IMPLICATURE IN ISLAMIC PRAGMATICS

A CASE STUDY OF THE ḤANAFĪ AND SCHOLASTICS *AL-MUTAKALLIMĪN*

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds

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November 2019

ACKNOWLEDGEMEN

ABSTRACT

This research belongs to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh), concerned with the linguistic topic of uṣūl al-fiqh. The aim is to collect data and arguments surrounding the pragmatic perspective of implicature in uṣūl al-fiqh. Followed by an analysis, critique   and a formulated model of implicature, that includes the principles of interpretation and a commentary on the different types of implicatures proposed by the uṣūl scholars. Of course, framing the data and discussing them theoretically will help us find out the foundations of interpretation in Islamic thought. This method will also enable us to examine and discuss the controversial opinions and streams being spread in the Islamic world.

Modern pragmatics will be employed through its theoretical frames and its insights of implicature to help in framing, analysing and formulating the model. This research uses analytical methods to discuss the data and arguments derived from the uṣūl al-fiqh's works. Additionally, the structural method used will frame the model of implicature.

The research has formulated a model of implicature in uṣūl al-fiqh. We could conclude that the uṣūl scholars discussed different types of implicatures, like congruent implicature (*mafhūm al-muwāfaqah*), counter implicature (*mafhūm al-mukhālafah*) and analogical implicature, which is developed by investing in the topic of analogy (*qiyās*) in principles of jurisprudence PJ. We could define the features of each implicature and the principles that generate it, whilst identifying the reasons behind the different classifications of meanings in uṣūl al-fiqh.

The research could frame a model in implicature by exhibiting the principles of implicatures, and their different types and properties in Islamic pragmatics.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Anti-CI = Anti Counter Implicature

CI = Counter Implicature

CP = Cooperative Principle

GCI= Generalized Conversational Implicatures

Lit = Literally

PCI = Particularised Conversational Implicatures

PJ = Principles of Jurisprudence

Pro-CI = Pro Counter Implicature

US = Uṣūl Scholars

TRANSLITERATION SYESTEM

ا	A	Short Vowels	
ب	B	ـَ	A
ت	T	ـُ	U
ث	Th	ـِ	I
ج	G		
ح	Ḥ		
خ	Kh	Long Vowels	
د	D	ـَا	Ā
ذ	Dh	ـُو	Ū
ر	R	ـِي	Ī
ز	Z		
س	S		
ش	Sh		
ص	Ṣ		
ض	Ḍ		
ط	Ṭ		
ظ	Ẓ		
ع	ʿA		
غ	Gh		
ف	F		
ق	Q		
ك	K		
ل	L		
م	M		
ن	N		
ه	H		
وَ	Wa		
ي	Y		
آ	Ā		
ة	H		
ال	al-		

SPECIFIC THERMOLOGY FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH

English	Transliteration	Arabic
necessities	*al-ḍarūrāt*	الضَرورات
signification by vocable	*al-dilālah bi al-lafẓ*	الدِلالة باللفظ
indefinite	*al-iṭlāq*	الإطلاق
Constancy	*al-iṭṭirād*	الاطِّراد
specific	*al-khuṣūṣ*	الخُصوص
designation	*al-laqab*	اللَّقب
structural allegory	*al-majāz al-tarkībī*	المجاز التركيبي
moral behaviour	*al-makrumāt*	المَكرُمات
recommendation	*al-mandūbāt*	المَندوبات
Explicitly said	*al-manṭūq al-ṣarīḥ*	المنطُوق الصريح
Implicit said	*al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ*	المنطوق غَير الصريح
the assigned language	*al-mawḍūʿ*	المَوضوع
The addressee	*al-mawḍūʿ lah*	المَوضوع له
useful communication	*al-mufīd mina al-khiṭāb*	المُفيد من الخطاب
qualified	*al-muqayyad*	المُقيد
qualification	*al-taqyīd*	التقييد
paronomasia	*al-tawriyah*	التورية
allegorical interpretation	*al-taʾwīl*	التأويل
causation	*al-taʿlīl*	التعليل
Convention	*al-ʿahd*	العَهد
Inversion	*al-ʿax*	العَكس
general	*al-ʿumūm*	العُموم
the mentioned	*almakhṣūṣ bil-zikr*	المخصُوص بالذكر
custom	*al ʿurf*	العُرف
command	amr	أمْر
priority	*awlawiyyah*	أولوية

counter implicature	*dalīl al-khiṭāb*	دَليل الخطاب
necessity	*ḍarūriyyat*	ضروريات
adherence cycle	*dawarān*	دوران
signification	*dilālah*	دِلالة
signification of vocable	*dilālah al-lafẓ*	دلالة اللفظ
indication	*eamāʾ*	إيماء
comprehension	*fahm*	الفهم
jurisprudence	*fiqh*	فقه
predominance of use	*ghalabah al-istiʿmāl*	غَلبَة الاستعمال
not supplement	*ghayr mukammil*	غَير مكمل
dependently signifying	*ghayr mustaqill*	غَير مُستقل
guide	*hādiyah*	هَادِية
needed	*ḥājiyyat*	حَاجيات
interpretation	*ḥaml*	حَمل
fact	*ḥaqīqah*	حقيقة
forbidden	*ḥarām*	حَرَام
ruling	*ḥukm*	حُكم
making someone understand something	*ifhām*	إفهام
entailment	*iltizām*	التزام
completion	*iqtiḍāʾ*	إقتضاء
allusion	*ishārah*	إشارة
presumption of continuity	*istiṣḥāb*	استصحاب
orientating towards meaning	*iʿmāl*	إعمال
genus	*jins*	جِنس
speech	*kalām*	كلام
obscure	*khafī*	خفي
specific	*khāṣṣ*	الخاص
metonymy	*kināyah*	كِناية
solecism	*laḥn*	لَحن

semantic	*lughawiyyah*	لُغوية
extension	*māṣadaq*	ماصدق
intension	*mafhūm*	مَفهوم
counter implicature	*mafhūm al-mukhālfah*	مَفهُوم المخالفة
congruent implicature	*mafhūm al-muwāfaqah*	مَفهُوم المُوافَقة
allegory	*majāz*	المجاز
recommended	*mandūb*	مندُوب
Uttered/ what is said	*manṭūq*	منطوق
Islamic law purposes	*maqāṣid al-sharīʿah*	مَقاصِد الشَريعة
ambivalent	*mujmal*	مُجمَل
dependently signifying	*mustaqill binafsih*	مُستَقِلّ بنفسه
equivalent	*muṭābaqah*	مُطابقة
absolute	*muṭlaq*	المطلَق
intricate	*mutshābih*	مُتشابِه
allegorical interpreted	*muʾawwal*	مؤول
prohibition	*nahī*	نَهي
transference of signification	*naql*	نَقل
abrogation	*naskh*	النَسخ
explicit	*naṣṣ*	نصّ
species	*nawʿ*	نَوع
clues	*qarāʾin*	قرائن
clue	*qarinah*	قَرينة
determinate	*qaṭʿī*	قطعي
qualification	*qayd*	قيد
analogy	*qiyās*	قِياس
diverted	*ṣārifah*	صَارفة
legal	*sharʿiyyah*	شرعية
Truthfulness	*ṣidq*	صِدق
Immediacy	*tabādur*	تَبَادُر
incorporation	*taḍammun*	تَضَمُّن

commendable	*taḥsīnyyat*	تحسينات
qualifying	*taqyīd*	تقييد
positive	*thubūtī*	ثُبوتي
principles of Islamic jurisprudence	*uṣūl al-fiqh*	أصول الفقه
language's assigner	*wāḍiʿ*	واضِع
Assigning words to meanings	*waḍʿ*	وَضع
Obligatory	wājb	واجب
manifest	*ẓāhir*	ظاهِر
probable	*ẓannī*	ظني
negative	*ʿadamī*	عَدَمي
general	*ʿāmm*	العام
the expression of the text	*ʿibārah al-naṣṣ*	عِبارة النص
ratio	*ʿillah*	عِلّة
theology	*ʿilm al-kalām*	عِلم الكلام
customary	*ʿurfiyyah*	عُرفِيَّة

Introduction

Islamic pragmatics and Muslim scholars' methodology in analysing discourses belonged and was discussed within the science called *principles of Islamic jurisprudence* or *uṣūl al-Fiqh.* There is a need to briefly introduce uṣūl al-fiqh to know the background of what it is called Islamic pragmatics.

Background to Uṣūl al-Fiqh

Islamic pragmatics refers to the nature of linguistic studies carried out by the uṣūl scholars in the course of instituting the principles that deal with the Qurʾān and the Sunnah. Islamic pragmatics belongs to the science of principles of jurisprudence (PJ). The central aims of PJ set the principles and rules that regulate the process of deriving rulings (*aḥkām*) from the Qurʾān and the Sunnah (Zaydān, P. 148; al-Zuḥaylī W, 1986, P. 23-24).

The word *fiqh* refers to different meanings linguistically Amongst the definitions, according to Arab linguists, is *understanding* (*fahm*) or *knowledge* (*al-ʿilm*) (ibn Fāris, 1986, p.1/703; ibn Sīdah 2000, p. 4/128; al-Fayrūzʾābādī, 2005, p. 1250). Al-Baṣrī (d. 1044) followed by al-Rāzī considered the word *fiqh* to mean the understanding of a speaker's intention (al-Baṣrī, 1964, p. 1/8; al-Rāzī, M, p. 1/78;). Whereas al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083) thought that the word *fiqh* is dedicated to understanding sensitive meanings (al-Shīrāzī 1988, p.1/157). However, *fiqh,* in Islamic law, refers to knowing the jurisprudential rulings (*aḥkām*), based on understanding and interpreting the texts of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah (al-Ghazālī, 2015, p. 1/35; al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 1/19-22).

Accordingly, uṣūl al-fiqh refers to the principles of deriving rulings (*aḥkām*) from the Qurʾān and the Sunnah. It is essential to note that uṣūl al-fiqh is not merely a methodology in discourse analyses, or restricted to linguistic rules. But the meaning encompasses the sources of rulings, the ways in which rulings can be derived from sources, and the capacities of scholars that can implement this task (al-Zuhailī, 1986,

p. 23). Therefore, in simple terms, *fiqh* refers to rulings, whereas PJ refers to the ways of producing these rulings.

Uṣūl al-fiqh's topics are derived from three fields as the scholastics of uṣūl scholars pointed out: language, theology (*ʿilm al-kalām*) and jurisprudence (al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/21). Theology or *ʿilm al-kalām* is based on logic and philosophy. Uṣūl al-fiqh is, therefore, not simply limited to the linguistic topics, but also on theology and jurisprudence too. The linguistic topics, within PJ, were developed and interacted with philosophy and jurisprudence, further enriching the linguistic element, as will be seen in this thesis.

The word *jurisprudence* will be used in the thesis to refer to the field of fiqh in Islam. Fiqh specifically, refers to the jurisprudential result of the interpreting the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, whereas the principles of fiqh refer to the methodology that produces fiqh.

Fiqh historically came into being with the Qurʾān and the Sunnah revelation, and for the simple reason that the understanding and applying of the texts were required at the time of revelation (al-Zuḥaylī M, p. 363). On the other hand, principles of jurisprudence (PJ) was theoretically established later in the 8th century. I mean that PJ came into being after fiqh as a theory because the Qurʾān and the Sunnah contained texts that are considered bases within PJ and producing rulings requires knowing the bases or *uṣūl*. Al-Shāfiʿī is considered by the US the first who wrote in uṣūl al-fiqh (al-Zarkashī 1992, p. 1/10)*,* in his book *al-Risālah*, where al-Shāfiʿī collected and laid some basic principles of PJ, including arguments from language and fiqh. Hallaq (1997) argues in this and thinks that there is no continuity from al-Shāfiʿī to the subsequent works in PJ. It is, according to him, an ample claim to consider al-Shāfiʿī as the master of PJ despite his significant contributions in some topics of PJ. According to Hallaq, PJ did not become as a legal theory until the end of the third/ninth

century (Hallaq,1997, p. 30; see also, Hallaq, 1993, p. 587-605)[1]. However, there is no need to delve into this here.

PJ was the bridge between both the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, and meanings or rulings (*aḥkām*). Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) pointed out that PJ's topics are divided into four; the first chapter discusses the sources of the Islamic law (the Qurʾān, the Sunnah and other sources), and the second chapter, focuses on the rulings (*aḥkām*) (obligatory (*al-wājb*), forbidden (*al-ḥarām*), recommended (*al-mandūb*), and so on). As for the third chapter, the focus is on the ways of inference, or the methods of deriving meanings from sources. Also, this chapter highlights the linguistic studies concerning this topic. Finally, the last chapter is concerned with qualifications of the mujtahid2 (al-Ghazalī, 2015, p. 1/39).

PJ was approached from two perspectives, the philosophical perspective and the jurisprudential perspective. Putting it another way, PJ was approached by two different backgrounds of scholars in philosophy and theology (*ʿilm al-kalām*). They were therefore called *scholastics* (*al-mutakallimīn*). This group included al-Shāfiʿiyyah, al-Hanābilah, al-Mālikiyyah and al-Muʿtazilah schools.

The other approach was presented by those who were concerned with Islamic jurisprudence. This group was called the way of *jurists* (*al-fuqahāʾ*), and it included primarily the *Ḥanafī* school. Within PJ, the two terms *jurists* or the *Ḥanafī* school refer to this approach.

The reason beyond calling this school, the jurist's school, is that uṣūl scholars relied on jurisprudence when formulating principles and rules of PJ, more than depending upon theology and logic. The jurists school tried to formulate comprehensive rules for

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[1] Hallaq's claim can be boosted by al-Zarkshī's (d. 1392) allusion who considered that PJ reached the degree of legal theory by the two judges (al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013) and ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Muʿtazilī (d. 1025).

[2] *Mujtahid* is the "legist competent to formulate independent tradition-based opinion in legal or theological matters" (Kamali, 2014-2015, p. 525).

jurisprudential matters, and they were, therefore, called the jurists school (al-Zuḥaylī M, pp. 574-575; Zaydān, p. 17). Jurists did rely on theology in their works.

Within the thesis, I am going to use *scholastics* to refer to the first group, and Ḥanafī to refer to the second one to avoid any confusion deriving from the term jurists, since it belongs to the field of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as well. I am, also going to use *uṣūl scholars* (US) to refer the two groups together.

This thesis is not meant to cover all Muslim schools and groups, but rather, is restricted within the Sunnī school (*madhhab),* but which also includes the scholastics and Ḥanafī schools.

The backgrounds and the methodologies in approaching PJ were the main difference between the two perspectives. In fact, their different backgrounds were influential in the difference amongst the two schools' classifications of signification, their counts of valid and invalid significations and other issues.

Scholastics dealt with uṣūl al-fiqh from their logical and philosophical background. Their methodology was inspired by logic and philosophy, while they addressed rules and discussed the principles and mechanisms of inference (Zaydān, 2009, p. 17). The philosophical influence can be explicitly observed in their arguments, as well as the philosophical terms used in their discussions around the topic of PJ.

Jurists or the Ḥanafī school approached PJ from the jurisprudential background, and their methodology was based on laying principles and mechanisms affected primarily by the jurisprudence (ibn Khaldūn, 2001, p. 576).

The primary difference between the two schools is that scholastics discussed the PJ topics regardless of the jurisprudence already produced, although jurists were affected by jurisprudence. Namely, the jurists who tried to justify the jurisprudence since it

came into being before PJ, as discussed before. Scholastics also laid the rules in PJ regardless of the confirmed rules, or they did not comply to the jurisprudence

The variety of backgrounds was present in the two schools' works while they addressed and framed PJ. We can, hence, see two different ways in PJ's writings. This result can be seen in the scholastics' writings, scholastics' classifications and the frames of PJ which are more theoretical than the other school. On the other hand, the Ḥanafī school focused pragmatically on the purpose of PJ and framed their topics according to this purpose. Whilst they wanted to justify their jurisprudential works and were closer than the other school to Islamic jurisprudence, they were limited at the same time. Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) considered the jurists or the Ḥanafī school more practical than scholastics. In fact, the jurists' background in language and jurisprudence made them more relevant to jurisprudence (ibn Khaldūn, 2001, p. 576).

The advantage of the two backgrounds can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the Ḥanafī school, which was limited in terms of its linguistic studies and jurisprudential purposes but was more practical. Secondly, the scholastic school, which was theoretical but more comprehensive. Their researches could address the Islamic texts and other Arabic texts more generally.

The different backgrounds, as mentioned before, can be explicitly seen in the legacies of the two schools. For instance, scholastics started their works by discussing the theoretical issues, like the origin of language, producer of the language, principles of proofs and so on (we can see for examples these works; al-Ghazālī, 2015, p. 2/9; al-Āmidī, 2003, pp. 1/23-29; al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 2/14-17). The Ḥanafī school specifically did not address any of these issues, assuming these cases were not relevant to jurisprudence. Instead, they focused on the linguistic issues that were relevant to the language in the Qurʾān and the Sunnah (see, al-Jaṣṣāṣ 1994; al-Ghazalī 2015).

But nevertheless, the two perspectives enriched Islamic pragmatics in terms of developing it within different perspectives and backgrounds. This is what makes the

US's linguistic studies unique. We shall see that Grice, who coined the modern conception of implicature, came from philosophical backgrounds and developed his model of implicature, whilst employing philosophical insights. Islamic pragmatics were developed within contributions of three fields, jurisprudence, language, and philosophy. These diverse backgrounds enrich Islamic linguistics and develop it within different perspectives. The influence from different backgrounds is one of the motivations behind choosing a topic from PJ to be discussed.

There is something triggered about the reason that motivated the US to address the linguistic studies although these topics are pertained to the Arab linguists' work.

The way that uṣūl scholars dealt with the linguistic topics were different from the Arab linguists' way. The two Arab linguists and uṣūl scholars discussed topics such as the literal meanings and allegorical meanings, but they adopted different approaches and purposes to them. Uṣūl scholar's endeavours were concerned to find whether either the literal meaning or the allegorical meaning was intended, and they sought the ways that uncover that. The Arab linguists, however, were concerned with the ways and rules that the speakers use to construct speeches effectively by using literal or allegorical meanings, i.e., uṣūl scholars were concerned with analysing speech, whereas Arabic linguists were focusing on constructing speech (Ḥāj Ibrāhīm, 2006, p. 14).

All uṣūl scholars discussed linguistic matters such as (synonyms, homonyms, general ʿāmm, specific khāṣṣ, and so on). Implicature that we are addressing in this thesis is one of the linguistic issues that were dealt with by uṣūl scholars. Uṣūl scholars intended mainly to interpret the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, using linguistic mechanisms. The US found that the sciences of Arabic were not concerned with analysing discourse. That motivated them to study some linguistic matters that are required to interpret the Qurʾān and the Sunnah.

The main difference between Arabic syntax and uṣūl al-fiqh's is that Arabic syntax was concerned with making rules to form speech. This can be noted from the syntax's definition (ibn Ginnī, p. 1/34). On the one hand, uṣūl al-fiqh was concerned with what the speaker intends by these sentences and styles. (Jamāl al-Din, 1405, p. 11). Syntax focused on the speaker's side, whereas PJ was concerned with the hearer's side. The syntax is concerned with speech before speakers produce it. However, PJ was concerned with speech after producing it, in order to be analysed (Ḥāj Ibrāhīm, p. 14).

Uṣūl scholars therefore stated that they looked at points that have not been covered by Arab grammarians, and that was the reason for them to address these matters instead of relying on Arab linguists (al-Zarkashī. 1992, P. 1/13-14).

Al-Juwaynī (1085) explained that each of the uṣūl scholars and the scholars of Arabic classified speech and meaning according to their purposes. Grammarians classified speech at noun, verb and letters (*ism, fiʿl, and ḥarf*), whereas uṣūl scholars classified it at command (*amr*) and prohibition (*nahī*) … (al-Juwaynī, 1979, p. 1/196). Uṣūl scholars therefore contributed with new dimensions to Arabic studies. For example, command (*amr*) was divided in PJ into two levels (obligatory *wajib* and recommended *mandūb*). Prohibition was also divided into two levels forbidden (*nahī*) and disapproved (*makrūh*) (Ṣaḥrāwī, 2005, p. 148; Zaydān, 2009, p. 230-240; Kamali, 2014-2015, pp.187, 413, 419, 421).

Instituting the new methodology in analysing discourses attracted and inspired many Arab linguists to develop their studies using the uṣūl al-fiqh methodologies. For example, the influences of Muslim scholars' works can be seen in the work of ibn Fāris (d.1004) *Fiqh al-Lughah*, and work of al-Suyūṭī (d.1505) *al-Muzhir* and *al-Iqtirāḥ*. For example, al-Suyūṭī discussed in *al-Iqtirāḥ* the ways of identifying reasons (*ʿilal)* and applied them to Arabic syntax. Ibn Fāris discussed in his book *Fiqh al-Lughah* the literal and metaphor meanings, which had already been studied according to the uṣūl scholars' perspective.

In summary, PJ was concerned with the principles of deducing rulings from the Islamic texts. The language in PJ was developed among philosophy, jurisprudence, and it has been developed among different perspectives and backgrounds by scholars from different civilizations. All these factors contributed to the PJ and its matters.

This background about PJ would articulate the environment at which linguistic topics were discussed and further explain the reasons of difference among the US later in the bulk of the thesis.

These two schools have been chosen in this thesis because they have different systems in classifying significations, and they have different opinions in the matter of implicature.

Research Rationale and Purposes

The previous background has provided us with the nature of the PJ's research, where linguistic topics were embedded in other topics because the US did not intend to set up theories in discourse analysis, but rather serve their primary work in Islamic jurisprudence. This made their linguistic conceptions and arguments spread within the PJ's topics and matters and made reviewing and discussing their conceptions hard to come by. And hence, analysing the reasons behind the difference in lots of Islamic issues even more difficult. There were lots of data and arguments, but they lacked the theoretical frames, and they needed to be linguistically formulated and placed in theoretical frames to be easily accessed and theoretically approached such as the different types of implicatures and different classifications of meanings.

Another reason that motivated me to choose this research is that there were lots of disagreements among the US in many matters such as the validity of some types of implicatures, the different classifications of meanings despite the unity of the same text being discussed between the two groups. There is a need to discover the principles

and reasons behind the different opinions in linguistic issues, and these principles can help understanding the different opinions in Islamic thought.

There are, also lots of arguments and topics in PJ being discussed in modern linguistic. Why we do not, hence, employ modern pragmatics and benefit from the modern linguists' insights in framing the massive linguistic data in PJ? And, then formulate models for interpretation and implicatures or other issues so that we can extract linguistic theories from PJ.

Many studies discussed the issues of vocables and meanings within PJ. However, They, either discussed the matter of implicature from either a jurisprudential perspective as Bashīr al-Kubaysī did in his research (*Mafāhīm al-Alfāz wa Dilālatuhā ʿind al-Uṣūliyyīn*, p. 2007)[3] or they did not discuss it theoretically such as the one made by Hishām ʿAbd Allah al-Khalīfah, (*Naẓariyyah al-Talwīḥ al-Ḥiwārī*, 2013)[4]. Al-Khalīfah did not address the implicature under a theoretical perspective. He discussed the issue of implicature as a linguistic matter in PJ but not as a theory, i.e. he did not look at the principles that trigger different implicatures and properties of each implicature. He instead associated implicatures in Islamic pragmatics to modern pragmatics' principle. The reader will read the heritage of PJ within modern pragmatics, and this will not demonstrate implicatures in PJ as an original theory. There are many works more than these two, but they did not discuss the issue of implicature as I am doing in this research.

The most related attempt to this work is the one (Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, 2000) implemented by Mohammad Yūnis ʿAlī, who has tried to link between modern pragmatics and Islamic pragmatics. His study was significant and gained lots of appreciations because he has introduced the Islamic pragmatics to western linguistics in a modern way. He addressed a special side of the big heritage. He concentrated on medieval Islamic pragmatics and compared between Salafī and the mainstream

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[3] This title can be translated as (The meanings of vocables and its denotations according to the US).
[4] This title can be translated as (The theory of communicational implicature)

perspectives, as labelled by ʿAlī. He discussed the two perspectives linguistically. Despite the competence of his research, I have some reservations and reasons to do my study as follows:

- His research was not especially concerned with implicature. He addressed the medieval Islamic pragmatics in general, whereas I am going to discuss the issues that are related to the conception of implicature only. He was interested in a certain time instead of a certain topic, and he discussed all arguments related to pragmatics.

- The principles of interpretation proposed by ʿAlī need review in light of the US's arguments. He did not note some of the PJ's data and arguments, and hence his model of interpretation was inadequate.

- ʿAlī discussed many of the diverse classifications in PJ but did not address the Hanafī schools' classification of texts. He did not also explain the reasons behind the different classifications in PJ.

- He was concerned with comparing, as he called, between Salafī and the mainstream perspectives although what he called them *Salafī* belongs to scholastics and adopt the same conceptions in most matters as will be seen in Chapter Three.

- He did not address some of the points that play roles in classifying implicatures such as the point of dispute in counter implicature (*mafhūm al-mukhālfah*) as will be explained.

- There are many points about the way he addressed issues in his thesis. There are some points on his adoptions from the US's works. All of these issues will be discussed in their places.

- However, he tried to formulate models in interpretation but did not aim to frame theory in implicature.

The previous points do not undermine the significance of his study. I acknowledge that I benefited from his research and translations a lot. I must point out that this thesis is not meant to discuss ʿAlī's model.

This thesis will focus on some points that have not been discussed, such as the higher purposes of Islamic law and their roles in generating meanings as will be seen in section (2-3). Al-Shāṭibī's conceptions about Islamic law purposes (*maqāṣid al-sharīʿah*) will, also, be addressed in this thesis.

The purpose of this thesis is to:
- Collect the data and arguments related to implicature, criticise and analyse them, in order to frame a model in implicature in Islamic pragmatics. This aim will be achieved by finding out and formulating the principles of interpretation.
- Exploring the bases of meanings and implicatures.
- Seeking for the reasons behind the difference among the US in the meaning's issues and implicature, in order to discover some of the significant Islamic heritage and to introduce to modern pragmatics the perspective of Islamic pragmatics regarding the conception of implicature.
- The result of this research will make Islamic pragmatics accessible for those who are interested in PJ or pragmatics in general.

I think that identifying the principles and bases of interpretation, especially in a matter such as an implicature would strongly help to examine and discuss the different opinions and streams in modern Islamic thought.

It is the hope that this thesis will fill in the gap in the Arabic library, which does not have so far, theoretical and original work on implicature despite its presence in the Arabic and Islamic heritage. I hope this thesis will make PJ accessible after demonstrating it in a modern way. This would help scholars who want to address PJ, but they find it broad and complicated.

PJ involves the mechanisms of inference in Islamic thought. Developing it is another advantage of this thesis. Discovering the comprehensive and theoretical principles and rules of inference will guide us to develop PJ from one hand, and examine and investigate the valid and invalid opinions, on the other hand.

Research Questions and Methodology

To put the data that related to the conception of implicature in a theoretical frame, there are some questions have arisen and need to be answered before forming a model of implicature.

Framing the arguments and the data and formulating a model of implicature will be in light of Grice's model since it is the first and only model that discussed implicature as a theory. Pragmaticians followed Grice and amen his model but kept the main frame apart from the relevance theorists as will be presented in Chapter One.

The main question in this thesis is
- to which extent can the modern notions and insights developed by modern pragmaticians help in formulating models in implicature?

This question has some sub-questions to be implemented. These questions are as follows:

- What is the linguistic perspective of the US that controls their principles of interpretation? What is the US's perspective regarding the conception of *use* and its relation to intentionality? How did they approach the concept of intentionality in their pragmatics?
- What are the principles that generate different types of meanings and implicatures?
- How did the two schools (scholastics and Ḥanafī) classify meanings? Where are implicatures in their classifications? And what are the reasons behind the difference in classifications?
- How many types of implicature has each school counted, and what are the reasons behind the disagreement in the validity of some implicatures?
- What are the bases and properties of Islamic implicatures?

In order to formulate a model of implicature in PJ, there is a need to discover the philosophy of language according to the US and examine to what extent it is pragmatic. The philosophy will play a role in formulating principles of interpretation. Principles of interpretation will produce different types of meanings, where implicatures are some of them. Once implicatures can be explored, we shall define them, characterise their properties and root them back to their principles.

These questions are going to be addressed and answered in this thesis. They are based on the western perspective of implicatures since I am going to use the modern pragmatics' frames and insights in formulating implicature theory within Islamic pragmatics.

Concerning the methodology, addressing these questions will involve using the inductive method to re-read relevant works by medieval Muslim scholars from both schools in PJ. Analysis, by using the deductive method, will also be used to identify arguments relating to the concept of implicature for these classical scholars. The structural approach will be employed in order to design and formulate the relevant arguments and conceptions in the appropriate frame.

It is essential to bring attention that this thesis is not meant to investigate the Islamic heritage or to show its compatibility to modern pragmatics. It is also not meant to apply modern pragmatics onto Islamic pragmatics to examine its arguments and proposals. Modern pragmatics' insights and frames would help in formulating and framing a model in Islamic implicature, but they are not meant to judge Islamic pragmatics. I do not want to read Islamic pragmatics using modern pragmatics but rather to find out its unique properties.

Design of Thesis

This thesis contains five chapters with an introduction and a conclusion. The introduction was meant to introduce a brief background about the nature of PJ, where

from the data and arguments are derived. It presented a summarised idea about the two schools, which consist of the two parties in the Sunnī's uṣūl al-fiqh.

Chapter One discusses the conception of pragmatics and implicature in modern pragmatics since these two terms are borrowed from modern pragmatics, and their arguments and theoretical basses are required to help in framing and discussing Islamic arguments that are related to implicature. This chapter is presented briefly according to the quantity of need in this thesis. This chapter discussed only the main issues that are related and can help in the concept of implicature. I did not discuss deeply modern pragmatics' arguments regarding implicature since it is not required in formulating and framing a theory of implicature in Islamic pragmatics. I presented only what is required to frame an Islamic model in implicature. I discussed the definition of pragmatics and implicature. This chapter also looked, at the source of the implicature. Further, the principles that generate implicature and features of implicatures were addressed according to the Gricean's perspective and the relevance theorists. Different types of implicatures were briefly discussed.

Chapter Two is dedicated to discussing the uṣūlī perspective of language. I discussed the nature of uṣūlī linguistics to find out the pragmatic dimension, and contours in their studies, as well as their bases in dealing with the cases of literal and allegorical meanings in language. I pointed out the role of *use* in making literal and allegorical meanings. Their position from a pragmatic sense, like the convention, predominance of use, and intentionality were discussed as well. This chapter aims to answer the question regarding the uṣūli perspective of language and intentionality.

Chapter Three is the main chapter of this thesis, which include the process of interpretation in PJ, and generate meanings and implicatures. This chapter discusses the two levels of obtaining meanings in PJ: the level of interpretation (*al-tafsīr or al-ḥaml*), and the level of causation (*al-ta'līl*), both of which pertain to two different types of implicatures. The principles of interpretation that generate some types of implicatures were further discussed and identified. The various ways of uncovering

the reasons of speech were also discussed. The principles of interpretation were designed with the help of modern pragmatics, and the chapter will therefore aim to answer the question regarding the principles of interpretation based on the uṣūli perspective of language.

Chapter Four is a result of the process of interpretation which will produce different types and levels of meanings. The different types of classifications between the two schools have been exhibited in this chapter, including the bases of classifications, the different perspectives of classification, and the reasons behind the various types and ways of classifying meanings. In this chapter, we identified the number and the definitions of implicatures in Islamic pragmatics to be discussed extensively in the next chapter. This chapter aims to answer the questions related to the reasons behind the different classification, according to the US.

Chapter Five is assigned to discuss the types of implicatures being deduced. The main issues of implicatures were raised in this chapter. Matters related to the bases of each implicature were discussed. The links to the principles of interpretation or the level of causation have also been addressed. The properties of each implicature have been explained, and finally, the controversial issues of considering each implicature as well. This chapter is meant to answer the question related to the validity of different implicatures, their properties and the principles to which implicatures root back.

In the conclusion, I presented the results and findings of this thesis.

Work Range

The primary resources of this thesis are the works of the US from the two schools. The main resources were supported by some resources of rhetoric, Arabic linguistics and some books from other Islamic resources such as Sunnah's books. Modern works either from modern pragmatics or from Islamic thoughts are presented in this thesis to exhibit the concept of implicature and its theory in modern pragmatics.

I took into consideration the main uṣūlī books and the modern books in PJ. The works from modern pragmatics were present in the thesis since the main frames are based on modern pragmatics.

Notes on Terminology and Documentation

There are many fields in the Islamic heritage. It is, therefore, very sensitive to choose the precise translations for terminologies in each field because they are culturally specific. I will introduce here some terminologies and explain what is intended by each of them, by also o drawing on some points about the system of documentation.

Main terminologies in the thesis

- The term *uṣūl scholars'* is intended to refer to the scholars who work in PJ.
- The term *jurists* without qualification (*qayd*) is intended to refer to the scholars who work in Islamic jurisprudence.
- The term *Muslim scholars* refers to all Muslim scholars in different areas of Islamic studies.
- Term *scholastics* refers to the school in PJ, which has a philosophical background.
- The *Ḥanafī* school refer to the other school in PJ, which has a jurisprudential background.

Some notes on documentations

I have some other notes regarding the documentations and some points as follows:
- I arranged citations and resources from old to new.
- I tried my best to consider the resources first historically, of any conception.
- I relied on Muḥammad Yūnus ʿAlī (2000) and Muḥammad Hāshim Kamālī (2014-15) in translating most of the terminologies alongside my own translations.

- The date after the classical books of PJ refers to the date of edition, whereas I pointed out to the date of death for the classical US.

- The Muslim scholars were pointed out by the names or designation, according to what they are known by, rather than by their real names.

- I did not differentiate between the two types of particles (ال) in transliteration; whether it is solar (*shamsiyyah*) or the lunar (*qamariyyah*) (ال). Both types will be written in the same way, such as this example, الكتاب *al-kitāb*. الشمس al-shams.

Chapter One

Implicature in Modern Pragmatics

Chapter One

Implicature in Modern Pragmatics

This chapter aims to give a brief outline of implicature in modern pragmatics. By discussing the main contours of implicature theory in modern pragmatics, there will be a primary focus on the main terms and principles that play a significant role in implicatures. The people who will be addressed in this chapter will be from the Islamic studies field. I am going to shed light on the general idea about the implicature and its principles, without delving into the discussions of the modern pragmaticians. This chapter is considered an introduction, benefiting from the modern frames. It is also an outline relating to implicature used in formulating and discussing Arabic and Islamic notions in implicatures.

