Deconstructing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute from 2008 to 2015: A Poststructuralist Approach

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Abstract

This dissertation fills a gap in the existing literature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. The bulk of research has explored the reasons why Japan and China have escalated this dispute since the early 2010s by pinpointing variables. However, scarce academic attention has been paid to how Japan and China have securitised the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands whilst entangling the dispute with the history problem. Given that the lingering history problem – disagreements over the interpretation of Imperial Japanese history between Japan and its neighbouring states – has had negative implications for Japan's regional security environment, it is vital to revisit how the dispute and the history problem started to become intertwined in the early 2010s.

This dissertation fills the research gap by taking a poststructuralist approach. Instead of seeking the entirely objective 'truth' of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, this study analyses how Japan and China have exerted power to construct a particular 'reality' of the dispute by providing a national history of the islands to justify their own sovereignty, fixing the meaning of the Self/Other, and discursively constructing an external 'threat'. Simultaneously, the proposed poststructuralist framework looks at how the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourses from Japan and China started to encompass the islands' security practices by eliminating the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. In this poststructuralist framework, the history problem is not irrelevant to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; rather, the history problem plays a vital role in Japanese and Chinese constructions of the Self/Other in the dispute.

This study applied a poststructuralist framework to a period from 2008 to 2015, which covers the Sino-Japanese honeymoon period of 2008 and the heightened Sino-Japanese antagonism in the early 2010s. The dissertation finds that Japan and China securitised the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by constructing the Other as a 'threat'. China did so by applying the lens of Sino-Japanese War history to interpret the dispute after September 2012 and constructing Japan's 'resurgence of militarism'. Meanwhile, from September 2010 onwards, Japan increasingly securitised the islands by constructing a 'rising China' as an illiberal, expansionist state that disregards the international order.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements **3**

Abstract **5**

Table of Contents **7**

Lists of Figures **11**

Abbreviations and Acronyms **13**

Notes on the Text **15**

Chapter 1 : Introduction **17**

1.1 International Relations (IR) Poststructuralist Approach 20

1.2 Why Is the Period from 2008 to 2015 Significant? 23

1.3 The Structure of the Dissertation 27

Chapter 2 : Literature Review **30**

2.1 The Why Questions Research 32

2.1.1 Political Science Approaches 33

2.1.2 Traditional IR Theories 40

2.1.2.1 IR Realism 40

2.1.2.2 IR Liberalism 43

2.2 The How Questions Research 45

2.2.1 IR Constructivism 45

2.2.2 IR Poststructuralism 48

2.2.2.3 What Is Poststructuralism? 49

2.2.2.4 Limited Poststructuralist Literature on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 54

2.2.2.5 Limitations of Poststructuralism and State-centric Approach 56

2.3 Conclusion 59

Chapter 3 : Theoretical Framework and Methods 61

3.1 Poststructuralist Framework 62

3.1.1 'Sovereign States' and 'Territorial Disputes' 62

3.1.2 'Discourse' and 'Identity' 67

3.1.3 'Security' 72

3.1.4 Summary 78

3.2 Methods 79

3.2.1 Reappraisal of Japanese and Chinese Sovereignty Claims 80

3.2.2 Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis 81

3.2.3 Intertextuality and Selection of Texts 87

3.2.2.1 Japanese Discourse 88

3.2.2.2 Chinese Discourse 90

3.2.4 Data Analysis 97

3.3 Conclusion 100

Chapter 4 : Analysis of Japanese Discourse 103

4.1 Reappraisal of Japan's Sovereignty Claim 103

4.2 Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis 107

4.2.1 Period I (January 2008 – December 2008): Honeymoon Period between the Leaders and the Diet Discussions That Called for the Strengthened Senkaku Islands Sovereignty 110

4.2.2 Period II (January 2009 – August 2010): Beginning of Japan's Securitisation of the Senkaku Islands That Renders the US Base in Okinawa as 'Deterrence' against China's Rise 115

4.2.3 Period III (September 2010 – September 2012): Japan's Intensified Securitisation After the Vessel Collision Case That Evolved into Japan's Purchase of the Senkaku Islands 122

4.2.4 Period IV (October 2012 – October 2014): Explicit Securitisation of the Senkaku Islands and Japan's Radical Security Reforms under the Abe Administration 130

4.2.5 Period V (November 2014 – December 2015): The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement and the Continued Abe's Security Reforms 136
4.3 Conclusion 142
Chapter 5 : Analysis of Chinese Discourse 150
5.1 Reappraisal of China's Sovereignty Claim 150
5.2 Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis 154
5.2.1 Period I (January 2008 - August 2010): Honeymoon Period between Leaders, and the Beginning of China's dispatch of Its Official Ships near the Islands 157
5.2.2 Period II (September 2010 - August 2012): Low-key Securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands 161
5.2.3 Period III (September 2012 - October 2012): Explicit Securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands through the Sino-Japanese War History Lens and the Beginning of Daily Patrols 165
5.2.4 Period IV (November 2012 - December 2015): De-escalation of the Diaoyu Islands Dispute, but Continuation of China's 'Tit-for-tat' Policy and Application of the Sino-Japanese War Lens until November 2014 172
5.3 Conclusion 180
Chapter 6 : Conclusion 187
6.1 Reassessing the Existing Literature 188
6.2 Theoretical Contributions 190
6.3 Empirical Findings 193
6.3.1 Deconstructing Japanese/Chinese Sovereignty Claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s 193
6.3.2 Deconstructing Japanese/Chinese Securitisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from 2008 to 2015 195
6.4 Reflections: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute and the History Problem 199
6.5 Suggestions for Future Research 202

Bibliography **205**

Appendices **231**

Lists of Figures

Figure 1.1: A Map of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 18
Figure 2.1: Bilateral Trade as Share of Total Trade, 1972-2014 44
Figure 3.1: Double-Fears of Death and Ontological/Daily Security 74
Figure 3.2: The Linking and Differentiation of 'the Balkans' and 'Europe' 82
Figure 3.3: Competing Constructions of Indian 'Savages' 83
Figure 3.4: Three Lenses to Read the Self/Other 84
Figure 3.5: Texts Representing the Japanese Discourse 89
Figure 3.6: The Japanese Government 90
Figure 3.7: Texts Representing the Chinese Discourse 91
Figure 3.8: The CCP and PLA at the Centre 93
Figure 3.9: The Chinese Government at the Centre 94
Figure 3.10: Screenshot of Nvivo: Coding Elements 98
Figure 3.11: Screenshot of Nvivo: List of Codes, China's Self as 'We Are Strong' 99
Figure 4.1: Japan's Levels of Securitisation 108
Figure 4.2: Period I, Japan's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts 111
Figure 4.3: A Map of Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the ECS 112
Figure 4.4: Period II, Japan's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts 117
Figure 4.5: A Map of US Bases in Okinawa 120
Figure 4.6: Period III, Japan's Construction of the Self/Other and Policy Shifts 124
Figure 4.7: Period IV, Japan's Construction of the Self/Other and Policy Shifts 131
Figure 4.8: Period V, Japan's Construction of the Self/Other and Policy Shifts 138
Figure 4.9: A List of Japan's Discursive Shifts 143
Figure 5.1: China's Expanded Sovereignty Claim 153
Figure 5.2: China's Levels of Securitisation 156
Figure 5.3: Period I, China's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts 158
Figure 5.4: Period II, China's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts 162
Figure 5.5: Period III, China's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts 166

Figure 5.6: The Number of Ships Identified in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands 170
Figure 5.7: Period IV, China's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts 173
Figure 5.8: The Number of Japan's Scramble to Chinese Aircrafts 175
Figure 5.9: A List of China's Discursive Shifts 181

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
EAC	East Asian Community
ECAFE	United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECS	East China Sea
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
IR	International Relations
JCG	Japan Coast Guard
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MACM	Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism
MLITT	Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOND	Ministry of National Defense
NDPG	National Defense Program Guidelines
NPC	National Party Congress
NSC	National Security Council

OTS	Ontological Security Theory
PFT	Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty
PLA	People’s Liberation Army
PRC	People’s Republic of China
SCS	South China Sea
SCIO	State Council Information Office
SDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
SFPT	San Francisco Peace Treaty
ST	Copenhagen School’s Securitisation Theory

Notes on the Text

Japanese and Chinese names are written using the surname first, given name second, except where the name is that of an author who has published in English using the Western name order. All Chinese words are presented in standard pinyin without tonal markings. Japanese terms, such as place names, are transcribed with macrons, except where the place-name is well-known in English (such as Tokyo). In order to specify the original Japanese/Chinese words that are key words or contain non-translatable nuances, the Japanese/Chinese are written in a bracket after the English translation, for instance, ‘the rule by might (覇道)’ and ‘rule of right (王道)’.

Chapter 1: Introduction

It is perhaps a truism to suggest that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands[1] dispute in the East China Sea (ECS) (Figure 1.1) has cast a dark shadow on Sino-Japanese relations. In particular, since the early 2010s, China has embarked on an increasingly assertive policy to challenge Japan's *de facto* control of the islands at sea and in the air, whereas Japan has bolstered its military capability in the ECS and deepened its security relations with the US in order to counter a rising China. Consequently, the nature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute has shifted: the dispute used to be a marginal issue in Sino-Japanese relations, but now it is the most serious controversy. In terms of security, since the early 2010s, Japan and China have been in a security dilemma in the ECS as both parties have bolstered their military capabilities near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Simultaneously, the dispute started to reveal explicitly the Sino-Japanese discrepancies over the understanding of Imperial Japanese/Sino-Japanese War history in their Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourses. Although Japan and China have had incongruent views in their modern history (i.e., the so-called 'history problem'[2]) since the 1980s, it was only in the early 2010s when the history problem started to become evident in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Currently, many Chinese people axiomatically view the dispute through a lens of Sino-Japanese War history and criticise Japan's moves in the islands as a resurgence of militarism. On the other hand, Japan has undertaken security reforms

[1] The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are a chain of uninhabited small islets in the East China Sea. Japan and China call them Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島) and Diaoyu Islands (钓鱼岛), respectively. Five are islets, and three are barren rocks. The size of the largest islet is 3.8 km^2 and is called (Japanese first and Chinese follows) Uotsurijima/Diaoyudao; the other islets, Kubajima/Huangweiyu, Taishō-Jima/Chiweiyu, Kitakojima/Beixiaodao, Minamikojima/Nanxiaodao, make up the chain, being called the Pinnacle Islands in English. The islands are located in the ECS, about 200 km northeast of Taiwan, 400 km east of Wenzhou, China, 290 km west of Okinawa, Japan. They lie in the 200 m deep edge of the continental shelf that extends from mainland China. Sovereignty over the islands could affect approximately 431,260 km^2 of the surrounding continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone (Vilisaar, 2010).

[2] The history problem originates in Japan's '"historical amnesia", represented by its political leaders' frequent denial of the Nanjing massacre, sanitization of its history textbooks, and the controversial visits of its head of state to the Yasukuni Shrine' (Shibata, 2015, p. 81). These Japanese revisionists' deeds and remarks have generated China's deep and enduring hostility toward Japan.

under the second Abe administration (from December 2012 to date) and put an end to the post-war grand strategy of the Yoshida Doctrine,[3] whilst problematising China's increasing activities near the islands as a challenge to regional peace and stability. Given that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute has become one of the most volatile flashpoints in East Asia since the early 2010s, critical appraisal of *how* Japan and China have escalated the dispute by intertwining the dispute with the history problem is of the utmost importance for preventing potential military confrontations between these two states.

Figure 1.1: A Map of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Chapter 2 will discuss that the majority of the existing studies have investigated *why* the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute has escalated since the early 2010s by testing hypotheses, explaining causal relations, and pinpointing specific variables. Nevertheless, scarce academic attention has been paid to *how* Japan and

[3] As will be explained in Chapter 4, the Yoshida Doctrine was characterised by a pragmatic and low-profile foreign policy based on Japan's highly constrained defence posture under the peace Constitution.

China have shifted their islands policy from early 2010 onwards, whilst entangling the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with the history problem. *How* China has started to view the islands dispute via a lens of Sino-Japanese War history has not been investigated yet. Moreover, *how* Japan has started to rearm itself by problematising China's activities in the ECS has not been thoroughly studied. In this context, this dissertation fills this research gap by taking seriously the role of identity. Instead of asking *why* the islands dispute has escalated since the early 2010s, the primary question this dissertation asks is: 'How have Japan and China come to securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in a manner of a zero-sum game by intertwining the dispute with the history problem?' The answer to this question requires the following four broader questions:

a. *How* have Japan and China constructed the sovereignty claims of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s?
b. *How* did Japan and China shift the Self/Other construction in their discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between 2008 and 2015?
c. *How* did Japan and China securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between 2008 and 2015?
d. *How* did the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem from 2008 to 2015?

As the argument unfolds, it will become clear that the answers to these four research questions lie in Japanese/Chinese foreign, defence, and security discourses pertaining to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. More importantly, this dissertation will clearly demonstrate the following five findings: (1) Japan and China started to construct the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands sovereignty claims only since mid-1960s and 1971, respectively; (2) Japan has centred its sovereignty claim on the legal framework of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and post-war history, whereas China has refuted Japan's claim by foregrounding the pre-1945 China-centric history taking a post-colonial stance; (3) Japan gradually constructed the Self as 'a legitimate and liberal leader of the region' that has a morally higher ground over 'a rising China that is an illiberal expansionist state challenging the regional order' in securitising the Senkaku Islands from 2008 to 2015; (4) China started to apply a lens of Sino-Japanese War to interpret Japan's islands practice, thereby constructing Japan as 'a state that tries to invade Chinese territory again and rearm itself without

remorse over wrongdoings during Imperial Japanese period' and China as 'a past victim of the Sino-Japanese Wars but now being ready to fight back against Japan' in securitising the Diaoyu Islands after September 2012; (5) by demonising the Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, both Japan and China justified its high-profile islands security policy and bolstering military capabilities in the ECS.

Firstly, this chapter provides a summary of the proposed poststructuralist framework and methods that will be unpacked in Chapter 3. After that, by giving the background information to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, I will set out the rationale for choosing a period from 2008 to 2015 in examining how the islands dispute and the history problem became entangled with each other. The last section of this chapter will lay out the structure of this dissertation.

1.1 International Relations (IR) Poststructuralist Approach

As will be laid out in Chapter 3, this dissertation builds on the work of international relations (IR) poststructuralism in deconstructing Japanese/Chinese discourses of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.[4] Specifically, I will draw on the following thinkers and scholars who have shaped poststructuralism: Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, R.B.J. Walker, David Campbell, Cynthia Weber, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Lene Hansen, and Jef Huysmans. Also, I will refer to the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory and ontological security theory. Primary to the proposed poststructuralist framework is our understanding of the nexus between language and reality. Taking a poststructuralist approach, I premise that language is not a transparent tool that conveys the objective 'truth'; however, language exerts power[5] to constitute a specific 'reality'. Thus, instead of seeking the entirely objective 'truth' of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, I will analyse *how* Japan and China have exerted power to construct a particular 'reality' of the dispute by providing a national history of the islands to justify the islands' sovereignty, fixing

[4] Deconstruction is one of the poststructuralist methods that is designed to problematise 'the hierarchical oppositions that have structured Western thought: inside/outside, mind/body, literal/metaphorical, speech/writing, presence/absence, nature/culture, form/meaning' (Culler, 1997, p. 127).

[5] Herein, 'power' does not signify coercion, but in the language of Michel Foucault, one of the most influential thinkers in shaping poststructuralism, 'power' is a 'regime of truth' which is a type of discourse each society has and accepts and makes function as truth whilst enabling people to distinguish true and false statements.

the meaning of the Self/Other, and constructing an external 'threat' via language. Simultaneously, this poststructuralist framework looks at how Japan's and China's use of language that constitutes a 'reality' of the dispute allowed for these states' current security practices by eliminating the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

Based on this epistemological premise of poststructuralism, I will define two keywords – 'sovereign states' and 'territorial disputes'. Being different from the traditional IR theories – i.e., realism and liberalism – that take the concept of 'sovereign states' for granted, the poststructuralist framework holds that 'sovereign states' do not naturally exist in the world; rather, 'sovereign states' are constantly enacted performatively[6] via their discursive practices of boundary inscription. In inscribing boundary, in foreign, defence, and security policies, sovereign states try to fix the meaning of the Self as safety, security, and amity, as opposed to the Other that is associated with anarchy, insecurity, and enmity. As per these policies, sovereign states show their territorial sovereignty by patrolling the border, bolstering their military capabilities to counter the external threats, and criticising the competing claimant state diplomatically. From the perspective of this dissertation, therefore, 'sovereign states' is not an objective entity that pre-exists specific political actions; however, sovereign states are merely a dominant mode of subjectivity that is performatively constituted by boundary inscription practices.

In light of this, we can understand the concept of 'territorial disputes' in a different way. Conventionally, we comprehend that what is at stake in territorial disputes is merely conflicting territorial claims of sovereign states. However, in order to understand 'territorial disputes' deeply, I will propose to interpret 'territorial disputes' as a political moment in which the performatively naturalised boundaries of sovereign states come to be unsettled by external force. In reaction to this development, the sovereign states try to re-inscribe the boundaries via new foreign, defence, and security policies. In re-inscribing the boundaries, sovereign states attempt to provide a national history that gives a specific meaning to the disputed territory, national identities of the Self/Other, and security policies that manage the potential external threat. By doing so, sovereign states re-constitute their territorial

[6] As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, 'performativity' is not a performance but is about 'the ways that identities are constructed iteratively through complex citational processes' (Weber, 1998, p. 79).

sovereignty. Based on this understanding of 'territorial disputes', the history problem is not irrelevant to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Instead, we can comprehend that the history problem is deeply implicated in Japanese and Chinese constructions of the Self/Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. In this way, this dissertation theoretically bridges the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem by taking a poststructuralist approach.[7]

In applying the poststructuralist framework to analyse Japanese and Chinese Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourses, I will employ poststructuralist methods that will be laid out in Chapter 3. Firstly, I will explain that this dissertation critically revisits how Japan and China have discursively constituted the islands' sovereignty claims since the 1950s by giving meaning to particular representations of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands history. By foregrounding the pre-1970 period when Japan and China did not have clear recognition of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, this analysis tracks the process of how Japan and China started to constitute their islands sovereignty in distinct ways. After that, I will explain how I will read the collected texts by conducting poststructuralist discourse analysis. Drawing on multiple thinkers and scholars who have shaped poststructuralism, I will set out the ways to analyse how Japan and China have shifted their constructions of the Self/Other in their Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute from 2008 to 2015. Additionally, I will explain what kind of texts reasonably represent the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourses of Japan and China. When it comes to Japan, in addition to my twenty-five interviews with Japanese officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), scholars, and journalists in Tokyo and Hong Kong, the following texts will be analysed: speeches of the prime ministers, documents provided by the Japanese MOFA, Ministry of Defense (MOD), Japan Coast Guard (JCG), the Cabinet Office and other related governmental institutions, and the records and laws passed by the Diet. On the other hand, for Chinese discourse, I have conducted ten interviews with scholars in Beijing and Hong Kong and the following texts are looked at: speeches by Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao and Xi Jinping/Li Keqiang, official statements and briefings released by the Chinese MOFA, Ministry of National Defense (MOND), State Council Information Office (SCIO), laws passed by the National People's Congress (NPC), and editorials

[7] The proposed poststructuralist framework also draws on the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory and ontological security theory by referring to the seminal work of Jef Huysmans (1998) in Chapter 3.

of *People's Daily* and *PLA Daily*. Drawing on Julia Kristeva's notion of 'intertextuality', I will analytically see these categories of texts are all linked to each other in a wider textual context. The discursive authority of these categories of texts will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

1.2 Why Is the Period from 2008 to 2015 Significant?

This section gives background information to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in order to set out why the period from 2008 to 2015 is crucial to explore the dispute and the history problem. Firstly, I will explain the current situations of the islands dispute in order to problematise the ongoing security dilemma between Japan and China in the ECS. Secondly, I will briefly track the history of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute from the late 1960s to 2015 whereby I will highlight the reason why the period from 2008 to 2015 is essential to this dissertation.

Due to the expansion of China's maritime interests and activities, and Japan's increasing military capability in the ECS,[8] Japan and China have been trapped in a 'strategic dilemma of structural kind, by which what is seen as a defensive measure by one side is seen as offensive by the other, requiring a response in kind' (Yahuda, 2013, p. 100). This exactly resembles a phenomenon called 'security dilemma', in which 'one state's gain in security inadvertently threatens the other' (Jervis, 1978, p. 170) and eventually the two countries get stuck in 'a spiral of illusory fears and "unnecessary" defenses' (Snyder, 1997, p. 17). In May 2018, Japan and China finally managed to establish the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism (MACM), which now enables Japan's Self-Defense Force (SDF) and China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) to communicate with each other to avoid military clashes in the ECS (Tanaka, 2018). Notwithstanding, the two countries are still driven by the fears of what their counterparts might do and are thus rapidly strengthening their military capabilities and exacerbating the security dilemma.

[8] The maritime interests of the Chinese Navy have expanded from a coastal to a near coastal and now to a blue water navy. China aims at deploying its navy in the Pacific Ocean, and the only access to the Western Pacific is through international straits that cross the Japanese Archipelago. Moreover, one of the ultimate goals of Chinese leaders is to unify Taiwan by preventing possible US military interventions via 'Anti Access and Area Denial (A2/AD)'. For these strategic reasons, the Chinese Navy increasingly regards the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as vital (Yahuda, 2013, p. 100).

In order to counter China, which had acquired a military aircraft carrier – *Liaoning* – in September 2012, Japan purchased a military aircraft carrier, *Izumo*, in November 2018 for the first time since World War II (McCurry, 2018). This move led to China's anxiety over Japan's potential resurgence of militarism whilst justifying China's plan to further develop its naval firepower; for example, by expanding at least four aircraft carrier battle groups by 2030 (Chan, 2018). Additionally, in July 2018, China undertook institutional reforms and incorporated the China Coast Guard (CCG), which patrols near the islands, to the PLA, and this shift has legally bolstered the military capability of the CCG, thereby making Japan more vigilant about China's moves in the ECS (Yomiuri, 2018). Even if a traditional, full-scale security dilemma has not occurred in East Asia yet, 'there is evidence of a security dilemma-driven spiral gradually unfolding between China and several states [including Japan] that is driving investments in military capabilities and that may worsen significantly in the years ahead' (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014, p. 88). Having said that, the ongoing Sino-Japanese security dilemma over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is a relatively new phenomenon that started to take place only in the early 2010s. To illustrate this clearly, I will explain below how the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute has emerged and evolved, and why the period from 2008 to 2015 is particularly important to this dissertation.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have a long history, but for this research, it will suffice to review the initial events that took place between Japan and China from the outset of the dispute until 2015. As will be precisely set out in Chapters 4 and 5, it was in the early 1970s when Japan and China started to construct the islands' sovereignty claims. In 1969, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) published a report suggesting that there might be major hydrocarbon reserves, including oil and natural gas, underneath the waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Due to this report, surrounding states started to pay particular attention to these small islands. The dispute officially began in July 1970 when the Japanese ambassador in Taipei sent a note to the Taiwanese MOFA, asserting Japan's sovereignty over the islands. In September 1970, Japan claimed that the islands belong to Japan. In the same month, a Taiwanese flag was put on the island, but days later, Okinawa authorities removed it. This quickly led to the emergence of the worldwide anti-Japanese nationalist Baodiao Movement, which formed a rallying point for overseas Chinese people to defend their unified territory.

In this context, in December 1971, the Chinese government in Beijing proclaimed sovereignty over the islands. In 1972, the US returned the 'administration right' to Okinawa, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, whilst refusing to clarify its stance on the 'sovereignty' of the islands under pressure from Taiwan (Han-Yi, 1999; Ōshima, 2017).[9]

Thereafter, tensions flared several times between Japan and China: in April 1978, prior to the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT), eighty Chinese fishing boats approached the islands; in 1990-91, Japanese ultranationalists urged the Japanese government to recognise the lighthouse built on the island, albeit without avail; in 1996, Japanese ultranationalists landed on the island to plant Japan's flag there; and in 2004, for the first time since the outset of the dispute, Chinese activists landed on the island and Japan swiftly arrested them and sent them back to China (Tretiak, 1978; Deans, 1996, 2000; Koo, 2010; Wiegand, 2011; O'Shea, 2012a). From the outset of the dispute, Japan has maintained *de facto* control of the islands, including the land and airspace. On the other hand, China has maintained a low-key islands policy by tacitly acknowledging Japan's effective control over the islands throughout this period (Fravel, 2010). It is noteworthy that during this period, Japan and China also successfully reached the Fishery Agreement in 1997 and the Prior Notification Agreement in 2001 (Manicom, 2008a; Drifte, 2009). In 1997-98, Japan even co-financed two Chinese oil and gas pipelines from the Pinghu field, which lies in the disputed areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the ECS, to the Chinese mainland (Drifte, 2009, p. 6). However, they have not reached an agreement to co-develop the ECS in the almost forty years since the beginning of the dispute.

In light of this, 2008 marked a crucial shift because Japan and China finally agreed to jointly develop the ECS gas field in the Principled Consensus on the East China Sea in June 2008. Moreover, in May 2008, Japan and China agreed to tacitly set aside the history problem by stating that 'the two sides resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future' in the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement on Comprehensively Promoting Strategic and Reciprocal Relations.[10] However, 2008,

[9] In the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT), the US obtained the Nansei Islands, including Okinawa and the Senkaku Islands.

[10] Japan and China decided to shelve the history problem in 2006 by agreeing on the mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests (Kokubun, 2013). This agreement was substantiated in the Joint Statement of 2008, which included the 'face history squarely' sentence.

retrospectively, turned out to be the beginning of the incremental deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. On 13th December 2008 – five days before the China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Summit in Fukuoka – two official Chinese vessels entered the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands for the first time,[11] remaining there for about nine hours, ignoring Japan's repeated warnings and protests via diplomatic channels. On 7th September 2010, a fishing vessel steered by a drunken Chinese man violently collided with two ships of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial waters. In response, Japan detained the Chinese captain for seventeen days, thereby seriously exacerbating the Sino-Japanese momentum for the co-development plan.

Thereafter, Japan started to problematise China's increasing activities in the ECS, whilst calling for strengthened security relations with the US and bolstering military capability in the ECS. China's security practices radically shifted after Japan purchased the islands from their Japanese private owner on 11 September 2012. Specifically, China began to establish a new routine to dispatch its official ships near the islands on a daily basis by directly challenging Japan's *de facto* control over the islands. Simultaneously, China started to refer to the Sino-Japanese War to criticize Japan in the context of the islands dispute. Also, China cut off dialogue and refused to meet with Japan's prime ministers for over two years. During this period, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō started to express his revisionist worldview and visited the Yasukuni Shrine[12] in December 2013. Also problematising China's increasing activities near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Abe started to embark on radical security reforms that eventually broke down the post-war grand strategy of Japan – the so-called Yoshida Doctrine. In December 2013, Japan established the National Security Strategy (NSS), and the National Security Council (NSC), and also passed the Special Secret Law; in April 2014, Japan lifted the self-imposed arms export embargo that had existed since 1967. On 1st July 2014, Abe made a Cabinet decision

[11] Before this case, the Chinese vessels that entered into the contiguous zones or territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were those of Taiwan, Hong Kong, or were Chinese fishing boats; therefore, it was the first time China deployed official vessels to the islands' territorial waters.
[12] The Yasukuni Shrine enshrines the war dead, including Class-A war criminals (i.e., Imperial Japanese leaders who were tried in the Tokyo Tribunal), who died for Imperial Japan. During the Imperial Japanese period, this shrine played a crucial role in the state Shintō system that mobilised the Imperial Japanese nation to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the Emperor (Shimazono, 2010). Japanese revisionists who deny the cruelty of Imperial Japanese war crimes have a special affinity to this shrine (Deans, 2007). Yet, in the eyes of the victims of Imperial Japan, Japanese leaders' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine signify Japan's lack of regret for the tremendous suffering of the victims.

to allow for Japan's collective self-defence, which had been considered unconstitutional throughout the post-war period. The military tensions in the airspace of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands increased in November 2014, when China set up the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the islands. In the same month, Japan and China finally mended the rift via the Sino-Japanese Four Articles of Principled Consensus. Yet, Abe's security reforms continued and culminated in September 2015, when the Peace and Security Law was passed in the Diet that legalised Japan's collective self-defence. China continued the daily patrols near the islands.

In light of this, the period from 2008 to 2015 provides the ideal set of empirical data that makes it possible to explore how the history problem and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands started to become intertwined. Beginning with the honeymoon period of 2008 that witnessed the Sino-Japanese agreement of the co-development of the ECS and tacit agreement to set aside the history problem, the chosen period covers the process of the incremental degeneration of Sino-Japanese relations in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands that eventually led to the states' security dilemma and to the worsened history problem.

1.3 The Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation will unfold in the following structure. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. To facilitate the literature review, I will first make it clear that there are two types of research questions: *why* questions and *how* questions. The *why* questions are asked by explanatory theories that try to test hypotheses and explain causal relations of major trends or recurring patterns in IR; *how* questions are asked by constitutive theory that tries to analyse an epistemological perspective about how the world comes to be seen in particular ways. As noted above, this dissertation will ask the *how* questions to approach the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, and so the review considers the various theoretical approaches which have been applied to the dispute in light of both types of questions. The first section assesses the *why* questions and widely covers the literature of political science and the traditional IR theories i.e., realism and liberalism, arguing that they are not designed to answer the proposed *how* questions. The second section outlines the existing research that has asked *how* questions in the

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. I will specifically explain that IR constructivism and poststructuralism have been applied to account for *how* the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute has developed. However, in light of this study, IR constructivism is unsuitable due to its theoretical limitations. IR poststructuralism is the better approach to answer the proposed questions, but the existing poststructuralist literature does not provide an appropriate framework to answer the proposed research questions. Hence, in Chapter 2 I will propose an original poststructuralist framework for this dissertation.

Chapter 3 will set out the poststructuralist theoretical framework by grounding it in the relevant poststructuralist literature. As noted above, the approach draws upon various poststructuralist thinkers and scholars, whilst combining their concepts and thoughts with the Copenhagen School's securitisation and ontological security theories. Having defined the concept of 'sovereign states' in a poststructuralist way, I develop the aforementioned concept of 'territorial disputes'. I will argue that 'territorial disputes' pertain to boundary inscription practices of sovereign states. Through this, we can understand that what is at stake in 'territorial disputes' is not only territorial claims of sovereign states but also foreign, defence and security policies, which are vital in performatively constituting sovereignty by providing a national history of the disputed territory, fixing the meaning of the Self/Other in particular ways, and discursively constructing external threats to the claimed territory. Based on this understanding of 'territorial disputes', I will theorise that the history problem is relevant to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and it is a part of the dispute itself. In the second section of Chapter 3, I will lay out poststructuralist methods. Firstly, I will explain how to revisit Japan's and China's sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from the 1950s onwards. This will be followed by an explanation of how I will conduct poststructuralist discourse analysis on Japan's and China's Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourses from 2008 to 2015. Lastly, I will set out the rationale for the selection of texts and data analysis.

This will be followed by Chapters 4 and 5 in which I will outline the empirical results of Japan's and China's discourse analysis. In these chapters, I will begin with the reappraisal of the countries' sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from the 1950s onwards. This part will answer the first research question: *How* have Japan and China constructed their sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s? By doing so, I will shed light on the

process of how Japan and China have started to exert power to discursively naturalise the essence of the islands' sovereignty since around 1970 by giving meaning to particular representations of the history of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Later chapters will outline the results of the poststructuralist discourse analysis to answer the following three research questions: *How* did Japan and China shift the Self/Other construction in their discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between 2008 and 2015?; *how* did Japan and China securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from 2008 to 2015?; and *how* did the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem from 2008 to 2015? In presenting the results, I will chart how Japan and China shifted their constructions of the Self/Other in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, depending on the degrees of their securitisation.

Lastly, Chapter 6 will lay out all theoretical and empirical findings. I will first reassess the literature review of Chapter 2 in light of the two previous chapters of Japanese and Chinese discourse analysis. After that, I will succinctly set out the theoretical contribution of the proposed poststructuralist framework. This chapter then sets out the empirical findings of Japan's and China's poststructuralist discourse analyses of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, based on the results of Chapters 4 and 5. I will compare the empirical results between the ways Japan and China have constructed their islands' sovereignty. After that, I will lay out how this dissertation contributes to our knowledge on the nexus of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem. The final section of Chapter 6 takes a reflexive look at the relation between territorial disputes and competing nationalisms in light of the dissertation itself and offers some suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

In the previous chapter, I have clarified the research questions of this dissertation by problematising the fact that Japan and China have entangled the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with the history problem from 2008 to 2015. In this context, this chapter will provide an overview of the literature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. This chapter will set out that International Relations (IR) poststructuralism is more suitable to approach the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute than any existing political science or conventional IR frameworks. Being aware of both theoretical advantages and limitations of poststructuralism, I explain how poststructuralism can answer the proposed research questions:

a. *How* have Japan and China constructed the sovereignty claims of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s?
b. *How* did Japan and China shift the Self/Other construction in their discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between 2008 and 2015?
c. *How* did Japan and China securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between 2008 and 2015?
d. *How* did the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem from 2008 to 2015?

Before moving on to the explanation of existing theoretical perspectives on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, it is important to identify the difference between conventional *why* research questions and *how* questions (Doty, 1996, p. 4; Cochran, 1999, p. 124; Kolmaš, 2019, p. 11). *Why* questions are asked by 'explanatory theories' (Burchill and Linklater, 2009, p. 16) that try to test hypotheses and explain causal relations of major trends or recurring patterns in international relations. As will be explained below, in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the majority of scholars have sought to explain the reason *why* Japan and China have protracted/escalated the islands dispute to this day. Answering the *why* questions, they have proposed numerous frameworks by pinpointing different

variables which arguably enable us to explain the particular development of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. On the other hand, the *how* questions are asked by 'constitutive international theory' (Burchill and Linklater, 2009, pp. 17–18) that tries to analyse an epistemological perspective. Specifically, this type of theory asks *how* the world comes to be seen in particular ways by revealing the underlying assumptions about how the world is and can be. In the existing research on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the amount of research that asked *how* questions to analyse Japanese/Chinese epistemological perspectives of the dispute has been very limited. In this context, *how* questions proposed by this dissertation can critically shed light on the very process in which the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem become entangled and emerged out of islands security practices and discourses of Japan and China.

This chapter introduces the existing theoretical perspectives by identifying them with either the *why* or *how* questions. Firstly, I will shed light on the *why* questions literature by explaining what kind of variables have been identified as the reasons for the dispute escalation since the early 2010s. The *why* questions research can be divided into the two sub-categories: (1) political science approaches and (2) the traditional IR theories. The former group of research will be reviewed by highlighting various variables that mainly pertain to Japanese and Chinese domestic politics, such as China's maritime policy, China's élite politics, the CCP's political legitimacy, dispute as bargaining leverage, linkage to the party/factional politics of Japan/China, and so forth. This will be followed by examination of the studies that have applied the traditional IR theories – i.e., realism and liberalism. After setting out the basic presumptions of the realist and liberal approaches, I will shed light on studies that have applied these approaches to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute to answer *why* questions. Throughout the review of the *why* questions research, I will highlight that these approaches are not theoretically designed to answer the *how* questions and thus they fail to theorise the relation between the islands dispute and the history problem.

In the following section, I will shed light on the *how* questions research. First, I will explain that IR constructivism can answer *how* questions; however, a few theoretical limitations of constructivism makes this approach unsuitable for this study. After that, I will lay out what IR poststructuralism is and why the poststructuralist approach makes it possible to answer the proposed research

questions by underlining the ontological/epistemological presumptions of poststructuralism. This will be followed by examination of the existing literature that has applied the poststructuralist approach, whereby I will set out that the existing poststructuralist approaches cannot satisfactorily answer the proposed research questions. By doing so, I will foreground the necessity of proposing a new poststructuralist framework in examining the development of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. In the last section of this chapter, I will shed light on the theoretical limitations of the poststructuralist approach and the overriding importance of employing this approach, albeit with its limitations.

2.1 The *Why* Questions Research

This section revisits the *why* questions research. The bulk of studies have been conducted to identify the reasons *why* Japan and China have protracted and escalated the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. I will first shed light on political science approaches that account for *why* Japan and China have behaved in a particular way in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute by pinpointing the variables, such as China's maritime policy, China's élite politics, the CCP's political legitimacy, dispute as bargaining leverage, linkage to the party/factional politics of Japan/China. After that, I will examine the traditional IR theories, realism and liberalism. After a brief explanation of the variants of realism and liberalism of relevance to this study, I will set out how those approaches interpreted the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute by pinpointing variables, such as distribution of military capability and economic interdependence.

By reviewing the *why* questions studies, I will argue that this group of literature are not suited to answer the proposed *how* questions of this dissertation. This is because these approaches commonly take a positivist stance to approach the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and thus cannot critically examine the process in which *how* Japan and China started to shift their Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands policy in relation to the history problem. The focus of this section is primarily placed on theoretical studies, rather than empirical ones. China is a country that has challenged Japan's *de facto* control over the islands, and thus more scholars have investigated the rationale for China's Diaoyu Islands policy shifts than that of Japan. Naturally,

the bulk of the existing literature here focuses on the explanation for China's islands policy.

2.1.1 Political Science Approaches

To begin with, I set out that the existing research on the Sino-Japanese relations does not fully address the nexus of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem. He (2009) and Hoppens (2015) demonstrated that the Sino-Japanese history problem originates in the Cold War politics that urged Japanese and Chinese leaders to pragmatically end the Sino-Japanese War in the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) in 1978, without deep reconciliation on a people-to-people level. Against this backdrop, Yoshida (2005) and Shibata (2018) suggested that Japan has taken a double-standard approach to the Japan's war responsibility to the Asian victims: internationally, Japan has taken the limited war responsibility via the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) of 1951 and published numerous official statements of apology, including the Murayama statement of August 1995; but domestically, revisionist politicians, such as Koizumi Jun'ichirō, Abe Shinzō, and Asō Tarō, have negated Japan's official apologies, glorified Imperial Japanese history, and visited the Yasukuni Shrine – a shrine that enshrines the war dead, including Class-A war criminals (i.e., Imperial Japanese leaders who were tried in the Tokyo Tribunal). Whiting (1989) and Christensen (1999) have pointed out the negative impact of the history of Japanese aggression and provocative remarks of Japanese revisionist politicians on the Chinese policymakers' perception of Japan. Moreover, He (2009) and Shibata (2015) have suggested that there has been a vicious circle of conflict between Japan and China in interpreting Imperial Japanese history from the 1980s onwards, and this has negatively impacted on their perception of mutual threat. Notwithstanding, these scholars have not specifically investigated *how* Sino-Japanese discrepancies over Imperial Japanese/the Sino-Japanese War history can empirically affect their security policy, let alone their Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands policy.

In contrast, there is a group of scholars who argue that Japanese and Chinese politicians have used variant interpretations of Imperial Japanese/Sino-Japanese War history as a political instrument to bolster their domestic political legitimacy or to

improve these states' international image. For instance, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō visited the Yasukuni Shrine during his office, from 2001 to 2005, to gain political support from a rightist organisation, Japan War-Bereaved Families Association (Chijiwa, Suzuki and Taguchi, 2008, pp. 148–149). Moreover, Endō (2013) and Kokubun (2017) have suggested that General Secretary Jiang Zemin played the history card against Japan to strengthen his domestic political base in the late 1990s. Furthermore, Japan and China have shifted their interpretations of Imperial Japanese/Sino-Japanese War history in their history textbooks to reflect the revisionist worldviews in Japan or to bolster the political legitimacy of the Chinese Community Party (CCP) (Rose, 1998; Suzuki, 2007; Reilly, 2006, 2011a; He, 2009).

In the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, there is a group of scholars who demonstrated the CCP's ability to keep good control over the anti-Japanese protests on both streets and the internet to prevent them from intervening its Japan policy (Reilly, 2011b, 2014; Shirk, 2011; Weiss, 2014). Additionally, it is pointed out that after Japan's purchase of the islands in 2012, China began to link the dispute to Sino-Japanese War history by combining 'a deep sense of humiliation about its modern history […] and a deep sense of national pride in spectacular rise' (Soeya, 2013). Pugliese and Insisa (2017) specifically analysed a series of papers authored by Sichuan University's professor Cai Shangwei, which were published on *People's Daily* on 12-16th October, 2012, and argued that the CCP's propaganda strategy after Japan's purchase of islands actually resonates very well with these papers' proposal for 'coherent, detailed and long-term plan to wage a comprehensive "information war" against Tokyo' (2017, pp. 105–106). These papers proposed the CCP to play the 'history card' in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute (Pugliese and Insisa, 2017, p. 107):

> [The People's Republic of China (PRC) should] play the 'history card' – the political instrumentalization of the history of Sino-Japanese relations and of Japan's war crimes during World War II in the Asia Pacific. The aim should be to obtain international support among 'anti-fascist' countries, while at the same time presenting the current sovereignty dispute as the result of the Japanese aggression which occurred during the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War. Finally, the PRC officials need to portray the Japanese nationalisation as a grave violation of the post-World War II international order, a warning sign of return to militarism in Japanese politics.

Confirming the link between these papers' proposal and China's actual policy for public diplomacy, Gustafsson (2013) found that China began to link Japan's position

on the islands to fascist Japan during World War II after Japan's purchase of islands in September 2012, thereby starting to build up diplomatic ties amongst China's ally during the war.[13] Currently, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute resonates well with Chinese memories of traumas inflicted by Imperial Japan's atrocities during the war.[14] Therefore, as Rose and Sýkora have rightly pointed out, 'the dispute itself is now incorporated into the history problem' (2017, p. 101). Notwithstanding, in the existing literature of the Sino-Japanese relations, there is no research that has theorised the relation between the islands dispute and the history problem and systematically examined the process of *how* they became entangled with each other.

