Implementing the Prevent duty: Conceptualising threat within Greater Manchester's Further Education sector

Natalie Claire James

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 mandated educationalists, alongside other public sector workers, to refer anyone deemed vulnerable to becoming engaged in terrorism or extremism to Channel. What became known as the Prevent duty, extended the realms of extraordinary counter-terrorism measures into the everyday practices of these workers. Concerns emerged surrounding the extent to which the Prevent duty securitised the education sector, risked further marginalising Muslim students through stigmatising narratives which had informed the duty's predecessor strategy, Prevent, and in doing so created a "chilling effect" on education. More recent studies demonstrated the need to engage not only with the Further Education sector, but to identify the experiences of those who the policy primarily seeks to *prevent*, students, situating them alongside those across the sector to understand how policy becomes not only enacted but what these implementations tell us about how threat becomes conceptualised within their 'everyday'. This research, therefore examines a multiplicity of experiences to reveal how the duty becomes implemented through two key tenets: safeguarding and British values. In examining how this becomes enacted, it reveals that threat becomes conceptualised through four narratives: as vulnerability to radicalisation; as all forms of extremism and terrorism; as antithesised by British values; and, as the responsibility to safeguard against. Further, the moments of continuity and conflict within and between these narratives demonstrate the conceptualisation of threat as a fluid process that is spatio-temporally located, responding to both agency and context. Identifying how the duty becomes enacted, therefore, reveals the way in which those within the FE sector have responded to, and become limited by, earlier concerns about its implementation, demonstrating the capacity for the duty to be embedded within existing pedagogic and safeguarding practices, whilst simultaneously being limited by an overriding wider public narrative of prejudice.

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Abbreviations

BAME – Black and Minority Ethnic

BVC – British Values Coordinator

CTS – Critical Terrorism Studies

CTSA – Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015

(NW)CTU – (North West) Counter-Terrorism Unit

CSE – Child Sexual Exploitation

DSL/O – Designated Safeguarding Lead/ Officer

ERG22+ - Extremism Risk Guidelines (22 Factors)

ESOL – English to Speakers of Other Languages

FBV – Fundament British Values (also known as British Values)

FE – Further Education

GM – Greater Manchester

HE – Higher Education

Hefce – Higher Education Funding Council for England

Ofsted – Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills

SMSC – Social, Moral, Cultural and Spiritual

UK – United Kingdom

WRAP – Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent

Labelling

Al Qaeda – Terrorist organisation responsible for the 9/11 attacks in America, against which the War on Terror was launched. The UK government have consistently, since the launch of CONTEST, outlined this group as the biggest terrorist threat to the UK.

ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and Libya) and Daesh. This research uses the term predominantly adopted by participants in this research: 'ISIS'. The group is outlined as being a key threat to the UK and has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in the UK and West more generally (HM Government, 2018a).

Far-Right – Umbrella term for groups on the far right of the political spectrum 'characterised by hostility to perceived alien groups within societies' (Lee, 2019, p.18).

Chapter One

Countering Terrorism: a duty to Prevent threat

This thesis is a critical examination of the implementation of the Prevent duty within Greater Manchester's Further Education (FE) sector. It is undertaken in order to understand what experiences of the Prevent duty's enactment tell us about the conceptualisations of threat within the sector. It builds upon a larger body of research which has critically examined the social construction of threat within Counter-Terrorism policy and the ways in which security discourse and practice has become de-exceptionalised, or normalised, drawing from and contributing to the fields of Critical Terrorism Studies, and Education studies, in addition to Security Studies and Intersectionality. The thesis is significant in a number of ways. Firstly, it offers a significant empirical contribution to the current limited data available on the enactment of the Prevent duty, drawing on a combination of primary data collection methods: interviews, focus groups, observations and an online questionnaire. Secondly, it examines over one-hundred[1] collected experiences through narrative analysis in order to understand not only how the duty becomes implemented, but what stories enactments tell us about how threat becomes conceptualised. Thirdly, it addresses key gaps around enactments of the duty within Further Education, a neglected sector within existing studies. In doing so it importantly offers one of the first data-led studies around student experiences of the Prevent duty. Finally, the study engages with not only students but their teaching and institutional staff, as well as those considered policy elites in order to map the conceptualisations of threat as the life of the policy evolves. In doing so, the thesis problematises a narrow focus on the conceptualisation of threat as a single phenomenon. By recognising the intersectional nature of experience, where discursive constructions manifest spatio-temporally at the vernacular level, this thesis reveals how threat conceptualisation is a complex and fluid process, constructed through actors' responses to evolving narratives and contexts. Grounded in Critical Terrorism Studies, this thesis reveals how actors within the five participating FE institutions enact a counter-terrorism policy within the pedagogic (and

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[1] Ninety-five of the total one-hundred and sixteen participants are drawn upon for this thesis, see Chapter Four

learning) practices and examines the multiplicity of experiences it obtains to understand what this tells us about how threat is conceptualised.

The impetus for this research is multi-layered: it is driven by perceived concerns about the normalisation of counter-terrorism measures; the disproportional impacts of these measures; and the implications for enacting counter-terrorism as a result.

The events of 11th September 2001 changed the way in which terrorism was understood by the UK and its Western allies, and indeed the resultant scholarship.[2] Yet, terrorism was not something new; the UK had seen significantly greater losses and incidents in the 1970's and 80's with the Northern Ireland 'troubles' (see Kirk-Wade and Allen, 2020, p.5). The Terrorism Act was even brought in, in 2000, suggesting that the inclination to counter terrorism threats already existed. However, 2001 onwards saw a marked increase in the application of this legislation, despite terrorism-related events and deaths significantly decreasing from their rates in the 70's (ibid.). It was, therefore, something about the *nature* of the 2001 events, or the *type* of threat, which resulted in the so-called 'War on Terror' being declared. The UK's response was an increased focus on programmes and policies which sought to 'prevent', 'prepare', 'protect' and 'pursue' this perceived existential threat (HM Government, 2006). This partly emerged as groups like those responsible for the attacks in the US, Al-Qaeda, could not be understood through the same political lenses that the Northern Ireland conflict could be, and thus new narratives were sought: religious ones (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Desai, 2007; Croft, 2012). Countering threat, therefore, became about denouncing Islamic extremism; programmes which followed, about preventing (male) Muslims from becoming radicalised (Vertigans, 2010; Awan, 2012; Bonino, 2013; Kundnani, 2014; Breen-Smyth, 2014; O'Toole et al., 2016; Ragazzi, 2016). Subsequent literature, as Chapter Two reveals, located the way in which these programmes problematically read Muslimness through racialised and gendered narratives and targeted certain groups of people as a result. They also documented an increasing catalogue of (the use of) legislation which was enabling a creeping of extra-ordinary measures into the realm of normalcy through a focus on 'prevention' (Aly, 2013; Mythen et al., 2017). The impetus for research, therefore, emerged from this concern over

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[2] See Chapter Two

the disproportionality of counter-terrorism agenda's and *whose* 'threat' it was they were concerned with *preventing.*

The 'catalyst' for undertaking this particular project came from a more personal angle. Concerns became 'real' when a family member revealed they, as an educator, were to become legally obligated and responsible for identifying *who* this potential threat might be under the introduction of the Prevent duty in 2015. The clashing of my 'personal' and 'political' so-to-say cemented the reality of the normalisation of counter-terrorism within the everyday. Concerns were therefore not only around the capacity for this person – and their colleagues throughout the country – to undertake such tasks, but to do so without perpetuating disproportionality against certain groups of people. The research therefore sought to question how these actors would implement their Prevent duty and what this would tell us about how threat became conceptualised for them in their enactments.

After outlining the structure of the thesis, this chapter offers an introduction to the emergence of the Prevent duty, detailing how the policy developed from the broader Prevent programme. It explores the discourses which informed and were informed by the Prevent agenda and its broader policy family, providing an introduction to the context and events from which it developed. The second part of the chapter, against this context, outlines the central research question '*What do experiences of the Prevent duty's implementation within Further Education institutions of Greater Manchester*[3] *tell us about the conceptualisation of threat within the sector?'*. It then presents the five key sub-research questions that will contribute to the work of the thesis. The chapter concludes by highlighting the key points of significance which detail the originality and significance of this research for the multiplicity of disciplines it draws on that seek to understand what the implementation of the Prevent duty can tell us about the conceptualisations of threat.

Chapter Two of the thesis provides an overview of the literature upon which this research is grounded. It situates the history of the conceptualisation of threat within the context of the War on Terror and identifies how discourses of 'Us' and 'Them' created imagined borders of

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[3] The selection of Greater Manchester is explored within Chapter Four

insiders and outsiders. The literature drawn upon in the review demonstrates how these processes of Othering securitised Muslims and resulted in counter-terrorism agendas which disproportionately impacted them through not only policy discourses, but constructions of threat at the vernacular level. It therefore also draws upon literature which has situated this construction of 'Us' and 'Them' within wider agendas of securing national identity, or *Britishness*. The chapter then explores the intertwining of these discourses within the education sector: seeing schools and colleges positioned as places to promote national identity through Britishness, identifying those non-British who require assimilation and surveillance in their difference. The chapter then examines the scholarship which documents the extent to which the Prevent duty reinforces this agenda and further securitises and silences Others. The chapter draws upon the key findings of the most recent studies which present a complex picture of the duty in its negotiations of these discourses. On the one hand literature suggests the duty continues to perpetuate them whilst, on the other, its enactment on the ground presents challenges to such criticisms. The chapter provides the context for the key debates this thesis deals with around the conceptualisation of threat and what the implementation of this latest counter-terrorism policy in the UK, the Prevent duty, can tell us about this.

Chapter Three details the theoretical framework of the research, positioning it as a Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) enquiry which is interdisciplinary in its approach. Epistemologically, the research sees knowledge as socially constructed and therefore draws upon a number of theoretical frameworks to situate its approach to understanding the discursive framing of threat. After offering an overview of CTS research, which prioritises an emancipatory approach to uncovering how non-state actors understand and engage with terrorism discourses, the chapter posits that threat occurs through processes of securitisation. It draws on the Paris and Welsh critiques of the Copenhagen school to understand these processes as occurring through a multiplicity of means, actors and contexts. In doing so, the chapter then positions these constructions as occurring at the vernacular level to understand how narratives and discourses of security, or 'threat', happen within the 'everyday'. The concept of enactment therefore becomes critical to identify how policy is transformed into practice. It therefore warrants an engagement with agency to understand how actors undertake such transformations within different spatio-temporal contexts. Recognising the plurality of

experience is aided by an intersectional approach which, in line with a CTS approach, rejects objective knowledge. Instead it places focus on experiences as individual sites of meaning-making. The chapter finally draws on the concept of reflexivity to underpin the research (and researcher's) commitment to providing space for the voiceless within everyday securitised spaces.

The fourth chapter of the thesis outlines the methodology. This is grounded on the theoretical framework and builds upon the current literature to address the identified gaps. It tells the story of how the research approached and undertook its key research questions and the methods it sought to engage with participants in doing so. It begins by outlining the importance of a qualitative approach before situating the context of both Greater Manchester and the Further Education sector as critical sites of enquiry. It then details the theoretical, practical and ethical processes of selecting and conducting the methods it draws upon (semi-structured interviews, focus groups, participant observations and an online questionnaire), and the participants engaged with during these different methods, to demonstrate the complexities behind conducting 'sensitive' (Silke, 2001) research. Chapter Four then outlines the choice and process of conducting both discourse and narrative analysis of the data to reveal what the implementation of the duty tells us about the conceptualisation of threat, but also how these stories of enactment become possible.

Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight examine these empirical stories provided by participants to uncover how the Prevent duty is implemented and what this tells us about the conceptualisation of threat. The chapters examine the experiences of Policy Elites, Institutional and Classroom Implementors, and Students. They deal with each individual 'level' of participant respectively to represent the general path of implementation for the policy.

Chapter Five explores how policy elites extract the tenets of the Prevent duty from its legislative format and introduce it to institutions as an implementable policy. It therefore provides the first 'level' at which threat becomes conceptualised through implementable mechanisms. It introduces three of the narratives which this thesis posits as the conceptualisations of threat: threat as vulnerability to radicalisation; threat as all forms of

extremism and terrorism; and, threat as the responsibility to safeguarding against. Chapter Six then examines how the discourses and instructions for implementation from policy elites become transformed into an actionable agenda within education institutions. It traces the continuation of the narratives proposed by policy elites and reveals the moments where they become disrupted in order to understand how the implementation is proposed and therefore threat conceptualised at institutional level. It also introduces the fourth narrative – British values as the antithesis to threat – through which threat becomes conceptualised, examining the role institutional leads have in assessing, managing and referring concerns and training others within their institution to do so too. In doing so it also provides the frameworks through which the Prevent duty is introduced to classroom staff. The extent to which classroom staff internalise and replicate the narratives presented both by their institutional leads and policy elites is then examined in Chapter Seven. This chapter explores how staff experience their classroom enactments of the duty, delivering both safeguarding and British values agendas to students and responding to their responsibility to refer potential concerns. The final 'level' of Prevent duty implementation is examined in Chapter Eight where the experiences of students are drawn upon. In this chapter, the extent to which the conceptualisation of threat presented by other participants across the three chapters are visible within student discourses are explored. To do so, student responses to the embedding of British values within their classroom, the requirement for their teachers to refer concerns related to extremism and terrorism, and the potential for them to have to refer concerns themselves, are all examined. The final chapter brings together these stories of enactment, situating them within the existing literature, to reveal what the implementations of the Prevent duty tell us about the conceptualisations of threat.

Presenting these chapters in this way, however, does not indicate lineage. Whilst this format is useful for demonstrating the general process of implementation, it does not suggest that this represents a set path of enactment or discursive construction. Contrarily, in locating where moments of (dis)continuity occur within and across them, the chapters demonstrate how the implementation of the Prevent duty is a fluid process. This further reveals how the discursive constructions of threat occur within the vernacular and are spatio-temporally located. By mapping these discourses across the chapters, the research examines participants individual and collective experiences, or stories, of implementation in order to understand

how they become possible and therefore what they tell us about the conceptualisations of threat.

1.1 The emergence of the Prevent duty

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 introduced the statutory Prevent duty, a mechanism for preventing people from engaging in terrorism and extremism. The duty placed an obligation on public sector workers, including educationalists, to identify those who might show vulnerabilities to becoming engaged in such activities and refer them to Channel, 'a confidential, voluntary multi-agency safeguarding programme that supports people who are vulnerable to radicalisation' (Home Office, 2017). It also placed an obligation on the education sector to promote British values, values which would serve as an antithesis to those of extremist and terrorist organisations (HM Government, 2015c).

The duty began, however, much earlier having been a development from the wider CONTEST strategy launched unofficially in 2003 and then legislated in 2006. The 2006 CONTEST strategy outlined within its first pages both 'the threat' of principally Islamist Terrorism and 'the response' consisting of four principle strands: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare (Great Britain et al., 2006). Prevent was outlined to be concerned with 'processes whereby certain experiences and events in a person's life cause them to become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances' which could be disrupted in order to prevent terrorist groups from recruiting such individuals and them becoming engaged in terrorism (ibid., 2006, p.9). Though the legislation did not define radicalisation, it is widely accepted that the process was understood through a so-called 'conveyor belt' notion where vulnerabilities and grievances, without being intercepted, would lead an individual to violent extremism or terrorism (ibid., 2006, p.10).

The strategy faced little alteration until the newly elected Conservatives version of Contest in 2011. The new strategy dropped 'International' from its title naming itself 'Contest The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' and claimed to 'address radicalisation *to all forms of terrorism*' (2011a, p.12, emphasis added); this was significant in line with a perceived refocus on the Prevent aspect of the agenda. The newly separated Prevent strategy was

grounded on the claim in its opening pages that 'the Prevent programme [the new Government] inherited was flawed' (2011b, p.1). It argued that the previous iterations of Prevent 'confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism' (ibid.). In the 2011 Prevent strategy, the Government therefore inferred that they had attempted to respond to a furore of criticism which had emerged around the blurring of previous agendas, such as Contest and community engagement as chapter two discusses, which led to a disproportionate and problematic targeting of Muslim communities (ibid., p.3). Instead, the new Prevent strategy would focus on the prevention of radicalisation through not only disrupting the exploitation of grievances or injustices and intercepting exposure to radical ideology, but on 'a successful integration strategy which establishes a stronger sense of common ground and shared values, which enable participation and the empowerment of all communities and which also provides social mobility' (HM Government, 2011a, p.12). Further, the 2011 Prevent strategy drew on the notion of extremism as linked to terrorism, previous iterations had not. The strategies, therefore appeared to conceptualise threat as terrorism *and extremism* that was not just external Islamist-inspired threats, but internal ones which crossed *all forms* of threat.

Despite continued concern around its implementation, as the forthcoming literature review chapter explores, Prevent remained in place as the flagship policy of UK counter-terrorism and became further entrenched as its hallmark approach through the 2015 Counter Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA). The act mandated 'the responsibility to prevent'; it obliged all public sector workers to show 'due regard' in the need to prevent vulnerable individuals from becoming engaged in extremism and terrorism. Threat then became positioned as a society-wide concern, with anyone potentially capable of engagement with extremism and terrorism and thus everyone requiring vigilance about. This thesis posits that the CTSA therefore symbolised a transformative shift for the enactment of counter-terrorism legislation in its embedding within everyday practices and in doing so created new ways for threat to be conceptualised and countered.

The conceptualisation of threat as a social issue, and thus the need for a society-based response, did not only emerge from counter-terrorist legislation. Instead, the transcendence of responsibility for society to also *play its part* had been rooted in political discourse for some

years through the notion of British values or a British 'way of life', as Gordon Brown (2007) put it in his Commonwealth Club Britishness seminar. Brown positioned the values to be rooted in Britain's history, principles, institutions and contributions to the rest of the world (Brown, 2007) echoing discourses of nationalism, colonialism and liberalisation (Sales, 2010; Mycock, 2010; McGlynn and Mycock, 2010; Sales, 2012). Though these sentiments failed to fully take off at the time, they are visible some years later in David Cameron's (2010) 'Big Society' endeavour. Under Cameron's muscular liberalism (Jose, 2015), values could and would unite society in order to overcome threats through a national bond which would preserve that British 'way of life'. Such threats came in the form of economic and social issues, but predominantly in the form of terrorist and extremist ideologies, particularly in light of the 7/7 bombings and the transcendence of once externalised threats within the nation's borders by so-called "homegrown" terrorists (Aly, 2013; Kundnani, 2014; Mythen et al., 2017).

Extremism, then, became defined as 'the active opposition to fundamental British values' (HM Government, 2011, p.34). This followed from the then Home Secretary Theresa May's (May, 2010) speech on the 'Response to the Terrorist Threat', where she introduced the Prevent strategy and the need for us to "stand up for our shared British values", inextricably linking the two. The Counter-Extremism Strategy in 2015 further entrenched British values, confirming their use as a core tool in the government's fight against radical groups, particularly Islamist-inspired ones given that was presented as the biggest threat Britain faced (HM Government, 2015a). Brown's reference to the challenge that 'Muslim Fundamentalism' posed to British values in his 2007 Britishness seminar laid the foundations for British values to represent the rejection of extremist and terrorist ideologies in not only government rhetoric, but government policy a few years on. British values, therefore, enabled a whole society approach to conceptualising and countering emergent threat(s) through a narrative of belonging for Us, who repudiated the beliefs of Them.

The 2014 Trojan Horse scandal, several scholars have claimed (Arthur, 2015; Miah, 2017; Abbas, 2017b; Shackle, 2017) provided the catalyst for enabling such narratives to become embedded within the foundations of society – through the enactment of policy within the education sector. The supposed Islamist takeover of Birmingham schools, which an anonymised "insider" letter to the press claimed to have revealed, argued that Islamist-

extremists were using a number of educational institutions within the area to radicalise children into a strict and extreme reading of Islam which was posited against Western *British* values. The events sparked outrage and government demanded an Ofsted investigation and report – lead by an ex-counter-terrorism officer – which found there to be serious risks posed to the children of these institutions (Mogra, 2016). Though Ofsted inspections, some only a year before, had found the schools to be fostering tolerance and providing value-based education, the same examples were, after the letter, used as examples of teaching extremist and narrow readings of Islamist ideology (ibid.).

The scandal, it has been claimed, provided the grounding for a British values agenda to enmesh both education policy and counter-terrorism policy permanently (Mogra, 2016; Miah, 2017; Abbas, 2017b; Shackle, 2017). Education Secretary Nicky Morgan, through a stream of speeches, called for the Promotion of Fundamental British Values within education in direct response to the alleged radicalisation of school children (Morgan, 2014a; Morgan, 2014b; Department for Education, 2016). The announcement of a government consultation 'on strengthening powers to intervene in schools failing to promote British values' followed (Department for Education, 2014a) with the publication of 'Guidance on Promoting British Values in Schools' (Gov.uk, 2014a) and instruction to promote British values through Social, Moral, Cultural and Spiritual agendas (Department for Education, 2014b) issued. Only one year later, the Prevent duty became statutory, through the CTSA, seeing the requirement for educational institutions, and other public sector bodies, to embed British values within their curriculums as part of their requirement to prevent people from becoming drawn into terrorism and extremism.[4]

The CTSA, therefore, embedded the Prevent duty into the education sector. Institutional staff became mandated through the duty's statutorisation, and Ofsted as their governing body, to implement the agenda as part of their safeguarding responsibilities and curriculum delivery (HM Government, 2015c). This thesis is therefore concerned with how this became enacted and what these implementations tell us about how threat became conceptualised by those tasked with identifying, referring and countering it.

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[4] Some of the above discussions on British values have been published in an earlier blog post (James, 2018)

1.2 Where the gaps lie – the research questions

This section firstly outlines the 'functionality' of the Prevent duty, showing how it works in practice and the role the education sector plays within this. In doing so, it highlights a number of critical areas which require attention and thus introduces the questions which this research is concerned with in order to understand how the Prevent duty becomes implemented and what this tells us about the conceptualisation of threat by actors within the sector.

With the introduction of the Prevent duty came the requirement to identify and refer potential vulnerability to radicalisation; public sector workers were required to pass on their concerns to Channel, the multi-agency safeguard hub, to assess and consider the case for support. In light of earlier referenced criticisms of the Prevent agenda and the promise of greater transparency in its implementation following from the 2011 re-think, the government has published referral figures annually and in its first publication post-duty, offered guidance on how referrals were dealt with. Figure 1 below shows the 'Prevent process flow diagram' released by the government explaining how the Channel process of referral works.

Figure 2.1:   *Prevent* process flow diagram

Source: *Home Office*   (fig.1)

The process outlines steps to check that referrals are both 'appropriate' and 'genuine' after concerns come through either the police or local safeguarding hubs and before they become engaged with by a Channel panel. The documentation infers that it is therefore not the role of education institutions, or their fellow public sector workers, to identify whether a concern was radicalisation, but that there was a vulnerability which might potentially lead to this. The figures which emerged during the first year of referrals suggested that the ambiguity in this directive was leading to a significant number of unnecessary referrals with, as figure 2 revealed, a large percentage emerging from the education sector.

Figure 3.1: Sector of referral and subsequent journey, 2015/16

Source: Table P.01-02, Home Office

(fig.2)[5]

Not only was the education sector revealed to be providing the greatest number of referrals, but it was also the sector who had the largest number of referrals placed into it rather than gain Channel support. Though a freedom of information request (FOI), to determine whether or not referrals made by the education sector were being placed back into the education, was rejected,[6] figures above nonetheless revealed a critically important and weighted role that the sector was playing within the Prevent duty. This was particularly pertinent since a follow up FOI revealed that in 2015/16 approximately[7] 251 referrals came specifically from the FE/HE sector and 209 in 2016/17. However, it also revealed only 27 of the 381 people who received Channel support in 2015/16 had been referred from the FE and HE sector and 16 of the 332 people in 2016/17.[8] The way in which these referrals were both determined and experienced therefore warrants examination.

Further, figures in relation to the types of concerns which were being referred into Channel through Prevent suggested that the type of threat being identified also warranted attention as part of the research:

Figure 4.3: Type of concern of those referred, discussed at a Channel panel and who received Channel support, 2015/16

(fig.3)[9]

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[6] Appendix i

[7] Figures are totalled from the individual levels of figures provided which was also caveated on the FOI that not all records have a sector of referral and data is based on management information only (see Appendix ii).

[8] Appendix ii

[9] Fig.1, fig.2, and fig.3 were all taken from (HM Government, 2016, pp.6; 8; 11 respectively)

The research therefore seeks to examine the following central research question:

What do experiences of the Prevent duty's implementation within Further Education institutions of Greater Manchester tell us about the conceptualisation of threat within the sector?

The question speaks to the immediate concerns raised by scholars and commentators, that the literature review deals with, around the practical implementation of the duty (Busher et al., 2017). The policy, as earlier described, posited a significant shift for counter-terrorism whereby educators were now responsible for the enactment this policy as part of their everyday pedagogical practices (Ball et al., 2012). The research therefore seeks to examine experiences of the policy within some of the institutions tasked with its implementation in order to reveal how it becomes enacted. In doing so, the central research question also speaks to the broader concern of the conceptualisation of threat which has governed the response of counter-terrorism approaches as earlier described. Where responsibility for countering threats has been transferred onto educationalists, the identification of threats similarly becomes transposed as part of their everyday tasks (Jackson and Hall, 2016; Jarvis and Lister, 2012). By identifying those vulnerable to radicalisation, I argue educationalists conceptualise threat in determining what *or who* constitutes a concern for Channel. Examining their enactments of the policy enables us to reveal how these social constructions of threats emerge (Jackson, 2007) and are fluid dependent upon their spatio-temporal context (Braun et al., 2011; Ball et al., 2012).

The research therefore examines the conceptualisation of threat in educationalists' implementation of the Prevent duty through a series of sub-research questions. These questions simultaneously reveal further points of significance for the thesis, providing knowledge for a series of gaps which are yet to be addressed within the existing scholarship.

To what extent is threat conceptualised as "all forms of extremism and terrorism"?

This question speaks to the conceptualisation of the nature of threat, specifically drawing upon the apparent shift in discourse within UK counter-terrorism policy. The research seeks to examine the extent to which the incorporation of 'all forms' is visible within educationalists' enactments in identifying *which* threats they are meant to be preventing. As the counter-terrorism legislation shows, from 2011 there was a renewed focus on not just Islamist-inspired terrorism, but all forms of terrorism *and* extremism suggesting that there had been a significant widening in how threat was conceptualised. The above question therefore seeks to reveal whether this was similarly the case for those within FE institutions or whether, as much of the critical scholarship has claimed, there remains a disproportionate focus on Islamist-inspired threat(s) and therefore those perceived more likely to be radicalised as Muslims (see, for example Bonino, 2013; Sian, 2015; O'Toole et al., 2016; Miah, 2017).

How do British values play into the conceptualisation of threat?

The research also seeks to uncover the extent to which the notion of Britishness and a British 'way of life' features within the implementation of the Prevent duty and thus informs the conceptualisation of threat. It looks to understand how Britishness is engaged with by educationalists and fits within the need to prevent terrorist and extremist threats. In drawing upon the earlier political context which surrounded (and enabled) the introduction of the duty, the thesis explores whether the role of nationhood and imaginary boundaries of acceptability are visible within these conceptualisations. It also looks to examine *how* British values become enacted within the institutions and which discourses enable such approaches. In doing so it seeks to understand how the FE sector negotiates the requirement to demonstrate engagement with British values and the role this has in determining who is either viewed, or views themselves, as being inside or outside of this narrative.

How do FE staff experience the duty on the ground?

The thesis examines the experiences of FE staff to identify how the implementation of the policy occurs, the challenges and limitations which surround this, and the variations and conflicts which occur between, across and within experiences. It seeks to identify whether

differences in experiences are also dependent on the role of staff, the nature of the subject matter, i.e. curriculum, and the type of institution. Critically, the thesis looks to reveal the ways in which individual participants experience their own duty, providing an outlet for their personal stories to be heard. Moreover, it is these individual narratives which enable conceptualisations of threat to be understood as fluid social constructions of lived and perceived realities.

How do students experience the duty on the ground?

A key lacuna within current knowledge around the implementation of the duty has been the rare insights into how those at the 'end point' of the Prevent duty, students, have experienced a policy predominantly aimed at them. Young people have been long posited as those most *at risk* of becoming radicalised (Ghosh et al., 2017; see also Stanley and Guru, 2015); yet their own experiences of a policy which seeks to prevent this has been largely omitted from studies on the Prevent duty thus far, as the literature review chapter reveals. The extent to which students are aware of and engage with the Prevent duty is therefore of key concern for this thesis. In a similar vein to understanding the experiences of staff within their institutions, the thesis looks to uncover how student experiences reveal challenges and limitations in their (potential) engagements with the Prevent duty and the ways in which this differs for different students. It seeks to explore whether or not students "see" themselves as at risk of radicalisation and subsequently upon what narratives they conceptualise *who* to be at risk from *what.*

How does the conceptualisation of threat change at the different points of enactment?

Finally, in positioning the conceptualisation of threat as a process that is not ascribed to a single phenomenon, the thesis seeks to examine how it fluctuates across time and space. In identifying points of continuity and conflict, the research thus looks to explore how threat can become understood simultaneously through multiple narratives and the implications this has on *who* becomes vulnerable to *which* threats. Further, it examines the context which governs these variations to identify (in)consistencies within implementation in order to understand a multiplicity of approach's to conceptualising threat can occur at the vernacular.

1.3 The value of the research

The thesis not only provides significant contributions to an underdeveloped knowledge base around the implementation of the Prevent duty, but it speaks to wider concerns around the conceptualisation of threat. It therefore makes several claims to originality.

Firstly, through examining everyday enactments of counter-terrorism, the thesis proposes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding security that enables us to view the conceptualisation of threat as a process, rather than a singular phenomenon. The thesis posits that threat does not exist as an objective reality, but a lived one which is fluid across both time and space and constructed by actors in response to their perceived context. It is cross-disciplinary, positioning its theoretical framework within the foundations of Critical Terrorism Studies whilst drawing upon the concept of 'enactment' from Education Studies to situate and reflect upon the processes of policy implementation within FE institutions, grounding the approach to obtaining and understanding data in recognising the intersectional *individual* nature of experience to understand how discourses of 'threat' emerge within everyday spaces. Thirdly, the research provides an in-depth study, beyond those which currently exist, around the experiences of the duty specifically within the FE sector. Thus it seeks to address a gap not only where those considered amongst 'the most vulnerable to radicalisation' are not being examined (HM Government, 2015c, p.3), but also by exploring both traditional academic and training institutions, examining experiences across a multitude of subjects and pedagogic delivery. The study is also the first to examine FE institutions within the Greater Manchester area, discussed further within chapter four, a Prevent priority area which has experienced a significant amount of media attention but minimal consideration within academic studies of the duty. Finally, the research is particularly significant as the first in-depth study that examines experiences of the Prevent duty across the multiple points at which it becomes enacted – policy elite level, institutional level, and classroom level. At classroom level, the research also uncovers the experiences of both teachers and students, the latter of which few studies across the education sector have sought to obtain. In doing so, the multiplicity of voices which emerge from the research enable an analysis of the

conceptualisation of threat as a process which is fluid and complex, being understood simultaneously through different narratives, by different actors, at different stages.

Chapter Two

Reviewing the Literature

Chapter Two introduces the literature upon which this research is grounded. It focuses on the key concepts, frameworks, and scholarly debates which are of greatest interest to this research. These were identified through a thematic analysis of the relevant literature obtained through key word literature searches (such as 'Prevent duty', 'threat', 'War on Terror', 'Securitisation', 'British Values' and 'identity', amongst others) and existing bibliographies within the literature (what else have they written and who do they cite?). It begins with the 'bigger picture', drawing on scholarship which outlines the narratives of threat that emerged out of the so-called era of 'New Terrorism'. It explores how against this backdrop, following the events of 2001, the War on Terror governed much of the understanding of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The chapter then situates the approaches taken within this literature to examine the discursive constructions of threat and (in)security amongst different audiences. In doing so, it makes the case for the importance of understanding experiences at the everyday level, examining the vernacular articulations of policy and the impact upon meaning-making. An overview of the literature follows which has revealed how discourses of (in)security have come to dominate the construction of threat and programmes which seek to counter it, drawing specifically on a UK context. They reveal the disproportionality with which Muslims have been treated within such programmes as a result of the War on Terror context. The literature then demonstrates how this construction of threat is also situated within a broader history of constructing insiders and outsiders upon ethno-nationalist narratives of 'Us' and 'Them'. The role of Britishness within this is also explored and provides some of the context through which the education sector becomes embroiled in counter-terrorism agendas. The review then draws on some of the 'narrower' debates exploring the concerns and empirically-driven criticisms of the securitisation of educational spaces before drawing specifically on studies which examine the introduction of the Prevent duty. In this final section, the literature reveals the discourses which have informed the implementation of the Prevent duty and the implications this has had on educators and their pedagogies. In doing so it raises a number of areas which require further

attention either through gaps or inconsistencies in the current understanding of not only how the duty has been implemented, but what this tells us about the conceptualisation of threat.

The literature surrounding the conceptualisation of threat within counter-terrorism discourse and policy has demonstrated how the securitisation of Islam has emerged. The 'new terrorism' thesis, coined by Walter Laqueur (2000) 'distinguished between older, political forms of terrorism, inspired by nationalism, communism or fascism, and the new "Islamic fundamentalist violence" that he saw as "rooted in fanaticism"' (Kundnani, 2012, p.4 citing Laqueur, 2000). Spalek (2011) claims that this helped 'securitise Islam as a religion, where securitisation might be thought of as the instigation of emergency politics' informing (and being informed by) a context 'characterised by fear, suspicion and distrust between Muslim communities and the state' (see also Birt, 2008; Brown, 2010; Bonino, 2012; Mythen et al., 2013; O'Toole et al., 2016). A plethora of literature has demonstrated how this is embedded within UK counter-terrorism policy and practice, seeing threats conceptualised along the lines of Huntington's (1993) "Clash of Civilisations" where Western liberalised (and thus civilised) norms are under threat (see Wiktorowicz, 2005). Edward Said's (2003) work on Orientalism has been influential within both Critical Terrorism Studies and broader Critical Security Studies in revealing the processes of Othering which set divisions between Us Occidents (Western, civilised) and Them Orients (Eastern, un-civilised). Such discourses have been predicated upon ethnic lines where racial, religious, linguistic or cultural differences, those which denote a sense of 'Muslimness', have been made hyper-visible and symbolic of threat (Kundnani, 2014; Bonino, 2015). The positioning of Islamist-inspired organisations like al-Qaeda as the biggest threat faced by the UK, outlined within the introduction of the thesis, was legitimated by the state on this basis. This backdrop therefore situates the grounding of counter-terrorism policy within the UK where existential threats have been created along these lines of difference to delineate the good (Western) from the bad (Eastern), the threatening (Muslim) from the non-threatening (non-Muslim).

Scholars Richard Jackson (2005) and Stuart Croft (2006) were amongst the first to map and examine *how* threats of the Other were discursively constructed within the context of the War on Terror. This followed from a trend within the wider International Relations scholarship to challenge and re-examine existing knowledge and the meaning of security, focusing on

human (in)security, rather than state (Booth, 1991; 2005; Newman, 2001). Their work provided the grounding for understanding threat as socially constructed, creating discourses of inclusion and exclusion, or Us and Them, as above. As Croft (2012, p.15) states 'security shapes the identity of the secure and the securitiser' and thus processes of securitisation[10] provide the narratives upon which the threatening and the threatened can be determined. This becomes possible through speech, texts, imagery and acts which *securitise* through discursive practices; in other words, threats do not exist a priori, they are created, often for the purpose of the creator(s) (Waever, 1995; Buzan and Waever, 2003; McDonald, 2008). Work which followed sought to reveal how identity was relayed and experienced within the discourse and praxis of the War on Terror relationally for both insiders and outsiders. It examined the ways in which social constructions of threat – and their resultant impacts – emerged at different scalar levels. This was not only through discourses of policy elites at the highest levels of governance (Jackson, 2005; Holland, 2012) but also within media platforms (Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2009; 2010; O'Loughlin et al., 2011; Clubb and O'Connor, 2019; Clubb et al., 2019) and of most importance for this research, at individual or vernacular 'everyday' levels (Jarvis and Lister, 2012; 2016; Jackson and Hall, 2016; Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016; Guillaume and Huysmans, 2018).

Chapter Three 'Theoretical Framework' discusses the 'everyday' vernacular constructions of threat but drawing on the literature which foregrounds some of the theoretical backdrop to this research here is important. Though, as an empirical contribution to the field it does not seek to contribute directly to this scholarship, the thesis situates its theoretical grounding in understanding threat as socially constructed at this vernacular level. The 'vernacular', coined by Bubandt (2005), refers to the 'socially specific articulations of security that are contextually and historically situated', according to Jarvis and Lister (2012, p.159). They suggested that research which seeks to understand security and securitisation, and ergo the conceptualisations of threat, should therefore prioritise offering empirical data on *how* threat becomes socially constructed at an individual level, in other words, *by people* (ibid., 2012). Browning and MacDonald's (2011) work also revealed the importance of situating these constructions within their contextual environments in order to understand not only how they

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[10] See Chapter Three for more on securitisation

manifest differently in different settings, but also how they vary according to time and space. Thus, this thesis develops on this emerging body of literature, which Jarvis and Lister's contributions have dominated (Jarvis and Lister, 2013; 2012; 2013; 2016), that seeks to 'investigate how public or 'vernacular' articulations of counter-terrorism powers intersect with everyday experiences of security' and threat (ibid., 2016, p.278; see also Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2017; and Mythen, 2012 for an example of this). This is because 'anti-terrorism measures do not simply 'wash over' citizens. These, and other, security assemblages are negotiated, accepted and contested in the spaces and practices of everyday life' (Lister and Jarvis, 2013, p.758; see also Holland and Jarvis, 2014). Literature focusing on the vernacular 'everyday' experiences of counter-terrorism has therefore sought 'to reorient security analysis around the everyday experiences of people' 'to ask not only what security means, but, also, what it *does* when articulated' (ibid., p.161, emphasis in original). Thus, as Vaughan Williams and Stevens (2016, p.41) note, more is needed to understand '*how* citizens conceptualize and experience 'threat' and '(in)security', whether they are aware of, engage with and/or refuse governmental attempts to enlist them in building societal resilience, and what the implications might be for social interaction'.

Whilst not all have prioritised the application of their empirics to demonstrate what experiences of counter-terrorism policy mean for the conceptualisation of threat, there is a plethora of literature which has assessed the role of counter-terrorism strategies and programmes within the UK that is useful for grounding this study (Pickering et al., 2008; Pickering et al., 2008; Spalek and Lambert, 2008; Vertigans, 2010; Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011; McDonald and Mir, 2011; Vermeulen, 2014; Madon et al., 2016). Many have questioned 'the fairness and neutrality' of counter-terrorism policies and legislation given the perceived disproportionate targeting of Muslims (El-wafi, 2006, p.2; see also Bonino, 2012). This has been understood through the lens of the 'suspect community' thesis by some, a term reapplied from the Northern Ireland conflicts (Hillyard, 1993), to describe discriminatory targeting by the British state against Muslims (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Mythen et al., 2009; Herron, 2013). Others, however, have questioned the terms definition (Bonino, 2013; Vermeulen, 2014; O'Toole et al., 2016; Ragazzi, 2016) and usefulness (Spalek and Imtoual, 2007; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Jarvis and Lister, 2016) seeing it as potentially counter-productive for 'threat' identity formation. Whilst this research does not seek to directly contribute to this

literature, the debates surrounding the notion of a 'suspect community' are important when considering the conceptualisation of threat and how this frames the enactment of counter-terrorism policy, *against who*. The concept enables us to deconstruct how visual signifiers of difference (Chadderton, 2012) are used within the implementation of counter-terrorism in order to define and externalise threat(s). Miah (2017), for example, claims this labelling emerged not only for Muslims, but any brown person. This '*racial formation*' sees racial appearance conflated with other signifiers of difference such as religion, culture or language, creating a sense of Muslim*ness* (ibid., p.3). The role that gender plays in this has also been critical for others who have explored how a visible Muslimness has been depicted through the headscarf (Dwyer, 1999; Rashid, 2014; 2016; Allen, 2015b; Joly and Wadia, 2017). However, as scholars like Moallem (2005, p.8) have warned, there is the potential for 'totalizing discourses' to emerge from the adoption of the suspect community thesis in that it homogenises a large and diverse set of individuals, for whom religion may hold very different meanings, seeing Muslims as a single entity. Such contestations are important for not only considering the gaps which emerge within the literature on counter-terrorism programming but also for encouraging researchers to avoid potential homogenisation of 'categories' of identity.

The notion of a suspect community has enabled the creation of an *acceptable* one, where markers of difference, like those associated with 'Muslimness' have been used to determine insiders and outsiders of the community – the threatened and the threatening, respectively. Mamdani's (2002) work, however suggests that such boundaries can be blurred. His paradigm of 'good Muslim' – 'bad Muslim' suggests that outsiders are able to become 'good' ones, overcoming their potential *threat.* This, a number of studies have demonstrated, has been visible within community cohesion programmes which were enmeshed with counter-terror agendas and as a result positioned Muslims as responsible for proving they were not threatening by becoming better *British* Muslims (Mythen et al., 2013; see also Thomas, 2011; Thomas, 2015; O'Toole et al., 2016). Acceptability was possible through assimilation (ibid.). Analysis on multiculturalism and integration can therefore be drawn upon to demonstrate how assimilation was used to frame the 'good' British citizen from the bad – the threatened from the threatening.

The 2001 Northern riots are argued to have been the point at which political discourse became concerned with a perceived dilution to British identity; a need to see multiculturalism abandoned and integration through assimilation favoured. The riots saw South East Asian and White communities clash in ethnically-motivated violent disputes which centred on socio-economic depravities. This deprivation was perceived to be predicated on racially divided local council funding and magnified by hostile racism that was rife in the areas (Bagguley and Hussain, 2003). The events were ultimately blamed politically on a perceived failure of multiculturalism which the report into them, the Cantle Report (2001), suggested could be dealt with through assimilation (see also Hussain and Bagguley, 2005; Bagguley and Hussain, 2006). Integration should be achieved, it argued, through the promotion of British values to instil a sense of collective identity. This collectivity would therefore determine the insiders from the outsiders – those who would prioritise their Britishness, over any other cultural or ethnic identity (Winter and Mills, 2020, p.50; see also Allen, 2007; Kundnani, 2014).

However, this was rooted in a much deeper history, Smith (p.302) claims, 'as far back as Mosley's Britain Union of Fascists in 1930s and 40s' where 'the plurality of Britain has been cast as a threat to the nation. Manichean constructions of 'us' vs. 'them' have situated some as enemies both with and without the nation'. Thus, where the project of nation-building 'relies on the construction of a shared image… common allegiances' become prioritised and *differences* of outsiders securitised (Vincent, 2019, p.19). Winter and Mills (2020) argue, therefore, that the nationalism of Britishness, and the British values which we now see within the Prevent duty, are not only 'articulated as a response to the 'terror threat' (p.50) but are a 'symptom' of a 'continued imperial nostalgia' or, citing Gilroy (2006), a 'postcolonial melancholia' (Winter and Mills, 2020, p.57; see also Lockley-Scott, 2019). In other words, the narrative of protecting national borders lends itself not only to protection against terrorist threats, but threats to (white) civilisation seeing the lens of securitisation speak to a wider narrative of ethno-nationalism against Oriental Others (see Keddie, 2014).

Situating the debates of Britishness within the education sector, Sukarieh and Tannock (2016) have explored the role of nationalism and national identity formation within counter-terrorism agendas and have argued that this is part of a broader neo-liberal ideological agenda. They claim a 'reorientation of the goals of education' requires pedagogical agendas

to respond to social, economic and cultural threats, the threat of terrorism straddling all categories. They suggest that children are shaped to embody the "British" way of life as a counter to such threats. Understanding the neo-liberal project through nationalist discourses however, draws back on the securitisation of identities deemed to be threatening; the debates problematise who the subjects (*British* citizens) and objects (*non-British* citizens) of these neo-liberal projects of nationalism are (Sian, 2015). Further, negotiations of nationhood are explored within the broader literature which enable us to locate the juxtaposition of national and transnational identity as a process of Othering, internally displacing those whose identity fails to conform to that of Britishness and therefore poses a threat to the neo-liberal British way of life (Yuval-Davis et al., 2005, pp.516–521; Yuval-Davis, 2006, pp.197; 213; Yuval-Davis, 2007; Alam and Husband, 2013).

These debates are also present in the works of those who have explored the impact of the Trojan Horse Affair on counter-terrorism policy within education, where many have argued the threat of an Islamist takeover across schools in Birmingham acted as a catalyst for a deeper embedding of nationhood within educational institutions. Revell and Bryan (2018) argue that the neo-liberal project of nationalism and determining *good* citizenship within curriculums is not a new phenomenon. In tracing this back to the early twentieth century (ibid. p.87), they detail how a history of empire and hegemonic superiority was celebrated within education settings. However, in agreement with Shamim Miah (2017) and Sadia Habib (2018), Revell and Bryan (2018) argue that the Trojan Horse scandal provided an inroad for this project of nationalism to become a project of counter-terrorism. For these authors, the pre-existing neo-liberalism of education simultaneously offered a short-term solution to a highly politicised scandal and a long-term means of countering terrorism through the promotion of nationhood and Britishness as an antithesis to the constructed threat(s) (James, 2019).[11] As Lister (2019) notes, seeing counter-terrorism as a neo-liberal project enables us to de-exceptionalise it; in applying this to educational settings we can see how the Prevent duty simultaneously represents a rolling back of the state and a display of sovereign power. The role of neo-liberalism within education, therefore, can be understood as both enabling

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[11] This section is adapted from a book review (James, 2019)

and being enabled by counter-terrorism. The extent to which the Prevent duty symbolises and further entrenches this requires attention.

For many, the integration of these agendas within educational spaces positioned educational institutions as sites of surveillance and intelligence gathering (Miah, 2012; 2016; 2017; Gearon, 2015; 2017; Durodie, 2016; Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016; Kyriacou et al., 2017; Taylor, 2013; Breen and Meer, 2019). Brown and Saeed's (2015) work explored the way in which activism had been challenged by counter-terrorist programmes within universities which sought to limit the potential for extreme ideas to be heard within these environments. However, it had been the securitisation of certain groups which had occurred through the disproportionate focus on Muslim activists, they argued, that was rooted in those earlier problematic conceptualisations of threat (see also Blackbourn and Walker, 2016). Campus-based activism is used by Brown and Saeed (2015) to examine how this is particularly felt by Muslim women; those who become hyper-visible through the hijab (see also Scott, 2007; Arian, 2014; Phipps, 2014; Naaz Rashid, 2016). In other words, counter-terrorism measures resulted in certain groups' educational freedoms being limited as a result of their Muslimness (Sian, 2015). These targeted and disproportionate restrictions are similarly explored by Chadderton (2012) who discussed the use of surveillance in *certain* secondary schools which have particular BAME (black and minority ethnic) make-ups. Chadderton draws upon on what Miah (2016) argues is a racialisation within the education system as a result of counter-terrorist programmes. Both Chadderton and Miah argue that the hyper-visibility of "Muslimness" through racial and/or cultural markers (Patel, 2013, p.43) has shaped the way counter-terrorism has been embedded within schools, focusing on schools with higher percentages of those who are, or look, Muslim, on the logic that they are more likely than non-Muslims to become radicalised (see also Breen and Meer, 2019).

Quartermaine's (2016) study in schools, encountered feelings of fear among both students and teachers when discussing topics related to terrorism in their classrooms due knowing counter-terrorism agendas were being operationalised in their schools. This stifling of discussion she argues (2016, p.21), reduced the potential for critical reflection and engagement. Miller et al. (2013) similarly questioned the extent to which open discussions around extremism, radicalisation and terrorism could be discussed in educational spaces;

teachers might choose to ignore or divert the topic as a result of a lack of confidence, knowledge or resource and the potential for that to result in the perpetuation of problematic narratives increased the risk of students holding prejudices or psychological impacts, they argued. Nelles (2003) further problematised the appropriateness and capacity of educational institutions as a vehicle for countering terrorism suggesting there simply is not enough known about impact to suggest they can serve as a successful counter-terrorism tool. More recently however, there has been an increasing number of empirically-based studies like this one which have sought to do just that.

Busher et al. (2017) offered one of the first, empirical studies into the implementation of the Prevent duty within the education sector and much of the literature which followed sought to deepen their key findings. The study looked at what the prevent duty meant for schools and colleges in England focusing on the role of staff in their interpretation, confidence, perceived impacts and opposition to the duty. Respectively, they found an acceptance of Prevent as a safeguarding mechanism, fairly high levels of confidence in implementing the duty but an uncomfortableness in using the term British values, a lack of fear that Prevent created a "chilling effect" (Rights Watch UK, 2016, p.4) on conversations with students, and very few participants questioning the legitimacy of the Prevent duty. Their findings presented a challenge to a number of the criticisms explored above in suggesting that for these teachers, there was a limited rejection and problematisation of the duty and its embedding within the education sector. Such findings thus suggested a disparity between the challenging nature of theoretical enquiries into the Prevent duty, and its predecessors, and those which analyse its implementation and engagement empirically.

The framework of safeguarding is problematised by scholars like Heath-Kelly (2016a) and Stanley and Guru (2015) who argued that the duty transformed the role of public sector workers to become 'guardians of radicalisation risk work' (ibid., 2015, p.353). By legally binding workers to report *anyone* they think who may appear vulnerable to extremism or terrorism, Heath-Kelly (2016a) argues that, through the Prevent duty, the government has created a large-N data capture system. Such a system is justified on the rhetoric of safeguarding which, she suggests, represents the normalisation of counter-terrorism into the everyday, where concerns around vulnerability become placed within the context of security

(ibid.). Heath-Kelly (ibid.) also problematises the depiction of radicalisation as a process of grooming and its conflation with other forms of harm and abuse, such as child sexual exploitation. She argues this frames people as vulnerable and therefore victims of the processes around them in requiring safeguarding from predatory *Others*. 'Vulnerability is posited as the characteristic that positions us in relation to each other as human beings and also suggests a relationship of responsibility between state and individual' according to Fineman (2010, p.1). The prevention of the exploitation of vulnerability, therefore, becomes the responsibility of the educator through both their relationship as an individual to the vulnerable person, and as an agent of the state in their duty to enact policy. This is what Ecclestone (2017, p.443) labels 'vulnerability creep' where 'the goals and practices' of education institutions are shifting alongside the 'expectations of both its human subjects and the curriculum subjects' of which, she argues, Prevent 'is an especially stark illustration'.

This framing of 'vulnerability', Durodie (2016, p.27) has argued, is 'a passive formulation that implicitly removes (young people's) autonomy and agency (as well as, inadvertently perhaps, their accountability) from the picture'. Further, in placing these events as happening *to* students, it becomes a risk which requires managing; Lundie (2019, p.323), quoting Marcuse (2002) argues this leads to 'totalising discourses' 'which functions to close down debate by labelling opposition as 'unsafe', irresponsible or a dereliction of professional duty'. For Revell (2019, p.33), this means that any teacher who wishes to challenge either their role as actors in the counter terrorism strategy or who wish to promote free speech in the classroom are in 'a precarious position in the current climate' (citing O'Donnell, 2016, p.67). Further, Revell argues that through creation of a 'pre-crime space' where safeguarding can prevent radicalisation from occurring, the Prevent duty normalises surveillance as an 'ordinary part of practice' and through the language of vulnerability legitimises the securitisation of teaching staff as state agents (ibid., pp.32;24). Yet, more recent empirical studies have echoed Busher et al.'s (2017) findings instead revealing that the narrative of safeguarding enabled the duty to become 'assimilate(d)… into one of the many ways that students need to be protected' (Moffat and Gerard, 2020, p.208; see also Revell, 2019; Elwick and Jerome, 2019; Sjøen and Jore, 2019). This, Higton et al., (2018) claim, 'results in the prioritisation of learner safety and facilitates the implementation of Prevent duties' through existing mechanisms and processes. The role of safeguarding within empirical data appears to be contesting some of the

theoretical challenges which have previously dominated the literature revealing an important area for enquiry.

In line with some of the existing critiques, however, Busher et al.'s research also found participant concerns about the disproportionate impacts the duty could have on Muslim students in particular. For Wolton (2017, p.131), the narrative of safeguarding served to silence these concerns: the normalisation of staff enacting counter-terrorism policy placed focus on the protection of children from harm, rather than on *which* forms of harm are perceived as more likely for *which* children. Citing Taylor and Soni's (2017) systematic review of Prevent duty research within the educational sector, Sjøen and Jore (2019) argue the potential securitisation that occurs within this paradigm, particularly for Muslim students, serves only to uphold the earlier narratives of 'the production of the neo-liberal 'good' citizen'. In this sense, safeguarding becomes not only part of preventing certain people's radicalisation, but part of protecting certain 'good' British citizens and their values. The extent to which, as the duty claims, all forms of extremism and terrorism are safeguarded against, therefore, requires further interrogation. Further, the extent to which British values are influential in this problematic conceptualisation of *whose* vulnerability can be safeguarded against, similarly warrants attention.

The uncomfortableness which Busher et al. (2017) revealed around the implementation of British values has also been replicated across a number of studies (see Jerome and Clemitshaw, 2012). The agenda has been seen as highly problematic as a result of the earlier discussions around ethno-nationalism which 'contribute to racial governance under neoliberalism through the continued targeting of certain racialised community groups for surveillance, management and containment' (Winter and Mills, 2020, p.51; see also Bhopal and Rhamie, 2014). British values is another means by which the agenda of muscular liberalism, therefore, can be embedded within the education system, McGhee and Zhang (2017, p.939) claim. Some have subsequently argued that this has made it difficult for staff – and their students - to critically engage with the agenda (Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017), particularly when this is undertaken alongside a requirement to refer potential vulnerability (Bryan, 2017). For others there was a reluctance to use the language of British values explicitly in the classroom (Moffat and Gerard, 2020, p.209), questioning not only whether 'British

values are distinctive and unique to Britain' (Maylor, 2016, p.323) but challenging, as earlier drawn upon, the exclusionary narratives of 'Us and Them' which came with defining these values as explicitly British (Lockley-Scott, 2019). Habib (2018) also drew upon these insider/outsider boundaries that were created through the language of Britishness finding notions of ethnicity; local, national and transnational identity; class; and culture, all critical to students' understandings of who was/could be or was not/could not be British and thus able to engage in these discourses. Further, she also highlighted some of the difficulties teachers face as a result of the duty which Revell and Bryan (2018) similarly point out to be the case for school leaders: applying vague and ill-defined concepts into the classroom; uncertainty in how to fulfil their statutory obligations; anxiety around teaching students of diverse ethnic backgrounds; a lack of guidance and resources to draw from; and, a cynicism in delivering a politicised government agenda (Habib, 2018).

Yet, research has also revealed that there has been 'broad agreement, alignment and support for the FBV [Fundamental British Values] agenda' in some education institutions (Bamber et al., 2019, p.762), with some even celebrating the language of Britishness (Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe, 2017 cited in Jerome & Elwick, 2019, p.105). This has emerged through an assimilation of the agenda to existing pedagogical ones (Bamber et al., 2019, p.763). For example, 'embedding it within their existing SMSC [Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural] development programmes, these schools and colleges have managed to translate a top-down controversial remedial citizenship intervention which has been imposed on schools and FE Colleges into their institutional contexts where respecting diversity and difference amongst pupils, parents and staff is essential to their operational effectiveness' (McGhee and Zhang, 2017, p.948). In other words, through a process of what Vincent (2019, pp.23–4) refers to as 're-packaging' the values, or 'relocating' them within existing school agendas, educational institutions have 'normalised' the British values agenda, making them more palatable to those implementing them.

Busher et al.'s study (2017, p.6) also found that there were 'high levels of confidence' around the implementation of the duty; for Moffat and Gerard (2020) and Elwick and Jerome (2019) however, confidence was related to levels of training which were seen to have influenced the 'approaches and understandings of the policy' (ibid., p.206; see also Lundie, 2017). Further,

for Higton et al., (2018, p.12) there was a perceived lack of 'practical guidance on dealing with challenging circumstances and having conversations on sensitive issues' within the training, instead staff were provided with 'an overview of their colleges' reporting structures'. As one of the few studies to engage with students, Higton et al. also found limitations with few students recalling having engaged in activities around Prevent. For the majority of students, sessions had been focused on what to do when reporting concerns rather than an 'understanding of radicalisation and extremism concepts', since the priority of teachers was 'to ensure learners knew enough to keep themselves safe… at a level required for safeguarding'; these sessions were deemed more applicable to integrate 'where the subject lent itself to the topic' (ibid., pp.13-4) which Moffat and Gerard (2020, p.207) also found in relation to social science.

A further finding of Busher et al.'s (2017) study was that there had not been the perceived "chilling effect" that both scholars and activists had argued would occur with the introduction of the Prevent duty (Rights Watch UK, 2016). As Moffat and Gerard (2020, pp.204–5) note, there had long been 'concern that reporting students for suspected radicalisation or vulnerability to radicalisation meant destroying trust'; both Dudenhoefer (2018) and Ramsay (2017) also claimed that safe spaces which should be within educational spaces were limited where free expression was now being monitored. Sjøen and Jore (2019, p.275) argued that it was the concerns over British values which were central to this 'fear and uncertainty'. Both Jerome and Elwick (2019) and Lundie (2019, p.333) found that where institutions embedded the duty through a 'pedagogical approach for students to develop critical enquiry skills', it provided a 'more positive framework' for engagement opposed to one which focused on securitising discussion. The extent to which the 'framing of the Prevent duty' has been 'essential to its success' (ibid.) therefore requires attention.

Much of the literature has premised its argument on the adaption of education to accommodate for security, ergo the securitisation of educational spaces. Instead, Durodie (2016) suggests, the potential for education to shape security discourses should be recognised and prioritised in what he labels the 'therapeutisation of security' (ibid., 2016, p.22). This is particularly important, he argues, since education spaces are yet to be proven to perpetuate narratives or ideas which lead to the radicalisation of their students (ibid., 2016,

p.27). I argue the studies which have more recently examined the Prevent duty within education have enabled such an approach to be considered, focusing on educators' enactments of policy, rather than seeing policy as something enforced upon them without agentic capacity to engage with it. Thus, a key lesson from these contributions and something I do within this research, is to allow for these variation in experiences to be revealed.

The number of empirical studies into the Prevent duty's implementation has increased in the last few years, however the bulk of these have examined the policy enactment within schools (Maylor, 2016; Busher et al., 2017; McGhee and Zhang, 2017; Revell, 2019; Jerome and Elwick, 2019; Vincent, 2019; Elwick and Jerome, 2019; Lundie, 2019; Lockley-Scott, 2019; Bamber et al., 2019; Winter and Mills, 2020; Jerome and Elwick, 2020). Only Moffat and Gerard (2020), Beighton and Revell (2018) and Higton et al., (2018) have focused on the space of Further Education. Engagement with students and teachers, as well as senior management staff within the Further Education sector was only undertaken by Higton et al. (ibid.). Further, though the vast majority of literature reference both, literature has tended to prioritise either the implementation of the Prevent duty through extremism and radicalisation awareness or referral mechanisms (Sjøen and Jore, 2019; Lundie, 2019; Jerome and Elwick, 2020), or through British values (Maylor, 2016; Beighton and Revell, 2018; Vincent, 2019; Lockley-Scott, 2019; Bamber et al., 2019). Studies which examined how both of these agendas interact with one another *at depth* within institutions (Busher et al., 2017; McGhee and Zhang, 2017; Elwick and Jerome, 2019; Winter and Mills, 2020; Moffat and Gerard, 2020) revealed how varied experiences could be and thus demonstrated the importance of gaining further insight into enactments. None of the studies which did both, however, examined student *and* staff experiences of them.

