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## **Variations in European populist anti-establishment parties**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis examines the varying success of populist anti-establishment parties (AEPs) in Europe, asking the following questions. How comparable are populist AEPs? Why are some populist AEPs more successful than others? How deeply rooted in attitudes is populist AEP support? It has long been understood that there have been structural shifts in public attitudes and political competition, particularly in Western Europe (Inglehart 1990; Kriesi et al 2006). Throughout the continent, voters increasingly feel that established parties, and the established political system itself, do not represent them (Ignazi 1992; Katz & Mair 1995; Kriesi 2014). Where voters ask such fundamental questions, populist AEPs thrive. Studies that analyse both the populist left- and right-wing, over time and across countries are few and far between. The evolution of political competition is not limited to one side of the political spectrum, or to one region, which needs to be taken into account. This thesis uses a variety of advanced quantitative methods to analyse populist AEPs across Europe, over time, at the country-, party- and individual-level to understand how they challenge the political system. To avoid similarities and the wider phenomenon being masked, a new definition for AEPs is developed, which focuses on whether their ideology challenges the political system. Populist AEPs perform best during economic downturns, when established parties converge and when they face fewer competitors. Populist AEPs that place more emphasis on the EU in particular are more successful, as they target political elites. Their voters tend to be from a lower socio-economic background but are primarily motivated by a sense of anger with the political establishment and ideological radicalism on a left-right basis. Their voters turn to a party that best represents them, not any populist AEP. Their success, therefore, is deep-rooted; populist AEPs are variations of the same phenomenon.

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## **Declaration**

I, the author, confirm that the Thesis is my own work. I am aware of the University's Guidance on the Use of Unfair Means ([www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means](http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means)). This work has not been previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, university.

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## Introduction

Over recent years, populist anti-establishment parties (AEPs) have risen to increased prominence across Europe. The 2008/09 financial crisis particularly accelerated their support, which has not been evenly spread. How comparable are populist AEPs? How deeply rooted in attitudes is populist AEP support? Why are some populist AEPs more successful than others?

Populist AEPs, left- or right-wing, seek to fundamentally alter the political system in line with their voter's radical attitudes. More voters are more willing to challenge the political establishment (Armingeon & Guthman 2014; Rooduijn et al 2017) and support parties that offer fundamental reform. Their voters hold populist, anti-elitist sentiment in common but do not solely protest a vague notion of 'the corrupt elites' and support any populist AEP. Instead, their voters have strong and clear ideological beliefs that differ on a left-right basis (Hobolt & Tilley 2016; Rooduijn et al 2017).

Most literature examining both left and right (e.g. Visser et al 2014; Spierings & Zaslove 2017; Rooduijn 2018) tends not to adequately demonstrate the extent to which populist left- and right-wing AEPs and their voters have important similarities *and* differences. Populist left-wing AEPs are typified by radical socialism, and those on the right by nativism. Their voters seek out a party that is ideologically congruent with themselves, and which also shares voter concerns that the political elite is unresponsive. As such, populist AEPs, left- or right-wing, are *variations of the same phenomenon* as their voters react to the same unresponsive political establishment, but wish to reform it in very different ways.

Populist AEPs benefit from economic downturn, established party convergence and fewer AEP competitors. Crisis leads to discontent with the political system (Armingeon & Guthman 2014) and support for populist parties (Kriesi & Pappas 2015) which indicates voters *and* the political system needs to be taken into account to best understand populist AEP success. They can, however, work to control their own fate; particularly when in government, they need to adapt (quickly), or lose out at the next election.

In order to fully understand this, an original, well-justified definition of AEPs is developed to capture the phenomenon, and both the parties and their voters are analysed. Previous literature, however, tends to a) use theoretically unjustified definitions and poor case-selection, b) often fails to fully understand the differences between the populist left- and right-wing, and c) is generally limited in scope.

These gaps in literature are addressed to show that ideologically disparate parties represent increasing disillusionment with established politics. Because their support comes from voters holding radical ideologies populist AEPs represent serious, long-term threats to the established political system. Only by analysing both populist left- and right-wing AEPs at both the supply- and demand-side can realistic inferences be drawn about where and why they succeed because supply and demand are always interacting with each other.<sup>1</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> As a case in point, radical voter ideology and feelings of being left out by established parties (demand-side) are key predictors of populist AEP support, but these factors can be spurred on by the supply-side (e.g. financial crisis)

following discussion underlines the importance of attitudes and representation to understanding populist AEP success.

### **A brief overview of the importance of attitudes and representation**

There are a variety of factors that may affect populist AEP success; some of them are long-term (shifts in public attitudes), some of them are short-term (the economy). Some are within the ability of populist AEPs to control (campaign rhetoric and issue emphasis), some of them not (established party convergence). Such factors are discussed and analysed in greater detail throughout this thesis. However, there are two particular factors that form the crux of this thesis: a desire for fundamental change to the status quo in line with voters' attitudes, and the (perceived lack of) representativeness of established politics.

Populist AEP support is fundamentally ideological and attitudinal in nature, best expressed as radical socialism on the left-wing, and nativism on the right-wing. Previous literature (e.g. Visser et al 2014) tends to identify this, but then leaves it at that (Rooduijn et al 2017). Exactly what do their voters believe? How much common ground do they share, and do they do so for the same reasons (i.e. a perceived lack of representation due to clear, radical attitudes)?

Where there have been notable shifts in public attitudes parties have had to adapt, fundamentally altering their strategies and electorates (Inglehart 1971; 1990; Kriesi 2014). Specifically, the largest parties have become less distinguishable from one another as they focus on governing, not representing specific voters (Katz & Mair 1995). Where voters are motivated by an increasingly diverse array of issues, ranging from the environment, equality and immigration in addition to the economic left-right dimension, and where established parties have become less able to represent more and more voters, populist AEPs have thrived.

Populist AEP support is not a temporary knee-jerk protest wherein voters aim to register unhappiness with a vote informed by ideologically ambiguous, anti-elitist anger. The priorities of both populist AEPs and their voters are to fundamentally alter the political system, which is an aim primarily motivated by (radical) ideology. This is combined with a populist platform to expand their appeal and to claim that only they offer true change. Voters support parties with whom they are ideologically congruent (Downs 1957; Grofman 1985; Rabinowitz & Macdonald 1989), and this should be no different for populist AEPs. Voters' fundamental values remain stable over time (Heath et al 1994), and they derive (stable) policy preferences from such values (Ansolabehere et al 2008).<sup>2</sup> As such, populist AEP support depends on voter's attitudes and their perception that the populist AEP best matches their views.

Populist AEPs are not a new phenomenon, neither in Western nor Central and Eastern Europe. However, they have undeniably reached new heights in more recent years, particularly following the 2008/09 financial crisis which led to a more volatile and radical electorate on both the left and right (Hobolt & Tilley 2016). There has been too little scholarship on both sides of the political spectrum meaning that the depth and breadth of their

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<sup>2</sup> Voters can change the salience they give to certain issues, but are unlikely to radically change their fundamental attitudes on the economic or social dimension

support is under-researched. The following discussion further explains why it is necessary to undertake this research.

### **Assessing previous research**

By defining AEPs as parties with a clear ideological commitment to fundamentally reforming the political system, the definition in this thesis is able to capture the wider phenomenon of populist left- and right-wing AEP success. Existing definitions tend to lead to inconsistent and problematic case-selection. Secondly, populist left- and right-wing AEPs are considered variations of the same phenomenon. Their voters are economically vulnerable and desire clear representation, but their core left-right ideologies differentiate them. Previous literature largely fails to measure the depth and breadth of populist AEP support. Thirdly, the geographic and temporal scope of the study offers a wide-reaching study of populist AEPs at the aggregate-, party- and voter-level, reflecting the complexity of their rise to prominence. Existing literature is mostly very limited in its scope.

The very categorisation of parties is no small matter as alterations in case-selection will typically lead to different conclusions. There are three main issues that can be identified with previous attempts to categorise parties as ‘anti-establishment’ or not.<sup>3</sup> Existing definitions tend to be difficult to operationalise (e.g. Schedler 1996), fail to disentangle key concepts from one another (e.g. Abedi 2004), and/or misunderstand party behaviour and how it does (not) alter party ideology (e.g. Zulianello 2018). These problems with categorisation are too fundamental to ignore and have to be rectified. An original definition for the term ‘anti-establishment party’ is developed in chapter two in order to address these concerns.

Secondly, this thesis analyses both populist left- and right-wing AEPs together. It is argued that they benefit from a crisis of representation; their voters are (radically) ideologically motivated, and perceive established parties as not being representative. This is *not* unique to one side of the political spectrum, but they are differentiated between radical socialism and nativism. They therefore represent distinct challenges to established parties. Analysing how populist left- and right-wing AEPs represent different aspects of this same phenomenon is a key contribution of this thesis.

Analysing only parties whose ideologies perfectly match is self-limiting and misses the wider phenomenon of discontent with the political establishment and desire for more radical policies. Only by understanding what their voters think and want will correct inferences about their rise to prominence be reached. Parties as disparate as Podemos and the (Dutch) Socialist Party, and the FPÖ and Fidesz are united by both their populist and anti-establishment nature. Both nativism and increased state involvement in the economy are fundamental attitudes that relate to what voters want the state to do, and the nation to look like, and determine if a voter will support, say, Podemos *or* Vox.

Recently, left and right AEP parties and their voters have been analysed together (e.g. Visser et al 2014; Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Spierings and Zaslove 2017; Rooduijn 2018). However, there is a tendency to focus on similarities between left and right, understating the role of differences in voter’s underlying ideologies, “leaving them conceptualized as, at most, *ad hoc*

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<sup>3</sup> Here, the term ‘anti-establishment’ is used colloquially; other definitions may use different terms, though the overall aim remains the same.

exceptions that prove a rule that the radical left and radical right share more than they contest (emphasis in original)” (Rooduijn et al 2017, p.555).

Hobolt and Tilley (2016), and Rooduijn et al (2017) are some of the very few studies which explicitly look for differences in populist left- and right-wing AEP attitudes. The former, however, speculate that populist AEP voters may be tempted to return to established parties depending on their responses (2016, p.986). It is not entirely clear, though, how established parties would be able to win over centre left-/right-wing and more radical left-/right-wing voters at the same time where a populist AEP already exists. Would centrist voters become more radical? Would populist AEP voters become less radical? Established parties have been well-aware of populist AEPs for many years and have hardly neutralised them. Rooduijn et al (2017, p.538) argue that radical parties win over discontented voters who have clear ideological preferences, but stress that fundamental left-right differences are becoming more polarised. Increased polarisation should lead to a more receptive electorate for populist AEPs.

Therefore, even on the rare occasions that literature is focusing on the wider phenomenon of populist left- and right-wing AEP success, it comes to differing conclusions. This shortfall in literature as well as lack of consensus means further research, in much more depth, is needed. This is done by arguing that a desire for fundamental reform, along with a populist ideology, is common to all populist AEPs. Because they hold ideologically radical attitudes, they look set to remain part of European politics in the future.

This leads to the third issue; previous research is often limited in its scope. This applies to a) geography (Western Europe *or* Central and Eastern Europe),<sup>4</sup> and/or b) unit of analysis (parties *or* voters). While there are often good reasons to do so, as above, both similarities and differences that are fundamentally interesting and meaningful can be missed.

Regarding geography, this thesis analyses populist AEPs across 31 countries, both Western and Central and Eastern Europe. This thesis analyses populist AEP support in Europe specifically as there is a broad degree of variation in the continent: countries with large and small economies; countries inside and outside of the EU; centralised countries and federal republics; countries with populist AEPs on both sides of the political spectrum or just one side. Europe is therefore a region worth analysing in detail, as populist AEPs are present in a variety of countries. Political competition throughout Europe is conducted under a general framework of democracy and capitalism (as well as, increasingly, the EU), and with similar issue dimensions (Kriesi et al 2006; Mudde 2007, p.3-4).

It is usually the case that researchers examine Western or Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Betz 1993; Pirro 2015). Kriesi (2014, p.372-75) points out that supporters of populist parties do so because they feel they are poorly represented. This is absolutely not unique to any one geographic region. A comparison between both regions is possible where populist *anti-establishment* parties are the focus, rather than populist parties more broadly. Centrist populist parties are more common in Central and Eastern Europe such as Smer (Slovakia) or Res Publica (Estonia) (Kriesi 2014, p.372-75). Such parties, however, hold no real aim of fundamental change, unlike, say, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia.

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<sup>4</sup> In the context of Europe, though comparative cross-regional research is even less common

The key criterion is therefore whether populist parties are *also* anti-establishment. Analysing populist AEPs rather than all AEPs ensures comparability, as populism (Mudde 2004) manifests itself similarly regardless of left-right party ideology. As a thin-centred ideology (Freeden 1998) in its own right, populism can be attached to a variety of other ideologies (Mudde 2004).<sup>5</sup> Left- or right-wing, populists are anti-elitist and argue that they stand up for the people (Mudde 2004; Rooduijn et al 2014). Populism has been observed on both the left- and right-wing of the political spectrum (Mudde 2004, p.549-51; Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). The following analyses are consistent with this, showing that populist AEP voters, left- or right-wing, share populist attitudes.

The rise of populist AEPs is, at its most fundamental level, due to an increasingly radicalised electorate and the perceived unrepresentativeness of the political establishment. Electorates have steadily moved away from the centre-ground (Knutsen 1998a) and issues such as Euroscepticism, immigration and inequality have risen in salience (Rooduijn et al 2017). Failure to take this into account risks misleading inferences regarding the patterns of political competition in Europe, East or West.

Lastly, it is very common for research to examine either parties (e.g. Abou-Chadi 2016) *or* voters (e.g. Rydgren 2008) (supply- or demand-side). However, a key component of this thesis is the notion that parties and voters are not independent actors who operate in a vacuum. Where it is argued that very different parties share similarities as well as differences, and that a lot of these factors are due to how voters respond to structural- and system-level factors, it necessitates that both the supply- and demand-side need to be examined. Particularly where the key objective of this thesis is to examine how factors such as the economy and representativeness of political parties affect populist AEPs, examining only the supply- or demand-side would not be sufficient.

Regarding governing populist AEPs, for instance, studies by Akkerman (2011), and Akkerman and de Lange (2013) argue that governing populist AEPs do not lose votes if they adapt to office but do not test individual-level support for such governments. This thesis therefore models not only the country-, party- and voter-level but also how voters interact with and perceive government and parties. For instance, it is demonstrated in chapter five that populist AEP voters are happy to support governing populist AEPs if they perform well in the eyes of voters. This offers new insights into why populist AEP voters support these parties.

As a further case in point, where only the demand-side is studied, often only one timepoint is used through cross-section surveys. This hinders the analysis of the evolution of parties and their electorates over time or as a response to certain events (such as the financial crisis). Indeed, as will be argued in chapter two, parties both can and do change their platforms over time. As such, this thesis analyses pooled cross-section time series data as well as repeated cross-sectional data over time for the same countries in order to understand how, if at all, populist AEPs have changed over time.

In sum, while there is a large amount of scholarship on populist AEPs and their voters, there are considerable gaps that remain. These are addressed in the following chapters. Specifically, scholars tend to miss the wider phenomenon, often placing too little emphasis

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<sup>5</sup> i.e. populism itself does not predict whether a party favours redistribution of wealth or restrictions on immigration

on the anti-establishment element of populist AEPs, instead either focusing on very narrow definitions (thus missing important trends), or shoehorn parties into an unsuitable framework. Inconsistent case-selection using theoretically unjustified definitions can often exacerbate the issue. There are also often shortcomings with the scope of previous research which do not allow for a full understanding of how the supply- and demand-side interact with each other.

### **Analysing similarities *and* differences between left *and* right**

Taking the above discussion into account there are a number of key contributions of this thesis to the wider literature on populist AEP support. Firstly, by analysing populist left- and right-wing AEPs together, they can be considered to both benefit from similar causes. Most literature examines left *or* right, and therefore remains very separated despite there being notable similarities between left and right. Secondly, and crucially, there are clear differences in their voters' attitudes on a left-right basis which are the key drivers that determine support for a populist left- *or* right-wing AEP.

These key differences primarily consist of nativism, on the right, and radical socialism, on the left. Two socio-economically similar voters (e.g. less-educated, working class men) may both support a populist AEP. If one, however, holds radical socialist attitudes, and the other holds nativist attitudes they would support *different* populist AEPs (left- and right-wing, respectively). Such key ideological differences best predict populist left- *or* right-wing AEP support and need to be considered to accurately understand who supports each party, and why.

In sum, socio-demographics are important in identifying which voters (the economically vulnerable) are more likely in general to be receptive to populist left- *or* right-wing AEP messaging. The parties themselves, left- and right-wing, benefit from similar political opportunity structures such as convergence. However, (left-right) attitudes truly determine *which* party such voters support because attitudes such as nativism or radical socialism dictate why the voter feels as though they are poorly represented. The depth and breadth of such differences are not clear from existing literature.

Populist AEPs are ideologically disparate and can be found on both the left- and right-wing of the political spectrum, and many European countries have at least two. Populist AEP support depends on voters feeling politically homeless and that there needs to be a real alternative. One of the most significant divides to have emerged in European politics over the last few decades is that of the so-called 'winners vs losers' of globalisation (Kriesi et al 2006; Kriesi 2016). The 'losers' of globalisation tend to be more inclined to support populist AEPs because they emphasise economic protectionism and seek to protect the nation, ideals that such voters largely believe in (Kriesi et al 2006, p.922).

Voters with lower levels of education tend to have less advanced skills which has seen them struggle to adapt to a rapidly changing labour market, a process that can be identified across Europe. This is coupled with widening wealth and income inequality (Inglehart & Norris 2017). In addition to this, major established parties tend to be associated with these trends, both left- or right-wing. Therefore, many voters perceive there to be an unresponsive political establishment with no real alternative major party to turn to (Hobolt & Tilley 2016, p.977). Instead, populist AEPs consciously address voters using anti-elitist rhetoric and argue that

they understand the economic struggles of voters as well as offering a real alternative (Rooduijn et al 2017, p.541).

As such, there are a number of similarities that enable populist left- and right-wing AEPs to be analysed together. They benefit from political opportunity structures such as weakening economies and they appeal to voters who feel left out of politics. However, the majority of studies that analyse such parties tends to be done on a left- *or* right-wing basis (e.g. Oesch 2008; Rydgren 2008; Ramiro 2016) and reach similar conclusions regarding socio-economic background. This is problematic because it inherently understates the scope of the wider phenomenon by not identifying that there is, in general, an increasing trend towards populist, anti-establishment politics among more economically vulnerable voters.

This is not unique to any one single side of the political spectrum as populist AEPs can be identified on both the left and right, such as Podemos and Die Linke, and Fidesz and Lega. Where established politics is perceived by voters as offering no real choice, and only serves to widen inequalities and benefit elites, populist left- and right-wing AEPs thrive by combining anti-elitism with calls to fundamentally alter firmly established policies. Those of a lower socio-economic class are more receptive to such rhetoric as they are less likely to adhere to established politics, having had different experiences with factors such as education and employment which leads to more radical attitudes. Such voters are more likely to perceive that their own attitudes are not being well represented in government. These attitudes are the true drivers of populist AEP support, not socio-economic class alone.

Studies that analyse left- *or* right-wing support tend to emphasise the importance of ideology that is left-right directional (e.g. wealth inequality). However, those that analyse left- *and* right-wing support together often do not focus on ideology or search just for ideological similarities (Visser et al 2014; Spierings & Zaslove 2017; Rooduijn 2018). Rooduijn (2019) notes on a similar issue that populism and anti-establishment party literatures rarely engage with each other despite both being able to provide valuable knowledge to each specialism. Those studies that analyse both the left- and right-wing have a similar issue where they emphasise similarities and under-emphasise the importance of left-right attitudes and ideology.

Similarities are undoubtedly important but focusing on them too much risks obfuscating populist AEP support.<sup>6</sup> Studies such as those by Hobolt and Tilley (2016) and Rooduijn et al (2017) only just scratch the surface of this substantial gap in literature. Populist AEP voters certainly share their socio-demographic similarities, but they are largely ideologically motivated. This is a key contribution of this thesis compared to studies that search primarily for similarities between the left- and right-wing (e.g. Visser et al 2014; Spierings & Zaslove 2017; Rooduijn 2018). Left- or right-wing specific ideologies (primarily radical socialism and nativism respectively) are key drivers behind populist left- or right-wing AEP support. While there are similarities (especially socio-demographically), these ideological differences are key to understanding which specific populist AEP a voter supports, and why.

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<sup>6</sup> Similarities are important (such as ideological radicalism/dissatisfaction with the established choices on offer, Euroscepticism, populist attitudes etc) because they show that populist AEPs are variations of the same phenomenon and that certain voters believe that established politics has let them down. However, the differences between left and right must be studied; missing the *variation* of the phenomenon serves only to misunderstand how voters feel about crucial issues

Over the last few decades, there has been an increase in the number of voters who are more concerned around issues such as nativism and wealth distribution, who also perceive that only certain parties both understand their concerns and truly offer that change. Socio-economic vulnerability does not predict support for nativism over radical redistribution of wealth (or vice versa). Instead, it is an indicator that a voter will support *either* policy position over more established, less radical policy options. The key difference between populist left- *or* right-wing AEP support, as such, is *why* the voter feels out of step with established politics as opposed to their socio-demographics.

Populist left- or right-wing AEP support is largely determined by radical socialist or nativist attitudes (respectively); these are the key differences between the two. Voters with such attitudes search for parties that they perceive as being representative of such views. Established parties have struggled to convince many voters throughout Europe that they are the best party to deal with issues such as income inequality or immigration. The following analyses even show that attitudes such as Euroscepticism are common to populist AEP support in general.

This, however, would still belie the importance of nativism and radical socialism: voters on the left oppose the EU because they dislike its economic policies, or free movement on the right. These differences, as such, are important when considering that populist left- and right-wing AEPs are *similar* (in terms of the socio-demographic background of their support and political system-level factors leading to their rise in support), but they share crucial distinctions around nativism and radical socialism. In sum, more voters are becoming motivated by these two issues, and are readily perceiving that established parties do not offer a real alternative. At the same time, partisan identity is weakening, leading to increased electoral volatility: more voters are more willing to switch party support (Rooduijn et al 2017, p.538). There are two specific reasons as to why these differences, in holding radical socialist *or* nativist attitudes, between populist left- or right-wing AEP support are important. Firstly, they show how important it is for voters to perceive themselves to be well-represented. Secondly, they demonstrate that populist AEPs represent distinct challenges to the political establishment.

Regarding the former point, populist AEP voters are not supporting such parties out of simple economically motivated protest. Instead, they turn to such parties when they perceive ideological incongruence between themselves and established politics. Populist AEPs, after all, have been prominent actors in a variety of countries such as Austria, Italy, Hungary, Poland and the Netherlands for many years. Events such as the 2008/09 financial crisis led to a fall in satisfaction with governments and the political establishment (Armingeon & Guthman 2014) and led to a prolonged political crisis (Kriesi 2016), sharpening existing political divides and increasing the salience and bitterness around issues such as immigration, the EU and wealth distribution.<sup>7</sup>

This thesis demonstrates that there are clear ideological determinants (primarily nativism or radical redistribution of wealth) of populist left- or right-wing AEP support that persist when controlling for socio-demographics. So, at the individual-level, populist AEPs do not simply win the votes of the less wealthy; they win the votes of the ideologically radicalised,

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<sup>7</sup> As such, factors such as the financial crisis created *more* voters who could potentially support a populist AEP (i.e. it accelerated existing trends, but did not in and of itself cause populist AEP support).



politically dissatisfied. Such voters are more likely to be of a lower socio-economic class due to their experiences and interactions with the economy and established political parties, but they are primarily motivated by ideology (Van der Brug et al 2000). Populist AEPs seek to address their own voter's inequality by addressing *certain* policy issues, such as multiculturalism or radical redistribution, as well as by claiming that only they actually offer such an alternative (Rooduijn et al 2017).

In sum, voters have clear policy preferences or attitudes (which also persist over time); primarily nativism among the right-wing and radical socialism among the left-wing (Heath et al 1994; Ansolabehere et al 2008). Moreover, they also wish that these attitudes are put into practice and are well-represented by governments and/or parties. Hence, voters support parties on the basis of ideology (Downs 1957; Van der Brug et al 2000). Socio-demographics help to determine ideology to an extent (e.g. pro-/anti-globalisation; pro-/anti-immigration), particularly in relation to how political competition is structured more broadly (e.g. class-based cleavages) (Van der Brug et al 2000, p.95-96).

However, since the 1980s such structures have been weakening and those of a lower socio-economic class are increasingly motivated by nativism *or* radical redistribution. Studies that examine similarities between populist left- and right-wing AEPs only look at one aspect of the phenomenon. Ideological differences between socio-economically similar voters clearly matter as populist left- and right-wing AEPs coexist, often within countries. However, literature often fails to take this into account (e.g. Visser et al 2014; Spierings & Zaslove 2017; Rooduijn 2018). In order to fully understand who supports such parties, and why, research needs to examine ideological differences (Van der Brug et al 2000, p.95-96; Rooduijn et al 2017).

This leads to the second, and final, reason as to why ideological differences are important to examine. For all their similarities, populist AEPs also represent polarisation in countries where they coexist; an aspect that chapter six examines in more detail. Left- or right-wing, their voters share more in common socio-demographically than they do attitudinally. Beyond populist attitudes and perceived convergence, the only attitude that is really common to populist AEP support is Euroscepticism. Even the manner in which this is expressed, though, is determined by left- or right-wing ideology and attitudes.

As such, it is right to speak of a wider populist AEP phenomenon, but not a populist AEP family. (Socio-economically) similar voters are united by what they oppose but not what they propose. This is as symptomatic of increasing polarisation as it is of disaffection with the political establishment. Populist attitudes, established party convergence and dissatisfaction with democracy are all strong predictors of populist left- or right-wing AEP support. These, however, are not unidirectional; there is no inherent left- or right-wing affinity with any of these attitudes.

Instead, the increased prominence of such radicalised attitudes demonstrates that populist AEPs are a variation of the same phenomenon. Discontent with the political system is linked to the increased salience of more radical attitudes among many voters. However, where political competition is increasingly centred around debates such as 'open vs closed societies' or 'pro- vs anti-globalisation' it will become harder for more centrist, established parties to hold on to moderate voters as well as win over radical voters.

Hobolt and Tilley's article (2016, p.986) posits that established parties could win back more radical voters by offering clearly distinct policies. Rooduijn et al's (2017) study, however, argues that European electorates and political systems are becoming more stretched and polarised. As such, even literature that searches for evidence of differences between left and right offers alternative viewpoints. The analyses below all demonstrate the importance of attitudes, and unless more centrist parties can find a way of balancing more moderate and more radical voters at the same time and/or defuse existing political divides it is likely populist AEPs will continue to remain significant actors in European politics.

### **An overview of the thesis**

The thesis starts by proposing a framework spelling out the need to analyse the country-, party- and individual-level to fully understand how populist AEPs win votes. Populist AEPs are more likely to win more support with a poorly performing economy, converging established parties and where they face fewer ideological competitors (Kitschelt 1986; Katz & Mair 1995). The voters themselves are economically vulnerable, but ideologically radical and have clear policy preferences (Betz 1993; Ramiro 2016). The majority of research on populist AEPs, though, tends to focus on just one such level.<sup>8</sup> Parties are always affected by political opportunity structures and are constantly interacting with voters (Stimson et al 1995; Adams et al 2004). Understanding their variation in success necessitates the study of all three levels under a common framework.

After this, the term 'anti-establishment party' is defined in chapter two. It is argued that previous definitions are flawed, often resulting in inconsistent and/or poor case selection, which makes drawing conclusions difficult (an issue both Mudde (2017a, p.9) and Pappas (2016, p.22) raise concern about). The new definition avoids such problems by focusing largely on whether or not the party ideologically offers fundamental reform of the political system. The chapter as such demonstrates that populist AEPs, across the political spectrum, are comparable in terms of their strategy.

Following this, four separate analyses test implications of the theoretical argument, utilising a rich variety of data sources and advanced quantitative methods. The first quantitative analysis, in chapter three, is of populist AEP support in European Parliamentary elections, spanning the years 2004-14. It demonstrates the importance in considering attitudes over socio-demographics in populist AEP support. Their voters are ideologically radical and Eurosceptic but left-right differences remain. As such, populist AEP voters do not mindlessly support the first party they come across, but instead search out a party that represents them. It is important to focus on *why* populist AEP supporters vote for them, not just their similarities (Rooduijn et al 2017) in order to be able to truly understand their success (and whether they will retain support which is less likely if it is just temporary protest).

However, populist AEP supporter attitudes shifted and became more solidified over time, especially regarding both immigration and Euroscepticism. This shows that Rooduijn et al's (2017) 'radical distinction' is not a fixed constant throughout time. It is therefore important to

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<sup>8</sup> Notable studies that examine just the aggregate-level include Jackman and Volpert (1993), and Golder (2003). Those that look only at parties include: Mudde (2007) and Rooduijn et al (2014). Those that look at just the voter-level include Akkerman et al (2014) and Rooduijn (2018)

understand how party support changes over time, particularly regarding events as momentous as the financial crisis.

Chapter four moves on to a country- and party-level analysis of populist AEP vote shares over time, covering over 230 elections from 1980-2019. As a whole, the chapter shows empirically that populist AEPs are comparable, both in terms of where they succeed, and their strategy. It is demonstrated that populist AEPs do indeed benefit from more favourable circumstances: a poorly performing economy, established party convergence and fewer AEP competitors. Furthermore, falling disposable income and greater inequality also lead to higher vote shares for populist AEPs.

However, it is also demonstrated that populist AEPs stick around once the economy improves, showing that their support is not that of temporary protest (Kriesi 2016 p.29). This underlines the importance of also studying voter's attitudes; populist AEP supporters are not *just* motivated by the economy. It is also shown that entering government costs populist AEPs votes: when a party claims to offer a true alternative, voters clearly have high expectations that may prove difficult to meet. Heinisch's (2003) notion that populism is destined to fail in office is challenged. Instead it is argued that populist AEPs that adapt are not punished by the electorate. This further shows that populist AEPs serve to clearly represent voter attitudes, not as vehicles of simple, temporary protest.

Chapter five delves further into populist AEP voter attitudes. They are indeed motivated by clear policy preferences, and reward governing populist AEPs when they meet voter expectations. As such, they want clear representation, not to simply protest; increasing populist AEP voter satisfaction with democracy does not bring them back to the centre. By analysing how voters engage with parties and governments, it adds nuance to Hobolt and Tilley's (2016, p.985-86) findings, who speculate that the established parties can win back such voters.

By analysing voter attitudes towards governing populist AEPs, this also fills a considerable gap left by Akkerman (2011) and Akkerman and De Lange (2013), who all focus only on party strategy. It is also shown that nativism as an ideology can be measured, predicting populist right-wing AEP support. This is an improvement over studies which rely only on anti-immigration attitudes (Hobolt & Tilley 2016; Akkerman et al 2017; Rooduin et al 2017). This is done so by taking into account the importance of not only anti-immigration attitudes/xenophobia, but also how threatened voters perceive the nation to be.

Lastly, chapter six analyses national election study data to offer a more detailed overview of populist AEP supporter attitudes. All populist AEPs have their quirks, but there are similar patterns in support across time and space. Their voters are motivated by populist, anti-establishment attitudes; they feel as though the political establishment does not represent them. They feel this way because they hold radical attitudes, and so are motivated by the same fundamental reasons (a perceived lack of representation). Definitions of parties that focus on a narrow sub-set of parties on one side of the political spectrum (e.g. Mudde (2017a, p.5-6)) can miss the wider phenomenon of discontent with the political establishment, which is not limited to any one single party family.

The chapter also shows that the gender-gap in populist AEP support is non-existent in older, larger and more mainstreamed populist AEPs. This lends support to Mudde's (hitherto

unexplored) notion that the *perception* of a party's radicalism causes the gender-gap in populist AEP support (2007, p.116). The chapter lastly shows that populist right-wing AEP voters are motivated by issue salience, unlike populist left-wing AEP voters. Populist right-wing AEPs therefore are better suited to carving out niche territory than those on the left.

Each chapter, therefore, uncovers key aspects behind populist AEPs and their voters. Chapters one and two argue that populist AEPs rely on the support of voters who feel unrepresented as they hold more radical ideologies. Chapter three demonstrates the importance of attitudes and ideology to their voters. Chapter four then moves to show the importance of considering the supply-side, as parties also need to adapt to their environment. Lastly, chapters five and six provide in-depth analyses of populist AEP voters' attitudes and their interaction with the political system. This demonstrates the importance of understanding they are not defined simply by what they oppose (the political establishment), but also by what they believe in.

In sum, this thesis offers an analysis over both time and space, as well as the political spectrum, to demonstrate that populist AEPs are variations of the same phenomenon. Their voters have strong, clear beliefs that they perceive are not being represented. Populist left-wing AEP voters are motivated by radical socialism, and populist right-wing AEP voters are motivated by nativism. The parties, therefore, rise to success on the basis of similar structural trends and voter attitudes, but offer very different answers in line with their left-right ideology.

### **Analysing voters, parties and countries**

As the above section demonstrates, this thesis analyses data in four chapters at three different levels (voters, parties and countries). The analyses conducted throughout the thesis are essentially done on a dataset-by-dataset basis. There are multiple possible ways of organising empirical analyses, and this is just one option. Nevertheless, it is preferable to proceed in this manner as opposed to other options. Alternative approaches would be either a country case-study approach (e.g. one chapter each on a Northern, Central and Eastern, Southern and Western European country) or a more thematic approach (e.g. one chapter each on the role that nativism, inequality, Euroscepticism etc play in determining populist AEP success).

Populist AEPs, as argued in chapters one and two, benefit from similar political opportunity structures (such as established party convergence) which are not unique to any one country or region. Likewise, they share many ideological similarities such as populism, which enables them to broaden their appeal and readily capitalise on wider anti-elitist sentiment and Euroscepticism. Populist AEPs on the same side of the political spectrum also share further ideological similarities (e.g. nativism) even if they are not part of a party family such as the populist radical right (e.g. Fidesz or UKIP). These similarities are to be found across both time and space and are also shared by voters as well as the parties they support.

There are also similarities at the country-level. Issues around the EU, liberal capitalism and its associated increase in income inequality, multiculturalism alongside wider trends such as the decline of industry and the expansion of higher education are identifiable across the entire continent. Likewise, political competition tends to be structured in similar manners across Europe (i.e. the left-right axis) (Kriesi et al 2006; Mudde 2007, p.3-4).

Despite the diversity of countries within Europe, there are clearly identifiable ideological frames and strategies common to populist AEPs. Parties with similar goals and ideologies are always learning from each other and applying what works to themselves (Rydgren 2005). These similar frames and strategies are further facilitated by the shared liberal democratic, capitalist, increasingly post-industrial frameworks common to Europe. As such, the *precise* detail of any two countries will always differ. However, there are demonstrably clear similarities and trends that are common across the continent and because of this, populist AEPs can capitalise on the same, or very similar, opportunities.<sup>9</sup>

The purpose of this thesis is to identify what is common and different to populist AEPs and their support across Europe. This means a country-by-country case-study approach would not be ideal because the same trends can be identified *throughout* Europe. The approach taken in this thesis instead is to analyse more elections in more countries in order to identify trends over time that can be generalised. This is preferable because it shows the extent of the phenomenon, whereas chapters going into individual case-studies would lead to a level of depth that makes it difficult to separate country-specific peculiarities from wider trends.

The second approach, to study certain themes one at a time is also a possibility, yet still unsuitable for the purposes of this thesis. Themes such as multiculturalism, inequality, Euroscepticism, socio-economic trends and political attitudes are important in determining populist AEP success, as demonstrated throughout this thesis. However, they are all important at the same time and interact with each other in a variety of ways, which means that they should be controlled for in any model. For instance, it would be difficult to analyse the role that the EU has played in populist AEP success without considering immigration and capitalism (and vice versa). Likewise, socio-demographic changes have affected party competition, which have macro-level causes, but at the same time socio-demographic changes affect public attitudes which *also* affects party competition.

As such, focusing on specific themes and trends, and analysing their effects on populist AEP support, would become exceedingly complicated where important concepts need to be controlled for. Instead, the thesis takes the approach of analysing data at the individual-, party- and country-level separately in order to tackle certain research questions.

Chapter three begins at the individual-level to determine whether or not populist AEP electorates have changed over time and whether or not there are both similarities and differences. The thesis begins by analysing voter behaviour using the European Election Study for three reasons. Firstly, the primary purpose of elections and party politics is to represent voters. Secondly, and related, attitudes are a central tenet of this thesis and so starting the analysis at the individual-level signals the importance of understanding voter attitudes. Thirdly, the European Election Study is uniquely suited to the purposes of the thesis because it consists of elections in all EU member states over time. As the thesis studies populist AEPs across the whole continent, this is a particularly useful dataset.

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<sup>9</sup> As a case in point, each country in Europe had very different experiences of the financial crisis and austerity measures. However, populist AEPs even in lesser-affected countries were still able to capitalise on the issue of the sovereign debt crisis by attacking the EU, liberal capitalism etc and by arguing that it will spread to themselves without change. A discussion of populism following the financial crisis in Europe is offered by Kriesi and Pappas (2015).

Chapter four moves on to the aggregate- and party-level in order to analyse political opportunity structures and party behaviour and ideology. Populist AEPs themselves have agency at the supply-side but are also constrained by factors beyond their control. This deserves significant attention because parties cannot simply create voters out of thin air. Instead, they may need to rely to some extent on other factors which affect voter attitudes and salience of certain issues.

Chapters five and six both move back to individual-level analyses and both serve different purposes. Chapter five analyses voter interactions with and perceptions of the political system in more depth, and chapter six analyses voter attitudes in further depth. As with chapter three, this is best done on a dataset-by-dataset basis because certain survey projects focus on certain purposes and therefore have limited items available for analysis. This allows for a more in-depth analysis of the issues in the surveys, and also limits issues regarding validity that typically arise when analysing the same concept using potentially very different question designs in the same analysis.

Chapter five focuses on voter interaction with the political system because of the importance of voters' satisfaction with how they are represented. The questions available in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and its geographic and temporal scope make this a particularly useful dataset. Particularly when immediately following on from chapter four, it demonstrates that voter behaviour is influenced not just by ideology but also by how the political system represents such ideologies.

Lastly, it would be remiss to not study the attitudes of populist AEP voters in more depth than chapters three and five go into given the importance of understanding what exactly populist AEP voters think. There are a variety of issues that are important in any political arena at any time which national election studies are perfectly suited at capturing. The level of depth that such surveys go into is unrivalled, and they therefore allow a more in-depth analysis of populist AEP voter attitudes. In particular, the chapter is able to go into more depth in analysing populist left- or right-wing voters in the same country (such as France and Germany). This is particularly understudied in literature, and the chapter shows the level of polarisation that these parties represent, beyond attitudes such as Euroscepticism and anti-elitism.

As such, all four empirical chapters serve specific purposes and provide new insights into populist AEP support, being guided by theory from chapters one and two. The dataset-by-dataset analysis is most appropriate as it allows for generalisable trends to be identified using high-quality surveys and datasets. At the same time, issues such as the validity of directly comparing distinct datasets are avoided.

## Chapter I

### A theoretical overview of populist AEP behaviour and support

#### Introduction

This chapter serves two purposes; to review major trends and findings in literature pertaining to populist AEPs and their voters, and secondly to outline the core hypotheses of this thesis. In doing so, it asks two main questions: how is AEP success determined by a combination of factors at the country-, party- and voter-level? How similar are populist AEPs (and their voters) to one another? This chapter, as such, spells out two key contributions of this thesis: analysing populist left- *and* right-wing AEPs, giving a clear understanding of the wider phenomenon. It also explains the importance of analysing all three of these levels, given their importance to populist AEP success.

Ultimately, populist AEPs tend to be Eurosceptic and focus their platform on one key issue (nativism on the right-wing, and radical socialism on the left-wing). Their Euroscepticism helps to translate broader, more abstract nationalism into something concrete. In order to find increased success, populist AEPs also rely on a poorly performing economy and established party convergence. Or, in other words, populist AEPs benefit from political opportunity structures; there are more favourable circumstances for them to compete in.

However, they cannot simply rely on being in the right place at the right time. Tapping into an electorate characterised by volatility and widespread disillusionment requires substantive policy proposals in addition to populist campaigning. Populist AEP support therefore is ideological in nature; they prosper where voters with strong attitudes feel poorly represented. Taking into account the country-, party- and voter-level will lead to a more accurate understanding of varying populist AEP success, and also their similarities.

The chapter is split into four sections to answer the above two questions. Firstly, country-level factors that affect populist AEP success are discussed. Specifically, these are the economy and established party convergence. Secondly, party-level factors are discussed. This includes issue ownership and party platforms, party behaviour and competition, and the importance of examining both the supply- and demand-side in addition to the relationship between public opinion and party platforms. Thirdly, key literature is discussed in relation to voting behaviour and party support to complement the earlier discussion of party platforms.<sup>10</sup> These first three sections, then, define key terms and their relevance to populist AEPs. Finally, section four discusses an overall picture of populist AEP success, combining country-, party- and voter-level factors.

## I

### Country-level factors

Political opportunity structures are defined as “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others” (Kitschelt 1986, p.58). A variety of such factors are tested in this thesis such as the electoral

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<sup>10</sup> Literature relating to party categorisation and labelling is not discussed in this chapter, as this forms a substantial component of chapter two

system, but two in particular are conducive to the success of populist AEPs. Namely, a weakening economy and established party convergence lead more and more voters to lose trust in the political establishment, increasing the potential pool of voters for populist AEPs.

### **The financial crisis: economic voting and voter volatility**

The fallout of the 2008 financial crisis was widespread, leading to bailouts of several Eurozone countries, huge financial losses and an increase in voter volatility due to anger with elected officials. Economic voting, and the financial crisis in particular, is important for two reasons.

Firstly, it provided populist AEPs with a window of opportunity to not only attack the political establishment's (in)ability to represent voters, but also to attack the political system itself. Economic voting entails that the government at the time of financial crises will be punished at the ballot box, and the sheer extent of the crisis magnified the issue across Europe. It also led to criticism of the EU and economic policy in wealthier, less affected Northern European countries which lent extensive sums of money to the worst-hit countries (Ivaldi 2018, p.285; Pirro & van Kessel 2018, p.333-35). As such, economic voting combined with the financial crisis' myriad effects increased the opportunities for populist AEPs to increase their vote shares.

Secondly, and in relation, voter volatility increased during this time. Economic voting has been consistently researched and shows that when the economy performs well the government is rewarded and, conversely, when the economy performs poorly the government is punished (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2007, p.518; Lewis-Beck & Whitten 2013, p.393). There are typically two different measures of the economy: pocketbook or sociotropic. The former refers to individual financial health, and the latter refers to the entire country's financial health (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2007, p.521; Hobolt & Tilley 2016, p.977).

It has been found that "when responsibility for managing the economy is less clear, it is harder for the voter to attach blame, and the economic vote is diluted" (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2007, p.528). One further aspect to consider, along these lines, is not just the attribution of responsibility to individual parties, but whether or not responsibility for the economy lies purely with the government itself.

By its very nature, the EU leads to increased cooperation, politically and economically and the single market has led to increasingly inter-twined economies, especially after the adoption of the Euro. The increased importance of other institutions may affect economic voting as voters become less likely to attribute blame and responsibility to governments (Talving 2018, p.698-99). Serricchio et al (2013, p.60-61) have argued that the EU became more important and visible in dealing with the economic crisis as it progressed into a sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012, p.527) found that economic voting was reduced in South European countries following the economic crisis as the EU is held responsible for the economy. However, populist AEPs utilise both a populist ideology and Euroscepticism, framing elites and the EU as enemies of the people. The EU's increased salience and the severity of the crisis should therefore benefit populist AEPs where it was blamed by voters.

Furthermore, literature has focused on the role that partisan identity plays with economic perceptions. It is now commonly accepted that partisan identification is a major factor in one's perception of the economy (Evans & Andersen 2006; Evans & Pickup 2010). Indeed,



Bailey (2019, p.1) points out that “[i]f partisanship confounds economic voting models, then decades of inference are at risk. Worryingly, this appears to be the case.” Further research has indicated that while partisan identity does affect one’s perception of the economy, voters do not do so in a uniform manner. De Vries et al (2018) argue that supporters of the government are much more optimistic about the economy than supporters of opposition parties, but that this partisan identity of the governing party does not override concerns about the economy. In other words, partisan bias is a major factor in voter’s perception of the economy, but receiving correct information about the economy can cause voters to re-evaluate their perception of the economy.

Bailey (2019) also finds that voters do update their perceptions of the economy in response to changes in the economy, but that they do so at different rates. When the economy performs poorly, voter perceptions move closer to convergence, but when the economy performs well voter perceptions diverge. Non-partisans may well be the voters that cause governments to be rewarded or punished; the aggregate electorate may mean economic voting holds true, and the individual-level mechanisms are affected by partisan identity (Bailey 2019, p.11-12). The voters who are more likely to switch to populist AEPs would be those whose attitudes are not fully aligned with established parties.

### **Established party convergence: voter disillusionment and depoliticised issues**

Established party convergence is a key issue to the success of populist AEPs. This section discusses the importance of Katz and Mair’s (1995) notion of ‘cartel parties’ and differentiates between the effects of convergence on the supply-side and demand-side. The causal mechanism differs depending on whether one analyses parties or voters.

Katz and Mair argue that traditional parties (of the right) took on a ‘catch-all’ nature (i.e. they did not limit their appeal to particular social classes, though there were different levels of success depending on social class). Furthermore, as the state developed and began to offer expanded welfare policies, and social conditions improved, such responsibilities and distinctiveness were gradually removed from mass-parties. Upon achieving office, these mass-parties wished to continue to win office and so broadened their appeal beyond class-lines, too. Katz and Mair refer to this as the development of traditional left- and right-wing parties converging to the “catch-all party model” (Katz & Mair 1995, p.11-12). The “interpenetration of party and state” results in ‘cartel parties’ whereby there is increased “collusion and cooperation” (Katz & Mair 1995, p.16-17).

Cartel parties were argued to be more developed in countries with proportional representation (PR), unlike the United Kingdom (UK) which has a more adversarial system and limited state support for parties. A further development of cartel parties is the ‘professionalisation’ of politics, and competition between parties is more managed and controlled (Katz & Mair 1995, p.19-20) This professionalisation of politics leads to parties competing as “fellow professionals” who all have job security and long-term careers in mind, “with whom business will have to be carried on over the long term” (Katz & Mair 1995, p.23). As such, they became less distinguishable from one another, leading to discontent among more voters who believe they must turn to much more radical parties to be represented.

As stated in the introduction, the same feelings of being poorly represented are still true in Central and Eastern Europe. The largest difference is, as Kriesi (2014, p.373) argued

“mainstream parties of West European party systems are *no longer* adequately representing their constituencies, the Central and Eastern European party systems have not yet produced mainstream parties that adequately represent their constituencies” (emphasis in original). The comparison is therefore valid in so far as the objective is to study *anti-establishment* parties because they all aim to offer fundamental change, unlike populist establishment parties that are common in Central and Eastern Europe (Kriesi 2014, p.375).

### **Demand-side convergence: voter disillusionment at the choices on offer**

The idea that established parties are increasingly indistinguishable fuels populist, anti-establishment sentiment among voters; many voters do not feel adequately represented. This sentiment has been utilised by AEPs for many years, particularly on the right-wing (Betz 1993, p.417-19). Katz and Mair (1995, p.24) argued that one of the most common challenges to cartel parties is precisely based on questioning increased convergence. This can often be simple rhetoric, they note, pointing out that parties such as the Liberal Democrats in the UK and Democrats 66 in the Netherlands have been “more than willing to join the establishment”, and even Green parties (who have more deep-rooted opposition) have cooperated.

However, there can be more radical disillusionment, such as Vlaams Block in Belgium and the Front National in France whose popularity is as a result of their claims to be able to break up the established parties (Katz & Mair 1995, p.24). Populist AEPs and their politicians can argue to voters that there is no difference between the established centre-left and -right parties and that they are essentially self-serving. Van Kessel (2011, p.176) states “unresponsive established parties can create a fertile breeding ground for populist parties, yet the latter parties only become successful if they present themselves as credible alternatives”.

On that note, Knutsen (1998a) demonstrated that electorates increasingly shifted to the centre from the mid-1970s and on. This was argued to be driven by changing values and priorities as well as decreasing polarisation of major centre-left and centre-right parties. In addition, Knutsen (1998b) argued that the voter’s movement towards the centre helped lead to decreasing polarisation of party systems.

However, particularly following the financial crisis, more voters became discontented with democracy (Armingeon & Guthman 2014; Flesher Fominaya 2017). Voters therefore became more receptive to claims that the established political system is failing the people. Indeed, Rooduijn et al (2017, p.538) argue that politics is becoming more polarised on key issues such as EU integration, immigration and so on. As such, more voters are willing to challenge more centrist politics. Where voters are becoming more radical, the political establishment is inextricably linked with centrism. Established parties therefore struggle to win over more radical voters. Populist AEPs consequentially benefit from this as they can claim only they are radical enough. This also indicates, contrary to what the study by Hobolt & Tilley (2016) had established, that centrist parties will struggle to win back the support of radical voters.

### **Supply-side convergence: distinct party platforms and space in the political arena**

On the supply-side, as established parties become increasingly similar there is more ideological space for smaller parties. By converging closer to the centre, established centre-left and -right parties depoliticise issues as they focus more and more on issues that they both agree with (Rydgren 2005). Political competition, then, becomes a matter of valence issues

(whereby voters are faced with a choice, who is *most effective* at addressing key political issues) (Clarke et al 2011, p.238).

However, voters have clear ideological positions and those who feel poorly represented are likely to seek alternatives. As such, greater emphasis on shared issues among larger parties leads to a de-emphasis on other issues. By being offered more space, the populist AEP can consolidate its position in the political arena. Populist AEPs can use de-politicisation of issues to their advantage by heaving emphasis on alternative dimensions (Rydgren 2005, p.423).

Populist right-wing AEPs tend to focus on the socio-cultural dimension. Populist left-wing AEPs take on radical economic left-wing positions, typically favouring radical socialism. While this is not focusing on a new issue dimension, it is taking on a distinct position in the political system, as populist left-wing AEPs find greatest success when there is no viable anti-capitalist/anti-neoliberal *established* party.<sup>11</sup> Focusing on a ‘new’ issue dimension is not crucial; taking on a distinct platform and remaining distinct from established parties is most important. Where given more space, populist AEPs should also benefit from increased issue salience among the electorate on key issues given their more distinct position (Rydgren 2005, p.419).

So, following on from Katz and Mair’s (1995) discussion of cartel parties and voter disillusionment, this thesis argues that there is a demand-side mechanism leading to convergence. Voters evaluate established party positions and judge whether or not there are clear choices on offer. Voters do not simply become discontented under convergence; they also find a party that is ideologically closer to them. Having a clear, distinct platform from established parties enables populist AEPs to fully utilise their populist and radical rhetoric, enabling them to argue that they are truly different from the established parties. Indeed, van Kessel (2011, p.193-94) argues that populist party success depends not just on structural conditions such as the economy, but also on the “perceived responsiveness and integrity of established parties, and also on the agency of the populist parties themselves.”

This is not a uniquely left- or right-wing phenomenon. As all populist AEPs challenge established, converged parties, analysing *both* the populist left- and right-wing leads to the most realistic understanding of how much effect convergence has. Given a large enough supply of discontented voters, and an establishment that has converged (as in, say, Germany and Greece) very different populist AEPs can prosper simultaneously. Throughout Europe, both centre-left and centre-right parties have become increasingly intertwined with the current socio-economic system. It is therefore important to analyse how discontent has manifested itself across the political spectrum.

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<sup>11</sup> There is therefore a difference between non-Communist radical-left parties and Communist parties. Communist parties have more traditional Marxist ideologies (March 2011, p.18) and their appeal is therefore much more limited, and often borderline extreme (March & Mudde 2005, p.13; March 2011, p.11). There is also a distinction between populist and non-populist radical-left parties. Those that combine populism with radical socialism do not view themselves as a vanguard of socialism and are “less theoretical and more inclusive” (March & Mudde 2005, p.36). The use of populism allows such parties to appeal to a much broader audience as they are not focused on “correct class politics” but still share a radical-left rejection of capitalism (March & Mudde 2005, p.35).

Most literature tends to focus on the supply-side measurement of convergence (Abedi 2002; Carter 2005; Arzheimer & Carter 2006). Populist AEPs should certainly benefit from being given greater space, but what also needs to be considered is whether or not voters *perceive* established parties to have converged. This is not trivial, and there is a well-developed literature examining voter perceptions of party policy shifts (e.g. Adams et al 2011; Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; Adams et al 2016). In sum, voters are not accurate at judging party policy shifts. As such, if voters perceive established parties to have converged then this indicates they are consciously evaluating what choices they have.

An increasing consensus is that voters, in Europe, use government coalition (non-)participation as a heuristic in order to judge party positions, not manifesto promises (Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; Fortunato & Adams 2014; Adams et al 2016). As such, the supply- and demand-side components refer to the same concept (established party convergence), but they work with different mechanisms; voters' perceptions are not necessarily in sync with party manifesto promises. As they are distinct, they need to be tested using appropriate data; chapter four tests the supply-side mechanism, while chapters five and six test the demand-side mechanism.

In sum, there is a strong theoretical reason to control for established party policy convergence when examining the success of populist AEPs. Not only will parties gain increased space, but they will also gain an increased pool of potential voters who grow dissatisfied with the (in)ability of established parties to represent them. This thesis also controls not only for the supply-side, but also the demand-side, which is rarely tested, offering a unique perspective on convergence.

## II

### Party-level factors

The above section primarily dealt with factors beyond populist AEPs' complete control. Populist AEPs themselves, however, also play a key role. Populist AEPs and their voters are argued to be Eurosceptic, largely due to its supranational structure but also for left-right specific reasons (economic policy and immigration, respectively). They are also argued to be nationalist, which is well-suited to populist AEPs as they can easily frame themselves as looking out for the 'good people' and their country.

Populist AEPs share certain characteristics with niche parties; they tend to stick to a more limited ideological programme, as they are typically policy-seeking. They typically tend to take advantage of de-politicised or neglected issues in order to increase issue ownership. As such, parties and voters do not act independently from one another; both need to be considered in order to gain the most accurate reflection of populist AEP success.

#### **Nationalism: appealing to the people**

Nationalism is broadly defined as an individual's (or party's) wish for their nation to be "independent, free and sovereign" (Halikiopoulou et al 2012a, p.509). Nationalism tends to be most commonly associated with the right-wing of the political spectrum (Halikiopoulou et al 2012a, p.531). This does not need to be the case by definition; nationalism on the left-wing focuses on territorial and economic issues whereas right-wing nationalists also focus on ethnicity and culture (Halikiopoulou et al 2012a, p.531-32). While an ideology in its own

right, a distinction should be drawn between thick- and thin-centred ideologies. Liberalism and socialism can be considered thick-centred ideologies, while nationalism (and, indeed, populism) can be considered thin-centred ideologies (Freeden 1998, p.750-51). Thin-centred ideologies are often attached to thick-centred ideologies.

A thin-centred ideology is “one that arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts” ... “and hence limited in ideational ambitions and scope.” The main effect of a thin-centred ideology therefore is that it simply does not offer a range of arguments ranging from abstract principles to more concrete principles (Freeden 1998, p.750-51). Nationalism can be best understood as a thin-centred ideology since even its own core concepts can be interpreted in different ways (Freeden 1998, p.751-54).<sup>12</sup> So, nationalism should be viewed on a left-right basis, as opposed to being one ideology fixed in place (Bonikowski et al 2018, p.72-73).

On the right-wing of the political spectrum, populist AEPs utilise nativism. The ideology of nativism, defined by Mudde (2007, p.19), “holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the nation-state.” Nativism is an appropriate definition to use in the case of populist right-wing AEPs as it combines both nationalism and xenophobia while not reducing nativists to focusing solely on immigration. Mudde’s (2007, p.22-23) influential work on *populist radical right* parties holds that nativism is a core component of this party family.

Halikiopoulou et al (2012b, p.108) find that radical right parties need to balance the tension between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. They argue that civic, liberal values are increasingly prominent in Europe, which is problematic for ethnic nationalism. They demonstrate that the more successful parties have “annexed civic values in their discursive toolkit, including the notions of democracy, citizenship and respect for the rule of law.” This underlines the importance of controlling for a variety of voter attitudes too. As per Halikiopoulou et al (2012a, p.111-13) and Mudde’s (2007, p.78) party-level analyses, nativist parties increasingly qualify their ethnic nationalism by stating the importance of civic values. They defend the values of the nation (such as democracy, rule of law) against the ‘others’, who do not share these values (Mudde (2007) notes this is especially the case regarding Islamophobia). As such, factors such as ethnicity are important, but nativist parties frame their discourse in civic terms.

However, the focus of this study is on populist AEPs and nativism is not a core component of either populism *or* AEPs. All populist *right-wing* AEPs examined in this thesis are, however, nativist to at least some extent. The only difference is whether nativism is core to the party. Even if not, this does not mean that it is not important to their voters. Given the potency of debates around immigration and integration in both Hungary and the United Kingdom (and elsewhere), nativism should be considered an important factor behind their support despite not being core to Fidesz or UKIP.

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<sup>12</sup> Nationalism is defined by Freedon (1998) as having five cores: nationhood; positive valorisation of the nation; giving politico-institutional expression to the former two concepts; space and time determine social identity; sentiment and emotion affecting a sense of belonging

Left-wing nationalists take a more inclusive approach to nationalism. The preferred term, then, is ‘civic nationalism’. It still covers the exclusivity of nationalism in general, while being removed from nativism’s methods of exclusion. It is instead based more on a common idea for the direction of the nation (Spencer & Wollman 1998, p.261; Fozdar & Low 2015, p.524-25). Nationalists on the left-wing still follow a similar path to nativists on the right-wing, by associating the (exploited) people, or nation, with class (Halikiopoulou et al 2012a, p.511; Kriesi 2014, p.362). Rather than seeking a homogenous nation, left-wing civic nationalists argue that the nation and its citizens are being exploited by other, external powers (Halikiopoulou et al 2012a, p.511-12). In sum, then, defending the nation is common to both the populist left- and right-wing, but as Ivaldi et al (2017) argue, the *precise* manner in which this is done depends on the party’s left-right ideology.

### **Euroskepticism: building on nationalism and anti-establishment politics**

Nationalism therefore is a rather abstract ideology due to its thin-centred nature; it does not, in and of itself, provide for a clear policy platform. Instead, nationalists utilise nativism or civic nationalism. Before discussing how Euroscepticism is used by populist AEPs, as with nationalism, it is important to firstly define the term.

Taggart (1998, p.366) defines Euroscepticism as “contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.” Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004, p.3-4) make the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is “outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration, and opposition to one’s country joining or remaining a member of the EU.” Soft Euroscepticism is “contingent or qualified opposition to European integration”. In Central and Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004, p.22-23) found that there is a greater concentration of Euroscepticism on the right-wing of the political spectrum and mainstream/governmental parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic.

In general, the two notions of nationalism and Euroscepticism are linked because of the desire of a nationalist to place their country first. By its very nature the EU, a supra-national organisation, takes policy competence away from member states, and AEPs frequently campaign on this issue (Mudde 2007, p.159-61; Ramiro & Gomez 2017, p.111-12). In 2012, mass protests took place across EU member states (particularly in Southern Europe) during the height of the Eurozone crisis, caused by austerity measures and reduced government spending (Giugni & Grasso 2016). Participation in protest is more likely among the more deprived, an effect that was magnified in countries with higher levels of unemployment and greater social welfare spending (Grasso & Giugni 2016).

The EU, rather than national governments and politicians, were often the target of the protests since policies around austerity were set by EU institutions (Hobolt & Tilley 2014, p.3-4; Giugni & Grasso 2016). The EU’s policy competence has increased not only in relation to economic policy but also in other core areas, ranging from immigration policy to foreign policy (Hobolt & Tilley 2014, p.4).

The EU’s policy competences in general, and particularly within the Eurozone, has limited the capacity of national governments, and parties, to enact policy (Laffan 2014, p.282). A nationalist party can utilise the loss of sovereignty to argue that power is being removed from

the nation and its people. Furthermore, populists tend to argue that the people have no (or too little) power, compared to increasingly complex institutions (Canovan 2004, p.244-45). The EU's supranational, technocratic nature is an easy target for populist AEPs in this regard.

In addition to the loss of sovereignty to the EU, the implementation of financial bailouts and/or austerity measures, is another focus of Euroscepticism aimed at the institutional side of the EU (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro & Plaza-Colodro 2018, p.252-53). Anti-austerity platforms, while by no means unique to populist left-wing AEPs, are a major component of populist left-wing AEP platforms (Pirro et al 2018, p.380). SYRIZA, for instance, displayed its Euroscepticism primarily in terms of economic and security frames where the EU is dominated by neoliberalism which harms the economy, as well as peace and stability within Europe. Furthermore, SYRIZA argued that the EU is not accountable to the citizens of Europe and is too far removed from public opinion (Vasilopoulou 2018, p.322-23).

The distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism is an important one for populist AEPs, too. Certain populist right-wing AEPs have also notably softened their stance, the Front National for instance abandoning its anti-Euro stance (Pirro et al 2018, p.382). It is worth noting here that parties cannot force attitudes on to voters. Van Kessel et al (2020a) argue that this was not unique to France, but populist radical right parties across Western Europe moderated their Euroscepticism. Mudde (2007, p.160) also notes that populist radical right parties have to tread a fine line, given that most voters are not Eurosceptic.

Vasilopoulou (2011) has argued that radical right parties' attitudes to European integration can be broken into three categories: rejecting; conditional and compromising. Populist right-wing AEPs such as the Austrian Freedom Party, Lega Nord and the Finns suggest that Euroscepticism needs to be carefully managed as AEPs get closer and closer to government (Ivaldi 2018, p.291; van Kessel et al 2020a, p.77). Indeed, SYRIZA by 2014 had softened its Eurosceptic stance as it came closer to power (Vasilopoulou 2011). This further suggests that the EU may often be a useful conduit for populist AEPs to channel their ideology, but that their populist and anti-establishment platform is key (e.g. anti-capitalism/radical socialism etc) (Vasilopoulou 2011, p.324).

Simply opposing EU membership, or austerity measures etc, will not win a party the maximum number of votes it can get. Rather, populist AEPs need to be opposing something that matters to voters. One needs only to look at UKIP's difference in support in general and European elections prior to 2014 and 2015 as an indicator of this. As such, ideology is a fundamental component to consider, but populist AEPs cannot simply create voters out of thin air. Instead, the party needs to a) ideologically challenge a fundamental component of the political system that a sufficient number of voters care about, and b) firmly occupy such territory in the political arena in order to win as many votes as possible. This shows the need to examine both the supply- and demand-side of populist AEP support. The following section discusses party competition and behaviour to demonstrate this latter point.

### **Issue ownership and salience, and party competition: party behaviour and tactics**

Increased anti-establishment sentiment widens the potential pool of voters for AEPs, but this sentiment needs to be directed so that it is both coherent and (ideologically) stable, but also salient. Having a clear, distinct platform is not worth much if too few voters care in the first place. There is, however, an increased number of voters who care about being offered

tangible differences by parties and are unhappy with the representativeness of the political system (Ignazi 1992; Hobolt & Tilley 2016, p.977). AEPs have certain characteristics; they are more radical, and they do not seek to change their platform. If AEPs are differentiating themselves from the political establishment based on certain policy issues, then such differences cannot be subtle.

### **Issue ownership**

Issue ownership is a crucial concept because voters tend to support the party viewed as most competent on issues they perceive as important to their voting decision (Stubager & Slothuus 2013, p.567-68). In this sense, parties will try to emphasise the issues that they themselves own; voters are influenced by issue salience (Bélanger & Meguid 2008, p.477). Increasing success of smaller parties can particularly damage established parties, as they often bring issues not currently dominant in the political arena into play, taking ownership of them (Mudde 2007, p.300; Abou-Chadi 2016, p.420). This could be because established parties have converged on to similar platforms, depoliticising issues and offering limited choice to voters. A consequence of this is that populist AEPs can find ideological space on neglected issues (Rydgren 2005, p.423).

An important caveat to issue ownership is that “the influence of issue ownership on vote choice is conditional upon the perceived salience of the issue” (Bélanger & Meguid 2008, p.489). Populist AEPs must rely on voters to believe that issues such as immigration and/or austerity are important. Recent events such as the financial crisis and Eurozone bailouts and the migrant crisis have done much to increase the salience of austerity, the EU and immigration and multiculturalism. Populist AEPs themselves cannot create such concern out of thin air and therefore rely on an electorate increasingly receptive to radical policies.

### **Spatial competition**

Theories of spatial competition are often used in order to explain party platforms and behaviour. Within the overarching theory of spatial competition, researchers distinguish between a) the proximity model, b) the directional model, and c) the discounting model. According to the median voter theory, parties will strategically position themselves to maximise their vote share (Downs 1957, p.97-103). The proximity model leans upon this idea; voters behave rationally and vote for the party closest to their position (Downs 1957, p.36). There is also an assumption that parties wish to maximise their vote share (Strøm & Müller 1999, p.8-9; Adams et al 2005 p.2; Meyer & Müller 2014, p.803). This typically leads to centrist parties moving closer towards the centre, but more radical parties can further use this to their advantage to, in turn, increase their votes by targeting those unhappy with the lack of choice. Such voters will, in turn, see that more radical parties may well be ideologically closer to them.

The directional model instead assumes voters and parties choose their side (left- or right-wing) and that they favour the most extreme party on that side, within a region of acceptability which serves to limit the platform of parties and voters (Rabinowitz & Macdonald 1989; Meyer & Müller 2014, p.803-04). However, under the proximity model a left-wing voter would support a right-wing party if it was more proximate to the voter. The directional model states that this does not happen as the voter desires a left- or right-wing



ideology and policies (Rabinowitz & Macdonald 1989, p.97; Fazekas and Méder 2013, p.694).

Furthermore, the discounting model argues that voters consider not just the party platform, but also the likelihood of change being implemented. As such, a party that proposes policies that are too radical for voters may not be perceived as able to actually enact those policies, and therefore may still win votes if the party still has the ‘correct’ direction (i.e. left- or right-wing) (Grofman 1985). The models discussed are theoretically distinct, yet empirically they have generally been found to “make identical predictions in most real-world situations” (Weber 2015, p.505).

Models of spatial competition should be complemented by non-spatial factors such as valence factors. Where spatial and non-spatial factors are assumed to be independent, parties (particularly more radical parties) can move to the centre but would undermine their credibility (Adams et al 2006; Meyer & Müller 2014, p.803). Therefore, voters take into account not only spatial competition but *also* valence factors (Meyer & Müller 2014, p.810-11). In sum, parties need to express sincerity in their beliefs in order to win support.

Meguid argues that ‘niche parties’ can have their vote share increased or decreased by mainstream parties’ actions (Meguid 2005, p.354). As such, Meguid (2005, p.348-49) notes the importance of spatial competition. Yet at the same time parties across the political arena are constantly interacting with each other, attempting to alter issue salience and ownership in order to benefit themselves. Instead of competing on all issues at all times, parties try and emphasise ‘their’ issues both to increase its salience, and to take ownership of the issue.

In essence, the behaviour of other parties is also an important determinant of party success, as they all compete in the same arena. Spatial models of competition in isolation do not offer a complete picture of party competition though; there are a multitude of factors at play. Populist AEPs tend to stick to their ideological platform and do not typically radically alter themselves. Indeed, below it is discussed that there would be a cost for doing so. Instead, increased vote shares rely more on increased salience among the electorate of issues such as immigration and austerity (Pirro et al 2018, p.381). So, this leads to the need to examine the demand-side as well as the supply-side.

### **Who leads whom: academic literature on party responsiveness to public opinion**

This sub-section argues that, on the whole, parties follow public opinion and are generally responsive to the electorate. However, this ultimately depends on the type of party and in the case of populist AEPs, it is argued that they share strategic characteristics with niche parties and are less likely to respond to shifts in the electorate. Rather, populist AEPs tend to stick to their core issues and respond to their *own* supporters. Deviating from their platform risks losing support and so populist AEPs seek to convince voters of the need for change.

The theory of dynamic representation (Stimson et al 1995) states that parties and politicians respond to changes in public opinion (assuming that politicians are rational, informed regarding shifts in public opinion, and they agree with each other on the nature of such shifts). A representative democracy should entail that parties and governments reflect the electorate; Stimson et al (1995, p.453) stated that “[r]epresentation exists when changing preferences lead to changing policy acts.” In the context of the United States of America

(USA), changes in public opinion do indeed have effects on parties (Stimson et al 1995, p.552-60).

Such research has been extended beyond the USA; Adams et al (2004, p.590) reported that, in West Europe, parties do follow changes in public opinion, yet only when public opinion shifts in a disadvantageous manner for the party (e.g. a right-wing party only shifts its platform when public opinion moves to the left). There is also a greater tendency for centre and right-wing parties to shift their policy platforms compared to left-wing parties (left-wing parties in general showed no signs of shifting, while establishment left-wing parties showed a tendency to shift, but to a lesser extent to other establishment parties). This finding implies that more centrist parties do respond to the electorate outside of the USA (Adams et al 2009, p.630).

### **Niche parties' responsiveness to public opinion and (their own) voters**

In general, political parties do respond to shifts in public opinion (Fagerholm 2016, p.505-06). However, not all parties have the same goals and therefore do not behave in the same way. There is a large body of literature examining niche party behaviour and their policy platforms in general (Meguid 2005; Adams et al 2006; Adams et al 2012). Niche parties are not synonymous with AEPs, although there is a degree of overlap between the two, particularly in relation to AEPs focusing on new issues in the political system, or by taking a more extreme position on an existing issue (Hobolt & Tilley 2016, p.973-74). Niche parties have been found to be responsive (in the sense that they do shift their platform), however this responsiveness relates to their own supporters, not public opinion as a whole.

Ezrow et al (2011, p.276) argue that “niche parties are highly sensitive to shifts in the position of their mean supporter”. It has also been found that in comparison to establishment parties “niche parties are penalized for moderating their policy programmes” (Adams et al 2006, p.523). Supporters of niche parties have also been found to be more policy-focused (and, should niche parties shift their policies in a disagreeable direction, they will also be quick to abandon the party) (Adams et al 2012, p.1288). For instance, populist radical right voters are found to be driven by their policies on immigration (Rooduijn et al 2016, p.38). Such findings are important to note because they demonstrate that not all parties in a political system respond to public opinion in the same manner. Established parties are, on the whole, keen to respond to public opinion in general. Niche parties, on the other hand, are certainly attentive and responsive, although they are mostly sensitive to their *own* supporters; their policy platform is key to their success in a very specific manner.

Rather than constantly shifting their platforms, populist AEPs retain their ideological profile in terms of opposing key policies in national political systems. As such, feeling one's policy preferences are poorly represented is a key indicator of populist AEP support. Combining a strong ideological platform with rapidly increased issue salience and a populist ideology is the best method for populist AEPs to increase their support.

This demonstrates the importance of studying both the supply- and demand-side of politics; parties and voters are not independent actors that never interact with each other. Rather, parties are constantly keeping themselves closely informed of the opinions of voters, be it the electorate in general or their own voters. Studying both the supply- and demand-side is therefore a key tenet of this thesis which offers a more realistic understanding of populist

AEP success. As has been discussed in the previous section, (established) party behaviour creates ideological space for populist AEPs and also leads to increased discontent. This, in turn, leads to an increased number of voters supporting populist AEPs, thus affecting party behaviour.

### III

#### Individual-level factors

This section identifies key trends and findings in the considerable demand-side literature of populist AEP support. Populist AEP support is more likely to come from those who are more disadvantaged in society. However, socio-demographics only tell part of the story. While revealing in one sense (that populist AEPs tend to win the support of the more disadvantaged), focusing purely on socio-demographics would also risk limiting the true extent of their support. Populist AEP voters support such parties because they desire to be adequately represented; as Rooduijn et al (2017, p.555) argue, the motivation behind supporting either a populist left- or right-wing AEP is ideological.

#### **Socio-demographics: who do populist AEPs rely upon?**

Social class is often considered one of the most fundamental influences in voting behaviour. Jansen et al (2013, p.391) in a study of 15 countries from 1960-2005 argue that social class, over time, has weakened as a predictor for left-right party support. Lipset (1960, p.220) argued that “parties are primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle and upper classes.” Nevertheless, Lipset (1960, p.229) acknowledged that social class and voting behaviour does not have a completely consistent relationship: poor people often vote for conservatives and wealthy people often vote for socialists.

Class voting is still significant, but nuanced theories and arguments are needed in order to fully understand the relationship between social class and voting behaviour (Evans 2000). In general terms, however, studies examining social class have found that there is evidence of working-class de-alignment; unskilled workers’ partisan support has become less distinctive over time (Jansen et al 2013, p.377). As such, the explanatory power of social class on support for left-wing parties has become weaker. This has led to benefit populist AEPs, left- or right-wing, as working-class voters are more likely to hold views that are more radical.

Education is generally considered to influence voting behaviour for two reasons. Firstly, due to group-interest theory. Secondly, it leads to an increased tolerance of and support for liberal values and institutions. Where populist AEPs are concerned, this means that those with higher levels of education would be *less* likely to support a populist AEP.

Group-interest theory holds that voters will support parties that advance their own interests (Visser et al 2014, p.542). This is true not only for education, but also for social class, (un)employment and so on. Indeed, there is a relationship between such factors; those who are working class are more likely to have lower educational attainment, and more likely to have lower income even with university-level education (Bukodi & Goldthorpe 2011; McCoy & Smyth 2011; Bukodi & Goldthorpe 2013).

Education may also create distinct societal groups, which all have their own interests and therefore hold attitudes in accordance with these interests. For example, economic insecurity may well lead to intolerance of ethnic minorities, whereas those in highly skilled jobs do not

face much competition from (primarily) ethnic minority immigrants (Stubager 2008, p.333-34). As such, should a voter have lower levels of education, they are more likely to be in a financially disadvantaged position compared to, especially, those with degrees. Populist AEPs commonly seek to win over such voters, arguing that the political establishment takes them for granted.

Higher education also has an association with greater tolerance of and support for liberal ideas and institutions (Kitschelt 1994), which should also lead to those with lower levels of education being more likely to support populist AEPs. It may well be argued that education is merely a proxy for liberal values (e.g. that wealthier individuals attend university, but that their advantageous upbringing is key to liberal attitudes) (SurrIDGE 2016, p.147).

However, education itself has effects which may only be accrued through experience, not via one's social background and upbringing. Phelan et al (1995), Stunnebager (2008) and SurrIDGE (2016, p.148) all demonstrate that liberal values are literally taught to students, in addition to subject-specific knowledge, while educators and fellow students help to reinforce liberal values informally. This is important to consider because populist AEPs challenge liberal democracy, indicating that those with lower levels of education should be more likely to support them. It also demonstrates the importance of studying *all* parties that represent the same wider phenomenon, not just left- *or* right-wing parties.

While education affects individuals' attitudes, there are still generational differences that persist when controlling for education (Inglehart 1971). Inglehart and Norris (2017) note that 'authoritarian populist' support is more common among lower-educated voters, but also those with more materialist views (i.e. those who grew up with insecurity). Conflicts in society that populist AEPs thrive upon are driven largely by attitudes (e.g. liberal democracy, nativism etc). At the same time, socio-economic factors underscore these conflicts, and divisions around education, social class and wealth have become starker over time. These divisions have led to more voters facing insecurity, creating ideological flashpoints (Inglehart & Norris 2017). Therefore, factors such as education and class demonstrably matter as they affect what values voters hold and how much wealth they have, but they cannot solely explain populist AEP support. Attitudes and values also need to be taken into account, which are discussed in more detail in the following section, as they are so closely related to socio-demographics.

Gender, too, is generally regarded as having an effect on voting behaviour more widely beyond populist AEP support. In broader terms, literature demonstrates that there is a gender gap in terms of political participation and political knowledge more broadly (Dow 2009; Beauregard 2014; Dassoneville & McAllister 2018). In the specific context of populist AEPs, however, it is argued that men are more likely than women to support populist AEPs. There is an extensive literature that examines this gender gap in (primarily) populist right-wing AEP support (e.g. Hartevelde et al 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015). Indeed, *Patterns of Prejudice* dedicated a special issue to this very subject (Spierings et al 2015).

In the literature, there are often two competing hypotheses: that the populist (right-wing) gender difference is due to the different socio-economic and structural positions men and women have, or that there are attitudinal differences between men and women (Spierings & Zaslove 2017). Regarding the former, it is argued that women are less likely to be employed in blue collar jobs and therefore feel less threatened by immigration. Furthermore, economic migrants are mostly male and mostly work in low-skilled, male-dominated jobs which could

accentuate the effects for men (Harteveld et al 2015 p.107-09). Regarding the latter, literature generally finds that there are not large differences between men and women's attitudes (Immerzeel et al 2015; Spierings et al 2017, p.822).

There is also a general focus on the populist radical right, rather than on populist AEPs more broadly. Spierings and Zaslove (2017 p.825-26) is one of only very few articles to examine both populist left- *and* right-wing party support in general, let alone regarding the effect of gender. They argue that men and women are socialised differently, and that *populism* may therefore be the key factor. Women, for instance are more likely to be depicted as favouring consensus or to be less aggressive than men. Trevor (1999) argues that differences in socialisation help to explain voting behaviour.

Populism, as an ideology, is inherently conflict-driven, pitting the people against the elite. Furthermore, not only is debate about fundamental issues a key component of populism, but 'winning' such debate is also key. As such, men should be more likely to support populist parties because they are more conflict driven (Spierings and Zaslove 2017, p.824-27).

In sum, there are a variety of ways in which key socio-demographic factors can affect voting behaviour. Chapters three, five and six all take these into account, while also controlling for other important factors in individual-level models. However, socio-demographics only tell part of the story. The following discussion gives an overview of attitudes and values which are particularly important in determining voting behaviour.

### **Core values and beliefs: why may voters support populist AEPs?**

Traditional economic left-right issues, based largely around social class, have been diminished by newly politicised issues. These issues include, but are not limited to, gender equality (and equality more generally), environmental protection and immigration (Jansen et al 2013, p.377). 'Postmaterialist' issues are important for two reasons; firstly, they provide a greater pool of potential supporters for smaller/newer parties. Secondly, it provides a new dynamic to party competition.

Firstly, the increased prevalence of issues beyond the traditional economic left-right dimension (or, perhaps, class-based voting) has helped to provide new groups of voters. One of the most significant developments in the 1970s was the increase in environmentalism and awareness of humanity's impact on the planet's ecosystem, particularly due to the increased prevalence of nuclear power (Grant & Tilley 2019, p.497-98).

Inglehart's argument, in brief, is that increased material wellbeing (financial security) as time wore on lead younger generations to begin to emphasise postmaterial (or quality of life) issues over more materialist issues such as economic security. Ultimately, the key driver is that increased financial and material wellbeing leads to a change in values, but that this is *generational*; the prevailing conditions that affect individuals when growing up largely influence one's most basic values. As such, this has been a long-term, generational change (Inglehart 1971; Norris & Inglehart 2019, p.32-33). Its effects were to lead to fundamental shifts in party support and platforms as they adapted to the electorate's evolving attitudes. Indeed, Kriesi (2010, p.683) noted that cleavage change affected *all* parties, not just 'new' parties.

Secondly, regarding party competition and platforms, Meguid (2005, p.348) argued that “issues raised by the niche parties are not only novel, but they often do not coincide with existing lines of political division”. Niche parties and populist AEPs are not entirely the same concept but the overriding similarity is that they share similar strategies. Populist AEPs are not typically known for having dynamic, wide-reaching policy platforms in the same sense that established, centre-left and centre-right parties may. Neither are niche parties; they purposely limit their platform to a key issue (Meguid 2005, p.348). As such, where immigration became relevant, populist right-wing AEPs were able to find room in the political spectrum. Where centre-left parties in particular focused their platforms towards middle-class, liberal voters, populist left-wing AEPs have also been able to benefit by *remaining* economically left-wing.

Populist left-wing AEPs do not typically emphasise ‘new’ issues like immigration but benefit largely from centre-left parties doing so. Where more voters perceive centre-left parties as not being left-wing enough, they are more likely to support parties such as Podemos or Die Linke. Their populist ideology offers particular advantages over non-populist left-wing AEPs as they are best placed to quickly capture support without focusing on “correct class politics” (March & Mudde 2005, p.35). In addition to the weakening of class-based voting and the increased salience of new issues, an electorate which is increasingly willing to vote for different parties has affected the emergence and success of new parties. Ignazi (1992) for instance noted that falling turnout and party membership indicated unhappiness with the political system.

Party membership and activism has fallen rapidly over the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (Mair 1994, p.4-5; Mair and van Biezen 2001; Whiteley 2011). Contingent with this fall in membership, partisan identity has also weakened over time: fewer and fewer voters have strong attachments to one particular party (Berglund et al 2005). Partisanship can be considered a “heuristic that helps individuals to organize the complexities of politics, integrate information into a political belief system and evaluate political phenomena” (Dalton & Weldon 2007, p.180). Partisan identity influences voting behaviour and policy preference among voters, which studies have consistently demonstrated (Goren 2005, p.881; Dalton and Weldon 2007, p.180).

As such, more voters are more likely to support new parties (and potentially repeatedly switch the party they vote for). The decline of feeling particularly attached to a party has roughly coincided with the general decline of the traditional class cleavage across Western democracies. As voters do not feel attached to parties, and fewer and fewer join parties, this has therefore increased the pool of potential voters for smaller and/or newer parties (Eatwell & Goodwin 2018, p.38). Populist AEPs, both left- and right-wing, benefit from this phenomenon.

To sum, cleavage dimensions are of huge importance in determining voter behaviour. In Western Europe there are typically two: economic and socio-cultural (Rydgren 2005, p.420). Cleavage dimensions are important as they dictate the grounds upon which parties compete in a political system. The economic cleavage contains competition on the involvement of the state in the economy, while the socio-cultural cleavage contains competition on issues around identity and values. Inglehart terms this the materialist and postmaterialist divide, though this is just one such name for the same phenomenon (Inglehart 1990; Dalton 2017, p.610). While

there is a supply-side element to cleavages (established parties' behaviour can open up new issues in a new cleavage dimension for instance) there is a key demand-side element: new and/or small parties will prosper the most when there is a large pool of potential voters motivated by a key issue.

In Central and Eastern Europe, such structural changes have not happened. Instead, competition largely falls around whether or not voters feel as though the political system as a whole is able to represent them (Kriesi 2014, p.376). A lack of faith in the establishment alongside radical policy beliefs leads to populist AEP support in Central and Eastern Europe, as opposed to changes in public opinion creating new pools of voters who *no longer* feel represented, but who would have done so before.

The key factor is whether or not the voter has radical attitudes that they feel cannot be represented by established parties. The phenomenon is therefore comparable across Europe as long as *anti-establishment* parties are the focus of analysis. Simply studying populist parties across both Western and Central and Eastern Europe would lead to misleading inferences due to the higher number of established parties that are also populist in the latter region. There is, though, a world of difference between a party saying it will change politics, and a party that is firmly, ideologically committed to radical reform. Only the latter can be labelled as AEPs.

Populist AEPs therefore are not amorphous entities that mindlessly win the support of a mass of any and all angry, dissatisfied voters. As stated previously, this is not always stressed enough in literature that examines both left and right together (e.g. Visser et al 2014). Populist AEPs attract voters who may well be disillusioned for the same reasons but who desire very different policy outcomes (Rooduijn et al 2017). This is why many European countries have more than one populist AEP represented in parliament. Indeed, Rooduijn (2019, p.367) cautions that comparative research into populist parties more broadly needs to carefully conceptualise and emphasise not just populism, but also the party's underlying ideology. This thesis therefore examines the similarities between populist AEPs, but their differences are also taken into account. At every step of the way, along a variety of analyses, party- and ideological-specific factors are diligently and consciously controlled for where necessary. Doing so provides for a dynamic, meaningful analysis of populist AEPs and their supporters.

