

# **Intelligence Divisions:**

## **Anglo-American Cooperation, Rivalry and Legacy in Post-War Germany**

**Luke Daly-Groves**

A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

University of Leeds

School of History

September 2020

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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This work was supported by the Arts & Humanities Research Council (grant number AH/L503848/1) through the White Rose College of the Arts & Humanities.

## *Acknowledgements*

This four-year journey truly began with confirmation from the White Rose College of the Arts & Humanities (WROCAH) that I had been awarded an Arts and Humanities Research Council competition studentship. The support of WROCAH and its directors, Caryn Douglas, Clare Meadley and Professor Julian Richards has been crucial to me in pursuit of this research and I will forever be thankful to them. Equally vital and deserving of thanks has been the guidance and support of my supervisors, Professor Simon Ball and Dr Elisabeth Leake.

My colleagues at the University of Leeds, Dr Adam Richardson, Dr Alan MacLeod, Dr Alexander Shaw, Dr Lorna Waddington, Dr Matthew Frank, Dr Sean Fear, Emma Chippendale, Francesca Morphakis, Hayley Brindle, Iona McCleery, Joanna Philips, Professor Andrea Major, Professor Holger Afflerbach, Richard Borowski, Sarah Foster, Scott Ramsay, Sukhdeep Olak and Verity Bedford-Read have all helped in various ways towards the completion of this thesis and I would like to sincerely thank them, along with my colleagues within the WROCAH cohort, and wish them well with their future work.

The idea of researching the Intelligence Divisions (IDs) first came to me during my undergraduate studies while I was researching Adolf Hitler's death. I am therefore grateful to Dr Jonathan Colman, Dr Billy Frank, Dr David Stewart, Dr Philip Constable and the history team at the University of Central Lancashire (UCLan) who have continued to help with my research throughout my PhD studies. I am also grateful to my students at both UCLan and Leeds for engaging with me in discussion about my PhD research.

Outside of my home institutions, I am grateful for the valuable help of Ben Hodges, Dr Camilo Erlichman, Dr Thomas Kehoe, Guy Walters, Lee Richards and Professor Frank McDonough.

My research in the UK was aided by the staff at the National Archives and the Imperial War Museums, Salvatore Bellavia at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives in King's College London, Dr Patricia McGuire at King's College Archive Centre, Cambridge University and Rob McIntosh, Curator of the Museum of Military Medicine. Brenda and Mike have kindly welcomed me into their home in Surrey to conduct research for all three of my theses.

For helping my research in America, I owe thanks to Nazgol Ghandnoosh and her family along with Paul Brown, Eric S. Van Slander and the staff at NARA II.

In Germany, I was helped by Christoph Laue and Eckhard Möller of the *Verein für Herforder Geschichte* and all those, such as Michael Oldemeier, who attended my public lecture about the British ID and engaged with me afterwards to share their personal and family experiences of occupation and British intelligence. Silke Christen, her family, and friends Maria and Norman, were perfect, kind and knowledgeable hosts. In Heidelberg, I was aided by Philip and Emi, the staff at Heidelberg University library and the F+U Academy of Languages.

Eckhard introduced me to Dr Wolfgang Stedtfeld who worked for the British ID in the 1940s. Dr Stedtfeld engaged in detailed correspondence with me and shared his family papers. Similarly, Patrick Burns shared with me the papers of his father, who was a British ID officer. Colonel Miles Templer shared and discussed his father's private papers with me. Michael Glueck introduced me to Dr Bruce Haywood who engaged in many conversations with me about his time working with the Counter Intelligence Corps in 1940s Bremerhaven. Christopher Yates of the Intelligence Corps introduced me to AF Judge, Senior Researcher at the Military Intelligence Museum, Shefford and both shared their knowledge with me in a series of correspondence. I am thankful to them all.

My fiancée, family and friends have selflessly helped me in every way possible to complete this thesis. Works of this sort cannot be accomplished without sacrifices, both on the part of the author and indeed on the part of those who help. I therefore hope that the new knowledge provided in this thesis, and the path its completion may now enable me to take, will allow me to better help those who have helped me in their future endeavours and to make all who have accompanied me on this journey, proud.

## **Abstract**

This thesis provides the first comprehensive history of the British and American Intelligence Divisions in occupied Germany and the liaison between them. It argues that the Intelligence Divisions operated a largely harmonious secret system of rule which was the real backbone of the occupation and which largely explains its successful outcomes.

The secret system of rule functioned remarkably smoothly, primarily owing to the work of British and American Intelligence Liaison Officers. Through analysis of newly discovered and recently declassified documents, this thesis provides previously unachievable insights into their activities.

Unprecedented insight is also provided into the daily workings of Intelligence Division Headquarters and the regional intelligence officers they commanded in pursuit of their five-key military, scientific, security, political and state building secret intelligence tasks, each of which form the focus of a chapter.

Analysing such a broad range of intelligence work enables this thesis to reach general conclusions concerning the quality of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation throughout the occupation. However, the thesis also breaks new ground by making intelligence rivalry a key focus throughout and reaching general conclusions concerning its extent, causes and consequences.

This thesis conveys findings of importance for scholars of Anglo-American intelligence, the Cold War and post-war Germany. It argues that the Intelligence Divisions succeeded in destroying serious Nazi and Communist threats to the occupation and the West German Government, that they were vital to British and American policymakers in pursuit of the occupation and the Cold War, that they helped to prevent a military conflict with the Soviet Union, to build important elements of the modern German state and to shape post-1955 German international relations. Therefore, this thesis argues that the Intelligence Divisions were the most important instruments of occupation and that their key legacy is no less than the creation of an enduring democratic Germany.

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## *Abbreviations*

<b>ACoS</b>	<b>Assistant Chief of Staff</b>
<b>AIO</b>	<b>Area Intelligence Office/Officer [British]</b>
<b>ASAE</b>	<b>Army Security Agency, Europe [American]</b>
<b>BAOR</b>	<b>British Army of the Rhine</b>
<b>BfV</b>	<b><i>Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz</i> [German: Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution]</b>
<b>BGS</b>	<b><i>Bundesgrenzschutz</i> [German: Federal Border Guard]</b>
<b>BIO(G)</b>	<b>British Intelligence Organisation Germany</b>
<b>BIOS</b>	<b>British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee</b>
<b>BND</b>	<b><i>Bundesnachrichtendienst</i> [German: Federal Intelligence Service]</b>
<b>BRIXMIS</b>	<b>British Commander-in-Chief's Mission to the Soviet Forces in Germany</b>
<b>CAB</b>	<b>Cabinet Office [British]</b>
<b>CCG(BE)</b>	<b>Control Commission for Germany (British Element)</b>
<b>CCMS</b>	<b>Control Commission Military Section [British]</b>
<b>CIA</b>	<b>Central Intelligence Agency [American]</b>
<b>CIC</b>	<b>Counter Intelligence Corps [American]</b>
<b>CIOS</b>	<b>Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee [SHAEP]</b>
<b>CIS</b>	<b>Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service</b>
<b>DAD</b>	<b>Department of the Army Detachment [American]</b>
<b>DDID</b>	<b>Deputy Director Intelligence Division [American]</b>
<b>DID</b>	<b>Director Intelligence Division [American]</b>
<b>FBI</b>	<b>Federal Bureau of Investigation [American]</b>
<b>FDJ</b>	<b><i>Freie Deutsche Jugend</i> [German: Free German Youth]</b>
<b>FIAT</b>	<b>Field Information Agency Technical [Anglo-American]</b>
<b>FO</b>	<b>Foreign Office [British]</b>
<b>FRG</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>
<b>GDR</b>	<b>German Democratic Republic</b>
<b>Gestapo</b>	<b><i>Geheime Staatspolizei</i> [German: Secret State Police]</b>

<b>HICOG</b>	<b>High Commission for Germany</b>
<b>HJ</b>	<i>Hitler-Jugend</i> [German: Hitler Youth]
<b>IA&amp;C</b>	<b>Internal Affairs &amp; Communications Division [British]</b>
<b>IB</b>	<b>Intelligence Bureau [British]</b>
<b>ID EUCOM</b>	<b>Intelligence Division European Command [American]</b>
<b>ID USAREUR</b>	<b>Intelligence Division United States Army Europe</b>
<b>ID</b>	<b>Intelligence Division</b>
<b>IG</b>	<b>Intelligence Group [British]</b>
<b>IWM</b>	<b>Imperial War Museum [British]</b>
<b>JIB</b>	<b>Joint Intelligence Bureau [British]</b>
<b>JIC</b>	<b>Joint Intelligence Committee [British]</b>
<b>JIC(CCG)</b>	<b>Joint Intelligence Committee (Control Commission for Germany) [British]</b>
<b>JIC(G)</b>	<b>Joint Intelligence Committee (Germany) [British]</b>
<b>LHCMA</b>	<b>Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives [British]</b>
<b>MfS</b>	<b>Ministry for State Security [East German]</b>
<b>MGB</b>	<b>Ministry for State Security [Soviet]</b>
<b>MGI</b>	<b>Major-General Intelligence [British]</b>
<b>MI5</b>	<b>Security Service [British]</b>
<b>MI6</b>	<b>Secret Intelligence Service [British]</b>
<b>MINT</b>	<b>Military Intelligence</b>
<b>MVD</b>	<b>Ministry of Internal Affairs [Soviet]</b>
<b>NARA II</b>	<b>National Archives and Records Administration, Maryland [American]</b>
<b>NKGB</b>	<b>People's Commissariat for State Security [Soviet]</b>
<b>NKVD</b>	<b>People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs [Soviet]</b>
<b>No. 1 P&amp;EU</b>	<b>No. 1 Planning and Evaluation Unit [MI6 Germany Cover Name]</b>
<b>OB</b>	<b>Order of Battle</b>
<b>OMGUS</b>	<b>Office of Military Government United States</b>
<b>OSS</b>	<b>Office of Strategic Services [American]</b>
<b>PW</b>	<b>Prisoner of War</b>
<b>QIC</b>	<b>Quadripartite Intelligence Committee</b>

<b>RG</b>	<b>Record Group</b>
<b>RIO</b>	<b>Regional Intelligence Office/Officer [British]</b>
<b>RIS</b>	<b>Russian Intelligence Service</b>
<b>SCAEF</b>	<b>Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force</b>
<b>SCINT</b>	<b>Scientific and Technical Intelligence</b>
<b>SHAEF</b>	<b>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force</b>
<b>SMERSH</b>	<b>Soviet Counterintelligence; literally ‘Death to Spies’</b>
<b>SOE</b>	<b>Special Operations Executive [British]</b>
<b>SS</b>	<b><i>Schutzstaffel</i> [German: Protection Squadron]</b>
<b>Stasi</b>	<b>Ministry for State Security [East German]</b>
<b>STIB</b>	<b>Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch [British]</b>
<b>TIB</b>	<b>Technical Intelligence Branch [American]</b>
<b>TICOM</b>	<b>Target Intelligence Committee [Anglo-American]</b>
<b>TNA</b>	<b>The National Archives, Kew [British]</b>
<b>USAFE</b>	<b>United States Air Forces Europe</b>
<b>USFET</b>	<b>United States Forces European Theatre</b>
<b>USMA</b>	<b>United States Military Attaché</b>
<b>WO</b>	<b>War Office [British]</b>
<b>21 AGP</b>	<b>21<sup>st</sup> Army Group [British]</b>



# Introduction

## I A Hidden History

‘These agents are used to being called everything from War Department employees to FBI operatives, but...theirs is the most interesting job in the American Zone...’

- *New York Herald Tribune*, 1947.<sup>1</sup>

‘Mr Ryan seems confused about the working relationship between CIC and the Intelligence Division of EUCOM. Indeed, there is no evidence that he ever explored the matter...Intelligence Division bore full responsibility for the withholding of Barbie from the French and for his ultimate escape through the rat line.’

- Earl S. Browning Jr., former Counter Intelligence Corps Commander, 1988.<sup>2</sup>

In 2018, just outside the historic German town centre of Herford, in the former British occupation zone of North Rhein-Westphalia, a British military base named Wentworth Barracks lay abandoned. Some of the buildings were in disrepair, weeds grew between most blocks and through the windows of others. The site was being converted into teaching rooms and student accommodation. Prior to a public lecture given by the author, many local people and even local historians were unaware that the unassuming Block C which lay vacant and indistinguishable amongst the others, was once the home of the British Intelligence Division (ID) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (Germany) (JIC(G)).<sup>3</sup> Indeed, the British head of MI6 in Germany would often travel to Block C from neighbouring Bad Salzuflen to take part in JIC(G) meetings.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, just outside the beautiful city centre of Heidelberg, in the former American occupation zone, lay Campbell Barracks. Behind the eagles clutching hacked away swastikas,

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<sup>1</sup> National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (NARA II), RG319, UD1075, Box 28, 26861603, Extract from *New York Herald Tribune* (07/03/1947).

<sup>2</sup> Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, *America's Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps* (London: Fontana, 1990), pp. 381-382.

<sup>3</sup> Jan Gruhn, ‘Arbeitete hier der britische Geheimdienst?’, *Westfalen-Blatt* (07/07/2018), <https://www.westfalen-blatt.de/OWL/Kreis-Herford/Herford/3380477-Forscher-Herford-nach-Krieg-so-wichtig-wie-Berlin-mit-Video-Arbeitete-hier-der-britische-Geheimdienst> [Accessed: 11/05/2020]. See also Anonymous, ‘Die Schlapphüte ihrer majestät’, *Neue Westfälische* (21/06/2018), [https://www.geschichtsverein-herford.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/presseartikel/neue\\_westf%C3%A4lische/NW\\_21.06.2018\\_Daly\\_Groves.pdf](https://www.geschichtsverein-herford.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presseartikel/neue_westf%C3%A4lische/NW_21.06.2018_Daly_Groves.pdf) [Accessed: 11/05/2020]; Luke Daly-Groves, ‘Sharing Secrets: An Unforgettable KEP Experience in Germany’ (16/07/2018), <https://wrocah.ac.uk/sharing-secrets-an-unforgettable-kep-experience-in-germany-by-luke-daly-groves/> [Accessed: 16/07/2018].

<sup>4</sup> For example see The National Archives, Kew (TNA), DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 72<sup>nd</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (04/03/1949). See also Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949* (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), pp. 664-665, 668.

in front of the etchings of Wehrmacht soldiers, building number 5, once home to the American Intelligence Division, still stood - awaiting its conversion into student accommodation.<sup>5</sup> For many years, these buildings were the focal point of Anglo-American intelligence liaison in occupied Germany and they were at times, more so than Berlin, at the centre of the Cold War and the post-war fight against a Nazi revival. They were, as this thesis will argue, the nexus of a secret system of rule which was the real backbone of the British and American occupation of Germany. Yet they are barely mentioned in the current historiography and far too little is known about the Intelligence Divisions (IDs) they once housed.

Prior to this thesis, there existed nothing resembling a comprehensive history, organisational or otherwise, of the British and American Intelligence Divisions or of Anglo-American intelligence liaison in occupied Germany. Despite at times being larger than more well-known and studied intelligence organisations such as MI5, MI6 and the CIA, the IDs have hitherto remained one of the most secret and misunderstood elements of even the secret histories of America, Britain and Germany.<sup>6</sup> Their activities received some mention in newspapers in the 1940s, but the name Intelligence Division was rarely printed. Vaguer references to 'British and American intelligence' instead predominated.<sup>7</sup> This secrecy at times even irritated some of those working in MI5 who worried that they would be blamed for and associated with some of the errors made by their ID colleagues in Germany.<sup>8</sup>

A notable exception was published in 1956, in the third edition of Hugh Trevor-Roper's *Last Days of Hitler* where he acknowledged that his report on Hitler's death 'was submitted by the Intelligence Division in Berlin...to the Quadripartite Intelligence Committee'.<sup>9</sup> But what exactly the ID was is not explained. This was also the case in the 1959 memoirs of Ivone Kirkpatrick, the former British High Commissioner of Germany, in which the ID is mentioned only once in a list of departments

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<sup>5</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, D.W. Glenn, Chief, Control Branch, ID EUCOM to COMP, 'Incl, Listing dtd 14 Nov 1951', Restricted (03/01/1952).

<sup>6</sup> Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 181.

<sup>7</sup> This is evidenced by a collection of British newspaper cuttings collected by the first Chief of the British ID concerning Operation Selection Board. See Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), Kings College London, Private Papers of Major-General John Sydney Lethbridge.

<sup>8</sup> TNA, KV4/469, Guy Liddell's Diaries (18/12/1947).

<sup>9</sup> Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler* (London: Pan Books, 2002), p. XXVII.

without further explanation.<sup>10</sup> These memoirs discuss one of the most important intelligence operations (Terminus) carried out by the ID's successor, the British Intelligence Organisation Germany (BIO(G)), but that organisation is not named.<sup>11</sup> Even in memoirs written by influential British intelligence officers with close links to intelligence in Germany such as those penned by Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong in 1968, the IDs go unmentioned.<sup>12</sup> An edited collection entitled *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* published in 1987 did feature a contribution from John Bruce Lockhart.<sup>13</sup> Lockhart was the former head of MI6 in Germany and, as this thesis will further reveal, he had a very close relationship with the ID.<sup>14</sup> Although Lockhart's essay provided useful, revealing and relevant information on the central political and security functions of secret intelligence work, the IDs again went unmentioned.<sup>15</sup>

Similarly, no clear mention was made of the Intelligence Division European Command (ID EUCOM) and its successor ID USAREUR (United States Army Europe) in Professor Harold Zink's lengthy 1957 study of the American occupation, despite its impressive scope and his role as the former Chief Historian of the US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG).<sup>16</sup> Brief mention is made of HICOG's Office of Intelligence although classified files prevented in-depth analysis and Zink himself seems to have known little of their operations at the time.<sup>17</sup> Of more (but still limited) interest to Zink were the denazifying exploits of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the US Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC).<sup>18</sup> But even published and unpublished memoirs written by CIC agents, those who worked with them, and other intelligence officers who worked in occupied Germany, do not mention the IDs.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, the IDs, their predecessor and successor organisations, are not a key focus of any published memoirs.

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<sup>10</sup> Ivone Kirkpatrick, *The Inner Circle* (London: Macmillan, 1959), p. 219.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 252-255.

<sup>12</sup> Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence At The Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer* (London: Cassell, 1969).

<sup>13</sup> John Bruce Lockhart, 'Intelligence: a British View' in K.G. Robertson (ed), *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 37-52.

<sup>14</sup> Jeffery, *MI6*, p. 668. See also Luke Daly-Groves, 'The Intelligence Division in Occupied Germany: The Untold Story of Britain's Largest Secret Intelligence Organisation', *Journal of Intelligence History*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2019), pp. 93, 104.

<sup>15</sup> Lockhart in Robertson (ed), *Approaches to Intelligence*, pp. 37-38, 44, 51.

<sup>16</sup> An Office of Military Government United States (OMGUS) and Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) Intelligence Division with regional branches is listed but its functions are barely explored and its relations to ID EUCOM and ID USAREUR unmentioned see Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany 1944-1955* (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957), pp. III, 33, 69, 62.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 60.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152, 159.

<sup>19</sup> Ib Melchior briefly mentions the commanding role of the ID's predecessor, G-2 United States Forces European Theatre (USFET) in *Case By Case: A U.S. Army Counterintelligence Agent in World War II* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1993), p. 247.

The IDs were also absent from much of the fruitful literature concerning Anglo-American intelligence liaison which bloomed in the late twentieth century owing to the international declassification of secret intelligence documents following the end of the Cold War.<sup>20</sup> The main exceptions to the rule of ignoring the Intelligence Divisions have been Richard Aldrich and Paul Maddrell. In 2001, Aldrich published the first focused and almost comparative analysis of the British and American Intelligence Divisions, although the latter organisation is not named as such.<sup>21</sup> However, this influential but brief analysis was hobbled by its lack of access to primary source material. As Aldrich commented, ‘the main body of ID files has been completely destroyed’, making it difficult to document ‘the history of this large organisation’.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, the files of ‘its main American collaborator, the Deputy Director of Intelligence [DDI] at EUCOM HQ’ were reported missing.<sup>23</sup>

According to Aldrich, Maddrell’s book, *Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961* provides ‘the best account’ of the British ID.<sup>24</sup> Maddrell analysed the ID through detailed studies of files produced by its Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch (STIB).<sup>25</sup> However, Maddrell’s focus on scientific and technical intelligence (SCINT) and his lack of consultation with documents at the US National Archives (entirely absent from his book) has produced a particular perspective.<sup>26</sup> For example, Maddrell’s focus on cooperation resulted in an overemphasis on the openness of Anglo-American intelligence sharing and the quality of wider western intelligence

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G-2 USFET is unmentioned in Arthur D. Kahn’s *Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the Turnabout, Anti-Nazi War to Cold War, 1944-1946* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004) which documents his service in OSS, the OMGUS Information and Control Division (ICD) and his occasional work with the CIC, see pp. ix, 52-53, 63, 65, 95.

As a member of the British Army’s Intelligence Corps, Bruce Haywood worked with a British ID controlled Area Intelligence Office (AIO) and with the CIC in Bremerhaven, but his excellent memoirs *Bremerhaven: A Memoir of Germany, 1945-1947* (editandpublishyourbook.com: 2010), do not mention the IDs. Archived in the Imperial War Museum, London (IWM), Major Patrick D. Cummins’ memoirs mention his work with a variety of ‘intelligence services’ in occupied Germany but never specify the ID or its predecessor. Similarly, the IWM housed memoirs of John Rhys document his work for the Planning and Intelligence Section of the British Control Commission for Germany (CCG) but do not mention the IDs.

<sup>20</sup> Christopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy (eds), *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp. 1-2, 7.

<sup>21</sup> Aldrich, *Hidden*, p. 182.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Intelligence within BAOR and NATO’s Northern Army Group’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2008), p. 97.

<sup>25</sup> Paul Maddrell, *Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany 1945-1961* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 7. See also Paul Maddrell, ‘British-American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration During the Occupation of Germany’, *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2000), pp. 74-75; Paul Maddrell, ‘Die West-Geheimdienste und die Flüchtlinge aus Ostdeutschland: Nachrichtendienstarbeit im ‘goldenen Zeitalter’ der Spionage (1945-1965)’, *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (2016), p. 129.

<sup>26</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, pp. XIII, 1.

collaboration, as this thesis will demonstrate.<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, Maddrell's conclusions concerning the 'ebb and flow' nature of Anglo-American intelligence liaison underestimated the uninterrupted continuation of the USLO-BLO (United States Liaison Officer and British Liaison Officer) system of liaison which is explored in detail in this thesis.<sup>28</sup> Although Maddrell does briefly mention Liaison Officers at Heidelberg and Herford (the latter unspecified), his perspective on the system of liaison within which these officers operated is severely limited, owing to his lack of reference to US files.<sup>29</sup> The absence of US ID evidence also resulted in Maddrell largely overlooking the relations between STIB and their key American counterpart in favour of emphasis on the CIA.<sup>30</sup>

Maddrell's focus on scientific intelligence has resulted in a general overemphasis of the importance of the ID's SCINT work in occupied Germany in comparison with its other functions. Drawing largely on Maddrell's works, Aldrich went so far as to suggest that STIB 'was perhaps the most important intelligence unit within the Intelligence Division'.<sup>31</sup> This argument is strongly challenged by the evidence concerning the ID's security and political intelligence work presented in this thesis.

The assumption that Aldrich and Maddrell had covered the ID in the early 2000s has been allowed to stand, even as the study of British intelligence, even in Germany, has moved on apace.<sup>32</sup> However, the absence of explicit mention of the Intelligence Divisions and the liaison between them is even more striking in publications discussing American intelligence in occupied Germany. In 2013, Thomas Boghardt published an excellent article concerning American security intelligence operations in occupied Germany in which he expressed understandable bewilderment at the historiographical emphasis on CIA and OSS history leaving the more important work of US military intelligence

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid, pp. 9, 82-83. See also Maddrell, 'British-American', p. 84.

<sup>28</sup> Maddrell, 'British-American', p. 88.

<sup>29</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 83. See also Maddrell, 'British-American', p. 83. Other brief mentions include Richard J. Aldrich, 'British intelligence and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' during the Cold War', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1998), p. 338 and Aldrich, *Hidden*, p. 413.

<sup>30</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 7. See also Maddrell, 'British-American', pp. 83-84.

<sup>31</sup> Aldrich, 'BAOR', p. 103.

<sup>32</sup> The IDs are not mentioned in Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Allen Lane, 2009); Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac, *The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers* (London: William Collins, 2016); Daniel W.B. Lomas, *Intelligence, Security and the Attlee Governments* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017); Kevin P. Riehle, 'Early Cold War Evolution of British and US Defector Policy and Practice', *Cold War History*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2019), pp. 343-361.

underexplored.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, the IDs go unmentioned throughout Tim Weiner's influential history of the CIA, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones history of the FBI and Christopher Andrew's broader analysis of secret intelligence and the American presidency.<sup>34</sup> Boghardt's work usefully acknowledges the dual threat from Communist and Nazi subversion which engaged American military intelligence agents in the early years of occupation.<sup>35</sup> But whilst acknowledging that the US Army's military intelligence organisations successfully accomplished their missions in tackling these threats, Boghardt barely explores how important British collaboration was to ensuring this outcome, referring only once to 'British intelligence'.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, although Boghardt highlights the difficulties in documenting the exact structure of US Army intelligence in post-war Germany owing to its frequent reorganisations: his analysis ends in 1947, when G-2 United States Forces European Theatre (G-2 USFET) became ID EUCOM.<sup>37</sup>

Even Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting's useful narrative history of the CIC is patchy and somewhat confused when it comes to discussing who 'masterminded' CIC operations, initially attributing this to the 'Operations Officer' in EUCOM Headquarters without explicitly mentioning the Intelligence Division within.<sup>38</sup> The commanding role of ID EUCOM later receives a brief mention but only in the unfairly negative context of the CIC wishing to pin blame on the ID for their continued employment of a notorious Nazi war criminal, Klaus Barbie.<sup>39</sup> Sayer and Botting briefly refer to MI5 and MI6, but never the British ID.<sup>40</sup>

The previous lack of access to primary sources and their poor labelling has certainly been a factor in the tendency to overlook the Intelligence Divisions and the liaison between them. Since 2001,

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<sup>33</sup> Thomas Boghardt, 'America's Secret Vanguard: US Army Intelligence Operations in Germany, 1944-47', *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 57, No. 2 (2013), pp. 1, 14.

<sup>34</sup> Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (London: Penguin, 2008). See also Nicholas Dujmovic in Moran and Murphy (eds), *Intelligence Studies*, pp. 90-94; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The FBI: A History* (Connecticut: Yale University Press: 2007); Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: HarperCollins, 1995).

<sup>35</sup> Boghardt, 'Vanguard', pp. 2-3, 8-9, 13.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 6, 13-14.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, p. 3.

<sup>38</sup> Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, pp. 273-274. Later brief mention is made of the Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI), the Director of Intelligence (DI) and Operations Branch EUCOM concerning the Hitler's death investigations, but the ID the former commanded and the latter belonged to is initially and confusingly unmentioned, pp. 310-312, 321.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, p. 328.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, p. 318.

however, thousands of documents have been discovered.<sup>41</sup> With the declassification of British Foreign Office and War Office files in the last two decades, it has become evident that Aldrich somewhat overestimated the destruction of ID files.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, an overwhelming number of files produced by the British ID, sent from Germany to government departments in London, have survived and have filtered into the National Archives at Kew (TNA).<sup>43</sup> Similarly, the present author has discovered a vast array of ID EUCOM files at the National Archives and Records Administration II in Maryland (NARA II).<sup>44</sup>

An equally important explanation for the IDs' undue obscurity is historiographical emphasis on the Cold War in Germany.<sup>45</sup> When it comes to analysing Anglo-American intelligence work, scholars have overwhelmingly focused on the one German city which was divided into four sectors by the occupying powers, Berlin. A key text in this regard published in 1997, was Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey's *Battleground Berlin*.<sup>46</sup> This book provided useful and, as of then unprecedented insight, into CIA activities in Berlin notably concluding that 'Intelligence played a key role in determining each side's position' during the Berlin Blockade crisis.<sup>47</sup> But this emphasis on the CIA again came at the expense of the Intelligence Divisions who are not listed as 'key players' or explicitly mentioned throughout, despite their considerable role in the Blockade crisis which will be revealed in this thesis.<sup>48</sup> This focus on Berlin was further cemented in September 1999 when the CIA hosted its first public conference abroad in the city.<sup>49</sup> Through the testimonies of former OSS and CIA officers in attendance, the conference helped to reveal more about the broad range of intelligence work (encompassing security, political, scientific and military intelligence tasks) which they undertook in post-war Berlin.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Division', pp. 86, 88-89. See also Luke Daly-Groves, 'Control Not Morality? Explaining the Selective Employment of Nazi War criminals by British and American Intelligence Agencies in Occupied Germany', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2020), pp. 331, 333.

<sup>42</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Division', pp. 88-89, 106.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Control', pp. 331, 333-334.

<sup>45</sup> Richard J. Aldrich (ed), *British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51* (Oxon: Routledge, 1992), p. 26. See also Holger Afflerbach in Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach (eds), *Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918-1989* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), p. 209; Donald P. Steury, 'On the Front Lines of the Cold War: The Intelligence War in Berlin', *Conference in Germany* (10-12/09/1999); Aldrich, *Hidden*, pp. 179-180; David Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 285; Maddrell, *Science*, p. 121.

<sup>46</sup> David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War* (London: Yale University Press, 1997).

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 51.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, pp. xv-xvi.

<sup>49</sup> Steury, 'Berlin'. p. 1.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, pp. 5-6.

But the extent to which such work in Berlin was reflective (or not) of intelligence tasks carried out elsewhere in Germany and their interrelation was not emphasised in the conference overview. Otis C. Mitchell added to this scholarly trend with his book *Cold War in Germany* which again focused predominantly on Berlin and the CIA when discussing Anglo-American intelligence.<sup>51</sup> Even Maddrell's compartmentalised analysis of the ID is further narrowed by a focus on Berlin as 'the operational capital of Cold War espionage'.<sup>52</sup>

Adding to this historiographical emphasis on the Cold War and Berlin have been works focusing on the British Commander-in-Chief's Mission to the Soviet Forces in Germany (BRIXMIS) which had its main office in West Berlin.<sup>53</sup> These small units were tasked primarily with collecting military intelligence from behind the Iron Curtain although their official duties, as formally confirmed by the Robertson-Malinin agreement of 1946, were that of liaison in East Germany.<sup>54</sup> The endurance of the BRIXMIS mission, ending only in 1990 after German reunification, has helped to make both it and Berlin continuing objects of fascination for scholars in contrast to the comparatively shorter-lived exploits of the IDs.<sup>55</sup> Works discussing BRIXMIS are commendable for highlighting the importance of military intelligence to the Cold War.<sup>56</sup> But works on BRIXMIS have also arguably helped to further obscure the military role of the Intelligence Divisions and accentuate the focus on Berlin, at the expense of ID headquarters and their operations deeper within the western zones.

The aforementioned historiographical trends have also helped to obscure the crucially important role which the British and American Intelligence Divisions fulfilled in the occupation of Germany. Publications concerning the occupation constitute a rich historiography, ranging from

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<sup>51</sup> Otis C. Mitchell, *The Cold War in Germany: Overview, Origins, and Intelligence Wars* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2005), pp. 185-198.

<sup>52</sup> Lukas Nievoll, 'Intelligence and Legitimacy in Cold War Germany: Between Friends, Foes, And Files', *Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2015), p. 65. See also Benjamin B. Fischer, 'Their Germans and Ours', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2008), p. 590.

<sup>53</sup> Tony Geraghty, *BRIXMIS: The Untold Exploits of Britain's Most Daring Cold War Spy Mission* (London: Harper Collins, 1997), pp. 3, 12. See also Aldrich, 'BAOR', p. 103.

<sup>54</sup> Geraghty, *BRIXMIS*, pp. 3,9. See also Steve Gibson, *BRIXMIS: The Last Cold War Mission* (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2018), p. 11; Aldrich, 'BAOR', p. 104.

<sup>55</sup> Gibson, *BRIXMIS*, p. 10. See also Geraghty, *BRIXMIS*, p. 3.

<sup>56</sup> Geraghty, *BRIXMIS*, p. 15. See also Aldrich, 'BAOR', pp. 104-105.



specialist texts to broad general overviews.<sup>57</sup> Common to several is a focus on the key occupation aims which were outlined by the Allies at the Potsdam Conference in July-August 1945.<sup>58</sup> These aims have been usefully summarised as the ‘four Ds’ (democratisation, denazification, demilitarisation and decentralisation).<sup>59</sup> Studies concerning denazification have drawn generally negative conclusions with Perry Biddiscombe noting that ‘...denazification failed. Nearly all historians have arrived at the same conclusion’.<sup>60</sup> Likewise, detailed studies of democratisation undertaken by historians such as Barbara Marshall have tended to emphasise German agency, rather than that of the occupiers.<sup>61</sup> John E. Farquharson went as far as to suggest that the British presided over ‘a badly managed disaster area’.<sup>62</sup> Such perceptions mirror that of some contemporary observers who referred to the British Control Commission for Germany (CCG) as ‘Complete Chaos Guaranteed’.<sup>63</sup> But the IDs go unmentioned throughout several histories of the occupation.<sup>64</sup> On rare occasions they are mentioned only briefly and, owing to the lack of knowledge of these organisations, sometimes inaccurately and usually negatively.<sup>65</sup>

By contrast, Camilo Erlichman’s award-winning 2015 thesis usefully changed the direction of occupation studies by analysing ‘occupation as a system of rule’ and shifting focus away from broad Allied policy schemes to ‘less visible patterns of rule’.<sup>66</sup> But even Erlichman’s thesis barely mentions the IDs despite his recognition that the ‘extensive system of surveillance of civil correspondence and telecommunications’ was an important element of the system the British imposed on Germany.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Camilo Erlichman, ‘Strategies of Rule: Cooperation and Conflict in the British Zone of Germany, 1945–1949’, PhD Thesis (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2015), p. 19. See also Walter M. Hudson, *Army Diplomacy: American Military Occupation and Foreign Policy after World War II* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> Erlichman, ‘Rule’, p. 17. See also Camilo Erlichman and Christopher Knowles (eds), *Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany: Politics, Everyday Life and Social Interactions, 1945-55* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), p. 7.

<sup>59</sup> Erlichman, ‘Rule’, pp. 13-14. See also Erlichman and Knowles (eds), *Occupation*, p. 7.

<sup>60</sup> Perry Biddiscombe, *The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950* (Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2007), p. 217. Such conclusions contrast with earlier and largely self-congratulatory works penned by officials who worked in occupied Germany, see Erlichman, ‘Rule’, pp. 19-20.

<sup>61</sup> Barbara Marshall in Ian D. Turner (ed), *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1989), pp. 109, 202, 204-205. See also Erlichman, ‘Rule’, p. 20; Biddiscombe, *Denazification*, pp. 218-219.

<sup>62</sup> John E. Farquharson, ‘The British Occupation of Germany 1945-6: A Badly Managed Disaster Area?’, *German History*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1993), pp. 316-317.

<sup>63</sup> Patricia Meehan, *A Strange Enemy People: Germans under the British, 1945–1950* (London: Peter Owen, 2001), p. 53.

<sup>64</sup> Giles MacDonogh, *After the Reich: From the Fall of Vienna to the Berlin Airlift* (London: John Murray, 2007). See also Frederick Taylor, *Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012); Lee Kruger, *Logistics Matters and The U.S. Army in Occupied Germany: 1945-1949* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Thomas J. Kehoe, *The Art of Occupation: Crime and Governance in American-Controlled Germany, 1944–1949* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2019).

<sup>65</sup> For example, see Meehan, *Strange*, pp. 78-87.

<sup>66</sup> Erlichman, ‘Rule’, pp. 14, 17, 27. See also Erlichman and Knowles (eds), *Occupation*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>67</sup> Erlichman, ‘Rule’, p. 37.

Erlichman's analysis, like other recent studies of occupation, ends in 1949. That year, the occupation statute changed the nature of occupation from one of more overtly intrusive military style rule undertaken by Military Governors to one of deceptively less intrusive civilian direction, embodied in the Allied High Commission.<sup>68</sup> This, of course, was also the year in which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) were established.<sup>69</sup> But West Germany was not yet fully sovereign as much of its internal affairs were still subject to intrusion by the occupying powers until the ratification of long-discussed treaties in 1955 formally ended the occupation.<sup>70</sup> This tendency to end analyses of the occupation in 1949 has undoubtedly helped to further obscure the importance of Anglo-American ID work which continued despite the overt change in occupation status.

Erlichman's more recent edited collection *Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany* confines its main analysis of secret intelligence work in those zones to exploring the employment of 'ex' Nazis by western intelligence agencies, thereby contributing to another historiographical trend which has helped to obscure the crucial and more positive roles which the IDs played in the occupation of Germany.<sup>71</sup> Indeed, repeated case studies discussing the employment of 'ex' Nazi scientists under the American directed Operation Paperclip and the similar British directed Operation Matchbox have accompanied and complemented a reluctance, which Biddiscombe suggests was inspired by 'modern German sensibilities', to focus on the serious threat to democracy at times posed by Nazi and Neo-Nazi movements in occupied Germany.<sup>72</sup> Instead, when discussing Nazis and secret intelligence in postwar Germany, historiographical attention has overwhelmingly focused on the Anglo-American employment of 'ex' Nazis and war criminals, as scientists and researchers, or as

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<sup>68</sup> Kirkpatrick, *Circle*, p. 216. See also Kehoe, *Occupation*, pp. 193-194; Kruger, *Occupied*, p. 174; Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, *The Fourth Reich: The Specter of Nazism from World War II to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 108.

<sup>69</sup> Sabine Lee, *Victory in Europe: Britain and Germany Since 1945* (London: Longman, 2001), p. 44.

<sup>70</sup> Kirkpatrick, *Circle*, pp. 216-219; Kehoe, *Occupation*, pp. 193-194; Lee, *Germany*, pp. 44, 61-63, 71; Zink, *Germany*, pp. 54-55; Rosenfeld, *Reich*, p. 108.

<sup>71</sup> Michael Wala in Erlichman and Knowles (eds), *Occupation*, pp. 271-281. See also Michael Salter, 'The Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals and the OSS: The Need For a New Research Agenda', *Journal of Intelligence History*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), pp. 77-78. 'Ex' Nazis refers to the fact that not all of those employed abandoned their Nazi beliefs.

<sup>72</sup> Perry Biddiscombe, 'Operation Selection Board: The Growth and Suppression of the Neo-Nazi 'Deutsche Revolution' 1945-47', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1996), p. 59. See also Annie Jacobsen, *Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program That Brought Nazi Scientists To America* (New York: Little Brown, 2014); Maddrell, *Science*, pp. 32, 35; Rosenfeld, *Reich*, pp. 3, 5, 11, 79, 86, 104-105.

informers and intelligence officers, with later roles in the new German intelligence services the occupiers helped to build, the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND) and the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (BfV).<sup>73</sup>

Anglo-American intelligence have therefore been subjected to much moral criticism while discussions of Nazis in occupied Germany have largely focused on those ex-Nazis who willingly operated within the parameters of a democratic German state.<sup>74</sup> The absence of a detailed understanding of the IDs and the anti-Nazi operations they undertook in histories of the occupation has therefore complemented West Germany's much studied foundation myths which deemphasise the Allied contributions to post-war successes and emphasise the publicly persistent idea of 'Zero Hour' with its questionable implication that the crushing defeat of 1945 was enough to bring Nazism to an end in Germany.<sup>75</sup>

Although anti-Nazi secret intelligence operations are largely absent from histories of the occupation, some are addressed in more specialised works such as Norbert Frei's *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration* in which he acknowledges that Werner Naumann's attempt at a Nazi revival in 1953 was 'destroyed by the British'.<sup>76</sup> Frei's book also critiqued the concept of Zero Hour and 'a widespread tendency by historians to overemphasize the free creative space enjoyed by the Germans' during the semi-sovereign years of Adenauer's rule.<sup>77</sup> But the fact, as

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<sup>73</sup> Linda Hunt, 'U.S. coverup of Nazi scientists', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1985), pp. 16-24. See also John Gimbel, 'German Scientists, United States Denazification Policy, and the 'Paperclip Conspiracy'', *The International History Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1990), pp. 441-465; Maddrell, *Science*, pp. 32, 35; Jens Wegener, 'Shaping Germany's Post-War Intelligence Service: The Gehlen Organization, the U.S. Army, and Central Intelligence, 1945-1949', *Journal of Intelligence History*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2007), pp. 41-59; Stephen Tyas, 'Smoke and Mirrors: The German Foreign Intelligence Service's Release of Names of Former Nazi Employees', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2011), pp. 290-299; Stephen Tyas, 'Ghosts From The Past. Nazi War Criminals Recruited By Great Britain's Secret Intelligence Service', *Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2012), pp. 62-79; Thomas Boghardt, Review: 'Constantin Goschler and Michael Wala, "Keine Neue Gestapo": Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2015)', *Journal of Intelligence History*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2017), pp. 63-65; Thomas Boghardt, 'Dirty Work? The Use of Nazi Informants by U.S. Army Intelligence in Postwar Europe', *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 79, No. 2 (2015), pp. 387-422.

<sup>74</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Control', p. 332. See also Hunt, 'Nazi', p. 24; Tyas, 'Smoke', p. 297.

<sup>75</sup> Peter C. Caldwell and Karrin Hanshew, *Germany Since 1945: Politics, Culture, and Society* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), pp. 1-2, 13. See also Laura J. Hilton, 'The Black Market in History and Memory: German Perceptions of Victimhood from 1945 to 1948', *German History*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2010), pp. 480-482, 496; Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration* (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. IX; Mark Hallam, 'May 8, 1945, was 'zero hour' for Germany in multiple ways', *Deutsche Welle* (08/05/2020), <https://p.dw.com/p/3brSG> [Accessed: 05/06/2020]; Otto Langels, 'Der Mythos der „Stunde Null“', *Deutschlandfunk* (07/05/2020), [https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/75-jahre-kapitulation-des-ns-regimes-der-mythos-der-stunde.724.de.html?dram:article\\_id=476262](https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/75-jahre-kapitulation-des-ns-regimes-der-mythos-der-stunde.724.de.html?dram:article_id=476262) [Accessed: 05/06/2020].

<sup>76</sup> Frei, *Germany*, p. 299. See also Rosenfeld, *Reich*, pp. 79, 86, 104-105.

<sup>77</sup> Frei, *Germany*, pp. ix, 306.

Katharina Stengel points out, that the Naumann affair is now the most well-known attempt at Nazi revival in Germany has perhaps contributed to the tendency of scholars to argue that the threat posed by such movements was exaggerated by British intelligence.<sup>78</sup> A broader understanding of ID threat perceptions in the context of their overall occupation duties and past experiences with Nazi revival attempts is surely needed before drawing such conclusions.

There are some studies that focus on earlier Allied intelligence operations such as Nursery and Selection Board which destroyed post-war Nazi and Neo-Nazi movements before the Naumann affair. But such case studies are not without issue. For example, Scott Andrew Selby's history of Operation Nursery tends to downplay the importance of Anglo-American liaison as his focus is overwhelmingly on the CIC.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, Biddiscombe's analysis of Operation Selection Board only mentions the ID in endnotes.<sup>80</sup> Most recently, Gavriel Rosenfeld has explored the concept of 'The Fourth Reich'. Engaging primarily in secondary source and newspaper analysis, he usefully argued that Nursery, Selection Board and (to a lesser extent) Terminus neutralised serious threats to democracy, unjustifiably overlooked by most scholars.<sup>81</sup> However, his book does not mention the IDs or the BIO(G).

Perhaps most importantly, a lack of knowledge concerning the daily work undertaken by the IDs and the missions they pursued has resulted in a rather fragmented historiography in which anti-Nazi operations cannot be appropriately placed into wider contexts or easily reconciled with the Allied recruitment of 'ex' Nazi war criminals in secret intelligence work, especially anti-Communist work. The enhanced knowledge of the missions pursued and the routine work undertaken by the IDs provided by this thesis will demonstrate how the IDs' struggle against both Nazis and Communists and their recruitment of 'ex' Nazis formed part of a secret system of rule in which security and control were consistently paramount considerations.

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<sup>78</sup> Katharina Stengel, Review: 'Günter J. Trittel, "Man kann ein Ideal nicht verraten ...": Werner Naumann – NS-Ideologie und politische Praxis in der frühen Bundesrepublik (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013), *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, Vol. 63, No. 6 (2015), pp. 592, 594. See also Aldrich, *Hidden*, p. 183; Rosenfeld, *Reich*, pp. 130, 138, 141.

<sup>79</sup> Scott Andrew Selby, *The Axmann Conspiracy: The Nazi Plan for a Fourth Reich and How the U.S. Army Defeated It* (New York: Berkley, 2012). See also Daly-Groves, 'Division', p. 97.

<sup>80</sup> Biddiscombe, 'Selection', pp. 76-77.

<sup>81</sup> Rosenfeld, *Reich*, pp. XI, 3, 5, 11, 76, 79, 86, 104-105, 142, 156.

Owing to the gaps in knowledge and interpretation outlined above, this thesis claims to be the most comprehensive history of Anglo-American intelligence collaboration in occupied Germany and of the Intelligence Divisions which undertook most of that collaboration. In line with recent studies of intelligence, it puts intelligence agencies in their proper historical context rather than automatically prioritising organisations that remain influential today.

Building on the works of Erlichman, the thesis also fills a significant gap in understanding of the occupation of Germany. The thesis argues that the IDs operated a secret system of rule which was not only the most crucial element of the system identified by Erlichman but also a system in its own right, exhibiting independence from military government officials on matters such as denazification and at times diverging from military government policy.<sup>82</sup> Its existence is most apparent in the IDs' closely linked security and political intelligence activities which involved not only informing and advising British and American policymakers but also almost unlimited powers of arrest, surveillance and various forms of substantial interference in German society, politics and economics which significantly influenced the course and outcome of the occupation.

Analysis of the missions pursued by the IDs, their predecessors and successors, also enables this thesis to place the plethora of case studies analysing different aspects of ID work or focusing on broad themes such as the Cold War into a single analysis, thereby providing a less skewed understanding of the work these organisations pursued and the legacies they left behind. In doing so, the thesis complements recent German-language studies which seek to broaden understanding of intelligence work in post-war Germany and it helps to further puncture the foundation myths of West Germany.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> The recruitment of Nazi war criminals provides an example of this, see Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 325.

<sup>83</sup> Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, 'The History of the West-German Intelligence Service (BND) between 1945 and 1968', <https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/projekte/the-history-of-the-west-german-intelligence-service-bnd-between-1945-and-1968> [Accessed: 13/05/2020].

## II Secret Sources and Overt Methods

This thesis is based largely on 49 boxes of documents, produced primarily by the American ID in Germany between 1947-1952, labelled 'general correspondence' and now housed at NARA II.<sup>84</sup> The vast majority of this material is completely new to the historiography.

In some ways, the label 'general correspondence' is accurate, for the boxes contain reports, letters, copies of minutes, outlines of procedures, notes and records of phone calls which circulated around the various branches of ID EUCOM and later ID USAREUR headquarters in rough chronological rather than thematic order. Consequently, the documents provide an unprecedented insight into the everyday workings of the American Intelligence Division with regards to *all* aspects of the secret intelligence tasks they were engaged with.

In other ways, the label 'general correspondence' is misleading, because the boxes also constitute the largest known single archive of correspondence sent between the British and American Intelligence Divisions in occupied Germany. Many of these documents were sent to and from the British Liaison Officer (BLO) and his American counterpart, the United States Liaison Officer (USLO). This thesis is therefore able to provide the first in depth study of the secret system of liaison which structured Anglo-American intelligence relations in post-war Germany.

This rich new archive provides several hitherto impossible opportunities for scholars to draw general conclusions concerning intelligence work in post-war Germany. The frequency and volume of correspondence can help to more precisely answer questions concerning the extent of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation and rivalry, the forms it took and its consequences, without many of the drawbacks of reaching conclusions based on more compartmentalised files.

Insights can also be gained into the priorities of the IDs, the missions they pursued and the extent to which these mission priorities reflected realities on the ground. These insights have important

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<sup>84</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, 563465, Boxes 728-764 and RG549, A12027, 574598, Boxes 124-135.

implications for Cold War and post-war German history. It should be emphasised that these records - in the context of the existing historiography - can be considered extraordinary. As Adam Svendsen points out, intelligence liaison, and particularly the undertakings of liaison officers, remain one of the most difficult areas of secret intelligence work to study as relevant files are typically classified, revealing as they do information about other nations with potential ramifications for present-day international relations.<sup>85</sup>

Despite the considerable strengths of these fresh documents, there are limitations to the perspective which the 'general correspondence' files can provide. Several documents discussed within appear to have been routinely destroyed. Some still remain classified. The entire series of 'general correspondence' after 1952 remains classified. Moreover, the files naturally provide a largely American perspective, despite many documents being produced by and received from British ID HQ. Steps have been taken to overcome these challenges insofar as possible. Many other documents at NARA II, such as a series of Top Secret ID teleconferences and operational files detailing CIC operations have been consulted to help fill the gaps left by the chronological range and scope of the general correspondence files.

Above all, an equally impressive array of British ID documents, housed at TNA, have also been analysed to help ensure that a proper dual perspective on events is provided and that gaps left by classification and destruction are filled, whenever possible. The files produced by the British ID available to the public at TNA are numerous. They include large series of weekly and monthly intelligence summaries which were sent to the Foreign Office. Regional intelligence reports have been preserved too, providing insights into the activities of British intelligence officers throughout western Germany and an unprecedented window into daily life in occupied Germany. For analysis of key intelligence operations, the opinions of high-ranking officials such as the British High Commissioner, notable diplomats and German officials up to and including Konrad Adenauer have been preserved. Correspondence of all three Chiefs of the British ID has been preserved and analysed. So too have the

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<sup>85</sup> Adam D.M. Svendsen, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method out of Mayhem* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 19, 27, 32. See also Christopher Hitchens, *Blood, Class and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American Special Relationship* (London: Atlantic, 2006), p. 379.

large series of JIC(G) and Quadripartite Intelligence Committee (QIC) minutes. Such minutes give more insight into how the British ID fit in with the overall British intelligence machine.

But there are issues with the files at TNA. The vast majority of records produced by the lowest echelons of the British ID, the Intelligence Teams, appear to have been destroyed. Moreover, the focus on Germans and the occupation in many ID reports means that American liaison can go unmentioned in lengthy documents.

Steps have again been taken to overcome these issues. The author has been successful in obtaining the declassification of 25 ID folders through the submission of Freedom of Information requests. Some of these recently declassified files, as will be seen, contain crucial insights into Anglo-American intelligence liaison. Moreover, efforts have been made to locate ID documents in several local archives in Germany. The main response from such archives, evidently true, and matched by the German national archives and those of the German intelligence services, was that such files had been sent back to London and Washington.<sup>86</sup> However, one notable exception is several reports produced by British Intelligence Team 8, presently stored at the local archives in Herford.<sup>87</sup> These may be the only such reports left in existence and they bolster the conclusions reached in this thesis concerning the secret system of rule.

Furthermore, the author has had the opportunity to interview several individuals who once worked with British and American intelligence organisations in Germany, including a German named Dr Wolfgang Stedtfeld who worked at British ID HQ, in an effort to better understand aspects which some official documents leave out, again strengthening the arguments conveyed in this thesis. Private papers, kindly sent to me by individuals such as Dr Stedtfeld and from numerous archives have helped to throw more light on personal relations which were forged during the ten years of occupation, the endurance of which enable some important conclusions concerning the legacies of the IDs to be drawn.

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<sup>86</sup> This was confirmed to the author via email by Michelle Bleidt of the Bundesarchiv (23/06/2017), Ilona Gerhards of the Mönchengladbach Stadtarchiv (26/06/2017), Kristin Kalisch of the Hamburg Staatsarchiv (14/07/2017) and Dr. Klaus A. Lankheit, Archivleiter, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, München (14/07/2017). Daniela Wagner of the Köln city archives confirmed they hold no ID records (03/07/2017). Rinderlin of the BfV (24/07/2017) and Dr. Andreas Kißlinger of the BND Archives (02/08/2017) had no files of interest to my search terms.

<sup>87</sup> Their existence was kindly revealed to me via email by Christoph Laue of the Herford Stadtarchiv (26/06/2017).



It is challenging to impose a structure on such a heterogeneous selection of documents. For example, the distinction drawn in this thesis between security and political intelligence was not always clear to intelligence officers working in Germany during the time period discussed: the missions and targets of both often overlapped. Nevertheless, the themes of the chapters which structure this thesis have been dictated as far as possible by the sources in order to convey as comprehensive, authentic and original an insight as possible into the daily workings and liaison undertaken by the British and American Intelligence Divisions. Consequently, an analysis of five key areas of ID work – military, scientific, security, political and state building intelligence - frames the bulk of this thesis.

Chapter One constitutes the first detailed analysis of the secret system of liaison which structured Anglo-American intelligence relations throughout much of the occupation. As this system provided the framework for the majority of ID-ID EUCOM cooperation, an understanding of its origins, the organisations which adhered to it, its advantages and disadvantages, is imperative. Without knowledge of this system, it is not possible to fully understand the outcomes of the ID work discussed thereafter.

Chapters Two, Three, Four, Five and Six each analyse a key area of ID work. They begin with a ‘mission’ section which helps to place case studies in the existing historiography into their appropriate context by analysing ID priorities in comparative perspective. This structure also loosely acknowledges the compartmentalisation of ID headquarters into branches dealing with security, scientific and military intelligence, thereby enabling the most comprehensive analysis of these organisations to date. Each chapter is then followed by a section concerning ‘cooperation’ which discusses key examples of when ID liaison functioned well and also provides some indication as to how essential such liaison was and why in pursuit of the missions outlined previously. Next, these chapters contain a section on ‘rivalry’ which discusses key examples of when ID liaison did not function well and disagreements arose between the two powers. Such analyses are the first of their kind in dealing solely with incidents of rivalry. This helps to avoid the hagiography criticised by Aldrich and to place the examples of cooperation hitherto discussed into appropriate perspective.<sup>88</sup> The chapters conclude with an evaluation

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<sup>88</sup> Aldrich, *Hidden*, p. 81.

section, enabling increasingly comparative conclusions to be drawn concerning the extent, forms and consequences of Anglo-American intelligence liaison. Each chapter also highlights the importance of certain areas of intelligence work to the Cold War, the occupation and the secret system of rule which largely contributed to the successes of the latter.

The final chapter draws together the new knowledge disseminated from the preceding chapters to reach several broad conclusions concerning the activities of the Intelligence Divisions in post-war Germany. It also places the findings of this thesis into a wider context, indicating fruitful areas for further study and highlighting the broader implications of the new discoveries made here. Most importantly, it is argued that the British and American Intelligence Divisions operated a largely harmonious secret system of rule which was the real backbone of the occupation of Germany. It ran remarkably smoothly primarily owing to the USLO-BLO system of liaison which mitigated disagreements and enabled the IDs to leave an impressive and mostly positive legacy of success by accomplishing the missions they pursued. That those missions largely complemented and, in some instances, exactly replicated the overt goals of occupation enables more precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the outcomes of British and American rule in Germany.

# Chapter One:

## The Structures of Liaison

‘The subject is horribly complicated, so at the risk of great length I had better start at the beginning’.  
- British Under Secretary Finance on the Organisation and Funding of BIO(G), 16<sup>th</sup> December 1953.<sup>1</sup>

The close cooperation between the British and American Intelligence Divisions in post-war Germany has its main origins in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). This joint organisation and its much-understudied Intelligence Division, far more than the well explored OSS-SOE relationship, laid the groundwork for Anglo-American intelligence relations in the ruins of the Third Reich.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, from as early as June 1944, members of SHAEF, most notably its head of intelligence (G-2), Major-General Kenneth Strong, engaged in detailed planning which helped to design the intelligence organisations that would operate in occupied Germany and structure the liaison between them.<sup>3</sup> Representatives of other intelligence organisations such as MI5 and MI6 were also included in these discussions.<sup>4</sup> But, as will be shown, the main impetus for future cooperation came from SHAEF.

Such early discussions were complex and difficult, largely owing to the existence of many different British and American intelligence organisations.<sup>5</sup> The interests of MI5, MI6, SOE, OSS, the CIC and several other service intelligence organisations all had to be considered. Despite minor disagreements, the British Control Commission Military Section (CCMS) importantly believed that ‘good future co-operation...is the only thing that matters’.<sup>6</sup> The latter comment was inspired by an influential memorandum which was produced by a British Major named McFarlane. It identified several dangers which would arise from poor Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in occupied Germany,

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<sup>1</sup> TNA, ADM 1/27788, Under Secretary Finance, ‘The British Intelligence Organisation, Germany’, Top Secret (16/12/1953).

<sup>2</sup> On SHAEF ID, see Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office: 1989), pp. 71-73. On OSS-SOE, see Jay Jakub, *Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-45* (London: Macmillan, 1999).

<sup>3</sup> Pogue, *Supreme*, p. 71. See also TNA, FO 1032/409, ‘meeting...to be held at Norfolk House’ (05/06/1944). Strong’s influence is usefully demonstrated in the latter document which indicates that his absence alone would result in a postponement of the meeting. This evidence places the origins of the IDs several months earlier than implied by Aldrich in *Hidden*, p. 181.

<sup>4</sup> Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, p. 89.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p. 90.

<sup>6</sup> TNA, FO 1032/409, Major-General C.A. West, CCMS to Major-General K.W.D. Strong, G-2 SHAEF, Secret (17/07/1944).

including ‘a grave danger of overlapping and duplication...but an even graver danger of important targets being altogether overlooked unless careful co-ordination is effected’.<sup>7</sup>

From the outset, then, Anglo-American intelligence cooperation was seen as crucial to the successful functioning of the British and American intelligence organisations in Germany. These intelligence organisations were also viewed as crucially important for the successful functioning of the occupation. For example, according to the head of CCMS, Major-General Charles A. West, ‘counter intelligence’ was ‘the real key to the control of Germany’.<sup>8</sup> Moreover:

The smooth running of the Control Commission machinery will...be dependent in a large measure on the efficient functioning of its information services, whilst it is perhaps not too much to say that the counter intelligence organisation, if successful, will contribute much towards the future peace of Europe.<sup>9</sup>

West’s views were common. In August 1944, one Control Commission report stated ‘It is apparent that the collection and dissemination of Intelligence information of all natures is one of the most important aspects of the work of the Control Commission for Germany’.<sup>10</sup> Four months later, this point was emphasised again: ‘It is not too much to say that the effective control of Germany depends as much upon an efficient Counter Intelligence Organisation as on any other single factor...’.<sup>11</sup> Clearly, whatever ‘system of rule’ was to be imposed on Germany, the prospective British and American intelligence organisations, and their cooperation, were believed to be crucial for its success.

In June 1945, shortly prior to the dissolution of SHAEF, Major-General John Sydney “Tubby” (to his friends) Lethbridge was appointed as Chief of the ID’s predecessor, the British Intelligence Group (IG) and Major-General Intelligence (MGI) of British Army Forces in Germany.<sup>12</sup> As Lethbridge later explained, ‘I am to wear two hats, one as Chief of the Intelligence Division C.C.G. and the other as MGI B.A.O.R.’.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> TNA, FO 1032/409, ‘Intelligence For Post-Hostilities Planning Germany’, Secret (July 1944).

<sup>8</sup> Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, p. 90. See also Pogue, *Supreme*, pp. 346-347.

<sup>9</sup> TNA, FO 1032/409, Major-General West to Major-General S.W. Kirby, Control Commission Planners, ‘Intelligence Staff of the Control Commission’, Secret (25/07/1944). See also Kirkpatrick, *Circle*, pp. 186-187.

<sup>10</sup> TNA, FO 1032/409, ‘Control Commission – Intelligence Organisation’, Secret (26/08/1944).

<sup>11</sup> TNA, FO 936/247, ‘Intelligence Group, War Establishment for the Counter Intelligence Bureau’, Secret (22/12/1944).

<sup>12</sup> TNA, WO 106/4285, Loose Minute (08/06/1945) and Cipher Telegram (10/06/1945). See also Aldrich, *Hidden*, p. 181.

<sup>13</sup> TNA, FO 936/344, Lethbridge, HQ ID to M.J. Dean, FO (German Section), Norfolk House, Confidential (16/06/1947).

Some civilian intelligence officers wondered why Lethbridge had been chosen, but he had a particularly relevant skill set.<sup>14</sup> As a Brigadier in 1942, Lethbridge was ‘specially employed on liaison duties with the Americans in London and in the United States’.<sup>15</sup> One year later, now as a Major-General, he headed the joint service ‘Lethbridge Mission’ to the USA, India and Australia to discuss the best ‘equipment and tactics’ which could be used to fight the Japanese after Hitler’s defeat.<sup>16</sup> His private letters reveal that during this Mission, he ‘met all the top Americans who have been charming and most helpful’.<sup>17</sup> Lethbridge clearly built up an enduring rapport with his American colleagues as one member of his Mission, Air Commodore Lachlan MacLean, recalled in 1961:

...John Lethbridge, in addition to all that was required of him as a soldier, produced qualities of tact, diplomacy and public relations which were quite remarkable. Largely due to his tact, his personal charm and his savoir faire the Americans opened all doors to us, showed us everything, and gave freely every bit of information that we asked of them... The greatest world power had shown us, without reserve, every aspect of its mechanism for putting its forces into the field, and its technique of waging war. In its journeys the Lethbridge Mission had established a trail of the friendliest contacts from the highest to the lowest in America... due in great measure to the... personality of the Mission’s leader – John Lethbridge.<sup>18</sup>

Considering that the role of MGI, from as early as December 1944, was designed to involve ‘Liaison and co-ordination with the United States and Russian Intelligence Staffs’ and that Anglo-American intelligence cooperation was considered to be of vital importance to the Control Commission Planners, it is likely that Lethbridge’s successful wartime liaison with American officers was a decisive factor in his appointment.<sup>19</sup>

The same, could also be said, of his successor, Major-General Joseph Charles Haydon. As a member of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington D.C. (1944-1945), Haydon worked with American officers on a daily basis.<sup>20</sup> Notably, his overall mission was one of a broad intelligence nature as it was part of his duty to ‘keep the British Chiefs of Staff continuously informed of the way in which the American mind is working’.<sup>21</sup> He also gained experience of Anglo-American intelligence

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<sup>14</sup> TNA, KV 4/466, Liddell Diaries (09/07/1945), pp. 54-55.

<sup>15</sup> LHCMA, Lethbridge Papers, *The Royal Engineers Journal*, p. 455.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> LHCMA, Lethbridge Papers, Lethbridge letter to ‘My Darling’ (11/08/1943).

<sup>18</sup> LHCMA, Lethbridge Papers, Lachlan MacLean to *The Times* (21/09/1961).

<sup>19</sup> TNA, FO 936/247, CCG(BE) to WO, ‘War Establishment for the Major-General Intelligence’ (14/12/1944).

<sup>20</sup> IWM, Private Papers of Major-General Joseph Charles Haydon, *Irish Guards Association Journal*, Obituary (February 1971).

<sup>21</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, ‘Some Outline Notes For A Lecture On The Combined Chiefs Of Staff’ (Undated, likely 1948).

cooperation as demonstrated by his knowledge concerning the functions of the Combined Intelligence Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.<sup>22</sup> During this time, Haydon developed strong opinions on the importance of continuing such cooperation.<sup>23</sup> As the notes which he later gave to General Gordon MacReady, then Chairman of the Bipartite Economic Control Group in Frankfurt, stated: 'It is my own personal opinion that for the good of ourselves and of the world the British Empire and the United States of America must never permit themselves to seriously diverge'.<sup>24</sup>

The above evidence largely stems from a British perspective. This is because, whilst detailed memorandums were being submitted to and from in London concerning the ID's predecessor, the IG, the Americans had not yet begun to form an intelligence organisation for their zone of Germany.<sup>25</sup> Such an American organisation was however anticipated from as early as July 1944.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, McFarlane's paper on post-hostilities planning outlined three initial phases of occupation which concerned intelligence.<sup>27</sup> During the second phase, the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), Dwight D. Eisenhower, would be in sole control and his directives would be paramount.<sup>28</sup> However, a third and final stage was envisioned when SCAEF would hand over control to British and American authorities on the ground in Germany.<sup>29</sup> To whom exactly Eisenhower would be delegating intelligence authority in the American Zone was not yet determined, as the memorandum makes clear with reference to what it calls CCMS (American) I Staff: 'As this has not yet been set up, there is no information as to its functions, but they will be presumably much the same as those of their British counterpart, only for the American zone'.<sup>30</sup>

A major agreement on Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in Germany was reached at a meeting, held at SHAEF, on 14<sup>th</sup> January 1945.<sup>31</sup> This meeting, which brought together members of

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid and Haydon, HQ ID to General MacCready (sic), Frankfurt (24/10/1948).

<sup>24</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, Haydon, HQ ID to MacReady, Frankfurt (30/10/1948).

<sup>25</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Division', p. 90.

<sup>26</sup> TNA, FO 1032/409, 'Intelligence For Post-Hostilities Planning Germany', Secret (July 1944).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> TNA, WO 219/5077, SHAEF G-3 Division, 'Minutes of Meeting on Special Activities in Germany', Top Secret (14/01/1945).

OSS, SOE and MI6, was chaired by Colonel Alms of SHAEF.<sup>32</sup> The topics of discussion reflected the wide-ranging role which the IDs would later undertake in post-war Germany as matters broadly concerning security, political and scientific intelligence were all discussed.<sup>33</sup> It was established that OSS and SOE methods of vetting agents were similar and that an initial key target was to be ‘the German security service’.<sup>34</sup> Crucially, ‘SOE, OSS and MI6 agreed to consult mutually to ensure that their lines in Germany do not become crossed. It was agreed to review this system in the light of experience’.<sup>35</sup> They also ‘agreed to exchange information’ concerning ‘dissident groups in Germany’.<sup>36</sup> US Army Groups and the British 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group were to liaise when necessary with OSS and MI6 and (as evidenced by procedure in the field) would be kept informed of intelligence developments via SHAEF.<sup>37</sup>

On 8<sup>th</sup> April 1945, another Anglo-American intelligence liaison meeting was held, again under SHAEF direction.<sup>38</sup> At this stage, ‘It was agreed that there was scarcely any necessity for further formal meetings, though Ad hoc discussions would be required...’.<sup>39</sup> Two key points arising from these meetings should be emphasised. The first is the acknowledgment that despite a vast amount of detailed planning, things would have to change according to experience as events unfolded on the ground.<sup>40</sup> 1945 was a year of anticipated organisational flux for the British and American intelligence services in Germany. The second is the ‘ad hoc’ nature of future broad Anglo-American discussions. As the Allies advanced deeper into Germany, outside of the firm, definite combined structures and directives of SHAEF, Anglo-American intelligence cooperation relied largely on loose agreements to ‘consult mutually’ and a commitment to ‘review this system in the light of experience’.<sup>41</sup>

The main Anglo-American intelligence objectives for the early occupation period were outlined in a series of SHAEF directives covering an array of issues from automatic arrests to the seizing of

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. See also TNA, WO 219/1602, SHAEF, ACoS, G-2, Forward HQ, ‘Werewolves’, Secret (16/04/1945); Strong, *Intelligence*, pp. 132-133, 175-176.

<sup>38</sup> TNA, WO 219/5077, SHAEF G-3 Division, ‘Meeting on Special Activities in Germany’, Top Secret (08/04/1945).

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Hudson, *Army*, p. 158.

<sup>41</sup> TNA, WO 219/5077, SHAEF G-3 Division, ‘Minutes of Meeting on Special Activities in Germany’, Top Secret (14/01/1945).

documents.<sup>42</sup> Throughout April 1945 the main forum for Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in pursuit of these objectives was SHAEF and particularly its Counter Intelligence (CI) War Room in London.<sup>43</sup> As more German towns and cities fell to the British and American forces, more Nazis were captured, more scientific, technical and documentary intelligence gathered, the Western Allies kept each other informed on intelligence developments in their ever-increasing zones of occupation by distributing intelligence reports between Army Groups, the London War Room and other SHAEF headquarters.<sup>44</sup> Information from such reports was collated by SHAEF and distributed as intelligence digests and general summaries.<sup>45</sup>

Throughout the closing days of World War Two, many intelligence tasks on the ground were undertaken by military intelligence officers of the American CIC and the British Intelligence Corps.<sup>46</sup> Whilst the British had planned and created an entirely new civilian and military intelligence organisation, named the Intelligence Group, this was not yet fully active and was to be activated gradually.<sup>47</sup> The Americans, on the other hand, had not yet developed a new intelligence organisation. Instead, they would rely heavily on the continuing services of their existing military intelligence organisations, particularly the CIC.<sup>48</sup>

During this initial occupation period, as planned in the summer of 1944, counter intelligence was under the control of the Supreme Commander Eisenhower at SHAEF.<sup>49</sup> Consequently, counter intelligence officers on the ground received many of their first instructions from SHAEF.<sup>50</sup> For example,

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<sup>42</sup> TNA, FO 1050/1424, SHAEF, ACoS G-2, Main HQ, 'OI Brief For Germany', Secret (15/09/1944). See also TNA, WO 219/177, SHAEF Forward Staff Message, Secret (28/05/1945) and (23/05/1945); TNA, FO 1005/1700, Intelligence Bureau (IB), Intelligence Review No. 7, Secret (20/03/1946). TNA, FO 936/247, 'Counter Intelligence Increment to a Civilian Internment Camp' (02/12/1945).

<sup>43</sup> TNA, WO 219/1602, SHAEF, ACoS, G-2, Forward HQ, 'Werewolves', Secret (16/04/1945). See also F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, *British Intelligence In The Second World War: Volume Four Security and Counter-Intelligence* (London: HMSO, 1990), p. 268; Edward Harrison (ed) in Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Secret World: Behind The Curtain Of British Intelligence in World War II And The Cold War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), pp. 24-25; Strong, *Intelligence*, pp. 131-132.

<sup>44</sup> TNA, FO 1050/583/1, P. Ramsbotham, 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group (21 AGP), Weekly CI Sitrep No. 3, Secret (02/05/1945). See also TNA, WO 219/177, Seventh Army to SHAEF Main, Top Secret (01/05/1945); TNA, WO 219/1602, SHAEF, ACoS, G-2, Forward HQ, 'Werewolves', Secret (16/04/1945). The latter folders contain many examples of such exchanges. See also Strong, *Intelligence*, pp. 132-133.

<sup>45</sup> TNA, WO 219/1602, SHAEF, ACoS, G-2, Forward HQ, 'Werewolves', Secret (16/04/1945). See also Strong, *Intelligence*, pp. 132-133, 175-176.

<sup>46</sup> Boghardt, 'Vanguard', pp. 1-2. See also Daly-Groves, 'Division', p. 91; Anthony Clayton, *Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps* (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. 194-196; Sayer and Botting, *Secret*, pp. 225, 232.

<sup>47</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Division', pp. 91-92.

<sup>48</sup> Boghardt, 'Vanguard', pp. 1-2.

<sup>49</sup> TNA, FO 1032/409, 'Intelligence For Post-Hostilities Planning Germany', Secret (July 1944).

<sup>50</sup> TNA, WO 219/176, ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 7, Change No. 2, Top Secret (15/03/1945).



in May 1945, William Heimlich, the Executive Officer of the American G-2 Division of Berlin District Headquarters, along with E.A. Howard, then of the British Army but later Deputy Chief of the British ID, were given instructions at SHAEF HQ to investigate the circumstances of Adolf Hitler's death upon their arrival in Berlin which was at that time under the sole control of the Soviets.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, the scientific and technical intelligence operations of T Force were controlled by SHAEF.<sup>52</sup> The latter also helped to coordinate the activities of the Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) in its efforts to exploit 'German signal intelligence targets'.<sup>53</sup>

SHAEF directives were still an important consideration in matters concerning Anglo-American scientific and technical intelligence cooperation in the summer of 1946 and its instructions on censorship policy were still in force in 1947.<sup>54</sup> SHAEF achieved the fullest coordination possible out of the myriad of different intelligence organisations that were in operation during its existence.<sup>55</sup> However, on 14 July 1945, SHAEF was disbanded.<sup>56</sup> It was at this point that the liaison procedures which would later shape the important relationship between the IDs began to form more clearly as their predecessors, the British IG and the newly formed G-2 USFET, commenced their occupation duties in earnest.<sup>57</sup>

The first two years of occupation were an era of organisational flux for the predecessors of the Intelligence Divisions in Germany. In the winter of 1945, the British IG underwent a period of gradual civilianisation and centralisation culminating, in 1946, in its headquarters being transferred from Lübbecke and Bad Oeynhausen to Herford and its renaming from IG to ID.<sup>58</sup> Likewise, on 15 March 1947, following the reorganisation of USFET into EUCOM, G-2 USFET became the American Intelligence Division (ID EUCOM) and in 1948 its headquarters shifted from Frankfurt to Heidelberg.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> NARA II, RG549, A1-52, Box 820, 563511, Heimlich Testimony, Secret (11/03/1948). See also Luke Daly-Groves, *Hitler's Death: The Case Against Conspiracy* (Oxford: Osprey, 2019), p. 58; TNA, FO 1012/281, RIO Conference, Lancaster House, Berlin (04/11/1946).

<sup>52</sup> TNA, FO 1038/56, 'Brief Report on Organisation of CIOS' (24/04/1945). See also Maddrell, *Science*, p. 17.

<sup>53</sup> TNA, WO 219/176, SCAEF, SHAEF to G-2 Sixth and Twelfth Army Group, Top Secret (05/04/1945). See also Randy Rezabek, 'TICOM: The Last Great Secret of World War II', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2012), p. 513.