This chapter has reviewed the literature which explores the Prevent duty, firstly through theoretical and conceptual analyses and secondly through empirical studies of its role and implementation. The first set of scholarly contributions encourage the deconstruction of key concepts upon which the Prevent duty is grounded. These engagements have located the transformative nature of the Prevent duty through a combination of longstanding concepts which have enabled counter-terrorism discourse and praxis within educational spaces to become normalised. The review has also highlighted disparities between the two bodies of

literature. The frameworks which Prevent has been created and grounded upon, deemed highly problematic, are, to some extent, challenged when the enactment of the Prevent duty is explored. Therefore, there is an urgent need for further empirically-based research which explores the extent to which this occurs and offers suggestions as to how and why it does. Moreover, the review has revealed a number of key gaps which require addressing; this research provides an empirical contribution which works towards filling these gaps. In doing so it also offers empirical insights into how the Prevent duty becomes implemented and what these experiences tell us about the conceptualisation of threat. It therefore also speaks to the theoretical literature outlined, examining the vernacular 'everyday' conceptualisation of threat(s) and the extent to which they are spatially and temporally located, informing and being informed by educators' implementations of the Prevent duty.

Chapter Three

An Interdisciplinary Theoretical Framework

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework through which the research has been undertaken. It grounds the research in a Critical Terrorism Studies approach (Jackson, 2007) that understands knowledge as socially constructed (Stump and Dixit, 2012) and 'problem-solving' research as problematic (Jarvis, 2009a). It also draws upon the Paris and Welsh contributions to Copenhagen Schools theory of securitisation before outlining vernacular, 'everyday' securities to situate its approach to identifying and analysing discourse construction. Further, the chapter explores the purpose of being informed by the concept of 'enactment' which requires a critical engagement with 'agency' to understand how counter-terrorism policy becomes practiced. Intersectionality is also drawn upon to ground the approach to understanding experiences as multiple, fluid and informed by intersecting identities, seeing no singular truth as possible.

Critical Terrorism Studies

Critical Terrorism Studies emerged after 9/11 and is credited to Richard Jackson's call for a re-examination of the scholarship which emerged following the events of 2001. Emerging from both Terrorism Studies and Critical Security Studies, Jackson responded to Silke's (2008) study 'of an analysis of articles published between 1995 and 1999 in the two key journals – Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism' (Gunning, 2007a, p.365) which found 'over 80 per cent of all research on "terrorism" is based either solely or primarily on data gathered from books, journals, the media or media-derived databases, or other published documents' (Silke, 2008 cited in Gunning (2007) p.365). These articles, he claimed had a number of 'methodological and analytical weaknesses' including state-centrism and a 'problem-solving' approach to analysis, which have 'important analytical and normative implications' (Jackson, 2007, pp.244–5):

> *Analytically, the state-centric orientation of the field functions to narrow the potential range of research subjects, encourage conformity in outlook and method and obstruct vigorous, wide ranging debate, particularly regarding the causes of non-state terrorism and the use of terrorism by liberal democratic states and their allies. More*

importantly, a normative perspective suggests that terrorism studies is a largely co-opted field of research that is deeply enmeshed with the actual practices of counterterrorism and the exercise of state power. (ibid., p.245-6)

Thus, he posits that Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) instead commands…

…research that self-consciously adopts a sceptical attitude towards state-centric understandings of terrorism and which does not take existing terrorism knowledge for granted but is willing to challenge widely held assumptions and beliefs (ibid., p.246)

CTS therefore begins by viewing all knowledge as 'insecure' and a product of social processes 'constructed through language, discourse and inter-subjective practices'. In doing so it rests upon the notion that 'neutral or objective knowledge' is impossible and is instead a reflection of 'the social-cultural context within which it emerges' (Jackson, 2007, p.246). In uncovering it as such, CTS research seeks to 'destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the inherently contested and political nature of the discourse – to reveal the politics behind seemingly neutral knowledge' (ibid., pp.246-7). CTS therefore encourages researchers to ask, 'who is terrorism knowledge for, and what functions does it serve in supporting their interests?' (ibid., p.246). It challenges a 'problem-solving' approach [that] does not question its framework of reference, its categories, its origins or the power relations that enable the production of these categories' (Gunning, 2007a, p.371) and thus 'offers very limited space for reflecting on the historical and social processes through which this identity, behaviour or threat has been constituted (Jarvis, 2009a, p.14). Thus, Stokes (2009, p.87) argues 'CTS seeks to empirically trace the silences within problem-solving terrorism studies which, it is claimed, often ignores the roles that liberal democracies have played in committing acts of both state and non-state terrorism' and more recently, as the literature review revealed, acts of counter-terrorism which have securitised identities en mass (Stritzel, 2007).

CTS is predominantly concerned with seeing as phenomenon not 'existing independently of human interpretive practice but, rather, a social construction sustained by communities of people' (ibid., p.201). In other words, I concur with Stump and Dixit (2012, p.204) who see CTS as uncovering and demonstrating 'representations of terrorism and their reality [as] socially produced through linguistic and nonlinguistic practices' (ibid., p.210). It advocates 'conceptualizing terrorism as a meaning-making practice leads to an empirical study of how articulations of terrorism and related practices are concretely used by interpretive

communities to produce some effect, especially in terms of boundary- making and identity formation' (ibid., p.211). This sees CTS examine terrorism and its associated phenomena as a 'deliberately and meticulously composed set of words, assumptions, metaphors, grammatical forms, myths and forms of knowledge – it is a carefully constructed discourse – that is designed to achieve a number of key political goals', requiring CTS research:

> (i) to make one's ontological stance explicit and clear by specifying the relationship between the observer and observed; (ii) to explicitly embrace the reflexive implications of a completely constructivist ontology; and (iii) to explicitly conceptualize terror, terrorists and terrorism as categories (categories of analysis and categories of political and social practice) (ibid., p.207)

Conducting CTS research requires us to understand phenomena as socially constructed in which actors, structures, and environments have interchanging and complex roles. The purpose of doing so is not only to re-examine theories of "knowledge" but to be emancipatory for both object and subject. Jackson (2007, p.249), in his seminal piece introducing Critical Terrorism Studies to Academia, posited 'in the tradition of Critical Theory, the core commitment of CTS is to a broad conception of emancipation, which is understood as the realisation of greater human freedom and human potential and improvements in individual and social actualisation and well-being'. Whilst CTS has been challenged for its emancipatory approach, such an approach to research enables a 'reflexive commitment' to providing space for silenced and marginalised voices to be heard (Mcdonald, 2007, p.253) and for 'discussing the (il)legitimacy of particular violences' by both state and non-state actors (Jarvis, 2009a, p.15). Thus, as Jackson (2007, p.249) originally posited, 'CTS is determined to go beyond critique and deconstruction and actively work to bring about positive social change – in part through an active engagement with the political process and the power holders in society. In short, based on an acceptance of a fundamental prior responsibility to 'the other''. The emancipatory approach therefore lends itself well to the examination of policy (Gunning, 2007a, p.387), but this is to be approached with caution. As both Jarvis (2009a) and Gunning (Gunning, 2007b, p.240) note, 'engaging policy-makers raises the issue of co-optation':

> By becoming embedded in the existing power structures, one risks reproducing existing knowledge structures or inadvertently contributing to counter-terrorism policy that

> *uncritically strengthens the status quo. Such dilemmas have to be confronted and debated; non-engagement is not an option (ibid.)*

Emancipation, McDonald (2007, p.257) argues, should therefore be understood 'as 'a (strategic) process of freeing up' rather than 'a condition of being freed'' whereby engagement occurs not only with policy-makers but with 'terrorists' and 'suspect communities', as well as civil society actors more generally' (Gunning, 2007b, p.247). Moreover, the process of reflexivity – shortly discussed – enables researchers to remain grounded in these (potential) process of co-option and respond to them where they occur.

Securitisation

One of the key concepts which CTS scholarship has concerned itself with has been 'securitisation', understood as the process by which an entity becomes 'a referent object of security' (Floyd, 2007, p.41). The thesis draws on the debates between the Copenhagen School of securitisation and the Welsh and Paris Schools, to overcome what I see as a narrow focus on speech acts that does not sufficiently account for agency, context and practice within the original conception of Securitisation. Securitisation, accredited to Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan (Waever, 1995; Buzan and Waever, 2003) of the Copenhagen School, is 'a theoretical tool for the analysis of security politics' where 'individuals can be both securitizing actors and/or referent objects of security' (Floyd, 2007, pp.38; 40). It argues that this becomes possible through speech acts: 'an intersubjective understanding [that] is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat' (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.491 cited in Stritzel (2007) p.358)). Under the Copenhagen School, the 'articulation of 'security' entails the claim that something is held to pose a threat to a valued referent object that is so existential that it is legitimate to move the issue beyond the established games of 'normal' politics to deal with it by exceptional, i.e. security, methods' (Stritzel, 2007, p.340). In determining how this occurs, focus is primarily on the actions of the state (or state actors) since they are the ones who are viewed to be able to make the securitising moves. Thus, using McDonald's (2008) influential 'Securitization and the Construction of Security' article, I draw upon the Paris school to challenge the notion of 'acts' as the only securitising 'moves' and the Welsh school to move beyond the idea of the State as securitising actors.

Stritzel's (2007) critical engagement with the Copenhagen school firstly, however, offers an important contribution to broadening the original conception of securitisation that is useful for this thesis. He posits that moving beyond the moment of a speech act allows for an 'externalist position by claiming that security articulations need to be related to their broader discursive contexts from which both the securitizing actor and the performative force of the articulated speech act/text gain their power' (Stritzel, 2007, p.360). In other words, 'an actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant. It is their embeddedness in social relations of meaning and power that constitutes both actors and speech acts' (Stritzel, 2007, p.367; see also McDonald, 2008). Thus, through this wider application of securitisation, 'the meaning of a threat text [as either spoken, written or acted discourse] is not given (by the concept of security as exceptionality) but generated — often as the result of a dynamic social process. Its meaning and performative force is therefore never uniform and perhaps impossible to figure out in abstract' (Stritzel, 2007, p.371). Through this approach we can situate securitisation as the product of three inter-related processes: '(1) the performative force of an articulated threat text, (2) its embeddedness in existing discourses and (3) the positional power of securitizing actors' (ibid., p.377) positioning the securitising actors within spatio-temporal specific contexts.

Figure 1
Framework of Securitization

Such an approach also feeds into the Welsh school's calls for securitisation to move beyond the state as the securitising actor and focus instead on providing space for the 'voiceless',

ensuring that it becomes a quest for emancipation (Jones, 1999, p.195 cited in McDonald (2008), p.575), rather than a perpetuation of 'exclusionary, statist and militaristic security discourses' (ibid.). Though previous scholarship on the Prevent duty has positioned educators as 'agents of the state' (Heath-Kelly, 2016b) and thus extended the statist discourse of securitisation, I posit that they should also be understood as agentic actors who are tasked with enacting the policy within their localised context. Such an approach affords 'greater access to the ways professional values, path dependency and institutional logics are agentive in reframing and reinterpreting policy in its implementation' (Lundie, 2017, p.324). In other words, securitisation occurs through 'moves' (McDonald, 2008, p.570; citing Williams, 2003), which are determined not only by a state using its modes of power to conceptualise threat via the policy, but by actors of the state conceptualising threat through enactments of the policy outside of traditional modes of 'power'. It is the latter process with which this thesis is concerned and thus the Paris school's challenges are also drawn upon. McDonald (2008, p.570) quotes Bigo's (2002) challenge of the 'exclusive focus on speech' claiming instead, 'for these theorists, security is constructed and applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinized practices'. In expanding the notion of securitisation to include these multiple 'moves', or practices, 'mundane and everyday physical actions… points to the multiple forms in which meaning can be communicated' (McDonald, 2008, p.570). Thus, it is not only about 'speech' as language, but as practice or action (ibid., p.569) and not only about 'acts' but the 'realization' of and 'engagement' with them (Huysmans, 2011, p.373) that occur within the everyday of securitising discourses.

Vernacular, or 'everyday'

The above framing of securitisation lends itself to the understanding of threat as constructed within the vernacular. This is important because, as Huysmans (2011, p.372) puts it, 'it is not just the speech that matters but the circulation of security speech and its appropriation or refusal by those who are addressed'. Viewing discourses of security as occurring through the vernacular, or everyday practices of actors, encourages researchers to examine how 'threat' is received, engaged with and enacted not necessarily by state elites, but *people* (Jarvis and Lister, 2012).[12] This social constructivist lens (Huysmans, 2002) transforms 'the analyst's gaze

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[12] 'enactment' is discussed shortly within this chapter

away from security's specific content, and toward its production, meaning and enunciative functions' (Jarvis and Lister, 2012, p.161) enabling research to identify how people 'construct and describe experiences of security and insecurity in their own vocabularies, cultural repertoires of knowledge and categories of understanding' (Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2017, p.11). 'Epistemologically, scholarship of this sort poses potential to significantly broaden our knowledge of security's social meanings and role… Normatively, research into vernacular securities addresses the concomitant risk that other voices – and ultimately, other insecurities – are marginalised, camouflaged or excluded by a focus on the speech acts or discourses of structurally privileged actors' (Jarvis and Lister, 2012, p.162). In 'disturb[ing] the distinction between micro and macro in terms of both scope and levels' (Guillaume and Huysmans, 2018, p.284), seeing threat construction as vernacular enables research to incorporate the daily experiences and activities of people (individually and as group members) to understand not only at what point (which) discourses of threat emerge, but the multiple ways in which they do and the multiple points at which they change (Huysmans, 2011; Browning and McDonald, 2011; Jarvis and Lister, 2012; Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016; Guillaume and Huysmans, 2018). Examining the 'temporal, spatial and emotional' dimensions of 'everyday security', helps to 'accentuate the mundane rather than the spectacular, the routine rather than the exceptional' whilst still 'allow[ing] for (everyday) inconsistencies, unintended consequences, struggles and resistances' to be heard (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016, pp.2, 7). This, Crawford and Hutchinson argue (ibid., p.3), is 'vital for understanding security governance [such as the Prevent duty] write large'.

Enactment

The thesis draws on Stephen Ball and colleagues concept of 'enactment' (see Ball, 2003; Braun et al., 2011; Ball et al., 2012). I have drawn upon this notion elsewhere (James, 2020) alongside a number of scholars in a volume examining the Prevent duty across educational spaces, in order to identify how educators transform policy into practice. Enactment demonstrates how '[p]olicy is never simply implemented, but goes through a networked process of representation, translation and enactment of beliefs and values instead' (Beighton and Revell, 2018, p.2; citing Braun et al., 2011). Moreover, in line with a social constructivist approach to Critical Terrorism Studies, the concept encourages one to simultaneously examine actors discourse and action within 'the socio-political context in which they are

learning to teach and concomitant policy changes' (Smith, 2016, p.299). In positioning implementation practices as 'enactments', research engages with both the actors meaning-making but situates this firmly within the context within which they sit, something which Critical Terrorism Studies requires us to do. Thus, the role of agency and context become central to understanding how policy is experienced and thus threat conceptualised as a result.

Agency

Drawing on Elwick and Jerome's (2019) work on the implementation of the Prevent duty and their utilisation of the concept of 'enactment' (Braun et al., 2011; Ball et al., 2012), I similarly incorporate their model of 'ecological agency' into the research to allow the above examination of actors and their environments (Elwick and Jerome, 2019, p.399):

> *An ecological definition of agency does not refer to the innate capacity of individuals to act* (Erss, 2018) *but instead reflects the 'interplay of individual efforts, available resources and contextual and structural factors as they come together in particular and, in a sense, always unique situations'* (Biesta and Tedder, 2007, p.137)*.*

The approach therefore recognises agency as a 'complex, temporally-situated interaction' which is 'shaped by context and environment' (Elwick and Jerome, 2019, p.339; citing Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). As a result, it recognises both that actors have agency through intention and action but that this is often at a constant interplay with 'direct and indirect effects' of the arena within which they produce their enactments (ibid., citing Priestley et al., 2015). Moreover, in utilising this approach to agency, the research responds varying experiences recognised in the literature review whilst grounding the core tenets of Critical Terrorism Studies to avoid generalisations that homogenise and posit 'truths' by recognising simply that different 'people do different things in relation to policy' and there is thus no way to understand the Prevent duty 'as a single phenomenon' (Elwick and Jerome, 2019, pp.339–40).

Intersectionality

The belief that objective knowledge cannot be obtained since no singular 'real truth' exists is central to CTS research (Jackson, 2007, p.246) but also the ontological and epistemological standpoints of intersectionality where experiences are posited as heterogeneous and intersecting along multiple layers of subordination and privilege (Denis, 2008). Attributed to

Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989; 1991), the theory of intersectionality is grounded in Black feminism where oppression can be understood as occurring, and heightened, at the intersects of identity formations (Carbado et al., 2013, p.303). For example, intersectionality suggests we not only study the imbalances and conflicts between [cis]men and [cis]women (Tickner, 1997), but we also study race, religion, sexuality, social class, ethnicity, and culture, amongst other identifiers, transforming knowledge production to recognise both difference *and* differences (Mattos and Xavier, 2016; Collins and Bilge, 2016; Andersen and Hill Collins, 2019). Though this research is not a study of intersecting experiences of oppression and a resistance to them, it seeks to provide space for different experiences to be heard. This is particularly important when studying an area such as counter-terrorism where multiple identifiers are argued to be used by government policies and strategies to identify whom they consider "suspicious" or "at risk" (see Ragazzi, 2016). The capacity to identify where these occur during policy enactment both in terms of the subject and the object of implementation is crucial.

Where the goal of intersectional research has been to identify differences *within* gendered difference (Davis, 2008, p.70), more recently there has been a broadening of this narrow paradigm of identifiers to view intersectionality 'in more general terms, applicable to any grouping of people, advantaged and disadvantaged' (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p.201; see also Hancock, 2016, p.33). This is possible by analysing the interactions between 'categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power' (Davis, 2008, p.68). An intersectional ontology is therefore based around questions of the complex dynamics of power and the resulting knowledge production, according to Hancock (2016, p.108), which 'de-exceptionalizes the processes and structures of racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, imperialism, nativism, ableism, and a host of other stratifications' (Davis, 2008 p. 107) in order to conceptualise 'power relationally' (Hancock, 2016, p.118; see also Phoenix, 2006, p.187). This broader notion of intersectionality is where this research grounds its understanding of experiences as relational to the individual they belong to and their environments, seeing both as co-constitutive of one another. This is particularly suited to Critical Terrorism Studies research which asks: 'whose voices are marginalised or silenced and whose are empowered in defining terrorism and responses to it in particular contexts?' (Mcdonald, 2007, p.255).

Moreover, this approach supports a social constructivist approach to understanding agency, seeing knowledge and power as temporally located across space and time. Both root the conceptualisation of phenomena in the discourses and structures which actors participate in – or not. For Denis (2008, p. 685), intersectional analysis is a combination of the 'deconstruction of – and challenges to – discursive categories with social structural referents [seeing power relations] based on both discourse *and* structure' (emphasis in original). An intersectional feminist analysis, therefore, enables us to not only 'challenge and ultimately change power structures to become more equitable, in part, by illuminating the voices and experiences of the less powerful' (Vanner, 2015, pp.3–4), but to also see the multiple layers of power that exist within multiple locations of knowledge production. Though this research does not primarily focus on revealing gendered, racial, classed, amongst other intersections of power, the approach of intersectionality provides an important grounding for this research to ensure a rejection of homogeneity, a 'deconstruction of analytical categories' (Carastathis, 2014, p.308) and a commitment to exploring where oppression and privilege can simultaneously exist (Nash, 2008, p.12; Carastathis, 2014, p.311). Moreover, utilising these key tenets of an intersectional approach to understanding experiences enables researchers to locate meaning-making and knowledge production at the multiple sites within which they exist (ibid., 2008, pp.5–6) on an individual, interpersonal, and structural level (Shields, 2008, p.307) in recognising that experiences do not occur in silos.

Reflexivity

In setting up the field of Critical Terrorism Studies, Richard Jackson responded to what he saw as a key weakness in Terrorism Studies: the lack of reflexivity in researchers. Citing Shaw (2003), Jackson (2007, p.247) posited that there should be 'a continuous and transparent critical–normative reflexivity in the knowledge-production process' of research. By this, I take his claim to mean that researchers of Critical Terrorism Studies should engage in a continuous process of self-reflection as an actor within the research project, or as Stump and Dixit (2012, p.205) posit, at the very least, should provide clarity on 'the relationship between the observer and the observed'. An approach grounded in social constructivism enables one to identify a continuous reproduction of one's own interpretations of others "knowledge" when accessing, obtaining, analysing and reporting data. Critical Terrorism Studies warns of the dangers that being inattentive to this can cause on the presentation of data and ultimately

the discourses being examined. Intersectionality enables us to also identify how damaging this can be on the voices that we are seeking to provide space for.

Methodologically, this has a number of implications. It is not possible to significantly shift the balance of power over to participants (Gatenby and Humphries, 2000, p.99), particularly since this is a pre-determined research project which seeks to explore a particular question. However, it is hoped that, through the methodological frameworks chosen – explored in the following chapter - participants are placed in control of their own level of participation and the space for marginalised voices is prioritised throughout the research processes (Vanner, 2015, p.2). Furthermore, in order to limit my role, I have followed Reays' (Reay, 1996, pp.443–444) advice of engaging in reflexivity throughout the research, continuously reflecting on the consequences of my own presence, privilege and/or subordination and how this may alter the dynamics of the data collection process (Chiu and Knight, 1999, p.107). In identifying my positionality, I follow Vanner's (2015, p.3) advice in being aware of how my own 'lived experiences' intersect and engage with those revealed by participants. In being 'willing to use [my] own social location, whatever it may be, as an analytical resource rather than just an identity marker' (Davis, 2008, p.72), this research becomes both 'self-critical and accountable' (ibid., 2008, p.71). As a result, the experiences revealed will be both conflicting and ambiguous, but will also be purposeful in having been included (and thus others excluded) for their usefulness in demonstrating key arguments. Yet, it is in this process of reflexivity that the views presented are also genuine and honest, with arguments emerging from them rather than being imposed upon them.

Key to reflexivity is also recognising the privilege which enabled me to have conducted this research without fear of reprisal or suspicion, something which for one of my Muslim participants (see chapter eight) was not the case. My own privilege stems from the intersection of my whiteness, middle-class status through being associated to a higher education institute and my perceived "Britishness" through language and (lack of) culture signifiers. My ability to conduct this research and have received funding to do so from my institution provided me with the security to undertake research in a politically sensitive area both through my academic freedom and my access to legal advice should I need it. Yet my positionality in being younger meant that for some I was not taken seriously enough to be

conducting research whilst for others, most notably students, I was able to connect with them on a level someone else might not have been able to.

Concluding Thoughts

Though CTS has not been without its critics (Gunning, 2007b; Mcdonald, 2007; Horgan and Boyle, 2008; Jarvis, 2009a; Stokes, 2009), it enables research to recognise phenomena as socially constructed, undertake reflexive analysis, pursue emancipatory approaches and in doing so uncover where, how and why silences occur in previously un-contested knowledge. Further through an interdisciplinary approach, the multiple concepts which underpin the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis enable some of the limitations of CTS, and other singular theoretical approaches as listed above, to be overcome. A broader notion of securitisation enables research to move beyond state-centric approaches to understanding threat and the policies which seek to counter it as vernacular. Understanding securitisation as occurring within the 'everyday' affords individual actors the agency of creating and performing threat discourses whilst the notion of enactment enables us to identify *how* actors engage in this. Intersectionality enables a deeper examination of identity construction of both the agents enacting policy and the multiplicity of discourses which inform their everyday enactments of policy (and thus conceptualisations of threats). Undertaking this approach with reflexivity encourages an identification of the modes of power which impact the processes of collection and analysis of such enactments and therefore an awareness in the role they play within the vernacular conceptualisations of threat.

Chapter Four

Methodology

This chapter outlines the research design of this thesis, informed by the previous two which identified current gaps in the literature (Chapter Two) and key theoretical frameworks and concepts that underpin this research (Chapter Three). The chapter is therefore concerned with devising a methodology which is grounded in a Critical Terrorism Studies and informed by both intersectionality and the educational studies concept of 'enactment' in order to reveal the socially constructed conceptualisation of threat by actors within the vernacular. The research was conducted between October 2016 and July 2020 with the fieldwork period September 2017[13] to November 2019. The chapter outlines the multi-method qualitative approach through semi-structured interviews, focus groups, online questionnaire and participant observation. It justifies the use of these methods and outlines their application as well as some of the limitations faced. It therefore draws on the ethical challenges and concerns throughout as these are and were inseparable from the decisions taken throughout the research process. First, the chapter posits the premise for the method selection and context of Greater Manchester's Further Education sector within this study.

Though the debate of political studies as a science is too vast to discuss within this chapter, I draw upon Shields (2008, p.306) to reason the choice of qualitative methods for this research:

> *Most qualitative researchers have the goal of describing the forms and processes of relations among categories of phenomena and the themes and units of meaning relevant to these relations. This stance makes the qualitative researcher more open to emergent phenomena than the quantitative researcher whose work is driven by hypotheses determined a priori.*

Qualitative research is constituted by several tenets of enquiry which enable this research to explore the avenues of enquiry necessary to meet its aims: firstly, it allows us to ask not only what, but how and why in uncovering 'the forms and processes' that create knowledge production; secondly, it enables us to explore the 'themes and units of meaning' that exist

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[13] Access negotiation with participants began in January 2017

alongside and shape one another (ibid., 2008, p.306); and thirdly, provides the space in which participants and their data are placed at the centre of the research in allowing their voices to shape 'bottom-up' research (Jarvis and Lister, 2016, p.277).

As earlier chapters of this thesis have detailed, the central research question seeks to reveal what experiences of the Prevent duty tell us about the conceptualisation of threat and therefore requires an engagement with individuals and their enactments of the policy 'on the ground' to understand what Crawford and Hutchinson (2016, p.1185) refer to as 'security experiences'. These are, they state (ibid.), 'the lived realities of practical security measures, including the diverse ways in which programmes, strategies and techniques for governing security are experienced, taken up, resisted, and even augmented by different individuals and groups within society.' The collection of such experiences therefore requires the selection of methods which engage directly with those involved in such 'lived realities' and provide the space to obtain and examine them. In line with the empirically focused scholarship of the numerous fields this research draws upon (Critical Terrorism Studies (Jackson and Hall, 2016), Educational Studies (Busher and Jerome, 2020), and Intersectionality (Rashid, 2016)) and those which examine the construction of security or threat discourse at the vernacular (Jarvis and Lister, 2012; 2013; 2013; 2016; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016; Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016; Guillaume and Huysmans, 2018), this research draws upon primary data collection methods which interact with and explore the 'everyday' of experience. It uses a combination of semi-structured interviews, focus groups, participant observation and an online questionnaire to obtain not only the experiences of those engaged in the enactment of the Prevent duty, but to provide space to examine how their enactments reveal the multiplicity of ways through which threat(s) become conceptualised.

Mixed methods strategies strengthen the qualitative approach, particularly through the use of focus groups and interviews (see Michell, 1999; Sprague, 2005; Lambert and Loiselle, 2008). Observations and a questionnaire supplement them further by offering contextual methods of enquiry. Data collection was therefore undertaken at a micro (individual) - interviews-, macro (contextual) -participant observation and questionnaire- and meso (how the individual behaves within their context) -focus group- level. Such an approach enables the vernacular level of threat conceptualisation to be realised where experiences are understood

as spatio-temporally located and multiple in their capacity to fluctuate in any given context (Jarvis and Lister, 2012). From this social constructivist standpoint, understanding what enactments of the duty tell us about the conceptualisation of threat therefore required a method selection which 'considers research data, such as the accounts of research participants, as 'constructed' within a particular research context, rather than as an objective reflection of reality' (Burck, 2005, p.242). The research therefore utilises a number of complex primary data collection tools which enable the study to understand not only the different experiences which could be had, within a multiplicity of contexts, but also the processes which surrounded the production of the discourses (individually or in a group) within these experiences and the points at which they fluctuated.

Context: Greater Manchester

Empirically, Greater Manchester is home to extensive counter-terrorism networks (both in terms of law enforcement (as the home of the North West Counter-Terrorism Unit) and anti-extremism/ anti-radicalisation groups (Making Manchester Safer, Manchester Safeguarding Boards, Tell MAMA, RadEqual). It has been a Prevent priority area since 2008 (Making Manchester Safer, n.d.), meaning that it is deemed as requiring extra Home Office funding to tackle a higher risk of radicalisation within its geographical remit:

> *Priority areas will, as now, be funded to employ a local Prevent co-ordinator to give additional support and expertise and additional Home Office grant funding is available for Prevent projects and activities.* (Gov.uk, 2019)

It has also received a significant amount of media attention for counter-terrorism operations, including young students who have been recruited by ISIS and fled to Syria and those targeted by terrorist activities including the Ariana Grande concert bombing (Qureshi, 2013; Wilkinson, 2014; Glendinning et al., 2014; Williams, 2015; Sculthorpe, 2016; Hooper, 2017; BBC, 2017; Halliday, 2017). The Manchester bombing in 2017, happened during the course of the fieldwork preparation and had a number of implications on the research. In the first instance, the ethical approval forms had to be amended to account for the events and recognise the potential implications this might have had on participants, including the need to have had support information available for anyone who might have revealed any negative side effects from the events and the potential for identifying stories to be told. As part of this, there was

also a mental and practical preparation for the conversations, particularly with students, that might follow in discussing their experiences of these events. The events, I suggest, may have also impacted some institutions within the Greater Manchester area from wanting to participate, particularly following the calls at the time for a review into Prevent and its implementation in the area by the GM Mayor Andy Burnham (Halliday, 2017). Such calls led to the Greater Manchester Combined Authorities report into extremism (2018) which advocated for a more community focus on countering extremism and terrorism. Reflecting on the events as a "local" who knew of people impacted and had spent a childhood watching artists within the same venue, I as a researcher, and as a person, was not immune to the impact that it had on my home town, even as a critical scholar who recognises the problematic role of memorialisation amongst other criticisms of the way we present and remember such events (Jarvis, 2009b; Holland and Jarvis, 2014; Heath-Kelly, 2016b). From a 'data' perspective, the events also provided further claim to the importance of understanding experiences of the Prevent duty on the ground within Greater Manchester. The perpetrator, a Greater Manchester resident who had been educated within GM's educational institutions for most of his life, and his actions, demonstrated that 'threat' was something which could directly impact this local area.

As a geographical area, Greater Manchester is formed of ten individual boroughs[14], with an estimated population of over 2.8million in 2019 and diverse population. The demographics from the last census in 2011 are as follows (City Population, n.d.):

Country of Birth (C 2011)	
UK	2,359,343
Republic of Ireland	26,433
EU (other)	65,396
Other country	231,356

Ethnic Group (C 2011)	
White	2,248,123
Asian	272,173
Black	74,097
Arab	15,026
Mixed/multiple	60,710
Other ethnic group	12,399

Religion (C 2011)	
Christian	1,657,594
Muslim	232,787
Hindu	23,478
Sikh	5,322
Jewish	25,013
Buddhist	9,555
Other religion	7,429
No religion	557,129

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[14] Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, Wigan

Such diversity is particularly important in light of the findings of scholarship within the literature review of this thesis, whereby Prevent has been found in previous iterations to have targeted areas which had more than a 5% Muslim population and "non-(white)British"[15] individuals/communities, both of which GM has (see Runnymede Trust, 2017 for more on ethnic diversity of Greater Manchester). Further, as referenced in the literature review, some of the boroughs of GM were also involved in the so-called 2001 Northern Riots as a result of ethnic-related disadvantage and problematic discourses around multiculturalism and integration (Bagguley and Hussain, 2006). FOIs were submitted to all ten of the GM boroughs for referral data but were rejected (see Appendix iii) and so local level data could not be obtained. As the hometown of the researcher, there were also a number of pre-existing networks which were utilised for the research and thus it was a logistically and empirically fruitful location for study. However, as a study which does not seek to make generalisations, this research does not claim that Greater Manchester offers an exemplar through which its experiences replicate other metropolitan areas. Nonetheless, it does speak to the existing literatures as earlier mentioned in providing empirical contributions to the way in which different people experience and conceptualise threat(s) within a 'Prevent priority area' which has also been directly impacted by related events. Further, it provides the basis for potential geographical comparisons which might offer greater insight into the local disparities within Prevent implementation.

Context: Further Education

As the introduction to this thesis revealed, the education sector has the highest rate of referrals to Channel, of those mandated by the Prevent duty. Yet, the introduction also revealed that whilst the data exists, the figures do not reveal which education sector holds

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[15] See Chapter Two

what levels of referral and nor will the government provide such figures. Those related to the further education sector (FE), therefore, may straddle a multitude of brackets where institutions tend to teach 16-19-year olds but also have capacity to teach anyone above the age of 16, particularly within training providers. FE institutions are not just a continuation of Secondary Education, but a means through which access to Higher Education can be granted, training or apprenticeship qualifications obtained or adult education can be undertaken.[16] The sector can therefore host a diversity of students who might be found in any of the age brackets from 15-20 onwards. As a result, released Prevent figures tell us little about the experiences from within Further Education Institutions around referrals and *who* it is being referred (and thus seen within the frameworks of 'threat'). Further, as the Literature Review revealed, there has been little scholarship which has sought to engage specifically with the FE sector, including both academic and training providers. The latter of whom were brought squarely into the sector (and thus the governance of it by Ofsted and relevant government educational policy) after the 2015 decision to mandate students to remain in training or education until the age of 18. The selection of Further Education sector institutions was therefore one which addressed a gap within not only the current literature, but also the wider knowledge of the duty's implementation.

It provided an opportunity to examine the hypothesised differences which might occur for staff and students within institutions teaching for traditionally academic subjects, and those for ones which were skill-based training programmes and the differences in implementation this brought. It also enabled an examination of the typical age range (16-19) which had formed a significant chunk of those positioned as the 'most susceptible to adopting extremist religious ideologies[17]... between the ages of 15 and 25 who are at a developmental age where they seek to uncover their own identity, look to bolster self-confidence and are in search of meaning in their lives (Bhui and Dinos, 2012; Manuel, 2014). This age group are very action

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[16] One of the participating institutions also revealed they had a 15-year-old student who had been expelled from a number of local schools and was therefore placed in a scheme at their institution to receive training on a brick laying programme, rather than a traditional academic curriculum.
[17] Whilst the focus on religious ideologies is problematic for the reasons outlined in the introduction and literature review of this thesis, the reference aligns with that of the government legislation where Islamist-related concerns remain documented as the biggest threat to the UK.

oriented and is usually characterised by higher risk-taking' it had been argued (Ghosh et al., 2017, p.119).

Further, the reference to FE within Prevent legislation also presented a blurring of lines: whilst FE and Higher Education (HE) were often combined within Prevent, the Prevent Coordinator for FE also being for HE, for example, FE had its own guidance materials and was excluded from those for primary and secondary. Yet, simultaneously, FE did not have Prevent applied to in the same way that HE did, with HE institutions provided greater 'academic freedom' and FE subject to the governing body of Early years, primary, secondary and care -Ofsted, rather than HE's regulatory body -Hefce. The overlapping suggested that FE straddled a complex point at which its students were not considered children under 16 but had not yet reached the maturity and adulthood associated with HE. The FE sector, therefore, presents a key area in which the experiences and processes surrounding threat formation, and identity and meaning making within that formation, were of critical importance. Understanding the implementation of the Prevent duty within these complex processes is therefore vital for understanding how threat(s) become conceptualised by actors required to enact it within their everyday.[18]

Participants and Methods

A central purpose behind the research was to understand how *different* actors experience the Prevent duty and what their implementation tells us about the conceptualisation of threat. Therefore, the research sought to engage with actors which were located at different points within the implementation process: policy elites, institutional level staff, classroom level teachers and students. The premise behind engaging with participants across these different levels was to establish the multiple sites at which meaning-making becomes formed. In other words, where the Prevent duty existed as a policy, it became implemented through a process which involved different actors and their own interpretations. The policy was taken from

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[18] In the (6) days prior to submission, a newspaper article leaked an agreement which had been obtained by researcher Hilary Akin that found FE and HE institutions within Greater Manchester to be required to share Prevent referrals between them (Grierson, 2020b). Given the close proximity to the submission date, this event could not be accounted for within the body of this thesis. It is, however, briefly engaged with in the final chapter to further demonstrate the significance of this research and its data obtained from the very institutions and areas which are now subject to even greater counter-terrorism requirements and national scrutiny as a result.

legislation by policy elites; these policy elites interpreted it to those responsible for the implementation of policy at institutional level; those at institutional level relayed it to their staff to implement within the classroom; and, classroom teachers then delivered it to their students as part of their everyday education. The process, therefore, provided a series of moments where the Prevent duty became enacted and thus a multiplicity of points where threat could be conceptualised.

Category of Participant

[19]

Policy elites were those understood to be responsible for providing institutions with the information, guidance and support necessary to take the Prevent duty from legislation to an implementable policy. A total of seven Policy Elites were engaged with: Nigel Lund, North West Prevent Coordinator for Further and Higher Education; a senior national Trade Union Official; a senior regional Trade Union Official; David Wells, Head of the North West Counter-Terrorism Unit; Andrew Cooke, North West Regional Director for Ofsted; a GM Council WRAP and Communities Coordinator; and, a GM Council Prevent and Communities Coordinator. Two additional participants from two separate Independent Training Providers were also engaged with and considered 'Policy Elites' through their role in helping institutions translate legislation into enactable policy; data from these two participants does not appear heavily within the thesis as it does not directly contribute to the outlined research questions. However, their contributions offered important contextual insights into the processes of training and fruitful data to be explored within future publications. Policy Elite participants were found through either research into the delivery of Prevent within the Greater

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[19] The numbers shown are X, Y where X= the number of participants, Y= the percentage out of the total participants

Manchester area and its individual boroughs, or through a 'snowballing' effect (Ritchie et al., 2003); contact was almost always made via email in the first instance and meetings for all but one, were face-to-face in either the participants place of work or a café within a convenient location to us both. The one interview which was unable to take place face-to-face was due to geographical location (as this was a national level participant) and skype was used instead. The skype interview was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the most "structured" with little scope for establishing a connection with the interviewee; three interruptions at the participants end also disrupted the flow of the conversation. Interviews conducted at the place of work of policy elites were more formal than those within coffee shops, but coffee shops had background noise and distractions which in one case made transcription incredibly difficult. Nonetheless, the one-to-one, face-to-face format and the provision of 1-2 hours with each participant provided the space to develop a relationship with the participant, opening with informal dialogue, whether about the weather or our journeys to the venue that created a relaxed setting for the interview to flow from.

Policy elites were the only level of participants who were provided with the option of a pseudonym since many would have been identifiable due to their role. Some participants chose to be anonymous; reasoning varied between wanting to share information they did not want attributing to them, not wanting to be identifiable as having participated in research and simply not being provided. Where this was the case, the role of the participant was altered to reflect, but not identify their role; this was particularly important where other identity markers are provided and engaged with at points during the research and together may have made them identifiable.

Institutional level staff were primarily Designated Safeguarding Leads (DSL's)[20], those who were identified as having taken the lead for implementing the Prevent duty within all of the participating institutions. It was, in the first instance, DSL's who were provided with the initial trainings and guidance and required to deliver to other staff within their institution. They therefore provided the second point at which the duty became interpreted and relayed to

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[20] Some larger institutions also had DSO's (Designated Safeguarding Officers) who sat below the DSL as an intermediary between teaching staff and the DSL.

others within these FE institutions. A total of 4 DSLs[21] and 1 British Values Coordinator were engaged with as part of the study. These participants were not only interviewees but were also facilitators within the recruitment process in setting up focus groups with students. Thus, a longer-standing relationship was established with these participants over several months via email but also face-to-face. Discussions indicated that their willingness to do so was based on their own perceptions that research into the Prevent duty was important, since it was felt to have become such a significant agenda within their institutions (see Chapter Six) but also because they wanted to be provided with an opportunity to share *their* experiences and potentially learn key lessons which would come out of the research.

At both institution and classroom teacher levels, semi-structured interviews were undertaken in the same format as those with policy elites: participants responses were used to guide the interview, using their responses to shape the direction of enquiry and structured questions only used to begin the interview process and fill moments of silence (Sprague, 2005, p.126; see also Jarvis and Lister, 2016; Kallio et al., 2016). This allowed participants to provide as much or as little information as they wished (Madill, 2011, p.335). Five of the total seven interviews with teaching staff took place within the institution, the other two on the phone. All lasted around 1 hour, providing sufficient time to engage in fruitful conversation with participants. An exception to this was one interview where I was given only twenty minutes due to time constraints; there were thus a number of unexplored avenues in this instance which limited the scope for analytical depth, though this was an anomaly. This approach, especially within a face-to-face context, allowed for a dialogical approach (Whiting, 2008; Madill, 2011), which is particularly important, Revell (2019, p.26) posits, 'where participants are likely to feel uncomfortable or unsure about their responses [as] it allows them a space to developing their thinking as part of the interview process'. Drawing on the work of Alvesson (2003), Krauss (2005) and Järvinen (2000), Revell (2019, pp.26–7) states 'dialogical interviews regard the interview as a site where meaning is made through the process of talk and reflection… In this sense interviews were embedded in a localist framework that acknowledges the immediate social and cultural boundaries of the interview environment

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[21] One DSL was responsible for two of the institutions engaged with: Academic Institute 2 and Training Institute 1

where the interview is a site of meaning making for both the interviewee and the interviewer' complimenting the epistemological underpinnings of this research.

Classroom level teaching participants, however, were much more difficult to gain access to. Whilst some of the DSLs were happy to share my call for participants amongst their teaching staff, this failed to generate many participants. For one DSL, they revealed that they were not comfortable approaching staff in fear that staff would not be able to answer my questions; whilst I stressed the importance of all responses, they were not happy of the potential image this might give. In response, a decision was taken to expand the research methods and incorporate an online questionnaire[22] into the study which would allow for the perceived limitations of access, anonymity, and time to be minimised, providing teaching staff with another means through which they could participate. The questionnaire was sent to the participating DSL's and policy elites, all institutions who had been approached but declined or ignored the invitation to participate, shared through the online platform of Twitter, and with the Schools and Colleges Network in Greater Manchester. A total of 375 people clicked on the link which took them to a digitised condensed version of the information sheet and consent form (for which additional ethical approval was sought), with 10 leaving on the second page, 9 on the third, 3 on the fourth, 12 on the fifth and final stage of the questionnaire and thus a total of 49 full responses recorded. Of these, 28 identified themselves as being classroom level staff[23]; it was these responses which were used within the research since the method was primarily adopted to gain further data on this level of participant.[24] Online participants were 'named' through their academic subject. At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked if they were happy to take part in an interview; 12 participants provided contact details for this, 3 went on to participate in an interview - all of whom were based at institutions which were already participating in the research.[25] These and other classroom interviewees were 'named' through their subject to identify them.

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[22] Appendix iv

[23] Other staff recorded responses of Pastoral, Welfare Behaviour staff (12); Administrative Staff (4); Senior Leadership Team (4); Safeguarding Staff (0); and Prefer Not to Say (1). Staff which selected 'Other' (7) were included in the classroom staff participants as all of their written responses revealed they were based within the classroom-level environment.

[24] The other data will be used in separate publications.

[25] Geographical locations provided by online participants suggested that not all respondents were from institutions already taking part, however.

The final 'level' where the duty became experienced was with students within the classroom. As mentioned above, it was the DSLs within institutions who provided access and facilitated the participation of students within the research. In some instances, these were volunteers and in others the students were selected by staff, largely to accommodate the provision of Female, Male and Mixed Gender focus groups, which were chosen as the method for engaging with students. Interviews with students were also sought in all of the participating institutions but none were able to accommodate due to the limitations of time. Whilst the intention was to populate groups by both gender and religion (being Muslim and non-Muslim as a result of the problematic impacts recorded by previous literature, the decision to use only gender-based groups was taken for three key reasons. Firstly, in order to avoid further marginalising Muslim voices by outlining them as different by their Muslimness to non-Muslims; secondly, to avoid pre-determining the outcome of experiences by religion; and finally, practically there were also a limited number of student participants. The data did not suggest there were any significant differences between the groups, whether (cis-) Male, Female or mixed. 9 focus groups were undertaken with a total of 45 students participating. DSL's were relied upon to have provided students with the information sheets and consent forms prior to participation in the study; to ensure that students had the opportunity to consider their informed involvement, they were also given ten minutes at the beginning of the session to read through the paperwork and ask any questions they might have. All of the students consented and there were no clarifying questions asked. They were asked to create their own pseudonyms which would be used to identify them and their responses within the research and at no point were their real names collected to minimise any potential identification and meet safeguarding requirements.[26]

Focus groups are drawn upon within research 'to understand how a particular population or group process and negotiate meaning around a given situation' (Stanley, 2016, p.2). They 'can be helpful in facilitating access to particularly sensitive research populations', in 'giving voice to sections of the community who frequently remain unheard' (Farquhar, 1999, p.62; see also Morgan, 1996, p.133), and finally, in placing the balance of power with the researched, rather

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[26] A Disclosure and Barring Service check was also obtained to provide further reassurance to institutions

than the researcher (Wilkinson, 1998, p.114). As a result, they offered a useful method which has been relied upon, particularly for research within security and terrorism studies, to uncover otherwise silenced experiences and the processes of meaning-making within them (see Jarvis and Lister, 2013; 2013; Mythen et al., 2013; McGlynn and McDaid, 2016).

Focus groups, undertaken within the institutions, began with a 'warm up' activity where students were asked to think about and write down issues/events/subjects which they thought about regularly on a global scale, and then on a personal scale. This was to firstly, get students thinking critically and encourage them to open up to the group and secondly, to understand whether or not terrorism and/or extremism was something which the students thought about. This then provided an in-road for more specific questions on whether or not the students had mentioned terrorism and/or extremism and why or why not. Focus groups lasted between 45 minutes and 1-hour dependent on the time provided by the institution as groups were generally taken out of tutorial sessions to participate. This proved especially useful as in all but two of the groups – who were taken out of subject groups – students studied a variety of subjects and therefore further plurality of experience was captured. Further, in groups being selected from pre-existing classes, there was arguably a sense of what Wilkinson (1998, pp.115–120) terms camaraderie, in that students would have felt more comfortable around familiar peers and therefore more likely to share their views than with a group of strangers (see also Farquhar, 1999). Lynn Michell's (1999) work on using focus groups in schools raised the potential for pre-existing hierarchies and relationships to risk distorting the data captured, with those who more vocal dominating, and the risk that some students may not want to share their views in the fear that their stories will be passed onto others around the school or even outside of it. Such limitations were addressed where possible through a number of means: students were reminded to respect one another and keep discussions, for the sake of their own and others anonymity, within the room at the beginning and end of discussions; they were provided with the space to share their experience but not placed under any pressure to do so, with warm up activities provided to 'break the ice'; and, mechanisms were in place, such as intercepting questions and the use of eye contact, to diffuse any dominance, though none was recorded in any of the focus groups.

Only one institution agreed to participant observation. For many of the institutions this was down to resource availability but for one of the participating DSL's facilitating access, they revealed that they did not think subject classes would offer any insight into the way Prevent is delivered within the institution, suggesting its embeddedness within the classroom was not explicit (see Chapter Seven). Despite insisting this was of importance, access was refused. The observations which did take place were within an institution where my presence fortuitously coincided with the delivery of Prevent-related workshops within tutorial sessions (see Chapter Seven). They provided the opportunity to understand how 'unprovoked talk and conduct in daily situations' played a role in the enactment of the duty and thus the conceptualisation of threat within the classroom (Stump, 2017, p.213). Due to the nature of the method, voice recording was not appropriate and thus written notes were taken. Informal consent was therefore sufficient and obtained through verbal detailing of the research to the groups prior to the sessions; no participants took the opportunity to refuse to be observed. Observations were undertaken of a WRAP session delivered by a GM council, a community-based Prevent-related session run by another GM council and in the two training organisations which participated in the research. However, as above, this data is not drawn upon directly within the thesis but provided important contextual information for understanding how training plays an important role in the enactment of the Prevent duty and therefore the conceptualisation of threat (see Denis, 2008).

Except participant observations, participation was recorded through Dictaphone with additional written notes taken to supplement recordings. For example, body language and hand or eye gestures were written down; emergent feelings and thoughts during and after the interview recorded on paper; and the nature of the room or area within which participation was conducted were noted, all to aid the transcription process. I undertook transcription of the recording to deepen my familiarity with the data and add these moments into the written experiences. Participants were provided with an information sheet and consent form which detailed the expectations of participation and gave them the opportunity to seek assurances as to the research and researcher and ask questions prior to their involvement. These forms also outlined the nature of the research and the questions likely to be asked, the use of the data for this thesis and subsequent publications, the processes of anonymity and confidentiality and the possibility (and conditions) of withdrawal. Participants

could withdraw within two months from the date of participation to ensure they had time to reflect upon their engagements but that the time frame did not impact the data analysis process.[27] The issue of potential withdrawal of participant data was not faced during this research, though the potential for participant identification did result in some data being withdrawn and excluded from the thesis. Though this limited the ability for some experiences to be drawn upon and examined, and thus important stories to be told, it ensured that participants identities were protected.

On the day of participation, I introduced myself as the researcher and outlined the purpose of the research, providing another opportunity for participants to ask questions or points of clarification prior to the recordings being started. All participants were also asked to fill out a questionnaire around their identity markers. Informed by intersectionality, this information was critically important to situate some of the responses from participants where their responses engaged with identity formation. It provided some of the contextual data necessary to ground claims, particularly around race, gender, ethnicity and class, which emerged throughout discussions in conceptualising the *threatening* and the *threatened* (see, for example Yuval-Davis, 2007; Rashid, 2016). Individuals own identity markers provided context for some of the claims and experiences and were therefore drawn upon at critical points within the thesis to aid the discovery of discourses and reflect upon the relationship between the research participant, and their fellow participants where appropriate, and the 'subject' of the discussions being had. Further, the data also enabled reflection of the intersects of privilege and oppression which informed experiences and of the potential implications this had on the 'relationship between the researcher and the research participants [in] the 'production' of the research material' (Burck, 2005, p.242; see also Mattos and Xavier, 2016).

As the research questions the possibility for ontological claims of 'reality' as singular, or static, (see 'Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework'), it does not suggest that the experiences within the thesis are reflective of any of the below 'categories' of identity beyond this research.

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[27] As student details were not taken, due to identification and safeguarding protections, a member of staff acted as a 'gatekeeper' should they wish to withdraw following participation

However, it does suggest that these 'categories' and their intersects are critical for providing space for previously silenced voices and understanding how identity formation informs policy enactment and therefore the conceptualisation of threat at the everyday, individual level. The following data provides an overview of the identity markers of all participants in the research[28]:

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
[28] N/A refers to data where the respondent did not complete the questionnaire.

Class

- Working Class
- Middle Class
- Upper Class
- I don't know
- Prefer not to say
- N/A
- Working Class / Middle Class

Nationality

- British
- N/A
- Other - Brazilian
- Other
- Other - Italian
- Other - Swedish

Sexual Orientation

- Straight
- Other
- Lesbian/Gay
- Prefer not to say
- Bisexual
- N/A

Disability

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to say
- N/A

Analysing the Data

The research methods provide the 'bottom-up' means of interaction and engagement with those experiencing vernacular constructions of threat through their implementation of the Prevent duty. As the above section highlights, participants were engaged through various methods; multiple wherever possible. Once the data had been collected, in line with the ethical approval gained, recordings had to be uploaded to an encrypted laptop at the point of recording and erased from the Dictaphone immediately. The recordings were stored under

the name of the pseudonym (or name of participant where identified) on the encrypted laptop and transferred to the University M: drive once connected to a secure network. Recordings were then transcribed within a private and secure location to ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants were prioritised at all times. In line with ethical procedures, the decision has been made to not upload the data to a repository to ensure the protection of participants. However, data will be stored securely and confidentially by the researcher for up to 10 years from the date of collection to allow for further use on the basis of the data being considered highly valuable in its inability to be recaptured. A disclosure strategy stated that unless there was a threat of physical or psychological harm considered to have emerged to either myself or participants, or where there was/is a court order, anonymity will be kept throughout and after the research process and data not shared with anyone other than the research team (myself and supervisors) or examiners upon request. No such event or request has occurred to date. These steps were necessary to gain ethical approval for the research in ensuring that participant confidentiality and anonymity was prioritised throughout.

As above, written notes surrounding observations were expanded on (in digital form on the encrypted laptop) straight after the sessions to ensure the detail of the experience was not lost. Transcriptions were also undertaken within the days following participation whilst the emotion, initial thoughts and recollection of participant non-verbal gestures were also fresh in the mind, so to say. This meant that transcriptions 'retain[ed] the words used, grammar, pauses, and unfinished sentences', in addition to facial expressions, head or hand movements, and props which were recorded as the storytelling of the experiences (Moffat and Gerard, 2020, p.203). Though the transcription process was incredibly difficult at times, competing with background noise in some instances, and up to six students talking over each other at others, conducting the transcription process myself provided me with a level of familiarity that aided my ability to conduct a thorough data analysis. In other words, I *got to know my data;* in familiarising myself with not only the written word but being able to recall the way in which certain words or phrases were spoken, enabled me to pick up on the tone and emotion, *the narrative,* within the experiences being shared. Discourse and narrative analysis were then used to establish not only which discourses informed experiences of the Prevent duty's enactment, but also the multiplicity of ways through which they occurred,

were engaged with, and became part of the participants experience. Discourse analysis provided the scope to examine the language participants used and narratives analysis uncovered how their language formulated the 'stories' of their experiences, in line with the interdisciplinary theoretical framework of the research.

Discourse analysis encourages researchers 'to scrutinize the 'orderly ways of talking' with which individuals account for and make sense of themselves and their social worlds (Shotter, 1993)' (Burck, 2005, p.248). It posits that 'people use language to construct versions of the social world… identity is not seen as a fixed entity, but as constituted and reconstituted through discourses and descriptions' (ibid.). This is particularly important, Milliken (1999, pp.240–1) notes, when examining how policy becomes implemented; it is the analysis of discourse which provides the opportunity to understand how policy becomes 'organized and enacted in particular circumstances'. Drawing on the work of Foucault (1977) Milliken's (ibid., p.242) argument for discourse analysis, therefore, echoes the claim behind the epistemological and methodological standpoints of this research: the operationalisation of policy cannot be understood without examining the discourses produced by those engaging with the policy during both its enactment and receipt.

Narrative analysis also lends itself well to CTS approaches and those informed by (or undertaken through) intersectional feminist research in understanding knowledge and meaning-making as socially constructed through stories (Gouin et al., 2011). Burck (2005, p.525) notes, it allows us to identify 'how people construct their self-accounts' and accounts of others, whilst also looking 'for patterns across different instances of everyday talk from similar people for evidence of such shared and stable understandings' (Stanley, 2016, p.11). It sees narration as 'sequence and consequence: events are selected, organised, connected, and evaluated as meaningful for a particular audience' (Riessman, 2005, p.1) both by the participant in relaying their experience and the researcher documenting and analysing it, complementing the commitment to reflexivity. Whilst the approach has been criticised as 'slow and painstaking', it's 'attention to subtlety' requires researchers to engage with 'nuances of speech, the organisation of a response, relations between researcher and subject, [and] social and historical contexts' (ibid., p.6). It therefore, encourages researchers to

examine what 'stories' are being told but also how these stories become possible through not only language but, as referred to in the 'Theoretical Framework', (in)actions and practices.

Both discourse and narrative analysis can be undertaken through a thematic approach to data analysis. Braun and Clarkes (2006) approach reflexively examines data to refine key themes through a process of six stages: familiarity, initial coding, code organisation, code review, defining themes and finally theme analysis during the writing stages. This allows, for an examination of *what* is said, *how* it is said, and *who* is saying it, mapping out similarities between participants (Riessman, 2005, pp.2–3). Grounded in CTS and informed by intersectionality however, the research overcomes Riessman's (ibid., p.3) critique that thematic analysis does not allow for a recognition of the 'ambiguities, "deviant" responses that don't fit into a typology, [or] the inspoken' by also calling upon experiences which reveal where inconsistencies lie and challenge any dominant voice. Guided by a requirement to uncover silences, thematic analysis in this research is not undertaken to only prove that themes exist, but to identify the multiplicity of experiences within those themes (Huysmans, 2002).

Limitations

Though the thesis makes considerable contributions to the literature and its knowledge of the conceptualisation of threat and the Prevent duty's implementation, it also holds some limitations. In light of the above epistemological grounding of this thesis, it does not seek to provide generalisations, ascertain causal links nor determine impact in the pursuit of its aims and questioning. It, therefore, does not provide "answers" or clear cut (dis-)advantages which thus removes the possibility for this thesis to be used as either an advocation or a critique of the duty. Instead, it presents ambiguity, conflict and juxtaposition. I argue that this is a key value of the research, to have not been led primarily by a desired outcome or a need to be definite in its conclusions. However, as a result, the thesis does not easily translate for audiences who wish to determine whether the Prevent duty is a good or bad thing. It will thus have which claims some will use to justify their view, whilst containing other elements they vehemently disagree with.

The nature of the project as qualitative also holds limitations which impact not only on the ability to make generalisable statements if the thesis so wished to, but also on the views which were obtained. Though the research draws on experiences of over 100 participants, through a number of methods, the level of engagement was extremely varied and access incredibly limited. The nature of the research in its 'sensitivity' (Silke, 2001) created a limitation in itself to participation levels, as explored in Chapter Four: Methodology. However, the added complexity of engaging in these discussions within education settings where time and resource is scarce and students considered children, limited engagement further. The limitation in face-to-face participant numbers, alongside the length of time taken to negotiate access, meant that the fieldwork period was spread over nearly eighteen months. Not only was the ability to go back to these participants for follow up interviews or clarification limited, questions which became of interest as the research project evolved, had not been fully explored with all participants and thus some areas left under-addressed.

A further limitation to the research also links with the methodological challenges faced. Whilst this study is significant for engaging with both academic and training providers within the FE sector, it hoped to have been able to draw upon the differences between the institutions to a much greater extent. Most notably, as chapters six, seven and eight begin to question: the difference in relationships between staff and students given the vast difference in contact time; relatedly, the capacity to embed Prevent within sessions implicitly or naturally where a such contact time was minimal; and, finally, how the experiences of students differed across the two types of institution. However, whilst over thirty institutions were approached to participate in the research, only five agreed to. Thus, there was not a sufficient amount of data to make detailed comparisons between the types of institutions.