Besides, many scholars have explained the reason *why* China began to shift its islands policy since around 2010 by examining its domestic politics. During a decade of the Hu Jintao administration (2003 - 2013), China diplomatically pursued 'peaceful development (rise)' by prioritising national development and international cooperation. China's accession to the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea with Vietnam and the Philippines in 2005 epitomised China's policy of 'putting aside the dispute for common development' (Men, 2007, pp. 31–32). In Sino-Japanese relations, after the Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 to 2006, the CCP made extensive efforts to return to the stable Sino-Japanese relations, and successfully cooled down anti-Japanese emotions of the Chinese people via orchestrated media propaganda (Reilly, 2011b). However, although China had kept to the Deng Xiaoping's grand strategy to 'keep a low profile and do what China needs to do to get results (韬光养晦，有所作为)' for a long time, at the 11th Foreign Delegation Meeting in July 2009, Hu Jintao started to propose, 'insist on keeping a low profile and *act actively*

[13] For instance, when Chinese Vice-Premier Li Keqiang met Papua New Guinean Prime Minister Peter O'Neill in September 2012, Li stated that, 'Japan's position today on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands is an outright denial of the outcomes of victory in the war against Fascism and constitutes a grave challenge to the post-war international order', and then, O'Neill affirmatively replied, 'Japan's moves cannot be accepted by the international community' (Gustafsson, 2013). Vice-Premier Li's remark indicates that for China, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is not simply a matter of territorial dispute, but China's claim for the islands is deeply intertwined with the history of Imperial Japan.

[14] The CCP's strategy to play the 'history card' in the islands dispute had very negative ramifications on Chinese people's view of Japan. Genron NPO (2015) pointed out that the number of the Chinese people who have (relatively) unfavorable impressions of Japan peaked at a high of 93 percent in 2013 and gradually decreased to 78 percent in 2015. As a reason for their negative impressions, 70 percent of them pointed to 'Japan's lack of a proper apology and remorse over the history of invasion of China' ranking the first, and followingly 68 percent of the respondents answered, 'Japanese purchase of the Diaoyu Islands for the nation and fueling the confrontation' (ibid.).

to get results (坚持韬光养晦，积极所持作为)' (Iida, 2013, pp. 44–45; emphasis added). Moreover, Xi Jinping – who was pointed as a successor to the General Secretary on 15th November 2012, at the 18th Central Committee of the CCP – started to transform the anti-Japanese public opinion immediately after Japan's 'nationalisation' of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in September 2012 into a high-profile 'tit-for-tat' islands policy, thereby advantageously consolidating his power position in the CCP (Ji, 2014, p. 240). Simultaneously, at the 18th National Party Congress (NPC) on 8th November 2012, China began to propose establishing 'marine power' by elevating the ocean development to a national strategy (Zhongguo Wang, 2013). This shift in China's maritime policy gradually became evident in the ways China increasingly behaves assertively in the ECS and also South China Sea (SCS) (Ji, 2014, 2017; Sun, 2017).

Under the leadership of Xi, China eventually shifted its basic trajectory of foreign policy to a mixture of the Hu-proposed 'peaceful development' and China as a 'great power', in which emphasis is placed on 'great power diplomacy' with the US and the EU over 'peripheral diplomacy' that includes Japan (Kawashima, 2015, p. 178; Shin, 2018). In 2015, the Chinese MOFA announced that it would abolish its 'Japanese Department' and incorporate it into the North-East Asian Department (Nikkei, 2015), somewhat representing a decline of Japan's relative importance to China's overall foreign affairs. In the report of the 18th NPC in November 2012 and Xi's slogan 'Chinese Dream', Xi began to pronounce China's 'uncompromising stance on protecting its sovereignty and core interests while maintaining the strategy of peaceful development' (Shin, 2018, p. 291). Making a sharp contrast to the 'peaceful development' of Hu's era, when the International Court of Justice rejected the China's claim in the SCS, China rebuffed the verdict by calling it 'a piece of paper that is destined to come to naught' and even warned the possibility of further military escalation (Phillips, 2016).

Against this backdrop, Kawashima (2015) and Kokubun (2017) commonly suggests that the reason *why* China started to shift its Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands policy ultimately lies in a shift in Chinese élite politics. Chinese leaders who pursued international cooperation – represented by Hu and Wen – were prioritising national development; however, conservative leaders who believe in socialism, including Xi, put forward that China first needs to adjust its domestic economic gaps between

inland/coastal and rural/urban areas (Kawashima, 2015, pp. 178–179). Those conservatives argued that the Chinese economy had already developed strong enough to rely on the increasing domestic demands, and thus China does not need to depend heavily on foreign investment by prioritising international cooperation (ibid.). Reflecting this power shift from the international cooperation group to the conservative group, China's Japan policy gradually swung since the latter period of the Hu administration. As a result, China substantially changed its Japan policy from the previous economic cooperation line to that of hardliners, in particular, on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem (Kawashima, 2015, p. 179; Kokubun, 2017, pp. 217–233). These scholars provide a convincing account for *why* China started to take a high-profile Diaoyu Islands policy and strict stance on the history problem in a period from 2008 to 2015; however, it cannot explain *how* China shifted its discourse of the Diaoyu Islands in relation to the history problem.

Moreover, there are several scholars who have examined *why* China has behaved in particular ways in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. First, Fravel (2005, 2008b, 2008a, 2010) analysed the patterns of China's behaviours in its territorial disputes with the neighbouring states. Fravel (2005) found out that China is likely to settle down its inland disputes when the CCP's regime is insecure due to a political turmoil. When it comes to the offshore islands disputes, however, China has never entered into talks with its adversaries and has always been delaying cooperation (2008a). Examining the conditions where China might use force in territorial disputes, Fravel (2008b) pointed out that when China's relative position declines in the dispute, in which China controls little or no contested territory, China is likely to resort to military resolution. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is the case in point as it is Japan that has *de facto* control over the islands, and thus Fravel (2008b) suggests this dispute could pose a crisis to Japan and China in future. Additionally, argues Fravel (2010), the reason *why* the relative stability of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute was maintained until 2010 was that the Japan-US Security Treaty remained the deterrence against China.

Additionally, Wiegand (2011) found that China uses its coercive diplomacy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute as bargaining leverage by linking the dispute to other contested issues with Japan. Based on a quantitative analysis of the timing of China's confrontations with Japan from 1972 to 2008, she suggests that when China confronted Japan diplomatically or militarily regarding the dispute, China threatened

to take further actions in the dispute to compel Japan to compromise on other linked issues, such as Japan-US security agreement, prime ministers' visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, Japan's foreign aid cut to China, and so forth. Therefore, the reason *why* China did not pursue dispute settlement until 2010 can be partially explained that China benefited from this issue-linkage strategy.

Moreover, focusing on China's domestic politics, Downs and Saunders (1998) have suggested that China's behaviours in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands can be explained via the CCP's political legitimacy. After the pro-democracy movement at the Tiananmen square in June 1989, the political legitimacy of the CCP has become increasingly dependent on both Chinese nationalism and the CCP's economic performance. In this context, due to Sino-Japanese War history, Japan plays a central role to the rise of Chinese nationalism, and so when the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes flared in 1990-1 and 1996, the CCP had to repress increasing demands of nationalists and downplay the dispute for the sake of good economic relations with Japan. However, Downs and Saunders also explain that the assumption – rising Chinese nationalism prompts the CCP to pursue aggressive international behaviours – is overstated, or at least premature. When China accumulates more power, argue Downs and Saunders (1998, p. 143), China's aggressive islands policy would serve both territorial nationalism and economic development because of the oil reserves in the seabed of the islands. Two decades have passed since the publication of this article, but this framework still holds explanatory power, accounting for *why* China has started to pursue increasingly assertive behaviours over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the 2010s when China surpassed Japan in terms of its GDPs.

Furthermore, a group of scholars explain the reason *why* Japan and China behave in the islands dispute in a particular way, focusing on variables of their domestic politics. Due to the nationalistic values attached to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the dispute became an element used by the opposition leaders to embarrass the ruling leaders in an élite struggle in Japan and China (Deans, 2000; Valencia, 2000). Also, Choi and Cho (2016) have suggested that when Japanese and Chinese leaders' domestic political vulnerability increases, they are prompted to take a high-profile islands policy. The reason *why* the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute escalated in 2010 and 2012 is, according to them, because Japanese and Chinese leaders needed to consolidate their political position in the context of their domestic élite struggle. Precisely, Japanese leaders needed to strengthen their political position

during the DPJ's (the Democratic Party of Japan's) presidential election in September 2010; whereas in September 2012, the Chinese leaders were in the midst of a once-a-decade succession process from Hu to Xi. These domestic political conditions intensified their political struggle, thus prompting them to pursue hardline policies of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in order to strengthen their political base. However, the domestic variables accounts fail to explain *how* Japan and China shifted their islands policy in relation to the history problem.

Some studies apply Robert Putnam's two-level game framework to China's behaviours in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Putnam's two-level game is a political model of international conflict resolution between two states that draws on game theory, and this framework analyses both international and domestic levels of negotiations. Applying this framework to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, Chung (2004, p. 147) suggested the reason *why* China has not started the negotiation with Japan to settle the islands dispute is that the negative historical memories shared by the Chinese people prevents the negotiation from taking place. Additionally, reviewing Chung's (2004) study after Japan's purchase of the islands in 2012, Manicom (2013, p. 139) argued that the Japanese government's decision to purchase the islands can also be explained by the two-level game theory. Moreover, Moore (2014) has also employed Putnam's theory and found that 'saving face' was an essential variable for Japan and China to choose a high-profile islands policy in 2012. In this way, Putnam's two-level game framework made it possible for scholars to explain the reason *why* China and Japan behave in a particular way in the islands dispute by bridging their domestic politics and international negotiations. Nonetheless, this framework is not designed to track *how* Japan and China shifted their islands policy in relation to the history problem.

Lastly, Manicom (2008b, 2014) has also provided two original frameworks to explain the trajectory of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute development. First, he proposed a framework to examine the interaction between a material resources factor and a rising nationalism factor (2008b). Application of this framework to the dispute up to 2005 suggested that the reason *why* Japan and China began to gradually compromise Deng Xiaoping's *modus vivendi* to shelve the sovereignty problem from the 1990s onwards is because core policymakers of both countries started to link the increasing resource values of the ECS to its exercise of national sovereignty owing to their nationalist constituencies. Moreover, further developing this framework,

Manicom (2014) proposed an approach to the dispute in which he exclusively focused on Sino-Japanese cooperation, but not competition, in multiple realms: islands sovereignty, fishery, maritime surveys, and resource development. Manicom (2014, p. 206) demonstrated that in these areas, Japan and China have been capable of managing tensions that arose from contested sovereignty and jurisdiction in the ECS from the outset of the dispute. He also put forward after the escalation of the tensions in the dispute, they actually made efforts to cooperate. Based on these unique analyses, Manicom (2014, p. 206) concluded that 'there are grounds for optimism that policymakers in both countries recognise the value of cooperation'. Nonetheless, Manicom's frameworks are not suitable to answer the proposed *how* questions.

2.1.2 Traditional IR Theories

In addition to the aforementioned political science approaches, certain scholars have applied the traditional IR theories – realism and liberalism –to provide explanations for the particular trajectory of the Senkaku/Dispute development. Hence, this section will first provide a brief explanation of the relevant variants of realism and liberalism, and then I will lay out how those approaches have been applied to the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.

2.1.2.1 IR Realism

There are several variants in realism, but they all share common assumptions – states are the principal actors, and they try to survive in anarchic international politics by accumulating 'power' that is principally determined by the distribution of material resources of military capabilities and economic strength (Donnelly, 2000, pp. 6–10). Power is the most critical variable to account for sovereign states' behaviours in international politics, and according to realists, so is for the escalation of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.

The most frequently used realism variant to interpret the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is a power transition theory of A. F. K. Organski. He theorises that

power parity between leading countries is likely to result in wars, especially when the rising power is dissatisfied with the existing order (Organski, 1958; Organski and Kugler, 1980). Since the turn of the twenty-first century, in the context of constructing an argument of the rise of China, East Asian regional scholars started to refer to power transition theory (Kim and Gates, 2015; cf. Shambaugh, 1996). Being premised that Japan and the US are the existing hegemonic power in the region and China is a potential challenger to it, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute has been rendered as an indication of a power transition taking place in East Asia (Smith, 2013; Lim, 2015). China's assertive behaviours and remarks on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the early 2010s arguably signal that China has 'revisionist aims' in the Asia Pacific, so there are possibilities that China would develop into a 'revisionist power' that poses a severe challenge to the region in future (Choi, 2018, p. 80). Due to the power transition taking place, for China, it has a chance to assertively claim its islands sovereignty by enhancing its effective control via increasing military capability (Midford, 2015, p. 178). Meanwhile, for Japan that is more pessimistic about its future, it is reasonable to aggressively consolidate the *status quo* that is favorable to Japan at the moment because China might become too strong to counter in future (ibid.). Hence, the escalation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in the early 2010s is a vindication of the emerging power shift between the US-Japan alliance and a rising China.

Additionally, adherents of structural-realism (neorealism) argue that the increased tensions in the dispute reflect the instability of the newly-emerging international structure. Structural-realism has been the most influential theory in IR since Kenneth Waltz's (1979) seminal work, *Theory of International Politics.* In this book, Waltz hypothesied that international order is anarchic, and so each state must 'put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so' (1979, p. 107). In such a state of anarchy, the differences between states are 'of capability, not function' (1979, p. 96); hence, according to the distribution of capabilities, states construct a hierarchic international structure. Based on this presumption, Waltz (1979, 1993) argued that the number of poles at the top of the international system greatly influences how international politics work.[15] Due

[15] Since the end of the Cold War, structural realists have debated on the characteristics of polarity, but to date, no consensus exists. Waltz argues a bipolar international system, exemplified by the US-Soviet relations during the Cold War, is least likely to cause major wars, but on the other hand, a

to the rise of new economic powers – in particular, China – the stability of the existing US-led global unipolarity after the end of the Cold War is transforming into a multipolar international system, resulting in destabilised geopolitics (Layne, 2012). In this context, the increased tensions in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute can be understood as the vindication of the destabilised geopolitics caused by transforming polarity in an international system (Pugliese and Insisa, 2017, pp. 49-50).

Moreover, there are a few scholars who apply neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism is primarily in accord with the line of reasoning of Waltz's structural-realism; however, it further puts forward that the power balance theory should be supplemented with sub-systemic analysis by widening its purview to cover *Innenpolitik*, which stresses the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009).[16] Neoclassical realists precisely analyse how domestic situations condition state leaders' capability to assess external threats and adjust to shifts in the relative power of international structure, by building arms and forming alliances (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009, p. 63). Applying neoclassical realism to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, Lai (2013) has examined the so-called 'revival' of Japanese nationalism in post-Cold War as a variable to explain the dispute escalation. His finding is that, contrary to the general assumption, nationalism was not the fundamental determinant of Japan's islands policy-making under the Koizumi administration (2001-2006). For instance, when seven Chinese activists landed on one of the islands in March 2004, Japan swiftly sent them back to China without detention, thereby refraining from taking a harder-line islands policy. Furthermore, applying neoclassical realism to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, Costa (2017) suggested that the reason *why* the islands dispute has escalated from the 1970s to date is that Japanese and Chinese leaders have increasingly regarded the

multipolar system is rendered as 'all too war-prone' (1993, p. 45). Nonetheless, many scholars in 'quantitative empirical school' argue the other way around – a multipolar system is more stable and peaceful than the bipolar one (Schweller, 1999, p. 6).

[16] Whilst Waltz founded structural-realism based on the conceptualisation of international systems that strongly mould choices of states as units, the limitations of it were also indicated by Waltz: '[it] can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to those pressures and possibilities' (1979, pp. 71–72). This theoretical limitation of structural-realism is problematised by neoclassical realists. Therefore, the adherents of neoclassical realism try to bridge between structural-realism and *Innenpolitik* theories by gaining certain insights from classical-realism so as to comprehensively analyse foreign policy at a systemic and unit-level (G. Rose, 1998).

islands as a convenient vehicle that justifies their more comprehensive approach to security and foreign policy.

The contribution of realism lies in its ability to 'explain some big, important, and enduring patterns' (Waltz, 1979, p. 70) and features of international-political life. Nonetheless, realist approaches disregard the role of identity, let alone the ramifications of the history problem in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Thus, the realist approaches fail to examine *how* the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem became entangled with each other.

2.1.2.2 IR Liberalism

Liberalism also provides explanations for the reason *why* the tensions of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute heightened in the early 2010s, albeit with a different variable, economic interdependence. A variant of liberalism – commercial liberalism – explains that increased economic interdependence amongst states deters them from aggressively pursuing a territorial claim because its resultant damage to the lucrative trade is too costly in the contemporary world. Contrary to the realist assumption that sovereign states are to compete for primacy, according to commercial liberalism, the increasing global trading ties prompt states to cooperate to fill each country's needs for material, products, and technology (Rosecrance, 1986, p. 24). Therefore, increasing economic interdependence amongst many countries has steadily decreased the relative importance of the territorial border of states to date (Strange, 1996, pp. 3–4).

Applying commercial liberalism to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, Koo (2009, 2010) suggested that Japan and China substantially increased their trade interdependence between 1968 and 2005, and this deterred both governments from developing the islands dispute into an armed conflict.[17] Having said that, Koo (2010, p. 134) also acknowledged that further economic development of China would allow China's aggression towards Japan in the dispute in future. This is because increased interdependence does not equate to peace in asymmetric relations as 'less dependent

[17] Blanchard (2009) criticises, however, that Japan and China increasingly found it difficult to manage the islands dispute during this period although Sino-Japanese economic interdependence consistently increased.

actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues' (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p. 11). Even though both countries have been economically integrating year by year, argues Wan (2016), Japan's dependence on China's market rapidly increased from around 2010 reaching slightly higher than 20 percent, whereas China's dependency on Japan consistently decreased after 2000 reaching a point of below 10 percent in 2010 (cf. Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: Bilateral Trade as Share of Total Trade, 1972-2014

During the targeted period of this dissertation, from 2008 to 2015, the dependency gap between Japan and China widened consistently in favor of the latter. Thus, it can be argued that China's decreased economic dependency on Japan reduced the relative cost of China's assertive territorial claim in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute during the period.[18] It confirms the argument of Downs and Saunders (1998, p. 146) noted above that when China economically catches up to Japan, China would begin to achieve 'nationalist goals' in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

[18] Additionally, Choi and Eun (2018) suggested that Japan's very high dependence on China's rare earth materials, which are vital to Japanese industries, made it possible for China to use its embargo on them as political leverage in the territorial dispute in September 2010 during vessel collision case. However, given that China had already announced its intention to reduce rare earth export to Japan by 40 percent due to environmental reasons in August 2010, it is uncertain to what extent China's embargo can be rendered as political leverage in the territorial dispute as such (Hagström, 2012).

Therefore, liberalists explain that the reason *why* the escalation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute took place in the early 2010s can be understood as the result of China's decreased economic dependence on Japan. Nonetheless, like realism, liberalism is not designed to answer the *how* questions. The liberal approach does not examine the ramifications of identity, let alone the history problem in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Hence, liberalism is not suitable to answer the proposed *how* questions.

2.2 The *How* Questions Research

This section reviews the *how* questions research. The amount of studies that has asked *how* Japan and China have protracted or escalated the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is limited in comparison with the *why* questions research. In this section, I will first shed light on IR constructivism. A brief explanation of constructivism will be followed by the studies that have applied the constructivist approach to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. After that, by highlighting the theoretical limitations of the constructivist approach, I will argue that constructivism is not suitable to explore the proposed *how* questions. Next, this section will lay out what IR poststructuralism is and why the poststructuralist approach is theoretically appropriate to answer the proposed *how* questions. And then, this section will review the existing research that has applied the poststructuralist approach to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. By doing so, I will highlight that the existing poststructuralist frameworks cannot theorise the relations between the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem. Lastly, this section will shed light on the theoretical limitations of the poststructuralist approach.

2.2.1 IR Constructivism

Being different from realism and liberalism that are premised on the positivistic assumption that the international material structure exogenously determines state

behaviours, constructivism[19] pays close attention to the ramifications of national identity upon sovereign state behaviours. Constructivists argue that sovereign states' behaviours in international politics cannot be sufficiently explained only with material structures as realists and liberalists believe, because normative and ideational structures are equally important in shaping the identity of actors (Reus-Smit, 2009, p. 220). One of the most-influential theorists of constructivism, Alexander Wendt (1992, p. 399), argues that there are international structures of identity and interests that are often organised in formal rules and norms. Social individual actors collectively internalise these norms of structures leading to construction of collective identity and interests. Based on this assumption, Wendt criticised Waltz's contention – anarchy is the international order – by putting forth that anarchy is not a pre-social condition, but 'anarchy is what states make of it' (1992, p. 391). In a similar vein, Wendt has argued that 'security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature' (1992, p. 407). They are rather caused by a social structure of intersubjective perceptions that sovereign states arm themselves and threaten others based on their worst-case assumptions.

In the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, Paul O'Shea (2012a, 2012b) has applied the constructivist approach to explain Japan's behaviours in its territorial disputes by proposing a framework 'sovereignty game'. Being premised on Wendt's (1992) argument that sovereignty is something socially constructed and Reus-Smit's (2004) theorisation of the nexus of international law and international politics, O'Shea conceptualised 'sovereignty game' in which states seek to exercise its sovereignty whilst preventing the other from doing the same action. Applying this framework to Japan's territorial disputes, O'Shea (2012a) found that in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, Japan shifted its islands policy from a 'hands off' approach, which prioritised good bilateral relations until the 1990s, to a more assertive policy under the Koizumi administration (2001-2006) onwards. On the other hand, explains O'Shea (2012a), China successfully consolidated its sovereignty since its promulgation of the Law of Territorial Sea in 1992 that stipulated that the Diaoyu Islands are China's territory. In this context, the vessel collision case in

[19] Herein, I use the term 'constructivism' by signifying one theoretical subject in IR, but not all theories that are premised on the assumptions that identities are not natural facts. This term encompasses a particular mode of thought that was put forward by scholars, such as Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999) and Peter Katzenstein (1993, 1996).

September 2010 can be understood as Japan's attempt to alter the sovereignty game in favor of Japan by arresting the Chinese captain and leaving China no choice but to protest against it fiercely (O'Shea, 2012b). Application of the 'sovereignty game' framework can explain the process of *how* Japan and China have strived for gaining supremacy over the counterpart in the 'sovereignty game' in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Additionally, drawing upon the aforementioned Wendt's conception of security dilemmas, Nakano (2016) has examined *how* Japan and China have developed their threat perceptions of each other since 1972 in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. She concluded that the islands dispute entered 'a new stage of normative and power-political competition in earning international support for territorial claims' (2016, p. 165) in the ECS since the dispute flare-up in 2010. Lastly, partially gaining insights from the constructivist approach, Oros (2008, 2017) and Singh (2013) analysed *how* Japan's 'security identity' has shifted since the end of World War II/Cold War.

As these scholars' work demonstrates, being different from realism and liberalism, the constructivist approach can answer *how* questions, and thus it seems suitable to answer the proposed research questions. Nonetheless, there are theoretical limitations of constructivism that make it problematic to apply to this dissertation. Firstly, in the context of security policy analysis, Kolmaš (2017, pp. 268–269, 2019, p. 23) explains that constructivism is suitable for explaining continuity and consistency of a security policy by focusing on the fundamental institutions of state – such as constitutions and security legislation system; however, constructivism is not suitable to look at shifts or changes in security discourse and practice that occurs in a short-term period.[20] Thus, in order to examine the incremental and subtle shifts of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourse and practice of Japan and China from 2008 to 2015, constructivism is ill-suited.

Moreover, constructivism does not conceptualise identity in a relational way (Herschinger, 2010, p. 24). As explained in Chapter 1, in this dissertation, I examine

[20] The studies that have applied the constructivism approach to Japan have commonly explained for Japan's continuity and consistency in its security policy. For instance, Berger (1996, pp. 336–337) explained that post-war Japan's security identity was firmly moulded as a pacifist 'merchant nation', whereby Japan exclusively concentrated on economic development whilst avoiding pursuing its strong military capability by heavily relying on the Japan-US Security Treaty. Also, taking a constructivist approach, Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) put forward that there was a structure of Japanese state that was firmly codified in the peace Constitution and social, legal norms, and which created incentives for Japan to pursue economic security rather than that of military continuously.

how Japan and China constructed the Self/Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. However, Wendt is predicated on that 'states are actors with certain essential properties', and more specifically he argues, 'identities are constituted by the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities' (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224–225). Therefore, for constructivists, state identities are not relationally constructed but from the beginning distinct from each other. This is why Wendt (1999, p. 229) argues that identities can be categorised in groups, as each identity is a distinct combination of role and type identities. For these reasons, despite that constructivism pays attention to the role of identity in shaping behaviours of sovereign states, this approach is not suitable to examine the specific process of *how* Japan and China shifted their Self/Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands context from 2008 to 2015.

2.2.2 IR Poststructuralism

This section explains that IR poststructuralism is the more suitable approach that makes it possible to answer the proposed research questions: *How* have Japan and China constructed the sovereignty claims of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s?; *how* did Japan and China shift the Self/Other construction in their discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between 2008 and 2015?; *how* did Japan and China securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between 2008 and 2015?; and, *how* did the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem from 2008 to 2015? This section firstly sets out what poststructuralism is by shedding light on the relevant poststructuralist literature to this dissertation. After that, I will explain how the existing poststructuralist literature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is limited in light of this study. Lastly, I will clarify the limitations of this dissertation.

2.2.2.3 What Is Poststructuralism?

Poststructuralism[21] is not a single approach to which all its advocates would faithfully adhere (Burchill and Linklater, 2009, p. 12). Rather, poststructuralism is conceived as a 'sponge word' that explains different approaches, such as discourse analysis, genealogy, deconstruction, and intertextualism, derived by variety of continental thinkers – such as, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, and Jean Baudrillard (Der Derian, 1988, p. 192). Alternatively, according to Edkins (2007, p. 88), poststructuralism can be described as a 'worldview' that deconstructs all grand narratives. This means, regardless of variant approaches taken by scholars, they commonly share a poststructuralist worldview that prompts them to 'examine in detail how the world comes to be seen and thought of in particular ways at specific historical junctures and to study how particular social practices – things people do – work in terms of the relations of power and the ways of thinking that such practices produce or support' (ibid.). In this dissertation, therefore, I use the term 'poststructuralism' as a useful signpost of heuristic amalgam, rather than a single coherent theory.

One of the most noticeable differences between poststructuralism and the political science/traditional IR theories (i.e., realism and liberalism) is the way that they conceptualise reality. The aforementioned explanatory theories take an Archimedean perspective[22] and premise that there is unambiguously objective reality out there, and thus scholars should be objective as much as possible to approach the objects just like natural scientists. On the other hand, poststructuralism is perspectivism and anti-essentialist in orientation, thus even affirms that 'there is no "truth"' (Devetak, 2009, p. 186). Rejecting the conceptualisation of entirely objective 'truth' as such, poststructuralists premise that what we can have is only multiple perspectives and interpretations of the world (Campbell, 2007, p. 214). This mode of poststructuralist thought is quite suitable to critically answer *how* questions

[21] 'Poststructuralism' and 'postmodernism' are often used interchangeably, although they are technically different terms (Devetak, 2009, pp. 183–184). In this dissertation, I use the former term as a useful label that covers the latter, encompassing a set of ideas that are unpacked in this section. Also, I chose to write 'poststructuralism (without hyphen)' but not 'post-structuralism (with hyphen)' because the latter 'can be taken to mean anything after or in the wake of structuralism' (Bowman, 2015, p. 1), and that is not what I want to mean in this dissertation.

[22] Archimedean perspective signifies 'a point "outside" from which a different, perhaps objective or "true" picture of something is obtainable' (Oxford Reference, n.d.).

by unveiling the way in which 'power' works to constitute particular reality (Doty, 1996, p. 4; Cochran, 1999, pp. 123–124). Herein, being different from traditional IR conception of 'power', which assumes that states or actors can amass power in different forms (e.g., military capability of realism, the economic power of commercial liberalism), poststructuralists conceptualise it referring to Michel Foucault (1977, 1987, 1998, 2000). Foucault argues that power cannot be possessed by anyone but only produced in relationships. Power is not coercion but is a 'regime of truth', which is a type of discourse each society has and accepts a function as truth by enabling people to distinguish true and false statements (Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72–73). The 'regime of truth' is changeable; whilst it is reinforced via the educational system, media, or political discourse, people can also resist it exercising their power (Pickett, 1996).[23] Being premised on this Foucauldian 'power', poststructuralism can shed light on the very process in which *how* power was exerted by Japan and China to construct a particular 'reality' of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Specifically, I can investigate *how* sovereign states produced and attached meanings to the islands and interpreted specific events, related subjects, and objects, including Imperial Japanese history, thereby enabling to shift their security practices to strengthen military capability during the period.

Secondly, the poststructuralist understanding of sovereign states and identity is crucial in light of the proposed research questions. Being different from traditional IR theories that take sovereign states for granted, poststructuralists are interested in examining 'how sovereign state is made possible, how it is naturalized and how it is made to appear as if it had an essence' (Devetak, 2009, p. 195). Poststructuralists, therefore, regard sovereign states as the dominant mode of subjectivity in world politics. Thus, they approach sovereign states by critically questioning their ontological construction of subjectivity. Richard Ashley argues that subjects do not preexist political practices in the history of international politics: 'there are no subjects, no fully-formed identical egos, having an existence prior to practice and then implicated in power political struggles' (1987, p. 410). Whilst rejecting the subjectivity of sovereign states prior to political practices, poststructuralism emphasises that sovereign states are constantly constituted by daily practices and

[23] For Foucault, therefore, power is knowledge, and knowledge is power.

continued iteration of norms. Highlighting that subjects are contingent, Edkins argues that (1999, p. 22):

> The postmodern[24] subject, […] has no fixed, essential, or permanent identity. Subjectivity is formed and transformed in a continuous process that takes place in relation to the ways we are presented or addressed alongside the production or reproduction of the social.

In a same vein, applying Judith Butler's conception of 'performativity'[25] to IR, Cynthia Weber further suggests that 'sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but subjects in process and that all subjects in process […] are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted' (1998, p. 78).

One of the essential practices that performatively constitutes sovereign states is boundary inscription. Contrary to the general assumption that state boundaries are neutrally informed by apolitical knowledge of geography, a critical geographer, Ó Tuathail argues that geography is actually very much about power and politics (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 1):

> Geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product about nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and, administer space.

Inscribing the boundaries of states is, thus, not a pre-political and neutral activity. Instead, it is 'the problematic of the social inscription of global space by intellectuals of statecraft' (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 47), and thus actually a very political activity that has enormous ramifications on the delineation of political space. Furthermore, Campbell (1998a) suggests that political communities are to strive for the perfect attainment of territory for the subject and identity of the states. Borrowing Derrida's term, he argues 'ontopology' assumes that a political community necessitates a perfect alignment of state, nation, identity, territory and ethnicity (Derrida, 1994; Campbell, 1998a, p. 80). Analysing the cause of 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia lay in the wrong attempt to pursue excessive ontopology, Campbell points out that all forms of a political community also have the same danger (1998a, p. 13):

> This is because inscribing the boundaries that make the installation of the nationalist imaginary possible requires the expulsion from the resultant 'domestic' space of all

[24] As explained earlier, I use the term 'poststructuralism' by encompassing 'postmodernism' as well.
[25] Performativity is not a performance but is about 'the ways that identities are constructed iteratively through complex citational processes' (Weber, 1998, p. 79).

> that comes to be regarded as alien, foreign and dangerous. This nationalist imaginary thus demands a violent relationship with the other.

'Ontopology' is, therefore, the primary reason why disputed territory easily conjures up a zero-sum game between sovereign states resembling a crisis of national identity.[26] This poststructuralist conception of boundaries inscription enables us to understand that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is not merely about Sino-Japanese discrepancy over their geographically peripheral barren rocks at the border. Rather, the islands dispute is deeply pertaining to the ontological construction of Japan and China as sovereign states. This poststructuralist approach to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute makes it possible to understand that Japanese and Chinese interpretations of Imperial Japanese history is not irrelevant to the islands dispute but is actually constitutive of their boundary inscription.

When boundaries are geographically inscribed, political identity is simultaneously constructed as the Self/Other. Devetak (2009, p. 200) argues that 'poststructuralism focuses on the discourses and practices which substitute threat for difference in the constitution of political identity'. Being different from constructivism that presumes that ideas of the Self have 'an "auto-genetic" quality' (Wendt, 1999, p. 225), poststructuralism relationally conceptualises identity. Dalby suggests that the origin of the continual dualism and dichotomy between the Self/Other can be found in Western philosophy, in which 'discourses construct their objects of knowledge as "Other"' (1993, p. 3). Likewise, explains Dalby (1993), when sovereign states define security as their objects of knowledge, this is ultimately done by excluding otherness that is rendered as a threat to the Self. He specifically demonstrates that the US national security in the 1970s heavily relied on its discourse that constructed the Soviet as a geographical threat to the US. Campbell (1998b, p. 50) further puts forward that ontological construction of sovereign states is based on the discourse of danger – death is its ultimate form. Owing to this discourse of danger, it becomes possible that 'the state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its citizens' (1998b, p. 50). In order to secure an 'ordered self and ordered world', states define 'elements that stand in the way of order as forms of "otherness"' (ibid.). Thus, poststructuralists argue that dualism of the Self/Other constitutes the crux of conceptualisation of state security, and so

[26] Chapter 3 will further elaborate on this concept.

discursive construction of the Other plays a notable role in state security practice. The poststructuralist theorisation of the Self/Other relations in state security discourse and practice is ideal for analysing Japanese and Chinese constructions of the Self/Other relationally in their Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands security discourses.

Lastly, poststructuralism is also different from other approaches in its conceptualisation of language. Poststructuralism does not merely regard language as a transparent tool to convey meanings objectively. Instead, language is understood as an integral element that constitutes realities *per se* (Herschinger, 2010, p. 13). For this reason, multiple thinkers and scholars who shaped poststructuralism – such as Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe, Lacan, and Derrida – have developed their theories on discourse and textuality in order to critically investigate how language constitutes the world (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Devetak, 2009). Moreover, Burke (2013, pp. 78–79) argues that the poststructuralist approach to the relation between language and the world significantly contributed to critical security studies. One of the contributions is the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory (ST). ST applies J.L. Austin's (1962) language theory of *speech act* to understand the relation between language and the world. This language theory conceptualises speech act as some utterances that not only describe the world but also interfere with it, for instance, by betting, giving a promise, and so on. Applying Austin's speech act to the context of security studies, ST posits that 'by uttering "security", state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it' (Wæver, 1995, p. 55). Thus, ST theorises that the discursive construction of threat enables states to justify particular security practices. The aforementioned poststructuralist theories that conceptualise the relation between language and reality as well as ST are vital in understanding *how* Japan and China shifted their islands security practices in relation to their security discourses.[27]

Thus far, this section has set out the poststructuralist worldview to look at international politics, and I have argued that poststructuralism is suitable for answering the proposed *how* research questions. In the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, by applying the poststructuralist approach, I can look at the way in which Japan and China exercised power to inscribe boundary,

[27] ST will be unpacked in Chapter 3.

constituted specific reality of the islands that dictates the Self/Other relations, and enacted particular islands security policy. Furthermore, poststructuralism makes it possible to understand that the history problem in effect plays a crucial role in constituting the ontological construction of Japan and China in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. For these reasons, poststructuralism is most appropriate for this study.

2.2.2.4 Limited Poststructuralist Literature on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

The existing literature on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands that takes a poststructuralist stance is limited and most of the research has exclusively focused on Japan's side. Firstly, referring to Foucault's conception of 'power', Linus Hagström (2012) critically investigated *how* Japan discursively rendered China in the vessel collision case in September 2010 in relation to Japan's security policy shifts. Hagström (2012) concluded that Japan discursively framed the incident as a vindication of 'China's rise and Japan's fall', thereby actually benefiting in terms of Japan's security interests: eventually, Japan strengthened its islands sovereignty position; obtained a US confirmation that the Japan-US Security Treaty would be applied to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; and, was able to sell a more active security policy to the Japanese people. Furthermore, Hagström and Pan (2020) have pointed out the theoretical advantage of poststructuralism in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands because it can explore the complex ontological relations between hard and soft power. In this article, they have theorised that states render the Self as soft power whilst the Other as hard power, and soft power of the Self enables their own practices of hard power. In the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, they highlighted that, from the early 2010s onwards, Japan and China have constructed the Self as a 'peaceful' actor as opposed to the Other that 'attempt[s] to change the *status quo* by coercion without paying respect to existing international law' and a 'belligerent' state that may repeat the history, respectively (Hagström and Pan, 2020, pp. 48–49). Also, they have argued that this way of representations of the Self/Other co-occurred with their boosting of military presence around the islands. The study of Hagström and Pan (2020) has provided a useful poststructuralist framework of soft/hard power binary that makes it possible to answer most of the proposed

research questions. Notwithstanding, their poststructuralist framework is primarily centred on soft/hard power binary discussion, and so their framework does not allow students to view the dispute more comprehensively via a lens of ST or boundary inscription. Against the backdrop of this theoretical limitation of Hagström and Pan (2020), in this dissertation, I propose an original poststructuralist framework, which will be precisely set out in the next chapter.

In addition, there is a group of scholars who have shed light on the link between Japan's security discourse and practice in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Kolmaš (2017, 2018) has pointed to the relation between Japan's security discourse and practice over the dispute by taking a poststructuralist approach. Kolmaš argued that due to China's assertive actions near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the early 2010s, in the official and media discourse, Japan began to imagine the Self as 'a victim of China's coercive policies' and China as the Other that is 'a coercive, arrogant, immoral, and revisionist bully' (2017, p. 277, 2018, p. 515). Simultaneously, Japan also constructed the Self as a 'lawful state protecting the status quo' (2017, p. 267). By doing so, explains Kolmaš, Japan successfully managed to persuade the US to confirm that the Japan-US Security Treaty would cover the islands, whilst enacting the Peace and Security Law that legalised Japan's collective self-defence as a means to reform 'weak' Japan to a 'normal state'. Moreover, Lindgren and Lindgren (2017, p. 397) have argued that between 2010 and 2014, Japan constructed the Self that represents 'a peaceful, transparent, and law-abiding democratic nation'; on the other hand, China as the Other that is 'an aggressive, unruly, non-transparent dictatorship'. This study is mostly in accord with the research of Hagström and Hanssen (2016) that further put forward that in the Diet, Japanese rightists used the term 'peace' while actually calling for rearmament. Additionally, Suzuki (2015) has suggested that the Japanese left, which used to be pro-China throughout the post-war period, started to imagine Japan as being 'bullied' and China as an 'arrogant' and 'irrational' negative Other after the vessel collision case in 2010. This group of research partially answers *how* Japan constructed the Self/Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Having said that, most of the scholars primarily focus on the period that witnessed the high-profile flare-up of the island dispute, and so in order to see the process of *how* Japan and China shifted their rendition from the amicable Self/Other in the ECS, this dissertation sets the starting point in 2008 that witnessed Sino-Japanese agreement

over the co-development of the ECS gas field. Moreover, apart from Hagström's and Pan's (2020) short analysis of Chinese discourse, *how* China shifted its constructions of the Self/Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has not been conducted thus far. For these reasons, in this dissertation, I propose an original poststructuralist framework that is based on ST and boundary inscription, and then systematically analyses *how* Japan and China shifted their constriction of the Self/Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands context from 2008 to 2015.

2.2.2.5 Limitations of Poststructuralism and State-centric Approach

Taking a poststructuralist approach, I am aware that it is important to recognise that all standpoints should be subject to critical analysis that foreground their closures and exclusions (George and Campbell, 1990), and this thesis is no exception. I cannot cover all the limitations of this research here, but this section tries to clarify crucial criticisms of this approach that mainly come from those who criticise poststructuralism *per se* and who problematise the state-centric approach.

The first criticism comes from scholars who defend the powers of reason. Most prominently, Richard Beardsworth (2005, p. 214) argues that poststructuralist thought is premised on radical critique of the concept of real and prioritises 'the ethical, the nomadic, and the unilaterally deconstructive over construction'. Therefore, poststructuralism consequently confines itself to 'short-circuited history, underestimate[s] the creative, differentiating powers of reason and institution' (2005, p. 214). Beardsworth, therefore, warns that poststructuralists should not underestimate 'how much good work reason can do, how much reason can shape contingencies of history, and how much reason can release difference' (2005, p. 224). In this dissertation, I take a poststructuralist approach to look at the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute whilst rejecting other explanatory theories and frameworks that are premised on the 'powers of reason'. Yet, this does not mean that I intend to falsify those explanatory theories. This thesis does, however, critically examine *how* the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute came to be seen in a particular way by Japan and China by entangling the islands dispute with the history problem. The main ethical advantage of poststructuralism is to provide an understanding of the world that is detached from territorial limitation (Ashley and Walker, 1990).

Given that currently, majority of the Japanese and Chinese people accept the 'regime of truth' that easily conjures an uncompromising zero-sum game from the term – the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (尖閣諸島/钓鱼岛), I contend that it is imperative to take a poststructuralist approach to deconstruct the process of how the specific 'regime of truth' was constructed and crystalised by Japan and China, albeit with the theoretical limitations of poststructuralism.

The next criticism comes from historians. Lack of historical specificity in poststructuralist thought is particularly problematic in IR historical sociology. This school tries to approach international politics by emphasising the importance of 'la long durée' that means 'the slow-moving and often barely perceptible developments that are often ignored by analyses of "high profile" contemporary problems' (Linklater, 2009, p. 136). Suganami argues that one line of reasoning of IR theories – 'it always happens like that' (2008, p. 333) – requires critical reappraisal of its historical specificity, and thus it is important for 'a critique of history to take root in discussions concerning the nature and role of IR's knowledge claim' (2008, p. 329). Although in this dissertation I do not apply an explanatory IR theory that argues 'it always happens like that', of which Suganami particularly problematises, I am aware that this poststructuralist approach still needs to be critically examined and evaluated by historians.

Additionally, in this dissertation, I will include how Japan and China viewed the US in their Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in the analysis. However, the ramifications of the US role in the overall dispute development is out of the analytical purview. The bulk of realists currently frame the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute as a potential Sino-US confrontation (cf. Glaser, 2011; Liff and Ikenberry, 2014). Moreover, given that the dispute originates in the President Richard Nixon's shift in its position over islands sovereignty in the process of negotiation with Japan over the reversion of Okinawa, due to the pressure from Taiwan (Blanchard, 2000; Ōshima, 2017), from the outset of this dispute, the US has played a crucial role. However, in this dissertation, I do not look at the US's role in the dispute.

