Transformations, crises, and contestations in narratives about environment and society on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts

Anna Sergeeva Antonova

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds
School of English
School of Earth and Environment

August 2020

 This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 642935.

Acknowledgements

Even in the midst of the global pandemic that isolated us, at least in the physical sense, I was never alone in my PhD journey. I am grateful to so many. Here at the close, I no longer have eloquent words, but my gratitude is heartfelt all the same.

At the University of Leeds, I wish to thank first my supervisors, Fiona Becket and Jouni Paavola, who were always so supportive of this interdisciplinary adventure. I am grateful to the ENHANCE network that funded my research, to everyone in the community it created, and to Graham Huggan and the late Antony Carrigan, its co-convenors, for bringing us all together. Thanks go also to Roger Norum and David Higgins, both of whom were always supportive of my work; and I am grateful to Tracy Ruddock and Nickolas Ray for helping me navigate challenging moments in my journey through the University of Leeds and its bureaucracy.

I am immensely grateful to all the participants who agreed to give me their time and shared their thoughts and stories with me for this project. As I have promised them anonymity, I cannot name them, but I am so grateful to each and every one. I also wish to thank to those who first helped me find my feet in each field: to Heather Davidson and Bex Lynam in Yorkshire; and to Hristina and Atanas Grozdanovi and Antonia Chonos in Bulgaria.

I have been incredibly fortunate in mentors and peers in the wider academic community. Especial thanks go to Kristen Ounanian, Katie Ritson, and Christof Mauch, all of whom supported me throughout the journey and endeavoured to read drafts and offer invaluable and attentive feedback during some of the most difficult months of my work. I am also grateful to Allison Rieser, from whom I learned a lot during our 2017 Icelandic project, and to Dolly Jørgensen, whose impromptu but in-depth advice to me in Edinburgh in January 2020 really helped me. Another debt of gratitude goes also to Sarah Elizabeth Yoho, Jeroen Oomen, Anna Pilz, Simone Müller, and everyone in the Rachel Carson Center community whose support, empathy, and ready ears upheld me many times when I would have come to my knees.

I am so grateful to my partner, Brody Fredericksen, who has found so many ways of supporting me from near and afar and believed in me at every turn during the last seven years.

And to my family and the friends with whom I have shared such long journeys: Лидия, Сергей и Кристиан Антонови; Гергана Митова, Ивайло Яйджиев и всички Ботове – обичам ви и ви благодаря, че не спряхте да вярвате в мен и да ме подкрепяте въпреки и напук на всичко.

Thank you. Благодаря.

Abstract

This thesis explores the narrated social and environmental transformations on two distinct European coasts, the Yorkshire North Sea and the Bulgarian Black Sea. It situates each shoreline's contemporary crises or contestations in the wider context of its ongoing environmental and political transformations. On the Yorkshire coast, it connects the clash between different marine governance visions surrounding the 2016 Referendum on Leaving the European Union to the advancement of a new oceanic legal paradigm since the Cod Wars. On the Bulgarian shore, it links contemporary conflicts over tourism (over)construction, conservation efforts, and corruption to the changing economic and knowledge politics from the establishment of the first coastal resorts during socialism to the present. To do so, the thesis analyses a range of spoken and textual narratives derived from interviews conducted during 2017-2018 fieldwork alongside literature, historical documents, media pieces, and political and legal documents.

Combining theoretical work in environmental humanities with the empirical focus of critical policy studies, the thesis positions the coast as the ideal point of departure from which to understand how communities narrate and navigate the kinds of change that increasingly characterize the Anthropocene. Arguing that awareness of what we now call the Anthropocene made an early arrival on the coast, the thesis demonstrates how the coastal communities specifically on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea shores each draw on varying meanings of environment in order to define and uphold their place in that landscape. Through the comparison between these two shorelines, the thesis offers a contribution toward strengthening the reciprocal relationship between environmental humanities and policy for a world increasingly defined by environmental change.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

Chapter I: Introduction

On one of my fieldwork visits to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, two participants offered to take me out on a walk. We had been speaking for several hours about the many social, political, and environmental issues on this part of the Bulgarian shoreline. We were all tired and hungry, as well as cold: although their office was state property, their budget was insufficient to heat it consistently during the winter. So, we took a walk. It was a calm, sunny winter's day and the Black Sea belied its name. The waters were quieter than those of a lake; what passed for waves barely so much as stirred the surface. In the low sunlight, the shallows were hued in turquoise, teal, and azure. We all paused at a railing to admire the sight for a little while. Amidst our contemplation, one of my companions said—quietly, in Bulgarian—"the ants are drinking water" („мравките пият вода"). It was a local expression, he explained, to describe the sea when it was this quiet.

The phrase fit the moment. Later, though, I would reflect on how incongruous it *should* have felt. It was an Arcadian counterpoint to our earlier conversation, in which these participants had been recounting the towering multitude of problems they saw on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore: from rapid tourism-related overconstruction and habitat loss, through corruption, land speculation, and broken links between locals and their coastline, to the cold offices of state employees. The tender attention to nature expressed by the phrase seemed irreconcilable with these bitter political themes. Yet, doing research on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coastlines, I often found myself having to reconcile individual narrative moments like these with both the wider societal and political transformations communities were grappling with and the global consequences of social and environmental change I had been trained to theorize as either a humanist or a political scholar. Thinking back to that short phrase in all its expressiveness, I could not but feel that it conveyed a great deal about what the coast and its nature meant, at least to that participant. Far from being incongruous, after all, his attention to that quirk of expression, to the fleeting image of tiny ants on the sea shore, seemed a way for him to emphasize all that he felt was being lost, and all that mattered in that loss, as a result of the issues he had been describing. Narratives can hold the key to human experiences and understanding of the environment. Could they also help frame the pragmatic social and political changes on the coast?

In my thesis, I came to explore the transformations emerging from a range of narratives on these two specific and unique European coastlines: the Yorkshire North Sea and the Bulgarian Black Sea. My project is a comparative study between the linked social and environmental dynamics on these two shorelines. I analyse narratives across a variety of materials from each case study, including original interviews I conducted during my 2017-2018 fieldwork, as well as a range of literature, historical documents, media pieces, and legal and political documents pertaining to a wider period from the 1950s to the present. By reading these narratives, I explore how different

ideas about environment and society are tangled with the transformations, crises, and contestations each coastal community faces. Throughout, the liminality of the seashore informs my thinking and my approach and leads me to argue, alongside other "blue" thinkers in the humanities and social sciences, for the merit of viewing global ecological change through a maritime lens. Altogether, I ask two interrelated questions:

1. *How has the coast mattered to the transformations each community has undergone and the contestations or crises they currently experience?*
2. *What can a "blue" perspective offer environmental humanities scholars studying social and environmental change?*

I chose the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts as illustrative cases for the wider social and environmental transformations communities experience in contemporary Europe. When I first designed this project, I had intended to find out how specific European Union (EU) environmental policies functioned on the coast in the context of a newer (Bulgaria) and a more established (United Kingdom) member state. Over the course of my research, however, I found that each case confronted me with more complicated questions. On each shoreline, I conducted qualitative interviews with participants who represented a range of perspectives: policy makers and local governance officers, environmental activists and members of advocacy groups or non-governmental organizations, members of the local community, and researchers. On each coast, moreover, I analysed a wide span of textual narratives—literature and media pieces, legislature and policy papers, and historical documents. As I learned from these narratives, the focus of my work shifted. My research came to engage not only with certain policies and how they were perceived, but also with how members of both communities thought, narrated, and related to their coastal environment through the societal and political dynamics they had encountered in recent history. Each of the two shorelines challenged my initial perspective in its own way.

On the Yorkshire North Sea coast, also referred to in the UK as the Yorkshire East Coast (see Figure 1), I encountered narratives about the marginalization and decline of once dominant maritime industries, especially fisheries, and the significance of this trend in the months and years leading up to the 2016 Brexit referendum. At the same time, I heard about the uncertainty some in this context felt about the future of coastal and environmental legislation past Brexit. Both narrative strands, I learned, exist in the context of a whole legal and political paradigm in marine governance that has emerged through the implementation of international and EU policies into UK law, bringing new uses like wind farms or marine protected areas to Yorkshire's waters. But alongside these stories of governance, participants also expressed more elusive sentiments about their shoreline. They spoke about local economic deprivation and its consequences for the community's pride in place; they reflected on who they thought the sea should be for, and on what it meant to have a stake in the marine environment; and they spoke about people or environments

who had been rendered invisible by government policy. There was more to these narratives, in other words, than legislative change.

Figure 1: Map of the Yorkshire North Sea coast



Administration of the Yorkshire shoreline is split between the Scarborough Borough Council in the north and the East Riding of Yorkshire Council in the south. I worked mainly in coastal locations in the East Riding, but also took interviews in Beverley, Kingston upon Hull (Hull), and York to accommodate participants.

On the Bulgarian Black Sea shoreline (see Figure 2), similar experiences of economic and political change seemed entangled with different kinds of meaning. Here, I witnessed contestations over rapid overconstruction and habitat destruction due to pressure from the growing tourism industry over the past few decades. On the surface, participants framed these events as examples of corruption or as government failure to protect the coastal environment. However, although at first these narratives seemed to be about policy and institutional capacity, my initial impressions were challenged by the way in which participants spoke about them. I encountered themes that framed the sand beaches and dunes as a space for civic protest. I heard claims that care for the environment came from the number of decades a society was exposed to democracy. In some participants' accounts, moreover, corruption was not only a concrete accusation, but also a societal metaphor. Thus, participants spoke about ruptures in societal trust and about broken links to the shoreline in ways that went beyond their concern with governance or policy.

Figure 2: Map of the Bulgarian Black Sea coast



Administration of the Bulgarian coastline is split between three regions, from north to south: Dobrich, Varna, and Burgas. I worked almost exclusively in coastal locations in the largest and southernmost Burgas region but also took individual interviews according to participants' wishes in the Bulgarian capital, Sofia.

In other words, my two case studies raised complicated questions and themes, spanning the range between the political and the affective. Although each coastline would have made for a rich study on its own, together they present a productive comparison. Over their history, the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts have experienced maritimity, environment, and society in entirely contrasting ways. Their contemporary struggles come from different economic and social directions. At the same time, both shorelines construct their sense of belonging in the environment against a shared European intellectual and political context. Both the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts belong to societies in the midst of reimagining themselves in the light of global visions and pressures: the Yorkshire shoreline in the context of the evolving legal and political paradigm of marine governance as a result of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the third such convention, henceforth UNCLOS III), and the Bulgarian coast as a result of Bulgaria's ongoing recovery from its 1989 postsocialist transition and the economic and political pressures associated with the change in property and governance. On both shorelines, these overarching transformations have significantly altered regional environments and livelihoods. Together, these two cases led me to

reflect on two diverse experiences of navigating social and environmental change on the coast and in the Anthropocene.

While the focus of my thesis evolved over the years in which I worked on it, my reasoning for choosing to situate my work specifically on the coast strengthened and deepened. The shore has a rich and contradictory ontology. Here, at the interface between land and sea, societal constructs and scholarship often reach a caesura; the real and the imagined meet; different kinds of temporality and spatiality intersect. Through these rich dualities, the coast allows me to think about transformations rather than fixed states and about the links and flows between communities and their environments. Throughout, my focus on narratives allows me to examine my case studies against multiple time scales, setting the immediate crises and contestations that emerge from my interviews with participants against the longer incidence of ideas and events evident in my work with literary and historical texts. By examining these different temporal frames, I trace how paradigms associated with environment and society have contributed, or continue contributing, to the transformations, crises, or contestations that can be observed in each context. The blue setting of my thesis enables me to probe the ways in which different forms of representation, and especially perceptions of liminality and (in)visibility, impact the emotive, socio-political, and even physical aspects of human and nonhuman relations.

In keeping with the shore's liminality, I blended different methodological and analytical approaches in my thesis. My work relies on a multi-material interdisciplinary narrative approach intended to combine the critical and theoretical depth of analysis supported by the humanities with the social science focus on tangible challenges faced by communities. In part, some of the more experimental aspects of the project's design were the mandate of the European doctoral training network that funded my research. Entitled "Environmental Humanities for a Concerned Europe", or ENHANCE, this funding scheme under the European Union's Horizon 2020 programme trained twelve doctoral students, each required as a deliverable of the grant agreement to produce a thesis that would "integrate cutting-edge research across a range of Environmental Humanities subjects" (Grant Agreement № 642935 - ENHANCE, Annex 1 pt. A, 3). To a much greater extent, however, my interdisciplinarity is mandated and supported through the different types of narratives I analyse—from literary works and media pieces, through archival, legal, and political documents, to the interviews with participants on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea shorelines. My methodological approach, including my fieldwork and narrative analysis methods, is outlined in detail in Chapter II, "Methodology".

Analytically, my work draws on insights from several key directions, which I will summarize here and outline at more length with the rest of this introduction. First, my thesis is situated within the field of environmental humanities, a growing field that strives to bring approaches and concerns from the wider humanities—literature, history, art, and philosophy—to comment on environmental issues. Since its earliest conceptualizations, environmental humanities

has aimed to deliver "a wide ranging response to the environmental challenges of our time" by "bringing various approaches to environmental scholarship into conversation with each other", including approaches from "environmental history, environmental philosophy, environmental anthropology and sociology, political ecology, posthuman geographies and ecocriticism (among others)" (Rose et al. 2012, 1-2). Interdisciplinarity, sensitivity to different perspectives, and broadly the encouragement of dialogue on issues of environmental and societal change have been among the field's central urges (Neimanis et al., 2015, 69; Weidner et al., 2019, 1-2). My work shares in this broad ambition. As the next section "Placing 'nature' into social change in environmental humanities" will outline, I see my thesis as building specifically on environmental humanities' efforts to build bridges between the social sciences and the humanities in order to engage with communities and their concerns about the environment, especially with issues of power and representation. In this next section, I will trace how environmental humanities scholarship has conceptualized the role of the environment in societal change and formulated the difficulties of navigating social and environmental transformations in the context of the Anthropocene—two central interests to which I hope my thesis can contribute.

My work also links these concerns more explicitly to issues of policy, inspired by Rachel Carson's example of spanning the affective and the political. To that end, my thesis also relies on insights from other fields, most prominently critical policy studies. It is a field that analyses the policy process with the assumption that culturally and historically constructed knowledge and ideas—rather than "objective" information—inform policy and its outcomes and implications (Fischer et al., 2015, 1-2). In my thesis, as the next section also explains, the field helps inform my reading of various national and regional policies on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea shorelines and how they affect the transformations experienced by the coastal communities. Engaging with a critical policy studies perspective, moreover, helps me highlight the relevance of environmental humanities for policy and policy analysis—a relevance toward which my thesis orients its own contributions.

In making these connections, the coast is central to my thinking. As I will outline in the second-to-last section of this introduction, entitled "A maritime lens on the Anthropocene?", I believe that blue thought—both in scholarship and as embodied by coastal communities—could offer environmental humanities and environmental policy alike helpful approaches for responding to the Anthropocene's challenges. To that end, my thesis also draws on a range of works theorizing maritime space from across the humanities and social sciences. These works help me show how the coast, as an overarching focus, not only connects the various strands and materials of my work, but also presents a productive theoretical context from which to examine social and environmental change in the present. Toward the end of the "A maritime lens on the Anthropocene?" section, I show how my research questions emerged from these discussions. Then, the final section of my introduction closes with a short guide to the overall structure of my thesis.

Placing "nature" into social change in environmental humanities

Participants' narratives on both coastlines often conveyed how entangled their pragmatic and political concerns were with the sea, its shore, and their visions about the environment. In reflecting on the role of their environment as central to their lives, I share in one of the chief concerns for modern environmentalist thought, including and perhaps especially for environmental humanities: placing "nature" more centrally into social change. Yet this task is complex, and this can be illustrated simply by considering the varying terms affiliated with the subject, at least in English language scholarship. Early environmental humanities thinkers, from critical theorists like Raymond Williams (1980) and Lawrence Buell (1995), environmental historians like Carolyn Merchant (1980) and William Cronon (1996), anthropologists like Arturo Escobar (1999), or philosophers like Val Plumwood (1993; 2002), relied on the term "nature" in their writing. Contemporary scholarship, by contrast, tends to refer to the "environment", and even so, much productive thought about the links between humans and their physical surroundings can also be found under the term "landscape", especially in fields such as geography or landscape studies. These terms have different histories, connotations, and hence conceptual loadings. Throughout my thesis, I refer predominantly to the "environment," not only as a signifier for its real, measurable, and physical aspects, but also as what I consider to be the most neutral and all-encompassing of these terms. By contrast, my use of the term "landscape" usually references insights from certain fields, like geography and landscape studies, that describe the aesthetic, social, and even political functions of the environment as situated in their physical environment. Finally, while I try to be sparing with the term "nature"—a term that for me invariably stands in quotation marks, since it is, as Kate Soper observes, "one of the most complex words in the [English] language" (Soper, 1995, 1)—I take it to signify the range of constructs, cognitions, and narratives embedded in human thought about the environment.

The nuances between these terms point to the larger challenge of navigating between the physical, collective, and cognitive aspects of how different communities understand the environment. I observed this challenge in practice when working on the Yorkshire and Bulgarian shores. At various points of my work, I found that the environment meant different things in different narratives. To some, like Helen on the Yorkshire North Sea coast who told me picking up rubbish on the beach was a matter of pride in oneself and one's community (Helen, local policy officer, 2017), the environment had a symbolic or metaphoric significance, pointing to more abstract concepts and experiences outside itself. Yet to others, like Evgenia on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, the environment was "not a symbol" (Evgenia, researcher, 2018) and rather a material entity with measurable impact on individuals' lives. To various British and Bulgarian governmental institutions, meanwhile, the marine or coastal environment was often a resource to be managed or maintained in line with either economic or (geo)political interests. The task of placing the environment at the centre of each coastline's transformation, therefore, was complicated by the

varying and sometimes contrasting assumptions about what the environment *was* and why it mattered in the first place.

I found these difficulties to be reflected in the environmentalist scholarship canon I was reading and learning. As early as 1990, for instance, environmental historian Donald Worster wrote that analysing "the role and place of nature in human life" (Worster, 1990, 1089) requires navigating between three related but very different concerns: first, uncovering the ecological dynamics of natural landscapes and their influence on human beings; second, tracing how human societies impact and have impacted the environment; and third, understanding the ideas, concepts, and cognitions humans associate with the physical landscape (Worster, 1990, 1090-1). The central challenge for a scholar in the field, Worster argued, was to decide "how and where to make connections among them" (Worster, 1990, 1091). His own focus fell on studying societal dynamics, although he also emphasized "a determinist, materialist, naturalist" perspective (Worster, 1990, 1144). In an exchange between himself and several other environmental historians on the pages of the *Journal of American History* (1990, Vol 76, Issue 4), however, some of Worster's colleagues disagreed. Carolyn Merchant (the only female historian included in the debate) found Worster's analysis impoverished by its lack of engagement with social issues like gender studies, consequently producing a limited theoretical framework with regard to its societal analysis (Merchant, 1990, 1117). In another response, Cronon critiqued Worster's dismissal of the human imagination about the environment as an aspect "so obvious and dramatic that it is in no danger of being neglected" (Worster, 1990, 1091); instead, Cronon wrote, it was "precisely this third level of analysis that has generally stood apart in the best environmental histories. We have either had studies of ecology and economy, or studies of ideas of nature; too rarely have we had the three together" (Cronon, 1990, 1123). Richard White, similarly, worried that Worster had involuntarily dismissed culture and ideology as irrelevant—"a superstructure in the old vulgar Marxist sense" (White, 1990, 1113). Simultaneously, White criticised Worster for oversimplifying the complexity of natural processes and their reciprocity with human societal dynamics (White, 1990, 1114-5).

Since environmental history is among the core disciplines from which environmental humanities emerged, the exchange between these scholars is an early articulation for one of the central, enduring problems in environmental humanities: the complexity of striking the right balance of materialist, social, and cognitive concerns while studying environment and society. At the heart of that difficulty, as Raymond Williams (1980) and Bruno Latour (1993) have both argued, lies the assumption that environment and society are divided in the first place. Williams' classic essay "Ideas of Nature" showed that the idea of "nature" underwrites a long history of Western thought (Williams, 1980, 80). In the West, Williams argued, the constructed abstractions of "nature" and "culture" as separate entities came at the root of agricultural and industrial advancements, at the heart of thinking of economic and legal relations, and at the base of scientific thought: "a separated mind observing separated matter; man looking at nature" (Williams, 1980,

77). Similarly, in *We Have Never Been Modern* (1993), Latour argued that the constructed distinction between "nature" and "society" defined modernity because of a corresponding distinction erected between two epistemological practices: "purification" (giving an intellectual order, distilling, synthesising) and "translation" (perceiving cross-pollination and messy connections) (Latour, 1993, 10-12). The chalk lines between these two types of critical thought, Latour claimed, helped justify the difference between not only humans and nonhumans but also different cultures (Latour, 1993, 6-7). Both Williams and Latour concluded that the idea of nature as an entity separate from human society, along with the epistemologies supported by this assumption, underpinned Western society's agricultural, industrial, and scientific advancements (Williams, 1980, 77-9; Latour, 1993, 29-31). Yet this interdependence, as Dipesh Chakrabarty later argued in his essay "The Climate of History: Four Theses", becomes highly problematic in an age defined by the unprecedented impact that humanity has had on the planet (Chakrabarty, 2009, 198). Chakrabarty asserted that the conceptual separation between human and geological timelines historically supported also Western modernity's best promises—like humanism, rationalism, or freedoms (Chakrabarty 2009, 208-211). "The mansion of modern freedoms," he wrote, "stands on an ever-expanding base of fossil-fuel use. Most of our freedoms so far have been energy-intensive" (Chakrabarty, 2009, 208). In the 21st century, human society has become more aware of its own ability to affect the bio- and geophysical environment in a deep planetary and geological sense (IPCC, 2018). Responding to this growing awareness, Chakrabarty argued that rethinking politics with societal and environmental justice in mind is among the key challenges of the climate change crisis (2009, 220).

Over the last decade, the growing field of environmental humanities has expanded on these conclusions. Defining environmental humanities has been the subject of more than one book (see Emmett and Nye, 2017 or Oppermann and Iovino, 2016) and an exhaustive definition would therefore be beyond the scope of my thesis. Many of the key existing definitions, however, have envisioned the field as a response to environmental change and the humanistic questions it raises (Rose et al., 2012, 1-2; Pálsson et al., 2013, 4). Thus, environmental humanities has sought to highlight aspects like values, ethics, responsibility, or meaning, seeing them as important political concerns but ones too often disregarded by dominant discourses on sustainability and environmental politics (Holm et al., 2015, 981; Neimanis et al., 2015, 68-75). Since Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer's postulation of the Anthropocene as the new geologic era (2000; Crutzen, 2002), environmental humanities—along with other strands of humanistic and social scientific scholarship—have taken this as a provocation to further debate and theorise the quandaries of contemporary social and environmental change. Different works have adopted contrasting approaches to the challenges, the periodization, and even the name of this new era. Gísli Pálsson and his co-authors, for example, saw the 'Anthropos' in the Anthropocene as a call to humanities and social sciences to lead the way in reframing human understandings of the environment as a social category and in characterizing a new human condition (2013, 6-9). Taking a historical

approach, Jason Moore has argued that the era should begin not with the Industrial Revolution and the visible stratigraphic record dating back to that time as per Crutzen and Stoermer's suggestion (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; Crutzen, 2002), but instead with the emergence of colonialism and capitalism—and that the era should accordingly be named the "Capitalocene" (Moore, 2017, 3; Moore, 2018, 4-5). Emphasizing the role of colonialism and in particular the plantation-based global economy even further, Donna Haraway and Anna Tsing in conversation with Gregg Mitman have proposed the "Plantationocene" (Mitman, Haraway, and Tsing, 2019). And Haraway, contesting the original term's anthropocentrism in the face of the growing need to rethink human-nonhuman relations, has put forth the "Chthulucene" (to represent kinship with chtonic beings) as another alternative (Haraway, 2016, 2). Despite the different terms, all of these approaches share the understanding that, against the scale of humanity's impact on the planet, the conceptual distinctions between human and nonhuman entities have become blurred, necessitating not only new solutions to concrete environmental problems but also new ways of thinking through these entangled relations. Discussing societal and environmental change in the Anthropocene against this understanding has been a key shared concern in environmental humanities scholarship. At the same time, by proposing such varying takes, contemporary environmental humanities debates also partially reflect early environmental historians' different alignments along the materialist, social, or cognitive aspects of studying social and environmental change.

In writing my thesis, my own alignment on these issues was directed by the narratives I worked with. In speaking to participants on both the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coastlines, I found that each community paid attention first and foremost to the immediacy of the social, affective, and political consequences that their coastlines' transformations engendered. My analysis, even when it works with scholarship offering materialist perspectives on the sea, follows these narratives' lead. Thus, I chose to speak to the Anthropocene, focusing on how the human communities on the Yorkshire or Bulgarian shores relate to, inscribe, and think themselves as part of or alongside each landscape and its transformations. Although the environment's agency is present to different degrees in each of the two case studies I examined, the narratives I read commented above all on the human assertion of agency over the environment. Despite this seemingly anthropocentric perspective, however, members of each community framed the human and societal consequences that interested them in ways that were always entangled with the environment and its materiality. To illustrate, on the Yorkshire North Sea shore participants like William spoke of fishermen as being part of the "natural" ecology, an indivisible element of the ecosystem (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). On the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, meanwhile, speakers like Deyan or Georgi framed the destruction of dunes not only as an issue of natural habitats, but also as a symptom of poor governance (Deyan, government expert, 2017; Georgi, environmental activist, 2017). These representations of each coastline's transformation, hence,

reflected the diverse spectre of hybrid environmental and societal change that environmental humanities research has sought to explore.

On both coastlines, different types of political change and how the marine environment impacted or was impacted by it, played a significant role in the various narratives I collected. Accordingly, my work shares Worster's field-founding interest in how societal processes result in the "reorganization of nature" (1990, 1100, emphasis removed), along with the reorganization of society. Focusing on narratives and their representation, I am interested in how environmental change plays out through regime change and property, through economics or politics, and through various democratic processes. In this sense, my thinking is informed by scholarship in environmental humanities that has emphasized capitalist (Chakrabarty, 2014; Moore, 2017; Moore, 2018) and (post)colonial (Nixon, 2011; Chakrabarty, 2012; Davis and Todd, 2017) transformations of the planet. Thanks to the comparison between the Yorkshire and Bulgarian contexts, I think about these transformations' entanglement with the various political and economic regimes that have defined these contexts in recent history. Accordingly, for each of the two contexts, I draw on regionally relevant scholarship, for example analysis on economic deprivation and sentiments of being "left behind" in the UK (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and O'Heath, 2015) or work on postsocialist transition processes in Bulgaria (Giordano and Kostova, 2002; Ganev, 2007; Dorondel and Şerban, 2019). The symmetries between the two coastline's experiences, despite the rich regional specificity of each, help highlight some shared challenges and responses to coastal transformation in Europe in the Anthropocene.

Indeed, on both coastlines, I found that participants' political concerns also existed against wider reflections on democratic society and environment's role and place in it. Amidst their navigation of changing policy and new maritime uses, for instance, participants on the Yorkshire North Sea coast like Connor also reflected on what it meant to have a "stake" in the environment and debated who was entitled to claim such a stake (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). On the Bulgarian shoreline, meanwhile, participants like Dimitar or Kaloyan speculated on the length of time a society should inhabit a space as a democracy before it could learn to care for its environment (Dimitar, researcher, 2017; Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018). As different as the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts are, I found that they shared in the overarching challenges of environmental and societal change that environmentalist thought grapples with today. These concerns bridged environmental humanities' philosophical but pragmatically oriented take on change in the Anthropocene with conversations on "just transformations" that have recently been gaining ground in environmental policy studies and marine and coastal policy in particular (see Feola, 2015; Kelly et al., 2018; Patterson et al., 2018; Bennett et al., 2019; or Wesselink et al., 2020). With its interest in transformations as forms of "major, fundamental change" (Feola, 2015, 377) and the pressing need to consider social justice centrally as part of them (Patterson et al., 2018, 5-6; Bennet et al., 2019, 1), this literature shares

the interests of environmental humanities scholars in social and environmental change. I found this intersection reflected in how communities on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea conceived of their shoreline's transformations.

Given this overlap between the pragmatical and philosophical aspects of social and environmental change, the issue of representation—as it appears in literary theory but also in democratic politics—became an important focus in my thesis. It is an issue that has been central in much environmental humanities literature. My work is especially influenced by ecocritic and philosopher Rob Nixon and his analysis on the unequal forms of representation that different forms of environmental change receive (Nixon, 2011; Nixon, 2014). Many of the narratives I examined throughout my thesis highlighted failures of representation, focusing on aspects of each coastline's change that were ignored or obscured in dominant narratives. This is a concern close to what Nixon terms "slow violence" in his book *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor*: a violence that occurs "gradually and out of sight," with repercussions above all for those most likely to be rendered invisible by it (Nixon, 2011, 2). Nixon's concern in *Slow Violence* with environmental change on different temporal and spatial scales from those that usually occupy popular attention or the news cycle (Nixon, 2011, 17-18) resonates with narratives of invisible aspects of change I encountered on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coast. Nixon's book asks what strategies of representation can address the kinds of transformations and the elements of each transformation that elude established historiographies, narrative forms, or analytical capacities (Nixon, 2011, 13-15). For me, as well, these challenges of thinking across different temporalities and spatial scales are pertinent ones. I am interested not only in slow "violence" but more widely in the linked *transformations*, violent or otherwise, of human and nonhuman entities that together comprise the fabric of each coastline.

I am also explicitly interested in how each community reacts to these changes. Recent scholarship responding to Nixon, like Thom Davies' work on "slow observation" (Davies, 2018; Davies, 2019) or Christof Mauch's essay on "slow hope" (Mauch, 2019), has theorized possible ways of navigating slow violence either locally or on a global scale. When speaking to participants in each of the two contexts, I learned that they themselves had found their own pragmatic, rather than theoretical, solutions to narrate, make visible, and ultimately navigate their transformations. Often, I found that the coast was crucial to these solutions. Living on the coast, being recipient to its inherent dynamism as liminal space, seemed to give both communities a way of noticing invisible or obscured patterns of change and of envisioning alternative futures. In other words, how communities on the Yorkshire North Sea and the Bulgarian Black Sea perceived their shoreline seemed a vital component in their ability to make sense of and envision ways forward through their entangled transformations.

A maritime lens on the Anthropocene?

Indeed, the coast could well be an ideal point of departure from which to understand how communities narrate and navigate social and environmental change in the Anthropocene. In the introduction to her book *The Shifting Sands of the North Sea Lowlands,* literary scholar Katie Ritson refers to the Anthropocene as a "liminal moment", thereby situating the Anthropocene and the coast as equally productive intellectual spaces (Ritson, 2019, 14). I agree with her, and I would argue further that the liminality of blue space is best placed to define the Anthropocene, both temporally and conceptually. As I will show, the intimation of the Anthropocene—or at least an awareness prefiguring the Anthropocene—arrived earlier on the coast than elsewhere. As a result, I believe that coastal communities like the ones on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts can offer nuanced, perhaps even advanced perspectives on the challenges of navigating social and environmental transformations in the Anthropocene. Since the coastal setting itself also challenges scholars to expand their epistemological and methodological approaches, thinking *with* the coast and *about* the coast can offer new connections and insights about Anthropocenic change.

Although the actual impact of humanity might extend further backward through time, for me the Anthropocene itself ought to begin in the second half of the twentieth century, with the sudden realization that humans can affect the oceans on a large scale. In the maritime context, the shock from coming to term with the scope of human environmental impact came earlier than it did on land. For centuries, the oceans and "probably all the great sea fisheries" were believed to be literally "inexhaustible", as Thomas Huxley famously insisted in his inaugural address at the 1883 Fisheries Exhibition in (Huxley, 1883, 88). This argument, along with the claim that maritime space cannot be properly defended by nation states, had centuries earlier served to justify the establishment of the "freedom of the seas" as the world's dominant legal paradigm with respect to maritime space (Grotius, 1609). Notably, this belief of the oceans as inexhaustible not only reflected an abstraction of nature but also upheld a related geopolitical view. By rendering oceanic space both empty and abstract, a negative space, Western genealogy of thought could frame it as a site well suited to hosting the projections of various human abstractions. Similarly, if oceanic space was empty, it could be "filled" with the influence of global powers. As geographer Philip Steinberg has argued, the ambiguity and marginality of oceanic space made it an area where (predominantly powerful) actors could establish their own legal and political imperatives before advancing them on land (Steinberg, 2001, 196-7). Steinberg points, for instance, to the role that oceanic cartography in the sixteenth century played in defining the modern idea of the territorial state; or to the way that anarchists have used the sea as "a likely arena for developing new structures to govern social relations in land-space" (Steinberg, 2001, 191). Equally, in the seventeenth century, the "Battle of the Books" between Hugo Grotius's *Mare Liberum* (1609) and John Selden's *Mare Clausum* (1635)—a debate on whether individual states could and should control oceanic space—helped establish the entire tradition of modern international law (Steinberg, 1999, 369). Steinberg

interprets these histories not only from the perspective of a territorial political economy but also as part of a genealogy very much complicit in the constructs of nature as a socially exploitable entity (Steinberg, 2001, 200). In ways more concrete than "nature", ocean-space hosts global politics and law. But, Steinberg asserts, for this to become possible, maritime space had to be classified squarely as an "other" (Steinberg, 2001, 197).

The collapse of this construction proved impactful precisely because it refuted the abstraction and intangibility associated with the oceans. Technological and scientific advancement during the first and second world wars led to a rapid increase in both the scale of use and scientific understanding of the oceans (Rozwadowski, 2018, 151-161). In the space of only a couple of decades, the once "unfathomable" and "inexhaustible" oceans and seas came to be seen as not only accessible but also highly vulnerable to human impact (Rozwadowski, 2018, 105, 210-12). This shift played a formative role in the rise of contemporary environmentalist awareness; a fact reflected, as I will show in Chapter III, through Rachel Carson's engagement with the oceans and seas. The new awareness of the oceans' vulnerability also registered politically and legally, sparking a fundamental transformation in global governance of the maritime environment between the first (1958) and the third (1982) United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (Juda, 2001, 19). In the outcome of UNCLOS III, provisions about exclusive economic zones (EEZs), deep sea-bed mining, or states' continental shelf claims demonstrate in tangible terms humanity's reflexive knowledge about its long-term, planetary-scale impact (UNCLOS III, 1982). Thus, the knowledge that humanity could affect a blue expanse previously thought to be "inexhaustible" washed across societal and political consciousness as a practical and epistemological provocation decades before Crutzen and Stoermer's postulation of the Anthropocene. Given this blue history, I would suggest that the Anthropocene is an epoch marked not only by humanity's deep-time impact on the environment, but also by *humanity's conscious awareness of its own impact*. It is this reflexivity, the new necessity of thinking across temporal and spatial scales, rather than merely the impact itself, that for me marks the Anthropocene. The same kind of reflexivity, I would suggest, should mark Anthropocenic scholarship.

Other scholars working on the maritime from across the humanities and social sciences have argued the relevance of studying the oceans and seas for the world at large before me. In a very pragmatic sense, environmental historian Helen Rozwadowski notes that blue space accounts for not only three quarters of the planet's *surface* but also ninety-nine per cent of its habitable space in terms of volume (Rozwadowski, 2013, 138). Hence, she argues, oceanic scholarship prompts its practitioners to consider space in a different way (Rozwadowski, 2013, 138). Both Rozwadowski and others, like Steinberg and John Gillis, have highlighted the central role that the oceans, seas, and coasts played throughout human history (Steinberg 2001; Gillis 2012; Rozwadowski 2013). For scholars like Elizabeth DeLoughrey or Steve Mentz, moreover, the oceans can help us critically reflect on global dynamics like colonialism and capitalism precisely because they were the medium

that enabled them (Mentz, 2009; DeLoughrey, 2010). Thus, as sociologist Emilio Cocco has observed, taking a maritime vantage point can amount to a robust lens on world society and its changes more generally (Cocco, 2013, 13-15).

The mandate to think *with* maritime space, and further to think with its material specificity, has grown further in the last decade. Geographers Philip Steinberg and Kimberley Peters have proposed adopting "wet" and "more-than-wet" ontologies as an inspiration for scholarly thinking with flows, liquidities, and volume (Steinberg and Peters, 2015), or with changes of state (Peters and Steinberg, 2019). For Elspeth Probyn, the ocean is an argument for embracing complexity, contradiction, and even disorientation in our thinking—"[s]ometimes," she notes, "it's not bad to be all at sea" (Probyn, 2016, 23). And posthuman feminist Astrida Neimanis has adopted the fluidity of the oceans and water more generally to argue for "a watery embodiment" that emphasises liquid interconnections between humans and the nonhuman world over discrete individualism (Neimanis, 2017, 2-3). Like these scholars, I see in the coastal environment a departure point for thinking with flows, links, and change. At the same time, I find it equally important to remember, as Hester Blum writes, that "[t]he sea is not a metaphor" (Blum, 2010, 670). Through calls for blue economies, maritime space has been increasingly allocated, developed, and enclosed in very concrete terms—often, as geographers Gordon Winder and Richard Le Heron show, by relying on the same types of blue thinking (Winder and Le Heron, 2017, 4). Modes of thinking with the sea, Christopher Bear observes, have every potential of transforming into modes of *managing* the sea (Bear, 2017, 28-9) Maritime space thus bridges the metaphorical—human constructs—with the material. It connects the immediacy of environmental damage and (geo)politics with the affective and imagined of society, its cultures, and modes of meaning. It links multiple time scales.

Because of this, the coast offers unique opportunities for conceptualizing debates surrounding the material, social, and cognitive aspects of the environment. As maritime anthropologists Christer Westerdahl and David Berg Tuddenham have argued, the coast and maritimity more generally challenge human conceptualization of space or even ontology (Tuddenham, 2010; Westerdahl, 1992, 2007). To Westerdahl, the study of maritime culture is both superficially marginal and, precisely because of that, embodies "one of the bases for explaining cultural history in general" (Westerdahl, 2007, 191). Tuddenham goes a step further, working through the concept of maritimity against Latour's ideas of the process of purification (Tuddenham, 2010, 9-11; Latour, 1993, 10-12). He writes:

> In the construction of maritime archaeology and its landscapes, […] the dichotomy Land and Sea plays a similar role as the Nature-Culture dichotomy with the same mechanisms at play. […] Out of this heterogenous soup, a maritimity appears; consisting of quasi objects that

> have been sorted out and translated in the network and then placed at its proper pole (Tuddenham, 2010, 10-11).

Thus, Tuddenham questions whether studying the coast can bridge an actual a priori division between land and sea (geographically, physically, and culturally speaking), and suggests, conversely, that we ourselves create and maintain an ontological division, one that does not actually exist in the network (Tuddenham, 2010, 11). Thinking about maritimity, in other words, is for Tuddenham an epistemological exercise. Westerdahl, by contrast, argues that there are at least two shared characteristics that define maritime culture (Westerdahl, 2007, 203). The first involves "a preoccupation with directions, and combinations of time, direction and distance" (Westerdahl, 2007, 203; emphasis removed). For Westerdahl, therefore, thinking across temporal and spatial scales is a vital component of maritime culture. Maritimity, in this sense, involves an inevitable awareness of the constructs behind human measures. His second element of maritime culture, meanwhile, emphasizes the material links enabled by the sea: "a preoccupation with the natural landscapes, including the sea itself and its obvious combination with and extension to the underwater landscape," carried out through maritime communities' rich concepts of "boats, winds and the weather" (Westerdahl, 2007, 203; emphasis removed). In this second element, I see as especially important Westerdahl's recognition that the shore connects immediately reachable parts of the landscape with the environments that are inaccessible or at least invisible.

I would argue that both Tuddenham and Westerdahl are correct. Indeed, for me, the ambiguity about maritimity they together convey, and the possible discomfort associated with this ambiguity, is precisely what makes the coast such an intellectually productive context. Together, they essentially reveal the shore to be an Anthropocenic space: Tuddenham by highlighting its epistemological liminality; Westerdahl by showing this space to transcend scales and erase the distinction between human and nonhuman, visible and invisible. It is with their joint conclusions in mind that I begin to consider the utility of a blue lens on the Anthropocene. My thinking also draws on the works of Astrida Neimanis and Elizabeth DeLoughrey, both of whom have written in different ways about the maritime dimension of the Anthropocene. As my reading of Rachel Carson in Chapter III will help illustrate, Neimanis' postulation of "Anthropocene waters"—through which she emphasizes both how humans have affected the world's watery flows *and* how water highlights interrelations, including political ones (Neimanis, 2017, 161-174)—bears especial relevance to coastal communities' multifaceted experience of the Anthropocene. A maritime Anthropocene, therefore, can address not only conceptual questions about environmental change but also pragmatic concerns about policy and visions of governance. In this sense, I see my work to be in conversation with DeLoughrey's recent suggestion that "critical ocean studies" should engage with both questions of "fluidity, flow, routes, and mobility" *and* ones of military strategies, energy pursuits, and economic regimes maintained through the oceans (DeLoughrey, 2019, 21-24). With my thesis, I aim to contribute to these currents in maritime scholarship. Since Western

society's shift in understanding the oceans has already produced a whole new paradigm of legal and political thought, I argue that thinking about the Anthropocene through a blue lens could be productive in a similar way.

This maritime engagement with the material and epistemological concerns that emerge from communities amidst the Anthropocene informs my research questions. The first, *How has the coast mattered to the transformations each community has undergone and the contestations or crises they currently experience?*, situates my analysis of each of my two case studies—the Yorkshire North Sea and the Bulgarian Black Sea—within the environmental humanities tradition I have outlined above. In the interdisciplinary spirit of this tradition, throughout my examination of narratives from each context I aim to bridge environmental humanities theory with critical policy studies concerns about the ideas and visions of environment behind power and governance. In order to do so, my thesis relies on an interdisciplinary narrative analytical approach, which I describe in detail in my next, methodological, chapter. It is an approach intended to accommodate multiple types of narrative materials—interviews with participants, literature, archival documents, media pieces, and legal and political documents. Accordingly, in each context I examine a contemporary perspective along with a wider temporal frame: I collected interviews in 2017-2018 fieldwork but many of the narrative sources I study pertain to a longer period from about the 1950s onward. Through my work with these narratives, I examine both the transformations each coastline has experienced and the solutions that each community has conceived of in navigating its contemporary crises or contestations. By looking across these two shorelines at the end of my thesis, I draw conclusions about the shared experience of navigating environmental and social change on the contemporary European seashore.

My second question reflects on what these two case studies can reveal about the analytical and methodological potential of the coast. The maritime comparative perspective informs my decision to take a multi-sited, multi-material approach. As a result, my reading first of Rachel Carson's works and then of the narratives emerging from two unique coastal communities could be viewed as three distinct islands in the theoretical sea (so to speak) of my thesis. As I ask *what a "blue" perspective can offer environmental humanities scholars studying social and environmental change*, I embrace the potential shortcomings of this unconventional structure, hoping nevertheless to show that being out at sea, as Probyn writes (2016, 23), can also be theoretically productive. In this sense, I embrace environmental humanities' call to champion scholarship that "self-reflexively acknowledges and *even nurtures* its own contradictions, variances, and necessary open-endedness" (Neimanis et al., 2015, 69). Together, the three components I examine—my examination of Carson as an origin point for maritime environmentalist thought and the comparison between the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea—work towards developing the interdisciplinary maritime perspective on the Anthropocene, highlighting the links between the visible and invisible,

material and metaphorical, imaginative and political entanglements between society and the environment.

Guide to this thesis

The next chapter, Chapter II, "Methodology", explains in detail how I structured and conducted this project, focusing especially on the interdisciplinary narrative approach that underpins my analysis of spoken and written narratives from multiple sources. As part of this account, the chapter also outlines the grounded theory analysis and triangulation of perspectives that guided my selection of narratives. In this way, I clarify how specific narratives emerged for analysis from the combined evidence base of my interviews and textual primary sources in each of the two case studies.

Chapter III, "Rachel Carson and the shore of environmentalist thought", develops several key themes from the blue perspective I have outlined in this introduction, thereby situating my work on the coast and in maritime space more broadly. The bulk of this chapter relies on reading from Rachel Carson's major pieces—her trilogy on the sea (*Under the Sea Wind, The Sea around Us, The Edge of the Sea*) and *Silent Spring* (Carson, 1941; Carson, 1951; Carson, 1955; Carson, 1962). Examining Carson's works helps me centre the sea and the coastline as a productive theoretical context. Carson's writing is widely believed to have propelled the modern environmental movement, having inspired both legislation and disciplinary thought, but the importance of Carson's focus on the sea to that broader legacy is relatively underexplored. I illustrate how her thinking and her works captured not only the evolving scientific understanding of the oceans but also the concurrently developing realization that the sea—and the natural world more broadly—was not inviolable. Moreover, I show how Carson's engagement with the seas and coasts led her to reflect on themes that are still relevant today, like human place in the environment and the limits of human epistemology, different temporal and spatial scales, and the flows and interconnections underpinning environmental justice. In this way, my analysis of Carson serves as a useful departure for the links between material and metaphorical, political and constructed experiences I observe in each of my two fieldwork case studies. I argue that, just as they were for Carson and her thinking, the coasts and blue space more generally should be a pillar for contemporary environmental humanities thought.

If Carson lived through and recorded the mid-century paradigm shift in thinking about the oceans and seas, then the contemporary Yorkshire North Sea shore—the subject of Chapter IV, "Inheriting 'a paradigm shift in marine governance' on the Yorkshire North Sea coast"—embodies the resulting fundamental change in maritime governance and its far-reaching consequences for life on the coast. In Chapter IV, I present the narratives I collected through my fieldwork on the Yorkshire North Sea coast. The chapter opens with a series of contestations over the shoreline's

future. Most immediately, perhaps, participants expressed fears, hopes, and varying degrees of uncertainty in the wake of the Brexit outcome of the 2016 Referendum on Leaving the EU. Related to this, however, participants also conveyed to me a landscape of local tensions over the changing uses of Yorkshire's maritime space—notably the arrival of offshore wind farms and marine protected areas, which were often perceived to displace fishermen from their traditional grounds. Drawing on these narratives, I explore how the calls to "take back our fish" on the Yorkshire shoreline that had risen to prominence in months leading up to the Referendum were situated within a wider context of conflicting local visions about society on the coast. In tracing the link between these concerns and the paradigm shift Carson's works captured, I also visit local archival and textual materials pertaining to the Cod Wars, to the loss of long-distance trawling on the Yorkshire North Sea coast, and to the UK's fishing politics during the accession negotiations with the EU. Altogether, my analysis of participants' narratives and range of written primary sources explores how the paradigm shift in understanding the sea, along with the corresponding shift in ideas about who deserves to have a "stake" in it, affected just about every aspect of life on the Yorkshire North Sea coast: from policy and economics through regional and national identity, to pride in community, environment, and place. Towards its conclusion, the chapter also visits participants' concerns about the relationship between changing governance—including the advent of neoliberal ideas of austerity and growing state incapacity—and their community's emotive responses to its landscape.

Chapter V, "Fighting for dunes and democracy on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast", expands on the theme of state incapacity, but to do so, it crosses the European continent over to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast. On this shoreline, participants spoke to me at length about a prevailing sense of losing their coast to the rapid overconstruction that has supported the coastline's tourist-dependent economy after the end of socialism in 1989. To many participants in this context, witnessing how the environment had changed – for example the destruction of dunes and their replacement with "ghost cities" – was a traumatic experience in and of itself. Yet their emotive response to the shoreline's transformation was also indivisible from their societal and political observations, especially ones about state incapacity, legal ambiguity, and corruption. By examining narratives from this context, I learned about the ways that the myriad perceived failures of environmental governance, and particularly those that rendered certain problems invisible to the state, had poisoned social trust. Indeed, in reading archival materials and other primary written sources of narrative pertaining to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, I discovered that this interrelationship was inherited from the socialist regime's policies of controlling environment, society, *and* knowledge. As a result, like narratives I collected from the 1950s onward illustrate, an enduring vision of nature and the coastal landscape as a protest space emerged in this context. The chapter expands further on these themes, illustrating how environmental control through different forms of representation and its metaphorical or emotive consequences can transcend different

political and economic regimes. In its final section, the chapter recounts a belief many participants shared: that a community's longevity in a space can be a source for meaningful environmental stewardship. Thus, the narratives I examine on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore also engage with constructive ideas of hope over time.

Since Chapters IV and V form the empirical core of my thesis, my writing in each is more descriptive, centring the narratives participants shared with me, as well as those contained in the written primary sources I worked with. I return to the landscape of theory I have outlined here in the final concluding Chapter VI of my thesis, situating insights from the comparison between the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea shores alongside these wider academic conversations. By drawing out the themes of the maritime Anthropocene I define through my examination of Carson in Chapter III, Chapter VI charts several broad conclusions. The chapter summarises ways in which contemporary coastal communities—as illustrated by the two I have examined—are entangled with their environment in visible and invisible ways, fusing their pragmatic and material experiences (like policy change, loss of fishing, or shoreline urbanization) with the cultural and imagined, societal and emotive aspects of living on each coast (from pride in place to social fabric). I discuss the challenges of representation, which Carson also understood, and the ways in which concerns with and over representation play an important part in narratives on both the Yorkshire and Bulgarian coastlines. Taking the maritime inspiration to think with flows across space and time, the chapter also highlights how the similarities between both case studies point towards a critical consideration not of a specific economic or political regime but instead of social and environmental transformations in the Anthropocene more generally. I consider the tensions and (mis)alignments between the solutions participants in each context imagine for themselves, their community, and their environment. Finally, the concluding chapter outlines my thesis's contributions toward environmental humanities, critical policy studies, and blue scholarship and highlights the implications that this kind of research could have for the environmental and political issues faced by contemporary societies—on the coast and elsewhere.

Chapter II: Methodology

In line with the coast's liminality, my thesis takes on a hybrid, and specifically interdisciplinary, approach. My hybridity emerged above all as a response to the empirical contexts I studied: the Yorkshire North Sea and the Bulgarian Black Sea coasts. As I discussed in my introduction, I had chosen these two sites to function as two distinct and often contrasting illustrative cases (an approach I first learned from Ounanian 2016) for the wider social and environmental transformations coastal communities experience in contemporary Europe. I found, however, that these changes were multifaceted, spanning affective, political, material, and metaphorical experiences. To understand the transformations each community went through, therefore, I felt that I needed a hybrid approach. Aware of the broader discussions on the distinction between inter-, multi-, or transdisciplinarity in hybrid research (see, for example, Klein, 2010, 15-16 or Lury, 2018, 1), I settled for an interdisciplinary approach because of my focus on integrating, linking, and blending approaches across and between disciplines. More specifically, I decided to utilise insights from the social sciences – especially critical policy studies and the subfields of political ecology and discursive institutionalism – in order to trace the links between policy, power, and ideas on each coastline. But I also felt that humanities approaches, and particularly environmental humanities with its focus on the history of ideas of nature and on society's affective responses to environmental change (Rose et al. 2012; Neimanis et al. 2015), would fruitfully inform my reading of the dynamics I encountered in each context. For the overall theoretical or interpretative frame of my project, finally, I drew on a range of "blue" theories from across the humanities and social sciences (for example Westerdahl, 2007; Steinberg and Peters, 2015; Neimanis, 2017; Winder and Le Heron, 2017; or DeLoughrey, 2019; see the discussion in my introduction). This last layer of analysis played a role above all in the assembly of the thesis as a whole. In this chapter, I reflect on my experiences combining these overarching lines of scholarship in my analysis, focusing especially on the central methodology—the interdisciplinary approach I developed in order to work with narratives. I outline the reasoning behind my approach, how I constructed it, and where I encountered pitfalls in its implementation.

In order to address these different concerns and analyse the varying insights from each case study, I developed an interdisciplinary narrative approach situated between the social sciences and humanities. I chose to take narratives as my main "unit of analysis" (Yin, 2003, 24) and to develop an interdisciplinary approach in order to analyse them. Robert K Yin (2003) has argued that the right unit of analysis for a robust case study project should follow the definition of the problem. In my case, narratives seemed a logical choice for several main reasons. Firstly, focusing on narratives enabled me to draw on a range of materials, tracing the development of ideas about environment and society across them. In addition to collecting interviews with participants during

2017-2018, I was able to analyse historical documents, literature, media pieces, and official legal and political documents pertaining to events from the 1950s to the present. Secondly, analysing narratives allowed me to approach all these data sources on equal terms, and to let theoretical insights emerge organically along with the themes I encountered – that is, through a grounded theory analytical approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006). Thirdly, I was aware that narrative analysis occurs across the humanities and social sciences, and has been utilised in critical policy studies (see, for example, van Eeten, 2007 or Fischer and Gottweis, 2013), political ecology (for example Iengo and Armiero, 2017 or Barca, 2014), and environmental humanities (for instance Nixon, 2011, Iovino, 2018, or Cronon, 1992) alike. Choosing narrative analysis therefore helped me deploy an interdisciplinary research strategy, both in terms of theory and in practice.

Nevertheless, I encountered issues along the way. Hybrid and by extension interdisciplinary scholarship can often entail a series of practical and intellectual difficulties. This was very much my own experience. On the one hand, the strands of scholarship I was using have a history of overlap and cross-pollination, frequently interchanging theories, scholars, and insights. This makes them, in some ways, natural bedfellows. On the other hand, they can at times represent divergent epistemological alignments that create, as I discovered in practice, unexpected analytical tensions (I discuss this at more length, and by giving some practical examples, in the section entitled 'Narrative analysis and interdisciplinarity: navigating epistemological friction,' below). I very much felt, as Marco Armiero aptly states in *Environmental Humanities: Voices from the Anthropocene* (Armiero, 2016), that disciplines organise not only university building and offices "but the very reality that they should help understand" (46). To conduct interdisciplinary work, in other words, means to cross parallel realities. In this chapter, I outline how I navigated my own travel through the multiple realities of narrative analysis.

Designing an interdisciplinary project: on case comparison, grounded theory, selection, and triangulation

Comparative case studies and grounded theory analysis

In the simplest sense, my project is a comparative study examining ideas about environment and society evident in the narratives on two coastlines, the Yorkshire North Sea and the Bulgarian Black Sea. I chose a critical case study design with the view that deep empirical knowledge is central to human learning (Flyvbjerg 2006; Byrne and Ragin 2009; Flyvbjerg 2011). Since I wanted to understand how different ideas influenced the socio-environmental transformations experienced by communities on European coastlines, I determined on a comparative perspective with two illustrative, rather than representative, cases. After the practices recommended by scholars like Kathleen M Eisenhardt (1989, 537-538) or Robert K Yin (2003, 28-29), I chose cases that presented the characteristics I was interested in and yet offered

pronounced variation on these characteristics. With this structure, I wanted to draw on different ways of knowing and different outlooks on social relations with and within the environment evident on two distinct coastlines.

I chose to work with grounded theory partly because of the complexity of ideas and themes I observed from the beginning in each case study context and partly because it reflects my research philosophy orientation (somewhere between constructivism and critical theory, as defined in Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba, 2018). First described by Glaser and Strauss (1967), grounded theory approaches support flexible but systematic methods for collecting and analysing information (Charmaz, 2006, 2). When constructing grounded theory, as Kathy Charmaz (2006, 2) has argued, researchers analyse their data continuously from the beginning of research to the end, allowing insights to inform the ongoing selection and research process more generally. Grounded theorists aim to marry their analysis with the data rather than force preconceived notions onto it (Charmaz, 2006, 17). Charmaz highlights that there is always a tension in determining where grounded theory's purposive selection and iterative analysis stop and 'forcing' preconceived notions on to where the data begins (Charmaz, 2006, 18). As I will explain later in this chapter, I was very aware of this tension throughout my analysis, particularly because I felt that my interdisciplinary approach to reading narratives added to it.

Narrative selection and triangulation

Although fieldwork was a central component of my research, it was designed to function alongside the other (textual) primary sources of narrative I drew on. By relying equally on literature, media, and legal and policy documents as primary sources, I aimed to achieve a triangulation of perspectives as described by Uwe Flick (2018) in the latest *SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. What I was seeking was not to establish an objective truth—as Flick himself points out, triangulation in and of itself does not ensure objectivity (Flick, 2018, 779)—but, as per constructive and critical theory paradigms, the ability to understand, reconstruct, and critically examine the relative and historically situated realities in each case (Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba, 2018, 216-7). Triangulating sources allows for a fuller assessment and a deeper description of the dynamics in case studies (Flick, 2018, 796-799). In my research on the Bulgarian Black Sea and Yorkshire North Sea shorelines, triangulation also enabled me to determine which narratives expressed significant shared challenges, experiences, or opinions in each community.

At the same time, since I was analysing materials across geographical and temporal scales on each coastline, it was also important that I ensured thematic crossover in my data. To do so, I relied on purposive snowball selection for my narratives (Bernard, 2006a). As with other nonprobability sampling methods, purposive selection suits the design of critical case studies when they aim to describe complex socio-cultural phenomena (Bernard, 2006b, 189-191). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this sampling methodology functioned a little differently with participants and with

documents. With participants, the snowball approach was more straightforward. On each coastline, I began with one or two key contacts, who then directed me towards others to interview; I asked participants to recommend people who represented what they felt were important viewpoints in the context. This sampling methodology allowed me to collect narratives from a variety of groups. I relied on something similar to what Karen Farquharson (2005) has called the reputational snowball method: a technique that begins with individuals expected to be embedded in the networks studied and asks them to name others who are influential or otherwise seen as representative in their community. Those most frequently nominated are targeted first and foremost for interviews (Farquharson, 2005, 347-350). I adapted the method for my purposes, explicitly asking participants to name individuals who represented multiple perspectives (activists and members of NGOs, policy makers and representatives of local institutions, community members, and scholars) and seeking recommendations for individuals whose voices were perceived by participants as representative, influential, or insightful in each category. I then pursued the participants who had been named most frequently. When participants began naming individuals I had already spoken to, that indicated that I had reached a point of saturation. All in all, I spoke to thirty individual participants, twenty-nine of whom I recorded: fifteen in Yorkshire and fourteen (plus one entirely off the record) in Bulgaria.

I guaranteed participants anonymity for their responses. Accordingly, I refer to them using pseudonyms chosen at random (but as names appropriate to each cultural context). At the onset of each interview, I warned participants explicitly that despite the pseudonyms they may be recognisable by readers through circumstantial information or by other participants in the snowball chain. In addition, I gave everyone the opportunity to withdraw or amend any information they had given me for up to a month following the interview, although in the end nobody took advantage of the option. In the interviews themselves, a couple of participants made comments they requested me not to cite. I did not transcribe these comments and have not cited them. The English-language version of the information I gave to participants on the project and issues of confidentiality and anonymity is available in the Appendix to this thesis.