Chapter Five

Policy Elites: Framing the duty, Normalising the Means

5.1 Introduction

As the methodology chapter of the thesis outlined, the chapters are ordered to demonstrate the general path of the Prevent duty's implementation within the everyday experiences of FE actors. This chapter therefore provides the first point of call, so to say, where the duty emerged through the eyes of policy elites engaged with Greater Manchester's FE sector. It was these actors who were seen to be providing the guidance to FE institutions, translating the policy to implementable directives, or practice. The thesis therefore begins its data analysis at the point of policy elites to identify the discourses which governed the implementation of the duty within the initial deliveries of the agenda to FE institutions. It does so in the belief, drawing back on the theoretical framework, that policy does not just *happen;* instead, it becomes enacted through processes which are multiple and non-linear, formed spatio-temporally by structures and agents that surround them. Whilst this thesis posits the importance of understanding threat construction at the vernacular or 'everyday' of the individual actors, it also views these policy elites as integral to shaping that vernacular. Therefore, discourses provided by policy elites form praxis which institutional staff draw upon in enacting the duty and are thus part of the stories of the Prevent duty's implementation, providing a 'starting point' for how this implementation occurred and what it tells us about the how threat is conceptualised. Drawing on those participants outlined as policy elites in the methodology, the chapter reveals how the directives they provided to institutional staff around the Prevent duty saw threat conceptualised through three key narratives: threat as vulnerability to radicalisation; threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism; and, threat as the responsibility to prevent.

In positioning the Prevent duty as a safeguarding mechanism, threat was conceptualised as vulnerability to radicalisation which required identification and prevention. The chapter demonstrates how policy elites reframed potential terrorists and extremists as potential victims whose involvement in these spaces was a result of their exploitation. This narrative

enabled a normalisation of the duty through mapping implementation of the duty as a continuation of existing practices of safeguarding, rather than the inclusion of extraordinary counter-terrorism measures. Secondly, policy elites conceptualised threat as concerned with all forms of terrorism. Largely in response to the furore of criticism which foregrounded the duty's introduction, as the introductory chapter of this thesis explored, policy elites presented it as something which was not just about preventing Islamist-inspired ideologies, but all forms, drawing most notably on the far-right to demonstrate this. This was further enabled by the narrative of safeguarding against vulnerability. Policy elites saw the potential harm of radicalisation cross all ideologies through its exploitation of vulnerability; the Prevent duty as a safeguarding mechanism was, therefore, concerned with all forms of extremism and terrorism. Finally, elite experiences demonstrated the conceptualisation of threat as the responsibility to prevent. Their depiction of the duty as a safeguarding mechanism enabled them to place the Prevent duty within the framework of public sector responsibilities through embedding it within existing practices. The role of multi-agency partnerships was utilised by policy elites who sought to position terrorism and extremism as a problem too large for counter-terrorism forces to tackle alone. The role of the public sector then was to work together to not only identify but manage these vulnerable individuals. It was upon this notion that policy elites responsibilised (Thomas, 2017) educationalists as key players within this wider public sector obligation to prevent the exploitation of vulnerability.

5.2 Conceptualising threat as vulnerability to radicalisation

A primary way the Prevent duty was introduced into the public sector was in the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to radicalisation. Through the language of vulnerability, policy elites sought to transform the duty from a counter-terrorism agenda to a safeguarding one; it became about the need to protect potential victims from radicaliser's and their organisations, as opposed to protecting the public from the acts of perpetrators.

5.2.1 "Our language is all about safeguarding, and I think that's what's really, really important"

Prevent, for all of the participating policy elite participants was about "preventing people from being drawn into violent extremism or from supporting terrorism" (David Wells, Head

of North West Counter-Terrorism Unit). In keeping with government legislation, the duty was viewed as a key tenet of the broader CONTEST strategy in its focus on the pre-crime arena. In other words, counter-terrorism through the Prevent duty became about ensuring those who might go on to commit acts of terror, were prevented from doing so by early intervention mechanisms. These mechanisms came in the form of safeguarding procedures, providing a means through which counter-terrorism could be embedded within educational institutions (for example Davies, 2016; Busher et al., 2017; Acik et al., 2018; Elwick and Jerome, 2019) and threat could be conceptualised as vulnerability which needed safeguarding against.

The discourse of safeguarding had always been a central tenet of the Prevent agenda and was not something created by the Prevent duty, some participants claimed. Instead, the duty offered "a consistency of approach" (Nigel Lund, North West FE Prevent Coordinator) to the way in which these safeguarding procedures would be undertaken. For these participants, public sector workers had always been responsible for safeguarding individuals in their care. However, I argue that it is only at the point of the duty's introduction that the threat of extremism and terrorism became integrated within these practices. As this sub-section and those which proceed it explore, it was the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability which enabled the framework of safeguarding to be employed, and largely without challenge. In doing so, policy elites were able to provide a narrative of continuity which presented the duty as an extension of the education sectors' existing roles and practice. The framework of safeguarding placed the duty at the forefront of educationalists' responsibility whilst also challenging the notion that it marked a stark departure from previous counter-terrorism agendas in shifting from security services provision to the everyday acts of public sector workers (Heath-Kelly, 2017).[29]

Safeguarding was not only positioned as "integral" (GM Council WRAP and Communities Coordinator) to the Prevent duty but its guiding principle. Nigel Lund, when discussing his training sessions for the duty claimed:

>   I will then make absolutely distinctive Prevent is safeguarding, and the thing I will say, is, "by the end of this session I'm hopeful that I will be able to convince you that not

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[29] See Chapter One for discussion around the criticism of the duty's introduction

only is this a safeguarding issue but it should be treated in the same way as any other safeguarding issue".

His sentiment echoed other responses that there was simply no question that Prevent was a protection mechanism which held the individuals it came into contact with as vulnerable and potential victims of harm. However, in stating that he needed to "convince" education staff within his training sessions, Lund implied that the framework of safeguarding was not something which had been internalised by everyone, inferring that the duty had been viewed by some through alternative lenses. Literature surrounding the integration of safeguarding into counter-terrorism measures provides some indications as to the sources of these interpretations. For Heath-Kelly (2016a), the lens of securitisation runs central to the notion of Prevent; its positioning as a safeguarding mechanism becomes questioned where the framework acts as a guise under which concerns over welfare become policed; Dudenheofer (2018) calls this the securitisation of 'safe spaces' where risk becomes a welfare issue and educationalists the 'guardians of radicalisation risk work' (Stanley and Guru, 2015, p.353). The framework of safeguarding for these scholars was 'conveniently inflated' (Dudenhoefer, 2018, p.172) to disguise what was at heart, a counter-terrorism agenda of securitisation, not one which protected against vulnerability to radicalisation. The requirement of Lund to 'convince' the education staff on his training that the Prevent duty was a safeguarding mechanism reads as an act to minimise the potential of such alternative frameworks informing their understanding of the agenda.

For others, rather than Prevent having always been safeguarding, this framework had been constructed and developed over the course of the duty's life:

> *[The council] don't have Prevent as a standalone safeguarding mechanism now like we did when we first implemented it, if that makes sense. So, at one time there were standalone Channel panels, there was a standalone panel chair, a meeting would take to place every six to eight weeks, you would have a set kind of core group attendees of attendees on there [...] since then we've brought in a multi-agency safeguarding hub which brings a range of services together to safeguard individuals and it's been embedded in there* (GM Council WRAP and Communities Coordinator)

The duty, here, was presented as an exception to *standard* safeguarding in that it was not based within the central safeguarding mechanisms of the council. Instead, it warranted

separate processes which detached it from other forms of harm or risk that safeguarding was traditionally concerned with. Indeed, even for Nigel Lund who insisted Prevent *was* safeguarding, he suggested that the integration in seeing the duty through the framework of safeguarding, rather than something which is "bolted on", was still to be felt by some within the education sector. It was only a matter of time, he claimed, which would result in there being "less and less divorce of Prevent from safeguarding and more and more classing Prevent as safeguarding". The subsequent chapters of this thesis explore the extent to which, as Busher et al., (2017) found, educational staff internalised the framework of safeguarding as the means through which threat was understood and countered under the Prevent duty. For policy elites, it was the only means through which the Prevent duty could be implemented since it was about protecting vulnerable people from exploitation.

5.2.2 "It is absolutely what we say it is, which is supporting and protecting vulnerable people"

I am kind of talking textbook here but there will be vulnerabilities that will have been displayed, in my opinion, that should've been picked up on erm, and those will have been done over time […] you don't just become radicalised, alright you might have a lone wolf who's kind of sat there and self-radicalised themselves but more often than not there would've been signs to that. So when you're talking about safeguarding, well if somebody's got a mental health issue we should be safeguarding that individual, if somebody's got drug and alcohol issues we should be safeguarding that individual, if people are at risk of homelessness or are being exploited in any way, they should be on somebody's radar and we should be picking them up, they shouldn't be getting to a point where they're susceptibilities or vulnerabilities have led them to be exploited even further (GM Council WRAP Coordinator)

For these policy elites, there were two processes of defining vulnerability: the idea that vulnerability to becoming engaged in terrorism was the same as vulnerability to any other form of harm, and thus the identification of them the same; and, the ERG 22+ vulnerability assessment.[30] When asked how vulnerability was understood, the focus of participant

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[30] The ERG22+ is a framework used by the UK Government to aid the identification of someone at risk of becoming radicalised; it uses 22 factors to determine their level of engagement, intent and capability; see p.82

responses remained on the first process, but when pressed as to how it was determined, the second process came to fruition. The tensions which this created translate to some of the key debates within the current literature (see Durodie, 2016; O'Donnell, 2016; Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2019). Policy elites prioritised an understanding of vulnerability in this context as the identification of an individual who could be vulnerable to any form of harm, not just engagement with terrorism. Yet, simultaneously they adopted a highly specific risk to radicalisation tool to determine vulnerability to terrorism as separate from those other forms. This paradox in policy elite experiences re-imagined the duty's target individual, from a potential criminal to a potential victim, through the framework of safeguarding vulnerability. Yet, for policy elites, this narrative was pre-existing, both in their perception that counter-terrorism had always been about protecting people from becoming engaged in these spaces, and in the way safeguarding already aimed to protect people from threat(s). The threat of terrorism and extremism, therefore, warranted the same approach by those on the ground to see vulnerability to radicalisation within the same spaces of safeguarding as any vulnerability, or threat, would be. This was no different, for them, to that which was already being done. These perceptions, however, omit an important transformation which occurs during this process: those with the potential to engage in terrorism or extremism were now victims, not perpetrators. It was through the language of vulnerability that this occurred.

The first approach visible within policy elites' narrative of vulnerability was viewing radicalisation as a form of harm. For many of these participants, when asked how they understood vulnerability in the context of counter-terrorism, it was the same as understanding and treating any other kind of vulnerability which could ultimately result in someone becoming harmed:

> *It's very similar to the way you would safeguard a young person from sexual exploitation, becoming involved in drugs, or gangs and so on and so forth, it's a similar process where safeguarding meetings are held with the lead professionals from different organisations, dependent upon the case, and there's a care plan if you like is put around that individual to manage their vulnerability* (David Wells)

Whilst the processes of referral and support are engaged with later in this chapter and through subsequent chapters, the experience echoes that of all of the policy elites where vulnerability remained a constant for establishing those at risk of harm. Radicalisation was

simply another harm which one might become vulnerable to, aligning with that of gangs, abuse, violence and exploitation (Dryden, 2017; Reeves et al., 2017). In this sense, the enactment of the duty through the framework of safeguarding became possible in positioning radicalisation within these existing discourses, enabling a shift away from the notion of a potential perpetrator to a potential victim. Through placing radicalisation as a form of harm which could happen *to* a vulnerable person, responsibility for their actions transferred to both those safeguarding against it and those exploiting it. While the implications of this are explored in the proceeding chapters, the narrative of vulnerability to radicalisation as *another form of harm* enabled the duty to embed itself within an existing framework of safeguarding which externalised the threat, not only portraying it as an identifiable and manageable risk but normalising the once extraordinary realm of counter-terrorism within everyday processes of safeguarding (Revell, 2019; Busher et al., 2019).

The use of grievances aided this vulnerability narrative. Nigel Lund explained that grievances could range from "a sense of injustice, the way they've been treated, the way someone in a group that they have an affinity or affiliation with have been treated […] they may have been subject to a hate crime or discrimination, to bullying, they might have suffered loss or bereavement" or they might be angry at "media bias" or hold "a misinterpretation of global events". Grievances were therefore areas which vulnerable individuals could become lost in and radicalisers exploit, providing gaps where they could be "persuaded, seduced, manipulated by somebody, to step into this into this arena" (Nigel Lund):

> *You don't just become radicalised, alright you might have a lone wolf who is kind of sat there and self-radicalised themselves but more often than not there would've been signs to that […] they shouldn't be getting to a point where their susceptibilities or vulnerabilities have led them to be exploited even further (GM WRAP and Communities Coordinator)*

In using the role of grievances, or susceptibilities, threat becomes something which can be countered, where policy elites identified these vulnerabilities as moments of potential intervention. The role of educators then became central to preventing this process of radicalisation through their responsibility to safeguard against such moments of exploitation.

The way in which the above approaches became entwined, enabling and being enabled by, the framework of safeguarding, was particularly poignant in the following excerpt:

> *We've got a seventeen year old who has been befriended by someone who is now buying them clothes, nice clothing, nice jewellery nice aftershave, he's a male, nice aftershave, basically, paid for some tattoos, right-wing extremism, so paid for some tattoos, branded them, got them part of the group, furnished them with Nazi memorabilia and books to hand out to people and so on and so forth so, take that set of circumstances and then say right just change it slightly, the concern is about a female instead, who, has met up with an individual, set of individuals, who are buying her clothes, buying her perfume, buying her nice jewellery trying to persuade her to do things that they want her to do etc and she's going along with that and so on and so forth, it's exactly the same process. So, would we have any qualms about supporting the individual who might potentially put themselves in a place where they might be sexually exploited? And the answer's no, so why should we have any qualms about supporting somebody who might be putting themselves in a place where they could potentially be exploited to get involved in violent criminality?* (Nigel Lund)

The framing of the process of radicalisation through these stories, utilised within training sessions for educationalists, placed the threat of terrorism and extremism into their existing frameworks, seeing it as no different from those other harms which these actors are already familiar with and trained to identify. In doing so, it enabled policy elites to position the duty as a continuation of their existing practices. The utilisation of a grooming narrative, a concept well embedded within existing safeguarding discourses (Reeves et al., 2017), visible within the above excerpt and across elite responses further denoted these lines of continuity. Moreover, in viewing radicalisation as a grooming process, policy elites' perceptions of victimhood, as opposed to perpetration were also visible. In positioning radicalisation as something which happened *to* individuals, policy elites externalised the threat of vulnerability depicting it as something which could therefore be prevented.

Scholars critical of the lens of grooming problematise the implications on said students in undermining the role of agency in positioning radicalisation as something which happens *to* them. Strausz and Heath-Kelly (2019, p.165) argue that this removal of agency is problematic in two key ways: firstly, it 'foregrounds the [vulnerable individuals'] victim status' whilst

secondly creating 'a site of intervention and battleground' between those who might radicalise, and those who can *prevent* it through safeguarding. Whilst this appears to echo the rationale of the policy elites discussed within this chapter, seeing individuals as potential victims and their vulnerability as simultaneously a means of exploitation and safeguarding, the latter of which would prevail through an execution of the duty, these scholars problematise this. For them, this rhetoric enables the normalisation of the 'pre-criminal space' leading to an ambiguous application of the duty as applicable to anywhere the enactor determines. In other words, for Strausz and Heath-Kelly, the language of grooming enables an environment in which not only the victim has no agency, but their victimhood is determined by their spatio-temporal context (see also Reeves and Sheriyar, 2015; Reeves and Crowther, 2019). Katherine E. Brown (2018), in personal correspondence, also discussed the idea that the narrative of grooming enables a sexualisation of individuals. This, she suggests, emerges from the dominant public narratives which link grooming to sexual exploitation. She argues that in reusing the language within the context of radicalisation, the idea that, particularly in the case of women, engagement in these ideas and organisation becomes 'driven by emotion, not politics [...] further reinforces the denial of their agency'. As Health-Kelly and Strausz (2018) note in another contribution, scholars have found little evidence to suggest that engagement with terrorist organisations is a result of processes of grooming (Della Porta, 2013; Alimi et al., 2015; cited in Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018).

Yet, the narrative of grooming is not new within the terrorism realm Durodie (2016) claims, recalling the narrative being utilised during the War on Terror. He utilises Furedi's (2007 cited in Durodie, 2016, p.25) observations that in doing so, governments were able to draw on 'fears and anxiety about paedophilia as a way of explaining the threat from al-Qaeda'. Such narratives surrounding the War on Terror were enabled by an overarching discourse of brutality and backwardness that Othered those within these organisations in the East who people required safeguarding from (Dryden, 2017). In other words, Others, most notably Muslims in the context of the War on Terror, have always been positioned as in need of 'permanent security' in their inherent vulnerability (Thomas, 2016; see also Coppock and McGovern, 2014). The extent to which this framework of vulnerability drove the perceptions about *who* might require safeguarding from such processes of grooming, therefore, requires further interrogation and is subsequently drawn upon later in the chapter.

Where policy elites were asked how this vulnerability was measured, the second process through which it was understood became apparent: The ERG22+. None of the elite participants explicitly labelled the mechanism for measurement as the ERG22+, though one elite did refer to "the twenty-two indicators" which examine "engagement, intent and capability" (GM Prevent and Communities Coordinator), which the ERG22+ takes form through. However, they did all refer to a vulnerability 'assessment' which considered different factors that would help determine an individual's vulnerability. Discussions indicated they were referencing the ERG22+.

(Azfar, 2016)

I suggest one key reason for the lack of explicit reference to the ERG22+, related to the extensive criticism that the mechanism has been subject to, particularly within the academic sphere. For many of the critical scholars of terrorism and counter-terrorism, the ERG22+ was incredibly problematic. Firstly, the capacity for it to be applicable to all forms of extremism and terrorism was problematised; and secondly, its ability to predict that which it was used for, radicalisation, was doubted (see McGlynn and McDaid, 2016). The first concern centred on the foundations of the ERG22+ study. The original research focused only on Muslim offenders, all of whom were in prison for belonging to or committing offences on behalf of Islamist-inspired organisations and ignored the other third at the time in prison for far-right related concerns (Qurashi, 2016). The extent to which this small-scale study can then be applied to all forms of terrorism, is questioned. Moreover, as Sian (2017) has noted, the underlying narrative of Islamophobia which encircled popular discourses as a result of a disproportionate focus on Muslims as perpetrators of Islamist-inspired terrorism only served

to limit the scope in which a study based on one type of ideology, would find only one type of perpetrator (see also Miah, 2016). Secondly, critics have pushed back, somewhat as a result of the previous critiques, against the use of the ERG22+ framework, arguing that it simply does not work. McGlynn and McDaid (2016) claimed that the majority of the factors listed, read under any other scope than a securitised lens, would describe normal adolescent behaviour, whilst activist organisation CAGE (2018) cited government sources which claim that the framework has no reliability and cannot actually determine an individuals' likelihood to be radicalised. Indeed the authors of the classified study commented in their following paper that the "ERG is work in progress" where a "lack of demonstrated reliability and validity remains the main limitation" (Lloyd and Dean, 2015, pp.51, 50).

The use of the ERG22+, I argue, presented a conflict with the conceptualisation of vulnerability to radicalisation as the same as vulnerability to other forms of harm. The insistence from policy elites that radicalisation could be viewed through the same lenses as drug or alcohol abuse, gang crime or sexual exploitation, as another form of harm, was central to their framing of threat through the narrative of vulnerability. Yet, in examining their experiences for how this vulnerability became measured, the use of the ERG22+ re-established a divide between radicalisation and those other forms of harm:

> *We'll base it on a list of criteria [...] some of them referrals are not appropriate, and we will say so, you know we will say "actually there's nothing in it for us", however there may well be other safeguarding issues and we would suggest to the referee that there still needs to be a safeguarding solution for that person but that doesn't involve us, you know... but that needs to be dealt with separately we have no reason to become involved in that we only become involved if there is, some concern that an individual has been radicalised or is self or is developing an ideology that is of concern from a terrorism perspective* (David Wells)

The excerpt echoed that of other policy elites and some critiques of the duty, whereby referrals were suggested to be being made into the Prevent system unnecessarily. This raised several considerations. Firstly, it aligned with some criticism that the duty had become a fast track to safeguarding; Heath-Kelly and Strausz (2019), for example, suggested the significant cuts to the welfare sector, but increased services available through Counter Terrorism Unit's (CTU), meant people were referring to through Prevent to get concerns noticed or dealt with

quicker. The above excerpt suggests this might well have been the case where vulnerabilities were then passed on to another service to be dealt with; something which government referral statistics have shown to occur in the majority of cases which do receive attention beyond the initial assessment.[31] A second consideration raised by the excerpt surrounds a potential fear of the consequences if one did not refer. As a result, suggestions from previous studies on the Prevent duty's implementation that lesser concerns were referred in a bid to be *better safe than sorry,* find fruition (Busher et al., 2017; Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2019)*. This links to a third consideration that people were not able to decipher whether or not vulnerability was to radicalisation or another form of harm, particularly since they had been told these vulnerabilities were the same, as earlier explored. As the final section of this chapter explores, Nigel Lund claimed that it was not the role of educational staff to decide if a concern was vulnerability to radicalisation, but to notice vulnerability and raise the flag. This however, created a complex process through which educators appeared to become simultaneously expected to identify and refer concerns over radicalisation, whilst being unaware of how to and not expected to identify concerns *specifically* for radicalisation. The forthcoming chapters of this thesis examine the extent to which these concerns were visible within the experiences of those educational staff fulfilling these identifications and referrals of vulnerability to radicalisation.

5.3 Threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism

Through the framework of safeguarding vulnerability, policy elites argued that terrorism and extremism became something which anybody could become involved with. As a result, Prevent needed to *and did* apply to all forms - not just Islamist, as many of the criticisms outlined in Chapters One and Three - they claimed.

5.3.1 "As long as there's a relevance from a counter-terrorism perspective, then the mechanism to deal with that ideology is the same"

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[31] In 2015-16, 7,631 referrals were recorded, of which 1,072 were deemed suitable for discussion at Channel with 381 of these receiving support for potential engagement with extremism and/or terrorism. In 2016-17, 6,093 referrals were recorded, of which 1,146 were deemed suitable for discussion at Channel with 332 of these receiving support. In 2017-18, 7,318 referrals were recorded, of which 1,314 were deemed suitable for discussion at Channel with 394 of these receiving support. In 2018-19, 5,738 referrals were recorded, of which 1,320 were deemed suitable for discussion at Channel with 561 of these receiving support.

Longstanding criticisms that had surrounded the broader Prevent programme placed Islamist-inspired concerns at the forefront of their agenda, problematically resulting in Muslims being viewed as those most likely to become engaged in terrorism and extremism.[32] The introduction of the Prevent duty extended this concern over a further securitisation of Muslims that would expand the lens of suspicion as arising from not only security officials, but public servants. Elite participants responded within this research, however, by suggesting that there had been an extension in the lens of Prevent, but that this came in the form of extending the lens of *safeguarding* to *everyone* in their efforts to prevent all forms of extremism and terrorism.

For policy elites, there was no doubt that Prevent was about protecting vulnerable individuals from all forms of extremism and terrorism. The source for this shift to 'all forms' of extremism and terrorism can be found in government documentation (HM Government, 2015b) where, as policy elites inferred, there had been a directive visible from the top to understand threat(s) as emerging from multiple ideologies.[33] Yet, claims surrounding the Act's emergence contradicted this perceived shift in focus, suggesting that it had instead been brought in light of a series of deadly terrorist attacks in Europe (see Kyriacou et al., 2017), all of which were Islamist-inspired. This conflict emerged in some of the participants discussions when asked about the rationale for the duty's introduction. David Wells (Head of NWCTU) suggested that it was the changing nature of threat which drove the legislation, but not necessarily a change in ideological concern. He argued that as a result of the Arab Spring in 2010 and the rise in people travelling to Syria in the years which followed, "[CTU's] saw a shift then in terms of the demand upon Prevent policing, [it] was very much more towards, vulnerable individuals who were buying into, what became a very effective, media machine by organisa… well predominantly Daesh, who were, at one point, were brilliant at putting their message out into the world using all sorts of different techniques".

For Wells, there was a "slow trajectory" which saw the conceptualisation of threat expand from isolated individuals being inspired to commit acts of terror to a wave of individuals and

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[32] See Chapter One
[33] Though the legislation still stated that al Qaeda and Islamist related ideologies remained the biggest threat to the UK

their families travelling overseas to join organisations. The development of propaganda and recruitment capacities from these organisations which drove such changes were, for Wells, a central reason for the duty to come into place. The experience suggested that although the ideology of the threat had not shifted, the way in which it was being spread both verbally and physically, and the types of people (families, for example) responding to them demanded the need to bring more agencies on board. For the GM Council WRAP and Communities Coordinator, events following from the 7/7 bombings shifted the "emphasis [to be] placed on local authorities" where the responsibility for preventing these individuals from becoming radicalised was dislocated further and further from central government as the threat dispersed in line with the spread of the ideology and those willing to accept it. For these participants, the introduction of the Prevent duty then, signalled a recognition that this ideology had permeated Britain and its citizens (see Aly, 2013; Mythen et al., 2017).

Whilst these experiences complicate the claim that the duty was concerned with all ideological forms of extremism and terrorism, they do concur that with the introduction of the duty, Prevent had expanded its lens of *safeguarding* in the recognition that the threat of extremism and terrorism could happen to those who might not previously have been viewed as radical. As Wells explored, the potential for those embedded within the British way of life – British society, British education systems, British culture – to be "[bought] into […] very effective media machine[s]" of extremist or terrorist groups outside of the UK was, therefore, felt as real. The Prevent duty, for policy elites, brought about the appropriate response whereby signs of potential engagement with these (though notably Islamist) ideologies could be spotted early on by those around them and the threat of extremism and terrorism prevented.

Statistics provided at the time of interview by Wells were used to suggest that this focus on Islamist-inspired concerns remained warranted, stating that "it's something like seventy-five percent of our cases are international terrorism". Yet Wells also went on to state that "fourteen percent" of the cases they were dealing with were related to the far-right in the suggestion that the duty could not and did not solely focus on Islamist-related ideologies. This figure rose some months later when Nigel Lund was interviewed, seeing "thirty-three percent of referrals to the Channel programme for far-right extremism" whilst the GM WRAP and

Communities Coordinator suggested that although her local authorities figures "mirror[ed]" national data, "the biggest threat [to this area] is the far-right". Thus, whilst the duty was presented as being brought in to respond to a surge in Islamist-inspired threats, these policy elites inferred that it had also enabled people to be able to report far-right concerns which were seemingly on the rise. Such experiences do appear to have mirrored what was to follow in the periods after the interviews took place, with referrals surrounding far-right concerns having increased year upon year to the most recent data where an equal number of referrals are being made in regard to both Islamist and far-right related concerns (HM Government, 2016; 2017; 2018b; 2019). The upwards trajectory of the figures then mapped onto the increasing focus that these and other policy elites' experiences appeared to suggest the far-right warranted in the years following the introduction of the Prevent duty.

Whilst a number of the participants recalled, or made reference to, the 5% Muslim population criteria for Prevent funding that was in place in its early days (Bonino, 2015; Stanford and Ahmed, 2016), they suggested that criticisms surrounding the duty were finding their basis in these earlier iterations of the programme and not recognising the "very holistic approach to extremism and all forms of terrorism" (GM Prevent and Communities Coordinator) that now laid at the heart of the duty. This was primarily explored through the framework of safeguarding, where those vulnerabilities earlier examined were depicted as "absolutely the same" and to "cut across" (GM Prevent and Communities Coordinator) all forms of terrorism and extremism. For these policy elites, the claims that Prevent and the duty were only concerned with Islamist-inspired ideologies[34] were based on "myths" and a "perception that this is just targeted at certain communities, certain ideologies, because it isn't. It's about trying to keep us all safe" (Nigel Lund). The critiques, therefore, emerged not from the reality of what the duty was, it was claimed, but from a wider public narrative of prejudice, visible in the media, and from people who either held "a complete misunderstanding of what Prevent is" or who had "nefarious intent, so people who have a political or ideological reason for trying to discredit the strategy" (David Wells). All of the policy elites argued that once they had explained what the duty was about, "supporting and protecting people" (Nigel Lund), they were able to work on "dispelling those myths" (GM WRAP and Communities Coordinator) to

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[34] (see, for example Miah, 2017; Abbas, 2017b; Kyriacou et al., 2017; Qurashi, 2017)

enable others to see the duty for what it was: "it's about all forms of extremism" (GM Prevent and Communities Coordinator). In other words, for these policy elites, those criticisms came from a lack of knowledge around the duty. They saw their role, then, as an educative one where they could "debunk" (Nigel Lund) these myths by delivering the programme through the language of vulnerability and safeguarding.

However, the ability to challenge what policy elites saw as Prevent being "overcomplicated" and "politicised" (David Wells), was limited by a number of factors. It was indeed those with "nefarious intent" like organisations such as CAGE and MEND who several of the participants saw as being "anti-Prevent" (GM WRAP and Communities Coordinator) and "not in it to try and understand" Prevent but to "discredit it as a policy". It was also the lack of information available on Prevent and the ability to provide this which limited policy elites ability to deliver education around Prevent being about all forms of extremism and terrorism. This emerged from several places. Firstly, the requirement and availability of resources, to disseminate this education, did not match up. For all of the participants, face-to-face dialogue was seen as a successful route through which education around vulnerabilities and the need to safeguard them against all forms of terrorism and extremism could be delivered. Yet, for David Wells who had seen a reduction in resources almost dry up the scope of his unit to be engaged with education providers, and for Nigel Lund and the GM WRAP and Communities Coordinator, who were tasked with engaging with an increasing number of people, somewhat as a result, the time necessary to educate enough people to shift the lens away from solely Islamist-inspired ideologies was not available. Moreover, though education institutions were legally required to engage with the duty, it was only mandatory that single points of contact, such as a designated safeguarding lead or members of the senior leadership team, undertook WRAP or Prevent-related training.[35] As a result, there were whole bodies of professionals whom these individuals were not always able to reach; the role of relaying this message then became the responsibility of the senior leadership team, or in most cases, the DSL. The following chapter explores the extent to which this conceptualisation of threat as all forms of

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[35] WRAP refers to Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent and is the Home Office package for delivering Prevent training; it is led at a local level by council officials and can be utilised by others within the Prevent process to deliver training within their institutions and organisations.

extremism and terrorism, then, came through their training and delivered within their institutions.

A second key challenge revolved around the capacity of these policy elites to challenge the narratives of Prevent being only concerned with Islamist-inspired ideologies. This was not only a resource issue as above, but related to overarching government directives:

> *I think that hasn't been forthcoming as much nationally because there's always been this, and I think we should understand why that has been and, quite rightly it was always a security issue* (GM Prevent and Communities Coordinator)

The secrecy and security of the agenda then has, as Nigel Lund argued, been "difficult because you don't want to identify people you've worked with and supported" but had, in doing so, created an environment where policy elites like those who participated in this research were unable to "celebrate the successes" of the agenda (Nigel Lund). As a result, many suggested, the public only saw the cases where things had gone wrong, or been perceived to have gone wrong, such as the 'Terrorist (Terrace) House' or 'Cookerbomb (Cucumber)'[36] cases. For Nigel Lund, there had not been, as a result of this veil of secrecy, the ability "to go on the front foot enough" to deconstruct these "isolated instances". Though policy elites conceptualised threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism, their abilities to portray the duty as grounded upon this understanding was limited by an inability to both challenge problematic presentations of it and share those instances which would serve to counter them. In other words, for these policy elites, it was not that threat was conceptualised as only being about Islamist-inspired ideologies, but that the government directives played a role in preventing them from being able to demonstrate that this was not the case.

The media was also a key challenge. For all of the elite participants, the presentation of terrorism, and indeed of Prevent had served to further the lens of viewing terrorism and Islamist ideologies as synonymous. This came both in the form of presenting terrorists as "a man with a with the beard and rucksack" (GM WRAP and Communities Coordinator) and in

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[36] These cases were both high-profile instances where Prevent had allegedly been applied to young children who had misspelled, or mispronounced words and the concerns had been reported. Nigel Lund argued that the Terrorist (Terraced) House incident had not actually had Prevent involved and was spotted by officers investigating another matter to do with child abuse; when the incident was explained by the teacher as a misspelling, no action was taken in relation to Prevent.

reporting problematic cases, like those referred to above, where Prevent was presented as a "spying mechanism" on Muslims (David Wells). In the portrayal of the latter, the media can be seen on the one hand to be supporting the perception of Islam as the terrorist ideology by reporting predominantly on these instances. However, on the other hand, it can be read to support the critiques of Prevent, illuminating the perceived disproportionate impact on Muslims that the agenda is alleged to have. There remains no literature to date which has assessed the extent to which media presentations of Prevent have served to illuminate and aid criticisms around Prevent but there has been an extensive amount written on the ways in which the media has served to perpetuate the conceptualisation of threat as Islamist only (Poole, 2002; Norris et al., 2004; Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2010; Ansari and Hafez, 2012; Brinson and Stohl, 2012; Ahmed and Matthes, 2017; Clubb and O'Connor, 2019). As a result of these narratives within the wider discourse, problematic conceptualisations of threat as Islamist had become dominant and were fuelling prejudices around *who* was more likely to require *preventing,* policy elites suggested*.* This further impacted levels of "confidence" around the agenda where they saw part of their role became about "mak[ing] sure that people don't disengage from Prevent" as a result of these false "stories" (GM Prevent and Communities Coordinator). However, coming full circle with the limitations surrounding policy elites' abilities to educate people, one participant echoed the view of others, stating "unfortunately we can't do all that in the capacity we've got" (GM WRAP and Communities Coordinator). For these policy elites, the mediated conceptualisation of threat as Islamist-inspired ideologies presented a key challenge to the way in which Prevent was perceived to conceptualise threat; but it was the lack of resources and the requirement of security which left them unable to deconstruct this and demonstrate how the duty was concerned with threat, conceptualised as being about all forms of terrorism and extremism, not just Islamist.

Though these challenges remained, the experiences also highlighted how, as earlier discussed, the ability to shift the perception of Prevents' applicability to all forms of extremism and terrorism had developed over time. The challenges of getting people to see Prevent as concerned with all forms of terrorism and extremism became easier with the perceived rise of the far-right:

> *At one point there wasn't very many right-wing kind of analogies that you could use*
>
> *but now you can kind of use like the murder of Jo Cox or the Finsbury Park and they're*

things that people relate to and they probably hadn't thought of it as right-wing extremism or even terrorism but now, it's kind of getting that over. (GM WRAP and Communities Coordinator)

The experienced inferred that prior to these high-profile events, seeing the far-right within the framework of safeguarding against vulnerability had been more difficult since the public image remained on Islamist-inspired threats. As Nigel Lund stated, "as sad as those events are, they are helpful in terms of [those involved in the portrayal and delivery of the duty] maturing with this". The increasing visibility of the far-right then, appeared to bring with it a greater ability for these policy elites to conceptualise threat as coming from all forms of extremism and terrorism, further demonstrating the earlier argument that such a conceptualisation appeared to both enable and be enabled by a changing wider perception of threat over time. In conceptualising threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism, the duty became something which sought to counter *all forms of extremism and terrorism.* The extent to which this filtered through the education system is explored throughout the rest of this thesis.

5.4 Threat as everybody's responsibility

As a mechanism that focused on safeguarding against the exploitation of vulnerability, policy elites conceptualised threat as a responsibility to prevent through enactments of the duty. As this sub-section explores, policy elites foregrounded this on the importance and long-standing practice of multi-agency approaches to referring and revealed the ways in which the education sector had become a key part of this.

5.4.1 A multi-agency approach to referring, assessing and supporting

The role of countering terrorism and extremism was viewed by policy elites as a multi-agency one, where responsibility for spotting vulnerability to these threats lay with partners across the public sector. This fell in line with the CTSA which mandated that these sectors all be involved in the safeguarding of individuals against such vulnerabilities in the 2015 legislation and subsequent Prevent duty guidance (HM Government, 2015c). However, for a number of the participants, the duty had not instigated this, but enabled a "consistent approach" (GM Prevent and Communities Coordinator), earlier referred to in this chapter, for existing

practices of agencies to be streamlined. The approach to Prevent had, they argued, always been about multi-agency partnerships.

Initial assessments would be made based on the information available about an individual across the different sectors in order to 'ascertain whether other agencies are working with that individual' and obtain any relevant information which would help in the assessment and support of said person (David Wells). The role of these multiple agencies, for Wells and other participants who echoed his narrative, was critical for identifying those vulnerable to threat. Through the framework of safeguarding identifying and supporting vulnerability was long standing, thus enabling policy elites to present the duty as something which had actually, for many of these public-sector agencies, been in place prior to its legislation (Lundie, 2019, p.324). Their roles, therefore, were suited to embedding the harm of radicalisation within them and utilising long standing practices to aid the countering of threat through referrals.

The responsibility of agencies did not end with their identification of vulnerability, however. For policy elites, support for those who might be becoming or have the potential to be radicalised also required multi-agency partnerships. This was "like you would [follow] with any other safeguarding issue around what the right solution is for that person" (David Wells). As Wells went on to explain:

> *The idea [is] that if the individuals got five or six identifiable vulnerabilities that those five or six lead officers sit round a table, develop a plan around how to support that individual […] This wasn't just about policing, this was about bringing people in from other agencies […] we needed to build a multi-agency response to the prevention of terrorism, that the police can't do this on their own and don't have the skills to deliver some of the solutions that are needed.*

The expertise of different agencies is brought into the process of responsibilisation whereby the police and counter-terrorism units were unable to offer some of the support necessary. The safeguarding of an individuals' vulnerability required a multi-pronged, or multi-agency, approach which could have identified the various issues which were contributing to that person's positioning; these various tenets of concern were positioned by policy elites as being potentially missed without the expertise of different sectors addressing the various different risks. Moreover, in positioning multiple agencies within the role of supporting the vulnerable

individual, elite experiences demonstrated how the Prevent duty had not only entrenched the responsibility to prevent within the expectations of public sector workers through requiring them to identify and assess referrals, but had positioned them as agents of prevention in fulfilling such work. In other words, the risk of radicalisation became a joint responsibility to protect, each sector was positioned as having to have played their part in not only identifying the individual but supporting them through process of extraction from spaces of (potential) radicalisation. Elite participants all echoed the suggestion that "the partnership working is the one element that I think is absolutely crucial to get. Get that right, a lot of the other things will fall into place onwards" (Nigel Lund). This sentiment demonstrated the weighting policy elites placed upon the mechanisms that had been put into place between different public agencies. For them, multi-agency working was central to the ability for the Prevent duty to be implemented and thus the need to frame it as everybody's responsibility was paramount.

In line with Acik et al.'s (2018, p.476) findings however, this push towards a multi-agency approach to prevention departed from a narrative of continuity whereby utilising the existing mechanisms also meant bringing in new partner agencies and collecting 'additional information about students and their families' in order to collect the information necessary to assess a potential prevent concern. This increased workload of the Prevent duty for some, also limited their opportunities to engage at sufficient depth with partner agencies. As David Wells noted, in his role within the counter-terrorism unit, the increased referrals requiring assessment due to the introduction of the duty and a reduction in resources that coincided left him and his teams unable to engage directly with education institutions. Instead, Nigel Lund as a representative for further and higher education was engaged with, as were his counterparts for other education sectors. It was only where a student was receiving support over concerns around radicalisation that the counter-terrorism unit would become engaged with the institution. This had two implications for the multi-agency relationship between the unit and education institutions. Firstly, in having little if any direct contact, training and information, provision was left to Nigel Lund who became solely responsible for not only the relationship within Greater Manchester, but the whole of the North West, further limiting the availability of support provision by one individual rather than a team within the counter-terrorism unit. Yet secondly, in doing so, it also distanced the duty from counter-terrorism

units and placed it in the hands of a role affiliated more with education – even though Lund had come from a counter-terrorism background - the role had been designated 'Further and Higher Education Prevent Coordinator', situating it within the education context. This distancing further enabled a shift away from counter-terrorism to educational safeguarding that the duty was being framed upon by limiting the contact between the two sectors.

Moreover, these limited opportunities were also visible within the GM Prevent and Communities Coordinators experiences when she discussed the relationship which her council had with educational institutions. She suggested that "the colleges we've gone to is where we see there is need to do it, so where we see maybe there's more referrals, they're big… so they're quite a lot of our student population from a college perspective". As such, we see a paradox in the insistence that multi-agency working ensures consistency, yet those institutions brought into multi-agency partnerships directly, are selected. Direct contact would be based on the perceived necessity for it – or perceived risk – at individual institutions. Though the coordinator went on to confirm that those others not directly engaged with, were brought into the process "through the existing networks, so our Economic and something Education and Economic Network of Safeguarding Leads would pick up Prevent there", the experience revealed a differentiation in the ways in which further education institutions would engage with these multi-agency partnerships; while some engaged directly with members of their local authority Prevent team, others relied on networks to speak on their behalf. This appeared to echo what Higton et al., (2018, p.71) found that obtaining external support varied between colleges. Thus, this differentiation identified by the GM Prevent and Communities Coordinator, created space for an inconsistency in the way in which the Prevent duty is rolled out across Greater Manchester, according to how vulnerable one might be deemed. The extent to which this is problematic for further education institutions, or alternatively has little impact and acts as a means by which to manage finite resource, is explored within the proceeding chapter.

5.4.2 Responsibilising the education sector: "all we're asking you to do is make sure that you've got support in place"

Through the notion of multi-agency partnerships, the education sector was positioned by policy elites as a key player within these processes of safeguarding, particularly as one which

had a significant amount of contact with some of the most vulnerable in society – children and young adults. This subsection further engages with Thomas's (2017) notion of 'responsibilisation' to explore the way in which educational staff were positioned as responsible for countering threat, in light of their Prevent duty. This responsibility, as I explore, was grounded upon the framework of safeguarding and thus positioned as a continuation of educationalists' existing practices. Nonetheless, in doing so the duty transferred responsibility for countering such threats from counter-terrorism officials to these educationalists and positioned them as agents of the state (Heath-Kelly, 2016a) in not only providing education, but in countering extremist and terrorist threat(s).

Thomas (2017) argues that the responsibilisation of educationalists is grounded in the communitarian approach to government and society whereby individuals become responsible for managing risk within an expanding notion of society and a limited conception of government, or 'Big Government'. He argues that Prevent, particularly in light of the introduction of the duty, demonstrates this approach to governing risk; it is, in effect, 'about the weaknesses and limitations of the modern state' (ibid., no pagination). Educationalists, through their public-sector positions, become agents of the state who can enable and be enabled by the state to overcome such barriers to preventing threat(s). This responsibilisation is visible throughout elite experiences who position educationalists as key players within this multi-agency relationship to identify and aid the management of potential threats on behalf of the state.

This was identifiable at the first point of the duty's life, whereby the importance for public sector workers to take on the responsibility of preventing threats was positioned as a key reason for its creation:

> *Being brutally honest, the duty exists because of higher education institutions, in some parts of the country, not engaging, not wanting to engage, not seeing it as being part and parcel of everything that they should be doing* (Nigel Lund)

I suggest this statement illustrates the way in which the duty enabled a responsibilisation of educationalists through a number of ways. Although Lund refers to Higher Education (HE) within this statement, arguably grounded on the perceived understanding of universities being breeding grounds for extremist ideas (Qurashi, 2017, p.200; see also Durodie, 2016;

Kyriacou et al., 2017), the reference infers to HE as the first point of call for the duty's entry into education settings. Thus, instead of suggesting that the further education sector (as well as primary and secondary) were engaged *already*, I argue that the statement refers instead to seeing HE as the first point of call, so to say, through which Prevent entered education. Therefore, it was a *lack of engagement* with the process from HE as *part* of the wider sector, which instigated the need to position it as the responsibility of educational institutions, rather than their choice. I argue this is demonstrable in a number of ways. Firstly, by grounding the notion of Prevent within safeguarding; in stating that the prevention of threat is "part and parcel of everything" that education institutions "should be doing", Lund invokes the language of safeguarding by referring to existing and long-standing responsibilities which are central to their role. Prevent then, becomes amalgamated with these responsibilities and is positioned as a continuation of such existing practices, highlighting the second way through which this responsibilisation occurred. Thirdly, by stating that this failure occurred in only "some parts of the country" Lund infers that the practice of safeguarding against threat was already embedded within institutions and it was those who had not engaged in such practices which were outliers. Fourthly, in doing so, the statement then positions the duty as bringing in that consistency of approach, to long-standing and widespread practices of safeguarding.

North West Head of Ofsted Andrew Cooke similarly suggested that it was the wider education sector and its failure to identify risk of radicalisation specifically which had created the need for the duty; Cooke was referring to the Trojan Horse Scandal. As outlined within the introductory chapter of this thesis, the Trojan Horse scandal in 2014 related to the alleged Islamist takeover of Birmingham schools and prompted emergency Ofsted inspections to assess the validity of the accusations (Morgan, 2014a). The result was that said schools were seen to be allowing the potential for students to become radicalised. Cooke, who led the inspections at the time, suggested that the failures presented within those schools and within their engagements with Prevent – though not mandated at the time - warranted the creation of the legal duty:

> *We could probably go into places who said "ooh we know about Prevent, we've got a policy, we've had all our teachers trained" and that was some of the schools that we found where, children were left to potentially, you know very damaging, things that would've potentially led them into extremism and radicalisation*

The Trojan Horse Affair, for Cooke, highlighted the potential spaces of risk within education institutions which were going unchecked and being left exposed to children. For him, it demonstrated that this could occur even where Prevent had been delivered, providing grounding for a requirement and standard of Prevent to be rolled out mandatorily.

The Trojan Horse Affair is explored by a number of scholars who similarly agree that its occurrence provided a catalyst for the statutorisation of Prevent through the duty, not as a necessity following from these supposed failures, but as an opportunity through which an extension of Prevent into the realm of the everyday became possible. As the literature review explored, Miah (2017) examined the role of the Trojan Horse Affair in securitising education and claimed that the saga utilised pre-existing narratives around the 'problematic Muslim' to frame Islamist-radicalisation as a threat which had, as a result, permeated a key tenet of society – education. Thus, he argued, it provided the scope through which the securitisation of Muslims, and of everyday citizenry, could be extended to promote good *British* citizenship. Similarly, Revell and Bryan (2018) also positioned the affair as a significant moment at which a long-standing agenda of British nationhood collided with that of countering threat(s). They suggested that this enabled the embedding of the British values agenda, an agenda explored in the proceeding chapters, which became a central tenet of the implementation of the Prevent duty within education. As a result, these authors argued, the Trojan Horse Affair provided the momentum needed to see counter-terrorism and counter-extremism as part of an education policy that would ultimately provide students with the knowledge and (British) values to build their resilience and *prevent* them from becoming engaged within these spaces (see also Habib, 2018). The education sector became positioned within these debates as a site which provided the space to simultaneously enable radicalisation and counter it. For both the above scholars and Andrew Cooke, the saga acted as a 'critical entry point' (Miah, 2017, p.38) for counter-terrorism within the education sector. However, for scholars this was to entrench a pre-existing agenda of nationhood and anti-Muslim securitisation (Miah, 2017; Habib, 2018; Revell and Bryan, 2018),[37] whilst for Andrew Cooke, it was to enable an agenda through which radicalisation could be prevented. The extent to which these interpretations are present within educationalists experiences are explored within the proceeding chapters,

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[37] Some of this work has been utilised elsewhere (James, 2019)

but they provide a poignant moment at which educators became responsibilised as government agents – whether that is the case for either of the above reasons.

Some of the experiences, however, suggested that the extent to which this responsibilisation positioned educationalists as government actors was limited. For a number of the policy elites, education staff were not a *replacement* for security forces but were an aid to *helping* them do their jobs. In other words, the duty for these participants, was not about making educationalists counter-terrorism experts, but asking them to extend their existing responsibilities around safeguarding to recognise vulnerability as something which might also lead to the harm of radicalisation. Their responsibilisation, then, was presented as not dissimilar to that which they had already been fulfilling:

> *My job is to try and get them to see that this isn't, you don't need to have a specialist knowledge and understanding, you don't have to have a skill set where you understand the mechanism of terrorist radicalisers and one thing and another, what you have to do is just say "there's something not right about that, I don't like it, I've got a niggle I don't know why, I can't put my finger on it", and you just do your bit…*
>
> *… I have to keep saying "it's not your job to decide what it is, your job isn't to say 'it looks like terrorism or violent extremism to me', it's not your job unless you're part of the safeguarding team to decide what that support looks like, all I'm asking you to do is to share, internally, to use tried and tested methods that you use every day of the week, your safeguarding mechanisms, the concern that you hold for whatever reason and let somebody else, join the dots, put the pieces of the jigsaw together, and decide what needs to be done if anything" (Nigel Lund)*

Implicit within this experience is a suggestion that there has been a misconception between the assumed level of responsibility of those mandated with the duty, and the task that has been asked of them. This is partly a result of the lack of empirical data which has been collected around the lived experiences of the implementation of the Prevent duty on the ground and the subsequent awareness around what the Prevent duty means, in reality, for people and their roles. However, I also argue that this perceived misconception was a useful tool to enable Lund, and other participants who echoed this notion of *leaving it to the experts,* to present the duty through the frame of a continuation of existing responsibilities. The concern that is inferred to be shared by staff whom Lund trained became minimised through

this narrative of continuity and enabled the duty to be framed through the lens of safeguarding, not counter-terrorism, minimising their responsibilisation.

Yet, within this excerpt, there was also the indication that different members of staff would have experienced different levels of responsibilisation. The distancing that Lund places on staff to determine vulnerability to terrorism and extremism from other forms appeared to only apply to non-safeguarding staff. In other words, the extent of responsibilisation depended on the type of staff member you were within an institution. Though this is somewhat unsurprising, given safeguarding teams would have greater knowledge and experience over safeguarding matters, it complicates the suggestion that the duty did not signal a shift for educationalists roles. Instead, it indicated that whilst a classroom teacher might be asked to report concerns in the same way they would any other "niggle", those responsible for safeguarding did play a role in determining whether or not a vulnerability was related to potential radicalisation processes or warranted intervention of another means. The subsequent chapters explore the extent to which these variations in the responsibilisation of educational staff occur.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the ways in which policy elites translated the policy of the Prevent duty into an implementable agenda for Further Education institutions. It revealed how the duty became introduced to educationalists and the narratives upon which their involvement was prescribed. In doing so, it argued that the discourses which surrounded these directives conceptualised threat through three key means: threat as vulnerability to radicalisation; threat as manifesting through all forms of extremism and terrorism; and, threat as everybody's responsibility to prevent.

In examining the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to radicalisation, the chapter explored the ways in which the framework of safeguarding was utilised by policy elites to position threat as a form of harm, one which, like any other form, was both identifiable and preventable. Through these narratives, the duty became depicted as a continuation of existing responsibilities, those being the protection of vulnerable individuals who might be

exploited by others. Framing radicalisation as a process which happens *to* people, enabled policy elites to portray the duty as protecting potential victims, not reporting potential perpetrators, as much of the critical literature outlined in the literature review problematised. Nonetheless, the chapter also drew on some of these critiques to critically assess this framing by policy elites. It highlighted how the transformation of counter-terrorism through the Prevent duty's placement as a safeguarding mechanism left little space for agency of the perceived victim, was premised on a highly problematic assessment of vulnerability to identify said victim, and was limited by its foregrounding agenda of Prevent as a security, rather than safeguarding, agenda.

As a response to many of the criticisms which surrounded the earlier Prevent strategy of securitisation, the second conceptualisation of threat emerged: threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism. In having positioned the Prevent duty as a safeguarding mechanism which was concerned with vulnerability, not a security one concerned with criminality, policy elites were also keen to dispel the claims visible in both the introduction and literature review of the thesis that it was *certain* peoples vulnerability which was most likely to be spotted and prevented. In other words, policy elites saw part of their role as challenging the claims that the duty was only concerned with Islamist-inspired terrorism. This emerged through their insistence that, as a safeguarding mechanism, Prevent transcended ideology just as vulnerability did; those tasked with implementing it should therefore be concerned with any vulnerability which could be exploited by any radicaliser. The chapter also revealed, however, that this was not a straightforward task for policy elites to undertake; in fact, it was one which had only been possible over time and both enabled and limited by a multitude of factors: wider discourses of prejudice, the history of the Prevent agenda as earlier mentioned, a perceived rise in the far-right, and a limitation to resource and scope for challenging that which prevented others from seeing the duty as a mechanism to safeguard against all forms of extremism and terrorism.

Finally, through the framework of safeguarding, vulnerability to radicalisation was positioned as comparable to any other form of harm which public sector workers had long been responsible for identifying and preventing. Policy elites utilised this narrative to present Prevent as a continuation of these existing practices which, as a result, educationalists and

their multi-agency partners had the responsibility to implement. The chapter revealed how they drew upon a shift in the processes of radicalisation, and the perceived failures to have addressed them, as creating the need for a public sector-based approach to countering-terrorism and extremism, of which educationalists were key. Threat, therefore, became conceptualised as a responsibility to prevent. The narrative enabled policy elites to demonstrate how educationalists played a critical role, but one that was part of a wider system of safeguarding and thus not differing from their existing responsibilities. Embedding the duty within these existing practices de-exceptionalised the Prevent duty within educational spaces; removing it from the lens of security, the duty was positioned as a safeguarding responsibility to protect potential victims from becoming exploited, something which educationalists were already doing.

In exploring the experiences of policy elites, chapter five has revealed how the Prevent duty became understood and relayed as an implementable policy for further educationalists. In positioning it as a safeguarding mechanism, the duty was framed as a continuation of existing practices which already positioned educationalists, and the wider public sector, as responsible for preventing the exploitation of vulnerability - vulnerabilities which also transcended all forms of ideology. As a result, it has provided key narratives through which the Prevent duty was transformed from policy to practice within the initial stages of implementation, a 'starting point' for subsequent chapters to identify moments of continuity and conflict. The subsequent chapters therefore draw on the extent to which the discourses of policy elites are also present within those of educationalists, and their students, to understand the processes which govern the implementation of the duty, and the conceptualisation of threat as a result. Chapter six takes forward the narratives identified within this chapter and explores how they were understood and enacted, by those who were responsible for taking policy elite guidance and directives and implementing the duty through them at institutional level. It seeks to ask whether these institutional actors similarly understood the duty as a continuation of their existing responsibilities to safeguarding against vulnerability and positioned said responsibility as preventing all forms of radicalisation.

Chapter Six

Institutional Implementation: Frameworks to Enactments

6.1 Introduction

Chapter six of this thesis engages with those responsible for the institutional implementation of the Prevent duty. This was found to have been primarily Designated Safeguarding Leads (DSLs) who were positioned as the single point of contact for the duty within the participating institutions. The chapter draws upon the three key conceptualisations of threat visible within the previous chapter, analysing the extent to which the narratives utilised by policy elites to understand the duty had been internalised by institutional level actors. It reveals that the conceptualisation of threat occurred through the same discourses which policy elites described but that there was not only an additional narrative which became apparent, but a series of moments where their narratives became blurred upon enactment. In doing so, the chapter demonstrates how the stories of enactment are not only a result of the discourses presented to them, but of the spatio-temporal context within which they find themselves. In other words, chapter six reveals how institutional level staff took forward the narratives of policy elites whilst responding to their own environmental needs and resources. The chapter, therefore, examines the implementation of the Prevent duty to reveal how educators enact the policy and thus conceptualise threat through four key ways: threat as vulnerability to safeguard against; threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism; British values as the antithesis to threat; and, threat as the responsibility to prevent.

Section 6.2 examines the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to safeguard against. It reveals that through the framework of safeguarding, DSLs internalised the narrative proposed by policy elites, positioning radicalisation as a form of harm, like any other harm, which could be exploited and therefore required safeguarding against. The slight shift in discourse demonstrated the extent to which the narrative became internalised where DSLs focus centred on the vulnerabilities which required safeguarding against; in other words, DSLs focused on vulnerability identification rather than specifically radicalisation identification. As policy elites portrayed, this was enabled by a narrative of continuity which positioned the

duty as a continuation of existing practices by educationalists. Subsection 6.2.1 analyses the framing of safeguarding by participants to demonstrate how this occurred but in doing so, reveals the ambiguities which emerged where participants responded to their environments in three key instances: firstly, in the management of a new policy framed through existing mechanisms; secondly, in negotiating the critiques explored in chapters one and three which the wider Prevent agenda has been viewed; and, thirdly, in responding to the enactment of the duty as a continuous process which occurs over time. Subsection 6.2.2 further highlights the internalisation of the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to safeguard against but similarly presents a more complex picture than policy elites had depicted. In examining who it was that participants felt required safeguarding, DSL experiences revealed a number of areas which required a blurring of the notion of safeguarding. Firstly, safeguarding was not just about the one individual, but those around them who would be made vulnerable by their potential action; secondly, there was the potential for staff to also require safeguarding; and finally, the negotiation of other vulnerabilities that blurred the determination of a radicalisation concern with other forms.

Section 6.3 explores the conceptualisation of threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism and similarly examines the extent to which this narrative translated from elite participants to institutional level. It demonstrates how, once again, the conceptualisation was internalised by participants at institutional levels but that there was similarly a far more complex reality of this when it came to enactments of the Prevent duty. Subsection 6.3.1 discusses attempts by participants to shift the duty away from being perceived to be only about Islamist-inspired extremism and terrorism, as policy elites had also done, largely through the inclusion of the far-right as other forms. Yet, in doing so, it also reveals the extent of influence that a perceived wider public narrative of prejudice is thought to have in conceptualising threat and thus details the efforts made to try and minimise the bias that occurs as a result, beyond a framework of simply stating the duty is applicable to all forms. Subsection 6.3.2, then explores the perception of the wider Greater Manchester context that participants suggest creates the necessary environment for conceptualising threat as being about all forms of extremism and terrorism; the diversity of the area they suggest requires such an approach where a multiplicity of ideologies might emerge.

The following section of the chapter, 6.4, introduces an additional narrative to the story of the Prevent duty's implementation which policy elites did not propose where British values become utilised by participants at institutional level to enact the duty as the antithesis to threat. Sub-section 6.4.1 reveals how British values become embedded within these FE institutions but in its departure from elite portrayals highlights the limited resources provided to staff to enact this part of their Prevent duty and the disconnect between British values and the safeguarding aspect of the duty. The label of 'British' is then problematised by participants within sub-section 6.4.2 who explore the notion of Britishness and its capacity to not only latch on to any existing values agenda and be seen through narratives of continuity, but to oppose the values of tolerance and respect that the agenda promotes.

Section 6.5 of the chapter examines the extent to which the conceptualisation of threat as everybody's responsibility to prevent is visible within institutional staff experiences. The section reveals how, through the framework of safeguarding against vulnerability, DSLs had internalised policy elite narratives, positioning themselves as responsible for identifying and referring concerns that might be exploited. Subsection 6.5.1 highlights the narratives of continuity where vulnerability to radicalisation was understood through the same lens as any other form of harm and therefore managed through the same, pre-existing, referral mechanisms. It also reveals, however, the moments at which the responsibility to refer for radicalisation was seen to present different challenges and require additional processes than for other forms of harm. Subsection 6.5.2 explores a number of referral experiences which highlight the limitation to participants' perceptions of their responsibility and the multiple ways through which responsibilisation occurs. These case studies offer a far more complex reality of referral for institutional level actors which see's their responsibility extend far beyond that of identifying and referring a concern.