Moreover, there is criticism of the state-centric approach. Firstly, the perspectives of Taiwan and Okinawa are not included in this dissertation. However, Chen and Shimizu (2019) problematise the lack of research that deconstructs Japanese and Chinese islands' sovereignty narratives from the viewpoint of margins

and border zones. Their study importantly challenges the state-centric conception of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by tracing the history of the islands in relation to Taiwan – where dominantly the aborigines resided – and Okinawa, which used to be called the 'Ryūkyū Kingdom'. They have a history of being colonised by Imperial Japan by 1945, and the former became the Republic of China whilst the latter was occupied by the US until its 'reversion' to Japan in 1972. As they argue, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands need to be understood by the perspectives of Taiwan and Okinawa as well. Ling and Nakamura (2019) also argue that it is important to revisit the state-centric narrative of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by conceptualising the islands beyond the Westphalian framework by considering implications of visual art and popular culture.

Additionally, taking a state-centric approach, this dissertation does not cover how Japanese and Chinese people perceived the state discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. For example, when the Chinese people protested against Japan's purchase of the islands in 2012, reportedly, some of them held banners that read 'all Japanese must be killed' (Mair, 2012a). However, there were also Chinese people who ironically twisted the same slogan in their banners and expressed their frustrated feelings towards social inequality, political situations in China, and also an affinity for one of the most famous Japanese in China, Fukuhara Ai.[28] For example, this banner was also observed (Mair, 2012b):

> Even though we drink nothing but tainted milk powder,
> we still must kill all the Japanese.
> Even though we consume gutter oil everywhere,
> we still must brandish our knives and slay the dwarf pirates.[29]
> Even though all we eat is meat laced with clenbuterol,
> we still must send troops to destroy [those who inhabit] the Eastern Sea.
> Even though every day we are 'represented',
> but we still must regain the Diaoyu Islands.
> Even though in our old age there's no one to take care of us,
> we still must occupy Mt. Fuji.
> Even though our old homes are forcibly demolished,
> we still must capture Ai Fukuhara alive.

As this example indicates, social interpretations of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute are discursively more diverse and varied than that of states. This dissertation

[28] Fukuhara Ai is a famous Japanese table tennis player, who used to be based in China. She fluently speaks Mandarin and is one of the most popular Japanese in China.
[29] The 'dwarf pirates (Wokou; 倭寇)' is a derogatory Chinese name for the Japanese.

exclusively focuses on the state discourse of Japan and China, but I am aware that it is important not to overgeneralise them.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the existing literature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. By doing so, I have set out that IR poststructuralism is the more suitable approach to answer the research questions proposed by this dissertation. To begin with, I made it clear that there are *why* questions and *how* questions. *Why* questions are asked by 'explanatory theories' that try to test hypotheses and explain causal relations of major trends or recurring patterns in international relations. On the other hand, *how* questions are asked by 'constitutive international theory' that tries to analyse an epistemological perspective about how the world comes to be seen in particular ways by revealing the underlying assumptions about how the world is and can be. After having clarified that this dissertation asks *how* questions, the existing approaches were reviewed in light of the *why* and *how* questions categories.

First, this chapter shed light on the *why* questions research. I have explained that many scholars have asked *why* the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute escalated in the early 2010s. I first reviewed the political science approaches that pinpointed various variables that mainly pertain to Japanese and Chinese domestic politics, such as China's maritime policy, China's élite politics, the CCP's political legitimacy, dispute as bargaining leverage, linkage to the party/factional politics of Japan/China. Also, I have reviewed studies that applied the traditional IR theories – realism and liberalism – to answer the *why* questions by attributing the reason for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands escalation from the 2010s onwards to China's increasing military capability and economic power, and the China's decreasing economic dependence on Japan, respectively. To be sure, this group of *why* questions research provided convincing explanations for the islands dispute development. However, I argued that they were not designed to answer the proposed *how* questions and so not suitable for this research.

In the following section, this chapter reviewed the *how* questions research. Firstly, I have set out that IR constructivism is theoretically suitable to answer *how* questions; however, the following two theoretical limitations of the constructivist

approach made it ill-suited to this study: the constructivist approach is not designed for examining subtle shifts taking place in a short-term period, and this approach does not posit that identity is relationally constructed. After that, I have argued that IR poststructuralism is the more suitable theory for this study. Taking a stance of perspectivism, the poststructuralist approach makes it possible to examine the process of *how* Japan and China have established a 'regime of truth' – i.e., an axiomatic reality accepted by the Japanese and Chinese societies – in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. In the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, by applying the poststructuralist approach, I can look at the way in which Japan and China exercised power to inscribe boundary, constituted specific reality of the islands that dictates the Self/Other relations, and enacted particular islands security policy. Furthermore, poststructuralism makes it possible to understand that the history problem in effect plays a crucial role in constituting the ontological construction of Japan and China in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Also, the poststructuralist approach posits that identity is constructed relationally in the Self/Other. For these reasons, I contend that the poststructuralist approach is suitable to answer the proposed *how* questions, albeit its theoretical limitations. The next chapter will precisely set out my original poststructuralist framework and poststructuralist methods.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Methods

In the previous chapter, I have set out the existing literature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, whilst demonstrating that little academic attention has been paid to how Japan and China securitised and constructed the Self/Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from 2008 to 2015 in relation to the history problem. Also, in the previous chapter, I have argued that IR poststructuralism is the more suitable theory to fulfil this research paucity. In this context, this chapter will put forward the original poststructuralist framework and methods that I employ in this dissertation.

To date, Japan and China have not settled the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. However, this does not mean that there have not been alternative choices. Midford (2015) suggests that it is technically possible for Japan and China to seek compromised or shared sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands like Norway and Russia have done over the Svalbard Islands, which is the closest inhabited land from the North Pole. Alternatively, Japan and China can refer to the case of Pheasant Island – an uninhabited island in the Bidasoa river – whose sovereignty switches between France and Spain every six months. Besides, there are numerous precedents in which territorial disputes were peacefully settled amongst claimants.

Nonetheless, Japan and China have chosen to render the dispute as a zero-sum game. Okada precisely analyses the escalation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute after September 2012 in the following way (2012, p. 4):

> Our thinking can be easily dictated by the absolute values of state sovereignty. 'Our' interests and 'their' interests always contradict: 'our' interests are the national interests, and if we side with 'their' interests, we would be chastised for 'helping the enemy' or being a 'traitor'. There is no third alternative to this simplified dichotomy.

Indicative of the main themes of poststructuralism, herein Okada highlights the rigidly fixed meaning of Japan and China that totally exclude each other in the context of the islands dispute. Precluding both parties from settling the dispute peacefully, Japan and China have securitised the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by demonising the counterpart discursively. In this context, being indebted to

poststructuralism, in this chapter, I propose my original framework to answer the following research questions: *How* have Japan and China constructed the sovereignty claims of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s?; *how* did Japan and China shift the Self/Other construction in their discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between 2008 and 2015?; *how* did Japan and China securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between 2008 and 2015?; and, *how* did the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem from 2008 to 2015? This chapter firstly sets out my original poststructuralist theoretical framework by giving definitions of the following three groups of key concepts: 1) 'sovereign states' and 'territorial disputes', 2) 'discourse' and 'identity', and 3) 'security'. After that, I will move on to the poststructuralist methods that will be employed in the analysis. Lastly, this chapter sets out what kind of data is analysed to answer the proposed research questions.

3.1 Poststructuralist Framework

Firstly, I set out a poststructuralist theoretical framework to approach the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, precisely by contextualising the following three groups of key concepts in the relevant poststructuralist literature: 1) 'sovereign states' and 'territorial disputes', 2) 'discourse' and 'identity', and 3) 'security'. As explained in the previous chapter, poststructuralism is not a single coherent theory but a useful signpost of heuristic amalgam that encompasses several approaches derived by various continental thinkers. Hence, in constructing the poststructuralist framework for this dissertation, I practically combine different poststructuralist arguments and concepts that share the same ontological/epistemological stance that problematises what is taken for granted in the traditional IR theories.

3.1.1 'Sovereign States' and 'Territorial Disputes'

Crucial to the theoretical framework of this dissertation is a poststructuralist understanding of 'sovereign states' and 'territorial dispute'. In this section, I firstly define the meaning of 'sovereign states' in light of the poststructuralist approach,

and then, based on that, I will explain how this dissertation conceptualises 'territorial disputes' accordingly.

One of the most influential poststructuralists, R.B.J. Walker (1993), points out that 'sovereign states' are the prerequisite concept for the IR discipline; yet paradoxically, this concept *per se* has attracted scant academic attention from the traditional IR theorists, such as realists and liberalists. When scholars operationalise the traditional IR theories, they conventionally share the working definition of 'sovereignty' as 'the recognition by internal and external actors that the state has the exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities in its territory' (Thomson, 1995, p. 219). This simple conceptualisation of 'sovereignty' would suffice for the traditional IR theories' research purposes. However, poststructuralism tries to deconstruct the concept of 'sovereign states' by elaborating upon it more. The origin of 'sovereign states' is conventionally understood as the Peace of Westphalia (1648). For instance, Henry Kissinger (2014, p. 26) – a prominent US diplomat-cum-realist scholar – explains that 'the Peace of Westphalia became a turning point in the history of nations' because in this treaty the existing authority of religion, empire, and dynasty started to give way to the 'sovereign states'. Retrospectively, this was a historic treaty, argues Kissinger (2014, p. 27), because 'by the mid-twentieth century, this [Westphalian] international system was in place on every continent; it remains the scaffolding of international order such as it now exists'. Kissinger's explanation of 'sovereign states' epitomises the traditional IR theories' conceptualisation of this concept as historic phenomena that emerged out of the long history of international politics.

Poststructuralists, however, problematise this orthodox conceptualisation of 'sovereign states'. David Campbell (1998b, p. 41) points out that the conceptualisation of 'sovereign states' by realists, such as John Herz (1959), is 'privileging the Peace of Westphalia as the point at which traditional anarchy gave way to modern harmony that signifies the edifying and teleological nature of such narratives'. Additionally, Walker (1993, p. 166) criticises the immutability of 'sovereign states' by arguing that 'governments and regimes may come and go, but sovereign states, these claims suggest, go on forever'. Walker (1993, pp. 165–169) further suggests that the subtext of the conventional conceptualisation of 'sovereign states' is that it is a permanent, ubiquitous, and universal entity that pre-exists specific political realities. In this context, poststructuralists commonly problematise

that, little attention has been paid to how we have come to define 'sovereign states' in this way in the traditional IR theories, although this is the most important concept in the IR discipline.

As explained in the previous chapter, poststructuralists rather argue that 'sovereign states' are merely a dominant mode of subjectivity, and they are by no means natural and neutral being as the traditional IR theorists presume. According to poststructuralists, sovereign statehood is constituted by constant practices, which are embedded in a specific historical, cultural, and political juncture. Cynthia Weber (1998, p. 78) argues, 'sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but subjects in process and that all subjects in process […] are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted'. In making this argument, Weber draws on Judith Butler. Butler is a gender theorist, who conceptualised 'performativity' as 'the ways that identities are constructed iteratively through complex citational processes' (Weber, 1998, p. 79), and she argued that gender is not *a priori* identity but performatively constituted by social and cultural discourses. Following on from this argument of gender studies, Weber (1998, p. 92) puts forward that 'sovereign states' are also performatively enacted with its constant discursive practices that naturalise their essence. In this sense, as Ashley (1987, p. 410) argues, the mode of the subjectivity of sovereign states are enabled by constant political struggles for power.[30] Taking a critical constructivist stance,[31] poststructuralists try to uncover the process of how sovereign states exercise power to give meaning to particular representations of their origin, territory, and history, thereby limiting the political and social options of the people's daily lives. In light of this, the conventional conceptualisation of 'sovereign states' is problematic, according to poststructuralists, because it disregards the on-going process in which the very conceptualisation of 'sovereign state' is exerting power to reify the existing mode of reference thereof. As Devetak (2009, p. 202) points to, the axiomatic conceptualisation of 'sovereign states' normatively plays an exemplary role to 'negate alternative conceptions of subjectivity or to devalue them as underdeveloped, incomplete or deviant'. Failure to become 'normal' and 'proper' sovereign states, therefore, are labelled as 'rogue

[30] As laid out in the previous chapter, for poststructuralism, 'power' means a 'regime of truth', which is a type of discourse each society has and accepts a function as truth whilst enabling people to distinguish true and false statements (Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72–73).
[31] Critical constructivism posits that historical, social, and political contexts construct our perspectives on the world, Self, and Other (Manning, n.d.).

state' or 'terrorist state', and by doing so, the dominant mode of the subjectivity of sovereign states are reinforced in international politics (Devetak, 2008, 2009, p. 202).

Besides, analysing the conventional conceptualisation of 'sovereign states', Walker (1993) also argues that this concept implies a spatial duality – inside/outside. The inside of the political community is associated with safety, security, and amity; on the contrary, the outside is associated with anarchy, insecurity, and enmity. This inside/outside dichotomy is performatively reproduced via discursive practices of foreign policy, defence policy, and diplomacy (Walker, 1993, p. 169). In this regard, sovereign states' foreign, defence and security policies function as an essential element that performatively constitutes the sovereign states *per se* by inscribing boundaries of inside/outside (Walker, 1993, p. 151):

> Violence outside permits peace and justice inside. Hence, the very special character of 'defense policy' or 'national security' as somehow beyond the limits of politics as usual. Defense policy is usually understood in relation to the securing of boundaries from external threat. It is at least as important to understand it as a practice to inscribe the boundaries of 'normal' politics, a patrolling of the borders at home, a disciplining of claims to sovereign authority and national identity within.

Herein, Walker argues that boundary inscription implies national identity construction between inside/out. Dalby (1993, p. 22) also argues that when sovereign states divide and rule territories via discursive practices, they exert power by including the Self and excluding the Other: '"We" are "the same" in that we are all citizens of the same nation, speak a similar language, share a culture. This theme repeatedly recurs in political discourse where others are portrayed as different and as threats'. This is why Foucault (1980, p. 22) has argued, 'territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it's first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power'.

Based on this poststructuralist conceptualisation of 'sovereign states', the concept – 'territorial disputes' – needs to be revisited. Conventionally, 'territorial disputes' signify 'either a disagreement between states over where their common homeland or colonial borders should be fixed, or, more fundamentally, […] one country contesting the right of another country even to exercise sovereignty over some or all of its homeland or colonial territory' (Huth, 1996, p. 19). When we conceptualise territorial disputes in this way, we unproblematically take the

subjectivity of sovereign states for granted and tacitly posit that sovereign states are being that pre-exists the disputed territory. However, taking a poststructuralist approach, I note that 'territorial disputes' are not merely a matter of interstate disagreement over borders; however, 'territorial disputes' are deeply implicated in ontological construction of the subjectivity of sovereign states *per se*. Based on the poststructuralist understanding of 'sovereign states', I contend that 'territorial disputes' are a political moment that the performatively naturalised boundaries of sovereign states are being challenged by internal dissent or external force, and in response, the sovereign states try to re-inscribe the boundaries via foreign, defence and security policies to reconstruct the Self/Other. That is to say, in the poststructuralist approach, what is at stake in 'territorial disputes' is not only territorial claims but also a national history that gives a specific meaning to the disputed territory, the collective identity of the Self/Other, and foreign, defence and security policies. Thus, I put forth that in 'territorial disputes', ultimately, sovereign states performatively (re)construct the sovereign states *per se*. This is how I conceptualise 'territorial disputes' in this dissertation.

Lastly, I look at how sovereign states may arrange the relations amongst their identity, state, territory, and ethnicity in inscribing boundaries. As noted in the previous chapter, Campbell notes that Derrida's neologism – 'ontopology' – is crucial to understand the politics of boundary inscription (Derrida, 1994, p. 82; Campbell, 1998a, p. 80). In the wake of the Bosnian War, problematising the so-called 'inter-ethnic wars', Derrida conceptualised 'ontopology' in the following way:

> By *ontopology* we mean an axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present-being [*on*] to its *situation,* to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the *topos* of territory, native soil, city, body in general.

Hence, Derrida coined the term 'ontopology' in order to problematise the axiomatic mode of reference that tries to constitute 'the ontological value of present-being' and a specific 'locality' including 'territory' as two inseparable elements. Referring to Derrida's 'ontopology', Campbell notes the cause of 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia lay in the wrong attempt to pursue excessive 'ontopology', under which a political community necessitated a perfect alignment of state, nation, identity, territory, and ethnicity. Against this backdrop, Campbell warns that boundary inscription implies animosity between the Self and Other (1998a, p. 13):

> This is because inscribing the boundaries that make the installation of the nationalist imaginary possible requires the expulsion from the resultant 'domestic' space of all that comes to be regarded as alien, foreign and dangerous. This nationalist imaginary thus demands a violent relationship with the other.

Hence, when I analyse how Japan and China (re)inscribed the boundary of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute via foreign, defence and security policies, it is crucial to examine how they tried to pursue or defy the 'ontolopogy' from 2008 to 2015. Thus far, this section laid out how I define 'sovereign states' and 'territorial dispute' in this dissertation.

3.1.2 'Discourse' and 'Identity'

Additionally, 'discourse' and 'identity' also play vital roles in my poststructuralist framework, and so this section defines the meaning of these terms. In order to facilitate the explanation of 'discourse' and 'identity', I begin with elaboration on the poststructuralist epistemological stance by shedding light on their understanding of the relation between language and reality. As briefly explained in the previous chapter, poststructuralists do not understand language as a transparent tool to convey meanings objectively; but instead, they conceive language as an integral element that constitutes realities *per se* (Herschinger, 2010, p. 13). Based on this epistemological premise, poststructuralists have developed various discourse theories to shed light on the nexus of language and reality, such as Michel Foucault's conceptualisation of 'discourse', Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's 'discourse theory', and Jacques Derrida's argument on 'textuality' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Devetak, 2009). When these poststructuralists use the terms, 'discourse' or 'text', they do not merely signify language, but the general context, in which particular phenomena are embedded and meaning is given, is also included. For instance, in *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault (1965) examined how 'discourse' made an understanding of madness possible at a specific historical juncture via social institutional practices at hospitals, universities, and scientific institutions. In the Foucauldian sense, therefore, discourse can be understood as 'a series of practices, representations and

interpretations through which different regime of truth,[32] for example, the boundary between sanity and insanity, are (re)produced' (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 79). In a similar vein, Derrida's 'text' is not limited to language, literature, or realms of idea either; Derrida claims that the real world is constituted like a text, and 'one cannot refer to this "real" except in an interpretive experience' (Derrida, 1988, p. 148; Devetak, 2009, p. 190). Laclau and Mouffe (2001), who draw on Foucault and Derrida in conceptualising their 'discourse theory', also note that when we conceive particular objects, we always rely on 'discourse' to render them, and thus the 'discourse' ultimately encompasses both the linguistic and extra-linguistic. However, Laclau and Mouffe explain, their contention that 'discourse' encompasses both the linguistic and extra-linguistic does not negate the existence of a world external to our thoughts (2001, p. 108; Italics in original):

> The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has *nothing to do* with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence.

The ontological premise of the poststructuralist 'discourse' is, therefore, different from that of rationalism and conventional constructivism[33] because poststructuralists posit that 'there is no extra-discursive realm from which material, objective facts assert themselves' (Hansen, 2006, p. 33). When rationalists and conventional constructivists operationalise their theories, they commonly seek to examine the explanatory power of the ideational factor – i.e., ideas, norms, identity, and culture – vis-à-vis the material factors (Hansen, 2006, p. 22). On the other hand, poststructuralists posit that realities cannot be divided clearly into the ideational and the material because the material is always embedded into a specific discursive context. Instead of seeking 'objective reality' as such, poststructuralists are interested in how discourse exerts power to constitute a particular 'reality'

[32] As explained in Chapter 2, 'regime of truth' means a type of discourse each society has and accepts a function as truth.
[33] Rationalism understands discourse as a transparent tool that objectively conveys information, and conventional constructivism understands that discourse is constitutive of reality, but at the same time, there is an extra-discursive reality independent of discourse.

performatively, by fixing representations and interpretations of relevant subjects, objects, history, or events. Hence, in poststructuralist methods, analysis becomes meaningful only when the ideal and material are constitutively and performatively linked to each other in a specific historical context, and this presumption needs to be consistent both in the theoretical framework and methods. Thus far, I have clarified the poststructuralist epistemological assumptions.

Hereafter, primarily drawing upon Lene Hansen (2006), I define the meaning of 'discourse' and 'identity'. I precisely combine thoughts/concepts of the following thinkers: Ferdinand De Saussure, Foucault, Derrida, and Laclau and Mouffe. First and foremost, De Saussure (1966) has substantially contributed to the poststructuralist thought by arguing that language is socially constructed signs of a system to express ideas (Edkins, 1999, pp. 22–25). Differentiating individual acts of speaking, *parole*, from social characteristics of language, *langue*, De Saussure (1966, p. 14) argues *langue* is 'social side of self; it exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of a community'. Additionally, he puts forward that signs of language are consisted of the *signifier* and *signified*: the former is the letters on the page or the sound of pronunciation, whilst the latter is the concept that appears in our mind when we read or listen to a particular signifier (1966, pp. 66–67). This De Saussure's linguistic theory takes a structuralist stance, arguing that the links between the *signifier* and *signified* are arbitrary, but they are positioned in a specific place within the fixed structure of language (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 25).

What is 'post' about poststructuralism is that this discipline further puts forward that meaning – i.e., the arbitrary link between *signifier* and *signified* – cannot be fixed so unambiguously and definitively as De Saussure expects. This is because the structure of meaning is always negotiated in social contexts (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 25). For example, the *signified* of 'women' of the nineteenth centuries was constituted with elements such as 'emotional', 'motherly', 'reliant', and 'simple', as opposed to 'male' that represented 'rational', 'intellectual', 'independent', and 'complex' (Hansen, 2006, pp. 19–20); however, to date, such a simplistic dichotomy of the *signified* of 'women'/'male' has been socially contested via women's movements, thereby exemplifying the changeability of the link between the *signifier* and *signified* over a period. When poststructuralists analyse discourse,

they commonly examine the process of how such a link between *signifier* and *signified* has been socially and politically negotiated at a specific historical juncture.

In addition to De Saussure's language theory, this study draws on Foucault and Derrida. Firstly, I define 'discourse' referring Foucault. According to Dalby (1993, p. 5), Foucault's 'discourse' serves to 'organise reality in specific ways through understanding and knowing in ways that involve particular epistemological claims, they provide legitimacy, and indeed provide the intellectual conditions of possibility of particular institutional and political arrangements'. Additionally, following on from Hansen (2006), this study also refers to Foucault's 'discursive formation' and Derrida's 'différance'. The 'discursive formation' expressly signifies a process in which a particular discourse is established at a specific historical juncture, whereby different examples begin to share the same themes, concepts, and perspectives. When the discursive formation is established, 'a system of dispersion between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices' constitutes 'a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations)' (Foucault, 1974, p. 38). For example, when Edward W. Said demonstrated in his seminal work, *Orientalism* (1978), that discrete pieces of literature or art of the West in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries commonly patronised the representations of 'the East', he analysed 'orientalism' as a discursive formation. At the same time, in analysing 'orientalism', Said employed Derrida's 'différance' too, and this concept is also highly relevant to this dissertation. Derrida's 'différance' signifies 'a system of differential signs, and meaning is established not by the essence of a thing itself but through a series of juxtapositions, where one element is valued over its opposite' (Hansen, 2006, p. 19). Said's (1978) 'orientalism', therefore, has exemplified différance by arguing that 'orientalism' does not actually equate to the essence of 'the East', but instead, 'orientalism' is inextricably reflecting the imperialist societies of the West that was only able to perceive 'the East' in virtue of the differentiation from the West. I conceptualise 'discourse' by combining these poststructuralist concepts.

Next, I will explain how I define 'identity' in this study. Drawing upon Derrida's différance, poststructuralists commonly understand that identity is not an essence, but identity is a product of the relational difference between the Self and Other. Connolly (2002, p. 64) argues, 'identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty'. To

construct the Other by differentiating from the Self is not a neutral practice, but power is always exerted by 'us' over 'them' (Dalby, 1993, p. 18):

> The Other is thus a relation of difference, but difference is tied to identity, the Other is defined in contrast to 'I', 'we'; or the same. It is thus a relation of power; 'they' are 'created' as 'them' by 'us'. It is thus a move of power; 'we' can impose 'our' conception of 'them' as being 'them' and act accordingly if 'we' have the capabilities to do so.

The crux of sovereign states' security discourse, including foreign, defence, and security policies, can also be understood as the construction of the Self/Other. Shapiro explains that sovereign states exert power by fixing the meaning of the Self invariably as a 'ruly' order-provider, and simultaneously, constructing the Other as an 'unruly' threat by the degree of difference to the Self (1988, pp. 101–102):

> The meaning of Other as something foreign is thus not an innocent exercise in differentiation, it is clearly linked to how the self is understood. A self constructed with a security-related identity leads to the construction of Otherness on the axis of threats or lack of threats to that security, while a self identifies as one engaged in 'crisis management' – a current self-understanding of American foreign policy thinking – will create modes of Otherness on a ruly versus unruly axis.

Campbell (1998b, pp. 53–72) also confirms this point when he explains that foreign policy can be understood as threat construction practice that performatively demarcates political identities: 'Self' as 'inside' and 'domestic' existence in need of protection vis-à-vis 'Other' as 'outside' and 'foreign' and thus threatening. The existence of the threatening Other, therefore, paradoxically serves to construct the political identity of the Self, and so 'the constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state's identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility' (1998b, p. 12).

When poststructuralists analyse 'identity' in 'discourse', they devote particular attention to how the Other is constructed as the external being against which internal identity is mobilised in discourses. By doing so, we can comprehend 'how discourses operate to foreclose political possibilities and eliminate from consideration a multiplicity of possible worlds' (Dalby, 1993, p. 4). As regards poststructuralist identity/policy discourse relations in foreign, defence, and security policies, Hansen (2006, p. 19) importantly points out, 'identities are thus articulated as the reason why policies should be enacted, but they are also (re)produced through these very policy discourses: they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and

product'. Put differently, poststructuralists posit that identity and policy discourses are mutually constitutive.

Having said that the Self/Other could be constructed by the radical difference, this is not to negate the complexity of identity construction. According to Hansen (2006, p. 36), the Self/Other are not always constructed by the radical difference, but they are in a web of wider 'identities of a less radical and more ambiguous character'. As Neumann (1999) has demonstrated with the case of European identity formation, it is not reasonable to always assume that the Self/Other nexus is merely constituted by negative othering because 'collective identities emerge as *multifaceted*' (1999, p. 36; emphasis in original). Confirming this point, Rumelili's (2004, p. 46) analysis of the EU's construction of Morocco and the Central and Eastern Europe as the Others has demonstrated that the former was constructed by negative othering, but the latter was more 'based on discourses of acquired difference, association, and recognition by other'. In order to avoid narrow conceptualisation of the Self/Other, in this dissertation, I posit that sovereign states are always open to the possibility of improving their relations via neutral or positive construction of the Other.[34] As noted in the previous chapter, being different from constructivism, poststructuralism does not conceptualise identity as being intrinsic, pre-social, and extra-discursive; nonetheless, this does not mean that poststructuralist argument is 'that there is no positive identity construction – what might appear as intrinsic – but that this is simultaneously constructed through a process of differentiation' (Hansen, 2006, p. 22). In this dissertation, thus, I define 'identity' as a product of positive as well as negative differences between the Self and Other.

3.1.3 'Security'

Lastly, this section elaborates on the concept of 'security'. Being premised on the discussion thus far, this study defines 'security' as a *signifier* that is performatively constituted by sovereign states via their constant discursive practices. Drawing on the seminal work of Jef Huysmans (1998) – *Security! What Do You Mean? From*

[34] Neumann (1999) and Rumelili (2004) combine poststructuralism and Wendt's constructivism in theorising the multifaceted Self/Other construction; however, Hansen (2006, pp. 22–24) argues that it is possible to explore the positive construction of the Other by using poststructuralist methods.

Concept to Thick Signifier, I contend that sovereign states' security discourse implies a specific metaphysics of the people's life, encompassing political identity construction of the Self/Other and threat construction that justifies new security practices.[35] Theoretically, Huysmans (1998) combines the early work of the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory (ST) (1998, p.232) and Anthony Giddens' 'ontological security' (1998, p.242) by methodologically contextualising them in a poststructuralist conceptualisation of 'security'. Thus, this section will unpack the Huysmans' conceptualisation of 'security' by supplementing it with the literature of ST, ontological security theory (OTS), and poststructuralism of particular relevance. Firstly, I lay out how Huysmans conceptualises 'ontological security' and 'daily security'. In explaining these concepts, Huysmans begins his discussion with the role of sovereign states as a mediator of people's life and death. To this end, he starts with an analysis of 'a fear of death' expressed in the texts of security theories of Thomas Hobbes (Blits, 1989) and John Herz (1959). According to Huysmans (1998, p. 235), 'a fear of death' expressed in these security theories is precisely constituted by (1) a fear to die biologically and (2) an epistemological fear of the unknown condition. Against this backdrop, Huysmans argues that sovereign states play an essential role to manage the double-fears of death by providing people with 'order' via 'ontological security' and 'daily security' (cf. Figure 3.1).

[35] Huysmans (1998) discusses the concept of 'security' in a broader social context, with reference to the immigration policy. However, in light of this research, I limit the context to sovereign states, here and throughout.

Figure 3.1: Double-Fears of Death and Ontological/Daily Security



Regarding 'ontological security', referring to Giddens (1991), Huysmans defines it as 'a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity – death as the undetermined – by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order' (1998, p. 242).[36] 'Ontological security', explains Huysmans (1998, p. 242), directly deals with the fear of the unknown by interpreting how the world is for the people who want to make their lives intelligible by obtaining the principle of determinability; therefore, 'ontological security' constitutes the legitimacy of sovereign states. When the principle of determinability provided by sovereign states is disrupted, a condition of ontological *in*security is created and 'the impression of chaos' (1998, p. 243) emerges, thereby undermining the legitimacy of sovereign states. According to Huysmans (1998, pp. 238–240), the above discussion of Campbell's (1998b) – i.e., foreign policy is threat construction practice that demarcates the Self/Other – needs to be understood as 'ontological security' providing activity by sovereign states. This is because foreign and security policies serve to transform an uncertain situation into concretised threats accompanied by

[36] In the discipline of IR, OTS has evolved into two strands of studies: (1) OTS to highlight relational aspect and (2) OTS to focus on 'autobiographical narratives'. And then, this Huysmans' definition is compatible with both strands of OTS. Firstly, referring to this Huysmans' argument, Mitzen (2006), started to propose the former. She specifically put forth that sovereign states gain ontological security from established routines with the significant Other. On the other hand, the latter strand of OTS is centred on the assumption that ontological security is constituted by 'autobiographical narratives': 'nation-states seek ontological security because they want to maintain *consistent self-concepts*, and the "Self" of states is constituted and maintained through a narrative which gives life to routinised foreign policy actions' (Steele, 2008, p. 3; italics in original).

specific countermeasures to them. Meanwhile, sovereign states are also in charge of 'daily security' that 'articulates a strategy of survival' (1998, p. 242) to counter the concretised enemy via military practices in order to postpone our physical death. This 'daily security' indirectly contributes to the 'ontological security' by adding to the determinability of the people's daily life (ibid.). When the 'daily security' is disrupted whilst leading to ontological *in*security, sovereign states, once again, try to provide 'ontological security' by newly identifying the Other that can constitute the Self, thereby coordinating the subsequent daily security to manage the new Self/Other relations. In this way, Huysmans theorises the relation between 'ontological security' and 'daily security'.

Referring to the early work of the ST literature of Wæver (1995) and Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde (1998, pp. 21–47), Huysmans further puts forth that the 'ontological security' and 'daily security' are determined by sovereign states' articulations of security language. In order to explain the general logic of 'securitisation' in the international context, Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde explain:

> In this context, security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. Traditionally, by saying 'security', a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development (1998, p. 21).

Drawing on this ST argument, Huysmans notes that by articulating the security category, sovereign states self-referentially and performatively 'establish[es] a security situation by itself' (1998, p. 232). This is precisely because sovereign states' security discourse provides 'ontological security' by constituting the Other as an 'existential threat' to the Self, and by doing so, it justifies 'the extraordinary measures' as new 'daily security' to counter the constituted 'threat'. In doing so, referring to De Saussure's (1966), Huysmans methodologically understands 'security' as 'a thick signifier'. The reason why Huysmans names it a 'thick' signifier is because this approach examines how the articulations of a security signifier by sovereign states eventually shifts the meaning of other signifiers in the security discourse, such as the 'Self' and 'Other', thereby changing the overall security relations. Also, drawing on the aforementioned Foucault's 'discursive

formation', Huysmans calls this process – in which articulations of a 'security' signifier eventually shifts the existing security relations – as 'security formation' (1998, pp. 228, 232). The early work of ST has been theoretically and methodologically contested by many scholars to date (e.g., Jones, 1999, pp. 104–123; Bigo, 2002; Balzacq, 2005, 2011; Stritzel, 2007; McDonald, 2008; Hansen, 2011; Aradau, 2018)[37]; nonetheless, this poststructuralist approach of Huysmans enables me to conceptualise 'security' as a thick signifier that is performed by sovereign states, without problematising the general logic of securitisation in the early work of ST. Santos (2018) and Herschinger (2010, pp. 16, 87–88) also methodologically justify the poststructuralist approach to ST. Thus far, referring to the seminal work of Huysmans, I have laid out how this dissertation defines the concept of 'security'.

Besides, hereafter, I shed light on the literature of OTS and poststructuralism of relevance in order to contextualise the Huysmans' conceptualisation of 'security' in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourse analysis. Firstly, in order to analyse Japanese and Chinese constructions of the Self/Other, it is vital to draw on literature that theorise how the Self/Other are constructed in bilateral relations. Thus, in this dissertation, I refer to Gustafsson (2016), who has theorised it by conceptualising 'routinised recognition'. Whilst combining relational identity literature (Doty, 1996; Campbell, 1998b; Neumann, 1999; Rumelili, 2004; Guillaume, 2010), OTS studies (Liang, 1960; Giddens, 1991; Kinnvall, 2004; Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2008; Zarakol, 2010), with recognition theory represented by Lindemann and Ringmar (2015), Gustafsson notes that bilateral relations could get well/worse, depending on whether two states can maintain the routinised mutual recognition to recognise the identity of the counterpart, in forms of statements, representations, or behaviours. When the routinised recognition is disrupted, they begin to securitise the Other in order to deal with the anxiety caused by a 'traumatic experience' of being denied their recognition (2016, pp. 618–619). On the contrary, as long as two sovereign states can recognise the identity of the counterpart, they can improve their relations. This Gustafsson's

[37] The early work of ST is centred on state-centric and military-focused securitisation. However, as the term 'security' started to cover wider range of social contexts, such as the environmental issues and immigration policy, the so-called 'second generation' of ST scholars has emerged and shifted the analytical focus toward the process of how the utterance of security is intersubjectively negotiated and legitimised amongst broader range of actors (Rychnovská, 2014, p. 12).

‘routinised recognition’ theorises how the Self/Other construction of sovereign states evolve in bilateral relations.

Last but not least, it is crucial to refer to OTS literature that makes it possible to analyse how the Self/Other are constructed by Japan and China. Analysing the way Japan constructs the Self, Shōgo Suzuki (2008, 2011, p. 49, 2019, p. 308) points out that Japan has sought to construct the Self as ‘a “legitimate” member of the international community’.[38] After the end of the Cold War, the essential prerequisites for a ‘legitimate’ member of the international community have become liberal values, such as a view that the protection of human rights and emphasis on a democratic system of domestic governance (ibid.). Against this backdrop, argues Suzuki, ‘by posing as a “legitimate” member of the international community, Japan can position itself as the ‘rightful’ leader of East Asia over a rising China’ (2019, p. 308). Suzuki has not systematically analysed how Japan constructed the Self in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in relation to Japan’s ‘legitimate’ member of the international community. Therefore, this dissertation will fill that research gap empirically.

On the other hand, in analysing China’s construction of the Self/Other in relation to the history problem, it is crucial to understand the memory politics of ‘trauma’. Kinnvall (2004) discusses the memory politics of ‘trauma’ when she conceptualises ‘securitisation of subjectivity’[39] in the context of OTS, in which she theorises that uncertainty is decreased by fixing the meaning of the Self as superior to the Other. Kinnvall precisely puts forth that in the process of the ‘securitisation of subjectivity’, the narratives that articulate the new Self/Other might be temporarily constituted by ‘chosen trauma’ that unites the people of a particular sovereign state, by linking ‘the present, the future, and a re-created past’ (2004, p. 755). Thereby, sovereign states provide comforting stories of the past to enhance ontological security (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 755):

[38] Suzuki draws on IR English School in conceptualising a ‘legitimate’ member of the international community. (As regards his analysis of Imperial Japan, see Suzuki (2005, 2009), and so as to the post-Cold War Japan, refer to Suzuki (2008).) However, he also draws on OTS in contextualising this concept in the Self/Other construction of Japan (Suzuki, 2019). Hence, I argue that his literature is compatible with this theoretical framework.

[39] ‘Securitisation’ is a concept that is not limited to the state-centric security context, but Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde (1998, p. 23) explain that ‘large scale collective identities’ can also be securitised. Herein, Kinnvall (2004) focuses on the latter securitisation.

> Most comforting among these stories are those that provide a feeling home, stability, and continuity while individuals and groups are beset by experiences of loss, alienation, and helplessness. A chosen trauma is often used to interpret new traumas. It brings with it powerful experiences of loss and feelings humiliation, vengeance, and hatred that trigger a variety of unconscious defense mechanisms that attempt to reverse these experiences and feelings.

Trauma is, therefore, deeply implicated in the politics of identity construction because 'trauma can create community, a sense of belonging, by setting those affected apart from others' (Kinnvall, 2017, p. 99).[40] When China refers to Sino-Japanese War history in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute context, hence, I need to examine how the Chinese memory of 'trauma' exerts ramifications on the current Self/Other construction.

3.1.4 Summary

Thus far, this chapter has set out a poststructuralist framework to look at territorial disputes. As explained above, there are three groups of keywords that are central to the proposed framework: (1) 'sovereign states' and 'territorial disputes', (2) 'discourse' and 'identity', and (3) 'security'.

Firstly, I have explained that taking a poststructuralist approach, this study conceptualises 'sovereign states' as a dominant mode of subjectivity that is performatively enacted by constant discursive practices of sovereign states that naturalise the essence of sovereign states *per se*. More precisely, I laid out that 'sovereign states' are constituted by boundary inscription practices where foreign, defence, and security policies demarcate the border between inside/outside, the Self/Other, and secure/threat. Based on this definition of 'sovereign states', I put forth that 'territorial disputes' can be understood as a political moment where the performatively naturalised boundaries of sovereign states come to be challenged by internal dissent or external force; and in response to this development, the sovereign states try to re-inscribe the boundaries via new foreign, defence and security policies to reconstruct their sovereign states. This definition of 'territorial disputes' makes it

[40] Edkins (2003, pp. 230–231) also argues that in order to maintain an imagined community of the people who share the history, culture, and values, sovereign states try to normalise and discipline trauma by forging a specific regime of remembering and forgetting of a particular event as a national history.

possible to understand that Japanese and Chinese constructions of the Self/Other with references to Imperial Japanese/Sino-Japanese War history is not irrelevant to their territorial dispute, but is an integral part of the 'territorial disputes' *per se*.

Besides, I have set out the meaning of 'discourse' and 'identity' as well. In this study, 'discourse' means a particular context that exerts power to organise reality in a specific way by providing the intellectual conditions of the possibility of certain institutional and political arrangements. Additionally, I argued that 'identity' is constructed relationally between the Self/Other through foreign, defence, and security policies. The Self/Other is constructed by not only negative othering but also positive/neutral differences. These 'identity' and 'discourse' are mutually constitutive: identities are articulated as the reason why particular policies should be enacted, and simultaneously identities are (re)produced through these very policy discourses.

Lastly, I defined 'security' as a thick *signifier* that is performatively constituted by sovereign states via their constant discursive practices. More specifically, I explained that sovereign states' articulation of security language constitutes the Other as an 'existential threat' to the Self, and by doing so, sovereign states justify the extraordinary measures to counter the constituted 'threat'. Herein, the construction of the Self/Other serves as 'ontological security' that increases the determinability of the world, and the specific measures to mediate the Self/Other relation signifies 'daily security'. The existing literature of OTS further points out that Japan has sought to construct the Self as 'a "legitimate" member of the international community' and the 'rightful' leader of East Asia over a rising China. When it comes to China's construction of the Self/Other, it is crucial to understand that narratives of 'trauma', such as with Sino-Japanese War history, serve to unite the Chinese people by providing a sense of belonging and setting those affected apart from others, thereby contributing their 'ontological security'.

3.2 Methods

Next, this chapter specifies the poststructuralist methods that will be applied to analyse the texts. First, I will explain that I will begin with the problematisation of Japanese and Chinese sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In order to

question the validity of the Japanese and Chinese islands sovereignty claims, I will briefly track how Japan and China have constructed their sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s. By doing so, I will highlight the process of how Japan and China have sought to naturalise the essence of their sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by shifting their interpretations of the islands. After that, the second section will explain how I will conduct poststructuralist discourse analysis in order to answer the following three research questions: *How* did Japan and China shift the Self/Other construction in their discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between 2008 and 2015?; *how* did Japan and China securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between 2008 and 2015?; and, *how* did the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem from 2008 to 2015? At the end of this section, I will discuss a rationale behind my selection of texts and how I analyse the collected texts.

3.2.1 Reappraisal of Japanese and Chinese Sovereignty Claims

I will begin my analysis with the reappraisal of the Japanese and Chinese sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. As noted in the introduction of this chapter, Japan and China have rigidly fixed the meaning of the Self/Other in the context of the islands dispute in a way that totally excludes each other, thereby foreclosing the possibility for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. In this context, I contend that it is vital to examine how Japan and China have constructed their sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s. Although I do not claim to track all the shifts Japan and China have made in their rendition of the islands from the 1950s onwards, I will highlight the noticeable discursive shifts that clearly illustrate how Japan and China have sought to naturalise the essence of their sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In the analysis, I will devote attention to the process in which Japan and China started to give meaning to particular representations of the history and past events of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in order to teleologically naturalise the essence of the Japanese and Chinese sovereignty. The reappraisal of the Japanese and Chinese sovereignty claims will answer the first research question: *How* have Japan and China constructed the sovereignty claims of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s?