Interviews can be conducted in different ways, with different levels of control exercised by the interviewer on participants' responses (Bernard, 2006b). The more structured an interview, therefore, the more distinct a power dynamic is created between interviewer and participant – but, as Bernard observes (2006a, 213), rigidly structured interviews can hinder the sharing of lived experiences. For this reason, I designed my interviews to be less structured and more collaborative, in order to predispose participants to share their *narratives*, rather than simply respond to questions. To that end, I employed several guiding approaches. Firstly, I always invited participants to choose the location as well as the time of our interview, thereby predisposing them towards feeling comfortable. In practice, this meant that I took interviews in a wide range of locations representing different levels of comfort for myself: from individual and shared offices through less or more

noisy coffee shops to participants' homes; on one occasion, I conducted an interview sitting directly on a sandy beach. Secondly, I employed a semi-structured, open-ended interview methodology (Rapley, 2001; Bernard, 2006b). Along with soliciting responses on certain themes, I also gave participants leeway in introducing new topics and concerns I had not anticipated.

In addition, since I was interested in participants' narratives about their contexts, especially relating to how they perceived their own place and agency within them, I utilised an approach that Gubrium and Holstein (1998, 164) have called "reflexive interplay". By this, they refer to the duality in working with narratives: on the one hand, the fact that they do represent a version of reality; and on the other, the inevitable discursive change to reality that a narrative effects—a narrative never conveys "pristine" truth (Gubrium and Holstein, 1998, 164-5). As a result, Gubrium and Holstein define the work with interviews as one that examines *both* participants' reality beyond the interview encounter *and* the more subjective narrative reality co-constructed by interviewer and participant as part of the interview (Gubrium and Holstein, 1998, 164-5). For me, to borrow Svend Brinkmann's words, the interviews were "not an interaction between disembodied intellects but a joint accomplishment of vulnerable, embodied persons with all sorts of hopes, fears, and interests" (2018, 998). This meant that I viewed the interviews as not simply research instruments—a resource for information on the problem at hand—but also as social practices in which the "how" matters just as much as the "what" (Brinkmann, 2018, 1013-4). Given this perspective, I specifically aimed to encourage participants to emphasise their subjective personal experiences, asking them explicitly to share their reflections rather than merely factual information. I also viewed myself as a participant, albeit a primarily passive one, in the interviews.

When it came to narratives in written documents, my purposive selection was still systematic but also somewhat more flexible. In line with the continuous analysis recommended by grounded theory approaches (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 32) I selected and analysed documents both before and during my fieldwork. Thus, documents ranged from the themes I had originally identified for each case study to others that emerged over the course of my interviews with participants. Before my fieldwork, I usually began with a key word search leading to key documents. During fieldwork, participants sometimes sent me documents themselves. In addition, they frequently addressed particular policies, legal documents, reports, histories, or even pieces of literature as part of our interviews, in which case I pursued either the document they had mentioned or, if they had not referred to a specific text, I researched relevant materials from archives (most notably the Hull History Centre, the Bulgarian State Archive (Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви"), and the Open Society Archives' Digital Repository) and looked up media and literary pieces that I believed best corresponded to their reference. Both before and during my fieldwork, I followed the references documents made to other documents. I ended up reading a very wide base of documents, but participants' narratives

led the way in helping me determine which of these texts to incorporate in my final manuscript. Thus, my selection of documents was purposive but also flexible.

My use of the grounded theory approach meant that the triangulation and the purposive selection functioned together as part of an iterative process. Throughout my research, I was continuously analysing and recalibrating the thematic and theoretical insights I collected. My thinking progressed along with the work, and that impacted the narrative material that I sought. For example, my earliest interviews on the Yorkshire North Sea shore (where I conducted fieldwork first) reflected the initial, EU policy-oriented, interest of my project. The questions I asked were at first more tentative when it came to community dynamics but more detail-oriented when it came to policy decisions. It was throughout the Yorkshire North Sea fieldwork, however, that I came to understand better how shared memories and histories of fishing on this shoreline, as well as the rise and fall of other maritime industries, impacted the reception of marine governance policies and the ongoing debates around "taking back our fish" as part of Brexit. Within the space of a few interviews in my Yorkshire North Sea fieldwork, I knew to ask participants more detailed questions about those experiences and knew better which documents and archival materials to pursue in order to deepen my interpretation of their responses.

Narrative analysis and interdisciplinarity: navigating epistemological friction

Narrative inquiry in the social sciences

In the social sciences, as Chase (2018, 951) writes in her review of narrative inquiry for *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, narratives are often understood in terms of making meaning through the shaping and communicating of experiences, whether personal or shared. Thus, social science narrative inquiry tends to focus on examining how narratives constitute identities, either in a personal sense or in conversation across national, cultural, and institutional boundaries; and it is a mode of inquiry particularly interested in understanding conflicting societal contexts in which narratives arise (Chase, 2018, 954-977). In the individual subdisciplines or lenses that informed my approach, this focus took different forms. In political ecology, narrative inquiry meant tracing the power relations inherent to recurring ideas about environmental change and development across local and global scales (Robbins, 2004, 14-6).

This focus informed my work, for example, when I considered how participants on both coastlines spoke of certain environmental concerns or indeed entire communities as invisible to their government. Whether it concerned activists on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore claiming that institutions were hiding runoff pollution from the overbuilt resorts, or participants on the Yorkshire North Sea coast telling me how Brexit narratives of "taking back our fish" had granted small-scale fishing communities media attention for the first time in decades, my critical policy and

political ecology focus helped clarify the inherent relationship between narrative expression and power, as well as the complex relationship between socio-political reality, the actual content of ideas, and the way discourses and narrative interact in an institutional context (Robbins 2004; Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2015; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). This conceptualization of narratives helped me to trace how ideas had evolved on a political level in both contexts. In the UK, for instance, I was able to examine how fishing communities had been conceived in government as a politically expedient issue since at least the Cod Wars, and to trace connections between narratives utilised then and those employed by pro-Brexit campaigners in 2016. In Bulgaria, meanwhile, I traced how communities had defined the coastal environment as a dissident space in opposition to government policy during socialism and drew links to how this framing persisted in the contemporary context. In short, my reliance on discursive institutionalist notions of analysing narratives helped provide important contextual information on a governance scale and across a longer timeline.

Narrative inquiry in the humanities

In the humanities, however, narrative analysis often has an altogether different focus. Narrative theory has traditionally been understood as much more closely concerned with form (that is, the way something is expressed, as opposed to the content) and the origin of narration (that is, identifying who the narrator is or is not) (Genette, 1980, 26-7). More recently, narrative theory has also become associated with the application of different theoretical models to a narrative (Fludernik, 2009, 8-12). One reason I was working with environmental humanities was the subdiscipline's relative closeness to social science approaches, particularly its attention to power in representation (Nixon's 2011 *Slow Violence* is a well-known example). Even so, as a humanities subdiscipline, environmental humanities tend to engage substantially with both theory and form. An environmental humanities scholar might hence examine the narrative form for its layers of expression and look to complicate the reader's understanding of how aspects like "human agency, social and cultural formation, social change and the entangled relations between human and non-human worlds" (Rose et al., 2012, 2) are represented in the narrative.

For me, this meant that I paid additional attention to *how* participants spoke or how documents employed language. I would analyse not only individual words and their recurrence but also figures of speech and metaphors. Moreover, I would employ insights from environmental humanities theory, which highlighted different aspects from each narrative than the social science approaches I was using. For example, when narratives on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast described how a coastal salt lake or lagoon had been filled in to make space for holiday apartments, social science analysis enabled me to reflect on the different economic models or property regimes behind the change and to comment on their impact on the community. But environmental humanities made me attentive to language I encountered of the salt flats as a symbiosis. This

language, in turn, helped me to reflect on the way some participants viewed the salt flats transformation as a metaphor for the linked social and environmental change on the coast.

My approach toward interdisciplinary narrative analysis and epistemological friction

In my analysis, I fused these different social science and humanities approaches together. In order to do this, I first had to define what I meant by "narrative" in a way that would function for all my divergent sources. The definition I utilised comes from the work of prominent literary narratologist Rimmon-Kenan. She has suggested that a discourse could be considered a "narrative" if there is a *double temporality* associated with it (that is, a gap between the events described and the narrative that represents them) *and* there is also a *transmitting agency* involved (the events are mediated by an agency of some kind) (Rimmon-Kenan, 2006, 16). I chose this two-part definition as one that could apply to narratives as divergent as a participant relating their observations on coastal change, a writer or a journalist writing a literary or factual account, or even an institutional document outlining possible policy outcomes. In order to ensure overlap between the interviews and other materials I was analysing, I also chose to examine my interviews, in a sense, as textual artefacts. This meant that participant observation was not part of my methodology. I also did not consider nonverbal communication (for example gestures) in my analysis, except for when it was indivisible from the text (if a participant said, "Look over there," I would of course consider as part of my analysis where she pointed to). Finally, I analysed narratives obtained from different sources and materials together, seeking triangulation and thematic overlap as well as any inherent tensions between them.

Although all of the above amounted to a cohesive approach, the combination of multiple traditions in narrative analysis produced several epistemological tensions. For example, there was tension between the humanistic elements of my analysis and participants' daily contexts or ways of thinking. Whereas with certain texts (particularly literature or media) I could approach my interpretation in more humanistic terms, with others (i.e. legal and political documents) the emphasis on form and expression had to be more limited. Most importantly, in analysing the interview narratives, my aim was to represent participants' meaning truthfully. At the same time, I was drawing connections between all these documents, intending to strengthen precisely these theoretical connections: an analytical necessity given my project's goals but one that nevertheless distanced my research from the ways some participants conceived and communicated their most urgent concerns.

To illustrate some of the epistemological tensions I encountered, consider the following quote from my conversation with Georgi, a pseudonym for a Bulgarian civic activist whom I interviewed on the Black Sea coast in 2017:

> What is absurd is that we [our activist group] protect state property from being pillaged by the state itself. I mean, that's what we are doing. This place, they want to pilfer it, to rip it into pieces, to sell it out, we're actually fighting against the state to protect parts of the state […] [Local government] have allowed this Black Sea coast to be transformed into a slab of concrete. That's all. And now what kind of tourism are we going to have? Well, we are not going to have any tourism. Who wants to go to the beach and have a 30-meter [tall] hotel behind it? Well, no one wants to go. And when returning from the beach to have feet covered in cement and concrete because the concrete mixers are somewhere nearby, constructing, and everything, the sand isn't sand anymore, it's some kind of concrete dust. Well, this isn't tourism, this isn't tourism strategy, this is pillage (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

In analysing Georgi's words, in line with the social science tradition of narrative inquiry, I considered first and foremost the meaning he most plainly meant to convey: the perils of overconstruction on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, the incapacity or unwillingness of Bulgarian institutions and local power to defend the coastal landscape against predatory investment interests, and the resulting loss of the environment and tourist industry. By means of triangulating Georgi's account, I analysed documents like official statistics on rates of construction and tourist visits from the National Statistical Institute, legal documents outlining the provisions for construction in the area Georgi speaks about, including their various amendments and applicable legal challenges, as well as media pieces discussing these dynamics. These critical policy analyses allowed me to reflect on "classic" political and governance questions: for example, the extent to which legal ambiguity was complicit in enabling rapid landscape transformation and creating social discontent on the Black Sea coast.

At the same time, my work with environmental humanities theory and my approach to analysing narratives meant that I paid as much attention to *how* Georgi was speaking about these issues and the meaning he ascribed to them. I was attentive, for instance, to the material transformation Georgi describes above: from coast to "a slab of concrete", from sand to "concrete dust". I noted how he conveys this metamorphosis through a series of suspended denials (What tourism? No tourism. Who wants to go to the beach? No one wants to go—and so on), a discursive form that highlights Georgi's sense of "[w]hat is absurd". I noted also how Georgi connects this metamorphosis of sand and coast into concrete slab or dust to the concept of "pillaging". It was environmental humanities theory and its attention to form that enabled my interpretation that, to Georgi, the material transformation of the landscape took on a specific meaning of loss and fragmentation, a meaning underpinned by his visual and sensory experience of natural space transforming into concrete (note, for example, how Georgi speaks of having one's feet covered in

cement). Through my analysis, I saw emotive experiences like Georgi's as intrinsically linked to the political and governmental issues on the coastline. Georgi's feelings originated from the experience of witnessing landscape change along the Black Sea shore, but they coloured his responses to the shoreline's governance, causing him to see the state as a central actor in this "pillaging". In a wider sense, I was then able to situate Georgi's statement against historical and literary narratives on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast I had already examined, in which the coastal environment received a historic framing as a space for dissidence.

Insights like these, produced by the interaction of humanities and social sciences, underpinned my overall project. They allowed me to connect, for instance in the example above, problems of legal ambiguity and coastal governance to the emotive experience of landscape change. My work with "blue" scholarship, in turn, enabled me to reflect on these connections as an example of how coastal or maritime space helped Georgi make these transformations more immediately visible—as per the interpretation of Westerdahl's definition of maritimity (Westerdahl 2007, 206) I offered in the previous chapter. But these kinds of theoretical connections were also the source of tension with my analytical approach. While I believe the links I interpreted to be substantial, important, and definitely contained in Georgi's account, I also have no way of knowing which of them, if any, Georgi was deliberately suggesting in this instance. In the quote above Georgi speaks of the physical environment, of issues that urgently concern him. The wider meaning might be present in his words, but the interpretation of its meaning is mine. Moreover, because I was analysing materials continuously as part of my grounded theory approach, it is possible that I myself participated in how these meanings were constructed, not only in my interpretation, but also in the way that my conversation with Georgi went. Thus, we return to the tension Charmaz signposted between iterative analysis and the ability of preconceived notions to impact the research insights (Charmaz, 2006, 18). In my research, this tension was perhaps heightened by my interdisciplinary approach with narratives.

This tension is important with any narrative analysis approach. It is worth noting that the study of narratives comes preloaded with the analyst's interpretative agency. One inherent difficulty of academic representation, as Dipesh Chakrabarty reminds us (Chakrabarty 2000), is that it frequently risks replicating the very power relations it seeks to critique. How we select the narratives we analyse, and how we choose to interpret them, can easily prove to be just as flawed as the power relations performed by the narratives themselves in the first place. Awareness of this challenge does not make it easy to surmount. I certainly found this to be the case myself. Although I strove to design an iterative methodology that would enable different perspectives and agencies to inform my thinking, in the end my own interpretation remained the dominant voice, magnified through my presence in the interviews.

In this sense, my analytical approach also gets at some of the inherent epistemological tension between disciplines. Working with language and narrative is a tricky thing at the best of

times. On the one hand, language holds the key to our cognitive capacities; it is one of the few ways that we can interpret and understand what our senses communicate of the world. On the other hand, it is an imperfect lens, precisely because we are aware that it *is* a lens. As Timothy Morton has argued, the more abstract a creative project—the more it seeks to decenter the human perspective through radical re-telling,—the more language inevitably points to itself, highlighting, rather than bridging, the perceived distance between humans and their environment (Morton, 2007, 29-31). And the more we perceive our ideas of nature as constructed, the more we risk dismissing the very real social and material consequences of environmental change or degradation (Soper, 1995; Escobar, 1999). Worse, we risk deepening the alienation and sense of disconnect that stand at the root of so much environmental trouble. Over-reliance on language, therefore, leads to detachment from vital and pressing political, social, or environmental issues. These aspects of the human creative expression certainly complicate its role for an era so heavily marked by the damage precisely of human authorship. In thinking on contemporary human relationship with and within the environment, then, the acts of imagination and expression become significant ontological challenge in and of themselves.

Every research method comes with its shortcomings. The strategies I employed to deal with these tensions were embedded in my project's design: my reliance on multiple types of narrative, my fusion of different epistemological traditions, my attention to varying timelines, and even my ongoing effort to remain reflexive about my own practices. The very structure of my project made the tensions I have discussed here even more visible. In the end, however, it is through what I learned via these analytical and methodological strategies that I arrived at the insights I have drawn not only from each individual case, but also from my thesis as a whole.

Chapter III: Rachel Carson and the shore of environmentalist thought

This chapter takes Rachel Carson as a point of departure for examining the visible and invisible, imaginative and political, and material and metaphorical entanglements I observed on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts. Reflecting on Carson and how her understanding of environmental transformations was informed by her attention to maritime space allows me to theorize why the coast is a conceptually generative space for communities and theorists alike. My work with Carson hence informs the broader argument my thesis derives from the Yorkshire and Bulgarian coastlines about the utility of a maritime lens on the Anthropocene. Carson's works have already been regarded as "a wellspring of environmental thought" (Sideris and Moore, 2008, 3) and "a significant rallying point for environmental awareness around the world" (Mauch and Ritson, 2012, 7). She is admired for pursuing her visionary agenda whilst confronted with the scepticism and abuse of her contemporaries for being a woman, for not being affiliated with a university, and for her unconventional writing style (Lear, 1997, 206-10, 429-37). Although Carson first became a bestseller in the US with her books on the sea, *Under the Sea-Wind* (1941), *The Sea Around Us* (1951), and *The Edge of the Sea* (1955), today she is best known for *Silent Spring* (1962), her critique of the long-term impacts that herbicides and insecticides have on the health of humans and ecosystems. Despite drawing on a wide tradition of nature writing and being published in the midst of a cohort of scientific writers describing similar issues (Desrochers and Shimizu, 2012, 38-9), *Silent Spring* would go on to become *the* book to lead to environmentalist movements and legislation in the United States and beyond. Carson is seen today, for example by Rob Nixon, to have heralded "the shift from a conservationist ideology to the more socioenvironmental outlook that has proven so enabling for environmental justice movements" (Nixon, 2011, xi). As a result, she features in genealogies spanning the range between environmental humanities and environmental policy.

By comparison, Carson's "blue" perspective is less well-known. Yet Carson made a deliberate choice in situating the messages she wanted to convey first and foremost in the sea and on its edge. Further, the sea was pivotal to Carson's career. In a personal sense, the ocean shore was to her a formative landscape, a source of emotional solace, a life passion, and an inspiration (Lear, 1997, 40, 52-3, 80). As an expert for the US Bureau of Fisheries (the contemporary Fish and Wildlife Service), meanwhile, her career focused on communicating her scientific knowledge and love of the seas, oceans, and their shores (Lear, 1997, 79-88). It was through this work, as Linda Lear's biography details, that Carson found her way to writing for a wide audience—first through essays in venues like the *Atlantic Monthly* and later with her first book *Under the Sea-Wind* (Lear, 1997, 83-91). Carson's sea books were also pivotal for her later success. All three, but especially her second, *The Sea Around Us* (1951), tapped into a *milieu* of public excitement with the oceans as

a result of the popularization of scientific and technological discoveries made during the first and second world wars (Rozwadowski, 2018, 151-161). Environmental historian Helen Rozwadowski has shown that *The Sea Around Us* made Carson famous precisely because it capitalized on the author's professional knowledge and network to become the first popular book to share newly evolved oceanographic and marine ecology findings with the wider public (Rozwadowski, 2018, 200). In short, the sea gave Carson not only a private purpose but also a public reputation, experience translating scientific research into popular prose, and a grasp on a wealth of topics—all factors that contributed to the eventual success of her last and most famous book, *Silent Spring*. Perhaps more importantly, if *Silent Spring* was the one book Carson wrote that was not *about* the sea, there is evidence to suggest that the author's inspiration for the book had very much to do *with* the sea. Carson, as environmental historian Jenny Price argues, wrote her most famous book "out of the depths of heartbreaking disappointment and real anger that even her beloved sea is not inviolable…" (Price, 2012, 32). By way of evidence, Price quotes Carson herself, writing on Hiroshima three months before the publication of *Silent Spring*: "Surely the sea was inviolate and forever beyond man's power to change it… But I was wrong" (Carson, 1962, quoted in Price, 2012, 25). In other words, scholars like Price, Rozwadowski, and Lear suggest that Carson captured and sparked the vital mid-century shift in environmental awareness as a result of her engagement with the sea.

In this chapter, I build on these insights, exploring in more depth the importance of Carson's maritime perspective to her contribution to environmental thought. I first debate the impact that the shift in ocean knowledge had on Carson's work; next, I read Carson's works in conjunction with "blue" theory from marine social sciences and blue humanities. Carson's works still matter today because they captured an important shift in scientific understanding about human impact on the natural world, including and especially on the oceans—and further, because they captured the emotive and intellectual struggles associated with this shift. Perhaps because of this, Carson's writing about the sea could be seen to display the seeds for some of the themes we now debate in the Anthropocene. Carson understood, for example, the difficulties of human agency and the problems of representation when writing about the sea; she also reflected on problems of deep time, flows, and visible and invisible impacts. To illustrate this, I read Carson alongside several contemporary blue theorists. By doing so, I also aim to show that her attention to maritime space informed important insights in *Silent Spring*, and more generally that the blue lens could similarly offer scholars today helpful epistemological approaches toward thinking about the Anthropocene. By situating herself on the shore, Carson was able to link the visible with the invisible; the poetic, emotive, or imaginative with the political; and the material with the metaphorical. In later chapters, I take her example for my own readings of narratives on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts. By showing how the coast was a context

generative to Carson herself, therefore, I illustrate the rich ontological potential of maritime contexts for others working in environmental humanities and beyond.

A sea change: representing inviolable and violable natures

Carson's writing spoke to the scientific and technical oceanic advances of her age from the beginning. Her first popular piece, the short essay "Undersea" published 1937 in *Atlantic Monthly*, started life as the introduction to an US Bureau of Fisheries pamphlet (Lear, 1997, 81-88). Offering detail about intertidal zone rhythms, migratory fish life cycles, and even submarine tectonics (Carson, 1937), the piece is already indicative of Carson's active—both field-based and well-versed in concurrent advancements—grasp of marine science. Her later books drew even further on this expertise. In addition to her own training in zoology, Carson drew on years of correspondence and visits with scientists at Woods Hole (the first in 1929) for her sea books (Lear, 1997, 120). By the time she wrote *The Sea Around Us*, therefore, she was capitalizing on an emerging wealth of scientific understanding in the wake of wartime research and technological advancements (Rozwadowski, 2018, 151-161). In particular, the increased use of submarines and aircraft carries during both world wars spurred a spike of research into the oceanic environment and its interaction with the atmosphere (Rozwadowski, 2018, 152). The wars also led to the increase and industrialization of global fishing as repurposed wartime vessels and purpose-built factory ships were dispatched across the world to address food shortages; fish population science and global catch alike ballooned (Rozwadowski, 2018, 155-8). Meanwhile, Rozwadowski writes, the ocean's depths were regarded as a science-technical frontier on par with the space one (Rozwadowski, 2018, 164). From the late 1930s onward, underwater movies, explorations by scientists-divers like William Beebe—whom Carson knew personally and consulted with for her works (Lear, 1997, 161-3)—and the rising popularity of recreational diving had opened a public appetite to learning about the undersea (Rozwadowski, 2018, 189-197). *The Sea Around Us*, published right in the midst of this oceanic excitement, speaks in its opening chapter directly to humanity's growing efforts and successes to sound the sea "mentally and imaginatively" (1951, 14):

> [Man] built boats to venture out on its surface. Later he found ways to descend to the shallow parts of its floor, carrying with him the air that, as a land mammal long unaccustomed to aquatic life, he needed to breathe. Moving in fascination over the deep sea he could not enter, he found ways to probe its depths, he let down nets to capture its life, he invented mechanical eyes and ears that could re-create for his senses a world long lost (1951, 14-5).

Carson, therefore, was both aware and responding to the sea's increasing accessibility to human society. At the same time, *The Sea Around Us* also records her conviction, manifestly still steadfast,

that "[man] cannot control or change the ocean as, in his brief tenancy of earth, he has subdued and plundered the continents" (1951, 15). Whereas on land humans feel hubris in admiring the scale of their impact, Carson continues, out at sea the receding horizons and the passage of stars at night remind humanity of its transience "in this world of water" (1951, 15). In a sense she still wrote in the tradition of Thomas Huxley's "inexhaustibility" thesis. Indeed, on at least one occasion her work was compared to Huxley's naturalist writing (Lear, 1997, 206).

Carson also wrote in a context of already evolving environmental thought. Her books, especially her sea trilogy, followed a pre-existing tradition of nature writing that sought to imaginatively reinstate individuals into the nonhuman environment and restore them to a sense of spiritual comfort that seemed to have been erased by industrialisation and scientific discovery (and especially Darwinian discourses of evolution and survival of the fittest) (Worster, 1977, 23-24). Many of these nature writers, including figures like Henry David Thoreau, John Burroughs, and John Muir, worked to create a new mythology and ethos grounded in science; this mythology often replicated Arcadian ideals of nature (Worster, 1977, 16, 59). Carson's practice, too, often leaned toward describing physical phenomena and scientific fact in the language of high myth, as in these opening passages from *The Sea Around Us*:

> Those who believe that the moon is a child of earth say that during an early stage of the earth's development something happened that caused this rolling, viscid tide to gather speed and momentum and to rise to unimaginable heights […] a great wave was torn away and hurled into space […] From the moment the rains began to fall, the lands began to be worn away and carried to the sea […] And over the aeons of time, the sea has grown ever more bitter with the salt of the continents (1951, 3-4).

Like the nature writers who influenced her, then, Carson articulated the wonder of the environment and the scientific knowledge that she wished to convey in the language of fables or even religion. Her poetic language, and its capacity to simplify and synthesise scientific literature through a highly digestible lyrical prose, were a key part of her voice as a writer from her very first book onwards (Lear, 1997, 104).

Carson's lyricism, and the apparent Arcadianism that goes with it, have prompted some critics to doubt her relevance for contemporary concerns. From a postcolonial perspective, literary critic Hedley Twidle observes, the "apparent simplicity and even naïveté" of Carson's prose rest uneasily "in a place where natural history has so often involved a silencing of social history" (Twidle, 2014, 58). Whereas Carson had to surmount the challenge of her "rhetorical newness", Twidle observes, in the Anthropocene we combat our "rhetorical exhaustion", particularly in contexts where political bitterness renders the lyricism difficult to buy into (Twidle, 2014, 52). The context of the Anthropocene prompts another of Carson's recent critics, environmental historian

Jenny Price, to argue that Carson's lyrical prose upholds a troubling division between humanity and nature, making Carson "one of our great apostles for the oh-so-problematic *idea* of nature as a timeless refuge from the relativism and vicissitudes of the human world" (Price, 2012, 28, emphasis her own). To Price (2012, 28), Carson is a key reason why this idea became lodged deep into modern environmentalism.

Carson's prose, at least on the surface, frequently does frame nature as a timeless refuge. Compared to the oceans, she reminds us in *The Sea Around Us*, "the existence of the race of men has occupied a mere moment of time" (Carson, 1951, 15). In *The Edge of the Sea*, similarly, Carson writes of the human being as out of place, "an uneasy trespasser" on the shore: "he [*sic*] punctuates the night with the complaining groan and grunt of a foghorn, sensing the power and menace of the sea" (Carson, 1955, 249). In line with traditional nature writing's search for "an alternative world *and* an alternative science" (Worster, 1994, 20), Carson's reverence for the oceanic nature frequently sought to provide imaginary respite from the all-too-real industrial day-to-day. The author herself admitted, for example in a letter to her close friend Dorothy Freeman, that emotion and childhood affection influenced her writing:

> [I]f there is any simple explanation I think it is that my sensory impressions of, and emotional response to, the world of nature date from earliest childhood, and that the factual knowledge was acquired much later. I had no formal training in biology for example, until my second year of college, yet I had felt at home with wild creatures all my life (Carson, letter to Dorothy Freeman on 28 September 1953, in Freeman, 1995, 7).

Moreover, this "love affair with nature", as Carson's biographer Linda Lear has argued, also served as "a substitute for the intimacy of the more conventional relationships of childhood and adolescence that she never had" (Lear, 1997, 26). As historian of science David K Hecht has recently written, "Carson had a vexed relationship with modernity", a tension that came through even in her later work, including *Silent Spring* (Hecht, 2019, 563). Thus, it is possible to see why scholars like Price, Twidle, and Hecht have sought to reflect on the more complicated and not only the lauded aspects of her environmentalism.

To others, however, Carson remains relevant. Far from seeing Carson as an "apostle" of nature-as-refuge, some of environmental humanities' key scholars have pointed to her works as the origin point for politically engaged environmentalism. When it comes to environmental justice, ecocritic Lawrence Buell argues, "American environmental writing effectively starts with Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*" (Buell, 2005, 211). In essence, Buell explains, Carson both embodied and prompted an important transition in nature writing and environmentalism: her work moved from more traditional, Arcadian terms, toward attention toward hybrid natures and societies, situated

amidst urban and degraded as well as rural landscapes (Buell, 2005, 22-25). Key to Carson's progression, Buell argues, is "the discovery that there is no space on earth immune from anthropogenic toxification" (Buell, 2005, 41). In his evaluation of Carson, therefore, Buell comes quite far from Price's critique. A similar view of Carson as a politically engaged writer comes from Nixon, who takes Carson as one of his inspirational figures for *Slow Violence* (Nixon, 2011, ix-xii). Like Buell, Nixon expresses an opinion of her as someone who "helped hasten the shift from a conservationist ideology to the more socioenvironmental outlook that has proven so enabling for environmental justice movements" (Nixon, 2011, xi). Further, Nixon sees in Carson's work an innovative lens on time and more specifically on the temporality of environmental damage due to her focus on telling "slow-moving stories about the long dying" (Nixon, 2011, 232). He argues that this focus, along with its aim to expose toxicities hidden by industry and politics, renders Carson's work relevant for speaking to issues of power even in contexts she herself did not directly address—for example in postcolonial settings (Nixon, 2011, xi). Nixon's estimation of Carson, hence, presents a very different view than that of Twidle's.

In the paragraphs above, I have attempted to illustrate some of the tension in how Carson's works have been interpreted: whereas some, like Buell and Nixon, see her prose to have introduced important political concerns to nature writing and environmentalism, others like Twidle and Price argue that Carson reinforced problematic nature-culture dichotomies. However, it is important to observe that to a large extent this tension comes from Carson herself. Not only did her thinking change in the two decades between *Under the Sea-Wind* (1941) and *Silent Spring* (1962), but that change reflected the evolving scientific understanding about the oceans and seas that she was a contemporary to and that she aimed to convey. The most significant piece of Carson's growing understanding – that humanity *could* affect the planet on a wide scale – was not yet fully evident in her earlier works but impacted her thinking significantly by the time she wrote *Silent Spring*. Thus, as I will illustrate in the next few paragraphs, the tension between different interpretations of Carson's work reflects the still-evolving science she was attempting to capture, as well as the conflicting emotions she herself admitted to feeling about some of this emerging knowledge.

Carson tended to work with the latest science available to her and often grappled with scientific uncertainty. "As I look over it," she wrote once of *The Sea Around Us*, "my text seems to be so full of expressions like 'perhaps'—'some scientists believe'—'it may be'—'we do not know'" (Carson, letter to James E Bennett on 1 November 1952, cited in Lear, 1997, 228). Several near misses on climate change in *The Sea Around Us* and *The Edge of the Sea* show her to have been well-versed with her contemporary advancements. Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, various pieces of what we now know to be the global climate puzzle—from the effect volcanic ash could have on the planet's temperature through ideas about the biosphere to knowledge of the oceanic currents system—had been individually theorized but not linked to each other (Weart, 2003, 12-9). As a chapter entitled "The Global Thermostat" in *The Sea Around Us*

demonstrates, Carson had a good grasp on early scientific knowledge about the ocean's effects on the atmosphere: "For the globe as a whole," she wrote, "the ocean is the great regulator, the great stabilizer of temperatures" (Carson, 1951, 170). She was also a contemporary of Guy Stewart Callendar's earliest theorization for the global atmospheric effects of CO_2 in the late 1930s (Edwards, 2011, 77). Callendar's 1938 theoretical model—which indicated a global temperature rise of 0.3°-0.4°C on average from 1890 to 1935—had been received with scepticism by the majority of contemporary climatologists, for many of whom the climate was still a relatively fixed and geographically localized feature rather than a planetary system (Edwards, 2011, 77-80). Nevertheless, Carson's later two sea books captured glimpses of the effects Callendar predicted. In the *Edge of the Sea*, for instance, she wrote of the alteration in a species' distribution that "is, of course, related to the widespread change of climate that seems to have set in about the beginning of the century and is now well-recognized—a general warming-up noticed first in the arctic regions, then in subarctic, and now in the temperate areas of northern states" (1955, 23). In *The Sea Around Us*, meanwhile, she observed, "We live in an age of rising seas" (1951, 97); and further: "Now in our own lifetime we are witnessing a startling alteration of climate […] the evidence that the top of the world is growing warmer is to be found on every hand" (1951, 180-2). Naturally, she was not prescient and reflected novel knowledge only to the extent that it was then available. Despite her acute observations about changing temperatures and sea level rise, Carson also wrote lines that framed these occurrences as fragments of age-old patterns. This is particularly evident in *The Sea Around Us*, where she observed of sea level rise: "What is happening is nothing new. Over the long span of geologic time, the ocean waters have come in over North America many times and have again retreated into their basins" (1951, 97). Even as she observed that there was something different about the contemporary pattern—"what we are experiencing now is perhaps a climatic change of shorter duration, measurable only in decades or centuries" (Carson, 1951, 184)—Carson still plainly saw the ocean as beyond human tampering, a matter of "the pendulum […] swinging" (1951, 184).

If knowledge about climate change would take longer to become widely accepted in academic circles, the fact that humanity could impact the oceans and seas *would* become scientifically evident within a decade of these words. By the revised 1961 edition of *The Sea Around Us*, in a preface dated October 1960, Carson was writing directly about this fundamental change. Back in 1951, she writes, she had reflected an emerging science that had "beg[u]n to show that many of the old conceptions of the sea were faulty […] But [the new picture] was still like a huge canvas on which the artist has indicated the general scheme of his grand design but on which large blank areas await the clarifying touch of the brush" (Carson, 1961, vii-viii). Now, however, she addressed herself to a new awareness:

> […] there has long been a certain comfort in the belief that the sea, at least was inviolate, beyond man's ability to change and to despoil. But this belief, unfortunately, has proved to be naïve (Carson, 1961, xi).

She was writing, here, about the possibility of toxic pollution from the ocean dumping of radioactive waste: she worried that "[o]ceanographers say they can make 'only vague estimates' of the fate of radioactive elements introduced into the deep ocean" (Carson, 1961, xii). But the preface concludes with an awareness that would become important in *Silent Spring*, namely that flows and interconnections can carry toxins back into human bodies. The sea, she observes in the last few lines, plays a special role in this realization:

> It is a curious situation that the sea, from which life first arose, should now be threatened by the activities of one form of that life. But the sea, though changed in a sinister way, will continue to exist; the threat is rather to life itself (Carson, 1961, xiii).

And these themes are carried directly into *Silent Spring*, published only a year later. In this most famous book, Carson takes for granted that "within the moment of time represented by the present […] one species—man—acquired significant power to alter the nature of his world […]" (1962, 5). Similarly, in *Silent Spring* Carson's sea is no longer beyond reach or in any way separate from human impact on land: "The most alarming of all man's assaults upon the environment is the contamination of air, earth, rivers, and sea" (1962, 6).

There is evidence to show that these realizations had a profound effect on Carson. She struggled to respond, both intellectually and emotionally, to the realization that the seas—and nature more broadly—were *not* a refuge from humanity. In a 1958 letter to her close friend and confidante Dorothy Freeman, Carson addressed the tension between her emotive and intellectual responses directly:

> I have been mentally blocked for a long time, first because I didn't know just what it was I wanted to say about Life, and also for a reason more difficult to explain. Of course everyone knows by this time that the whole world of science has been revolutionized by events of the past decade or so. I suppose my thinking began to be affected soon after atomic science was firmly established. Some of the thoughts that came were so unattractive to me that I rejected them completely, for the old ideas die hard, especially when they are emotionally as well as intellectually dear to one. It was pleasant to believe, for example, that much of Nature was forever beyond the tampering reach of man […]
>
> These beliefs have almost been part of me for as long as I have thought about such things. To have them even vaguely threatened was so shocking

> that, as I have said, I shut my mind—refused to acknowledge what I couldn't help seeing. But that does no good, and I have now opened my eyes and my mind (Carson, letter to Dorothy Freeman on 1 February 1958, in Freeman, 1995, 248-9).

According to Carson's own admission, therefore, her writing had once sought to reassure readers, and perhaps herself, about the inviolability of nature and the sea. At the same time, her words to her friend indicate how the emotional struggle to accept the scale of human impact on the environment had affected her "for a long time." Carson's work evolved through her career, reflecting her grappling with both new scientific findings and their implications for her worldview. Just as she worked with the latest science available to her, causing her to grapple with scientific uncertainty, Carson worked also with the latest tools for thought available to her, grappling with the resulting philosophical uncertainties. Undercurrents or at least precursors of her struggle to accept the violability of nature to human impact were hence already present in her earlier books.

The conceptual difficulty Carson faced with this new perspective on the oceans matters for several reasons. For one, it provides context for the experiences of communities on the Yorkshire North Sea coast, which I will detail in the next chapter. There, I will highlight how the paradigm change in thinking about and governing the oceans post UNCLOS III cut across the coastline's societal fabric, producing tensions over maritime space that still reverberate today. Paying attention to the contradictory or at least multivalent environmentalism Carson inspired as a result of grappling with this evolving perspective of the sea helps show that the change was one of thought and imagination, as well. Moreover, it is possible to show that many of the themes Carson expanded on in response to her new awareness—themes such as the need for humility rather than hubris in the face of the environment, or the interconnections between environment and society—emerged from concerns she had previously engaged with on the edge of the sea. In the second half of this chapter, I highlight the ways in which these themes evolved through Carson's writing about the sea and culminated in *Silent Spring*. By learning to think with the sea, Carson not only came to reflect on philosophical subjects like human place in the environment, but also developed the political engagements that later led scholars like Buell and Nixon to see her work as enabling modern environmental justice movements. Through Carson, therefore, I show how blue thought can bridge the imaginative and the political in ways that, in later chapters and especially toward the end of this thesis, impacts my analysis of the narratives I encountered on the Yorkshire and Bulgarian shorelines.

Carson on the coast and the maritime Anthropocene

(Dis)placing humans in the environment: maritime time, space, and knowing

One of the strongest recurring themes throughout Carson's writing, evident from some of her earliest prose, is her urge to query human place in the environment. Vitally, her reflections on the subject frequently tend to be prompted specifically by the encounter with the sea. For confirmation, we might look to her literary debut, "Undersea" – a piece originally intended for a 1936 Bureau of Fisheries brochure but, proving too lyrical for the purpose, ended up being published in 1937 in the *Atlantic Monthly* (Lear, 1997, 81-82). From the essay's opening lines, Carson highlights how marine space evades and even dissolves human perception:

> Who has known the ocean? Neither you nor I, with our earth-bound senses, know the foam and surge of the tide […] Nor can we know the vicissitudes of life on the ocean floor […] Even less is it given to man to descend those six incomprehensible miles in the recess of the abyss, where reign utter silence and unvarying cold and eternal night.
>
> To sense this world of waters known to the creatures of the sea we must shed our human perceptions of length and breadth and time and place (Carson, 1937, 63).

Even in this early piece, Carson frames the effort to know the ocean as an experience that collapses human ideas of time and space. Through her attention to the immemorial, invisible, and unreachable, her thinking might be seen to exemplify the "preoccupation with directions, and combinations of time, direction and distance" that Christer Westerdahl identifies in maritime communities (Westerdahl, 2007, 203; emphasis removed). At the very least, the highlight both Carson and Westerdahl place on thinking about *time* and *space* is not coincidental. For Westerdahl, maritime space offers a provocation to think about scales that extend beyond the human temporal or spatial human experience; and it is a provocation, in his words, that lingers in the collective mind (Westerdahl, 2007, 203). For Carson, her focus on decentring the human notwithstanding, the provocation of maritime space works in a similar way. Equally, her engagement with questions of epistemology—how might one know the sea?—speaks directly to what Steinberg and Peters have much more recently termed "wet ontology": "a means by which the sea's material and phenomenological distinctiveness can facilitate the reimagining and reinventing of a world ever on the move" (Steinberg and Peters, 2015, 248). Maritime space enables in Carson, indeed, a specific way of thinking about human knowledge and scale that helps her reconceive of what she would like human relationship with the world to be.

If this tendency is already present in her 1937 essay, it becomes even stronger in Carson's books. From the earliest, *Under the Sea-Wind* (1941), Carson's urge to decentre human thinking

leads her to insist that the sea exerted its own agency to impose itself as the overarching arc of any story she could produce: "the sea itself must be the central character whether I wished it or not; for the sense of the sea, holding the power of life and death over every one of its creatures from the smallest to the largest, would inevitably pervade every page" (1941, 3). The central role of the sea and of its ecological realities, in turn, leads Carson to a reflection on the different kinds of nonhuman time this "character" raises for her readers:

> To get the feeling of what it is like to be a creature of the sea requires the active exercise of the imagination and the temporary abandonment of many human concepts and human yardsticks. For example, time measured by the clock or the calendar means nothing if you are a shore bird or a fish, but the succession of light and darkness and the ebb and flow of the tides mean the difference between the time to eat and the time to fast, between time an enemy can find you easily and time you are relatively safe. We cannot get the full flavor of marine life—cannot project ourselves vicariously into it—unless we make these adjustments in our thinking (1941, 5).

In the paragraph above—to borrow from Steinberg and Peters' discussions of "wet ontology"—the maritime temporality Carson describes is a fluid, "real-time" subversion rather than a *longue durée* (Steinberg and Peters, 2015, 258). In otherwise, it is a wet ontology for temporality derived from the rhythms of light and tide. But by following the ocean's materiality throughout *Under the Sea-Wind*, Carson also widens her readers' temporal scale to measures of time that are literally geological:

> As the waiting of the eels off the mouth of the bay was only an interlude in a long life filled with constant change, so the relation of sea and coast and mountain ranges was that of a moment in geologic time. For once more the mountains would be worn away by the endless erosion of water and carried in silt to the sea, and once more all the coast would be water again, and the places of its cities and towns would belong to the sea (Carson, 1941, 162).

Similar ideas of an eternal sea are present in *The Sea Around Us* (1951) and *The Edge of the Sea* (1955). In her second novel, Carson juxtaposes human perspective to maritime temporality more explicitly, drawing on ancient Greeks beliefs that the ocean is "an endless stream that flowed forever around the border of the world, ceaselessly turning upon itself like a wheel, the end of earth, the beginning of heaven. This ocean was boundless; it was infinite" (Carson, 1951, 199). Despite the extensive history and experience of sea voyaging humanity have acquired ever since, she observes, this wider meaning remains: "all at last return to the sea—to Oceanus, the ocean

river, like the ever-flowing stream of time, the beginning and the end (Carson, 1951, 212). In charting this perspective of the all-encompassing sea, Carson highlights the ocean's supra-human scales in terms of not only time but also space: as the title of the book suggests, the sea is literally *around us*, "a water world" that, even as we learn to partially access through mechanical means, remains also largely beyond us (1951, 15). *The Edge of the Sea* repeats these kinds of provocations. Like earlier books, it makes references to geologic eras ("in the hidden chamber of that pool, time echoes down the long ages to a present that is but a moment", 1955, 123). And once again, Carson reflects here on the sea's dissolution of human time and space—the shore lending her "an awareness of the past and of the continuing flow of time, obliterating much that had gone before, as the sea had that morning washed away the tracks of the bird (1955, 6) and of the links between different shores across the world, "made one by the unifying touch of the sea" (1955, 249).

Although, as I have discussed in earlier sections, *Under the Sea-Wind*, *The Sea Around Us* and *The Edge of the Sea* maintain Carson's belief in the oceans' inviolability, the undercurrents of change are already there in the conclusions she draws from her more-than-human sea, which are much more complex. Rather than simply promoting a kind of nature piety in response to the immensity of the sea, throughout her books Carson writes repeatedly of the necessity of challenging human epistemologies. This is particularly evident, for example, in a passage from *The Sea Around Us*:

> Man, in his vanity, subconsciously attributes a human origin to any light not of moon or stars or sun. Lights on the shore, lights moving over the water, mean lights kindled and controlled by other men, serving purposes understandable to the human mind. Yet here are lights that flash and fade away, lights that come and go for reasons meaningless to man, lights that have been doing this very thing over the eons of time in which there were no men to stir in vague disquiet (1951, 34).

The excerpt above also demonstrates that for Carson, the "vanity" associated with human perception and interpretation of the world is a key point of contention. This point, as she wrote to her friend Dorothy in 1958, would remain vital even—and perhaps more so—in a world of violable natures: "I still feel there is a case to be made for my old belief that as man approaches the 'new heaven and earth'—or the space-age universe, if you will, he must do so with humility rather than arrogance" (Carson, letter to Dorothy Freeman on 1 February 1958, in Freeman, 1995, 249). In response, as the trilogy progresses, Carson reflects repeatedly on what is beyond, or what is invisible to, human vanity. This tendency would yield important insights throughout her work, leading her to circumvent existing patterns of representation. Although it was in *Silent Spring* that Rob Nixon would find inspiration from Carson's concern with "the dubious finding of partitioned knowledge" and "obfuscatory language" (Nixon, 2011, xi-xii), her attention to what is hidden or invisible is already evident in earlier books: "Even more than the visible life," she states in *The Edge of the Sea*, "that which was unseen came to dominate my thoughts, and finally the invisible throng

seemed to me the most powerful beings in the pool" (Carson, 1955, 117). Carson's attention to the invisible and the unseen is therefore enabled by her thinking with the sea. This point is important to my work because, as I will show in later chapters of this thesis, maritime space functions in a similar way for communities on both the Yorkshire and Bulgarian shorelines.

By the closing chapter of *The Edge of the Sea*, Carson's thinking strives to weave these different strands—her attention to nonhuman time and spatial scales, to visible and invisible elements of representation—together:

> Hearing the rising tide, I think how it is pressing also against other shores I know […] Then in my thoughts these shores, so different in their nature and in the inhabitants they support, are made one by the unifying touch of the sea. For the differences I sense in this particular instant of time that is mine are but the differences of a moment, determined by our place in the stream of time and in the long rhythms of the sea (1955, 249).

In my introduction, I outlined how environmental humanities scholarship has framed the Anthropocene as a challenge to epistemology. However, in the paragraphs above I have tried to illustrate that to some extent this epistemological difficulty preceded Crutzen and Stoermer's postulation of the Anthropocene—and that it was already becoming evident to Carson as she reflected on human place in "this world of water" (1951, 15). In doing so, I have tried to illustrate that—just as she wrote at the cusp of scientific knowledge about the oceans available to her at the time—Carson found at the edge of the sea philosophical queries very similar to those that would yield the concerns later voiced by Anthropocene thinkers. More importantly, perhaps, the themes that she encountered as a result came to influence key insights throughout her writing.

Flows, interconnections, and environmental justice

Side by side with her challenges to human place in the world and epistemology, throughout her works Carson also expands on a theme of flows and interconnections between humans and the nonhuman world. This is also a theme she derives from the material reality of the sea. As early as her 1937 "Undersea" essay, she observes poignantly that "to the sea's children nothing is so important as the fluidity of their world" (Carson, 1937, 63). In *The Sea Around Us*, she emphasizes how society is entangled with the oceans, pointing to the way that commerce, weather, and even the material make-up of continents in the form of eroding land flows continuously between land and sea (Carson, 1951, 212). *The Edge of the Sea* begins with Carson's "strong sense of the interchangeability of land and sea in this marginal world of the shore, and of the links between the life of the two" (1955, 6). In the preface to the 1961 edition of *The Sea Around Us*, Carson writes about evolving understanding of "the deep sea as a place of movement and change, an idea that is far more exciting and that possesses deep significance for some of the most pressing problems of our time" (Carson, 1961, ix).

These observations both derive from Carson's reflections on human place in the environment and diverge from them in one important sense. Whereas Carson's attention to nonhuman temporal and spatial scales is ultimately *epistemological*, her charting of flows and interconnections is much more pragmatic. Had Carson been a contemporary of literary scholar Hester Blum, she might have observed, with her, that "[t]he sea is not a metaphor" (Blum, 2010, 670)—or at least that the sea is not *only* a metaphor. Even as the materiality of maritime space prompts her into different kinds of thinking, her engagement with flows is both scientific and political. Although often evoking a symbolic functioning of the oceans, Carson always also situated this function within her awareness of a real, tangible environment. This seeming contradiction could be explained through Lear's observation that Carson saw in the sea partly a metonymic device with which to illustrate her very ecological understanding of a fluid, interconnected world (Lear, 1997, 88). Indeed, this point appears throughout Carson's writing. In *The Sea Around Us*, we learn that "[t]here is, then, no water that is wholly of the Pacific, or wholly of the Atlantic, or of the Indian or the Antarctic […] It is by the deep, hidden currents that the oceans are made one" (1951, 147). And in *Silent Spring*, this kind of understanding of flows has evolved to be a key argument. Water, Carson writes, is "an endless cyclic transfer of materials from life to life" (1962, 46). It is water, therefore, that carries humanity's impact throughout the natural world—and back into human bodies. Thus, Carson's sea has significance as a tangible environment as well as a metonym.

In her recent book *Bodies of Water*, posthuman feminist scholar Astrida Neimanis has made a similar point. Neimanis suggests that we should imagine the Anthropocene not through geology—the lithosphere—but instead through the hydrosphere: the "fascia that lubricates and connects the Earth's lithosphere to biosphere and atmosphere, those most popular players in the Anthropocene drama" (Neimanis, 2017, 160). In making this claim, Neimanis draws on the central ecofeminist postulation that human lives and their varying modes of existence are all supported by a series of relationships and flows. Water, she argues, helps anchor the idea of the body as becoming rather than fixed (Neimanis, 2017, 7-8). In that vein, she proposes a "watery embodiment" that more aptly represents the flows and connections of our bodily experiences: our leaks into the sea and into cisterns of underground reservoirs, the flows from and into other human and nonhuman bodies ("a kissable lover, a blood transfused stranger, a nursing infant") (Neimanis, 2017, 2). For the context of the Anthropocene, Neimanis tells us, these links are important: "Bodies of water, as figuration, invite us to amplify a relational aqueous embodiment that we already incorporate, and trans-corporate" (Neimanis, 2017, 169). Or, in other words: thinking with an aqueous, especially maritime, perspective, helps foreground the relationships that already exist between human beings and between humans and nonhumans. This observation will inform, later in this thesis, my understanding of how communities in Yorkshire and Bulgaria are entangled with their coastlines.

Preceding Neimanis by decades, Carson's writing throughout the sea books, and finally in *Silent Spring*, emphasises flows in a way very similar to Neimanis' "watery embodiment." Carson's sea literally lingers, in the evolutionary sense, within the human body: "each of us begins his individual life in a miniature ocean within [our] mother's womb, and in the stages of [our] embryonic development repeats the steps by which [our] race evolved" (1951, 14). For Neimanis, the conceptual advantage to this watery embodiment is in that it helps her challenge human corporeality, especially its expressions as "discrete individualism, anthropocentrism, and phallogocentrism" (Neimanis, 2017, 3). Carson's displacement of the human perspective throughout her sea books might be viewed in a similar light. And notably, these ideas also find their way into *Silent Spring* where the spectre of human environmental health is raised by the suggestion that "there is also an ecology of the world within our bodies […f]or each of us, as for the robin in Michigan, the salmon in the Miramichi, this is a problem of ecology, of interrelationship, of interdependence" (Carson, 1962, 189). As in the sea books, where the sea lingers in the human body and mind, health in *Silent Spring* is expressed in both physical and mental terms. The harmful chemicals are found "stored in the bodies of the vast majority of human beings regardless of age. They occur in the mother's milk, and probably in the tissues of the unborn child" (Carson, 1962, 16).

Thus, it is precisely Carson's use of what Neimanis might term watery embodiment that ultimately enables her to reflect on the relationship between ecosystemic and human health—a theme that becomes central in *Silent Spring* but is already evident in Carson's earlier thinking. The sea books emphasize evolution as something starting on the seashore, framing its marginal space as a link between past and future:

> For us as living creatures [the shore] has special meaning as an area in or near which some entity that could be distinguished as Life first drifted in shallow waters – reproducing, evolving, yielding that endlessly varied stream of living things that has surged through time and space to occupy the earth (Carson, 1955, vii).

This sense of cyclicity and interconnection intimated in the sea trilogy prepares the ground for Carson's powerful arguments about the seriousness of "genetic deterioration" threatening the continuity of past and future in *Silent Spring*:

> For mankind as a whole, a possession infinitely more valuable than individual life is our genetic heritage, our link with past and future […]. Yet genetic deterioration through man-made agents is the menace of our time (Carson, 1962, 208).

In the passage above, *Silent Spring*'s appeal to inter-generational justice acquires further currency when understood in the context of the evolutionary chain of existence spread across time

communicated by the earlier books. Understood in light of the trilogy, this potential loss of genetic heritage hits at human means of knowing ourselves—not only in terms of scientific knowledge but also in the sense of impoverishing our origins and thereby our ways of constructing meaning. In other words, the trilogy helps build Carson's ecology into a subversive approach, one that aims to collapse personal spiritual and even religious values into a kind of genetic knowledge that cannot in fact exist without its ecosystem.

Reading the sea trilogy, with its stated aim "to interpret the shore in terms of that essential unity that binds life to the earth" (Carson, 1955, viii), also illustrates the origin of Carson's argument in *Silent Spring* that human hubris breaks cyclical patterns of planetary life and its interconnections. Carson's blue thinking is especially evident in the story of the Miramachi salmon, which can no longer find its way back to its breeding grounds (1962, 129-135). This maritime story is a metonymic example for the shape of Carson's arguments throughout *Silent Spring*. She first illustrates the flows and interconnections: "From the green depths of the offshore Atlantic many paths lead back to the coast. They are paths followed by fish; although unseen and intangible, they are linked with the outflow of waters from the coastal rivers" (1962, 129). Then she illustrates the man-made disruption to these flows, painting it as the breaking—and Carson herself uses the word "break" in this context—of "thousands upon thousands of years" of continuity (1962, 129), "a pattern that was age-old" (1962, 130). The declension argument recurs through *Silent Spring*, but this passage illustrates how it is an argument that rests on a fluid understanding of the world in the first place. In this sense, Carson's way of thinking with the sea proves pivotal for her scientific and political arguments here.

With Carson's realization that the oceans are vulnerable to human impact, the political currency of her blue thinking becomes stronger. Starting with the preface to the 1961 edition of *The Sea Around Us*, Carson's watery engagement also incorporates, in terms similar to Neimanis' definition decades later, an important sense of "man-made water" (Neimanis, 2017, 162). For both Neimanis and Carson, the reality of water or its flows as "man-made" has, simultaneously, important material and political implications and a more metaphorical, spiritual cost. In thinking about man-made or "Anthropocene water," Neimanis reflects equally on political issues of control (damming, irrigation, sea level rise, flooding) and on disrupted relations (Neimanis, 2017, 161-174). For Carson, this kind of dual engagement is evident throughout the sea trilogy, but culminates in *Silent Spring*, where human morality and agency become strongly entangled with human health, spirituality, and even societal citizenship.

The theme of human place in the environment and Carson's concern with epistemologies and representation returns in *Silent Spring* as she highlights the importance of watery interconnections against deliberate human ignorance: "what of the outflow of scores of other rivers, carrying contaminants perhaps equally lethal? At present our answers to these questions are for the most part only conjectures, but there is growing concern about the role of pesticide

pollution in estuaries, salt marshes, bays, and other coastal waters" (1962, 146). Hence, the fact that the scale of human impact exceeds our knowledge worries Carson particularly in the context of her vision of an interconnected, flows-dependent world. "The whole situation," she states, "is beset with questions for which there are at present no satisfactory answers":

> We know that pesticides contained in runoff from farms and forests are now being carried to the sea in the waters of many and perhaps all of the major rivers. But we do not know the identity of all the chemicals or their total quantity, and we do not presently have any dependable tests for identifying them in highly diluted state once they have reached the sea (1962, 151)

As a result, Carson admonishes, "In an age when man has forgotten his origins and is blind even to his most essential needs for survival, water along with other resources has become the victim of his indifference" (1962, 39). Crucially, this concern with flows and with the impacts invisible to human knowledge includes both pragmatic and philosophical elements. Carson may not have been familiar, perhaps, with *Anishinaabek* notions of water as the underlying relationality of life that extends across notions of societal, environmental, and even legal relations (McGregor, 2013, 71); or with other dynamic Indigenous legal orders that frame, for example, fish or other nonhumans as points of *societal* engagement between humans and nonhumans (Todd, 2014, 217-22). But the ethic Carson propagates through *Silent Spring*, because it draws on her engagement with the sea, comes to similar conclusions. The decision to release toxic chemicals into the environment, she writes, "is that of the authoritarian temporarily entrusted with power" and made "during a moment of inattention by millions to whom beauty and the ordered world of nature still have a meaning that is deep and imperative" (Carson, 1962, 127). It is a decision, in other words, that devalues democracy. This reduction of society by an authority unconcerned with the "beauty" and "meaning" associated with nature is a point at which Carson's work resonates directly with some of the narratives I encountered on the Yorkshire and Bulgarian coasts. On the Bulgarian Black Sea shore, especially, participants raised a similar point about the right to an environment as democratic to the one Carson arrives at here. Although *Silent Spring* is much less familiar in that context, therefore, in more abstract terms Carson's ability to derive from the sea a political argument translates widely, demonstrating the generative power of blue thought.

Although these societal and political aspects of *Silent Spring* were vital to its message, they were deliberately side lined, as Hecht has recently shown (2019, 568-70), by commentators following its publication. Carson's reviewers and promoters emphasized her moderation and focused their ebullient praise onto the book's criticism of pesticide use, ignoring her critiques of society and politics (Hecht, 2019, 568-70). "It was an early step in the creation of an origin story for environmentalism," Hecht observes, "that couched moderate interpretations in decidedly immoderate terms" (2019, 571). As a closer examination of Carson's works demonstrates,

however, maintaining the links between humans and the nonhuman environment was for Carson an ethical and political point, rather than a moderate one. This understanding is enriched through tracing the evolution of themes through Carson's earlier works. While the physical impact of environmental degradation on human health may perhaps be easier to identify—and indeed proves unavoidable in the sad irony of Carson's own death from breast cancer in 1964—equally at work in *Silent Spring* is an appeal to "humanity" that is not merely spiritual. Carson frames the broad morality of pesticide pollution in strong and direct political terms. Questioning the ethics of poisoning other living beings (she refers to this as "biocide") is not simply an appeal to the right of nonhuman creatures to live and to be respected, nor is it *only* a reminder to us that refusing to do so undermines our spiritual and mental well-being as humans. Instead, Carson insists that biocide also tears at the human social contract between individuals and society because it tramples individual rights and societal norms when it comes to holistic, spiritual and physical, health. The book frames the pesticide pollution recurrently, and poignantly, to the breaking of social trust. It is a breaking strongly connected to physical health:

> We have subjected enormous numbers of people to contact with these poisons, without their consent and often without their knowledge. If the Bill of Rights contains no guarantee that a citizen shall be secure against lethal poisons distributed either by private individuals or by public officials, it is surely only because our forefathers, despite their considerable wisdom and foresight, could conceive of no such problem (Carson, 1962, 12).