6.2 Threat as vulnerability to safeguard against

This section demonstrates how the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to safeguard against became internalised by institutional level staff. The first subsection explores the extent to which the framework of safeguarding provided the means through which the duty could be embedding within existing practices of protecting vulnerability to harm, whilst the

second sub-section examines the application of this framework in practice and the challenges faced when determining *who* required safeguarding.

6.2.1 "Prevent sits neatly under the safeguarding banner"

Responsibility for implementing the Prevent duty within these further education institutions lay with the designated safeguarding lead/officer (DSL) and their team(s). The positioning of the duty as the primary responsibility of the DSL reinforced the notion that Prevent was to be read and implemented through the framework of safeguarding, something which was accepted by participants at institutional level as the appropriate means through which it could be implemented:

> *Well for me, erm… it fits into safeguarding because radicalisation is a safeguarding issue* (DSL, Training Institute 2)

Whilst scholars such as Heath-Kelly (2017; 2018), McGlynn and McDaid (2016; 2018) and Dudenhoefer (2018) have all insisted this leads to the securitisation of public sector workers to become 'guardians of radicalisation risk work' (Stanley and Guru, 2015, p.353), the experiences of DSLs in this research did not suggest that they viewed their work as securitised. Instead, DSLs' responses, suggested that the framework of safeguarding had been internalised, further supporting Busher et al. (2017; 2019) study which showed 86% of questionnaire respondents either agreed or agreed strongly that "The Prevent duty in schools/colleges is a continuation of existing safeguarding responsibilities". Experiences gathered within this research, further such findings by demonstrating how this occurred. Across a number of their experiences, the language of policy elites was similarly utilised by DSL participants who drew upon the rhetoric of vulnerabilities and harm to explore their understandings of the Prevent duty, situating it firmly within the framework of safeguarding. As one DSL explained, in relaying their own understanding of the duty to colleagues; they:

> *Home in on the vulnerabilities that people can have in life, and look at the plethora of vulnerabilities and then the classic safeguarding issues, domestic violence, forced marriage etc., … I also point out that in order to be groomed and radicalised, one has to be vulnerable, hence the slant on the safeguarding and that it's very similar to child sexual exploitation, it's the same grooming methods, so I'll put the two safeguarding issues together, child sexual exploitation and being groomed, in order to be groomed*

you have to be usually vulnerable and you have to be ready to be manipulated and malleable… although it's a Prevent agenda, the issues themselves fall neatly into the safeguarding, they all fall into safeguarding and everybody here will tell you (DSL, Training Institute 2)

The experience, reflective of other participants', drew directly upon the discourses of harm and vulnerability visible within the previous chapter. In doing so, it demonstrated how the rhetoric of the policy elites had successfully become replicated within DSLs enactments of the duty within their institutions. Notable too is the discourse of grooming which is similarly invoked by this DSL to demonstrate the similarity between radicalisation and other forms of harm, child sexual exploitation in particular, and the ability for vulnerabilities to be exploited. The replication of the language highlighted how the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to radicalisation by policy elites was internalised by DSL staff in not only their understandings of the duty, but also in their relaying of it to others as part of their institutional implementation.

I introduce it [to staff] as safeguarding, and when I do the safeguarding training and I do a little bit of Prevent I say "and you will have another hour with me, on Prevent, because it's safeguarding" and I'm always saying to them "I'm delivering this, because I'm the safeguarding lead and it's a safeguarding issue" (DSL, Academic Institute 3)

Relaying of the duty to staff members added another layer to the duty's implementation where through the lens of safeguarding they were encouraging teachers to similarly see it within these spaces, as Elwick and Jerome (2019) and Vincent (2019) also found amongst senior leaders.[38] The extent to which teaching staff internalised this is therefore explored in the following chapter.

However, within a number of the responses there were also ambiguities present. As the two previous experiences also highlighted, language such as the duty "fitting" into safeguarding and being "introduce[d]" as safeguarding highlighted a recognition of the scope for the duty to be seen outside of the safeguarding processes. Yet, for all of the DSL participants, there was a need to place it within these frameworks, particularly when presenting it to their staff. Importantly, this was not because any of the participants expressed concerns that it *should*

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[38] DSLs formed part of Senior Leadership Teams

be seen as anything other than safeguarding but that it *could* be. Thus, the pro-active placement of the duty within safeguarding, I argue, was an approach adopted by staff in anticipation of colleagues having had alternative frameworks through which they had read the Prevent duty. However, it was not only a requirement for them to shift their lens to one of safeguarding but a necessary one in order to properly understand (and enact) the Prevent duty.

This emerged from the legislative positioning of the duty within a *familiar* framework through both narratives of continuity and normalisation. Firstly, the narrative of continuity which policy elites utilised, similarly manifested within DSL responses, demonstrating the extent to which it had been accepted; the duty was understood as an extension of their normal practice. Education institutions have long been subject to strict regulation around the safeguarding of students: the Education Act (2002), the Education (Independent School Standards) Regulations (2014b), and the Non-Maintained Special Schools (England) Regulations (2015), amongst others. According to government guidance '[s]afeguarding and promoting the welfare of children is **everyone's** responsibility. **Everyone** who comes into contact with children and their families has a role to play' (Department for Education, 2018, p.5 emphasis in original). Indeed, the cruciality of safeguarding children within educationalists' roles is clear through Ofsted's ability to deem a school inadequate solely on their failure to safeguard. The implications of the inclusion of Prevent within this raise important questions which a subsequent paper to this thesis will explore. However, the centrality of safeguarding within educationalists roles provided a clear avenue through which DSL acceptance of the duty, being positioned as part of these responsibilities, can be understood. As one participant who provides externally funded Prevent-related training to DSLs and their staff within institutions noted:

> *I just think that you know, safeguarding has a task to do, the easiest way, the way it's been discovered is the best way of placing it, it's to place it as an additional duty in safeguarding, but it wasn't originally designed that way I don't think, that's not my understanding of how it was designed so, this is just an accidental way we've decided that we'll do it, because it makes more sense and people are more willing to accept it* (Trainer, Training Organisation 1)

This participant suggested the government had found an agreeable means by which Prevent could be embedded within institutions with little scope for legitimate challenge; to reject the Prevent duty through either verbal critique or a refusal to adopt the legislation would have had the potential to be viewed as a rejection of safeguarding duties. For these DSLs, whose primary role was to safeguard, the Prevent duty had become positioned as a central responsibility and thus, I claim, had resulted in their acceptance of it as an extension of their existing practice and a requirement for them to meet.

Secondly, I argue the narrative of normalisation also explained why DSLs had implicitly referenced, but sought to quieten, the presence of other frameworks from their portrayals of the Prevent duty:

> *The first thing that still comes into my head, even after all the training that I've done, was it was about terrorism. Obviously as you get more involved with Prevent you realise that's not really where you should be starting but I think if you asked a lot of colleagues that's probably what they would say, the underlying ethos is about preventing people being drawn into terrorism* (DSL, Academic and Training Institute)[39]

For this DSL, alongside others, the perception that Prevent had emerged from a counter-terrorism space and not a safeguarding one, had been perceived to have remained in place for many of their colleagues. As a result, the duty had become exceptionalised in the sense that it had been viewed primarily through this lens of security, rather than of safeguarding. This spoke to much of the literature which positioned the entry of the duty (and alike programmes) as securitising education (Durodie, 2016; O'Donnell, 2016; Gearon, 2017). Yet, in reflecting upon an increased involvement with Prevent, and thus a greater knowledge of it, this DSL, similar to others, appeared to both justify the presence of this narrative and confirm its appropriateness to be used for the duty. In other words, for a number of the DSLs, through an increased awareness of the Prevent duty, there could be a realisation that it was through the lens of safeguarding that the duty could be fully understood, not of securitisation. As earlier noted, it was not that Prevent *should* be understood through these alternative frames, but that it *could* be given its history. Internalising the language of safeguarding

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[39] As per Chapter Four, this DSL was responsible for two institutions participating in the research: Academic Institute 2 and Training Institute 1

enabled this distancing of the duty from such criticisms. Importantly, however, there was also a recognition that this distancing was something which came with time. When discussing the critique that "Prevent was spying on students" in its earlier iterations, the DSL within Academic Institute 3 admitted they remained unsure "whether that has completely gone because of the lasting impacts of the way it was put out to start with". For this participant, the initial presentation of Prevent as a security measure for criminalisation was problematic; the potential "lasting impacts" of this earlier framing had left her needing to gain what another DSL referred to as "buy in" (DSL, Training Institute 2) from staff to this shift to understanding Prevent as safeguarding. By focusing on "the underlying ethos [of the Prevent duty as] about preventing people being drawn into terrorism", however, these DSLs were able to re-educate their colleagues to see it within the spaces of safeguarding. The positioning of the duty as having evolved over time reflected the journey of 'detoxification' for Prevent (Busher et al., 2019) where prevention became about protection rather than prosecution. DSL internalisation of the safeguarding framework demonstrated the ways through which the Prevent duty had migrated from the realm of security within which it started, to that of safeguarding.

6.2.2 Who's at risk? Extending the narrative of safeguarding

The responsibility to safeguard, however, did depart from elite perspectives to some extent when DSLs positioned the duty as not only protecting a potentially vulnerable individual, but those around them too. At this point, the narrative of the duty acting as a generic and pre-existing safeguarding mechanism becomes disrupted. For a number of the DSLs, it was not only about the potential victim of exploitation, but the potential *victims* of the potentially exploited:

> *It means we've got a responsibility to any young person or employee for that matter if we had concerns about their own wellbeing in terms of a path they might be heading towards, but then we've also got a responsibility to the others within the organisation and the impact on them, erm but also the wider community as well if that issue isn't addressed* (DSL, Academic and Training Institute)

Here safeguarding enabled prevention of the potential risk to an individual but simultaneously the potential risk that they posed to others, what Health-Kelly (2013) refers

to as *at risk* and *risky.* However, though Heath-Kelly's (ibid.) lens focuses on the securitisation of the deemed *risky,* through the rhetoric of safeguarding, the *risky* remained a potential victim in their need to be protected from the exploitation of radicalisers, disrupting the lines between the conventional victim and perpetrator dichotomy (Coppock and McGovern, 2014). On the one hand, this mirrored standard safeguarding procedures whereby the protection of the individual might have been seen to minimise the impact on others, but on the other, it blurred the lines around the individual who could simultaneously be the threat which they were threatened by. In other words, the individual became the risk, one which, unlike other forms of harm, could not be isolated by their own vulnerability, but was inextricably linked to their potential to leave others vulnerable as well (Acik et al., 2018, p.470). Both subsequent chapters on teaching staff and student experiences of the duty explore this expanded notion of safeguarding to provide an examination of how this became deliverable within the classroom enactment of the legislation. DSL experiences, however, situated this emergence at institutional level and exposed a critical point at which the Prevent duty transcended the normal boundaries of safeguarding.

This becomes particularly poignant at the point of further education. Generally, for further education sectors, their students ranged from the ages of 16 to 19; at this point, the reality of safeguarding was not simply of children whom might be impressionable and their ideas transferred back to *normality* as easily as they might have been *perverted*, but instead is of near-adult age individuals, young enough to have had malleable ideas but old enough to have engaged in adult activities. The vulnerability of an individual who transcended the realms of childhood and adulthood into adolescence therefore, resulted in a transcendent approach to safeguarding for these DSLs whereby safeguarding had become about both the potentially vulnerable individual but also the potential vulnerability that might have been inflicted on others. In revealing this approach, the experiences highlighted a critical avenue which, at present, remains unacknowledged within the existing literature surrounding the Prevent duty's implementation and one which requires significant attention from the scholarship going forward.

Another area which blurred the generic lines of safeguarding regarded the requirement of the duty to show due regard in the need to prevent not only students from becoming engaged

in terrorism, but also staff. This has also, as of yet, failed to have been picked up within any of the existing studies on the implementation of the duty. A third of referrals into Channel, across the data available from each year the duty has been in place, were from the education sector and the majority of overall referrals came from those under 20 years of age. However, the data did not reveal which referrals – from which age categories – came from the education sector and thus gave reasonable grounds for the impression that these referrals would have largely related to those under 20.[40] Thus, the focus in the literature, government guidance and this research in its initial stages, had remained on safeguarding students. However, for a small number of participants who had responsibility for the duty's implementation at institutional level, there was reference to the duty being applicable to staff members. Indeed, the duty does not at any point suggest that only students would be included within its remit; responsibility under Prevent legislation read that institutions must also safeguard and report *anyone* for any potential vulnerabilities to or engagements with terrorism. As one DSL anecdotally shared, this was something that required attention since, under their local safeguarding board, all of the individuals receiving Channel support at the time, were adults.[41] Though none of the participating DSLs referred to instances where they had dealt with referrals related to staff, a Trade Union official who had worked with a number of Further Education institutions within the Greater Manchester area claimed that:

> *Some of our members have had to deal not with youngsters but with members of staff, where there's been a suspicion that they might have been radicalised or that they might have been involved in activity overseas, for example Syria or one of the other Middle Eastern countries [… In one institution] a member of staff I think had, I think had actually been arrested and charged with terrorism related activity abroad. I think it was about going abroad to join a proscribed organisation, it was at that level* (North West Trade Union Official)

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[40] Though, the education sector would also include higher education referrals, many of whom would then be considered in the age brackets above, so this also needed consideration. Freedom of Information requests were submitted to identify the number of referrals specifically from the Further Education sector to narrow these figures, but the request was refused on the basis of national security and the right to privacy of individuals engaged with the programme.

[41] These were not necessarily from education institutions – all referrals from all sectors would have been discussed at the same panel. A breakdown of the individual cases was provided by the participant but is not detailed here for potential identification.

The potential for staff to be considered as potential subjects of safeguarding within institutions was felt to be real. Whilst it was not made explicitly clear whether the institution had a role in alerting Channel, the information suggested that the referral was made from outside of the institution.[42] In this instance, the frameworks which were in place for aiding the identification of students for referral do not appear to have been similarly applied to the member of staff. That is not to be read as an accusation but instead to raise an important consideration as to whether the Prevent duty had been applied to staff as it had students – both from an institutional perspective and a governmental one which made (or failed to have made) the necessity of this focus clear. Further, the lack of clarity around staff inclusion within the Prevent duty as a safeguarding mechanism was referred to by another participant who, when discussing members of staff she felt had potentially engaged in far-right organisations, she observed:[43]

> BVC: *No, I don't think so, I don't think people would think of [referring staff]*
>
> NJ: *why do you think that differentiation occurs then, the Prevent duty in its legislation says that it is for everyone including staff-*
>
> BVC: *staff yeah... I think people associate it with the younger people... I've never heard anybody talking about a member of staff... I don't think it's something that is commonly discussed* (British Values Coordinator, Training Institute 2)

For this participant, concerns over radicalisation within education institutions were associated with students. I argue this is partly a result of the responsibilisation of staff, where they are understood as 'guardians' (Stanley and Guru, 2015, p.353) of protection within institutions, but also a result of the rhetoric of safeguarding vulnerability. The framing of individuals as vulnerable to exploitation processes, like grooming, became associated with childhood and the inherent innocence and naivety that invokes. In other words, adults should have known better and not have required such mechanisms of safeguarding to protect them. Thus, in its framing through safeguarding, the Prevent duty became something that in its nature then was readable as appropriate and suitable for the protection of the vulnerable – "young people" – and not for staff in their adultness. This draws back on earlier discussions surrounding the blurring of lines for those within the further education sector whereby

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[42] The participant was not able or willing to share more information for fear of identifying the institution
[43] The two cases referenced in this section are drawn upon further in sub-section 6.4

students were deemed as both vulnerable and capable of causing vulnerability in their transcendence between childhood and adulthood. There is undoubtedly more research which is required to understand the cases of staff who might have been referred and the potential implications referring colleagues might have on working relationships and educational institutions. However, the role of age for those viewed as appropriate for requiring the protection of the Prevent duty was thus highlighted as a critical aspect to have shaped the way that safeguarding vulnerability was understood and therefore threat conceptualised.

The final way in which the framework of safeguarding became blurred was through the consideration of mental health concerns in relation to the Prevent duty. Similarly, this had not resulted in DSLs questioning the framework, but presented an additional point at which its use had not directly translated with the ease which policy elites had positioned it as having done so. For the participants who raised this as a concern, there was a fine and often blurred line between a mental health concern and a Channel one. For these participants, "there's quite a lot of cases that do cross over that link" (DSL, Academic and Training Institute) with the DSL from Training Institute 2 claiming "two-thirds of the cases that have gone forward to Channel are mental health issues", though such figures could not be confirmed through publicly available data. Nonetheless, both quoted DSLs revealed concerns for the threshold of deciphering at what point a safeguarding issue was one for mental health services, or one for Prevent. The framework of safeguarding acted as a useful means to identify vulnerability but the concern which surrounded mental health undermined the claim from policy elites that vulnerability to radicalisation was the same as vulnerability to any other form of harm when it came to identifying and signposting to support services. For these DSLs, mental health concerns reintroduced a separation between generic safeguarding and Prevent as safeguarding where the vulnerabilities were seen as overlapping, but with different outcomes that needed different solutions, *and thus different services*. To demonstrate their concern, one DSL offered two examples which, for them, fell into the definition of a Prevent referral in theory, but were inappropriate in practice:

> *We had a student once who was on the autistic spectrum… and one of his obsessions, things he does, is dressing up in different outfits and he came in as a soldier one day with a hunting knife. So obviously, we took the knife off him and you're dealing with a slightly different issue there, are you dealing with somebody that's being radicalised?*

That wouldn't have been appropriate, but it's hard to make that judgement… so some people might disagree and say "well he could go on to do-" but then so could any of our students, I don't know, it's a call no one really wants to make isn't it…

… I've just had one that's hacked into college software so not Prevent in the traditional sense, but if you think about where that could go, I suppose the difference is there's no cause to do harm, it's curiosity, I don't know what his motivations are but his motivations aren't to do harm to anybody. But if you think about the implications with that young person as they go out into the big wide world and actually their vulnerability in, you know, being susceptible to being groomed and being obsessed about a particular thing […] I think that's a really worrying, really worrying area (DSL, Academic and Training Institute)

For this DSL, both of these cases could have ticked several boxes for vulnerability to radicalisation and suitability for a Prevent referral. Yet, there were also doubts as to whether *this* vulnerability was related to radicalisation, despite in theory the potential for it to be. Such ambiguities reflect the most recent findings from a study conducted by MEDACT (Aked, 2020, p.6) who found that whilst 'people with mental health conditions are disproportionately referred to Prevent', 'evidence for official claims that people with mental health conditions are more likely to be drawn into terrorism is not robust enough to base policy upon'. Such a belief 'risks pathologisation and exacerbating stigma', it claims, which is 'compounded when an individual is also Muslim and/or BAME'. The anecdotes, therefore, revealed not only the blurring which occurred in reading the Prevent duty through the framework of safeguarding, but the importance of educationalists to have situated their enactments of the duty within the context they found themselves in (Braun et al., 2011).

The reality of reporting concerns, I suggest, was therefore far more complex than simply having read them through a framework of safeguarding; instead, DSLs had a number of further tasks which developed from this point, namely, identifying which vulnerabilities existed, assessing what services might be required, and evaluating which mechanism most suitable to refer the concern to. Whilst on the one hand this might not be too dissimilar to other forms of harm, where DSLs evaluated involvement of children's service, social services or the police, on the other hand, there appeared to be less clarity from some participants as to whether these services were sufficiently involved in cases of radicalisation, and indeed

whether other services could be included in addition to Channel. In other words, where a CSE or abuse concern might have been raised, DSLs suggested that they would have informed both children's services and the police but that these services would alert one another where they had not shared across multiple agencies. There was a lack of clarity as to whether this would occur for Prevent. The wider policy context played a crucial role in this for one DSL. A wider reduction in services had contributed to the blurring of vulnerability concerns where they felt "the money is in Prevent" (DSL, Academic Institute 3); thus there was a potential that vulnerabilities were being shifted to the services available – those of Channel – whether they were wholly appropriate or not. Whilst safeguarding emerged as an accepted and utilised framework, the inclusion of Prevent *within* safeguarding practices on the ground had implications for the wider understanding of what safeguarding concerns were, who they should be assigned to, which concerns took priority and as a result, implications for the multi-agency structures within which these concerns sat.

6.3 Threat as all forms of Extremism and Terrorism

This section explores discussions around *who* it was that was perceived to require safeguarding. The first subsection reveals the challenges which institutional staff faced in conceptualising threat as something which should be about all forms of extremism and terrorism, but that remained limited in its capacity to be so by an overriding narrative of prejudice which positioned Islamist-related concerns as both more visible and more threatening. The second subsection further demonstrates these challenges by drawing on participants presentation of the wider context of Greater Manchester to demonstrate why it was perceived as so important that implementations of the duty were about all forms of terrorism and extremism in a community depicted as being so diverse, with a multiplicity of views and concerns.

6.3.1 Islamist-inspired concerns: responding to criticisms, avoiding disproportionality

In a similar vein to elite participants, DSLs had expressed the view that, through the safeguarding framework, the Prevent duty encapsulated all forms of extremism and terrorism since its focus lay on vulnerabilities and not on ideology. So too, however, had they identified

a problematic disproportionality with which they perceived Islamist-inspired threats to have been dealt in previous iterations of Prevent and a broader UK counter-terrorism agenda. In this sense, DSL experiences appeared to have echoed those of policy elites, having recognised a history of pre-determined focus on Islamist-inspired concerns, but internalising a notion that, through safeguarding, the Prevent duty did not hold such focus at its core. However, in having unpacked their experiences and perceptions, I argue that once again the picture was blurred for some DSLs where they did not feel such prior focus could be or had been shifted through the framework of safeguarding; for them, an overriding discourse still loomed over the conceptualisation of threat as Islamist-inspired extremism or terrorism. For one participant who was responsible for the institutional implementation of British Values, this was incredibly problematic:

> BVC: I think statistics bear that out don't they, I think the majority of referrals to Channel are people who are Muslim, and I think people associate Prevent with stopping Muslims from blowing things up
>
> NJ: Why do you think people have got that association then?
>
> BVC: There's a wider media isn't there, you know teachers are no different than anybody else they're reading newspapers that, you know a lot of our press is quite Islamophobic, and I think even the more responsible sections of the press are not entirely, and you know it's irrefutable the Manchester arena bomb was carried out by a Muslim boy who lived down the road so you can't, you can't deny that but I think what people don't have an education in is not extrapolating from one incident that happened with one young man whose become radicalised and then drawing this huge conclusion that every young Asian male is potentially going to be radicalised, it's like people sit on the tube and on the tram and think "if anyone's going to have a bomb it's going to be that Asian lad with the rucksack", it's that wider context and I think people who work here are no different so they absorb all that stuff don't they (British Values Coordinator, Training Institute 2)

The experience referenced a long standing narrative which has been widely documented in the scholarship regarding the securitisation of Muslims as a result of their problematic conflation with Islamist-inspired groups; such groups, were conceptualised as the key security threat by Western governments, largely since 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror (see Archer, 2009; Mythen et al., 2009; Brown, 2010; Bonino, 2012; O'Toole et al., 2016; Ragazzi,

2017). Echoing all of the DSLs who participated, this experience highlighted the perception that this wider narrative led to prejudice of who it was that was more likely to need the support of Prevent and thus referring under the duty. A number of concerns lay at the root of this.

The presentation of terrorists within public discourse, particularly from the media had, many of the DSLs argued, promoted this narrow depiction of who was like to be under suspicion of committing terrorist/extremist related crimes. As Ahmed and Matthews (2017) found in their meta-analysis of studies to examine the construction of Muslim and Islamic identity within the media, Muslims and Islam were overwhelmingly framed through negative lenses that Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010) suggested had led to their 'hypervisibility'. For West and Lloyd (2017), this had led to crimes being positioned as terrorism to a much greater extent where they were committed by Muslims. DSL experiences suggested that this was translatable to concerns which were raised about vulnerability in relation to radicalisation; for them it was likely, as a result of these overarching narratives of Muslim securitisation and hypervisibility, that Muslim students would be the ones that the Prevent duty, and other de-radicalisation efforts, would have been perceived to be concerned with (see also Clubb and O'Connor, 2019).

For example, one DSL recalled a referral made about a young Muslim male who some teachers had raised concerns after he changed from Western to religious dress (DSL, Academic Institute 1). In this instance, after an informal discussion and no other factors found to have raised concern - the student was happy to talk through the concern, his grades and attendance were good, and his parents were spoken to – the concern was dismissed. In other words, his vulnerability had been determined through his (visible) religiosity. Drawing back on Mamdani's (2002) good Muslim – bad Muslim dichotomy referred to in the literature review, this students visible 'bad', i.e. non-assimilating, Muslimness, was counter-acted by his 'good' Muslimness, i.e. his assimilation through his otherwise *normalcy,* but it was ultimately the hyper-visibleness of his religion which positioned him as requiring concern. The DSL's revelation that the student was unsurprised that he had been 'spotted' as a result of his change in dress, laughing with the DSL during the conversation as a result, demonstrated the extent to which such discourses were expected and normalised within the everyday of both

Muslimness and enactments of the duty. The experience spoke to the wider narratives of prejudice within both media and political discourses, which positioned Muslims as threatening post 9/11 and in turn influenced the public perception of who it was most likely to become involved in these spaces (see Norris et al., 2004; Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2010; Allen, 2012; Ansari and Hafez, 2012; Brinson and Stohl, 2012; Ahmed and Matthes, 2017; Ivandic et al., 2019).

One way through which a number of the DSLs felt that there were attempts by policy elites to minimise this was through the inclusion of 'other forms' of terrorism and extremism within training, most notably, the far-right. This mirrored the Prevent WRAP workshop I observed, designed for senior leadership members such as DSLs who had gone on to include other forms, like the far-right, in their own in-house trainings to demonstrate the duty's applicability to all forms of extremism and terrorism. The inclusion of these 'other forms' of terrorism and extremism became a mechanism for minimising the potential for internal bias – both their own and their staff – to have influenced what *or who* it was that the Prevent duty was applicable to. However, as one DSL noted, this shift in focus was something which had emerged over time:

> DSL: *Take right-wing extremism, I've become really knowledgeable about right-wing extremism […] I mean in the past particularly two years, because of my prevent involvement with the champion* group
>
> NJ: Is that because it's become more dominant within that that you've become more knowledgeable about it?
>
> DSL: *yeah and probably the safeguarding role I think probably you know, I think because of the training that I've done I suppose* (DSL, Training Institute 2)

DSLs perceived concerns around Prevent having been originally guided by and through problematic narratives of prejudice against Muslims, in the same way that was outlined by policy elites in the previous chapter, was something that had existed. It was, they inferred, only through measures of inclusion within training had other forms, most notably the far-right, also become positioned within these agendas. Further, as policy elites had also noted, the increase in far-right attacks similarly enabled a shift to view other ideologies as included within the conceptualisation of threat, since this was perceived to have had some impact on the perceptions that people had. This further demonstrated that the wider public narratives

played an important role in determining, or influencing at the least, internalised discourses. Thus, for a few of the participants, this rise in far-right attacks had not only enabled people to see a shift in the focus of Prevent but had simultaneously driven it with what some viewed as an increasing and real threat for their institutions.

This depiction of 'other forms' of extremism and terrorism did not only emerge from an engagement with the far-right; for one DSL radicalisation could have happened with or without a predominant ideology, or for something like animal rights extremism (DSL, Academic and Training Institute):

> Those areas where you think, you could consider those views, extreme in certain cases but based on what? Based on whose judgement? I might think it's extreme or I might not… I think for me it is, when does it become unhealthy, and that's, I don't know, I don't know how you determine that (DSL, Academic and Training Institute)

Referral processes and cases are explored within sub-section 6.4 of this chapter, particularly around the role of referral thresholds as this experience highlighted. There is a clear sense of uncertainty within this quote where the DSL's internal bias was brought to the forefront of her considerations in the potential for interpretation and misconception of what did or did not constitute extreme. While the DSL offered some measurement in the form of an un-healthiness, the point at which it was determinable was similarly uncertain and highlighted the role of personal judgement and individual knowledge when making these calls. I argue that this uncertainty also linked with a lack of familiarity of conceptualising these 'other forms' as threat against a backdrop of focus on Islamist-related ones. Channel referral data since the duty became statutory has appeared to reflect this suggestion in around 10% of referrals, on average, being for 'other' forms of ideology (those not associated with Islamist-inspired or far-right) (HM Government, 2016; 2017; 2018b; 2019).

Uncertainty around 'other forms' of extremism and terrorism were also visible within another DSL's experience. In this instance it was not uncertainty with what she constituted a Prevent concern but what Channel understood as an 'other form' of threat and thus whether or not her conceptualisation of threat was accurate overall. The DSL explored the referral of a female student who had become involved in anti-fracking demonstrations which had a 'detrimental

affect' on her health, studies and safety; it was these resultant impacts, and not the nature of the views as anti-fracking, that led the DSL to believe this was a Prevent referral:

> *I said 'out of interest, I'll approach the contact in [local counter-terrorism unit] to see what they think', you know, via Channel, because it's extremist behaviour, and I wanted also to see how they might deal with it in all honesty, but what they did was, because of the nature of it, they gave it back to us* (DSL, Training Provider 2)

The referral highlighted how the safeguarding narratives through which Prevent was framed had led the decision made by this DSL to refer. Though the student's beliefs were not viewed as extreme, the consequences of her radicalism through involvement in extreme activities were viewed to have put her own, and potentially others', wellbeing in danger. As a result, the DSL had identified a point of uncertainty whereby 'other forms' of extremism were not perceived to be considered in the same light as Islamist or far-right. This the DSL argued, was evident when the young girl's actions - which included being arrested at demonstrations that had become violent - had the potential to cause harm to herself or others as a result of an extremist belief, yet they had not been viewed *as* extremist. This was further problematic since the DSL felt they were following the guidance and training they had received since "about a year before, [at] the police presentations on Prevent, they said "just give us a ring, anything concerning you give us a ring on extremist behaviour"'. Thus, the DSL concluded that this type of extremism "was out of their court, I think I was testing the water with them" highlighting a potential disparity with which these other forms were being understood. Whilst the more recent calls that environmental or eco-extremism should be being referred into Channel (Grierson, 2020a) suggest that, *over time,* there has come to be an inclusion of these other forms, this DSL did not feel her own conceptualisation of threat as all of these forms was replicated by the Prevent officers she had engaged with. I argue the case demonstrated how the 'form' of extremism or terrorism did appear to have mattered as to whether the Prevent duty would be applicable when it came to referring outside of the institution.

6.3.2 The Greater Manchester Context

A number of the DSLs drew upon the wider environment to position the duty as conceptualising threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism. As Elwick and Jerome (2019, p.348) found in their study, staff responses to the Prevent duty reflected 'their reading of the

local context and their perceptions of local needs and challenges'. The context of Greater Manchester, one of a diverse population and thus one with diverse challenges, was depicted as being a key motive for the duty being necessary but also for it being applicable to everyone:

> *We have such a vast client group[44], from those who are in prisons to those who have been disadvantaged, to those who are addicts etc. etc. etc. This is my own personal gripe that, if you're going into, going back to the schools in Bedfordshire, I forget where it was, where all the students are privately educated and are doing four or five a-levels, hoping to go on to Oxford or Cambridge, then there shouldn't be much going wrong there, in an organisation like ours, we're [local area removed] Manchester, you know, I think the challenges are much more, challenging so to speak, it's a bigger, it's a bigger agenda to deliver* (DSL, Training Institute 2)

The experience highlighted the perception that location mattered for the implementation of the Prevent duty. Whilst this opened up the space for further research into the geographical variations of the duty and its implementation, it highlighted the belief that not only was Greater Manchester different to elsewhere in the country, but that there were also significant variation within Greater Manchester as an area, particularly for those institutions who might deal with crossovers in the locations where students came from. Freedom of Information requests to all ten local authorities within Greater Manchester for data on referral figures at a local level were requested but all rejected, despite the data existing, inhibiting further information on a local level to contextualise these claims.[45] However, drawing back on participants in the previous chapter, David Wells of the North West Counter Terrorism Unit divulged that for Prevent related referrals, in the Greater Manchester area "it's something like seventy-five-percent of them are international terrorism related, about fourteen percent of them are far-right, and then you've got a mixture of others, you know the bits of things, some of it's we don't know the ideology and that doesn't mean that we've not been bothered to ask it means that there might be for example the ideology might be confused".[46] Despite the larger number, at the time of interview in 2018 being for Islamist-inspired, it did reveal that there had been a variety of concerns present within the Greater Manchester area.

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[44] The 'client group' referred to are the students. The training provider this DSL works for is a private business which runs as such and so this language is aligned with the nature of the provider as a company. Though this is not seen as unproblematic, there is not the space to explore this here.

[45] See appendix iii

[46] Correct at the time of interview in 2018

Further, given statistics were largely replicative of national figures, it would be plausible to assume that along with those nationally, far-right related concerns have seen an increase and would thus be somewhat greater now than those stated at the time.

For the DSL from Academic Institute 3, wider issues within the Greater Manchester context provided key points through which a multitude of ideologies could have found grounds to emerge, as she recalled:

> *One of the questions that I asked a few times [at a training event] was 'well, how's it different in Manchester from London?' and of course they didn't know because they were from London (laughs) so I've done my own sort of research if you like, and we are quite different you know, because here, in Greater Manchester, we've got, you know on our doorstep, one of the biggest universities in the country really and Manchester are doing research on embryos, animals… in leafy Cheshire we've got chemical companies, and some people there get targeted… obviously we've got fracking round here, and last year with Channel, the only school child who did work with Channel was a girl who was anti-vivisectionist league or whatever, one of those organisations. We have a lot of right-wing extremists, we have a lot of anti-Semitic hate crime in this area… in the Synagogues and during Jewish festival times they actually have the police incidents units' outsides, for safety, it's absolutely crazy… That might not be happening in other places, we don't know, so I think it has to be local, we have to know what's happening locally* (DSL, Academic Institute 3)

The local context, particularly considering the size and diversity of not only Greater Manchester but the areas surrounding it, was critical for understanding the breadth of reach the Prevent duty was required to have. It was through the DSL's engagement with her students, involvement with the local Channel board as a representative on their panel, and through her knowledge and connections with the local area and communities that she felt the presence of these ideologies having had the possibility to influence students within her institution. For her, the duty had to be about all forms of extremism and terrorism since it had the potential to be required to identify and deal with a multitude of concerns that were felt to be on her institutions doorstep: animal rights extremism, anti-Semitism, far-right and climate and environmental extremism were all considered as ideologies appropriate for consideration through Prevent. Importantly, such ideologies were not drawn upon in

response to questions surrounding a focus on Islamist-inspired extremism, but around the local context of the institution; for this DSL and her institution, whilst Islamist-inspired extremism had been a significant concern, 'other forms' were similarly at the forefront of this DSL's mind when it came to the duty.

The history and importance of community cohesion programmes that had been prominent across Greater Manchester were also drawn upon to highlight the different challenges that faced the area. For the North West Trade Union official, who had worked closely with a number of FE institutions across Greater Manchester, community cohesion had long been a part of a number of institutional priorities:

> *I think it's because there are people who know that [community cohesion] is an issue, you know… I mean if, you know, if you worked in Oldham, for example, I mean you must know some of the background that's happened in Oldham over the past 10 years… all that stuff around the white areas and the black areas and bringing those schools together and how difficult that's been… [the institutions] are bound to have an insight into it really because it's part of the cultural make-up isn't it of those areas…*
> (North West Trade Union Official)

For this participant, community tensions which were entrenched within the history of communities like Oldham within Greater Manchester, in his view provided a grounding for seeing the Prevent duty as applicable to everyone. The reference drew back on discussions within the literature review on the 2001 Northern riots (see Bagguley and Hussain, 2006). The divisions which occurred were viewed to be tensions which could have been exploited through radicalisation for anyone according to this DSL; it was not just about Muslim communities who might be targeted by Islamist organisations, but groups who utilised tensions *on the other side* to radicalise anti-Muslim, anti-immigration, pro-white communities as the 2001 riots had seen. Inferring the capacity for Prevent to engage with both sides, the experience spoke to the proposed shift from previous iterations of Prevent whereby community cohesion agendas had been, for a number of scholars, about making *good Muslims* (Cantle, 2001; Thomas, 2011; Mythen et al., 2013; Thomas, 2015; O'Toole et al., 2016). As the scholarship within the literature review revealed, social integration was therefore seen as an antithesis to terrorism and extremism; an improved sense of *Britishness* positioned as an enabler of good citizenship and ergo a counter to *Islamist* radicalisation

(Mythen et al., 2013; Alam and Husband, 2013). However, for the TUO, knowledge and experience of these divides now acted as a means through which the duty could be utilised to identify and counter the tensions that emerged as a result of them from both *sides*.

Whilst community cohesion had been absent from counter-terrorism legislation from 2011 – largely as a result of the resultant securitisation of Muslims which emerged from a problematic enmeshing of the agenda's (Thomas, 2015) – I argue that the notion of community has been reintroduced by the Prevent duty. For this TUO, the community and knowledge around it was key to helping shape the duty to respond to the different threats an institution might have encountered, something which was also present across the earlier excerpts surrounding the importance of knowledge of the local context. Hillary Pilkington's (2018) more recent claims following the report into extremism within Greater Manchester after the 2017 arena bombing, that communities are key to helping prevent radicalisation, furthered this claim. I argue, therefore, that whilst community cohesion agendas might have been distanced from counter-terrorism ones, the introduction of the Prevent duty has seen the community and the need for its cohesiveness brought squarely back into the mix. Moreover, these excerpts also demonstrate it was no longer just Muslim and non-Muslim but about a perceived shift in understanding 'vulnerable communities', those of various nature including religion, race, and class, who held a multiplicity of views across the multiple local contexts of ones Greater Manchester. For these participants, the duty therefore was not just about Islamist inspired threats, but all forms of terrorism and extremism that might utilise community tensions to radicalise anyone. The role of communities in the Prevent duty, therefore, warrants further attention elsewhere.

6.4 British Values as the Antithesis to Threat

This section explores the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat. It does so by examining training provisions and the subsequent practical implementation of the British values agenda in the first subsection and the language of Britishness in the following one. In doing so, it draws particularly on the previous two sections and argues that the implementation of the Prevent duty at institutional level through the British values agenda distorted the depiction of the Prevent duty as a continuation of existing practices and more

importantly was framed as problematic in aiding their delivery of a mechanism to safeguard *everyone.* It therefore demonstrates how the narrative was replicated out of necessity and in contrast to the previous sections, not internalised through acceptance.

6.4.1 "Try and get them to see British values as something that they're doing anyway"

British values had been posited by the UK government within the Prevent duty as those which, when embodied, would enable individuals to reject the ideas of extremist and terrorist ideologies. The values of democracy, individual liberty, mutual respect and tolerance and the rule of law were values which, by their nature, according to the UK government, were rejected and countered by organisations which held such ideologies. Thus, as outlined within chapter one, British values became the antithesis to the ideologies of these organisations and were thus promoted as the means by which extremism and terrorism could be countered.

In all but one of the institutions, the delivery of the British values curriculum had been led by a member of the teaching staff with none of the DSLs given the responsibility to implement this. I draw primarily on the single participant I had access to during the research to explore how this implementation occurred and use DSL responses to further explore the points where possible. This member of staff, referred to as the British Values Coordinator (BVC), was a member of teaching staff but with responsibility for the delivery of the British values agenda, is engaged with in this chapter for their institutional level implementation role (Training Institute 2). From their understanding, they were tasked with this role because of their experience in the classroom, knowing classroom management and having been familiar with previous agendas and the means through which they had been rolled out, such as Equality and Diversity. This suggested that, as McGhee and Zhang (2017, p.945) noted, the British values agenda had been 'fold(ed)' into existing practices. For the other DSLs, however, there were no real indicators provided to determine who had been responsibilised with the delivery of British values, often by someone outside of their safeguarding team, and why this was the case.

Despite her own perception of experience that had led to her selection to deliver the agenda, the BVC believed that she needed to have undertaken further research to fully understand the agenda and devise a suitable means of delivering it to her colleagues:

> *I read around it a little bit, I read some academic articles around British values, I didn't have a lot of time, but I didn't just want to do it from my perceptions, because I didn't really know what I thought about it if I'm honest, you just hear this term, and I knew about the whole Trojan Horse scandal, so-called, and that was when Michael Gove decided we had to have British values, so I just did a little bit of research into the background, and then I read a couple of critical articles*

The experience highlighted the limited guidance and training this coordinator had been provided with, which other DSL experiences did not suggest was unique in relation to the agenda. Instead, the BVC had sought her own resources to develop the training to provide to her colleagues. As a result, there was not only a division between safeguarding and British values in the implementation of the duty within institutions, as in who was delivering the agendas, but a division within the support which had been provided to staff. Whereas safeguarding meetings, networks and training sessions had been utilised and further devised upon the introduction of the duty, staff like the BVC were allocated the role of providing British values training but effectively, as this experience inferred, left to their own devices to do so. Moreover, as the BVC's experience also highlighted, this non-existent training created a gap in how to interpret and deliver British values and how to deal with the potential bias and prejudice in doing so. For the BVC in this study, critical reflection of resources, and of herself, was undertaken to minimise bias coming through the training. In trying to minimise staff bias, she focused on providing tangible materials that could have been utilised within the classroom to keep the potential for interpretation low. Furthermore, given the limited resourcing of both her own *training* and for her delivery of training for others, she argued, providing structured guidance as to how staff could include British values into the classroom pedagogy was prioritised over any depth of understanding around what it actually meant to enable staff to pass Ofsted inspections. This was confirmed by another DSL who discussed their implementation as the need to reference British values 'at the beginning of class, British values in the lesson plans, British values in the lessons' and have British values posters on the walls, rather than engage critically with them (DSL, Academic Institute 3).

Drawing back on the earlier excerpt, the BVC's experience also identified that whilst British values might have been new for institutions and those having to deliver and implement them, they were not a new agenda. In having referenced the 2014 Trojan Horse scandal the DSL traced the British values agenda back to Michael Gove, Education Secretary at the time, who utilised the lexicon of British values to demonise the alleged Islamist takeover of Birmingham schools, as earlier drawn upon in chapter one. However, as I have suggested elsewhere (James, 2018), the notion of British values actually goes as far back as Gordon Brown's (2007) Britishness seminar in 2007 with David Cameron (2010) then seen to incorporate British Values within his 'Big Society' endeavour three years later. Thus, in line with the literature (Revell and Bryan, 2016; Miah, 2017; Habib, 2018; Poole, 2018), the affair was not the catalyst for British values, but for the inclusion of them within education settings (Poole, 2018). In having recognised this history, and attributing the values to Michael Gove, the BVCs experience inferred that the duty had failed to latch the agenda onto existing ones through its labelling as 'British'. The agenda thus disrupted elite's presentation of the duty as a continuation of existing practices, with participants viewing British values as new, a point I return to in the next sub-section.

6.4.2 Safeguarding *everybody* through *British* values: "the majority of staff just want to get it right"

British values had also been placed by Ofsted as a requirement for meeting institutional obligations in relation to the Prevent duty through embedding British values into the delivery of the curriculum, regardless of the subject matter, and demonstrating that they had been internalised by students. Though the implementation of the British values agenda within the classroom is explored within the following chapter of the thesis, the British Values Coordinator (BVC) shared an experience of how this became implemented at institutional level in the directives provided to teaching staff:

> *I had a class this afternoon, there were thirteen students there and there was one white student and everybody else was Asian, black, the teacher was black. I've just given her feedback actually on how she could've done a little bit more on British values… so what I've written in her feedback, she did a little thing on world cancer day so she just brought in about it being world cancer day and I said to her 'you missed an*

opportunity there to embed British values' but then I wrote 'but don't call them British values, call them, our values' and I said to her 'you could have contrasted the health care that a cancer sufferer receives in a liberal democracy like ours, and given the nature of the people in the room, you could've asked if anybody has got a story from another country, and in that way you're reinforcing the message that actually this is a good country to live in and we have got a democracy and we have got a national health service and you know in a lot of respects we've got access to so much more than people have in other parts of the world, so to me that's a way you can enforce, it's a way you can embed British values but it's what good teachers have always done, you don't need a British label on it (British Values Coordinator, Training Institute 2)

This experience highlighted a number of paradoxes which occurred in trying to meet Ofsted's requirements. Firstly, the experience challenged the idea that conversations which enable British values to be embedded within the classroom emerged *naturally*, as many of the DSLs perceived Ofsted would want to have seen. Instead, conversations were manufactured and scripted to ensure British values were visible during lessons. The excerpt demonstrated how the use of British Values calendar, utilising key events like World Cancer Day, were used as the vehicle through which British values could be delivered. Despite the BVC claiming that teachers would have promoted values of respect and democracy because it's "what good teachers have always done", she, or her institution – this was not clear - felt it necessary to provide this guidance at institutional level whereby tangible examples could be drawn upon to ensure an explicit delivery of British values.

Moreover, whilst the label of British was questioned by the BVC, as it was by a number of other DSLs, there was juxtaposingly a need, within a classroom of diverse students, to promote the notion of Britishness. Here, it appeared that the cultural and national background of students was used to formulate a comparison to have suggested that it was better to be British, or at the very least be within Britain. Yet, as Maylor (2016, p.323) found, referring to the values as British was viewed as problematic and divisive. Instead, the BVCs' guidance to staff implementing them within the classroom therefore instructed them to call them "our values" whilst also explicitly referencing the merits of British society suggesting that, as Vincent (2019, p.24) found, there had been a 're-packaging' of the agenda in an attempt to 'normalise' it.

The reframing of the values as "our values" also occurred in Academic Institute 1 to account for the potential divisions which were perceived to potentially occur within an institution of a diverse make-up, as a result of the language of *Britishness*. When asked about the implementation of British values, the DSL began discussing the religious make-up of the institution. Though this was referred to in the context of tolerance and respect being a central part of their existing institutional ethos, the reference to religion, rather than race, gender, class or any other identity marker, suggested that there was an implicit association made between British values and religion. The experience demonstrated the applicability of the debate within the literature about Muslims, in the context of the War on Terror, being the ones needing to demonstrate their Britishness and therefore their *non-threat.* Thus, for this DSL, the experience of implementing British values highlighted that it was about making Muslims feel included within British values, rather than excluded from these values by their difference. The hyper-visibilisation of Muslim students by this DSL was unintentional but highlighted the way in which British values were seen, despite the insistence that they saw and treated all students the same, as inherently more applicable to some than others.

As earlier noted, for the BVC and other DSLs, the British values agenda was positioned as something which had required a shift from institutions, particularly in reference to the inclusion and utilisation of the language of British values. For others, however, the narrative of continuity was also visible within discussions around the agenda. A number of the participants referred to the longstanding equality and diversity agenda which was already embedded within education institutions prior to the duty. As one DSL claimed:

> *For me, if you take Prevent out of it for a minute, British values is an extension of the equality and diversity work we've done in colleges for the last fifteen years, it's no different for me and that's what I say to people… If we'd have had British values first and worked with that in the way that we work with E and D, I think we'd have all said "oo it's like the old E and D" and then perhaps, perhaps we might have had more of an understanding. You've got this branding of British values and this branding of Prevent that came together, whether they should be together or not, whether training should be delivered as those two things, I don't think they should, I think British values should sit with when we're talking about equality and diversity, when we're teaching students*

about the code of conduct within college and how we should behave towards each other, I think Prevent should sit within safeguarding and it being part of safeguarding (DSL, Academic and Training Institute)

The experience grounded British values within institutions as a continuation of existing practices, seeing it as an extension of a broader values approach to teaching, as Revell and Bryan (2018) had similarly found. Instead, it was the language shift through the use of 'British' that was perceived as *new* for institutions. Yet, there was simultaneously a recognition that the agenda behind the values *was new* after all*;* for this DSL, its positioning as part of the Prevent duty as a safeguarding mechanism was problematic in placing values as part of a counter-terrorism agenda, not a pedagogic one. This, she suggested, damaged the "understanding" surrounding the agenda having amalgamated, what she perceived to be, very different agendas. In its provision through the Prevent duty, the British values agenda had become not about values, but about the right kind of values that prevented radicalisation. The British values agenda was positioned to be about safeguarding everyone, through its utilisation of existing values that were already embedded within institutions, but through its provision alongside safeguarding against radicalisation, had become about utilising British values (or a failure to embody them) as a means of determining who might be deemed vulnerable to radicalisation. The values which should have been a continuation of existing practices for these institutions became transformed into what it meant to be British - not in being a member of a community or contributing to the ethos or values of the institution but as the critical literature points out, being someone who did not present a threat (Farrell, 2016; Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017).

We had a lot of ESOL [English for Speakers of Other Languages] students at the time, a lot of ESOL students where I was previously and it just felt wrong, it just felt so wrong… I mean why is it British? Because we might be owning that and saying "these are our British values" but does that mean nobody else in any other country has those same values? Because they do! We're thinking about the ones that don't have those values and why that is an issue, or why it's an advantage that we have them, but I don't, I'm not sure what gives us the right to actually own what a lot of people sort of consider, well they're sort of basic human values or global values, so, personally, I'm

over it now, I'm over the British part of the values thing (DSL, Academic and Training Institute)

The excerpt echoed all of the experiences within the institutional implementation of British values whereby participants had questioned "what is British? (laughs)" (DSL, Academic Institute 3), positioning it as both problematic and pointless rhetoric. DSLs, and the BVC, all stressed the capacity for the agenda to have been brought in and adopted by staff as a development to an existing values agenda in keeping with the broader notion of equality and diversity. However, through the labelling of the values as British, the agenda was perceived to have been about determining the good from the bad, creating an "Us" and "Them" through something which was deemed to be by its nature unifying of all humanity, not dividing by national superiority. In other words, threat became conceptualised by a failure to assimilate and *become* a good British citizen through the embodiment of these British values. This became particularly problematic for staff who had previously stressed the importance of reading the Prevent duty as applicable to all forms of extremism and terrorism; in seeing the values agenda as something which only *British* people could have adopted and the values as being the antithesis to extremism and terrorism, the experiences highlighted how non- or anti-British(ness) was positioned as threatening and thus, that which needed safeguarding against (Smith, 2016).

This potential stigmatisation of those positioned as not British, or not British *enough,* was also particularly problematic for a number of the participants in the potential for these discourses be utilised by far-right groups. Some of the participants drew directly on the role of Brexit in fuelling what one DSL suggested it "being okay to be racist" (DSL, Training Institute 2) arguing that this had resulted, they perceived, in a real impact on how British values could be interpreted "in the wrong way" (DSL, Academic and Training Institute) by some people. As the BVC shared, during training sessions with staff:

> *I've had a minority of white working-class male staff who have reacted in quite an alarming way actually, they'd wrote "it's to make them behave like us" … "it's to make them behave like us" …*

The long pauses were used to demonstrate the shock with which this educator felt that such remarks had been made within the classroom by a member of staff.

… So, I put it up, just parked it, and 'oh we'll come back to this later on' because I was giving them the benefit of the doubt. I thought well maybe it's just a ham-fisted way of saying "well we live in a democracy and these are the rules we have to abide by" but no, it wasn't. So when I came on to the scenarios, one scenario that I've given them is 'imagine you are an English for speakers of other languages tutor and you are taking a group of students out and they come from all different parts of the word I think they were refugees, need to learn English and your lesson today is buying food… how could you embed British values into that? So the answers I usually get are "that people can exchange ideas from different cultures through food so 'we cook it this way' 'we cook it that way'" so it was to foster tolerance and mutual respect through talking about things that people have got in common and every class that I every delivered who I ever gave that scenario to came up with that answer that it was a way of bonding people and uniting them, this one said, "well I'd tell them, to go to that stall over there, and get served by that woman in the mini skirt"[…] [it was] sexist, it was racist, and it was intended to put me in my place as well and I just said 'why would you do that?'[…] "well, they won't shake hands with us, they're not allowed to speak to us, they treat women like dirt" so it's this 'they'[…] This is staff, these are people, I know it's a minority, but still they're being expected to teach British values… If it's misunderstood, it can be hijacked for a completely wrong agenda! (British Values Coordinator, Training Institute 2)

The possibility for the British values agenda to feed into narratives utilised by the far-right was very real for this DSL in their first-hand experience of narratives of ethno-national superiority associated with right-wing ideologies having been promulgated by their colleague. For this participant, it was the rhetoric of Britishness that both enabled these views to be shared and limited the BVC to challenge them given the perceived acceptability of nationalism that they were felt to have promoted (Allen, 2019). The potential for institutions without someone to challenge such views, to have had staff utilise the far-right approach to British values "for the purpose of recruiting people to have a right-wing ideology" was felt to be real. Through the rhetoric of Britishness, all of the participants felt there was a promulgation of the "us and them" narrative by the British values agenda, a key element to such an agenda being hijacked by far-right organisations (see also Lockley-Scott, 2019, p.362). The implementation of British values as a key tenet of the Prevent duty in institutions was

positioned as an antithesis to threat. The presence of these discourses and the role of the far-right in institutions requires further attention.

6.5 Threat as our responsibility to safeguard against

This section explores institutional staff internalisations of their responsibilisation in enacting the Prevent duty. Firstly, it reveals the referral systems in place across the institutions and the challenges which occurred within the processes of referring, and secondly examines key examples drawn upon by DSLs to demonstrate the complexity of enacting these processes. In doing so, the section demonstrates that, although the practice was more complex than policy elites had depicted in the previous chapter, the framework of safeguarding meant institutional staff internalised the conceptualisation of threat as a responsibility for them to safeguard those within their institution against.

6.5.1 Existing referral mechanisms, new responsibilities

The experiences of those who participated in the research suggested that at the institutional level of implementation, the narrative of responsibility, put forward by policy elites, had been internalised with DSLs depicting themselves and their roles as responsible for identifying and referring concerns regarding potential radicalisation, as they would have for another other form of harm. The referral systems were thus positioned as a continuation of existing practices within the institutional implementation as a result of the safeguarding framework. However, once the concern reached DSL level, though in the same way as other concerns, they would have similarly been investigated for their credibility, it appeared that there were extra precautions taken by DSLs where radicalisation concerns were raised. In doing so, a number of departures from current depictions of the referral system came to fruition.

All of the participating institutions had referral systems in place that meant once an individual had presented themselves as potentially vulnerable, a concern would be raised with the safeguarding teams to establish the severity and required action for the perceived risks. These were flexible processes which contained a mix of formal and informal procedures to enable appropriate and considered enactment (Ball et al., 2012): "our referral system is about getting

all the information and advice first and then referring" (DSL, Academic Institute 1). A standard *formal* process which involved a staff member noticing a concern or issue, said staff member approaching the safeguarding lead with the concern and then the safeguarding lead referring the concern to Channel. However, in practice, the process was far more fluid and involved important moments of informal dialogue with both internal and external parties, at various stages. I argue this demonstrated, firstly, a challenge to the current critical scholarship which problematised educationalists responsibility to refer on the basis of their capacity, the appropriateness and the consequences of them doing so (Heath-Kelly et al., 2015; Miah, 2017; Qurashi, 2017; Dudenhoefer, 2018) and instead offered insight into their referral processes as complex, considered and based on experience and knowledge. Secondly, I argue that the referral processes highlighted a challenge to elite presentations of safeguarding referral mechanisms as continuations of existing practices whereby staff appeared to take extra precautions in their referral processes for fear of *getting it wrong* or not meeting their statutory duty. Finally, I argue that the fluidity of referral mechanisms in relation to the duty highlighted the paradox apparent between trusting the judgement of staff in relation to individual concerns and the broader consistency of approach for the overall implementation of the Prevent duty. Despite these ambiguities which surrounded the implementation of the duty through referral mechanisms, as this section now explores, DSLs and those responsible for the institutional implementation of the duty all internalised their responsibility to safeguard against threat; the issues which occurred were limitations which they sought to overcome to remain committed to safeguarding those potentially vulnerable to radicalisation.

Though there was nothing stopping a member of staff from reporting something as a member of the public, one DSL acknowledged, there was an outlined preference within institutions that staff would report the concern to their DSL in the first instance. This was to mitigate the "knee-jerk" reactions (DSL, Academic and Training Institute) that some DSLs felt likely to occur "because as soon as somebody sees a student's been looking at such a thing on the internet its panic panic panic stations" (DSL, Academic and Training Institute). The referral coming through them would have enabled these DSLs to identify where referrals were out of panic, rather than identification of vulnerability. This was, largely, no different from any other form of harm where a concern would similarly be passed to the DSL, not any particular agency,

demonstrating a continuity with existing practices which was apparent in the implementation of the duty. The utilisation of these systems of referral enabled DSLs to pick out the referrals which caused concern through an application of their knowledge and expertise and identify the behaviour and performance of the student, to speak with a number of potential sources within the institution who might have knowledge of the student, and to identify if any other concerns might also have been raised – whether by another member of staff or another service in relation to a different concern. In the latter case, this enabled DSLs to establish where a student might have already been "in the system" (DSL, Academic and Training Institute) and aid their own and other agencies work by identifying which, if any, existing routes of safeguarding might have already existed. Moreover, for the DSLs, identifying, investigating and assessing safeguarding concerns was a central part of their role which could not be done by other members of staff due to the limitations of knowledge, experience and training. This, however, was no different than had been the case prior to the duty. DSLs internalised the responsibility to implement and enact the duty through these referral mechanisms through its positioning as safeguarding; for them, the duty had become an extension of their existing practices and thus embedded as such.

However, within some of the discussions around DSLs decisions on what would warrant a concern to be taken forward to Prevent, there emerged a distinct shift outside of the narrative of continuity which saw a referral for potential radicalisation differ somewhat from a referral made regarding other forms of harm. For one DSL, they recalled the extent of work that had been required, and requested, for a Prevent referral to have met the threshold for Channel consideration – or consideration by the counter-terrorism unit prior to being passed onto the local safeguarding Channel board, which fieldwork identified was the actual route of referral outside of institutions or organisations. In discussing a case whereby assistance from Channel felt warranted, one DSL recalled being asked to provide more evidence to substantiate the concern that they had:

> *The police once said to me, "do more! Do more [DSL's name]!" can you imagine saying that for CSE* [Child Sexual Exploitation]*? That wouldn't happen! It's outrageous! Absolutely outrageous and I'll have that on tape! Because if you look at CSE, once you spoil a case, we can't spoil a case, I mean that's a key thing about safeguarding, you take it so far but you don't put on your police hat and say 'well can you tell me, what*

time did you leave the house to meet the ten men?' you do not go that far because you spoil a case, you taint it, and you're tampering with evidence, do you know what I mean? […] But when they get a call from somebody like me, or a safeguarding lead, I'm not Joe Bloggs, do you know what I mean? There are reasons why I'm thinking something's odd here, you know and I can't say, if you look at that man that I was telling you about earlier[47], where I said he was going to meetings all around the country, I mean you couldn't get somebody like me saying 'well take me, I'd like to go to one of the meetings with you because I've got to provide evidence that you're at a meeting that I think you're at so I can provide evidence to the police' I mean you look at that with CSE, say you're dealing with a fifteen year old girl, you know I can't say 'can I go out with you at three o clock in the morning to see who you're meeting' it's absolute bloody nonsense isn't it! Do you know what I mean? […] It was as if to say, "I want more from you and then I'll treat it seriously", I found it quite arrogant (DSL, Training Institute 2)

For this DSL, the belief that for them to have referred a concern to Channel, information had been collected which presented it as significant and requiring expertise of a higher level, even beyond knowledge and training this participant had received to deal with safeguarding situations. However, such knowledge and remit of responsibility could have only gone so far which, as for any other safeguarding concern, was where specialist services would be drawn upon to provide the necessary support and guidance. As the DSL also noted, there was only *so much* information which could be collected by them, highlighting the limits to their responsibility both in their role to safeguard but in their profession as educationalists who only had access to certain parts of student's lives. Beyond this was where those with specialist authority and knowhow were employed. Yet, for this DSL it was felt that such limitations had not been considered by the police; she suggested that they had asked her to overstep the boundaries which she felt were in place through her role by asking her to go beyond that which she had already done.