3.2.2 Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis

In the second section of the analysis, I adapt Hansen's (2006, pp. 37–45) poststructuralist discourse analysis to answer the following three research questions: *how* did Japan and China shift the Self/Other construction in their discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between 2008 and 2015?; *how* did Japan and China securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between 2008 and 2015?; and, *how* did the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem from 2008 to 2015? The first step of the poststructuralist discourse analysis begins with identifying elements in texts that indicate an explicit construction of the Self/Other by using Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) discourse theory. Referring to De Saussure's language theory and Derrida's différance, Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 105) note that the meanings of identities or objects – i.e., the arbitrary link between *signifier* and *signified* – are established by articulatory practices that link different elements in discourse. As regards the ways of how elements are linked to each other in discourse, there are two principles: *logic of equivalence* and *logic of difference* (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 127). To clearly illustrate how identities are relationally constructed via the *logic of equivalence* and *logic of difference*, I use Hansen's example of the European construction of the Balkan identity as the Self/Other in the early 1990s (2006, p. 42) (cf. Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: The Linking and Differentiation of 'the Balkans' and 'Europe'



As illustrated above, 'Europe' is constructed through the *logic of equivalence* that links positive elements to the Self, such as 'civilized', 'developed', 'rational', and 'controlled'. This series of positive elements that constitute the European Self are simultaneously juxtaposed to the negative elements of the Balkans via the *logic of difference,* thereby linking the Other to 'barbarian', 'underdeveloped', 'irrational', and 'violent', respectively. Although the *logic of difference* is exemplified as negative othering in this instance of the European/Balkans identity construction, as noted above, this dissertation is open to the possibility that there are instances where the Other is constructed via positive or no difference.

When analysing how the Self/Other are constructed in the text via the *logic of equivalence* and *logic of difference,* I also need to devote attention to how the Self/Other construction justifies particular foreign, security, and defence policies of Japan and China. Referring to Tzvetan Todorov's *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (1992, p. 165), Hansen (2006, pp. 38–39) notes that it is crucial to analyse how the elements of the Other are linked to other signs in

discourse to justify a specific policy. For instance, as the following Figure 3.3 shows, there were two competing dominant discourses amongst Spanish conquistadors regarding how to deal with the 'savage' Indians. On the one hand, Cortés constructed 'savage' Indians with elements, such as 'non-human', 'incapable of change', and thus 'beyond Christian redemption'. This way of constructing the 'savage' Indian gave grounds for a policy to annihilate them. On the other hand, the priest-cum-historian, Las Casas, argued that the 'savage' Indians are 'heathen', but they are simultaneously 'human' and have 'capacity for transformation and salvation'. Hence, Las Casas upheld the policy of conversion. As this Todorov's example demonstrates, it is vital to analyse not only what kind of noticeable elements are linked to the Self/Other construction, but also how they give a justification for particular foreign, defence, and security policies in the texts.

Figure 3.3: Competing Constructions of Indian 'Savages'



Besides, in order to improve the quality of the reading of the Self/Other construction, this study applies Hansen's (2006, p. 41) 'spatial, temporal and ethical' lenses to explore the Self/Other relations (cf. Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4: Three Lenses to Read the Self/Other

Types of lens	Questions to be asked…
Spatial lens	How is the Self/Other constructed spatially?
Temporal lens	How is the Self/Other constructed temporally?
Ethical lens	How is the Self/Other constructed ethically?

Firstly, the 'spatial' lens pertains to the geographical construction of the Self/Other. When foreign, defence, and security policies construct the Self/Other, they always imply 'the construction of boundaries and thereby the delineation of space' (Hansen, 2006, p. 42). In discussing this 'spatial' lens, Hansen (2006, p. 43) points out the importance of the 'universal discourse' that 'articulates a boundless political subject, but this subject is, on the other hand, always discursively mobilised in relation to a set of particular identities'. For example, in a foreign policy that justifies a state's humanitarian intervention to defend 'universal human rights', the Self is constructed as a state complying with the 'universal demand' as opposed to the Other that violates it (ibid.). The 'universal discourse' is, therefore, teleologically constructed to justify particular foreign, defence, and security policies.

Secondly, the temporal dimension of the Self/Other construction is also crucial. Applying the temporal lens, I can examine temporal references, such as 'development, transformation, continuity, change, repetition, or stasis' (Hansen, 2006, p. 43). Put differently, the temporal lens makes it possible to ask 'how the temporality of the Other is constituted in relation to the temporality of the Self' (Hansen, 2006, p. 43). In the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the temporal lens enables me to analyse how China's references to Sino-Japanese War history in the Diaoyu Islands discourse have constructed the current Self/Other in a particular way, thereby justifying China's specific islands policy. When it comes to Japan, the perceived 'China's rise' expressed in the Senkaku Islands discourse can be analysed as a 'change' of the Other that might justify the Self to rearm itself to deal with it.

Moreover, via an 'ethical' lens, I will examine 'concern with the discursive construction of ethics, morality, and responsibility; with the moral force of particular representations' (Hansen, 2006, p. 45). For instance, argues Hansen, when a foreign policy discourse of the Bosnian War stressed an 'international responsibility, whether to stop "genocide", to combat "humanitarian disaster", or to prevent violations of "human rights",' a powerful discursive move took place in that the problem was moved out of the strategic and "selfishly national" domain and then relocated in the '"higher grounds" of the morally good' (2006, p. 45). In light of this, China's references to Sino-Japanese War history in the context of the Diaoyu Islands discourse might be able to construct the Chinese Self as being in a morally higher ground as opposed to Japan. On the other hand, Japan's construction of the Self as the 'guardian of the international liberal values' may give grounds for Japan's 'legitimate' position in international society, whilst differentiating the Self from China that defies the 'liberal values'. These spatial, temporal, and ethical lenses will be applied to enrich the quality of reading of Japanese and Chinese Self/Other construction in their discourses from 2008 to 2015.

As noted above, this study posits that the Self/Other are constructed by articulatory practices in discourse; however, there are a few caveats. First, even if discourses are constituted by articulatory practices, this does not necessarily mean that all texts construct the Self/Other 'through a slavish juxtaposition of a Self and an Other' (Hansen, 2006, p. 39). For example, when George W. Bush discursively constructed 'evil' Saddam Hussein and the 'oppressed' Iraqi people as the Other(s) in his discourse to justify the US' fighting the Iraq war, Bush did not state explicitly, himself was 'not evil', and the American people were 'not oppressed' (ibid.). Nevertheless, the implicit construction of the 'not evil' and 'not oppressed' American Self was not only evident in the discourse but actually 'reinforced by the articulation of Saddam Hussein's Iraq' (Hansen, 2006, p. 39). Hence, the implicit construction of the Self/Other needs to be considered in the analysis. Secondly, I need to take it into account that once the meaning of the essential signifiers in discourse is stabilised, the discourse ceases to give 'as detailed constructions of identities as when "the problem" first manifested itself on the political and media agendas' (Hansen, 2006, pp. 39–40). For example, the political identity of 'the Balkans' was elaborated in detail by repeated articulations of long series of elements when the war of Yugoslavia just broke out in the early 1990s; however, as the war

continued, ‘the Balkan’ references decreased because the meaning of ‘the Balkan’ was already established and naturalised socially. Besides, Hansen (2006, p. 40) also points out that there is ‘discursive disappearance’, which signifies that once essential elements of identity cease to be linked to the Self/Other construction. The other way around, the elements that were not important previously could also be newly linked to the Self/Other construction. Thus, what kind of elements are linked to the Self/Other construction needs to be carefully analysed during the targeted period. These three caveats will be noted in analysing Japanese and Chinese constructions of the Self/Other.

Last but not least, I lay out the rationale for choosing Hansen’s poststructuralist discourse analysis as a method of analysis, but not other approaches – such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), framing theory, and qualitative content analysis. The latter group of approaches is epistemologically incompatible with this poststructuralist study. Also, these approaches fail to provide a comprehensive method to analyse the process of how the Self/Other construction shifts as time passes. Firstly, whilst positing identity is constituted by a pre-social and extra-discursive essence, CDA analysts problematise the poststructuralist conception of identity. One of the founders of CDA, Norman Fairclough (2003, p. 160), criticises that ‘it [poststructuralism] fails to recognise the importance of our embodied, practical engagement with the world, which begins before children even learn languages and continues throughout our lives’. This epistemological assumption of CDA renders it ill-suited to this study. Additionally, Guan and Liu (2018) and Guan (2018) apply framing theory to the analysis of *People’s Daily*, looking at how China framed and interpreted the Sino-Japanese relations in a certain way; and, this approach might appear to be available to this study. However, framing theory posits that discourse can influence the perception of the media audience, and so this approach does not allow me to posit that discourse *per se* constitutes a particular reality like poststructuralists do. Lastly, qualitative content analysis is methodologically impossible to explore ‘multiplicity of meaning and how different meanings relate to each other’ (Schreier, 2012, p. 181) in the texts, and thus this methodological downside is unsuitable to this research. This is because I need to explore layers of meaning in analysing texts in this study. For instance, Japan’s construction of the ‘rise of China’ might not only signify Japan’s construction of the Other but also it is pertaining to Japan’s securitisation of China as well. For these

reasons, I contend that Hansen's poststructuralist discourse analysis is the more suitable method for this study.

3.2.3 Intertextuality and Selection of Texts

In this section, I lay out what kind of texts were collected for analysis. Firstly, to choose texts, it is theoretically and methodologically important to understand Julia Kristeva's (1980) notion of 'intertextuality'. Kristeva explains that this term signifies that 'any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another' (1980, p. 66). Therefore, in explaining the concept of 'intertextuality', Kristeva posits that texts published by different sources are interlinked with each other in a broader web of meaning. In relation to identity construction and security policy, 'intertextuality' precisely signifies that 'texts are situated within and against other texts, that they draw upon them in constructing their identities and policies that they appropriate as well as revise the past, and that they build authority by reading and citing that of others' (Hansen, 2006, p. 49). The 'intertextuality' becomes most explicit when 'texts make *explicit references* to older works, in particular when these are constructed as texts with a particular authority, or as classics that have to be assessed and criticised' (Hansen, 2006, p. 50; italics in original). The explicit references to the other texts does not mean, however, that the original meanings of the text are accurately reproduced in the new context, explains Hansen (2006, p. 51):

> Rather than seeing new texts as depending on older, one should therefore see the two as interacting in an exchange where one text gains legitimacy from quoting and the other gains legitimacy from being quoted. […] No quote or rendition of an original text is ever a complete reproduction of the original and the meaning of original texts will therefore always be read and re-read through new texts. Even a direct quote is situated inside a new textual context, reconstructed by it, and meaning is therefore never seamlessly transmitted from one text to another.

Hence, it is methodologically essential to carefully analyse the established links amongst the texts, whilst examining how the new texts exert power to modify the original meanings of the referred old texts. Drawing on Kristeva's 'intertextuality', I posit that every individual text is unique but, at the same time, united in a wider textual web of meaning. Thus, I analytically see the following category of texts are

all linked to each other in a wider textual context: Japanese and Chinese foreign, defence, and security policies and related documents, speeches/remarks of Japanese and Chinese leaders, the Diet record of Japan, editorials of *People's Daily* and *PLA Daily*, and secondary sources written by scholars. In analysing these texts, I need to devote attention not only to which text refers to which, but also how the older texts are utilised to construct specific identities to justify certain policies. As explained in Chapter 2, this dissertation takes a state-centric approach in analysing how Japan and China as sovereign states have discursively naturalised the essence of their Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sovereignty and so their societal discourses are out of analytical purview. To this end, this dissertation limits the texts to official or semi-official sources and chooses not to include a broader range of texts from popular culture and visual arts.

The following section will lay out what kind of texts were collected and how they are situated in the wider sovereign state system of Japan and China in order to validate the textual authority of individual texts.

3.2.2.1 Japanese Discourse

In order to analyse Japan's official security discourse, this study will examine the following texts: speeches of prime ministers, documents provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Defense (MOD), Japan Coast Guard (JCG), the Cabinet Office and other related governmental institutions, and the records and laws passed by the Diet. Japan is a representative democratic political system, which is similar to that of the United Kingdom, and thus these texts represent the Japanese authority in a quite straightforward way (cf. Figure 3.5). Additionally, I conducted twenty-five interviews with Japanese MOFA officials, scholars, and journalists in Tokyo and Hong Kong. There will be no direct quotation from these interviews in the following chapter of analysis, but these interviews gave me a perspective on the topic and served to triangulate the official texts.[41]

[41] Appendix 1 shows a list of interviewees, who did not request anonymity.

Figure 3.5: Texts Representing the Japanese Discourse



As the following Figure 3.6 shows, Japan's bicameral system can be divided into the Lower House and Upper House, and they approve the Japanese laws. Japanese prime ministers are chosen by the ruling party. During a period of 2008-2015, Japan had five prime ministers who represented either the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) or the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ): Fukuda Yasuo (in office until September 2008; the LDP), Asō Tarō (September 2008-September 2009; the LDP), Hatoyama Yukio (September2009-June 2010; the DPJ), Kan Naoto (June 2010-September 2011; the DJP), Noda Yoshihiko (September 2011-November 2012; the DPJ) and Abe Shinzō (December 2012 to date; the LDP). These prime ministers' speeches and remarks in the Diet have vital textual authority. Additionally, texts issued by the executive organisations will also be examined. In addition to the documents released by the Cabinet Office, the subordinated ministries, such as the MOFA, MOD, and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLITT), publish important texts. In terms of daily security of the islands, the JCG that is subordinated to the MLITT is in charge of the maritime patrol, and the Self Defense Force (SDF) that belongs to the MOD is in charge of the control of the airspace surrounding the Japanese borders. Also, the Diet record is crucial to Japanese discourse. As Hagström and Hanssen (2016, p. 272) note, Japanese parliamentary debates are suitable for examining the distribution of discursive representations of the Self/Other.

When I collected texts in the website of the Diet record (https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/), I systematically searched the following combinations of keywords: '中国 東シナ (China ECS)', '中国 尖閣 (China Senkaku)', and whilst typing the name of prime minister in the category of 'speaker' I searched '靖国神社

(the Yasukuni Shrine)', '戦犯 (war criminal)', '歴史問題 (the history problem)'. Besides the Diet record, the other texts were collected by their official websites.

Figure 3.6: The Japanese Government



3.2.2.2 Chinese Discourse

When it comes to China, I contend that the following texts represent the Chinese discourse: speeches by Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao and Xi Jinping/Li Keqiang, official

statements and briefings released by the MOFA, Ministry of National Defense (MOND), State Council Information Office (SCIO), and laws passed by the National People's Congress (NPC). This group of texts can be deemed as 'authoritative' (Webster, 2017) texts. Additionally, editorials of *People's Daily* and *PLA Daily* will also be looked at, and they represent the 'quasi-authoritative' voice of China (ibid.) (Figure 3.7). Moreover, I conducted ten interviews with scholars in Beijing and Hong Kong. There will be no direct quotation from these interviews in the chapter of analysis, but these interviews gave me a perspective on the topic.[42]

Figure 3.7: Texts Representing the Chinese Discourse



In terms of polity, China employs the Leninist democratic centralism,[43] which makes the process of China's Diaoyu Islands policymaking primarily hidden in a 'black box'. However, this does not mean that textual authority of Chinese texts is impossible to identify. In the Chinese political system, according to a prominent scholar of the politics of China, Alice L. Miller, 'authority of official comment is

[42] Appendix 1 shows a list of interviewees, who did not request anonymity.
[43] Democratic centralism is 'the process by which lower levels elect higher levels, who in turn make decisions to be passed down along the hierarchy' (Dreyer, 2004, p. 88). Herein, the term 'democracy' does not mean multiparty system or votes. Rather, this means consultation amongst the relevant people before a policy is decided. Lieberthal (2004, p. 193) explains that during the period of consultation, 'individuals may express their views freely on the issue so that necessary information is made available to the decision makers. […] Once a decision is reached, however, centralism prevails, which means that people must implement the decision regardless of whether or not they agree with it'. The process of consultation is not open to the public, and thus this is the reason why Chinese politics are often metaphorically rendered as a 'black box' by China watchers.

determined by the place of the issuer in the institutional hierarchy' (Swaine, 2012, p. 16). In order to explain how these texts accurately represent the Chinese authority, I explain how the individual texts are issued by different actors in the Chinese institutional hierarchy.

China's state system consists of three interlocking branches of power: the CCP, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the Chinese government (cf. Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9).[44]

[44] The central structure of the CCP, PLA, and the Chinese government are shown in orange, yellow, and blue, respectively. I made these diagrams referring to those of Lieberthal (2004, pp. 173–9), and the arrows in the diagrams indicate 'general direction of authority in practice' (ibid). These figures aim at shedding light on the state system that is particularly relevant to the Diaoyu Islands policymaking and collected text. However, the actual organisation of these three branches of power is more complex than this basic outline conveys.

Figure 3.8: The CCP and PLA at the Centre



Figure 3.9: The Chinese Government at the Centre



The CCP assumes the supreme political power over the overall state institutions in China. In light of this, speeches and remarks of the two top-leaders of the CCP have vital textual authority. Therefore, in this dissertation, I analyse texts of the top leader of the CCP, General Secretary – Hu Jintao (until November 2012) and Xi Jinping (from November 2012 to date). Also, the head of the Chinese government – i.e., the Premier of the State Council – has the second most significant authority in the CCP; therefore, texts of Wen Jiabao (until November 2012) and Li Keqiang (from November 2012 to date) are also looked at. Besides, as shown in the orange in

Figure 3.8, *People's Daily* plays the role of the CCP's public mouthpiece. Being subordinated to the Party Secretariat, *People's Daily* reflects the Party line.[45] Regarding how to evaluate this party organ, Miller notes that '*People's Daily* editorials and commentator articles speak for *People's Daily* as an institution, and so by extension for the CCP Central Committee, and so they outrank "authoritative" commentary in every other newspaper' (Swaine, 2012, p. 16). Therefore, bylined editorials in *People's Daily*, such as *Zhong Sheng* (钟声; a homophone for 'the voice of the Central'),[46] *Jin Caiwei* (金采薇),[47] *Guo Jiping* (国紀平),[48] *Ren Zhongping* (任仲平)[49] can be deemed as 'quasi-authoritative' text, even if they are not official statements by the Chinese government (Swaine, 2012, p. 1; Webster, 2017).

In a similar vein, as shown in yellow in Figure 3.8, *PLA Daily* represents the PLA (Swaine, 2012, p. 16). Therefore, editorials of *PLA Daily*, such as *Diao Baoyan* (钓保言), can be deemed as the 'quasi-authoritative' text representing the PLA (Webster, 2017).[50] Analysis of *PLA Daily* demonstrates that 'as an institution, the PLA is not publicly expressing views on major policy issues and strategic orientation

[45] This has been particularly the case since the hardline political leaders' 'thorough purges of dissidents' (Lieberthal, 2004, p. 223) in *People's Daily* after the pro-democratic movement in April-June 1989. As *People's Daily* had actively participated in the movement by 'not only taking to the streets themselves but also bolstering the movement through the content and conduct of their work' (Tan, 1990, p. 151), the hardline CCP leaders – represented by Li Peng – served as an editor and published an editorial on 26th April 1989 to condemn the movement (Nathan and Link, 2001, p. 75). This case demonstrates how the CCP leaders reassert authority over the party's mouthpiece when *People's Daily* tries to deviate from the party line. Today, there is a case that top leaders' different opinions on economic policy are reflected in *People's Daily*, but this represents, by no means, 'power struggle' amongst them (Naughton, 2016, p. 4).

[46] According to an interview in 2009 with Wu Changsheng, who used to be the head of the International Department of *People's Daily*, and Wang Wei, who was a journalist of International Department, *Zhong Sheng* is supposed to express 'the voice of China regarding important international problems and China-related problems' (Renminwang, 2012).

[47] *Jin Caiwei* is the name of an editor of the International Department of *People's Daily* (Zhongguo Wang, 2012). After September 2012, *Jin Caiwei* started to provide editorials, often referring to up-to-date Japan's diplomatic developments (e.g., Japan's value-oriented diplomacy, Abe's move towards proactive diplomacy, etc.) and criticise them in the context of the Diaoyu Islands and war history. In comparison with *Zhong Sheng*, which is more like the quantitative repetition of the party line, *Jin Caiwei* tends to have a specific theme in each editorial.

[48] *Guo Jiping* stands for 'important editorials related to international affairs (*Youguan guoji de zhongyao pinglun*)' (Renminwang, 2012). *Guojiping* represents 'the most important editorials of international affairs in *People's Daily*. *Guojiping* generally centres on vital international issues, explains China's stance and viewpoint. *Guojiping* is very long – some reach more than 4000 words, and others have more than 5000 words' (Renminwang, 2012).

[49] *Ren Zhongping* stands for 'important remarks of the People's Daily' (*Renmin Ribao Zhongyao Yanlun*).

[50] The Chinese government has protected *PLA Daily* from the ramifications of media reformations and commercialisation, and therefore this organ still maintains the principle of 'propaganda first, profitability second' (Shirk, 2011, p. 31).

that are far from the CCP's message' (Johnston, 2013, p. 42). Hence, in Chapter 5 of Chinese discourse analysis, *PLA Daily* will be used as supplementary texts to *People's Daily.*

On the Chinese governmental side, the National People's Congress (NPC) is supposed to be in charge of the legislature (cf. Figure 3.9). Therefore, Chinese laws passed by the NPC are also examined. Besides, I will also look at texts published by the organisations subordinated to the State Council[51]: the MOFA, MOND, and SCIO.

Apart from the editorials of *People's Daily* and *PLA Daily*, texts were collected from their official websites. When it comes to the editorials of *People's Daily*, the official website (http://www.people.com.cn) withdrew the archives from 2008 to 2015 during my data analysis from March to August 2019, and so I could not use the search engine of *People's Daily*. The official website of *PLA Daily* (http://www.81.cn) had the same problem. Therefore, I used the search engines of Baidu (https://www.baidu.com) and Google to collect the texts. Firstly, I picked up a specific date of September 2012 and searched the titles of related editorials on these search engines whilst referring to the printed newspapers. And then, I found out that most of the editorials were accessible online, albeit at different websites, such as the web pages of 人民网 or sometimes 人民政府. After that, I systematically searched the following combinations of keywords: (1) name of the newspapers, either '人民日报 (*People's Daily*)' or '解放军报 (*PLA Daily*)', (2) name of editorials, '钟声 (Zhong Sheng)'/'国紀平 (Guo Jiping)'/'国际论坛 (Guoji Luntan)'/'金采薇 (Jin Caiwei)'/'任仲平 (Ren Zhongping)' or '钓保言 (Diao Baoyan)', respectively, and (3) keywords, '钓鱼岛 (Diaoyu Islands)'/'东海 (ECS)'/'日本 军国主义 (Japan militarism)'/'日本 国防 (Japan national defence)'. I have done so by limiting the time, for instance choosing the 1st September 2015 as the 'starting date' and 30th September 2015 as the 'end date' in order to manage the amount of results. To double-check the validity of this approach, I compared the collected articles online with the existing research that had listed titles of editorials of the same topic (e.g., Ma, 2014; Masuo, 2018) when the official websites were still available. By doing so, I found out that this approach enables me to collect most of the relevant editorials.

[51] The State Council serves as Japan's Cabinet in China's system.

This was the best alternative method I was able to take, and in total, I collected sixty-two editorials for *People's Daily* and supplementally twelve for *PLA Daily*.[52] Even if the collected editorials in this approach do not cover every single editorial, they have provided enough texts to chart how China constructed the Self/Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in a qualitatively rich manner.[53]

3.2.4 Data Analysis

In order to facilitate the data analysis and reduce paper consumption, I used Nvivo Version 11 as regards the poststructuralist discourse analysis. After importing all texts to Nvivo, I coded elements in each text. For instance, Figure 3.10 shows the screenshot of a coded editorial of *People's Daily*. The left part is the texts, and the right side shows the coded elements. Methodologically, during the careful and repeated reading, when I identified a new element in the text, I created a new code. For example, under the parental code of 'China as Self', I added child codes, such as 'No compromise', 'Peace', and 'We are strong now'. After completing the coding phase, I made a list of the codes linked to each text; for instance, the code 'We are strong now' is unfolded, as is shown in Figure 3.11. By checking which texts shared this element, I was able to track how the different elements were linked and de-linked to the Self/Other construction during the targeted period.

[52] The collected editorial titles are listed in Appendix 2.
[53] These editorials tend to repeat a similar way of Self/Other construction for a certain period of time, and I have analysed these texts until the data was saturated.

Figure 3.10: Screenshot of Nvivo: Coding Elements





国际论坛： 日本应停止玩火

钟 声

2012年09月12日07:27 来源：人民网－人民日报

和平发展是中国战略抉择，但捍卫领土主权和追求和平发展从来不是二选一的问题

9月11日，中国海监船抵达固有领土钓鱼岛外围海域，海监部门已制定相关行动计划，将视情展开维权行动。依据10日中国政府宣布的钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿领海基线，从11日起，中国气象局和国家海洋局正式发布钓鱼岛天气预报和海洋环境预报。这一切都明确无误地表明，中国政府维护领土和国家主权的意志是坚定不移的。

日本政府非法“购买”钓鱼岛及其附属的南小岛和北小岛，极大地伤害了13亿中国人民的感情。一段时间以来，面对中国政府和中国人民的强烈抗议，日本非但没有悬崖勒马，反而是在错误的道路上越走越远。11日上午，日本政府与所谓的“所有者”签订“购岛”合同。日本政府高级官员不断抛出奇谈怪论为自己壮胆：“购岛”是为了“平稳安定管理”、“购岛”只是“日本领土某一部分土地的所有权从一个（私人）所有者转给了国家，不应该引发与其他国家的矛盾”，这种所谓钓鱼岛是日本固有领土、中日之间不存在领土争端的言论，完全是罔顾史实和法理，既违背两国老一辈领导人就钓鱼岛问题达成的共识，也是对中国政府和人民维护国家领土主权的意志和行动力的误判，更是对世界反法西斯战争胜利成果和战后国际秩序的公然挑战。名为“购岛”，实为偷窃中国领土，这种卑劣行径暴露出日本的阴险图谋。

Figure 3.11: Screenshot of Nvivo: List of Codes, China's Self as 'We Are Strong'

3.3 Conclusion

Firstly, this chapter has set out a novel poststructuralist framework to analyse the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Being different from the traditional IR theories that take the conventional conceptualisation of 'sovereign states' for granted, this poststructuralist framework defines 'sovereign states' as a dominant mode of subjectivity, which is performatively constituted by discursive practices that try to justify the essence of sovereign states. The mode of the subjectivity of sovereign states is enabled by constant political struggles for power. In light of this, I understand 'territorial disputes' as a political moment in which the performatively naturalised boundaries of sovereign states come to be unsettled by internal dissent or external force; and in reaction to this development, the sovereign states try to re-inscribe the boundaries via new discursive practices. That is to say, what is at stake in the territorial dispute is not only territorial claims, but also a national history that gives a specific meaning to the disputed territory, national identities of the Self/Other, and foreign, security, and defence policies to demarcate the inside/outside boundaries. Thus, in territorial disputes, ultimately, sovereign states performatively (re)construct the sovereign states *per se* by reifying the boundary of inside/outside and constructing the identity of the Self/Other.

Additionally, I have defined 'discourse' and 'identity' in a poststructuralist approach. Firstly, 'discourse' does not merely signify language, but it means the general context, in which particular phenomena are embedded and meaning is given, and thereby constituting a particular reality. The ontological premise of the poststructuralist discourse is that there is no extra-discursive and pre-social realm from which objective facts can assert themselves. In this context, 'identity' can be understood to be embedded in a specific discourse, and poststructuralists conceptualise that identity is relationally constructed via differences. When poststructuralists analyse 'discourse' and 'identity', they devote attention to how the Other is constructed as the external being against which internal identity is mobilised. By doing so, we can understand how the discourse exerts power to fix the meaning of the Self/Other and foreclose a multiplicity of political possibilities in order to justify a specific political reality. Whilst rejecting narrow conceptualisation

of ‘identity’ as negative differences between the Self and Other, I define ‘identity’ as a product of positive as well as negative differences of them.

When conceptualising ‘security’, this study defines it as a signifier that is performatively constituted by sovereign states via their constant discursive practices. Drawing on Huysmans (1998), I argue that sovereign states’ security discourse provides ‘ontological security’ by constituting the particular Other as an ‘existential threat’ to the Self, and by doing so, sovereign states justify ‘the extraordinary measures’ as new ‘daily security’ to counter the constructed ‘threat’. In bilateral relations, the relations could get well/worse, depending on whether two states can maintain the routinised mutual recognition to recognise the identity of the counterpart, in forms of statements, representations, or behaviour. The existing literature of OTS points that Japan has sought to construct the Self as ‘a “legitimate” member of the international community’ vis-à-vis China’s rise. When it comes to China’s Self/Other construction, it is crucial to understand that narratives of ‘trauma’, such as with Sino-Japanese War history, serve to unite people by providing a sense of belonging and setting those affected apart from others, thereby contributing their ontological security.

The latter section of this chapter has laid out the methods. Firstly, I explained that I will begin my analysis with the problematisation of the Japanese and Chinese sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. By doing so, I will answer the following question: *how* have Japan and China constructed the sovereignty claims of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s? This will be followed by poststructuralist discourse analysis that will answer the following three questions: *how* did Japan and China shift the Self/Other construction in their discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between 2008 and 2015?; *how* did Japan and China securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between 2008 and 2015?; and, *how* did the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem from 2008 to 2015? Being indebted to Hansen’s (2006), I have set out how to analyse the Self/Other construction of Japan and China. In addition to the *logic of equivalence* and *logic of difference*, I will employ spatial, temporal, and ethical lenses to read the texts. When it comes to my conceptualisation of texts, whilst referring to Kristeva’s ‘intertextuality’, I posit that every individual text is unique but at the same time united in a wider textual web of meaning. So analytically, I see Japanese and Chinese foreign, defence, and security policies, Japanese and Chinese leader’s

remarks and speeches, the Diet record, the CCP's/PLA's organ – *People's Daily/PLA Daily*, secondary sources written scholars are all linked to each other in a wider textual context. In the following chapter, I will specifically analyse how Japan constructed the Senkaku Islands sovereignty from the 1950s onwards and how Japan securitised the islands from 2008 to 2015. In reading the texts, I apply the poststructuralist framework and methods that were set out in this chapter.

Chapter 4: Analysis of Japanese Discourse

In the previous chapter, I have laid out the poststructuralist framework and methods to deconstruct Japanese and Chinese Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourses. This chapter will apply the proposed theoretical framework and methods to analyse Japanese discourse of the Senkaku Islands empirically. Firstly, as noted in the previous chapter, I will examine Japan's sovereignty claim in order to answer the following research question: *how* has Japan constructed the Senkaku Islands sovereignty claims from the 1950s onwards? In revisiting Japan's sovereignty claim, particular attention will be devoted to the process of how Japan has exerted power to construct a linear teleology between the past and the present to naturalise the essence of Japan's islands sovereignty since the 1950s. This will be followed by poststructuralist discourse analysis of Japan's construction of the Self/Other from 2008 to 2015 that will answer the following three questions: *how* did Japan shift the Self/Other construction in its discourse of the Senkaku Islands dispute from 2008 to 2015?; *how* did Japan securitise the Senkaku Islands from 2008 to 2015?; and, *how* did the Senkaku Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem? In the process of the analysis, I will precisely look at how Japan interpreted Imperial Japanese history in constructing the Self and Other, in order to see how the islands dispute started to become entangled with the history problem on Japan's side.

4.1 Reappraisal of Japan's Sovereignty Claim

How has Japan discursively constructed the Senkaku Islands sovereignty claim from the 1950s onwards? In order to answer this question, I revisit Japan's Senkaku Islands sovereignty claim in this section by unveiling the process of how Japan has discursively constructed its ownership of the Senkaku Islands by giving meaning to particular representations of the history and past events.

To start with, according to Tomabechi (2016, 2018), Japan did not have clear recognition of the Senkaku Islands, at least, in a period from the 1950s to the mid-1960s. Since Imperial Japan made a file in October 1933, titled 'International Law Preceding Collection (国際法先例彙輯)' that recorded that the Senkaku Islands had been incorporated into Imperial Japan following the relevant international law – the principle of *terra nullius*,[54] this file has been kept at the Japanese MOFA even after the end of World War II (2018, pp. 133–134). Nevertheless, the Diet record of the 1950s demonstrates that the then-Japanese government did not have clear recognition of the islands. For instance, when six fishermen of Okinawa were either killed or abducted by a Taiwanese junk in the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands in March 1955, the then-Asia director of the Japanese MOFA, Nakagawa Tōru, could not name the specific proper nouns of the islands, and thus he instead noted in the Diet, 'an island in the southernmost part of Ryūkyū, being very close to Taiwan, a very small island' (Tomabechi, 2016, p. 25). Tomabechi (2016) notes that a similar kind of ambiguous terms was repeatedly used in the Diet throughout the 1950s. At that time, the Senkaku Islands were under the US administration along with the Ryūkyū Islands under the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) (1951). Therefore, since 1951, the US was actually using two of the Senkaku Islands as shooting exercise areas under the permission of the Japanese government (Urano, 2005, pp. 145–146; Ōshima, 2017, pp. 95–96). However, as the Diet records demonstrate, at that time, the Senkaku Islands were not playing a crucial role in Japan's boundary inscription in the ECS.

As noted in the Introduction, it was only in the late 1960s when Japan started to build up its Senkaku Islands sovereignty claim incrementally. When it was becoming increasingly viable to negotiate with the US over the return of the Ryūkyū (Okinawa) Islands in 1967, Japanese politicians started to use the term 'the Senkaku Archipelago (尖閣群島)' in the Diet in order to problematise the local Taiwanese people living on the islands (Tomabechi, 2016, pp.26-27). It was the then-US director of MOFA, Tōgō Kazuhiko, who criticised this case by using a term 'violation of the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands (尖閣列島) and others' for

[54] '*Terra nullius*' means 'vacant territory'. This is one of the five modes of acquisition through which a state may acquire additional territory. O'Shea (2012, p.72) explains that *terra nullius* implies 'occupying land over which there is no sovereign, but it is not always clear whether a territory is in fact *terra nullius* or not'.

the first time in the Diet in August 1968 (Tomabechi, 2016, p.26). In the following year, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) published a report, suggesting that there might be major hydrocarbon reserves, including oil and natural gas, underneath the waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Han-Yi, 1999). Since then, increasing regional attention started to be paid to the sovereignty of the islands throughout the process of the Japan-US negotiation over the Okinawa Reversion Agreement that was reached in 1971.

Eventually, it was only in September 1970, when Japan started to clarify that regarding the possession of the Senkaku Islands, 'they clearly belong to Japan', and so 'there exists no necessity to negotiate with any governments' (Tomabechi, 2016, pp.33-35). Since the Japanese MOFA released the 'Basic view on the Senkaku Islands' (1972) that clarified Japan's Senkaku Islands sovereignty in light of the relevant history and past events, Japan's sovereignty claim has been consistently centred on the international law. Based on the principle of *terra nullius* that implies 'occupying land over which there is no sovereign' (O'Shea, 2012, p.72), the 'Basic view on the Senkaku Islands' (1972) highlighted that 'not only were they [i.e., the Senkaku Islands] uninhabited islands, but it was carefully confirmed that there were no traces of Qing territory, and a Cabinet decision was made on 14th January 1895, to build a marker on the site, and they were officially approved'. Additionally, Japan also based its sovereignty claim on the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) that 'legally confirmed post-war Japan's sovereignty' (1972). Specifically, Japan interpreted that in the Article three of the SFPT, the Senkaku Islands started to be administered by the US as the part of 'the Southwest Islands (南西諸島)'; however, the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands was returned to Japan in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty (ibid.). The 'Basic view on the Senkaku Islands' clearly illustrates that when Japan naturalises the essence of its Senkaku Islands sovereignty, Japan based its sovereignty claim on international law and a post-war legal framework built on the SFPT.

After the vessel collision case of September 2010, the Japanese MOFA started to release 'Senkaku Problem Q&A' by further elaborating on the 'Basic view on the Senkaku Islands' of 1972 (Asahi, n.d.). After Japan's purchase of the three islands in September 2012, the Japanese MOFA set up a web page titled 'the

Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島)' (1972). In this, Japan put forth the following claim as regards the Senkaku Islands:

> There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are clearly an inherent part of the territory (固有の領土) of Japan, in light of historical facts and based upon international law. Indeed, the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control of Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands. Japan will act firmly and calmly to maintain its territorial integrity. Japan continues to strive for peace and stability in the region, which is to be established through the observance of international law.

By stating that the Senkaku Islands are 'an inherent part of the territory of Japan (固有の領土)', Japan highlights the inseparable historical, geographical, and ideational link between the islands and Japan; however, this term does not mean anything in light of international law (Tomabechi, 2016, pp.97-100, Midford, 2015, pp.184-185). Additionally, Japan's claim that 'Japan continues to strive for peace and stability in the region, which is to be established through the observance of international law' discursively constructs that Japan's protection of the Senkaku Islands sovereignty contributes to the regional peace and stability.

This section has looked at how Japan has constructed its Senkaku Islands sovereignty claim since the 1950s. As clearly illustrated above, in a period from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, Japan did not have clear recognition of the Senkaku Islands. It was only in 1967 when Japan started to call them as 'Senkaku Islands (尖閣群島/列島)', and Japan started to build up its sovereignty claim incrementally after the ECAFE's report of 1969. As demonstrated in the 'Basic view on the Senkaku Islands' (1972), Japan's sovereignty claim is primarily based on international law and a post-war legal framework built on the SFPT. Additionally, Japan rejects the possibility to negotiate the sovereignty of the islands with other states by stressing the inseparable historical, geographical, and ideational link between the islands and Japan by using a term, 'an inherent part of the territory of Japan (固有の領土)'. After Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012, Japan made a website, which justifies Japan's protection of the Senkaku Islands sovereignty by rendering that it would contribute to regional peace and stability. Thus far, I have illustrated the process of how Japan has discursively naturalised the essence of the Senkaku Islands sovereignty since the 1950s.

4.2 Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis

This section will set out the results of poststructuralist discourse analysis to answer the following three questions: *how* did Japan shift the Self/Other construction in its discourse of the Senkaku Islands dispute from 2008 to 2015?; *how* did Japan securitise the Senkaku Islands from 2008 to 2015?; and, *how* did the Senkaku Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem? As noted in Chapter 3, in order to analyse Japan's security discourse, I will specifically examine the following texts: speeches of prime ministers (i.e., Fukuda Yasuo, Asō Tarō, Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, Noda Yoshihiko, and Abe Shinzō); documents published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), other related governmental institutions; and, the records and laws passed by the Diet.

The chosen period for the poststructuralist discourse analysis (i.e., from 2008 to 2015) covers Japan's incremental securitisation of the Senkaku Islands that eventually evolved into the breakdown of post-war Japan's grand strategy – the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine' – that was characterised by a pragmatic and low-profile foreign policy based on Japan's highly constrained defence posture. Beginning in 2008, which witnessed the Sino-Japanese agreement to tacitly set aside the history problem and jointly develop the gas field in the ECS via the 'Sino-Japanese Joint Statement on Comprehensively Promoting Strategic and Reciprocal Relations' (henceforth, 'the Joint Statement') and 'Principled Consensus on the East China Sea Issue' (henceforth, 'the Principled Consensus'), respectively, the targeted period can chart the process of how Japan incrementally shifted its Self/Other construction by problematising the following initial events surrounding the Senkaku Islands: China's dispatch of its two official ships in the Senkaku Islands territorial waters in December 2008; the vessel collision incident of September 2010; and normalised China's patrol near the islands since September 2012. Moreover, I will examine how Japan shifted the islands discourse and security policy after its reconciliation with China in November 2014 via 'the Sino-Japanese Four Articles of Principled Consensus'. In parallel with Japan's islands discourse, I will also look at how Japan interpreted Imperial Japanese history from 2008 to 2015 by keeping the agreement of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement of 2008 that stipulated, 'the two sides resolved

to face history squarely, advance toward the future'. In the analysis, therefore, I will devote particular attention to prime ministers' stance on their visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and Japan's past apology for the war victims, such as the Murayama statement in August 1995 that has been considered to be 'the most complete apology by a top Japanese leader since the end of the war' (Stockwin and Ampiah, 2017, p. 161). By doing so, I will track the link between the Senkaku Islands dispute and the history problem.

The following section will be presented by splitting up a period from 2008 to 2015 into five, depending on the degree of Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands (cf. Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Japan's Levels of Securitisation

	Time	Characterised by…
Period I	January 2008 to December 2008	The honeymoon period between Fukuda and Hu, who agreed on the Joint Statement and Principled Consensus, and the Diet discussions that called for the strengthened Senkaku Islands sovereignty
Period II	January 2009 to August 2010	Beginning of Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands that renders the US base in Okinawa as 'deterrence' against China's rise
Period III	September 2010 to September 2012	Japan's intensified securitisation after the vessel collision case of September 2010 that evolved into Japan's purchase of the Senkaku Islands in September 2012
Period IV	October 2012 to October 2014	Japan's explicit securitisation of the Senkaku Islands that led to its historic security reforms under the Abe administration
Period V	November 2014 to December 2015	The Sino-Japanese rapprochement in November 2014 and Abe's continued security reforms by passing the 'Peace and Security Law'

Herein, I firstly provide a brief overview of the five periods listed above. Firstly, Period I (from January 2008 to December 2008) is characterised by Japan's very positive Self/Other construction at the top-leaders' level that was specifically underpinned by the Joint Statement and Principled Consensus, thereby agreeing to tacitly set aside the history problem and jointly develop the ECS gas field. However, Period I also witnessed the Diet discussions that called for Japan's strengthened Senkaku Islands sovereignty. Period II (from January 2009 to August 2010) witnessed Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands after China's deployment of two official ships in the Senkaku Islands waters in December 2008. Although Prime Minister Hatoyama tried to advance the ECS co-development plan, it eventually failed. In the Diet, securitisation of the Senkaku Islands eventually justified the existence of the US base in Okinawa as 'deterrence' against China's rise. In Period III (from September 2010 to September 2012), Japan intensified securitisation of the Senkaku Islands after the vessel collision case of September 2010. Thus, Japan not only justified a 'Dynamic Defense System' in the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) in December 2010 but also Japan's purchase of the privately-owned three Senkaku Islands in September 2012. This was followed by the most explicit securitisation of Period IV (from October 2012 to October 2014), which witnessed Japan's radical security reforms under the Abe administration that ultimately broke down the 'Yoshida Doctrine'. At the same time, in Period IV, Prime Minister Abe started to express his revisionist worldview in the Diet and visited the Yasukuni Shrine, whilst breaching the Joint Consensus of 2008 – 'face history squarely'. Although Japan reconciled with China in Period V in November 2014 via the Sino-Japanese Four Articles of Principled Consensus and Abe stopped his explicitly revisionist remarks and visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, Japan continued to rearm itself and then, in September 2015, passed the 'Peace and Security Law' that legalised the collective self-defence by securitising the Senkaku Islands. The following section will specifically look at each period in chronological order.