1-1- Introduction:

Implicature belongs to the field of pragmatics. In fact, the definition of Pragmatics and its concerns can be found in Morris (1938), where he tried to draw the boundaries between pragmatics and semantics. Semantics, according to Lyons, is "generally defined as the study of meaning" (Lyons, 1977, p. 1). However, this is also the interest of pragmatics. So, what is the difference between them? Morris states that semantics is "the relation of signs to what they denote, whereas pragmatics is the relation of signs to their users and interpreters" (Morris, 1938, P. 29; Horn L. R., 2004, p. xi). Pragmatics, accordingly, deals with meaning as a "triadic relation" (Leech, 1983, p. 6) (*triadic relation, linguistics signs, their signification, and their users*), whereas semantics, deals with meaning as a "dyadic relation" (Leech, 1983, p. 6) (*signs, and their designations*) (Culpeper, 2010, P. 70). So, if semantics is concerned with the meaning of x, or meaning in abstraction from a specific context, pragmatics focuses instead on what x means (Leech, 1983, p. 6). Since the third element in pragmatic users of language is involved in obtaining the intended meaning, some utterances' meaning might be subject to change in relation to their literal meaning. This conclusion leads us to the next section, which is interested in this changed meaning based on the speaker's intentions.

1-2- Grice and Implicature:

Implicature can be defined as a "component of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is meant in a speaker's utterance without being part of what is said" (Horn L. R., 2004, P. 3). Therefore, a speaker can mean something without saying it, or he can say something whilst intending a different meaning (Bach, 2012, P. 47).

The conception of Implicature came into being by the British philosopher, H. Paul Grice, who was the first to discuss the phenomenon in his article, *Logic and Conversation* (1975). Grice distinguished between two senses, *what is said* and *what is implicated.* In terms of *what is said*, the meaning is derived from the words' meanings. As for *what is implicated*, Grice divided the meaning into conventional and conversational implicated meanings. The **conventional implicature** according to Grice, is not taken from the meanings of *what is said,* but rather what is indicated (Grice H. P., 1975, P. 44). It depends on the conventional meanings of words such as this example proposed by Grice, *he is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave*. This statement has determinedly confirmed the result of his bravery because he is an Englishman. This is because the word, *brave*, comes from his being an *Englishman* as a consequence of using *therefore*. The consequence was not explicitly said, but rather indicated. But, with the phrase "he is an Englishman, and he is brave", there would not be an inference of bravery being a result of him being an Englishman, and therefore, the conventional meaning of *therefore* plays the role in generating this implicature. Hence, the conclusion from these two examples is that some implicatures are conventional, whilst there are implicatures that are nonconventional. The latter implicatures, according to Grice, are referred to as **conversational implicatures** (Grice, 75, P. 45) and refers to when the speaker intends to deliver more than what is directly said (Horn L. R., 2004, P. 3). Theses implicatures are conversational, but not conventional, because they are generated in a specific situation.

There are now two types of implicatures: conventional and conversational implicatures. The former is derived from meanings of words, whereas the latter is not directly derived from the meanings of words. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the conventional

meaning is prior to the implicature, so sentences should have their conventional meanings before implicatures can be raised (Davies, 2000, P. 16).

Conventional and conversational implicatures have different features as discussed among pragmaticians. Conventional implicature's features, according to Horn (1985; 1989) can be drawn as follows:

1- Make no contribution to truth conditions, but constrain appropriateness of expressions with which they are associated, as seen in the previous example *English man.* Even if the result of -being an English man is a reason to be brave- is not true, the main sentence, *he is an English man*, and *he is brave* is still true.

2- Unpredictable, arbitrary part of meaning; must be learned ad hoc, because they are not derived from cooperative principles but assigned by convention to a particular lexical item. As discussed in the conventional meaning of *therefore.*

3- Noncancelable; apply in all contexts of utterance. They are not subject to cancellation.

4- Detachable: two synonyms may have different conventional implicatures because conventional implicatures are based on particular lexical items or expressions.

5- Conventional implicatures not calculable through any procedure, but rather must be given and assigned by convention. (Horn, 1985, P. 129; Horn L. R., 1989, P. 145). A convention determines the meaning derived here, and a convention is arbitrary. Arbitrariness means there is no natural connection between the meanings and symbols (de Saussure, n.d. p. 67; Dirven and Marjolijn, 2004, p. 12; Crystal, 2008, p. 32).

Conversational Implicatures have their properties as well. These properties are collected from Grice and his followers, and can be drawn here as follows:

1- Cancellability (i.e. defeasibility): this is the primary attribute of implicatures, and Implicatures can be cancellable by adding a further statement without causing any contradiction. (Grice, 1975, P. 57). For example, saying (3), consequently implicates (4).

(3) Shops have to close at 9.00 pm.

(4) Sports centres can stay after 9.00 pm.

The implicature (4) can be cancelled by adding another statement without any contradiction as in (5)

(5) Sports centres have to close also. (3) might be said as an answer to a certain question.

2- Nondetachability: i.e. implicature does not cling to words. Any expression with the same content will bear the same implicatures, regardless of the specific vocabulary, and unlike the conventional implicature which is detachable. This property is derived from being the implicature is based on the interlocutors' situations and the context of conversation. These two statements have been used sarcastically and can articulate this property.

(6) You are an amazing man.

This sentence has been said in a situation where the addressee failed to choose the suitable decision despite its clarity. The speaker implicated (7).

(7) You are a funny man.

By saying (6) the speaker is implicating (7). This implicature will maintain to be triggered even if the word *amazing* has been replaced with another word such as *wonderful or great* in sarcastic situations, as long as the sentence (6) is untruthful, and it is uttered in a context which triggers the implicature.

3- Calculability: implicatures can be deduced by following inferred rules, starting from knowing the conventional meaning, observing the cooperative principle, then moving to conversational maxims, and finally, moving to the contextual elements of an utterance.

4- Nonconventionality: this property means that implicatures are unrelated to conventional meanings, but rather, they derive from particular contexts. I think that this property was placed to confirm the first property *cancellability* and to assert that cancelling triggered implicature does not affect the truthfulness of what is said, unlike that of conventional implicature. This property confirms that conversational implicatures do not belong to the conventional senses, and they are therefore, cancellable.

An utterance can be valid despite its implicature being false, because it is simply not conventional. The implicature in (9) is derived from the sentence (8). In the following scenario, a woman is asked whether or not she is good at cooking, to which she replied;

(8) I am good at washing dishes.
(9) She is not good at cooking.

(9) Is derived from (8) according to the maxims of relevance. The woman may say (8) even the (9) is false. Even if (9) was false, it does not affect the truthfulness of (8) as she may choose not to cook in a particular situation, in preference to doing something else.

5- Reinforcability: This property has been added by Sadock (Levinson, 2000, P. 15), and it means that implicatures can be added to the uttered expressions without failing through redundancy, and which might happen if the coded content is repeated. For example, in (10) and (11).

(10) Mary ate some of the bread
(11) Mary did not eat all of it.
(11) can be added to (10) with less sense of redundancy and become as follows:
(12) Mary ate some of the bread, but not all of it.

Unlike the coded content as in (13)

(13) Mary ate some of the bread, and she did. In (13) the maxim of manner is infringed because of redundancy.

6- Universality: many languages can have these implicatures because it depends on the way in which speakers use languages (unlike with coded meanings, of course). Conversational implicatures are motivated so that the triggered implicature appropriate the situation and intended for it. Implicatures are not arbitrary as the coded meanings. (Levinson, 2000, P. 15; Horn, 1989, p. 145).

The previous property is briefly mentioned, although the previous properties are not neceassarily agreed amongst all the scholars. These properties are presented according to the need in this thesis, in order to help in categorising the properties of Islamic implicatures. As for the previous properties, they are going to help me in Chapter Five (5-3-4) when I discuss the propeties of congruent and counter implicature.

These are the main properties of the conversational implicature.

Concerning the **conversational implicatures**, Grice considered some of the conversational implicatures to be "in the absence of special circumstances" (Grice, 1975, P. 56) and he called them Generalized Conversational implicatures (**GCI**). Unlike the other type of implicatures which can be understood in particular situations "in virtue of special features of the context" (Grice, 1975, P. 56) and in a particular context and background are required to make the needful inference (Yule, 1996, P. 40). Grice called this type Particularized Conversational Implicature (**PCI**).

As said before, (GCI) can be deduced regardless of a particular context, by "using a certain form of words in an utterance" (Grice, 1975, P. 56). Grice then admitted that it is difficult to find noncontroversial examples of this type of implicature since this type might be considered a conventional implicature. He then gave an example with the hopes of not being controversial. Anyone who uses a sentence of X is meeting a woman this evening

would ordinarily imply that the person met someone other than X's wife, mother, sister, or close friend. Likewise, if someone says: I have been to a home. The indefinite article 'a' refers to the home not being his or being closely linked to the speaker. The implicature is present because the speaker has failed to be specific in a way in which he might have been expected to be specific (Grice, 1975, P. 56-58. Levinson, 1983, P. 132).

Yule introduced an example of this type:

(14) a. Doobie: Did you invite Bella and Cathy?

   b. Mary: I invited Bella.

It can be concluded that Mary did notinvite Cathy regardless of the context where the interchange occurred (Yule, 1996, P. 40).

An example can illustrate the (PCI),

(15) Dan. Are you attending the football match today with your friend?

   Laura. My sister is travelling.

It can be inferred that Laura is not going to attend the football match with her friends because she is going to be present at the departure of her sister. Dan needs some assumed background that Laura generally stays with her sister in such situations. More examples of PCI will be placed when I am going to discuss the principles of conversational implicature.

We can, according to the previous discussion, draw the tree of Grice's implicatures as follows in the next page (Levinson, 2000, P. 13; Mey, 2009, p. 365).

Total signification of an utterance

What is said   what is implicated

conventionally   conversationally

generalized   particularized

Figure 1. The Gricean typology of speaker meaning

However, the question raised now is what are the principles playing a role in generating implicatures? The next section will be dedicated to answer this question.

1-2-1- Principles of Implicatures

Grice "echoing Kant" (1975, P. 45) proposed some maxims that are, according to him, responsible for deriving conversational implicatures. These maxims are based on the Cooperative Principle (CP) being said: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice, 75, P. 45; Grice, 1991, P. 26). The four maxims are:

QUANTITY: This relates to the quantity of information provided. There are sub-maxims under it:

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Grice, then, said that the second sub-maxim is disputable, and it can be said that to be "over informative" is not a violation of the CP but rather, it could waste time.

QUALITY: Try to make your contribution one that is true and two more specific. Sub-maxims are placed under this maxim:

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.

2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

RELATION: Grice placed a single maxim. Be relevant.

MANNER: this maxim is related to the way the speech is said in, not to what is said to "how what is said is to be said". The supermaxim 'Be perspicuous', and various rules are subsumed under it:

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.

2. Avoid ambiguity.

3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

4. Be orderly (Grice, 1975, P. 45-46).

The participants' attitudes will be facing these maxims differently. The previous maxims are not automatically gained in the participants' attitudes, but their attitudes will be different towards the CP and its maxims. And hence, different implicatures can be triggered according to the commitments of the previous maxims. The attitudes could be one of the following:

1- The participants will **observe** the maxims.

2- There is non-observing of the rules. This can take one of the following appearances:

　1- Participant may "quietly and unostentatiously" be **violating** the rules. He will be, in some cases responsible for to misleading.

　2- He may **opt out** from the maxims clearly, and someone might refuse to give a more required statement.

3- He may commit a **clash** between the maxims, but not fulfilling the maxim of quality without violating the maxim of quantity.

4- He may **flout** the maxims. The participant is able to observe it and be aware that a certain implicature is generated, however, he does not commit to a maxim. He is exploiting the maxim, because he is intentionally generating a particular implicature (Grice, 1975, P. 49).

5- He may **infringe** the maxims because he cannot observe them (Grice, 1975, P. 49).

Some examples can be placed here, to explain the role of each maxim in generating conversational implicatures.

Examples of the maxim of Quantity:

Example of following the rule:

(16) a. What is the time of the football match today?

b. It is at 3.00 pm.

B responds to A without adding any extra information.

Example of flouting the rule:

(17) a. Where is the concert going to be held?

b. I think that it is in theatre A or maybe B. There are many theatres.

B provides too much information rather than saying A or B. He is flouting the rule two of the maxim.

Another example of flouting the rule can be placed here,

(18) a. Where is the conference?

b. It is at the university.

B providing less information than required (where at the university?). He is doing that because he does not want to infringe the maxim of quality by giving wrong details.

Examples of the maxim of Quality

Example of following the rule:

(19) a. Why were you absent yesterday?

    b. I went to the doctor.

B gives a piece of specific and truthful information.

Example of flouting the rule can be found in metaphor, hyperbole or irony. We can take this example from hyperbole

(20) a. His shot breaks metal (talking about a shot of a good football player).

The audience know that the speaker does not mean this literally, but instead, he wants to describe some features of the player's shot.

Examples of the maxim of Relation

Example of following the rule:

(21) a. How was the weather on your trip?

    b. It was sunny.

B provides a specific and relevant answer.

Another example can be taken from Leech:

(22) A: Where is my box of chocolates?

B: The children were in your room this morning

B's reply can be relevant even if he still unsure of where the box of chocolates is. In fact, his answer may help A find the answer as it implicates the children might have either eaten it or know where it could be (Leech, 1983, P. 94).

Example of flouting the rule:

(23) a. Is Jake good in math? (someone asking to offer Jake a job).

    b. He is good in history (the interlocutor answering).

The interlocutor's answer is not related to the question. The interlocutor flouts the maxim of relation, and hence an implicature has been raised that Jake is not good in math.

Examples of the maxim of Manner

Examples of following the rule:

(24) a. What did you do after the lecture?

    b. I left the university and then went to my home.

B provides orderly information to the question.

(25) a. What is the grade your son has got in the exam?

    b. He has got an honour.

B provides a specific and clear answer.

Example of flouting the rule:

(26) a. How was the match?

    b. It was lots of passes across the width of the pitch and back passes.

B's answer is not clear enough because it does not give the straight answer about the match. His answer was vague and obscure. He implicates that the match was not good.

The previous were Grice's Maxims and some examples about them.

The previous principle and its maxim are going to be employed in Chapter Three (3-1-3) to frame the principles of interpretation from the scholastics and the Ḥanafī school. The Grice's outlines are going to help in identifying and analysing the data and arguments in PJ in order to be designed in a theoretical frame.

Grice's maxims received lots of critiques. The critique centred around the values of the maxims in generating implicatures, where some maxims are considered more important than the other, on one hand, and critiques deal with the reformulation of the maxims on the other hand. The scholars have two groups after Grice approach: one amended the Grice's maxims, but continue within the same framework of Grice, whereas another group reformulate the Grice's approach entirely (Mey, 2001, P. 82).

The next section will discuss the first one. I will focus on two approaches which critique the Grice model, and then I will discuss Horn's and Levinson's approach regarding Grice's model since their attempts are the most prominent. Horn and Levinson followed Grice in the main frames of his model but proposed different models.

1-2-2- Neo-Gricean's Approches
1-2-3- Reformulating the Principles

Horn (1985) and Levinson (2000;1987) who are from the Neo-Gricean group, found some clash in the maxim of quantity. One rule pulls in maximizing informativeness, which essentially means: making your contribution as informative as is required, whereas the other pulls in minimising informativeness, so contributions are less informative than required. With respect to the maxim of quality, Horn believes that this maxim is always needed in any case unless we want to see "the entire conversational and implicatural apparatus collapse" (Horn, 1984, P. 12).

Another critique is whether Grice's maxims can be simplified somewhat (Atlas, 1981, P. 43; Mey, 2001, P. 82; ʿAbdu Allah, 2015, P. 7362). I shall, therefore, present in the next sections the principles and modifications carried out by Horn and Levinson.

1- Horn's Principles:
Horn suggested replacing Grice's maxims with these two general principles:

A. The **Q principle** (hearer-based). Make your contribution sufficient (cf. quantity). Say as much as you can (given R).

B. The **R principle** (speaker-based): make your contribution necessary (cf. Relation, quantity2, manner). Say no more than you must (given Q) (Horn, 1984, p. 13; Horn, 2004, P. 541).

Q principle is for the hearer's favour, to let the speaker make the contribution as much as the hearer requires to obtain the intended meaning. Furthermore, it contains Grice's first rules of the quantity maxim and the two rules of the manner maxims "avoid obscurity of expression" and "avoid ambiguity" ('Abdu Allah, 2015, P. 7363). The second principle R contains the second rule of the quantity maxim and the rest of the manner maxim's rule "be brief" and be "orderly".

Horn tried to simplify the maxims and lessen the speaker's effort by placing clear principles since the rules of the Grice's maxim of quantity were apparently clash.

2- Levinson's Approach

Levinson (1987) followed Horn in reformulating the Grice's maxims, and he nearly adopted a similar approach, but with some differences. He, in fact, added some heuristics in order to increase the "informativeness of the coded message" (Levinson, 2000, P. 31). These heuristics can play a role in incrementing the content of speech. He proposed two principles as Horn had done, and appended with the heuristics as follows:

Q-Principle
1. Speaker's maxim: "Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange". Specifically: do not provide a statement that is, in term of information, weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing a stronger *statement that would contravene* the I-principle.

2. Recipient's corollary:
Take it that the speaker made the strongest statement consistent with what he knows (67).

I-Principle
1. Speaker's Maxim: The maxim of Minimization

"Say as little as necessary" i.e. give the minimal linguistic clues sufficient to yield your communicational ends, bearing Q in mind.

2. Recipient's corollary: Enrichment Rule

"Amplify the informational content of the speaker's utterance, by finding a more specific interpretation, up to what you judge to be the speaker's m- intended point" (Levinson, 1987, P. 68).

Levinson, then, proposed his heuristics as following:

1- The Q Heuristic: "What isn't said, isn't. the case".

2- The I Heuristic: "What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified" (the "I" stands for "informativeness").

3- The M Heuristic: "What's said in an abnormal way isn't normal" (Levinson, 2000, Pp. 31-39).

It can be explicitly seen that Levinson addressed the speaker and the hearer in his principles. He makes his principles a type of interpretation principles, rather than instructions for the speaker to deliver his speech explicitly. His rules are saturated with details to be observed, unlike Horn who simplified the maxims of Grice.

These are the significant attempts fulfilled by the neo-Gricean group, presented briefly, only to give a general idea about the path of implicature and its principles.

The neo- Gricean approach generated some new implicatures, and which will be explored in the next sections. There are more than two attempts that criticise Grice's approach; however, what has been discussed is enough for the purpose of this research.

1-2-4- Scalar Implicature

Scalar implicature has been discussed first by Horn from the neo-Gricean group, and it is therefore considered a development stage of implicatures studies.

Scalar implicature or Quantity implicature is a part of GCI related to the Quantity principle. It belongs to GCI because it "consists of a set of linguistic alternates, or contrast expressions of the same grammatical category, which can be arranged in a linear order by degree of informativeness or semantic strength" (Levinson, 1983, P. 133). The stronger statement can include the weaker one but not vice versa. For example, *all* can entail *some*, but *some* cannot entail *all*, as can be seen in these examples:

(27) All boys went to the party.

(28) Some of the boys went to the party.

(27) Can entail (28), but not vice versa. (Levinson, 1983, P. 133).

The essence of scalar implicature is based on adopting the weaker statement, as the speaker is unable to, or chooses not to use the stronger one. This could further imply the stronger statement is essentially not desired (1989; Gazdar 1979, p. 55). Meanwhile, each scalar implicature case has an operator that dominate the weaker or, the stronger statement. The operator is the scale item in scalar implicature (Reda, 2014, P. 2). For example:

 (29) Some players travelled with the team. The word *some* is the operator which is responsible for generating scalar implicature.

The weaker statement is used because using the stronger one might infringe the "consideration of relevance, brevity, or politeness". It can be used as well in case of a lack of "certainty that the stronger counterpart holds" (Horn, 2014, p. 16). In such situations, speakers may make use of operators to produce this scale. For example:

(30) Some of the boys went to the party.

This sentence implicates that:

(31) Not all of the boys went to the party.

The stronger statement is that: all of the boys went to the party.

The weaker statement is that: Some of the boys went to the party, and not all.

There are different types of scales. I am starting with Horn's scales as they are the first proposed:

⟨all, most, many, some, few⟩

⟨and, or⟩

⟨n, . . . , 5, 4, 3, 2, 1⟩

⟨excellent, good⟩

⟨hot, warm⟩

⟨always, often, sometimes⟩

⟨succeed, Ving, try to V, want to V⟩

⟨necessarily p, p, possibly p⟩

⟨certain that p, probable that p, possible that p⟩

⟨must, should, may⟩

⟨cold, cool⟩

⟨love, like⟩

⟨none, not all⟩ (Horn L. R., 1972, P. 47)

If the speaker says: *most of the students attended the last lesson*. He is implicating that not all of them attended. The speaker has said A because he is in a position which does not permit him to use the stronger state (Levinson, 1983, P. 134).

Julia Hirschberg (1985), who is from the neo-Gricean group, presented a study about Scalar implicature and concluded that the traditional distinction between a generalised and particularised implicatures are "false" (Hirschberg, 1985, P. 56). Instead, Hirschberg thinks that there are subclasses of scales that differ from the Horn's ones (Hirschberg, 1985, P. 56). Horn's scales are nothing but small amounts of scales. There are many relations which can generate partly ordered sets (posets). These scales are known as

Hirschberg's scales. Here are some examples that are mostly taken from Hirschberg (Hirschberg, 1985, P. 56-66; Carston 1998, P. 179-236):

Ordered entities:

Ranked entities**:**

(32) A: Is Jill a professor yet?

　　B: She's a senior lecturer.

Implicature: Jill isn't a professor

Whole/part relation:

(33) A: Did you manage to read that section I gave you?

　　B: I read the first couple of pages.

Implicature: B did not read the section

Instance - of:

(34) A: do you have any juice?

　　B: I have grape, orange or tomato

Implicature: B does not have any lemon/apple/etc.

Unordered entities:

(35) A: did you get Paul Newman's autograph?

　　B: I got John Woodward's.

Implicature: B did notget Paul Newman's autograph

(36)A: Do you have apple juice?

　　B: I have grape, tomato or orange.

Implicature: B does not have any apple juice. (Levinson, 2000, P. 105-107; ʿAbdu Allah, 2015, P. 7366-7367).

According to Levinson (2000: 105), Hirschberg also independently observed that lexical sets of incompatibles can lead to interesting implicatures by means of affirming a side to

deny the other one, whereas denying a side on the contrary "implicates affirmation of another" Levinson (2000):

(37) A: "Do you speak Spanish?"

   B: " I speak Ladino "

The implicature is *I do not speak Spanish*

For more about the types of scales, it can be found at Levinson (2000).

1-2-5- Clausal Implicature

This implicature was formulated by Gazdar (1979). The notion was that when the speaker tends to choose certain linguistic expressions because he is in an epistemic position that does not allow him to use a phrase that carries a stronger statement.

For example, if I say 1 instead of 2:

(38) I believe John is away

(39) I know John is away

I implicate that it is possible, according to my epistemic position, that John is not away. (Levinson, 1983, P. 136). The class verbs that play this role in generating implicature "includes many verbs of propositional attitude (believe, think, hope, dream, etc)" (Gazdar, 1979, P. 61). More about this can be seen at (Gazdar 1979). I think that this is a type of scalar implicature.

1-3- The Relevance Theorists' Approaches

Relevance Theorists think that the relevance principle is the cornerstone in the implicature process. Or it is the only principle that is responsible for generating implicatures, without a need for any other principle. Relevance Theorists support their claim by psychological cognitive studies about the nature of human cognitive activities, which "derive as great a range of contextual effects (contextual, implications, strengthening, and eliminations) as possible for the least expenditure of effort" (Carston, 1995, P. 231). The human cognition is full of facts that can deduce all facts that are manifested in them (Sperber & Wilson,

1995, P. 39). Human cognition can be optimally biased towards relevant issues when there is the greatest stimulus (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 158).

According to Sperber and Wilson, there are some reasons behind adopting the relevance approach, and there are many differences. One of them is the relevance principle, which is more explicit than Grice's cooperative principle and maxims. Another difference is, according to Sperber and Wilson, is that Grice's theory presumes that there is a bigger degree and more elements than what we suppose involve in human communication (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 161) because Sperber and Wilson believe the relevance principle to be sufficient in explaining communication, without any other factors involved. Sperber and Wilson disagree that the communicator and the audience must know the cooperative maxims to be able to communicate, as the Grice's approach claims.

The essence of a successful communication is based on the presumption of optimal relevance. Optimal relevance is defined by Sperber and Wilson, in the following ways:
(a) "The set of assumptions *I* which the communicator intends to make manifest to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee's while to process the ostensive stimulus".

(b) "The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could have used to communicate *I*" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 158).

Ostensive stimulus is the clear action by the communicator "designed to attract an audience's attention and focus it on the communicator's meaning" (Horn & Ward, 2004, P. 611).

Optimal relevance requires the hearer to deal with the communication by means of decoding the linguistic signal, and yielding the intended meaning, by spending the required effort. This is because the relevance of stimulus will be determined by two factors: "the effort needed to process it optimally, and the cognitive effects" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 156). Both required effort and cognitive effect is placed in an adequate

level to lead to optimal relevance. The less effort placed, the more relevant, and vice versa. (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 152-153; Carston, 1995, P. 231).

In summary, we can, according to the previous discussion, present the principle of relevance. The principle says: "Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 158).

The theory of relevance is broader than presented in this section. However, the primary features landing the main arguments are presented here, according to the need for employment in our research.

Relevance theorists focused on the explicit meaning as it is the counter of the implicit meanings. Sperber and Wilson coined the term *Explicature* to be "parallel to Grice's notion of implicature" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 256). Relevance Theorists coined other terms that will be discussed in the next sections.

1-3-1- Explicature

This term has been created by Sperber and Wilson (1986) to discuss the explicit side of the meaning. Explicature refers to the meaning of the utterance given by the context, and explicature specifically, to relate to what is explicitly communicated (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 182). Explicature is derived from a logical form, and is derived from decoding and inference. The following examples explain the concept of explicature well:

 (40) Mary has said to Peter "it will get cold"

There are some sets of assumptions that can be taken from this:

(40) a. Mary's utterance is optimally relevant to Peter

   b. Mary said that the dinner will get cold very soon

   c. Mary belives that the dinner will get cold very soon

d. The dinner will get cold very soon

e. Mary wants Peter to come and eat dinner at once. (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 179).

Explicature can be taken from (40 a, b, c), whereas implicature can be taken from (40 d). As for (40 a,b,c), they are derived from the context, specifically from the words of the utterance, whereas (40 e) is based on the relevance principle and can be cancellable.

Another example can be drawn here to show the difference between explicature and implicature.

If someone said to his friend,

(41) Jay: you moved from London to Leeds.

    Frank: it is cheaper.

Implicature: expensive living costs are a good enough reason to move your cities.

Explicature: Leeds is cheaper than London.

We can consider this example also,

(42) have you seen my book?

A lot of contexts will be needed here in order to lead to optimal relevance. If the speaker is your flatmate and you have a habit of borrowing his things, he might be asking you whether you borrowed the book (explicature) and asking you to return it (implicature). If the speaker is your supervisor, he might be asking you whether you have seen the book written by him (explicature) and assume that the quality of your essay should be better (implicature). The meaning of the word *see* can make different types of explicatures. Is it meant by it *read* or visually *seen*? If the question is about the visual perceiving, the explicature will be therefore asking about borrowing it.

On the other hand, if the question is about reading the book, the explicature raised will be, then, asking you whether you have seen the book written by him. Implicature has a

different propositional form from the original utterance (Grundy, 2000, p. 102-103).

Defining explicature depends on the effort spent in finding the relevance, so, "the smaller the relative contribution of the contextual features, the more explicit the explicature will be, and inversely" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 182) I.e. the bigger the relative contribution of the contextual features, the more implicit the implicature. Explicature combines both semantics and pragmatic features (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 182).

In the previous example, *Leeds is cheaper than London*, there are many steps required to reach the implicature that:

- He moved from London to Leeds.
- Leeds is cheaper than London.
- He moved because of this reason.

However, the explicature *Leeds is cheaper than London* is quickly emerged in the listener's minds because of the context.

Explicature is a part of (what is said), according to relevance theory, however implicature is not.

In summary, the distinction between what is said and what is implicated, according to relevance theorists, is based on the relevance principle. They classified meanings in two folds, Explicature and implicature. Explicature can cover, according to Sperber and Wilson, what is said semantically, and what is defined contextually. Issues and examples drawn under the term explicature were not accepted by Bach who is one of the relevance theorists. He, thus, adopted another term and labels it *impliciture,* and which will be presented in the next section.

1-3-2- Impliciture

Bach coined the term Impliciture because he has some notes on the inclusion of the term

explicature, as will be seen. According to Bach's approach, he thinks that there are three levels: explicature, which is equivalent to what is said. Implic**i**ture which is a part of the semantic meaning, but not fully said, is necessary to complete the meaning of a sentence. And, finally, implic**a**ture which is the same one defined by Grice.

For example:

(43) Steel is not strong enough.

The sentence semantically is incomplete, and there is a need for completion to be added to the sentence to make a proposition. The context helps in finding this part to complete the sentence. We can by the context understand that it is not strong enough for certain types of building.

(44) the bed is expensive (relative to another one).

Bach (2006) discussed the distinction between Impliciture and explicature, by stating that Impliciture is an "expansion or completions of semantic contents" (Bach K, 2006, P. 1), whilst explicature is a development of logical form (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, P. 182). Impliciture, by completion or expansion will be a part of the semantic content. Completion is needed when the uttered sentence is "semantically incomplete and fails to express a proposition" (Bach K, 2006, P. 5) whereas expansion is needed when the sentence semantically expresses a proposition, but the speaker's intention is more of a "specific or elaborate proposition" (Bach K, 2006, P. 5).

The distinction between explicature and impliciture, according to Bach, is that explicature should be inferred after the full proposition has been made, whereas impliciture involves a part, based on what is semantically said. This, is in my point of view, is the reason behind using the term impliciture, which is derived from *implicit* as Bach suggested (Bach K, 2006, P. 4). He thinks that explicature, which is derived from explicate is fully said, whilst impliciture, derived from implicate, is not.

This term *Impliciture* is located between explicature and implicature. The case of scalar

implicature, according to Bach, is considered a good example of Impliciture, since the speaker's utterance: "some of the boys went to the party" is incomplete. The whole meaning of the utterance is "some of the boys, but not all went to the party", and this impliciture is combined with what is said and what is communicated.

In summary, Impliciture can cover some of explicature and implicature cases. Explicature, according to Bach, is assigned to the sentences that are fully uttered, whilst Implicature is only allocated to cases directly conveyed but not fully uttered.

The features for each explicature, impliciture and implicature can be drawn as follows:

Explicature = spelt out + explicit

Impliciture = not spelt out + explicit

Implicature = not spelt out + inexplicit

I shall finish this section by laying some examples of the three terms according to Bach.

(45) tigers are striped.

If your proposition is tigers are striped and you believe that tigers are striped, and then this is an **explicature**.

(46) The queen is late (for the party). This is an **impliciture** and is derived from the context.

(47) Where is the key? Children have been to your room? They might have it. This is an **implicature**, since according to the statement, it is inferred that the children have been in the room. Furthermore, this statement does not include the implicature that: *they might have it* neither by means of completion or enrichment. It is not a part of what is said.
The term impliciture coined by Bach is going to be used in Chapter Four, where the classification of significations is going to be discussed. We shall see that impliciture refers roughly to the same conception of the term *al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ* coined by ibn al-

Ḥājib (4-2-5).

1-3-3- What is said

This is another term, from the relevance theorists' group, coined by Recanati concerned with the notion of explicit meanings, as the previous relevance theorists did.

Recanati adopted a different approach to addressing the case of explicature and implicature. He rather preferred to expand the concept of *what is said* than adopting the terms *impliciture or explicature* (Recanati, 1989, P. 310; Recanati,1993, p. 246).

Recanati started that there is no principled distinction made between implicatures and pragmatic aspects derived from what is said (Recanati, 1989, P. 327). Rather, if this principle had been offered, one could understand and define the meaning of implicature and constituent of what is said. He asserted that there is a need for a new criterion to be "devised to make this decision possible" (Recanati, 1989, P. 327).

Recanati proposed this principle, referring to it as the **Availability Principle.** This principle says: "In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is part of what is said, that is, in making a decision concerning what is said, we should always try to preserve our pre-theoretic intuitions on the matter" (Recanati, 1989, P. 310; Recanati,1993, p. 246).

Recanati, accordingly, expanded the term *what is said* to include the semantic and the contextual ingredients, because *what is said* cannot be accessed without both of them. For example:
(48) He has bought Jone's book.

To obtain the what is said we need to know the meaning of the sentence and the referent of the components of the sentence *he*, *Jone, the book* and *the relation between Jone and book.* Then, we can reach the meaning of *what is said* (Recanati, 1989, P. 297).

Bach added impliciture to the semantic content, whereas Recanati added contextual ingredients, as seen in the previous example to, what is said. Recanati amplified the concept of what is said. I think that Recanati wanted to divide what is said into two divisions; first, the semantic meaning and second, the explicature. I do not think that he is far from what has been proposed by S&W as they confirmed that there is a semantic meaning, explicature and implicature.

Recanati classified meaning as follows:

What is communicated

What is said   What is conversationally Implicated

Sentence meaning   Contextual ingredients of what is said

Figure 2. Recanati's classification of meanings

The essence of the Availability principle is that intuitions are to be respected. The basis of what is communicated is the intuitive datum humans start from, and it is also the "consciously accessible output of the process of pragmatic understanding" (Recanati, 1989, P. 310).

The term *what is said* is consisted of sentence meaning, also known as semantic content, and explicature, which is contextual ingredients i.e. pragmatic ingredients (Recanati, 1989, P. 311). In Recanati's approach cognition again is present to confirm that pragmatic meanings are parts of what is said.

Recanati's perspective of expanding *what is said* meets with ibn al-Ḥājib as will be seen in (4-2-5).

At the end, it is very useful to draw on the terminologies table from Levinson (2000, P. 195).

The table explains the division of what is said and what is implicated according to scholars discussed in this chapter. There are some amendments on Levinson's table.

Levinson 2000	Semantic representation	Deictic & reference resolution	Minimal proposition	Enriched proposition	Additional proposition
Grice 1989	"What is said"			"Implicature"	
Sperber & Wilson	"Semantics"	"Explicature"		"Implicature"	
Carston 1988	"Semantics"	"Explicature"		Implicature	
	"What is said"				
Recanati 1989	"What is said"				
	"Sentence meaning"			"Explicature"	Implicature
Levinson 1988b	"What is said"				
	"The coded"			"Implicature"	
Bach 1994	"What is said"		"Impliciture"		"Implicature"

Table 1. Terminologies in the domain between "what is said" and "what is implicated"

Conclusion

As I stated at the beginning of the chapter, this chapter is meant to be an introduction to the other chapter. The pragmatic perspective on language has been discussed here, and I am going to use it in Chapter Two, where I am going to focus on the main features of Islamic pragmatics.

I am also going to analyse the perspective of the US regarding the language, in order to outline the main contours of pragmatics in principles of jurisprudence PJ. This will be discussed in Chapter Two.

The principles proposed by Grice and discussed by other scholars are going to help me in formulating a model of implicature in PJ by employing Grice's frames in designing the theory of implicature in Islamic pragmatics. This is going to be in Chapter Three, where I am going to adopt Grice's frame in categorising the principles into a higher purpose and sub-principles as will be seen in (3-1-3-2).