Though CSE had been used frequently by both DSLs and policy elites within the previous chapter, alongside child abuse and gangs, in presenting radicalisation as another form of harm

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[47] This example is drawn upon in the following subsection, 6.5.2

against which children needed safeguarding, I argue this lens became blurred within this experience and highlighted a point at which the framework of safeguarding became fractured. In doing so, it highlighted a limitation to the referral processes whereby existing mechanisms and practices were not sufficient, but alternative routes had not been provided or resourced. Despite internalising the framing of radicalisation and CSE as forms of harm which both involved the exploitation of vulnerability, in this DSLs' experience they became treated differently when it came to the transfer of responsibility of evidence collection on the DSL, rather than a Prevent or counter-terrorism expert, despite the ownness being perceived to remain with the police in a CSE case. Though the DSL noted that they could "kind of understand why the police are doing it because they must be inundated with calls, they must also get some really strange stuff coming from people", as educationalists, they insisted that there was only so much information which they are both professionally and legally able to obtain. The experience then raised concerns about if the capacity for the existing referral mechanisms to implement the duty were sufficient enough to enable DSLs to identify concerns and create cases that would have warranted Channel intervention. Further, in sharing the concern the DSL highlighted how they had felt unable to fulfil the level of responsibility that was being asked of them by the police. The implementation of the duty through referral mechanisms then created a disparity between the level of responsibility assumed of the DSLs in theory to continue and expand existing roles and in practice, to go beyond that.

A further point at which experiences of the referral mechanism implementation had become more complex at DSL level, than had been inferred by policy elites, was the inclusion of the individual concerned within the process. Engagement with the student in question further enabled the information collection process according to a number of the participants. DSLs outlined that these conversations had often been open in discussing directly with the student the concern that had been raised. Students would be asked around a change in dress, a written or verbal comment, online activity or their engagement in an event or occurrence. This, for all DSLs, was incredibly important to ensure that the child remained involved in the process, given it was about them. Secondly it was to provide the student with the opportunity to give their own version of events or explanation. This further challenged some of the critiques levelled by those within the critical scholarship who have suggested that the covert

nature of referral systems, created by the surveillance of students for signs of radicalisation, excluded students from the process (see Miah, 2017; Qurashi, 2017; Dudenhoefer, 2018). For these DSLs, engaging directly with the student was an integral part to their process of implementing the Prevent duty, and it was, in conjunction with other information, after speaking with the student that the DSL felt able to decide whether it was a Prevent referral, or whether the concern was resolvable or could be monitored and dealt with internally.

External services were also included within these processes of consideration. Many DSLs had spoken to Prevent referral units for advice, prior to recording any official referrals, highlighting a further additional layer to their referral process. For all of the DSLs who discussed using the units for advice as to whether a concern met the threshold for official channels, the opportunity to gain guidance from these sources was looked upon positively and as an aid to their understanding in light of the responsibility to ultimately *make the call,* particularly when ascertaining which service might be most appropriate for the concern being raised and where if multiple vulnerabilities which crossed multiple potentials for harm were visible. As one DSL noted:

> *DSL: Where it gets messy as well with, if I've got a Channel concern, and something that I think should go to Channel, and the person is under the age of eighteen, do I go to children's services first? Do I go to Channel first? Do I make a referral to both of them? Do I assume that one's going to refer to the other? And until you pick your way through it- and every authority will tell you different as well*
>
> NJ: In terms of what to do?
>
> *DSL: uhm yeah, which is the case with child protection as well, it will all be slightly different, we just pick our way through it* (DSL, Academic and Training Institute)

Whilst the experience suggested that engagement with external agencies was necessary to determine the appropriateness of referral to Prevent, it also highlighted a further layer to DSL's responsibility whereby it had become their role to ascertain which service would be most appropriate. Despite the portrayal by policy elites in the previous chapter of referral systems simply having to identify vulnerability and let the experts decide whether or not it was prevent-related, DSLs had perceived this to be their responsibility in needing to identify which service the concern was most appropriate for. The excerpt furthered this by demonstrating a lack of dialogue between and across the different agencies whereby this DSL,

who had made several Prevent referrals and was confident in their ability to determine a concern which required support for any service, remained unaware of the wider case management of referrals and the role of the different services within them. I argue that this denoted a failure in the referral system whereby DSLs were left in silos, unable to participate and engage in the wider management of concerns and develop the necessary contextual knowledge to understand what impact and role their decisions had within it.

It was also noted that this was not something unique to Prevent, however and that these complex negotiations had occurred with all safeguarding concerns. Their Prevent duty in this respect mirrored other performances of policy where educators were responsible for managing resource and engaging with external partners in constrained circumstances on a regular basis (Ball, 2003; Braun et al., 2011). Further, DSLs stressed that no one case with safeguarding would ever be the same and as such, the fluidity in not having set guidelines which left DSLs having to determine the appropriateness of a referral to Prevent, or any other service, whilst creating some problems, enabled DSLs and the referral process to cater to individual cases which could have been unique in their arising. Yet, this uncertainty around threshold requirements – understanding what met the level necessary to warrant referral to external agencies both in relation to Prevent and other forms of harm – for some was more problematic, something which Moffat and Gerard (2020, p.206) found for teaching staff in their study. This created a "barrier" for DSLs to be able to fully undertake their duty (DSL, Academic and Training Institute) with arbitrary threshold requirements perceived to have created invisible goal posts for their decisions to work within. The implementation of the duty through the responsibility to refer, I argue, became a balance between DSLs using their professional capacity to assess individual cases and the need to conform to conventional safeguarding practices in maintaining consistency of approach and compliance. For DSLs, the responsibility to implement referral mechanisms had been internalised but it was not just about identifying vulnerability and passing it on to Channel; as these experiences highlighted, they saw their responsibility to be about identifying vulnerability, examining its roots and potential outcomes and determining to what extent an external referral was necessary and their role within this. How this played out in the practice of making a referral is now examined.

6.5.2 The realities of referring and the limits of responsibilisation

The internalisation of the responsibility to implement the Prevent duty and safeguard against threat became particularly clear when DSLs discussed cases they had been involved with. In these instances, DSLs positioned the prevention of vulnerability and potential radicalisation of their students as a central part of their role in both protecting the individual from harm, but also those around them from their potential actions. For one DSL who participated in the research, their motivation for doing so was emotive and personal (Academic Institute 3). This institution had experienced cases of former students who had ended up engaged with extremism and/or terrorism and died as a result of their actions. For this DSL, participating in the research provided her with an opportunity to share experiences around the referral processes in relation to both the lessons learned and the warnings she felt needed to be acknowledged in the responsibility to implement. I argue that the ability to have shared such experiences also provided an opportunity to give their perspective of events and the perceived consequences on them, their colleagues and their institution that emerged as a result. Details are omitted to prevent identification though the DSL spoke at length about the cases and the students involved, expressing upset but also anger and guilt that they had occurred. Each of the cases experienced by this and other DSLs offered critical insight into the realities of the perceived responsibility that DSLs expected of themselves, and also felt expected of them.

The first case the DSL disclosed was a young man who had become involved in an organisation that he ultimately lost his life for, as a result of his engagement:

> DSL: *[He was] a good student, very good student, passed all his exams, did well, was liked by staff, there was no hint, he didn't come my way, nobody had, there was nothing. He was due to go to University, and we just assumed that he'd started in the October, his parents assumed that he'd started, we now understand that he'd told his sister he was going to be a hero or whatever*
>
> NJ: Did that come as a shock to everyone?

DSL: *Absolute shock to everybody, you know he was from [the local area]*[48]*, you know, nice family, there was nothing, absolutely nothing, we were devastated* (DSL, Academic Institute 3)

In this case, the DSL and their colleagues were only made aware of his involvement as a result of his death; there were none of the 'warning signs' that Prevent trained them to spot, there were no vulnerabilities which could have flagged this student to their attention, and there were no warnings from other agencies which could have alerted the institution to this boy's intention. Alongside the 'devastat[ion]' and 'shock' which this DSL said was felt, was also the guilt felt by them in not having been able to refer this student to Channel. For them, their responsibility to have spotted such individuals left them with self-doubt about their knowledge and implementation of the duty, questioning their actions surrounding this individual as to whether they had missed something. The case suggested that the responsibility to safeguard against threat had been so deeply internalised that even where there had been no action perceived necessary, those within these positions of responsibility to safeguard had perceived themselves to have failed. Without transferring responsibility for these perceived failures onto DSLs, I argue the case also raised questions around the "signs" which they were trained to look out for in potential radicalisation cases. The case problematises the notion of being able to *spot* signs of vulnerability to radicalisation, thus drawing back on the debates within the previous chapter surrounding the critical literatures challenges against the ERG22+. In other words, for this DSL, there simply were no *signs,* the training she had received had not been applicable for this case and the vulnerabilities that she would normally look for did not exist. The case, therefore demonstrated the potential dangers that could result in responsibilising staff to implement a programme which prevented radicalisation and the emotional burdening that occurred when this did not fit as planned (see also Revell, 2019 who cites ; McCulloch and Wilson, 2017; Revell and Bryan, 2016).

In the second case, a young man was identified by the institution as he had presented what the DSL saw to be vulnerabilities to radicalisation; however, as the DSL recalled, the external agency of Channel, whom the participant felt could be trusted to protect the individual where she was no longer able to, dismissed her concern. Channel were perceived to have failed both

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[48] local area removed to avoid identification

her and the student in a case which once again saw an individual lose their life as a result of engagement with extremism and/or terrorism that was not prevented:

He was in his second year, in his first year he had dressed casually, he was very bright, best in the class, he had a good job […] he was the top student in that class. Second year came and he started missing classes, he started dressing in more traditional clothes, he travelled abroad, he said for medical reasons, but it was a bit odd, he distanced himself from his friends. When he came to see one of my team, he was very, controlled in what he said about what he was doing, so this raised alarm bells for us, it was like 'these are all the classic signs, this boy's being groomed' so contacted Channel officers, they came in and they spoke to this young man with the teacher, unfortunately I was in another meeting I couldn't be in this meeting, but with the teacher, and the mentor, and at the end when they came to see me they said "no, everything's fine, he's just attending the mosque more because he's likely to be the first member of his family who's going to be an Imam", but they reassured us everything was absolutely fine, there was nothing, and he went to university and then a short while after that he was then killed as a terrorist […] That one really upset us because, we had identified it, and we felt that we had passed it to the right people, we felt reassured that there was nothing because there was nothing you know, we had nothing else, he'd never said to us "I'm going to kill somebody", "I'm going to do this"… we still have in the back, my team anyway, we have in the back of our minds that, did we push him over the edge? Maybe he wasn't going to be a terrorist but when we brought in the police, and they spoke to him, maybe that was, "they're all against me" that was maybe his trigger, we don't know that, and that does worry me at times (DSL, Academic Institute 3)*

The DSL was visibly upset and frustrated by the outcome of the case with moments where their anger at the perceived failure of services came through in their body language and tone of voice as they retold of the incident. The DSL had felt her, and her team had fulfilled their Prevent duty, they had referred an individual whom they were concerned about and they had asked for the help and support in safeguarding him from the spaces they perceived him to have been becoming involved in. They were assured by those they relied on that the it was 'absolutely fine' and the concern required no further investigation or referral. The use of external sources highlighted the point at which this DSL perceived her responsibility to have

been transferred whereby her safeguarding role had reached its point of professional capacity. Further, despite her concerns that the case *did* require the support of these services, her perception of the expertise and responsibility of these external services saw her trust their judgement. The eventual outcome of the case demonstrated the DSL's judgement as correct, with the individual going on to engage in acts of extremism and/or terrorism. This saw their responsibilisation performed in an additional way whereby she, as a result, took on responsibility for the failure to support the individual despite her having placed the responsibility in someone else's hands by referring it, as her Prevent training had required her to do. The DSL shared that the instance had left her distrustful of the system which she not only perceived to have failed both her and the individual but also to have questioned her own professionalism. I argue that this instance demonstrated the emotional impacts which can be felt when something "goes wrong" with Prevent and responsibility has been placed on individuals to *get it right*. Even though the DSL and their institution had followed the guidelines and training and the decision to de-escalate the concern had been above their head, the feeling of guilt engulfed this DSL's experience in believing that they had not done enough. It raised questions about the pressures placed on DSL's and others responsible for safeguarding against vulnerability and the point at which responsibility or these failures were placed; for this DSL, she had not only internalised her responsibility to prevent but the perceived failure of another agency to take responsibility too.

Moreover, though the DSL felt failed by Channel in the above case, the burden of the individual losing their life as a result of their engagement in extremism and/or terrorism pushed them to work towards not allowing this type of case to happen again. Yet, in doing so, it also resulted, they argued, in them being "very, very careful [of] reporting somebody" because of that fear that involving outside agencies "pushed" the individual in the previous case "over the edge". In raising concern about Channel, the DSL had gone on to extend her own responsibility by taking on the task of evidence collection and vulnerability support, referring to external agencies where absolutely necessary. The point at which this would occur draws back on discussions in the previous sub-section around thresholds. For this DSL and the DSL within Training Institute 2, the issue of thresholds for which concerns warranted Channel consideration or not, had created a blind spot for their institutions where their responsibility was blurred by understanding what did or did not need reporting:

There was another one that I had about seven months ago where we had real concerns about a young man, and his attendance was off kilter, he was going off around the country to various meetings, he'd arrive up in a fancy car although he had didn't have two pennies to rub together apparently, and there were various things and we were fearing, and he was going off to Qatar, and by some of the things he had said and the way he was coming across to us, it was like the classic kind of what things you might look out for, so I contacted the anti-terrorist unit, I think I did a referral and they contacted me back and said I didn't have enough evidence that he was involved in extremist groups and I must admit I thought at the time, fair enough, but I think they could've talked to me... part of me thought 'my god, is this the way you're playing it now? Asking us to get the evidence?' […] It made me think last time well what more evidence would you like from me? Would you like me to go to a right-wing meeting with him, take some pictures?... And this is what always worries me, I suppose I spend my life covering my back but, if I don't report it, I'm damned and if I do report it, I'm damned either way. Say that person goes on to put a bomb in the Arndale, they'll say "well she never reported it, she never told us she had any concerns" or "yes she did tell them she had concerns but they didn't take it seriously", you know? (DSL, Training Institute 2)*

As a result of their dealings with Prevent-related external agencies, the DSLs who provided excerpts here had seen their responsibility for the implementation go beyond that which was presented to them within their training and that which was presented to them, and me, by policy elite participants. For both of these DSLs, a large part of this was down to the limitations of "resource" which Channel and the local Prevent team within the counter-terrorism unit had, particularly after the Manchester arena bombings which both DSLs felt would have had a 'massive' impact on the number of referrals being made. However, though they had sympathy, the resultant lack of support from these agencies was perceived to be problematic. As one of the DSLs argued "[Prevent has] got key people in organisations taking responsibility but "we'll give them bugger all resource and we won't give them any support!"" (DSL, Training Institute 2); I argue this sentiment from the DSL represented the perception that the responsibility of Prevent in theory was something quite different than had been played out in practice.

Roles had become increasingly involved with the concern, as opposed to simply referring it for "experts" to deal with, as a number of the elite participants claimed. A number of the DSL's also reported having to get involved and provide support for an individual who had been of concern where Prevent-related support had been refused:

> It's as if oh they've got, you know, all these wonderful resources where "we'll come and talk to these students" and that hasn't happened for any of the students I've referred […] The services provided to the students is me, yep, "you talk to them"[…] They're saying there's not enough to go on, you know? Unless somebody has said "I'm going to plant a bomb" or "I'm going to kill people" then nothing else seems to be enough… and I find that very frustrating, especially when we've lost students (DSL, Academic Institute 3)

The experiences highlighted the level of dissatisfaction from DSLs with the external referral processes that were in place and the implications this had had on their perceived responsibilities to prevent. The promise of resource provision had not materialised, and they had, as a result, been forced to expand their role into a potential de-radicalisation expert where it had become, they argued, their role to de-escalate a concern. Thus, in being refused access to or not having been provided with resources which they felt would have enabled them to provide such support, DSLs felt not only further failed by the external systems but further responsibilised in becoming experts by self-directives, not by professional training. For them, external agencies had failed to both take on their responsibility to deal with concerns but also to have enabled DSLs to do so. Thus, though they internalised their responsibility to safeguard against threat, they also problematised the realities of it in practice.

A case drawn upon by one participant provided another means through which responsibilisation became entrenched through the Prevent duty. The response is not attributed to any individual DSL or institution for anonymity purposes. The case demonstrated the ways in which an institution could simultaneously be proven to have fulfilled their responsibility to prevent by the relevant authorities, whilst having responsibility for radicalisation placed upon them for perceived failures that had no grounding:

> DSL: *We didn't know anything about that at all, nothing. He was a bit weird at times, you know, a bit strange attitude towards women at times… That was a huge shock,*

huge, for the staff that taught him particularly, because there was nothing, just nothing at all. Yeah, he was a bit weird at times, but lots of kids are a bit weird at times, you know…

NJ: How does something like that affect an institution?

DSL: *Hugely. Hugely… all of that was really hard because again it was like 'well these are his friends, we don't know whether they're involved or not involved, we need to check them out' because you just don't know, we didn't know… then a lot of, well I mean I would say I'm still getting it, the backlash, because, well we didn't know anything about him, and so therefore other authorities in [the local area] didn't know, and every time, I would say every time I go to a Prevent meeting it's mentioned, and it's like "you never told us anything", 'we didn't know!'*

NJ: so, there's almost like a portion of blame?

DSL: *yes, very much yes, yeah and that has been hard, you know?*

The experience demonstrated the way responsibility for a failure in the Prevent system could be placed upon education institutions; notably, however, this had not come from the Channel system who had stated the institution had fully undertaken their responsibility to Prevent and fulfilled their duty, but from the wider community and the local safeguarding board. The experience recalled by the DSL suggested that it was the nature of the events as related to acts of extremism and/or terrorism which had led to this failed responsibility being imposed upon them. It was implied that this would not have happened for any other form of harm, largely because of the profile with which radicalisation and the acts which followed in this instance received within the wider public. The DSL felt because of the responsibility the duty placed upon educational institutions, they had automatically been positioned as responsible where a previous student had gone on to engage in these actions, even where *signs* could not be spotted. Though there were no official measures taken against the institution, since it had been proven that they had fulfilled their duty, the DSL felt there had been a stigma placed upon them by other agencies who saw them as having failed in their responsibility to Prevent. As a result of both this and the guilt which the incident and subsequent reaction to it brought, the DSL and their staff further internalised the narrative of responsibility in enacting their duty with the events continuously in mind of what happened when *things went wrong.* The case for them, despite having not been *officially* seen as a result of their inaction, acted as a constant reminder of the importance of their responsibility to play their part in safeguarding

against threat. Moreover, I argue, it demonstrated how the responsibilisation of institutions and their staff went far beyond the need to identify and report a concern, but also take responsibility for the actions of those who were perceived to be failed or missed by Prevent. The duty responsibilised anyone who it deemed appropriate to have due regard in the need to Prevent, and the responsibility both to protect against radicalisation and accept failure in doing so was therefore everyone's to share.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter engaged with the experiences of those responsible for implementing the Prevent duty at institutional level in order to examine the conceptualisation of threat at this level within the FE sector. The chapter built upon the analysis revealed at elite level, examining the extent to which threat was understood as vulnerability to safeguard against; as all forms of terrorism and extremism; and, as everybody's responsibility to safeguard. It revealed the internalisation of these frameworks by all of the participants at institutional level whereby narratives of continuity were drawn upon to position the duty as extensions of existing responsibility in its framing as a safeguarding mechanism. However, the chapter also revealed multiple points where these narratives became disrupted and blurred as participants responded to the environments within which they found themselves.

Section 6.2 examined the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to safeguard against. It highlighted the internalisation of the narrative as positioned by policy elites where vulnerability to radicalisation was positioned as the same as vulnerability to any other form of harm and thus requiring safeguarding against exploitation. As a result, in examining both the framing of safeguarding and the nature of who required safeguarding, narratives of continuity were transferred from policy elite level to institutional level in being positioned as an extension of their existing practice. Further, the extent to which the narrative became internalised became evident in the focus on vulnerability to safeguard against, rather than a focus on vulnerability to radicalisation. In other words, institutional staff focused on vulnerabilities as a safeguarding concern, not as a radicalisation concern. Yet, the first section also revealed multiple moments where these narratives of continuity became blurred upon implementation. Participants at institutional level recognised the potential for the duty to be

read through alternative frameworks, largely those which the criticisms of chapter one spoke to. In doing so, part of their role became about implementing the duty through means beyond just discourse which would counter these criticisms. The second part of the section also revealed how the framework of safeguarding became blurred as a result of the practical implications of the narrative. DSLs were forced to consider the vulnerability of others as a result of an individual's potential actions, expanding on Heath-Kelly's (2013) notion of individuals being both at risk and risky; the scope for staff to fall under the requirement of referral; and, the challenges faced in determining vulnerability to radicalisation from other forms of vulnerability.

The internalisation of policy elite's conceptualisation of threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism was explored in section 6.3 where institutional staff similarly insisted that this *should* be the focus of the agenda. However, the discourses surrounding the history of Prevent as targeting Islamist-inspired threats meant that it was not always the case. Thus, the section explored the approaches by institutional staff to minimise such a portrayal by drawing on other forms of extremism and terrorism, most notably the far-right. This was both in response to, and limited by, a perceived wider public narrative of prejudice that had long positioned Islamist-inspired ideologies as threatening and thus depicted Muslims as the threat. Participants, similarly to policy elites, therefore utilised the framework of safeguarding in their attempt to shift the duty away from such an understanding and position it as protecting all forms of extremism and terrorism through everyone's vulnerability. Further they also drew upon the Greater Manchester context to ground the importance of doing so; for them, the diversity of the area required an approach that was able to respond to a multiplicity of threats and the Prevent duty with its focus on vulnerability was perceived as being able to facilitate such an approach.

Section 6.4 revealed a fourth narrative which policy elites had not proposed. The section explored how institutional educationalists had conceptualised British values as the antithesis to threat. British values became the second key tenet through which the duty was implemented within institutions alongside the safeguarding mechanism of referring. In exploring how the values agenda became embedded within institutional implementations of the Prevent duty, the section also revealed how it was viewed, as a result of the label of

British, as highly problematic. The lens of Britishness, constructed through ethno-nationalist discourses, challenged the capacity to position the duty as concerned with all forms of extremism and terrorism and undermined a pre-existing values agenda that had long guided pedagogical approaches to FE. Due to Ofsted inspection frameworks, however, it was also necessary and thus a central tenet through which the duty became implemented.

The final section of the chapter explored the extent to which staff at institutional level had internalised the conceptualisation of threat as being their responsibility to safeguard against. It was revealed that participants had indeed positioned themselves as responsible for both the identification and referral of individuals potentially vulnerable to radicalisation similarly through the utilisation of the safeguarding framework as a continuation of their existing practices. However, in the same vein as the previous sections, moments at which such narratives became blurred were also apparent, where the implementation of the duty was perceived to be far more complex than policy elites had portrayed it to be. Yet, for the first part of the section, these disruptions simultaneously highlighted continuity whereby the challenges faced in implementing and managing referrals were as complex as they were for any other form of harm. Nonetheless, there were also moments where the distinctiveness of referrals surrounding radicalisation were apparent, challenging the positionality of responsibility to safeguard as an extension of existing practices through the duty. Moreover, the management of cases in relation to Prevent revealed the challenges which were believed to be specific to the responsibility of the duty. It also demonstrated the multiple ways in which responsibilisation of staff occurred, where it was not only their responsibility to identify and refer, but to also manage referrals and accept (perceived) failure departing further from the simplicity with which policy elites had depicted their responsibility.

The chapter demonstrated an internalisation of the multiple narratives which were presented by policy elites in the previous chapter. However, it also revealed how the realities of implementation led institutional level educators to blur these conceptualisations of threat as they responded to the environments within which they enacted the policy. In doing so, it provided a deeper insight into the enactments of the Prevent policy as it transformed from legislation to implementation. The chapter also revealed, therefore, the narratives through which the duty had been presented to classroom staff; as a result, it provided a number of

areas to consider when examining the enactments which followed these institutional implementations, More specifically: the acceptance of radicalisation as vulnerability and the identification of *which* or *whose* vulnerability; the language of Britishness; and the overall realities of embedding these discourses within the classroom.

Chapter Seven

Classroom Implementation: Referring, Relaying, Responsibilising

7.1 Introduction

Chapter Seven explores the experiences of teaching staff, those who were responsible for the classroom implementation of the Prevent duty. It draws upon the experiences of teachers across three of the five institutions who engaged in face-to-face means of participation and twenty-eight online respondents who defined themselves as teaching staff. The chapter examines the extent to which the conceptualisations of threat which were presented within the previous two chapters – at policy elite and institutional levels – were visible within the experiences of teachers. As chapter six similarly sought to do, this chapter also reveals where these conceptualisations became disrupted and ambiguities emerged that challenged the straightforwardness with which policy elites had depicted the implementation of the duty. In revealing where there were continuities and departures from previous experiences of implementation at institutional and policy elite level occur within the classroom, the chapter adds further layers to the discursive constructions of threat. It does so through three core sections: the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to safeguard against; the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat; and, the conceptualisation of threat as their responsibility to safeguard against. The conceptualisation of threat as all forms of terrorism and extremism was constructed within teachers discourses but was done so alongside other narratives and so is integrated within the above three conceptualisations.

Section 7.2 explores the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to safeguard against and demonstrates the ways through which teaching staff internalised this narrative through their implementation within the classroom. Through the language of vulnerability and harm, teachers framed the duty in the same way that policy elites and DSLs had, as a means through which exploitation (and therefore radicalisation) could be prevented. Vulnerability to radicalisation, subsection 7.2.1 highlights, was positioned as the same as vulnerability to any other form of harm and thus one which could be spotted and supported, viewing potential refer*ee's* as victims not perpetrators. Subsection 7.2.2 also explores how the training received

by teachers entrenched this narrative and positioned the duty as a continuation of their existing safeguarding duties. In doing so, however, it also reveals the points at which such narratives of continuity become disrupted whereby the Prevent duty's delivery was not only separated but required different knowledge from existing safeguarding training and delivery. The next subsection 7.2.3 highlights how the conceptualisation of threat as all forms of extremism became internalised by teaching staff in positioning the duty as something which should be concerned with all ideologies by its nature as a safeguarding policy, despite the potential for it not to be as DSL's and policy elites also drew upon.

The chapter then reveals the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat by exploring the embedding of British values within the classroom in 7.3.1 and the labelling of the values as *British* in subsection 7.3.2. The section demonstrates that all teachers positioned the embedding of British values as a central element to their enactment of the Prevent duty but that many faced difficulties in doing so around the perceived applicability and rigidity upon what implementation should look like. A key difficulty which emerged for a significant number of teaching staff was the labelling of the values as British. The idea of Britishness was viewed as highly problematic and retracting from their implementation of the duty as a safeguarding mechanism. Whilst the section demonstrates that the internalisation of the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat was visible in some of the experiences it also highlights that for a number of staff the narrative was replicated out of necessity to meet Ofsted requirements for implementation and not because participants internalised it.

The final section of the chapter engages with the conceptualisation of threat as educator's responsibility to safeguard against. Sub-section 7.4.1 reveals how teaching staff participated in the referral mechanisms put into place by the DSLs at institutional level, internalising the narratives proposed by institutional staff and policy elites by positioning themselves as a key actor within the process of spotting and referring vulnerabilities. It argues that this became possible through narratives of continuity and the framework of safeguarding as an extension of their existing practices. The following subsection 7.4.2 goes on to highlight the extent to which this internalisation became entrenched by introducing a further element of responsibilisation which had not previously been revealed by policy elites or DSLs: the

responsibility to responsibilise students. In their responsibilisation, teachers saw their duty to not only spot and refer vulnerability to radicalisation, but to build students resilience to and awareness of extremism and terrorism to enable them to *prevent* themselves and others around them from becoming exploited by radicalisers.

7.2 Threat as vulnerability to safeguard against

This section reveals the internalisation of the narrative put forward by both policy elites and institutional level staff where classroom staff also conceptualised threat as vulnerability to safeguard against. It presents the two key ways through which this occurred: firstly, through the discursive framing of Prevent as a safeguarding mechanism and secondly through training which positioned the duty as a continuation of their existing safeguarding practices.

7.2.1 Embedding the duty within existing frameworks of safeguarding

Overwhelmingly, teaching staff experiences showed little signs of divergence from those previously engaged with at both the elite and institutional level in referring to the Prevent duty through the framework of safeguarding. All of the participating teaching staff stated that they believed the Prevent duty was applicable to their institution with all but one (online) participant seeing it as applicable to their role. I argue that this emerged through the language of safeguarding whereby teaching staff read the duty through their existing responsibilities, in its positioning by both those around them and the guidance as an extension of their current role, rather than a deviation. As some online participants commented:

> *Staff should be observant of student behaviour but most likely this would fall under general safeguarding* (Business Educator, online participant)

> *Am always aware of things students say, their behaviour and changes in order to support them. Whether this be Prevent or any other area of Pastoral care* (Health and Social Care Educator, online participant)

The narratives within the above excerpts positioned vulnerability to radicalisation as the same as other forms of harm, highlighting behaviour and personal changes as indicators rather than ideology. As a result, teaching staff also saw radicalisation as something that could be

prevented through the protection of vulnerability, as participants in the previous two chapters had. Understanding the duty as a support mechanism also highlighted the replication of the victim narrative within teaching staff experiences that policy elites had portrayed. For teaching staff, the duty had been understood and accepted as being about protecting the exploitation of potential victims, not prosecuting potential perpetrators. I argue this furthered the de-exceptionalisation of the duty whereby enactments of the duty demonstrated embedding within institutions as continuations of existing practices, despite its recent introduction to the education system. Experiences of teaching staff demonstrated that they did not see the duty therefore as something which, in relation to safeguarding, required any different or further action on their part.

The positioning of the duty within an existing framework of safeguarding enabled teachers to limit their role within the process as one which simply sought to notice where vulnerability, of any kind, was visible and pass it up the chain. This, I argue, provided teaching staff with an opportunity to minimise the level of involvement they had with the implementation of the duty as a safeguarding mechanism, referring the concern to someone with greater expertise to determine the level and type of vulnerability present. Face-to-face participants echoed many of the online responses that the duty meant they spotted vulnerability and reported it to their safeguarding team, something which Revell (2019, p.30) also found in a majority of her participant experiences. Thus, in treating vulnerability to radicalisation as the same as vulnerability to other forms of harm, the framework of safeguarding offered a route of familiarity but also one which enabled many of the participating teaching staff to depict themselves as having a limited role in the process.

However, in a similar sense to that which had been seen at institutional level, there were ambiguities present within a number of the responses. Rhetoric suggested that some had similarly seen a disconnect between the introduction of the duty and its positioning as a continuation of existing practice; the duty was referred to as being "part of safeguarding" (Politics Educator, Academic Institute 1) or "linked to safeguarding" (Social Care Educator, Training Institute 2). There was also a recognition that the duty could be seen outside of the realms of safeguarding. For one participant, this reflected some of the DSL discussions, viewing Prevent as primarily a counter-terrorism agenda:

We're being told that "this is just another safeguarding thing, it goes on the same system in our processes" but in practice it totally feels different, it feels like you're looking out for different things […] You do feel more like you're in kind of war time watching out for spies kind of thing, as opposed to whereas safeguarding feels more like caring and it doesn't feel like a caring thing, I think that's the difference. So yeah, I think absolutely we are being told its part of safeguarding, but it most definitely doesn't feel like it, it feels more like, I don't know, policing? Yeah (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1)

For this teacher, there was a disconnect in what Prevent was relayed as in theory, and what it was for them in practice. They explained that although **p**revent as a term had positive connotations, **P**revent as a programme was something associated with a longer standing agenda of surveillance. The experience was mirrored in their questionnaire which furthered this sense of "big brother" where they "understand the need for it" but were "also uncomfortable" with the sense of "shop your neighbour" that they believed came as a consequence of the requirement to report concerns over potential radicalisation (Art and Design Educator, Online Participant). The paradox of the Prevent duty being simultaneously something which could prevent and cause harm. Through this duality, this teacher challenged the victimhood status which safeguarding enabled and instead reintroduced the narrative of risk whereby it was the potential riskiness of individuals, rather than the potential exploitation of them, which was being monitored, they argued. Yet in also replicating the narrative of safeguarding elsewhere, the teacher highlighted the simultaneous 'risky/at risk' depiction which had been demonstrated in the previous two chapters whereby the duty could be seen as both protecting vulnerable individuals 'at risk' of being exploited, and protecting those around the individual made vulnerable by their 'riskiness' (Heath-Kelly, 2013; see also Stanley and Guru, 2015; Stanley et al., 2018). In other words, it was about safeguarding the individual, but also safeguarding those around them in their potential to have become a threat.

This enmeshing of narratives became further evident for both the analysis and the participant whereby they explored this juxtaposition through their own enactments of the duty, locating the points at which this blurring occurred:

In a way it feels like people are covering themselves by saying its part of safeguarding. So, it starts off by them saying its part of safeguarding when they're giving us the

materials, then we deliver it and it branches off, then it goes back into these processes to protect the students and it comes back together again [through the referral system]. Why is it becoming separate in this bit? (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1)

The experience suggested that it was in both the presentation of the duty and the practice of it through the referral system that the narrative of safeguarding became entrenched; however, it was in the enactment of duty within the classroom - the practice of identifying the vulnerability - that the teacher perceived the narrative to have become disrupted. For them, it was the perception that vulnerability to radicalisation warranted particular vulnerabilities to be identified, which were separate from those of other forms of harm, that were at the root of such a perception. At this point, the influence in the experience became difficult to extract. The teacher depicted the securitisation narrative as being a result of a wider public narrative that framed certain individuals, namely Muslim, as being threatening and thus their vulnerability as being more likely to occur than anyone else's. Whilst it was also presented that the securitisation narrative had created such discourses of prejudice and thus only certain people's vulnerability requiring safeguarding under the duty. Nonetheless, despite the teacher's uncertainty of the emergence of this perception, the duty had been about protecting vulnerability but through its connection with counter-terrorism had, for them, been about particular vulnerabilities which were likely only applicable to certain people, namely Muslims. This is explored at greater depth within the following section of the chapter, 7.3, but revealed how the framework of safeguarding, for this participant, had become disrupted during the enactment of who it was perceived to be positioned as vulnerable to radicalisation. Nonetheless, the depiction of the duty as safeguarding was overwhelming across teacher experiences and the above discussion was rare amongst participants. For almost all, there was little discussion to be had around the presentation of the Prevent duty through the safeguarding framework; for them it was a narrative which they had internalised and raised little concern or question around in accepting and enacting its positioning as a continuation of their existing practices.

7.2.2 Experiencing Prevent training and dealing with knowledge gaps

Despite teaching staff portraying the duty as being no different to their existing practices, almost all of the participants described Prevent-specific training which they had undertaken.

I argue that in revealing this differentiation in the delivery of training for the duty within institutions, there had emerged both a distinctiveness surrounding the duty and a separation between it and *standard* safeguarding. Simultaneously, however, the delivery of the training in utilising the narratives of vulnerability and harm, as noted above, framed the duty as safeguarding against threat and thus enabled the internalisation of the framework.

All participants had undergone Prevent duty training through a variety of avenues, often multiple, such as sessions led by senior institutional staff or by external agencies like the police or Department for Education, or through online platforms set up by external organisations. There had been a clear distinction, however, between the delivery of training in the *early years* of the duty, upon its introduction, and training which was now being delivered within institutions. It had been organisations like the police and the department for education which had primarily led on those initial training sessions, ones which were for the majority of participants who recalled them, viewed positively through the face-to-face experience, case study examples and ability to have discussions and ask questions with the trainers and others within the room. The depth of knowledge that was felt to have been gained from such sessions was notable across a number of participants who claimed that these sessions were of real benefit to their capacity to understand and implement the Prevent duty. This firstly suggested that the narratives utilised by policy elites were largely well received in their preference for these face-to-face sessions over alternative ones and secondly, in such a preference existing, training methods were perceived to have had an impact on teachers knowledge absorption.

In contrast to the participants of Elwick and Jerome (2019, p.347) who predominantly engaged in face-to-face methods with external agencies, there was a perception from participants in this research that such sessions were no longer available and instead other methods of training provision were being delivered by institutions. Many of the participants recalled more recent training – whether for new or existing staff – being smaller group trainings within their institutions, delivered by a colleague or their DSL, that occurred once a year or, for one institution, through *the same* refresher quiz that would be handed out for staff to complete on a regular basis. For the majority, an online means of either introductory or refresher training was also mentioned. For those who had experienced this change in the

format of delivery, there were negative implications for their knowledge around how to implement the duty, particularly since the one-size-fits-all methods that were perceived to be being used were felt to be generic, impersonal and lacking in depth (see also Santry, 2016 cited in Acik et al., (2018), p.475). More importantly, unlike Revell (2019, p.28) who found very few participants to be dissatisfied with the level of training where the majority was undertaken through online means, participants in this study argued these impersonal forms did not offer the opportunity to ask questions, clarify any uncertainties, or explore with someone deemed to have more knowledge than them around what the duty meant in practice for them. Moffat and Gerard (2020, p.208) similarly found that training 'had not provided satisfactory answers on how to practically apply Prevent' for teachers in their study. As a result, for a number of the participants, gaps in knowledge had occurred through these isolated training sessions and many had sought to conduct their own research – mostly through Google with some referring to the Education and Training Foundation website – to top-up their understanding. Further, recalling the experiences of David Wells who discussed a limitation to resources and increased demand that Nigel Lund referred to in chapter five, the experiences recalled here appeared to be reflective of the wider sector whereby the provisions offered at the beginning of the duty simply were not available now. I suggest this was indicative of a wider reduction to public sector resources and thus positioned the duty as no different to any other area which required training. In other words, the duty was viewed through the same lens as other frameworks which were central to the provision of education and was thus treated the same when it came to the limited resources available to deliver it (Braun et al., 2011).

Yet, the experiences also demonstrated that there *was* a perceived difference when it came to the Prevent duty in that it was its *newness,* and the unfamiliarity that brought, warranted further training than was being provided. This was particularly the case for those who had either never or only received the more specialist sessions discussed above once. The knowledge gaps referred to were, I argue partly a result of the positioning of the duty as a continuation of existing safeguarding practices whilst, in practice, being perceived to be a new responsibility, albeit within the pre-existence of a wider safeguarding role. Thus, the experiences demonstrated a perception that there had been a failure to have recognised the *newness* of the agenda. Where teachers felt that there was a requirement to undergo

additional and more in-depth training, it suggested that the duty was *not* being seen as a continuation of their existing roles since it required the development of further knowledge and skills. This somewhat complicated Moffat and Gerard's (2020, p.204) finding that teaching staff felt 'frustrated that the facilitators [of training sessions] showed little to no appreciation of their existing skill set'. Further, the existence of Prevent-specific training which often sat outside of the generic safeguarding training that incorporated all other forms of harm, emphasised the blurring surrounding the narrative of continuity within existing practices that policy elites had previously suggested in chapter five. For many of the participants in this chapter, separate and developed training sessions were felt to have been required to have properly understood the duty and their role in implementing it.

However, there was, simultaneously a reluctance to question their knowledge of Prevent and their capacity to meet its requirements, with most staff focusing on the *desire* to have had more specific training to fulfil it. Indeed, as figures 1 and 2 below demonstrate, perceptions following initial training surrounding the duty were positive. Thus, a gap emerged between such positive perceptions and the earlier calls for greater training and knowledge, challenging another of Moffat and Gerard's (ibid. p.209) findings that low satisfaction led to low levels of confidence. I suggest this emanated from the perceived pressures of Ofsted referred to in the previous chapter, whereby inspections required institutions to meet their duty or faced failing their safeguarding responsibilities. In this sense, a number of participants referred to a sense of 'box ticking' in being able to ensure that they could pass an inspection and not necessarily anything more. Teaching staff suggested that so long as Ofsted would be satisfied, they had no requirement to do anything more in regard to the duty. Yet, there was also a sense from a number of staff that this did not necessarily mean that the duty was then implemented to the extent that it could be – this, I argue, is where the desire for further guidance and training came in. Though it demonstrated that confidence for meeting Ofsted requirements – of which many felt was the standard to which they were expected to get to – and thus meeting their duty, was present amongst the majority of participants, there was simultaneously a sense that their existing training did not go far enough to have left them feeling fully informed.

23 Thinking back to the first prevent duty-related training you received, how helpful did you find this initial training in helping you understand what the Prevent duty was?

Response	Count
Very helpful	12 (42.9%)
Helpful	8 (28.6%)
Somewhat helpful	6 (21.4%)
Neither helpful nor unhelpful	2 (7.1%)
Somewhat unhelpful	0
Unhelpful	0
Very unhelpful	0
I don't know	0
Not applicable	0

Fig.1

24 How helpful did you find the initial training in understanding how the Prevent duty related to your role?

Response	Count
Very helpful	9 (32.1%)
Helpful	9 (32.1%)
Somewhat helpful	6 (21.4%)
Neither helpful nor unhelpful	3 (10.7%)
Somewhat unhelpful	0
Unhelpful	0
Very unhelpful	0
I don't know	0
Not applicable	1 (3.6%)

Fig.2

7.2.3 "There's all sorts of terrorism going on but we have this idea that terrorism is religious"

Teaching staff internalised the conceptualisation of threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism, depicting the duty as a means through which any form of radicalisation could be targeted for prevention. This mirrored Revell's (2019) findings that teachers claimed that 'all children were potentially at risk from radicalisation', grounding this in the framework of safeguarding. It was as a result of the narratives of vulnerability and harm that the duty became about focusing on all forms by its nature of being a protection mechanism. This sentiment was present across a multitude of experiences whereby the singling out of any one individual or ideology was externalised to being something that happened elsewhere, where

Prevent was done wrong as Busher et al. (2017; 2019) similarly found. In this case, for these participants, where Prevent had been concerned about only one ideology, it was not Prevent, but an incorrect attempt to implement the duty.

Despite all of the participants suggesting this problematic implementation did not happen at their institution (see also ibid.), many explored what they perceived to be root causes where this did occur, drawing upon the wider public narratives which had centred upon Islamist-inspired ideologies and thus associated Prevent with the countering of them. Thus, it was similarly positioned not as a fault of the policy where this occurred, but of those who were either perceiving it falsely, or bias in their absorption of such a narrative. As the previous two chapters similarly drew upon, there was a perception that narratives of prejudice had long synonymised Islam with Islamist-inspired ideologies and thus positioned Muslims as potential terrorists in having seen groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS associated with the notion of terrorism. As one online participant claimed, a shift in this problematic discourse would enable a "better understanding of Prevent in the general public as it has been mainly linked to Islamic terrorism in the press" (Insurance Educator, online participant). This conflation of Islam and terrorism has been explored by a number of scholars who similarly have noted the potential implications for this on the wider perception of those more likely to become engaged in extremism and terrorism (Poole, 2002; Norris et al., 2004; Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2010; Allen, 2012; Ahmed and Matthes, 2017; West and Lloyd, 2017; Kearns et al., 2019). For the teaching staff therefore, the duty was about the safeguarding of *everyone* since the potential for vulnerability to be exploited could impact *anyone.* However, it was where there was not the scope for recognising and breaking down these prejudicial narratives, the duty could not be properly enacted.

For a number of teachers across both the online and face-to-face participation, it was also the resources they perceived to have come from the government had left them understanding where such problematic enactments might have emerged from. As one teacher explained:

> *What it feels like is, in all the materials that we get, it really seems to be focused on Islamic radicalisation. However, what they seem to do is add in these tokenistic things, so suddenly you find on a PowerPoint, the next slide you've got is talking about right-wing extremism or the next one is talking about Northern Irish extremism. But all the*

bullet points you're looking out for just seem to constantly refer to Islamic radicalisation and that's where I struggle, particularly in a college where we are in the middle of [local area], we do have a lot of Islamic students and you're going through this PowerPoint that seems to be aimed at them… It felt the same with, when we had the guy from Manchester police[49], I mean he was brilliant, I don't want to put him down and he did make a whole point, one of the videos he showed, it was a young white lad, I think he'd become sort of really right-wing basically, so that was really good because it was an alternative way of looking at it but still when you then going through "look for this, look for someone whose started wearing a headscarf, look for…" it didn't seem to apply to everything (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1)*

For this member of staff, the inclusion of the far-right was "tokenistic", challenging Moffat and Gerard's (2020, p.204) finding that examples of the far-right were viewed positively in adding 'balance'. In this sense, the teacher depicted the inclusion of non-Islamist ideologies as a smokescreen to create the perception that the duty was about all forms of extremism and terrorism but the lack of real challenge that this actually brought. For this teacher, it was the markers which teachers were asked to spot when it came to identifying vulnerability which ran in line with the criticisms of the ERG22+ noted in chapter five, that undermined the attempts to conceptualise threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism. The training they had undertaken and the resources they had engaged with perpetuated a problematic presentation of the duty.

For another, however, these attempts of trainers to challenge such predominant narratives within their sessions by including examples of other forms of extremism and terrorism (Access to HE Business Educator, Training Institute 2) and the inclusion of alternative resources (and therefore narratives) - those found through Google and websites like the Education and Training Foundation or Educate Against Hate, not provided by government (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Training Institute 2) – did enable the duty to be properly enacted as a preventative mechanism for all forms of extremism and terrorism. Nonetheless, the experiences did reveal how the conceptualisation of threat as safeguarding

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[49] Further conversations revealed this was Nigel Lund who works for the Department for Education. He previously worked at Greater Manchester Police and refers to this within his trainings.

against all forms of extremism and terrorism was understood as dependent on individual efforts to challenge the overriding narrative of prejudice that conflated Islam with terrorism and positioned Muslims as requiring *prevention.* However, in doing so, they deflected the critiques to problematic enactments of the duty and not the policy itself, seeing the *poor enactment* discourse favoured to explain these concerns over a *systemic prejudice* one. The duty was about safeguarding all forms of extremism and terrorism, but where it was properly enacted.

7.3 British values as the antithesis to threat

For a number of staff, the British values agenda was more problematic than the safeguarding aspect of the duty and thus this section argues that the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat was replicated by staff but was not wholly internalised. By firstly examining the enactment of embedding British values within the classroom and secondly highlighting the problematisation of the agendas labelling of the values as "British", the two subsections revealed how staff integrated British values into their teaching largely through a necessity to do so rather than through a belief that British values would prove as an antithesis to threat.

7.3.1 Negotiating British values as a pedagogic requirement

Not all of the participants had undergone training in relation to British values, as had been visible with the safeguarding aspect of the duty. For those who had undertaken it, their experiences echoed those in the previous chapter whereby it had been a member of staff who had been approached and selected to deliver British values training to their colleagues, rather than a member of the safeguarding team. For most, the sessions were a brief introductory training that focused on providing "a lot of paperwork" which teachers would work through to identify "what British values are, how we can use them within our teaching, within our pastoral lessons as well" (Politics Educator, Academic Institute 1). This for many had been a sufficient introduction to the agenda and its placement not only within their institutions (fig.3) but also in relation to their roles (fig.4).

37   If you had training, how helpful was the training in helping you understand what British values are?

Very helpful	9 (32.1%)
Helpful	9 (32.1%)
Somewhat helpful	3 (10.7%)
Neither helpful nor unhelpful	2 (7.1%)
Somewhat unhelpful	1 (3.6%)
Unhelpful	1 (3.6%)
Very unhelpful	0
I don't know	1 (3.6%)
I haven't undergone any training for British values	2 (7.1%)

(fig.3)

38   How helpful was the training in helping you understand how British values relates to your role?

Very helpful	8 (28.6%)
Helpful	10 (35.7%)
Somewhat helpful	2 (7.1%)
Neither helpful nor unhelpful	4 (14.3%)
Somewhat unhelpful	1 (3.6%)
Unhelpful	0
Very unhelpful	0
I don't know	1 (3.6%)
I haven't undergone any training on British values	2 (7.1%)

(fig.4)

Yet, the experiences of face-to-face participants appeared to have challenged such positive data. For a number of the teaching staff, their British values training had not been perceived to be sufficient for understanding how the values would be implemented within their own classrooms. Implementing the values into their subjects was noted as being particularly challenging where a number of the staff suggested that although their training had enabled them to understand the British values agenda, it had not provided them with the necessary knowledge to apply it to their specific subject area, something which Moffat and Gerard (2020) and Higton et al. (2018) also found in relation to the duty's implementation. As one participant explained:

We can't set projects that might explore one of the British values like they might be able to do in other stuff, all of our students are doing completely individual projects, so they're working on different things so it's really difficult to embed it in art […] I don't know how we'd do it without it being really tokenistic, aside from if it popped up in somebody's project, if you've got somebody who's doing some kind of political art work or something like that possibly, but that's kind of ad hoc, it might happen, it might not (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1)

The experience raised questions over the consistency of approach which would emerge where some staff felt it more viable to implement the agenda within their classrooms than others. This was further demonstrable in another teachers experience where they felt the training and resources provided had similarly not been appropriate for delivering the agenda to learners with different abilities. The experiences highlighted gaps in the training provisions where teachers felt the specificity of the implementation of the agenda within *different* classrooms had not been accounted for. I argue this highlighted a further point at which the duty, in practice, had been far more complex than it had been perceived to be at elite level whereby resources failed to deliver the necessary guidance for classroom implementation of British values that many of the teachers felt necessary for *their own* classroom. As Vincent (2019, p.22) also noted, citing Ball et al. (2012), whilst training positioned teachers to 'have the freedom to plan for what they consider to be the most appropriate pedagogic response', adapting their approach as necessary for their own implementation, such a directive assumed 'unlimited resources of time, creativity and energy and also overlooks the fact that teachers are coping with the demands of multiple policies' simultaneously. These disparities highlighted a conflict between ensuring a consistency of approach in providing staff with strict guidelines; the dependence on the experience and knowledge of teachers to implement the agenda as they felt appropriate; and, the capacity for teachers to negotiate between these within an already constrained and overburdened context.[50]

Nonetheless, despite the concerns over the level and specificity of the training being received, teaching staff all positioned the embedding of British values as central to their implementation of the duty. Yet, a number of the teaching staff argued that the two tenets

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[50] According to Ball et al. (2012) schools are enacting over 170 different policies at any one time

of Prevent as safeguarding and British values within the classroom were "quite different"; one teacher stated that it was "hard to talk about British values and then go on to talk about Prevent" as their responsibility to link the agendas was not as straight forward as it had been presented within the guidance and training (Business Administration and Customer Service Educator, Training Institute). For the majority of staff, it was not clear how they could present British values alongside the awareness raising sessions of radicalisation. This was understood through the separate delivery of the agendas in terms of both training and Ofsted where both the Common (or Education) Inspection Framework (Ofsted, 2019) saw Prevent and British Values referred to independent of one another. As a result, British values as an agenda was presented by almost all of the participants as something which they dealt with separately within their implementation of the Prevent duty. Moreover, in its dislocation from the framework of safeguarding through which the duty had been positioned but British values had not, space was created for teaching staff to critique the agenda in its perceived disconnection from the rhetoric of safeguarding. In other words, they were not questioning the duty as a safeguarding mechanism, nor its positioning as a tool to prevent radicalisation through the referral of vulnerabilities, but instead they questioned the use of the values agenda in this process of safeguarding. As a result, this disconnection enabled them to present a critique to the duty whilst still upholding that which section 6.2 demonstrated that they were not in a position to reject – safeguarding. This space, I argue, therefore provided the context through which criticisms of the British values agenda became possible where those of the duty as a safeguarding mechanism had not.

Participants recalled how the British values agenda was introduced to students at the beginning of their entry into further education. Induction sessions would provide students with the basic information and expectations of the institution, with British values being delivered as part of this. For some, there was an explicit link to the Prevent duty made, for others, this was framed, as DSLs in the previous chapter outlined, through the values of the institution. In either case, the values were drawn upon to frame the expectations of students. For a number of staff, the use of values to signpost expectations had always been present within these student inductions (see also Revell and Bryan, 2018); it was the framing of them through the rhetoric of British values which had been new, as referenced by participants in chapter six. For some therefore, British values were seen as a box-ticking exercise "merely to

meet Ofsted objectives" with the rhetoric "shoehorned in" as a means to demonstrate compliance, making "little difference in stopping radicalisation and extremism" (History Educator, online participant). In other words, a values agenda had always helped provide students with a grounding to acceptable behaviour, but for these participants the introduction of the British values agenda was predominantly an Ofsted requirement, rather than a tool to fight radicalisation, it was "knowing your students and having good professional relationships" that would enable the latter (History Educator, online participant).

The limitations of the agenda were not only seen through the perceived rigidity of being about meeting Ofsted's requirements but also the capacity for some students to understand and engage with the values purported by the agenda. For both the Access to HE Business educator and the Business Administration and Customer Services educator within Training Institute 2, their conversations with students had often been ones which led them not to discuss how democratic values can serve as an antithesis to the processes of radicalisation, but to them providing whistle stop tours of how government worked, who the Prime Minister was and why people vote:

> They're not educated enough to learn the prevent agenda to start with, so you've got to have more time to teach them about the bit before, before they start to understand the Prevent agenda (Business Administration and Customer Services Educator, Training Institute 2)

This perceived (lack of) knowledge around the "basic political systems" which were positioned by these teachers to be at the heart of both the values and their wider agenda, limited the potential for conversations to be had and the agenda to be utilised as an antithesis to threat. Moreover, for the Access to HE Business educator, had such knowledge been embedded prior to FE, British values would have already been instilled through knowledge of, and therefore opportunities to engage in, political matters. In other words, for this teacher there would be no need to position British values as the antithesis to threat if students had been included within discussions around the political system prior. Despite problematising the enactment of the British values agenda as a key tenet of the Prevent duty, the above experiences highlighted a further way through which the framework had been internalised. It was not an inability to see British values as the antithesis to threat, but an inability to enact them as such because of external factors, such as a lack of knowledge of the British political system. The

experiences also demonstrated an inconsistency of implementation where some teachers felt able to discuss the values of the agenda, whilst others like the above educators had to spend their time explaining the institutions and context which purported the values. Thus, for the majority of staff who discussed the limited time they felt able to engage with the agenda as a result of the constraints and demands of their curriculum, this time was spent very differently. Where teachers in some institutions were able to discuss topics like Brexit and immigration in depth, others had their allocated time for delivery of the agenda taken up by providing students with the fundamentals of the British political system in order for them to understand what the values actually were. Yet, either and all of these varying experiences were judged by the same Ofsted inspection framework, thus creating an inconsistency with the British values agenda that some teachers were able to enact.

Several of the participants revealed how they dealt with some of these uncertainties and approached their own delivery as a result. As the previous chapter drew upon, one of the participating institutions utilised a diversity calendar whereby culturally significant days were signposted and engaged with as a means to deliver the British values agenda:

> *So, if we're talking about any festivals and so on, so for example its Diwali this week and we'll be talking about respect and tolerance, but kind of that extremism isn't appropriate and really to kind of make sure that they don't get drawn into anything* (Teacher Trainer, Training Institute 2)

Others from the same institution also referred to the use of this diversity calendar to enable them to draw upon key events and occasions to situate the importance of tolerance and respect, the benefits of living in a democracy and the advantages of individual liberty and the rule of law. The experiences were therefore in line with those of the DSL and British Values coordinator explored within the previous chapter staff appeared more confident where they had resources to utilise, implementing the agenda through key tangible examples. For others, who were not provided with resources, other means were utilised in their enactments. A number of the participants recalled collecting "news topics before class to demonstrate values" during sessions (Business Educator, online participant), or getting students who were based in the workplace to "research the values of their own company, and to compare these to British values to see where they overlap. We then discus how they can demonstrate British Values within their own role" (Insurance Educator, online participant). For some, like the

Politics Teacher, there were multiple opportunities within the existing syllabus that allowed discussions around British values to emerge within the classroom, demonstrating the earlier discussions that the agenda was seen as easier to embed for some subjects than for others (Health and Social Care Educator, online participant; Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Training Institute 2)(see Higton et al., 2018; Moffat and Gerard, 2020 as earlier cited). This sense of familiarity with the nature of the topics and debates surrounding British values meant for some the embedding British values was not perceived to be a difficult task:

> *Certainly, our team, we haven't found any difficulties in actually embedding it with what we were doing anyway in terms of things like British values, equality and diversity and so on because we do obviously have that culture of mutual respect anyway, you know? I mean we encourage students to share kind of their cultural experiences and so on so it kind of forges that acceptance amongst all the students and they can gain the understanding really of forming their own opinions and thinking critically about anything that's put in front of them* (Teacher Trainer, Training Institute 2)

For this teacher, the British values agenda was as participants within the previous chapters had positioned the duty to be – a continuation of existing practice. The only difference "now [is] just making the links to British values per say as opposed to it just being like an equality and diversity thing" echoing the sentiments of DSL's that British values were an extension of equality and diversity agendas. As I argued earlier that the framework of safeguarding left little space for criticism of the duty as a safeguarding mechanism, I similarly propose here that the framing of the values agenda as an extension of equality and diversity similarly left marginal room for certain teachers – particularly those responsible for the training of educational agendas like equality and diversity – to critique a framework that their students would ultimately be subject to themselves. Staff like this participant involved in the training of teachers could be seen as an agent of the state in not only implementing the Prevent duty through their enactments, but also through their training of students who would go on to enact the duty themselves in their future roles. I argue that this provided the context through which their internalisation of this narrative of continuity, and as a result of the British values agenda, came about.