## IV

### **Hypotheses and concluding remarks**

To move on from the review, above, of key terms and concepts, their importance to the success of populist AEPs will now be demonstrated. Chapters three-six analyse data at the country-, party- and voter-level. Analysing country-level and macro-level economic data, it is shown that populist AEPs win increased support when economies perform poorly. At the party-level, populist AEPs are shown to prosper where: established parties converge, they face fewer competitors, and they are Eurosceptic. At the voter-level, populist AEP supporters tend to be economically vulnerable, Eurosceptic and ideologically radical. The following

discussion expands on key hypotheses.<sup>13</sup> Further chapter-specific hypotheses are discussed in the relevant chapters.

### **Country-level factors: the economy and established party convergence**

Where the economy performs poorly, voters are more likely to punish the government. Populist AEPs can be key beneficiaries of this as they argue established opposition parties do not really offer true change. The 2008 financial crisis and resultant austerity measures throughout much of Europe has further led to increased and sustained discontent among the electorate. While extreme austerity measures in countries such as Greece were outliers, throughout Europe broad, sweeping cuts in public spending were to be found following recession (Pontusson & Raess 2012, p.22; Magalhães 2014, p.128; Lavery 2018, p.32-33). More voters became willing to question the political establishment and consequentially became more receptive to radical parties and policies (Armingeon & Guthman 2014; Flesher Fominaya 2017).

The effects of recession are no less true in previous years; the mechanics remain the same. The financial crisis is worth highlighting because the effects were a) so prolonged, and b) so widespread. Political and economic crisis can lead to dissatisfaction and discontent among the electorate; as the length of the crisis increases, the probability of there being widespread political upheaval increases too (Kriesi 2016, p.29). Recession increases materialism among voters, making them more receptive to populist AEPs who purport to offer true change (Inglehart & Norris 2017, p.446).

Populist AEPs are able to capitalise upon this by pointing to a perceived unrepresentative, converged and culpable political establishment. Kriesi (2012) notes that short-term economic voting is important, where incumbents often lose out following a recession. However, he (2016, p.31) also notes that longer-term factors are also crucial to understand, such as a restructuring of partisan space and a reconfiguration of power within the new dimensions. Eatwell and Goodwin (2018, p.9) further argue that the financial crisis softened partisan support for established parties, increasing volatility and therefore enabling populist AEPs to win over more voters.

The financial crisis did not lead to *just* a short-term dip in support for incumbent governments. Populist AEPs mobilise on long-standing grievances within their country that previously bubbled under the surface. The financial crisis catapulted issues such as the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalisation and political and economic malaise to the top of the agenda (Kriesi 2016, p.33-34; Inglehart & Norris 2017). In an increasingly globalised world, scholars often point towards ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, where the losers seek to “protect themselves through protectionist measures and through an emphasis on the maintenance of national boundaries and independence” (Kriesi et al 2006, p.922). Populist AEPs also point to economic and political crisis, arguing that they stand for the good people who have been consistently let down by the corrupt elite.

The financial crisis led to an increasingly dissatisfied electorate, creating greater levels of anti-immigration sentiment and Euroscepticism (Serricchio et al 2013). Coupled with economic voting and widespread discontent, throughout Europe there was an electorate

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<sup>13</sup> This is for two reasons: to keep this chapter as broad as possible, and also because there may be data and/or analysis-specific factors that must be taken into account



increasingly receptive towards the policies populist AEPs offer. As such, the financial crisis altered the electorate and political competition much more than previous recessions: more voters became more concerned around newly salient issues and turned to radical ideologies because of the increase in inequality, and a political establishment perceived to be unrepresentative.

It is also important to note that such issues were intertwined, creating very favourable circumstances for populist AEPs, post-crisis. The refugee crisis, (EU-led) austerity, perceived unresponsive established parties all combined alongside existing concerns around immigration, Euroscepticism and/or severe political and economic problems. This leads to **H1**: *poor economic conditions increase populist AEP appeal*.

There is both a supply- and demand-side component to the notion that established party convergence increases populist AEP support. Regarding the supply-side, policy convergence creates increased 'space' for populist AEPs to carve out a specific platform, allowing them to consolidate their position in the political system. Regarding the demand-side, where established parties' platforms are similar, an increased number of voters become disillusioned with the lack of readily perceptible differences between parties. Where voters are more radical, they are more likely to question how much of a choice established parties really offer and turn to more radical parties.

As stated just above, where voters perceive there to be an unresponsive political establishment, they are more likely to turn to alternatives. As such, these voters become more likely to listen to populist anti-establishment messages. This leads to **H2**: *established party convergence increases populist AEP appeal*.

### **Party-level factors: Nationalism, Euroscepticism and competition**

As stated above, nationalism is neither inherently left- or right-wing. Nationalism itself benefits populist AEPs for two distinct reasons: party competition and issue ownership, and secondly it interacts with populism. Euroscepticism is also often used to channel nationalism, as the EU provides populist AEPs with a concrete target.

On the right-wing, nativists argue that there is one culture for their nation-state, and that integration and assimilation into this culture is necessary. In reality, European countries being firmly multicultural has created hindrances for nativists, who tend not to argue for monocultural states. Rather, nativists more commonly argue that there is one dominant culture, which should be preserved (and therefore reject multiculturalism when immigrants arrive in the country. It is now more common for nativist parties to make distinctions on the basis of religion, and particularly Islam (Mudde 2007, p.138-45). This is perhaps best typified by Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV), which has called for the Koran to be banned (Vossen 2011, p.185).

Issues around immigration and multiculturalism are 'new' issues that were depoliticised by established parties, giving populist right-wing AEPs space to take issue ownership (Rydgren 2005, p.423). Where they occupy such a distinct position in the political system, they are best positioned to take issue ownership. As immigration has risen in salience, nativist parties have therefore benefited from ideological congruence as well as occupying this space in the arena. Therefore, the issue is not solely ideological, but voters choose populist AEPs because they

perceive the party to understand their concerns since they generally remain true to their platform over time.

Regarding civic nationalists, the issue is largely the same regarding party competition; populist left-wing AEPs try to present themselves as a genuine left-wing party. Civic nationalism among populist left-wing AEPs is generally found in conjunction with anti-austerity and anti-neoliberal policies. Therefore, the discursive importance of factors such as anti-elitism (particularly economic elites) such as multinational banks and institutions is key (Bonikowski et al 2018, p.72-73). Populist left-wing AEPs therefore still adhere to radical socialism, but also typically frame their discourse in terms of how the nation is under threat from economic elites. As such, this is a similar strategy to the populist right-wing; nationalism is used to give a greater sense of urgency to voters.

This leads to the second issue, that nationalism can be readily combined with populism. With its people vs elite distinction, populism fits in well with nationalist arguments, as populists often argue that the elite is the cause of the decline of the nation. Populism and nationalism are not the same, yet since they both offer visions of insiders and outsiders, they can easily go hand-in-hand where the elites oppose the people, harming the nation in the process.

It is important then to note that nationalism is used in conjunction with other ideological positions in order to complete a party's policy platform. The focus of this thesis as such is *populist* AEPs, and both their populist ideology and anti-establishment tendencies are important in giving them similarities, left- or right-wing. A key contribution is therefore that it carefully examines populist left- and right-wing AEPs, taking into account their ideological differences in order to fully understand the wider phenomenon (Rooduijn 2019, p.365-67). Previous literature such as Visser et al (2014), Spierings and Zaslove (2017) or Rooduijn (2018) show that the differences are not always the focus of literature which limits understanding the reasons behind their support.

Euroscepticism helps in part to put nationalism into practice and forms a key component of populist AEP success. Populist left- and right-wing AEPs are similar in that they are Eurosceptic, but for very different reasons. On the right-wing, favouring restrictive policies towards immigration is a core component of nativism, and the free movement policies mandated by EU membership means that the EU is inextricably linked to immigration by right-wing populist AEPs. At the party level, populist radical right parties have long targeted immigrants from Europe (Mudde 2007, p.69-70). Particularly powerful frames are to link immigration with crime and social tension, and to link immigration with losing cultural distinction and national identity (Rydgren 2008, p.760-61). In more recent years, Muslims have also been heavily targeted (in addition to European immigrants) (Mudde 2007, p.69-70).

Left-wing Euroscepticism is notable for attacking the EU and its institutions, primarily on the basis of economic policy; the European Central Bank and even other member state's governments have frequently been the targets of such attacks (Aslanidis & Rovira Kaltwasser 2016, p.1080; Ramiro & Gomez 2017, p.112). Populist right-wing AEPs also target the institutional framework of the EU, but in addition, and in line with their nativism, also focus on immigration. Populist left- and right-wing AEPs may therefore express similar strategies (i.e. Euroscepticism), but these strategies must fit in with their existing left-right ideology. There are clear impacts as a result of EU membership which affect citizens in many ways and

by linking the EU, nationalism, and populism together, populist AEPs provide voters with a clear cause of certain problems.

On the right-wing of the political spectrum, the Front National in France, in addition to cultural arguments, also framed its Euroscepticism along economic arguments during and after the economic crisis, in addition to its nativist ideology (Ivaldi 2018, p.285). The Dutch Freedom Party withdrew its support for the minority coalition government in 2012 over austerity measures imposed by the EU, its manifesto including references to the economic crisis and promises to leave both the Eurozone and the EU (Pirro & van Kessel 2018, p.334-35). Lega Nord, too, draws upon opposition to the Euro and open markets (in addition to nativism) for its Euroscepticism Pirro & van Kessel 2018, p.331). As such, the increased importance of the EU in the economy in particular is utilised by populist AEPs across the political spectrum. This demonstrates the depths to which the EU was associated with the financial crisis, and also how its expanded competences is criticised by populist AEPs.

So, Euroscepticism can play an important role for populist AEPs, either left- or right-wing. The precise issues that they focus on depends firstly on ideological placement on the left-right spectrum, and secondly on national political context. Hungary, for instance, does not have high levels of immigration but during the migrant crisis, as it was a key country of entry for asylum seekers, the issues of immigration and Euroscepticism rose (Pirro et al 2018, p.380). This continues to show the importance of nativism for parties such as Fidesz, as it is a powerful tool to create divisive debates. This leads to **H3**: *greater Euroscepticism increases populist AEP appeal*.

Populist AEPs that face too much competition should lose out compared to those that do not. When, say, a populist left-wing AEP competes against a Communist party (i.e. another left-wing AEP), the platforms of both parties will not be identical. However, the fact remains that both are competing on *similar* platforms that will offer radical reform to capitalism. But there are only so many voters at any one given time that would be amenable to such policies, and so there would be considerable overlap between their pool of potential voters (at the very least). As such, greater competition should result in lower vote shares, even if the party platforms are not identical. This leads to **H4**: *fewer ideological competitors increase populist AEP appeal*.

Those parties that place the most emphasis on their core issue should see higher vote shares, as this indicates that the party is focusing most on issues that are known to matter to large portions of most electorates. It also indicates that the party is trying to maintain a consistent platform, rather than trying to be multiple versions of itself. This leads to **H5**: *core issue salience increases populist AEP success*. In addition, populist AEPs should therefore seek to retain a distinct location in the political arena. Where they are faced with greater competition, particularly from established centre-left or centre-right parties wishing to win over their voters, populist AEPs should lose out. If the populist AEP retains a more distinct platform, it not only will be ideologically closer to voters further away from the established party, but it will also be able to claim it is offering a more distinct choice. This leads to **H6**: *greater distance to the nearest established competitor increases populist AEP appeal*.

## **Voter-level factors: economic insecurity and ideology**

This thesis argues that class voting is important, but it is not the case that the working class support left-wing parties and the middle class support right-wing parties. Instead, lower social class affects support for policies that populist AEPs offer, be it anti-immigration policies, Euroscepticism and/or economic redistribution. Whether or not the voter supports a populist left- or right-wing AEP in particular depends on their own ideology. Working class voters can hold nativist *or* radically left-wing views, and they are more likely to hold either of these radical views than middle class voters. Established parties are increasingly middle-class parties and therefore less likely to appeal to working-class voters due to structural shifts in attitudes and party competition. As such, populist AEPs win over support from those of a lower social class due to a combination of both economic vulnerability *and* a desire to be clearly ideologically represented.

Education should also affect support for populist AEPs not only due to economic vulnerability but also because of the link between attitudes and education. Democracy itself can be defined, conceptualised and measured in a variety of ways (Munck & Verkuilen 2002; Coppedge et al 2011). Liberal democracy, however, is a framework best suited for the analysis of European countries, and can be defined as “a system characterized not only by free and fair elections, popular sovereignty, and majority rule, but also by the constitutional protection of minority rights” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012a, p.13). Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012a, p.17) argue that populism and liberal democracy are opposed to each other because of populism’s desire for majority rule, as opposed to pluralism and the protection of minorities. As such, those who are less, or not at all, liberal should be more likely to support populist parties.

Indeed, populist AEPs that have entered government “[put] forward proposals and championing initiatives and repeatedly, consistently and purposely clashed with the fundamental tenets of liberal democracy” (Albertazzi & Mueller 2013, p.346). Likewise, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012b, p.207) argued that populists argue “the rule of law and the ‘checks and balances’ anchored in the constitution not only limit the capacity of ‘the people’ to exercise their collective power, but also give rise to a growing discontent with the political system.” As liberal values go hand-in-hand with higher levels of education, lesser-educated voters should be more likely to support populist AEPs as they are more comfortable challenging liberal democracy. This leads to **H7**: *populist AEP support is more likely among economically vulnerable voters.*

Populist AEP voters are also more likely to be male, and similar to the effect of education, the effect is due to the way in which individuals are socialised. Men and women are typically socialised differently from a very young age; men are more aggressive and conflict-driven, while women are more likely to seek consensus and avoid conflict. Populism itself, however, is fundamentally conflict-driven which should lead to men being more likely to support populist AEPs than women, regardless of left-right ideology. This leads to **H8**: *populist AEP support is more likely among men than women.*

Socio-demographics only tell part of the story; attitudinal factors and ideology are key tenets of populist AEP support. Both Ignazi (1992), and Inglehart and Norris (2019) use the terms ‘counter-revolution’ and ‘backlash’ respectively to describe the backlash against liberalism. Ignazi (1992) questioned why an increase in postmaterialist values, as well as economic

growth, coincided with an increase in populist right-wing support. Ultimately, an increase in dissatisfaction with the political system and established parties led to a rise in anti-system sentiment. As such, where voters cared about immigration and perceived established parties to be unresponsive, populist right-wing AEPs were able to fill the gap. Inglehart and Norris (2019, p.445-53) likewise argued that generational change has led to, particularly, older, working-class rural voters with low levels of education (social conservatives) to react and support authoritarian populist parties.

Eatwell and Goodwin, however, argue that ‘national populist’ voters are stereotyped as “old white men” (2018, p.9). It is worth noting that younger voters have become politically socialised during extreme financial turmoil and, of particular importance for populist right-wing AEPs, rapid changes in ethnic diversity (Eatwell & Goodwin 2018, p.13-14). Evidence presented throughout chapters three, five and six challenges the notion that populist AEP voters are best characterised by old age. This shows the importance of analysing all populist left- and right-wing AEPs together; the wider phenomenon is not being driven overwhelmingly by one generation but instead by voters with radical attitudes who do not feel represented.

In so far as the populist right-wing is concerned, there is considerable debate between the so-called ‘economic anxiety thesis’ (that voters translate economic anxiety into support for populist right-wing AEPs) and the ‘cultural backlash’ (that populist right-wing AEP voters are primarily motivated by cultural concerns around immigration). The former is closely related to the concept of ‘losers of globalisation’; that globalisation led to an ‘underclass’ who feel threatened by immigration and therefore vote for parties who promise a return to the past (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, p.1674-75).

The debate has largely been settled in favour of the cultural backlash thesis (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, p.1674-75). Populist right-wing AEP voters are motivated primarily by nativism, and point out that they are most supported in wealthier European countries, and that there is, at best, limited evidence that either absolute deprivation (e.g. low income) or relative deprivation (perception of losing out) affect populist right-wing AEP support. Instead, there is a wealth of evidence that their voters are driven primarily by cultural attitudes (e.g. Oesch 2008). Their voters are more motivated by cultural issues for reasons of ideology; they are firm, emotive beliefs that established parties are finding increasingly difficult to address, in part due to *most* voters being culturally liberal. Nativist voters perceive established parties as being unrepresentative, and so vote for a party that matches with their ideology. These voters may well be less wealthy, but their primary motivation is ideological.

The increased prevalence of postmaterialist attitudes therefore led to structural changes in public attitudes, and consequentially in party behaviour and strategy. For populist AEPs, this led to a) a cross-cutting pool of potential voters, and b) an increased belief among such voters that established parties do not represent such views. On the left, radical redistribution is not a ‘new’ issue like nativism, but populist left-wing AEPs still benefit from the same phenomenon because of the structural shifts in party support and behaviour. Established parties, particularly on the centre-left, increasingly shifted to pro-environment, socially liberal platforms and minimised their economic radicalism. Voters further to the left who care strongly about redistribution therefore turn to populist left-wing AEPs.

Populist left- and right-wing AEPs and their voters are therefore ideologically distinct from each other. Capturing these distinctions is a key contribution of this thesis as stated previously. Literature that seeks out differences (Hobolt & Tilley 2016; Rooduijn et al 2017) is limited in scope and comes to differing conclusions regarding the true depth of their support. This chapter has argued that there are important factors at the country-, party- and voter-level that all affect the wider phenomenon of populist AEP success. Their support is determined by clearly defined attitudes and a desire for voters to be represented. The ability of established parties to win both radical and more centrist voters is questionable.

As such, support for populist AEPs is determined by left/right ideology. Their voters are more likely to desire more radical changes in policy expressed through Euroscepticism, nativism and/or radical socialism (attitudes which populist AEP voters perceive established parties do not represent but populist AEPs do). This leads to several more hypotheses. **H9:** *ideologically radical voters are more likely to support populist AEPs than other parties.* **H10:** *voters dissatisfied with democracy are more likely than not to support populist AEPs than other parties;* **H11:** *Eurosceptic voters are more likely to support populist AEPs than other parties;* **H12:** *radical socialism or nativism determines support for populist left- or right-wing AEPs over other parties.* The hypotheses discussed in this section are summarised below.

#### **National level factors:**

1. Poor economic conditions increase populist AEP appeal
2. Established party convergence increases populist AEP appeal

#### **Party level factors:**

3. Greater Euroscepticism increases populist AEP appeal
4. Fewer ideological competitors increase populist AEP appeal
5. Core issue salience increases populist AEP appeal
6. Greater distance to the nearest established competitor increases populist AEP appeal

#### **Voter level factors:**

7. Economically vulnerable voters are more likely to support populist AEPs than other parties
8. Men are more likely than women to support populist AEPs
9. Ideologically radical voters are more likely to support populist AEPs than other parties
10. Voters dissatisfied with democracy are more likely than not to support populist AEPs than other parties
11. Eurosceptic voters are more likely to support populist AEPs than other parties
12. Radical socialism or nativism determines support for populist left- or right-wing AEPs over other parties

### **Conclusion**

Overall, this chapter has offered a broad overview of literature covering key aspects of political science. It has identified key trends, findings and weaknesses in research that have informed the above set of hypotheses. Two questions were answered in this chapter: whether populist

AEPs are affected by country-, party- or voter-level factors, and secondly, how similar populist AEPs and their voters are.

Populist AEPs are conceivably affected by factors at each three of these levels, and failure to take into account (at least) once such level will not give a more realistic picture of populist AEP success. Furthermore, populist AEPs, despite being located across the political spectrum, share many similarities, again across each of the three levels. As will be demonstrated in chapters two to six, populist AEPs are indeed spurred on by economic and institutional conditions, and their voters share key socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics. There are also key ideological differences; voters support populist left- *or* right-wing AEPs.

All of these levels are studied, providing a level of detail, across both time and the continent of Europe, that existing literature does not reach. Likewise, differences in populist left- and right-wing AEPs are examined in detail, adding nuance to both Hobolt & Tilley (2016) and Rooduijn et al (2017) and addressing concerns that studies such as Visser et al (2014) miss the wider phenomenon. Next, chapter two specifically defines the term ‘anti-establishment party’, giving a clear and concise definition that is able to differentiate between established and anti-establishment parties, regardless of their left-right position.

## Chapter II

### Defining and identifying anti-establishment political parties

#### Introduction

What makes a party ‘*anti-establishment*’? This chapter outlines the key concept behind this research project. There is a variety of definitions and categorisations in academic literature, yet one which is clear, consistent, and theoretically well-informed for the purposes of analysing parties’ opposition to the political establishment remains elusive. This is a considerable gap in the literature, especially given the increased prominence of AEPs (and particularly populist AEPs) in Europe. Throughout Europe there has recently been a wide array of prominent populist AEPs, ranging from Podemos, UKIP, Fidesz, SYRIZA and Law and Justice. All of these parties, and their specific fortunes, are diverse. However, they also share very clear similarities, beyond their populist ideology, in terms of party behaviour and strategy. It is only with a well-justified definition that these similarities can be unmasked. Theoretically questionable and inconsistent case-selection in studies can hide key trends in politics, voting behaviour and governance (Pappas 2016, p.22; Mudde 2017a, p.9).

Difficulties in a) operationalisation, b) disentangling ideology and systemic integration), and c) failure to take rational party behaviour into account are identifiable in previous definitions and categorisations. For the most part, differing approaches to categorisation tend to be suited to one, or a few, specific purposes. Yet despite this, they all (largely) focus on the same parties. There are usually subtle, but key, differences regarding case-selection across different papers. As such, this mandates a new definition that addresses such weaknesses, but which also captures the parties’ anti-establishment nature.

This is plainly problematic, particularly if the salient feature of research is to study AEPs. Existing definitions can leave out parties from an analysis that theoretically deserve to be included. The definition developed in this chapter is both readily operationalisable (and thus well suited to empirical research, qualitative or quantitative), and parsimonious while remaining flexible enough to capture the dynamic nature of party behaviour. Indeed, it is argued that many previous definitions of AEPs do not adequately capture the dynamics of political arenas. This is especially striking given the heterogeneity found in European political systems.

Firstly, this chapter identifies both the strengths and weaknesses of existing definitions of AEPs.<sup>14</sup> Afterwards, the new definition is discussed, which addresses the weaknesses in literature, leading to a parsimonious, well-justified definition that takes the dynamics of political systems into account. The focus of this thesis is specifically *populist* AEPs, however the definition itself applies to all AEPs. Thirdly, the strengths of the definition are discussed in particular reference to Hungarian politics, and the Green party family. Finally, the concept of populism is defined and discussed.

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<sup>14</sup>‘Anti-establishment’ here is used as a catch-all phrase; as seen below, the precise label used by researchers varies



## I

### Categorising parties: key trends in literature

Parties are often grouped together under labels that, at first glance, can all appear very similar. Terms used throughout literature examining party politics include: anti-establishment parties, populist parties, radical-right (radical-left) parties, outsider parties and anti-system parties.<sup>15</sup> Such terms are distinct from one another for a variety of reasons (which will be discussed in this chapter), and yet they usually apply to (largely) the same parties. The key difference in their usage is not just the case-selection, but rather the implications that the definition of the terminology creates.

Populist parties are not always right-wing, for instance, and anti-establishment or anti-system parties may be populist, but not exclusively so. In fact, there is very good reason to believe that populist parties do *not* always take a similar position in a country's political arena. Some are anti-establishment (e.g. Lega Nord) and some are established (Forza Italia). As such, the concepts of 'populist' and 'anti-establishment' are distinct from one another. The definition developed below defines *anti-establishment* parties, who may be further sub-categorised into populist AEPs.

Recently, *radical* left- and/or right-wing parties has become an increasingly popular phenomenon. Issues around case-selection notwithstanding, such terms are simply not adequate in order to gauge whether a party is actually anti-establishment. Terms such as far right (left) or radical right (left) denote a party's ideological platform, *not* whether the party's ideology is actually anti-establishment in the first instance. As a case in point, if a researcher wishes to classify Fidesz as radical-right, it will later be discussed that in the year 2020 Fidesz is not anti-establishment. Such terms also belie the position that parties such as the Scottish National Party take; it is not radical left yet is still an AEP because it seeks to bring about fundamental change to the UK. As such, the following definition enables parties to be studied on the basis of how they challenge the political establishment, while being flexible enough to further sub-categorise (e.g. *populist* AEPs, or *left-wing* AEPs).<sup>16</sup>

Other scholars have created various definitions to deal with such issues. There are three major issues with previous definitions: difficulties around operationalisation; conflation of party ideology and systemic integration and a failure to take into account rational party behaviour. Systemic integration refers to a party engaging with the established political system. This may be indirect, by cooperating with established parties (including coalitions), or direct, where the AEP is in government and becomes identifiable with metapolicies (the status quo) (Zulianello 2018, p.662-63).<sup>17</sup> This section therefore discusses key definitions of parties, alongside their strengths and weaknesses. The weaknesses are discussed in comparison to this thesis's adopted terminology: anti-establishment party.

The key concept in the definition developed below therefore is whether or not a party is ideologically committed to fundamentally altering key policies that affect the very

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<sup>15</sup> This is by no means an exhaustive list, though it does demonstrate the variety of terminology

<sup>16</sup> For instance, a researcher may feasibly wish to study why some left-wing AEPs are more successful than others. A hypothesis may be that *populist* AEPs win more votes, which necessitates studying all left-wing AEPs, not just those that are populist

<sup>17</sup> Metapolicies are both defined and discussed below

functioning of the national political system. This is distinct to concepts such as populism. Populist parties *claim* to offer a true alternative to the people but because it is a thin-centred ideology, populism itself is attached to ideologies that provide the bulk of a party’s policy platform. Many populist parties have quite moderate ideological platforms and therefore do not actually meet the criteria for being anti-establishment (Kriesi 2014; Rooduijn 2019). This thesis focuses on the *populist* AEP subset because populism provides more ideological flexibility, enabling parties to broaden their appeal and to adapt rapidly, particularly where anti-elitist sentiment is increasing in salience among voters.

**Party ideology and metapolicies**

The term ‘anti-system’ has long been used in political science, stemming back to Giovanni Sartori (1966, p.148). The term has been developed further, over time, by different scholars (e.g. Capoccia 2002; Zulianello 2018). As with any concept in political science, it has its notable strengths and weaknesses. Sartori defines an anti-system party in both broad and narrow terms. The broad definition is an anti-system party is one which “*undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes*” (emphasis in original) (Sartori 2016, p.117-18). The narrow definition is “an anti-system party would not change – if it could – the government but the very system of government. Its opposition is not an ‘opposition on issues’ ... but an ‘opposition of principle’” (Sartori 2016, p.118). As such, it takes into account the primacy of ideology for the anti-system party. The notion of ideology is an important one to capture as it demonstrates the nature of the parties themselves; that they are sincere and not merely using a ploy to target voters.

The term ‘anti-system’ itself, however, is characterised by stretching (Sartori 1970; Capoccia 2002, p.9-10). This is due to its utility in two broad fields; the study of party systems, and of democratic regimes (Capoccia 2002, p.10). In order to address such concerns, Zulianello (2018, p.656-57) developed a typology that tackles the “boundlessness” of Sartori’s definition and the problem of determining conceptual boundaries for parties whose “coalition and propaganda strategies do not vary in the same direction and obtain contradictory impacts on the functioning of party systems”. He tackles the issue of governmental participation by creating four different categories, summarised in Table 2.1. It therefore demonstrates that there is a clear ideological component to the categorisation of parties. Ideology *and* behaviour are key components.

**Table 2.1: A typology of political parties (Zulianello 2018)**

		Systemic integration	
		Yes	No
Ideological orientation towards established metapolicies	Anti-metapolitical	Halfway house parties	Anti-system parties
	Conventional anti-incumbent/policy oriented	Pro-system parties	Complementary parties

To move on, McDonnell and Newell (2011, p.445) have used the term ‘outsider party’ which they define as “those which – even when their vote share would have enabled it – due to their ideology and/or attitude towards mainstream parties have gone through a period of not being

‘coalitionable’, whether of their own volition or that of other parties in the system.” Therefore, there is a lot of focus on governmental participation. However, the definition also directly takes the ideology of the outsider party into account.

McDonnell and Newell (as well as Zulianello (2018) consider Cotta’s (1996) concept of *metapolicies* crucial; a key strength of their definition.<sup>18</sup> They (Cotta 1996, p.29 cited in McDonnell & Newell 2011, p.445) define metapolicies as:

The choices that concern the basic arrangements of the political regime, of the political community or of the social and economic system, or else the country’s location in an international system of alliances expressing fundamental conflict between two sides, or, lastly, support for all-encompassing visions of the world.

A metapolicy, as such, demonstrates platforms of parties and/or politicians at the highest possible level; it is informative of whether or not a party challenges the status quo. This concept is discussed in more detail in the following section. Further discussing ideology, McDonnell and Newell (2011, p.445) stress the important point that outsider parties “do not just offer alternative choices in the areas, for example, of economic, social and foreign policy, but alternatives in terms of the fundamental way in which choices are made.” As such, they stress the importance that outsider parties significantly challenge the status quo, as opposed to wishing to make changes *within* the status quo.

A number of other definitions use the term ‘anti-establishment party’. All three of Schedler (1996), Abedi (2004) and Hartleb (2015) use this term,<sup>19</sup> and also mention ideology. Schedler (1996, p.293-94) discusses the “anti-political triangle” of three actors: the political class, the people and the anti-establishment party itself. He further states (1996, p.302) they “typically hesitate to position themselves on the left-right continuum, which they tend to dismiss as anachronistic”.

Schedler (1996, p.302) argues anti-establishment politics seeks to challenge the establishment’s platform for conducting politics; “[a]nti-political-establishment discourses subordinate socio-economic cleavages to intrapolitical ones. They concentrate on political-system issues, often paying complete disattention to extra-political themes (like class cleavages or economic structures)”. As such, AEPs attack the regular grounds of competition as a whole for established parties; the AEPs completely differentiate themselves. This is very similar to the concept of actively challenging metapolicies, though is expressed in a different manner.

Hartleb (2015, p.43) gives a list of 13 points that “are common to all types of anti-establishment party, despite their differences”. The notion of AEPs challenging established metapolicies is also present in the definition. As above, the specific term ‘metapolicy’ is not used but the AEPs’ opposition to them is implicit: AEPs all share “the doctrine that ‘there is an alternative’” (Hartleb 2015, p.44). In addition to this, Hartleb (2015, p.41) argues that AEPs do not seek to co-operate with the political establishment; AEPs “consider (mainstream) politics to be a redundant activity and argue that there is no distinction between the parties of the establishment.” Further to this, AEPs take “an aggressive attitude towards

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<sup>18</sup> Zulianello’s ‘anti-system party’ definition also makes use of metapolicies

<sup>19</sup> Schedler and Abedi specifically use the term ‘anti-political-establishment party’, however for ease of discussion and comparison this is shortened to ‘anti-establishment party’

political adversaries (conflict instead of consensus)” (Hartleb 2015, p.44). So, AEPs attempt to distance themselves from the political establishment in order to retain their appeal.

Likewise, Abedi (2004, p.12) gave three necessary criteria, the first of which is to challenge the status quo and its major policy and system issues. The status quo chimes well with the concept of metapolicies and, as such, ideology is a prominent component of the definition. Examples that are given include the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)’s opposition to the ‘Proporz’ system in Austria (Abedi 2004, p.14-15).

Abedi’s two other criteria are that the party should perceive itself as a challenger, and that the party asserts there is a fundamental divide between the establishment and the people (2004, p.12). Stating that AEPs perceive themselves to be a challenger is certainly a key point, though it is necessary to be absolutely clear on whether or not this is behavioural or ideological (or rhetorical). Indeed, the following sub-section discusses party behaviour and systemic integration. As has been noted above, behaviour towards the political establishment and systemic integration is a key point that needs to be clearly specified and discussed. A party may perceive itself to be a challenger but entering government does not necessarily change this perception. As such, it is open to interpretation as to whether or not AEPs that perceive themselves as a challenger should be able to co-operate with the political establishment (and to what extent).

Asserting that there is a fundamental divide between the establishment and people (like self-perception as a challenger) aims to tap into an unwillingness (or reluctance) to engage with the establishment, though it is more ideological in nature. As will be explained in the final sub-section below, this criterion is problematic as it is difficult to operationalise, as ideology and behaviour are not easily disentangled from Abedi’s definition.

So, the element of ideology is explicitly discussed in the above definitions in similar ways.<sup>20</sup> Metapolicies are not always used specifically, but the *general* concept of metapolicies are often alluded to. Identifying and taking into account party ideology should be a key requirement for any definition of AEPs as it reflects not only *what* a party’s ideological platform is, but also *why* parties behave and act the way they do.

### **Party behaviour and systemic integration**

Party behaviour and systemic integration are not synonymous, and there is a subtle difference: the level of integration into the political system will be a function of party behaviour. Zulianello’s (2018, p.668) definition of anti-system parties takes into account not only ideology, but also behaviour. As he argues, an anti-system party should display “a double image of externality in comparison to the ‘system’: in terms of its core ideological concepts as well as in terms of its direct and indirect visible interactions with the system itself”.

Another type, challenger parties, primarily captures whether or not a party has entered government. It also indirectly captures elements of niche and populist parties; mobilising new issues, or rejecting the political establishment, for instance, while it also allows for the responsibility of policy outcomes to be attributed to parties (Hobolt & Tilley 2016, p.974).

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<sup>20</sup> One final definition, discussed below (popularised by Hobolt and co-authors) only implicitly operationalises ideology and, as such, is not assessed in this sub-section

De Vries and Hobolt (2012, p.250-51) make a distinction between mainstream opposition parties, mainstream government parties and challenger parties. Mainstream parties regularly alternate between government and opposition while challenger parties have not held office.

While this is technically three categories, the definition is essentially binary: mainstream or outsider, as the distinction between mainstream opposition and governmental is passing. In addition, they seek to change the political arena to their advantage by bringing new issues into play (De Vries & Hobolt 2012 p.250-52; Hobolt & Tilley 2016, p.974). The ideological profile of parties is captured indirectly; challenger parties are considered “issue entrepreneurs” (De Vries & Hobolt 2012, p.251). Above all else, ‘challenger parties’ is an approach best viewed as measuring a party’s systemic integration. The proposed definition in this paper does capture this, but not so that it becomes the defining feature. There is, however, a lot of crossover between the concepts of challenger parties and AEPs, making it necessary to discuss this definition.<sup>21</sup>

McDonnell and Newell (2011, p.447) discuss party behaviour and systemic integration at length. Parties such as the FPÖ and Lega Nord would ordinarily be excluded. Instead, they discuss what they call “one foot in and one foot out” behaviour of outsider parties in government. A ‘one foot in and one foot out’ strategy for Lega Nord was successful, enabling them to remain in government from 2001-2006 “while shedding little of its ‘outsider’ ideology, identity, rhetoric and traits” (McDonnell & Newell 2011, p.447).<sup>22</sup> The FPÖ, entering government in 1999, attempted this tactic which ended in electoral disaster (McDonnell & Newell 2011, p.448-50).

Schedler (1996), like Abedi (2004), discusses the self-perception of AEPs.<sup>23</sup> AEPs are “not only outside, they are against the political establishment” (Schedler 1996, p.299). Schedler essentially argues that AEPs are careful in their construction of the ‘political class’ and that there are no real differences between established parties (1996, p.295). Where the only alternative is the AEP, the party therefore demonstrably considers itself different to the political establishment. If a party considers itself to be different to established parties, it follows that their behaviour and ideology will be different in comparison to parties that do not consider themselves outside of the political establishment.

Abedi’s (2004) argument that AEPs perceive themselves to be a challenger is neither clearly ideological nor behavioural, as stated previously. However, it has clear behavioural/strategic implications. As McDonnell and Newell’s (2011) ‘one foot in and one foot out’ approach, described above, demonstrates (at least when in government) AEPs are acutely aware that they need to tread a fine line between governing, and not turning into the establishment. However, such a way of thinking risks giving primacy to temporary rhetoric and/or purely strategic parliamentary voting patterns. An about-face in terms of their core ideological platform, or a shift in metapolicies, should lead to a re-evaluation of an AEP’s label. Hartleb (2015) does not explicitly discuss party strategy, at least in a way that is easy to separate from ideology. In and of itself, this is problematic both because it is difficult to operationalise, and

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<sup>21</sup> AEPs often (but not always), for instance, are newer parties who insert new or depoliticised issues into the political arena, and most have not entered government, allowing them greater flexibility in making bigger promises while not having to justify their past policies in office

<sup>22</sup> McDonnell, Duncan and Newell, James L. ‘Outsider parties in government in Western Europe’ p.447

<sup>23</sup> This is similar to the ‘one foot in and one foot out’ and ‘half-way party’ approaches

because party strategy and behaviour is often key to determining its place in the political system.<sup>24</sup>

As such, all definitions bar Hartleb (2015) discuss party behaviour and systemic integration, at least implicitly. This is important to control for in a definition because parties in government are, naturally, in a position to clearly influence policy. However, they are also constrained in terms of how radical their enacted policies may be. Nevertheless, there are clear inconsistencies in terms of how definitions work in practice. The following section discusses these weaknesses and inconsistencies in more detail.

### **Addressing key concerns in previous literature**

This final sub-section addresses concerns found in the above definitions. These concerns are threefold: a lack of consideration around rational choice theory; operationalisation; and difficulties disentangling ideology and behaviour.

The rational choice tradition allows for three general models to view party behaviour: office-seeking, policy-seeking and vote-seeking (Strøm & Müller 1999, p.5-9). No one party is purely one of these; there is always a balance to be struck, for instance a party's actions in government will affect its vote shares at the next election (Strøm 1990, p.572-73). Similarly, a party will never simply seek votes in and of themselves; votes are used for policy influence and/or office seeking (Strøm & Müller 1999, p.9). So, parties have goals which they seek to achieve, which inevitably has consequences for their behaviour.

This is important to keep in mind because of the question of what happens to an AEP when it enters government. The changing profile of parties (such as when they reach government) has caused debate in academic literature (Zulianello 2018, p.656-57). Zulianello's (2018) anti-system label reflects the integration (or not) of a party into the national political system, such as governmental participation. There is, though, an important distinction to be made between *anti-establishment* and *anti-system* that is not explicit. Table 2.1 showed that ideology and behaviour are *both* key for the definition of anti-system parties.

The halfway house party category is particularly problematic. Treating a party's behaviour as equally important to its ideology leads to a change from anti-system to halfway house by simple engagement with the political establishment. Zulianello (2018, p.668) argued that Podemos shifted from anti-system to halfway house for attempting, but failing, to form a coalition government after the 2015 Spanish general election. This is problematic for two reasons: 'anti-system' ideologies and systemic integration do not always perfectly correlate, and it fails to take into account rational party behaviour.

Parties like Lega Nord and Fidesz displayed systemic integration while also ideologically challenging core features of the status quo. Integration into the national political system does not necessarily entail that the party's core ideological goals have substantively altered. Fidesz remained an AEP even when having a supermajority in parliament (an extraordinary degree of systemic integration) and only became an established party after 2018. Furthermore, the FPÖ and LN remain AEPs despite having participated in coalition governments. Fidesz went

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<sup>24</sup> As is discussed below, the new definition of AEPs takes into account party behaviour in terms of governmental participation. This does *not* turn a party into an established one, but it is vital to clearly explain important factors such as party behaviour and strategy.

to great lengths to dismantle liberal democracy in Hungary, which is what enabled it to remain an AEP in government; had it stopped attacking Hungary's institutions as its core platform, it would have ceased to be labelled an AEP (Enyedi 2016; Krekó & Enyedi 2018). As such, it does not entail that Fidesz should have been considered anything other than anti-system (used here colloquially) as it attacked liberal democracy. Entering government absolutely did not change its commitment to altering liberal democracy.<sup>25</sup>

Because parties compete in elections for a reason, to influence policy and/or enter office, it should follow that a party considered anti-establishment can enter office and retain its anti-establishment label dependent on its core beliefs.<sup>26</sup> It is not possible for a party to completely ignore the pressures that come with winning a significant number of votes in regard to government formation. So, treating core ideology and behaviour (systemic integration) equally is problematic. Parties compete in elections to influence policy or enter office, so it should follow that AEPs can enter office and remain anti-establishment, dependent on its ideological beliefs. It is the core ideological platform which makes a party anti-establishment, not its (lack of) governmental experience, this is discussed in more detail in the following section.

The challenger party label is perhaps the most problematic in this regard. According to the definition, parties such as FPÖ would be automatically excluded, despite being frequently labelled as both populist and radical. Indeed, the so-called Ibiza scandal in Austria showed that despite being a party of government, the FPÖ still sought radical change to Austria's political system.<sup>27</sup> So, the challenger party label best measures systemic integration, as ideology is not even explicit in the definition. This, however, does not mean that it is adequate at measuring whether a party is anti-establishment or not, as the Austrian case shows.

It is perhaps a good indicator of how mainstreamed an issue has become, but the caveat is usually where an AEP is mainstreamed, they either *become* the establishment (as in Hungary) or they simply shift the debate and perhaps party positions somewhat, still maintaining their *even more* anti-establishment platform.<sup>28</sup> The latter is applicable in most European countries with mainstreamed AEPs that have helped to alter political debate; the FPÖ, Lega Nord and Front National, for instance, are very much a part of mainstream politics, yet their biggest selling point is that they *still* offer anti-establishment alternatives.

The outsider party label is also problematic in this regard, as whether a party is able to be considered for coalition is problematic. The 'one foot in and one foot out' approach enables

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<sup>25</sup> Fidesz has stopped being an AEP post-2018 *because* it has been so successful at challenging liberal democracy, not because it simply entered government.

<sup>26</sup> For example, a party seeking to leave the EU as a core constituent of its belief system *before* entering government, and then abandoning this policy *afterwards* should cease to be considered anti-establishment

<sup>27</sup> The (then) leader of the party, Heinz-Christian Strache was recorded in 2017 offering public contracts in return for campaign support to a woman claiming to be related to a Russian oligarch (Oltermann 2019). The video was released shortly before the 2019 European Parliament elections, causing the collapse of the Austrian government.

<sup>28</sup> 'Mainstream' is best understood as how prevalent a party or issue is in political discourse. Concern around both austerity and immigration or multiculturalism are certainly mainstream in contemporary European politics. However, certain parties are so radical that they are anti-establishment because of the extent of the reform they wish to make (such as the Dutch Socialist Party, or Lega Nord)

McDonnell and Newell (2011) to include cases such as the FPÖ. This marks a departure from a binary distinction; an outsider party is *not* considered coalitionable *because* of their ideology and/or behaviour. It does not then automatically follow if a party must take certain actions to operate a ‘one foot in and one foot out’ approach. This opens up the possibility for inconsistent operationalisation, and at the least is not easy to objectively judge. Furthermore, as voter perceptions matter at least as much as AEP behaviour when in government, it may even be that the party’s behaviour *before* entering government may matter more.<sup>29</sup> Terms such as ‘halfway’ parties aim to address such problems, but the outsider party label does not fully take this aspect of party behaviour into account.

This fits in with the above discussion of rational choice theory; it would be entirely rational, and expected, for an AEP to attempt to retain its anti-establishment profile. The expected behaviour of AEPs, when entering government, is built into the definition clearly and concisely (as will be shown). This avoids complicated explanations of party behaviour and rhetoric; the proposed definition treats such behaviour as a function of the party’s policy platform. This should follow from rational choice theory, as when a party has an agenda it wishes to implement (either office-seeking, or policy-seeking) it will adjust its behaviour accordingly.<sup>30</sup>

Abedi (2004) argues that AEPs self-perceive as challengers, but what the relationship between behaviour to the political establishment systemic integration is needs to be made clear. AEPs may enter government but this will not necessarily change their own perception of being a challenger, as per McDonnell and Newell’s (2011) ‘one foot in and one foot out’ concept. This, though, can be complicated to argue and articulate, and is also not easily operationalisable. As stated above, it is difficult to judge if a party’s rhetoric is purely temporary and strategic, or if it is genuinely fundamentally shifting its ideology.

As such, disentangling ideology and behaviour (both short- and long-term) from one another is a vital aspect to get right in any definition. Perhaps the only way to tell would be through time, but this therefore negates any ‘one foot in and one foot out’ approach, because a shift in ideology would still need to be observed *after* leaving government. As stated above, it may well be natural for AEPs to perceive themselves as challengers and therefore to try and maintain this image in government. If the ‘one foot in and one foot out’ approach is to be expected, then it a) negates any binary distinction (because an ‘outsider party’ may enter government but remain an ‘outsider’), and therefore b) necessitates that its ideology and platform is what makes it anti-establishment (or an ‘outsider’).

This brings up another weakness that can often be identified in previous literature: difficulties around operationalisation. The term ‘challenger party’ is easily operationalisable as it takes into account solely participation in government. The more objective and easily operationalisable a definition is, the easier and more consistently researchers will be able to identify their case-selection. Clear boundaries are also important to prevent misspecification whereby two similar borderline cases may be categorised differently. However, the challenger party label’s operationalisability is also a weakness, particularly where coalition

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<sup>29</sup> e.g. if the party over-promised in opposition it may be judged more harshly by voters

<sup>30</sup> This is discussed in the following section along with the definition itself; but it is argued that AEPs are policy-seeking and, as such, seek to push the issue or policy area that propelled them to high enough vote shares to enter government to bring about change



governments are common. As the challenger party label captures only participation in government, it does not adequately reflect the anti-establishment nature of parties such as the FPÖ.

It may also be difficult to judge a ‘one foot in and one foot out’ approach according to the outsider party label. As such, complicated, lengthy discussions of party behaviour may be necessary in order to justify and explain case-selection. This issue is compounded by the rationality of joining government in the first place: AEPs may well wish to influence policy and view entering government as the best way to do this. This does not necessarily change their core ideological goal, only their systemic integration.

Schedler’s (1996) article is particularly problematic in this regard. Firstly, he does not give a clear, concise definition able to be packed into a few short sentences or bullet points. Instead, only the characteristics of AEPs are given. This may give more freedom to the researcher but can also open up the possibility for inconsistent case-selection. This does not invalidate the work by any means, but it does make it difficult to condense. As a case in point, if comparative research across the globe is a research objective, then a more diverse array of political systems and actors may accentuate such issues.

What is most important is the lack of a systematic definition. Indeed, Schedler (1996, p.302) argued we should not “overlook the fact that anti-political-establishment actors show a clear ‘elective affinity’ with right-wing parties” and that “anti-political-establishment politics is crystallizing as the new ideology of the right”. Certainly, this is not true; parties such as the Five Star Movement, Podemos and SYRIZA demonstrate that anti-establishment sentiment is not unique to the right-wing. As stated in the previous paragraph, this is certainly not true across the planet. In South America, for instance, right-wing AEPs (or politicians/presidential candidates) are much less common than they are in Europe.

Schedler’s article furthermore does not adequately differentiate between anti-establishment and populism. Populism’s “main thrust has been anti-capitalist, anti-oligarchic, or anti-imperialist” (1996, p.293). At the same time, Schedler argues that AEPs “stage charismatic populism” (1996, p.301). Three points are given to argue this and two in particular are problematic; firstly AEP actors argue they are agents of change (1996, p.301). However, this is not unique to populism; a communist party undoubtedly seeks systemic change but this is not by definition populist. Second, “most anti-political-establishment actors flee the political world in order to invade non-political arenas, above all, fields of culture and entertainment”, and examples given include concerts, talk shows and sports events (1996, p.301-02). This does not describe populism specifically (at least not as a thin-centred ideology).<sup>31</sup> It may work as a description of a breakdown of traditional political behaviour and communication, and may be particularly relevant if this is the *sole* or *primary* method of communication for a politician but what should matter most is the ideology of the party itself.

Hartleb’s (2015) work has a similar weakness to Schedler’s article (1996) in that it is not easily operationalisable. The 13 criteria all make conceptual sense for an AEP, but a lot of them are closely related to each other and could have been condensed much further. In addition, it is not stated if all or only some of the 13 criteria must be present at the same time

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<sup>31</sup> This will be discussed in more detail below

to be considered AEP. Under such circumstances, the scope for inconsistent case-selection increases.

As a final point, not all of the above definitions adequately define the *opposite* of AEPs. Both De Vries and Hobolt (2012) and Zulianello (2018) give clear, consistent labels for *all* parties. The opposite of a challenger party is a “mainstream party” (McDonnell and Newell 2011, p.445). The issues of the ‘one foot in and one foot out’ approach notwithstanding, the very concept of a ‘mainstream’ party is inherently problematic (not least because it is not formally defined by the authors).<sup>32</sup> Parties such as the FPÖ and Lega Nord a) epitomise issues which are increasingly the subject of widespread public concern, and b) have been consistently successful. They are surely mainstreamed within their respective countries, but as stated above, this does not mean that they are not ‘anti-establishment’. It just means that their radical, anti-establishment ideology is popular among the electorate. Something being popular does not stop its (potential) implementation from being a radical departure from established policy.

Schedler (1996) makes no clear reference to the opposite of his definition. This is even more problematic than an inconsistent definition. As Sartori (1970, p.1039) argues, it is vital to be able to clearly define something as ‘either-or’. Hartleb (2015, p.41) confuses ‘mainstream’ with ‘established’, when defining mainstream parties when “its electoral appeal is based on a recognisable and moderate programmatic platform.” ‘Recognisable’ is rather vague; communism for instance is readily recognisable but is hardly mainstream (in Europe). Likewise, ‘moderate’ depends on context; most of the SNP’s policies are centre-left and presumably would be classed by most as moderate but it is still an AEP. The Hungarian Socialist Party, too, is centre-left, yet were it to come to power in Hungary, it would likely wish to make extensive reform to Hungarian politics following Fidesz’s time in power.

Lastly, Abedi’s definition of establishment parties does not adequately capture the dynamics of political systems; just within the EU, minority governments, coalition governments and single-party parliamentary majority governments are normally expected in the various member states. The definition Abedi uses is influenced by Sartori’s notion of party relevance. The establishment is defined by Abedi (2004, p.11) as:

first, all those parties that have participated in government or alternatively those parties that the governing parties regard as suitable partners for government formation, and second, parties that are willing to cooperate with the main governing parties by joining them in a coalition government.

This can be problematic due to its heavy focus on *coalition* governments, and states where there is a tradition of single-party parliamentary majority governments, or even presidential systems, do not clearly fit in with this definition.

As such, there are important lessons to be learned from previous literature. Table 2.2 contains a list of strengths and weaknesses in previous definitions. Directly taking into account ideology is crucial, as this enables the researcher to capture the true nature of the party. Furthermore, party behaviour and systemic integration should be acknowledged as entering

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<sup>32</sup> ‘Mainstream’ may feasibly mean several things. However, it may well most commonly refer to whether or not the party (or issue) has been popular (or salient) for an extended period of time, and perhaps one which has altered other parties’ strategy and/or behaviour

government is a key method to bring about fundamental change. The previous definitions discussed above all have weaknesses relating to party behaviour and/or operationalisation. Ideology should be treated as structural opposition to the establishment, specifically in terms of opposition to metapolicies. Furthermore, the dynamics of party competition and behaviour need to be properly taken into account: parties can and do enter government, and parties can and do cease to be labelled anti-establishment. These are not the same two things, however. The next section proposes a new definition that takes the above discussion into account, thus rectifying these issues.

**Table 2.2: Strengths and weaknesses in previous categorisations**

<b>Label (author)</b>	<b>Strength</b>	<b>Weakness</b>
Anti-political establishment party (Abedi)	Takes ideology into account; concise definition; takes party behaviour into account	Difficult to disentangle behaviour from ideology (therefore difficult to operationalise); definition of establishment problematic for non-coalition governments
Challenger party (De Vries and Hobolt)	Entirely objective; easily operationalisable	Indirectly captures ideology; systemic integration overrides reality of anti-establishment tendencies in governing AEPs
Anti-establishment party (Hartleb)	Takes ideology into account; takes party behaviour into account	Overlapping criteria; cannot be easily operationalised; conflates populism with anti-establishment
Outsider party (McDonnell and Newell)	Takes ideology into account; acknowledges ideology and systemic integration are separate concepts; clearly takes into account rational party behaviour	Binary definition makes distinction between ideology and behaviour difficult to operationalise and conceptualise
Anti-political-establishment party (Schedler)	Takes ideology into account; takes party behaviour into account	Conflates populism with anti-establishment; argues populism is a right-wing phenomenon; cannot be easily operationalised
Anti-system party (Zulianello)	Takes ideology into account; flexible definition	Conflates systemic integration with party ideology (and does not take into account rational party behaviour)

## II

### A new definition of ‘anti-establishment party’

This section introduces and discusses a new definition of AEPs. It contains the definition itself (and a discussion of metapolicies) and an expanded discussion on the nature of party behaviour and systemic integration. In doing so, it offers a concise and new definition which enables systematic empirical analysis. The expanded discussion disentangles the complicated relationship between anti-establishment and systemic integration. In order to take this into account, a new distinction is made to control for systemic integration *separately* from (anti-)establishment; governmental and non-governmental parties.<sup>33</sup>

A party is defined as an AEP if it meets **both** of the following criteria:

- It actively challenges established, prominent metapolicies
- It does not seek co-operation with established parties; *or* it retains a minimally co-operative relationship with an established party in a coalition/minority government.

A party is considered an establishment party if it meets the following criterion:

- Whether in government *or* opposition: it has actively supported the enactment of prominent metapolicies *and/or* it actively supports the continuity or strengthening of prominent metapolicies.

As such, this is a binary distinction between *establishment* or *anti-establishment*. Parties are characterised on the basis of their core policy platform and, consequently, their actions in respect of the political system. Appendix A1 contains a list of AEPs in Europe, to demonstrate the ability of the definition to identify such parties. They are also further subcategorised into populist or non-populist AEPs, following Rooduijn et al’s (2019) ‘Populist’ of populist parties in Europe. The *populist* AEPs identified here comprise the case-selection for the analyses in the following four chapters.

This definition of anti-establishment allows that parties either in government or opposition can be considered as an AEP and, likewise, smaller ‘establishment’ parties that may never have had a chance to govern can also have their policy platform recognised. Support or opposition to established metapolicies demonstrates a party’s policy platform at the highest possible level: whether or not the party wants extensive change to the very nature of the national political system. As Zulianello (2018, p.657) argued, ‘anti-system’ parties do not merely express “anti-incumbent and policy-oriented opposition”, but they instead challenge metapolicies themselves. However, it is vital to accept that any party can express anti-metapolicy sentiment if it would benefit them, so only if opposition to established metapolicies is a *core* component of its policy platform is it an AEP. As such, AEPs consist of parties as ideologically varied as the Scottish National Party, the Greek Communist Party and Jobbik.

So, for a party to be considered anti-establishment it must seek, as a primary objective, to enact wide-reaching change to established metapolicies. It is also important to note that

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<sup>33</sup> This does not simply apply to AEPs; ‘establishment’ parties may never have entered government due to, among other things, their age and the voting system

metapolicies must be prominent and *established*; there must be widespread agreement among the political mainstream for the ‘establishment’ to form. Where there is political agreement among parties based on metapolicies, the anti-establishment may then form.

For instance, the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) is generally considered to be a radical left party (March & Mudde 2005; March & Rommerskirchen 2015; Rooduijn et al 2017). Ordinarily (as explained in more detail in the following subsection) this would indicate that AKEL is an AEP (although *not* a populist AEP). However, it is one of the major parties in Cyprus alongside Democratic Rally (DISY). Given that AKEL and DISY are in direct competition with each other, with markedly different policy platforms (radical-left vs centre-right), it entails that this is normal incumbent vs opposition competition. This is especially so given March and Mudde’s observation that the left-right cleavage is very strong in Cyprus (2005, p.28).

As such, AKEL does not oppose an *established* metapolicy since it has not finished third in a general election since 1985 (instead, AKEL has finished either first or second in every single election from 1991-2016). As a further point, AKEL’s radical left ideology is mixed with a more moderate, ideologically inclusive (and evolving) platform (Christophorou 2001, p.116-17; March & Mudde 2005, p.28). Since the two major parties have such fundamentally different platforms, AKEL is simply not opposing an *established* metapolicy. It is therefore entirely possible for a party to be radical, but not an AEP. A similar example is discussed further below; Hungary and Fidesz.

McDonnell and Newell (2011) and Zulianello (2018) identify five metapolicies: the political regime; the political community; the social and economic system; international alliances that express conflict between two sides; and all-encompassing visions of the world.<sup>34</sup> These are briefly discussed below. Metapolicies are not overly prescriptive but are instead more general terms that allow for variation over time and space.<sup>35</sup> As a further point, a party need only oppose *one* to be considered an AEP, but it must be part of the party’s core platform. It is possible to oppose more than one, but in practice this does not happen. Communist parties often have Eurosceptic tendencies (Marks et al 2006, p.167), however this typically stems from anti-capitalism among those that are Eurosceptic (Benedetto & Quaglia 2007, p.483).

Firstly, ‘the political regime’ is defined by Zulianello as “sources of legitimation upon which the political regime itself is built” (2018, p.660). In EU member states, such a prominent metapolicy is membership of the EU itself and/or the Eurozone. In addition, liberal democracy is also a metapolicy (i.e. opposing the *liberal* democratic structures of a country would bring about a fundamental shift in the functioning of governments (Zulianello 2018, p.660). Eurosceptic parties include the Front National and Party for Freedom (PVV), while Fidesz (pre-2018) and Law and Justice challenge liberal democracy.

Both McDonnell and Newell (2011, p.446) and Zulianello (2018, p.661) argue that the political community metapolicy refers primarily to national independence parties. Such parties include the Scottish National Party. Both also agree (2011, p.445-46; 2018, p.661) that the social and economic system refers to capitalism, and is primarily relevant to radical left-

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<sup>34</sup> McDonnell and Newell (2011) refer to Western Europe, while Zulianello (2018) refers to liberal democracies

<sup>35</sup> Specific metapolicies can change over time, and one that is relevant in, say, Portugal (e.g. EU membership) simply may not be relevant in other countries (Zulianello 2018, p.660)

wing parties. International alliances that express conflict between two sides is fairly self-explanatory, although Zulianello (2018, p.661) points out the requirement that it “bears fundamental implications for the political and economic status quo at the national level”. The example of NATO and the Warsaw Pact that Zulianello gives is no longer relevant in contemporary European politics.

The final metapolicy is all-encompassing visions of the world and refers to non-democratic proposals. Specifically, this should refer to extreme left-wing parties such as Maoist, Trotskyist and Stalinist Communist parties, and extreme right-wing parties (Zulianello 2018, p.661). There are few, if any, relevant extreme left-wing parties in Europe, though the Greek Communist Party does have some revolutionary tendencies. Most European anti-capitalism, though, is *radical* (March and Rommerskirchen 2015, p.41). Golden Dawn is an example of an extreme right-wing party (Mudde 2017a, p.6).

### **AEP behaviour and systemic integration**

The proposed definition of AEPs has two necessary components; its core platform and its behaviour (i.e. AEPs generally tend not to cooperate with established parties). These often go hand-in-hand but there are several cases that blur this distinction. The overall discussion in this sub-section seeks to demonstrate that ‘the system’ is different to the policy platform of a party. As such, systemic integration should be viewed as separate from policy platforms, not as a consequence; the two are not synonyms.

An AEP should seek to upheave established metapolicies but should also seek to do this on its own terms (outside of the influence of established parties). AEPs invest heavily in their core policy platform and therefore are generally unwilling to seek compromise. An AEP may, however, participate in government with another establishment party, though it would retain a minimal role within the government. Essentially, the AEP offers its support and extracts as much leverage as possible on issues key to its own ideological platform. Further to this, the Danish People’s Party is well known for supporting minority governments, without actually entering government (McDonnell & Newell 2011, p.446).

A party’s policies are fundamental to the proposed definition, and therefore behaviour towards and engagement with establishment parties are affected by this: AEPs do not want their platform to be watered down. As such, AEPs seek to retain as much independence from other parties as possible. However, increased success brings a greater likelihood of entering government and this discussion is now more important than ever due to recent success of AEPs in Europe.

Parties can be thought of as vote-, office- or policy-seeking; parties compete for a reason, votes have no intrinsic value. AEPs may enter government and retain their ‘anti-establishment’ label, dependent on its core policy platform. In many of the above definitions, there is a tension between how party platforms and behaviour are treated, particularly when AEPs enter government. There are two general problems that can be identified: there is a risk of minimising the role of policy platforms, and rational party behaviour is not always taken into account,

Anti-establishment parties should therefore be sub-categorised into *governmental* and *non-governmental*. A governmental party is one which has held office in a government (in a coalition/minority government and/or single-party parliamentary majority). This reflects

purely the systemic integration of a party while the AEP label reflects its ideological profile. In other words, systemic integration can be controlled for while ensuring that ideology remains the key aspect of a party's categorisation. Fidesz for instance, as an AEP, had an extraordinary degree of systemic integration, yet still had an unwavering commitment to anti-liberal democratic policies. Ciudadanos, in Spain, meanwhile, is a (non-governmental) established party due to its unwillingness to challenge prominent metapolicies in Spain such as national independence, or EU membership.

Parties should be viewed as rational actors with specific goals they set out to achieve; they should seek to pursue specific policies or office. No governing party, particularly in a liberal democracy, can ever reasonably expect to achieve everything it wants. There are always compromises to be made, existing laws to be navigated and external actors to be negotiated with. Entering government poses such challenges for any party.

Entering government demonstrates systemic integration, to varying extents (supermajorities differ greatly to minority coalitions), and this is something the term '(non-)governmental' can capture, as it does not contain any criterion on the basis of ideology. A populist radical right-wing party abandoning any policies seeking to fundamentally alter liberal democracy with a nativist platform, for instance, would be a change requiring a re-think of its categorisation as an AEP. Such a party entering government is separate from its policy platform and categorisation, as any party faces pressure to enter government on the basis of a high vote share in conjunction with the likely increased issue salience that would normally accompany AEP success.

The AEP label, with (non-)governmental sub-categorisations captures the nature of party competition and systemic integration while still taking into account rational party behaviour. Table 2.3, below, shows the distinction that should be made, following the 2015 (September) Greek general election. New Democracy and PASOK did not enter government following the election, though they have previously dominated Greek politics. Despite being in government, SYRIZA and ANEL did not immediately become establishment parties because their core ideology did not change at the point of entry into government. At the heart of their platforms was firm anti-establishment/Eurosceptic sentiment and opposition to austerity (Aslanidis & Rovira Kaltwasser 2016, p.1087; Vasilopoulou 2018 p.315).

Table 2.4 shows the same distinction following on from the Austrian 1999 election. The FPÖ entered government as the junior partner of the centre-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) (despite winning more votes). The prior government had been formed by a grand coalition between the ÖVP and Social Democratic Party. The FPÖ's entry to government was the culmination of a relentlessly populist right-wing, aggressive platform. The ultimate goal was to maximise votes to not only survive potential losses following incumbency, but to also be strong enough to robustly influence policy (rather than propping up a senior coalition partner) (Luther 2011, p.456).

**Table 2.3: (non-)Governmental (anti-)establishment parties in Greece, 2015 (September)**

	Party of government	
	Yes	No
Establishment	New Democracy*; PASOK*	The River; Union of Centrists
Anti-establishment	SYRIZA; ANEL <sup>2</sup>	Golden Dawn; Greek Communist Party

\* Not in government following the election

2: Independent Greeks (ANEL) entered government following both 2015 elections, though subsequently left government in 2019

**Table 2.4: (non-)Governmental (anti-)establishment parties in Austria, 1999**

	Party of government	
	Yes	No
Establishment	Austrian People’s Party; Social Democratic Party of Austria*	The Greens
Anti-establishment	Freedom Party of Austria	

\* Not in government following the election

As discussed above, other academics may work criteria regarding systemic integration directly into their definitions. This is not just unnecessary, but also counter-productive to the categorisation of parties as it does not take into account rational behaviour. Accepting a distinction between governmental and non-governmental parties (be they AEP or not) is a more flexible approach. (Non-)governmental establishment parties is also a necessary distinction to make; parties *not* in government and who would *not* expect to enter government may have the added luxury of appealing to a wide variety of voters. Furthermore, the proposed approach also helps to take into account the discourse and/or actions of AEPs once in government.

A concept is meaningful when one can argue something is ‘either-or’ before arguing whether it is ‘more-and-less’ (Sartori 1970, p.1039). As such, it is crucial to be able to say, specifically, what a party actually is; anti-establishment, or established. Concepts such as the notion of ‘one foot in and one foot out’ are unhelpful in this regard as they blur the boundaries and jar with the definition of outsider parties. However, given that party competition and behaviour is dynamic, the proposed definition still takes into account any ‘more-and-less’ logic by sub-categorising parties on the basis of systemic integration.



Parties such as Lega Nord remained eager to distance themselves from establishment parties, even in government (McDonnell and Newell 2011, p.446). Parties like Lega Nord still keep their radical, anti-establishment ideology even after entering government; entering government does not entail a change in ideology. So, the distinction between governmental and non-governmental parties is an important one to make. This is an improvement over many other definitions because it treats policy platform and systemic integration as separate. This allows for a more flexible and inclusive definition of ‘anti-establishment’ without making problematic associations between party behaviour and systemic integration.

The proposed definition for AEPs offers an improvement on existing literature because it takes into account the core ideology of a party, and allows for systemic integration to be controlled for, rather than working it into the definition. Treating the two as the same, or equally important, is problematic as it does not take into account rational party behaviour and is too prescriptive, certainly when voters themselves perceive integrated parties as still being ‘anti-establishment’. So, the proposed definition provides a concise and flexible way of studying AEPs. The discussion moves on to now discuss two examples of shifting metapolicies and party classification: Hungary and Fidesz, and the Green party family.

### III

#### **Not set in stone: shifting metapolicies and party classification**

This section offers a more focused discussion of how the proposed definition of AEPs can be applied to cases where there are often difficulties in labelling and defining parties, and in cases where there has been significant political upheaval. The example of Hungary and Fidesz shows that a party can, in the right circumstances, switch between AEP and established. The example of the Green party family shows that political arenas can be fundamentally altered, rendering a formerly anti-metapolitical platform to one of widespread political agreement.

#### **Fidesz: challenging liberal democracy in Hungary**

Fidesz, as alluded to throughout this chapter, was an established party until *after* 2002, upon which it became an AEP. However, *after* 2018, Fidesz again turned into an established party, such is its dominance in Hungarian politics. The definition, as such, allows for parties to change classification depending on their actions and/or ideology. In Fidesz’s case, after 2018 it became an established party because it has been successful in effectively dismantling liberal democracy in Hungary beyond recognition.

Since the 1990s, Hungary’s democracy has been characterised by bitter bipolar and increasingly divisive party competition between left and right (Enyedi 2015, p.236; Batory 2016 p.292; Buzogány 2017, p.1312). Nevertheless, it was not until losing the 2002 election that Fidesz adopted a sufficiently radical nationalist (and populist) platform for it to be labelled as an AEP (indeed, a *populist* AEP) (Enyedi 2015, p.238). The specific metapolicy that Fidesz opposes is the ‘political community’ due to its opposition to liberal democracy. However, the discourse and platform of Fidesz vis-à-vis liberal democracy was more carefully guarded and it did not seriously challenge liberal democracy until after 2010 (Enyedi 2015, p.244; Batory 2016, p.298). Despite its historical good performances in Hungarian elections, Fidesz can still be considered an AEP *after* 2002 due to its stronger populist and nationalist tone (Enyedi 2015, p.236; Batory 2016, p.286). This was a marked

contrast to its previous rhetoric, even by Hungary's polarised standards, with such a rhetoric only matched by Jobbik and (formerly), MIEP.

The new constitution following the 2010 general election and the 'system of national cooperation' resulted in a decline of liberal democracy. This is uniquely due to Fidesz, as the party has won consecutive supermajorities in 2010, 2014 and 2018. This is why Fidesz has stopped being anti-establishment; Fidesz *is* the establishment. A new constitution entered into force in 2012, however this should not qualify as the "establishment" of Fidesz because the constitution, in and of itself, did not alter Hungary's status as a liberal democracy. Not only is there a grey area between liberal democracy and authoritarianism, but there also remained liberal institutions and clear constraints imposed on Hungary by the EU in particular (Zulianello 2018, p.672).

When national institutions become beholden to one party, though, as is the case in Hungary, the country should effectively cease to be classified as a liberal democracy. Krekó and Enyedi point out that "[t]he procedures that were originally designed to limit executive power survive, but only as a joke, and nearly all the country's decision makers belong to the prime minister's personal clientelist network" (2018, p.39). Hungary is far from a dictatorship; both Dawson and Hanley (2016, p.21), and Krekó and Enyedi (2018, p.49) use the term "backsliding".

Krekó and Enyedi further refer to Hungary as an "illiberal regime" (2018, p.41). As Hungary has transformed into an *illiberal* democracy, the manner in which the national political system functions has been fundamentally altered. This transformation into an illiberal democracy is not up for question, but the timing of *when* Fidesz became the party of the establishment is. Following the 2018 election is most appropriate, and not before 2018.

As per the definition of AEPs, the metapolicy needs to be established; nothing must interrupt the process of the metapolicy taking hold in the political system (i.e. it needs to become settled into the political system so that a) it has demonstrable effects on politics, and b) the effects are long-standing). As such, after immediately passing the new constitution in the 2010-14 parliament, the effects were simply not longstanding enough for Fidesz to have clearly dismantled liberal democracy and turned illiberal democracy into a new metapolicy. Secondly, given the polarised nature of Hungarian politics, Fidesz losing the 2014 election would likely have resulted in further constitutional reform.

Furthermore, a thin shell of liberalism, and of checks and balances remained; the Constitutional Court, despite being heavily reformed by Fidesz, still ruled government reforms unconstitutional (Batory 2016, p.294). Liberal parties managed to use Parliament and the EU to challenge Fidesz, too, with the EU forcing a (limited) amount of backtracking from Fidesz (Batory 2016, p.296-98). The European Court of Justice also repealed the government's decision to force over 200 judges into retirement (Enyedi 2015, p.246). As such, Fidesz was unable to act with complete impunity immediately following the 2010 election and adoption of a new constitution. Zulianello (2018, p.672) furthermore argued that Fidesz is a 'halfway house' party rather than an 'anti-system' party because there are still remnants of liberalism.

However, time has worn on and Fidesz has upheld not only its ideology but also its behaviour: Hungary's institutions are still beholden to Fidesz. It is also worth pointing out

that, now, in three consecutive elections (2010; 2014 and 2018), that parties critical of liberal democracy have won over two-thirds of the vote (Jobbik being the additional party) (Enyedi 2015, p.249; Zulianello 2018, p.671). More damningly, Jobbik, as of 2018, is the second largest parliamentary party. This demonstrates not only that illiberalism has now been relevant both institutionally and electorally for many years, but also that it has truly become cemented in place. While the EU still imposes some constraints on Hungary, its weak challenges towards Fidesz have clearly not been enough to restore liberalism, and the distinct lack of a serious pro-liberal challenger over a prolonged period of time require a rethink of the AEP label that Fidesz previously had.

### **Green parties: how a family of AEPs entered the establishment**

Green parties, on the whole, *were* considered to be AEPs up until the late 1990s. Green parties first emerged (particularly, though not exclusively, in Western Europe) in the 1970s, typically promoting new politics or post-material issues (Müller-Rommel 1998, p.146; Dolezal 2010, p.534; Grant & Tilley 2019, p.497). By the 1990s, Green parties and their issues quickly entered mainstream political debate to even greater extents than previously. Indeed, Zulianello (2018, p.669) argued that the German Greens changed from anti-metapolitical to a ‘complementary party’ in the early 1990s.

The ever-increasing mainstreaming of environmental issues helped to alter party competition, led in tandem by scientific consensus on climate change and increased public concern for environmental issues. As such, (established) political elites saw not only an opportunity to adopt such issues, but also arguably a need to do so, given the increased salience. The increased importance of the climate and environment by the 1990s can be best typified by the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.

Further to Zulianello’s (2018) observation that Green parties became less critical of the political system in the 1990s, Poguntke (2002, p.135) too noted that while the German Greens in 1998 still called for the dissolution of NATO (a policy which would automatically make a party anti-establishment if it is fundamental to their platform), this was the result of an outdated programme from the 1980s due to infighting preventing newer manifestos from being published. This indicates that such radical, anti-metapolitical policies can no longer be defined as fundamentally central to their platform. Further still, Poguntke has argued that green parties have tended to be “co-operative” when in government and had “very limited” impact on nuclear policy (2002, p.140).

This fits in well with Grant and Tilley’s argument that the German Greens moved to “a broader left-libertarian ‘rainbow catch-all’ position”, abandoning its more radical policies (2019, p.509). This is also a trend that Norris and Inglehart noted throughout Western Europe (2019, p.44). So, it is notable that green parties are considered to have dropped their more radical policies in favour of a softer platform. As such, this indicates that Green parties, at some point in time, *stopped* offering a clear, anti-establishment platform. This primarily occurred in the 1990s and did so for two separate reasons as described above.

Firstly, Green parties simply no longer offer policy proposals that can be described as radical and anti-establishment. There is widespread public and political support for action on climate change. Green parties may well wish to take stricter environmental protection measures, but this is simply a matter of degrees, rather than offering a fundamentally different choice. This

can be directly contrasted to, say, Fidesz, which dramatically altered Hungary's very political system.

Secondly, Green parties themselves sensed this and also altered (broadened) their own platforms. As such, not only is their broad goal of environmental protection congruent with established government policy, but they have also moved *beyond* just the environment. Instead, they offer a much more wide-reaching left-wing platform, consequentially meaning that the core of their ideology and platform is no longer just the environment.

The key question that remains is: did this affect the *entire* party family and, if so, when? If, as Grant and Tilley (2019) argued, the German Greens are taken as the prototypical party, literature suggests that other members of party families rapidly learn from such a party (Rydgren 2005). Upon their election to government, it became apparent to the German Greens that they would need to accept the constraints of entering a national (coalition) government. The solution, common to all Green parties, was to broaden their ideological appeal and attempt to lose their single-issue party label by focusing on other policy areas (Poguntke 2002, p.143). Only when in government did this become so immediately apparent to other parties and, as such, the year 1998 is taken as the date in which green parties ceased to be anti-establishment.

In sum, this section demonstrated the dynamics and practicalities of the new definition of AEPs. It shows that parties should be categorised on the basis of their ideological challenge (or not) to the political system as a whole. Other definitions tend to struggle with this, particularly when such parties enter government. This is certainly understandable, but often concepts such as 'mainstream', 'systemic integration' and 'anti-establishment' are conflated and/or used interchangeably.

Instead, this section has showed how the party's ideology and its relation to the wider political system is most important in determining what it does, and does not, stand for. Only when an AEP stops challenging metapolicies does it cease to be anti-establishment. This could either be because it successfully altered the metapolicy itself (Fidesz), or because the party needed to adapt to an evolving political system (Green parties).

## IV

### Populism as the focus of analysis

This fourth, and final, section further specifies the rationale to analyse *populist* AEPs. In doing so, it is divided into two sub-sections. Firstly, as populism is a contested concept, a brief overview of how to define it is given. Secondly, the reasoning for studying populist AEPs specifically is given.

Ultimately, populism is considered to be a thin-centred ideology in its own right. This allows it to be identified along the political spectrum as opposed to being, say, a right-wing phenomenon. Populist AEPs specifically are the focus of analysis due to a) their uneven success across countries, b) populism acts as a 'bridge' between the left-right spectrum, and c) populist AEPs, despite *uneven* success, are both present and represented in parliament in nearly all European countries. This is not the case for *non-populist* AEPs.

Populist AEPs specifically are the focus of analysis due to the the variation in terms of populist AEP success and ideology. Secondly, with the exception of very few countries,

following the financial crisis it has largely been *populist* AEPs that have risen to prominence.<sup>36</sup> As such, taking into account both the rapid increase in success of populist AEPs, and the uneven nature of this success, specifically focusing on populist AEPs is pertinent.

### **Populism: a thin-centred ideology**

Populism is one of, if not the most, contentious issues in political science in recent years. There is no universally accepted definition of populism, but there are three major approaches that can be identified: ideational, political-strategic, and socio-cultural (Mudde & Rovira Kaltasser 2018, p.1668-69). In general, though, populism is inextricably linked to the notion of ‘the people’ (Canovan 2004, p.247-51). Out of these three approaches, which are discussed below, the ideational approach is increasingly popular and this is the approach taken in this thesis as it has several strengths. Firstly, populism as a thin-centred ideology allows for a realistic and flexible approach to the study of party ideology: populism is not unique to the left- or right-wing (or to any one person), and it may be combined with a variety of other ideologies. Secondly, it enables populism to be studied at the individual level (i.e. voters may hold populist attitudes).

Each of the three approaches to populism are merely umbrella terms which encompass a variety of different specific definitions. It is far beyond the scope to offer an expansive review, but it is crucial to adequately explain the strengths of the ideational approach given the contested nature of populism, and the radically different case-selection that other approaches would lead to.<sup>37</sup>

Competing definitions within the ideational approach include (but are not limited to) thin-centred ideology, discourse, frame, and worldview (Mudde 2017b, p.29-31; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, p.1669). Nevertheless, they *all* share a set of broad similarities. They all tend to accept that populism is “first and foremost, about ideas in general, and ideas about “the people” and “the elite” in particular” (Mudde 2017b, p.29). Secondly, the ideational approach uniquely enables populism to be observed as an individual-level attitude (Mudde 2017b, p.39). There are a number of studies that measure populism at the individual-level through the use of opinion surveys (e.g. Akkerman et al 2014; Rovira Kaltwasser & Van Hauwaert 2020; Van Hauwaert et al 2020). The individual-level measurement of populism is discussed in more detail in the fifth chapter of this thesis.

Being able to measure populism at the party- and individual-level is a crucial benefit because, as Mudde (Mudde 2017b, p.39) argues, it “enables the integration of very different types of populism studies.” For instance, questions such as: whether or not populist attitudes is associated with populist party support, whether or not countries with large populist parties have more populist voters, and whether or not populist attitudes are related to other attitudes such as nationalism and socialism.

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<sup>36</sup> There are exceptions to this; Malta, for instance, has no populist AEPs, and certain *non-populist* AEPs have risen to prominence, particularly in Catalonia and Scotland, but the overall pattern is undeniably one of *populist* protest

<sup>37</sup> For a more complete overview of populism more broadly, including the three major approaches to defining it, see: Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal; Taggart, Paul; Ochoa Espejo, Paulina and Ostiguy, Pierre (2017)

In Mudde's (2004, p.543) terms, populism is "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people". A thin-centred ideology, as stated in chapter one, is an ideology which "arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts" (Freeden 1998, p.750). So, a thin-centred ideology is very limited in terms of its own scope, where it is unable to provide complicated arguments as there are no chains of ideas relating from abstract notions to more tangible arguments from the core of the ideology to its peripheral concepts (and vice versa) (Freeden 1998, p.750).

Ideologies such as liberalism or socialism have extended sets of core principles attached to them, unlike populism. As this is the case, populism can be attached to other ideologies to enable parties to appeal to a large number of voters (Mudde 2004, p.543-48; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, p.1669). As a further case in point, the ideational approach is able to travel along diverse regions as the components used to define populism are not dependent on regional or temporal idiosyncrasies, which is not uncommon in literature (Mudde 2017b, p.38).

This reflects the complicated nature of populism, especially at the party-level: in the case of Greece, for instance, both SYRIZA and ANEL are located at opposite ends of the political spectrum (Pappas & Aslanidis 2015, p.191-95). Nevertheless, at the height of the Greek crisis they both appealed to 'the people', who had been forced to suffer at the hands of the political elite. The precise manner in which their discourse manifested itself differed in line with their left-right ideology, yet they were still utilising populism, alongside their left-right ideology (Pappas & Aslanidis 2015, p.192-95). This means that, left- or right-wing, multiple parties in the same country can claim to represent the people and restore power to them from the elite. It also means that left- and right-wing parties will not be speaking to the *same* voters: populism is paired with other ideologies.<sup>38</sup>

Populist parties, then, appeal to voters dissatisfied with the current state of politics, but the fundamental left-right ideology of a populist party also matters (Stanley 2008, p.107). Where populism is viewed as a (thin-centred) ideology, it enables their populist nature to be viewed as a sincere belief of the party (and/or voter). It is not opportunistic rhetoric, and it is not an ideologically vacant ploy to target voters. Instead, it is a way of viewing the world of politics, and it helps to guide political behaviour, as does any other ideology. Beyond this, Mudde (2017b, p.34-36) argues that his definition enables it to be distinguishable from its opposites, elitism and pluralism in line with Sartori's 'either-or' logic. As such, one can clearly state that a party is populist, or it is not, enabling a more meaningful analysis in empirical research.

As stated, other definitions of populism outside of the ideational approach may often be utilised by researchers. Populism may be best grouped into three distinct approaches: ideational, political-strategic and socio-cultural (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, p.1668-69). The other two approaches will be briefly discussed, in addition to the strengths that the ideational approach (and particularly Mudde's thin-centred ideology approach) has over them.

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<sup>38</sup> This applies to populist parties located far away on the political spectrum: two populist right-wing parties, for instance, would likely be competing among the same pool of potential voters

Weyland defined populism “as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (2001, p.14). As power is argued to stem from the people, what is most salient to this approach is what leaders actually do (particularly in order to gain and maintain power). Furthermore, the populist leader argues that they are best-suited to not only lead but also to maintain the people’s interests. In addition, they attempt to communicate directly with the people (such as through mass rallies), but also use a very intense critique of the enemies of the people in order to make up for the loss of formal institutional connections to the people (Weyland 2017, p.50).

As such, a *personalistic* leader (i.e. an individual) is the focus of the political-strategic approach: the leader relies on direct appeals to the people, as ‘the people’ is a heterogenous concept comprised of distinct sectors, but with no formal organisation. Instead, the populist leader styles themselves as the embodiment of the people and relies on direct contact in order to fight against and rise above the political elite; they must show they are independent from other factions and/or organisations. However, this then is a self-reinforcing circle, as without clientelism or an institutionalised party, the people are exposed to the unreliability and fickleness of populist leaders. In order to combat this, populist leaders constantly seek to engage with the people with increasing intensity, as there is often a limited support network for the leader. Typically, the people are engaged towards goals such as re-founding the nation, which requires having to fight against the enemies of the people (Weyland 2017, p.55-59).

Therefore, the political-strategic approach is fundamentally centred on the importance of leadership, and their engagement with the people. This, however, is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it lacks explanatory power especially in European countries where there are long-standing populist parties. Those such as the FPÖ, Front National and UKIP (to name just three) have all had multiple leaders, yet have consistently been labelled populist, as they still emphasise the division between the people and the elite regardless of leadership. Where populism is applied to specific actors, there is a significant danger that other actors are then missed out of an analysis who are also populist (Mudde 2017b, p.35).

Secondly, and related to the above point, populism can still be observed among a variety of different organisations from the genuinely leaderless Tea Party in the United States of America, to formal, long-standing parties such as the Front National. The ideational approach does not require as part of its definition charismatic leadership, and also theoretically argues that populists should actually be sceptical of strong leaders (and strong organisations). However, there is an elective affinity between populism and charismatic leadership with weak organisations, but it is simply not part of the definition. Rather, charismatic leadership may well be better suited to explaining levels of popular support for populists (Mudde 2017b, p.40). This, however, is very different to the *existence* of populism. As such, the definition of populism should not be centred on leadership itself, but, rather, should focus on the ideas *behind* the leader and/or the party. In doing so, this takes into account the fact that parties can (and do) have more than one leader over time without significantly altering their populist nature.

Finally, the socio-cultural approach is another major method of analysing populism in the literature. A ‘high’ or ‘low’ dimension is used to identify populists, where this axis measures

ways of acting in politics.<sup>39</sup> As such, populism when viewed in this way refers to political leaders and their relationship with a group in society, which is maintained through “low” appeals which are supported by certain specific sectors of society. The low axis is characterised firstly by a sense of nativism (in the sense that the leader is from the people, as opposed to a cosmopolitan, *not* nativism in the right-wing nationalist sense), and secondly as being a strong and personal leader on the socio-cultural and socio-political sub-dimensions respectively (Ostiguy 2017, p.73-83).