<sup>54</sup> TNA, FO 1012/422, BIOS, 11th Meeting Minutes, Confidential (31/07/1946). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 728, 563465, DDI, US Army to Controller, Censorship Bureau, BAOR, 'Bi-Zonal Censorship Policy', Confidential (27/03/1947).

<sup>55</sup> Jakub, *Spies*, p. 184.

<sup>56</sup> Strong, *Intelligence*, p. 217. See also Pogue, *Supreme*, p. 515.

<sup>57</sup> Pogue, *Supreme*, pp. 512-514. See also Daly-Groves, 'Division', p. 91.

<sup>58</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Division', pp. 91-92.

<sup>59</sup> 'History of Campbell Barracks', *The Observer* (Winter: 2007), <https://www.nato.int/fchd/observer/2008-winter.pdf> [Accessed: 24/06/2020].

Despite such changes, there were some broad constants. For example, throughout the occupation, the IDs, as well as their predecessors and, in the British case, their successors, were structured pyramidically.<sup>60</sup> The British headquarters shifted three times from Lübbecke and Bad Oeynhausen (1945) to Herford (1946-1951), Wahnerheide (1951-1954) and finally to München-Gladbach (1955).<sup>61</sup> Throughout their existence, the IG and the ID commanded a series of Regional Intelligence Offices [RIOs] (in places such as Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein) which received and collated reports from a network of Area Intelligence Offices [AIOs] (in places such as Cologne and Detmold) from which operated a network of smaller Intelligence Teams, consisting of around 6 individuals per team, and a series of district censorship stations.<sup>62</sup>

ID EUCOM's headquarters remained in Heidelberg from 1948 although it was initially based in nearby Frankfurt, like its predecessor.<sup>63</sup> Consequently, the majority of Anglo-American intelligence correspondence exchanged during the occupation passed through Herford and Heidelberg. Like the British ID, ID EUCOM and its successor, ID USAREUR, instructed a pyramidal network of regional Counter Intelligence Corps offices located in places such as Munich, Stuttgart and Regensburg along with other American intelligence organisations.<sup>64</sup> Both the British and American ID Headquarters were separated into branches and sections, each focusing on a different aspect of intelligence such as military and scientific or performing specific functions such as analysis and training.<sup>65</sup> However, unlike their

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<sup>60</sup> For example, see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 743, 563465, Annex A, 'Intelligence Channels', Secret (1949). See also Daly-Groves, 'Division', p. 93.

<sup>61</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Division', pp. 91, 95. For move to Wahnerheide see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, E.N. Clarke, JIC(Germany) to Director of Intelligence, ID EUCOM, Secret (09/01/1951). See also TNA, FO 1035/77, 'Future of Intelligence Division', Top Secret (05/03/1951). On München-Gladbach: TNA, ADM 1/2778, TRW Hartland for Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) to Secretary JIC London, 'Intelligence Organisation (Germany)', Secret (30/07/1954).

<sup>62</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Division', pp. 92-93. Many detailed organisation tables and diagrams outlining the ID's structure under Lethbridge and Haydon can be read in TNA, FO 936/344 and FO 1005/1731 (Redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017). For continuities under Kirkman and the BIO(G) see NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 124, A. Rhodes, HQ ID Wahnerheide, Confidential (10/03/1952). See also Box 133, Regional Intelligence Office (RIO) to Production Directorate, HQ ID Wahnerheide, 'Production Report Proforma', Secret (26/03/1952); Box 128, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Group and CO 7707 USAREUR IC, 'Conduct of Investigations in British Zone', Restricted (31/12/1952); TNA, FO 371/103904, J.M. Kirkman, BIO(G), 'Operation Terminus', Secret (05/02/1953).

<sup>63</sup> 'History of Campbell Barracks', *The Observer* (Winter: 2007), <https://www.nato.int/fchd/observer/2008-winter.pdf> [Accessed: 24/06/2020].

<sup>64</sup> James L. Gilbert, John P. Finnegan and Ann Bray, *In The Shadow of The Sphinx: A History of Army Counterintelligence* (Fort Belvoir: Department of the Army, 2005), pp. 92-93. See also Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 273; NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, W.R. Rainford, Chief, Control Branch, ID HQ EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, Washington 25, D.C., 'Overall Plan for Intelligence Collection', Secret (24/10/1949); Box 758, 'Intelligence Organization in EUCOM', Confidential (20/06/1951).

<sup>65</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 737, 563465, W.R. Rainford, Chief, Control Branch, 'Annex A', Confidential (15/12/1949). See also Box 748, 'Organization Chart', Restricted (Undated: likely 1950); Box 755, 'Organization Chart Intelligence Division' (Undated: likely 1951); TNA, FO 1038/105, Deputy Chief, ID, 'Reorganisation of H.Q. Int Div', Secret (June: 1946); TNA, FO 936/344, 'Outline Organisation Intelligence Division' (01/04/1947); FO 1005/1731, 'Establishment

British counterparts, ID EUCOM did not command a large network of ID officers but instead had the power to control and demand the services of other organisations.<sup>66</sup> The most important of these, partially owing to its size, was the CIC. In 1951, it was the largest American intelligence organisation in West Germany.<sup>67</sup> CIC command in Germany was variously named 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment (1945-1948), 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment (1948-1949), 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment (1949-1952) and finally 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Group (1952-1960).<sup>68</sup> Its headquarters shifted from Wiesbaden (1945) to Frankfurt (1945-1949) to Stuttgart (1949-1960).<sup>69</sup> As the CIC also maintained its own internal command structure, it sent a liaison officer to HQ EUCOM as did the FBI and the CIA.<sup>70</sup> The similarities, differences and resulting advantages and disadvantages of these intelligence organisations were the subject of much Anglo-American discussion, comparison and disagreement.<sup>71</sup>

Following the dissolution of SHAEF in 1945, much Anglo-American intelligence liaison on the ground in Germany continued in the same forms and to the same extent as it had done before, only names were changed. For example, 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group Counter Intelligence reports, previously sent to SHAEF, were now sent to G-2 USFET as were British IG reports.<sup>72</sup> In turn, USFET distributed their weekly intelligence summaries to the IG.<sup>73</sup>

The merits of such regular and large-scale information exchange and its ‘special’ character was made clear during meetings of the British Joint Intelligence Committee (CCG). The JIC (CCG), later, and more accurately renamed JIC (Germany), was a forum in which representatives of all the British

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Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division’, Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author’s possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531–17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>66</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, W.R. Rainford, Chief, Control Branch, ID HQ EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, Washington 25, D.C., ‘Overall Plan for Intelligence Collection’, Secret (24/10/1949). See also Box 758, ‘Intelligence Organization in EUCOM’, Confidential (20/06/1951).

<sup>67</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, ‘Intelligence Organization in EUCOM’, Confidential (20/06/1951).

<sup>68</sup> Gilbert, Finnegan and Bray, *Sphinx*, pp. 87, 92-93, 125. See also 66<sup>th</sup> Military Intelligence Brigade, ‘Our History’, <https://www.inscom.army.mil/MS/66MIB/index.html> [Accessed: 25/06/2020]; Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 273.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> On CIC liaison see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 733, 563465, Robert A Schow, Deputy Director Intelligence Division (DDID) to Deputy Chief of Staff, HQ EUCOM, ‘Reduction of Headquarters’ (19/07/1948). FBI liaison: Box 756, ID to AG Div, ‘Request for Orders’, Restricted (26/09/1951). CIA/DAD liaison: NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Ritchie Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch to DAD, ‘Liaison with British’, Secret (11/07/1952) and Box 126, David Wagstaff, Jr, Chief, Plans, Policy & Training Branch (PP&T), HQ ID USAREUR to CO 7746 Communications Intelligence Service Detachment, Secret (15/12/1952).

<sup>71</sup> For example see TNA, FO 1035/77, ‘The Future of Intelligence Division in Germany’, Top Secret (18/12/1950).

<sup>72</sup> TNA, FO 1050/583, 21 Army Group CI SITREP Nos. 1 -15 (April-August 1945), Secret, Distribution Lists. See also TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 1, Secret (12/12/1945).

<sup>73</sup> USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 18 referred to in TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 1, Secret (12/12/1945). See also USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 25 referred to in TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 3, Secret (09/01/1946).

intelligence organisations operating in Germany could coordinate, much like the JIC in London.<sup>74</sup> It was chaired by the Chief of the IG and later the ID at the headquarters of those organisations. In 1946, the JIC(CCG) frequently discussed ‘the type of Intelligence material which could be given to Dominion and Foreign Missions’.<sup>75</sup> From the outset, however, it was acknowledged that ‘The matter did not, of course, arise in respect of US Authorities, with whom full exchange took place’.<sup>76</sup> The special character of this Anglo-American exchange was highlighted at a later meeting, during which Lethbridge informed the committee that the JIC London had instructed him to share ‘all available information’ with ‘the Americans’ but that ‘nothing of a secret or top secret nature should be given to the other Allies’.<sup>77</sup>

However, JIC meetings also demonstrated that ‘full exchange’ with the Americans did not mean full exchange in actuality as ‘special care was taken to omit from the two Intelligence publications mainly concerned, viz. Intelligence Bulletin and Intelligence Review, any information which would embarrass us if it came into the hands of the recipients’.<sup>78</sup> Clearly, considerations of prestige placed limits on the otherwise impressive flow of highly classified finished intelligence reports which passed between British and American intelligence headquarters throughout the occupation.

Although direct liaison between the Chiefs and Directors of the IDs took place throughout the occupation, what differentiated the early occupation period was the frequent direct liaison between the heads of subordinate sections and branches. For example, in 1946, the head of the British IB and his subordinates communicated directly with the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACoS) at G-2 USFET concerning anti-Nazi operations.<sup>79</sup>

In the absence of any comprehensive post-SHAEF agreements regulating intelligence liaison in the field when it came to security, political and counter intelligence operations, much of such early

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<sup>74</sup> On the change of name see TNA, FO 1032/190, HQ ID, ‘Joint Intelligence Committee (Germany)’ (29/01/1947). On similarities with London see TNA, FO 1032/1474, ‘Draft Charter for JIC (Germany)’, Top Secret (15/06/1948). Some officials disagreed with the London comparison, see TNA, FO 1035/77, ‘Charter for JIC(Germany)’, Top Secret (Undated: likely 1951). On the JIC London’s coordinating functions see Aldrich (ed), *British Intelligence*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>75</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 17<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (04/03/1946).

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 19<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (02/04/1946).

<sup>78</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 20<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (16/04/1946).

<sup>79</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, Head IB, CCG(BE), ‘Operation Deadlock’ to ACoS, G-2 (CI), HQ USFET (20/05/1946) and (28/05/1946). See also Box 13, For Head IB, CCG(BE), ‘Operation Rome’ to ACoS, G-2 (CI), HQ USFET (17/06/1946); TNA, WO 208/4431, Head IB, CCG(BE), ‘Himmler’s Bodyguard’ to ACoS, G-2 (CI), HQ USFET, Secret (27/05/1946).

liaising appears to have been conducted on an ad-hoc, case by case basis. For example, in October 1946, a CIC memorandum concerning another anti-Nazi operation stated: 'Due to a recent agreement between American Intelligence and British Intelligence a system of co-operation has been established in the two Zones for this operation'.<sup>80</sup> Prior to October 1946 apparently no formal system of liaison existed which adequately encompassed the requirements of all field operations. But there were some regulations, or, at least, loosely accepted common courtesies, structuring the liaison between the two powers at this time. For example, in April 1946, Lieutenant W.J. Owen of HQ USFET's G-2 Division had to request and receive 'clearance' from the British before he was permitted to enter the British Zone with Wilhelm Walter (formerly one of Heinrich Himmler's bodyguards) to investigate underground Nazi subversive activity and search for some of Himmler's documents.<sup>81</sup>

Such requests for clearance were increasingly common and also regulated liaison at the very top in both zones as evidenced by the American Military Governor and commander of USFET, General Joseph T. McNarney's request in September 1946 for 'clearance' from HQ ID to 'pick up body for transfer'.<sup>82</sup> Requests for clearance, in order to be effective, needed to be monitored to ensure compliance and structures had to be put in place to prevent or punish deviance. This significant role was undertaken by the increasingly important offices of the British Liaison Officer (BLO) and the United States Liaison Officer (USLO).

The USLO-BLO chain of liaison would eventually provide the most important link between the many different forms of cooperation. By April 1946, Major R.B. Hemblys-Scales, the BLO to the CIC at USFET, was the individual from whom clearance was requested by the Americans to operate in the British Zone.<sup>83</sup> From that point onwards it was also Hemblys-Scales who coordinated much of the correspondence between the ID and USFET concerning Anglo-American intelligence operations.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, H.D. Ludwell, Investigator, CIC, Memorandum: Operation Gopher, Top Secret (14/10/1946).

<sup>81</sup> TNA, WO 208/4431, Memorandum (30/04/1946).

<sup>82</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, McNarney, HQ USFET, Top Secret Message to HQ ID (06/09/1946).

<sup>83</sup> TNA, WO 208/4431, Memorandum (30/04/1946).

<sup>84</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 13, Head IB to Hemblys-Scales (amongst others), 'Operation Rome', Top Secret (23/05/1946). See also HQ ID, Herford to Hemblys-Scales, USFET, 'Operation Pilgrim' (02/08/1946); Denk for Chief ID, Herford to Hemblys-Scales, USFET, 'Operation Pilgrim' (29/08/1946); Box 12, HQ ID Herford to Hemblys-Scales, G2 USFET, 'Operation Gopher', Secret (18/10/1946).

Clearly, the BLO was gaining increased importance in 1946. In December, a meeting took place at Wentworth Barracks, home of the British ID, in Herford. In attendance were three CIC officers from USFET, five British ID officers and one member of MI6 Germany, disguised in the minutes under his suitably inconspicuous German cover organisation - Number 1 Planning and Evaluation Unit (No. 1 P&EU) - along with Hemblys-Scales and his colleague, Mr. J.B. Da Silva, the BLO to G-2 USFET.<sup>85</sup> The meeting was called for three reasons. Firstly, ‘...to bring closer together the C.I. Staffs in both Zones so that through personal contact a more unified policy, might, in future, be adopted in handling German underground movements in Western Germany’.<sup>86</sup> Secondly, ‘...to prepare the way for both C.I. Staffs to exchange views at a subsequent meeting on existing penetration carried out in their respective Zones’.<sup>87</sup> Thirdly, ‘...to set up, if possible, satisfactory machinery whereby this mutual policy of closer collaboration in counter intelligence investigations could be maintained’.<sup>88</sup>

The meeting concluded unanimously in favour of closer coordination but argued that ‘it would be physically impossible for any one Liaison Officer to handle all or even several operations common to both zones’.<sup>89</sup> It was therefore decided ‘That the C.I. Officers of both H.Qs. should liaise direct with their opposite numbers. In order to achieve this, meetings should take place between case-work officers (whenever the situation demanded it), either in Herford or Frankfurt’.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, ‘a Counter Intelligence liaison officer should be attached by USFET to H.Q. Intelligence Division’.<sup>91</sup> Thus commenced the beginning of the powerful, impressive and successful USLO-BLO system of cooperation that would come to structure and dominate Anglo-American intelligence relations in Germany throughout the occupation.

The increasingly important role of liaison officers following the December meeting was highlighted in January 1947 when attempts were made by G-2 USFET to provide Da Silva with ‘suitable

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<sup>85</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, ‘Meeting of Representatives of CIC USFET and HQ Intelligence Division’, Secret (05/12/1946). See also Maddrell, *Science*, p. X.

<sup>86</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, ‘Meeting of Representatives of CIC USFET and HQ Intelligence Division’, Secret (05/12/1946).

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

quarters'.<sup>92</sup> Also highlighted by the ensuing discussions, were the disadvantages of the decentralised organisation of American intelligence which directly affected how liaison with the British was conducted. At this time, the American military was struggling to cope with a backlog of accommodation requests and felt it would be unfair to expediate Mr. Silva's request for appropriate accommodation 'ahead of 58 U.S. individuals who have a higher priority'.<sup>93</sup> Confused as to why G-2 had requested that Mr. Silva be given priority, G-1 made enquiries. General Magruder informed them 'that an agreement was made with the British that we would take care of their people if they would take care of ours'.<sup>94</sup> Perplexed, Colonel Barnes of G-1 noted that 'this division knows nothing of such an agreement...'.<sup>95</sup>

With the creation of ID EUCOM in March 1947, some issues arising from the, at times, poor communication and coordination between American intelligence organisations were resolved through increasing centralisation. As the British ID, which maintained a constant interest in the organisation of their American colleagues, helpfully summarised:

Until 15th April [1947] a distinction was made between the Office of the Director of Intelligence, OMGUS, which was situated in Berlin and the G-2 Staff of USFET. Broadly speaking, ODI, OMGUS was concerned only with military government intelligence and all other matters were controlled by G-2 USFET. Since 15 April these 2 staffs have been amalgamated.<sup>96</sup>

There now existed two Intelligence Divisions in Germany and Lethbridge had a closer American counterpart with whom he could liaise, the Deputy Director of the American Intelligence Division (DDI or DDID), Colonel Robert A. Schow. But even the Directors of ID EUCOM (DID) were not the exact opposite numbers of the British ID Chiefs, although their roles were the most comparable. As the JIC (Germany) complained in 1951, 'Both the Americans and the French have a variety of agencies in Germany with no co-ordinating head' and 'there is no American Intelligence head in Germany, and most agencies take their orders from Washington and not from their High Commissioner or

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<sup>92</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, G-1 to The Chief of Staff, 'Assignment of Quarters' (31/01/1947).

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1003, Adv. HQ ID, Berlin, 'Strength of U.S. Intelligence Organisation in Germany', Secret (30/04/1947).

Commanders-in-Chief'.<sup>97</sup> Due to the absence of a clear coordinating head of American intelligence, the role of intelligence liaison officers gained added importance.

Throughout 1947, information concerning joint Anglo-American intelligence operations continued to be coordinated through the BLO.<sup>98</sup> Other documents of intelligence interest were now also sent between the two Divisions via the latter's office.<sup>99</sup> It is evident that the USLO in 1947 was mediating disputes concerning violations of liaison procedure.<sup>100</sup> This was the case during the joint anti-Nazi 'Operation Big Ben' when CIC Region I complained that British intelligence were operating in the American Zone without contacting their office.<sup>101</sup> All further communications on this subject were immediately directed to the USLO whose response revealingly acknowledged that it was still 'usual practice to send prior notification to this Headquarters' when British intelligence wished to operate in the American Zone.<sup>102</sup> Similarly, the BLO, Da Silva, was kept informed of disputes concerning liaison procedures in Bremen which occurred directly between Lethbridge and the DDI.<sup>103</sup>

Bremen was an extraordinary place for Anglo-American intelligence liaison throughout the occupation. Despite its location deep within the British Zone of Germany, the American Military Government had 'authority over Bremen...and Bremerhaven' whilst the British Military Government controlled 'the rural counties of the Enclave'.<sup>104</sup> This situation arose owing to the American need for a port to supply their occupation zone in southern Germany.<sup>105</sup> Consequently, intelligence cooperation in

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<sup>97</sup> TNA, FO 1035/77, JIC(Germany), 'Intelligence And The Future German Government', Top Secret (28/06/1951).

<sup>98</sup> TNA, WO 208/4431, J.B. Da Silva, British Liaison Officer, G-2, HQ USFET to ID HQ, 'Operation Globetrotter', Top Secret (13/01/1947). See also NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, HQ ID Herford to Da Silva, HQ USFET, 'Operation Brandy', Secret (07/02/1947); Box 18, Top Secret Document Replacement Sheet, Source: Brit. Liaison Officer (08/07/1947); HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det, EUCOM to CO CIC Region IV, 'Operation Big Ben', Top Secret (08/08/1947); HQ ID, Herford to Da Silva, BLO, HQ EUCOM, 'Big Ben', Secret (11/08/1947); Box 13, Miss J.M. Knight for Chief ID, Herford to British Liaison Officer, HQ EUCOM, 'Operation Magic Circle', Secret (17/10/1947).

<sup>99</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, Laurence E. Lynn, Chief Military Division to HQ BAOR, 'Transmittal of Aerial Photography', Restricted (04/12/1947).

<sup>100</sup> TNA, WO 208/4431, Fox for Chief ID HQ to da Silva, BLO, HQ EUCOM, 'Cordial', Top Secret, Copy to Capt. R. Frasier, American Liaison Officer (15/09/1947).

<sup>101</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 18, 6829150, CO 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det Region I to 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det HQ EUCOM (July 1947).

<sup>102</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 18, 6829150, 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det EUCOM to CIC Region I Esslingen, 'further communications attention Frazier this headquarters' (1947). See also Captain Frazier for Earl S. Browning Jr. to CO CIC Region I, 'Operation Big Ben' (22/07/1947).

<sup>103</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, Lethbridge, Chief ID, Herford to DDI, HQ EUCOM, Frankfurt, 'Intelligence Responsibility in ...the Bremen Enclave', Copy to da Silva, BLO/ODDI, HQ EUCOM (25/09/1947).

<sup>104</sup> Haywood, *Bremerhaven*, p. 15.

<sup>105</sup> Kruger, *Occupied*, p. 77.



this area was complicated and unique.<sup>106</sup> However, with the withdrawal of ‘British Intelligence Liaison Staff’ from Bremen in 1951, this unique area of intelligence cooperation became subject to the USLO-BLO chain.<sup>107</sup>

The power and influence of the British and American intelligence liaison officers increased substantially throughout 1948. In July, Schow placed the BLO on a list of ‘agencies of the Intelligence Division [that] must remain in Heidelberg in order to operate and accomplish its mission’.<sup>108</sup> Clearly ID EUCOM believed it could not succeed without British cooperation and that such cooperation was best undertaken via the BLO-USLO system. Haydon apparently agreed as throughout 1948 the British ID’s detailed ‘Top Secret Monthly Summary’ was routinely distributed to HQ EUCOM via the USLO and the BLO as were British interrogation reports.<sup>109</sup> It is likely that the majority of Anglo-American intelligence correspondence in Germany passed between these two officers at this stage too.

Nevertheless, some direct liaising between the heads of branches and sections at ID headquarters did still occur. This is partially revealed by a list of telephone calls made from ID EUCOM HQ in January 1948.<sup>110</sup> In the space of a month, various branches of ID EUCOM called British ID HQ in Herford six times.<sup>111</sup> This may not seem like a lot, but some branches, such as the ‘Pers Training & Org Section’ made only two telephone calls that month, both of which were to Herford and out of the nine calls made by ‘Special Projects – Interrogation’ branch, two were to British HQ.<sup>112</sup> This evidence helps to demonstrate the scale and special character of cooperation between the two Intelligence Divisions. However, the increasing importance of liaison officers in this process is also revealed by this

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<sup>106</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, G-1 to The Chief of Staff, ‘Assignment of Quarters’ (31/01/1947). See also FO 1005/1731, ‘Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division’, Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author’s possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531–17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>107</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 754, 563465, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, ‘British Intelligence Liaison Staff, Bremen’, Confidential (03/04/1951). See also Box 756, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, ‘Improper Liaison with British’, Secret (01/11/1951) and (03/12/1951).

<sup>108</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 733, 563465, Schow, DDID to Deputy Chief of Staff, HQ EUCOM, ‘Reduction of Headquarters’ (19/07/1948).

<sup>109</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, CCG(BE), Top Secret Intelligence Summaries, Nos. 1-10 (April-December 1948). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 732, 563465, ODDI to Provost Marshal, ‘Possible US Army Deserter’ (09/04/1948); Box 733, Schow, DDID to Deputy Chief of Staff, HQ EUCOM, ‘Reduction of Headquarters’ (19/07/1948).

<sup>110</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 732, 563465, Intelligence Division List of Telephone Calls (January 1948).

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

evidence as it records the BLO making five telephone calls not only to Herford but also to other important locations throughout the British Zone such as Detmold and Hannover.<sup>113</sup>

It is difficult to measure exactly when the BLO-USLO system of liaison came to dominate Anglo-American intelligence relations in Germany. It is clear, however, that by the summer of 1949, the Heidelberg liaison office was considered by the British ID to be ‘the link through which the greater part of the exchange of Intelligence takes place’ with the Americans.<sup>114</sup> An ID EUCOM description of the USLO’s duties, produced in December 1949, demonstrates just how significant this role was – a great deal of power was concentrated in one set of hands:

Liaison Officer, Intelligence Division, at British Headquarters, Herford. Acts as Intelligence Division staff representative in matters of mutual British Zone-European Command interest; coordinates joint EUCOM-British Zone intelligence operations; collects, evaluates and forwards to this branch staff information of pertinent interest to Intelligence Division and Headquarters, EUCOM, transmits action requests from Intelligence Division to Intelligence Division, Herford and keeps suspense file on these requests; attends British intelligence conferences as delegate of Intelligence Division in order to follow intelligence developments and to indicate need for liaison on specific operations; advises Intelligence Division, Herford, on EUCOM Intelligence operations and policies, as directed by this branch.<sup>115</sup>

In December 1949, the liaison procedures which structured Anglo-American intelligence relations in post-war Germany were noted down definitively in a memorandum produced by ID EUCOM which was circulated throughout the Division in January 1950.<sup>116</sup> The memorandum highlighted the role of liaison officers in more detail and made clear that the great majority of ID-ID EUCOM correspondence was filtered through them:

Dissemination of classified information to foreign governments and nationals will be effected only through the Foreign Liaison Section, Operations Branch. Such dissemination, to include mutual exchanges, will be in accordance with the current DADCOMI and such additional procedures as this Headquarters may enunciate. The current agreed procedure with the British is as follows:

a. Requests emanating from this headquarters for information from British Intelligence should be passed to United States Liaison Officer, Herford. Requests from this Division upon which action is to be taken in the British Zone are also to be served upon the USLO, Herford.

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> FO 1005/1731, ‘Liaison Offices, Heidelberg and Baden Baden’ (1949), redacted copy in author’s possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>115</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 737, 563465, ‘Survey of General Staff Corps with Troop Requirements’, Confidential (15/12/1949).

<sup>116</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 751, 563465, W.R. Rainford, Chief, Control Branch, HQ ID EUCOM, ‘Office Memorandum’ (09/01/1950).

b. Summaries and reports to be furnished the British for information only are to be passed to the British Liaison Officer at this Headquarters for transmission.

c. The British have agreed to follow a like procedure, ie., requests and reports calling for action by this Division will be forwarded by them to the British Liaison Officer at this Headquarters for transmission.

d. The British have agreed to follow a like procedure, ie., requests and reports calling for action by this Division will be forwarded by them to the British Liaison Officer in the Division. All other reports and summaries from the British to the Division will be routed via the USLO, Herford.<sup>117</sup>

In light of this evidence, it is clear that any analysis of British and American intelligence relations in post-war Germany must focus a great deal, if not the majority, of its attention on the activities and documents produced by and forwarded between the British and American intelligence liaison officers. Heads of branches and sections mostly communicated with their counterparts via this link. By 1951, evidence suggests that such department heads were *required* to communicate via liaison officers. When this requirement was not adhered to, the role of liaison officers in upholding liaison procedures can be further revealed. For example, in March, the USLO requested that Analysis Branch, ECIC, S&T and STIB refrain from ‘personal exchange of official items’ because ‘Correspondence shld be channeled correctly for proper control of exchange of info’.<sup>118</sup> Analysis Branch later produced an outline of the ‘proper procedure’ for the sending of Anglo-American intelligence correspondence between sections and branches of ID headquarters which made clear that all such correspondence should be sent via the USLO in Herford and the BLO in Heidelberg.<sup>119</sup> At this stage, according to the final British ID Chief, John Kirkman, ‘the amount of paper received from the American authorities was in the region of about 5 hundredweights per week’.<sup>120</sup>

Whilst the main focus of this chapter so far has been on the sharing of documents via the USLO-BLO system, it is also important to acknowledge that the strengths and weaknesses of the ID-ID EUCOM relationship, like the broader Anglo-American relationship itself, was often determined by

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 761, 563465, W.R. Philp, Chief, Operations Branch to C/Anal, ‘Exchange of Information’, Restricted (30/03/1951).

<sup>119</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 757, 563465, M.J. Morin, Chief, Analysis Branch, ‘Routing of Correspondence to or from BAOR’ (23/08/1951).

<sup>120</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 118<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (15/11/1951), Annex A.

individual personalities and personal, face-to face relationships.<sup>121</sup> This has rendered analysis of the relationship even more elusive for historians.<sup>122</sup> The ID EUCOM ‘general correspondence’ files do contain some documents which provide a glimpse into the ordinary, everyday, more social aspects of the intelligence relationship. For example, in February 1948, the USLO, Major P.J. Moore, ‘established a “Magazine Library” at his office in Herford’ because his British colleagues liked American comics.<sup>123</sup> Whilst such details may appear trivial, evidence contained in other ID correspondence suggests that social functions served an important intelligence purpose for ID EUCOM when they sought to obtain information from their British counterparts.<sup>124</sup> The USLO spent most of his time at Herford, making only ‘...biweekly visits to this [Heidelberg] headquarters’.<sup>125</sup> Clearly, it was seen to be important to have an almost constant American presence at British headquarters and vice versa.

Streamlining intelligence sharing in this way had mutual advantages for both Intelligence Divisions. Firstly, when it was felt to be necessary, sources and methods could be closely guarded. For example, if the British ID requested information on a security suspect but the only information available at ID EUCOM was produced by a CIC source that they did not wish to disclose, the relevant CIC report could be summarised, omitting reference to the source and then sent via the liaison officer to Herford as an ID EUCOM communication. The same method could also be used to omit other intelligence that ID EUCOM did not wish to share. This sort of omission occurred relatively frequently.

Secondly, the arrangements enabled the Intelligence Divisions to liaise with several intelligence agencies at once. For example, if the ID in Herford wished to inform ‘American intelligence’ in general of a new policy or a security issue, then the ID liaison officer could arrange for this information to be distributed to all of the American intelligence agencies which ID EUCOM was in frequent contact with such as the CIA and the FBI. This often-saved time, improved coordination in the field and prevented duplication. However, one disadvantage of this was that the British ID did not always know which

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<sup>121</sup> Jakub, *Spies*, p. 47. See also Steve Marsh and John Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2006), pp. 184-185, 201; Aldrich, ‘Special’, p. 342.

<sup>122</sup> Jakub, *Spies*, p. 47.

<sup>123</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 732, 563465, Merilatt Moses, Chief Operations Branch to Executive PPI Control R&A, ‘Magazines’ (18/02/1948).

<sup>124</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 755, 563465, C/Ops to Anal Br, ‘Military Intelligence Funds’ (17/01/1951). See also Box 746, USLO to Executive Officer ID HQ EUCOM, ‘Confidential Funds’ (31/05/1949) and Ben W. Miller, Liaison Officer to Executive Officer ID, ‘Confidential Funds’ (23/06/1949) and similar requests dated 14/06/1949 and 01/07/1949.

<sup>125</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 737, 563465, W.R. Rainford, Chief, Control Branch to QM Div (19/08/1949).

organisation was receiving its communications. This was the case with the ID EUCOM controlled Technical Intelligence Branch (TIB), the existence of which was kept completely secret from the British.<sup>126</sup> The fact that these liaison procedures facilitated the concealment of sources demonstrates that this was not a relationship of complete trust, though it was very efficient.

Although the USLO-BLO system of liaison was clearly the most comprehensive means of collaboration, fairly regular visits were made by heads of branches and sections to Herford and Heidelberg.<sup>127</sup> Sometimes, members of other intelligence organisations such as the CIA and MI6 would visit ID headquarters too. For example, in the summer of 1948, both Heidelberg and Herford were visited by the CIA's documents survey team.<sup>128</sup> The following year, on 9<sup>th</sup> September 1949, Lt Colonel Languth, the American Military Attaché at the American Embassy in London, visited the Operations Branch at ID EUCOM headquarters for a 'discussion of intelligence operation'.<sup>129</sup> Three days later, Mr. Keith Randell, Chief of the British ID's Directorate of Security accompanied Mr. John Bruce Lockhart, the head of MI6 in Germany, to Heidelberg.<sup>130</sup> In 1951, 'General Truscott, the Head of the CIA in Germany...paid a visit to Intelligence Division'.<sup>131</sup> Visits of ID officers to London and Washington also took place for a variety of conferences and meetings (both formal and informal).<sup>132</sup>

However, even meetings of this sort were not entirely free from the influence of liaison officers as the latter usually arranged clearance for these face-to-face meetings and sometimes helped in other ways to facilitate them.<sup>133</sup> On at least one occasion, the USLO personally accompanied Lieutenant Colonel Hughes of ID EUCOM's Operations Branch to London, following his visit to Herford, in

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<sup>126</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, William E. Hall, Director of Intelligence to ID EUCOM Branch Chiefs and CO 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, 'Guide to ID/EUCOM on Exchange of Intelligence Information with the British', Secret (07/10/1949). See also Box 743, DDID to CO 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, 'British Black List of Discarded Sources', Secret (07/06/1949).

<sup>127</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, David Wagstaff Jr, Executive, Operations Branch to Anal Br, 'Liaison Visit to the British Zone', Secret (28/12/1950). See also Box 738, Kenneth L. Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch to Director ID EUCOM, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (08/12/1949).

<sup>128</sup> NARA II, RG549, A1 48, Box 733, 563465, 'Activity Report of CIA Documents Survey Team To European Command' (1948).

<sup>129</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 738, 563456, C.J. Letzelter, Chief, Operations Branch, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems' to DDID, Secret (15/09/1949).

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 115<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (11/09/1951).

<sup>132</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, 'Intell Matters' (12/04/1949). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 751, 563465, Charles M. Adams, Jr. Chief, Plans Policy & Training Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to US Army Attaché, London, 'Intelligence School Programs of Instruction' (10/08/1950).

<sup>133</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, Opns Br to BLO, 'Visit of British Officer' (23/02/1951). See also Charles M. Adams, Jr., 'Visit of British Officer', Secret (03/04/1951).

March 1951.<sup>134</sup> During the latter visit, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) suggested that there were ‘advantages accruing from personal contact’.<sup>135</sup> Their American colleagues appeared to agree as stated in one of their important internal Attaché conferences ‘We in the European Command look forward to these attache meetings...we see and know each other, and people work better when they know each other’.<sup>136</sup>

Liaison officers were usually kept aware of when such meetings were taking place and also what conclusions were reached during them, in the interests of good coordination.<sup>137</sup> This was routine, as is suggested by the fact that in 1952 an uniformed Army Liaison Officer, when asked about such a meeting, was seen to be a source of ‘embarrassment’.<sup>138</sup> When it came to field operations, limited forms of direct liaison, common in the early occupation period, persisted too. However, these exchanges were also increasingly restricted by the USLO-BLO chain. For example, in December 1950 ID EUCOM headquarters granted permission for a British Intelligence Officer named Peter Boughey to ‘engage in direct liaison’ with the 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment who were also ‘to aid him in operational matters’.<sup>139</sup> However, when Boughey expressed willingness ‘...to supply CIC direct with reports outside the scope of his mission...’, attempted ‘to convey a tidbit of information to this detachment’ and requested information which had already been conveyed to the BLO at Heidelberg, the CIC worried that ‘compliance without reference to your headquarters [ID EUCOM] could interfere with the conduct of

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<sup>134</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, C/Ops to D/Int, ‘Visit to British Intelligence Agencies’ (21/03/1951) and ‘schedule of staff visits for Operations Branch’ (12/03/1951). It is not clear whether Box 755, Ops Br to BLO, ‘Correspondence with General Kirkman’ (30/01/1951) refers to an earlier visit or discusses alternative dates for the visit described above.

<sup>135</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, C/Ops to D/Int, ‘Visit to British Intelligence Agencies’ (21/03/1951).

<sup>136</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 749, 563465, ‘Final Report Fourth European Attache Conference Frankfurt’, Introductory Remarks by Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, Secret (23-27 May 1949).

<sup>137</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, Chief Ops Br to USLO, ‘HAUSCHILD, Inge’, Secret (19/04/1951). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 125, J.T. Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ID USAREUR to ID Wahnheide thru USLO, ‘Border Police Headquarters – Baltic Area’, Confidential (28/11/1952).

<sup>138</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, William E. Potts, Asst. Executive to C-in-C, USAREUR, ‘Staff Officer Visits to London’ (22/10/1952).

<sup>139</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, Bernard A. Tormey, Commanding, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Det EUCOM to Director, ID HQ EUCOM, Secret, ‘Liaison with British Agency’ (29/12/1950). In NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 124, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to BLO, ‘Suspected Czech Agents’, Confidential (04/01/1952), Mr. Peter Boughey is identified as working for ‘British Liaison Unit, Frankfurt’. However, in Box 133, Garrison, Executive, Opns Br to DAD, ‘Czech Identity Documents’, Secret (18/03/1952) he is described as ‘the chief of the Section concerned’. Considering the latter description, Boughey may have been the Chief of G Section in Frankfurt, described on pp. 39, 78 in this thesis.

your existing liaison with British intelligence'.<sup>140</sup> Consequently, ID EUCOM informed the CIC that in approving their liaison with Boughey it was not their intention:

...to change or interfere with presently established channels for exchange of information with the British. Present policy places the burden of dissemination on this headquarters upon receipt of requests from British Headquarters in Herford...Local exchange of operational information is permitted when necessary to coordinate local operations on the frontier, or for security in the Frankfurt area. However, these exchanges can be considered raw information and operational leads and not the considered opinion of this headquarters.<sup>141</sup>

This evidence again suggests that despite limited direct exchanges of operational intelligence in the field, the great majority of Anglo-American intelligence liaison in occupied Germany took place directly between just two officers.

One of the most frequent forms of liaison which occurred outside of the USLO-BLO chain was the regular attendance of a British ID officer, Major W.G.S. Mills (not the BLO) at EUCOM's military intelligence teleconferences.<sup>142</sup> The specialist nature of military intelligence, and the focus of such conferences on order of battle (OB) collation, probably accounts for this exception. However, even at these conferences the activities of and information sent to the USLO were sometimes discussed, thus further demonstrating the pervasiveness of the USLO-BLO channel of liaison.<sup>143</sup>

Scientific and technical intelligence cooperation, including censorship, arguably operated with most autonomy from the BLO-USLO chain. For example, a British administered organisation based in Frankfurt known as G Section was responsible for '...coordination with scientific and technical and PAPERCLIP matters'.<sup>144</sup> Moreover, as the head of Operation Apple Pie (the British initiated but later joint Anglo-American exploitation of 'ex' Nazis for knowledge (particularly economic) on the Soviet Union), Major K.W. Gottlieb commanded two document research teams which were 'under the direct

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<sup>140</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, Tormey, Commanding, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Det EUCOM to Director, ID HQ EUCOM, Secret, 'Liaison with British Agency' (29/12/1950). See also HQ ID EUCOM to Commanding Officer, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Liaison with British Agency', Secret (12/01/1951).

<sup>141</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, HQ ID EUCOM to Commanding Officer, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Liaison with British Agency', Secret (12/01/1951).

<sup>142</sup> For example see NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, 'Subject: Usual' (25/01/1949). See also Teleconferences on 15 March and 12, 26 and 31 April 1949.

<sup>143</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, 'Intell Matters' (14/03/1949).

<sup>144</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 736, 563465, R.E. Kilzer for DDID to Director, Civil Affairs Division (29/06/1949).

operational control of Deputy Chief, Intelligence Division'.<sup>145</sup> Gottlieb was also seemingly permitted to liaise directly with American intelligence officers, as he did with the American Liaison Officer to the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) in London during a visit in September 1947.<sup>146</sup>

In terms of censorship and cryptanalysis, some SHAEF agreements were still in force until March 1947.<sup>147</sup> In light of the Bizonal merger, they were reviewed and the resulting arrangements (despite some disagreements concerning method and organisation) created extremely 'cordial relations' between the two ID censorship staffs which were preserved by frequent visits.<sup>148</sup> For example, a joint Anglo-American meeting on the subject in 1947 resulted in special permission being requested to interchange 'Technical reports' and 'All Code material'.<sup>149</sup>

Such separate channels of direct liaison were again understandable, owing to the specialist focus of scientific and technical intelligence work. But the compartmentalisation and relative autonomy of scientific and technical intelligence work in Germany contributed to the difficulty some officials expressed in understanding its utility in relation to the Control Commission.<sup>150</sup> The relatively distinct nature of scientific and technical intelligence liaison further demonstrates why historians should not present evidence concerning scientific intelligence cooperation as representative of general Intelligence Division practices. However, even in this sphere, the ID liaison officers maintained a largely overlooked coordinating function. For example, Gottlieb's initial suggestion of sharing Apple Pie details with the Americans was discussed with the BLO, Da Silva.<sup>151</sup> Meetings between the directors of the two ID scientific branches had to be cleared by liaison officers.<sup>152</sup> Moreover, members of the ID's STIB and

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<sup>145</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/62, K.W. Gottlieb, Apple Pie Memorandum No. 6, Top Secret (17/03/1947). On the contents of Apple Pie papers see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 739, 563465, DDID to British Liaison Officer, 'Discontinuance of "Apple Pie" Project', Secret (12/01/1949). See also Maddrell, *Science*, p. 22.

<sup>146</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 48<sup>th</sup> Meeting Extract, Top Secret (10/09/1947). On JIB see Aldrich (ed), *British Intelligence*, p. 17.

<sup>147</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 728, 563465, A.F. Hennings to Controller, Censorship Bureau, 'Bi-Zonal Censorship Policy', Confidential (27/03/1947).

<sup>148</sup> TNA, FO 1047/83, 'Liaison Visit To U.S. Civil Censorship Division Frankfurt – Report' (09/06/1947) and HQ ID EUCOM to Censorship Branch, Intelligence Division, BAOR, 'Proposed Conference of Research in Frankfurt', Confidential (12/06/1947).

<sup>149</sup> TNA, FO 1047/83, No. 27 Special Censorship Unit, Bad Salzflun to Censorship Branch, ID HQ, 'Liaison with U.S. Zone', Secret (10/07/1947).

<sup>150</sup> TNA, FO 936/344, P.T. Lyver, 'CD/294/3-Intelligence Division' (28/11/1947).

<sup>151</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/62, K.W. Gottlieb, Apple Pie Memorandum No. 6, Top Secret (17/03/1947).

<sup>152</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 738, 563456, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch to DID, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (08/12/1949). See also Box 758, Ops Br to BLO (22-23/01/1951).



ID EUCOM's Scientific & Technical Section (S&T) increasingly communicated via the ID liaison officers too.<sup>153</sup>

Evidence suggests that from 1948 the USLO-BLO system of liaison operated effectively and largely unchanged throughout the existence of the Intelligence Divisions.<sup>154</sup> A minor change occurred in 1951. With the moving of British ID headquarters from Herford to Wahnerheide and its subsequent renaming as BIO(G), the USLO at BAOR headquarters in Bad Oeynhausen (previously focusing solely on military, not intelligence, matters) now operated as a military intelligence liaison officer for the Americans too, although he still had to coordinate much correspondence with the regular intelligence liaison officer at Wahnerheide.<sup>155</sup> The change of location from Herford to Wahnerheide and resulting changes in liaison procedure partially explains why the Intelligence Divisions kept each other regularly informed about their organisational developments: such changes had a direct bearing on the forms which Anglo-American liaison took and were vital to its quality.<sup>156</sup>

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The effectiveness of the prevalent, and much understudied, USLO-BLO chain of liaison which structured Anglo-American intelligence relations throughout the occupation will be further demonstrated in the following chapters which analyse the missions and activities of the Intelligence Divisions. Its effectiveness helps to explain the effectiveness of British and American rule in Germany, despite the 'complete chaos' of military government that some observers claimed was unfolding around them.<sup>157</sup> Indeed, this system largely explains how the British and Americans were able to control

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<sup>153</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/69, JIC(Germany), Coordinating Committee, 25<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (14/02/1949). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 741, 563465, R.E. Kilzer, HQ ID EUCOM to C/O 7707 ECIC, 'Serum Plant at Oelzschau', Confidential (08/06/1949); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Henry H. Rogers, Chief, Scientific & Technical Section to USLO, Wahnerheide, 'Report of Reports', Secret (05/05/1952) and (04/06/1952); Box 129, Henry H. Rogers, Chief, S&T, to BLO ID, 'Dr. Botho Demant', Confidential (28/08/1952).

<sup>154</sup> Although the ID EUCOM general correspondence records currently available end in 1952, evidence of later intelligence operations discussed in this thesis suggests that the regulations which structured intelligence liaison earlier in the occupation were still in place towards its end.

<sup>155</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, 'Liaison between Intelligence Division EUCOM...', Secret (29/03/1951). See also Peter Speiser, *The British Army of The Rhine: Turning Nazi Enemies into Cold War Partners* (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2016), p. 77. British ID HQ relocated 'on operational and security grounds' and also because 'their accommodation at Herford is needed for additional Army units', see TNA, FO 1035/77, 'Future of Intelligence Division', Top Secret (05/03/1951) and FO 1005/1731, Mr. Seal, Top Secret (04/04/1951), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>156</sup> For example, see British comments on preventing 'farcical' liaison in cryptanalysis in which quality may be sacrificed to quantity in attempts to keep up with U.S. Code Research who had much more staff than their British counterparts in TNA, FO 1047/83, N.V. Timewell, Code Research Officer to Capt. J.A. Homer, Int. Corps, BAOR, 'Report on Visit', Secret (09/07/1947).

<sup>157</sup> Meehan, *Strange*, p. 53.

Germany and how the Intelligence Divisions achieved their broad objectives. Whilst the stress the system placed on preventing disputes might suggest that much potential conflict lay beneath the surface, the ID liaison officers effectively managed the majority of such incidents. Examples of significant conflict are dwarfed by overwhelming evidence of good cooperation.

## Chapter Two:

### Military Intelligence

‘I think we have lost World War II and are losing World War III (now only in the diplomatic and political overture to the shooting) as definitely as we lost World War I. I think that Russia is destined to take all of Germany, Italy and Greece, no matter what we say or do or spend. We are facing a more determined, resourceful and dogged enemy than we did in Hitler -- one who has been preparing its Bulgarian, Hungarian, German, French and Italian stooges (yes, and American, too) since the days of Lenin and Trotsky. They have a plan of campaign for every country and it works without fail in all of them so far. Only momentarily are they stopped in the Allied occupation zones of Germany and Austria...Maybe we and the British can save France, but...without industry, Germany is doomed financially and Communism flourishes in such ground’.

- Managing Director, *Ohio State Journal*, Personal Letter sent to ID EUCOM, 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1947.<sup>1</sup>

Military intelligence gathered in occupied Germany was of crucial importance for the waging of the Cold War from London and Washington. Here, the frontlines of the intelligence war and the fearfully anticipated ‘hot’ war, as described by the alarming excerpt shared within ID EUCOM above, blurred most seamlessly.

Despite its importance, little has been written about the military intelligence functions of the IDs. Instead, historiographical attention has focused mainly on the BRIXMIS missions. But military intelligence played a crucial role in preventing an escalation from cold to hot war in post-war Germany and ID liaison was essential to this outcome. In contrast to the prevalent narrative of British decline and ID irrelevancy, this chapter argues that military intelligence gathered by British organisations highlighted the continued dependence of American intelligence officers on their British counterparts and the dependence of organisations such as MI6 and the CIA, on their ID allies.<sup>2</sup>

Although considerably compartmentalised and Cold War focused, military intelligence work in occupied Germany clearly complemented the primary security missions of the IDs, making its utility

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<sup>1</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 728, 563465, Chief of Branch, WM. Slayden, ID EUCOM, ‘Stateside Views on European Situation’ (03/09/1947).

<sup>2</sup> Differing narratives of British decline can be found in Jakub, *Spies*, pp. 184, 197; Constantin Goschler and Michael Wala, *“Keine Neue Gestapo”: Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2015), pp. 21-22; Maddrell, ‘British-American’, pp. 87, 89; Maddrell, *Science*, p. 83.

to the occupation and the secret system of rule more apparent than the IDs' at times closely related, but more compartmentalised, SCINT work.

## **I** **Mission**

The Intelligence Divisions, performing, as they did, a variety of intelligence functions, and consisting of civilian and military service members, had strong origins in military intelligence. In the first months of occupation, it was British military intelligence officers who undertook the security and political intelligence tasks which would later fall to their ID colleagues.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, military intelligence officers established the regional offices which would later be commanded by the IDs.<sup>4</sup> In doing so, they were performing one of the four key missions of military intelligence work in post-war Germany, that of preparation. They prepared the ground for the intelligence organisations of occupation to move in. The foundations of the secret system of rule were therefore laid by military intelligence.

Following the full activation of the British IG in July 1945, many military intelligence functions remained with BAOR, allowing the IG and later the ID, to focus on their security and political tasks.<sup>5</sup> This meant that British Military Intelligence (MINT) organisations could focus earlier, and more single-mindedly, on Cold War priorities as the focus of ID officers remained on other events in western Germany. Contrastingly, the American CIC continued to perform its political and security intelligence functions throughout the occupation, although with differing emphasis.

ID EUCOM headquarters had a Military Intelligence Section which was headed by David Dillard and presumably responsible for collating all military intelligence collected in Germany.<sup>6</sup> ID EUCOM also commanded several intelligence organisations with the principle objective of collecting military intelligence. For example, 'S-2, Berlin Military Post (7829 MI Platoon)' was ordered to collect 'military information on eastern European forces, with particular emphasis on Soviet forces located in

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<sup>3</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Division', pp. 91-92. See also Clayton, *Forearmed*, pp. 194-196.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1280, 'Transfer of Functions from GSI HQ BAOR to Control Commission' (November: 1945).

<sup>6</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, David S. Dillard, Chief, Military Section, HQ ID EUCOM to MA, Budapest, Hungary, Secret (28/02/1952).

the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany'.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, 'S-2, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation (7854 MI Detachment)' was tasked with collecting 'Military, scientific, technical, political and economic information on the Soviet Union, satellite countries, and Soviet Zone of Germany, through interrogation of illegal border-crossers and returning PW's'.<sup>8</sup>

The military intelligence functions of the British ID have been underestimated by historians, as they were by some British officials at the time. According to Aldrich, the ID was 'not organised for the collation or evaluation of military Intelligence'.<sup>9</sup> But although the ID may not have been originally organised to perform these functions, it was still deeply involved in military intelligence collection, collation, dissemination and most importantly, liaison. Those on the ground in Germany such as Sir Brian Robertson, the British High Commissioner, realised this. Consequently, Robertson complained that a large review of the ID organisation carried out by Sir Philip Vickery (head of Indian Political Intelligence) in 1950 attached 'insufficient importance...to the military functions of the Division'.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, only a year before, MI6 had requested that contrary to their standard practice, it should be ID officers who initially interrogated Red Army defectors in Germany, otherwise it 'would result in the MI6 staff now in Germany being over strained'.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, in April 1950, the MI6 representative at the JIC (Germany) argued that 'Security Directorate, Intelligence Division, had the responsibility of collating material on communist affairs in Germany on behalf of MI6, London, and that part of this work naturally included the Bereitschaften. If Intelligence Division ceased to collate material on the Bereitschaften it might be lost to MI6 London'.<sup>12</sup>

The ID's military intelligence role extended beyond informing MI6. For example, the Chief of the British ID also enjoyed the title of 'Major General Intelligence' for BAOR which placed him in overall command of the latter's G (INT) Branch which collected military intelligence with a focus on

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<sup>7</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, W.R. Rainford, Chief, Control Branch, ID HQ EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, Washington 25, D.C., 'Overall Plan for Intelligence Collection', Secret (24/10/1949).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Aldrich, 'BAOR', p. 97.

<sup>10</sup> FO 936/833, Robertson, High Commissioner, Wahnerheide to E.A. Seal, Foreign Office, Top Secret (16/03/1950), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 1123-16) completed on 02/02/2017.

<sup>11</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 84<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (25/11/1949). This is contrary to the impression given in Riehle, 'Defector', pp. 349, 354.

<sup>12</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/65, JIC(Germany), 91<sup>st</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (25/04/1950).

OB information.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, evidence suggests that like ID EUCOM, the British ID headquarters also commanded a Military Intelligence Section as did its predecessor, the IG.<sup>14</sup> This is further suggested by the fact that it was a British ID officer who regularly attended ID EUCOM's Top Secret teleconferences for the predominant purpose of sharing raw military intelligence.<sup>15</sup> Importantly, for most of the occupation, the bulk of Anglo-American military intelligence liaison was conducted via the ID's liaison officer who shared BAOR information with his American colleagues.<sup>16</sup> Only with the shift of ID headquarters from Herford to Wahnerheide in 1951 did the BAOR liaison officer adopt military intelligence duties.<sup>17</sup> But even in 1952 British RIOs were still producing military intelligence reports.<sup>18</sup>

The Military Intelligence Sections of the IDs along with the Army, Air Force and Navy intelligence organisations of the two powers worked closely together throughout the occupation on tasks broadly designed to protect the forces and occupying powers in Germany, prevent a surprise attack or unnecessary escalation of hostilities with the Soviet Union, predict, insofar as possible, enemy actions, intentions and capabilities and prepare British and American forces for worst case scenarios. These objectives, hereafter referred to as the 'Four Ps', are explicitly stated throughout ID EUCOM's general correspondence files. Designed, as they were, ultimately to guard against and deter hostile action, they are often intermixed and sometimes indistinguishable from the broader security intelligence tasks of the IDs. They begin with a focus on a threat from German militarism, shifting, understandably, with the end of quadripartite control in Germany, the explosion of the Soviet atom bomb and the Korean War to a focus on the threat of Soviet invasion.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> TNA, FO 936/344, Lethbridge, HQ ID to M.J. Dean, FO (German Section), Norfolk House, Confidential (16/06/1947). See also Aldrich, 'BAOR', pp. 97-98; FO 1005/1731, 'Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division', Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017; NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, DI to DC/S Opns, 'Liaison between Int Div EUCOM G (Int) BAOR & Int Div', Secret (09/02/1951). G (INT) was represented at the JIC(CCG) and later JIC(Germany), see TNA FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 26<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (30/07/1946) and TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 68<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (07/12/1948).

<sup>14</sup> TNA, FO 936/247, CCG(BE) to WO, 'War Establishment for the Major-General Intelligence' (14/12/1944).

<sup>15</sup> NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 135, Dillard to ACoS, G-2, Seventh Army, 'Current Intelligence on Soviet Order of Battle in Germany', Secret (30/09/1952). See also pp. 39, 56 in this thesis.

<sup>16</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, DI to DC/S Opns, 'Liaison between Int Div EUCOM G (Int) BAOR & Int Div', Secret (26/01/1951) and (09/02/1951).

<sup>17</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, 'Liaison between Intelligence Division EUCOM...', Secret (29/03/1951).

<sup>18</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, RIO, Land Commissioner's Office, Hansstadt-Hamburg to Production Directorate, HQ ID Wahnerheide, 'Military Information', Secret (26/03/1952).

<sup>19</sup> According to Kirkpatrick the impact of the Korean War on attitudes in Germany was 'tremendous' see Kirkpatrick, *Circle*, p. 238. See also Maddrell, *Science*, pp. 29, 78; Caldwell and Hanshew, *Germany*, p. 41.

In 1947, the CIC mission was identified as ‘primarily to protect the United States occupation against espionage, sabotage and subversion within the boundaries of U.S. Occupied Germany and to support Military Government’.<sup>20</sup> In November, documents reveal a specific task was to ‘Prevent the reorganization of the German intelligence services...and affiliated para-military or resistance organizations’.<sup>21</sup> In April 1948, the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was ordered to:

1. Discover, prevent, and counter the activities of foreign intelligence services, secret police and dissident or resistance groups.
2. Protect the United States' interests in the Zone against sabotage and investigate any incidents of sabotage which may occur...
4. Prevent the reorganization of the ex-enemy intelligence services, security and secret police, and affiliated para-military organizations.<sup>22</sup>

In June 1951, the American ID was described as ‘the senior military intelligence agency in EUCOM, and as such coordinates the military intelligence activities thereof’.<sup>23</sup> As this document made clear, ID EUCOM was the point at which all Military intelligence in occupied Germany was collated:

...the Intelligence Division deals with the senior Military Attaches of the various European countries...the three major commands - the Twelfth Air Force, the Seventh Army, and the US Naval Forces in Germany [each have their] own intelligence organization...which concentrate on matters peculiar to their own service. All three of these major commands analyze and forward information to the Intelligence Division, EUCOM.<sup>24</sup>

In addition, it made clear that the 427th Counter Intelligence Detachment ‘protects the internal security of Seventh Army units and installations’.<sup>25</sup> The Berlin-based 7880th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) was tasked with collecting ‘positive intelligence generally within the Soviet Zone of Germany’.<sup>26</sup> The purpose of such positive military intelligence gathering was made explicitly clear by the Chief of ID EUCOM’s Analysis Branch the following year: ‘It is the official position of this Division that its two prime missions are the prevention of surprise attack by Communist armed forces against Western

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<sup>20</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, ‘Material for G-2 Presentation at Conference for District and Port Commanders’, Secret (Undated, likely 1947).

<sup>21</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, Organisation Table, Secret (November: 1947).

<sup>22</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 734, 563465, E.A. Zundel, Chief, CIC, ‘Report of CIC Activities – Europe’, Secret (19/04/1948).

<sup>23</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, ‘Intelligence Organization in EUCOM’, Confidential (20/06/1951).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

Europe and the anticipation of, and protection of the Command against, Communist subversive activities in the midst and in the rear of the European Command'.<sup>27</sup>

British mission statements of this sort are fewer but although not explicitly stated, the 'Four Ps' can be identified in similar documents outlining British military intelligence functions in occupied Germany. For example, in November 1947 the JIC London produced a document detailing 'Priorities of Tasks for the Collection of Intelligence Information from Germany'.<sup>28</sup> First on its list was 'Russian intentions in Germany'.<sup>29</sup> Second was the 'Security of the British Zone' – an obvious task of protection.<sup>30</sup> Further down the list which becomes more specific was the goal of collecting 'Order of Battle of Soviet...Forces, in all areas'.<sup>31</sup> This was again designed to prevent and protect against a surprise attack by determining what is normal for Soviet forces and to prepare for such attack through collection of information on Soviet strength. OB analysis was a key area of ID-ID EUCOM liaison, as will be seen.

The importance of military intelligence work increased in the 1950s as partially evidenced by the transferring of the British ID from Foreign Office to War Office control and increased troop numbers in Germany.<sup>32</sup> This is further revealed by the 1951 statement of an influential Foreign Office official named E.A. Seal: 'It was no longer a question of controlling a disarmed Germany, but of preparing to defend the country as part of Western Europe. Some work of internal security nature was naturally involved'.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Morin, Chief, Analysis Branch, ID HQ EUCOM to Civilian Personnel Officer, Heidelberg Military Post, 'Position Classification Appeal of Jessie VOSS', Secret (24/06/1952).

<sup>28</sup> TNA, FO 371/64554, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 'Priorities of Tasks for the Collection of Intelligence Information from Germany', Top Secret (24/11/1947).

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Division', p. 95. See also TNA, DEFE 5/28/130, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 'Future of Intelligence Division in Germany', Top Secret (09/03/1951); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Det, 'Justification For Military Augmentation', Secret (11/01/1952); FO 1005/1731, Mr. Seal, Top Secret (04/04/1951), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>33</sup> FO 1005/1731, Ministry of Defence, 'Corrigendum', Top Secret (21/04/1951), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.



Military Attachés shared similar missions to their colleagues on the ground in Germany. In 1950, the Army Attaché at the American Embassy in London was assigned the following collection priorities:

- (1) All indications of outbreak or imminence of outbreak of hostilities involving or likely to involve the United States.
- (2) Intentions, activities, capabilities, and potentials of the U.S.S.R. and Satellites as revealed by Communist activities throughout the Empire or by information reaching the Empire from any source.<sup>34</sup>

In this short extract, the Four Ps can again be identified. Indications of a hostile outbreak were designed to prevent a surprise attack which would aid the protection of US forces, and analysis of intentions would aid preparation for an attack and help predict the likely future actions of their enemy.

That the IDs genuinely believed they were on the front line in preparing for, protecting against, predicting and hopefully preventing a Soviet attack is best revealed by a series of remarkable speeches given in May 1949 at the Fourth European Attaché Conference in Frankfurt.<sup>35</sup> The conference was attended by the European Military Attachés, CIC officers, ID EUCOM Chiefs and representatives from the FBI and the CIA.<sup>36</sup> The first speech given by the Acting Commander in Chief of EUCOM, Clarence R. Huebner, perfectly captured the atmosphere:

Today, you gentlemen are the outposts of America more than ever before in the history of our country. We are engaged in a great war which has no periphery. Its intensity moves from place to place. It is here today, in the Far East tomorrow, in the Middle East the next day, in South America the next day. You are the sentinals - the advance guards who are keeping the departments informed. You have done your work during the last year in a superb manner. The information you have sent has not only helped the people at home, it has helped us in Europe... We have our agencies within the Zone to keep our Order of Battle complete, but without your help we could do nothing. We in Europe are sitting close to the USSR. We are the ones who would feel the impact first if anything should happen. We feel that if we could get some warning we could take care of ourselves and put up a good showing... It is so important for you in the field to use every means at your disposal to ferret out his thoughts and what he intends to do. As you know, of course, he has a great security system of his own, and it is hard to penetrate... So far you have been very successful. There is no question in my mind that we are in a life and death struggle for our existence. Time will be the only thing that will tell us how we will come out.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 745, 563465, Office of the Army Attache, American Embassy, 20 Grosvenor Square, London, 'Local Operating Instructions', Secret (October: 1950).

<sup>35</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 749, 563465, 'Final Report Fourth European Attache Conference Frankfurt', Secret (23-27 May 1949).

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 749, 563465, 'Final Report Fourth European Attache Conference Frankfurt', Introductory Remarks by Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, Secret (23-27 May 1949).

The third, given by Major-General C.P. Cabell, the Director of US Air Force Intelligence, further revealed the importance of military attachés, the close relation between security and military intelligence, and the apocalyptic scale of the struggle American intelligence officers considered themselves to be engaged in:

Behind the scenes of any successful intelligence organization there is always a hard working team of individuals, and the attache is most certainly an important member of that military intelligence team. You are first and foremost collectors, twenty-four hours a day, and all your activities must be pointed to that end... Today, as in the case of Hitler's "Mein Kampf", we have a blue print for world conquest. This blue print has been under preparation for a hundred years. It began with the writings of Marx and Engels, followed by the further writings of Lenin and Stalin. These documents include the "Communist Manifesto". They have been followed by specific acts of violent revolution, subversion, infiltration, propaganda and political upheaval... The Communists have told us bluntly that it is their long range intention to dominate the world. I believe that none of us here today doubts this intent. Facing us is the constant problem of fathoming the more immediate intentions and probable actions of the Soviet Union.<sup>38</sup>

Evidence suggests that the British ID agreed with such American assessments of the Soviet threat. When Kirkman visited Truscott and General Handy at Heidelberg in 1951 he 'came away with a very satisfactory impression of apparent unanimity of view between the British and US Intelligence authorities'.<sup>39</sup> The extent to which British intelligence informed and shared this American perception of the Soviet threat and the role of military intelligence in countering it is further revealed in the following analysis which analyses the extent, forms and consequences of Anglo-American military intelligence cooperation in pursuit of their four key objectives in occupied Germany.

## **II Cooperation**

The objective of protection most closely links military intelligence work to the IDs' primary mission, the broader objectives of the occupation, and the secret system of rule which played a crucial role in achieving them. That is because protection was essentially a matter of security which was necessary to achieve the occupation objectives. Consequently, the work undertaken by military intelligence officers

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<sup>38</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 749, 563465, 'Final Report Fourth European Attache Conference Frankfurt', Introductory Remarks by Maj. General C.P. Cabell, Secret (23-27 May 1949).

<sup>39</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 111<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (19/06/1951).

overlapped, sometimes harmoniously, at other times with unnecessary duplication, with the work of ID officers.

ID officers, the officers, agents and organisations they commanded and the intelligence elements of the three armed services were all concerned with ensuring the security of their occupation forces. Consequently, both IDs closely monitored and exchanged information concerning attacks on troops and underground organisations composed of former German armed forces personnel who were suspected of being capable of carrying out violent attacks.<sup>40</sup>

In the American Zone, the task of ensuring the security of military posts throughout the zone fell to ID EUCOM which carried out inspections.<sup>41</sup> Likewise, the British ID advised CCG units in their zone on how to protect their buildings from espionage.<sup>42</sup> Protection of military installations also involved much counterintelligence work. Indeed, both IDs were aware that their Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) adversaries behind the Iron Curtain were conducting positive military intelligence operations in the western zones.<sup>43</sup> Consequently, correspondence was exchanged via the USLO-BLO chain concerning suspects to help both IDs prevent Iron Curtain intelligence agents from collecting OB information about their installations.<sup>44</sup>

In one notable (but in many ways, not uncommon) incident, ID EUCOM informed the USLO that one Owe Heinrich Hermann Kampovsky had been arrested on the Bavarian/Czechoslovakian border whilst picnicking with his wife.<sup>45</sup> They were interrogated and imprisoned for 10 days by the Czechs who tried to recruit them for espionage in the western zones and asked questions about the reconstruction of highways and factories in the latter (such questions could have had a military,

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<sup>40</sup> TNA, FO 1038/102, Air Headquarters, 'Fortnightly Summary' (18/06/1946). See also TNA, FO 1005/1702, ID Summary No. 1, Secret (08/07/1946); TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 1, Top Secret (01/04/1948); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 734, 563465, Moore, USLO to DDID, 'Forwarding of Reports', Secret (19/04/1948).

<sup>41</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, David Wagstaff Jr, Executive Opns Br, ID EUCOM to Acting Director, ID, 'Staff Visits, S-2, Military Posts', Restricted (02/05/1951).

<sup>42</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1003, 'HQ Intelligence Division, Security Advisory Section Charter', Confidential (23/01/1948). See also TNA, FO 936/344, 'Function of Officers in HQ Intelligence Division and Regions' (01/04/1947) and HQ ID, 'Directorate of Security', Top Secret (12/08/1948).

<sup>43</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66th CIC Detachment, 'Elli Gertrud BADING', Secret (02/04/1952).

<sup>44</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Garrison, ID to BLO HQ EUCOM, 'Johann KOPP', Secret (18/01/1952) and Garrison to USLO Wahnerheide, 'Werner Helmut Paul Eggert', Secret (08/04/1952). See also Box 134, Marshall, Chief S&S Section to BLO, 'Gerardus STAN', Secret (26/09/1952).

<sup>45</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to USLO Wahnerheide, 'Owe Heinrich Hermann Kampovsky', Confidential (27/08/1952).

economic or SCINT significance).<sup>46</sup> They were returned to Western Germany wearing only bathing suits.<sup>47</sup> The CIC did not trust that they had not agreed to an espionage mission, hence they forewarned the British ID.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, in 1952, ID USAREUR and the BIO(G) were both monitoring at least one individual suspected of attempting to collect OB information for an Iron Curtain agency as he approached an individual in Dusseldorf (presumably a British soldier) and asked him 'to provide mil info'.<sup>49</sup>

Both IDs also helped each other with the internal security of their forces by informing each other when a British or American soldier was suspected of engaging in espionage for the Soviets.<sup>50</sup> Such suspicions could arise when, for example, a British car was regularly seen parked outside an official building in the Soviet Zone.<sup>51</sup>

Most Anglo-American counterintelligence liaison was conducted via the IDs' USLO-BLO chain although some work on the ground was undertaken by military intelligence officers. For example, in the 1950s, ID EUCOM's 7880 MID interrogated espionage suspects and engaged in some direct raw intelligence sharing with their British ID colleagues in Berlin.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, since at least 1948, the vast majority of military intelligence work in occupied Germany was undertaken in anticipation of a Soviet military attack. To protect from this threat, adequate preparations had to be made.

A key form which such liaison took was the sharing of OB information. Much of it was shared via the USLO-BLO chain. For example, ID EUCOM and the USLO exchanged reports and information concerning paramilitary police in the Soviet zone, with emphasis on their organisation, key personalities within them and even their service regulations.<sup>53</sup> Information concerning the composition of intelligence

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, 'Gerardus STAN', Secret (26/09/1952).

<sup>50</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 755, 563465, George A. Baldry, Chief, S&S Section to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Alleged American Officers at Soviet Kommandantur', Confidential (16/04/1951). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Garrison, Executive, Opns Br to BLO HQ EUCOM, 'Walter BELLMANN', Secret (09/07/1952).

<sup>51</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to HQ ID (Thru BLO), 'Wilhelm H. BUCHARE', Secret (16/04/1952).

<sup>52</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, Baldry, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, 'Antonin GENEK', Secret (08/10/1951). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Hughes, Jr., Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 7880 MI Detachment, 'Transmittal of Military Intelligence Field Reports to British Element in Berlin', Secret (13/02/1952).

<sup>53</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 735, 563465, Rainford, Chief, Control Branch for DDID EUCOM to USLO Herford, 'Border Police and Alert Units', Secret (05/08/1949) and S1b Kelly to USLO (03/03/1949).

organisations such as the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and even the German Communist Party (KPD) OB was also exchanged.<sup>54</sup> The fear was that, 'like the former German SS', the MVD would be used in combat if war was to break out and the KPD would engage in covert violence.<sup>55</sup> Importantly, prior to April 1951, information of this sort which ID EUCOM wished to send to G (INT) BAOR was transferred via the USLO.<sup>56</sup> Even after this point the ID Liaison Officer worked closely with his BAOR colleague.<sup>57</sup> The variety of reports shared from a plethora of different agencies is impressive. The IDs and their liaison officers acted as a key filtering post for all of it ensuring that information was widely shared between the service intelligence organisations and national organisations such as the CIA and the JIB, without necessarily revealing sources or distribution lists.<sup>58</sup>

Much OB information was derived from interrogations of defectors, displaced persons and prisoners of war. Interrogation briefs were regularly shared via the USLO-BLO chain.<sup>59</sup> The broader significance of SCINT work and its close interrelation with MINT can be identified here as interrogations often centred on specific technical or terrain information, all of which was essential for adequately preparing for battle.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, the S&T section of ID EUCOM was in regular contact with their military colleagues, exchanging information on Soviet weaponry and equipment, some of which derived from British intelligence.<sup>61</sup> The IDs were incredibly efficient at extracting OB

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<sup>54</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 367, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (February: 1949). See also Box 360, Top Secret Teleconference, 'Subject: Usual' (25/01/1949); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Transmittal of Documents', Secret (15/05/1952).

<sup>55</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 751, 563465, 'Estimate of Future Purpose of Main Administration for Training', Secret (Undated: Likely 1950). See also TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Summary No. 10, Top Secret (31/12/1948).

<sup>56</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, E.N. Clarke, JIC(Germany) to Director of Intelligence, ID EUCOM, Secret (09/01/1951).

<sup>57</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, 'Liaison between Intelligence Division EUCOM...', Secret (29/03/1951).

<sup>58</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 764, 563465, Adams, Jr., Chief, PP&T Branch to ACoS G-2 Seventh Army, 'Soviet Army Uniforms', Restricted (31/01/1951). See also Box 750, Hardick, Chief, Collection Section, 'Separate Letters', Secret (27/12/1950); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Marshall, ID EUCOM to G/INT BAOR thru BLO, 'Copies J.I.B. Reports', Secret (16/01/1952); Box 134, Marshall, ID USAREUR to Intelligence Officer, Commander US Naval Forces, Germany, 'Transmittal of British Intelligence Report', Secret (21/11/1952).

<sup>59</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 124, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, Confidential (07/04/1952). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 750, 563465, Johnson, Chief, Opns Br, HQ ID EUCOM to USLO, ID Herford, 'Rolf KAUSON and Emmanuel DZIWOK', Confidential (20/04/1950); Box 736, Miller, USLO to Ops Br, 'KUHN, (Fnu)', Secret (15/07/1949); Box 741, Steinmetz, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 7707<sup>th</sup> ECIC, Secret (26/10/1949); Box 761, Hughes, Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 7707<sup>th</sup> ECIC, 'EKM Turbinen-fabrik, VEB, Dresden', Secret (14/12/1951).

<sup>60</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 741, 563465, Steinmetz, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 7707<sup>th</sup> ECIC, Secret (26/10/1949) and Anne C. Moe for DDID to CO 7707 ECIC, 'Logistics of Guided Missiles', Secret (16/05/1949); Box 760, Knapp, Chief Military Section, HQ ID EUCOM to ACoS G-2 Washington D.C., 'Infrared Telescopic Sight', Secret (11/09/1951); Box 736, Steinmetz for DID to CO 7707<sup>th</sup> ECIC, 'Max FELDMEIERS', Secret (07/11/1949).

<sup>61</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 760, 563465, Knapp, Chief Military Section, HQ ID EUCOM to ACoS G-2 Washington D.C., 'Infrared Telescopic Sight', Secret (11/09/1951). See also Box 757, Rogers, Chief, S&T Section to CO 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment, 'British Production Interrogation Report', Confidential (11/12/1951); NARA II, RG549, A12027,

information from those who left the communist side of the Iron Curtain. For example, in March 1952, ID EUCOM received an interrogation report from RIO Hamburg which gave the testimony of a shipyard worker from Boizenburg who had recently moved to Hamburg.<sup>62</sup> During his business trips in the Russian Zone as a purchaser and messenger, he had taken note of the location of Russian army detachments he saw, their numbers and equipment.<sup>63</sup> Such information would typically be corroborated against any similar American sources, resulting in more measured OB estimates.<sup>64</sup> Corroboration was a key advantage of largely unrestricted military intelligence liaison.