7.3.2 The language of Britishness: dividing classrooms or antithesising threat?

> *We make sure British values are embedded in every lesson, and we constantly make sure learners are aware of them, but (sighs) I have a lot of personal issues with British values and students do as well. They're British values, but they're everyday values, they're all about respect and tolerance, treating people how you want to be treated, and a lot of our clientele, ninety percent are non-British, or don't identify as being British. So, we go through British values, and they're like "well I'm not British, do they not apply to me?" I think the wording of British values is an issue, it should be everyday values, human values, rather than identifying them as British and I think that is an issue in itself. So, when we do them in class, they know they are British values but we do them as our classroom values and we do it like that rather than focusing on them that they are British, but it always creates for interesting discussion of what does it mean to be British?* (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Training Institute 2)

The excerpt above echoed many participant responses surrounding their perception of the British values agenda, outlining a number of the key concerns over their enactments of the agenda as part of the Prevent duty. Firstly, the excerpt highlighted the questioning of the label of British when the values were perceived by both staff and their students as visible outside of Britain; secondly, it nodded to the implications of labelling the values British on those who did not identify as being wholly or primarily British; thirdly, it raised considerations about the nature of the discussions which emerge from values being labelled British; and finally, it drew upon the conflict earlier discussed around the implications on the institution and its staff from a compliance perspective on disregarding the "British" of British values. These considerations now frame the analysis of participants experiences which demonstrated that it was the labelling of them as British which served as the biggest limitation on the internalisation of the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat. Further, for a number of the participants, in challenging what was so British about these values, the agenda became more likely to feed into the hands of the radicalisation process than it did counter them.

A number of the teaching staff across institutions stated that they had actively removed the word British from their enactment of the agenda within their classroom. For these participants, there was an uneasiness with labelling them British when such values were ones which anyone could hold, regardless of their nationality. Instead, a majority of the participants suggested that the agenda should be labelled "human values" (Art and Design Educator; Business Educator; Health, Social Care, Psychology and Mental Health Educator; all of whom were online participants) or as Webber and Struthers (2019, p.17) also found, 'universal' values. Even for educators who did not have an "issue" with the labelling of the values as British, they questioned the exclusivity of them being referred to as such: "I also have an international heritage and I do not see these values as being exclusively British" (Early Years and Childhood Studies, online participant). It was this exclusiveness, I argue shortly, which lay at the heart of participants concern around the labelling of the values, and not the values themselves (see Busher and Jerome, 2020). It would be erroneous, however, to portray all of the participants as having had a problem with the language of Britishness. As one participant noted, given the agenda was being rolled out within Britain, about the values people should hold within Britain, they did not "think you could label it any other way" (Business Administration and Customer Service Educator, Training Institute 2). For another teacher although this sentiment was similarly visible, it was rooted in a belief that there was something distinct about Britishness that the values drew upon:

> Because we're in Britain aren't we, you know what I mean? I would've been happy if they'd have been called universal standards or universal values or anything but you know we have to, we are a country, we all live on the same rock of land, I think… for everybody to be rubbing along as best as we can that these British values will help (Politics Educator, Academic Institute 1)

The appeasement to the values being labelled "universal" is similarly visible in this teacher's experience in having suggested that the values were not distinct to British people. However, in referencing the geographical spaces of Britain in their explanation, the educator infers that their understanding of British values is also based on and defined by national borders, connoting a conflict within their conceptualisation of who these British values are, or can be, for as Lockley-Scott (2019, p.356) and Vincent (2019, p.19) have argued. This I argue, is where the exclusiveness of the Britishness rhetoric becomes apparent in even those who did not, prima facie, suggest that they had a problem with the labelling. Moreover, a number of the

participants, across both face-to-face and online forms of participation, similarly saw this conceptualisation of Britishness as leading to exclusive and stigmatising narratives which contributed to the feeling that the Prevent duty targeted those who were or perceived to be "non-British":

> *It causes problems between learners. They ask, why isn't it people values? Why British?* (Vocational Educator, online participant)

> *Uncomfortable with the subject, especially with Asian students, the government's understanding of the values might not be the same as all* (Automotive Educator, online participant)

These experiences demonstrated a perception that the British values agenda had the potential to be seen as the advocation for a narrow prescriptive of the *right* identity, where it was felt by them to be potentially enacted as a means to isolate or look down upon non-British identity. In framing the agenda as a British project, the experiences inferred that there was a sense of exclusion for non-native students. As a result, a number of the participants suggested that the agenda left these students feeling unable to participate in both their learning but more problematically, their citizenry. British identity was thus perceived to be positioned through the labelling of the agenda as the right and only way through which these values could be held. *Non-British* students were seen to be required to assimilate or be excluded. Such experiences revealed the presence of critiques within the literature review of this thesis where assimilation had long been used as a means of countering threat through a promotion of ethno-nationalism (Keddie, 2014; Winter and Mills, 2020).

The latter experience also demonstrated how the synonymisation of cultural and national identity occurred through his inference to Asian as a separate entity to British. Britishness then was not only about nationality, but visual appearance. As Modood (2005) observed, the reference to 'Asian' in the context of longstanding discourses of Otherness, has been understood as a culturally charged identity largely associated with Muslims through its racist undertones of associating brownness with difference, despite it being an erroneous usage. Cultural signifiers then became a potential for discrimination through the British values agenda whereby cultural and national identity were seen at odds. Nasar Meer (2014) has noted how through this presentation, ethnicity becomes a replacement for race whereby

perceived cultural markers of difference, such as brownness, dress, language or religious symbolism come to symbolise an Otherness and thus a non-native nationality. Muslimness, through such ethnic differences becomes depicted as non-British.

The potential for the British values agenda to feed into the wider critiques of the Prevent duty and appear targeted towards certain groups, namely Muslims, was therefore visible within these experiences. For both the Fine Art teacher in Academic Institute 1 and the Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health teacher in Training Institute 2, it was the alignment of British values with the Prevent agenda that provided grounds for such a critique. Reflecting others' experiences, the uncomfortableness felt by these participants, particularly surrounding Muslim students, demonstrated how the conceptualisation of threat as all forms of terrorism and extremism was perceived to be limited by the rhetoric of British values. Where it was only those who could be understood as British who would not be at risk of radicalisation; those deemed as non-British through their difference would be. The Fine Art teacher suggested this was visible through the collective gaze of their students who had commented "oh it's about the Muslim's again", when discussing Prevent in the classroom. This, she argued had resulted in some students feeling more "victimised" by the agenda than others as a result of this complex conflation of non-Britishness with Muslimness and the positioning of British values as the antithesis to threat. For the Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health teacher, such stigmatisations were not recognised by the students, but visible in their own narratives:

> *At induction we did a session on British values and we did a session on radicalisation and extremism, we had about seventy learners in the group and ninety-percent of them are from different ethnic backgrounds, from different cultural backgrounds with different cultural values and it was quite hard to control that discussion because a lot of the learners said "whatever happens in society, it's because of religion" […] it's quite hard to get them not to point the finger and that for some learners makes them quite standoffish because that might be their religion or that might be their culture, so then they're then feeling like they're being attacked […] because straight away the first thing they said was "we need to get rid of religion and then we won't have any terror" […] and it's really hard to get people to see that [that isn't the case] because they have so many other sources telling them differently, which is why we look at different types of extremism, and it did make for an enjoyable session and at the end of the session*

we did a plenary activity for one thing they didn't know before the session and a lot of them put that extremism wasn't just about religion […] it did create a bit of conflict (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Training Institute 2)

For this educator, the discussions around Prevent and British values had provided the opportunity for such problematic conflations to be aired. In this instance, she claimed, it had provided a positive outcome in some views being changed around Muslims. Nonetheless, it had also presented a number of concerns for her. Firstly, the presence of wider public narratives of prejudice that have been discussed throughout the chapters of this thesis were seen to be embedded within students understanding of terrorism and extremism. The teacher's role then became about changing mindsets where they found themselves positioned as responsible for breaking down stereotypes and providing counter-narratives. Secondly, it highlighted the conflict which emerged between students as a result of such problematic perceptions of threat and in doing so, further challenged the conceptualisation of threat as all forms of terrorism and extremism by some students, raising important questions for the forthcoming chapter.

In placing this conflict and as occurring across students, of whom ninety-percent were from different "ethnic" or "cultural backgrounds", the above experience also highlighted the teachers perception that though Muslims were predominantly targeted as a result of the conflation of Islam with terrorism, there was the space for not only Muslim (or Muslim *looking*) students to have felt targeted by the British values agenda, but also those who were not British-born:

Most of our students do not identify as being British, a lot of our students are Nigerian or South Asian, they don't identify as being British and as soon as you say that when you're talking about British values they automatically feel isolated and marginalised from that conversation (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Training Institute 2)

Though student engagements with British values are explored within the proceeding chapter of the thesis, this teacher's understanding of their experiences highlighted the perception of a division which British values lead to within the classroom. As another educator commented, in promoting these values as specifically British, it created "barriers" for those who did not identify as British, leaving them questioning both why they could not be included within the

framing of these values and why their own nationality could not simultaneously hold them (Fine Art educator, Academic Institute 1).

For another educator, the values being labelled British was not about the promotion of a nationality status:

> *Because I wasn't born in the UK, I moved to the UK 1991, my husband is English and so on, so the fact that I lived half of my life in another country, I fully appreciate British values, I totally understand democracy, the rule of law, I can see the difference between what happens in the UK and what happens in my country, for example, I'm from South America, when I was a child we had a military government and were at risk of electing someone with the same tendencies after years and years of democracy* (Social Care Educator, Training Institute 2)

Their own experiences of threats to democracy acted as an incentive for British values to be upheld and promoted; Britishness to them was not about heritage or national identity but was about the constitutional pillars of the British state. However, for others who similarly saw the label of British as important in their embedding of the values, the role of ethno-nationalism was central to their conceptualisations:

> *One of the things that worries me is that, where I've lived in the past like Halifax and stuff, we have had almost like apartheid of different groups within society, you know? Different ethnic groups lived in different areas and nobody ever mixed and I think the idea that we can all see that we all have more in common than what we do different I think is helpful and like I said the British values stuff is the basics of what makes a society keep going and I think we can all quite easily agree with what they're saying so for me yeah I was really positive about them yeah […] British values is not a sort of cultural imperialism that's designed to alienate, you know? I mean they're the absolute basics of civilisation you know what I mean? Everyone should be allowed to speak, that everyone should be allowed to make their own choices, that we live in a free and fair democracy where there's a multiplicity of different perspectives, that's absolutely fine, you know what I mean?* (Politics Educator, Academic Institute 1)

Similarly, for the only Muslim educator to take part in the face-to-face mode of research, they saw British values as an opportunity for unification through the sharing of cultural difference to highlight the shared values across and between them:

It doesn't matter if I had a full group of one-hundred percent white British I'd still do the same thing, but to be honest, British values actually helps me to understand my students further, where they come from you know, what their culture is, share with me what your values are, it's a place of actually harnessing what they have, with ours, and saying 'actually, we have a lot in common', it's what it's about (Access to HE Business Educator, Training Institute 2)

For this educator, the most fruitful discussions had emerged from classes which were not "predominantly white… because the culture isn't as rich". In contrast to the earlier experience of conflict which emerged from the label of British and positioned the agenda as potentially isolating, divisive and silencing, such a conflict for this educator encouraged cross- and inter-cultural dialogue and understanding. The language within this teachers' experience was revealing, however: where "they" might be understood as a reference to their students as a collective, the use of 'ours' shortly after transformed the meaning of this educators' experience and highlighted it as one that recognised and perpetuated a divide through difference. Thus, through their creation of an "us and them" narrative, this educator reinforced the idea of a *true* Britishness. This is also present within the Politics Educators experience in the previous excerpt where, through the right kind of Britishness, cultural and ethnic divisions would be minimised. In referencing the "almost […] apartheid" they felt had occurred in their home town where "nobody ever mixed" the educator suggested that *difference* - whether through racial, cultural, educational or class as communities emerged based on their experience of socio-economic structures - created barriers that could have been overcome through the sharing of values (see Miah et al., 2020 for further context on the perceived failure of multiculturalism in Northern towns). In utilising the language of apartheid however, it also became apparent that difference for this educator was primarily understood through racial and/or ethnic lines. For another teacher, their similar "Yorkshire" background led them to view the promotion of Britishness as a "dangerous game" *because* of the existence of such divides (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1). In suggesting these cultural and ethnic barriers could have been overcome through 'commonalities', the Politics and Access to HE Business teachers implicitly suggested that those who were different, could *and should* have erased or minimised their difference in order to have both embodied and enabled British values. In doing so, both suggested that it was the absence of commonality which created conflict and thus the potential for radicalisation. *Difference,* therefore,

synonymously became associated with threat and thus its unification through British values seen as the antithesis to threat. In doing so however, threat became conceptualised as something only attributable to certain, non-British, identities.

This was incredibly problematic for one teacher who suggested that it led to an ethno-nationalism that potentially isolated many of the students within their institution:

> *I personally struggle with the British values bit, especially because its covered in union jacks and looks a little bit like a far-right propaganda thing (laughs) and its really harsh to say but it's, I sort of took them all off, and talked to them about human values and people values. Now I know that's difficult because I've got to deliver the words British values but again it feels, it just feels really kind of conservative and really right-wing to be saying […] I know we do live in Britain so you know that's part of the point of it but I think the problem is there are all these connotations attached with the term British values and then all of these union jacks and red, white and blue lettering and that, again, I just feel like I'm stood, like a racist! And it's really difficult!* (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1)

This educator's online response further noted "most of the material we are provided with looks way too patriotic and as a white middle class woman, I feel guilty preaching about the subject matter" (Art and Design, online participant). The suggestion made within these experiences is that British values are meant for *visibly* British people; in referencing their own identity she distinguishes herself from looking British and "preaching" about their Britishness through this agenda, suggesting that in doing so, anyone who looks different to her – non-white - is not viewed as British. This is furthered by her fear of feeling like a "racist" when embedding values which are both linguistically and visually signified by this aesthetic of what it means to be British – being white. The experiences suggested that Sian's (2017) concerns over the potential for the 'securitised agenda' to 'override established messages about inclusion and anti-racism' appeared to be very real for some of the educators (Elwick and Jerome, 2019, p.343). Moreover, in referencing their class, the educator also suggests that it is not only being British that matters, but being the right type of British that is also critical, something which was briefly engaged with by Sadia Habib (2018) in her research on Britishness in schools. Such an understanding of Britishness feeds into the wider neo-liberal agenda referred to in the literature review; as an abundance of scholars across and beyond

race and class studies have explored, it is those who do not meet the white heteropatriarchal privilege who tend to be exploited by a capitalist system that serves to reinforce ethno-nationalist agendas and leave oppressed groups further marginalised in their difference (Leonardo, 2004; Andersen and Hill Collins, 2019).

The perceived patriotism in the framing of British values, particularly as a result of the associated material, for the Fine Art teacher, became associated with a far-right agenda, as some DSL's had also stressed concern over in the previous chapter. Through the imagery of union jacks and red, white and blue lettering, the visualisations of British values became replicable of the advocation of a certain type of Britishness, one which this teacher depicted as something that the far-right would both embody and advocate. I argue this was facilitated through two interlinked means: firstly, through the problematic synonymisation of terrorism with Islam explored throughout this thesis and the far-rights anti-Muslim stance (Kundnani, 2007; Ansari and Hafez, 2012; FEMYSO, 2013; Abbas and Awan, 2015); and secondly, through the pro-white stance of far-right extremists and the ethno-nationalist white Britishness that British values was perceived to have denoted. Through these narratives, Britishness became something which rejected terrorism, but in its whiteness, rejected a particular form of terrorism – the same form that far-right extremists do. This is not to suggest that in the creation nor implementation of British values, there laid an active or intentional agreement with far-right extremists, but in its portrayal of what was or *who* could be British, the agenda found itself entangled with discourses promulgated by the far-right. In other words, in participants having recognised a wider public narrative that viewed counter-terrorism, and thus the Prevent duty, as a counter to Islamist-inspired ideologies, the linkage of the duty with British values served only to entrench such narratives whereby Britishness was understood as whiteness, and thus *non-Muslimness*. In line with some of the concerns of the DSLs within the previous chapter, the Fine Art teacher saw the British values agenda as not only potentially divisive through its advocation of a narrow form of Britishness, but as serving to conceptualise threat as only one form of extremism and terrorism in its positioning of British values as the antithesis to a certain kind of threat, one which saw it - perhaps unintentionally – aligned with the views of the far-right.

7.4 Threat as responsibility to safeguard against

This section explores how classroom staff internalised their responsibilisation to both spot signs of radicalisation and embed Prevent and British values into the classroom, as proposed by policy elites and institutional staff in the previous chapters. The first subsection demonstrates how teaching staff positioned the duty as an extension of their existing safeguarding practices but reveals the challenges they faced during enactment. The second subsection reveals how staff not only internalised their own responsibilisation, but extended it to students, placing them as partly responsible for safeguarding themselves and those around them.

7.4.1 "We're responsible to safeguard our students, to look out for anything that might hurt them"

As DSLs highlighted in the previous chapter, teaching staff also noted a clear preference for internal referral systems to identify concerns through formal mechanisms but informal dialogue of consideration and confirmation (see also Lakhani, forthcoming). Through these means, teachers were able to position their responsibility to refer through narratives of continuity whereby a concern over radicalisation would be identified and managed, within their role, in the same way that any other form of harm would be. When staff were asked to describe their process of referral, this was positioned as a continuation of existing practices with little nuance between the institutions; almost all described taking any concern verbally to their designated safeguarding officer (DSO) or lead (DSL)[51], some recalled needing to complete paperwork within a twenty-four-hour window alongside speaking with their DSO/L (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Business Administration and Customer Service Educator, both Training Institute 2; Health, Social Care, Psychology and Mental Health, online participant) whilst one online respondent said they would add a confidential note to the student's learner profile for the DSO to follow up (Health and Social Care Educator, online participant). For others, an online system to report the concern was utilised which similarly

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[51] DSO's were found to be present within larger institutions. They had undergone training in safeguarding but were not as experienced or senior as the DSL who tended to be the individual in charge of safeguarding. DSO's, therefore, acted as an intermediary between educators and the DSL, approaching the DSL where concerns could not be solved by the DSO, or in the case of the DSL from the Training Institute, where this was radicalisation-related, due to their specific training on this issue.

was the same system for any type of concern. The utilisation of these existing mechanisms demonstrated the ease with which the Prevent duty had become embedded within the organisational structures. In doing so, it also highlighted the grounding upon which the referral process had been so, prima facie, readily accepted as a practice by the vast majority of respondents. These experiences further demonstrated the findings of a number of studies on the Prevent duty's implementation whereby the referral mechanism had been integrated within the safeguarding mechanisms with little objection from staff (see for example Busher et al., 2017; Elwick and Jerome, 2019; Moffat and Gerard, 2020). I argue that it was teachers' familiarity with such practices and the positioning of the duty through these narratives of continuity that enabled this.

Some of the teaching staff also discussed having informal discussions with DSO's prior to making any referral (Business Administration and Customer Service Educator, Training Institute 2) whilst others said they spoke with colleagues to confirm their concerns, prior to a DSO/L (Access to HE Business Educator; Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, both Training Institute 2). Though some suggested that this would have been the case for other safeguarding concerns, for others it was a particularly useful mechanism in relation to Prevent where, as a result of the nature of it being potential radicalisation, they felt a sense of fear that was not always apparent when it came to other forms of harm. The ability to partake in informal dialogue provided them with the reassurance they felt they needed to take the decision to refer through the formal institutional mechanisms, as one teacher explained:

> If it was something that I was very, very concerned about I would automatically report it but sometimes if it's a slight change or a slight notice of something different, you do discuss it just to see if they've noticed it too or if they've had other issues because sometimes students can be one way with me and one way with another tutor depending on who the tutor is so it does help to talk about the different issues going on (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Training Institute 2)

These informal discussions further acted as a checking mechanism for not only the validity of their own concerns, but whether other members of staff had similarly been aware of any changes in the students. The extent to which the teacher felt concerned would have affected their decision to undertake informal conversations. Similar to the DSLs in the previous

chapter, this educator suggested that should their concern be deemed serious enough, these informal mechanisms would be bypassed, and the DSO/L be immediately informed. Whilst another educator who shared this view imagined this would be in the case of a "severe" issue; as they had not been in this position they did not feel they could not give an example of what this severity would look like in practice (Business Administration and Customer Service Educator, Training Institute 2). Another educator drew on their experiences from a previous institution where they had worked where evidence had been found that students were planning to travel abroad, or had been watching YouTube videos on how to build a bomb to suggest that these kinds of acts would have been indicators of concerns being serious (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Training Institute 2). Thus, there was a clear sense that it would be the professional judgement of these staff members in assessing a situation once it had arisen that would be drawn upon to decipher whether informal dialogue could be had, or formal mechanisms were necessary (Braun et al., 2011).

As DSLs had revealed in the previous chapter, there had been nothing to stop teachers making referrals externally but it was their preference that this was not the route followed. Teachers confirmed the DSO/L would be the one who investigated the concern and brought in appropriate agencies to provide support to the student in question; teaching staff saw their own responsibility within the referral process as identifying potential concerns and passing it to someone, through either informal dialogue or formalised internal mechanisms, who had greater knowledge, resource and training than them to determine whether a concern required escalating to external agencies (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Social Care Educator, both Training Institute 2; Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1; Teaching Assistant; Careers Advisor; Religious Education Educator; Business Educator; Insurance Educator, all online participants). In reference to the previous two chapters, teachers' responsibility was both positioned and accepted, therefore, as one part of a multi-actor, multi-agency process with the right professionals stepping in at the relevant points.

I argue the positioning of teaching staff responsibility within internal mechanisms of referral was also evident in some participant's limited knowledge of or reference to, external processes and agencies involved in the process, including Channel. Where all but one

participant knew what their referral process was (fig.9), fewer were aware of what Channel was (fig.10):

30 Do you know what the referral process is in your institution for concerns related to terrorism and/or extremism?

Yes — 27 (96.4%)
No — 1 (3.6%)

(fig.9)

29 Do you know what Channel is?

Yes — 22 (78.6%)
No — 6 (21.4%)

(fig.10)

Uncertainty about Channel highlighted the limited knowledge provided by institutions of external mechanisms involved in the Prevent process; I argue a result of staff being felt to not require such information in relation to their own responsibility:

> *What I don't know very well is the Channel process, or in other words, once someone has been identified as being at risk and I have passed that on, you know, what would happen afterwards?* (Social Care Educator, Training Institute 2)

Despite the perceived lack of necessity by DSL's for staff to obtain this knowledge and the preference both for and of staff to utilise existing mechanisms of referral internally, the reference to external systems suggested that there was a perceived knowledge gap for teachers around *what happened next.* I argue that whilst this was not raised as a significant concern for staff, it did present a challenge to their acceptance of responsibilisation whereby they did not fully understand the process with which they had a role in. This was acutely visible within some of the teachers uncomfortableness with their responsibility to refer where, as a result of not always understanding the full referral process, there was an uncertainty about the potential outcomes and thus risks of referring someone which also emerged:

It was also uncomfortable because it felt like going against a friend, but at the same time, it may have saved her from something worse (Early Years and Childhood Studies Educator, online participant)

This experience replicated a number of participants' where an uncomfortableness emerged as a result of an uncertainty as to whether the referral would have helped the student concerned or not. This became heightened where it was combined with a sense of betrayal as the act of referring became about transferring the responsibility of the individual and their vulnerability to an unknown. As the Early Years and Childhood Educator (Online Participant) explained:

The prevent duty has its place, but I wish it were easier to implement and that there could be a simpler way of raising a concern without it being viewed as such an unfriendly thing for someone to do

The responsibility to refer was justified in its positioning as a safeguarding mechanism, but one which also weighed heavy on a number of respondents in both its role and perception.

The following longer excerpt demonstrated the multiple conflicts which emerged in these negotiations of their responsibilities:

I don't feel like I'm supporting students, I feel like I'm shopping them, which is very different with the rest of safeguarding […] I think that we're in a position where we can be vigilant, again I struggle with the whole kind of Big Brother idea of being vigilant, I really do as a teacher and I struggle with this kind of "shop someone who you think is going to become radicalised". Again, probably my own personal opinion, but I have heard other teachers having these conversations as well. But at the same time, I also do feel that I've got a responsibility to my students to make sure that they're okay but I don't think putting it into this Prevent strategy, putting it into this British values strategy is the right way, because I think that's separating it out from everything else that we do, making us feel like we're responsible for national security when we don't feel trained enough for it, we don't feel, I certainly don't feel like I've got the emotional capacity to be able to handle something like that. Whereas if you leave it in the package of "just watch out for safeguarding" and you know we're responsible to safeguard our students and you know to look out for anything that might hurt them, when it's bundled in with that it feels a lot more what we're trained

to do, it feels a lot more like looking after these kids, whereas when it's this separate
thing, these separate processes and all these big words and these big names and the
police are involved in this and its national security, it's terrifying yeah, and in that case
I don't think that bits our responsibility (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1)

In viewing Channel referrals as "shopping" students rather than "supporting" them, this educator labelled the responsibility placed on them as "terrifying", demonstrating the emotional weight of their responsibilisation. This emerged from a perceived separation between the duty and safeguarding, challenging the earlier notion that the duty represented a continuation of existing referral mechanisms. The duty in relation to the responsibility to refer was not viewed by this teacher through narratives of continuity but instead through lenses of securitisation which added a new and uncomfortable dimension to their responsibilities. Moreover, through this narrative the experience also spoke to Heath-Kelly and Strauz's (2018) positioning of public sector workers as 'agents of the state' as she spoke of the feeling of being responsibilised with the states' security work. This similarly both stemmed from and resulted in the teachers' uncertainty around the outcomes of referring students and placing them within a system they knew little about. They discussed the potential of a referral to "mess up somebody's life" creating "fear" and leading her to question the implications of her responsibility: "am I going to put somebody into system? Are they going to be branded for life as somebody who's been, you know, even if they've just accessed something dodgy or, you know?" (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1). Rather than "looking after" them, which this teacher believed safeguarding to be about, the uncertainty which surrounded the implications of a referral led them to position the duty as detracting from their existing responsibilities. Instead the teacher positioned their responsibility as expanding to become part of a broader national security agenda which was about preventing perpetrators, not protecting victims.

For this educator, the emergence of the duty from security policy and their perception that it remained grounded in national security discourse brought with it the longstanding association of counter-terrorism with countering Islamist-inspired terrorism that has been explored throughout this thesis:

I've had sort of one concern myself which I found quite difficult[…] So I had a student
who suddenly became very much more strict with their religion, like literally overnight,

> *which was hard because it was a concern to me considering all the things we'd been*
> *taught in terms of the prevent strategy, but at the same time I found it really difficult*
> *because I didn't want to interfere with her right to be religious[...]*

The positioning of an increase in religiosity as a key concern in relation to Prevent, visible too within the ERG22+ discussed in chapter five and concerns raised I chapter six, against a perceived backdrop of disproportionate focus upon Muslims, created an internal conflict for this teacher. The experience demonstrated not only how the internal bias discussed in chapter six played out on the ground but also how it intersected with a self-reflection of this bias; an internalisation of the narratives portrayed within government guidance and a challenge to such presentations, against an awareness of the overriding public narrative of prejudice against Muslims. The management of these simultaneously occurring ambiguities left the teacher "feeling like I'm looking towards a particular sector of society" and potentially discriminating within her responsibility to *prevent.* Moreover, as they went on to disclose:

> *I've never felt comfortable with looking, with identifying people based on opinions, I*
> *find it a lot easier to support someone based on what's happening to them, or based*
> *on their distress, rather than opinions their expressing* (Fine Art Educator, Academic
> Institute 1)

Therefore, it was also the idea that teachers had to report opinions rather than events, or actions, which also set the duty apart. The experience further disrupted the narrative of continuity by seeing the duty position their responsibility to be about spotting signs of vulnerability which were distinct from those related to the other forms of harm which this teacher felt their existing responsibility was positioned to safeguarded against.

However, for all of the participants who stressed an uncomfortableness, it was always caveated by their insistence on "the need" (Art and Design Educator, online participant) for the duty (see also Moffat and Gerard, 2020, p.206). The earlier excerpt from online participant The Early Years and Childhood Studies Educator (p.184), for example, where concern surrounding her responsibilisation was immediately followed up by a reference to the belief that the referral "may have saved the student from something worse" had the decision, or perceived betrayal, to refer not been undertaken. This sentiment was visible across teachers experiences; despite concerns which appeared on the one hand to challenge the conceptualisation of threat as something which required safeguarding against through the

Prevent duty, teachers simultaneously demonstrated the internalisation of this narrative in upholding the notion that they had, because of their safeguarding responsibilities, a responsibility to refer, on the other hand. Thus, decisions were weighted with the potential outcomes of the two choices likened to the lesser of two evils, a sentiment which was echoed in Busher et al.'s (2017) work where educators felt it was *better to be safe than sorry* or had favoured the potential outcome of being wrong, than being right and having done nothing about it. As one online participant put it "if in doubt, refer" since, for them, the duty "could have a major positive impact on individuals and ultimately save lives" (Sales Training Advisor, Online Participant). I argue this sentiment was also enabled by viewing safeguarding as not only about the individual, but those around them, as chapter six revealed. In the Sales Training Advisor's (online participant) referencing of "lives", he extended his responsibility as one to safeguard the individual from harm but in doing so prevent the harm that might be inflicted by this individual upon others. Despite a number of teaching staff having perceived a potential problematic outcome for the individual, the narrative of safeguarding encouraged them to see their responsibility as beyond any single individual and about the collective of the classroom and wider society.

In detailing how these risks might be spotted, many replicated the signs of radicalisation which had been proposed by both the policy elites in chapter five and the DSLs in chapter six which they had a responsibility to spot. These were, as in the previous chapters, positioned by many as vulnerabilities which could be protected from exploitation in being safeguarded against. However, the experiences in this chapter demonstrated both the acceptance from teachers of their role on the front line of spotting such signs, and the challenges which emerged on the ground in doing so. Similarly to the DSLs experiences in the previous chapter, educators were also fluid in their responses depending on the nature or type of concern which was presented to them at the time. This furthered my earlier argument that teachers rested on their own professional judgement, or what Strausz and Heath-Kelly (2019, p.165) refer to as the 'non-expert professional gaze' alongside an 'adherent intuitive judgement' to determine where a vulnerability both emerged and required the attention of their DSL/O (see also Lakhani, forthcoming). As a result, the internalisation of the responsibility, and its continuity with their existing role became visible here where teachers drew upon their prior knowledge to determine where vulnerability to both radicalisation and any other form of

harm occurred. It was this knowledge which would enable them to move beyond some of the problematic signs that were earlier explored by the Fine Art educator in enabling them to contextualise the concerns within the wider environment and knowledge of the student. As one teacher explored:

> *So some of the signs are if learners are isolating themselves, starting to act differently, maybe have new groups of friends that they didn't have before, maybe they talk about new people or things that are happening to them, those kind of things […] Just because they have a new group of friends doesn't necessarily mean anything because imagine if we reported students every time they had a new group of friends, we'd be reporting everybody! So even though I feel like I know the signs I'm looking out for, sometimes they're not very clear on what I'm looking out for at the same time* (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Training Institute 2)

It was therefore about "listening to what they're saying but then asking them questions" about any perceived changes which would have enabled this teacher, and others who similarly shared this sentiment, to understand the validity and nature of the concern. Further, the ability to establish a holistic understanding of a concern was also grounded in participants' positionality as teachers within the classroom. For the Business Administration and Customer Service educator (Training Institute 2), the relationship she had built up with her students positioned her as able to both understand the student, their background and the changes which might have occurred but also conduct a deeper enquiry than someone unfamiliar with the student would be able to. In this sense, the established trust between teachers and students, and a knowledge of their backgrounds, was seen to be relied upon in obtaining a holistic picture of the individual and their perceived concern. The experiences therefore suggested that a referral based entirely on signs would be problematic; it was the unique position of trust and knowledge that teachers held which provided the basis for legitimate and informed referrals.

7.4.2 Responsibility to responsibilise: "what steps to take to protect themselves"

In addition to the embedding of British values within the classroom, teaching staff also highlighted a second way through which the enactment of the duty emerged within classrooms: Prevent workshops. These workshops sought to entrench the framing of Prevent

as a safeguarding mechanism which would spot vulnerability to radicalisation and prevent individuals from coming to harm. I argue that these so-called awareness raising sessions demonstrated an extension of Thomas' (2017) 'responsibilisation' where it was not only public sector workers, in this case teachers, who had been responsibilised with fulfilling the work of the state, but that in doing so they had been tasked with the responsibility to responsibilise their students. The duty required teachers to build resilience amongst their students through not only good British values, but through making them aware of the potential dangers of radicalisation and how to spot it within themselves or amongst those around them. In other words, in their resilience students also became agents of the state, responsible for *preventing* themselves and those around them from becoming radicalised.

For the vast majority of educators, both online and face-to-face participants, these Prevent workshops were delivered as a part of a wider tutorial programme whereby brief presentations were given by subject or pastoral tutors around definitions of terrorism and extremism and the processes of radicalisation discussed to raise student awareness. Training Institute 1 allowed me access to two of their tutorial sessions on Prevent which fortuitously were taking place during my time spent there. I observed one tutor across two different classes – one of plumbing students and the other of brick laying students. Tutorials were delivered by a member of the pastoral and welfare team in this institution, as opposed to subject tutors in Academic Institute 3 for example who had taken on the additional role of tutors in other institutions due to funding cuts and being subsequently short staffed. In the observed institution, pastoral staff were thought to have more experience and knowledge with issues discussed as part of the wider tutorial programme such as Prevent but also mental health awareness, employability, and health and wellbeing, amongst others and therefore led these sessions which all students were required to attend once a week, regardless of their taught subject.

In the sessions I observed, the educator used an external online package from which two videos were played. One video looked at a young white male who was working as an apprentice on a building site and was invited by a far-right extremist to participate in demonstrations against "all the immigrants taking our jobs". The second video was a young South East Asian male who had been abused by white males and sought solace in a group

which was inferred to be linked with Islamist-inspired extremism. Both of the young males at the centre of the videos were depicted as vulnerable and marginalised, having both been radicalised by others who used their experiences to convince them of an Us versus Them rhetoric. Both videos echoed WRAP training videos closely. Students were encouraged to write down answers to questions within a pre-designed booklet on definitions of extremism and terrorism: signs to spot when someone is being radicalised, and what you might do if you thought you or somebody else was being radicalised, answer to which they should have gained from the video. The tutor paused the videos at intervals where these answers were visible and used PowerPoint slides which similarly provided signposting to the answers. She told me afterwards that such explicit direction was required for these students firstly due to time constraints, secondly, due to the nature of the subject within such a tight time frame and, finally, the academic level of the students in the room who she felt were unable to understand or engage with the material.

Though the staff member observed did not agree to be interviewed due to her own time constraints, other participants' experiences provided further insight into resources and knowledge within the classroom that presented potential limitations to teacher's classroom enactments of the duty. One teacher explained that they had similarly utilised external resources which they had found themselves through education websites and Google (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health Educator, Training Institute 2). As earlier discussions around training highlighted, for them, these external resources – outside of WRAP and institutionally provided ones – enabled them to move beyond an understanding of extremism and terrorism being Islamist-related and instead position groups such as the far-right within these spaces for students to consider. These external resources were drawn upon by a number of teaching staff to have therefore enabled them to present a picture to students of extremism and terrorism as they had conceptualised it, as being about all forms of threat. However, they also served additional purposes for some of the participants. As one teacher explained, internal resources provided by the institution that were assumed by her to be replicative of government provided ones were not "relatable" to sixteen-year olds. Policy elites and institutional implementors, in being distanced from the classroom enactment of the duty, she argued, "don't understand the battle that we've got to teach them this, whatever example they've given us, and try and relate it to them, and that's the battle that

we have to deal with" (Business Administration and Customer Services Educator, Training Institute 2). Instead, resources which she had found from the Education and Training Foundation website provided her with a comprehensive package that she felt able to implement and her students able to relate to:

It gives case studies at the top so it's a man and a woman and they've split it up into four sections, so the first one is radicalisation and extremism, the second one is staying safe online, the third one is what to trust, so like social media so like what news can you trust, and the fourth one's British values and we very much split them up into reviews, well I do anyway, so every review, they have four a year, I say "do this, it takes about an hour or two, put your headphones in and kind of get yourself in the zone" and hoping that a scenario video would educate them and they'd remember it […] They have to do a test at the end and they get a certificate which they send to me and it's one more thing that I can say if Ofsted come and go "how does X, Y, and Z know that" it's just one more thing to back me up (Business Administration and Customer Services Educator, Training Institute 2)

For this teacher, the resource provided not only a clear template for them to implement the duty through their classroom enactment but did so to cover their Ofsted requirements. In this sense, the resource acted as the information provider and in doing so was perceived to have removed some of the risk of relaying incorrect or insufficient information. This was particularly poignant for them since doing so was perceived to have left them vulnerable to Ofsted disapproval. The certificate therefore acted not only as confirmation of student engagement with and knowledge of Prevent (or Prevent related concerns such as extremism, terrorism and radicalisation), but I argue also enabled the participant to shift responsibility of a lack of knowledge in students onto the programme, rather than themselves; the teachers emphasis on Ofsted suggested that the resource therefore was equally about raising awareness of students but also covering her own back at inspection time. Whilst this was also recognised by other teachers across both online and face-to-face forms of participation, their experiences suggested that the need to meet Ofsted requirements had become prioritised over student's meaningful engagement with the agenda blurring the enactment of awareness raising. This demonstrated what I have elsewhere argued (James, 2020), that the governance processes of Ofsted requirements which surrounded the classroom enactments limited teacher's capacities to implement resilience building. I suggest this is particularly notable

where, as the earlier experiences within Training Institute 1 highlighted, students required significant guidance to understand such issues – guidance that teachers simply did not have the time to give. As a result, the fear of having to meet inspections I argue, left teacher's enactments focused on making the implementation visible, rather than deliverable.

Nonetheless, workshops had been embedded within existing tutorial programmes demonstrating the applicability to existing educational agendas; governance processes of educational institutions had similarly also existed prior to the duty monitoring and assessing the delivery of such agendas (Busher et al., 2017; Revell and Bryan, 2018).[52] In this sense, the experiences appeared to have demonstrated a continuation of teacher's responsibility and navigation of agenda implementation. However, I suggest that it was the challenges which were specific to Prevent which demonstrated where this continuity became disrupted. Whilst a number of teachers noted they had long been subject to the provision of agendas within constrained environments of limited resource, particularly in relation to spare time within heavily loaded curriculums, those agenda's had not been positioned by them to have had the same impact on their role and institutions capacity to meet an inspection. In other words, the pressure teachers placed upon themselves to make their enactment of Prevent within the classroom visible stemmed from the fact that meeting Prevent requirements was a core element to their safeguarding responsibilities – those which if were not met, would see the institution deemed inadequate (see HM Government, 2015c, p.3; Ofsted, 2019, p.12). I argue therefore, that the responsibility to responsibilise students was not only for student resilience against radicalisation, but for the staff member and their institution to meet Ofsted requirements. The responsibility was not just about an institutions collective approach and embedding of the agenda, but an individual teachers' enactment of Prevent within the classroom.

It's very much teaching and educating individuals into not being so naïve and thinking for themselves and to not be radicalised as such, so thinking for themselves and having a bit of ounce about them (Business Administration and Customer Services Educator, Training Institute 2)

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[52] See also (Lee and Fitz, 1997) for more on educational inspections

The responsibilisation of students occurred through the development of critical thinking skills for some (see Jerome and Elwick, 2019). Students capacities to question problematic discourses and ideas around them was perceived as a key means through which their resilience could be established, and teachers have fulfilled their Prevent duty (O'Donnell, 2017). This spoke to wider literature around the potential for students to be influenced by surrounding discourses, whether through peers (see Prinstein and Dodge, 2008), familial relationships (see Laursen and Collins, 2004) or indeed as many of the participants drew upon, the wider media (see Strasburger et al., 2014) and social media (see Allen et al., 2014) discourses. These influences were particularly poignant, Allen and Loeb (2015) note, at the stage of adolescence which the vast majority of students within these institutions would have been at. Critical thinking was therefore a means through which consciousness raising could be developed as a challenge against problematic discourses of prejudice, an approach which had also been visible within educational settings prior to the Prevent duty (Walsh, 1988; see Pate, 1992). In line with literature around (de-)radicalisation agendas (see Weeks, 2018) and further suggesting an internalisation of government narratives, teachers inferred that an inability to challenge and deconstruct such narratives might lead to students becoming engaged in extremist ideologies. Thus, this responsibility to responsibilise students through resilience building was positioned as central to their own responsibility to safeguard against threat.

A further way through which this had been created, and thus demonstrated the internalisation of teachers responsibilisation, was the creation of safe spaces. Teachers described these as having enabled the implementation of the duty to occur not only through the explicit delivery of workshops but implicitly through the creation of "inclusive environments" (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1). As one participant explored:

> *It's about kind of ensuring the safety of our students and also raising their awareness. So we've spoke to them about radicalisation and so on, and what steps to take to protect themselves in terms of building their own resilience, we do some discussant work on various topics really around how can I develop critical thinking skills to help really to arm themselves, as well as kind of feel in a safe environment with us that they won't be put in a position really, and also just a general awareness of kind of what's right, what's wrong from their own perspective* (Teacher Trainer, Training Institute 2)

The 'safe space' for a number of teachers then became the basis upon which the policy's resilience building agenda could be delivered within the classroom. It enabled them both to assess student attitudes and behaviours and notice any changes whilst simultaneously creating the spaces within which such attitudes and changes in behaviour could come to light and be challenged. Further demonstrating the extension of the responsibilisation discourse, in creating these safe spaces within the classrooms, teachers also inferred that students themselves would be involved in the challenging of narratives of their peers within these critical thinking sessions. The sessions, therefore, also acted as an opportunity in which teachers could relay their own training of how to both spot signs of radicalisation (through the workshop video tutorials) and deconstruct the narratives that often emerged alongside them when they occurred (through the critical skill building). One teacher spoke of the challenges however, in running these sessions as a simultaneous approach to responsibilising students in their enactment of the Prevent duty:

> *Over the last month I've delivered two sort of Prevent type ones, so there was the actual Prevent one that our college goes through and then there was the other sort of staying safe and then the sort of digital stuff that had a lot of Prevent stuff in it, and then yesterday we had one on democracy. The difference in the way they responded to those different topics, so democracy yesterday the conversation was so dynamic, everyone was talking, everybody had different opinions, there was no divide between types of students that were responding, they were discussing all those different things, they were talking about Brexit, they were talking about immigration, they were talking about all sorts, it was really good. So, I know I've got a tutor group that do respond to stuff, but when we were talking about the Prevent strategy and we were going through that stuff, they just switched off. Just totally didn't want to engage with it. Now I don't know how much of that was their uncomfortableness with it, or coming across from my uncomfortableness with it, I couldn't tell you that, but it was a very different session*
> (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1)

Where discussions centred around critical thinking students were positioned as lively and enthused in their discussions by the teacher but, where Prevent was directly taught, conversations were muted with students "not necessarily giving direct comments, more sort of tuts or sort of looking away" in relaying their disinterest to her during the session. The sense of "uncomfortableness" – from either the students or the teacher – for her was a key

aspect of students' "switching off". Whilst students were comfortable and engaged in conversations around topics which would help them develop critical thinking, particularly on recent events or topical debates, they were uncomfortable with ones linked directly to terrorism and extremism. For another teacher, this detraction from government related debates was not that students did not want to engage in these conversations, but that they did not want to have them under the banner of a government strategy:

> When you start saying it's from the government and its an agenda and it's a strategy, they just, it goes like that (*signals with hand sweeping over their heads*) … It's not necessarily the content of what Prevent is, that they know the content and they're rejecting that, but it's because it's [from] government (Business Administration and Customer Services Educator, Training Institute 2).

Experiences from some of the teachers responsible for the training of future public sector workers also offered another explanation as to why some students were more reluctant than others to engage with what a number of the teachers positioned as a government agenda. For students of the Teacher Trainer and Social Care Trainer, the duty had been embedded within their curriculum since they would be subject to its requirements once in their role. As such, these educators spent greater amounts of time on teaching their students about Prevent in order to prepare them for their own enactments as public sector workers. Thus, whilst a variation in implementation with some students receiving one forty-five-minute session and others spending entire modules on Prevent could have appeared to have been problematic in demonstrating an inconsistency of implementation, I argue the experiences actually revealed a relative approach to their students. For those who would be tasked with implementing the Prevent duty, it should have been expected that these students were given greater space and time to explore it than those who would not immediately face any such duties. However, in comparison to Maylor's (2016, p.326) study on initial teacher education, focus was placed for the students in this research upon knowing what the Prevent duty was rather than, as Maylor found, on trainee teachers establishing a 'critical consciousness' around Prevent and British values'. As one online participant wrote, Prevent should be "taught separately and discussed in employability sessions and of course in schools prior to apprenticeships/training so that it's already embedded […] Don't forget we teach the main aim, in my case, Automotive" (Automotive Educator, online participant). I argue therefore

that this perceived applicability transcended across and between students and their teachers. Where teachers, as earlier explored, focused their enactments on meeting their responsibilities, students were interested in that which they felt might impact them, such as discussions around Brexit and immigration, not the processes of radicalisation. This relationship between teachers and students in the former's responsibility to responsibilise the latter provides the grounding upon which the next chapter on student engagements becomes framed.

7.5 Conclusion

Chapter seven has presented an exploration of the experiences of teaching staff and their classroom enactments of the Prevent duty. It has sought to examine the extent to which the conceptualisations of threat visible at both elite and institutional level were visible at classroom level and identify where these narratives were both replicated and disrupted. In doing so, it demonstrated that teaching staff internalised the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to safeguard against; replicated the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat; in doing the former two, internalised the conceptualisation of threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism; and, extended the conceptualisation of threat as their and students' responsibility to safeguard against.

Section 7.2 examined participants' internalisation of the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to safeguard against. Subsection 7.2.1 demonstrated that the framework of safeguarding was similarly used by teaching staff, as had been visible in the previous two chapters, to position radicalisation as something which could be prevented by safeguarding against the vulnerability of potential victims and their exploitation. Through this framing, teachers internalised the notion that safeguarding against vulnerability was the same as safeguarding any other form of harm and thus a continuation of their existing practices; experiences of Prevent training in subsection 7.2.2 provided a key means through which this internalisation occurred. The final subsection, 7.2.3, similarly demonstrated how it was the framework of safeguarding which enabled teachers to see the duty as applicable to all forms of extremism and terrorism, since it was about protecting *everyone's* potential vulnerability. However, the three sections also revealed conflicts, or nuances, within teachers' discourses.

Experiences in subsection 7.2.1 drew upon a lens of securitisation where students were positioned as both at risk and risky (Heath-Kelly, 2013); safeguarding therefore became not only about the individual, but about those around them who might be impacted by their vulnerability. The distinctions between *standard* safeguarding and *Prevent* safeguarding were visible within experiences of subsection 7.2.2 with existing safeguarding knowledge not deemed sufficient to fulfil their Prevent duty and enable them to spot signs for radicalisation in particular. Further, the wider discourses of prejudice which institutional staff and policy elites had referenced were also drawn upon within subsection 7.2.3 to highlight the challenges teachers faced in implementing an agenda to safeguard all forms of extremism and terrorism against a longstanding discourse which had synonymised radicalisation with Islamist-inspired ideologies and therefore problematically with Muslims. Nonetheless, in revealing the negotiations teaching staff undertook to manage these conflicts, the section also revealed how teachers' enactments de-exceptionalised the policy through implementations which enabled them to respond to the above challenges and conceptualise threat as, ultimately, vulnerability which required safeguarding against.

Section 7.3 saw a disruption from previous chapters where the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat appeared only to be replicated out of necessity and not internalised by staff enactments of the duty. In examining the embedding of British values within the classroom, subsection 7.3.1 revealed the ways in which the agenda was positioned as central to their implementation of the duty and the means through which they came to enact it within their classrooms. In doing so, however, it revealed a series of conflicts such as the complexities of applying the values, and the (lack of) specificity of training and resources in order to meet Ofsted requirements. Underpinning these challenges however was a deeper concern around the labelling of the values as British which subsection 7.3.2 explored. Though some staff were happy to replicate the language, many challenged the values as invoking a certain form of Britishness that led to division and exclusion, particularly against (perceived) Muslim students, through the promotion of an ethno-nationalist sense of Britishness. Nonetheless, as a result of the Ofsted inspection framework, teachers noted a necessity to embed the agenda within their teaching and as a result replicated the discourse within their classroom.

The conceptualisation of threat as educators' responsibility to safeguard against was explored within section 7.4 where experiences of teaching staff demonstrated the internalisation of their responsibilisation. The first subsection, 7.4.1, confirmed the role of internal referral mechanisms, as institutional staff had put forward in the previous chapter, which further de-exceptionalised the duty enabling teachers to distance themselves from anything other than identifying and referring a concern. However such processes of identification and referral were complicated by a perceived need for informal dialogue with colleagues for not only reassurance and validation for their concern, but as a result of the perceived emotional weight which occurred through their responsibilisation, the fear of internal bias, the lack of knowledge around potential outcomes of referrals and the perceived conflict which emerged between safeguarding and surveillance. Yet, as with the previous sections of the chapter, teaching staff also caveated many of their concerns with the need to fulfil their duty in safeguarding both the student and those around them. Moreover, as subsection 7.4.2 revealed, the experiences not only demonstrated an internalisation of the conceptualisation of threat as their responsibility to safeguard against, but an extension of this narrative in the responsibilisation of their students. Participants demonstrated how their role was to not only raise the awareness but build the resilience of students to enable them to identify potential vulnerability to both themselves and those around them.

The chapter has argued that teaching staff largely internalised the conceptualisations of threat that had been proposed in the previous two chapters as continuations of their existing safeguarding responsibilities and practices. It has demonstrated clear parallels with both of the previous chapters in doing so but has simultaneously raised a number of important conflicts across and between policy elite, institutional and classroom levels. It therefore has not only contributed to a greater depth of knowledge to the overall picture of what the implementation of the duty tells us about the conceptualisation of threat within the FE sector but provided the backdrop against which the following chapter can be examined. The experiences of teachers have raised important questions about student awareness of the Prevent duty, their engagement and perception of a "British" values agenda and their perceived knowledge around, capacity to and comfortableness with identifying vulnerability to radicalisation in themselves and those around them as they not only receive, but as this chapter revealed, also enact the duty themselves within the classroom.

Chapter Eight

Student Engagement: The Expectations and the Realities

8.1 Introduction

Chapter eight examines experiences of student participants across four of the five institutions engaged with within this thesis. It does so in order to understand the extent to which students internalised the conceptualisations of threat put forward within their classroom, institution and within the broader policy implementation. It examines whether or not the narratives utilised by teachers, DSLs and policy elites respectively were found within student responses and in doing so reveals the points at which student experiences deviated from these presentations in both their receipt and implementation of the duty. The chapter provides the final layer of analysis to this thesis to uncover what the implementation of the duty reveals about the conceptualisation of threat within the sector. In doing so, it examines the conceptualisation of threat within student experiences through three lenses: threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism; British values as the antithesis to threat; and, threat as their responsibility to safeguard against.

Whilst all of the three previous chapters examined the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to be safeguarded against, students did not engage with this as an isolated narrative and instead rooted their internalisation of it through discourses which surrounded the conceptualisations of threat as all forms of terrorism and extremism and as responsibilisation. Thus, the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to be safeguarded against is dealt with through sections 8.2 and 8.4 of this chapter.

Section 8.2 examines the conceptualisation of threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism. It reveals that whilst students claimed all ideologies should be understood as threat, they saw a wider public narrative of prejudice preventing such a conceptualisation from occurring. Instead, students argued that threat was understood largely as being about Islamist-inspired terrorism and extremism and thus it was Muslims who were seen as more vulnerable to radicalisation, requiring safeguarding. The section outlines how this was perceived to occur

through an Othering of Muslimness which saw threat associated with non-white non-Britishness. Moreover, students also explored the perceived implications this had on both Muslims who had been problematically synonymised with threat, and those who's non-Muslimness positioned them as non-threatening regardless of their potential to be so.

Section 8.3 of the chapter examines the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat. Experiences revealed how teachers reframed agenda of 'our' or 'institutional' values were far more familiar to students than the language of British values. Subsection 8.3.1 therefore reveals the variations with which the agenda became embedded within the classroom and the extent to which students engaged with it. Subsection 8.3.2 explores the labelling of British values and reveals a rejection of the label of British by students who problematised the ethno-nationalism that this was perceived to invoke, particularly when this was understood as a means through which *a certain type* of extremism and terrorism could be countered.

The final section of the chapter, 8.4, examines the extent to which students internalised the conceptualisation of threat as a responsibility to safeguard against. The first subsection, 8.4.1 of the chapter draws directly on the previous chapter where teachers positioned part of their responsibility as awareness raising. It reveals that though students recalled engaging with prevent workshops, experiences were varied, and the knowledge obtained from them perceived as limited. It also reveals conflicting stories surrounding the necessity and appropriateness of the agenda in the classroom. Subsection 8.4.2 engages with students' understandings of their teacher's responsibility to refer vulnerability to radicalisation and the challenges they envisage within this whilst their own responsibilisation is examined in subsection 8.4.3. Though students positioned themselves as morally obliged to prevent the harm of radicalisation, both to the individual concerned and those around them, they problematised their requirement to do so. This was grounded in the lack of awareness revealed in subsection 8.4.1 but also an uncomfortableness with not only referring but the perceived implications this would have for both themselves and the person being referred. The section suggested that whilst students understood the conceptualisation of threat as the responsibility to safeguard against, they questioned their teacher's capacity to, to *all* forms

of extremism and terrorism, and their own responsibilisation to engage in these processes at all.

8.2 Threat as all forms of extremist and terrorist threat

As participants across the previous three chapters had drawn upon, students similarly suggested that a wider discourse of prejudice had become central to the conceptualisation of threat. This section explores how wider public discourse framed student perceptions of terrorism and extremism, but also an awareness both that it had done so, and of the implications which occurred as a result. This section therefore analyses the conflicts present within experiences that revealed students, like their teachers, saw that threat *should* have been conceptualised as all forms of extremism and terrorism, but *was not* because of this wider long-standing narrative of prejudice.

8.2.1 "Social stigma – if someone said terrorist, you'd probably think of an Islamic person"

> *Joe: [the media] represent Muslim terrorist attacks a lot more than they do any other person, so that is instantly who you associate it with*
>
> *Dale: That's the thing though they're not, terrorists aren't really Muslims are they [Joe: no] they don't represent the religion at all* (Training Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders).

The experiences of students replicated their teachers and DSLs in revealing a perceived wider public narrative of prejudice that was felt to have had an impact on perceptions of terrorism for them and more broadly. Students had all drawn upon the idea that terrorism was primarily something which had been associated with groups like ISIS or al Qaeda within their lifetimes. These groups, for them, had been the most documented and the most visible in terms of both public discourse and nature of attacks. However, the vast majority of students also argued that despite them only ever having been presented with Islamist-inspired organisations, they were acutely aware that there was also a problematic conflation of these organisations with the religion of Islam. As a result, a number of students spent time in their discussions challenging the problematic framing of *who* the terrorist was perceived to be. Several of the students drew upon the perception that groups like ISIS were being inaccurately portrayed

within public discourse as Muslims and therefore Muslims being homogenised as being a single entity that was associated with such organisations. It was not that they understood such attacks as being perpetrated by Muslims, but in a wider public perception of them as such, it was difficult to separate the two.

Many of the other students explored the impacts of this problematic framing, hypothesising what they thought it must feel like to be a Muslim student having to face such stigmatisations where people were unable to have separated Islamist-inspired terrorism from Muslims:

> *I bet they hate it though like when the Manchester bombing happened I know like, I bet people like in our class, I bet they was all like "oh god" like scared to go to college, to think what people would think about them and it's like, it's angin when you have to think about that. My best mate, like he's Muslim and he didn't even talk about it but he knew what people were saying, I remember one time we was out and it was after it happened and his dad came to pick him up and there was these white people who had just come out of the pub and was like shouting abuse at them, like saying like all nasty things, saying he was like a terrorist and all this and it was like "what?!" like he's just picked up his son to take him home and just getting all this abuse. It's horrible.*
>
> (Jessie, Academic Institute 2, Group Two, Female group)

For this student, though she had not received the abuse targeted towards her friend and his dad as a result of their religion, she saw the implications of these narratives and the stigmatising impacts upon them. The familiarity with which her friend had with these types of comments – "he knew what people were saying" – revealed the extent to which such events were normal in his daily experiences as a Muslim. This, in comparison to Jessie's perception of the event as "horrible", further demonstrated the extent to which the experiences of those perceived associated with terrorism differed from those who were not (see Ivandic et al., 2019). Threat was therefore conceptualised as not only Islamist-inspired forms of terrorism, but as a Muslimness.

The above experience which was perceived to have led to the stigmatisation of Muslims was not isolated. In fact, a number of the students directly drew upon their concern that these types of experiences were commonplace as a result of people being unable to separate Muslims from Islamist-inspired terrorism and seeing Islamist-inspired ideologies as *the threat*.

This discrimination was directly felt by one of the Muslim students who participated in the research:

> *I think about [terrorism and extremism], maybe not all the time but especially me being Muslim, like you think about it a lot. Like you get paranoid when you're on like public transport and stuff like that, if someone's treated you differently is it because you're of a certain race or is it because of your religion and stuff*
>
> (Sara, Academic Institute 2, Group One, Mixed genders)

Sara's experience demonstrated the everyday-ness of marginalisation that occurred from the conceptualisation of threats as something which only Muslims could create. Moreover, for Sara who identified as a black hijab wearing Muslim of Somalian decent, it was her race and her visible gendered religion which became symbolic of her difference. Her identity presented a crossover in which she was unsure which signifier her mistreatment was a result of but positioned the amalgamation of them to have made her Muslimness visible. Studies which have claimed it is Muslim women who are disproportionately the victims of anti-Muslim hate crimes due to their *visibleness* (Feldman and Littler, 2014; Allen, 2015b; Joly and Wadia, 2017) and the gendered, racialised and anti-Muslim discourses that had been associated with the headscarf (Dwyer, 1999; Arian, 2014; Allen, 2015b; Rashid, 2016), demonstrate the replicability of this experience beyond this research. Moreover, the extent to which the everydayness of this is felt is present within Sara's revelation that she thought about the depiction of Muslimness as a threat a lot; for her, normal tasks such as using public transport had become a source of paranoia in the fear of her expected mistreatment. The experience also spoke to the earlier excerpt in which a wider sense of Islamophobia existed within the everyday realities of this Muslim student and other Muslims around her she suggested; for them, their mistreatment on the basis of their religion was depicted as commonplace. For another of the participants within a different focus group, there was also a reference to paranoia over public transport. However, as a white student, this was a result of her fear in seeing someone "suspicious" who might be the perpetrator of terror; her perception of suspicion was linked to the portrayal of Muslims as terrorists, she admitted. The juxtaposition of the two experiences highlighted not only the fear which emerge from such a conceptualisation in both understandings, but this sense of Islamophobia which separated them on the basis of their perceived identity. For all of the students, it was the problematic framing of Muslims as terrorists that lay at the root of these stereotypes. However, the

experiences revealed how for the Muslim and non-Muslim students in this research, the outcomes of this were felt very differently.