The high axis, on the other hand, is characterised by adherence to procedure and institutionalism, and of a well-refined communication style and cosmopolitanism. That is contrasted to the more informal language used by politicians on the low axis (Ostiguy 2017, p.78-79). As such, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018, p.1672) note that the socio-cultural approach is characterised by a “folkloric style of politics used by leaders who behave improperly and break taboos”. Indeed, Ostiguy (2017, p.73) states “[w]e define populism, in very few words, as the “flaunting of the ‘low.’”

This definition certainly retains a level of face-validity; well-known populist leaders such as Nigel Farage and Geert Wilders are (in)famous for their willingness to use strong language and to also exhibit strong leadership. However, there are numerous examples of high-profile populist politicians who quite plainly do not meet all of these criteria. Both Nigel Farage and Donald Trump, for instance, have both very openly acknowledged their wealth and more privileged lifestyles. Ostiguy is careful to state that wealth does not define one’s place on the high-low axis; just claiming to be “from here” is adequate (Ostiguy 2017, p.78). However, the simple fact is that Farage and Trump do not even *claim* to be “from here”. They merely claim to *understand* the people’s concerns. Furthermore, Mudde (2017b, p.40-41) noted that Pim Fortuyn is not located on the ‘low’ axis in political-cultural terms.

As such, while the high-low axis certainly makes sense in theory, and is a good way of comparing populist leaders’ communication style and strategy, it simply does not adequately fit politicians that are near-universally agreed to be populist such as Nigel Farage. As a further point, it still places a large degree of emphasis on party leadership and is therefore not immune to some of the issues with the political-strategic approach discussed above.

In sum, there are three main approaches to defining populism, while each share both their similarities and differences. However, populism is best defined as a thin-centred ideology. Not only does this enable populism to be understood as present both at the supply- *and* demand-side, it is able to be consistently applied to an otherwise diverse case-selection, enabling both similarities and differences to be meaningfully understood.

### **Populism as the focus of analysis**

This final sub-section explains the rationale for studying *populist* AEPs in this thesis. The above definition for AEPs leads to an ideologically diverse list of parties, ranging from the Greek Communist Party on the left to extreme-right parties such as the National Democratic Party in Germany as well as parties closer to the centre such as the Scottish National Party that advocate national independence. As such, the key concept of the AEP label is a party’s ideological commitment to altering established metapolicies. Populism does *not* inherently

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<sup>39</sup> The ‘low’ axis can be further sub-categorised into the social-cultural and social-political




entail this (Kriesi 2014, p.372-75). As stated, there are three clear reasons as to why populist AEPs are of particular interest for the following detailed quantitative analyses.

Firstly, populist AEPs have, especially since the 2008 financial crisis, rapidly gained success throughout the EU. Despite this *general* increase in success, success has been uneven, and it is therefore important to understand the drivers behind success. Secondly, the ideologies that populism attaches itself to can be as varied as the levels of success of the populist parties themselves. However, it is their populism that separates otherwise left- or right-wing parties from other parties in political systems. As such, despite the left-right distance of, say, SYRIZA and ANEL, populism still allows for a degree of ideological congruence. What gaps in ideology does populism help to bridge? Thirdly, populist AEPs are present in nearly all EU member states, wielding an increasing amount of power in some. Non-populist AEPs are, comparatively, few and far between. It may well be the case that *populism* is pertinent to these AEPs' success.

Firstly, as stated, populist AEPs have seen varying levels of success. The general trend for populist AEPs, over time, has been on an upward trajectory. For years, populist AEPs have increased their support, as Figure 2.1 (created with data from ParlGov) shows below. As can be seen, there is a notable, yet still modest, increase in the average vote share until the years 2005-09. In this period of time, there is a rather more notable jump, with another increase from 2010-14, and yet another significant jump in the final timepoint. In and of itself, this shows that populist AEPs have, over time, been increasing their support; they are clearly *not* dependent upon the financial crisis of 2008.

**Figure 2.1: Average populist AEP vote shares, 1980-2019 (Döring and Mannow 2019)**



However, the notable jump in support since the financial crisis does show that they appear to have benefited from it. This was not a temporary spike in support; the vote shares do not drop

back down to pre-crisis levels. Instead, populist AEP support appears to have been magnified by the financial crisis, and increased politicisation of the EU and refugee crisis in later years. It is also worth pointing out that there was no real ‘pre-crisis level’ to begin with; they have been relentlessly increasing their support over time.

Nevertheless, while the overall trend is upwards, there is still notable variation in their support. The majority of this is *between* countries, and there is very little *within* country variation.<sup>40</sup> For instance, Malta and Portugal have no populist AEPs, while Hungary saw Fidesz elected to a supermajority in three consecutive elections (2010-2018). Compared to Portugal, neighbouring Spain has two populist AEPs on both sides of the political spectrum (Podemos and Vox). It is worth pointing out, however, that Portugal does have a non-populist AEP (Left Bloc). Where populist AEPs do exist, which is in nearly every European country under analysis, their trajectory is almost always upwards over time.

Even this masks variation; some countries have non-governmental populist AEPs, and some countries have governmental populist AEPs. Why did populist AEPs enter government in Austria and Hungary, but not the UK and the Czech Republic? Why did *one* populist AEP enter government in Spain, but *two* entered government together in Greece and Italy? As such, despite the very clear trend over time, there is still variation that needs to be analysed.

There is not one single answer to these questions. The financial crisis undoubtedly mattered, but Portugal, Ireland and Spain were badly affected by the financial crisis, but have no populist AEPs, a non-governmental populist AEP and *two* populist AEPs respectively. The electoral system may matter, but two-thirds of Hungarians supported a populist AEP in 2018 despite not having a party list system, which can be contrasted to Portugal. The past performance of populist AEPs could also matter, but disastrous stints in government following 1999 in Austria and 2005 in Poland did not completely wipe out the FPÖ and Law and Justice, but List Pim Fortuyn collapsed in the Netherlands. As such, populist AEPs need to be analysed over time, at the country-, party-, and voter-level in order to fully answer such variation in success.

Secondly, as stated, populism acts as a bridge between ideologies. Why did SYRIZA govern with the populist right-wing ANEL instead of the fellow radical-left Greek Communist Party? The Five Star Movement too sought out Lega Nord after the Italian 2018 election despite it not being the only mathematically possible coalition. Populism seemingly enables certain ideological barriers to be crossed. This was the case in 2015 in Greece, regarding the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition.

The parties certainly agreed on a lot; the economic dimension and European integration dimension in Greece essentially combined in Greece (Katsanidou & Otjes 2016). Both SYRIZA and ANEL, and their voters, were anti-austerity and Eurosceptic. Their populism also helped to underline these similarities (Rori 2016, p.1331). Essentially, they shared a comparable ideology (at least on the key dimension, but most certainly differed on the cultural dimension), but they *also* blamed the same actors which further united them. The circumstances in which such different parties can cooperate are limited (Rooduijn et al 2017, p.555-56), but where they do, it is because of their shared populist ideology *and* agreement

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
<sup>40</sup> Belgium, for instance, saw a notable decline of populist AEP support, but even in 2019 Vlaams Belang made a surprise comeback, winning nearly 12% of votes

on a key, salient issue. Populism therefore can act as a bridge for unlikely alliances if the conditions are right.

It will be shown in chapters five and six that voters themselves hold populist attitudes; left- and right-wing voters are united in blaming the elites for holding back the people. Populism therefore is common to a certain subset of AEPs as well as their voters. Following years of austerity, more voters have been willing to challenge established politics leading to voters questioning the established parties, as argued in chapter one. As such, *populist* AEPs have risen to prominence across Europe at the same time, warranting further investigation.

Finally, as noted above, many countries have at least two populist AEPs across the political spectrum in any case, regardless of their systemic integration. The anti-elitist rhetoric of populist AEPs is remarkably similar across the left-right spectrum and, as such, it is likely that the *populist* element of populist AEPs is important to their success. It may well be that populism is uniquely tuned to capture the attention of an increasingly angry electorate as it both attacks the political elite and can also be attached to either end of the political spectrum. As a case in point, Figure 2.2, below, shows the average vote share of *non-populist* AEPs in Europe. It shows that, over the same time-period, their vote share has remained almost entirely stagnant, remaining between 6-8%.

**Figure 2.2: Average vote share of non-populist AEPs, 1980-2019 (Döring and Mannow 2019)**



In sum, there is a clear rationale to studying *populist* AEPs in more detail. Despite their general increase in success, there is still considerable variation in success. There is not one single clear, obvious reason as to why this would be. Populism itself also appears to be particularly salient; it allows similarities between otherwise very different parties to be unmasked, and it may also be uniquely popular among the electorate.

Populist AEPs, as such, win votes above all-else because they are *anti-establishment*. Both they and their voters are ideologically motivated and wish to reform key metapolicies. This desire to do so stems from ideology, such as communism, nativism and so on. This is therefore the primary reason for AEP classification – ideological commitment to altering metapolicies. Ensuring that the parties analysed below are primarily selected on holding anti-establishment ideologies, Rooduijn's (2019) call to not confuse populism with other ideologies is adhered to. *Populist* AEPs are a subset of all AEPs, worthy of particular attention in this thesis for the above reasons.

## Conclusion

This chapter served two main purposes. Firstly, to define and identify AEPs, and to secondly further explain the reasoning for this thesis' focus on *populist* AEPs. Previous approaches to defining AEPs were critically assessed, whereupon it was demonstrated that it is important for a definition to take into account a party's propensity to challenge prominent 'metapolicies'. Metapolicies refer to the fundamentals of the political system, and any alteration to them would indicate a significant change in the very functioning of the state. Existing definitions, however, tend to suffer from a number of weaknesses. They often struggle to take into account systemic integration of AEPs, conflate distinct terms and/or are difficult to operationalise.

In order to rectify this, a new definition of AEPs was proposed. It is ultimately binary; a party is an AEP, or an established party. This is based on the party's ideology (opposition to a prominent metapolicy) and the expectation that it keeps other established parties at arm's length. Systemic integration itself should be *further* controlled for, not worked into the categorisation itself. AEPs may be considered (*non-*)*governmental* where appropriate. Systemic integration is important to take into account as governing certainly comes with constraints, but other definitions may automatically assume a party is no longer anti-establishment immediately upon entry to government, or come up with complex, difficult to prove exceptions.

This is, at best, unrealistic. Instead, it was demonstrated that an AEP ceases to be anti-establishment if it becomes too inter-twined with the political system (Fidesz), or if it consciously alters its ideology (the Green party family). Simply entering government is not a guarantee of a shift in party ideology. The new definition of AEPs, as such, allows for a realistic, theoretically justified and dynamic method of defining and identifying AEPs.

Finally, this thesis specifically analyses *populist* AEPs. There is considerable variation in the success of populist AEPs despite their general increase in support over time. This is largely *between* country variation, indicating that there may be more or less favourable conditions for populist AEPs. Populism also appears to act as a bridge between AEPs, which indicates that populist AEPs at the very least share some key characteristics beyond simply being anti-establishment. Finally, populism itself may be better placed to capture the support of an increasingly angry electorate. These factors all suggest the need to analyse all three of countries, parties, and voters. The next chapter proceeds to analyse populist AEP support in European Parliamentary elections.

## Chapter III

### Cross-national examination of populist AEP support in European Parliamentary elections (2004-14)

#### Introduction

This chapter presents the first of three individual-level analyses of populist AEPs' performance at elections. Specifically, European Parliamentary elections are analysed between the years 2004-14. It seeks to understand what populist left- and right-wing AEP voters share in common, and whether or not their voters have clear policy preferences in line with the party's left-right ideology.

The findings of this analysis are threefold. Firstly, there are clear and notable similarities between left- and right-wing populist AEPs' voters (both socio-economically and attitudinally). Secondly, those most acutely affected by the financial crisis are more likely to support a populist AEP over other parties (suggesting that populist AEPs were successful in mobilising voters after the financial crisis). Thirdly, there is also clear ideological variation between the left- and right-wing.

In order to complete the analysis, the European Election Study (EES) is used where multilevel logistic regression models are estimated for the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections. The findings ultimately show that populist AEP voters tend to be younger, male, financially insecure and ideologically further away from the centre in addition to displaying dissatisfaction with democracy and EU membership. However, populist AEPs are ultimately defined by their left-right ideology and the same is true for their voters; populist left-wing AEP voters support redistributive policies while populist right-wing AEP voters hold nativist attitudes. This indicates that populist AEPs rely on common strategies and general grievances with the political system, but that they are not catch-all parties that aim to Hoover up any and all discontented voters.

As such, there is strong evidence that populist left- and right-wing AEPs should be considered *variations of the same phenomenon*. Key left-right differences mean that, in line with the thin-centred ideology approach to populism, populist AEPs mobilise voters around common grievances (feelings of discontent with the political process and financial loss) with the same strategies but that left- and right-wing voters have dissimilar ideologies.

This chapter is split into four sections. Firstly, the theory and hypotheses are outlined and discussed and secondly the data and methodology used is explained. Thirdly, the results of the models are shown and interpreted, with the final section providing a discussion of the results and outlines plans for further methods of analysis (specifically, an aggregate-level analysis of national general elections and individual-level analysis aimed to model the attitudes of populist AEP voters in more detail).

#### I

#### Theory and hypotheses

This sub-section is split into three components; a) a discussion around socio-economic factors that affect populist AEP support, b) a discussion around attitudinal factors that affect populist AEP support, and c) a discussion around the temporal aspect to this analysis and its expected

impact on the results. Ultimately, age, financial insecurity, gender, social class, and education should all affect populist AEP support. In addition, Euroscepticism, dissatisfaction with democracy and ideological extremity should have an impact too. Furthermore, it is expected that key left-right differences remain, namely radical socialism on the left-wing, and anti-immigration attitudes on the right-wing. Furthermore, it is expected that following the financial crisis, the expected effects should intensify after the financial crisis, as the effects wore on.

## I

### **Socio-demographic factors and their expected impact on populist AEP support**

A voter's support for a populist AEP should be rooted in both socio-economic and attitudinal attributes. Key suppositions that are analysed in this chapter are a) populist AEPs mobilise voters that feel as though they are losing out (both politically *and* economically), and b) that this should have intensified after the financial crisis. Regarding socio-economic attributes, age, (un)employment, gender and education should have an effect on populist AEP support.

It is argued here that populist AEP voters are more likely to be younger in comparison to establishment party voters. There are two reasons for this expected relationship. Firstly, younger voters are less likely to have formed a partisan attachment to a specific party. As such, they will be more likely to support an AEP as the lack of a strong partisan identity is one less (significant and notable) hurdle for populist AEPs to overcome when trying to attract voters (Goren 2005, p.882).

Norris and Inglehart (2019, p.53) too point out that social and partisan dealignment increased volatility, with centre-left parties being the biggest losers, but centre-right parties have also notably suffered too. Secondly, and in relation, those younger voters who are affected by financial crisis and hardship can be expected to turn to populist AEPs as a result of mainstream convergence; Hobolt and Tilley (2016) argue the political establishment lost out electorally as a result of financial crisis. In combination with a lack of partisan attachment, this should affect younger voters more who are typically less established in the workforce. As such, the first hypothesis to be tested is:

- **H1:** Younger voters are more likely than older voters to support a populist AEP

Secondly, economic insecurity and employment status are key factors that may affect voting behaviour. The effects of (un)employment and economic insecurity on voting behaviour have been studied extensively. Lipset (1960, p.323-36) argued that increased unemployment and economic insecurity inherently fosters support for left-wing parties. Knutsen (2007) further provides an overview of the effects of a variety of factors on class voting, arguing that factors such as industrial employment and income inequality lead to greater class voting (whereby those less well-off vote for left-wing parties).

Unemployment and economic insecurity should not be considered a guarantee of support for a left-wing party. Indeed, Knutsen (2007, p.475) argued: a) that class voting was regional, being most prevalent in Western democracies in the industrial phase (and even then was subject to cross-national variation), and b) that the transition from industrial to advanced industrial society brought about a decline in class voting in advanced western democracies.

Factors for this include the decline of the working class, increased prosperity and mainstream parties' move towards the centre-ground.

Economic insecurity and unemployment, in relation to populism (and, most commonly, the populist radical-right) has likewise been analysed and discussed extensively. Proponents of the economic anxiety thesis argue that the most economically insecure voters are more likely to support populist (radical-right) parties (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). This argument should work in conjunction with, and not against, the 'cultural backlash' thesis in so far as populist right-wing AEPs are concerned.<sup>41</sup> Less well-off voters should be more likely to support populist AEPs, but ideology is the key driver which indicates nativism is crucial for the populist right-wing. As such, economic anxiety is predicted to be important, but not the *sole* predictor of populist AEP support. Unemployment and economic insecurity are argued to foster populist AEP support, left- or right-wing, for two related reasons.

Firstly, economic voting is widely considered to be a key driver behind voting behaviour; those who lose out wish to rectify this (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2007, p.518). Ordinarily, economic voting is seen as a classic government vs opposition scenario whereby poor economic circumstances lead to those viewed as responsible (the government) being punished (or rewarded for economic prosperity). However, as Knutsen (2007) argued, mainstream parties have converged towards the centre-ground. This is a crucial point to note, and one which calls for a slight qualification of the economic voting mechanism; voters wish to see any economic loss rectified, yet if they cannot have faith in an opposition establishment party to provide an adequate solution, they will have to turn elsewhere.

This leads to the second reason as to why populist AEPs in general should benefit from economic insecurity: particularly after the financial crisis, established parties typically converged on support for austerity and/or financial bailouts. As voters saw fewer differences between more centrist parties, it became easier to desert them for more radical parties that offer clear alternatives (Hobolt & Tilley 2016, p.981-82). This leads to the second hypothesis, which has one subcomponent. An interaction term is measured in the 2014 regression models to model the effect of the financial crisis. This measures not just unemployment at the time of the survey, but also asks respondents if they or anyone in their home has lost their job and/or income previously as a result of the financial crisis.

Given that unemployment is usually relatively temporary, it is more ideal to measure whether or not a voter had previously been affected by the financial crisis at some point in the last year. In line with the above discussion, it is hypothesised that younger, economically insecure voters have an increased likelihood of supporting a populist AEP. Being affected by the financial crisis will likely lead to increased willingness to vote for populist AEPs.

- **H2:** Unemployed voters are more likely than employed voters to support a populist AEP
  - **H2a:** Younger voters affected by the financial crisis are more likely than older voters to support populist AEPs

Gender is another key factor that this chapter seeks to examine. Previous literature has found that men are more likely than women to support radical left- and right-wing parties. Spierings

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<sup>41</sup> In any case, should the objective be to prove one argument over the other, *both* theses would need to be controlled for in the first instance in any empirical analysis

and Zaslove (2017, p.839-40), for example, have found that men are more likely than women to support both the populist radical-right and populist radical-left (although the gender gap is more pronounced for the populist radical-right than populist radical-left). Men are more likely to support populist radical parties due to the nature of populism itself and the manner in which men and women are socialised. Specifically, “men are more prone to conflictual politics and women prefer consensus-seeking” (Spierings & Zaslove 2017, p.826). As conflict within society is a core component of populism itself, it is logical to infer that this may override the more common gender gap between the left- and right-wing of the political spectrum (Mudde 2017b, p.29-30).

- **H3:** Men are more likely than women to support a populist AEP

Low levels of education are often argued to increase the likelihood in supporting populist right-wing parties (Goodwin 2011, p.6). Regarding populist left-wing AEPs, previous literature is more nuanced, and there is certainly no consensus on the role that education plays (Ramiro 2016, p.5-6). Ramiro found that those with both high *and* low levels of education have an increased likelihood of supporting a radical-left party (as opposed to those with intermediate levels of education). Ramiro (2016, p.18) ultimately argued that the radical-left no longer relies only on the most disadvantaged in society, and instead competes for highly educated left-wing voters.

It is hypothesised here that lower levels of education should increase the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP over other parties. This is for two distinct reasons. Firstly, group-interest theory argues that an individual will hold an ideology that seeks to advance the interest of their group (Visser et al 2014, p.542). Regarding populist left-wing AEPs, the parties adhere to a more radical left-wing ideology which is associated with redistributive policies that will benefit those with lower levels of education and income. Populist right-wing AEPs should also attract voters with lower levels of education as the parties often target so-called ‘losers of globalisation’ with economic policies to address insecure income and poor job opportunities that is associated with lower levels of education (Arzheimer & Carter 2006, p.421; Rooduijn 2018, p.354-55). Such parties also typically combine anti-globalisation rhetoric with nativism in order to win votes.

Secondly, in similar fashion to the above discussion around gender, the nature of *populism* and the role that education plays in liberalism should be taken into account. Populism, by the nature of its definition, clashes with liberal democracy. The (positive) effect of education in fostering strong liberal attitudes is well-known and has been extensively studied (Weakliem 2002; Eatwell & Goodwin 2018, p.27-29). As such, those who have greater levels of education should be less likely to question fundamental tenets of liberal democracy in the same manner that populist parties do, by calling for populism to be an expression of the will of the people (i.e. placing the sovereignty of individuals over institutions, checks and balances and minority opinions).

Theoretically this relationship should still hold for populist left-wing AEP voters. While higher education levels are associated with the radical-left, two key differences remain (Visser et al 2014; Ramiro 2016). Firstly, both examined the radical-left, whereas this study



examines populist left-wing AEPs (i.e. largely a subset of the broader radical-left family).<sup>42</sup> Secondly, Visser et al (2014) further examined radical-left ideology, not voting behaviour. Ultimately, the economic insecurity that is associated with lower levels of education combined with the impact of education on one's attitudes to liberal democracy and tolerance should lead to greater support for populist AEPs.

- **H4:** Lesser-educated voters are more likely to support a populist AEP than more-educated voters

One final socio-demographic factor that should be controlled for is social class. As stated above, the economic anxiety thesis (regarding populist right-wing AEPs) is a key concept to explain populist AEP support. Those who are economically vulnerable (the working class) should be more likely to support populist AEPs as they are aware of their position in society and wish to address this by supporting parties that offer more radical policies (Mayer 2014).

Beyond this, however, lies perhaps the most important development in terms of working-class voting behaviour. In addition to the general decline of the size of the working class (and corresponding increase of the middle class), social democratic parties have started to appeal more to middle class voters. Economic growth and the development of the service sector throughout particularly Western Europe in the post-war period saw the dealignment of traditional structural cleavages. A realignment of politics saw 'new politics' issues increase in importance throughout many countries (Knutson 1988; Clark et al 1993). Where the middle class was becoming larger, and postmaterial attitudes increasing in importance, social democratic parties were more likely to seek the support of middle class voters (Przeworski & Sprague; Kitschelt 1994, p.47; Jansen et al 2013, p.378). In doing so, working class support moved away from social democratic parties.

The decline in size of social class only explains so much; what also matters is a shift in attitudes and political competition (Kitschelt 1994, p.41-47). Where social democratic parties, in particular, emphasise issues that working class voters are less likely to hold, these voters turn elsewhere. This is why working-class voters may support populist left- *or* right-wing AEPs. Ideologically, these two types of party are very different, yet the preferences that the individual working-class voter can determine their support for either. Of those working class voters who are economically left-wing, and care most about this dimension, they should be more likely to support a populist left-wing AEP if they judge that a centre-left party is not left-wing enough and/or they feel anger towards the political establishment.

On the other hand, working class voters may still support a populist right-wing AEP if they hold nativist or anti-immigration opinions (and believe this to be important). Such issues are cross-cutting, much in the same way as environmentalism and/or believing in gender equality (to name just a few examples). Working class voters, concerned by nativism, are more likely to support populist right-wing AEPs (Oesch 2008). Indeed, for these parties, economic policies play only a very small role in their voters' attitudes. Rennwald and Evans (2014) further find evidence that the Swiss Social Democratic Party turned towards the middle class, and that the working class tend to support the populist right-wing Swiss People's Party.

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<sup>42</sup> One key difference would be the inclusion of the Five Star Movement in this thesis, which is not a member of the radical left party family, but is still a populist AEP with a more left-leaning platform

As such, the working class do not have an innate affinity towards any populist AEP; instead, individual preferences determine support for populist *left-/right-wing* AEPs. So, working class voters should be more likely to support populist AEPs assuming that individual feels politically abandoned, and there certainly is a structural component to this predicted pattern that affects *all* populist AEPs. Established parties across Europe are less likely to appeal to working class voters, and they are more likely to be economically vulnerable. This should not belie the importance of individual attitudes, however. To quote Clark et al; “classes have become more fluid and complex, and consequently less inescapably polarising” (1993, p.311).

On a further note, the ‘professionalisation’ of politics may also have an effect. Politicians are increasingly career politicians, who tend to have less experience outside the world of politics (King 1981). As such, working class voters are increasingly disconnected from the socio-demographic backgrounds of politicians (Blondel & Müller-Rommel 2007, p.822). As a result of this, working class voters in particular should be more likely to support populist party rhetoric that the political establishment is not representative of the people. Working class voters across Europe are therefore more likely to feel left out of debate, but they are also less likely to feel that their representatives share their background.

The key factor is that populist AEPs win the votes of the economically vulnerable, but they do not do so because the ‘losers of globalisation’ are lashing out due to circumstance (e.g. unemployment, recession, competing for jobs with immigrants etc). Instead, the more economically vulnerable are more likely to feel politically abandoned by established parties because of their culturally right-wing or economically radical left-wing views.

So, class matters in the sense that the working class are more likely to have more radically left-/right-wing views. The working class is not a homogenous group: who they support depends on their own left-right attitudes. Likewise, lesser-educated voters do not support populist AEPs solely because they have lower-paying jobs, but also because they are more likely to hold fundamentally illiberal attitudes. The following hypotheses relate to such attitudes, arguing that populist AEP support is determined by ideology, and not only socio-demographics.

- **H5:** Working class voters are more likely than other voters to support a populist AEP

## I

### **Attitudinal factors and their expected impact on populist AEP support**

In addition to socio-demographic factors, there are a number of key attitudinal and ideological factors that should be tested in order to best understand populist AEP support. Firstly, populist AEP voters are hypothesised to be Eurosceptic. As was previously argued in the conceptual framework, populist AEPs use Euroscepticism as a tool for putting more abstract notions of nationalism and identity into concrete policy proposals. Or, in other words, populist AEPs can identify a specific, readily identifiable organisation or institution as the cause of serious threats to the nation; increased immigration and/or neo-liberal (and austerity) policies.

Euroscepticism should be a feature of populist left- and right-wing AEP support due to a) populist and anti-establishment sentiment, and b) left-right specific ideology. The increased

importance of the EU, combined with its distant, elite-dominated nature means it is a key driver of populist AEP support. There appears, at first glance, an impenetrable labyrinth of institutions and rules that comprise the EU. Key institutions include the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union, while there is also the Council of the European Union, European Council and the similarly named (but very much distinct) Council of Europe (European Union, 2019). Not only are these institutions physically removed from the majority of EU citizens (i.e. located in a different country) but there is also a general lack of knowledge of how the institutions work; Clark found that EU citizens tend to be much less knowledgeable about the EU in comparison to their own national political system.

The EU's policy competences have increased over time, particularly following the Maastricht Treaty as stated in chapter one (Taggart 2017, p.256). Mudde (2007, p.159-61) notes that the EU is frequently referred to as both a 'Soviet Union of Europe' and a 'United States of Europe'. The transfer of power towards not just the EU but also other organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (and consequently away from elected (national) politicians to unelected officials such as central bankers and judges in institutions outside of the nation) (Mudde 2016). The financial crisis and increased importance of the EU further exacerbated the issue among the electorate as the institution itself became increasingly politicised (Taggart 2017, p.256). This increased salience and politicisation helped to provide populist AEPs a greater platform as voters began to increasingly question the political establishment.

However, Euroscepticism is directed by ideology. Left-wing opposition to the EU should be considered to mostly emerge from pro-redistribution and welfare state preferences, which the market-oriented policies of the EU impede due to, increased competition and restrictions on national government policy competences (van Elsas & van der Brug 2015, p.199). Populist right-wing opposition to the EU stems largely from nativism and opposition to immigration. Populist right-wing AEPs also oppose the very notion of the EU superseding the nation (this may be termed 'principled opposition') (van Elsas et al 2016, p.1185). Van Elsas et al (2016, p.1200) note that cultural reasons for Euroscepticism have in recent years become much more important for the right-wing than the left-wing.

This is very much different to the left-wing which tends to oppose the EU because of the manner in which its rules and laws *currently* operate (van Elsas et al 2016, p.1187). The key notion on the left-wing is that the net effect of EU integration is negative (i.e. the positives of integration are not outweighing the negatives), and as such EU integration in and of itself is not negative (van Elsas & van der Brug 2015, p.199). This is similar to the notion of 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism discussed in chapter one (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004).

The left-wing has a strong internationalist tradition and, as such, should be less likely to inherently object to the very notion of the EU (unlike the right-wing) (Halikiopoulou et al 2012, p.505). Rather, the EU is viewed *currently* as an impediment to more radical-left policy goals (Halikiopoulou et al 2012a, p.507). For instance, the EU is often painted as a capitalist club, and its current rules inhibit heavy restrictions on capitalism (Hooghe et al 2004, p.128-29). This therefore translates into Euroscepticism.

While both populist AEPs and their voters should be considered Eurosceptic, there should also be variation in their ideological beliefs. Populist left-wing AEP voters should be

motivated primarily by anti-austerity and/or equal distribution of wealth and income. Populist right-wing AEP voters, on the other hand, should be motivated primarily by nativism.

Populist right-wing AEPs themselves are generally identified as being nativist (Mudde 2007; Oesch 2008, p.370; Rydgren 2008; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013, p.155). As such, a key component of their ideological platform is based around anti-immigration policies. As populism is a *thin-centred ideology*, it is attached to a full ideology such as socialism or liberalism. However, in the case of populist right-wing AEPs, this is nativism. Voters, ultimately, seek to feel represented, and so where voters hold nativist attitudes they will be more likely to support a populist right-wing AEP as these parties are likely to claim to offer true representation. It is necessary to point out here that ‘nativism’ and ‘anti-immigration’ are not the same thing. This is both expanded on and tested in chapter five, but data limitations necessitate focusing on attitudes to immigration.

Populist left-wing AEPs, on the other hand, should not be characterised by nativism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, p.155). Indeed, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014, p.132) argue that SYRIZA is “one of the most consistent advocates of the immigrants’ equal rights and their full inclusion in Greek society.” Rather, the radical-left is best characterised by a policy platform that focuses largely on the economic left-right dimension (March & Rommerskirchen 2015, p.41). As with the populist right-wing AEPs, it should be hypothesised that their voters are attracted to the populist left-wing because of their economic policies. Populism unites left- and right-wing AEPs in a certain sense; it informs researchers of the manner in which they seek to compete with the mainstream and in which they deliver their message. Populism does not override fundamental left-right differences however and, as such, they should remain key predictors of populist AEP support.

As such, this thesis tests both populist left- and right-wing AEP support, arguing that it is for the same fundamental reason; their voters hold clear, radical attitudes that they demand are represented. However, while some studies (Rooduijn 2018) try only to find similarities between ideologically disparate parties and others fail to explain differences (Visser et al 2014), this thesis demonstrates that there are *clear* differences. Populist AEP support is inherently ideologically driven, meaning that while there are commonalities such as Euroscepticism and political radicalism, the ideological differences are the key driver behind supporting a populist left- *or* right-wing AEP.

**H6:** Eurosceptic voters are more likely than all other voters to support a populist AEP

- **H6a:** Voters opposed to immigration are more likely to support a populist right-wing AEP than other voters
- **H6b:** Radically socialist voters are more likely to support a populist left-wing AEP than other voters

Populist AEP voters are more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy in comparison to other voters due to the nature of populism itself; it paints politics as an expression of the will of the people, and that the elite are corrupt. Furthermore, populist parties often tend to call for more ‘direct democracy’, often via national referenda (Mudde 2012, p.13). As such, a key component of populist AEPs’ platforms is to argue that there is not a suitable establishment party should one wish for an alternative to the corrupt elite.

Roberts (2017, p.287), for instance, argues that “political space for populism is opened by the failure of established parties to effectively represent salient interests or sentiments in the body politic.” Eatwell and Goodwin (2018, p.30-31) further argued that national populists are not dissatisfied with democracy per se, rather they are dissatisfied with feeling left out of political debate. As such, where voters feel politically left behind by establishment parties, they are more likely to support populist AEPs over other parties and to express dissatisfaction with democracy. As such, both the *populist* and the *anti-establishment* aspect of populist AEPs are related to dissatisfaction with democracy.

Populism and anti-establishment are *not* the same thing; populist establishment parties and non-populist AEPs both exist.<sup>43</sup> As such, voters have various options in addition to supporting establishment parties or populist AEPs (one further option for those unsatisfied with democracy is to not vote at all). However, it is hypothesised that populist AEPs will be greater beneficiaries of dissatisfaction with democracy over all other parties due to their populist nature, which provides a very clear path to speak to a greater number of voters in a more general (i.e. by making politics resemble a series of simplistic choices) manner. An analysis of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data in chapter five and national election study data in chapter six controls for dissatisfaction with democracy in addition to populist attitudes.

This differs to communist parties or other more pluralistic AEPs such as the Scottish National Party, who a) focus on a specific sub-set of voters, and therefore b) have very specific policy proposals, which do not travel well across different groups of voters. Populist establishment parties such as Forza Italia are much less common than populist AEPs (both historically and post-2008/09). The salient feature may well appear to be solely populism. This, however, should not be assumed; populist AEP supporters have very specific, and increasingly radical, ideological demands, and as such parties that can combine populism *and* a very clear alternative to the political establishment should be the greatest beneficiaries of dissatisfaction with democracy.

This leads to the final hypothesis; that populist AEP voters are more likely to locate themselves at the ideological extremities. They have radical preferences, and therefore vote for populist AEPs because they perceive established parties to not represent such attitudes. Populist AEPs often share similar platforms with other parties, particularly Communist parties. As shown in chapter two, however, such parties have remained, at best, stagnant throughout Europe. More radical voters have been motivated to support populist AEPs, not least because of their populist ideology which captures support of those discontented with established politics. Therefore, they should place themselves further away from the political centre.

- **H7:** Voters dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to support a populist AEP than those satisfied with democracy
- **H8:** Voters located further away from the centre ground are more likely than those closer to the centre to support a populist AEP

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<sup>43</sup> Such as Forza Italia and the Greek Communist Party, respectively

## I

### **Changing patterns of populist AEP support over time: 2004-14**

As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter analyses EES data from the years 2004-14. As populist AEPs' electoral fortunes have rapidly increased over time, it is also expected that the analysis below will show differences over time. The three waves of the EES are analysed separately (i.e. three different models are run).

There is, firstly, a methodological and, secondly, a conceptual reason for this. Firstly, the EES does not have a fully harmonised questionnaire which does not easily facilitate an aggregated dataset. Specifically, the variables used to measure H6, H6a, H6b and H7 differ to the extent that they would need to be extensively recoded or standardised which risks losing precision. Secondly, and most importantly, the purpose of this chapter is not only to identify the characteristics and attributes of populist AEP voters, but also to see whether or not this has changed over time. As such, running the models separately is the preferred option as it is reasonable to believe that populist AEP voters are not exactly the same in the year 2004 as in 2014.

An alternative approach would be to run a pooled model that includes all data from all timepoints. However, an aim of this chapter is to see exactly how support evolved over time. Simply including timepoint dummies would show that populist AEP support became more likely over time, but this is a very well-known fact (as indicated by Table 3.1 below). Instead, interacting key variables with timepoint dummies would say how these variables have been affected. This, though, would become exceedingly complicated to interpret, particularly due to the number of variables of interest. As such, running models separately is the ideal approach.

As has been noted previously, populist AEPs have existed for many decades and they are by no means a new phenomenon to have emerged from the financial crisis. The 2004 model serves as a benchmark that identifies populist AEP support at a time when issues such as the increased politicisation and involvement of the EU in national political systems had a relatively low salience. Furthermore, the financial crisis was yet to happen, and therefore such as acute austerity measures and financial bailouts, and their consequences, were simply not relevant. While populist AEPs themselves have maintained their ideologies over time, the issue priorities of voters are often subject to change. Analysing populist AEP support over time will therefore uncover whether or not their electorate has changed.

The 2009 EES data was collected as the financial crisis was unfolding. As such, this model will show populist AEP support in a time of increasing uncertainty (both political and economic). However, the crisis rapidly evolved as time wore on, leading to long-lingering effects such as harsh austerity measures, financial bailouts, sluggish growth and mass protest. As such, the 2014 wave was taken at a time when citizens in many EU member states had been living under austerity measures for years. H6, H7 and H8 are expected to be significant in all models, as ideologically populist AEPs have not dramatically shifted their ideologies. Parties such as the Front National, UKIP and the Party for Freedom (PVV) have been nativist and Eurosceptic for years, while SYRIZA for example has always been a radical-left party seeking dramatic reform of capitalism.

The key difference is the salience, longevity and impact of issues such as austerity and immigration. As such, the intensity of H6, H7 and H8 should be greater in 2014 than in earlier waves (and particularly 2004) since populist AEPs have increased their attacks on the EU and political establishment. Demographically, there should also be greater explanatory power in 2014 in comparison to earlier waves as the financial crisis continued to affect the electorate. As the financial crisis was deeply entrenched throughout Europe in 2014, the 2014 wave of the EES asked two questions to all respondents that aim to measure the effects. Respondents were asked whether they or someone else in their house has lost their job and/or their income has decreased. These questions are utilised in the 2014 wave of the EES in order to analyse the impact of the financial crisis on voting behaviour. It should be expected that those who have suffered the most (i.e. lost a job and income) will be likely to support a populist AEP even after other variables (both socio-demographic and attitudinal) have been controlled for. As is argued throughout this thesis, populist AEPs have increased their success not just for ideological reasons, but because they provide an outlet for voters to show their discontent.

So, both socio-demographic and attitudinal factors will be controlled for over time, as the financial crisis emerged and evolved. There are expected to be both similarities and differences between populist left- and right-wing AEPs. Namely, populist AEP voters should be financially disadvantaged, younger and more likely to be male. In addition, they should be Eurosceptic, dissatisfied with democracy and politically radicalised. However, key ideological differences remain as populist AEPs do not mindlessly appeal to any and all dissatisfied voters, but rather they adhere to radical socialist or nativist ideologies, framing the crisis in terms of immigration or austerity while blaming both the EU and political establishment as being its cause. In addition to this ideological variation, there is expected to be temporal variation as the political landscape shifted dramatically over the decade between 2004-14.

## II

### **Data and methodology**

This section discusses and describes the data used (including a brief description of key statistics from the data), as well as the methodology. Multilevel logistic models are run using 2004, 2009 and 2014 EES data, analysing firstly socio-demographic factors, and then adding in attitudinal factors. Further, two additional models are estimated; one for populist left-wing AEPs and one for populist right-wing AEPs in order to analyse the specific ideological profile of their voters.

#### **European Election Study: 2004-14**

The EES is a cross-national survey conducted prior to European Parliament elections in all EU member states (Schmitt et al 2004; Egmond et al 2013; Schmitt et al 2016). Approximately 1000 respondents are gathered for each state. Using the EES, as with all datasets, has both positives and negatives. Key benefits of the EES are, firstly, its impressive cross-national and temporal scope. It is the only publicly available, nationally representative survey programme covering all EU member states at regular intervals. As such, it allows for a large-scale analysis of countries ranging in size from Germany and France to Cyprus and Luxembourg for a variety of research questions. Secondly, as it is a cross-national project, the surveys are

not only run at the same point in time but are also run using the same questionnaires. This means that, despite being run across an entire continent in very different political systems, the questionnaires are measuring the same concepts.

Potential downsides to using the EES include the fact that, across survey waves, the questionnaires themselves are not harmonised; as mentioned above, this makes comparison in an aggregated dataset difficult. Nevertheless, key concepts are measured throughout each survey wave.<sup>44</sup> Secondly, while the EES is run at the same point in time, this means that the survey is completed at differing stages in the electoral cycle in each country. As such, this may make a true comparison of party support difficult. This issue can also lead to issues with recollection of voting behaviour at national elections (Ramiro 2016, p.8). Nevertheless, national election survey data will be analysed in chapters five and six, which mitigates this concern, and allows a helpful comparison between two different types of election. Furthermore, national election survey data is not as comprehensive in its cross-national reach in comparison to the EES, which is run across the entirety of the EU.

Thirdly, and somewhat relatedly to the second downside, EU Parliament elections are widely considered to be ‘second-order’ elections; generally, they are not treated with the same importance by voters in comparison to general elections. As such, voters often use second-order elections to display dissatisfaction with national governments and/or policy areas, and turnout is also generally much lower (Hix 2008, p.79-81). As stated above, in order to reduce any risk of biased results, another individual-level analysis is conducted using national election results. However, the benefits of the geographic and temporal scope of the EES outweigh the above concerns, especially as such concerns can be readily addressed using other data sources later.

## II

### Operationalisation and key variables

The dependent variable for the following analyses is a binary variable measuring vote choice; 1 if the respondent votes for a populist AEP, and 0 if the respondent votes for any other party.<sup>45</sup> As mentioned, additional models are measured for populist left- and right-wing AEP supporters specifically, so Tables B3 and B4 have a value of 1 if the respondent voted for a populist *left- or right-wing* AEP, and 0 for any other party.

There are two approaches that can be taken; to include only certain (larger) populist AEPs in the analysis, or to include *all* populist AEPs. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the variation in success of populist AEPs which, by necessity, indicates that all elections where they competed need to be considered. Arzheimer and Carter (2006, p.426) argue this may skew results as smaller party voters may have different attitudinal characteristics. There is, however, theoretical reason to believe populist AEPs all occupy the same place in the political system and attract similar voters. Nevertheless, chapter six further analyses national

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<sup>44</sup> The one exception to this is that the 2004 wave does not contain a variable suitable for measuring socialist views. Nevertheless, the benefits of using the EES and the fact that this can be tested in a later analysis in this thesis outweigh this downside

<sup>45</sup> Table A1 shows case-selection




election study data with larger populist AEPs in order to understand populist AEP voters' attitudes in more detail.

Table 3.1 shows the overall number of voters, including the total number of AEP voters. The total number of voters, as would be expected, differs from the overall sample size due to the number of non-voters. Figures 3.1 and 3.2, below, shows populist AEP party positions on the economic left-right dimension and social liberal-conservative scale in 2014, and the salience that the party applies to each dimension using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al 2015; Polk et al 2017).

**Table 3.1: Total number of voters, by party categorisation**

Year	Number of Populist AEP Voters	Number of non-AEP Voters	Total number of voters
2004	1219 (6.69%)	17,008 (93.31%)	18,227
2009	1397 (8.99%)	14,150 (91.01%)	15,547
2014	2237 (15.45%)	12,271 (84.55%)	14,479

**Figure 3.1: Populist AEP positions, 2014**




As can be seen from Figure 3.1, there are two relatively clear clusters between the populist left- and right-wing AEPs. Furthermore, Figure 3.2 shows that there is a lot more variation in terms of the salience that populist AEPs attach to each dimension. Regardless, there is still a general trend in that populist left-wing AEPs such as SYRIZA and the Dutch Socialist Party attach a very high salience to the economic left-right dimension, while every populist right-wing party with the exception of the Party for Freedom attaches high salience (i.e. a salience of over five)<sup>46</sup> to the social liberal-conservative scale. These two figures give general face

<sup>46</sup> The scale runs from 0-10; in any case the PVV is very close to the mid-point

validity to the argument that populist AEPs differ on a left-right basis, and that even if populist AEPs may be viewed as economically right-wing, they do not attach too much salience to this dimension. H6a and H6b attempt to test this assumption at the individual-level; that despite their similarities, there are ideological differences between the voters as well as the parties.

**Figure 3.2: Salience of populist AEP left-right dimensions**



As the dependent variable is binary, a logistic regression model is used. Furthermore, the EES is clustered; voters are nested within countries. As such, a multilevel logistic regression is estimated. Failure to take into account the clustered nature of data can lead to smaller standard errors, increasing the risk of a type one error (finding a statistically significant relationship where none exists). Missing data and those who responded “don’t know” are listwise deleted.

In addition to variables aimed at measuring the above hypotheses, a number of additional control variables have been added into the model. Firstly, age is a continuous variable while gender is binary. Education is categorical with values increasing as the age at which the respondent left education increases. This is not, then, a direct measure of educational qualification, although it is directly comparable across the EES as this question is included in 2004, 2009 and 2014.<sup>47</sup> Employment status is a binary variable measuring whether or not the respondent is employed, or unemployed with a value of 0 if the respondent is *not* unemployed, and 1 if they *are* unemployed. Employment status is intended to aid in the measure of H2; those who are unemployed should be more likely to vote for AEPs. In all three waves the variable was created from a variable measuring respondent’s type of job;

<sup>47</sup> Both the 2004 and 2009 wave contains a continuous variable asking the age at which the respondent left education which was recoded to match the 2014 categories. However, the 2014 variable included a distinct category for ‘no education’; these observations have been recoded into the ‘15 and under’ category in 2014

those who are *unemployed* take the value of 1, and all other respondents (e.g. those who are retired) take a value of 0.

Social class cannot easily be controlled for objectively as the questions measuring occupation are not harmonised across the three waves. Instead, social class is measured subjectively; there is a strong relationship between objective and subjective measures (Ramiro 2016, p.11). This is a binary variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent feels as though they are working class, and 0 if not.

Additional individual-level controls in the model are: residential area, trade union membership and religiosity. Residential area (rural or urban) is also controlled for in the models. In addition to voting behaviour differing between rural and urban areas, those living in urban areas also tend to have more integrationist attitudes (Teney et al 2014, p.581; Ramiro 2016, p.6). As such, residential area is controlled for in each model below in order to take into account any differences in voting behaviour that it may have. Trade union membership is binary, taking a value of 1 if the respondent is a union member and 0 if not. Religiosity is categorical, measuring whether the respondent attends religious services weekly, monthly, yearly or never.

Regarding the attitudinal variables, ideology is measured using the standard left-right self-placement variable, on a scale of 0-10 (with 10 being right-wing). This has been recoded in order to measure distance from the centre, with higher values indicating more extreme ideological placement (left- or right-wing).<sup>48</sup> However, the EES does not use a harmonised scale across time; in 2004 the variable is on a 1-10 scale (*except* in Sweden, which used a 0-10 scale, meaning only 20 voters are placed as 0). Five is often considered to be the ‘psychological midpoint’ (Rose et al 2002) by respondents on 1-10 scales and, as such, five is treated as the midpoint.

Taking this discrepancy into account, the variable can also be recoded to a 1-10 scale using Knutsen’s (1998) formula:  $v11 * 0.9 + 1$  (where *v11* is the eleven-point scale to be transformed to a 1-10 scale). Where this is done, results are substantively unaltered. When examining left- or right-wing populist AEPs specifically, the left-right self-placement variable is used.

Euroscepticism is measured using a 0-10 scale, with 10 being pro-further integration. In 2004, the variable was also measured on a 1-10 scale *except* in Sweden *and* Estonia; this can again be recoded without affecting results. For the purposes of these regression models, EU integration has been reverse coded, so a positive coefficient implies that populist AEP voters are Eurosceptic, and a negative value would imply that they are pro-integration. There are also attitudinal variables measuring immigration policy preferences, and variables measuring whether or not the respondent is satisfied with democracy. In the 2004 and 2009 waves, satisfaction with democracy in the respondent’s country is included on a four-point scale, where higher values indicate dissatisfaction. There is no such variable included in the 2014 wave, so this variable cannot be included in the model.

Immigration policy preferences are measured using a different variable in each wave in order to test H6a. In 2004 the variable asks if respondents agree or disagree that immigrants should

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<sup>48</sup> i.e. an individual placing themselves as either four *or* six have a value of one in the new variable as this is one point away from the centre (five)

receive benefits.<sup>49</sup> In 2009 the variable is a five-point scale asking whether respondents agree or disagree that the number of immigrants in their country needs to be reduced. Finally, in 2014, the variable is a ten-point scale asking whether or not the respondent is in favour or opposed to a restrictive immigration policy. These variables have all been coded so that higher values indicate anti-immigration preferences.

H6b is tested using a variable asking for respondent's views on the redistribution of income. In 2009 this is done using a five-point variable asking whether or not the respondent agrees or disagrees that wealth should be redistributed to ordinary people. In 2014 the variable is a ten-point scale that asks if the respondent is in favour or opposed to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in their country. Unfortunately, there was neither a directly comparable question, nor an alternative question that measures the economic left-right scale, asked in the 2004 EES. As such, H6b cannot be tested in 2004. The variables have been recoded so that higher values indicate support for the redistribution of wealth.

The 2009 and 2014 models also control for authoritarianism by asking whether or not the respondent supports or opposes same-sex marriage<sup>50</sup> (no such variables are available in 2004). While Mudde argues that authoritarianism is a key component of the 'populist radical right' family, and many populist left-wing AEPs are also more conservative (especially relative to Green parties), this is not a key hypothesis (Mudde 2007; Gomez et al 2016). Authoritarian attitudes are more likely to be a defining feature of the working class, but the working class (and less educated)<sup>51</sup> are more likely to support populist AEPs in line with their underlying left-right ideology, *not* on the basis of authoritarianism (Lipset 1959; Achterberg & Houtman 2006, p.77). It is the defining feature of the populist AEPs that should also attract the support of voters (i.e. nativism or radical socialism).

As stated previously, populist AEP voters are likely to be motivated by nativism or radical socialism because these are easily perceptible and more emotional. Authoritarianism, on the other hand, is less likely to be more important for their voters. Indeed, authoritarianism inconsistently predicts populist left- and right-wing party support (Todosijević & Enyedi 2008; Dunn 2015; Akkerman et al 2017). While parties may be authoritarian, this simply does not mean their voters must be. Instead, it is more likely that voters more readily perceive that populist AEP differ from the political establishment on the basis of nativism or radical socialism, but authoritarian attitudes should still be controlled for in order to gain a more complete picture.

In addition, several upper-level variables are controlled for in order to control for the effects of the financial crisis. GDP growth rate, unemployment rate and government debt as a percentage of GDP are used. All of these variables are lagged at t-1, the latter two are taken from Armingeon et al's (2019) Comparative Political Dataset, while GDP growth is from the

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<sup>49</sup> This variable was not asked in Lithuania and Sweden

<sup>50</sup> There are another four variables in 2009 (abortion rights, harsher sentencing, teaching authority in schools and women's role in the workforce), though Cronbach's alpha for such a scale is 0.53, well below the conventional 0.7 threshold. Only one other question is asked in 2014 (privacy and crime) and Cronbach's alpha is even lower at 0.14. As such, given that this question is a) repeated in both years, and b) has an even distribution of responses (unlike all of the other 2009 variables except women's role in the workforce) this variable is chosen to measure authoritarian attitudes. Higher values indicate authoritarian values

<sup>51</sup> The earlier discussion regarding education and liberalism in chapter one should be recalled for the relationship between the two

World Bank (2020). The following chapter analyses the effect of the economy in further detail at both the country- and party-level in more depth. Nevertheless, it is important to control for the economy because voters are not wholly independent actors operating in a vacuum. In addition, the financial crisis in particular had an unequal impact across the continent, and as such failure to control for the economy may lead to bias in the results. The main focus of this chapter, however, remains the voters themselves, and their attitudes.

### III

#### Results


Figures 3.3 and 3.4, below, show the socio-demographic model run in 2004, 2009 and 2014, which tests H1-H5. Coefficients for H1-H5 only are shown; full tables from all models are located in appendix B. All regression figures display 95% confidence intervals using Jann's 'coefplot' command (Jann 2014). Firstly, in all three models populist AEP voters are indeed more likely to be younger in comparison to all other voters. Secondly, only in 2004 is unemployment statistically significant and positive. However, 2014 does have an additional variable that measures how, if at all, the respondent was affected by the financial crisis. Those most affected, who lost both their job and income, are more likely to support a populist AEP (shown in Table 3.6). Regarding gender, in 2009 and 2014 men are more likely to support populist AEPs in comparison to women. The coefficient is still negative in 2004 but just about fails to cross the 95% threshold. Those who identify as working class are more likely than the middle class to support a populist AEP in all three models.

Education broadly has the expected effect. In both 2004 and 2009, in reference to those who left education aged 20 or older, those who left sooner were more likely to support a populist AEP. There is no significant effect on those who are still studying, which is unsurprising given that students will likely have similar profiles to graduates. No coefficients for education in 2014 are significant. It may well be the case that by 2014, the effects of the financial crisis had permeated so widely that populist AEPs were able to find support among the more highly educated too. The results in general show that there is more of a divide between those with degrees, and those without. The same general pattern is shown in chapters five and six.

As mentioned above, further controls were added into the models: residential area, union membership and religiosity. Residential area has a very limited effect, with populist AEP voters more likely to live in more built-up areas in 2014. Trade union membership has no effect on support for a populist AEP. Religiosity has no effect in 2004, but by 2009 and 2014 those who attend services more frequently are less likely to support populist AEPs.

The upper-level variables are not statistically significant in any of the waves, with the exception of government debt as a percentage of GDP in 2014. The coefficient is positive, indicating that higher levels of debt increase the likelihood of populist AEP support. This is as expected; countries with very high levels of debt such as Greece, Ireland and Italy have all seen recent surges in support for populist AEPs. This finding is replicated in the following chapters, too, indicating that it is vital to take the economy into account. Finally, and exclusively to the 2014 wave, age was interacted with the impact of the financial crisis. The results of these variables show that those most affected by the financial crisis are more likely to support a populist AEP, and are shown in Figure 3.6.

**Figure 3.3: Socio-demographic predictors of populist AEP support**



**Figure 3.4: Effect of education on populist AEP support**




Figure 3.5, below, shows the attitudinal models from the three waves. These models contain the same socio-demographic variables as above in addition to attitudinal and ideological variables in order to test the remaining hypotheses. As above, the full tables are located in the

appendix. Age; gender; unemployment (and the effects of the financial crisis); education; social class and trade union membership are all substantively the same as in the socio-demographic models in Table B1.

The attitudinal and ideological variables introduced into the model provide some notable results. Firstly, ideological extremity is statistically significant in all three models; the positive coefficient indicates that the further away from the centre respondents place themselves, the more likely they are to support a populist AEP over another party. Ideological extremity in 2014 just fails to cross the threshold when the interaction between age and impact of the financial crisis is included, as it is in Figure 3.5. Removing this interaction term sees the coefficient pass the 95% threshold. It is also worth noting that, over time, the coefficient decreases in its magnitude. Kurtosis figures of the left-right self-placement scale suggest that voters in general may have become slightly more radical over time, though the difference is small.<sup>52</sup> In any case, the coefficient is still positive, and significant when the interaction effect is removed.

Regarding H6, Euroscepticism predicts populist AEP support in all waves. H7, testing whether or not populist AEP voters are dissatisfied with democracy, also has strong supporting evidence. As stated, however, this variable is not asked in 2014 and is therefore only included in 2004 and 2009. Populist AEP voters also hold more authoritarian attitudes, in the form of opposition to same sex marriage. The attitudinal variables therefore show support for a key tenet of the thesis: populist AEP support is determined by attitudes, whereby their voters believe established parties can no longer represent their fundamental beliefs.


The socio-demographic picture is much the same. Populist AEP voters tend to be younger, male, working class and less educated. Unemployment increases the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP in 2004, as are those who lost income and their job in 2014. The three upper-level variables still do not cross the 95% threshold, the four-year change in unemployment comes close and retains its negative coefficient. Finally, the interaction effect between those who lost their job *and* income and age becomes statistically significant in 2014. The negative coefficient indicates that among those who have been most impacted by the crisis, the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP is greater for younger voters.

This is shown in Figure 3.6 (and was only available for the 2014 wave). When this variable is interacted with age, among those who lost both their job and income compared to those who did not, younger voters are more likely to support populist AEPs; older voters are less likely. No other coefficients are significant. This does demonstrate the importance of focusing on the wider effects of the financial crisis, and that those who lost out the most are more likely to support populist AEPs. A similar finding in Austria is shown in chapter six; it may well be the case that older unemployed voters are more likely to perceive themselves to be at risk (financially) and therefore turn to populist AEPs.

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<sup>52</sup> 2.38 in 2004; 2.57 in 2009 and 2.61 in 2014. The biggest increase is actually in 2009, which fits with the idea that the electorate was affected by the financial crisis. This still lends credence to the notion that the electorate as a whole was increasingly radicalised. However, at no point in time is the value >3. Only then are the tails of the scale heavier, so 'less centrist' may be more apt than 'radicalised'.

**Figure 3.5: Socio-demographic and attitudinal predictors of populist AEP support**



**Figure 3.6: Effects of financial crisis, 2014 only**




Figure 3.7 reports a model estimated specifically for populist right-wing AEP support. This model includes both the socio-demographic and attitudinal variables used in the above models. In order to keep the graph parsimonious, socio-demographics have been removed



from the graph.<sup>53</sup> There are, however, two key differences. Firstly, ideological distance from the centre is replaced with the standard left-right scale (i.e. higher values indicate right-wing beliefs). Secondly, anti-immigration and economic redistribution attitudes are included in the following models in order to further test the ideological profile of populist left- and right-wing AEP voters.

The models show an interesting picture; the increasing importance of socio-demographic variables both in 2009 and 2014. The 2004 wave has no statistically significant socio-demographic variables beyond those who left education aged 16-19 being more likely to support populist AEPs. Indeed, the only variables that have an effect at all are left-right self-placement and Euroscepticism. Dissatisfaction with democracy does, however, come close to significance in 2004.

Attitudinally, the models in each wave point in the same direction; populist right-wing AEP voters in the 2009 and 2014 waves were also located further along the right-wing of the political spectrum and are both Eurosceptic and dissatisfied with democracy. Furthermore, both in 2009 and 2014, anti-immigration attitudes are statistically significant and positive, giving support to H6a. In 2009 and 2014 the variable measuring support or opposition to redistribution was added (no suitable question was asked in 2004), which is not significant in either model. This indicates that populist right-wing AEP voters are not motivated by the economic left-right dimension.

The significance of populist right-wing AEP voters a) considering themselves right-wing, b) holding clear attitudes towards immigrants and the EU, and c) being dissatisfied with democracy should not be understated. Together, this indicates that their voters do not aimlessly lash out and support any populist AEP. Instead, they are consciously choosing a party that represents their views. This goes some way towards explaining why populist AEPs did not quickly fall away after many European economies began to grow again. It is also shown below that the same is true for the populist left-wing.

Regarding the interaction term between the impact of the financial crisis and age in 2014, one coefficient is significant. Of those who lost income only, the likelihood of supporting a populist right-wing AEP *increases* with age. This is counter to expectations. Nevertheless, age itself is statistically significant and negative in both the 2009 and 2014 models which indicates that, on the whole, populist AEP voters tend to be younger than other voters.

Populist right-wing AEP voters also tend to be male and there is some evidence that they tend to have lower levels of education, although there is still very little evidence for education having an effect. In both 2009 and 2014, social class became statistically significant, and as expected it shows that those who self-identify as working class are more likely to support a populist right-wing AEP than another party. Furthermore, there is evidence that by 2014, those who attend religious services more frequently are less likely to support a populist right-wing AEP.

None of the upper-level variables are significant in any of the models, indicating that populist right-wing AEPs do not solely rely on economic conditions for success. Instead, the evidence seems to suggest that there is a strong attitudinal component, particularly Euroscepticism and

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<sup>53</sup> The full tables can be found in the appendix

anti-immigration attitudes. Their voters also consider themselves to be right-wing, further indicating that they are not simply voting for *any* populist AEP, regardless of their own ideology. Furthermore, the importance of socio-demographic variables in later years appears to show that populist right-wing AEPs were targeting those who were more economically vulnerable.

It is worth noting that anti-immigration attitudes are not significant in 2004, counter to expectations. This may well be because immigration has only more recently become salient enough to more voters to lead to them supporting populist right-wing AEPs (Dennison & Geddes 2019). Immigration remains nonsignificant where Central and Eastern European countries are removed from this model; the (null) finding is not because of strong geographic variation. As such, these results show that it took time for populist right-wing AEP electorates to solidify into the now-familiar anti-immigration bloc of voters. This demonstrates the importance of analysing their support over time in order to uncover how electorates have changed.

However, the key evidence is that attitudes persist in their importance: populist AEP voters may well be more economically vulnerable, yet they are still reacting ideologically. Younger, working class men may be more likely to support populist right-wing AEPs, yet the models for populist left-wing AEPs show this too. As such, populist AEP supporters choose to support the party on the basis of their attitudes, not solely because they may be in a more economically insecure position. There is only inconsistent evidence that populist right-wing AEP voters oppose same-sex marriage; in 2014 only.

**Figure 3.7: Populist right-wing AEP support**





Figure 3.8, below, shows the final set of models that examine populist left-wing AEP voters.<sup>54</sup> As above, these control for socio-demographic variables as well as attitudes. Interestingly, in comparison to populist right-wing AEPs, there is *more* of an effect socio-demographically in 2004 which almost entirely disappears by 2014.

**Figure 3.8: Populist left-wing AEP support**



Several variables are statistically significant in all waves; populist left-wing AEP voters tend to consider themselves as working class, left-wing and are dissatisfied with democracy. Furthermore, as predicted, in 2009 and 2014 support for the redistribution of wealth is statistically significant. Populist left-wing AEP voters are not motivated by authoritarian attitudes, though the coefficient is positive in 2014 for opposition to same sex marriage. In addition, in 2014 only, anti-immigration attitudes are also statistically significant and positive. This is discussed in further detail below. Euroscepticism also increases the likelihood of supporting a populist left-wing AEP in both 2009 and 2014, albeit only significantly in 2014. As such, it appears that the importance of the EU increased as a result of the financial crisis among the populist left-wing.

As with the populist right-wing, the populist left-wing voters are motivated by ideology and attitudes, not simple protest. The populist left-wing has also become more concerned with the EU over time, as Figure 3.8 demonstrates. This demonstrates the increased visibility of the EU, and the ability of populist left-wing politicians to frame the EU's policies as harmful.

<sup>54</sup> Lagged unemployment rate is dropped from the 2004 model in order to allow it to converge. A likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that a multilevel is not an improvement over a single-level model in 2009. As such, this and the 2004 models are also run as logistic models with country fixed-effects (at the cost of removing upper-level variables, as these are collinear). All individual-level results remain substantively the same

Populist left-wing AEP supporters are more likely to be younger (though age is not significant in 2009) and working class. Furthermore, women in 2004 were significantly less likely than men to support a populist left-wing AEP. There is a limited effect of education, where only in 2004 are those who left education aged 15 and under more likely to support a populist left-wing AEP.

Trade union membership has no significant effect, and religiosity is significant in 2004 and 2009. Interestingly, the effect of religiosity is reversed in 2009; those who attend services more often are less likely to support a populist left-wing AEP, whereas more frequent attenders were more likely to support one in 2004. Finally, the interaction effect in 2014 between the effects of the financial crisis and age is not statistically significant. Full models can be seen in the appendix.

## IV

### Discussion of results

This section focuses on three important aspects from the above results: socio-demographic and attitudinal factors, changes over time, and the differences between populist left- and right-wing AEPs. As a general summary, from Figure 3.4, there is evidence that populist AEP supporters tend to be younger, working class men who live in urbanised areas. They are dissatisfied with democracy, are Eurosceptic and ideologically more radical than other voters. There is, on the whole, strong support for the hypotheses discussed above.

#### **Socio-demographic factors: still important when controlling for attitudes**

On the whole, there is evidence that certain socio-demographic characteristics matter for populist AEP support. The age, gender and social class of populist AEP voters in particular seem to persist not only over time but also when attitudes are added into the model. Education has a rather more limited effect, losing significance by 2014, but in previous waves the hypothesis is still supported. In addition, by 2014 populist AEP voters can also be characterised by having lost out due to the financial crisis.

This holds not only when attitudes are controlled for, but also when it is interacted with age. Indeed, when interacted with age, it can be seen that those who are younger and have been hit hardest by the crisis are *more* likely to support a populist AEP. This demonstrates that populist AEPs have been very successful in winning the support of those who have suffered from the financial crisis (Hobolt & Tilley 2016). This provides evidence that by 2014 populist AEP support retained its strong ideological component, but that the profile of voters that display such attitudes has become solidified within the electorate. In other words, populist AEPs are finding support among those who have suffered during the economic crisis and have become more radicalised. After years of economic hardship throughout the EU, populist AEPs, both left- and right-wing, managed to carve out a supporter profile of those who have suffered economically and are willing to pin the blame for this on the political establishment and the EU.

It would be incorrect to state that populist AEPs aimlessly Hoover up voters who have lost out due to the financial crisis. Rather, the bigger picture is that populist AEPs do target those who have lost out financially, but that they also retain a strong ideological profile. Indeed, the presence of populist AEPs on both sides of the political spectrum in countries such as

Germany, the Netherlands and Greece indicates that they are not simple protest parties. The ideological profile of populist left- and right-wing AEP voters is discussed further below.

As mentioned, age, gender and social class were also key predictors of populist AEP support. The effect of age, as predicted, was negative (i.e. populist AEP voters tend to be younger). However, as seen by the coefficients in Figure 3.3, the size of the effect is modest.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, the predicted probability of an average 21 year-old in comparison to a 65 year-old supporting a populist AEP in 2014 (Figure 3.4) is 18.39% to 13.88%.<sup>56</sup> There is a statistically significant difference, as reported in both Figures 3.3 and 3.4, and younger voters are indeed more likely to support a populist AEP. So populist AEPs are *more* reliant on younger voters' support, but not totally reliant on them.

Men, too, are generally more likely than women to support a populist AEP (as was predicted). This is likely due to the populist nature of these parties which is an inherently conflict-driven ideology, therefore is more likely to win the support of men due to differences in socialisation. Furthermore, social class is a key predictor of populist AEP support; those who self-identify as working class are more likely to support a populist AEP over another party. This relationship is as expected, though it was not until 2009 that it became significant specifically for populist right-wing AEPs. This may be an indication that it was not until the financial crisis and its effects had lingered that populist right-wing AEPs managed to mobilise those in more precarious positions in society.

In order to demonstrate the importance of socio-demographic factors, predictive margins have been calculated from each wave.<sup>57</sup> In 2004, the two single-most likely groups to support a populist AEP are unemployed, working class men educated up to age 15, and between 16-19. Likewise, the *least* likely to support a populist AEP were employed, working class women who finished education aged 20 or over, and who are still in education. These predictive margins as such indicate that the socio-demographic background of populist AEP voters is as predicted.

By 2014, the two groups of voters most likely to support a populist AEP were unemployed, working class men educated between the ages of 16-19, and employed, working class men educated between the ages of 16-19. Likewise, the least likely groups to support a populist AEP were employed, working class women educated aged 20 and over, and unemployed working-class women educated aged 20 and over. All marginal effects are statistically significant.

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<sup>55</sup> A quadratic term was added into the socio-demographic and attitudinal models, but was not significant in any year and therefore not shown

<sup>56</sup> Where all other variables are held at their mean

<sup>57</sup> In order to maintain a parsimonious output, marginal effects were calculated for working class only

**Table 3.2: Predictive margins of populist AEP support, 2004<sup>58</sup>**

	Male				Female			
	Age educated	15 and under	16-19	20+	Student	15 and under	16-19	20+
Employed	11.24%	11.77%	9.36%	9.77%	10.06%	10.55%	8.34%	8.72%
Unemployed	14.33%	14.97%	12.06%	12.56%	12.91%	13.51%	10.81%	11.28%

**Table 3.3: Predictive margins of populist AEP support, 2009**

	Male				Female			
	Age educated	15 and under	16-19	20+	Student	15 and under	16-19	20+
Employed	17.02%	14.28%	12.65%	13.20%	14.33%	11.93%	10.52%	11.00%
Unemployed	17.30%	14.53%	12.88%	13.44%	14.58%	12.15%	10.72%	11.20%

**Table 3.4: Predictive margins of populist AEP support, 2014**

	Male				Female			
	Age educated	15 and under	16-19	20+	Student	15 and under	16-19	20+
Employed	19.43%	20.74%	20.46%	17.65%	16.25%	17.42%	17.17%	14.69%
Unemployed	19.43%	20.75%	20.46%	17.66%	16.25%	17.42%	17.17%	14.69%

There are three key aspects to take from the predictive margins. Firstly, the probability of *all* groups to support a populist AEP increased between 2004-14. As populist AEP support skyrocketed it stands to reason that more voters generally support them. Indeed, compared to 2004, the 2014 marginal effects indicate that the probability of supporting a populist AEP have approximately doubled for several of the categories, particularly among those who are employed. In fact, that the largest increase over time is for these categories may perhaps show that unemployment is not, in and of itself, the *best* guide to supporting a populist AEP. Instead, populist AEPs have won the votes of those who are in less secure positions in society, and do not rely purely on the unemployed. The important effect of this is that populist AEPs are therefore not overly reliant on temporarily unemployed voters who can be brought back to the political establishment upon getting a new job. Instead, attitudes drive their support.

The second key aspect is the continued role of gender. On average, men are simply more likely to support a populist AEP, again indicated from the regression models. Indeed, gender seems to somewhat override the importance of employment status; it was employed *and* unemployed (working class) men who were most likely to support a populist AEP, and employed *and* unemployed (working class) women who were least likely.

<sup>58</sup> All values for all three tables are significant ( $p < .05$ ); marginal effects for model 2 (Table B2). All variables held at the mean except social class; marginal effects reported are for working class respondents

Thirdly, and in relation, the marginal effects indicate that there is a similar pattern emerging regarding education. Those most likely to support populist AEPs in both waves were lower educated men (i.e. no university degree), while those least likely to support populist AEPs were more educated women. This is consistent with expectations, and generally reflective of the educational divide that has steadily emerged. More educated voters favour free trade, internationalism and cultural liberalism, which are at odds with populist left- and right-wing AEP platforms (Ford & Jennings 2020, p.300-02). Those without degrees tend not to hold liberal attitudes and are more economically vulnerable, and populist AEPs are particularly adept at winning their support by offering policies that address not only their place in the economy but also that match their attitudes and values (Rooduijn et al 2017, p.541).

The benefit of analysing both populist left- and right-wing AEP voters together is that the wider phenomenon is not missed. Studies such as Arzheimer and Carter and Ramiro focus solely on the right- or left-wing respectively and find very similar results in terms of socio-demographics (Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Ramiro 2016). Such studies then fail to tie together the wider picture, that across Europe those who are the ‘losers’ of globalisation (i.e. the economically vulnerable) are more likely than others to turn to populist AEPs. Where the end result is the same (polarised political discourse, collapsing established party vote shares etc) then knowing who supports populist AEPs, left- or right-wing, is an important starting point. Even where both left and right are analysed it is next important to understand *why* they support such parties; something the articles by Visser et al (2014) and Rooduijn (2018) fail to do.

So, populist left- and right-wing AEP voters are more likely to be men, working class, unemployed, younger and to have lower levels of education. The predicted probabilities above show that there is a differential impact between socio-demographics; gender and education appear to be the biggest socio-demographic divides. Lower educated men are the most likely to support a populist AEP, while more educated women are the least likely to support a populist AEP. Socio-demographics are certainly important, yet it is important to note that attitudes play a key role in determining populist AEP support, as Rooduijn et al (2017) argue. This discussion is expanded further below.

### **Populist AEP support: trends and changes over time**

On the whole, there are few changes over time for the key variables in Figures 3.3 and 3.4; populist AEP support has retained a (largely) similar platform. There are several key differences, however. Most notably, education is statistically significant in the 2004 and 2009 waves, but not 2014. Socio-demographic factors are certainly necessary to control for, and there is a general pattern that largely matches expectations, but crucially they do not reveal the whole picture.

The marginal effects discussed above also show that there is an education divide, though it is not particularly large. In their analyses of the extreme-right and radical-left, Arzheimer and Carter (2006), and Ramiro (2016) (respectively) both reported more complicated findings for education than they hypothesised. Namely, right-wing parties relied most on those with mid-level education, while the left wins votes from the most and least educated. Furthermore, Bathwater et al argued that even among those in higher education, social class remains a key distinction, with the middle class benefiting from advantages over the working class

(Bathmaker et al 2013). It is therefore important to consider not just educational attainment, but also social class, which is a demonstrably important factor in determining party support.

One notable finding from the 2009 wave is that populist AEP support was not only characterised by the very least educated; those who have more intermediate levels of education were also more likely than the most educated to support a populist AEP. While the coefficient for the very least educated was larger, the result still shows that populist AEPs do not solely rely on the votes of the very least educated. As such, it appears that the key difference is more likely to be whether or not the respondent has a degree. In general, owning a degree boosts income, in addition to the more social and attitudinal effects of attending university (e.g. more pro-liberal values).

The largest discrepancy is on the left-wing; coefficients are mostly negative in reference to the highest level of education from 2009 onwards (although the only coefficient to pass the 95% threshold shows that the least educated were *more* likely to support a populist left-wing AEP (in 2004)). The change in direction may well be due to the relationship between increased education and support for more progressive policies (Visser et al 2014).

For populist left-wing AEPs in particular, the role of socio-demographic factors changes over time, with attitudinal and ideological factors becoming much more important predictors of support. This further accentuates the need to truly emphasise the role of attitudes, as per Hobolt and Tilley (2016) and Rooduijn et al (2017), unlike Visser et al (2014) and Spierings and Zaslove (2017).

By 2014, only age and social class were significant predictors of populist left-wing AEP support, while age, gender, unemployment and education were all significant (and as expected) in 2004. Populist right-wing AEPs, on the other hand, see a slightly more stable socio-demographic profile. Gender and age were both significant in both 2009 and 2014. In addition, a working-class identity became statistically significant from 2009 onwards. This indicates that populist right-wing AEPs may have managed to carve out a reputation for themselves as ones which stand up for the interests of the more disadvantaged in society. In 2004, before the financial crisis, there was much less evidence of this.

A slight discrepancy is the significant finding that older age increases the likelihood of supporting a populist right-wing AEP among those who lost income (only) from the financial crisis. This contrasts with the earlier finding that younger voters who lost their job and/or income are more likely to support *all* populist AEPs. Chapter six finds additional evidence for this in Austria. A possible explanation may be that those who were more established in the workforce and who lose out financially are more likely to support a populist AEP. It may well be the case that younger voters earn less and therefore have less far to fall compared to older workers. The general finding, though, is that those who have lost out due to the financial crisis are more likely to support a populist AEP.

### **Variations of the same phenomenon: populist left- and right-wing AEP voters**

In general, populist AEP voters benefit from a crisis of representation. Their voters are ideologically radical, Eurosceptic, dissatisfied with how they are represented and desire fundamental reform. This sub-section firstly discusses the key differences between the left- and right-wing, and then secondly discusses potential reasons for this finding. Finally, the



attitudinal similarities are discussed, and how the above findings reflect populist AEP strategy.

The left-right differences are important to understand as they show that populist AEPs are not simply relying on a populist and/or anti-establishment appeal; they attract dissatisfied voters on the basis of a clear left-right platform. Studies that examine voters of both the left- and right-wing tend to minimise differences (Rooduijn et al 2017, p.537-38) such as those by Visser et al (2014) and Rooduijn (2018), and/or particularly focus on socio-demographics, such as Spierings and Zaslove (2017).

A more realistic study of their support should start from the premise that populist AEPs are driven to success by the perceived unrepresentativeness of established parties and political elites (Rooduijn et al 2017, p.538). Their support is ideological: populist AEP voters are radical and perceive the establishment to be unrepresentative. The above analyses show the importance of maintaining a distinction between populist AEP voters. Populist left- or right-wing AEP voters support populist AEPs for the same broad reasons but seek very different policies.

Populist right-wing AEP voters are indeed motivated by more anti-immigration concerns, and not by redistributive policy preferences. As concern over immigration has risen over time, populist right-wing AEPs have been able to capitalise on this. Populist right-wing AEP voters, as was expected, also viewed themselves as right-wing on the left-right scale. Economic policy is not a significant driver of populist right-wing AEP support. This means that the parties do not win just *any* dissatisfied voter's support.

Populist left-wing AEP voters, on the other hand, are motivated by redistributive policy preferences and consider themselves left-wing. By 2014, their support was also Eurosceptic. As time wore on, populist AEPs on both sides homed in on the EU due to its increased visibility and association with austerity, immigration and the financial crisis.

However, the 2014 wave also showed that populist left-wing AEP voters hold anti-immigration beliefs. The size of the coefficient is very modest and is only found in the latest wave, however it is still a statistically significant finding which suggests that populist left-wing AEP support may be more nuanced.

This, and the lack of significance for immigration attitudes for populist right-wing AEP supporters in 2004 shows that party support does not remain constant over time. This adds further nuance to studies that examine left and right which fail to look at long-term trends (e.g. Hobolt & Tilley 2016; Rooduijn et al 2017; Rooduijn 2018). The parties themselves may well have stable ideologies over time, but their electorates did not wholly converge on their now-familiar platforms until after the financial crisis.

As Hobolt and Tilley argued (2016), the financial crisis appears to have sparked populist AEP success by creating flashpoints over the EU, immigration and austerity. Ideological and political homelessness, a crisis of representation, is a grievance that populist AEPs have managed to pick up on. These are findings that have simply not been stressed enough; populist AEP supporters certainly share their similarities, but they seek very different solutions to the same perceived problems.

By 2014, however, the populist left-wing AEP voters also appear to have some anti-immigration concerns. There are two possible explanations for this finding. Firstly, populist left-wing AEPs were most prominent in South European countries, where countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain have seen a huge influx of asylum seekers in recent years. It is possible that any anti-immigration beliefs reflect concern over the refugee crisis as opposed to it being a key motivation behind populist left-wing AEP voters. Chapter six, analysing national election study data, finds further evidence that populist left-wing AEP voters can oppose immigration. This shows that Rooduijn et al's (2017) 'radical distinction' is not so clear.

Secondly, Andreadis and Stavrakakis (2017, p.503-04) found that SYRIZA resembled ANEL voters more than they did SYRIZA politicians on both the economy and immigration. Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018) found that poor economic conditions are the best causes of populist left-wing AEP success. Populist left-wing AEPs may well manage to mobilise at least some voters who are both economically left-wing and anti-immigration.

As such, despite any anti-immigration beliefs voters may have, they may be drawn to the populist left-wing AEP (at least primarily) on the basis of their economic policies. The (relatively) sudden rise of populist left-wing AEPs in South Europe (best typified by Podemos) may well belie their ability to gain long-term, dedicated support in the same manner that populist right-wing AEPs such as the Front National and Freedom Party of Austria have. Populist left-wing AEPs outside of South Europe, for instance, are few and far between (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, p.37). Where they do exist with parliamentary representation, such as in the Netherlands and Germany, their vote shares remain modest in comparison to Podemos, SYRIZA and the Five Star Movement.<sup>59</sup> Chapter six finds further evidence that populist left-wing AEPs are not carving out a specific niche for themselves, unlike populist right-wing AEPs.

The radical-left in general (including non-populist parties) competes on the economic left-right dimension and Green parties are usually associated with left-wing policies too (March & Rommerskirchen 2015, p.41; Grant & Tilley 2019, p.509). Populist right-wing AEPs, on the other hand, do not typically have to compete with multiple right-wing parties; Alternative for Germany, UKIP and the Party for Freedom have rarely seen far-right competition.<sup>60</sup> Populist left-wing AEPs may simply struggle to maintain high levels of support over time outside of financial and/or political crises.

So, it is notable that populist left- and right-wing AEPs are successful at mobilising those unhappiest with the political system.<sup>61</sup> They are also politically radical; voters that place

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<sup>59</sup> All of these parties, plus Sinn Féin in Ireland, performed very well in countries hit hardest by financial and political crisis. While none of these parties are populist right-wing AEPs, it is worth noting that in Greece and Italy there were successful populist right-wing AEPs too. Only by 2019 did Spain have a populist right-wing AEP represented in parliament, and Ireland has no such party at all, let alone one in parliament

<sup>60</sup> Populist right-wing AEPs may well have competitors too, but where there are multiple far-right parties there is often one larger party such as Lega Nord which largely outcompetes Brothers of Italy. Austria also shows how there is often room only for one populist right-wing AEP; the Freedom Party of Austria remains a major party in Austrian politics, having seen off challenges from both Alliance for the Future of Austria and Team Stronach.

<sup>61</sup> Those dissatisfied with democracy have an alternative to supporting populist AEPs in the form of simply not turning out in the first instance

themselves further to either end of the left-right scale are more likely to support a populist AEP. Euroscepticism is also a common tool that populist AEPs exploit; the EU is painted as a distant, elitist institution that is in dire need of reform (at the least). However, this is where the similarities end. All of this is done for very different reasons; the populist right-wing focuses on immigration and nativism while the populist left-wing focuses on anti-austerity and neoliberalism.

Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018) argue that populist right-wing support is most likely in those countries with relatively stronger economies, and weaker economic performance increases the populist left-wing. The above results show that populist right-wing AEPs are attracting voters on a much more cultural (i.e. nativist) element, as well as using Euroscepticism and populism to motivate voters. As such, with populist right-wing AEPs, simply relying on the economic anxiety theory alone is a misleading picture. However, this is also true for populist left-wing AEPs.

The results therefore show that populist AEP voters are more likely to be economically insecure, but their attitudes are the key determinants for populist left- *or* right-wing AEP support. It would be remiss to follow Boris Johnson's (2014) dismissal of the success of populist AEPs as a "peasants' revolt". Instead, the findings show that there is a clear attitudinal component to populist AEP success. They are more likely to feel as though they are not well-represented, and to have clear, radical attitudes regarding immigration or economic redistribution.

The bigger picture to focus on is what policies populist AEP voters want, and who they think can and cannot deliver them. There is a relatively clear socio-demographic picture that emerges, and the financial crisis may well have accentuated socio-economic divisions among European electorates.<sup>62</sup> However, these voters are very much defined by their attitudes. Rather than being "pitchfork-wielding populists ... drunk on local hooch" (Johnson 2014), their attitudes and sense of abandonment are real, clear and radical. These voters and their attitudes are not simply going to disappear, and by supporting a populist AEP they are consciously expressing very clear preferences, not mindlessly rebelling before being quelled.

Populist AEPs, instead, are a variation of the same phenomenon: they all win the support of radical voters, who are unhappy that the political establishment does not represent them. They will not easily be brought back into the establishment. The evidence from countries as varied as Austria, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain is that such voters' attitudes have now been brought into mainstream political debate, further stretching an already worn and tired political establishment.

## **Conclusion**

There are two key findings from the analyses presented and discussed above. Firstly, populist AEP voters display clear socio-demographic and attitudinal similarities. Secondly, populist left- and right-wing AEPs specifically target voters on the basis of anti-immigration and redistributive policies.

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<sup>62</sup> The analysis of national election study data in this thesis shows that before the financial crisis, similar attitudes define populist AEP voters. As such, the key factor may well be that the financial crisis created more voters susceptible to populist AEP rhetoric

Younger voters, men, the working class and economically insecure tend to be more likely to support populist AEPs. Furthermore, their voters are ideologically radical, Eurosceptic and dissatisfied with democracy. This is a notable finding as it demonstrates that populist AEP supporters are motivated by their desire to bring about real change; their voters are receptive to populist AEPs' claims to offer true alternatives to the political establishment. The 2014 pooled model showed that those who have been most affected by the financial crisis (lost income and employment) were more likely to support a populist AEP in comparison to those who suffered no such impact. Again, populist AEPs have been successful at targeting those who have lost out and blame the political establishment.

However, despite their similarities, it would be incorrect to claim that populist AEPs are all the same. There are, as hypothesised, left-right ideological differences. Populist right-wing AEP voters are motivated by anti-immigrant attitudes, while populist left-wing AEP voters are motivated more by support for the redistribution of wealth. There was also evidence that in 2014 populist left-wing AEP voters also held anti-immigration attitudes. Nevertheless, the variation in ideological background of populist left- and right-wing AEP voters shows that they can be considered variations of the same phenomenon. They attract *different* voters by using the *same tactics*. It took time for such platforms to solidify in the electorate, though, showing the importance of considering not just differences in ideology, but also how these differences evolve over time. As such, this adds further nuance to studies such as Rooduijn et al (2017), while offers a marked improvement over others such as Visser et al (2014) that do not examine left-right differences in detail.