4.2.1 Period I (January 2008 – December 2008): Honeymoon Period between the Leaders and the Diet Discussions That Called for the Strengthened Senkaku Islands Sovereignty

As Figure 4.2 shows below, Period I was characterised by Japan's positive and negative renderings of the Self/Other in the context of the ECS. The vertical axis in the figure shows the Self/Other difference, and the horizontal one differentiates the positive/negative elements. The yellow square shows Japan's principal stance on the islands dispute, and the blue box at the bottom shows Japan's islands/security policies. Period I started with a honeymoon period, at least, on a level of leaders between Japan and China. In May 2008, following General Secretary Hu Jintao's visit to Japan, Japan and China agreed to advance the Sino-Japanese relations via the Joint Statement, and also, in June 2008, they agreed on the joint development of the ECS gas field in the Principled Consensus. In these agreements, Japan consistently constructed the Self/Other positively. Nevertheless, these agreements were reached in parallel with a mixture of positive and negative construction of the Other in the Diet that justified Japan's strengthening of the Senkaku Islands sovereignty. After China's deployment of two official ships in the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands on 8th December 2008, which took place for the first time since the outset of the dispute, Japan started to de-link positive elements from the Other by dominantly highlighting China's negative elements.

Figure 4.2: Period I, Japan's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts



Period I started with Sino-Japanese close cooperation[55] to repair the severely damaged relations after Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō's (2001-2006) multiple visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Soon after General Secretary Hu Jintao's visit to Japan to see Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo in May 2008, the Japanese MOFA published the Joint Statement on 7th May, and this was swiftly followed by the Principled Consensus on 18th June 2008. The former statement marked the fourth important Sino-Japanese agreement in the history of the contemporary Sino-Japanese relations (Japanese MOFA, 2008a).[56] As regards the Principled Consensus, Japan and China

[55] Although Sino-Japanese relations were severely damaged during the Koizumi administration (2001-2006) by his yearly visit to the Yasukuni Shrine throughout his term, as soon as Abe became the prime minister in September 2006, China switched to a pro-Japan policy. During Abe's visit to China in October 2006, Abe, General Secretary Hu, and Premier Wen agreed on Hu's and Wen's visit to Japan, implementation of Sino-Japanese consultations on the issue of the ECS, and Sino-Japanese cooperation to promote 'Strategic and Reciprocal Relations' (Iida, 2013, p. 46).

[56] The first one was the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué in 1972 that established diplomatic relations; the second one was the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (PTF) in 1978 that officially settled down the war; and in 1998, Japan and China reached the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration.

agreed to jointly develop the gas field in the ECS, specifically by agreeing to co-develop the areas shown in pink in the following map, including Shirakaba (白樺: Japanese)/Chunxiao(春暁: Chinese) (Japanese MOFA, 2008c) (cf. Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: A Map of Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the ECS



Therefore, the Joint Statement coupled with the Principled Consensus of 2008 – which marked the thirtieth anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) of 1978 – signified the firm determination of Japan to move its relations forward by agreeing to pursue the 'strategic and reciprocal relations' and jointly develop the gas field in the ECS.

In the Joint Statement in May 2008, Japan constructed the Other positively (Japanese MOFA, 2008a):

> The Japanese side expressed its positive evaluation of the fact that China's development since the start of reform and open policy, saying China's development has offered great opportunities for the international community including Japan. The Japanese side stated its support of China's resolve to contribute to the building of a world that fosters lasting peace and common prosperity.

Herein, Japan constructively evaluated China's economic development since the open and reform policy in 1978 as well as China's peaceful and harmonious development. Moreover, the Joint Statement stressed the following positive commonalities between the Self and Other: Japan and China sharing 'responsibility for peace, stability, and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world', and their 'sole option is to cooperate to enhance peace and friendship over the long term'. There was a reference to an element, 'history'; however, the Joint Statement did not condemn Japan for its Imperial history, but explained, 'the two sides resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future, and endeavor with persistence to create a new era of a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests (戦略的互恵関係)" between Japan and China' (ibid.). Reflecting Japan's determination to put an end to Japan's construction of the Self based on a revisionist worldview[57] – including Japan's justification of prime ministers' visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the Joint Statement linked the element, 'face history squarely', to the Self.[58]

Japan's positive construction of the Self/Other was substantiated in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in the Principled Consensus in June 2008. It specifically argued, 'Japan and China will endeavor to make the ECS, which has not yet been demarcated between China and Japan, a sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship' (Japanese MOFA, 2008b). Whilst carefully avoiding Japanese and Chinese proper nouns of the islands, the Principled Consensus linked positive elements – peace, cooperation, and friendship – equally to the Self/Other in the ECS context in order to justify the co-development of the gas field thereof. Thus, as the Joint Statement and the Principled Consensus demonstrated, on the Sino-Japanese leaders' level, Period I witnessed a honeymoon period of the Sino-Japanese relations.

Having said that, in the Diet, there were positive and negative reactions to these Sino-Japanese agreements. On the one hand, there was forward-looking discussion about the proposed 'strategic reciprocal relations' and Sino-Japanese co-

[57] Japanese revisionists, including Koizumi, deny the cruelty of Imperial Japanese war crimes and have a special affinity to the Yasukuni Shrine (Deans, 2007). Yet, in the eyes of Imperial Japanese victims, Japanese leaders' visit to the Yasukuni Shrine signifies Japan's lack of regret for the war crimes.

[58] Japan and China decided to set aside the history problem in 2006 by agreeing on the mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests (Kokubun, 2013, p. 12). This agreement was substantiated in the Joint Statement of 2008, which included the 'face history squarely' sentence.

development of the ECS gas field, which realistically proposed that Japan should not adhere to the rigid conception of the Senkaku sovereignty. For instance, in discussing the Sino-Japanese negotiation over the co-development plan, the LDP's Suzuki Keisuke (2008) stated on 28th February 2008, 'in order for both parties to approach each other, it is not necessary for each party to assert their own rights only, but it is important for each other to reduce the distance a little bit in the form that both parties can accept'. Additionally, interpreting the meaning of the 'strategic reciprocal relations', the LDP's Kanō Tokio (2008) highlighted the importance of being 'considerate of each other regarding very sensitive matters for public sentiment'.

On the other hand, there were discussions in the Diet that called for strengthened Japan's Senkaku Islands sovereignty via education, Japan's uncompromising stance in the negotiation with China, and a new maritime law that stipulates how to deal with foreign ships entering Japan's territorial waters. First, two days after the announcement of the Joint Statement, the DPJ's Kawakami Yoshihiro (2008) problematised not only preceding China's development of the gas field in the disputed areas of the ECS but also the possibility of China's purchase of the Senkaku Islands from their Japanese private owner. Moreover, in June 2008, Japan passed the Law on the Navigation of Foreign Ships in Territorial Waters, which stipulated how to deal with foreign ships that enter the territorial waters of Japan. In the Diet discussion on this law of 10th April 2008, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLITT) (2008) clarified that this law would be applied to the Senkaku Islands territorial waters too, in consultation with relevant ministries and other government agencies. Therefore, on the leader-to-leader level, Japan consistently constructed the Self/Other positively in Period I, but simultaneously, in the Diet discussions, some politicians were trying to strengthen Japan's Senkaku Islands sovereignty.

The momentum for the Sino-Japanese cooperation in the ECS was eventually lost in the last quarter of Period I. In September 2008, pro-Chinese Fukuda resigned the post as the prime minister, whilst giving way to the LDP's Asō Tarō, who was prominently known for his critical stance on China. More importantly, on 8th December 2008, just before the Japan-China-Korean Trilateral Summit held in Fukuoka, two official Chinese ships entered and drifted in the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, for the first time since the outset of the dispute. On 12th

December 2008, in the Diet discussion at the security committee, the DPJ's Mabuchi Sumio (2008) problematised this case as 'a crisis that weakens Japan's security' and argued that 'Japan must take a resolute attitude, and I think, it [this case] is a sign that it [Japan's resolute attitude] was not enough'. Mabuchi (2008) also called for the Self Defense Forces' (SDF's) more proactive operations near the islands to increase the 'deterrence (抑止力)'. The positive elements linked to the Other – peace, friendship, and cooperation – started to be de-linked since this event of December 2008, whilst giving way to Japan's negative construction of the Other.

When it comes to Japanese leaders' interpretation of Imperial Japanese history, in Period I, Japan consistently refrained from reflecting a revisionist worldview in constructing the Self. By doing so, Japan kept the agreement of the Joint Statement – 'the two sides resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future'. Being different from Koizumi, Fukuda had consistently differentiated Imperial Japanese history from the current Self by opposing the Japanese leaders' visits to the Yasukuni shrine.[59] Additionally, although Asō Tarō (2006) was a revisionist, who even proposed to make the Yasukuni Shrine a national memorial in 2006, after Asō became the prime minister in September 2008, he toned down the revisionist argument regarding the Yasukuni Shrine. Specifically, when Asō (2008) was asked about his stance on the Yasukuni Shrine in the Diet, he stated, 'I am not in a position to discuss how this religious corporation should be'. Thus, in Period I, both Fukuda and Asō followed the agreement of the Joint Statement of 2008, thereby differentiating Imperial Japanese history from the current Self.

4.2.2 Period II (January 2009 – August 2010): Beginning of Japan's Securitisation of the Senkaku Islands That Renders the US Base in Okinawa as 'Deterrence' against China's Rise

As Figure 4.4 below shows, in Period II, Japan started to securitise the Senkaku Islands by linking them to the 'deterrence' of the US base in Okinawa. The red square shows Asō's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the gray one shows de-linked

[59] For instance, when Fukuda was the Minister of State of the Koizumi administration in 2003, Fukuda proposed to build a secular 'national memorial (国家追悼施設)' that can mourn the war dead – not only Japanese victims (excluding Class-A war criminals) but also 'foreign soldiers and civilians who lost their lives due to the war engaged by Imperial Japan' (Fukuda, 2003).

positive elements of China. Japan's demands for China are shown in the green square at the bottom. Period II started with Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands that problematised China's military expansion and China's dispatch of its official ships in the islands territorial waters in December 2008. In Period II, Japan started to problematise the possibility of China's Senkaku Islands invasion with references to the SCS case, and so in February 2009, Prime Minister Asō stated in the Diet that the Japan-US Security Treaty would be applied to the Senkaku Islands. After the landslide Lower House election of 30th August 2009 that resulted in the historic regime shift from the LDP to DPJ, regardless of Japan's securitisation of China in the Diet in the former 2009, Prime Minister Hatoyama suggested to promote Sino-Japanese cooperation and make the ECS a 'sea of friendship (友愛の海)', whilst referring to the post-Germany-French relations that got over the history of repeated wars. Notwithstanding, before making the ECS a 'sea of friendship' Hatoyama resigned the position as the prime minister in June 2010. Besides, against the backdrop of Hatoyama's bid for relocating the US Marines Air Station in Futenma out of Okinawa prefecture, in the Diet, Japan crystalised securitisation of the Senkaku Islands to justify the existence of the US base in Okinawa as crucial 'deterrence (抑止力)' to counter China's rise, during the Hatoyama administration. When it comes to Japan's interpretation of Imperial Japanese history, Period II witnessed Asō's allegedly 'private' visit to the Yasukuni shrine on 22nd April 2009 during the Spring Festival. However, after that, explaining that Hatoyama would stick to the 'Murayama statement' in the Sino-Japanese Summit in October 2009, Hatoyama made it clear that he had no intention of taking a revisionist stance like his predecessor, Asō. Since then, Hatoyama and Kan maintained the stance of 'face history squarely' following the Joint Statement of 2008 throughout Period II.

Figure 4.4: Period II, Japan's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts



Period II began with Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands that problematised China's dispatch of two official ships in the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands in December 2008 and its military expansion. The most outstanding securitisation was exemplified by the Diet discussion between Prime Minister Asō and the DPJ's Maehara Seiji (2009) on 26th February 2009. Referring to the China's territorial dispute in the South China Sea (SCS), Maehara explained the Senkaku Islands invasion scenario arguing that in the SCS dispute, at the beginning, China dispatched 'survey ships', next 'patrol' was conducted, and then 'a warship came out' to effectively control the islands. According to Maehara, the December 2008 event signified the beginning of the 'patrols' phase in the ECS. When Maehara asked

Asō's 'willingness to protect the sovereignty of the islands', Asō clarified, 'as the Senkaku Islands are an inherent territory of Japan, they are subject to the Japan-US Security Treaty'.[60] Moreover, Maehara problematised the rapidly expanding China's military budget and its opacity, whilst suggesting Asō to obtain the US' pledge to protect the Senkaku Islands in case Japan is militarily attacked by China. Herein, positive elements of the Other – peaceful and harmonious development – was explicitly de-linked from China. Additionally, on 24th March 2009, the LDP's Satō Masataka (2009) problematised the modernisation of the PLA and China's aircraft carrier construction, which would 'affect the defense of the Senkaku Islands, including their territory, territorial waters, and airspace' in future. All in all, the 171st Diet discussions (from the beginning of 2009 to July 2009) on the Senkaku Islands dominantly justified maintaining or strengthening the Japan-US alliance by problematising China's increasing activities near the Senkaku Islands (e.g., Matsubara, 2009; Shimajiri, 2009). Thus, China's dispatch of official ships of December 2008 played an important role in constructing the increasingly threatening Other, thereby justifying Japan's vigilant stance on China. In terms of the JCG's Senkaku Islands policy, the Law on the Navigation of Foreign Ships in Territorial Waters that had been passed in Period I was put into effect in February 2009. In the same month, the JCG created an 'arresting manual' that stipulated how to deal with illegal fishing activities near the Senkaku Islands (Sunohara, 2013, p. 4).

Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands in the first half of 2009 was followed by the historic regime shift from the LDP to the DPJ that took place in the landslide Lower House election of 30th August 2009. The new DPJ government led by Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio put forward 'the East Asian Community (EAC) (東アジア共同体)' plan based on 'friendship diplomacy (友愛外交)′ . In the DPJ manifesto published in July 2009, Hatoyama clarified that under the EAC, 'we [the DPJ] will do our best to build trust with Asian countries, including China and South Korea' (2009, p. 22). More specifically, whilst acknowledging the massive

[60] It was in 1996 when the application of the Japan-US Security Treaty started to become the focal point in the Senkaku Islands dispute, after the US Ambassador in Tokyo Walter F. Mondale stated in the New York Times, 'The United States takes no position on who owns the islands' and 'American forces would not be compelled by the treaty to intervene in a dispute over them' (Kristof, 1996). After Japan problematised this remark, the US Department of Defense confirmed the application of the Japan-US Security Treaty to the Senkaku Islands (Ōshima, 2017, p. 201), and since then, Japan had repeatedly reconfirmed it.

difference between the EU and the situations in East Asia, Hatoyama (2009) explained in the Diet that 'it is important to first promote regional cooperation in possible areas such as trade and investment, finance, the environment, and education'. Regardless of the securitisation of the Senkaku Islands in the former 2009 in the Diet, pro-Chinese Hatoyama linked many positive elements to the Other until his resignation as the prime minister in July 2010. In the Sino-Japanese summit meeting with State Council Wen Jiabao in Beijing on 10th October 2009, whilst problematising China's unilateral development of the gas field in the Shirakaba/Chunxiao, Hatoyama highlighted the importance of making the ECS a 'sea of friendship (友愛の海)' with references to the post-war German-French cooperation (Japanese MOFA, 2009):

> Prime Minister Hatoyama has taken the example of Germany and France and stated that Germany and France had been involved in many wars but started cooperating in the fields of coal and steel, resulting in a large framework – the EU. Like Germany and France, Prime Minister Hatoyama hopes that Japan and China cooperate in the ECS, promote joint work in the field of mining such as oil or natural gas, and unite public sentiment between Japan and China. Following the agreement of 2008, Hatoyama stated that he would like to promote further cooperation and make it a 'sea of friendship (友愛の海)'. In addition, Prime Minister Hatoyama told Hu that he was worried about China's movement in Shirakaba.

Referring to the case of post-war Germany-French relations that recovered from the long history of repeated wars, Hatoyama highlighted the necessity of Sino-Japanese cooperation in the ECS. Although the Japanese Diet had dominantly securitised the Senkaku Islands after December 2008, herein, Hatoyama reconfirmed to promote the Principled Consensus of 2008 that was reached in the Sino-Japanese honeymoon period during Period I. Whilst criticising China's unilateral development of the Shirakaba/Chunxiao, Hatoyama linked the positive element – 'friendship (友愛)' – to the Self/Other relations in the ECS. The same positive element, 'friendship', was repeated by Hatoyama in constructing the Self/Other in ECS in the Sino-Japanese summit meeting with Wen on 31st May 2010, although Hatoyama also expressed his worry over 'Chinese actions in the waters around Japan' (Japanese MOFA, 2010).[61] Notwithstanding, Hatoyama announced to resign the position as the prime minister two days after the Sino-Japanese Summit of 31st May 2010.

[61] At that time, Japan problematised the PLA's provocative actions in the ECS. Specifically, Chinese helicopters flew from PLA naval vessels abnormally approached the Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer on 8th and 21st April 2010, during China's naval exercise in the ECS.

Regardless of the Hatoyama's consistently positive construction of the Self/Other in Period II, the Diet discussions were more critical of China. In the 174th Diet session (from the beginning of 2010 to mid-June 2010), the focal point of the Diet discussion was primarily concerned with the relocation of the US base in Okinawa prefecture. Although Okinawa prefecture accounts for only 0.6 percent of Japan's territory, 70.3 percent of the US bases in Japan are located in Okinawa (Japan MOD, 2019). Problematising this situation, Hatoyama promised to seek 'equal Japan-US relations' (2009, p. 22) in the DPJ manifesto.[62] Specifically, he proposed to reconsider the Japan-US agreement of 2006 that had decided to relocate the US Marines Air Station in Futenma to Nago within Okinawa (Miyagi, 2015) (cf. Figure 4.5). In order to reduce the disproportionate military burden to Okinawa, Hatoyama was trying to find alternative places out of Okinawa to relocate the US Marines Air Station in Futenma until the end of May 2010.

Figure 4.5: A Map of US Bases in Okinawa



[62] Hatoyama (2009b) problematised the Japan-US alliance by arguing that it did not 'really respect the will of the Japanese people'. For instance, according to Hatoyama (2009b), Japan should have told the US that 'the US should stop the war' in the wake of the Iraq war, although Japan dispatched the SDF to Iraq when 'the US had told Japan, "boots on the ground."'

Against this background, the 174th Diet session witnessed that multiple politicians who were against Hatoyama and even ministers of the Hatoyama cabinet, such as Nagashima, Maehara, further securitised the Senkaku Islands in order to justify the existing Japan-US agreement of 2006 to relocate the US Marines Futenma Air Station to Nago within Okinawa prefecture, by stressing the importance of 'deterrence (抑止力)' of the US base in Okinawa to counter China's rise. For example, in the Diet discussion of 28th April 2010, the LDP's Hirasawa Katsunobu (2010) problematised that Chinese helicopters flying from PLA naval vessels had abnormally approached the Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer on 8th and 21st April 2010, during China's naval exercise in the ECS. In response, Vice-Minister Nigashima (2010) stated, 'although we have been closely watching the expansion of the PLA as a whole, especially in the ECS and the SCS, and recently in the ECS, China's particularly navy has been growing or active in this area'. And then, Nagashima (2010) highlighted the importance of Japan's review of its security policy: 'in future, it will be questioned how Japan will respond to such trends in the Chinese military, including reviewing Japan's NDPG, or how it will respond in the context of the Japan-US alliance'. In the discussion of 18th May 2010 with the LDP's Satō Masahisa, Nagashima (2010) even hinted that from the viewpoint of the 'deterrence (抑止力)' against China's usurpation of the Senkaku Islands, Japan needs to keep the US Marines base in Okinawa. Additionally, problematising China's military expansion and China's sovereignty claim over the Senkaku Islands, Minister of State Maehara (2010) stated on 10th May 2010, 'considering the current situation, it is certain that the existence of the SDF or the US military, mainly in Okinawa, has become a major deterrent (抑止力) for Japan'.

On 2nd June 2010, Prime Minister Hatoyama proposed to resign the position as the prime minister as his negotiation with the US to relocate the base out of Okinawa ended up in a stalemate. In the Upper House election of 11th July 2010, Kan Naoto succeeded Hatoyama as the DPJ's prime minister. The DPJ's manifesto (2010) continuously held up the realisation of the EAC that had not been much substantiated under the Hatoyama administration; however, Kan deleted the sentence of the manifesto of 2009, 'review the US military base in Japan' (DPJ, 2009), and instead wrote, 'regarding the relocation of the Futenma base, we will do our utmost

to reduce the burden on Okinawa based on the Japan-US agreement [of 2006]' (DPJ, 2010). Hence, Japan's threat construction of China over the Senkaku Islands in Period II eventually served to justify cancelling the Hatoyama's suggestion to relocate the Futenma Air Station out of the Okinawa prefecture.

When it comes to Japan's interpretation of Imperial Japanese history, Period II witnessed Asō's allegedly 'private' visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on 22nd April 2009 during the Spring Festival, thereby deviating from the Joint Statement of 2008 that promised Japan would 'face history squarely'. After China condemned Japan for this event, the Minister of State Nakasone Hirofumi (2009) stated in the Diet, 'as confirmed by the leaders and last year's Joint Statement, the government will continue to promote strategic reciprocity in a comprehensive manner', and explained that Asō's visit was personal but not official. Asō himself did not give any explanation for this in the Diet. When Hatoyama met Wen at the Sino-Japanese Summit on 10th October 2009, Wen touched 'the history problem', but Hatoyama reassured China by stating that Hatoyama sticks to the 'Murayama statement' (Japanese MOFA, 2009):

> Prime Minister Wen said that there is a history problem as an issue that the Chinese people are paying attention to, and in response, Prime Minister Hatoyama stated he adheres to the 'Murayama statement', he has taken the right attitude to look squarely at history, and he would like to look into history and build a future-oriented relationship between Japan and China.

Herein, Hatoyama clarified that he adheres to the 'Murayama statement', thus making it clear that he had no intention of taking a revisionist stance like his predecessor, Asō. Since then, Hatoyama and Kan maintained the stance of 'face history squarely' following the Joint Statement of 2008 throughout Period II.

4.2.3 Period III (September 2010 – September 2012): Japan's Intensified Securitisation After the Vessel Collision Case That Evolved into Japan's Purchase of the Senkaku Islands

As Figure 4.6 below shows, Period III started with a vessel collision case, in which a fishing vessel steered by a drunken Chinese man violently collided his vessel with two ships of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial waters, on 7th September 2010. In Period III, Japan obtained the US' pledge to

protect the Senkaku Islands under the Japan-US Security Treaty and started to problematise China's activities near the Senkaku Islands in the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) in December 2010, thereby strengthening Japan's military capability to deal with the Chinese activities near the islands. Despite that the Hatoyama administration linked positive elements in constructing the Other in Period II, in Period III, Japan dominantly linked negative elements to China in the ECS, whilst further crystalising the 'China threat' discourse. Specifically, in Period III, Japan started to link 'a rule of law country' to the Self, whilst constructing the Other as a lack of 'common sense' in 'international society', pursuing 'expansionism and coercion', and based on the 'rule by might' but not 'rule of right'. Japan's intensified securitisation of the Senkaku Islands after the vessel collision case eventually evolved into Japan's purchase of the Senkaku Islands from their private owner – Mr. Kurihara – on 11th September 2012. Throughout Period III, Kan and Noda maintained the stance of 'face history squarely' of the Joint Statement of 2008.

Figure 4.6: Period III, Japan's Construction of the Self/Other and Policy Shifts



Period III started with an upheaval in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. On 7th September 2010, a fishing vessel steered by a drunken Chinese man violently collided his vessel with two ships of the JCG in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial waters, thereby resulting in a loss of 14 million yen of the JCG's ships (Hayashi, 2014). Without asking for a decision of the high government officials and political leaders, the local JCG personnel followed the 'arresting manual', which was made under the Asō administration in February 2009 during Period II, and arrested the Chinese captain for obstructing the JCG in the performance of their duties, according to then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito (Sunohara, 2013, p. 14). On 24th March 2004, when seven Chinese activists were arrested by Japan for

landing on one of the islands, then-Prime Minister Koizumi quickly released them by ordering their 'forced repatriation' without committing the suspects for trial, in order not to damage Sino-Japanese relations. However, this time, according to Sengoku, two DPJ leaders of the Kan Cabinet – then-Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism Minister Maehara Seiji and Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya – argued that the JCG's arrest of the Chinese captain was appropriate and Japan should apply the relevant Japanese law to this case (Sunohara, 2013, p. 12). Eventually, the Chinese captain was detained by Japan until 24th September 2010, and Sino-Japanese relations were seriously worsened during this period.

After the release of the Chinese captain, in the Diet discussion of 28th September, Maehara (2010) justified Japan's arrest of the Chinese captain and stated, 'it is a matter of course that Japan strictly responded based on Japanese law'. In response, the DPJ's Saitō Yoshitaka (2010) positively evaluated Japan's *modus operandi* as 'common sense as a rule of law country' and interpreted China's call for Japan's apology and reparation for the damage of the Chinese vessel as a lack of 'common sense' in 'international society'. When it comes to Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands, it was most conspicuous in the Diet discussions of 30th September 2010. Firstly, the DPJ's Nagashima (2010) condemned the Chinese MOFA's remark that 'all Japanese judicial proceedings were illegal and invalid' and argued '[China's] unreasonable attitude is noticeable'. Moreover, Nagashima (2010) argued that 'reciprocity does not come at the expense of sovereignty or territory', and then interpreted that this case signified China's 'intense national willingness' and he called for Japan's 'expression of national willingness' too. When Nagashima asked if the US confirmed the application of Article V of the Japan-US Security Treaty[63], Foreign Minister Maehara answered (2010):

> In talking with Secretary Clinton, it was clearly stated that the Senkaku Islands are under the Japanese administration and that Article V of the Japan-US Security Treaty would be applied to the Japanese administration. At the same time, it is important to note that not only Japan's security but also the Japan-US alliance is a public good for the stability of the Asia-Pacific. Both parties have agreed on the common understanding that, including these, it is extremely important as a public good for the stability of this region.

[63] The Article V stipulates the US' support of Japan when Japan is militarily attacked: 'Each Party recognises that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes (Japanese MOFA, n.d.)'.

Being different from Period II – that only witnessed Asō's remark that the Japan-US Security Treaty would be applied to the Senkaku Islands after the December 2008 case – in Period III, Foreign Minister Maehara directly met the US Secretary Clinton and confirmed the application of the Japan-US Security Treaty to the Senkaku Islands, whilst enhancing Japan's potential military capability surrounding the Senkaku Islands. Maehara met Clinton on 23rd September 2010, and it was on the following day when the detained Chinese captain was finally released by Japan. Given that the Chinese captain was drunk when he was arrested on his private ship, it was retrospectively possible for Japan to interpret this event as an accidental event (Okada, 2017). Nevertheless, in Period III, whilst problematising this event as a vindication of a rising China's challenge to Japan, Japan validated the US' application of the Japan-US Security Treaty to the Senkaku Islands, thereby bolstering Japan's military capability in the ECS. Additionally, when the LDP's Shimomura Hakubun (2010) problematised the lack of description that 'the Senkaku Islands are an inherent territory of Japan' in the High School textbooks in the Educational Science Committee on 29th October 2010, in response, Minister of State agreed on this point.

After the release of the Chinese captain, Prime Minister Kan problematised 'China's rise', but still maintained positive elements of the Other, in order to repair the damaged Sino-Japanese relations. For instance, in the Diet discussion of 1st October 2010, Kan (2010) stated:

> In recent years, China's rise has been remarkable, and there is concern about strengthening invisible defense capabilities and increasing marine activities from the Indian Ocean to the ECS. […] We expect China to play appropriate roles and actions as a responsible member of the international community. Even if various problems arise between Japan and China, it is important that neighbouring countries cope calmly. Regarding Sino-Japanese relations in general, we believe that efforts by Japan and China to deepen strategic reciprocity from a global perspective are essential, including peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, and progress in economic cooperation.

Herein, on the one hand, Kan problematised 'China's rise' that was underpinned by China's 'strengthening invisible defense capabilities and increasing maritime activities' and 'increasing maritime activities'. On the other hand, Kan tried to re-establish the Sino-Japanese relations by linking positive elements and called for the bilateral efforts 'to deepen strategic reciprocity from a global perspective' and 'peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region'.

However, after the vessel collision case, the DPJ government started to be harshly criticised by the Opposition in the Diet. In particular, the LDP put forward an interpretation that the vessel collision case occurred because China took advantage of the weakened Japan-US alliance against the backdrop of the Hatoyama's plan to relocate the US base out of Okinawa. The LDP's Tanigaki Sadakazu (2010) specifically argued, 'the more serious question is that China may have taken on more offensive in light of the recent dilution of Japan-US relations'. Additionally, in asking Kan about his view on China's rise, the Your Party's (みんなの党) Mizuno Kenichi (2010) argued, 'considering the recent attitude of China in the gas field of the ECS, the expansion into the SCS, and the enhancement of naval power, the background of the [vessel collision] incident seems to be China′ s expansionism and coercion as a great power (大国主義)'. Moreover, in the same Diet session, the LDP's Kishi Nobuo (2010) also criticised Kan by stating that the vessel collision incident was the result of 'China's maritime advance' that occurred in a way to take advantage of the weakened Japan-US alliance.

Eventually, after the vessel collision case, Japan started to express its security concern about China explicitly in its defence policy. On 17th December 2010, Japan published the 'NDPG FY 2011 and beyond' (Japan MOD, 2010) that clarified that China's 'insufficient transparency' over its military expansion coupled with 'expanding and intensifying its maritime activities in the surrounding waters' are 'of concern for the regional and global community'. Given that the previous NDPG published in December 2004 stated, 'we will have to remain attentive to its [China's] future actions' (Japan MOD, 2004), the level of Japan's security concern about China was clearly elevated in December 2010, reflecting the increased tensions over the Senkaku Islands dispute. Although Japan's defence had been bound by the concept of 'Basic Defense Capability' in the previous NDPG, the NDPG of 2010 newly proposed to build-up a 'Dynamic Defense Force' that enables Japan's 'effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilise the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner' (Japan MOD, 2018, p. 218). In explaining the new NDGP of 2010, on the previous day of the NDGP publication, the DPJ's Nagashima (2010) explained in the Diet that China's foreign stance is 'a nineteenth-century style that pushes national

will to the foreground with power' as demonstrated in the Senkaku Islands dispute case, whilst calling for Japan's establishment of a posture that 'we protect our own country' because this is ' a matter of course as a sovereign state'.

Eventually, even after the Diet discussion on the vessel collision case became low-key, Japan maintained its stance to render the Other negatively in the ECS context throughout Period III, whilst diplomatically calling for the 'strategic reciprocity'. For instance, on 22nd February, former-diplomat-cum scholar Okamoto Yukio (2011) was invited to, and explained at, the Diet that 'China actually appears in the Pacific Ocean, has over 60 submarines, including nuclear missile-carrying ships, and appears to be building multiple aircraft carriers, and thus, referring to such facts, I think that Japan should establish coping ability'. Additionally, on 16th February 2011 – the year marked the one hundred anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution – Kan (2009) criticised China with references to the Sun Yat-sen's criticism of Imperial Japan:

> In the famous Sun Yat-sen's speech in Japan, he confronted the militarised Japan at that time with the words, whether to choose the rule by might (覇道) or rule of right (王道)[64] and in a sense, they are very important to us today. In some cases, on the contrary, I feel like asking China the same question.

Despite that in the Joint Statement of 2008 in Period I, Japan had positively evaluated China's 'peaceful and harmonious development', as this Kan's remark demonstrates, in Period III, Japan de-linked such a positive element by crystalising the meaning of China as a rising power that does not obey the rule of international society by pursuing 'the rule by might' but not 'right'.

Even after Noda Yoshihiko replaced Kan and became the new DPJ prime minister on 2nd September 2011, Japan continued to securitise the Senkaku Islands in Period III. On 31st January, the LDP's Machimura Nobutaka (2012) harshly criticised Noda for his 'weak-kneed (及び腰)' stance on Japan's territorial defence. Pointing out that *People's Daily* on that day reported that the Diaoyu Islands fell in China's 'core interests (核心的利益)',[65] Machimura (2012) problematised Japan's

[64] Mencius (孟子) – a Chinese Confucian during the Warring States period – put forward that the former is based on militarism and the latter is based on the principle of civilian control, and the latter is ideal.

[65] China stopped using this expression, at least, by June 2013. Although it was reported that at the Sino-US Summit on 7th June 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping called the Senkaku Islands as

lack of law that justifies Japan's use of force to warn China's private ships near the Senkaku Islands. In this context, on 16th April, the Mayor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintarō – a well-known revisionist-cum-anti-Chinese statesman – revealed his plan that Tokyo would purchase the privately owned three of the Senkaku Islands, in his speech at the Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C.. Later on, Ishihara also announced his idea to develop the islands by establishing a fisheries base and building a port to strengthen Japan's sovereignty; and Ishihara's plan was backed by Japanese citizens who responded by donating a total of more than 1.4 billion yen to Tokyo by 10th August 2012. According to Noda (2017), when Noda met Ishihara on 19th August 2012 to dissuade Ishihara from conducting his provocative plan, Noda found out that 'Ishihara did not mind even if a conflict between Japan and China would occur in the event of a change in the island situation'. This meeting agreed that Noda could purchase the islands from the owner – Mr. Kurihara – to prevent Ishihara's provocative actions. In the Diet, the LDP supported Ishihara's plan. For example, on 3rd September 2012, the LDP's Satō Masahisa (2012) urged the Noda government to 'develop an evacuation port while maintaining a system to control illegal [Chinese] activities by having police stationed at the site [i.e., the Senkaku Islands]'. When Minister of State Fujimura Osamu (2012) answered that Japan would pursue 'peaceful and stable maintenance of the Senkaku Islands', Satō criticised that 'there is no government that cares so much about China', whilst calling for Japan's strengthened military capability to deal with the Chinese activities near the Senkaku Islands. Eventually, Japan purchased the islands from Mr. Kurihara on 11th September 2012.

When it comes to Japan's interpretation of Imperial Japanese history, Period III did not witness Japanese leaders' expression of the revisionist worldviews, thereby keeping the line of the Joint Statement of 2008 that stated Japan would 'face history squarely'. Although Noda (2005) once submitted a question letter to the Diet that argued the Class-A war criminals are not criminals in Japan in 2005, when Koizumi visited the Yasukuni shrine, after Noda became the prime minister, he refrained from expressing his revisionist worldview and visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. When his view on the Japanese prime minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine

China's 'core interests' on 12th June 2013, the Chief Cabinet General-Secretary Suga Yoshihide officially denied this at the press conference (Nikkei, 2013).

was asked in the Diet on 31st January 2012, Noda (2012) answered, 'it is necessary to make rational decisions in consideration of various circumstances including international relations', thereby refraining expressing his personal stance.

4.2.4 Period IV (October 2012 – October 2014): Explicit Securitisation of the Senkaku Islands and Japan's Radical Security Reforms under the Abe Administration

As Figure 4.7 shows, Period IV witnessed Japan's most explicit securitisation of the Senkaku Islands, thereby justifying Japan's historic security reforms that eventually ended Japan's post-war grand strategy – the Yoshida Doctrine. The LDP's Prime Minister Abe Shinzō undertook a series of security reforms. Specifically, in December 2013, Japan established the National Security Strategy (NSS), replacing the 'Basic Policy of the National Defense' in May 1957 that allowed moderate military capability only, and the National Security Council (NSC). In the same month, Abe forced a vote on the Special Secret Law, thereby allowing Japan to share its broader national security information with allied counties. Moreover, in April 2014, Japan lifted the self-imposed arms export embargo that had existed since 1967, thereby allowing Japan to develop military capability with its alliances jointly. Last but not least, on 1st July 2014, Abe made a Cabinet decision to allow Japan's collective self-defence that had been considered to be unconstitutional throughout the post-war period. In the process of these security reforms, Japan consistently rendered the Self as a guardian of 'peace' and 'international liberal order'. On the other hand, the Other was constructed as an 'illiberal' state, 'defying the international order and the freedom of navigation', and 'challenging the *status quo* by coercion'. Simultaneously, in Period IV, Abe started to express his revisionist worldview in constructing the Self/Other, whilst blurring the difference between Imperial Japan and the current Self. (Abe's deeds and remarks pertaining to the pre-1945 history are highlighted in red in the following figure.) Yet, throughout Period IV, Abe diplomatically stated that 'the door is open' to improve the Sino-Japanese relations.

Figure 4.7: Period IV, Japan's Construction of the Self/Other and Policy Shifts



Period IV started with the Lower House election of December 2012 that marked the victory of the LDP over the DPJ, with the LDP's bold campaign slogan – 'Reclaim Japan (日本を取り戻す)'. The LDP's (2012) manifesto harshly criticised the DPJ's for leading Japan to a 'diplomatic crisis'. As regards the Senkaku Islands policy, the LDP (2012) even proposed to review the existing uninhabited islands policy by promising to 'consider stationing public servants on the islands' in order to protect the islands from China. Although the LDP eventually maintained the uninhabited islands policy, such a high-profile islands policy proposed in the manifesto signified the LDP's bid to differentiate itself from the DPJ by articulating its resolute stance on China, thereby gaining political support. After Abe became the head of the LDP in October 2012, in the Diet, Abe (2012) articulated, the three

years' DPJ government signified 'a diplomatic defeat (外交敗北)' that 'kept on losing national interests'. According to Abe (2012), the DPJ government's attempt to relocate the US base out of Okinawa must have 'surprised and been welcomed by the Chinese leaders' because the Japanese leaders did not understand the importance of the Japan-US alliance. Moreover, argued Abe (2012), the way of dealing with the Senkaku Islands dispute of 2010 [i.e., the release of the Chinese captain after more than two weeks of detention] signified a 'complete lack of an understanding of national security′ . In order to stop other states 'belittling and harming Japan's national interests', Abe (2012) highlighted the importance of the strengthened Japan-US alliance, re-interpretation of the Constitution to allow the collective self-defence, and establishment of the National Security Strategy (NSS). Thus, from the outset of the LDP government that started in December 2012, the discursive construction of China as 'threatening Other' in the context of the Senkaku Islands played a crucial role in Abe's justification of the LDP government's uncompromising security policy to counter China's rise in the ECS.

Eventually, the Abe administration's threat construction of China served to break down post-war Japan's grand strategy – the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine (吉田路線/吉田ドクトリン)'. The Yoshida Doctrine was determined by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in the aftermath of Japan's complete defeat of World War II, and it has 'long emphasised for Japan the need for a pragmatic and low-profile foreign policy, a highly constrained defence posture, reliance but not over-dependence on the US-Japan security treaty' (Hughes, 2015, p. 2). However, in Period IV, Abe-led Japan has broken down the Yoshida Doctrine via the radical security reforms: on 12th February 2013, Abe (2013c) proclaimed to 'increase the next year's defense budget, for the first time in the last eleven years' in order to 'prepare well' to prevent China from 'taking advantage of Japan's weakness' in the Senkaku Islands; in December 2013, Japan established the NSS replacing the 'Basic Policy of the National Defense' in May 1957 that allowed moderate military capability only, whilst proposing Japan's 'proactive contribution to peace' (Japanese MOFA, 2019a) and also the NSC was established, in order to deal with 'various threats to Japan' in the 'dramatically changing security environment' (Abe, 2013d); in the same month, Abe forced a vote on the Special Secret Law, thereby allowing Japan to share its broader national security information with allied counties; and, in April 2014, Japan

lifted the self-imposed arms export embargo that had existed since 1967, thereby allowing Japan to develop military capability with its alliances jointly. In Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga's words, the lift of the embargo 'will contribute to peace and international cooperation from the standpoint of proactive pacifism' (BBC, 2014). Last but not least, on 1st July 2014, Abe made a historic Cabinet decision to allow Japan's collective self-defence that had been considered to be unconstitutional throughout the post-war period. In the process of these historic security reforms, Japan consistently rendered the Self as a guardian of 'peace'. For instance, the Cabinet decision of July 2014 to allow Japan's collective self-defence used the term 'peace' for thirty-six times in the eight-pages document, and this 'peace' element was mostly linked to the Self (Cabinet Office, 2014).

China as 'threatening Other' not only resulted in Japan's justification of its historic security reforms, but also Japan's overhaul of its foreign policy strategy. Two months after his return to the office, Abe stressed Japan's new international presence in his speech, titled *Japan is back* at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Specifically, Abe (2013a) criticised China for making the SCS a 'lake of Beijing' by obstructing the freedom of navigation thereof, and Abe conceived Japan's new Self as a 'rule-promoter' for the liberal democracies in the region as a counterbalance to China's rise:

> Firstly, when the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific region becomes more and more prosperous, Japan must remain a leading promoter of rules […]. Secondly, Japan must continue to be a guardian of the global commons, like the maritime commons, open enough to benefit everyone. Japan's aspirations being such, thirdly, Japan must work even more closely with the U.S., Korea, Australia and other like-minded democracies throughout the region. A rule-promoter, a commons' guardian, and an effective ally and partner to the U.S. and other democracies, are all roles that Japan must fulfil.