But the act of poisoning also strips from citizens what Carson frames as their inalienable rights to morality: "anything that destroys the wildlife of an area for even a single year has deprived [a citizen] of pleasure to which he has a legitimate right" (1962, 71). Thus, Carson's prose reminds us that the relationship between individuals and society includes the environment. Environmental health, in *Silent Spring*, relates to the underpinnings of civil society:

> Who has made the decision that sets in motion these chains of poisonings, this ever-widening wave of death that spreads out, like ripples when a pebble is dropped into a still pond? […] Who has decided – who has the *right* to decide – for the countless legions of people who were not consulted that the supreme value is a world without insects, even though it be also a sterile world ungraced by the curving wing of a bird in flight? The decision is that of the authoritarian temporarily entrusted with power; he has made it during a moment of inattention by millions to whom beauty and the ordered world of nature still have a meaning that is deep and imperative (Carson, 1962, 127).

Consequently, the physical and well-being implications of insecticide pollution raise powerful questions of political legitimacy. In this way, Carson works to construct a social contract in which citizenship implies not only civil, political, and social rights as postulated in classical political theory, but also the rights to a healthy environment and the intellectual and emotive benefits that could be derived from it. Social order, as Carson sees it, is reflected in the environment: no society "can wage relentless war on life without destroying itself, and without losing the right to be called civilized" (Carson, 1962, 99). The environmental deterioration witnessed by *Silent Spring* is not socially desired; instead, Carson tells her readers, it is an imposition abdicated of democratic support and wrought only through a lack of public knowledge. To highlight her point, she quotes Jean Rostand: "The obligation to endure gives us the right to know" (Rostand, quoted in Carson, 1962, 13). The phrase "obligation to endure" lends itself for *Silent Spring*'s second chapter title, pointing precisely to the exchange of rights and obligations that underpins social politics in democratic societies. Environmentalism, in the end, becomes an essential democratic right for Carson; its absence calls to question the legitimacy of all other "traditional" human rights. The same entanglement between rights to an environment and democratic rights is significant, as the next chapters will show, to participants on the contemporary Yorkshire and Bulgarian coastlines.

Blue environmental humanities after Carson: a maritime lens on the Anthropocene?

One of many reasons why Carson's works are still relevant today is that they raise many of the themes and political issues societies grapple with as they navigate social and environmental change in the Anthropocene. Carson's contemporary relevance might be most readily evident in *Silent Spring* with its focus on global ecologies; yet, as I have tried to illustrate throughout this chapter, the themes that underpin *Silent Spring* originated from Carson's particular attention to, and regard for, the marine environment. As I have demonstrated above, for Carson the coastal setting provided a vital liminality, one which allowed her to imagine the complex, dualistic aspects of the human-environmental relationship that then proved so important for her environmental ethic and her construction of social contract in *Silent Spring*. From that perspective, the coast presented Carson with an ideal material and metaphorical setting from which to imagine new iterations of the socio-environmental relationship. Locating herself first and foremost on the shore, Carson could conceive of new kinds of human engagement with the environment that touched on both environmental ethics and creative practices. Writing of the sea allowed her to imagine a new, complex social contract that reflected the rights and obligations written into a social trust between citizens, government, and corporations but that incorporated also human relationship with the environment. Carson reflected deeply on issues of creativity and human agency and brought them

to bear on her pragmatic, political concerns with environmental degradation and society's relationship with the environment more broadly.

For the wider field of environmental humanities and environmentalist thought, Carson's blue perspective is important because it demonstrates clearly the generative potential of the coast. For one, Carson highlights the historical significance of the coast to contemporary environmentalist thought: an early setting for the awareness of humanity's planetary impact, and therefore one in which communities came early to the pragmatic and philosophical challenges of what is now called the Anthropocene. More importantly still, her works illustrate the epistemological potential of the coast. By reading Carson alongside contemporary blue theory in the sections above, I have aimed to show how her maritime writing throughout her earlier works and culminating in *Silent Spring* can be seen to align with, and in some cases could even be said to pre-empt, the ways in which contemporary blue theory responds to the Anthropocene. Although few of the maritime theorists I have cited above refer to Carson directly, her works lend themselves remarkably well to being read as provocations to blue thinking. She diagnosed how the maritime context could inspire its visitor to think across fluctuations of time and space much as Westerdahl did decades later (2007, 203). The seas and oceans also helped Carson to reflect on the wider epistemologies inspired by maritime materiality long before Steinberg and Peters articulated their ideas on the wet ontology (Steinberg and Peters, 2015). At the same time, the sea and her thinking on flows enabled her to engage in effective advocacy for her pragmatic and political concerns. Given the impact Carson has had on both environmentalist thinking and environmental policy, these observations suggest that the maritime context has an important generative potential. The enduring resonance of Carson's themes further shows that potential's relevance for the Anthropocene. Hence, paying attention to the coast after Carson's example helps my work respond to Neimanis' invitation to think about "Anthropocene water" as a subversive framing for the Anthropocene (2017, 160) and, simultaneously, respond also to DeLoughrey's call for centring (geo)politics in oceanic humanities (2019, 26). Indeed, my reflections on Rachel Carson's blue thinking, and on how transformations in environmental understanding can be generated through thinking on the shore, help justify and develop my own use of the coast as an empirically and theoretically productive space throughout this thesis. The two key themes I showed as important through my reading of Carson in this chapter are of especial significance to my later discussions.

Firstly, the seashore's tendency to foreground the invisible aspects of social and environmental change is a key conclusion to take away from Carson's works. The blue setting, in a sense, provides an ideal stage for the type of narratives Nixon sought, in *Slow Violence*, as capable of foregrounding the hidden aspects of environmental change (Nixon, 2011). Moreover, Carson's sensitivity to what is seen or not seen as the shoreline changes speaks to concerns with social justice in scholarly debates on just transformations in marine and environmental governance (Feola, 2015; Bennett et al., 2019). An essential task for policy scholarship debating

transformations, Bennet and his co-authors have argued (2019, 10), is to take into account which perspectives are incorporated or ignored in the decision-making process behind this change. I have shown that in her own works, Carson was able to do just that because of her attention to the shore. In subsequent chapters, I will argue that the coast plays a similar role for communities on the Yorkshire East Coast and the Bulgarian Black Sea shore, helping them to focus on otherwise hidden aspects of their transformations. This point is also important for my thesis as a whole. If the view from the coast is one that can better envision the invisible sides of change, then it is also a vantage point from which both environmental humanities and critical policy studies can address questions of environmentally and socially just transformations.

In this way, the second theme I have reviewed in this chapter—the links that blue thought enables between philosophical and political engagements—resonates further with the two contemporary maritime contexts I explored. It is significant that Carson's sea is, as I have observed in this chapter, simultaneously literal—a material, oceanographically and biologically delineated entity—and metaphorical—a stand-in for the flows and connections Carson wanted to observe among humans and between humans and the nonhuman world. This ready duality of the sea as both real and imagined parallels how I observed the coast to be in participants' narratives on the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts. As I illustrate the entanglements between the material and metaphorical, imaginative and political, and slow and spectacular aspects of each community's relationship with its environments in the next two chapters, Carson's way of thinking remains an important background. Her attention to invisibility and to the connections between policy and poetics then informs the overarching conclusions of my thesis in its final chapter. There, after Carson's example, I explore how blue thinking and a maritime lens on the Anthropocene could not only connect and explicate the specific concerns narrated by each community, but also form a productive approach to the overarching epistemological and philosophical questions about social and environmental change that environmental humanities grapples with today.

Chapter IV: Inheriting "a paradigm shift in marine governance" on the Yorkshire North Sea coast

The realization that the seas are not inviolable had a significant personal and professional impact on Carson. The same realization had an even more substantial impact on global oceanic governance and coastal communities around the world. On the Yorkshire North Sea coast, as this chapter will illustrate, the consequences of inheriting what one participant called "a paradigm shift in marine governance" (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017), resonated still. While previously prevalent livelihoods became marginalized, new industries, policies, and cultural and environmental priorities arrived. In participants' narratives of the resulting tensions on the Yorkshire East Coast, I encountered a wealth of themes contesting not only local and national identities but also conflicting visions over whose environment the sea should be. Even participants who worked on environmental policy hinted at times about the problematic dynamics they felt this paradigm shift had introduced into Yorkshire's maritime space. These dynamics, in turn, manifested in the contemporary contestations surrounding Brexit and its outcome.

I conducted interviews on the Yorkshire North Sea coast during the spring and summer of 2017, roughly a year after the Referendum on Leaving the European Union had taken place on 23 June 2016. Results had shown the UK voting to Leave, with 51.9 per cent going to the Leave vote and 48.1 per cent for Remain (BBC News, 2016a; Electoral Commission, 2019). At the time I worked in the field, British Prime Minister Theresa May had only just sent European Parliament President Donald Tusk the letter invoking Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union on 29 March 2017; in accordance with that article, her letter triggered a two-year period until the planned date of the UK's withdrawal, effectively setting the date to 29 March 2019 (Prime Minister's Office, 2017; Treaty on European Union, 2016). Shortly after dispatching the letter, on 18 April 2017, the Prime Minister also announced a snap general election for the expressed purpose of "mak[ing] a success of Brexit" (Boyle and Maidment, 2017). The outcome, on 8 June 2017, resulted in the Conservative party losing its majority and forming a hung parliament (BBC News, 2017). These events unfolded while I was conducting my fieldwork on the Yorkshire coastline and asking participants to speak about issues pertaining to marine governance and life on the coast. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that the subject of Brexit and the anticipated set of changes emerging from the process came up frequently in our exchanges.

Over the course of my fieldwork I would learn, however, that Brexit was only the latest event in a long chain of societal transformations on the Yorkshire North Sea coast. In the first section of this chapter, I will foreground Brexit and individual sentiments I heard about it on both sides of the debate, but from there on out I will widen the lens to show how my conversations with participants revealed a wider landscape of governance change and shifting economic patterns

leaving vital communities behind. I will show how narratives from the pro-Leave campaign expressed important feelings of invisibility, fishing as an identity, and pride of place among the Yorkshire coastal community. I visit local histories and archival sources pertaining to Hull's trawling history, which offer some background for these contemporary feelings on the Yorkshire North Sea shore. In particular, I will show the resonance of contemporary events with events surrounding the Cod Wars, thereby discussing the political framing of fishing as national identity that has been utilized since at least the 1970s in both internal UK political struggles and with respect to the EU. In the final section of this chapter, I bring these insights together to discuss how the global paradigm shift in ocean governance executed after the Cod Wars carried these tensions forward in the Yorkshire context and tied them to still-pertinent questions of whose voice and stake in the sea counts and should count when managing the marine environment.

Brexit on the Yorkshire North Sea Coast

> I am really at this crossroads now where—I grew up in the Shetlands. My dad was a fisherman and my ancestors were whalers and fishermen, so I come from, my deep roots, my romantic roots if you like are the Shetlands. And yet I am struggling to reconcile my roots with my head. I am as pro-European as you can possibly get. I'd be quite happy to have the United States of Europe. I want my children to be able to move around and go live in Bulgaria, if they want, or Romania, or Sweden, or wherever—I don't like divisions, I don't like dividing things up. I'm having a problem because my research career has been going down this fisheries route, with European funding, et cetera, and now I feel that somebody's just swept my feet up from underneath me, both in terms of where I should be looking for funding and what am I going to do? What am I going to study? […] I don't know what to do. I don't know what to do (Stephen, researcher, 2017).

Speaking in his office at the University of Hull in the spring of 2017, Stephen seemed at a loss while telling me how he found himself "at this crossroads" in the wake of Brexit. For many involved in the governance, research, or advocacy of the marine environment, this outcome was unexpected (Boyes and Elliott, 2016, 44). To Stephen, as his words above suggest, Brexit meant that the subject matter he studied, along with much of the financial support he relied on in order to conduct this research, now faced substantial uncertainty. But harder still, as his comment also indicates, was that Brexit prompted him to feel at an internal "crossroads", one at which his "deep, romantic roots" in fishing now existed in opposition with his pro-European views. This tension, as I will discuss later in this chapter, had historic roots. Yet it had recently come to the fore of British political life through the Brexit debate, and specifically through narratives of fishing on the

pro-Leave side of the Referendum. Nationwide, fishing had become strongly entangled with the pro-Leave vote in the months leading up to the Referendum. In a poll conducted ahead of the Referendum by UK scholars Craig McAngus and Simon Usherwood, over 92 per cent of fishermen across the UK shared their intention to vote Leave (McAngus and Usherwood, 2016). In their words, this constituted "a uniformity of opinion that is unmatched by any other economic or social group in the UK" (McAngus and Usherwood, 2016).

This "uniformity of opinion" seemed to be shared on the Yorkshire North Sea shore. For much of Yorkshire and the Humber region more broadly, Leave proved to be the preferred outcome. In Yorkshire specifically, only the councils of Leeds, Harrogate, and York decided on the pro-Remain side (Reed, 2016). More significantly still, all of coastal Yorkshire voted to Leave by large margins and with a high turnout: the Leave option took 60.4 per cent of the voters in the East Riding of Yorkshire on a 74.88 per cent turnout, 61.99 per cent of those in Scarborough on a 73.00 per cent turnout, and 67.62 per cent of those in Kingtson-upon-Hull (the city of Hull) on a 62.89 per cent turnout (Reed, 2016). When it came to the fishing community, as local fisheries advocate William told me, there seemed to be a clear consensus:

> Well, the fishing industry in general wanted to leave. But they saw it as—the fishing industry in general, like the white fish industry, were heavily quota-ed and they could only operate so many days at sea [...]. So they saw it as a way of regaining control of the seas (William, fisheries advocate, 2017).

William's reference to "regaining control of the seas" spoke to wide-spread dissatisfaction among UK fishermen with the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Comprising a series of rules on fishing effort, fish stocks conservation, and seafood trade in EU member states, the CFP has been the primary legislation directing fisheries governance in the UK for decades. First constituted in 1983 (although succeeding competences of the European Economic Community that had existed since 1970), the CFP has been criticised for a range of shortcomings throughout its history (see, for example, Daw and Gray, 2005 or Khalilian et al., 2010) and revised several times in response, most recently in 2014 (Common Fisheries Policy, 2013). Although reports on the most recent reform have been positive, with officials and scientists observing that new measures seemed to improve the status of shared fish stocks in the North Sea (O'Brien, 2016; Beukers-Stewart and O'Leary, 2017, 3; Phillipson and Symes, 2018, 168), the CFP remained unpopular with UK fishermen (Phillipson and Symes, 2018, 168).

Small-scale fishermen, in particular, tended to associate the CFP with the series of regulations and limitations that they had to navigate daily. I encountered this sentiment also during my fieldwork on the Yorkshire North Sea shore. James, a Yorkshire fisherman, told me that the restrictions he and other fishermen faced in their part of the industry were "pretty tight":

> We are under pretty tight restrictions on fishing, we are. We're alright on shellfishing but we're very restricted on anything else, like cod or anything like that, we are on pretty tight restrictions on that. We are. But we're hoping, if the stocks, they say they are improving, we might be allowed to catch more fish. But we'll see (James, fisherman, 2017).

To James, the hope that white fish quotas might increase with the improvement of stocks was an important factor when it came to his views on Brexit. He expressed some ambivalence on the subject, telling me that he had "very mixed feelings" about the outcome (James, fisherman, 2017). Even as he told me that he doubted fishing would ever return to the industrial levels he had experienced in his trawling years decades ago, however, James still saw Brexit as a potential opportunity:

> You watch on telly, and it's sort of been, 'Oh, we're gonna get a 200 mile fishing limit'. Well I can't honestly believe that our fishing fleet will get back to what it was, I just don't see it somehow, but I'd like to think it would. So if we could get more quota, I'd be all in favour of leaving the EU (James, fisherman, 2017).

Hence, for James, the issue was not so much the regulations that restricted how the industry could catch fish as the key question of how much fish he and others were allowed, or allocated, to catch. This was a widely shared concern for small-scale fishermen, and an important factor in how many of them across the UK voted in the Referendum (McAngus and Usherwood, 2016). William confirmed this, commenting:

> [Fishermen thought], 'we'll be able to catch what I can and we'll have free for all and we'll do anything'. Because at the time, nobody corrected them. But in reality, that's not gonna happen (William, fisheries advocate, 2017).

As William also highlighted, however, fishermen's hope of more freedom was at least partly based on misinformation, which "nobody [had] corrected" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). For one, he highlighted the fact the UK would still be governed by UNCLOS III, as part of which "if we cannot harvest all the allowable catch in our EEZ, other nations have got to be given the opportunity through agreement to access the surplus" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). Moreover, as research at the time highlighted, the subject of quotas and their allocation was equally a source of misconception. Although the European Commission and Parliament do determine the total allowable catch (TAC) for the UK—that is, the size of the fishing "pie" that each member state received from North Sea stocks—the process through which the quotas from each TAC, or "pieces of that pie", then get allocated to fishermen by the member state functions independently of EU policy. In the UK, the internal distribution of quotas from its TAC had been determined for most species by an allocation system implemented in 1999, which fixed these shares of the

national catch for an indefinite period (Carpenter and Kleinjans, 2017, 9). The particulars around this process, as economists Griffin Carpenter and Richard Kleinjans have shown (2017, 325-326), left small-scale fishermen with a reduced access. When setting the shares, the UK assigned individual quotas to members of producer organisations and assessed the fishing activity of others using a reference period, 1994-1996, during which small-scale fishermen were not actually required to report their landings (Carpenter and Kleinjans, 2017, 325). Accordingly, the government underassessed and thereby disadvantaged a large part of its fleet: although 77 per cent of UK vessels are under ten meters in length, they must share a quota pool equivalent to only 1.5 per cent of the national shares (Carpenter and Kleinjans, 2017, 312, 325). This issue was compounded by the fact that, after these shares were initially fixed, they remained largely unchanged; but licenses could be sold to others (Carpenter and Kleinjans, 2017, 317, 325). Quotas thus acquired a non-fishing financial value and gradually became concentrated into the hands of only a few companies (Carpenter and Kleinjans, 2017, 325-6). As a result, a large proportion of the quotas came to be owned by non-EU companies (Le Gallic et al., 2018, 32; Phillipson and Symes, 2018, 170). In other words, the quota disadvantage for small-scale fishermen like James largely originated from internal UK policy.

In the industry, however, the fault for this disadvantage frequently was ascribed to the EU. These opinions persisted despite the efforts of experts to correct public misconceptions about quotas and the CFP. Darren, a University of York scholar who was one of these experts, spoke to me with some frustration about the large volume of false information available in the public domain and the seemingly futile efforts he and other scholars undertook to correct it:

> There's so much misinformation out there. Really basic stuff that has been [mis]reported. Myself and others have worked hard to try and correct it and then you just see it coming up again and again and it's so frustrating.
>
> AA: Where does it come from?
>
> Darren: Who knows where it first comes from but—for example, arguments about the small-scale fishermen, inshore fishermen, not having enough quota and struggling to earn a living, these are very real issues but they've not really to do with Europe, they're actually because of the way quota's distributed within the UK fleet, so it's under the control of the UK government and always has been. And yet that was used constantly as a key argument for Brexit and it really had nothing to do with it, and you just saw it coming up time and again (Darren, researcher, 2017).

The expression Darren used—"time and again"—conveyed his frustration with the apparently vain labour of disputing false arguments about the EU and the CFP. In part, he was exasperated that the efforts he and his colleagues put into communicating these positives to the public made

relatively little difference: the information "was something that myself and others worked to put out there and I think some people accepted it but then you still see the same arguments coming up" (Darren, researcher, 2017). He remarked that he was "sure you could find an article today" that repeated the same misconceptions he and other researchers had been busy correcting (Darren, researcher, 2017). And indeed, around the same time as I was conducting interviews on the Yorkshire North Sea coast, UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader and Member of the European Parliament for South East England Nigel Farage was publicly stressing claims that the EU's CFP had wrought "an economic and environmental disaster in which the UK fishing industry and fish stocks have suffered terribly" (Farage, 2017) and that the only means of "taking back control of fishing policy" was "kicking the EU out of Britain" (Farage, 2017). Darren's comments about the persistence of certain claims, therefore, was being borne out almost literally as he spoke.

To Darren, arguments like Farage's were damaging as well as frustrating because they threatened what he saw as positive improvement in fishing governance. The CFP had many faults, Darren went on, and he himself had criticized it in the past, "but most of them were to do with the way it was implemented rather than the actual policy" (Darren, researcher, 2017). Moreover, as he explained, there had been much improvement in overcoming past problems: TACs were now set in accordance with scientific advice, illegal fishing surveillance had improved, and increasingly innovative measures "like the real time closures for cod in the North Sea" were introduced (Darren, researcher, 2017). According to Darren, the CFP and its implementation were not only not at fault for the disadvantages small-scale fishermen experienced but also now contributed to more sustainable management of stocks, which benefited these fishermen. Indeed, EU legislation more widely was seen by experts like Darren and others to be positive because of its wider impact on supporting environmental governance. Participants pointed out supporting sustainable fishing required an international cooperative consensus for safeguarding the marine environment. Peter, an NGO officer, expressed this sentiment to me in the context of his comments about the CFP and his views on post-Brexit marine governance in the UK:

> The EU, whatever you think about the [Common] Fisheries Policy, one thing it has done, it has helped bring about some control over the overuse, exploitation of fish stocks. It's far, far from perfect but that principle is an important principle. And so I think post Brexit it's absolutely crucial, don't just think 'Oh these are UK waters, we can completely fish them and keep everybody else out', and we end up then overfishing our waters and destroying in isolation, so we have to find ways of working with other countries, working internationally to safeguard ecosystems that don't respect boundaries, and without a fear that we might say Brexit is an opportunity to see it as a resource for England and the United Kingdom (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017).

Thus, Peter saw both fishing and the environment above all as cross-boundary issues. With his statement, he emphasized how possessive national isolationism—that is, the urge see the sea "as a resource for England and the United Kingdom"—could all too easily result in "overfishing our waters and destroying in isolation" (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017). Further in our conversation, Peter emphasized that he did not mean his comment as a critique on the fishing industry or its significance: "I think the fishing community is absolutely crucial, a critical part of the marine economy and the marine ecosystem," he said (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017). At the same time, he stated that neither the fishing industry nor the economy should be treated in isolation from what he considered the larger picture. It was important, he insisted, "to find a way to make it work so that it can create jobs and provide sources of food but do that in a way obviously that doesn't destroy that environment" (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017). Thus, his sentiments stressed that governing the marine environment ought to be done through a focus on the cross-boundary dynamics of the ecosystem and not through a narrow focus on the local. The environment, he suggested, should be centre stage in these discussions.

Participants like Peter spoke to a broad picture of marine environmental governance in the Yorkshire North Sea context and their concerns with the impact Brexit might have on it. Because this picture is both complex and pertinent to the contestations this chapter addresses—namely, the tensions with inheriting an overarching paradigm shift and the resulting debate over which communities and actors deserve a stake in the marine environment—in the next two subsections, I will take the space to briefly outline the environmental concerns Brexit raised for participants and the marine governance background in the Yorkshire context. In the following section, however, I will move beyond Brexit to show the feelings of invisibility, pride, and identity associated with fishing that many other participants shared over the course of my fieldwork.

Uncertainty and Yorkshire's marine environment post-Brexit

The extent to which the environment had been side lined in the Brexit debate worried many of the participants I spoke to on the Yorkshire North Sea shore. Several stated that they were most concerned with legal and governance uncertainty caused by the results of the Referendum. For Lauren, who was involved in the management of an important protected area along the Yorkshire coast, not knowing how existing EU measures or designations might translate into UK measures post-Brexit carried important legal and procedural consequences. Speaking about the upcoming changes, Lauren put forth her best guess about the future:

> I would hope that with the Great Brexit Repeal Bill, as it's called, all of the European Environmental Directives, of which there are a lot, and we get a lot of our environmental law from that, will just be transposed into national law and it will stay the same for the short term at least […] In the long term, it might be a case that all the European designations are made

> into national ones, so we might still have the same designation names but they might be under different legislation maybe. They might all become marine conservation zones, because that's in our national legislation already—Literally don't know (Lauren, local policy officer, 2017).

Despite constructing a detailed speculation on the future of environmental legislation, in the end Lauren interrupted herself to exclaim honestly, "literally don't know" (Lauren, local policy officer, 2017). In this way, she admitted that her conjectures about the way EU law may be transposed into future national legislation, however well thought-out, were entirely tentative.

William, who felt Brexit may offer new market opportunities for the fishing industry, nevertheless shared Lauren's reservations and uncertainties about the Great Repeal Bill. He highlighted that it was in fact not a repeal bill at all, "because all the Repeal Act is doing is actually bringing [existing regulations] into law and we'll get rid of them when it's right and proper to do so, when they've worked it out" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). But that process would be arduous and complicated—in William's words, "a minefield" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). In fisheries alone, William said, there were 850 regulations that members of parliament would have to evaluate and either adopt or repeal. But "they only go through about twelve acts a year in Parliament" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). Consequently, William implied that delivering the policy change promised in the Brexit pro-Leave campaigns would in reality take decades.

As a result, many shared the discomfort around the practicalities of the legal and political change Brexit had introduced. While Lauren hoped and William feared little would change in terms of existing legislation, others worried about the ways in which the sudden uncertainty could complicate ongoing transformations. For example, this fear arose in conversation with Seamus, who works as an expert for a local governance institution in Yorkshire. Like Lauren, he speculated that European legislation would find its way into equivalent UK governance mechanisms; but, also like Lauren, Seamus perceived a lot of uncertainty around the way this may or may not occur:

> It's always working on the assumption that equivalent national legislation will take its place. I mean, who knows what's going to happen, whether the existing European Marine Sites will be transposed into MCZs, whether then MCZs legislation will be enforced to give the same level of protection that European Marine Sites are offering, it's all unknown (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017).

In addition, Seamus also worried about the future of inshore fisheries governance, which had been restructured in the UK through the Marine and Coastal Access Act of 2009 partly as a response to EU policy like the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (Phillipson and Symes, 2010, 1208). The restructuring into the so-called inshore fisheries conservation authorities, or IFCAs, had in his words "been a good process", but now, as he said, "[t]here's nobody really knows what form

fisheries management will take" (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017). He hoped that the regional approach introduced through the IFCAs would be retained; but ultimately, he told me that the policy outcomes were yet to be determined. When I asked him how the national steer for his own responsibilities might change as a result of Brexit, he replied that nobody knew, Brexit being "a massive question that a lot of people are working on and everyone is being very quiet about as well"—that is, he clarified, "everybody at central government" (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017). As a result, the future of existing policy instruments and the governance structure that supported them was unclear. "It's almost a 'watch this space' sort of thing at the moment", he concluded (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017).

Lauren and Seamus were not the only participants who speculated on the practical implications of Brexit for legal and governmental institutions. Darren framed his concerns in terms of the legal responsibility for oversight over the implementation of environmental legislation. In the past, he explained, "one of the ways that those European marine sites have been made to be effective is because of the threats of action through the European Court of Justice" (Darren, researcher, 2017). Because of this external oversight, he told me, European designations usually offered stronger protection than national British ones, particularly ones in England and Wales, which often were designated without any management plans in place (Darren, researcher, 2017). But it was unclear whether this instrument would be retained after Brexit:

> What happens in the long term is anybody's guess. Because as far as we know, we won't have a sort of watchdog body like the ECJ [the European Court of Justice] after Brexit. There's been some talk of forming one, but I don't know—an independent body that would oversee the implementation of the environmental legislation. I guess it could be lots of different legislations (Darren, researcher, 2017).

Here I asked Darren if he thought it was likely that an external body to watch over the government's implementation of environmental legislation would really be set up post-Brexit. Displeasure with the European Court of Justice had been one of the Leave Campaign's main talking points during weeks leading up to the Referendum: claims that "the European Court is supreme" and "overrules us [the UK] on everything from how much tax we pay, to who we can let in and out of the country, and on what terms", as well as that the UK had suffered a "loss of control [that] is deeply damaging and undemocratic" as a result of its interference featured prominently throughout the Leave Campaign (Vote Leave Official Website, n.d.). Given that the complaints about the ECJ were precisely that it was external, I inquired, did Darren think that an independent body such as the one he was talking about would be accepted by politicians or the public? He responded:

> Yeah, exactly, and it would seem a strange thing for a government to set up an external body to watch over itself. Yeah, so that's why I'm not very optimistic that that will happen. Or if there is a body, it won't be particularly independent or effective. I mean, I guess they could use a process like when they do public enquires, for example. But—Yeah, I don't know. It's not gonna be the top of the list for the government, I don't think, given the huge amounts of things they need to sort out over the next few years. I don't think this is gonna be a top priority (Darren, researcher, 2017).

Darren's last comments here, the ones indicating his view that ultimately environmental stewardship was not "a top priority" for the government in the Brexit negotiations, reflected a concern that several other participants shared. Peter told me plainly, "I'm not sure who's shouting for the environment at the moment" (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017). Lauren likewise stated, "I don't anticipate that the environment is high on the Brexit agenda" (Lauren, local policy officer, 2017). Although she admitted that the UK had a good track record of developing sites and national parks before joining the EU, she highlighted that in recent decades the EU's push had been vital for the country's environmental protection and conservation legislation, and that post-Brexit these concerns may be much lower on the priority list (Lauren, local policy officer, 2017). And in a similar vein Kate, who works for a non-government organization based in Yorkshire, expressed her doubts that the marine environment mattered at all to the politicians managing the Brexit negotiations:

> We have a huge potential to strengthen that legislation and to make the environmental law in this country really ambitious. However, whether we have the government will to do so—I think that it will be safe to say that there's a large question mark over that (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017).

In short, many of participants on the Yorkshire shore raised concerns with the large amounts of change they faced in the wake of Brexit. For participants working on or with marine governance in Yorkshire, the uncertainty introduced through Brexit added to the challenges of navigating an already complicated political system. In the next subsection, I will briefly outline the policy landscape and the number of significant changes participants were responding to as Brexit came onto their agenda.

Evolving marine and environmental governance on the Yorkshire coast: "A paradigm shift"

Even prior to the Referendum, the Yorkshire stretch of the East Coast had formed part of a dynamic policy context. For one, the environmental regulations in place here, as across all of

Britain, were highly complex. In an early 2016 report that outlined possible policy outcomes from the forthcoming Brexit decision, environmental policy expert Charlotte Burns and her co-authors described the environment as "a mature policy area" in the UK (Burns et al., 2016, 3). Affected by a portfolio of British and EU policies alike, this policy area already constituted, in the authors' words, "one of the most comprehensive bodies of environmental protection law in existence anywhere in the world today" (Burns et al., 2016, 3).

In the maritime context, this legal situation was additionally complicated by changing policies affecting the various uses of the sea. Broadly speaking, marine and coastal management in the UK had recently taken a new direction. Traditionally, British marine governance had been largely sectoral and dependent on a land-sea divide whose origins dated back to Crown property rights (Ballinger, 1999, 501-2). Since the 1970s, however, there had emerged an increasing recognition for the need of more integrated coastal and marine management (Ballinger, 1999, 508-14). External and internal factors alike contributed to this rising awareness. To begin, the same shift away from sectoral governance in the maritime context was occurring globally and codified into international law through the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 1982; Antonova, 2015). These principles also begun filtering into the UK through policies and directives of the European Economic Community (EEC, the precursor to the EU) since the UK's accession in 1973 (Ballinger, 1999, 508). By the 2000s, the European Union's influence had grown to become "a dominant driver" on UK marine and coastal management (Fletcher et al., 2014, 261) through legislation like the Common Fisheries Policy, the Birds (Directive 2009/147/EC) and Habitats (Council Directive 92/43/EEC) Directives, the Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC), and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (Directive 2008/56/EC).

At the same time, the change in marine governance was driven by increased domestic demands for reformed governance mechanisms. With more types of marine activities developing more and more densely in the UK's waters, integrated coastal and marine management became increasingly important (Fletcher et al., 2014, 262). Simultaneously, a range of citizens and stakeholders came out in support of stronger policy. Environmental non-governmental organizations like Kate's, for example, had led campaigns for new conservation legislation: as she told me, "we did petition prior to the consultations for MCZs to get the actual Marine and Coastal Access Act, which is the mechanism that allowed us to have this network of MCZs in the first place" (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017).

Indeed, the enactment of the 2009 Marine and Coastal Access Act became the most notable policy instruments affecting change in UK marine and coastal management to respond to these internal and external demands (Fletcher et al., 2014, 262). The Marine and Coastal Act was a comprehensive piece of legislation, meant to provision for a range of "marine functions and activities" (Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, Introductory Text). Accordingly, it set up the

governance mechanisms to manage every aspect of marine and coastal management, from offshore spatial plans and licensing, through conservation and fisheries management, to provisions for coastal access and access to marine environmental data (Fletcher et al., 2014, 262). Most significantly, the Act established the Marine Management Organization (MMO), a new governmental agency tasked with the explicit objective of pursuing sustainable development in the UK's coastal and marine waters (Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, Ch. 2, para. 2 (1)). It was the MMO that was to develop the offshore spatial plans, oversee the issuing of marine licenses, and supervise and coordinate between the newly formed IFCAs (Fletcher et al., 2014, 262).

This series of changes in the lead up to the 2010s ultimately produced, in Seamus's words, "a paradigm shift towards ecosystem management" in UK coastal and marine governance (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017). In 2017, Seamus saw that paradigm shift as being "still in development" through the ongoing evolution of the policy mechanisms first introduced by the Marine and Coastal Access Act (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017). This conceptual turn toward integrated and environmentally minded conservation of the seas, however, was ultimately accompanied by an increasingly complex range of European and British policies intended to execute it. This policy portfolio grew to be so elaborate that marine governance in the UK was described in 2014 by scholars Suzanne Boyes and Michael Elliott as "the ultimate horrendogram" (Boyes and Elliott, 2014, 43).

This complexity applied in full strength to the Yorkshire East Coast due to the wide diversity of marine and coastal activities in the region's marine waters. Indeed, the Yorkshire coastline was seen as diverse enough that the MMO included its EEZ in its first scheduled management plan (for the East inshore and offshore areas) as a way of informing future marine plans: as Stephen Fletcher and his co-authors argue, the context was seen to offer "the greatest contribution to the achievement of sustainable development within the UK marine area" (Fletcher et al., 2014, 263). Robert, an academic at the University of Hull like Stephen, illustrated this complexity of the Yorkshire coast for me by showing me two comprehensive lists—one of types of natural coastal habitat in the world and the other of all possible types of human marine use, both over two dozen entries long. Yorkshire's coastline, Robert emphasized, ticked almost all the items on both lists:

> Of all of those things, all those natural habitats, how many we've got on the Yorkshire coast? We've got most of them. A few things we don't have like mangroves and fjords, but most of it we've got. And then the same with these—

here he pointed to the list of marine uses, which spanned a range from fisheries and coastal defences, through telecommunication cables, urban areas, different types of energy generation, and navigation and safety, to military uses, recreation, and research:

> —We've got almost every one of those along the Yorkshire coast (Robert, researcher, 2017).

Small wonder, Robert concluded, that legislating this coastline was so complicated.

Brexit, then, arrived in an already tangled policy landscape. Two years after their original postulation of marine governance as "the ultimate horrendogram", Boyle and Elliott would observe that Brexit made the 'horrendogram' even "more horrendous" (Boyes and Elliott, 2016, 41-44). William expressed this much more prosaically: "The only thing that we know for certain with Brexit is, we don't know what's gonna happen" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). Indeed, as the statements by participants like Darren, Kate, or Lauren above illustrate, Brexit seemed to cast a degree of uncertainty over the entire paradigm shift in marine governance set up by the 2009 Marine and Coastal Access Act. If the environment was no longer an overarching government priority as a result of Brexit, these participants wondered, to what extent could they rely on the institutional procedures and mechanisms established to enact this paradigm shift?

Kate, perhaps, summarized these concerns best. She had been speaking about the ongoing national effort for adopting new marine conservation zones (MCZs) to form a "blue belt" (Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 2016) around the UK. In accordance with the 2009 Marine and Coastal Access Act, the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra) was consulting for, and designating, these sites in three tranches (or rounds) of MCZs. The first two of these tranches, she explained, had taken less than a year each from consultation to adoption (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017). She recounted that sites in the then most recent second tranche had been consulted in 2015 and designated in January 2016. In early 2017, when Kate and I were speaking, interested organizations like hers were "just waiting on the government to consult on the third" tranche but, in her words, this process had been "delayed somewhat due to lots happening politically within the country with impending Brexit process and this current election" (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017). To her mind, the delay reflected not only a procedural clog-down, but also the overarching shift in government priorities caused by Brexit, which could change the process itself: "I think with tranche 3, to be honest, we really don't know, and anything that we did think we knew, we can just throw out of the window anyway" (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017). Although Kate referred specifically to conservation, her words were indicative of the way Brexit impacted the wider range of policy processes resulting from the paradigm shift Seamus had described.

The economics, romanticism, and (in)visibility of fishing on the Yorkshire North Sea coast

Throughout the previous section, I outlined the most pertinent tensions around Brexit that I encountered while doing fieldwork on the Yorkshire North Sea coast. From participants I would

learn, however, that Brexit was only the latest chapter in a much longer and more complex story of change. The underlying tensions associated with Brexit emerged from a series events over the past few decades, in which Yorkshire's maritime space and communities underwent a transformation spanning not only industry and economy but also local and national identity. In this section, as I begin to explore this broader transformation, I follow the accounts many participants gave me of the narrative and symbolic role of fishing and fishing communities. Later in this chapter, I will illustrate how this role has come into tension with a different set of visions about the sea, particularly in the Yorkshire context. Here, however, I outline an important entanglement that participants communicated between local economy, community pride, and governance.

In many of the narratives I encountered, economics, romanticism, and identity were tied in with how narrators viewed Yorkshire's sea and the future they imagined for it. When it came to fisheries, participants highlighted this entanglement frequently. Contemporary economic analyses have shown that fishing is worth about 0.05 per cent of the UK's gross domestic product (Carpenter, 2017, 8). Yet the industry's visibility in the Brexit debate, as Darren observed, went far beyond this figure:

> [F]isheries is an interesting one because it's worth almost nothing to the British economy, it's less than half a percent of GDP or something, but it does have a very high profile, there's probably hundreds of articles written over the last year or more about Brexit and fisheries. We had things like the flotilla on the Thames,[1] it is very much in the public eye. So I think for that reason the UK government is giving it a lot more attention than it would according to its economic value. And it also obviously is more important in specific areas, there's certain cities or towns at least that very heavily rely on fishing (Darren, researcher, 2017).

As Darren's last comment suggests, fishing attained its significance at least in part against the context of the smaller coastal economies in which it operated. This observation is particularly true given the nationwide pattern, in which seaside towns have experienced years and even decades of cumulative decline nationwide (Agarwal and Brunt, 2006, 656). A 2007 report to the House of Commons prepared by the Communities and Local Government Committee found that coastal towns across the country shared a number of worrying characteristics: "their physical isolation,

[1] In speaking about "the flotilla on the Thames," Darren referenced a widely cited Brexit campaign moment from shortly before the Referendum, in which the symbolism of fishing to either side was visibly represented in the so-called "battle for the Thames" on 15 June 2016 (Withnall, 2016). As part of the Leave campaign, a "Brexit armada" of pro-Leave fishing boats led by Nigel Farage floated up the Thames to London and was met under Tower Bridge by "a rival Remain fleet" led by British vocalist and campaigner Bob Geldof (BBC News, 2016b).

deprivation levels, the inward migration of older people, the high levels of transience, the outward migration of young people, poor quality housing and the [seasonal] nature of the coastal economy" (Communities and Local Government Committee, 2007, 3). Benchmark studies conducted in 2008 and 2011 showed that twenty six out of thirty seven principal seaside towns (Beatty et al., 2008, 9) and twenty two out of thirty seven smaller seaside towns (Beatty et al., 2011, 6) in England had greater levels of deprivation than the English average. Even in 2019, a report by the Select Committee on Regenerating Seaside Towns and Communities on the 2017-2019 session found that seaside communities, particularly smaller coastal towns, often continued to feel "overlooked and unloved by the Government, local councils, service providers and businesses alike," and thus ultimately "isolated, unsupported and left behind" (Select Committee on Regenerating Seaside Towns and Communities, 2019, 6).

These figures and sentiments apply directly to the contemporary context of the Yorkshire North Sea shore. Along its coastline, several communities rely on fishing as a source of income, one particularly important in some cases given their level of local deprivation. As of 2019, for instance, statistical information published in the Indices of Depravation by the Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government listed two of coastal Yorkshire's bigger towns as containing areas classed within the 0.1 percentile of deprivation in the country. The statistics included central parts of Bridlington as the 44th most deprived area in the country out of 32,844 individual areas, while Hull contained the 21st, 40th, 41st, and 42nd most deprived areas (Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government, 2019). I also heard about these conditions from a few participants, who referenced directly the economic decline of their communities. William, for example, pointed out of his window from his own office, which was located on the outskirts of a larger coastal town in Yorkshire:

> [This town] is an area of deprivation in the national statistics. [This] is an area of deprivation, you won't believe it if you look around in the moment but, you know, you go in certain areas after dark and, well, you wouldn't go in certain areas after dark. Even I don't like to go in certain areas after dark (William, fisheries advocate, 2017).

Helen, a local policy officer and community member whom I met at her workplace near the promenade, described the levels of deprivation in her town in similar terms:

> [This town] a very deprived area. [...] There's some areas in town that are some of the most deprived in the country, people being on benefits and low income, probably in the lowest 2 per cent in certain areas of [the town], so there's bits of poverty--not abject poverty, they've got food and things—but there's a food bank (Helen, local policy officer, 2017).

In Helen's account, this economic deprivation had a direct impact on how the community saw itself, and further, on how it cared for his environment. She illustrated this point using the example of rubbish in her town—a personal frustration of hers—which she framed as a matter of pride and community care. "[W]hen I was a kid," she remarked, "we were always taught to put the rubbish in the bin, always"; but there was now, she felt, a lot more rubbish in the environment than when she had been young (Helen, local policy officer, 2017). When I asked her why she thought that was, she replied without hesitation:

> I think as a country we're losing pride. I really do, I think there's a lack of pride in what we've got. The older generations tend to be better. But kids nowadays, they just don't seem to—they don't care.
>
> AA: Is that pride in the environment or in the country as a whole?
>
> Helen: I think it's even in themselves, I just don't think people have any pride in anything anymore. Certainly not in the town that they live in. Obviously, it's not everybody, but there just seems to be a lack of pride and it's a shame because there's plenty to be proud of. And then partly it does come back to demographics and how much money people have, and for whatever reason, more deprived areas tend to be less bothered (Helen, local policy officer, 2017).

Thus, for Helen, the loss of pride was a real consequence of economic deprivation. Further, in her account it was this entanglement of identity and economics that determined the shape of the local community's relationship with its coastline. By explaining rubbish on the beach as a matter of people's pride either "in themselves" or "in the town that they live in," I felt that Helen hinted at something similar in essence to how ecofeminist María Puig de la Bellacasa speaks about the matter and ethics of care (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017). The practice of care, to Puig de la Bellacasa, is both quintessential to society and at the same time one that is undervalued, marginalized, and invisible (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017, 11). The care for nonhuman material "things", she argues, is an indivisible part of that marginalized practice of maintaining society (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017, 18). In a similar sense, in the context of rubbish Helen herself also spoke of the relationship between community, care, and daily practices, telling me: "I like to think the community cares, but it's maintaining that care. It's hard work" (Helen, local policy officer, 2017). For it to work, she thought, "You've gotta give people something to be proud of, and I think I lot of them don't" (Helen, local policy officer, 2017). Thus, the connection Helen made between economics, care, and pride emphasized how the *economic* deprivation extended beyond economic consequences, and instead to sense of society and even environment shared by people in the community.

The importance Helen gave to pride and care elevates the significance of industries like fishing on the Yorkshire North Sea shore that already contribute much in purely economic terms.

In the context of Bridlington's national status within the 0.1 percentile of deprivation, the value of landings from the shellfishing industry into its port—worth 10.5 million pounds in 2018 alone (Marine Management Organization, 2019, 60)—constituted a substantial source of income. When I spoke to Connor, a fisheries advocate working on the Yorkshire North Sea coast, he stressed this tension between national and local economics as well:

> Ultimately, we are a small industry, there's no doubt about that, but within the communities where that industry is based, it's enormously important. On a national scale, it's tiny. But locally, the fishing industry is one of the largest private sector employers, in this part of the world. And given that this is one of the most economically deprived parts of Britain, this adds importance to it. So we have to advocate for it (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017).

Much like Connor, William emphasized in our conversation that Yorkshire's shellfishing was "a multi-million-pound industry", one that was "vital for the economy of the town" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). With pardonable pride, he explained that "the Holderness coast area is the largest lobster fishery in Europe and […] we land more lobsters than anywhere in Europe" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). His words indicated that, for him at least, the industry's success was as important as its economic value: the Holderness coast's shellfishery was something to take pride in.

Invisibility, romanticism, and fishing identity

Despite this dual local significance, however, I heard that fishermen often were not seen—not as important, or not at all—on the outside. Connor recounted that fishing as an industry and indeed its role for its community had often been invisible in the past. In his opinion, it had often been a community without a voice: "Fishermen and fishing communities are not generally historically well heard, well listened to […] normally you wouldn't see politicians coming and campaigning around fishing ports" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). Even to its own in-town neighbours, he emphasized, fishing was a practically invisible activity. He conceded that this was partly because "it usually happens at stupid times of day"—but even then, he said, the significance of the industry's invisibility went beyond the question of who observes it. Fishing was invisible both in the practical sense and metaphorically:

> You don't necessarily notice there's loads of people turning up and going to work at three o'clock in the morning. You're just not there, hopefully you're asleep if you're sensible. You don't see it. It's on the edge of things. It's always the case with fishing, it exists on the edge, and then it's swept over the edge and disappears. And you only see it when it comes back, very occasionally (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017).

In contrast to this event horizon effect, Connor opined that the valorisation of fishing as a symbol of national pride and independence through the Brexit campaigns was a welcome change. "This is a little bit different actually lately in politics", he told me, "Been a little bit different actually with the whole Europe debate" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). Fishing had become both visible and significant, not only for politicians and activists, but also for members of the local community.

Moreover, he thought that Brexit would make a very pragmatic difference because it meant that that the industry's visibility would be structurally embedded within the British government. Fishermen, industrial groups, advocates, or even the National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations had never before had to "make noise nationally", Connor explained—instead, these voices had been directed at Brussels, where the decisions were debated and made (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). As a result, he went on, in all the years in which the CFP had functioned fishing policy had also never been a topic that high-level politicians in the UK were knowledgeable about or concerned with:

> We haven't really spent a lot of time talking to British MPs cause they're not really interested in fishing and they don't regulate it anyway, so—we have talked to each other, specific local issues for local fishing and MPs, absolutely, but on a parliamentary level, federation to parliament—There's an annual fisheries debate, which is one job session in Parliament, which a handful of MPs would turn up in it, we make representation to that, there's a six or seven MPs present that would say something—it's gonna be different now (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017).

Consequently, he concluded, "the profile of fishing may well continue to rise" nationally (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). The rhetoric surrounding Brexit and the Referendum's results shifted the conversation, bringing the issue higher on the government's agenda and giving it attention beyond the "six or seven MPs" who would previously have been present at the fisheries debate. Connor also highlighted that the new national visibility the industry acquired served fishermen and fishing communities even if it was not originally construed with their specific interests in mind:

> Just lately, with the whole Brexit debate, fishing seems to have acquired a new visibility that it didn't have for a long time. It's seen, I suppose, as having an iconic value, it's red telephone boxes and cycling vicars and cricket on the green and fishing boats […]. A romanticized version, I suppose, but nonetheless it's kind of helpful to us, generally, if people are aware that we exist as an industry, that even if they think we are all, you know, old men with big beards knitting jumpers and singing sea shanties while going out for mackerel, it's still helpful in that people are aware we're there, that it's an industry that exists and […] that it's a community that

> exists. I think there has been an element of trying to use that image for particular political purposes lately, which are not necessarily done with the interest of fishermen in mind, I think people that are making those associations are trying to make other associations in the public mind, but that's another issue. It seems to have acquired a little bit more profile. If that gets us noticed and gets us some influence with policy makers, then— (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017).

By painting the "romanticized version" of fishermen as old men wearing knit sweaters and singing sea shanties alongside the stereotypical British "red telephone boxes and cycling vicars and cricket on the green", Connor emphasized how the nostalgic image of fishing fits inside a wider national identity. In turn, evoking this identity made the fishing community visible, helping to make others "aware that we exist as an industry" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). Connor's words illustrate his awareness that this image was evoked for a complex set of reasons, not all of them in the best interest of the communities he advocates for. His allusion to the fact that "people that are making those associations are trying to make other associations in the public mind" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017) hinted at his understanding that other and even potentially exploitative political interests were at play with the romanticized narrative of old bearded men in sweaters. Cautious as he was, however, Connor stressed above all the political utility for the community itself: the importance of getting noticed, being visible, and thus ensuring influence with policy makers.

On a wider scale, however, fishing was framed in a very different way. Fishing, as a journalist writing for the BBC observed on the eve of the actual Brexit (31 January 2020), had become a symbol that many others across the nation identified it:

> Symbolically and politically fishing punches way above its economic weight. It speaks to our identity as an island nation and is the life blood of coastal communities. Many fit the description of the "left behind" parts of Britain into which Boris Johnson has promised to inject new life (Jack, 2020).

In writing about the "left behind", Jack evokes not only political rhetoric like Boris Johnson's but also scholarly analysis of the reasons behind the Brexit outcome. Political scientists Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin had used the same term to argue that the UK independence movement had tapped into the economic and social marginalisation of voters "left behind" not only because of their demographics—older, less educated, working-class—but also because of their values: once mainstream, older generations' outlook on social norms and national identity had grown to be regarded as outdated in the mainstream within the space of two generations (Ford and Goodwin, 2014, 278-280). Following this line of argument, Goodwin and Oliver Heath concluded that Brexit had ultimately originated not solely from economic reasons, but had instead tapped into an

entanglement between economic deprivation and cultural isolation (Goodwin and Heath, 2016, 331). But on a local scale, as the comments by Helen, William, and Connor suggest, the fishing industry counteracted those feelings by contributing to the economy and to sentiments of pride in place and community. This raised its significance. The industry's local fortunes became a symbol against feelings of economic and cultural isolation.

The industry also allowed these local communities to feel that they have a national relevance. Darren, for example, observed:

> I think, you know, the other thing is, it's a really strong part of the British identity and the identity of seaside towns, and people actually wanna see fishing boats in the harbour, they look nice, they look quaint, et cetera. They like to be able to go to the pub and eat locally caught crab or lobster or whatever it is, and so there is a much bigger value to fisheries than that raw value of the landings (Darren, researcher, 2017).

Thus, Darren highlighted the association of fishing with "the identity of seaside towns", with the social significance of pubs and very "British" picturesque ideal. His observation resonates with Connor's imagery of fishermen as romantic figures "knitting jumpers and singing sea shanties" Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). Both men's comments illustrate how the identity-forming aspect of fisheries—not only on the local level but nationally, as well—elevate the industry's value above "the raw value of the landings" (Darren, researcher, 2017). This link with national identity, in turn, is what enabled coastal communities to access visibility and counteract their feelings of being "left behind" (Ford and Goodwin, 2014) as part of the Brexit campaign.

As Connor had observed, however, the same associations between fishing and national identity also opened these narratives to politicization. The pro-Leave campaign, as I will illustrate in the following subsection, often relied on imagery of fishing as a point of nationalism. Communities were receptive to these persuasions, as I have shown here, because of their sense of not being seen or heard by their government. Equally, however, a history of fishing decline, global policy change, and its local implications played an important part for the sentiments I encountered on the Yorkshire North Sea shore. In the following subsection, I will visit the regional significance of the Cod Wars and the subsequent British negotiations to join the EU (then the European Economic Community, or EEC). This, in turn, will enable me to chart the wider global landscape of changing marine governance and the implications pertaining to whom the marine environment—in Yorkshire and elsewhere—should be for.

From Cod Wars to EEC negotiations

Throughout my fieldwork, many participants cited the rapid decline of fishing that the Yorkshire North Sea shore had seen over just a few decades. James, for example, described a range

of fishing practices that had shifted in his lifetime across a variety of scales, species, and locations on the Yorkshire shore:

> There used to be quite a big fishing fleet at Filey, you know, but they're all more or less gone there now, apart from, there's a few people still go salmon fishing from there, but the cobbles like we use, they used to be, oh, about half a dozen there, but there isn't any there now, most of the lads are, well, those that aren't retired, they've started to move to Scarborough, you see […]. [My friend] he had a cobble that he worked off beach at Filey but now him and his brother, they have a boat at Brid. They're still potting but just in a bigger boat. I mean, you'll have been onto pier. Most, all the boats there, they're all potting boats. There's no trawlers left in Brid now (James, fisherman, 2017).

Because those kinds of change had occurred in the course of a single generation, they seemed fresh on participants' minds. Ultimately, as Seamus summarized the situation, Yorkshire's fleet had gone "from what it was 20-30 years ago with a lot of trawlers, to smaller inshore potting vessels mostly" (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017). The earliest and perhaps most memorable steps participants referenced in the Yorkshire North Sea coast's fishing decline was Hull, a city that "was a big fishing port years ago," as James remarked at one point in our conversation, "it's one of the major ports that was a deep-sea trawling fleet, Hull, because they went to Iceland […]. It's all gone" (James, fisherman, 2017). But because this had occurred only a generation ago, the story of the industry's economic and symbolic importance to local communities was still well-remembered at the time I conducted interviews on the Yorkshire North Sea shore. In this section, I visit the story of Hull's deep-sea trawling fleet and its decline through the Cod Wars at some length because it launched narrative and political patterns that are still of significance today.

From the late nineteenth through the latter half of the twentieth century, Hull was one of the world's largest fishing hubs, its fleet largely fishing in Icelandic waters; but by the late 1970s, the loss of these fishing grounds through the so-called Cod Wars contributed to the industry's rapid decline, with far-reaching social consequences (Byrne, 2016, 243-4). In her ethnographic work documenting memories of trawling in Hull, Jo Byrne emphasizes how, prior to the Cod Wars, there existed a strong association between industry and sense of place in Hull (Byrne, 2016, 244-245). Sociological research in the area from the late 1950s supports that view, showing that, even as far as the trawlermen ventured, they still tended to come from tightly-knit and locally concentrated communities, thereby making the industry a locally rooted one (Horobin, 1957, 343). In addition, the industry spread beyond the fishermen and ship owners to a series of ancillary businesses like gear and rope makers (Horobin, 1957, 344) and further to the shops and establishments that fishermen viewed as "their own", like pubs, shoe stores, or barbers (Byrne, 2016, 251). To indicate the close connection between industry and place identity, Byrne refers to

Hull as "Trawlertown", a term she takes from folk music and a local historical video from the 1990s; but as she also records, for many in Hull the industry was synonymous with the one long street around which it oscillated, Hessle Road (Byrne, 2015, 819). These factors all resulted in a strong entanglement between urban geography, community, and the various maritime activities associated with trawling.

Trawling, as James told me, could be both highly labour intensive – "It's a hard job; it is a hard job" – and dangerous: "as it [the weather] gets rougher, it gets harder and progressively harder and if it's really rough it's very, very difficult. That's when it starts to become dangerous, if you like" (James, fisherman, 2017). This was very much the case in the height of the Hull long-distance trawling, as well. Recorded in a 2008 oral history project on the Hessle Road communities, former trawlerman Terry Thresh shared that "on the grounds the work was very hard. Hauling, shooting, gutting the fish, mending the net, cracking ice off the rigging […]" (Terry Thresh, interview in Hull Museum Education and the British Library, 2008). Barry Field, another former fisherman recorded for the same project, referred not only to trawling as "a really, really hard job" but also to life on Hessle Road as far from idyllic:

> I lived down Hessle Road all my life from being born up to being married. And the conditions down Hessle Road… everybody was very friendly and everybody talks about how friendly it was, but the back to back houses it wasn't very nice to live in them at the time. Looking back, when you were sleeping three in a room with no central heating and an outside tap and an outside toilet and no bathroom. I don't think I'd like to go back to those times now, I don't think (Barry Field, 2008, interview in Hull Museum Education and the British Library).

On the one hand, narratives like Field's provide an antidote to the nostalgic visions of fishing by illustrating the hardship associated with the labour. In addition to cold or uncomfortable, long-distance trawling in cold waters was also dangerous. To some extent this is true for fishing in general, even in the contemporary context: as of 2010, commercial fishing was the most hazardous occupation in the UK, accounting for 115 times more fatal accidents than the average for the British workforce (Roberts, 2010, 47). Although the industry's safety has improved, its dangers were well-embedded in the minds of its practitioners. Communities like James', as his wife Grace attested in our conversation, had seen their fair share of incidents over the years: "We've had some grim ones in our lifetime" (Grace, fishing family, 2017). When it came to the long-distance trawling, living memory encompassed an even stronger record of fatality: one of the most severe fishing accidents, in 1968, involved the loss of three Hull trawlers and 58 lives in Arctic waters over the course of three weeks (Roberts, 2010, 44).

On the other hand, even the hardship and danger could play into the romanticisation of fishing, for instance through reinforcing communities' strong self-identification with the industry. As local historian Alec Gill has argued, much of the trawling community's day-to-day life and character was shaped by the awareness of danger and the celebration of safe return, resulting in habits, superstitions, and other cultural traits that survived beyond the industry's decline (Gill, 1994). Because of hardship, Gill wrote, the Hessle Road community had become a "unique breed of people" bonded together through their interactions with the sea: "Sea salt forms crystals of love between people. And the bond is built upon salty tears" (Gill, 2003, 9).

Moreover, even despite the danger or hardship, the promise of prosperity contributed significantly to the community's draw. Horobin's sociological account of the industry in 1957 showed that young men frequently joined the industry even despite their parents' fears or first-hand experiences of danger (Horobin, 1957, 350). Trawlermen returning to Hull for only up to 72 hours as part of their regular rhythm spent their earnings generously enough to merit the epithet "three-day millionaires" (Byrne, 2016, 247). As Horobin argued, this evident financial comfort of fishermen contributed greatly to the industry's popularity: "the fisherman ashore […] has good clothes, he has money in his pocket, he goes about in a taxi, and he is popular. It is in this 'ready cash' aspect of the job that the romance lies" (350). The same "romance" helped the industry recruit widely also outside the existing community. Moreover, the long-distance fishery out of Hull and Grimsby had expanded so quickly in the 1850-1914 period that recruiting labourers into it became important enough to spur the development of an apprentice system (Wilcox, 2015, 724-7, 742). Sailors came to serve apprenticeships in Hull and Grimsby (or both) expecting to earn higher posts and better pay in the rapidly growing industry (Horn, 1996, 175). Trawling, in short, fully represented a modernist promise of prosperity through labour. It is not surprising, therefore, that the industry's eventual decline affected not only the fabric of whole towns and communities but also the promises and visions of prosperity that they had represented. This, too, played into how the industry was retroactively romanticized.