This analysis is the first of three aimed at understanding the fortunes of populist AEPs at the ballot box. Further analyses are necessary for several reasons. Firstly, this analysis did not consider national general elections. The data source was specifically chosen due to its geographic scope and harmonised questionnaire. However, the following analyses consider national elections where the stakes are different. Secondly, the supply-side was not fully investigated in this chapter. The next analysis offers a cross-sectional time-series analysis of national general elections. This has the benefit of showing a) how different circumstances condition populist AEP support, and b) offering a long-term view of populist AEPs' electoral performance. Finally, a further, more in-depth analysis of the attitudes of populist AEP voters is conducted in order to further understand the differences between the populist left- and right-wing AEPs in Europe.

## Chapter IV

### Aggregate analysis of populist AEP support

#### Introduction

This analysis moves on from the previous individual-level analysis and instead focuses on party vote shares in national elections. This analysis is split into two components; firstly, the effects of the electoral system, economy and established party behaviour on populist AEP vote shares are analysed. A second analysis utilises party manifesto data in order to examine the role that ideology and party platforms have on populist AEPs' fortunes. The benefits of an aggregate-level and party-level analysis are notable, as it is possible to determine both whether and how parties respond to their immediate environment. The chapter as a whole asks one main question: are there supply-side factors that lead to some populist AEPs being more successful than others?

Populist AEPs benefit from poor economic conditions, established party convergence and having fewer AEP competitors. They also lose out when they enter government. Populist AEPs therefore are sensitive to the political and economic environment, meaning that there is a significant supply-side component to populist AEP success. Populist AEPs cannot control some of these factors, such as the economy, but they certainly can react to such circumstances. As such, the voters (demand-side) are undoubtedly important, but there are indeed *more favourable* circumstances in which populist AEPs can win votes. The political opportunity structures populist AEPs face affect their success. Lastly, greater levels of salience attached to the EU by the party lead to higher vote shares.

This chapter is split into three sections. Firstly, the theory and hypotheses are discussed, and the first analysis follows on from this. This second section consists of a methodology section and a presentation of the aggregate-level analysis. Thirdly, the methodology and results of the individual party-level analysis are presented. The results of each section are discussed in more detail following each set of models.

#### I

#### Theory and hypotheses

Populist AEPs, like all parties, are either constrained or boosted by certain factors beyond their control: electoral rules, the behaviour of other parties and the economy, for example (the external supply-side). Such factors are often referred to as political opportunity structures. However, parties can also have some degree of control over their electoral fortunes, such as formulating an effective strategy to compete with other parties, picking an effective leader and so on (the internal supply-side). The supply-side is also dynamic; when a populist AEP challenges an established party on multiculturalism for example, the established party must choose whether to confront the issue or ignore it. This, in turn, affects other parties in the political system.

The electoral system and any legal threshold should have an impact on the representation of parties (especially small parties) in national parliaments and may well also affect the level of support that parties win at the ballot box too. Electoral systems are most commonly grouped into three distinct categories: majoritarian, proportional or mixed. There is considerable variation within each of these three categories: the simple plurality system and the two-round

system are both majoritarian; open- and closed list systems are both proportional; and the additional-member system and mixed member system are both mixed systems. Furthermore, legal thresholds have an impact, ranging from 0% of the vote to 5% (in this analysis). Some countries, such as Turkey, have even higher thresholds, while some (such as Poland and Hungary) have two thresholds; one for individual parties and one for coalitions.<sup>63</sup>

In terms of voting behaviour, electoral systems and their (dis)proportionality may affect smaller parties (which the vast majority of populist AEPs are) for two reasons. Duverger's Law posits that there are both mechanical and psychological considerations in majoritarian/plurality electoral systems. The mechanical effect is that smaller parties will not win (m)any seats unless they have geographically concentrated support. In other words, consistently finishing second (or below) will not be good enough for a party in countries such as the United Kingdom. However, second place finishes in constituencies in countries such as Denmark will, in practice, result in winning seats. The psychological effect is that voters realise this and are therefore less likely to vote for a likely loser which makes it difficult for smaller parties to make breakthroughs in majoritarian systems (Duverger 1954).

As such, there is good reason to control for the electoral system in this analysis. Firstly, there is considerable variation between countries not just in terms of the success of populist AEPs, but also in terms of electoral systems. Secondly, the majority of populist AEPs can be classed as small parties for at least some of the time in this dataset; large, relatively consistently well-supported populist AEPs such as the FPÖ are the exception, not the rule. Smaller parties may struggle to pass thresholds, or not have geographically concentrated support in majoritarian systems. The Front National, for instance, is a well-known, long-standing populist AEP, yet typically struggles to transform its sizeable support into representation, losing approximately 98% of all second-round votes in France's 2015 departmental elections (Shields 2015; Gougou & Persico 2017).

**H1:** Proportional electoral systems lead to greater populist AEP success compared to non-proportional systems.

To move on to the economy, *populist* parties are typically less interested in attacking the government specifically, and more interested in attacking the political establishment in its entirety. So, poor economic performance should boost the number of dissatisfied members of the electorate, creating a wider pool of potential voters for populist AEPs to draw from. Multiple measures of the economy are necessary as national economies are dynamic, complex entities and it is entirely possible to have, say, high government debt which will not necessarily be salient without some other catalyst.<sup>64</sup> Only controlling for, say, government debt as a measure of the economy may thus provide a misleading picture.

Secondly, and in relation, the financial crisis and its after-effects were multifaceted. Some countries in Europe faced minimal impact (such as Norway), while others (such as Greece) endured years of harsh austerity following financial bailouts, coupled with a collapse in employment rates. Therefore, it is most appropriate to control for a variety of economic measures (Kriesi & Pappas 2015, p.1-2). Kriesi and Pappas (2015, p.10) identify three

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<sup>63</sup> In those countries where more than one threshold exists in any given election, the lowest threshold is applied (i.e. the threshold for single parties)

<sup>64</sup> e.g. high government debt can be accompanied by low levels of unemployment and decent GDP growth

different economic dimensions in their analysis of populist parties: unemployment, GDP growth, and government debt. In addition, two more measures are controlled for, which aim to test ‘individual’ level data: disposable income growth and income inequality.

These latter two are, indeed, measured at the aggregate level, but reflect the manner in which individuals interact with the economy, rather than, say, GDP growth. Countries such as the UK have seen near uninterrupted (albeit modest) economic growth in recent years. Likewise, the UK saw record levels of employment in 2019 (Leaker 2019). Such measures, however, simply cannot take into account deprivation and/or poverty which, if the theories expounded in chapter one hold true, are likely to increase populist AEP support. Assessing the role of real disposable income controls for an increased number of voters in (insecure and/or poorly paid) work. Voters who are employed, but over-worked, under-employed (e.g. zero-hour contracts) and/or underpaid are objectively in work but would unlikely be satisfied with their working conditions.

In addition, the proportion of wealth owned by the top 10% in the country is controlled for. In a similar manner to disposable income, a greater concentration of wealth among the top 10% of earners should indicate not only tightening living standards for others, but can also help to breed resentment and anger among voters (Eatwell & Goodwin 2018, p.204-12). As such, both disposable income and wealth inequality can measure not just how the economy is performing, but can also tap into how voters engage with the economy more directly. This offers a more realistic picture of populist AEP support, where long-term resentment needs to be captured rather than just measures such as GDP growth (Kriesi & Pappas 2015, p.10).

Unemployment, GDP growth and government debt are clear indicators of the state of the economy in a country. Meanwhile, disposable income and wealth inequality help to control for voters’ more direct interactions with the economy. The causal mechanism for each of these variables is largely the same: greater unemployment, greater government debt, greater wealth inequality and negative GDP and disposable income growth should all boost populist AEP vote shares. When the economy performs poorly, populist AEPs should benefit at the ballot box as an increased number of voters become dissatisfied with the political establishment, creating a more receptive audience. Very high GDP growth may also lead to increased populist AEP vote shares as rapid economic growth followed the 2008 financial crisis in Europe (Kriesi & Pappas 2015, p.10). This is tested below through the use of GDP squared.

**H2:** High unemployment levels increase populist AEP appeal

**H3:** Lower GDP growth increases populist AEP appeal

**H4:** Higher government debt increases populist AEP appeal

**H5:** Lower disposable income growth increases populist AEP appeal

**H6:** Greater wealth inequality increases populist AEP appeal

Moving on, the political ‘space’ available to parties should have an effect. In the case of populist AEPs, established party convergence should increase their vote shares. Voters themselves may find themselves ideologically distant to established parties, giving populist AEPs a greater pool of potential voters who are unhappy their beliefs are not being represented by the dominant parties (Kitschelt & McGann 1995, p.15-18; Arzheimer &

Carter 2006, p.424). At the supply-side, populist AEPs themselves may also benefit from more space in the system. They can therefore not only enter the political arena but do so meaningfully (to thrive, as well as survive). Studies have previously shown that convergence increases populist right-wing AEP success, in particular (Muis & Immerzeel 2017, p.913).

There is not much evidence to suggest that voters' perceptions of party positions are accurate. Adams et al (2011) found no evidence that voters update their perceptions of party left-right positions following elections. What matters more is voter *perceptions* of party positions, rather than their objective placement. Indeed, research has found that voters update their perceptions of party positions based on government formation, not manifestos (Fortunato & Adams 2014; Adams et al 2016). The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the supply-side; the following two chapters test the demand-side component as the causal mechanism differs between the two.

Whether or not voters can correctly (objectively) judge convergence is different to whether or not a populist AEP is able to carve out space for itself in the political system. It may well be able to create its own receptive audience from there, accentuating issue salience and ownership. Likewise, established parties may diverge to challenge populist AEPs, heightening issue salience of, say, immigration, which leads voters to believe they never cared before, thus perceiving there to be convergence when there was objectively divergence. As such, *both* perceptions of convergence and its objective measurement may be key to populist AEP success.

There are two ways of measuring established party convergence: by measuring the absolute distance between the centre-left and centre-right parties, or by measuring their movement over time. The latter is chosen over the former. Should absolute values be used, this would be problematic as it would be difficult to parse out the difference between party behaviour. In other words, a distance between established parties of, say, 15 (on a 0-100 scale) at time  $t_0$  may, in fact, be a *decrease* from, say, 25 at time  $t_1$  (i.e. policy convergence). Whereas in another election, a value of 15 may be an *increase* from 5 (i.e. policy divergence). There would be no context to the absolute values, but in such a case the theory posits that, actually, a populist AEP would be more likely to benefit in the election in which there was convergence, not divergence.

Where established parties have recently converged, populist AEPs receive more space and should have greater freedom to consolidate their place in the party system. What is key is whether their space is being restricted or expanded. The shift over time measures whether the absolute distance has increased or decreased, creating a *more* or *less* hospitable environment. In other words, the shift over time measures the act of convergence or divergence, the absolute value of distance measures a snapshot in time.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, as stated above, the absolute distance may obfuscate reality; it says nothing of whether or not established parties actually converged or diverged. Whether or not a populist AEP has been afforded more space is the key issue. The testing of the effect of convergence is therefore both more robust and rigorous compared to existing studies (Abedi 2002; Carter 2005; Arzheimer & Carter 2006) as it parses out the supply- and demand-side mechanisms.

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<sup>65</sup> Positive values mean that the established parties have diverged, while negative values mean that the established parties have converged



As all parties are constantly adapting to win votes, this often gives populist AEPs a challenge. Should established parties diverge and move away from the centre, how do populist AEPs respond? McDonnell and Werner (2019) argue that, regarding Euroscepticism, populists rely on being perceived as Eurosceptic (i.e. issue ownership). As such, it is necessary to be as extreme as possible on the EU to continue to claim ownership. Populist AEPs thrive off their issue ownership.

Their main agency comes from being able to put issues onto the agenda by way of maintaining a clear platform that remains stable out of both principle and a rational desire to maintain support (Adams et al 2006). Where they do succeed in causing established parties to move, populist AEPs themselves should also adapt and remain distant from established parties. Not only will there be more competition, but the established party may be able to call upon greater resources and also have the added allure of potentially being the largest party in a government which may win over voters wavering between an AEP or established party.

As stated in chapter one, populist AEP voters wish to feel as though they are truly being offered a choice. As such, voters may be less inclined to support a populist AEP if an established party is ideologically similar and demonstrates to voters that it cares about them. It may be either the case that the populist AEP needs to be more radical, or that it simply needs to be distinct (and therefore the established party could be closer to the extreme). Both are tested in the analysis below.

**H7:** Established party convergence increases populist AEP appeal

**H8:** Greater ideological distance to established parties increases populist AEP appeal

In a similar manner, populist AEPs should also benefit when there is less competition in general on the left- or right-wing. If there are two or more left- or right-wing AEPs competing in an election, this will inevitably crowd the field more as while no two parties are identical, they will be competing on similar platforms for similar voters (March & Rommerskirchen 2015, p.44; Grant & Tilley 2019, p.499-500).

This is best tested at the party-level, not aggregate-level, as populist AEPs are harmed by competition on their own side, not the total number of populist AEPs in an election.<sup>66</sup> As a case in point, SYRIZA faced no left-wing AEP competition in January 2015, but ANEL and Golden Dawn competed for a very similar pool of voters. The previous analysis in chapter three does indeed demonstrate that there are significant differences between populist AEP voters on a left-right basis.

**H9:** Fewer (left-right) AEP competitors increases populist AEP appeal

Populist AEPs, as argued previously, share some similarities with niche parties. One key similarity that will be tested for is that increased emphasis on core ideological issues should lead to increased vote shares. Parties that are smaller, more radical and have distinct platforms in the political system are more likely to attach greater issue salience to their key

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<sup>66</sup> At the aggregate level, the total number of populist AEPs competing in the election would not show the impact on individual populist AEPs, merely the sum total of all of their votes, especially where populist left- and right-wing AEPs coexist

policy area (Wagner 2012). For the most part, this describes many populist AEPs and so those that emphasise their key issues the most should be more likely to benefit.

They should benefit from issue salience (emphasising certain issues more) as they seek to not only politicise issues that they hope a large number of voters will feel has been abandoned by established parties, but also to show that they are serious about this issue. How best to do this other than heaving emphasis onto the issue, and repeatedly making the same argument? Entering the political arena with a new issue, or politicising a previously abandoned issue, should increase issue salience among the electorate, subject to there being a suitable pool of potential voters. Issue salience, on the demand-side, refers to concern among the electorate for a certain issue, be it healthcare, immigration, the economy and so on (Wlezien 2005, p.555).

Where voters are able to judge that a party truly cares about an issue, they will in turn be more likely to support this party should they themselves care about the issue. Indeed, niche party supporters tend to be more policy-seeking compared to other voters and are willing to abandon the niche party should it moderate its position (Adams et al 2012, p.1288). As a result of this, populist AEPs should seek to win over voters on the basis of a salient and narrow policy platform. This will be used in conjunction with populist and anti-establishment rhetoric that the establishment is unable and/or unwilling to address the issues that matter most to the people. As such, greater issue salience should lead to greater vote shares as more voters are attracted to them.

Furthermore, it is argued that populist AEPs win more votes when they are Eurosceptic. The relationship between populist right-wing AEPs and Euroscepticism is the same as with the populist radical-right. Euroscepticism should play a key role in their success as they can use the EU to claim that establishment parties and politicians are both out of touch with reality and beholden to an elitist supranational institution (Mudde 2007, p.159-61). In addition, populist right-wing AEPs can link the EU to policy issues such as immigration and multiculturalism, as well as the aforementioned national sovereignty concerns (Mudde 2007, p.69-70). While institutional and national sovereignty concerns are also utilised by populist left-wing AEPs, anti-immigration platforms are unique to the right-wing. Instead, the populist left-wing AEPs associate the EU with neoliberalism and/or austerity measures (Ramiro & Gomez 2017, p.112).

**H10:** Greater emphasis on their core ideological platform increases populist AEP appeal

**H11:** Greater levels of Euroscepticism increases populist AEP appeal

The concept of 'cost of ruling' is well-studied (Bingham Powell Jr & Whitten 1993; Hjermslev 2018; Greene et al 2020) and states that governments will very likely lose support at the next election. Enacting policy typically requires compromise (either with coalition partners and/or powerful blocs of MPs within the governing party). When in government parties inevitably must face tough choices; maintaining the happiness of all a party's voters when in government is simply not possible (Paldam 1986). Furthermore, opposition parties are better able to propose policies popular among the electorate, and they are less constrained by external events, such as poor economic performance and international crises (Lewis-Beck & Whitten 2013; Klüver & Spoon 2016, p.637).

Populist AEPs are likely to lose out in government. Heinisch (2003, p.123) argued that populism “creates nearly insurmountable difficulties once such groups reach public office”. Populist (radical-right parties), according to Heinisch (2003, p.124), typically make big promises to their voters, but that the best way to enact change is through expertise, which populist parties tend to lack. This, however, does not stack up with reality. While it took many years for the FPÖ to recover following the 1999 election, parties such as Fidesz and the Danish People’s Party have entered government and not struggled. Furthermore, the collapse of the government headed by Law and Justice (PiS), elected in 2005, followed by the success later enjoyed by PiS in 2015 and 2019 shows that the salient feature may well be the *party*, and not its (populist) ideology.

Instead, Akkerman and de Lange (2013) argue that party management and strategy are key distinctions between parties that differentiate successful and unsuccessful performance both in government and at the ballot box following (populist right-wing AEP) entry to government. Governments with populist AEPs may well enact laws in line with their ideology; the issue is more that they often struggle to take the credit for any achievements (Akkerman 2011).

As such, contrary to Heinisch (2003), populism is not the problem in and of itself, poor strategy and management is the issue. This is likely to affect populist AEPs but has not previously been quantitatively tested; studies by Akkerman (2011), and Akkerman and De Lange (2013) qualitatively assess records in government. It is also necessary to point out that populist AEPs not in government have also suffered losses in support, such as the Front National, Vlaams Belang, Jobbik and Podemos (whose 2019 entry to government followed its lowest vote share). As such, this analysis allows for the precise effect of entry to government to be tested by comparing all populist AEPs’ vote shares over the course of approximately 40 years.

**H12:** Entry to government is more likely than not to decrease populist AEP vote shares

## II

### **Convergent on crisis: an aggregate-level analysis of populist AEP success**

This section aims to test H1-H7 and H12 at the aggregate-level; the *total* vote-share of populist AEPs in national general elections. The other hypotheses are best tested at the party-level (e.g. ideological distance to the nearest established competitor simply cannot be measured at the aggregate-level where multiple populist AEPs co-exist). The analysis runs from 1980 and on in all EU member-states, plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.<sup>67</sup> Below, the data and methodology for this analysis is discussed before the results of the models are presented. The models returned from this first analysis point to three main findings: populist AEPs appear to *benefit* from disproportionate electoral systems, and they benefit from poor economic performance.

### **Data and methodology**

The following analysis uses a cross-sectional time-series approach whereby populist success is measured as vote share. As stated, the analysis is split into two sections, the first of which

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<sup>67</sup> These three countries were not tested in the previous analysis of European Election data as they are not EU members and, as such, do not participate in European Parliament elections

analyses the *total* vote share of populist AEPs in elections, while the second analyses the vote shares of *each* populist AEP. This allows for both country-level and party-level factors to be examined. The aggregate-level should be analysed as it allows for country-level conditions of success to be analysed (i.e. this analysis looks at whether or not certain economic and/or political conditions cause populist AEP success in general). In addition, it allows for an analysis of more parties as datasets covering party ideology such as the Manifesto Project only cover certain parties. Focusing on the country-level therefore helps to reduce any potential bias by not only examining already successful or larger parties.

The timespan of both analyses begins in 1980 in Western Europe and the first election following the collapse of the Soviet Union for Central and Eastern Europe. By the early 1980s the populist radical right had transformed into today's now familiar nativist platform (Arzheimer 2009, p.259-61; Mudde 2014, p.217-18). The same is true of the radical left; for instance, the Dutch Socialist Party by 1975 moved away from Maoism, shifting emphasis on to a more populist platform (Lucardie & Voerman 2019). Tarrow (1996, p.396) argues that “[h]istory is not a neutral reservoir of facts out of which viable generalisations are drawn.” Researchers, in other words, must be careful to ensure that what they are analysing is comparable in the first instance. The timespan of the analysis does not risk bias by including earlier elections in which populist AEPs may have had different ideologies, unlike the analysis conducted by Jackman and Volpert (1996).

As a further point, it is from around this time that fundamental shifts in the electorate's attitudes and priorities were solidifying, having emerged from around the 1960s, as were patterns in party behaviour as they adapted to new issues entering the arena and increased globalisation (Inglehart 1971; Kriesi et al 2006). Social democratic parties that drove the creation of the welfare state in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century may plausibly be argued to have been anti-establishment because they fundamentally altered the way in which the state worked. Under such circumstances, an analysis would need to pay very careful consideration in any comparison between electorates and also parties, because issue priorities and political competition was so dramatically different. Comparisons from the 1980s and on do not suffer such issues.<sup>68</sup>

The first analysis is conducted using a dataset created specifically for this analysis. The total vote shares of populist AEPs in an election is calculated from ParlGov. The ParlGov dataset contains roughly 1700 parties in 990 elections in 37 EU and OECD countries, making it an extremely valuable resource (Döring & Mannow 2019). As a result, this dataset helps to reduce any potential biases by only including, say, parties that entered parliament.

In order to control for the electoral system, three variables are used: thresholds, district magnitude and disproportionality. As stated above, legal thresholds are commonly used in national elections and except in a few countries (such as Germany), failure to cross the threshold cannot be negotiated with, regardless of how close the party was or how much representation it had prior to the election.<sup>69</sup> As an example, the Austrian Green Party failed to

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<sup>68</sup> As stated further below, it is also important to take into account any potential differences between Western and Central and Eastern Europe. The only particularly noteworthy difference between the two regions is the role that disproportionality plays in populist AEP success.

<sup>69</sup> While Germany does indeed have a threshold, the electoral system is mixed, meaning it is possible to not cross the threshold but still win enough single-member constituencies to enter parliament

re-enter parliament in 2017, winning 3.8% of the vote and no seats, down from 12.4% and 24 seats in 2013. In many other countries, 3.8% would likely be enough to win representation.

District magnitude is measured as the average district magnitude in the lowest tier of the parliament, as measured by Bormann and Golder (2013). Values for elections that occurred after the release of Bormann and Golder's dataset have been added in order to maximise case-selection. District magnitude has been logged in order to account for the effect being smaller as magnitude increases (Roberts Clark & Golder 2006, p.689).

Disproportionality has been measured by Gallagher's (1991) index of disproportionality. As above, a disproportional system may well deter voters from supporting (smaller) parties, which many populist AEPs are (or at least have been for a significant period of time). Furthermore, disproportionality should be controlled for as the district magnitude may not be constant across the entire country. This is the case in Spain, for instance, where election results are disproportionate in more rural seats, despite Spain having a PR system.<sup>70</sup> The index is lagged from the previous election. Lagging the index therefore allows the coefficient to be interpreted as the response of voters to a (dis)proportional system.

Lagged effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) is also included using Laakso and Taagepera's formula (1979). ENPP may restrict the ability of populist AEPs to make themselves stand out to voters and so is added in as an additional control. Furthermore, the number of months since the previous election is also included as a further control, aimed at measuring political and/or economic crisis. Should an election be called much sooner than originally planned (such as Greece having five general elections between 2009-2015, or Spain having four between 2015-2019) this implies that there is a fundamental issue that cannot easily be resolved. In times such as this, populist AEPs (among others) may well seek to capitalise on any potential crisis.

A binary variable measuring whether or not there was a populist AEP in government prior to the election is also included. As this is an aggregate-level analysis, this does not differentiate between parties in years when there is more than one populist AEP, but not all were in government. The following party-level analysis does, however, make this distinction. This variable includes parties that supported minority governments but did not formally enter government.

The term 'in government', as such, is not used literally. Labelling parties supporting minority governments is appropriate for the reason that supporting a government makes a party a very clear, visible de facto supporter of the government. Bale and Bergman (2006, p.196) argued that parties supporting minority governments struggle to have policy input themselves and can find themselves forced into supporting government policy. Mudde (2012), de Lange (2012), and Akkerman and de Lange (2013) all refer to minority government support parties as in government. As a case in point, the Danish People's Party (DF) has consistently supported minority governments while remaining outside of the cabinet. However, Danish mainstream media frequently referred to DF as a member of the "VKO-government" (V; K

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<sup>70</sup> As such, there is not a perfect correlation between the two, but they are related. Where all models are reran without logged district magnitude all other results are substantively unaltered with the exception of model B2 where the change in unemployment just slips out of significance ( $p=.053$ ), and model D3 where disproportionality does so too ( $p=.056$ ).

and O representing the Liberals, Conservatives and DF) (Jupskås 2015, p.26). As such, a party may not be *in* the government, but that does not mean it is not *of* the government.<sup>71</sup>

Economic conditions are controlled for using growth in GDP and disposable income, unemployment levels (as a percentage of the workforce), levels of government debt and the proportion of income owned by the top 10%. GDP growth is lagged from the previous year and is taken from the World Bank (2020). Government debt and unemployment data has been extracted from Armingeon et al.'s (2019) Comparative Political Dataset, both have also been lagged from the year prior to the election. There is a possibility of a quadratic relationship between GDP growth and populist AEP. Using GDP growth squared, the analysis below shows that this appears to be the case. Particularly after the financial crisis, GDP severely dropped in many countries before rapidly expanding again, most notably in countries such as Ireland. The growth in household disposable income is lagged and taken from Eurostat (AMECO 2019). Finally, the share of income owned by the top 10% is lagged and taken from the World Bank (2020).

Both government debt and unemployment are also controlled for in different models as the percentage growth in their levels. This is worthwhile as certain countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, have had consistently low (compared to, say, Greece during the financial crisis) levels of unemployment and government debt. However, both countries have notable populist AEPs. What may be more salient is not the *total level* of unemployment and/or debt, but rather the change over time. A jump of unemployment from, say, 3% to 6% may be a complete shock in certain countries, compared to unemployment stabilising at a much higher rate.<sup>72</sup> Simply taking into account the total rate of unemployment and debt may cloud the analysis, while the change over time may be able to unmask any potential effects of debt and/or unemployment.

One final variable controlled for in the first analysis is established party policy convergence. The measurement of party's ideological placement is a source of much debate in literature (Dinas & Geminis 2010). The preferred method for this analysis is to use a logit scale approach, initially developed by Lowe et al (2011). Their approach is to sum the percentage of quasi-sentences in a party's manifesto for both the 'left' and 'right' side of a policy dimension. An offset is added to both the left and right side of the dimension, given in the formula as 0.5. In practice, the offset is calculated as  $100 * (0.5 / \text{total sentences})$  (Lowe et al 2012). The approach used by Lowe et al (2011, p.131) is thus:

$$\theta^L = \frac{R+0.5}{L+0.5}$$

Prosser (2014) used this same methodology to develop his unidimensional scale, which is used in this analysis. The values for the scale have been rescaled to 0-100, in order to ease interpretation, using the following formula utilised by Prosser (2015, p.740):

$$\text{Rescaled dimension} = (\text{scale position} - \text{scale mean} + 7) * \frac{100}{14}$$

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<sup>71</sup> The variable is therefore coded as 1 if there was either a populist AEP in government following the previous election (or if it supported a minority government), and 0 if not

<sup>72</sup> As such, a jump from 3% to 6% would be a growth rate of 100%, from 3% to 4.5% would be 50% and so on. These variables are also lagged at t-1

Established party convergence is thus measured on a left-right basis. The score itself is calculated as the difference between the centre-left and centre-right established party. The measure used in the models is then calculated as the difference between the election, and the previous election. As such, a positive value indicates *divergence*, and a negative value indicates *convergence*. Established parties are chosen as the largest two established parties (in terms of vote share), largely following Grant and Tilley (2019). Taking the parties with the largest vote share is a clear indication of the dominance they would have in the political system over other parties (established or not) who are much smaller.

Established party policy convergence itself is calculated through the Manifesto Project (MARPOR) dataset (Volkens et al 2019). Indeed, Prosser's scale is designed to be used only with MARPOR data. Two of the most common approaches when using a cross-section time-series approach to the study of political parties and elections is to either use manifesto data or expert survey data. By far the most common expert survey is the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) series (Bakker et al 2015; Polk et al 2017). This survey is filled out by country experts and had 337 respondents in 2014. On the other hand, MARPOR uses hand-coding to place quasi-sentences into pre-determined policy categories (Gemenis 2013, p.3).

Manifesto data is the preferred method to calculate party ideology from as manifestos are regarded as authoritative statements by the party regarding their ideological profile and policy platform (Adams et al 2006, p.516). Expert survey data, on the other hand, is created by experts who take other factors into consideration (Adams et al 2012, p.1273). They are indeed valuable to the study of political parties, however they do not necessarily measure the party's ideology and policy platform at the time of the election, unlike manifestos. Furthermore, they are conducted infrequently and are not systematic. Using CHES would not only give few time points, but they only began in 1998 which would further restrict the analysis. Furthermore, not all countries in Europe have been included in all waves of CHES, which would even further restrict any analysis. Using manifestos therefore provides a more comprehensive analysis than the studies by Abedi (2002) or Carter (2005).

In order to model the effects of electoral systems, economic performance and policy convergence on populist AEP support, a tobit model is estimated. Tobit models differ from linear models in the sense that they control for censored data. The dependent variable in the first analysis is left-censored as there are a number of elections coded as 0 (i.e. no support for a populist AEP). A linear model would assume that there is no support for a populist AEP in these elections. However, this is an unlikely assumption to make; no organised populist AEP is not synonymous with no *support* for a populist AEP (Golder 2003, p.448). Coding such elections as 0 and running a linear model essentially means that the independent variables in the model do not have an effect on the dependent variable (Grant & Tilley 2019, p.504-05).

Both Golder (2003) and Jackman and Volpert (1996) use tobit models for their studies on populist right-wing parties. Furthermore, Grant and Tilley (2019) used tobit models in their analysis of Green party success, while March and Rommerskirchen (2015) did so in an analysis of radical-left party success. As such, the same approach is taken in this analysis in order to: a) most accurately model populist AEP success, and b) to ensure that the methods used in this analysis are as comparable as possible to the wider literature on party success.

The analysis of cross-section time-series data does not come without its difficulties. Green, Kim and Yoon (2001) point out that simply running a pooled model and failing to take into

account time and space can lead to misleading results from an analysis. There are two concerns that are often present in such data: autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. A Wooldridge test for autocorrelation ( $p < .05$ ) (Drukker 2003) and a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity ( $p < .05$ ) indicate that both are present in the data.

A lagged dependent variable is included in the models below in order to control for autocorrelation, and country dummies are included in order to take into account heteroscedasticity. Ordinarily, OLS with panel-corrected standard errors would be estimated in order to control for heteroscedasticity. However, as stated, tobit models conceptually fit the data better than a typical linear model such as panel-corrected standard errors. The inclusion of country dummies essentially turns the model into fixed effects, and this is substantively desirable as well as statistically desirable. Not only are country-specific peculiarities controlled for that may otherwise bias the results, but also the analysis is reduced to within-country change. Furthermore, robust standard errors are estimated for all tobit models.

Four models are estimated: one containing variables covering the political system, economy and party competition; one using change over time in unemployment and government debt; one adding in disposable income; and one controlling for income inequality. These final models are estimated separately as data is not available for years before the mid-1990s for disposable income and around the year 2000 for income inequality, which causes earlier elections to be dropped.

The models are estimated for all countries, and Western Europe only. Central and Eastern European countries have a lower level of institutionalisation in their party systems which provides an even greater likelihood of new parties to enter the political arena (Kriesi 2014, p.362; Kriesi & Pappas 2015, p.3). In the full sample, a dummy variable controlling for whether or not the country is Western or Central and Eastern European is used, while this variable is dropped from the Western Europe-only sample. Ideally, one model for each of Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and all countries together, would be estimated. However, there are limitations to the data that must be acknowledged. Firstly, there are simply fewer Central and Eastern European countries, and secondly, they have no observations until the 1990s. Such a model would produce a small sample size, reducing explanatory power.

## Results

Table 4.1, below, show four models based on all countries; one with the absolute value of (lagged) unemployment rates and government debt, and one with their percentage growth rate, rather than the absolute values. In addition, both of these models are re-estimated with GDP growth squared and an interaction between established party movement and GDP growth. In sum, the results show that populist AEPs lose out from being in government, and that they benefit from a weaker economy. The dummy variable controlling for Central and Eastern European countries is not significant, indicating that populist AEPs are not more likely to thrive here compared to Western Europe in general.

Three coefficients are statistically significant: time since the last election; government debt (as an absolute value, but not in terms of its change over time) and GDP growth. The positive value for time since the last election indicates that populist AEPs do *not* benefit from elections closer to each other. This may be contrary to expectation, as countries such as



Greece and Spain have both had four elections in four years (2012 and 2015 in Greece, 2015; 2016; and 2019 in Spain). However, such frequent elections are outliers both geographically and temporally; not many countries have had such frequent elections. As such, this coefficient is likely just reflecting the increasing popularity over time of populist AEPs across the continent, where elections swiftly following one another are not typically the norm.

Lagged government debt (as a percentage of GDP) is statistically significant in both model 1.1 and 1.3 (the latter containing interaction terms). This suggests that populist AEPs benefit from higher government debt in terms of its absolute value. However, its change over time (i.e. precisely how much it increased or decreased) is not statistically significant in either model. It is easy to understand why populist AEPs may benefit from high levels of government debt; governing parties and/or the political establishment as a whole can be painted as incapable of effectively managing the economy. Furthermore, debt levels that are very high, as happened in countries such as Ireland and Greece, resulted in acute financial turmoil and, in the latter, social unrest.

Finally, model 1.4 shows that lagged GDP growth is statistically significant, and negative, as predicted. Higher levels of GDP growth dampen populist AEP success, so they do indeed appear to thrive in elections following poor economic performance. Its squared term is also statistically significant, while GDP growth in model 1.1 (without the squared term) is not significant. This suggests that, as suspected, that there is indeed a quadratic effect: economies may well rapidly bounce back from financial crisis (in terms of GDP), but the damage has already been done.

**Table 4.1: Populist AEP support; political system, economy and party competition**

Independent variables	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4
ENPP (lagged)	1.034 (0.919)	0.878 (0.931)	0.914 (0.907)	0.646 (0.923)
Months since election	<b>0.105**</b> <b>(0.0409)</b>	<b>0.0899**</b> <b>(0.0394)</b>	<b>0.0986**</b> <b>(0.0404)</b>	<b>0.0781**</b> <b>(0.0386)</b>
Threshold	0.239 (0.717)	-0.0578 (0.750)	0.241 (0.720)	-0.0332 (0.756)
District magnitude (logged)	1.598 (1.571)	1.325 (1.535)	1.476 (1.567)	1.127 (1.538)
Disproportionality (lagged)	0.0563 (0.364)	0.143 (0.357)	0.0120 (0.371)	0.0676 (0.365)
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in govt)	-1.954 (1.909)	-2.582 (1.995)	-1.994 (1.820)	-2.650 (1.862)
GDP growth (lagged)	-0.162 (0.168)	-0.388 (0.267)	-0.276 (0.222)	<b>-0.711**</b> <b>(0.329)</b>
Government debt (lagged)	<b>0.0747**</b> <b>(0.0321)</b>	---	<b>0.0744**</b> <b>(0.0322)</b>	---
Unemployment rate (lagged)	0.0740 (0.220)	---	0.0662 (0.219)	---
Established party movement	0.0736 (0.0572)	0.0921 (0.0625)	0.0728 (0.0565)	0.0942 (0.0624)
Central and Eastern Europe (ref: Western Europe)	-5.150 (3.890)	-5.878 (3.707)	-5.043 (3.856)	-5.609 (3.618)
Government debt (change)	---	0.00544 (0.0565)	---	0.00580 (0.0568)
Unemployment rate (change)	---	-0.0472 (0.0406)	---	<b>-0.0854**</b> <b>(0.0428)</b>
GDP growth <sup>2</sup>	---	---	0.0169 (0.0120)	<b>0.0285**</b> <b>(0.0126)</b>
Constant	-10.75* (6.292)	-2.598 (5.921)	-9.424 (6.287)	0.175 (5.874)
Observations	233	233	233	233
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variable	Included	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 4.2, below, re-runs the above analyses in just Western Europe as stated above, as party systems are less entrenched (or certainly have been for most elections) in former Soviet bloc countries. Time since the last election is not statistically significant (indicating that the previous results were being driven largely by Central and Eastern Europe).

**Table 4.2: Populist AEP support in Western Europe**

Independent variables	Model B1	Model B2	Model B3	Model B4
ENPP (lagged)	0.0334 (0.966)	-0.195 (0.970)	-0.144 (0.972)	-0.513 (0.999)
Months since election	0.0736* (0.0413)	0.0600 (0.0402)	0.0706* (0.0405)	0.0502 (0.0394)
Threshold	0.165 (0.619)	-0.253 (0.671)	0.154 (0.629)	-0.246 (0.704)
District magnitude (logged)	2.296* (1.228)	1.909 (1.227)	2.070* (1.222)	1.524 (1.222)
Disproportionality (lagged)	<b>0.912***</b> <b>(0.298)</b>	<b>0.946***</b> <b>(0.290)</b>	<b>0.838***</b> <b>(0.311)</b>	<b>0.825***</b> <b>(0.302)</b>
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in govt)	-1.865 (2.342)	-1.822 (2.466)	-2.026 (2.118)	-1.933 (2.191)
GDP growth (lagged)	-0.233 (0.181)	-0.441* (0.260)	-0.460* (0.274)	<b>-0.948***</b> <b>(0.357)</b>
Government debt (lagged)	<b>0.0838***</b> <b>(0.0290)</b>	---	<b>0.0848***</b> <b>(0.0288)</b>	---
Unemployment rate (lagged)	0.0884 (0.184)	---	0.0645 (0.177)	---
Established party movement	0.0366 (0.0541)	0.0502 (0.0584)	0.0365 (0.0537)	0.0474 (0.0584)
Government debt (change)	---	0.0352 (0.0487)	---	0.0534 (0.0416)
Unemployment rate (change)	---	<b>-0.0718**</b> <b>(0.0362)</b>	---	<b>-0.120***</b> <b>(0.0387)</b>
GDP growth <sup>2</sup>	---	---	0.0202 (0.0132)	<b>0.0352**</b> <b>(0.0144)</b>
Constant	-9.184 (6.238)	-0.764 (5.945)	-7.193 (6.318)	3.146 (6.150)
Observations	173	173	173	173
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variable	Included	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Lagged disproportionality is statistically significant and positive, which indicates that populist AEPs win more votes following *more*, not less, disproportionate elections. Disproportionate elections may well increase demand, as dissatisfaction among the electorate may increase following disproportionate results. In addition, populist AEP supporters may simply be more likely to protest against the political establishment, in general, regardless of the electoral institutions, as Golder (2003, p.459) argued may be the case with what he termed neofascist parties. In any case, the precise individual-level mechanisms at play simply cannot be determined without appropriate survey data. Populist AEP voters being willing to

protest, though, certainly makes sense in theory and indeed fits in with the individual-level analysis in chapter three.

Furthermore, government debt (as an absolute value) is statistically significant, but its change over time remains nonsignificant. In comparison to the above model, GDP growth is significant in model B4. Its negative value is entirely as predicted: populist AEPs benefit from economic turbulence. Its squared term becomes statistically significant too, which would indicate that there is a quadratic effect. The absolute rate of unemployment remains nonsignificant, yet the change in unemployment becomes statistically significant. However, the coefficient is negative, which indicates that as the unemployment rate grows, populist AEP support falls. This is counter-intuitive to expectations, though there are two possible explanations.

Firstly, high levels of unemployment may force voters to turn to the political establishment as they may give such parties greater credibility. Secondly, and more likely, this finding may be an artefact of the data. If unemployment really decreased support for populist AEPs, then the absolute rate should also be negative and significant. Furthermore, this would not explain either the individual-level data to the contrary, nor the finding from the party-level models below that unemployment boosts populist AEP vote shares. Rather, unemployment, particularly following the financial crisis, shot up rapidly in many countries, before falling after hitting a high point. For instance, despite Spain's high unemployment rate of 22% for the 2016 election, the growth rate for the same election was a *decrease* of 9%. Other large decreases can be seen in other countries, as varied as the Netherlands and Latvia. As such, what is more likely to be the case is that, as with GDP, economically 'positive' values such as high GDP growth and falling unemployment are at risk of masking the anger that voters felt.

Table 4.3, below, controls for the growth rate of disposable income. This model was run separately in order to maintain a larger overall sample. Time since the previous election continues to be statistically significant. As predicted, the growth in disposable income is statistically significant in all models. Its negative coefficient indicates that populist AEPs benefit from elections in which voters are losing out financially.<sup>73</sup>

Table 4.4, as above, estimates the same model as above but for Western Europe only and the results are similar. Time since last election is significant while disproportionality still remains significant and positive in all four. Growth in disposable income remains statistically significant, however only in model D2, though comes close to the 95% threshold in models D1 and D4. Nevertheless, as above it is negative which indicates that populist AEPs benefit when disposable income growth rates are lower. GDP growth remains negative and significant, in model D4, as expected, as does its squared term.

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<sup>73</sup> There are three notable outliers in this model, all in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria (1997); Estonia (1995) and Latvia (1995). As they take such extreme values for the growth in disposable income, they skew the results, rendering the coefficient non-significant. As such, a dummy variable controlling for these three elections was included, but not shown in Table 3. The dummy variable has the effect of absorbing the outliers while still providing a meaningful analysis. Dropping these three elections yields substantively identical results.

**Table 4.3: Populist AEP support; disposable income growth rate**

Independent variables	Model C1	Model C2	Model C3	Model C4
ENPP (lagged)	0.637 (0.925)	0.448 (0.930)	0.638 (0.921)	0.383 (0.928)
Months since election	<b>0.142**</b> <b>(0.0580)</b>	<b>0.152***</b> <b>(0.0570)</b>	<b>0.142**</b> <b>(0.0579)</b>	<b>0.148***</b> <b>(0.0567)</b>
Threshold	-0.0352 (0.773)	-0.350 (0.752)	-0.0359 (0.775)	-0.325 (0.757)
District magnitude (logged)	1.003 (1.811)	0.724 (1.828)	1.005 (1.811)	0.641 (1.821)
Disproportionality (lagged)	-0.0505 (0.410)	0.00884 (0.409)	-0.0498 (0.416)	-0.0171 (0.414)
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in govt)	-2.166 (1.857)	-2.367 (1.835)	-2.166 (1.852)	-2.404 (1.797)
GDP growth (lagged)	0.0528 (0.166)	-0.179 (0.210)	0.0550 (0.257)	-0.318 (0.332)
Government debt (lagged)	0.0691* (0.0363)	---	0.0691* (0.0360)	---
Unemployment rate (lagged)	-0.0953 (0.226)	---	-0.0952 (0.226)	---
Disposable income growth (lagged)	<b>-0.375***</b> <b>(0.120)</b>	<b>-0.509***</b> <b>(0.132)</b>	<b>-0.376***</b> <b>(0.132)</b>	<b>-0.480***</b> <b>(0.140)</b>
Established party movement	0.0325 (0.0580)	0.0437 (0.0640)	0.0324 (0.0583)	0.0466 (0.0643)
Central and Eastern Europe (ref: Western Europe)	-3.469 (5.368)	-5.454 (4.984)	-3.474 (5.352)	-5.278 (4.952)
Government debt (change)	---	-0.0235 (0.0494)	---	-0.0196 (0.0495)
Unemployment rate (change)	---	-0.0856* (0.0438)	---	<b>-0.100**</b> <b>(0.0497)</b>
GDP growth <sup>2</sup>	---	---	-0.000235 (0.0123)	0.0106 (0.0124)
Constant	-6.903 (7.766)	1.352 (7.056)	-6.912 (7.785)	2.061 (7.011)
Observations	192	192	192	192
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variable	Included	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

**Table 4.4: Populist AEP support in Western Europe; disposable income growth rate**

Independent variables	Model D1	Model D2	Model D3	Model D4
ENPP (lagged)	-0.250 (1.013)	-0.341 (1.074)	-0.326 (1.015)	-0.489 (1.074)
Months since election	<b>0.120**</b> <b>(0.0559)</b>	<b>0.121**</b> <b>(0.0566)</b>	<b>0.118**</b> <b>(0.0547)</b>	<b>0.117**</b> <b>(0.0550)</b>
Threshold	-0.0756 (0.670)	-0.408 (0.664)	-0.0539 (0.677)	-0.351 (0.700)
District magnitude (logged)	1.650 (1.364)	1.498 (1.361)	1.483 (1.381)	1.082 (1.382)
Disproportionality (lagged)	<b>0.780**</b> <b>(0.339)</b>	<b>0.846**</b> <b>(0.341)</b>	<b>0.735**</b> <b>(0.353)</b>	<b>0.745**</b> <b>(0.352)</b>
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in govt)	-1.944 (2.233)	-1.725 (2.271)	-2.019 (2.118)	-1.724 (2.130)
GDP growth (lagged)	-0.186 (0.165)	-0.381* (0.218)	-0.340 (0.293)	<b>-0.840**</b> <b>(0.353)</b>
Government debt (lagged)	0.0536 (0.0357)	---	0.0567 (0.0356)	---
Unemployment rate (lagged)	0.120 (0.189)	---	0.106 (0.184)	---
Disposable income growth (lagged)	-0.214* (0.125)	<b>-0.329**</b> <b>(0.129)</b>	-0.177 (0.135)	-0.232* (0.124)
Established party movement	0.00955 (0.0588)	0.00401 (0.0652)	0.0131 (0.0585)	-0.000146 (0.0647)
Government debt (change)	---	0.0377 (0.0535)	---	0.0746 (0.0538)
Unemployment rate (change)	---	<b>-0.105**</b> <b>(0.0417)</b>	---	<b>-0.143***</b> <b>(0.0463)</b>
GDP growth <sup>2</sup>	---	---	0.0119 (0.0120)	<b>0.0292**</b> <b>(0.0134)</b>
Constant	-6.143 (8.122)	0.448 (7.798)	-5.530 (8.098)	2.182 (7.748)
Observations	137	137	137	137
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variable	Included	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 4.5, below, controls for income inequality. The models continue to show that greater levels of government debt and disproportionality increase support for populist AEPs. Furthermore, as expected, GDP growth is significant and negative in models E2 and E4 (including its squared term in E4). In addition to this, income inequality is statistically significant and positive. As such, the higher the share of income owned by the top 10%, the more votes populist AEPs receive at the ballot box. This finding therefore demonstrates that voters appear to be fuelled by not just the economy itself, but also about their place within the economy. Governmental participation by a populist AEP comes close to significance, and is negative, in model E4, which indicates that populist AEPs lose out when in government.

**Table 4.5: Populist AEP support; income inequality**

Independent variables	Model E1	Model E2	Model E3	Model E4
ENPP (lagged)	0.832 (1.140)	0.665 (1.235)	0.727 (1.154)	0.279 (1.229)
Months since election	0.0845* (0.0493)	0.0815* (0.0486)	0.0820* (0.0490)	0.0817 (0.0495)
Threshold	-1.114 (1.784)	-0.344 (1.858)	-1.110 (1.770)	-0.393 (1.770)
District magnitude (logged)	0.244 (1.776)	0.240 (1.873)	0.179 (1.762)	-0.0800 (1.834)
Disproportionality (lagged)	<b>1.125***</b> <b>(0.356)</b>	<b>1.212***</b> <b>(0.387)</b>	<b>1.093***</b> <b>(0.363)</b>	<b>1.148***</b> <b>(0.374)</b>
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in govt)	-2.432 (1.769)	-3.021 (1.827)	-2.473 (1.703)	-3.172* (1.620)
GDP growth (lagged)	-0.231 (0.173)	<b>-0.600**</b> <b>(0.289)</b>	-0.276 (0.240)	<b>-1.062***</b> <b>(0.358)</b>
Government debt (lagged)	<b>0.141***</b> <b>(0.0373)</b>	---	<b>0.140***</b> <b>(0.0377)</b>	---
Unemployment rate (lagged)	0.0639 (0.231)	---	0.0603 (0.230)	---
Income share of highest 10%	<b>1.302***</b> <b>(0.456)</b>	<b>1.490***</b> <b>(0.508)</b>	<b>1.339***</b> <b>(0.462)</b>	<b>1.676***</b> <b>(0.496)</b>
Established party movement	0.105 (0.0867)	0.124 (0.0965)	0.103 (0.0865)	0.115 (0.0953)
Central and Eastern Europe (ref: Western Europe)	-5.179 (5.311)	-7.794 (5.111)	-4.867 (5.275)	-6.716 (4.882)
Government debt (change)	---	0.0294 (0.0490)	---	0.0351 (0.0480)
Unemployment rate (change)	---	-0.115* (0.0586)	---	<b>-0.188***</b> <b>(0.0677)</b>
GDP growth <sup>2</sup>	---	---	0.00698 (0.0123)	<b>0.0314**</b> <b>(0.0131)</b>
Constant	-32.76*** (12.10)	-28.61** (12.58)	-32.93*** (11.98)	-29.22** (12.00)
Observations	127	127	127	127
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variable	Included	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Lastly, Table 4.6, below, shows the same model for Western Europe only. The findings are very similar, with greater government debt, disproportionality and negative GDP growth all being significant predictors of populist AEP support. In addition, income inequality is also significant and positive: populist AEPs in Western Europe benefit when there is greater inequality.

**Table 4.6: Populist AEP support in Western Europe; income inequality**

Independent variables	Model F1	Model F2	Model F3	Model F4
ENPP (lagged)	-1.507 (1.076)	-1.800 (1.163)	-1.768* (1.015)	-2.000* (1.141)
Months since election	0.0388 (0.0539)	0.0437 (0.0565)	0.0426 (0.0533)	0.0572 (0.0559)
Threshold	-0.303 (1.471)	0.139 (1.609)	-0.391 (1.383)	-0.0570 (1.457)
District magnitude (logged)	1.448 (1.267)	1.475 (1.344)	1.130 (1.169)	0.950 (1.326)
Disproportionality (lagged)	<b>1.351***</b> <b>(0.300)</b>	<b>1.225***</b> <b>(0.355)</b>	<b>1.224***</b> <b>(0.299)</b>	<b>1.117***</b> <b>(0.347)</b>
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in govt)	-0.950 (1.858)	-0.323 (1.902)	-1.013 (1.497)	-0.0737 (1.444)
GDP growth (lagged)	<b>-0.447**</b> <b>(0.212)</b>	-0.463 (0.291)	<b>-0.741***</b> <b>(0.252)</b>	<b>-1.144***</b> <b>(0.408)</b>
Government debt (lagged)	<b>0.119***</b> <b>(0.0418)</b>	---	<b>0.119***</b> <b>(0.0421)</b>	---
Unemployment rate (lagged)	0.209 (0.212)	---	0.173 (0.204)	---
Income share of highest 10%	<b>1.936***</b> <b>(0.405)</b>	<b>2.091***</b> <b>(0.511)</b>	<b>2.041***</b> <b>(0.413)</b>	<b>2.168***</b> <b>(0.508)</b>
Established party movement	-0.0143 (0.0725)	-0.0201 (0.0789)	-0.0313 (0.0724)	-0.0493 (0.0774)
Government debt (change)	---	0.0153 (0.0441)	---	0.0470 (0.0431)
Unemployment rate (change)	---	-0.0364 (0.0669)	---	-0.131 (0.0840)
GDP growth <sup>2</sup>	---	---	<b>0.0247**</b> <b>(0.0101)</b>	<b>0.0390***</b> <b>(0.0130)</b>
Constant	-44.69*** (12.31)	-42.70*** (13.28)	-44.68*** (11.87)	-40.44*** (12.54)
Observations	90	90	90	90
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variable	Included	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

## Discussion of results

From the models above, three key lessons can be learned which are discussed in more depth below. Firstly, populist AEPs benefit from disproportionate electoral systems (in Western Europe). Secondly, populist AEPs benefit from poor economic conditions. Thirdly, there is no evidence that populist AEPs benefit from established party convergence.



Firstly, it was predicted that populist AEPs appear to benefit from more proportional electoral systems. However, lagged disproportionality is significant, but positive. In other words, populist AEPs benefit from more disproportionate results. Greater disproportionality may benefit populist AEPs as more voters, following elections where votes were poorly translated into seats, may well increase a desire for radical change among voters. Indeed, this finding is not unheard of (Golder 2003, p.450-51; Carter 2005, p.160-62; Arzheimer & Carter 2006, p.432), but is still counter-intuitive to the notion that proportional systems should benefit smaller and/or newer parties (which the vast majority of populist AEPs are).

It is worth noting that this finding holds in Western Europe only. Countries with disproportionate systems being more likely to have populist AEPs is not a suitable explanation; while France has a long-standing populist AEP, their impact in Greece, Spain and the UK has really been limited to only much more recent years.<sup>74</sup> It may be worth noting, however, that all of these countries have (essentially) two-party systems, but have seen huge surges in populist AEP support. This can be contrasted to rather more stable, but seemingly ever-present populist AEPs in, say, Denmark and the Netherlands.

It could therefore be that populist AEPs benefit where less choice over time (via strongly entrenched parties) built up into sudden waves of anger. This also does not preclude the possibility that populist AEP voters disregard the constraints of electoral systems and expressively vote for a populist AEP. Where populist AEPs can have greater representation (and perhaps impact on policy/other parties) their support may be more consistent, but at a lower level since political systems are more responsive. This could therefore explain why the finding is present only in Western Europe, where Central and Eastern European countries have more fluid political systems. It is therefore worth considering the wider political arena rather than focusing on the mechanics and psychology of electoral systems as Golder (2003) and Carter (2005) do.

The second key finding of the above models is that poor economic conditions increase populist AEP support. Populist AEPs benefit from lower GDP and disposable income growth, and higher inequality and government debt. However, there is also some evidence that populist AEPs lose out when the growth rate of unemployment increases. This latter finding, though, is likely to be driven by rapidly decreasing unemployment rates, following rapid increases.

In sum, there is very strong evidence that populist AEPs benefit from weaker economies. In a similar manner to the effects of disproportionality, the precise individual-level mechanisms cannot be known from these models. However, likely explanations are that more voters lose out financially, and therefore turn to radical alternatives. Furthermore, populist AEPs frame the political establishment as incompetent and/or untrustworthy. When coupled with an increased pool of potential voters, such populist messaging can be fruitful for politicians.

The quadratic effect from models A4 and B4 is graphed below. There is clearly not a perfect convex curve, though the earlier suspicion that GDP growth is not perfectly linear was well-founded. The main trend that should be identified is that economic crises lead to higher populist AEP shares. High levels of GDP growth are not leading to lower and lower levels of populist AEP support. At the very least, this demonstrates that there is at least *some* demand

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
<sup>74</sup> The UK only saw significant populist AEP support in 2015

for populist AEPs in Western Europe, regardless of economic growth. There is not, though, a clearly linear relationship; economic growth simply is not an all-curing panacea to populism.


As such, voters do not support populist AEPs in a temporary, knee-jerk response to a declining economy and then turn back to the establishment when the economy begins to grow. Instead, populist AEP voters support these parties as the credibility of larger parties has been diminished. Furthermore, the effects of disposable income and income inequality show that populist AEP voters also appear driven by anger at their place in the economy. This demonstrates the importance of controlling as much as possible for voter engagement with the economy in aggregate-level models. Populist AEPs win votes because they can effectively channel the sense of abandonment that many voters feel. This is best demonstrated by the finding that greater income inequality increases populist AEP vote shares (as does falling disposable income levels).

Focusing simply on GDP growth would not reveal the full picture: populist AEP voters are driven by anger with established parties. They turn to the populist AEPs in their countries as a result of individual-level concerns, not as an automated response to the economy. The results therefore chime with arguments by both Kriesi (2016) and Goodwin and Eatwell (2018), who assert that the longer-term consequences of poor economic performance have been important. However, neither test their assumptions using quantitative methods. The results also further add nuance to existing studies such as that of Kriesi and Pappas (2015) which do not consider measures that can better capture voter engagement and discontent with the economy such as disposable income and inequality.

**Figure 4.1: Quadratic effect of GDP growth**



**Figure 4.2: Quadratic effect of GDP growth (Western Europe)**



One other key finding is the null result for established party movement. This is counterintuitive: populist AEPs are fond of arguing that they are the true alternative to the elite. Indeed, this is mandatory, as it is a core component of the definition of populism (as a thin-centred ideology). Rather than there being no effect, further analyses both in the section below and the following individual-level chapters demonstrate that convergence does indeed increase populist AEP success. This points to the conclusion that a) party-specific factors are seemingly important to control for, and/or b) individuals *perceiving* convergence or divergence are also important. This latter point raises the question of how voters judge party platforms, and how accurate they are at doing so.<sup>75</sup>

While literature generally accepts that convergence benefits populist/anti-establishment parties, the evidence actually needs to be qualified, and there is not one clear method that is unanimously used in previous literature. Of the three studies by Abedi (2002), Carter (2005), and Arzheimer and Carter (2006), they all used different methods and/or data sources.

It is worth noting that most previous studies that show convergence increases AEP success has been done using expert surveys (Abedi 2002; Carter 2005). These may be problematic for reasons discussed above; they do not necessarily measure party ideology at the time of the election, for instance. Indeed, Carter (2005, p.140) found evidence only in the form of a bivariate correlation, meaning other factors that plausibly affect vote shares such as the economy simply were not controlled for.

Arzheimer and Carter (2006), likewise, found in an individual-level model that a grand coalition increases the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP, not the manifesto data they also used. A grand coalition restricts choice and is a clear indication that parties have

<sup>75</sup> Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis

converged. Indeed, Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) found that coalition formation causes voters to readjust their perception of parties. However, this is problematic as it may be picking up very specific country-level factors. Grand coalitions are common in Austria, and are near guaranteed in Belgium and Latvia, but they only very rarely occur elsewhere beyond (recently) Germany. There have, however, been notable populist AEPs to emerge in countries as varied as France, Italy, and Hungary, where grand coalitions do not occur. Likewise, 2018 was the first time a populist AEP emerged in Latvia since the 1990s (which promptly joined a grand coalition), so grand coalitions do not fully explain populist AEP support.<sup>76</sup>

Given the above-mentioned evidence that voters do not update their understanding of party positions following elections, other factors may be more important. Perception of convergence could easily be created by a combination of newly salient issues, skilled populist AEP politicians and increased discontent with politics among voters. Secondly, convergence may not have an impact when only aggregate-level variables are considered. Parties are not empty vessels, simply channelling in outside forces every few years in a general election. Instead, there may be good reason to assume that once party-level variables are included then convergence begins to have a more notable effect. This discussion demonstrates the need to robustly test the hypothesis on convergence using appropriate theory, data and methods.

In sum, the above regression models have demonstrated that populist AEPs benefit from certain conditions: namely, from economic turbulence, falling disposable income and increased inequality. Greater levels of disproportionality also appear to boost populist AEP success. While the individual-level mechanism behind this finding remains elusive, the most likely explanation is perhaps that populist AEPs benefit from greater discontent among voters, caused by poor representation. Model E4 does not quite reach the 95% threshold, but indicates that populist AEPs lose out when in government, however this is measured at the aggregate-level. The following party-level analysis offers a more in-depth analysis of this hypothesis (and finds that populist AEPs do indeed lose out upon entry to government).

### III

This section now presents the second analysis of this chapter: an analysis of the populist AEPs themselves. This allows for the ideology and platform of each populist AEP to be tested. Firstly, the data and methods are discussed before the results are presented. These are then discussed in detail. In sum, there is strong evidence that the external supply-side affects populist AEP success: established party convergence and the number of competitors affect vote shares. In addition, participation in government has a detrimental impact on the party's vote share.

#### **Data and methodology**

The first analysis alone is not able to provide a full picture of populist AEP success, as it focuses purely on the country level. The second analysis as such is conducted at the party level, which allows for party-specific variables to be modelled (such as issue salience of the populist AEP and distance to the nearest established competitor).

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<sup>76</sup> The grand coalition in Latvia is used in order to maintain a cordon sanitaire against Harmony who have actually won the *most* votes in the 2011, 2014 and 2018 elections, and second most in 2010.

Issue salience is measured as the total amount of quasi-sentences the party dedicates in its manifesto to its core ideological issue. This is done on ideology that is core to the party. There are three main blocs of parties in this analysis that, together, encompass populist AEPs: radical left, populist radical right and populist non-radical right. Populist AEPs that are categorised as radical left have issue salience measured using policy dimensions identified by Fagerholm (2017). Populist radical right parties rely on nativism, which, following Abou-Chadi (2016), is measured using the multiculturalism dimension. Not all populist right-wing AEPs are populist radical right in Mudde's (2007) terms. As Rooduijn (2019, p.367) argued, failure to adequately conceptualise party ideology can lead to erroneous conclusions. As such, multiculturalism is included for such parties, alongside party-specific dimensions. Multiculturalism is still controlled for as it is still used by such parties, though only strategically, not as their *core* ideology (Mudde 2017a, p.5-6). The appendix contains a full list of dimensions used. The formula used to calculate issue salience is:

$$\text{Salience} = \sum i_p + i_p$$

This is *not* a directional variable, it simply measures the weight that the party attached to a policy dimension (e.g. anti-multicultural + pro multicultural statements).<sup>77</sup> In addition to their log-ratio scales for party positions, Lowe et al (2011) also develop a measure of salience that parties place on issues. As with their scales, this is log-transformed, as they argue there is a decreasing effect of more quasi-sentences. Abou-Chadi et al (2020, p.756) argue that this is unrealistic, as the salience of an issue surely depends on the absolute amount of space a party is willing to dedicate to it. Instead, they too add the number of quasi-statements. This same formula was also used by Greene and Jensen (2018).

Distance to the nearest establishment party competitor was calculated as the difference between the populist AEP's left-right position and the centre-left party for a populist left-wing AEP, and centre-right for a populist right-wing AEP.<sup>78</sup> Ideological distance to the nearest competitor is taken as the difference between the populist AEPs' left-right position at time  $t_0$  and the establishment party's position at time  $t_0$ . This is also particularly important for new parties that may well emerge as a result of a perceived gap in representation.<sup>79</sup> Nationalism and Euroscepticism are both also controlled for, measured using scales developed by Lowe et al (2012). While commonly associated with the right-wing, Halikiopoulou et al (2012a) argue that nationalism is also prevalent on the radical-left, and acts as a bridge towards Euroscepticism.

Additional variables are added; firstly, the salience of the EU is modelled in order to control for the potentiality that populist AEPs benefit from focusing on the EU. This has been interacted with Euroscepticism in order to see if there is a relationship between Euroscepticism and EU salience. The number of AEP competitors faced by each party is controlled for in order to test the hypothesis that greater competition reduces populist AEP vote shares. As such, this measures competition from likely competitors: the number of left-

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<sup>77</sup> The specific dimensions are described in the appendix

<sup>78</sup> This is calculated using Prosser's left-right scale as described above

<sup>79</sup> i.e. politicians may sense a growing opportunity to found a party when there is general discontent among sections of the electorate that established parties are ignoring them. This will therefore require a party *at the time of an election* to show how it is currently different to the established party's recent ideological position

or right-wing AEPs competing against the (left-right) populist AEP.<sup>80</sup> Additional controls from the previous analysis are included due to their importance to the study: lagged GDP growth and its squared term, lagged unemployment and lagged government debt and logged district magnitude.<sup>81</sup> A dummy variable measuring whether or not the specific party entered government following the previous election is also included. This will help to determine whether or not it is specific populist AEPs that lose votes after entering government.

Linear fixed-effects (at the party level) models are estimated below.<sup>82</sup> Standard errors are clustered on the country; clustered standard errors are able to deal with both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, and properly clustering standard errors is important for any inferences to remain valid. As there are often multiple populist AEPs per country, it is not reasonable to assume that errors are uncorrelated across parties. As with the above tobit models, a fixed effects model is ideal, in any case, as the key factor is how each party responds to its environment and behaves over time (Wooldridge 2002, p.266). The models do not include a lagged dependent variable but do include party age and a dummy variable indicating if the party was represented in the previous parliament.

The use of fixed effects without a lagged dependent variable is the ideal solution for the following analysis. Within-party change over time can be modelled, while also maximising case-selection (as the lagged dependent variable drops the first observation). This is not purely a matter of preserving the number of observations (though any increase in statistical power is another benefit). There is a substantive reason to *not* lose the first election; this is an important election for any party, let alone populist AEPs. Losing the first election would alter the research question, because it would drop, primarily, the first election and would therefore begin after they reached a clear degree of success. There is one issue that remains: the case of so-called 'singleton' parties (those which merely have one observation).<sup>83</sup>

There is both a theoretical and methodological reason for using fixed effects in this analysis. Methodologically, pooled ordinary least squares would simply ignore the panel structure of the data. Indeed, an F-test (computed without clustered standard errors)<sup>84</sup> shows, as should be expected ( $p < .05$ ), that fixed effects are preferable to a pooled OLS model.

Theoretically, parties always need to adapt to a constantly changing environment, and also have agency themselves to cause change (e.g. by raising issue salience among the electorate). As such, measuring changes in populist AEP support over time demonstrates what they can do to increase their success. It is simply not possible to measure change without at least two observations, but understanding what populist AEPs do over time, and how it affects them, is a substantively important question.

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<sup>80</sup> This variable includes the number of AEPs, not just populist AEPs, in competition (e.g. Golden Dawn, while not populist) still competed with ANEL on the right-wing of Greek politics. While the analysis itself is concerned with populist AEPs, the similarity between platforms of such parties indicates that they will compete for similar voters

<sup>81</sup> The parliamentary threshold variable is not included to keep the model as parsimonious as possible

<sup>82</sup> A Hausman test indicates that fixed effects should be preferred over random effects

<sup>83</sup> There are 21 such parties in the dataset

<sup>84</sup> It is computationally too difficult to calculate an F-test when there are too many panels (StataCorp 2015, p.15)

In an analysis of, say, populist AEP formation, inferences would be impacted by dropping such parties. In so far as the aim is to analyse party change over time, the trade-off is necessary to make.<sup>85</sup> In this analysis, inferences would only be biased should newer parties be somehow different (e.g. ideologically) to older parties.<sup>86</sup> The previous tobit analysis helped to mitigate issues such as this by modelling the total vote share of populist AEPs at the country-level, small or large, old or new. Not using a lagged dependent variable further mitigates against bias as the first observation is not dropped (i.e. parties such as Podemos that are new (at the time) are not inherently excluded). The trade-off, as such, is justified on both methodological and theoretical grounds.<sup>87</sup>

Ordinarily, a model like this (linear dependent variable, time-series cross-section data) would be estimated using ordinary least squares with panel corrected standard errors and a lagged dependent variable (Beck & Katz 1995; 1996). Using a lagged dependent variable drops the first observation present, which is not innocuous. Even successful parties such as Podemos may have few observations simply because they are newer. Furthermore, arguably the single most important election for any party is its first election.<sup>88</sup>

Getting into parliament has a number of well-known benefits, such as increased funding, greater prestige, the possibility for greater media attention and a platform for the party and its politicians. Not getting elected can be make-or-break for small and/or new parties. Indeed, Dinas et al (2015) find that not only does winning representation lead to a party's vote share increasing by two-thirds in the next election, but also that the effect of representation is strongest in newer democracies and for newer parties. The previous analysis as stated above helps with the issue of very new and/or unsuccessful populist AEPs; however, there are also likely party-level attributes that affect their success over time which needs further analysis.

Therefore, the dummy variable measuring if the party was, or was not, elected to parliament at the previous election can be seen as a suitable marker of past success while not dropping observations. Party age (measured in years) can be considered another good proxy of party success; without winning votes and seats, parties struggle to survive. This analysis therefore enables change over time to be modelled, while also ensuring that the case-selection remains as wide-reaching as possible.

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<sup>85</sup> This analysis still includes parties with varying fortunes, such as the decline of the Danish Progress Party and Vlaams Belang; the rise of parties such as SYRIZA and Party for Freedom; newer parties such as Podemos, and older parties such as the Front National. As such, there is still a very broad degree of variation in populist AEPs in this analysis

<sup>86</sup> As a case in point, the Dutch parties Forum for Democracy and Party for Freedom are both radical right and therefore ideologically similar, despite the former only having competed in the 2017 Dutch election. Party families are quite stable over time (indeed, this analysis begins in 1980 to *ensure* stability), so the analysis remains unbiased

<sup>87</sup> Multilevel models are another appropriate method to analysing similar data and are well-equipped to handle imbalanced data. As such, a multilevel model (including singleton parties) is run in the appendix for additional robustness with very similar results

<sup>88</sup> With Manifesto Project data, not *all* parties that compete in an election are in the dataset. However, the general use of proportional systems in Europe mitigates some bias, while its strengths over other data sources such as expert surveys (timescale, consistency and so on) means the following analysis is as in-depth and robust as possible

A Wooldridge test indicates that even *without* party age and parliamentary status there is no autocorrelation present ( $p > .05$ ).<sup>89</sup> However, it is important to still control for past party success as long-standing parties may differ to newer parties, such as by having greater and/or more positive media coverage. All models are replicated with a lagged dependent variable as it is still common to do so; such models are reported in the appendix further below. However, as autocorrelation is not a statistical concern, and adding in the dependent variable substantively alters the research question (by dropping the first election of many parties), models without a lagged dependent variable are preferred.

## Results

Three models are run in this analysis, two with party-level variables, and one that controls for economic and political system variables. Table 4.7, below, shows models G and H (party-level variables only). The primary difference between the two is that model G measures established party convergence, while model H measures the populist AEP's distance to the nearest ideological competitor. As stated above, this is measured in terms of both absolute and directional terms.<sup>90</sup> The interaction between EU salience and Euroscepticism is not run as it is neither statistically significant nor does it substantively alter the findings.

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<sup>89</sup> As expected, autocorrelation is still not present when the additional parliamentary representation and party age variables are added

<sup>90</sup> Directional difference is measured so that positive values mean the populist AEP is *more* radical, and negative if it is *less* radical than the established party



**Table 4.7: Party-level variables**

Independent variables	Model G1	Model G2	Model H1	Model H2
Party in parliament (ref: not in parliament)	0.117 (1.303)	0.117 (1.307)	0.520 (1.298)	0.445 (1.391)
Number of AEP competitors	<b>-1.481***</b> <b>(0.495)</b>	<b>-1.479***</b> <b>(0.497)</b>	<b>-1.388***</b> <b>(0.439)</b>	<b>-1.369***</b> <b>(0.447)</b>
Issue salience	-0.110* (0.0553)	-0.110* (0.0535)	-0.0775 (0.0681)	-0.0882 (0.0666)
Established party movement	<b>-0.151***</b> <b>(0.0420)</b>	<b>-0.151***</b> <b>(0.0423)</b>	---	---
EU salience	<b>0.123**</b> <b>(0.0555)</b>	0.120 (0.163)	0.0952* (0.0529)	0.0927* (0.0494)
Euroscepticism	-0.523 (0.493)	-0.526 (0.542)	-0.446 (0.426)	-0.439 (0.426)
EU salience * Euroscepticism	---	0.000937 (0.0446)	---	---
Nationalism	0.488 (0.314)	0.487 (0.313)	0.588* (0.314)	0.597* (0.318)
Party age	<b>0.392***</b> <b>(0.0976)</b>	<b>0.392***</b> <b>(0.0994)</b>	<b>0.368***</b> <b>(0.102)</b>	<b>0.373***</b> <b>(0.105)</b>
Party in government (ref: not)	-3.524 (2.292)	-3.522 (2.312)	-3.795 (2.313)	-3.867 (2.308)
Absolute distance to establishment competitor	---	---	-0.0709 (0.0798)	---
Directional distance to establishment competitor	---	---	---	-0.0436 (0.0644)
Constant	5.615*** (1.774)	5.619*** (1.751)	5.658*** (1.683)	5.418*** (1.764)
Observations	172	172	172	172
R-squared	0.353	0.353	0.316	0.314
Party fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variable	Not included	Not included	Not included	Not included

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Firstly, populist AEPs clearly benefit from having fewer competitors; an increase in the number of AEP competitors leads to a decrease in vote shares. Secondly, when the distance between established parties increases (i.e. divergence), populist AEP vote shares fall. Both of these relationships are entirely as expected. Thirdly, party age is also associated with higher vote shares. This latter finding is unsurprising; in order to survive, any party needs to win popular support. As such, older parties are likely to have a greater platform, a higher public profile and more supporters. Finally, EU salience is significant in Model G1.

Table 4.8, below, shows the same model with additional variables added into the analysis. These variables control for the economy and political system and all three models are near-

identical, and chime well with the above tobit analyses. The number of competitors remains significant and negative: more competitors results in lower vote shares. Furthermore, older parties are more likely to see higher vote shares. Furthermore, established parties diverging reduces populist AEP vote shares.

Interestingly, governmental participation becomes significant in all models once the economy is taken into account. In contrast to the above tobit models, the lagged unemployment rate becomes statistically significant in all models. The positive coefficient indicates that greater levels of unemployment lead to higher vote shares for populist AEPs, which is as expected. Furthermore, the salience attached to the EU still appears to lead to higher vote shares for populist AEPs. Party age, too, remains significant and positive, while no other variables cross the 95% threshold.

Issue salience is not significant in any model, contrary to predictions. Wagner (2012, p.82-83) notes that issue salience is beneficial where the party is smaller in terms of vote share, and when the issue is distinct in the political system or has been neglected by other parties. Likewise, established parties are constantly reacting to populist AEPs and other parties, meaning voter perceptions may be particularly important if issues are constantly being fought over (Meguid 2005; Bale et al 2010). It may be the case that populist AEPs rely on a combination of issue ownership among the electorate coupled with campaigning through other means, such as through news/other media or television debates (Mudde 2012, p.15; Kriesi 2014, p.365-66). The party may therefore simply not emphasise the issue in its manifesto if it is confident it is already associated with the policy area. It is well documented that media coverage is a key factor in party support, including populist AEPs (Walgrave & De Swert 2004; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2007; Murphy & Devine 2020).

As such, it could be the case that populist AEPs rely on other means to communicate their 'niceness' to voters, especially as other parties respond to their platform, and broaden their manifestos. It may therefore be the case that voters *perceive* populist AEPs to be distinct, perhaps by way of (voter-level) issue salience/ownership, and populist AEPs write their manifestos with other goals in mind. Indeed, chapter six shows that voter's issue salience does predict populist AEP support in both Austria and Germany.

**Table 4.8: Party-, economy- and political system-level variables**

Independent variables	Model I1	Model I2	Model I3
Party in parliament (ref: not in parliament)	0.880 (1.268)	0.895 (1.290)	0.918 (1.286)
District magnitude (logged)	0.629 (0.501)	0.600 (0.511)	0.656 (0.506)
Unemployment rate (lagged)	<b>0.729**</b> <b>(0.313)</b>	<b>0.715**</b> <b>(0.306)</b>	<b>0.736**</b> <b>(0.318)</b>
Government debt (lagged)	-0.0170 (0.0185)	-0.0126 (0.0213)	-0.0162 (0.0206)
GDP growth (lagged)	-0.0382 (0.133)	-0.114 (0.145)	-0.105 (0.147)
GDP growth <sup>2</sup>	---	0.00986* (0.00556)	0.00952 (0.00569)
Number of AEP competitors	<b>-2.060***</b> <b>(0.538)</b>	<b>-2.045***</b> <b>(0.546)</b>	<b>-2.126***</b> <b>(0.550)</b>
Issue salience	-0.0993 (0.0602)	-0.0903 (0.0615)	-0.0875 (0.0637)
Established party movement	<b>-0.180***</b> <b>(0.0486)</b>	<b>-0.180***</b> <b>(0.0488)</b>	<b>-0.181***</b> <b>(0.0487)</b>
EU salience	<b>0.111**</b> <b>(0.0529)</b>	<b>0.110**</b> <b>(0.0531)</b>	0.201 (0.180)
Euroscepticism	-0.401 (0.412)	-0.374 (0.409)	-0.271 (0.441)
EU Salience * Euroscepticism	---	---	-0.0309 (0.0470)
Nationalism	0.412 (0.332)	0.439 (0.331)	0.446 (0.330)
Party age	<b>0.365***</b> <b>(0.0729)</b>	<b>0.350***</b> <b>(0.0750)</b>	<b>0.349***</b> <b>(0.0746)</b>
Party in government (ref: not in government)	<b>-4.425**</b> <b>(1.910)</b>	<b>-4.356**</b> <b>(1.920)</b>	<b>-4.429**</b> <b>(1.906)</b>
Constant	0.00535 (3.370)	-0.0668 (3.690)	-0.280 (3.785)
Observations	172	172	172
R-squared	0.446	0.452	0.453
Party fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variable	Not included	Not included	Not included

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

## Discussion of results

Overall, the results from the above models point to a number of findings. Firstly, governmental participation has a negative impact on populist AEP support. Secondly, populist AEPs benefit when established parties converge. The negative coefficients indicate that populist AEPs lose out when established parties diverge. Thirdly, the number of competitors populist AEPs face has a negative impact on their support. This indicates that

they are sensitive to the environment in which they compete and may be an issue more acutely felt by smaller parties. Finally, targeting the EU leads to higher vote shares for populist AEPs.

Firstly, entering government costs populist AEPs votes. There are four very well-known outliers in recent and contemporary European politics: Austria, Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland. In Austria, at the 2002 election the Austrian Freedom Party completely collapsed, slumping to 10% of the vote (down from 26.5% in 1999), before stagnating at 11% in 2006, following a ruinous period in government, culminating in a split in the party. The Netherlands, too, saw List Pim Fortuyn collapse in the 2003 election, and PVV likewise was punished in the Dutch 2012 election (albeit to a lesser extent). In Hungary, on the other hand, Fidesz has remained in power since 2010, while the Law and Justice party in Poland also won another term in office in Poland's 2019 election. It is worth pointing out, however, that in 2014, Fidesz still lost around 7.8 percentage points from their 2010 vote share. As such, governing populist AEPs certainly face difficulties.

Any assumption that the natural consequence of populist AEPs entering government is to follow the path of the FPÖ or List Pim Fortuyn is as unhelpful as it is incorrect (Heinisch 2003). The issue is whether or not the party can adapt to government; voters in, say, Denmark and Poland have plainly not perceived the Danish People's Party and Law and Justice to have failed. Instead, as Akkerman (2011) points out, governing populist (right-wing AEPs) often have no impact on immigration policy, which is largely due to their inability to adapt to office. This is not the rule, though; some manage better than others (Akkerman & de Lange 2013, p.594-95). The issue is therefore that populist AEPs are likely to be inexperienced and incompetent at managing themselves (Fallend & Heinisch 2016).

The results indicate that populist AEPs are more likely to lose out upon entry to government. This is not because their populism makes them inherently incapable of governing, but because they are *more likely* to struggle to prove themselves to voters. Parties such as Fidesz, and the Danish People's Party have managed to perform well in government. Populist AEPs have also suffered losses when not in government which made these tests necessary, yet the results show that entry to government is certainly risky.

Akkerman (2011) and Akkerman and De Lange (2013) rightly point out that party management, not populist ideology, matters. Yet this also indicates that voter perceptions of the government matter. None of the studies by Heinisch (2003), Akkerman (2011) or Akkerman and de Lange (2013) actually analysed voter attitudes. This is a significant gap in the literature that needs addressing, which the next chapter does. Populist AEPs can succeed in government, but they need to prove themselves to voters.

A second key finding from the above models is that established party behaviour has a clear effect on populist AEP success. Convergence has been tested (with mixed results) before, almost entirely on just the populist right-wing (Abedi 2002; Carter 2005; Arzheimer & Carter 2006). The tests in this chapter are more robust than previous studies as argued above. Furthermore, the differentiation between supply- and demand-side mechanisms is a notable advance because literature shows voter perceptions of party positions differ to their objective placement on a left-right scale. Smaller parties such as niche parties are very sensitive to the behaviour of established parties (Meguid 2005). Specifically, established party convergence (or divergence) was measured as the directional shift in distance between the established

parties. When included, all models showed that as the established parties diverged, populist AEPs win lower shares of the vote. As established parties converge, they offer greater space to other, more radical, parties.

In addition, there is strong evidence that the number of competitors affects populist AEP success. As the number of AEPs (on the same side of the left-right scale) increases, the vote share of populist AEPs decreases. The number of AEPs (not just populist AEPs) should be controlled for because they typically have similar platforms. For instance, both Podemos and United Left (before their alliance) were both radical-left parties offering alternatives to capitalism and austerity (despite the latter not being populist). Likewise, and perhaps most dramatically, the competition between FPÖ and the BZÖ, following the latter's split from the FPÖ, saw Jörg Haider competing against his former party (Luther 2009, p.1052).

There are a variety of different ways in which populist AEPs (or any party facing a challenger) can deal with this issue. Two more prominent examples are in Spain and Greece. Podemos, struggling to be heard, quickly made alliances in order to bolster its support, particularly by forming *Unidas Podemos* with United Left (IU). This alliance was formed largely out of mutual interest: IU are penalised by the electoral system, while Podemos wished to grow their support further. While the coalition persisted through to the 2019 elections, it has been an uneasy alliance with both parties coordinating their campaigns, but technically running them separately (Simón 2016, p.505-06). However, the case of Spain shows that Podemos were able to deal with their competition rationally and strategically.

In Greece, ANEL, while much less extreme than Golden Dawn, still faced a considerable challenger on the right-wing. Golden Dawn, the subject of a cordon sanitaire, actually won more votes than ANEL in both 2015 Greek elections, though it was ANEL that entered government. The two are both on the far-right, and so both likely harmed each other's success. SYRIZA, too, suffered a split when Popular Unity (LAE) broke away following Greece's failure to re-negotiate bailout measures (resulting in a second election in 2015). However, SYRIZA was able to triumph over LAE's unpreparedness and lack of organisation due to its hasty formation (Rori 2016, p.1337).

The case of Austria, which in 2013 had three populist right-wing AEPs competing, perhaps shows that multiple AEPs can co-exist. However, they clearly take support from each other and by the 2017 election, only one (the FPÖ) even competed, let alone won seats.<sup>91</sup> As such, in the short-term, multiple parties may emerge, taking advantage of small gaps in the electoral market and/or being the result of an internal split. However, realistically, populist left- and right-wing AEPs in the long-term have relatively stable ideologies, and there is only so much room, and so many potential voters. It is, however, unsurprising that in Austria, Greece and Spain, the larger parties have ended up dominant at the expense of their challengers (FPÖ, Podemos and SYRIZA).<sup>92</sup>

One final key finding is that populist AEPs win higher vote shares by attaching greater salience to the EU. This is in line with expectations: the EU is often portrayed as an elitist, out of touch institution that harms the country and its people. Euroscepticism (and nationalism) is not unique to either the left- nor right-wing; Halikiopoulou et al (2012a,

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<sup>91</sup> In fact, the FPÖ entered government following the 2017 election

<sup>92</sup> Podemos is formally in an alliance with IU, yet is the dominant party

p.532) demonstrated that the key difference is *why* radical left and radical right parties are nationalist. Both share economic and territorial nationalism, but only the right is ethnically and culturally nationalist. This, as stated above, means that the reason as to why populist AEPs oppose the EU differ; populist right-wing AEPs oppose it largely due to immigration policies, while populist left-wing AEPs oppose it due to its economic policies (Mudde 2007, p.69-70; Ramiro & Gomez 2017, p.112).

Euroscepticism itself was not statistically significant, only EU salience. McDonnell and Werner (2019) find a notable disconnect between populist (right-wing) AEPs and their voters. Parties themselves have recently hardened their Euroscepticism, and salience of the EU while voters' attitudes have not done so. Instead, they posit that a populist (right-wing) AEP needs only to be the most Eurosceptic party, not perfectly aligned with their support, to claim issue ownership since voter salience of the EU is low.