As this Abe's speech demonstrates, in Period IV, Japan started to construct the Self as a guardian of the liberal order in the region as opposed to China's euphemistically illiberal rise in the ECS and SCS. In the speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2014, Abe (2014) elaborated on a concept – 'new Japanese' – by explaining that they are 'determined ultimately to take on the peace, order, and stability of this region as their own responsibility', by promoting the liberal values such as, 'freedom', 'democracy', 'the rule of law', and 'human rights', from Asia and the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Whilst underscoring the close relations with the US, Australia, India, and ASEAN, Abe newly constructed Japan's international role as a leading state to

promote the liberal international order to counter China's rise. Such a high-profile foreign policy of Japan, coupled with the historic rearmament, marked the apparent shift from the existing trajectory of the Yoshida Doctrine that was characterised by a low-profile and pragmatic foreign policy based on Japan's limited defence capabilities.

As Abe's speech at the CSIS implied, throughout Period IV, China was constructed as the problematic Other that challenges the existing international order. The NDPG FY 2014, which was published on 14th December 2013, explicitly problematised China's increasing activities in the ECS and stated, 'as Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise concerns over regional and global security'. Specifically, the NDPG FY 2014 argued (Japan MOD, 2013):

> In particular, China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the *status quo* by coercion. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and violated Japan's airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations, such as its announcement of establishing an 'Air Defense Identification Zone' based on its own assertion thereby infringing the freedom of overflight above the high seas. China is also expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains farther offshore than before. For example, Chinese military vessels and aircraft routinely enter the Pacific Ocean and are expanding their operational areas, which include areas north of Japan.

Making a sharp contrast to the Self as a guardian of 'the rule of law' and the liberal international order, China is constructed as a disturbing Other that 'attempts to change the *status quo* by coercion'. Moreover, in the NDPG of 2013, Japan not only problematised China's intrusion into Japan's territorial waters but also China's violation of Japan's airspace coupled with its establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). In Period IV, Japan started to clarify the specific situations of the ECS in the NDPG, whilst calling for Japan's rearmament.

In the Diet, throughout Period IV, Japan continued to securitise the Senkaku Islands concerning China's activities near the islands. For instance, when PLA's frigate pointed its military radar at an SDF's destroyer near the islands on 31st January 2013, Minister of State Onodera Itsunori (2013a) problematised this case in the Diet whilst highlighting the necessity of the development of security laws to deal with this kind of China's activity. Additionally, in the same Diet session, Abe

(2013b) stressed the importance of establishing the rule of engagement[66] to deal with the situations surrounding the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, whilst problematising the state of the Chinese ships' entering the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands as a 'gray zone (グレーゾーン) situation',[67] in the Diet answer of 30th October 2013, Onodera (2013b) justified the establishment of the NSC that was supposed to facilitate the process of islands policy-making. Furthermore, Japan has started to clarify in the Diet not only the Japan-US Security Treaty will support Japan but also Japan will use the individual right to self-defence in case of an emergency that includes China's attempt to seize the islands (Onodera, 2014).

Abe's 'resolute' stance on China was also evident in his interpretation of Imperial Japanese history throughout Period IV. Explaining that China had not made a sovereignty claim over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands for a long time, Abe (2013f) argued, in a similar vein, 'China had not protested when fourteen A-class war criminals were enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine, and then-prime minister visited the shrine'. This means that, in response to China's criticism of Japanese leader's visit of the Yasukuni Shrine,[68] Abe started to dismiss China's claim by interpreting it as a pragmatic diplomatic tool to undermine Japan's reputation, thereby deviating from the agreement of the Joint Statement of 2008 – 'face history squarely'. Moreover, whilst criticising China's 'anti-Japanese education' for causing China's 'provocative actions' (Abe, 2013b) near the Senkaku Islands, Abe (2013f) defended his cabinet members' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine to 'express reverence for the heroes who gave their precious lives for the country'. This is because, according to Abe (2013f), 'our job is to protect our national interests, and also to protect our pride in the history and traditions'. This was followed by his own visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on 26th December 2013 that marked the anniversary of his second administration. Hence,

[66] The rule of engagement signifies internal rules that define the circumstances and conditions for the use of force.

[67] The DPJ's Nagashima explains 'gray zone' is defined as 'a situation that has not yet resulted in an armed conflict but could lead to such a situation', as a response to this Onodera's (2013b) remark in the Diet.

[68] As explained in the Introduction, the Yasukuni Shrine enshrines the war dead, including Class-A war criminals (i.e., Imperial Japanese leaders who were tried in the Tokyo Tribunal), who died for Imperial Japan. During the Imperial Japanese period, this shrine played a crucial role in the State Shintō system that mobilised Imperial Japanese nation to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the Emperor (Shimazono, 2010). Japanese revisionists who deny the cruelty of Imperial Japanese war crimes still have a special affinity to this shrine (Deans, 2007). Yet, in the eyes of the victims of Imperial Japan, Japanese leaders' visit to the Yasukuni Shrine signifies Japan's lack of regret for the tremendous suffering of the victims.

during Period IV, Abe started to view the Senkaku Islands dispute through a lens of an ideological war surrounding Imperial Japanese history. As a prominent revisionist,[69] Abe began to link the 'Yasukuni Shrine' element and 'Japan's pride in the history and traditions' to the Self, whilst interpreting China's increasing activities near the Senkaku Islands as a ramification of the 'anti-Japanese education'. In Period IV, Abe's interpretation of the Senkaku Islands dispute started to blur the difference between Imperial Japan and the current Self. Despite the contradiction between proposed Japan's role as 'a guardian of the liberal order' that respects 'human rights' and Abe's revisionist worldview that glorifies Imperial Japanese history, Abe justified the combination of these two elements in a peculiar way in Period IV. As a result, despite Abe's repeated phrase during Period IV that 'Japan requests China to come back to the mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests and Japan's door to dialogue is always open' (e.g., Abe, 2013e), Japan and China did not reach rapprochement for two years.

4.2.5 Period V (November 2014 – December 2015): The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement and the Continued Abe's Security Reforms

Period V started with the Sino-Japanese rapprochement for the first time since Japan's purchase of the Senkaku Islands in September 2012. Japan and China reached the Sino-Japanese Four Articles of Principled Consensus (henceforth, 'Four Articles Consensus') before the Sino-Japanese Summit of 10th November 2014. One of the agreements in the Four Articles Consensus was that Japan and China would follow 'the spirit of squarely facing history and advancing toward the future'. So, Japan and China again agree to tacitly set aside the history problem by avoiding to demonise each other with references to Imperial Japanese history. Since that point, as Figure 4.8 shows, Abe started to refrain from referring to Imperial Japanese history to construct the Self/Other relations, and also began to include positive

[69] Abe oftentimes denied the guilt of Class-A war criminals during his first term (2006-2007). For instance, on 14th February 2006, Abe (2006) stated in the Diet, 'Class-A war criminals are not criminals under Japanese law'. Also, during his visit to India in August 2007, at the Indian Parliament, Abe (2007) enthusiastically explained that Japan and India share Pan-Asian history, and on the following day he would meet the son of Justice Pal – an Indian judge who exonerated all the Japanese leaders at the Tokyo Tribunal – because 'Justice Pal is highly respected even today by many Japanese for the noble spirit of courage he exhibited during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East'.

elements to construct the Other. Specifically, Abe started to highlight China's 'responsibility for regional peace and prosperity' and Sino-Japanese 'solid friendship'. Yet, simultaneously, Abe's vigilant stance on China in terms of security continued, and he continuously called for Japan's 'resolute and calm' response to China's bid to 'change the current situation by force based on their own assertions' (2015a). Eventually, Japan continuously carried out its radical rearmament that was underpinned by the new Japan-US Security Guideline published in May 2015 and the Peace and Security Law in September 2015, which crucially substantiated the Cabinet decision of July 2014 that allowed collective self-defence for the first time throughout the post-war period. Prior to 15th August 2015, which marked the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, much attention was devoted to whether Abe would include his revisionist worldview in his statement or not; however, Abe eventually did not. Hence, throughout Period V, Abe returned to the stance of 'face history squarely', as clarified in the Four Articles Consensus.

Figure 4.8: Period V, Japan's Construction of the Self/Other and Policy Shifts



The Four Articles Consensus before the Sino-Japanese Summit of 10th November 2014 finally repaired the rift between Japan and China for the first time since September 2012. Whilst agreeing to come back to the mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests, they shared the view that 'they had different views as to the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the waters of the ECS, including those around the Senkaku Islands, and shared the view that, through dialogue and consultation, they would prevent the deterioration of the

situation, establish a crisis management mechanism and avert the rise of unforeseen circumstances' (Japanese MOFA, 2014). Moreover, they agreed that 'both sides shared some recognition that, following the spirit of squarely facing history and advancing toward the future, they would overcome political difficulties that affect their bilateral relations' (ibid.). Following this Sino-Japanese discussion toward improving their relations, in Period V, Japan started to include positive elements to construct the Self/Other relations, although Japan continued to problematise China's activities in the ECS.

Firstly, when constructing the Other in the Senkaku Islands context, Abe started to link the Self and Other with their positive commonalities. For example, in his speech at the Diet on 12th February 2015, Abe (2015b) stated:

> Japan and China have an inseparable relationship with great responsibility for regional peace and prosperity. In November 2014, I carried out the summit meeting with the Chairman Xi Jinping, to confirm the principle of mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests, whilst taking a major step towards improving relations. In future, while deepening dialogue at various levels, we will develop a stable, friendly relationship from a broad perspective and meet the expectations of the international community. […] Sino-Japanese relations are one of the most important bilateral relations. It is a great opportunity for Japan and China to achieve peaceful development in a manner that respects the rules of the international community and the rule of law.

Herein, Abe started to highlight positive elements shared between Japan and China: 'great responsibility for regional peace and prosperity', 'we will develop a stable, friendly relationship', and a great opportunity for Japan and China to achieve peaceful development'. These positive elements were equally linked to the Self and Other, and such a positive construction of the Other was maintained throughout Period V. On 23rd April 2015, in the Sino-Japanese Summit, Abe stated, 'making the ECS a "sea of peace, cooperation and friendship" is a common goal and interest of both countries', and Abe wants to 'accelerate discussions on implementing the June 2008 Agreement' (Japanese MOFA, 2015a). For the first time since Hatoyama's summit meeting in May 2010, Japan re-articulated its clear intention to make the ECS a 'sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship'.

On the other hand, Japan continued to problematise China's activities in the ECS. Whilst discussing the necessity of the Peace and Security Law, which crucially substantiated the Cabinet decision of July 2014 that allowed collective self-defence, Abe (2015a) explained:

> In the ECS, Chinese vessels have repeatedly invaded territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, and unilateral resource development has been underway in undefined sea areas. In the SCS, China has been revitalising its activities and unilaterally implementing large-scale and rapid landfills. China is trying to change the *status quo* by force based on its own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order. This attitude of China, combined with its lack of transparency on security policies, has become a concern for the international community, including Japan.

Hence, like Period IV, Abe continued to render the Other negatively in the Senkaku Islands context by stating that 'China is trying to change the *status quo* by force' and China's rise is 'concern for the international community, including Japan'. In order to deal with China, Abe argued that Japan needs to 'respond calmly and resolutely to any attempt by China to change the current situation without escalating the situation (ibid.)'. Abe (2015a) further explained that Japan needs to strengthen its 'deterrence (抑止力)' via the strengthened Japan-US alliance and security partnership with other regional states. The Peace and Security Law, therefore, was put forward by Abe as a countermeasure against China's challenge to the existing international liberal order.

In Period V, Japan published the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation in April 2015, whilst enabling the SDF and US armed forces to cooperate with each other not only when there is an emergency but also during peacetime. Additionally, the new Guideline articulated Japan-US cooperation in maritime areas, and Japan and the US will 'cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation' (Japan MOD, 2015). In the Diet session of 14th September 2015, after Abe's explanation of the importance to increase 'deterrence' to counter China in the ECS, the LDP's Satō (2015), confirmed that the new Guideline underpins the so-called 'dynamic deterrence' and it is 'extremely effective in the Senkaku Islands and the ECS defense guard' because the Guideline allowed Japan and the US to cooperate from peacetime via surveillance and joint training while mutually protecting each other with weapons. Additionally, in September 2015, Japan passed the Peace and Security Law, thereby enabling Japan's collective self-defence for the first time throughout the post-war history, albeit under a limited condition. In explaining rationale for this law, Japan highlighted positive elements of the Self: Japan is 'a peace-loving nation' and this law is for Japan's '"proactive contribution to peace"' (Japanese MOFA, 2016).

Period V can also be characterised by Abe's adjustment of his stance on Imperial Japanese history. Being different from Period IV, Abe stopped applying his revisionist worldview in constructing the Self/Other in the Senkaku Islands context. Prior to 15th August 2015, which marked the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, much attention was devoted to whether Abe would include his revisionist worldview in his statement or not. About a week before the release of the Abe statement, the Cabinet Office (2015, p. 36) released a report, titled – Report of the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and Japan's Role and the World Order in the 21st Century – and this report argued that it is important for Japan to be mindful of the Asian victims of Imperial Japan when leading the establishment of liberal rules. Although in Period IV, Abe linked the contradicting two elements, 1) a guardian of the liberal order and 2) the pride in Imperial Japanese history, in constructing the Self, this report advised stopping using the latter. Eventually, following the advice of this report and the agreements in the Four Articles Consensus – Japan and China would follow 'the spirit of squarely facing history and advancing toward the future', Abe refrained from expressing his conspicuously revisionist worldview in the statement that marked the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II (Japan Cabinet, 2015). Additionally, throughout Period V, Abe did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine.

On the other hand, in Period V, Abe started to argue that China should not focus on Imperial Japanese history too much. For instance, at the 6th Japan-China-Korean Summit of November 2015, Abe stated, 'we needed not only to squarely face the history but also to cooperate toward the future, and that it was not productive to focus on a certain period of the past. He [Abe] then concluded that Japan-ROK and Japan-China had a history of cooperation and shared development, and he hoped to continue to write a looking-forwarded [sic] history of this trilateral cooperation' (Japanese MOFA, 2015b). Hence, whilst refraining from expressing his revisionist worldview, Abe started to ask China to write a forward-looking history. In the Diet, Abe (2015c) further argued that it is important not only for Japan but also for China to 'squarely face the history' in order to reconcile over the history problem.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed Japan's discourse of the Senkaku Islands. Firstly, I have reviewed *how* Japan has constructed its Senkaku Islands sovereignty claim from the 1950s onwards. As clearly illustrated, in a period from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, Japan did not have clear recognition of the Senkaku Islands. It was only in 1967 when Japan started to call them as 'Senkaku Islands (尖閣群島/列島)', and Japan started to build up its sovereignty claim incrementally after the ECAFE's report of 1969. As demonstrated in the 'Basic view on the Senkaku Islands' (1972), Japan's sovereignty claim is primarily based on international law and a post-war legal framework built on the SFPT. Additionally, Japan rejects the possibility to negotiate the sovereignty of the islands with other states by stressing the inseparable historical, geographical, and ideational link between the islands and Japan by using a term, 'an inherent part of the territory of Japan (固有の領土)'. After Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012, Japan made a website, which justifies Japan's protection of the Senkaku Islands sovereignty by rendering that it contributes to regional peace and stability. Thus far, I have illustrated the process of how Japan has discursively naturalised the essence of the Senkaku Islands sovereignty since the 1950s.

Against this background, I have conducted poststructuralist analysis in order to answer the following three research questions: *how* did Japan shift the Self/Other construction in the Senkaku Islands discourse from 2008 to 2015?; *how* did Japan securitise the Senkaku Islands from 2008 to 2015?; and, *how* did the Senkaku Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem? As the following Figure 4.9 shows, the chosen period for the poststructuralist analysis can be split into five phases depending on the level of Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands.

Figure 4.9: A List of Japan's Discursive Shifts

	Time	Characterised by…
Period I	January 2008 to December 2008	The honeymoon period between Fukuda and Hu, who agreed on the Joint Statement and Principled Consensus, and the Diet discussions that called for the strengthened Senkaku Islands sovereignty
		[The Self/Other construction] Japan shifted the positive construction of the Self/Other into the negative one after December 2008 Self: responsibility for peace, stability, and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world, face history squarely, lack of a resolute attitude towards China Other: peaceful and harmonious development, sharing responsibility for peace, stability, weaken Japan's security
		[Security/Islands Policy] - ECS Co-development - the Law on the Navigation of Foreign Ships in Territorial Waters
		Beginning of Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands that renders the US base in Okinawa as 'deterrence' against China's rise

Period II	January 2009 to August 2010	[The Self/Other construction] Japan started to differentiate the Self from Other by problematising China's dispatch of its official ships in December 2008 Self: Prime minister's 'private visit' to the Yasukuni Shrine is allowed [Asō], willingness to protect the islands sovereignty, face history squarely [Hatoyama and Kan], lack of deterrence, if the US base is relocated out of Okinawa Other: friendship [Hatoyama], potentially usurps the Senkaku Islands, rapidly expanding military capability and it affects Japan's security
		[Security/Islands Policy] - ECS Co-development - The US base will remain in Okinawa
Period III	September 2010 to September 2012	Japan's intensified securitisation after the vessel collision case of September 2010 that evolved into Japan's purchase of the Senkaku Islands in September 2012
		[The Self/Other construction] Japan further differentiated the Self from Other after the vessel collision case in September 2010 Self: has common sense as a rule of law country, Japan-US alliance is a public good for the stability in the Asia Pacific, 'we protect our own country' as a matter of course as a 'sovereign state', 'weak-kneed' stance on Japan's territorial dispute, 'there is no government that cares so much about China' Other: strengthening invisible defence capabilities and increasing maritime activities, a lack of 'common sense' in international society, unreasonable, intense national

		willingness, expansionism and coercion, ‘the rule by might’ not ‘the rule of right’
		[Security/Islands Policy] - cope calmly in the ECS - obtaining the US confirmation about the application of the Japan-US Security Treaty to the Senkaku Islands - NDPG, ‘Dynamic Defense Force’
Period IV	October 2012 to October 2014	Japan’s explicit securitisation of the Senkaku Islands that led to its historic security reforms under the Abe administration
		[The Self/Other construction] Prime Minister Abe started to apply Imperial Japanese history lens to the Senkaku Islands dispute Self: Prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni is not problematic [Abe], ‘Japan’s pride in the history and tradition’, ‘proactive pacifism’, peace, a guardian of the regional/international liberal order, freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law Other: anti-Japanese education regarding the pre-1945 history, illiberal, defy the international order and the freedom of navigation, challenge the *status quo* by coercion
		[Security/Islands Policy] - build-up military capability to deal with China in ECS - ‘door to dialogue is always open’ - the establishment of the NSS, NSC, the Special Secret Law - lift of the self-imposed arms export embargo, Cabinet decision to allow the collective self-defence for the first time throughout the post-war period

Period V	November 2014 to December 2015	The Sino-Japanese rapprochement in November 2014 and the continued Abe's security reforms by passing the 'Peace and Security Law'
		[The Self/Other construction] After the Four Articles Consensus of November 2014, Japan started to increase positive elements to the Other whilst stopping references to Imperial Japanese history Self: 'proactive pacifism', peace, a guardian of the regional/international liberal order, being mindful of Asian victims of Imperial Japan Other: responsibility for regional peace and prosperity, stable friendship, peaceful development, defy the international order and the freedom of navigation, challenge the *status quo* by coercion
		[Security/Islands Policy] - bolster military capability - the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, the Peace and Security Law

In the period from 2008 to 2015, Japan incrementally securitised the Senkaku Islands, and eventually, Japan overhauled post-war Japan's grand strategy – the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine' – that was characterised by a pragmatic and low-profile foreign policy based on Japan's highly constrained defence posture. Firstly, Period I (from January 2008 to December 2008) is characterised by Japan's very positive Self/Other construction at the top-leaders' level that was specifically underpinned by the Joint Statement and Principled Consensus. In these agreements, Japan positively constructed the Other by evaluating 'China after the open and reform policy' and China's 'peaceful and harmonious development'. Pointing to the commonalities between Japan and China, they also linked positive elements, such as, 'peace, cooperation, and friendship', to the Self/Other in the context of the ECS to justify the

joint development plan. In terms of Japan's stance on Imperial Japanese history, in the Joint Statement, they agreed, 'the two sides resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future', whereby Japan tacitly agreed to refrain from allowing leaders to visit the Yasukuni Shrine and express a revisionist worldview. At the end of Period I, however, Japan started to de-link the positive elements from the Other after China deployed two official ships in the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands in December 2008.

Period II (January 2009 to August 2010) witnessed the beginning of Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands, whilst problematising the event of December 2008 and also China's rapidly expanding military capabilities. In February 2008, Prime Minister Asō stated in the Diet that the Japan-US Security Treaty would be applied to the Senkaku Islands. Also, in Period II, Japan started to problematise the possibility of China's Senkaku Islands invasion with references to the SCS case, whilst calling for the strengthened military capability of Japan. Despite the DPJ's Prime Minister Hatoyama's efforts to make the ECS 'a sea of friendship' referring to the Germany-French relations that got over the history of repeated war, he resigned his post as the prime minister only nine months later before carrying out the ECS joint development plan. Besides, against the backdrop of the Hatoyama's bid for relocating the US Marines Air Station in Futenma out of the Okinawa prefecture, in the Diet, Japan crystalised securitisation of the Senkaku Islands to justify the existence of the US base in Okinawa as crucial 'deterrence' to counter China's rise. When it comes to Japan's interpretation of Imperial Japanese history, Period II witnessed Asō's 'private' visit to the Yasukuni shrine in April 2009. However, after that, at the Sino-Japanese Summit in October 2009, Hatoyama made it clear that he would stick to the 'Murayama statement', and he had no intention of taking a revisionist stance like his predecessor, Asō. Since then, Hatoyama and Kan maintained the stance of 'face history squarely' following the Joint Statement of 2008 throughout Period II.

Period III (September 2010 to September 2012) started with Japan's intensified securitisation of the Senkaku Islands after the vessel collision case in September 2010. In Period III, Japan actually obtained the US' pledge to protect the Senkaku Islands under the Japan-US Security Treaty and started to problematise China's activities near the Senkaku Islands in the NDPG in December 2010, thereby strengthening Japans' military capability to deal with the Chinese activities near the

islands. In Period III, Japan dominantly linked negative elements to China in the ECS, whilst further crystalising the 'China threat' discourse. Specifically, Japan started to link 'a rule of law country' to the Self, whilst constructing the Other as a lack of 'common sense' in 'international society', pursuing 'expansionism and coercion', and based on the 'rule by might' but not 'rule of right'. Japan's intensified securitisation of the Senkaku Islands after the vessel collision case eventually evolved into Japan's purchase of the Senkaku Islands from their private owner – Mr. Kurihara – on 11th September 2012. Throughout Period III, Kan and Noda maintained the stance of 'face history squarely' of the Joint Statement of 2008.

Period IV (October 2012 to October 2014) witnessed Japan's most explicit securitisation of the Senkaku Islands, thereby justifying Japan's security reforms that eventually ended Japan's post-war grand strategy – the Yoshida Doctrine. The LDP's Prime Minister Abe Shinzō undertook a series of security reforms by interpreting the three years' DPJ government signified 'a diplomatic defeat'. In December 2013, Japan established the NSS and the NSC. In the same month, Abe forced a vote on the Special Secret Law, thereby allowing Japan to share its broader national security information with allied counties. Moreover, in April 2014, Japan lifted the self-imposed arms export embargo that had existed since 1967, thereby allowing Japan to develop military capability with its alliances jointly. Last but not least, on 1st July 2014, Abe made a Cabinet decision to allow Japan's collective self-defence that had been considered to be unconstitutional throughout the post-war period. In the process of these security reforms, Japan consistently rendered the Self as a guardian of 'peace' and 'international liberal order'. On the other hand, the Other was constructed as an 'illiberal' state, 'defying the international order and the freedom of navigation', and 'challenging the *status quo* by coercion'. Simultaneously, in Period IV, Abe started to express his revisionist worldview in constructing the Self/Other, whilst blurring the difference between Imperial Japan and the current Self.

Lastly, Period V (November 2014 to December 2015) started with the Sino-Japanese rapprochement for the first time since Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012 via Four Articles of Principled Consensus in November 2014. One of the agreements in the Four Articles Consensus was that Japan and China would follow 'the spirit of squarely facing history and advancing toward the future', and so Japan and China again agree to tacitly set aside the history problem by avoiding to

demonise each other with references to Imperial Japanese history. Since that point, Abe started to refrain from referring to Imperial Japanese history to construct the Self/Other relations, and also began to include positive elements to construct the Other. Specifically, Abe started to highlight China's 'responsibility for regional peace and prosperity' and Sino-Japanese 'solid friendship'. Yet, simultaneously, Abe's vigilant stance on China in terms of security continued, and he called for Japan's 'resolute and calm' response to China's bid to 'change the current situation by force based on their own assertions'. Eventually, in Period V, Japan carried out security reforms that were underpinned by the new Japan-US Security Guideline in May 2015 and the Peace and Security Law of September 2015, which crucially substantiated the Cabinet decision of July 2014 that allowed collective self-defence. Prior to 15th August 2015, which marked the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, much attention was devoted to whether Abe would include his revisionist worldview in his statement or not; however, Abe eventually did not. Hence, throughout Period V, Abe returned to the stance of 'face history squarely', as clarified in the Four Articles Consensus.

In the next chapter, I will examine Chinese discourse by applying the poststructuralist discourse analysis in order to understand the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute development from 2008 to 2015, from the viewpoint of China's Self/Other construction.

Chapter 5: Analysis of Chinese Discourse

In the previous chapter, I have analysed how Japan has shifted the Self/Other constructions in its discourse of the Senkaku Islands, whilst securitising the islands from 2008 to 2015. In a similar vein, this chapter will examine the Chinese discourse of the Diaoyu Islands. Firstly, as noted in Chapter 3, I will problematise China's sovereignty claim to answer the following research question: *how* has China constructed its Diaoyu Islands sovereignty claims from the 1950s onwards? To problematise the China's sovereignty claim, particular attention will be devoted to the process of how China has exerted power to construct a linear teleology between the past and the present to justify its sovereignty by shifting its rendition of the islands since the 1950s. This will be followed by poststructuralist discourse analysis of China's construction of the Self/Other from 2008 to 2015 that will answer the following three questions: *how* did China shift the Self/Other construction in its discourse of the Diaoyu Islands dispute from 2008 to 2015?; *how* did China securitise the Diaoyu Islands from 2008 to 2015?; and, *how* did the Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem? In the process of the analysis, I will precisely analyse how China interpreted Sino-Japanese War history in constructing the Self and Other, to see how the islands dispute became entangled with the history problem on China's side.

5.1 Reappraisal of China's Sovereignty Claim

How has China discursively constructed the Diaoyu Islands sovereignty claim from the 1950s onwards? In order to answer this question, in this section, I revisit China's Diaoyu Islands sovereignty claim by unveiling the process of how China has constructed its ownership of the Diaoyu Islands by giving meaning to particular representations of the history and past events.

Until 1971, China had not published its islands sovereignty claim, and in the 1950s, China actually recognised that the islands belong to the Ryūkyū Islands, but not Taiwan. To start with, on 8th January 1953, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), *People's Daily* (1953), published an article, introducing the islands using the Japanese name – the 'Jiange Zhudao (尖閣諸島)' – explaining that they belong to the Ryūkyū Archipelago. Additionally, Masuo (2018, p. 3) notes that the Chinese MOFA's document of 15th May 1950, 'Draft Outline of Territory Issues and Proposals in the Peace Treaty with Japan (对日和约中关于领土部分问题与主张 纲草案)', also clarified that the 'Jiange Zhudao (尖閣諸島)' belong to the Ryūkyū Archipelago. Besides, given that China had not either expressed any sovereignty claims of the islands or problematised the US' use of the two islands as areas for shooting practices until 1971, it is reasonable to argue the Diaoyu Islands had nothing to do with China's boundary description practices throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

As noted in the Introduction, it was in December 1971, when the Chinese MOFA articulated its Diaoyu Islands sovereignty claim for the first time. This was three years after the publication of the ECAFE's report that informed the potential oil reserves underneath the seabed of the islands. According to the statement released by the Chinese MOFA in December 1971, China based its sovereignty claim on the following five points (Nakauchi, 2012, pp. 72–73):

> (1) The Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese territory for a long time. During the Ming Dynasty, it was within the Ming Dynasty's maritime defense zone against Japanese invaders and was not part of the Ryūkyū at the time but belonged to Taiwan in China.
>
> (2) Japan snatched the islands from China during the Sino-Japanese War. In addition, the Japanese government exerted pressure on the then-Qing dynasty government in April 1895, signing an unequal treaty on the ceding of Taiwan and all of its attached islands and the Penghu archipelago, or the Maguan Treaty [i.e., the Shimonoseki Treaty].
>
> (3) It was illegal for the US to declare after World War II that it has power over the Diaoyu Islands that belong to Taiwan.
>
> (4) It is illegal for the US and Japan to include the Diaoyu Islands in the return zone to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.
>
> (5) The Chinese will certainly liberate Taiwan. Also, be sure to restore the islands belong to Taiwan, including the Diaoyu Islands.

As the first point above illustrates, China started to justify the Diaoyu Islands sovereignty by foregrounding the Sino-centric history. As Suzuki (2017) and Midford (2015, p.184) rightly point out, until the late nineteenth century, there had not been Westphalian conceptualisation of 'sovereign states' that are based on the rigidly compartmentalised political community in East Asia; but instead, the Sino-centric tribunal system existed that lacks distinct borders. In light of this, China's references to the Sino-centric history do not actually strengthen its sovereignty in terms of international law (Suzuki, 2017); but for China, the Sino-centric history started to carry heavy weight. Also, as the second point highlights, central to China's Diaoyu Islands sovereignty claim became a post-colonial understanding of modern history. China started to problematise the 'unequal treaty' at the end of the First Sino-Japanese War (1984-1985). Whilst delegitimising the post-war legal framework of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) in the third point, China principally based its grounds for the Diaoyu Islands sovereignty on the pre-1945 history. Despite that China actually recognised that the islands belong to the Ryūkyū Archipelago but not Taiwan in the 1950s as noted above, in this statement of 1971, China started to claim that the islands had always belonged to Taiwan. So, in the last point, China expressed its resolute to 'liberate' Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands, firmly taking an irredentist stance. It is noteworthy that in this statement of 1971, China did not even refer to international law to justify China's sovereignty claim.

As the following Figure 5.1 below shows, it was after the vessel collision case in September 2010 when China started to include references to international law.[70]

[70] Although the tensions of the dispute flared in 1996 and China criticised Japan, at that time, China used the same discursive structure to constitute the sovereignty as that of the 1971 statement (cf. People's Daily, 1996a, 1996b).

Figure 5.1: China's Expanded Sovereignty Claim



On 3rd October 2010, *People's Daily* published a lengthy editorial written by Deputy Director of Institute of Marine Development Strategy, Jia Yu, titled 'Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands Dispute from a Perspective of International Law' (2010). Although China had not referred to the argument of international law until that point, since the publication of this editorial, China started to criticise Japan with a discussion of international law.[71] Additionally, on 13th January 2011, a *People's Daily* editorial written by Vice President of Qinghua University Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Liu Jiangyong (2011), started to refute Japan's sovereignty claim of 'Basic view on the Senkaku Islands' (1972) by providing detailed historical information.

Furthermore, two weeks after Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012, the State Council Information Office (SCIO) published the White Paper, 'Diaoyu Islands, an Inherent Territory of China' (2012). In this White Paper, China

[71] Jia Yu (2010) problematised Japan's sovereignty claim. Firstly, he argued that Japan's claim for *terra nullius* is invalid because China had already obtained the islands before Japan. And also, he delegitimised Japan's claim that as a result of its long-term peaceful and open control over the islands, Japan obtained sovereignty.

started to view the islands dispute through a lens of Sino-Japanese War history. For instance, China condemned Japan followingly: '[Japan] rejected and challenged the outcomes of victory of the World Anti-fascist War. […] China strongly urges Japan to respect history and international law and immediately stop all actions that undermine China's territorial sovereignty'. The White Paper of 2012 illustrates China's intention to render the islands dispute not only as a territorial dispute but also the history problem.

This section has looked at how China has constructed its Diaoyu Islands sovereignty claim since the 1950s. As clearly illustrated above, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, China recognised that the islands belonged to the Ryūkyū Archipelago but not Taiwan. During this period, China recognised the islands as the 'Jiange Zhudao (尖閣諸島)', and the islands had nothing to do with China's boundary inscription practices. It was in December 1971 when China started to construct its sovereignty claim. According to the statement published by the Chinese MOFA in December 1971, China started to justify its islands sovereignty by highlighting the Sino-centric history, delegitimating a post-war legal framework of the SFPT system, and stressing the invalidity of the 'unequal treaty' after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) based on a post-colonial stance. At this point, China started to claim that the Diaoyu Islands had always belonged to Taiwan but not the Ryūkyū Archipelago. It is noteworthy that at that time, China did not refer to international law to justify its own claim. It was only in 2010 when China began to rebuke Japan's claim by using international law. After Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012, China started to view the islands dispute through a lens of Sino-Japanese War history. Thus far, I have illustrated the process of how China has discursively naturalised the essence of the Diaoyu Islands sovereignty since the 1950s.

5.2 Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis

This section will set out the results of poststructuralist discourse analysis of Chinese discourse to answer the following three research questions: *how* did China shift the Self/Other construction in its discourse of the Diaoyu Islands dispute from 2008 to 2015?; *how* did China securitise the Diaoyu Islands from 2008 to 2015?; and, *how*

did the Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem? As noted in Chapter 3, in order to analyse China's security discourse, I will specifically examine the following texts: speeches by Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, and Li Keqiang, statements and briefings released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of National Defense (MOND), and the State Council Information Office (SCIO), and, editorials of *People's Daily* and *PLA Daily*.[72]

The targeted period for the poststructuralist discourse analysis (i.e., from 2008 to 2015) covers China's different phases of securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands that eventually evolved into China's normalised patrol near the islands and China's rendition of the dispute through a lens of Sino-Japanese War history. Beginning in 2008, which witnessed the Sino-Japanese agreement to tacitly set aside the history problem and jointly develop the gas field in the ECS via the 'Sino-Japanese Joint Statement on Comprehensively Promoting Strategic and Reciprocal Relations' (henceforth, 'the Joint Statement') and 'Principled Consensus on the East China Sea Issue' (henceforth, 'the Principled Consensus'), respectively, the chosen period for the poststructuralist discourse analysis can chart the process of how China shifted its very amicable Self/Other construction of 2008 to the antagonistic one from September 2012 onwards. Moreover, I will examine how Japan shifted the islands discourse and security policy after its reconciliation with China in November 2014 via the 'Sino-Japanese Four Articles of Principled Consensus'. In analysing the texts, I devoted particular attention to China's interpretation of the dispute in light of Sino-Japanese War history.

The following section will be presented by splitting up a period from 2008 to 2015 into four, depending on the degree of China's securitisation (cf. Figure 5.2).

[72] Refer to Appendix 2 for the list of the collected editorials of *People's Daily* and *PLA Daily*.

Figure 5.2: China's Levels of Securitisation

	Time	Characterised by…
Period I	January 2008 to August 2010	The honeymoon period between Hu and Fukuda, who agreed on the Joint Statement and Principled Consensus, and the beginning of China's dispatch of its official ships near the islands
Period II	September 2010 to August 2012	Beginning of China's securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands at a low-key level after the vessel collision case of September 2010
Period III	September to October 2012	China's most explicit securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands with a lens of Sino-Japanese War history after September 2012
Period IV	November 2012 to December 2015	The Sino-Japanese rapprochement in November 2014 and continued China's new islands security practices

Herein, I provide a brief overview of the four periods listed above, before moving on to the detailed results of analysis. Firstly, Period I (from January 2008 to September 2010) is characterised by China's very positive Self/Other construction at the top-leaders' level that was underpinned by the Joint Statement and Principled Consensus, thereby agreeing to tacitly set aside the history problem and jointly develop the ECS gas field. However, in December 2008, two Chinese ships entered and drifted in the territorial waters of the islands for the first time since the outset of the dispute. In Period II (from September 2010 to August 2012), after the vessel collision case of September 2010, China started to securitise the Diaoyu Islands, albeit at a low-key level. China started to link negative elements to the Other, China still called for the Sino-Japanese co-development of the ECS, following the Principled Consensus of 2008. In Period III (from September to October 2012), China most explicitly securitised the Diaoyu Islands with numerous references to the Sino-Japanese War. Simultaneously, China started to take a 'tit-for-tat' islands

policy and normalised daily patrols near the islands, thereby starting to physically challenge Japan's *de facto* control and sovereignty of the islands. Period IV (from November 2012 to 2015) witnessed China's de-escalation of the islands dispute in editorials of *People's Daily* and *PLA Daily*; however, China continued the 'tit-for-tat' islands policy that was established in Period III. Until the Sino-Japanese rapprochement in the Sino-Japanese Four Articles of Principled Consensus (hereafter, 'Four Articles Consensus') in November 2014, China continued to apply the Sino-Japanese War lens to interpret the dispute and Japan's security reforms under Prime Minister Abe.

5.2.1 Period I (January 2008 - August 2010): Honeymoon Period between Leaders, and the Beginning of China's dispatch of Its Official Ships near the Islands

As Figure 5.3 below shows, Period I was characterised by China's consistently positive rendering of the Self/Other in the context of the ECS. The vertical axis in the figure shows the Self/Other difference, and the horizontal one differentiates the positive/negative elements. The yellow square shows China's principal stance on the islands dispute, and the blue box at the bottom shows China's actual islands practices. Period I started with a honeymoon period, at least, on a level of leaders between Japan and China. In May 2008, following General Secretary Hu Jintao's visit to Japan, Japan and China agreed to advance the Sino-Japanese relations via the Joint Statement Also, in June 2008, they agreed on the joint development of the ECS gas field in the Principled Consensus. In these agreements, China consistently constructed the Self/Other positively. On the other hand, in Period I, China started to dispatch its official ships in the territorial waters of the islands for the first time since the outset of the dispute. On 8th December 2008, just before the Japan-China-Korean Trilateral Summit held in Fukuoka, two official Chinese ships entered and drifted in the territorial waters of the Diaoyu Islands for nine hours. Additionally, on 26th December 2009, the NPC passed the 'Law on the Protection of Sea Islands'. Retrospectively, this law was instrumental in establishing Chinese governmental systems that make it possible to implement China's incremental expansion of maritime control in cooperation with China's military institutions. Thus, Period I witnessed a contradiction between China's positive construction of the Self/Other in

the ECS and China's beginning of the deployment of its official ships in the islands territorial waters.

Figure 5.3: Period I, China's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts



Period I started with the Sino-Japanese honeymoon period, at least on the leaders' level. As noted in the previous chapter, The Joint Statement in May 2008 signified the firm determination of Chinese and Japanese leaders to move their relations

forward.[73] Therefore, the Joint Statement contained very favorable terms that rendered the Self/Other in an equally positive manner, and it noted that 'to pursue long-term peace, friendship and cooperation is the only choice for the two sides' (Chinese MOFA, 2008b). China referred to 'World War II' once in this statement. However, there were no connotations to demonise Japan: 'China takes a positive view of Japan pursuing a path of a nation striving for peace and making a contribution to world peace and stability through peaceful means over the past sixty years since the end of World War II' (ibid). When it comes to Japan's international role, China encouraged Japan to take a more significant role by noting, 'China values Japan's status and role in the UN and is ready to see Japan playing a bigger and constructive role in international affairs' (ibid.). In the Joint Statement, China also agreed, 'the two sides resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future', whereby China was tacitly agreeing to refrain from demonising Japan with references to Imperial Japanese history. As noted in the previous chapter, the positive elements linked to the Other in the Joint Statement were further substantiated in the ECS context in the Principled Consensus in June 2008 (Chinese MOFA, 2008a):

> In order to make the ECS – which has not yet been demarcated between China and Japan – a sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship, China and Japan have reached a consensus based on the consensus reached by the leaders of China and Japan in April 2007 and December 2007. After careful consultations, the new consensus agreed that China and Japan will cooperate in the transition period until the demarcation will be achieved without jeopardising the legal positions of the two sides. To this end, the two sides have taken the first step and will continue consultations in the future.

This consensus refrained from constructing a zero-sum game in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by interpreting that the ECS 'has not yet been demarcated between China and Japan' (ibid.). In this consensus, China also agreed to co-develop the ECS gas field, including the Shirakaba/Chunxiao, in order to make the ECS 'a sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship' (ibid.) (cf. Figure 4.3). When the Principled Consensus constructs the Self/Other relations in the ECS, China and Japan are equally linked to the highly positive elements: peace, cooperation, and friendship.

[73] This statement marked the fourth important Sino-Japanese agreement in the contemporary Sino-Japanese relations history.

China's positive construction of the Self/Other continued until the end of Period I. On 1st June 2010, Premier Wen took an interview of the NHK[74] during his visit to Japan. An NHK's anchor, Kuniya Hiroko, interviewed Wen for half an hour in her news programme. It was a week before Prime Minister Hatoyama's resignation. In the interview, Wen did not change his stance of the Joint Statement and Principled Consensus of 2008. When Kuniya asked about how to enhance a sense of intimacy between the two peoples, Wen referred to 'World War II' once; however, the emphasis was placed on Wen's respect for Japan's 'peaceful development' throughout the last sixty years after the end of World War II, and this reinforced the stance of Joint Statement in May 2008 (Chinese MOFA, 2010):

> Talking about the gap between the Chinese and Japanese peoples, ultimately, it's about how to understand the issues of history and reality. The reason why we emphasise history as a mirror to face the future is not to continue hatred, but to enhance the feelings and friendship of the two peoples and prevent historical tragedies from repeating themselves. If we talk about reality, after World War II, the Japanese Constitution stipulated that Japan should follow the path of peaceful development. This has brought tangible benefits to Japan. The Japanese economy has rapidly developed, and the people's living standards have been greatly improved. In the sixty years since the founding of China, especially in the thirty years of reform and opening-up, China's economy and society have also undergone significant changes. We have proposed to adhere to peaceful development and harmonious development. In other words, China and Japan must follow the path of peaceful development. The two peoples should understand each other, trust each other, and cooperate.

Wen's reference to World War II history was not meant to link Sino-Japanese War history to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, but to praise the current good Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, Wen emphasises commonalities between the Self/Other, rather than differences, by stressing both countries' post-war 'peaceful development' and 'economic development'. By concluding his answer with a constructive suggestion, 'the two peoples should understand each other, trust each other, and cooperate', Wen drew attention to the possibility of improving the Self/Other relations in future.