In preparation for a potential battle, the IDs also shared much information concerning the OB of their own occupation forces. Strength figures, uniform and equipment information was shared, and American ID officers attended British manoeuvres and RAF demonstrations.<sup>65</sup> Terrain information pertaining to Bizonia, some of which was collected via aerial photography was also shared.<sup>66</sup> ID EUCOM were particularly impressed with the preparatory methods of their British counterparts in military intelligence work. For example, in January 1950, 7712 European Command Intelligence School received a letter from ID EUCOM recommending:

...that a Russian Army Exhibit, similar to the British War Office Intelligence Team Exhibit, be organized for the purpose of touring the zone in order to acquaint every enlisted man and junior officer with the equipment, uniforms, organization, customs, fighting ability, and characteristics of the Russian Army.<sup>67</sup>

Illustrative of how close such preparatory measures were is the fact that in January 1952 the BLO was requested to ask a BAOR officer 'to give a class of instruction to officers in the combat intelligence

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Box 126, C/S&T ID to Sig Div, 'Transmittal of Various Intelligence Reports', Secret (14/01/1952); Box 127, C/S&T ID to Sig Div, Confidential (28/04/1952); Box 133, C/S&T ID to Sig Div, 'Transmittal of Intelligence Reports', Secret (07/04/1952).

<sup>62</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, RIO, Land Commissioner's Office, Hansestadt-Hamburg to Production Directorate, HQ ID Wahnerheide, 'Military Information', Secret (26/03/1952).

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (14/06/1949). See also Box 362, Top Secret Teleconference (13/09/1949).

<sup>65</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 751, 563465, Johnson, Chief, Opns Br to USLO ID Herford, 'Location Statements', Secret (16/03/1950) and Steinmetz, Asst. Control Officer, 'BAFO Air Demonstration', Restricted (18/05/1950) and Miller, USLO, ID Herford to Ops Br., 'Training Aids', Confidential (20/12/1950). See also Box 743, Moe for DDID, 'Transmittal of Document', Secret (15/04/1949); Box 741, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM, to USLO Herford, 'Strength Figures of the British Sector of Berlin', Secret (30/12/1949); Box 738, Johnson, Chief Opns Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to DID, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (13/10/1949).

<sup>66</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, Laurence E. Lynn, Chief Military Division to HQ BAOR, 'Transmittal of Aerial Photography', Restricted (04/12/1947) and Lynn to DDID, 'Transfer of Operation "Groundhog" Material', Restricted (08/12/1947).

<sup>67</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 751, 563465, W.R. Rainford, Chief, Control Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Commandant, 7712 European Command Intelligence School, 'Russian Army Exhibit' (09/01/1950).

course at EUCOM Intelligence and Military Police School'.<sup>68</sup> By the end of the year the latter School was receiving BIO(G) reports, presumably for the purpose of training.<sup>69</sup>

The IDs also played a crucial role in emergency planning. Their involvement in this seems to have begun in earnest in 1948, likely inspired by the heightened tensions caused by the Berlin Blockade. Indeed, in October 1948, the BLO was involved in discussions concerning the creation of 'an emergency radio link for urgent messages' for communication between the IDs in Herford and Heidelberg and BAOR in the event of an emergency.<sup>70</sup> It is clear that the military recognised the importance of ID communications in the event of an emergency as the suggestion originated with the Signals Division of the US Army.<sup>71</sup> The following month, the BLO informed the DDID of Herford's suggestion that 'since this link is primarily designed for an emergency, and any emergency is almost bound to be mutual, that a combined Anglo-American code be employed'.<sup>72</sup> The mutual threat of Soviet invasion clearly highlighted the mutual dependence of the IDs in this area and necessitated close cooperation. The BLO played a leading role in these initial emergency preparations, even arranging a One Time Pad system.<sup>73</sup> By December 1949, clear radio contact was made between Herford and EUCOM using this new emergency link.<sup>74</sup>

ID EUCOM's reliance on their British allies was further exposed in August 1950 when it was decided that the Army Security Agency Europe's (ASAE) Command Issuing Office for cryptomaterial, presently attached to EUCOM in Frankfurt, had to move to England.<sup>75</sup> The threat the Western Allies were fearing from Soviet invasion in Germany, heightened by the Korean War, was further highlighted in correspondence concerning this move:

It is considered that the exposed position of the present location, where large stocks of cryptomaterial might be captured before emergency destruction could be completed in the event of a surprise attack by overwhelming forces, results in a serious threat, not only to

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<sup>68</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 130, George A. Baldwin for DID to BLO, 'Request For Guest Speaker' (25/01/1952).

<sup>69</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID USAREUR to Commandant Intelligence and Military Police School, 'Transmittal of British Intelligence Report', Secret (01/12/1952).

<sup>70</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 732, 563465, Moe for DDID to BLO, 'W/T Communication', Secret (25/10/1948).

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 732, 563465, E.J. Linnington, BLO to DDID, 'W/T Communication', Secret (19/11/1948).

<sup>73</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 738, 563456, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch to DID, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (08/12/1949).

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 748, 563465, Chief of Staff, US Army to CINCEUR, Secret Message (10/08/1950).

communications security of the European Command, but also to that of all U.S. military forces.<sup>76</sup>

This move appears to have been carried out with no opposition from the British, partially owing to ID EUCOM's good relationship with the American military attaché at the British Embassy in London.<sup>77</sup>

It appears that ID liaison officers were to play a crucial role in the event of a Soviet invasion, presumably in keeping their Allies regularly informed of developments as the Soviets advanced. This is further suggested by the fact that ID EUCOM described 'Some form of rapid, classified communication with the USLO' as 'a definite operational requirement' to ASAE.<sup>78</sup> Furthermore, in May 1952, the USLO to BAOR participated in 'Exercise Team Spirit' which was presumably one of many war games designed to increase preparations for Soviet attack.<sup>79</sup> Such emergency preparations were usually undertaken in anticipation of worst-case scenarios, particularly a surprise attack. A key goal of Anglo-American military intelligence cooperation was to prevent the latter.

Throughout 1949, a British ID officer named Graham Mills regularly attended a series of Top Secret teleconferences which were held between EUCOM and the Department of the Army in Washington, DC.<sup>80</sup> These conferences were overwhelmingly concerned with sharing and quickly analysing recently obtained OB information. As one American officer put it, they sometimes involved 'a hasty assessment of poop'.<sup>81</sup> Held in a sometimes-jovial atmosphere, they reveal much about the working relationship between the two IDs and the vital importance of the military intelligence work they undertook in relation to the Cold War. Such information can be revealed for the first time in this thesis, through analysis of the large collection of conference minutes stored at NARA II.

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<sup>76</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 748, 563465, R.K. Taylor, Director of Intelligence to Chief of Staff, 'Establishment of Command Issuing Office (ASA) in England', Secret (14/08/1950). See also Kirkpatrick, *Circle*, p. 238; Maddrell, *Science*, p. 78; Robert Cecil in Aldrich (ed), *British Intelligence*, p. X.

<sup>77</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 748, 563465, G.T. Kimbrell to Commanding General, Army Security Agency, 'Establishment of an Army Security Agency, Europe Command Issuing Office in England', Secret (08/09/1950).

<sup>78</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 757, 563465, Philp, Acting DDID, EUCOM to Chief, ASAE, Confidential (31/07/1951).

<sup>79</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 130, Armel Dyer, Senior USLO, BAOR, 'Restricted Availability of Sr USLO, BAOR', Restricted (21/05/1952).

<sup>80</sup> For example see NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, 'Subject: Usual' (25/01/1949). See also Teleconferences on 15 March and 12, 26 and 31 April 1949.

<sup>81</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (February: 1949).



Held several times a month throughout 1949, 1950 and probably throughout the occupation too, the ID teleconferences provided a forum for the sharing of incredibly detailed OB information. Here, information from a plethora of sources such as the British and American military attachés, BAOR, the IDs and the CIA were discussed.<sup>82</sup> OB information derived mainly from human intelligence sources. British and American military attachés sometimes also pooled information together at OB conferences held at American ID Headquarters in Heidelberg, but the teleconferences appear to have been the most frequent forum for Anglo-American military intelligence cooperation.<sup>83</sup>

At several conferences, the vast majority of information discussed derived from British sources, particularly BAOR. For example, in May 1949, the Department of the Army noted ‘You will have noticed recently that we have passed you several items on Poland which we have received from the British. The majority of these reports are unconfirmed but we nonetheless have passed them on to you, as pickings on Poland are so meager’.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, British intelligence were sometimes the sole source of information for their American colleagues at these conferences which helps to demonstrate American dependence. This also helps to further highlight the importance of cooperation, its necessity and a key consequence of it – the filling of gaps in knowledge.

One reason for British success in military intelligence, given at a teleconference in January 1949, was organisation and manpower differences:

What this amounts to is that we give the Russkies credit for a lot bigger “Division Slice” than the British do. Another big difference is in the strength of each division. The British are probably more accurate than we are on that because they have enough personnel in the business to have one officer doing nothing but studying organization and unit strengths.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (17/05/1949), (31/05/1949) and (14/06/1949). See also Box 362, Top Secret Teleconference (November 1949).

<sup>83</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Morin, HQ ID EUCOM, ‘Czechoslovak Order of Battle’, Secret (27/02/1952). Several similar Anglo-American OB conferences were held in the 1950s, see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, Dillard, Chief, Military Section to CO 7707 ECIC, ‘Visit of British Officer’, Secret (05/10/1951). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, P. Stewart, BAOR to ID EUCOM, Secret (16/02/1952); Dillard to ACoS, G-2, Washington, D.C., Secret (10/03/1952); Mark McClure, Director of Intelligence, HQ ID EUCOM to Shortt, War Office, London, Secret (28/03/1952); Dillard to Park T Jenkins, Detachment Q, US Army Attache, London, Secret (27/10/1952); Box 135, Dillard to HQ BAOR, ‘AA Positions in the Soviet Zone’, Secret (25/06/1952). Preparation for such conferences was usually arranged via the USLO see Box 134, Morin, Chief, Analysis Branch thru USLO ID to DMI, War Office, London, ‘Soviet Army Conference Number 14’, Secret (13/03/1952).

<sup>84</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, Top Secret Teleconference (31/05/1949).

<sup>85</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, Top Secret Teleconference (January 1949).

As the latter quotation indicates, a particular focus of such conferences was estimating the ‘strength’ or ‘figures’ indicating just how many Soviet troops were behind the Iron Curtain and where at a particular time. As EUCOM noted in March, ‘You can scare yourself to death with figures.’<sup>86</sup>

It was partly the job of EUCOM, BAOR and the British ID on the ground in Germany to ensure that decisionmakers in London and Washington did not panic and take rash decisions through sensible analysis of the OB intelligence they received. A key way of preventing this, and of preventing a surprise attack, was to discover what was normal for the Soviets. For example, in April 1949, the Department of the Army asked ID EUCOM:

Do you know whether Soviets normally send units on maneuvers with their full war scales of ammunition, transportation, medical facilities, etc? We can find nothing on this and it strikes us that it is rather important to find out what their normal practice is in this respect. If it is not normal practice, then, if and when we hear of them on maneuvers with all this sort of thing we should have quite a good indication of intent. If, however, th[ey] always go out on maneuvers with the wherewithal for war, then we must hope that other indications will give us the tip-off.<sup>87</sup>

Clearly, seemingly mundane details could give crucial indications of war intentions. EUCOM responded to this particular query in July: ‘This item gives an answer to the question we raised some time ago about whether the Soviets take all their combat equipment etc. on maneuvers. Looks like we are going to have to look some place else for indications!’<sup>88</sup> The IDs did in fact look in every conceivable place to obtain intelligence which could indicate Soviet military intentions.

Frequent joint monitoring of Soviet movements, sharing of raw information, comparing conclusions and corroborating reports helped to reduce potential panic and poor decision making in response to the alarming information received concerning the size of Soviet forces behind the Iron Curtain and their activities.<sup>89</sup> For example, in November 1949, EUCOM noted in response to an alleged largescale influx of Soviet troops into Germany ‘it is interesting to note a similarity in the independent responses of this office and the British’.<sup>90</sup> Corroboration helped to reduce anxiety at EUCOM and

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<sup>86</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, Top Secret Teleconference (15/03/1949).

<sup>87</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, Top Secret Teleconference (19/04/1949).

<sup>88</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, Top Secret Teleconference (July: 1949).

<sup>89</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, Top Secret Teleconferences (14/06/1949), (05,26/07/1949). See also Box 362, Top Secret Teleconferences (September: 1949); Box 364, Secret Teleconference (16/10/1950).

<sup>90</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 363, Top Secret Teleconference (08/11/1949).

resulted in more accurate assessments of the threat being faced. Importantly, not once did either ID conclude that a Soviet attack was imminent.

Sometimes, differences of opinion with regards to Soviet strength figures were expressed at these conferences. But this did not result in any significant disputes. On one such occasion EUCOM stated ‘The best of friends differ sometimes and this seems to be just one of those occasions’.<sup>91</sup> Indeed, ID EUCOM were very comfortable when their British guest was in attendance to the extent of being able to make frank assessments such as ‘All this looks like the result of adding innumerable bottle of Schnapps to some amateur strategists’.<sup>92</sup>

It appears that the intelligence officers who contributed to such teleconferences helped to prevent several ‘flaps’ in Washington. As ID EUCOM stated in February 1949:

There is nothing new reference this present flap...Our crystal-ball indicates darkly that it is just class of 28 coming in. If it were new units and if the Soviets had ulterior motives it does not seem logical that their security personnel would allow our Agents to move more or less freely through the area and so far there has been no further restrictions on the Mission\*. Could it be they want us to see something and become alarmed?<sup>93</sup>

The frequent sarcastic use of the term ‘crystal ball’ helps to demonstrate the humorous atmosphere which seems to have prevailed at these conferences, perhaps as a way of dealing with the high stakes involved.<sup>94</sup> It also demonstrates how closely linked the IDs’ military intelligence objectives were as rash responses and surprises were expected to be prevented partially through predictions of Soviet intentions.

Both IDs played a crucial role in compiling intelligence from all available sources in Germany to produce predictions of Soviet intentions. G2 USFET and the British ID had produced separate predictions in 1947 to inform their policy makers of ‘the Soviet mind’ in light of the Moscow

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<sup>91</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, Top Secret Teleconference (17/05/1949).

<sup>92</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, Top Secret Teleconference (31/04/1949). This comment referred to a report from a German source.

<sup>93</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, Top Secret Teleconference (23/02/1949).

\* The ‘Mission’ here may refer to the American counterpart of BRIXMIS, the United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM), established in 1947 with identical functions to BRIXMIS, see Boghardt, ‘Vanguard’, p. 3.

<sup>94</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, Top Secret Teleconference (19/04/1949).

Conference of the 'Big Four' Foreign Ministers.<sup>95</sup> However, evidence suggests that Anglo-American intelligence cooperation on the ground in Germany in this area began in earnest on 1 April 1948. On this date, the British ID, now under the command of General Haydon, produced the first edition of its newly revised Top-Secret monthly summary.<sup>96</sup> These lengthy and incredibly detailed summaries were routinely shared with the BLO at Heidelberg.<sup>97</sup> Opening, as did many future publications, with a detailed summary of international events, focused on Russia, the report argued that 'tension has been heightened by the action of the Russians in walking out of the Allied Control Council. The ultimate division of Germany into two is now coming to be taken for granted'.<sup>98</sup> Information on Russian intentions, it informed its readers, was gathered by Regional Intelligence Officers via monitoring of the KPD, constructions or obstacles on zonal boundaries and even collection of OB information.<sup>99</sup>

At the end of the month, the second ID summary which opened with a 'Forecast of Russian Intentions in Germany' referenced a JIC(G) document to argue that although the layout of Russian forces was 'more or less defensive... her forces could if she wished launch an offensive without first carrying out extensive regrouping. In our opinion, and in view of the very small forces opposing her, she could begin such an offensive without notice and with good prospects of immediate short term successes'.<sup>100</sup> However, and importantly, the ID was:

...of the opinion that this is not yet her intention. If asked to estimate what was in her mind we would answer as follows: -

- (a) To evict the Western Powers from Berlin by means short of war.
- (b) To proclaim Berlin as the capital of Germany and to set up a so-called central government there.
- (c) To intensify the iron curtain on the zonal boundaries and to reorganise behind it.
- (d) To nullify to the maximum extent possible the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan perhaps by a well co-ordinated sabotage campaign...<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 730, 563465, HQ USFET Intelligence Branch, G-2 Division, 'Estimate of Soviet Intentions in Germany', Secret (04/02/1947). See also TNA, DEFE 41/62, HQ ID, 'Appreciation of the Probable Course of Development of Russian Intelligence and Political Activity in the British Zone of Germany', Top Secret (June: 1947). On the Moscow Conference see Andrew Szanajda, *The Allies and the German Problem, 1941-1949: From Cooperation to Alternative Settlement* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 65-71.

<sup>96</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 1, Top Secret (01/04/1948).

<sup>97</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, CCG(BE), Top Secret Intelligence Summaries, Nos. 1-10 (April-December 1948), Distribution Lists.

<sup>98</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 1, Top Secret (01/04/1948).

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 2, Top Secret (30/04/1948).

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

Such conclusions were arrived at following analysis of military (OB) and political intelligence obtained by British ID officers in the zone, interrogations of PWs, defectors and even apparently some positive intelligence work behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>102</sup> Much of this report also focused on anti-Nazi operations, perfectly illustrating how the IDs were always fighting two wars at once in post-war Germany against extreme left wing and right wing enemies, as will be seen in Chapters Four and Five.<sup>103</sup>

The next report produced by the ID is a remarkable document. It represents a considerable success for the British ID as it largely predicts the Berlin Blockade, one month before it was fully implemented, although with inaccurate timing:

Information which is considered to be of good reliability, and which is very recently dated, indicates that the Soviet administration intends "completely to close the Frontier with the Western Zones sometime in the autumn of this year"...Exactly what this implies and how it will be effected is not yet clear, but this item of information certainly confirms the trend of events hitherto observed and provides a strategic pointer to possible future Russian policy towards the Frontier.<sup>104</sup>

The arrival of new political officials in the Soviet Zone, the sudden reinforcement of frontier troops and *Grenzpolizei*, increased shootings and even killings on the interzonal boundaries, the questions asked by Soviet interrogators of those arrested near the British Zone borders and the hindering of interzonal freight traffic all indicated that a drastic change in Soviet methods was coming.<sup>105</sup> The report further warned policymakers to expect a 'sealing process' in Eastern Germany as it was:

...probable that the tentacles of Soviet imperialism are at this present moment being more actively spread further North and West, over the Eastern Zones of Germany, and that its present military occupation of this area is being consolidated with the object of bringing Eastern Germany once and for all within the greater Soviet Orbit.<sup>106</sup>

Such language is reminiscent of that used by Americans at their attaché conference in Frankfurt the following year, indicating a common perception of the serious threat posed by the Soviets.

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 3, Top Secret (31/05/1948).

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

ID reports on Soviet intentions likely played a key role during the Berlin Blockade in preventing a potentially volatile and misguided Allied response by presenting accurate measures of the Soviet threat. For example, on 30 June, the ID noted ‘Earlier reports from covert sources indicated that Russia would exploit any sign of weakness on the part of the Western powers but if faced with a resolute stand would not force matters to a pitch where an armed conflict became likely’.<sup>107</sup> It is just as well that Anglo-American intelligence had sources other than their military missions to the Soviet Zone because Lieutenant Colonel Rowlandson of BAOR’s G (INT) branch noted at the JIC(G) in October 1948 that ‘he was not obtaining sufficient information of value from BRIXMISS’.<sup>108</sup> Indeed, despite the at times patchy coverage of BRIXMIS, political, economic and military intelligence continued to be utilised to reach largely accurate conclusions throughout the blockade crisis.<sup>109</sup> These various areas of intelligence were henceforth regularly discussed in turn at meetings of the JIC(G) under the heading ‘Indications of a Certain Power's Intention to make War’.<sup>110</sup> The inclusion of economic intelligence in such indicators suggests another broad use of SCINT as combined knowledge of the materials which the Soviets were buying, stockpiling and producing could give clues as to whether they were gearing up for war and what technology might be used in such a war.<sup>111</sup> Unsurprisingly, in December 1949, commenting on Haydon’s departure from the ID, the British High Commissioner noted ‘His analysis of the situation in Germany and of Soviet intentions has been consistently sound and helpful to me’.<sup>112</sup>

In June 1949, the Chief of US Air Force intelligence in Germany asked his British counterpart for a copy of the British list of indicators of Russian preparedness for war.<sup>113</sup> In August, the JIC London approved the sharing of such lists in Germany with American authorities.<sup>114</sup> In return, the British

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<sup>107</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 4, Top Secret (30/06/1948).

<sup>108</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 65<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (05/10/1948).

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. See also TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 61<sup>st</sup>-64<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (13/07/1948 – 14/09/1948); TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary, Top Secret, Nos. 9 (30/11/1948) and 10 (31/12/1948); TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 69<sup>th</sup>-76<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (04/01-1949 – 07/06/1949).

<sup>110</sup> For example see TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 68<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (07/12/1948). This changed in August 1949 to ‘Indications of Russian Preparedness for War’, a heading which endured until at least 1953, see TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 79<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (09/08/1949) and TNA, DEFE 41/67, JIC(Germany), 137<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (05/01/1953).

<sup>111</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 82<sup>nd</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (18/10/1949) and 80<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes (30/08/1949). See also TNA, FO 1005/1166, Major K.W. Gottlieb, Apple Pie Memorandum No. 5, Top Secret (13/01/1947); NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 367, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (October: 1949).

<sup>112</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, ‘Confidential Report Signed High Commissioner’ (29/12/1949).

<sup>113</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 78<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (19/06/1949).

<sup>114</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 80<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (30/08/1949).

received a copy of EUCOM's indicators.<sup>115</sup> Knowledge of these shared indications with their influence on high policy enables the value of the detailed OB work undertaken at the frequent ID EUCOM teleconferences to be better appreciated. Indeed, in July 1949, the two IDs were already sharing analysis of indications to be gleaned from the minutiae of Soviet OB. As the conference minutes note:

This week the British sent us the following reports which they had presumably received from BAOR: (A) Lychen "There is going to be a big exercise ground for panzers on the way between here and Templin..."...British comment:...Possibly the erection of semi-permanent camps and arty ranges near training areas which would be an indication of the Soviet intention to maintain a large garrison in Germany for some time.<sup>116</sup>

As the above extract suggests, ID EUCOM were not always informed as to where the MINT information they received from their British allies originated. Furthermore, despite the many typical examples of positive and productive Anglo-American MINT cooperation discussed in this chapter, the sharing of British indicators with American intelligence officers was not undertaken without opposition. Therefore, the extent, causes and consequences of military intelligence rivalry must be studied before general conclusions can be drawn concerning MINT liaison.

## II Rivalry

Although frequent and at times extensive, military intelligence cooperation was subject to restrictions concerning the sharing of information with Allies as were other areas of intelligence work. Indeed, some American intelligence documents were marked with 'American Eyes Only'.<sup>117</sup> Likewise, some material was to be gazed upon only by British eyes.<sup>118</sup> Although Kirkman acknowledged that Anglo-American intelligence shared most information in some form or other, both IDs sought to protect sources, at times, methods and certain topics, US-UK atomic weapons in particular, were not subject for liaison.<sup>119</sup> As such restrictions were reciprocal and agreed upon, they were rarely the cause of issues or rivalry in the

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<sup>115</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 78<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (19/06/1949).

<sup>116</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (05/07/1949).

<sup>117</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, Top Secret Teleconference (15/02/1949). See also NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (30/08/1949).

<sup>118</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/67, JIC(Germany), 137<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (30/12/1952).

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. See also TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 118<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (15/11/1951), Annex A.

military intelligence field, although they are indicative of the limits of trust and cooperation. There are two notable exceptions.

In August 1949, during JIC(G) discussions regarding sharing British lists of indicators concerning Soviet intentions and preparedness for war with American intelligence, Peter Ramsbotham raised an objection:

...whilst he welcomed the proposal in principle he felt that there might be objection to passing on the political and economic paragraph...he considered that the correct channel...was from London to Washington...He felt that Political Division might be embarrassed if their American colleagues were to receive British political views through American Intelligence channels instead of direct from Political Division to the US counterpart...it was agreed in discussion that it would be appropriate to make certain alterations and deletions before it was handed to the Americans.<sup>120</sup>

This episode helps to demonstrate the wider importance of the political and economic intelligence work undertaken by the British ID as it contributed towards crucial military intelligence publications. What this also reveals is that British intelligence in Germany had little issue with sharing political and economic intelligence with their American counterparts but rather the manner in which it was shared and who exactly it was shared with, was important. For example, on paper, EUCOM was only permitted to share military information originating in EUCOM with the British in Germany.<sup>121</sup> Still, exceptions could be made and were made for this, especially as EUCOM were aware that the British attaché in Washington received non-EUCOM information.<sup>122</sup>

Such concerns with the manner of information sharing further highlight the important role undertaken by the ID liaison officers. Indeed, the USLO-BLO system provided a logical and simplified main channel through which to filter the exchange of military intelligence information from a wide variety of sources, whilst, if necessary, protecting them. Unsurprisingly, when this liaison system was

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<sup>120</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 80<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (30/08/1949). Ramsbotham was an influential RIO, see p. 162 in this thesis.

<sup>121</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 131, Baldry, Chief, Plans, Policy & Tng Br to OPOT, 'Request for Field Manuals', Confidential (19/03/1952). See also Box 130, George A. Chester, DDID to SUSLO BAOR, 'Release of Information to HQ BAOR', Restricted (13/05/1952).

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.



violated, disputes temporarily occurred. But so robust was this system that the reassertion of itself and the shared logic behind it following such disputes was enough to prevent any further escalation.

This was the case in December 1952, during the 136<sup>th</sup> meeting of the JIC(G), when the BIO(G) Chief Kirkman discussed an incident concerning ‘a US CIC official who had made unauthorised contact with German employees of the Naval HQs at MINDEN’.<sup>123</sup> Commander Sheppard explained that although ‘CIC officials frequently visited MINDEN’, they usually reported to the local Field Security Section first.<sup>124</sup> However, the CIC agent in question had ‘made no effort to contact the British authorities in MINDEN, and had interrogated employees of the British services without their permission’.<sup>125</sup> More alarmingly, those interrogated ‘appeared to have no connection whatsoever’ with the key individual the CIC official had come to question.<sup>126</sup> Mr Randell argued that due to this incident ‘American authorities should give explicit reasons for the visit of their officials to the British zone’.<sup>127</sup> Further, ‘the drill’ which involved reference of each case to ‘HQ BIO(G) should be strictly adhered to’.<sup>128</sup> In all such cases, ‘contact must be made with the local British authorities and...any clearance given should be telephoned to the RIO concerned’.<sup>129</sup> Following further discussion, the BIO(G)’s Security Director was instructed to ‘...take up this matter with the Americans authorities on the above lines and especially to find out why the interrogations...were carried out’.<sup>130</sup>

ID USAREUR’s files contain evidence of this approach. It was made, as usual, to the USLO. The British letter to the latter reveals that an American intelligence official named Bernhard Hewitt had received clearance to visit the British Zone but only to interrogate one German scientist named Dr. Bueckner.<sup>131</sup> Apparently unable to locate Bueckner’s address, Hewitt proceeded to question several British service employees, his questions extending beyond what was required to locate the doctor.<sup>132</sup> Since Hewitt was not cleared to visit any British Armed Forces establishment or interrogate employees

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<sup>123</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/67, JIC(Germany), 136<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (09/12/1952).

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 128, N.P. Browne to USLO, Restricted (17/12/1952).

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

within, British intelligence 'received a protest'.<sup>133</sup> Consequently, the USLO was asked to mediate the situation:

Would you represent to Intelligence Division, USAREUR, the difficulties with which such a situation presents us.

The clearances are designed for the interrogation of nominated persons. Views were exchanged on the mutual advantages of this system at the time of its inception, and these advantages seem to be lost, if investigators proceed on their own responsibility to interrogate other persons, whose names may have been suggested to them in the course of their researchers, but for whom no clearance has been obtained. Emergency clearance can always be sought by reference to the nearest Regional Intelligence Office or sub-office, which will have been informed by BIO(G) of the U.S. interrogator's intended visit and will be ready to assist him.<sup>134</sup>

As a result, ID USAREUR sent a letter for 'the attention of all agents who may become involved in visits to the British Zone of Germany' restating the established liaison procedures and drawing attention 'to the inclosed letter from the British, to Major Lerch, USLO with the British'.<sup>135</sup> The USLO had therefore effectively diffused what could have been a damaging disagreement which was notably inspired by an intelligence officer from the regions, presumably not used to direct liaison with the British.

The operation of agents without proper clearance was sometimes a reflection of rival procedures which could be a product of the many different intelligence organisations that worked in occupied Germany. For example, in April 1951, the BLO wrote to ID EUCOM concerning Lt. Cdr. Tyler who had been conducting interrogations in the British Zone without clearance.<sup>136</sup> In response, ID EUCOM informed the BLO that Tyler obtained 'approval' from Cdr. Courtney of the Royal Navy which he thought was sufficient to enable American Naval intelligence personnel to carry out interrogations in the British Zone.<sup>137</sup> ID EUCOM told the BLO that it considered this arrangement to be acceptable but understood that 'it can be construed as not completely filling the present agreement between EUCOM and HERFORD, for the clearance of all US Forces visitors to the British Zone

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 128, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Group and CO 7707 USAREUR IC, 'Conduct of Investigations in British Zone', Restricted (31/12/1952).

<sup>136</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 763, 563465, Opns Br to BLO, 'US Interrogation in the British Zone', Confidential (03/05/1951).

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

through the USLO, Herford'.<sup>138</sup> To ensure proper coordination, ID EUCOM suggested that the British ID have British Naval intelligence inform them when such clearance was granted.<sup>139</sup> Typical of the friendly understanding which often aided the resolution of such matters, ID EUCOM left the decision to their allies in Herford as to whether that system of clearance should be implemented or whether the USLO-BLO system should be reasserted.<sup>140</sup> The latter seems to have taken place.

Although the concealment of sources permitted by the USLO-BLO system was to some extent a strength of that system in that it facilitated, acknowledged and respected a joint desire for such concealment, source concealment itself could sometimes weaken the quality of Anglo-American military intelligence liaison. For example, on at least one occasion in August 1949, ID EUCOM disregarded OB information in a BAOR report in favour of contradictory information in a TIB report.<sup>141</sup> This may to some extent have hindered the proper corroboration of information if TIB were unwilling to share their information and could have frustrated the British who, if informed, would have been unaware as to why exactly their information had been disregarded.<sup>142</sup>

TIB's MINT activities also help to demonstrate how the ID-ID EUCOM relationship was not one of complete trust. This is further demonstrated by the fact that from May-July 1949, the USLO received confidential funds for the 'official entertainment of British personnel for the purpose of obtaining military information'.<sup>143</sup> Such 'friendly spying' likely continued beyond the summer of 1949. In October 1950, the US Military Attaché in London was certainly spying on the British to some extent. Indeed, his standard operating procedure required him to report on questions such as 'In event of war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. what is the probability that the British will use their war potential for or against the U.S.? To what extent?' and 'What plans, activities or probable courses of action of the

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (30/08/1949). See also Box 367, Top Secret Teleconference, '221257Z TT1146' (22/12/1949).

<sup>142</sup> TIB was kept entirely secret from the British. See pp. 37, 141-142 in this thesis.

<sup>143</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 746, 563465, USLO to Executive Officer ID HQ EUCOM, 'Confidential Funds' (31/05/1949) and Ben W. Miller, Liaison Officer to Executive Officer ID, 'Confidential Funds' (23/06/1949) and similar requests dated 14/06/1949 and 01/07/1949.

British could affect the security of the U.S.?'<sup>144</sup> However, somewhat paradoxically, the exploration of such mistrusting questions may have served to increase trust between the two IDs in Germany as American intelligence officers certainly concluded that the British would not undertake actions which would hinder the anti-Communist mission of the United States.<sup>145</sup>

Rare, but notable disagreements concerning rival methods sometimes created tensions in military intelligence matters. For example, the issue of handling Soviet military defectors inspired much discussion between the Intelligence Divisions. As EUCOM's Commander in Chief, Thomas T. Handy pointed out in a letter to the American High Commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy, in 1951:

The question of increasing the flow of Soviet military defectors has been a subject of discussion from time to time between representative of this headquarters and the British at Herford. Each time, the discussion reverts to a firm belief of the British that abrogation of the Clay-Sokolovsky agreement would materially increase the number of defections. A consideration of the problem, however, has led this headquarters to the conclusion that no benefits would be gained by such action that could not be gained by other means...<sup>146</sup>

The IDs did not always concur on OB evaluations neither. On 23 March 1949, the JIC London asked the JIC (Germany) for their comments on a CIA critique of a JIC report concerning 'Aggression in Germany' in which the CIA disagreed with the British on matters such as the number of and reliability of paramilitary police (*Bereitschaften*) in the Soviet Zone.<sup>147</sup> The CIA asked the British for any contrary evidence.<sup>148</sup> Following a detailed analysis, the British ID's Security Directorate gave the following response:

Our conclusions presented in this memorandum are based on available evidence, both from our own and US sources. Unless CIA is in possession of evidence not available to the US authorities in Germany, we are inclined to believe that this is largely a matter of appreciation and

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<sup>144</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 745, 563465, Office of the Army Attache, American Embassy, 20 Grosvenor Square, London, 'Local Operating Instructions', Secret (October: 1950).

<sup>145</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 749, 563465, Final Report Fourth European Attache Conference Frankfurt, 'Great Britain' by Major-General John W. Leonard, Secret (23-27 May 1949). See also TNA, FO 1005/1165, JIC(CCG), 'Internal Security Commitment In The British Zone', Top Secret (11/12/1945).

<sup>146</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 754, 563465, Thomas T. Handy, Commander-in-Chief to John J. McCloy, US High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt, Secret (January: 1951). Contrary to the impression given by Riehle's recent analysis, the Clay-Sokolovsky agreement dating from 1946 (named after the American deputy military governor and the Soviet head of military government respectively) did not preclude the retention of military deserters if they requested political asylum. It was also useful for handing back Soviet criminals who were of no further use to American intelligence and securing the return of American citizens from East Germany, as the British were informed. See Riehle, 'Defector', p. 348.

<sup>147</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1173, J.K. Gardiner, Secretary, JIC to Secretary, JIC(Germany), HQ ID, 'CIA Comments on JIC(48)130 (Final)', Top Secret (23/03/1949) and attached 'CIA Comment' (24/02/1949).

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

evaluation of the evidence available; comparisons are invidious, but we have confidence in our own machinery.<sup>149</sup>

Such apparently widely differing military threat assessments were rare. Importantly, they never escalated into serious disagreements with significant consequences, the USLO-BLO system of liaison operated uninterrupted and the successes of positive corroboration far outnumber examples of differing military threat assessments.

## IV Evaluation

The IDs acted as crucial collation and dissemination points for military intelligence from a variety of sources. But, contrary to the impression given in the existing historiography, the IDs were more than mere post offices for military information collected elsewhere. Indeed, British RIO officers collected military intelligence, a British ID officer attended regular conferences designed for the sharing and analysis of OB information and the USLO-BLO chain provided the key system for the regular exchange of military information. Rather than just acting as a cover for MI6 officers in the field, the British ID provided the latter organisation with its main source of military information from behind the Iron Curtain and took an active role in collecting intelligence on its behalf.

The close relationship between the key goals of military intelligence work and the primary security missions of the IDs has perhaps contributed to the underestimating of the IDs military intelligence functions. Conversely, the later prominence of military intelligence work in post-war Germany, and the British ID's shift from FO to WO control, has resulted in some historians misinterpreting the British ID as a solely military intelligence organisation.<sup>150</sup>

The prevalent focus on Berlin is somewhat more understandable in discussions of MINT work. It was out of and near Berlin that the BRIXMIS and US Missions operated. But, as this chapter demonstrated, during the crucial period of the Berlin Blockade it was felt that 'sufficient information

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<sup>149</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1173, 'Comments By Security Directorate', Top Secret (Undated).

<sup>150</sup> Alaric Searle, 'Vopo'-General Vincenz Müller and Western Intelligence, 1948-54: CIC, The Gehlen Organization and Two Cold War Covert Operations', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2002), p. 32.

of value' was not coming from BRIXMIS.<sup>151</sup> Consequently, the work of the British and American Military Missions to the Soviet Zone are best understood as only one important element of a wider military intelligence effort, as they are in this chapter. Furthermore, as was demonstrated in this chapter, counterintelligence work with a military intelligence focus was undertaken throughout the western zones as enemy agents sought to gain information from Munich, Dusseldorf, Bremerhaven and the border areas. When it came to MINT, battleground Germany, rather than Berlin, is a much more appropriate description.

Discussion of ID EUCOM's teleconference files has enabled this thesis to bring more new evidence to the historiography which highlights the important role which military intelligence collected and analysed on the ground in Germany played in Cold War decision making in Washington and London. Indeed, consistent monitoring of Soviet OB enabled the IDs to inform their policymakers of what was normal with the result that even in times of crisis, rash decision making was prevented. Intelligence cooperation was vital to this process as worrying gaps in knowledge could be filled by reference to information obtained from an ally and conclusions could be verified by cross referencing to a greater variety of sources. Had disaster struck, it is very possible that the first warnings of an imminent Soviet attack may have travelled via the USLO-BLO chain either via one-time pad or telephone. That such a disaster did not take place is largely attributable to the anxiety reducing military intelligence cooperation undertaken by both IDs in Germany.

Although both IDs knew they were preparing for and trying to prevent an emergency that was 'bound to be mutual', it is striking that ID EUCOM at times obtained their best information from British intelligence sources and sometimes their only information.<sup>152</sup> Indeed, even in 1952, British ID reports produced in 1950 were providing ID EUCOM with 'considerable assistance in study of the MGB order of battle', the JIB produced some of ID USAREUR's best available terrain information and, as with matters concerning security intelligence, expressions of thanks to British intelligence abound.<sup>153</sup> When

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<sup>151</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 65<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (05/10/1948).

<sup>152</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 732, 563465, E.J. Linnington, BLO to DDID, 'W/T Communication', Secret (19/11/1948).

<sup>153</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief S&S Section to USLO BIOFG Wahnerheide, 'British MGB Workbook', Secret (29/05/1952). See also Box 125, Marshall to Int/Div Wahnerheide thru USLO, 'Border Police Headquarters

it came to military intelligence, ID EUCOM were in many ways still the junior partners of their British counterparts. Considering this, it is perhaps unsurprising that ID EUCOM specifically requested BAOR officers to teach in their intelligence schools and expressed pride when American information was utilised in British reports.<sup>154</sup>

Shared objectives, varying degrees of dependence and the USLO-BLO system of liaison helped to ensure that military intelligence rivalry was infrequent and largely inconsequential. The close relation between the MINT objective of protection and the IDs' primary security missions undoubtedly contributed to the comparative lack of rivalry in this field as it could be more closely and clearly linked to the broader shared aims of occupation and the largely harmonious secret system of rule. This was not so for SCINT which, although most closely linked to MINT, was more focused on tasks of clearer utility to London and Washington than to Herford and Heidelberg, as the following chapter makes clear.

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– Baltic Area', Confidential (28/11/1952); Box 132, W.R. Hanks, ID USAREUR, 'Terrain Information on Pyrenees Region', Secret (19/09/1952).

<sup>154</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Morin, Chief, Analysis Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to ACoS, G-2, Seventh Army, 'Letter of Transmittal', Secret (05/01/1952). See also Box 130, Baldwin for DID to BLO, 'Request For Guest Speaker' (25/01/1952).

## **Chapter Three:**

### **Scientific and Technical Intelligence**

‘...the Russians hope to obtain parity with, and ascendancy over, the Anglo-Americans in the field of scientific research’

- Headquarters, British Intelligence Division, June 1947.<sup>1</sup>

Scientific and Technical intelligence is the most studied aspect of the British ID’s work. This has resulted in an overestimation of its importance in relation to the other missions pursued by the IDs. As this chapter argues, SCINT was never considered by the IDs to be a primary mission.

Although much is known about the work of the British ID’s STIB and the comparable activities of the CIA and MI6 in Germany, little is known about STIB’s American counterpart, ID EUCOM’s Scientific & Technical (S&T) Branch and its Top Secret Technical Intelligence Branch (TIB) which both go unmentioned throughout Maddrell’s works. They are discussed in detail here.

Analysing the IDs’ SCINT liaison in the context of the hitherto poorly understood USLO-BLO system and the broader missions undertaken by the IDs enables this chapter to argue that SCINT was subject to an unusual frequency of rivalry which was eventually effectively managed by the IDs’ Liaison Officers.

This chapter also argues that SCINT had a comparatively earlier and stronger link to the waging of the Cold War from London and Washington which was reflected in its considerable compartmentalisation from other duties of occupation. This Cold War emphasis has made SCINT particularly fascinating to historians. However, as the following chapter reveals, it is also to some extent what made SCINT generally unrepresentative of Anglo-American intelligence work in occupied Germany, notwithstanding some understudied but important links to the secret system of rule which are also discussed here.

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<sup>1</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/62, HQ ID, ‘Appreciation of the Probable Course of Development of Russian Intelligence and Political Activity in the British Zone of Germany’, Top Secret (June: 1947).



By placing the IDs' SCINT activities into the wider context of their overall missions and the secret system of rule they upheld, this chapter regains proportionate perspective on the importance of such work.

## **I** **Mission**

The IDs' SCINT work was undertaken in pursuit of four key objectives: to deny the Soviets scientific and technical knowledge, to discover the capabilities of German and Soviet science and technology, to control German scientists and their research and to further British and American interests. These objectives often overlapped and were pursued with differing emphasis over time.

According to Maddrell, by 1958, SCINT was a 'high priority' for all Western intelligence services.<sup>2</sup> But, in contrast to security and political intelligence, there is no evidence to suggest that during the occupation of Germany, scientific and technical intelligence was considered by the Intelligence Divisions or the main intelligence organisations they directed to be a primary mission. Available evidence, in fact, suggests the contrary. For example, in January 1947 the British ID produced an overview of its key responsibilities. In this document, 'the collection, co-ordination and distribution of intelligence of a scientific and technical nature which emanates not only from sources reporting to the Joint Intelligence Committee (CCG) but also from adjacent Zones and Countries' was ranked second behind the need to ensure 'the security of the British Zone of Germany', a task which included the related political objective of combatting 'subversive political movements of the Left'.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, in a 1949 overview of EUCOM's 'General Intelligence Mission', SCINT tasks barely featured.<sup>4</sup> Most notably, when discussing the mission of the 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, the largest ID EUCOM directed organisation, security intelligence tasks such as counter espionage and political intelligence tasks such as assisting military government came before the need to 'Protect and keep under surveillance certain

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<sup>2</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 122.

<sup>3</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1003, Secretariat, Zonal Executive Offices to General Department, Control Office, 'New Admiralty Intelligence Handbook', Secret (22/01/1947).

<sup>4</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 743, 563465, HQ EUCOM, 'Intelligence Directive No. 3', Secret (11/01/1949).

German scientists, as directed by the Deputy Director of Intelligence' which was listed only 'in addition to its primary mission'.<sup>5</sup>

There are several reasons why the British ID and the majority of intelligence officers directed by ID EUCOM on the ground in Germany did not always view scientific intelligence as a key mission priority. British and American SCINT activities in postwar Germany first commenced under SHAEF.<sup>6</sup> Following SHAEF directives, British and American intelligence teams removed Nazi scientists from the Soviet occupation zone in order to learn just how advanced German science was and to deny the Soviets, whose intentions were rightly mistrusted, a potential advantage in war production.<sup>7</sup> The latter objective endured throughout the occupation. In addition, a key objective of British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (BIOS) teams was 'to enable the UK to catch up on the Germans'.<sup>8</sup> That is to say, they were working primarily for British interests, like Operation Paperclip would later primarily serve those of the USA.<sup>9</sup> The teams in pursuit of these missions, T Force and Field Information Agency Technical (FIAT), were not initially under ID control or the control of their preceding organisations.<sup>10</sup> Consequently, from the outset, SCINT work was linked more closely with the specific needs of agencies in London and Washington than the predecessors of the centralised IDs whose tasks were more firmly rooted in the minutiae of everyday governance in occupied Germany with considerably more autonomy from the metropolises.<sup>11</sup> As the British ID noted in November 1946 with regards to STIB:

The important difference is that both FIAT and 'T' Force are primarily concerned with exploitation of German science and technology for the benefit of industry in the United Kingdom; neither organisation is directly concerned with obtaining present and future intelligence in Germany or in adjacent countries...<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 17. See also Maddrell, 'British-American', p. 79.

<sup>7</sup> TNA, FO 1012/422, British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, 11<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Confidential (31/07/1946). See also Maddrell, *Science*, pp. 11, 17-18, 24, 30.

<sup>8</sup> TNA, FO 1012/422, E.G. Lewin, Research Branch, Trade & Industry Division, CCG(BE), 'British Geologists Visit to Germany' (22/08/1946).

<sup>9</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 17. See also Gimbel, 'Paperclip', pp. 442, 459.

<sup>10</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 7. See also Maddrell, 'British-American', p. 79; TNA, FO 1038/56, 'Brief Report on Organisation of CIOS' (24/04/1945). It was not until late August 1945 that FIAT (British Element) came under the control of Lethbridge and it was gradually integrated into the IG, see TNA FO 1005/1165, JIC(CCG), 'Proposed New Establishment of Field Information Agency Technical', Secret (15/08/1945), TNA, FO 1032/1280, IG, Intelligence Directive No. 11, Confidential (01/12/1945) and TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 21<sup>st</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (14/05/1946).

<sup>11</sup> TNA, KV 4/469, Liddell Diaries (22/10/1947).

<sup>12</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1003, Director, STIB, HQ ID Herford to HQ Mil Gov, Hamburg, 'Formation of STIB' (28/11/1946).

But from the earliest stages of occupation, SCINT was also intended to be used as a tool for controlling occupied Germany. As Strong noted, ‘The control of German scientific and technological research is of primary importance to the success of the plans of the major Allies for the occupation of Germany’.<sup>13</sup> However, controlling SCINT was only one of many such tools. This likely minimised its importance to several intelligence officers on the ground, most of whom were primarily concerned on a daily basis with other tools of control vital to political intelligence work and above all with security, as Chapters Four and Five make clear. Moreover, the objective of controlling German scientists and their research was initially undertaken amidst concerns that experts capable of ‘reconstituting’ Germany’s war making capabilities could secretly use their knowledge against the Allies.<sup>14</sup> But as the threat from Nazism and German militarism gradually receded and the threat from Communism and Soviet expansionism increased, this mission of control was underappreciated, if not forgotten, by some intelligence officers who viewed SCINT work as increasingly separate from the broader tasks of the IDs.<sup>15</sup>

Such a disconnect between the objectives of London and the British ID is most evident in a dispute which occurred in late 1947 about where the manpower for the new STIB should come from. Some ID officers contended that as the Ministry of Defence benefitted most from SCINT work, the manpower and resulting expenses should be provided by them.<sup>16</sup> This culminated in an emphatic and revealing reply from the Foreign Office: ‘the collection of Scientific and Technical Intelligence has been accepted as a part of the work of controlling Germany, and it is immaterial what Department gets the benefit of it’.<sup>17</sup> The objective of control was clearly enduring, despite being understudied in the existing historiography and underappreciated by some intelligence officers at the time.

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<sup>13</sup> TNA, WO 219/177, KWD Strong, ACoS, G-2, SHAEF to the Chief of Staff, ‘Control of German Scientific and Technological Research’, Secret (11/05/1945).

<sup>14</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, 21AGP, ‘The Disposal of German Scientists’, Secret (October: 1945). See also TNA, FO 1038/105, Air Division, Berlin, ‘Situation Report On The Present Work And Future Commitments Of A.D.I.(K).’, Secret (Undated, Likely 1946).

<sup>15</sup> This reflected broader trends in the British intelligence community. As Aldrich points out, in mid-late 1940s London ‘Scientific intelligence had ‘been exiled...north of Marble Arch’ and so the Services looked upon it as a ‘trash bin for misfits’’. See Aldrich (ed), *British Intelligence*, p. 30.

<sup>16</sup> TNA, FO 936/344, Deputy Military Governor to Foreign Office (German Section), ‘Establishments Board Meeting No. 87 – Intelligence Division’ (11/11/1947).

<sup>17</sup> TNA, FO 936/344, P.T. Lyver, ‘CD/294/3-Intelligence Division’ (28/11/1947).

Notwithstanding the tendency of some intelligence officers to view SCINT work as ‘separate’ from the broader tasks of intelligence work in occupied Germany, the complexities of SCINT occupied much of the time of those at the top, particularly the British ID chiefs, as evidenced by its discussion at several JIC(Germany) meetings.<sup>18</sup> It was primarily the desire to reduce such complexities which resulted in the creation of the ID’s own SCINT branches. After the dissolution of SHAEF, SCINT was initially poorly coordinated within and between Anglo-American intelligence.<sup>19</sup> The need to impose some order on overlapping organisations resulted in the ID’s creation of STIB in 1946. As Lethbridge informed the JIC(CCG):

STIB, as originally conceived, was to be a Secretariat to co-ordinate scientific, technical and in some cases, economic intelligence on Germany and adjacent countries and to pass it back to the U.K. It was not intended that it should act as a producer agency but that it should co-ordinate the information received from various agencies...in order to prevent duplication and to ensure that such information went back to JSIC/JTIC/JIB through one channel.<sup>20</sup>

STIB became operational on 21<sup>st</sup> October 1946.<sup>21</sup> According to its charter, it was ‘To act as the sole agency for the collection, co-ordination and forwarding of scientific and technical (and in certain cases economic) intelligence emanating from sources reporting to JIC (CCG) but relating to adjacent Zones and countries’.<sup>22</sup> This was far more than what Maddrell describes as a ‘team of interrogators’.<sup>23</sup>

Contrary to Maddrell’s focus on American leadership, the British ID were in many ways pioneers in establishing the missions and methods of SCINT in post-war Germany.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, like ID EUCOM itself, its S&T Section was established after STIB. Indeed, the first mention of S&T Section, initially headed by Lawrence M. Knapp, in ID EUCOM’s general correspondence files, is a quarterly

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<sup>18</sup> ‘scientific and technical requirements are listed separately’ noted the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (London) in TNA, FO 371/64554, ‘Priorities of Tasks for the Collection of Intelligence Information from Germany’, Top Secret (24/11/1947). See also TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 8<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, (16/10/1945); 23<sup>rd</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (11/06/1946); TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 46<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (21/07/1947); TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 83<sup>rd</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (08/11/1949); TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 118<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (15/11/1951).

<sup>19</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 12<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (11/12/1945). See also TNA, FO 1012/422, British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, 10<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes (11/07/1946); TNA, FO 1038/105, JIC(CCG), Agenda, Secret (02/10/1946).

<sup>20</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 33<sup>rd</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (05/11/1946).

<sup>21</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1003, Deputy Military Governor, ‘Formation of a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch of the Intelligence Division’, Secret (09/11/1946).

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, ‘Annexure A’.

<sup>23</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 83. See also Maddrell, ‘British-American’, p. 89.

report of activities dated 7 April 1949.<sup>25</sup> This report informed the DID that ‘The purpose of this section is to exploit scientific and technical intelligence’ and that ‘Personal contacts have been made and liaison is being maintained’ with STIB.<sup>26</sup> The following quarterly report confirmed that STIB was ‘the British counterpart of this Section’.<sup>27</sup> Although evidence of S&T’s mission statements in the ‘general correspondence’ files does not extend beyond the single sentence above, it is clear from their activities that they engaged in the same broad array of tasks as STIB, as will be seen from the following analysis of Anglo-American SCINT cooperation.

## II Cooperation

Anglo-American joint efforts to deny the Soviets scientific and technical experts and knowledge began under SHAEF, at the outset of the occupation.<sup>28</sup> Following SHAEF’s discontinuance, such cooperation was loosely structured and coordinated.<sup>29</sup> This situation was made worse by an initial lack of policy direction from London and Washington as both powers sought to wait until Soviet intentions had become clearer before undertaking actions which could hinder quadripartite cooperation.<sup>30</sup>

With the creation of the two IDs, STIB and S&T Section, and the increasing prevalence of the USLO-BLO system, cooperation became more organised. In January 1947, the British directed Operation Matchbox sought the ‘interrogation’ and ‘eventual employment of as many as possible of the accepted “Consultants” in the U.K., U.S.A. and the Dominions’.<sup>31</sup> Clearly, employing Matchbox scientists in the USA required American cooperation. Fortunately, American intelligence officers

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<sup>25</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 748, 563465, Lawrence M. Knapp, Chief, S&T Section, HQ ID EUCOM, ‘Quarterly Report of Activities’, Secret (07/04/1949).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 748, 563465, Knapp, Chief, S&T Section, HQ ID EUCOM, ‘Quarterly Report of Activities’, Secret (06/07/1949).

<sup>28</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 17. See also TNA, FO 1012/422, British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, 11<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Confidential (31/07/1946).

<sup>29</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 12<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (11/12/1945). See also TNA, FO 1012/422, British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, 10<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes (11/07/1946). Further examples can be read in the ‘rivalry’ section of this chapter.

<sup>30</sup> TNA, WO 219/177, Eisenhower, SHAEF to Combined Chiefs of Staff, Secret (15/05/1945) and Strong, ACoS, G-2, SHAEF to Chief of Staff, ‘Interim Policy...The Exploitation of German Scientists and Industrial Technologists’, Secret (03/06/1945); TNA, FO 1032/190, 21AGP, ‘The Disposal of German Scientists’, Secret (October: 1945) and JIC(CCG), 21<sup>st</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (14/05/1946); TNA, FO 1005/1169, CCG(BE), I Conference, 17<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (09/01/1946).

<sup>31</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, Deputy Military Governor, ‘Operation Match Box’, Top Secret (10/01/1947).

showed ‘considerable interest’ in helping Matchbox scientists find employment.<sup>32</sup> American willingness to assist their British counterparts was undoubtedly largely inspired by their knowledge of what the British ID described as ‘The Denial Value of Operation “Match Box”’ which was outlined in routinely shared ID reports.<sup>33</sup> For example, one engineer who became a consultant under Matchbox was evacuated from Berlin ‘purely on his denial value’.<sup>34</sup>

American aid with Operation Matchbox was mirrored by British involvement in the American directed Operation Paperclip. The latter operation was in fact used by British officials to justify the breach of Potsdam involved in Matchbox.<sup>35</sup> For example, at a JIC(Germany) meeting in May 1947, ‘Mr. STEEL pointed out that it was a well known fact that USSR was doing it and a report in THE TIMES of 17 May 1947 stated that 350 scientists under Operation “PAPER CLIP” had been voluntarily moved to the United States of America’.<sup>36</sup> CIC reports concerning the activities of potential Paperclip scientists in the British Zone suggest British involvement from at least February 1948.<sup>37</sup> In November, a Bipartite committee was established to produce a combined allocation list of scientists to be employed by the Americans under Paperclip or by the British under their similar schemes, presumably including Matchbox.<sup>38</sup> In January the following year, the British ID were receiving information concerning Paperclip from the BLO.<sup>39</sup> British assistance must have been substantial because in June 1949, the British G Section in Frankfurt which involved ‘coordination with scientific and technical and PAPERCLIP matters’ was listed on ID EUCOM’s list of ‘necessary’ personnel.<sup>40</sup> In August 1952, correspondence concerning such scientists was taking place between S&T at Heidelberg and the BLO.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1231A, E.A. Howard, Deputy Chief, ID, Herford, ‘Operation “Match Box”’, Top Secret (30/10/1947).

<sup>33</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 1, Top Secret (01/04/1948).

<sup>34</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 5, Top Secret (31/07/1948).

<sup>35</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 24.

<sup>36</sup> TNA, DEFE, 41/62, JIC(Germany), 43<sup>rd</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (19/05/1947).

<sup>37</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 731, 563465, Henry D. Evans, Special Agent CIC, ‘Scientist Activity’, Secret (19/02/1948).

<sup>38</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 748, 563465, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch, ‘Quarterly Report – Operation PAPERCLIP’, Secret (09/01/1950). See also Box 740, Bipartite Committee On Scientific & Technical Personnel, 15<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (04/11/1949).

<sup>39</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, Moe, Asst. Control Officer for DDID to BLO, ‘German Scientists in USSR and ROZ’, Secret (28/01/1949).

<sup>40</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 736, 563465, R.E. Kilzer for DDID to Director, Civil Affairs Division, Restricted (29/06/1949).

<sup>41</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Henry H. Rogers, Chief, Scientific & Technical Section to BLO, ‘Dr. Botho DEMANT’, Confidential (28/08/1952).

Although evidence concerning British involvement in Paperclip is patchy, it is clear that several Paperclip scientists and/or their families were living in England and the British Zone of Germany.<sup>42</sup> It is also clear that the two IDs collaborated to arrange special privileges for scientists employed under operations such as Paperclip in each of their zones as further incentive to prevent them from going East. For example, scientists working under schemes directed by British and American intelligence in the British or American zone were issued with ‘letters of protection’ which provided them and their families with some level of protection from military government policies such as requisitioning.<sup>43</sup> British reliance on the Americans enforcing letters of protection and vice versa suggests a certain amount of mutual dependence in the field of SCINT.

The case of Dr. Helmut Walter, ‘an expert on submarines’ who ‘would undoubtedly be very valuable to the Russians’, further illustrates the extent to which British and American intelligence were dependent on each other in their denial efforts.<sup>44</sup> Walter and his team had been brought to the UK in 1946 under the Deputy Chief of Staff’s (DCOS) scheme with concurrence of American intelligence.<sup>45</sup> By May 1949, their knowledge had been ‘fully exploited’.<sup>46</sup> The Foreign Office did not want them to continue work as they would learn too much about Anglo-American Naval advances, nor did they want them to return to Germany, where they could be enticed to give knowledge to the Soviets.<sup>47</sup> As they explained:

The Russian HTP submarine propulsion project now being developed at Leningrad is having the greatest difficulty in proceeding beyond the design stage and is still at least 4 years behind US and UK. The possession of Walter would enable Russia to bridge this gap in a matter of months.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, W.R. Rainford, Chief, Control Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to HQ ID CCG(BE), ‘Revised Security Reports’, Restricted (14/04/1949). See also Box 753, ID EUCOM to USLO Herford, ‘Clearance for Travel in British Zone’, Restricted (20/02/1951); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 124, A.R. Hercz, Chief, S&T, HQ ID USAREUR to ACoS G-2, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., Restricted (28/11/1952); Box 126, ‘Monthly Status Report – Project PAPERCLIP’, Secret (31/12/1951). See also names and locations of numerous Paperclip specialists in Box 128.

<sup>43</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, Rainford, Chief, Control Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, General Staff, US Army, Washington D.C., Restricted (17/01/1949) and (15/08/1949). See also Rainford to Chief, “G” Section (Frankfurt), BAOR, ‘Letter of Protection’ (06/01/1949) and ‘Letters of Protection’ (10/01/1949).

<sup>44</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/60, Deputy Director, STIB to Deputy Chief, ‘Dr. Helmut WALTER’, Secret (13/06/1949).

<sup>45</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/60, Cipher Message from FO (German Section) to ID Herford, Top Secret (20/05/1949). The DCOS scheme was similar to Operation Paperclip, see Maddrell, *Science*, pp. 32-33, 35.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

Consequently, ‘every effort’ was ‘made in consultation with Washington to find new employment for these men’.<sup>49</sup> As this shows, if suitable employment for such individuals could not be found in Britain or the Commonwealth, British intelligence relied on American cooperation to find them suitable employment in America.

The extent and complexities of Anglo-American SCINT denial efforts is revealed through analysis of their efforts to prevent the smuggling of uranium to the Soviet Zone. For example, one ID EUCOM letter revealed HICOG, FBI, CIC, ID EUCOM, British ID and British Public Safety cooperation on the same case.<sup>50</sup> Notably, the letter observed that ‘Since the unexploited leads in this case are in the British Zone of Germany, all details of this case have been forwarded to the US Liaison Officer at HERFORD for transmittal to the British Authorities’.<sup>51</sup> Clearly the ID Liaison Officers were at the centre of all forms of intelligence liaison in post-war Germany, making them sometimes more well informed than the S&T section Chief who was merely copied in to this correspondence.<sup>52</sup> Frustratingly, ID EUCOM’s correspondence files do not reveal the outcome of these joint efforts.

Nevertheless, evidence of extensive ID-ID EUCOM information sharing, usually via the USLO, concerning legitimate and illegal trade from the Western Zones to countries behind the Iron Curtain abounds.<sup>53</sup> Such cooperation undoubtedly produced results. For example, in October 1949 an ID EUCOM report on Soviet trade drew heavily on information derived from British counter intelligence reports to substantiate its own conclusions.<sup>54</sup> The report discussed ‘The sale of silk stockings by Soviet Zone representatives in the Western Zones’ which ‘has been an important source of DM West revenue used by various Soviet Zone firms in purchasing Western Germany industrial equipment and raw materials, in short supply in the Soviet Zone’ and a report from an American firm

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 763, 563465, Hardick, Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, HICOG, Confidential (02/01/1951).

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 127, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to Reports and Analysis, HICOG, Confidential (14/01/1952); Box 129, Marshall to USLO w/BAOR, ‘Illegal Interzonal Transactions’, Confidential (29/06/1952); Box 135, Ch Ops to USLO ID Wahnerheide, ‘Rudolf KREJCI’, Secret (08/01/1952); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, Moe, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, OMGUS, ‘Illegal Interzonal Trade’, Secret (10/02/1949); Box 754, Baldry, Chief, S&S Section to USLO Herford, Confidential (29/06/1951); Box 759, Baldry to USLO, ‘Kurt Wilhelm’, Secret (12/07/1951); Box 760, Chief Ops Br to USLO ID, ‘DAVIDOVIC, Gustav’, Secret (13/04/1951).

<sup>54</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 738, 563465, HQ ID EUCOM, ‘Items of Intelligence Interest’ (21/10/1949).



in Berlin detailing ‘Soviet desires to buy 100 tons Banca tin via the German Economic Commission (DWK)’.<sup>55</sup> After referencing a British CI report, ID EUCOM concluded ‘This report is further confirmation of the longstanding Soviet practice of using Soviet Zone German agencies or firms as cover purchasers of prohibited export materials from Western Germany and Western Europe’.<sup>56</sup> As the Soviets could use all manner of trade, both legal and illegal, to indirectly fund their scientific, technological and war making efforts, mass monitoring of companies engaged in such trade had to be conducted. That the IDs succeeded in this task is demonstrated by the impressive level of detail in their correspondence and reports on the subject.<sup>57</sup>

The IDs also worked together in trying to encourage defectors.<sup>58</sup> But such cooperation did not carry the same weight of necessity which rendered the Divisions mutually dependent on matters such as security and political intelligence. For example, in October 1951, at a JIC(G) meeting, Kirkman ‘...said that it would be interesting if more information could be obtained on the methods adopted by the Americans in handling deserters and he asked Mr RHODES to find out’.<sup>59</sup> The fact that such methods were not well known so late in the occupation suggests that both intelligence organisations were operating without such close cooperation prior to this point. Still, sharing interrogation reports concerning defectors did help to reduce potential duplication of effort.<sup>60</sup> Such reports also helped the IDs to discover much about the scientific, technical and war making capabilities of their enemies behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> For example see NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, N.M. Quinn, Acting Chief, S&S Section to USLO ID Wahnerheide, ‘Czech Illegal Trade Practices’, Secret (18/04/1952); Box 126, Rogers, Chief S&T Section to Sig Div, ‘Transmittal of Various Intelligence Reports’, Secret (14/01/1952); Box 134, Marshall to USLO, ‘FISCHER-BENZON’, Secret (15/10/1952); Box 127, Marshall to Chief, Eastern Economic Relations Division, HICOG, Confidential (02/10/1952); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, Moe, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, OMGUS, ‘Illegal Interzonal Trade’, Secret (10/02/1949); Box 759, Baldry to USLO, ‘Nordkontinentals Schiffsmakler Zweigniederlassung’, Secret (21/09/1952); Box 760, Baldry to USLO, ‘Czech Military Mission’, Confidential (03/12/1951); For detailed economic reports see various exchanged as ‘Apple Pie Ash’ in TNA FO 1056/465, particularly OMGUS, ‘Soviet Zone Industry Under The Counter-Blockade’, Secret (05/02/1949). See also METRANS intercepts discussed on p. 85 in this thesis.

<sup>58</sup> Maddrell, ‘British-American’, pp. 84-86. See also TNA, DEFE 41/65, JIC(Germany), 90<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (04/04/1950).

<sup>59</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 116<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (02/10/1951).

<sup>60</sup> NARA II, RG 549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Hardick, Chief, Collection Section to ACoS, A-2, 12<sup>th</sup> Air Force, ‘Erich POLZ’, Secret (04/04/1951).

<sup>61</sup> Maddrell, ‘British-American’, pp. 83-86. See also Maddrell, *Science*, pp. 4, 7, 15, 40, 68-70, 96, 205-206.

The aim of discovering Soviet capabilities and intentions arguably inspired most Anglo-American SCINT cooperation throughout the occupation. Indeed, one of the earliest SCINT operations, Apple Pie, initiated by the British but later coordinated with the Americans, was designed to discover the war capabilities of the USSR through interrogations of German scientists, intelligence officers and Soviet PWs with knowledge of its wartime scientific, technological and economic/industrial potential.<sup>62</sup> Another key source for such intelligence was reports derived from interrogations of prisoners of war returning from Russia, displaced persons and defectors.<sup>63</sup> It was STIB policy to furnish their American counterparts with a copy of every interrogation report of this kind, apart from those concerning atomic energy which were exchanged 'at London level'.<sup>64</sup> Files at NARA II contain evidence of many interrogation reports being passed to S&T via the USLO.<sup>65</sup> The British led the way in such interrogations as their methods of economic interrogation were adopted by ID EUCOM.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, as the British Political Division informed Haydon in September 1949, the Americans realised that their 'system of interrogating defectors...had been inadequate' and too military focused in the past.<sup>67</sup> Consequently, they were expanding their system and sending a State Department official to London to learn more about British methods.<sup>68</sup>

Notwithstanding British innovation, the mass interrogations of individuals who had lived behind the Iron Curtain revealed a considerable amount of mutual dependence between the two Divisions. Indeed, not only did cooperation on interrogations prevent duplication, it enabled American intelligence officers to put questions to subjects in the British Zone and vice versa. This was not, as Maddrell claims, an automatic right.<sup>69</sup> Requests for interrogation had to be cleared via the USLO-BLO

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<sup>62</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 22. See also pp. 39-40, 93-94 in this thesis.

<sup>63</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 48<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (10/09/1947). See also TNA, DEFE 41/69, JIC(Germany), Coordinating Committee, 33<sup>rd</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (19/07/1949); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Rogers, Chief, S&T to Sig Div, 'Transmittal of Intelligence Reports', Secret (14/05/1952) and Rogers to Army Attache, American Embassy, London, Secret (16/05/1952); Box 127, Rogers to Sig Div (21/07/1952); Maddrell, *Science*, pp. pp. 4, 7, 15, 40, 69.

<sup>64</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/65, JIC(Germany), 101<sup>st</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (20/11/1950). See also Maddrell, 'British-American', pp. 83, 85.

<sup>65</sup> NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 134, Archer L. Lerch JR., US Liaison Officer, ID USAREUR to Chief, Analysis Branch, 'Transmittal of British Production Directorate Interrogation Reports', Secret (08-09/09/1952).

<sup>66</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 738, 563465, Johnson, Chief, Opns Branch to DID 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (17/11/1949).

<sup>67</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1173, Political Division to Haydon, Top Secret and Personal (06/09/1949).

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 83.

system.<sup>70</sup> Sometimes, joint interrogations were undertaken.<sup>71</sup> But most commonly, briefs were submitted as this was more cost efficient and could be less time consuming. Interrogation cooperation had numerous other benefits such as enabling both Divisions to corroborate the statements of their own sources. Most importantly, it contributed significantly to the production of finished intelligence reports. Indeed, reports concerning a plethora of topics were regularly shared between the S&T and STIB chiefs via the USLO-BLO chain.<sup>72</sup> For example, in February 1952, Henry Rogers, the Chief of S&T section, requested that the USLO forward a copy of S&T's 'Report of Reports for...January 1952' to David Evans, the Director of STIB.<sup>73</sup> This document listed all the reports produced by S&T that month covering topics such as 'Uranium Mining in Czechoslovakia', 'German Nerve Gases - Naval Application', 'Photographic Development - Soviet Zone', and 'Construction of a Nuclear Research Institute in the Soviet Zone'.<sup>74</sup>

ID cooperation on Soviet nuclear research was particularly close. In 1948, British ID reports covering topics such as 'Uranium Mining', 'Heavy Water' and 'Chemical Warfare' were shared with the USLO.<sup>75</sup> In 1952, the US Military Attaché at the British Embassy in London received several samples of uranium ore from ID EUCOM which were analysed at a laboratory in London.<sup>76</sup> His activities appear to have been closely coordinated not only with British intelligence authorities in London but with the USLO and S&T Branch.<sup>77</sup> The Attaché personally visited the latter establishment.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> NARA II, RG 549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Intelligence Officer, US Naval Forces, Germany, 'Intelligence activities in the British Zone of Germany', Confidential (13/04/1951). See also Box 759, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, to CO 7707 ECIC, 'Clearance of US Personnel to Enter British Zone', Confidential (07/12/1951); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 128, N.P. Browne to USLO, Restricted (17/12/1952).

<sup>71</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, Hardick, Chief, Collection Section to CO 7707 ECIC, 'Visit of Mr. PALLENBERG to COLOGNE', Restricted (22/01/1951). See also NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 362, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (September: 1949).

<sup>72</sup> See NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Henry H. Rogers, Chief S&T Section to USLO Wahnerheide, 'Report of Reports - December 1951', Secret (03/01/1952) and several subsequent months of reports transferred this way in Boxes 133 and 134.

<sup>73</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Rogers, Chief S&T to USLO Wahnerheide, 'Report of Reports - January 1952', Secret (04/02/1952).

<sup>74</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, S&T Section, 'Report of Reports - January 1952', Secret.

<sup>75</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary, Nos. 6-8, Top Secret (August-October 1948).

<sup>76</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Johnson, S&T, HQ ID EUCOM to Damon, Office of the Army Attache, London, 'Object 96 of the Wismut AG', Secret (23/07/1952). See also Box 135, Johnson to Damon, 'Object 96 of the Wismut AG', Secret (05/11/1952).

<sup>77</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 743, 563465, Ops Br to USLO, 'Uranium Deposits', Secret (20/05/1949) and HQ ID EUCOM to US Military Attache, American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, 'Uranium Deposits in New Guinea', Secret (07/04/1949). See also Box 757, Rogers, Chief S&T, HQ ID EUCOM to Office of the Army Attache, American Embassy, London, 'Transmittal of Special Report', Confidential (09/02/1951).

<sup>78</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, Kilzer, Asst. Control Officer, HQ ID EUCOM to Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, London, Confidential (12/08/1949).

The obtaining of uranium samples from behind the Iron Curtain was, as Maddrell points out, aided by human intelligence work undertaken by individuals willing to spy for Western intelligence.<sup>79</sup> For example, in 1949, the CIC obtained two ore samples from a miner employed in Oberschelma.<sup>80</sup> The identification of such individuals was aided by another closely coordinated method of discovering Soviet capabilities and intentions, censorship, communications intercepts and signals intelligence.

In June 1947, British and American censorship stations monitored 100% of all international telephone calls made to Germany.<sup>81</sup> In December 1950, British censorship was ‘directed...in a proportion of approximately 80% against communications to and from areas coming within the Russian sphere of influence’.<sup>82</sup> The following year, the JIC(G) noted that censorship ‘...provides very valuable leads to the activities of German scientists and others employed in Russia’.<sup>83</sup> Such leads in the forms of postal or communications intercepts were regularly shared between both IDs.<sup>84</sup> A considerable extent of mutual dependence is notable here too as quid pro quo agreements meant that British censorship staff would ‘...procure necessary information otherwise unobtainable by the U.S. agencies’.<sup>85</sup>

A notable success of such intelligence gathering was the British Operation Lister. This involved the monitoring of mail which German scientists working in the USSR sent back to their families in Germany.<sup>86</sup> By October 1948 it had uncovered ‘more than 200 photographs covering 25 different areas in Russia’ including snapshots of buildings potentially revealing the places where the scientists worked.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, pp. 10-11. See also Maddrell, ‘British-American’, p. 78.

<sup>80</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 743, 563465, Moe, HQ ID EUCOM to USMA, London, ‘Soviet Pitchblend Mines at OBERSCHELEMA, Germany’, Confidential (07/02/1949). Bribery sometimes helped obtain such samples, see NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Clifford L. Johnson, S&T Section, ID EUCOM, ‘Ore Processing Installation of Object 8’, Secret (03/06/1952).

<sup>81</sup> TNA, FO 1047/83, ‘Liaison Visit To U.S. Civil Censorship Division Frankfurt – Report’ (09/06/1947).

<sup>82</sup> TNA, FO 1035/77, JIC(Germany), ‘Intelligence Information In A Period of Tension’, Top Secret (21/12/1950).

<sup>83</sup> TNA, FO 1035/77, JIC(Germany), ‘Powers Under the Occupation Statute Which it is Wished to Retain’, Top Secret (28/06/1951).

<sup>84</sup> TNA DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 75<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (10/05/1949). See also TNA DEFE, 41/65, JIC(Germany), 97<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (29/08/1950); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, DDID to BLO, ‘TOLKMITH, Henry’, Secret (23/06/1949); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, ‘Transmittal of Letter’, Confidential (03/04/1952); Box 129, Marshall to BLO, ‘Correspondence from Australia to German Academy of Science’, Confidential (20/08/1952).