The properties of implicatures are going to also help me in searching and analysing the arguments among the US. Considering they will be setting the lists of properties for each implicature in Islamic pragmatics, and which will further be explained in Chapter Five.

The arguments related to the definition and validity of the implicatures are going to help in analysing the arguments occurred among the US, and reclassify meanings in Chapter Four.

The insights of the relevance theory with respect to the analysis of relevance, is going to be employed in developing some conditions, like the concept of immediacy (*tabādur*). This is because immediacy includes psychological sides, since it is an interpretive reaction of vocable within certain context, and which will be shown (3-1-3-2-4).

Insights into modern pragmatics and the conceived outlines of implicature will guide me to look for the appropriate data in PJ and analyse them, in order to formulate an Islamic model in implicature. However, this does not mean that the conceptions and arguments will be justifiably matching to the conceptions in modern pragmatics. But rather, this research will borrow the frames and basis of the theory of implicature from modern pragmatics to guide me in framing a theory about implicature in PJ.

I will assert here again that this chapter is not meant to present the rules of modern pragmatics with which the Islamic heritage is going to be examined. Putting it another way, this chapter is not the theoretical chapter, but the rest of the chapters are the applied cases of the first chapter.

This chapter will include the central conceptions of implicature in modern pragmatics, in order to refer to them during framing a model of implicature in Islamic pragmatics. Furthermore, it is going to be a guide to find out the arguments relating to implicature in Islamic pragmatics.

Chapter Two

Intentionality and The Uṣūlī Perspective of Language

Chapter Two

Intentionality and The Uṣūlī Perspective of Language

Before we begin to discuss the principles and types of implicatures, it is important to introduce the philosophy of Islamic pragmatics first. The title of the thesis claims that Islamic linguistics is a pragmatic one, and the question posed in this paper is so what is the US's perceptive to language? How did the uṣūl scholars deal with the case of language in use in a pragmatic sense? Moreover, how did they draw the main contours of intentionality as it dominates the different ways of interpretation?

In order to answer the previous questions, we need to explore the uṣūl scholars' perspective on language in use to see how they designed it. As well as this, we need to explore their perspective on language users in relation to intentionality. So, in order to carry out this investigation, I shall start the chapter by discussing their philosophy of language by bringing to light their perspective in the source of language. I shall then turn to consider the major merits of the language in use by talking about conventional and allegorical meanings. These are called in PJ ḥaqīqah and majāz, where ḥaqīqah refers to fact, or veracity, and majāz refers to allegory. Furthermore, I am going to point out the main features of each ḥaqīqah and allegory (*majāz*).

Thereafter, the chapter will address the intentionality and its main features that control and direct the exegetical process. This will include the intentionality according to each of the speaker, the hearer and the text itself.

2-1- The *Waḍʿ*

The term waḍʿ refers to the process of applying, assigning or appropriating words to meanings (Lane, 1893, p. 3055). Waḍʿ, accordingly, requires us to search for the wāḍiʿ (who assigned or applied words to meanings). The consequence of wāḍiʿ and waḍʿ results

in the thing that has been laid i.e. languages mawḍū' as will be seen in this section. These terms are only related to the process of assigning words to meanings, before languages can be used by communicators. *Waḍ', wāḍi', mawḍū'*.

The term waḍ', on the other hand, is usually accompanied by the US' writings, with the term use or isti'māl, since using language is the purpose of creating it. Al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) specifically endeavours to explain the whole process of language from the wāḍi' to the communicators, and he discussed the three terms: waḍ', use or isti'māl and ḥaml or interpretation. Waḍ' refers to the process of assigning words to specific meanings; for example, when there is a name given to a person, it is intended by the given name to be a sign to refer to the person. The word table is a sign and refers to the known item. Al-Qarāfī turned to define the term use as uttering vocables to mean their literal or allegorical meanings (al-Qārāfī, 2004, p. 24). As for the term interpretation, this refers to the process of hearers accessing meanings that are intended by speakers (al-Qarāfī, 2004, p. 24).

Al-Qarāfī's distinction between these three terms is roughly close to de Saussure's distinction between language and speech (langue and parole) (Chandler, 2007, p. 8), where language (*lughah*) belongs to waḍ' and speech (*kalam*) belonging to use or isti'māl in linguistics.

The term waḍ' belongs to the language's creator, whereas the term use is associated with speakers. The last term interpretation appertains to hearers and their understanding.

There are now five terms according to their existences sequentially (*wāḍi', waḍ', mawḍū', isti'māl* use and *al-ḥaml* interpretation). These five terms constitute and design the structure for the linguistic studies at uṣūl scholars' works, and US's studies tried to discuss and deal with these five terms.

In this thesis, we are going to discuss the following three sides: the creator of the language, the speaker and his purposes, and the hearers and his devices of interpretation. There are

lots of arguments related to previous issues. However, I am going to address these issues as far as this research requires.

We can briefly start with the first term wāḍiʿ, and this refers to that who applies or assigns appropriate words to meanings. There are no significant consequences based on the case of wāḍiʿ as the interpretation relies upon using language regardless of its source. However, it is the introduction in the US's writings to move to the next step and to show us the perspective from the US's language origin.

Scholastics only started the linguistic studies in principle of jurisprudence PJ with the case of language origin waḍʿ and the wāḍiʿ of language. This case was studied briefly because there were no significant consequences that relied on it. However, it is an introduction in PJ for the other topics. The questions raised by the US were: who created language? Was it revealed by God or was it a product of humans?

There can be counted six opinions in the US' writings as answers for the previous question (al-Shawkani, 2000, pp. 1/98-99). Bernard George Weiss, (1966) who had studied the case of the origin of language, coupled by the uṣūl scholars in the US, he engaged with the various perspectives and summarised them into these three pointers:

Some scholars say that language is the **product of nature**. According to the second view, language is as the **product of the human convention**. The last view thinks that language as the **result of divine instruction**.

The various viewpoints were substantially supported by the US (Weiss, 1987, pp. 8-9. al-Shawkani, 2000, pp. 1/98-99), and they were all plausible examples, without any deeming more prestige. In fact, according to most uṣūl scholars, all opinions are valid, since we are unable to reach the producer of language or the point of assigning waḍʿ (al-Ghazalī, 2015, P. 2/9-10; al-Shawkani, 2000, p. 1/103).

As alluded before, there are no significant results upon this case. However, the aim of addressing the language's origin is to conclude that the US dealt with language from a pragmatic perspective. Namely, the US considered the point of gathering languages in dictionaries as the first point of waḍʿ since there is no evidence referring to the first time of linguistic coding waḍʿ. Uṣūl scholars think that the definition of waḍʿ is an essential step for use because use depends on waḍʿ. They wanted to set the starting point of waḍʿ to link between vocables and their original meanings. The conclusion of this is that there are waḍʿ based meanings that belong to the point of gathering the Arabic.

Compiling the Arabic dictionaries was meant to protect meanings of revelation. The Arabic linguists aimed to compile language inside dictionaries when they found that words started to have new meanings which did not exist in the time of revelation (Āl Yāsīn 1980, p. 226). Arabic linguists collected words in dictionaries and classified them into either: original meaning or allegorical meaning. It can be noted in Arabic dictionaries that some words originally meant a particular meaning and were used metaphorically for another one. Furthermore, there are specific Arabic dictionaries to distinguish waḍʿ-based from figurative meanings such as Asās al-Balāghah for al-Zamkhsharī (d. 1144).

The middle of the second century, Hijri, was the last time Arabic linguists accepted language from people in cities. This is because solecism (*laḥn*) spread among people, and words started to have new meanings which did not exist in the Qurʾān and the Sunnah in the revelation period (J. a.-D. al-Suyūṭī 1989, p. 123' see also, al-Afaghānī n.d. p. 19-20; Āl Yāsīn 1980, p. 39). As for Arabic tribes, they stayed away from solecism (*laḥn*) until the fourth century (al-Afaghānī n.d. p. 19-20).

Furthermore, linguists refused to accept any new generated meanings concerning the interpretation of the Qurʾān because new meaning of words did not exist in the revelation period. It is essential to identify the time considered by the Arabic linguists and the US, and the authentic time of language to identify later that the conventional meanings and rules are pertained to this authentic time.

The term use will be the following step of waḍʿ. Communicators will use words assigned in their communications to accommodate their communicational purposes, and they are going to use them either in their original waḍʿ meanings or outside of their original meanings. The next section will discuss the issue of using language and its relationship to waḍʿ.

2-2- Use and The Case of *Ḥaqīqah* and Allegory

Communicators are going to use language to accommodate their communicational purposes. According to uṣūl scholars, if communicators use vocable in its waḍʿ- based meaning, this usage will deserve the attribute *ḥaqīqah* or (fact/verity), whereas if the vocable is not used in its waḍʿ- based meaning, this usage will deserve the attribute allegory (*majāz*) (ibn Ginnī, p. 2/442; al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 1/352). In the case of the binary of language in use, this is *ḥaqīqah* and allegory. So, we now have three terms (waḍʿ, -based, *ḥaqīqah* and allegorical meanings5), all of which I will be using in their literal translation, until the end of this section, where I will conclude with the proper translation.

The uṣūl scholars insisted that *ḥaqīqah* and allegory are pertained to language in use. Accordingly, words would not take a state of *ḥaqīqah* or *allegory* before use (ibn al-Ḥajib, 2006, p. 1/237; al-Bukharī, 1997, p. 1/99; al-Isnawī, 1980, pp. 2/146-47). The term *ḥaqīqah*, in my point of view, is a ratification ruling addressing the use of language to judge whether or not using language is delivered in accordance with waḍʿ. The terms *ḥaqīqah* and *allegory*, therefore, pertained to *use* not to waḍʿ. This can explain why, according to the US, *ḥaqīqah* and allegory cannot be ascribed to words before use. Adopting term *majāz* can confirm this since *majāz* linguistically means "going beyond something, place or road ..." (ibn Manẓūr, p. 5/326). Consequently, *majāz*, occurs when you do not commit to the rules, as will be explained later in this section. Using the term

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5 Robert Gleave (2012, p. 4) distinguished three types of meanings close to what is demonstrated here. He proposed the literal meaning, the intended meaning and the understood meaning. He considered the literal meaning is the meaning of the sentence regardless of the speaker's intention, i.e., the semantic one.

ḥaqīqah refers originally to a ruling more than to meaning but transformed conventionally to refer to the proffered meaning.

I shall discuss in the next sections the definitions of *ḥaqīqah* and allegory, their main criteria and the properties of each. The section of *ḥaqīqah* and allegory was extensively discussed in the US's writings, because interpretation is based mainly on it, and it also contains the US's perspective on language.

2-2-1- The Definition of *Ḥaqīqah* and Allegory

There are two main definitions of *ḥaqīqah* and allegory. One proposed by al-Bāqillānī (1013), and the other proposed by Abū al-Husayn al-Baṣrī (1085).

The standard definition of *ḥaqīqah* is "a vocable used to convey the meaning to which it was originally assigned as an item within the lexical code" (Weiss S, 2010, p. 130), i.e. the meaning that words have it in waḍ', so if words are used in their etymological or original meaning, this is *ḥaqīqah*. The meaning can be considered *ḥaqīqah* when using it equals the meanings in dictionaries or *waḍ'* (ibn Ginnī, p. 2/442; al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 1/352; al-Jurjānī, n.d. p. 307; ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, p. 1/127; al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/47. 1/352; al-Bukharī, 1997, p. 1/96; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 2/152).

Accordingly, Allegory is "a vocable used to convey a meaning other than the meaning to which it was originally assigned on account of a relationship between the two meanings" (Weiss S, 2010, p. 130). Namely, when speakers use words in new meaning, on account of a relationship to the original meaning (ibn Ginnī, p. 2/442; al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 1/352; ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, p. 1/127; al-Bukharī, 1997, p. 1/96; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 2/152).

Allegory (*majāz*) is based on non-compliance with the *waḍ'* as mentioned before, and the meaning of the word *majāz* in Arabic confirms that as it means to "go beyond something, place or road ..." (ibn Manẓūr, p. 5/326) or the meaning assigned for words. According to

the *majāz* meaning, the speaker is going beyond the *waḍʿ* and using words for new meanings. This type of *majāz* is concerned with individual words.

There is another type of allegory which can occur in sentences or composed speech called the rational allegory or the structural allegory (*al-majāz al-tarkībī*), differentiated from the linguistic one. This type happens when the attribution between two or more words are not on the *waḍʿs* rules, so ascribing verbs or what looks like verbs to whatever cannot be attributed to (al-Qazwīnī, n.d. p. 1/83). For example, with the phrase *the sun laughed*, laughing cannot be attributed originally to the sun because it is a human property (al-Rāzī, M, p. 1/321; al-Qazwīnī, n.d. p. 1/83; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 2/214).

Al-Jurjānī (d. 1078) distinguished the rational from the linguistic allegory by asserting that the rational one is related to ascribing (*ithbāt*), an attribute to something as explained in the previous example. Whereas the linguistic allegory is based on the object (*al-muthbat*) as it is the attributed thing and is not used in its original meaning (al-Jurjānī, n.d. p. 373).

With regard to this definition, there should be only one *ḥaqīqah*[6] according to *waḍʿ* and many metaphors can be found according to use. The outcome of this definition, so far, is that *ḥaqīqah* equals the lexical meaning.

Abū al-Husayn al-Baṣrī from al-Muʿtazilah (d. 1044) proposed a different definition of *ḥaqīqah* and allegory. For instance, he did not consider the time or the original meaning (*al-maʿnā al-waḍʿī*) as the base for *ḥaqīqah*. Instead, he adopted a different approach to consider *ḥaqīqah* and allegory by defining *ḥaqīqah* as "a vocable used to convey the meaning to which it was originally assigned as an item within a conventional process of assigning words to meanings (*muwāḍaʿah*)". Furthermore, al-Baṣrī replaced the *waḍʿ* with *muwāḍaʿah* (a conventional agreement of assigning words to meanings). This definition detaches *ḥaqīqah* from the *waḍʿ*, and leaves us with four stages now (*waḍʿ*,

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[6] There might be more than one *ḥaqīqah* according to *waḍʿ*, like homonyms. However, I am talking here about the generated *ḥaqīqahs*, that come after the process of *waḍʿ* completed.

muwāḍaʿah, *ḥaqīqah*, *allegory*). *Ḥaqīqah* and allegory, according to al-Baṣrī, are based on *muwāḍaʿah* not on *waḍʿ* (al-Baṣrī, 1964, p. 1/16; al-Rāzī, M, p. 1/286; al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/47).

As for Allegory, this is "a vocable used to convey a meaning other than the meaning to which it was originally assigned the *muwāḍaʿah*" (al-Baṣrī, 1964, p. 1/16; al-Rāzī, M, p. 1/286; al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/48).

Al-Baṣrī and his proponents, especially al-Rāzī, did not consider the *waḍʿ- based* meaning as *ḥaqīqah*. Rather the attribute *ḥaqīqah* was considered as deserved by the domain of use and conventional approval (*muwāḍaʿah*), instead of the first meaning laid when the language was collected, i.e., the time of *waḍʿ*.

Moreover, there are many significant distinctions and consequences between the two definitions:

- The first looked at the *waḍʿ*, whereas the latter looked at the conventional assigning.
- The first definition excludes users of language from being participating in assigning *ḥaqīqah* and allegory because *waḍʿ* is pre-users, unlike the latter.
- The first definition is arbitrary,[7] whereas the second definition is intended.
- The first definition states that the numbers of *ḥaqīqahs* are only one, but the second definition can generate many *ḥaqīqahs* due to revolving conventions.
- The first definition can generate many allegories to accommodate people's purposes, whereas the second one can produce many *ḥaqīqahs*, in case there is a conventional approval amongst users of language.

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[7] Arbitrary refers that there is no connection between significations or meanings and their symbols.

The US think that allegory is more than *ḥaqīqahs* because words are limited, and meanings are renewed as uṣūl scholars say (al-Shawkani, 2000, pp. 1/126). The US's claim, in my point of view, is based on the first definition.

A list of properties of the two definitions will be placed in the table below.

The property	Waḍʿ	Muwāḍaʿah
Pre-users	+	-
Changeable	-	+
Arbitrary	+	-
Subject to reasoning	-	+
Users-generated	-	+

Table 2. The properties of waḍʿ and muwāḍaʿah

The consequences of the two distinctions will appear in the next section, as we discuss the types of *ḥaqīqahs* in the US's writings.

Before moving onto the next section, it is worth noting that the issue was raised by al-Āmidī (d. 1233) in defining *ḥaqīqah* and allegory. Al-Āmidī wondered whether allegory is a matter of *waḍʿ,* or a matter of use and he therefore suggested two different definitions according to the belief of allegory nature. He suggested that if allegory was a matter of *waḍʿ,* the definition will be "allegory is the vocable that had been agreed on to be used not in its original meaning" (al-Āmidī, 2003, pp. 1/47-48). However, if allegory is a matter of use, the definition will be "the vocable being used not in its original meanings" (al-Āmidī, 2003, pp. 1/47-48). Al-Āmidī further considered that the US have two opinions on this case. The second definition of al-Āmidī agreed, according to ʿAlī with some modern linguists such as Searle and Davidson who think that the metaphor is a matter of use (ʿAlī, 2000, p. 105; Davidson, 1978, p. 42; Searle, 1991 in ʿAlī, 2000, p. 105).

The significance of this matter is in the way of dealing with allegory, either semantically or pragmatically as will be shown in the principle of interpretation (3-1-3-2). Considering allegory to be an issue of use or *waḍ* plays a significant role in determining the nature of the US's linguistics, semantic or pragmatic. The principles of interpretation will be discussed in the next chapter, after we define the nature of allegory and the nature of the US's linguistics.

2-2-2- *Ḥaqīqahs* and Convention

In the previous section, *ḥaqīqah* and allegory were defined according to two different opinions. The base of *ḥaqīqah* was presented in the definitions and attention to the US's works having a tripartite classification of *ḥaqīqahs* and allegories was considered. The uṣūl scholars US think that there are three types of *ḥaqīqahs* according to the domain of use.

These domains, according to the uṣūl scholars are: lexicon, custom and jurisprudence.

Haqīqah will accordingly be three: lexicon or **semantic**[8] (*ḥaqīqah lughawiyyah*)*,* **customary** (*ḥaqīqah ʿurfiyyah*) and **legal or jurisprudential** (*ḥaqīqah sharʿiyyah*) *ḥaqīqah* (al-Rāzī, M pp, 1/286; al-Bukharī, 1997, pp. 1/96; al-Zarkashī 1992, p. 2/154; al-Shawkani 2000, p. 1/136; Kamali, 2014-2015, p. 160). The US classified domains according to the areas they work in; otherwise, there can be many domains according to the natures of works. I shall explain first the three types of *ḥaqīqahs*, then I will consider their validity according to the definitions of *ḥaqīqah* and allegory.

The first type of *ḥaqīqahs* is the **Semantic** (*ḥaqīqah lughawī*) and this refers to using language in the lexical domain or unspecified area. This specifically relates to the word's denotation in its domain initially, or what would be considered *ḥaqīqah*; any other

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[8] I mean by *semantic* in this classification the lexical meaning or the etymological one. I don't mean the meaning that belongs to the field of linguistics, because all meanings are related to linguistics. I refer here to the Arabic term *lughawī*, which means in English *linguistic*, I prefer to use *semantic* over using *linguistic* not to confuse reader in English because linguistic meaning in English covers all types of meanings.

meanings are otherwise metaphors. In this situation, the semantic meaning is *ḥaqīqah* by force of *waḍʿ*. Teaching languages, for instance, drives teachers mainly to consider the semantic meanings of words because teaching happens in a domain where semantic meanings of words are primarily required. There are no doubts that teachers might mention that the practical meaning of these words might differ, but the lexical meaning is dominant in this context.

In Arabic, it might not be that difficult to know the original and the generated meanings, because Arabic linguists collected language and classified meaning into literal meaning (*ḥaqīqah*) and allegory according to the time of collection (see section 2-1). So, when a word is looked up in an Arabic dictionary, it will be seen that there are an original meaning and the later uses. In fact, there are many examples of this type of *ḥaqīqah* in Arabic like: *prayer* (*salah*), *market* (*sūq*) and *animal* (*ḥayawān*). These words have their original meanings and other uses related to generated meanings. Hence, the key here is to explore the intended meaning and the context in which words are used. The word prayer (*salah*) can mean supplication as it is the original meaning, but it could also mean the known prayer in Islam.

The second type of *ḥaqīqah* is the **customary or** (*ḥaqīqah ʿurfiyyah*), and the context here is the custom, i.e. language in use. Words are looked up from a pragmatic perspective, so whenever vocables are used in their customary meaning, the meaning will be salient in the minds of communicators, before any other meaning, by virtue of the predominance of use. The customary meaning here is generated and preferable. Other meanings (lexicon, legal...) are delayed and considered according to the customary meaning, allegories. In Arabic, the word *sayyārah* customarily means *car*, however, originally and lexically it means *convoy* (al-Fayrūzʾābādī, 2005, p. 412). When the word *car* is uttered in a customary context, the salient meaning of it is the *customary* one, because communicators' minds tend to use the customary meaning of *car* regardless of the original meaning.

Original meanings might be forgotten sometimes by the predominance of use, so the word *dābbah* for instance etymologically or semantically means "anything that walks on the ground". However, it customarily refers to any animal (al-Fayrūzʾābādī, 2005, p. 82). Hence, using this word customarily refers to any animals in the communicators' minds as can be explicitly seen in everyday language of Arabic.

Sometimes users of a language might forget the original meaning, or it might have dropped out of use. In this situation, uṣūl scholars used the term ***transference of signification*** (*naql*) (al-Subkī, 1995, p. 1/286; al-Isnawi, n.d., p. 2/179) or what is referred to as a ***dead metaphor*** in Western linguistics (Reimer, 1996). *Naql* means that these words are used to have a particular meaning but is no longer used in its old meaning.

For example, the word *ghāʾiṭ* was assigned to mean *low land* but this meaning has fallen out of use in favour of a new one which is '*defecating'* (al-Aāmidī. 2003, P. 1/47). There is, in fact, also a relationship between the two meanings: people used to go to low land to defecate, then people forgot the original meaning. The relationship between the two meanings are that the old meaning has been replaced with the new meaning, and this relationship is called the relationship of site (*maḥall*), i.e. the place of the defecating (al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 2/1210). Generally, people understand the new meanings of words without knowing their earlier connotations as words lose the original meaning, due to its extensive or popular usage.

The third type of *ḥaqīqah* is the **legal** or **jurisprudential (*ḥaqīqah sharʿiyyah*).** It is the particular context or field in which The US and Muslim jurists work, and a particular realm can happen at any exclusive realm of professional jobs like uṣūl al-fiqh. Al-Qarāfī (d.1285) adopted an expressive term to include any special domain, and he called it 'the special customary' (al-Qārāfī, 2004, p. 42) because any particular profession could use their own special terms, such as philosophy, syntax, and so on. Due to the new philosophy and vision of life, Islamic law generated new meanings to fit the Islamic philosophy's purpose, and therefore there was a need to upload new meanings on the existed words.

The word *prayer* (*ṣalāh*) in the Arabic *waḍʿ* means originally *supplication*. However, it was assigned to include a new meaning, which is the well-known prayer beyond mere supplication and this meaning emerged as Islam came about. Therefore, when the word *prayer* is uttered in an Islamic context, it immediately takes us to the *legal ḥaqīqah* regardless of the original meaning of *supplication* by virtue of predominance, widespread usage or the legal *ḥaqīqah*.

According to different types of *ḥaqīqahs*, and the measure of classifying them, I can say that the relationship between *ḥaqīqah* and allegory is relative, i.e. some words might be *ḥaqīqah* in a context and a metaphor in another. The veridical meaning for the word *prayer* (*ṣalāh*) in a linguistic context is '*supplication*', meaning '*performing prayer*' – which is also a metaphor in this context. *Ḥaqīqah* meaning for *prayer* in a jurisprudential context is the actual preforming of prayers, whereas the metaphor meaning is supplication (al-Qarāfī 2004, p. 42).

However, there is a serious question that stands opposite to this tripartite classification of *ḥaqīqahs*, which is: Were there three *waḍʿs* to derive three *ḥaqīqahs*, according to the first definition of *ḥaqīqah*? Since it is explicitly defined that *ḥaqīqah* means using words in accordance with its *waḍʿ* meaning. An extensive argument among scholastics occurred to justify this issue. Al-Muʿtazilah and some of the Sunnī US thought that the lawgiver coined new meanings to the existed words, like prayer *ṣalāh*. I.e. they believe in the ***transference of signification*** (*naql*) (al-Baṣrī, 1964, p. 1/23; al-Shīrāzī, 2003; p. 1/10).

Al-Bāqillānī and some of the US, on the other hand, refused absolutely the notion of *transference of signification*. They thought that the legal *ḥaqīqahs* were left on their original meaning, but the lawgiver put some details upon them as a specialising (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, pp. 1/395-397; al-Juwaynī, n.d. p. 1/211; al-Samʿānī, 1998, p. 2/119).

Al-Bāqillānī argued that transferring words to new meanings indicates that God is communicating with people other than their language, and this is impossible to be made

by God (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 1/391). He, therefore, maintained to consider that the new meanings are related to the old ones through clues (*qarāʾin*).

It could be argued that ***transference*** is nothing but signifying words to new allegorical meanings, due to relevance with the original meaning of the word. The new meaning being signified to the word is going to be a "technical or conventional language" (Lane, 1978, p. 4/1715). The new meaning is a kind of allegorical meaning, but it has become dominant by *use*. The word prayer (*ṣalāh*) for example, was used to mean *supplication* (*duʿāʾ*) semantically. Legally this means the well-known prayer among Muslims. The new meaning is related to the old one because prayer legally includes supplication. The old meaning has broadened to include the old meaning and some extra features.

The conclusion being asserted is that the process of ***transference*** is not arbitrary, unlike the *waḍʿ-based* meanings. In fact, ***Transference*** is based on relevance through the process of coining new terms. There is a big debate among them in the US's works. However, it does not serve the purposes of this research.

Yet, the question of multi-*ḥaqīqahs* is not answered. Why do the US classify *ḥaqīqahs* into three types despite being one *waḍʿ*? There are three possible reasons. Either the US believe in three *waḍʿs,* and they believe in transference of signification, or the term *ḥaqīqah* was not based on the *waḍʿ*. The first two answers are excluded because there is only one *waḍʿ* limited by the time of collecting the Arabic language. The option of transference is refused as seen by most of the US apart from al- Muʿtazilah. The only answer left is that the term *ḥaqīqah* is not based on *waḍʿ*. The conclusion, then, is that *ḥaqīqahs* are based on use. This answer was adopted explicitly by al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) who considered languages to be derived from "*waḍʿ* and *use"* (al-Juwaynī, n.d. p. 1/212).

The previous argument can tell us why there are two definitions of *ḥaqīqah* and allegory. Abū al-Husayn al-Baṣrī from the Muʿtazilah school wanted to include the types of *ḥaqīqah* in his definition, and this motivated the late scholar of the US to adopt al-Baṣrī's

definition as al-Āmdī stated: "that this definition can include all types of *ḥaqīqah*" (al-Āmidī, 2003/1424, p. 1/48).

Al-Baṣrī's definition explicitly relies on *use* by asserting that *ḥaqīqah* is based on a "conventional assigning" as shown before. According to the Sunnī school, the existence of three *ḥaqīqahs* according to the three domains confirms that the main dominator factor in classifying *ḥaqīqah* and allegory is the *use* and *convention*. This conclusion will give preference to al-Baṣrī's definition over the first definition, because the first definition contradicts the three types of *ḥaqīqahs*. Both of the Sunnī school and the Muʿtazilah school adopted it lately as seen in al-Āmdī's statement.

The three types of *ḥaqīqahs* based on three different domains confirm that conventions and use are the reason to produce the different types of *ḥaqīqahs* due to the convention and the salient meaning in this domain or that. Al-Armawī (d. 1283), therefore, emphasised that "each community should interpret speech according to the conventional meanings commonplace among them" (al-Armawī, 1988, p. 1/256). As such, relying on the convention in considering *ḥaqīqah* and allegory open the door to have multiple *ḥaqīqahs* according to various conventions, and this is what is called by al-Qarāfī (d. 285) the "particular convention" (al-Qarāfī, 2004, p. 42).

We can say now that *ḥaqīqah* is based on use and convention, but yet, we have not reached the factors that raise meaning to be *ḥaqīqah* or allegory, except the domain. The next section will discuss the bases that leads a meaning to be either *ḥaqīqah* or allegory in uṣūl al-Fiqh PJ.

2-2-3- The Bases of *Ḥaqīqah* and Allegory

Based on the previous discussion, we can infer one of the factors in raising meaning, and which is suggested to be *ḥaqīqah* according to the US. We shall discuss the other factors in this section.

It can be deduced from extended discussions at the PJ' writings that there are three factors that play a role in considering *ḥaqīqah* and allegory (*majāz)*.

The first one is the *domain of use*, as discussed in the above section. There is no doubt that each specialisation or particular community might have their own terms to accommodate their purposes since languages are a means to deliver our intentions.

The second criterion to point out *ḥaqīqah* is the *predominance of use* (*ghalabah al-istiʿmāl*) (al-Qārāfī, 2004, p. 41; al-Samʿānī, 1998, p. 2/95).

The third criterion is the *immediacy or salience*[9] (*tabādur*) where hearers' minds can immediately tend to the salient meanings, which is also *ḥaqīqah* (al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/50; al-Qārāfī, 2004, p. 25). These three criteria, according to the US signs, refer to *ḥaqīqah*.

Respecting the *predominance of use* (*ghalabah al-istiʿmāl),* the US consider it a sign of *ḥaqīqah* since users of a language agree on a meaning to be predominant when they utter vocables. This criterion alludes that *ḥaqīqah*s are changeable according to the *ghalabah al-istiʿmāl.* The US admit this, and they explicitly confirm that any *ḥaqīqah* may become allegory, and any allegory can become *ḥaqīqah* as seen in the word prayer (*ṣalāh*) which becomes *ḥaqīqah* in the jurisprudential domain (al-Baṣrī, 1964, p. 1/28; al-Ghazalī, 2015, p. 2/14; al-Kalwadhānī, 1985, 2/273; al-Rāzī, n.d. p. 1/344; al-Qarāfī, 1995, p. 2/945; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 6/166; al-ʿAlawī, 1914, p. 1/54) and for this reason there are several *ḥaqīqah*s according to the US.

Predominance of use plays a significant role in explaining the change in language. Whilst some meanings might be used less, some meanings might be generated, die or the predominance of use precede or delay its meanings.

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[9] This term *immediacy* or *salience* will be extensively discussed in the next chapter. I shall discuss the two translations *immediacy* and *salience* to deduct the close one to the Arabic term.

Regarding immediacy (*tabādur*)*,* the US agrees that the salient meaning of words in the minds of language users, that is, immediacy, is the main sign to consider *ḥaqīqah* and allegory (al-Baṣrī, 1964, p. 1/28; al-ʿUkbarī, 1992, p. 41; al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/48; ibn Qudamah, 2002, p. 1/503; al-Bābartī, 2005, p. 1/260; alʿAṭṭār, n.d. p. 1/423). Moreover, each domain can have its salient meanings connected to words, and the minds of communicators in this domain will tend to these meanings.

Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Āmidī and some scholars were more specific in defining what is meant by the term *immediacy*. They stated that the *immediacy* intended as a sign for *ḥaqīqah* is the **immediacy without a clue (*qarīnah*)** (al-Baṣrī 1964, 1/32; Abū al-Baqāʾ al-ʿUkbarī, 1992, p. 41; al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/48; ibn Qudamah, 2002, p. 1/503; al-Bābartī, 2005, p. 1/260; alʿAṭṭār, n.d. p. 1/423) whereas **immediacy with a clue is the sign for allegory** (ibn Qudamah, 2002, p. 1/517; al-Bukharī, 1997, p. 1/98; al-ʿUkbarī, 1992, p. 41). This means that communicators' minds tend immediately to *ḥaqīqah* meaning without a clue and to allegory immediately with clue without going through the classical process, *ḥaqīqah then allegory*. There is a serious note that should be considered in defining immediacy according to the US. I think we can add another condition to make the concept of immediacy more effective. We can say that immediacy without a clue in a certain domain is a sign for *ḥaqīqah*.

Abū al-Ḥusaīn al-Baṣrī explained that immediacy is a sign for *ḥaqīqahs* without a clue (*qarīnah*) by arguing that the *wāḍiʿ* of language (who assigns words to significations) "assigned words to significations to signify by themselves without any need to for further elements. It is as if the *wāḍiʿ* says: "if you hear me uttering this word, you should be aware [of what] I mean by [its] meaning, this will be applied on anyone using my language" (al-Baṣrī, 1964, p. 1/28).

This point, that is, immediacy with or without a clue is very essential to be noted when we are going to discuss the principles of interpretation in the next chapter because most of the confusion in the validity and efficiency of the immediacy principle is traced back to defining the conditions of immediacy.

Immediacy works in parallel with the predominance of use criterion. Immediacy can be the real checker of the predominance of use because a meaning generally comes into the minds of communicators immediately, reflecting that this meaning is predominant in a certain convention. More about immediacy and predominance of use will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Before leaving this section, we can based on the previous discussion, conclude the merits of *ḥaqīqah*s.

With regards to the semantic *ḥaqīqah*, it can be explicitly said that it is the *waḍʿ* and the lexicon which was a conventional meaning at the time of collecting the Arabic language. The semantic meaning can, therefore, be considered *waḍʿ*- based meaning, i.e. the literal meaning. The other *ḥaqīqah*s, unlike the semantic one, are based on convention, and I will therefore refer to them as conventional meaning, i.e., not *waḍʿ*- based meaning.

There is now a literal meaning and *ḥaqīqah*, and we can thus draw the merits of *ḥaqīqah* and the literal meaning as follows:

- The literal meaning is based on the lexicon and *waḍʿ*, whereas *ḥaqīqah*s, namely, legal and customary are based on use and *muwāḍaʿah*.
- The literal meaning is constant, whereas *ḥaqīqah*s are changeable by the predominance of use.
- *Ḥaqīqah*s are ties to a specific field, whereas literal meaning can be the original meaning.
- *Ḥaqīqah*s have preference over the literal meaning.
- *Ḥaqīqah*s are subject to reasoning, precisely the legal and customary *ḥaqīqah*s because they require a clue to be associated to the first *ḥaqīqah* or the semantic *ḥaqīqah*.

Concerning the difference between *ḥaqīqah* and allegory, we can drop these differences:

- *Ḥaqīqahs* can be fulfilled by convention, lexicon, and use, whereas allegory is associated to language users and language use.
- *Ḥaqīqahs* are salient without a clue, whereas allegory is salient with a clue.
- *Ḥaqīqahs* are preferable over allegories in general. This conclusion can be derived from using the term *ḥaqīqah*, which refers to the counterpart as not *ḥaqīqah* as explained earlier (2-2-1).

The following chart will show of each the literal meaning, *ḥaqīqah* and allegory.