As populist left- and right-wing AEP support is fundamentally ideological it stands to reason that their voters are most concerned with nativism or radical redistribution of wealth, not Euroscepticism in and of itself. Indeed, many populist AEPs have rowed back on their Euroscepticism recently (McDonnell & Werner 2019, p.1775). Populist AEPs instead benefit from using the EU and keeping it in political discourse. However, they link the EU to specific policy areas (nativism or the economy); overt Euroscepticism does not benefit populist AEPs. This helps to answer Rooduijn's (2019, p.367) call for a greater understanding of the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism; it needs to be linked to something voters care about. Further research should examine *precisely* how the EU is targeted by populist AEPs (Serricchio et al 2013, p.60-61).

## **Conclusion**

There are five key findings from this analysis: populist AEPs benefit from both poor economic conditions, and established party convergence. In addition, the political system affects populist AEPs; they benefit from disproportional electoral systems, but when they are faced with extra competition they lose out. Fourthly, populist AEPs that enter government (as opposed to all populist AEPs in a country) lose out when they enter government. Finally, targeting the EU leads to higher vote shares for populist AEPs.

Where the economy performs poorly, this causes voters to lose faith in the government. Economic voting theory generally argues that more voters will abandon the government for the opposition party. However, it should also entail that if more voters become unhappy with the economy, they may also be more willing to blame the entire political class. The models analysed above lend credence to this theory: populist AEPs benefit when the economy performs poorly. As a further point, populist AEPs also benefit when disposable income falls, and inequality is higher. As such, they benefit from voter anger at the economy, as well as their interactions with the economy. Populist AEPs do not disappear once economic growth returns, indicating that they tap into more than just temporary anger.

Furthermore, populist AEPs benefit when the two largest centre-left and centre-right establishment parties have converged. There is both a demand- and supply-side argument to this hypothesis. The demand-side argument, tested in the following two chapters, is supported. At the supply-side, populist AEPs should benefit from greater space afforded to them by established parties, and can also claim that established parties are too similar for

voters to receive a real choice. The findings from the party-level analysis do indeed show that populist AEPs benefit when the distance between the established parties shrinks and lose out when they diverge.

The number of challengers a populist AEP faces affects their support. When multiple parties compete for the same pool of potential voters, it stands to reason that support at the ballot box will be reduced. Coupled with the finding that populist AEPs benefit from established party convergence and are harmed by divergence, populist AEPs are sensitive to their environment.

Fourthly, populist AEPs in government appear to lose support. Given that governing parties in general typically lose votes at the next election, this is not entirely surprising. However, literature points to a number of caveats and qualifications to this rule. Populist AEPs, for instance, seem largely to be hampered by their own lack of organisation and poor strategy. Literature does also show that populist AEPs can succeed in government. As such, while they are more likely to lose support, the reasons are not because they are populist and/or anti-establishment. Instead, it is down to the unique challenges each party faces, and how they deal with it.

Finally, higher salience on the EU leads to higher vote shares for populist AEPs. Populist AEPs tend to target the EU because of its elitist nature, and its association with neoliberal economic policies and immigration and asylum. Such concerns are key to populist AEP voters (as is shown through individual-level data in this thesis). On the basis of both the individual- and party-level findings, the EU is a key determinant of populist AEP success. Ideally, further research could examine the relationship between Euroscepticism and the recent financial and refugee crises, and any possible interaction with populism.

## Chapter V

### Populist AEP voters: an individual-level, national election analysis

#### Introduction

This chapter moves back to an individual-level analysis, unlike the previous aggregate- and party-level analysis. However, it analyses national general elections, in contrast to chapter three. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) means that the consequences of using second-order election data can be avoided. The CSES itself also contains a number of useful questions that are not present in the EES data used previously, enhancing the analysis. The analysis itself seeks to understand the extent to which populist AEP voters are motivated by being clearly represented. There are a number of key findings.

Firstly, populist AEP voters, on the whole, are more likely to be younger, unemployed lower-educated men with lower income. In addition, they are more ideologically radical, motivated by the perception that established parties have converged, dissatisfied with democracy and are motivated by populist attitudes. Secondly, the key left-right differences found in the analysis of EES data remain; populist AEPs, left- or right-wing, do not simply attract the votes of all dissatisfied voters in the country. Instead, they attract voters by offering clear, radical policies. Thirdly, and in relation, populist AEP voters are shown to specifically be motivated by whether or not they feel represented. In addition, entry into government alters the way in which populism is used by populist AEPs.

This chapter is split into four sections. Firstly, theories and hypotheses are discussed. Secondly, the data and methodology used is discussed and explained. Thirdly, the results of the regression models are presented, which are then finally discussed.

#### I

#### Theory and hypotheses

As the purpose of this chapter is to complement the previous EES analysis, many of the hypotheses (and their causal mechanism) remain the same but are still important to control for.

#### *Individual-level hypotheses*

- **H1:** Younger voters are more likely than older voters to support a populist AEP
- **H2:** Unemployed voters are more likely than employed voters to support a populist AEP
  - **H2a:** Younger voters affected by the financial crisis are more likely than older voters to support populist AEPs
- **H3:** Men are more likely than women to support a populist AEP
- **H4:** Lesser-educated voters are more likely to support a populist AEP than more-educated voters
- **H5:** Voters dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to support a populist AEP than those satisfied with democracy
- **H6:** Voters located further away from the centre ground are more likely than those closer to the centre to support a populist AEP



### *Aggregate-level hypotheses*

- **H7:** Higher unemployment levels increase populist AEP appeal
- **H8:** Lower GDP growth increases populist AEP appeal
- **H9:** Higher government debt increases populist AEP appeal
- **H10:** Lower disposable income growth increases populist AEP appeal

While there is an objective measure of social class, there are a number of inconsistencies and country-specific options that make controlling for social class difficult. Instead, income is used in its place as a proxy. Those with lower levels of income should be more likely to support a populist AEP than those with higher levels of income, for the same reasons as to why working-class voters are more likely to support populist AEPs. Working class voters are more likely to feel abandoned in politics for a variety of factors, such as difficulty accessing education and the increasing ‘professionalisation’ of politics meaning fewer politicians are working class.

In addition to these hypotheses, there are a number of additional hypotheses that can be tested with the data available. The *perception* of established party distance should be controlled for. While the previous analysis analysed established party movement, one key consideration is that populist parties typically point out that they are the best alternative to established parties. Objectively (through Manifesto Project data), parties are shifting their platform every election. The previous analysis did indeed find evidence that when the distance between established parties grows, populist AEPs suffer. However, the aggregate-level is not the only way that convergence can be tested.

As previously stated, theoretically there is a strong demand-side argument in favour of the convergence hypothesis. Should centre-left and centre-right parties move closer to each other (at the centre, typically), then more voters further along the political spectrum will be further away from a centrist party. Should voters detect this, then demand will rise for a more radical party on the left- or right-wing (one that already exists would benefit, or one would have demand to be established should there be ‘space’ available). Voters who perceive there to be a greater distance between the established parties should, as a consequence, be less likely to support a populist AEP, as they feel as though there is a greater choice on offer. In reverse, those who place the parties closer together will therefore feel as though there is less choice, and should then be more open to supporting a populist AEP.

As stated, this hypothesis measures *perception* and is therefore not objective. Indeed, there is much evidence that voters are not accurate at judging shifts in party platforms. Instead, voters tend to rely on heuristics such as participation in coalition governments to update their perceptions of party placement (Adams et al 2011; Fortunato & Stevenson 2013). However, neither the accuracy of voter perceptions nor how they drew these conclusions are important for this hypothesis; what matters is simply what the voter believes. A perception of less distance, objectively correct or not should lead to an increased likelihood of supporting a populist AEP if this is the information available to the voter at the time of the election.

- **H11:** As perception of distance between centre-left and -right establishment parties decreases, the probability of supporting a populist AEP increases

The fifth wave of the CSES furthermore contains a battery of questions that, together, measure nativist attitudes. One particular strength of nativism is that it does not merely reduce parties to simply being labelled as xenophobic or anti-immigration. This means the concept is able to travel, especially where immigration is not as much of a key concern to voters, but where parties such as Jobbik still retain both xenophobic and nationalist platforms. Instead, nativism is able to accommodate xenophobic and nationalist sentiment to indigenous minorities (Mudde 2007, p.19). In other words, indigenous minorities refer to ethnic minorities who are *not* immigrants. While Mudde noted that this is particularly prominent in Eastern Europe, as opposed to Western Europe, the term nativism still applies to parties such as the PVV better than simply ‘anti-immigration’.

Geert Wilders and his party, PVV, have previously called for the Koran to be banned and Muslims who do not adhere to Western values to be deported (Vossen 2011, p.185). Several European countries have also banned burqas and/or niqabs, such as Belgium, Bulgaria and France. Muslims, and ethnic minorities in general, constitute (significant) minorities in Western European countries with strong populist right-wing AEPs (such as the Netherlands and France) and the number who are affected by bans on burqas are very small (usually only in the hundreds). However, the potency and symbolism of debates around integration and (especially) Islam need not correspond to the number of people that wear burqas. Reducing the categorisation of parties like PVV to a simple ‘anti-immigration’ label simply does not reveal the full picture since those affected by such legislation are not exclusively immigrants. Conceptually, therefore, nativism and anti-immigration are distinct from one another.<sup>93</sup>

Research has identified the importance of ethnicity among many members of the electorate. This is the case not only for attitudes on immigration, but also on ethnic minorities. Ford (2011) found greater opposition to non-white and culturally distinct immigrants than to white and culturally proximate immigrants. In addition to this, Ford and Mellon (2020) found that across Europe, citizens are consistently more willing to accept skilled immigrants over unskilled immigrants, but that many countries’ respondents also preferred European over non-European immigrants. However, they found variation in attitudes to European and non-European immigrants both between and within countries. There are also often ethnic dimensions regarding attitudes to minorities within countries. Ford (2016) found that, in Britain, an ethnic minority immigrant faces *more* discrimination compared to a minority British citizen *or* an immigrant from white majority citizens. There is also a tendency to view minority and immigrant claimants as less deserving of welfare.

Therefore, literature demonstrates that ethnic majority citizens may hold discriminatory attitudes towards others on the basis of their nationality *and/or* ethnicity. So, immigration does not tell the whole story regarding discriminatory attitudes; native-born ethnic minority citizens can still be viewed negatively by nativist voters. Referring to anti-immigration questions as measures of ‘nativism’ is inadequate for the simple fact that they are not the same thing. However, studies of voter attitudes tend to rely on only anti-immigration attitudes (Hobolt & Tilley 2016; Akkerman et al 2017; Rooduijn et al 2017). Instead of just capturing attitudes to immigration, any measure of nativism needs to capture (ethnic) nationalism and

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<sup>93</sup> Even where they are not populist radical right, such as Fidesz, nativism still generally constitutes at least some part of a populist right-wing AEP’s ideology. This is indeed the case for Fidesz, which is discussed further below

xenophobia. As populist AEP support is driven largely by attitudes and ideology, it should be expected that populist right-wing AEP voters hold nativist attitudes. This chapter therefore offers an improvement on existing literature by measuring nativist attitudes, while answering Rooduijn's (2019, p.365-66) 'plea' for clarity in key concepts to be measured.

**H12:** Voters with nativist attitudes are more likely to support a populist right-wing AEP than another party

It should also be expected that populist attitudes increase the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP. Populist AEPs themselves have been classified on the basis of the party's ideology in relation to metapolicies, not on the basis of their voter's ideology. There are many studies that have demonstrated that populist parties do, in fact, utilise populist rhetoric more than non-populist parties (Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). Nevertheless, Rooduijn et al (2014) find that non-populist parties also exhibit some degree of populism, while more successful populist parties actually tone down their populism. Sometimes using populist discourse does not mean, however, a party actually adheres to a populist ideology (Mudde 2017b, p.35-36).

Van Hauwaert and van Kessel argue that populist attitudes are key determinants of individual voting behaviour (2018). Populist AEPs are a specific subset of AEPs, who are typically no less radical, but are set apart by populism. Populist AEPs campaign not just on the basis for radical change, but also on the basis that the elitist establishment has been consistently letting down the people. There has been an increase in voters who feel that the political elite is unrepresentative of their views (Ignazi 1992; Kriesi 2014, p.364-65). When such rhetoric is a major part of their platform, it should be expected that populist attitudes among voters are activated, and that they are a significant factor determining support for a populist AEP.

Populist AEPs rely on their ability to claim that they are 'outsiders' to a greater extent than established parties, yet still join governments. There is, as stated, a general lack of research on the demand-side where populists enter government. Given the importance of populist AEPs' claims that they offer true change, it is necessary to test for any voter-level differences of opinion between where they do and do not govern. It is predicted that populist attitudes have a *negative* effect on supporting governing populist AEPs.

This is not to say that populist AEPs, when entering government, automatically become established or pluralist; chapter two has argued that they do not. It does, however, mean that governing brings about a different set of challenges. Entry to government necessarily entails association with the national political elite. Castanho Silva et al (2020, p.420) note that voters perceive governing populist parties as part of the elite. Fidesz best typifies this, but this is no less true for other populist AEPs that have entered government such as the FPÖ and SYRIZA.

Voters should find it more difficult to delineate establishment and anti-establishment parties where the latter enter government, because governance brings power and influence.<sup>94</sup> They will then be much more likely to associate populist AEPs with the elite, leading to the effect of populist attitudes being reversed. As stated, this does not mean that populist AEPs stop being either populist or anti-establishment, but it does mean that their relationship with both

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<sup>94</sup> Though, as stated, the difference between established and anti-establishment parties is what they want to do with power, not whether or not they are in government

voters and the national political system has changed. Those who do not support them may well view governing populist AEPs as part of the elite and may not find them trustworthy, or may see them as being a problem in the country as the questions used to measure populist attitudes ask. Such concerns would be heightened where they govern, leading to the effect being reversed.

Among their own supporters, governing populist AEPs need to adapt; they often struggle to be heard, and any policy achievements regarding immigration they may wish to claim often go instead to the established party they (usually) govern with (Akkerman 2011). They may well lose the ability to benefit from public discontent with the government because they *are* the government. Conversely, voters of other parties may associate governmental populist AEPs with the elite. Therefore, populist attitudes are more likely to reduce support for populist AEPs where one was in government. This also adds further nuance to Albertazzi and Mueller (2013), who argue that governing populist parties challenge liberal democracy. The parties themselves also face challenges in setting themselves apart.

**H13:** Voters with populist attitudes are more likely to support populist AEPs in comparison to all other voters

- **H13a:** Populist attitudes decrease the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP when a populist AEP was in government

Two further variables are analysed in order to further understand the nature of populist AEP support and governmental participation: who is in power does or does not make a difference (referred to here as institutional responsiveness<sup>95</sup>) and government (dis)approval. Populist AEP voters are dissatisfied with democracy because they perceive they are not being represented, and that they reward governing populist AEPs where they feel they represent their views.

Spruyt et al (2016, p.42) further argue that low external efficacy (institutional responsiveness) is associated with populism, summing up that “populist attitudes are grounded in a deep discontent, not only with politics but also with societal life in general.” However, this refers to populist *attitudes*, not populist *voting behaviour*. A key attitudinal difference between populist voters and populist non-voters may well be that populist AEP voters have clear policy preferences (van Kessel et al 2020b, p.2). Because their demands are very radical and difficult to enact, populist AEP voters should generally have a dim view of the responsiveness of government.<sup>96</sup> As such, on the whole belief that who governs makes no difference should increase the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP.

Krause and Wagner (2019) argue that external efficacy plays a key role in determining support for a populist party. They argue that the belief that institutions are *not* responsive to voters increases the propensity to vote for younger and less successful populist parties such as Alternative for Germany, but decreases it for larger, more successful populist parties such as Fidesz. Their overall finding could be characterised as saying populist AEP voters care about whether or not the party represents them. External efficacy is therefore not a predictor for *all*

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<sup>95</sup> This variable may be more generally referred to as external political efficacy

<sup>96</sup> Particularly, their demands are politically difficult. EU membership, for instance, is generally supported (or at least not strongly opposed) by most EU member state established parties and governments but significant minorities of voters wish to leave the EU

populist parties, but only where their voters do not have populists with sufficient influence to wield.

Dissatisfaction with democracy essentially measures how well represented the respondent feels (Foa et al 2020, p.25). Voters dissatisfied with democracy are therefore not necessarily disengaged from politics. They feel as though democracy is not working out for *them*: who is in power *does* make a difference. Not turning out to vote at all would instead measure disengagement with politics.

Because populist AEP voters are motivated by clear, radical policy preferences, they are more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. They should also be more likely to believe that who is in power makes a difference, otherwise they would not vote at all. What is key is that they need the *right* party to be in power to make a difference: a populist AEP. As such, voters who are both dissatisfied with democracy and who believe that who is in power makes a difference should be more likely to support a populist AEP than another party. Those who have the greatest interest in reform would also be more likely to believe that they can actually bring about such reform (with the right party) and would vote for a populist AEP to do so.

This adds further nuance to Spruyt et al (2016), as institutional responsiveness can actually be mitigated by dissatisfaction with democracy since populist AEP voters are motivated by a desire for radical reform. Their voters, therefore, are certainly pessimistic (especially about the political establishment), but they have by no means given up hope altogether.

As such, Hobolt and Tilley's (2016) argument that elections are used by voters to 'sanction' poor economic performance and 'select' parties that are ideologically congruent with themselves is also developed further by arguing that populist AEP support is driven by voters truly feeling that they are better represented by such parties. It is important to consider how populist AEP supporters interact with parties and the perceived representativeness of governments. Hobolt and Tilley's study (2016) only tests ideological preferences; failure to test how voters perceive the functioning of the democratic process itself risks underestimating both the strength of and reasons for populist AEP support.

**H14:** Those who believe it does not make a difference who is in power are more likely to support a populist AEP

- **H14a:** Those who are both dissatisfied with democracy and who believe it makes a difference who is in power are more likely to support a populist AEP

In chapter four it was shown that populist AEPs often lose votes upon entry to government. As such, at least some voters will believe that the government performs poorly. There is, in general, a lack of research on populists in government (Andreadis & Stavrakakis 2017, p.485) and it tends to mostly focus on the relationship between populism and democracy (Rovira Kaltwasser & Taggart 2016, p.201).<sup>97</sup>

As stated previously though, a considerable gap in Akkerman (2011) and Akkerman and de Lange's (2013) work on governing populist (right-wing) AEPs is their omission of voter-level data. Given that they argue governing populist AEPs succeed when they perform well and adapt to office, the failure to analyse voter perceptions of such governments is surprising.

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<sup>97</sup> Andreadis & Stavrakakis (2017), however, analyse the congruence between populist AEP voters and governing parties, though in Greece only

As populist AEP voters are strongly policy-motivated, it stands to reason that they will engage in punishment/reward behaviour.

There is a well-established finding in literature that voters typically engage in reward-punishment behaviour when deciding how to vote (e.g. Key 1966; Giger 2010). Studies have shown that aspects of the political system, such as the presence of a coalition government and partisan bias, affect the reward-punishment model (Marsh & Tilley 2010). The argument of the reward-punishment model is similar to the economic voting theory; should voters believe the government has performed poorly, they will be more likely to support other parties. The general theory follows the same logic for other issues, and not just the economy (Giger 2010; Marsh & Tilley 2010, p.117-18). The salience of certain policy areas, however, will matter; not all voters care about all issues, and certain parties seek to emphasise certain issues (Marsh & Tilley 2010, p.118).

De Vries and Giger (2014, p.357) argue that those with greater levels of political sophistication find it easier to evaluate government performance, but that attaching greater salience to issues helps to offset this. Given that populist AEP voters tend to be radically motivated by just a few issues, such as nativism or radical socialism, it is reasonable to assume that such issues will be prominent in their evaluations of government performance.

As such, believing the government has done a poor job, where there is a governmental populist AEP, should see voters who are dissatisfied with democracy less likely to support a populist AEP. This is because they will feel poorly represented (dissatisfied with democracy) but will also believe that the government simply has not lived up to its promises (poor vs good performance). The issue should be particularly acute for governing populist AEPs as voters may be more likely to judge them as ‘just another party, unable to make a difference’.

This leads to two final hypotheses. H15a is tested via a triple interaction; populist AEP governmental participation, (dis)satisfaction with democracy and evaluation of government (dis)approval. These hypotheses are tested separately primarily because of data limitations, government (dis)approval and institutional responsiveness are not asked in all surveys, which limits the analysis.

**H15:** Where a populist AEP governed, voters who feel the government has performed poorly are less likely to support a populist AEP

- **H15a:** When a populist AEP is in power, of those who are dissatisfied with democracy, believing the government has done a poor job decreases the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP

## II

### A cross-national analysis of populist AEP support

#### Data and methodology

To move on, this section describes and discusses the data and methods used in the first analysis: the CSES. The CSES is one of the most widely used datasets in political science; it is a cross-national project, spanning multiple continents, with four modules spanning from

1996-2016, plus a fifth module underway, running until 2021.<sup>98</sup> The timespan, geographic scope and consistent battery of questions makes this dataset an extremely valuable resource to analyses similar to this. Arguably its key benefit, however, is that it is run as a post-election survey (often run alongside existing national election studies), put into the field following a general election. As such, it captures public behaviour and opinion following first-order national elections.

Large, cross-national datasets spanning many years are readily available that measure political attitudes and behaviour, yet the majority of these are taken at one certain point in time in all participating countries. While this certainly has its benefits, such as the ability to analyse public opinion on a salient issue at the exact same time, it also has its drawbacks. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse populist AEP success in elections. Pre-election polls, however, can be notoriously volatile and those taken prior to elections can give results that prove to be inaccurate come the election itself; voters both can and do change their minds. On this point, referring to presidential elections in the USA, Gelman and King (1993, p.449) noted “being ahead in the early polls is worth almost nothing”.

In principle, it would be possible to measure *past* voting behaviour; such questions are standard in most datasets. However, recall bias is a well-known issue (Kellner et al 2011, p.97-98). Van Elsas et al (2014) find that recall bias is mainly down to voters forgetting whom they voted for, non-attitudes and cognitive bias. Recall bias becomes worse as the time elapsed since the election increases. This can be an issue in many cross-national surveys, which could be conducted years after the most recent general election. In addition, attitudinal questions may well be shaped by events that happened recently; this issue would become more problematic the further away from an election the survey was conducted.

Since the CSES is taken following general elections, it therefore captures voting behaviour (not intention to vote or past voting behaviour in an election well in the past). Given the known volatility in vote intention questions as well as the focus of this thesis being populist AEP success in elections, the CSES is a valuable resource for this analysis. It still also uses a common battery of questions, enabling cross-national research and therefore retaining benefits of other cross-national projects.

The dependent variable in the following analysis is binary; 1 if the respondent voted for a populist AEP, and 0 for another party. Out of the sample, there is a total of 13,332 populist AEP voters (which is 12.27% of voters). Voters are clustered in elections, which are clustered in countries. As such, a three-level multilevel logistic model is estimated, which is the dominant approach in analysing multiple waves of survey data (Fairbrother 2014, p.123). Alternative (multilevel) approaches would be to estimate a two-level model, with voters clustered in either countries, or voters clustered in country-years. The former would not be able to model change within countries over time without election dummies, and the latter would make the erroneous assumption that elections are independent of each other (i.e. the assumption would be that they are *not* themselves clustered within countries). A three-level model further enables the variance of both country-years and countries to be estimated.

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<sup>98</sup> Data already collected as part of the fifth module has been released, and used in the following analysis (up to 2018)

The variables used in the models presented below are as follows: age; gender; level of education; income; urbanisation; unemployment; ideological extremity; satisfaction with democracy; perception of established party distance; GDP growth; unemployment rate; government debt and disposable income. These variables are all vital for measuring the above hypotheses.

As in the analysis of EES data, age is measured in years, gender is a binary variable (male or female), unemployment is binary (unemployed or not unemployed)<sup>99</sup>; ideological extremity is calculated from the left-right self-placement variable (0-10), and measures distance from the centre.<sup>100</sup> GDP and disposable income growth, unemployment rate and government debt are all lagged (as was the case in the previous aggregate-level analysis). As such, these macro-economic variables are the same as used in the country- and party-level analysis.

Dissatisfaction with democracy is asked in the CSES on a five-point likert scale: very satisfied-not at all satisfied. However, the mid-point was not consistently asked across surveys, even within the same module. As such, this would introduce bias into the model. Instead, the middle category is coded as missing, and the scale turned into four points (highest being dissatisfied).<sup>101</sup> The CSES, in all modules, asks voters to place major parties in each election on the left-right scale, these variables are used in order to calculate the perceived distance between the established centrist parties.<sup>102</sup> Income is measured in quintiles, from the lowest to the highest in the country. Furthermore, decade dummies are added into the model in order to measure whether or not voters are more likely to support populist AEPs in more recent years.

Each four waves of the CSES are used and have been merged with the CSES Integrated Module Dataset (IMD) (CSES 2019).<sup>103</sup> In addition, the second advance release of the CSES fifth wave is appended to the dataset (CSES 2020). The analysis consists of over 60,000 voters in 64 elections from 23 European countries.<sup>104</sup> As was the case in the EES analysis, the objective here is to study all populist AEPs, and so elections where they competed are included (as opposed to only including certain populist AEPs). The elections analysed are shown in Table 5.1 below.

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<sup>99</sup> As such, retired voters (for instance) are *not* unemployed, as there will likely be a difference between someone actively seeking work, and someone who is retired

<sup>100</sup> As such, a value of 5 (maximum) means that the voter placed themselves as *either* 10 or 0 and a value of 1 means the voter is *either* 6 or 4. Therefore, the variable is *not* directional, it instead measures ideological extremity

<sup>101</sup> There are only 1646 respondents who take the neutral option in the dataset

<sup>102</sup> The variable is calculated by subtracting the centre-left party placement from the centre-right party. A minority of observations are negative (i.e. they believe the centre-left party is further to the right than the centre-right party). The absolute value is used in such cases: the purpose of the variable is to simply measure perception of distance. Unfortunately, the question was not asked for relevant parties in Belgium (2003) and Slovakia (2016). As such, these two elections are dropped from analysis.

<sup>103</sup> The CSES IMD contains most of the variables necessary (with the exception of employment status), but only for the first four modules

<sup>104</sup> One additional benefit of the CSES is that it includes Iceland; Norway and Switzerland (as these countries are not EU members, they are not included in European Parliament elections)



**Table 5.1: Elections analysed (CSES)**

Country	Elections
Austria	2008; 2013; 2017
Bulgaria	2014
Croatia	2007
Czech Republic	2013
Denmark	1998; 2007
Finland	2003; 2007; 2011; 2015
France <sup>105</sup>	2002; 2007; 2012; 2017
Germany	1998; 2002; 2005; 2009; 2013; 2017
Greece	2009; 2012 (June); 2015 (Jan); 2015 (Sep)
Hungary	1998; 2002; 2018
Iceland <sup>106</sup>	2009; 2013
Ireland	2002; 2007; 2011; 2016
Italy <sup>107</sup>	2006; 2018
Lithuania	2016
Netherlands	1998; 2002; 2006; 2010
Norway	1997; 2001; 2005; 2009; 2013; 2017
Poland	2001; 2005; 2007; 2011
Romania <sup>108</sup>	2004; 2012
Slovakia	2010
Slovenia	2004; 2008; 2011
Sweden	2006; 2014
Switzerland	2003; 2007; 2011
United Kingdom	2005; 2015

Each CSES module has a module-specific set of questions, with the topic of the fifth wave being populism and anti-elitism. There are also module-specific questions that can measure nativism, and nationalism. As such, this is a valuable set of questions to use in this analysis.

The overwhelming majority of literature on populism has generally focused on defining populism, voting behaviour for populist parties and the effect of populist parties on government policy (Akkerman et al 2014, p.1325). While populism at the individual-level (i.e. populist attitudes, *not* support for populist parties) has received less attention, in more recent years there has been an increase in literature on this important topic (e.g. Stanley 2011; Akkerman et al 2014; Schulz et al 2018; Castanho Silva et al 2020; Hamelers & de Vreese 2020; Van Hauwaert et al 2020).

It is not possible to accurately measure populism in one simple question, and as such existing measures develop a battery of questions, each aiming to tap into one of these three elements.

<sup>105</sup> Presidential elections, not parliamentary elections

<sup>106</sup> Both the 2016 and 2017 Iceland elections are available through the CSES, but respondent education is not available which is not only a hypothesis but is also a key socio-demographic control. As such, these two elections are not included

<sup>107</sup> The 2018 election data does not include the variable measuring urbanisation. As this may be an important control variable it is not included in the three-level models, but is included in the fifth module analysis as 2018 is also an important election to analyse

<sup>108</sup> Presidential elections are included in the CSES, but only parliamentary elections are analysed

As a consequence, populism is modelled by combining these answers into a scale. The most common method appears to be principal components analysis (PCA) or factor analysis (Akkerman et al 2014; Schulz et al 2018; Hameleers & de Vreese 2020). A precise overview of batteries of questions and their validity goes beyond the scope of this analysis, though both Castanho Silva et al (2020) and Van Hauwaert et al (2020) offer detailed discussions and tests of existing scales. In addition to helpful overviews of existing scales, both articles also offer a very important methodological advancement: the use of item response theory (IRT).

IRT is favourable over other methods such as factor analysis, which relies on a variety of assumptions that are simply not met, such as assuming a continuous, normal and latent process. IRT, on the other hand, is particularly well designed for ordinal data (the variables used in the following analysis are, indeed, ordinal). Furthermore, another valuable benefit of IRT is that it enables measurement error to vary across the constructed scale, which enables researchers to better understand whether the constructed scale is adequately measuring the entire range of the construct (Van Hauwaert et al 2020, p.6-7).

Table 5.2, below, gives an overview of the questions used in the CSES to construct the populist scale, while Figure 5.1 shows the ‘test information function’ (in order to show the conceptual breadth, mentioned above). The ‘dimension’ column shows the subdimension of populism that the question is associated with. For example, populism\_1 taps into the ‘Manichean worldview’ subdimension, while \_6 taps into the ‘will of the people’ subdimension. Populism\_5 does not seemingly tap into any dimension, and is therefore problematic, as discussed below.

All questions are measured using a five-point likert scale (strongly disagree-strongly agree, numeric values of 1-5). Elections included in the second advance release of the CSES fifth wave are: Austria (2017); France (2017); Germany (2017); Greece (2015 (Sep)); Hungary (2018); Iceland (2016; 2017); Ireland (2016); Italy (2018) and Lithuania (2016) and Norway (2017). Unfortunately, there is one major inconsistency in the CSES fifth wave: neither Ireland nor Greece were asked all seven of the above questions: populism\_1 was not asked. This is because both surveys fielded the fifth module’s pilot questionnaire. An alternative question was asked instead, with similar wording that also taps into the Manichean worldview: “In a democracy, it is important to seek compromise among different viewpoints” (populism\_1\_pilot).

**Table 5.2: Questions used to measure populism**

<b>Variable name</b>	<b>Question wording</b>	<b>Dimension</b>
populism_1	What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.	Manichean worldview
populism_2	Most politicians do not care about the people.	Manichean worldview
populism_3	Most politicians are trustworthy.	Anti-elitism
populism_4	Politicians are the main problem in [country].	Anti-elitism
populism_5	Having a strong leader in government is good for [country] if the leader bends the rules to get things done.	
populism_6	The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	Will of the people
populism_7	Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.	Anti-elitism

While IRT is very well-equipped to handle missing data (unlike other methods, should one or more items in the scale have missing data, the respondent will not be removed via listwise deletion but the error will simply increase for this one individual), including populism\_1 in all countries would be a source of systematic bias. However, simply dropping both Greece and Ireland would not only be a poor waste of data but would also lead to potentially misleading inferences from the models. Both countries have significant populist left-wing AEPs (SYRIZA and Sinn Féin), while Germany and Italy are the only others to have a populist left-wing AEP. In addition, Greece is also the only country to have a populist left-wing AEP in government, and even has a coalition government between populist AEPs.

Instead, all items are modelled for all other countries, while populism\_1\_pilot is substituted in for populism\_1.<sup>109</sup> Conceptually, the questions are very similar, and both aim to tap into the same sub-dimension. As such, this is not a significantly problematic workaround. Populist attitudes are calculated separately for Greece and Ireland as the questions are not entirely the same. The values from the constructed scale are then plugged into the populist attitudes variable created with the other countries.

There is no good reason to discard data that is clearly conceptually related to the constructed scale. At the same time, the validity of the scale is important. It appears to be more accurately measuring anti-liberal democracy, more broadly, or perhaps authoritarianism. There is not a clear conceptual link to populism and any of its sub-dimensions. In fact, this very question has been used in the 2019 EES (Schmitt et al 2019), in a battery of questions specifically measuring attitudes to liberal democracy. Castanho Silva et al (2020, p.413) noted that the poorest performing item in the populist attitudes scale (but not by using IRT) was indeed this item, which was recommended to be dropped from analysis. As such, for the analysis below, this variable is not included in the analysis.

<sup>109</sup> As such, Greece and Ireland are calculated in a separate IRT model

All items *except* populism\_3 (and populism\_1\_pilot) have been recoded so that higher values indicate populist attitudes. The other two items were already in the correct direction for these purposes. As the responses are on a likert scale, a graded response model is estimated (Samejima 1969), which is the approach taken by Van Hauwaert et al (2020). IRT reports the latent construct being measured (populist attitudes here) as *theta*  $\theta$ .<sup>110</sup> There are two key notions in IRT: difficulty, and discrimination. The former refers to the level of  $\theta$  needed to select a response, and the latter refers to how well each question differentiates between respondents at different levels of  $\theta$ . As such, a higher discrimination means that individuals with similar levels of  $\theta$  have much more distinct probabilities of selecting a category within that question.

Table 5.3 shows the discrimination and difficulty parameters for each of the questions.<sup>111</sup> Questions with a greater difficulty range are more descriptive (Annaheim et al 2010, p.147-48); populism\_1 and \_6 are the most difficult while populism\_2 and \_7 are the least difficult at the highest category (strongly agree). In other words, a respondent with  $\theta$  1.04 has a 50% chance of selecting ‘strongly agree’ over all other categories (strongly disagree-agree) for populism\_2. There are k-1 parameters: if there are five possible responses, there are four parameters per question.

The fact that there are some categories more difficult than others shows the benefits of using IRT over an additive scale, which would treat all responses with equal weight (Van Hauwaert et al 2020). In other words, it is more ‘difficult’ to strongly agree with populism\_1 (or populism\_6) (because fewer people do so), and therefore one who does so is more populist. There are, as such, questions that are able to discriminate between higher and lower levels of populist attitudes and those with a greater difficulty range, thus being more descriptive across a broader range.

**Table 5.3: Item response theory parameters, populist attitudes**

Item	Discrimination	Category threshold			
		B1	B2	B3	B4
Populism_1	0.95	-2.20	-0.32	0.82	2.60
Populism_2	2.68	-1.41	-0.38	0.16	1.04
Populism_3	1.56	-2.37	-0.49	0.27	1.38
Populism_4	2.24	-1.22	-0.08	0.57	1.46
Populism_6	1.06	-2.30	-0.74	0.19	1.64
Populism_7	2.64	-1.54	-0.44	0.10	1.05


The precision of the overall measurement is shown below in Figure 5.1 (test information function). Greater information leads to a more precise estimation of  $\theta$ . As can be seen, precision is quite high between approximately -2 and 2, not dropping below 4, and peaks at approximately the centre of the scale (where information exceeds 8). This general pattern is not unique to the CSES battery of questions (Van Hauwaert et al 2019; 2020; Castanho Silva et al 2020). Compared to scales reviewed by Van Hauwaert et al 2019), this scale performs quite well as the highest information is not skewed to one side, unlike others. As such, there

<sup>110</sup> In other words, higher *theta* means the respondent is more populist and lower *theta* means they are less populist

<sup>111</sup> Table 5.3 and Figures 5.1-5.3 refer to all countries except Greece and Ireland

is a good degree of precision across the scale itself, and it is *most* precise where the majority of respondents are located.


**Figure 5.1: Test information function, populist attitudes**



Test information function itself is a sum of each individual item information function, shown in Figure 5.2. Each line represents each question, and the discrimination parameter represents the steepness of the slope. It can be seen how different questions tap into different areas of the overall concept of populism; populism\_3 performs best for those who are more pluralist while populism\_4 performs well at the other end of the scale (more populist). It is important for questions to tap into as many areas of  $\theta$  as possible (as opposed to just, say, the middle of the scale), and this is the case. Castanho Silva et al (2020) and Van Hauwaert et al (2020) show that no scales are perfect. However, the questions used in the CSES do capture the concept of populism quite well.

To broaden the test information, questions need to be designed to peak further at the extremes (as populism\_4 begins to do so). As such, more questions need to be polarising; only very few people should strongly agree (or disagree) with questions to broaden the information (Castanho Silva et al 2020, p.414-15). Populism is, especially in contemporary European political discourse, a very emotive and divisive issue. The issue may well be that respondents are just likely to have at least some strong opinions on issues around elites, representation and participation in politics because they are so salient and emotive.

**Figure 5.2: Item information functions, populist attitudes**




The questions themselves are conceptually related to populism and, as such, those who select stronger preferences are expressing populist attitudes.<sup>112</sup> This is reflected in the model, as shown by Figure 5.3. Questionnaire design could possibly be improved even further, but those who select more populist answers are answering theoretically justified and well-informed questions. There are questions that have higher difficulty and discrimination parameters that lead to greater information and to distinguish respondents, and the test information itself is high, especially compared to other scales.

As question responses range numerically from 1-5, an additive scale would lead to values from 6-30. Figure 5.3 shows the expected total score on the y-axis for respondents along the normal distribution. As such, the overwhelming majority (95%) of respondents are scored between 9 and 28. A respondent with a  $\theta$  of -1.96 has an expected score of 9, for instance.<sup>113</sup> The figure therefore shows that respondents can be more pluralist, fairly neutral or more populist. It also shows that those who score higher or lower have a value of  $\theta$  that corresponds to their answers to the questions.

<sup>112</sup> Castanho Silva et al (2020, p.420) test the external validity of this exact scale, referring to it as “high”

<sup>113</sup> e.g. the respondent may answer four questions as ‘strongly disagree’ (scored as 1), one as ‘disagree’ (scored as 2) and one as ‘neutral’ (scored as 3) which would lead to a numeric score of 9.

**Figure 5.3: Test characteristic curve, populist attitudes**



In sum, populist attitudes are measured quite well because the questions themselves are clearly, theoretically related to populism. Those who respond to more questions with stronger opinions are more populist. IRT is particularly advantageous because it shows a) exactly how well they are measured, and b) that additive scales should not be used (Van Hauwaert et al 2020, p.11) since some questions have greater difficulty than others.

Table 5.4, below, shows the five questions that form the nativist attitudes battery, again created using IRT.<sup>114</sup> Table 5.5 shows the discrimination and difficulty parameters. There is varying difficulty which, as above, IRT is able to take into account. Likewise, there are very informative items, particularly the latter two which provide the greatest information due to their high discrimination parameters.

The first two questions are crucial in the measurement of nativist attitudes, as opposed to simply anti-immigration attitudes/xenophobia, because they specifically measure the all-important threat (or not) that respondents feel non-natives pose to the nation-state. As noted above, this is particularly important when non-immigrant minorities are the focus of parties' rhetoric. This is particularly true for Eastern Europe which has seen lower levels of immigration compared to Western Europe. Even in Western Europe, ethnic minority citizens who are *not* immigrants (especially those who follow Islam) need to be considered. The latter three variables capture xenophobia, and specifically tap into different perceptions of immigrants: whether they harm the economy, culture or crime rates. Therefore, the first two questions measure how threatening respondents find non-natives, while the latter three

<sup>114</sup> Questions are asked on a five-point likert scale. Higher values indicate nativist attitudes

measure attitudes to immigration, which constitutes a key element of nativism in contemporary European (nativist) political discourse.

**Table 5.4: Variables measuring nativist attitudes**

Variable name	Question wording	Dimension
outgroup_1	Minorities should adapt to the customs and traditions of [country].	Threat to nation-state
outgroup_2	The will of the majority should always prevail, even over the rights of minorities.	Threat to nation-state
outgroup_3	Immigrants are generally good for [country]'s economy.	Xenophobia (economic threat)
outgroup_4	[country]'s culture is generally harmed by immigrants.	Xenophobia (cultural threat)
outgroup_5	Immigrants increase crime rates in [country].	Xenophobia (social threat)

As with the populist attitudes questions, both Greece and Ireland are missing two questions from this battery (outgroup\_2 and \_5). Unlike with the populist attitudes questions, there are not similar questions that can be used in place. As such, both Greece and Ireland are dropped from this final model. In any case, only Greece has a populist right-wing AEP (ANEL), which is considerably smaller than its left-wing counterpart, SYRIZA.

In addition, a battery of questions asking respondent's perceived importance towards both ethnic *and* civic views of national identity are included in this model. The questions ask if respondents view place of birth; ancestry; ability to speak the language, and following customs and traditions are important to truly be a part of the country. As such, the former two cover ethnic definitions of nationalism while the latter two control for civic nationalism.

The ability of nativism to travel also enables valid measurement at the individual-level (using appropriate questions). Mudde (2007) noted that nativism can still apply to Central and Eastern Europe (despite even some countries seeing net emigration) due to the presence of ethnic minorities within the country. The first and second items are therefore valid across a variety of contexts as they are not limited to specific minorities. While the prominence of Islam, in particular, has increased in recent years (this is discussed in more detail below with specific reference to Hungary), the questions themselves are able to be used across a variety of contexts as they only require that the respondent can identify *any* minority.



**Table 5.5: Item response theory parameters**

Item	Discrimination	Category threshold			
		B1	B2	B3	B4
<b>Outgroup_1</b>	1.20	-3.55	-2.13	-0.97	0.62
<b>Outgroup_2</b>	1.27	-1.67	-0.31	0.50	1.80
<b>Outgroup_3</b>	1.70	-1.60	-0.20	0.70	1.67
<b>Outgroup_4</b>	3.28	-0.74	0.16	0.65	1.32
<b>Outgroup_5</b>	2.57	-1.28	-0.36	0.26	1.1

## Results

Table 5.6, below, shows the results of the three-level multilevel models, which test H1-H11. The results show support for all of these hypotheses with the exception of upper-level macro-economic hypotheses: populist AEP voters are more likely to be younger, lesser-educated men with low income. In addition, they are more ideologically radical, dissatisfied with democracy and are more likely to perceive that established parties have converged. The aggregate-level variables show that greater levels of government debt, as expected, are associated with a greater likelihood of supporting a populist AEP. Unemployment is close to significance in all models, and positive compared to those who are not unemployed, as would be expected. Figure 5.4 shows the effect of age<sup>2</sup> in model A3.

**Table 5.6: Populist AEP support, 1997-2018**

Independent variables	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3
Age	<b>-0.00697***</b> (0.000789)	<b>0.0112**</b> (0.00444)	<b>0.0117***</b> (0.00446)
Age <sup>2</sup>		<b>-0.000184***</b> (4.43e-05)	<b>-</b> <b>0.000187***</b> (4.44e-05)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.0996* (0.0539)	0.0869 (0.0540)	0.293* (0.164)
Unemployed * age			-0.00443 (0.00335)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.293***</b> (0.0256)	<b>-0.296***</b> (0.0256)	<b>-0.296***</b> (0.0256)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None/primary/lower secondary	<b>0.626***</b> (0.0442)	<b>0.638***</b> (0.0444)	<b>0.639***</b> (0.0444)
Higher secondary	<b>0.567***</b> (0.0386)	<b>0.574***</b> (0.0387)	<b>0.575***</b> (0.0387)
Post-secondary (non-university)	<b>0.525***</b> (0.0432)	<b>0.526***</b> (0.0432)	<b>0.525***</b> (0.0432)
Income	<b>-0.104***</b> (0.00979)	<b>-0.113***</b> (0.0100)	<b>-0.113***</b> (0.0100)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area or village)</i>			
Small or mid-sized town	-0.0627* (0.0360)	-0.0597* (0.0360)	-0.0596* (0.0360)
Suburbs of large town or city	-0.00437 (0.0408)	0.00169 (0.0408)	0.00207 (0.0408)
Large town or city	<b>-0.120***</b> (0.0363)	<b>-0.110***</b> (0.0364)	<b>-0.110***</b> (0.0364)
Ideological extremity	<b>0.250***</b> (0.00850)	<b>0.251***</b> (0.00851)	<b>0.251***</b> (0.00851)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.429***</b> (0.0184)	<b>0.425***</b> (0.0184)	<b>0.425***</b> (0.0184)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.105***</b> (0.00598)	<b>-0.105***</b> (0.00599)	<b>-0.105***</b> (0.00599)

**Table 5.6 continued: aggregate variables**

	A1	A2	A3
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in gov't)	0.396 (0.463)	0.396 (0.464)	0.396 (0.464)
Unemployment rate (lagged)	-0.0165 (0.0457)	-0.0170 (0.0457)	-0.0171 (0.0457)
GDP growth (lagged)	0.0128 (0.0440)	0.0130 (0.0440)	0.0131 (0.0440)
Government debt (lagged)	<b>0.0173**</b> <b>(0.00751)</b>	<b>0.0173**</b> <b>(0.00752)</b>	<b>0.0173**</b> <b>(0.00752)</b>
Disposable income growth (lagged)	-0.00323 (0.0296)	-0.00331 (0.0296)	-0.00337 (0.0296)
<i>Decade dummies (ref: 1990s)</i>			
2000s	0.191 (0.575)	0.191 (0.575)	0.192 (0.576)
2010s	0.943 (0.617)	0.948 (0.618)	0.949 (0.619)
Variance (country)	<b>1.075**</b> <b>(0.531)</b>	<b>1.072**</b> <b>(0.531)</b>	<b>1.074**</b> <b>(0.532)</b>
Variance (election)	<b>1.066***</b> <b>(0.284)</b>	<b>1.070***</b> <b>(0.285)</b>	<b>1.071***</b> <b>(0.285)</b>
Constant	-5.081*** (0.786)	-5.448*** (0.792)	-5.471*** (0.792)
Observations	61,734	61,734	61,734
Number of countries	23	23	23
Number of elections	64	64	64

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Figure 5.4: Marginal effect of age, model A3**




Table 5.7, below, shows models that now include cross-level interactions. There is firstly an interaction between dissatisfaction with democracy and whether or not a populist AEP was in government. Secondly, there is an interaction between unemployment (individual-level) and the lagged unemployment rate (t-1) at the aggregate level. The latter aims to test whether or not those voters who are most acutely affected by economic downturn are more likely to support populist AEPs.

Model B1, as expected, shows that those dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to support a populist AEP in comparison to those who are satisfied. The interaction effect is also statistically significant: those who are dissatisfied with democracy are *less* likely to support a populist AEP, when one was in government following the previous election. Two possible explanations for this result are firstly, established parties quickly move to secure their flanks, taking (or trying to take) issue ownership/issue salience and also taking credit for any such policy achievements.

A second explanation is that when a populist AEP is in government, their voters (the formerly dissatisfied) instead become satisfied as they feel they are in the ascendency. This has a polarising effect on non-populist voters, who become dissatisfied at the inclusion of populist AEPs in government. The results are discussed in more detail in the following section, though this second one is considered more likely. The interaction between the individual's unemployment status and the nation's rate of (lagged) unemployment is introduced in model B2. However, the interaction does not cross the 95% threshold. In addition to this, there is no substantive change in any other results in comparison to model B1. The null result of this interaction, however, appears to lend further credence to a central notion of this thesis: populist AEP support is not simply an artefact of economic concerns. Populist AEPs are not relying solely on the votes of the unemployed in countries with unemployment crises. They

instead rely upon the attitudes of voters. Financial crisis may well accentuate feelings of discontent with politics, but objective indicators alone cannot fully explain populist AEP support.

**Table 5.7: Populist AEP support, 1997-2018 (cross-level interactions)**

Independent variables	Model B1	Model B2
Age	<b>0.0123***</b> (0.00448)	<b>0.0123***</b> (0.00448)
Age <sup>2</sup>	<b>-0.000190***</b> (4.45e-05)	<b>-0.000190***</b> (4.45e-05)
Unemployed * age	-0.00474 (0.00338)	-0.00527 (0.00346)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.294* (0.165)	0.379* (0.205)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.294***</b> (0.0257)	<b>-0.294***</b> (0.0257)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>		
None/primary/lower secondary	<b>0.634***</b> (0.0446)	<b>0.634***</b> (0.0446)
Higher secondary	<b>0.571***</b> (0.0389)	<b>0.571***</b> (0.0389)
Post-secondary (non-university)	<b>0.524***</b> (0.0433)	<b>0.524***</b> (0.0433)
Income	<b>-0.114***</b> (0.0101)	<b>-0.114***</b> (0.0101)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area or village)</i>		
Small or mid-sized town	-0.0632* (0.0362)	-0.0635* (0.0362)
Suburbs of large town or city	0.00629 (0.0410)	0.00604 (0.0410)
Large town or city	<b>-0.107***</b> (0.0365)	<b>-0.107***</b> (0.0365)
Ideological extremity	<b>0.250***</b> (0.00854)	<b>0.250***</b> (0.00854)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.603***</b> (0.0212)	<b>0.603***</b> (0.0212)

**Table 5.7 continued: aggregate-level variables**

	B1	B2
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in government)	<b>2.359***</b> (0.481)	<b>2.359***</b> (0.481)
Dissatisfied * populist AEP in government	<b>-0.761***</b> (0.0435)	<b>-0.761***</b> (0.0435)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.105***</b> (0.00601)	<b>-0.105***</b> (0.00601)
Unemployment rate (lagged)	-0.0112 (0.0460)	-0.0107 (0.0460)
Unemployed * unemployment rate	---	-0.00630 (0.00905)
GDP growth (lagged)	0.0129 (0.0448)	0.0128 (0.0448)
Government debt (lagged)	<b>0.0182**</b> (0.00755)	<b>0.0182**</b> (0.00755)
Disposable income growth (lagged)	0.00168 (0.0297)	0.00169 (0.0297)
<i>Decade dummies (ref: 1990s)</i>		
2000s	0.0968 (0.587)	0.0968 (0.587)
2010s	0.850 (0.628)	0.851 (0.628)
Variance (country)	1.001* (0.515)	1.001* (0.516)
Variance (election)	<b>1.127***</b> (0.297)	<b>1.127***</b> (0.297)
Constant	-5.967*** (0.804)	-5.970*** (0.804)
Observations	61,734	61,734
Number of groups	23	23
Number of elections	64	64

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 5.8 shows a more in-depth analysis of CSES data, specifically from the fifth module. Doing so enables not only populism but also attitudes to minorities to be modelled. The fifth module contains only one election per country when Iceland is excluded (as the education of respondents was not included in the dataset). As such, Table 5.6 fits a two-level model where voters are clustered into countries. In order to maximise case-selection urbanisation is dropped from the model.<sup>115</sup> The only other change is the inclusion of populism. As above, cross-level interactions are not included in these models; Table 5.9 further below introduces

<sup>115</sup> This question was not asked in Italy and therefore would lead to its exclusion from the model. Furthermore, decade dummies are not included

the cross-level interactions needed to test the effects of governmental AEPs on populist attitudes.

The results do not largely differ from above: populist AEP voters tend to be younger men with lower levels of education and income, who are also more ideologically radical. Similarly, the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP decreases as perceived distance of established parties increases.

In addition to this, government debt is statistically significant; the positive coefficient indicates that, as expected, higher levels of debt lead to a greater likelihood of supporting a populist AEP. There are two further aggregate-level variables that are significant: unemployment rate and the presence of a populist AEP in government. That the latter is significant is unsurprising, as being in government would ordinarily indicate a large vote share. In fact, in three of these four countries, a populist AEP remained in government following the election in question.<sup>116</sup>

The unemployment rate is also significant, but negative. As with the findings from the previous chapter's tobit models, this is likely to be because unemployment certainly has decreased in many countries. The very high unemployment rate in Greece (2015) and, to a lesser extent, Italy (2018) is outweighed in this dataset by, for instance Austria, Germany, Hungary and Norway, all of whom have very well supported populist AEPs. These findings still fit with the overall argument of the thesis. Financial crisis may well help to spur populist AEPs on, by creating a larger pool of potential voters, but simply increasing employment rates will not bring voters back to the establishment. Once voters identify themselves with radical attitudes and distrust of the establishment, these attitudes are unlikely to decrease in importance to the individual voter simply by creating more jobs. Instead, it shows that the effects of the financial crisis have stubbornly lingered.

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<sup>116</sup> Countries that had populist AEPs in government in this analysis are: Greece (September 2015); Hungary (2018); Lithuania (2016) and Norway (2017). Only in Lithuania did a populist AEP leave government following the election

**Table 5.8: Populist AEP support, 2015-2018**

Independent variables	Model C1	Model C2	Model C3
Age	<b>-0.0123***</b> (0.00171)	<b>0.0485***</b> (0.0100)	<b>0.0483***</b> (0.0102)
Age <sup>2</sup>	---	<b>-0.000614***</b> (0.000100)	<b>-0.000613***</b> (0.000102)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.144 (0.128)	0.0831 (0.129)	0.0509 (0.439)
Unemployed * age			0.000750 (0.00976)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.279***</b> (0.0553)	<b>-0.293***</b> (0.0554)	<b>-0.293***</b> (0.0554)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None/Primary/lower secondary	<b>0.539***</b> (0.0952)	<b>0.596***</b> (0.0963)	<b>0.596***</b> (0.0963)
Higher secondary	<b>0.393***</b> (0.0732)	<b>0.396***</b> (0.0735)	<b>0.396***</b> (0.0735)
Post-secondary (non-university)	<b>0.268***</b> (0.0881)	<b>0.262***</b> (0.0882)	<b>0.262***</b> (0.0882)
Income	<b>-0.0603***</b> (0.0221)	<b>-0.0885***</b> (0.0227)	<b>-0.0885***</b> (0.0227)
Ideological extremity	<b>0.233***</b> (0.0176)	<b>0.235***</b> (0.0177)	<b>0.235***</b> (0.0177)
Dissatisfied with democracy	0.0671* (0.0387)	0.0567 (0.0388)	0.0567 (0.0388)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.0600***</b> (0.0123)	<b>-0.0591***</b> (0.0123)	<b>-0.0591***</b> (0.0123)
Populist attitudes	<b>0.531***</b> (0.0391)	<b>0.517***</b> (0.0393)	<b>0.517***</b> (0.0393)



**Table 5.8 continued: aggregate-level variables**

	C1	C2	C3
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in government)	<b>1.035***</b> (0.362)	<b>1.000***</b> (0.364)	<b>1.000***</b> (0.364)
Unemployment rate (lagged)	<b>-0.189***</b> (0.0484)	<b>-0.186***</b> (0.0486)	<b>-0.186***</b> (0.0486)
GDP growth (lagged)	0.0179 (0.0230)	0.0155 (0.0231)	0.0155 (0.0231)
Government debt (lagged)	<b>0.0335***</b> (0.00661)	<b>0.0331***</b> (0.00665)	<b>0.0331***</b> (0.00665)
Disposable income growth (lagged)	-0.0359 (0.0622)	-0.0289 (0.0625)	-0.0289 (0.0626)
Variance (country)	<b>0.111**</b> (0.0556)	<b>0.112**</b> (0.0562)	<b>0.112**</b> (0.0562)
Constant	-3.174*** (0.486)	-4.378*** (0.528)	-4.374*** (0.530)
Observations	8,839	8,839	8,839
Number of groups	9	9	9

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The key attitudinal variable from the models in Table 5.8 behaves precisely as predicted: populist attitudes do indeed increase the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP. However, dissatisfaction with democracy does not significantly increase the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP. Table 5.9, tests whether the composition of government affects populist attitudes and satisfaction with democracy's relationship with voting behaviour.

Populist AEP governmental participation is interacted with satisfaction with democracy in model D1, populist attitudes in D2, and D3 controls for both interactions at the same time. Age, gender, education, income, ideological extremity, populist attitudes, unemployment rate and government debt all retain the same (significant) effects as in Table 5.7. However, once cross-level interactions are included, there are some interesting findings.

Firstly, those who are dissatisfied with democracy, in comparison to those who are satisfied, are more likely to support a populist AEP. However, the interaction between governmental participation and dissatisfaction again shows that those who are dissatisfied with democracy are *less* likely to support a populist AEP where one entered government.

While populist attitudes are positively associated with supporting a populist AEP in all three models below, models D2 and D3 show that where a populist AEP was in government, populist attitudes are *negatively* associated with supporting a populist AEP. This indicates that, when in government, populist AEPs struggle to maintain their image of political outsiders in the eyes of voters. These results are further discussed below.

**Table 5.9: Populist AEP support, 2015-2018 (cross-level interactions)**

Independent variables	Model D1	Model D2	Model D3
Age	<b>0.0465***</b> (0.0104)	<b>0.0469***</b> (0.0103)	<b>0.0459***</b> (0.0104)
Age <sup>2</sup>	<b>-0.000594***</b> (0.000103)	<b>-0.000605***</b> (0.000102)	<b>-</b> (0.000103)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	-0.0302 (0.447)	0.0217 (0.441)	-0.0405 (0.448)
Unemployed * age	0.00257 (0.00993)	0.00165 (0.00982)	0.00290 (0.00994)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.313***</b> (0.0564)	<b>-0.315***</b> (0.0559)	<b>-0.321***</b> (0.0565)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None/Primary/lower secondary	<b>0.590***</b> (0.0980)	<b>0.603***</b> (0.0970)	<b>0.594***</b> (0.0982)
Higher secondary	<b>0.404***</b> (0.0748)	<b>0.377***</b> (0.0742)	<b>0.395***</b> (0.0749)
Post-secondary (non-university)	<b>0.263***</b> (0.0894)	<b>0.243***</b> (0.0886)	<b>0.255***</b> (0.0895)
Income	<b>-0.0846***</b> (0.0231)	<b>-0.0836***</b> (0.0228)	<b>-0.0830***</b> (0.0231)
Ideological extremity	<b>0.234***</b> (0.0180)	<b>0.231***</b> (0.0178)	<b>0.233***</b> (0.0180)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.444***</b> (0.0477)	<b>0.0551</b> (0.0390)	<b>0.408***</b> (0.0487)
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in gov't)	<b>3.824***</b> (0.445)	<b>1.134***</b> (0.379)	<b>3.599***</b> (0.451)
Dissatisfied * populist AEP in government	<b>-1.154***</b> (0.0787)	---	<b>-1.038***</b> (0.0842)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.0611***</b> (0.0125)	<b>-0.0601***</b> (0.0124)	<b>-0.0613***</b> (0.0125)
Populist attitudes	<b>0.515***</b> (0.0401)	<b>0.743***</b> (0.0480)	<b>0.616***</b> (0.0490)
Populist attitudes * populist AEP in government	---	<b>-0.689***</b> (0.0769)	<b>-0.309***</b> (0.0837)
<i>Aggregate-level variables</i>			
Unemployment rate (lagged)	<b>-0.128**</b> (0.0532)	<b>-0.162***</b> (0.0505)	<b>-0.123**</b> (0.0535)
GDP growth (lagged)	-0.00206 (0.0253)	0.00843 (0.0240)	-0.00362 (0.0255)
Government debt (lagged)	<b>0.0305***</b> (0.00726)	<b>0.0309***</b> (0.00690)	<b>0.0297***</b> (0.00730)
Disposable income growth (lagged)	0.0672 (0.0689)	0.0293 (0.0653)	0.0840 (0.0694)
Variance (country)	<b>0.137**</b> (0.0690)	<b>0.122**</b> (0.0611)	<b>0.139**</b> (0.0698)
Constant	<b>-5.679***</b> (0.578)	<b>-4.477***</b> (0.547)	<b>-5.599***</b> (0.581)
Observations	8,839	8,839	8,839
Number of elections	9	9	9

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Finally, Table 5.10, below, specifically tests populist right-wing AEP voters and their propensity to hold nativist attitudes. As above, this is modelled using data from the fifth wave only of the CSES, and Greece and Ireland are excluded from the model due to data limitations. The left-right scale is also used instead of distance from the centre as it is expected populist right-wing AEP voters are ideologically similar and would consider themselves right-wing.

The results, on the whole, are as expected. All socio-demographic variables remain the same as above, with the exception of post-secondary education (compared to university education) which loses significance. Interestingly, the effect of gender does appear to be weaker, reaching significance in only one of the models. The following chapter, in an analysis of national election study data, finds a similar pattern (of inconsistent significance). This is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

Populist right-wing AEP voters are also more likely to consider themselves to be right-wing and hold populist attitudes. The same finding regarding dissatisfaction with democracy and governmental status continues to hold; populist right-wing AEP voters are more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy, but when one was in government the effect is reversed. Populist attitudes continue to decrease the likelihood of supporting a populist right-wing AEP in countries where one was in government.

Regarding nativism, the results are as expected; nativist attitudes increase the likelihood of supporting populist right-wing AEPs. Furthermore, as Mudde noted, there is a cultural element to populist right-wing support. The variable measuring whether voters believe it important that a nation's customs and traditions are adhered to significantly increases the likelihood of supporting a populist right-wing AEP. A variable measuring whether a person's ancestry is important to determine nationality is also significant, indicating that there is also a notable degree of ethnocentrism among populist right-wing AEP voters.

These findings, therefore, add more depth to the previous findings from EES data that populist right-wing AEP voters oppose immigration. They do, but leaving the analysis there plainly underestimates the depth of their voter's attitudes. Their voters feel as though the nation is under threat from *non-natives*. One must not only accept the customs and traditions of a nation, but there is also an ethnic component to national identity in the minds of populist right-wing AEP voters.

In his definition of nativism, Mudde noted that there will always be a cultural component to defining natives and non-natives, and it appears that the nation's past traditions are particularly important to populist right-wing AEP voters. Conceptually, there is no need to assume this (in and of itself) is nativist: a left-wing, civic nationalist would undoubtedly believe one must believe in the nation's customs. What truly sets populist right-wing AEP voters aside from other parties is the belief that there is also an ethnic component to being part of the nation.

Halikiopoulou et al (2012b, p.124), as stated in chapter one, argue that civic nationalism is increasingly utilised in such parties' discourse, particularly regarding the defence of the nation's traditions and values. The results support this; populist right-wing AEP voters are also motivated by the defence of customs and traditions. The difference between left- and

right-wing nationalism is more along the lines of *who* threatens the nation. So, among populist right-wing AEPs, nativism is key, and their increased use of civic nationalism also shows how they have entered mainstream political discourse.

**Table 5.10: Populist right-wing AEP support, 2016-18**

Independent variables	Model E1	Model E2	Model E3
Age	<b>-0.0174***</b> (0.00263)	<b>-0.0169***</b> (0.00266)	<b>-0.0172***</b> (0.00267)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	-0.0411 (0.239)	-0.0817 (0.240)	-0.0919 (0.241)
Female (ref: male)	-0.138 (0.0854)	-0.161* (0.0865)	-0.169* (0.0866)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None/Primary/lower secondary	<b>0.525***</b> (0.146)	<b>0.543***</b> (0.147)	<b>0.549***</b> (0.147)
Higher secondary	<b>0.371***</b> (0.123)	<b>0.388***</b> (0.124)	<b>0.377***</b> (0.124)
Post-secondary (non-university)	0.0731 (0.155)	0.0632 (0.157)	0.0536 (0.157)
Income	<b>-0.0739**</b> (0.0340)	<b>-0.0682**</b> (0.0343)	-0.0658* (0.0343)
Left-right self-placement	<b>0.465***</b> (0.0230)	<b>0.447***</b> (0.0231)	<b>0.445***</b> (0.0231)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.115**</b> (0.0575)	<b>0.485***</b> (0.0735)	<b>0.447***</b> (0.0751)
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in government)	<b>2.736***</b> (0.511)	<b>5.177***</b> (0.533)	<b>5.007***</b> (0.544)
Dissatisfied * populist AEP in government	---	<b>-0.949***</b> (0.113)	<b>-0.842***</b> (0.121)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.0979***</b> (0.0189)	<b>-0.0982***</b> (0.0191)	<b>-0.0984***</b> (0.0191)
Populist attitudes	<b>0.302***</b> (0.0640)	<b>0.318***</b> (0.0648)	<b>0.442***</b> (0.0835)
Populist attitudes * populist AEP in government	---	---	<b>-0.298**</b> (0.124)
Nativism	<b>1.004***</b> (0.0702)	<b>0.965***</b> (0.0708)	<b>0.963***</b> (0.0708)
Important to have been born in country	0.0733 (0.0586)	0.0790 (0.0594)	0.0842 (0.0594)
Important to have country's ancestry	0.118* (0.0660)	<b>0.143**</b> (0.0669)	<b>0.144**</b> (0.0669)
Important to be able to speak country's language	-0.0944 (0.103)	-0.0544 (0.105)	-0.0649 (0.105)
Important to follow country's customs	<b>0.155**</b> (0.0676)	<b>0.140**</b> (0.0681)	0.131* (0.0682)

**Table 5.10 continued: aggregate-level variables**

	E1	E2	E3
Unemployment rate (lagged)	<b>-0.566***</b> (0.0779)	<b>-0.575***</b> (0.0693)	<b>-0.574***</b> (0.0702)
GDP growth (lagged)	<b>-2.276***</b> (0.489)	<b>-2.508***</b> (0.427)	<b>-2.526***</b> (0.435)
Government debt (lagged)	<b>0.0440***</b> (0.00610)	<b>0.0425***</b> (0.00538)	<b>0.0420***</b> (0.00546)
Disposable income growth (lagged)	<b>0.650***</b> (0.138)	<b>0.780***</b> (0.121)	<b>0.797***</b> (0.123)
Variance (country)	0.0275 (0.0218)	0.0169 (0.0164)	0.0179 (0.0170)
Constant	<b>-3.059***</b> (0.775)	<b>-3.806***</b> (0.726)	<b>-3.658***</b> (0.734)
Observations	6,695	6,695	6,695
Number of countries	7	7	7

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Discussion

The above results all show broad support for the hypotheses given above. As stated, many of these hypotheses have already been supported, and discussed, previously. Populist AEP supporters are more likely to be younger, unemployed men with lower levels of education who are more ideologically radical and dissatisfied with democracy. However, in addition to these findings, the analysis of CSES data has pointed to a number of findings.

Firstly, voters who perceive there to be less difference between established parties tend to support populist AEPs. Their voters not only have radical attitudes, but they also believe that the political establishment cannot, or will not, represent them. Instead, they turn to a more radical party which claims they offer real change. Testing the demand-side perception of convergence adds nuance to studies by Abedi (2002), Carter (2005) and Arzheimer and Carter (2006) who do not test for this separate mechanism.

The results here show that their own radical ideologies are important, but so too is the belief that they *have* to turn to populist AEPs: populist AEP voters increasingly question whether established parties are radical enough. These findings hold despite the inclusion of other attitudinal factors, which shows the strength of populist AEP voter's desire to feel as though their attitudes are being represented.

Secondly, dissatisfaction with democracy was found to be a significant predictor of populist AEP support. However, this effect is reversed when a populist AEP was in government. Satisfaction with democracy need not be confused with happiness with liberal democracy. Instead, it may be better termed as “congruence between popular sentiment and the attitudes expressed by the political class, whatever those sentiments may be” (Foa 2020, p.25).

Being the winner or loser affects satisfaction with democracy (Anderson & Guillory 1997; Blais & Gélinau 2007). Furthermore, Kim (2009) argues instead that ideological congruence between voters and the median party explains satisfaction with democracy, while Reher (2015) argues greater congruence with political elites increases satisfaction with democracy.

As such, satisfaction with democracy measures how (un)happy the voter is about their representation.

Akkerman et al (2014, p.1325) state that dissatisfaction with democracy “may constitute a breeding ground for populism”, but this may well be a misconception. Geurkink et al (2020) find that populist attitudes measure a different dimension to both political trust and external political efficacy. As dissatisfaction with democracy measures happiness with representation, any such evidence that populist AEP voters are more likely to be dissatisfied may be due to the simple fact that in most elections, in most countries, populist AEPs are not elected to government.<sup>117</sup>

Instead, populist AEP supporters are not dissatisfied with democracy so much as they are dissatisfied with how they have been represented. Failure to take into account institutional concerns such as this may well give a misleading picture as to the nature of populist AEP supporters’ attitudes. Does that mean that governmental populist AEPs win votes because of their record in office? This question is addressed in a series of additional models below, though the answer does appear to be that, yes, their perceived record in office does matter. The key is that the *right* party needs to deliver the *right* policies and messages in office.

The final key finding from the above models is that populist attitudes increase the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP, as expected. Where populist AEPs were in government, populist attitudes *decrease* the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP. When they enter government, most voters likely associate them with the national political elite, hence the negative coefficient. These findings suggest that once in government, populist AEPs need to adapt.

Typically, populist AEPs seek to attack the morally bankrupt elites of the established parties, but in government there is nowhere to hide. Being the dominant party in government exacerbates this.<sup>118</sup> While parties such as the FPÖ may have struggled to be heard by voters regarding policy achievements, almost the exact opposite was true of SYRIZA; they spoke, but nobody (i.e. the EU) listened regarding austerity.

As Akkerman (2011) demonstrated, the FPÖ’s problem was that the established ÖVP not only listened to them, but also took the headlines while the FPÖ floundered. Restrictive immigration policies were enacted *despite* the FPÖ and BZÖ being in government, not because of them (Akkerman 2011, p.522; Akkerman & de Lange 2013, p.594-65).

SYRIZA, on the other hand, proceeded to squander its negotiating time with the EU shortly after entering government following the January 2015 election. Long negotiations regarding what Mudde (2016, p.28) termed “amateurish” attempts to negotiate austerity with the EU proved fruitless, wherein Rori (2016, p.1332) argued SYRIZA’s strategy was one of “[procrastination], believing that the creditors would ultimately give in.” SYRIZA’s emphasis shifted to one of blame and deflect, where the power differential between Greece and

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<sup>117</sup> It is crucial to note that the number of populist AEPs entering government has increased in more recent years, yet the fact remains that *most* populist AEPs have never entered government

<sup>118</sup> Parties in coalitions such as the Danish People’s Party have had more room for manoeuvre as they can adopt a ‘one foot in and one foot out’ approach (McDonnell and Newell 2011)

Germany (in addition to miscalculating other countries' strategies) was to blame for austerity (Rori 2016, p.1337).

Fidesz shifted emphasis toward conspiracy theories, arguing that Europe's ethnic composition is being deliberately altered by actors as varied as George Soros and the EU (Hegedüs 2019, p.420-21). As such, it appears that when populist AEPs are in power, they struggle to separate themselves from the establishment. The FPÖ was out-manoeuvred and out-strategised by its coalition partner; SYRIZA failed to effectively make the transition into a governing party (and certainly tried to achieve too much: setting lower expectations is near-compulsory for any governing party, let alone one trying to negotiate with the rest of the EU); and Fidesz was *so* successful that it *needed* to shift its emphasis to retain its populist ideology.

The latter two examples demonstrate that populist AEPs may well remain populist, and their supporters may well too (as shown below in Figure 5.5), but their rhetoric changes. Dominant governmental populist AEPs like SYRIZA and Fidesz had to alter their platforms almost exclusively to targeting external actors. The negative interaction coefficient thus likely shows that voters generally think of them as part of the national elite.

These results and discussion add further context to Albertazzi and Mueller's (2013) argument that governing populist parties challenge liberal democracy. They also adapt their populism to the situation around them, as they become increasingly intertwined with the national political elite. A government quite plainly cannot blame the government for letting the people down; instead, it is the fault of external actors. As such, it is necessary to note that populist attitudes do not instantly turn into pluralist/elitist attitudes among a governmental populist AEPs' supporters. Instead, populist AEP voters likely turn their attention away from the national elite and towards supranational bodies such as the EU, but other voters perceive of them as part of the national elite.

Believing it makes a difference who is in power decreases the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP. Its interaction with dissatisfaction with democracy, however, shows that the effect is mitigated; the interaction is positive and significant. This is because populist AEP voters are strongly policy motivated and have not abandoned politics altogether. They are, as such, sceptical and pessimistic but feel this way *because* they have strong policy preferences. Furthermore, believing that a government containing a populist AEP has performed poorly decreases the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP.

There are constraints to being in government; governing parties simply cannot please everyone. Governments are all elected on policy promises, and populist AEPs are especially policy-seeking (often making grand promises). Voters dissatisfied with democracy under a governing populist AEP who believe the government has performed poorly are less likely to support a populist AEP. Simply being in a position of power is not enough for voters to believe that they should vote for them.

**Table 5.11: Assessing the impact of populist AEPs in government<sup>119</sup>**

Independent variables	Model F1	Model F2	Model F3	Model F4
Ideological extremity	<b>0.273***</b> (0.0117)	<b>0.271***</b> (0.0117)	<b>0.263***</b> (0.0119)	<b>0.264***</b> (0.0119)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.0976***</b> (0.00797)	<b>-0.0970***</b> (0.00801)	<b>-0.0980***</b> (0.00813)	<b>-0.0980***</b> (0.00813)
Institutional responsiveness	<b>-0.0714***</b> (0.0147)	<b>-0.158***</b> (0.0469)	<b>-0.187***</b> (0.0475)	<b>-0.185***</b> (0.0477)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.421***</b> (0.0253)	<b>0.459***</b> (0.0715)	<b>0.352***</b> (0.0722)	<b>0.433***</b> (0.0825)
Institutional responsiveness * dissatisfaction	---	<b>0.0349**</b> (0.0176)	<b>0.0433**</b> (0.0177)	<b>0.0431**</b> (0.0178)
Govt bad performance (ref: good)	<b>0.253***</b> (0.0380)	<b>0.262***</b> (0.0382)	<b>0.739***</b> (0.0436)	<b>1.018***</b> (0.141)
Govt bad performance * dissatisfaction	---	---	---	<b>-0.120**</b> (0.0574)
Populist AEP in govt (ref: not in govt)	0.444 (0.602)	<b>2.518***</b> (0.626)	<b>2.517***</b> (0.616)	<b>2.499***</b> (0.631)
Govt bad performance * populist AEP in govt	---	---	<b>-2.428***</b> (0.108)	<b>-2.178***</b> (0.327)
Populist AEP in govt * dissatisfaction	---	<b>-0.868***</b> (0.0624)	<b>-0.422***</b> (0.0670)	<b>-0.410***</b> (0.0915)
Bad performance*populist AEP in govt*dissatisfied	---	---	---	-0.104 (0.132)
Number of populist AEPs in election	<b>1.398***</b> (0.485)	<b>1.430***</b> (0.489)	<b>1.483***</b> (0.484)	<b>1.479***</b> (0.484)
Variance (country)	1.516 (1.143)	1.443 (1.107)	1.642 (1.162)	1.637 (1.160)
Variance (election)	<b>1.117**</b> (0.552)	<b>1.167**</b> (0.562)	<b>1.052**</b> (0.519)	<b>1.057**</b> (0.520)
Constant	<b>-7.305***</b> (1.552)	<b>-7.464***</b> (1.565)	<b>-7.697***</b> (1.592)	<b>-7.871***</b> (1.591)
Observations	36,024	36,024	36,024	36,024
Number of countries	21	21	21	21
Number of elections				

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

It is worth noting, however, that the triple interaction does not pass the 95% significance threshold. Unfortunately, the institutional responsiveness question has not been asked in as many elections as the government performance variable. Removing this variable (increasing

<sup>119</sup> Socio-demographic and upper-level variables were included in the model but removed from the output to maintain parsimony



the number of observations) leads to this triple interaction becoming significant and retaining its negative coefficient, which is the expected direction.<sup>120</sup> So there is not strong support for H15a. This does therefore warrant further, more in-depth investigation to assess the relationship between government performance, feelings of representation and populist AEP support. Perhaps the ideal way of doing so would be on a country-by-country basis (ideally with longitudinal individual-level data), in order to take into account not only the dynamics of the national political system, but also specific choices and decisions taken by governing populist AEPs.

Nevertheless, this chapter adds further nuance to the studies by Akkerman (2011), and Akkerman and de Lange (2013).<sup>121</sup> Both posit that governing populist AEPs that perform well in office do not suffer at the next election. However, neither actually test this notion using voter-level data. This is a considerable gap given the importance of public opinion to such arguments. Populist AEP voters are *not* mindlessly protesting. Instead, they are conscious of whether or not they are represented. Voters will be happy to support a governing populist AEP if they perceive it to have performed well.

The fact that they are not always opposed to the government is important to note because it demonstrates that populist AEP voters do not simply protest all the time. Instead, they evaluate whether or not they are being adequately represented. This therefore adds further nuance to the studies by both Hobolt and Tilley (2016) and Rooduijn et al (2017), who do not test whether populist AEP supporters will stick with them when in government. They will, so long as they are satisfied with democracy and feel that the government represents them.

Lastly, the fifth wave of the CSES is also re-analysed in models G1 and G2 in Table 5.12 below but replaces dissatisfaction with democracy with populist attitudes in the triple interaction. The findings from the models demonstrate the continued impact of government (dis)approval. Where there is no populist AEP in government, those who disapprove of the government are most likely to support a populist AEP. However, the effect is reversed in countries with a governing populist AEP.<sup>122</sup> The coefficient of the triple interaction is close to significance. Below, the result of the interaction between governmental participation of populist AEPs and government approval is graphed along populist attitudes. All margins are statistically significant.

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<sup>120</sup> These extra elections are Greece (September 2015); Ireland (2007; 2016) and Switzerland (2007). Both Greece and Switzerland had governing populist AEPs at the time of the election

<sup>121</sup> Indeed, the majority of literature that examines governing populist AEPs does not analyse the demand-side (Andreadis & Stavrakakis (2017) does so, though only in Greece)

<sup>122</sup> Specifically, the countries in this model with a populist AEP in government prior to the election are: Hungary (2018); Lithuania (2016) and Norway (2017). Unfortunately, the institutional responsiveness question was not asked in Greece (September 2015) meaning this election, and Ireland (2016) are both dropped from the analysis.

**Table 5.12: Populist attitudes under populist AEP governments<sup>123</sup>**

Independent variables	Model G1	Model G2
Ideological extremity	<b>0.264***</b> (0.0210)	<b>0.259***</b> (0.0211)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.174***</b> (0.0468)	<b>0.177***</b> (0.0469)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.0688***</b> (0.0141)	<b>-0.0706***</b> (0.0141)
Institutional responsiveness	---	<b>0.0830***</b> (0.0302)
Populism	<b>0.646***</b> (0.0952)	<b>0.669***</b> (0.0957)
Populist AEP in government (ref: not in govt)	<b>2.782***</b> (0.474)	<b>2.747***</b> (0.503)
Populist AEP in government * populism	-0.137 (0.137)	-0.145 (0.137)
Govt bad performance (ref: good)	<b>1.213***</b> (0.0957)	<b>1.217***</b> (0.0957)
Govt bad performance * populism	-0.0710 (0.110)	-0.0738 (0.110)
Populist AEP in govt * govt bad performance	<b>-3.500***</b> (0.191)	<b>-3.496***</b> (0.191)
Populist AEP in govt * gov bad performance * populism	-0.338* (0.192)	-0.346* (0.192)
Unemployment rate (lagged)	<b>-0.309***</b> (0.0869)	<b>-0.308***</b> (0.0918)
Government debt (lagged)	<b>0.0365***</b> (0.00785)	<b>0.0357***</b> (0.00830)
Disposable income growth (lagged)	0.0164 (0.0706)	0.0135 (0.0748)
Number of populist AEPs in election	0.137 (0.336)	0.157 (0.357)
Variance (country)	0.142* (0.0798)	0.161* (0.0904)
Constant	<b>-3.859***</b> (0.718)	<b>-4.124***</b> (0.767)
Observations	7,103	7,103
Number of groups	7	7


Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Figure 5.5 (model G2) shows that populist attitudes do, indeed, predict support for populist AEPs irrespective of whether or not a populist AEP was in government. When there was no

<sup>123</sup> Socio-demographic and upper-level variables were included in the model but removed from the output to maintain parsimony

populist AEP in government, as populist attitudes increase, the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP increases. There is a stronger effect when a voter believes the government has performed poorly, but the same is also true to a lesser extent for those who believe that the government has performed well. However, the effect is different in countries where there was a populist AEP in government. As populist attitudes increase in intensity, so does the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP if a voter believes the government performed well.

**Figure 5.5: Predictive margins of (non-)governmental populist AEP support**



This demonstrates the importance of taking evaluations of government performance into account. Populist attitudes are, indeed, associated with supporting a governing populist AEP, should the government be judged to perform well. The study by Castanho Silva et al (2020) does not consider government approval in their evaluation of populist attitudes, despite there being very good reason to believe that populist AEP voters wish to be well represented. Instead, these results show that populist attitudes behave as expected (i.e. they predict support for populist AEPs) once approval is also taken into account. Voters as a whole may well struggle to delineate governing populist AEPs from the elite, but their own voters remain populist.<sup>124</sup>

As such, these findings show that governmental populist AEPs and their voters oppose established politics, but they are also policy motivated. This adds further nuance to Spruyt et al (2016) by examining populist AEP voters. They are not discontented with politics altogether, just with established politics because their radical attitudes are not represented. Should their voters believe government is working for them, they will support governing populist AEPs. Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) find that some voters may vote for

<sup>124</sup> This lends support to the notion that governing populist AEPs adapt their populism. Further, more detailed, questions would be ideal to further test this

populist parties due to their having strong populist attitudes, not because they ideologically match with the party. They speculate that populist parties may well benefit electorally from this, by becoming more populist. Chapter four showed populist AEPs often do lose votes in government.

The findings from this last set of models raise two further questions. Firstly, exactly what do populist AEP voters demand from government? Secondly, exactly what are populist AEP voters prepared to accept from governmental populist AEPs? It may well be that some voters are so protest-oriented that, realistically, they would always have felt let down, and are thus more likely to abandon populist AEPs as they often struggle to adapt to office.

## Conclusion

In sum, the above models point to several findings. Firstly, populist AEP voters are more likely to believe that established parties have converged. So, not only do populist AEPs benefit from increased space in the political arena, but their voters also believe that established parties offer less choice. None of the studies by Abedi (2002), Carter (2005) nor Arzheimer & Carter (2006) differentiate between supply- and demand-side convergence. However, this chapter demonstrates populist AEP supporters do, indeed, feel as though they have less choice. This finding, as such, raises questions as to the actions that established party elites take: how much attention do voters pay to *overall* left-right convergence (as opposed to specific policy areas such as immigration)? How accurate are (populist AEP) voters' perceptions in the first instance, and how much of a role does populist AEPs' campaigning play in forming them?

Secondly, dissatisfaction with democracy decreases the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP where one governed. Satisfaction with democracy essentially measures whether or not the survey respondent is happy with how they feel democracy is working *for them*, rather than how well it is working *per se*. Populist AEP voters are not all inherently protest-oriented; they have a clear idea of what policies they want. Those who are dissatisfied with democracy but believe it does make a difference who is in power are *more* likely to support a populist AEP. Likewise, believing that the government performed well where a populist AEP governed increases the likelihood of supporting one. This adds nuance to the literature on populists in government (Akkerman 2011; Akkerman and de Lange 2013), which argues that governing populist AEPs who adapt do not suffer at the ballot box, but does not actually test individual-level approval of governments.

Lastly, populist attitudes decrease the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP where one was in government. This is because they become intertwined with the national political elite and need to adapt. Once government approval is controlled for, populist attitudes do predict support for a populist AEP among those who approve of the government. This further demonstrates that populist AEPs in government become associated with the national elite, and it is therefore important to consider the systemic integration of populist AEPs. Alongside this, it shows that studies by both Hobolt and Tilley (2016) and Rooduijn et al (2017) risk misunderstanding their support: it is not *entirely* protest-oriented, but to understand this, how voters interact with governments must be controlled for. Instead, populist AEP supporters want to be clearly represented and will stick with governing populist AEPs if they meet expectations. They are not always searching not for the newest populist AEP, but for a party they feel will represent them.

These analyses raise additional questions, such as what populist AEP voters want and what they will accept from governing populist AEPs. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, let alone this specific chapter, to answer such questions. Nevertheless, the evidence from the above models has provided evidence that answering such questions can go a long way in understanding exactly how much attitudes matter for populist AEP support. The following, and final, chapter now turns to NES data to provide a more nuanced analysis of populist AEP supporter attitudes.