The eventual loss of this kind of fishing occurred partly due to declining and shifting fish stocks, but it was spurred along through the events of the Cod Wars, an important series of 20th century conflicts pertaining to territorial fishing rights between the UK and Iceland. With more and more powerful long-distance trawlers increasing their efforts in the waters off Iceland after the Second World War, the Icelandic government became concerned with threats of overfishing (Guðmundsson, 2006, 98). As a result, Iceland extended claims for its fishing limit first to four, then to twelve, fifty, and two hundred miles (Guðmundsson, 2006, 97). The first extension triggered a British industrial embargo on Icelandic fish (Guðmundsson, 2006, 97). However, the 12-mile dispute (1958-1961), 50-mile dispute (1972-1973), and the 200-mile dispute (1975-1976) became significantly more confrontational. British naval vessels were dispatched to protect the long-distance trawlers; Icelandic coast guard boats harassed the British trawlers using trawl-wire

cutters; and vessels on both sides collided, resulting in serious and often dangerous damage (Guðmundsson, 2006, 97). The 1972-1973 dispute led to the UK escalating the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (United Kingdom v Iceland, 1972). In the last Cod War (1975-1976), Iceland broke off its diplomatic relations with the UK, the only such incident between NATO allies during the Cold War (Guðmundsson, 2006, 97).

The British government remained supportive of its fishing interests in Iceland despite the rising stakes of the conflicts. Outwardly, the government argued that any resolution with Iceland must be "consistent with [the British fleet's] traditional interest and acquired rights in and current dependency on those fisheries" (United Kingdom v. Iceland, 1974, 8). Archival sources show that, in confidence, voices within the Parliament considered the disputes to have escalated "far beyond any rational or reasonable level of confrontation" and raised concerns with the diplomatic and human consequences: "NATO is threatened; Iceland appears ready to break diplomatic relations with Britain and many lives have been put in real jeopardy" (Conservative Research Department, 1976, 1). The same source showed awareness that the British government's position on the conflict was "inconsistent with British pronouncements and actions in other fora"—namely, the ongoing negotiations for the third UNCLOS, through which the UK intended to lay the same claim to a 200-mile exclusive economic zone that it was objecting to in the case of Iceland (Conservative Research Department, 1976, 4-5). After all, only a few years earlier, the UK government had argued in front of the ICJ that Iceland could have "no authority for such action in international law, whether conventional or customary […and] that such an extension is unjustifiable and invalid" (United Kingdom v Iceland, 1972, 10).

Hull's long-distance trawling fleet, and its symbolic significance for the UK government, were a driving force behind these apparent contradictions. Together with Grimsby, it comprised a significant portion of all British vessels fishing in Icelandic waters (Jóhannesson, 2004, 545). It has been suggested that the political affiliation of Anthony Crosland, who represented Grimsby between 1959-1977 while also serving as Secretary of State for the Environment between 1974-1976 and as Foreign Secretary between 1976-1977, contributed significantly to the UK's contradictory position in the last dispute (Guðmundsson, 2006, 111-2). However, there were also aspects of nationalist pride and geopolitical interest involved. If, as Icelandic historian Valur Ingimundarson has claimed, the Cod Wars were for Iceland partly "about nationalism, Western integration, historical memory, and domestic party politics" (Ingimundarson, 2003, 88), the same held true for the UK. Other Icelandic historians like Guðni T. Jóhannesson (2004, 545-7) and Guðmundur J. Guðmundsson (2006, 111) have shown that British national pride and naval power-projection played key roles in the origins of the Cod Wars from the beginning. Trawlermen were seen by Whitehall as symbolic of national pride because of their service in the Second World War but also as representative of national geopolitical interests because their long-distance pioneership in Northern waters were in line with freedom of the seas principles that had supported British

naval supremacy for centuries (Jóhannesson, 2004, 545-50). In turn, trawlermen themselves evoked this pride throughout the conflicts, reportedly playing the imperialist hymn "Rule Britannia" on loudspeakers when refusing to obey Icelandic coast guard vessels' orders (Guðmundsson, 2006, 111). Further, the UK government showed illicit and explicit support to trawlermen throughout the conflicts: from tacit agreement with the British industry's 1952 embargo on Icelandic ice fish (Jóhannesson, 2004, 546) through organizing Royal Navy protection from 1958 onward (Jóhannesson, 2004, 556) to even deploying aircraft intended to spy on Soviet forces to the fishing grounds, at a cost for British readiness against potential Soviet threats (Guðmundsson, 2006, 111).

Ultimately, the legal and political costs proved too high, and the UK gave literal and metaphoric ground in all four conflicts. The loss of Iceland's fishing grounds and its economic consequences, however, were felt quickly in Hull. By January 1980, Hull's fishing industry felt the impacts strongly enough to put in a formal submission for financial assistance with the government (Hull Fishing Industry, 1980). The submission's "Five point paper for meetings with ministers" summarized details pertaining to the "[d]amage done to the Hull Fishing Industry since the loss of fishing grounds at Iceland, January 1976 to January 1980" in several categories, among which fleet size (from 40 "freshers" to zero; from 35 freezers to 25), tonnage of white fish landed by Hull vessels (from 117,035 to 23,713 tonnes), and seagoing personnel employed in the industry (from a total of 2,131 to 1,199) (Hull Fishing Industry, 1980, 3). These numbers show the scale of decline even more sharply in contrast to the 3,564 fishermen in the industry reported by sociologist Gordon W Horobin in 1957 (Horobin, 1957, 344); or to the 8,600 people Byrne claims were directly employed in the industry as of 1976 (Byrne, 2016, 256).

Further, as Byrne's ethnographic work also shows, the entanglement between industry and identity in trawling meant that the consequences of its decline spread beyond the local economy to urban change and to the disruption of whole communities and even rhythms of life that had existed around the trawlermen (Byrne, 2015, 820). After 1978, Hessle Road, formerly the heart of the trawling community, changed entirely with trawling-related infrastructure disappearing and housing and stores taken over by others from outside the industry (Byrne, 2015, 820). Byrne cites one of her participants, former trawler skipper Michael, who reflects that at the time it felt "like half of Hull had gone to sleep and just left" (Byrne, 2015, 820). The metaphor of sleep was also evoked by Alec Gill, who claimed that, "[a]s if jolted from a dream, Hull people [were] left wondering how they were all swept away" (Gill, 1993, A8). Those who remained in the community saw it change entirely, no longer defined by familiar relations between people sharing strong links to the same industry and its rhythm, and no longer shaped even by the same infrastructure when docks and buildings gradually became abandoned (Byrne, 2016, 258-9).

On the governance level, this story of loss produced direct political consequences, ones that would translate into the UK's accession negotiations with the European Economic

Community (EEC, later the EU). This tendency was already emerging in 1971, before the 50-mile Cod War dispute (1972-3). In a 26 June 1971 speech to his constituents in Anlaby, a small town in what is now East Yorkshire, MP Patrick Wall displayed the awareness that fishing opportunity would be a key concern for the community he represented: "agreed terms for the fishing industry" in the upcoming negotiations with the EEC were, he said, an "important matter and one which will considerably influence my vote" (Wall, 1971, 1). At the time of the speech, MP Wall highlighted that fishing policy was to be renegotiated in the near future, with the British government asking "for a six mile exclusive fishing limit from base lines together with jurisdiction over a further six miles in which there will be no discrimination between our vessels and those of the Community" (Wall, 1971, 1); but he set an additional requirement outside these negotiations: appropriate arrangements with Iceland, "who has already threatened to claim a 50 mile fisheries limit off her coast" (Wall, 1971, 2).

In reality, contention over the fit of the EEC's fishing policy for the needs of the UK had begun as early as the first day of accession negotiations, 30 July 1970—which also happened to be the day that the CFP's original basic principles were set by the Council of Ministers (Churchill, 1977, 26). British scepticism about this date "coincidence", for instance as expressed in a Conservative Research Department briefing from 1977, certainly informed UK-EEC tensions on fishing:

> The present [as of 1970] CFP was hurriedly put together by the original six member states of the EEC during the negotiations for membership by Norway, Iceland, Denmark and the United Kingdom. They saw the opportunity to increase their fishing effort in the long term, and it was as a result of this that Norway opted out of the negotiations. Britain persuaded the original six member states that the CFP should be renegotiated by 1982 in return for us accepting the need for a fishing policy at all (Conservative Research Department, 1977, 1).

The letter also shows, however, that negotiations with the EEC were at least initially seen in London as an opportunity to secure access to lost fishing grounds, first to Iceland in the Cod Wars and later to Norway and Denmark after they had declared EEZs under UNCLOS III.

Even after Iceland had dropped out of the negotiations, British politicians continued to draw links between the Cod Wars, the decline of long-distance fishing, and the ongoing negotiations with the EEC to revise the CFP. The confidential Conservative Research Department on the UK-Iceland dispute from 15 January 1976 put blame on the ruling Labour government for "show[ing] itself to be incompetent in handling the dispute and protecting either the interests of the fishing industry or broader British interests within NATO or the EEC" (Conservative Research Department, 1976, 10). At the same time, the brief hinted at tensions between the UK's

position and the role of the EEC not only as a potential mediator of the Cod War conflict but also as another potential challenge to British fishing independence:

> EEC mediation would not smile unreservedly on Britain's case, but not only could such meditation bring the dispute to an early end, it could also enhance Britain's international image and strengthen her hand in the vital renegotiation of the EEC's Common Fisheries Policy (Conservative Research Department, 1976, 4).

These and other excerpts from the confidential brief also betray an early sense amid the UK's political elite that fishing could be a politically expedient issue both domestically and internationally. Although Conservative and Labour governments had largely pursued similar policies throughout the Cod War disputes (Guðmundsson, 2006, 111), the brief specifically impugned "the Labour Government's record in handling the dispute", which it claimed was "marked by incompetence, apparent duplicity and a failure either to recognise or protect British national interest" (Conservative Research Department, 1976, 1). Accordingly, the brief recommended action. "The Government should be pressed to explain the preparations it is making to secure the interests of the fishing industry under the expected new legal regime," the brief suggested to its readers as a possible opposition initiative: "The explanation would probably be inadequate and leave the Government open to criticism" (Conservative Research Department, 1976, 5). In other words, the Conservative Research Department saw in the tension between navigating the legal paradigm change and protecting British fishing interests a political opportunity to show the sitting government in a poor light. In this way, the report indicates that politicians in the 1970s were as ready to utilise fishing against their domestic opponents as their contemporary counterparts in debates leading up to Brexit.

In terms of international expediency, meanwhile, the briefing's references to British interests in the upcoming EEC negotiations could be read as an early precursor for the way that fishing would be deployed against the EEC and later the EU. Already in early 1976, the briefing documents concern with the EEC perspective on fishing on both sides of the aisle: "H.M.G. may well be correct in supposing that NATO or EEC meditation would not smile unreservedly on Britain's case" (Conservative Research Department, 1976, 4). These hints metamorphized into attitudes by the 1977 confidential report, in which now the European Commission, rather than the government, had become the recipient for political criticism about the British long-distance fleet's fortunes:

> There has been a total failure by the European Commission to achieve any real agreements for reciprocity with third countries. This can be partly blamed on the fact that the internal policy is in such chaos, but it seems that generally they have not really got to grips with this particular problem

> which is so vital to the United Kingdom industry. Iceland is finished as far as anyone can see, Russia is fiddling around […], the Faroes' quotas are temporary and small and agreements with Norway are also temporary […]
>
> Generally, the future is extremely bleak for our distant water fleet which is the largest within the Community.
>
> One element of progress by the Community was to ban certain countries such as Poland and East Germany from fishing within the new 200-mile EEC zone but this is of little consolation to our fishermen (Conservative Research Department, 1977, 2).

Taken together, these archival texts show several relevant trends. First, the loss associated with long-distance trawling led to far-reaching societal and political consequences. It impacted the very fabric of Yorkshire's maritime economy and communities. Moreover, it was also on the mind of British politicians to the extent that it influenced UK diplomatic relations with not only Iceland, but also NATO and later the EEC. Second, as early as the 1970s, and perhaps thanks to the concurrent decline of long-distance trawling, politicians recognized the political utility of fishing as a symbol and employed it rhetorically against domestic and international opponents alike. Finally, as long-distance trawlermen in Hull lost their traditional Arctic grounds, their industry, and the promises, identity, and sense of community they derived from it, the British government shifted responsibility onto the EEC via criticism of the CFP.

All these themes, then, were inherited by subsequent narratives on the Yorkshire North Sea shore. In a 2002 article for *The Guardian* on Hull's trawling heritage, for instance, journalist Chris Arnot drew similar links between the plight of former trawling communities, the Cod Wars, political failures in Britain, and EU fault through the CFP. From describing the "dereliction" and "rotting wood" evident in Hull's old maritime infrastructure alongside the economic and cultural consequences for its communities, he continued,

> Successive governments, meanwhile, have treated [trawlermen] with a lack of respect bordering on contempt. The trawling industry was decimated by the last of the cod wars, fought over Icelandic waters in the 1970s. Since then, there has been a failure to come up with a workable common fisheries policy in Europe (Arnot, 2002).

The same idea that British politicians had treated trawlermen and fishermen "with a lack of respect bordering on contempt" (Arnot, 2002) recurred in the contemporary pro-Leave narratives I encountered more than a decade later on the Yorkshire North Sea coast. Off the record, one participant shared with me the view that fishing had been used as a trading chip in the UK's accession negotiations during the 1970s. The idea that the UK had deliberately sacrificed fishing

interests in the name of a more favourable accession arrangement for the nation was also documented in scholarship (Phillipson and Symes, 2018, 169). And it proved an influential idea, one that would come to frequently grace the narratives of pro-Leave campaigners who evoked the case of fishing throughout the Leave campaigns.

An illustrative example comes from a booklet entitled "The Betrayal of Britain's Fishing to the European Union", prepared in 2016 for the Campaign for an Independent Britain. The booklet's foreword cites fishing and the history of the UK's accession as an example of deliberate governmental abdication of both responsibility and power:

> Harold Macmillan, when he was Prime Minister, declared that Britain should join the European Economic Community (Common Market) because he believed that our country was ungovernable and should be subjected to the chill wind of competition from Europe. The British fishing industry has certainly suffered from that chill wind and is now a shadow of its former self, due to our membership of what has become the European Union (David Stoddart in Ashworth, 2016, iii).

The themes raised in this excerpt—that EU membership had decimated the fishing industry, that any governance on the EU level was irreconcilable with Britain's independence as a state, and that these two points are entangled in the maritime context—echo the appeals to fishing as a national symbol that I have shown appeared throughout the Cod Wars and the EEC accession negotiations. Further in the booklet, John Ashworth argued that "a great national asset and a whole industry [were] sacrificed as the price of membership. So obsessed was [Prime Minister Edward Heath] with taking the UK into the EEC that he felt this was a price worth paying" (Ashworth, 2016, 4). Perhaps it was also thematic linkages between fishing sovereignty and nationalist pride inherited from the Cod Wars that prompted Ashworth to compare the original EEC-six CFP to "a powerful tool in the planned eradication of the Nation State" (Ashworth, 2016, 12). In Leave narratives, then, the EEC/EU, the decline of fishing, the loss of national sovereignty and that of individual prosperity and pride, were all tied together. Yet this entanglement, as the archival materials I have reviewed here suggest, emerged initially in narratives surrounding the Cod Wars. From there, it coloured the legal and political changes that followed on from the Cod Wars: UNCLOS III, the new vision of oceanic governance, and the EU and CFP.

These political visions became further reinforced on the Yorkshire shore through the 1990s and 200s, as Yorkshire's fishing fleet was reduced in size outside of Hull through a different set of dynamics. When the UK introduced quotas in 1999, it was in order to distribute the UK's TAC set under the CFP—in other words, the quota system was linked to the UK's membership in the EU and the government's compliance with the CFP (Carpenter et al., 2016, 9). The mechanism through which local and especially small-scale Yorkshire fishermen became excluded

in the UK quota allocation, as I reviewed early on in this chapter, was a UK-based one, and separate from the CFP (Carpenter and Kleinjans, 2017, 9). Nevertheless, fishing on the Yorkshire shoreline did change after the quotas were distributed, in a way that resonated with the loss of Hull's long-distance trawling through the Cod Wars.

Ultimately, although UNCLOS III's introduction of EEZs, the CFP, and the UK quotas were all introduced to prevent overfishing, the socio-economic impact mattered more to communities (Carpenter et al., 2016, 13). I observed this to be the case also on the Yorkshire North Sea coast. When speaking about the changed patterns of fishing on the Yorkshire shore, for example, James opined that even if fishing effort and changes to stocks were the underlying cause, for his own experience the introduction of quotas had been a key factor:

> For us, it was probably quotas that really started to affect us, didn't it, Grace? By the time we'd finished, we were on very tight quotas and it probably coincided—We probably hadn't enough quota really and it probably coincided with, it came to a time where, when we're trawling, we maybe spent four or five days at sea, certainly in the summer, and I think we'd just had enough of that really. [...] It's probably the right thing to do because trawling's sort of finished at Brid, but as I said there is still a few trawlers at Scarborough, but it has reduced drastically, has trawling, yes it has (James, fisherman, 2017).

Official accounts on fishing in Yorkshire support James' observations, expanding, as he did in our conversation, on the impact to individual towns. For example, in oral evidence submitted in 2004 to the House of Commons, Andrew Palfreman reported, "The Yorkshire and Humber region has witnessed the disproportionate decline, indeed near collapse in some ports, of the whitefish industry in that region, with dire effects on the major ports" (Palfreman, 2004).

The pro-Leave narratives, in turn, capitalized on these losses by promising a reversal. For instance, on a 2015 visit to the Lincolnshire fishing port Grimsby, across the Humber from Hull, UKIP leader Nigel Farage was quoted by the BBC promising, "When Britain leaves the European Union, Grimsby will once again be a great fishing port" (Farage in BBC News, 2015). A year later, just before the Referendum, journalist Tara John observed that Farage's words had found resonance with Grimsby's fishing communities, for whom the vote had become "more about emotion than economics" (John, 2016). Despite thriving industries—Grimsby was a hub for UK seafood processing its "run-down" fishing docks were productively utilized by renewable energy companies—many in Grimsby reported to *Time* that they strongly leaned pro-Leave:

> The town is adamant that foreigners—including Europeans—should not meddle in national issues. That includes Vincent, the former fisherman, who is also critical of what he sees as the E.U.'s intervention into British

> affairs. According to him, Britain should regain its dominion over 200 miles of water from its shores and regain the pride that Grimsby lost all those years ago. "We are seafarers, we are an island nation" he says, standing on the now rotting deck of the Ross Tiger. "We are not made for Europe." (John, 2016).

Vincent's words, as reported by Tara John, evoke the same theme of fishing as a symbol of British national independence evident in the Campaign for Independent Britain booklet or in Farage's words in Grimsby. It was this last theme, Stephen highlighted for me in our conversation, that resonated with fishing communities on the Yorkshire North Sea coast. To an extent, he disagreed with the view illustrated in Tara John's piece that dislike of "foreigners—including Europeans" was the main motivator for fishermen. Instead of isolationism, Stephen framed the issue as one of independence:

> Brexit isn't the result of fishermen being xenophobic—though there's a tendency there because they're from small communities—but it's about having been told by people who don't know what they're talking about for so long how to do what they do as a job, and they've just been angry about that, they needed to kick someone, and unfortunately an opportunity came up to kick someone and it wasn't the right person to kick but that's what they've done. And they're independent, fishermen are independent, some fiercely independent people, and they see this EU as an evil overlord that's caused all the problems in the last 20-30 years. Despite the fact that you can now eat North Sea cod because it's certified as sustainable (Stephen, researcher, 2017).

Stephen's allusion to fishermen "kick[ing] someone [who] wasn't the right person to kick" in part spoke back to the UK government's unacknowledged responsibility for the access limitations that fishermen faced and that had ultimately contributed to their sense of the EU as "an evil overlord" (Stephen, researcher, 2017). Stephen's emphasis on the "fierce" independence of fishermen, moreover, is even more important, not only because it was an aspect the pro-Leave narratives often capitalized on, but also because it links feelings about the EU with the complex set of local and national identities linked with fisheries, including those on the Yorkshire North Sea coast.

Additionally, Stephen was referencing fishermen's frustrations with other aspects of marine governance in the UK, which had been undergoing change in recent decades, resulting into widening and competing claims on Yorkshire's maritime space. Environmentalist policies on energy and conservation, often associated with the EU, had led to the establishment of offshore wind farms and marine protected areas (MPAs) in the waters off Yorkshire's shorelines. They were "the new cool kids on the block", Stephen told me, and since "fishermen have such a bad

reputation as evil people who take something for nothing from the sea, it's very difficult for them to fight this lovely green movement" (Stephen, researcher, 2017). Hence, Stephen explained, fishermen had long held a sense that their communities were powerless and unheard. This, he emphasized, was one of the key reasons why the narratives propagated by the Leave campaigns found resonance with fishermen on the Yorkshire North Sea shore.

There are several relevant observations to be drawn here. First, the decline described in paragraphs above remains, as per James' comments, a part of fishing communities' living memory. Through the deprivation still experienced on the shoreline, this decline accrues further significance for the contemporary context. Indeed, the local history I have outlined above informs the ability to reflect back on the invisibility felt by contemporary fishing communities on the Yorkshire shore, on the pride still associated with fishing as a successful local economic earner, and on the identity—both regional and national—still tied in with the industry. Finally, the regional archival documents illuminating politics at the end of the Cod Wars and the EEC negotiations help to show how these histories, economies, and the sentiments associated with them attained a political edge. As politicians shifted blame for the trawling decline onto their opponents and on external actors like Iceland and the EU, the idea of fisheries management as a matter of "us or them" became entrenched and entwined with the romanticism, identity, and nostalgia also associated with fishing. And from the 2000s onward, as I would learn, echoes of these patterns occurred with the arrival of new marine uses like offshore wind generation and protected areas, viewed as new factors of displacement. In the next section of this chapter, I will explore participants' narratives of their arrival and the wider themes of enclosing and governing maritime space that they brought up.

The "paradigm shift" and maritime space enclosure in Yorkshire's waters

Viewed on a wider scale, the Cod Wars must also be understood within the wider context that Rachel Carson reacted to and herself worked to advance: that is, within the context of evolving knowledge about the marine environment, rising awareness about the scale of human impact on the oceans and seas, and the evolution of a new international legal paradigm to reflect these factors. To a large degree, the contemporary ocean governance regime under UNCLOS III evolved in response to this awareness (Juda, 2001, 17). The EEC's supranational competence in marine governance evolved around the same time, emerging in response to this paradigm shift and indeed drawing justification from it (Antonova, 2015, 126, 130-1; Antonova, 2016, 80). From the onset of UNCLOS III, in other words, the EEC/EU's identity in the context of the marine environment was entangled with the newly established global legal order for its governance. This link was further reinforced through the EU's strengthening competences over environmental policy during the 1990s, as well as through the importance that the narrative of "green Europe" played for EU integration since (Kelemen and Vogel, 2010, 443; Manners and Murray, 2016, 194-5). This paradigm, as Seamus had also remarked, found its expression in Britain through a series of policies

through the 1990s and 2000s, including the Marine and Coastal Access Act. Given this context, the histories surrounding the Cod Wars, EEC negotiations, and fishing decline could also suggest that some of the uncertainty and discomfort participants had cited on the contemporary Yorkshire coastline also inherited tensions from the new paradigm's implementation in the UK context.

In fact, several participants spoke about this change in governance directly. Some highlighted philosophical concerns with the very idea of delineating ocean space. Stephen, for instance, criticized the concept of MPAs, and by extension the MCZs that executed the UK's marine conservation targets as part of the Marine and Coastal Access Act. When asked to elaborate on a passing comment that MPAs were not his "cup of tea", Stephen replied, "No, no, they're not, I don't like them. […] The problem—ugh, I could go for hours. I'll try not to" (Stephen, researcher, 2017). Once reassured that he could speak on the subject for as long as he liked, he continued:

> The problem with marine protected areas is, they appeal to a simplistic view of the world: you can put a fence 'round an area, leave it alone, and that's it, it's fine. It's protected. And that's just such bullocks, it really is. There's one at Flamborough Head. It's a no-take zone, and it's, I think it's probably about a thousand, fifteen-hundred meters long and seven hundred meters wide so it's the same size as a salmon net, basically. It's in the wrong place. There's nothing there. We've dived it, we've had a look at it. The only thing you're gonna see on there is canals, 'cause it's sand, it's just sand. There's nothing there, it's not worth protecting. And yet, there was a fanfare when it was developed and everybody said this is a great achievement, we're gonna have a no-take zone where our fishermen are not allowed to go. This is stupid, and it's tiny, it's not gonna do anything (Stephen, researcher, 2017).

Hence, Stephen identified two problems with MPAs from an ecological standpoint. First, in his view they often relied on arbitrary designations—as he illustrated through his claim that the Flamborough no-take zone covered an unproductive area "in the wrong place" (Stephen, researcher, 2017). The larger problem for him, however, seemed to be the "simplistic view of the world" that promoted parcelling the sea into protected and unprotected portions—whereas, he went on, "the whole world should be a protected area" (Stephen, researcher, 2017). His sentiments thus could be interpreted as critique of the perspective represented by NGOs like Kate's, which she revealed had played an active role "to draw the lines on the map initially" in the consultation process for setting up MCZs in the North Sea (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017). In Kate's view, the significance of these protected areas was "just to leave some space for wildlife […] that's essential from our point of view because there's so much [other activity] going on, there's little space for that [wildlife]" (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017). In this way, even an area like the

Flamborough no-take zone, which Stephen had argued was "tiny [and] not gonna do anything" (Stephen, researcher, 2017), could in Kate's view be significant as a dedicated space in the maritime landscape. Nevertheless, even Kate admitted that the protected areas were an imperfect tool, particularly in the fluid, moving context of the sea. "Those MCZs are in place in a fixed area," she commented, "but we need to think about other factors that will affect them going forward, for example climate change, so we could see range shifts" (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017). Personally, she was committed to advocating for developing the MCZ's management plans with a "level of adaptability and flexibility" (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017).

Unlike Kate, who still viewed the MCZs as a valuable first step, Stephen argued that these areas could in fact prove ecologically counterproductive in certain cases. To make this point, Stephen cited the case of Lundy Island in the Bristol Channel, off the UK's West Coast, where a no-take zone like the one at Flamborough Head had been established. Once fishermen were banned from working in the area, the lobster population changed, as intended. But an unintended consequence, Stephen explained to me, was that the newly enlarged population of lobsters also altered the local ecosystem: "all the active fauna, the stuff that lives on the rock, that's in that area, is being grazed. So yes," he went on, "there's more lobsters around, but it's changed something else, you know" (Stephen, researcher, 2017). Thus, he highlighted the fluidity and interconnectedness of the marine ecosystem, which a single delineated area for protection failed to account for.

William, who was similarly critical of the MCZ network, also referenced the Lundy Island case. After the protected area had been completely closed to fishing, he recounted how the lobsters living there had grown ill with Gaffkaemia "because they were living all on top of each other" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). He stressed that the illness would not have occurred had fishing effort continued, saying that ordinarily "there's natural selection and there's a fishery selection […] in a natural fishery, this [disease] doesn't happen, because [the population] gets thinned out" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). I found William's view of the "fishery selection" as a natural process indicative. It suggested a belief that humans and the sea existed in a symbiosis rather than as separate entities and conveyed a soft claim of fishermen's importance to the ecosystem. It was a view that fishermen around the UK had overwhelmingly shared with geographers Emma Cardwell and Thomas Thornton as part of their recent research into "the fisherly imagination" of the sea (Cardwell and Thornton, 2015, 162-3). Fishermen, the researchers reported, "tended to see themselves as key actors in this ecosystem assemblage, with the role of changing fishing patterns, gears, or harvesting trends in the wider ecosystem often discussed" and contributing to the fishermen's belief that they engaged in a kind of "stewardship of place" (Cardwell and Thornton, 2015, 163). This view was also expressed by Connor, who stressed that humans have "lived in and depended on the sea since Neolithic times" and that the idea of preserving a pristine sea made reference to something that had never existed in human history: "You can't go and look at the

countryside and say, right, there's the natural bit. We've been affecting that for thousands and thousands of years. Similarly, we've been taking from the sea for thousands and thousands of years" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). Thus, human communities were embedded in the ecosystem in a way that disproved the idea of naturalness that underpinned protected areas as a policy tool in the first place.

For participants like Connor, William, or Stephen, then, MPAs were not only biologically counterproductive but flawed precisely through their erasure of human labour as an integral part of the ecosystem. As a result, all three thought that MPAs not only represented a simplistic perspective on the world but also, in enforcing that perspective, were unjust. This idea was expressed to me quite clearly by Stephen, who pointed out,

> [U]sually the reason, the underlying reason for protecting an area, of marine protected areas, is anti-fishing. All you do is displace a fishing activity. Those who used to fish here, can't fish here anymore, so there's ten fishermen used to fish there, twenty fishermen used to fish here, now those ten fishermen that used to fish there have to fish here and they fish harder, more, and they do more damage here than there (Stephen, researcher, 2017).

Hence, not only did the displacement of effort merely relocate and intensify environmental damage, but, in Stephen's view, this was done for the "underlying reason" of denying fishermen access. Leaving space for wildlife and the environment, as environmentalists argued, in other words, was not something Stephen would regard as a politically neutral act. That there was tension in delineating areas for conservation was evident even in Kate's account, as she admitted that the meetings to "draw the lines on the map" had been "very challenging at the time, you can imagine there are a lot of conflicting interests in that room, lots of people that want to use the sea for various different reasons" (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017). But whereas Kate did not linger on the contentious history of establishing the MCZs, participants like Stephen highlighted the ongoing consequences of cumulative enclosure.

Enclosures and having a "stake" in the marine environment

Indeed, on the Yorkshire North Sea maritime space, concerns around displacement due to the MPAs was exacerbated by past experiences encompassing those of long-distance trawlermen who had lost their grounds during the Cod Wars and those of small-scale Yorkshire fishermen, like James, who had been locked out of quota during the 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, these factors were exacerbated by the subsequent arrival of a series of new marine uses. For some participants, therefore, the paradigm shift in marine governance represented a change for the worse in terms of access to North Sea space, a change seen to disadvantage above all fishermen. Stephen

connected his criticism of MPAs to the global trend of the enclosure of the commons and specifically to the claims of ownership in the North Sea:

> [S]ome of it is, it makes me think of commons. So fishing is a common, is common land. And our history throughout time has been to start to own, for people to start to own the commons. It's one of the things that wind farms are doing. So wind farms—You can't buy a bit of the sea bed. For instance, if you go up in North Yorkshire and find some land for sale and buy it, it would be yours. You can't do that in the North Sea. Or you didn't used to be able to, but now these wind farms are able to buy huge tracts of the North Sea and own them, pretty much, in all but name, and that didn't used to happen. And in doing so they are […] controlling where fishermen can fish on their commons (Stephen, researcher, 2017).

When speaking about fishing as a common, Stephen was in essence referencing the sum of two key Enlightenment ideas: Hugo Grotius' 1609 *Mare Liberum*, which claimed that the seas beyond a three-mile mark from the shore should be free and common property (Grotius, 1609); and John Locke's justification of property as resulting from the addition of labour to a thing—a justification, not coincidentally, Locke illustrated through the example of catching fish: "what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind […], is by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property, who takes that pains about it" (Locke, 1690, no pagination).

Stephen's evocation of fishing as a common land thus speaks to legal history as well as to the idea that fishermen have a right to their livelihood that should be guaranteed through a property regime. While the legal reality had changed, in part externally through the Cod Wars and UNCLOS III and internally through policies and interests introducing new uses for Yorkshire's maritime space, Stephen's comment suggests how the *idea* endured. For Stephen, then, the paradigm shift in marine governance could be interpreted in terms of ideas of ownership, property, and right to the sea. The same themes recurred also in a statement that Connor made:

> We never really before had people staking a claim to the sea, it's always been this idea of free passage through the sea, but now that idea, that concept has sort of gone a bit, hasn't it. If you build a wind farm, you can't say there's free passage through that anymore. That group restricts what we can and can't do there. So that's changed, that bit of sea is not free to navigate anymore. If we have marine conservation zones put in places, that's a kind of spatial regulation, of that place—it's not regulating an activity, we're regulating a place, we're saying that isn't the open sea, the

> free sea anymore, that's a special bit. So that's changed (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017)

Both Stephen and Connor emphasized how fishermen had perceived the arrival of new uses of maritime space, from wind farms onward, as a reason to band together and seek help for what they saw as an encroachment on maritime space to which they felt they had a traditional right. In Stephen's words, fishermen had found themselves "up against a developer or an organization that wants to do something in their part of the world, on *their* water, that *they* own, you know—that's how they felt it" (Stephen, researcher, 2017, his emphasis).

Indeed, these themes of ownership had recurred through contestations of Yorkshire's maritime space. The earliest of these contestations could be traced to the arrival of wind farms off the Yorkshire coast during the previous decade. Yorkshire's waters have been the site of rapid development for UK wind power generation in recent years. Since construction began on the first local projects in the early 2010s (consequentially Teeside, Westermos Rough, and Humber Gateway—all now operational), several new, and increasingly larger, projects have been approved in Yorkshire's offshore waters by the Crown Estate. At the time I spoke to participants, in 2017, Hornsea One and Two were already under construction and projected to be completed 2020 and 2022 respectively; while the Dogger Bank project, set to become "the largest wind farm in the world" and feature "the largest offshore wind turbines ever built", had only just received approval two years earlier (Ambrose, 2019).

These developments emerged thanks to a specific policy context following on from the "paradigm shift to ecosystem governance" (Seamus, 2017). Wind energy became important to the extent of coming "to the front of the British political, business and social agenda" throughout the 2000s, encouraged by national policy strategies (Strachan et al., 2006, 3). In 2007, the UK government outlined concerns with energy security, specifically in the face of "risks arising from the concentration of fossil fuel reserves in fewer and further away places, some of them in less stable parts of the world" (Department of Trade Industry, 2007, 7). Climate change represented another overarching challenge, and the UK aspired to take the lead in European Union renewable energy policy (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2009a, 5; Directive 2009/28/EC). In response to both concerns, the UK government published its Low Carbon Transition Plan in 2009, which adopted commitments to cut 2008-level emissions by 18 per cent before 2020 and to increase the share of renewables in the UK's total energy production to 30 per cent (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2009a, 4). From only about 5.5 per cent out of the total in 2008, the UK's share of renewables rose to 11.3 per cent in 2012 and to 33 per cent in 2018 (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2009b, 29; Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013, 32; Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2019, 32). Offshore wind was a key component of this growth. Between 2011 and 2012 alone, offshore wind capacity in the UK increased by 46 per cent (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013, 32). Although the first

wind farm in the UK had not been built until 2000, by 2012 the UK was already the largest global market of offshore wind, featuring more than half of Europe's installed capacity (Dawley 2014, 93-4). This acceleration was due to the government policy outlined above, combined with what Connor called "healthy subsidies" for wind energy projects (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). In sum, as he put it, in the UK there was "a clear policy steer that thou shalt build wind farms" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017).

Although these projects were planned for offshore waters beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea mark, their location frequently coincided with existing fishing grounds. Furthermore, they presented potential obstacles to normal fishing operations even before they were built. Fear of displacement had often been reported by research into the interactions between fishermen and offshore wind farm developments across the UK, including in Yorkshire. Speaking to government and university researchers alike, a decade apart, fishermen shared their expectations that the arrival of offshore wind would mean loss of fishing their fishing grounds, as well as disruption to how their gear was deployed once wind construction or maintenance crews needed access to the same space (Hooper et al., 2015, 18-19; Mackinson et al., 2006, 5). Fishermen also reported fearing for their navigational safety (Mackinson et al., 2006, 6). Finally, researchers found that even though individual fishermen could expect to receive compensation for being displaced by the wind farms, fishing communities as a whole believed the process would prove unequitable and fail to take into account wider impacts to the fishery, for example the crowding of maritime space not occupied by wind farms (Hooper et al., 2015, 19).

Several participants echoed these concerns while recounting the early local experiences with wind farm projects. Connor's account, for example, suggested that the first offshore projects in Yorkshire had not learned from the research. Instead, these initial developments had shown themselves as insensitive precisely to fishermen's access and habitual practices:

> [T]he early contact between the offshore wind industry and fishermen had not gone particularly well, had been quite adversarial, the first developers that started work around here had tried to just kind of force their way in, saying we are, we're gonna do the survey, we're doing it in a couple of weeks' time, we need you to move all of your fishing gear out of the way so our survey boat can go there, and by the way it's August 1, the busiest season of the year (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017).

Due to these failures in awareness and communication, as Connor described them, early interactions between fishermen and offshore wind companies had not only failed to assuage, but had indeed played directly into, local communities' existing concerns over access. For Connor, moreover, the tendency toward limiting maritime space introduced by the wind farms had not

abated and would only continue to increase in the future through the advancement of various other uses of the sea. He commented:

> [T]he 'threat', in inverted commas, didn't go away. So after the first survey came along, then there were more, then they started building a wind farm, then another wind farm, and then two more wind farms, and then somebody wanted to develop two new gas fields, and then there were Marine Conservation Zones being planned, and then telecoms cables, and then carbon capture pipeline—that whole threat of other people turning up and announcing that this bit of the sea is now mine, yes I know you or your family has fished it for 300 years but it belongs to me now and I'm gonna dig it up—that's an ongoing threat. […] This is something quite new, and it isn't changing (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017).

In the context of MPAs and the introduction of MCZ tranches, the same patterns seemed to repeat. In the Yorkshire context, specifically, the introduction of two new large MCZs—Holderness Inshore and Offshore—had been seen from the industry side to leave "local fishermen in the dark about their future" (Hobbs, 2016). Cited in the article, the chief executive of the Holderness Fishing Industry Group protested the MMO's failure to consult with local fishermen where it came to developing the management plans for newly established MCZs: "We want to know there are going to be sensible management measures as it is important to fishermen's livelihoods. There is a lot riding on this" (Cohen, cited in Hobbs, 2016).

These themes of distrust echoed concerns that had emerged earlier with the arrival of offshore wind. Companies had reinforced the fishing community's pre-existing fears with respect to the compensation practices they adopted. While individual fishermen might have received compensation for being displaced, the community to which those individuals belonged did not always feel the wider advantages wind farms promised. William, for example, believed the benefit to be limited mainly to individuals:

> Like wind farms, you know, we are told that we have to have so many wind farms in there. Well, what benefit do we see from wind farms? We got displaced, some fishermen got displaced from the fishing grounds and got compensation for it, and I believe they got decent compensation for being displaced. But we don't actually see anything from it here (William, fisheries advocate, 2017).

In William's view, the wind industry offered little to his town, particularly as construction and servicing vessels chose another regional port for their operations—despite there only being a "200 meters' difference" between the towns' distances to the project (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). When I inquired why, given this small a difference, the wind farms had chosen the other town as

their port of call, William replied that one key difference lay in the types of sea access that both ports offered. The port in William's town, unlike its competitor, did not provide the twenty-four-hour-access necessary for the wind farm vessels; instead, its access was tide-dependent (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). Although it was possible to reconfigure the port's facilities, William explained that, having once lost the competition, his town was now too late to develop capacity as a service port for future wind farm projects: "by the time it's built, they'll be nearly decommissioned" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). The economic advantage the wind farms offered, therefore, would remain limited to the other port.

An additional reason for why the other town received the offshore firm's preference, however, pertained to the fate of fishing infrastructure:

> They [the other town] changed their economy wrong when the fishing dropped. So, they didn't need the sea ways for fishing anymore, so the wind farm company moved in. Cheap land, cheap redundant buildings (William, fisheries advocate, 2017).

Although the issue of twenty-four access proved to be the determining factor, I was interested in the link that William drew between a coastal town's attractiveness as a base of operations for the new wind farm industry and that same town's level of adaptation to the decline of industrial fishing. "Changing the economy wrong" seemed, in this remark, to suggest a failure to rejuvenate it after the deindustrialization. As a result, the "cheap land" and "cheap redundant buildings" differentiated the competitor town. The sharper the decline, William's comment therefore implied, the more profitable it was for offshore energy projects to move in. In this sense, the wind industry seemed to perform a less-than ritual but also intentional replacement of the promises for success and prosperity once embodied by long-distance fishing.

Indeed, in the context of the UK North East and Yorkshire, external actors had also often framed the promise of wind power both implicitly and explicitly in terms of capitalizing on the region's industrial heritage—especially where it came to the infrastructure and expertise inherited from the maritime industries of its past (Dawley, 2014, 93, 102). In 2010, for example, then Prime Minister Gordon Brown connected offshore wind as an industrial opportunity similar to North East England's history of shipbuilding in terms of world leadership (Dawley, 2014, 93). When the Crown Estate announced its approval of the Hornsea contract early in the same year, Associated British Ports' commercial director Patrick Walters commented that the project was good news for ports like Grimsby and Hull, whose existing port infrastructure would help attract "leading players" from the industry (cited in BBC News, 2010). Referring to the same 2010 announcement, Greenpeace's executive director then noted, "Throughout its history Britain has shown the determination and ingenuity to tackle the great industrial challenges of each era. In the 21st century these qualities are being called on once again" (John Sauven, cited in Jha, 2010). Similar appeals to

Britain's and specifically the North East's industrial leadership in the maritime realm have been voiced in the context of more recent wind farm ambitions. Announcing a 2019 election pledge to build thirty-seven new offshore wind farms, for instance, shadow business secretary Rebecca Long Bailey remarked:

> Britain has long benefited from its windy shores, with the wind playing an essential role in our history as a seafaring nation. […] By taking a stake in offshore wind, we can collectively benefit from the profits, investing them back into our held back coastal communities. That wind will turn into harbour fronts and libraries (Rebecca Long Bailey, cited in Parsons, 2019).

Implicit in these appeals to maritime history, as Long Bailey's reference to the "held back coastal communities" suggests, is a recurring promise that offshore wind farms would help rejuvenate those communities hit hardest by the decline of former maritime industries. In this sense, narratives like hers sought to take over the values of community prosperity and benefit traditionally associated with fishing.

For Connor, however, this kind of implicit promise to give coastal communities "a stake" in the perceived national industry was a problematic concept:

> We talk a lot—and this is a word you would use a lot—about 'stakeholders' in the marine environment […] and that is a word that I think I find interesting, I find interesting how it's used. If I place a bet, my stake is the thing I will lose if it goes wrong. Fishermen's "stake" in good marine management is everything. It's their livelihood, it's their community. It's food on the table and paying the bills. It's not just a feeling that 'I like the sea; the sea is nice'. I was invited to an event from the building of a wind farm for stakeholders. There were two stakeholders from different hiking, hikers' associations, and their stake was that as they walk on the cliff tops, they like the way the sea looks, and how they feel about seeing wind farms in there. That's not a 'stake' (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017).

When it came to government consultations, therefore, Connor argued that the political process failed to represent or indeed even to recognize vital differences between "stakes" in the environment. Throughout the process, Connor explained, "the fishing industry is treated as one stakeholder, along with ramblers' associations and yachting associations and one thing and another. And that voice gets lost amidst all that, you're one stakeholder amidst a whole load of opinion holders" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). This loss of voice by precisely those who knew the environment most intimately troubled Connor. Pointing out of his window toward the horizon, he continued,

> We get consulted about wind farms that will be built 70 miles off land. Unless you're a fisherman, you've never seen that, unless you've looked out the window of an airplane going from Humberside Airport to Scandinavia. You've never seen that. What's your stake in that? You have opinions about it, I don't doubt, they're legitimate, valuable opinions, but opinion holders are not the same as stakeholders. (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017).

In this sense, Connor's comments also repudiated the notion that offshore wind generation could compensate or replace the societal losses experienced by Yorkshire's coastal communities. His emphasis on who has "seen" the maritime space offshore served to emphasize what he saw as an important difference. Aesthetic values in the sea were valuable, he highlighted, but as "opinions". By contrast, having a "stake" went beyond simply seeing and caring, pertaining instead to the material encounter situated in a fisherman's body and habitual practices, including the willingness to take on a risk or danger—which Connor highlighted was the real meaning of the word "stake".

Further, what fishing communities might lose also had to do with "the real nitty-gritty of life, of how am I gonna feed the kids today" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). The connection, therefore, was much more visceral. Further on in our conversation, Connor used just that word to describe to me what for him constituted the core difference between the two industries. He framed it in terms of the wider significance that each had and could—or could not—have for the coastal community:

> I think people underestimate the visceral nature of the threat when somebody announces 'I'm sticking 80 wind turbines there, those 5 square miles of sea are mine now'. What?! I think people don't get quite what an emotional impact that has. It's not just like, you know, the high street changing, or even some new regulation that comes in and restricts how you can do business. It's massively more than that. It's also OK, here's a regulation that changes the way you do business, oh and, by the way, it also means we're gonna come and paint your front door a different colour, and see your kids go through a different school now. It's something huge, it's big, it's, really you feel it, you see it every day. And that's what people misunderstand, I think. It's not just some sort of transaction that's financial value or economic impact, it's much more emotional than that, and that's why fishermen respond so strongly to these things. […] You're building a wind farm, it's what you do during the week and that's it, you go home at the end of the day and you do something else. It's not, you go home and you're polishing wind turbine blades and everybody you socialize with also makes wind turbines, and so is everybody in their family

> and everybody they know, it's not like that. There's an intensity to this that people misunderstand and that leads to some quite fierce confrontations (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017).

Connor's comments on the gap between wind farm work and fishing labour, particularly his choice of words like "visceral", "emotional", and "intensity", highlight the vital societal and cultural aspects characterizing the difference. Fishing, he stressed, was something done in the family and in the wider community. Simply replacing the main industry in former fishing towns would not be sufficient to provide these social and cultural links because, as in Connor's metaphor, nobody goes home and spends their evening "polishing wind turbine blades" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). Thus, while offshore wind may amount to the same economic value for a particular town, in Connor's view it could not counteract the significant emotional and societal impacts associated with the change. These were the aspects, especially in the light of Connor's earlier comment about "the stake", that became side lined once all perspectives were framed as equivalent.

Once introduced through the arrival of the wind farms, these societal and cultural tensions were replicated and even heightened through the further enclosures in the wider context of the shifting marine governance paradigm. Connor's concerns over the side lining of "real nitty-gritty of life" impacts in the context of the offshore energy consultations applied equally to the consultations through which MCZs had been and were still being, at the time I spoke to participants, implemented. In this case, however, further tension came from the activities of environmental organizations like Kate's, which directed outreach efforts towards implementing the new protected areas. Connor's insistence that a regular person might never "see" the space 70 miles off land, that their perspective was therefore purely abstract, came into contrast with how Kate spoke about her work to involve the public in consultations: "Of course, many people, most people in fact, are never going to see what lives in the North Sea […] so [our work] was bringing the sea to them, so they could see that what we have got, why it is fantastic and then why we should be trying to protect these species" (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017). Through efforts like videos and imagery, environmentalists like Kate explicitly worked to strengthen that "stakeholder" perspective, involving the public as part of consultation processes: "hopefully we've inspired them to respond to our call to action" (Kate, environmental advocate, 2017). By working to involve precisely those for whom the sea was not a source of income or immediate daily experience, the efforts of organizations like Kate's hence came into tension with Connor's perspective on who has a real "stake" in the marine environment. They represented possibly irreconcilable visions between either tangible or abstract "stake" in the North Sea, each focused on either the local or the global scale.

These tensions were complicated further by the views of participants like William, who felt that efforts like those of Kate's organization produced artificial governance decisions. Involving a

wide range of opinions in the process, he remarked, sometimes produced comical kinds of "evidence": "I remember one person saying, no licenses should be issued because it kills fish. Can't argue with that" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). On a more serious note, he continued, it was important to recognize that the consultations were not a purely democratic process:

> When it comes to consultation, it's not a popularity vote. So if there's a 100 answers, if there's 100 responses to the consultation, and 99 are in favour and one person is against it, it's not, "well 99 want it and 1 person doesn't, so therefore it's going in". Those 99 people may just have put, "I think it's a good idea" and the one person may have gone into a really reasoned argument as to why it should go in, and that may be the response that they go with. So it's not, who gets the most votes on it, it's who comes up with the most reasoned argument to it all (William, fisheries advocate, 2017).

When it came to public consultations, therefore, William indicated that some views mattered more than others. While he highlighted that, on the one hand, "everybody has equal right to the sea", on the other hand he worried about the weight that different perspectives received in public governance, in contrast to the consequences, which were not equally distributed (William, fisheries advocate, 2017). "Sometimes," he remarked, "the small person gets lost in the big cloud of bureaucracy […] sometimes some of the maritime regulations that are brought in have no effect on the big people but absolutely destroy the livelihoods of the little people" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017).

For William, the new protected areas exemplified this concern. He remarked how a MCZ could deepen the economic impact on fishermen directly and through knock-off effects, and contrasted this specifically to the salaries of those who might earn "seven times the worth of the local economy":

> We can have the marine conservation zones, but let's not try and drop them over the most productive fishing grounds we've got, because that's just putting people out of business, reducing their income and changing their lifestyle, stopping their kids from going to university.
>
> […] There, somebody's salary's worth seven times the worth of the local economy. So you may have a marine conservation zone and that may drop somebody's income by a hundred thousand pounds a year because they can't fish in that area. Well you take a seven-fold of them out there, and that's just cost 700,000 pound. Now you multiply it out by 10 fishermen that fish in that area that have all lost 100,000 pounds, so that could be,

> that's 7 million pounds now that's disappeared from the local economy (William, fisheries advocate, 2017).

In referring to the "somebody" whose individual worth exceeded the local economy, William did not specify any one person, but instead stressed the disparity between the marine environment as an abstraction viewed from a position of wealth and as the setting for one's livelihood. In doing so, he was also highlighting the discrepancy in scale inherent to the wider British marine governance context in general. Thus, for William, the new marine conservation zones represented a wider context of a national or even supranational agenda raised above the economic needs of local communities. Much like Connor had conveyed when speaking about the word "stake", William thought that the voices of fishing communities became diluted and were ultimately ignored as soon as they were set against national governmental interests. Thus, for both men the changing nature of maritime space resulted in the fishing perspective becoming invisible or underrepresented. Aspects like local livelihood, personal danger, material engagement with the sea, or social and cultural change, remained left out. The feelings of invisibility and being left behind that I illustrated in a previous section of this chapter, therefore, related directly—or at least were seen by participants to relate—to the change in how marine governance was conceptualized.

Austerity and doing marine governance by the numbers

In turn, participants debated whose agency was the one that imposed external targets and marginalized the concerns of local communities and individuals on the Yorkshire North Sea coast. The EU, as it had been since the accession negotiations, presented an easy political culprit. William, for instance, referenced the EU's conservation targets as an underlying reason for some of the new protected areas:

> Some of the things like the marine conservation zones and some of the special protected areas, they were probably only brought in because we had a certain number that we were told to do and we were always behind the number. [...] And the environmentalists told me that. They said, well it's gonna go through because we haven't enough SPAs as we should have done for Europe. So it's bound to go through because we need to get the numbers up (William, fisheries advocate, 2017).

William's comment illustrates how the ongoing friction between political priorities under the new marine governance paradigm and the local Yorkshire coast perspective tie into perceptions of the EU and its environmental policies. In his view, the new protected area designations pursued arbitrary supranational goals as a kind of check-box exercise. This arbitrariness, for him, aggravated the sense that ordinary people on the Yorkshire North Sea shore were being caught in the spokes of an impersonal bureaucratic wheel. In this sense, his comment resonated with the range of pro-

Leave narratives framing the EU as a distant bureaucratic machine indifferent to the interests of local coastal communities.

William's claim that even conservationists working in support of the protected areas believed them to be arbitrary—"the environmentalists told me that […] it's bound to go through because we need to get the numbers up" (William, fisheries advocate, 2017) was partially borne out by Lauren. She spoke about the new MCZs as part of a move toward quantifiable rather than quality-based conservation policy. But unlike William, Lauren absolved the EU's policies and instead spoke about the British government's by-the-numbers implementation:

> [T]here is a move towards numbers of sites, I feel, in national policy, rather than effective management of sites, and I don't really know where that comes from, because in the Habitats directive it does say that they should be well managed, and not just there, and that's transposed in the habitats regulations. […] But from where I'm sitting it looks like there's a push toward numbers of MPAs rather than a well-managed network—from my perspective (Lauren, local policy officer, 2017).

Lauren's comment shifted the focus of the conversation away from the EU and towards insufficient implementation. As someone directly involved in conservation management, she feared that the MCZs designated through the first two tranches were in effect "paper parks" because there were no actual management schemes in place for them or officers responsible for implementing them (Lauren, local policy officer, 2017). She highlighted that many conservation officers who had previously been funded by the national government, including Lauren herself, "no longer get funding from a national pot, which wasn't very much to start with but it was a national, you know—it was almost like a national acknowledgement of the importance of marine sites and of MPAs so we now have to find our funding elsewhere" (Lauren, local policy officer, 2017). In such cases, she asked rhetorically, "what's the point in managing, in having these sites if you're not gonna manage them? […] They're just there to, they're just lines on a map" (Lauren, local policy officer, 2017). These comments indicated Lauren's view that the reversal of the national government's support, even if that support had been given at a minimal level, essentially emptied the meaning out of the initial legislation. It was this reversal, she highlighted, that reduced MPAs to being "just lines on a map" (Lauren, local policy officer, 2017).

Thus for Lauren, as for some other participants involved in conservation on the Yorkshire North Sea shore, the problem with the new policy was rooted more specifically in the UK government's capacity to commit fully to executing the Marine and Coastal Access Act and the marine governance paradigm shift more broadly. Seamus, too, spoke openly about the effects of austerity on the ability of regional institutions like his to deliver effective marine governance. Sitting in the office of one of these institutions, he worried about the wide and widening array of activities

his team was expected to cover, even though his team had recently gone down in size and the funding had decreased, as well (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017). As a result, "[l]ike all government departments," he and his colleagues were "having to look at what's essential to answer the questions we need for management and rationalize our survey" (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017). Implementing a still-developing paradigm shift in an area as complex as marine governance given the scarcity of resources, Seamus admitted, was difficult. Too often it left his institution as "the middleman in between the industry and the NGOs and other government partners—somewhere in the middle there and trying to balance all the requirements" (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017). Although he stressed that everyone in his team was doing their best, the implication that policy objectives were undermined by the government's lack of financial commitment was clear.

Indeed, as Connor also highlighted, the pressures placed on government agencies as a result of insufficient funding produced problematic decisions. This applied especially to the public consultations over which both he and William had expressed concern. Most public servants, Connor noted, were "hugely overworked, and they're under resourced"; thus, when confronted with "thousands of pages of documents" from each public consultation, they were likely to follow the government steer and approve the project or protected area under consultation (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). As a result, much of the social and environmental complexity that the government should have taken into account was not always considered to the necessary depth. Peter, similarly, thought that in processes like these the government undermined its own agenda. Marine governance, he argued, became reduced to economic interest:

> But at the sea, what do we say? Okay, well this area might be developed for dredging, this area might be developed for wind farms, this area might be developed for more fisheries, so let's not develop any of these areas as nature reserves, let's look at some of the rubbish habitat that's left around the edges and let's designate a network of nature reserves so that we're showing that we're protecting the sea, but actually we're protecting some of the worst areas because we won't designate the best areas for nature conservation because there's an economic conflict, and it's madness. Almost illogical (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017).

Thus, for Peter, the perverse incentives followed by the government were economic ones. Referring specifically to the government's renewable energy agenda, he told me that the drive for more capacity was motivated not by genuine concern for the environment but instead purely by economics, "potentially at the expense of the sea itself" (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017). Wind farms were built, he felt, because they allowed the government "to achieve their renewable energy targets"; but that meant that "no one's really thinking about the impact on wildlife it might have" (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017). Here he referenced the Dogger Bank offshore wind

energy project and its relative closeness to the Flamborough Head European Marine Site, which provides nesting grounds for important populations of gannets, guillemots, razorbills, and kittiwakes (Flamborough Head European Marine Site Management Scheme, 5-8). Why, Peter wondered, would the government and agencies allow "the largest wind farm possibly in the world adjacent to the largest seabird colony in the UK?" (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017). His feeling, he concluded, was that ultimately "economy just wins, hands down, out at sea" (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017).

These varying comments and disagreements on the UK government's shortcomings in implementing marine policy all touch on themes that speak back to the debates on fishing and environment as part of the Brexit campaigns. Lauren and William's comments about by-the-numbers policy—especially in the context of William's suggestion that this policy existed only to satisfy obligations to the EU—help explain how Yorkshire's coastal community might have become susceptible to Leave narratives of the EU as a disinterested bureaucratic machine. Peter's concern about the environment's low rank on the government agenda, along with Seamus' admission that agencies intended to implement a paradigm shift were frequently underfunded and stretched thin, speak on the one hand to operational failures in policy implementation. On the other hand, however, these comments also tie in with the wider context of frictions emerging with the arrival of a new paradigm for marine governance on the Yorkshire North Sea shore. Reflecting back on these narratives shows how participants' concerns about the injustices or inefficiencies of marine governance policy have broader implications. Ultimately, they reinforce the tensions inherent to an ongoing clash of ideas over what the sea is about and whose "stake" should count foremost for its governance.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have traced the narrative patterns behind Brexit on the Yorkshire North Sea shore back to the Cod Wars and consequently to the "paradigm shift" in global marine governance that began with the realization that the oceans are not inexhaustible. I showed how conflicting perceptions of maritime space on the Yorkshire East Coast played a significant role in producing the tensions and contestations that have characterised this coastline's transformation since the 1950s. Reviewing participants' contemporary narratives in parallel with local historical materials, archival documents, media articles, and policy documents helped me to show how the identity and pride associated with maritime labour had played a part in British politics since at least the Cod Wars and the UK's accession negotiations into the EEC. With respect to Brexit itself, these findings contribute local depth to existing scholarship that highlights the cultural and societal sentiments that exist side by side to the economic experiences of communities feeling "left behind" (Ford and Goodwin, 2014, 278-280; Goodwin and Heath, 2016, 325). Contextualizing that scholarship on the Yorkshire North Sea shore, however, shows that environmental identities and

imaginaries can be central to the worldviews that underpin "left behind" sentiments. Within the Yorkshire maritime context, I showed how the decline of long-distance trawling as livelihood and as an identity left communities feeling invisible—or in Connor's words, "swept over the edge" (2017). For some participants I spoke to, including Connor but also William and Stephen (2017), this sense of marginalization applied most clearly to fishing communities and their ability to have a say in the policy process. From my conversation with Helen (2017), however, I discerned that as equally overlooked was the wider significance of local communities' links to the sea and coast—as expressed in the relationship she drew between picking up rubbish, pride in oneself, and care for one's environment and community. Moreover, the sense that important aspects of change were invisible to policy applied also to the sea itself, as environmental advocate Peter observed (2017). There is a parallel to be drawn here between Ford and Goodwin's suggestion that feeling "left behind" entails significant cultural and societal sentiments (2014, 278-80) and Rob Nixon's concern, in *Slow Violence*, with communities whose experiences of social and environmental change are overlooked by dominant representation patterns (2011, 8-9). The narratives I have examined suggest that, for various communities on the Yorkshire North Sea shore, the marine environment and its role in their daily lives is as central a political concern as the region's economics. This conclusion resonates with contemporary environmental humanities scholarship and its interest in highlighting aspects of social and environmental change that are in truth political despite not usually receiving central attention in politics (Neimanis et al. 2015, 75). For Yorkshire's maritime communities, at least, their relationship to the sea and the coast was part of what they felt was "left behind" and part of what they sought to restore.