Property	The literal meaning	*Ḥaqīqah*	Allegory
Timeless	+	-	-
Changeable	-	+	+
Conventional	-	+	-
Subject to reasoning	-	+	+
Use-based	-	+	+
Require clue	-	-	+

Table 3. The properties of the literal meaning, ḥaqīqah and allegory

In summary, the literal meaning and *ḥaqīqahs* are different according to the US's usages. Thus, I will argue against those who translated *ḥaqīqahs* into the literal meaning, as Muḥammad ʿAlī (2000, P. 70) or Robert Gleave (2010, p. 24) although Gleave was more accurate when he used the terms *literal in terms of language use*. It is more accurate to use the term *conventional meaning* because the conventional meaning is the salient one in a particular realm and based on *muwāḍaʿah* which is a conventional process of assigning meanings to words. I shall keep the term *ḥaqīqah* as it has its unique merits according to the US.

It is useful to conclude these sections on *ḥaqīqah and allegory* by pointing out some rules that have been taken from US writing to regulate the relationship between *ḥaqīqah* and allegory.

2-2-4- Rules in *Ḥaqīqah* and Allegory

The Uṣūl scholars laid some rules to constrain the process of interpretation with regards to *ḥaqīqah* and allegory. These rules work under the previous three principles: domain, Predominance of use *ghalabah al-istiʿmāl and* immediacy *tabādur*. These rules can be interpretive rules and some of these rules will be placed as follows:

1- *Ḥaqīqah* has preference *al-ʿibrah bi āl-ḥaqīqah* (al-Zarkashī. 1992. 2/191. 2/227; al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, 1/303). *Ḥaqīqah* has preference over allegory, by considering the previous classification of *ḥaqīqahs*. The word *prayer* in the legal or jurisprudential sense will be interpreted as the well-known prayer (acting prayer) because it is *ḥaqīqah* in this realm. The convention has a preference in general because it does not require a further element such as a clue.

2- Allegory is not preferable (*al-majāz khilāf al-ʾaṣl*). However, we tend to use allegory in the case of applying *ḥaqīqah* is impossible (*yuṣār ilā al-majāz idhā taʿadhdhart al-ḥaqīqah*) (al-Zarkashī.1992, p. 2/192; al-Shawkani, 2000, pp. 1/143; al-Būrnū, 2003, pp. 8/302)*.* The word *prayer* will be interpreted as *supplication* in a legal sense when we cannot interpret it as the prayer act. With the utterance, *our prayers go for those who suffered in the incident*, it is impossible to be interpreted into *ḥaqīqah* because it would suggest that we worship those people. But rather, we would go to the metaphorical meaning, which is *supplication.*

3- Allegory is not independent in denotation, but rather, it needs a relationship for *ḥaqīqah* to be understood (al-Zarkashī.1992, p. 2/192; al-Shawkani, 2000, p. 1/143). Uṣūl scholars discussed many types of relationship between *ḥaqīqah* and allegory, and al-Zarkashī counted thirty-eight types of relationships (p. 2/198).

I can outline some key relationships here:

1- To refer to the cause with the result's name. So, Arabs might call grapes *wine* because the end result is wine.

2- To refer to the result with the cause name. So, Arabs might call wine *grapes*, because the grapes produce wine. Arabs might also say clouds are falling rather than saying the rain is falling, because *clouds* are the reason for rain.

3- To name things with their place. For example, by saying: *the glass was spilt.* When in *fact* we mean, the water was spilt, not glass (its place).

4- To mention the part only, when intending the whole. For example, the saying, *this person has thirty heads of sheep*, when in fact we are referring to the whole sheep, rather than the sheep's head alone.

Above we have illustrated only a few examples of the rules on *ḥaqīqah* and allegory accompanied by some types of relationships between *ḥaqīqah* and allegory. More can be seen at the US's works (al-Zarkashī.1992, p. 2/192-213; al-Shawkani, 2000, p. 1/143).

2-3- Intentionality

We will transition from the design of language, to its users and their intentionality, and I will begin by exploring the historic background. I shall then move onto presenting the main contours of the intentionality in the PJ.

The notion of Intentionality was developed during the Islamic ages through prominent stages since the revelation to the modern principles of jurisprudence. Al-Raysūnī (2005, p.5-44) discussed the roots of the intentionality in his works, and he pointed out that al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. ninth century- third century)[10] was one of the pioneers who contributed to the studies in the Qurʾān and the Sunnah's purposes in his work (Ritual Prayer and its Objectives) (al-Raysūni, 2005, p. 5).

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[10] There is a disagreement concerning al- Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī's date of death However, it is agreed that he lived during the third century Hijri, the ninth century (al-Raysūni 2005, p. 5; see also, al-Dhahabī 2003, p. 6/814; Ibn al-ʿImād al-Ḥanblī 1986, p. 3/404).

Intentionality and the higher purposes or *maqāṣid* of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah were concerned with the uṣūl scholars because the essence of the Islamic jurisprudence and its principles were meant to uncover the intended meanings from the Qurʾān and the Sunnah. The early endeavours in Islamic ages in designing a theory in Islamic intentionality are traced back to early jurists who were aware of the notion of intentionality in their interpretations. The early attempts were confined to formulate partial systems in some areas in Islamic jurisprudence and uṣūl al-fiqh such as purposes of prayer (al-Raysūni, 2005, p. 5).

Al-Juwaynī (d. 1085, 478) contributed to the theory of intentionality by defining the primary purposes (*maqāṣid*) of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, which is, according to him the necessities, (*al-ḍarūrāt*), the public needs (*al-ḥājāt al-ʿāmmah*), moral behaviour (*al-makrumāt*), recommendation (*al-mandūbāt*) and "what cannot be attributed to specific reason" such as worships, which is required without including apparently specific purposes (al-Juwaynī, 1979, pp, 2/923-26; Auda, 2008, p. 17).

There are other scholars such as al-Ghazālī (d. 1111, 505) who contributed to the notion of intentionality as it can be seen in categorising the purposes of Islamic law into five (self *nafs*, religion '*deen*', intellect *ʿaql*, property *māl*, family *nasl*) (al-Ghazalī 2015, p. 1/417: al-Raysūnī, 2005, p. 16; Auda, 2008, p. 18), and all the previous contributions were partial until al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388) presented his unique approach of intentionality in his book *al-Muwāfaqāt*.

Unlike the former US, al-Shāṭibī discussed in his book, *al-Muwāfaqāt* the higher purposes of Islamic law theoretically (al-Najjār 2008, p. 23), and he presented a significant approach in formulating the purposes of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah in a theoretical frame. His work aimed to fit jurisprudential purposes, and I am going to present some of his theory and approach it from a linguistical angle. I will specifically focus on the linguistic views of his theory, as it fits in with the purpose of this research.

Al-Shāṭibī lived in the 14th century, and his contribution came into being after the contours of Islamic sciences were shaped. The works in uṣūl al-fiqh were influenced by logic and philosophy a lot, and most of the US started their works by logical premises and dealt with issues logically. So that uṣūl al-fiqh became a kind of a static subject that relies much on logic in discussion so that the spirit of Islamic law abated.

This reason required a revival effort to look at the purposes of PJ. Consequently, al-Shāṭibī attempted to revive the notion of intentionality in both interpretation and inference because appreciating the purposes of texts were the basis of understanding the intended meanings (ibn ʿĀshūr, 2007, p. 15). Al-Shāṭibī replaced the logical premises with which the previous uṣūl al-fiqh's works were full, with new premises that are based on the purposes of Islamic law (al-sharīʿah) to be the guide and the control principles to the rules within uṣūl al-fiqh. He wanted to assert that the Qurʾān and the Sunnah are meant for certain purposes, and we have to observe these purposes not only in their logical inference, whilst we are interpreting their texts (al-Najjār, 2008, pp. 18-19).

I am going to reframe the main contours of al-Shāṭibī's theory, supported by thoughts of the US, to make it fit our linguistic purposes here.

Al-Rāzī (d. 1210) categorised the linguistic matters into matters associated to the *wāḍiʿ* (who assigns words to meanings), to the assigned language (*al-mawḍūʿ*) or to the addressee (*al-mawḍūʿ lah*) (al-Rāzī, n.d. p. 1/175). Borrowing al-Rāzī's classification, we can classify matters associated to intentionality into three; intentionality of the speaker, the speech and the hearer. The sections of intentionality will be concluded by discussing the way of uncovering the purposes of a speech.

2-3-1- Intentionality and The Speaker

The importance of al-Shāṭibī's work, in my point of view, comes from his focusing on the speaker's side with purposes to be shown. In fact, PJ was laid on the favour of the hearer, i.e. uṣūl al-fiqh laid the rules in which the hearer can infer the speaker's purpose, whereas,

al-Shāṭibī's work focused more on the speaker's purposes and the ways in which the speaker can make his purposes explicit and understood. Therefore, al-Shāṭibī's contribution, complements the other uṣūl scholars' works considerably.

In every communicational situation, every speaker has his own purpose when speaking. So, for instance, teachers aim to articulate abstract concepts in simple ways to students, whereas doctors aim to explain illness and possible side effects to their sick patients in an informative, and sensitive way. And the purpose of each speech plays a significant role in the interpretation of each sentence and the way it is paralleled with the primary purpose of speech. Likewise, al-Shāṭibī tried to primarily extract the main purposes of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, but despite his specific aims of doing so, we can deduce the higher outline of the speaker's intentions in general from his work. The speaker's intentions of a speech can be drawn as follows:

There are primary purposes of instituting any speech, but it is in the Islamic law to **bring benefits to people and avoid hardships, to protect the people's good (*maṣāliḥ*) and to protect them from evil (*mafsadah*)** (al-Ghazālī, 2015, p. 1/417; al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 2/324). These are the main purposes of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, according to the US.

The previous primary purpose, according to al-Shāṭibī, can be achieved by considering these three levels: Necessity (*ḍarūriyyat*), needed (*ḥājiyyat*) and commendable (*taḥsīnyyat*) (Masud, 2009, p. 152). The roots of these levels can be seen at the previous scholars' works from al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī (al-Juwaynī, 1979-1399, pp. 2/923-958. al-Ghazālī, 2015, pp. 1/417).

With respect to necessity (*ḍarūriyyah*) *maqāṣid*, these *maqāṣid* are called necessary because they are essential to sustaining life, meaning that if they are opted out, the stability of life will be corrupted. The necessary *maqāṣid* are five (self *nafs*, religion 'deen', intellect ʿ*aql*, property *māl*, family *nasl*), so the Qurʾān considered these five areas, and legislated rules to sustain them, such as eating, wearing to protect the self, marriage to keep the human species and transactions to protect property, and so on (al-Shāṭibī , 2010,

p. 2/325). Breaking fast during the month of fasting (*Ramḍān*) is allowed jurisprudentially for sick people because protecting the self is from the necessity (*ḍarūriyyah*).

As for the needed (*ḥājiyyah*)*,* they are called needed because they are required in order to remove the strictness and hardship from life. For examples, reducing prayer from (four to two *rakʿa*) in travelling is an option in order to alleviate any hardship upon the traveller. This also extends to eating different types of food, therefore avoiding restricting people's choices when there are limited options, and allowing sales and purchase in order that people can accommodate their needs. (al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 2/327).

Given the commendable (*taḥsīnī*) *maqāṣid,* this means to "adopt what conforms to the best of customs, and to avoid those manners that are disliked by wiser people" (Masud, 2009, p. 152; al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 2/327). This includes for instance, considering the customary manners in eating and drinking and forbidding some harmful foods.

Another purpose taken from al-Shāṭibī refers to the speaker aiming to make his speech achievable (al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 2/415), meaning a speaker intends to be understood by the hearer, and can thus take the pointers into consideration. Al-Shāṭibī called this the purpose of *taklīf.*

The higher purposes of a text give us an idea of the aims of the texts, which we aim to gain in the interpretation process. And thus, these texts should be interpreted according to these high purposes. The intentionality of God who is the speaker given the Qurʾān can be framed as placed above, but there is no need to go into further detail about each purpose. I simply wanted to draw on the main purposes of the speaker according to the US, and further explain their roles in interpretation[11].

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[11] For more about the purposes of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, look at (al-Shāṭibī, 2009, chapter one)

I presented the purposes of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah to give an idea about the higher purposes that the US worked in their interpretation to gain them. Of course, every text has its own purposes, which should be looked for within the interpretation process.

2-3-2- Intentionality and Language

It has been alluded above that the speaker's speech content aims to be taken into consideration. Henceforth, in order to do this, he needs to make his speech understood. This requires the speaker to use language in a clear and digestible way. In fact, all Muslim scholars discussed the aim of language and discourse, and they concluded that it is the *ifhām* (a term in essence referring to making someone understand something) (al-Baṣrī, 1964, p. 1/22; ibn Ḥazm, n.d. p. 3/303; al-Farrāʾ, 1990, p. 2/389; al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/132).

The US were notably precise in adopting the term *ifhām* to express the aim of language and discourse. So much so, they refused to consider comprehension, or *fahm* as the target of communication, so that the hearer does not understand more than the speaker intends, as al-Āmidī pointed out (al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/132). Thus, the aim of dicourse is that the hearer can mainly understand what is meant by the speaker, and the language should therefore be used in a way that can reach this purpose.

Considering the term *ifhām* as the purpose of language and discourse, this denotes that there is no standard way of delivering speeches. In fact, the ways will be varied according to the addresses and their abilities of *ifhām,* and so, to make someone understand the intentions, you need to consider the language, style and addressee's situation. Moreover, *ifhām,* to different people, required different methods, and the nature of the term *ifhām* pushed the US to take into account some conditions to obtain *ifhām*;

The first condition is that the speech should be delivered according to the conventions, or (*maʿhūd*) of the language used. The speaker should be committed to the conventions (*maʿhūd*) in using language, whether it is in style used or the meaning of words. Al-Shāṭibī cited al-Shāfiʿī's text, the first writing in uṣūl al-Fiqh:

"In their language, [the Arabs] often address others in general statements which are to be taken at face value. In addition, they may speak in general terms which, in one respect, bear a universal message, and in another respect, a particular message addressed to a specific group or individual. At other times they may speak in general terms which are actually addressed to particular individuals, or in terms which bear one meaning on the literal level, and another on the non-literal level. All of this may be discerned from the beginning, the middle, or the end of their words [that is to say, based on the surrounding context]. They employ speech whose opening words help to clarify what will be said at the end, or whose closing words serve to clarify what was said in the beginning. They speak of things which may be understood either through the explicit meaning of their words or by way of allusion. They refer to a single thing by many names, and to many things by a single name. All of these [rhetorical] styles are familiar to them, and neither they themselves nor those who have grown familiar with their manner of verbal expression would call any of them into question. This being the case, then, the Qur'an - in terms of both meaning and style - can be expected to reflect these same features" (al-Shāfiʿī, pp. 51-52. al-Raysūnī, 2005, p 266-267).

The previous text was considered as one of the constructive resources of the US's linguistic studies, confirming that you cannot get your intention delivered unless you commit to the convention. The convention pointed out here is the one that can serve the speaker to process *ifhām* by employing the appropriate style and the convention that the hearer can interpret the speech, i.e. the conventions in delivering and receiving speech.

To obtain *ifhām,* al-Shāṭibī asserted that the speaker should consider the linguistic and rational situation of the hearer, so that the speech will not be higher than the hearer's intellectual comprehension, and neither surpass his or her physical ability. By physical ability, this refers to the requested work that is not physically fulfilled (al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 2/397). The speaker should take into consideration the hearer's ability (2/415) and see whether the hearer can respond physically to the speech in the case where a physical response is required. This is because the hearer might not understand well if the speech

does not consider his physical ability, as his expectation will lead him to reject this salient meaning, and look for another meaning.

In summary, *ifhām* requires a deeper consideration into the language, the manner and the address. *Ifhām,* rather than *fahm*, is receiving and understanding speech, because *fahm* will be processed by the hearer without considering the speaker's intention. More about *ifhām* and *fahm* will be discussed in Chapter Four (4-1-4), and the significance of *ifhām* will be seen in the next chapter as it is the main principle of interpretation. The term *ifhām* will be extensively presented in the next chapter (3-1-3-1).

2-3-3- Intentionality and the Hearer

The intentionality of the hearer is reflected on the speaker, and the required skill from the hearer is to understand the speaker's intention of the speech. As al-Āmidī stated, the hearer should understand only what the speaker aims from his speech and no more (al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/132). In order to do so, the listener needs to use the convention, and to consider the speaker's context to understand what the speaker intends to deliver to him. Likewise, the hearer in al-Shāṭibī's expression has to match his understanding to the speaker's intention (al-Shāṭibī, 2010, pp. 2/613-15).

Al-Shāṭibī proposed some methods that can help hearers learn about the speaker's intention. It is important to note that al-Shāṭibī's treatise was designed for the purposes of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, and we are trying to issue it in a linguistic way, since the Qurʾān is a text, despite its unique properties. Al-Shāṭibī therefore proposed a way to uncover the purposes of the Qurʾān, and worked on the textual communications.

I shall formulate the ways that are related to our research as follows, by:

- Considering the individual objectives which can lead to the higher ones (al-Shāṭibī, 2010, pp. 2/670-71).

- Considering the reasons that motivate to hold the speech (al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 3/311).
- Looking at the detailed explanations of speech *reasons*. The explanations can lead to the higher purposes as they are tied to each other.

Finally, I shall summarise intentionality as follows:

Speaker: the objective of speech is for the purpose of comprehension *ifhām* that can be through:

- Using the general conventions in structuring utterances, which are known to most people.
- Considering the hearer's physical ability, as he will not expect what is higher than his ability.
- Targeting the hearer in your speech.
  In order for the process of *ifhām* to be successful, the speaker should consider the manner in which the hearer can reach the intended meaning.

Hearer: make sure that your understanding corresponds to the speaker's purposes:

- Consider the situation and reasons for the speech.
- Apply the conventional rules in interpreting.
- Consider the reasons behind the speech.
- Consider the explanations inside the speech.

So, in brief, the role of intentionality, is to control the process of interpretation to focus on the speaker's intentions instead of the meanings of utterances themselves.

Conclusion

This chapter presented an approach to the Islamic perspective of language and its users. We saw that the US relied on use and convention in designing the main topics of language, *ḥaqīqah and allegory*. Moreover, we learned that *ḥaqīqah* is not based on the literal

meaning, but rather on the convention and use, and therefore, translating *ḥaqīqah* into the literal meaning is an incorrect approach to accommodate the conceptual content in PJ. I adopted *conventional meaning* as a translation to *ḥaqīqah,* because *ḥaqīqah* is based on convention, and changed according to it. The convention meaning is the one developed by people in a particular area, through the process of *muwāḍaʿah*. All types of *ḥaqīqahs,* according to the US are reflected to a specific domain.

We discussed the principles of *ḥaqīqah* and concluded that immediacy (*tabadur*) is the main basis of *ḥaqīqah*. But we drew our attention to *tabadur*, and how it is the main base of *ḥaqīqah* without a clue (*qarīnah*). This is one of the comments in the previous studies that did not note this condition, and which will make a significant difference in formulating the principle of interpretation.

We discussed the differences between the literal meaning and *ḥaqīqah* and concluded that *ḥaqīqahs* are changeable under the predominance of use. In fact, this conclusion confirms the pragmatic perspective of language, according to the US, and the crucial matter which arises in the conclusion here. That is, when one interprets the texts of the Qurʾān and Sunnah, one must be aware of the conventional meaning of the text's vocables according to the time of revelation, rather that the generated meanings only.

For example, words such as non-believer or (*kāfir)*, non-Muslim countries or (*dār al-kufr)*, caliph (or *ḵalīfah)*, may have different meanings that are recently generated. Or, people may go to interpret these words by relying on the Arabic dictionary, and here, people could fall into literalism. This is important because *ḥaqīqah* has preference over allegory, and the literal meaning, and therefore, we should find *ḥaqīqah* of these vocables that also consider the context and coherence of the Qurʾānic texts.

Concerning the language users, we also discussed the philosophy of intentionality and pointed out the main contours of the speaker, the hearer and the discourse's purposes. Thus, we addressed the unique term of *ifhām,* which can itself consider the manner, convention and the hearer's state. We concluded, hence, that the purposes of a speaker

guide him in delivering a speech in the appropriate ways, whereas the purposes of language control the mutual process of communication between the speaker and the hearer. And finally, the purposes of a hearer, controls what is delivered to the receiver.

What has been discussed in this chapter were the foundations of the interpretation, and which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. The matter of *ḥaqīqah* and allegory summarises the US's philosophy of language, and this philosophy is the fundamentals for interpretation. The next chapter is going to discuss the principles of interpretation and the different grades of interpretation.

Chapter Three

Interpretation and the Principles of Implicatures

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Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the uṣūl scholars' perspective of language, its users and intentionality. In this chapter, we will address, based on the US's perspective, the principles of interpretation to which implicatures are traced back.

The US confirm that texts can be approached at two levels. The first level involves the texts' vocables and their meanings, and the second level relates to the texts' significance and the reasons beyond the proposals of a speech. Al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) for instance, considered the principle of Islamic jurisprudence PJ based either on "vocables (*al-alfāẓ*) or on their significances (*al-maʿānī)*". He meant the reasons by *significances* (*al-maʿānī*) (al-Juwaynī, 1979, p. 1/169). Al-Juwaynī meant that significances (*al-maʿānī)* can include many individual cases as can be seen in rations (*al-ʿilal*) that subsume many individual cases under them. Al-Juwaynī's conception was asserted by al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), ibn ʿAqīl (d. 1119) and other scholars of PJ (al-Ghazalī, 2015, p. 2/7; ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, p 1/37; al-Bājī, 1995, p. 2/513; ibn Taymiyyah, 1995, 6/179; Hallaq, 1997, p. 20).

It can be said that there are two levels of interpretation; interpreting the vocables and interpreting the reasons beyond proposals' meanings. The questions posed therefore would be: what does an utterance mean? And why is it this? We are going to address the two levels in this chapter because each level has its particular outcomes of meanings and significations. The first level will be called the interpretive level, whereas the other will be called the level of causation (*al-taʿlīl*). Moreover, both levels will have different types of implicatures as will be shown in Chapter Five.

Concerning the first stage, or what is referred to as the *interpretive level*, the discussion will focus on the principles of interpretation that generate explicit and implicit meanings.

However, before discussing my model of interpretation, other attempts of formulating models of interpretation in PJ will be discussed.

This begins with us pointing towards the nature of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah's texts, which are the domain of the US's work since the nature of texts may overshadow the principles of interpretation.

With respect to the second level, the consideration will be taken into the ways of obtaining reasons (*ilal*) of speech. These *ʿilal* are the reasons behind proposals or rulings (*aḥkām*). For example, what is the reason behind considering wine forbidden in Islam?

The last section in the chapter will discuss the relevance between these two levels of interpretations and the higher purposes been discussed in (2-3-1; 2-3-2) because the higher purposes (*maqāṣid*) govern the individual interpretations of the two levels.

3-1- The Interpretive Level

This level is concerned with the level of interpreting texts or speech[12] (*kalam*) in terms of its vocables' meaning, i.e., what does the speech mean in language and conventions? I will start this section by highlighting the nature of the texts discussed in the PJ, followed by proposing the principles that work on this level to interpret discourse.

3-1-1-The Nature of Texts Studied in Uṣūlī Pragmatics

The US's linguistic studies were primarily meant to serve the texts of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah. i.e. to yield meanings from them, and there is no doubt that any process of placing rules will be influenced by the nature of where the rules are applied.

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[12] Word *speech* (*kalam*) refers originally to what is orally delivered (Ibn Hishām, 1963, pp. 43-44). However, the word *kalam* refers from another perspective to a completed sentence that makes a full proposal. This perspective looks at the amount that makes a useful or full proposal. The US keep using term speech *kalam* according to this perspective. For more about the debate regarding the definition of speech *kalam*, see (Ibn Ginnī, n.d. p. 1/17).

Discussing the nature of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah's texts can be approached from different perspectives. However, the aim of this chapter is not to demonstrate the different syntactical or rhetorical features of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, but rather to shed light on some features that should be given special consideration, when analysing the Qurʾān and Sunnah.

Firstly, one of these features is that the Qurʾān's verses should be understood as one entity, i.e. it is one text. Muslim scholars consider the Qurʾān as one entity so that some verses provide the appropriate interpretation of the others (al-ʿIzz bin ʿAbd al-Salām 1996, p. 3/97; al-Bukharī, 1997, pp. 4/291; al-Zamakhsharī, pp. 2/405; ibn Kathīr, 1999, pp. 5/477; al-Shāṭibī, 2010, pp. 3/381). Accordingly, interpreting any verse of the Qurʾān should be considered in relation to the whole Qurʾān as it is seen as one entity, where verses interpret each other.

This issue has been raised because there are different types of texts in the Qurʾān and the Sunnah in terms of their clarity and inclusion. There are general texts (ʿāmm) and specific ones (khāṣṣ), and there are manifest and explicit texts. When we aim to understand the Qurʾān, it should be managed without any contradictions because the Qurʾān and the Sunnah are one text, assisting the interpretation of each other, rather than in contradiction.

Therefore, uṣūl scholars extensively discussed any allegedly contradictory texts, and proposed some rules to solve the alleged contradictions, and which we will be explored in this section.

As will be seen in this chapter, issues such as general (ʿāmm) with specific (khāṣṣ), absolute (muṭlaq) with qualified (muqayyad) have been discussed by the US to keep the consistency in interpreting the Qurʾān.

Secondly, the other point that needs to be explained here is that the Qurʾān is an Arabic text in terms of its interpretation regardless of its divine source. Al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013) pointed out to this issue by asserting that discourse (*khiṭāb*) (including the Qurʾān) needs to be delivered in the language of the addressee within the addressee's ability of understanding (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 1/335). We also discussed in section (2-3-2) that *ifhām* is the purpose of language, and we concluded that *ifhām* could not be fulfilled without being made in the language capacity of the communicators. The US emphasised that statement is necessary to whom you want to understand you "*yajib al-bayān liman ʾurīda ifhāmuh*" (al-Qarāfī, 2004, p. 224; al-Armawī, 1988, p. 1/431; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 3/503; al-Simlālī, 2004, p. 4/367). The rules being used in interpreting the Qurʾān, therefore, is the Arabic rules that are generally used to interpret any Arabic discourse with consideration of certainty of the Qurʾān's truthfulness.

Finally, the last point is that the US proposed many rules to harmoniously interpret the Qurʾān so that the supposed contradictions can be solved. They discussed many rules to be applied initially, and others to be applied where some apparent contradictions occur. However, there is no need for all of the rules, because they are not in the range of use in this thesis. I will present here what can be linguistically invested, because most rules in PJ are developed to serve fiqh. Some of these rules will be placed here to briefly give an idea about the coherence of the Qurʾānic texts and to be used later in this thesis.

The US proposed some interpretive theoretical rules, i.e. where there are no contradictions inside the whole text or where there are no more elements (such as context), than vocables or sentences to play a role in interpretation as in the pragmatic interpretation.

These rules consider that interpretation will be biased according to the following:
- *ḥaqīqah* has preference over allegory as seen (2-2-4).
- General (*ʿāmm*) is interpreted on its inclusion without exclusion. it is not permitted in Islam for someone to marry two sisters at the same time because

the Qurʾān's stipulated this in Q 4: 23. This rule has to be applied to all statuses, regardless of whether the two sisters are slaves or free[13].

- Absolute (*al-muṭlaq*) has preference over qualified (*al-muqayyad*). For example, having said give money to a poor man can include any one man without any further qualification *qayd*[14].

- Instituting (*al-taʾsīs*) has preference over emphasis (*al-tawkīd*). For example, if someone says to his wife, *you are divorced, you are divorced*. The question raised whether the second clause would be counted as an emphasis, or instituting a new speech. According to the rule, it is a new speech. Hence, the man will be considered to have divorced his wife twice[15].

I have placed some rules as examples of the comprehensive look at the Qurʾānic texts. More about these rules can be seen in: (ibn juzaī, 2003, p. 1/165; al-Subkī, 1995, p. 3/30; al-Zarkashī, 1992pp. 6/165-168; al-Simlālī, 2004, pp. 2/360- 375; al-Shawkani, 2000, pp. 2/1133-1150).

In cases where there are apparent contradictions, the US suggested some other rules:

- *Ḥaqīqah* has preference over allegory, unless the allegory is predominant.
- Specific (*khāṣs*) has preference over general (*ʿāmm*). For instance, having said, *do not give benefit to students*, and said *give money to Mike* (where he is a student). There is an explicit contradiction, and this rule precedes specific over general, thereby allowing this student only to get the benefit. On the other hand, the general rule will maintain to consider all cases, not included in the specific statement. I explained the rule of contradiction

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[13] This is the conception of most of the Muslim scholars. However, a few scholars said that this rule is only applied upon the free people and they excluded the slaves from the ruling *ḥukm* (al-Simlālī, 2004, p. 4/367).

[14] The US stipulate some conditions to apply the absolute; however, discussing them are out of the scope and purposes of this work.

[15] Muslim, according to Islamic law, has three times only, then the spouses cannot remarry anymore (al-Zuḥaylī, n.d. p. p. 9/6907).

briefly, however, there is a big debate regarding the conditions of prioritising general or specific at PJ (Zaydān 2009, p. 245).

- Qualified (*al-muqayyad*) has preference over absolute (*al-muṭlaq*). An example can be taken from the Qurʾān of this, Q 4: 29. In this verse, God commands someone who kills a person to free a Muslim slave; however, in another verse as in Q 5; 49, freeing a slave as a propitiation was mentioned without considering the qualification (*qayd*), which is a Muslim slave. According to the rule and some scholars, the second verse should consider the Muslim slave because qualified (*al-muqayyad*) has preference over the absolute, and the absolute should be interpreted in the light of the qualified (Zaydān 2009, p. 227-228). There are lots of discussions about the qualified *al-muqayyad* and the absolute (*al-muṭlaq*) in PJ in terms of the stipulations of giving preference to the qualified (*al-muqayyad*) over the absolute (*al-muṭlaq*) (Zaydān 2009, p. 225-230). However, the case of absolute and the qualified has been mentioned here to point out that the US consider in interpretation the two verses, regardless of whether they agree or not to the decision.

However, I want to explain the consistency in dealing with texts in PJ briefly, based on the previous discussion. These are some examples of understanding the Qurʾān as one entity. There are many rules counted in sections of contradiction and preference (al-Subkī, 1995, p. 3/30; al-Zarkashī, 1992pp. 6/165-168; al-Shawkani, 2000, pp. 2/1133-1150).

This introduction about the nature of the texts analysed by the US would help to give a better understanding of the US's principles of interpretation and their different types of classification of signification since their work aimed to reach the meanings from the Qurʾān and the Sunnah.

3-1-2- Revision of Muḥammad ʿAlī's Model

Before presenting my model of the principles of interpretation according to the US, it is very important to discuss the previous endeavours in formulating the principles of interpretation from the US's standpoint.

Muhammad ʿAlī (2000) presented an approach to study the principles of interpretation, according to uṣūl scholars. ʿAlī is one of the pioneers who introduced the Islamic legacy to the Western studies, and his approach in formulating interpretations principles according to uṣūl scholars, is considered one of the leading studies in this field, because he exhibited the Islamic heritage in a modern way, and discussed it linguistically.

However, ʿAlī's model is based on analysing the different and spread data and arguments of the US. There are many significant insights and there are also many points on his model that need to be discussed. I shall first introduce his model and then discuss it, followed by exhibiting my model of the principles of interpretation.

3-1-2-1- Muḥammad ʿAlī's Model

ʿAlī addressed the principles of interpretation under the title of the *interpretation model*. He started his model by differentiating between two types of rules *principles* and *bases*. He allotted the term *Principles* to the rules "which operate in the majority, if not all, speech situations" whereas he pertained the term *bases* to the *rules* "which are applicable only to particular discourses" (ʿAlī, 2000, p. 59).

ʿAlī then explained the difference between principles and bases. Bases, according to him, are designed to "depict *discourse* in its ideal form" according to the rules of language, whereas principles according to his expression "intended to describe the *behaviour* of the interlocutors in the course of the communicative process". Bases are purely connected to the language, whereas principles are allotted to the users of a language.

Another difference proposed by ʿAlī, is that flouting bases can generate some rhetorical purposes, or what Grice calls implicatures. Flouting principles, on the other hand, would lead to "problems in communications" (ʿAlī, 2000, p. 59). For example, if the speaker ignores the base (*ḥaqīqah* is preceded over metaphor in interpretation), his utterance will be considered as a metaphor, but if he violates the principle of truthfulness, his utterance will be considered false, and hence, communication will break-down.

The conclusion of this distinction, according to ʿAlī, is that flouting bases; relates to the use of language, whereas the violation of principles pertains to the users themselves (e.g., their credibility) (ʿAlī, 2000, p. 60).

Moreover, ʿAlī thinks that the Western pragmatists did not highlight the distinctions between principle and maxims offered by Grice. According to ʿAlī, they did not do this because they were going to face significant problems. In fact, ʿAlī claims that a quick look at Gricean maxims will display that the Grice's maxims are nothing but "instructions intended to show what speakers should do in actual communicative situations" to be considered cooperative in a communicational state.

In summary, ʿAlī tried to present a distinction between the maxims and the principle, where he replaced maxims by bases. The main distinction again is that the principles are allotted to the users of language, whereas bases are related to the language itself.

With respect to the primary purpose of language, ʿAlī wanted to be in harmony with Grice. He proposed that cooperation is the underlying reason behind using language according to uṣūl scholars. Then he discussed five principles which can lead communication to be successful. The principles proposed by ʿAlī are related to both speaker and hearer. It leads the speaker to make his contribution manifest and the hearer to lead him to discover the intention of the speaker. These principles, according to ʿAlī, were treated in uṣūl al-fiqh as a necessity for the success of communication. The principles are:

1- *Bayān al-mutakallim* (the speaker's disposition to make his intention manifest) (ʿAlī, 2000, p. 64). This principle means that the speaker has the desire to make his intention

manifest, i.e. the speaker inclines to reveal his intention to the hearer because in case the speaker does not intend to make his intention recognised, this would contradict his position as addresser. The speaker, as addresser, should be cooperative and follow the bases and principles in his speech. The hearer, according to this principle, will be committed to making the apparent interpretation as the intended one. The speaker can commit by being cooperative and following the bases.

2- The principle of the speaker's truthfulness. The speaker believes that truthfulness is in his interest. If the hearer has known, or assumed that the speaker is telling the truth, he will, accordingly, interpret his speech using allegory where the literal meaning is not possible (ʿAlī, 200, p. 66).

3- The principle of *iʿmāl*. Concerning this principle being derived from the US's works, ʿAlī refers to one of these two possibilities, either to divert a speech towards a possible interpretation rather than ignoring it, or to consider the more informative interpretation.

If there is more than one interpretation, the hearer should go with the more informative one. In ʿAlī's state, this principle means that the hearer tends to make the received discourse employing the relevant contexts activated, to give the maximum information. The hearer should, according to this principle, activate the speech as far as possible before disregarding it or any part of it, and he should take all the speaker's utterances as operative signifiers for their meaning.

All linguistic elements should be taken into consideration unless there is no sense to be activated. For instance, if the utterance is fluctuated or ambiguous between emphasis or instituting new speech, consideration should be given to instituting, for example, if someone says to his wife, *you are divorced you are divorced*. The question, according to this principle raised here, whether the second clause would be counted as a new message. Hence, the man will either consider to have divorced his wife twice, or that the second clause was just used for emphasis, and not a duplicated divorce. The second clause,

according to this principle, will be counted as a second time, because instituting a new speech is more informative, than emphasis.