<sup>85</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, HQ 7746 Communications Intelligence Service Detachment, USAREUR to DID, USAREUR, ‘Analysis of Intercepts’, Secret (21/11/1952).

<sup>86</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary, Top Secret, Nos. 2 (30/04/1948), 5 (31/07/1948), 6 (31/08/1948), 7 (30/09/1948).

<sup>87</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 8, Top Secret (31/10/1948).

Another signals intelligence success in the field of SCINT was the routine intercepting and monitoring of METRANS communications. METRANS was a 'Czech Forwarding Firm'.<sup>88</sup> In 1951 ID EUCOM's intercepts revealed a 'great quantity of war potential presently being shipped through METRANS and its various affiliates, to Czechoslovakia and other Soviet satellite countries'.<sup>89</sup> As METRANS also intended to send an official named Miroslav Dycka to Hamburg in the near future, ID EUCOM shared these intercepts with the USLO in anticipation of a British 'desire to refuse Dycka's request for an entry permit since it is not to the best interests of the Allies'.<sup>90</sup> Throughout 1952, METRANS intercepts were routinely transferred from ID EUCOM to the BLO.<sup>91</sup> Such intercepts not only enabled the British to hinder undesirable trade to the Iron Curtain through the refusal of entry permits but presumably also revealed something of Iron Curtain intelligence activities in 'cover' firms as suggested by the involvement in this case of Jessie Voss, an influential ID EUCOM counterintelligence officer, discussed further in Chapter Four.<sup>92</sup>

Many successes of Anglo-American SCINT cooperation aimed at discovery are discussed in Maddrell's works.<sup>93</sup> Analysis of ID EUCOM's files enables the addition of the following discoveries: the detailed specifications of Soviet gas masks transferred from ID EUCOM to STIB via the USLO, the location and produce of numerous chemical plants behind the Iron Curtain shared via the USLO-BLO chain and a British report, shared with S-2 Berlin, concerning a Soviet train designed to shoot V2 rockets.<sup>94</sup>

Although such Cold War related discoveries dominate the existing historiography, it is essential to remember that Anglo-American intelligence interest in weapons such as the V2 began, at the outset of the occupation, with a desire to discover German technological and scientific capabilities. Indeed,

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<sup>88</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, 'METRANS Intercepts', Confidential (25/08/1952).

<sup>89</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 760, 563465, Chief, Ops Br, ID to USLO HQ ID, 'Miroslav DYCKA', Secret (17/04/1951).

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. For more on ID powers to refuse entry permits see p.122 in this thesis.

<sup>91</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, 'MLO Hamburg Requirements', Confidential (23/06/1952) and 'METRANS Intercepts' (22/09/1952), (27/10/1952). See also Box 127 (02/12/1952); Box 129 (25/08/1952).

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 116. See also Maddrell, 'British-American', p. 82.

<sup>94</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 744, 563465, Rainford for DDID to BAOR Thru USLO, 'Answer to BAOR Regarding Soviet Gas Mask', Secret (04/03/1949). See also Box 741, 563465, Kilzer for DDID to CO 7707 ECIC, 'Stalingrad Chemical Plant', Confidential (08/06/1949) and 'Serum Plant at OELZSCHAU'; Box 743, Rainford, HQ ID EUCOM to BLO, 'Electro-Chemical Combine BITTERFELD', Secret (25/07/1949); Box 730, Harry H. Pretty, S-2 Berlin to DDI, 'Russian Special Trains', Secret (19/11/1947).

many of the initial SCINT missions directed by SHAEF were aimed at discovering just how advanced German science and technology was.<sup>95</sup> But it was not only the mission of discovery, combined with a desire to deny knowledge to the Soviets, which placed much German equipment, many documents and several German scientific and technological experts in British and American hands. The latter acquisitions fulfilled a key objective of the occupation and involved many of the methods by which the secret system of rule would enforce it, the control of the German population.

The SHAEF directed acquisition of German documents, equipment, scientists and technicians placed several important tools of control in the hands of British and American intelligence. That such assets were initially captured in pursuit of the objective of control is confirmed by Strong's statement regarding the purpose of SCINT.<sup>96</sup> It was reconfirmed in 1947 during debates concerning the purpose and funding of STIB.<sup>97</sup>

From the outset of occupation, Anglo-American intelligence kept each other informed about the amount and type of documents which came under their control through the sharing of intelligence reports in SHAEF.<sup>98</sup> Captured German documents continued to be shared following the dissolution of SHAEF. Indeed, in 1949, the American 7771 Document Centre informed ID EUCOM that they were receiving several thousands of requests for documents from 'British agencies'.<sup>99</sup> As ID EUCOM noted in 1949, some of these captured documents contained information on Nazi architectural plans which was withheld '...from German custody because it constituted too great a favorable propaganda value to the Nazis'.<sup>100</sup>

If information concerning arguably niche matters such as Nazi architecture needed to be controlled in the interests of denazification and democratisation, it is perhaps unsurprising that the

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<sup>95</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, p. 17.

<sup>96</sup> TNA, WO 219/177, KWD Strong, ACoS, G-2, SHAEF to the Chief of Staff, 'Control of German Scientific and Technological Research', Secret (11/05/1945). SHAEF directed that the acquisition of documents should be undertaken primarily to aid 'The establishment of control...' see TNA, FO 1050/1424, SHAEF, ACoS G-2, Main HQ, 'OI Brief For Germany', Secret (15/09/1944), Appendix B.

<sup>97</sup> TNA, FO 936/344, P.T. Lyver, 'CD/294/3-Intelligence Division' (28/11/1947).

<sup>98</sup> TNA, FO 1038/56, 'Brief Report on Organisation of CIOS' (24/04/1945). See also TNA, WO 219/177, BETTS, SHAEF to BISSELL, Secret (28/05/1945); TNA, FO 1050/583, GSI, Main HQ, 21 Army Group, 'CI Sitreps for Period 1-10 May', Secret (12/05/1945) and 'for Period 13-18 Jun 45' (19/06/1945).

<sup>99</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 738, 563465, '7771 Document Centre', Restricted (29/03/1949).

<sup>100</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 738, 563465, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch, ID EUCOM to DID, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (17/11/1949).

acquisition of documents pertaining to German science, technology, economics and military matters was at times considered primarily through the prism of control. For example, in September 1946, ADI(K) of British Air Force intelligence in Berlin wrote a detailed report describing the utility of a large amount of Luftwaffe records in its possession.<sup>101</sup> After discussing the close coordination with American Air Force intelligence on exploiting these documents, the lengthy report argued that:

This collection of documents is unique and has the following long term exploitational possibilities:

a. The G.A.F. personnel on whom we hold these most detailed records, constitute potentially the most dangerous body of men in existence to-day. It is all very well to go witch hunting after Nazis, but the really dangerous individuals in Germany are those with the military knowledge requisite for reconstituting Germany's air power.<sup>102</sup>

Minimising the dangers posed by such individuals was viewed by ADI(K) primarily as a 'problem of "control"'.<sup>103</sup> It concluded with a revealing note:

The seizure of these records by any eventual aggressor, or their handling by Germans, would be a serious threat to Allied security because,

(a). an aggressor could use them to control his German assistants.

(b). the Germans could use them to re-organise themselves.

The value the Germans put on these records is clearly proved by the extraordinary and dangerous lengths they went to protect them.<sup>104</sup>

British intelligence was, therefore, denying the possibility of an enemy controlling such valuable documents and individuals by controlling them themselves.

The arguments and concerns of ADI(K) with regards to controlling Luftwaffe records and personnel were reflected by some intelligence officers' attitudes towards German scientists and technicians. For example, in October 1945, a British 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group report suggested that scientists with unrepentant Nazi beliefs should be deported from Germany to ensure they could not secretly work together against the Allies.<sup>105</sup> But the JIC (CCG) did not share the concerns raised by the 21<sup>st</sup> Army report. As Brigadier Spedding argued, 'If these men were Nazis they would be dealt with under that heading, but he did not think they constituted a danger as scientists'.<sup>106</sup> His reason for thinking this was

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<sup>101</sup> TNA, FO 1038/105, Air Division, Berlin, 'Situation Report On The Present Work And Future Commitments Of A.D.I.(K).', Secret (Undated, Likely 1946).

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, 21AGP, 'The Disposal of German Scientists', Secret (October: 1945).

<sup>106</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 8th Meeting Minutes (1945).

important. According to Spedding, the danger such scientists may pose was effectively managed because they were ‘kept under surveillance’.<sup>107</sup> In other words, they were under control.

A key tool of such control was censorship. For example, individuals employed under Operation Matchbox had their communications routinely intercepted.<sup>108</sup> Information sent from scientists in the USA or the UK to their colleagues in Germany was intercepted too and shared between the IDs via the BLO.<sup>109</sup> Operations such as Matchbox also enabled Anglo-American intelligence to control exactly what work potentially dangerous scientists undertook and with whom. Indeed, documents concerning Matchbox reveal a consistent British desire ‘to place them in non-war potential work where their interests will develop along peaceful lines’.<sup>110</sup>

American intelligence officers shared a similar concern with regards to controlling exactly where, on what, and with whom German scientists worked.<sup>111</sup> For example, in October 1945 a British Military Government report concerning ‘nine leading German physicists mostly connected with atomic development’ noted that ‘The Americans would like to see them settled in...Bonn or one of the University towns so they could be watched and prevented from disappearing into the French or Russian zones’.<sup>112</sup> Although the joint monitoring of German scientists and technicians clearly helped with the objective of denial, it also aided what the JIC(CCG) described as the ‘Control of Scientific Research and Technical Development in Germany’ as did the preferential treatment of the families of scientists.<sup>113</sup> That ID EUCOM aided the British ID in their efforts to control what German specialists worked on is further evidenced by discussions between the two Divisions concerning a proposed law to aid the ‘Control of German Activities in Survey and Cartography’.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 1, Top Secret (01/04/1948).

<sup>109</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, DDID to BLO, ‘TOLKMITH, Henry’, Secret (23/06/1949). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, ‘Transmittal of Letter’, Confidential (03/04/1952).

<sup>110</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1231A, D.E. Evans, Director, STIB, ‘Operation “Match Box”’, Top Secret (08/08/1947).

<sup>111</sup> The CIC engaged in ‘surveillance of important scientists’ which was sometimes ‘overzealous’, see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 749, 563465, ‘Final Report Fourth European Attache Conference Frankfurt’, Operation of the 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group in the US Zone of Germany by Major Earl S. Browning, Jr., Secret (23-27 May 1949) and NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, ‘Intelligence Matters’ (04/03/1949).

<sup>112</sup> TNA, FO 1012/422, Spedding, Economic Division, Planning and Intelligence Branch to Chief Economic Division, ‘Report on Visits to London’ (19/10/1945).

<sup>113</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 17<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes (04/03/1946).

<sup>114</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 735, 563465, R.E. Kilzer for DID to Chairman, Military Security Board, ‘Control of German Activities in Survey and Cartography’, Secret (17/09/1949).



The objective of controlling German scientists and their research was initially undertaken amidst concerns that experts capable of ‘reconstituting’ Germany’s war making capabilities could secretly use their knowledge against the Allies. To prevent this from occurring, German scientists, technicians and similar experts were identified and whenever possible, or deemed necessary, employed. Their movements and communications were monitored and restricted and what they worked on and with whom could be determined by the British and American intelligence services. But as the threat from Nazism and German militarism gradually receded and a similar threat from Communism and Soviet expansionism increased, this mission of control was underappreciated, if not forgotten, by some intelligence officers who viewed SCINT work as increasingly separate from the broader tasks of the ID. But SCINT work was arguably always only loosely linked to the broader missions of the IDs and the occupation itself. Its real significance was clearer to London and Washington and the broader interests they pursued.

To some extent, both IDs did help to further the interests of one another in the field of scientific and technical intelligence. Indeed, both participated in Operations Paperclip and Matchbox, they exchanged tips on improving methods of collection and interrogation, filled gaps in each other’s censorship coverage, corroborated information from informants and exchanged a large quantity of finished intelligence reports concerning a plethora of subjects which benefitted researchers and government departments in both Britain and America. But British and American interests in SCINT did not always align. It is for this reason that the IDs missions cannot be considered completely identical. The pursuit of unilateral interests also made SCINT work particularly susceptible to rivalry, as the following analysis will make clear.

### **III Rivalry**

The pursuit of national interests was at the heart of much Anglo-American intelligence rivalry in the field of scientific and technical intelligence. Such rivalry was most apparent in the early years of occupation, prior to the establishment of the two IDs and the centralised USLO-BLO system of liaison.

It is particularly evident in the policy confusion surrounding the dissolution of SHAEF. For example, at a JIC-Subcommittee meeting in London in July 1945, officials discussed the ‘need for a body...to give guidance on the intelligence and research exploitation of German science and industry in British interests’.<sup>115</sup> This proposed committee was:

(a) To advise on problems connected with the employment of German scientists and technologists in this country or in the U.S. or in Germany, in the manner best calculated to achieve effective results of benefit to this country.

(b) To advise, from the British point of view, on the allocation of German scientific and technical personnel as between British and United States interests.<sup>116</sup>

It is clear from such early discussions that the British were seeking to pursue their separate national interests and only sought cooperation with America insofar as it furthered those interests.

In the first year of occupation, whilst the intentions of the Allied powers were still somewhat unclear to each other, it was not always obvious that British and American interests in this field aligned.

As the JIC (CCG) declared in May 1946 with regards to information sharing at the QIC:

...our policy should be restricted to giving interviews with scientists on a reciprocal basis, and to producing lists in instalments until the intentions and attitude of the other Allies became clear; it was to be expected that the names of scientists employed by us would, in due course, become known if they remained inside Germany.<sup>117</sup>

Initially, such hesitancy was not only directed towards the Soviets. For example, at a JIC(CCG) meeting in November 1945, there appeared to be some unwillingness on the part of British intelligence officials to share the scientists living in the British Zone. Indeed, the committee minutes note a discussion concerning ‘the difficulties viz-a-viz our Allies of employing scientists in our own Zone while at the same time ensuring they were not given complete freedom to leave the British Zone’.<sup>118</sup> During the 16<sup>th</sup> meeting in February 1946, it was clear that the ‘Allies’ under previous discussion included the Americans: ‘Brigadier Spedding sought the views of the Committee regarding the migration of scientists to the U.S. Zone. It was agreed that there could be no objection to scientists going to the U.S.

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<sup>115</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘Ad Hoc Meeting’, Annex, Secret (04/07/1945).

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 21<sup>st</sup> Meeting Minutes (14/05/1946).

<sup>118</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 11<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (27/11/1945).

Zone if not required in our own Zone and that in fact this was far preferable to their going to other Zones'.<sup>119</sup> As this suggests, British intelligence would rather control and exploit scientists themselves, but where this was not possible, it was much better for them to be in American than Russian hands. To this extent, cooperation favoured British interests by denying scientists to the Soviets. But it is notable that some British intelligence officers appear to have considered preventing scientists under British control from migrating to the American Zone altogether.

Initial British distrust and uncertainty about American intentions was not unfounded. They too were pursuing their national interests. This was most apparent in October 1945 when British intelligence requested that USFET restrict the movement of hundreds of German scientists and technicians who had presumably been evacuated from the Soviet Zone.<sup>120</sup> But Eisenhower, in an apparent attempt to preserve good cooperation with the Soviets, had invited the Russians to inspect these scientists in the US Zone and even to 'submit lists of personnel they wish returned to Russian Zone'.<sup>121</sup> Of course, American intelligence had already selected and made plans to withhold scientists of interest to them.<sup>122</sup> Just over a week later, Spedding noted in probable frustration, 'A large number who were evacuated by the Americans and ourselves from the Magdeburg area before it came under Russian control have just been released by the U.S. Authorities despite a request from the Joint Intelligence Committee to hold them for another month'.<sup>123</sup> But American frustration was somewhat understandable as frequent British requests for them to hold scientists in their zone partially stemmed from the fact that authorities in London had yet to issue clear policy guidance on what could be done with them.<sup>124</sup>

Both the British and Americans were seeking to preserve good cooperation with the Soviets, but this was hindering cooperation between the intelligence services, many officers in which foresaw

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<sup>119</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 16<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes (19/02/1946).

<sup>120</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, Secretary, JIC(CCG), 'Use of German Scientists and Technicians', Secret (11/10/1945).

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> TNA, FO 1012/422, Spedding, Economic Division, Planning and Intelligence Branch to Chief Economic Division, 'Report on Visits to London' (19/10/1945).

<sup>124</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1170, JIC(CCG), 7<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (02/10/1945). See also TNA, FO 1032/190, Secretary, JIC(CCG), 'Use of German Scientists and Technicians', Secret (11/10/1945) and JIC(CCG), 11<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (27/11/1945) and 13<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes (08/01/1946); TNA, FO 1012/422, Spedding to Chief Economic Division, 'Report on Visits to London' (19/10/1945).

the potential dangers of future Soviet policy.<sup>125</sup> Uncoordinated cooperation with the Soviets threatened to potentially ‘split’ the Allied intelligence services. For example, in December 1945, the JIC(CCG) discussed a telegram from FIAT ‘dealing with certain divergence of procedure between U.S. and British policy, arising from the fact that the Americans are now adopting a rather more severe attitude vis-a-vis the Russians and our other Allies than are we’.<sup>126</sup> The following meeting discussed ‘the difficulties which F.I.A.T. (British) was experiencing as a result of differences in treatment accorded respectively by the Americans and ourselves to our Allies’.<sup>127</sup>

One year later, a lack of uniform policy was still causing liaison issues. For example, in July 1946, at a BIOS meeting, Brigadier Maunsell ‘mentioned that the U.S. authorities were complaining that Germans taken to the UK for interrogation were sometimes being approached by the agencies concerned and offered employment in England’.<sup>128</sup> However:

Mr. Derek Wood was certain that such a practice was not, in fact, being followed in England. What did happen was that Germans brought over as a direct result of a BIOS visit were interrogated and, if they appeared to be likely candidates for the Darwin Panel Scheme, were asked if they would be prepared to accept employment in U.K. if such an offer were made to them. In the absence of any formal arrangement with the Americans for sounding possible recruits under the Darwin Panel Scheme, the above-mentioned procedure seemed the only possible course.<sup>129</sup>

This incident was resolved in a manner which reflected the overall good relations between Anglo-American intelligence officers concerned with SCINT and the increasing but gradual coordination of policy since the dissolution of SHAEF:

Mr. Broomfield of the Board of Trade had visited Frankfurt where he had had a meeting with Brigadier Maunsell and the Americans... an agreement had been made that Germans brought to UK for interrogation would be sounded on the possibility of their future employment in UK only when they emanated from the British Zone... Maunsell added that the meeting with the Americans had been highly satisfactory and that they had been assured that the British would do all possible to avoid misunderstanding in the future.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Sean Greenwood, *Britain and the Cold War 1945-91* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 6, 10, 20. See also Aldrich, *Hidden*, pp. 41, 43-44, 48, 49; Kahn, *Occupation*, p. 79.

<sup>126</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 12<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (11/12/1945).

<sup>127</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 13<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (08/01/1946).

<sup>128</sup> TNA, FO 1012/422, BIOS, 10<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Confidential (11/07/1946).

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>130</sup> TNA, FO 1012/422, BIOS, 11<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Confidential (31/07/1946).

As policy became increasingly coordinated between the British and American intelligence organisations on the ground in Germany, rivalry tended to decrease. But the pursuit of national interests was still causing issues in January 1947. On the 13<sup>th</sup>, the 5<sup>th</sup> ‘Apple Pie’ Memorandum produced by Major Gottlieb noted that:

Information on Prof. ACHMETELI...has now been received through INT.DIV.L.O. with USFET. It appears that [he is living] in Munich...U.S. authorities are prepared to make him available for interrogation but will NOT hand him over as they are themselves interested in him...policy with regard to him is laid down by Washington.<sup>131</sup>

It went on to note that ‘U.S. authorities take a very definite interest in APPLE PIE personalities’.<sup>132</sup> The British had not yet told their American Allies about Apple Pie and the Americans were not willing to completely part with scientists of interest to them. Both were pursuing their own national interests, at the expense, if necessary, of the other. To some extent, this evidence supports the observations of Stephen Dorril, Sayer and Botting who argue that British intelligence engaged in competition with their American allies in an attempt ‘to maintain their perceived (if not actual) position at the top of the intelligence heap in the western zones of Germany’.<sup>133</sup> But there was more to it. SCINT and the knowledge it imparted, was not just of relevance to occupied Germany, but to the future, post-occupation world too. Knowledge obtained during the occupation could potentially put a single power ahead of all others, as the atom bomb had done, temporarily, for America.

But by withholding scientists of interest to operations such as Apple Pie, British and American intelligence officers merely revealed the extent of their mutual dependence. As Gottlieb noted, the British wished to interrogate Achmeteli for his knowledge ‘on the whereabouts of certain other Apple Pie personalities or, possibly, documents’.<sup>134</sup> To obtain this knowledge they needed American permission to interrogate, which meant that ‘Any such information would, of course, have to be pooled with U.S. authorities’.<sup>135</sup> This sparked a debate within the British intelligence community. Evans, the

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<sup>131</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1166, Major K.W. Gottlieb, Apple Pie Memorandum No. 5, Top Secret (13/01/1947).

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p. 104. See also Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 318.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

Director of STIB ‘...said that the matter had been discussed with JIB and Professor Norman in London, and it had been agreed that information on the investigation as a whole should be exchanged on a governmental level; JIB had not, however, been in favour of the Americans being informed of details of the operation’.<sup>136</sup> Consequently, the JIC (CCG) ‘agreed that the methods and names of personalities, should not be revealed at present, but that the Americans should be told, in general terms, the nature of the operation and should be given items of particular interest as they occurred...’.<sup>137</sup>

Importantly, the first step towards informing the Americans was to brief the BLO, Da Silva, on the operation.<sup>138</sup> But before USFET cooperation in Apple Pie was confirmed, mutual dependence was further revealed by the fact that a German scientist and his library of important documents of interest to the Apple Pie project were detained in the American Zone at the last minute, despite their anticipated transfer to the British Zone.<sup>139</sup> On the same day, Gottlieb’s Apple Pie memorandum to the JIC(G) noted that during a meeting with the JIB in London ‘The question of pooling information with the Americans was also brought up and it transpired that the policy of JIB is one of fullest co-operation with their American counterparts’.<sup>140</sup> By the end of the month, ‘the fullest co-operation’ between the IDs had been secured following an exchange of letters between Lethbridge and Schow.<sup>141</sup> It was, fittingly, therefore, with the establishment of two Intelligence Divisions in occupied Germany that Anglo-American SCINT cooperation became most coordinated and rivalry more effectively managed. The common aims of discovery and denial now mostly took precedence over national interests.

But early disputes concerning policy towards the Soviets revealed another area of disagreement common to all aspects of intelligence work in post-war Germany, differing threat perceptions. Indeed, British and American intelligence officers not only initially disagreed on how to respond to the Soviet threat and the level of that threat but also on the level and type of threat posed by Nazi scientists. For example, in October 1945, Spedding was concerned with:

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<sup>136</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/62, JIC(CCG), 38<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (10/02/1947).

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/62, K.W. Gottlieb, Apple Pie Memorandum, Top Secret, No. 6 (17/03/1947) and No. 7 (09/05/1947).

<sup>140</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/62, Gottlieb, Apple Pie Memorandum No. 7, Top Secret (09/05/1947).

<sup>141</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/62, JIC(Germany), 43<sup>rd</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (19/05/1947).

...nine leading German physicists mostly connected with atomic development who were brought over to England under ALSOS arrangements about April and who are now a cause of some embarrassment to U.K. authorities who would like rid of them... The British view is they are not especially important from the security angle, but I understand the U.S. think they are.<sup>142</sup>

Nevertheless, evidence of such disputes are far outnumbered by examples of cooperation concerning the joint monitoring of scientists. Moreover, disputes concerning the level of threat posed by the employment of 'ex' Nazi scientists were just as heated within as they were between British and American intelligence.<sup>143</sup>

Disagreements concerning the level of threat posed by employing ex or even unrepentant Nazis and war criminals may have inspired the American policy of keeping TIB entirely secret from their British counterparts as it likely employed such individuals, as will be further discussed in Chapter Four. This enabled TIB to pursue secret intelligence missions which could cause friction between the two IDs and later the CIA as TIB came under its control.<sup>144</sup>

The withholding of SCINT information extended beyond TIB for a variety of reasons. For example, a set of instructions concerning 'Releasable Military Information' in ID EUCOM's correspondence files makes clear that 'Information pertaining to Atomic Energy, including "Restricted Data" as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946' could not be shared with the British ID without permission from the Director of Intelligence.<sup>145</sup> Indeed, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, inspired partially by the revelation that British scientist Alan Nunn May had passed atomic secrets to the Soviets during World War Two, severely restricted Anglo-American nuclear cooperation.<sup>146</sup> As Evans noted at a JIC(G) discussion concerning information sharing in November 1951, 'This particularly affected the work of his Branch, especially papers dealing with atomic energy and he would like an assurance that such papers would not be passed to the Americans in Germany'.<sup>147</sup> But when such exceptions were

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<sup>142</sup> TNA, FO 1012/422, Spedding, Economic Division, Planning and Intelligence Branch to Chief Economic Division, 'Report on Visits to London' (19/10/1945).

<sup>143</sup> For example see pp. 133-134, 141-142, 208-209, 226 in this thesis.

<sup>144</sup> TIB switched from ID to CIA control in October 1949, see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, Rainford, Chief, Control Branch, ID HQ EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, Washington 25, D.C., 'Overall Plan for Intelligence Collection', Secret (24/10/1949). See also NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 362, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (06/12/1949). On friction see p. 142 in this thesis.

<sup>145</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, 'Extracts From DA-DCMI-48', Secret.

<sup>146</sup> Aldrich (ed), *British Intelligence*, pp. 36-37. See also Maddrell, *Science*, p. 85.

<sup>147</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 118<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Annex A, Top Secret (15/11/1951).

discussed, it was usually followed with an acknowledgement that information sharing of the highest secrecy was otherwise free and extensive. Even the restrictions concerning atomic energy did not prevent information sharing on Soviet atomic energy, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter.

As with MINT and security intelligence, the violation of established liaison procedures could sometimes cause friction between the IDs in the field of SCINT. For example, in March 1951, Colonel W.R. Philp, the Chief of ID EUCOM's Operations Branch sent a letter to Analysis Branch requesting 'Your assistance in correcting the repeated deliberate non-compliance with established procedures...'.<sup>148</sup> A memorandum attached to this letter noted that 'USLO, Herford, requests that Anal Br refrain fr personal exchange of official items with ECIC. Also, ECIC, S&T and STIB. Correspondence shld be channeled correctly for proper control of exchange of info'.<sup>149</sup> Notably, the only other incident of procedure violation of relevance to SCINT was the Minden incident discussed in the previous chapter, when an American intelligence official received clearance to interrogate a scientist in the British Zone but preceded to interrogate others without permission. The fact that both of these incidents were resolved by a reassertion of the USLO-BLO system and that they are some of the most notable incidents of SCINT rivalry for the years 1951-1952 helps to demonstrate how that system effectively managed and minimised rivalry between the two Intelligence Divisions.

## **IV Evaluation**

The scientific and technical intelligence work undertaken by the IDs was a small part of their overall activities and missions. At British ID HQ in 1949, the Directorate of Security employed 97 individuals whereas STIB employed only 20.<sup>150</sup> Similarly, at ID EUCOM headquarters in 1951, Operations Branch, which was primarily concerned with security intelligence operations, employed 47 individuals and the Security Section employed 24 people compared with just 9 people working for S&T and an additional

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<sup>148</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 761, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch to C/Anal, 'Exchange of Information', Restricted (30/03/1951).

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> FO 1005/1731, 'Manpower For Intelligence Division', Secret (27/06/1949), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.



4 focusing on Operation Paperclip.<sup>151</sup> Considering these figures, it is perhaps unsurprising that SCINT received a low priority on some ID mission overviews and that some intelligence officers perceived it as a separate and even perhaps unnecessary expense. This evidence jars with the existing historiography in which the overwhelming focus on SCINT work has produced a skewed perspective of Anglo-American intelligence liaison in post-war Germany.

Indeed, to some intelligence officers on the ground, the control of German science and technology likely appeared as only one element in a much broader strategy of control practised through the secret system of rule which upheld the overt structures of military governance and played a primary role in achieving the objectives of occupation. Others may never have been involved in SCINT work. Considering this, it is unsurprising that it was in pursuit of the objectives related to the secret system of rule, most notably that of control and those which can be considered part of the IDs' primary security missions - defending against potential Soviet aggression and discovering enemy intentions and capabilities in which ID cooperation functioned best. These tasks could be most clearly grounded in the world of occupation.

It is the pursuit of national interests which caused the most issues and inspired the most rivalry between the two powers. Indeed, whereas several security and political intelligence tasks related primarily to issues of shared and immediate concern in Germany, potential British or American predominance in science or technology would aid them in theatres outside of Germany and resonate long after the occupation had ended. It is notable too that it was SCINT's clearer links to London and Washington that made some intelligence officers question its utility to their organisations on the ground. It is remarkable that ID EUCOM's 'general correspondence' files detail no incidents of rivalry of this sort following the establishment of the American Intelligence Division and of the USLO-BLO system of liaison as the primary form of liaison between the two powers. Clearly, the trust which liaison officers built played a significant role in preventing and deescalating such incidents.

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<sup>151</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, ID to COMP, 'Listing, dtd 14 Nov 51', Restricted (03/01/1952).

The decreasing rivalry in SCINT matters was also inspired by a growing realisation of the mutual dependence between the two Divisions and the important mutual interests which they shared which accompanied the crystallization of the Cold War. Indeed, it was no use keeping operations such as Apple Pie secret if as a consequence important documents would be unknowingly confiscated in the American Zone and interrogations denied. The fact that interrogations could be denied shows that cooperation was not as unrestricted as Maddrell implies. Indeed, the ID-ID EUCOM relationship was never one of complete trust, as further evidenced by the secrecy of TIB. But ID officers were aware and accepted that the USLO-BLO system facilitated the concealment of sources. This was in fact another advantage of that system as it ensured that information could be exchanged without always indicating from where it came. It kept information flowing with clear mutual advantages as indicated by the number of SCINT successes described in this chapter.

Although intelligence rivalry was noticeably more prevalent in the field of SCINT than other areas of ID work, it should not be overestimated. For every incident of SCINT rivalry in post-war Germany, one can cite at least ten indicating good and productive cooperation. The few incidents which are documented were overcome by a realisation of mutual dependence, shared interests and later by the mediation of the ID's influential, but hitherto understudied, liaison officers.

The primary importance of SCINT in occupied Germany lies in its involvement in the waging of the Cold War from London and Washington, as demonstrated by its contribution to knowledge of the Soviet Union and the hindering of its advances, particularly when linked to military intelligence. But if the histories of the IDs are to be fully understood, historians must not lose sight of the fact that SCINT did not occupy the time of most ID officers. It was only a minor element of the secret system of rule and it was considered to be a low mission priority in comparison with the security intelligence functions to which it only loosely related, as the following chapters further reveal.

## **Chapter Four:**

### **Security Intelligence**

‘Subversive movements are naturally to be expected in an occupied country like Germany, especially when conditions are as grim and ugly as they are here to-day. Remember too, that there are many extremely bad men at large’.

- Draft Statement for Chief ID on Operation Selection Board, 1947.<sup>1</sup>

The Intelligence Divisions waged a secret two front war for democracy against Nazi and Communist threats to the Allied occupation of Germany and the West German government. In doing so, they proved themselves to be the most important elements of the system of rule which controlled the West German population throughout the occupation.

The two-front nature of this battle for the control of Germany has been inadequately demonstrated in the existing historiography as works have tended to focus solely on the Nazi or the Communist threat: the latter usually through the prism of the Cold War; the former overwhelmingly focusing on American intelligence work.

This chapter will analyse the IDs’ security intelligence work primarily through the prism of the occupation, in the context of their overall missions. The crucial importance of Anglo-American intelligence liaison to the accomplishment of the IDs’ security missions, hitherto obscured by national case studies and patchy discussions of rivalry, will be revealed through unprecedented insight into the USLO-BLO system of liaison.

The new knowledge of the security intelligence work undertaken by the IDs’ conveyed by this chapter is crucial to understanding their closely related and sometimes indistinguishable political intelligence work. Together, such work constituted a secret system of rule which was largely responsible for the successful democratisation and denazification of Germany.

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<sup>1</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, ‘Draft Statement for Press Conference to be held by Chief, Intelligence Division in the ZECO Area on ‘D’ Day’, Top Secret (Undated: likely 1947).

## **I Mission**

Throughout the occupation of Germany, the majority of British and American intelligence officers spent most of their time engaged in tasks which can be broadly defined as security intelligence work. This is unsurprising because guaranteeing the security of the British and American Zones was consistently stated as the primary mission of both IDs. For example, in December 1946, Lethbridge wrote that ‘...the security of the British Zone in Germany...is my primary concern’.<sup>2</sup> The following year, the British ID identified its main responsibility as ensuring ‘the security of the British Zone of Germany’.<sup>3</sup> Under Haydon, the British ID was issued with a Charter which identified its primary task as ‘Intelligence work in support of Military Government’ which involved five duties, beginning with :

- (a) The provision of intelligence concerning communist inspired espionage and subversive activities in the British Zone.
- (b) Investigations into all forms of resurgent German nationalism.<sup>4</sup>

These primary objectives can be considered security intelligence tasks as they involve protecting British Military Government from espionage, subversion and German nationalism although the latter objective notably overlaps with political intelligence work, as did many matters affecting security in occupied Germany. In May 1951, Kirkman stated at a JIC(G) meeting that ‘the Counter-Intelligence activities of Intelligence Division...were an essential part of its work’.<sup>5</sup>

The primary mission of the American ID controlled 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was also one of security: ‘The counterintelligence mission is primarily to protect the United States occupation against espionage, sabotage and subversion within the boundaries of U.S. Occupied Germany and to support Military Government...’.<sup>6</sup> In 1948, it remained overwhelmingly focused on security intelligence

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<sup>2</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1003, Lethbridge, Chief ID, ‘Intelligence Division Communications’ to DMG, Zonal Executive Offices, Restricted (17/12/1946).

<sup>3</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1003, Secretariat, Zonal Executive Offices to General Department, Control Office, ‘New Admiralty Intelligence Handbook’, Secret (22/01/1947).

<sup>4</sup> FO 1005/1731, ‘Manpower For Intelligence Division’, Secret (27/06/1949), redacted copy in author’s possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>5</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 110<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (29/05/1951).

<sup>6</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, ‘Material for G-2 Presentation at Conference for District and Port Commanders’, Secret (Undated, likely 1947).

matters.<sup>7</sup> The following year, ID EUCOM's 'Overall Plan for Intelligence Collection' demonstrated that the CIC's primary mission remained the same:

Collection of information pertaining to sabotage, espionage, disaffection, subversive, and other acts prejudicial to the security and mission of the U.S. Forces within the boundaries of the U.S. Zone of Germany.<sup>8</sup>

In 1951, a presentation given by Philp, the Chief of ID EUCOM's Operations Branch, made clear that the 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment shared the same primary mission as its predecessor: '66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment...operates throughout the Zone and provides this headquarters with subversive and counterespionage information essential to the maintenance of internal security'.<sup>9</sup> A report from the following year made this mission even clearer:

The mission of this organization is to detect and neutralize espionage, sabotage and subversion directed against the European Command by unfriendly interests, and to perform such other counter intelligence and intelligence missions as are directed by the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, EUCOM.<sup>10</sup>

This focus on security intelligence continued as 66<sup>th</sup> CIC came under the control of ID USAREUR:

The primary missions of the 66th CIC Detachment are to protect the US occupation in Germany against espionage, sabotage and subversion...<sup>11</sup>

The primary mission of the American ID itself in 1952, despite it encompassing a variety of branches dealing with a multitude of different aspects of intelligence work, was also one of security:

It is the official position of this Division that its two prime missions are the prevention of surprise attack by Communist armed forces against Western Europe and the anticipation of, and protection of the Command against, Communist subversive activities in the midst and in the rear of the European Command.<sup>12</sup>

The above statement was written in defence of Jessie Voss, a key intelligence officer who worked on ID EUCOM's Counterintelligence Desk and had been denied a request to upgrade her position classification due to civilian personnel not fully understanding the importance of her role. A brief analysis of Voss's appeal helps to highlight the importance of ID EUCOM's security intelligence

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<sup>7</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 734, 563465, E.A. Zundel, Chief, CIC, 'Report of CIC Activities – Europe', Secret (19/04/1948).

<sup>8</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, W.R. Rainford, Chief, Control Branch, ID HQ EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, Washington 25, D.C., 'Overall Plan for Intelligence Collection', Secret (24/10/1949).

<sup>9</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, 'Intelligence Organization in EUCOM', Confidential (20/06/1951).

<sup>10</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Det, 'Justification For Military Augmentation', Secret (11/01/1952).

<sup>11</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 124, 'Personnel Utilization Survey, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC', Confidential (20/11/1952).

<sup>12</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Morin, Chief, Analysis Branch, ID HQ EUCOM to Civilian Personnel Officer, Heidelberg Military Post, 'Position Classification Appeal of Jessie VOSS', Secret (24/06/1952).

functions vis-à-vis other American intelligence organisations and the occupation in general. As Voss herself claimed:

It is believed appropriate to re-emphasize that the security of the European Command and polices governing same derive primarily from intelligence produced within the Counterintelligence Desk of Intelligence Division, EUCOM, and not by higher intelligence or Government agencies...<sup>13</sup>

As such statements suggest, the prevalent focus in the historiography on the activities of the CIA, MI6 and on SCINT has produced a skewed perspective of intelligence work in occupied Germany.

The organisational structures of the IDs also reveal something of their mission priorities. The emphasis on security intelligence at ID headquarters, revealed by the staff figures discussed in Chapter Three, reflected realities in the regions as demonstrated by the content and focus of general and regional intelligence reports.<sup>14</sup> Regional CIC reports opened with a discussion of the ‘General Security Situation’ followed by a section on ‘Routine Security Control Measures’.<sup>15</sup> A typical 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group ‘Quarterly Historical Report of Operations’ in spring 1949 stated that the CIC, in that time period, had closed 962 cases concerning espionage, 43 concerning sabotage, 1035 concerning political subversion and only 93 concerning scientific intelligence.<sup>16</sup> The fact that the CIC dealt with more cases of political subversion in that time than espionage, despite its main mission being one of security, demonstrates the close interrelation between security and political intelligence work in occupied Germany owing to the nature of the threats the IDs were trying to protect their zones from.

Much security intelligence work in post-war Germany involved arresting individuals or groups who posed both potential and actual threats to the security of the occupation. A 1951 document concerning ‘Security Arrest Procedure’ which was shared between the CIA and the American ID outlined that:

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<sup>13</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Jessie Voss, ‘Position Classification Appeal’, Secret (24/06/1952).

<sup>14</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Commanding Officer, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, ‘Transmittal of Documents’, Secret (06/03/1952). See also NARA II, RG498, UD964, Box 4563, 5891629, G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 7, Secret (03/11/1945); No. 8 (10/11/1945); No. 9 (17/11/1945); No. 10 (24/11/1945); No. 11 (01/12/1945).

<sup>15</sup> NARA II, RG260, A1898, Box 156, 772407810, Region IV CIC Weekly Report No. 52, Secret (14/11/1946). See also Region IV CIC Weekly Report No. 53, Secret (21/11/1946); No. 54 (23/11/1946).

<sup>16</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 748, 563465, HQ 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, EUCOM, ‘Quarterly Historical Report Of Operations’, Confidential (01/07/1949).

Security Arrests are those involving the arrest and detention of persons engaged or suspected of engaging in, or being about to engage in, activities dangerous to the security of the Allied Forces, including but not limited to, espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and the protection of Allied intelligence activities.<sup>17</sup>

The planning and organising of such security arrests, particularly those which formed part of broader operations, was typically done at ID headquarters by intelligence officers trained in analysis and collation, such as Voss. Indeed, through monitoring a myriad of seemingly unconnected security cases and producing finished intelligence reports from the impressive volume of raw intelligence which passed through Heidelberg from the Regions, Voss was able to help ID EUCOM determine ‘...the strategic pattern of Communist espionage and subversive activity...the degree of success of the enemy effort...’ and then evolve measures ‘...to either counteract these hostile efforts or alert the Command for taking appropriate measures necessary to protect itself’.<sup>18</sup>

When intelligence officers were not engaged in field operations, undertaking security arrests or writing reports, many were engaged in security screening. This could involve background checks of suspect individuals, of potential or actual informants and recruits, or of individuals wishing to emigrate to America or Britain.<sup>19</sup>

Interrogations were also often a matter of security intelligence despite the impression given by the predominant focus on scientific intelligence interrogations in the current historiography. For example, during discussions concerning the anticipated arrest of Naumann’s Neo-Nazi group, the British High Commissioner’s office informed Frank Roberts at the Foreign Office that ‘the existing B.I.O.(G) interrogation machine is adapted to the simpler task’ of interrogating ‘low grade spies’.<sup>20</sup> As Colonel Proudlock stated at a meeting of British intelligence officers held at ID HQ in Herford in 1946, ‘if Intelligence Division was to maintain the security of the Zone, facilities must be provided for

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<sup>17</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, ‘Security Arrest Procedure’ attached to letter from L.K. Truscott, JR. to Director Intelligence Division, EUCOM, Secret (06/08/1951).

<sup>18</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Jessie Voss, Military Intel Analyst, Counterintelligence Desk, S&S Section, Analysis Branch, Intelligence Division to Civilian Personnel Officer, Heidelberg Military Post, ‘Position Classification Appeal of Jessie VOSS’, Secret (24/06/1952).

<sup>19</sup> For example, in a typical three-month period, the 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group completed 6609 Visa Screenings, see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 748, 563465, HQ 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, EUCOM, ‘Quarterly Historical Report Of Operations’, Confidential (01/07/1949).

<sup>20</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, ‘From Wahnerheide to Foreign Office’, Top Secret (31/12/1952).

interrogating people who are trying to sabotage our regime'.<sup>21</sup> The latter term helps to demonstrate just how integrated with and vital to the British system of rule the security intelligence functions of the ID were.

Some ID officers also worked on ensuring the physical security of Military Government buildings and helped ensure that the staff who occupied them followed correct security procedures through lectures and inspections.<sup>22</sup> Censorship, too, was sometimes considered to be primarily a security intelligence task.<sup>23</sup> This wide variety of functions was usefully (though not comprehensively) summarised by Major Earl S. Browning, Jr. of the CIC at the Fourth European Attaché Conference in Frankfurt in 1949:

Our mission of security is concerned with sabotage, active subversion, border security, security surveys of vital military installations, safeguarding information, surveillance of important scientists, performing background checks, and locations and interrogations.<sup>24</sup>

The main long-term objective of the IDs' security intelligence activities was to help build an enduring democratic Germany. Consequently, the primary security threats faced by the IDs were often political, followers of extreme anti-democratic ideologies, Communists and Nazis. This meant, as the British High Commission usefully observed in 1951, that '...the frontier between "security" and "political" intelligence is obviously difficult to define'.<sup>25</sup> The close interrelation between these two areas of intelligence work reveals just how integrated the IDs were into the systems of rule which operated in the British and American Zones of Germany. The very survival of these systems, or 'regimes', depended on the success of the IDs as did their ability to control the German population and implement fruitful policies.

The following sections focus on threats from individuals and groups suspected of or actively engaged in espionage or which were labelled 'security' threats and dealt with by officers concerned

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<sup>21</sup> TNA, FO 1047/7, 'Minutes Of A Working Party Held On 21<sup>st</sup> November In Block 'C' Wentworth Barracks, Herford, To Decide The Guarding Of Intelligence Divisions VPs', Secret (21/11/1946).

<sup>22</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1003, 'HQ Intelligence Division, Security Advisory Section Charter', Confidential (23/01/1948).

<sup>23</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Philp, Chief, Opns Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, 'Matters Affecting the Security of CIS Operations', Confidential (22/09/1951).

<sup>24</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 749, 563465, 'Final Report: Fourth European Attache Conference Frankfurt 23-27 May 1949', Secret.

<sup>25</sup> TNA, FO 1035/77, The Chancery, Office of the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Wahnerheide to D.P. Reilly, Foreign Office, Secret (26/11/1951).



primarily with security intelligence, leaving analysis of the IDs' involvement in military government and monitoring of officially recognised political parties to Chapter Five. They reveal that Anglo-American security intelligence cooperation in occupied Germany was formidable. Although rivalry inspired by a multitude of complex motives did occur, it was usually dealt with effectively by the USLO-BLO system and it was eclipsed by examples of good cooperation. Ultimately, it is argued that ID cooperation was essential to the successful completion of their security missions with significant consequences for the positive outcomes of the occupation itself. The IDs' security intelligence powers underpinned the secret system of rule and ensured the survival of the Allied and West German structures it sought to protect through the combatting of serious threats to democracy.

## II Cooperation

From the outset of occupation, both British and American intelligence officers faced the same primary security threat of violent resistance from Nazis. Since at least February 1945, the two allies planned to face this threat together primarily under SHAEF's integrated structures.<sup>26</sup> After Germany's surrender, this enabled the Western Allies to quickly conclude that the threat from Hitler's Werewolves was not one of 'a large organised resistance group' but rather a poorly coordinated last-ditch attempt wrongly associated with other 'resistance movements' and 'isolated incidents'.<sup>27</sup> The joint monitoring of such incidents ensured that neither Britain nor America would be taken by surprise should such an organised effort be attempted. Exchanging knowledge of which war criminals had been arrested and sharing interrogation reports and briefs also prevented duplication of effort.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> TNA, WO 219/1602, Major E.M. Furnival Jones, Evaluation and Dissemination Section, G-2 (Counter-Intelligence Sub-Division), Rear Echelon, SHAEF to Col. D.G. White, CI Sub-Division, G-2 (Int) Division, SHAEF (Main), Secret (03/02/1945) and White, 'My comments on this paper...' (12/02/1945).

<sup>27</sup> TNA, FO 1050/583, GSI, Main HQ, 21 Army Group, 'CI Sitrep No. 6 for period 21-28 May', Secret (29/05/1945).

<sup>28</sup> TNA, KV 2/94, 'Special Brief SHAEF, Counter Intelligence War Room, London' (12/06/1945) and SHAEF Fwd to War Room, Secret (30/06/1945). See also TNA, KV 2/95, HQ, Third United States Army, ACoS, G-2 to ACoS, G-2, SHAEF (Attn: CI War Room, London), 'Special Interrogation Report Re SCHELLENBERG', Confidential (20/06/1945) and PW&R G-2 to CIS/DIV G-2, '...Walter Schellenberg', Secret (01/07/1945); TNA, WO 219/1602, MI6 to MI14 and G2 SHAEF, Secret (21/06/1945).

Both powers realised the advantages of such widespread general information sharing because it continued uninterrupted by the dissolution of SHAEF.<sup>29</sup> Partially as a result, by December 1945, essential trust had been built between the IG and G-2 USFET. As a JIC(CCG) report on internal security stated that month: ‘We are confident that the Americans would never foster anti-British activity by Germans...’.<sup>30</sup>

Joint operations dominated 1946-1947 as the IDs and their predecessors engaged together in at least sixteen anti-Nazi and five anti-Communist security intelligence operations.<sup>31</sup> The first was codenamed Operation Nursery. It began with a series of CIC reports in June 1945.<sup>32</sup> Through clever use of ‘ex’ Nazi informants, the CIC discovered that a group of former Hitler Youth and BDM members, headed by Artur Axmann, were, under the cover of a transportation company (Tessmann & Sons), implementing a long-range plan designed to place themselves in ‘influential’ economic positions in ‘the new Germany’.<sup>33</sup> Through this influence and the education of a new generation of Nazi leaders, they hoped to ‘make possible the ultimate resurrection of some form of National Socialism’.<sup>34</sup>

As Tessmann & Sons’ operations extended into the British Zone, the CIC cooperated with the British IG in monitoring the group.<sup>35</sup> Rather than arresting members of this organisation when it was first discovered, Anglo-American intelligence decided to let the network spread in order to discover its ‘full scope’ before arresting most of its members in one large swoop.<sup>36</sup> Accordingly, on 31 March 1946, hundreds of suspects were arrested simultaneously in the British and American Zones.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> TNA, FO 1050/583, GSI, Main HQ, 21 Army Group, ‘CI Sitrep No. 13 for period 11-17 Jul’, Secret (18/07/1945), No. 14 (02/08/1945), No. 15 (11/08/1945). See also TNA, KV 2/2862, ‘Copy of letter to Chief X-2, OSS Germany’ (23/07/1945); TNA, KV 2/98, HQ Third US Army, Intelligence Center, Interrogation Section to 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, ‘Meeting between WIRSTING and SCHELLENBERG’, Secret (25/07/1945); TNA, KV 2/963, ‘GISKES and HUNTEMANN’ (26/07/1945); TNA, KV 2/96, ‘Schellenberg Foreign Policy Activities – Consolidated Report’ (03/08/1945); TNA, WO 208/4421, CIB, Fortnightly News Sheet No. 32, Secret (12/11/1945), No. 33 (28/11/1945); TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 1, Secret (12/12/1945) and No. 2 (26/12/1945).

<sup>30</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1165, JIC(CCG), ‘Internal Security Commitment In The British Zone’, Top Secret (11/12/1945).

<sup>31</sup> Joint anti-Nazi operations include: Big Ben, Brandy, Deadlock, Dry Martini, Globetrotter, Gopher, Hedgehopper, Lampshade, Magic Circle, Mortar Board, Nursery, Peter, Pilgrim, Rome, Selection Board and Traffic Jam. Anti-Communist operations include: Candy, Nantucket, Octopus, Red Lilac and Semaphore.

<sup>32</sup> Selby, *Axmann*, p. 103.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 66,94-101,150-151,195-196, 198-199, 208-210. See also TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Intelligence Review No. 13, Confidential (October: 1946).

<sup>34</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Intelligence Review No. 13, Confidential (October: 1946). See also Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, p. 97.

<sup>35</sup> Selby, *Axmann*, pp. 137, 161, 221. See also Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, p. 97.

<sup>36</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Intelligence Review No. 13, Confidential (October: 1946). See also Selby, *Axmann*, p. 102; Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, p. 97.

<sup>37</sup> Selby, *Axmann*, p. 225. See also Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, p. 97.

The success of Operation Nursery was the product of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation. This was already apparent in January 1946 as correspondence exchanged between the head of the British IG's Intelligence Bureau, E.R. Haylor, and the Chief of G-2 USFET's Counterintelligence Branch, Colonel T.J. Sands, suggested that 'splendid co-operation and assistance' between the organisations was viewed as contributing towards the evolving success of the case.<sup>38</sup> At a meeting of the JIC(CCG) the following month, Haylor noted that the situation with regards to subversive activities was '...well in hand, paying a particular tribute to the excellent co-operation of the U.S. authorities'.<sup>39</sup> That such positive experiences were also reflected at lower headquarters is suggested by the memoirs of Bruce Haywood, a British intelligence officer who worked on Operation Nursery with the CIC in Bremerhaven.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, Bruce's account of this operation, and of the two years he spent working with the CIC, is notable for its almost complete absence of rivalry.<sup>41</sup>

In May 1946, Hemblys-Scales, the BLO to the CIC at USFET received a letter from the British IB Head entitled 'Operation Rome', informing him that 'The above code name has been allotted to a possible SS underground movement, at present believed to be forming in the areas of Hannover, Hamburg, Oldenburg and Lunenburg' and requesting that 'a watch' be kept on the activities of certain suspects until the order was given to arrest them.<sup>42</sup> After monitoring the organisation for weeks with no new developments, all known members were arrested.<sup>43</sup> From the evidence available, no incidents of rivalry occurred during this operation, instead examples of good cooperation can be revealed, such as the CIC undertaking an interrogation following a request from the IB.<sup>44</sup>

One reason why good rapport was necessary was that, as a British report noted, 'many of these groups overlap and are connected in varying degrees'.<sup>45</sup> At least one target of Operation Deadlock,

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<sup>38</sup> TNA, WO 208/3789, Brigadier E.R. Haylor, Intelligence Bureau, Bad Oeynhausen to Colonel T. Sands, ACoS, G-2, USFET (08/01/1946) and T.J. Sands, Chief, CIB, HQ USFET G-2 Division to Haylor, Intelligence Bureau, Bad Oeynhausen (23/01/1946).

<sup>39</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 16<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (19/02/1946).

<sup>40</sup> Haywood, *Bremerhaven*, pp. 152-163. See also Selby, *Axmann*, pp. 221-223.

<sup>41</sup> A rare, short-lived exception can be read here: Haywood, *Bremerhaven*, p. 18.

<sup>42</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 13, Head IB to Hemblys-Scales (amongst others), 'Operation Rome', Top Secret (23/05/1946).

<sup>43</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 13, IB to ACoS, G-2 (CI), HQ USFET, 'Operation Rome', Secret (17/06/1946). See also TNA, FO 1005/1702, Intelligence Division Summary No. 1, Secret (08/07/1946).

<sup>44</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 13, IB to ACoS, G-2 (CI), HQ USFET, 'Operation Rome', Secret (17/06/1946). See also C.M. Culp, Acting Chief, CIC, Frankfurt to IB, Bad Oeynhausen, 'Bludau, Hedda', Top Secret (02/08/1946).

<sup>45</sup> TNA, WO 208/4114, MI4, War Office, MITROPA, Periodical Intelligence Summary No. 23, Secret (05/06/1946).

which involved ‘an SS Resistance Movement extending from the American to the British Zone’, was also sought in connection with Operation Lampshade.<sup>46</sup> The Lampshade movement, rumoured to be led by Martin Bormann, again involved ‘mainly ex-Waffen SS’ members but its aims were worryingly ‘...subversive in the sense that “Nursery’s” were not. There seems to exist the intention of sabotage, if not insurrection, as the existence of arms dumps is indicated, and it is possible that its ramifications are not only inter-Zonal but international’.<sup>47</sup> Again, there is only evidence of good cooperation during these operations, in the form of information sharing and arrests.<sup>48</sup>

Less evidence is available concerning the USFET directed Operation Peter which involved an ‘SS Underground Movement...centering in Bavaria, Wuerttemberg and Baden’.<sup>49</sup> However, leads in the British Zone prompted ‘coordination with the British authorities’, again suggesting that good cooperation occurred throughout.<sup>50</sup> The same can be said with regards to Operation Pilgrim during which the British ID requested that Hemblys-Scales provide the ID with ‘any information’ on certain leads in the American Zone concerning an ‘SS escape organisation’.<sup>51</sup> Consequently, USFET asked the CIC Regions to furnish all information on the subject for transmittal to Herford and responded to additional British queries.<sup>52</sup>

Several of the most important joint operations which began in 1946 continued into 1947. These included Operations Gopher, Brandy and Globetrotter, all of which became entangled with the largest and most important operation of 1947, Selection Board.

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<sup>46</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, IB, Bad Oeynhausen to ACoS, G-2 (CI), HQ USFET, ‘Operation Deadlock’, Secret (20/05/1946) and (28/05/1946). See also TNA, WO 208/4114, MI4, War Office, MITROPA, Periodical Intelligence Summary No. 23, Secret (05/06/1946); TNA, FO 1005/1702, Intelligence Division Summary No. 1, Secret (08/07/1946).

<sup>47</sup> TNA, WO 208/4114, MI4, War Office, MITROPA, Periodical Intelligence Summary No. 23, Secret (05/06/1946). On Bormann survival rumours and Anglo-American intelligence see Daly-Groves, *Hitler’s Death*, pp. 96-120.

<sup>48</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, Operation Deadlock, Semi-Weekly Report, Secret (18/07/1946). See also C.M. Culp, Acting Chief, CIC to IB, ‘Operation Deadlock’, Secret (28/05/1946); IB to ACoS, G-2 (CI), HQ USFET, ‘Operation Deadlock’, Secret (28/05/1946); John L. Inskeep, Commanding, 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment to IB, ‘Operation Deadlock’, Secret (30/08/1946); Dale M. Garvey, HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, USFET to C/O CIC Region I, ‘Operation Lampshade’, Top Secret (01/11/1946). On arrests see TNA, FO 1005/1702, Intelligence Division Summary No. 1, Secret (08/07/1946). On the end of Lampshade see TNA FO 1038/102, Air Staff Intelligence, Fortnightly Intelligence Brief No. 16, Secret (19/08/1946).

<sup>49</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, Dale M. Garvey, ‘Periodic Report Of Theater Directed CIC Operations: Operation Peter’, Secret (29/06/1946).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 13, HQ ID, Herford to Hemblys-Scales, USFET, ‘Operation Pilgrim’ (02/08/1946).

<sup>52</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 13, Dale M. Garvey, HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, USFET, ‘Operation Pilgrim’, Secret (03/09/1946). See also John L. Inskeep, Commanding, HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, USFET to HQ ID Hereford [sic], ‘Operation Pilgrim (Krass, Hugo)’, Secret (11/10/1946).

Operation Gopher began in March 1946 when the CIC employed Nazi war criminal, Günter Ebeling (alias: Slim), informed American intelligence of an SS underground movement which was plotting to kill or capture numerous military government officials.<sup>53</sup> Slim met the head of this movement, SS-Brigadeführer Erhardt Müller whilst working as a key informant in the Nursery organisation.<sup>54</sup> As the Gopher movement was collaborating with similar groups in the British Zone, a special 'system of co-operation' was arranged for this operation which apparently enabled the CIC and Slim to make lengthy visits to the British Zone.<sup>55</sup> One such visit took place in October 1946, as CIC Agent Ludwell reported, 'British Intelligence in the course of this trip extended...every assistance and co-operation necessary...'.<sup>56</sup> Any rivalry which may have occurred during this operation was evidently dwarfed by many examples of good cooperation. As one regional CIC report to HQ USFET emphasised:

Liaison between British Intelligence Units all along the line is to be highly commended. Each AIO contacted by Agent Ludwell and No 43 had been fully oriented and afforded every aid possible. Major B.B.M. Kent's office (6th Area Intelligence Officer) forwarded a letter to his Divisional Headquarters, BOAR [sic], duly praising the Americans for the excellent cooperation given the British in Operation Gopher.<sup>57</sup>

Whilst Slim and Ludwell were in the British Zone investigating another subversive movement, the American General Burrell 'demanded the arrest of "Slim" and Ludwell' because American intelligence believed that Slim was 'double crossing' them.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, Ludwell, who had 'been continuously drunk ever since he had entered our Zone' was feared to be 'completely under "Slim's" influence and power'.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, the penetration of subversive movements was in danger of failing. Burrell feared that Slim would give the Nazi movements the names of American agents and that he knew too much about 'the American Intelligence service'.<sup>60</sup> Consequently, Lethbridge had both Ludwell and Slim arrested. Slim violently resisted and was killed after a long struggle culminating in

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<sup>53</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, HQ Third US Army, 303rd CIC Det to S-3, CIC, USFET, 'Operation Gopher', Secret (11/03/1946).

<sup>54</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, Dale M. Garvey, 'Periodic Report Of Theater Directed CIC Operations: Gopher', Top Secret (29/06/1946). See also HQ CIC USFET, Region IV, 'Müller, Erhardt', Top Secret (29/01/1947).

<sup>55</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, H.D. Ludwell, Investigator, CIC, 'Operation Gopher: Report on trip into British Zone', Top Secret (14/10/1946).

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, HQ CIC Region IV to HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det, USFET, 'Operation Gopher', Top Secret (23/10/1946).

<sup>58</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1744, Lethbridge, Chief, Intelligence Division to Major-General W.H.A. Bishop, Office of Deputy Military Governor, BAOR, Top Secret & Personal (22/04/1947).

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

him being struck over the head.<sup>61</sup> As Slim was ‘wanted by the Polish Government, as a major war criminal’, Burrell requested that the incident be kept ‘a very closely guarded secret’.<sup>62</sup> In a morbid display of just how close Anglo-American intelligence cooperation was in occupied Germany, Slim’s body was buried beneath a wooden cross marked with the name John X White following a funeral ‘with some pomp’.<sup>63</sup>

Evidence of close cooperation also surrounds Operation Brandy which began in September 1946 and targeted ‘...an alleged association of former members of the Brandenburg Division and the SS Jagdverbände’ who were ‘trained in sabotage’ and therefore ‘potentially dangerous’.<sup>64</sup> The multizonal nature of this organisation again necessitated Anglo-American intelligence cooperation as information was shared concerning suspects and arrests made in both zones.<sup>65</sup>

At this time, British and American intelligence were also sharing information concerning Operation Globetrotter.<sup>66</sup> This involved three groups. The first was helping wanted persons escape with false papers, the second was ‘mainly political’ and sought to create an SS and Hitler Youth (HJ) leaders organisation which could serve either side ‘in the event of an east/west war’ and the third consisted of ‘ex-HJ leaders living under assumed names in order to avoid arrest’.<sup>67</sup> Examples of good cooperation in this operation again abound.<sup>68</sup>

On 18 February 1947, CIC Sub-Region Dachau submitted a ‘supplementary list of targets’ to 970<sup>th</sup> headquarters, some of whom were also known from Operations Globetrotter and Brandy, requesting permission to arrest the individuals listed as part of the mass Anglo-American ‘swoop operation’ which was planned as the most important phase of Operation Selection Board.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1744, ‘Ebeling (SLIM): Summary of attached statements’ (1947). See also ‘Telephone Message: Keble/Stephens’ (20/01/1947).

<sup>64</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1474, JIC(CCG), ‘2ND Report Of Public Order Sub-Committee’, Secret (17/09/1946).

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. See also NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, HQ ID Herford to ACoS G-2 (CI), HQ USFET, ‘Operation Brandy’, Secret (07/11/1946); J.M. Knight for Chief ID, HQ Herford to ACoS G-2 (CI), HQ USFET, ‘Operation Brandy’, Secret (02/01/1947); HQ ID Herford to Da Silva, USFET, ‘Operation Brandy’, Secret (07/02/1947).

<sup>66</sup> TNA, WO 208/4431, John L. Inskip, Commanding, HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det, USFET to HQ ID Herford, ‘Operation Globetrotter’, Top Secret (03/12/1946). See also Da Silva, BLO, G-2 CIB, HQ USFET to HQ ID, ‘Operation Globetrotter’, Top Secret (13/01/1947).

<sup>67</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1715, Hamburg RIO, Monthly Security Intelligence Summary No. 16, Secret (01/04/1947), p.3.

<sup>68</sup> Daly-Groves, *Hitler’s Death*, pp. 131-132.

<sup>69</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, HQ CIC Region IV to CO, 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, USFET, Top Secret (18/02/1947).

The swoop was launched ‘...on the night of 22/23 February 1947 and arrests continued to be made throughout the following week’.<sup>70</sup> Its scope exceeded Operation Nursery and it was widely reported throughout British newspapers.<sup>71</sup> The main focus of Selection Board was three groups of Nazis, first monitored by British intelligence in 1946, which, through aims expressed in a political manifesto with international ambitions (to match the international contacts of some), had shown increasingly dangerous signs of convergence.<sup>72</sup> The operation followed a similar pattern to Nursery although the targets this time were apparently first discovered and handled by British intelligence alone, who watched the organisation for months before deciding the best moment to make arrests.<sup>73</sup> As the movement involved individuals living in the American Zone, the CIC was involved towards the later stages.

Following the swoop arrests, Burress of G-2 Division, USFET thanked Lethbridge for his ‘kind message and the complete cooperation of your agencies in operation selection board’.<sup>74</sup> Both intelligence staffs also received ‘thanks and congratulations’ from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Frank Pakenham.<sup>75</sup>

In light of Operation Selection Board, Hamburg RIO reported ‘that there has been a general inactivity amongst the subversive elements’.<sup>76</sup> Unfortunately, the suggestion that this could have been partially due to the severely cold weather turned out to be correct.<sup>77</sup> Indeed, in June 1947, the CIC extracted a particular article of interest from the British ID’s monthly intelligence summary.<sup>78</sup> Entitled ‘Big Ben’, it explained that:

This "nick-name" has been allotted to the investigation of an underground movement in Bensberg, Rheinisch-Bergischer Kreis. Its aims are believed to be the re-establishment of National Socialism, and its immediate object the destruction of incriminating Party documents and the recruiting of high-ranking Nazis. The movement is reported to have ramifications in all Zones of Germany, and our informant has been sent to Stuttgart by the Organization to try to recruit further members there.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> LHCMA, Lethbridge Papers, various newspaper cuttings such as ‘Extract from the News Chronicle’ (24/02/1947). See also Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, pp. 97-98.

<sup>72</sup> TNA, CAB 191/1, JIC(Germany), ‘“Deutsche Revolution” Appreciation of Investigations into German Subversive Movements culminating in Operation Selection Board’, Secret (03/04/1947).

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. See also LHCMA, Lethbridge Papers, ‘Extract from the News Chronicle’ (24/02/1947).

<sup>74</sup> LHCMA, Lethbridge Papers, G-2 Div HQ USFET to BAOR (28/02/1947).

<sup>75</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, HQ ID, ‘Unclassified Message’ to multiple intelligence offices (28/02/1947).

<sup>76</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1715, Hamburg RIO, Monthly Security Intelligence Summary No. 16, Secret (01/04/1947).

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 18, 6829150, ‘Big Ben’, Secret (15/06/1947).

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

This information initially alarmed the staff at CIC Region I (Esslingen) who worried that ‘work evidently being carried forward in this area but no contact being maintained with this office’.<sup>80</sup>

However, Captain Frazier at HQ EUCOM informed Region I that:

...no great alarm is felt in this Headquarters concerning possible operation of British informants without proper notification. It will be noted that the informant is being sent by the organization, not by British authorities. While it is usual practice to send prior notification to this Headquarters in such cases it is not considered that failure to do so represents any great infringement on your sphere of responsibility, but rather neglect on the part of British authorities.<sup>81</sup>

Frazier’s interpretation of British conduct was correct. When they were queried about this issue they explained that the individual concerned had been in the American Zone prior to his employment with British intelligence and that EUCOM would be informed if he re-entered their Zone.<sup>82</sup> Consequently, a potential incident of rivalry was successfully mediated by the USLO and aided by the large amount of trust which had evidently built between the two organisations.

Throughout the remainder of this operation until its anticlimactic conclusion in February 1948 (‘The exploitation of all leads’ investigated by CIC Region IV were ‘proven negative’), evidence was shared freely between the IDs with growing use of the USLO-BLO chain of liaison.<sup>83</sup>

Anticlimactic endings to post-Selection Board joint anti-Nazi operations increasingly became the norm. As the British ID reported in November concerning Operation Traffic Jam (the investigation of an escape organisation to Spain), HQ EUCOM and the CIC both agreed that a key informant represented ‘a prevalent type of ‘Professional Informant’ who attempts to sell fabricated information for a few cigarettes or a little food’.<sup>84</sup> Consequently, the ID closed the case.<sup>85</sup> Similarly the British directed Operation Hedgehopper, which began around January 1947, was closed in November 1947 following investigations in the British and American Zones, because AIOs did not uncover any ‘real proof’ that Colonel Rudel was engaged in recruitment, active subversion or (as was originally suspected), trying to

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<sup>80</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 18, 6829150, CO 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det Region I to CIC HQ EUCOM (22/07/1947).

<sup>81</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 18, 6829150, Captain Frazier for Earl S. Browning Jr., HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det EUCOM to CO CIC Region I, ‘Operation Big Ben’, Top Secret (22/07/1947).

<sup>82</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 18, 6829150, HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det EUCOM to CO CIC Region I, ‘Big Ben’, Top Secret (15/10/1947).

<sup>83</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 18, 6829150, HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det EUCOM to CO CIC Region IV, ‘Operation Big Ben’, Top Secret (08/08/1947). See also G.L. Dent, HQ ID, Herford to Da Silva, BLO, HQ EUCOM, Copy to Capt. Ott, USLO, ‘Big Ben’, Secret (11/08/1947); HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Det to Da Silva, ‘Operation Big Ben’, Top Secret (17/10/1947); Ellington D. Golden, Commanding, HQ CIC Region IV to CO 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment EUCOM, ‘Operation Big Ben’, Top Secret (05/02/1948).

<sup>84</sup> TNA, FO 371/64554, ID Intelligence Summary No. 2, Top Secret (15/11/1947).

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.



build up 'a new Luftwaffe in Spain.'<sup>86</sup> He was however wisely kept under surveillance due to the potential danger he posed owing to his 'large number of admirers, whom he regards as his followers'.<sup>87</sup>

In April 1948, the IDs were still investigating what was probably the last major Anglo-American anti-Nazi operation in occupied Germany, Magic Circle. This operation concerned an organization called the Niebelungen Ring which was rumoured to be plotting 'sabotage activities' in Bad Oeynhausen, to have its headquarters in the American Zone and to have enlisted thousands of members.<sup>88</sup> Following British ID and CIC investigations, successfully managed via the USLO-BLO chain, the reports petered out with increasingly negative conclusions.<sup>89</sup>

Clearly, the threat posed by Nazi groups in post-war Germany was changing and their numbers were diminishing. Thus, the main focus of Anglo-American security intelligence cooperation did not shift from Nazis to Communists in response to changing Cold War political priorities but rather in response to changing realities on the ground. The final British report on Operation Selection Board described these changes well in noting how the Operation:

...demonstrated even more clearly how the emphasis in all investigations of such Groups is becoming more and more a political one. During the period immediately after the capitulation, the urgent need was to uncover groups of Nazis who might be attempting to keep Nazism as such alive. Now it is clear that the real danger from the Right Wing comes from those who, realising that Nazism is dead for ever, but that its catch-phrases, its emotional appeal and its out-and-dried philosophy of intolerance are still deeply imprinted on the German mind, see their only chances of a "come-back" in the gradual dissemination of what has been described above as "Neo-Nazism" with its veneer of Pan-European thought to lull the suspicion of former enemies, its continuation of the traditional hatred of the Slav and its appeal to the "Germanic" ideals of race, blood and martial prowess.<sup>90</sup>

Like Britain and America, the Soviet Union entered Germany with several intelligence organisations which underwent various reorganisations.<sup>91</sup> The People's Commissariat for Internal

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<sup>86</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, A.F. Hennings, HQ G-2 USFET to Director of Intelligence OMGUS, 'Operation Hedgehopper', Secret (21/02/1947). See also TNA, FO 371/64554, Mr. L.H. Long, RIO, Düsseldorf, 'Top Secret Annexe To Monthly Intelligence Report No. 1' (17/11/1947).

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 13, J.M. Knight, HQ ID Herford to BLO HQ EUCOM, 'Operation Magic Circle', Secret (17/10/1947).

<sup>89</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 13, Ellington D. Golden, Commanding, HQ CIC Region IV to CO 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment EUCOM, 'Operation Magic Circle', Confidential (19/12/1947). See also Bruce B. Smith, CIC, 'Operation Magic Circle' (03/02/1948); HQ ID Herford to Mr. G.H. Potter, BLO, HQ EUCOM, Copy to: Major P. Moore, USLO, 'Operation Magic Circle', Secret (02/03/1948); TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, CCG(BE), Intelligence Summary No. 2, Top Secret (30/04/1948).

<sup>90</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, JIC(Germany), 'Right Wing Movements Curtailed By Operation Selection Board', Secret (18/07/1947).

<sup>91</sup> Andreas Hilger, 'Counter-intelligence Soviet Style: The Activities of Soviet Security Services in East Germany, 1945-1955', *Journal of Intelligence History*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2003), pp. 83-84.

Affairs (NKVD; MVD from 1946), the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB; Ministry for State Security (MGB) from 1946) and the military counterintelligence organisations of SMERSH ('Death to Spies'; MGB from 1946) on paper, had different duties, but in practice their activities overlapped as each competed for Stalin's favour.<sup>92</sup> Stalin ensured that the Western Allies, particularly America, were main targets for Soviet foreign espionage because they were hindering the furtherance of Communism in Europe.<sup>93</sup> Like East Germany's closely connected Ministry for State Security (MfS or Stasi), founded in 1950, Soviet intelligence organisations engaged in the internal repression of East German civilians, but also in external espionage activities in the Western Zones.<sup>94</sup>

According to Andreas Hilger, organisational changes in Soviet intelligence did not accompany 'fundamental changes in Soviet security policy' in Germany.<sup>95</sup> Like their Western adversaries who were defending and furthering democracy, the Stasi and Soviet intelligence in East Germany, in defence and furtherance of communism, were 'waging a cold civil war on two separate fronts: against domestic and Western enemies'.<sup>96</sup>

As Communist parties increasingly stifled opposition in Eastern Europe, particularly with the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, secret agents of such countries became an increasing problem for the IDs in Germany.<sup>97</sup> As Stéphane Lefebvre points out, 'the CIS's main focus in post-1948 Europe was the FRG'.<sup>98</sup>

By 1949, the primary security threat to the IDs came from communists and the spies who aided communist governments. This had been a gradual development. In June 1946, the CIC received help from 'the British with reference to leads in their area' when conducting Operation Nantucket.<sup>99</sup> This Operation succeeded in breaking up a KPD espionage ring in Frankfurt which had been 'broadcasting

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid, p. 83.

<sup>93</sup> Jonathan Haslam, *Near and Distant Neighbours: A New History of Soviet Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 153, 166, 176. See also Jens Gieseke, *The History of the Stasi* (Oxford: Berghahn: 2014), pp. 19-20.

<sup>94</sup> Haslam, *Soviet*, p. 176. See also Hilger, 'Counter-intelligence', p. 83; Gieseke, *Stasi*, pp. 11, 15, 19-20, 22-23, 28, 32, 39; Thomas Wegener Friis, Kristie Macrakis and Helmut Müller-Enbergs (eds), *East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy* (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 3-4.

<sup>95</sup> Hilger, 'Counter-intelligence', p. 85.