## Chapter VI

### Populist AEP voters' attitudes in eight European countries

#### Introduction

This final chapter consists of an individual-level analysis, switching from the CSES to national election studies (NES). The benefits of doing so, in addition to analysing CSES data are explained further below. The findings from the models analysed below point to several key conclusions. Firstly, there are clear attitudinal similarities between populist AEPs, left- or right-wing. As such, populist AEPs, left- or right-wing, are able to win over disaffected voters, due to their populist ideology. However, as expected, their voters are not mindlessly supporting *any* populist AEP: left-right differences are key.

Secondly, where populist left- and right-wing AEPs coexist in the same country their voters do not generally hold similar attitudes beyond Euroscepticism and a perception of convergence. Disaffection with established politics and/or one key, salient issue despite left-right differences may be enough to at least support temporary co-operation. Such populist, anti-establishment sentiment helped to form a coalition in Italy, in addition to Greece (January and September 2015). Yet, the evidence seems to suggest that without clear ideological congruence, spatially implausible coalitions between populist AEPs are unlikely to prosper, simply because the parties and their voters are ideologically different. Ultimately, two populist AEPs (on either side of the political spectrum) co-existing at the same time is a symptom of widespread political anger and polarisation.<sup>125</sup> Rooduijn et al (2017) point this out yet their work is extended here, to look at this issue on a country-by-country basis.

Thirdly, populist right-wing AEP voters are characterised as much by the salience they give to immigration as they are by their anti-immigration attitudes in the first instance. The same cannot be said for populist left-wing AEP voters. Unlike populist right-wing AEPs, those on the left do not contribute anything (new) to the political arena. Populist right-wing AEPs, as such, are more clearly carving out a niche for themselves, raising questions as to the long-term potential for populist left-wing AEPs to grow further. They are instead *more* economically left-wing but in most of Europe the economic dimension is reducing in salience. Issues like immigration are cross-cutting, eating away at left-wing parties. As such, populist left-wing AEPs are inherently self-limiting by focusing on the economic left-right dimension.

This chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, the hypotheses and theory are discussed, followed by data and methodology. Thirdly, results are presented and discussed from the NES data on a country-by-country basis. Fourthly, and finally, the results and hypotheses are reflected upon and discussed.

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<sup>125</sup> While it was pointed out in chapter two that SYRIZA and ANEL shared a lot of similarities, it is worth pointing out that ANEL left the coalition over a dimension they did not share positions on: the cultural dimension

## Hypotheses, data and methodology

As in the previous chapter, most of the hypotheses and their causal mechanisms are identical.<sup>126</sup> As such, they are briefly re-stated below. There is one new hypothesis that is able to be tested in this chapter (H9), however, which is explained in more detail below.

- **H1:** Younger voters are more likely than older voters to support a populist AEP
- **H2:** Unemployed voters are more likely than employed voters to support a populist AEP
  - **H2a:** Younger voters affected by the financial crisis are more likely than older voters to support populist AEPs
- **H3:** Men are more likely than women to support a populist AEP
- **H4:** Lesser-educated voters are more likely to support a populist AEP than more-educated voters
- **H5:** Working class voters are more likely than other voters to support a populist AEP
- **H6:** Eurosceptic voters are more likely than all other voters to support a populist AEP
  - **H6a:** Voters opposed to immigration are more likely to support a populist right-wing AEP than other voters
  - **H6b:** Radically socialist voters are more likely to support a populist left-wing AEP than other voters
- **H7:** Voters dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to support a populist AEP than those satisfied with democracy
- **H8:** Voters located further away from the centre ground are more likely than those closer to the centre to support a populist AEP
- **H9:** Voters who believe inequality/immigration is the most salient issue are more likely than all other voters to support a populist AEP

H9, arguing that populist AEP voters are more likely than other voters to give greater weight to the key ideological issue that defines their party, aims to test whether or not populist AEP voters are different not just in their attitudes, but in terms of how important their beliefs are. It is hypothesised that immigration/inequality is likely to matter more for populist AEPs (on a left-right basis) because populist AEPs typically have limited platforms. Populist right-wing AEPs such as the PVV spend the majority of their efforts campaigning on issues around a combination of Euroscepticism, immigration and Islam, while populist left-wing AEPs such as Podemos overwhelmingly focus on economic inequality, redistribution, austerity and so on.

It thus stands to reason that a voter who cares about immigration/austerity (or any issue for that matter) will be more likely to vote for parties that place more emphasis on such issues in the first instance. Attitudes that are important to voters are, cognitively, more easily accessed by the voter (and therefore more relied upon for decision-making). Furthermore, voters who care more about an issue are more likely to pay greater attention to politicians' preferences/statements on the issue, and therefore differentiate between different voting decisions (Fournier et al 2003, p.53).

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<sup>126</sup> As this chapter analyses cross-section data, there are no national-level hypotheses examined in the following models

The most common method of measuring issue salience is either ‘most important problem’ (MIP) or ‘most important issue’ (MII) questions. Jennings and Wlezien (2011) argue that ‘most important issue’ is increasingly preferred as it is theoretically better placed to measure importance on *issues* to the voter (which are distinct to *problems*). Nevertheless, they find the difference between the two measures is minimal.

However, both Wlezien (2005), and Johns (2010) argue that MIP and MII (respectively) are problematic measures of issue salience. Wlezien (2005, p.575) argues that those who use MIP questions “are doing science backwards, making do with existing instruments without knowing or being clear about what they represent.” Johns (2010, p.155), on a similar note, agrees, concluding that “MII does not work well as a measure of personal issue salience, and appears more often to elicit respondents’ belief about the issue that currently tops the national agenda.”

Perhaps the best method of measuring issue salience among voters is by utilising questions that ask ‘how important is the economy/immigration/healthcare (etc)?’ Although Wlezien (2005) points out that most people think most issues are important, such questions have been utilised in literature to measure issue salience among voters (Fournier et al 2003; Wlezien 2005, p.576; Bélanger & Meguid 2008). This method is used in the following analyses, following the recommendation of Johns (2010, p.156), who states that less ambiguity in questions is necessary. This restricts the possibility to test H9 to Austria (2008) and Germany (2017). Nevertheless, this is preferable to ‘doing science backwards’ by trying to force a theory onto a question that simply measures something else (Wlezien 2005, p.575). This further strengthens the logic of analysing NES data; issue salience feasibly has a major impact on supporting a populist AEP, yet neither the EES nor CSES contain such questions.

## **Data and methodology**

All models analysed below are logistic models, where the dependent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent voted for a populist AEP, and 0 for another party. Data is taken from a variety of NES projects, summarised in Table 6.1 below. As indicated above, the NES data analysed below is chosen to best measure attitudes of populist AEP voters, not to track the parties over time.<sup>127</sup> Instead, elections have been chosen based on three criteria. In order to increase generalisability, this analysis should analyse not *just* older populist AEPs such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) but also newer parties such as Vox. Analysing voters of both types of parties can help to identify any potential differences in voters’ attitudes.

It would be at the very least problematic if the only elections included were those in, say, Austria, Denmark and Belgium after 2008. There would be minimal geographic variation, and none of these countries have populist left-wing AEPs. Indeed, their populist right-wing AEPs are relatively old and successful. Likewise, the financial crisis and its after-effects may well have altered populist AEP support. As such, a wide variety of populist AEPs with mixed fortunes are included in order to maximise generalisability of results. There are, for instance, both older and newer populist left- and right-wing AEPs; elections where populist AEPs entered government; elections where populist AEPs left government; elections in North, East, South and West Europe, and elections before, during and after the financial crisis.

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<sup>127</sup> This is what the CSES data analysed previously was primarily used for



Secondly, suitable questions are necessary. While most NES surveys typically include questions necessary for this analysis, it is far from guaranteed. The 2013 German Election Study, for instance, does not ask a question on attitudes to the EU. Furthermore, questions measuring populist attitudes are uncommon, and do not appear to exist (in NES data with enough populist AEP supporters) aside from GLES 2017, the French National Election Study (FNES) 2017 and the Italian National Election Study (ITANES 2018). As this thesis studies populist AEPs, measuring populist attitudes, wherever possible, is desirable. Thirdly, a suitable number of populist AEP voters must be present in the data, in any case; this analysis simply cannot take place without a large enough sample size.<sup>128</sup> While the 2010 Swedish election saw the Sweden Democrats enter parliament, the election study (Holmberg & Ekengren Oscarsson 2017) contains just 30 of their voters. For the purposes of this chapter, meaningful inferences would be difficult to obtain from such a sample.

**Table 6.1: National Election Studies analysed**

Country	Year	Populist AEPs	Total number of populist AEP voters
Austria	2008; 2013	FPÖ; BZÖ; Team Stronach	2008: 181 (20.45%) 2013: 250 (23%)
Denmark	2007; 2011	Danish People's Party	2007: 380 (9.83%) 2011: 168 (8.59%)
France	2007; 2017	Front National; France Unbowed	2007: 204 (5.76%) 2017: 628 (44.41%)
Germany	2017	Alternative for Germany; Die Linke	315 (18.67%)
Hungary	2006	Fidesz; Hungarian Justice and Life Party	292 (40.39%)
Italy	2018	Five Star Movement; Lega Nord; Brothers of Italy	1085 (58.08%)
Netherlands	2006; 2010	Party for Freedom; Socialist Party	2006: 533 (23.01%) 2010: 456 (22.9%)
Spain	2019 (November)	Podemos; Vox	791 (23.46%)

All models adhere to the same pattern regarding inclusion and measurement of variables. All populist AEP voters are modelled with just socio-demographic variables. Country-level variables cannot be estimated as the values would be identical for all respondents in the survey, as these are single-level logistic models. Where possible, models control for age; gender; unemployment; education; social class; urbanisation; religiosity; ideological extremity; perception of convergence; Euroscepticism; attitudes to globalisation; satisfaction with democracy; trust in institutions and key left- and right-wing attitudes. This is done

<sup>128</sup> Analysing 'probability to vote' responses is a suitable solution for studies which seek to investigate which types of voters are responsive to party ideologies/party families, however only voting behaviour can reveal exactly what motivates voters to actually support populist AEPs

wherever possible. The Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) 2006, for instance, simply does not measure employment status in a manner appropriate for this analysis.<sup>129</sup> Likewise, the 2007 French Election Study (FES) did not ask respondents to place candidates on the left-right scale, and therefore the perception of convergence cannot be measured.

The models are run in four stages. Once with socio-demographic variables; once with age-squared, and once with age-squared *and* an interaction between unemployment and age. Attitudinal variables are lastly included which are hypothesised to be common to *all* populist AEP voters (e.g. Euroscepticism, ideological extremity). The results from these two sets of models are presented and discussed in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, below.

Then, populist left- *or* right-wing AEP voters are analysed separately where they co-exist, in order to control for variables that are assumed to be unique to the left- or right-wing, such as attitudes to immigration. The results from the left- *or* right-wing models are presented using rope ladder plots in two stages. Firstly, attitudes hypothesised to be common to populist AEPs, left- or right-wing, are shown. Secondly, attitudes which are hypothesised to differ based on left- *or* right-wing parties (e.g. nativism and economic redistribution) are shown. Where there is both a populist left- and right-wing AEP, there are two sets of coefficients; one left- and one right-wing.<sup>130</sup> All variables are coded, wherever possible, so that a positive coefficient indicates a greater likelihood of supporting the populist AEP.

It is important to control for attitudes to both economic redistribution and immigration/nativism because populist right-wing AEPs tend to draw support from working class voters. Furthermore, they generally take economically centrist positions in order to attract the support of such voters. That, however, raises the question of how much (if at all) populist right-wing AEP voters are actually motivated by inequality relative to nativism. Likewise, populist left-wing AEPs may choose to confront nativist parties in an effort to try and further show how they are still radically different from dominant discourse, which is often negative towards immigrants and ethnic minority citizens. This may particularly be the case where populist left-wing AEPs compete in the same election as a populist right-wing AEP, who, particularly recently, have been able to shift the debate increasingly in favour of issues around immigration. Therefore, both sets of attitudes should be controlled for in order to best measure the dynamics of populist AEP support.

## Results

As the causal mechanism and hypotheses examined below are identical, for ease of analysis and interpretation, all model output is restricted to the tables below for socio-demographic variables, and those where there is expected to be similarity between left and right. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 summarise the analyses of populist AEP voters against all other voters. The majority of results are supportive of the hypotheses. Focusing on Table 6.2, for the most part, populist AEP voters are more likely to be younger, have lower levels of education and to be working class. Unemployment and gender, though, are more inconsistent.

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<sup>129</sup> Respondents are asked whether or not they are employed (full-/part-time etc), or not. However, 'not employed' includes *all* who do not work, including retirement. It is therefore not possible to determine whether or not a respondent is unemployed but still in the labour force.

<sup>130</sup> i.e. in Germany (2017) two models are estimated: 1 for supporting Die Linke and 0 for another party, and then 1 for supporting AfD and 0 for another party

**Table 6.2: Populist AEP support, socio-demographics**

<i>Country</i>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Working class</b>
Austria (2008)	✓	NS	NS	✓	NS
Austria (2013)	✓	NS	✓	NS	✓
Denmark (2007)	NS	✓	NS	✓	NS
Denmark (2011)	NS	✓	NS	NS	NS
France (2007)	✓	✓	NS	✓	NS
France (2017)	✓	NS	NS	✓	✓
Germany (2017)	✓	✓	NS	✓	✓
Hungary (2006)	✓	NS	NS	NS	X
Italy (2018)	✓	NS	X	✓	✓
Netherlands (2006)	✓	NS	---	✓	✓
Netherlands (2010)	✓	NS	NS	✓	✓
Spain (Nov. 2019)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓ hypothesis supported ( $p < .05$ ); NS not significant ( $p > .05$ ); --- not included; X hypothesis contradicted ( $p < .05$ )

There is limited support for the hypothesis that unemployed voters are more likely to support populist AEPs (the effect is reversed in Italy (2018)), but the effect is as predicted in both Austria (2013) and Spain (November 2019). Unemployment and subjective experiences of the economy are discussed further below. It is worth noting, though, that the Spanish and Austrian elections took place during the financial crisis, so it may well be the case that the increased salience of the economic crisis is an important factor. Indeed, Figure 6.1 shows that in Austria (2013), as age increases among unemployed voters the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP increases. Those who are older and were more established in the workforce may well become unhappier and therefore support a populist AEP.

Regarding gender, as with unemployment, there is evidence from all individual-level analyses in this thesis that men are more likely to support populist AEPs. However, there are also many cases of non-significance. It is discussed further below that women tend not to vote for toxic parties; many populist AEPs are very mainstreamed and therefore not toxic to many voters. There is no effect of gender in countries where there are longstanding, mainstreamed populist AEPs whereas in Denmark, Germany and Spain populist AEPs are smaller and/or less integrated into the political system.<sup>131</sup> Mayer (2015, p.408) noted that over time the gender gap in Front National support disappeared, argued to be due to the political

<sup>131</sup> While the Danish People's Party has provided parliamentary support to coalition governments, its partners have tried to keep them at arms-length while the Danish People's Party has also tried to do the same

context in the 2012 election. Ford et al (2012) further argued that UKIP managed to win the votes of women, unlike the BNP which is typically viewed as more extreme.

**Figure 6.1: Marginal effect of age and unemployment on voting behaviour, Austria 2013**



Table 6.3, below, shows the results of models examining populist left- and right-wing AEP voters' attitudes.<sup>132</sup> Those countries where there are only populist AEPs on one side of the political spectrum are not included: the results of these variables can be seen in the graphs below for countries such as Austria. This is because the aim of the table is to show that where very different populist AEPs co-exist, their voters still share similarities on issues such as Euroscepticism.

As with Table 6.2, the majority of hypotheses are supported. In sum, the results previously identified in both the EES and CSES analyses continue to hold. Populist AEP voters, on the whole, are ideologically radical (i.e. distance from the centre), Eurosceptic, dissatisfied with democracy and are likely to feel as though established parties have converged.<sup>133</sup> Their voters also hold populist attitudes; they strongly believe that politics is divided into a Manichean outlook, where the corrupt elites are letting down the people.

Attitudes of populist AEP supporters from before and after the financial crisis are near-identical, yet populist AEPs have grown in support. There is therefore a crisis of representation; the growth of populist AEPs has been spurred on by the financial crisis and solidified. Their support is not solely due to temporary protest from recession, though, but instead because voters with more radical attitudes are willing to support populist AEPs. This further challenges Hobolt and Tilley's (2016) study that argues established parties may be

<sup>132</sup> i.e. in Germany (2017) the dependent variable is coded as 1 = AfD or Die Linke, 0 = all other parties

<sup>133</sup> The left-right self-placement variable used in Spain was asked on a 1-10 scale. Five is used as the midpoint. This is also not strictly 'satisfaction with democracy' in Spain but rather happiness with the political situation due to data limitations.

able to win back populist AEP supporters. They have had years to do so and the attitudes of populist AEP voters are solidly at odds with the more moderate values of established parties.<sup>134</sup> Both the differences and similarities in populist AEP support are shown in the graphs below.

**Table 6.3: Populist AEP support, attitudes**

Country	Ideologically radical	Eurosceptic	Populist attitudes	Dissatisfied with democracy	Perceive convergence
France (2017)	✓	✓	✓	NS	✓
Germany (2017)	✓	✓	✓	✓	NS
Italy (2018)	✓ <sup>135</sup>	✓	✓	---	✓
Netherlands (2006)	NS	✓	---	✓	✓
Netherlands (2010)	NS	✓	---	✓	✓
Spain (Nov. 2019)	✓	---	---	NS	✓

✓ hypothesis supported ( $p < .05$ ); NS not significant ( $p > .05$ ); --- not included

The remainder of this chapter now focuses on each NES listed above. The results of the models are displayed below and are split into country-by-country analyses. This has the benefit of enabling country- and party-specific peculiarities to be examined and discussed in more detail. Firstly, a brief overview of both the populist AEP(s) under consideration is offered, as well as their recent history and the general context of the elections. Afterwards, the results are discussed in the context of not only the specific country and election but also the wider thesis and its findings.

### **Austria**


The four graphs below above show support for populist AEPs in Austria, following the 2008 and 2013 elections (Kritzinger et al 2014; 2017). These elections both took place during different economic contexts which is ideal for this thesis. 2008 was a snap election, following seemingly endless bickering between the governing parties as the financial crisis was initially unfolding, while the 2013 election followed as the financial crisis had re-emerged in the form of the sovereign debt crisis. In 2008, the dependent variable consists of those who supported both the FPÖ and its fellow populist radical-right offshoot, the BZÖ. The 2013 survey consists of the same parties, in addition to the populist right-wing AEP Team Stronach (TS). As such, Austria's populist AEPs are solely right-wing.

<sup>134</sup> In any case, such parties are far from a new phenomenon. Countries as varied as Austria, Denmark, Italy and Poland have had successful populist AEPs for many years and established parties have not been able to even win back, let alone retain, their voters.

<sup>135</sup> In Italy, populist AEP supporters are more likely to not place themselves *anywhere* on the left-right scale. This is therefore not radical in the sense that their voters are more extreme, but can also be interpreted as radical in the sense that they appear to completely reject conventional left-right politics


The results show clear patterns in Austria. Their populist AEP voters tend to be Eurosceptic, dissatisfied with democracy and ideologically right-wing (both in terms of self-placement and a desire for lower taxes (and less spending)). In addition, the perception of distance between established parties decreases the likelihood of supporting a populist AEP.<sup>136</sup> Evidence from 2008 further suggests that they desire more referendums (at least on the EU) and have lower levels of trust in governmental institutions.

**Figure 6.2: Populist AEP support in Austria, 2008**



<sup>136</sup> In 2013, however, this variable fails to cross the 95% threshold

**Figure 6.3: Populist AEP support in Austria, 2008 (left-right attitudes)**




The 2008 survey shows that the populist right-wing AEP voters were *more* likely to ascribe greater salience to immigration, and *less* likely to ascribe salience to balancing the national budget. That this survey was taken as the financial crisis was taking off is particularly telling. Mid-crisis, the populist right-wing AEP voters gave *less* salience to the national budget than they did to asylum. In spite of this, however, they were also more likely to believe that the financial crisis demonstrates that the financial market is fundamentally flawed. The 2008 survey shows no other significant support for attitudes relating to immigration or multiculturalism.

As such, what may well be key here is that populist right-wing AEP voters are not fundamentally different to other voters in terms of having anti-immigration attitudes. Such values have previously found to be widespread throughout electorates (Mudde 2010, p.1175-78). Instead, a key difference between populist AEP voters and other voters may well be how *important* anti-immigration attitudes are. Those who care about immigration more than anything else would be more likely to support a populist right-wing AEP, even if their attitudes themselves may be within the mainstream (assuming that the populist AEP also has ownership of this issue) (Mudde 2010, p.1181). If such attitudes are very mainstreamed but those who care more about immigration perceive the populist AEP is the best party for them, this may indicate that established parties will find it difficult to wrestle back issue ownership if they increasingly become associated with voters who are more moderate and/or less concerned about the issue.


The 2008 election itself was a snap election, called due to the centre-left SPÖ (governing with the centre-right ÖVP) demanding referendums on all future EU treaties. This gave the SPÖ a boost by roughly three or four percentage points in opinion polls, causing them to pull out of the government (Luther 2009, p.1050-51). The FPÖ focused primarily on anti-immigration, Euroscepticism and nationalism, essentially standard populist radical-right territory. The BZÖ provided it with intense competition with a similar platform (Luther 2009, p.1052). As such, it appears unsurprising that the populist right-wing in Austria following the

2008 election was motivated by both immigration laws and Euroscepticism, especially given the prominence of the latter in calling the election in the first place.

**Figure 6.4: Populist AEP support in Austria, 2013**



**Figure 6.5: populist AEP support in Austria, 2013 (left-right attitudes)**



The 2013 data shows a similar picture: a desire to stop immigration increases the likelihood of supporting populist right-wing AEPs, but no other anti-immigration variables are



statistically significant. All coefficients point in the predicted direction, though, and the belief that assimilation has become worse comes close to significance. In addition to this, the populist right-wing AEP voters were more likely to desire lower taxes and therefore less spending. In other words, their voters are *both* economically and socially right-wing. This is atypical, as Mudde (2007, p.136-37) noted populist radical right parties are generally economically centrist.

Nevertheless, Luther (2009, p.1059) notes the neoliberal agenda that the FPÖ in particular was associated with following their participation in government after the 1999 election. Müller (2009, p.515) further points out that both the FPÖ and BZÖ stressed that taxes should be cut, while welfare spending should conversely be increased. Both parties argued that this is not contradictory because asylum, immigration and the EU cost Austria money; problems which they also planned to deal with. As such, populist right-wing AEPs in Austria are associated with the economic right-wing, with the BZÖ especially emphasising tax cuts in the 2013 campaign (in order to differentiate itself from the FPÖ, which primarily focused on immigration) (Dolezal & Zeglövitš 2014, p.648). There is no firm evidence that their voters are motivated by authoritarianism more than other voters, though attitudes to crime almost reach significance in 2013.

TS did not have nativism at the core of its ideology, instead it had a strong anti-party sentiment, directed primarily at the SPÖ and ÖVP's dominance (Austria has a long history of grand coalitions. Luther notes that many former BZÖ and FPÖ voters supported the party nonetheless (and four BZÖ MPs defected to TS) (Luther 2015, p.153-57). In order to check for robustness, if TS is coded either as 0, or removed entirely, all results remain substantively identical with the exception of dissatisfaction with democracy which loses significance.<sup>137</sup> As such, this indicates that populist AEPs thrive on winning voters who feel left out of politics. This indicates that TS was still able to tap into a similar electorate, showing that populist AEPs may win over the votes of those who hold incongruent beliefs with the party (Van Hauwaert & van Kessel 2018).

In sum, the NES data from Austria in both 2008 and 2013 shows that populist (right-wing) AEP voters' attitudes broadly match expectations. They have clear right-wing preferences, particularly on immigration, and are Eurosceptic and dissatisfied with democracy. Furthermore, they are more likely to believe that they are not offered a clear choice by established parties. It does, however, appear that they are also economically right-wing. However, as the following analyses show, this is unique to Austria for populist right-wing AEPs (among the elections analysed). Nevertheless, this finding reflects country-specific factors, demonstrating the need to analyse specific elections in detail which can only be provided through NES data.

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<sup>137</sup> Where TS is coded as 0, perceived established party distance becomes positive and remains negative, though it was close to significance in the first instance

## Denmark

The four figures below show populist AEP support in Denmark in both 2007 and 2011 (Andersen et al 2007; Stubager et al 2011). Like Austria, only the populist right-wing is present in Denmark; the Danish People's Party (DF). As it so happens, Denmark shares both some interesting similarities and contrasts with Austria. Both countries have had governing populist right-wing AEPs (FPÖ and BZÖ in Austria, DF in Denmark). This reflects a greater degree of systemic integration for these parties. Yet while both Austrian parties have been full coalition partners, DF has never held a ministerial portfolio. Instead, it has provided parliamentary support to governing coalitions.<sup>138</sup> Strangely for a populist AEP, DF has competed in seven elections, entering government following four of them.<sup>139</sup> Approximately half of its existence as a party has been spent supporting governments.

It is therefore one of the more integrated populist AEPs analysed in both this chapter and the thesis, while it has also clearly maintained its distance from the political establishment at the same time. McDonnell and Newell (2011) noted that the DF has been particularly adept at maintaining a 'one foot in and one foot out' approach. In fact, DF has participated in governments as many times as Fidesz.<sup>140</sup> Given the peculiarities of DF, being a consistently successful governing populist AEP (by supporting minority governments), Denmark and DF makes an interesting country to view in more depth.

The results are consistent with expectations for a populist right-wing AEP. DF voters consider themselves to be right-wing, are Eurosceptic and are motivated by anti-immigration attitudes. In addition, following the 2007 election, perceiving a greater distance between established parties decreased the likelihood of supporting DF (as expected). However, in 2011 this effect is completely reversed: as voters perceive a greater distance between the Social Democrats and Venstre they are *more* likely to support DF.

While contrary to expectations, the nature of the campaign itself, and the unfolding economic crisis may have played a role in this. Not only was the campaign very long, but the economic crisis saw the economy top the issue agenda at the expense of values, such as immigration (Kosiara-Pedersen 2012, p.417-21). As such, it could be the case that it was more difficult for DF to cut through to voters by arguing that established parties are the same when its key topic of immigration was not the most salient issue. Governmental participation proving to voters that established parties are different after all is a theoretical possibility but given that in 2007 DF had already participated in governments, this is perhaps a less likely explanation.<sup>141</sup>

In addition, in 2007, DF voters were not more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. As discussed previously, satisfaction with democracy better measures how represented the voter feels. While the variable is not significant, it is still negative (in reference to those who are

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<sup>138</sup> As stated previously, this is classified as participating in government due to the pressures minority-government supporting parties such as DF face


<sup>139</sup> In fact, aside from its first election (1998), DF has never polled below 3<sup>rd</sup> place and supported governments following the 2001; 2005; 2007 and 2015 elections

<sup>140</sup> Nevertheless, the degree to which Fidesz integrated itself into the Hungarian political system remains unrivalled by *any* European party, let alone populist AEPs


<sup>141</sup> In addition, this variable is still significant in the above graphs for Austria, which has had two governmental populist AEPs

satisfied with democracy). DF's success, and the fact it was in government, would seemingly explain this. This variable was not asked in 2011 and so could not be included in the model.

**Figure 6.6: Populist AEP support in Denmark, 2007**




**Figure 6.7: Populist AEP support in Denmark, 2007 (left-right attitudes)**




Other results are consistent with expectations for DF voters. In both 2007 and 2011, DF voters were not motivated by economic issues. However, in contrast to Austria, the coefficients themselves for economic variables point to DF voters having economically left-wing attitudes. In and of itself, this is broadly in line with literature that demonstrates populist right-wing AEPs tend to have economically centrist platforms. However, issues such as immigration matter more to their voters.

**Figure 6.8: Populist AEP support in Denmark, 2011**



**Figure 6.9: Populist AEP support in Denmark, 2011 (left-right attitudes)**



Regarding the immigration attitudes in both years, there are several variables that are repeated in both surveys. In comparison to those voters who believe immigration rules have become too restrictive, both those who think they are fine as they are, and that they should actually go further are *more* likely to support DF. Likewise, those who believe that immigrants negatively affect culture are more likely to support DF, though this measure just fails to reach significance in 2011. Further to this, DF voters wish that headscarves should be banned, and that fewer refugees should be granted asylum (both in 2007). As with Austria,

there is not much evidence that DF voters are motivated by authoritarianism. This further demonstrates that it is issues around immigration that truly distinguish populist right-wing AEPs and their voters from other parties.


As such, DF voters are motivated by a variety of different factors, but most of those significant variables have one thing in common: they reflect culture and values, *not* economics. They are not more likely than other voters to believe that: immigrants should be discriminated against in the job market; immigrants should be restricted from accessing welfare and benefits. Instead, their voters appear more motivated by emotive issues such as Danish culture and the perception that immigrants affect it. This chimes with previous findings on nativism from the CSES analysis; populist right-wing AEP voters are largely concerned with issues around culture and identity, not economics, which are impossible to argue with objectively (as opposed to the economic impact of immigration, which can be measured). Instead, populist right-wing AEP voters are influenced by attitudes that form a core part of their identity. This finding is not unique to just Denmark.

## France

The six figures below show support for populist AEPs in French presidential elections (2007 and 2017) (CEVIPOF 2007; CDSP 2017). 2007 consists of solely Front National voters (FN), and 2017 contains both FN and France Unbowed voters (LFI). Dependent variables are coded as supporting Le Pen (Jean-Marie in 2007 and Marine in 2017), or Mélenchon in the first round of the Presidential election. While Marine Le Pen made it through to the second round in 2017, Mélenchon did not. Furthermore, as France has a semi-presidential system, voting behaviour in these elections is preferred over parliamentary voting behaviour.<sup>142</sup>


The results from all models are largely in line with expectations. In both 2007 and 2017 FN voters were more likely to be unhappy with democracy, though coefficient for LFI voters is negative in 2017. In any case, dissatisfaction with democracy is not significant for either party in 2017. This is not entirely surprising, as Macron rose to power, seemingly from nowhere (having never held elected office before), indicating that a desire for change to the traditional party system was not limited to populists. However, neither populist FN nor LFI voters appear to desire more referendums than other voters, and nor are they more likely to believe the economic effects of globalisation are bad.

**Figure 6.10: Populist AEP support in France, attitudes (2007)**




<sup>142</sup> In any case, the 2007 survey was fielded after the Presidential election but before the parliamentary elections, and therefore only asks for intended parliamentary voting behaviour

**Figure 6.11: Populist AEP support in France, EU's impact on France (2007)<sup>143</sup>**



**Figure 6.12: Populist AEP support in France, left-right attitudes (2007)**




<sup>143</sup> All variables are dummy variables, in reference to those who do not fear the EU's impact on the factors included in the graph




FN voters in both 2007 and 2017 were more Eurosceptic compared to all other voters, though LFI voters appear no more Eurosceptic than others. However, in 2007, while FN voters believed that EU membership on the whole is bad (compared to those who feel it is good), additional Eurosceptic variables show that *only* those related to French identity and immigration are significant. Those who fear the EU’s impact on their nationality and the levels of immigration were more likely to support FN. There is no impact from the other economic impacts of the EU (fearing the impact on welfare and unemployment), and no impact on the effect of EU membership on France’s world role. FN voters are motivated by their attitudes, but economic attitudes pale in comparison to those around culture and values.

By 2017, this has changed, where FN voters were more likely to believe the EU has a negative impact on national deficits and that customs barriers should be restored by France. Likewise, those who believe the EU is bad for democracy or has an impact on immigration are *not* more likely to vote for FN. So, the effect appears reversed, yet this is perhaps likely due to years of austerity measures and the increased role that the EU has had in economic affairs following the financial crisis (Serricchio et al 2013, p.60-61).


**Figure 6.13: Populist AEP support in France, attitudes (2017)**



**Figure 6.14: Populist AEP support in France, attitudes (2017)**



**Figure 6.15: Populist AEP support in France, left-right attitudes (2017)**



In any case, in 2017, nativist attitudes are a significant predictor of FN support. Likewise, coefficients for believing Muslims cannot be truly French, and that it is important to be born in France, and to have French ancestry to be French indicate that such attitudes increase FN

support. These variables, though, are not statistically significant. Likewise, the coefficients for believing it important to speak French, and to follow French traditions are negative (but not significant): they *decrease* the likelihood of FN support. So, it appears that there is much more of an ethnic dimension to FN support (as opposed to a civic dimension, where speaking French and following French traditions would be more important).

These trends are the same further back, in 2007, where FN voters were more likely to have a negative opinion of Islam and to no longer feel as though they are living at home. Wishing to ban Eastern European labour was not a significant predictor of FN support, consistent with other election studies analysed in this chapter. In sum, values and culture matter much more for FN voters, even regarding anti-immigration attitudes. Unlike Austria and Denmark, there is stronger evidence that populist right-wing AEP voters in France are motivated by authoritarian attitudes *as well as* nativism. LFI voters appear to have more liberal attitudes, but not significantly so compared to other voters. This remains consistent with expectations for populist left-wing AEPs; they focus on the economic left-right dimension.

The effect is completely reversed for LFI voters in 2017: the coefficient for nativist attitudes is negative, indicating a confrontational stance to the radical-right. The variable is just short of significance. Furthermore, they appear to be more likely to believe that Muslims can be truly French, and that it is not important to have French ancestry but *is* more important to follow French customs. Such variables are not statistically significant, but there is more evidence that LFI voters appear more confrontational to FN. The lack of significance for these variables in 2017, but expected directions of the coefficients, points to the fact that such polarised attitudes were very widespread in France. What may matter more is the salience that voters apply to such attitudes, rather than simply their direction.

As expected, believing that the state should have more control over the economy, compared to companies, is a predictor of LFI support. Likewise, their voters were significantly motivated by the belief that the financial crisis affected people such as themselves. Therefore, the economic dimension is key for LFI voters, as would be expected for a populist left-wing AEP. Both the 2007 and 2017 surveys show that FN voters were not significantly motivated by attitudes on the economic left-right scale.<sup>144</sup> This adds more evidence that FN voters have become more concerned by the economic dimension. Again, populist right-wing AEP voters having economically left-wing views is not entirely unexpected, but it does indicate the changing profile of FN support over time. It may be likely that years of austerity has taken its toll on FN supporters, increasing their concern over the economy.


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<sup>144</sup> The belief that workers should have the upper hand, over employers, comes close to significance for FN voters in 2017, however

## Germany


The two graphs below show populist AEP support in the German 2017 election. Germany has both a populist left-wing AEP (Die Linke) and a populist right-wing AEP (Alternative for Germany (AfD)). While Die Linke was founded in 2005 and has been represented in parliament since the 2005 election, AfD in 2017 was competing in only its second election.<sup>145</sup> In 2013 it failed to pass the legal threshold for representation, yet in 2017 its fortunes completely reversed as the party ended up with the third-highest amount of seats. Furthermore, the 2017 election took place at the height of concern over the refugee crisis, and after a grand coalition had been governing Germany since the 2013 election.

**Figure 6.16: Populist AEP support, attitudes (Germany 2017)**



<sup>145</sup> One of the predecessors to Die Linke, the Party of Democratic Socialism, had been represented in parliament since the 1990 election

**Figure 6.17: Populist AEP support, left-right attitudes (Germany 2017)**



Figures 6.16 and 6.17 above, shows populist left- and right-wing AEP voters in Germany (2017) (Roßteutscher et al 2019). For both AfD and Die Linke voters, neither the perceived distance between established parties nor Euroscepticism is statistically significant. Interestingly, a desire for more referendums is significant for only Die Linke voters. Given that referendums are a good way for citizens to most directly engage in policymaking (especially if they are binding), it is interesting that AfD voters are *not* motivated by their increased use.

The salience of neither the economic nor liberal-authoritarian dimension is not a significant predictor of Die Linke support, but AfD voters do appear to be motivated by different dimensions. They attach *more* salience to the liberal-authoritarian dimension, and *less* salience to the economic dimension. So, as per H9, this is as expected for AfD voters.<sup>146</sup> Die Linke, however, do not really appear to be carving out a clear niche for themselves, unlike AfD who appear to be targeting voters most motivated by the liberal-authoritarian scale. Neither set of voters appear motivated by authoritarianism, measured by support or opposition towards same-sex marriage (but the coefficients are still in the expected direction).

That the perceived distance between established parties is not a significant predictor for supporting either populist AEP may initially appear surprising. However, in more recent years, German politics has been characterised by grand coalitions, with the 2005 and 2013 (in

<sup>146</sup> The hypothesis specifically states anti-immigration attitudes, but such a question was not asked. However, given that a) immigration and nativism is a core component of AfD's platform and b) immigration and the refugee crisis was the most salient issue in 2017, it is reasonable to assume this dimension, for AfD voters, captures the issue of immigration

addition to 2017) election returning grand coalitions between the SPD and CDU/CSU. As such, perhaps the most likely explanation is that *most* voters perceive the two largest establishment parties to have similar platforms. As such, there may simply be not enough to distinguish populist AEP voters' judgements from all other voters.

Indeed, the average perceived distance in Germany (2017) is 2.14 (standard deviation: 1.58) whereas from the CSES the average score for all European countries (1997-2018) is 4.00 (standard deviation: 2.65). As such, it does appear that in 2017 the perceived distance is smaller than the average; this perhaps reflects the fact that there is a grand coalition. That being said, the simple presence of a grand coalition cannot be the only reason, as the models from Austria, above, showed that populist AEP voters were significantly less likely to believe there is greater distance between the established parties (both of whom were in government). What could be the case is that German voters are less familiar with grand coalitions compared to Austrian voters.

Regarding right-wing issues, clear ideological differences between Die Linke and AfD voters begin to emerge. Die Linke voters tend to believe that immigrants do *not* need to assimilate into German culture (whereas there is no effect on AfD voters). AfD supporters, on the other hand, hold nativist attitudes and believe that a refugee limit is necessary. As such, rather than not being motivated by immigration at all, Die Linke voters seem to have a confrontational approach to AfD. In and of itself, the lack of significance for integration of immigrants among AfD voters appears surprising. However, given the salience of refugees and asylum seekers in both Germany and 2017 more broadly, it is perhaps likely that their voters were motivated largely by this issue, but not more so than most other voters.

Nevertheless, AfD voters are plainly motivated by nativist attitudes, as expected. This is particularly noteworthy, given AfD's rapid change from a single-issue Eurosceptic party with a more economically neoliberal ideology to a stridently nativist platform (Goerres et al 2018; Arzheimer & Berning 2019). As such, it appears that AfD elites realised that the fastest way to grow the party was to appeal to those with nativist attitudes. With data from as recently as 2016, Goerres et al (2018) argue that AfD voters held right-wing economic preferences despite the party's transformation. Yet, Arzheimer and Berning (2019, p.8) argue that by the 2017 election the salience of immigration made more voters amenable to AfD's new nativist platform. Public opinion on nativist attitudes has not changed; voters are simply more likely to give more importance to such attitudes. The above analyses chime with Arzheimer and Berning's argument; that AfD voters are more motivated by the cultural dimension.

In terms of nationalism, among both AfD and Die Linke voters, only two coefficients are significant. Believing it important to be born in Germany *decreases* the likelihood of supporting AfD. This runs counter to expectations. However, for AfD voters the belief that it is important to have German ancestry is significant (at precisely .05).<sup>147</sup> As such, it is apparent that AfD voters believe that ethnicity is more important than place of birth (i.e. they are ethnocentric, which the findings from chapter five indicated).

In a similar fashion, left-wing attitudes are significant predictors of Die Linke support, while they have no significant effect on AfD voters. Die Linke voters believe that inequality must be reduced, and that socialism is inherently a good idea but has been poorly implemented in

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<sup>147</sup> Should age<sup>2</sup> be added into the model, the coefficient more comfortably passes the threshold

the past. Likewise, they are significantly more likely to be fearful of globalisation, unlike AfD voters. Given that AfD voters attach *less* salience to the economic dimension, it is unsurprising that none of these variables have a significant effect on their support. The direction of the coefficients still points to AfD voters being economically left-of-centre (with the exception of fear of globalisation).


However, the *salience* of economic policy typically comes a distant second to immigration and nativism among populist right-wing AEP voters. The German 2017 models continue to support this. In sum, populist AEP voters in Germany (2017) largely meet expectations: they share common grievances, but they diverge in their attitudes. Die Linke and AfD voters have clear (even confrontational) policy preferences. Nevertheless, their voters do still share some similarities as shown in Table 3 above. The two graphs above further demonstrate that populist AEP voters still choose their support carefully: they are unhappy at the political elite, but they are unhappy for different reasons.

## Hungary

The graph below shows support for Fidesz and Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) voters. The 2006 election saw MIÉP and Jobbik compete together in an alliance, winning under 2% of votes. Both Fidesz and MIÉP are classified as populist right-wing AEPs (in addition to Jobbik). The data itself is not specifically taken from a Hungarian National Election Study, but instead from the Comparative National Elections Project (Gunther & Beck). The 2006 general election is particularly noteworthy for Fidesz, as this is the first election in which it is classified as both populist *and* anti-establishment. Further to this, Fidesz in particular provides a rather more unique party to this chapter: in 2006 it is a *formerly* established party and, indeed, Viktor Orbán himself had been prime minister of Hungary (1998-2002). Similarly to Poland's Law and Justice therefore, Fidesz did not start out as a populist AEP, but instead transformed into one.<sup>148</sup>

The 2006 campaign resulted in the Hungarian Socialist Party remaining in power. This was the first time since the collapse of Communism that a Hungarian government was returned to power. Viktor Orbán himself has since won (re-)election in the 2014 and 2018 elections. In fact, since the fall of Communism Hungarian politics has been characterised by intensely bitter and divisive politics. Orbán's controversial premiership from 2010 onwards is a continuation of this (though there has been without question an increase in the intensity, and it is only under Orbán that Hungary has seen severe liberal democratic backsliding) (Dawson & Hanley 2016, p.21).

**Figure 6.18: Populist AEP support in Hungary (2006)**



After (narrowly) losing the 2002 election, Fidesz modified its platform to become both populist and nationalist. As is often noted among populist (right-wing) parties, Fidesz also

<sup>148</sup> Fidesz is by no means the *only* party to have turned from an establishment party to an AEP. Nevertheless, it is still uncommon and, as such, examining the 2006 Hungarian election is of particular interest



turned more towards the economic left-wing, decrying the wealth of the socialist prime minister. The failed 2004 referendum on granting citizenship to ethnic Hungarians in other countries further demonstrated to Orbán that simply relying on nativism alone is not enough. Instead, voters want to know specifically how their welfare will be improved (Enyedi 2015). As it so happens, working class voters in 2006 were significantly *less* likely than middle- and upper-class voters to support populist right-wing AEPs. This may, however, be due to Fidesz's long association with the centre-right.

Nevertheless, Figure 6.18 shows that populist right-wing AEP voters are likely to consider themselves right-wing, while the coefficient for support for wealth redistribution indicates that they appear to lean towards redistribution. In any case, this variable does not cross the 95% threshold, as would be expected: socio-economics are simply not *key* to populist (right-wing) AEP voters. The perception of established party distance (the Hungarian Socialist Party and Hungarian Democratic Forum) is, as expected, negative. However, it fails to reach significance. This may be explained by Hungarian politics being characterised by intense partisan competition, and voters therefore being more aware of differences between parties. Their voters further appear more dissatisfied with democracy, but this again is not statistically significant.

Populist right-wing AEP voters, on the other hand, are more likely to believe that ethnic minorities should assimilate, and that the election was not wholly free and fair. Both of these two variables are entirely as expected, showing that their voters appear nativist and intensely bitter about the result of the election. This latter finding is very much in-keeping with the polarised state of Hungarian politics.

On a further note, given the importance of authoritarianism to Fidesz in particular, three questions on this dimension were included. They measure the respondent's views on abortion rights, law and order over civil liberties and religious and moral values over individual freedom. Interestingly, none of these variables are statistically significant; populist right-wing AEP voters in Hungary simply were not motivated by authoritarianism (at least in 2006). Enyedi (2016, p.20) does note, though, that authoritarianism is particularly common throughout Hungary compared to the rest of Central Europe. As such, the Hungarian populist right-wing does not differentiate itself on the basis of authoritarianism, because this is much more common in Hungary. This further demonstrates the importance of attitudes towards nativism, in particular.


In sum, the results from Hungary (2006) are largely supportive of populist right-wing AEP voters. They are more likely than not to believe that ethnic minorities should assimilate, while they also challenge the fairness of the election (a point perhaps more unique to Hungary's polarised politics). Furthermore, their voters appear to lean towards the economic left-wing, but the lack of significance in any direction demonstrates that, as expected, values and culture are more important.

## Italy


Figures 6.19 and 6.20, below, show support for the Five Star Movement (M5S), Lega Nord (LN) and Brothers of Italy (FdI) following the Italian 2018 election (ITANES 2018). The latter two are populist right-wing AEPs, while M5S is characterised as a populist left-wing AEP. While it should not be classified as a part of the radical-left family (such as Podemos and Die Linke), M5S is *both radical and left-wing*. For instance, its key policy pledge in 2018 was to introduce universal basic income for the unemployed (Garzia 2019, p.674). By any measure, a clear commitment to approach unemployment and cost of living in such an innovative (and economically left-wing) manner offers a significant challenge to the liberal capitalist metapolicy. In any case, given M5S's general ideological ambivalence it is not normally classified as radical-left (using March's (2011) definition). This, however, is a specific party family and, much in the same way that Fidesz and UKIP are not radical-right parties, M5S is still populist and anti-establishment.

Both M5S and Lega Nord eventually ended up forming a coalition government together. While Lega Nord had governed previously, this is the first time that Italy had been governed by *only* populist AEPs. Following the 2019 European Parliamentary elections Lega Nord pulled out of the coalition government in an effort to force an election to benefit from surging popularity. The move swiftly backfired, with M5S remaining in government, forming a coalition with the established centre-left Democratic Party. As such, Italy's first populist AEP government remained a short-lived experiment. Nevertheless, despite ideological differences, as was the case with SYRIZA and ANEL, a spatially implausible coalition government did manage to form.

**Figure 6.19: Populist AEP support in Italy, 2018**



**Figure 6.20: Populist AEP support in Italy, 2018 (left-right attitudes)**



The results show that populist attitudes are a significant predictor of M5S support, although not for LN and FdI voters.<sup>149</sup> Perceived distance between established parties is, again, a significant predictor for M5S voters (though the size of the effect is small), but not for populist right-wing AEPs. This may be explained by the fact that Italian politics traditionally sees competition between left- and right-wing alliances. The 2018 right-wing alliance comprised of both LN and FdI, in addition to Silvio Berlusconi’s People of Freedom party. Nominally, the People of Freedom was the leading party for the alliance. M5S, on the other hand, did not participate in any alliance. Given the long-standing association of LN with the right-wing alliance, and FdI having being formed in 2013 as a splinter from the People of Freedom, it is perhaps not surprising that their voters are not motivated by the perception of convergence.

Trust in governmental institutions is not a statistically significant predictor for either populist left- or right-wing AEP voters. In a similar vein, only M5S voters are Eurosceptic. In reference to those who think the Eurozone is good for Italy, both those who think it is neither good nor bad, and bad are more likely to support M5S. Furthermore, in reference to those who think EU membership is good for Italy, those who think it is bad are more likely to support M5S. As such, M5S voters clearly maintain a sense of hostility towards the EU.

Populist right-wing AEPs, on the other hand, win over the votes of those who oppose immigration. Believing that there are too many immigrants, and that immigrants harm culture are both significant predictors of supporting LN or FdI. As was noted above, populist right-wing AEP voters are clearly motivated by *cultural* objections to immigration. The question asking whether or not immigrants harm or benefit the economy is not a significant predictor

<sup>149</sup> This is perhaps due to M5S voters being very populist, and coded as 0 when LN and FdI voters are analysed

of support for populist right-wing AEPs. M5S voters, on the other hand, appear to be more confrontational to populist right-wing AEPs on the issue of immigration. Their voters are more likely than other voters to believe that immigration enriches culture, though this variable just fails to cross the 95% threshold.

Finally, the ideological ambivalence of M5S in particular can be seen through recoding the standard left-right self-placement question into categories. 27.2% of all respondents state that they are placed “nowhere” on the left-right scale. Given M5S’s well-known ideological ambiguity, disregarding over one-quarter of all respondents as missing risks introducing severe bias to the models (Conti & Memoli 2015, p.525). A chi-square analysis between two dummy variables denoting if voters supported M5S, or another party, and if they placed themselves anywhere, or nowhere, on the left-right scale confirms this. M5S voters are significantly more likely ( $p < .05$ ) to place themselves “nowhere”. The same, incidentally, is true for *all* populist AEP voters. As such, the ‘nowhere’ responses should be treated substantively, rather than as missing data.

Figure 6.19 confirms these suspicions. In reference to those who are left-wing, M5S voters are *more* likely to be centre-left, centrist and (especially) ‘nowhere’ on the left-right scale. They are *less* likely to be right-wing. There is a similar picture for populist right-wing AEPs; compared to those who are left-wing, they are more likely to be centrist, centre-right and (especially) right-wing. The final ‘nowhere’ category is also a significant predictor of supporting populist right-wing AEPs, though the biggest predictor is the right-wing category. On the whole, M5S voters are likely to lean to the left, but are mostly associated with a rejection of traditional politics. LN and FdI voters are more likely to consider themselves right-wing, but there is also evidence of them rejecting traditional politics too.

Corbetta et al (2018, p.290) argued that M5S voters were characterised primarily by a distrust of politics; “[their] main motivations would appear to be the malfunctioning of democracy and voters’ dissatisfaction with, if not downright hostility towards, the party system and the political class.” Passarelli and Tuorto (2018) further argue that M5S voters (in 2013) were indeed characterised by their desire to vote for them out of protest, but that they *also* display clear attitudes. Specifically, their voters were found to be Eurosceptic and pro-immigration. The findings from above show that M5S voters are particularly protest minded, and that they *also* appear to have clear attitudes, specifically Euroscepticism. A belief that immigrants enrich culture also predicts M5S support, although the p-value falls just short of significance. Nevertheless, there is evidence that M5S voters therefore are more confrontational to LN and FdI voters on immigration.

However, the most powerful predictors of M5S support are the more protest-oriented variables: populist attitudes and left-right self-placement (specifically, ‘nowhere’). This should immediately be contrasted to populist right-wing AEP voters who appear neither Eurosceptic nor populist in comparison to all other voters.

Instead, LN and FdI are motivated by anti-immigration sentiment. M5S voters, on the other hand, are motivated more by Euroscepticism and seemingly have more of an ‘anti-politics’ profile, at least in terms of how they are likely to place themselves on the left-right scale. There is also some evidence that M5S voters are actually pro-immigration, indicating a more confrontational stance to the populist right-wing. While M5S has remained ambiguous on immigration (as opposed to overtly pro- or anti-immigration), given the ideological profile of

LN and FdI, it should be expected that voters concerned by immigration support one of these parties.


M5S voters are driven much more by populist, anti-establishment anger. This lack of a clear, coherent ideological platform may be able to explain why M5S managed to win so many voters as such a new party, but it also may mean that these voters will be much more willing to abandon the party. Unfortunately, further attitudinal questions were not asked in the survey so further analysis of M5S voters' attitudes is not possible, but the importance of distrust in institutions and Euroscepticism tracks with previous literature. How much (if at all) of an effect their more radical economic policies mattered to their voters cannot be tested using the 2018 ITANES survey, though. The findings for all other populist AEPs indicate that they rely on voters motivated by clear policy preferences, so M5S may well struggle to retain their popular support (especially being in government) without a clear, coherent ideology that their electorate adheres to.

## Netherlands

The four graphs below show populist AEP support in the Netherlands, in both 2006 and 2010 (Kolk et al 2006; Kolk et al 2012). These two elections saw two populist AEPs compete; the right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV) and the left-wing Socialist Party (SP). Furthermore, the two elections are both pre-financial crisis, and mid-crisis, while the fortunes of both parties are both notably different in each election.

The 2006 election was the first that the PVV competed in winning approximately 6% of votes, while the SP won a record high 16.6%. 2010, on the other hand, saw the PVV climb from the fifth-largest party to the third-largest, and the SP drop from third to fifth. The PVV would go on to provide parliamentary support to the government after the 2010 election. As such, the Netherlands provides a particularly interesting example for more in-depth analysis. In 2012, the PVV withdrew its support from the government, causing it to collapse, bringing about a snap election.

**Figure 6.21: Populist AEP support, Netherlands 2006**




The voters of both PVV and SP consider themselves right- and left-wing respectively, indicating that they are consciously choosing parties that represent their ideology. Perceiving greater distance between the two largest established parties, the centre-left PvdA and the centre-right CDA decreases the likelihood of supporting both the PVV and SP.<sup>150</sup> In other words, populist AEP voters wish to feel as though the dominant parties are offering them a choice. When voters perceive that there is not enough of a difference, then they become unhappy and turn towards more populist, radical alternatives such as PVV and SP. Populist

<sup>150</sup> The p-value for SP in 2010 just about fails to cross the 95% threshold, though the coefficient is still negative as expected


AEP voters are also more likely to desire more referendums, except PVV voters in 2010 (which just fails to cross the 95% threshold).

**Figure 6.22: Populist AEP support, Netherlands 2006 (left-right attitudes)**




Both sets of voters are more likely than others to hold Eurosceptic attitudes in 2006, but in 2010 the coefficients do not reach significance (though are pointed in the expected direction). Both sets of voters are again likely to be dissatisfied with democracy, though in 2010 the coefficient is reversed (but not significant) for SP voters. As would be expected, SP voters in 2006 believed big companies threaten democracy and that income differences need reducing. No attitudinal variables beyond left-right self-placement and a desire for more referendums are significant predictors of SP support in 2010, even on the economic left-right dimension. Reductions in government spending, and mortgage tax in particular, was the key topic of the 2010 election, following the financial crisis (van Holsteyn 2011, p.415). It may be the case that increased attention over the economy meant there was less to differentiate SP from others, beyond being *more* left-wing.

**Figure 6.23: Populist AEP support, Netherlands 2010**



**Figure 6.24: Populist AEP support, Netherlands 2010 (left-right attitudes)**



It is also worth noting that PVV voters in both 2006 and 2010 were likely to believe income inequality needs reducing, unlike SP voters.<sup>151</sup> It does suggest that the populist right-wing

<sup>151</sup> This coefficient for SP in 2010, however, comes close to significance and is pointed in the expected direction



*may* attract voters motivated by economic anxiety; unemployed voters were more likely to support PVV in 2010, too. Nevertheless, the evidence is mixed, as PVV voters desired tax cuts in 2010, but not in 2006. While the variables are not significant, the (mixed) direction of the coefficients still shows that populist right-wing AEP voters may hold economic left-wing attitudes, but this dimension simply comes in second place to cultural attitudes.

Coefficients related to immigration fail to reach significance for PVV voters in 2006 beyond the belief that illegal immigrants should be deported. While all coefficients for PVV voters point in the expected direction (more restrictive on immigration, asylum and foreign aid), their voters are not significantly more likely than others to hold such views. Given that 2006 was the first election that the party competed in, it may be the case that the party's lack of 'name recognition' was holding it back among those who oppose immigration. Nevertheless, by 2010, the PVV and Geert Wilders in 2010 still focused heavily on immigration and Islam van Holsteyn 2011, p.415). Those who believe: immigrants need to assimilate; more asylum applications should be rejected; foreign aid should be reduced; and that Muslim immigration should be stopped are more likely to support PVV over other parties.

Interestingly, SP voters are *more* likely than all other voters to reject more asylum applications (in 2006; the coefficient is reversed in 2010 but is not significant). In addition, SP voters in 2010 appear more likely than not to favour a ban on Muslim immigration (but this coefficient fails to cross the 95% threshold). Given that the Dutch party system is very crowded, at least in part due to their very permissive electoral system, voters who hold anti-immigration views supporting SP may make sense.


GroenLinks, as the Netherlands' green party, in particular would offer a home to economically left-wing *and* socially liberal voters who do not wish to support the major centre-left party (PvdA) (Grant & Tilley 2019, p.509). Furthermore, Gomez et al (2016) argue that SP is best characterised as a 'traditional' radical left party that sticks largely to Communist appeals (as opposed to 'new left' radical left parties that also emphasised issues such as feminism and minority rights). It may well be the case that GroenLinks won over the voters of economically left-wing, socially liberal voters, leaving the more socially conservative, economically left-wing voters for SP (Achterberg & Houtman 2006, p.88). Still, on the whole, SP voters are consistently motivated by radical-left attitudes, which remains consistent with expectations and not by the reintroduction of the death penalty. PVV voters, on the other hand, do believe it should be reintroduced, but only in 2006. This continues with the trend of mixed evidence regarding authoritarian attitudes on the right-wing.

## Spain

These final two graphs, below, show the results of populist AEP support in Spain in the November 2019 election (Centro de Investigaciones 2019). Both Podemos and Vox saw success, with Podemos entering government with the centre-left PSOE. This, though, was after lengthy and protracted coalition negotiations which initially failed (causing this second election in 2019). PSOE had been governing by itself as a minority government since winning a no-confidence vote in 2018. Incidentally, while Podemos entered government, perhaps the biggest winners of the election were the populist right-wing AEP, Vox.

Competing in their fourth election, they had only won parliamentary representation in April 2019. However, by November, they won approximately 15% of the vote (up from their previous 10%), taking third place as both the centre-right Partido Popular (PP) and Ciudadanos (C's) floundered, splitting the right-wing vote. Podemos, meanwhile, after the 2015 election (its first) has actually seen its vote share fall consecutively, from approximately 20% in 2015 to around 12% in November 2019. As such, while Podemos entered government following this election, it has had markedly different fortunes compared to Spain's other populist AEP, Vox.

**Figure 6.25: Populist AEP support, Spain Nov.2019**



Due to data limitations, several hypotheses are unable to be tested. Nevertheless, Spain is an important country to cover in more depth due to a) how much it was affected by the financial crisis (compared to most other European countries, especially in the North and West, such as Austria) and b) it has two populist AEPs with varying fortunes.

Figure 6.25 shows, as expected, that Podemos and Vox voters consider themselves left- and right-wing, respectively. Likewise, perceiving a greater distance between PSOE and PP decreases the likelihood of supporting either populist AEP: their voters do not feel as though

there is a clear difference between the two largest establishment parties. Again, as would be expected, Podemos and Vox voters consider themselves left- and right-wing respectively.

Furthermore, in reference to those who think the political situation in Spain was good, those who believe it to be bad are seemingly *less* likely to support Podemos (the coefficient, though, does just fail to cross the 95% threshold). The reverse is true for Vox voters. This may, however, be due there being a centre-left government for the first time since PP won power in 2011. In other words, Podemos supporters may have had more optimism at the time, especially so given that their party itself was also on the cusp of power.


Furthermore, the Moreno nationalism scale is of particular use in Spain, as there are a variety of national independence movements. Most notably so in Catalonia and the Basque country. Given that Vox advocates a highly centralised Spanish government, the finding that those who consider themselves to be more sub-national (e.g. Catalan) than Spanish are *less* likely to support Vox (in reference to those who only consider themselves Spanish). The same, however, is true for the left-wing: compared to those who consider themselves only Spanish, those who absolutely do not consider themselves Spanish are less likely to support Podemos. Again, compared to those who only feel Spanish, those who feel *mostly* Spanish are less likely to support Podemos. Despite being left-wing, then, it appears as though Podemos are still supported by nationalists.

There are two possible, not mutually exclusive, reasons for this. Firstly, given that national independence movements are particularly prominent in Spain, the patterns of responses to the question may be influenced by events in Catalonia. Podemos, despite being left-wing, still oppose Catalan independence (but did favour a referendum) (Orriols & Cordero 2016, p.476). Secondly, populist parties (such as Podemos) use language and campaign rhetoric that is close to nationalism, by arguing that the Spanish nation has been let down by the corrupt elites (Casero-Ripollés et al 2017, p.988).

As such, it is entirely possible that populists on the left-wing feel a sense of nationalism. However, as stated previously, this is *civic* nationalism. Indeed, the nationalism of Podemos is characterised by a desire to regain Spain's sovereignty from political elites, and Podemos is particularly proud of Spain being both multicultural and multinational (Ivaldi et al 2017, p.368; Ramiro & Gomez 2017, p.111-12). So, it certainly appears the case that both Podemos and Vox voters seek to defend their nation, but that they have very different visions of both what the nation is, and what it should be.

Finally, Figure 6.26 shows the results of two further binary variables, asking whether or not the respondent was influenced by the Catalan independence protests and the exhumation of Franco. Neither populist AEPs' voters were influenced by Franco's exhumation, but those who were influenced by the Catalan protests were more likely to support Vox. This is unsurprising, given Vox's strong stance on national independence. Vox go so far as to call for the suspension of the Catalan parliament, and for independence parties to be banned, on top of a right-wing nationalist, anti-immigrant and anti-feminist platform (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019, p.2-3). The effect is reversed for Podemos voters: those who were influenced by the protests were less likely to support them. While Podemos are not strongly pro-independence, it is more likely to be the case that their voters simply gave less salience to the protests relative to the economy.

**Figure 6.26: Populist AEP support, Spain Nov.2019 (left-right attitudes)**



### Discussion

The findings from these analyses point to a number of similarities from chapters three and five, demonstrating the robustness of the thesis. There are four main additional findings. Firstly, gender, and secondly unemployment inconsistently predict populist AEP support. Thirdly, populist AEPs represent polarisation where they coexist on both the left and right. Fourthly, populist left-wing AEPs are not carving out a niche territory for themselves.

The gender gap in populist AEP support has been studied previously and shown to exist (Harteveld et al 2017; Spierings & Zaslove 2017). The general consensus in literature is that men are not more likely than women to hold similar attitudes, including nativism, but that men and women ascribe different levels of importance to attitudes (Harteveld et al 2015; Spierings & Zaslove 2015), and that men are more combative than women (Spierings & Zaslove 2017). Table 6.2 showed that women are not always less likely than men to support a populist AEP, however.

Harteveld et al (2017) find that women are less likely than men to support stigmatised and extreme parties. Mudde (2007, p.116) argued that while women are more likely to support mainstreamed parties, not those perceived of as extreme, “*perception* is more important than *reality* (emphasis in original)” (i.e. that women simply need to believe the party is not radical/extreme, even if it actually is). The issue then is more likely to be that larger populist AEPs are not *perceived* as being too radical, even where they are objectively radical and anti-establishment.

The effect of gender tends not to reach statistical significance in those countries (e.g. Austria) where there are long-standing populist AEPs that campaign on highly salient issues. It is, in fact, particularly telling that in the French 2017 election, there was no gender difference in support for the Front National, but women were less likely than men to support France Unbowed. The salient difference here seems more likely that women were less likely to support a newer, radical party that was fighting to be heard against the overwhelmingly dominant En Marche! and Front National, rather than women being less likely to be left-wing. This indicates that the party’s position within the political system and its systemic integration should also be considered; populism alone does not reveal the full picture, adding further nuance to Spierings & Zaslove’s (2017) analysis of the populist left- and right-wing.

Secondly, unemployment only predicts populist AEP support in Austria and Spain (though the result was negative only in Italy). This lends support to a key tenet of the thesis: attitudes matter more than socio-demographic factors such as unemployment. Unemployment offers merely a snapshot in time; it is usually short-term, not long-term, and so when the survey is asked may make a difference. Chapter three showed those who had been affected by the financial crisis in the last *year* were more likely to support populist AEPs.

Objective measures may not be better suited to measure differences in voting behaviour. Those who are poorest in society are best characterised by a lack of engagement in politics. What may matter more is voter's interactions with and perceptions of the economy. Eatwell and Goodwin (2018, p.214) make this same point, arguing that objective measures "are actually poor predictors of support for national populism". Instead, they argue that attitudes to relative deprivation may be more important. Spruyt et al (2016, p.344) also argue that those with populist attitudes are characterised more by subjectively experienced vulnerability, not material vulnerability.

In Italy, those who struggle to (or cannot) make ends meet are more likely to support populist left- *and* right-wing AEPs. In France, voters who believe 'people like me' were more affected by the financial crisis than those poorer than them were more likely to support the left-wing LFI. This would be largely consistent with expectations: that populist AEP voters *feel* hard-done-by, yet the fact that it is significant only for a populist left-wing AEP indicates that economics, in general, is not important for the right.<sup>152</sup>

So, there is some limited evidence that negative voter perceptions of the economy lead to populist AEP support. Eatwell & Goodwin seemingly overstate the importance of this for the right-wing, however; the only explicit support for negative perceptions is for the left-wing.<sup>153</sup> The key conclusion from the NES data below and all other models is that younger, lowly educated, working class voters support populist AEPs. What is much clearer is that attitudes and values are key determinants of populist AEP support.

Thirdly, then, attitudes are fundamental to populist AEP support. Their voters are certainly economically vulnerable, but attitudes determine *which* populist AEP a voter supports. Their support is not because they are mindlessly protesting "the elite" but because the elite simply do not represent them; they perceive established parties to have converged. To that end, populist attitudes predict support for populist AEPs; their voters believe they *can* be represented but that the corrupt elites will not do so. Euroscepticism plays a key role in this regard; it is a supranational, elite-dominated institution that populist AEPs and their voters feel holds back the nation and its people.

However, populist left- and right-wing AEP voters are motivated by radical socialism or nativism. These preferences persist when other attitudinal variables such as populist attitudes, trust in institutions and/or dissatisfaction with democracy are controlled for. Populist AEPs therefore attract socio-economically similar voters for similar reasons: they have radical

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<sup>152</sup> For this same variable, the category stating all were affected equally is nearly (but still not) significant for Front National voters, so there is loose evidence that perceptions may matter

<sup>153</sup> As stated above, there is evidence that all populist AEP voters in Italy are more likely to struggle to make ends meet. However, this is not a significant relationship among populist right-wing AEPs (either in Italy or elsewhere)

attitudes and desire clear representation. Yet this is largely where their voters' similarities end. Populist AEP voters do not agonise over supporting Podemos or Vox.

As such, populist left- and right-wing AEPs are *variations of the same phenomenon*. There are certain attitudinal factors that predict support for populist AEPs, left- or right-wing. Populist attitudes do not overwrite left-right ideology. Their voters have very strong beliefs, and so the ideological platform of the populist AEP matters at least as much as their ability to represent them better than the established parties. Voters, ultimately, perceive themselves as left- or right-wing, and then further identify a party that best represents their (more radical left- or right-wing) views as well as their socio-economic group (Rooduijn et al 2017, p.541).

Populist AEP voters' attitudes remain remarkably similar across time and space: pre- and post-financial crisis, and countries with different experiences of the crisis (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands or Italy and Spain). Their support may well have been solidified by the financial crisis as Hobolt and Tilley (2016) argue, but populist AEPs really benefit from a crisis of representation, not just a financial crisis. Voters are more radical and are asking increasingly searching questions of the political establishment.

Populist AEPs, therefore, are generally very polarising features of a political system (Rooduijn et al 2017). The parties and their voters are policy-seeking, and where populist left- and right-wing AEPs coexist in one country, their voters tend to hold confrontational attitudes on nativism/immigration.<sup>154</sup> The failed coalition between M5S and LN in Italy appears to be at least partly caused by a lack of ideological congruence. M5S, voters are largely characterised by anti-political sentiment (but some of their voters also seemingly lean to the left).<sup>155</sup>

LN voters, on the other hand, are largely motivated by xenophobia, while M5S voters appear to be pro-immigration. As such, their short-lived coalition appeared largely driven by their shared populist, Eurosceptic ideologies, but this was clearly not self-sustaining. As such, it appears that populism can certainly bridge ideological gaps, but it is a very shaky foundation upon which to build a coalition: “[e]xamples of ... cooperation are exceptions that prove, or at least predict, a rule – a rule of radical distinctions” (Rooduijn et al 2017, p.556).

These results therefore go much further than studies by Rooduijn (2018), who searches for attitudinal similarities, and Visser et al (2014) who do not explain differences in left-right self-placement between radical left- and right-wing voters. While Rooduijn et al (2017) argue that these differences are key to voters choosing left- or right-wing parties they do not examine the degree of polarisation *within* countries. Populist left- and right-wing AEP voters disagree on fundamental issues of what is important, and what actions the government should be taking. Populism can bridge ideological gaps, but there still needs to be a solid-enough foundation in the first instance.<sup>156</sup>

Lastly, if a party has a clear niche for itself in the electorate, it will enable it to more clearly own an issue which will inevitably harm other parties. Over the last few decades, no other

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<sup>154</sup> The Netherlands appears to be a caveat to this; as stated above, this may be due to the dynamics of the Dutch party system wherein GroenLinks may take economically left, socially liberal voters

<sup>155</sup> M5S is the only such party that does not have a more formal ideology, yet in 2018 it campaigned on the economic left-right dimension by wishing to bring in universal basic income for the unemployed

<sup>156</sup> There was in Greece's 2015 coalition government, but not for Italy's 2018 coalition between M5S and LN

issue can truly come close to immigration in terms of the impact it has had on party systems across Europe. This impact has been particularly magnified in recent years, even after years of harsh austerity in many countries. Where populist AEPs have thrived, perhaps Greece is the only case where the economy has remained the most salient issue over immigration. Even in Spain, by 2019 issues such as Catalan independence had taken precedence over the economy, which appears to be significantly harming Podemos. Their vote share has nearly halved in just four years, while Vox managed to burst onto the scene in a similar fashion to Podemos in 2015.

The issue that Podemos (and many populist left-wing AEPs) appears to face among the electorate is that it does not contribute a new, cross-cutting issue to the political arena. Instead, its support is won on the basis of it being *more* left-wing, and populist. However, with PSOE in the ascendancy, their share of the vote is being diminished. Further, in-depth analysis in Spain would reveal if this is due to increased confidence that PSOE is suitably left-wing and/or if it has proven to voters that it is not too elitist. In any case, Spain can be contrasted with the findings from Austria and Germany.

Following the 2008 election, even as the crisis was unfolding, populist right-wing AEP voters in Austria placed *more* salience on asylum and *less* salience on the national budget. Furthermore, AfD voters in Germany placed *more* salience on the socio-cultural dimension and *less* on the socio-economic dimension. As such, populist right-wing AEPs have successfully carved out a niche for themselves by attracting the votes of socially conservative voters who are dissatisfied with the political establishment. Populist left-wing AEP voters are certainly unhappy at the establishment too, but they simply do not inject an issue such as nativism into the political arena.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter aimed to analyse NES data from a variety of countries (Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western Europe), containing a variety of populist AEPs (left- and right-wing, old and new, governmental and non-governmental). There are a number of important conclusions from the above analyses. Firstly, attitudes truly are the key drivers behind populist AEP support. Secondly, because of this populist AEPs represent polarisation on key issues. Finally, populist right-wing AEPs have been more successful than those on the left at carving out a niche for themselves.

Firstly, previous socio-economic trends previously identified in chapters three and five continued to broadly hold: populist AEP voters tend to be more economically vulnerable. However, the analyses also point to a number of interesting results regarding, in particular, gender and unemployment. Older and more mainstreamed populist AEPs see no gender gap in their support. More rigorous testing is required, but this adds much further nuance to existing studies on the gender gap in populist AEP support, and indicates that Mudde's (2007) notion that the perception, not reality, of extremity matters for the gender gap in support. Likewise, unemployment has very little impact on populist AEP support. Voters' perceptions of their place in society may be better placed to predict populist AEP support. The manner in which populist AEP voters engage with the economy is a key question to answer further, such as their experience of austerity and/or precarious employment.

Instead, attitudes clearly set populist AEP voters apart from other voters. Populist left- and right-wing AEP voters are united by what they oppose (the EU, established parties and established politics) but not by what they propose (nativism on the right, radical socialism on the left). They therefore represent polarisation, both in terms of the overall left-/right-wing families, but within the same country where they coexist. Countries such as Germany and Spain are increasingly stretched and polarised. Rooduijn et al (2017) speculated as much, but these analyses go one step further on a country-by-country basis, showing that populist AEP voters' differences should not be minimised. Hobolt and Tilley (2016) demonstrate the importance of the financial crisis, yet these results go much further in underlining that populist AEP success is a crisis of representation, not just due to financial crisis.

Lastly, populist right-wing AEPs have been successful at carving out a niche for themselves, unlike the populist left-wing. This can largely be traced back to the rise of postmaterialist values and resultant backlash (Inglehart 1990; Ignazi 1992). Populist right-wing AEPs typically occupy clear territory in the political arena (Kriesi 2010) and utilise nativism/anti-immigration policies as a cross-cutting issue that targets voters on both the economic left and right, as long as they are culturally conservative. Populist left-wing AEPs, however, compete against established centre-left parties and Green parties on the economic left-right dimension. Beyond the economy, they tend to have little else going for them beyond momentum and populist, anti-establishment sentiment and have no clearly defined electorate for just themselves. The prospects for populist left-wing AEPs to prosper and grow further seem much more limited without high salience for the economy and low credibility for centre-left parties. Even then, they may well find themselves competing against Green parties, the success story of the 2019 European Parliament and 2017 German elections.



## Concluding remarks

### Introduction

The detailed analyses of populist AEPs in Europe that constitute this thesis have offered a number of important conclusions. These are fourfold. Firstly, populist AEPs (indeed, all AEPs) are ideologically disparate yet they still share key characteristics. Secondly, populist AEPs benefit from political opportunity structures. A poorly performing economy, established party convergence and fewer (AEP) competitors increase success. Thirdly, populist left- and right-wing AEP voters share both similarities *and* differences. Finally, the systemic integration of populist AEPs is important to consider, especially as in more recent years they have more frequently entered government than ever before. These four overall conclusions are discussed and reflected on, before potential future research is discussed.

### Similar, but not identical: analysing populist left- and right-wing AEPs together

Existing definitions for AEPs all offer innovative ways of not just categorising parties, but also for viewing political competition and the differing role parties play in the system. The specific role parties play is where most definitions tend to stumble. The majority take into account AEPs' objections to 'metapolicies'. Any party should be considered anti-establishment if it fundamentally opposes a prominent metapolicy and if it seeks retain this ideology over time.

AEPs, as such, are primarily defined on the basis of their ideology, and their systemic integration is a conceptually distinct concept. Focusing on ideology while keeping systemic integration distinct provides a realistic picture of party ideology and competition. Other definitions struggle to fit parties such as the FPÖ and LN into an AEP category despite these parties demonstrably desiring fundamental change to the political system. As such, the new definition offers a marked improvement upon existing definitions due to its operationalisability and theoretically well-justified criteria.

The thesis itself focused on a further subset; populist AEPs. Voters have become more willing to criticise established parties and to question whether or not they can represent them. This has led to *populist* AEPs to prosper in particular, as populism is fundamentally anti-elitist and places the conflict between the 'good people' and 'corrupt elites' at the heart of its discourse. Populism as such is used in very similar ways by populist AEPs, left- or right-wing.

Because this thesis focused on AEPs across the political spectrum it offered further insight into the phenomenon of populist AEP success by not being blinded to their similarities (at the country-, party- and voter-level). Analysing populist left- and right-wing AEPs together is therefore a key contribution because it shows a more realistic picture of the depth and breadth of the wider phenomenon of populist AEP support across Europe. There is no true populist AEP 'family', though. The similarities that (populist) AEPs share between themselves are largely strategic and behavioural, not ideological. They oppose key metapolicies and utilise populism to win voters who increasingly desire more radical reform of the political system. The ideological congruence between all populist AEPs both begins and ends with populism and Euroscepticism, however. Ultimately, populist AEPs are a variation of the same phenomenon. They identify a common enemy, but they and their voters are motivated primarily by their left-right ideology. The results show that researchers should pay further

attention beyond distinct party families such as the ‘populist radical right’ in order to understand which (and why) parties and voters challenge liberal democracy.

While they are certainly very similar in terms of their overall goals (fundamentally reforming the political system), populist left- and right-wing AEPs typically represent polarisation beyond a few shared attitudes among their voters (e.g. Euroscepticism). This thesis therefore adds further nuance to studies such as Visser et al (2014) who do not explain the differences between left and right that they find. It also goes further than Hobolt and Tilley (2016) and Rooduijn et al (2017) by examining differences within individual countries as well as over time, showing how populist AEP supporter attitudes have changed and solidified over time.

### **When do populist AEPs prosper? Crisis, convergence and competition**

Populist AEPs benefit from financial downturn, converging established parties and less competition from fellow AEPs. Populist AEPs are particularly able to claim that the established parties are all the same and that they do not offer a real alternative. Where recession is combined with a widespread feeling that many voters are not being represented by established parties, then populist AEPs can benefit immensely.

Kriesi (2016) argued that longer-term factors resulting from the financial crisis can lead to significant changes in party support; years of austerity, sluggish growth and increasingly precarious employment take their toll on voters. As many populist AEP voters are more economically vulnerable, it would be remiss to control *only* for purely aggregate-level economic measures. As such, taking more measures such as inequality and disposable income gives a more detailed understanding of how voters interact with the economy. This therefore provides more nuance to Kriesi and Pappas (2015), who solely looked at GDP, unemployment and government debt.

Furthermore, populist AEPs benefit from increased space in the political arena. They can consolidate their position, cementing themselves in the eyes of voters that they offer a true alternative to the established parties. On the demand-side, perceiving established parties to be close together predicts populist AEP support; their voters do not feel as though the establishment offers them a choice. These two levels *both* need to be tested; populist AEPs may well benefit from increased space but this does not mean that their supporters perceive established parties to have converged, nor does it mean that they care. This therefore offers further nuance to previous studies by Abedi (2002), Carter (2005), and Arzheimer and Carter (2006) who do not differentiate between supply-side party competition and voter perception of convergence.

Populist AEPs also benefit when they face fewer (AEP) competitors. While no two parties are ever identical, AEPs with similar ideologies still compete for roughly the same pool of potential voters. Larger (or at least governmental) populist AEPs may well be more likely to face competitors, perhaps as they are more likely to disappoint voters. They are also in a better position to see off fellow AEP competitors. These three findings show that populist AEPs are sensitive to their environment; they benefit from economic downturns, convergence and fewer competitors. In such circumstances, voters are more receptive to radical parties, and populist AEPs are able to get their message across.

## **Variations of the same phenomenon: distinguishing between left and right**

Together, populist left- and right-wing AEPs are variations of the same phenomenon. Their voters share certain similarities both socio-demographically and attitudinally but are best characterised by their ideological radicalism. Their voters tend to be economically vulnerable and they question elite, established parties and institutions such as the EU. Established parties do not offer a clear choice to these voters, and they are generally dissatisfied with democracy. As such, populist AEPs have benefited not solely from an economic crisis, but they have also benefited from a crisis of representation. Those with more radical policy preferences feel as though they have been shut out of politics, and so have turned to more radical parties. The individual-level analyses in this thesis all show that populist left- and right-wing AEP voters are motivated by radical socialism and immigration/nativism respectively. They therefore have very clear policy preferences and perceive that established parties cannot, or will not, represent them. Each populist AEPs' supporters are therefore not ideologically disparate. They support the party because it offers policies they believe in.

Scholarship on these differences is, at best, limited and inconsistent in its conclusions. Visser et al (2014) find evidence of such differences, but do not examine or explain them further. Rooduijn (2018) searches only for similarities (and finds few). Hobolt and Tilley (2016) and Rooduijn et al (2017) both search for differences, yet the former under-emphasise the depth and strength of such attitudes and overestimate the ability of established parties to confront populist AEPs. They are not a new phenomenon and established parties have had years to win their voters back. They have not done so, because an increased number of voters perceive that established parties do not represent them.

Rooduijn et al (2017) recognise the degree of polarisation that these parties represent yet do not clearly examine these on a country-by-country basis. Chapter six does so, confirming that populist left- and right-wing AEP voters agree on little beyond Euroscepticism (which itself is determined by left-right ideology). Yet chapter three also demonstrated that populist AEP supporter attitudes have changed over time; Euroscepticism only predicted populist left-wing AEP support in 2014 while immigration did so for the right-wing only after the financial crisis. These parties are distinct, but this thesis shows how now-familiar attitudes still took time to truly harden.

Consequentially, this polarisation also demonstrates an issue that established parties (in particular) face. Where politics is becoming more polarised, and where populist AEPs cement themselves into mainstream debate, how will they recapture such voters without losing more moderate voters? This may well prove difficult; established parties generally appear more comfortable to try to cooperate (often at arm's length) with populist AEPs than to either directly confront or copy their platform. Indeed, the cordon sanitaire placed around both Vlaams Belang and Sweden Democrats have come under intense pressure as a result of their increased success (BBC News 2019; Milne 2019). Even if populist AEPs lose votes, their (former) voters' attitudes are not likely to disappear. Where populist AEPs are in a position of power, understanding exactly what their voters expect, and accept, is particularly important. This leads to one final conclusion; that the systemic integration of populist AEPs is important to consider.

## Populist AEPs in power and in the mainstream

Populist AEPs entering government is not a new phenomenon; even before the financial crisis they had entered government in countries as varied as Austria, Denmark and Poland. However, only in recent years has it become a rather more common occurrence. However, it was also found that populist AEPs that enter government tend to lose votes. Heinisch's (2003) notion that populism is doomed to failure does not explain the Danish People's Party, Fidesz and Law and Justice to name three governmental populist AEPs. Akkerman (2011) and Akkerman and de Lange (2013) argue that the onus is on the party to adapt to government.

Populist AEPs are not prone to adapting, but this is *not* because of their populist ideology. Akkerman (2011) and Akkerman and de Lange (2013), however, do not test whether or not government approval has an effect on populist AEP support where one governed. This is a considerable gap in the literature given that public opinion is fundamental to such an argument. Chapter five addressed this concern, showing that populist AEP voters are not inherently protest-oriented but instead can approve of governments and be satisfied with democracy where such parties govern.

Further understanding how governmental AEPs do adapt, however, should be of particular importance. It was demonstrated that populist attitudes *decrease* the likelihood of supporting a governmental AEP. When governmental approval is taken into account, populist attitudes continue to predict populist AEP support. In other words, it appears that populism may mean different things to different voters. Voters may associate governmental populist AEPs with the national political elite, hence the negative interaction effect. Populist AEPs do not immediately abandon their populist ideology. Instead, they tend to adapt it and focus their attacks on supranational actors (Rori 2016, p.1337; Hegedüs 2019, p.420-21). Is this done systematically, or does it depend on the party's ideology (or perhaps the individual party)? In sum, above all else, governmental populist AEP voters reward the party if they feel represented by them.

As one final case in point, as populist AEPs enter the political mainstream, their support base appears to change. Specifically, it appears to broaden; larger parties are less likely to see a gender gap in their support. This is likely to be because women are less likely to support a toxic party more aggressive in its discourse. However, 'mainstream' and systemic integration are hardly the same thing, despite the terms often being used interchangeably. The Front National sees no gender gap in its support, despite having never been in power (and is in fact the subject of a cordon sanitaire).

Instead, the Front National is a (very) popular populist AEP that has been shut out of the French political system. There was, however, a gender gap in the (considerably smaller) Danish People's Party electorate, despite it having supported four coalition governments during its lifetime. This suggests that how the party is viewed among the electorate, and how much it has altered popular political discourse is *not* the same thing as systemic integration. This is not a minor point and is something previous research has rarely taken into consideration, adding further nuance to previous studies by Hartevelde et al (2015) and Spierings and Zaslove (2015; 2017).

## Populist AEPs in Europe: reflections on literature

The above points provide summaries of the main conclusions reached from the analyses. Together, they point to a number of implications for the wider literature on populist AEPs. Firstly, socio-demographically similar voters can support ideologically very different parties. Literature needs to focus more on these differences, and why they emerge among similar voters. Secondly, the political system and other parties (especially the largest centre-left and centre-right parties) matter in determining satisfaction with representation. There is an extensive literature on this more broadly which does not focus on populist AEPs, despite them offering a distinct challenge to established politics. Thirdly, populist AEPs prosper from polarisation and an unwillingness to compromise.<sup>157</sup> How deeply entrenched is this, and what are the consequences for policy-making and political discourse? Fourthly, and finally, the mainstreaming (i.e. widespread popularity and support) of these parties should be taken into account.