On the other hand, Period I is also characterised by China's shifts in its Diaoyu Islands security practice, which contradicted China's constructive elements linked to the Self/Other and Sino-Japanese co-development of the ECS. The very first shift took place on 8th December 2008, when two official Chinese ships, for the

[74] The NHK is Japan's national broadcasting organisation, which is managed in a similar way to the BBC.

first time, entered into the territorial waters of the Diaoyu Islands and drifted there for nine hours. China did not publish any 'authoritative text' regarding this move, and *People's Daily* (2008) published one very short article on 9th December 2008, which claims China's right to patrol the area. Therefore, there was an unexplained gap between China's islands security practice and its positive rendering of the Self/Other. A year later, on 26th December 2009, the NPC passed the 'Law on the Protection of Sea Islands'.[75] Masuo (2017) notes that this law was instrumental in establishing Chinese governmental systems that implement China's incremental expansion of maritime control in cooperation with China's military institutions. Owing to this legislation, China started to construct the artificial Spratly island in the SCS as a national project. Despite the considerable ramifications of this law on China's overall maritime activities, China did not provide any explanation of this law in relation to the Sino-Japanese cooperation in the ECS, and so this law quietly came into effect in March 2010. Thus, in addition to the abrupt patrol of the official ships of December 2008, China had, once more, quietly shifted its islands security practice in Period I.

5.2.2 Period II (September 2010 - August 2012): Low-key Securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands

Period II is characterised by China's increasing securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands, albeit at a low-key level, as shown in Figure 5.4 below. In Period II, China started to de-link the positive elements of Japan that are highlighted in the gray box in the figure. Regardless of Wen's painstaking efforts to improve the Sino-Japanese relations in a top-down approach throughout Period I, China and Japan critically lost their momentum toward the Sino-Japanese co-development of the ECS, on 7th September 2010, when the vessel collision case took place. As noted in the previous chapter, on that day, a fishing vessel steered by a drunken Chinese man violently collided his vessel with two ships of the JCG in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial waters, and eventually, the Chinese captain was detained by Japan until

[75] The purpose of this law is manifolded, according to the Chinese government: 'This Law is enacted for the purpose of protecting the islands and its surrounding sea ecosystem, rationally exploiting and utilising the natural resources of the island, safeguarding the national maritime rights and interests, and promoting sustainable economic and social development' (2009).

24th September 2010. It was the first time for Japan to detain foreigners who are arrested on/near the islands for such a long term, and also, it was the first time for China to cause that serious damage to the ships of the JCG near the islands. Although China consistently constructed a positive discourse of the Sino-Japanese cooperation in the ECS throughout Period I, after the vessel collision case in September 2010, China shifted the way to construct the Self/Other by differentiating the Self from Other and de-linking the following positive elements of Japan: post-war Japan as 'peace' development, 'Japan's larger international role is expected', and 'history is important for the Sino-Japanese friendship'.

Figure 5.4: Period II, China's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts



Period II started with the vessel collision case. As a result, being different from the previous discourse of Period I, China stopped to use the element, 'peace', to foreground the commonality between China and Japan anymore. Instead, China started to link this element only to the Self, whilst excluding the Other. *Zhong Sheng*[76] of 26th September clarifies that 'peaceful development does not mean tolerance, let alone abandoning core interests' (2010). It explains that China's uncompromising attitudes to the Diaoyu Islands are clearly expressed in a speech by Premier Wen Jiabao at the UN General Assembly on 23rd September (ibid.):

> China is friendly and talks about principles, and unswervingly safeguards the core interests of the country. On issues regarding its sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, China will never give in and never compromise.

Herein, highlighting the combination of 'friendliness' and 'resoluteness', China has started to differentiate the Self from Other.

Additionally, although in Period I, China constructed the ECS as a sea of 'peace, friendship, and cooperation' between the Self and Other, in Period II, China started to stress that the Diaoyu Islands are 'inherent Chinese territory' and so China has 'indisputable islands sovereignty'. Such discursive construction of the implicit righteous the Self became possible by newly interpreting the Other as 'illegal', 'hostile to China', and having a 'contradiction between what Japan says and what it actually does' in the context of the vessel collision case (People's Daily, 2010). Japan's arrest of the Chinese captain was interpreted as Japan's bid to 'coerce China to submit', and to 'contain' China whilst 'relying on the big external country [i.e., the US] as a backer' (People's Daily, 2010). Japan's detention of the Chinese captain was rendered as being based on 'selfish calculation' to play up the 'China threat theory' and 'US military deterrence theory' in order to settle the Futenma base problem (Wu, 2010).[77]

Period II also witnessed a temporal discursive shift in China's way to frame Japan's move in the Diaoyu Islands. In Period I, China clearly differentiated pre-1945 Imperial Japan from current Japan in constructing the Other. However, in

[76] As noted in Chapter 3, *Zhong Sheng* (钟声) is one of the editorials of *People's Daily* and a homophone for 'the voice of the Central'. *Zhong Sheng* is supposed to express 'the voice of China regarding important international problems and China-related problems' (Renminwang, 2012).
[77] As set out in the previous chapter, at that time, there were several Japanese politicians in the Diet, who securitised the Senkaku Islands to justify the existence of the US base in Okinawa as 'deterrence'.

Period II, China's position was abandoned, and history started to be used by China to explicitly construct righteousness of the Self and wrongness of the Other, thereby strengthening China's islands sovereignty claim. China precisely began to demonise the Other in the context of the Diaoyu Islands by increasing references to Imperial Japanese history, including the unequal Shimonoseki Treaty that stipulated ceding of Taiwan to Imperial Japan (Jia, 2010; Liu, 2011; People's Daily, 2011). China's rendition that Japan illegally stole China's Diaoyu Islands during the Imperial Japanese period and 'even after World War II Japan has not stopped its movement in the Diaoyu Islands' constructed a new discursive reality of the Diaoyu Islands, which called for China's countermeasures to deal with the perceived threat from Japan (Jia, 2010). Against this backdrop, China securitised the islands during Period II by explicitly justifying China's new security practices of challenging Japan's *de facto* control of the islands since December 2008 in a *People's Daily* editorial (Jia, 2010). Moreover, on 24th August 2011, China indeed dispatched two official vessels to the Diaoyu Islands territorial waters. This time, China set up an electronic bulletin board on the deck of the patrol vessels that read 'at present, [we are] conducting public affairs following the law in China's maritime jurisdiction. The Diaoyu Islands and surrounding islands are the inherent territory of China' (LDP, 2011). During Period I, China's shift in its islands practice had remained unexplained, but in Period II, China started to justify its security practices of challenging Japan's *de facto* control of the islands, against the backdrop of the negative construction of the Other explicitly.

Having said that, like Period I, China continuously expressed China's willingness to pursue good Sino-Japanese relations. The *Zhong Sheng* (2010) of 26th September emphasised that China and Japan should strengthen their friendship and mutual understanding, thereby providing Japan with the leeway to repair the damaged Self/Other relations in future. Likewise, a *People's Daily* editorial of Liu (2011) also showed China's willingness to restore the Sino-Japanese relations for the joint development of the ECS. Even after Tokyo Mayor Ishihara had proposed to purchase the three Senkaku Islands from their private owner on 16th April 2012, a *People's Daily* editorial of 13th July 2012 still expressed the view that 'China hopes that Japan will earnestly abide by the relevant consensus and understanding reached by the two sides so far and return to the correct path of managing differences with

China through dialogue and consultation, and take concrete actions to safeguard the overall situation of bilateral relations' (2012j).

5.2.3 Period III (September 2012 - October 2012): Explicit Securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands through the Sino-Japanese War History Lens and the Beginning of Daily Patrols

Period III started with China's most explicit securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands after Japan's purchase of the privately-owned islands on 11th September 2012. In Period III, as the following Figure 5.5 shows, China started to securitise the Diaoyu Islands by applying the Sino-Japanese War lens, thereby deviating from the Joint Statement of 2008 in which China tacitly agreed to refrain from demonising Japan with references to Imperial Japanese history. Being different from Period II, analogies to the Sino-Japanese War were repeatedly made by China in interpreting Japan's islands policy, and these elements are highlighted in red in the figure. The de-linked elements in Period III are highlighted in gray, and China's new demands from Japan are listed in the green box. As soon as Japan purchased the islands, China started to interpret Japan's conduct as an attempt to 'achieve the invasion' of the Diaoyu Islands by making an analogy to the Mukden Incident (1931) that had become a pretext for Imperial Japanese invasion of the northeast China, Manchuria. In Period III, the Other was constructed with a sequence of new negative elements, such as 'defy the rules and order', '(euphemistically) fascist', 'sinister', 'deceptive', 'blatantly challenges the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and the post-war international order', and 'thief'. Simultaneously, when constructing the Self, China highlighted that 'the era that the Chinese nation is bullied by others has already gone', thereby justifying China's 'the strong will of the Chinese nation'. In period III, China started its new islands security policy to challenge Japan's *de facto* control over the islands via daily patrols, which took place for the first time since the outset of the islands dispute.

Figure 5.5: Period III, China's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts



After Japan's purchase of the three islands from the private owner on 11th September 2012, China embarked on its extensive and intensive campaign to problematise Japan's 'nationalisation' of the Diaoyu Islands, and *People's Daily* suddenly inflated the number of articles and editorials on the Diaoyu Islands on an unprecedented scale (Ma, 2014). First and foremost, it is crucial to shed light on how China has interpreted Japan's moves. As laid out in the previous chapter, Japan's purchase of the islands from Mr. Kurihara was partially to prevent Tokyo Mayor

Ishihara from building any ports and military facilities on them.[78] As a matter of fact, since the day of the purchase, Japan has consistently prevented anyone from landing, let alone building anything, on all islands to date. Before Japan's purchase of the islands on 11th September 2012, Japan had conveyed this intention to the Chinese side in early July, and at that time, the Chinese MOFA had not condemned Japan's plan (Amako, 2013; Nagashima, 2013; Sunohara, 2013). Nevertheless, after Japan's purchase of the islands, China eventually chose to interpret Japan's behaviour as 'ridiculous, illegal, and destined to be impossible' (People's Daily, 2012e). Although it was *Asahi*, which for the first time used the term 'nationalisation (国有化: *kokuyūka*)' to expose the Japanese government's plan for purchase of the islands, and the Japanese government carefully avoided using this term throughout the event, China chose to render the Japan's moves as 'nationalisation (国有化: *guoyouhua*)', using the same characters. However, being different from the Japanese connotation of this term, which merely signifies the transfer of the ownership of the islands, the Chinese implication of the same three characters hinted at the Japanese government's proactive development of the islands, for instance, the building of military facilities.[79] Notwithstanding the crucial gap of the meanings of these three characters, China chose to doubt Japan's intention by relying on the Chinese connotation of this term, whilst disregarding something lost in translation (People's Daily, 2012e; emphasis added):

> [Japan] connived the right-wing forces to start the 'purchase of the islands' crisis, and finally jumped to the forefront, directly to 'purchase' the Diaoyu Islands and the affiliated South Island and North Islet, implementing the so-called 'nationalisation (国有化)'. The purpose of the Japanese government's move is to strengthen its so-called 'actual jurisdiction' over the Diaoyu Islands through the so-called 'nationalisation (国有化)' to finally *achieve the invasion* of the Diaoyu Islands.

[78] In my personal interviews with Japanese policymakers and scholars in Tokyo, it was confirmed that there was no alternative way to prevent Ishihara's provocative conduct. As Japan is a democratic country, being different from China, the central government cannot intervene in the decision-making of local governments.

[79] Several Japanese policymakers, scholars, and Chinese scholars confirmed this point in my personal interviews. In Japan, lands may be traded freely like in the UK, but in China, there is a shared understanding that lands are from the beginning state's property. Such a conceptual difference in ownership of lands led to different interpretations of 'nationalisation (国有化)'.

Using a hyperbolic term, such as ‘achieve the invasion’, China started to attribute the reason of Japan’s ‘nationalisation’ of the islands solely to Japan’s lack of regret for its wrongdoings during the Imperial period (ibid.):

> The essence [of Japan’s wrong behaviour] is its defiance and reversal of the post-war arrangements for Japan’s settlement and the Asia-Pacific regional order as determined by international legal documents such as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. It [i.e., Japan’s ‘wrong behaviour’] is a denial and challenge to the victory of the World Anti-fascist War.

Thus, China chose to frame Japan’s moves in the Diaoyu Islands as an extension of pre-1945 Japan’s invasion of China, whilst blurring the differences between Imperial Japan and current Japan. At this point, China started to apply the Sino-Japanese War lens to view the islands dispute, thereby deviating from the Joint Statement of 2008 in which China tacitly agreed to refrain from demonising Japan with references to Imperial Japanese history.

Eventually, in Period III, China started to construct the Other with far more negative elements pertaining to Sino-Japanese War history. Firstly, China continuously used negative elements such as ‘illegality’ and ‘Japan playing up “China threat theory”’ like Period II; however, China newly linked other negative elements to the Other – ‘crazy’, ‘talk nonsense’, ‘defy the rules and order’, ‘(euphemistically) fascist’, ‘sinister’, ‘deceptive’, ‘a defeated nation [as a result of the Sino-Japanese War]’ (People’s Daily, 2012c), and ‘a thief (People’s Daily, 2012k)‘. China pointedly criticised that Japan ‘completely ignores historical facts and jurisprudence’; Japan ‘violates the consensus reached by the older generation’s leaders’; and, Japan ‘blatantly challenges the victory of the World Anti-fascist War and the post-war international order’ (People’s Daily, 2012c). The basis of these criticisms lies in China’s interpretation of Japan’s action as ‘stealing Chinese territory’, and China even interprets Japan’s purchase of the islands as similar to the ‘bullying’ of China during the Sino-Japanese War (ibid.). On the 81st anniversary of the Mukden Incident,[80] rendering this day as ‘National Day of Shame of the Chinese Nation (中国民族的国耻日)’, China made an analogy to Japan’s ‘nationalisation’ of the islands (People’s Daily, 2012a). On this day, Japan’s past Self was linked to a

[80] On 18th September 1931, the Mukden Incident occurred. This event became a pretext for Imperial Japanese invasion of northeast China – Manchuria. China used to explain that the starting point of war of resistance against Japan was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7th July 1937. However, in 2012, China interpreted that the beginning of the anti-Japanese War was the Mukden Incident.

rendition, ‘deliberately manufacturing the Mukden Incident’ to eventually invade Manchuria; and simultaneously, Japan’s current Self was interpreted in the Diaoyu Islands context that ‘Japan has no sincere remorse for the past war of aggression and colonial rule, and lacks correct understanding and profound reflection on the crime of militaristic aggression’, and which dares to ‘openly infringe China’s territorial sovereignty [again]’ (People’s Daily, 2012a). Hence, in Period III, China started to make an analogy to the Sino-Japanese War explicitly to interpret the islands dispute in a specific way, whilst excluding any alternative possibilities to interpret Japan’s purchase of the islands. By doing so, China discursively constructed ‘a threat’ in rendering Japan’s moves in the Diaoyu Islands.

On the other hand, China began to shift the elements that constitute the Self accordingly. Although Chinese ‘friendliness’ was emphasised along with ‘feeling of anger’ and ‘resoluteness’ throughout Period II, all words related to ‘friendliness’ (i.e., 友好, 友谊, 和睦) were erased in Period III. Moreover, China started to refer to the Sino-Japanese War to interpret the Self as the ‘victor of the World Anti-fascist War’ (People’s Daily, 2012c; SCIO, 2012). More importantly, a new element was further added: ‘the era that the Chinese nation is bullied by other has already gone’ and then China tries to construct Chinese identity via a specific historical perspective (People’s Daily, 2012c):

> The era that the Chinese nation is bullied by others has already gone. Japan should not forget that the aggression of the Chinese War launched more than half a century ago, eventually turned it into a serious consequence of the defeated country. Based on the history of Japan’s exchanges with China, Japan should have a deep understanding of the strong will of the Chinese nation who loves peace but never yields. Japan should be aware of the multiple meanings of ‘One should return as good as one receives (来而不往非礼也)’.[81]

Herein, China explicitly warns Japan by noting that China used to be bullied, but now it is strong enough to fight back against Japan to the extent that it would result in a severe consequence of Japan. Such construction of the Self strongly justified a call for China’s urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat from Japan – ‘tit-for-tat’ policy, as metaphorically expressed in the Chinese adage.

[81] This is a Chinese adage from one of the Confucius classics, ‘礼记 (Book of Rites)’. The general meaning of adage is, ‘friendship cannot always stand on one side’. However, in this context, stressing the ‘multiple meanings’ of the adage, the article is conveying that Japan cannot take it for granted that China always accepts what Japan does. And so, it can be interpreted as ‘Japan should know that now China returns what it receives from Japan’.

This was the moment when China abandoned its existing islands policy to pursue the joint development of the ECS that had been kept throughout Period I and II. On 10th September 2012, like Japan, China issued a statement – 'Baseline of the Diaoyu Islands and Their Affiliated Islands'. From the following day onwards, the China Meteorological Administration and the State Oceanic Administration began to release the Diaoyu Islands weather forecast and marine environment officially. On 13th September, like Japan, Ambassador of Permanent Representative of China to the UN, Li Baodong, deposited with the Secretary-General of the UN the coordinate tables and charts of the base points of the Diaoyu Islands and their affiliated islands. On 25th September, the SCIO published the White Paper of the Diaoyu Islands for the first time since the outset of the dispute. On 30th September, the UN website published a baseline map of the Diaoyu Islands and its affiliated island territorial waters provided by China. More importantly, since the day of Japan's 'nationalisation', China has embarked on its patrol near the islands on a daily basis to exercise China's jurisdiction over the islands and its adjacent waters, whilst normalising its practices to challenge Japan's *de facto* control (Japanese MOFA, 2019b) (cf. Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6: The Number of Ships Identified in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands



Also, the beginning of China's 'tit-for-tat' policy in Period III signified the end of the existing policy to 'solve the problem via talk and consultation', 'avoid talking

about sovereignty', and 'carry out co-development'. Instead of these conciliatory approaches, in Period III, China started to highlight how strong the 'will and the force of action of the Chinese government and people to safeguard the territorial sovereignty of the country' (People's Daily, 2012c). Whilst challenging Japan's *de facto* control, in Period III, China began to demand Japan to 'give up the idea that "there is no dispute"' in order to improve the Sino-Japanese relations, and China no longer expressed its willingness to restore the deteriorated Sino-Japanese relations (People's Daily, 2012c).

Besides, in Period III, China's differentiation between the Self and Other was also contextualised in their relations to Asia and the world. Making a sharp contrast to Period I, when China had encouraged Japan to play a larger international role by praising post-war Japan's peaceful development, in Period III, China started to present a united front with Asian victims against Japan by pointing to Japan's inability to settle the history problem. For instance, a *People's Daily* editorial (2012h) of 25th September 2012 noted, 'from time to time, Japanese politicians made "Freudian slips" to beautify the history of aggression, deny the Nanjing Massacre, and refused to take responsibility for the issue of comfort women. This has not only caused tensions between Japan and its neighbours but also expanded the "market" of security issues in Japan'. Although China used to differentiate Japan from the Japanese right-wing forces, after Japan's 'nationalisation', Japan started to be constructed as a collaborationist with the right-wing forces that increases the tensions with the Asian neighbours: 'it is not an accident that the Japanese government and the right-wing forces staged a "two-man comic show"[82] on the Diaoyu Islands issue. They have a background of accelerating right-wing politics in Japan, increasingly tough diplomacy, and tensions with neighbouring countries' (People's Daily, 2012f). On the other hand, China consistently constructed the Self as a contribution to the Asian and world peace and stability: 'China's enhancement of naval power is not only an increase in peace forces in the Asia-Pacific region but also conducive to world peace and stability' (People's Daily, 2012d). By doing so,

[82] China often used this term – 演双簧 in Chinese – to render the Japanese government's 'complicity' with the 'right-wing forces' in the process of the purchase of islands. In a short editorial of *Jin Caiwei* of 16th October (People's Daily, 2012g), it provides a specific description of it: 'Ishihara and others sing a red face, and Noda sings a white face. The expressions of red and white faces are different, but the mind is the same. "One mind" is to steal Chinese territory, and "different expressions" are deceiving'. Alternatively, China also uses expressions, such as Japan's 'farce' to 'perform "purchase island" (For example, People's Daily, 2012b)'.

China constructed the Self as a guardian of the world and regional peace to protect other countries from Japan's 'rise of militarism'.

5.2.4 Period IV (November 2012 - December 2015): De-escalation of the Diaoyu Islands Dispute, but Continuation of China's 'Tit-for-tat' Policy and Application of the Sino-Japanese War Lens until November 2014

As Figure 5.7 shows, in Period IV, China stopped its lengthy and intensive campaign of Period III that problematised Japan's 'nationalisation' of the Diaoyu Islands in *People's Daily*. However, throughout Period IV, China consistently maintained the 'tit-for-tat' islands policy that had been established in Period III. Besides the normalised daily patrols of the Diaoyu Islands that had started in September 2012, Period IV witnessed China's beginning of dispatching the People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) aircraft in the territorial airs of the Diaoyu Islands. Moreover, on 23rd November 2013, China established the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the ECS. When it comes to China's construction of the Other, whilst expressing China's intention to improve the Sino-Japanese relations, China started to demand Japan to 'correct view of history' by interpreting Japan's conducts in the Diaoyu Islands and Abe's security reforms as Japan's lack of regret for the wrongdoings during Imperial Japan. China's application of the Sino-Japanese War lens to view the Diaoyu Islands dispute continued until the Sino-Japanese rapprochement in the Four Articles Consensus of November 2014.

Figure 5.7: Period IV, China's Construction of Self/Other and Policy Shifts



In Period IV, China stopped its lengthy and intensive campaign of Period III that problematised Japan's 'nationalisation' of the Diaoyu Islands in *People's Daily*. Notwithstanding, throughout Period IV, China consistently maintained the 'tit-for-tat' islands policy that had been established in Period III. Besides the normalised daily patrols of the Diaoyu Islands that had started in September 2012, Period IV witnessed China's beginning of dispatching the PLA's aircraft in the territorial airspace of the Diaoyu Islands. According to the Japanese MOD (2012), on the 13th 2012, which marked the 75th anniversary of the day of the Nanjing Massacre, an PLA aircraft entered into the territorial air of the islands for the first time since 1958, when Japan had taken over the ADIZ[83] from the US. On the following day, a Chinese MOFA spokesperson, Hong Lei, officially stated that this was 'a part of the legitimate patrol to protect Chinese territory' (2012). The total number of Japan's scrambles to the identified Chinese aircraft in the territorial airspace of Japan has consistently increased from 2012 to 2015, reflecting China's increased activities in the ECS (Japan MOD, 2016) (cf. Figure 5.8).

[83] The ADIZ is a concept made in the 1950s during the Cold War. It means explicitly 'a publicly defined area extending beyond national territory in which unidentified aircraft are liable to be interrogated and, if necessary, intercepted for identification before they cross into sovereign airspace' (Welch, 2013).

Figure 5.8: The Number of Japan's Scramble to Chinese Aircrafts



NB: the vertical axis shows the number of scrambles, and the horizontal axis shows the year from 2004 (H16) to 2015 (H27)

Moreover, on 23rd November 2013, China established the ADIZ in the ECS, which largely overlapped that of Japan. A *PLA Daily* editorial of 25th November (2013) criticised the negative reactions of Japan and the US for its 'double-standards' which do not problematise their own ADIZ but become worried about China's ADIZ: 'such double standards and overbearing logic, China certainly cannot accept, and cannot withstand the balance of internationally established truth and justice'. Hence, in Period IV, China's 'tit-for-tat' policy has expanded to the realm of the islands territorial airs.

Additionally, in Period IV, China embarked on the institutional reforms, which pertains to the Diaoyu Islands policy. First, On 22nd July 2013, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) was created based on the State Council Institutional Reform passed in March 2013 at the 12th NPC (Xinhua News, 2013). Institutionally, the CCG integrated the five existing departments in the Chinese government (i.e., Maritime Surveillance, Fishery Law Enforcement, Maritime Safety Administration, Border Guard, and Customs and Excise Department) under the Ministry of Land and Resources (ibid.). Due to the lack of integration amongst these five departments,

they used to be mocked as 'five dragons govern the sea (五龙闹海)', but now they have become an efficient unified organisation to patrol China's maritime border (Takeda, 2014, p. 92). On the anniversary of Japan's 'farce of "purchasing the islands",' an article of *People's Daily* (2013b) reported that the ships of the CCG conducted patrol near the islands, and in the words of a MOFA spokesperson, Hong Lei, this is 'a normal official activity that exercises jurisdiction over the waters of the Diaoyu Islands'. Hence, even after the end of its intensive campaign of Period III to interpret the Diaoyu Islands dispute in a certain way, China did not stop its islands practice – daily patrols to challenge Japan's *de facto* control – and moreover, China established the CCG to enhance its maritime capability.

When it comes to China's construction of the Other, in Period IV, China did not continuously employ the highly negative elements that had been linked to Japan in Period III (e.g., 'crazy', 'talk nonsense', 'a thief', and so forth) because there were no events surrounding the Diaoyu Islands that evolved into the similar level of dispute flare-up of Period III. Nevertheless, whilst expressing China's intention to improve the Sino-Japanese relations, China started to demand Japan to 'correct view of history'. On 17th December 2012 – the following day of Japan's general election for the Lower House that heralded in Abe Shinzō's return to the position of prime minister after almost five years of break – *People's Daily* (2012i) published an editorial that stressed the importance of Japan's new prime minister's 'correct view of history', in the realm of the Diaoyu Islands, the Yasukuni Shrine, and the revision of the peace Constitution including the collective self-defence. Hence, Period IV can be characterised by China's extensive application of the Sino-Japanese War lens to Japan's overall security policy. China obscured the boundary between the pre-1945 Imperial Japan and current Japan in constructing the Other, thereby constructing China's morally higher position than that of Japan. By doing so, China condemned Japan's overall security policy, including that of the Diaoyu Islands. Using the Sino-Japanese War lens, China criticised not only Japan's Diaoyu Islands policy (cf. People's Daily, 2013a, 2014a) but also Abe's 'values-oriented diplomacy' (People's Daily, 2013c); 'proactive diplomacy' (People's Daily, 2014c); Japan's ' idea of "Asian version of NATO"' (ibid.); Japan's 'proactive contribution to peace' (People's Daily, 2014b); Japan's lift of arms export ban in April 2014 (ibid.); and the Abe Cabinet decision to legalise Japan's collective self-defence. For instance, China

condemned Abe's security reforms that includes 'active pacifism', lift of arms exports embargo, and legalisation of the collective defence, as 'resurgence of militarism' by applying the lens of Imperial Japanese history in *Zhong Sheng* of 27th July 2014 (People's Daily, 2014b):

> The Japanese right-wing forces are now constantly beautifying the war of aggression, encouraging the militarists and even proposing the so-called 'active pacifism', loosening arms exports, and lifting the right to collective self-defense ... A series of actions are providing a hotbed for the resurgence of militarism. History is history, and facts must not be denied; law is law, and its dignity must be defended. In the face of a series of Japanese right-wingers' challenges to international law and the post-war international peace order, it is even more necessary to safeguard historical fairness and justice and maintain peace and stability. History is the best textbook and the best sober agent.

On the other hand, China expressed its willingness to improve the Sino-Japanese relations in Period IV. For instance, *People's Daily* (2012i) editorial of 17th December 2012 stated, 'China and Japan are rebuilding the consensus on the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu Islands through diplomatic negotiations. We hope that the new leader of the Japanese side can proceed from the overall situation, proceed from the long-term development of Asia, avoid escalating disputes, jointly and effectively control the crisis, and shift the focus as soon as possible'. Calling for improvement of the Sino-Japanese rift after Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012, in Period IV, China started to positively construct the Self/Other (People's Daily, 2013d):

> China and Japan are important neighbours, being the world's second largest and third largest economy, respectively. Dealing with Sino-Japanese relations and promoting the respective development of the two countries will contribute to the recovery of the world economy. Promoting Sino-Japanese relations to overcome difficulties and continue to move forward is the responsibility of the well-being of the Chinese and Japanese peoples and have a positive international impact.

Herein, like Period I, China emphasised the commonality of China and Japan and encouraged their cooperation and contribution to the world economy. However, although in Period I, China positively evaluated Japan's post-war 'peaceful development' in the Joint Statement in May 2008, as this editorial illustrates, China did not link an element, 'peace', to Japan in Period IV. Moreover, by clarifying that the Self/Other as 'the world's second-largest and third-largest economy, respectively', China started to highlight its economic supremacy over Japan.

When it comes to China's rendition of the Diaoyu Islands dispute, in Period IV, China continued to employ the lens of Imperial Japanese history. Therefore, whilst calling for reconciliation with Japan, China highlighted the importance of Japan to remember the following two quotations of Japan's official apology for the war responsibility from the Joint Communiqué of 1972 and the Joint Declaration of 1998, respectively (People's Daily, 2013d):

> 'The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself'.

> 'The Japanese side explained that Japan adheres to the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement of 1972 and the prime minister's remarks on 15th August 1995 [i.e., the Murayama statement], Japan is keenly conscious of the responsibility of the Chinese people for the great disaster and damage caused by the aggression against China'.

A sentence following these quotes of Japan's apology was that 'under the current special situation of Sino-Japanese relations, it is necessary for us to emphasise this point (i.e., these quotes) again'. As noted in the previous chapter, from Japan's perspective, Japan's purchase of the islands had nothing to do with Sino-Japanese War history; however, China did not change its stance to problematise Japan's moves in the Diaoyu Islands as the history problem. China, therefore, started to demand that 'Japan should abide by the promises it has given, face history and reality, and learn from history' (People's Daily, 2013d).

It was only on 7th November 2014, when China and Japan finally managed to agree to restore the damaged diplomatic relations in the Four Articles Consensus. Three days later, General Secretary Xi Jinping met Prime Minister Abe at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), thereby finally signaling the Sino-Japanese diplomatic détente since September 2012. As noted in the previous chapter, in the Four Articles Consensus, China and Japan agreed to pursue the mutually beneficial relationship, to 'overcome the political obstacles affecting the relations between the two countries in the spirit of "face to history and face to the future",' and to 'recognise that there are different opinions on the tensions in the ECS, such as the Diaoyu Islands, and agree to prevent the situation from deteriorating through dialogue and consultation, and establish a crisis management and control mechanism to avoid unforeseen events' (Embassy of China in Japan, 2014). Notwithstanding, even after the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, China did not stop the new security

practices that had been established in Period III: challenging Japan's *de facto* control of the islands via daily patrols, and occasional dispatch of aircraft to the islands territorial airspace.

Owing to the Four Article Consensus of November 2014, China started to refrain from criticising Japan explicitly in the context of the Diaoyu Islands dispute. However, China maintained its criticisms of Abe's security reforms and his revisionist historical stance, whilst using the existing elements, such as ' [Japan challenges] victory of the World Anti-fascist War' or Japan's 'reversal' of the long-term peaceful development (People's Daily, 2015a). Although China explicitly linked the 'war of resistance against Japan' to the islands dispute in *People's Daily* editorials in every September from 2012 to 2014 (People's Daily, 2012a, 2013a, 2014a), the editorial of 2015 (2015c) that commemorated the 70th anniversary of the 'victory of the World Anti-fascist War' did not make reference to the 'Diaoyu Islands (钓鱼岛)'. This is indicative of China's intention to refrain from linking Imperial Japan to current Japan after November 2014.

However, when Japan's MOFA website publicised the situation of oil and gas development in the ECS with references to 'China's rise', *People's Daily* editorial (2015b) condemned Japan's overall security developments, in a 'tit-for-tat' way:

> In recent years, the contradictions arising from historical issues between China and Japan have not been provoked by China; it is the Japanese government's illegal purchase of the 'Diaoyu Island' which has intensified the dispute between of China and Japan; […] Japan aggravates the contradictions of all parties; the steps of Abe's constitutional amendment and rearmament have become bigger and bigger, and the people of the countries that remember the Japanese militaristic aggression are still unable to feel at ease. From this, it can be seen that the Abe government's speculation on the 'China threat theory' is completely deliberate. Japan's breakthrough in the post-war system and the search for the military rise are the real threats to regional peace.

This editorial did not make many references to Imperial Japanese history; however, by stressing 'the people of the countries that remember the Japanese militaristic aggression', China indirectly criticised Japan's security reforms as 'the real threats to regional peace'. Hence, after the Four Article Consensus of November 2014, China started to stop linking the Diaoyu Islands to its explicit references to the Sino-Japanese War. Yet, throughout Period IV, China did not change its practice of challenging Japan's *de facto* control of the Diaoyu Islands both in their sea and air.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed China's discourse on the Diaoyu Islands. Firstly, I have analysed how China has constructed its Diaoyu Islands sovereignty claim from the 1950s onwards. As clearly illustrated, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, China recognised that the islands belonged to the Ryūkyū Archipelago but not Taiwan. During this period, China recognised the islands as the 'Jiange Zhudao (尖閣諸島)', and the islands had nothing to do with China's boundary inscription practices. It was in December 1971 when China started to construct its sovereignty claim. According to the statement published by the Chinese MOFA in December 1971, China started to justify its islands sovereignty by highlighting the Sino-centric history, delegitimating a post-war legal framework of the SFPT system, and stressing the invalidity of the 'unequal treaty' after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) based on a post-colonial stance. At this point, China started to claim that the Diaoyu Islands had always belonged to Taiwan but not the Ryūkyū Archipelago. It is noteworthy that at that time, China did not refer to international law to justify its own claim. It was only in 2010 when China began to rebuke Japan's claim by using international law. After Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012, China started to view the islands dispute through a lens of Sino-Japanese War history. Thus far, I have illustrated the process of how China has discursively naturalised the essence of the Diaoyu Islands sovereignty since the 1950s.

Against this backdrop, the latter section of this chapter has examined how China securitised the Diaoyu Islands by shifting the Self/Other construction from 2008 to 2015. By doing so, I have answered the following three research questions: *how* did China shift the Self/Other construction in the Diaoyu Islands discourse from 2008 to 2015?; *how* did China securitise the Diaoyu Islands from 2008 to 2015?; and, *how* did the Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem? As the following Figure 5.9 shows, the period of 2008 to 2015 can be divided into four phases, depending on the degree of China's securitisation of the islands.

Figure 5.9: A List of China's Discursive Shifts

	Time	Characterised by…
Period I	January 2008 to August 2010	The honeymoon period between Hu and Fukuda, who agreed on the Joint Statement and Principled Consensus, and the beginning of China's dispatch of its official ships near the islands
		[The Self/Other construction] China positively constructed the Self/Other Self: peaceful and harmonious development after the open and reform policy Other: post-war Japan = peace and economic development, Japan's larger international role is expected, 'history' is important for Sino-Japanese friendship
		[Security/Islands Policy] - ECS Co-development - Beginning patrol by the official Chinese ships - the Law on the Protection of Sea Islands passed
Period II	September 2010 to August 2012	Beginning of China's securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands at a low-key level after the vessel collision case of September 2010
		[The Self/Other construction] China started to differentiate the Self from Other Self: peaceful development, protect the 'core interest', friendly but resolute

		Other: illegality, contradiction, hostility, contain China, coerce China to submit, play up 'China threat theory', and 'US military deterrence theory'
		[Security/Islands Policy] - ECS Co-development - vessel collision case in September 2010 - China's patrol of the islands in August 2011
Period III	September to October 2012	China's most explicit securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands with a lens of Sino-Japanese War history after September 2012
		[The Self/Other construction] China started to further differentiate the Self from Other by applying a lens of the Sino-Japanese War Self: a guardian of the post-war international order, contribution to peace and stability of Asia and the world, resolute, victor of the World Anti-fascist War, the era that the Chinese nation is bullied by other has already gone, China can fight back now Other: illegality, crazy, talk nonsense, defy the rules and order, fascist, sinister, deceptive, defy the rules and order, sinister, deceptive, a thief, violate the 'consensus' of the 1970s, 'nationalisation' = invasion of China, Japan is a collaborationist of the right-wing, increase the tensions with Asia due to the history problem, challenges the victory of the World Anti-fascist War and the post-war international order, analogy to the Mukden Incident
		[Security/Islands Policy]

		- China's 'tit-for-tat' policy - China patrol the islands on a daily basis…etc.
Period IV	November 2012 to December 2015	The Sino-Japanese rapprochement in November 2014 and continued China's new islands security practices
		[The Self/Other construction] China stopped using highly negative elements of Period III after November 2014 but continued to apply the lens of Sino-Japanese War history Self: a guardian of the post-war international order, contribution to peace and stability of Asia and the world, the second-largest economic power, the victor of the World Anti-fascist War Other: the important neighbour, ADIZ = double standard, Promote 'China threat theory', lack of 'correct view of history' = rearmament, the real threats to regional peace
		[Security/Islands Policy] - 'tit-for-tat' policy - establishment of the ADIZ, CCG - Chinese aircraft started to enter into the territorial air of the islands Sino-Japanese Four Articles Consensus

In a period from 2008 to 2015, China's highly amicable construction of the Self/Other of Period I (January 2008 to August 2010) developed into the intense securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands after Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012. Firstly, Period I was characterised by China's consistently positive rendering of the Self/Other in the context of the ECS. Period I started with a honeymoon period, at least, on a level of leaders between Japan and China. In May 2008, following General Secretary Hu Jintao's visit to Japan, Japan and China

agreed to advance the Sino-Japanese relations via the Joint Statement, and also, in June 2008, they agreed on the joint development of the ECS gas field in the Principled Consensus. In these agreements, China consistently constructed the Self/Other positively. In particular, in the Joint Statement, China tacitly agreed to refrain from demonising Japan with references to Imperial Japanese history by accepting, 'the two sides resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future'. On the other hand, in Period I, China started to dispatch its official ships in the territorial waters of the islands for the first time since the outset of the dispute. On 8th December 2008, just before the Japan-China-Korean Trilateral Summit held in Fukuoka, two official Chinese ships entered and drifted in the territorial waters of the Diaoyu Islands for nine hours. Additionally, on 26th December 2009, the NPC passed the 'Law on the Protection of Sea Islands'. Retrospectively, this law was instrumental in establishing Chinese governmental systems that make it possible to implement China's incremental expansion of maritime control in cooperation with China's military institutions. Thus, Period I witnessed a contradiction between China's positive construction of the Self/Other in the ECS and China's beginning of the deployment of its official ships in the islands territorial waters.

After that, Period II (September 2010 to August 2012) was characterised by China's increasing securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands, albeit at a low-key level. Regardless of Wen's painstaking efforts to improve the Sino-Japanese relations in a top-down approach throughout Period I, China and Japan critically lost its momentum toward the Sino-Japanese co-development of the ECS, on 7th September 2010, when the vessel collision case took place. On that day, a fishing vessel steered by a drunken Chinese man violently collided his vessel with two ships of the JCG in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial waters, and eventually, the Chinese captain was detained by Japan until 24th September 2010. It was the first time for China to cause that serious damage to the ships of the JCG near the islands. Although China consistently constructed a positive discourse of the Sino-Japanese cooperation in the ECS throughout Period I, after the vessel collision case in September 2010, China shifted the way to construct the Self/Other by differentiating the Self from Other and de-linking the following positive elements of Japan: post-war Japan as 'peace' development, 'Japan's larger international role is expected', and 'history is important for the Sino-Japanese friendship'.

Period III (September 2012 to October 2012) started with China's most explicit securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands after Japan's purchase of the privately-owned islands on 11th September 2012. As soon as Japan purchased the islands, China started to interpret Japan's conduct as an attempt to 'achieve the invasion' of the Diaoyu Islands by making an analogy to the Mukden Incident (1931) that had become a pretext for Imperial Japanese invasion of the northeast China, Manchuria. China's application of the lens of Sino-Japanese War history deviated from the Joint Statement of 2008, in which, in which China tacitly agreed to refrain from demonising Japan with references to Imperial Japanese history. In Period III, the Other was constructed with a sequence of new negative elements, such as 'defy the rules and order', '(euphemistically) fascist', 'sinister', 'deceptive', 'blatantly challenges the victory of the World Anti-fascist War and the post-war international order', and 'thief'. Simultaneously, when constructing the Self, China highlighted that 'the era that the Chinese nation is bullied by others has already gone', thereby justifying China's 'the strong will of the Chinese nation'. In Period III, China eventually started its new islands security policy to challenge Japan's *de facto* control over the islands via daily patrols, which took place for the first time since the outset of the islands dispute. Hence, Period III witnessed the beginning of China's application of the Sino-Japanese War history lens to frame the Diaoyu Islands.

In Period IV (November 2012 to December 2015) China stopped its lengthy and intensive campaign of Period III that problematised Japan's 'nationalisation' of the Diaoyu Islands. However, throughout Period IV, China consistently maintained the 'tit-for-tat' islands policy that had been established in Period III. Besides the normalised daily patrols of the Diaoyu Islands that had started in September 2012, Period IV witnessed China's beginning of dispatching the PLA's aircraft in the territorial airs of the Diaoyu Islands. Moreover, on 23rd November 2013, China established the ADIZ in the ECS. When it comes to China's construction of the Other, whilst expressing China's intention to improve the Sino-Japanese relations, China started to demand Japan to 'correct its view of history' by interpreting Japan's conduct in the Diaoyu Islands and Abe's security reforms as Japan's lack of regret for the wrongdoings during Imperial Japan. China's application of the Sino-Japanese War lens to view the Diaoyu Islands dispute continued until the Sino-Japanese rapprochement in the Four Articles Consensus of November 2014. Thus far, this

chapter has examined China's discourse on the Diaoyu Islands. The next chapter will conclude this dissertation by laying out all the theoretical and empirical findings.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This dissertation has taken a poststructuralist approach to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. The overarching aim of this study was to shed a new light on how Japan and China constructed the Self/Other whilst intertwining the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with the history problem. The dissertation focused on the following four key questions: *How* have Japan and China constructed the sovereignty claims of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s?; *how* did Japan and China shift the Self/Other construction in their discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between 2008 and 2015?; *how* did Japan and China securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between 2008 and 2015?; and, *how* did the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem from 2008 to 2015?

In conclusion, I will set out the overall findings of this research. Firstly, I will reassess the literature review of Chapter 2 in light of the two previous chapters of Japanese and Chinese discourse analyses. After that, I will provide a summary of the poststructuralist approach that was proposed in this study by summarising Chapter 3. This chapter then sets out the empirical findings of the poststructuralist analysis of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourses of Japan and China, based on the results of Chapters 4 and 5. I will compare the empirical results between the ways Japan and China have constructed their islands' sovereignty claims from the 1950s onwards, and securitised the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from 2008 to 2015. I will then lay out how this dissertation contributes to our knowledge on the nexus of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem. The final section takes a reflexive look at the relation between territorial disputes and competing nationalisms in light of this dissertation and offers some suggestions for future research.