<sup>96</sup> Gieseke, *Stasi*, p. 33.

<sup>97</sup> Haslam, *Soviet*, p. 166. See also Pavel Žáček, 'The Origins and Development of the Czechoslovak Interior Ministry First Directorate: Communist Espionage in the 1950s', *Journal of Intelligence History*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2005), pp. 81-82.

<sup>98</sup> Stéphane Lefebvre, 'The U.S. Counterintelligence Corps and Czechoslovak Human Intelligence Operations, 1947-1972', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2006), p. 122. CIS refers to the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service.

<sup>99</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, Dale M. Garvey, HQ CIC USFET, 'Operation Nantucket', Top Secret (29/06/1946).

to an NKVD station' and resulted in the capture of a transmission set with all the necessary codes and frequencies.<sup>100</sup> That same month the CIC at HQ USFET reported that 'Coordination has been made with the British in order that they may follow up leads in their Zone' concerning Operation Octopus which involved 'Surveillance of an alleged group of NKGB agents...'.<sup>101</sup>

Although at this stage the majority of Anglo-American intelligence operations in Germany involved Nazis, the two security threats sometimes overlapped. For example, in 1946 it was discovered that a group of ex-Nazis investigated under Operation Lampshade actually had 'pro-communist leanings' with connections in the Russian Zone and at least one member was suspected of 'working for the Russian Intelligence service'.<sup>102</sup> Consequently, the Anglo-American investigation of this group became known as Operation Red Lilac.<sup>103</sup>

In November 1947, the British RIO's report in Berlin analysed its main security priorities under the headings 'Right Wing (Pro Fascist or Nazi)' and Russian Intelligence.<sup>104</sup> This report helps to demonstrate how the increasing threat from the left differed from the Nazi threat as it often involved dangerous individual agents, rather than large groups. The two IDs continued to keep each other informed of the security threat posed by such agents:

The US Authorities have now arrested one BIELKE whose activities aroused suspicion. BIELKE pulled a gun on the CIC agent who was arresting him and is, as a result, about to be sentenced to at least 10 years imprisonment. During interrogation, he confessed to the abduction of numerous people in the British and US Sectors and named his two accomplices. He was, he states, acting under orders of the MVD.<sup>105</sup>

Operations did sometimes still take place when tackling agents from behind the Iron Curtain. For example, on 9 November 1948 the BLO received a letter from Anne Moe of ID EUCOM, informing him that 'a swoop operation' had occurred in the early hours of that morning to arrest 28 individuals who had been 'engaged in Czech espionage activities' within the American Zone.<sup>106</sup> The letter requested that several individuals wanted in connection be arrested in the British Zone and handed over to

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, Dale M. Garvey, HQ CIC USFET, 'Operation Octopus', Top Secret (29/06/1946).

<sup>102</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, 'Annexe to Intelligence Division Summary No 7', Top Secret (15/10/1946).

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> TNA, FO 371/64554, K. Randell, RIO, 12 (Berlin) Intelligence Staff, Monthly Summary No. 2, Top Secret (30/11/1947).

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 732, 563465, Moe for DDID to BLO, 'Czech Espionage', Secret (09/11/1948).

American custody for interrogation.<sup>107</sup> The British complied (with the exception of one individual who was already in British hands awaiting trial having confessed to working for the CIS).<sup>108</sup> Nevertheless, it is clear that by late 1949 the majority of Anglo-American security intelligence cooperation concerned individual suspects about whom information was exchanged between the liaison officers at ID headquarters.

The main targets were what ID EUCOM sometimes referred to as Iron Curtain Intelligence Agencies.<sup>109</sup> Of these agencies, most frequently discussed were members of the numerous organisations which made up the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS). Gathering evidence concerning RIS agents in the Western Zones was a difficult task which required Anglo-American cooperation to maximise chances of success. As the CIC noted in 1948, their new focus on Communism and Soviet agents ‘...presents a problem concerning which we Americans have had little training or experience in solving, in that all the intrigues of the Old World are involved’.<sup>110</sup>

The new world agents of Heidelberg realised that they would have to work with the agents of old in Herford if both were to accomplish their missions. This was especially the case when sources of intelligence were meagre. As ID EUCOM complained in June 1949:

...there has been very little RIS intelligence during the past four months reported to you mainly because...we have not received any good RIS poop in sometime. Feel though that the RIS activity has not been curtailed [sic] one bit. Just have not been getting any hot characters.<sup>111</sup>

Due to this initial scarcity of information, the necessity for Anglo-American intelligence cooperation, and its significance, was even more apparent. For example, a Top Secret ID EUCOM teleconference in February 1949 reported that ‘Only identification of Soviet CI agency responsible for secret markings on identification papers received from British who specified that this information received from one source only’.<sup>112</sup> Often, British intelligence provided their American counterparts with their sole source of information on certain Soviet intelligence activities making cooperation between

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, CCG(BE), Intelligence Summary No. 9, Top Secret (30/11/1948).

<sup>109</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 124, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief, Combined Travel Board, US HICOG Box 580, ‘WELWARD, Wilhelm’, Confidential (11/02/1952).

<sup>110</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 734, 563465, E.A. Zundel, Chief, CIC, ‘Report of CIC Activities – Europe’, Secret (19/04/1948).

<sup>111</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, ‘Subject: Intelligence Matters’ (14/06/1949).

<sup>112</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 367, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, ‘Subject: Usual’ (February 1949).

Herford and Heidelberg essential if either Division wished to successfully carry out their security missions. The latter conference also helps to demonstrate how the interrogation of defectors was not always primarily undertaken to obtain scientific and technical intelligence as works by historians such as Maddrell imply:

We have a great need for information on the organization and disposition of MGB--MVD in the USSR proper. All suitable defectors should be queried extensively on this subject. If possible British Intelligence and local CIA organization should be contacted for anything they may have on this subject.<sup>113</sup>

Anglo-American cooperation was excellent when it came to interrogations concerning Soviet intelligence. Through the BLO-USLO chain, requests for interrogation of suspects and questioning of sources in their respective zones were submitted and fulfilled, polygraph examination results were shared, clearance was arranged for CIC agents to interrogate suspects in the British Zone and interrogation reports sent to each headquarters upon request.<sup>114</sup>

It was not just the difficulty of obtaining information concerning the RIS and its initial scarcity which inspired Anglo-American cooperation in this field of intelligence. The multizonal activities of Russian intelligence agents necessitated Anglo-American cooperation. For example, in July 1950, the British ID were interrogating an 'Alleged Soviet Agent – Vera PETROVICH alias Susanne WAGNER' who revealed that she was allegedly tasked with meeting '...a Russian National, residing in Munich for espionage purposes'.<sup>115</sup> Consequently, the British ID, via the BLO, asked ID EUCOM to make enquiries in Munich to aid the British investigation, which they did.<sup>116</sup>

Such investigations sometimes required file checks, as was the case in January 1951 when a 'File check by British' informed ID EUCOM that one Dr. Artur Pilz 'was previously suspected as RIS agent', thus strengthening EUCOM's suspicion that he had been 'engaged in intelligence activity' for

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, Baldry, Chief S&S Section, ABr to USLO Herford, 'Sulfikar ATACHAN', Confidential (29/06/1951). See also Box 761, Baldry, Chief S&S Section, ABr to BLO, Confidential (21/08/1951); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'Aunuschka Marie Pocktanowitsch', Secret (25/08/1952) and 'Ludwig TERHOEVEN', Secret (10/10/1952) and 'TAUBERT, Guenther', Secret (17/12/1952); Box 135, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'MISCHOR, Erich', Secret (25/11/1952) and J.F. Hughes, Jr. Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Asmus BORGSTADTE', Secret (28/01/1952).

<sup>115</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 750, 563465, Philp, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Alleged Soviet Agent', Secret (11/07/1950).

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

around four years.<sup>117</sup> Typical of cooperation in cases of this sort and again revealing of their multizonal nature, ID EUCOM sent the BLO CIC reports about Artur and requested him to obtain a report detailing the interrogation of Artur's wife who was apparently questioned by the British near Hamburg.<sup>118</sup> Under arrest in October 1951, Pilz confessed to espionage.<sup>119</sup>

On comparatively rare occasions, British ID agents conducted investigations in the American Zone themselves. For example, in July 1952, a BIO(G) agent named Fred Guddat received clearance to investigate the suspected CIS activities of Alfred Werner in the American Zone.<sup>120</sup> This was apparently a complete success. As an ID USAREUR letter to the 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment's commanding officer reveals: 'By letter dated 25 Aug 1952, British Intelligence asked that their thanks be relayed to Region I for their assistance in the conduct of this case. Slunecko is at present in custody of German authorities pending prosecution under charges arising from his Czech courier activities'.<sup>121</sup>

Throughout the last year of the British ID's existence and the first of its successor, the BIO(G), much information was shared freely, predominantly via the BLO-USLO chain, concerning suspected and actual Soviet agents along with their family members and contacts who were suspected of currently or previously residing and/or operating in the British Zone and vice versa.<sup>122</sup> One letter from ID EUCOM asked the USLO at Wahnerheide to obtain 'comment and any information British may have' concerning a 'Probable Sovzone Intelligence Agent' with connections to the British Zone.<sup>123</sup> Another politely requested the USLO to 'conduct an investigation in Dusseldorf to determine if Subject is engaged in espionage activities on behalf of Russia and forward results of this investigation to this

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<sup>117</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 760, 563465, D/Int EUCOM to BLO EUCOM, 'PILZ, Dr. Artur', Secret (23/01/1951).

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, Baldry, Chief S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'PILZ, Arthur Bruno', Confidential (17/10/1951).

<sup>120</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'Alfred WERNER', Secret (25/08/1952).

<sup>121</sup> Antonin Slunecko was presumably involved in the Werner case, see NARA II, RG549, A1 2027, Box 134, Marshall, Chief S&S Section to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'WERNER, Alfred', Secret (23/09/1952).

<sup>122</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, W.L. Hardick, Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to USLO HQ ID BAOR 15, 'LINSE, Manfred', Secret (26/04/1951). See also Box 761, Baldry, Chief S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'Ingeburg, Richter', Confidential (22/05/1951). The 'general correspondence' files contain similar documents concerning at least seven more individuals.

<sup>123</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch to USLO ID Wahnerheide, 'SCHROEDER, Kurt Bernhard', Secret (03/01/1952).

Division'.<sup>124</sup> In March 1952, ID EUCOM received a 'British Production Report...which describes an alleged RIS/MSS attempt to recruit subject, a ballet dancer, for military intelligence work in Munich'.<sup>125</sup>

Sometimes, information of only 'possible interest' to the British concerning suspects in the British Zone was transmitted to the BLO.<sup>126</sup> This was the case concerning a suspected 'low-level MSS informant residing in W. Berlin' who had an acquaintance 'reported as living in Hamburg'.<sup>127</sup> The latter example helps to further demonstrate why the IDs activities must be considered in the context of 'Battleground Germany' not just 'Battleground Berlin'. Moreover, it reveals more about the impressive extent of Anglo-American security intelligence cooperation as information concerning even the slightest hint of hostile intelligence activity was shared, in this instance so that British intelligence could exploit a lead 'if they so desire'.<sup>128</sup>

Finished intelligence reports concerning Soviet and Stasi agents were also regularly shared between both IDs.<sup>129</sup> This was probably owing to an ID EUCOM 'policy of supplying British with material on the MSS' which also presumably facilitated the regular exchange of raw intelligence and letters on this subject.<sup>130</sup> A similar policy, which enabled comparative advantages and outcomes, was also in place concerning the IDs' second major espionage threat in this period, the CIS.<sup>131</sup>

The frequent sharing of such reports enabled both IDs to build up a picture of the methods and strategies employed by Iron Curtain intelligence organisations, noting, amongst other patterns, contacts and targets in various zones. This helped the IDs to formulate the most efficient strategies to combat their enemies. At ID EUCOM, this task fell to agents such as Voss at the Counterintelligence Desk,

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<sup>124</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, C/Ops to USLO ID Wahnerheide, 'Louis Edward Madison', Confidential (13/11/1951).

<sup>125</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Elli Gertrud BADING', Secret (02/04/1952).

<sup>126</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 127, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, 'Karl Gottfried', Confidential (04/03/1952). See also Marshall, Chief S&S Section, ID USAREUR to BLO, 'Friedrich SCHIRIOTH possible MGB agent living in Hamburg', Secret (06/11/1952).

<sup>127</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 127, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, 'Karl Gottfried', Confidential (04/03/1952).

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief S&S Sect, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Heinz BECKE', Secret (14/07/1952). See also Box 134, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'British Reports', Secret (25/08/1952) and (28/08/1952); Box 127, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Transmittal of Loan Documents to CIC', Confidential (09/09/1952); Box 126, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Transmittal of Documents' (31/12/1952).

<sup>130</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ID USAREUR to USLO (Major Lerch), INT/DIV, Wahnerheide, 'Soviet Zone Ministry For State Security' (31/10/1952). See also Box 133, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABR to USLO BIOFG Wahnerheide, 'Rosemarie PASOLD', Secret (24/06/1952).

<sup>131</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 761, 563465, James L. Cantrell, ABR to BLO, 'Czech Intelligence Activity', Secret (26/01/1951).

whose name appears at the bottom of much correspondence sent via the BLO-USLO chain.<sup>132</sup> The British performed similar functions. As 'British Intelligence' informed ID EUCOM in July 1952, they were '...hoping to be able to forward other reports illustrating technique and targets of the MSS'.<sup>133</sup> Sharing intelligence in this way also enabled both IDs to corroborate information from their sources and build up a more accurate picture of 'MSS Personalities and Installations'.<sup>134</sup>

To help build such finished intelligence reports covering broad topics of general importance to the Cold War and security within the zones and to solve cases involving multizonal topics, both IDs frequently sent requests for information via the BLO-USLO system. For example, in December 1951, ID EUCOM sent the BLO a lengthy letter describing the case of Georg Bozenhard who was convicted of acting as a courier for Soviet intelligence and sentenced to almost five years imprisonment in October of that year.<sup>135</sup> ID EUCOM asked the BLO whether British intelligence had any information on a list of suspects named by Bozenhard who worked at the Berlitz Language School in Leipzig in the probable hope (as Voss's name at the bottom of this case suggests) of learning more about the functions of Soviet intelligence at the school and capturing more enemy agents.<sup>136</sup>

Little information is available about some cases, such as that of Eric Lemke who was the subject of an information request from the BIO(G) to ID EUCOM in July 1952 as he was suspected of being a 'Sov agent'.<sup>137</sup> What is important about such requests is their sheer scale (in 1951 ID EUCOM submitted at least 95 requests for information from the British) and the fact they were usually fulfilled.<sup>138</sup> In the case of Lemke, ID EUCOM noted 'CIC queried and requested to circulate an Identity Request'.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Her name appears on at least 13 cases concerning RIS and CIS espionage in ID EUCOM's 'general correspondence' files.

<sup>133</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief S&S Sect, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Heinz BECKE', Secret (14/07/1952).

<sup>134</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABR, ID USAREUR to Int/Div Wahnerheide (thru USLO), 'MSS Personalities and Installations Mentioned in British Reports', Confidential (24/10/1952). See also Marshall, Chief S&S Section, ABR to USLO BIOFG Wahnerheide, 'Keel, Horst', Confidential (30/09/1952).

<sup>135</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 760, 563465, Baldry, Chief S&S Section, ABR to BLO, 'Georg Bozenhard', Secret (27/12/1951).

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, J.F. Hughes, Jr. Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Eric LEMKE', Secret (23/07/1952).

<sup>138</sup> Further examples of fulfilled information requests concerning Soviet intelligence include NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, Abr to BLO, 'Curt Egon POCHER', Confidential (26/03/1952); Box 135, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, ID EUCOM to BLO, 'Kurt Gerhard Walter PIEPER', Secret (23/01/1952); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch to USLO HQ ID, 'TAEGER, Alfred', Confidential (30/08/1951).

<sup>139</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, J.F. Hughes, Jr. Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Eric LEMKE', Secret (23/07/1952).



Requests for information and investigation did not always yield successful results or positive evidence of enemy espionage. On several occasions both IDs were unable to find any trace of suspected Soviet agents.<sup>140</sup> At other times, suspicions of espionage could not be verified.<sup>141</sup> But the fact that such negative outcomes were reported demonstrates the strong level of trust between the two IDs, especially considering the potentially undesirable implications for prestige if a onetime untraceable enemy agent caused trouble at a later date.<sup>142</sup> The frustrations of dead-end leads and potential considerations of prestige were far outweighed by the positive consequences of regular intelligence sharing concerning communist espionage.

In the 1950s, the IDs successfully identified and arrested several confessed Soviet and CIS agents.<sup>143</sup> Information exchanged via the USLO-BLO chain was vital to such successes. For example, an ID EUCOM memo at the bottom of one letter sent to the BLO notes ‘On lead fm British, subj has been under invest by CIC as Sov agent...now under arrest by Frankfurt Police for attempted sale of stolen auto. Subj admitted espionage activ and described contacts’.<sup>144</sup> On at least one occasion, a British response to an ID EUCOM request for information was ‘provided to DA 9th Judicial District HICOG to help establish espionage case against subject’.<sup>145</sup> American ID information concerning successful and unsuccessful prosecutions of Soviet agents was also shared with the BLO.<sup>146</sup>

Such information sharing enabled the IDs to maximise the chances of securing successful espionage convictions by learning from mistakes and continuing successful strategies. This was likely the case in March 1952 when ID EUCOM sent the BLO information concerning a Russian Intelligence Agent named Hebert Shulz. The BLO was informed that:

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<sup>140</sup> For example see NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to BLO, ‘Herbert SCHMIDT’, Secret (14/04/1952) and ‘Dr. Fnu WAHL’, Secret (13/05/1952).

<sup>141</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to BLO, ‘HENKE, Hans Herbert’, Secret (22/03/1952).

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> For example, ID EUCOM’s ‘general correspondence’ files detail the successful convictions of several members of the ‘Willi Berger Czech Espionage Net’ and ‘a major CIS personality’ named Heinz Silomon whose confessions following ID activity in both zones resulted in several Czech agents being brought to trial. The files for 1952 document the arrests and confessions of at least four Russian intelligence agents.

<sup>144</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, Baldry, Chief S&S Section, ABr to BLO, ‘PILZ, Arthur Bruno’, Confidential (17/10/1951).

<sup>145</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 761, 563465, J.F. Hughes, JR. Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, ‘KOROL, Eugen’, Confidential (14/09/1951).

<sup>146</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 753, 563465, James L. Cantrell, Chief, GE Section, ABr to BLO, ‘Hans LANG’, Confidential (08/02/1951). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, ABr to BLO, ‘Curt Egon POCHER’, Confidential (26/03/1952); Box 135, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to BLO, ‘Walter LAUTERBACH, “Fritz”’, Secret (21/07/1952).

... a grave error was made in bringing Shulz to trial as the details of this case were only generally known prior to his arrest and subsequent conviction. Better utilization could possibly have been made of subject in a double agent capacity. Had this case been allowed to develop further, it is believed that ultimately much valuable information would have been received.<sup>147</sup>

Similarly, ID EUCOM admitted to the BLO that the arrest of one Hans Lang, 'a 24 yr old FDJ\* functionary, [who] was sentenced to 3 yrs imprisonment for espionage' was 'premature'.<sup>148</sup> The Nursery strategy of delayed arrest was clearly enduring.

The joint strategies and methods formulated and deployed by both IDs to tackle the Nazi and Communist threats were also extremely effective in undertaking another important task of the occupation, controlling the German population. Indeed, both IDs frequently shared information with the Herford based US and UK Elements of the Combined Travel Board (CTB) which had the power to refuse entry permits for individuals wishing to travel to the Western Zones or between them.<sup>149</sup> The criteria for refusal was agreed via meetings attended by the IDs and Allied Permit Officers.<sup>150</sup> Unsurprisingly, suspicion of 'communist espionage' was sufficient to refuse travel, as was engaging in various forms of communist activism such as leading a youth group or spreading propaganda.<sup>151</sup>

From at least 1950, both IDs shared security information with the CTB in the form of an evolving Travel Restriction List (TRL), later renamed Travel Control List (TCL), which enabled them to successfully control the movements of suspected hostile intelligence agents (including former Nazi intelligence agents) and Communists, some of whom were also considered to pose a threat to security.<sup>152</sup> Cooperation in this area of security intelligence also functioned smoothly.<sup>153</sup> By collecting and sharing

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<sup>147</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief S&S Section ABr to BLO, 'Herbert SCHULZ', Secret (13/03/1952).

<sup>148</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 753, 563465, Cantrell, Chief, GE Section, ABr to BLO, 'Hans LANG', Confidential (08/02/1951).

\* *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (Free German Youth).

<sup>149</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 736, 563456, Robert B. Gelston, US Civilian, A/Chief, Entries, US Element, Herford to Director of Intelligence, HQ EUCOM, 'MARKUS, Deszo', Confidential (08/10/1949). See also R.K. Steinmetz for DID to BLO, 'VAPEIADES, Philemon', Secret (01/12/1949).

<sup>150</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 745, 563465, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch to PP&T, 'Division Policy on Entry of Communists to US Zone, Ger', Secret (24/02/1950).

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>152</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 745, 563465, ID EUCOM to Chief, Combined Travel Board, US Element, 'SZTWIERTNIA, Emil', Confidential (15/12/1950). See also HQ ID EUCOM to Chief, CTB, US Element, 'Travel Restriction List', Secret (28/12/1950); Box 753, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief, CTB, US Element, 'de PEGANOW, Nicolas', Confidential (03/01/1951) and 'Travel Restriction List' (06/02/1951); 'Medici, Denner' (21/02/1951); 'MICHAHELLES, Alfred Hermann' (03/04/1951); 'KOSTOFF, Theodore' (25/04/1951); 'WIESEL, John Maximilian' (10/05/1951); 'OGRIZEK, Anton' (06/07/1951); 'MENSION, Robert' (28/11/1951); NARA II, RG549, A1 2027, Box 124, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief, CTB, HICOG, 'WELWARD, Wilhelm', Confidential (11/02/1952).

<sup>153</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 753, 563465, Harry R. Smith, Chief, Security Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief, CTB, US Element, 'PRINZ, Erich', Confidential (09/06/1951) and Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief,

information concerning entries and exits between the Western Zones and carrying out investigations on travelling suspects when requested, both IDs helped to control, govern and protect their own zone and that of their allies.<sup>154</sup> Such was the level of trust between the two IDs that entry to the American Zone could be restricted based solely on a British report, and action could be postponed pending the report of an ID counterpart.<sup>155</sup> On one occasion, a British permit officers' unevaluated but typical description of 'subject as militant commie' was enough for the American ID to agree to keep an individual on the TCL.<sup>156</sup>

Of course, not all enemies of the Western occupiers would travel via legal routes. Consequently, both IDs took great interest in zonal border areas and shared much information concerning illegal border crossings.<sup>157</sup> Strange activity at the borders could be indicative of enemy intelligence activity and monitoring this was a good way for the IDs to capture suspects and convict enemy agents.<sup>158</sup> Even if espionage could not be proven, illegal border crossing itself was an offence in the American Zone which could result in detention, and apprehension on these grounds could aid espionage cases.<sup>159</sup> For example, in March 1952 ID EUCOM informed the BLO that one Robert Sandner was '...suspected of espionage on behalf of Czech Intelligence' but '[b]oth CIC and German authorities desire his apprehension for

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CTB, US Element, 'URBANY, Dominique', Confidential (02/11/1951); 'PREUSS, Otto' (17/12/1951). See also Box 760, Chief Ops Br, ID to USLO HQ ID BAOR, 'Miroslav, DYCKA', Secret (17/04/1951).

<sup>154</sup> NARA II, RG549, A1 48, Box 753, 563465, Smith, Chief, Security Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief, CTB, US Element, 'BADER, Hildegard' (02/03/1951). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to USLO ID Wahnerheide, 'Anna VOLKMANN', Confidential (14/04/1952). This could also help national intelligence organisations such as the FBI, see Marshall to USLO, 'Walter ALBERS', Confidential (14/05/1952) and Marshall to ACoS, G-2, Intelligence, Washington, 'Walter ALBERS', Confidential (29/05/1952).

<sup>155</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 753, 563465, Smith, Chief, Security Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief, CTB, US Element, 'Travel Control List', Confidential (30/11/1951).

<sup>156</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 753, 563465, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief, CTB, US Element, 'KIEFFER, Bernhard A.', Confidential (28/12/1951).

<sup>157</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 743, 563465, Moe, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, OMGUS, 'British-Soviet Zone Daily Border Sitreps', Secret (27/01/1949) and (18/03/1949); Confidential (05/04/1949). See also Box 764, Chief Operations Branch to USLO ID Herford, 'Economy of Paper', Confidential (13/02/1951); Box 757, James L. Cantrell, Chief, GE Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'British Communications Intercept', Confidential (09/02/1951); Box 754, Baldry, Chief, S&S Section, ID EUCOM to BLO, 'KPD/SED Designated Crossing Point at HELMSTEDT', Secret (29/05/1951).

<sup>158</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to USLO BIOFG Wahnerheide, 'Uwe Heinrich Hermann KAMPOVSKY', Confidential (27/08/1952). See also Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'MIERSWA, Egon', Confidential (22/10/1952).

<sup>159</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 128, Baldry, Chief, PP&T Branch, Memorandum for Director of Intelligence, 'Report of Meeting', Confidential (21/02/1952).

illegal border crossing'.<sup>160</sup> ID EUCOM felt that apprehension on those grounds followed by interrogation 'may result in a confession of espionage on behalf of the Czechs'.<sup>161</sup>

Anglo-American intelligence concern with zonal borders throughout Germany, not just in Berlin, again helps to demonstrate the broader significance of the IDs activities. Both IDs also cooperated to protect the borders of their own countries from enemy agents as revealed by much USLO and BLO correspondence on the subject, including the prevention of Soviet agents entering the USA, British ID aid to FBI investigations and the monitoring of suspicious KPD members in England.<sup>162</sup>

The IDs did not only perform background checks on those wishing to travel. For example, weddings were the focus of much USLO-BLO correspondence as both IDs performed thorough background checks on ladies who wished to marry members of their forces and those seeking employment for sensitive positions.<sup>163</sup> Performing such checks helped the IDs to avoid employing unreliable and potentially dangerous individuals.

Still, some unreliable agents were occasionally hired by both Divisions. Often when this occurred, the British ID informed ID EUCOM and vice versa.<sup>164</sup> For example, in March 1952, the USLO informed ID EUCOM that one Hans Rohde of Bad Salzflun was previously in touch with British intelligence in 1949 but found to be 'very unreliable' and was now apparently 'offering his services to all and sundry'.<sup>165</sup> Whilst the latter correspondence occurred in response to a query from EUCOM, information concerning dropped informants was shared en masse, too. For example, in 1949, both IDs compiled and exchanged 'Black List[s] of Discarded Sources'.<sup>166</sup> Several individuals were dropped 'for

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<sup>160</sup> NARA II, RG549, A1 2027, Box 130, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'Robert SANDNER', Confidential (26/03/1952).

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 739, 563465, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch, D/Int to USLO, 'Voldemars, BASTJANIS...', Confidential (16/12/1949). See also Box 760, Baldry, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to ACoS, G-2, D/A, Washington, DC, 'Mary MORTON-JAKOBSON', Secret (19/09/1951); Box 745, James L. Cantrell, Chief, G&E Section, D/ID to BLO, 'Ex-communists Emigrating to the United States', Confidential (21/11/1950); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, ABr to USLO, 'SCHUSTER, Annemarie', Secret (22/09/1952); Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ID USAREUR to BLO, 'Franz Hermann FILA', Confidential (26/11/1952).

<sup>163</sup> For example see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 761, 563465, Smith, HQ ID EUCOM to USLO HQ ID, 'GARLING, Maria Josephine', Confidential (23/08/1951). There are at least 20 other examples of such checks in the 'general correspondence' boxes.

<sup>164</sup> There are files relating to at least 6 such individuals shared with the USLO and the BLO in the 'general correspondence' boxes.

<sup>165</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, J.F. Hughes, Jr., Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Hans ROHDE', Secret (18/03/1952).

<sup>166</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, DDID to BLO, 'British Black List of Discarded Sources', Secret (05/05/1949). See also Box 743, DDID to CO 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, 'British Black List of Discarded Sources', Secret (07/06/1949); Box 736,

reasons of security' such as Herbert Edler, a disgruntled former American agent who had been compromised by the Soviets.<sup>167</sup> ID EUCOM warned the BLO about Edler because he intended 'to contact other Allied intelligence agencies for employment'.<sup>168</sup> Sharing information in this way prevented opportunists such as Zbigniew Majewski, described by the CIC as a 'worthless and unscrupulous individual', who had attempted to sell or had already sold their services to ID EUCOM from doing the same to the British and vice versa.<sup>169</sup> It also prevented individuals such as Edmund Teplitz-Sembitzky, 'an agitator and opportunist who will play one faction against the other to obtain his objective' from playing 'divide and rule' between the two intelligence services.<sup>170</sup>

It is unsurprising that both IDs spent much time helping each other to ensure that their respective Divisions were not internally compromised as this would affect the quality of vital intelligence that was shared between them and have a direct effect on security in their respective zones. For this reason, both IDs also regularly shared information concerning actual and suspected nuisance or confusion agents.<sup>171</sup> Such agents, often trained by Iron Curtain services such as the CIS, were instructed or inclined on their own initiative to waste the time of Allied intelligence officers by giving in false information.<sup>172</sup> Confusion agents could have potentially severe consequences for security. For example, in August 1952, ID USAREUR sent the BLO a report concerning the case of one Gerda Hannchen Zietmann which presented '...a classic example of the effectiveness of confusion tactics

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W.R. Rainford, Chief, Control Branch for DDID to BLO, 'List of Informants Dropped...', Secret (27/06/1949); Box 738, IRS fr ID to BLO, 'List of Informants Dropped...' (21/09/1949).

<sup>167</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch to BLO, 'Herbert EDLER', Secret (08/01/1952). See also Box 124, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment EUCOM, 'JAHNS, Hans', Confidential (11/02/1952); NARA II, RG549, A1 48, Box 742, 563465, Moe for DDID to DAD, 'Dr. Rudolf PECHEL', Secret (19/05/1949);

<sup>168</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch to BLO, 'Herbert EDLER', Secret (08/01/1952).

<sup>169</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 124, Tormey, Commanding, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment EUCOM to DID, HQ EUCOM, 'MAJEWSKI, Zbigniew', Confidential (27/02/1952) and Eugene L. Maleady, Chief, Operations Section, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment EUCOM, 'MAJEWSKI, Zbigniew', Confidential (21/02/1952).

<sup>170</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 124, Tormey, Commanding, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment EUCOM to DID, HQ EUCOM, 'TEPLITZ-SEMBITZKY, Edmund', Confidential (15/03/1952) and Maleady, Chief, Operations Section, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment EUCOM, 'TEPLITZ-SEMBITZKY, Edmund', Confidential (21/02/1952). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 736, 563456, DDID to BLO, 'SCHUMANN, Klaus', Secret (01/03/1949).

<sup>171</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 761, 563465, Chief Ops Br ID EUCOM to USLO HQ ID BAOR, 'Ernst Frank McKinley', Confidential (14/06/1951). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Eberhard KAEHLER', Secret (21/02/1952); Box 124, Walter J. Unrath, Chief, Technical Specialist Section, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment EUCOM, 'SCHRECK, Walter', Confidential (11/02/1952) and Tormey, Commanding 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment EUCOM to DID, 'SCHRECK, Walter' (25/02/1952); Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Werner DUEPPE', Confidential (16/04/1952); Box 134, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Annuschke Marie POCKTANOVITSCH', Secret (09/10/1952) and 'STOCKER, Josef...', Secret (24/10/1952).

<sup>172</sup> For CIS example see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 760, 563465, Baldry, Chief S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'RUZICKA, Ladislav', Secret (24/10/1951).

employed against Allied Intelligence agencies'.<sup>173</sup> Zietmann was a 'self-confessed MSS agent' who succeeded in wasting '202 hrs' of CIC agents' time.<sup>174</sup>

The frequent sharing of such information between British and American intelligence helped to expose confusion agents by having stories checked by another agency, minimise the security risk they posed and, as the involvement of agents such as Voss again suggests, formulate more efficient strategies to combat them.<sup>175</sup> Cooperation in this area of security intelligence work was excellent with information concerning individuals who even just 'may be of irritating value to British' being transferred to the BLO.<sup>176</sup>

Confusion agents usually admitted their employment with hostile intelligence agencies in order to begin their elaborate time-wasting activities. But other intelligence nuisances and perhaps more sinister operatives of Iron Curtain organisations could pose as British or American intelligence officers or employees of other Allied organisations. Cooperation helped to combat this threat as well. Indeed, both IDs confirmed that captured individuals posing as Allied officials were imposters by sharing false identity documents for verification, usually via the USLO-BLO chain.<sup>177</sup> Out of courtesy, both IDs informed each other when such frauds were located too. For example, in 1951 the USLO and the BLO received correspondence from ID EUCOM concerning Heinrich Struebe who was arrested and imprisoned for five months in the American Zone for wearing a British Army uniform without proper identification.<sup>178</sup> The USLO-BLO system of clearance undoubtedly helped to capture such imposters as did the exchange of OB information between both IDs.

The two IDs and later the BIO(G) also exchanged much information concerning 'friendly agents', individuals or groups suspected of working for (or having previously worked for) an Allied

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<sup>173</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'Gerda Hannchen ZIETMANN', Confidential (25/08/1952).

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'Annuschke Marie POCKTANOVITSCH', Secret (26/09/1952) and Marshall to USLO BIOFG Wahnerheide, 'Tanja, LEMUSENKO...', Secret (28/11/1952).

<sup>176</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section HQ ID USAREUR to BLO, 'RJABOF, Helmut', Confidential (09/12/1952).

<sup>177</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 737, 563465, G.E. Hartel, Intelligence Chief, 7707 ECIC to Ops Br DDID, 'MEISEL, Henry', Secret (31/01/1949). See also Box 735, Ops Br to USLO ID Herford, 'WICHODIL, Karl Heinz', Secret (13/12/1949).

<sup>178</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 753, 563465, ID EUCOM to BLO, 'M/R', Confidential (20/02/1951). See also Box 759, 'Roto ERITA', Confidential (29/03/1951) and ID HQ EUCOM to BLO HQ EUCOM, 'STRUEBE, Heinrich @ Erita, Roto, Sgt', Confidential (06/04/1951).

intelligence agency who came to the attention of either ID during the course of investigations or offered their services.<sup>179</sup> This helped to ensure that imposters, intelligence frauds and ‘divide and rulers’ were exposed, that Allied agents would not be arrested by other Allies, that they could be protected if compromised by enemies and others could be warned if an operation behind the Iron Curtain was at risk. For example, in July 1951, ID EUCOM sent the USLO a letter concerning two individuals who had been described by local border police as ‘running loose up and down the border’ raising suspicions of espionage.<sup>180</sup> The USLO was advised that ‘Should these individuals be employed by your agency it is necessary that this Division learn of this fact as soon as possible in order to prevent apprehension’.<sup>181</sup> Moreover, in April 1952, the BIO(G) informed ID EUCOM that an American source was ‘an especially poor security risk’.<sup>182</sup> This prompted an investigation which revealed that ‘the MSS is aware of subject’s intelligence activities’.<sup>183</sup> Consequently, the USLO was asked to ‘Please inform the British of our appreciation for that information, which has been confirmed’.<sup>184</sup>

When ‘friendly’ arrests did occur, ID EUCOM could be apologetic. This was the case in June 1951 when one Kurt Ferdinand Schmidt, an individual of interest to the British ID, was arrested by German police in Köln, presumably acting on a CIC instigated ‘Germany-wide alert’.<sup>185</sup> Consequently, Philp, Chief of ID EUCOM’s Operations Branch, admitted to the BLO that ‘This Division was in error in not properly ascertaining British interest in Subject’.<sup>186</sup>

Both IDs also informed each other when British or American intelligence employees, soldiers and citizens had been arrested behind the Iron Curtain, some of whom tragically committed suicide in prison.<sup>187</sup> But the great majority of intelligence sharing concerning friendly agents took place as a result

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<sup>179</sup> The ID EUCOM ‘general correspondence’ boxes contain individual files documenting discussions, primarily via the USLO and BLO concerning at least 39 individual British and 12 American agents, sources and/or associates.

<sup>180</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 760, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, ID EUCOM to USLO, ‘VERNER, Fred, and VRACOVSKY, Vladislav’, Secret (30/07/1951).

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to USLO BIOFG Wahnerheide, ‘Heinz BARNITZKE’, Secret (29/04/1952).

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>185</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, ID to BLO, ‘Kurt Ferdinand Schmidt’, Secret (01/06/1951).

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> There are at least seven letters in the ‘general correspondence’ files discussing such arrests behind the Iron Curtain. For example see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 736, 563456, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch to USLO ID Herford, ‘British

of specific requests for information. Indeed, there is no evidence that the IDs shared lists of friendly sources and agents in the same way that they exchanged lists concerning discarded agents and suspects. Moreover, the USLO-BLO system of indirect liaison enabled both IDs to ask other intelligence services if sharing a source with their Allies was desirable before doing so.<sup>188</sup> This again helps to demonstrate the importance of the ID liaison officers in acting as a key focal point for CIA and MI6 liaison.<sup>189</sup> But it also suggests that despite the impressive examples of security intelligence cooperation discussed in this thesis, the ID-ID relationship was not one of complete trust. One must therefore analyse the extent to which rivalry contributed towards this limited trust and identify the limits of security intelligence cooperation.

### III Rivalry

During the Second World War, according to General Strong, prestige driven attempts to accentuate the contributions of one Allied nation above others were a considerable issue, albeit successfully resolved, at SHAEF.<sup>190</sup> Since anti-Nazi operations were considered by some to be a continuation of that war, attempts at accentuation were initially an issue in post-war Germany as well.<sup>191</sup>

In late 1945, three copies of Hitler's last will and testament were discovered, the first by British intelligence alone and the last two following an Anglo-American investigation led by Hugh Trevor-Roper.<sup>192</sup> Whilst high level discussions were occurring concerning whether to publish or destroy the documents, they were leaked to the press by Lucian Truscott Jr. (Commanding General of the Third United States Army, Munich).<sup>193</sup> This was done in direct contravention of an agreement between British

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Report on Alfred KRAUSE', Secret (25/11/1949). See also Box 756, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch to USLO ID Wahnerheide, 'Arrest of Suspected Western Intelligence Operative in GDR', Secret (30/11/1951).

<sup>188</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, J.F. Hughes, Jr. Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Werner GRIMMER', Secret (17/09/1951). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section for DID EUCOM, to HQ ID BAOR (thru BLO), 'UFDJ', Secret (15/04/1952).

<sup>189</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 760, 563465, ID EUCOM to BLO, 'Alyeksandr Ignatysvich NAZAROV', Secret (11/09/1951).

<sup>190</sup> Strong, *Intelligence*, pp. 165-166, 171-172, 218.

<sup>191</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, 'Draft Statement for Press Conference to be held by Chief, Intelligence Division in the ZECO Area on 'D' Day', Top Secret (Undated: likely 1947). See also LHCMA, Lethbridge Papers, Extract from *The Times* (24/02/1947).

<sup>192</sup> Daly-Groves, *Hitler's Death*, pp. 76-77.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 77-79.



intelligence and USFET to keep the wills Top Secret.<sup>194</sup> As Trevor-Roper later explained in a private letter to his cousin, Brian Melland:

General Truscott ... was clearly displeased by the fact that a British officer had discovered these documents in his area and determined to claim the entire credit for his own forces. He therefore behaved in a very curious way. First, he had the documents ... shut away in a safe and I was not allowed to see them. Then, in direct contradiction to the assurances given to me that nothing would be published till the British and American texts had been compared, immediately after I had left, sent for the American press and published the whole discovery as a brilliant coup by the U.S. 6th Army. This naturally led to some indignation in the British zone, and somebody in a high place (presumably Truscott), in order to defend his action, evidentially made unspecific charges against me which resulted in my never visiting the American zone again.<sup>195</sup>

British intelligence responded in kind. They gave their own handout to the press which revealed, to the surprise of some American intelligence officers, that 'British Intelligence were *already* in possession of a copy of the two testaments' [emphasis added].<sup>196</sup>

This was a battle of prestige. It was sparked by Truscott who apparently let his 'American feelings' cloud his better judgement. Each power wished to take the credit for discovering the Führer's final political statement to the world.

This incident had some significant consequences for Trevor-Roper's investigations.<sup>197</sup> But he never mentioned it in public. His reasons for this are important. As he explained to Melland, it was a story '...which, for reasons of Anglo-American solidarity, I have never published'.<sup>198</sup> Thus, Trevor-Roper turned a serious incident of rivalry into a triumph of cooperation. He realised that the benefits of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation far outweighed whatever personal satisfaction he may have gained from publicly criticising Truscott's actions which would have escalated matters.

In post-war Germany, presenting a public image of Anglo-American intelligence 'solidarity' was particularly important because enemies of the IDs could exploit differences between them, as shown in the last section. Furthermore, in August 1952, ID USAREUR believed 'that the Soviets are

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<sup>194</sup> TNA, WO 208/3789, CIB, Secret Signal (08/01/1946).

<sup>195</sup> TNA, CAB 146/438, Trevor-Roper, History Faculty Library, Oxford to Brian Melland, Cabinet Office, Historical Section (28/03/1966). See also Daly-Groves, *Hitler's Death*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>196</sup> Daly-Groves, *Hitler's Death*, p. 80.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 20, 68, 81, 84-87.

<sup>198</sup> TNA, CAB 146/438, Trevor-Roper to Melland (28/03/1966). See also Daly-Groves, *Hitler's Death*, p. 84.

making an effort to split the allied unity that presently exists'.<sup>199</sup> In light of these wider strategic considerations and with the benefit of hindsight, Trevor-Roper's decision can be considered particularly sagacious because in 1951, Truscott was appointed head of the CIA in Germany and Special Adviser to the US High Commissioner.<sup>200</sup> Nevertheless, the incident did negatively affect Anglo-American liaison in Germany almost ten years later, as will be seen.

Serious incidents of this sort with long lasting consequences were unusual and by no means representative of Anglo-American intelligence relations in general, despite being more frequent during the early occupation period. Melland's response to Trevor-Roper made this clear as he emphasised that despite the 'childishness' of individuals like Truscott, all of the American intelligence officers at G-2 USFET in Frankfurt who he encountered during his occupation duties were 'cooperative types'.<sup>201</sup>

The Truscott incident shows how the less centralised organisation of American intelligence in Germany could create problems as Truscott, then an Army, not intelligence representative, went against an Anglo-American intelligence agreement apparently without punishment. The CIC were aware of such problems and eventually took measures to mitigate them. As CIC Chief E.A. Zundel reported in 1948:

In Germany each region differs from the others in organization and to some extent in method of operation. Some operate with highly centralized control while others decentralize with resident agents scattered throughout the region... The present Commanding Officer of the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment is fully cognizant of this problem and prior to my arrival was taking steps to...standardize the regional organization and employment of agents.<sup>202</sup>

With regards to the latter, Zundel elaborated:

A CIC agent requires greater self-discipline, integrity and moral character than any other agency in the Army. After the war during the demoralization of demobilization, a large number of personnel infiltrated into the CIC who were unfitted and unqualified for this important duty. A certain element also remained in the occupation forces on duty who saw an opportunity to use their position for personal gain. This together with the use of CIC in investigating black marketing activities in Germany resulted in considerable loss of prestige to the organization.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 128, HQ ID USAREUER, 'Summary of Recent Military Mission Activities in Germany', Confidential (01/08/1952).

<sup>200</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 11<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (19/06/1951).

<sup>201</sup> TNA, CAB 146/438, Melland to Trevor-Roper (13/04/1966).

<sup>202</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 734, 563465, E.A. Zundel, Chief, CIC, 'Report of CIC Activities – Europe', Secret (19/04/1948).

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

Zundel concluded that ‘The vast majority of CIC personnel are capable, energetic, and extremely enthusiastic about their job’ but he also acknowledged that although ‘The present Director of Intelligence was given the mission of cleaning up the situation...some irregularities continue in the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment today’.<sup>204</sup>

He was correct. In 1949, two American military intelligence officers were arrested in the British Zone for attempting to sell chocolates and cigarettes to German customs officials.<sup>205</sup> This incident did not escalate due to the skilful mediation of the USLO who dealt with the matter and the willingness of ID EUCOM to stamp out such ‘irregularities’.<sup>206</sup>

As the above evidence suggests, individual officers, arguably unfit for the important duties of intelligence work, could damage American prestige in the eyes of their British counterparts. But rivalry inspired by concerns with prestige was usually more subtle than the battle over Hitler’s wills. For example, omitting embarrassing material from shared intelligence reports became common practice in occupied Germany. As Lieutenant Colonel Hinks stated at a JIC(CCG) meeting in April 1946, ‘special care was taken to omit from...the Intelligence Bulletin and Intelligence Review, any information which would embarrass us if it came into the hands of the recipients’.<sup>207</sup> This was also the case with British Military Government reports, as one British official noted in regards to French liaison: ‘An ill-disposed person could take extracts and turn them to the detriment of British prestige’.<sup>208</sup>

ID EUCOM’s standard operating procedures enabled American intelligence officers to omit certain information from reports shared with the British ID including ‘Information which is derogatory to the United States Government or any agency thereof, prejudicial to United States relations with a foreign government with which the United States maintains friendly relations, or derogatory to a United States citizen or commercial entity’.<sup>209</sup> This policy and similar exclusion instructions may have been

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<sup>204</sup> Ibid. At the time of the Chief’s visit to Germany ‘one Regular Army Lieutenant Colonel and regional commander was being investigated regarding reported irregularities, five agents were under investigation and four agents were being court-martialled’. However, a new ‘periodic swoop inspection system of the various regions and sub-regions which covered all activities and agents’ was having ‘an extremely salutary effect on the command’.

<sup>205</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 736, 563456, Moe, HQ ID EUCOM to ACoS, G-2, HQ US Constabulary, ‘Military Police Report’, Confidential (16/03/1949).

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC(CCG), 20<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (16/04/1946).

<sup>208</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1004, Central Secretariat (ZECO) to HQ Land Niedersachsen (22/11/1947).

<sup>209</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, ‘Extracts From DA-DCMI-48’, Secret.

partially inspired by desires to prevent embarrassment in the interests of prestige. For example, it may have reflected badly on ID EUCOM's abilities if the British ID judged the extent of 'Communism or other subversion within US Armed forces' to be too great.<sup>210</sup>

But such restrictions on information sharing did not have significantly negative consequences for Anglo-American intelligence liaison. They were in fact compatible with the mutually agreed liaison procedures. The consolidated nature of the BLO-USLO system enabled liaison officers on instructions from headquarters to withhold certain information from reports before discussing them with their allies.<sup>211</sup> It also allowed ID EUCOM to seek permission from external agencies before sharing information with the USLO as was the case with a HICOG report marked 'American Eyes Only' which was shared with the USLO in September 1951.<sup>212</sup>

In ID EUCOM's general correspondence files, evidence of British information requests not being fulfilled are few and far between.<sup>213</sup> Moreover, when external agencies such as the Department of the Army Detachment (DAD) were unable to comply entirely with a British request, ID EUCOM responded to their British allies insofar as they could.<sup>214</sup> For example, in January 1952, the 'British authorities' requested permission from ID EUCOM to contact and interrogate one Heinrich Reiser in connection with an investigation concerning 'the RSHA Amt IV and the Gestapo'.<sup>215</sup> ID EUCOM had 'no objection' to granting this request but as their information on Reiser came from DAD, they asked the latter for approval.<sup>216</sup> For reasons not documented, DAD refused this request and suggested that the British may submit a questionnaire instead.<sup>217</sup> ID EUCOM's letter to the BLO informing him of this demonstrates the tactful, kind and genuinely helpful tone in which such cases were handled:

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<sup>210</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, William E. Hall, Director of Intelligence to ID EUCOM Branch Chiefs and CO 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, 'Guide to ID/EUCOM on Exchange of Intelligence Information with the British', Secret (07/10/1949).

<sup>211</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 750, 563465, Johnson, Chief, Ops Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to USLO, ID Herford, 'LANGE, Joachim', Confidential (11/06/1950).

<sup>212</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, Baldry, Chief, S&S Section, ID EUCOM to USLO HQ ID BAOR, 'Nordkontinentals Schiffsmakler Zweigniederlassung', Secret (21/09/1951). Similar examples include TNA KV 2/963, T.A. Robertson to Mr. Wilson (10/08/1945); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ID EUCOM to HQ ID BAOR (Thru BLO), 'FDJ (UFDJ)', Secret (15/04/1952) and Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, ID to DAD, 'FIKEJA, Jan', Secret (22/04/1952).

<sup>213</sup> For example see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 735, 563465, DDID to USLO, Secret Letter (02/06/1949).

<sup>214</sup> DAD was an 'umbrella organization for all non-military intelligence agencies operating in Germany under US military cover'. Most importantly, it was used as cover for the CIA. See Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 322.

<sup>215</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, J.F. Hughes, Jr. Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief, DAD, 'REISER, Heinrich', Secret (30/01/1952).

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>217</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, ID to BLO HQ EUCOM, 'Heinrich REISER', Secret (19/03/1952).

This Division regrets to inform you that the contact with REISER is of a nature which would preclude a direct interview at this time. It is suggested that you prepare a written questionnaire on information desired from REISER. This questionnaire will be handled as expeditiously as possible.<sup>218</sup>

In terms of the specific exclusion policy, ID EUCOM could obtain permission from the Director of Intelligence to share derogatory or prejudicial information with the British and often did.<sup>219</sup>

There is evidence of only one other example of prestige-based rivalry which is comparable in its seriousness to the Truscott incident. This again took place relatively early in the occupation during Operation Selection Board. It involved the notorious war criminal, Klaus Barbie.<sup>220</sup> Owing to his SS rank, Barbie's name was on the automatic arrest list in 1946.<sup>221</sup> He managed to escape arrest by US forces in August that year but was captured by the British on 12 November in Hamburg.<sup>222</sup> He escaped two days later.<sup>223</sup> In February 1947 he avoided the CIC again, this time by jumping out of a window in Kassel during the Selection Board arrests.<sup>224</sup> Two months later, Barbie was employed by the CIC following discussions with two ex-SS officers also working for them.<sup>225</sup> A dispute between the Regions then occurred with Region XII (Augsburg) desiring Barbie's detention and Region IV (Munich) arguing for his continued employment.<sup>226</sup> In the end, it was decided to continue Barbie's employment because:

CIC rationalized that if unemployed, Barbie would renew his overtures to the British "who would find out that CIC had not turned him in or reported him regarding SELECTION BOARD because CIC was using him as an informant". CIC felt that such a revelation would be "a serious blow to CIC's prestige in the eyes of the British".<sup>227</sup>

Considerations of prestige therefore prevented the apprehension of a war criminal wanted by the British. But this incident differs from the Truscott episode in two important ways. The CIC was concerned here with preserving their prestige in the eyes of the British, not accentuating it at the expense of the latter. This was likely the case with many of the aforementioned examples of selective

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<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

<sup>219</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, 'Extracts From DA-DCMI-48', Secret.

<sup>220</sup> Aldirch, *Hidden*, p. 181. See also Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 323.

<sup>221</sup> NARA II, RG59, ZZ1004, Box 31, 26169009, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 'The Relationship of Klaus Barbie To The U.S. Government' (18/03/1983).

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid. This crucial issue of prestige is omitted from the Barbie account in Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 326.

information sharing. The desire to preserve prestige was therefore most often born out of a desire to preserve the positive advantages of intelligence cooperation and to continue it. The CIC's employment of Barbie despite British desires to arrest him also reflects deeper disagreements concerning sources, threat perceptions and methods.

Although both IDs shared almost identical security missions, they sometimes disagreed on the best methods to successfully accomplish them. For example, in November 1947, the commander of 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, John L. Inskip, recommended to ID EUCOM '...that no reference be made to methods used for obtaining information to be transmitted...in information forwarded to British authorities'.<sup>228</sup> Indeed, ID EUCOM's operating procedures prohibited the transmitting of information concerning '...methods of acquisition, and the degrees of success attained' without permission of the DID.<sup>229</sup> Nevertheless, as previously shown, such permission was often granted.

When methods were not being concealed, disagreement concerning rival methods did sometimes occur. In February 1949 both IDs could not agree on what to do with Soviet deserters who were captured in Trieste.<sup>230</sup> The British ID wanted such individuals to be transferred directly to London for interrogation by the British on a brief supplied by the USA, if necessary.<sup>231</sup> However, ID EUCOM wanted to interrogate such deserters first, followed 'possibly' by 'British agencies in Germany' before transfer to London.<sup>232</sup> Both Divisions cited security reasons to justify their positions.<sup>233</sup> As usual, the BLO, J. Linnington, was the main channel of liaison throughout this discussion.<sup>234</sup> Because agreement could not be reached via correspondence, a conference was held between ID EUCOM and the BLO.<sup>235</sup> Unusually, both sides failed to agree a policy, and it was decided to deal with such instances on a case by case basis with each Division pursuing their own preferred methods for the time being.<sup>236</sup> This seems

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<sup>228</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 730, 563465, John L. Inskip, Commanding, Hqs 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment to Ops Br ODDI, 'American Lloyd', Secret (21/11/1947).

<sup>229</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, 'Extracts From DA-DCMI-48', Secret.

<sup>230</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 735, 563465, W.R. Rainford for DID, ID HQ EUCOM to ACoS G-2 HQ Trieste United States Troops, Secret Control (18/02/1949).

<sup>231</sup> Ibid.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid.

to have worked well as there is no evidence of any future disagreement on this subject in ID EUCOM's correspondence files.

Far more common and consequential than issues surrounding rival methods were disputes concerning rival sources. Indeed, ID EUCOM's operating procedures made clear that 'identification of agencies or individuals whose identity as a source of intelligence information requires protection...' would not be shared with the British without approval from the DID.<sup>237</sup> When the latter's permission was granted, the sharing of such intelligence could still be treated with great precaution as the BLO was informed in November 1952: 'This report is extremely sensitive and pinpoints Source. It is requested that care be taken in dissemination of the report and exhibit in order to protect Source'.<sup>238</sup>

Although the USLO-BLO system of liaison facilitated the concealment of sources by enabling liaison officers to omit references to them in correspondence when desired, it could still create problems with liaison. Indeed, the withholding of information concerning sources sometimes fostered distrust between the two Divisions. In a letter concerning a British communist named Josef Winternitz, the Commander of 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC, George R. Eckman, told the USLO, Ben W. Miller, that '...it is felt that a more complete answer regarding subject's background could have been obtained from British Intelligence authorities' and that 'A remote possibility which has occurred to this Headquarters is that subject might conceivably be a British source'.<sup>239</sup> The CIC wished to determine whether the latter was the case before initiating surveillance.<sup>240</sup> This issue was resolved by the USLO who informed Eckman that in future he should ask more specific questions and confirmed that Winternitz was not employed by British intelligence.<sup>241</sup>

Further suspicions concerning sources were aroused in November 1949 when the BLO's assistant, Pauline Deighton-Pascoe, asked ID EUCOM for any information concerning Boris Sokolov,

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<sup>237</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 742, 563465, 'Extracts From DA-DCMI-48', Secret.

<sup>238</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ID USAREUR to BLO, 'GDR Attempt To Approach British Foreign Trade Council', Secret (25/11/1952).

<sup>239</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 741, 563465, George R. Eckman, Acting Commander, HQ 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group to USLO thru OPS BR, 'Josef WINTERNITZ', Secret (08/04/1949). For more on Eckman see Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, pp. 322-323

<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>241</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 741, 563465, Miller, USLO to 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, Secret (30/05/1949) and J.J. Simpson for Chief, ID Herford to USLO, HQ ID, 'Josef WINTERNITZ', Secret (26/05/1949).

who was reported to be in Stuttgart.<sup>242</sup> However, the British ID was 'either unable or unwilling to report the origin of its statement'.<sup>243</sup> On request of ID EUCOM, DAD performed a file check which revealed that Sokolov was reported to be a Soviet agent, connected with the CIC.<sup>244</sup> It is unclear as to whether the British ID ever received this information as ID EUCOM informed the CIC: 'Since it appears...that subject may be of interest to you, this Division contemplates making no release to the British, other than a negative statement, without concurrence of your headquarters'.<sup>245</sup>

The Sokolov case was also of interest to TIB.<sup>246</sup> Due to the indirect nature of the USLO-BLO chain, this meant that information supplied by British intelligence was given to an organisation whose very existence they were denied knowledge of.<sup>247</sup> But the concealment of sources and organisations such as TIB caused more problems for Anglo-American intelligence relations in post-war Germany. Most notably, if a secret American source wished to operate in the British Zone and vice versa, this had to be done without clearance, outside of the established liaison channels. Intelligence agents operating without clearance were sometimes arrested if their activities aroused suspicion. This appears to have been the case in March 1947 when Seefeld Walter was apprehended in the British Zone and claimed to work for a Mr. Reno who operated from 'HQ CIC Munich Region and Frankfurt'.<sup>248</sup> According to his British questioners, Walter's CIC work '...varies from being placed in internment camps to swanning all over Germany complete with false SS papers supplied by the Americans in order to penetrate SS Groups'.<sup>249</sup> The CIC was asked to confirm their association with Walter but their response is frustratingly absent from the Foreign Office folder concerned.<sup>250</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> NARA II, RG549, A1 48, Box 742, 563465, R.K. Steinmetz, HQ ID EUCOM to CO HQ 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, 'Boris SOKOLOV', Secret (04/11/1949). See also Box 736, R.E. Kilzer for DDID to Director, Civil Affairs Division (29/06/1949).

<sup>243</sup> NARA II, RG549, A1 48, Box 742, 563465, R.K. Steinmetz, HQ ID EUCOM to CO HQ 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, 'Boris SOKOLOV', Secret (04/11/1949).

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid.

<sup>247</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 743, 563465, DDID to CO 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, 'British Black List of Discarded Sources', Secret (07/06/1949).

<sup>248</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1004, STEINREG KIEL, Top Secret Cipher Message (10/03/1947).

<sup>249</sup> Ibid.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.



Unauthorised American activities in the British Zone likewise irritated the ID in Wuppertal.<sup>251</sup> Exactly what American intelligence agents were targeting in Wuppertal is unclear. They were possibly spying on British intelligence as the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment's 'Outline For Top Secret CI Periodic Report' instructed CIC agents to include material concerning 'Intelligence activity of all other countries which affects US interests in the US Zone of Germany' with particular focus on France, Spain and Great Britain.<sup>252</sup> British intelligence officers likely engaged in similar espionage in the American Zone. American intelligence officers were aware of this, but the DID, William Hall, instructed ID EUCOM in 1949 that information should never be released to the British indicating as such.<sup>253</sup> Incidents of 'friendly' espionage demonstrate that the ID-ID EUCOM relationship was not one of complete trust and that issues of trust could equally inspire incidents of rivalry.

Causes of rivalry could be incredibly complex. In October 1952 the BIO(G) expressed frustration that an associate of theirs named Valentin Sokolov was prevented from emigrating to the USA despite possessing the necessary papers.<sup>254</sup> But it was not so much the failed emigration as it was the manner of the British response which caused tension. As J.T. Marshall of ID USAREUR told the USLO:

This Branch is rather concerned, as was CIC, that the British chose to write direct to CIC, bypassing all established liaison channels.... It is felt that CIC's handling of this matter has been entirely just, fair, and beyond the amount of assistance which the British could normally have expected. However, the tenor of the British letter indicates criticism of US handling of this matter. For this reason it is desired that the case be handled in your capacity as Liaison Officer rather than this Division handling it strictly by correspondence which might lead to hard feelings on both sides.<sup>255</sup>

The USLO system of liaison offered an easy solution. But it is notable that violation of liaison procedures was capable of producing hard feelings. This helps to demonstrate just how crucial the USLO-BLO system of liaison was for preventing and deescalating intelligence rivalry in post-war

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<sup>251</sup> FO 1005/1731, 'Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division', Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>252</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 18, 6829150, Major Earl S. Browning, Jr., HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment to several CIC Regions, 'Top Secret CI Periodic Report', Top Secret (28/12/1947).

<sup>253</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, William E. Hall, Director of Intelligence to ID EUCOM Branch Chiefs and CO 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, 'Guide to ID/EUCOM on Exchange of Intelligence Information with the British', Secret (07/10/1949).

<sup>254</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to USLO BIOFG Wahnerheide, 'SOKOLOV, Valentin alias DOLLING, Walter', Confidential (24/10/1952).

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

Germany. That such incidents did not escalate was also undoubtedly aided by the impressive level of trust which had been built between both IDs through positive cooperation.

The fact that established procedure was sometimes abandoned for good reason or due to honest mistakes also helped to temper immediate reactions. For example, Captain Frazier initially suspected the Big Ben incident, when a British source was found to be operating without the knowledge of CIC Region I, was a product of ‘neglect on the part of British authorities’ rather than a deliberate violation of procedure. Furthermore, in February 1951, D.H. Watt, the BLO, explained to Operations Branch at ID EUCOM that as an urgent meeting had to be arranged during a ‘US holiday’ between Lt Col G.A. Colville, the head of ID Herford’s Communications Section, and Major Drennan of Heidelberg, a telephone call had been made direct to the latter’s private quarters.<sup>256</sup> The visit was approved with the request that in future ‘clearance be obtained through proper channels’.<sup>257</sup> This would allow more time for officers to be briefed on the issues to be discussed enabling them to give the general view of Headquarters which Drennan could not owing to the short notice given.<sup>258</sup>

Cases of potential rivalry involving organisational complexities and improper liaison were particularly prominent in Bremen. This is unsurprising owing to the daily direct liaison which occurred there between British and American intelligence officials.<sup>259</sup> Unusually, the most important incident of rivalry here involved Lethbridge himself and fits well with the observations of Dorril, Sayer and Botting concerning the motivations behind Anglo-American intelligence rivalry in Germany.<sup>260</sup>

On 25 September 1947, Lethbridge sent the DDID Colonel Schow a letter suggesting that due to a recent reorganisation of British intelligence in the Bremen Enclave, a British detachment under the control of an AIO should now ‘undertake all Intelligence coverage’ in order to avoid ‘irritating delays’ which apparently resulted from the present, more cooperative, arrangements.<sup>261</sup> This request for an

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<sup>256</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, Opns Br to BLO, ‘Visit of British Officer’ (23/02/1951).

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

<sup>259</sup> FO 1005/1731, ‘Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division’, Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author’s possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531–17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>260</sup> Dorril, *MI6*, p. 104. See also Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 318.

<sup>261</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, Lethbridge, Chief ID, Herford to DDI, HQ EUCOM, Frankfurt, ‘Intelligence Responsibility in ...the Bremen Enclave’ (25/09/1947).

increase of ID power was surrounded by much bureaucratic jargon apparently designed to make Lethbridge's request seem like 'a purely domestic one and not in any way affecting the CIC set-up'.<sup>262</sup>

Not deceived by its diplomatic shrouding, the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment Commander Browning focused on the proposed increase of British power in his letter to the commander of CIC Region IX (Bremen), asking for his opinion on Lethbridge's proposal.<sup>263</sup> In particular, he noted that 'It is further considered inadvisable for British personnel to conduct intelligence activities in these Kreise independently of CIC'.<sup>264</sup> The response from Region IX argued that 'the disadvantages of the present set-up from the point of view of an unwieldy channel of communication' as expressed by the British would be even worse for American intelligence if Lethbridge's proposals were implemented.<sup>265</sup> Its conclusions were categorical:

Regardless of the merits of the British case, it is felt that as long as U.S. installations remain within the boundaries of the Bremen Enclave the primary intelligence responsibility is-and must remain-American...It was only through courtesy that British Intelligence agencies were allowed within the limits of the Enclave originally and it is not deemed advisable to broaden the scope of these activities.<sup>266</sup>

This response reveals the limited nature of trust between the two IDs and the tendency of regional intelligence officers to closely guard their areas of influence.

Having gathered the opinion of his agents, the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment Commander informed ID EUCOM that 'the Commanding General, BREMEN Enclave, does not desire to surrender counter intelligence responsibility for any portion of his command'.<sup>267</sup> This incident concluded with a kind letter from Schow to Lethbridge informing the Chief that although his proposals had 'merit' and that British internal reorganisation in Bremen could improve liaison, 'CIC coverage' would have to remain the same 'as long as the US Forces are charged with security responsibilities' within the Bremen Enclave.<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

<sup>263</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, Earl S. Browning, Jr., HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, EUCOM to CO CIC Region IX, 'Revision of Intelligence Responsibility in Bremen Enclave', Confidential (30/10/1947).

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

<sup>265</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, HQ Ninth CIC Region to CO 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, Confidential (06/11/1947).

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

<sup>267</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment to DDI, 'CIC Coverage BREMEN Enclave', Confidential (13/11/1947).

<sup>268</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, Schow, DDI, HQ EUCOM to Chief, ID, Herford, 'Counter Intelligence Responsibilities, Bremen Enclave', Confidential (17/11/1947).

The BLO, Da Silva, was kept informed of Lethbridge's proposals, but the latter's intervention appears to be the product of failed negotiations which had occurred at a regional level and between lower ranking officers at headquarters.<sup>269</sup> Still, Region IX's otherwise critical letter ended with much praise for Mr. Linnington who was then acting as a liaison officer for the Bremen AIO and became BLO at Heidelberg the following year.<sup>270</sup>

Thanks to liaison officers such as Linnington and the system of liaison they upheld, most incidents of rivalry were short-lived and easily resolved. In September 1951, the CIC Region X Bremen Field Office sent the British Consul a letter requesting that British intelligence conduct an investigation concerning 'International of Seamen & Harbor Workers – Hamburg'.<sup>271</sup> The Consul sent the request to the ID in Wahnerheide which resulted in a protest from the USLO to ID EUCOM arguing that such requests should be made through headquarters via the BLO-USLO system.<sup>272</sup> The British ID's Director of Security agreed.<sup>273</sup> When questioned by ID EUCOM, the CIC were defensive claiming that their request did not violate local liaison agreements.<sup>274</sup> They also stated that the CIC and British intelligence in Frankfurt should 'conform' with the British definition of liaison channels.<sup>275</sup> That comment perhaps reveals some regional tensions which may have arisen from perceived violations of or exceptions granted to established liaison procedures in Boughey's area of operation. This incident concluded with a typical reassertion of the USLO-BLO system of liaison. ID EUCOM informed the CIC that as their request involved the need for an investigation outside of Bremen, it was not considered to be a matter of local liaison and therefore needed to be conducted via headquarters.<sup>276</sup>

Although organisational differences between the two IDs were most apparent in Bremen, incidents concerning rival methods of organisation could have negative implications for Anglo-

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<sup>269</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, Lethbridge, Chief ID, Herford to DDI, HQ EUCOM, Frankfurt, 'Intelligence Responsibility in ...the Bremen Enclave' (25/09/1947).

<sup>270</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, HQ Ninth CIC Region to CO 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, Confidential (06/11/1947).

<sup>271</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Improper Liaison with British', Secret (01/11/1951).

<sup>272</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Improper Liaison with British', Secret (03/12/1951).

<sup>273</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Improper Liaison with British', Secret (01/11/1951).

<sup>274</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Improper Liaison with British', Secret (03/12/1951).

<sup>275</sup> Ibid.

<sup>276</sup> Ibid.

American intelligence liaison throughout Germany. For example, complaints discussed at a JIC(G) meeting in 1950 concerning unequal information sharing were attributed to a ‘fault... within the United States machinery itself’ owing to ‘the lack of liaison between the various United States intelligence agencies’ rather than any deliberate malice on the part of American intelligence.<sup>277</sup> Another reason cited was differing American procedures concerning the handling of Top Secret documents.<sup>278</sup> British awareness of such organisational differences helped to ensure that issues arising from them rarely escalated.

Potentially more serious than disagreements concerning organisation and procedure were the rival threat perceptions held by both IDs. Indeed, the lack of an integrated analysis section sometimes resulted in the IDs drawing different conclusions about the level of threat posed by certain enemies. As Chapter Two demonstrated, comparative analysis of Soviet threat assessments were sometimes considered invidious. But disagreements concerning the Nazi threat were more frequent and the consequences more severe. For example, British and American intelligence officers often failed to agree on which Nazis (or ex Nazis) posed a security risk or could be controlled.<sup>279</sup> Considerations of security and control, rather than morality, were the primary factors which influenced the decision of British and American intelligence officers in post-war Germany to employ ‘ex’ Nazis.<sup>280</sup> It is highly likely that such rival threat perceptions are what inspired the CIC’s concern for prestige with regards to Klaus Barbie.<sup>281</sup> TIB’s probable employment of Nazi war criminals may also explain why it was kept secret from the British ID.<sup>282</sup>

The secrecy of TIB and its employees sometimes caused issues in the British Zone. For example, evidence strongly suggests that an individual known as Issel was an employee of TIB.<sup>283</sup> In

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<sup>277</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/65, JIC(Germany), 101<sup>st</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret & Guard (20/11/1950).

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>279</sup> Daly-Groves, ‘Control’, pp. 339-340, 342.

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 331, 342.

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 339-340.

<sup>282</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, ‘Intelligence Matters’ (10/03/1949). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, HQ ID USAREUR to ACoS, G-2 Intelligence, Department of the Army, Washington DC, Secret (22/08/1952).

<sup>283</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, ‘Intelligence Matters’ (10/03/1949).

February 1949, British public safety officers arrested him because he was wanted for war crimes in Denmark.<sup>284</sup> According to an American ID discussion on this subject:

While awaiting deportation from Hamburg on 24 February, British Intelligence prevailed upon by man named GROPP (through British Public Safety) to withhold ISSEL from deportation since the two of them were working for American Intelligence against Russians.<sup>285</sup>

Alarming for ID EUCOM, Gropp and another probable TIB employee informed the British ““That if the son-of-a-bitching Americans wouldn’t protect them they wouldn’t work for them””.<sup>286</sup> This issue was resolved in a conference with a British RIO during which it was agreed ‘that any effort to salvage this character will evoke questions by the Danish government which would be prejudicial to our intelligence efforts’.<sup>287</sup> But Gropp’s declaration of disloyalty for his American employees likely encouraged the British ID in its opinion, expressed by Haydon himself, that American intelligence officers in Germany were not always in full control of the Nazis and ‘ex’ Nazis they employed.<sup>288</sup>

Such rival perceptions concerning the threats posed by individual Nazis were also evident in analyses of Nazi groups. On 21 January 1952, Ritchie Garrison of ID EUCOM’s Operations Branch asked the USLO for further information concerning Dr Werner Naumann and the ‘group Subject allegedly leads’.<sup>289</sup> Naumann had been in the Führerbunker during Hitler’s last days owing to his position as Minister of State in Joseph Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry.<sup>290</sup> He was appointed Goebbels’ successor in Hitler’s last will and was friends with top Nazis such as Himmler.<sup>291</sup> ID EUCOM first learned of his post-war activities from the British ID’s routinely exchanged monthly intelligence summary.<sup>292</sup> The document had described Naumann as the leader of a ‘Covert Nazi Group’ who had

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<sup>284</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, ‘Intelligence Matters’ (28/02/1949).

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

<sup>286</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, ‘Intelligence Matters’ (10/03/1949).

<sup>287</sup> Ibid.

<sup>288</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Haydon, Chief, ID, Herford to Dugold Malcolm, The Chancery, Office of the UK High Commissioner, Wahnerheide, Top Secret, Personal & Guard (08/08/1950).

<sup>289</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch to USLO w/Br Wahnerheide, ‘Dr Werner Naumann’, Confidential (21/01/1952).

<sup>290</sup> Daly-Groves, *Hitler’s Death*, p. 129. See also Frei, *Adenauer’s Germany*, p. 277; Rosenfeld, *Reich*, p. 123.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid. See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, J.F. Hughes, Jr. Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief DAD, ‘Dr. Werner NAUMANN’, Confidential (21/01/1952).

<sup>292</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch to USLO w/Br Wahnerheide, ‘Dr Werner Naumann’, Confidential (21/01/1952) and J.F. Hughes, Jr. Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief DAD, ‘Dr. Werner NAUMANN’, Confidential (21/01/1952).

‘close connections’ with veterans’ groups, a society known as *Die Brüderschaft* (The Brotherhood) and the German Liberal Party, the FDP.<sup>293</sup>

In response to ID EUCOM’s request, the British ID sent what was described as ‘a short but excellent piece of intelligence collation within the field of extreme nationalist underground activities in West Germany’.<sup>294</sup> ID EUCOM forwarded this report to the Department of the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 in Washington, DC owing to its ‘potential military significance’ and the involvement of ‘former German officers’.<sup>295</sup> The accompanying letter to Washington noted that ID EUCOM was ‘unable to give a firm evaluation of the contents of the report’ because the Nazi activities were mostly centred in the British Zone.<sup>296</sup> After comparing ID EUCOM’s ‘findings with those of the British’ concerning the importance of *Die Brüderschaft*, the American ID believed they discovered:

...a tendency on the part of the British to exaggerate somewhat the importance of "crypto-Nazi" activities... We believe, contrary to the British conclusion, that the "crypto-Nazi" group would constitute a serious threat only if it were to secure control of a mass organization such as the SRP potentially is.<sup>297</sup>

Three months later, following discussions and much analysis with the 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, ID USAREUR drew firmer conclusions on the new Nazi threat, particularly that posed by the *Freikorps Deutschland* (FD) - a paramilitary group with links to Naumann’s circle.<sup>298</sup> They had secretly formed in Hamburg in August 1951 and their anti-Semitic members still swore allegiance to Hitler.<sup>299</sup> One of their most influential sponsors was Colonel Hans Rudel, who had previously been watched as part of Operation Hedgehopper.<sup>300</sup> But ID EUCOM’s analysis of this threat demonstrated further divergence from the British point of view:

It would appear that we must consider the FD as the "strong arm" group of an underground network which has the long-range goal of securing governmental power in Germany. The "importance" of the FD is therefore closely related to, if not completely dependent upon, the significance of the network as a whole. The British consider this network, to which they have given the name "crypto-Nazis", as perhaps the most important extreme-nationalist threat to Allied policy. While this division does not concur absolutely with the British opinion, it would

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<sup>293</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Hughes, Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Chief DAD, ‘Dr. Werner NAUMANN’, Confidential (21/01/1952). On Naumann’s *Brüderschaft* and FDP links see Wellington Long, *The New Nazis of Germany* (Philadelphia: Chilton, 1968), pp. 78-79 and Rosenfeld, *Reich*, pp. 124-126.