Regarding the first point, the differences between populist AEP voters is an important but still understudied theme in the wider literature. As stated in the introduction, there are two main issues with scholarship on the parties studied in this thesis. Firstly, the majority of literature looks at either the left *or* the right, not both together (e.g. Rydgren 2005; Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Oesch 2008; Ramiro 2016). Such studies yield important conclusions as to both the socio-demographics and attitudes of the parties' voters, but also inherently miss out on wider trends, such as increased distrust with established politics more broadly, that are common to populist AEPs on both sides of the political spectrum. This obfuscates reasons for the appeal of populist AEPs in general (i.e. how Euroscepticism, convergence (and so on) drive anti-elitism and ideological radicalism).

In addition, where literature *does* examine both left and right, it tends to focus on similarities between their support, thus minimising differences (e.g. Visser et al 2014; Spierings & Zaslove 2015; Rooduijn 2018). Studies that consciously examine similarities *and* differences (e.g. Hobolt & Tilley 2016; Rooduijn et al 2017) are too few and far between, which only just scratch the surface of the wider picture of populist AEP support. The results from the analyses of this thesis are that populist AEPs, left- or right-wing, benefit from similar political opportunity structures: crisis, convergence and (less) AEP competition. Their voters are also: socio-economically vulnerable, Eurosceptic, dissatisfied with democracy, perceive convergence and hold populist attitudes.

As such, populist AEPs profit from the same phenomenon of increasing distrust and unhappiness with established politics; more voters are questioning established policies and turn to more radical options. *However*, voters still ultimately support a populist *right-wing* (or left-wing) AEP, not simply the first one they come across. Key left- or right-wing attitudes such as nativism or radical redistribution consistently predict support for such parties and the depth of support for such policies should not be understated. Articles that focus on differences as well as similarities are few and far between (Hobolt & Tilley 2016; Rooduijn et al 2017) but are important for understanding populist AEP support more broadly. Where focusing on both left and right, literature should take into account the ideological motivation

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<sup>157</sup> Their anti-establishment nature is not solely important here. Populism, too, drives this because it separates society into the people vs the elites, and states that the two sides are in conflict

behind voting behaviour. This would logically dictate that there will still be differences between left- and right-wing parties, regardless of theoretically justified similarities.

Much research also focuses directly on populist AEPs (and their voters). There is also scope, though, for questions such as how other parties respond to populist AEPs' key issues (e.g. Abou-Chadi & Krause 2020) and how populist AEPs affect political discourse and participation more broadly (e.g. Immerzeel & Pickup 2015; Ardag et al 2020; Pirro & Portos 2021). Both supply and demand, therefore, are also important to take into account; voters respond to what they are offered, and parties react to public opinion.

On this note, moving on to the second point, the political system (and voters' perceptions and interactions with it) affect populist AEP support. Populist AEPs offer policies that are important to many voters, who feel the need to turn to these parties because they believe only they offer a real alternative (Hobolt & Tilley 2016). Likewise, chapter five argued that populist AEP voters are not inherently protest-oriented and always dissatisfied with democracy. As their voters are motivated by ideology and a desire to be well-represented, where they perceive governments comprising populist AEPs to be performing well, they will continue to support them. They need to feel as though there is a party in government that cares for them. They need to feel as though there is a party in government that cares for them.

However, questions still remain that literature could address in the future. Populist AEPs claim to offer true alternatives; this is a key message they utilise. Chapters five and six show that their voters perceive established party convergence and chapter four demonstrated that the parties themselves benefit from convergence. There is a significant amount of research into how voters perceive party policy shifts (Adams et al 2011; Fortunato & Stevenson 2013; Adams et al 2016). There is very little research that focuses specifically on populist AEPs, despite their prominence. Do populist AEP supporters simply just believe that there is established party convergence, even when they diverge? If so, then this raises significant questions as to what more centrist parties can do to appeal to such voters, and why voters feel like this.

Hobolt and Tilley, in their (2016) study argue that established parties may be able to win back such voters by offering new, different policies. Beyond the United Kingdom, post-Brexit, populist AEPs have not been terribly diminished.<sup>158</sup> This leads to the third point. Populist AEP support represents an increasingly polarised electorate that is also unwilling to compromise. This is a key point of Rooduijn et al's (2017) study which offers a slight contrast to that of Hobolt and Tilley's (2016) article. Parties may well have to choose between more moderate *or* more radical voters.

What populist AEP voters care about (feeling well represented, nativism, inequality etc) is demonstrated in this thesis. It is an important conclusion because it shows the depth and breadth of differences between parties that still share many important similarities at the same time. Chapter six shows this on a country-by-country basis, therefore going into greater detail than previous literature (Hobolt & Tilley 2016; Rooduijn et al 2017). Studies have shown that

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<sup>158</sup> In the Austrian 2019 election, the FPÖ suffered another huge loss (having been in government since the 2017 election) though it must be noted that this followed a corruption scandal, on their part, significant enough to bring about a snap election following the collapse of government. Likewise, their support fell to approximately 16% (down from 26%); this is no small sum and still made them the third largest party, showing the depth of their popularity.

polarisation is high among voters (Goldberg et al 2020) and parties respond to polarised issues by listening and diverging to represent such views (Spoon & Klüver 2015).

Can established, centrist parties win over ideologically radical voters and maintain more moderate supporters at the same time? Studies also show that populist AEPs moderate their populism the closer they get to power (Rooduijn et al 2014). This does *not* necessarily mean that their voters become more moderate. Chapter five demonstrated that what may happen is that governing populist AEP voters become satisfied with perceived progress by governments. However, voters' core attitudes persist over time (Heath et al 1994) which means voters with very different attitudes all need to be balanced at the same time.

It is unlikely nativist or radical socialist attitudes will disappear; cooperation and uneasy alliances is perhaps the most likely way for centrist parties to retain power and for populist AEPs to maintain influence (as has been the case in countries as varied as Austria, the Netherlands and Spain). Further research, as such, should identify how likely voters are to compromise and to interact with each other. This is important for the literature on populist AEP support and how, if at all, radically ideologically motivated populist AEP voters can be won over by established parties. This, as noted above, is an important issue that the literature on populist AEPs has not specifically addressed and reached a consensus on.

Research by Hobolt et al (2020) shows that voter-level (affective) polarisation can be extended beyond partisanship to opinion based social identity (Brexit, in the context of the study) and that such identities limit a voter's willingness to interact with those who oppose them.<sup>159</sup> Where issues are becoming increasingly polarised and radicalised, it is questionable as to whether or not parties can appeal to both moderate and radical voters in the long-term. Where more voters are willing to switch party support between elections, how strongly they identify with issues, not parties (particularly fundamental, cross-cutting issues such as Brexit and Catalan independence), could affect how likely compromise and reconciliation is in polarised political systems. The wider literature on populist AEP success largely focuses on party vote shares or voter-level behaviour. A greater focus on how populist AEP and established party voters interact with each other would provide newer insight into how divided electorates are.

Lastly, throughout Europe populist AEPs and their ideologies and policy positions have been increasingly mainstreamed in recent years. Mainstreaming is not the same as governing; parties such as the Front National and UKIP (to name just two) have never governed but represented ideologies and policy positions that have widespread popularity. Mudde (2020) argues that since 2000, far right politics and far right parties have become more detached from one another; even established, centre-right parties are adopting far right populist, authoritarian and nativist platforms. At the same time, the far right retains the power to set the agenda and profits from issue ownership and are more likely to enter government.

Krause (2020) identifies a similar trend on the radical left; they benefit from being associated with mainstream economic policy as they are often considered to own the issue of state control of the economy. To be perceived as *too* extreme would indicate to voters that they are

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<sup>159</sup> The authors further speculate that such research could be extended to Spain following calls for Catalan independence (Hobolt et al 2020). There may well be similarities regarding Scottish independence and the linguistic divide in Belgium for instance

pariahs who will have little to no influence on policy. Likewise, they benefit electorally where established centre-left parties move to the left on economic issues.

The mainstreaming of such parties' ideologies, on both the left- and right-wing, does not lead to a decrease in their support as voters move to larger parties of the political establishment. Populist AEPs benefit from setting the agenda and maintaining issue ownership. Other parties would likely struggle to ignore rapidly salient issues, fuelling perceptions they have converged and are unrepresentative. However, other parties clearly end up losing out where trying to fight populist AEPs on their own territory. Future literature should focus not just on the electoral consequences of party strategy (both populist AEPs and established parties), but also on the decision-making process among established parties. What do they hope to achieve in their campaigning, and how did they reach their conclusions when devising strategy?

The environment in which populist AEPs prosper remains crucial to consider, so political opportunity structures should never be far from consideration, but *other* parties' strategies and the ways in which they help to mainstream populist AEPs should also be considered. Doing so will provide a more nuanced account of how populist AEPs emerge and thrive.

### **Future research**

In sum, the four main conclusions point to a lot of both differences and similarities between populist AEPs and their voters. However, this thesis has also demonstrated the need for further research. As stated in the theoretical overview of this thesis, parties and voters are not independent actors operating in a vacuum. Instead, there is always a constant give-and-take. Parties must react to public opinion, which then may alter public opinion; one party's reaction may cause another party to react in turn, which then causes a *different* change in public opinion. And so on. More research into how parties (populist AEPs and established parties) interact with voters should be conducted.

In terms of populism more broadly, and specifically populist AEPs, there is very little research that examines both voters *and* parties. The majority of research tends to be either parties *or* voters, not how they interact with each other. The analyses in this thesis have been a promising start yet raised further questions. There is particular scope for research around governmental populist AEPs and voter's interactions with parties and the political establishment. It was argued that governmental populist AEPs win the votes of those who judge their time in office to have been a success, but that they also may struggle to convince voters that they are responsible for any achievements.

What do governmental populist AEP voters a) expect, and b) accept from the party? As their voters are primarily motivated by very few policy areas, do they only look for tangible progress here, or do they truly view the party as part of the political elite, who soften and expand their platform? Populist parties often attract protest voters, or voters whose beliefs are at odds with the party (Andreadis & Stavrakakis 2017, p.503-04; Van Hauwaert & van Kessel 2018). It could be that certain populist AEP voters would simply always be disappointed when their party enters government. These questions are best suited to longitudinal analysis, as this will help to distinguish between different types of voters (e.g. some populist AEP voters may be more protest oriented than others). Understanding these questions will lead to a greater understanding of how deep these values run, and where those who abandon governmental populist AEPs turn to.



Furthermore, how do populist AEPs communicate with voters? Does this change when in government? Do governmental populist AEPs consistently adapt their populism to focus on supranational actors and/or heave emphasis from populism towards policy and ideology? These questions may well be best measured on a party-/country-specific basis due to country- and government-specific peculiarities. Analysis of party and/or leader statements and communication will be able to demonstrate how governmental populist AEPs juggle maintaining their image and the responsibilities of governing (Rooduijn et al 2014; Hawkins et al 2019).

The demand-side of populism furthermore remains comparatively under-studied compared to the supply-side. The analysis of CSES data indicates that voters may perceive populism differently in line with who is in government. Populist parties remain populist over time, but their discourse may certainly change (Rooduijn et al 2014). It is not known how stable populist attitudes are and/or whether or not they change over time among voters. The British Election Study Internet Panel (Fieldhouse et al 2020) uniquely offers longitudinal data asking populist attitudes over time throughout a turbulent period in British politics. If parties are constantly changing their discourse then voters may also change their understanding of populism, and/or become more or less populist.

Furthermore, voter perception of established party convergence was measured on a left-right uni-dimension due to data limitations. Do populist AEP voters give equal consideration to all policy areas, or only those they care about the most? Are these perceptions accurate? De Vries and Giger (2014) argued that voters who attach salience to issues are more likely to judge governmental performance. As populist AEP voters are ideologically driven, it may stand to reason that they only judge parties (and governments) on certain policy areas. Understanding what a) voters look for in established parties, and b) whether or not they have pre-conceived opinions can help to show how easy or difficult it may be for established parties to win their support.

### **Final remarks**

In sum, this thesis sought to answer three questions. Firstly, how comparable are populist AEPs? Secondly, why are some populist AEPs more successful than others? Thirdly, how deeply rooted in attitudes is populist AEP support? It has been demonstrated that populist AEPs can be grouped under one ‘anti-establishment’ label. They share similarities in that they seek fundamental reform of the political system and try to limit their engagement with established parties. Furthermore, populism itself acts as a bridge to lead to unlikely (but still volatile) alliances. Secondly, populist AEPs benefit from poor economic performance, established party convergence and fewer AEP competitors. Political opportunity structures therefore condition populist AEP success. Finally, populist AEP voters are, above all else, ideologically motivated. They turn to populist AEPs, who promise to offer real change.

Their success is the result of firmly held attitudes and values, and it appears the more successful they become, the more successful they may become in the future. There is a near-constant upwards trajectory, and only in very few countries are there no, or declining, populist AEPs. Their voters’ attitudes are not going to disappear, and established parties surely have difficult decisions to make in order to compete with populist AEPs.

This thesis, as such, has provided a detailed understanding of the causes of populist AEP success. Future research should now focus on the consequences of populist AEP success, incorporating the above-identified areas of research. Firstly, how do populist AEPs aim to expand their support and engage with voters? Where electorates are becoming more polarised it is important to consider what voters expect and accept from governments, and how voters perceive whether they are offered a clear choice by established parties. Do populist AEPs politicise key flashpoints, constantly jabbing at governments or do they moderate and try to outmuscle opponents on the basis of issue ownership?

Secondly, how (if at all) has populism altered established political discourse and parties? Established parties such as the Austrian People's Party have lurched to the right under Sebastian Kurz while SYRIZA did the opposite and softened its anti-establishment profile. Are there predictable patterns to how parties (AEP or otherwise) react? Populist rhetoric among parties adapts over time, but is this in-keeping with voters' populist attitudes?

Lastly, and in relation, what has been the effect on public attitudes to issues such as Euroscepticism, direct democracy and liberal democracy? Are all voters becoming polarised, or is a minority of voters becoming louder? These are issues that are emotive and fundamentally shape how the government looks and works. Understanding how deeply polarised electorates are on these issues is crucial to learning where European democracies are headed.

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## Appendix

### Appendix A – chapter II

**Table A1: AEPs in Europe, 1980-2019**

Country	Party	Populist	Left-right	Notes
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	Yes	Right	
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	Yes	Right	Since 1986
Austria	Team Stronach	Yes	Right	
Austria	Communist Party of Austria	No	Left	
Austria	No – Citizens' Initiative Against EU Membership	No	Left	
Austria	The Greens – The Green Alternative	No	Left	Until 1998
Austria	United Greens Austria	No	Left	Until 1998

Country	Party	Populist	Left-right	Notes
Belgium	Flemish Interest	Yes	Right	
Belgium	List Dedecker	Yes	Right	
Belgium	Front National	Yes	Right	
Belgium	Agalev – Green	No	Left	Until 1998
Belgium	Communist Party	No	Left	
Belgium	Confederated Ecologists	No	Left	Until 1998
Belgium	Workers' Party of Belgium	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Bulgaria	Attack	Yes	Right	
Bulgaria	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	Yes	Right	
Bulgaria	Order, Lawfulness and Justice	Yes	Right	
Bulgaria	Will	Yes	Right	
Bulgaria	Communist Party of Bulgaria	No	Left	
Bulgaria	Bulgaria Without Censorship	No	Right	
Bulgaria	IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement	No	Right	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja	Yes	Right	
Croatia	Labour Party	Yes	Left	
Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights	No	Right	
Croatia	Human Shield	No	Right	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Cyprus	Citizen's Alliance	Yes	Left	
Cyprus	New Horizons	Yes	Right	
Cyprus	Ecological and Environmental Movement	No	Left	Until 1998
Cyprus	Fighting Democratic Movement	No	Right	
Cyprus	National Popular Front	No	Right	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Czech Republic	Dawn of Direct Democracy	Yes	Right	
Czech Republic	Freedom and Direct Democracy	Yes	Right	
Czech Republic	Republican Party	Yes	Right	
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	No	Left	
Czech Republic	Czech Pirate Party	No	Left	
Czech Republic	Sovereignty	No	Right	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Denmark	Danish People's Party	Yes	Right	
Denmark	Progress Party	Yes	Right	
Denmark	Community of the People	No	Left	
Denmark	Forward	No	Left	
Denmark	Hard Line	No	Right	
Denmark	The New Right	No	Right	
Denmark	People's Party	No	Right	
Denmark	Red-Green Alliance	No	Left	
Denmark	Republic	No	Left	
Denmark	Socialist People's Party	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Estonia	Conservative People's Party	Yes	Right	
Finland	True Finns	Yes	Right	
Finland	Ecological Party	No	Left	Until 1998
Finland	Green League	No	Left	Until 1998
Finland	Left Alliance	No	Left	
Finland	Pirate Party	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
France	Front National	Yes	Right	
France	National Republican Movement	Yes	Right	
France	Unbowed France	Yes	Left	
France	Citizens' Movement	No	Left	
France	Ecology Generation	No	Left	Until 1998
France	French Communist Party	No	Left	
France	Greens	No	Left	Until 1998
France	Martinican Independence Movement	No	Left	
France	Movement for France	No	Right	
France	Revolutionary Communist League	No	Left	
France	Workers' Struggle	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Germany	Alternative for Germany	Yes	Right	
Germany	Die Linke	Yes	Left	Including 2005 PDS alliance
Germany	The Republicans	Yes	Right	
Germany	Alliance 90/Greens	No	Left	Until 1998
Germany	German Pirate Party	No	Left	
Germany	National Democratic Party	No	Right	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Greece	Democratic Social Movement	Yes	Left	
Greece	Independent Greeks	Yes	Right	
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	Yes	Right	
Greece	SYRIZA	Yes	Left	Until 2019
Greece	Alternative Ecologists	No	Left	Until 1998
Greece	Coalition of the Left	No	Left	Until 2004 – formation of SYRIZA
Greece	Communist Party of Greece	No	Left	
Greece	Front of the Anticapitalist Left	No	Left	
Greece	Golden Dawn	No	Right	
Greece	Political Spring	No	Right	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Hungary	Fidesz	Yes	Right	From 2006, until 2018
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	Yes	Right	
Hungary	Jobbik	Yes	Right	
Hungary	Hungarian Workers' Party	No	Left	



Country	Party	Populist	Left-right	Notes
Ireland	Sinn Féin	Yes	Left	
Ireland	Democratic Left	No	Left	
Ireland	Green Party	No	Left	Until 1998
Ireland	People Before Profit Alliance	No	Left	
Ireland	Socialist Party	No	Left	

Country	Party	Populist	Left-right	Notes
Italy	Brothers of Italy	Yes	Right	
Italy	Five Star Movement	Yes	Left	
Italy	North League	Yes	Right	
Italy	Communist Refoundation Party	No	Left	
Italy	Federation of the Greens	No	Left	Until 1998
Italy	Italian Social Movement	No	Right	

Country	Party	Populist	Left-right	Notes
Latvia	For Fatherland and Freedom	Yes	Right	1993-1995 only
Latvia	Who owns the State?	Yes	Right	
Latvia	Harmony	No	Left	Election winner in 2011; 2014; 2018; cordon sanitaire due to United Russia affiliation
Latvia	National Alliance	No	Right	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Lithuania	Lithuanian Centre Party	Yes	Right	
Lithuania	Order and Justice	Yes	Right	
Lithuania	Socialist People's Front	Yes	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Luxembourg	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	Yes	Right	
Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg	No	Left	
Luxembourg	National Movement	No	Right	
Luxembourg	Pirate Party Luxembourg	No	Left	
Luxembourg	Greens	No	Left	Until 1998
Luxembourg	Green Left Ecological Initiative	No	Left	Until 1998
Luxembourg	The Left	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Netherlands	Centre Democrats	Yes	Right	
Netherlands	Centre Party	Yes	Right	
Netherlands	Fortuyn List	Yes	Right	
Netherlands	Forum for Democracy	Yes	Right	
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	Yes	Right	
Netherlands	Socialist Party	Yes	Left	
Netherlands	50plus	No	Centrist	
Netherlands	GreenLeft	No	Left	Until 1998
Netherlands	Party for the Animals	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Poland	Kukiz'15	Yes	Right	
Poland	Law and Justice	Yes	Right	Populist AEP since 2005
Poland	League of Polish Families	Yes	Right	
Poland	Party X	Yes	Right	
Poland	Self-Defense of the Republic Poland	Yes	Left	
Poland	Congress of the New Right	No	Right	
Poland	Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic	No	Right	
Poland	Together Party	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Portugal	Bloc of the Left	No	Left	
Portugal	Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers	No	Left	
Portugal	Ecology Party – Greens	No	Left	Until 1998
Portugal	Portuguese Communist Party	No	Left	
Portugal	Revolutionary Socialist Party	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Romania	Greater Romania Party	Yes	Right	
Romania	United Romania Party	Yes	Right	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Slovakia	Real Slovak National Party	Yes	Right	
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	Yes	Right	
Slovakia	99% - Civic Voice	No	Left	
Slovakia	Communist Party of Slovakia	No	Left	
Slovakia	People's Party Our Slovakia	No	Right	
Slovakia	We are family	No	Right	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	Yes	Right	
Slovenia	Slovenian Pirate Party	No	Left	
Slovenia	Civic Green List	No	Left	Until 1998
Slovenia	Greens of Slovenia	No	Left	Until 1998
Slovenia	The Left	No	Left	
Slovenia	United Left	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Spain	Podemos	Yes	Left	Including United Left alliance
Spain	Vox	Yes	Right	
Spain	Basque Country Unite	No	Left	
Spain	Basque Solidarity	No	Left	
Spain	United Left	No	Left	
Spain	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia	No	Right	
Spain	Galician Nationalist Bloc	No	Left	
Spain	Republican Left of Catalonia	No	Left	
Spain	Together for Catalonia	No	Cross-party alliance	
Spain	United People	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Sweden	New Democracy	Yes	Right	
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	Yes	Right	
Sweden	Feminist Initiative	No	Left	
Sweden	Greens	No	Left	Until 1998
Sweden	Left Party	No	Left	
Sweden	Pirate Party	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
United Kingdom	British National Party	Yes	Right	
United Kingdom	Sinn Féin	Yes	Left	Not in ParlGov
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party	Yes	Right	
United Kingdom	Green Party	No	Left	Until 1998
United Kingdom	Plaid Cymru	No	Left	
United Kingdom	Referendum Party	No	Right	
United Kingdom	Respect	No	Left	
United Kingdom	Scottish National Party	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Iceland	Civic Movement – The Movement	Yes	Left	
Iceland	People’s Party	Yes	Left	
Iceland	Bright Future	No	Right	
Iceland	Dawn	No	Left	
Iceland	Humanist Party	No	Left	
Iceland	Iceland Democratic Party	No	Left	
Iceland	Left-Green Movement	No	Left	
Iceland	Liberal Party	No	Right	
Iceland	Pirate Party	No	Left	
Iceland	Revival	No	Right	
Iceland	Social Democratic Alliance	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Norway	Progress Party	Yes	Right	
Norway	Centre Party	No	Agrarian/centrist	
Norway	Christian Democratic Party	No	Right	
Norway	Coastal Party	No	Right	
Norway	Red Electoral Alliance	No	Left	
Norway	Socialist Left Party	No	Left	

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	Yes	Right	
Switzerland	Ticino League	Yes	Right	
Switzerland	Automobile Party – Freedom Party of Switzerland	No	Right	
Switzerland	Autonomous Socialist Party	No	Left	
Switzerland	Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland	No	Right	
Switzerland	Feminists and Green Alternative Group	No	Left	Until 1998
Switzerland	Geneva Citizens' Movement	No	Right	
Switzerland	Greens	No	Left	Until 1998
Switzerland	National Action – Swiss Democrats	No	Right	
Switzerland	Progressive Organisations of Switzerland	No	Left	
Switzerland	Solidarity	No	Left	
Switzerland	Swiss Party of Labour	No	Left	

## Appendix B: chapter III

**Table B1: populist AEPs under analysis**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Years included</b>
Alliance for the Future of Austria	Austria	2009, 2014
Freedom Party of Austria	Austria	2004, 2009, 2014
List Dedecker	Belgium	2009
Front National	Belgium	2004, 2009
Vlaams Belang	Belgium	2004, 2009, 2014
Attack	Bulgaria	2009, 2014
Bulgaria Without Censorship	Bulgaria	2014
Order, Law and Justice	Bulgaria	2009
Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonia and Baranja	Croatia	2014
Croatian Labour Party	Croatia	2014
Citizens' Alliance	Cyprus	2014
New Horizons	Cyprus	2004
Republican Party	Czech Republic	2004
Danish People's Party	Denmark	2004, 2009, 2014
People's Movement against the EU	Denmark	2004, 2009, 2014
Progress Party	Denmark	2004, 2009
Finns	Finland	2004, 2009, 2014
Front National	France	2004, 2009, 2014
Alternative for Germany	Germany	2014
Die Linke	Germany	2009, 2014
Republicans	Germany	2004, 2009
Democratic Social Movement	Greece	2004
Independent Greeks	Greece	2014
Popular Orthodox Rally	Greece	2004, 2009, 2014
SYRIZA	Greece	2009, 2014
Fidesz	Hungary	2004, 2009, 2014
Hungarian Justice and Life Party	Hungary	2004, 2009
Jobbik	Hungary	2009, 2014
Sinn Féin	Ireland	2004, 2009, 2014
Brothers of Italy	Italy	2014
Five Star Movement	Italy	2014
Lega Nord	Italy	2004, 2009
Order and Justice	Lithuania	2004, 2009, 2014
Alternative Democratic Reform Party	Luxembourg	2004, 2009, 2014
List Pim Fortuyn	Netherlands	2004, 2009
Party for Freedom	Netherlands	2009, 2014



Socialist Party	Netherlands	2004, 2009, 2014
Sinn Fein	Northern Ireland	2004
Law and Justice	Poland	2009, 2014
League of Polish Families	Poland	2004, 2009
Self-Defence of the Republic	Poland	2004, 2009
Greater Romania Party	Romania	2009, 2014
Slovak National Party	Slovakia	2004, 2009, 2014
Slovenian National Party	Slovenia	2004, 2009, 2014
Podemos	Spain	2014
Vox	Spain	2014
Sweden Democrats	Sweden	2009, 2014
British National Party	United Kingdom	2004, 2009, 2014
Sinn Féin	United Kingdom	2014
UKIP	United Kingdom	2004, 2009, 2014

**Table B2: Socio-demographics**

Independent variables	2004 Populist AEP support	2009 Populist AEP support	2014 Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.00802***</b> (0.00289)	<b>-0.00600**</b> (0.00253)	<b>-0.00614**</b> (0.00273)
Female (ref: male)	-0.143* (0.0828)	<b>-0.240***</b> (0.0705)	<b>-0.292***</b> (0.0581)
Unemployed (not unemployed)	<b>0.438***</b> (0.143)	0.0683 (0.165)	-0.0257 (0.117)
<i>Education (ref: 20+)</i>			
15 and under	<b>0.319**</b> (0.143)	<b>0.592***</b> (0.123)	0.0479 (0.0973)
16-19	<b>0.371***</b> (0.105)	<b>0.263***</b> (0.0836)	0.130* (0.0707)
Student	0.0718 (0.247)	0.0557 (0.171)	-0.138 (0.158)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area or village)</i>			
Small or mid-size town	0.114 (0.0983)	0.0144 (0.0889)	<b>0.161**</b> (0.0720)
Large town	0.0933 (0.106)	-0.157* (0.0886)	0.141* (0.0773)
Working class (ref: not working class)	<b>0.411***</b> (0.0953)	<b>0.397***</b> (0.0870)	<b>0.570***</b> (0.0664)
Union member (ref: not member)	0.0543 (0.107)	-0.0367 (0.0882)	-0.116 (0.0829)
<i>Religiosity (ref: never)</i>			
Yearly	0.112 (0.128)	-0.0298 (0.111)	-0.0842 (0.0759)
Monthly (a few times a year)	0.126 (0.120)	<b>-0.238***</b> (0.0901)	<b>-0.308***</b> (0.0961)
Weekly	0.0756 (0.133)	<b>-0.228**</b> (0.115)	<b>-0.306***</b> (0.104)
<i>Aggregate-level variables</i>			
Unemployment rate (lagged)	-0.00922 (0.0962)	-0.0889 (0.179)	0.0117 (0.0552)
Government debt (lagged)	-0.00145 (0.0178)	0.0149 (0.00985)	<b>0.0216***</b> (0.00831)
GDP growth (lagged)	0.199 (0.233)	0.120 (0.0994)	0.235 (0.150)

**Table B2 continued: interaction terms**

	2004	2009	2014
<i>Impact of crisis (ref: no impact)</i>			
Lost income only	---	---	0.0571 (0.232)
Lost job only	---	---	-0.346 (0.595)
Lost income and job	---	---	<b>0.807***</b> <b>(0.257)</b>
<i>Impact of crisis * age (ref: no impact)</i>			
Lost income only * age	---	---	0.00146 (0.00401)
Lost job only * age	---	---	0.00660 (0.0115)
Lost job and income * age	---	---	<b>-0.0101**</b> <b>(0.00487)</b>
Variance (country)	2.508** (1.019)	1.253*** (0.417)	1.539*** (0.498)
Constant	-3.571** (1.415)	-2.472** (1.103)	-4.001*** (0.867)
Observations	9,133	9,707	10,535
Number of groups	17	20	24

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table B3: Attitudinal**

Independent variables	2004	2009	2014
	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.00987***</b> (0.00293)	<b>-0.00884***</b> (0.00264)	<b>-0.0103***</b> (0.00282)
Female (ref: male)	-0.158* (0.0838)	<b>-0.239***</b> (0.0734)	<b>-0.266***</b> (0.0600)
Unemployed (not unemployed)	0.362** (0.145)	0.0237 (0.168)	0.000215 (0.120)
<i>Education (ref: 20+)</i>			
15 and under	0.259* (0.144)	<b>0.407***</b> (0.127)	-0.0805 (0.0991)
16-19	<b>0.327***</b> (0.107)	0.162* (0.0864)	0.0214 (0.0725)
Student	0.0604 (0.251)	0.0567 (0.175)	-0.225 (0.162)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area or village)</i>			
Small or mid-size town	0.149 (0.0994)	0.0367 (0.0915)	<b>0.177**</b> (0.0733)
Large town	0.127 (0.107)	-0.111 (0.0912)	<b>0.219***</b> (0.0788)
Working class (ref: not working class)	<b>0.387***</b> (0.0959)	<b>0.283***</b> (0.0892)	<b>0.513***</b> (0.0675)
Union member (ref: not member)	0.0461 (0.108)	-0.0354 (0.0911)	-0.0625 (0.0846)
<i>Religiosity (ref: never)</i>			
Yearly	0.106 (0.130)	-0.0131 (0.114)	-0.120 (0.0779)
Monthly (a few times a year)	0.112 (0.121)	<b>-0.209**</b> (0.0936)	<b>-0.356***</b> (0.0988)
Weekly	0.0716 (0.134)	-0.215* (0.122)	<b>-0.426***</b> (0.108)
Ideological extremity	<b>0.126***</b> (0.0253)	<b>0.0598***</b> (0.0205)	0.0333* (0.0177)
Euroskepticism	<b>0.116***</b> (0.0158)	<b>0.143***</b> (0.0123)	<b>0.157***</b> (0.0107)
Oppose same sex marriage		<b>0.132***</b> (0.0297)	<b>0.0563***</b> (0.00933)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.285***</b> (0.0549)	<b>0.548***</b> (0.0480)	
<i>Aggregate-level variables</i>			
Unemployment rate (lagged)	-0.00734 (0.0984)	-0.147 (0.183)	0.0230 (0.0566)
Government debt (lagged)	-0.000662 (0.0182)	0.0136 (0.0101)	<b>0.0211**</b> (0.00852)
GDP growth (lagged)	0.190 (0.238)	0.0879 (0.102)	0.255* (0.154)

**Table B3 continued: interaction terms**

	2004	2009	2014
<i>Impact of crisis (ref: no impact)</i>			
Lost income only	---	---	-0.0472 (0.237)
Lost job only	---	---	-0.530 (0.599)
Lost income and job	---	---	<b>0.746***</b> <b>(0.262)</b>
<i>Impact of crisis * age (ref: no impact)</i>			
Lost income only * age	---	---	0.00262 (0.00410)
Lost job only * age	---	---	0.00772 (0.0116)
Lost job and income * age	---	---	<b>-0.00992**</b> <b>(0.00496)</b>
Variance (country)	<b>2.627**</b> <b>(1.062)</b>	<b>1.312***</b> <b>(0.436)</b>	<b>1.615***</b> <b>(0.521)</b>
Constant	-5.128*** (1.456)	-4.576*** (1.136)	-5.076*** (0.891)
Observations	9,133	9,707	10,535
Number of groups	17	20	24

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table B4: Populist right-wing AEPs**

Independent variables	2004 Populist right-wing AEP	2009 Populist right-wing AEP	2014 Populist right-wing AEP
Age	-0.00117 (0.00360)	<b>-0.0126***</b> <b>(0.00314)</b>	<b>-0.0118***</b> <b>(0.00358)</b>
Female (ref: male)	-0.0499 (0.103)	<b>-0.373***</b> <b>(0.0894)</b>	<b>-0.348***</b> <b>(0.0813)</b>
Unemployed (not unemployed)	-0.0406 (0.183)	0.0285 (0.208)	0.0742 (0.175)
<i>Education (ref: 20+)</i>			
15 and under	0.181 (0.173)	<b>0.345**</b> <b>(0.152)</b>	0.0910 (0.131)
16-19	<b>0.437***</b> <b>(0.128)</b>	0.173* (0.104)	0.0539 (0.0973)
Student	0.107 (0.334)	0.0199 (0.221)	<b>-0.489**</b> <b>(0.249)</b>
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area or village)</i>			
Small or mid-size town	0.0271 (0.119)	0.111 (0.110)	0.153 (0.0962)
Large town	0.0256 (0.132)	-0.0858 (0.112)	0.212** (0.107)
Working class (ref: not working class)	0.187 (0.120)	<b>0.228**</b> <b>(0.109)</b>	<b>0.519***</b> <b>(0.0923)</b>
Union member (ref: not member)	0.0673 (0.140)	0.00226 (0.113)	0.0148 (0.108)
<i>Religiosity (ref: never)</i>			
Yearly	-0.00944 (0.147)	0.0300 (0.141)	-0.154 (0.102)
Monthly (a few times a year)	-0.175 (0.142)	-0.160 (0.115)	<b>-0.551***</b> <b>(0.135)</b>
Weekly	-0.208 (0.164)	-0.208 (0.149)	<b>-0.496***</b> <b>(0.149)</b>
Left-right self-placement	<b>0.223***</b> <b>(0.0215)</b>	<b>0.227***</b> <b>(0.0177)</b>	<b>0.246***</b> <b>(0.0164)</b>
Euroscepticism	<b>0.143***</b> <b>(0.0193)</b>	<b>0.138***</b> <b>(0.0150)</b>	<b>0.156***</b> <b>(0.0149)</b>
Oppose same sex marriage		0.0526 (0.0345)	<b>0.0686***</b> <b>(0.0124)</b>
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.150**</b> <b>(0.0673)</b>	<b>0.502***</b> <b>(0.0583)</b>	
Oppose immigration	-0.0493 (0.0507)	<b>0.512***</b> <b>(0.0455)</b>	<b>0.146***</b> <b>(0.0145)</b>
Economic redistribution		0.0380 (0.0372)	-0.00727 (0.0144)

**Table B4 continued: aggregate-level variables and interaction terms**

	2004	2009	2014
Unemployment rate (lagged)	-0.0298 (0.103)	-0.150 (0.226)	-0.0780 (0.0689)
Government debt (lagged)	0.00448 (0.0194)	0.00769 (0.0132)	0.0180 (0.0112)
GDP growth (lagged)	0.336 (0.243)	0.0810 (0.151)	0.410 (0.263)
<i>Impact of crisis (ref: no impact)</i>			
Lost income only	---	---	-0.519 (0.342)
Lost job only	---	---	-0.411 (0.760)
Lost income and job	---	---	0.623* (0.372)
<i>Impact of crisis * age (ref: no impact)</i>			
Lost income only * age	---	---	0.0112* (0.00576)
Lost job only * age	---	---	0.00349 (0.0146)
Lost job and income * age	---	---	-0.00832 (0.00698)
Variance (country)	<b>2.558**</b> <b>(1.117)</b>	<b>1.839***</b> <b>(0.634)</b>	<b>2.085***</b> <b>(0.740)</b>
Constant	-6.728*** (1.644)	-7.179*** (1.367)	-6.703*** (1.234)
Observations	6,888	8,587	9,511
Number of groups	15	19	22

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table B5: Populist left-wing AEPs**

Independent variables	2004	2009	2014
	Populist left-wing AEP support	Populist left-wing AEP support	Populist left-wing AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0211***</b> ( <b>0.00618</b> )	0.00233 (0.00631)	<b>-0.0135***</b> ( <b>0.00523</b> )
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.370**</b> ( <b>0.167</b> )	0.0352 (0.160)	-0.0712 (0.0962)
Unemployed (not unemployed)	<b>0.903***</b> ( <b>0.286</b> )	0.333 (0.328)	-0.124 (0.169)
<i>Education (ref: 20+)</i>			
15 and under	<b>0.694**</b> ( <b>0.297</b> )	-0.0549 (0.313)	-0.231 (0.156)
16-19	-0.0283 (0.216)	-0.134 (0.197)	-0.106 (0.115)
Student	0.200 (0.387)	0.233 (0.353)	-0.0776 (0.232)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area or village)</i>			
Small or mid-size town	<b>0.463**</b> ( <b>0.205</b> )	-0.0412 (0.207)	0.194 (0.121)
Large town	0.224 (0.212)	0.00194 (0.199)	0.197 (0.123)
Working class (ref: not working class)	<b>1.077***</b> ( <b>0.195</b> )	<b>0.447**</b> ( <b>0.195</b> )	<b>0.360***</b> ( <b>0.108</b> )
Union member (ref: not member)	0.281 (0.192)	0.122 (0.187)	-0.129 (0.143)
<i>Religiosity (ref: never)</i>			
Yearly	0.696* (0.362)	-0.360 (0.225)	0.00290 (0.131)
Monthly (a few times a year)	<b>0.797**</b> ( <b>0.330</b> )	<b>-0.828***</b> ( <b>0.210</b> )	0.0512 (0.158)
Weekly	<b>0.852**</b> ( <b>0.334</b> )	<b>-1.360***</b> ( <b>0.347</b> )	-0.259 (0.177)
Left-right self-placement	<b>-0.283***</b> ( <b>0.0369</b> )	<b>-0.234***</b> ( <b>0.0333</b> )	<b>-0.326***</b> ( <b>0.0229</b> )
Euroscepticism	-0.0326 (0.0327)	0.0466* (0.0277)	<b>0.0864***</b> ( <b>0.0172</b> )
Oppose same sex marriage	---	-0.0495 (0.0811)	0.0145 (0.0161)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.616***</b> ( <b>0.107</b> )	<b>0.493***</b> ( <b>0.103</b> )	---
Oppose immigration	-0.0567 (0.0943)	-0.0764 (0.0724)	<b>0.0364**</b> ( <b>0.0173</b> )
Economic redistribution	---	<b>0.351***</b> ( <b>0.0861</b> )	<b>0.0859***</b> ( <b>0.0201</b> )



**Table B5 continued: aggregate-level variables and interaction terms**

	2004	2009	2014
Unemployment rate (lagged)	---	-0.198 (0.169)	0.00435 (0.0548)
Government debt (lagged)	-0.0487 (0.0302)	0.00903 (0.0106)	<b>0.0239**</b> <b>(0.0104)</b>
GDP growth (lagged)	-0.412 (0.280)	-0.0585 (0.111)	0.178 (0.150)
<i>Impact of crisis (ref: no impact)</i>			
Lost income only	---	---	0.374 (0.372)
Lost job only	---	---	-0.536 (0.950)
Lost income and job	---	---	0.538 (0.407)
<i>Impact of crisis * age (ref: no impact)</i>			
Lost income only * age	---	---	-0.00473 (0.00669)
Lost job only * age	---	---	0.0162 (0.0185)
Lost income and job * age	---	---	-0.00426 (0.00780)
Variance (country)	0.961 (0.667)	0.116 (0.190)	0.828* (0.465)
Constant	0.138 (1.863)	-3.438*** (0.788)	-4.080*** (1.012)
Observations	3,548	3,286	5,017
Number of groups	6	6	11

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Appendix C – chapter IV

**Table C1: established parties**

### Austria

Centre-left	Centre-right
Austrian Social Democratic Party	Austrian People's Party

### Belgium

Centre-left	Centre-right
<i>Flanders</i>	
Socialist Party Different (1981-1999; 2007-2010)	Christian Democratic and Flemish (1981-2010)
Socialist Party Different – Spirit (2003)	
<i>Wallonia</i>	
Francophone Socialist Party (1981-2010)	Humanist Democratic Centre (1981-2010)

### Bulgaria

Centre-left	Centre-right
Bulgarian Socialist Party (1990-1997; 2013)	Union of Democratic Forces (1990-1994)
BSP for Bulgaria (2001-2009; 2014-17)	United Democratic Forces (1997-2005)
	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (2009-2017)

### Croatia

Centre-left	Centre-right
Social Democratic Party of Croatia (2000-2007)	Croatian Democratic Union (1992-2011; 2016)
People's Coalition (2011-2016)	Patriotic Coalition (2015)

### Cyprus

Centre-left	Centre-right
Progressive Party of the Working People	Democratic Coalition

### Czech Republic

Centre-left	Centre-right
Czech Social Democratic Party	Civic Democratic Party

### Denmark

Centre-left	Centre-right
Social Democratic Party	Liberals

### Estonia

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Electoral Union 'Popular Front' (1992)	Pro Patria Union (1992)
Social Democratic Party (1995-2015)	Estonian Reform Party (1995-2015)

### Finland

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Finnish Social Democrats	National Coalition

### France

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Socialist Party	Union for a New Majority (1981-1988)
	Rally for the Republic (1993-1997)
	The Republicans (2002-2017)

### Germany

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Social Democratic Party	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union

### Greece

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	New Democracy

### Hungary

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Hungarian Socialist Party (1990-2006)	Hungarian Democratic Forum (1990-1994; 2006)
Politics Can Be Different (2010-2014)	Fidesz (1998-2002)
	Hungarian Socialist Party (2010-2014)

### Ireland

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Labour Party	Soldiers of Destiny

### Italy

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Italian Socialist Party (1983-1992)	Italian Popular Party (1983-1992)
Democrats of the Left (1994-2001)	Forza Italia (1994-2006; 2018)

Olive Tree (2006)	People of Freedom (2008-2013)
Democratic Party (2008-13)	

### Latvia

Centre-left	Centre-right
Latvian Way Union (1993-1998)	Latvian National Independence Movement (1993)
New Era (2002-2006)	Popular Movement for Latvia (1995)
Greens' and Farmers' Union (2010-2018)	People's Party (1998-2006)
	Unity (2010-2018)

### Lithuania

Centre-left	Centre-right
Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (1992-1996)	Sąjūdis Coalition (1992)
A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition (2000)	Homeland Union (1996-2004)
Working for Lithuania (2004)	Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (2008-2016)
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (2008-2016)	

### Luxembourg

Centre-left	Centre-right
Socialist Workers' Party of Luxembourg	Christian Social People's Party

### Malta

Centre-left	Centre-right
Labour Party	Nationalist Party

### Netherlands

Centre-left	Centre-right
Labour Party	Christian Democratic Appeal

### Poland

Centre-left	Centre-right
Democratic Left Alliance (1991-1997; 2005; 2011)	Democratic Union (1991-1993)
Coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (2001)	Electoral Action 'Solidarity' (1997)
Democratic Left Alliance (2007)	Civic Platform (2001-2011)

### Portugal

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party

### Romania

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Democratic Party (1990)	National Liberal Party (1990)
Social Democratic Party (1992-2000; 2016)	Democratic Convention of Romania (1992-1996)
National Union (2004)	Democratic Party (2000)
Social Democratic Party and Conservative Party Alliance (2008)	Justice and Truth Alliance (2004)
Social Liberal Union (2012)	Democratic Liberal Party (2008)
	Right Romania Alliance (2012)
	National Liberal Party (2016)

### Slovakia

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Common Choice (1994)	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (1994-2002)
Party of the Democratic Left (1998)	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (2006-2010)
Direction – Social Democracy (2002-2016)	Christian Democratic Movement (2012-2016)

### Slovenia

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (1990-2004)	Slovenian Christian Democrats (1990-1996)
Social Democratic Party (2008; 2014)	Social-Democratic Party of Slovenia (2000)
Positive Slovenia (2011)	Slovenian Democratic Party (2004-2014)

### Spain

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Spanish Socialist Worker's Party	Popular Party

### Sweden

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Social Democratic Labour Party	Moderate Coalition Party

### United Kingdom

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Labour	Conservative Party

### Iceland

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
People's Alliance (1983-1995)	Independence Party
The Alliance – Social Democratic Party of Iceland (1999-2017)	

### Norway

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Labour Party	Conservative Party

### Switzerland

<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>
Social Democratic Party of Switzerland	The Liberals

**Table C2: countries, elections and populist AEPs under analysis**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Years</b>	<b>Populist AEPs</b>
Austria	1986-2017	FPÖ; BZÖ; Team Stronach
Belgium	1985-2010	Vlaams Belang; National Front; List Dedecker
Bulgaria	1997-2017	Attack; Order, Law and Justice; National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria/United Patriots
Croatia	2003-2016	Croatian Labour Party; Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja
Cyprus	2001-2016	New Horizons; Citizens Alliance
Czech Republic	1996-2017	Czech Republican Party; Dawn of Direct Democracy; Freedom and Direct Democracy
Denmark	1984-2015	Progress Party; Danish People's Party
Estonia	1999-2015	Conservative People's Party
Finland	1987-2015	Finns
France	1986-2017	Front National; National Republican Movement; France Unbowed
Germany	1983-2017	Alternative for Germany; Republicans; Die Linke
Greece	1985-2015 (Sep)	Independent Greeks; Popular Orthodox Rally; SYRIZA; Democratic Social Movement
Hungary	1998-2014	Fidesz; Hungarian Justice and Life Party; Jobbik
Iceland	1987-2017	Civic Movement; People's Party
Ireland	1982-2016	Sinn Féin
Italy	1987-2018	Brothers of Italy; Lega Nord; Five Star Movement
Latvia	1998-2018	Who Owns the State?
Lithuania	2000-2016	Order and Justice; Lithuanian Centre Party; Socialist People's Front
Luxembourg	1994-2013	Alternative Democratic Reform Party
Malta	1998	
Netherlands	1982-2017	Centre Party; Centre Democrats; List Pim Fortuyn; Socialist Party;

		Party for Freedom; Forum for Democracy
Norway	1985-2017	Progress Party
Poland	1997-2011	Law and Justice; Self-Defence of the Republic; League of Polish Families
Portugal	1983-2015	
Romania	1996-2016	Greater Romania Party; United Romania Party
Slovakia	1998-2012	Slovak National Party; Real Slovak National Party
Slovenia	2000-2014	Slovenian National Party; United Left
Spain	1986-2016	Podemos; Vox
Sweden	1985-2018	Sweden Democrats; New Democracy
Switzerland	1987-2015	Swiss People's Party; Ticino League
United Kingdom	1987-2017	British National Party; Sinn Féin; UKIP

**Table C3: party-level case-selection**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Issue salience items</b>	<b>AEP Competitors</b>
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)	per607; per608	BZÖ; TS
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	per607; per608	FPÖ; TS
<b><i>Belgium</i></b>		
List Dedecker (LD)	per607; per608; per410; per412	VB
Vlaams Belang (VB)	per607; per608	LD
<b><i>Bulgaria</i></b>		
Attack	per607; per608	Order, Lawfulness and Justice; NFSB; IMRO
<b><i>Croatia</i></b>		
Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonia and Baranja (CDSB)	per607; per608	Croatian Party of Rights; Human Shield
<b><i>Czech Republic</i></b>		
Republican Party	per607; per608	
<b><i>Denmark</i></b>		
Progress Party (FrP)	per607; per608; per410; per412	DF
Danish People's Party (DF)	per607; per608	FrP
<b><i>Finland</i></b>		
True Finns	per607; per608; per410; per412	
<b><i>France</i></b>		



Front National	per607; per608	Movement for France; National Republican Movement
<b>Germany</b>		
Alternative for Germany (AfD)	per607; per608	National Democratic Party
Die Linke	per401; per403; per404; per410; per412; per413; per414; per415; per416; per501; per505; per601; per602; per603; per604; per606; per701; per607; per608; per705	Pirate Party
<b>Greece</b>		
SYRIZA	per401; per403; per404; per410; per412; per413; per414; per415; per416; per501; per505; per601; per602; per603; per604; per606; per701; per607; per608; per705	Communist Party of Greece; Popular Unity
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	per607; per608	ANEL; Golden Dawn
Independent Greeks (ANEL)	per607; per608	Golden Dawn; LAOS
<b>Hungary</b>		
Fidesz	per607; per608; per603; per604	Jobbik
Jobbik	per607; per608	Fidesz
<b>Ireland</b>		
Sinn Féin	per401; per403; per404; per410; per412; per413; per414; per415; per416; per501; per505; per601; per602; per603; per604; per606; per701; per607; per608; per705	Socialist Party; Democratic Left; People Before Profit Alliance; Green Party (before 1998)
<b>Italy</b>		
Brothers of Italy (FdI)	per607; per608	LN
Lega Nord (LN)	per607; per608	FdI; Italian Social Movement
Five Star Movement (M5S)	per304; per416	Communist Refoundation Party
<b>Latvia</b>		
For Fatherland and Freedom	per607; per608	
<b>Lithuania</b>		
Order and Justice	per607; per608	Lithuanian Centre Party
<b>Luxembourg</b>		
Alternative Democratic Reform Party	per607; per608	National Movement

<b><i>Netherlands</i></b>		
Socialist Party	per401; per403; per404; per410; per412; per413; per414; per415; per416; per501; per505; per601; per602; per603; per604; per606; per701; per607; per608; per705	GroenLinks ( <i>before 1998</i> ); Party for the Animals; 50Plus
Party for Freedom (PVV)	per607; per608	Forum for Democracy
List Pim Fortuyn	per607; per608; per304	
Centre Democrats	per607; per608	Centre Party
<b><i>Poland</i></b>		
Law and Justice (PiS)	per607; per608; per603; per604	Congress of the New Right; League of Polish Families
Self-Defense of the Republic	per401; per403; per404; per410; per412; per413; per414; per415; per416; per501; per505; per601; per602; per603; per604; per606; per701; per607; per608; per705	
League of Polish Families	per607; per608	PiS; Congress of the New Right
<b><i>Romania</i></b>		
Greater Romania Party	per607; per608	
<b><i>Slovakia</i></b>		
Slovak National Party	per607; per608	People's Party Our Slovakia; We are Family Boris Kollar
<b><i>Slovenia</i></b>		
Slovenian National Party	per607; per608	
<b><i>Spain</i></b>		
We Can	per401; per403; per404; per410; per412; per413; per414; per415; per416; per501; per505; per601; per602; per603; per604; per606; per701; per607; per608; per705	United Citizens
<b><i>Sweden</i></b>		
Sweden Democrats	per607; per608	
<b><i>United Kingdom</i></b>		
Sinn Féin	per401; per403; per404; per410; per412; per413; per414; per415; per416; per501; per505; per601; per602; per603; per604; per606; per701; per607; per608; per705	

United Kingdom Independence Party	per108; per110; per607; per608	
<i>Norway</i>		
Progress Party	per607; per608; per407; per410; per401; per606	Christian Democratic Party; Coastal Party
<i>Switzerland</i>		
Swiss People's Party	per607; per608	National Action Swiss Democrats; Freedom Party of Switzerland; Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland

**Table C4: Manifesto Project Item definitions**

<b>Item</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Per108	European Community/Union: positive
Per110	European Community/Union: negative
per401	Free market economy
Per403	Market regulation
Per404	Economic planning
Per410	Economic growth: positive
Per412	Controlled economy
Per413	Nationalisation
Per414	Economic orthodoxy
Per415	Marxist analysis
Per416	Anti-growth economy: positive
Per501	Environmental protection
Per505	Welfare state limitation
Per601	National way of life: positive
Per602	National way of life: negative
Per603	Traditional morality: positive
Per604	Traditional morality: negative
Per606	Civic mindedness: positive
Per607	Multiculturalism: positive
Per608	Multiculturalism: negative
Per701	Labour groups: positive
Per705	Underprivileged minority groups

**Table C5: Replication of Models G and H**

Independent variables	Model G1	Model G2	Model H1	Model H2
Number of competitors	-0.303 (0.927)	-0.601 (1.027)	-0.181 (0.895)	-0.193 (0.907)
Issue salience	-0.0318 (0.0687)	-0.0244 (0.0742)	-0.0264 (0.0724)	-0.0236 (0.0716)
Established party movement	<b>-0.126**</b> <b>(0.0599)</b>	<b>-0.125**</b> <b>(0.0587)</b>	---	---
EU salience	0.184* (0.107)	<b>0.401**</b> <b>(0.169)</b>	0.114 (0.0972)	0.110 (0.0910)
Euroscepticism	-0.141 (0.467)	0.0636 (0.581)	-0.121 (0.431)	-0.0948 (0.435)
EU salience Euroscepticism	---	-0.0683 (0.0526)	---	---
Nationalism	0.632* (0.314)	<b>0.672**</b> <b>(0.319)</b>	0.637* (0.327)	0.651* (0.319)
Party in government (ref: not)	<b>-4.711**</b> <b>(1.919)</b>	<b>-4.748**</b> <b>(1.895)</b>	<b>-5.056***</b> <b>(1.728)</b>	<b>-5.093***</b> <b>(1.747)</b>
Absolute distance to established competitor	---	---	-0.0704 (0.0706)	---
Directional distance to established competitor	---	---	---	-0.0579 (0.0544)
Constant	6.172** (2.581)	5.745** (2.651)	6.686** (2.736)	6.419** (2.653)
Observations	133	133	133	133
R-squared	0.371	0.381	0.351	0.350
Party fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variable	Included	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

**Table C6: Replication of Model I**

Independent variables	Model I1	Model I2	Model I3
District magnitude (logged)	0.589 (0.541)	0.438 (0.529)	0.619 (0.557)
Unemployment rate (lagged)	0.568* (0.297)	0.559* (0.283)	<b>0.613**</b> <b>(0.293)</b>
Government debt (lagged)	0.0402 (0.0280)	0.0429 (0.0252)	0.0323 (0.0278)
GDP growth (lagged)	-0.192 (0.224)	-0.409 (0.261)	-0.382 (0.276)
GDP growth <sup>2</sup>	---	<b>0.0203**</b> <b>(0.00903)</b>	0.0195* (0.00955)
Number of competitors	-1.126 (0.687)	-1.286* (0.684)	<b>-1.560**</b> <b>(0.656)</b>
Issue salience	0.0110 (0.0882)	0.0560 (0.0897)	0.0601 (0.0905)
Established party movement	<b>-0.146***</b> <b>(0.0506)</b>	<b>-0.150***</b> <b>(0.0499)</b>	<b>-0.149***</b> <b>(0.0490)</b>
EU salience	0.157* (0.0883)	0.139* (0.0773)	0.352* (0.200)
Euroscepticism	-0.109 (0.381)	-0.0546 (0.351)	0.152 (0.457)
EU salience * Euroscepticism	---	---	-0.0668 (0.0541)
Nationalism	0.564 (0.368)	0.565 (0.385)	0.603 (0.387)
Party in government (ref: not)	<b>-5.095**</b> <b>(1.884)</b>	<b>-4.826**</b> <b>(1.788)</b>	<b>-4.975***</b> <b>(1.745)</b>
Constant	-0.229 (2.642)	-0.222 (3.360)	-0.721 (3.536)
Observations	133	133	133
R-squared	0.468	0.494	0.502
Party fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variable	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

In Tables C5 and C6, the dummy variable measuring whether or not the party was in parliament and party age are removed from the model, as these were intended to control for previous success. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable achieves this purpose.

**Table C7: Multilevel analysis of populist AEP vote shares**

Independent variables	Model 1 % vote share	Model 2 % vote share
Party in parliament (ref: not in parliament)	0.776 (1.099)	0.827 (1.005)
District magnitude (logged)	-0.192 (0.559)	-0.172 (0.518)
Unemployment rate (lagged)	<b>0.517***</b> <b>(0.143)</b>	<b>0.405***</b> <b>(0.142)</b>
Government debt (lagged)	-0.00292 (0.0224)	0.0116 (0.0226)
GDP growth (lagged)	-0.134 (0.135)	-0.109 (0.121)
GDP growth <sup>2</sup>	0.0103 (0.00872)	0.0125 (0.00862)
Number of AEP competitors	<b>-1.263**</b> <b>(0.631)</b>	-0.973 (0.594)
Issue salience	-0.0665 (0.0653)	-0.0883 (0.0618)
Established party movement	<b>-0.152***</b> <b>(0.0487)</b>	<b>-0.109**</b> <b>(0.0436)</b>
EU salience	0.0541 (0.168)	0.0599 (0.162)
Euroscepticism	-0.450 (0.300)	-0.483* (0.266)
EU Salience * Euroscepticism	0.0135 (0.0472)	-0.00108 (0.0441)
Nationalism	0.382 (0.248)	<b>0.584**</b> <b>(0.235)</b>
Party age	<b>0.178**</b> <b>(0.0772)</b>	<b>0.188**</b> <b>(0.0797)</b>
Year	<b>0.171**</b> <b>(0.0840)</b>	0.155* (0.0910)
Party in government (ref: not in government)	<b>-3.059**</b> <b>(1.230)</b>	<b>-3.898***</b> <b>(1.086)</b>
Constant	4.118 (2.739)	3.297 (2.614)
Observations	192	192
Number of countries	29	29
Number of parties	60	60

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table C7 shows two models, with populist AEPs clustered in countries. An additional control variable, year, is also added and is mean centred. Model 2 adds random slopes for year at the

party level which a likelihood ratio test suggests is a better fit (random effects not included in the table). The results are very similar to those in chapter four.

## Appendix D – chapter V

**Table D1: populist AEPs in analysis**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria
Austria	Team Stronach
Bulgaria	Attack
Bulgaria	United Patriots
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja
Czech Republic	Dawn of Direct Democracy
Czech Republic	Czech Republican Party
Denmark	Progress Party
Denmark	Danish People's Party
Finland	Finns
France	Front National
France	France Unbowed
France	National Republican Movement
Germany	Alternative for Germany
Germany	Die Linke
Germany	Republicans
United Kingdom	UKIP
Greece	Independent Greeks
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally
Greece	SYRIZA
Hungary	Fidesz
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party
Hungary	Jobbik
Iceland	Civic Movement
Ireland	Sinn Féin
Italy	Brothers of Italy
Italy	Five Star Movement
Italy	Lega Nord
Lithuania	Lithuanian Centre Party
Lithuania	Order and Justice
Netherlands	Socialist Party
Netherlands	Party for Freedom
Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn
Netherlands	Centre Democrats
Netherlands	Centre Party
Norway	Progress Party
Poland	Law and Justice
Poland	League of Polish Families
Poland	Self-Defence of the Republic
Romania	Greater Romania Party
Slovakia	Slovak National Party
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party



Sweden	Sweden Democrats
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party
Switzerland	Ticino League

## Appendix E – chapter VI

### Austria (2008)

The left-right self-placement variable is asked on a 1-11 scale, with higher values denoting the right-wing. Perceived established party distance is measured as the difference between the voter's estimation of the established left- and right-wing party. Higher values denote the respondent believes there is a *greater* distance. Euroscepticism is measured by a variable asking whether the respondent believes European integration has gone too far, or not far enough (1-11; higher values are Eurosceptic). Desiring a referendum on EU treaties is measured on a scale of 1-11 with higher values denoting the respondent thinks treaties should be subject to public approval. Dissatisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale, with higher values meaning the respondent is dissatisfied.

Attitudes towards immigration are measured through several variables, all of which are on a 1-11 scale. Higher values denote anti-immigration opinions. The variables ask a) whether or not Austrians should get preferential treatment in the labour market, b) whether or not immigrants should adapt to Austrian culture c) whether or not foreign workers are good for the economy, d) salience of immigration laws.

Attitudes towards the economy are measured through four variables, all on a 1-11 scale. Higher values denote economically left-wing opinions. The variables ask a) whether or not the financial crisis has shown markets to be flawed, b) whether or not income inequality should be reduced, c) the salience of fixing the national budget, d) nationalisation is suitable to combat the financial crisis.

**Table E1: Socio-demographics (Austria 2008)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0305***</b> <b>(0.00800)</b>	0.0135 (0.0443)	0.00843 (0.0448)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.000445 (0.000443)	-0.000403 (0.000446)
Female (ref: male)	-0.0705 (0.245)	-0.0925 (0.246)	-0.0869 (0.246)
Unemployed * age			0.0337 (0.0495)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	1.132* (0.612)	1.087* (0.610)	-0.546 (2.464)
<i>Social class (ref: White collar)</i>			
Manual worker	0.0352 (0.292)	0.0440 (0.292)	0.0608 (0.294)
Civil servant	-0.741 (0.500)	-0.748 (0.500)	-0.734 (0.501)
Self-employed (with employees)	-0.491 (0.455)	-0.516 (0.458)	-0.515 (0.458)
Self-employed (no employees)	-0.497 (0.607)	-0.511 (0.607)	-0.499 (0.608)
Farmer	-0.445 (0.556)	-0.454 (0.557)	-0.442 (0.557)
<i>Religiosity (ref: not at all)</i>			
Not very religious	<b>-0.956***</b> <b>(0.351)</b>	<b>-0.928***</b> <b>(0.351)</b>	<b>-0.933***</b> <b>(0.352)</b>
Somewhat religious	<b>-0.742**</b> <b>(0.312)</b>	<b>-0.736**</b> <b>(0.313)</b>	<b>-0.737**</b> <b>(0.313)</b>
Very religious	<b>-1.534***</b> <b>(0.452)</b>	<b>-1.538***</b> <b>(0.453)</b>	<b>-1.553***</b> <b>(0.454)</b>
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
Compulsory secondary or less	<b>2.465***</b> <b>(0.829)</b>	<b>2.474***</b> <b>(0.829)</b>	<b>2.476***</b> <b>(0.830)</b>
Secondary	1.411* (0.805)	1.385* (0.804)	1.377* (0.805)
Post-secondary	<b>2.430***</b> <b>(0.757)</b>	<b>2.413***</b> <b>(0.757)</b>	<b>2.413***</b> <b>(0.757)</b>

**Table E1 continued**

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<i>Urbanisation</i> (ref: up to 10,000)			
10,000-50,000	0.0883 (0.354)	0.0831 (0.354)	0.0657 (0.356)
50,000-1 million	0.133 (0.336)	0.106 (0.337)	0.129 (0.337)
More than 1 million	-0.309 (0.340)	-0.352 (0.343)	-0.358 (0.344)
Union member (ref: not member)	0.602*	0.598*	0.598*
	(0.315)	(0.315)	(0.316)
Constant	-1.476* (0.892)	-2.429* (1.299)	-2.300* (1.310)
Observations	561	561	561

---

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E2: Attitudes (Austria 2008)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0342***</b> <b>(0.0101)</b>	0.0121 (0.0534)	0.00608 (0.0545)
Age <sup>2</sup>	---	-0.000465 (0.000530)	-0.000415 (0.000538)
Female (ref: male)	-0.150 (0.302)	-0.185 (0.305)	-0.187 (0.305)
Unemployed * age	---	---	0.0334 (0.0605)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.990 (0.752)	0.977 (0.754)	-0.619 (3.011)
<i>Social class (ref: White collar)</i>			
Manual worker	0.183 (0.362)	0.191 (0.363)	0.204 (0.364)
Civil servant	-0.0765 (0.566)	-0.109 (0.571)	-0.0920 (0.572)
Self-employed (with employees)	-0.358 (0.540)	-0.416 (0.546)	-0.399 (0.547)
Self-employed (no employees)	-0.561 (0.722)	-0.568 (0.722)	-0.555 (0.722)
Farmer	-0.496 (0.617)	-0.480 (0.617)	-0.464 (0.617)
<i>Religiosity (ref: not at all)</i>			
Not very religious	<b>-1.235***</b> <b>(0.451)</b>	<b>-1.202***</b> <b>(0.451)</b>	<b>-1.205***</b> <b>(0.452)</b>
Somewhat religious	<b>-1.027**</b> <b>(0.399)</b>	<b>-1.012**</b> <b>(0.399)</b>	<b>-1.012**</b> <b>(0.400)</b>
Very religious	<b>-1.705***</b> <b>(0.559)</b>	<b>-1.701***</b> <b>(0.560)</b>	<b>-1.702***</b> <b>(0.560)</b>
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
Compulsory secondary or less	1.031 (0.949)	1.057 (0.951)	1.053 (0.952)
Secondary	0.861 (0.893)	0.852 (0.892)	0.831 (0.895)
Post-secondary	1.137 (0.845)	1.142 (0.845)	1.139 (0.846)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: up to 10,000)</i>			
10,000-50,000	0.139 (0.415)	0.129 (0.417)	0.115 (0.419)
50,000-1 million	0.235 (0.445)	0.214 (0.445)	0.228 (0.445)
More than 1 million	0.110 (0.436)	0.0662 (0.439)	0.0497 (0.439)
Union member (ref: not member)	0.414 (0.375)	0.409 (0.377)	0.414 (0.377)

**Table E2 continued**

Left-right self-placement	<b>0.417***</b> (0.0735)	<b>0.419***</b> (0.0739)	<b>0.418***</b> (0.0740)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.165***</b> (0.0607)	<b>-0.165***</b> (0.0607)	<b>-0.164***</b> (0.0607)
Euro scepticism	<b>0.203***</b> (0.0598)	<b>0.202***</b> (0.0599)	<b>0.203***</b> (0.0598)
Referendum on EU treaties	<b>0.152***</b> (0.0535)	<b>0.157***</b> (0.0539)	<b>0.157***</b> (0.0540)
Harsher sentencing	0.00251 (0.0729)	-0.00266 (0.0731)	-0.00349 (0.0732)
Reduce immigration	-0.0106 (0.0812)	-0.0141 (0.0815)	-0.0126 (0.0817)
Favour Austrians in job market	-0.0278 (0.0701)	-0.0326 (0.0711)	-0.0382 (0.0720)
Immigrants affect culture	-0.0942 (0.0698)	-0.0945 (0.0700)	-0.0922 (0.0701)
Immigrants harm economy	0.0445 (0.0546)	0.0436 (0.0547)	0.0472 (0.0551)
Salience of immigration laws	<b>0.221**</b> (0.110)	0.209* (0.109)	0.214* (0.110)
Financial crisis shows markets flawed	0.0766 (0.0493)	0.0733 (0.0494)	0.0723 (0.0494)
Reduce income inequality	0.000812 (0.0715)	-0.000969 (0.0716)	-0.00458 (0.0720)
Salience fix national budget	<b>-0.124**</b> (0.0570)	<b>-0.121**</b> (0.0570)	<b>-0.119**</b> (0.0571)
Nationalisation will not help financial crisis	0.0646 (0.0490)	0.0639 (0.0491)	0.0620 (0.0492)
Dissatisfied with democracy	0.352* (0.214)	0.362* (0.214)	0.349 (0.216)
Constant	-7.009*** (1.751)	-7.878*** (2.017)	-7.695*** (2.044)
Observations	561	561	561

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Austria (2013)

Left-right self-placement is measured on a 0-10 scale; higher values indicate the right-wing. Euro scepticism is measured on a 0-10 scale, with higher values indicating that the respondent believes integration has gone too far. Perception of established party distance is calculated as the voter's perceived distance between the established left- and right-wing parties. Greater values indicate the voter perceives a greater difference between the two. Whether or not the respondent believes there needs to be a crackdown on crime is a five-point likert scale (strongly agree-strongly disagree). Higher values are more authoritarian. Satisfaction with democracy is run on a four-point scale with higher values indicating dissatisfaction.

Attitudes to immigration are measured with four variables, all on a five-point likert scale. The variables are a) believing European and Muslim lifestyles are compatible, b) believing assimilation has become better or worse, c) believing immigration should be stopped, and d) believing immigrants affect culture. Higher values indicate anti-immigration attitudes.

Attitudes to the economic left-right dimension are measured with three variables. High tax and spending vs low tax and spending is measured on a 0-10 scale. Higher values indicate a desire for higher taxation and spending. Believing income inequality should be reduced, and that inequality is good are both measured on a five-point likert scale. Higher values indicate left-wing positions.

**Table E3: Socio-demographics (Austria 2013)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	-0.0106* (0.00582)	0.0405 (0.0339)	0.0200 (0.0346)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.000527 (0.000345)	-0.000351 (0.000350)
Female (ref: male)	-0.117 (0.186)	-0.130 (0.187)	-0.121 (0.188)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None or elementary	0.619 (0.715)	0.767 (0.724)	0.781 (0.723)
Primary or secondary	0.343 (0.457)	0.488 (0.468)	0.549 (0.470)
Vocational	<b>0.824**</b> <b>(0.341)</b>	<b>0.846**</b> <b>(0.342)</b>	<b>0.847**</b> <b>(0.342)</b>
<i>Social class (ref: white collar)</i>			
Manual worker	<b>0.813***</b> <b>(0.232)</b>	<b>0.766***</b> <b>(0.234)</b>	<b>0.741***</b> <b>(0.236)</b>
Civil servant	-0.342 (0.296)	-0.381 (0.297)	-0.365 (0.297)
Self-employed (with employees)	0.169 (0.342)	0.138 (0.342)	0.1000 (0.345)
Self-employed (no employees)	-0.136 (0.484)	-0.186 (0.487)	-0.292 (0.502)
Farmer	0.518 (0.459)	0.459 (0.461)	0.455 (0.461)
<i>Religiosity (ref: not at all religious)</i>			
A little religious	-0.0743 (0.249)	-0.0965 (0.249)	-0.144 (0.251)
Somewhat religious	-0.152 (0.259)	-0.175 (0.260)	-0.188 (0.260)
Very religious	-0.462 (0.401)	-0.458 (0.401)	-0.420 (0.401)

**Table E3 continued:**

Unemployed * age			<b>0.0798**</b> <b>(0.0328)</b>
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	<b>0.905**</b> <b>(0.412)</b>	<b>0.873**</b> <b>(0.413)</b>	-2.472* (1.472)
Union member (ref: not member)	<b>0.606**</b> <b>(0.247)</b>	<b>0.642***</b> <b>(0.248)</b>	<b>0.654***</b> <b>(0.248)</b>
<i>Urbanisation (ref: village)</i>			
Small town	-0.383 (0.251)	-0.363 (0.252)	-0.391 (0.253)
Mid-size town	0.142 (0.318)	0.126 (0.319)	0.123 (0.322)
Centre of a large city	-0.397 (0.259)	-0.352 (0.261)	-0.364 (0.262)
Suburbs of a large city	<b>-0.807***</b> <b>(0.312)</b>	<b>-0.759**</b> <b>(0.314)</b>	<b>-0.793**</b> <b>(0.321)</b>
Constant	-1.646*** (0.508)	-2.782*** (0.901)	-2.224** (0.920)
Observations	800	800	800

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Table E4: Attitudes (Austria 2013)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0188***</b> <b>(0.00682)</b>	0.00367 (0.0382)	-0.0219 (0.0394)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.000229 (0.000383)	-9.29e-06 (0.000392)
Female (ref: male)	-0.110 (0.214)	-0.117 (0.215)	-0.101 (0.216)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None or elementary	0.422 (0.773)	0.462 (0.777)	0.462 (0.775)
Primary or secondary	0.0812 (0.518)	0.138 (0.527)	0.191 (0.531)
Vocational	0.297 (0.391)	0.297 (0.391)	0.312 (0.393)
<i>Social class (ref: white collar)</i>			
Manual worker	<b>0.605**</b> <b>(0.268)</b>	<b>0.583**</b> <b>(0.271)</b>	<b>0.577**</b> <b>(0.275)</b>
Civil servant	-0.294 (0.333)	-0.310 (0.334)	-0.291 (0.335)
Self-employed (with employees)	0.402 (0.391)	0.386 (0.391)	0.351 (0.393)
Self-employed (no employees)	-0.520 (0.564)	-0.541 (0.565)	-0.654 (0.576)
Farmer	0.248 (0.505)	0.224 (0.506)	0.240 (0.507)
<i>Religiosity (ref: not at all religious)</i>			
A little religious	-0.104 (0.289)	-0.112 (0.289)	-0.183 (0.292)
Somewhat religious	-0.203 (0.296)	-0.211 (0.296)	-0.243 (0.299)
Very religious	-0.382 (0.435)	-0.387 (0.435)	-0.353 (0.439)
Unemployed * age			<b>0.107**</b> <b>(0.0415)</b>
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	<b>1.199**</b> <b>(0.477)</b>	<b>1.181**</b> <b>(0.480)</b>	-3.392* (1.926)
Union member (ref: not member)	0.423 (0.276)	0.439 (0.277)	0.467* (0.281)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: village)</i>			
Small town	-0.409 (0.287)	-0.401 (0.287)	-0.439 (0.289)
Mid-size town	-0.0680 (0.367)	-0.0747 (0.367)	-0.0525 (0.373)
Centre of a large city	-0.202 (0.305)	-0.180 (0.308)	-0.202 (0.310)
Suburbs of a large city	-0.675* (0.348)	-0.651* (0.351)	-0.675* (0.359)

**Table E4 continued:**

Left-right self-placement	<b>0.165***</b> (0.0621)	<b>0.164***</b> (0.0622)	<b>0.164***</b> (0.0626)
Euroscepticism	<b>0.134***</b> (0.0465)	<b>0.132***</b> (0.0467)	<b>0.143***</b> (0.0473)
Perceived established party distance	-0.104* (0.0551)	-0.105* (0.0551)	-0.0918* (0.0558)
Crack down on criminals	0.251* (0.130)	0.247* (0.130)	0.271** (0.132)
European lifestyle and Muslims not compatible	0.157 (0.110)	0.157 (0.111)	0.122 (0.111)
Assimilation has become worse	0.244* (0.125)	0.244* (0.125)	0.242* (0.126)
Stop immigration	<b>0.208**</b> (0.0979)	<b>0.208**</b> (0.0980)	<b>0.192**</b> (0.0981)
Immigrants affect culture	0.0420 (0.110)	0.0372 (0.110)	0.0259 (0.111)
Higher tax and spending	<b>-0.191***</b> (0.0542)	<b>-0.191***</b> (0.0542)	<b>-0.204***</b> (0.0548)
Reduce income inequality	-0.127 (0.0947)	-0.126 (0.0946)	-0.129 (0.0952)
Inequality bad	0.00291 (0.0862)	-0.000452 (0.0865)	0.0138 (0.0870)
Dissatisfied with democracy	0.200 (0.143)	0.198 (0.143)	0.176 (0.144)
Constant	<b>-4.466***</b> (1.170)	<b>-4.899***</b> (1.378)	<b>-4.134***</b> (1.413)
Observations	800	800	800

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Denmark (2007)

Left-right self-placement is measured on a 1-11 scale. Higher values indicate the right-wing. Perceived established party distance is measured as the difference between voter's perceptions of the left-right position of the established left- and right-wing party. Greater values indicate the perception they are more different. Euroscepticism is measured on a five-point likert scale (very positive-very negative), asking what the respondent's general attitude to the EU is. Attitudes to globalisation is measured on a five-point likert scale (very positive-very negative). Higher values indicate anti-globalisation views. Believing the need for harsher sentencing is measured on a five-point likert scale (strongly disagree-strongly agree). Higher values indicate authoritarian attitudes. Dissatisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale, with higher values indicating dissatisfaction.

Anti-immigration or nativist attitudes are measured with seven variables. Believing headscarves should be banned in public buildings is binary. Believing the Fogh government's immigration rules is nominal with three categories: rules are adequate, not far enough, or too far (the reference category). The remaining five variables are asked on a five-point likert scale. Higher values indicate anti-immigration attitudes. The variables are a) believing the integration of immigrants has gotten worse in the last three years, b) believing immigrants affect culture, c) believing immigrants and refugees should have the same rights to welfare, d) believing fewer refugees should be allowed into Denmark, and e) believing Danes should be favoured in the labour market.

The economic left-right dimension is measured with three variables, all on a five-point likert-scale. The variables are: a) believing high incomes should be taxed more, b) reducing income inequality is a good proposal, c) too many receive welfare without needing it. Higher values indicate left-wing values on the former two, and right-wing values on the latter.

**Table E5: Socio-demographics (Denmark 2007)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	-0.00450 (0.00446)	0.00174 (0.0259)	-0.00159 (0.0260)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-6.17e-05 (0.000253)	-1.18e-05 (0.000254)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.267**</b> <b>(0.134)</b>	<b>-0.267**</b> <b>(0.134)</b>	<b>-0.285**</b> <b>(0.134)</b>
Unemployed * age			-0.0238 (0.0157)
Unemployed	-0.186 (0.253)	-0.184 (0.253)	1.233 (0.943)
Annual income	-0.00561 (0.00426)	-0.00570 (0.00429)	-0.00569 (0.00427)
<i>Education (ref: Higher preparatory)</i>			
Primary school	<b>1.038***</b> <b>(0.327)</b>	<b>1.039***</b> <b>(0.327)</b>	<b>1.017***</b> <b>(0.327)</b>
Lower secondary	<b>0.828***</b> <b>(0.318)</b>	<b>0.826***</b> <b>(0.318)</b>	<b>0.809**</b> <b>(0.319)</b>
Upper secondary	-0.504 (0.343)	-0.499 (0.344)	-0.508 (0.344)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural district)</i>			
Town (<10,000)	0.227 (0.206)	0.230 (0.207)	0.229 (0.207)
Town (10,000-50,000)	0.210 (0.205)	0.215 (0.206)	0.219 (0.206)
Town (15,001-500,000)	0.0924 (0.221)	0.0978 (0.222)	0.0913 (0.222)
Metropolitan area	0.240 (0.228)	0.245 (0.229)	0.240 (0.229)
Union member (ref: not member)	<b>-0.430***</b> <b>(0.138)</b>	<b>-0.442***</b> <b>(0.147)</b>	<b>-0.438***</b> <b>(0.147)</b>
Constant	-2.299*** (0.414)	-2.435*** (0.695)	-2.392*** (0.696)
Observations	3,027	3,027	3,027

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E6: Attitudes (Denmark 2007)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	-0.000845 (0.00592)	-0.0500 (0.0321)	-0.0506 (0.0322)
Age <sup>2</sup>	---	0.000472 (0.000303)	0.000482 (0.000306)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.338**</b> <b>(0.167)</b>	<b>-0.331**</b> <b>(0.167)</b>	<b>-0.336**</b> <b>(0.168)</b>
Unemployed * age	---	---	-0.00478 (0.0191)
Unemployed	-0.224 (0.301)	-0.235 (0.301)	0.0492 (1.171)
Annual income	-0.00861* (0.00500)	-0.00813 (0.00497)	-0.00805 (0.00498)
<i>Education (ref: Higher preparatory)</i>			
Primary school	0.578 (0.401)	0.606 (0.402)	0.599 (0.403)
Lower secondary	0.396 (0.391)	0.427 (0.392)	0.422 (0.392)
Upper secondary	-0.182 (0.420)	-0.210 (0.421)	-0.214 (0.421)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural district)</i>			
Town (<10,000)	-0.0448 (0.245)	-0.0799 (0.246)	-0.0787 (0.246)
Town (10,000-50,000)	0.0240 (0.245)	-0.0102 (0.246)	-0.00660 (0.246)
Town (15,001-500,000)	0.0221 (0.266)	-0.0217 (0.268)	-0.0232 (0.268)
Metropolitan area	0.180 (0.277)	0.137 (0.278)	0.135 (0.278)
Union member (ref: not member)	-0.182 (0.177)	-0.115 (0.182)	-0.112 (0.182)
Left-right self-placement	<b>0.132***</b> <b>(0.0346)</b>	<b>0.130***</b> <b>(0.0346)</b>	<b>0.130***</b> <b>(0.0346)</b>
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.116***</b> <b>(0.0316)</b>	<b>-0.116***</b> <b>(0.0315)</b>	<b>-0.116***</b> <b>(0.0315)</b>
Euroscepticism	<b>0.468***</b> <b>(0.0848)</b>	<b>0.476***</b> <b>(0.0852)</b>	<b>0.476***</b> <b>(0.0852)</b>
Globalisation bad	0.172 (0.115)	0.161 (0.115)	0.162 (0.115)
Harsher sentencing	0.284* (0.148)	0.284* (0.148)	0.283* (0.148)
Immigrant integration become worse	-0.0894 (0.0943)	-0.0866 (0.0943)	-0.0869 (0.0944)
Immigrants affect culture	<b>0.347***</b> <b>(0.101)</b>	<b>0.354***</b> <b>(0.101)</b>	<b>0.353***</b> <b>(0.101)</b>
Refugees should not have access to welfare	-0.00882 (0.0820)	0.00520 (0.0828)	0.00466 (0.0828)
Let in fewer refugees	<b>0.757***</b> <b>(0.124)</b>	<b>0.753***</b> <b>(0.123)</b>	<b>0.753***</b> <b>(0.123)</b>

**Table E6 continued:**

Favour Danes in job Market	0.0907 (0.0740)	0.0848 (0.0741)	0.0845 (0.0741)
<i>Immigration rules (ref: go too far)</i>			
Adequate	<b>1.270**</b> <b>(0.544)</b>	<b>1.273**</b> <b>(0.544)</b>	<b>1.274**</b> <b>(0.544)</b>
Not far enough	<b>1.925***</b> <b>(0.567)</b>	<b>1.937***</b> <b>(0.567)</b>	<b>1.937***</b> <b>(0.567)</b>
Ban headscarves (ref: do not)	<b>0.432**</b> <b>(0.195)</b>	<b>0.455**</b> <b>(0.195)</b>	<b>0.455**</b> <b>(0.196)</b>
Tax high earners more	0.0216 (0.0707)	0.0204 (0.0708)	0.0185 (0.0712)
Reduce income inequality	0.0549 (0.0808)	0.0584 (0.0809)	0.0593 (0.0809)
Too many benefits	-0.157* (0.0821)	<b>-0.165**</b> <b>(0.0822)</b>	<b>-0.163**</b> <b>(0.0826)</b>
Dissatisfied with democracy	-0.191 (0.134)	-0.184 (0.134)	-0.186 (0.134)
Constant	-10.82*** (1.172)	-9.746*** (1.352)	-9.735*** (1.352)
Observations	3,027	3,027	3,027

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Denmark (2011)

Left-right self-placement is measured on a 0-10 scale with higher values indicating the right-wing. Perceived established party distance is measured as the difference between the voter's perception of the established left- and right-wing parties. Higher values indicate the voter believes they are more different. Euroscepticism is measured on a five-point likert scale (very positive-very negative). Higher values indicate their general attitude to the EU is negative. Attitudes to globalisation is measured on a five-point likert scale (very positive-very negative). Higher values indicate globalisation has a negative effect on Denmark. Believing that there should be harsher sentencing for violent crimes is measured on a five-point likert scale with higher values indicating authoritarian attitudes.

Attitudes to immigration and nativism are measured with five variables. Attitudes to the government's immigration and refugee rules are nominal, with respondents believing they go too far (reference category), not far enough or are adequate. The remaining variables are measured on a five-point likert scale with higher values indicating anti-immigration attitudes. The variables are a) believing immigrants affect culture, b) believing fewer refugees should be allowed into Denmark, c) that Danes should be favoured in the labour market, and d) believing refugees and immigrants should not have equal access to welfare.

The economic left-right dimension is measured with four variables. How to fight unemployment is binary, asking if education should be increased or benefits made less attractive. What is most important for the Danish economy is also binary, asking if the budget should be balanced or unemployment should be tackled. Whether or not high incomes should be taxed more and whether too many get welfare without needing it are both measured on a five-point likert scale. Higher values are more left-wing attitudes.