This is briefly the conception of the principle of *i ʿmāl*. More about this case will be explained in this chapter, when discussing the principles of interpretation.

4- The principle of Immediacy. By the virtue of this principle, the immediate, or the salient interpretation i.e., the first interpretation that comes into the hearer's mind immediately is considered the one which is most likely to be the intention of the speaker. ʿAlī then, hedged this statement to say that immediacy cannot unconditionally work. Therefore, ʿAlī proposed some constraints that should temper the reliance on immediacy:

- The first interpretation that occurs to the speaker is the one in accordance with bases. He refers to these bases (literal interpretation is given priority comparing to metaphor, unless we cannot apply literal meaning here. The bases then say that we should move to metaphor)
- The first interpretation is the one in accordance with *waḍ ʿ*
- The first interpretation is the most expected one.
- The first interpretation which occurs to the hearer is the most related one to the literal meaning. (ʿAlī, 2000, 70-72)

ʿAlī gave two examples to show how immediacy can fail:

The first one: On his way to Medina, he is accompanied by the prophet Muḥammad (in their secret *Hijrah* (emigration) from Mecca to Medina in (622 A.D.) Abū Bakr was asked by some of the unbelievers about his companion. His answer was: "*hadhā al-rajulu al-ladhī yahdīnī al-sabīla*" (lit. this is the man who is guiding me to the way).

The second one: on his way (in the desert) to *Badr* (the place of the first battle in Islam), the prophet was asked by one of his enemies: "Where do you come from?" He replied: We come from *māʾ* (lit- water).

In both examples, the addressees misunderstood the speaker's intention. In the first example, he understood the word "way" to be the path in its superficial meaning, whereas Abū Bakr intended by *way* to be the way leading him to the interest or benefit in this life, and the Paradise in the hereafter. In the second example, the addressee interpreted "*mā*" as the name of a tribe, while the prophet intended it to be *water*, as water is the origin of human life.

In the second example, the addressee failed to reach the intended meaning, because the meeting took place in the desert. ʿAlī thinks that the addressee failed to reach the intended meaning due to a lack of knowledge of the addressee that the prophet does not tell a lie, and he lacks the knowledge that in Islam, human beings are created from water. This made the addressee equate the speaker's intention with the most explicit meaning of the utterance because of the context. I think that even if the addressee knows that prophet does not tell a lie, he will still intend the same meaning because of the clue (*qarinah*).

5- Principle of Istiṣḥāb. (lit, maintenance of the original status) (ʿAlī, 2000, p. 77). Or presumption of continuity (Kamali, 2014-2015, p. 284) This principle refers to the idea that "humans tend, in the absence of any instantaneous evidence, to form an initial intuition-based presumption about the situation they encounter" (ʿAlī, 2000, p. 77). Under the principle of *Istiṣḥāb*, this assumption is maintained unless it contradicts with some contextual proofs. Humans, accordingly, continue to consider their presuppositions about a case, until the evidence contradicts their presuppositions.

They will consider the literal meaning until a clue (*qarīnah*) occurs, and takes them to allegory. Therefore, the priority ought to be given to: "literal use over non-literal use (*al-ḥaqīqah dūna al-majāz*), the general over the specific (*al-ʿumūm dūna al-khuṣūṣ*), the determinacy[16] over indeterminacy (*al-ifrād dūna al-ishtirāk*), the indefinite reference over

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[16] Determinacy means to interpret a word for one meaning not for all its meaning, when the word is homonym.

qualification[17] (*al-iṭlāq dūna al-taqyīd*), the originality[18] over tautology (*al-taʾṣīl dūna al-ziyādah*), and so on and so forth (Ali, 2000, p. 80; al-Qārāfī, 2004, p. 93; ibn Juzaī, 2003, p. 1/165; al-Subkī, 1995, p. 3/30; al-Simlālī, 2004, pp. 2/360- 375).

ʿAlī did not present the bases, but rather, the bases of interpretation can be observed from the examples he gave about the principles and bases. The rule *ḥaqīqah has preference over allegory* is one of the bases, according to ʿAlī. It can be identified that bases are the partial rules of language in interpretation according to ʿAlī, as seen in the principle of *iʿmāl*.

This is a brief summary of the principles of interpretation, proposed by ʿAlī in his work (2000), and the *principles of the mainstream* of the US, as he referred to it.

ʿAlī next presented the Salafī's model, which is the same mainstream's model apart from the fifth principle *Istiṣḥāb*. He then concluded that the Salafī's model is determinate *qaṭʿī,* because it drives straight to the intended meaning, by means of clues *qarāʾin,* without processing through the principle *istiṣḥāb.* On the other hand, the mainstream's model is indeterminate *ẓannī* because it processes the interpretation through the principle of *Istiṣḥāb,* which consider *ḥaqīqah* first and the allegory next, if *ḥaqīqah* cannot be applied. Salafī's model drives straight to the intended meaning by means of clues, without being involved in the classical way, *ḥaqīqah then allegory.*

His endeavour is a significant one as it brings out the Islamic legacy in a modern style. Despite its significance, I agree with him on some points, and disagree with many others.

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[17] Un-qualification "denotes a word which is neither qualified nor limited in its application when we say, for example, a "book", a "bird" ... each one is a generic noun which can be applied to any book, bird, ..." (Kamali, 2014-2015, p. 155)

[18] Originality means: to consider some clauses for a new meaning not to conform a previous one.

3-1-2-2- Discussing ʿAlī's Model

My discussion of ʿAlī's model will be detailed into two parts. First, I will discuss his distinction of the principles and the bases. Second, I will discuss his proposed principles, and their efficiency.

Concerning the distinction between the principles and bases issue, ʿAlī claimed that pragmaticians failed to draw on the difference between principles and maxims, within the Gricean framework because, according to Alī', the pragmaticians will face serious difficulties. He did not discuss the nature of the difficulties pragmaticians are going to face, and he therefore proposed a criterion to solve this issue, as mentioned in the previous section.

I am going to examine his distinctions principles from bases, according to the criterion placed by him. Ultimately, I do agree that the principle of truthfulness and the principle of *bayān* of the speaker (the speaker's disposition to make his intention clear), are in conformity with his criterion (ʿAlī's differentiating between principle and bases).

However, what about the last principle *istiṣḥāb* (maintenance of the original status)? If the speaker flouts this, the communication will not be broken down, because the utterance will be taken to another interpretation, since *istiṣḥāb* means to consider *ḥaqīqah* first, unless *ḥaqīqah* cannot be operated. *Istiṣḥāb* confirms that the general is over the specific, but in the case of contradiction, the specific will have the preference over the general, as seen (3-1-1). The same can be placed to the absolute and the qualified. If the hearer cannot maintain with *istiṣḥāb*, he can turn to the alternative, and he can go to allegory in case *ḥaqīqah* cannot be used. He can go to the specific and qualified if the general and absolute cannot be applied. Whilst all the previous possibilities can be operated without causing any failure to the communication on the one hand, they are not related to the users, on the other hand. The US assert my point, as seen (3-1-1).

ʿAlī mentioned *ḥaqīqah* and allegory as an example of bases (literal use over non-literal use, the general over the particular ... and so on). *Istiṣḥāb*, as discussed in the previous paragraph, gives the same role of bases. *Istiṣḥāb* should be, according to ʿAlī's criterion, one of the bases not one of the principles. *Istiṣḥāb* should not be a principle, because violating it does not lead to a communication breakdown and it does not relate to the users, but to the speech.

The same can be said about the principle of immediacy and the principle of *iʿmāl*, since the two principles are based on choosing a superior interpretation over the other. Namely, there are alternative interpretations to be taken in the process of interpretation. The two principles are therefore related to the language itself. Moreover, choosing one interpretation against another does not lead to the failure of the communication, but rather to another option. The US discussed these cases, as mentioned before, and assigned rules to choose among the possible options. The two principles immediacy and *iʿmāl* work as the base of *ḥaqīqah* and allegory work exactly. Why, then, are *ḥaqīqah* and allegory considered bases, whereas immediacy and *iʿmāl* are considered principles? Despite the belief that failing in immediacy refers to the signal between the speaker, and the hearer is missed.

Given the way of approaching the principles, I think that ʿAlī's study confuses Grice and usūl scholars' approaches. He tried to combine the two perspectives, despite their difference in goals.

Grice addressed the speakers and proposed maxims to help them expose their intentions in the speech, whereas usūl scholars addressed the hearers to guide them in the right way of interpretation. Grice and usūl scholars work on different sides.

ʿAlī chose a title from usūl al-fiqh (the mainstream interpretation model), which refers to the hearer and the interpreting process. Then, he declared that these principles aim to answer two questions: "how does the speaker make his intention manifest to the hearer?", and how does the hearer reach the intended meaning? ʿAlī then subsumed two principles

under the first question: the "principle of *bayān al-mutakallim*", and "principle of the speaker's truthfulness". Hence, the remaining three principles were meant to address the hearer's side. So, he combined Grice and usūl scholars under a title of *interpretation* (which occurs in the hearer's side).

ʿAlī did not mention any rule or instruction under the first two principles (that related to the speaker) to instruct speakers on how to express their intentions adequately. On the contrary, he justified why the hearer should accept that the speaker is telling the truth and what his statement expresses. In fact, ʿAlī presumes that:

- The hearer expects that the speaker wants to make his intention manifest
- The hearer supposes that the speaker tells the truth.

According to the discussion data produced under the two principles, *bayān al-mutakallim* and *truthfulness* were discussed from the hearers' side, and consequently, are relevant to the hearer expectation. I.e. According to ʿAlī's explanation he then should have subsumed them under a title of *the hearer's expectations*. The two principles did not answer his question, *how does the speaker make his intention clear?*

In sum, Alī prompted two questions to cover the whole process of delivering speech and interpretation, but he answered the question of the hearer's side only. I think this confusion comes from aiming to combine the Islamic and the Gricean perspectives in one model despite their difference in nature.

Given the principle of immediacy (*tabādur*), ʿAlī stipulated some conditions to temper reliance on immediacy, as mentioned in (3-1-2-1). The conditions make the value of immediacy marginal, despite the importance of immediacy in interpretation. According to conditions placed by ʿAlī, the principle of immediacy does not make any difference or play a further role in the interpretation than the principle of *iʿmāl* or *istiṣḥāb*. This is because immediacy, repeats what principle of *istiṣḥāb* bears (*ḥaqīqah* has preference over metaphor). These conditions make it either content-free or useless. They provide a

preference to the literal meaning over the pragmatic one (literal meaning has preference over metaphor (ʿAlī, 2000, 70) despite his claim that the PJ's perspective is pragmatic.

Going further into his stipulations. ʿAlī's results confirm that immediacy will be accepted when it is in accordance with bases (*ḥaqīqah* has preference over metaphor). So, the power of this principle comes from bases, not from itself. The principle which can impact the success of communication has its power from the base, that does not affect the success of communication but can orientate it. This unusual conclusion is yielded by Alī's premises. What is known is that principles govern rules and maxims but not the contrary. As we pointed out, bases, according to ʿAlī, are the rule of language.

Another criticism can be addressed to ʿAlī's work, where some stipulations contradict each other. The condition *first interpretation that occurs to the speaker is the one in accordance with bases* and the condition *the first interpretation is the one in accordance with waḍʿ* contradict with the condition *the first interpretation which occurs to the speaker is the most related one* because the most related one can be either *ḥaqīqah* or allegory by virtue of clue (*qarīnah*) as discussed in (2-2-3) The first interpretation is the most expected one. This means that communicators' minds tend immediately to *ḥaqīqah* without a clue and to allegory immediately with clue without going through the classical process, *ḥaqīqah then allegory*.

Furthermore, according to the literal meaning of ʿAlī's expression. Which *ḥaqīqah* did he mean by *literal meaning*? There are three *ḥaqīqah*s, according to the US (2-2-2). The confusion emerged not from the concept of immediacy (*tabādur*) according to the US, but where they distinguished two types of immediacy, as discussed in (2-2-3).

It would have been preferable for ʿAlī to define the concept of immediacy and its types first to be able to make its conditions corresponding to it as we discussed in section (2-2-3). The nature of immediacy, which comes into the minds the communicators immediately, does not accept all the previous stipulations. We can speak about the failure of immediacy, but we cannot put conditions for a mechanism that occurs cognitively.

Immediacy, according to usūl scholars, is the main factor that is used to determine *ḥaqīqah* and allegory as seen (2-2-3). The immediacy, according to the US, is considered the sign for *ḥaqīqah*, and it should, at the same time, according to ʿAlī, be in accordance with *ḥaqīqah*. This is a circularity or (*dawr*) because immediacy is the sign for *ḥaqīqah*, and *ḥaqīqah* is the condition for the immediacy.

With respect to the principle of *istiṣḥāb* in the light of immediacy, if ʿAlī noted that the US distinguished two types of immediacies, one with clue *qarīnah* and one without, as explained in section (2-2-3). He would have not considered the Salafī stream more determinate than the mainstream, because the mainstream goes straight to the intended meaning by the clue. Furthermore, the mainstream considers the principle of *istiṣḥāb* when there is no clue, and the Salafī stream will do the same. There is no need, hence, for the principle of Salafī. According to the US's arguments, I cannot consider *istiṣḥāb* as a principle of interpretation because we are going to maintain the power of *istiṣḥāb* to *ḥaqīqah* where there is no clue and to the allegorical meaning where there is a clue (see: 2-2-3). This is exactly the role of immediacy, according to the US. There is no need for the principle *istiṣḥāb* because it repeats a part of the principle *immediacy*. [19] As we learnt, the full principle of immediacy, according to the US is, (*ḥaqīqah* has preference without a clue, whereas allegory has a preference with a clue). There is no need, hence, to the

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[19] It could be argued that the difference between Salafī's model, and the mainstream is the principle of *istiṣḥāb,* which gives preference to *ḥaqīqah* over allegory in general. In fact, Ibn Taymiyyah who leads Salafī stream in this point did not concern himself with the preference between *ḥaqīqah* and allegory, because this issue can be solved by clues *qarāʾin*, and both streams agreed that clues could lead to the intended meaning. *Ḥaqīqah* and allegory, according to the US, are considered as possible meanings and clues can determine the intended one. Ibn Taymiyyah refused that allegory is found in language. Hence, all meanings are *ḥaqīqahs*.

I think that Ibn Taymiyyah refused the existence of allegory in languages to refuse and negate the relationships between *ḥaqīqahs* and allegory, which means that allegory can be subjected to allegorical interpretation *taʾwīl,* or allegory can be similar to *ḥaqīqah* by means of interpretation. This means to ibn Taymiyyah that the verses which talk about God's attributes can be interpreted based on similarity or allegorical interpretation. But Ibn Taymiyyah refused the point of *ḥaqīqah* and allegory in order not to say that God's attributes can be allegorically interpreted. He wanted to say that these attributes are *ḥaqīqahs* despite our inability to define them and they are not based on likeness to human attributes through the relationship between *ḥaqīqah* and allegory. Thus, for instance, Ibn Taymiyyah thought that word lion (*asad*) was assigned to refer to the bravery, which is mutual between lions and brave people. I would say that this claim means that languages are not arbitrary, albeit this claim being very broad, and people transferring meaning from an object to another **based on relationship**.

principle of *istiṣḥāb* because it is included in the previous rule. The US do not consider always *ḥaqīqah* in the category of preference.

As we learnt, the full principle of immediacy, according to the US is, (*ḥaqīqah* has preference without a clue, whereas allegory has a preference with a clue). There is no need, hence, to the principle of *istiṣḥāb* because it is included in the previous rule. The US do not consider always *ḥaqīqah* in the category of preference.

If immediacy plays the role of identifying *ḥaqīqah* and clue, deepening the convention or clues, there will not be a role, hence, the principle of *istiṣḥāb*. Furthermore, *istiṣḥāb's* conception can work only in the plain situation where there are no clues, or a certain convention, as explained in the principle of *iʿmāl*. The principle of *istiṣḥāb* can, therefore, be a part of the principle of *iʿmāl*. In case we are removing *istiṣḥāb* or we are deactivating it, the two streams are going to be same in their model, in which I believe.

Finally, the principles proposed by ʿAlī can work for literalism *waḍʿ* meaning rather than the *pragmatic* meaning, because they assert the importance of *ḥaqīqah* over other meanings, whereas pragmatics goes beyond the literal meaning. Principle of *istiṣḥāb* asserts *waḍʿ* over *use* and repeats some bases. The only principle that is related to pragmatics is the principle of immediacy, but with the condition laid by ʿAlī, it can be taken to *waḍʿ*. Considering *waḍʿ* over *use* breaks down the claim that the uṣūli studies are a pragmatic one.

ʿAlī presented very significant work, considering it was the first time in modern linguistics to formulate the works from Islamic linguistics. However, I think his attempt has some confusions and contradictions. For instance, there is a need for more critical issues, such as the predominance of use to be considered in interpretation. Details and rules under the principles are needed to be laid as well, and work with the light of the principle. The distinction between principles and bases are not effective from my point of view. In fact, these issues created motivations to readdress the case of the principles of interpretation, as will be addressed in the next sections.

3-1-3- Principles of Interpretation

In this section, I am going to present my view regarding the principles of interpretation according to the US. This approach is based on reading the US's conceptions and arguments in different matters of language and formulate them in a theoretical frame. I shall exhibit, at first, the primary principle which is the purpose of language that controls the principle of interpretation, since it is concluded in the previous chart that the higher purposes govern the process of interpretation.

I am going to use the Gricean model discussed in section (1-2-2) to frame and formulate my model, and I am going to categorise the model into a higher purpose and principles. The higher purpose will be the equivalent to the cooperative principle, whereas the principles of the maxims. The difference between my model and the Gricean's one is that I shall call the main principle the *purpose* because interpretation process works with the light of the higher purposes of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, as explained in section (2-3).

Another difference between my model and Grice's one is that my model is meant to formulate principles of interpretation, whereas Grice's one is meant to instruct speakers mainly. The two models look similar only in the frames.

I will use the relevance theorists' insights to develop the condition of immediacy as well. Their insights would help as will be seen in explaining the process of immediacy.

3-1-3-1- *Ifhām* is as a Purpose of Language

ʿAlī (2000) claimed that the US, are like the modern pragmaticians in terms of considering that cooperation (*al-taʿāwun*) is the primary motive behind the establishment of language, because people need to inform each other about their needs and to cooperate (al-Rāzī, M, pp. 1/193. al-Suyūṭī, 1998, pp. 1/34. ʿAlī, 2000, p. 63).

Despite the significance of the cooperation, it is a broad reason, and it is related to all common human activities, including language but not specialized for language. Usūl scholars rely on a technical term that relates to the purpose of language itself, which is the purpose of comprehension *ifhām* (ibn Ḥazm, 1984, p. 3/270; al-Razi, T, 1993, p. 2/5; al-Bukharī, 1997, p. 2/142; al-Aṣfhānī, 1986, p. 1/332; al-Taftāzānī, 1996, p. 1/290; al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 1/375; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 2/8; ibn ʾAmīr al-Ḥājj, 1983, p. 2/52).

Ifhām, as discussed in (2-3-2), is the purpose of language. The principles of interpretation, hence, are based on it and controlled by it. The key in considering *ifhām* as the purpose of language is that the success of communication depends on obtaining and achieving it. If only the hearer can reach what the speaker wants him to understand, the communication will be then effective and successful.

It is worth pointing out that the US use different ways to express this point. They say that *ifhām* is the purpose of language, discourse or speech, and they used these three terms (ibn Ḥazm, 1984, p. 3/270' al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 1/375. al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 2/8). However, there is no difference according to the different uses since the US mean by the terms *language use* where speech or discourse are extensions (*māṣadaq*) of it.

The question triggered in this principle is what are the elements of *ifhām*?

The word *ifhām* (lit: to make someone understand something) refers itself to its stipulations, and the term *ifhām* itself refers mainly to the hearer as you are going to make him understand something. In fact, al-Zarkashī asserted that *ifhām* is the characteristic or the attribution *ṣifah* of the speaker, whereas the comprehension (*fahm*) is the attribute or characteristic (*ṣifah*) of the hearer (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 2/36). Moreover, *Ifhām* is the task and the responsibility of the speaker to make the hearer understand what the speaker wants, lest the hearer understands what is not required from him by the speaker (al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/132).

Ifhām, according to my reading in PJ, can be fulfilled by following these procedures:

1- The consideration should be given to the quantity of the speech according to Āmidī's previous point that confirms that the hearer should not understand more than what is required by the speaker, and likewise, the speaker should not deliver more than what is required.

2- Considering the linguistic convention is important to obtain *ifhām*, because the speaker tends to use the mutual conventions in style and denotation to make sure that the hearer will obtain *Ifhām*. Al-Shāfiʿī (d.820) underlined this as discussed in (2-3-2) (al-Shāfiʿī, pp. 51-52; al-Raysūnī, 2005, p 266-267).

3- Considering the particular convention of the hearer. The US pointed out that making speech adequately manifest is required when the addressee is particular, but it is not required to make the speech manifest if the addressee is not particular, i.e., there is no need for more care in styles if the speech is meant to be delivered in general (al-Kalwadhānī, 1985, p. 1/349; Ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, p. 3/86; al-Armawī, 1988, p. 1/431; al-Simlālī, 2004, p. 4/367). The US scholars did not mean the speaker should not make his speech manifest if the addressee is not particular. However, they aimed to take particular hearer in more consideration; otherwise, the speaker will violate the principle of *ifhām*. Likewise, the speaker may have a particular convention, and it should be taken into consideration through the process of interpretation as will be explained in the third principle.

4- *Ifhām* could not be obtained unless the speaker considers the hearer's situation and their expectations towards understanding, regardless of whether he can react to the speech or not. In some situations where the hearer cannot react to the speech, he might understand it differently to how the speaker intended it. Al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388. al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 2/141) indicated that works required from the addressee should be within the scope of their ability as a condition of *ifhām* so that the hearer does not misinterpret the speaker's intended meaning, simply because it is beyond their understanding. Mental and physical

incompetence on the part of the hearer might be a diverting clue in relation to the intended meaning.

According to a reading of the US's works, these are the main components of *ifhām*. It can be said at the end of this section, that term *ifhām* equals the CP of Grice, which includes the maxims of Grice: the quantity, the manner and the relevance, because *ifhām* is based on the required quantity of the speech, the right manner, the nature of the speech and it being relevant to the context.

Ifhām requires the speaker to be cooperative and produce an adequate and evident amount of speech. It requires the hearer to consider what is meant to be delivered by the speaker and not any more.

After explaining the purpose of speech, we can turn now to its representatives in the principles of interpretation.

3-1-3-2- Principles of Interpretation

This section aims to present the principles of interpretation from a pragmatic perspective. Section (3-1-1) discussed the rules proposed by the US to conduct the interpretation theoretically. We discussed that general (*ʿāmm*) has preference over specific (*khāṣṣ*). Absolute (*al-muṭlaq*) has preference over qualified (*al-muqayyad*). Instituting (*al-taʾsīs*) has preference over emphasis (*al-tawkīd*), and we discussed the priorities in cases of contradiction. The previous rules can provide a theoretical basis. However, this section will discuss the pragmatic principles and bases under the principles. It is, of course, a more complicated process due to other elements involved in the pragmatic analysis.

As previously mentioned, the principles are governed by the Principle of *ifhām*. The model of interpretation will address only the hearer's side. i.e. it is concerned with interpreting speech. This is because the interpretation occurs from the hearer's side. Addressing the speaker's side was discussed in Chapter Two (2-3-1). These four principles are as follows:

1- Principle of the Hearer's Predisposition *Al-Istiʿdād* or *Al-Tahayyuʾ Al-Takhāṭubī*

    1-1- Communicational Predisposition Versus the Speaker

    1-2- Communicational Predisposition Versus the Context

    1-3- Communicational Predisposition Versus the Topic

2- Principle of *Iʿmāl* (to effectuate the speech)

3- Principle of Communicational Convention *Al-ʿAhd*

4- Principle of Immediacy *Tabādur*

3-1-3-2-1- The Hearer's Communicational Predisposition[20] *Al-Istiʿdād or Al-Tahayyuʾ Al-Takhāṭubī*

This principle refers to the communicational situation to which the hearer is engaged in and receives the speech. The hearer's predisposition will affect his expectations towards the speaker, context, topic and consequently the interpretation. This principle is about the hearer's expectations based on the hearer's communicational receptive background. This principle plays an essential role in biasing the interpretation towards a certain meaning and putting the hearer in the right position to interpret the speech. If the hearer's expectations are based on the wrong predisposition towards the speaker or the topic, then this might also lead to an unintended meaning. For example, if the hearer underestimates the speaker's ability in delivering a speech, he, accordingly, would try to find an appropriate interpretation that corresponds with his expectation about the speaker. Further, elementary texts cannot be understood in some cases despite their simplicity, because some readers might have a pre-existing stereotype that generates an expectation often leading to a misunderstanding. This stereotype might arise due to the type of topic, the author or another factor.

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[20] I prefer to use term *predisposition* because it includes two suggestions. It will refer to the attention of the speaker in the hearer's situation at the state of receiving the communication. Using term expectation does not include the previous suggestion because it does not refer to any concern of the speaker. Another reason is that the term *predisposition* inspires the hearer's expectation. The term *predisposition* can obtain the two suggestion, but the term expectation does not.

Hearer's expectations, also, play a significant role in the fourth principle of this model *immediacy principle*, so that the hearer, as a result of his expectations, can see that some meanings are more salient than others, as will be explained later.

Predisposition, briefly, is concerned with the hearer's expectation about speech in a certain context. *Al-tahayyuʾ,* has been mentioned as a condition of *ifhām* by some of the US. They presumed that the texts make "*ifhām* to those who are in a communicational predisposition (*mutahayyiʾ*) to receive a speech and understand it" (al-Subkī, 1999, 1/490; al-Zarkashī,1992, pp. 1/126; al-Taftazani, 1996, pp. 1/23; al-Kafawī, 1998, p. 658).

Al-Sakkākī (d, 1229) who is one of the most well-known Arabic rhetoricians believes that speakers choose the style that coincides best with the hearer's predisposition and situation. Hence, the speaker might "choose incipient informing (*al-khabar al-ibtidāʾī*) to construct a new meaning when the hearer's mind is free from any presuppositions". However, the style will be different if "the speech was delivered to the person who requests it" (al-Sakkākī, 1987, p. 170). The underlying reasons behind choosing one style over another can be the hearer's predisposition, and trying to reach the appropriate level of persuasion.

The US discussed the domains of communication as seen in section (2-2-2), which can put hearers in a certain predisposition; however, I am going to extend this notion to include more factors such as the topic and the speaker since they play roles in creating the hearer's predisposition. I shall present a system drawing together these statements of the US about this subject.

1- Communicational Predisposition Versus the Speaker

We discussed the expectation of the speaker towards the hearer in the speaker's intentionality (2-3-1). The discussion here is about the expectations of the hearer, which will be directed towards the speaker, especially his/her truthfulness (*ṣidq*) and his ability in explaining *bayān*). Truthfulness (*ṣidq*) and clarification (*bayan*) of the speaker are

discussed here from the hearer's perspective, not from the speaker's side as ʿAlī did because addressing them assists in the interpretation process that occurs from the hearer's side. The hearer subsequently can only expect whether the speaker tells the truth or not, and whether his ability of clarification can lead to making *ifhām* to the hearer or not. I, therefore, adopted the title communicational predisposition, versus the speaker.

Alī, in his model, considered *ṣidq* and *bayān* as two principles and discussed them from the speaker's side. He then assumed that the hearer would believe that the speaker is telling the truth as discussed in (3-1-2-1). I think that the two principles can be combined into one principle, and be discussed from the hearer's perspective, under the expectation of the hearer, since predisposition can obtain the speaker's truthfulness and his clarification.

Al-Rāzī pointed out that the hearer will interpret and consider the speaker's utterance if "he thinks that the speaker does not tell a lie" (al-Rāzi, pp. 1/332). The hearer, then, will take the speech to an allegorical interpretation, where *ḥaqīqah* cannot be activated, or the hearer may think that the speaker implies something else from his speech.

Adopting allegory or deducing implicature can be partially obtained from the hearer's expectation. As presented before, simple texts sometimes contain difficulty in interpretation because there might be a high or low expectation towards the level of the speaker's clarification (*bayan*). However, the hearer will stop the process of interpretation if he thinks that the speaker does not tell the truth (Ali, 2000, p. 66) or he might think that the speaker has not made his intention clear. Expectations regarding the speaker's clarification and truthfulness are the only aspect that the hearer can hold in this situation, and, according to his expectation, the hearer will choose the way of interpretation. The hearer might disregard what is said in the case of ambiguity, whereas truthfulness will make understanding challenging, but the hearer probably would not disregard it.

Contexts or conventions can play an essential role in expecting the speaker's truthfulness or clarification. Different contexts such as the context of irony, metaphors, hyperbole and teaching can shape the hearer's expectations towards the speaker.

There is still an important question remaining in this discussion. Communicators, in some situations pronounce certain statements, where they want the addressee to understand a particular meaning by making it salient, while they intend something else, as it happens in paronomasia (*al-tawriyah*)[21]. For example, if the speaker intends to withhold the truth or does not want to commit to the cooperative principles CP according to Grice (1975, P. 45). How can we, then, count the success of the communication? Can the communication be successful if the hearer only has access to the salient meaning, or do they need to understand the hidden meaning too? Putting it another way, the speaker, here, has two intentions. He intends the addressee to understand a specific meaning while he intends to deliver another one, as in Abū Bakr's paronomasia example.

To answer this question, it is necessary to revisit the purpose of language according to the usūl scholars, which is *ifhām.* Communication will be, according to the previous principle *ifhām*, considered successful if *ifhām* has been obtained, namely, communication will be considered successful if the hearer understands what the speaker wants him to understand and no more information (see, 3-1-3-1). This phenomenon *paronomasia* is, according to Arabic rhetoricians not an eloquent (*balīghah*) way of communication, although it refers to a high ability of the speaker in manipulating the words towards meaning (al-ʿAlawī, 1914, 3/62). It is not eloquent because the audience who receives the speech cannot understand it, from hand, and it violates the CP and convention on another hand. It is a kind of tricky game of words. The great speech is the one that can be understood well despite the difficulty of making the instance.

In the example of Abū Bakr, when he answered the addressee who asked Abū Bakr about his companion (prophet Muḥammad). Abū Bakr replied, "this is the man who is guiding me to the way". The word *way* was understood by the addressee as the way in the desert, whereas Abū Bakr intended by it to be "the way leading to the furtherance of his well-

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[21] Paronomasia (*al-tawriyah*) is when the speaker, in a certain context, uses polysemous words. The words have salient and far meaning and he intend the far meaning, whereas the hearer inclines to the salient one in interpretation (alʿAlawī, 1914, pp. 3/62. Abdul-Raof, 2006. P. 254).

being in life, and Paradise in the hereafter" (Ali, 2000, p. 72). ʿAlī considered that the hearer failed to reach the intended meaning by Abū Bakr. However, it can be said that the addressee obtained the meaning that Abū Bakr wanted because Abū Bakr, by means of using the technique of paronomasia (*al-tawriyah*), had two intentions: one for himself and one for the addressee. The addressee accessed the one placed for him, i.e. the addressee obtained what Abū Bakr wanted him to understand, so, the process of *ifhām*, was accurate and successful. Considering the communication successful is based on the purpose of language, according to the US, which is *ifhām*, despite violating the CP in terms of interaction with the co-present addressee.

Abū Bakr has two meanings here: one for himself and one for the addressee. It can be argued that the communication will fail if the hearer understands the far meaning because he understands more than is required from him by the speaker. If the hearer understands more than the speaker intended, then this reflects the speaker cannot use conventional rules to make his intention salient. Namely, the speaker failed in the process of *ifhām*.

At which state, then, should the success of communication be considered? Through accessing the meaning intended by the speaker as ʿAlī claimed, or through the principle of *ifhām*. The communication would be, according to the US, successful at considering the principle of *ifhām* because this what is meant by the speaker, and this is the purpose of language as discussed before.

The following chart will exhibit the cases of successful or unsuccessful communication

	The speaker			The hearer	
The case	*Waḍ* '-based meaning	Intended meaning	*Ifhām- bases* meaning	Interpreted meaning	Success of communication
I	+	+	+	-	unsuccessful
II	+	+	+	+	successful
III	-	+	+	-	unsuccessful
IV	-	-	+	+	successful
V	- +	+	-	-	unsuccessful

Figure 3. Formulas of successful and unsuccessful communication

The objective of this discussion is to reach the formulas of "effective communication" according to Gleave's expression (2012, p.4). The previous chart explained the situations of successful and unsuccessful communication. The pluses and minuses are only used to refer to the matching between delivered and interpreted meanings. The conclusion is that the success of communication is based on matching the interpretation and the *ifhām- based* meaning.

ʿAlī in his chart (Ali, 2000, p. 50) considered that communication is regarded as successful if only the interpreted meaning matches the intended meaning. However, I have added another category, which is the *ifhām*-based meaning to be involved in the formulas of meanings.

Regarding the cases in the chart, the case *I* shall happen when the hearer cannot obtain any meaning from the speaker and, of course, this is considered as unsuccessful communication. Case *II* is clear. Concerning case *III*, the communication fails because it matches neither the intended nor the *ifhām*-based meaning. The example for *IV* has been extensively discussed in the example of Abū Bakr under the technique of paronomasia (*al-tawriyah*). Regarding case *V*, there is only an intended meaning without any other meaning, and the hearer could not access it. The communication, obviously, is considered unsuccessful.

Before leaving this section, it is useful if we consider an example of the hearer's expectation towards the linguistic ability of the speaker. A language teacher expects a certain level from her students. However, sometimes, some students might mislead their teacher if they speak higher or lower than their level. The teacher, for the first instance, can be misled because she does not expect this level. The teacher's expectation is motivated by the students' abilities. Her expectation motivates her to look for a meaning that is suitable to the students' level. The students, in language, might use very technical terms that the teacher does not expect from them, so, she might go to think that they mean something else.

Furthermore, the expectation about the speaker's truthfulness or the speaker's (*bayan*) depends heavily on the hearer's knowledge of the speaker's history, habit, and ability in the use of the language (al-Mawṣilī, 2001, p. 101). The hearer can, on some occasions, understand the two meanings *hidden and salient* delivered by the speaker if he is aware of the speaker's use of expressions. The hearer, then, is descending from the general conventional (*maʿhūd*) rules to the specific conventional (*maʿhūd*) rules in interpreting the speech. This convention will be discussed in further detail within the following sections.

In summary, the predisposition versus the speaker plays a role in adopting the interpretation of the utterance or ignoring it. The same text can be approached differently if it is issued by two different people, according to their abilities. We tend to search for any possible interpretation when the utterance has been made by a lecturer, and we might ignore the same utterance if it has been made by another. The next principle will discuss the issue of ignoring or adopting the interpretation of an utterance.