<sup>294</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to ACoS, G-2, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, ‘Extreme Nationalists and Veterans’, Secret (09/05/1952).

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>296</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>298</sup> Long, *New Nazis*, pp. 98-99.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>300</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

obviously be unwise to disregard it entirely; the network apparently has enough high contacts, leadership prestige and experience, financial resources, and propaganda outlets to act as the controlling agent of a broad, extreme-right merger action which would, almost by definition, make it the outstanding extreme-nationalist threat. Our difference of opinion with the British stems from our believe that without a broad merger, the crypto-Nazi group presents less of a threat than felt to be the case by the British and that such a merger is not immediately probable. On the other hand, the British evaluation of the FD as "an insignificant neo-Nazi group in HAMBURG" is clearly incorrect. Given that the FD is in fact an integral, if overt, part of the crypto-Nazi net, it would seem unwise to regard it as anything less than an important target in the extreme-right field...<sup>301</sup>

The British ID were probably aware of ID EUCOM's difference of opinion concerning the Naumann circle. This, combined with disagreements concerning the 'ex' Nazis employed by American intelligence, likely influenced the decision of British High Commission and Foreign Office officials, when planning the arrest of Naumann and his associates in early 1953, to give their American allies only 'minimum advance notice' of the impending Operation Terminus.<sup>302</sup> In justifying this approach, Kirkpatrick informed the Foreign Office that:

The Americans are prone to act without consulting us in matters which concern us equally closely. Our record has been good and we obviously do not want now to create a precedent which the Americans may invoke for years to justify ill-considered American unilateral action.<sup>303</sup>

Like Trevor-Roper before him, Kirkpatrick appeared to have realised the importance of presenting a united front in public, lest the enemies of British and American intelligence seek to exploit any obvious divisions between them. A last-minute consultation would help prevent any public American criticism. But by informing French and American intelligence officials only '3 or 4 hours before action', Kirkpatrick was primarily hoping to avoid a potential 'leakage'.<sup>304</sup> This concern was inspired by British lack of trust in German officials and possibly the ineffectively controlled 'ex' Nazis employed by American intelligence as will be discussed further in Chapter Six.<sup>305</sup>

It was also inspired by a lack of trust in American intelligence officers, particularly Truscott, the leaker of Hitler's wills, who was now head of the CIA in Germany. Indeed, in July 1954 when a

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<sup>301</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Freikorps Deutschland', Secret (14/08/1952).

<sup>302</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Frank K. Roberts to Sir W. Strang, Top Secret (07/01/1953).

<sup>303</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Kirkpatrick, Wahnerheide to Foreign Office, Top Secret (02/01/1953).

<sup>304</sup> Ibid.

<sup>305</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Draft Top Secret Telegram to Wahnerheide (08/01/1953).



lengthy British report about the Naumann circle had been completed, a British High Commission official noted to his American colleague that:

...no doubt General Truscott will wish to pass it on to HQ, USAREUR...I have been asked by the Foreign Office to say that in view of the circumstances surrounding the case it is most important that there should be no publicity of any kind about it. I know that you will appreciate our reasons for requesting this and I am sure that you will be able to undertake that the document receives only a limited circulation and that there will be no publicity of any kind.<sup>306</sup>

The fact that this request for no publicity had to be reiterated with specific reference to Truscott suggests that the Foreign Office had not forgotten his disregard for similar orders in 1946. A key consequence of intelligence rivalry in light of this evidence is clearly the undermining of trust which was essential for Anglo-American intelligence cooperation to function smoothly and for ID missions to be fully accomplished.

The BIO(G)'s lack of consultation with American colleagues during the planning of Operation Terminus restricted its success. Indeed, when the arrests were launched on 15 January 1953, only six out of nine targets were caught.<sup>307</sup> Amongst those who escaped was one Karl Friedrich Bornemann, a newspaper editor and former *Brüderschaft* member who helped Naumann with publicity.<sup>308</sup> As Kirkpatrick noted in a telegram to the Foreign Office, three days before the arrests, 'I am advised that it may prove impossible to arrest Bornemann and Kaufmann...owing to the possible absence of the former in the American Zone and illness of the latter'.<sup>309</sup> The BIO(G) needed clearance to operate in the American Zone. Fear of leakage and the resulting desire to inform American intelligence as late as possible about the arrests meant that clearance could not be obtained and Bornemann could not be caught in the initial swoop arrest.

American authorities appear to have taken their last-minute consultation about Operation Terminus rather well, Kirkpatrick observed: 'United States Acting High Commissioner was personally also favourable and volunteered that he had been feeling worried at growth of Nazi intrigues in the

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<sup>306</sup> NARA II, RG319, A1134-B, Box 554, C.P. Hope, The Chancery, UK High Commission, Bonn to Mr. Laughlin Campbell, United States High Commission, Mehlem, Bad Godesberg, Top Secret (14/07/1954).

<sup>307</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Kirkpatrick, Wahnerheide to Foreign Office, 'Naumann Group', Confidential (15/01/1953).

<sup>308</sup> Long, *New Nazis*, p. 92.

<sup>309</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Kirkpatrick, Wahnerheide to Foreign Office, Top Secret (12/01/1953).

Federal Republic'.<sup>310</sup> Some American ID officers may have felt the same way because the Anglo-American system of intelligence liaison enabled such late consultations owing to its mostly unintegrated structures. For example, on 10 November 1949, a meeting was held between ID EUCOM and the CIC concerning a new operation involving 'coverage of the German Government and Right Wing subversion'.<sup>311</sup> Analysis Branch pointed out that 'a detailed survey of the target would be required, and that the operation would have to extend into the British Zone', but 'In case of the latter it was agreed that no further approach to the British should be made pending completion of the survey'.<sup>312</sup>

It is clear that very little of the rivalry which took place in post-war Germany concerning security intelligence can be easily placed in Dorril's category of competition to become the top intelligence service.<sup>313</sup> Intelligence rivalry was multifaceted, multicausal and complex. However, its consequences were very seldom serious, largely because incidents were effectively managed by the USLO-BLO system of liaison.

#### **IV Evaluation**

Analysed in isolation, the incidents of rivalry discussed in this chapter may give the impression that there was no 'special' Anglo-American intelligence relationship in post-war Germany. However, when analysed in the context of ID EUCOM's 'general correspondence' files, it is clear that examples of good cooperation far outnumber those of rivalry and disagreement. Indeed, the extent of Anglo-American security intelligence cooperation revealed in this chapter is truly impressive.

No incident of Anglo-American intelligence rivalry proved severe or significant enough to disrupt the regular flow of information which travelled between both ID Headquarters via the USLO-BLO chain. The USLO-BLO system of liaison was necessary for both IDs to accomplish their security

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<sup>310</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Kirkpatrick, Wahnerheide to Foreign Office, 'Detention of former Nazis', Confidential (15/01/1953).

<sup>311</sup> NARA II. RG549, A148, Box 738, 563456, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to DID, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (17/11/1949).

<sup>312</sup> Ibid.

<sup>313</sup> Dorril, *MI6*, pp. 104-105.

intelligence missions, for mediating disagreements and preventing rivalry from escalating. In performing these functions, it was incredibly effective.

By acknowledging the importance of the USLO-BLO system and its mutual advantages, both British and American intelligence recognised their mutual dependence in post-war Germany.<sup>314</sup> Indeed, in July 1948, the DDID Schow acknowledged that the BLO was essential for ID EUCOM ‘to operate and accomplish its mission’.<sup>315</sup> The following year, a letter written on behalf of the DDID described the BLO and his staff at Heidelberg as ‘necessary and desirable to retain’.<sup>316</sup> Realising the necessity of such cooperation arguably inspired intelligence officers such as Trevor-Roper to deescalate and even conceal incidents of rivalry. As the BLO himself said of the system of clearance he upheld in 1951: ‘It works very well. No intelligence is lost, ground is not unnecessarily covered twice, false confirmation is avoided, willing informants are not unduly pestered and information is not paid for twice’.<sup>317</sup>

Without ID-ID cooperation, the reverse, and worse, would have occurred. For example, EUCOM stated in 1949 that ‘Only identification of Soviet CI agency responsible for secret markings on identification papers received from British’.<sup>318</sup> Without British cooperation, ID EUCOM would have been in the dark about a ‘Soviet CI agency’. Similarly, without Anglo-American cooperation, Czech intelligence agents such as Heinz Silomon and his associates may have remained at large, as would Soviet agents such as Dr. Pilz.<sup>319</sup> Moreover, without such cooperation, American or British intelligence agents who had been discovered by their enemies would have continued with their duties, unaware of their dangerous exposure.<sup>320</sup> Individuals posing as British or American intelligence agents may have remained unexposed. Enemy agents may have travelled more freely across the Zones or even to Britain and America. They could have married intelligence officers and more may have obtained employment

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<sup>314</sup> This contrasts Jakub, *Spies*, p. 194.

<sup>315</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 733, 563465, Schow, DDID to Deputy Chief of Staff, HQ EUCOM, ‘Reduction of Headquarters’ (19/07/1948).

<sup>316</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 736, 563465, R.E. Kilzer for DDID to Director, Civil Affairs Division, Restricted (29/06/1949).

<sup>317</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Intelligence Officer, US Naval Forces, Germany, ‘Intelligence activities in the British Zone of Germany’, Confidential (13/04/1951).

<sup>318</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 367, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, ‘Subject: Usual’ (February 1949).

<sup>319</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to USLO, ‘Heinz SILOMON’, Secret (14/02/1952).

<sup>320</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to USLO BIOFG Wahnheide, ‘Heinz BARNITZKE’, Secret (29/04/1952). See also Box 132, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, ‘Czech Trade Mission, FRANKFURT’, Secret (03/12/1952).

in the two Divisions.<sup>321</sup> Furthermore, time may have been wasted investigating suspects who would have been exonerated by information available to an ally.<sup>322</sup>

Conversely, one of the few drawbacks of the USLO-BLO system was the slow sharing of information that it sometimes caused.<sup>323</sup> Some British enquiries required ID EUCOM to request information from its CIA Liaison Officer who in turn had to request information from his main headquarters in Frankfurt, which sometimes caused ‘considerable delay in getting the answer back to the British’.<sup>324</sup> But the advantages of the coordinated point of view such indirect liaison enabled, the reduction of replication and the ability to conceal sources and/or information when deemed necessary outweighed the drawbacks of occasionally delayed information sharing, hence its apparent persistence throughout the occupation. Moreover, the USLO-BLO system and the regular cooperation it enabled arguably saved more time than it wasted. For example, without the sharing of information concerning confusion and dropped agents, such individuals may have wasted the time of more than one Division and further hindered the almost identical missions which both Divisions were pursuing.

The very subtle differences in missions related to the protection of British and American ‘interests’ in Germany, although both usually aligned. Most importantly, both IDs identified security intelligence work as their primary task. Both also identified Nazis and Communists as their primary enemies and sought the same outcome in defeating them: a democratic Germany.

In pursuit of their security intelligence objectives, the IDs arrested and monitored individuals throughout Germany. Indeed, most Anglo-American intelligence operations during the occupation were directed from ID headquarters in the zones.<sup>325</sup> Clearly, occupied Germany itself was an intelligence

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<sup>321</sup> Leo Long was recruited as a Soviet agent by Cambridge Five spy Anthony Blunt during the Second World War. He later worked as an ID officer in Düsseldorf and seemingly enjoyed a personal relationship with Haydon. See IWM, Haydon Papers, Chief Political Officer, Office of Land Commissioner, Düsseldorf, BAOR 4, letter to Haydon (31/12/1950). See also Nigel West, *The A to Z of British Intelligence* (Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, 2009), p. 312; Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, p. 104.

<sup>322</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 128, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, ‘Horace TRIKISZA’, Restricted (21/02/1952).

<sup>323</sup> Personnel shortages sometimes caused similar issues see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, R.K. Steinmetz, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, Washington, DC, ‘TANCOUS, Otto Rico’, Confidential (21/10/1949). See also Box 761, James L. Cantrell, ABr to BLO, ‘Czech Intelligence Activity’, Secret (26/01/1951).

<sup>324</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch to DAD, ‘Liaison with British’, Secret (11/07/1952).

<sup>325</sup> FO 1005/1731, ‘Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division’, Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author’s possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

battleground, not just Berlin. The multizonal nature of the threats faced by both IDs necessitated their cooperation and demonstrated their mutual dependence as did the ramifications of a neighbouring zone losing ‘effective security control’.<sup>326</sup> Both IDs therefore helped each other to effectively control their zones through organisations such as the CTB. Such control was considered necessary for the successful completion of the IDs’ security missions and the occupation itself.

The success of the occupation of Germany depended on the success of the IDs’ security intelligence missions and the success of the latter depended on Anglo-American cooperation. The activities of both IDs fundamentally underpinned the successes of the occupation and the system of rule that was implemented throughout it. If the IDs failed to successfully tackle the post-war Nazi threat, democracy itself may have been threatened as would the system of rule which the occupying powers were implementing and the democratic ‘regime’ they were helping to create.

Both IDs were aware that so much was at stake. As the Head of Detmold AIO concluded in 1949 in relation to militarist groups, ‘The leadership of such an organisation in the hands of the wrong person or persons would constitute a considerable threat to the development of democratic government as well as to the overall security of the Western Zones’.<sup>327</sup> On several occasions, such leaders did arise, but their failure can be directly and primarily attributed to the IDs, the operations they directed and the officers they commanded. As Thomas Johnson, a former CIC agent, perceptively noted in his private papers:

In occupied Germany CIC agents are formally charged with the duty of watching all elements of the German population in order to prevent the birth of a new Adolph Hitler or the formation of any Nazi-type organization. Despite their protestations to the contrary, there are many Germans who would welcome a return to the days of SS pomp and pagentry [sic] -- the days when everybody had a uniform and was his own small tin god. Even now, a few of the more ambitious have taken it upon themselves to recreate those wonderful days. That none have yet succeeded is due to the vigilance of CIC.<sup>328</sup>

Johnson was accentuating the contributions of the CIC. Even the gripping story he went on to document about the arrest of an underground Nazi organisation codenamed SOWA (*Suedostwacht*;

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<sup>326</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1165, JIC(CCG), ‘Internal Security Commitment In The British Zone’, Top Secret (11/12/1945).

<sup>327</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1709, D.A.C. Peck, ‘Intelligence Office Detmold Monthly Summary’, Confidential (29/09/1949).

<sup>328</sup> NARA II, RG319, UD1075, Box 28, 26861603, Typed Notes, ‘Germany 1948-9’, Undated. See also Kevin C. Ruffner, ‘CIC Records: A Valuable Tool for Researchers’, *Center for the Study of Intelligence Bulletin*, No. 11 (2000), p. 15.

Southeastern Guard) culminated with British intelligence arresting some leaders in their zone, albeit following leads furnished by the CIC.<sup>329</sup> But, as corresponding evidence suggests, he was not accentuating the dangers such men faced, the importance of their missions and the consequences of failure. As he concluded:

Caught in the early stages of its growth, the eradication of Suedostwacht was a comparatively simple affair. The importance of the cleanup is also simple and straight forward. It was from just the same sort of small reactionary group that the Nazi party sprang with the rabble rouser Hitler at its head.<sup>330</sup>

Johnson's conclusions can be applied to most of the joint intelligence operations discussed in this thesis which successfully disbanded numerous Nazi and Neo-Nazis groups. Their validity is further strengthened through analysis of the consequences of the three major anti-Nazi operations which occurred in occupied Germany, Nursery, Selection Board and Terminus.

In March 1946, the British IB's Monthly Intelligence Review concluded: '...the Nursery organisation...might plainly have become much larger and more formidable if they had not in general been arrested'.<sup>331</sup> The following Review offered more reflections on Nursery:

...A subversive organisation it was, but not in any violent sense. It foresaw a time when merely political and economic action would suffice to emancipate a new National-Socialist Germany without more than incidental violence: but they did not conceive of long-term resistance to the Allies in terms of sniping, wire-stretching and sabotage. For that very reason the organisation was the more sinister...<sup>332</sup>

Indeed, if they were not arrested by Anglo-American intelligence, Axmann's group may have gained political power once the occupying powers had left. Of course, such conclusions can only be speculative as organisations such as Nursery were stopped before they managed to achieve their full potential. But, as Rosenfeld has suggested, the successes of Anglo-American intelligence operations should not blind historians to the potential consequences of their failure.<sup>333</sup>

The timing of Operation Selection Board has encouraged doubts about the severity of the Nazi threat it countered. Aldrich argues that the threat may have been exaggerated to counter Soviet claims

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<sup>329</sup> NARA II, RG319, UD1075, Box 28, 26861603, Typed Notes, 'Germany 1948-9', Undated.

<sup>330</sup> Ibid.

<sup>331</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 7, Secret (20/03/1946).

<sup>332</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 8, Secret (04/05/1946).

<sup>333</sup> Rosenfeld, *Reich*, pp. X, 7-8, 86-87, 104-105.

that British and American intelligence were harbouring Nazis.<sup>334</sup> Some Germans did suggest that the Operation was launched to influence the forthcoming Moscow Conference.<sup>335</sup> Indeed, the publicity given to Selection Board was useful for showing the Soviets and other critics that British and American intelligence were tough on Nazis.<sup>336</sup> But this may have been a welcome side product of an operation that was primarily intended to act as a deterrent to Nazi groups. Later British anti-Nazi operations certainly used publicity as a deterrent and Selection Board was used to stop as many Nazi groups as possible, not just the main three.<sup>337</sup> Moreover, it is clear that Lethbridge considered the threat from Selection Board to be serious. He had a British intelligence officer named Mr. Coleman and his family sent home from Germany after Coleman was warned by the ‘ringleaders of “Selection Board” that he and his family would be killed if any harm came to “Slim” or if their organisation was “betrayed”’.<sup>338</sup> Lethbridge ‘considered the threat to be a very real one’.<sup>339</sup>

Slim’s death offers a more convincing explanation for the timing of Selection Board. A CIC memorandum created a few days before the arrests worried that the Nazis had ‘become alarmed and nervous’ due to Slim’s disappearance and had made plans to disappear themselves as a consequence.<sup>340</sup> The swoop arguably had to take place when it did because Slim’s death could have forced key suspects into hiding.

The serious nature of the security threat posed by the Selection Board groups is further outlined in Lethbridge’s draft statement to the press following the arrests:

These are desperate characters who have no hope for the future in any decent democratic society. They will clutch at any chance, however slender and however dangerous, to re-establish the days in which they flourished... This movement has as its avowed objects the re-establishment of a totalitarian form of government in Germany...<sup>341</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, p. 183.

<sup>335</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 14, Philip O’Neil, Special Agent, CIC, HQ Region IX to CO 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, USFET, ‘Public Reaction to Operation Selection Board’, Confidential (13/03/1947). See also TNA, FO 1005/1724, ‘Schleswig-Holstein Region Monthly Political Intelligence Summary No. 8’, Secret (29/03/1947).

<sup>336</sup> Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, p. 103.

<sup>337</sup> TNA, CAB 191/1, JIC(Germany), “Deutsche Revolution” Appreciation of Investigations into German Subversive Movements culminating in Operation Selection Board’, Secret (03/04/1947). See also Operation Terminus discussed on pp. 154-156 in this thesis.

<sup>338</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1744, Lethbridge, Chief, ID to Major-General W.H.A. Bishop, Office of Deputy Military Governor, BAOR, Top Secret & Personal (22/04/1947).

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>340</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, CIC HQ Sub-Region Rosenheim, MOIC, ‘Operation Selection Board’, Top Secret (16/02/1947).

<sup>341</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, ‘Draft Statement for Press Conference to be held by Chief, Intelligence Division in the ZECO Area on ‘D’ Day’, Top Secret (Undated: likely 1947).

In conclusion, Lethbridge expressed confidence in the ID's ability to discover and destroy '...future subversive movements before they have time to become dangerous'.<sup>342</sup> Selection Board and its affiliated organisations already posed a security threat dangerous enough to require their immediate dissolution. But just how dangerous the Selection Board organisation may have become was further addressed in a similar draft statement filed alongside that discussed above:

While these individuals are not taken seriously as being politically powerful, the danger existed that their program would attract larger numbers of followers from the ranks of the disgruntled and dissatisfied nationalistic fanatics. Such a group could easily be formed by clever leaders into a powerful organisation capable of becoming a dangerous threat to the security of the occupation...<sup>343</sup>

ID operations successfully prevented any such dangerous groups and leaders from becoming too powerful. As the statement concludes:

To prevent this type of individual from gaining any position where he might become a threat to the occupation or to a new democratic Germany, agents of the Army intelligence system have maintained unrelenting efforts to discover, observe and destroy such activity. Whenever it is determined such persons have become active they have been quietly arrested and interned or tried for their violations of various Military Government regulations. During the past year, arrests for such activity alone have totaled more than 80 persons, including SA Generals, SA and SS Colonels and other high former leaders.<sup>344</sup>

Secret evaluations of security intelligence operations, never intended for public consumption but often shared via the USLO-BLO chain, provide further evidence that the IDs' public statements on the severity of the threat they neutralised, and the potential consequences of inaction, were not exaggerated.<sup>345</sup> For example, a lengthy British ID report on Selection Board concluded in April 1947 that:

...the operation curbed the activities of a large number of discontented SS elements who were gradually forming groups throughout both Zones. These groups had they been left to organise themselves more thoroughly, might well have developed into a rich breeding ground in which such fanatical thinkers as DR. GERICKE and MAJOR GEN. ELLERSIECH would have found ample opportunity to sew their seeds for a new form of super-national-socialist German Government.<sup>346</sup>

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<sup>342</sup> Ibid.

<sup>343</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, untitled and undated statement filed alongside the above (likely 1947).

<sup>344</sup> Ibid.

<sup>345</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, C.J.W. Legry, Secretary, JIC(Germany), 'Right Wing Movement Curtailed By Operation "Selection Board"', Secret (25/07/1947).

<sup>346</sup> TNA, CAB 191/1, HQ ID, "'Deutsche Revolution" Appreciation of Investigations into German Subversive Movements culminating in Operation Selection Board' (03/04/1947).



In other words, Anglo-American intelligence had prevented a potential Nazi revival and in so doing protected and preserved their occupying regimes and future German democracy. As the the JIC(G) worryingly concluded in July 1947, ‘...“Germanic” ideals of race, blood and martial prowess’ and the spirit they inspired were ‘still undoubtedly widespread in Germany’.<sup>347</sup>

These conclusions were supported by the private opinions of Germans which had been monitored and analysed by the ID. As a Schleswig-Holstein intelligence summary noted regarding public reactions to Selection Board:

Private opinions generally vary between condemnation, purely on the grounds that an underground movement would have had no chance of success, and expressions of surprise that similar organisations had not already appeared in view of the outrageous manner in which Germany was being treated. One rather imprudent woman, in an extremely bitter letter, went so far as to say that she would have joined the movement if it had existed in her own town.<sup>348</sup>

According to the JIC(G), the publicity of Selection Board achieved a short-term victory as it stifled increasingly open public expression of such widespread ideas.<sup>349</sup> Even the usually sceptical German press agreed that without the Selection Board arrests ‘a powerful movement’ may have arose which could have posed ‘a dangerous threat for the security of the occupation’.<sup>350</sup>

Naumann’s Neo-Nazi circle also posed a serious threat to the occupation and future German democracy. This is partially evidenced by the fact that Operation Terminus went ahead despite serious reservations expressed by Kirkman. In December 1952, he wrote to D.P. Reilly of the JIC in London expressing concern that a publicised intelligence operation concerning German ‘internal political matters’ at such a late stage in the occupation may lead to widespread public criticism of British intelligence which would prejudice the BIO(G)’s ‘much more important efforts vis-a-vis Russia’.<sup>351</sup> Kirkman did ‘fully realise the dangers of these ex-Nazis having a free run’ but he wanted to make London aware of the risks involved, including potentially damaging future intelligence and political relations with an independent Germany, before deciding to act.<sup>352</sup>

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<sup>347</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, JIC(Germany), ‘Right Wing Movements Curtailed By Operation Selection Board’, Secret (18/07/1947).

<sup>348</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1724, ‘Schleswig-Holstein Region Monthly Political Intelligence Summary No. 8’, Secret (29/03/1947).

<sup>349</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, JIC(Germany), ‘Right Wing Movements Curtailed By Operation Selection Board’, Secret (18/07/1947).

<sup>350</sup> Rosenfeld, *Reich*, pp. 86-87.

<sup>351</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Kirkman, HQ BIO(G), Wahnerheide to D.P. Reilly, Joint Intelligence Committee, London, Top Secret & Personal (30/12/1952).

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*

Responding to Kirkman's concerns, Foreign Office officials stated:

There is of course substance in these comments, but the whole operation must be a risky one. We are running the even more serious risk of losing Adenauer's confidence and of making German ratification of the Bonn & Paris treaties more difficult. The reason for running such risks is that it would be more dangerous to do nothing or to make a flop certain by consultation with the Germans.<sup>353</sup>

British lack of confidence in German intelligence will be explored further in Chapter Six. What is important to note here is that despite finding Kirkman's anxieties 'troubling', Foreign Office officials still agreed, after much discussion, that it was necessary for the BIO(G) to arrest Naumann and his gang.<sup>354</sup> As Mr. D Allen concluded:

We are, therefore, faced with a straight decision – either to act ourselves now and accept the risks or to face the probability that the activities of the conspirators will be allowed to continue unchecked for an indefinite period.<sup>355</sup>

Frank Roberts and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir William Strang, concurred, noting: 'I am afraid that we must act within the next month or so or leave the whole question to the Germans, with the strong probability that no effective action can or will be taken...'.<sup>356</sup> In support of the High Commissioner Kirkpatrick's arguments, the minute concluded: '...the deterrent effect of the arrest by an act of supreme authority – however arbitrary – and the fact that German public opinion would thus have been aroused to the dangers would justify the whole operation and should ensure its success'.<sup>357</sup>

British officials clearly considered the threat to democracy posed by Naumann's circle to be a very real one because, despite the considerable risks involved, they still went ahead with Operation Terminus. The aftermath of that operation proved this was the correct action and helps to further demonstrate the serious threat which Naumann and his conspirators posed to democracy.

As the British Deputy High Commissioner informed Frank Roberts just under one month since the Terminus arrests: 'It is rather remarkable that so far there has been practically no German criticism of the part played in the arrests by B.I.O. (G) including our censorship and monitoring services'.<sup>358</sup>

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<sup>353</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Foreign Office Minutes, Top Secret (02/01/1953).

<sup>354</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Foreign Office Minutes, Top Secret (03/01/1953).

<sup>355</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, D. Allen, 'The "Gauleiters" Circle" Conspiracy', Top Secret (03/01/1953).

<sup>356</sup> Strang and Roberts signed minute attached to Ibid.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid.

<sup>358</sup> TNA, FO 371/103904, Jack Ward, Deputy UK High Commissioner, Wahnerheide to F.K. Roberts, Foreign Office, Secret (10/02/1953).

Arguably the most important criticisms made were directed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) against the Adenauer government's supposed 'lack of vigilance'.<sup>359</sup> Apparently 'stung' by such accusations, Dr. Lehr, the Federal Minister of the Interior, adopted the public strategy of '...trying to reply to his critics by playing down the importance of the arrested men's activities'.<sup>360</sup>

But in secret, senior German officials strongly agreed with the British action. As the Minister of Justice, Dr. Thomas Dehler told Kirkpatrick:

...he had originally deprecated our action, but that since he had studied the captured documents he had altered his opinion. It was now quite clear to him that the Naumann conspiracy constituted a grave threat to the Federal Republic. He was appalled at the extent of its ramifications and at the success with which his own party, the F.D.P., had been penetrated. He now agreed with the Chancellor that we had done Germany a notable service by arresting Naumann and impounding these valuable documents.<sup>361</sup>

Such statements strengthen the argument that anti-Nazi operations in post-war Germany helped to destroy real threats to German democracy as it was not just British and American intelligence officers drawing such conclusions but also senior German officials. As Frank Roberts noted:

I had many opportunities in Germany last week of discussing the Naumann case with prominent Germans... I found them all strongly favourable to the action we had taken. Some had their doubts at the outset. They were all now convinced that our original arrests and the way we had handled the whole question had done nothing but good in Germany. On the other hand... There was a real fear that the lawyers at Karlsruhe would get lost in legal niceties and would fail to frame a really convincing charge.<sup>362</sup>

In July 1953, Naumann was released from German custody and cleared from suspicion of 'criminal conspiracy'.<sup>363</sup> This infuriated Adenauer who disagreed with the court's decision.<sup>364</sup> Indeed, the evidence obtained by the BIO(G) did seem to strongly indicate the existence of a conspiracy. As C.H. Johnston of the UK High Commission noted in May 1953:

...it is already clear that the captured documents and the interrogations have supported and justified the original Intelligence appreciation in almost every detail. In some respects the conspiracy turned out to be even wider in scope than appeared from the Intelligence appreciation.<sup>365</sup>

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<sup>359</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Foreign Office Minutes, 'Official and Party Reactions to arrest of the Naumann group' (19/01/1953).

<sup>360</sup> Ibid.

<sup>361</sup> TNA, FO 371/103912, Kirkpatrick, Wahnerheide to Foreign Office, Confidential (12/04/1953).

<sup>362</sup> TNA, FO 371/103912, Frank K. Roberts, FO Minute (18/04/1953).

<sup>363</sup> Long, *New Nazis*, p. 104.

<sup>364</sup> Ibid, p. 105.

<sup>365</sup> TNA, FO 371/103912, C.H. Johnston, The Chancery, Office of the UK High Commissioner, Wahnerheide to P.F. Hancock, Foreign Office, Confidential (08/05/1953).

Despite the failure of the German courts to establish a charge of conspiracy, Operation Terminus can still be considered an overall success. As Kirkpatrick exclaimed in April 1953:

It will be seen that the operation, despite all the obvious risks attending it, has been successful and has fulfilled its primary aim, namely to call public attention to neo-Nazi designs and to prevent continued infiltration of the constitutional parties.<sup>366</sup>

Roberts agreed as he stated: ‘Sir I. Kirkpatrick is fully justified in claiming that this operation has been successful, whatever action the German courts may take in the case of Naumann’.<sup>367</sup> The BIO(G) also agreed, noting in a Top Secret report on the subject that Naumann’s arrest had ‘undoubtedly impeded the dangerous development of crypto-Nazism’, albeit temporarily.<sup>368</sup> Indeed, as a consequence of Operation Terminus, the FDP dismissed all staff involved with Naumann’s circle and arguably, at least partially owing to the reported conspiracy unveiled by the BIO(G), the *Deutsche Reichspartei* (DRP) for whom Naumann had intended to stand in the September 1953 elections failed to achieve even 1% of the vote.<sup>369</sup> Furthermore, although it is notable that due to a lack of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation, Terminus did not initially succeed in apprehending all of the leaders implicated in the Naumann conspiracy, American intelligence may have eventually agreed with the British perception of the threat posed by Naumann as they were still compiling information concerning him in 1954.<sup>370</sup>

The IDs’ successful tackling of the communist threat similarly underpinned German democracy and the occupation itself. As the British ID reported in July 1947: ‘The Communists are fundamentally hostile to Great Britain and to the ideals of Western democracy which we are trying to introduce into Germany’.<sup>371</sup> The two IDs were remarkably successful in identifying, arresting and imprisoning East German, Soviet and Czechoslovakian intelligence agents. Within a year of November 1950, the CIC alone had arrested ‘55 espionage agents of foreign countries, deported numerous others and neutralized several espionage nets’.<sup>372</sup>

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<sup>366</sup> TNA, FO 371/103912, Kirkpatrick, Wahnerheide to Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Confidential (24/04/1953).

<sup>367</sup> TNA, FO 371/103912, Frank K. Roberts, FO Minute (01/05/1953).

<sup>368</sup> TNA, FO 371/103912, BIO(G), ‘Crypto-Nazism In Western Germany’, Top Secret (April 1953).

<sup>369</sup> Long, *New Nazis*, pp. 102-103, 105, 108.

<sup>370</sup> NARA II, RG319, A1134-B, Box 554, ‘NAUMANN, Werner (Dr.)’ (23/09/1954).

<sup>371</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, HQ CCG(BE), Berlin, BAOR, ‘Communist Activity in the British Zone’, Top Secret (09/07/1947).

<sup>372</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Det, ‘Justification For Military Augmentation’, Secret (11/01/1952).

The number of successful arrests would have been undoubtedly smaller had both IDs not cooperated via the USLO-BLO chain. Indeed, without such cross-zone cooperation, interrogation and monitoring of suspects vital for uncovering the full nature of a particular net's activities may have been impossible. Moreover, the sharing of finished intelligence reports and the resulting formulation of strategies was surely a significant factor which led to ID EUCOM acknowledging the necessity of the BLO for accomplishing its mission. Indeed, in September 1952, J.T. Marshall of ID EUCOM asked the USLO to 'convey the appreciation of this Branch to the British for their cooperation and the excellence of the completed case report'.<sup>373</sup>

The IDs' joint successes in tackling Iron Curtain espionage and their positive intelligence missions behind that curtain also made both Divisions vital to their national governments in waging the Cold War. As several British government officials argued in the summer of 1949:

...that Russia is an extremely difficult problem from the Intelligence point of view and that the Bizone provides them with the most effective window into Russian affairs.<sup>374</sup>

Furthermore, when discussing the future of British intelligence in Germany after the occupation, the JIC(G) argued that:

The continuance of the activities of the Intelligence Division on at least high priority external intelligence tasks is very necessary for our forces in GERMANY and indeed for the British Government itself...

The Intelligence Division is at present entitled under ZEI 68 to arrest and hold for interrogation any persons suspected of being enemy agents. This power is the most important single factor in our researchers into the activities of the Russian and particularly Satellite Intelligence Services. We are probably better informed on these matters than is any other country...<sup>375</sup>

This statement also helps to show how the interrogation of enemy agents, not just those with scientific and technical knowledge, provided the most important insights into the activities of Iron Curtain intelligence organisations.

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<sup>373</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section ABr to USLO BIOFG Wahnerheide, 'Heinz BECKE', Confidential (11/09/1952).

<sup>374</sup> FO 1005/1731, E.A. Seal, Foreign Office to General Sir Brian H. Robertson, Top Secret (02/06/1949). Copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on July 28, 2017.

<sup>375</sup> TNA, FO 1035/77, JIC(Germany), 'Intelligence and the Future German Government', Top Secret (28/06/1951) and 'Appendix A'.

ID EUCOM were aware that its activities were of equivalent importance. The analysis of espionage cases, as performed by Voss at ID EUCOM's Counterintelligence Desk, was said to increase '...knowledge of Soviet and satellite subversive capabilities and activities...many fold'.<sup>376</sup> Intelligence sharing via the USLO-BLO chain played a crucial role in the analysis performed and the reports produced by Voss's Desk. Intelligence produced by such liaison undoubtedly also contributed to the striking fact that by 1954, NATO received '...their intelligence from London and Washington, little realising that it is picked up through British and American outstations in Germany who produce 75 per cent of Anglo/American knowledge of Soviet intentions'.<sup>377</sup>

Largely owing to the USLO-BLO system of liaison, the procedures that upheld, the trust it built, the cooperation it facilitated, the rivalry it prevented and its usually successful mediating of disagreements, both IDs succeeded in accomplishing their primary security missions: securing their zones, the occupying forces within them, the regime they supported, protecting democracy and controlling the German population. In doing so, they arguably proved themselves to be the most important Divisions out of the many which constituted British and American Military Government. They were essential to the Allied systems of rule.

But these successes, and the extent of the IDs' involvement in those systems, cannot be fully explained without analysing the closely linked wider political role of both Divisions. Indeed, when tackling the two main security threats produced by followers of Communism and Nazism, both IDs' realised that security intelligence operations and arrests alone would not defeat those enemies. As the JIC(G) acknowledged in July 1947, although operations such as Selection Board had temporarily 'checked' open expression of a Nazi style 'spirit':

...in the long run the only hope of countering it, or at least keeping it at bay, lies in thorough and widespread penetration of the breeding grounds of such ideologies, the Universities, the schools, the teacher training colleges, the Youth Movements, the Police and the Administration, as well as a most critical study of the financially powerful Groups (cartels, industrial combines, etc.) which will undoubtedly play an increasing part behind the scenes of overt political life.<sup>378</sup>

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<sup>376</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Jessie Voss, Military Intel Analyst, Counterintelligence Desk, S&S Section, Analysis Branch, Intelligence Division to Civilian Personnel Officer, Heidelberg Military Post, 'Position Classification Appeal of Jessie VOSS', Secret (24/06/1952).

<sup>377</sup> TNA, FO 1060/655, Mr. Hope Minute to Mr. Bathurst, Secret (29/10/1954).

<sup>378</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, JIC(Germany), 'Right Wing Movements Curtailed By Operation Selection Board', Secret (18/07/1947).

Likewise, when tackling the Communist threat, the British ID were aware that ‘Communist activities cover a very wide field’ and, therefore, ‘our counter measures must be adopted in each case to suit the particular sphere of activity’.<sup>379</sup> Those spheres, as the following chapter reveals, were often political.

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<sup>379</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, HQ CCG(BE), Berlin, BAOR, ‘Communist Activity in the British Zone’, Top Secret (09/07/1947).

## **Chapter Five:**

### **Political Intelligence**

‘If at this stage the Germans got the idea that anyone from Military Government was "spying" on them, it would make our position quite untenable...’.

- Mr. G.R. Gauntlett, CCG(BE) on the ID’s Operation Magnet, 20<sup>th</sup> April 1949.<sup>1</sup>

The IDs played a crucial role in helping to achieve the political objectives of the occupation. But they were also, perhaps more importantly, vital for the day-to-day governing and control of occupied Germany. Indeed, without the IDs, the systems of rule imposed by the Western Allies would certainly not have functioned as smoothly and successfully as they did, and they could even have failed altogether owing to a victory of the IDs’ primary ideological enemies.

Despite the important consequences of their potential failure, the political functions of the IDs are the most understudied aspects of their histories. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the IDs often acted under the cover of overt political organisations which has in some instances resulted in historians attributing ID work to other organisations or overlooking it altogether.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, archival processing of some ID files, the mass destruction of others, and a lack of knowledge concerning the ID’s organisational structure, has contributed to the overlooking of ID reports. Thirdly, the historiographical emphasis on the Cold War and still existing intelligence organisations has shifted focus away from the IDs’ political functions which are best understood in the context of occupation.

While Erlichman has discussed the ID’s huge censorship apparatus and the important intelligence reports produced by Kreis Residence Officers (KROs), censorship was only one element of both IDs’ broader political intelligence activities.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, even KROs were trained at the British

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<sup>1</sup> TNA, FO 1056/283, Mr. G.R. Gauntlett to Haydon, Chief ID, Herford, Secret (20/04/1949).

<sup>2</sup> For example, Elspeth O’Riordan quotes a British political adviser, who was quoting a British ID report, without mentioning the ID, see ‘Rethinking Britain’s Foreign Policy and the Occupation Zone in Germany 1945-1947: Questions of Structural and Functional Continuity in British Foreign Policy-Making’, *The International History Review* (2017), p. 9. See also Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, pp. 102-103. ID officers produced ‘special reports’ for the CCG Political Division, see FO 1005/1731, ‘Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division’, Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author’s possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>3</sup> Erlichman, ‘Rule’, pp. 92, 110-112, 128, 132-133, 135-138, 141-142.



ID's School of Intelligence in Herford and they maintained close contact with their more powerful ID colleagues.<sup>4</sup>

As this partially illustrates, the IDs permeated almost every conceivable aspect of German life and the systems of rule which sought to control those lives. This largely contributed to making the IDs the primary element of those systems. Indeed, the IDs' political activities alone constituted a secret system of rule which was the real backbone of the occupation.

## **I Mission**

The Intelligence Divisions carried out five key political tasks in occupied Germany. Firstly, they helped the occupying powers to achieve the aims outlined at Potsdam, with emphasis on denazification and above all democratisation. Secondly, they kept policymakers on the ground in Germany and in London and Washington well informed of economic and socio-political events throughout Germany, including events in the Soviet Zone. Thirdly, they helped to prevent and minimise political opposition to the occupation and the policies of the occupiers. Fourthly, they helped to formulate policy within and towards Germany including policy towards other occupying powers, most notably, the Soviet Union. Their final task of a broadly political nature, that of building a new democratic German state which would favour British and American national interests, is of such a magnitude that it must be discussed as the subject of Chapter Six.

From the outset, British and American intelligence officers commanded by the IDs in post-war Germany were always destined to perform a broad and crucial array of political tasks. This reflects the ideas of the early occupation planners, particularly Kenneth Strong, who placed politics at the centre of his definition of intelligence work: 'The purpose of Intelligence is to make the best possible information

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<sup>4</sup> On close cooperation see TNA, DEFE 41/62, P.E. Ramsbotham to R.R. Colwill, HQ ID, 'Public Opinion Reports' (20/02/1947). Further evidence can also be found in a letter of recommendation signed by J.D. Buchanan, KRO, LK Osterholz on 17<sup>th</sup> March 1948 for a British ID officer named Mr. Gordon Hatfield Burns. This document was kindly sent to the author by his son, Patrick Burns. The ID could instruct KROs, see TNA FO 1013/364, L.H. Long, RIO, 'Relaxation of Restrictions on obtaining facilities for Germans', Secret (01/10/1947). The ID's role in teaching KROs was confirmed to the author on 05/10/2018 in correspondence with Dr. Wolfgang Stedtfeld. Dr. Stedtfeld worked at the ID School of Intelligence in Herford in 1948. Primary source documents, kindly sent to the author, confirm Dr. Stedtfeld's account.

available to those who make policy'.<sup>5</sup> As Strong's memoirs further note, 'the activities of spies, agents, code breakers and so forth' often obscure the real task of intelligence which is to provide a 'balanced picture' for 'a Prime Minister, a Head of State, or for someone less elevated'.<sup>6</sup>

This has certainly been the case with the IDs. As Sir Peter Ramsbotham, the influential Regional Intelligence Officer (RIO) for Hamburg reflected in 2001, 'Not enough has been written about that period of our Control Commission work from Norfolk House in London'.<sup>7</sup> It was at Norfolk House, in 1944, where officials first stated that intelligence organisations in post-war Germany would be vital for the 'smooth running' of the Control Commission and that they would be 'the real key to the control of Germany'.<sup>8</sup> Such control was essential if the political objectives of the occupation were to be achieved. Indeed, effective control of the German population would enable the British and American military governments to formulate and implement their policies aimed at achieving their broad aims with minimal opposition.

The IDs, their predecessors and successors, actively pursued the political aims of their governments and expressed consistent awareness of their role in ensuring that such aims were successful and of the complexities of pursuing democratic objectives through secret intelligence work. For example, the first British Intelligence Bureau Review in December 1945 stated:

...it was not to be expected that most Germans would welcome our complicated mission of destroying with one hand their economic power for war, which means in practice impoverishing them; and with the other hand imposing liberalism by authority. It is true that the anomaly of imposing liberalism by authority at present embarrasses us rather than the Germans.<sup>9</sup>

The second review expanded on this theme:

...how could the National-Socialist system, based on pride and violence, be better destroyed than by a resounding military defeat? And yet we find ourselves with our task not over, and embarked upon an unsought crusade. The object lesson of 1918-39 has compelled us to turn Clausewitz back on himself and seek in politics the continuation of war by other means. The military counter-offensive which began three years ago is complete: but the political counter-offensive is only now developing, and there is still an enemy to be the subject of intelligence.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Strong, *Intelligence*, p. 244.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 220.

<sup>7</sup> British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, Churchill Archives Centre, Sir Peter Edward Ramsbotham Interviewed by Malcom McBain (09/01/2001).

<sup>8</sup> TNA, FO 1032/409, Major-General West to Major-General S.W. Kirby, Control Commission Planners, 'Intelligence Staff of the Control Commission', Secret (25/07/1944).

<sup>9</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 1, Secret (12/12/1945).

<sup>10</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 2, Secret (26/12/1945).

The sixth review clearly aligned the political aims of British intelligence with those of the occupation, ‘Our purge is in three parts, two destructive and one we hope constructive: denazification, demilitarisation and democratisation’.<sup>11</sup>

These political aims were also consciously pursued by American intelligence officers. Indeed, CIC approved press releases spoke of ‘our objective of a new Germany modeled on democratic lines’ and detailed reports discussed ‘giving the Germans some rather intensive, on-the-job training in Democracy’.<sup>12</sup> A typical USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary concluded in 1945 that ‘a great deal of re-education in the principles and methods of democracy is needed before Germans can be left to their own devices’.<sup>13</sup>

In pursuit of these broad political objectives, the IDs shared the same targets and enemies. As with security intelligence, both IDs waged two simultaneous secret wars against far-left political parties such as the KPD and against far-right extremists such as the DRP. Accordingly, CIC Commander Browning noted in May 1949 ‘Our activity within the political field is split between the two extremes of Fascism and Communism’.<sup>14</sup>

But several British and American intelligence reports expressed the idea that something in the German ‘character’, ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’, not just overtly expressed through Nazism or Communism, also needed watching.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, discussions of German militarism, enduring admiration for Otto von Bismarck and widespread German sympathy for Nazi aims recorded in British and American intelligence reports helps explain why, after two world wars, Allied intelligence officers simply did not trust Germans en masse.<sup>16</sup> Such distrust, combined with the assumption that occupied peoples naturally

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<sup>11</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 6, Secret (20/02/1946).

<sup>12</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, ‘Draft Statement for Press Conference to be held by Chief, Intelligence Division in the ZECO Area on ‘D’ Day’, Top Secret (Undated: likely 1947). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 728, 563465, ‘Present Status of the Nazi Threat’, Secret (28/02/1947).

<sup>13</sup> USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 18 (15/11/1945) in TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 1, Secret (12/12/1945).

<sup>14</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 749, 563465, ‘Final Report Fourth European Attache Conference Frankfurt’, Operation of the 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group in the US Zone of Germany by Major Earl S. Browning, Jr., Secret (23-27 May 1949).

<sup>15</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Reviews, Secret, Nos. 2 (26/12/1945), 5 (06/02/1946) and 6 (20/02/1946). See also TNA, FO 1050/66, Internal Affairs and Communications Division (IA&C), Intelligence Summary No. 7, Confidential (12/06/1946) and USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 66 in IA&C, Intelligence Summary No. 42, Secret (01/11/1946); TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Intelligence Review No. 15, Confidential (December: 1946); NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, ‘Operation Selection Board: Conclusions’ (1947), p. 12; TNA, FO 1005/1715, Hamburg RIO, Monthly Security Intelligence Summary No. 21, Secret (31/08/1947). This to some extent reflected attitudes in Whitehall, see Speiser, *BAOR*, pp. 14- 15.

<sup>16</sup> NARA II, RG498, UD964, Box 4563, 5891629, HQ VI Corps, G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 7, Secret (03/11/1945). See also TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Reviews, Secret, Nos. 2 (26/12/1945) and 5 (06/02/1946); TNA, WO 208/4114, MI4, MITROPA, Intelligence Summary No. 22, Secret (20/05/1946); TNA, FO 1050/66, IA&C, Intelligence

desired to rebel, undoubtedly inspired the IDs' mission of controlling the German population.<sup>17</sup> This, along with their mission of keeping British and American policymakers informed, the pervasiveness of Nazi ideology in public institutions throughout Hitler's rule and the potential for extremists to infiltrate moderate parties such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the SPD, required British and American intelligence officers to infiltrate and monitor almost every conceivable aspect of German life.<sup>18</sup>

The British ID, partially owing to its centralised structure, as discussed in Chapter One, was most effective in performing its political intelligence functions.

The largest (and perhaps only) surviving collection of records produced by a British Intelligence Team was produced by Intelligence Team 8 in Herford.<sup>19</sup> These records show that in 1946 and 1947 the ID officers of Team 8 received detailed reports describing the minutiae of youth organisations and activities in Herford from the *Stadtdirektor*.<sup>20</sup> Such reports relied on a local German official acting as an informer, indicating the continued importance of human intelligence and the extent to which ID officers successfully integrated themselves into German society and military government at a very local level.

Similar discussions of youth activities and organisations accompanied overviews of political meetings and local politics, propaganda, newspaper reports and analysis of general public opinion in incredibly detailed AIO and RIO reports.<sup>21</sup> Such reports discussed both left and right-wing politics.

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Summary No. 7, Confidential (12/06/1946) and USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 66 in IA&C, Intelligence Summary No. 42, Secret (01/11/1946); TNA, FO 1005/1702, ID, Summary No. 1, Secret (08/07/1946); NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, 'Operation Selection Board: Conclusions' (1947), p. 12.

<sup>17</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, 'Draft Statement for Press Conference to be held by Chief, Intelligence Division in the ZECO Area on 'D' Day', Top Secret (Undated: likely 1947).

<sup>18</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, 'Operation Selection Board: Conclusions' (1947), p. 12. See also Frank McDonough, *The Hitler Years: Triumph 1933-1939* (London: Head of Zeus, 2019), pp. 13, 48-49, 74; Matthew Seligmann, John Davison and John McDonald, *In the Shadow of the Swastika: Life in Germany Under the Nazis 1933-1945* (Kent: Spellmount, 2003), pp. 43, 58, 106.

<sup>19</sup> Kommunalarchiv Herford (KH), No. 1424, KAHS 51, 'Britischer Geheimdienst: Intelligence Service Team 8, Herford, Bielefelder Strasse 6'.

<sup>20</sup> For example see KH, No. 1424, KAHS 51, Wöhrmann, Stadtdirektor to Intelligence Service, Herford, 'Summing up of reports of the Youth-Groups on their activity in month December 1946' (10/01/1947). See also Wöhrmann, Stadtdirektor to Int. Team. Herford, 'Monthly Report' (07/09/1947).

<sup>21</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1721, 8 AIO, Osnabruck, Monthly Summary, Nos. 8-9, 11-14, Secret (1947). See also TNA FO 1005/1709, 5 AIO, Detmold, Monthly Intelligence Summary, Nos. 12-31, Secret (February 1948 – September 1949); NARA II, RG260, A11336, Box 23, 202 AIO Bremen, Monthly Political Summary, Nos. 1-4, 6-8, Secret (March-October 1947); TNA, FO 1005/1713, Hamburg RIO, Summary, Nos. 1-6, Secret (April-June 1946); TNA, FO 1005/1724, Schleswig-Holstein RIO, Monthly Intelligence Report, Nos. 6-7, Secret (January-February 1947) and Political Summary, Nos. 8-14, Secret (March-September 1947); TNA, FO 1005/1722, 11 Rhine/Westphalia Intelligence Staff (11 RWIS), Political Summary, Nos. 3-12, Secret (November-August 1947); TNA, FO 1005/1711, 13 RIS Hannover, Weekly Intelligence Sitreps (January-December 1948); TNA FO 1005/1710, 13 Niedersachsen Intelligence Staff, Weekly Summary of Political Events, Nos. 1-15, Confidential

Some were even split between sections headed ‘left wing’ and ‘right wing’, thus demonstrating the impartial way in which the IDs conducted their enduring two front war for democracy.<sup>22</sup> The reports included comments on British policy, predictions of possible German reactions to future policy, suggested changes to current policy and made new policy suggestions which were sent to British Regional Commissioners and other Military Government officials.<sup>23</sup> Some RIO reports were also sent to the Foreign Office.<sup>24</sup> However, high policy, as undertaken by the British Military Governor, High Commissioner and the Foreign Secretary, was usually informed by the general overview reports produced by ID Headquarters.<sup>25</sup>

All of these reports provide an unprecedented window onto life in occupied Germany which has been surprisingly neglected by political and social historians. Their potential utility to the latter helps to demonstrate just how integrated into German society and therefore vital to the occupation system of rule the British ID was.

British Area and Regional Intelligence Officers alone were vital to the system of rule which operated throughout the British Zone. In 1946, at a conference in Berlin, RIOs met with officials from the British Political Division.<sup>26</sup> The predominant influence of the former was apparent throughout the meeting. For example, RIOs were thanked for sending ‘telegrams containing “hot” news...from the Regions’ which were ‘regularly seen by the D.M.G. who took an active interest in their contents’.<sup>27</sup> They were requested to help directly implement British policy by trying to ‘convince the CDU representatives in their regions that...they would be unwise to make an issue of socialisation’.<sup>28</sup> They

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(November 1949-March 1950); TNA, FO 1050/66, 12 (Berlin) Intelligence Staff, Intelligence Summary No. 68, Secret (31/10/1946); TNA, FO 371/64554, 12 (Berlin) Intelligence Staff, Political Intelligence Summary No. 58, Secret (30/06/1947).

<sup>22</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1715, Hamburg RIO, Monthly Security Intelligence Summary, Nos. 17-19, Secret (April-June 1947).

<sup>23</sup> TNA, FO 1013/317, RIO, 11 Rhine Westphalia to Regional Commissioner, ‘Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 3’, Secret (21/11/1946) and No. 4 (13/12/1946). See also TNA, FO 1013/375, 11 Rhine-Westphalia Intelligence Staff, ‘Political Notes for Inclusion in The Regional Commissioner’s Report’, Secret (31/05/1948) and (30/06/1948); TNA, FO 1005/1721, 8 AIO, Osnabruck, Monthly Summary, No. 11 Secret (26/06/1947), No. 12 (26/07/1947) and No. 13 (26/08/1947) .

<sup>24</sup> TNA, FO 371/64554, FO comments on 11 Rhine-Westphalia RIO Monthly Intelligence Report, Secret No. 3 (03/12/1947) and Schleswig-Holstein RIO Monthly Intelligence Summary (05/12/1947). See also TNA, FO 1012/281, RIO Conference, Lancaster House, Berlin (04/11/1946).

<sup>25</sup> TNA, FO 371/64554, FO comments on ID, Intelligence Summary No. 2, Top Secret (15/11/1947). See also TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, CCG(BE), Intelligence Summary, Nos. 1-10, Distribution Lists, Top Secret (January-December 1948); IWM, Haydon Papers, ‘Confidential Report Signed High Commissioner’ (29/12/1949).

<sup>26</sup> TNA, FO 1012/281, RIO Conference, Lancaster House, Berlin (04/11/1946).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

were also advised of continuing British policy designed to control the German media by keeping ‘a close watch on editorials with a view to suppressing malicious criticism’.<sup>29</sup>

The supremacy of RIOs in the regional British system of rule and their almost complete independence from normal political accountability was also asserted. Indeed, it was established that RIOs were not ‘in any way under the jurisdiction of the Regional Governmental Officer’ but rather ‘administered completely by Intelligence Division’ although their ‘function was that of liaison officer between Intelligence Division and the Regional Commissioner’.<sup>30</sup> Notably, their reports were even stated to be capable of influencing the Foreign Secretary.<sup>31</sup>

A report circulated around the CCG the following year concerning the relationship between RIOs and Local Government in the British Zone made the power of the former more apparent.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, not only did RIOs advise Regional Commissioners concerning the ‘political implications of any measure taken by the ACA, or by Mil Gov, or by the German authorities’ and ‘on the political reactions to be expected to any imminent official action or on the action which should be taken to evoke a reaction which is desired’ but they were also instructed to ‘search for and use...opportunities for promoting democratic development and thought in German political life’.<sup>33</sup> In pursuit of the latter objective, RIOs were permitted to ‘observe and, if necessary, unobtrusively, influence the manoeuvres and positioning of the Parties’.<sup>34</sup> These activities alone arguably constitute a secret system of rule. But the ID’s political influence went further.

Although Regional Commissioners possessed ‘oversight and power of veto over a Land Government’, it was British ID officers who supplied them with the information needed in order to effectively wield that power.<sup>35</sup> RIOs would monitor and investigate German social and cultural societies, associations and similar organisations in order to advise Regional Commissioners as to

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> TNA, FO 1013/320, ‘Relationship to be maintained at Regional Headquarters between the Regional Intelligence Officer and the Administration and Local Government Branch and their staffs’ (January: 1947).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> FO 1005/1731, ‘Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division’, Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author’s possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

‘whether the societies may be allowed to continue to function’.<sup>36</sup> ID officers were therefore aware that the position of RIO was ‘a post of great responsibility’.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, ID officers not only informed and advised regional government officials but the contents of their reports were considered by well-connected officials in London such as Lord Marley to be ‘...of great importance because upon the reports of this division depend the foundations for future democracy, the prevention of the creation of new trouble by Germans and because of the fact that Germany is a meeting place for all the great powers’.<sup>38</sup> Even the Foreign Secretary, Bevin, took ‘great interest’ in the ID and concerned ‘himself closely in its welfare’.<sup>39</sup>

The collection and distribution of political information by American intelligence officers was equally important but more fragmented and therefore more difficult to analyse. In the American Zone, a separate Deputy Director of Intelligence for Military Government Matters was established to liaise closely with OMGUS.<sup>40</sup> With the creation of the High Commission, this role transitioned into that of the Director of Intelligence HICOG which had an equal focus on social, economic and political intelligence.<sup>41</sup> In many ways, the OMGUS and HICOG Directors were subordinate to the Director of ID EUCOM, as they could not directly control ‘field’ or ‘operational’ intelligence agencies and they liaised with the British ID mostly via the USLO-BLO chain.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, much of their work was undertaken via EUCOM whom they supplied with political intelligence gathered by their office.<sup>43</sup> The political intelligence work of ID EUCOM, OMGUS and HICOG often overlapped.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> TNA, FO 938/63, Lord Marley, House of Lords, ‘Memorandum on the Intelligence Division’ (09/05/1946).

<sup>39</sup> TNA, FO 938/208, C.P. Mayhew, Parliamentary Under Secretary, Draft Letter to G.C. Touche, M.P., House of Commons (June: 1948). See also Daly-Groves, ‘Division’, p. 104. This helps further close gaps in knowledge outlined by Lomas, *Attlee*, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, ‘Coordination of Intelligence Activities in the European Command’, Secret (04/09/1947).

<sup>41</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, ABr to USLO Herford, ‘KEIL, Ludwig’, Secret (05/01/1951). See also Box 758, ‘Intelligence Organization in EUCOM’, Confidential (20/06/1951).

<sup>42</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, Organisation Table, Secret (November: 1947). See also Box 743, HQ EUCOM, ‘Intelligence Directive No. 3’, Secret (11/01/1949); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID USAREUR to USLO, ‘FISCHER-BENZON’, Secret (15/10/1952); Lerch, USLO, HQ ID USAREUR, ‘Transmittal of British Production Directorate Interrogation Reports’, Secret (09/12/1952).

<sup>43</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, Organisation Table, Secret (November: 1947). See also Box 743, HQ EUCOM, ‘Intelligence Directive No. 3’, Secret (11/01/1949); Box 758, ‘Intelligence Organization in EUCOM’, Confidential (20/06/1951).

<sup>44</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, ‘Coordination of Intelligence Activities in the European Command’, Secret (04/09/1947).

Nevertheless, American intelligence officers were just as integrated into the American system of rule as their British ID counterparts. Indeed, local government records discussing a wide variety of issues contain files indicating CIC influence and interest.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, OMGUS and G2 intelligence reports are just as detailed as those produced by AIOs and RIOs as they demonstrate regular monitoring of every conceivable aspect of German life from family quarrels to local food and agriculture issues.<sup>46</sup> Intelligence gathered by CIC officers and collated into general ID EUCOM reports was used to keep American military government officials, the commander in chief of EUCOM as well as officials in the State Department and the War Department in Washington, well informed.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, intelligence produced by ID EUCOM contributed ‘...to the over-all determination of national policy’.<sup>48</sup>

American ID directed CIC officers and their predecessors directed from G-2 USFET also performed similar political functions to their British IG, ID and BIO(G) colleagues. Like the latter, undercover CIC officers attended and reported on German political meetings, recruited informers within political parties and sat in beer halls to monitor public opinion.<sup>49</sup> Political intelligence gathering could be the focus of intelligence operations too. This was the case with the CIC’s Operation Honey-pot which involved the recruiting of a journalist named Hildegard Springer (codenamed Agent Honey-pot) to report on German political trends with particular emphasis on the KPD.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, in 1949, the British ID’s Operation Magnet involved ‘recruiting informants in key targets and installations...to get warnings of

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<sup>45</sup> For example, see folders of CIC correspondence (1946-1948) in NARA II, RG260, A11057, Box 51, 23905188, OMGUS, Bavaria, Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Division and in RG260, A11637, Box 787, 16803577, OMGUS, Wuerttemberg-Baden.

<sup>46</sup> NARA II, RG260, A11564, Box 457, 12126642, OMGUS, Landkreis Heidelberg, Weekly Intelligence Reports to Director, OMGUS, Wuerttemberg-Baden Headquarters, Restricted (1947-1948). See also NARA II, RG466, A1183, Box 1, 1151877, Intelligence Division, Office of Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Nuremberg Field Office, Biweekly Intelligence Reports, Restricted (1949-1950); NARA II, RG260, A11657, Box 863, 16795225, OMGUS, Landkreis Waiblingen, Liaison and Security Office, Intelligence Report, Restricted (19/10/1948); NARA II, RG498, UD964, Box 4563, 5891629, HQ VI Corps, G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summaries, Nos. 3-5, Secret (October 1945 – January 1946).

<sup>47</sup> NARA II, RG319, NM382, Box 1847, 2155420, HQ EUCOM, Intelligence Summary No. 5, Secret (14/04/1947) and No. 10 (23/06/1947).

<sup>48</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, ID to Analysis Branch, ID, ‘Position Classification Appeal of Jessie Voss’, Secret (24/06/1952).

<sup>49</sup> NARA II, RG260, A1898, Box 156, 772407810, Region IV, CIC Weekly Report No. 51, Secret (02/11/1946). The latter box is full of detailed regional CIC reports documenting CIC political intelligence activities. British AIO officer Gordon Burns was tasked with uncovering active Nazi party members and recalled how he would ‘draw them into conversation over drinks and get them to say something indiscreet’. See Patrick Burns to author via email (27/03/2019).

<sup>50</sup> Daly-Groves, ‘Control’, p. 338. See also NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 13, Dale M. Garvey, HQ 970<sup>th</sup> CIC to CO CIC Region VI, ‘Operation HONEYPOT’ (13,15/09/1946) and Garvey, ‘Periodic Report of Theater Directed CIC Operations’, Top Secret (31/07/1946).



communist activity or of other adverse trends'.<sup>51</sup> Human intelligence activities of the two IDs, not just censorship intercepts, helped to make them the most important elements within their systems of rule.

Of course, censorship cannot be overlooked, as it provided a vital tool for controlling the German population. In building up general surveys of public opinion to be utilised by policymakers, combined with information gathered by officers in the field, it was invaluable. For example, a G2 Weekly Intelligence Summary dated 3 November 1945 contains the subheading 'The Occupation Pulse', as it explains:

The following excerpts are selected from the letters and phone calls censored by Det E, Group B, CCD, during the past week. They serve to give an insight into what the German civil population is doing, saying and thinking, as it concerns the occupational authorities, and though these excerpts the finger of authority is aided in sensing the pulse of the occupied area. Censored German mail and monitored phone calls brought forth no new trends during the week. Arrogance, unrest, criticism of Military Government and de-Nazification and pessimism on the part of the German civilians continues to be reflected in many of the communications...Owing to the now large volume of communications and the limited space in this report, only a few samples are quoted; however, they serve the purpose of indicating the way the wind is blowing.<sup>52</sup>

With the creation of the High Commission and the establishment of the Federal Republic, the western occupying powers found it increasingly difficult to overtly interfere in local areas of German life. This increased the importance of the IDs' secret political functions. As a Top Secret report on the British ID noted in 1947:

The handing over of governmental responsibility to the Germans has led to certain psychological changes, the effect of which is that it is increasingly difficult to obtain information by straightforward contact. It has therefore been decided to increase the provision for covert investigation.<sup>53</sup>

Although some functions did reduce over time as overt authorities gradually took over the role of mass political reporting, the IDs still played an important role behind the scenes.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, the political intelligence work undertaken by British ID officers and CIC agents did not cease altogether but it

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<sup>51</sup> TNA, FO 1056/283, Haydon, HQ ID to G.R. Gauntlett, Information Services Division, CCG(BE), Berlin, Secret & Personal (23/04/1949).

<sup>52</sup> NARA II, RG498, UD964, Box 4563, 5891629, HQ VI Corps, G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 7, Secret (03/11/1945).

<sup>53</sup> FO 1005/1731, 'Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division', Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>54</sup> With the move of the ID from FO to BAOR control in 1952, Land Commissioners took over such reporting, see TNA, FO 1035/77, High Commissioner's Military Conference, Secret (26/10/1951). See also Daly-Groves, 'Division', p. 95.

became more targeted.<sup>55</sup> Intelligence officers continued to produce political reports, but they focused more clearly on extreme political movements of the left and right.<sup>56</sup> Public opinion monitoring focused more on particular areas of interest although censorship endured throughout the occupation.<sup>57</sup>

Most importantly, when the British or American occupiers felt they needed to take political action which may be frowned upon by Germans, they relied on intelligence officers. This was the case with Operation Magnet which involved ID infiltration of Cologne's North West German Radio (NWDR) in response to KPD penetration.<sup>58</sup> This caused alarm amongst some CCG officials because they had 'recently handed over the running of NWDR to the Germans with something of a flourish of trumpets... If at this stage the Germans got the idea that anyone from Military Government was "spying" on them, it would make our position quite untenable...'.<sup>59</sup> Haydon's explanation of the operation convinced the CCG of its necessity and of the fact that with appropriate sensitivity it would not interfere with their attempts 'to influence their [German] policy both towards a sympathetic attitude to Britain and towards a liberal and democratic outlook'.<sup>60</sup>

As Kirkpatrick memorably noted with regards to Operation Terminus, 'it came as a salutary shock to most people to discover that the High Commissioners still possessed virtually supreme powers. They had been basking in the comforting illusion, fostered by the press, that Germany had already recovered her sovereignty'.<sup>61</sup> So important was the continued role of intelligence that 'by mid-summer,

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<sup>55</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 748, 563465, HQ 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, EUCOM, 'Quarterly Historical Report Of Operations', Confidential (01/07/1949). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Det, 'Justification For Military Augmentation', Secret (11/01/1952); IWM, Haydon Papers, 'Intelligence Operations in a Free Society', Notes for Lecture to Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine, USA, 1962 or 1963.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Information Control Officer, Survey Group, US HICOG, Secret (02/01/1952), (15/02/1952); Box 133, Marshall to Information Control Officer, Secret (05/05/1952).

<sup>57</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 754, 563465, R.K. Taylor, DID to VC/S EUCOM, 'German Attitude Toward American Occupation, US Zone', Confidential (20/01/1951). See also TNA, FO 1035/77, JIC(Germany), 'Intelligence Information In A Period of Tension', Top Secret (21/12/1950); TNA, FO 1060/620, 'Notes of a Meeting held...in the office of the Deputy High Commissioner to consider the intelligence arrangements under a contractual regime', Secret (30/03/1951); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, George A. Chester, DDID USARUER to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Analysis of Intercepts', Secret (17/11/1952); TNA, FO 371/103896, Kirkman, HQ BIO(G), Wahnerheide to D.P. Reilly, Joint Intelligence Committee, London, Top Secret & Personal (30/12/1952); Erlichman, 'Rule', p. 141. Censorship continued beyond the occupation, see CIA, Special Collections Online, Office Memorandum, 'ZIPPER Agreement' (11/03/1953) in Kevin C. Ruffner (ed), *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume II*, Secret (2006), p. 425 and TNA, FO 1060/655, C.P. Hope, British Embassy, Bonn, 'Examination of Communications' (07/05/1955).

<sup>58</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, HQ CCG(BE), Berlin, BAOR, 'Communist Activity in the British Zone', Top Secret (09/07/1947). See also TNA, FO 1056/283, Haydon, HQ ID to Gauntlett, ISD, CCG(BE), Berlin, Secret & Personal (23/04/1949).

<sup>59</sup> TNA, FO 1056/283, Gauntlett to Haydon, Chief ID, Herford, Secret (20/04/1949).

<sup>60</sup> TNA, FO 1056/283, Gauntlett to Haydon, Top Secret & Personal (27/05/1949).

<sup>61</sup> TNA, FO 371/103912, Kirkpatrick, Wahnerheide to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Confidential (24/04/1953).

1950', the British ID made up one-third of the Control Commission, though this fact was skilfully hidden from German and American authorities.<sup>62</sup>

The enduring political role of British and American intelligence in post-war Germany may come as a shock to some historians too owing to the current underestimation of the IDs importance to the occupation system of rule. Indeed, ID officers were the secret power behind the receding public throne of the occupation. Through their networks of informers, censorship stations, undercover agents and political contacts, both IDs ensured that British and American policymakers in post-war Germany could make well informed decisions, remain in control of their subjects, effectively respond to dissent and stay one step ahead of their opposition. If that opposition was deemed by the IDs to become too dangerous, they could, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, exercise their almost unlimited powers of arrest.<sup>63</sup> This was a secret system of rule. The extent to which it can be considered unitary and harmonious is revealed by the following analysis.

## II Cooperation

In the first months of occupation, American Army Historical Officers conducted interviews with American forces, including CIC agents, who were waiting in what was to be the British Zone of occupation, to be relieved by British forces. Such accounts are notable for the degree of harmony they reveal when comparing British methods of military government. For example, Sergeant Odean W. Hagen of the 61<sup>st</sup> Field Artillery Brigade claimed he did not know just how the British would deploy their units throughout München Gladbach but it was 'assumed by all American personnel who have been contacted by advanced British Liaison officers, that their method will not differ greatly from that

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<sup>62</sup> FO 1005/1731, 'Minutes of the second meeting of the working party to examine the future of the Intelligence Division', Foreign Office, Top Secret (21/06/1949) and Foreign Office Minutes, Secret (4-5/04/1951), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>63</sup> According to Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 281, the CIC had 'almost unlimited powers of search and arrest'. British ID powers of arrest, so long as the Military Governor concurred, were 'unlimited'. See TNA, FO 1032/1003, N.L. Macaskie, Chief, Legal Division, HQ CCG(BE), Berlin to G.H.R. Halland, Public Safety Branch, Zonal Executive Offices (11/07/1947) and Legal Division, HQ CCG(BE), 'Arrest without warrant' (07/07/1947).

of the Americans'.<sup>64</sup> Likewise, Major Jack Bradford of the Aachen Military Government Detachment noted:

The fact that there will be no great changes made by the British when they assume control is a healthy indication of the relationship which exists between our two countries. We are allies who think alike and who will employ the same modus operandi with the German. The British may open a few new factories and inaugurate minor changes in policy, but their over-all occupational system will be the same as we have employed.<sup>65</sup>

Indeed, potential differences in policies such as denazification were considered only 'minor' in the grand scheme of things by Major Bradford.<sup>66</sup> When it came to the real substance of the 'occupational system', the secret system of rule which operated throughout and upheld it, both US and British officials undertook identical tasks in pursuit of predominantly identical missions. As an interview with a G-2 officer revealed: 'Because of SHAEF we and the British work and think along the same lines, especially in intelligence work'.<sup>67</sup>

Although internal policy differed between the two Zones after the dissolution of SHAEF on matters such as denazification, political intelligence cooperation continued throughout the occupation. Indeed, British and American intelligence officers realised the importance of keeping each other informed about such policy changes and their effects for two reasons. Firstly, policy affected security and security affected both zones. Secondly, both intelligence organisations were combatting the same multizonal political enemies in pursuit of the same outcomes: a denazified and democratic Germany. Their intelligence reports reflect a genuine desire to achieve this through analysis of the successes and failures of differing policies.

Throughout the occupation, lengthy, detailed finished intelligence reports packed full of political analysis were exchanged between British and American ID headquarters, via the USLO-BLO

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<sup>64</sup> NARA II, RG498, UD1001, Box 4637, 5891726, 5<sup>th</sup> Information and Historical Service, Fifteenth US Army, John M. Williams, Historical Officer interview with Sergeant Odean W. Hagen, Secret (12/06/1945).

<sup>65</sup> NARA II, RG498, UD1001, Box 4637, 5891726, 5<sup>th</sup> Information and Historical Service, Fifteenth US Army, Carroll G. Fitts, 2d Lt., Cavalry interview with Major Jack Bradford, Executive Officer, Military Government Detachment, Aachen, Secret (12/06/1945).

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> NARA II, RG498, UD1001, Box 4637, 5891726, 5<sup>th</sup> Information and Historical Service, Fifteenth US Army, Captain Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer interview with Thomas L. Crystal, Jr., G-2 Section, HQ XXII Corps, Secret (04/06/1945).

chain.<sup>68</sup> Of the ‘hundredweights’ referred to by Kirkman, the great majority of this concerned the overlapping fields of security and political intelligence.<sup>69</sup> Indeed, American military government officials received British RIO reports and British political intelligence reports produced by their ID Headquarters were transferred via the American ID to OMGUS and later HICOG government and intelligence officials.<sup>70</sup> Likewise, British military government, IG and ID officers received USFET, CIC and later ID EUCOM finished political intelligence reports.<sup>71</sup> Political intelligence collected by ID EUCOM even made its way to the Foreign Office in London and information gathered by the British ID was utilised by the Department of the Army in Washington.<sup>72</sup> On several occasions, British policy was altered based on information pertaining to alternative policies received from American intelligence reports and vice versa.<sup>73</sup>

Clearly, the British and American systems of rule were, when it came to political intelligence, mutually dependant to a considerable extent. Indeed, the multizonal nature of several political threats, as with security intelligence, necessitated cooperation and the sharing of finished intelligence reports helped both British and American occupation officials to monitor, prevent and combat such threats.