**Table E7: Socio-demographics (Denmark 2011)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	0.00884 (0.0113)	0.0514 (0.0719)	0.0648 (0.0738)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.000493 (0.000824)	-0.000704 (0.000854)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.630**</b> <b>(0.313)</b>	<b>-0.647**</b> <b>(0.314)</b>	<b>-0.639**</b> <b>(0.314)</b>
Unemployed * age			0.0779 (0.0523)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.366 (0.596)	0.347 (0.599)	-3.474 (2.846)
<i>Education (ref: Higher preparatory)</i>			
Primary schools	1.002* (0.591)	1.039* (0.594)	1.093* (0.597)
Lower secondary	0.595 (0.564)	0.610 (0.565)	0.651 (0.568)
Upper secondary	-0.541 (0.605)	-0.514 (0.608)	-0.466 (0.611)
Annual income	-0.0387 (0.0544)	-0.0511 (0.0581)	-0.0504 (0.0581)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: Copenhagen/major city)</i>			
City	-0.745 (0.454)	-0.751* (0.454)	-0.694 (0.457)
Small town	0.241 (0.330)	0.229 (0.331)	0.279 (0.335)
Rural area	-0.104 (0.412)	-0.122 (0.414)	-0.0786 (0.415)
Struggle to pay bills (ref: no)	0.0919 (0.353)	0.0743 (0.355)	0.129 (0.354)
Union member (ref: not member)	0.239 (0.298)	0.278 (0.305)	0.306 (0.305)
Constant	-2.935*** (0.771)	-3.707** (1.510)	-3.953** (1.538)
Observations	998	998	998

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E8: Attitudes (Denmark 2011)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	0.0109 (0.0152)	-0.00604 (0.0836)	0.000293 (0.0846)
Age <sup>2</sup>	---	0.000198 (0.000960)	8.19e-05 (0.000977)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.758**</b> <b>(0.380)</b>	<b>-0.756**</b> <b>(0.380)</b>	-0.735* (0.382)
Unemployed * age	---	---	0.0691 (0.0772)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.0739 (0.806)	0.0741 (0.806)	-3.321 (4.092)
<i>Education (ref: Higher preparatory)</i>			
Primary schools	0.0448 (0.736)	0.0310 (0.740)	0.115 (0.759)
Lower secondary	0.152 (0.694)	0.148 (0.694)	0.208 (0.712)
Upper secondary	0.0435 (0.713)	0.0339 (0.714)	0.0579 (0.725)
Annual income	-0.0334 (0.0691)	-0.0285 (0.0731)	-0.0277 (0.0734)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: Copenhagen/major city)</i>			
City	<b>-1.568***</b> <b>(0.560)</b>	<b>-1.571***</b> <b>(0.560)</b>	<b>-1.537***</b> <b>(0.561)</b>
Small town	-0.172 (0.410)	-0.173 (0.411)	-0.179 (0.411)
Rural area	-0.368 (0.504)	-0.363 (0.504)	-0.368 (0.505)
Struggle to pay bills (ref: no)	-0.0782 (0.424)	-0.0695 (0.427)	-0.0625 (0.428)
Union member (ref: not member)	0.0351 (0.356)	0.0230 (0.361)	0.0594 (0.362)
Left-right self-placement	0.0997 (0.0753)	0.0993 (0.0754)	0.105 (0.0762)
Perceived established party distance	<b>0.141**</b> <b>(0.0680)</b>	<b>0.140**</b> <b>(0.0683)</b>	<b>0.135**</b> <b>(0.0685)</b>
Euroscpticism	<b>0.332**</b> <b>(0.159)</b>	<b>0.333**</b> <b>(0.159)</b>	<b>0.327**</b> <b>(0.160)</b>
Globalisation negative	0.131 (0.187)	0.133 (0.187)	0.127 (0.189)
Harsher sentencing	0.133 (0.221)	0.132 (0.221)	0.143 (0.220)
Immigrants affect culture	0.329* (0.178)	0.330* (0.178)	0.330* (0.179)

**Table E8 continued:**

Restrict number of refugees	<b>0.597**</b> <b>(0.262)</b>	<b>0.599**</b> <b>(0.262)</b>	<b>0.588**</b> <b>(0.264)</b>
Favour Danes in job market	-0.0659 (0.127)	-0.0649 (0.127)	-0.0681 (0.127)
Restrict refugee welfare access	-0.215 (0.185)	-0.215 (0.185)	-0.210 (0.185)
<i>Immigration rules (ref: go too far)</i>			
Adequate	<b>2.302**</b> <b>(1.073)</b>	<b>2.305**</b> <b>(1.074)</b>	<b>2.456**</b> <b>(1.118)</b>
Not far enough	<b>2.831**</b> <b>(1.104)</b>	<b>2.838**</b> <b>(1.105)</b>	<b>2.998***</b> <b>(1.149)</b>
Increase tax on high earners	0.163 (0.120)	0.162 (0.120)	0.162 (0.121)
Too easy to access welfare	-0.128 (0.166)	-0.127 (0.166)	-0.0989 (0.168)
<i>Reduce unemployment (ref: increase education)</i>			
Make benefits less generous	0.101 (0.357)	0.0944 (0.358)	0.0888 (0.360)
<i>Most important for economy (ref: balance budget)</i>			
Combat unemployment	0.518 (0.351)	0.512 (0.352)	0.511 (0.353)
Constant	-10.96*** (2.100)	-10.67*** (2.537)	-10.97*** (2.573)
Observations	998	998	998

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### France (2007)

Left-right self-placement could not be measured on a continuous scale as this variable was not included. Instead, the variable asked respondents to place themselves into pre-defined categories: very left; left; centre; right; very right or nowhere. Satisfaction with democracy was asked on a four-point scale (very good-very bad). Attitudes to globalisation and EU membership are nominal, with respondents stating it is good, bad or neither. Whether or not the death penalty should be brought back is measured on a four-point scale (strongly disagree-totally agree). Higher values indicate authoritarian attitudes. There are also five additional dummy variables that measure Euroscepticism, measuring whether or not the respondent fears the EU's impact on: welfare; national identity; French world role; unemployment; immigration.

Attitudes to immigration and nativism are measured with three variables. The respondent's opinion of Islam is a four-point scale (very positive-very negative) with higher values denoting negative views. Whether or not Eastern European labour should be banned is measured on a four-point scale (not agree at all-totally agree). Higher values indicate a desire



to ban it. Whether or not the respondent feels at home is also measured on a four-point scale, with higher values indicating they do not.

The economic left-right dimension is measured with two variables, both on a four-point scale (not agree at all-totally agree). The variables measure whether or not wealth should be redistributed and whether or not tax should be raised on high earners. Higher values indicate left-wing attitudes.

**Table E9: Socio-demographics (France 2007)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0216***</b> (0.00578)	0.0141 (0.0293)	0.00936 (0.0302)
Age <sup>2</sup>	---	-0.000353 (0.000285)	-0.000313 (0.000292)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.736***</b> (0.179)	<b>-0.743***</b> (0.179)	<b>-0.748***</b> (0.179)
<i>Social class (ref: Higher-grade professional)</i>			
Lower-grade professional	-0.0332 (0.544)	-0.0118 (0.544)	-0.0153 (0.544)
Routine non-manual	0.436 (0.387)	0.440 (0.387)	0.445 (0.387)
Small proprietor	-0.345 (0.527)	-0.335 (0.527)	-0.331 (0.527)
Lower-grade technicians/supervisors of manual workers	0.337 (0.462)	0.333 (0.462)	0.333 (0.462)
Skilled manual	0.304 (0.385)	0.301 (0.385)	0.300 (0.385)
Semi-/unskilled manual	0.599 (0.397)	0.601 (0.397)	0.607 (0.397)
Student	-0.897 (0.574)	-0.672 (0.603)	-0.714 (0.606)
Unemployed * age	---	---	0.0163 (0.0264)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.358 (0.315)	0.369 (0.315)	-0.278 (1.111)
Have religious faith (ref: do not)	<b>0.386**</b> (0.180)	<b>0.382**</b> (0.180)	<b>0.381**</b> (0.180)

**Table E9 continued:**

<i>Education (ref: Higher education)</i>			
No diploma	<b>2.385***</b> (0.622)	<b>2.367***</b> (0.622)	<b>2.362***</b> (0.623)
BEPC/CAP/BEP	<b>2.072***</b> (0.605)	<b>2.039***</b> (0.606)	<b>2.031***</b> (0.606)
Baccalaureate	<b>1.308**</b> (0.644)	<b>1.318**</b> (0.644)	<b>1.312**</b> (0.644)
Bac + 2 level	0.932 (0.686)	0.936 (0.686)	0.924 (0.686)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area)</i>			
Urban area < 20,000	-0.109 (0.214)	-0.112 (0.214)	-0.115 (0.214)
Urban area between 20-100,000	<b>-0.579**</b> (0.272)	<b>-0.572**</b> (0.272)	<b>-0.573**</b> (0.272)
Urban area > 100,000	-0.0329 (0.194)	-0.0319 (0.193)	-0.0310 (0.193)
Paris metropolitan area	-0.536* (0.302)	-0.540* (0.303)	-0.544* (0.303)
Union member (ref: not member)	-0.296* (0.174)	-0.303* (0.174)	-0.302* (0.175)
Constant	<b>-3.656***</b> (0.705)	<b>-4.440***</b> (0.949)	<b>-4.309***</b> (0.969)
Observations	3,313	3,313	3,313

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E10: Attitudes (France 2007)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	-0.0199*** (0.00706)	0.0175 (0.0348)	0.0185 (0.0360)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.000363 (0.000331)	-0.000372 (0.000341)
Female (ref: male)	-1.061*** (0.219)	-1.064*** (0.219)	-1.063*** (0.219)
<i>Social class (ref: Higher-grade professional)</i>			
Lower-grade professional	-0.206 (0.658)	-0.174 (0.662)	-0.170 (0.663)
Routine non-manual	0.175 (0.471)	0.175 (0.472)	0.174 (0.472)
Small proprietor	-0.926 (0.617)	-0.903 (0.618)	-0.905 (0.618)
Lower-grade technicians/supervisors of manual workers	0.156 (0.560)	0.148 (0.560)	0.148 (0.560)
Skilled manual	-0.0759 (0.470)	-0.0739 (0.470)	-0.0739 (0.470)
Semi-/unskilled manual	0.0874 (0.485)	0.0860 (0.486)	0.0838 (0.487)
Student	-0.0858 (0.666)	0.157 (0.703)	0.167 (0.708)
Unemployed * age			-0.00357 (0.0316)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.294 (0.375)	0.302 (0.375)	0.446 (1.326)
Have religious faith (ref: do not)	0.216 (0.215)	0.214 (0.215)	0.214 (0.215)
<i>Education (ref: Higher education)</i>			
No diploma	1.782** (0.872)	1.807** (0.872)	1.811** (0.874)
BEPC/CAP/BEP	1.570* (0.856)	1.583* (0.856)	1.587* (0.858)
Baccalaureate	1.005 (0.886)	1.066 (0.888)	1.070 (0.889)
Bac + 2 level	0.979 (0.940)	1.029 (0.942)	1.033 (0.944)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area)</i>			
Urban area < 20,000	-0.198 (0.253)	-0.195 (0.254)	-0.195 (0.254)
Urban area between 20-100,000	-0.427 (0.309)	-0.428 (0.309)	-0.429 (0.309)
Urban area > 100,000	0.139 (0.229)	0.141 (0.229)	0.140 (0.229)
Paris metropolitan area	-0.159 (0.366)	-0.158 (0.367)	-0.158 (0.367)
Union member (ref: not member)	-0.0426 (0.201)	-0.0478 (0.202)	-0.0477 (0.202)

**Table E10 continued:**

<i>Left-right self-placement (ref: very left)</i>			
Left	0.919 (1.090)	0.955 (1.093)	0.949 (1.093)
Centre	1.289 (1.096)	1.332 (1.099)	1.325 (1.100)
Right	1.750 (1.081)	1.803* (1.085)	1.796* (1.085)
Very right	<b>3.967***</b> <b>(1.110)</b>	<b>4.057***</b> <b>(1.115)</b>	<b>4.051***</b> <b>(1.115)</b>
Nowhere	2.047* (1.077)	2.091* (1.079)	2.085* (1.080)
French democracy works poorly	<b>0.245**</b> <b>(0.118)</b>	<b>0.252**</b> <b>(0.119)</b>	<b>0.252**</b> <b>(0.119)</b>
<i>Globalisation (ref: good thing)</i>			
Bad thing	<b>0.707**</b> <b>(0.319)</b>	<b>0.715**</b> <b>(0.319)</b>	<b>0.715**</b> <b>(0.319)</b>
Neither good nor bad	0.549* (0.333)	0.565* (0.334)	0.565* (0.334)
<i>EU membership (ref: good thing)</i>			
Bad thing	<b>0.682**</b> <b>(0.286)</b>	<b>0.659**</b> <b>(0.287)</b>	<b>0.660**</b> <b>(0.287)</b>
Neither good nor bad	0.0633 (0.226)	0.0508 (0.227)	0.0505 (0.227)
Bring back death penalty	<b>0.491***</b> <b>(0.0833)</b>	<b>0.484***</b> <b>(0.0834)</b>	<b>0.484***</b> <b>(0.0834)</b>
Fear EU's impact on welfare (ref: not fear)	0.0217 (0.233)	0.0277 (0.233)	0.0267 (0.233)
Fear EU's impact on national ID (ref: not fear)	<b>0.645***</b> <b>(0.236)</b>	<b>0.639***</b> <b>(0.237)</b>	<b>0.639***</b> <b>(0.237)</b>
Fear EU's impact on world role (ref: not fear)	-0.0460 (0.194)	-0.0448 (0.195)	-0.0429 (0.195)
Fear EU's impact on unemployment (ref: not fear)	0.117 (0.279)	0.112 (0.278)	0.113 (0.278)
Fear EU's impact on immigration (ref: not fear)	<b>0.588**</b> <b>(0.260)</b>	<b>0.593**</b> <b>(0.261)</b>	<b>0.593**</b> <b>(0.261)</b>
Dislike Islam	<b>0.557***</b> <b>(0.128)</b>	<b>0.543***</b> <b>(0.129)</b>	<b>0.543***</b> <b>(0.129)</b>
Ban Eastern European labour	0.0176 (0.0908)	0.0192 (0.0910)	0.0188 (0.0911)
No longer feel at home	<b>0.267***</b> <b>(0.0872)</b>	<b>0.271***</b> <b>(0.0874)</b>	<b>0.270***</b> <b>(0.0875)</b>
Redistribute wealth	-0.152 (0.0945)	-0.150 (0.0947)	-0.149 (0.0948)
Raise tax on high income	-0.0279 (0.0858)	-0.0289 (0.0861)	-0.0291 (0.0861)
Constant	-10.14*** (1.552)	-11.04*** (1.765)	-11.07*** (1.781)
Observations	3,313	3,313	3,313

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### France (2017)

Left-right self-placement is measured on a 0-10 scale, with higher values being right-wing. Ideological distance is measured as distance from 5 (i.e. a value of 1 means the respondent is *either 4 or 6*). Perceived distance between established candidates is measured as the distance between the respondent's placement of the established left- and right-wing candidates. Higher values denote greater difference. As France has Presidential elections, the perceived left-right placement of candidates is preferred over parties. Dissatisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale with higher values indicating dissatisfaction. Whether or not globalisation is bad for France is asked on a four-point scale, with higher values indicating an anti-globalisation attitude. Who the victims of the financial crisis were is nominal with four categories: people poorer than the respondent; people like them; people richer than them and everyone the same.

Populism is measured using the same questions as in chapter five, using item response theory (populism\_5 is not included in the scale).

**Table E11: Populist attitudes questions (France 2017)**

Variable name	Question wording	Dimension
populism_1	What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.	Manichean worldview
populism_2	Most politicians do not care about the people.	Manichean worldview
populism_3	Most politicians are trustworthy.	Anti-elitism
populism_4	Politicians are the main problem in [country].	Anti-elitism
populism_5	Having a strong leader in government is good for [country] if the leader bends the rules to get things done.	
populism_6	The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	Will of the people
populism_7	Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.	Anti-elitism

Euro-scepticism is measured with a variety of variables. The EU's impact on immigration and deficits is on a 0-10 scale, with higher values indicating it has a negative impact. Those who said the EU has no impact (11) were recoded to the mid-point. Whether or not customs barriers should be restored, or whether or not integration needs to be increased. Both are asked on a five-point likert scale (agree-disagree), and higher values indicate Euro-scepticism. Whether or not the respondent desires referendums to be called by enough citizens is measured on a four-point scale (agree-disagree). Higher values indicate pro-direct democracy opinions. Whether or not the death penalty should be brought back is measured on a four-point scale (agree-disagree). Higher values denote authoritarian attitudes.

Attitudes towards nativism are measured using several variables. Firstly, whether or not respondents believe Muslims can truly be French is measured on a four-point scale (disagree-

agree). Higher values indicate the respondent does not believe so. Four variables also ask for the respondent's opinion on national identity on a four-point scale (not important at all-very important: importance of being born in France, importance of having French ancestry, importance of speaking French and importance of following French customs. Higher values indicate greater importance. Nativism itself is measured with item response theory using the same variables as in chapter five. All are on a five-point likert scale and higher values indicate nativist attitudes.

**Table E12: Nativist attitudes questions (France 2017)**

<b>Variable name</b>	<b>Question wording</b>	<b>Dimension</b>
outgroup_1	Minorities should adapt to the customs and traditions of [country].	Threat to nation-state
outgroup_2	The will of the majority should always prevail, even over the rights of minorities.	Threat to nation-state
outgroup_3	Immigrants are generally good for [country]'s economy.	Xenophobia (economic threat)
outgroup_4	[country]'s culture is generally harmed by immigrants.	Xenophobia (cultural threat)
outgroup_5	Immigrants increase crime rates in [country].	Xenophobia (social threat)

The economic left-right dimension is measured using three variables. State intervention in the economy is binary, measuring whether the voter believes firms should have freedom or the state should have control. Whether or not workers or firms should be given priority is also binary. Finally, whether or not the rich should be taxed to achieve social justice is measured on a four-point scale (disagree-agree). Higher values indicate left-wing attitudes.

**Table E13: Socio-demographics (FN and LFI, France 2017)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0286***</b> (0.00521)	-0.0342 (0.0259)	-0.0365 (0.0261)
Age <sup>2</sup>		5.74e-05 (0.000261)	7.63e-05 (0.000262)
Female (ref: male)	-0.149 (0.154)	-0.148 (0.154)	-0.151 (0.154)
Unemployed * age			0.0274 (0.0332)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.431 (0.374)	0.440 (0.377)	-0.776 (1.505)
<i>Education (ref: tertiary)</i>			
None or Primary	<b>0.890***</b> (0.238)	<b>0.882***</b> (0.241)	<b>0.878***</b> (0.241)
Lower secondary - vocational (CAP-BEP)	<b>0.669***</b> (0.212)	<b>0.668***</b> (0.212)	<b>0.665***</b> (0.212)
Secondary	0.00886 (0.209)	0.00597 (0.210)	-0.00397 (0.210)
Subjective social class (working class)	<b>0.252***</b> (0.0525)	<b>0.253***</b> (0.0527)	<b>0.254***</b> (0.0527)
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly)</i>			
Monthly	0.382 (0.302)	0.384 (0.302)	0.386 (0.303)
Yearly/special occasions	<b>0.541**</b> (0.228)	<b>0.540**</b> (0.228)	<b>0.543**</b> (0.228)
Never	<b>0.619***</b> (0.182)	<b>0.618***</b> (0.182)	<b>0.627***</b> (0.182)
Union member (ref: not member)	<b>0.572**</b> (0.253)	<b>0.577**</b> (0.254)	<b>0.569**</b> (0.255)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area)</i>			
2000/20000 inhabitants	0.152 (0.225)	0.154 (0.225)	0.155 (0.225)
20001/100000 inhabitants	0.136 (0.271)	0.133 (0.272)	0.121 (0.273)
>100000 inhabitants	0.208 (0.206)	0.205 (0.206)	0.208 (0.206)
Agglomeration of Paris	-0.126 (0.275)	-0.129 (0.275)	-0.140 (0.276)
Constant	-0.845* (0.434)	-0.728 (0.687)	-0.668 (0.691)
Observations	861	861	861

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E14: Attitudes (FN and LFI, France 2017)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0208***</b> <b>(0.00601)</b>	-0.00735 (0.0289)	-0.00895 (0.0291)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.000137 (0.000289)	-0.000125 (0.000290)
Female (ref: male)	-0.338* (0.178)	-0.343* (0.178)	-0.346* (0.178)
Unemployed * age			0.0216 (0.0365)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.475 (0.413)	0.457 (0.415)	-0.496 (1.654)
<i>Education (ref: tertiary)</i>			
None or Primary	-0.157 (0.293)	-0.144 (0.294)	-0.147 (0.294)
Lower secondary - vocational (CAP-BEP)	-0.257 (0.254)	-0.258 (0.254)	-0.259 (0.254)
Secondary	-0.301 (0.243)	-0.295 (0.243)	-0.302 (0.243)
Subjective social class (working class)	<b>0.186***</b> <b>(0.0609)</b>	<b>0.185***</b> <b>(0.0609)</b>	<b>0.187***</b> <b>(0.0610)</b>
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly)</i>			
Monthly	0.560 (0.345)	0.559 (0.345)	0.559 (0.345)
Yearly/special occasions	<b>0.822***</b> <b>(0.259)</b>	<b>0.824***</b> <b>(0.259)</b>	<b>0.829***</b> <b>(0.260)</b>
Never	<b>0.491**</b> <b>(0.208)</b>	<b>0.493**</b> <b>(0.208)</b>	<b>0.502**</b> <b>(0.209)</b>
Union member (ref: not member)	0.563* (0.291)	0.548* (0.293)	0.539* (0.293)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area)</i>			
2000/20000 inhabitants	0.159 (0.257)	0.154 (0.257)	0.151 (0.257)
20001/100000 inhabitants	0.140 (0.304)	0.143 (0.304)	0.129 (0.305)
>100000 inhabitants	0.282 (0.233)	0.290 (0.234)	0.289 (0.234)
Agglomeration of Paris	0.107 (0.314)	0.110 (0.314)	0.101 (0.314)



**Table E14 continued:**

Populist attitudes	<b>0.607***</b> (0.141)	<b>0.608***</b> (0.141)	<b>0.606***</b> (0.141)
Left-right self-placement	<b>0.453***</b> (0.0662)	<b>0.455***</b> (0.0664)	<b>0.457***</b> (0.0665)
Perceived distance between established candidates	<b>-0.156***</b> (0.0419)	<b>-0.157***</b> (0.0421)	<b>-0.159***</b> (0.0422)
EU negative effect on deficits	<b>0.0968**</b> (0.0477)	<b>0.0968**</b> (0.0477)	<b>0.0977**</b> (0.0477)
Customs barriers should be restored	0.0910 (0.0785)	0.0944 (0.0789)	0.0921 (0.0790)
Euroscepticism	0.0543 (0.0729)	0.0537 (0.0730)	0.0535 (0.0730)
EU negative effect on immigration	0.00493 (0.0480)	0.00474 (0.0481)	0.00460 (0.0481)
Desires increased use of referendums	0.123 (0.121)	0.122 (0.121)	0.118 (0.121)
Globalisation bad for France	0.0468 (0.119)	0.0464 (0.119)	0.0496 (0.119)
<i>Victims of economic crisis (ref: people poorer than me)</i>			
People like me	0.118 (0.225)	0.108 (0.226)	0.108 (0.226)
People richer than me	0.904 (0.690)	0.897 (0.693)	0.894 (0.695)
Everyone the same	0.0439 (0.228)	0.0346 (0.229)	0.0359 (0.229)
Bring back death penalty	0.156* (0.0890)	0.156* (0.0890)	0.160* (0.0893)
Dissatisfied with democracy	0.00846 (0.134)	0.00370 (0.135)	-0.00433 (0.135)
Constant	-1.879*** (0.702)	-2.147** (0.901)	-2.086** (0.907)
Observations	861	861	861

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E15: FN or LFI voters (France 2017)**

Independent variables	LFI	FN
Age	-0.00688 (0.00778)	<b>-0.0353***</b> <b>(0.0104)</b>
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.665***</b> <b>(0.219)</b>	-0.120 (0.279)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.134 (0.458)	-0.309 (0.562)
<i>Education (ref: tertiary)</i>		
None or Primary	-0.316 (0.376)	-0.0582 (0.465)
Lower secondary - vocational (CAP-BEP)	-0.170 (0.314)	-0.0339 (0.418)
Secondary	-0.115 (0.292)	-0.348 (0.407)
Subjective social class (working class)	0.0890 (0.0712)	0.143 (0.0924)
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly)</i>		
Monthly	0.378 (0.467)	<b>0.959**</b> <b>(0.483)</b>
Yearly/special occasions	<b>0.668**</b> <b>(0.303)</b>	0.454 (0.430)
Never	0.447* (0.250)	0.0976 (0.353)
Union member (ref: not member)	0.425 (0.339)	0.288 (0.521)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area)</i>		
2000/20000 inhabitants	0.352 (0.322)	-0.229 (0.395)
20001/100000 inhabitants	-0.166 (0.404)	-0.0380 (0.463)
>100000 inhabitants	0.341 (0.298)	-0.0421 (0.351)
Agglomeration of Paris	0.595 (0.372)	-1.154* (0.603)
Populist attitudes	<b>0.353**</b> <b>(0.174)</b>	0.136 (0.220)
Left-right self-placement	<b>-0.647***</b> <b>(0.0707)</b>	<b>0.458***</b> <b>(0.0689)</b>
Perceived distance between established candidates	<b>-0.131**</b> <b>(0.0525)</b>	<b>-0.148**</b> <b>(0.0607)</b>
EU negative effect on deficits	0.0129 (0.0578)	<b>0.160**</b> <b>(0.0744)</b>
Customs barriers should be restored	-0.0728 (0.102)	<b>0.641***</b> <b>(0.150)</b>

**Table E15 continued:**

Euroscepticism	0.103 (0.0909)	0.188* (0.112)
EU negative effect on immigration	-0.000365 (0.0607)	-0.0299 (0.0718)
Desires increased use of referendums	0.254* (0.149)	0.122 (0.213)
Globalisation bad for France	-0.170 (0.153)	-0.0540 (0.201)
<i>Victims of economic crisis (ref: people poorer than me)</i>		
People like me	<b>0.565**</b> <b>(0.280)</b>	0.260 (0.391)
People richer than me	0.755 (0.746)	0.172 (1.080)
Everyone the same	0.342 (0.290)	0.581 (0.394)
Bring back death penalty	-0.124 (0.123)	<b>0.532***</b> <b>(0.131)</b>
Nativism	-0.339* (0.190)	<b>0.662***</b> <b>(0.252)</b>
Muslims can be French	0.157 (0.171)	-0.254 (0.164)
Important to be born in France	0.144 (0.156)	0.256 (0.182)
Important to have French ancestry	-0.169 (0.169)	0.0194 (0.204)
Important to speak French	-0.230 (0.196)	-0.0407 (0.354)
Important to adhere to French customs	0.0261 (0.151)	-0.215 (0.212)
Tax rich to reduce inequality	-0.0315 (0.139)	0.0410 (0.164)
<i>State intervention in economy (ref: freedom for firms)</i>		
State control	<b>0.705***</b> <b>(0.227)</b>	0.189 (0.300)
<i>Firms or workers should have priority (ref: firms)</i>		
Workers	0.378 (0.239)	0.576* (0.307)
Dissatisfied with democracy	-0.167 (0.162)	0.175 (0.212)
Constant	1.102 (1.185)	-6.963*** (1.539)
Observations	861	861

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Germany (2017)

Left-right self-placement is measured on a scale of 1-11 with higher values indicating the right-wing. Ideological extremity is calculated as the distance from the mid-point. Perceived established party distance is calculated as the difference between the voter's perceived left-right placement of the established left- and right-wing parties (1-11). Higher values indicate that the voter believes there is a greater difference between the parties. In this case, respondents are asked to place the CDU and CSU separately. As the bigger party, the CDU is used for the scale. Euroscepticism is measured on a five-point likert scale (strongly agree-strongly disagree). Higher values indicate the respondent believes EU unification should not be pushed further. Whether or not the German government should provide financial support to EU member states in financial difficulty is measured on the same scale; higher values indicate opposition to supporting them. Satisfaction with democracy is measured on a five-point likert scale (very satisfied-not at all satisfied). Higher values indicate dissatisfaction. Populist attitudes are measured using item response theory using six variables.

**Table E16: Populist attitudes questions (Germany 2017)**

<b>Variable name</b>	<b>Question wording</b>	<b>Dimension</b>
populism_1	What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.	Manichean worldview
populism_2	The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	Will of the people
populism_3	The politicians in the German Bundestag need to follow the will of the people.	Will of the people
populism_4	Differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.	Anti-elitism
populism_5	I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.	Anti-elitism
populism_6	Politicians talk too much and take too little action.	Anti-elitism

Attitudes to globalisation are measured on a seven point scale (not worried at all-very worried). Higher values indicate more fear about globalisation. Support for the notion citizens should be able to initiate binding federal referendums is measured on a five-point likert scale (strongly agree-strongly disagree). Higher values indicate support for direct democracy. Authoritarianism is measured by support or opposition to same-sex marriage on a five-point likert scale (strongly agree-strongly disagree). Higher values indicate authoritarianism.

Liberal-authoritarian and economic left-right salience is measured on a five-point likert scale (not important at all-very important). Higher values indicate greater importance. Attitudes to nativism are measured using three variables. Whether or not immigrants should assimilate and whether or not there should be a limit on the number of refugees is measured on a five-point likert scale (strongly disagree-strongly agree). Higher values indicate anti-immigration attitudes. Nativism itself is measured using the same battery of questions as in chapter five.

All variables are on a four-point (not important at all-very important). Higher values indicate greater importance.

**Table E17: Nativist attitudes questions (Germany 2017)**

<b>Variable name</b>	<b>Question wording</b>	<b>Dimension</b>
outgroup_1	Minorities should adapt to the customs and traditions of [country].	Threat to nation-state
outgroup_2	The will of the majority should always prevail, even over the rights of minorities.	Threat to nation-state
outgroup_3	Immigrants are generally good for [country]'s economy.	Xenophobia (economic threat)
outgroup_4	[country]'s culture is generally harmed by immigrants.	Xenophobia (cultural threat)
outgroup_5	Immigrants increase crime rates in [country].	Xenophobia (social threat)

The economic left-right dimension is measured with two variables, both on a five-point likert scale (strongly agree-strongly disagree). Higher values indicate left-wing attitudes. The variables measure whether or not inequality should be reduced, and whether or not socialism is a good idea but has been poorly implemented previously.

**Table E18: Socio-demographics (AfD and Die Linke, Germany 2017)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	-0.00388 (0.00453)	<b>0.0829***</b> <b>(0.0261)</b>	<b>0.0827***</b> <b>(0.0263)</b>
Age <sup>2</sup>		<b>-0.000875***</b> <b>(0.000259)</b>	<b>-0.000874***</b> <b>(0.000260)</b>
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.393***</b> <b>(0.149)</b>	<b>-0.417***</b> <b>(0.150)</b>	<b>-0.418***</b> <b>(0.150)</b>
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None or lowest	0.189 (0.242)	0.256 (0.242)	0.256 (0.243)
Intermediary	<b>0.551***</b> <b>(0.180)</b>	<b>0.541***</b> <b>(0.181)</b>	<b>0.541***</b> <b>(0.181)</b>
Vocational	0.277 (0.250)	0.299 (0.251)	0.299 (0.251)
Lower/working class	<b>0.457**</b> <b>(0.203)</b>	<b>0.447**</b> <b>(0.204)</b>	<b>0.447**</b> <b>(0.205)</b>
Unemployed * age			0.000979 (0.0201)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.143 (0.302)	0.120 (0.303)	0.0716 (1.036)
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly/more often attendance)</i>			
Monthly/two/three times a month	0.759 (0.606)	0.685 (0.609)	0.685 (0.609)
Yearly/several times a year	0.756 (0.535)	0.657 (0.538)	0.657 (0.538)
Never	<b>1.684***</b> <b>(0.528)</b>	<b>1.563***</b> <b>(0.531)</b>	<b>1.564***</b> <b>(0.531)</b>
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area or village)</i>			
Small or medium-sized town	0.0124 (0.174)	0.0206 (0.175)	0.0211 (0.175)
Suburb of a large town or city	-0.205 (0.342)	-0.131 (0.343)	-0.131 (0.343)
Large town or city	0.294 (0.194)	0.329* (0.195)	0.329* (0.196)
Union member (ref: not member)	0.291 (0.197)	0.235 (0.198)	0.235 (0.199)
Constant	-2.753*** (0.600)	-4.560*** (0.817)	-4.556*** (0.821)
Observations	1,370	1,370	1,370

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E19: Attitudes (AfD and Die Linke, Germany 2017)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	-0.00786 (0.00553)	<b>0.0625**</b> <b>(0.0292)</b>	<b>0.0600**</b> <b>(0.0294)</b>
Age <sup>2</sup>		<b>-0.000714**</b> <b>(0.000291)</b>	<b>-0.000697**</b> <b>(0.000292)</b>
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.426**</b> <b>(0.174)</b>	<b>-0.443**</b> <b>(0.174)</b>	<b>-0.450***</b> <b>(0.175)</b>
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None or lowest	-0.405 (0.282)	-0.351 (0.284)	-0.347 (0.285)
Intermediary	0.0912 (0.211)	0.0791 (0.212)	0.0796 (0.212)
Vocational	0.0265 (0.282)	0.0420 (0.281)	0.0368 (0.281)
Lower/working class	-0.0194 (0.234)	-0.0328 (0.236)	-0.0297 (0.236)
Unemployed * age			0.0135 (0.0217)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	-0.221 (0.342)	-0.233 (0.340)	-0.891 (1.120)
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly/more often attendance)</i>			
Monthly/two/three times a month	0.710 (0.644)	0.694 (0.653)	0.693 (0.653)
Yearly/several times a year	0.622 (0.572)	0.584 (0.579)	0.579 (0.579)
Never	<b>1.292**</b> <b>(0.567)</b>	<b>1.248**</b> <b>(0.575)</b>	<b>1.244**</b> <b>(0.575)</b>
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area or village)</i>			
Small or medium-sized town	0.191 (0.200)	0.202 (0.201)	0.210 (0.201)
Suburb of a large town or city	-0.0447 (0.380)	0.00473 (0.383)	0.0104 (0.383)
Large town or city	<b>0.568**</b> <b>(0.225)</b>	<b>0.603***</b> <b>(0.226)</b>	<b>0.608***</b> <b>(0.226)</b>
Union member (ref: not member)	0.249 (0.226)	0.208 (0.227)	0.210 (0.227)

**Table E19 continued:**

Populism	<b>0.322**</b> (0.128)	<b>0.331**</b> (0.129)	<b>0.328**</b> (0.129)
Ideological extremity	<b>0.416***</b> (0.0595)	<b>0.408***</b> (0.0598)	<b>0.410***</b> (0.0599)
Perceived established party distance	-0.102* (0.0584)	-0.0997* (0.0585)	-0.0993* (0.0585)
Euroskepticism	<b>0.168**</b> (0.0816)	<b>0.151*</b> (0.0825)	<b>0.153*</b> (0.0826)
Support EU members financially	0.0702 (0.0874)	0.0795 (0.0881)	0.0755 (0.0883)
Fearful of globalisation	0.0609 (0.0524)	0.0519 (0.0526)	0.0524 (0.0526)
Desire direct democracy	<b>0.183**</b> (0.0837)	<b>0.172**</b> (0.0837)	<b>0.176**</b> (0.0839)
Same-sex marriage should be banned	<b>0.211***</b> (0.0690)	<b>0.227***</b> (0.0693)	<b>0.225***</b> (0.0695)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.730***</b> (0.107)	<b>0.731***</b> (0.108)	<b>0.731***</b> (0.108)
Constant	-6.443*** (0.910)	-7.886*** (1.100)	-7.812*** (1.105)
Observations	1,370	1,370	1,370

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Table E20: AfD or Die Linke (Germany 2017)**

Independent variables	Die Linke	AfD
Age	-0.00170 (0.00737)	-0.0182* (0.00971)
Female (ref: male)	-0.337 (0.224)	<b>-0.634**</b> <b>(0.306)</b>
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>		
None or lowest	-0.296 (0.401)	-0.153 (0.444)
Intermediary	-0.00269 (0.281)	0.299 (0.379)
Vocational	0.321 (0.350)	0.00537 (0.544)
Lower/working class	-0.177 (0.318)	0.266 (0.364)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	-0.0477 (0.449)	0.0572 (0.486)
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly/more often attendance)</i>		
Monthly/two/three times a month	0.977 (1.144)	-0.0869 (0.977)
Yearly/several times a year	0.796 (1.083)	0.306 (0.744)
Never	1.470 (1.076)	0.664 (0.743)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: rural area or village)</i>		
Small or medium-sized town	0.00240 (0.274)	0.189 (0.310)
Suburb of a large town or city	-0.210 (0.489)	0.646 (0.607)
Large town or city	0.471* (0.282)	-0.153 (0.448)
Union member (ref: not member)	0.112 (0.284)	0.281 (0.404)
Populism	0.0889 (0.169)	0.348 (0.225)
Left-right self-placement	<b>-0.572***</b> <b>(0.0757)</b>	<b>0.425***</b> <b>(0.0832)</b>
Perceived established party distance	-0.115 (0.0783)	-0.113 (0.0971)
Euro scepticism	0.0295 (0.122)	0.169 (0.119)
Support EU members financially	0.166 (0.123)	-0.208 (0.142)
Fearful of globalisation	<b>0.139**</b> <b>(0.0698)</b>	-0.0844 (0.0894)
Desire direct democracy	<b>0.245**</b> <b>(0.111)</b>	0.0145 (0.146)

**Table E20 continued:**

Same-sex marriage should be banned	0.117 (0.102)	0.170* (0.101)
Liberal-authoritarian salience	0.0345 (0.123)	<b>0.306**</b> <b>(0.138)</b>
Socio-economic salience	0.132 (0.169)	<b>-0.518***</b> <b>(0.195)</b>
Immigrants must assimilate	-0.215* (0.126)	-0.0902 (0.173)
Nativism	-0.168 (0.209)	<b>1.251***</b> <b>(0.273)</b>
Refugee limit necessary	0.00764 (0.102)	<b>0.490***</b> <b>(0.168)</b>
Important to be born in Germany	-0.0848 (0.176)	<b>-0.522**</b> <b>(0.227)</b>
Important to have German ancestry	0.0434 (0.189)	0.467* (0.238)
Important to speak German	0.0523 (0.209)	0.481 (0.336)
Important to follow German customs	-0.115 (0.165)	-0.305 (0.217)
Reduce inequality	0.218 (0.135)	0.0227 (0.143)
Socialism is inherently good	<b>0.230**</b> <b>(0.0945)</b>	0.0453 (0.107)
Dissatisfied with democracy	0.477*** (0.141)	0.852*** (0.174)
Constant	-5.520*** (1.886)	-9.081*** (2.306)
Observations	1,370	1,370

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

### **Hungary (2006)**

Left-right self-placement is measured on a 1-10 scale with higher values indicating the right-wing. Perceived established party distance is measured by the distance between the voter's perceived left-right placement (1-10) of the established left- and right-wing parties. Higher values indicate a perception of greater distance. Authoritarianism is measured using three variables, all on a 1-10 scale (higher values are more authoritarian). The variables measure: a) whether individual or religious and moral values are more important, b) whether civil liberties should be defended, or law and order enforced, and c) whether or not abortion should remain legal.

Attitudes to the fairness of the election was binary: completely free and fair, or not completely free and fair. This variable was created from a four-point variable (not free or fair; free and fair with major problems; free and fair with minor problems; completely free and fair). The latter is one category, and the other three were combined into the second. Satisfaction with democracy is a four-point scale (very satisfied-very dissatisfied).

Attitudes to nativism are measured with a binary variable asking whether those who are of an ethnic minority should assimilate, or not. Attitudes to the left-right dimension are measured with a variable (1-10 scale) asking whether or not goods should be distributed equally or according to individual performance. Higher values indicate equal distribution.

**Table E21: Socio-demographics (Hungary 2006)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0300***</b> <b>(0.00658)</b>	-0.0662* (0.0343)	-0.0655* (0.0345)
Age <sup>2</sup>		0.000361 (0.000335)	0.000356 (0.000336)
Female (ref: male)	-0.265 (0.209)	-0.268 (0.210)	-0.268 (0.210)
Lower/working class (ref: middle/upper class)	-0.289 (0.318)	-0.286 (0.318)	-0.284 (0.318)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
8 years or less	0.640 (0.542)	0.623 (0.538)	0.622 (0.538)
Secondary school	0.151 (0.489)	0.172 (0.486)	0.170 (0.486)
Post-school	0.360 (0.511)	0.411 (0.511)	0.410 (0.511)
Unemployed * age			-0.0110 (0.0655)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	-0.135 (0.636)	-0.0697 (0.641)	0.396 (2.833)
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly/a few times a week)</i>			
Monthly/few times a month	<b>-1.850***</b> <b>(0.515)</b>	<b>-1.836***</b> <b>(0.513)</b>	<b>-1.832***</b> <b>(0.513)</b>
Yearly/few times a year	<b>-2.188***</b> <b>(0.427)</b>	<b>-2.155***</b> <b>(0.425)</b>	<b>-2.151***</b> <b>(0.426)</b>
Never	<b>-2.939***</b> <b>(0.440)</b>	<b>-2.920***</b> <b>(0.438)</b>	<b>-2.917***</b> <b>(0.438)</b>
<i>Urbanisation (ref: Budapest)</i>			
Chief town or city of the county	-0.329 (0.309)	-0.347 (0.310)	-0.346 (0.310)
City	-0.0918 (0.344)	-0.0754 (0.344)	-0.0751 (0.344)
Village	-0.399 (0.311)	-0.383 (0.312)	-0.382 (0.312)
Union member (ref: not member)	-0.144 (0.379)	-0.121 (0.381)	-0.122 (0.381)
Constant	3.531*** (0.742)	4.284*** (1.020)	4.263*** (1.027)
Observations	509	509	509

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E22: Attitudinal (Hungary 2006)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0286**</b> <b>(0.0139)</b>	-0.0380 (0.0769)	-0.0356 (0.0784)
Age <sup>2</sup>		9.62e-05 (0.000768)	7.47e-05 (0.000781)
Female (ref: male)	0.316 (0.433)	0.309 (0.436)	0.318 (0.440)
Lower/working class (ref: middle/upper class)	<b>-1.503**</b> <b>(0.680)</b>	<b>-1.499**</b> <b>(0.682)</b>	<b>-1.485**</b> <b>(0.688)</b>
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
8 years or less	0.187 (1.186)	0.187 (1.187)	0.176 (1.188)
Secondary school	0.177 (1.061)	0.184 (1.064)	0.183 (1.063)
Post-school	0.493 (1.100)	0.510 (1.109)	0.508 (1.109)
Unemployed * age			-0.0163 (0.107)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.769 (1.110)	0.782 (1.120)	1.421 (4.391)
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly/a few times a week)</i>			
Monthly/few times a month	-1.864* (1.059)	-1.866* (1.058)	-1.840* (1.074)
Yearly/few times a year	-1.488* (0.873)	-1.489* (0.873)	-1.479* (0.877)
Never	<b>-2.166**</b> <b>(0.902)</b>	<b>-2.172**</b> <b>(0.903)</b>	<b>-2.161**</b> <b>(0.907)</b>
<i>Urbanisation (ref: Budapest)</i>			
Chief town or city of the county	0.0601 (0.621)	0.0500 (0.626)	0.0570 (0.627)
City	0.582 (0.702)	0.581 (0.702)	0.586 (0.702)
Village	0.199 (0.646)	0.197 (0.646)	0.198 (0.646)
Union member (ref: not member)	1.193* (0.666)	1.195* (0.667)	1.193* (0.667)

**Table E22 continued:**

Left-right self-placement	<b>1.411***</b> ( <b>0.147</b> )	<b>1.410***</b> ( <b>0.147</b> )	<b>1.409***</b> ( <b>0.147</b> )
Perceived established party distance	-0.167* (0.0958)	-0.166* (0.0958)	-0.165* (0.0964)
Protect religious values	0.0385 (0.0842)	0.0381 (0.0843)	0.0380 (0.0843)
Protect law and order	0.0681 (0.0827)	0.0682 (0.0828)	0.0669 (0.0832)
Prohibit abortion	0.0276 (0.0908)	0.0263 (0.0914)	0.0264 (0.0914)
Election not completely free and fair (ref: completely free and fair)	<b>1.235***</b> ( <b>0.436</b> )	<b>1.229***</b> ( <b>0.438</b> )	<b>1.228***</b> ( <b>0.438</b> )
Ethnic minorities should assimilate (ref: should not)	<b>1.109**</b> ( <b>0.529</b> )	<b>1.114**</b> ( <b>0.530</b> )	<b>1.111**</b> ( <b>0.531</b> )
Equal distribution of wealth	0.101 (0.0778)	0.102 (0.0779)	0.102 (0.0780)
Dissatisfied with democracy	0.151 (0.321)	0.151 (0.320)	0.156 (0.322)
Constant	-8.066*** (2.065)	-7.850*** (2.689)	-7.931*** (2.744)
Observations	509	509	509

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Italy (2018)

Left-right self-placement was measured on a 0-10 scale, but there was also an option of ‘nowhere’ which was by far the modal response (27.2% of all respondents). As such, dropping this category would likely introduce severe bias into the models. Instead, ideological self-placement was captured by a nominal variable. Those who placed themselves as 0 or 1 are “left-wing”; 2 and 3 are “centre-left”; 4, 5 and 6 are “centrist”; 7 and 8 are right-wing and 9 and 10 are “right-wing”, with “nowhere” as another category. This variable also allows distance from the centre to be calculated in the pooled model of *all* populist AEP voters (e.g. centre-left *or* centre-right).

Perceived distance between established parties is measured as the distance between the voter’s placement on a 0-10 scale of the established left- and right-wing parties. Trust in institutions is a scale constructed from four variables asking how much voters trust government institutions (no trust-complete trust) from 0-10 (higher values indicate more trust). The institutions are: parliament; parties; Italian President, and the EU. The scale has a cronbach’s alpha of 0.87. Euroscepticism is measured through two nominal variables, asking respondents if they think the EU and Eurozone is a good thing, bad thing or neither.

Attitudes to immigration are measured using three variables. Whether or not there are too many immigrants is measured on a 1-7 scale with 7 indicating the respondent believes there are too many immigrants. The other two variables are measured on a 0-10 scale, with higher

values indicating anti-immigration attitudes. They measure whether or not immigrants are harmful to the economy and whether or not they enrich culture. Populist attitudes are measured with item response theory from the following variables measured on a five-point likert scale (very agree-not at all agree).

**Table E23: Populist attitudes questions (Italy 2018)**

<b>Variable name</b>	<b>Question wording</b>	<b>Dimension</b>
populism_1	Politicians in Parliament must follow the will of the citizens	Will of the people
populism_2	Citizens, and not politicians, should make the most important political decisions	Will of the people
populism_3	The differences between politicians and the people are greater than the differences within the people	Manichean worldview
populism_4	I would prefer to be represented by an ordinary person rather than a professional politician	Anti-elitism
populism_5	Politicians talk a lot but do little	Anti-elitism
populism_6	Making compromises in politics actually means selling off your principles	Manichean worldview
populism_7	Journalists are too close to strong powers to inform ordinary people	Anti-elitism
populism_8	The big international banks are colonizing our country	Anti-elitism

**Table E24: Socio-demographics (M5S, LN and FdI, Italy 2018)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0118**</b> <b>(0.00464)</b>	<b>0.0663**</b> <b>(0.0304)</b>	<b>0.0687**</b> <b>(0.0305)</b>
Age <sup>2</sup>		<b>-0.000822***</b> <b>(0.000316)</b>	<b>-0.000883***</b> <b>(0.000325)</b>
Female (ref: male)	-0.0669 (0.111)	-0.0784 (0.112)	-0.0738 (0.112)
Unemployed * age			0.00737 (0.00904)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	<b>-0.340**</b> <b>(0.134)</b>	-0.181 (0.148)	-0.545 (0.471)
<i>Social class (ref: Higher-grade professional)</i>			
Lower-grade professional	-0.0595 (0.254)	-0.0848 (0.255)	-0.0730 (0.255)
Routine non-manual	0.0663 (0.216)	0.0342 (0.218)	0.0388 (0.218)
Small proprietor	0.297 (0.236)	0.268 (0.237)	0.290 (0.239)
Skilled manual	0.690* (0.355)	0.647* (0.356)	0.664* (0.357)
Semi-/unskilled manual	0.381 (0.269)	0.294 (0.272)	0.320 (0.274)
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly attendance)</i>			
Monthly	<b>0.705***</b> <b>(0.208)</b>	<b>0.698***</b> <b>(0.209)</b>	<b>0.699***</b> <b>(0.209)</b>
Two/three times a year	<b>0.732***</b> <b>(0.180)</b>	<b>0.731***</b> <b>(0.180)</b>	<b>0.732***</b> <b>(0.180)</b>
Yearly	<b>0.444**</b> <b>(0.214)</b>	<b>0.438**</b> <b>(0.214)</b>	<b>0.441**</b> <b>(0.214)</b>
Never	0.192 (0.165)	0.196 (0.166)	0.196 (0.166)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None/middle school	0.485* (0.260)	0.510* (0.263)	0.496* (0.263)
High school	<b>0.427***</b> <b>(0.127)</b>	<b>0.409***</b> <b>(0.127)</b>	<b>0.414***</b> <b>(0.127)</b>
Professional qualification	<b>0.758***</b> <b>(0.262)</b>	<b>0.712***</b> <b>(0.264)</b>	<b>0.706***</b> <b>(0.264)</b>
<i>Urbanisation (ref: &lt; 10,000)</i>			
10,000-30,000	0.0629 (0.170)	0.0630 (0.170)	0.0589 (0.170)
30,000-100,000	0.142 (0.164)	0.151 (0.164)	0.151 (0.164)
Over 100,000	-0.104 (0.153)	-0.103 (0.154)	-0.106 (0.154)



**Table E24 continued:**

<i>Manage with income (ref: comfortably/easily)</i>			
With difficulty	<b>0.358***</b> (0.114)	<b>0.340***</b> (0.114)	<b>0.343***</b> (0.114)
Cannot make ends meet	<b>0.644***</b> (0.210)	<b>0.588***</b> (0.211)	<b>0.592***</b> (0.212)
Constant	-0.102 (0.355)	-1.810** (0.745)	-1.797** (0.746)
Observations	1,542	1,542	1,542

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E25: Attitudinal (M5S, LN and FdI, Italy 2018)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0117**</b> (0.00557)	0.0344 (0.0358)	0.0375 (0.0360)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.000487 (0.000373)	-0.000568 (0.000384)
Female (ref: male)	-0.149 (0.134)	-0.157 (0.134)	-0.151 (0.134)
Unemployed * age			0.0100 (0.0107)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	-0.266* (0.161)	-0.176 (0.176)	-0.672 (0.561)
<i>Social class (ref: Higher-grade professional)</i>			
Lower-grade professional	-0.154 (0.297)	-0.172 (0.297)	-0.157 (0.298)
Routine non-manual	-0.0932 (0.255)	-0.117 (0.256)	-0.111 (0.256)
Small proprietor	0.122 (0.277)	0.106 (0.278)	0.137 (0.280)
Skilled manual	0.316 (0.412)	0.282 (0.413)	0.306 (0.414)
Semi-/unskilled manual	0.135 (0.314)	0.0840 (0.317)	0.116 (0.319)
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly attendance)</i>			
Monthly	0.466* (0.244)	0.463* (0.244)	0.463* (0.244)
Two/three times a year	<b>0.619***</b> (0.214)	<b>0.619***</b> (0.214)	<b>0.620***</b> (0.215)
Yearly	0.0929 (0.256)	0.0941 (0.256)	0.0975 (0.256)
Never	0.0378 (0.203)	0.0437 (0.204)	0.0430 (0.204)

**Table E25 continued:**

<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None/middle school	-0.0752 (0.313)	-0.0702 (0.314)	-0.0904 (0.315)
High school	0.245 (0.150)	0.233 (0.150)	0.241 (0.150)
Professional qualification	0.276 (0.313)	0.244 (0.314)	0.235 (0.313)
<i>Manage with income (ref: comfortably/easily)</i>			
With difficulty	-0.0433 (0.137)	-0.0539 (0.137)	-0.0476 (0.137)
Cannot make ends meet	-0.350 (0.257)	-0.377 (0.258)	-0.369 (0.258)
<i>Urbanisation (&lt; 10,000)</i>			
10,000-30,000	0.143 (0.200)	0.139 (0.200)	0.134 (0.200)
30,000-100,000	0.0147 (0.194)	0.0146 (0.194)	0.0142 (0.194)
Over 100,000	-0.153 (0.182)	-0.156 (0.182)	-0.158 (0.182)
Populist attitudes	<b>0.816***</b> <b>(0.0926)</b>	<b>0.815***</b> <b>(0.0926)</b>	<b>0.814***</b> <b>(0.0926)</b>
<i>Left-right self-placement (ref: centrist)</i>			
Centre-left/-right	0.168 (0.180)	0.172 (0.180)	0.174 (0.180)
Right/left	-0.0141 (0.190)	-0.0149 (0.190)	-0.0132 (0.190)
Nowhere	<b>0.967***</b> <b>(0.248)</b>	<b>0.963***</b> <b>(0.248)</b>	<b>0.966***</b> <b>(0.248)</b>
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.0551**</b> <b>(0.0221)</b>	<b>-0.0532**</b> <b>(0.0222)</b>	<b>-0.0524**</b> <b>(0.0222)</b>
Trust in government institutions	<b>-0.120***</b> <b>(0.0362)</b>	<b>-0.118***</b> <b>(0.0362)</b>	<b>-0.119***</b> <b>(0.0363)</b>
<i>EU membership (ref: good thing)</i>			
Neither good nor bad	<b>0.618***</b> <b>(0.174)</b>	<b>0.626***</b> <b>(0.174)</b>	<b>0.630***</b> <b>(0.175)</b>
Bad thing	<b>0.829***</b> <b>(0.245)</b>	<b>0.839***</b> <b>(0.245)</b>	<b>0.840***</b> <b>(0.246)</b>
<i>Eurozone (ref: good thing)</i>			
Neither good nor bad	<b>0.581***</b> <b>(0.183)</b>	<b>0.578***</b> <b>(0.183)</b>	<b>0.574***</b> <b>(0.183)</b>
Bad thing	<b>0.783***</b> <b>(0.216)</b>	<b>0.778***</b> <b>(0.216)</b>	<b>0.772***</b> <b>(0.217)</b>
Constant	0.570 (0.497)	-0.448 (0.924)	-0.430 (0.926)
Observations	1,542	1,542	1,542

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E26: M5S or LN and FdI (Italy 2018)**

Independent variables	M5S	LN or FdI
Age	<b>-0.0153***</b> <b>(0.00574)</b>	0.00418 (0.00766)
Female (ref: male)	-0.152 (0.136)	0.208 (0.181)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	-0.0464 (0.165)	-0.351 (0.225)
<i>Social class (ref: Higher-grade professional)</i>		
Lower-grade professional	-0.0150 (0.324)	-0.245 (0.417)
Routine non-manual	0.163 (0.279)	-0.248 (0.351)
Small proprietor	-0.112 (0.304)	0.265 (0.366)
Skilled manual	0.685* (0.403)	-0.460 (0.517)
Semi-/unskilled manual	-0.0364 (0.335)	0.459 (0.420)
<i>Religiosity (ref: weekly attendance)</i>		
Monthly	<b>0.655***</b> <b>(0.254)</b>	-0.294 (0.323)
Two/three times a year	0.431* (0.225)	0.257 (0.279)
Yearly	-0.0440 (0.270)	0.0427 (0.322)
Never	0.238 (0.215)	-0.148 (0.277)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>		
None/middle school	-0.273 (0.329)	-0.143 (0.367)
High school	<b>0.303**</b> <b>(0.154)</b>	-0.187 (0.207)
Professional qualification	0.00699 (0.307)	0.163 (0.372)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: &lt; 10,000)</i>		
10,000-30,00	0.171 (0.203)	-0.172 (0.265)
30,000-100,000	0.0953 (0.197)	0.0377 (0.252)
Over 100,000	0.0787 (0.185)	-0.351 (0.243)
<i>Manage with income (ref: comfortably/easily)</i>		
With difficulty	0.123 (0.139)	-0.104 (0.189)
Cannot make ends meet	-0.231 (0.249)	-0.0359 (0.323)

**Table E26 continued:**

Populist attitudes	<b>0.878***</b> (0.0952)	-0.153 (0.123)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.0813***</b> (0.0222)	-0.0116 (0.0288)
Trust in government institutions	<b>-0.0789**</b> (0.0367)	0.0463 (0.0481)
<i>Left-right self-placement (ref: left-wing)</i>		
Centre-left	<b>0.455**</b> (0.217)	0.428 (0.684)
Centrist	<b>0.471**</b> (0.234)	1.227* (0.641)
Centre-right	-0.427* (0.258)	<b>3.014***</b> (0.617)
Right-wing	<b>-1.859***</b> (0.304)	<b>3.869***</b> (0.623)
Nowhere	<b>1.064***</b> (0.246)	<b>1.425**</b> (0.637)
<i>EU membership (ref: good thing)</i>		
Neither good nor bad	0.206 (0.187)	0.328 (0.260)
Bad thing	0.403 (0.245)	0.274 (0.317)
<i>Eurozone (ref: good thing)</i>		
Neither good nor bad	<b>0.598***</b> (0.193)	0.189 (0.279)
Bad thing	<b>0.625***</b> (0.224)	-0.0600 (0.297)
Too many immigrants	0.0634 (0.0567)	<b>0.408***</b> (0.0884)
Immigrants harm economy	0.00797 (0.0346)	0.00864 (0.0463)
Immigrants enrich culture	0.0638* (0.0344)	<b>-0.0902**</b> (0.0439)
Constant	-0.977 (0.679)	-5.916*** (1.062)
Observations	1,542	1,542

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Netherlands (2006)

Left-right self-placement is measured on a 0-10 scale (right-wing being higher values). Ideological extremity is measured as distance from the centre (e.g. voters placing themselves as 4 or 6 have a value of 1). Perceived established party distance is measured as the distance between voter's perceived left-right placement of established left- and right-wing parties (measured on a 0-10 scale). Euroscepticism is measured on a 1-7 scale (integration should go further-has gone too far). Higher values indicate Eurosceptic attitudes. Support for major decisions being supported by a referendum is measured on a five-point scale (fully agree-fully disagree). Higher values indicate pro-direct democracy opinions. Whether or not the death penalty should be introduced is measured on a five-point scale (fully disagree-fully agree). Higher values indicate authoritarian attitudes. Satisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale (very satisfied-not at all satisfied). Higher values indicate dissatisfaction with democracy.

Attitudes to immigration and nativism are measured using five variables. Whether or not immigrants should assimilate, and whether or not more asylum applications should be accepted or rejected are both measured on seven-point scales. Higher values indicate anti-immigration attitudes. The other variables are measured on a four-point scale (fully agree-fully disagree). The variables are: whether or not illegal immigrants should be deported; whether or not the immigration of Muslims should be stopped, and whether or not more should be spent on foreign aid. Higher values indicate anti-immigration (and anti-foreign aid spending) opinions.

Attitudes to the economic left-right dimension are measured using three variables. Whether or not income differences should be increased or decreased are measured on a seven-point scale with higher values indicating left-wing opinions. The other two variables are measured on a four-point scale (fully agree-fully disagree). The variables are: whether or not taxes should be cut, and whether or not big companies threaten democracy. Higher values indicate economic left-wing attitudes.

**Table E27: Socio-demographics (PVV and SP, Netherlands 2006)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0136***</b> <b>(0.00431)</b>	0.00935 (0.0228)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.000244 (0.000238)
Female (ref: male)	0.101 (0.128)	0.0898 (0.129)
Lower/working class (ref: middle/upper class)	<b>0.587***</b> <b>(0.147)</b>	<b>0.566***</b> <b>(0.149)</b>
<i>Education (ref: higher level vocational/degree)</i>		
Elementary	<b>0.828**</b> <b>(0.362)</b>	<b>0.919**</b> <b>(0.374)</b>
Lower vocational/secondary	<b>0.432**</b> <b>(0.190)</b>	<b>0.454**</b> <b>(0.192)</b>
Mid-level vocational/higher-level secondary	<b>0.400**</b> <b>(0.162)</b>	<b>0.414**</b> <b>(0.162)</b>
Religious denomination (ref: no religious belief)	<b>-0.684***</b> <b>(0.136)</b>	<b>-0.677***</b> <b>(0.137)</b>
<i>Urbanisation (ref: very high)</i>		
High	0.0930 (0.203)	0.0758 (0.204)
Medium	0.00649 (0.214)	-0.0131 (0.214)
Low	0.133 (0.211)	0.110 (0.212)
Very low	-0.271 (0.246)	-0.293 (0.247)
Union member (ref: no)	-0.0270 (0.159)	-0.00821 (0.160)
Constant	<b>-0.927***</b> <b>(0.308)</b>	<b>-1.411**</b> <b>(0.565)</b>
Observations	1,583	1,583

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E28: Attitudinal (PVV and SP, Netherlands 2006)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0169***</b> <b>(0.00469)</b>	0.00437 (0.0244)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.000227 (0.000256)
Female (ref: male)	0.119 (0.137)	0.110 (0.137)
Lower/working class (ref: middle/upper class)	<b>0.333**</b> <b>(0.158)</b>	<b>0.315**</b> <b>(0.159)</b>
<i>Education (ref: higher level vocational/degree)</i>		
Elementary	0.513 (0.388)	0.596 (0.400)
Lower vocational/secondary	0.191 (0.205)	0.212 (0.207)
Mid-level vocational/higher-level secondary	<b>0.354**</b> <b>(0.171)</b>	<b>0.365**</b> <b>(0.172)</b>
Religious denomination (ref: no religious belief)	<b>-0.665***</b> <b>(0.143)</b>	<b>-0.660***</b> <b>(0.143)</b>
<i>Urbanisation (ref: very high)</i>		
High	0.0486 (0.217)	0.0391 (0.218)
Medium	-0.0470 (0.227)	-0.0597 (0.228)
Low	0.113 (0.224)	0.0996 (0.225)
Very low	-0.262 (0.261)	-0.278 (0.262)
Union member (ref: no)	0.0322 (0.169)	0.0504 (0.170)
Ideological extremity	0.0597 (0.0558)	0.0614 (0.0559)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.132***</b> <b>(0.0351)</b>	<b>-0.134***</b> <b>(0.0352)</b>
Euroscepticism	<b>0.280***</b> <b>(0.0438)</b>	<b>0.280***</b> <b>(0.0438)</b>
Desires more referendums	<b>0.476***</b> <b>(0.0844)</b>	<b>0.475***</b> <b>(0.0845)</b>
Introduce death penalty	0.0231 (0.0487)	0.0223 (0.0488)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.620***</b> <b>(0.116)</b>	<b>0.623***</b> <b>(0.116)</b>
Constant	-4.949*** (0.530)	-5.397*** (0.734)
Observations	1,583	1,583

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E29: PVV or SP (Netherlands 2006)**

Independent variables	SP	PVV
Age	<b>-0.0187***</b> <b>(0.00581)</b>	-0.00705 (0.0102)
Age <sup>2</sup>	0.197 (0.158)	<b>-0.652**</b> <b>(0.332)</b>
Female (ref: male)	-0.0735 (0.188)	0.534 (0.343)
Lower/working class (ref: middle/upper class)	0.113 (0.473)	0.564 (0.764)
<i>Education (ref: higher level vocational/degree)</i>		
Elementary	0.0898 (0.245)	0.481 (0.519)
Lower vocational/secondary	0.347* (0.197)	0.307 (0.491)
Mid-level vocational/higher-level secondary	-0.136 (0.166)	<b>-0.834**</b> <b>(0.343)</b>
Religious denomination (ref: no religious belief)	0.323 (0.248)	0.329 (0.537)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: very high)</i>		
High	0.192 (0.261)	0.0959 (0.564)
Medium	0.249 (0.262)	0.903* (0.521)
Low	0.0309 (0.293)	-0.553 (0.673)
Very low	0.218 (0.192)	0.0254 (0.382)
Left-right self-placement	<b>-0.490***</b> <b>(0.0480)</b>	<b>0.370***</b> <b>(0.0911)</b>
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.191***</b> <b>(0.0404)</b>	<b>-0.231***</b> <b>(0.0730)</b>
Eurosepticism	<b>0.223***</b> <b>(0.0529)</b>	<b>0.214**</b> <b>(0.104)</b>
Desires more referendums	<b>0.356***</b> <b>(0.0969)</b>	<b>0.484***</b> <b>(0.188)</b>
Introduce death penalty	-0.00333 (0.0637)	<b>0.523***</b> <b>(0.129)</b>



**Table E29 continued:**

Immigrants should assimilate	-0.0119 (0.0603)	0.0782 (0.138)
Reject more asylum application	<b>0.134**</b> <b>(0.0662)</b>	0.113 (0.134)
Deport illegal immigrants	-0.192* (0.108)	<b>0.498**</b> <b>(0.200)</b>
Stop Muslim immigration	-0.0445 (0.126)	0.238 (0.205)
Do not spend more on foreign aid	<b>0.274**</b> <b>(0.115)</b>	0.214 (0.212)
Decrease income differences	<b>0.153**</b> <b>(0.0610)</b>	<b>0.207**</b> <b>(0.0982)</b>
Do not cut taxes	0.0743 (0.124)	0.121 (0.224)
Big companies threaten democracy	<b>0.284**</b> <b>(0.113)</b>	-0.0527 (0.207)
Dissatisfied with democracy	<b>0.342**</b> <b>(0.133)</b>	0.417* (0.235)
Constant	-3.986*** (0.885)	-15.24*** (1.941)
Observations	1,583	1,583

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

**Netherlands (2010)**

Left-right self-placement is measured on a 0-10 scale (higher values indicate the right-wing). Ideological extremity is measured as distance from the centre (e.g. a respondent placing themselves as four or six has a value of one). Perceived established party distance is measured as the distance between the voter's perceived left-right placement (0-10) of the established left- and right-wing parties. Higher values indicate a perception that the parties are more different. Euroscepticism is measured on a 1-7 scale, asking if integration should go further or has gone too far. Higher values indicate Euroscepticism. Whether or not major decisions should be subject to a referendum is measured on a five-point likert scale (fully disagree-fully agree). Higher values indicate support for direct democracy.

Trust in institutions is measured on a scale constructed from six variables (on a four-point scale, very much-no trust at all). The variables measure trust towards: government; parliament; the EU; parties; civil servants, and judges. Higher values indicate no trust. The scale has a Cronbach's alpha of 0.79. Trust in politicians is measured on a scale constructed from 13 variables (on a five-point likert scale (fully agree-fully disagree). The variables measure whether: politicians overpromise; ministers are self-interested; MPs' friends were more important than their abilities to get elected; MPs quickly lose contact with voters; politicians are honest; politicians are profiteers; politicians keep promises; politicians are corrupt; politicians are reliable; politicians only have fine talk; politicians do not understand society; politicians can solve society's problems, and politicians are competent. The scale has a Cronbach's alpha of 0.88. Higher values indicate trust in politicians.

Satisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale (very satisfied-not at all satisfied). Higher values indicate dissatisfaction with democracy. Whether or not the death penalty should be introduced is measured on a five-point likert scale (fully disagree-fully agree). Higher values indicate authoritarian attitudes.

Attitudes towards immigration and nativism are measured using five variables. Whether or not immigrants should assimilate and if more asylum applications should be accepted or rejected are measured on a seven-point scale with higher values indicating anti-immigration attitudes. The remaining variables are asked on a four-point scale (fully agree-fully disagree). The variables measure: whether or not more or less should be spent on foreign aid; whether or not illegal immigrants should be deported, and whether or not the immigration of Muslims should be stopped. Higher values indicate anti-immigration (and increased foreign aid spending) attitudes.

The economic left-right dimension is measured using five variables. Whether income inequality should get bigger or smaller is measured on a seven-point scale (higher values denote it should get smaller). The remaining variables are measured on a four-point scale (fully agree-fully disagree), higher values indicate economic left-wing attitudes. The variables measure whether or not: big companies threaten democracy; taxes should be cut; banks should be bailed out by the government; mortgage deduction should be banned.

**Table E30: Socio-demographics (PVV and SP, Netherlands 2010)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0151***</b> (0.00500)	0.0400 (0.0266)	0.0418 (0.0267)
Age <sup>2</sup>	---	<b>-0.000596**</b> (0.000283)	<b>-0.000606**</b> (0.000284)
Female (ref: male)	0.0102 (0.148)	0.00577 (0.149)	0.0109 (0.149)
Unemployed * age	---	---	-0.0204 (0.0234)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.0244 (0.309)	-0.0444 (0.312)	0.923 (1.137)
<i>Education (ref: higher-level vocation/degree)</i>			
Elementary	<b>1.607***</b> (0.387)	<b>1.820***</b> (0.403)	<b>1.814***</b> (0.403)
Lower vocational/secondary	<b>1.566***</b> (0.227)	<b>1.632***</b> (0.230)	<b>1.631***</b> (0.230)
Mid-level vocational/higher-level secondary	<b>0.934***</b> (0.195)	<b>0.969***</b> (0.196)	<b>0.966***</b> (0.196)
Religious denomination (ref: no religious denomination)	<b>-0.501***</b> (0.156)	<b>-0.491***</b> (0.156)	<b>-0.492***</b> (0.156)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: very high)</i>			
High	0.287 (0.243)	0.265 (0.244)	0.265 (0.244)
Medium	0.230 (0.254)	0.211 (0.254)	0.208 (0.254)
Low	0.197 (0.257)	0.164 (0.258)	0.160 (0.258)
Very low	0.408 (0.281)	0.368 (0.283)	0.358 (0.283)
Lower/working class (ref: middle/upper class)	<b>0.710***</b> (0.159)	<b>0.679***</b> (0.160)	<b>0.681***</b> (0.160)
Union member (ref: not member)	<b>0.516***</b> (0.165)	<b>0.483***</b> (0.166)	<b>0.485***</b> (0.166)
Constant	-1.930*** (0.321)	-3.060*** (0.628)	-3.118*** (0.632)
Observations	1,354	1,354	1,354

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E31: Attitudinal (PVV and SP, Netherlands 2010)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0155***</b> <b>(0.00557)</b>	0.0234 (0.0287)	0.0264 (0.0289)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.000421 (0.000305)	-0.000439 (0.000306)
Female (ref: male)	0.0541 (0.159)	0.0474 (0.159)	0.0547 (0.159)
Unemployed * age			-0.0271 (0.0249)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	0.186 (0.330)	0.143 (0.332)	1.418 (1.199)
<i>Education (ref: higher-level vocation/degree)</i>			
Elementary	<b>0.896**</b> <b>(0.422)</b>	<b>1.037**</b> <b>(0.438)</b>	<b>1.029**</b> <b>(0.438)</b>
Lower vocational/secondary	<b>1.051***</b> <b>(0.244)</b>	<b>1.089***</b> <b>(0.246)</b>	<b>1.089***</b> <b>(0.246)</b>
Mid-level vocational/higher-level secondary	<b>0.564***</b> <b>(0.208)</b>	<b>0.586***</b> <b>(0.208)</b>	<b>0.580***</b> <b>(0.208)</b>
Religious denomination (ref: no religious denomination)	<b>-0.459***</b> <b>(0.165)</b>	<b>-0.447***</b> <b>(0.165)</b>	<b>-0.450***</b> <b>(0.165)</b>
<i>Urbanisation (ref: very high)</i>			
High	0.232 (0.267)	0.222 (0.268)	0.219 (0.268)
Medium	0.178 (0.278)	0.170 (0.279)	0.160 (0.279)
Low	0.125 (0.281)	0.111 (0.282)	0.102 (0.282)
Very low	0.450 (0.306)	0.433 (0.306)	0.411 (0.307)
Lower/working class (ref: middle/upper class)	<b>0.464***</b> <b>(0.171)</b>	<b>0.444***</b> <b>(0.171)</b>	<b>0.450***</b> <b>(0.171)</b>
Union member (ref: not member)	<b>0.512***</b> <b>(0.178)</b>	<b>0.496***</b> <b>(0.178)</b>	<b>0.500***</b> <b>(0.178)</b>

**Table E31 continued:**

Ideological extremity	-0.00664 (0.0607)	0.00386 (0.0613)	0.00409 (0.0614)
Perceived established party distance	-0.0727* (0.0393)	-0.0753* (0.0394)	<b>-0.0801**</b> <b>(0.0396)</b>
Euroscepticism	<b>0.150***</b> <b>(0.0499)</b>	<b>0.150***</b> <b>(0.0501)</b>	<b>0.149***</b> <b>(0.0501)</b>
Desires more referendums	<b>0.353***</b> <b>(0.0924)</b>	<b>0.347***</b> <b>(0.0925)</b>	<b>0.349***</b> <b>(0.0925)</b>
Distrust government institutions	0.425 (0.264)	0.408 (0.265)	0.422 (0.265)
Trust politicians	<b>-0.720***</b> <b>(0.228)</b>	<b>-0.728***</b> <b>(0.228)</b>	<b>-0.714***</b> <b>(0.228)</b>
Introduce death penalty	<b>0.171***</b> <b>(0.0566)</b>	<b>0.167***</b> <b>(0.0567)</b>	<b>0.170***</b> <b>(0.0568)</b>
Dissatisfied with democracy	0.180 (0.144)	0.181 (0.145)	0.177 (0.145)
Constant	-4.768*** (0.894)	-5.506*** (1.045)	-5.625*** (1.053)
Observations	1,354	1,354	1,354

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E32: PVV or SP (Netherlands 2010)**

Independent variables	SP	PVV
Age	-0.00862 (0.00736)	<b>-0.0367***</b> <b>(0.00938)</b>
Female (ref: male)	<b>0.421**</b> <b>(0.203)</b>	<b>-0.735***</b> <b>(0.266)</b>
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	-0.424 (0.451)	<b>1.183***</b> <b>(0.459)</b>
<i>Education (ref: higher-level vocation/degree)</i>		
Elementary	0.340 (0.518)	1.266* (0.676)
Lower vocational/secondary	<b>0.658**</b> <b>(0.306)</b>	<b>1.366***</b> <b>(0.404)</b>
Mid-level vocational/higher-level secondary	0.342 (0.257)	0.624* (0.369)
Religious denomination (ref: no religious denomination)	-0.217 (0.209)	-0.468* (0.265)
<i>Urbanisation (ref: very high)</i>		
High	0.594* (0.339)	-0.326 (0.421)
Medium	0.0250 (0.369)	0.195 (0.428)
Low	0.442 (0.359)	-0.332 (0.443)
Very low	0.734* (0.379)	-0.272 (0.503)
Lower/working class (ref: middle/upper class)	0.196 (0.218)	0.346 (0.259)
Union member (ref: not member)	<b>0.519**</b> <b>(0.215)</b>	0.0249 (0.280)
Left-right self-placement	<b>-0.232***</b> <b>(0.0499)</b>	<b>0.199***</b> <b>(0.0616)</b>
Perceived established party distance	-0.0618 (0.0455)	<b>-0.138**</b> <b>(0.0580)</b>
Euroscepticism	0.0573 (0.0635)	0.0916 (0.0786)
Desires more referendums	<b>0.337***</b> <b>(0.120)</b>	0.241 (0.146)
Distrust government institutions	0.0995 (0.352)	0.484 (0.395)
Trust politicians	-0.560* (0.298)	-0.296 (0.341)
Introduce death penalty	0.0496 (0.0786)	0.165* (0.0920)

**Table E32 continued:**

Immigrants assimilate	-0.0151 (0.0842)	<b>0.274**</b> <b>(0.123)</b>
Reject more asylum applications	-0.0915 (0.0880)	<b>0.376***</b> <b>(0.116)</b>
Do not spend more on foreign aid	0.0124 (0.162)	<b>0.472**</b> <b>(0.214)</b>
Deport illegal immigrants	-0.187 (0.137)	0.126 (0.164)
Stop Muslim immigration	0.275* (0.157)	<b>0.459***</b> <b>(0.169)</b>
Income inequality	0.127* (0.0763)	<b>0.184**</b> <b>(0.0809)</b>
Big companies threaten democracy	0.151 (0.140)	-0.122 (0.169)
Do not cut taxes	0.213 (0.161)	-0.322* (0.182)
Banks should not be bailed out	0.215 (0.143)	0.0108 (0.167)
Do not abolish mortgage deduction	0.236* (0.131)	0.129 (0.165)
Dissatisfied with democracy	-0.238 (0.190)	0.347* (0.207)
Constant	-5.105*** (1.407)	-11.91*** (1.797)
Observations	1,354	1,354

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Spain (November 2019)

Left-right self-placement is measured on a scale of 1-10, with right-wing being higher values. Ideological extremity is measured as distance from the centre; five is taken as the midpoint of the scale. Perceived established party distance is taken as the difference between the voter's placement on the 1-10 scale of the established left- and right-wing parties. Higher values indicate they believe the parties are more distinct. Satisfaction with democracy is measured through a nominal variable asking how the voter feels the political situation is: good, bad or regular.

National identity is measured through the Moreno scale. Respondents are asked to place themselves as either: only Spanish; more Spanish; equally Spanish; more sub-national; only sub-national. Whether or not the respondent's vote choice was affected by the Catalanian situation and Franco's exhumation was measured through a dummy variable: yes or no.

**Table E33: Socio-demographics (Podemos and Vox, Spain Nov. 2019)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0277***</b> <b>(0.00342)</b>	-0.0242 (0.0171)	-0.0236 (0.0176)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-3.81e-05 (0.000184)	-4.30e-05 (0.000187)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.457***</b> <b>(0.0992)</b>	<b>-0.458***</b> <b>(0.0992)</b>	<b>-0.458***</b> <b>(0.0992)</b>
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None or lowest	-0.817 (0.540)	-0.793 (0.552)	-0.793 (0.552)
Primary	<b>-0.505**</b> <b>(0.244)</b>	-0.492* (0.252)	-0.493* (0.252)
Secondary	<b>0.547***</b> <b>(0.153)</b>	<b>0.548***</b> <b>(0.153)</b>	<b>0.548***</b> <b>(0.153)</b>
Post-secondary	0.172 (0.134)	0.173 (0.134)	0.173 (0.134)
Unemployed * age			-0.00156 (0.0108)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	<b>0.449***</b> <b>(0.136)</b>	<b>0.445***</b> <b>(0.137)</b>	0.512 (0.483)
Working class (ref: not working class)	0.230* (0.119)	0.228* (0.119)	0.228* (0.119)
Religious (ref: not religious)	<b>-0.490***</b> <b>(0.104)</b>	<b>-0.490***</b> <b>(0.104)</b>	<b>-0.491***</b> <b>(0.105)</b>
Constant	0.391** (0.188)	0.320 (0.391)	0.303 (0.407)
Observations	2,605	2,605	2,605

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Table E34: Attitudinal (Podemos or Vox, Spain Nov. 2019)**

Independent variables	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support	Populist AEP support
Age	<b>-0.0289***</b> (0.00364)	-0.00980 (0.0183)	-0.00996 (0.0188)
Age <sup>2</sup>	---	-0.000208 (0.000195)	-0.000206 (0.000198)
Female (ref: male)	<b>-0.316***</b> (0.106)	<b>-0.316***</b> (0.106)	<b>-0.316***</b> (0.106)
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>			
None or lowest	-1.008* (0.569)	-0.894 (0.580)	-0.894 (0.580)
Primary	<b>-0.522**</b> (0.258)	-0.457* (0.265)	-0.457* (0.265)
Secondary	<b>0.578***</b> (0.165)	<b>0.584***</b> (0.165)	<b>0.583***</b> (0.165)
Post-secondary	0.172 (0.144)	0.180 (0.144)	0.180 (0.144)
Unemployed * age	---	---	0.000437 (0.0117)
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	<b>0.482***</b> (0.147)	<b>0.462***</b> (0.148)	0.443 (0.525)
Working class (ref: not working class)	<b>0.374***</b> (0.129)	<b>0.362***</b> (0.129)	<b>0.362***</b> (0.129)
Religious (ref: not religious)	<b>-0.522***</b> (0.115)	<b>-0.519***</b> (0.115)	<b>-0.519***</b> (0.115)
Ideological extremity	<b>0.657***</b> (0.0476)	<b>0.661***</b> (0.0477)	<b>0.661***</b> (0.0477)
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.286***</b> (0.0340)	<b>-0.284***</b> (0.0340)	<b>-0.284***</b> (0.0340)
<i>Political situation (ref: good)</i>			
Regular	-0.188 (0.293)	-0.189 (0.294)	-0.189 (0.294)
Bad	-0.161 (0.276)	-0.165 (0.277)	-0.165 (0.277)
<i>National identity (ref: only Spanish)</i>			
More Spanish	-0.256 (0.248)	-0.247 (0.248)	-0.247 (0.248)
Equally Spanish	-0.0870 (0.141)	-0.0888 (0.141)	-0.0891 (0.141)
More sub-national	<b>-0.801***</b> (0.220)	<b>-0.808***</b> (0.220)	<b>-0.808***</b> (0.220)
Only sub-national	<b>-2.016***</b> (0.304)	<b>-2.023***</b> (0.305)	<b>-2.023***</b> (0.305)
Constant	0.628* (0.372)	0.226 (0.530)	0.230 (0.542)
Observations	2,605	2,605	2,605

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table E35: Podemos or Vox (Spain Nov. 2019)**

Independent variables	Podemos	Vox
Age	<b>-0.0278***</b> <b>(0.00528)</b>	<b>-0.0339***</b> <b>(0.00534)</b>
Female (ref: male)	0.00736 (0.148)	<b>-0.661***</b> <b>(0.161)</b>
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>		
None or lowest	-1.684 (1.066)	0.0278 (0.713)
Primary	-0.461 (0.350)	-0.148 (0.404)
Secondary	0.179 (0.229)	<b>1.261***</b> <b>(0.261)</b>
Post-secondary	-0.217 (0.188)	<b>0.872***</b> <b>(0.240)</b>
Unemployed (ref: not unemployed)	<b>0.811***</b> <b>(0.191)</b>	0.244 (0.233)
Working class (ref: not working class)	<b>0.495***</b> <b>(0.169)</b>	0.302 (0.206)
Religious (ref: not religious)	<b>-1.169***</b> <b>(0.158)</b>	0.334 (0.216)
Left-right self-placement	<b>-0.765***</b> <b>(0.0602)</b>	<b>0.793***</b> <b>(0.0525)</b>
Perceived established party distance	<b>-0.372***</b> <b>(0.0489)</b>	<b>-0.179***</b> <b>(0.0471)</b>
<i>Political situation (ref: good)</i>		
Regular	-0.256 (0.339)	-0.375 (0.616)
Bad	-0.630* (0.325)	0.284 (0.577)
<i>National identity (ref: only Spanish)</i>		
More Spanish	<b>-1.186**</b> <b>(0.508)</b>	-0.0993 (0.313)
Equally Spanish	-0.0687 (0.214)	-0.0513 (0.196)
More sub-national	-0.510* (0.284)	<b>-0.981**</b> <b>(0.445)</b>
Only sub-national	<b>-1.964***</b> <b>(0.377)</b>	-0.293 (0.644)
Vote choice influenced by Catalonia (ref: no)	<b>-0.860***</b> <b>(0.209)</b>	<b>0.951***</b> <b>(0.162)</b>
Vote choice influenced by Franco exhumation (ref: no)	0.272 (0.342)	0.146 (0.245)
Constant	4.994*** (0.551)	-5.763*** (0.742)
Observations	2,605	2,605

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1