6.1 Reassessing the Existing Literature

In Chapter 2, I reviewed the existing literature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. By doing so, this study set out that IR poststructuralism is the more suitable theory to answer the proposed research questions. To facilitate the examination of the existing literature, I clarified that there are two types of research questions: *why* questions and *how* questions. The *why* questions are asked by explanatory theories that try to test hypotheses and explain causal relations of major trends or recurring patterns in IR, and *how* questions are asked by constitutive international theory that analyses an epistemological perspective about how the world comes to be seen in particular ways. As noted above, this dissertation has asked *how* questions to approach the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, and so the existing literature was reviewed according to these two categories.

In Chapter 2, I laid out that many scholars have asked *why* questions to explain the reason for the escalation in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in the early 2010s; however, researchers did not often ask *how* questions, except for those who took IR constructivist and poststructuralist approaches. For the 'why questions' research, I first reviewed the political science approaches that pinpointed various variables that mainly pertain to Japanese and Chinese domestic politics, such as China's maritime policy, China's élite politics, the CCP's political legitimacy, dispute as bargaining leverage, linkage to the party/factional politics of Japan/China. While these political science approaches provided convincing accounts for *why* questions, they have failed to approach the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by asking *how* Japan and China have escalated the dispute in relation to the history problem. In a similar vein, I argued that the traditional IR theories – realism and liberalism – were also problematic in light of the research purpose of this dissertation because they attributed the reason for the recent Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands escalation to China's increasing military capability and economic power, and China's decreasing economic dependence on Japan. These traditional IR theories commonly disregard the ramifications of Japanese and Chinese identity in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, let alone the history problem. Hence, I argued that they were not suitable for this research.

When it comes to the *how* questions research, I explained that there were a few scholars who took IR constructivist and poststructuralist approaches to examine

the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. IR constructivism was theoretically able to answer *how* questions, yet two limitations of constructivism made this approach ill-suited to this study. Firstly, I set out that constructivism was not designed for examining subtle shifts over the short term. Also, I have problematised the fact that constructivism does not posit that identity is relationally constructed. These two shortcomings made constructivism unsuitable for this research.

Lastly, I have argued that IR poststructuralism is the more suitable theory for this study, for several reasons. Firstly, taking the stance of perspectivism, the poststructuralist approach makes it possible to examine the process of *how* Japan and China have established a particular 'regime of truth' – i.e., an axiomatic reality – in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Moreover, I noted that poststructuralism takes a critical stance on the conceptualisation of 'sovereign states', and thus I can understand the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute as a discursive practice in which Japan and China try to inscribe the boundary to constitute their territorial sovereignty, whilst constructing the inside/outside, Self/Other, and safe/threat. Furthermore, being different from constructivism, the poststructuralist approach posits that identity is constructed relationally. Also, poststructuralism is suitable to explore the nexus of identity and security policy. For these reasons, I have argued that this study takes the poststructuralist approach to answer the proposed *how* questions.

As noted in Chapter 2, the existing poststructuralist literature on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is limited. Firstly, referring to Michel Foucault's conception of 'power', Linus Hagström (2012) critically investigated *how* Japan discursively rendered China in the vessel collision case in September 2010 in relation to Japan's security policy shifts. Also, Hagström and Pan (2020) pointed out the theoretical advantage of poststructuralism in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, arguing that poststructuralism enables us to explore the complex ontological relations between hard and soft power. Notwithstanding, their poststructuralist framework is primarily centred on the soft/hard power binary discussion and so it does not allow students to view the islands dispute more comprehensively via lenses of the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory, ontological security theory, and boundary inscription practices like this dissertation does. There were other scholars who partially answered *how* Japan constructed the Self/Other in the Senkaku Islands dispute. Having said that, most of them primarily focused on a relatively short period

of time that witnessed the high-profile flare-up of the islands dispute (e.g., only 2010 and 2012). Moreover, apart from Hagström and Pan's (2020) short analysis of Chinese discourse, *how* China shifted its construction of the Self/Other in the Diaoyu Islands has yet to be conducted. Therefore, to see *how* Japan and China shifted their construction from the amicable Self/Other in the ECS in 2008 to the very negative one in the early 2010s, this dissertation has chosen the period from 2008 to 2015, thereby filling the research paucity. Chapter 2, therefore, concluded that this dissertation proposes an original poststructuralist framework that makes it possible to analyse *how* Japan and China shifted their construction of the Self/Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in relation to the history problem from 2008 to 2015.

6.2 Theoretical Contributions

The proposed poststructuralist framework made it possible to reveal how sovereign states exercise power to construct a particular 'reality' in their territorial disputes to constitute their territorial sovereignty discursively. As noted above, various studies have partially answered how Japan and China have escalated the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute since the early 2010s, but no studies have theorised how sovereign states constitute their territorial sovereignty by giving meaning to particular representations of their disputed territory, history, and national identities of the Self and Other. In this context, this dissertation proposed an original poststructuralist framework by drawing upon multiple poststructuralist thinkers and scholars – Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, R.B.J. Walker, David Campbell, Cynthia Weber, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and Lene Hansen – and the Copenhagen School's securitisation and ontological security theories.

The proposed poststructuralist framework is predicated on the understanding that 'sovereign states' do not naturally exist in the world; however, 'sovereign states' are constantly enacted performatively via their discursive practices of boundary inscription. In inscribing boundary, sovereign states try to fix the meaning of the Self as safety, security, and amity, as opposed to the Other that is associated with anarchy, insecurity, and enmity in their foreign, defence, and security policies. As per these policies, sovereign states patrol the border, bolster their military capabilities to counter the external threats, and criticise the competing claimant state

diplomatically, thereby constituting their territorial sovereignty. From the perspective of this dissertation, therefore, 'sovereign states' is not an objective entity that pre-exists specific political realities; however, sovereign states are merely a dominant mode of subjectivity that is performatively constituted by boundary inscription.

In light of this, I have argued that what is at stake in 'territorial disputes' is not only territorial claims of sovereign states. Instead, I have proposed to understand 'territorial disputes' as a political moment in which the performatively naturalised boundaries of sovereign states come to be unsettled by internal dissents or external force, and in reaction to this development, the sovereign states try to re-inscribe the boundaries via new discursive practices. Ultimately, 'territorial disputes' imply not only territorial claims but also national history that gives a specific meaning to the disputed territory and sovereign states' construction of national identities of the Self/Other. Based on this understanding of 'territorial disputes', the history problem is relevant to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute as it becomes clear that the history problem is deeply implicated in Japanese and Chinese constructions of the Self/Other. In this way, this dissertation theoretically bridged the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem by taking a poststructuralist approach.

In constructing the poststructuralist framework, I explained in Chapter 3 that 'security' plays a crucial role. Drawing upon Jef Huysmans, the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory and ontological security theory, this study defined 'security' as a *signifier*[84] that is performatively constituted by sovereign states via their constant discursive practices. Drawing on securitisation theory literature, I contend that when sovereign states present a particular move of the competing claimant as an existential threat to the claimed territory, the special nature of security threats justifies the sovereign states' use of extraordinary measures to handle the situation. Discursive construction of an existential threat as the Other, therefore, plays a vital role in securitisation. As Huysmans suggested, in the process of securitisation sovereign states provide the people who share the same political

[84] Drawing upon De Saussure, I have explained that signs of language consist of the *signifier* and *signified*: the former is the letters on the page or the sound of pronunciation, whilst the latter is the concept that appears in our mind when we read or listen to a particular signifier. Poststructuralism commonly examines the process of how the meaning of a particular term – i.e., arbitrary link between the *signifier* and *signified* – has been socially and politically negotiated at a specific historical juncture.

community with (1) ‘ontological security’ that increases the determinability of the meaning of the world including the Self/Other relations and (2) ‘daily security’ by mediating the Self/Other relations physically via specific measures to counter the concretised threat. By doing so, sovereign states gain political legitimacy from the people. Drawing upon Huysmans’ argument, this dissertation explained that the proposed poststructuralist framework makes it possible to examine how sovereign states’ construction of the Self/Other relations give way for a new security policy in the process of their securitisation.

Chapter 3 also explained that ontological security theory literature conceptually deepens the poststructuralist framework by contextualising it in the Japanese and Chinese discourses. Shōgo Suzuki pointed out that Japan has sought to construct the Self by posing as a ‘legitimate’ member of the international community. By doing so, Japan has been able to position itself as the ‘rightful’ leader of East Asia over a rising China, whilst providing ontological security. When it comes to China’s construction of the Self/Other, drawing upon Catarina Kinnvall, I have put forth that it is crucial to understand that narratives of ‘trauma’, such as with Sino-Japanese War history, serve to provide ontological security to the Chinese people because those narratives of trauma can unite them by setting those affected apart from others and giving a sense of belonging. The old trauma is often used to interpret new traumas: the former brings the latter with powerful experiences of loss and feelings of humiliation, retaliation, and hatred that trigger a variety of unconscious defence mechanisms. Hence, when I analysed how Japan and China securitised the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, I paid particular attention to how Japan constructed the Self/Other in relation to international society and how China referred to Sino-Japanese War history to fix the meaning of the Self/Other in a specific way. Alongside Suzuki and Kinnvall, and drawing on Karl Gustafsson’s ‘routinised recognition’, I have also argued that bilateral relations could get better or worse, depending on whether the two states can maintain the routinised mutual recognition of the identity of the counterpart, in forms of statements, representations, or behaviour.

All things considered, I contend that this poststructuralist framework has great originality by which:

I. we can trace the process of how the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem started to be intertwined;
II. we can compare how sovereign states construct their Self/Other and securitise the disputed territory; and,
III. we can make use of the main ethical advantage of poststructuralism – to provide an understanding of the world that is detached from territorial limitation – in the context of territorial disputes.

6.3 Empirical Findings

Throughout Chapters 4 and 5, I presented the empirical findings of the poststructuralist analysis of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourses of Japan and China. This section compares the overall findings in Japanese and Chinese Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands discourses. Firstly, the following section looks at how Japan and China constructed their sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from the 1950s onwards. This will be followed by the results of how Japan and China securitised the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from 2008 to 2015.

6.3.1 Deconstructing Japanese/Chinese Sovereignty Claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s

In Chapters 4 and 5, I first answered the following research question: *How* have Japan and China constructed their sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the 1950s? The results of the analysis demonstrated that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands did not play a vital role in boundary inscription practices of Japan and China throughout the 1950s and mid-1960s. As illustrated in Chapter 4, in a period from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, Japan did not recognise the Senkaku Islands. Only in 1967 did Japan start to call them the 'Senkaku Islands (尖閣群島/列島)' in the Diet, and Japan started to build up its sovereignty claim incrementally after the ECAFE's report of 1969. When it comes to China, Chapter 5 demonstrated that throughout the 1950s and 1960s, China recognised that the islands belonged to the Ryūkyū Archipelago but not to Taiwan. During this period, China recognised the islands

using the Japanese name, 'Jiange Zhudao (尖閣諸島)' in the CCP's organ, *People's Daily*, and official documents of the Chinese MOFA. It was only in December 1971 that China started to articulate its islands' sovereignty claim. Hence, the timing of Japan's and China's construction of their sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands commonly started around 1970.

Nonetheless, there was a stark difference in the ways Japan and China constructed their islands' sovereignty claims. Chapter 4 has set out that, in the 'Basic view on the Senkaku Islands' published by the Japanese MOFA in 1972, Japan's sovereignty claim was primarily based on international law and a post-war legal framework built on the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT). On the other hand, Chapter 5 found that, in December 1971, the Chinese MOFA justified its islands' sovereignty by foregrounding the pre-1945 Sino-centric history, delegitimating a post-war legal framework of the SFPT system, and stressing the invalidity of the 'unequal treaty' after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) whilst taking a post-colonial stance. Only then did China start to claim that the Diaoyu Islands had always belonged to Taiwan but not to the Ryūkyū Archipelago. It is noteworthy that at that time China did not refer to international law to justify its own claim.

In the early 2010s, both Japan and China started to strengthen their islands' sovereignty claims. In 2010, China began to try to rebuke Japan's sovereignty claim by including references to international law. Moreover, after Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012, China started to view the islands dispute through Sino-Japanese War history. For instance, China condemned Japan's purchase of the islands in the White Paper (SICO, 2012) as follows: '[Japan] rejected and challenged the outcomes of victory of the World Anti-fascist War. […] China strongly urges Japan to respect history and international law and immediately stop all actions that undermine China's territorial sovereignty.' At this point, China started to view the Diaoyu Islands dispute as the history problem by ascribing the dispute escalation to Japan's lack of regret for the wrongdoings in the Sino-Japanese War. On the other hand, after Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012, Japan started to justify its protection of the Senkaku Islands' sovereignty as Japan's contribution to 'regional peace and stability' on the Japanese MOFA's website.

Therefore, this dissertation found that Japan and China are similar in having started to construct their sovereignty claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands around

1970. However, the ways they have naturalised their islands' sovereignty have been starkly different: Japan has based its claim on international law and a post-war legal framework of the SFPT system; however, China has grounded its claim on the pre-1945 Sino-centric history and post-colonial worldview that rejects the legal framework of the SFPT and the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. Drawing on different time periods and legal frameworks, Japan and China have constructed the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands' sovereignty since the early 1970s in a zero-sum game.

6.3.2 Deconstructing Japanese/Chinese Securitisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from 2008 to 2015

These different ways of constructing the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have become more evident in the securitisation process of Japan's and China's islands from 2008 to 2015. In the latter sections of Chapters 4 and 5, I conducted a poststructuralist discourse analysis, thereby answering the following two research questions: *How* did Japan and China shift the Self/Other construction in their discourse of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between 2008 and 2015?; and, *how* did Japan and China securitise the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between 2008 and 2015?

The targeted period started with the honeymoon period of 2008 that witnessed the Sino-Japanese agreement to tacitly set aside the history problem and jointly develop the gas field in the ECS via the Joint Statement on Comprehensively Promoting Strategic and Reciprocal Relations in May and the Principled Consensus on the East China Sea Issue in June. Against the backdrop of the Sino-Japanese rift after Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō's (2001-2006) multiple visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, in 2008 Japan and China agreed to mend the severely damaged relations in these two agreements. However, retrospectively, this year turned out to be the beginning of Japan's and China's incremental securitisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Japan securitised the Senkaku Islands and constructed a 'threat' from China by problematising China's increasing activities near the islands. In particular, Japan problematised the following: China's deployment of its official ships in the Senkaku Islands territorial waters in December 2008; the vessel collision case in September 2010; China's normalisation of its daily patrols near the Senkaku Islands since

September 2012; China's setup of the ADIZ in November 2014; and China's opaque military expansion since December 2008.

In the securitisation of the Senkaku Islands, Japan constructed the Self as 'a rule of law country' and a guardian of 'peace' and 'international liberal order'. On the other hand, China was constructed as the Other, lacking 'common sense' in 'international society', pursuing 'expansionism and coercion', being based on the 'rule by might' but not 'rule of right', an 'illiberal' state, 'defying the international order and the freedom of navigation', and 'challenging the *status quo* by coercion'. Hence, I have found that in the process of the islands' securitisation, Japan constructed its morally higher ground by referring to international law, international society, and international liberal order that disqualified China from being a morally wholesome and acceptable sovereign state.

These positive constructions of the Self and negative renditions of the Other eventually justified Japan's strengthening the Japan-US alliance and bolstering its military capabilities throughout the period. In 2009, Japan allowed for the existence of the US base in Okinawa as crucial 'deterrence (抑止力)' to counter China's rise. In 2010, Japan got the US to pledge to protect the Senkaku Islands under the Japan-US Security Treaty. In December 2010, the National Defense Program Guidelines started to problematise China's activities near the Senkaku Islands, thereby strengthening Japan's military capability. Moreover, after Abe Shinzō became the prime minister in December 2012, he started security reforms that eventually ended Japan's post-war grand strategy – the Yoshida Doctrine, which had been characterised by its low-profile foreign policy based on Japan's highly constrained military capabilities under the peace Constitution. In December 2013, Japan established the National Security Strategy and the National Security Council. In the same month, Abe forced a vote on the Special Secret Law. Moreover, in April 2014, Japan lifted the self-imposed arms export embargo that had existed since 1967. In July 2014, Abe made a Cabinet decision to allow Japan's collective self-defence which had been considered unconstitutional throughout the post-war period. Japan accelerated security reforms in the new Japan-US Security Guideline in May 2015 and the Peace and Security Law of September 2015, which crucially legalised the Cabinet decision of July 2014.

As explained in Chapter 3, Shōgo Suzuki (2019, p. 308) suggested that Japan has sought to construct the Self as a 'legitimate' member of the international community and the 'rightful' leader of East Asia over a rising China. However, I have argued that Suzuki has not systematically analysed how Japan has come to construct the Self/Other in such a manner in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Therefore, this dissertation has empirically filled that research gap. In the context of the Senkaku Islands, as Chapter 4 has demonstrated, throughout the period from 2008 to 2015, Japan incrementally constructed a 'rising China' as an illiberal expansionist state that disregards the international order, thereby constructing China as a 'threat' to Japan's Senkaku Islands. In the process of Japan's securitisation of the Senkaku Islands, Japan eventually broke down the Yoshida Doctrine and successfully rearmed itself as a guardian of 'peace' and 'international liberal order' in the region in order to counter 'illiberal' China's rise. Thus, this dissertation has empirically underpinned Suzuki's contention in the context of the Senkaku Islands discourse.

In contrast, China securitised the Diaoyu Islands by constructing its morally higher ground with references to Sino-Japanese War history. China started to problematise Japan's 'resurgence of militarism' in the Diaoyu Islands through a lens of Sino-Japanese War history to interpret the dispute since Japan's purchase of the islands in September 2012. Although low-key securitisation had already taken place after the vessel collision case in September 2010, it was only after September 2012 that China suddenly started its full-scale securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands. As soon as Japan purchased the islands to prevent the Mayor of Tokyo, Ishihara – a well-known Japanese ultranationalist – from establishing a fisheries base and building a port to strengthen Japan's sovereignty, China started to interpret Japan's moves as an attempt to 'achieve the invasion' of the Diaoyu Islands by making an analogy to the Mukden Incident that had become a pretext for the Imperial Japanese invasion of Manchuria, China, in 1931. Japan was, therefore, constructed with a series of highly negative elements, such as 'defy the rules and order', '(euphemistically) fascist', 'sinister', 'deceptive', 'blatantly challenges the victory of the World Anti-fascist War and the post-war international order', and 'thief'. Simultaneously, when constructing the Self, China highlighted that 'the era that the Chinese nation is bullied by others has already gone', thereby justifying the 'strong will of the Chinese nation'. China's construction of the antagonistic Self/Other

showed just cause for China's new islands' security policy to challenge Japan's *de facto* control over the islands via its daily patrols, which took place for the first time since the outset of the dispute. Moreover, on 13th December 2012, which marked the 75th anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, a PLA aircraft entered the territorial air of the islands for the first time since 1958, when Japan had taken over the ADIZ from the US. On the following day, a Chinese MOFA spokesperson, Hong Lei, officially stated that this was 'a part of the legitimate patrol to protect Chinese territory'. Later, on 23 November 2014, China established the ADIZ in the ECS. Even after the Four Article Agreement of November 2014 that marked a Sino-Japanese détente, China continued to challenge Japan's *de facto* control of the Diaoyu Islands at sea and in the air. Therefore, I have found that in the process of the islands' securitisation, China constructed its morally higher ground by referring to Sino-Japanese War history, whereby China powerfully demonised Japan and delegitimised Japan's sovereignty claim over the Diaoyu Islands by constructing Japan as an arrogant, unrepentant militaristic state. As noted in Chapter 3, the existing literature has not systematically tracked how China shifted its Diaoyu Islands discourse with references to Sino-Japanese War history to securitise the islands. Hence, this finding contributes to the existing knowledge.

This finding also adds to Catarina Kinnvall's argument that narratives of 'trauma' serve to unite people by triggering defence mechanisms. As noted above, she suggested that old trauma is often used to interpret new traumas: the former brings the latter with powerful experiences of loss and feelings humiliation, retaliation, and hatred that trigger a variety of unconscious defence mechanisms. In effect, this dissertation has clearly illustrated Kinnvall's argument with the case of China's Diaoyu Islands discourse. As set out in Chapter 5, Japan had conveyed that the primary purpose of Japan's purchase of the islands was to prevent Ishihara from taking provocative actions in early July 2012, and at that time, the Chinese MOFA did not condemn Japan. Nonetheless, in September 2012, China eventually chose to render Japan's moves as an attempt to 'achieve the invasion' of China, making an analogy to the Mukden Incident. China's references to traumatic Sino-Japanese War history powerfully served to justify China's demonisation of Japan and normalisation of its physical challenge to Japan's *de facto* control over the islands. Narratives of 'trauma', therefore, demonstrated their politically potent discursive power in that China successfully fixed the meaning of the Self as a former-victim

state that has accumulated enough military capabilities to fight back against the former-aggressor, and the Other as an arrogant, unrepentant militaristic state that dares to steal Chinese territory once again, thereby powerfully securitising the Diaoyu Islands.

Lastly, the above findings also contribute to our deeper understanding of David Campbell's concept of 'ontoplogy'. As explained in Chapter 3, borrowing Derrida's neologism, Campbell argued that ontopology assumes that a political community necessitates a perfect alignment of state, nation, identity, territory and ethnicity. Based on this understanding of ontopology, he suggested that the cause of 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia lay in the wrong attempt to pursue excessive ontopology. In this context, this dissertation has demonstrated that central to the boundary inscription practices of sovereign states is the pursuit of ontopology. However, as the honeymoon period of 2008 and the Sino-Japanese détente of 2014 have clearly illustrated, in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, Japan and China have also demonstrated their capability to restrain their excessive pursuit of ontopology to avoid military confrontations. Therefore, this study pointed out that Campbell's conceptualisation of ontopology needs to be understood in various ways to deepen our understanding of how sovereign states pursue ontopology.

6.4 Reflections: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute and the History Problem

Based on the empirical findings of Chapters 4 and 5, in this section I will answer the last research question of this dissertation: *How* did the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute become entangled with the history problem from 2008 to 2015? This section first outlines the empirical results to answer the question. Afterwards, I will set out how this dissertation has advanced our understanding of Sino-Japanese relations by exploring the nexus of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem.

As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, there was a pattern in how Japan and China dealt with the history problem. When their relations worsened – owing to Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (2001-06) and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands escalation with China's references to Sino-Japanese War history (2012-14) – Japan and China made diplomatic efforts to mend the rift via the Joint Statement on

Comprehensively Promoting Strategic and Reciprocal Relations, in May 2008, and the Four Article Consensus of November 2014. In these agreements, it was confirmed that they would 'face history squarely, advance toward the future' whereby Japan and China tacitly agreed to stop damaging their relations with references to Imperial Japanese and Sino-Japanese War history. In this sense, this dissertation found that Japan and China demonstrated their capability to set aside the history problem diplomatically to restore their damaged relations when their relations reached the nadir.

On the other hand, Japan and China also demonstrated the vulnerability of these bilateral agreements. The agreement of the Joint Statement of 2008 was breached by Japan when Prime Minister Asō 'privately' visited the Yasukuni Shrine on 22nd April 2009 during the Spring Festival. In the Sino-Japanese summit meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao in Beijing on 10th October, Prime Minister Hatoyama made it clear that he would stick to the 'Murayama statement' to improve relations when Wen mentioned the 'history problem'. By doing so, they returned to the agreement of the Joint Statement of 2008. In September 2012, China started to abandon the stance of the 'face history squarely, advance toward the future' when it started to apply the Sino-Japanese War history lens to frame the Diaoyu Islands dispute and demonise Japan. In response, without repairing their relations, Abe began to express his revisionist worldview and visited the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013, thereby leading China to condemn Abe's entire security reforms as an indication of 'resurgence of militarism' in Japan. After the Four Article Agreement of November 2014, in which they once more tacitly agreed to set aside the history problem, both Japan and China stopped their references to Imperial Japan and Sino-Japanese War history.

Eventually, the history problem played a vital role in justifying China's full-scale securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands after September 2012 by providing China with a sense of community as the victim of Imperial Japan. As noted above, China's references to the traumatic Sino-Japanese War history in the context of the Diaoyu Islands powerfully demonstrated its discursive power to demonise Japan morally and delegitimise Japan's sovereignty claim on the islands. Hence, the history problem facilitated China's assertive boundary inscription by fixing the meaning of the Other as an unrepentant state that militarises itself and steals China's territory – the Diaoyu Islands. On Japan's side, Asō and Abe demonstrated their inability to keep to the

agreement to ‘face history squarely, advance toward the future’ when they visited the Yasukuni Shrine and expressed their revisionist worldviews. These revisionist remarks and deeds probably satisfied the personal pride of these leaders and revisionist constituencies who align themselves with Imperial Japanese orientalism which shows antipathy towards China. However, by blurring the boundary between Imperial Japan and post-1945 Japan, these Japanese prime ministers put Japan, in the Senkaku Islands dispute, at a disadvantage by giving China an opportunity to securitise the islands by problematising Japan’s uncontrite attitude.

Based on these empirical findings, this dissertation has demonstrated that as long as the history problem remains unsettled, China can problematise Japan’s security reforms as a vindication of the ‘resurgence of militarism’, thereby justifying China’s bolstering its military capability to counter the ‘threat’ of Japan. In this respect, I argue that Japan started to take seriously the negative ramifications of the history problem, when Japan took a decision to stop Abe from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and making revisionist remarks after the Four Articles Agreement of November 2014, and preventing Abe from expressing his revisionist worldview in the speech of August 2015 that marked the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. This dissertation demonstrated that the history problem started to be intricately intertwined with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in the period from 2008 to 2015 due to Japanese leaders’ revisionist remarks and deeds and China’s references to Sino-Japanese War history in the Diaoyu Islands. Moreover, this study suggested that from 2014 onwards, Japan started to prevent revisionist leaders from expressing their worldviews in order not to give China an opportunity to securitise Japan’s military reforms.

As explained in Chapter 2, the existing literature has not theorised the relations between the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and history problem. In this context, this dissertation has pushed forward our understanding of Sino-Japanese relations by proposing the poststructuralist framework and making it possible to understand that the history problem – in particular the traumatic Sino-Japanese War history – plays a politically potent role in China’s securitisation of the Diaoyu Islands. It is hoped that this study has provided an alternative reading of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, one which deconstructs the axiomatic ‘reality’ of the islands that was created by Japan and China.

6.5 Suggestions for Future Research

In this study, I proposed an original poststructuralist framework that made it possible to explore the nexus of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem. In seeking to answer the research questions, I have thought of a few other questions which could provide fruitful directions for future research.

To begin with, further research is required to cover the different periods of time of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands' development. This study has chosen a period from 2008 to 2015 to cover the gap between the Sino-Japanese honeymoon period of 2008 and the nadir of Sino-Japanese relations in the early 2010s, and also to see the process of Japanese/Chinese explicit securitisation of the islands during that period. Although this study found out that Japan and China agreed to shelve the history problem tacitly in the Joint Statement in May 2008 and once more in the Four Articles Consensus in November 2014, this dissertation could not track how Japan and China have (or have not) shifted their stances on the history problem from 2015 onwards. Hence, it is vital to observe Japanese leaders' deeds and remarks to prevent Japan and China from further entangling the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the history problem. To this end, this poststructuralist framework is very helpful in deconstructing the island dispute development.

Additionally, to deepen our understanding of the nexus of Japan's territorial dispute and the history problem in a comparative way, I suggest investigating Japan's and South Korea's constructions of the Self/Other in the dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima, a group of small islets in the Sea of Japan.[85] Japan has territorial disputes with South Korea over the islets, and these states also have the Imperial Japanese colonial period history problem.[86] By comparing Japan's constructions of the Self/Other in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with that of the Dokto/Takeshima issue, we should be able to shed light on Japan's multifaceted identity construction with its past victims of Imperial Japan; also, comparison between the Self/Other construction of China and South Korea in these disputes

[85] In English, it is called the Liancourt Rocks.
[86] Chinese memory of 'trauma' is centred on the Sino-Japanese War, but in the case of South Korea, the history problem is centred on Imperial Japan's colonisation of the Korean peninsula (1910-45) that includes the so-called 'comfort women' issue and the wartime forced labour problem.

would make it possible to comprehend the similarities and differences in how the former-victim states of Imperial Japan construct 'trauma' in their boundary inscription practices in their disputes.

Finally, the proposed poststructuralist framework is applicable to all territorial disputes that involve securitisation of the territory and competing nationalisms. For instance, the situation on the island of Cyprus. Cyprus is an ethnically mixed island in the eastern Mediterranean, and it is divided into two states: Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus. Only the latter is internationally recognised. Northern Cyprus is recognised only by Turkey which maintains a military presence there. In this context, in January 2020, Turkey started to drill a maritime area, which the Republic of Cyprus has claimed as an Exclusive Economic Zone, whilst adding tension in the region (ekathimerini.com, 2020). Given that 'politics and nationalism, or the politics of nationalism, are at the center of the history of Cyprus' (Christofis, 2018), applying the poststructuralist framework to Cyprus – which would require some further theoretical refinement – would make it possible to analyse how Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus have constructed the Self/Other whilst (re)inscribing their boundary. Closer examination of various cases by applying the proposed poststructuralist framework would contribute to our deeper understanding of how sovereign states exert power to fix the meaning of the Self/Other and foreclose a multiplicity of political possibilities to justify a specific political reality of territorial disputes. It is hoped that this dissertation has shed some light on these questions whilst providing a base for future research on these topics.

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—— (2012d) ‘Don’t Talk about “Arms Race” with China [Shao na “junbei jingsai” he zhongguo shuo shi]’, *People’s Daily*, 29 September.

—— (2012e) ‘How Can China Tolerate Other’s to Recklessly “Buy” the Diaoyu Islands? [Zhongguo diaoyudao qi rong taren siyi ’maimai]’, *People’s Daily*, 11 September.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: A List of Interviewees

(in chronological order; those who requested anonymity are omitted)

Date	Name	Institutions/Background
13th Apr 2017	Prof. Takahara, Akio	The University of Tokyo
27th Apr 2017	Prof. Amako, Satoshi	Waseda University
28th Apr 2017	Prof. Sahashi, Ryō	The University of Tokyo
8th May 2017	Prof. Kohara, Masahiro	The University of Tokyo
11th May 2017	Prof. Kawashima, Shin	The University of Tokyo
11th May 2017	Prof. Shinoda, Tomohito	International University of Japan
17th May 2017	Miyamoto, Yūji	Ambassador to China (2006-2010)
17th May 2017	Prof. Tanaka, Akihiko	National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
18th May 2017	Niwa, Uichirō	Ambassador to China (2010-2012)
18th May 2017	Prof. Kamo, Toshiki	Keiō University
24th May 2017	Dr. Tomabechi, Masato	Secretary of the DPJ's Kondō Shōichi
25th May 2017	Prof. Masuo, Chisako	Kyūshū University
31st May 2017	Nagashima, Akihisa	Then-DPJ legislator
31st May 2017	Tanino, Sakutarō	Ambassador to China (1998-2001)
12th Jun 2017	Okada, Mitsuru	Kyōdō News
17th Jun 2017	Mori, Yasuhiro	Kyōdō News
29th Jun 2017	Bandō, Kenji	Mainichi Shinbun
9th Aug 2017	Dr. Horiuchi, Tōru	The Chinese University of Hong Kong
14th Aug 2017	Prof. Cabestan, Jean-Pierre	Hong Kong Baptist University
15th Aug 2017	Prof. Zhang, Baohui	Lingnan University
16th Aug 2017	Prof. Kitamura, Takanori	The Chinese University of Hong Kong
18th Aug 2017	Prof. Ting, Wai	Hong Kong Baptist University
31st Jul 2017	Dr. Teo, Victor E.	The University of Hong Kong

28th Sep 2018	Prof. Su, Hao	China Foreign Affairs University

Appendix 2: A List of 'Quasi-authoritative' Texts Produced by China

Date	Newspaper	Tile of Editorials
30th Aug 1996	*People's Daily* (an article)	Don't Do Stupid Things, Japan [日本别干蠢事]
14th Sep 1996	*People's Daily* Tian Jun	Misleading Sino-Japanese Relations Is Not Allowed [不允许把中日关系引入歧途]
9th Dec 2008	*People's Daily* (an article)	The Entry of Chinese Sea Surveillance Vessels into the Diaoyu Islands Is 'Unobjectionable' [中国海监船只进入钓鱼岛海域活动是"无可非议"的]
26th Sep 2010	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Honest and Pragmatic Actions Are Necessary to Repair Relations with China [要用坦诚务实的行动修复对华关系]
27th Sep 2010	*People's Daily* Wu Huaizhong	Lessons to Be Learned [应该汲取的教训]
3rd Oct 2010	*People's Daily* Jia Yu	Sino-Japanese Diaoyu Islands Dispute from Perspective of International Law [国际法视野下的中日钓鱼岛争端]
13th Jan 2011	*People's Daily* Liu Jiangyong	Viewing the Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands from Historical Facts [从历史事实看钓鱼岛主权归属]
14th Jan 2011	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	January 14th Should Be Called Japan's Diaoyu Islands Stealing Day [1 月 14 日应称为日本对钓鱼岛窃取日]
13th July 2012	*People's Daily* Guoji Luntan	Strategic Short-sightedness Is a Self-deceptive Cowardly Mentality [战略短视是自欺欺人的懦夫心态]
16th Aug 2012	*People's Daily* Guoji Luntan	Japan's Misconception of History Makes It Difficult to Discipline Itself [日本不端正历史观就难以自律]
21st Aug 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	The US and Japan Islands Battle Exercises Are a Waste [美日夺岛作战演习是张废牌]
11th Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Guo Jiping	How Can China Tolerate Other's Recklessly 'Buying' the Diaoyu Islands? [中国钓鱼岛岂容他人肆意"买卖"]
Ditto.	*PLA Daily* Yang Xiyu	Japanese Government Doesn't Need to Play with Fire [日本政府不要玩火]

12th Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Japan Should Stop Playing with Fire [日本应停止玩火]
Ditto.	*PLA Daily* Luo Yuan	China Will Never Give Up on Territorial Sovereignty [中国在领土主权问题上绝不会退让半步]
13th Sep 2012	*PLA Daily* Diao Baoyan	Do Not Wish to Grab Half an Inch Territory of Our Country [休想攫取我国半寸领土]
14th Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Japan Must Return to Reason [日本必须回归理性]
Ditto.	*PLA Daily* Diao Baoyan	How Can Historical Truth Be Distorted [历史真相岂容歪曲]
17th Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Watch out for Japan's Fluke [警惕日本以拖待变的侥幸心理]
Ditto.	*PLA Daily* Diao Baoyan	Who Is Destabilising the Region [究竟谁在破坏地区稳定]
18th Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	China Has the Strength and Confidence to Defend the Sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands [中国有实力有信心捍卫钓鱼岛主权]
20th Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Diaoyu Islands Test the Political Wisdom of the US [钓鱼岛问题考验美国政治智慧]
21st Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Japan's 'Preemption' of the Diaoyu Islands Is Stealing [日本"先占"钓鱼岛实为窃取]
23rd Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	How to Repair Japan's Relations Without Thinking About Repentance [日本不思悔改何谈修复对华关系]
25th Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Rightist Degeneration Aggravates Japan's Foreign Policy Confrontation [右倾化加剧日本外交政策对抗性]
28th Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	What Makes Japan Eligible to Talk about the 'Big Picture' [国际论坛：日本有何资格谈论"大局"]
29th Sep 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Don't Talk about 'Arms Race' with China [少拿"军备竞赛"和中国说事]
1st Oct 2012	*PLA Daily* Editorial	Any Inch of Territory Is Not Allowed to Be Violated [绝不允许任何一寸领土受到侵犯]
8th Oct 2012	*People's Daily* Liu Ge	China Needs Such Persistence [中国需要这样的坚守]
12th Oct 2012	*People's Daily* Guo Jiping	The Diaoyudao Islands Are Chinese Territory, Iron Proofs! [钓鱼岛是中国领土，铁证如山！]
16th Oct 2012	*People's Daily* Jin Caiwei	Poor Two-man Comic Show [拙劣的双簧]

Ditto.	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	The Dispute Was All due to Japan's 'Stealing' the Island – the Truth about the Diaoyu Islands [纷争皆因日本"窃"岛而起——一论钓鱼岛问题真相]
17th Oct 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	There Is a Kind of Behaviour Called Act without Shame – the Second Comment on the Truth of the Diaoyudao Problem [有一种行为叫做耍赖——二论钓鱼岛问题真相]
18th Oct 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	The History of World War II Cannot Be Turned over – The Third Comment on the Truth of the Diaoyu Islands [二战历史不容翻案——三论钓鱼岛问题真相]
19th Oct 2012	*People's Daily* Jin Caiwei	Malformed View of History [畸形的历史观]
Ditto.	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	What Is the 'San Francisco Peace Treaty'? – The Four Truths Comment about the Diaoyu Islands ["旧金山和约"何足为凭？——四论钓鱼岛问题真相]
22nd Oct 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Japan Must Bear the Serious Consequences of Betrayal – The Fifth Comment on the Truth about the Diaoyu Islands [日本必须承担背信弃义的严重后果——五论钓鱼岛问题真相]
Ditto.	*People's Daily* Jin Caiwei	Japanese Media Should Be Prudent [日媒当自重]
3rd Dec 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Don't Play with Fire on the Diaoyu Islands Issue [别拿钓鱼岛问题玩儿火]
17th Dec 2012	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	See How the Japanese Authorities Clean up the 'Bad Mess' [看日本当局怎样收拾"烂摊子"]
21st Jan 2013	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	China Does Not Provoke Anything, Nor Is It Afraid of Anything [中国不惹是非也不怕什么]
26th Jan 2013	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	To Develop Sino-Japanese Relations, Japan Must Abide by Its Commitment to Reflect [发展中日关系日本必须信守反省承诺]
10th Apr 2013	*People's Daily* Jin Caiwei	The 'Values' Card is Not Good ["价值观"这张牌不好使]
18th July 2013	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Japan, Don't Need to Bring Shame on Yourself [日本，不要自讨没趣]
26th July 2013	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Japan's Right-handedness Increases World Wariness [日本右倾化加大世界戒心]
7th Aug 2013	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Japan's 'Ghost Worship' Farce Comes to a Break [日本"拜鬼"闹剧当休矣]

3rd Sep 2013	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Japan, History of Aggression Cannot Be Reversed [日本，侵略历史翻不了案]
18th Sep 2013	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	The 82nd Anniversary of the 'September 18th' Incident, Forgetting History Means Betrayal [“九一八”事变 82 周年 忘记历史意味着背叛]
20th Sep 2013	*PLA Daily* Diao Baoyan	China Has Determination And Confidence in Safeguarding Its Territorial Sovereignty [维护领土主权，中国有决心有信心]
27th Sep 2013	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Dangerous Abe-style 'As You Like' [危险的安倍式“请便吧”]
25th Nov 2013	*PLA Daily* Diao Baoyan	How Can 'Double Standards' Maintain Regional Peace [“双重标准”怎能维护地区和平]
Ditto.	*PLA Daily* Diao Baoyan	Don't Underestimate China's Firm Determination to Safeguard National Sovereignty and Security [勿低估中国维护国家主权安全坚定决心]
26th Nov 2013	*PLA Daily* Diao Baoyan	If There Is No Intention to Occupy, Why Are You Worried [若无觊觎之心，何来担忧之语]
27th Nov 2013	*PLA Daily* Diao Baoyan	Who Is Creating the Danger? [究竟谁在制造危险？]
28th Dec 2013	*PLA Daily* Diao Baoyan	Abe's 'Ghost Worship' Is Outrageous [安倍“拜鬼”令人愤慨]
31st Dec 2013	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Abe 'Crazed' on Historical Issues [安倍在历史问题上“抓狂”]
3rd Jan 2014	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	World Peace Forces Have a Responsibility to Stop Abe's Mess [世界和平力量有责任阻止安倍胡来]
7th Jan 2014	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Abe's Worship, a Blatant Challenge to Conscience and Justice [安倍参拜，对良知和公理的公然挑战]
13th Feb 2014	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Naked 'Shangwu', Prevent Abe from Activating Japanese Militarism [赤裸“尚武”，严防安倍激活日本军国主义]
3rd Apr 2014	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Prevent Japanese Right-wing from Hitting the Bottomline Manically [严防日本右翼冲撞底线的狂躁]
10th Apr 2014	*People's Daily*	The US Needs to Do Something Beneficial to Asia-Pacific Security [美国要为亚太安全做有益之事]
22nd Apr 2014	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Paranoid 'Normal Mind' [偏执狂妄的“平常心”]
3rd Jun 2014	*People's Daily* Jin Caiwei	The Diaoyu Islands Issue Has Been Stalemated, and Japan Begins Stirring up the South China Sea [钓鱼岛问题打了死结，日本就搅局南海]

2nd Jul 2014	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	For What Does Japan Lift Ban on the Right to Collective Self-defence [日本解禁集体自卫权意欲何为]
7th Jul 2014	*People's Daily* Editorial	Historical Tragedies Must Not Be Allowed to Repeat [历史悲剧决不允许重演]
25th Jul 2014	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Taking History as a Warning [以史为鉴 警钟长鸣]
27th Jul 2014	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Remember History, Cherish Peace [铭记历史 珍视和平]
2nd Aug 2014	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Japan's 'Naming' Farce Is an Explicit Provocation [日本“命名”闹剧是赤裸裸的挑衅]
16th Aug 2014	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Against Justice, Only Ends up in Failure [对抗正义，结局只有失败]
3rd Sep 2014	*People's Daily* Ren Zhongping	Let History Illuminate Human Tomorrow [让历史照亮人类的明天]
13th Dec 2014	*People's Daily* Editorial	Building a National Memory of Justice [构筑捍卫正义的国家记忆]
17th Jul 2015	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	Be Wary of 'Forced Voting' [值得警惕的“强行表决”]
30th Jul 2015	*People's Daily* Zhong Sheng	The Hype 'China Threat Theory' Is Untenable [炒作“中国威胁论”站不住脚]
2nd Sep 2015	*People's Daily* Ren Zhongping	Watching History for Peace [守望历史 为了和平]