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<sup>68</sup> See distribution lists in NARA II, RG319, NM382, Box 1847, 2155420, HQ EUCOM, Intelligence Summaries, Nos. 4-12, Secret (1947) and TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Top Secret Intelligence Summaries, Nos. 1-10 (April-December 1948). See also NARA II, RG 549, A148, Box 743, 563465, Moe, HQ ID EUCOM to USLO, ‘Uranium Mine at AUE’, Secret (21/02/1949); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to ACoS, G-2, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, ‘Extreme Nationalists and Veterans’, Secret (09/05/1952).

<sup>69</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 118<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (15/11/1951), Annex A.

<sup>70</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1710, 13 Niedersachsen Intelligence Staff, Weekly Summary of Political Developments Nos. 3-14, Confidential (09/12/1949 - 10/03/1950). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 743, 563465, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence OMGUS, ‘British-Soviet Zone Daily Border Sitreps’, Secret (01/03/1949); Box 741, Kilzer, HQ ID EUCOM to USLO, ‘Monthly Summary of Political and Economic Intelligence in British Zone’, Confidential (14/10/1949); Box 757, Baldry, Chief S&S Section HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, HICOG, Confidential (06/06/1951); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Information Control Officer, HICOG, Secret (17/01/1952).

<sup>71</sup> USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 18 in TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 1, Secret (12/12/1945). See also TNA, FO 1005/1702, ID, Summary No. 1, Secret (08/07/1946); TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Monthly Summary No. 8, Top Secret (31/10/1948); NARA II, RG319, NM382, Box 1847, 2155420, HQ EUCOM, Intelligence Summaries, Nos. 4-12, Secret (1947).

<sup>72</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ID EUCOM to HQ ID BAOR Thru BLO, ‘Remilitarization Plebiscite in Land Hesse’, Confidential (20/02/1952). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 736, 563456, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, General Staff, US Army, Washington 25, DC, ‘Correspondence from National Council for Prevention of War’, Confidential (15/07/1949); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 127, Baldry, Chief, Analysis Branch, HQ ID USARUER to ACoS, G-2, Department of the Army, Washington DC, ‘Transmittal of Reports’, Secret (12/09/1952).

<sup>73</sup> TNA, WO 106/4285, B.L. Montgomery, 21 Army Group, ‘Conference: Corps District Comds’, Top Secret (11/06/1945). See also TNA, WO 106/4453, Eisenhower to Prime Minister, Top Secret Cypher Telegram (01/06/1945); TNA, WO 208/4114, MI4, MITROPA Intelligence Summary No. 28, Secret (12/08/1946); TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Intelligence Review No. 15, Confidential (December: 1946).

The IDs' political role of prevention helps to demonstrate most clearly the impressive level of control and power which these secret organisations exercised over post-war German society. Their physical control over German documents such as those produced by the Gestapo helped them first to identify and arrest potentially dangerous Nazis and later to identify and monitor suspect members of the KPD.<sup>74</sup> The IDs were also able to monitor and physically restricted the movements of such suspects through the Combined Travel Board. Their myriad of informers and undercover agents enabled both IDs to exchange reports concerning the activities of several German organisations and societies.<sup>75</sup> The content of school books, the political sympathies of university lecturers and the content of lectures were also the subject of documents exchanged via the USLO-BLO system.<sup>76</sup> The communications of any and every German, particularly political activists, important party officials, and even Ministers, were subject to monitoring in all formats.<sup>77</sup> The IDs also monitored journalists and could instruct the media not to publish certain news and determine which journalists were able to receive press cards.<sup>78</sup>

Given its opposition to the occupation and western style capitalist orientated democracy, the multizonal KPD was particularly heavily penetrated by the IDs.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, ID concern with KPD

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<sup>74</sup> TNA, FO 1050/583, GSI, Main HQ, 21 Army Group, 'CI Sitreps for Period 1-10 May', Secret (12/05/1945). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 736, 563456, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, Washington DC, 'REMSCHEID...', Confidential (29/12/1949); Box 760, Baldry, Chief S&S Section to USLO Herford, 'TJOKRANAGORO...', Secret (21/09/1951).

<sup>75</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 736, 563456, Morin, Chief, Analysis Branch to BLO, 'Labor Agricultural Orthodox Society', Confidential (21/11/1949) and Rainford, Chief, Control Branch to BLO, 'Europa-Federation der Unabhaengigen und Nationalen Organization', Confidential (09/12/1949). See also Box 754, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to USLO, Herford, 'Society for German Soviet Friendship', Confidential (28/03/1951); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Marshall, Chief S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Polish Society in Germany', Secret (11/03/1952).

<sup>76</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 760, 563465, Baldry, Chief, S&S Section, ID EUCOM to HQ ID thru BLO, 'FRAENKEL, Professor Ernst Daniel', Secret (08/01/1951). See also Box 740, Steinmetz, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, US Army, Washington, 'Dr. H.W. ROEHRIG', Confidential (09/11/1949); TNA, FO 1038/102, HQ, Air Division, Berlin, 'Fortnightly Summary of Items of General Interest Culled From Current Intelligence Reports', (22/05/1946).

<sup>77</sup> TNA, FO 1005/713, QIC, Censorship Sub-Committee, 'Censorship Regulations for the Civilian Population', Restricted (15/01/1946). See also TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 9, Top Secret (30/11/1948); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Philp, Chief Opns Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence HICOG, 'Security of CIS Operations', Confidential (22/09/1951); Box 743, W.C. Stanley for Chief ID, Herford to USLO, 'Censorship intercept', Confidential (29/09/1949); Box 737, Steinmetz, HQ ID EUCOM to Office of Intelligence, HICOG, 'Communications Intercept', Confidential (18/11/1949).

<sup>78</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 738, 563456, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch to DID, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (08/12/1949) and R.B. Firehock, Chief PP&T Branch to DDID, Confidential (29/09/1949). See also Box 750, Hardick, HQ ID EUCOM to USLO Herford, Confidential (25/08/1950); Box 761, Smith, Chief, Security Section to USLO, 'MOELICH, Dr. Heinrich J.', Confidential (01/05/1951); Box 742, Leslie Spinks, Chief, Munich Detachment ID to Chief Spec Proj Br, 'Unauthorised Publicity of Operation Paperclip', Confidential (04/01/1949); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, 'General Hays from General Mathewson', Secret (05/02/1952); TNA, FO 1032/1258, HQ CCG(BE), Berlin, BAOR, 'Communist Activity in the British Zone', Top Secret (09/07/1947).

<sup>79</sup> For example see TNA, FO 1032/1258, HQ CCG(BE), Berlin, BAOR, 'Communist Activity in the British Zone', Top Secret (09/07/1947). See also TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 1, Top Secret (01/04/1948); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Det, 'Justification For Military Augmentation', Secret (11/01/1952); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 754, 563465, Baldry, Chief S&S Section, ID EUCOM to BLO, 'KPD/SED Designated Crossing Point', Secret (29/05/1951).

activities extended throughout Germany, again demonstrating how the emphasis on Berlin in the existing historiography has produced a skewed perspective of their activities. For example, one notable report referred to a 'possible threat to security in such KPD strongholds as Hamburg, Bremen, the industrial area of the Ruhr and (to a slightly lesser extent) in Hannover'.<sup>80</sup> Members and associates of this party were a key target of movements and communications monitoring.<sup>81</sup> The IDs also exchanged information concerning KPD publications which were occasionally banned.<sup>82</sup> Journalists and officials favourable to the KPD were monitored and informants placed within the party reported on their private conversations and meetings.<sup>83</sup> Communications intercepts aided the latter too.<sup>84</sup>

This mass information gathering and sharing performed several important functions. Firstly, it enabled the IDs to identify and arrest KPD members who engaged in espionage for the Soviets.<sup>85</sup> Secondly, it kept policymakers informed of KPD propaganda and opinions enabling them to more effectively counter communist criticisms of the occupation.<sup>86</sup> Thirdly, it enabled the IDs to keep their policymakers well informed of any forthcoming actions by the KPD and its supporters which had the potential to escalate into situations transcending political dangers, such as strike action.

Secret KPD plans to incite, exploit and escalate strikes made strike action one of the few politically relevant matters which required the immediate exchange of raw political intelligence via the

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<sup>80</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1474, ID, 'Security of the British Zone During Winter of 1946/1947', Top Secret (14/11/1946).

<sup>81</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to USLO Wahnerheide, 'Missing KPD Personalities', Secret (19/03/1952). See also Box 126, Marshall to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Communications Intercepts', Secret (17/11/1952); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, Ops Br to USLO Herford, 'Hermann AHRENS', Secret (18/10/1949).

<sup>82</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 125, Marshall to BLO, 'KPD Bavaria Landesleitung Circular', Confidential (17/04/1952). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 738, 563465, Carl A. Weaver, Chief, R&A Branch, ID EUCOM to DDID, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (22/09/1949); TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Monthly Summary No. 8, Top Secret (31/10/1948).

<sup>83</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'HOLLSTEIN, Fritz', Confidential (22/10/1952). See also Box 135, Marshall to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Kurt Bernhard SCHROEDER', Secret (26/02/1952) and Marshall to BLO, 'Erwin REHDORF', Secret (12/03/1952); TNA, FO 371/64554, ID, Summary No. 2, Top Secret (15/11/1947); Daly-Groves, 'Division', p. 100.

<sup>84</sup> For example see NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 741, 563465, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 7970 CIC Group, 'KPD Finances and Membership', Confidential (18/10/1949).

<sup>85</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, Garvey, for Chief CIC, Operation Sunrise, Report No. 2, Top Secret (01/07/1946). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 753, 563465, Cantrell, Chief, GE Section, ABr to BLO, 'Hans LANG', Confidential (08/02/1951).

<sup>86</sup> For example, see FO comments in TNA, FO 371/64554, ID, Summary No. 2, Top Secret (15/11/1947). See also TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary No. 2, Top Secret (30/04/1948); NARA II, RG 549, A148, Box 757, 563465, Cantrell to Director of Intelligence HICOG, Confidential (23/02/1951); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Information Control Officer, HICOG, Secret (17/01/1952); Box 132, Marshall to ACoS, G-2, Washington DC, 'Request for Membership Figures of KPD', Secret (13/02/1952).

USLO-BLO chain.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, on several occasions the IDs and the intelligence officers they commanded kept each other informed of plans for future strike action and intended KPD involvement in such strikes which enabled British and American government officials to prepare and react accordingly.<sup>88</sup> The British ID also recorded an incident earlier in the occupation of Nazi sympathisers attempting to sway the mood of mass protests in Hamburg.<sup>89</sup> This made strike action a particular area of concern for the IDs.

The IDs also closely coordinated their equally close monitoring of the communist youth organisation, the FDJ.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, they kept each other well informed of the policies which government officials in their zones would take towards FDJ events, presumably to facilitate a more coordinated response as a protection against the feared attempts to split the Western Allies. For example, in July 1950, ID EUCOM sent the USLO a letter with the following: ‘Request that this Division be expeditiously informed as to the British position in this matter and the policy which the British are likely to follow in regard to the planned FDJ rally’.<sup>91</sup>

Another outstanding multizonal political threat with potential security ramifications, that of rumours, was initially tackled on a quadripartite basis at the QIC in Berlin.<sup>92</sup> Rumours were rife in occupied Germany and the Allies feared that they were being spread by ‘Subversive influences’.<sup>93</sup> Some certainly were.<sup>94</sup> The similarity of rumours in all four zones, made more apparent by the sharing of lists of rumours at the QIC, led British intelligence to worry that some were ‘being deliberately launched

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<sup>87</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 733, 563465, Richard J. Conran, ID EUCOM, ‘The Communist Party in Germany’, Third European Intelligence Conference, Frankfurt, Secret (2-7/06/1948). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, Rainford, Chief Control Branch to CO 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC, ‘KPD Activities’, Secret (22/07/1949); Box 733, ‘British Telegram’, Secret (06,09/11/1948).

<sup>88</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 733, 563465, Orlando Epp, CIC Liaison Officer, ‘Memorandum for Chief, Operations Branch’ (10,13/09/1948); A.T. Netterblad, JR to Colonel Schow, ‘Possible Bizone-wide General Strike’, Restricted (28/10/1948); ‘British Telegram’, Secret (06,09/11/1948).

<sup>89</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Review No. 10, Confidential (June: 1946).

<sup>90</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 761, 563465, ID EUCOM to USLO, Herford, ‘FDJ Functionary Conference’, Confidential (07/03/1951). See also Box 757, W.C. Stanley for Chief ID to USLO, ‘FDJ delegates’ (06/03/1951); Box 750, Philp, Operations Branch to USLO, ‘FDJ Membership in British Zone’, Confidential (02/08/1950); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Marshall, Chief S&S Section Thru BLO, ‘Alleged Trial of FDJ Functionaries’, Secret (16/01/1952).

<sup>91</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 750, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to USLO, ID Herford, ‘Planned FDJ Rally in Western Germany’, Secret (14/07/1950).

<sup>92</sup> LHCMA, Lethbridge Papers, Deputy Military Governor and Chief of Staff, 18<sup>th</sup> Executive Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (01/12/1945).

<sup>93</sup> TNA, FO 1050/583, GSI, HQ, 21 Army Group, ‘CI Sitrep No. 10’, Secret (10/06/1945).

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.* See also Daly-Groves, *Hitler’s Death*, pp. 71-72.



and circulated'.<sup>95</sup> Indeed, rumours, such as the popular assumption that war between Britain and America against Russia was on the horizon, that Hitler had survived the war or that the British or Americans were deliberately starving Germans were considered 'dangerous' because 'it serves the interests of fascist sympathisers to spread such stories'.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, as 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group noted, such stories were sometimes evidence of 'a definite effort to split the Allies'.<sup>97</sup>

The QIC failed to agree a common approach to tackle such rumours (unsurprisingly, considering that the Soviets were spreading some of their own) and lists ceased to be exchanged on a quadripartite basis in September 1946.<sup>98</sup> Still, in June 1947, the JIC(G) complained that 'the large currency of rumours and the great credence given to them was making our job in Germany more difficult'.<sup>99</sup> This partially inspired continued Anglo-American cooperation on the issue.<sup>100</sup>

The IDs had another notable reason to help each other manage the public image of their occupying forces. As Montgomery perceptively noted in June 1945, 'There is a need to watch the Russian propaganda; communist cells give the power to turn the heat on when there are signs of dissension between the Allies'.<sup>101</sup> Public squabbles stirred up by rumours or propaganda emphasising the political differences between the British and American Zones could serve the interests of the IDs key ideological and security enemies, Communists and Nazis.

The two IDs worked closely together to help monitor the image of their occupying regimes and present a united front to their enemies, particularly the Soviets. Consequently, American censorship stations filtered out anti-British propaganda and British intelligence officers confiscated and shared political texts which were deemed 'inimical to the best interests of the United States'.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> TNA, FO 1050/583, GSI, HQ, 21 Army Group, 'CI Sitrep No. 12', Secret (11/07/1945).

<sup>96</sup> Ibid and No. 11 (05/07/1945); No. 13 (18/07/1945). See also King's College Archive Centre, Cambridge University, The Private Papers of Noel Gilroy Annan, 'The Political Situation in the British Zone' (1946); TNA, WO 208/4114, MI4, War Office, MITROPA, Periodical Intelligence Summary No. 18, Secret (23/03/1946) and No. 21 (07/05/1946); TNA FO 1005/1700, ID, Intelligence Review No. 12, Confidential (September: 1946); Daly-Groves, *Hitler's Death*, pp. 71-73.

<sup>97</sup> TNA, FO 1050/583, GSI, Main HQ 21 Army Group, 'CI Sitrep No. 6', Secret (29/05/1945).

<sup>98</sup> TNA, FO 1005/693, QIC, 11<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (15/02/1946) and 26<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Restricted (30/09/1946); Daly-Groves, *Hitler's Death*, pp. 34, 69, 89-90.

<sup>99</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 45<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (30/06/1947).

<sup>100</sup> Rumours were analysed in shared finished intelligence reports see TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Review No. 13, Confidential (October: 1946).

<sup>101</sup> TNA WO 106/4285, Field-Marshal, B.L. Montgomery, 'Conference: Corps District Comds', Top Secret (12/06/1945).

<sup>102</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1169, IG, I Conference, 26<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (03/07/1946). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, R.C. Lehmann, 'Analysis of Intercepts, 7746 CIS', Secret (17/11/1952); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 730, 563465,

The IDs also exchanged potentially 'useful propaganda' material which could be used against the Soviets.<sup>103</sup> Such political material was often gathered from interrogations of defectors or deserters who had fled from behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>104</sup> In fact, the primary purpose of many such interrogations was to obtain political information on conditions behind the Iron Curtain to help with estimates of Soviet intentions and for shared use as Anglo-American, anti-Soviet propaganda.<sup>105</sup> The enticing of individuals for this purpose was also closely coordinated between the two Divisions.<sup>106</sup> This again helps to demonstrate how, contrary to the impression given by Maddrell, interrogations were undertaken and reports exchanged between the IDs for purposes and topics far broader in scope than just scientific, technical and even military intelligence.<sup>107</sup>

Increasing focus on gathering intelligence concerning communism in Western Germany and political intelligence from behind the Iron Curtain combined with the reduction in staff numbers for both British and American intelligence organisations in anticipation of the occupations' end, left a gap in ID EUCOM's political coverage concerning organisations of the extreme right.<sup>108</sup> To some extent, British intelligence filled that gap. For example, in March 1949 ID EUCOM noted:

Information received from British sources indicates that the Strasser newspaper "Sieben Tage", published at Konstanz, is on sale throughout Trizonia. Its main feature is reportedly a double-center page serial by Strasser entitled, "Hitler und Ich". French authorities as well as ODI, OMGUS, and 7970th CIC have been asked to forward confirmatory information concerning this newspaper... The British report conversations have taken place between representatives of the DKP/DRP, the NDP of the US Zone, and Prinz Hubertus zu Loewenstein, in which the latter has expressed his readiness to work for the creation of a strong right wing in Germany and to use his influence with American and Catholic circles for this purpose. It was hoped

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George W. Busbey, S-2, Berlin to DDID, EUCOM, Frankfurt, 'Material Inimical to the Best Interests of the United States', Secret (17/05/1947).

<sup>103</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, R.E. Kilzer, Asst. Control Officer to DDID EUCOM, 'German Reaction to Soviet Police Action', Secret (22/07/1949). See also Box 736, R.K. Steinmetz, HQ ID EUCOM to Mr. Watt, BLO, 'REIMANN, Joseph', Confidential (31/10/1949).

<sup>104</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 84<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (29/11/1949). See also TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 108<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (17/04/1951); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Hardick, Chief, Collection Section to ACoS G-2, Seventh Army, 'Interrogation of Eva FISCHL', Secret (29/05/1951).

<sup>105</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/64, JIC(Germany), 74<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (19/04/1949). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Hardick, Chief, Collection Section to ACoS G-2, Seventh Army, 'Interrogation of Eva FISCHL', Secret (29/05/1951); Box 756, Wagstaff, Chief Foreign Liaison Section, ID EUCOM to Walter Stoessel, HICOG, Secret (09/03/1951); Box 738, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to DDID, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (29/09/1949).

<sup>106</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/65, JIC(Germany), 87<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (07/02/1950), 89<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes (14/03/1950) and 95<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes (17/07/1950).

<sup>107</sup> Maddrell, *Science*, pp. 77-78. See also TNA, FO 1005/1173, Political Division to Haydon, Top Secret and Personal (06/09/1949).

<sup>108</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Division', pp. 94-95. See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 734, 563465, Zundel, Chief, CIC, 'Report of CIC Activities - Europe', Secret (19/04/1948); Box 729, 563465, Lethbridge to DDI, 'Intelligence Responsibility in ...the Bremen Enclave' (25/09/1947).

eventually to create a so-called "Deutsche Aktion" - a broadly-based Nationalist and Conservative Movement on popular lines.<sup>109</sup>

This helps to further demonstrate the multizonal nature of the continuing far right threat and the links between ID EUCOM and OMGUS's political intelligence structures. But as the report went on to acknowledge: 'due to CIC's reduced mission with regard to right-wing activity, no effort has been made to maintain coverage of such groups as the "Deutsche Aktion"'.<sup>110</sup> British intelligence thus filled gaps in ID EUCOM's perspective.

This evidence again indicates the continued mutual dependence of both intelligence organisations, but in this instance American dependence on their British counterparts is very much apparent. Indeed, it was the British ID who first made ID EUCOM aware of Naumann and his increasingly successful attempts to infiltrate the FDP.<sup>111</sup> But once ID EUCOM had been made aware of a potential right-wing threat to the political aims of the occupation, they continued to collect and supply British intelligence with information on the subject, as they did throughout 1949 with matters concerning Strasser, his connections with Oswald Mosley, and the NDP.<sup>112</sup> Although communism and extreme left-wing movements were the clear focus of the IDs in the later years of occupation, they were always fighting a secret two front battle. The Cold War did not eliminate the threat from the extreme right as the general overlooking of its activities in the existing historiography dealing with intelligence and the occupation implies.

With a shared suspicion of even moderate German political activity, in pursuit of broadly identical political objectives and in a secret battle against identical political enemies, the British and American Intelligence Divisions helped each other to control the German people within their zones, inform their policymakers, influence and protect their political Allies, and hinder their political enemies.

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<sup>109</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 748, 563465, Operations Branch, 'Quarterly Historical Report For The Period 1 January 1949 - 31 March 1949', Secret.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Garrison, Executive, Operations Branch to USLO w/Br Wahnerheide and Hughes, Chief Collection Section to DAD, 'Dr Werner Naumann', Confidential (21/01/1952).

<sup>112</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 739, 563465, DDID to BLO, 'Possible Leads on Strasser Adherents in Britain', Confidential (22/08/1949). See also Box 740, Steinmetz, Control Officer, ID to BLO, 'Bund Fuer Deutschlands Erneuerung', Confidential (30/11/1949); Box 738, Steinmetz to BLO, 'Der Deutsche Block', Confidential (02/12/1949) and Weaver, Chief, R&A Branch to DDID, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (08/09/1949); NARA II, RG549, A1 2027, Box 129, C.C. Miller, Strategic Desk, HQ ID EUCOM, 'Memorandum For BLO', Confidential (24/03/1952) and Marshall, Chief S&S Section to BLO, 'Otto STRASSER', Confidential (09/04/1952).

In doing so, they established a largely harmonious secret system of rule which operated smoothly, despite overt policy differences and issues. But even this area of intelligence work was not entirely free of rivalry. Consequently, the following analysis of its extent, causes and consequences is essential in order to obtain a full understanding of the IDs political work in post-war Germany and the systems of rule they upheld.

### **III Rivalry**

Of the few incidents of political intelligence rivalry for which evidence exists, notably none had severe consequences. For example, at the eleventh meeting of the QIC in February 1946, the American intelligence representative sided with the Soviets against the British IG in seeking to define and implement sanctions to be imposed on individuals spreading rumours.<sup>113</sup> The Deputy Chief of the British IG thought sanctions for rumours were impractical and undesirable noting that ‘even with Gestapo, it had been impossible to prevent circulation of rumours; moreover, it had been said in England during the war that after victory a democratic regime would have to be imposed but freedom of speech would be allowed’.<sup>114</sup> This issue was resolved with each ally pursuing their own response towards rumours.<sup>115</sup> But it notably did not prevent British and American intelligence exchanging detailed reports containing analysis of rumours within their zones.<sup>116</sup> It is also important to note that British and American intelligence officers later conferred together before presenting united opinions at the QIC once Soviet unwillingness or inability to faithfully cooperate had become more apparent.<sup>117</sup>

Of course, the British and American military governments sometimes implemented rival policies in pursuit of the same goals and such differences were occasionally noted and analysed in intelligence reports. For example, in December 1946, the British ID Review noted:

...we must be very chary of handing over to them [Germans] unreservedly the responsibility for denazification, which is, for all its difficulties, the key to the future of Germany. In this

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<sup>113</sup> TNA, FO 1005/693, QIC, 11<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (15/02/1946).

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> TNA, FO 1005/693, QIC, 26<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Restricted (30/09/1946).

<sup>116</sup> TNA, FO 1050/66, IA&C, Intelligence Summary No. 18, Secret (24/07/1946) and No. 30 (30/08/1946). See also TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Review No. 13, Confidential (October: 1946); TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Summary No. 10, Top Secret (31/12/1948).

<sup>117</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1004, Berlin ID to HQ ID, Secret Cipher Message (14/01/1947).

respect recent experience in the American Zone, where perhaps there was a tendency to believe too readily German protestations of innocence and reform, furnish a salutary warning. There the Germans were entrusted with responsibility for denazification at an early stage, and it is now notorious that they took advantage of this to exercise leniency towards genuine Nazis and that the tribunals became...an instrument to whitewash the guilty. As a result...the occupying power has been compelled to intervene...<sup>118</sup>

But such differing analysis of military government policy did not interfere with the impressive and routine intelligence sharing which occurred between the two powers. This applied in the field of British and American foreign policy too. Indeed, politically motivated rivalry was extraordinarily rare within the Intelligence Divisions.

One such rare instance occurred in 1945 when two British intelligence teams (consisting of Indian staff) were refused entry to the American Zone because 'the Americans have taken the extraordinary attitude that India is a separate and independent country, and that the request for permission to enter the US Zone of Germany must be made through diplomatic channels'.<sup>119</sup> But this incident was apparently the product of a 'low-level squabble' rather than representative of the views held at headquarters who defined and upheld liaison procedures.<sup>120</sup>

Usually when it came to matters concerning the British Empire, a subject which Christopher Hitchens argues has always been particularly contentious in Anglo-American relations and one which Jay Jakub highlights for inspiring wartime intelligence rivalry, American intelligence demonstrated surprising understanding and even willingness to help Britain with its Commonwealth and imperial interests.<sup>121</sup> In the context of occupied Germany, the truth is much closer to the theory of David Reynolds who suggests that rivalry with America was not a prime cause of British imperial decline.<sup>122</sup> Indeed, ID EUCOM shared information with the British ID and BIO(G) concerning South Africa, Canada, Australia, Iran and Egypt.<sup>123</sup> They had good reason for doing so.

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<sup>118</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Intelligence Review No. 15, Confidential (December: 1946).

<sup>119</sup> TNA, FO 1012/422, E.G. Lewin, 'Admission of BIOS Teams To United States Zone' (22/12/1945).

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Hitchens, *Empire*, pp. 21, 30, 39, 238. See also Jakub, *Spies*, pp. XI, 45.

<sup>122</sup> David Reynolds, 'Rethinking Anglo-American Relations', *International Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (1988-1989), p. 93.

<sup>123</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ID EUCOM to BLO, 'Correspondence to The British Commonwealth', Confidential (28/07/1952) and 'Correspondence from Canada' (11/06/1952) and 'Correspondence from Australia' (20/08/1952). See also Box 132, Marshall to BLO, 'German Immigrant to AUSTRALIA', Secret (04/03/1952); Box 126, Marshall to BLO, 'Transmittal of Document', Secret (22/01/1952); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 731, 563465, A.F.

In 1946, an OMGUS intelligence report cited a United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) study of the global organisation of British intelligence.<sup>124</sup> Despite noting a few weaknesses, both documents agreed it was ‘an intelligence system which has been extremely effective’.<sup>125</sup> So effective was British intelligence that OMGUS recommended ‘The use of intelligence as an instrument of policy, devoted exclusively to the furtherance of national aims is to be admired and copied’.<sup>126</sup> In this analysis, the Empire played a major role in making British intelligence so effective and worthy of imitation:

They were used to dealing with foreigners, and to getting their way with them - foreigners in their own Empire, such as Canadians and Australians, and foreigners of other nationalities. They had a hundred years of experience behind them. We had almost literally none at all... Intelligence was always the Empire's ace in the hole. When British fortunes were at the lowest ebb, it was their intelligence organization which saved them.<sup>127</sup>

In American eyes, experience of colonial government had improved and refined British intelligence which is why their secret system of governance was functioning so well in occupied Germany and was worthy of imitation. As American intelligence were arguably dependent on British intelligence in post-war Germany to achieve their key objectives, they had no incentive to weaken the British Empire which informed and was partially upheld by the secret systems of rule implemented by British intelligence.<sup>128</sup> Following the logic of the USAFE report, to do so would have been to reduce the quality of information being gathered in Germany which would have a negative knock on effect for American agencies reliant on such information. As the CIC noted in 1948:

The Communist Party in Germany, with its many ramifications and its courier routes to and from Berlin, the Soviet Zone, Soviet satellites and the Soviet Union and the various foreign missions in the occupied area with their numerous agents... presents a problem concerning which we Americans have had little training or experience in solving, in that all the intrigues of the Old World are involved’.<sup>129</sup>

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Hennings, Asst. Executive, G-2 to AG Operations, ‘Iranian Arrestee in American Zone of Germany’ (26/01/1947); Box 762, Baldry, Chief S&S Section to BLO, ‘Egyptian Attempts to Hire German Ex-Officers’, Confidential (19/11/1951).

<sup>124</sup> NARA II, RG498, UD644, Box 4123, 5889899, ‘Reference USAFE Intelligence Summary No. 7’, Secret (15/05/1946).

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, The Cold War and the Twilight of Empire* (London: Harper Press, 2013), pp. XIX, XXVII-XXVIII, 1-4, 113, 115-116, 129, 139, 143-144, 334-335. See also Aldrich and Cormac, *Black Door*, p. 21. The British ID maintained ‘a direct link with MI5 and MI6 in order to exchange information’ on Communist espionage, see TNA, FO 936/344, HQ ID, ‘Directorate of Security’, Top Secret (12/08/1948).

<sup>129</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 734, 563465, E.A. Zundel, Chief, CIC, ‘Report of CIC Activities – Europe’, Secret (19/04/1948).

It made little sense to oppose the agents of the old world when their experience and assistance were required.

As with Security intelligence, both IDs were forbidden from sharing intelligence concerning some political issues. For example, in November 1947, E.A. Howard, the Deputy Chief of the British ID, noted that:

TOP SECRET information may be passed to US Authorities working with Intelligence Division, an exception being made in the case of information on Jewish activities, regarding which considerable discretion should be exercised in view of the US attitude of reluctance to part with information on this subject.<sup>130</sup>

Howard was correct in his concern that American intelligence were withholding information on this subject as ID EUCOM regulations noted in 1949: ‘Releasable information concerning Jewish activities is limited to that which pertains to the security of the British and US Zones’.<sup>131</sup> Such restrictions undoubtedly arose due to disagreements concerning British activities in Palestine. Indeed, as a British ID report discussing Operation Oasts (the turning back and repatriating of a ship full of Jewish Displaced Persons on way to Palestine) commented: ‘The better informed and more serious Americans would appear to be on the whole, sympathetic. The most resentment has come from people of more limited intelligence, whose judgments are governed by emotions or by misunderstanding of the factors involved’.<sup>132</sup>

Earlier that year, the JIC(Germany) discussed ‘a strongly worded signal’ from the Foreign Office ‘asking for firm representations to be made to the Americans to control Jewish anti-British demonstrations and anti-British propaganda disseminated by Jews in the American Zone’.<sup>133</sup> However, in a demonstration of the power of the ‘men on the spot’, or, secret rulers, in Germany, the JIC(Germany) concluded that ‘representations should NOT be made to the Americans’.<sup>134</sup> As with the

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<sup>130</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1004, E.A. Howard, Deputy Chief ID, ‘Exchange of Information with the US Authorities’, Top Secret (14/11/1947).

<sup>131</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 740, 563465, William E. Hall, Director of Intelligence to ID EUCOM Branch Chiefs and CO 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, ‘Guide to ID/EUCOM on Exchange of Intelligence Information with the British’, Secret (07/10/1949).

<sup>132</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, Intelligence Division, ‘Special Report On Operation Oasts’, Top Secret (12/11/1947). For further information on American intelligence activities concerning Jewish DPs and Palestine see Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, pp. 314-315.

<sup>133</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 45<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (30/06/1947).

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*

Truscott incident, they likely judged that escalating disagreements about such matters was not worth jeopardising the impressive flow of intelligence which passed between both IDs on a weekly basis.

ID EUCOM were aware that British intelligence were unwilling to risk losing American cooperation against the communist threat in Germany, even if this required not pressing issues of disagreement that were perceived to be of less importance. As noted by the UK based American Military Attaché in 1949:

Under a Socialist Government we expect the economic situation in Britain to improve gradually as a result of heroic efforts of self-denial but we do not expect Britain to become independent of dollar aid by 1952 unless she continues her austerity program. Britain will continue to maintain a respectable military posture and stand firm as our friends, recognizing that their best hope for continued existence as a free non-Communist country lies in Anglo-American solidarity.<sup>135</sup>

Haydon himself admitted as much in a letter to MacReady in 1948 noting that ‘It is the opinion of a great many that for the good of ourselves and of the world the British Empire and the United States of America must never permit themselves to seriously diverge’.<sup>136</sup> Economic weakness contributed to the British ID’s dependence on EUCOM’s help. Conversely, the British ID’s experience and efficiency in political intelligence, undoubtedly aided by its close cooperation with MI5 and MI6 and their experience in imperial matters, made ID EUCOM equally dependent on their British allies. Common enemies and common objectives combined with complementary strengths and weaknesses helped ensure the infrequency of Anglo-American political intelligence rivalry in occupied Germany on matters pertaining to the occupation (but not, as will be seen, on matters pertaining to the future, unoccupied Germany).

There is no evidence of the IDs engaging in disputes concerning overt policies differing between their zones, apart from comments noting the weakness and successes of various policies noted in finished intelligence reports which were exchanged.<sup>137</sup> But ID officers could be equally critical of their own military governments and often concurred on the areas of such criticism. For example, both

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<sup>135</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 749, 563465, Final Report Fourth European Attache Conference Frankfurt, ‘Great Britain’ by Major-General John W. Leonard, Secret (23-27 May 1949).

<sup>136</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, Haydon, HQ ID to General MacCready (sic), Frankfurt (24/10/1948).

<sup>137</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary, Top Secret, No. 5 (31/07/1948). See also TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Intelligence Review, No. 15, Confidential (December: 1946).



IDs acknowledged that the overt political programme of denazification, no matter what way it was carried out, was not enough to ensure a lasting democratisation of Germany.<sup>138</sup> Indeed, there existed a hitherto underacknowledged secret aspect of denazification which was undertaken by the IDs. For example, in August 1947 a teacher lost her job because a censorship intercept revealed she had sent a letter expressing 'pro-Nazi sentiments' to her friends.<sup>139</sup> Moreover, intelligence operations such as Selection Board caught those Nazis who were disgruntled about their exclusion from public life owing to denazification and so decided to pursue their ideological goals covertly.<sup>140</sup> During such anti-Nazi operations British and American intelligence officers sometimes felt it necessary to recruit 'ex' Nazis and even war criminals which shows that they could and sometimes did act independently of the overt policies and systems of military government in pursuit of their security missions with the overall goal of democratisation.<sup>141</sup>

The need to present a united front against common enemies also helped to minimise potential areas of dispute concerning issues such as differing conceptions of democracy. For example, the British IB Review in December 1945 noted that:

They [German officials] complain that Military Government policy imposes a foreign system without regard to the traditions of democracy which existed in Germany before Hitler; a complaint which suggests that, as usual, two sides mean different things by 'democracy'... The British attitude remains definite. Our policy is not specifically British, but is common to the whole democratic world... such democratic tradition as existed has patently been inadequate to prevent the rise of National-Socialism.<sup>142</sup>

As this evidence demonstrates, what exactly was meant by democracy was in fact contested in post-war Germany. But there is no evidence of the IDs engaging in political disputes concerning British or American forms of democracy. Perhaps this is because, as Reynolds suggests, in facing common anti-democratic enemies who themselves tended to view such differences as superficial, they paled.<sup>143</sup> For example, as the British IB Review stated in 1946, KPD speeches often suggested 'that the British and American representation of democracy is a farce and that the Germans will not stand for a dictatorship

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<sup>138</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Control', pp. 335-336.

<sup>139</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1715, Hamburg RIO, Monthly Security Intelligence Summary No. 21, Secret (31/08/1947).

<sup>140</sup> LHCMA, Lethbridge Papers, Extracts from *News Chronicle* and *Daily Herald* (24/02/1947). See also NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, 'Draft Statement for Press Conference to be held by Chief, Intelligence Division in the ZECO Area on 'D' Day', Top Secret (Undated: likely 1947).

<sup>141</sup> Selby, *Axmann*, pp. 94-100. See also Daly-Groves, 'Control', pp. 331-332,334; Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 325.

<sup>142</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 1, Secret (12/12/1945).

<sup>143</sup> Reynolds, 'Anglo-American', p. 104.

of the Western powers'.<sup>144</sup> Attempts of Communists and Nazis to split the western allies whilst simultaneously homogenising differences between them only increased Anglo-American solidarity.

When it came to the mission of democratisation, both IDs were also similarly critical of (and criticised by) their military governments. For example, in 1948, several British intelligence officers were court martialled for torturing security suspects at the Bad Nenndorf Detailed Interrogation Centre.<sup>145</sup> As the court noted:

Notwithstanding the important role of Intelligence Division in the British Zone, the overriding powers of this Division appeared to the Court to be contrary to our conceptions of the rights of the individual which we are endeavouring to instil into the minds of the Germans... Our efforts to teach democracy in the British Zone scarcely tally with an organisation in many respects resembling the Gestapo. Against this, Intelligence Division has been given a charter which requires it, among other things, to unearth and bring to light subversive movements in the British Zone. This is an important role - in fact, as the Occupation Forces run down, this role becomes even more important.<sup>146</sup>

The CIC were also subjected to unflattering comparisons with the Gestapo which they sought to counter.<sup>147</sup> Neither organisation sought to defend torture. But the notable tensions between pursuing a democratic mission using unlimited powers of surveillance and arrest clearly caused some tensions between military government and the IDs. Sometimes the IDs would understandably defend their methods against the concerns of policymakers, as the British did with regards to the use of bribery and blackmail for recruiting sources, and with Operation Magnet, too.<sup>148</sup>

This was a clash of two systems of rule, one overt and another secret with the latter in many ways securing and upholding the former but it was poorly understood by some of those it sought to protect. Both systems usually functioned smoothly as Allied courts helped to try agents captured by the IDs and political intelligence reports and censorship intercepts were utilised by policymakers. But any evaluation of the IDs' political roles in post-war Germany must take into account the issues and contradictions which were brought to light by the Nenndorf scandal, as the following analysis does.

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<sup>144</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 9, Secret (04/06/1946).

<sup>145</sup> Meehan, *Strange*, pp. 83-85.

<sup>146</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1744, 'Part VI: Responsibility of Persons Involved' and 'Part VII: Recommendation as to Criminal Proceedings', Top Secret (Undated: likely 1948).

<sup>147</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 728, 563465, Robert A. Cormier, Operations Officer, HQ 427<sup>th</sup> Constabulary CIC, 'Unfavorable Criticism of American Occupation', Confidential (20/06/1947).

<sup>148</sup> For example, see Long's comments on p. 194 in this thesis.

## IV Evaluation

The political activities of the British and American Intelligence Divisions in post-war Germany were so closely coordinated and to a large extent mutually dependent that historians can arguably speak of an Anglo-American secret system of rule. This system, apart from its more obvious censorship activities, was (owing to its secrecy) poorly understood by Germans at the time and remains so for historians today. It relied on a network of informers, double agents and intelligence officers in civilian clothes. Its methods were mass surveillance, control of movements, selective control of documents and the media, suppression of anti-democratic organisations and their propaganda, targeted infiltration, detailed reporting, analysis and when necessary, security arrests. Primarily through this system, the British and American occupying powers established incredibly effective control of their zones throughout the occupation.

The overt British and American systems of rule to a large extent relied on their secret counterparts and the IDs, in turn, relied upon each other. Indeed, the British ID filled a gap in ID EUCOM's communications coverage and vice versa. Such coverage was a primary source of information for policymakers in both zones and in London and Washington where the IDs political intelligence work contributed to the waging of the Cold War, too. The British ID also filled a gap in ID EUCOM's coverage of extreme right-wing organisations. Reports concerning such organisations helped keep policymakers informed of 'the way the wind is blowing' when considering their actions and also enabled the quick suppression of any movements which became potentially dangerous enough to threaten the occupation or future German democracy.<sup>149</sup>

The multizonal nature of the IDs primary political targets necessitated cooperation between the two Divisions and also helps to further demonstrate how focusing on Berlin can only provide a skewed perspective of intelligence work in occupied Germany. Attempts by Nazis and Communists to 'split the Allies' also necessitated coordinated responses to propaganda which ID cooperation enabled. The fact

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<sup>149</sup> NARA II, RG498, UD964, Box 4563, 5891629, HQ VI Corps, G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 7, Secret (03/11/1945).

that a bad security situation in one zone inspired for example, by strike action, could directly affect the security situation in a neighbouring zone also ensured cooperation between the two Divisions to the benefit of overt military government.

The effect of policy on security and the analysis of differing policies provided in finished intelligence reports may also have benefitted the overt systems of rule in both zones. As powers were transferred back into German hands and military government officials found it increasingly difficult to interfere in German life without criticism, the IDs covertly continued such interference with their detailed reports on the inner workings of German political parties and organisations through operations such as Magnet. But when necessary they did so with planned publicity to frustrate the plans of antidemocrats as was the case with Operation Terminus.

To a considerable extent, the secret system of rule helps to explain how and why the occupation succeeded in its main objectives despite the relative failure of some overt military government policies. Although, according to the ID, 'Denazification has been the cause of more muddled thinking than any other aspect of Allied policy in Germany', the IDs' joint efforts in monitoring and when necessary arresting unrepentant Nazis and Nazi movements arguably ensured that those 'ex' Nazis who preserved their positions in public life after the war did not pose a threat to German democracy.<sup>150</sup> Indeed, widespread censorship, informer networks, double agents and arrests helped to ensure that those Germans who sought to restore a form of totalitarian rule to Germany were unable to do so. 'Ex' Nazis who preserved their public positions were firmly, though secretly, controlled. This was a secret, and arguably more effective, form of denazification. Indeed, to some extent it can be argued that the real success of the occupation lied in the successes of the intelligence services, rather than those of military government.

CCG failings certainly frustrated several intelligence officers. For example, in August 1947, a British Royal Navy Intelligence Report entitled 'Democratic Review' asked 'How are we doing? After

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<sup>150</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, ID, Intelligence Review No. 11, Confidential (August: 1946). See also Daly-Groves, 'Control', pp. 331, 335-336, 342.

two years of peace, how are we getting on with the job of building the better world and the re-educated Germany we fought for?'.<sup>151</sup> Its criticisms were scathing:

After Hitler and Nazism fell...The Germans...cried for faith in something to pull them up again; something cloaked in a veneer of glamour and novelty. We have offered them the C.C.G...we have failed to put over our honest sincerity of purpose or make use of good propaganda to cover our mistakes. Where is the publicity service that should have explained to the Germans why food is short all over the world and shown them how the British live and the efforts we are really making?<sup>152</sup>

Complaints from intelligence officers about military government neglecting propaganda opportunities which consequently made the jobs of the intelligence services more difficult were common.<sup>153</sup> But the IDs protected their policymakers, despite their failings, even when they disagreed with them.

When military government blundered, as it sometimes did with regards to denazification and in its undertaking of controversial policies such as requisitioning, it was the IDs, with their analysis of public opinion and reactions which gave policymakers the upper hand and their powers of suppression and arrest which prevented blunders from escalating into disasters.<sup>154</sup> The post-war Nazis and Communists were defeated more by the Intelligence Divisions than the overt divisions of military government.

Even when intelligence officers publicly blundered, as they did at Bad Nenndorf, they never damaged the prestige or legitimacy of the occupation in the long term. Indeed, the fact that those responsible for Nenndorf were court martialled increased German trust in the sincerity of the British democratic mission.<sup>155</sup> The dedication of Anglo-American intelligence officers to their broad democratic missions helped to prevent any seriously damaging incidents of political rivalry. Common enemies, weaknesses which could be and were overcome by cooperation and broadly shared objectives made political intelligence work in post-war Germany an overall story of successful cooperation. It is

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<sup>151</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1541, ACoS (Intelligence), Royal Navy, Hamburg, 'Weekly Intelligence and Security Report', Secret (26/07/1947).

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/62, Capt F.R. Collins, RIO, 11 Rhine Westphalia Int Staff to HQ ID, 'Public Opinion Report' (07/03/1947).

<sup>154</sup> On requisitioning see TNA, FO 1005/1721, 8 AIO, Osnabruck, Monthly Summary, No. 11 Secret (26/06/1947).

<sup>155</sup> Meehan, *Strange*, p. 84.

also important to note that German participation in the secret system of rule (sometimes unknowingly) as informers, agents, and teachers, contributed to its successes.

The uncomfortable contradictions between attempting to create a free democratic society through secret authoritarian methods was reflected on by and troubled several intelligence officers. Such tensions were never, and arguably are still not, fully resolved, but ID officers certainly considered their methods to be necessary for the creation of a democratic Germany and for protection from the Soviet and Nazi threats they faced. Indeed, so pervasive was Nazism and similar ideas in German society, as confirmed by the comments collected from the IDs mass monitoring of German public opinion, that intelligence officers considered it to be too dangerous to give extreme antidemocratic parties ‘a free run’.<sup>156</sup> The lessons of Weimar had been learnt - the demos would not be allowed to vote to destroy democracy again, at least during the occupation.

But the IDs were so fearful of the potential of their political enemies that they sometimes worried about the future path Germany may take. In February 1946, the British Intelligence Review noted:

In an ideally simplified world this might be a straight question for Intelligence to answer. Given our policy, will the Germans react as intended and emerge as a companionable European state, not threatening their neighbours on any side? But no straight answer can be expected from us...so much is in practice contingent on the way in which our policy is worked out that no long-range calculations are safe.<sup>157</sup>

Similarly, in 1949, a State Department report, read by the DDID at ID EUCOM, noted ‘The potentialities of postwar political life in Germany are as yet only slightly developed, and the full play of extremist forces, both of right and left, cannot be gauged so long as the occupation holds them in check’.<sup>158</sup> To help ensure that democracy in Germany would endure beyond the occupation, the IDs engaged heavily in building crucial elements of the modern German state.

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<sup>156</sup> TNA, FO 371/103896, Kirkman, HQ BIO(G), Wahnerheide to D.P. Reilly, Joint Intelligence Committee, London, Top Secret & Personal (30/12/1952).

<sup>157</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 6, Secret (20/02/1946).

<sup>158</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 743, 563465, Robert F. Corrigan, Foreign Service Officer to DDID, ‘Transmittal of Current Foreign Relations’, Secret (05/08/1949).

## Chapter Six: Building A New Germany

‘We shall break this state in pieces and subdue it to our will’

– Adolf Hitler, Munich, 8<sup>th</sup> November 1933.<sup>1</sup>

‘My possessions, in so far as they are worth anything, belong to the Party, or if this no longer exists, to the State. If the State too is destroyed, there is no need for any further instructions on my part...’

– Adolf Hitler, Personal Will, 29<sup>th</sup> April 1945.<sup>2</sup>

In late May 1945, the German state effectively ceased to exist.<sup>3</sup> The country was occupied, split and administered by the militaries of foreign powers. Currency was less valuable than black market goods, especially cigarettes.<sup>4</sup> Political parties were initially disallowed by the occupiers.<sup>5</sup> The German intelligence services, the Hitler Youth and similar Nazi organisations which had structured, shaped and controlled society for years were disbanded.<sup>6</sup>

As previous chapters discussed, British and American intelligence played a key part in this destructive process. However, the occupiers also set themselves the task of building a democratic Germany as agreed at Potsdam. Still, the exact forms which a new democratic Germany would take were the subject of much disagreement between them. Central to this state building mission were the British and American Intelligence Divisions.

The existing historiography has, perhaps understandably, focused on the role of British and American intelligence in building the new German intelligence services. However, very little has been written about how this process, and that of building other German institutions, affected Anglo-American intelligence relations. Studies have instead tended to focus on bilateral relations, that of the British with

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in McDonough, *Hitler*, pp. 88-89.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in Trevor-Roper, *Last Days*, p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> Caldwell and Hanshew, *Germany*, p. 1. See also Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 269.

<sup>4</sup> W. Byford-Jones, *Berlin Twilight* (London: Hutchinson, 1947), pp. 34-36. See also Peter Johnston, *British Forces In Germany: The Lived Experience* (London: Profile Books, 2019), p. 23; Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 270; Caldwell and Hanshew, *Germany*, p. 39.

<sup>5</sup> Daniel E. Rogers, *Politics After Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. 14, 20, 23.

<sup>6</sup> Taylor, *Exorcising*, pp. 227-228. See also TNA, FO 1032/1463, CCG(BE), Intelligence Bulletin Number 3 (20/09/1945); TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review, No. 5, Secret (06/02/1946) and No. 7 (20/03/1946); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 728, 563465, ‘Present Status of the Nazi Threat’, Secret (28/02/1947).

the BfV and the Americans with the BND and even more so on the Nazi backgrounds of those employed within these organisations. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, the formation of new German state institutions was a key area of rivalry between the two IDs. Contrastingly, the increasing agency of Germans themselves complicated the USLO-BLO system of liaison but also demonstrated the strengths and endurance of it.

Through analysis of ID correspondence records which are new to the historiography, this chapter sheds further light on the IDs role in rebuilding Germany and the nature of the secret system of rule they upheld. It is argued that the IDs' state building activities resulted in some of their most significant and enduring legacies.

## **I Mission**

The task of building a new democratic German state was a clear objective of the IDs and their predecessors. In the first three years of occupation, both British and American intelligence were deeply involved in dismissing German authorities in organisations as diverse as transport, administration and policing, and in recruiting and training their replacements.<sup>7</sup> In October 1945, a section of the British IG was responsible for planning and instructing an organisation tasked with 'selecting Germans, sufficiently free from Nazi taint, for employment in Central and Local Governments and other official posts of various natures'.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, looking back in 1948, one member of 307<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment expressed pride in the latter's role in the denazification of Heidelberg University.<sup>9</sup>

Such tasks were usually framed within the context of the IDs' shared broad mission of constructing a democratic Germany. For example, in September 1945 a JIC(CCG) report which discussed the need to keep certain 'ex' Nazis in positions of authority in order to keep the country functioning worried that a failure to implement denazification would '...cast doubt on British intentions

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<sup>7</sup> TNA, FO 1050/583/1, P. Ramsbotham, 21 AGP, Weekly CI Sitrep No. 3, Secret (02/05/1945). See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, Baldry, Chief, S&S Section, ID to BLO, 'Hans SCHMIKOWSKI', Secret (16/08/1951); TNA FO 1050/119, Standing Committee on De-Nazification, CCG(BE), 'The Progress of De-Nazification', Secret (16/10/1945); TNA, FO 936/247, Deputy Military Governor to HQ BAOR, 'War Establishments Committee' (25/11/1945) and 'Intelligence Group, Area Security Unit, Hamburg' (02/12/1945); Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, pp. 219-220, 225, 232; Kehoe, *Occupation*, p. 79; QIC minutes discussed on pp. 197-198 in this thesis.

<sup>8</sup> TNA, FO 936/247, 'The Proposal' (26/10/1945).

<sup>9</sup> NARA II, RG319, UD1075, Box 28, 26861603, Wallace E. Snelson to Thomas M. Jonson (21/05/1948).



to create a democratic Germany and would react unfortunately on the morale of that section of the German population prepared to cooperate in this task'.<sup>10</sup> As usual, such concerns were resolved by the strategy of control, as the JIC(CCG) noted the following day: '...whether the Germans can take over the management of their own country under general Allied control. This will be the time when our reconstruction of German administrative arrangements bears its harvest, good or bad'.<sup>11</sup>

The CIC framed their anti-Nazi operations such as Nursery in the broader context of state building too, noting that the Nursery group targeted officials 'who were working with the Americans in building a free Germany'.<sup>12</sup> In 1946, British RIOs were monitoring what officials in political parties such as the SPD thought about democracy in an attempt to ensure that those who were to wield political power in Germany would do so in good faith.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, throughout the occupation, the intelligence services preserved a deep-seated distrust of Germans (with notable, selective exceptions) which was reflected in some pessimistic estimates of their democratising efforts. For example, in October, the US 3<sup>rd</sup> Army's Weekly Intelligence Report spoke of a:

...revived and strengthened anti-semitism and hatred of foreigners...the progress of democracy in Germany is indeed slow and disappointing, and there is a strong pre-disposition to an authoritarian regime which could develop easily if conditions permit.<sup>14</sup>

The same month, an American Military Government report discussing 'the General attitude of the Bavarians' summarised the latter as follows, we '...are only alien tools...the present regime in Germany is a caricature of real democracy...everybody is wondering whether or not he will have to starve tomorrow'.<sup>15</sup> It concluded that unless economic conditions improved 'there is not much hope for re-education'.<sup>16</sup>

As Chapter Five revealed, in January 1947, British RIOs were given permission to 'search for and use...opportunities for promoting democratic development and thought in German political life'.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1165, JIC(CCG), 'The Progress of De-Nazification', Secret (17/09/1945).

<sup>11</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1165, JIC(CCG), 'Economic and Administrative Conditions in the British Zone', Secret (18/09/1945).

<sup>12</sup> NARA II, RG319, UD1075, Box 28, 26861603, 'The Biggest Nazi Attempted Comeback, After VE Day' (Undated).

<sup>13</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1713, Hamburg RIO, Summary No. 1, Secret (19/04/1946).

<sup>14</sup> TNA, FO 1050/66, IA&C, Intelligence Summary No. 41, Secret (25/10/1946).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> TNA, FO 1013/320, 'Relationship to be maintained at Regional Headquarters between the Regional Intelligence Officer and the Administration and Local Government Branch and their staffs' (January: 1947).

In April, Hamburg RIO reported concern that the continued operation of Civilian Internment Camps in the British Zone contributed significantly to the fact that 'hope and belief in democracy' which was expressed at the end of war 'has in most cases probably begun to waver now'.<sup>18</sup> The following month, the British ID's secret war against Communism was framed as part of the broader goal of building a democratic Germany: 'The Communists are fundamentally hostile to Great Britain and to the ideals of Western democracy which we are trying to introduce into Germany'.<sup>19</sup> Their American CIC colleagues concurred, noting in February:

As our military control of the population decreased and as we increase the amount of self-government permitted to the Germans, it becomes easier for the die-hard Nationalist to attempt to form groups with aims detrimental to our objective of a new Germany modeled on democratic lines. It is therefore more and more important that a very careful observation be made for subversion in any form.<sup>20</sup>

Memorably, they also referred to 'giving the Germans some rather intensive, on-the-job training in Democracy'.<sup>21</sup>

In August, a British Royal Navy Intelligence report worried that the British had failed in their mission to teach the Germans democracy, not because of the work undertaken by intelligence officers, but due to CCG policy.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, as the occupying powers overt structures of direct control began to gradually rollback, the IDs found themselves in increasing conflict with Military Government authorities. As Long, the RIO for Dusseldorf noted in October 1947, 'In order to achieve that ideal state in Germany which will be administered strictly "without fear of favour", we are afraid that it will be necessary for Intelligence on occasions both to inspire fear and connive at favours'.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, the IDs gradually began to exert their influence more through the remaining overt structures of military governance, such as KROs, and, with the decreasing of their numbers, they began to employ more and

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<sup>18</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1715, Hamburg RIO, Monthly Security Intelligence Summary No. 16, Appendix A, Secret (01/04/1947).

<sup>19</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1258, HQ CCG(BE), Berlin, BAOR, 'Communist Activity in the British Zone', Top Secret (09/07/1947).

<sup>20</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 12, 'Draft Statement for Press Conference to be held by Chief, Intelligence Division in the ZECO Area on 'D' Day', Top Secret (Undated: likely 1947).

<sup>21</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 728, 563465, 'Present Status of the Nazi Threat', Secret (28/02/1947).

<sup>22</sup> TNA, FO 1032/1541, ACoS (Intelligence), Royal Navy, Hamburg, 'Weekly Intelligence and Security Report', Secret (26/07/1947).

<sup>23</sup> TNA, FO 1013/364, L.H. Long, RIO to RGO Dusseldorf, 'Relaxation of Restrictions', Secret (22/10/1947).

more Germans to undertake intelligence work.<sup>24</sup> Some of them would go on to join the new German intelligence services.

The creation of the German intelligence services in which the IDs played the most important part, largely derived from the necessity of Adenauer's government to have accurate information to function. As Kirkpatrick informed the Foreign Office in August 1950:

It would be hard to exaggerate the lack of organization of the Federal machine as indeed we have pointed out to you on a number of occasions. In no department, and for obvious reasons, is this more apparent than in the sphere of information both overt and covert. The German Consular Service is still in embryo and the Chancellor is literally reduced to reliance upon the very bad German Press or upon the hearsay of individuals for his information. He is particularly prone to listen to the stories of unqualified observers and there is therefore much to be said for his being provided with more reliable sources.<sup>25</sup>

Both IDs worked closely with German government officials and intelligence officers of the BfV and future BND in helping to improve the efficiency of those organisations, as will be seen. However, the IDs also oversaw, from around 1947, the increased employment and training of German border officials.<sup>26</sup> For example, in 1948, British Passport Officers worked closely with the ID in their shared mission to 'build up a German Immigration Service in accordance with Mil. Gov Ordinance 115 as an efficient operational Department of State, working through its own channels of command'.<sup>27</sup> The British ID attached specialised intelligence officers to oversee this process and to partake in the 'Supervision and training of Abteilung Passkontrolle who examine travellers' and seamen's documents...'.<sup>28</sup>

The following year, the British ID worked closely with the Public Safety Branch of military government to produce joint reports on the performance of German police officers which were sent to

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<sup>24</sup> TNA, FO 1013/364, Long, RIO to RGO Duesseldorf, 'Relaxation of Restrictions', Secret (01/10/1947) and 'Relaxation of Restrictions', 12A (Undated: Likely November 1947). See also TNA, FO 936/344, P.T. Lyver, Minute (19/12/1947); TNA, FO 1038/193, Hamburg Navy, 'Physical Security of Cyphers', Secret (08/07/1947); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 729, 563465, Lethbridge, Chief ID, Herford to DDI, HQ EUCOM, Frankfurt, 'Intelligence Responsibility in ...the Bremen Enclave' (25/09/1947).

<sup>25</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Kirkpatrick, High Commissioner, Wahnheide to W.I. Mallet, Foreign Office, Top Secret (23/08/1950).

<sup>26</sup> TNA, FO 936/344, Establishments Branch, Berlin, Secret (30/12/1947). See also NARA II, RG260, A1898, Box 156, 772407810, CIC Region IV, Bi-Weekly Report No. 67, Secret (29/03/1947).

<sup>27</sup> Passport Officers later became 'Immigration Inspectors' under ID control, see TNA FO 936/344, Establishments Branch, Berlin, Secret (25/02/1948).

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, Appendix D, 'Intelligence Division Operations and Planning Branch British Immigration Officers'.

regional government officials.<sup>29</sup> A typical report from June 1949 related such monitoring to the ID's wider democratic state building mission:

Their [the Police] behaviour...has shown that they could be relied upon to a great extent. They have, in these incidents, proved themselves able to use forbearance and tact, which are of some indication that they are absorbing democratic methods of police duty and are gradually moving towards the goal of being completely reliable irrespective of the political conditions attached thereto.<sup>30</sup>

At the same time ID EUCOM were also closely monitoring the German police, paying particular attention to the number of communist sympathisers within.<sup>31</sup> By 1950, the Commander of 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment Tormey stated that his organisation had 'spent a not inconsiderable effort in establishing working liaison with US and German governmental installations'.<sup>32</sup>

As the IDs were deeply involved in liaising with German authorities, it is perhaps unsurprising that they also played a key role in negotiating the 'contractual relations' which would eventually culminate in the formal end of occupation in 1955.

The IDs were involved too, although to a lesser extent, with the rebuilding of the German Armed Forces. Most notably, in September 1951, ID EUCOM sent the following message to the ACoS G-2 in Washington DC:

HICOG memorandum...reports the existence of a belief in high West German government and political circles that a serious difference of policy exists between the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Army over the question of West German rearmament...the belief that a split exists is regrettable and could cause unnecessary injury to U.S. policy through a possible German attempt to play one side against the other.<sup>33</sup>

This information reveals not only ID EUCOM involvement in German rearmament but also continued American spying on German government officials in the 1950s which is evidenced in other

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<sup>29</sup> TNA, FO 1013/371, Deputy Inspector General, Public Safety to Office of the Public Safety Adviser, 'Quarterly Intelligence Division/Public Safety Joint Report on the German Police', Top Secret (23/09/1949).

<sup>30</sup> TNA, FO 1013/371, Deputy Inspector General, Public Safety to Office of the Public Safety Adviser, 'Quarterly Intelligence Division/Public Safety Joint Report on the German Police', Top Secret (June: 1949).

<sup>31</sup> NARA II, RG549, A18, Box 361, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference (01/07/1949).

<sup>32</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, Tormey, Commanding, HQ 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Det EUCOM to Director, ID HQ EUCOM, 'Liaison with British Agency', Secret (29/12/1950).

<sup>33</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Baldry, Chief, S&S Section to ACoS, G-2, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., 'German Rearmament', Secret (24/09/1951).

correspondence files too.<sup>34</sup> This helps to show how despite increased intelligence liaison with Germans, they were never fully trusted. Furthermore, the desire, noted in this extract, to offset potential German attempts to play divide and rule provided one of several motivations for increased Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in their state building activities as the following analysis will discuss.

## II Cooperation

The IDs were at the heart of early quadripartite talks to construct crucial elements of the new German state. For example, at meetings of the QIC in Berlin, intelligence officers were responsible for selecting and vetting candidates to run a new central German transport agency and a German administration in general.<sup>35</sup> However, not much productive selecting took place. For example, in January 1946, the committee agreed to use an American style fragebogen and to exchange lists of candidates.<sup>36</sup> Yet in August, the QIC was reconsidering the issue because the Soviets wished to make ‘additions to the U.S. form’.<sup>37</sup> The Soviets did not bring these amendments to the following meeting.<sup>38</sup> By January 1948, only 9 candidates had been approved, 29 disapproved and 55 were still pending out of a total of only 95 under consideration since late 1945.<sup>39</sup>

This was a failure of quadripartite cooperation on matters of high-level occupation policy. It reflected political disagreements which were, by 1948, increasingly obvious globally. But it was not a failure of the intelligence services. Indeed, despite Soviet obstructionism, the Western intelligence officers seem to have developed a genuine fondness for their Soviet counterpart at the regular committee meetings, expressing sadness at his departure and hinting at a realisation of the difference between

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<sup>34</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Thomas Polgar, Special Assistant to Coordinator & Special Advisor, HICOG, Director, Office of Intelligence, HICOG, ‘German Military Contribution’, Secret (01/09/1951). See also NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Chief Analysis Branch to Chief Operations Branch, ‘Dr fnu VOLLHARD’, Secret (25/02/1952); Box 127, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to Chief Internal German Affairs, HICOG, Confidential (25/08/1952) and Marshall to Information Control Officer, HICOG, Confidential (28/08/1952); Box 134, Garrison, Executive, Opns Br to American Consulate General, US Army, Secret (24/09/1952).

<sup>35</sup> TNA, FO 1005/700, QIC, Counter Intelligence Working Party (CIWP), 1<sup>st</sup> Meeting Minutes, Restricted (21/01/1946) and 5<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes (11/04/1946).

<sup>36</sup> TNA, FO 1005/700, QIC, CIWP, 1<sup>st</sup> Meeting Minutes, Restricted (21/01/1946).

<sup>37</sup> TNA, FO 1005/693, QIC, 24<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Restricted (30/08/1946).

<sup>38</sup> TNA, FO 1005/693, QIC, 25<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Restricted (16/09/1946).

<sup>39</sup> TNA, FO 1005/704, ‘Report For The Intelligence Committee’, Restricted (January: 1948).

frustrating Soviet policy and the man chosen to represent it.<sup>40</sup> Humour too, surfaced at some meetings. As minutes from April 1946 record, some of the candidates selected were ‘answerable only to other higher Headquarters - that is, they are dead’.<sup>41</sup>

The key thing to note about these early QIC meetings is the important state-building functions which were assigned to British and American intelligence officers from the first year of occupation. This reflected the firm control which the IDs established over the remaining and newly forming elements of the German state which were essential for operating the secret system of rule. For example, the British ID liaised closely with and later operated the CCG’s Entries and Exits Branch.<sup>42</sup> By 1947, the CTB which, as discussed in Chapter Four, facilitated close cooperation between British and American intelligence officers on matters concerning German immigration and emigration, was in operation.<sup>43</sup> In 1950, the IDs were clearly considering their work on the borders in relation to a future, sovereign Germany. As the American ID noted in February regarding an Allied Permit Officers meeting to be held in Herford ‘It is believed that these restrictions on travel of communists are...necessary for a free and properly oriented political development of western Germany’.<sup>44</sup>

In the semi-sovereign Germany of 1950, the secret system of rule still controlled West Germany’s borders, but most Germans were not allowed to know this. As ID EUCOM commented on a security meeting held in Herford that summer ‘It is the belief of this Division that direct reference of cases to the Intelligence Division, EUCOM, by German Authorities is undesirable in principle’.<sup>45</sup> The overt system of rule acted as a cover for the IDs in their influencing and aiding of some new German authorities. Throughout 1951, the two IDs shared information concerning arrests and monitored conversations obtained by the German Border Police via the BLO-USLO chain.<sup>46</sup> A crucial moment

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<sup>40</sup> TNA, FO 1005/693, QIC, 20<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Restricted (28/06/1946).

<sup>41</sup> TNA, FO 1005/700, QIC, CIWP, 4<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Restricted (01/04/1946).

<sup>42</sup> TNA, FO 1071/17, Director, Entries & Exits Branch, IA&C Division, HQ, CCG(BE), Berlin to Political Division, HQ Berlin, ‘Return of German Nationals’ (21/10/1946) and C. Nethercott, Assistant Director, CTB to Entries and Exits Branch, ID HQ, Berlin, ‘Documentation of Germans outside Germany’ (27/03/1947).

<sup>43</sup> TNA, FO 1071/17, Paul B. Bachrach, US Civilian Chief, US Element, Combined Travel Board, OMGUS, to Nethercott (19/03/1947).

<sup>44</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 745, 563465, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch to PP&T, ‘Division Policy on Entry of Communists to US Zone, Ger’, Secret (24/02/1950).

<sup>45</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 745, 563465, Philp for DID to CTB, US Element, Herford, ‘Security Clearance Letter’, Secret (21/08/1950).

<sup>46</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, Baldry, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, ‘KRUBY, Franz Robert Karl’, Confidential (13/04/1951). See also Box 760, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, ID EUCOM to USLO, ‘VERNER, Fred, and

came in January 1952 when, following a British proposal in light of the anticipated ‘change-over from Allied to German control’, ID EUCOM agreed to ‘start giving the German authorities information on any individual we want on their Travel Control List’.<sup>47</sup> The CTB was designated the agency to do this in order to camouflage the intelligence source of the information now being shared with German authorities.<sup>48</sup> In this way, the IDs played a crucial role in building a key institution of West Germany but concealed their involvement in doing so.

Not all Germans were to be kept in ignorance of the IDs’ state building. The need for the Germans to establish their own, post occupation Travel Control List (TCL) was first to be discussed with the BfV.<sup>49</sup> Revealingly, this was to take place only after ‘the three Allied intelligence agencies have a meeting to coordinate their various problems and thereby present a unified viewpoint to the Germans’.<sup>50</sup> The IDs were conscious of attempts to play divide and rule, with good reason, as will be seen. It was the BfV too, particularly its leader, Dr Otto John, who attended conferences with German ministers and ID officers to discuss the mission, powers and liaison procedures for the *Bundesgrenzschutz* (BGS; Federal Border Guard).<sup>51</sup> Several similar meetings took place throughout 1952 as the IDs began to consider how British and American intelligence would deal with their German counterparts in a post-occupied Germany.

The predominant influence of the IDs at such meetings is illustrated by the fact that it was a British ID officer, A.W. Rhodes, who chaired a crucial conference concerning border problems held at Bonn in February 1952.<sup>52</sup> It was attended by several other British ID officers, including an RIO, two ID EUCOM officers, two BfV representatives (including John) and representatives of the West German Interior and Finance Ministries.<sup>53</sup> The meeting agreed the substance of a directive which was to be ‘sent

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VRACOVSKY, Vladislav’, Secret (30/07/1951); Box 757, Baldry to BLO, ‘Transmittal of Intelligence Document’, Confidential (01/10/1951); Box 758, Baldry to BLO, ‘British Nationals Visiting Czechoslovakia’, Confidential (22/10/1951).  
<sup>47</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to R.H. Cunningham, Office of Coordinator and Special Advisor, Secret (14/01/1952).

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 128, ‘Minutes of Conference Held at HQ EUCOM’, Confidential (05/02/1952).

<sup>52</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 128, Baldry, Chief, PP&T, Memorandum for Director of Intelligence, Report of Meeting, Confidential (21/02/1952).

<sup>53</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 124, A. Wright Rhodes, HQ ID Wahnerheide, Working Party Meeting Minutes, Confidential (10/03/1952).

to appropriate Land Ministries of the Interior by the Federal Ministry of the Interior with the request that they similarly instruct organisations under their control, e.g. police in border areas'.<sup>54</sup> The directive permitted German border authorities to conduct brief interrogations of certain border crossers before passing the information, or, in the case of illegal border crossers, the individuals themselves, on to 'the nearest Allied Intelligence Office'.<sup>55</sup> An exception was made as 'Russian and satellite deserters require special handling, however, and should be passed discreetly and at once to the nearest Allied military or Intelligence unit'.<sup>56</sup> Border officials were not permitted to interrogate espionage suspects neither but rather instructed to detain them immediately and wait for the arrival of a BfV or Allied intelligence representative.<sup>57</sup> The two IDs also committed to handing their routine intelligence reports concerning border information to Germans who cooperated with them on border cases and 'when possible in duplicate, to the Federal and appropriate Land Ministries of the Interior'.<sup>58</sup>

Henceforth, German Border Police records and arrests were discussed via the BLO-USLO chain in regard to several suspected espionage cases.<sup>59</sup> Such increasingly close tripartite liaison helps to illustrate the significant extent to which the IDs helped to train and build up important elements of the modern German state and in which the newly formed German authorities aided the IDs in pursuit of their missions.

The two IDs also worked together in helping to build and train the West German police forces. For example, in September 1949, ID EUCOM's Operations Branch noted that:

Minutes of a meeting describing the proposed German Federal Police were received from CAD and forwarded to R&A and CIC. The British and French have concurred in the draft of the organization plan as compatible with the occupation statute. The U.S. Delegation reversed its decision pending a further meeting of the tri-partite commission.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid, Appendix A.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, Annexure I and II.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, Annexure I.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, Annexure IV.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, Annexure V.

<sup>59</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section to BLO, 'Ruediger BRENNER', Secret (14/04/1952) and 'Marian BOHUSLAV', Secret (21/04/1952). See also Box 129, Marshall to BLO, 'MIERSWA, Egon', Confidential (22/10/1952).

<sup>60</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 738, 563465, Johnson, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to DDID, 'Weekly Report of Projects and Problems', Secret (29/09/1949).



Prior to this point, information derived from German police had been shared between the two IDs but the building of the police in both the British and American Zones had been undertaken largely independently.<sup>61</sup> With the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany and increased discussion of an unoccupied Germany, steps were taken to increase coordination between the police forces in both zones. Consequently, in October 1949, ID EUCOM requested that the USLO send information concerning ‘the present progress of police training in the British Zone of Germany’ and a ‘Table of organization and functions of German police in British Zone’.<sup>62</sup>

The IDs were particularly concerned to avoid having communists in the German police. In the 1940s they shared intelligence reports concerning the extent of communist influence in the police which they frequently monitored.<sup>63</sup> A particularly worrying incident which ID EUCOM discussed with the USLO in 1951 involved the leaking of impending police action to the KPD.<sup>64</sup> The source of the leak was not found but such incidents increased mistrust between the IDs and German authorities.<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless, throughout 1951, information obtained from German policemen was shared via the USLO-BLO chain.<sup>66</sup>

The IDs’ crucial cooperation in shaping West German border and police institutions accompanied even more significant joint work in building the new German intelligence services. At a JIC(G) meeting in October 1948, British intelligence were already anticipating that ‘the equivalent German MI5 and MI6 organisations should be set up under different German Ministries...subject to Tri-Partite agreement’.<sup>67</sup> They also, revealingly, considered ‘...that it might suffice if the three

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<sup>61</sup> TNA, WO 208/4114, MI4, ‘MITROPA’, Secret Summaries No. 13 (12/01/1946) and No. 24 (18/06/1946). See also TNA, FO 1032/529, IG, ‘Summary of Evidence on the American Zone’, Top Secret (22/05/1946); NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 734, 563465, Moore, USLO, ID Herford to DDI EUCOM, ‘Forwarding of Reports’, Secret (19/04/1948); Box 740, Kilzer for DDID to POLAD, ‘German Reaction to Soviet Police Action’, Secret (22/07/1949).