2- Communicational Predisposition Versus the Context

In specific contexts the expectation of the hearer's expectation is biased towards some of the meanings depending on the context. The usūl scholars call this the *context of*

muwāḍaʿah (see section 2-3). Usūl scholars classified using language into three realms (semantic, customary, and jurisprudential) as explained in section (2-2-2) because they think that the hearer gravitates towards a certain meaning due to the realm of the usage. Their rule says that *ḥaqīqah*s will be changed according to the domain of use (al-Subkī A, 1981, pp. 3/231; al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 2/228-229).

However, there is another type of context, which is narrower than the realm of use. This type of context is related to the context between the speaker and the hearer at the point where the speech is occurring, as in the case of Abū Bakr when he met the tribesman in the desert. The context made the tribesman interpret the *way* as a physical path. Realms refer to the field at which words are used (semantic, customary, and jurisprudential). However, contexts refer to factors surrounding a specific communication such as learning, playing or any other clues (*qarāʾin*).

Both the field and the context play roles in generating particular expectations in the hearer's minds.

3- Communicational Predisposition Versus the Topic

Within any topic, interlocutors' predisposition and expectations are communicatively orientated to the topic. This claim can be confirmed as one of the interlocutors stated, "*sorry I did not expect you to be talking about that*". This occurs most often when one of the interlocutors says something that does not relate to the current topic.

The Jurisprudential rule that responds to this expectation is "the question is iterated in the answer" "*al-suʾāl muʿād fī al-jawāb*" (al-Suyūṭī, A, 1983, p. 141; al-Būrnū, 2003, pp. 6/3). An example, similar to Grice, can be used to articulate this case. If someone says: *is Tom good at maths*? And if the answer is *yes*, then this means that Tom is good at maths, because the question states *is he good at maths*. By virtue of the previous rule, it is iterated in the answer, so, the full answer will be *yes, Tom is good at maths*. The paradox will happen if the answer is that *he is good at philosophy.* The question, here, is not iterated in

the answer. This can make the speech nonsensical or generate an implicature according to the clues (*qarāʾin*). If someone has said, *I will sell you my car,* and the other has said, *I accept,* jurisprudentially the transaction has completed because of the rule "the question is iterated in the answer".

By returning to the example of prophet Muḥammad placed above, "*We come from mā*ʾ". The man asked the prophet, and there is a connoted word in his question "*where do you come from?*". The connoted word is located behind the word *where,* which is in reference to *place* so, he meant: *which place do you come from?*, and because the rule says that the question is iterated in answer, the man thought that prophet meant that *the place we come from is mā*ʾ. Prophet Muḥammad was aware of the purpose of the question, but of course "prophet would not give the addressee any information that would lead to their being arrested" (Ali, 2000, p. 71). The man did not access the hidden meaning because he expected to receive an answer referring to a place, because of the topic and the context in which the exchange took place. Under this rule, the man thought that the prophet was repeating the question in his answer.

This rule "the question is iterated in the answer", also depends on the clarity of the question and whether the question is iterated or not.

3-1-3-2-2- Principle of *Iʿmāl* (to effectuate the speech)

The essence of this principle is based on two points: The first is that the speech should be orientated towards meaning before deciding to ignore it. The other point to consider is whether there is more than one possible interpretation, then the more informative one should be taken into consideration. Examples for the second point can be in these bases of the principles of jurisprudence PJ. General (*ʿāmm*) has preference over specific (*khāṣṣ*). Absolute (*al-muṭlaq*) has preference over qualified (al-*muqayyad*). Instituting (*al-taʾsīs*) has preference over emphasis (*al-tawkīd*) and so on, as discussed in (3-1-1).

If there is more than one potential signification, and there is no clue *qarīnah* to guide interpretation towards a particular signification, the signification that is more informative will have the preference (al-Subkī, 1991, p. 1/189; al-Suyūṭī, A, 1983, p. 128; ʿAlī, 2000, P. 68).

The US substantiate this principle by asserting that the speaker is rational. Hearers will consider rationality and tend to consider speech, not ignore it. Considering every linguistic element has preference over omittance, because hearers consider with a reason, the linguistic quantity is found in the utterance. On the other hand, if the hearer disregards any linguistic quantity, he does this without evidence (*tarjīḥ min ghaīr murajjiḥ*) (al-Taftazani, 2/31-32), and the hearer, thus, assumes that the speaker's communication is based on a random choice, and this is not the primary expectation of communication (al-Taftazani, pp. 2-31-32; ʿAlī, 2000, P. 68). This rule is based as ʿAlī (2000, p. 68) explained on maximising the meaning of a speech.

This principle intersects with Levinson's notion of amplifying the content of the speech (1-2-3). The principle takes informativeness in consideration.

However, despite the significant rule of this principle, there are some notes on the arguments presented previously. It is linguistically difficult to compute the efficiency of all people at the same level. This principle depends on the premise of *expectation*. Accordingly, the hearer tends to orient to the discourse being analysed to the maximum possibility based on their expectations of the speaker's intentions.

Uṣūl scholars considered this principle in the Qurʾān and the Sunnah discourses because they believe that God will not use higher informative styles to covey lesser meanings. However, if the hearer thinks that the speaker does not have the required ability to reach the level where he intends every linguistic element, this principle, in this case, will not be operated. This principle works in parallel with the premise *expectation*.

Another point can be raised here. This principle can work theoretically and can be applied to the bare texts, which depends only on their wording, rather than contexts and convention. The US discussed this principle and the other bases placed under it and found no preference to use one over the other (ibn juzaī, 2003, p. 1/165; al-Subkī, 1995, p. 3/30; al-Zarkashī, 1992pp. 6/165-168; al-Simlālī, 2004, pp. 2/360- 375; al-Shawkani, 2000, pp. 2/1133-1150). This principle works in primordial situations, where there is not any clue (*qarīnah*).

These are some rules for PJ writings that express this principle:

i- "Making sense of the utterance has priority over disregarding it" (*i ʿmāl al-kalām awlā min ihmālih*) (al- Ṣuyūṭī, p. 128).

ii- "Making sense of the utterance has preference over ignoring it" (*inna ḥaml al-kalām ʿala fāʾidatin awlā min ilghāʾih*) (al- Ṣuyūṭī, p. 129).

Al-Ṣuyūṭī (d. 1505) illustrates the previous rules by offering many examples (al-Ṣuyūṭī. 1983, Pp. 128-132). One of his examples considers that if one declares that he leaves his possessions to *awlādih* (his children), the word *awlād* must be given to his descendants, in the case that he does not have children. This avoids any disregards of the expression, because the word *awlādih* in Arabic includes children, and descendants in general.

Another convoluted example can be placed to additionally articulate this principle. If someone sarcastically says *one of you is divorced* to his wife and a car, the view of many Muslim jurists would be that his wife has been divorced. This is on the premise that the that the car cannot accept this conception (al-Ṣuyūṭī. 1983, Pp. 128). They substantiate such cases as follows: there are two possible interpretations, one is to disregard the speech, by diverting it towards the car, which the ruling cannot involve, and the other is the speech can be regarded by biasing it to his wife. Orienting the speech to the *car* will disregard it, but orienting it to his wife will regard it, and the base says, "Making sense of the utterance has priority over disregarding it". Therefore, the speech directed to his wife will be taken into consideration.

According to this principle, if the hearer must choose between an informative interpretation and a more informative one, he would, as maintained by this principle, choose the more informative one (Ali, 2000, p. 69), because this leads to increasing the value. Some rules that are correlated to this principle will be listed down to show us the effect of this principle:

i- Allegory should be considered if since *ḥaqīqah* is impossible, and this should be done in order not to disregard the speech (al-Subkī T, 1991, pp. 1/189; Ibn Nujaym, 1980, p.135).

ii- Absolute *muṭlaq* will be operated to its pure meaning until evidence of qualification *taqyīd* has been presented. For example, if there is a law that presents the residents a specific benefit, everyone considered a resident can benefit from it by virtue of the principle of *iʿmal,* until a new law comes into being and is explained.

iii- Specific (*khāṣṣ*) would be preceded over general (*ʿāmm),* because we consider the two texts in this case. We consider the general (*ʿāmm*) for all cases and the specific (*khāṣṣ*) for the individual cases. Referring to the previous example, if there has been a new law excluding some cases of residents, then the law will be applied in general to all cases and only exclude some cases.

iv- Expressing an indivisible statement is like uttering the entire statement (*dhikr baʿḍ mā lā yatajazzaʾ kadhikr al-kul*). For example, if someone says to his wife: *you are one half divorced*. She will be considered divorced, because divorce does not accept division, and the speech should not be ignored as far as there is a potentiality of applying it (ibn Nujaym, 1999, p.135).

v- Originality is over tautology (*al-taʾṣīl dūna al-ziyādah*) (al-Qarāfī, 2004, p. 93; al-Asnawī, 1980, p. 167; al-Simlālī, 2004, p. 2/367). The same example can be used again. If someone says to his wife: *you are divorced, you are divorced*. There can be two probabilities; the first one is to consider the repeated clause as an emphasis; however, the second

is to consider the second clause as a new speech. Consideration will be oriented, by virtue of this principle to the second possibility because it regards the speech as seen in section (3-1-1).

vi-   Finally, the only way the speech can be ignored is when there is no route to be considered. (*Idhā taʿadhdhar iʿmāl al-kalām yuhmal*) (al-Būrnū, 2003, pp. 1/289). In this case, the speech cannot be interpreted because there is no potential interpretation, we can disregard it.

Before we discuss the third principle, we have one last question to consider, what is the relationship between this principle and the pragmatic perspective of language?

This principle contributes partly to the semantic values and the pragmatic aspects. It considers the speech of interlocutors as semantically intended because they are rational, and do not randomly deliver their words. Hence, their speech should be biased towards a particular meaning unless some obstacles are raised. This principle can contribute to pragmatics as well, by working in parallel with the principle of communicational predisposition and principle of convention, in order to know which way the *iʿmāl* will be activated, especially when there are conventional significations: *iʿmāl* to utterances. Otherwise, this principle will be dedicated only for the standard cases being considered semantically.

Principle of the convention, which is the next one, can employ the principle of *iʿmāl* and define specifically the way of adopting meanings.

I shall conclude this section with an example from the Qurʾān, Q 4: 97. {Whoever does righteousness, whether male or female, while he is a believer - We will surely cause him to live a good life, and We will surely give them their reward [in the Hereafter] according to the best of what they used to do}.

The expression *causes him to live a good life* can equally (in Arabic) have two possible interpretations: the life we live, or life after death (in paradise). The first interpretation has

a preference. This is because the rest of the verse insists that righteous people will be rewarded in the Hereafter. Accordingly, the expression *cause him to live a good life* will only be repeated and included in the expression *we will surely give them their reward [in the Hereafter]*. By virtue of the principle *iʿmāl* the interpretation of this *life* will have a preference because *iʿmāl* gives preference to originality over tautology, and the two meanings that can be obtained here are *the good life now* and *in paradise* (al-Shanqīṭī, 1995, 2/97).

3-1-3-2-3- Principle of Communicational Convention *Al-ʿAhd*

The term *al-ʿahd* overlaps with the other the two terms in the classical Islamic tradition. Specifically, *predominance of use (ghalabah al-istiʿmāl),* and the term *custom (alʿurf)* carries with the same merits as the term *convention*. However, I shall use the term convention for the following reasons:

Convention is certainly yielded by the force of *predominance of use* as explained in (2-2-3) when we concluded that any meaning could become conventional by the force of the *predominance of use.* I tend to use *convention* instead of the *predominance of use* because the term *convention* refers to the meaning becoming the conventional meaning, i.e. the term completed his way to becoming conventionally determined. The *predominance of use* refers more to the process; however, *convention* refers to the conclusion. The term convention entails *predominance of use,* but not necessarily the contrary, since the *predominance of use* is a long process. It might refer to meanings being thought of as getting the *predominance of use*. The last step of the *predominance of use* is the convention.

The term *custom* has jurisprudential suggestions since it is used as a principle in rulings. This term is vast due to its jurisprudential connotation, and it is therefore, broader than required. The term convention seems more appropriate to fit our purposes in this section, especially as it is used by the US in contexts of interpretation as seen with al-Shāfiʿī and al-Shāṭibī (2-3-2).

However, the contents of the three terms that are related to the process of interpretation will be combined in this section.

The term *communicational convention* refers to the denotation that it is obtained by the force of use. We agreed that convention is a type of linguistic agreement amongst users of the language (2-2-2; 2-3-2), and therefore, it could happen in different levels or fields. There can be a discussion about the convention in the scientific field, area, groups, person and so on. Convention here, is the one shared amongst the language users in any specific area, field, or even personally between specific people.

This principle is at the core of Islamic pragmatics and plays a substantial role in interpretation. It has been insisted upon since al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820) who laid the first work in PJ to the modern Islamic uṣūl scholars, such as al-Raysūnī (al-Shāfiʿī, pp. 51-52. al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 2/376; al-Raysūnī, 2005, p. 266-267).

This principle replaces the principle adopted by ʿAlī (2000) *istiṣḥāb* (lit, maintenance of the original status) (see: 3-1-2-1). However, I would think that convention is the essence of Islamic pragmatics and plays the main role in changing the salience of a meaning. It is the reason to make *ḥaqīqah* an allegory, or to lift an allegory to becoming *ḥaqīqah* as discussed in (2-2-3). *Istiṣḥāb* confirms, according to ʿAlī, that we have to maintain considering *ḥaqīqah* over allegory, where ʿAlī concluded that *ḥaqīqah* equates to the literal meaning. On the contrary, I concluded that *ḥaqīqah* equates to the conventional meaning (2-2-3). If we are going to consider *istiṣḥāb*, we have to consider the decisive factor which determines *ḥaqīqah* and allegory and the changing of their roles. The decisive factor is the convention as seen. For this reason, the convention is the principle that plays a role in interpretation, especially in the way it responds to the pragmatic effects that might change the predominant meanings according to the use. *Istiṣḥāb* (presumption of continuity), however, confirms the static situation of language, contradicting the concept of pragmatics, which is dynamic according to the language users and conventions.

This principle convention assumes that there might be more than one denotation: where one outweighs the others in the interpretative process. This conventional meaning, hence, comes into mind immediately, due to the convention amongst language users, as will be explained in the next section.

It is not only vocables that can have their conventional meaning. Styles can also have a conventional signification. The following example taken from prophet Muḥammad in a Ḥadīth narrated by his wife ʿĀʾishah, can illustrate this point. She said,

"the prophet said to me, I, in fact, know when you are satisfied with me or not. How do you know that? ʿĀʾishah replied. He said if you swear by Muḥammad's Lord, you are satisfied with me, whereas when you swear by Ibrahim's Lord, you are not. She replied, yes. It is right" (al-Bukhārī, 2001, pp. 7/36).

In this example, ʿĀʾishah used either "proper oath's" expressions (Muḥammad's Lord or Ibrahim's Lord), however, the prophet knew why she used different expressions to perform a valid oath in different contexts. With the former expression used when she was happy, and the latter when she was angry, and therefore each expression exemplified her emotions towards the prophet. This conclusion was gained by the convention between the prophet and his wife. The prophet obtained the intention by the means of her own convention.

However, the previous example can express a special convention in a specific case. General convention, for example, can be found in the meanings of words, as explained in *ḥaqīqah* and allegory, and it can also be found in linguistic styles. Convention can also work in proverbs, where the literal meaning is another and not the intended one in the expression, by virtue of use. The Arabic metonymy (*kināyah*) states, "man with lots of ash" (*rajul kathīr al-ramād*) is a proverb which means that the man is very generous because ash can always be found at his home. The allusion is that he always has guests and he cooks for them.

The word prayer (*ṣalāh*) can also be an excellent example to demonstrate the role of convention in its interpretation, since the word *ṣalāh* (prayer) can either refer to the known worship (performing prayer) or the literal meaning *supplication.* The change of interpretation is dominated by the convention and the context, and the examples of the convention in the proverb and words can happen in all languages because it is related to users.

Convention plays an essential role in general *ʿāmm* to make it *khāṣṣ.* The Arabic word *dābbah* (lit: any living creature that walks on land), however, the convention allocated is only in reference to animals, so when this word is used, minds go to the new meaning, and not to the original meaning because of the convention (al-Baṣrī, 1964, p. 1/301; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 2/157). Absolute (*muṭlaq*) can be also identified by the convention. For example, if someone swore not to eat meat and ate fish, he would not be considered breaching his oath, because fish is customarily not considered meat (al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/191; al-Būrnū, 2003, p. 10/669).

Importance of convention, according to uṣūl scholars does not stop at this point, but goes further. For instance, the concept of the convention was expanded by the US to consider it as a legislative source under the name of *custom* (*ʿurf*), which, according to them, can play a role in interpretation or can even produce rulings (*aḥkām*) (Zaydān, 2009, p. 201; al-Zuhailī, 1986, p. 2/830).

The word *ʿurf* in Arabic, or custom, refers to "what is common" (al-Fayrūzʾābādī, 2005, p. 835-836). Consequently, we should refer to what is common in interpreting speech or understanding certain rules. For example, when someone buys a mobile phone, the charger will be included in the transaction because of custom, unless the seller stipulates that the charger is not included. An example of the role of custom in producing rulings *aḥkām* can be found in the previous example, that if someone swore not to eat meat, he would not be breaching his oath, because fish is customarily not considered meat.

Despite ʿurf being a source to produce rulings (ʾaḥkām) and interpret texts, uṣūl scholars stipulated some bases to control using this source. The prime base states that "the custom is evidence" (al-Juwaynī, B, 1979, p. 1/582; al-Suyūṭī j. A.-d., 1983, p. 89; al-Shawkani, 2000, p. 2/697; al-Būrnū, 2003, pp. 7/337). However, under this base uṣūl scholars subsumed a set of bases[22]:

i- "Custom takes the legislative text's role" (al-ʿādah tanzil manzilah al-naṣṣ). Custom can play the role of texts when there is no text, as shown in the mobile phone example.

ii- "The usage of people is evidence that must be acted upon" (istiʿmāl al-nās ḥujjah yajib alʿamal bihā) (al-Būrnū, 2003, pp. 1/388; al-Zarqā, 1989, p. 223).

iii- "The common and recurrent custom (ʿurf)is like a stipulated condition" al-ʿādah al-muṭṭaridah tanzil manzilah al-sharṭ (al-Būrnū, 2003, pp. 7/337).

iv- "The custom (ʿurf) is proof in specifying the absolute (muṭlaq)" (al-ʿādah muʿtabarah fī taqyīd al-muṭlaq) (al-Būrnū, 2003, pp. 7/337). For example, if someone is buying something in the UK and the seller asks him for the money without specifying the currency, the money will be by virtue of convention and custom identified as the British pound.

v- "What is laid by ʿurf is like a stipulated condition" (al-maʿrūf ʿurfān kalmashrūṭ sharṭān) (ibn Nujaym, 1999, p. 84; al-Būrnū, 2003, pp. 7/337).

vi- "Assigning by ʿurf is like Assigning by texts" (al-taʿyīn bil ʿurf ka al-t-taʿyīn bil naṣṣ) (al-Zarqā, 1989, p. 24; al-Būrnū, 2003, pp. 2/417).

vii- "Each speaker generally has his own ʿurf , so, we should consider his ʿurf when he speaks" (kul mutakallim lahu ʿurf faʾinna lafdhah ʿinda a-liʾṭlāq yuḥmal ʿalā ʿurfih) (al-Qarāfī, pp. 3/118; al-Būrnū, 2003, pp.

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[22] I depended on Kamali translation in some term. See (Kamali, 2014-2015, p. 370-371).

8/593). This rule refers to a specific custom or convention. Al-Zarkashī (d. 1392) stipulated that the hearer should be considerably aware of the speaker's convention in interpreting his speech. Al-Zarkashī, therefore, thought that allegorical interpretation (*al-taʾwīl*) should be based either on the language, the common convention, or the specific convention (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 3/443).

viii- "ʿ*Urf* should be out of consideration as to when the interlocutors stipulate in contrary to it" (y*asquṭ iʿtibār al-ʿurf ʿind al-tanṣīṣ bikhilāfih*) (al-Būrnū, 2003, pp. 12/373). In this case, custom cannot work because there is a condition not to be considered. If someone is trading in the UK where the British pound is used, but he explicitly mentioned that he would use the US dollars, there cannot be a possibility to object because there is a stipulation of co-contracting to ignoring the convention.

In summary, it can be deduced from the previous statements that convention has the following properties:

1- Spatial, it differs from one place to another one due to its use.
2- Temporal, it differs from time to time due to the movement of use.
3- Common, it can be related to groups or communities.
4- Contextual, it differs from context to context and from one domain to another one. I.e. it can happen within small groups.
5- Personal, it can pertain to persons.

Despite the significant role of the convention or custom, the convention is not the only principle deal with interpretation. There are other principles. In order for this principle not to contradict other principles, the US stipulate some rules to temper reliance on custom or convention. These rules are derived from the custom and convention topics[23]. They think that convention can only be considered if it is:

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[23] I have already mentioned that custom deal with jurisprudence, whereas convention deal with interpretation.

1- General, where people in a certain environment are aware of it

2- Recurrent and consistent. It is continuously considered by people

3- Not against the purposes of Islamic law (this condition is stipulated to the work of the custom in the ruling)

4- It is valid when the case or issue is happening, not before or after

If the custom or convention had these conditions, it would be considered as a source to interpret or to produce rules, and will be compulsory, unless the speakers state an opposition to it. (al-Ḥamwī, 1985, pp. 1/311-317; Zaydān, 2009, pp. 203-204).

The three terms *custom, convention, predominance of use,* have been used here interchangeably because each one has an additional contribution from a different viewpoint.

The last point is that this principle reflects to the domain of use. Hence, it is broad and cannot correspond to specific conversations or texts, where the interlocutors involve more linguistic elements to their communications. Accordingly, there is a need for another principle to respond to a narrower domain or special contexts. The next sections will present the principle that accomplishes this task.

3-1-3-2-4- Principle of Immediacy *Tabādur*

In the previous section, the principle of the convention was addressed, and its vital role has been discussed in changing the denotation of words according to using language. The principle being studied now can be the reaction of the one that had been studied before, because when the denotation of a word has been changed by the power of convention, the effect of this changing will be salient in the user's language. Accordingly, it can be said that the convention is a source of the salient meaning (Giora, 1999, p. 919).

We pointed out that the convention principle is general and reflects the domain of use. The new principle responds to the domain in use, and hence it is an examiner of the convention's meaning. It also reflects to context as will be seen. Its work, hence, is more precise and more special than the role of convention.

There is an agreement amongst the US in considering immediacy in interpretation as seen in (2-2-3). Immediacy is considered the primary criterion in defining *ḥaqīqah* from allegory because it is a criterion to examine to what extent the interlocutors adhere to the linguistic conventions, and the purposes of conversation and its context because immediacy is a cognitive reflection towards the previous elements.

In this section, the discussion will be dedicated to defining the concept of immediacy, the factors that generate it and its conditions. However, before that, I would like to draw attention to the terminology (*tabādur*) that has been discussed in modern pragmatics.

Giora (1999) presented a paper on salience, discussing the priority of the salient meaning over other potential meanings (Giora, 1999, p. 919). She discussed the term *salience*, which is close to the term immediacy (*tabādur*). However, there are slight differences between the two terms.

The term immediacy (*tabādur*) in PJ refers to the users of language; however, the linguistic pragmatic term *salience* refers to meaning itself. The term immediacy has cognitive suggestions, which points out that meaning comes into mind immediately without call, whereas, the term salience does not have the cognitive suggestion because it is related to the meanings themselves. It can be said that salience is generated by immediacy. I am going, therefore, to adopt ʿAlī's translation as a rough one to the Arabic term immediacy, because it expresses the uṣūlī case with its suggestions.

Another point proposed by Giora is that the mental lexicon, not the context, which governs the interpretation and defines the salient meaning[24]. This precisely agrees with the uṣūl scholars' conceptions about the three ḥaqīqahs (semantic, customary and jurisprudential).

The US classified meanings according to their realms and categorised the standard signification in each field. The signification in each field can make its own dictionary, as some Muslim scholars did. There can be seen in the Arabic and Islamic linguistic tradition some dictionaries allotted to a particular field[25]. The purpose of these particular dictionaries is to identify the salient meaning in the particular realm.

I presented the term *salience* to explain why I am going to use term *immediacy* instead of the modern pragmatic term *salience,* despite roughly referring to the conception. From presenting Giora's approach, its aim is to refer to the rapprochement amongst the US's works and the modern ones through the principle of immediacy.

As discussed above and in (2-2-3), immediacy refers to the meaning that comes into the minds of language users without calling this meaning or that, but rather as a cognitive reaction. We concluded that there are two types of immediacy:

- Immediacy without a clue *qarīnah.*
- Immediacy with a clue *qarīnah*.

We concluded that some of the confusion in dealing with the principle of immediacy comes imprecise remarks regarding the concept of immediacy.

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[24] Mental lexicon is defined as a mental dictionary that "contains information specific to individual words – semantic, grammatical, and phonological – needed to use the words appropriately" (Cruse, 2006, p. 104). It is a kind of internal dictionary that relates to a specific realm, group or even persons. I think that it is a dictionary of a specific convention. It can be said that mental dictionary or convectional one.

[25] There are many dictionaries that are dedicated to a specific realm such as Ṭilba al-Ṭalabah, ʿUmar bin Muḥammad al-Nasafī; al-Mughrib fī Taratyib al-Muʿrib, Nāṣir bin ʿAbd al-Sayyid.

The term immediacy carries cognitive suggestions. These suggestions refer that immediacy is a type of reaction to a factor. This factor is either the convention or the clue according to its different types. These two factors generate the salient meanings in the minds of hearers since convention and context can impact the preferable meaning. There are no other options. The governor in immediacy is the link, which is either leans towards the convention or to the context within its clues [26].

We have already studied the role of the convention. We can turn now to the role of context, and the clue, as this principle works on a narrower scale of interpretation related to the context.

Clue is defined as "a thing that refers to what is intended" (al-Jurjānī ʿ. B., 1985). There is another definition of clue presented by al-Tahānawī (d. after 1745), who says that clue is "what refers to a thing without being used in it" (al-Tahānawī, 1996, p. 1315)[27]. The two definitions imply that the clue can be anything assisting in accessing intended meaning, despite the second definition being more specific, when it excluded signs that are part of the thing. According to the two definitions, clues can be texts, contexts, situations of the speakers, signs, actions, and "thing cannot be counted" according to al-Ghazālī (2015, p. 2/22-23). So, anything that plays a role in accessing the intended meaning can be a clue.

The uṣūl scholars divided clues into verbal and non-verbal, such as context and situations of the speakers (al-Ghazalī, 2015, pp. 2/22-23). Despite there being many clues, Muhammad al- Jurjānī could categorise them into two types; diverting clue (*qarīnah ṣārifah*), and guiding clue (*qarīnah hādiyah*) (al-Jurjānī M. b., 1997, p. 185; ʿAlī, 2000, p. 35-36).

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[26] The essence of Sperber and Wilson's work focused on the relevance and the cognition as seen in (1-3)
[27] ʿAlī (2000) elaborately discussed the role of clue.

The diverting clue prevents a certain interpretation from being considered, because it is impossible to be meant. However, according to al- Jurjānī, this clue is not enough to guide an individual to the intended meaning, so a guiding clue is needed to help the hearer reach the intended meaning (al-Jurjānī M. b., 1997, p. 185; ʿAlī, 2000, p. 35-36).

The following example can explain the two types of clues. Calling someone a *lion* cannot be understood by its literal meaning. This is the diverting clue, but this clue is not enough to know what is meant by calling this person *lion,* without a guiding clue. The guiding clue can be the context in which the speech is happening. Hence, if the speech is happening in the context of praise (guiding clue), the intended meaning will, then, be that this person is brave.

The Ḥanafī school counted five reasons or clues that play roles in *ḥaqīqah* and allegory. Some of the reasons behind this are "the denotation of use (*diliālah ʿurf al-istiʿmāl*), the denotation of the vocable itself (*dilālah al-lafdh*), the context of the speech, the situation of the speaker (*dilālah al-mutakallim fī sifatih*), and the situation of the speech (*dilālah maḥal al-kalām*)" (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 127; al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/190; al-Bukharī, 1997, p. 2/140; ibn ʾAmīr al-Ḥājj, p. 1983, 1/282).

The following examples of these five factors can illustrate the aforementioned reasons. With regard to the denotation of use, a straightforward example can be taken from the word *prayer*, which is used to mean supplication before Islam (in the semantic realm), whereas its meaning after Islam is the action of prayer (in the jurisprudential realm). Leaving *ḥaqīqah*, in the previous example, is because of use. With respect to the denotation of the vocable, if someone swears that he will not eat meat, his oath will not be considered breached if he eats fish, because the word meat itself does not conventionally include fish without a clue (*qarīnah*). i.e., fish can be counted meat with a clue but not without. It can be scientifically argued that it is a type of meat but not conventionally within the Arabic language, and we learnt that convention has preference over semantics (see, 2-2-2). The third reason that *ḥaqīqah* can be left with is the context of the speech, and we can take this example to clarify this reason. If a teacher says to one

of her lazy students: *you will be responsible for your work, so it is up to you whether you want to study or not.* It is clear, by the power of context, that the teacher does not want to give options to her students. Rather, she wants to rebuke them. With regards to the fourth reason, an example can be taken from the Qurʾān, Q 17: 64. When God is talking to Satan {And incite [to senselessness] whoever you can among them with your voice and assault them with your horses ...}. The verse did not explicitly command Satan to be an unbeliever and fight God and control believers, however, the intended meaning, according to al-Sarkhasī (d. 1090), is that God gave him the possibility to do so (al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/193). An example for the last reason can be taken again from the Qurʾān, Q 35: 19 {they are not same, a blind man and man who can see}. There are, in some situations, some specific requirements required for the work to be done. When people, for instance, go to war to defend their country, the meaning, in verse, is not to deny equality in general. However, the purpose is to deny equality in the situation of war, *ḥaqīqah* (they are not equal always) is being left here because of the situation of the speech *maḥal al-kalām* (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 127; al-Sarkhsī, p. 1/190; al-Bukharī, 1997, p. 2/140; ibn ʾAmīr al-Ḥājj, p. 1983, 1/282). These are the comprehensive clues according to the Ḥanafī school.

In summary, clues plays the central role in guiding speech to the intended meaning, and making it salient in the minds of hearers even if it is conventionally not salient. Back to the example of prophet Muḥammad and his companion Abū Bakr, where the tribesman interpreted word *māʾ* as a name of a tribe, this is the salient meaning that comes to mind due to the context where the interchange occurred. It is the same for the other example where Abū Bakr replied to the tribesman when he asked him about the prophet, and he replied (this is the man who is guiding me to the way). The tribesman understood that the prophet is guiding him to his destination, whereas Abū Bakr meant that prophet guides him to good (*khair*). Both the prophet and Abū Bakr used the technique of immediacy to divert the tribesman's mind towards the salient meaning , even it is not the intended one.

The principle of immediacy, because of its nature, can be used by the speakers to divert the minds of the hearers to a specific position of interpretation.

The last point in this principle pertains to the conditions of immediacy. The US stipulated one condition, but this one can lead to others by employing the insights from the relevant theorists because immediacy, according to the US is governed by convention or clue. The salient meanings are obtained by the relevance either to convention or clues. Relevance plays a significant role in immediacy. The conditions are as follows:

1- The first condition is that the right immediacy is the one precedes to minds "*tasbiq ilā al-dhihn*)" (al-Baṣrī, 1964, p. 1/28; al-Āmidī, 2003/1424, p. 1/50; ibn Qudamah, 2002, p. 1/503; al-Bukharī, 1997, p. 2/142).

2- The fast immediacy requires less effort. This condition is derived from the cognitive nature of immediacy.

3- The right immediacy is the one that has the more explicite clue. In order to minimise effort, the clue should be explicit, i.e., the more explict clue, the less effort, and then the faster immediacy. This reminds us of the optimal relevance discussed in (1-3).

These conditions were not explicitly stipulated by the US, but they can be understood from the cognitive nature of immediacy and through the assistance of modern pragmatics, be deduced according to the nature of the principles proposed by the US.

The immediacy and relevance according to pragmaticians are close to each other. Immediacy is a reflection of relevance either to the convention or to a clue, and the hearer can note this. Whereas relevance is related more to the speaker to instruct him to make his statement relevant. If his contribution is relevant, the meaning will become clear to the hearer immediately. I.e, the immediacy is a result of relevance. The two terms immediacy and relevance are two sides facing each other in the process of meaning. One is related to the speaker, whereas the other is related to the hearer. The two are based on cogniation.

Failing communication can be possibly attributed to one of these things; either that the hearer cannot obtain the clue, or the speaker lays the wrong clue that diverts a person from the salient meaning. Clue here means any piece that carries or leads to the speaker's intention. This situation might occur when intentions of the speaker and the addressee are not mutual and they have different goals from their communication.

What can make a meaning immediate is the association either to the convention or the context so that meanings arise in the minds of communicators. It is essential to note that immediate meaning is not always the intended-delivered meaning, because there are many reasons behind tackling the process of immediacy, either by the speaker or the hearer. Immediacy works when the two sides of communication have mutual purposes of understanding and use the linguistic conventions in line with their purposes.

The last point I want to raise here before moving to the level of causation is how these four principles can work together. I can say that these four principles' work is based on the mechanism of general (*al-ʿāmm*) and specific (*al-khāṣs*) as discussed in section (3-1-1).

These principles can work by descending from general al-ʿāmm to specific *al-khāṣs as follows:*

- The predisposition principle will put both the hearer and the speaker in the domain of use.
- However, the principle of *iʿmāl* will conduct primordial interpretation.
- Convention leads to the salient meaning in the domain of use.
- Immediacy reflects to both, the convention and the specific context.

The descent from the general to the specific is governed by the power of relevance and clues.

3-2- The Level of Causation *Al-Taʿlīl*

In this section, the more profound level of interpretation will be addressed. This section completes the previous one and explain it. The search here is not about interpreting the speech's vocable and sentences. It is more complicated because "the theorist keeps thinking and thinking to obtain it" (al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 5/111). It goes beyond the vocables to search for the reasons that motivate meanings and proposals or as called by al-Ghazālī "deriving proposals from vocables' rationality (*maʿqūl al-alfādh*) by means of analogy" (al-Ghazalī, 2015, p. 2/235). As mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, the level of causation requires the involvement of more factors in the process of analogy and inference in order to obtain the reasons and significance of speech.

Obtaining a deep reason can affect and change the interpretive level. I will explain this by this example, where a mother is telling her son, *do not travel alone from Leeds to London*. On the interpretive level we can take these meanings:

- It is a fortiori not travel further than London.
- You can travel with some companions.

If we discovered that the reason behind this request is *safety*, the derived meaning can be totally changed as follows:

- It is a fortiori not to travel or even to do any unsafe action even with companions.
- You can travel if it safe even without companions.

We have seen how the meanings derived from the speech have totally changed according to the reasons. Hence, we could understand why the US considered reasons to translate as controlling the profound meanings. This level governs the level of interpretation.