There was, however, a perceived shift which had occurred during student's enrolment in further education. Many distanced the framing of Muslims as being those capable of threat from happening within their institution and instead referred to events which had happened at high school. For two of the groups of students, they discussed how these stereotypes had been both visible and verbalised within their school environment but that the ethnic and cultural mix of students and the perceived maturity that students had at college had minimised their occurrence within their further education institute. Whilst data was not collected at secondary level, and other studies do not offer sufficient data to demonstrate these claims further, the experiences revealed a perceived academic and personal development during adolescence, to have encouraged both an awareness of the consequences of such narratives and a willingness to challenge such discourses when they emerged. Yet, for most there was still a likelihood that whilst these stigmatisations would not occur *inside* their institutions, "there's people in the college that have to deal with stuff that they shouldn't really have to deal with" (Jeffrey, Academic Institute One, Group Three, Male) outside of them. This spoke to a number of the experiences where students referenced the potential of anti-Muslim hate crimes within the wider society, like those earlier drawn upon, to occur:

> *Well right after [the Manchester bombing] you heard about like people that weren't even religious but looked like they were Muslim were getting jumped*
> (Hollie, Academic Institute 2, Group Two, Female group)

It was a perceived Muslimness which had left those within her story victim to an anti-Islamic hate crime. I suggest that in line with Bonino (2015) and Kundnani (2007), this was largely predicated on the notion of race and religious symbolism that made, as the previous chapter drew upon, individuals hyper-visible in their markers of difference. As Meer (2014) has explored, the notion of race has become absorbed into the conception of ethnicity and in being so has become synonymised with religious and cultural signifiers leading to an albeit problematic conflation of these distinct markers of identity within public discourse. Moreover, though it spoke to the wider issue of anti-Muslim hate crime and the documented rise of cases which occur after a terrorist attack (see Ivandic et al., 2019 for Greater

Manchester statistics), the experience also confirmed the concerns of activists and organisations that it was also those *perceived* to be Muslim who were experiencing these forms of hatred (see Awan and Zempi, 2018). Yet, within her experience Hollie problematised such an assumption that individuals can be labelled Muslim as a result of their appearance but moments later similarly re-uses the discourse of Muslimness when commenting "if you see a Muslim everyone's like "oh they're going to be the next terrorist" when most likely they're not" (Hollie, Academic Institute 2, Group Two, Female group). The perception of these narratives as widespread and commonplace offered some explanation for this and other students' replication of the language; I argue that this suggests that they had also to an extent internalised the same wider narratives of prejudice that they challenged creating a conflict within their own conceptualisations of threat. Moreover, the comments highlighted that in this discourse being so mainstreamed, the replication of language reflected the idea that there was such a thing as *looking Muslim* for participants.

This conception of Muslimness was, as discussed, based not only on religious signifiers but racial ones too. Race was outlined by many participants as a key determinant factor for students in both how events were portrayed and what they were subsequently understood as, as a result of their perpetrators appearance. The following discussion is replicative of conversations across student participants where they problematised the centrality of race in the labelling of acts:

> *Emily: when I mentioned about my cousin, like he's white and he showed signs of terrorism, and it didn't get blown up, no one heard about it I only knew about it because I was family but if he was black or he was Asian it would've been a big thing it would've been everywhere I think*
>
> NJ: So, you think that a person's race *[Emily: yeah]* is dependent on how it gets shown?
>
> *Emily: It shouldn't be, but it is*
>
> *Rio: Yeah, it's just like with the shootings and stuff so like, the school shootings in America, they erm, they're usually predominantly white males, and they don't get called terrorists, but it still is an act of terrorism*
>
> *Emily: Yeah, they get told that they're mentally ill*
>
> *Rio: yeah, they got told yeah stuff like that [Emily: rather than an act of terrorism] but say if it was an Asian man or a black man, it's straight to terrorism*

(Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders)

For these students, the portrayal of the *type* of act which was committed was underpinned by the race of the perpetrator. However, it should be noted that there are some misunderstandings which are present within these experiences. In the first example given, the revelation of Emily's cousin being referred to Channel was, she says, dealt with through mental health services because of his whiteness, rather than being labelled as terrorist and publicised as she believes would have been the case had he been Asian or black. Yet, given the anonymity of the Chanel process it would be highly improbable that an individuals' identity would be publicised, regardless of their race. Nonetheless, what is striking in this claim by Emily is the perception that such event *would* occur because of a stigmatisation of certain races, suggesting that there was a perceived imbalance and unfairness in the treatment of individuals of going through the Prevent process as a result of racial discourses. In the second example, whilst it is worth noting the lack of domestic terrorism legislation within America,[53] there remains a distinct difference in the framing and policy response between 'white mass shooters' and 'Muslim "terrorists"' (D'Orazio and Salehyan, 2018, p.1025), as the students claim. The white perpetrator's actions are understood as mental health related concerns and the non-white Muslim's as a security concern. The perpetuation of this depiction within media and policy rhetoric, Kunst et al., (2018) argue, serves only to reinforce such racialised narratives, reducing the culpability (and perceptions of this) of the actions on white perpetrators. Whilst the latter example drew on the American context, students placed the framing in parallel to that which they saw as happening within the UK and highlighted the centrality of race within the conceptualisation of extremism and terrorism which told them who could and could not be understood within these spaces.

For students, a central element to tackling this was re-positioning whiteness within these spaces. Almost all of the groups referenced the role of mental health within conceptualisations of *white* threat:

It's seen more as a one off if it's a white person

(Stephen, Training Institute, Group Two, Mixed)

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[53] The lack of domestic terrorism legislation prevents terrorism charges being brought on domestic perpetrators of crime, unless there are links to international organisations.

Henry: Yeah because say if someone who's white did severe killing, they'd say that he was traumatised or mental illness but say if he was brown then he'd be labelled as a terrorist

Charlotte: That is true

Hannah: Yeah

(Academic Institute 2, Group One, Mixed genders)

When a white person does it, call it terrorism and not just that they're mentally ill, give them an equal title - if you're gonna do it at all!

(Emma, Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders)

The almost identical responses across the three separate groups highlighted the prevalence of the narrative which was placed on white perpetrators of perceived terrorism and extremism. In revealing mental health as a dominant lens through which white terrorism was viewed, experiences demonstrated how race played a central role in the conceptualisation of threat (Patel, 2013; Corbin, 2017). In other words, for these students, *white* terrorism was not portrayed as terrorism, but the results of a mental illness. Parker et al., (2019, p.111) conducted a content analysis of press coverage of lone-actor terrorism in the UK and Denmark between 2009 and 2015, finding that in the UK, far-right lone-actors 'are more likely to be described as mentally ill'. As students had also described, the vast majority of UK media reporting on terrorism was found within the study to be Islamist related where 'Islamist actors tend to be framed in relation to crime and violence', both explicitly in criminal terms and indirectly in articles that feature criminal aspects of their biographical information, whereas, 'in contrast, far-right actors in the British media were more than twice as likely to be described in relation to mental health issues' (ibid., pp.120;121). Media portrayals, students claimed, were therefore critical in how they understood what or *who* could be conceptualised as the threat (Ahmed and Matthes, 2017; Kearns et al., 2019).

Further, the reference to mental illness was also seen to remove responsibility from white perpetrators by limiting their agency in placing the reasoning behind their acts as out of their control. As a result, white perpetrators were viewed as victims of their illness, rather than agents of their actions. Such a narrative of victimhood replicated that of the safeguarding

framework which was present throughout the previous two chapters in the conceptualisation of threat. However, for students, it was that mental illness enabled a conceptualisation of threat to be safeguarding the *at risk* vulnerable white people. The Muslim agents responsible for their actions then, became the *risky* ones who would be punished (Kundnani, 2007; Chadderton, 2012; Patel, 2017; Sian, 2017). For these students, race altered the lens through which individuals engaged in any forms of terrorism and extremism could be viewed; white extremism and terrorism was put down to mental illness and non-white and therefore *Muslim* terrorism and extremism down to religion – the former imposed, the latter a choice. The perceived distinction here requires urgent attention within the field.

For almost all of the students, the media played the biggest role in depicting this image, something which Jerome and Elwick (2019, p.102) similarly found. Images of burqa-wearing women, of ISIS fighters and stories of illegal immigrants were all referenced within student discussions to demonstrate how the media had problematically framed Muslims as being something which was threatening to the British way of life (Poole, 2002; Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2010; Allen, 2015b; Bonino, 2015; Joly and Wadia, 2017; Ahmed and Matthes, 2017). Their experiences drew upon the wider debates on the presentation of Islam and Muslims as both a social and security threat in demonstrating their Otherness and providing the grounding upon which they became so easily securitised post-9/11, as the introduction of this thesis noted. The experiences confirmed what teachers in Jerome and Elwick's (2020, p.230) study were concerned about, that students had grown up in this era and grounded their conceptualisations of threat within this context since it was all they had been familiar with. Yet, in deconstructing the messages behind these presentations, students demonstrated an awareness of stereotypes and a desire to have challenged them. Their ability to do so, however, was perceived as limited when the wider media system that surrounded them remained underpinned by stigmatising discourses. For some of the other participants, there was also a sense that government was behind problematic conceptualisations of Muslimness as threatening, in both rhetoric and policy (Brown, 2010; Allen, 2015a; Rashid, 2016; O'Toole et al., 2016). Once again issues like anti-immigration, Brexit, and the then Prime Minister Theresa May's relationship with Donald Trump, who many viewed as racist, were all used to highlight the way in which difference was seen as a negative. For a number of the students, these political choices created an environment which sought to vilify Others in finding

someone "to place the blame [for issues] on" (Poppy, Academic Institute 2, Group Two, Female).[54]

These media and political discourses surrounding the far-right also played into a perceived difference with which the different forms of terrorism and extremism were presented. Some students claimed to be unaware of any far-right incidents and others suggested that Northern Ireland related terrorism was included in the far-right. When prompted to consider this, it was both the lack of media commentary around incidents which were not related to Islamist organisations and the political response to acts perpetrated by those affiliated to such organisations which students suggested were to blame. Though, it should be noted that there have been fewer far-right incidents than Islamist-inspired ones, the focus groups came only months after the murder of MP Jo Cox, the Finsbury Mosque attack, and the proscription of National Action as a far-right terrorist organisation. Thus, I suggest that the absence of these incidents from students' minds was not a result of limited media coverage since there was a significant amount, but the portrayal of such events as something *different* to Islamist-inspired terrorism since this difference framed student depictions of the far-right (Norris et al., 2004; Brinson and Stohl, 2012). For those who did demonstrate knowledge of the far-right, there were associations made with the English Defence League (EDL) and Tommy Robinson, which most saw as having fallen under the category of extremism, not terrorism. Though students felt they were unable to define these categories when probed, unsure of the difference between them and the points at which they overlapped, they insisted that there was a difference and that this difference emerged out of media and political portrayals.

For one group of students, the far-right was associated with jokes on Facebook, where peers shared memes about 'Free Tommy Robinson' campaigns and far-right marches (Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Male group). However, in referring to friends only 'joking' when doing so, these experiences were revealing for a number of reasons. Firstly, in being visible on social media, a recreational and private space, such images were not understood as propaganda which could be used in the recruitment of supporters, but as passive images which were scrolled past in seconds. Secondly, the memes were comical and not taken seriously; for these

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[54]This argument was also presented in another publication (James, 2020)

students, it was something which could be laughed about in its distance from them, both physically (or virtually) and morally. This moral distancing revealed the third consideration whereby though the posts were seen as problematic and often fuelling hatred, seeing them as memes simultaneously detached them from reality. The student's ability to see it as such enabled them to scroll past it as something which they could choose not to engage with. The visibility of these discourses on these platforms and thus the tendency for students to not challenge them, I argue, enabled them to become normalised.

This normalisation was further evident within one of the observations referred to within the previous chapter that was conducted at Training Institute 1. During the session which was a Prevent workshop demonstrating the processes of radicalisation, students were shown a fictional video of a far-right rally, halfway through which three of the students started to chant "EDL" "Tommy Robinson" and "build the wall" in between moments of laughter and encouragement from peers. Such actions demonstrated, I argue, the way in which the far-right was seen as something which could be joked about by students; it was the normalisation of these discourses which transformed the threat of the far-right from potentially terrorist or extremist to simply offensive. The reference to Robinson and Donald Trumps' anti-immigrant Mexico border wall during the video of far-right extremists further highlighted the fluidity of discourses which transcended across far-right extremist organisations and far-right political and media narratives (Lakhani and James, forthcoming). In revealing an important area for future research, I suggest that the mainstreaming of far-right narratives and ideas fed into an already (perceived) mediated depiction of far-right organisations through a different lens to Islamist-inspired organisations. For these students, far-right extremism was associated with right leaning politics of familiar white faces and thus its extremities minimized, whilst Islamist-inspired terrorism in its Otherness, seen only as terrorist. The mainstreaming of the ethno-nationalist discourses associated with the far-right also served to entrench the notion that threat was conceptualised as Islamist-inspired forms of terrorism and extremism in its non-white non-Britishness. The far-right then was not only perceived to be mainstreamed in its association with normalised discourses, but the normalisation of its discourses I argue served to mainstream the conceptualisation of threat as Islamist-inspired terrorism in its Othering of Muslims (ibid). As above, the implications, and replicability, of those perceptions and engagements with the far-right require attention.

8.3 British Values as the antithesis to threat

This section explores student knowledge and engagement with the agenda of British values and reveals a rejection of their conceptualisation as the antithesis to threat. It does so by firstly examining the (lack of) presence and familiarity of the agenda within classrooms, and secondly highlighting students problematisation of the label "British" and the perceived implications this had not only on the ability to conceptualise threat as all forms of terrorism and extremism, or to safeguarding *everyone* from *all* forms of threat, but also upon their peers and those perceived as the Other within wider society.

8.3.1 British values in the classroom: awareness and engagement

Awareness of British values within the classroom for students was varied with some able to draw upon the central themes, "treating everybody as equal, freedom to do everything within your human rights […] the duty you have to society and the duty society has to you and the inter-relation of all that" (Jake, Academic Institute 3, Group Three, Male group), whilst others claimed that they had "heard of them and we've done a lesson on them, I couldn't name them off the top of my head" (Ava, Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders). As a number of teachers had outlined in the previous chapter, British values had been explicitly implemented through the means of tutorial and under the banner of British values, only a handful of times. For some of the other participants, there had also been discussion about tolerance and freedom of speech which were incorporated into these sessions, but these were limited with individual liberty rarely drawn upon.

For all of the student's bar two, they could not recall British values – or its four pillars - being referred to in any other lessons than initial, one off, tutorials. This demonstrated that either staff had successfully reframed the agenda as embedding *our* or *human* values within the classroom and its naturally occurring discussions as chapter seven revealed they had sought to do in a rejection of the label of British; or, as a number of other staff had revealed in the previous chapter, that the absence of this agenda within the classroom for students was down to staff being unaware of how or unable to embed it within their everyday classroom enactments. For the two students who were able to recall discussing British values within the

subject classroom, they thought they had touched upon these within politics (Academic Institute One, Group Two, Mixed group). For them, it was the sense that these discussions, as staff in the previous chapter highlighted, were naturally occurring since the subject matter by its nature led to conversations around democracy, the rule of law and respect. The implementation of the agenda of British values was therefore perceived to be much easier within some classrooms than in others, revealing one explanation surrounding an (potential) inconsistency of approach across not only institutions but classrooms. Nonetheless, for most of the students it was an agenda they were familiar with but not one which was depicted as commonplace within the classroom.

A second way students suggested British values had been introduced to them was through posters which many claimed were in every room of the institution. However, for a significant number of the students, the focus group had been the first opportunity they had taken to read the posters with many saying they had simply ignored them prior to this: "we just don't pay attention to them" (Emma, Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed group). For students, the use of posters like these was, as DSL's and teachers had also revealed, "for Ofsted" (Henry, Academic Institute 2, Group One, Mixed group). I argue this further demonstrated the focus of teachers within chapter seven to make British values visible within the institution and thus only replicate the conceptualisation of them as the antithesis to threat rather than the internalisation of them and thus engagement with them in the classroom.

For many, British values had therefore not been something they had given much thought to or seen impact them. For one student, however, the inclusion of British values within the classroom was remembered with concern:

> *I remember you had to do a test about being British so erm, I feel that's quite, I don't know I just feel that's a bit weird (laughs) just a test to be told you're British but yeah, that's all I can think of when I think of British values*
>
> (James, Academic Institute 1, Group Three, Male group)

The experience was an anomaly in no other student reporting the use of a Britishness test, nor any of the staff having reported conducting such a test. However, it does not diminish the validity of the claim in revealing how this student *perceived* his workshop on British values to be a test of his Britishness. This emerged, I suggest, from the practice of being told what these

British values were and instructed to replicate such answers within a set workbook. The *copy and paste* exercise then became symbolic for parameters through which Britishness could be understood; for James, if he did not respond with the *correct* answer, his Britishness would be challenged. The laughter, alongside his body language, during the exploration of his experience highlighted a sense of disbelief and uncomfortableness with the activity which he read as a means through which he and others would be seen to qualify as a good British citizen, or not. Though this has not been suggested is the case by government in either rhetoric or guidance and legislation, I argue that the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat provided the context upon which James' experience could be read. In the UK Governments definition of extremism being a rejection of British values and British values symbolic of good citizenry, the implementation of the values within the classroom demonstrated the agenda as positioning students as required to not only engage with them but embody them if they were to avoid becoming radicalised. British values were therefore a necessity for being a good *acceptable and accepted* British citizen. Whilst James might have not interpreted the activity as his teachers had intended, drawing back on the previous chapter, it demonstrated that for him, British values was a test of Britishness and his citizenship viewed as determinable on his knowledge and advocation of such values.

For another group within the same institution, the term British values was positioned as much more familiar:

> NJ: Have any of your heard of the term British values?
>
> *Lois: oh godddddd!*
>
> *Isla: Yeah*
>
> *Rachael: Yeah, all the time*
>
> *Nadia: They bang on about it all the time!*
>
> *Lois: Arrgghhh!*
>
> (Academic Institute 1, Group One, Female group)

The exhaustion exclaimed by these participants in their response was qualified by the feeling that they were being bombarded with this agenda on a regular basis, not just on a single occasion. However, further discussion into their experiences highlighted that this was not as straightforward as it had appeared. Firstly, the students told of how the values were the default screen within classroom projector boards and so "we don't always talk about them

[laughter] they're just always there!" (Lois, Academic Institute 1, Group One, Female group). In this sense, the values were always *visible* but not necessarily always discussed. It also became evident in this groups discussion that though they knew the values *were* British values, they had been rephrased as institutional values. This furthered the suggestion within the earlier chapters that their institution, like others, had embedded the agenda through a subversion of language, or what Vincent (2019, p.24) termed a 're-packaging'. It was that this group of students had a teacher who had explicitly told them that the two agendas were in fact the same which led this group to position themselves as much more familiar with British values than the two other groups within this institution. Given their peers within the other groups did not refer to the values being on every board at the beginning of each class as group one had claimed, the labelling of the values then, I suggest, had an impact upon the level of engagement with and awareness of the agenda. For those who had been made aware of the wider agenda and the institutions attempts to reframe it, it had become more visible in its implicit enactment within the classroom. This raised an important consideration as to the extent to which this labelling and transparency of the British/Institutional values agenda was important, particularly since the lack of engagement with the terminology for most of these students inferred that the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat had not been internalised, nor replicated as it had been by their teachers.

Though only a small number of students stated that they were aware that the British *or institutional* values agenda came from government, none were overly surprised since they saw most educational programmes emerging from central education policy and therefore government anyway. However, only one of the student focus groups suggested that there had been an explicit link made by their teachers between British values and the Prevent sessions. Thus, whilst the two agendas were for most understood as government initiatives, they were not linked as being part of the same directive under Prevent; British values were not connected to the notion of (de/anti)-radicalisation. This highlighted, therefore, the detachment through which Prevent, and British values had been both presented by staff, as the previous chapter posited, and now perceived by students as a result. For the only group which had connected the two agendas, it was because the connection was made explicit to them. This was an anomaly, however, and therefore revealed how the concerns raised by staff within the previous chapter around the connection between the two agendas and the

problematic connotations of Britishness countering radicalisation, impacted the delivery of the agendas within the classroom. In the bulk of teachers separating the two agendas, students were unaware that their Britishness was being perceived as a means through which their potential threat could be prevented. For some this was unproblematic; values like mutual tolerance and respect were seen by these participants to prevent people from becoming engaged in terrorism and extremism, suggesting an internalisation of the notion that values could be conceptualised as the antithesis to threat. I return to this when discussing the framing of them as British in the next section. However, for others there was a sense of uncomfortableness that this connection had not been made explicit to them with one group response having revealed a sense of shock when I had told them:

> *Lois: Is it?!*
>
> *Isla: Ohhh*
>
> *Nadia: Oh!*
>
> *Lois: (*gasp*) there's some Big Brother shit going on! God!*
>
> *Isla: argh!*
>
> (Academic Institute 1, Group One, Female group)

The shock that these students felt, albeit beyond that of any other participating group, emerged from a feeling of deceit they claimed, both in their teachers not revealing that the agendas were linked but also in the government using the promotion of a values agenda as a means of countering terrorism within their institution. The reference to "Big Brother" brought up the notion of surveillance which had similarly been referred to in the previous chapter. For Lois, keeping the connection between the agendas hidden resulted in her viewing the agenda as a monitoring tool through which student's actions and views could be obtained. As Lois went on to explain, though she felt the prevention of people from getting involved in terrorism and extremism was necessary and appropriate, she felt counter-terrorism was being used by the government as a means for greater control both of the political agenda and of citizens. Lois's outrage at the two agendas being linked but not made public to her could therefore be used to demonstrate the visibility of a potential 'chilling effect' upon educational environments (Rights Watch UK, 2016). For Lois, it was not the two agendas as individual programmes which she came to reject in her conversations, but the amalgamation of them together and importantly her lack of knowledge about this which left her feeling surveilled in

her deception. This was also rooted in the labelling of the values as British and thus the connection of Britishness to countering terrorism and extremism.

8.3.2 "I don't understand why they are called *British* values"

For a number of the students, as alluded to earlier, though they could recall the phrase 'British values', many were unable to expand on what these values were. For some, they drew upon stereotypes to joke about British values being the idea of "queuing" (Junaid, Academic Institute 3, Group One, Mixed genders) and "someone getting drunk like on their summer holidays like in Ibiza or something" (John, Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders).[55] It was in these stereotypes that a large number of the students found the application of the label of British problematic. The language of Britishness, though comical on the one hand, invoked a sense of national identity that was, as many teachers and DSL's had argued, narrow on the other. The label of British was therefore described by some of the participants as exclusionary, stigmatising, and isolating. In line with what Jerome and Elwick (2019, pp.104–5) suggested, citing Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe (2017), the experiences of students appeared to mirror 'a trend in some schools towards celebrating narrow forms of British cultural identity, rather than engaging critically with FBVs [Fundamental British Values]'.

For students, the values within the agenda should have been instead seen as "human" "everybody's" or "universal" values which applied to everyone, regardless of their nationality, demonstrating the internalisation of the reframed notion of values that many of the teachers within chapter seven had sought to enact instead (see also McGhee and Zhang, 2017; Vincent, 2019). Many of the students subsequently questioned the perception that such values were determinants of (good) citizenship. In echoing the views of some of her peers, one student argued that the labelling of the values as British:

> *Felt quite excluding because it's almost like if you're saying it's British, for somebody who maybe has moved to this country or maybe has like relatives who like maybe first generation immigrants or whatever, they are living in this country, attending school here and are being told these are how British people are and if they don't feel British*

then that just isn't like, that's not okay, we should make people feel welcome and they're values that should be carried across people's lives generally throughout the world, it's not something that's exclusive to British people and I agree that it's also kind of perfection like nobody's going to have all of these things let's face it

(Rachel, Academic Institute 1, Group One, Female group)

For Rachel, not only was the embodiment of these values for anyone – British or non-British - unrealistic but was not determinable by nationality. The experience was replicative of the wider sentiment of students and of experiences at both institutional and classroom level, where the label of British invoked a problematic nationalist notion that only British nationals were capable of holding such values. The resultant division that many of the students, and DSLs and teaching staff problematised as occurring, spoke to the literature around a perception of a civilised and liberalised (Western) Britain (Said, 2003; Miah, 2017, p.79; Habib, 2018, pp.9; 59; Lockley-Scott, 2019, p.358).

Not only was this perceived to determine a hierarchy of morality across and between those within Britain, but it created an internal imagined border whereby there was an acceptable and non-acceptable Britishness determined by those who were *truly* British by birth right:

If you're a good person, [Isla: it doesn't matter what country you're from] it doesn't matter where you're from, what religion you've got, what race, you know? It's just like you don't have to have an excuse to be a nice person and it doesn't matter if you're living in Britain and you don't consider yourself British. It feels like it could isolate some people being like "if you're going to be a nice person you have to be British!" it's like, well you don't!

(Lois, Academic Institute 1, Group One, Female group)

Through narrowing who could be considered "good", students claimed that British values simultaneously broadened who could be seen as threatening. Across the participant experiences, this was problematic and had significant implications for those deemed Other within these discourses. The experience revealed how nationality was viewed as not only place of birth or citizenship status but through other visible identifiers of difference such as race and religion – whether through dress or symbolism – within this context. Britishness became understood through their experiences as not only about *looking* British through whiteness, but *acting* British through a depiction of *non-white* cultures and religions as

something which was the Other (Lockley-Scott, 2019, p.361; Winter and Mills, 2020, p.47; see also Modood, 2005; Kundnani, 2014; Keddie, 2014).

For James, who struggled with the perceived need to prove Britishness, as his earlier reflections around a Britishness test revealed, it was the wider political discourse which both enabled such a policy to have emerged and reinforced its stigmatisations:

> *I feel like just being here in Britain is enough to have like British values or be British, I feel like you shouldn't need to prove that you're British, I feel like that's a bit of a way to protect ourselves and try to show that we're keeping people out and stuff. So, that's what I think about that [...] because, just what I think myself, a lot of people think like immigrants come in and take jobs and you know do these terrorisms, so I think the act of having like British values and like a test is like, a way to separate ourselves from them, which I just feel like is just, just terrible and erm, and it might just add to terrorism just because people feel like segregated and separated, especially with like this new Windrush stuff as well like, that's quite a big deal*

(James, Academic Institute 1, Group Three, Male group)

For James it was not only problematic that, like participants in the previous two chapters, British values depicted a necessity to assimilate, but that such an agenda was dangerously counter-productive in relation to countering threats, pushing people towards extremism, rather than away from it. These problematic narratives of Othering which students had claimed the label of British had created, were seen to be useful for such organisations (see Mcdonald, 2011). The lines of division that had been drawn internally were thought to have been utilised externally, enabling radicalisers to provide solace for those excluded from society. Invoking a narrow sense of Britishness was therefore seen to have only fuelled potential radicalisation of those already left behind by a wider environment of hostility. For James, this was rooted within a wider political agenda of exclusionary politics. As the only black participant in the research, I posit that the excerpt demonstrated how the political context was perceived and experienced to have both enabled and be enabled by a wider sense of marginalisation where certain forms of Britishness were awarded more value than others, notably those of whites (Maylor, 2016, p.317). The Windrush scandal for James was another example of how entrenched these narratives were and the consequences that emerged from such (white) nationalist discourse. Exclusion which had left people stateless

under Windrush was viewed in comparison to the potential for it to have left people seeking alternative statehood through the notion of Britishness.

This broader political climate was used to demonstrate the "irony" (Lois, Academic Institute 2, Group One, Female group) that some of the students believed emerged from labelling the values as British:

> *With us leaving Brexit now everybody keeps saying like "yeah let's leave Brexit, let's keep our borders to ourselves" but that doesn't really go with mutual respect and tolerance does it. Wanting everybody out but saying "yeah we'll treat everybody the same", it's a bit contradictory!*

(Joe, Training Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders)

Thus for the majority of the students, not only was there resentment and concern regarding the notion that these values were British, as the earlier discussions revealed, but there was also a disbelief and amusement about them being promoted by a government which they felt were not, in so many words, practicing what they preached. The role of Brexit in not only entrenching a notion of white Britishness but positioning Others as a national security threat spoke for a number of the students in direct contrast to the values which were being posited. Students viewed a juxtaposition in a Britishness which was exclusionary and anti-Other on the one hand and promoted respect and tolerance on the other; the wider British political environment was at odds with what these students were being told being British was about. A number therefore suggested that this had left them less willing to take the agenda seriously. The reference to Brexit also suggested that students linked the discourses associated with Brexit to that of counter-terrorism where in both cases, Britishness was viewed as determining and therefore deterring those who were a threat to *our* national security (see also Lakhani and James, forthcoming).

This was further magnified when also read through the wider context of counter-terrorism, within which the agenda sat. As one student claimed:

> *When they say British values and then they move on to radicalisation and extremism, it's kind of like, if you don't believe in these British values then that's why you're radicalised and you're extreme. So, stuff like that, especially for me like in the Work*

> *Skills when they were talking about it cos, I was one of the only Muslims there you just feel a bit like, I don't know, it's just not a nice environment when they speak about it*
>
> (Sara, Academic Institute 2, Group One, Mixed genders)

The presentation of British values in this exclusionary way resulted in Sara feeling separated from her non-Muslim peers within these classroom debates as a result of her not seeing her religion deemed acceptable within these notions of Britishness. Her experience also demonstrated an internalisation of the Us and Them narrative, where she felt she was positioned as the Other through her religion; her Muslimness was positioned as her non-Britishness. With Britishness then positioned, through Prevent, as the antithesis to extremism and terrorism, Sara saw her identity become synonymised with threat through her non-Britishness leaving her vulnerable to radicalisation. The experience further spoke to student's earlier rejection that threat was, though they believed that it should have been, conceptualised as all forms of extremism and terrorism. As a result, Sara felt excluded from the notion of British through which the rest of her perceived non-Muslim classmates could be understood, suggesting that the claimed disproportionate impact of policies related to Prevent on Muslims was also felt in relation to the British values tenet of it (see, for example Awan, 2012; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Miah, 2017). For the only other Muslim within the same group, though he did not draw on his own experiences like Sara, he agreed with her feelings about this conceptualisation of Britishness, which they both saw as positioning their Muslimness as threatening. In the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat, Sara and Henry viewed their Muslimness as the threat that the Prevent duty was concerned with and it was a sympathy with this perceived outcome of labelling the values as British that led both them and their peers across a number of the focus groups to reject it.

Nonetheless, despite the majority of students positioning the notion of British values as problematic, similarly to teachers within the previous chapter, there were also a minority who did not share the same concerns:

> *Yeah they are good, it lets you be your own person doesn't it, cos like the law can protect you, the individual one that's saying you have the power to be who you want to be you don't have to conform, democracy gives you a voice, and then, everyone needs to have respect for someone or some organisation and stuff. It just protects you as a person to be yourself*

(Leroy, Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders)

A focus on the sentiment behind the values saw Leroy replicate some of the narratives which teachers proposed in the previous chapter whereby the agenda was about students embodying the values in their understanding of citizenship. This suggested that he had internalised their presentation of it within his classroom. The focus for Leroy was on what these values could have offered him in exercising life: being protected by the law, being given a voice by democracy, showing and obtaining respect, for example. In this sense, I argue that focus was placed on the values themselves, rather than the labelling of them. However, in his lack of challenge to the label, the experience did suggest that the idea that these values were British was not something which he found overly problematic and certainly not in comparison to some of his peers. For another group who similarly did not raise the same challenges to the agenda as those which have been drawn upon earlier in this subsection, a limited engagement with the agenda was not down to problematic framing, but a lack of knowledge around what they actually were (Academic Institute 2, Group Two, Female group). This spoke to some of the excerpts within the first subsection around a number of students' inability to recall what the values were. As a result, it was not that these students had internalised the narrative of British values in these instances, nor that they had rejected them. Instead, it was that there appeared to have been a replication of their teachers framing at best and little to no engagement at worst. Either way, the enactments of the teacher appeared to correlate to the experience of the student.

The influence of teachers' presentation of the values within the classroom was further evident in two of the other focus groups who referred to their teachers directly sharing their own uncertainties around the label of the values as British. This for students not only led them to question the label but limited their own discussions of this as a result of an uncomfortableness that led staff to restrict debates:

> *[The teacher] said they disagreed with why it was called, this is what they told me, they disagreed with why it was called British values and if they gave an answer [to me questioning why] they may have been seen as politically biased*

(Toby, Academic Institute 1, Group Three, Male group)

Toby's recollection of his teacher shutting down questions from students in the fear of providing biased responses demonstrated the limitations on both the teacher and the student

around these conversations within the classroom. The teacher in this experience being unable to have facilitated discussion for fear of repercussions in being unable to objectively teach their students something which they disagreed with. They chose, instead, to close off the conversations and simply replicate the narrative so that the values were visible within the classroom as required. Drawing back on the experiences of teachers within the previous chapter, I argue this was a result of both the British values being conceptualised as the antithesis to threat and Ofsted requirements, and the conflict this had with the teacher's personal views. This stifling of debate was similarly present within another student's recollection of their teachers' discussions around the values:

> *Lois: I remember the, I remember the teacher was like "oh it's a bit daft that they're called British" […] our form tutor was like "ahh well, these are just good things to do and you know I don't know why they're called British values but it's a new government thing" and we went through it and like talked about what each word meant […]*
>
> *Nadia: Yeah, we were just like worried that it might offend someone so I think Miss thought she should probably say "I don't know why it's called British values" just in case it might offend someone*
>
> (Academic Institute 1, Group One, Female group)

The experience further demonstrated a perception from students that some teachers had disagreed with the label of British had not wanted to discuss why. Students within the above focus group suggested that this was because their teacher recognised a potential for the language to be exclusionary. Thus for some students the limited engagements within the classroom, though also likely down to a lack of time and resource, were a result of the labelling of the values as British where teachers had limited the discussions in not wanting to have been either enticed into sharing their own perspectives or have undermined their requirement to ensure British values were conceptualised as the antithesis to threat within the classroom.

8.4 Threat as responsibility to safeguard against

This section examines the extent to which students internalised the conceptualisation of threat as a responsibility to safeguard against. It does so firstly by exploring the extent to which classroom engagements with Prevent gave students an awareness of terrorism and

extremism and the relevance and appropriateness with which such activities were viewed as prevention mechanisms. The section then seeks to explore the role of preventing through referrals by revealing students' expectations around the responsibility (and capacity) of their teachers to spot signs of vulnerability to radicalisation within the second subsection and in the third by problematising the extension of this responsibility to themselves.

8.4.1 Prevent in the classroom: Balancing awareness and appropriateness

Whilst many students were not surprised, prior to their participation in the research they were unaware that their activities surrounding extremism and terrorism were part of a government agenda. Though one of the groups explicitly placed these activities within the framework of safeguarding, they all believed they were part of a general awareness raising programme which schools were rolling out. For the group who positioned the agenda as safeguarding, it was a result of their own potential enactment of the duty within the expected career of PE teachers that they as Sports Coaching students were expected to take (Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders). As the Social Care and Teacher Trainer members of staff within the previous chapter revealed, where students were undertaking public sector related courses, and therefore expected to be delivering the Prevent duty themselves, it was delivered closely in line with government framing, as a safeguarding mechanism. For the other groups, the duty was just another programme that was added to their tutorials.

As posters had been used for the British values agenda, they had also been visible in most of the classrooms and hallways around their institutions to signpost students to what to do in the event of a terrorist incident or who to contact if they saw signs of extremism or terrorism. However, few had read them or used them to learn about Prevent, they just knew they existed in spotting key words as they had past them. The influence of the posters was therefore seen by many of the students as limited:

> *Ava: They say about if there's a terrorist attack try and like, don't try and help out you've just got to run. It says something like "I climbed Mount Everest and even I would run and hide, don't film it, don't try and be the hero in a way, get yourself safe". There's one about if you think you're being groomed for terrorist activities like where to report it and things like that […] I don't think that posters are very, they don't really have an*

effect like you see the 'Run Away, Don't Get Involved' like if that was my friend, that posters not going to make me run away! Like you'd want to, or you'd like to think that you'd do something, so I think like, a poster's not going to make you think 'oh okay, that's what I'll do'. It's being educated and actually someone telling me "these are the reasons why you should do it; this is what will be done", that might change my opinion. A poster's not going to make me run if someone needs help that I know

John: Yeah I agree 'cos I ignore them completely

Rachael: yeah, I didn't realise there were posters up!

John: I just expect them to be something about how to put a comma when you're writing an essay or something. So, it's just, I'm not going to look at a poster that's supposedly going to save my life, [Rachael: mmm] because it's a poster

(Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders)

For these students, the posters were both unengaging and unrealistic, offering limited information which they were likely to have taken on or felt useful for them in preventing radicalisation. Instead, they suggested that face-to-face engagement with someone who could have explained the reasoning behind the posters would have been of greater benefit to their understanding of and responsiveness to these issues, mirroring experiences of their teachers 'training'. Sessions which the posters supported were similarly viewed as unhelpful. Tick-box style activities and 'copy and paste' presentations provided no space for questions or debate and made them no more aware of terrorism and extremism than they had been prior to the sessions.

For a significant amount of the students, it was not that they were uninterested in these topics but that their classroom experience of the duty through these workshops, or through the use of posters within the institution, were seen to have had little use for raising their awareness. Instead, activities were seen as a "tick box" for Ofsted and not to raise their awareness at all (Academic Institute 2, Group One, Mixed genders). Similar to Jerome and Elwick's (2019, p.104) findings, students wanted to actively engage in these conversations; "going through what's going on, what's being done about it, how we should feel safe, what if like something does happen what do we do" (Ava, Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders). Instead, students argued, teachers were simply concerned with meeting their requirement to discuss it in the classroom and no more. However, drawing on discussions from the previous chapter,

such perceived disinterest was more likely representative of a limitation of resource, lack of knowledge, or an uncomfortableness in implementing these sessions, highlighting an important conflict between staff and students within the classroom implementation of the duty. This desire to know more was grounded in both a perceived moral obligation and a quest for greater knowledge, further complicating some of the critiques around the perceived 'chilling effect' on student debate when, for these participants, greater discussion on these very issues was called for. Terrorism and extremism, for many of the participants was perceived as a real concern, though the extent to which this was influenced by an existing awareness of the agenda or by their participation in the focus group should be acknowledged. Nonetheless, it was clear across the focus groups that students felt terrorism and extremism was something which was never going away and thus something they required knowledge on. For a number of the students this was grounded in living within an area like Greater Manchester which was by its nature perceived to be a target of such acts, echoing the concerns of some of the DSLs in chapter six.

For some, terrorism was something which they only thought about in light of an attack or event, whilst for others it was felt to have been either so unlikely or so far out of their control that the likelihood of threat had led them to have concern but not shape their behaviour as a result of it potentially occurring. Whilst many said that the Manchester arena attack had brought the issue to the forefront of their minds more recently, seeing it as something "closer to home" which could or had impacted them or their friends in some way, most still felt it was something which happened to others, creating a distance between themselves and these events. For these students, they did not believe that they required their awareness raising since it was not something that they thought likely to have an impact upon them or those around them. For some who did, this was alongside other more pressing concerns. Homelessness, gun and knife crime, racism and climate change were issues which many felt required more attention than terrorism – within government and public discourses and within their classrooms. This was largely because these issues felt closer to students through either their frequency or proximity:

> Leroy: [there's] more, er, incidents of knife crime and stuff round here so if you think of terrorism in England there's not actually a lot, like there's the bombing of the arena, and then there's the proper old one that was like the IRA or something in town but like

you know loads of people, people know people that have been stabbed and stuff round
here loads so, it's happening, like knife crime is more occurring or something like that
than terrorism […]
Rio: Yeah cos I know people who've been stabbed, and I know people who've been shot
do you know what I mean so that's more close to me than terrorism is
Vincent: In like a proper crowded place like Manchester like when you go to like the
Arndale or something it's proper crowded so like anyone could have anything on them
(Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders)

For a number of students, bringing societal issues into the classroom warranted focus to be placed beyond terrorism and extremism. This appeared to present a paradox to the earlier discussions in which the majority of students suggested they wanted to have greater time and resource to discuss issues of terrorism and extremism at depth. However, I argue it presented the critical reflection from students on the nature of the conversations they were having in the classroom; students problematised the positioning of terrorism and extremism as the only societal concern that warranted an awareness raising agenda, whilst simultaneously problematising an agenda that failed to raise their awareness beyond that which they already knew. In other words, whilst the experiences might be read in contrast to one another, they demonstrated two separate conflicts which students had with their classroom engagement with the Prevent duty; terrorism and extremism were not the only 'threats' being faced but equally they did not know enough to deal with this threat should they ever face it.

A further conflict emerged when some of the students recalled experiences of conversations around terrorism and extremism that did occur within the classroom which were perceived to have been shut down by teachers. These experiences suggested that the 'safe spaces' which a number of the teachers in chapter seven referred to had not been visible to students in the classroom. This was most obvious when students discussed conversations that emerged in the classroom following the Manchester arena attack. Though it must be noted that these experiences were from their secondary schools and thus not replicative of their further education experience, they were positioned by many of the students as reflective of the silencing they felt which continued within the classroom at FE level. Though some had noted teachers allowed them at the time of the event to use their free time to discuss the events, there was no indication when asked that teachers encouraged, sparked or facilitated

debates. Moreover, almost all of the students who recalled discussing the arena attack claimed that they were then asked to finish the conversations once *learning* then began. This spoke to the limited time and resource which teaching staff in the previous chapter revealed left them struggling to fit in these types of conversations against an overloaded curriculum but for a number of the participants, there was a perceived fear that allowing discussions around terrorism and extremism would lead to upsetting students. For one of the groups, this emerged from a fear about stirring up memories for those who had been impacted by the events and teachers being perceived to be unable to have dealt with the emotion and trauma that might have occurred (Academic Institute 2, Group Two, Female group). For another group, this silencing was linked to the stigmatising narratives earlier discussed that were perceived to be inherent to these conversations (Academic Institute 2, Group One, Mixed genders). There was a perception that teachers would have been unable to have dealt with the potential discrimination that some students, namely Muslims, might have felt given the wider public narrative of prejudice.

The "sensitive" nature of these topics, students claimed, left it difficult for their both teachers to have managed such conversations but also for them as students to navigate them where they might have potentially been "offending" people:

> *Like in our group there are many like, we are from different ethnicities and nationalities so erm, no one wants to, you can say, hurt the other person by saying something wrong during a discussion*

(Junaid, Academic Institute 3, Group One, Mixed genders)

The fear and resultant shutting down of debates was therefore seen by a number of the students as a mechanism through which the stigmatisation of others could be minimised. Ethnicity and nationality were positioned as central to the discourses which might have occurred by Junaid, a migrant himself, which for one student led to a fear of being "racist by accident". In these discourses being perceived to be so prevalent within discussions around terrorism, the potential for them in the classroom left her feeling "awkward": "so I just don't have an opinion" (Aimee, Academic Institute 3, Group One, Mixed genders). Whilst the duty has been accused of creating a chilling effect through the fear of saying the wrong thing and being reported, these discussions suggested that they had, for some students, created a silencing on those worried about saying the wrong thing *and offending.* In the belief that there

was a wider stigmatisation of Muslims which came attached to conversations of terrorism and extremism, a number of students rejected the appropriateness of such awareness raising to be placed within the education environment. For them, this was simply asking for conflict and a perpetuation of problematic narratives that would ultimately leave some students stigmatised. Yet, it was this same conflict that was used also as a reason *for* these conversations within institutions by others further complication claims that 'students feared being safeguarded or sanctioned for "saying the wrong thing," making a joke that could be seen as inappropriate, or expressing feelings of anger' (Acik et al., 2018, p.478). Some of the students posited a belief that such stereotypes could not be challenged without safe, constructive spaces – those which educational institutions provided them with - which would enable them to raise their awareness of such problematic ideas and minimise the potentially damaging effects of seeing threat through a single, narrow, lens. Nonetheless, there was also the fear that the chances of changing someone's mind who was "set in their ways" (Aimee, Academic Institute 3, Group One, Mixed genders) was so slim that it was not, for some, worth the greater risk of causing offence.

The risk associated with these awareness raising discussions was interpreted differently for one student, however. For Sara, her Muslimness positioned her at greater *risk* than her peers in engaging in these debates, where she perceived her contributions to have obtained greater scrutiny as a result of the association of her religion with extremism and terrorism. During the conversations with peers, she claimed:

> *You just never know like they might take it the wrong way and then all of a sudden, I'm gone! [laughter] so I don't think I would [engage in conversations], I'd just like keep it to myself*

> (Sara, Academic Institute 2, Group One, Mixed genders)

As a Muslim she perceived her own ability to have engaged in conversations as limited and claimed to have silenced herself in order to protect her freedoms as a result. The statement that she would be "gone" reads to many of the horror stories which critics have referred to when challenging Prevent; the experience suggested that for this student there had emerged a silencing in which she self-policed her thoughts because of the perceptions of her Muslimness. Though the implications of this on this student should not be downplayed and require attention, it must also be noted that the staff interviewed, as demonstrated in the

previous chapter, also self-policed to the extent of engaging in informal dialogue and internal bias reflections to ensure that they were not wrongly referring students on their religion, but on their vulnerability. However, given that both staff and students recognised the *potential* for student's religion to play a factor in a referral which Sara felt to have been very real, I argue that there remained perceived limitations for some to engage in these awareness raising sessions as a result of the wider conceptualisation of threat as Islamist-inspired terrorism. Acik et al.'s (2018, p.478) claims that 'students will withdraw from discussing radicalisation and extremism for fear of saying something that could link them with radicalised thinking or, in some way, raise teachers' suspicions' was clearly demonstrable in Sara's experience.

8.4.2 Teachers responsibility: "their job is to look after us"

Whilst all but two of the focus groups of students stated that they were, prior to their participation, unaware of the duty's obligation, the vast majority expected that their teachers would have referred people they were concerned about for potential radicalisation. This was framed, in line with the previous three chapters, through their duty of care where it was perceived that they had a responsibility to safeguard students from any potential harm:

> *Rio: teachers obviously like, if they suspect abuse and stuff, they have to report it, so it'd be the same, it's basically like the same*
>
> NJ: How come you think it's the same?
>
> *Rio: Erm because it's ensuring not only your own safety but everybody else's safety*
>
> *Emily: It's bigger than just your relationship between you and your teacher, it's everyone else so, like of course they've got to report it*
>
> *Vincent: It's everyone else in the college as well*
>
> (Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders)

The experience also replicated the responsibility of staff to not only safeguard the potentially vulnerable individual, but those around them who would be made vulnerable by their actions, as both institutional and classroom staff had similarly posited. For a number of the students, they suggested teachers therefore had not only a legal responsibility but a moral obligation to prevent potential harm to the wider society from that individual (Stanley and Guru, 2015; Heath-Kelly, 2017). Yet, in widening the scope of responsibility beyond that of the vulnerable

individual, students also normalised the act of referral. Where people might be hurt, a referral, for many, was depicted as common sense.

Whilst the theory behind this was understood by most, others questioned the ability, and appropriateness, for it to happen in practice. As Charlotte (Academic Institute 2, Group One, Mixed genders) claimed "no teacher would do that" since she claimed, it was not their job to do so. For Charlotte and her fellow group members, there was a limitation to teachers' knowledge of terrorism, extremism and radicalisation that left students doubtful of their capacities to firstly spot the signs of someone becoming radicalised and secondly know what to do with it. They argued that whilst "they might have got taught in like induction of teaching or whatever, they wouldn't actually remember that" (Henry, Academic Institute 2, Group One, Mixed genders) and were subsequently viewed to not be in a position to make a judgement call on whether someone's vulnerability was a result of radicalisation, or another form of harm. This sentiment was echoed at a different institution where students similarly problematised the capacities for their teachers to identify radicalisation:

> *It's not that I don't think it's a good thing, I don't think, I'm not like I'm not being rude to like teachers, but I don't think they'd be able to spot a lot of cases because say like someone's distressed, like obviously that's not an issue that you'd report as terrorism but in some cases that might be, they might be distressed about something that's going on, that they're being groomed but in some cases they might be distressed about family problems or something like that*

(Ava, Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders)

Ava questioned the depth of knowledge around radicalisation which would be required to identify whether or not a vulnerability was related to terrorism or another form of harm, which, her experience suggested required a different response. Firstly, the experience revealed a disruption in the narrative of radicalisation as alike to other forms which was earlier proposed by some students and participants throughout the previous three chapters. Though policy elites had told institutional staff, and institutional staff had told classroom staff in turn, to *spot vulnerability and we will decide if it's radicalisation or not,* both institutional and classroom staff in their respective chapters had revealed that there had to be some basis for making a referral on what it was that a student was vulnerable to. In other words, they had to determine to some extent whether radicalisation was involved. For Ava and some of

her peers, this process was not one which their teachers were viewed as able to enact. Teachers should be able "to tell someone else who's better qualified" but should not be expected to "actually go and stop it themselves" (Andrew, Academic Institute 3, Group Two, Male group), one student argued whilst others positioned them as the right people, due to the established relationship, to engage in a "one to one with [the vulnerable student]" to establish "more information" about the case before passing their concerns onwards (Junaid, Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders). Conversely there were also students who challenged the capacity for teachers to have been able to confront students in this way and others who stated that teachers "shouldn't be expected to get involved' in these situations where the potential risk this came with went beyond their responsibility (Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Female). The experiences demonstrated the varied understanding of educator's role within the processes of referral; whilst they almost all states teachers should refer vulnerability, none could agree on how or to what extent this should occur.

For one group, there was a concern around the potential erosion of trust between students and staff as a result of the referral process, something which Moffat and Gerard (2020, p.205) also found amongst staff. In viewing their teachers as required to report their concerns – concerns which they were not perceived to have sufficient expert knowledge on - some of the students argued that falsely assuming the presence of a concern could further isolate an individual. This was heightened within an environment which this group had previously problematised as being securitised; in placing teachers responsibility as part of the enactment of counter-terrorism, their role as teachers was extended to agents of the state (Heath-Kelly, 2017) and their position of trust minimised. Referrals as a result were instead understood as reporting:

> Sara: So then why would people speak to the teachers then? [Hannah: exactly] if they wanted to, if like they have that duty to basically snitch on them like if [students] are like looking for help, and then they just get-
>
> Maisie: they want help not getting into trouble
>
> Sara: yeah and then you just get sent to some counter whatever then it's just like 'who am I going to speak to now then? No one?'
>
> Charlotte: It's like you're alone
>
> (Academic Institute 2, Group One, Mixed genders)

Though these students were the only group to vehemently reject the responsibilisation of teachers, their views spoke to some of the wider criticisms in the literature which challenged the conceptualisation of threat as the responsibility to safeguard against, positioning it rather as the responsibility to report on potential criminals (Heath-Kelly, 2017; Qurashi, 2017; Dudenhoefer, 2018; Lundie, 2019). For this group, the potential for teachers to act as confidants in their positions of trust was diminished by their responsibilisation to act on behalf of the government in preventing radicalisation. The perceived implications therefore reinforced the idea of a 'chilling effect' for some students whereby they were felt to be further isolated with no one to seek assistance or guidance from (Rights Watch UK, 2016). However, in revealing this concern, the students also demonstrated that they had internalised the responsibilisation narrative to some extent, seeing their teachers as important actors in the prevention of student's potential radicalisation. This was grounded not in their responsibility to refer concerns however, but in acting as a perceived safe and trusted figure that would have provided guidance and support to someone who might have wanted "help not getting into trouble".

One of the sources of this concern around the referral aspect of teachers responsibilisation I argue emerged from the same concern which teachers put forward: the potential for internal bias to frame *whose* vulnerability they felt responsible for safeguarding against:

> *Ava: To be completely honest, I might show the same traits as, I'm not saying I'm a terrorist [laughs] but I might show the same traits or warning signs or something but as like a small white girl I don't think it'd be picked up as like "she might be a terrorist" like I don't think I'd have that problem whereas say, this college is very diverse, and I think if some other, like if a lad was like that and he was from a different ethnicity, from a different background, I think he would be more likely to be picked out as "oo what's this about" rather than, like me*
>
> NJ: Okay, where do you get that impression from?
>
> *Ava: I think it's just from like society, I never get funny looks if I'm, I don't know, if I'm carrying a backpack or erm even if I'm talking about terrorism or things like that, I don't feel any sort of 'oo I shouldn't like I shouldn't be doing like are people looking at me?' or 'should I be talking about this?' erm whereas I think other people would, so*

when it doesn't cross my mind, it does cross other people's minds, or people are treated differently in society and that obviously like goes into college as well

NJ: Do you think teachers might actually do that?

Ava: I think they'll try not to but I find it very hard to believe that, a teacher would report someone like say, I find it very like difficult to think they'd report like a white boy and say "oo I think" I don't think intentionally, but I just don't, I don't see that they would, so that's not fair because they might show the exact same signs but just cos they just have an impression of what a terrorist does look like, so they're like "oh no no no that's not terrorism because he doesn't look like a terrorist" so I don't think it's fair

(Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders)

The potential for teachers to be informed by a wider societal narrative of prejudice that depicted a narrow conceptualisation of threat as Islamist-inspired was viewed by a number of the participants as very real. For Ava, her identity and (lack of) visual signifiers as a "small white girl" minimised her capacity to be positioned as someone who would have required safeguarding against radicalisation. For her and a number of her peers, non-white/British ethnicities and backgrounds were positioned as central to determining this type of vulnerability drawing upon the earlier discussions around the conceptualisation of threat as Islamist-inspired through the narratives of visible Muslimness. These discourses were thus seen as the lenses through which societal expectations of threat were conceptualised with a number of students, like Ava, questioning the extent to which teachers' referrals would not be influenced by public narratives of prejudice.

8.4.3 Negotiating the responsibility to refer: ability, morality and consequence

As I argued the experiences of teaching staff in the previous chapter revealed, teachers had also become responsible for the responsibilisation of their students. This emerged through raising awareness but also – partly as a result of such awareness raising - through responsibilising students to refer their vulnerable peers. For a number of the students, this responsibility was internalised on a moral obligation where they were aware that someone might commit acts of terror, they believed they *should* report the individual. However,

ambiguities surrounded many of their discussions with a number rejecting the responsibility altogether.

For most, concern around their responsibility to refer was grounded in a perceived lack of knowledge around what it was that they might be looking for. The narrative that there were 'signs' to radicalisation which could be identified reinforced the notion of radicalisation as a process that could be intercepted which policy elites described in chapter five. Their awareness of what these signs were, as the last section revealed, however was limited. When asked if they thought they could spot radicalisation, they considered:

> *Rio: Not unless someone came and told me they were going to an extremism meeting no (laughs)*
>
> *Emily: I think there's a few things you could look out for*
>
> *Rio: It depends actually unless it's like someone I actually talk to a lot, then you'll be able to like see it a bit, but if it's like someone in your class you don't really talk to or anything or just someone in your college I wouldn't have a clue*
>
> *Emily: Like if you are close to someone and they used to be all chatty and talkative and the next minute they're hanging out with different people and becoming like more quiet, and like to themselves, like if that can be a sign? If they're starting getting involved in crime it can get bigger*
>
> *Ashleigh: Well, it depends on how big the signs are because it could be like Rio said like saying "do you wanna do this" and trying to get you involved with going to do it or it could be like subtle small changes like what Emily was saying. You're not really taught what to look for, cos you kind of look for the stereotypical signs of what it's supposed to look like*
>
> NJ: What do you think those stereotypical signs would be?
>
> *Ashleigh: Like dead like them acting not themselves or suddenly like their entire personalities changed and they just act difference from what they used to be*
>
> *Rio: Their appearance as well*
>
> *Ashleigh: Yeah that as well*
>
> NJ: What do you think change about appearance?

Rio: So, like obviously, say, it's more like of a stereotypical racial thing so say like, it could be a group of ten people and an Asian male with a beard could be in that ten people, everyone would suspect him as a terrorist, but it may not be him

(Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders)

Through their group discussion, some of the students were able to draw on signs which they thought might have been easier to spot. Some of the signs were those which were also featured in educators training, WRAP training and the ERG22+ suggesting that for some of the students there had been an awareness gained through their classroom Prevent workshops despite some challenging their use. However, in positioning these signs as "stereotypical" Ashleigh's experience inferred that they were also inaccurate depictions of what someone who was becoming radicalised would in reality show or go through. For Ashleigh and some of her peers, these 'signs' were instead seen to have been grounded in the problematic discourses which many of the students had repeatedly referred to around the conceptualisation of threat as Islamist. The visibility of these signs was therefore equated with a visibility of Muslimness through the stereotypical imagery of "an Asian male with a beard". Such imagery served to have reinforced their perceptions that they were being asked to refer particular vulnerabilities to certain types of extremism and terrorism.

Nonetheless, behavioural and personality changes were also referred to as potential signs of radicalisation by some of the participants, as Ashleigh did in the previous excerpt. Though this did suggest that other non-visual markers had also been considered as signs, for others it was not something that they would have equated with a potential to have been vulnerable to radicalisation:

Rachael: I would feel uncomfortable if someone was showing them signs and going straight to like 'they're a terrorist' or like whatever. I know that I would feel really uncomfortable to jump to that conclusion. It almost feels like a last resort I think, yeah, I think it is quite a taboo subject in terms of trying to figure out like if somebody was distressed and why they were doing that and whatever

NJ: Why do you think it would be a last resort for you?

Rachael: Because, I don't really know, I think I'd think other things first, I think I'd be like 'maybe they're struggling with their mental health, maybe they're like really like feeling really down at the moment' or 'maybe somethings going on in their family and

they just need to be dealing with that' I wouldn't go 'maybe they're being groomed for terrorism they're thinking all of these extremist thoughts' or whatever

Ava: It's a big label to put on someone [Rachael: Yeah it's a big label] and I think if they were your friend as well, I don't think you'd really want to, like even if you saw them I don't think you'd see them as terrorist like signs cos [Rachael: especially if you care about them as well] they're your friend, yeah like if it's someone you know obviously you don't know terrorists, so I think it would be different, it wouldn't be as obvious as maybe like people think it would

(Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders)

Concerns such as mental health or family problems were, for students, far more likely to be at the root of a change in behaviour. This spoke to the distancing that students placed between themselves and these events earlier in the chapter; it was not only that they would not have expected themselves or their friends to have become radicalised, but that such a risk was further minimised against the perceived pressures which were more likely to be the case during this period of their adolescence. This distancing also revealed the perceived sense of enormity in the application of the label 'terrorist' which a referral was felt to result in; these events were so seismic that they were not felt to be realistic within their own social groups. Moreover, the reluctance to use the label 'terrorist' could also be read as a rejection of what critical security and terrorism scholars label a speech act (Buzan and Waever, 2003). As drawn upon during the theoretical framework of this thesis, the role of a speech act is to securitise (Stritzel, 2007); for Ava, applying the label of 'terrorist' would have securitised the individual and transformed them from being a friend to an object of security, with the consequences that brought alongside it (Floyd, 2007), something she did not want to carry the responsibility for.