In this way, the Yorkshire North Sea coast raises a wider point about the less visible aspects policy needs to address in order to respond to overarching shifts in environmental thinking and still make and execute decisions that are fair, accounting for communities' links to their environments. As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, the transformation that narratives on the Yorkshire East Coast chronicle forms part of the wider global story of human impact on the planet and its hydrosphere, and the resulting change in global oceanic governance represented by UNCLOS III and the EU's marine policies. In my conversations with participants, this link was not only signposted by Seamus' reference to the "paradigm shift in marine governance" (2017), but also made clear by various speakers—from Kate and Peter outlining the usefulness of newer environmental regulations (2017) to William, Stephen, and Connor debating the arrival of new uses of the sea in Yorkshire's maritime space (2017)—who highlighted how the policy landscape had changed in recent decades and discussed the benefits and drawbacks that they saw as a result. Their contrasting narratives on the arrival of wind farms and MPAs, for example, show how contentious the overarching change in marine governance has been on the Yorkshire North Sea shore. Often, participants suggested that the policies intended to guarantee the environment's sustainable use either overlooked or intentionally marginalized the economic, societal, and cultural

interests local communities had in maintaining their generational links to the sea. By unfolding the complicated regional legacy of this "paradigm shift", the narratives I have examined illustrate in detail the challenge that Chakrabarty predicted with reimagining politics for the Anthropocene while upholding local societal and environmental justice (2009, 220). These narratives also link this concern in environmental humanities scholarship to the policy literature debating "just transformations" and its argument that social justice and locals' perspectives (Bennett et al., 2019, 10) must underpin environmental policies designed to deliver sustainability. The Yorkshire North Sea shore presents a case for the significance of considering humanistic aspects, like representation and care, as part of what must constitute "just transformations".

These insights demonstrate how environmental humanities can usefully comment on concrete policy change in the environmental realm. However, this chapter also illustrates how the environment and its meaning can have an important bearing on wider politics, as well. The narratives I examined on the Yorkshire East Coast show that sentiments about the sea and its role for the community were often politicised throughout the decades, for a variety of environmental and non-environmental purposes alike. During the Cod Wars, long-distance trawling served as a symbol for British naval power projection. After the conflicts were settled in Iceland's favour, as I learned reviewing archival documents by the Conservative Research Department, the industry's decline became a rhetorical tool that British politicians utilised against their opponents. And, as the parallels between pro-Leave narratives and narratives surrounding the EEC accession negotiations decades earlier suggest, the romantic vision of fishing and the affiliated imaginary of carving local and national identity from the sea has been utilised repeatedly for alternative political goals. Moreover, at least on the Yorkshire North Sea shore, this vision of the marine environment and maritime labour continues to impact local communities' perception of the EU as a whole. In this sense, to place the environment centrally while examining this coastline's transformation is to discern significant cultural, historical, and narrative drivers behind policy: a direct way in which environmental humanities speaks to critical policy studies (for example as described in Fischer et al., 2015, 1-2 or Schmidt, 2015, 171) at least with regard to the Yorkshire context.

Thus, this chapter has demonstrated a broader significance to the links between the Cod Wars, pride and identity, and Brexit. Illustrating how narratives can and do get politically exploited presents another argument for the utility of considering the implications of communities' links to their environment as a central part of governance. Moreover, it speaks to an overarching concern of what is at stake when hidden or alternative interests shape a community's relationship with its landscape. On the Yorkshire North Sea coast, as this chapter has shown, Brexit is only one part of the many and significant consequences for communities, the environment, and even to social trust in the face of limited government capacity. Indeed, ultimately narratives from participants like Lauren, Peter, or Seamus suggest that the difficult heritage of the "paradigm shift" on the Yorkshire coastline is at least partly due to the its execution and the limited capacity that

institutions were given to support and recognize the perspectives, visions, and narratives of those "left behind" as new policies were implemented. At its close, therefore, the story of the Yorkshire North Sea shore raises questions about governance priorities and the willingness and ability of governments and societies to support environments and local communities through large political transformations. This theme is also one that resonates strongly with the next chapter, where I explore the narratives I collected and analysed on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore. I return to the Yorkshire North Sea shore, and visit at more length the parallels and tensions between it and the Bulgarian Black Sea, in the final chapter of this thesis.

Chapter V: Fighting for dunes and democracy on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast

Growing up in Bulgaria in the early 1990s, I visited the Black Sea coast with my family every year. Over the years, even as a child, I observed the coastline's rapid development, seeing resort towns grow exponentially between seasons and previously remote beaches become urbanized. Even to a casual visitor today, the significance of the tourist industry to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast is plain to see, with much of the shoreline's length dedicated to infrastructure and commercial businesses oriented towards seasonal beach-goers. As I will discuss in this chapter, tourism contributes significantly to the local and national economy; it has therefore spurred rapid and large-scale urbanization of the coastal landscape. Yet, although I initially approached the Bulgarian Black Sea shore with all this in mind, over the course of my fieldwork in the fall and winter of 2017-2018 I acquired a much deeper and more detailed perspective about the transformations of this coastline's environment and society. To most of the participants I spoke to, I learned, tourism per se was not the key issue. Rather, the tourist industry was the point around which a range of other concerns—from environmental loss through politics of knowledge and corruption to destructive economic and societal practices—crystallized. In response to these other issues, as I would discover, narratives in this context ascribed different meanings to the coastal environment and its significance for local communities.

This chapter opens by recounting participants' sentiments of losing the coast and its nature to tourism overconstruction before delving deeper into problems with perceived governance incapacity, legal ambiguity, and even corruption on the Bulgarian shoreline. Outlining the controversies around dunes and their status, I dedicate some space to discuss the complex relationship between these different forms of flawed or informal governance because of their significance to how participants understood social relations and the environment's transformation on the Black Sea shore. In the following section, I visit historic and literary materials pertaining to the establishment of tourism on the Bulgarian coast during socialism. Tracing the thematic connections between contemporary and historic materials, I chart the continuing importance of politics of knowledge and representation in this context. At the same time, I also show how in response, the Black Sea coast's landscape acquired meaning as a space for democracy that remains relevant, as participants' narratives demonstrate, to contemporary contestations. This conceptual significance of the coastline, as I discuss toward the end of this chapter, promotes alternative visions for positive change.

Losing the coast: Tourism overconstruction, environmental change, and legal ambiguity on the contemporary Bulgarian Black Sea coast

> Those overconstructions… at the sea[side] that's actually the biggest problem. That's what I was thinking about telling you, that—I'm sure you have an eye on things, I mean—here the biggest problem is that we must first destroy our nature in order to remember that we must preserve our nature. At the sea in particular […] in some places it's so overconstructed as to chase people away, Bulgarians have been chased away from our Black Sea coast (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation).

Over coffee in Sofia, Deyan spoke with both expertise and sadness about overconstruction and what he referred to as the destruction of nature on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast. As an expert working for the national government, he presented an objective overview of the challenges and issues associated with the coastline's environmental governance. At the same time, he had insisted that we meet outside his office and working hours, so that we could speak more informally, and thus he drew not only on his professional expertise but also on personal experiences and sentiments. This is indicated in his words above, which shifted in the same breath from overconstruction to the destruction of nature and to his observation that "Bulgarians have been chased away from our Black Sea coast" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). Thus, Deyan's remark on the coastline's "biggest problem" not only references a documentable concern with construction patterns on the Bulgarian shoreline, but also demonstrates the significance an overwhelming number of narratives in this context ascribed to that change: a sentiment of losing the coast and its environment.

During fieldwork, I encountered dozens of individual stories about pieces of the shoreline "lost", usually to tourism-related construction and its associated threats. In a small town on the coast, for example, local policy official and resident Kaloyan shared an illustrative anecdote about a friend of his, once a regular visitor who had stopped coming to the Bulgarian shoreline after seeing the new construction works behind the beach he had frequented:

> [H]e said, "I learned, I saw on the Internet, that there's something happening on Nestinarka [beach], do you mind if I just leave my suitcase with you?" He left it, he went to take a look, and he said, "This is no longer my place, I cannot go on here and will go somewhere else. When my memories are connected to this place from before, I cannot watch it, I had better go to some other place I did not know and where I won't be asking myself constantly why this has happened" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation).

Towards the second half of the anecdote, Kaloyan's own feelings seemed to become mixed in with those of the friend whose story he was recounting. The sentiment of memories lost once the beach had changed—particularly the remark "this is no longer my place"—conveyed an emotional response to the landscape's transformation that Kaloyan himself shared.

During the last decade, similar sentiments of losing "my place" have motivated a series of popular movements like "Save Koral", "Save Karadere", or "Save Irakli", each named after a beach deemed "the last wild place" along the shoreline. Frequently driven by so-called "wild campers" fighting to prevent development near "their" beach, these movements have at times sparked country-wide discontent and calls for governments seen as pushing construction to step down (Damyanov, 2015, 80-82; Leviev-Sawyer, 2014). Through their protests, art installations, media appearances, and legal actions, these citizens' initiatives have often been seen as the frontlines of environmental protection along the Bulgarian coast (Damyanov, 2015, 80-94). But Georgi, civic activist and seasonal resident on the coast, told me that even the subversive beach campers were leaving: "There are not that many campers here," he said, "not like we imagine it. People are now going to Greece and Turkey, because it's better there. This thing has disappeared now" (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). He listed beaches that, in his view, were irrevocably lost or destroyed: "This happened at Oasis, this happened at Nestinarka, they are destroyed now as places where the normal Bulgarian tourist could go and take pleasure in the sea" (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). Throughout our conversation Georgi often evoked the metaphor of the coast transforming "into a slab of concrete" (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). In his words, no one wanted to come to the beach anymore because "the sand isn't sand anymore, it's some kind of concrete dust" (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). Through metaphors like these, Georgi often emphasized the extent of the shoreline's material transformation away from a natural state.

Images and stories of environmental loss like Georgi, Kaloyan, and Deyan's emerge from the rapid change the Bulgarian coastline has experienced in just a couple of decades. Much of the change has come from the growing importance of the tourism industry in Bulgaria. After 1989, construction along the coast supported hopes of modernizing the former socialist country's economy and orienting it toward a Western European model (Holleran, 2015, 244-6). Along with agriculture, tourism was identified as one of the first strategic pillars for reforming the national economy post-1989 (Koulov, 1996, 188). Multiple successive governments listed tourism, in a range of development plans and strategic documents at the national and regional levels, as an important source of employment and as a means of improving living standards in the country more broadly (Anderson et al., 2012, 322). This tendency continues to date. The active National Strategy for Sustainable Tourism Development (2014-2030), prepared by the Bulgarian Ministry of Tourism, notes that the industry contributed 12.8% to the Bulgarian GDP and accounted for 11.9% of the country's employment as of 2016, and was expected to contribute 16.7% of GDP

and 16.7% of employment by 2027 (Ministry of Tourism, 2017, 83). The Black Sea coastline plays a leading role in these dynamics: over 80 per cent of all foreign tourists who spent a night in Bulgaria in 2016 did so in one of the country's three Black Sea districts (National Statistical Institute, 2017).

The tourist industry's significance and profitability have led to a quick growth in construction. Between 1999 and 2004, for example, the number of hotels in Bulgarian municipalities along the coast doubled, with the biggest growth registered in large coastal resorts (Palazov and Stanchev, 2007, 696). Near Nessebar, the municipality that hosts Bulgaria's largest coastal resort Sunny Beach, tourism-related development grew from 0.77 square kilometres in 1970 to 6.5 square kilometres in 2005 (Stancheva et al., 2011, 327). In the period between 2002 and 2007 alone, the Burgas region increased its lodging capacity by 874% (NSI 2010, referenced in Anderson et al., 2012). These factors were further strengthened by Bulgaria's negotiations for entry into the EU, as part of which foreigners from other EU states were allowed to invest into property in the country. Construction of vacation properties for foreign investment quickly outpaced that of homes for Bulgarian citizens; by 2007, the year Bulgaria formally joined the EU, there were about ten building permits issued in coastal and mountainous tourist areas to every one issued elsewhere in the country, including in the capital (Anderson et al., 2012, 325-326). But the resulting construction boom, as environmental NGO expert Andrei explained, has since led to perverse effects. Andrei and I were speaking at his workplace, a visitors' centre in a coastal town that had witnessed its own share of change. Although Andrei now lives in nearby Burgas, the Bulgarian coastline's second-largest city, he had used to live in this smaller town "sometime around when the [2008 economic] crisis started" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). He recalled:

> I remember there were some publications [then] about tens of thousands of apartments between Pomorie and St Vlas waiting for their owners—they probably never stopped waiting. But that's what a speculative market is. And people should supposedly realize that but… win some lose some… But anyway, that's the idea, that building must continue and there's pressure like that on the whole coastline. There were once a Karadere [beach], or what, a Byala [beach], and there were great ambitions to build large there—to the south, to the north, there are ones [ambitions] like that everywhere. So as a whole, Bulgarians' vision for developing the Black Sea coast is construction to the end. And that's it. […] We hear so much about the Spanish experience, how in southern Spain there was also mass overconstruction, many deserted… Ghost cities. Here next to Tsarevo there's one. The Ghost city. Neighbourhood. (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

In referencing Spain, Andrei pointed out that the investment model Bulgaria had followed was nothing new, and that its decline should therefore have been predicted long ago. "The so-called great investment that generated the amazing GDP and growth in Bulgaria, the bubble popped quickly—the property bubble—as regularly happens all over the world," he remarked (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). In his view, the economic decline of the overbuilt coastline should have been foreseen from the start. "But," he went on bitterly, "Bulgaria doesn't learn from the good examples, it learns from the worse ones, and we follow them persistently—in fact, we improve them" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

Andrei's observations speak to the fraught pattern of investment architecture that has followed, as Max Holleran has argued in his ethnographic work on the construction industry in Bulgaria, a general "you build it and they will come" mentality (Holleran, 2015, 240). But this mentality did not always bear the desired fruit. As Andrei's discussion of ghost cities illustrates, construction has tended to outpace the rate at which "they come". Meanwhile, the construction of hotels, casinos, and flats for sales has similarly tended to outpace the development of the infrastructure required to support it, whether it came to waste treatment or the availability of attractions to draw people back to the coast. Gergana, who like Andrei works for an environmental NGO, painted a gloomy picture of what this has meant for the industry's profile:

> Unfortunately here the link [to the sea] is always rudimentary: a hotel as close to the beach as possible, until recently treatment plants were not a priority [so] these pipes opened up into the sea and spilled out everything conceivable to the human imagination, and that's it, a season that grows narrower every year, and nothing much on offer to speak of. Here, we've been speaking to the island's manager [of St Anastasia] and what he says is, several years ago they'd organised a tourist bus, well we in Burgas don't have enough on offer to show in order to fill a bus, this isn't Barcelona (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

Like Gergana and Andrei, most participants communicated a belief that the coastline's development had been, and continued to be, counterproductive. Far from the "you build it and they will come" perspective with which they were built (Holleran, 2015, 240), the constructions completed over the last decades had led to an alternative reality one might refer to as "you build it and they will leave". To start, data supports Deyan's sentiment that "Bulgarians have been chased away from our Black Sea" (Deyan, government expert, 2017). Marketing research from the beginning of the 2019 summer season, for instance, indicated that almost a third of Bulgarians planning to go on a summer holiday would do so abroad, predominantly in Greece and Turkey (Trend Marketing, 2019). Nearly a quarter of those people shared that they saw services there as being of higher quality (Trend Marketing, 2019). Indeed, in the midst of the summer season news reported on a 25% increase on the previous year of automobile traffic crossing into Greece from

Bulgaria (Dzhekova, 2019). Participants I spoke to expressed similar sentiments. Andrei, for instance, drew a direct comparison with Greece, "More and more Bulgarians go to Greece for their sea holidays. There are always comparisons between the Bulgarian shore and the Greek one, how there is no such construction in Greece—there is, but it's low, spread around, it's not as dense as here" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). Kaloyan remarked that "not a few of the young Bulgarians simply go elsewhere, where they find themselves unencumbered by the views of concrete piles" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). Georgi concurred, telling me that "Anywhere in the world, anywhere you pick to go to the seaside, it's now better than here […] go to Greece, go to Turkey, go to the other side of the world…" (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). According to Georgi, many tourists now felt the same. To illustrate his point, he gestured around the beach where he had invited me to meet and where we now spoke, sitting directly onto the sand. The beach had frequently been the focus of activist campaigns in the past, as it was a favourite "wild camping" location; it therefore had a symbolic draw in addition to its soft sands, backdrop of dunes, and small bay. On the day we met, the weather was sunny and the sea was calm, but there were few people apart from the two of us on the beach. Georgi indicated this and noted:

> I mean, here they're only just now going to have to fight and struggle to bring back tourists. […] There's an ebb every year. You can see it, although the minister and so on claim that there's no ebb, the ebb is… As a person who observes the beach, I can see it. So this year people came after 20 July and left on 10 August. I observe the beach, when it's full and when it's empty. Here now, beautiful weather, warm water, sunny weather, here on this beach that's 75 hectares there are currently 50 people.
>
> AA: School hasn't even started yet.
>
> Georgi: Yes, it's still—now is the best time (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

Those like Georgi or Andrei who spoke of the unsustainability of the model and the decline of tourism seemed to be proven correct when, in 2019, national news outlets reported on a substantial drop in tourist visits on the coastline for the summer season. Sources like *Investor News*, the Bulgarian National Television, and various dailies cited a decline from around 15% to above 20% in tourists to the country, especially at large and all-inclusive resorts along the coastline (Peycheva, 2019; Dzhekova, 2019; Maleva and Sutreva, 2019). A representative of the Varna Chamber of Tourism commented for the Bulgarian National Television that "the situation is such that many hotels with unoccupied rooms during the high season will be forced to take steps toward […] discounts, which in some cases will reach half the regular price" (Stoyan Marinov, cited in Maleva

and Sutreva, 2019, my translation). Yet the shortage of tourists on the Bulgarian coastline was contained to hotels and business in the large resorts. The Bulgarian National Television reported that smaller holdings, instead, were thriving:

> Unlike in the resorts near Varna and those on the southern Black Sea coast, this summer the Shabla, Kavarna and Balchik municipalities [in the north] greeted more tourists compared to last year. There are no free spaces there for July and August. According to tourism professionals, this is due to the beautiful nature and the tranquillity (Maleva and Sutreva, 2019, my translation).

For many participants, too, the coastline's nature was the one feature that could still bring many visitors to Bulgaria and support the coastline's economy. When I asked Dimitar—an academic at the University of Sofia who had been involved in the setting up of Natura 2000 zones along the Bulgarian Black Sea coast—about his ideal vision of the relationship between the coastline and Bulgarian society, he described a landscape with "very sustainably and reasonably organized relations between wild nature and people", supported by "infrastructure that allows for the coming of specialised tourists […] who would appreciate this biodiversity, who would observe, photograph, and then add money to the local economy by staying there" (Dimitar, researcher, 2017, my translation). But he admitted that this product was not well-developed here. Asked what he thought the Bulgarian coastline lacked in order to accomplish this vision, he replied that society lacked the ability to see the value of its environment: "We lack adequate perceptions oftentimes. And we can't appreciate how precious it is, what we have in our natural resources" (Dimitar, researcher, 2017, my translation).

Thus, for many participants, losing the coast was also about how the environment had been devaluated in the recent past. In part, as Dimitar's comments above suggest, this sense came from how the natural features' economic potential had been overlooked. Additionally, in accounts like Andrei's, Gergana's, and Georgi's, the environment's devaluation was continuous and borne by an economic imagination limited to the extractive and destructive practices associated with tourism construction on the coast: a speculative market that takes away rather than adds value. But in all these accounts, I encountered also a more general sense of value loss—the leaching of memories and meaning that had been tied to the coastal environment. The rest of this chapter explores the what, how, and who behind this wider sense of loss.

Where the wild dunes are

In conversations with participants, I often encountered the idea that the environment had been not only devalued but also rendered invisible through government (in)action. Participants like Deyan, for instance, highlighted the contrast between visible and hidden impacts to the

environment. He asserted that the tourist industry had changed the coastal landscape and threatened its biodiversity in several visible ways, for instance when it came to dune habitats:

> For example, the destruction of dunes. The dunes are gone now in many places. Once upon a time there were lots of dunes between Ravda and Nessebar, it was all dunes. Now they're gone, it's all a city. So, here, yes, construction destroys biodiversity. In the literal sense of the word (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation).

In the destruction of dunes and their biodiversity, therefore, Deyan saw a documentable, literal result of tourism-related construction. This change, as his words indicate, is visible: the environment between Ravda and Nessebar has transformed from "all dunes" to "all a city" (Deyan, government expert, 2017).

At the same time, however, Deyan also asserted that many of the likely environmental impacts from tourism construction remained unmeasured and unobserved on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast. Speaking from his national-level environmental monitoring expertise, he stated that there was insufficient scientific information to document all the possible ways the tourist industry could be impacting the Bulgarian coastline, its biodiversity, and resources. He relayed that the Ministry of the Environment, for example, did not conduct studies on these effects, and further that no Bulgarian institution would have the necessary capacity to establish the extent of such impacts. Nevertheless, he asserted that additional negative impacts were likely:

> [T]he other effect you can't see, for which we don't have studies because it's not our job, is whether the number of people doesn't come into—doesn't damage the biodiversity. That's very difficult, to establish an effect like that. Nowadays they say on the media that there are purification stations everywhere, and what not, but I am convinced that there are many places where the resorts themselves pour their wonders down into the sea. But that's not related directly to the number of people—well, it is related to the number of people I mean, but they do it either way. But that's a slightly different analysis, which we don't do, and in fact nobody requires of us.
>
> AA: Does anyone do it?
>
> Deyan: I don't know. At least I don't know that anyone does it. It should be done. […] On the one hand the state aims to increase its millions of tourists every year. Now we claim there were 11 million. For this year [2017]. And actually, the idea is for those millions to grow. Which means that all the usage of resources, of fish, of water, of pollution to water, will grow by as much as the millions of people. There's a nice term in ecology,

> footprint. I don't know so far that in Bulgaria anyone has done it, perhaps they have, research like that on the ecological footprint of tourism on the nature […]. We don't do this at the moment. Because we don't have the capacity, to tell the truth (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation).

As a government employee, therefore, Deyan felt concern with the lack of research and data against the planned growth of tourist numbers. Admitting the difficulty of conducting large-scale impact studies, he added that institutions even at the national level simply did not have enough information or indeed staff to summarize complex trends of that nature (Deyan, government expert, 2017). With respect to the coast, further on in our conversation, he admitted, "Actually the truth is that until 2012 we didn't even work along the sea, we had no people working there" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). Whereas Deyan was referring to the limited government expertise on the shoreline, Gergana spoke about the same issue from the perspective of the availability of research in public discourse. When it came to the sea, she observed, "there's very little expertise, very few published data, very little public information, and that's something I feel really sad about" (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation).

This scarcity of information has often served to fuel disagreement over the threats and concerns pertaining to the Bulgarian coast. This was reflected in participants' narratives. I encountered contrasting opinions, for instance, on the extent to which pollution from wastewater and rubbish occurred along the shoreline as a result of the increased summer population. Svetoslav, a local small-scale fisherman, ascribed at least partly to coastal pollution the decline he had observed in fishing, telling me that "now in the last few years, I don't know, the sea got very dirty, and the fish declined too" (Svetoslav, fisherman, 2018, my translation). Georgi went further, claiming that there was an overall lack of infrastructure or canalization, insufficient purification at existing stations, and a pipe at Karaagach beach that "spews, every second it spews some litres per second" of waste (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). Government experts I spoke to, however, expressed contrasting opinions from Georgi and Svetoslav, claiming that "there has been a lot improvement in our territory over the last year or two, for completing activities that, with which we've come to prevent the runoff of impure water" (Boryana, government expert, 2017, my translation). In the summer of 2019, official inspections by the Regional Inspectorate for Environment and Waters (Регионален инспекторат по околната среда и водите, Bulgarian acronym RIOSV) on the site indicated by Georgi "found no outflows or discharges of waste" and claimed that the "sea waters are visually pure, with no colouring, opalescence or specific smells observable", as well as that their probes had come back clean (Regional Inspectorate for Environment and Waters, 2019). Earlier inspections nearby along the coastline, however, have yielded different results, at times observing "at a perimeter of 300-400 meters that the sea water is turbid with a specific household-fecal smell" (Regional Inspectorate

for Environment and Waters, 2017). Spread across time and space, and in the absence of definitive monitoring studies, these reports give a conflicting picture about the impact of tourism on the coastline as a whole.

Even the threat that Deyan considered plainly visible—the destruction of sand dunes—is in fact a highly contested subject. More than 30 per cent of the 432-kilometer-long Bulgarian coast features sandy beaches, many of which were historically part of large dune formations (Stanchev et al., 2015, 60-61). In the recent past, however, human impact has significantly reduced these habitats, predominantly through construction (Stancheva et al., 2011; Stanchev et al., 2015). Officially, sand dunes fall under the most stringent forms of protection in the country and their destruction is not allowed under any circumstances, regardless of whether they are located within a formally designated protected territory or not. Nevertheless, over the years there have been different instances in which media, civic organizations, and individuals have remarked on their destruction. In December 2012, images shared across social media of excavators levelling dunes near Nessebar prompted a scandal later dubbed "Dunegate". An investigation conducted by independent media site *Bivol* revealed that these dune formations, which fell within a Natura 2000 protected area, had been sold at an extreme discount to investors with close links to state officials (Bivol, 2012). Although "Dunegate" raised public awareness of the issue, and sparked some protests, it was by no means the last instance in which dunes were threatened or harmed. Deyan remarked on a case he had witnessed even more recently: "last year I went to an organized camping site, Oasis, and this year they destroyed its dunes, on Oasis, they simply ruined them, levelled them, and said, oh, but here there were never dunes" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). Speaking of a different beach, meanwhile, Georgi observed how dunes have been levelled down "during the night, [by an] unknown perpetrator, as if they didn't know whom the excavator belonged to […] Yes, that excavator is unknown. They didn't know if those were dunes or not" (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). The sarcastic tone in which he pronounced the last couple of sentences communicated his negative view of the official justifications he was citing.

The issue of where the wild dunes are located has often stood at the core of such cases. In one high-profile incident from the spring of 2015, "Save Koral Beach" alerted media and institutions about another concrete construction started over Easter, this time on top of a sand dune at the grounds of camping Yug (IOr, "South") (Capital News, 2015). Images published by the civic group showed concrete groundworks laid atop a partially levelled sand hill (Capital News, 2015). The construction site's owner, however, claimed that the location "was not dunes and that he [was] in possession of a document proving it" (Capital News, 2015, my translation). On the next day, officials from the Ministry of the Environment, the Regional Ministry, the Directorate for National Building Control (DNSK), and the Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre Agency declared that, while the construction site lacked compatibility with Natura 2000 and would

therefore be temporarily halted, it was not, in fact, located on top of dunes (Leshtarska, 2015a). The sand hill in question, according to them, was not a dune (Leshtarska, 2015a). The ministries' explanations revealed also that "the beach actually is not a beach"—at least not according to municipal designations adopted in 2004, which mark camping site Yug as "urbanized territory" (Leshtarska, 2015a, my translation). The confusion, these officials claimed, arose from the existence of local development plans and permits from before the tightening of Bulgarian law in 2008, when the Black Sea Coast Development Law (Закон за устройство на черноморското крайбрежие, usually referred to with its Bulgarian acronym, ZUCHK) was introduced. But not everyone agreed that ZUCHK had been effective. Andrei, for example, spoke to me of the law with extreme scepticism:

> […] they made up the ZUCHK 7-8-10 years ago, supposedly they'll redo it, supposedly they'll undo it, zone A, zone B… when you look at it, you can't distinguish either zone A or zone B, it's all built over (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

ZUCHK, along with its regulations and designations, may well confuse many. The law, first published on 15 June 2007, was designed to serve as the primary legislation controlling development and natural resource management along the shoreline; it covers regulations on construction and pollution, guarantees citizens' public access to the shore, manages shoreline defence, and even promotes the preservation of cultural and historical heritage (ZUCHK, 2008, Article 2). It has been hotly contested, however. Since January 1, 2008, when it entered into force, ZUCHK has been amended and supplemented a total of twenty-two times, with the latest addendum dated 29 March 2018 (ZUCHK Addendum of 29 March 2018). In addition, a 2013 decision of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court declared two points in articles 17 and 17a as unconstitutional, necessitating their further rewording (Bulgarian Constitutional Court, 2013). In broad terms, the law as it currently stands designates two zones for territorially defined protections: Zone A, covering the 200 m water territory measured out from the coastal baseline, the littoral beach strip and parts of the territory falling within a 100 m strip outside of settlements (measured horizontally from the edge of the shoreline or from that of the sea beaches where they are present); and Zone B, covering territories up to 2 km out from the boundaries of Zone A, except in "urbanized territories" or settlements (ZUCHK, 2008, Article 10, (1); Article 11, (1)). Neither Zone A nor B prohibits construction, unless the territory concerned is also a protected area under other national or European legislation. Each zone, however, defines levels and standards for construction, like density and height of new buildings, or mandatory levels of landscaping. (Article 10, (3), 2; Article 12, (1)). And in addition, ZUCHK designates all sand dune formations as "public state property, which cannot be declared as private" (Article 6, (4), 4) and cannot be built on (Article 17a)—but there are exceptions.

The exceptions concerning construction in dunes require further explanation. First, all territorial designations under ZUCHK are valid only as of the law's entry into force on January 1, 2008 (ZUCHK, 2008, §24, (1)). This means that a territory previously designated an "urbanized territory" under a municipal development plan—as in the case of camping site Yug—would retain its designation; although, if the development plan is still being implemented, that implementation would have to be completed in accordance with ZUCHK, meaning that the presence of any sand dune formations should automatically spell an end to construction activities on that property (ZUCHK, 2008, §24 (1)). The law itself allows for some exceptions to that rule, however. If the construction under a pre-approved development plan is considered "an object of national significance" (ZUCHK, 2008, Article 17a, (1), 1) or counts as one of "special sites relating to the state's protection and security" (Article 17a, (1), 3), construction may continue as planned. Article 17a, (1), 2, introduced in a March 2013 amendment to ZUCHK, provided for one more exception, relating to "objects of technical infrastructure" (ZUCHK Amendment and Addendum of 15 March 2013, 11). This particular amendment, however, was among the two pronounced unconstitutional later in 2013; the Bulgarian Constitutional Court cited as a key reason for its decision the failure of these clauses to provide appropriate and legally unambiguous protection to exclusive state properties (Bulgarian Constitutional Court, 2013). Amended once again in 2014, in response to the Court's decision, the exception currently relates to "underground linear objects of technical infrastructure falling outside of points 1 and 3 – when there is no technical alternative or when available technical alternatives are clearly economically inappropriate" (ZUCHK, 2008, Article 17a, (1), 2).

Whether this and many of the other amendments and addendums to the law over the years had done much to improve its effectiveness, however, remains unclear. Georgi suggested to me that the law's many exceptions were essentially loopholes utilized at the local level. He illustrated specific instances in which the law's regulations were not followed. From where we sat on the beach, he pointed to a set of buildings perched on the edge of the shoreline's higher ground, directly to the south. Georgi indicated that the development was visibly taller and denser than the regulations allow, although it had been built after ZUCHK's entry into force:

> So [ZUCHK] entered with amendments on February 1, 2008, then the construction of buildings taller than 7 meters and a half in zone A, up to 100 meters from the seashore or the beach boundary, became forbidden. And that there was built which year? 2009. How did they build that there, which is 25 meters tall? How did they put ten thousand square meters of built space on 4 hectares of land? How did they do that? And that there is what you see (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

Next, Georgi pointed in the other direction to "supposed RVs" that had in fact been repurposed into houses "with glazed windows, with everything", circumnavigating ZUCHK to make them

into permanent structures (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). These and similar violations of ZUCHK, Georgi said, occurred because the municipality's mayor and chief architect had simply recertified building permits that preceded ZUCHK, regardless of whether they were in compliance with the new designations (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017). Andrei shared a similar view. After expressing his scepticism to me about the ZUCHK's effectiveness, Andrei added, "Everything is supposedly done centrally, and then locally it's turned around 180 degrees" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). Both men's accounts, in other words, suggested that the exceptions or amendments written and unwritten into ZUCHK at the very least reflect a tension between national legislative intentions as written and municipal developmental interests on the ground.

Further ambiguity, however, is introduced into the legal system through the question of how dunes are mapped. While ZUCHK provides formal protection for all types of dunes, regardless of whether they are categorized as mobile, immobile (vegetated), or forested, this protection is dependent on official cadastral maps showing where the dunes are. If those maps are unavailable—say, because they are incomplete—approval for construction in Zones A and B requires the builder to obtain a written opinion from the Ministry for Environment and Waters affirming the absence of dunes in the property (ZUCHK, 2008, §25 (3)). This was likely the document that, in 2015, the owner of the contested construction on Yug camping site claimed to possess. Although ZUCHK contained provisions for the creation and publication of digital cadastral maps from its earliest publication in *Darzhaven Vestnik* in 2007, these maps were still not available by April 2015. An investigation for *Capital* in that period revealed that experts from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences had been present along the coastline for surveys as early as 2012, but that some beaches—including the site of the contested construction at the Yug camping grounds—"were overlooked with the argument that they were already sketched and that those sketches don't need updates" (Leshtarska, 2015b, my translation).

Several days after the controversy surrounding the case, the Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre Agency published a batch of over three hundred files. However, as Leshtarska observed at the time in her investigation for *Capital*, the newly publicized maps were not a powerful tool for clearing up ambiguity in these kinds of spatial conflicts:

> Most of them are pdf files of scanned paper maps, which are difficult for non-specialists to understand. They were prepared by different agencies and the graphic elements differ between some of them. Most worryingly, in some the dunes' location is not marked at all, and instead they show only the outlines of the sea beach and different habitats (Leshtarska, 2015b, my translation).

Leshtarska's summary applies also to the state of affairs as of 2020. On the Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre Agency's official website, a visitor may find a statement (in Bulgarian only) claiming that the Agency has completed its overview and approval of "all specialized maps and registers of sand dunes found immediately behind the beach strip in zones of protection B in the regions of Burgas, Varna and Dobrich" (Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre Agency, n.d.). The maps can be accessed from a file transfer protocol (ftp) index linked on the website. Individual files are listed along with their upload dates, and generally seem to have been deposited into the index in two large batches: once in 2015—likely the batch released in response to the Yug camping site controversy—and then in another large upload in 2017. For the most part the maps are indeed pdf scans of paper maps. They display the shore outline, the outlines for numbered private property plots, and an outline and in-map label for each of the two zones designated under ZUCHK. Many of these maps do not include a legend, any extent indication (to show visibly what portion of the Bulgarian coast they represent), or even a north marker: in other words, they are missing basic elements of map creation. Moreover, many also lack shading, symbols, or any other type of graphic representation that could mark the extent of beaches, different sand formations, or other natural features. Even as someone trained formally in geographical information systems and familiar with the landscapes represented, I found the maps difficult to read. My GIS certificate professor would have failed these maps.

Why were the coastal maps published so late after ZUCHK's entry into force, and why, when published, were they so illegible? Officially, the reasons given for the delay in publishing the coastal maps have ranged from finding fault with previous governments, through lack of funds, to uncooperative municipalities (Leshtarska, 2015b). ZUCHK itself, as I have tried to illustrate above, creates legal ambiguity exacerbated over the years by the public, political, and judicial contestations over its texts; from that perspective, the issue of the maps' publication could be seen simply as a symptom of the larger problem. When, in our conversation, I remarked to Deyan that I found it strange how the state itself could be unclear on its own definition of the dunes' location, he replied:

> Well here there's some ambiguity about what the state is. Whether it's the municipality, whether it's the regional inspectorate for the environment, whether it's the ministry, which institution—because every institution could have its say (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation).

In this way, Deyan indicated that Bulgaria's different institutions did not always cooperate well with each other on to the Black Sea coast.

The issue of contrasting goals or even views between government institutions came up when I raised the issue of construction on dunes with local government experts responsible for overseeing investment projects on the coastline, including the geographic area in which problematic areas like the Yug camping site and Nessebar camping had occurred. In contrast to

Deyan's statement that overconstruction was one of the key issues on the Bulgarian coastline, and one that impacted dune habitats, the experts at the local institution disagreed that construction in dune habitats was an ongoing concern at all. Boryana, for instance, began decisively:

> Construction [on dunes] is in no case tolerated. All statements of investment interest are mandatorily inspected for the presence of dunes in the property. When they are found, the procedures are simply terminated, are not tolerated. It's another question that this activity commenced after, when ZUCHK was voted in, and before that only certain ones… they were protected under the Protected Areas Law. There were only prohibitions for certain activities and types of construction in there. So with the dunes there are certain pre-existing…

At this stage, however, her colleague Margarita stepped in and took over Boryana's explanation:

> Up until the moment these dunes were mapped under ZUCHK there were deals, sales of territory that are now private property. At the moment the owners themselves cannot do anything but still, until the law's entry into force there were cases in which this thing happened and it's irreversible, because you can't apply it retroactively. So from here on out we do not tolerate it, now that we apply ZUCHK, before that there was no such instrument. What there is, if cases like that and information of that sort appear in the media, it's with pre-existing cases like these, which continue constructing and reconstructing, add-ons to the construction, which have begun in an earlier period.
>
> AA: I imagine you are often called on by the media to answer questions about…?
>
> Margarita: Well, yes, yes. One problem for a large part of the dunes is precisely the invasive species we mentioned earlier, which advance because they usually are in resorts, in settlements, where the landscaping uses species like that and now they advance, and this is most acutely the case for Nessebar (Boryana and Margarita, government experts, 2017, my translation).

Margarita's intervention and change of subject effectively closed our discussion about the regulation of property and construction inside the dune habitat. After this, I was unsuccessful in soliciting more comments from her and Boryana on the issue, and they discussed dunes only in the context of their ongoing concern about invasive species. I was equally unable to determine for certain the source of their discomfort, although it may have been related to the frustration of working in an environment of unresolved legal complexity, particularly where it came to some of

the more heavily contested cases. In the case of the Yug camping site, for example, a RIOSV inspection after the scandal had confirmed that there were, in the end, dunes on site. But although this confirmation had resulted in a ministerial order to cease construction and a municipal order to remove the concrete, the orders were later upturned at the Burgas administrative court on conflicting evidence *against* the presence of dunes (Bivol, 2016). The ongoing legal ambiguity may well have left experts in difficult positions, making them less likely to wish to comment on an evolving situation.

Corruption, ambiguity, and state (in)capacity

At the same time, it is equally possible that the experts' discomfort had something to do with the frequent and multidirectional accusations of corruption associated with the subject of development along the Black Sea coast. To begin, corruption has been raised specifically in relation to the government's poor-quality dune maps. At times, such suggestions have been made even by members of the government, as in the following 2015 statement by then-Minister for Regional Development Liliana Pavlova: "You know that the maps were prepared in 2012 [...] but were not approved, published, or uploaded for long after, everyone knows why" (cited in Leshtarska, 2015a, my translation). As the news report citing the Minister's words explains, her phrase "everyone knows why" conveys a strong hint toward corrupt interests (Leshtarska, 2015a, my translation). Participants often utilized similar kinds of explicitly implicit language. Georgi, for example, shared a cynical view about dune mapping:

> So, out of 4,500 acres of dunes in Bulgaria, 3,500 acres of dunes have come into private hands in mysterious ways. Quote-unquote. In the last—so this pilfering of state property happened with the involvement of all those governments that were in place, and everyone was involved in this. Because this can't happen just like that on state property.
>
> AA: Accidentally.
>
> Georgi: It happens with documents, with alterations, with [the official] cadastre, with all kinds of things, everything was involved, everyone was involved. And this is why they're now hiding these maps of the dunes, the digital ones, they published paper ones a few years ago, because if they overlay the contemporary cadastre on them, if we had them in digital format, we would be able to see precisely what has happened over the years and how (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

Georgi's belief that the digital maps would resolve spatial contestations along the coastline has been expressed by others, as well. Leshtarska wrote for *Capital* that "the specialized maps of the dunes can prove to be the surest, easiest to use, and most immediate means of preserving the last unbuilt corners on the Black Sea coast" (2015b). By contrast, the government's production of

uncertainty through ineffective legal or governance tools was cited by participants as a deliberate form of control. Instead of "seeing like a state" and imposing administrative order as a tool of statecraft (Scott, 1998, 4-5), the government was, in Georgi's view, using its blindness strategically.

Many participants thought that, overall, legal ambiguity was utilised on the coast as a shield for corruption. Indeed, over the course of my research, corruption recurred as a theme, both in public and media discussions and in my conversations with participants. NGO expert Adriana, for instance, claimed that corruption was behind the insufficiency of scientific information regarding the ecosystem or cultural impact of tourism on the Black Sea shore (Adriana, environmental advocate, 2018). She pointed out that environmental expertise in Bulgaria did not always come from those with the most experience, knowledge, or indeed interest in the environment:

> …actually the state is much more willing to pay for low-quality expertise, documents, and research from private firms, entirely low-quality, than it is to work with experts who are, who have 30 or 50 years of experience in the NGO sector, which is shocking.
>
> AA: Should we discuss why that is?
>
> Adriana: Well it's glaringly obvious. Our country is eaten through and through with corruption at every level. And those are all kinds of different interests, if expert reports or evaluations were prepared, they just wouldn't work for those who make the final decisions (Adriana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation).

Adriana was not the only one who expressed the opinion that expertise was subjugated to special interests. Deyan had, at one point in our conversation, observed that "the state does not respect those of its people who have experience and knowledge. It somehow ignores them sometimes. Whether purely financially or purely in terms of their opinions, if you like. It just ignores them. It doesn't always stand behind the opinions of its experts. And it doesn't always call on them" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). And another NGO expert, Gergana, described in some detail the concrete obstacles faced by conservationists and green activists working in Bulgaria. She spoke of "an active black PR campaign against ecological organizations" carried throughout social and traditional media (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation). She explained that there was no state funding or support for NGO organizations in Bulgaria, not even where it came to co-funding or municipal projects (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation). Indeed, quite to the contrary, in Gergana's experience the state frequently made funding *more* difficult for such organizations, acting as a gatekeeper (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation). To illustrate, she remarked how,

> […] when it came to applying for [the 2017] session of the [European] Life program in September, since [her NGO] is conducting activities in

> territories or for species of priority conservation significance, [we] had to have a letter of support from the Ministry of the Environment. The Minister of the Environment […] did not support several projects and for all others demanded everything imaginable he could demand before the actual project […] and deigned to give us his support two hours before the Brussels timeline (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation).

Working with official contact points at the government was so difficult, she added, that the NGO often preferred sources for funding in which the government had as little input as possible (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018).

Evgenia, an ornithologist and local educator living on the coast, expressed herself in even stronger terms. During our conversation she had remarked that, although she was an expert in her field of environmental science, she would no longer agree to testify at court from her expertise because of how discouraging past experiences had been (Evgenia, researcher, 2017). Not only had her experiences in the past been disregarded, but the court would accept obviously flawed evidence (Evgenia, researcher, 2017). She described one case in particular, in which she had found herself testifying against a fellow expert. Evgenia spoke with bitterness how the man in question had been paid to dispute his own scientific findings in the interests of private firms:

> And at a certain point it turns out that the investor, unsurprisingly, has paid the experts and we turn out to be against each other. The unfortunate thing is, in this instance I mean, that there are, they're known, several colleagues ornithologists who are always 'aye' and positive for all [environmental] assessments and in all such cases they are 'aye' and 'okay'. And basically they're paid for this, which is very ugly too, because in this case one of those experts was the person who was the one—imagine a ravine, and that ravine is proclaimed a protected area, and the wind generators will be at the edge of the ravine. And he turned there and he said, before the court, that there was nothing valuable there and there were no geese and there was nothing, and at the same time [he was] the initiator for that ravine to become a protected area. So you spit on your name, on your labour, on all those years in which people have respected you as a person and that, too, is very ugly and very disappointing and… leads me to despair (Evgenia, researcher, 2017, my translation).

In the past, the Bulgarian government has been sued at the European level for cases precisely like the one Evgenia describes above. A high profile suit in the Court of Justice of the EU, initiated against the Republic of Bulgaria by the European Commission after complaints made by the

Bulgarian Society for the Protection of Birds (Българско движение за защита на птиците, or BDZP), concerned wind farm developments, birds, and protected area designations in Kaliakra, on the northern coastline (European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, 2016). Like most of the Bulgarian coast, Kaliakra forms part of *Via Pontica*, Europe's second-largest migratory route for birds. A number of species, some highly threatened, reside, breed, or winter in the area (BirdLife International, n.d.); as part of the case, the European Commission cited evidence that "the entire world population of the red-breasted grouse (Branta ruficollis), considered to be a globally threatened species, spends the winter in the region" (European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, 2016, 23). For this importance to the conservation of multiple bird species and their habitats, Kaliakra was established as a special protected area (SPA) under the Birds Directive after Bulgaria's accession to the EU. According to the BDZP's complaints, however, the designation contained insufficient territory, covering only two-thirds of the important bird area defined earlier by international non-governmental organization BirdLife, and excluding important habitats especially for the threatened red grouse ((European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, 2016, 23). Over the course of written communications with Bulgaria between 2008 and 2014, the European Commission became increasingly concerned about renewable energy projects approved in the area (European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, 2016, 10-11). Eventually, on 20 March 2014, the Commission brought the formal action against the Republic of Bulgaria to the Court of Justice (European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, 2016, 16). The Court's ruling on 14 January 2016 determined that, by "failing to include all the territories of the important bird areas in the special protection area covering the Kaliakra region" and "approving the implementation of [various] projects" inside the important bird area and special protection areas in Kaliakra, Bulgaria had not fulfilled its various obligations under the Birds Directive (European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, 2016, 99). The judgement ends matter-of-factly, "Orders the Republic of Bulgaria to pay the costs" (European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, 2016, 99).

Several details in the case itself are particularly relevant to participants' discussions of undervalued or bought expertise. In the course of the proceedings, Bulgaria's representatives cited various scientific studies in order to contest the assertion that it should have included certain areas in the Kaliakra special protection area and to dispute the importance of the region as a resting place for migratory birds (European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, 2016, 25-26). The Commission's Advocate General, however, retorted in the proceedings that "it is clear precisely from the evidence adduced by that Member State that those concentrations of birds are neither random nor entirely exceptional and that, on the contrary, they occur regularly, depending on the prevailing wind conditions" (European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, 2016, 34). Similar controversy over scientific expertise arose within Bulgaria following the Court's judgement. On 21 July 2017, more than a year after the judgment itself, the Ministry of the Environment and Waters caused panic and protest in the Kaliakra region by issuing an order to ban all agriculture and new

construction in the area of the Ponto-Sarmat Steppes "according to the attachment that forms an indivisible part of the current order" (Ministry of the Environment and Waters, 2017, 68, my translation). The indivisible attachment, instead of a map, featured a list of coordinates that confused many (Nikolova and Spasov, 2017). In response to the outcry of locals in Kaliakra, many of whom subsist on agriculture, high-ranging government officials like the Deputy Prime Minister or the Minister for the Environment shifted blame onto those specialists in the green organizations who had helped create the Natura 2000 network in the first place (Nikolova and Spasov, 2017). In response, a group of scientists and experts published an open letter on an NGO's website, in which they claimed that Bulgaria exhibited "an aggressive display of intolerance and disregard toward the professionalism and scientific competence of the Bulgarian scientist", particularly with respect to ecology and nature conservation (Ganeva et al., 2017, my translation). The letter asserted that not only was there no reasonable dialogue between government and scientists on how to honour economic interests while protecting the environment—there was "an open war" against experts (Ganeva et al., 2017, my translation).

Given the ongoing distrust between environmental specialists and the government, it may be unsurprising that, amidst Bulgarian pro-conservation activists, the intervention of the EU's institutions has been viewed with positivity and even enthusiasm. The proceedings were seen so optimistically in some circles that, in a 2013 letter to the European Commission, one representative of the civic organization "Save Koral" cited Kaliakra in his plea for the Commission to intervene with legal action elsewhere on the coastline, too (Rusev, 2013). The letter explicitly invited the Commission "to open a formal infringement procedure and to implement strict legal means" (Rusev, 2013, 4, emphasis removed). In softer terms but in the same spirit, Deyan expressed his appreciation for the European Commission, which he suggested even Bulgarian government institutions at times used as a kind of policy implementation tool: "the truth is that the European Union helped us a bit to introduce a thinking that there are no unpunished wrongs. You can't do wrong and not be punished. And somehow I think this is the nice thing that's happening, that from time to time we use the Commission as the stick" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). That the threat of suit at the European Court of Justice was a frequent recourse in interinstitutional clashes was confirmed also by Andrei, who explained how the European Commission served as a detriment against the approval of one particular development close to when we spoke on the coastline:

> [T]he Ministry won't approve their impact assessment, because the designated space for construction within the Natura [2000] area is large, they don't dare approve it, because it might lead to punitive measures from… There could be a complaint to the European Commission, which would probably lead to court and fines, to sanctions from the European Commission (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

Deyan remarked, however, that he did not believe this supranational pressure could provide a long-term solution: "the wagging of fingers from the European Commission as the only pressure against the failure to follow our national laws, at some point this will stop. Because it has other problems, the European Commission, it can't shine everywhere" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). Andrei, too, shared some scepticism, founded precisely on the Kaliakra case, which in his opinion had shown that any intervention "happens very slowly and with difficulty […] to be honest, knowing the level of infringement of environmental law in Bulgaria, it's a small mystery and a small miracle how they haven't done it. How they haven't approved the development plan [here]" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). Deyan and Andrei's enthusiasm about the European Commission's intervention speaks to a broader tendency of distrust toward the state in environmental cases. This distrust has often been grounded, as in the case of the missing or illegible dune maps, in suspicions of corruption. However, assessing whether cases like the "Yug" camping site construction or Kaliakra pertain to corruption in the purest sense, to the influence of strong interests, to institutional incompetence and legal ambiguity, or to any combination of all of the above, is a difficult task.

Indeed, the extent to which participants or other actors look to the EU's institutions as substitutive betrays yet another complication: distinguishing between corruption and institutional weakness. That Bulgarian institutions should "use the Commission as the stick", in Deyan's words (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation), indicates how few other "sticks" they seem to have at their disposal. Over the course of my fieldwork, I witnessed many examples for the limited capacity of institutions or regional governments. For example, when I met with Kaloyan, he asked if I might drive him and a colleague from the coastal town where they lived (and where I was staying) to their office in another, smaller coastal town. Despite technically being government employees, they did not have a budget to afford fuel for their daily commute so during the winter months, when transport between coastal towns was limited, they ordinarily hitchhiked or asked friends to drive them to and from work.

To deal with this kind of chronic incapacity, Deyan highlighted, individuals often stepped in on an informal basis. He recounted, for example, that BDZP experts voluntarily provide data on different bird species to experts at the Ministry of the Environment, not only despite the lack of an official agreement between NGO and government, but also despite ongoing formal law suits between the two sides (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). Deyan described how the Ministry conducted the midwinter count on birds together with a series of NGOs including BDZP, with Regional Inspectorates for the Environment, and even hunters: "we all get together, decide who goes where, help each other with transport, share data between ourselves […] But the truth is that this kind of good work only exists at the expert level" (Deyan, 2017, my translation). At the institutional level, instead, relations were often taut. The state creates enemies, Deyan reflected: "It says, well, if you are suing me then you are my enemy. Which is absurd. You can't

break your own laws and yet think that there could be organizations working against the Bulgarian interests" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). Here Deyan paused and admitted that the question of collaboration was difficult, because it was so often political—a matter of different governments and their interests—as well as legal. He concluded, "And this is why we work well at the expert level. I mean between myself and the experts" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). This informal collaboration, he highlighted, was vital for his ability to ensure that the government would fulfil its international obligations. Without the data he received from NGOs, he explained, he would find himself unable to complete the formal reports to the EU he was responsible for creating.

Deyan's account helps to illustrate how state (in)capacity and the importance of informal networks complicate the question of corruption on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast. This observation aligns with existing scholarship on corruption in Eastern Europe. In his anthropological discussions of the subject David Torsello has observed that, in Eastern and Central Europe, perceptions of corruption are located at the level of local power, where the distinctions between public and private are harder to make (Torsello, 2011, 9). Hence, Torsello has argued, corruption can often be utilised discursively by communities as a means of expressing other concerns, especially "as a framework of reference to convey general issues of legality and legitimity" (Torsello, 2011, 9). Both the actual and discursive practices of corruption, according to him, function for individuals as a means of restoring their political agency (Torsello, 2011, 18). In a similar vein Giuliana Prato has shown that corruption can take on shared meaning in response to rapid political change (Prato, 2013, 208). In the context of the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, Torsello and Prato's arguments highlight the difficulty in some cases of differentiating between corruption in the classic sense and discursive uses of corruption that speak, instead, to the legal uncertainty and institutional incapacity that plague the coastline's management.

Corruption in the simplest sense certainly does exist on the Black Sea coast. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, flawed a measure as it is (Torsello, 2011, 5), ranked Bulgaria 72st out of 180 countries worldwide in 2018; in 2016, the same index pronounced Bulgaria the most corrupt country in the European Union (Transparency International, 2018; Nielsen, 2016). Participants, too, shared plenty of anecdotal evidence about the presence of corruption. Both Georgi and Andrei, for example, claimed that municipalities accepted and even elicited bribes from locals who wanted their fields approved for reclassification as development land (Georgi, Andrei, 2017). Andrei told me bluntly that corruption also applied to activities ranging from choosing developing contractors to teachers determining where their school trip will go: "Because everything else that happens on the coastline, it's connected to corruption, it feeds a large part of the public sector" (Andrei, 2017, my translation).

However, these clearer instances of corruption are often paralleled with small-scale illegal activity that confuses the issue because it goes ignored by officials. One example comes from my

conversation with Andrei, during which we accidentally observed what might have been a poacher inside a protected area. I had been asking about a structure constructed by Andrei's NGO for the purposes of improving birds' nesting habitat. He offered to show me the structure in more detail through his binoculars. As he adjusted them for me, he suddenly exclaimed, "Oh hey, there's someone striding through there. A poacher" (Andrei, 2017, my translation). The figure in question seemed to be preparing to do some fishing, and when I asked him to clarify whether that activity was allowed in the lake we were observing, Andrei replied,

> Oh, yes, yes, yes, fishing there is forbidden. There he goes, he'll put his net down now. Huh, no, yes, it's an interesting net he's putting down there, I don't know what it it's for but… it's like a fishing trap. But it's now the season when fish starts to leave the lake, that's where the canal is, actually, and they start toward the canal to swim out, the older fish and here… Although, if he decided to do what he's doing here inside the canal, maybe it won't be in breach of the law, because they allow—here's the focus [for the binoculars], adjust your zoom here—because they allow *gard* fishing here. Except that the *gard* is a gear that you build inside the canal as a trap. Which you make out of wooden, I'm not exactly sure what it looks like…
>
> AA [taking a turn looking through the binoculars]**:** He's putting down the net, which might be…
>
> Andrei: Perhaps some of Zhoro's colleagues at IARA might interpret this as a *gard* (Andrei, government expert, 2017, my translation).

As our exchange shows, even a direct observation could not always determine whether a certain activity was really against the law or not. The line between uncertainty, ambiguity, and actual infringement remained blurred, particularly for an occurrence as small-scale as the one we witnessed. Moreover, I found myself reflecting about Andrei's final statement with respect to "Zhoro's colleagues" and how they might choose to interpret the situation. Zhoro (also a pseudonym) had dropped by Andrei's office earlier, interrupting our conversation for a while. A friend of Andrei's, he was an official from IARA, the Executive Agency of Fisheries and Aquaculture [Изпълнителна агенция по рибарство и аквакултури]. Andrei's implication, therefore, was that certain officials at the agency might let activities like the one we observed slide. I had previously heard from Georgi that IARA officials might overlook illegal trawling in exchange for "turbot for Christmas" (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). Another participant, Kalina, recounted to me a story she had heard from a friend working for the Institute for Fish Stocks in Varna. The friend was on board the Institute's research vessel, which was conducting a study on turbot stocks during the seasonal ban. At one point, they encountered turbot

nets, which they then promptly took down. But "the fisherman found out and went to argue with them" until the scientists had to specifically spell out to him that he was a poacher and they could report him (Kalina, researcher, 2017, my translation). It was only at this point that the man left, and the scientists let him go, taking none of the fisherman's personal details and choosing not to report him. When Kalina told me this story, she first remarked on what she thought of as the poacher's entitlement: "I mean, they are so arrogant that even when they poach they go to argue with those who'd sanction them" (Kalina, researcher, 2017, my translation). But when I asked her if she thought it were possible that the poacher had not known about the ban, she admitted: "Well, yeah […] I mean, they're not educated, they certainly don't know when the fishing periods [are]" (Kalina, researcher, 2017, my translation). Both interpretations, though, helped explain her friend and fellow scientists' informal treatment of this poaching instance. Instead of reporting it to the institutions, they had seen it as a minor incident, an anecdote to illustrate the daily and unremarkable nature of infringement on the turbot ban. Poaching—an illegal activity—was in Kalina's story almost a routine.

Together, these accounts of small-scale poaching and its treatment by the institutions put me in mind of Stefan Dorondel's description of patronage and illegal logging in Romanian forests in his book *Disrupted Landscapes* (Dorondel, 2016). Describing the relations between Rudari and local bureaucrats in a Romanian state forest, Dorondel shows how the informal networks and bribes between them are utilized regardless of whether it comes to handling a logging mistake or a cartful of illegally harvested wood (Dorondel, 2016, 72-77). Gifts of wood, in this account, function to sweeten the relations (Dorondel, 2016, 73). It was possible, I thought, that similar informal network relations defined the interactions Kalina, Georgi, and Andrei had hinted at between illegal poachers and scientists or officials. Dorondel's work with Stelu Şerban in rural Bulgaria has shown that small communities rely on informal networks and on-their-own-terms engagements with the state largely as a means of resisting the neoliberal state's unequal conditions (Dorondel and Şerban, 2019, 11-12). The informal relations participants sketched around poaching and turbot, therefore, speak not only to legal ambiguity but also to a widely spread recognition that this ambiguity might be unfair.