<sup>62</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 741, 563465, W.R. Rainford, Chief Control Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, Office of the High Commission, ‘German Police in British Zone of Germany’, Secret (16/11/1949).

<sup>63</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1704, ID, Intelligence Summary, Top Secret, No. 5 (31/07/1948) and No. 7 (30/09/1948).

<sup>64</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, Cantrell, Chief, GE Section to USLO Herford, ‘KEIL, Ludwig’, Secret (05/01/1951).

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Cantrell to BLO, ‘Czech Recruitment of Agents by Mail’, Confidential (15/02/1951) and Hardick, Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, ‘TAEGER, Alfred’, Secret (09/07/1951). See also Box 753, Chief Ops Br to USLO, ‘SCHMIDT, Kurt’, Confidential (26/04/1951); Box 759, Hardick to DAD, HQ EUCOM, ‘Ernst HUWE’, Secret (11/07/1951); Box 760, C/Ops to USLO HQ ID, ‘CAFEROGLU, Osmann’, Confidential (06/08/1951).

<sup>67</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 66<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (26/10/1948).

occupying powers had Liaison Officers... attached to the MI5 organisation'.<sup>68</sup> That 'MI5 organisation' was to become the BfV. This meeting is also notable for the clear assertion of the ID's importance over MI6 as a member of the latter organisation admitted 'the paper under discussion had been written to represent MI6 interests, which were admittedly a small part of the problem, and that if it was decided to submit a paper on this subject to the Military Governor he suggested that the report should be prepared by Intelligence Division and not by MI6'.<sup>69</sup> It was to be the ID, more so than MI5 or MI6, which was to shape the new German intelligence services.

Britain seized the initiative with regards to this task and obtained a clear head start in the creation of internal German intelligence organisations. On 12 May 1949, 'the Chiefs of Staff agreed to the proposal to establish a Federal Security Service'.<sup>70</sup> Discussions surrounding this decision in July 1949 note that the British had already 'gone ahead with the creation of special Branches of the local police in our zone'.<sup>71</sup> They also note that from the outset, there was a concern not to overlap with similar American projects: 'One of the points raised by the Minister of Defence in connection with the Security Service was that of the "Rusty" organisation\*, an espionage service run by the Americans from Washington... We have taken this matter up with the State Department, who are making an investigation into the whole question and have undertaken to get in touch with us when they have more information'.<sup>72</sup>

By August 1950, several bipartite Anglo-American discussions had taken place concerning a potential official role for Rusty in the Federal Government.<sup>73</sup> Although demonstrating a willingness to cooperate on this issue, such discussions revealed, as will be seen, a key area of rivalry between the two IDs. This was also reflected in discussions occurring around the same time concerning who exactly should work in the BfV.<sup>74</sup> Nevertheless, it is notable that the IDs continued to hold meetings throughout

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> FO 1005/1731, Kirkpatrick to Mr. Seal, Top Secret (14/07/1949). Copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

\* Operation Rusty was the original American (CIC) codename for the Gehlen Organisation. See Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, p. 322.

<sup>72</sup> FO 1005/1731, Kirkpatrick to Mr. Seal, Top Secret (14/07/1949). Copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>73</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Haydon, Chief, ID, Herford to Dugold Malcolm, The Chancery, Office of the UK High Commissioner, Wahnerheide, Top Secret, Personal & Guard (08/08/1950).

<sup>74</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Kirkpatrick, High Commissioner, Wahnerheide to W.I. Mallet, Foreign Office, Top Secret (23/08/1950).

1950 concerning BfV personnel, demonstrating attempts to cooperate, even if those attempts were sometimes frustrating and not always successful.<sup>75</sup>

Outside of such top-level official meetings, cooperation on the subject of the BfV was also occurring via the USLO-BLO chain. As ID EUCOM noted in January 1951, 'There are subjects of Intelligence interest, such as the Verfassungsschutz, that are of interest to both BAOR and Herford which we now handle through Major Miller, USLO'.<sup>76</sup> By early March, both IDs were undertaking independent liaison with the BfV with differing levels of restrictions and extent, the British still firmly in the lead.<sup>77</sup> At the end of the month Kirkman noted '...that it was agreed by JIC London that it would be of value if the Americans were invited to co-operate in improving German security and it was recommended that the Foreign Office be invited to take up this matter after consultation with the High Commissioner for Germany'.<sup>78</sup>

Increasing thought was now also being given to future intelligence relations in a West Germany ungoverned by the Allied High Commission. The contractual agreements which, once ratified in 1955, would determine the extent of West Germany's new freedom from Allied rule framed the discussion of many high-level intelligence meetings.<sup>79</sup> Such a meeting of British High Commission officials and ID officers held in March 1951 acknowledged that:

though there was a need for a tripartite policy with regard to the establishment of German internal agencies, this could not be achieved with regard to external agencies...machinery for joint contact with the Federal Government could only be achieved on a very broad basis...it was undesirable to enter into tripartite discussions on intelligence arrangements in general, except that...it would be as well to establish some common standards in order to prevent divergences becoming too wide.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid. See also NARA II, RG549, A148, 752, 563465, HICOG, OI, OPNS, 'Projects Initiated', Secret (17/10/1950).

<sup>76</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 756, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, 'Liaison between Int Div EUCOM, G(INT) BAOR & Int Div CCG', Secret (12/01/1951).

<sup>77</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch to Director of Intelligence, US High Commissioner, Germany, Two Letters, Confidential (13/03/1951). See also Daly-Groves, 'Division', p. 105.

<sup>78</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 107<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (29/03/1951).

<sup>79</sup> FO 1005/1731, Ministry of Defence, Minutes of Meeting, Top Secret (13/04/1951), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017. See also NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 761, 563465, Mark McClure, Director of Intelligence, HQ ID EUCOM to J.J. Bins, Office of the Army Attache, US Embassy, London, 'German Contractual Relations', Secret (11/10/1951); TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 117<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (23/10/1951) and 118<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes (15/11/1951); NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, McClure to Bolling, 'Drafting of the Contractual Agreement', Secret (22/01/1952) and Allied Directors of Intelligence, 24<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (18/02/1952); Box 132, HQ ID EUCOM, 'SOP in Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention on Relations between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers', Secret (28/07/1952).

<sup>80</sup> TNA, FO 1060/620, 'Notes of a Meeting held...in the office of the Deputy High Commissioner to consider the intelligence arrangements under a contractual regime', Secret (30/03/1951).

Consequently, it was only with hesitancy that the meeting agreed that ‘it would be desirable to try to co-operate in the establishment of an external service’.<sup>81</sup>

As the above extract also reveals, the IDs were, to a loose extent, coordinating their increasing liaison with the BfV on a tripartite level. This was the case in May 1951 when Kirkman argued that ‘the best way to tackle’ a serious problem involving ‘Russian Zone press and radio correspondents’ would be to ‘discuss this matter with the BfV and, should it prove necessary, on a Tri-Partite level’.<sup>82</sup> As this example reveals, the IDs increasingly asserted their will through German organisations. But as the power of German institutions increased, old concerns from the early occupation period resurfaced prominently and inspired closer Anglo-American cooperation. As a JIC(G) paper argued in June 1951:

... there must be a tripartite policy with regard to the German internal agencies... Some common standards must be established in order to prevent divergences becoming too wide and to prevent the Germans playing one power off against another... and that there is no allied competition within the boundaries.<sup>83</sup>

In July, the JIC(G) ‘agreed that the time was now right for discussions to take place with the American authorities’ about the ‘Development of a German Federal External Intelligence Service’.<sup>84</sup> Again, the ID demonstrated their predominant influence over MI6 as the latter were prevented from discussing the subject in Washington in favour of discussions between Kirkman and CIA representative, Truscott, in Germany.<sup>85</sup> In August, the JIC(G) discussed an ID report on what they called ‘The Embryo Federal Abwehr’.<sup>86</sup> They also discussed an ID report concerning the progress of ‘the Federal Security Services (BfV and LfVs) during the last twelve months’ and noted a forthcoming visit of Truscott to ID HQ to ‘have discussions on certain high-level policy matters’ which probably involved the increased building of new German institutions.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 109<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (08/05/1951).

<sup>83</sup> TNA, FO 1035/77, JIC(Germany), ‘Intelligence and the Future German Government’, Top Secret (28/06/1951).

<sup>84</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 112<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (10/07/1951).

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 114<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (21/08/1951).

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

It was around this time when BfV reports and information obtained from the BfV began to be shared via the USLO-BLO chain.<sup>88</sup> All of such reports contained information on suspected Soviet agents, presumably uncovered and monitored by the BfV. The latter were not yet fully trusted to monitor right wing extremists, with good reason.<sup>89</sup> This was apparent in an ID EUCOM document dated January 1952 which outlined liaison procedures with the BfV.<sup>90</sup> This liaison was to centre around liaison officers in Bonn who helped the ID to filter information to protect sources and to omit certain information (such as derogatory information concerning German officials) before it was passed to the BfV.<sup>91</sup> Notably, 'Information pertaining to more than one Occupation Zone will be coordinated tripartitely before transmitted to the BfV. Such coordination will be accomplished by the Bonn Liaison Office unless otherwise directed by this Division'.<sup>92</sup>

ID USAREUR's liaison officer in Bonn was in fact Major Archer L. Lerch (the USLO) who was now in charge of liaising with the BIO(G) at Wahnerheide and with other American intelligence organisations at the US Embassy in Mehlem.<sup>93</sup> This was an extension of the USLO-BLO system of liaison to involve new German actors. Indeed, information from the BfV was smoothly integrated into the USLO-BLO chain throughout 1952, enabling the same advantages of corroboration and a wider perspective which derived from the IDs' use of sources from other external intelligence agencies such as the CIA.<sup>94</sup> In 1952, the BfV had even begun the high-level Operation Knuth which grew to involve ID EUCOM, the CIC, the FBI, G-2 and British intelligence, and culminated in a high treason trial.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 761, 563465, Garrison, Executive, Opns Br. to USLO, Confidential (29/08/1951). See also Box 759, Baldry, Chief S&S Section to Director of Intelligence HICOG, Confidential (13/09/1951) and 'Secret' (01/11/1951).

<sup>89</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/65, JIC(Germany), 93<sup>rd</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (06/06/1950). See also TNA, FO 1035/77, JIC(Germany), 'The Future of Intelligence Division in Germany', Top Secret (08/02/1951).

<sup>90</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Commanding Officer, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Release of Information to the BfV and LfV', Secret (21/01/1952).

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, George A. Chester, DDI, HQ ID USAREUR to US Liaison Officer, Bonn, Germany, 'Letter of Instructions', Secret (16/12/1952). See also L.H. Gallogly, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID USAREUR to Commanding Officer, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'BfV/LfV Liaison', Secret (17/12/1952).

<sup>94</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, C/Ops Br to USLO, 'Heinz Alfred STERN', Confidential (15/07/1952). See also Box 135, Marshall, Chief S&S Section to BLO, 'Walter LAUTERBACH', Secret (21/07/1952); Box 134, Marshall to USLO, Wahnerheide, 'SCHUSTER, Annemarie', Secret (17/10/1952); Box 132, Marshall to BLO, 'VVN Sponsored Conference', Secret (24/11/1952).

<sup>95</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 133, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to ACoS G-2, Department of the Army, Washington, 'Operation KNUTH', Secret (23/06/1952). See also Boghardt, 'Gestapo', p. 65.

On 18 February 1952, the 24<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Allied Directors of Intelligence Committee took place in Bonn.<sup>96</sup> Chaired by Truscott and attended by Kirkman, the meeting expressed disquiet at the fact that a recent German raid on KPD offices appeared to have leaked to KPD members before the raid took place.<sup>97</sup> It also demonstrated the central role which the IDs played in shaping the new German intelligence services and influencing the German ministers that would control them, but, as will be seen, with increasing limitations.<sup>98</sup> Kirkman chaired a meeting of the Allied Directors in November which resulted in discussions with Adenauer and John on the need to improve the security of the BfV.<sup>99</sup>

Nevertheless, by late 1952, relations between the IDs and the BfV had advanced to the extent that espionage cases involving confusion agents were being turned over to the BfV for prosecution following Allied investigation and agreement obtained via the BLO or USLO.<sup>100</sup> This suited Anglo-American intelligence as it enabled them to enhance their secrecy and to act overtly only through German organisations. In December, the BIO(G) favourably considered passing thousands of old ID records (which were sadly destroyed by the Foreign Office) to the BfV as soon as ratification of the contractual agreements had taken place.<sup>101</sup>

The delay in ratifying those agreements, deriving primarily from French concerns, was reflected at intelligence meetings.<sup>102</sup> For example, in January 1953, the French representative of the Allied Directors of Intelligence prevented a paper on improving the security of the German intelligence services being passed to Adenauer.<sup>103</sup> They presumably did not want the Germans to be too efficient in this area. Contrastingly, the JIC(G) was complaining that restrictions on passing intelligence material to the Germans was proving embarrassing for men on the spot.<sup>104</sup> This reflected similar American

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<sup>96</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Allied Directors of Intelligence, 24<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (18/02/1952).

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/67, JIC(Germany), 135<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (11/11/1952).

<sup>100</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, ABr to BLO, 'Annuschke Marie POCKTANOVITSCH', Secret (26/09/1952) and Marshall to CO 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'POCKTANOVITSCH', Secret (09/10/1952).

<sup>101</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/67, JIC(Germany), 136<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (02/12/1952). See also Daly-Groves, 'Division', pp. 87-88.

<sup>102</sup> Lee, *Germany*, pp. 61-63.

<sup>103</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/67, JIC(Germany), 137<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (05/01/1953).

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

desires to pass raw intelligence to the BGS.<sup>105</sup> Such issues surrounded ID USAREUR and the BIO(G)'s deep involvement in the negotiations surrounding the contractual agreements.

Intelligence cooperation in this area seems to have begun in late 1951 when Kirkman expressed he was 'anxious to do all he could to help the US Intelligence authorities' with the contractual agreements.<sup>106</sup> That such help was needed is evident from the negative attitude of the High Commission authorities towards the proposals suggested by Anglo-American intelligence. In brief, the CIA, the IDs and French intelligence were seeking to extend, through secret agreement, many of the powers they enjoyed during the occupation into the post-occupation period, including primary jurisdiction of espionage suspects if they could be linked to the security of Allied forces remaining in Germany.<sup>107</sup> Eventually, in June 1952, ID EUCOM reported that:

The Contractual Agreements signed 26 May by the Governments of the United States, France, United Kingdom, and Germany come into force upon ratification by all of the four powers. At the same time two classified memoranda implementing certain portions of the agreements also come into effect. These memoranda were negotiated by intelligence personnel of the four governments and were agreed to by an exchange of letters between the Allied Directors of Intelligence and the Federal Chancellor's office. For political reasons even the existence of the memoranda is classified secret. They will not be discussed with any German without authorization of this division.<sup>108</sup>

These secret agreements constitute one of the IDs most notable legacies, but they were only arrived at following heated discussions which, as the following analysis will reveal, unveiled a considerable amount of rivalry between the two IDs, the secret and overt systems of rule and the democratic state building missions of both.

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<sup>105</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 135, Wagstaff for DID to Opns Br, 'Release of Positive Intelligence to German Federal Republic', Secret (10/11/1952).

<sup>106</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 118<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (15/11/1951).

<sup>107</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, McCloy, HICOG, Bonn to State Department, Secret (12/01/1952).

<sup>108</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Baldry, Chief PP&T, HQ ID EUCOM, 'Effect of Contractual Agreements on EUCOM Intelligence Operations', Secret (05/06/1952).

### III Rivalry

In 1954, British newspapers ran stories about a now controversial incident which had occurred in 1945.<sup>109</sup> Then, British officials had dismissed Konrad Adenauer from his American appointed post as Mayor of Cologne.<sup>110</sup> One paper described this decision (with the obvious benefit of hindsight) as an ‘unparalleled example of Occupational buffoonery’.<sup>111</sup> The latter accusation stung the men responsible for Adenauer’s sacking who engaged in private correspondence in light of the news stories.<sup>112</sup> Apart from Adenauer’s apparently inefficient performance as Mayor, the men in charge, including General Templer, agreed that Adenauer was sacked because he was ‘trying to play politics with the Americans behind our backs’.<sup>113</sup>

This incident reveals two important facts. Firstly, it shows an early concern, later much more prominent, that Germans could exploit differences between the British and Americans to their own advantage. Secondly, it demonstrates that despite pursuing the common objective of building a democratic Germany, from the outset of the occupation, British and American officials could not agree on what exact forms such a democratic Germany would take, what institutions it would comprise of and, most importantly, what individuals would work within them. Here lies one of the most prominent causes of Anglo-American intelligence rivalry in occupied Germany.

From the first year of occupation, both British and American intelligence officials (including future prominent ID officers) had recruited or worked with Germans, some with tainted Nazi pasts, to undertake a variety of intelligence tasks.<sup>114</sup> The recruitment of ‘ex’ Nazis and in some cases war criminals was done primarily in pursuit of the IDs main security missions and as part of a wider strategy of control designed to ensure that individuals capable of undermining the IDs democratic mission were

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<sup>109</sup> Private Papers of Sir Gerald Templer, Letter from Brigadier J. A. Barraclough to Templer, High Commissioner, Malaya (17/05/1954). Documents in possession of Colonel Miles Templer, kindly shown to author.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid. On CIC involvement in Adenauer’s appointment see Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, pp. 219-220.

<sup>111</sup> Templer Papers, Letter from Brigadier J. A. Barraclough to Templer, High Commissioner, Malaya (17/05/1954).

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid. See also Letter from Seffron Wellwer to Templer (01/04/1954); Templer to Barraclough (21/05/1954); Note dated (14/09/1959).

<sup>114</sup> Selby, *Axmann*, pp. 94-100. See also Daly-Groves, ‘Control’, pp. 331-332, 334.



unable to do so.<sup>115</sup> However, from the outset, such recruitment revealed divisions between and within both British and American intelligence organisations as they could not always agree on which ‘ex’ Nazis could or should be controlled.<sup>116</sup> Such disputes naturally filtered into those surrounding the creation of new German institutions. For example, in 1946, one MI5 officer expressed ‘belief that Von Gehlen's experience was really very limited and one-sided’.<sup>117</sup> Contrastingly, many American intelligence officers thought highly of Reinhard Gehlen, and of Operation Rusty which he headed.<sup>118</sup>

Representatives of the latter organisation appear to have developed their own animosity towards British intelligence as during a liaison meeting with the CIC in Austria:

Colonel Loebel was quite definite in stating that he would not inform the British in the matter of his operations in their Zone for he feared possible lack of security (either alleged or actual) would endanger members of his organization and their activities. Colonel Loebel further stated that he had already penetrated the Austrian Communist Party in the British Zone. However, he requested that this information be withheld from the British Intelligence Service.<sup>119</sup>

Remarkably, the CIC and later the CIA, who controlled Rusty, acceded to some of the latter’s demands for secrecy from the British.<sup>120</sup> In December 1947, it was agreed that British intelligence would be given assurances that they would be informed of Rusty operations in their zone and of the results but that ‘The British will not be informed of the details of that part of the organization which is active in the British Zone for security reasons’.<sup>121</sup>

When, in October 1948, the British ID began to seriously consider the form which the new German intelligence services would take, it is notable that they envisioned two organisations resembling

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<sup>115</sup> Daly-Groves, ‘Control’, pp. 331, 335-337, 342.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, pp. 339-340. See also Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, pp. 324-327; TNA, DEFE 41/69, STIB, HQ ID, ‘Wastage of Intelligence from Returned PsW to the U.S. Zone of Germany’, Top Secret (09/02/1949). The British IG and ID were generally more restrictive than their American colleagues when it came to employing Germans in intelligence work, see TNA, FO 1047/7, ‘Reorganisation of Censorship in the British Zone’, Secret (04/10/1946); TNA, FO 1032/1003, J.A. Kemp for Chief ID to Secretariat, Zonal Executive Offices, ‘German Drivers for Int Div’ (15/11/1946); TNA, FO 1038/193, Staff Minute Sheet (13/03/1947); TNA, FO 1005/1744, WHA Bishop to Deputy Military Governor, Top Secret (17/06/1947); FO 1005/1731, ‘Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division’, Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author’s possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

<sup>117</sup> TNA, KV 2/2862, JMA Gwyer, ‘GEHLEN’ (20/06/1946).

<sup>118</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Haydon, Chief, ID, Herford to Dugold Malcolm, The Chancery, Office of the UK High Commissioner, Wahnheide, Annexure, Top Secret, Personal & Guard (08/08/1950). See also Afflerbach in Haslam and Urbach (eds), *Secret Intelligence*, p. 273.

<sup>119</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 15, 6829084, Paul Lyons, Special Agent CIC, ‘Result of Liaison Visit’ (28/12/1947).

<sup>120</sup> NARA II, RG 319, ZZ6, Box 15, 6829084, HQ 430<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, Austria, ‘Project RUSTY’, Top Secret (29/12/1947) and 7821 Comp Group to ODI, ‘RUSTY’, Top Secret (31/12/1947).

<sup>121</sup> NARA II, RG319, ZZ6, Box 15, 6829084, Eric Haldman, Informal Routing Slip (31/12/1947).

both MI5 and MI6.<sup>122</sup> More revealingly, the JIC(G) ordered that the 'Intelligence Division should prepare a paper covering short-term CCG and Tri-partite angles and also the purely British long-term MI6 interests'.<sup>123</sup> British interests in a future unoccupied Germany were, from the outset, seen to diverge from tripartite interests. In pursuing these interests, which equated to influence in the future German intelligence services, the ID engaged in clear competition with their American allies.

This was complicated by increasing German agency as local German authorities in particular pursued what they perceived to be their interests. For example, in 1949 the JIC(G) complained that 'due to the Continental reluctance to divorce the police system from political considerations', the Minister of Interior in North Rhine Westphalia was hesitating to place his services under the new Security and Special Branch structures the British were establishing.<sup>124</sup> The British sense of urgency with regards to this matter is particularly revealing:

The whole question is one of considerable urgency and, failing an early expression of British policy which can be made known to the Germans, there is a distinct danger that we shall not only lose the *considerable lead which we have gained over our Allies in this field* during the past year, but that we may find ourselves faced with German developments along lines which we would not readily have accepted but which would be difficult for us to reverse, particularly if they fell within the framework of an organisation which would not be objectionable to American and French minds [Emphasis Added].<sup>125</sup>

The British ID were clearly trying to mould the security apparatus of the new Germany to their own interests in opposition to that desired by the other western occupiers. In March 1950, Haydon obtained assurance from the American Director of Intelligence that the Americans would discard their 'proposal to create an officially recognised link between Rusty and the Federal Government'.<sup>126</sup> However, Haydon did suggest that 'discussion of this proposal may have continued secretly between the American Authorities and the Federal Government'.<sup>127</sup> The British ID were obviously aware that the American ID would pursue their own interests in this field too.

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<sup>122</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/63, JIC(Germany), 66<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (26/10/1948).

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1173, JIC(Germany), 'German Security Organisation', Top Secret and Guard (1949).

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Haydon, Chief, ID, Herford to Dugold Malcolm, The Chancery, Office of the UK High Commissioner, Wahnerheide, Annexure, Top Secret, Personal & Guard (08/08/1950). To counter this, the British High Commissioner even encouraged German officials to opine to Adenauer that Rusty would not be a suitable intelligence service for the German government, see Kirkpatrick, High Commissioner, Wahnerheide to W.I. Mallet, Foreign Office, Top Secret (23/08/1950).

<sup>127</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Haydon, to Malcolm, Annexure, Top Secret, Personal & Guard (08/08/1950).

British objections to Rusty stemmed primarily from the fact that they believed the ‘ex’ Nazis operating in Gehlen’s organisation were security risks under poor American control.<sup>128</sup> For example, Haydon claimed that:

...quite apart from what the American authorities may wish or intend, there is a real danger that RUSTY itself, to an extent not necessarily appreciated or known to the Americans, is aiming at the ultimate domination of both the present Security Service and the future Intelligence Service.<sup>129</sup>

Furthermore, prior to its transfer to CIA control, Rusty had been ‘a nuisance to British Intelligence in the British Zone of Germany’.<sup>130</sup>

Haydon’s detailed comments were written in response to Foreign Office complaints that ‘We have always handled this RUSTY business with kid gloves and have allowed ourselves to be put off with vague assurances which are never fulfilled’.<sup>131</sup> To this charge, Haydon sensibly commented that the British ID had in fact been outspoken on the subject with their American colleagues and had secured several concessions which had improved the control of Rusty.<sup>132</sup> Moreover, there was no use asking the Americans to disband Rusty as they held the organisation ‘in high regard’ and would not do so anyway, so the request would unnecessarily harm Anglo-American relations.<sup>133</sup> One Foreign Office official agreed, adding ‘I should be inclined to leave Rusty alone. The possibility is that by raising the subject we shall fail to secure any change whatever + will likely succeed in annoying a number of Americans’.<sup>134</sup> Moreover, Haydon pointed out that if the Americans dropped Rusty, the German authorities could still use it as an embryo for a foreign intelligence service.<sup>135</sup> Instead, Haydon suggested, ‘it would be wiser to take the initiative, authorise the Germans to set up an external service, and then attempt to mould it according to British taste’.<sup>136</sup> This strategy, Haydon explained, was already

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<sup>128</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Haydon, to Malcolm, Top Secret, Personal & Guard (08/08/1950). See also Daly-Groves ‘Control’, p. 340.

<sup>129</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Haydon, to Malcolm, Annexure, Top Secret, Personal & Guard (08/08/1950).

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Foreign Office Minutes (31/08/1950).

<sup>135</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Haydon, to Malcolm, Annexure, Top Secret, Personal & Guard (08/08/1950).

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

underway with the BfV with whom the ID were 'doing our utmost to establish a thoroughly good relationship'.<sup>137</sup>

British bipartite efforts with the BfV were occurring at the same time as difficult tripartite talks concerning its structure. According to the High Commissioner in August 1950, 'The tripartite discussions on the Internal Security Service have been so long and futile that even now, nearly a year after the set-up of such a Service was authorised by the Allies, no progress whatever has been made'.<sup>138</sup> This was the product of French officials persistently opposing 'almost every candidate whom the Germans propose for a position' in the BfV, combined with 'hesitations and bureaucratic fumbling of the tripartite machine'.<sup>139</sup> With the impending 'run down' of the ID, the British did not wish to see a repeat of this process with regards to the German foreign intelligence service.<sup>140</sup> This undoubtedly inspired later concessions, as will be seen.

The American ID were surprisingly late to notice the advances their British allies had made in pursuing British interests and influence with the BfV. As Philp, ID EUCOM's Operations Branch Chief, reported in March 1951:

I have noticed in recent reports of the meeting of the Allied Directors of Intelligence that the British appear to be taking a lively interest in the development of the German Agencies for the Protection of the Constitution. It is also my impression that the personnel manning the various German agencies are to a great extent new to intelligence work. It occurs to me that we may be overlooking an opportunity to do US Intelligence some good by offering assistance to the land agencies now... I do not think that this assistance should be forced upon the Germans but should be at their invitation.<sup>141</sup>

The American ID was now about to pursue its own interests through the BfV. But, as the last sentence of the above quotation indicates, this was to be done tactically through the new, more indirect strategy of intelligence which accompanied the creation of the High Commission - influence now had to be sought with more consideration given to Germany agency.

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Kirkpatrick to Mallet, Top Secret (23/08/1950).

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 762, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch to Director of Intelligence, US High Commissioner, Germany, Confidential (13/03/1951).

It is notable that ID EUCOM also commented on the inexperience of BfV staff. This was a deliberate consequence of the British ID's insistence that the BfV not be staffed by undue numbers of former Nazi intelligence officials.<sup>142</sup> This could have been an extension of the British strategy of limiting Rusty's influence, since Gehlen and his men could likely forge strong relations with former Nazi intelligence officials. It also reflected British concern that such officials could be difficult to control en masse, as proved by incidents involving American controlled 'ex' Nazis in the British Zone.<sup>143</sup>

In June, Philp was discussing a proposed visit of BfV representatives to CIC headquarters.<sup>144</sup> This was viewed as an excellent opportunity for furthering American interests. As he stated, 'It is hoped that the visit will produce good will on the part of all concerned and facilitate combined operation, in the future, because of the adoption of US methods and procedures by the BfV'.<sup>145</sup> Despite their suspicions, ID EUCOM were apparently ignorant of just how much influence the British had already obtained within the BfV. Indeed, at this time, Haydon, despite no longer being Chief ID, had already established firm friendly relations with Hans Ritter von Lex (State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior) as evidenced by their private correspondence, and Lex would later attribute the BfV's successes primarily to Haydon and the British.<sup>146</sup> As Philp further stated 'Unless and until some organization representing a Western Power takes the responsibility for providing the necessary guidance, the BfV will be of little value to the Bonn government or to the Allies'.<sup>147</sup> The guidance which the CIC were instructed to give focused particularly on the format of report writing.<sup>148</sup> That ID EUCOM were considering American interests in a future, unoccupied Germany through influence in German state institutions is further revealed towards the end of Philp's letter:

All members of the 66<sup>th</sup> CIC who will have contacts with the BfV should be present, at some time during the stay of the Bonn representatives, in order to meet them and to get on a friendly footing for future relations... Every effort should be made to cement good relations and to cause

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<sup>142</sup> TNA, FO 371/85353, Haydon, Chief, ID, Herford to Dugold Malcolm, The Chancery, Office of the UK High Commissioner, Wahnerheide, Top Secret, Personal & Guard (08/08/1950).

<sup>143</sup> Ibid. See also Daly-Groves, 'Control', pp. 340-341. See also pp. 142, 211 in this thesis.

<sup>144</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Commanding Officer, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Proposed Visit of BfV Representatives', Confidential (20/06/1951).

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, Hans Ritter von Lex Letter to Haydon (29/03/1951). See also p. 231 in this thesis.

<sup>147</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 758, 563465, Philp, Chief, Operations Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Commanding Officer, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, 'Proposed Visit of BfV Representatives', Confidential (20/06/1951).

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

the leading direction of the BfV to feel that they can lean heavily on the 66<sup>th</sup> CIC and can always count on its assistance.<sup>149</sup>

This American intelligence campaign for influence in the BfV, which ran, in some ways, counter to that underway by the British, achieved some short-term successes. For example, in August, Dr. John asked the CIC to help the BfV screen officials who were to work in the new Federal Border Police.<sup>150</sup> With their usual eye on future American influence, ID EUCOM noted ‘This Division is in accord with HICOG’s statement "that this is an excellent opportunity for American Intelligence to establish a good working relationship with the BfV"’.<sup>151</sup>

It was only when the British felt their influence and interests were sufficiently ingrained in the BfV that they invited their American colleagues to cooperate in improving the organisation.<sup>152</sup> This was likely also inspired by the increasing need to present a combined Anglo-American position, not only to German authorities (distrusted by both IDs) but also to the newly activated Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). As a British High Commissioner’s meeting commented in October 1951 on where and how SHAPE would obtain its intelligence:

Unless a tripartite view was sent there would be a danger, for example, that the British might describe a certain German ex-General as a ruffian while the U.S. might describe the same individual as a hero. There must be a coordinated point of view.<sup>153</sup>

Regular meetings of the Allied Directors of Intelligence therefore became an important forum for obtaining coordinated stances on high policy matters concerning the future of Germany. It was at such a meeting in February 1952 where a mutually accepted tripartite desire for maximum influence in the future unoccupied Germany through which national interests could be best pursued inspired the British and the French to eventually allow individuals they viewed unfavourably to work in the German intelligence services. As Kirkman commented:

There would be a good deal of difficulty in maintaining good liaison on our part with unsatisfactory German officials. Indeed, I would go so far as to suggest that we have already possibly reached the stage where we must be very chary of disapproval, for purely technical

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> NARA II, RG549, A148, Box 759, 563465, J.F. Hughes, Jr., Chief, Collection Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of Intelligence, Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, Secret (14/08/1951).

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 107<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (29/03/1951).

<sup>153</sup> TNA, FO 1035/77, ‘Extract From Minutes of the 10<sup>th</sup> H.C.M.C.’ (26/10/1951).

reasons, of any candidate whom the Germans will be able to appoint of their own free will. I think that is a point that we might possibly want to have in mind when we think of achieving the best possible relations in the long run, as opposed to standing on our rights on a short term. Later on, when the Germans have much more freedom, we may have difficulty in maintaining the best possible relations or getting them to accept our advice. I think, therefore, it is very important if we can avoid giving advice now which we can foresee might be put straight into the wastepaper basket. That, I think, is all I have to say.<sup>154</sup>

Truscott agreed, adding:

I see no possible way in which we can retain the right to approve or disapprove candidates, and I believe that in our relations with the BFV and LFVs, our ends will have to be achieved by liaison. I would therefore doubt the advisability of raising this question at this time, with a view to contractual discussions.<sup>155</sup>

The French representative, M. Toussaint, agreed too, noting:

I am in complete agreement with the views expressed by you two gentlemen and I think we will have no possibility whatsoever of disapproving a candidate in the future.<sup>156</sup>

With the disputes concerning the composition of the future German intelligence services largely resolved, rivalry inspired by the desire for influence within the future unoccupied Germany in pursuit of national interests continued. This accompanied an ongoing and overlapping rivalry between the secret and overt systems of rule. This was particularly well expressed by the US High Commissioner, John J. McCloy, in regards to the demands of British, American and French intelligence for strong powers of arrest and jurisdiction after the occupation formally ended:

My own personal opinion is that while allied assertion of jurisdiction over limited security cases may be legally justified by general agreement, it is politically unobtainable since such exercise of jurisdiction associated in German mind with two occupation periods. I am not convinced intelligence needs this primary jurisdiction...I anticipate far less difficulties in getting acceptable cooperation than do service intelligence agencies who I feel are more horrified at thought of having to abandon present usages than impressed by the added overall security the whole new relationship gives us.<sup>157</sup>

In this scramble for influence in the new Germany, a distinctly Anglo-American rivalry was also evident. As McCloy continued:

I do not like British scheme for right of arrest and custody for interrogation purposes for 21 day period since this deprives protection civil rights through court arraignment. In addition I think it may be equally unacceptable politically.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Allied Directors of Intelligence, 24<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Secret (18/02/1952).

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, McCloy, HICOG, Bonn to State Department, Secret (12/01/1952).

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

Later that month, negotiations had deteriorated to the extent that McCloy was insisting on no compromise with the British or the French and advising that American officials should:

...resist any French and British attempt to impose contrary system...this will strengthen agreement politically in Bundestag consideration, but my basic reason is consistency with American principles and policy in democratic orientation of Germans.<sup>159</sup>

Such disputes concerning the powers of post-occupation intelligence were threatening to hinder the broader negotiations concerning the contractual agreements altogether.<sup>160</sup> McCloy illustrated the objections of political officials, and the clash between the secret and overt systems of rule, perfectly with the following statement:

What really bothers me in all these proposals is complete rejection of position which for 6 years we have tried to persuade Germans to adopt, that constitutional rights of individuals should be respected and protected. Implicit in all the proposals is assumption that we must have the right to apprehend a suspect; keep him in secret custody with no right to have court pass upon justification of arrest and no protection against oppression; and that only by these methods can we protect security...Finally last clause implies that when we turn over our responsibilities to German agencies we expect them to follow same course against own citizen although for 6 years we have been attempting to educate them against this...I am not persuaded that intelligence needs to violate these basic human rights in order to protect security. It does not have such powers elsewhere and situation in Germany is not sufficiently special to require it here... Furthermore, experience has shown that despite well-established policy and attempts at high level to correct abuses, operating levels of intelligence, in limited but significant number of cases, arrest and secrete people through over-zealousness and in extreme cases are guilty of oppression. We cannot for the future defend a system under which this is possible. I know perfectly well that the responsible intelligence officials condemn these abuses as strongly as I do and make every effort to prevent them.<sup>161</sup>

The contradictions of a system designed to ‘impose liberalism by authority’, outlined by Lethbridge’s IG all those years ago, had still not been resolved and were now once again coming to the fore.

Outside of Tripartite negotiations, both British and American officials were still pursuing their own interests. For example, in February 1952, ID EUCOM sent the American High Commission a report concerning ‘Adenauer’s Visit to London in the Light of the International Situation’ which was ‘developed as peripheral information in connection with our interests in the West German

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<sup>159</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, McCloy, HICOG, Bonn to State Department, Secret (25/01/1952).

<sup>160</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Bolling to McClure, Secret (02/02/1952).

<sup>161</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, McCloy, HICOG, Bonn to State Department, Secret (25/01/1952).



Government'.<sup>162</sup> In July, ID EUCOM were discussing the drafting of two secret agreements concerning future relations with the Germans.<sup>163</sup> One, to be shared with and approved by the Allied intelligence organisations.<sup>164</sup> The other, 'for indicating to US officials confidential intentions as to the implementation of the proposals on the American side'.<sup>165</sup> In the latter document 'for US officials only, mention will be made of the possibility of "hiring" defectors, etc. in order to preclude German access to them'.<sup>166</sup>

The evidence of what exactly was agreed, by whom and when is patchy. However, it is clear that by March 1953, the German government had agreed to a 'Secret Memoranda of Understanding' which gave Allied forces remaining in Germany after the formal end of occupation 'a 21-day exclusive right of interrogation of security arrestees'.<sup>167</sup> It also compelled German government officials to 'Notify, and in certain cases deliver to, the Forces, Soviet and Satellite defectors and deserters, line-crossers, former PWs, refugees and other repatriates'.<sup>168</sup> It enshrined the necessity for continued intelligence cooperation on cases of mutual security interest, freedom of movement for Allied intelligence officials within Germany, their right to employ Germans and to consider Allied advice on matters concerning entries and exits.<sup>169</sup> Monitoring of postal and telecommunications was also to continue but only 'if and when German legislation permits such monitoring'.<sup>170</sup>

Available evidence suggests that the IDs, through the Tripartite Directors Committee, played a key part in drafting and negotiating the secret memorandum of understanding.<sup>171</sup> What is less clear is the extent to which Britain and America secured separate, diverging agreements in pursuit of their own interests. It is possible. The pursuit of such interests did continue in the last year of occupation but with

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<sup>162</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 126, Marshall, Chief, S&S Section, HQ ID EUCOM to Information Control Officer, Survey Group, US HICOG, Secret (08/02/1952).

<sup>163</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, HQ ID EUCOM, 'SOP in Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention on Relations between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers', Secret (28/07/1952).

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> CIA, Special Collections Online, Office Memorandum, 'ZIPPER Agreement' (11/03/1953) in Kevin C. Ruffner (ed), *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume II*, Secret (2006), p. 425.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 132, Baldry, Chief PP&T, HQ ID EUCOM, 'Effect of Contractual Agreements on EUCOM Intelligence Operations', Secret (05/06/1952).

increasing attempts at coordination as the end of occupation drew closer.<sup>172</sup> Speculation regarding the potential endurance and divergence of such secret agreements raises interesting questions concerning the IDs legacies which are discussed in the following evaluation.

#### **IV Evaluation**

The composition and modus operandi of the West German intelligence services, police forces and border officials were to a large extent determined by the Intelligence Divisions. The political composition of the new Germany too was to a considerable and hitherto underappreciated extent decided, or at least permitted, and certainly shaped, by Allied intelligence officers. Indeed, the secret system of rule enabled the IDs to monitor and influence German politicians, government officials and press correspondents, and, whenever they deemed necessary, arrest those opposed to the IDs vision of a new democratic Germany.

Although the objective of building a new democratic Germany was shared in its broadest sense, there was much Anglo-American disagreement concerning the composition of new German state structures. A great deal of this disagreement derived from rival threat perceptions. For example, many British ID officers seem to have considered Rusty to be a poorly controlled security risk whereas American intelligence officials thought highly of it. Since decisions concerning which Germans could be controlled and the extent of the security risk which they posed were often decided on an ad hoc basis by individual officers, it is perhaps inevitable that judgements between largely unintegrated organisations would differ as they did sometimes within them.<sup>173</sup>

The IDs also played a significant role in determining the limits of West German sovereignty which further complicated disputes concerning the employment of 'ex' Nazis. Indeed, in the context of ID involvement in the discussions of contractual relations, such employment had increasing implications not only for occupied Germany but for the future, unoccupied Germany. In the long

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<sup>172</sup> TNA, FO 1060/655, E.J.W. Barnes, Deputy High Commissioner to Mr. Bathurst, UK High Commission, Secret (27/10/1954).

<sup>173</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Control', pp. 340, 342. See also Boghardt, 'Nazi Informants', p. 400.

anticipated unoccupied Germany where German rule was presumed to be supreme, the shared objectives of occupation which necessitated so much Anglo-American liaison no longer seemed to hold as much sway. A scramble for national interests ensued in which both British and American ID officers sought to influence and establish friendly relations with the new German intelligence services.

Somewhat paradoxically, it was shared British and French recognition, expressed at an Allied Directors of Intelligence conference, that Allied influence in a future unoccupied Germany would not be best achieved by outright refusing German candidates for the new intelligence services which considerably dampened the rivalry between the IDs concerning the composition of new German state institutions.

A shared, selective distrust of German authorities and a fear of German attempts to play ‘divide and rule’ appears to have also inspired Anglo-American cooperation, trust, suspicion and rivalry in equal measure. However, such distrust of German authorities which at least partially inspired ID attempts to preserve great influence in unoccupied Germany created a combined struggle of the secret system of rule against the overt in which the former in many ways appears to have triumphed. Indeed, according to some scholars, elements of the secret memoranda of understanding may still be in force today, making them a particularly enduring legacy of ID work.<sup>174</sup>

Obtaining German agreement to secret memoranda permitting Allied intelligence operations to continue in Germany after 1955 was arguably only possible due to the role played by the IDs in working with German officials, helping to build up their security organisations and the positive legacies of other ID work which were obvious to prominent German officials, including Adenauer himself. Indeed, it was clear to German officials that the IDs not only helped to construct the German intelligence services through training and liaison but that in so doing they also actively protected the West German state from security threats.

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<sup>174</sup> Petra Lambeck interview with Historian Josef Foschepoth, ‘NSA: Permission to Spy in Germany’, *Deutsche Welle* (29/07/2013), <https://www.dw.com/en/nsa-permission-to-spy-in-germany/a-16981062> [Accessed: 27/07/2020].

German realisation of this is particularly evident in the response to Operation Terminus.

According to Kirkpatrick, Adenauer himself:

...although momentarily shaken during the first days by the critical attitude of many German politicians and newspapers, has from the outset consistently supported the British action...His attitude has prevented the affair from becoming an Anglo-German issue and reflects his sincere desire to maintain relations between Great Britain and Germany on a friendly basis. He is much relieved that the evidence which we have now placed at his disposal justifies him...<sup>175</sup>

Terminus had several important legacies. It contributed to the fact that Anglo-American distrust of German intelligence organisations when it came to dealing with extreme right wing threats to democracy endured remarkably late into the occupation. It succeeded in its own objectives of drawing public attention to continuing Neo-Nazi designs and thereby giving ‘the Federal Republic another four years’ breathing space in which to consolidate’.<sup>176</sup> In the concluding comments of Kirkpatrick, it revealed a continuing uncertainty as to what the legacy of the ID’s occupation work would be as the High Commissioner worried:

Although the future is not clear, one thing is certain. Nazism is not extinct in Germany, and whilst the neo-Nazis are unlikely ever to improve on Hitler's record and obtain an absolute majority by free election, it must be expected that they will make further attempts to enter public life. The opponents of Nazism are numerous enough, but deficient in moral courage, and they must be fortified by the Western allies...[who must]...remain alert, use the influence which flows from the presence of their troops and display resolution not to countenance the revival of Nazi political activity in Germany...even if the Germans fail to press home the attack, the circumstances that we have not been afraid to act will offer some comfort and assurance for the future to democratic elements in this country.<sup>177</sup>

It also increased the trust of German authorities in the intentions of British intelligence which undoubtedly influenced the signing of the secret memoranda. This increased trust also improved Allied-German relations. Finally, it ensured that extreme right-wing organisations, including those supported by Naumann were henceforth consistently monitored by German and American intelligence organisations. Indeed, the CIC and the BfV continued to share intelligence concerning Naumann long

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<sup>175</sup> TNA, FO 371/103912, Kirkpatrick, Wahnerheide to Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Confidential (24/04/1953).

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

after the formal end of occupation.<sup>178</sup> In the early 1960s, the British Army's security organisation was still liaising with the BfV and MI5 on some matters concerning 'ex' Nazis too.<sup>179</sup>

Throughout the many disagreements which surrounded the IDs' attempts to help construct a new Germany, it is important to note that the USLO-BLO system of liaison continued to function, even on matters concerning potentially heated subjects such as the BfV. It is also a significant achievement of that system that it was used as the basis for Allied liaison with the new German intelligence services at Bonn. However, the importance of British and American liaison officers did wane to some extent towards the end of occupation as it was meetings of the Directors of Intelligence, more than anything else, which helped to determine and shape ID high level policy towards the new West German state. Still, the continued functioning of the USLO-BLO system undoubtedly served to maintain an important and continued level of trust when discussions at tripartite level got heated. It also likely helped to deescalate several incidents concerning Rusty owing to its upholding of the rules concerning clearance and of those concerning courtesy checks which were implemented before potential employees of Allied organisations were arrested.

Although the IDs succeeded in their state building activities, it is also important to note that the legacies of these activities were not all positive. In a series of articles analysed by MI5 in 1954, the UK magazine *Picture Post* discussed the apparent rivalry between the BfV and the Gehlen Organisation.<sup>180</sup> Despite its journalistic tone, there may be something profound in its observation that 'While John... saw the sole danger in a Nazi revival, Gehlen, single-mindedly, kept the Communists in his sights'.<sup>181</sup> This suggests that the enduring British emphasis on the Neo-Nazi threat to German democracy in contrast to the American ID's later lesser efforts in this area may have reflected in the early priorities of the BfV and the BND, trained as they were primarily by British and American intelligence respectively. However, the IDs may to some extent have contributed to an even more negative legacy, the likely

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<sup>178</sup> NARA II, RG319, A1134-B, Box 554, Region IV, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, 'NAUMANN, Dr. Werner', Confidential (12/07/1955) and 'BfV Monthly Intelligence Report', Confidential (30/06/1957).

<sup>179</sup> TNA, KV 2/3664, L.C. French for Commander, British Services Security Organisation, Rhine Army to Box 500, London, 'Dr. Bohling' (16/02/1961).

<sup>180</sup> TNA, KV 2/2862, Willi Frischauer, 'The Traffic In Lives Across The Iron Curtain', *Picture Post* (13/11/1954).

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*

defection (but disputed kidnapping) of John to East Germany in the summer of 1954.<sup>182</sup> Indeed, Foreign Office officials, when trying to understand this defection in 1955, noted that although John approved of Naumann's arrest and favoured British policy over that of the Americans towards Communism, he had strongly criticised the secret memoranda of understanding which gave Anglo-American intelligence considerable powers in Germany after 1955.<sup>183</sup> For insisting on such powers, the IDs can also, to some extent, be blamed for the length of time it took to ratify the Bonn-Paris agreements and formally end the occupation of Germany.<sup>184</sup>

What precisely was agreed at the Tripartite Intelligence Director meetings, particularly concerning the secret memorandum of understanding, is difficult to determine as no comprehensive set of minutes have yet been discovered. Nevertheless, it is clear that the IDs' involvement in such negotiations helped to shape post-occupation international relations. It is also clear that they played a significant role in constructing important elements of the modern German state and in so doing helped to establish a lasting German democracy with German organisations that the British and American governments could work with and, in the end, to a considerable extent, trust.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Mark Fenimore, 'Victim of Kidnapping or an Unfortunate Defector? The Strange Case of Otto John', *Cold War History*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2020), pp. 143, 147-148, 152, 155-156.

<sup>183</sup> TNA, FO 1060/4326, Peck, Berlin to Foreign Office, Secret (20/12/1955).

<sup>184</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 134, Bolling to McClure, Secret (02/02/1952).

<sup>185</sup> TNA, WO 208/4473, B. Melland, Cabinet Office to Dr. G.W.S. Friedrichsen, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 'Nazismus Redivivus' (04/10/1955).

## Conclusion

‘There are moments in history that have been deeply engraved in people’s memories through great events or monumental buildings. And then there is history that hardly anyone knows...’

- *Neue Westfälische* on the history of the British Intelligence Division, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2018.<sup>1</sup>

This thesis has revealed in previously unachievable detail how, why and to what extent the British and American Intelligence Divisions worked together in occupied Germany on military, scientific, security, political and state building intelligence tasks. In doing so, it has placed existing, narrower case studies into context, resulting in the most comprehensive history of the Intelligence Divisions to date. Notwithstanding the limited failures discussed in this thesis, it is difficult to come to any conclusion other than that the IDs succeeded in all of the missions they pursued. The result is a profound legacy which can be said to include, most impressively, an enduring democratic Germany.

To avoid hagiography, considerable space in each chapter has also been devoted to analysis of the rivalry between the occupying powers which explains when, where, why and how often things did not always run smoothly. But the findings of this thesis have implications far beyond the historiography of Anglo-American intelligence relations. Indeed, detailed analysis of the IDs political, security and state building functions has enabled this thesis to argue that the British and American Intelligence Divisions operated a secret system of rule that was the real backbone of the occupation of Germany. That this system operated largely harmoniously and successfully can to a considerable extent be considered the product of a secret system of liaison, practised and upheld primarily by British and American ID Liaison Officers in a USLO-BLO chain of liaison.

The functions of intelligence liaison officers and the rules they adhered to and upheld are no longer a ‘missing dimension’ in the history of Anglo-American intelligence liaison in post-war Germany. Through analysis of the largest known collection of documents detailing USLO-BLO work,

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<sup>1</sup> Anonymous, ‘Die Schlapphüte ihrer Majestät’, *Neue Westfälische* (21/06/2018), [https://www.geschichtsverein-herford.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/presseartikel/neue\\_westf%C3%A4lische/NW\\_21.06.2018\\_Daly\\_Groves.pdf](https://www.geschichtsverein-herford.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presseartikel/neue_westf%C3%A4lische/NW_21.06.2018_Daly_Groves.pdf) [Accessed: 11/05/2020].

this thesis has shown how and why these officers undertook the bulk of British and American intelligence liaison in post-war Germany. The system of liaison in which they were the primary actors and enforcers was remarkably successful. It consisted of an almost constant British presence at American ID headquarters in Heidelberg and an American presence at British ID headquarters in Herford. It involved the mass exchange of finished intelligence reports, the regular sending of routine queries, requests for action, adherence to rules concerning clearance, courtesy checks before undertaking arrests and a mutually recognised selective concealment of sources and methods.

The vast majority of such liaison, with the exception of conferences (although ILOs attended many of these and arranged clearance for others) was carried out by the USLO and the BLO. By the late 1940s, personal exchange of information outside of this USLO-BLO system, notwithstanding the transferring of raw operational intelligence at a local level in the field, was unusual. Indeed, the centralisation of most Anglo-American intelligence liaison in Germany between just two key officers was vital to the building and maintaining of trust between the two Intelligence Divisions. It provided a consistent and uninterrupted stream of friendly dialogue, even when matters became heated in the regions or at the highest policy levels.

The mutual advantages of the system were many. It enabled the quick sharing and corroboration of information between *all* of the intelligence organisations operating in Germany with the possibility of concealing sources and methods when desired and it also helped to prevent unnecessary duplication and irritating ‘friendly’ arrests. Such were the mutually recognised advantages of this system that its restatement at times was enough to resolve disputes. It was also used as the mechanism through which to integrate liaison with the new German intelligence services.

The USLO-BLO system of liaison was essential to the successful completion of the IDs’ missions. The reality of this continued mutual dependence was recognised by ID officers themselves and it was anticipated by planners in London during the Second World War. Indeed, there is little evidence of a narrative of British decline or ‘junior partnership’.<sup>2</sup> The British ID sometimes supplied

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<sup>2</sup> To differing extents, such narratives have been conveyed in Jakub, *Spies*, pp. 184, 197; Goschler and Wala, *Gestapo*, pp. 21-22; Maddrell, ‘British-American’, pp. 87, 89; Maddrell, *Science*, p. 83.



their American colleagues with their sole source of important intelligence on both the Communist and Nazi threats which they faced. The American ID also often copied the structures and methods of their British colleagues, recognising the innovation and utility of the latter. Equally, the British ID recognised that the security and politics of one zone affected that of another and that the multizonal nature of the threats and targets pursued by the IDs necessitated good cooperation. This cooperation was undoubtedly 'special' in terms of exclusivity, quantity, quality and frequency.

The missions pursued and functions undertaken by the IDs were largely identical encompassing as they did security, political, scientific, military and state building intelligence tasks. While it is difficult to differentiate more 'important' missions from lesser owing to their interrelation, as embodied in the USLO-BLO chain which dealt with matters concerning all, it is clear that Scientific & Technical intelligence has been elevated to a level of undue importance in the existing historiography. The IDs themselves consistently identified security intelligence as their primary mission. This is reflected by the numbers of intelligence officers working on security intelligence tasks at ID headquarters in comparison to others. Security and political intelligence tasks often overlapped because they were sometimes undertaken against identical enemies in pursuit of an identical broad key objective, a lasting democratic Germany. This crucial objective of the occupation and of the IDs required control of the German population. The IDs were recognised by policymakers from the outset as the key instruments of control.

The qualitative analysis of the ID files discussed in this thesis confirms that such tasks took up most of the time of ID officers on the ground in Germany throughout the occupation. Indeed, of the several 'hundredweights per week' exchanged between British and American intelligence officers in Germany, historians can now confidently conclude that the great majority of this material was not scientific and technical intelligence.<sup>3</sup>

In pursuit of their overall democratising mission, the IDs helped each other to secretly control almost every conceivable element of German society. They monitored and censored communications, infiltrated and reported on political parties, controlled movements, jointly monitored the police forces

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<sup>3</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/66, JIC(Germany), 118<sup>th</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (15/11/1951), Annex A.

and other new German state institutions they helped to build; they advised and informed policymakers in London and Washington and kept each other informed of political developments in their zones. When judged necessary, they arrested anti-democratic political movements.

In these functions this thesis has identified a largely harmonious secret system of rule. Indeed, behind the public facing Kreis Resident Officers discussed by Erlichman lay a network of hitherto poorly understood Regional Intelligence Officers, informing and advising the Regional Commissioners and monitoring and subtly influencing German political parties. Behind the censorship apparatus lay a team of analysts at ID headquarters who collated and interpreted censorship intercepts, placing them in the context of the human intelligence work undertaken by AIOs and Intelligence Teams. Behind some reports written by the Political Division lay secret ID authors. Behind some overt organisations of military government which trained employees of new German state institutions lay instructions provided by the IDs. And, behind the more publicly obvious mechanisms of control, such as policing and denazification, lay the IDs security arrests and recruitment of 'ex' Nazis to further the aims of occupation utilising methods not always approved of by military government officials.<sup>4</sup> This secret system of rule persisted and even grew in importance as the overt structures of military government rolled back in 1949, the point at which most recent studies of the occupation conclude, thus further obscuring the continued influence of the Intelligence Divisions and their role in shaping the outcomes of occupation.

The concept of the secret system of rule helps to further explain the positive long-term outcomes of the Allied occupation, particularly in terms of democratisation, despite overt policy failures such as denazification. Indeed, the IDs performed a secret sort of denazification, one which used the controlling structures of the secret system of rule to ensure that those 'ex' Nazis who remained in public life could be trusted not to hinder democracy or further Nazism and those that did otherwise were arrested or removed from their positions of influence. Nazis who could be controlled and who were not security risks were used by the IDs to advance the democratic aims of the occupation.<sup>5</sup> This was the case in

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<sup>4</sup> The CIC apparently even lied to the US High Commissioner about Barbie's employment although Browning disputes this, see Sayer and Botting, *Secret Army*, pp. 324-325, 328, 380-381.

<sup>5</sup> Daly-Groves, 'Control', pp. 331-342.

operations such as Nursery during which Nazi war criminals were employed to successfully help destroy a Nazi organisation.<sup>6</sup>

When overt policies failed or were unpopular, the secret rulers used their knowledge of German public opinion to advise policymakers on what steps to take next and ensured that protests and even to some extent the media could never escalate opposition to an extent that would seriously threaten the rule of the occupiers or the democratic state institutions they were helping to build.

Consequently, new knowledge of the secret system of rule implemented by the IDs outlined here helps to explain why despite presiding over what scholars such as Farquharson have called ‘a badly managed disaster area’, the Western occupation of Germany succeeded in its key aim of democratisation.<sup>7</sup> The successful completion of the IDs’ secret missions was rightly recognised as essential to a successful occupation outcome; those missions depended on ID liaison which continued closely despite occasional overt policy failures and differences between the zones.

The enduring secret nature of the extensive governing functions undertaken by the Intelligence Divisions has implications which extend beyond assessments of Allied successes and failures in occupied Germany. Indeed, during the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq in 2003, the occupation of Germany was utilised as a key example by some American government officials to develop and justify policy.<sup>8</sup> As Perry Biddiscombe points out, this was particularly problematic because a simplistic view of the successes of overt military government policy appears to have been drawn from the fact that ‘Germany successfully democratised in the long run’.<sup>9</sup> But even more problematic is the apparent absence in such government planning of knowledge concerning the crucial role played by the Intelligence Divisions in ruling occupied Germany.

Knowledge of the possibility that it was the secret system of rule upheld by the IDs, more so than overt military government policy, which contributed to Germany’s eventual democratisation, may have resulted in an entirely different approach to the occupation of Iraq. The large absence of the IDs

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid, pp. 331, 334. See also Selby, *Axmann*, pp. 96-100.

<sup>7</sup> Farquharson, ‘Occupation’, pp. 316-317.

<sup>8</sup> Kehoe, *Occupation*, pp. 6, 209-211. See also Erlichman and Knowles (eds), *Occupation*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>9</sup> Biddiscombe, *Denazification*, p. 218. See also Erlichman and Knowles (eds), *Occupation*, p. 19.

in the historiography of occupation may therefore have had negative effects on how future military occupations were undertaken. A full exploration of this possibility exceeds the scope of this thesis but would provide a fruitful basis for a future comparative study.

Despite also contributing to the secret system of rule and the outcome of the occupation, the successes of the IDs' scientific, technical and military intelligence missions are better measured in the context of the Cold War. Indeed, the scientific and military intelligence collected, collated and analysed by the IDs and the organisations they commanded were rightly viewed as indispensable by policymakers in London and Washington. This was particularly evident during the Berlin Blockade when the system of liaison and the multiple branches and regions of the IDs worked together to produce accurate predictions of Soviet intentions and reduced the panic of policymakers. Contrary to Maddrell's focus on American initiative and the CIA, this thesis has shown how the British ID were in many ways pioneers in establishing the missions and methods of SCINT in post-war Germany and revealed more about the positive relations between STIB and their hitherto understudied closest American counterpart, ID EUCOM's S&T section.

The thesis has also made clear that scholars have hitherto greatly underestimated the military functions of the IDs. Indeed, the bulk of Anglo-American military intelligence liaison in occupied Germany was undertaken via the IDs' USLO-BLO chain and the IDs themselves engaged in the collection, collation and analysis of military intelligence, to the benefit of policymakers.

Of course, the missions pursued by the IDs can only be described as *largely* identical and the secret system of rule as *largely* harmonious because some rivalry did occur not least because both powers pursued what were at times perceived to be competing national interests. This was particularly the case in the fields of SCINT and state building where the IDs' missions had clearer ramifications for general international influence. However, early SCINT rivalry seems to have been largely resolved by an eventual recognition of mutual dependence and the mutual advantages of cooperation. It is surely more than a coincidence too that the petering out of SCINT rivalry coincided with the solidification of the USLO-BLO system and the firmer structures of the IDs from which this system functioned.

National interests were also clearly pursued when it came to securing influence in Germany after the end of the occupation. This rivalry centred around two key issues. Firstly, the Allies sought influence in new German state institutions as evidenced by attempts to shape the German intelligence services and to agree secret bilateral contractual agreements. Secondly, the Allies did not always agree on which 'ex' Nazis posed a security risk and which should or could be controlled and recruited. This issue was eventually resolved by a mutual recognition that the influence of all powers would best be secured in unoccupied Germany by not rejecting candidates proposed by the German authorities who the Allies may have to work with at a later date regardless.

Nevertheless, rival threat perceptions were a frequently recurring issue highlighted throughout this thesis, as were issues concerning prestige, organisational differences, occasional violations of agreed liaison procedures, the concealment of sources and methods and 'friendly' espionage. Still, the latter two issues can both paradoxically also be considered strengths of the USLO-BLO system because recognition of a mutual desire for some secrecy enhanced confidence in the system, allowing the continued flow of essential information despite wider security concerns and 'friendly' espionage built further trust by confirming the agreeable intentions of Allies.

It is clear that the existing explanations for, and explorations of, rivalry in the existing historiography offered by scholars such as Dorril and Maddrell are too narrow. Indeed, little of the security intelligence rivalry which occurred in occupied Germany can fit easily into Dorril's thesis concerning desires to become the top intelligence organisation.

Intelligence rivalry in occupied Germany was multicausal and complex. A key consequence of it was the reduction of essential trust, fittingly illustrated by the most enduring single incident of rivalry analysed in this thesis, General Truscott's seizure of Hitler's wills. But intelligence rivalry in occupied Germany seldom had such long-term consequences. Most importantly, it was dwarfed by the many examples of harmonious cooperation discussed throughout this thesis and usually efficiently mitigated by the USLO-BLO system of liaison, the rules that upheld and the trust that inspired. As Lockhart, who rightly emphasised the importance of trust for the efficient functioning of intelligence organisations,

noted: 'Trust without continuity is almost impossible'.<sup>10</sup> The USLO-BLO system provided such continuity. Indeed, no incident of rivalry was consequential enough to interrupt the consistent flow of much information which passed between the ID liaison officers. Consequently, it is not naive to interpret the history of Anglo-American intelligence liaison in occupied Germany as one of overall success both in terms of Anglo-American relations and the missions the IDs accomplished.

That the IDs accomplished their security intelligence missions was already implicit in the existing historiography but the extent of that success has been fully revealed here for the first time. The IDs successfully secured their zones by working together to destroy the dual threats the occupying powers and later the West German government faced from far right and far left extremists. Indeed, not only did the IDs destroy numerous Nazi and Neo-Nazi groups they also had considerable success in discovering, capturing and imprisoning numerous Iron Curtain intelligence agents. The latter fact provides a useful counterbalance to the prevailing negative perception of Western security intelligence capabilities inspired by in depth analysis of Stasi files.<sup>11</sup>

The IDs also accomplished their political intelligence missions. By creating a united front, they reduced the potential effectiveness of 'divide and rule' politics attempted by the Soviets and indeed by some Germans. They discovered much about Soviet scientific and military capabilities, produced accurate estimates of Soviet intentions, prepared as adequately as possible for Soviet attack, provided a regular enough stream of intelligence to prevent policymakers from panicking and successfully denied the Soviets many scientists and the knowhow they possessed.

Most impressively, the IDs played a key role in building enduring institutions of the modern German state which were initially moulded by and controlled by their secret system of rule. The IDs can therefore rightly include the creation of an enduring democratic Germany as part of their shared legacy. That legacy too includes post-occupation Anglo-American-German intelligence and political cooperation as much of this was founded on the essential trust which was built between German organisations and ID officers during the occupation. Indeed, several influential German officials,

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<sup>10</sup> Lockhart in Robertson (ed), *Approaches to Intelligence*, p. 51.

<sup>11</sup> Maddrell in Friis, Macrakis and Müller-Enbergs (eds), *East German*, pp. 7, 28. See also Haslam, *Soviet*, pp. XXII, 176.

including Adenauer himself, demonstrated a clear and appreciative understanding of the importance of the work the IDs undertook in protecting West Germany from serious threats to democracy.

That it was primarily the work of the IDs and the intelligence agents and officers they commanded which raised the BfV and the BND to their later almost completely 'equal partner' status with their British and American counterparts was never forgotten by some German authorities. For example, von Lex sent Haydon a series of private letters between 1951-1961 in which he thanked the former ID Chief again and again for the help he gave to him and the BfV and consequently, to West Germany as a whole.<sup>12</sup> In 1952, von Lex asked Haydon to accept a cigarette box on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior as a 'token of our lasting gratitude for all the invaluable assistance, which you bestowed on us in the formation of the Security Service'.<sup>13</sup> Such gratitude was not forgotten.

When von Lex came to retire from his Ministry role in 1960, a party was held in his honour at the American Embassy Club in Bad Godesberg.<sup>14</sup> During the party, telegrams were read out by an influential former British ID officer named Rhodes (nicknamed 'Dusty').<sup>15</sup> These telegrams came from Haydon, his successor Kirkman, and his former American colleagues such as Truscott.<sup>16</sup> A key legacy of the IDs can be identified from this event alone as it was 'Truscott's successors' (as described by von Lex) who had arranged this party, which included former ID men, on their own initiative, indicating a clear link between the liaison established by the IDs and that continuing five years after the formal end of occupation.<sup>17</sup>

Out of all the telegrams received, von Lex wrote to express particular fondness of Haydon's, noting that 'I shall always remember that it was you, of all others, who during the first trying years of the establishment of the Federal organisation for the Protection of the Constitution has assisted me in particular with expert advice and confidence'.<sup>18</sup> He expressed such sentiments again a year later.<sup>19</sup> As

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<sup>12</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, Ritter von Lex to Haydon (29/03/1951), (22/02/1952), (08/11/1960), (10/12/1961).

<sup>13</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, Ritter von Lex to Haydon (22/02/1952).

<sup>14</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, Ritter von Lex to Haydon (08/11/1960).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. On Rhodes' nickname see K.J. Archer, HQ ID Herford to Haydon (12/07/1949).

<sup>16</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, Ritter von Lex to Haydon (08/11/1960).

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, Ritter von Lex to Haydon (10/12/1961).

such letters further help to reveal, the security of post-occupied Germany, the organisations responsible for ensuring that security and the liaison conducted between them, was, to a large extent, shaped by the IDs.

It is hoped that the new knowledge conveyed by this thesis will inspire a shift in focus and emphasis in future histories of the occupation, the Cold War in Germany and Anglo-American intelligence relations.

Readers will hopefully now share Boghardt's bewilderment with the prevalent historiographical focus on organisations such as the CIA in Germany, and the author's with regards to MI6.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, the evidence conveyed here suggests that throughout most of the occupation, the IDs, their predecessors and successors were the most well informed and influential intelligence organisations operating in Germany. Rather than playing a junior role, they provided vital intelligence for now well-known organisations such as the CIA and MI6 and operated as the key coordinating conduits through which the majority of information exchange took place between all of the intelligence organisations of both powers in Germany. Both the CIA and the FBI sent liaison officers to American ID headquarters and communicated with the British ID via the USLO-BLO chain. When Lockhart wanted to be kept in the loop of events in Germany at JIC(G) meetings, it was to ID HQ, not MI6 HQ, that he travelled. As Lockhart told Haydon in private letters around the time of his dismissal from the post of Chief ID, MI6 owed him 'a great deal'.<sup>21</sup>

Considering this, it is perhaps unsurprising that MI6 suspended its usual practice by allowing ID officers to be the first to interrogate Soviet Army defectors and, as this thesis revealed, relied on the ID to collate crucial intelligence without which 'it might be lost to MI6 London'.<sup>22</sup> MI6 even agreed that the ID should lead in meetings and reports concerning the creation of the German intelligence services in seeming recognition that the ID was most capable of solving such important issues relating to Germany. Moreover, MI5 officers such as Guy Liddell sometimes knew little of the situation 'on the

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<sup>20</sup> Boghardt, 'Vanguard', p. 1.

<sup>21</sup> IWM, Haydon Papers, Lockhart to Haydon, letter signed 'John' (Undated: likely 1950).

<sup>22</sup> TNA, DEFE 41/65, JIC(Germany), 91<sup>st</sup> Meeting Minutes, Top Secret (25/04/1950).



ground' in Germany other than what ID officers told them.<sup>23</sup> It is possible that the declassification of MI6 files concerning Germany could counteract this impression of ID predominance. Perhaps a defence of prestige will prompt that organisation to release some more relevant files.

The multizonal nature of the threats faced and the work undertaken by the IDs outlined in this thesis will hopefully be the start of a broadening of geographic scope in the existing historiography. Occupied Germany as a whole was the Cold War frontline, not just 'battleground Berlin'. Indeed, the IDs took great interest in the entire border with the Eastern Zone as enemy agents did not only enter the West via Berlin. Neo-Nazi groups and Iron Curtain intelligence agents operated throughout West Germany. The political threat from the KPD extended to several cities throughout West Germany.

Most Anglo-American security intelligence operations were directed from ID headquarters deep within their respective zones. Most Anglo-American intelligence liaison in occupied Germany was conducted via the USLO-BLO chain, between two officers stationed at ID headquarters. Some information concerning Berlin was also shared via the USLO-BLO system.<sup>24</sup> The secret system of rule functioned via the latter and via a network of Regional Intelligence Offices (RIOs) scattered throughout West Germany.

This is not to say that Berlin was not important. It functioned as British ID Advanced Headquarters, it was the seat of several important intelligence conferences and the flashpoint of several major Cold War incidents such as the blockade. However, events in the zones were at times of equal if not greater importance to intelligence officers and this thesis contends that the occasional significance of Berlin is best understood in the context of the broader Anglo-American intelligence network. In the final year of occupation there were more British intelligence officers operating in the zones rather than in Berlin.<sup>25</sup> At times, the British RIO in Berlin (12 Berlin Intelligence Staff) seemed to play a role little different to that in other RIOs throughout Germany. Berlin was but one of many such offices, and it

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<sup>23</sup> TNA, KV 4/469, Liddell Diaries (22/10/1947).

<sup>24</sup> NARA II, RG549, A12027, Box 129, Marshall, Chief S&S Section to BLO, 'Herbert SCHULZ', Confidential (29/08/1952). See also Box 128, Marshall to BIOFG (Thru BLO), 'World Peace Council Representatives', Confidential (12/09/1952); Box 132, Marshall to BLO, 'Polish Military Mission, Berlin', Secret (12/11/1952).

<sup>25</sup> TNA, ADM 1/27788, T.J. Bligh, Treasury Chambers, Great George Street to Miss M.E.M. Dougans, Admiralty, Top Secret (21/12/1953).

was not even the only office subject to an unusual frequency of direct liaison as information concerning arrangements in Bremen make clear.<sup>26</sup>

This unusual frequency of direct liaison arguably makes cities such as Berlin and Bremerhaven unsuitable for drawing general conclusions on Anglo-American intelligence liaison in occupied Germany. At the very least, future studies should pay more attention to ID activities in Berlin and the activities of the organisations they commanded as a counterbalance to the prevalent focus on organisations such as the CIA.

Future studies of the occupation too should no longer overlook the IDs and their work but place them at the forefront of analysis. Indeed, more so than any other divisions or branches of the overt occupation machinery, the IDs had a hand in almost every conceivable aspect of life in post-war Germany. Consequently, their files provide useful material for scholars wishing to study the socio-political and economic history of Germany in the first ten years after Hitler. In doing so, they will undoubtedly discover further material to support this thesis's contention that the continued threat from Nazism in the years of occupation has been underestimated in the present historiography.

British and American intelligence did not exaggerate the threat from Nazi movements. They drew reasoned conclusions based on the intelligence they had gathered relating to the private opinions of Germans and their previous experiences with Nazi revival attempts. Upon examination of the evidence, even German government officials privately agreed with their conclusions, as was the case during the Naumann affair. As the latter example suggests, further research into ID files will undoubtedly also produce more evidence of the roles that Germans undertook within the Intelligence Divisions.

Although it is difficult to differentiate the effects of ID work from other factors influencing the evolution of mass German political thought, holding extremist forces in check undoubtedly contributed to ensuring that post-war Germany would remain a stable democracy with democratic parties such as

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<sup>26</sup> FO 1005/1731, 'Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division', Top Secret (1947), redacted copy in author's possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531-17) completed on 28/07/2017.

the CDU and the SPD dominating the Bundestag in the first ten years after occupation. Indeed, underground Nazi groups such as Nursery had ‘no immediate subversive intention: the aim being rather to create an organisation that could exercise influence later’.<sup>27</sup> The destruction of such movements undertaken by the IDs and their predecessors clearly prevented such possibilities. They were stopped before they had the chance to become more dangerous.

The failure of far-right extremist groups to combine into larger movements can certainly be linked to ID divide and rule strategies and preventative operations.<sup>28</sup> As Chapters Four and Five demonstrated, the IDs continued to monitor extreme right wing organisations into the 1950s and sought successfully to prevent their merger through double agent infiltration and when necessary, preventative arrests. A democratic Germany then, can, to a large extent, be considered a significant legacy of the IDs.

Owing to the work which they undertook, the influence they wielded and the missions they accomplished in occupied Germany, the Intelligence Divisions should be just as well known to scholars of post-war Germany and early Cold War intelligence as MI6 and the CIA. Herford and Heidelberg should be discussed just as frequently as Berlin in analyses of early Cold War liaison. Histories of the occupation should devote just as much attention to the secret system of rule as to that overtly practised by Military Governments and the High Commissions, especially when drawing conclusions on the outcomes of occupation. The activities of the ‘ex’ Nazis and other Germans who helped the secret system of rule to function in its battle against the continued Nazi threat should be just as well-known as those recruited to help tackle Communism. It is hoped that this thesis will be the start of such a new familiarity with this hitherto most secret but impressively successful and influential chapter in the histories of America, Britain and Germany.

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<sup>27</sup> TNA, FO 1005/1700, IB, Intelligence Review No. 6, Secret (20/02/1946).

<sup>28</sup> For example see comments of Detmold AIO in TNA, FO 1005/1709, AIO Detmold, Monthly Summary, Confidential (29/09/1949).

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