We can take an example to illustrate the two levels of interpretation. This verse of the Qurʾān {O you who have believed, surely wine and games of chance, and altars (for idols) and divining (i.e., divination by arrows or in any other way) are only an abomination of Ash-Shaytan's (The all-vicious, the Devil) doing, so avoid it, that possibly you would prosper} Q 4: 90. This verse prohibits wine and something else. The prohibition ruling is taken from the interpretive level since it is related to the meanings of the vocables. The level of causation is concerned with the reason behind this prohibition. Why is wine prohibited? The reason in the PJ is intoxication. The addressee, accordingly, can understand that wine will not be forbidden when it is free of intoxication. On the other hand, drinks that have intoxication will be considered forbidden because the reason for forbidden is found in these drinks. This section, as will be seen, will consider this level of interpretation.

This reason is called by the US ʿillah, which is studied under the chapter of analogy *al-qiyās*. The discussion in this section will encompass the definition ʿillah, its conditions and its essence and the way the hearers can uncover the reasons.

3-2-1- The Determination and The Condition

There are two English terms used by scholars for the term ʿillah :*reason* and *ratio*. I think that the term *ratio* is more applicable for ʿillah and its essence, according to its linguistic load[28]. *Reason*, however, refers more to the term *sabab*, and there is an argument amongst the uṣūl scholars regarding the difference between reason (*sabab*) and ratio (ʿillah) (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 5/115; al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, p. 1/651). Whilst some scholars considered the two terms to express the same work, others thought that ʿillah had relevance to ruling, *ḥukm,* while reason did not (al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, pp. 1/651-652). However, ʿillah is the term related to the level of causation and therefore, I will consider the term ratio as a translation.

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[28] I shall use *ratio* as a translation of ʿillah because it is used by Islamist figures in the west. *Ratio legis* as ʿillah has been used by Wael Hallaq, who is an expert in Islamic law and Islamic intellectual history. (Hallaq, 1997, p. 20). I might use the two terms interchangeably when they both play the same role because they share some merits. I am going to use ratio only in this research to refer to both legal and linguistic ratios.

'Illah, according to the US, is the attribute, which is manifest and constant and appropriates the rule *ḥukm*[29] (al-Sarakhsī, p. /2/174; al-Samʿānī, 1998, p. 4/187; al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 5/111-113; al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, pp. 1/646-647; Zaydān, 2009, P. 161; Kamali, 2014-2015, p. 274). The US counted many conditions of ratio. Al-Zarkashī (1992, p. 5/142-156), for example, counted twenty four conditios. There is no need to discuss all, because most of the conditions are related to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), however, I will summarise the primary conditions as follows:

Manifest *Ẓāhir* means that the attribute can be shown and perceived by senses (Zaydān, 2009, P. 161), not hidden like intentions or goodwill. The red light, for example, in traffic is a ratio for stopping and can be shown. However, the driver's goodwill to stop the car is not shown, and hence, we are unable to calculate it. We cannot pass judgment on the driver's goodwill or lack thereof, because we cannot know it. This condition is a premise for the second one, *constant.*

Constant *Munḍabiṭ* (Kamali, 2014-2015, p. 275) means that the attribute can be calculated (al-Zuḥaili, 1986, W, p. 1/655), and so, the *intoxication caused by* wine for instance, can be measured. Moreover, if the attribute is not calculable, i.e. it differs from person to person (al-Asnawi, p. 4/53), from time to time or from case to case, it will not be considered as *'illah.* The previous example of the *red light* can thoroughly explain the concept of *constant.* The *'illah* for the traffic light is *red* to stop and *green* to go. The purpose (*maqṣid*) is to organise traffic and protect people. This *'illah red* and *green*, which is based on colours can be recognised by all drivers in normal conditions, it can thus be considered *'illah* (Kamali, 2014-2015, p. 275).

The lawgiver did not make the goal (organising traffic and save people lives) the *'illah,* i.e.*,* he did not say that *all drivers can decide whether to go or not at a traffic light and actually, there is no need for traffic lights.* The concept of organising traffic itself is not enough to be considered ratio, because it is not applicable to be measured, and it differs

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[29] (waṣf ẓāhir munḍabiṭ yunāsib -alḥukm al-ḥukm) العلة: وصف ظاهر منضبط يناسب الحكم

from person to person in terms of their judgments. Drivers are different in judging the safety and organising of traffic. The lawgiver, therefore, stipulated that the ratio should be constant. Despite uṣūl scholars aiming to reach the higher purposes of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, they technically associated *ḥukm* to *ʿillah* because it was constant.

It appropriates the ruling *ḥukm* (*tunāsib al-ḥukm***) (al-Ghazālī, 2015, p. 2/306; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 5/206; al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, p. 1/652-653)*. This condition points out that the *ʿillah* leads to the purposes (*maqṣid*) of the *ḥukm*. Intoxication appropriates the ruling *ḥukm* (prohibition of wine) and leads to the purpose of the lawgiver, which is protecting minds. The red light is a part of the traffic system and can be calculated, and by committing to the traffic system, we organise traffic and save lives. So, *ʿillah* here leads to the purposes of the lawgiver. However, if *ʿillah* does not lead to these purposes, it would not qualify to be an *ʿillah*.

In the wine's example, the ratio cannot be the smell, because it does not obtain any benefit, whereas intoxication can be the ratio of prohibition due to its influence on the mind. Prohibiting wine, containing intoxication, leads to protecting the mind, which is one of the five purposes in Islamic law, as seen in (2-3-1).

It can be said that ratios are situated in the middle. They are the reasons beyond proposals, and they link the proposals to higher purposes as will be seen in (3-3) (al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 5/111-113; Zaydān, 2009, p. 159).

The ratio has an essential role in explaining and substantiating ruling. The ratio is considered the essence of the principle of analogy (*qiyas*), which is a solid principle in legislating rulings (al-Bukharī, 1997, p. 3/399; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 5/5; al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, p. 1/600). Extracting *ʿillah* of speech is, primarily, meant to be used in the analogy *qiyas*.

By learning the ratio of a proposal, there is a possibility of applying the ruling (*ḥukm*) to another one, if the two cases share the same ratio (al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, pp. 1/602). I shall

explain the main pillars of analogy to explore how the analogy principle works. Analogy consists of four pillars (al-Rāzī, M, p. 5/5; Kamali, 2014-2015, p. 266; al-Zuḥaili, 1986, 1/605-606) as follows:

- The original case (*al-ʾaṣl*) which is the *wine* in the example above. The original case is the case to which the new case will be compared.
- The new case (*al-farʿ*), which is the new case that needs a ruling (*ḥukm*) since it does not have one. This can be any intoxicating drink. The new case will obtain a ruling by comparing it to the original case.
- Ruling of the original case (*ḥukm alʾaṣl*), which is (forbidding)
- *ʿIllah* of the forbidden, which is (intoxication).

Analogy's *qiyās* is used in jurisprudence and law, to provide the new cases new cases with new rulings by means of comparing the new cases to some original cases. Analogy is used as well in everyday arguments. When it is broadcasted, for example, in some media channels that a *refugee has stolen from a shop in this area,* and the media repeats that continuously, it will unconsciously suggest that being a refugee is the reason for this. People, then, might apply the analogy by means of looking and dealing with refugees in a certain way. Many examples like this can be found in media, when they relate actions to attributes.

Implicatures in PJ are related to analogy and ratios as much as they are related to the level of interpretation, as will be shown in Chapter Five. There are different types of implicatures, some of which are based on interpretation and others based on causation (*taʿlīl*). We can now move onto the next section and discuss the ways in which ratios are uncovered.

3-2-2- Ways of Uncovering Ratios *ʿIlal*

By deducing ratios, the hearer can complete the missing parts of speech. In the example of wine, the mentioned speech is forbidden without raising any reason. Finding the ratio

because it includes intoxication can complete the speech in terms of its significance. This is deduced from parts of the speech *ʿillah*. The US discussed the methods of uncovering ratios. These techniques can vary in difficulty, so it requires rethinking to reach *ʿillah*. The speaker might explicitly state the ratios beyond the proposal, or he might not. In this case, the hearer needs to deduce it. The topic of uncovering ratios is extensive in the US's writings. I shall briefly explain it and present the main ways of uncovering ratios, since the topics in this research do not require a thorough discussion. Some are generally agreed upon, but others are not, a factor that will be explained below. I shall choose methods that can be linguistically employed, to articulate the mechanism that ratios of speech can be derived from.

3-2-2-1- To be Provided by the Text *Naṣṣ*

The ratio is explicitly stated by the speaker (al-Rāzī, M, p. 5/139; al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 3/317; al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, p. 1/663). In this way, the text itself includes the *ʿillah.* The speaker mentions the reason for the *ḥukm*, i.e., he makes a full proposal containing the state and its ratio, as we have in this sentence: *would you please open the window, because the weather is hot*? In this sentence, the speaker states the reason or ratio for his request. The hearer does not need any effort to deduce *ʿillah* because it is explicit. Understanding the *ʿillah* can push the hearer to respond to the request in various but nonetheless adequate ways, but all must have the *ʿillah*. He might switch on an air-conditioner, turn on a fan, open the window or tend to any other option that carries the ratio. The addressee is comparing all the previous responses to the *ʿillah (hot weather),* unless there is another ratio. This mode is the strongest one, and all Muslim scholars agree on it (al-Rāzī, M, p. 5/139-141; al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 3/317-319; al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, p. 1/663).

3-2-2-2- Indication *Eamāʾ*

The ratio is not explicitly stated but strongly indicated (al-Ghazālī, 2015, p. 2/300; al-Rāzī, M, p. 5/143; al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 3/320; al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, p. 1/665). The speaker does not state the *ʿillah* explicitly, but he indicates to the *ʿillah*. Al-Āmidī (2003, p. 3/319-

320) explain "that the *ʿillah* is taken from the utterance's indication, not from its meaning".

In Islamic jurisprudence, judges should not arbitrate among people when they are angry, according to the prophet Muhammad's Ḥadīth: "do not judge between people if you are angry" (al-Bukhārī, 2001, p. 9/65; Muslim, n.d. p. 3/1342) this Hadith indicates that *anger*, is a consequence of extreme change of emotion, where extreme change of emotion is the *ʿillah* because it prevents judges from reaching the correct decision, hence they are not allowed to judge if they are angry, because the extreme change of emotion may disrupt the right state of mind.

The US discussed some ways of indication. One indication is when a speech is ordered in such a way that lays the *ḥukm* after the attribute, such as this sentence, *if you are going to eat, clean your hands*. It is indicated that *eating* is a *ʿillah* for cleaning the hands, but the speaker does not state it explicitly.

Another approach is when a speaker places an attribute after a ruling, so that if the attribute is not a ratio, the speech or the attribute is useless, as in this example taken from a Ḥadīth. A Bedouin said to the prophet that he had intercourse with his wife during a day of the month of Ramaḍān (the month of fasting). The prophet then replied "free a slave" (ibn Ḥanbal, 2001, p. 13/196). The answer denotes that intercourse during a day of Ramaḍān is the reason for freeing slave, because the ruling was applied according to the question, and the question is iterated in the answer as explained in section (3-1-3-2-1-3) (al-Rāzī, n.d. p. 5/148; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 5/199).

We can also take this example from the Qurʾān Q 51: 5. {Indeed, the righteous will be among gardens and spring}. This verse confirms that righteousness is the reason for entering paradise and being among gardens and springs. The verse does not spell out the reason, but rather the reason is indicated. If the attribute is not a reason for the rulings, this will not "appropriate the eloquence of God" (Abo Zarʿah. 2004, P. 564).

Another way of indication (*eamāʾ*) is when a ruling or a proposal is considered as a consequence of a previous clause, and associated to it by means of a conjunction such as the conjunction *fāʾ* which means *then*, as we can see in this verse, {And the male thief and the female thief: then cut (off) the hands of both, as a recompense for what they (both) have earned, as a torture from Allah; and Allah is Ever-Mighty, Ever-Wise}. Q 5: 38.

Or this example from the Sunnah (the prophet forgot in his prayer, and then he prostrated) (ibn Ḥanbal, 2001, p. 7/370). The conjunction *fāʾ* or *then* associates the rulings, whereas the ratio is preceded (al-Rāzī, n.d. p. 5/144). The conjunction *fāʾ* indicates that what comes after is a consequence of what comes before. In the first example, the ruling *cut off* is associated with the ratio *thief* by the conjunction *fāʾ* or then. In the second example, the ruling *prostrated* is a consequence for the ratio *forgot* by means of *fāʾ* or *then*.

According to the previous example discussed by the US, this way of uncovering ratio meets with the definition of conventional implicature discussed in Grice's model in section (1-2) in the example of *English man*. He deduced that he is brave because he is an English man. The examples placed by the US are similar. It can be, therefore, considered that the indication of a text is a kind of implicature because the indication of a text is not spelt out.

Grice's example belongs to this method of indication because the implicature has been inferred by pertaining the consequence to the attribute placed by means of the conjunction *therefore*, *He is English man, he is, therefore, brave*. Being an English man as a reason for being brave is not explicitly said, but rather indicated as seen in (1-2).

The indication of the ratio is based on linguistic styles and conventions ((al-Rāzī, n.d. 5/143-155; al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 5/197-198).

We can say now that the level of interpreation can identify ratios when the ratio is derived from linguistic elements and conventions. The indicated meaning of text will be cosidered in my classifcation of meaning as one of implicature in section (4-4-3).

This approach and the one previous are agreed upon amongst uṣūl scholars because the relationship between reasons and *ḥukm, prohibiting* and *judging* in the previous example are explicit and easily deduced by means of the convention. This way has been extensively discussed in PJ. However, our purpose is to articulate the way of uncovering ratio. More about this can be found in the uṣūl's books (al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 5/203; Zaydān 2009, p. 168).

3-2-2-3- Constancy *Al-Iṭṭirād*

Constancy (*al-iṭṭirād*) happens when we have a specific attribute continuously being accompanied to a *ḥukm* by the lawgiver or a particular speaker. The attribute here is neither relevant (*munāsibah*) to purpose (*maqṣid*) nor irrelevant, and the speaker does not mention that this attribute is *ʿillah* or reason. The point here is that this attribute always accompanies the *ḥukm* (*tadur maʿa al-ḥukm*) (al-Ghazālī, 2015, p. 2/315; al-Rāzī, M, p. 5/221; al-Āmidī, 2003, pp. 3/374-378; al-Zuḥaili, W, 1986, p. 1/661). An example to illustrate this can be borrowed from media. We can take a statement from the media at different times to remark the continuity of the accompaniment between the attribute and the ruling. The public environment is that the media wants to mobilise people against the current government.

(1) Government has built two bridges in the last three years. (people know that the quality of work in these bridges is poor, but the media channel did not say that explicitly).

(2) These schemes are released by the government. (people know that the schemes are poor).

(3) The social service decreased in the last two years (since the government took over the country).

There is a general social impression in Syria (my country) that any project led by the government fails. Media channels are not stating explicitly that the government is the reason, however, findings showed that every failed project was run by the government, and this relationship between the government and failure implies that the government is the reason.

In some, if not all Arabic newspapers, there is an impression that any article that holds criticism of authority will not be published, without any explicit statement that stipulates that. Scholars concluded this reason to be in relation to the mechanism of constancy because every time an article criticises authority, the article will be impermissible. The attribute is the criticism of authority, and the ruling is the prevention of publication. By employing this case, the conclusion is that the criticism of authority is the ratio of the prevention.

This approach needs its other face to be completed as will be explained in the next section.

3-2-2-4- Inversion *Al-ʿAx*

Inversion *al-ʿax* is the other face of the constancy. In this case, we note that there is a different ruling *ḥukm* because we missed the *ʿillah*. I.e. the *ḥukm* changes because the ratio is not here.

This completes the previous technique of identifying *ʿillah*. Both methods in combination are referred to as an adherence cycle (*dawarān*). *Dawarān* means that the ruling (*ḥukm*) will turn *yadūr* with the *ʿillah*. If the *ʿillah* was asserted, the *ḥukm* would also be asserted, and the vice versa (al-Bazdawī, 1997, p. 3/532; al-Ghazālī, 2015, pp. 2/315. 1986; al-Zuḥaili, W, pp. 1/662.). We can review some examples to conclude the difference between constancy and inversion. These statements reflect the findings of the previous section (Constancy *al-iṭṭirād*).

Some of the following statements often emerge in the media:

(4) A private company has built a bridge.

People know that this bridge is good, and they know that the government is not involved in this project. This means that when the ʿillah (government) is kept out of action, the ruling ḥukm (failure) will be kept out. The common impression, according to the example, is that if the government discontinues a project and hands it to a private company, the project will be successful. Inversion says that if we miss the ʿillah, the ḥukm will not be maintained in this situation. If the government is absent, then, failure is also absent. The result is that the presence of government is the ʿillah for any failure.

We can consider another example from the media:

(5) A horrible accident happened. An armed man entered a school and shot 20 students.

Given this example (5), the *terrorism* attribute is omitted because the identity of Muslim is also missing. The result is when one finds the causation: *Muslim* in these types of crimes create the ruling of *terrorism* to emerge, whereas, when a *Muslim* is missed, the ruling will also be missed. This leads readers to presume that *Muslim* is the ʿillah for the ruling of *terrorism*.

There is a disagreement amongst uṣūl scholars whether *al-iṭṭirād* and *al-ʿax* should be considered valid ways to uncover ʿillah. It was said that *al-Muʿtazilah* thought that it definitely (*qaṭʿaan*) leads to uncovering ʿillah, whereas most uṣūl scholars such as, al-Juwaynī and al-Rāzī, thought that it will most likely lead to ʿillah, if there is no dispute with another attribute (al-Rāzī, p. 5/207; al-Zarkashī, pp. 1992, 5/243-244).
Some scholars such as the Ḥanafī school's scholars, al-Ghazālī and al-Āmidī stipulated that this technique is a valid way to uncover ʿillah, only if the attribute leads to higher purposes of the Islamic law (al-Sarakhsī, p. 2/176; al-Ghazalī, 2015, p. 2/315; al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 3/375; al-laknawī, 2002, p. 2/354).

I think this way is insufficient in PJ to hold validity in identifying ʿillah without any relevance (munāsabah) to higher purposes. There needs to be a greater strength of evidence in these circumstances. This and the previous methods can imply the ratio but not assert it. Islamic jurisprudence deals with holy texts: the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, so there is a need to examine attributes deeply before determining whether they can be ʿillah or not.

This way might be valid in the contexts of media and politics when the need is to imply something but not to state it. This somehow, can become a conventional style of communication, so that people can instantly understand the message beyond associating an attribute to an utterance or proposal. Conventionally, when some media channels use attributes such as (refugee, British, Muslim, and so on) and pertain them to a good or bad act, there will be an implication in people's mind that this attribute is the reason for this act. The conventional dimension leads us to suggest a new way of uncovering ratios, as will be discussed in the next section.

I have chosen this method of uncovering ratio because it complements the previous approach to combine what is called in PJ al-dawarān. I wanted to discuss the case where ratios are consistent (muṭṭaridah) or inversed (maʿkūsah).

3-2-2-5- Immediacy *Tabādur*

We discussed in the principle of interpretation that immediacy is the primary player in the process of interpretation (3-1-3-2-4). I will expand on the role of immediacy to involve the level of causation with some supporting arguments from PJ. It is noteworthy that this approach has not been explicitly stated by the US in their works; however, there is an inference that some arguments rely on the immediacy as an indication. This can, from my point of view, play a significant role in deducing ratios.

We can take an example from the media as in (6) and (7) since we are talking about reasons behind texts or utterances.

(6) A terrorist crime happened today. A Muslim blew himself up and killed several people in Paris.

(7) A centre in Berlin was attacked by three refugees. This is the third terrorist crime this year.

In the two cases, the proposal *terrorist* is related to the attribute *Muslim and refugee* constantly. This correlation between the attributes and the proposal implies that the attribute is the ratio for the proposal. The ratio has not been explicitly stated but rather implied, so that the minds of people find a correlation between the attribute and the proposal. The PJ ruling that corresponds to this issue expresses that, "associating a ruling *ḥukm* to a derivative noun implies that the source of derivation is the *ʿillah* for that ruling" "*taʿlīq al-ḥukm bil-mushtaqqi yunbiʾ biʿilliyyah mā minhu al-ishtiqāq*" (ʾĀl Taymiyyah., n.d. p. 438; al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 5/201; ibn al-Laḥḥām, n.d. p. 147; al-Mardāwī, 2000, p. 7/3350).

The previous rule implies that this type, *associating a rule to a derivative noun* of pertainance between attributes and proposals determines that the attribute is a ratio for the recipient. Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) and al-Isnawī (d. 1370) explicitly used the term immediacy "*yasbiq ilā al-afhām*" in their discussion of ways that lead to ratios (al-Ghazalī, 2015, pp. 2/194-95; al-Isnawi, n.d. p. 4/69). Al-Ghazālī considered immediacy as a ratio when he discussed the ratio of the following verse {Indeed, the righteous will be in pleasure, and indeed the wicked will be in the Hellfire} Q 82: 13-14. Al-Ghazālī thought that the attributes of *righteous* and *wicked* are the ratios of *pleasure* and *Hellfire* because this conclusion comes to mind immediately *tatabādr*.

I think that this method can lead to ratios, especially when it relies on conventional styles of speech as seen in the base of associating a rulings (*ḥukm*) to a derivative noun implying that the source of derivation is the *ʿillah* for that ruling. This is because the ratio was derived from the linguistic style governed by convention. Al-Ghazālī and al-Isnawī

examined the role of immediacy when they discussed linguistic styles in assigning ratios.This method can overlap with technique of indication.

As mentioned in the principle of immediacy (3-1-3-2-4), immediacy is considered as a reflection of something. Immediacy in the interpretive level was a reflection either from the convention or from the context. In my point of view, immediacy is a way of uncovering ratios and is also a reflection of either a specific linguistic style of speech (as seen in the rule of derivative) or the relevance of higher purposes. For example, applying fines on a serious social problem illustrates that the reason is the problem.

This can be a good method of uncovering ratio if is supported by relevance to higher purposes (al-Āmidī, 2003/1424, p. 3/331; al-Isnawi, n.d. p. 4/69; al-ʿAṭṭār, n.d. p. 2/316).

There is a need to draw attention to the ratios being derived from immediacy, as they are subjected to being cancelled. The ratio derived from immediacy can be raised to the level of manifest (*ẓāhir*) signification as will be discussed in (4-2), but not to the level of explicit signification.

There are other means to uncover ratios that are discussed by the US. The aim is only to discuss the primary ways of uncovering ratios to highlight how communicators can reach ratios and build on them to generate some implicature, as will be explained in section (5-2).

The term relevance has been mentioned many times in the section, and there is a need to exhibit it. The next section will be dedicated to discuss the relevance and its role.

3-3- Relevance *Munāsabah*

We discussed that the US addressed the case of intentionality, and concluded that higher purposes of a text regulate the process of interpretation and causation. The interpretation in its two levels should be dealt under the intentionality and higher purposes, in order for

interpretation not to clash with the intentions of the speaker, which flouts the principle of *ifhām.*

Relevance is what connects interpretation or ratio and higher purposes through examining the validity of the interpretaion, or the ratio in relation to higher purposes. Its purpose is to associate the proposed interpretation or ratio with the higher purposes of a text. This section will address the definition of relevance, the difference from the modern term proposed by Sperber and Wilson, and some examples to show the relevance's mechanism in observing the process of interpretation. I am going to start with the definition of relevance in PJ.

The US discussed *relevance* as a way of uncovering ratio and to associate ratios to higher purposes [30]. I, however, tend to use relevance as an examiner for the proposed ratios. Relevance assumes that there is an attribute thought of as the ratio, and the relevance will determine its validity. It works together with constancy, inversion, immediacy to examine a ratio in terms of responding to the higher purposes. Relevance is a part of the definition of ratio, as seen in (3-2-1). This confirms that it examines ratios, in order to consider it valid and meet the higher purposes of Islamic law (*maqāṣid al-sharīʿah*). The term relevance (*munāsib*) points out that this ratio or this interpretation leads to something, which is the higher purposes in Islamic law (al-Juwaynī, 1979, p. 2/113; al-Ghazālī, 1971, pp. 144-145).

Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) defined relevance as "the way with which the proposed attribute can be a sign for ruling (*ḥukm*) by the lawgiver" (al-Ghazālī, SH, 1971). Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 1249) defined relevance as "the attribute, which is manifest and constant, where benefits will be rationally obtained by associating the attribute to the ruling" (ibn al-Ḥajib, 2006, p. 2/1085). The two definitions confirm that relevance is a way of uncovering ratios or a sign for the valid ratio. However, ibn al-Ḥajib added in his definition that relevance brings benefits, which are some of the higher purposes.

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[30] Al-Ghazālī discussed this issue extensively. It can be reviewed in his work (al-Ghazālī, 1971, pp. 143).

Some uṣūl scholars such as al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī agreed that *relevance* itself is a way of *ʿillah* if it is leads to higher purposes of Islamic law (*maqāṣid al-sharīʿah*) (al-Juwaynī, 1979, p. 2/1113; al-Ghazālī, M, 2015, p. 2/306; al-Ghazālī, SH, 1971, p. 142; al-Rāzī, M, p. 5/172; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 5/206). The work of relevance in PJ is jurisprudential or legal but not linguistic or combinational. The US discussed the legal or jurisprudential relevance, which associates ratios to the higher purposes of Islamic law to make rulings jurisprudentially reasonable.

The definition and the role of relevance, according to the US carries complications. It is at once, a method of uncovering ratios, an examiner of the proposed attribute, and a stipulation of ratio as seen in the definition of ratio. When the US discussed relevance as way of uncovering ratios, it appears that this was in references to cases that are relevant to the higher purposes of Islamic law, and where no other stipulations of ratio are found. Is relevance itself enough to consider an attribute ratio?

I am going to consider the second approach of ratio, as an examiner of ratio. This is the main work of relevance because the term relevance in its linguistic meaning refers to the link between two things, which here are ratios and higher purposes.

The definition of relevance differs from the content of the modern term relevance, as discussed in (1-3). Some scholars[31] used it as an equivalent to the term in modern pragmatics. Relevance in modern pragmatics refers to the relationship between the utterance and the intended meaning; however, relevance in the PJ refers to the relationship between the ratio and higher purposes, rather than the contextual. The two types of relevance work differently and use contrastive directions. One looks for the context and one looks for the higher purposes of a text. The nature of the two types of relevance also differs; relevance in modern pragmatics is cognitively obtained, but in Islamic pragmatics

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[31] Such as Muḥammad Yūnus Alī and Hishām, Ibrāhim ʿAbdu Allah used relevance in their works vaguely so that it can be understood that it is equivalent to the term in modern pragmatics (Ali: Medieval Islamic pragmatics) (ʿAbdu: Scalar Implicature in Modern Pragmatics and Traditional Arabic Pragmatics)

requires the consideration of reasoning and inference. Table 4 (below) shows the differences between them.

Relevance in modern pragmatics	Relevance in PJ
Links to context	Links to the higher purposes of a text
It defines the intended meaning	It is a way of causation *taʿlīl*
It determines the meaning	It is an examiner to ratio
Linguistic/ Communicational	Legal/ Jurisprudential

Table 4. The difference between relevance in modern pragmatics and PJ

The differentiation between the modern perspective and the Islamic is significant when we discuss the bases of counter implicatures in Chapter Five (4-3-5). Some scholars claimed that the relevance (in its modern meaning) is the base of counter implicature without considering the difference between the two terms. I think that Arabic translation played a role in this confusion. The word *relevance* is translated into Arabic as *munāsabah*, additionally there is a similar term in PJ but it has a different concept.

The following example illustrates the role of relevance in appropriating ratio. If a charity wants to motivate people to donate to disadvantaged people in Syria, who live under war-torn circumstances, it uses motivating language like this sentence: *please donate generously to children and women who live under severe circumstances in Syria.*

We can analyse the sentence as follows:

The *ḥukm* is (to donate), the attributes and qualifications (*quyūd*) that might be ratio (disadvantaged, women, children, live under severe circumstances, and Syria). Now, which one of these functions as the *ʿillah?* The charity does not either explicitly or implicitly state it. In this case, relevance can help identify the attribute and the purpose of the donation. The qualification *women and children* are not enough to be *ʿillah,* because there are women and children out of these severe circumstances in other countries. Women

and children might be rich, so they are unlikely to be the *ʿillah*. The qualification *Syria* itself is also not enough to be *ʿillah:* as prior to the war it was a country like all countries in the world, so that is also an unlikely option. The qualification *under severe circumstances* is most likely the ratio. However, the word *disadvantaged* is more specific and explains the severe circumstances. So, the (*disadvantaged*) attribute is the *ʿillah* by virtue of relevance. The technique used to filter *ʿillah* among the different assumed attributes, is called *categorisation and examination* (*al-sabr and al-taqsīm)* by uṣūl scholars. Categorisation and examination refer to the process in which we seek and divide the proposed attributes to be *ʿillah,* then examine them to determine which attribute is the ratio and has relevance to higher purposes. This categorisation and examination are considered by the US as a way of uncovering *ʿillah* (al-Juwaynī,1979, pp. 2/815; al-Samʿānī, 1998, pp. 4/231/232; al-Ghazalī, 2015, pp. 305). [32]

Another example from al-Shāṭibī explains the relationship between any level of interpretation and higher purposes through the means of relevance. Al-Shāṭibī thinks that one of the higher purposes is to remove hardship even in worship. However, bearing hardship is esteemed in Islam according to some texts, such as this from the Sunnah "your reward will be according to your tiredness" (al-Bukhārī, 2001, p. 3/5). Hence, Muslims who can bear hardship are appreciated. According to this introduction, people seek harder tasks to gain more rewards (*ʾajr*).

Al-Shāṭibī rejected this understanding, and he stated that "the worshipper is not allowed to seek hardship itself; worshipper can seek work itself. Then, if this work has hardship, there will be an extra-reward according to more hardship" (al-Shāṭibī, 2010, p. 2/434). He substantiated his notion that tasks normally have some hardship, and worshippers intend to do the work, which matches the lawgiver's purposes. However, if the worshipper intends to have more hardship itself to have more rewards, the worshipper contradicts the

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[32] The US discussed many ways of uncovering ratio. Some of these ways, in my point of view, can work as assistants to other ways. Some ways cannot work independently, such as the way of *categorisation and examination* because these ways need constancy (which is another way) to refer that this attribute often emerges with the ruling, and it needs relevance (another way) to examine the validation of the proposed attribute to be in terms of its corresponding to higher purposes.

lawgiver's purposes to remove hardship. Hardship itself has no relevance to higher purposes. Hardship will only be held in esteem if it is caused as part of the work, and it is reasonable. Al-Shāṭibī, considered that this contradicts higher purposes and does not hold any relevance to them (2/436). As a conclusion, worshippers should remove the hardship as they are applying a purpose of Islam, and then they will be rewarded according to their effort in removing hardship.

Purposes are the genus of the ratios. So, the partial *ʿilal* are species (*nawʿ*), and the shared purpose is the genus (*jins*). I shall explain this notion through some examples. In Islamic jurisprudence, a traveller can break his fast, and the ratio ʿ*illah* is the travelling. Pregnant women can break their fast also, the ʿ*illah* is the pregnancy. People can pray sitting, and the ʿ*illah* is the illness. People can eat dead animals in starvation to save their lives. We have now four different *ʿilal* (travelling, pregnancy, illness, and starvation) that can be considered species. The mutual denominator amongst them is that each one is most likely lead to hardship (*mashaqqah*). Hardship is the genus for each species (travelling hardship, pregnancy hardship, and so on). There have been different types of species of hardships of *ʿilal.* The hardship of travelling, the hardship of illness, and the hardship of pregnancy. They are under the genus *hardship* (al-Zarkashi, 1992, pp. 5/214; al-Shawkani, 2000, pp. 2/904; al-Zuḥaili, 1986, p. 1/682).

The relationship between ratios and purposes is demonstrated in the following figures:

Figure 4. The genus of ratios

Figure 5. The genus of rulings

Hardship is a genus of some ratios, whereas reduction is another genus of rulings (*aḥkām*). Every time there is a hardship, we should have a reduction in the ruling. This is the meeting between the two genera in rulings*,* and *ʿilal*.

In sum, any interpretation of any verse in the Qurʾān that contradicts the purpose (*maqṣid*) of removing hardship will be refused. Moreover, al-Shāṭibī considers aiming to create hardship itself, in any work, forbidden (*ḥarām*) (al-Shāṭibī, 2010, pp. 2/434) because the worshipper works against the *maqāṣid* of the Islamic law (*al-Sharīʿah*). The value of hardship is explained in the following figure, where + refer to the existence, and - refers to non-existence:

Case number	Work	Hardship	esteemed
1	+	+	+
2	+	-	+
3	-	+	-

Table 5. The cases where hardship is esteemed

The following example demonstrates the third issue: when Muslims perform ablution (*wuḍūʾ*) for prayer in cold water, and they do not dry their bodies. They must reduce the hardship because there is no work in leaving the body wet without drying it.

Higher purposes should control individual interpretations and be considered in any process of causation. Otherwise, interpretations might contradict the higher purposes, leading to problematic understandings of esteeming hardship and other literal meanings because we miss the sense of higher purposes.

Relevance is the link that pertains linguistic interpretation or *ʿilal* to higher purposes. The relationship between the three aspects is like the relationship between the premise and the result. Interpretation levels are concerned with the meaning of vocables. However, the *ʿilal* level is meant to find the meaning of meaning (*maʿnā a-lmaʿnā*). Higher purposes, then, will determine whether or not this *ʿillah* corresponds to higher purposes. We first need to assign the meaning of wine and the ruling. We can then assign *ʿillah* beyond the forbidding wine, which is related to one of the five primary purposes in Islam.

The aim of all the examples presented above show how higher purposes can control the process of interpretation and causation, and exhibit how, by avoiding the role of intentionality, which includes the purposes of the texts, interpretation will fall in literalism, and inference in dry analogy. These examples are related to the daily interpretation of a Muslims' life. The examples included numerous jurisprudential details. These details are necessary to be able to imagine the concept of relevance in Islamic pragmatics. The principal key to successful interpretation or inference should be considered in combination with the relevance of the higher purposes.

The examples here exhibit the jurisprudential background that controls the process of interpretation and causation, as Sperber and Wilson did when they discussed the psychological background of their understanding of the term *relevance*.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the discussion aimed to frame and formulate the model of interpretation in PJ at two levels, and these two levels produced different levels of significations and meanings. I presented my model of four interpretation principles: The principle of

communicational predisposition, the principle of *iʿmāl*, the principle of convention and the principle of immediacy. These four principles are controlled by a dominant principle, which is *ifhām*.

The shortcomings of the other endeavours were presented and explained highlighting that attempts were based on imperfect data and arguments of the US's works, such as the concept of the principle immediacy and the purpose of *ifhām*. The process of interpretation is governed by the process of causation and the latter is governed by higher purposes. The three levels work within this system.

Modern pragmatics, especially Grice's model, helped in framing the spread data and arguments related to the interpretation in PJ, under a model that can exhibit the Islamic legacy in a modern way. Insights regarding relevance helped me to also stipulate the conditions of immediacy.

The level of causation was studied at a higher level of interpretation. I discussed the factors that affect the process of causation. A new categorisation of uncovering ratios was proposed, which is the *immediacy*.