Considering corruption as a form of societal building, in line with Dorondel's account (Dorondel, 2016) or Torsello and Prato's ideas (Torsello, 2011, 18; Prato, 2013, 208), also helps to explain some of the wider conceptual complexity around identifying what counts as corruption and whom it affects in the first place. Another participant, whom I will anonymize fully here in order to protect them, opined:

> There is a conscious effort to keep locals from uniting in any way, to prevent any local unions that might demand something from their municipal administration, because any one of these people could be accused of something. So it is that we have that wonderful catch of

> corruption: you, as citizens of this municipality, as taxpayers of this municipality, will not ask for much of anything or demand much from your municipality's leadership, which in turn will not demand that you obey all law strictly (Anonymous, my translation).

The anonymous quote above suggests that such occurrences form part of a societal chain, an order of sorts that the participant describes with "that wonderful catch of corruption". The exchange this participant outlines is itself a form of unwritten law, one that defines the real daily relationships between citizens and their municipality's leadership. Combined with the small-scale illegal activities and informal relations, these observations help show why disassembling corruption from the wider functioning of the coastal society is difficult.

In short, there exists a challenge of distinguishing between corruption, ambiguity, and the spaces in between, especially at different scales. This difficulty is complicated further still by the various narrative meanings associated with corruption. On the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, construction, lack of clarity, and corruption have long been entangled on a conceptual as well as a practical level. Partly this entanglement has emerged because of actual illegal developments and the wide-spread legal and governmental ambiguity. Sometimes, however, it has been influenced even by aesthetic factors like the stylistic choices evident in many developments (Holleran, 2015, 242). For instance, a particular flavour of post-1989 construction favouring over-the-top decorative elements and influences as a way of repudiating socialist minimalism and displaying new wealth has been popularly referred to as "Mafia baroque" (мутробарок, *mutrobarok*) (Holleran, 2014). The resulting conflation between ostentatious "Mafia" style and corruption has not helped the clarity of the issue. Some owners of larger tourist hotels, for instance, have expressed resentment at being compared with or taken for mafia, and vilified as part of the problem, when the negative effects of overconstruction affected them equally strongly, or even more so. One such owner, Atanas Karageorgiev, interviewed for *SEGA* Newspaper on the subject of the 2019 summer season's low tourist numbers, commented that the association had impacted his business in a significant way:

> In years past the unregulated construction also left its negative impact. But there is something else. Many people decided to launder their money through tourism, which is why the state took on the strategy 'We won't help the industry because it will always pull something out from underneath the mattress.' But that led to the reducing all investors to the common moniker "mafia". But why am I mafia for having worked and managed to earn something, having invested it in Bulgaria? For some it may not matter how many the tourists are, exactly. But when you've drawn credit, which comes to 40-50% of the investment price, it becomes

> quite important whether another two tourists come or not (Atanas Karageorgiev, quoted in Bozhidarov, 2019, my translation).

Karageorgiev's comments speak directly to the conceptual entanglement between corruption and other ills along the shoreline: in this case, the results of unsustainable and speculative investments associated with tourist construction. Construction or investment in the tourist industry, Karageorgiev protested, are not in and of themselves corruption. Instead, those who "launder their money through tourism" exacerbate existing problems along the coastline. His comments help to highlight, however, how corruption has been a narrative wielded in conversations about economic and governmental mismanagement more generally, making these topics difficult to disentangle.

For many, ultimately, the dynamics of overconstruction and corruption tapped into wider feelings about the state, much as in the case of the European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria case on Kaliakra. This wider entanglement comes through clearly in Georgi's account. Toward the end of our conversation, I asked if there was anything we should speak about that I had not yet asked about. Georgi generalized:

> We could talk about everything, but what is actually happening is that the state has entirely abdicated from its tasks and responsibilities and this is why tourism is disappearing. Right now on Kaliakra there's ongoing illegal construction, it's been established, DNSK [the Directorate for National Building Control], ministries have established it, this construction is still ongoing. There's no one to stop it. And concrete will sprout there and there's no one to go and stop it. The police can't go and catch these people who are building it and arrest them. It's not happening. So this is madness, so this means there's no state. It means everyone can do whatever they want. You can come here and right here—to prove it I'll come here [on the beach] and I'll, here on the very beach someone could make a concrete house and no one will say anything to him. By the time anyone says anything to him, by the time they stop him, he'll have finished it. Just as they tilled down the dunes, just as they did everything. This is, this is no country, this is a pig sty. This is no country (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

It was a charged way for him to end the formal part of our conversation. I felt, however, that this closing speech displayed well Georgi's strong sense of disappointment and anger toward the state, as well as the way in which, for him, these feelings were entangled with the shoreline's change. Alongside his commentary on state failure, his language of "tilling down the dunes" and "concrete sprouting" directly on the beach communicated his sensitivity to the environment's visible, material change. Another eloquent example on this entanglement comes from my conversation

with small-scale fisherman Svetoslav, who had told me that pollution had contributed toward the decline in fish, particularly turbot, in later years (Svetoslav, fisherman, 2018). But when, at the end of our conversation, I asked him how he would envision a perfect relationship between society and the environment on the Bulgarian coast, he did not speak about fisheries decline or pollution, even though those were the issues that had concrete and immediate consequences for him personally. Instead, Svetoslav spoke about societal relations:

> Both in the land, and in the sea, everyone tries to be ahead of the other, everyone tries to outrun the other, everyone tries to lower their net in front of the other, and this is wrong, because there is enough fish for everyone […] This is what I wish would change, the jealousy between people (Svetoslav, fisherman, 2018, my translation).

Svetoslav's use of his own livelihood as a metaphor is an important illustration for the way dynamics on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast function on a metaphorical as well as a material level. In his account, fishing was both a tangible practice and a symbol for society. The same tendency is exemplified by the complexity of corruption and its literal and symbolic meanings on the Bulgarian shoreline. Corruption here, as I have illustrated above, may well be a reality in the most straightforward sense. But, in many of the narratives I encountered, it was simultaneously also a metaphor for a society in which collective decisions—whether the productive collaboration between Deyan and other institutions' experts or Kalina's fishing for turbot story—are often made in ways invisible to the public. More importantly still, corruption also represented, as in Georgi's comment and Svetoslav's reflection, the charged disappointment some felt with perceived government injustice and societal breakdown. Debating corruption, in these cases, enabled individuals to render what they considered invisible, whether it was wastewater or the destruction of dunes, visible at least in their narratives.

I found it significant that the coastal environment and its material transformations seemed to play a central role in these types of symbolism. Whether it was the gift of turbot signifying informal relations, the beach evoked as a reason for the European Commission to sue the Bulgarian state, or Georgi's "sprouting" concrete in Kaliakra as a symbol for the country abdicating from its responsibilities, attributes of the seashore itself were paramount to the narratives' ability to speak to material and metaphorical levels alike. The wealth of this entanglement between the coastline's physical features and transformations and the meaning others imbued in them can be better explained when looking at the Bulgarian Black Sea coast from a longer temporal perspective. Thus, in the following section, I shift to narratives pertaining to the wider time period from the 1950s onward, aiming to bring the socio-political and cognitive impacts of environmental and societal change over time further to the fore.

Planning, power, and tourism on the Bulgarian coast under socialism, 1950-1989

The importance of tourism on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, and the tensions it raises with local communities, livelihoods, and the environment, can be traced decades back in time to the industry's emergence. Although the first seaside recreation facilities in Bulgaria were built along Varna's beach as early as 1889 (Marinov and Koulov, 2002, 167), the significant growth and internationalization of tourism as an industry occurred in the 1950-1960s. Throughout that period, the socialist government invested in tourism on the Black Sea coast by constructing several large "resort complexes": state-owned, state-run resorts bearing names such as Golden Sands (*Zlatni pyasatsi,* Златни пясъци), Sunny Beach (*Slanchev bryag*, Слънчев бряг), and Comradery (*Druzhba*, Дружба), promoted and managed through the state's monopolist tour operator Balkantourist.

Although the new resorts in part represented an openness to the world and a capitalistically inclined economic model antithetical to earlier socialist *diktats*, they also constituted an important strategic asset for the state. The start of their construction coincided with Khrushchev's 'thaw' of relations with the West, as part of which freer travel within, into, and outside the socialist bloc came to play an important ideological and political role: to establish socialist countries on the international stage (Gorsuch, 2011, 12-14). Khruschev personally took credit for encouraging the Bulgarian government to develop the Black Sea coastline (Conterio, 2018, 327-8) and, according to the vision he promoted, the resorts were built to serve as a "display window of communism" (Markov, 1980, 404). The display window worked both ways, as the KGB and Bulgarian secret services both considered the Bulgarian seaside resorts to offer many espionage opportunities (Ghodsee, 2005, 94-96). Thus, the resorts' openness in fact contributed to a wider and multivalent political agenda.

Simultaneously, tourism also performed an important economic function for the socialist state. By the mid- and late-1950s, the Bulgarian government was acknowledging the necessity to seek economic development through means other than heavy industry. In an address from 2 December 1958, for instance, Bulgarian First Secretary Todor Zhivkov noted, "We know the Marxist thesis that socialism and communism cannot be built without heavy industries. This is correct, but it must be asked to what extent it holds for a small country like Bulgaria" (Zhivkov, 1958, 7, my translation). Instead, Zhivkov argued, Bulgaria should invest in lighter industries that would allow it "more quickly to solve the tasks that are in place to improve the nation's circumstances" (Zhivkov, 1958, 7, my translation). Tourism, from the 1960s onward, increasingly grew into one of those industries. In April of 1960, the development of international tourism came to be first on the agenda of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Politburo) (Politburo, 1960a, 1). An exchange of official documents from September of the same year recommends the construction of new hotels accommodating 1,000 additional beds at

the cost of 10 million lev for 1960 and 13,400,000 lev for 1961 and orders the money repurposed from other sectors of the economy (Politburo, 1960b, Planning, Finances, and Commerce Division and Construction, Transport, and Communications Division, 1960, Ministry Council, 1960). By December of 1960, a report by the Deputy Chair of the Council of Minister observed that tourism brought in one currency equivalent of the lev for every 1.64 lev invested, where other exports required an investment of 2.85 lev to return the same (Politburo, 1960c, 122). The Deputy Chair noted, "No other economic activity in the country recovers invested means as quickly as tourism" (Politburo, 1960c, 123, my translation).

From there on, tourism served as a kind of "hidden export" providing the regime with much-needed hard foreign currency (Koulov, 1996, 187; Marinov and Koulov, 2002, 167). The importance of currency could be gleaned even from dispatches to Western media, as in the following report to *The New York Times* from September 25, 1957:

> SOFIA, Bulgaria, Sept. 21—The whir of roulette wheels across the golden sands of the Black Sea. Snake dances in Sofia night clubs. "Eve's Beach" for nude sunbathing. These are parts of Bulgaria's bid to become a sort of Miami Beach of the Eastern world, a Florida of communism. What the founding fathers Marxism would think about the experiment that has been launched by this hard-working sobersided Communist land is hard to imagine. Bulgaria seems to have chosen the primrose path as her unique road to socialism.
>
> [...]
>
> Within five years, Bulgaria hopes to bring in 30 per cent of her foreign trade revenue in the form of tourist expenditures. A substantial part of this is expected to be in hard Western currencies. For the present, ordinary United States tourists will not be able to take advantage of the new Bulgarian Riviera because the State Department permits travel to Bulgaria only by newspaper correspondents and other persons with specific business here. However, Bulgaria is hopeful that diplomatic relations between the two countries will be restored, opening the way to a flood of United States tourists and of United States dollars (Salisbury, 1957).

In less than half a decade, this broad hope for internationalization had borne some fruit. In the intervening years, as evidenced by Politburo documents of the time, Bulgaria invested further funds in development and propaganda (see Politburo, 1960c.). By March 1962, Paul Underwood wrote for *The New York Times* that

> Throughout the Communist world, Bulgaria occupies a position roughly equivalent to that of Florida in the United States: It is the place to go for a seaside vacation. This Iron Country has other attractions but, for land-locked northerners or touring Americans longing for a tanning sun and warm seas, the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria is the principal lure (Underwood, 1962).

Underwood's article goes on to note that, in the previous year (that is, 1961), Bulgaria had "played host to more than 250,000- foreign tourists, of whom 80,000 came from the West, mainly West Germany, Austria and Scandinavia" and that expectations for 1962 were for the total "to rise above 300,000" (Underwood, 1962). In Underwood's dispatch, travel into Bulgaria is represented largely as cosmopolitan and accessible, with "road, rail, air and sea connections with Western Europe" and road infrastructure he deems as "generally good" (Underwood, 1962). Tourism had indeed contributed to the modernization of local infrastructure. In his account of how tourism changed the country as part of his *In Absentia Reports on Bulgaria*, Georgi Markov[2] commented on the improvements to roads, restaurants and bars, as well as the new construction of gas stations and postal and telephone services (Markov, 1980). "Simply said," he wrote in "Bowing to His Majesty the Dollar",

> …tourism, and not communism, modernized Bulgaria. […] All of those accomplishments filled the pages of the regime's propaganda publications and, of course, were credited not to tourism but to communism. But for any impartial observer it's more than clear that without this breathless involvement of the state to transform Bulgaria into a country of international tourism, Bulgarian citizens perhaps would have still been sneezing in the old roads' dust (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 406, my translation).

---

[2] Georgi Markov was a Bulgarian novelist, playwright, and journalist celebrated by the regime until his defection in 1969. His *In Absentia Reports on Bulgaria* were first aired as a series of 137 broadcasts on Radio "Free Europe", Munich, between November 1975 and June 1978. After Markov's murder, famously executed by the Bulgarian secret service in the 1978 "umbrella assassination" in London, the broadcasts were published in written form in Zurich in 1980 through the activism of another Bulgarian emigrant, General Yosif Zagorski. The *Reports* straddle documentary and literary prose and constitute a powerful uncensored written account from the period. Although an English translation exists, done by Liliana Brisby in 1983 and retitled *The Truth that Killed*, I have everywhere cited from Markov's Bulgarian original, rather than from Brisby's English translation, since the latter was edited and abridged for a Western audience. I also refer to Markov's original title throughout, not only because I personally find the amended title sensationalist but also because the original title represents the feeling of diaspora that was so important to Markov himself.

This accessibility and improvements Underwood and Markov cite helped ensure that the Bulgarian coastline's popularity with foreign tourists would grow even further. Several years later, in May of 1966, another journalist reporting to *The New York Times* would note, "all Bulgarian beaches are truly international, and it is common to see Russians sitting next to Americans and Turks next to Greeks" (Eperon, 1966). This internationalization was certainly the result of official policy, he observed:

> Bulgaria is going all out to attract foreign visitors. Visas cost $1, if obtained from a Bulgarian legation in the United States or Europe, at the frontier or upon arrival in Sofia by plane. Visitors do not prepay for their trips; when they arrive in the country, they can go to any office of Balkantourist, the Bulgarian National Travel Office, which will arrange for hotels, tours and visits to factories and collective farms (Eperon, 1966).

As the articles on the pages of *The New York Times* and Markov's account suggest, the tourist industry had already become a significant driver for the Bulgarian economy. By the early 1970s, 3 million foreign tourists were entering Bulgaria annually, more than half of whom from the West (Radio Free Europe, 1973, 6). The country could indeed be said to have become a "Florida by the Black Sea" (in Underwood's phrase), with the designs of its resorts and hotels viewed elsewhere in the Socialist bloc as exemplary in both planning and architecture (Conterio, 2018, 345-6). By the mid-1970s, tourism accounted for 20% of Bulgaria's foreign currency earnings; in 1985, at the industry's pre-1989 height, over 18 million nights were spent in Bulgaria by foreign tourists, some 270,000 of them from Western countries (Anderson et al., 2012, 320). However, as Markov's comment about crediting the modernization to communism suggests, the importance of tourism was rarely discussed by officials in public. Whereas closed meetings of the Bulgarian Communist Party's Central Committee continued to put the development of international tourism in Bulgaria first on the agenda through the decades (see, for instance, Politburo, 1973 or Politburo, 1989), formal announcements to the public rarely made mention of the industry's important role (Ghodsee, 2005, 89). Tourism remained a "hidden export", designed and regulated above all for the benefit of the central government and its political and economic needs.

Accordingly, the industry also brought hidden costs to local communities and environments. Indeed, reports of the hidden ecological costs during the early years of socialist tourism parallel in many ways the issues that participants shared with me in 2017-2018. As early as 1978, for example, geographer Francis W. Carter expressed concern for the fate of "some of the most precious nature reserves" along the Black Sea coast, where he saw

> […] a conflicting situation aris[ing] based on the unfavourable effects of the country's growing tourist industry. The Black Sea coastal area houses

> not only the largest tourist and health resort complexes in the whole country, but it is one of the most significant such regions within the socialist bloc. The new tourist complex of 'Kamchija yug' is very near to the precious Kamchija nature reserve; similarly the 'Arkutino' tourist hotel complex lies close to the aforementioned small, but botanically important, Zmijskija ostrov, Vodnite lilii and Morski pelin nature reserves. These areas are continually visited by tourists, who disturb wild animals, collect rare flowers and break tree branches. Unfortunately, the Bulgarian government, in its desire to encourage and develop the tourist industry, has neglected to pass sufficiently severe enough laws to discourage such activity (Carter, 1978, 72).

This tendency to overlook how the under-regulated industry could harm precisely the natural features that attract tourists to the coastline went beyond "wild animals, rare flowers, and tree branches" (Carter, 1978, 72). It extended, in fact, to basic planning decisions about landscape planning. Although there are few records on the precise dimensions and abundance of sand formations prior to the 1950s, evidence does suggest that the socialist state was not entirely innocent of harming dunes during the resorts' initial construction. On the site where Sunny Beach was developed, for instance, scholars have suggested that dunes as high as 11 meters may have been destroyed, especially in the more vegetated parts of sand formations that extend further landward (Stancheva et al., 2011, 326-7). In addition, atypical (poplars, pine trees) or invasive species (acacias, amorphas) were introduced into the dune habitats as part of the landscaping around the hotels and restaurants. These species, as government experts observed during our 2017 exchanges, still present a threat to the dunes today:

> Boryana: There [in Nessebar/Sunny Beach], years ago they even forested the dunes. With poplars, in the North there are even cases of conifers…
>
> Dessislava: Mostly poplars.
>
> Vanya: They simply used to forest the dunes.
>
> Boryana: That was just the policy then, to stop the sands' drifting. And afterwards they realized it was a mistake, of course. They have a relatively short life, poplars, the wood is like that, quick-growing, it doesn't add structure well, and its life is generally short. They've mostly been cut down, removed. Of course, some do remain. Acacias, there are many acacias, it's a very aggressive species… Not to mention the amorphas. And in the past, they landscaped along the roads largely with exactly poplars, amorphas, they planted them in front of us.
>
> Dessislava: Without you knowing it was invasive.

> Boryana: There was no such thing back then! Do you know how hard it was to get it to thrive?
>
> Dessislava: And how hard it is now to remove it.
>
> Boryana: Such care, and now I'll die feeling pain in my heart, seeing how we just can't fight it back. We tried, we fought…
>
> Dessislava: We can't. We tried in Strandja…
>
> Boryana: …desperate attempts (Boryana, Dessislava, and Vanya, government experts, 2017, my translation).

As the exchange between Boryana, Dessislava, and Vanya shows, the species introductions made into the dunes under socialism were not all incidental. Instead, they were part of a specific landscaping policy "to stop the sands' drifting" or line the roads with poplars, as Boryana indicates. Her account coincides with wider evidence that these kinds of alterations to the ecosystem during socialism were entirely purposeful. In her ethnographic work in Bulgarian coastal resorts, for instance, Kristen Ghodsee reports hearing multiple Golden Sands employees recounting how Hungarian porcupines were imported on a train to help clear swamp snakes from the resort grounds (Ghodsee, 2005, 87). Boryana, Dessislava, and Vanya's account on the treeing of dunes "to stop the sands drifting" forms part of the same pattern of environmental control. Since its beginning—certainly as early as the 1948 Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature—the international socialist regime had held views of environment and society as equally malleable to the state in the service of its ideals (Olšáková, 2016, 6). Although Stalin's specific agenda of *velikie stroiki* was abandoned after Stalin's death (Olšáková, 2016, 5), the tendency of shaping environments and the people within them to the needs and visions of the political leadership was frequently replicated, albeit in different iterations, by individual socialist countries (see, for example, Stefan Dorondel's reflections on this in *Disrupted Landscapes*, 2016, 25-53). This was certainly Francis Carter's sense when commenting on the environmental management of the Bulgarian coastline in 1978: "In Bulgaria, as in other East European countries, the approach towards the natural environment is more codified and bureaucratic than in some western countries, based on an assumption that this will lead to rational conformist decisions" (Carter, 1978, 72).

This "codified and bureaucratic" approach at the heart of the regime's project of developing Bulgarian tourism applied equally to environment and to people. For instance, the openness and flexibility of Black Sea resorts for Western visitors, as described by Eperon in 1966, often came at the direct expense of ordinary Bulgarian citizens. In "The Sting and Honey of Tourism," Markov relates how, in the midst of summer, he and many other Bulgarian vacationers were effectively evicted from the rooms they had booked with Balkantourist in Sunny Beach in order to make space for an unexpected influx of Western tourists (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 382-283, my translation). He writes of visiting hotel after hotel "desperately begging to be found a room",

along with "at least a hundred" other Bulgarians placed in the same helpless situation (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 382, my translation). Markov also recalls being refused service in restaurants at the resort "because they were busy with foreigners" (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 384, my translation). Reflecting on these experiences, he notes, "I think Bulgaria has two most unpleasant and constant sources of national humiliation. Those are, in the first place, the passport office at the Ministry of the Interior, and in the second, 'Balkantourist'" (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 383, my translation).

Markov's reflections on tourism also suggest, however, that the alteration of environment for the economic benefit of tourism has resulted in societal change. Immediately following the passages on Sunny Beach's unwelcoming atmosphere, he writes:

> I walk on the beautiful sand along the shore and think about what this shore was only 10 years ago. This was the 6-kilometer long northern beach of Nessebar. A long and empty space of rolling dunes, hot sun, and a clean, clear sea. As students we wandered through this expanse, lay on the dunes, and took joy in some sun-lit freedom. You could go wherever you wanted, because no one looked at you and there were few vacationers here. In Nessebar itself and in Sozopol, in Primorsko and in Ahtopol people lived in a simple and virgin world. The fishermen were real fishermen, the wine makers were real wine makers, and people were real people.
>
> […]
>
> Far from the plastic civilization of tourism, far from the commercial infection of the new time, and far from the rotten servile morality of the regime, you once met clean and honest people. God forbid someone should ask for a rent above the reasonable low price. How frequently landlords in all these places refused to accept rent with the words, 'We're all people, today you were my guest, tomorrow I'll be yours, that's how it should be.' How many of us still recall and will recall the warm nights spent in someone's home, or entertainment in an inn, where generosity sprung from empty pockets and where there lived a large, unexpressed human understanding.
>
> This old world would die on the day in 1956 when Nikita Khrushchev saw the beauty of the Black Sea coast and advised the Bulgarian government to earn money from tourism (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 384-385, my translation).

In the passage above, Markov shows an appeal to authenticity—"The fishermen were real fishermen, the wine makers were real wine makers, the people were real people"—that he links

directly to the unchanged environment, the dunes, and the clean sea. In the same vein, he also speaks directly to the capitalist characteristics of the industry in a supposedly socialist state. His descriptions of tourism as a "plastic civilization" or a "commercial infection" (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 385) might just as easily have been employed by a contemporary critique of the industry's neoliberal characteristics. And, continuing the parallel between this description and contemporary narratives, Markov's focus on the "large, unexpressed human understanding" (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 385) shows above all a concern with how societal relations may have changed along with the coastal environment.

Overall, given the extent to which the coastline's partial transformation for the benefit of tourism had been a top-down political and economic project, with hidden costs to both society and environment, it is unsurprising that communities came to ascribe meaning to the coast in a range of different ways. For some, unlike for Markov, places like Sunny Beach or Golden Sands held a more positive connotation. The resorts afforded possibilities of obtaining Western items, contacts, or lovers—in other words, opportunities for previously limited contacts with the world outside the socialist bloc. As part of that tendency, there was also a pattern of Bulgarians and other Eastern Europeans approaching vacationing on the Black Sea shore as a more literal means of escape. In "The Sting and Honey of Tourism", Markov describes a pattern of Bulgarian men vacationing near the resorts in the deliberate search of "a girlfriend, a lover, who would agree to something larger—perhaps an invitation to visit abroad or a marriage (fictional or real)" (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 388, my translation). In narratives like these, people saw the resorts as opportunities for glimpsing or accessing the wider world. These opportunities, however, came with dangers. The socialist state carefully monitored and controlled opportunities for escape. The resorts were physically removed from inhabited areas, exclusive, and carefully observed by secret services (Ghodsee, 2005, 93-100).

Because of the resorts' inaccessibility to ordinary citizens without the right connections, many young Bulgarians alternatively came to see the act of camping on an empty beach *outside* the resorts as an escape from the control and surveillance of organized socialism (Holleran, 2015, 236-8). Their sense of the beach as a resistance ground was strengthened by the symbolism of the beach as a garden to the socialist urbanism and a space of revelry to the socialist order (Holleran, 2015, 236-238). This function of the sea or the beach as an escape is well-documented, for example, by Markov himself. In "*Shumi Maritsa* for Valko Chervenkov," one of the *Reports*, Markov describes the beach bungalows and tents at Arkutino as a place of respite for a group of Sofia's intelligentsia:

> Many of the regulars belong to what in Sofia is known as the scientific-technological intelligentsia. Most are engineers, architects, doctors, people with technical specialties and only a few artists and writers. And it is precisely this scientific-technological intelligentsia that imposes a much more casual, human, and nonbinding lifestyle. Here [on the beach]

> nobody feels obliged to talk about books or paintings, nor to seem more erudite than he is. The conversation is about food, drinks, and pleasures, because these are the treasures with which people want to fill their long-awaited 14 days of annual leave.
>
> […]
>
> There is a very vital difference between the biographies of the technical intelligentsia at Arkutino and the artist crowd taking their rest in Sozopol. While the writers, actors, painters, composers, and so on are in the most part people who have always found themselves in harmony with the power, here almost everyone has a past that, in police speak, "has a large black spot" (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 179, my translation).

Elsewhere in the *Reports*, Markov elaborates further on this function of sea and coast as a kind of escape from the realities of life in the regime by relating a conversation in Burgas in which the participants points out that, although in socialist Bulgaria people have been reduced to speaking only *to* or *at* each other, rather than *with* each other, one can definitely speak with the sea (Markov, 1980, Vol. 2, 175, my translation).

Markov's account, in short, is indicative of the extent to which coastal nature came to be perceived by many ordinary citizens as a form of escape. This framing was also coloured by the broader way in which the socialist state wielded and withheld environmental knowledge. For the most part, ecological data was unavailable to the public even when it directly concerned its health or, when it was communicated, often proved false; this made it difficult for independent observers or advocates to assess the environmental status of ecosystems (Baumgartl, 1993, 159). Before *glasnost*, the regime allowed very little discussion on the ecological consequences of its various industrial undertakings, despite their potential impact on either workers or nearby environments. One prominent example features air pollution from the Kremikovtsi metallurgic plant, opened in 1961 near the capital city Sofia as "the greatest Bulgarian industrial project ever undertaken and […] the greatest single symbol of socialist construction" (Radio Free Europe, 1961, 1). Various reports to *Radio Free Europe* elaborated on the ironic significance of this symbol. From an economic standpoint, the plant was unnecessary and indeed counterproductive due to the poor iron content in local ore deposits and the insufficient quantities of processing materials available in Bulgaria: factors that necessitated expensive imports, earning the plant the nickname "the graveyard of the Bulgarian economy" (Radio Free Europe, 1963, 7-8; 1967, 2). The pollution and threat to health produced from the plant are hard to ascertain: from the start, labourers considered its working conditions equivalent to those of a concentration camp (Radio Free Europe, 1961, 1); but discussions of air pollution were subdued by the government until the late 1980s, when glasnost allowed open debate over some of these issues for the first time (Ashley and Nikolaev, 1987, 9).

The Kremikovtsi case thus demonstrates aptly how environment, health, and knowledge were all held hostage by the socialist state's industrial targets, even when these targets were unrealistic.

Air pollution is an important tangent here for more than one reason. Demands for *glasnost* around this specific issue resulted in the environment's entanglement into events leading up to the 1989 political transition in Bulgaria. In 1987, high levels of air pollution from a Romanian chlorine factory in the Bulgarian Danube town Ruse prompted public demonstrations initially led by mothers concerned for their children's health (V. Antonova, 2019; Baumgartl, 1993, 162-4). From that relatively small focus, however, the movement quickly spread across the country. By 1988 and especially 1989, the movement called *Ecoglasnost* had grown into a country-wide public platform for discussions on human rights and political change through the prism of environment (Botcheva, 1996, 298; Jancar-Webster, 1998, 72). Finally, in the autumn of 1989, *Ecoglasnost* protests in Sofia organised in support of the Helsinki Conference on Environmental Cooperation played a pivotal role in the series of events that triggered the regime's fall (Baumgartl, 1993, 166-167; Jancar-Webster, 1998, 72).

This brief history of the *Ecoglasnost* movement hints at a vital entanglement between perceptions of environmental degradation, intolerability toward knowledge control, and society-building in socialist Bulgaria. This entanglement was strengthened further through the role that poets played in popularizing the issue early on (Baumgartl, 1993, 161). A 1988 article in Bulgarian literary newspaper *Literaturen Front* responding to some of the original Ruse protests directly connected environmental degradation to morality and societal degradation: "Not only is the environment unhealthy, but also the moral environment suffers, and these unhealthy changes are becoming increasingly serious" (cited and translated by Baumgartl, 1993, 164). *Ecoglasnost* took on this tendency of utilising the environment as a political and economic critique, one targeted equally at material pollution, opaque knowledge production, and societal degradation. The movement's program, as reported by a spokesman to *Radio Free Europe* in August 1989, included explicit concerns with "the lack of full and up-to-date information about the dangers concealed in all the things we cannot do without—air, water, food, and the soil" (Ashley, 1989, 16), as well as with social and environmental justice: "Those who make the strategic decisions are not the same people as those who have to face the consequences" (Ashley, 1989, 16). These conclusions would come to be echoed the Bulgarian Black Sea coast after 1989, as well. The sense of environmental injustice and the outcome of the *Ecoglasnost* movement, moreover, would solidify the imaginary of the Bulgarian environment as a protest subject linked closely to the issues of democracy.

Where it came to the tourist industry and the Black Sea coast, as I have tried to demonstrate in this section, the Bulgarian socialist state bequeathed many negative patterns to the series of postsocialist governments that succeeded it. These patterns included not only the deliberate and accidental series of changes to the coastal environment, but also the hidden economics of the industry and the resulting marginalization of many ordinary Bulgarian citizens. As I will illustrate

in the next sections, these tendencies would be inherited in part due to how power was retained in the transition by many of the same internal actors, and in part because of the equally important role external actors and pressures played in solidifying these same dynamics on the Bulgarian shoreline after 1989.

What the postsocialist coastline would also inherit, however, was the narrative framing of its natural features as an *alternative* space, set in opposition to these overarching dynamics, and thus often seen as one of resistance. This framing continues to impact how many participants narrate the transformations on their coastline. It is also a perspective that allows many to imagine, as I will demonstrate in later sections of this chapter, alternative ways of governing the coast as well as a more positive future for the coming generations.

Inheriting the coast: the tourist industry, property change, and environmental care post-1989

Much like the invasive species still plaguing dune habitats, many of the issues planted during socialism on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast have persisted into the present. To begin, there is direct continuity between socialism and capitalism in terms of the dynamics of power and planning before and after 1989. Evidence has shown that, after the transition, those who had held political power in socialist Bulgaria were in privileged positions to transform it into economic influence (Ganev, 2007, 63). This principle applied to the Black Sea coastline's most valuable properties: the state resorts formerly managed by Balkantourist. Due to the perceived value of the tourism industry to the newly democratic country's economy, the resorts were privatized quickly, but privatizations began in 1990 without clear directives about the process or the desired outcome (Marinov and Koulov, 2002, 173). When handling the privatization of Sunny Beach, for instance, the liquidation commission charged with the process made no prior announcements, set no regulations, held no auctions, and involved no trade unions (Koulov, 1996, 191). Balkantourist itself was restructured in the form of a private company, but its management stayed and retained control over much of the resorts' infrastructure and services—from landscaping through general maintenance to laundry facilities—thereby positioning it as a highly privileged tourism operator even post 1990 (Koulov, 1996, 192). These quirks of the privatization process made investment conditional and ultimately affected returns decades down the line. Interviewed in 2019 for *SEGA* Newspaper, hotelier Karageorgiev cited these difficulties, originating in the early 1990s, as an ongoing challenge for modern business:

> When drawing the privatization contracts, our esteemed former Prime Minister Ivan Kostov decided to denationalize the hotels [in the resorts] by giving away only construction rights. Whoever wanted to buy the land had to do it through the respective resort cooperatives. These

> cooperatives were given the infrastructure as a gift. For example, in the privatization contract you would take on the responsibility to realize your investment within 3 to 5 years, let's say to make the 30 rooms into 70, but in order to do it you would have to buy the land [underneath the hotel] from them—if not, they became your co-owner. Separately from this, to this day you pay infrastructure fees to them. These cooperatives are hoteliers themselves, thus I am forced to pour water into another's mill (Atanas Karageorgiev, quoted in Bozhidarov, 2019, my translation).

Karageorgiev's account helps to illustrate how the privatization process fragmented the resorts and created economic competition and inequality between hoteliers.

Something similar occurred on a smaller scale along the entire coastline. Where it came to individuals' property, the restitution process was beset by the same issues of opacity, lack of clarity, and perceived inequality. In arranging the property restitutions of the early 1990s, government officials intended not only to reorient the economy toward a Western capitalist model but also, as evidenced by the ethnographic work of Christian Giordano and Dobrinka Kostova, to restore an idealistic—and ultimately unrealistic—vision of rurality (Giordano and Kostova, 2002, 79-80). At the individual level the restitution process, although intended to "revert history" and land management to the pre-socialist state, was in effect organized haphazardly, resulting in land fragmentation and multiple conflicting claims (Giordano and Kostova, 2002, 80). Thus, a broad pattern of Bulgaria's transition to market economy in the 1990s became the increase of socioeconomic inequality across the whole country, privileging a very small minority of politicians and newly wealthy businessmen (Vassilev, 2003, 108). Overall, the transition from socialism to capitalism involved "cataclysmic economic changes" that concentrated wealth in the hands of a very few while bringing nearly three-fourths of the population below the poverty line by the early 2000s (Vassilev, 2003, 109-110).

Amidst this atmosphere, the tourist industry offered ordinary people the promise of refuge. For those working in the large resorts, the industry provided vital financial security during the otherwise economically difficult years of the early post-socialist transition. Ghodsee's ethnographic account of the coastline's biggest resorts in 1999-2000, for example, showed that an individual waiter or bartender working in Sunny Beach or Albena could earn higher wages from tips over the few short months of the summer season than his or her average compatriot earned in their regular job in the course of the entire year (Ghodsee, 2005, 67-70). Accordingly, most of the people employed in the industry shared with Ghodsee a high level of job satisfaction during a period of economic precariousness for most other Bulgarians (Ghodsee, 2005, 65-75). Working in tourism allowed these individuals to amass both the economic capital (Western currency from tips) and the cultural capital (skills, attitudes, understanding of the liberal market from interactions with Westerners) necessary for their survival in the newly liberalized economy (Ghodsee, 2005, 97-103).

In the course of her book, Ghodsee describes various instances of female workers employed in the industry as maids or waitresses supporting their husbands and families through the transition's years (Ghodsee, 2005, see for instance 9-10, 45). This perceived security, however, made jobs in the tourist sector highly competitive, dependent on social capital and language skills (Ghodsee, 2005, see 50-51, 155-157).

For locals along the coastline whose land held developmental potential, tourism seemed to offer a more accessible, and more profitable, form of security. After properties were restituted to individuals in the early 1990s, many locals found themselves the owners of fields or other industrial lands with promising views of the sea. Exposed simultaneously to the chronic economic deprivation of the transition and to external promise of wealth that the tourist industry offered, many of the new heirs looked for ways to gain quick economic security from their land through rent or sale (Giordano and Kostova, 2002, 82). Selling land alongside the coast to developers came to be viewed as a highly desirable opportunity. It is still viewed this way today, as Andrei explained:

> [T]he dream in Bulgaria is either to scratch off a small piece of carton [a lottery ticket] and become a millionaire or to be the heir to a property that you wake up having sold for twenty or fifty thousand lev and to have become overnight—well, not a millionaire, but usually they take several hundreds or several tens of thousands of lev at once. Over there you've got a mudpool of water, and suddenly—which is nothing, brings you no income—and suddenly you've become, you've got a hundred thousand, and you're a big shot (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

Andrei's words highlight well the gold-rush kind of draw that the tourist industry exerted on many ordinary citizens along the Bulgarian Black Sea coastline, not only during the transition but also today. By comparing property sale to winning the lottery, Andrei emphasized his sense that this "dream" was both fervent and economically unsustainable. His final ironic comment about becoming "a big shot" taps into an important element of the fantasy: the ability of an individual to transcend from the bottom side of socioeconomic inequality to the wealthy minority. Locals who could not develop their ancestral lands because they happened to fall inside of a protected area felt "cheated because when their cousins, or they themselves, had properties in the urban [area of the former] salt flats, they built on them. And now why not build on the others, which are larger, they'll fetch more, right?" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). Thus, economic incentive and the desire to beat a rigged game combined to make the sale of land locals' preferred response to the climate of social mistrust created by the transition (Giordano and Kostova, 2002, 84-86). Kaloyan also explained how societal distrust and fear for the future filtered directly into individual motivations to sell property or develop it for the tourist industry:

> If I alone don't sell my grandfather's field, and all my neighbours build in such a way as to make my field into an inner courtyard, this means that I would be sacrificing the future, or part of the future, of my child, my children, to satisfy whims of my own. I don't want to sacrifice my children's future guarding something that state and society obviously cannot currently guard. This is why I too will sell my property, and I will seek to sell first, before everyone else, so that my property can be the first on which they construct, and not, due to construction on the surrounding properties, lose on its value (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation).

In a broad sense, Kaloyan's comment illustrates the cascading incentives for construction during that period. An equally strong motivation, however, was what he refers to as the unwillingness to "sacrifice [one's] children's future guarding something that state and society obviously cannot currently guard" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). His words help demonstrate how low trust in the state, coupled with economic uncertainty and consequently the reorientation of values toward economic gain, helped to drive the rapid scale of social and environmental change on the coast.

A range of external factors contributed to the tourist industry's value and exacerbated the inequalities spurred by the rush to cash in on its promise. Privatization after 1989 occurred rapidly, and with little organization, in part because of external pressure: during the 1980s, Bulgaria had amassed a large foreign debt and the World Bank withheld loans until the new government had begun privatizing or liquidating state assets in order to service the debt (Ghodsee, 2005, 121-2). As Naomi Klein has remarked in her book *The Shock Doctrine*, Western investors found the newly opened Eastern European market attractive precisely because most of the region's assets were still state-owned and therefore ripe for quick profit making (Klein, 2007, 176-178). The Bulgarian tourist industry exemplified this tendency well. Since it already possessed much of the necessary infrastructure, the Bulgarian Black Sea coast was seen as a promising market for companies seeking to invest in "the bottom end of the European package tourism business" (Holleran, 2017, 708). Because the "bottom end" in sea, sun, and sand holidays had previously been occupied by Spain, which had now grown oversaturated by investment, a number of Spanish companies procured investment ventures on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast (Holleran, 2017, 707-8). German tour operators, similarly, began heavily investing on the coastline in the early 2000s (Ghodsee, 2005, 143-144).

Further external encouragement came from the European Union, whose various institutions supported investment and loans in tourism over the course of its accession negotiations with Bulgaria (Holleran, 2017, 705-6). Meanwhile foreign individuals, especially EU citizens, increasingly became interested in buying holiday homes along the coast (Anderson et al.,

2012, 326). In order to accommodate all this demand and the economic benefits it promised, municipal development outpaced and at times purposefully circumnavigated central planning (Anderson et al., 2012, 324-326). This occurred at the same time as planning expertise more generally, associated as it was with socialism, was suffering from a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of citizens and politicians alike (Holleran, 2014; Holleran, 2015; Nedović-Budić, 2001, 38).

During my fieldwork in 2017-2018, several participants highlighted how external investment or funding continued to play a pivotal role in the coastline's management. Government expert Margarita admitted, for instance, that investment was a deciding factor when it came to providing purification facilities along the coastline. In the past, she said, funding for improving water treatment had often come from the EU and its regional development funds (Margarita, government expert, 2017). She explained further that the government had not yet addressed two problematic areas along the coastline because the state "can't find investment interest to allow new [purification plants] because there's no capacity", meaning that the towns in question had too small a year-round population to attract investment interest, even though additional treatment capacity was needed during the tourist season (Margarita, government expert, 2017, my translation). I thought it poignant that, in a government expert's own tacit admission, the availability of external funding essentially shaped regional institutions' ability to enforce environmental policy.

Other participants were more explicit in highlighting how policies served external interests rather than regional ones. When Kaloyan described the regional planning policies in the coastal municipality in which we met, he spoke of how management had bowed down to external interests in a way that disempowered local citizens. The municipality's prioritization of large-scale development had harmed not only local individuals but also the community, particularly by suppressing any tendency toward entrepreneurship. Once the municipality had allowed large, all-inclusive hotels to be built directly onto the beach strip, Kaloyan pointed out, "of course people who have fixed up their houses in the neighbourhood wouldn't have any livelihood" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). Indeed, even smaller businesses were left behind: when tourists come for their all-inclusive vacations, Kaloyan stressed, "they don't set foot in [the local town] at all, they don't buy the local *kebabcheta*, *tsatsa*, ice cream, and so forth, because everything is arranged for them in the restaurant itself, which of course shops in Burgas, and there is no contribution to the local economy" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). At the same time, he highlighted, the local environment paid a price. All-inclusive hotels contribute to the problem of seasonal waste waters that must be treated at the local plant and exceed its capacity during the summer months—as a result, he told me, "they've poisoned the next bay over" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). Andrei shared a similar analysis about the coastal town in which he and I had met. Local heirs to property who had sold their land eventually felt cheated, he told me: some "quickly blew through the money", others "fell victim to drugs", but, perhaps most importantly, even those who had successfully invested the profits from their

sales back into the tourist industry ultimately found themselves dependent on what was now a waning industry (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). In Andrei's view, the industry's decline was a direct consequence from the rush to profit off land sales. The result of all the for-sale construction done in past decades, Andrei remarked, was that "Russians [who bought these properties] began their own internal business, the owners let to their acquaintances, make agreements, they come here as friends, and in reality they pay nothing for this, and the locals see none of it" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). In other words, both Kaloyan and Andrei saw the external pressure to prioritize large-scale construction—whether for all-inclusive tourism or holiday homes—as what had deprived locals of the control over their own towns and profits.

To Kaloyan, one root of these problems was precisely the way in which external interests had shaped municipal policy. He explained to me that the municipality had even disregarded scientific advice for its economic development that had recommended this part of the coastline orient itself toward eco-tourism: "The then-mayor took the report, which had been paid for with municipal funds, with the funds of all those who live in the municipality and pay taxes, and said, 'I'll put that report in my drawer, first we'll build our Riviera from [end to end], then we'll think of the ecology'" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). Kaloyan spoke of this pattern as a perversity, a repudiation of what local governance ought to be about:

> So this is how, with a decision of the municipality council, the local rule, [with] the municipality council's income from local people, it turned out that the branch on which local owners of guesthouses sat got cut down […] so it turns out that, legally, through public forms of local rule, there were ideas pushed through that were in complete discord—economic ideas were realized that confiscated entrepreneurship from the hands of local owners of houses, guest houses, or hotels of the family type (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation).

Kaloyan's suggestion here that contemporary coastal tourism is shaped by economic ideas that are "in complete discord" with the interests of local developmental parallels Markov's complaints about the industry decades earlier. In both cases, planning is seen by its critics as entirely top-down, favouring external interests at the direct expense of local economic or environmental well-being. In both cases, moreover, these critics speak of societal as well as environmental harm. In Markov's pre-1989 narrative, tourism creates a "plastic civilization" beset by "rotten servile morality" (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 384-385, my translation). In Kaloyan's 2018 account, all-inclusive tourism harms not only the economic prospects of the community but its entrepreneurial outlook. In both accounts, the "winners" of these dynamics are the hidden external interests that really shape local governance.

Participants' sense that surreptitious factors directed coastal development was further heightened through the experience of the transition process and its opacity. Nearly three decades after 1989, some participants continued to see the tendency of political power to translate to economic inequality as an enduring factor in local development. This sense came through clearly in participants' accounts of corruption. A participant whom I will anonymize here in order to protect observed that the coastline's largest investments did not benefit local people precisely because they served criminal interests:

> If you were to look at information about the owners of the larger tourist properties, there are few who are locals. You could literally count them on the fingers of your hand. […] The large resorts that drastically altered the coastline's outlook were not built by locals, were not built by people who would have a connection with precisely this view of preserved nature, and it is no coincidence that they [these resorts] changed owners many times. It is well-known—I have spoken to acquaintances from the other side of the Black Sea, for instance from Georgia, who also bought lands on our coastline—that Bulgaria likely is, and was, a good means for laundering unclean money—money linked to drugs, to prostitution, to weapons—from Georgians, Ukranians, Russians—and what we have here is not real market development but instead a competition between stretches of coastal areas on the Black and Mediterranean Seas where you can easily launder money (Anonymous, my translation).

The quote above communicates clearly a shared sense that the optimistic economic trajectory contained in the promise of tourism had in fact masked an undisclosed agenda. The participant's suggestion that the Bulgarian Black Sea coast supports a hidden market, rather than a truly competitive one, goes not only against the hopes and goals stated in national strategic documents but also against those expressed by the very people the tourist industry is supposed to benefit: those ordinary local citizens who, in Andrei's account, had dreamt of waking up as heirs to a piece of land. This sense of betrayal is exacerbated by the inherited sense of disempowerment from the socialist regime and from the opaque economic processes of the transition. Hence, temporal continuity complicates even further the challenge of making sense of the ongoing conceptual ambiguity surrounding corruption, external interests, and state weakness today.

Ultimately, it was participants who made these links explicit. Georgi spoke directly about a continuity he saw between socialism and contemporary contestations he was part of on the coastline. He went as far as to claim that locals today were actively suppressed in the same way as they had been decades ago:

> We organize protests here to protect the coastline here and none of the locals dare come, because they're afraid that someone would see them and that they mayor later won't give them approval for this or that, people here are afraid. They live 40 years in--, they think we're still 30, 40 years in the past, when the *konsomol* secretary or the party functionary here gave orders, and that's how they see it now: he's the feudal lord, he's the strong of the day, everything that is mine depends on him. And that's that. That is, they live as though it were 50 years ago (Georgi, environmental activist, 2017, my translation).

Although Georgi's comments opened with a critique of those locals who still felt as though they lived in the past (Georgi, environmental activist, 2017), the broader meaning of his comment highlighted above all the sense of repression people in these communities still felt. By using the language of the "strong of the day" (Georgi, environmental activist, 2017, my translation), Georgi indicated that contemporary municipal policy replicates the suppression of independent opinion once exhibited by the socialist state. Thus, just as Kaloyan's account claimed that contemporary governance had taken away local people's entrepreneurship, Georgi's narrative showed that locals' civic spirit had been undermined. For participants like Georgi or Kaloyan—or Andrei describing the "big shot" feeling of those who sold their land—the combination of external interests and the continuity between the socialist and postsocialist forms of top-down coastal governance led above all to a slow emptying of communities' ability or willingness to defend themselves and by extension the coast.

The coast as dissident ground

In parallel to the replicated dynamics of power and disempowerment from the socialist regime to the postsocialist coastal planning and tourist industry, however, participants' narratives also illustrated how the contemporary idea of nature as a political ground inherits attitudes toward the coast from before 1989. In many of the contemporary narratives I analysed, I observed replications of how the environment had been framed by the *Ecoglasnost* movement or even earlier, as evidenced in Markov's account. Take, for instance, the personal memory Deyan shared as part of his account on overconstruction:

> When I was a student, we used to go to Bolata [beach]—you know where Bolata is—there was nobody, Bolata was an entirely unknown beach on the northern Black Sea coast, you just took the shuttle with seven people from the village, it picked up the children to go swimming, and it was very wild. That was in the 90s, in the period between '95-2000. After 2000, the instant that Bulgaria had a stable economy, the growth began, the wealth

> began to grow, now there are people everywhere. It's a madhouse of people [and] cars (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation),

This nostalgic account of the beach of his youth—secluded, shared only with local children, "very wild"—certainly could be seen to reflect the escapist ideal of coastal nature from before 1989. Deyan's description of the pre-growth beach in many ways resembles Markov's description of the pre-Golden Sands Nessebar. Here, as in Markov's account, there is a nostalgic note of authenticity: the beach is unknown, the visitor shares in a locals'-only experience, and coastal nature is "wild", connoting pristineness. And, just as Markov in the *In Absentia Reports*, Deyan describes a sense of loss associated with that pre-tourist environment.

Echoes of the past were also evident in the rhetoric around "wild" camping and the mode of protest that the movement has symbolized. Viewed from a longer temporal perspective, the "wild" campers' environmental protests along the coast can be seen to replicate escapist and protest tendencies from the socialist period. This connection emerges, for instance, from the language participants used when speaking of camping. My use of the term "wild-camping" follows media and popular narratives about the movement, but when I spoke about it with Georgi, he corrected my language: "this is free camping, not wild, wild is not the right word, let's call it free" (Georgi, environmental activist, 2017, my translation). Although Deyan spoke critically about wild camping, even as someone who had personally engaged in it in the past, his framing of the movement was somewhat similar to Georgi's in its association with a particular kind of dissident, anti-state freedom: "[There are people] who don't follow any rules—that is there are no rules, the so-called wild camping. It's very pleasant and I'm a former wild camper myself. But at some point, lately I've been noticing that there's a wrong conception of what wild camping is. Kind of like anarchy" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). Georgi's reference to camping as "free" and Deyan's critique of it as "anarchy" are both reminiscent of frontier-like ideas of nature as an escape. On the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, however, this idea owes much to the meaning ascribed to camping on the beach during socialism.

Thus, the Bulgarian Black Sea coast's political history directly affects how visions of the environment are politicized by contemporary narratives. To illustrate further, consider the 2016 opinion piece "Goodbye Koral beach" written for *Capital* by entrepreneur and civic activist Kiril Petkov. The piece bemoans a new concession plan for Koral beach, described in similar terms as "our last beach without hotels, lounge chairs […] The last beach where big *mutri* (mafiosos) don't build cheap 'temporary' discos and sell illegal alcohol. The last beach where our children could see playing dolphins!" (Petkov, 2016, my translation). Just as in Deyan's account of Bolata beach, Petkov's account adopts a nostalgic view of Koral before tourism, a wild place characterized equally by its naturalness (represented here by the dolphins) and by its lack of tourism development. Petkov's account, however, is explicit in framing the threat of tourism as one of corruption. Further in the opinion piece, Petkov also evokes ideas of (im)morality and patriotism:

"[T]his is the last drop in the series of wrong decisions from this government. No real judiciary reform, no attempt to control corruption, and now another treason. Goodbye, Koral!" (Petkov, 2016, my translation). Much as in the days of *Ecoglasnost*, then, the environment in Petkov's piece stands in for injustice and opaque state policy.

One participant, Kalina, reflected directly on similar uses of the environment as a symbol, sharing with me her sense that environmental issues are utilized purposefully for political goals. Kalina is a scientist at the University of Sofia who specializes in dolphin biology; she has been involved for some years in research on the causes of mortality for Black Sea dolphin species, particularly by studying dolphin corpses washing up on the shore. When she and I met in 2017, the issue had been debated in public circles for a while due to its heightened occurrence in 2015 and 2016. Public discussions often framed the issue as yet another example of governmental lack of control: dolphins were said to be tangling and drowning in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing nets. Like the issue of dune destruction, the mortality of dolphins was beset by a lack of detailed information: both Andrei and Deyan, for instance, had told me that there had been too few studies (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, Deyan, government expert, 2017). A 2016 independent study commissioned by environmental activists extrapolated on spatial analysis to speculate on the correlation between the peak of dolphin deaths in 2015 and instances of illegal turbot fishing, noting that the "Black Sea is notorious for such activities", but ultimately conceded that the correlation was impossible to determine because illegal fishing boats did not report on their whereabouts (Rusev et al., 2016, 23).

In Kalina's expert opinion, however, the mortality of dolphins had natural causes. Since the dolphin deaths most frequently affected one of the three dolphin species in the Black Sea, she believed it likely that an outbreak of illness among that species was the cause (Kalina, researcher, 2017). On the one hand, she thought that the public attention to these recent cases of dolphin bodies washing up on the shore had increased because "it brought out anger around the sea's pollution, [about] whether there was any fish, [about] all kinds of problems like these" (Kalina, researcher, 2017, my translation). On the other hand, in her view this public anger was also utilized deliberately by certain environmentalist actors:

> With these [dolphin] deaths there are people who are neither biologists nor ecologists but started taking part in broadcasts, are often spoken about, people know about them […] I don't know exactly what they aim but they seem to have another interest, by getting involved in this issue they want to accomplish something, some other aim. Because one of the people [who speak on TV] was, what's his name, he was managing Koral beach and they took his rights away, I mean, he's no longer the concessioner, and perhaps this is why suddenly he speaks about [dolphin] poaching (Kalina, researcher, 2017, my translation).

The former concessioner of Koral beach Kalina references was in fact a prominent environmental activist. In Kalina's view, however, his involvement in the dolphin mortality issue was not motivated by knowledge or care about the dolphins per se; instead, she suggested here that the activist might be pursuing personal interests in speaking out. Even if his motivation was to utilize the symbolism of dying dolphins, to Kalina this constituted a politicization of the issue that misrepresented the truth.

Like Kalina, Andrei thought that at times the sentiments around dolphin deaths had been utilized for ulterior motives. He suggested, however, that this manipulation of the environmental narrative could take on an even more nefarious note. He told me how this had occurred institutionally, through the funnelling of money from a European-funded project to monitor dolphin biodiversity in the field "toward party coffers" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). The project, in his observation, had been conducted only superficially. Research organizations "without much scientific knowledge on the subject" had been chosen to conduct the project: "studies were simulated, reports were written, there was someone to approve them and accept them" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). In short, for Andrei, the interest in dolphin deaths had been directed to yet another instance of politically charged ambiguity. In its symbolic function as dissident ground, then, the environment became a narrative easily occupied for political goals.

In short, one interpretation of how the environment on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast is viewed, and polarized, derives much from an inherited sense of coastal nature as a space for dissidence. As the narratives I have reviewed in this section show, however, this symbolic meaning of the environment is a powerful tool with two edges. While the symbolism gives strength to environmentalist movements, as in the cases of wild camping and defending "our last beaches", it also lends itself to political usurpation from a variety of actors. Politicizing the environment, particularly in Andrei's account about the dolphin project, can paradoxically harm it, in this instance by stripping support from the very actors who wish to defend its interests.

Time and material links to the sea

At the same time, I also heard from participants that the sea was more than symbolic, and more than a politically productive category. For some, it stood in for missing societal connections. In my conversation with Evgenia, I asked her this question directly: did she think the environment served as a symbol for resistance? She replied decisively, "No. No, I don't think it is symbolic. People realize completely that nature is important for their well-being. So I don't think that they take it as a symbol or simply as some kind of cause to fight for, I think people appreciate it and I think people want it" (Evgenia, researcher, 2017, my translation). Other participants also indicated to me that this more-than-symbolic connection with the coastal environment was important, on both an individual and on a societal level. Accordingly, they worried that the connection was not

strong enough. When I asked Gergana how she would imagine, in an ideal world, the perfect relationship between community and the sea on the Black Sea coast, she replied,

> As a sea person, it pains me greatly that we have a very weak link to the sea. As a whole. So often we've spoken about the fact that we don't have either enough knowledge, or enough opportunities, or enough uses of the sea (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation).

She then clarified her opinion further. In part, what she spoke of as "a very weak link" implied the limited uses of the shoreline space, from insufficient tourist attractions for tourists to ways of locals to experience the coast. "Outside of using it for the beach," she said, "we almost don't use [the sea] in any other way" (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation). Until the nearby island of St. Anastasia had opened to visitors in 2014, Gergana observed, many locals had never boarded a seagoing vessel. Yet being on water "even for half an hour" gave people a different sense of the sea (Gergana, environmental advocate 2018, my translation). When Burgas seaport had opened a part of its grounds to the public in the same year, she added, locals had discovered an entirely new perspective: "For the first time we have some gaze on the sea different to that from the beach" (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation). But she believed these experiences insufficient. She felt frustrated that local children never had organized visits to the sea, that the Day of the Black Sea occurred in cold weather on October 31, that even people's culinary link to the sea was limited to "no other taste of fish apart from baked mackerel […] which isn't even a native species" (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation). To Gergana, these missing material links were important. In her view, the ability to experience coastline and sea from multiple visual and sensory perspectives was key for achieving a balanced relationship between society and the coastal environment.

This sense that the sea is more than a symbol, and that the material or sensory links to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast matter, took on an aspect of societal commentary for some participants. The key here, participants suggested, revolved around the passage of time. In Gergana's continued answer to the question about the ideal society, she bemoaned the lack of inherited connections to the sea:

> I really wish—while we're speaking of the ideal—we need generations to go by, because we don't have that many generations, we don't have the stories of some kind of sea people, because many of those in the south with whom we [in our NGO] have argued time and again over the lands in Strandja, over what and how they want to build, what they want to do, in most cases are people settled here, they are refugees who were given a piece of land each so they would have a livelihood, and so they don't have that link with the sea, that generational thing isn't there as it is in many

> maritime and oceanic countries (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation).

In speaking about refugees, Gergana was referring to political dynamics associated with the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829, which resulted in roughly two-thirds of the existing population leaving the region that now forms the southern Bulgarian coast (Shterionov, 1996, 268). Most of these emigrants never returned, causing a significant demographic shift in the region. Further, they took away with them not only their maritime economic expertise—particularly where it came to ship-building—but also their political and societal activism, thereby changing the region's social fabric in its entirety (Shterionov, 1996, 268-9). The southern coastal region was repopulated some decades later through land grants from the newly re-established Bulgarian state to Bulgarian refugees who had been displaced from either the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie uprising of 1903 or the Balkan War of 1912-1913 (Raychevski, 2016, 57).