Despite rejecting the likelihood and the responsibility, participants did hypothesise what they would do had a concern come to light when asked. Responses from students were both complex and fluid but central to the majority of them was the preference for informal mechanisms, as many of their teachers had preferred. These were viewed to have been a potential support for both them and the individual they were concerned of, particularly when read against the proposed alternative "official" route of reporting to the police. Several factors were found to be important for students when making the decision of whether or not

to report a concern and who they would report this to. The first of which was the level of friendship the student had with the individual concerned which was deemed as critical for a majority of students. Where there was a close friendship, some of the students suggested that they would feel comfortable directly speaking with the person to query events or changes:

> *It would be depending on how close I was with them though. If it was like one of my best friends, then I'd go directly to them. If it was someone who I didn't know particularly well but like was like friends with, maybe I'd go to like my friends first, see what they were thinking, maybe get like a general consensus and then I'd maybe speak to them, but it would depend on how close I was to the person. I'd feel awkward if I didn't really know them really well but then again, I might not even know what was going on if I didn't know them that well*

(Rachael, Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders)

This is reflective of educator experiences who, in chapter seven, also stressed the preference to engage with colleagues prior to making any decisions of referring a concern. For a few of the students, this reassurance also came in the form of parental advice with whom they could "talk it through", rather than getting "worked up on it or something and then go off and accuse them or say the wrong thing" (John, Academic Institute 3, Group Two, Mixed genders). John also suggested that his parent's knowledge would enable him to better understand the concern and make a more informed decision on what to do, something which was similarly present in other's dialogue whereby students uncertainty came from not knowing how they should respond to or deal with a concern arising. For them, these informal conversations offered the spaces in which they could develop their understanding and confidence of how to manage the situation with the guidance and support of others whom they trusted. This was also important for those students who said that they would approach a member of staff within their institution, which other studies had similarly found to be preferable over the likes of the police for students (Thomas et al., 2017; Jerome and Elwick, 2019). Whilst some said they could approach any member of staff; the majority claimed the selection of the member of staff they would report concerns to was critical. For one student, they responded by questioning how they would feel if they were the person of concern, arguing that they "wouldn't want someone going to a member of staff because it's it feels very impersonal, just somebody who doesn't know you, you know? But maybe like my form tutor cos we get on

with him quite well" (Joseph, Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders). Drawing on the relationship between the student and the tutor revealed that trust and familiarity were central to this students' decision making around whether or not information and concerns would be shared. Where these informal conversations of reassurance were less important was where the relationship was not present between the student and the (hypothetic) person of concern, in addition to when it was "something that really concerned me" or if "I thought that is definitely not right" some claimed (Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders). In these instances, albeit fewer, students suggested that they would bypass some conversations and report their concern to any member of staff within their institution, since if they did not know them, the only signs they would have been able to spot would have been explicit signs of danger, they suggested. Nonetheless, this still demonstrated a preference for an internal process of referral within the school, rather than to the numbers that were printed on their 'run, hide, tell' posters.

For those who did suggest that there would be an inclination to engage with external services, there remained an element of doubt which left them hesitant and requiring confirmation from their peers:

> *My first thought would just be like ring the police, but I guess it's not right?* (Emily, Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders)

For this student, though their initial reaction would have been the police, they questioned their judgement and called on their peers to either confirm or deny their own uncertainty. For another student, it was an uncomfortableness with the potential outcomes of police involvement which led them to outright reject the involvement of the police, claiming that they would "just straight up put you away" whereas "helplines" would "diffuse it and help you" (Joe, Training Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders). For this student, an external helpline would have offered the support and guidance that they felt would be required in considering a referral whilst the police were immediately associated with criminalisation. The potential repercussions of the latter for both him as a *referrer* and the person *referred* were positioned as central to this rejection of police involvement where the outcome was understood to be punitive rather than preventative through helplines. Instead, the student similarly drew back on the importance of informal, internal and most importantly *familiar*

means by which a concern should be dealt with to support, rather than securitise, as earlier experiences had also described.

Where concerns might have been spotted online, for example their friend sharing extremist material, external mechanisms were actually preferred due to both the ease and sense of inappropriateness that was deemed with bringing such concerns into the college environment, where they were not already visible. Instead, in these instances students referred to seeing the "report" buttons on Facebook which would allow them to pass on their concerns. Utilising these functions enabled students to report anonymously and not be linked to any problematic outcomes of securitisation as earlier discussed which might occur. Through the ambiguities in the discussions, two scenarios emerged in which this would not have been seen as appropriate, however. Firstly, in the event of a close relationship with the individual, talking with them directly about what they had liked or shared would be preferred. The second consideration spoke to a wider concern around the normalisation and mainstreaming of certain forms of extremism and terrorism. For most of the students who discussed seeing material that would indicate extremism or terrorism online, particularly on social media, it was understood as being associated with the far-right. Students revealed that such imagery was actually very common but was not something they would refer since it was presented as "memes" which people often shared "for a joke" (Training Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed genders). Whilst I suggest student engagement with the far-right within these mainstream platforms requires further examination elsewhere, the experiences demonstrated evidence of a not only a mainstreaming of far-right discourses within the UK (Atton, 2006; Ansari and Hafez, 2012; Abbas and Awan, 2015; Mondon and Winter, 2019)[56] but a normalisation of them.[57] Student experiences suggested that they and their peers were able to view potentially extremist narratives readily but did not consider them extreme in the same way that they would have done Islamist-inspired propaganda, due to their online availability and formatting. This, therefore, had an impact on what they were therefore likely to see as requiring referring.

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[56] Youth-culture and the far-right has been explored at depth in mainland Europe (see, for example Kuhn, 2004; Rieker, 2006; Grubben, 2006; Cockburn, 2007; Pels and de Ruyter, 2012; Miller-Idriss, 2018)
[57] This normalisation of the far-right has been discussed elsewhere (Lakhani and James, forthcoming)

Though it was rare, some students also suggested that they would ignore any potential concerns. Whilst one said that they would "keep a distance until I know for certain that somethings up" (Vincent, Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders), they were unable to suggest when they thought such a point might be, raising the issue of thresholds that was present within chapter six. For two of the students who said they would not want to be involved in the referral of others, their uncomfortableness with it was cited as the primary reason. For one student, this came from his lack of knowledge around what to do (Rio, Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders), whereas for the other, it was the potential of getting it wrong:

> I don't know cos then, say you report it and it goes wrong and then your friends like "you tried to get me done for terrorism didn't you" so, and in fairness you never know what's going on these days they could just be messing about or something so, I'd have probably just left it and just not dealt with it
>
> (Leroy, Training Institute 1, Group One, Mixed genders)

For this student, the potential damage that could be done to a friendship and to the individual concerned. The potential of getting this wrong, or "betraying" their friend was incentive to have removed themselves from the situation altogether (Jeff; Jake, Academic Institute 1, Group Two, Male group). An overwhelming amount of the students discussed the potential backfire on not only for their friend as earlier discussed, but for their friendships and their own safety. Anonymity was therefore key for almost all of the students where they would choose to refer friends, whether through internal or external mechanisms. However, there was also a small number of students who would have "just left it"; for Leroy this was based on the idea that some extremist messaging was people simply "messing about", as just discussed; it was problematic, but not harmful, he argued. For another of the students, their preference to ignore was based in a repositioning of responsibility: "if something bad happens to them, it's their decision, if they're aware of the consequences afterwards then [and still do it], that's their fault" (Jeff, Training Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed group). Experiences like Jeff's suggested that it was not only that some students had problematised their responsibility to refer, but that others had simply rejected it; responsibility lay with the person concerned and ownership of their actions belonged to them. Nonetheless, for others, this was problematic. Though they agreed with Jeff's sentiments, they felt a referral would "probably be important wouldn't it 'cos obviously it makes the other students safer if that one person

isn't at the college" (Dale, Training Institute 1, Group Two, Mixed group). The reference to harm to others demonstrated how, through the framework of safeguarding, the responsibility to refer had been internalised for even those who had problematised it previously; where an awareness was present of potential harm, it came with a responsibility to prevent it for the sake of those around them. As another student claimed, "I feel like reporting them is better than them ending up like hurt or dead or something" (James, Academic Institute 1, Group Three, Male group). Thus, the responsibility to refer returned where it was not just about safeguarding that one individual, but also everyone else around them.

8.5 Conclusion

Chapter eight has explored the student experiences of the Prevent duty within the classrooms of four Greater Manchester further education institutions. It has examined the ways in which students conceptualised threat in order to understand how their experiences offered both continuity and conflict with those of their teachers, their DSLs and policy elites who had governed the portrayal of the duty within their institutions. In doing so, it firstly explored the conceptualisation of threat as all forms of terrorism and extremism, secondly British values as the antithesis to threat, and thirdly threat as a responsibility to safeguard against. As the chapter demonstrated, the narrative of vulnerability to safeguard against foregrounded many of the claims made by students and therefore became embedded throughout these sections.

The first section of the chapter, 8.2, examined the conceptualisation of threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism. For students, threat *should* have been understood through this narrative since the duty was about protecting *anyone* from being exploited by *any* ideology. However, the section revealed that this was not believed to be the case in practice as a result of wider long-standing public narratives of prejudice. Students therefore drew upon the same concerns which their institutional and classroom educators had in terrorism and extremism being synonymised with Islamist-inspired ideologies due to political and media discourses which problematically conflated them with Islam. In examining the way these narratives emerged and became enacted, the students revealed the perceived implications of this not only on Muslims (and those perceived to be Muslim) but also on the depiction and subsequent approach to the far-right by the policy. As a result, a significant number of the

students felt that whilst all forms of terrorism and extremism required safeguarding against, it was Muslim vulnerability to Islamist-inspired ideologies which was conceptualised as the threat.

Section 8.3 of the chapter drew upon the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat which had been visible within the institutional and classroom level enactments of the Prevent duty. Subsection 8.3.1 demonstrated how the reframing of the agenda to "our" or "institutional" values by teachers had been recognised to a greater extent than 'British values' across student experiences. It revealed the varied approaches across the institutions with some students aware of the values in every classroom whilst others had come across them once or twice during tutorial sessions. Issues around subject applicability, teacher's knowledge and a perceived necessity for the values within the education sphere were all drawn upon by students, most of whom questioned the relevance within their classrooms. Subsection 8.3.2 echoed concerns visible within the previous two chapters around the labelling of the values as British; for students it was felt to have perpetuated an ethno-nationalist discourse which determined threat by non-Britishness. Where these values were understood as only something which (visible) British people could hold, difference became a source of othering for these students and served to stigmatise and isolate those who did not meet these standards. British values were therefore conceptualised by these students as the antithesis to Islamist-inspired extremism and thus largely rejected as a mean through which all forms could be countered.

Section 8.4 explored the extent to which threat was conceptualised as a responsibility to safeguard against, by students, as it had been by participants across the previous three chapters. As teachers revealed in the previous chapter, staff and student responsibilisation merged where prevention was seen through both resilience and referral. Subsection 8.4.1 dealt with the first narrative of responsibilisation and revealed that although students were aware of the issues of terrorism and extremism, they did not feel the classroom session they undertook provided them with sufficient knowledge to engage in their prevention. Yet simultaneously, students problematised the need for such sessions in their perceived distance from processes of radicalisation in seeing it as something which happened to others. Nonetheless, where it did exist, students believed there needed to be measures in place to

prevent it from going any further. Though students internalised the narrative of responsibilisation for their teachers, subsection 8.4.2 also revealed how they problematised the capacities of teaching staff to safeguard against all forms of extremism and terrorism as a result of the wider narratives of prejudice, and lack of knowledge on the subject, that they feared resulted in bias over *who* would be *prevented*. Subsection 8.4.3 saw students draw on many of the same concerns when it came to their own responsibilisation, claiming they felt ill-prepared, unconfident and unaware of how to spot (potential) signs of radicalisation and engagement in terrorism or extremism and what to do once they did spot them. Negotiations around whether or not they should or would refer therefore centred on their level of awareness and the potential repercussion of referring or not, whilst conflicts also emerged surrounding who they felt both appropriate and comfortable to refer such concerns to. Thus, whilst students internalised the narrative of threat being a responsibility to safeguard against, their discourse revealed a series of moments where this became highly problematic for them in practice.

The chapter provides the final layer of analysis for this thesis in understanding the multiple points at which the Prevent duty became implemented and thus threat became conceptualised. It has revealed how the conceptualisation of threat firstly as all forms of extremism and terrorism, secondly as antithesised by British values and thirdly as a responsibility to safeguard against were visible across the experiences, as they had been across all three of the previous chapters. It has also revealed how the conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to safeguard against was rooted throughout these sections and the grounding upon which the duty was seen to have been accepted. However, in revealing the internalisation of the need to safeguard against radicalisation as a form of harm, student experiences problematised the ways in which this occurred, whether through awareness raising, embedding British values or the responsibility to refer, when an overriding public narrative of prejudice was viewed to shape the conceptualisation of threat as Islamist-inspired. The conflicts which emerged throughout this chapter provide the final insights through which the conceptualisation of threat can now be examined in chapter eight to have occurred within the implementation of the Prevent duty within Greater Manchester's FE sector.

Chapter Nine: Concluding Thoughts

9.1 Discussion

The thesis has examined experiences of the implementation of the Prevent duty within five of Greater Manchester's Further Education (FE) institutions to reveal how threat has been conceptualised within the sector. It has contributed to a number of bodies of literature, grounded in a Critical Terrorism Studies approach but drawing on Educational Policy, Security Studies and Intersectionality to uncover the multiplicity of experiences that govern a fluid and responsive enactment of the duty and conceptualisation of threat. It is therefore significant for a number of emerging debates surrounding the enactment of the Prevent duty, the experiences and implementation of counter-terrorism policy within everyday spaces, and the vernacular conceptualisations of threat, providing an extensive empirical contribution to these concerns. More specifically, it has provided one of the first studies which has engaged with both training and academic further education institutes, which provides not only student experiences of the policy but does so in addition to their classroom and institutional staff as well as policy elites, and in doing so, which maps the variations of experiences across and between these points of enactment. Furthermore, it has not only provided knowledge around how the Prevent duty becomes implemented but also how these stories of enactment become possible and therefore construct the conceptualisations of threat across a multitude of spatio-temporal contexts. It is also the first study to undertake these empirical investigations within Greater Manchester, a Prevent priority area and a unique city in its diversity which, during the course of fieldwork, saw one of its own students commit a terror attack upon his fellow Mancunians, killing 22, injuring hundreds more and attracting the world's attention for a perceived failure to *prevent*, as a result.

In examining the multiple ways in which the Prevent duty was implemented by the various actors engaged with throughout this thesis, the chapters have revealed the relationship between four key conceptualisations of threat which emerged as a result: firstly, as vulnerability to be safeguarded against; secondly, as all forms of extremism and terrorism; thirdly, through British values as its' antithesis; and finally, as the responsibility of those within

the education sector to safeguard against. This chapter now maps these findings and claims across the four data-driven chapters, and onto the existing literature, to reveal not only how the duty became implemented, but also the moments of continuity and conflict which occurred within these GM FE institutes and what this tells us about their conceptualisations of threat.

Threat as vulnerability to safeguard against

The conceptualisation of threat as vulnerability to be safeguarded against was seen to be internalised by the vast majority of participants across the four data-led chapters of the thesis (chapters five through eight). This was in line with much of the existing literature on implementations of the Prevent duty (Busher et al., 2017; Busher and Jerome, 2020; Moffat and Gerard, 2020 amongst others) but furthered their claims by demonstrating how this occurred. Through the language of vulnerability (Revell, 2019) and harm (Heath-Kelly, 2016a), threat became something which could be identified and prevented, with the duty a mechanism through which this could be done. This language created discourses of victimhood, transforming radicalisation into a form of harm which, like other forms of exploitation, could be and required safeguarding against (see Mythen et al., 2009; Strausz and Heath-Kelly, 2019). In doing so, these discourses de-exceptionalised the duty as a continuation of existing practices (Busher et al., 2019); the familiarity with which it became viewed, therefore, enabled the policy to become normalised through educationalists enactments and thus accepted as part of their everyday practices (Revell, 2019). The discourses echoed those of a number of scholars who had problematised the framework of safeguarding for counter-terrorism agendas (Stanley and Guru, 2015; Heath-Kelly, 2016a; Durodie, 2016), but the acceptance and internalisation of the narrative by participants throughout this research challenged their claims that this had led to a securitisation of education institutions, where ultimately threat was vulnerability and the duty enabled them to safeguard against its exploitation.

However, there were also moments of ambiguity in this narrative across chapters six, seven and eight where, in practice, the discourse of threat as vulnerability to safeguard against faced limitations. Whilst policy elites challenged it, many of the other participants referred to a possibility for the duty to be read through alternative lenses, speaking to the history of

securitisation and surveillance within the duty's predecessor, Prevent (Awan, 2012; Sian, 2015; O'Donnell, 2016; O'Toole et al., 2016; Ragazzi, 2016). Though all of the participants felt the duty had the potential to be a safeguarding mechanism, both practical and contextual limitations were faced. For institutional and classroom staff, the delivery of training, the identification of potential signs and to an extent the path of referral all disrupted earlier narratives of continuity where the duty and its requirements were positioned as something different in the introduction of new practices and knowledge it required. For both classroom staff and students the potential for the safeguarding narrative to be enacted for *everybody's* potential vulnerability against *all* forms of ideology, was also questioned when a wider public narrative of prejudice against Muslims existed (Miller et al., 2013). Furthermore, for all of the participants beyond policy elites, there was also a widening of safeguarding where, due to the nature of harm possible through radicalisation, enactments of the duty became about safeguarding not only an individual, but also those around them revealing the extent to which Heath-Kelly's (2013) 'risky' and 'at risk' paradigm was embedded within these institutional practices (Acik et al., 2018).

These ambiguities furthered the current literature by providing an insight into the everyday limitations and challenges faced by those across the implementation process of the duty. Yet, in examining these moments where the narrative became blurred, participants demonstrated that where the duty was implemented properly, recognising and overcoming the above limitations through their own enactments, the duty *was* about safeguarding against the threat of vulnerability and this vulnerability to radicalisation 'assimilate[d]… into one of the many ways that students need[ed] to be protected' (Moffat and Gerard, 2020, p.208).

Threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism

The wider public narrative of prejudice against Muslims was referenced by the vast majority of participants (Modood, 2005; Kundnani, 2007; Allen, 2015a; Bonino, 2015). For policy elites, this was something which lay in previous iterations of Prevent, not the Prevent duty (see Awan, 2012; Rikabi, 2013; Bonino, 2013 for examples). For all of the other participants, however, these long standing stigmatisations were still felt to influence the conceptualisation of *who* it was that was perceived to be threatening (Elwick and Jerome, 2019). The research furthers the findings of Busher et al. (2017) by revealing not only that concerns over

disproportionality existed, but extended it by demonstrating the perceived causes which lay at the root of impacts, felt particularly by Muslims, as a result of the duty. For DSLs, teachers and students there remained a fear that the entrenched synonymisation of Islam with Islamist-inspired terrorism, within both media and political discourses, still governed which threats were felt to be of greater concern (Sian, 2015; 2017). Thus, whilst these participants agreed with policy elites that threat *should* be conceptualised as all forms of extremism and terrorism, they problematised the duty's ability to implement this as a result of these wider public discourses, and their own and others capacities to overcome the resultant bias. This, in addition, demonstrated the capacity for discursive constructions of threat to transcend between policy (Jackson, 2005; Holland, 2012) and media (O'Loughlin et al., 2011; Clubb et al., 2019) 'levels', and individual, everyday conceptualisations (Jarvis and Lister, 2016). Further, as DSL and student experiences both drew upon, this also impacted the ability to see other forms of threat, most notably the far-right, within the same frameworks as Islamist-inspired, since they were not perceived to fit within these prescribed discourses of threat (West and Lloyd, 2017; Kearns et al., 2019). The experiences demonstrated the extent to which mainstream threat discourse impacted the conceptualisation of threat within these everyday spaces (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016; Jarvis and Lister, 2016) and thus that these 'other forms' were, therefore, felt to be tokenistic.

For DSLs, provided resources did not demonstrate the focus on 'all forms' which policy elites had put forward and further work undertaken to source such examples themselves. For teaching staff, the same concern was felt to be the case where they similarly undertook their own research to widen the scope of who they were presenting to their students as potentially vulnerable. The efforts from DSLs were therefore not translated to teaching staff. Similarly, such efforts were also lost on students. The pro-active inclusion of these other forms at the multiple points of enactment therefore suggested that it was not only that training was not felt to be sufficient, as Higton et al. (2018), Moffat and Gerard (2020) and Elwick and Jerome (2019) had all drawn upon, but that another issue was also at play. I argue that student experiences revealed that this was a wider public narrative of prejudice. In their challenges towards the resources (or lack of) engaging with other forms that they were presented with, student experiences revealed that regardless of the multiple efforts to do so, it was not until there was a sufficient challenge or breaking down of prejudicial narratives surrounding

Islamist-inspired forms that the inclusion of other forms would not be undermined. The finding therefore demonstrated the critical importance of moving beyond existing studies, as Jerome and Elwick (2019) have argued, to engage directly with students, at the 'end point' of policy implementation, in order to understand the duty's approach in preventing 'all forms' of terrorism and extremism and thus being concerned with 'all forms' of threat.

A further contribution this thesis makes in regard to the conceptualisation of threat as all forms of extremism and terrorism is in regard to the processes of referral. There has been no examination of which referrals are made, and are more likely to be made, on the basis of understanding threat, in the literature so far. This research therefore offers a key contribution by revealing that whilst DSLs felt more confident in their expertise to identify problematic referrals, teachers and their students felt the above discourses of prejudice influenced their own and others' identification threat. In other words, they problematised their own conceptualisations of which forms of terrorism or extremism might be more likely to determine *whose* vulnerability they safeguarded. Whilst staff feared the impacts this *might* have on Muslim students, student experiences revealed such a fear was very real and indeed felt on an everyday basis – whether for themselves as Muslims or their Muslim friends.

British Values as the antithesis to threat

As the literature review of the thesis highlighted, few studies had engaged at depth with both the Prevent duty (in terms of safeguarding) and British values simultaneously (see Busher et al., 2017; McGhee and Zhang, 2017; Elwick and Jerome, 2019; Winter and Mills, 2020; Moffat and Gerard, 2020), locating the relationship between the two agendas during policy enactment and the points at which their implementation intersected or clashed. Though the British values agenda was not something which policy elites explored, for DSLs and teachers it was positioned as a central means through which their Prevent duty became enacted. This, they revealed, was largely due to the governance processes of Ofsted which required such engagement (James, 2020), an area which requires further attention. Whilst some studies had revealed concerns over training in relation to the enactment of the Prevent duty overall (Lundie, 2017; Higton et al., 2018; Elwick and Jerome, 2019; Moffat and Gerard, 2020), this research demonstrated how these concerns were also visible specifically in relation to British values where the responsibility for training was not always clearly allocated, guidance and

resource for training was limited, and the capacity to understand when, how and through what means the agenda should be embedded within the classroom was, as a result, also unclear.

The applicability to the classroom was noted by participants as necessary under Ofsted, but problematic in its prescribed implementation. In defining extremism as the rejection of these British values, the agenda became conceptualised as the antithesis to threat. However, as participants across chapters six, seven and eight all revealed, the agenda was seen as an antithesis to a certain type of extremism and terrorism through its narrow reading of Britishness (Lockley-Scott, 2019). Whilst Winter and Mills (2020), McGhee and Zhang (2017), and Lockley-Scott (2019), suggested this was the case, this research is significant in demonstrating how this occurred and some of the considerations and implications which emerge in the classroom as a result. In drawing on the wider narratives of prejudice, and situating this within a long standing discourse of Otherisation, "British" values were seen by participants to invoke an ethno-nationalist understanding of acceptability where difference became threatening (Maylor, 2016; Lockley-Scott, 2019; Winter and Mills, 2020; see also Keddie, 2014; Sian, 2015; Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016). The thesis demonstrated not only that these concerns existed, but that that difference was also understood through racial, gendered and sometimes classed discourses (Yuval-Davis, 2007; Allen, 2015a; Bonino, 2015; Rashid, 2016; Habib, 2018). It was Muslimness that was perceived to reify this difference in its hyper-visibleness against a backdrop of threat being synonymised with Islamist-inspired concerns, as earlier noted (Chadderton, 2012; Patel, 2013; Miah, 2016). As a result, British values were perceived by participants across the three chapters that engaged with them as marginalising in their replication of Otherising narratives that, rather than unifying communities, divided them as 'Us' versus 'Them'.

For some of these participants this not only demonstrated a difficulty and uncomfortableness from staff, but also students, in delivering the agenda within the classroom as Busher et al. (2017) and Winter and Mills (2020) had found. In this respect, British values were found to have caused a "chilling effect" (Rights Watch UK, 2016), to an extent with, as Sjøen and Jore (2019, p.275) found, 'fear and uncertainty' around the use and purpose of "British" values within the classroom where both students and their teachers were found to shut down

conversations. The research further contributes to understanding this fear around the implementation of British values in demonstrating how these discourses led to narratives of superior 'Us' versus inferior 'Them'. Both staff and students raised concerns over this feeding into rhetoric of the far-right; for some of the participants, not only did this further minimise the perceived threat the far-right was associated with, since it was not understood through the same discourses as Islamist as above, but in doing so only heightened the threat of Islamist-inspired in its distancing from "Britishness".

As Bamber et al. (2019) found, the values were positioned by institutional and classroom staff to have had the potential to act as a continuation of existing values agendas, with a small minority of staff seeing them as a means through which difference could be unified (see Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe, 2017). As a result of the above concerns, however, institutional and classroom staff were found to have adopted alternative language to embed the agenda, mandated by Ofsted, within their classrooms. This mapped onto the claims that staff were 'repackaging' values by embedding them within existing pedagogical and values frameworks and thus normalising their presence within the classroom (Vincent, 2019, pp.23–4; see also McGhee and Zhang, 2017; Bamber et al., 2019). As one of the first studies to examine student engagements with the British values agenda (see Jerome and Elwick, 2019; 2020 for the other), the responses by participants in this research revealed that whilst staff attempts to reframe the agenda through "our" or "institutional" values was internalised, they also demonstrated the points at which this became blurred within the classroom. For many, there was a perceived lack of knowledge and an uncomfortableness from staff with different levels of engagement across not only institutions, but classrooms. This was partly due to the belief that some subjects were more suited to the agenda than others, as Higton et al. (2018) and Moffat and Gerard (2020) found, but also simply because students did not feel they nor their teachers saw a place for promoting a "Britishness" within the classroom.

This distancing from the language of British also appeared to replicate the shift in government rhetoric around British values emerging at the time of fieldwork in the then Primer Minister and Home Secretary's shifting to "our values" in speeches (May, 2017a; David, 2018; Tolhurst, 2018). Although this is not a new phrase, having been used in conjunction with 'British values' (May, 2014b; May, 2014a; May, 2015; May, 2017b) by Theresa May in her position as Home

Secretary and as Prime Minister, "our values" has been favoured significantly, within the new 2018 CONTEST strategy (HM Government, 2018a) which sees the term "British values" as almost entirely obsolete. As I have discussed elsewhere however (James, 2018), the current Head of Ofsted Amanda Spielman has denied that the term is going anywhere from educational settings. Yet, as this chapter has demonstrated, the conceptualisation of British values as the antithesis to threat was only replicated in staff enactments through necessity of duty compliance (and rejected in students) as a result of its perceived positioning of anything outside of the imagined borders of (white) Britishness, as a threat. Further, as participants across chapters six, seven and eight all demonstrated, in conceptualising British values as the antithesis to certain forms of extremism and terrorism, the agenda served to undermine their attempts to present the duty as a safeguarding mechanism for *everyone.*

Threat as a responsibility to safeguard against

This conceptualisation of threat developed on the work of Paul Thomas (2017) who positioned the duty as a responsibilising mechanism where staff became required, in their role (and duties of care) as public sector workers, to refer potential cases of radicalisation. The thesis demonstrated that throughout the four chapters, this responsibility was upheld and replicated within actors experiences of the duty as a continuation of their existing safeguarding responsibilities. It therefore furthered the findings of Busher et al. and challenged those of Heath-Kelly (2016a; see also Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018; 2019) and Stanley and Guru (2015). However, as a result of the previous two conceptualisations of threat, the narrative was not as clear cut at institution and classroom level as policy elites had depicted it to be in understanding it as a continuing responsibility that simply extended their pre-duty safeguarding role. As above, for both (institutional and classroom) staff and students, the fear that some, namely (visible) Muslim students would be more likely to be referred over non-Muslims as a result of wider discourses of prejudice problematised the perceived likeliness of viewing certain threats as more likely to warrant referrals. This demonstrated the potential, where such fears became realised and students referred over their Muslimness, rather than their vulnerability to radicalisation, that the act of referral became a surveillance mechanism, rather than a safeguarding one, for certain suspect communities (Gearon, 2015; 2017; Miah, 2016; 2017; Kyriacou et al., 2017).

Whilst explorations have been offered around the discourses which grounded the responsibility to refer, as above, studies have yet to examine experiences of referral. The research has demonstrated that though the practical implementation of the duty, in theory, mirrored that of any other form of harm within the institution, there were a number of ambiguities and conflicts which emerged when delving deeper into the personal experiences of what referrals involved in practice. Whilst some teaching staff felt it was the responsibility of their DSL to determine what form of harm *spotted* vulnerability was in relation to once they passed it on, others believed there was an implicit necessity to understand what vulnerability to radicalisation was in order to spot it in the first place. Similarly, whilst policy elites had presented institutional roles as simply spotting any vulnerability, DSLs also felt a responsibility to determine its potential for exploitation for radicalisation in not only knowing how to understand and manage the concern, but for knowing which external service to refer it to.

Further, the thesis also revealed the huge emotional burden which both educational staff and students felt during the stages of referral, from consideration to implementation. It examined the conflicts which emerged where referrals could be simultaneously felt to be warranted, in minimising the risk to the individual and those around them, but unwarranted for the potential risk of being wrong or of placing an innocent person in a potentially securitised realm. These findings drew directly upon the notions of 'risky' and 'at risk' (Heath-Kelly, 2013), demonstrating their visibility within educational settings (Acik et al., 2018). Furthermore, for DSLs, this risk calculation became further heightened where referrals were made to external partners and educators concerns not engaged with, or taken seriously enough, as policy elites had claimed would always be the case. For a number of the DSLs, these instances damaged the relationship between institutions and their external partners and revealed some of the implications placed on them and their staff where referrals were not always as easy as signposting a concern, like policy elites had portrayed. This research therefore offered one of the first studies examining the processes of referrals and the decisions and difficulties faced when doing so, providing an important area for not only policy (and policy enactment) development but further research to interrogate how responsibilisation becomes performed (Ball, 2003; 2012).

Whilst the above points demonstrated some of the conflicts which emerged within educators responsibilisation, the thesis also developed upon Thomas' (2015) work by demonstrating how staff were not only responsibilised to enact policy through referral, but to also extended the notion by responsibilising their students. It revealed how implementation of the duty required staff to make students responsible for their own resistance to radicalisation through awareness raising sessions, which Jerome and Elwick (2019; 2020) and Lundie (2019) had explored, but also by referring their peers for potential radicalisation which has not previously been revealed within the literature. Whilst Higton et al. (2018, p.13) hinted to this directive claiming that students were required to know only what to do to safeguard themselves, they did not explore how this was envisaged to be the case. Thus, this research offers a significant insight to what the Prevent duty meant for the responsibilisation of students, bringing them into the stories of policy enactment and threat conceptualisation as key players within these processes. As students challenged their teachers' capacities to refer without bias, they also problematised their responsibilisation as a result of their own bias but also their sense of uncomfortableness in doing so; concerns like the consequences of false referrals for them or the person being referred were critical in determining whether or not they would refer. Yet, in positioning themselves as part of a wider society who held a moral obligation to safeguard vulnerable people from becoming engaged in terrorism and extremism, these narratives enabled them to mirror the discourses of their classroom and institutional staff in seeing radicalisation as something which could and should be prevented wherever possible. The research therefore provides critical considerations for the role of students within the implementation of the Prevent duty and the conceptualisation of threat as a responsibility which *everyone* must be engaged with in their *everyday* lives.

Vernacular threat

Through the above four conceptualisations, the thesis has both understood and uncovered the ways in which threat is discursively constructed through the vernacular (Jackson and Hall, 2016; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016). In doing so, it speaks to the theoretical literature around threat discourse and practice, revealing how these constructions are socio-temporally situated and emerge within 'everyday' realities of policy enactment (Jarvis and Lister, 2012; 2016; Ball et al., 2012). The thesis has demonstrated how these multiple discourses simultaneously overlapped and clashed at different stages of policy implementation, where

challenges and limitations forced reflexivity in actors' understandings and enactments. Furthermore, in demonstrating where and how different conflicts emerged, the thesis also highlighted how the conceptualisations of threat became blurred as actors negotiated their own and others' positionality and the discourses which governed these (Braun et al., 2011). It therefore revealed how threat was conceptualised as a 'process that draws boundaries on the basis of the position of the target group in the political field rather than [an] objective seriousness' (Tsoukala, 2008, p.137). In other words, threat was not only something which actors constructed in response to perceived requirements of policy implementation and the context within which they found themselves enacting it, but also in response to those who they were enacting the policy 'against' and where they positioned themselves in relation. Participants therefore revealed how 'threat' was constructed as fluid, being (de-)constructed simultaneously in response to, and engagement with, the structures and agents, practices, acts, and discourses, and norms and environments within which actors situated themselves and those around them (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016). It also, therefore, continuously shifted as their spatio-temporal positionality (and that of those around them) changed (ibid; Braun et al., 2011). Examining participants implementations of the Prevent duty, therefore enabled the thesis to identify the conceptualisations, therefore, within the vernacular and make important contributions to not only how, but why this occurred.

Greater Manchester

In days prior to the submission of this thesis came the announcement that that FE and HE sector had become embedded in a process of referral sharing within Greater Manchester (Grierson, 2020b). The details of the agreement, at the time of submission, are relatively unknown but the announcement, found by researcher Hilary Akid and leaked within a national newspaper, suggested that through the local Counter-Terrorism Unit, Greater Manchester FE institutions would share the information of those referred through Prevent, to HE institutions within the area. This it is claimed, is in order to ensure 'that those people who need support services can receive them' (ibid.). Given the timeframe, the questions and potential implications this raises cannot be explored within the thesis. However, its findings, as a result, become even more significant in providing stories which should inform and frame future policies such as the one announced but also perhaps answer questions as to how they

might have come about and pose them as to what we should be looking for in further rolling out the Prevent duty in Greater Manchester's FE sector.

9.2 Considerations for the wider scholarship

The thesis is significant for its empirical contributions to the current understandings of the Prevent duty and its implementation, and for speaking to the theoretical literature about the vernacular constructions of threat. It also offers points of significance for wider scholarship, such as critical security studies, terrorism studies and political violence, and education and social policy, which it contributes to in examining these findings. In doing so, it also provides empirical starting points for these bodies of literature to draw upon and further develop, specifically around the wider discourses of prejudice, the role of responsibilisation, the "Britishness" of values, and the role of the far-right within the implementation of the Prevent duty and indeed the conceptualisation of threat.

One of the central findings which emerged throughout the thesis was the overwhelming sense that a wider narrative of public prejudice, both as a result and enabler of political and media discourse, governed the conceptualisation of threat as Islamist-inspired and thus, problematically, as Muslim. In line with the critical scholarship around Security and Terrorism Studies (Mythen et al., 2009; Jackson et al., 2011; Croft, 2012; Bonino, 2013; Kundnani, 2014; Breen-Smyth, 2014 amongst others), there remained a perception that the Prevent duty had the potential to be disproportionately focused upon Muslims. Moreover, in also speaking to pedagogic scholarship, this revealed the extent to which enactments of policy by educationalists become limited and undermined by wider societal discourses that find themselves embedded within the classroom, whether through staff or student (un)conscious bias (Ball et al., 2012; Heimans, 2014; Gearon, 2015; Durodie, 2016; Thomas, 2016). The research therefore also has important considerations for literature which engages with the emergence and effects of Islamophobia (Birt, 2008; Alam and Husband, 2013; Bonino, 2015); the impacts of policy upon freedom of speech for particular groups (Gilmore, 2017; Ni Aolain, 2020), and importantly for scholarship which deals with Prevent more specifically, whether in education policy or terrorism studies, around the *limited* capacity for the programme to separate itself from its past (Thomas, 2017; Ramsay, 2017; Miah, 2017; Dudenhoefer, 2018).

The research also found that the discourse of responsibilisation (Thomas, 2017) was entrenched within the conceptualisation of threat across participants, seeing radicalisation as their responsibility to safeguard against. However, it also revealed that this became extended from not only public sector workers, such as educationalists, but was now being applied to students. The finding should be of critical importance to scholars across both critical and mainstream terrorism studies, particularly those seeking to understand the enactment of Prevent policy (Durodie, 2016; Miah, 2017; Qurashi, 2017; Acik et al., 2018; Dudenhoefer, 2018), those examining its de-exceptionalisation through enlisting citizens as state agents in this work (Stanley and Guru, 2015; Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018; Stanley et al., 2018; Lister, 2019), and those exploring how students understand and engage with the Prevent duty (McGlynn and McDaid, 2016; Kyriacou et al., 2017; Jerome and Elwick, 2019). The latter point of which also speaks to scholars within education studies and childhood studies concerned with the safeguarding narrative, whereby safeguarding became something students simultaneously required, and were required to do (Dryden, 2017; Acik et al., 2018; Revell, 2019). The conflicts which emerged between, within and across student and staff experiences also speaks to those within education studies concerned with policy enactment, particularly in relation to Prevent (Maylor, 2016; Busher et al., 2017; 2019; McGhee and Zhang, 2017; Jerome and Elwick, 2019; 2020; Vincent, 2019; Lockley-Scott, 2019; Busher and Jerome, 2020; Moffat and Gerard, 2020).

The rejection of the British values which emerged also spoke to a multitude of disciplines. The role of ethno-nationalism, national identity and (imagined) borders of nationhood became central to a narrative which also drew upon political discourses of muscular liberalism and civilisation to create a (visible) threat in determining Us from Them (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005; Yuval-Davis, 2006; 2007; Keddie, 2014; Winter and Mills, 2020). The problematisation of the language of Britishness raises critical considerations for those concerned with education , particularly around policy and Ofsted governance (Jerome and Clemitshaw, 2012; Panjwani, 2016; Maylor, 2016; Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe, 2017; Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Habib, 2018; Revell and Bryan, 2018; Vincent, 2019; Lockley-Scott, 2019; Bamber et al., 2019); terrorism, political violence and radicalisation scholars who examine the conceptualisation of threat, the role of British values and the role of these narratives within both

extremist/terrorist and counter-extremist/terrorist rhetoric should also find these contributions useful (Keddie, 2014; Allen, 2015a; McGhee and Zhang, 2017; Poole, 2018; Webber and Struthers, 2019). The findings are also significant for scholars interested in how the role of nationalism and national identity within counter-extremism/terrorism policy (Husband and Alam, 2011; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Allen, 2015a; Ragazzi, 2016; Madon et al., 2016), in addition to those concerns with the role of identity and in/out groupings within community relations (Mycock, 2010; Sales, 2010; 2012; Vertigans, 2010; Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2010; Keddie, 2014; Allen, 2015a; Smith, 2016).

The final space identified which this research speaks to within the wider literature is the role of the far-right. The findings demand that the literature now seeks to examine how a disproportionate focus on Muslimness leaves narrow opportunities to apply the Prevent duty to the far-right (Lakhani and James, forthcoming). As above, the research also provides some important empirical findings for those who explore how British values can be co-opted by ethno-nationalist discourses (Allen, 2019; Winter and Mills, 2020). I also argue that the findings provide an important basis for a subsequent research project around the extent to which the far-right 'mainstreaming'[58] is visible within British classrooms and the implications this has on the conceptualisation of threat within the context of the UKs counterterrorism efforts (Abbas and Awan, 2015; Abbas, 2017a; Allen, 2019) and more specifically enactments of the Prevent duty (Lakhani and James, forthcoming).

9.3 Concluding Thoughts

This thesis has examined the experiences of those located within Greater Manchester's further education sector. It has done so in order to understand enactments of the policy but also what these tell us about the conceptualisation of threat by actors with the sector. The contributions this thesis makes are therefore multiple. The research has been innovative in its mixed methods approach and spans multiple academic disciplines in its theoretical approach speaking to Critical Terrorism Studies, Education Studies, Critical Security Studies and Intersectional approaches to understanding experience. It has prioritised participant

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[58] (see Atton, 2006; Ansari and Hafez, 2012; Krasteva, 2016; Ahmed, 2018; Winter, 2019; Mudde, 2019; Mondon and Winter, 2020)

voices in uncovering and addressing silences within current understandings of policy enactment and threat construction. Empirically, it is one of the first in-depth qualitative studies that not only reveals and examines first-hand experiences of those located at different points within the FE sector but also contextualises them amongst one another. In doing so it has mapped the journey of the narratives which come to inform enactments of the policy and examined how their stories corresponded to one another and conceptualised threat across a multiplicity of spatio-temporal contexts. It has not provided clear cut (homogenising) analysis, nor can it offer 'yes' or 'no' answers about the duty's suitability for counter-terrorism or education agendas. This empirically significant study has revealed, however, a complex and at times ambiguous picture of the lived reality of the Prevent duty's implementation and the subsequent fluid conceptualisations of threat which emerge from its enactments.

Appendix

i)

Home Office

Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF

Tel: 020 7035 4848
Fax: 020 7035 4745
www.homeoffice.gov.uk

Natalie James
ptnj@leeds.ac.uk

FOI : 47910
18 April 2018

Dear Natalie James

Thank you for your e-mail of 27 March 2018, in which you raise questions about the Prevent duty in the education setting. You asked specifically:

1. When an individual is referred to the education sector through their referral to 'other services', who within the education sector are they referred to?
2. When an individual is referred to the education sector through their referral to 'other services', what type of support do they receive from within this sector? What does this support look like?
3. How many of the referrals that have been made by the education sector, have been referred back into the education sector when they have been referred to 'other services', rather than being referred for discussion at a Channel panel?
4. How many referrals which were discussed at Channel panel, were made by the education sector?
5. How many referrals which were discussed at Channel panel, were referred to the education sector in their referral to 'other services'?
6. How many referrals which were discussed at Channel panel, were referrals made by the education sector, which subsequently were referred back to the education sector through their referral to 'other services'?

In relation to questions 1) and 2), the Home Office does not collect data with regards to whom within the education sector an individual is referred, nor the specific nature of the support received by the individual. However, a schools' designated safeguarding lead generally handles safeguarding concerns, and could be one of several individuals involved in ensuring the individual is supported in the school setting. This support could simply be greater communication between the parents, one-to-one mentoring with a teacher that has a positive relationship with the individual, or simply sharing information amongst staff so that a more sensitive approach can be taken with the individual in the classroom. Although the Channel panel referred the individual back to the school, the precise nature of this support would likely be at the discretion of the school.

In relation to questions 3), 4), 5) and 6) we can confirm the Home Office holds the information that you requested. However, after careful consideration we have decided that this

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information is exempt from disclosure under sections 24(1) (National Security) and 38(3) (Health & Safety).

Please find further details of the exemptions in the Annex to this letter.

If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent internal review of our handling of your request by submitting a complaint within two months to FOIRequests@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk, quoting reference 47910. If you ask for an internal review, it would be helpful if you could say why you are dissatisfied with the response.

As part of any internal review the Department's handling of your information request will be reassessed by staff who were not involved in providing you with this response. If you remain dissatisfied after this internal review, you would have a right of complaint to the Information Commissioner as established by section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act.

Yours sincerely

**Freedom of Information
Home Office**

<u>**Annex**</u>

<u>**S24 National Security**</u>

<u>Public interest considerations in favour of disclosing the information</u>

It is recognised that there is a general public interest in knowing what happens to individuals referred to Prevent, and how such referrals are progressed in relation to the education sector. The public interest favours disclosure of the requested information as it will allow the public to be informed about the onward handling of referrals in the education sector.

<u>Public interest considerations in favour of withholding the information</u>

Disclosure is not in the public interest as it would prejudice national security. Disclosure of specific Home Office activity with this cohort could risk identifying areas of intervention or higher risk.

This risk may also lead to individuals being disinclined to consent to voluntary Prevent support, which we can not compel individuals to accept. While demonstrating transparency, we do not wish to jeopardise the confidential nature of Channel and wider safeguarding support. If vulnerable individuals do not trust Prevent and ultimately reject Channel support, the subsequent threat posed to National Security could increase.

<u>**Section 38(3) – Health & Safety**</u>

<u>Considerations in favour of disclosing information</u>

The Home Office recognises that there is a general public interest in transparency and openness in government. Such openness would increase public understanding and inform public debate. In the context of this request, there is a public interest in information on the progression of Channel referrals from the education sector. This would increase the public awareness of the efforts to support vulnerable individuals in the education setting, ultimately increasing the transparency of Prevent's work and the wider work of safeguarders in the education sector.

<u>Considerations against</u>

Disclosing information on interventions pertaining to a relatively small cohort could lead to the identification of people referred to Channel, and could put individuals at considerable risk of intimidation, serious injury, or harm.

We assess that the safety of any individual is of paramount importance and that in all circumstances of the case, the public interest is best served by withholding the information.

ii)

Home Office

Office for Security and Counter-
Terrorism
2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF

Tel: 020 7035 4848
Fax: 020 7035 4745
www.homeoffice.gov.uk

Natalie James
ptnj@leeds.ac.uk

FOI : 50255
11 OCT 2018

Dear Natalie,

Thank you for your e-mail of 18 September 2018, in which you request "With respect to documents 'Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2015 to March 2016' and 'Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2016 to March 2017':

> *1. In relation to the statistics within the afore mentioned documents, there is data from 'the education sector'; is there data kept on which area of the education sector these referrals come from? (i.e. early years, primary, secondary, further, higher education).*
>
> *In relation to the statistics in the afore mentioned documents, what are the statistics, relating to referrals from the education sector, which are from the Further education sector in regards to the following:*
>
> *2. Number of referrals made from the further education sector which required no further action.*
>
> *3. Number of referrals made from the further education sector which were referred to other services.*
>
> *4. Number of referrals made from the further education sector which were discussed at channel panel but require no further action.*
>
> *5. Number of referrals made from the further education sector which were discussed at channel panel but were referred to other services.*
>
> *6. Number of referrals made from the further education sector which were discussed at channel panel and received channel support".*

Your request has been handled as a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

**INVESTORS
IN PEOPLE**

In relation to question 1, we can confirm that the Home Office does collect data for referrals from Higher Education (HE) and Further Education (FE) sectors, however we are unable to split FE from HE, so the following figures relate to referrals from FE and HE combined. In the data collected, not all records have a sector of referral. This means that the figures below may be an under-representation. Additionally, the following data is based on management information only, and is therefore not directly comparable to statistics in the Prevent and Channel publications for the years 2015/16 and 2016/17.

In relation to question 2, there were 126 referrals from HE and FE that required no further action in 2015/16, and 97 in 2016/17.

In relation to question 3, there were 74 referrals from HE and FE that were signposted to alternative services in 2015/16, and 64 in 2016/17.

In relation to question 4, there were 14 referrals from HE and FE which were discussed at a Channel Panel, but required no further action in 2015/16, and 19 in 2016/17.

In relation to question 5, there were 10 referrals from HE and FE which were discussed at a Channel Panel before being signposted to alternative services in 2015/16, and 13 in 2016/17.

In relation to question 6, there were 27 referrals from HE and FE which went on to receive Channel support in 2015/16, and 16 in 2016/17.

If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent internal review of our handling of your request by submitting a complaint within two months to FOIRequests@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk, quoting reference **50255.** If you ask for an internal review, it would be helpful if you could say why you are dissatisfied with the response.

As part of any internal review the Department's handling of your information request will be reassessed by staff who were not involved in providing you with this response. If you remain dissatisfied after this internal review, you would have a right of complaint to the Information Commissioner as established by section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act.

Yours sincerely

Freedom of Information
Home Office

iii)   The below is an example of FOI responses from Greater Manchester Local Authorities. All ten local authorities were asked the same questions and provided the same response; namely that the data was held centrally at the Home Office but was not available due to Section 24(1), 31(1)a and 40(2).

Date   20 September 2018

Dear Ms James,

Freedom of Information – Request for Information
Unique Reference: FOI 7898

Thank you for your request for information dated 13 August 2018 and further to my email sent to you on the 11 September 2018, apologising for the delay in responding to your request. You have requested the following information:

"I would like to request further information regarding the number of individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, for the years 2015 to 2016, and 2016 to 2017. The questions are based on the information available through the national statistic for referrals to the Prevent Programme.
Specifically, I would like to know the following for your area:

1. *How many individuals were referred into the Prevent programme in the year 2015-2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
2. *What percentage of the individuals referred between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017 were male/female?*
3. *What is the percentage breakdown of ages of individuals referred between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
4. *What is the percentage breakdown of type of concern of individuals referred between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
5. *What is the percentage breakdown of sector of referral for individuals referred between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
6. *What is the percentage of referrals from the education sector which required no further action between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
7. *What is the percentage of referrals from the education sector which required support from other services between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
8. *What is the percentage of referrals from the education sector which required discussion at Channel panel between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
9. *What is the percentage of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel but required no further action between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
10. *What is the percentage of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel but required other support between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*

11. *What is the percentage of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel and received Channel Support between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
12. *What is the gender breakdown of referrals from the education sector between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
13. *What is the percentage gender breakdown of referrals from the education sector which required support from other services between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
14. *What is the percentage gender breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at a Channel panel between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
15. *What is the percentage gender breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel but required no further action between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
16. *What is the percentage gender breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel but required other support between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
17. *What is the percentage gender breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel and received Channel Support between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
18. *What is the age breakdown of referrals from the education sector between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
19. *What is the percentage age breakdown of referrals from the education sector which required support from other services between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
20. *What is the percentage age breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at a Channel panel between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
21. *What is the percentage age breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel but required no further action between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
22. *What is the percentage age breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel but required other support between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
23. *What is the percentage age breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel and received Channel Support between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
24. *What is the type of concern percentage breakdown of referrals from the education sector between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
25. *What is the percentage type of concern breakdown of referrals from the education sector which required support from other services between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
26. *What is the percentage type of concern breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at a Channel panel between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
27. *What is the percentage type of concern breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel but required no further action between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
28. *What is the percentage type of concern breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel but required other support between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*
29. *What is the percentage type of concern breakdown of referrals from the education sector which were discussed at Channel panel and received Channel Support between 2015 and 2016, and 2016 to 2017?*

We are withholding the information; Section 24(1) (national security), Section 31(1)(a) (law enforcement) and Section 40(2) (personal information) of the Act makes provision for the public authorities to refuse requests for information. This is because the level of breakdown requested, i.e. individuals referred from a particular local authority, when used in connection with other information which may be available by other sources, could lead to individuals being identified because of the low numbers. This could result in individuals being more reluctant to engage with

the programme, which in turn would have a direct impact on national security and law enforcement. It would also mean that the information in effect constitutes sensitive personal data.

The public interest in deterring crime and engaging the public in the prevent programme outweighs the public interest in releasing this information.

iv)

Page 2: Eligibility

Do you work within the further education sector (college, sixth form, training/skills/apprenticeship provider)? *Required

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Is the further education organisation you work for based within Greater Manchester? *Required

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Page 3: About yourself

Please provide us with a pseudonym to use in the research which we can associate your responses with *Required

Your answer should be no more than 25 characters long.

[   ]

Which age category do you belong to? *Required

Please select exactly 1 answer(s).
- ☐ 16-18
- ☐ 19-29
- ☐ 30-39
- ☐ 40-49
- ☐ 50+
- ☐ Prefer not to say

Are you *Required

- ○ Female
- ○ Male
- ○ Transgender
- ○ Prefer not to say
- ○ Other

What is your racial/ethnic background? *Required

- ○ White - British
- ○ White - Irish
- ○ White - Gypsy or Irish Traveller
- ○ White - Other
- ○ Black - African
- ○ Black - Caribbean
- ○ Black - Other
- ○ Mixed heritage - White and Black Caribbean
- ○ Mixed heritage - White and Black African
- ○ Mixed heritage - White and Asian
- ○ Mixed heritage - Other
- ○ Asian - Indian
- ○ Asian - Pakistani
- ○ Asian - Bangladeshi
- ○ Asian - Chinese
- ○ Asian - Other
- ○ Prefer not to say
- ○ Other

Are you affiliated to any of these religions? *Required

- ○ Christian
- ○ Catholic
- ○ Muslim
- ○ Jewish
- ○ Hindu
- ○ Buddhist
- ○ No Religion
- ○ Prefer not to say
- ○ Other

Would you consider yourself *Required

- ○ Working class
- ○ Middle class
- ○ Upper class
- ○ I don't know
- ○ Prefer not to say

What is your sexual orientation? *Required

- ○ Straight
- ○ Lesbian/Gay
- ○ Bisexual
- ○ Asexual
- ○ Prefer not to say
- ○ Other

Do you consider yourself to have a disibility? *Required

- ○ Yes
- ○ No
- ○ Prefer not to say

What is your nationality? *Required

- ○ British
- ○ Prefer not to say
- ○ Other

Page 4: About your role

Which type of institution do you work in? *Required

- ○ College
- ○ Sixth Form
- ○ Sixth Form College
- ○ Training / Skills Provider
- ○ College / Training Mixed Provider
- ○ Prefer not to say
- ○ Other

What is your main role at the institution? *Required

- ○ Teaching staff
- ○ Teaching assistant
- ○ Pastoral, welfare, behaviour staff
- ○ Administrative staff
- ○ Senior leadership team
- ○ Safeguarding staff
- ○ Prefer not to say
- ○ Other

In which bourough of **Greater Manchester** is the institution you work for based? ✳ *Required*

➕ More info

- ○ Bolton
- ○ Bury
- ○ Oldham
- ○ Rochdale
- ○ Stockport
- ○ Tameside
- ○ Trafford
- ○ Wigan
- ○ Manchester City Centre
- ○ Salford
- ○ Prefer not to say
- ○ Other

How long have you been employed at the institution you currently work for? ✳ *Required*

- ○ Up to 1 year
- ○ Between 1 and 2 years
- ○ Between 3 and 5 years
- ○ Between 6 and 10 years
- ○ More than 10 years
- ○ Prefer not to say

How long have you been acting in your role? ✳ *Required*

- ○ Less than one year
- ○ Between 1 and 2 years
- ○ Between 3 and 5 years
- ○ Between 6 and 10 years
- ○ Between 10 and 20 years
- ○ More than 20 years
- ○ Prefer not to say
- ○ Not applicable

Page 5: Knowledge and Experience of Prevent

Do you know what the Prevent duty is? ✳ *Required*

- ○ Yes
- ○ I'm uncertain
- ○ No

Is the Prevent duty applicable to the organisation you work for? ✳ *Required*

- ○ Yes
- ○ No
- ○ I don't know

Is the Prevent duty applicable to your role? ✳ *Required*

- ○ Yes
- ○ No
- ○ I don't know

Have you undergone training for the Prevent duty? ✳ *Required*

- ○ Yes
- ○ No
- ○ I don't know

If you have undergone training for the Prevent duty, who was this training run by? ✳ *Required*

Please select between 1 and 4 answers.

- ☐ Staff within my institution
- ☐ External - local authority
- ☐ External - police
- ☐ External - other organisation
- ☐ Online
- ☐ I don't know
- ☐ I haven't undergone any training
- ☐ Other

Thinking back to the first prevent duty-related training you received, how helpful did you find this initial training in helping you understand what the Prevent duty was? ✳ *Required*

- ○ Very helpful
- ○ Helpful
- ○ Somewhat helpful
- ○ Neither helpful nor unhelpful
- ○ Somewhat unhelpful
- ○ Unhelpful
- ○ Very unhelpful
- ○ I don't know
- ○ Not applicable

How helpful did you find the initial training in understanding how the Prevent duty related to your role? ✳ *Required*

- ○ Very helpful
- ○ Helpful
- ○ Somewhat helpful
- ○ Neither helpful nor unhelpful
- ○ Somewhat unhelpful
- ○ Unhelpful
- ○ Very unhelpful
- ○ I don't know
- ○ Not applicable

How confident did you feel about implementing the Prevent duty **after** the initial training? ✳ *Required*

- ○ Very confident
- ○ Confident
- ○ Somewhat confident
- ○ Neither confident nor unconfident
- ○ Somewhat unconfident
- ○ Unconfident
- ○ Very unconfident
- ○ I don't know
- ○ Not applicable

How many times have you undergone Prevent training? ✳ *Required*

- ○ Once
- ○ Twice
- ○ Three times
- ○ Four times
- ○ Five times or more
- ○ Never
- ○ I don't know

How long ago did you complete your **last** Prevent training?   ✳ *Required*

- ○ I have not completed any yet
- ○ I am currently completing it
- ○ In the last month
- ○ In the last six months
- ○ In the last year
- ○ In the last two years
- ○ In the last three years
- ○ Four or more years ago
- ○ I don't know

Please provide any further information you can remember about the training you received for the Prevent duty. (You might want to tell us what resources were used, what organisation ran the session, what you thought about the training at the time, what you think about the training now, or anything else you think we might want to know)

[text box]

Do you know what Channel is?   ✳ *Required*

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Do you know what the referral process is in your institution for concerns related to terrorism and/or extremism?   ✳ *Required*

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Could you tell us about this referral system?

[text box]

Have you ever referred somebody internally?   ✳ *Required*

- ○ Yes
- ○ No
- ○ Prefer not to say

Have you ever referred somebody externally?   ✳ *Required*

- ○ Yes
- ○ No
- ○ Prefer not to say

If you have referred somebody, how did you find your experience of referring them?

[text box]

Have you heard of British values?   ✳ *Required*

- ○ Yes, and I know what they are
- ○ Yes, but I don't know what they are
- ○ No, I haven't heard of British values

Have you undergone training around British values? If so, who was this run by?   ✳ *Required*

Please select between 1 and 4 answers.

- ☐ Someone from my institution
- ☐ External - local authority
- ☐ External - police
- ☐ External - other organisation
- ☐ Online
- ☐ I don't know
- ☐ I have not undergone any training for British values
- ☐ Other

If you had training, how helpful was the training in helping you understand what British values are?   ✳ *Required*

- ○ Very helpful
- ○ Helpful
- ○ Somewhat helpful
- ○ Neither helpful nor unhelpful
- ○ Somewhat unhelpful
- ○ Unhelpful
- ○ Very unhelpful
- ○ I don't know
- ○ I haven't undergone any training for British values

How helpful was the training in helping you understand how British values relates to your role?   ✳ *Required*

- ○ Very helpful
- ○ Helpful
- ○ Somewhat helpful
- ○ Neither helpful nor unhelpful
- ○ Somewhat unhelpful
- ○ Unhelpful
- ○ Very unhelpful
- ○ I don't know
- ○ I haven't undergone any training on British values

How confident do you feel about implementing British values as a result of your training?   ✳ *Required*

- ○ Very confident
- ○ Confident
- ○ Somewhat confident
- ○ Neither confident nor unconfident
- ○ Somewhat unconfident
- ○ Unconfident
- ○ Very unconfident
- ○ I don't know
- ○ I haven't undergone any training in British values

Please tell us your thoughts on British values, including how you implement them into your work if you do

[text box]

Please tell us your thoughts on the Prevent duty, including how you implement it into your work if you do

[text box]

Would anything make your role easier in relation to the Prevent duty or British values?

[text box]

Please tell us any further thoughts that you would like us to know in relation to the Prevent duty and British values

[text box]

If you would be happy to talk to the researcher in more depth about your experiences, please leave a contact email address here. (By entering your email address you are not committing to an interview, but to receiving an email to discuss this opportunity. You will still remain anonymous if you

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