The significance of these events, and what they meant for generational understanding of the material environment, was also an aspect that emerged from Kaloyan's account. The newly established inhabitants of the coast were primarily folk coming from the inland: in Kaloyan's words, they were "people from the heart of the [Strandja] mountain, who until this time had not been connected to the sea for their livelihood, for them the sea was perfectly foreign" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). Previously, he explained, these communities had relied on livestock and agriculture to survive; conversely, they had viewed the coastline as infertile and therefore as undesirable land (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018). After they settled here, therefore, neither these people nor their heirs felt a real connection to the sea:

> [T]he people related to the coastline itself, those who exercise some control over their councils, which in turn direct local development, have no lasting generational link to this precise territory. They came as refugees here, in two or three generations they became settled, but I think that, on a very deep level, as an archetype, these are not the typical sea people who could go back generations, generations, generations in time and defend, with some honour, with some dignity, their attachment to and their roots in precisely this place. This is why it became relatively easy in the new political context, and in the new economic context after the changes in the [19]90s, for these people to be given to understand that what they can access from the new possibilities is simply to sell their fields and surrender entrepreneurship to someone else (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation).

Kaloyan's narrative thus went even further than Gergana's sense that generational continuity is a prerequisite for strong material links with—and thereby strong stewardship of—the coast. To

Kaloyan, a community's longevity in a place was the factor that underpinned its desire and ability to defend that landscape (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018). Conversely, he suggested, the lack of longevity and connection leaves the community more vulnerable to external pressures like the shock of the post-1989 transition.

Later in the conversation, however, Kaloyan complicated this opinion by recounting the story of the forestry cooperatives this same community had formed in the early 20th century. Although longevity was in his view an important prerequisite for the ability of a community to defend "with some honour, with some dignity" their landscape, he told me that in the 1920s and 1930s the refugees who settled here had in fact found a way to build a connection to the Strandjan coastal landscape for themselves. Soon after arriving "with just a cartload each", he explained, they started forming forestry cooperatives—self-governing local institutions for the collective management of the region's logging industry—which, in Kaloyan's words, "could give them an honourable way of life" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). In order to defend the value of their own labour, locals created a network between individual settlements and successfully resisted the dumping prices imposed on them by larger export contractors (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018). Eventually, the cooperatives were trading on a state level, reinvesting their profits into railway and maritime transport—even building the largest wooden ship made in Bulgaria—and deciding on new international markets where old ones declined or became inaccessible (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018). "In other words," Kaloyan summarized, "whenever there was an obstacle, they managed to surmount it, to find a solution" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). What enabled these cooperative members to stand together and defend their livelihoods, in his opinion, was that

> …they were young people who held in their hands the main means of production and participated in the market themselves, without being someone else's hires. When you work in that way, you are willing to put in more effort […] Perhaps this is the closest form through which a society can use a local resource, a national resource, because when resources are utilized economically in this way, it seems to preserve a society closer to the family, people think about their future more (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation).

These reflections on the forestry cooperatives complicated Kaloyan's opinion about a community's longevity as the source of its connection to the landscape. Time remained a significant factor, in that he cited the community's reliance on younger people and their ability to think about the future. But here Kaloyan was also speaking about the importance of an economic model that remains in the hands of individuals and families, and thus prioritizes their interests and needs. This model worked beyond the context of Strandja's forestry cooperatives. Kaloyan asserted that early 20th century cooperatives in Bulgaria were so successful that, when the Italian

princess Giovanna married into Bulgaria's royal family in 1930, she purportedly summoned experts who could transpose them into Italian law (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). But even more importantly, perhaps, it was precisely this model and its closeness to individuals and families that in Kaloyan's view was missing from the contemporary coastal society—because the latter had been denuded of the entrepreneurship and societal care that made the model possible.

Archival materials from other contemporaneous cooperative unions along the Black Sea coast help support Kaloyan's opinion that this economic model's success was related to its societal engagement. For example, documents pertaining to the Bulgarian Fishing Cooperatives' Headquarters, established in 1938, show that the Headquarters sought to alleviate its members' financial burden in the winter of 1941 by having its store in Burgas offer fishermen interest-free loans for gear and supplies, secured against the season's projected catch (Bulgarian Fishing Cooperative, 1941). These documents suggest that the loan was not motivated by profit. Instead, the minutes for the meeting at which the loan was decided record the management board's concern with the market's existing 5% interest loans, which in the board's view constitute an "illegal and cutthroat pilfer of fishing labour" (Bulgarian Fishing Cooperative, 1941, my translation). In providing gear loans, the cooperative's management board also prioritized the industry's future development, for which, as one contemporary commentator had noted, "[t]he most pressing concern [was] that of finding a way to alleviate [fishermen's] fishing inventory debts" (Ayanov, 1938, 90, my translation). Even more tellingly, however, correspondence between the cooperative and its credit-granting institution some months later shows that the cooperative's labour-protective policy had put it at a direct financial disadvantage: the bank's letter upbraids the management board as having been "unable to show a sufficiently tradesman-like and organizational attitude" toward its finances and recommends stricter debt collection policies (Bulgarian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, 1942a, my translation). Combined, these archival materials speak to the cooperative's prioritization of its members' livelihood interests over its monetary gain as a company.

Further still, the archival materials suggest that the cooperatives' societal importance was politically recognized, as well. Policy directives sent to all cooperatives between 1938 and 1947 sought to involve it and enlist its help in the major political shifts during that period. When Bulgaria joined the Axis Powers, for example, cooperatives were directed to exclude Jewish members unless they wished "to be treated as 'mixed enterprises'" (Bulgarian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, 1942b, my translation). A letter on the occasion of Tsar Boris III's death sent on 31 August 1943 sought the fishing cooperative's support in ensuring "the complete unity of national forces and concentrating the Bulgarian people's will for winning a better future for our country" by urging it to write to its members with messages of unity and loyalty to the new Tsar's throne (Bulgarian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, 1943a, my translation). And another mid-war letter wrote of the cooperative's important societal and political role as potential allies in "the systemic and

organized fight against speculation, against the 'black market', and against the agents who spread anti-state rumours" (Bulgarian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, 1943b, my translation).

Back in Strandja, the cooperatives played an important societal role at the local level, as well. Bulgarian historian Stoyan Raychevski writes that the Strandja forestry cooperatives supported local schools and educational centres, ran literacy courses for adults, and provided funds to village libraries (Raychevski, 2016, 60). Likewise, the forestry cooperatives' union brought various professionals to speak in the community, issued newspapers, and even created a communal conflict dissolution panel intended to help resolve private disputes between forestry cooperative members, from boundary disputes to "indecent acts in public places" or "breaches of morality" (Raychevski, 2016, 60-61). The panel's meetings were public and, according to Raychevski's research, always opened and ended with a plea to the dispute's parties to resolve their differences on amicable terms (Raychevski, 2016, 61). Thus, in many ways the cooperatives performed the role of social arbiters as well as community traders.

In short, evidence from early 20th century Bulgaria shows that the cooperative model for managing environmental resources played a significant part in society building, both at the national and at the local level. These multifaceted functions speak to JK Gibson-Graham's[3] work on community economies, and indeed to her commentary on the potential of community-led economies to serve as emancipatory projects for political and environmental management (Gibson-Graham, 2003, 126). Examining the case of the Spanish Mondragon cooperative, Gibson-Graham shows how the cooperative structure can uphold "a commitment to valuing community sustainability over and above immediate personal consumption" (Gibson-Graham, 2003, 143). In Gibson-Graham's account, this is enabled by the cooperative's development and promotion of shared practices of mutual trust and collective decision-making, resulting in what she terms "ethical communal subjects" (Gibson-Graham, 2003, 157). A similar function, it seemed, was at the heart of Kaloyan's account on the Strandja cooperatives. When he expressed his belief that "the keystone for these questions [is] to what extent communities can self-organize in order to build their own future" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation) in light of his account of the forestry cooperatives, he seemed to be thinking about something very akin to Gibson-Graham's "becoming of ethical communal subjects" (2003, 157). Conversely, this element of communal thinking was what he felt missing in the contemporary context, and what he thought stood at the root of contemporary environmental mismanagement.

Kaloyan spent some time in our conversation reflecting on the reasons why the cooperatives' entrepreneurial spirit had not survived. Here he returned to longevity, albeit in the

[3] A collective voice for long-term collaborators, and feminist economic geographers, Katherine Gibson and Julie Graham. JK Gibson-Graham is perhaps best known for her feminist critique of political ecology in *The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It)*.

sense of the longevity of government policy. The first major disruption, in his view, had been the interference of the socialist state, "which did not like these kinds of unions, although it spoke about the cooperative movement, about uniting the people" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). After the socialist government came into power in 1944, it usurped and reconfigured existing cooperatives by appointing new managers loyal to the party and dismissing or even imprisoning previous managers (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018). The Bulgarian Fishing Cooperatives' Headquarters archive reflects these dynamics, as well. Protocols from late 1944—months into the socialist government's rule—discuss the abrupt and complete overhaul of the management board, with a new management board appointed by the government presiding over the meeting (Bulgarian Fishing Cooperative, 1944). This, then, was an early way in which locals' entrepreneurial links to managing their land and society had been disrupted on the Bulgarian coast.

Subsequently, the disorder of the postsocialist transition process had done even more to disconnect locals from their region's environmental management. Kaloyan described how, during weeks of public discussions on the first post-1989 regional development plan, only eight local inhabitants had attended the meetings (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018). Ultimately, he told me, local communities felt no attachment to preserving their environment, for instance through their region's protected areas, because conservation had become removed from their daily life and income (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018). Moreover, he believed that the nationalization and restitution of property over the course of only a few generations had essentially replicated and magnified the effect of the early 1900s land displacement: "on a deep psychological level," he summarized, "I think there is the conviction that once the state has given you something, it can also take it away in some other way" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). This conviction had, for Kaloyan, played a pivotal role in suppressing or even eradicating these communities' earlier drive toward shared entrepreneurship. Instead of restoring to them the power or confidence to self-organize, the restitution process had disempowered them.

Thus, the cross-temporal property regime changes had, in Kaloyan's telling, done lasting damage to local knowledge and local links to the coast. His narrative speaks to Christian Giordano and Dobrinka Kostova's ethnographic account, which attests to the complications produced when the restitution process granted agricultural land to individuals whose families had not tilled it in decades and therefore had little interest or knowledge for doing so under the new democratic conditions (Giordano and Kostova, 2002, 81-82). Andrei also spoke on this subject, in a way that further elucidated the dual consequences for communities' material connection to the coast and the coastal environment itself. He recounted an illustrative story about the local town's former salt flats. Salt making had once been the main source of livelihood for the Burgas region of the coast; during the 1900s, the region had been the largest producer or salt in the country, and early forms of health tourism subsisted on the salt flats' by-production of mineral-rich mud (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017). In Andrei's narrative, salt production was a symbiotic model, one

centred on the coexistence of human and nonhuman communities. Since the Black Sea had no significant intertidal zones, he explained, shallow salt lakes and lagoons like the lakes near Burgas served the same function as habitats for invertebrate species and migratory birds (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017). Human development of these lakes for salt production improved the habitat, especially for the birds, as the dykes necessary to create salt flats gave these species increased nesting space. Conversely, human communities could draw economic value from the salt flats, as well as health and wellbeing value: not only through mud baths but also because the highly saline waters were unwelcoming to disease-bearing mosquitos. Hence, to Andrei the salt flats provided the possibility of a locally sustainable, entrepreneurial economic model based around salt production, health, and nature tourism (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

This same concept of the salt flats as symbiotic had also come through narratives I heard from participants like Gergana, Evgenia, or Adriana, who saw symbiotic potential in the collaboration between NGOs and salt flat producers. This synergy was also an idea that underpinned the SymBiotic exhibition on salt opened in 2015 at the Atanassovsko Lake. Exhibition materials frame the salt flats in the lake as "an organism that lives, breathes, and pulsates close to the heart of Burgas […] a natural oasis [that] wouldn't be the same without the awesome exchange hidden in its colourful waters and its salt crystals, without its inhabitants and humans" (Pavlova, Sarbova, Nikolov and Milkova, 2015, my translation). But, in Andrei's account, these models of co-existence and the possibilities they suggest were placed under direct threat by, first, the disruptive dismantling of social-environmental links in the course of Bulgaria's recent political transformations; and second, the pressures of the new dominant economic model. Like other private properties along the shoreline, the salt flats had been nationalized by socialism (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017). Much of the town was then built on top of "destroyed, filled in" salt flat properties (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). In the 1990s, he explained, "when they were restituted, there were thousands of heirs. Including [heirs to land] inside the lake. Because parts of the lake were also salt flats" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). And accordingly, the latest part of the salt flats to be "destroyed and filled in" had been sold off as valuable tourist development property (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017). Thus, much of the salt flats had now "transformed into a neighbourhood of apartments for sale, chiefly to Russians or the former Soviet republics" (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). These were the same tourists on whom the town had become dependent, and who had later began running their own internal business, excluding locals from the profits (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017). At the root of this dependence, Andrei's narrative of the salt flats suggests, was local people's loss of entrepreneurial links to the properties and industries they inherited:

> [A] large part [of the pressure to construct] comes from local people. For the most part those are the salt flats inheritors. And for them of course

> the main issue is, what the contradiction is, on the one hand they say, 'these are our properties, you can't tell us what to do with them' and 'that's our inheritance'. Yes, it's your inheritance, you were given salt flats, you must manage salt flats—but nobody wants to make salt (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation).

In Andrei's view, these locals were now active contributors for the pressure to develop the shoreline even further. For them, the logic of the local economy had shifted. By dismantling the material links to the sea, the nationalization and subsequently the restitution processes had negated the salt flats' previously prominent symbiotic model. In its stead, these processes had increased locals' dependency on selling land for more tourist development. And, as Andrei remarked, this dependency has proven unsustainable in the long term. This is how, in his telling, the material transmutation of the salt flats into flats for sale had proven unsustainable for both environment and society.

Like Kaloyan, then, Andrei suggested that the Bulgarian coast's material transformation coincided with its economic plunder and the decline of its communal spirit. That notion resonated with a 2015 Gibson-Graham and Miller essay comparing the production of the capitalist economic imaginary to that of monocultures (Gibson-Graham and Miller, 2015). The essay bemoans the loss of global economic biodiversity: from multitude and diverse economic relations to a set of particular configurations (Gibson-Graham and Miller, 2015, 8-9). Or, in Gibson-Graham and Miller's words: "Diverse processes of human livelihood were reduced to narrow logics" (Gibson-Graham and Miller, 2015, 9). I felt that Gibson-Graham and Miller's analysis could speak directly to participants' narratives of generational links to the sea, forestry cooperatives, and salt flats. For many participants, at least, the coastal environment represented a material element to society-building. Thus, the scarcity of strong enough material links served to explain both the coastline's environmental degradation and locals' disempowerment.

Early on over the course of our conversation over coffee in Sofia, Deyan confided that he had a personal philosophy about the links between environment and society in Bulgaria. When prompted to share this philosophy, it turned out that a key component pertained precisely to time and longevity:

> I keep thinking that, in order for people to think about nature first they must stop thinking about themselves. This is too philosophical a way of thinking about existence, not only about making it through alive and well from today till tomorrow but to [think], to have my children think about, for them to live well in the future. Because the preservation of the environment is precisely the preservation of nature in the future. And not only preservation now. So in Bulgaria most people think first of their

> livelihood and then they think about the environment. Actually when they stop thinking about their livelihood maybe then they'll think about the environment. That's the main problem. And the other thing is this primal greed, which unfortunately… I don't know where it comes from. Some kind of hang-up that we live in a bad environment. And actually we live in one of Europe's most beautiful countries but we don't respect it, we don't protect it. I hope younger generations change my opinion in this. To tell you true there is some kind of improvement. But people will start preserving nature only when they stop thinking about themselves. That's my philosophy. That actually it's very difficult to make people think, when they have problems with themselves, to think about nature. You can't… Those pretty words, to live in a clean environment, can't reach them. When they don't know how to make ends meet (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation)

Deyan's personal philosophy in many ways relates to the sense, in Kaloyan and Andrei's narratives, that material societal and economic links to the coast are necessary for its sustainable environmental management. Yet his thoughts also help clarify the relationship Kaloyan had perceived between these links and the passage of time. Taken together, participants' reflections highlight the material engagements over time that they felt would be necessary in order to develop ways of environment and society to co-exist meaningfully on this coast.

"With time, let's hope": Reclaiming the coast?

The recurring theme of time was not one I prompted, yet many participants in the Bulgarian context raised it in the course of our conversations. Sometimes, I felt that speaking about time was a way for participants to critique contemporary issues within the framework of a projected, pre-conceived timeline of development. As scholars like Larry Wolff or Maria Todorova have long ago shown, this perception of Eastern Europe or the Balkans as a bridge between stages of development and growth, neither uncivilized nor fully civilized, is not at all new and frequently self-imposed (Wolff, 1994, 8-9, 13; Todorova, 1997, 16, 38-61). This same auto-peripheralising sense, I thought, might be behind statements like Deyan's comment about "the hang-up that we live in a bad environment" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation).

At the same time, the theme of temporality also communicated a strong sense of hope: hope that time is the most important component necessary to address many of the issues that participants observed along the coastline. In many of the accounts participants gave me, the suggestion that "we don't have that many generations" (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation) also contained the firm belief that things will get better with each further

generation. Deyan had voiced this as part of his philosophy, sharing his hope that new generations would change his opinions (Deyan, government expert, 2017). Evgenia, meanwhile, remarked, "Hope just lies with the children" (Evgenia, researcher, 2017, my translation). Like Deyan, she viewed the opportunities presented by future generations in a philosophical light, even referring to the Biblical story of Moses: "Well, there is a fable about this. Why did Moses roam the desert with his people? [To wait] until all those born in chains were dead. So he could go on with the freethinking, unburdened minds. Perhaps the same has to happen here" (Evgenia, researcher, 2017, my translation). Although opinions like Evgenia's were therefore dismissive of their contemporaries, at the same time they represented participants' optimism that time will resolve many of the difficulties that they faced and struggled with in the contemporary context. Indeed, this optimism found its way into many participants' visions for the future. When I asked Dimitar, the Sofia University professor, what Bulgarian society lacked to accomplish his image of the perfect relationship between the Bulgarian coastline and its society, he connected his response to the same sense that the disruptive historical events he saw at fault would be corrected with time:

> What we lack… For Bulgaria, specifically, historical events have led to many abrupt changes. I believe that not enough years have passed from our entry into the demographic sphere and the free market sphere, and a large portion of people have no access to resources in the first place, or, if they do, are sceptical and lack a serious attitude toward preserving nature. But I think that with time, perhaps, these things will change, let's hope (Dimitar, researcher, 2017, my translation).

In narratives like Dimitar's, the hope associated with the passage of time could be seen to betray some passivity. If time is all that is required in order to resolve the coastline's social and environmental issues, then little intervention or deliberate action is necessary from individuals.

In many other participants' narratives, however, this same hope was not an excuse for a passive holding pattern. For example, Adriana saw the passage of time as an ally in her active efforts, as part of her NGO work, towards developing civic environmental consciousness. Like many other participants, she thought that communities on the coast (and elsewhere in Bulgaria) had not had enough time to develop the practices, links, and self-awareness to defend its landscape and society. To Adriana, however, this was a motivating challenge, as well as an opportunity:

> …it's a challenge, this process of educating civic society in some way, explaining to people how to seek their rights, motivating them to be active, to have their own position […] to see this society develop in the right way [and] what is happening at the moment is part of the whole process, without which we cannot reach the end point of living in a truly

> normal country and in a lawful state (Adriana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation).

In Adriana's telling, then, the same element of historical trajectories of development offered the individual an exciting chance to make a difference, to contribute toward the building of an environmentally conscious society.

Hopes and efforts like Adriana's seemed, to a certain extent, to be paying off. At one point in my conversation with the regional government experts, I asked about their observations with respect to signals and letters from the public, inquiring if they had observed any difference "in how the coastline is developing". Here Dessislava clarified whether I meant ecological awareness. In truth, I think I had in mind an idea about citizen signals as indicators of policy penetration, but instead I went with Dessislava's suggestion, as always more interested to follow participants' association. I could never have foreseen the response. As soon as I agreed, Boryana, Dessislava, and Vanya all began speaking at the same time, complaining enthusiastically and good-humouredly about what they saw as the heightened environmental consciousness of contemporary citizens:

> Boryana: It's on people's minds even too much…
>
> Dessislava: In the last few years the citizen consciousness…
>
> Vanya: Every year there are more signals, letters, complaints…
>
> Dessislava: …especially in the summer, all kinds. Someone smelled something, another…
>
> Vanya: It's even too acute, the consciousness. Even when it comes to things over which we have no oversight, we still get the signals (Boryana, Dessislava, and Vanya, government experts, 2017, my translation).

Here I became curious and inquired what some of these misdirected signals they received were. For a moment, they grew thoughtful; then, once again, they began talking all at once:

> Vanya: …for dead cows, bodies of pigs…
>
> Dessislava: Sometimes there are ridiculous signals. That the stork's nest is too narrow. Things like that. All kinds of things.
>
> Vanya: Or that the swan has only been strolling along the levee and won't swim in the water.
>
> Dessislava: Or that people are taking photos with it and that's suspicious, to take photos with a swan on the seashore… That the parrots' feathers are falling off and so on, just ridiculous things, to which we are required to respond (Boryana, Dessislava, and Vanya, government experts, 2017, my translation).

Albeit half-jocular in their exasperation, Boryana, Dessislava, and Vanya's complaints indicated their shared sense that there had been a great deal of change in how people on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast thought about their environment. Others, too, shared the experts' sense that good and bad mixed in the contemporary contestations on the coastline. Like Adriana, participants framed the challenges and the opportunities as tied together. Gergana believed, for example, that "[t]hat's the good thing about Bulgaria, that there are many opportunities, but there are also many challenges. It is all up to our spirit how we would shape and direct things" (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2018, my translation).

Back in Sofia, at the end of our conversation, Deyan reflected on what we had talked about and the various challenges for the Bulgarian Black Sea coast we had discussed. It was not easy but challenges were inevitable and even necessary, he concluded. "You need them," he told me, "because they are what leads to aspiration. Otherwise, if you don't have problems, you start doing stupid things like Brexit" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation).

Conclusion

Ultimately, the range of narratives I analysed on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast complicated the sense of losing the coast with which I initially approached the shoreline and with which I opened this chapter. To begin, the sense of loss itself seemed to encompass a variety of aspects. For different speakers, losing the coast entailed pain over the material metamorphosis of certain natural features, like beaches or dunes; nostalgia for the memories associated with these locations; or simply frustration with the unsustainability of the shoreline's economy and its "property bubble" (Andrei, 2017, my translation). In a wider sense, however, I discovered that participants' observations about the coastline's overdevelopment often relayed broader sentiments about their society's political, economic, and societal transformation. Comparing participants' narratives on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore to archival, literary, and media materials, I found that many of the tourist industry's contemporary patterns—including its significance for the national economy and its hidden costs for local communities and the environment—were inherited from the socialist state. After 1989, these patterns became entrenched through the influence of external interests. Reflecting on these connections in this chapter has highlighted how, despite the rapid, visible, and material transformations associated with overconstruction, the societal impacts that most worried participants developed slowly over time and pertained to their society's ongoing democratic transition. The sentiments of losing the coast and its meaning spoke not only to the significance of the environment itself to the community, but also to these larger concerns.

On a regional level, therefore, this chapter adds to a growing conversation between scholarship on postsocialist transitions and environmental humanities research (Dorondel, 2016; Dorondel and Şerban, 2019; Iordăchescu, 2018; Vasile, 2019) and its response to what Zsuzsa

Gille termed, in 2007, "the mutual ignorance of East Europeanists and environmental studies scholars" (11). The narratives I have examined in this chapter show that the environment played a significant role in Bulgaria's postsocialist transition not only in the immediate sense, as scholars reflecting on the *Ecoglasnost* movement have already shown (Baumgartl, 1993, 166-167; Jancar-Webster, 1998, 72), but also, and more to the wider point of my thesis, in the long term. During my 2017-2018 fieldwork, participants identified many economic and societal aspects of local communities' links to their shoreline that were first set in motion by socialism or by the immediate transitional period. The flawed property restitution process described by Giordano and Kostova (2002), for example, underpinned Andrei's observations that local communities' contemporary aspirations were reduced to inheriting and selling property as a form of winning the lottery (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017). Similarly, Markov's account that the socialist state's form of tourism altered and disempowered local communities (1980, Vol. 1, 385) seemed reflected in Georgi's 2017 claim that locals in 2017 remained too scared of their "*konsomol"* mayor to protect their environment, believing themselves to live "as though it were 50 years ago" (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation). Significantly, I found that participants' comments about these links addressed not only the enduring institutional, societal, and economic consequences of the postsocialist transition, but also the significance of these consequences for the reciprocal relationship between society and the environment. This was particularly clear in the terms of the coast's enduring function as a space for political dissidence—a direct consequence of its economic and political inheritances from the socialist regime. Thus, the story of the Bulgarian Black Sea shore shows the overlap between, on the one hand, political and economic transitions on the institutional level and, on the other hand, how meanings of environment are created or controlled.

In many of this shoreline's narratives, in fact, coastal nature was a key component of societal relations, serving as a bell-weather for community health, for economic agency, and for political awareness. This was evident, for example, in Kaloyan and Andrei's reflections on the contrast between economic models for salt or forestry management in the early 1900s and the current economic structure on the coast, which they both felt had taken away locals' agency over long-term planning for the coastline's development. Similarly, comments I heard about the "rudimentary" relationship locals had to the Black Sea (Gergana, environmental advocate, 2017, my translation) or the importance of understanding your neighbours' intentions when deciding what to do about your "grandfather's field" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation) throughout my fieldwork indicated the extent to which relations among people on the coast and between people and the coast were a central concern for participants. Just as speakers on the Yorkshire shoreline had raised concerns with declining pride and care in their communities, participants on the Bulgarian coast worried about social trust and the rupture of social and environmental links as a result of the postsocialist transition. Even in discussions on corruption,

legal ambiguity, and environmental enforcement, these broader concerns emerged through participants' emphasis on who or what was (not) represented. The focus on poorly charted or unavailable dune maps in several narratives served not only to highlight corruption but also to stress and make visible material and metaphorical changes to the coastline's social and environmental fabric. These findings speak directly to environmental humanities literature and its capacity to put the entangled links between humans and nonhumans front and centre in conceptualisations of social and environmental change (Rose et al., 2012, 2; Neimanis et al., 2015, 70). They also highlight the relevance of environmental humanities' focus on issues of representation and power (Nixon, 2011; Weidner et al., 2020, 246-7) for institutional and political problems like corruption, enforcement, or political change.

In this way, this chapter's conclusions transcend the Eastern European context. Postsocialist contexts have been shown before to exemplify and clarify transitional dynamics relevant beyond East and Central Europe—for instance, as illustrative of the patterns of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007, 171-193). The story of the Bulgarian Black Sea coast functions similarly in my thesis. By showing how patterns of political, social, and environmental change translate between different economic and political regimes—from socialism through the postsocialist transition to European Union membership—the Bulgarian Black Sea demonstrates in a different way from the Yorkshire North Sea shore the relevance of environmental humanities as a commentary on transformations. In policy literature on "just transformations", just as in environmental humanities scholarship taking Nixon's que on extended temporalities of change (2011, 7), transformational change is "a non-linear, non-teleological" process (Feola, 2015, 381). On the Bulgarian coastline, the narratives I examined often intuited this. Deyan's closing comment about the necessity of challenges for a society to face, and even his passing remark on Brexit as the result of lacking enough challenges, was indicative of a shared awareness on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast that transformations are fungible, multivalent, and evolving processes that unfold over long timescales.

Finally, participants' awareness of the slow and unfolding timelines of change on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast illustrate how the environment—and especially the coast—can host and inspire alternative political visions for the future. Reviewing the thematic links between the varying narrative materials I have explored on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore shows how the coastline and its environment acquired meaning as a space for alternative social and environmental imaginaries. While some of these imaginaries relied on appeals to nostalgia, as with Markov and Deyan's memories of the pre-tourism coastline, a number of others—like the significance Andrei ascribed to the salt flats, the nature-based tourism Dimitar imagined, or the emphasis on collective and cooperative management Kaloyan placed—served to highlight concrete economic and ecological models that participants wished to see. Appealing to the agency of passing time, participants like Dimitar or Adriana framed these imagined futures as attainable rather than utopic. In this way the

coast, its environment, and the meaning ascribed to it enabled participants to imagine and subsequently work towards positive change. Just as the coast served as a provocation for Carson's reflections on social and environmental justice throughout her career, like I showed in Chapter III, the Bulgarian Black Sea's maritime space was a focus point for debating alternative visions. As I move toward the conclusion of this thesis, this role of the coast remains important for my analysis. In the next and final chapter, I return to both the Bulgarian Black Sea and the Yorkshire North Sea in order to reflect back on how participants in each context framed the transformations, crises, or contestations they experienced through the lens of their shoreline.

Chapter VI: Coda, or, Narrating societal and environmental change across different shores

In this thesis, I have visited two very different stories on two contemporary European shores. Taken individually, the Yorkshire North Sea and the Bulgarian Black Sea each present a multifaceted case of linked social and environmental transformation on the coast, spanning decades and culminating in the crises or contestations that local communities face today. In many ways, the two shorelines are entirely distinct from one another. Even what they envision when they speak about the coast is different in each case. Communities on the Yorkshire shoreline, a place of long maritime history and rich maritime activity, look outward to their sea, thinking of its space in both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Those on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, heirs to inland refugees now faced with the dominance of a single industry, often keep their focus to the narrow strip of land defined within two hundred meters inward from the baseline. As a result, the stories these two communities tell about their transformations are as different as the shorelines they pertain to. The story charting how frustrations with the gradual decline and displacement of Yorkshire's fishing communities found an outlet in the 2016 Brexit campaigns is quite different to the one of Bulgaria's socialist-era tourist resorts metastasizing to take over the shoreline's natural features and key livelihoods. Each story reveals a different set of affective and political struggles facing local communities today.

Taken together, however, these two cases speak to a wider experience of narrating and navigating change on the contemporary European coast. Both are stories of loss, changing economies and livelihoods, and alternative visions for the future. In both Yorkshire and Bulgaria, moreover, the coastal and maritime environment plays a role in how coastal communities define their identity. In each case, communities inherited meanings of their environment—whether that was the shared value of labouring the sea on the Yorkshire North Sea coast or the framing of the environment as a democratic space on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast—that still influence how they navigated their contemporary difficulties. Despite their differences in history, geography, or political economy, therefore, each coastline's societal and environmental changes are entangled with the common experiences of lost livelihoods, lost natures, or lost pride. And in each case, consequently, maritime space hosted and enabled communities' efforts to restore or reimagine these losses and construct specific visions for their future.

In the opening chapters of this thesis, I drew on blue theory—including Westerdahl's argument that maritime communities' relationship with the coast renders them adept at seeing or thinking with the invisible (2007, 203)—in order to show how Rachel Carson's focus on the sea was pivotal to her ability to frame the environment as a vital aspect of just and democratic societies. I argued that it was thanks to her focus on the coast that Carson arrived at insights and themes

that would become even more relevant for the Anthropocene. I suggested that Carson's blue thinking not only underpins *Silent Spring* but also offers an epistemological approach for a key challenge Chakrabarty would later identify for environmental humanities (2009), a challenge also reflected in contemporary policy literature I have referred to throughout my thesis (Feola, 2015; Patterson et al., 2018; Bennet et al., 2019): that is, the difficulty of constructing transformations to a more sustainable planetary society without sacrificing the social and environmental justice that depends on recognizing and attending to difference. My reading of Carson's works alongside existing theory from blue scholarship suggested two concrete strengths of blue thinking: its ability to highlight invisible aspects of change; and its capacity, through emphasizing flows, to link material and metaphorical, and therefore also humanistic and political, aspects of change. I found that these two strengths were reflected in the narratives on the Yorkshire and Bulgarian coastlines. In this final chapter, I expand on these insights from the two empirical case studies in order to draw the overarching conclusions for my thesis.

Maritime space, representation, and narrating change

In speaking about their contemporary crises or contestations on each coastline, both communities' narratives sought to emphasize people, experiences, or types of environmental change that they felt government policy failed to represent. Whether they spoke about maritime governance in the UK or about coastal development in Bulgaria, participants expressed concern with communities who were not seen—as with Connor's observation that fishing "exists on the edge, and then it's swept over the edge and disappears" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017)—or changes that were outright hidden—as in Georgi's assertion that the Bulgarian government was "hiding these maps of the dunes" to obscure illicit property deals (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017). Connor, Georgi, and others like them on the Yorkshire and Bulgarian shorelines felt that these less-represented dynamics were the ones that *really* mattered, that they went to the heart of what was wrong on each coast. In both cases, participants ascribed the marginalizations they saw to the agency of the state. And on both shorelines, their focus on the coast itself enabled them to envision invisible aspects of their shorelines' transformation in concrete and meaningful ways.

On the Yorkshire North Sea coast, participants debated how the gradual enclosure of maritime space over the previous three decades—a result of what Seamus called the "paradigm shift toward marine ecosystem governance" (Seamus, local policy officer, 2017)—had led to policies that overlooked the livelihoods and pillars of care that sustained local communities. Practices like fishing with centuries-old history on the Yorkshire shoreline, participants remarked, were no longer central to the UK's contemporary marine and environmental policy. Speakers on this coast felt that the very tool meant to ensure everyone's needs in maritime space were considered fairly—the public consultations through which new sea uses like offshore wind farm projects or MPAs were negotiated—in fact masked who needed the coastline the most,

marginalizing local and situated livelihoods. This was illustrated especially through Connor's unease about the term "stakeholder" and his insistence that having a "stake" in the environment should not be an abstract term (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). By emphasising the meaning of the word "stake" as that which is risked or lost, Connor highlighted how fishing communities depend on the sea for their livelihood, their sense of self, and their culture and community. Having a "stake" on the coast, he stressed, should mean living with it, engaging with it in a direct, material sense. When the word "stake" became an abstract term to indicate voices in the governance process, Connor felt, fishing communities' dependence was erased and devalued as merely one experience among many, all equal (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). But the differences between "stake" holders and "opinion holders" only became visible when one looked closely at what it meant to live with and work the sea. Along with other participants, Connor conveyed how the resulting loss of voice cost vulnerable communities not only in terms of income or political influence on the national level, but also in terms of their ability to feel rooted on this shoreline.

On the Bulgarian Black Sea shore, participants' narratives sought to cut through a complicated tangle: while trying to identify the roots for the coastline's transformation, they pointed alternatively to the ambiguous legislation surrounding the coast's management, to instances of perceived corruption, or to Bulgarian institutions' limited capacity to either assess the full impacts from the tourism overconstruction or effectively enforce the rules supposed to mitigate it. Debating when and where natural coastal features were being destroyed or in what cases the opinions of scientific experts were (dis)counted by environmental management, participants connected the coastline's transformation to politics surrounding knowledge and its propagation. This sense came through clearly, for example, in narratives surrounding the fate of the dune habitats. Even between government experts, the accounts I heard differed: while Deyan asserted the destruction of dunes was an ongoing issue, citing a recent case, Boryana and Margarita insisted that the cases of constructions levelling dunes were firmly relegated to the past. To other participants, meanwhile, the problems stemmed from a deliberate effort on the part of the state to *not* see inconvenient information or even inconvenient environments. Participants like Georgi cited the missing, delayed, or poorly drawn cadastral maps of dune habitats as proof that dunes were being "hidden" in the interests of profit (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017). For Georgi, however, the consequences of these obfuscations extended beyond the ongoing physical transformation of the coastline. In his account, the tendency of the state to hide dunes, to deny the existence of concrete in protected areas, or to pretend ignorance of whom an excavator belongs to, was both symptomatic and a core component of the wider marginalization of citizens or the environment in the interest of select special interests (Georgi, environmental advocate, 2017).

On both coastlines, participants described how societal and environmental interests are sacrificed for an abstracted pursuit of national or even external economic gain. In Yorkshire, participants like Lauren, Peter, or Stephen commented on the government's flawed priorities in

elevating the national economy at the expense of everything and everyone else, including the environment: "economy just wins, hands down, out at sea" (Peter, environmental advocate, 2017). Helen's view that the recent abundance of rubbish alongside the shore was due to people's loss of pride "in themselves" and "in their town" spoke well to this point (Helen, local policy officer, 2017). The links Helen drew between pride in place and environmental and social care pointed to aspects of the local community's transformation that had declined in ways just as important, if less quantifiable, as local incomes. Whereas the community's economic deprivation and cultural isolation were visible and represented, for example in select committee reports, Helen's words emphasized that caring for and having pride in one's environment had been the invisible casualties from the Yorkshire East Coast's transformation. In parallel to how participants on the Yorkshire North Sea shore described broken links of care, many on the Bulgarian Black Sea saw themselves as chroniclers of the coastline's devaluation into something worth only money. Much like in Yorkshire, moreover, this devaluation coincided with eroding links between individuals *on* the coastline and *with* the coastline. When Kaloyan remarked on the motivation to "sell my grandfather's field" in order to prevent that field from becoming "an inner courtyard" between overbuilt neighbouring properties, he highlighted that the profit-seeking mentality was a reaction to eroding social links and trust in the state: the value of unbuilt nature was "something that state and society obviously cannot currently guard" (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018, my translation). As a result, his words also indicated, certain types of meaning became obscured. A "grandfather's field" became only a property to be sold before it lost on its economic value (Kaloyan, local policy officer, 2018). In a similar way, in Andrei's account, salt flats along the Bulgarian coastline had once represented a productive and meaningful local livelihood, but now were regarded by the inheritors simply as a piece of property. The salt flats' transformation into flats for sale thus provides another material example for how the environment had been devalued from something that supports a community, along with its livelihood and shared values, to something that is worth only money.

Hence, on both shorelines the supremacy of the economy, along with the patterns of representation it created, had eroded links between communities and their environments. In each transformation, the national focus on economic development rendered the human and ecological consequences to coastal communities invisible, sidelining local communities' forms of pride, meaning, or care for the environment. This failure of representation resonates with environmental humanities literature, especially environmental justice concerns that the falsely neutral narratives of development obscure the negative effects that vulnerable communities experience when their landscapes are stripped of their most valuable characteristics (Nixon, 2011, 19-26). The same diagnosis is also in line with JK Gibson-Graham and Miller's analysis of "the economy" and its production of specific and narrow forms of ecological relations (Gibslon-Graham and Miller, 2015, 9). The narratives I analysed on the Yorkshire and Bulgarian shorelines speak directly to

these theories. The range of political and economic regimes that these two cases span all advanced an impoverished conceptualisation of human-nonhuman relations resulting in fraud societal and environmental consequences. It is significant that the marginalization of local communities' links to their coastline applies not only to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast's economic transition, but also to the Yorkshire North Sea coast's transition to new industries and management practices designed to deliver on sustainability goals. Participants narrating the arrival of offshore wind farms in Yorkshire often intimated the same loss of environmental connection and meaning as speakers detailing the tourist industry's growth on the Bulgarian shoreline. This parallel suggests that transformations for sustainability are just as much in danger of disregarding human-nonhuman links as the capitalist and neoliberal ones environmental humanities analysts like Nixon or Moore have more frequently focused on (Nixon, 2011; Moore, 2017). Thus, while social justice is already a concern in critical policy literature on transformations (see Patterson et al., 2018 or Bennett et al., 2019), the narratives I have examined suggest that the less visible but equally vital consequences to local ecological relations should be just as important a factor for evaluating the success of such transformations.

Envisioning alternative futures

Through their narrative attention to the coastal environment, participants contested these dynamics of invisibility and constructed alternative visions for their environment and society. Focusing on the coast, members of each community found ways of circumnavigating, contesting, or even hijacking the dominant patterns of representation. During the Brexit campaigns, for instance, communities on the Yorkshire shoreline seized the meaning and symbolism associated with working in the marine environment as a means of acquiring visibility on the national scale. Connor's comment about the utility of the image of fishermen as bearded men wearing knit jumpers demonstrates the symbolic significance derived from labour in the coastal environment and used to advance a political narrative. To fishing communities, as Stephen also attested, Brexit was "about having been told by people who don't know what they're talking about for so long how to do what they do as a job" and the opportunity to "kick" against that—in other words, to regain their agency and say (Stephen, researcher, 2017). In Connor's account, this urge pertained explicitly to the pursuit of recovering visibility and a voice beyond the local level. Brexit, he stressed, afforded fishing communities the chance to show that theirs was "a community that exists" (Connor, fisheries advocate, 2017). Hence, these narrative efforts were not only symbolic but also deliberately political, striving to bring local issues higher on the national agenda than they had previously been.

Similarly, on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore, participants' narratives drew on the material transformation of the coast in order to define its environment as a space for defending democracy. Coastal nature was "not symbolic", Evgenia insisted, unknowingly echoing Hester Blum's

argument that "the sea is not a metaphor" (Blum, 2010, 670). Instead, Evgenia told me, nature mattered to people in and of itself, as a tangible and meaningful material entity in their lives. It was this material significance that enabled the Bulgarian Black Sea coast's environment to carry multiple meanings of political resistance. This was evident, for example, in the subversive aspects of beach-going that Markov described in his *In Absentia Reports*, that activists like Georgi evoked as they promoted "wild" or "free camping", and that Deyan echoed when telling me of the Bolata beach from his youth. These accounts all framed the coastal environment as a space for asserting citizen power and democratic control, both through the symbolism of the pristine beach *and* through the situated practice of beach-going itself. Moreover, in narratives like Kaloyan's story of the Strandjan forestry cooperatives or Andrei's description of the salt flats, the coastal environment itself—along with the specific livelihoods grounded in its communal and sustainable management—functioned as an opportunity to imagine alternative political and economic models. Both Andrei and Kaloyan lingered on their early 20th century examples of successful enterprises on this coast as a way of envisioning small-scale economic activities embedded in the local community, drawing on situated inherited knowledge and therefore resulting in an activity that would be simultaneously ecologically sustainable and in the service of the local community's social and cultural interests. Indeed, the imaginary of salt development in Andrei's narrative was employed in practice by the SymBiotic exhibition. Representing the salt lake explicitly as a productive symbiosis between small-scale economy, environment, and human health, the exhibition sought to promote the alternative vision it shared with Andrei in an active, public-oriented manner. In these ways, narratives of the coastline in the Bulgarian context simultaneously take on symbolic aspects and resist treating the shore as only a metaphor. Rather than merely a symbol, the coast in the participants' narratives is a politically charged space deriving its meaning from individuals' material experiences and observations.

Together, these narratives from the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts offer situated examples for environmental humanities theorizations on the challenging nature of Anthropocenic change and communities' responses to it. While most participants would not have been familiar with Nixon's *Slow Violence*, their sentiments about underrepresented or invisible consequences of government policy on each coast resonate with the book's insights about slow and incremental transformations hidden from view (2011, 2). Participants, like Nixon (2011, 7-10), sought to shift attention to relations within the environment that were left outside dominant narratives. Indeed, the narrative forms of resistance communities exhibited on both shorelines resonates with Davies' recent response to Nixon that, while slow violence obscures itself from the *public* view, it is not invisible to the specific communities subjected to it (Davies, 2018, 1548). Davies coins the term "slow observation" (Davies, 2018, 1537; see also Davies, 2019), a process through which communities subjected to slow violence record that process through their own experiences (Davies, 2018, 1548). The narratives I analysed on both coastlines both exhibit and

complicate Davies' idea of "slow observation". The very act of noticing functioned as a type of resistance for members of each community. When Georgi spoke of himself as being "a person who observes the beach" and therefore as someone who could literally "see" a series of changes the Bulgarian government did not acknowledge, like the "ebb" of tourists or the various infringements against ZUCHK, he framed himself as a witness to the dynamics he considered hidden or (mis)represented—akin to Davies' theorization of "slow observation" (Davies, 2018, 1537). Complicating Davies' insight, however, my research also illustrates the political volatility of "slow observation". On the Bulgarian Black Sea shore, Georgi's way of seeing informed his scepticism and the wider atmosphere of distrust, whereas on the Yorkshire shoreline communities' resistance narratives played into politics that did not necessarily have their best interests at heart. By contrast, productive and robust mode of resisting slow violence seemed to emerge through community narratives that enacted the capacity to imagine alternative, hopeful futures. When Evgenia, for example, spoke about her trust in future generations, she exhibited a "slow hope" (Mauch, 2019, 20) that her educational work would bring about the gradual change she wished to see on the Bulgarian coastline. Her hope in the ripples she might cause through teaching children, along with similar hopes expressed by other participants on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore, illustrate what "slow hope" might mean in practice and how it could function in context. In this way, the two coastlines' narratives contribute to ongoing conversations in environmental humanities that envision how communities could imagine and shape positive change for the future. These narratives, furthermore, offer a response to calls for next-generation environmental humanities (Rose et al., 2012, 3; Neimanis et al., 2015, 78) to engage with hopeful and constructive narratives alongside criticism of dominant discourses.

Imagining the coast, policy, and governance

Further, communities' focus on narrating the invisible aspects of change and imagine alternative futures resulted in direct political consequences on each coast. Together, the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea demonstrate how the meaning of environment can intersect with multiple issues of governance. For both coastlines, firstly, the reciprocal links between governance and ideas of environment had concrete policy implications in terms of coastal and marine governance. My research on both coastlines has shown how the ideas and imaginaries embedded in specific pieces of law or policy can determine their resonance with communities. On the Yorkshire North Sea shore, local community members' perceptions of wind farms projects and new MPAs was influenced by the oceanic paradigm they believed in. On the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, attitudes toward coastal development law and the willingness of citizens to engage with environmental enforcement institutions similarly depended on whether legislation or institutions were seen to uphold a concrete meaning of environment. In both cases, however, this reciprocal relationship between ideas of nature and governance also pertained to governance in non-

environmental areas: from national identity-forming to the making or breaking of public trust in institutions. The environment was as pivotal to the sentiments of being "left behind" on the Yorkshire East Coast as it was to the processes of the postsocialist transition on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore. These associations have concrete implications for contemporary policy issues on each of the two coastlines.

The Yorkshire North Sea case shows how a prevalent oceanic imaginary—the vision of the oceans as foreign, unfathomable, and in Thomas Huxley's word, "inexhaustible"—and especially its resonance with Yorkshire's maritime labour communities has consistently influenced British (geo)politics in recent decades. The romanticism and identity associated with fishing, as the story of Hull's long-distance trawling community and its "three-day millionaires" (Byrne, 2016, 247) illustrates, depend on a core image and experience of human labour extracting value from the sea against hardship and danger. That image, as events surrounding the Cod Wars show, also played into British national pride and naval power projection. Even as confidential voices in the British Parliament worried over the diplomatic fallout and possible loss of human life in the Cod Wars conflicts, the sense that Yorkshire trawlermen had traditional rights to the Iceland's fishing grounds—and relatedly that Britain had a right to assert its interests in the freedom of the seas—proved powerful enough to influence Britain's formal position throughout the disputes. What the ocean meant for local and national identities, therefore, influenced the direction of UK diplomacy at the height of the Cold War.

Within the UK, the significance of this oceanic meaning for politics has been understood, and utilised, by British politicians since at least the 1970s. Parallels between confidential Conservative documents during the accession negotiations with the EEC and the 2015-2016 Leave campaign rhetoric show how the evocation of fishing as a nostalgic and romantic symbol of nationalism consistently afforded politicians the opportunity to discredit their opponents, often in pursuit of wider gains. Just as in 1976, the Conservative Research Department recommended that members of its party raise the question of British long-distance fishing interests in the EEC negotiations explicitly in order to criticise the government as "marked by incompetence, apparent duplicity and a failure either to recognise or protect British national interest" (Conservative Research Department, 1976, 1), in 2016, pro-Leave literature drew on the same argument about "the betrayal of Britain's fishing to the European Union" in order to show pro-European British governments complicit "in the planned eradication of the Nation State" (Ashworth, 2016, 12). Thus, the symbolism of labouring the sea played into recurring debates on British EU membership.

In the context of the Yorkshire East Coast, the specific oceanic imaginary associated with fishing also allowed politicians to shift responsibility for the economic and cultural decline experienced by maritime communities. The association between the EU and the post-UNCLOS III alternative vision of the oceans—namely, as a global ecosystem to be managed through international cooperation—helped certain political actors in the UK frame EU institutions as a

lightning rod for the discontent that followed on from the decline of industrial fishing and policies executing the increased enclosure of maritime space. In my conversations with environmental advocates like Lauren, Darren, or Peter on the Yorkshire North Sea shore, I learned that local communities had been marginalized above all through the actions of British governments: from the way that UK quota distribution had disadvantaged small-scale fishermen since 1999 to the by-the-numbers implementation of conservation policies through the MCZ tranches. Yet the association between these policies and the EU because of the legal paradigm they shared—an association deliberately promoted by various political narratives—helped frame EU institutions as a lightning rod for marginalized local communities' discontent. The tension between contrasting meanings of environment on the Yorkshire North Sea coast thus affected communities' attitudes toward European integration.

In a similar way, the Bulgarian Black Sea coast also illustrates the role that communities' ways of imagining the environment can play in non-environmental aspects of governance. On this shoreline, the environment's meaning emerged as an unintended result of policy decisions. When it established the coastal tourist resorts in the 1950s and 1960s, the Bulgarian socialist state intended above all to gain an easy, covert source of foreign currency income. Heedless of the environmental or societal costs associated with this project, as with any other of its industrial goals, the government kept tight control on knowledge production and dissemination. The politicization of knowledge about the hidden costs and gains of the tourist industry, however, led communities on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast to develop a meaning of the pre-tourism coastal environment and its surviving natural features as inherently democratic. In Markov's writing, the juxtaposition between "the plastic civilization of tourism" on the coast and the "large, unexpressed human understanding" supported by "real fishermen" and "real wine makers" that had preceded it (Markov, 1980, Vol. 1, 384-5, my translation) serves as a commentary of not only environmental transformation but also of changing societal relations. In exactly the same way, on the contemporary Bulgarian shore, Svetoslav's comment that "Both in the land, and in the sea, […] everyone tries to lower their net in front of the other" (Svetoslav, fisherman, 2018, my translation) is one that speaks not so much to the competitiveness of fishing as to a wider social condition of competitiveness that Svetoslav identifies through the example of fishing. And the same condition is reflected in Andrei's observation that "the dream in Bulgaria" pertains to either winning the lottery or to inheriting "a mudpool" that could be sold overnight for tens or hundreds of thousands of lev (Andrei, environmental advocate, 2017)—and getting ahead of one's neighbours. In accounts like these, the transformation of the coastal environment attains a wider meaning, signifying participants' attitudes to a whole economic or political regime.

Thus, how the environment is imagined on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast pertains also to how communities debate corruption and the legitimacy of different institutions. The meaning of the coast and the significance of its physical transformation play into wider critiques of national

governance. In turn, this influences attitudes toward the EU as an alternative source of legitimate governance. When Evgenia expresses her disgust and desperation at having witnessed colleagues "spit on [their] name, on [their] labour, on all those years in which people have respected [them] as a person" when they testify against their own environmental science in national courts (Evgenia, researcher, 2017, my translation), in a sense she paves the way for government expert Deyan viewing the European Commission and its "wagging of fingers" as "the only pressure against the failure to follow our national laws" (Deyan, government expert, 2017, my translation). Both attitudes, however, rely on Evgenia and Deyan's observations about coastal nature and how its preservation has been failed by national institutions. Thus, in contrast to the Yorkshire North Sea case, where the prevalent meaning associated with the ocean frequently came to undermine local trust in EU institutions, on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore the environment's significance to the community framed the EU as a positive actor even when it sued the Bulgarian government.

Taken together, these insights from the Yorkshire and Bulgarian coastlines demonstrate the relevance of environmental humanities in conversation with critical policy studies. The perspectives that environmental humanities has offered in each of the two cases I examined in my thesis closely align the field with critical policy studies' efforts to understand ideas and narrative knowledge as central to practical policy and democratic theory (Fischer et al., 2015, 5-6; Schmidt, 2010, 2-3; Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016, 323). Indeed, the two cases I have examined might well suggest environmental humanities *as* critical policy analysis: more concretely, as a mode of analysis capable of showing intended and unintended meanings of environments in policy, both with respect to environmental and to non-environmental governance. Environmental humanities, in this sense, is affirmed in my thesis as a capable and powerful mode of critical policy critique, one that is able to remind us that the environment not only should but already does play a central role in our day-to-day societal and political experiences.

Future research and the relevance of "blue" thinking for environmental humanities and the Anthropocene

In future research, the implications of these findings could be explored further, particularly to aid policy efforts. For example, I would be interested in seeing how insights from each coastline could help assess the in-context relevance of the "blue economy" rhetoric that has been prevalent in recent EU and international policy narratives of sustainable maritime development (see, for example, Hudson, 2018; or European Commission, 2019). Although my thesis has not engaged centrally with this rhetoric, the insights both case studies offer about the reciprocity between environmental imaginaries and policy are ones that resonate with the work of scholars like Winder and LeHeron (2017, 4) and Bear (2017, 28-9), who have speculated that the "blue economy" imaginary could establish and solidify specific economic, institutional, or environmental choices. Environmental humanities scholarship, meanwhile, has already identified the problems of

depoliticizing environmental transformations as matters of neutral economic growth (see Neimanis et al, 2015, 75) in ways that resonate with the experiences I have outlined on the Yorkshire and Bulgarian coastlines. Accordingly, I would be interested in seeing how my findings from the Yorkshire North Sea and Bulgarian Black Sea shore combine with these strands of scholarship and evaluating how the kinds of tensions these two shorelines illustrate play against the "blue economy" rhetoric. Pursuing this line of thought could strengthen the conversation between environmental humanities and "just transformations" scholarship in critical policy studies even further, as it would engage with existing queries about the concepts and ideas represented or obscured in conceptualizations of green and blue growth (Feola, 2015, 387). In the pragmatic sense, moreover, such research could not only illuminate the potential reception of existing policies associated with this rhetoric, but also inform and enrich future policy efforts that draw on it as the term gains traction in the EU and beyond. Indeed, doing so would also respond to current calls in marine social science (Bavinck and Verrips, 2020, 122) for research that can critically examine the "blue economy" agenda as it unfolds in global fora.

Furthermore, the links between environmental meaning and governance that the Yorkshire and Bulgarian coastlines together reveal could further speak to research into what makes aspirational governance visions, especially European integration, successful. My thesis has shown that environmental imaginaries can affect how communities frame their relationship with the EU to a significant extent. Visions of the coast as a democratic value promote pro-European views on the Bulgarian Black Sea shore as much as the meanings ascribed to maritime labour informed Eurosceptic sentiments on the Yorkshire North Sea coast during the Brexit campaigns. As a supranational institution conceived in the service of normative ideals like peace, democratic freedoms, and beyond-national identity, the EU must at least partly stand or fall by its ability to resonate with the values its citizens hold. With rising awareness of the Anthropocene, and younger generations taking a stand for the climate, the environment and what it means to various communities will likely continue taking an increasingly important place among these values. In this sense, the implications of my findings go beyond individual environmental or marine policies that the EU might put forth. Rather, my thesis also suggests the need for a conversation about the relevance of environmental imaginaries to European integration in the future.

These wider implications suggest that the relevance of blue thinking due to its ability to draw connections between imaginaries and policy extends beyond the maritime setting. Through my work with Carson earlier in this thesis, I sought to theorise the wider generative potential of the coast. I suggested that awareness of humanity's deep impact on the planet arrived earlier on the coast than it did elsewhere, and consequently that coastal communities have grappled longer with the social and environmental transformations inherent to the Anthropocene. Hence, I proposed that communities living on the coast can offer insights into the experience of navigating, learning to live with, and even conceiving solutions to these transformations. Earlier in this thesis,

I illustrated this generative potential of blue thinking theoretically through my reading of Carson's works, showing how her engagement with the seas informed her thinking on key themes that underpinned her contributions to environmentalist thought. After Carson's example, I suggested that thinking with and about the coastal setting challenges scholars to expand their epistemological and methodological approaches, thereby deriving new connections and insights about Anthropocenic change. I would argue that the relevance of blue thinking emerges in even clearer and more productive ways, however, from the insights that the Yorkshire North Sea and the Bulgarian Black Sea coasts together have to offer. Just as Carson was able, through her engagement with the sea, to arrive at ways of shifting the attention to the invisible, communities on the Yorkshire and Bulgarian shorelines find in their coastal environment ways of narrating and constructing change. Paying attention specifically to each community's narratives helped highlight the relevance of these links.

This blue lens and its emphasis on the links between each shoreline's narratives and policy change thereby furthers a productive conversation between environmental humanities and critical policy studies. While critical policy studies have long explored how ideas function across institutions, actors, and policies (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016; Schmidt, 2010, 2015), I would argue that it can still gain from environmental humanities' attention to meaning, imaginaries, and wealth of representation. In particular, the power of narratives and the strength environmental humanities can bring to understanding its potential can reveal important aspects of societal change, on the coast and elsewhere. Conversely, environmental humanities can only gain from sustaining and even strengthening its efforts to speak to social change and policy. Throughout this thesis, I have striven to uphold and contribute to its stated purpose of centring questions of value, meaning, or affect as vital and political components in efforts to address environmental change (Neimanis et al., 2015, 75-76). The interdisciplinarity that this goal has promoted proved at times daunting, but I have found that thinking with the sea, and highlighting the connections it exposes, can be productive even at its most challenging.

Thus, in response to Neimanis, who sees thinking with flows as a rebuttal to discrete individualism (2017, 3) and to DeLoughrey, who would prompt oceanic humanities to engage with the geopolitics of military power and territorialism (2019, 26), my research suggests that blue thought can offer a useful approach for evaluating the complex entanglement between policy change and narrated imaginaries. In this thesis, I have found in blue thought the inspiration for an interdisciplinarity that makes sense of communities' material experiences and metaphorical imaginaries at the same time, and that therefore binds together the pragmatic engagements of social science with the theoretical work in environmental humanities. My research's insights were enabled specifically by my comparative perspective, the interdisciplinary narrative approach I used, and the multiple materials I analysed—all decisions informed by my inspiration from the liminality of the shore. Using this interdisciplinary narrative approach enabled me to understand the

contestations or crises communities experienced on each coastline in the light of their wider societal and environmental transformations and highlight how imaginaries, politics, and the environment were linked on each coastline. For both contexts, I was able to connect participants' experiences to a deeper and broader understanding about specific policies or about recent historic events. Focusing especially on maritime communities, I would argue, offers a context rich with the complexity and immediacy of social, political, and environmental entanglements so inherent to the Anthropocene. Yet the significance and potential of blue thinking transcends the maritime setting itself. Shining a blue lens on the Anthropocene—not only by focusing on communities on the coast, but also by adopting comparative perspectives, by spanning multiple economic regimes and timelines, or more generally by thinking about the flows between the invisible and visible, the material and the metaphorical, and the political and the imagined—could help others who share environmental humanities' ambition to attend to the complex and multifaceted nature of global environmental transformations.

Bibliography

Agarwal, S. and Brunt, P. 2006. Social exclusion and English seaside resorts. *Tourism Management*. **27**(4), pp.654–670.

Ambrose, J. 2019. World's largest wind turbines to be built off Yorkshire coast: Biggest offshore windfarm in North Sea will generate electricity for 4.5m homes. *The Guardian* [Online]. 1 October. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/01/worlds-largest-wind-turbines-to-be-built-off-yorkshire-coast.

Anderson, J., Hirt, S. and Slaev, A. 2012. Planning in market conditions: The performance of Bulgarian tourism planning during post-socialist transformation. *Journal of Architectural and Planning Research*. **29**(4), pp.318–334.

Antonova, A.S. 2015. Reforming European Union Participation in Fisheries Management and Conservation on the High Seas. *Ocean Yearbook*. **29**(1), pp.125–143.

Antonova, A.S. 2016. The rhetoric of 'responsible fishing': Notions of human rights and sustainability in the European Union's bilateral fishing agreements with developing states. *Marine Policy*. **70**, pp.77–84.

Antonova, V. 2019. Бунтът срещу отровния въздух на соца (The rebellion against the poisoned air of socialism. *Capital News*. [Online]. 30 March. [Accessed 13 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.capital.bg/specialni_izdaniia/kapital_gradove/2019/03/30/3409501_buntut_sreshtu_otrovniia_vuzduh_na_soca/.

Armiero, M. 2016. Environmental History between Institutionalization and Revolution: A Short Commentary with Two Sites and One Experiment *In*: S. Oppermann and S. Iovino, eds. *Environmental Humanities: Voices from the Anthropocene*. London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, pp.45–59.

Arnot, C. 2002. To Hull and Back. *The Guardian*. [Online]. 9 January. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2002/jan/09/guardiansocietysupplement.

Ashley, S. 1989. *Situation Report: Bulgaria, 7 August 1989*. 7 August. Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports. [Online]. Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. HU OSA 300-8-47-45-7. [Accessed 13 May 2020]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:97952a64-d0ae-445a-892d-470dc064b639.

Ashley, S. and Nikolaev, R. 1987. *Situation Report: Bulgaria, 4 November 1987*. 4 November. Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports. [Online]. Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. HU OSA 300-8-47-43-10. [Accessed 13 May 2020]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:72d3c8ec-c35e-42f0-aff8-7ab9d0d2b69f.

Ashworth, J. 2016. *The Betrayal of Britain's Fishing to the European Union*. [Online]. Worksop: Campaign for an Independent Britain. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://campaignforanindependentbritain.org.uk/publications/.

Ayanov, G.P. 1938. *Странджа: Етнографски, географски и исторически проучвания (Strandja:*

Ethnographic, geographic and historic survey). Sofia, Bulgaria: Тракийски научен институт.

Ballinger, R.C. 1999. The evolving organisational framework for Integrated Coastal Management in England and Wales. *Marine Policy*. **23**(4–5), pp.501–523.

Barca, S. 2014. Telling the right story: Environmental violence and liberation narratives. *Environment and History*. **20**(4), pp.535–546.

Baumgartl, B. 1993. Environmental protest as a vehicle for transition: The case of Ekoglasnost in Bulgaria *In*: A. Vari and P. Tamas, eds. *Environment and Democratic Transition: Policy and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*. Kulwer Academic Publishers, pp.157–175.

Bavinck, M. and J. Verrips. 2020. Manifesto for the marine social sciences. *Maritime Studies*. **19**, pp. 121-123.

BBC News. 2010. Offshore wind farm plan announced. [Online]. 8 January. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/humber/8448544.stm.

BBC News. 2015. Election 2015: Farage unveils UKIP fishing reform plan. [Online]. 8 April. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2015-32220052.

BBC News. 2016a. UK votes to leave the EU [Online]. 24 June. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.

BBC News. 2016b. Thames: Nigel Farage and Bob Geldof fishing flotilla clash. [Online]. 15 June. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36537180.

BBC News. 2017. UK election 2017: Conservatives lose majority [Online]. 9 June. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40209282.

Bear, C. 2017. Assembling ocean life: More-than-human entanglements in the Blue Economy. *Dialogues in Human Geography*. **7**(1), pp.27–31.

Beatty, C., Fothergill, S. and Wilson, I. 2008. *England's Seaside Towns: A benchmarking study*. London.

Beatty, C., Fothergill, S. and Wilson, I. 2011. *England's Smaller Seaside Towns: A benchmarking study*. London.

Bennett, N., Blythe, J., Cisneros-Montemayor, A., Singh., G., and Sumalia, U. 2019. Just Transformations to Sustainability. *Sustainability*. **11**(14), pp.1-18.

Bernard, H.R. 2006a. Interviewing: Unstructured and Semistructured. *In*: *Research Methods in Anthropology*. Oxford: Altamira Press, pp.210–250.

Bernard, H.R. 2006b. Nonprobability Sampling and Choosing Informants. *In*: *Research Methods in Anthropology*. Oxford: Altamira Press, pp.186–210.

Beukers-Stewart, B.D. and O'Leary, B.C. 2017. *Post-Brexit Policy in the UK: A New Dawn?* York: University of York.

BirdLife International. n.d. [Online]. Kaliakra Data Zone. [Accessed 6 September 2019]. Available from: http://datazone.birdlife.org/site/factsheet/kaliakra-iba-bulgaria/details.

Bivol 2012. Грозна корупция: ГЕРБ директно разпродава защитени територии на безценица (Ugly corruption: GERB selling off protected areas directly at knock-off prices). *Bivol*. [Online]. 30 December. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from:

https://bivol.bg/gerb-razgrabvane-duni.html.

Bivol 2016. МОСВ: На къмпинг Юг има дюни и няма да се строи. Точка! (MOSV: there are dunes at camping site Yug and there will be no construction. Period!). *Bivol*. [Online]. 16 June. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: https://bivol.bg/mosv-camping-yug-duni.html.

Blum, H. 2010. The prospect of oceanic studies. *Pmla*. **125**(3), pp.670–677.

Botcheva, L. 1996. Focus and Effectiveness of Environmental Activism in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Study of Environmental Movements in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. *The Journal of Environment & Development*. **5**(3), pp.292–308.

Boyes, S.J. and Elliott, M. 2014. Marine legislation - The ultimate 'horrendogram': International law, European directives & national implementation. *Marine Pollution Bulletin*. **86**(1–2), pp.39–47.

Boyes, S.J. and Elliott, M. 2016. Brexit: The marine governance horrendogram just got more horrendous! *Marine Pollution Bulletin*. **111**(1–2), pp.41–44.

Boyle, D. and Maidment, J. 2017. Theresa May announces snap general election on June 8 to 'make a success of Brexit'. *The Telegraph*. [Online]. 18 April. [Accessed 16 August 2020]. Available from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/18/breaking-theresa-may-make-statement-downing-street-1115am1/.

Bozhidarov, D. 2019. Гласове край морето: "Кой луд ще дойде да почива тук?!" (Voices from the seaside: "What madman would come here for a holiday?!"). *SEGA Newspaper*. [Online]. 17 July. [Accessed 12 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.segabg.com/category-observer/glasove-kray-moreto-koy-lud-shte-doyde-da-pochiva-tuk.

Brinkmann, S. 2018. The Interview. *In*: N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. LA: Sage Publications, pp.997–1038.

Buell, L. 1995. *The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American Culture*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Buell, L. 2005. *The Future of Environmental Criticism: Environmental Crisis and Literary Imagination*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Bulgarian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank. 1942a. *Писмо №81732 от БЗКБ до Кооперативната централа от 22 декември 1942* (*Letter №81732 to the Bulgarian Fishing Cooperative Headquarters on 22 December 1942).* 22 December. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф673к, оп. 1, а.е. 11.

Bulgarian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank. 1942b. *Писмо №573 от БЗКБ до Кооперативните сдружения в страната, кредитирани или не от Б.З.и К. банка от 23 декември 1942 (Letter №573 to cooperative unions in the country credited or not credited by the BZKB from 23 December 1942).* 23 December. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф673к, оп. 1, а.е. 11.

Bulgarian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank. 1943a. *Писмо №56794 от БЗКБ до Кооперативната централа от 31 август 1943* (*Letter №56794 to the Bulgarian Fishing Cooperative Headquarters on 31 August 1943).* 31 August. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф673к, оп. 1, а.е. 11.

Bulgarian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank. 1943b. *Писмо №15127/41 от БЗКБ до Кооперативната централа от [месец и ден нечетими]* (*Letter №15127/41 to the Bulgarian Fishing Cooperative Headquarters on [month and day illegible]).* София: Централен държавен

архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви“ (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф673к, оп. 1, а.е. 11.

Bulgarian Constitutional Court. 2013. Решение №12 от 28 ноември 2013 г. по конституционно дело №9 от 2013 (Decision №12 from 28 November 2013 on Constitutional case №9 of 2013). *Държавен вестник* **105** (6 December 2013).

Bulgarian Fishing Cooperative. 1941. *Протокол №17 от 27 октомври 1941 в Протоколна книга на УС на Кооперативна централа за общи доставки при Българския рибарски съюз, 1938-1944 (Protocol №17 from 27 October 1941 in the Protocol book of the Managing Committee of the Bulgarian Fishing Cooperative's Headquarters, 1938-1944)*. 27 October. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви“ (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф673к, оп. 1, а.е. 3.

Bulgarian Fishing Cooperative. 1944. *Протокол №36 от 7 и 8 декември 1944, Протколна книга на УС на Кооперативна централа за общи доставки при Български рибарски съюз, 1938-1944. (Protocol №26 from 7 and 8 December 1944 in the Protocol book of the Managing Committee of the Bulgarian Fishing Cooperative's Headquarters, 1938-1944)*. 7 and 8 December. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви“ (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф673к, оп. 1, а.е. 3.

Burns, C., Jordan, A., Gravey, V., Berny, N., Bulmer, S., Carter, N., Cowell, R., Dutton, J., Moore, B., Oberthuer, S., Owens, S., Rayner, T., Scott, J. and Stewart, B. 2016. *The EU Referendum and the UK Environment: An Expert Review. How has EU membership affected the UK and what might change in the event of a vote to Remain and Leave?*

Byrne, D. and Ragin, C.C. (eds.). 2009. *The SAGE Handbook of Case-Based Methods*. LA: Sage Publications.

Byrne, J. 2015. After the trawl: Memory and afterlife in the wake of Hull's distant-water fishing industry. *International Journal of Maritime History*. **27**(4), pp.816–822.

Byrne, J. 2016. Hull, Fishing, and the Life and Death of Trawlertown: Living the Spaces of a Trawling Port-City *In*: B. Beaven, K. Bell and R. James, eds. *Port Towns and Urban Cultures: International Histories of the Waterfront, c. 1700-2000*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp.243–263.

Capital News. 2015. Сдружение "Да запазим Корал": Излива се бетон върху дюните на къмпинг "Юг" ("Save Koral Association": Concrete poured over the dunes at camping "Yug"). [Online]. 13 April. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2015/04/13/2511818_sdrujenie_da_zapazim_koral_izliva_se_beton_vurhu/.

Cardwell, E. and Thornton, T.F. 2015. The fisherly imagination: The promise of geographical approaches to marine management. *Geoforum*. **64**, pp.157–167.

Carpenter, G. 2017. *Not in the Same Boat: The Economic Impact of Brexit Across UK Fishing Fleets*. [Online]. 17 November. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://neweconomics.org/2017/11/not-in-the-same-boat.

Carpenter, G. and Kleinjans, R. 2017. *Who Gets To Fish? The allocation of fishing opportunities in EU Member States*. [Online]. 15 March. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: https://neweconomics.org/2017/03/who-gets-to-fish

Carpenter, G., Kleinjans, R., Villasante, S. and O'Leary, B.C. 2016. Landing the blame: The influence of EU Member States on quota setting. *Marine Policy*. **64**, pp.9–15.

Carson, R. 1937. Undersea. *Atlantic Monthly* **78**. In Ferara E. 2015. *Visions for Sustainability* **3**, pp. 62-67.

Carson, R. 1941. *Under the Sea-Wind* 1996 ed. London: Penguin Books.

Carson, R. 1951. *The Sea Around Us* 1991 ed. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carson, R. 1955. *The Edge of the Sea*. London: Staple Press Limited.

Carson, R. 1961. Preface to the 1961 Edition. In *The Sea Around Us*. 1991 ed. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, vii-xiii.

Carson, R. 1962. *Silent Spring* 2002 ed. London: First Mariner Books.

Carstensen, M.B. and Schmidt, V.A. 2016. Power through, over and in ideas: conceptualizing ideational power in discursive institutionalism. *Journal of European Public Policy*. **23**(3), pp.318–337.

Carter, F.W. 1978. Nature Reserves and National Parks in Bulgaria. *Espace géographique*. **7**(1), pp.69–72.

Chakrabarty, D. 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Chakrabarty, D. 2009. The Climate of History: Four Theses. *Critical Inquiry*. **35**(2), pp.197–222.

Chakrabarty, D. 2012. Postcolonial Studies and the Challenge of Climate Change. *New Literary History*. **43**(1), pp.1–18.

Chakrabarty, D. 2014. Climate and Capital: On Conjoined Histories. *Critical Inquiry*. **41**(1), pp.1–23.

Charmaz, K. 2006. *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis*. London: Sage Publications.

Chase, S.E. 2018. Narrative Inquiry: Toward Theoretical and Methodological Maturity *In*: N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publications, pp.946–970.

Churchill, R. 1977. The EEC fisheries policy. Towards a revision. *Marine Policy*. **1**(1), pp.26–36.

Cocco, E. 2013. Theoretical Implications of Maritime Sociology. *Annuals of Marine Sociology*. **22**, pp.5–18.

Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). 2013. Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy [Online]. *Official Journal of the European Union* L 354/22. 28 December. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1380/oj.

Communities and Local Government Committee. 2007. *Coastal Towns: Second Report of Session 2006-7*. (HC 351). [Online]. London: The Stationary Office. 7 March. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/60/60i.pdf.

Conservative Research Department. 1976. U.K. – Icelandic Fisheries Dispute. 15 January. Hull History Centre: Patrick Wall MP Collection, U DPW/13/138 d.

Conservative Research Department. 1977. Fisheries and the EEC: The Present Position. 30 December. Hull History Centre: Patrick Wall MP Collection, U DPW/13/9 c.

Conterio, J. 2018. 'Our Black Sea Coast': The Sovietization of the Black Sea Littoral under Khrushchev and the Problem of Overdevelopment. *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*. **19**(2), pp.327–361.

Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats of wild fauna and flora (Habitats Directive). [Online]. *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 206/7. 22 July.

[Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1992/43/oj.

Cronon, W. 1990. Modes of Prophesy and Production: Placing Nature in History. *Journal of American History*. **76**(4), pp.1122–1131.

Cronon, W. 1992. A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative. *The Journal of American History*. **78**(4), pp.1347–1376.

Cronon, W. 1996. The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature. *Environmental History*. **1**(1), pp. 7-28.

Crutzen, P.J. 2002. Geology of mankind. *Nature*. **415**(January), p.23.

Crutzen, P.J. and Stoermer, E.F. 2000. The Anthropocene. *Global Change Newsletter*. **41**, pp.17–18.

Damyanov, M. 2015. *Save Karadere: Resisting Relentless Urbanization of a Wild Beach on the Bulgarian Black Sea Coast*. M.A. Thesis, Radboud University.

Davies, T. 2018. Toxic Space and Time: Slow Violence, Necropolitics, and Petrochemical Pollution. *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*. **108**(6), pp.1537–1553.

Davies, T. 2019. Slow violence and toxic geographies: 'Out of sight' to whom? *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*. **0**(0), pp.1–19.

Davis, H. and Todd, Z. 2017. On the importance of a date, or decolonizing the Anthropocene. *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies*. **16**(4), pp.761–780.

Daw, T. and Gray, T. 2005. Fisheries science and sustainability in international policy: A study of failure in the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy. *Marine Policy*. **29**(3), pp.189–197.

Dawley, S. 2014. Creating New Paths? Offshore Wind, Policy Activism, and Peripheral Region Development. *Economic Geography*. **90**(1), pp.91–112.

DeLoughrey, E. 2010. Heavy Waters: Waste and Atlantic Modernity. *PMLA*. **125**(3), pp.703–712.

DeLoughrey, E. 2017. Submarine Futures of the Anthropocene. *Comparative Literature*. **69**(1), pp.32–44.

DeLoughrey, E. 2019. Toward a critical ocean studies for the anthropocene. *English Language Notes*. **57**(1), pp.21–36.

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 2019. *UK Energy in Brief 2019*. [Online]. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-energy-in-brief-2019.

Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs. 2016. *Marine Conservation Zones: Update January 2016*. [Online]. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/marine-conservation-zones-january-2016-update.

Department of Energy and Climate Change. 2009a. *The UK low carbon transition plan: national strategy for climate and energy*. [Online]. 15 July. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-low-carbon-transition-plan-national-strategy-for-climate-and-energy.

Department of Energy and Climate Change. 2009b. *UK Energy in Brief 2009*. [Online]. The National Archives. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130106092313/http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/publications/brief/brief.aspx.

Department of Energy and Climate Change. 2013. *UK Energy in Brief 2013*. [Online]. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-energy-in-brief-2013.

Department of Trade Industry. 2007. *Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Energy*. (CM 7124). [Online]. 23 May. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/meeting-the-energy-challenge-a-white-paper-on-energy.

Desrochers, P. and Shimizu, H. 2012. The Intellectual Groundwaters of *Silent Spring*: Rethinking Rachel Carson's Place in the History of American Environmental Thought *In*: R. Meiners, P. Desrochers and A. Morriss, eds. *Silent Spring at 50: The False Crises of Rachel Carson*. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, pp.37–60.

Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (Water Framework Directive). [Online]. *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 327/1. 22 December. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj.

Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive). [Online]. *Official Journal of the European Union* L 164/19. 25 June. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/56/oj.

Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC. [Online]. *Official Journal of the European Union* L 140. 5 June. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/28/oj.

Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (Birds Directive). [Online]. *Official Journal of the European Union* L 20/7. 26 January 2010. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/147/oj.

Dorondel, S. 2016. *Disrupted Landscapes: State, Peasants and the Politics of Land in Postsocialist Romania*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Dorondel, S. and Şerban, S. 2019. Dissuading the state: food security, peasant resistance and environmental concerns in rural Bulgaria. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*. **40**(4), pp.564–79.

Dzhekova, G. 2019. Над 20% спад на туристите по Черноморието. Ние ли ги изгонхиме? (Over 20% decline of tourists on the Black Sea coast. Did we chase them away?). *Dnes News*. [Online]. 3 July. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.dnes.bg/stranata/2019/07/03/nad-20-spad-na-turistite-po-chernomorieto-nie-li-gi-izgonihme.415273.

Edwards, P.N. 2011. History of climate modeling. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*. **2**(1), pp.128–139.

van Eeten, M.J.G. 2007. Narrative Policy Analysis *In*: F. Fischer, G. J. Miller and M. S. Sidney, eds. *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods*. Abingdon & New York: Taylor and Francis, pp.251–271.

Electoral Commission. 2019. Results and turnout at the EU referendum. [Online]. 16 July. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-

referendum/results-and-turnout-eu-referendum.

Emmett, R.S. and Nye, D.E. 2017. *The Environmental Humanities: A Critical Introduction.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Eperon, A. 1966. Bulgaria Copies the Best of Western Tourism. *The New York Times*. 20 March, p.414. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times.

Escobar, A. 1999. After Nature: Steps to an Antiessentialist Political Ecology. *Current Anthropology*. **40**, pp.1–30.

European Commission. 2019. *The Blue Economy Report 2019*. [Online]. [Accessed 7 June 2020]. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/press/european-commission-launches-blue-economy-report-european-maritime-day-lisbon_en.

European Commision v Bulgaria. 2016. Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 January 2016 (Case C-141/14). [Online]. *Official Journal of the European Union* C 98/4 [Accessed 12 May 2020]. Available from: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-141/14.

Farage, N. 2017. Letter to those who have been contacted by Chris Davies MEP [Online]. 10 April. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.nigelfaragemep.co.uk/pages/get-involved/campaigns/hughs-fish-fight.php.

Farquharson, K. 2005. A Different Kind of Snowball: Identifying Key Policymakers. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*. **8**(March), pp.345–353.

Feola, G. 2015. Societal Transformation in Response to Global Environmental Change: A Review of Emerging Concepts. *Ambio*. **44**(5), pp.376-390.

Fischer, F. and Gottweis, H. 2013. The argumentative turn in public policy revisited: Twenty years later. *Critical Policy Studies*. **7**(September), pp.425–433.

Fischer, F., D. Torgerson, A. Durnová, and M. Orsini. 2015. Introduction to critical policy studies. *In* Fischer, F., D. Torgerson, A. Durnová, and M. Orsini, eds. *Handbook of Critical Policy Studies*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1-24.

Flamborough Head European Marine Site Management Scheme. 2016. 2016-2021 Flamborough Head European marine Site Management Plan. [Online]. [Accessed 22 May 2020]. Available from: http://www.flamboroughheadsac.org.uk/downloads/.

Fletcher, S., Jefferson, R., Glegg, G., Rodwell, L. and Dodds, W. 2014. England's evolving marine and coastal governance framework. *Marine Policy*. **45**, pp.261–268.

Flick, U. 2018. Triangulation *In*: N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. LA: Sage Publications, pp.775–804.

Fludernik, M. 2009. *An Introduction to Narratology*. London and New York: Routledge.

Flyvbjerg, B. 2011. Case Study *In*: N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. LA: Sage Publications, pp.301–316.

Flyvbjerg, B. 2006. Five misunderstandings about case-study research. *Qualitative Inquiry*. **12**(2), pp.219–245.

Ford, R. and Goodwin, M.J. 2014. Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change and the Left Behind. *The Political Quaterly*. **85**(3), pp.285–288.

Freeman, M. (ed.). 1995. *Always, Rachel: The Letters of Rachel Carson and Dorothy Freeman, 1952-1964*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Le Gallic, B., Mardle, S. and Metz, S. 2018. Brexit and Fisheries: A Question of Conflicting Expectations. *EuroChoices*. **17**(2), pp.30–37.

Ganev, V.I. 2007. *Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Ganeva, A., Dimitrov, M., Tsonev, R., Gusev, T., Zhelev, P., Rusakova, V., Gogushev, G., Kavrakova, V., Rakovska, K., Belev, T., Dimova, D., Ivanov, P., Popov, D., and Tilova, E. 2017. Отворено писмо: Опровержение на клевети и неверни твърдения срещу учени и експерти с компетентност в екологията и опазване на околната среда, отправени от Национална асоциация Българско Черноморие във връзка със случая „Калиакра" (Open letter: Rebuttal of the accusations and false claims made against scientist and experts in eology and environmental conservation by the National Bulgarian Black Sea Association with regard to the Kaliakra case). *Green Balkans Federation* [Online]. 17 October. [Accessed 12 May 2020]. Available from: https://greenbalkans.org/bg/OTVORENO_PISMO_Oproverzhenie_na_kleveti_i_neverni_tvyrdeniya_sreshtu_ucheni_i_eksperti_s_kompetentnost_v_ekologiyata_i_opazvane_na_okolnata_sreda_otpraveni_ot_Natsionalna_asotsiatsiya_Bylgarsko_Chernomorie_vyv_vryzka_sys_sluchaya_Kaliakra_-p6459.

Genette, G. 1980. *Narrative Discourse*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Geodesy Cartography and Cadastre Agency n.d. Черноморско крайбрежие (Black Sea coast). [Accessed 21 July 2020]. Available from: https://cadastre.bg/chernomorsko-kraibrezhie.

Ghodsee, K. 2005. *The Red Riviera: Gender, Tourism, and Postsocialism on the Black Sea Coast*. Duke University Press.

Gibson-Graham, J.K. 2003. Enabling Ethical Economies: Cooperativism and Class. *Critical Sociology*. **29**(2), pp.123-161+121.

Gibson-Graham, J.K. and Miller, E. 2015. Economy as Ecological Livelihood *In*: K. Gibson, D. B. Rose and R. Fincher, eds. *Manifesto for Living in the Anthropocene*. Punctum Books, pp.7–16.

Gill, A. 1993. Against the tide of loss. *The Guardian*.. December 29, pp.A8–9.

Gill, A. 1994. All at Sea? The Survival of Superstition. *History Today*. **44**(23), pp.9–11.

Gill, A. 2003. *Hull's Fishing Heritage: Aspects of Life in the Hessle Road Fishing Community*. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Wharncliffe Books.

Gille, Z. 2007. *From the Cult of Waste to the Trash Heap of History: The Politics of Waste in Socialist and Postsocialist Hungary*. Bloomington & Indianopolis: Indiana University Press.

Gillis, J.R. 2012. *The Human Shore: Seacoasts in History*. London: University of Chicago Press.

Giordano, C. and Kostova, D. 2002. The social production of mistrust. *In*: C. M. Hann, ed. *Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.74–91.

Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Goodwin, M.J. and Heath, O. 2016. The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result. *Political Quarterly*. **87**(3), pp.323–332.

Gorsuch, A.E. 2011. *All this is your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grant Agreement № 642935 - ENHANCE. 2014. The EU Framework Programme for Research

and Innovation MSCA-ITN-2014-ETN.

Grotius, H. 1609. *Mare Liberum* . 1916 ed., J. B. Scott, ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gubrium, J.F. and Holstein, J.A. 1998. Narrative Practice and the Coherence of Personal Stories. *The Sociological Quarterly*. **39**(1), pp.163–187.

Guðmundsson, G.J. 2006. The Cod and the Cold War. *Scandinavian Journal of History*. **31**(2), pp.97–118.

Haraway, D.J. 2016. *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*. Durham, N.C.; London: Duke University Press.

Hecht, D.K. 2019. Rachel Carson and the rhetoric of revolution. *Environmental History*. **24**(3), pp.561–582.

Hobbs, G. 2016. Fishermen in dark over new marine zone rules. *Holderness Gazette*. 21 January.

Holleran, M. 2014. 'Mafia Baroque': Post-socialist architecture and urban planning in Bulgaria. *British Journal of Sociology*. **65**(1), pp.21–42.

Holleran, M. 2015. On the Beach: The Changing Meaning of the Bulgarian Coast after 1989. *City and Society*. **27**(3), pp.232–249.

Holleran, M. 2017. Tourism and Europe's Shifting Periphery: Post-Franco Spain and Post-Socialist Bulgaria. *Contemporary European History*. **26**(4), pp.691–715.

Holm, P., Adamson, J., Huang, H., Kirdan, L. Kitch, S., McCalman, I., Ogude, J., Ronan, M., Scott, D., Thompson, K.O., Travis, C., and Wehner, K. 2015. Humanities for the Environment—A Manifesto for Research and Action. *Humanities*. **4**, pp.977-992.

Hooper, T., Ashley, M. and Austen, M. 2015. Perceptions of fishers and developers on the co-location of offshore wind farms and decapod fisheries in the UK. *Marine Policy*. **61**, pp.16–22.

Horn, P. 1996. Pauper apprenticeship and the Grimsby fishing industry, 1870 to 1914. *Labour History Review*. **61**(2), pp.173–194.

Horobin, G.W. 1957. Community and Occupation in the Hull Fishing Industry. *The British Journal of Sociology*. **8**(4), pp.343–356.

Hudson, A. 2018. Blue Economy: a sustainable ocean economic paradigm. *United Nations Development Programme Blog*. [Online]. 26 November. [Accessed 7 June 2020]. Available from: https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2018/blue-economy-sustainable-ocean-economic-paradigm.html.

Hull Fishing Industry. 1980. *Submission to Her Majesty's Government for Assistance*. January. Hull History Centre: Patrick Wall MP Collection, U DPW/13/98 d.

Hull Museum Education and the British Library. 2008. *Local Heroes: Hull's Trawlermen*. [Online]. November 2008. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.mylearning.org/stories/local-heroes-hulls-trawlermen/resources.

Huxley, T.H. 1903. Inaugural Address: Fisheries Exhibition, London (1883) *In*: M. Foster and E. R. Lankester, eds. *The Scientific Memoirs of Thomas Henry Huxley*. London: Macmillan, pp.80–89.

Iengo, I. and Armiero, M. 2017. The politicization of ill bodies in Campania, Italy. *Journal of Political Ecology*. **24**(2), pp.44–58.

Ingimundarson, V. 2003. Fighting the cod wars in the cold war: Iceland's challenge to the

western alliance in the 1970s. *RUSI Journal*. **148**(3), pp.88–94.

Iordăchescu, G. 2018. Making the "European Yellowstone"—Unintended Consequences or Unrealistic Intentions? *Arcadia* **10** [Online]. [Accessed 21 July 2020]. Available from: https://doi.org/10.5282/rcc/8303.

Iovino, S. 2018. Reading the Anthropocene with Italo Calvino: A Narrative Strategy *In*: *Lunchtime Colloquium, Summer Term 2018*. Munich: Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society.

IPCC. 2018. *Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5 °C*. [Online]. [Accessed 3 August 2020]. Available from: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/.

Jack, S. 2020. Fishing will be a 'red line' in Brexit negotiations. *BBC News*. [Online]. 31 January. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51319257.

Jancar-Webster, B. 1998. Environmental movement and social change in the transition countries. *Environmental Politics*. **7**(1), pp.69–90.

Jha, A. 2010. £75bn for UK's biggest offshore wind programme signals new era for renewables. *The Guardian*. [Online]. 8 January. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/jan/08/uk-offshore-windfarms-100bn.

John, T. 2016. Meet the British Fishermen Who Want Out of the E.U. *Time* [Online]. 7 June. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://time.com/4351849/brexit-grimsby-fishing-capital-eu/.

Jóhannesson, G.T. 2004. How 'cod war' came: the origins of the Anglo-Icelandic fisheries dispute, 1958-61. *Historical Research*. **77**(198), pp.543–574.

Juda, L. 2001. Basic Trends in the Evolving Law of the Sea and Their Implications for Ocean Use Management. *Oceanography*. **14**(2), pp.17–22.

Kelemen, R.D. and Vogel, D. 2010. Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the European Union in International Environmental Politics. *Comparative Political Studies*. **43**(4), pp.427–456.

Kelly, C., Ellis, G., and Flannery, W. 2018. Conceptualising Change in Marine Governance: Learning from Transition Management. *Marine Policy*. **95**, pp.24-35.

Khalilian, S., Froese, R., Proelss, A. and Requate, T. 2010. Designed for failure: A critique of the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union. *Marine Policy*. **34**, pp.1178–1182.

Klein, J.T. 2010. A taxonomy of interdisciplinarity *In*: R. Frodeman, J. T. Klein and C. Mitcham, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.15–30.

Klein, N. 2007. *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Koulov, B. 1996. Market Reforms and Environmental Protection in the Bulgarian Tourism Industry *In*: D. Hall and D. Danta, eds. *Reconstructing the Balkans: A Geography of New Southeast Europe*. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, pp.187–196.

Latour, B. 2004. *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*. Cambridge and Oxford: Harvard University Press.

Latour, B. 1993. *We Have Never Been Modern*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lear, L. 1997. *Rachel Carson: Witness for Nature*. New York: Henry Holt and Co. Inc.

Leshtarska, D. 2015a. Строежът на къмпинг "Юг" не бил върху дюни, но е незаконен (The construction at 'Yug camping proves not on top of dunes, but still illegal). *Capital News*. [Online]. 14 April. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from:

https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2015/04/14/2512609_stroejut_na_kumping_jug_ne_bil_vurhu_djuni_no_e/.

Leshtarska, D. 2015b. Къде са дюните (Where the dunes are). *Capital News*. [Online]. 17 April. [Accessed 12 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2015/04/17/2514767_kude_sa_djunite/.

Leviev-Sawyer, C. 2014. Karadere protests revive public campaign for resignation of Bulgarian government. *The Sofia Globe*. [Online]. 25 March. [Accessed 11 April 2015]. Available from: http://sofiaglobe.com/2014/03/25/karadere-protests-revive-public-campaign-for-resignation-of-bulgarian-government/.

Lincoln, Y.S., Lynham, S.A. and Guba, E.G. 2018. Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences, Revisited *In*: N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. LA: Sage Publications, pp.213–263.

Locke, J. 1690. Chapter V: Of Property. In *Second Treatise of Government* §30. [Online]. *Project Gutenberg*. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.gutenberg.org/.

Lury, C. 2018. Introduction: activating the present of interdisciplinary methods *In*: C. Lury, R. Fensham, A. Heller-Nicholas, S. Lammes, A. Last, M. Michael and E. Uprichard, eds. *Routledge Handbook of Interdisciplinary Research Methods. Routledge Handbook of Interdisciplinary Research Methods*. Abingdon & New York: Routledge, pp.1–26.

Mackinson, S., Curtis, H., Brown, R., Mctaggart, K., Taylor, N., Neville, S. and Rogers, S. 2006. *A report on the perceptions of the fishing industry into the potential socio-economic impacts of offshore wind energy developments on their work patterns and income*. Science Series Technical Report, no. 133. Lowestoft: Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science.

Maleva, M. and Sutreva, N. 2019. Сериозен спад на туристите на българското Черноморие (Significant decline of tourists on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast). *Bulgarian National Television*. [Online]. 6 July. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: http://news.bnt.bg/bg/a/seriozen-spad-na-turistite-na-blgarskoto-chernomorie.

Manners, I. and Murray, P. 2016. The End of a Noble Narrative? European Integration Narratives after the Nobel Peace Prize. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **54**(1), pp.185–202.

Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009. (c.23). [Online]. London: The Stationary Office. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/23/contents.

Marine Management Organization (MMO). 2019. *UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2018*. [Online]. Newport: Office for National Statistics. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/marine-management-organisation.

Marinov, V. and Koulov, B. 2002. Water Recreation Resources and Environmental Pressures along Bulgaria's Black Sea Coast *In*: S. C. Anderson and B. H. Tabb, eds. *Water, Leisure & Culture: European Historical Perspectives*. Oxford: Berg, pp.165–180.

Markov, G. 1980. *Задочни репортажи за България (In Absentia Reports on Bulgaria)* Vol. 1&2. 2008th ed. Sofia: Ciela.

Mauch, C. 2019. Slow Hope: Rethinking Ecologies of Crisis and Fear. *RCC Perspectives*. (1).

Mauch, C. and Ritson, K. 2012. Introduction L. Culver, C. Mauch, & K. Ritson, eds. *RCC Perspectives*. **7**, pp.7–8.

McAngus, C. and Usherwood, S. 2016. British fishermen want out of the EU – here's why. *The Conversation*. [Online]. June 10. [Accessed 21 July 2020]. Available from:

https://theconversation.com/british-fishermen-want-out-of-the-eu-heres-why-60803.

McGregor, D. 2013. Indigenous Women, Water Justice and Zaagidowin (Love). *Canadian Woman Studies*. **30**(2/3), pp.71–78.

Mentz, S. 2009. Toward a Blue Cultural Studies: The Sea, Maritime Culture, and Early Modern English Literature. *Literature Compass*. **6**(5), pp.997–1013.

Merchant, C. 1980. *The Death of Nature: Women and Ecology in the Scientific Revolution*. New York: Harper & Row.

Merchant, C. 1990. Gender and Environmental History. *The Journal of American History*. **76**(4), pp.1117–1121.

Ministry Council. 1960. *Проекто-постановление №11-107 за курортно строителство на ДСП „Балкантурист" на Министерски съвет по доклад №1059/124 от 21 август 1960 на министъра на външната търговия. (Draft order №11-107 of the Ministry Council regarding the Balkantourist resort construction, in response to report №1059/124 from 21 August 1960 of the Minister of Foreign Commerce).* 29 September. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф. 1Б, оп. 6, а.е. 4270, 54-7.

Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government. 2019. *English indices of deprivation 2019*. [Online]. 26 September. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2019.

Ministry of the Environment and Waters. 2017. *Заповед №РД-526 от 21 юли 2017г. (Order №RD-526 from 21 July 2017).* 21 July 2017. *Държавен вестник* **61** (28 July 2017).

Ministry of Tourism. 2017. *Национална стратегия за устойчиво развитие на туризма в Република България, 2014 - 2030 г. (National strategy for the sustainable development of tourism in the Republic of Bulgaria, 2014-2030)*. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Mitman, G., Haraway, D., and Tsing, A. 2019. Reflections on the Plantationocene: A Conversation with Donna Haraway and Anna Tsing. *Edge Effects*. [Online]. 18 June. [Accessed 27 July 2020]. Available from: https://edgeeffects.net/haraway-tsing-plantationocene/.

Moore, J.W. 2017. The Capitalocene, Part I: on the nature and origins of our ecological crisis. *Journal of Peasant Studies*. **44**(3), pp.594–630.

Moore, J.W. 2018. The Capitalocene Part II: accumulation by appropriation and the centrality of unpaid work/energy. *Journal of Peasant Studies*. **45**(2), pp.237–279.

Morton, T. 2007. *Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics*. Camebridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Nedović-Budić, Z. 2001. Adjustment of planning practice to the new eastern and central european context. *Journal of the American Planning Association*. **67**(1), pp.38–52.

Neimanis, A. 2017. *Bodies of Water: Posthuman Feminist Phenomenology*. London: Bloomsbury.

Neimanis, A., Åsberg, C. and Hedrén, J. 2015. Four Problems, Four Directions for Environmental Humanities: Toward Critical Posthumanities for the Anthropocene. *Ethics and the Environment*. **20**(1), pp.67–97.

Nielsen, N. 2016. Bulgaria seen as most corrupt in EU. *EU Observer*. [Online]. 27 January. [Accessed 21 July 2020]. Available from: https://euobserver.com/justice/132012.

Nikolova, R. and Spasov, S. 2017. Лъжата 'Калиакра' (The 'Kaliakra' Lie). *Capital News*. [Online]. 10 August. [Accessed 12 May 2020]. Available from:

https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2017/08/10/3022112_lujata_kaliakra/.

Nixon, R. 2011. *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Nixon, R. 2014. The Anthropocene: The Promise and Pitfalls of an Epochal Idea. *Edge Effects*. [Online]. 6 November. [Accessed 21 July 2020]. Available from: https://edgeeffects.net/anthropocene-promise-and-pitfalls/.

National Statistical Institute. 2017. *Activity of the acommodation establishments by statistical zones, statistical regions, and districts* [Online]. Sofia, Bulgaria. [Accessed 21 July 2020]. Available from: http://www.nsi.bg/en/content/7067/annual-data.

O'Brien, C. 2016. *Fish Stock Status*. 10 November 2016, Seafish Common Language Group, Friend's House, London.

Olšáková, D. (ed.). 2016. *In the Name of the Great Work: Stalin's Plan for the Transformation of Nature and its Impact in Eastern Europe*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Book.

Oppermann, S. and Iovino, S. (eds.). 2016. *Environmental Humanities: Voices from the Anthropocene*. London and New York: Rowan and Littlefield International.

Ounanian, K. 2016. *In Place of Fishing: Coastal Communities in Transition*. Ph.D. thesis, University of Rhode Island.

Palazov, A. and Stanchev, H. 2007. Tourist industry growth pressure along the Bulgarian Black Sea coast. *Rapp. Comm. Int. Mer Médit.* **38**, p.696.

Palfreman, A. 2004. Memorandum submitted to the Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. (HC 2004-5 W21). [Online]. 16 November. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmenvfru/122/4121413.htm.

Pálsson, G., Szerszynski, B., Sörlin, S., Marks, J., Avril, B., Cruley, C., Hackmann, H., Holm, P., Ingram, J., Kirman, A., Buendía, M.P., Weehuizen, R. 2013. Reconceptualizing the 'Anthropos' in the Anthropocene: Integrating the social sciences and humanities in global environmental change research. *Environmental Science and Policy*. **28**, pp.3-13.

Parsons, R. 2019. Labour says its plans for 37 new offshore wind farms will create 11,000 new jobs in Yorkshire and the Humber. *Yorkshire Post*. [Online]. 23 September. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/environment/labour-says-its-plans-37-new-offshore-wind-farms-will-create-11000-new-jobs-yorkshire-and-humber-1749580.

Patterson, J., Thaler, T., Hoffman, M., Hughes, S., Oels, A., Chu, E., Mert, A., Huitema, D., Burch, S., and Jordan, A. 2018. Political feasibility of 1.5°C societal transformations: the role of social justice. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*. **31**, pp. 1-9.

Pavlova, D., Sarbova, M., Nikolov, N. and Milkova, G. 2015. *SymBiotic* [Exhibition]. Бургас: СимБиотично Пространство.

Peters, K. and Steinberg, P.E. 2019. The ocean in excess: towards a more-than-wet ontology. *Dialogues in Human Geography*. **9**(13), pp.293–307.

Petkov, K. 2016. Сбогом, плаж Корал (Goodbye, "Coral" Beach). *Capital News*. [Online]. 15 January. [Accessed 13 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/mnenia/2016/01/15/2686624_sbogom_plaj_koral/.

Peycheva, R. 2019. Доколко е сериозен отливът на туристи по Черноморието? (How serious is the ebb of tourists on the Black Sea coast?). *Investor News*. [Online]. 10 June. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.investor.bg/novini-ot-chernomorieto/464/a/dokolko-e-seriozen-otlivyt-na-turisti-po-chernomorieto--283705/.

Phillipson, J. and Symes, D. 2010. Recontextualising inshore fisheries: The changing face of British inshore fisheries management. *Marine Policy*. **34**(6), pp.1207–1214.

Phillipson, J. and Symes, D. 2018. 'A sea of troubles': Brexit and the fisheries question. *Marine Policy*. **90**(January), pp.168–173.

Planning, Finances, and Commerce Division and Construction, Transport, and Communications Division of the Politburo. 1960. *Докладна записка относно курортното строителство на АСП „Балкантурист" (Report memorandum on the Balkantourist resort construction)*. 13 September. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф. 1Б, оп. 6, а.е. 4270, 49-51.

Plumwood, V. 1993. *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*. London and New York: Routledge.

Plumwood, V. 2002. *Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason*. London and New York: Routledge.

Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Politburo). 1960a. *Протокол „А" №71 на заседанието на Политбюро на ЦК на БКП от 14 април 1960 год. (Protocol A №71 from the Politburo sitting on 14 April 1960)*. 14 April. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф. 1Б, оп. 6, а.е. 4136.

Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Politburo). 1960b. *Справка по курортното строителство на АСП „Балкантурист" от 27 септември 1960 (Consultation on the Balkantourist resort construction from 27 September 1960)*. 27 September. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф. 1Б, оп. 6, а.е. 4270, 52-53.

Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Politburo). 1960c. *Протокол „А" № 280 от 29 декември 1960 год. (Protocol A №280 from the Politburo sitting on 29 December 1960)*. 29 December. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф. 1Б, оп. 6, а.е. 4347.

Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Politburo). 1973. *Протокол „А" №668 на заседанието на Политбюро на ЦК на БКП от 27 ноември 1973 (Protocol A №668 from the Politburo sitting on 27 November 1973)*. 27 November. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф1б, оп. 35, а.е. 4470.

Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Politburo). 1989. *Протокол „А" №20 на заседанието на Политбюро на ЦК на БКП от 7 февруари 1989 (Protocol A №20 from the Politburo sitting on 7 February 1989)*. 7 February. София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф1б, оп. 68, а.е. 3585.

Prato, G.B. 2013. Corruption between public and private moralities: The Albanian case in a comparative perspective. *Human Affairs*. **23**(2), pp.196–211.

Price, J. 2012. Stop saving the planet!--and other tips via Rachel Carson for Twenty-First Century environmentalists L. Culver, C. Mauch, & K. Ritson, eds. *RCC Perspectives*. **7**, pp.11–30.

Prime Minister's Office. 2017. [Online]. *Prime Minister's letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50 of*

the Treaty on European Union. 29 March. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50.

Probyn, E. 2016. *Eating the Ocean*. Durham, N.C.; London: Duke University Press.

Puig de la Bellacasa, M. 2017. *Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More Than Human Worlds*. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press.

Radio Free Europe. 1961. *Situation Report: Bulgaria, 20 November 1961*. 20 November. Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports. [Online]. Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: HU OSA 300-8-47-14-74. [Accessed 13 May 2020]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:ec90390e-4f1c-47eb-8626-fdc33dc32723.

Radio Free Europe. 1963. *The Opening of the Kremikovtsi Combine in Bulgaria*. 15 November. Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports. [Online]. Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. HU OSA 300-8-3-639. [Accessed 13 May 2020]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:31b5b5fb-9ce5-4676-9b9a-3811322794db.

Radio Free Europe. 1967. *Situation Report: Bulgaria, 9 November 1967*. 9 November. Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports. [Online]. Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. HU OSA 300-8-47-22-70. [Accessed 13 May 2020]. Available: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:3517198a-cdc0-487c-af2a-5ae4423b3754.

Radio Free Europe. 1973. *Situation Report: Bulgaria, 18 January 1973*. 18 January. Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports. [Online]. Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. HU OSA 300-8-47-29-3. [Accessed 12 May 2020]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:fabf7909-e0bf-4c63-884b-05a093ed35c3.

Rapley, T.J. 2001. The art(fulness) of open-ended interviewing: some considerations on analysing interview. *Qualitative Research*. **1**(3), pp.303–323.

Raychevski, S. 2016. Forestry Cooperatives in Strandzha (1922-1944) S. Zaric & V. Babic, eds. *LIMES plus: Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*. **XIII**(3), pp.55–68.

Reed, J. 2016. How you voted: Referendum results in detail from every Yorkshire district. *Yorkshire Post* [Online]. 24 June. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/politics/general-election/how-you-voted-referendum-results-in-detail-from-every-yorkshire-district-1-7981535.

Regional Inspectorate for Environment and Waters Burgas. 2017. Проверен е сигнал за замърсяване на морските води в района на Ахтопол (Monitored signal for sea waters pollution in the Ahtopol region). [Online]. 1 September. [Accessed 17 October 2019]. Available from http://riosvbs.com/home/news.

Regional Inspectorate for Environment and Waters Burgas. 2019. Басейнова дирекция и РИОСВ-Бургас провериха устието на река Караагач (Basin directorate and RIOSV-Burgas have monitored the Karagaach River estuary). [Online]. 19 July. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: http://riosvbs.com/home/news.

Rimmon-Kenan, S. 2006. Concepts of Narrative M. Hyvarinen, A. Korhonen, & J. Mykkanen, eds. *COLLeGIUM: Studies across Disciplines in Humanities and Social Sciences*. **1**, pp.10–19.

Ritson, K. 2019. *The Shifting Sands of the North Sea Lowlands: Literary and Historical Imaginaries*.

London and New York: Routledge.

Robbins, P. 2004. *Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction* 2nd ed. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Roberts, S.E. 2010. Britain's most hazardous occupation: Commercial fishing. *Accident Analysis and Prevention*. **42**(1), pp.44–49.

Rose, D.B., van Dooren, T., Chrulew, M., Cooke, S., Kearnes, M. and O'Gorman, E. 2012. Thinking Through the Environment, Unsettling the Humanities. *Environmental Humanities*. **1**(1), pp.1–5.

Rozwadowski, H.M. 2013. The Promise of Ocean History for Environmental History. *Journal of American History*. **100**(1), pp.136–139.

Rozwadowski, H.M. 2018. *Vast Expanses: A History of the Oceans*. London: Reaktion Books.

Rusev, A. 2013. *Letter to the European Commission and Mr Janez Potocnik, European Commissioner for the Environment*. 13 October.

Rusev, A., Galabov, V. and Popescu-Mirceni, R. 2016. GIS Investigation of Mass Dolphin Death. *GIM International*. (June 2016), pp.21–23.

Salisbury, H.E. 1957. Bulgaria Builds Eastern Riviera: Bulgaria Plans to Become a Communist Florida. *The New York Times*. September 25, p.3. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times.

Schmidt, V.A. 2010. Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth 'new institutionalism'". *European Political Science Review*. **2**(01), pp.1–25.

Schmidt, V.A. 2015. Discursive Institutionalism: Understanding Policy in Context *In*: F. Fischer, D. Torgerson, A. Durnova and M. Orsini, eds. *Handbook of Critical Policy Studies*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.171–189.

Scott, J.C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Select Committee on Regenerating Seaside Towns and Communities. 2019. *The future of seaside towns* (HL Paper 320). [Online]. London: The Stationary Office. 4 April. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.parliament.uk/regenerating-seaside-towns.

Shterionov, S. 1996. Преселнически движения от 30-те години на XIX век и въздействието им върху историческото развитие на Южното българско Черноморие (Emigration movements of the 1830s and their impact on the historic development of the Southern Bulgarian Black Sea coast) *In*: *Българите в Северното Причерноморие: Изследвания и материали*. Велико Търново: Veliko Tarnovo University Press, pp.263–272.

Sideris, L.H. and Moore, K.D. 2008. Introduction *In*: L. H. Sideris and K. D. Moore, eds. *Rachel Carson: Legacy and Challenge*. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp.1–15.

Soper, K. 1995. *What is Nature? Culture, Politics and the Non-Human*. Oxford, UK & Cambridge, USA: Blackwell.

Stanchev, H., Stancheva, M. and Young, R. 2015. Implications of population and tourism development growth for Bulgarian coastal zone. *Journal of Coastal Conservation*. **19**(1), pp.59–72.

Stancheva, M., Ratas, U., Orviku, K., Palazov, a, Rivis, R., Kont, a, Peychev, V., Tonisson, H. and Stanchev, H. 2011. Sand Dune Destruction Due to Increased Human Impacts along

the Bulgarian Black Sea and Estonian Baltic Sea Coasts. *Journal of Coastal Research*. **64**, pp.324–328.

Steinberg, P.E. and Peters, K. 2015. Wet ontologies, fluid spaces: Giving depth to volume through oceanic thinking. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*. **33**(2), pp.247–264.

Steinberg, P.E. 1999. Navigating to Multiple Horizons: Toward a Geography of Ocean-Space. *The Professional Geographer*. **51**(3), pp.366–375.

Steinberg, P.E. 2001. *The Social Construction of the Ocean*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steinberg, P.E. 2008. It's so easy being green: Overuse, underexposure, and the marine environmentalist consensus. *Geography Compass*. **2**(6), pp.2080–2096.

Steinberg, P.E. 2013. Of other seas: metaphors and materialities in maritime regions. *Atlantic Studies*. **10**(2), pp.156–169.

Strachan, P.A., Lal, D. and von Malmborg, F. 2006. Ecological modernization and wind power in the UK. *European Environment*. **16**(1), pp.1–18.

Todd, Z. 2014. Fish pluralities: Human-animal relations and sites of engagement in Paulatuuq, Arctic Canada. *Études/Inuit/Studies*. **38**(1–2), pp.217–238.

Todorova, M. 1997. *Imagining the Balkans* 2009th ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Torsello, D. 2011. The ethnography of corruption: research themes in political anthropology. *QoG Working Paper Series*. (March), pp.1–24.

Transparency International. 2018. *Corruption Perception Index: Bulgaria* [Online]. Berlin. [Accessed 21 July 2020]. Available from: https://www.transparency.org/country/BGR.

Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version). 2016. [Online] *Official Journal of the European Union* 2016/C 202/15. 7 June. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2016/oj.

Trend Marketing. 2019. Нагласи на българите към летния туристически сезон (юни 2019) (Bulgarians' attitudes towards the summer tourist season, June 2019). [Online]. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://rctrend.bg/project/Нагласи-на-българите-към-летния-турис/.

Twidle, H. 2014. Rachel Carson and the Perils of Simplicity: Reading Silent Spring from the Global South. *ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature*. **44**(4), pp.49–88.

Underwood, P. 1962. Bulgaria's 'Florida' by the Black Sea. *The New York Times*. 11 March, p. XX22. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times

United Kingdom v Iceland. 1972. Application instituting proceedings submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. [Online]. The Hague: International Court of Justice. 14 April. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/55.

United Kingdom v Iceland. 1974. Judgement of 25 July 1974. [Online]. The Hague: International Court of Justice. 25 July. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/55.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). 1982. [Online]. Montego Bay, 10 December 1982. [Accessed 21 July 2020]. Available from: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm

Vasile, M. 2019. Fiefdom forests: Authoritarianism, labor vulnerability and the limits of

resistance in the Carpathian Mountains. *Geoforum*. **106**, pp.155-166.

Vassilev, R. 2003. The 'Third-Worldization' of a 'Second-World' Nation: De-development in Post-Communist Bulgaria. *New Political Science*. **25**(1), pp.99–112.

Vote Leave Official Website. n.d. Taking back control from Brussels [Online]. [Accessed 9 May 2020]. Available from: http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_control.html.

Wall, P. 1971. Transcript of speech in Anlaby at 15.30 on Saturday 26th June. Hull History Centre: Patrick Wall MP Collection, U DPW/13/31 a.

Weart, S.R. 2003. *The Discovery of Global Warming*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Weidner, C., Braidotti, R. and Klumbyte, G. 2019. The Emergent Environmental Humanities: Engineering the Social Imaginary. *Connotations – A Journal for Critical Debate*. **28**, pp. 1-25.

Wesselink, A., Fritsch, O., and Paavola, J. 2020. Earth system governance for transformation towards sustainable deltas: What does research into socio-eco-technological systems tell us? *Earth System Governance*. [Online]. [Accessed 26 July 2020]. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2020.100062.

Westerdahl, C. 2007. Fish and Ships: Towards a theory of maritime culture. *Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv*. **30**, pp.191–236.

White, R. 1990. Environmental History, Ecology, and Meaning. *The Journal of American History*. **76**(4), pp.1111–1116.

Wilcox, M. 2015. 'The want of sufficient men': Labour recruitment and training in the British North Sea fisheries, 1850-1950. *International Journal of Maritime History*. **27**(4), pp.723–742.

Williams, R. 1980. *Problems in Materialism and Culture*. London: Verso.

Winder, G.M. and Le Heron, R. 2017. Assembling a Blue Economy moment? Geographic engagement with globalizing biological-economic relations in multi-use marine environments. *Dialogues in Human Geography*. **7**(1), pp.3–26.

Withnall, A. 2016. Nigel Farage and Sir Bob Geldof clash over Brexit flotilla in 'battle for the Thames'. *Independent*. [Online]. 15 June. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nigel-farage-and-sir-bob-geldof-clash-over-brexit-flotilla-in-battle-for-the-thames-a7083106.html.

Wolff, L. 1994. *Inventing Eastern Europe: The map of civilization on the mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Worster, D. 1977. *Nature's Economy: The Roots of Ecology*. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.

Worster, D. 1990. Transformations of the Earth: Toward an Agroecological Perspective in History. *The Journal of American History*. **76**(4), pp.1087–1106.

Yin, R.K. 2003. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Zhivkov, 1958. Изказване пред философски семинар от 2 декември 1958г. (Transcript of speech to a philosophy seminar on 2 December 1958). София: Централен държавен архив при Държавна агенция „Архиви" (Bulgarian State Archive). Ф. 1Б, оп. 5, а.е. 360.

ZUCHK (Закон за устройство на черноморското крайбрежие). 2008. *Указ №181, приет от XL Народно събрание на 1 юни 2007, влизащ в сила 1 януари 2008 (Decree №181 of the XL National Assembly on 1 June 2007, into force 1 January 2008)*. Sofia: *Държавен вестник* **48** (15 June 2007).

ZUCHK (Закон за устройство на черноморското крайбрежие). 2013. *Закон за изменение и допълнение*

от 15 март 2013г. (Amendment and Addendum of 15 March 2013). Sofia: *Държавен вестник* **27** (15 March 2013).

ZUCHK (Закон за устройство на черноморското крайбрежие). 2018. *Допълнение от 29 март 2018г. (Addendum of 29 March 2018)*. Sofia: *Държавен вестник* **28** (29 March 2018).

Appendix: Information Sheet & Consent Form (English version)

UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

A doctoral research project

EU Marine Governance, Conservation, and Contestation in Narratives of Wildness on the Bulgarian Black Sea and Yorkshire North Sea Coasts

About this research

Our coasts are beautiful but contested places: there are different visions on how to manage them, preserve them, or develop their potential. This project explores how different ideas about environment and society influence coastal governance, and vice versa, in two regional contexts within the EU: the Bulgarian Black Sea and the Yorkshire North Sea. It hopes to inform marine governance for a more sustainable and prosperous future.

This research forms part of Anna S. Antonova's doctoral degree requirements at the University of Leeds. It is funded through the EU's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under a Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant (ENHANCE ITN, Grant №:642935). Her supervisors are Dr Fiona Becket (f.d.becket@leeds.ac.uk) and Dr Jouni Paavola (j.paavola@leeds.ac.uk).

Invitation to participate

I would really appreciate your help! You have been selected to participate because of your involvement with marine governance and/or coastal conservation. It is also possible that another participant recommended that I speak with you about the issues I research. If you agree to help me, your input will be valuable, but your participation is entirely voluntary.

If you decide to participate, we will have an informal conversation for about an hour. If you agree, I will record our conversation for my reference, but if you prefer not to have your voice recorded, I will only keep notes of what you say. While information you provide may be published, I will always use a pseudonym to protect your identity. The recording itself will never be published anywhere without your further written consent.

When I publish materials based on our conversation, I may quote you directly or refer to information you gave me indirectly. Although I will always protect your identity with a pseudonym in these cases, there is still a chance that others might be able to recognize you. If other participants recommended I speak with you, or if I speak to others you have recommended, these participants are highly likely to know that you have taken part in my study. Also, because I will use information you give me in publications, anything you tell me in the course of this conversation could become public. Please keep these points in mind, especially if we talk about sensitive topics.

You can refuse to participate or speak on a particular topic at any time, without giving a reason. Following the interview, you will be able to withdraw any information you give me, fully or in part, but only up to a month after the interview.

Thank you!

Contact Information
Name: Anna S. Antonova
Tel.: +44 [redacted] | +359 [redacted]
Email: a.s.antonova@leeds.ac.uk
Address: 29-31 Clarendon Place | LS2 9JT Leeds | United Kingdom

UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

A doctoral research project

EU Marine Governance, Conservation, and Contestation in Narratives of Wildness on the Bulgarian Black Sea and Yorkshire North Sea Coasts

Consent to take part in this project

Please tick the appropriate boxes below to indicate your agreement:

- ☐ I have read the information sheet provided. I feel informed about this research project in sufficient detail and have been able to ask questions. I know whom to contact should I have any further questions or concerns
- ☐ I know that my participation is **fully voluntary** and I can refuse to participate or speak on particular topics at any point. I know that I can withdraw any information I have provided, fully or in part, for **up to a month** after the interview by emailing a.s.antonova@leeds.ac.uk
- ☐ I understand that my responses will be anonymised using a pseudonym and my name will not be linked with the research materials or outputs
- ☐ I understand that **there is a risk I may be identifiable:**
    - in publications or other outputs based on circumstantial information (for example, based on the sector or on the geographic area in which I primarily work)
    - to other participants in this research who are in my network, especially if they have nominated me to participate or if I nominate them as participants
- ☐ I understand that any information on suspected or known **illegal activity** I provide may need to be reported to relevant regulatory bodies as per official University of Leeds policy
- ☐ I give permission to the researcher to make use of my words and information I provide in any publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs, with the understanding that the researcher will maintain my anonymity using pseudonyms

Additionally, please tick the appropriate boxes below if you agree (optional):

- ☐ I agree to be recorded by the researcher, with the understanding that the recording will not be published or otherwise made widely available without my explicit further consent
- ☐ I want to be informed of future developments in this research, such as publications, web pages, or presentations. My e-mail address: _____

Name of participant:	**Name of researcher:** Anna S. Antonova
Date:	**Date:**
Signature:	**Signature:**