The concept of relevance in both Islamic pragmatics and modern pragmatics was discussed and the paradox between the two views was explained. The inaccuracy in defining the merits of each type of relevance was the reason behind the confusion for some scholars who consider the two types of relevance to be the same. The role of relevance in associating interpretations and inferences to higher purposes was presented. The dinstinct feature of each perspective regarding relevnce would help in Chapter Five to define the bases of implicatures in Islamic pragmatics.

Hence, we could depict the manner in which the levels of interpretation and causation should work under the supervision of the higher purposes that it represents. This mechanism can play a role in exceeding the literalism in interpretation and stagnation in inference.

Disregarding ratios and purposes in Islamic law led to literal interpretations and considered most rulings as devotional (*taʿabbudiyyah*) rulings that are not subjected to causation. We might stop at the process of analogy without going any further towards the higher purposes, so we miss the spirit of Islamic law, and consider different matters as static cases.

Moreover, this chapter was motivated by Chapter Two, which presents the philosophy of the US in language and intentionality. Chapter Four will delineate the results of this chapter, since the significations and meanings are based on the process of interpretation within its two levels, and it will focus on the meanings obtained by the processes of interpretation. The different classifications by the US will be presented in the next chapter.

Chapter Four

Classification of Signification

Chapter Four

Classification of Signification

In Chapter Three, I pointed out that the chapter on *classification of signification* will be the consequence of the chapter on *interpretation,* since interpretation will normally generate different levels of significations, ranging between explicit and implicit significations. In this chapter, the discussion will concern classifying the signification between the Ḥanafī and the scholastic schools. I will consider the ways that these two schools have primarily different methods of classifying signification.

Uṣūl al-fiqh PJ is filled with classifications and terms expressing the different levels of signification and meanings. The diverse ways of classification make approaching and redesigning them somewhat difficult. In fact, many scholars addressed the different perspectives between the Ḥanafī and the scholastics schools in classifying signification. However, no one, in my view, has discussed the linguistic roots of the differences between the two schools, or answered why the two schools differ, even though they work on the same discourse. Most scholars superficially concluded a simple result, stating that the only comparison between the different classifications was a terminological difference, i.e. the classification of the two schools are the same, but have different names, and they have not investigated beyond the differences in terms of the roots or perspectives.

Firstly, I am going to set the foundations of classifying signification and expound the basics of classifying meanings. I shall then move onto presenting the different classifications of the two schools, considering the historical evolution of terms and categories. Finally, I shall state the reasons behind the differences based on the classifications presented.

This chapter aims to address the two perspectives of classifications, whilst finding the linguistic and epistemic reasons, and bases beyond the distinctions of classification. I argue that there is a deeper difference, well beyond that of simple differences in names.

As a conclusion of this chapter, we shall discover how many types of implicatures there are and explore their categorical situations.

Classifying signification has been approached by Arabic rhetoricians, Arabic linguists and Uṣūl scholars (US). The three domains, however, have different objectives from each other in their classifications as al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) pointed out (al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/196). The US were the first to address the case of classifying signification, followed by the Arabic rhetoricians as can be seen in (al-Ṭirāz) al-ʿAlawī's book (d. 1345). It is essential to point out that this research will rely more on the US's work, rather than the work of the Arabic linguists and rhetoricians', since the study is in their court, and Arabic linguists and rhetoricians adopted the US's terms and definition of *ḥaqīqah* and *allegory*. I will, therefore, rely on the uṣūlī legacy in this chapter as they are the first to deal with classifications, whereas Arabic linguists and rhetoricians were not previously concerned with this issue.

4-1- Foundations of The Classification

The following sections will be devoted to the foundations that are considered as the backgrounds for the process of classifying significations.

4-1-1- Introduction to the Components of Meanings

It is useful to start these sections with an introduction about the nature of meaning that will be considered as a map for producing different types of meanings. The question raised here is, what are the elements that form and contribute in producing meanings? I can conclude from the US's works that producing meanings or significations is based on linguistic components and domain of use, and this will be explained below. By employing the linguistic components on a domain of use, we can access the meaning and any bias that is signified (*madlūl*).

It can be concluded from the US's works, that the linguistic components are as follows – ranking from strongest to weakest:

1- A full statement, such as this sentence: *fasting during Ramadan is obligatory for every Muslim.* The statement is clear and full in terms of its situation. This full statement can be decisive (*qāṭiʿ*) or probable (*ẓannī*).

2- An incomplete statement, that cannot make sense, or make a full proposal, without the estimated part. So, with the example: *you are half divorced*, the woman will be divorced because *divorce* cannot be divided, according to the Muslim scholars, and the speech will not be sensible without considering the hidden part (ibn Nujaym, 1999, p. 135). Under the category of the incomplete proposal, it could be for example, *ask the class*, which is meant to say: *ask the students of the class*. The Jurisprudential rule that expresses this type, says: "stating what cannot be divided is like stating it fully" *zikr baʿḍ mā lā yatajazzaʾ kadhikri kullih* (ibn Nujaym, 1999, p. 135).

3- An incomplete statement can gain a meaning generally without considering the details of the issue, such as asking for prayer without articulating its way and conditions.

4- Stating the contrary, such as this statement, *free-grazing sheep are not subjected to the alms-tax.* So, what about the *stall-fed sheep*, are they subjected to alms-tax?

5- No-statement, this type is expressed by this rule from Islamic jurisprudence "keeping silent when a statement is required is considered the statement" *al-sukūt fī maʿriḍ al-ḥājah ilā bayān bayan* (al-Zarqā, 1989, p. 337). An example of this can be taken from Islamic jurisprudence, keeping silent when there is a question for a recommendation from someone who implies that the questioner agrees on the proposed characteristics by the questioner. Otherwise, his religion morals should have pushed him to deny that (al-Zarqā, 1989, p. 339).

6- Stating the homonyms such as the word *pole,* which has different meanings.

I will call these six components of meanings *group one.*

These linguistic components depend on how the grammatical rules and rhetoric styles are delivered in communicational situations.

With regards to the domains of use, they can be as follows:

1- *Waḍʿ* or lexicon. The vocables will be placed and interpreted in its *waḍʿ* meaning. *Waḍʿ* here includes the grammatical rule as well.

2- Convention. The vocables will be placed and interpreted conventionally. Conventional styles are also included in this section.

3- Context. The vocables will be interpreted according to the context of communication. Clues (*qarāʾin*) can play roles in defining the intended meanings.

These three domains can fit the US's perspective of language in use, as seen in section (2-2-2 and 2-2-3). I will call these three domains *group two.*

Meanings are generated by placing a linguistic component from group one - continued grammar rules and rhetoric styles - to a domain from group two. The classifications of both schools are based on these two groups as will be seen in the following sections. The classifications that will be discussed later are simply applications of the connection between the two groups.

I shall now move onto the first foundation of classifying signification according to the US.

4-1-2- Signification of Vocable and Signification by Vocable *Dilālah Al-lafẓ wa Al-dilālah bi Al-lafẓ*

Another foundation will be discussed here, relating to meanings that are going to be contained in the classification. The US start their classifications by raising an issue about the signification *of* vocable or signification *by* vocable, i.e. they look at the vocable from two different perspectives.

The US discussed many differences between the two significations. Al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) combined these differences and extensively discussed them in his book *Nafāʾis al-ʾUṣūl fī Sharḥ al-Maḥṣūl*, as he presented fifteen differences (al-Qarāfī, 1995, Pp. 2/566-68). I will rely on al-Qarāfī at this point, since his works were the spark for this case, starting with the definitions of the two terms, and then drawing on the differences between them.

I shall draw some of the differences between the signification by vocable and the

signification of vocable according to US' perspective.

- The place: where the signification of a vocable is placed in the heart whereas signification by vocable is placed on the tongue. What the speaker is pronouncing verbally, either *ḥaqīqah* or allegory, he means in his heart to deliver a congruent or a counter implicature.
- The second difference is related to their existence: signification of vocable is necessarily inferred when signification by vocable is set but not vice versa, i.e. signification of vocable entails signification by vocable because analysing speech requires the statement to have been uttered, i.e. words have been used. On the other hand, signification by vocable does not entail signification of vocable, because there might be words or sentences used and the hearer cannot understand them for whatever reason.
- Signification by vocable is divided into *ḥaqīqah* and allegory (see 2-2) because the speaker will use words either in their literal meaning or not (al-Qarāfī, 1995, pp. 2/566-68; al-Qārāfī, 2004, P. 26; al-Subkī, 1995, Pp. 1/207; al-Asnawi. 2/38). Signification of vocable can be assigned to many significations according to what the hearer can understand from the speech.
- Signification by vocable leads to the signification of vocable as mentioned above. Choosing the meaning of supplication in the previous example, is a reason to obtain later meanings from the communication.
- Signification by vocable is related to the speaker, whereas signification of vocable is related to the hearer. (al-Qarāfī, 1995, Pp. 2/566-68; al-Qārāfī, 2004, P. 26; al-Subkī, 1995, P. 1/207; al-Asnawi, p. 2/38; al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 2/37). The speaker will decide to choose either *ḥaqīqah* or allegory, and the hearer will interpret the adopted meaning by the speaker, i.e., his work will start after the stage of signification by vocable has been done.

These are the main differences the two significations. The signification of vocable can contain many categories, as will be seen in this chapter. We can say, accordingly, that the word is being used in its veridical meaning (*ḥaqīqah*) to allegory (*mazāz*). After this step, the utterance can deliver the uttered (*manṭūq*) or implicature (*mafhūm*) meanings.

The following figure will explain the place and the role of each of signification by vocable or signification of vocable:

Signification by Vocable

ḥaqīqah   allegory

Signification of Vocable

explicit   manifest   counter implicature   congruent implicature   other meanings

Figure 6. Difference between signification by vocable and signification of vocable

I am presenting this section here to point out these issues:

- The signification of vocable is the result of an interpretive process since it is an attribute of the hearer. The signification by vocable, on the other hand, is a result of a semiotic process, because the speaker wants to link a signifier to the signified.

- Arabic rhetoricians focused on the signification by vocable, whereas the US concentrated on the signification of vocable. Arabic rhetoricians are interested in creating speech, and this can be clearly seen in their works, whereas the US are interested in interpreting speech. A quick look in the two works of the US and Arabic rhetoricians will articulate this issue. Al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) enhanced this proposition by pointing out that the US tended to their classifying speech in a different way to that of the Arabic scholars who managed according to their goals (al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/196). He said that the Arabic scholars divided speech, according to their purposes

into letter, verb and noun, whereas the US divided speech into command (*amr*), forbidding (*nahī*) etc. By that, we can infer that the Arabic scholars were interested in creating speech, whereas the US were interested in analysing it. The Arabic scholars were also interested in the linguistic elements, whereas the US were interested in the meanings proposed.

- The last and most important point is that the classification of signification starts after the signification by vocable can be determined. Accordingly, *ḥaqīqah* and allegory are not a part of the classification, but they should be chosen before the process of signifying. The US's concern is about the proposal made by the speech, not by the way with which the speech is delivered. In other words, the model of signification can be stated as follows: the word will be used either by *ḥaqīqah* or allegory to provide a particular meaning that will present a particular proposal. As for the US, they are concerned with the proposal made by the speech, which will be gained after using vocable.

Signification by vocable $\Longrightarrow$ Signification of vocable $\Longrightarrow$ proposals

I wanted to answer in advance a potential question, as to why we are not going to see the terms *ḥaqīqah* and *allegory* in the US' classifications. This is due to the fact that they are placed in the prior process of classifying signification.

4-1-3- Signification and Meaning

Another foundation needs to be discussed before presenting the different classifications of the US. The question raised here is whether the meaning, (*maʿnā*), and signification (*dilālah*), are synonyms in the US's classifications, or whether they have some distinctions despite the mutual uses. The focus here is on the distinction between the two terms in the US's works. Answering this question, will consequently lead to the nature of the US's classification, specifically whether the US classified its meanings or significations.

There are no works, based on my research at least, which were dedicated to distinguishing between the meaning and signification, except certain notions by some scholars.[33] I will, therefore, try to deduce the difference, from US' uses of these two terms.

Moreover, it is worth noting that the signification (*dilālah*) refers in Arabic to different meanings; however, the study here is concerned with two of the possible meanings, which are: the relationship between the signifier and the signified, and of something being signified (ʿAlī, 2000, P. 141). I am going to use the second meaning to refer to what can be derived from utterances, whether they are explicit or implicit.

Signification (*dilālah*) according to al-Tahānawī, is defined as "the state of something so that the cognition of it entails the cognition of something else" (al-Tahānawī, 1996, P. 1/787; ʿAlī, 2000, P. 141). See also: (al-Kafawī, 1998, P. 1/787; ibn fāris, 1979, P. 2/259). Thus, the first thing to consider is the signifier, whereas the other is the signified (al-Tahānawī, 1996, P. 1/787). The former definition is more general than the linguistic signification because it refers to any sign, whether or not it is linguistic.

The US defines signification as a "state where the meaning will be obtained by a vocable when it is expressed" (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 2/36). It can be seen that the definition is narrower and concerned with the linguistic signification, and the signification according to the definition refers to the relationship (*nisbah*) between the vocable and the meaning (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 2/36).

There is no proper definition of meaning in the Arabic dictionaries or the US's works. In fact, al-Kafawī defined it as "what is taken from the vocable" (al-Kafawī, 1998, p. 842). This definition may be overly simplistic and not provide an elaboration to the difference between signification and meaning. Prior to discussing the difference depending on the US's usages, I will briefly examine the relationship between the vocables and the meanings or signification. I will again state that I am going to use significations as

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[33] Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Ḥasanayn briefly discussed this in his book al-Dilālah wa al-Naḥū. Hādī Nahr approached this as well in his book ʿIlm al-Dilālah al-Taṭbīqī 2007.

something being signified.

The US raised a question as to whether the vocables are assigned to a mental image (*al-ṣūrah al-dhihniyyah*) or external entities. There are many arguments in this case. However, in brief, there are two opinions. Al-Rāzī leads the opinion that the vocables are assigned to a mental-image. He also argues that if we see something in the distance, and we assume it is a rock, then we will consider it a rock. We, however, might realise that it is something else if we had been closer to it and thought it was an animal. We might change our mind again if we had been much closer and saw that it was a bird. All changes are based on the change in mental-image (al-Rāzī, n.d. pp. 1/200-1; al-Isnawi, n.d. 2/16). This proposal has argued that the mental image is changeable due to the change in external entities, i.e. the mental-image follows the external entities (ibn ʾAmīr al-Ḥājj, 1983, Pp. 1/100-1). Accordingly, vocables are assigned to the external entities and not for the mental image. This opinion was attributed to al-Shīrāzī (d.1083) (ibn ʾAmīr al-Ḥājj, 1983, Pp, 1/100-1).

I can support this conclusion through al-Isnawī's (d. 1370) work, who asserted that vocables are assigned for meanings themselves, regardless of whether the meaning is mental or non-mental. He then said that some meanings are mental, such as *knowledge,* and some are not, such as all external entities (tree, stone). According to al-Isnawī, "obtaining meanings mentally or in the real world is an extra signification of the meaning, and the vocables are just assigned for the meaning" (al-Isnawi, n.d. p. 2/16). Vocables are therefore assigned to the cognition of external entities, and this cognition causes the meaning to enter into an individual's thought process immediately.

The change in the case of something in the distance is due to the meaning and the cognition of it.

The previous discussion concluded that the vocables are assigned to meanings, which are changeable according to our interpretation and cognition. So, the place of meaning in the interpretation is between the signifier and the signified. We can now turn to the prime

question of the differences between the signification (as something signified) and meaning.

The two terms are commonly used alternatively in the US's works, but this does not mean that they are synonymous. There are certain distinctions of use which will be explored that are derived from the US's uses and accompanied by my own opinion:

- The US consider meaning, in some cases, as a signifier and take the signification from it, as has been seen in the congruent implicature (*mafhūm al-muwāfqah*) or what is called, at the Ḥanafī school (*dilālah al-naṣṣ*). They say that the speech denotes its expression to this meaning and denotes its meaning to this signification (see section, 4-2-2; 4-3-2).

- Concerning the ruling (*ḥukm*), The US uses *signification* for the outcome of the rulings and state whether the text denotes the action as permissible or forbidden. However, they use meaning as an interpretation of the text, i.e. Meaning, thus, precedes signification because the ruling is based on interpretation.

- A question of meaning demands the explanation of the concept in order to create or define the cognition or the mental-image of the subject , whereas the question of signification refers to logic of the extension (*māṣadaq*) and the intention (*mafhūm*). For instance, the word *apple* leads to the description of the *apple* as a type of fruit, whereas the signification leads to the extension of the *apple* in the real world. When the US address the case of congruent implicature, they think that the uttered (*manṭūq*) meaning refers to another meaning, and the other meaning refers to the signification because the uttered meaning clarifies the conception and the cognition of the signified.

- Meaning is a result of an interpretation process whereas the signification is the result of a semiotic process. The interpretation is a mutual process between the speaker and the hearer, and the hearer can deduce some meanings despite the speaker not intending them. However, signification implies that this is what the speaker intended.

- The interpretation or seeking the meaning of something aims to clarify the

cognition, and, thus the cognition can be varied according to the interpreters, i.e. the meaning is relative and not absolute. The signification aims to define what is signified.

- Meanings are not detachable from their vocables. They accompany their vocables every time even if only partially. Usually, it is said that this word has these meanings, but none of these significations. The meaning will be attached with its vocable even if only partially by means of allegory that is based on the relationship between *ḥaqīqah* and allegory as seen in (2-2. 2-2-4). This conclusion can be applicable in Arabic since different meanings of a word are derived from the same root (*jadhr*). Meanings, but not significations are attached, because they are an outcome of the lexical or conventional process. On the other hand, signification is an outcome of a semiotic process. So, the red traffic sign refers to stopping, but only in its context, because it is a signification, and hence, *stopping* does not accompany the *red sign* every time. However, different meanings of a word will be presented in an interpretive process. According to the previous discussion, signification is private so that it can happen in a particular context, but the meaning is comprehensive and can be analogised to similar cases. However, meanings can include all cases that have a sense of the meaning. Drinking can be applied to any action that has the same quality.
- Meaning is subjective but signification is objective. Meanings can differ according to the communicators and their cognitions.
- Meanings refer to the users of language. Signification, however refers to the language itself. The US, therefore declared that the signification is the **attribution of vocables** (*ṣifah al-lafẓ*) not the hearers (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 2/36). Meanings are the attribute of the hearer (*fahm*) or the speakers (*ʾifhām*). Both *ʾifhām* and *fahm* are based on the meanings intended.
- Signification is the last step in the signifying process. It is determnied by the meaning since it is the result of the interpretaion process.

The speaker ⟶ Signifier ⟶ Signification.

The meaning can be in the middle as happens in the congruent implicature, as will be seen in section (5-1).

Speaker ⟶ Signifier ⟶ Meaning ⟶ Signification.

The cognition

I have presented some differences in uses, and there are many mutual uses in the US's works. This means that the two terms are not complete synonyms because according to Lyons, synonyms should be able to be used interchangeably in any context (Lyons, 1968, p. 447).

I think that the two terms, *meaning* and *signification,* have been used alternatively in the classical Arabic tradition since the two terms are similar to each other and one determines the other. They have been used in the Arabic tradition according to the base of *ḥaqīqah* and allegory because the meaning is a reason for the signification and signification is a result of meaning, and this is one of *ḥaqīqah* and *allegory* relationships (see: 2-2-4).

The previous discussion can conclude the following:

- The two terms *meaning* and *signification* have been used interchangeably in some cases in the Arabic linguistic tradition. In other times, the US used a specific term to express their conception as seen above.
- Meaning comes between the signifier and the signification, because it is the mental-image or the cognition. According to the meanings in minds, the signification will be gained.
- Signification is intended, whereas meaning is not necessary because meaning might emerge mentally due to the vocables' options without any relation to the speaker's intention.

Meaning, according to our findings, will be considered as a basis for the signification (something signified), and it will be, then, a broader range than the signification because it includes the communicators and their intentions in the process.

4-1-4- *Al-Fahm and Al-Ifhām*, and the Perspective of Classification

'Understanding' or 'comprehension' is the English translation of word, *fahm,* whereas there is no word in English, as far as my knowledge goes, to translate the word, *ifhām,* as explained in Chapter Two (3-1-3-1). The meaning of *ifhām* can be explained as making someone comprehend or understand something.

As discussed in Chapter Three, that interpretation is based on some principles, and these principles in turn are based on a general principle, which is *ifhām,* as explicitly presented. Moreover, it is discussed that the success or failure of communication is based on obtaining *ifhām* during the interpretive process.

Classifying meanings is based on the process of interpretation. We have learnt that interpretation is a mutual process between the speaker and the hearer. The US pointed out that the ***ifhām* is the attribution of the speaker**, whereas the ***fahm* is the attribution of the hearer** (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. ; 2/36; ibn juzaī, 2003, p. 155). Effective communication will occur when there is correspondence between *ifhām* and *fahm.*

We can say, according to the two terms *ifhām* and *fahm*, that these are the meanings of what the speaker delivers, or that these are the meanings that the hearer understands. There are two perspectives of classifying meanings, one from the speaker's perspective and the other from the hearer's perspective. The question raised here is, are the US's classifications based on the speaker's or the hearer's perspective? I.e., are the classifications based on *ifhām* or on *fahm*?

We need to present, first, their classifications in order to analyse their perspectives in classifying signification.

4-2- Scholastics Classifications of Significations

Classification of signification has been developed through scholastics' works. And I will

therefore choose some of the scholastics' classification, especially the ones that presented a development in the path of classification of signification. Furthermore, I will highlight the main route and generate new terms of classification.

I will choose al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013), al-Juwaynī (d. 1085), al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), al-Rrāzī (d. 1210), and Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 1249). I have chosen these scholars because they have a significant impact in classifying signification. Furthermore, I want to follow the track of the classification from the beginning in order to note the development in terms and categories.

4-2-1- Al-Bāqillānī's Classification

I am starting with al-Bāqillānī, despite his limited classification, because he is the master of scholastics and his works are considered the main sources for the scholastics' works. His classification, nevertheless, drew the first contours of the classification of signification for the scholars who came after him (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 1/8).

Al-Bāqillānī considered the independence of signification as the base of classification. He then classified signification, or as he named it, *useful communication* (*al-mufīd mina al-khiṭāb*) into: independently signifying (*mustaqill binafsih*), semi-independently signifying (*mustaqill binafsih min wajh*) and dependently signifying (*ghayr mustaqill*) (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 1/340). Choosing the term *useful communication* (*al-mufīd mina al-khiṭāb*) implies that al-Bāqillānī intended in his classification to include a broader sense, than signification. His classification includes both: signification of vocable and signification by vocable, explained in this section.

The independent signifying refers to the signification that can be received, without the need for any external signifiers in a way where the signification is not subject to probability. [34] Moreover, the independent signification, according to the definition, is

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[34] It can be understood from the US's works that the word *signifier* refers to any sign carries signification, whatever it was, letter, word, and sentence (Ibn al-Najjār 1997, p. 1/125).

explicit and univocal. The signification includes two criteria: explicitly and univocity.

The independent signifier is divided as well into explicit, by means of *its clear wording* and *its meaning*. He called the first, *naṣṣ,* and the latter *mafhūm*. *Naṣṣ* is the explicit and univocal signification by the expression itself, whereas *mafhūm,* according to al-Bāqillānī, is explicit and univocal signification by the meaning of the expression. Or according to Weiss is "what is understood by way of congruence" (Weiss, 2010, p. 477). *Mafhūm* which is not cancellable is the one derived from the convention because it independently signifies and is explicit. Examples can articulate this better:

An example of *naṣṣ* can be seen in Q 4: 29. {And do not kill yourself}. The verse denotes its signification without the need for any other signifiers, and there is no other probability of another meaning being inferred.

Concerning the example of *mafhūm,* we can consider this verse,

{And your Lord has decreed that you should not worship any except Him (only) and (to show) fairest companionship to parents; in case ever one or both of them reaches old age (Literally: being great "in years") in your presence, do not say to them, "Fie!" nor scold them; and speak to them respectful words (Literally: say to them an honourable saying} Q 17: 23.

The meaning explicitly states you should not harm your parent in any way, and this meaning is explicit and univocal. The difference between the two types of the explicit *naṣṣ* and *mafhūm* is that the former relates to signification taken explicitly from the words, whereas the latter is taken from the convention and the rules of the communication (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 1/342-345).

Al-Bāqillānī subsumed, under the independent in terms of its meaning, many examples that their meanings cannot be cancellable despite the different merits of each example. He, for instance, laid the verse (Q 82: 13,14) under this category. The verse says {Indeed,

the righteous will be in pleasure. And indeed, the wicked will be in Hellfire}. The independent in terms of its meaning, in the last verse, is that righteousness is a reason for pleasure, and wickedness is a reason for Hellfire. Al-Bāqillānī incorporated under this section any meanings can be taken from conventional styles, and it is not cancellable. He subsumed *indication of text* (*eamāʾ alnaṣṣ*), *congruent implicature* (*mafhūm al-muwāfaqah*) and *completion* (*iqtiḍāʾ*) under this category. The following scholars subdivided these categories.

The semi-independent signifier refers to the signification that lacks for another signifying element to articulate some unclear sides of the text, as can be seen in this verse {So when they bear fruit, eat some of it, paying what is due on the day of harvest} Q 6: 141. The day of harvest is known, but the amount of payment is unknown, the meaning is, therefore, clear from a side (payment that is due on the day of harvest) and not clear from the other one (the amount required to be paid) (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 1/349) There is a need for another text to state the unknown part of the text.

The dependently signifying is merely the allegory one, according to al-Bāqillānī (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 1/351). As stated previously, al-Bāqillānī considered allegory within the classification despite it being a signification by vocable because he addressed what can be taken from the useful communication. Any use of allegory can be placed here, such as this example, *the lion* in reference to a brave person. This example is from the dependant section because the intended meaning cannot be gained without relevance. The relevance is the assistant here.

Al-Bāqillānī considered cancellability as the criterion for his classification. *Naṣṣ* and *mafhūm,* are not cancellable according to al-Bāqillānī's declaration.

Another term came into being in al-Bāqillānī's classification but in a different place in his book *al-Taqrīb wa al-Irshād*. He discussed the case of *counter implicature* (*mafhūm al-muḵālafah*) but under the title *discourse's evidence* (*dalīl al-khiṭāb*), which refers to the unmentioned case of *mafhūm.* Counter implicature is defined as "pertaining a ruling on an

attribute, hence giving the case that lacks the attribute the counter ruling" or simply as Weiss defined it "what is understood by way of opposition" (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 3/331. Weiss, 2010, p. 477). We can have an example for counter implicature as follows:

If the law says that there is no tax upon children's food, it implies that non-children's food is subjected to the tax.

Al-Bāqillānī pointed out that counter implicature is a counter to the congruent implicature (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 3/331). Al-Bāqillānī laid the first classification. His classification, therefore, was basic and broad as we shall see in the other classifications.
We can now draw al-Bāqillānī's classification as follows:

useful communication

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              ┌──────────────┬──────────────────┬──────────────────┐
independently signify  semi-independently signifying  dependently signifying  counter implicature
      ┌───────────┴───────────┐
     naṣṣ                    mafhūm
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
Figure 7. Al-Bāqillānī's classification of signification

The base of al-Bāqillānī's classification is cancellability. Independently signify is every meaning that is not cancellable whether or not it is explicitly said. He categorised meanings by their power not by their conceptional characteristics. Al-Bāqillānī's classification concerned more on the signifying texts and their explicitly or certainty. He, therefore, combined different perspectives in his classification. However, al-Bāqillānī's work was considered the root and the spark for scholars that came after to expand his conceptions.

4-2-2- Al-Juwaynī's Classification

Al-Juwaynī worked on al-Bāqillānī's legacy and clarified his terms. He thought that what can be derived from the expression is either derived from *what is said,* or from *what is understood*. In terms of what is derived from *what is said* will be called explicit (*naṣṣ*) if the meaning received is explicit and univocal, where there is no potentiality of cancellability. However, in case the derived meaning of *what is said* is subjected to the potentiality of cancellability, it will then be called manifest (*ẓāhir*) (al-Juwaynī, 1979, Pp.1/448-50)*. Ẓāhir* is the text that can obtain two meanings; one of them has preference over the other meaning. The meaning that has a preference will be called *ẓāhir.* The difference between manifest (*ẓāhir*) and explicit is that the *ẓāhir* is cancellable.

If the two possible meanings are equal in the text, the meaning will be kind of ambivalent (*mujmal*) where the two possible meanings have the same potentiality in the text. The meaning cannot be, therefore, perceived. *Mujmal* is what al-Bāqillānī called semi-independently. However, al-Juwaynī also presented a further explanation to include what cannot be perceived (al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/419).

An example of manifest can be taken from the Qurʾān, Q 5: 3. {Prohibited to you are carrion}. The manifest meaning is that the skin is forbidden like meat. However, it can be said that the forbidden context only applies to eating meat. An example for *Mujmal* can be found in the verse on sand ablution (*al-tayammum*)[35] (then wipe (most of) your faces and hands). Equally, the word *and* can refer to wiping a section of your hands or starting from your hand and wiping all your hands.

Mafhūm is classified into congruent implicature, or "what is understood by way of congruence" and counter implicature, also is "what is understood by way of opposition". Congruent implicature divides into *naṣṣ* (non-cancellable) and *ẓāhir* (cancellable)*. The naṣṣ* of congruent implicature, according to al-Juwaynī, is taken from the force of context,

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[35] *Al- tayammum* is an action being performed where water has not existed. It is acted by sand as a condition for prayer.

not only from the congruence, as in a previous example (do not say to them, "Fie) because the context asserts respect towards the parents. The *naṣṣ* of congruent implicature is not cancellable unlike the *ẓāhir* of congruent implicature, as witnessed in this example from the Qurʾān, Q 4: 92. {And whoever kills a believer by mistake - then the freeing of a believing slave and a compensation payment presented to the deceased's family}. This verse implies, by virtue of congruent implicature, that killing a believer deliberately is a fortiori and requires freeing a believing slave, but this conclusion is not agreed upon amongst scholars (al-Juwaynī, 1979, pp. 1/452-3). This is because they think that killing a believer deliberately is a more terrible sin than can be forgiven by freeing a slave, and freeing a slave is legislated as a way of cleansing souls. Al-Juwaynī elaborated on the factors that generate the congruent implicature. Convention, as al-Bāqillānī presented, is only one of the factors that generates the congruent implicature. Further factors include context, expression and sentence style as will be seen in (5-1).

I can present al-Juwaynī's classification as follows:

Figure 8. Al-Juwaynī's classification of signification

Al-Juwaynī reclassified al-Bāqillānī's classification and concentrated more on the meaning derived from expressions rather than focusing on classifying texts and their powers. He also elaborated on the potential meaning of congruent and counter implicature,

clearly explained with their sub-classifications.

By moving to the next classification, we are going to explore more terms of the classification of signification.

4-2-3- Al-Ghazālī's Classification

Al-Ghazālī has his own additions to the classification of signification. It can be seen that al-Ghazālī followed al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī in general contours of the classification, especially through features of the explicit and the manifest, but he presented a further elaboration in the classification.

Al-Ghazālī started his classification logically and discussed the methods of signification for a single vocable. He divided this signification into three types: the equivalent (*muṭābaqah*), incorporation (*taḍammun*) and entailment (*iltizām*).

Equivalent signification refers to a state where a vocable includes the full signification of a subject, such as the word *house* which refers entirely to a known house. Incorporation signification concerns a vocable which refers to a part of the signification such as word *house,* which refers to a known house equivalently, and also to the *wall* through incorporation. *Iltizām* is the signification of something entailed but not part of the word, such as the word *ceiling,* which entails *wall* by *iltizām* because the word *ceiling* is not encoded for *wall* and does not include it, but it entails it as a *ceiling* logically requires *walls*. This is something that is understood by people with successful mental entailment (al-Ghazālī, 2015, p. 1/74).

In summary, the word *house* refers to the whole house by equivalent. It refers to wall by incorporation (as they are incorporated in house). The word *ceiling* refers to walls by entailment (as they are required for it).

Al-Ghazālī turned, then, to another type of the signification, which addresses composed

speech. He divided meanings into three types: composed meanings, implied meanings and rationalised meanings. The composed meaning refers to the meaning derived from the wording of the speech *waḍʿ*, i.e. from the semantic signification *manṭūq* (what is said). Whereas the implied meaning is derived from the meaning of the speech where it is not explicitly said. The rationalised one is based on analogy (*qiyas*) (see: 3-2) (al-Ghazālī, 2015, p. 2/7).

Al-Ghazālī then *divided what is said,* or what he called *manẓūm* at explicit (*naṣṣ*), manifest (*ẓāhir*), ambivalent (*mujmal*) following al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī in defining the former terms. The examples presented in the previous sections can be used here for *naṣṣ, ẓāhir* and *mujmal*.

With respect to the derivation from the *meaning of the speech,* al-Ghazālī expounded his teacher, al-Bāqillānī's, classifications. He did not consider the *implied meaning* as one category, and like al-Bāqillānī, subsumed it under many examples. However, he divided it into five types: completion of the vocable (*iqtiḍāʾ al-naṣṣ*), the allusion of the text (*ishārah al-naṣṣ*), the indication the vocable (*eamāʾ al-naṣṣ*), congruent implicature (*mafhūm al-muwāfaqah*) *and* counter implicature (*mafhūm al-mukhālafah*)[36] (al-Ghazālī, 2015, pp. 2/192-6). With regards to the rationality of the speech, he used the legal analogy as we discussed in (3-2). We can turn now to the definitions and examples of each type. Completion of the vocable *iqtiḍāʾ* is not a part of the expression, but it is necessarily estimated and required for these reasons:

- The speaker cannot be considered truthful without estimating the missed part of the expression, like the Ḥadīth of the prophet stating that: (Verily Allah has pardoned for me my ummah: their mistakes, their forgetfulness, and that which they have been forced to do under duress) (ibn Mājah, n.d. 1/659). Mistakes, forgetfulness, and coercion cannot be forgiven or removed in themselves as actions because people face them every day.

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[36] Al-Ghazālī called (*mafhūm al-mukhālafah*) *al- mafhūm*, and he said that there are many names for this conception (alGhazālī, 2015. Pp, 2/196).

There is a missing element required to make a full proposal. The part that is forgiven is the impact of the actions. This Ḥadīth can then be understood as follows: My Ummah was forgiven *in terms of the impacts* of their mistakes, forgetfulness and what they were coerced into doing because mistakes cannot be forgiven, but their result can be. I have chosen the translation *completion* because the essence of this term is the same as what Bach explained (see section: 1-3).

- The speech is not legally recognised as this statement is between two people. One says to the other, *free your slave on behalf of me*. This statement requires that the slave is in his possession. The estimated part is that *I am buying your slave first* to be able to free him on my behalf.

- To be able to rationally imagine the expression such as this verse from the Qurʾān {lit: Your mothers are forbidden for you}, Q 4: 23. There is an element required for the expression to be rationally absorbed, and to produce a full proposal. The question raised is, under what terms are mothers forbidden? The required element is *taking your mothers as wives* (al-Ghazalī, 2015, p. 2/193). The full proposal with the estimated part is, your mothers are forbidden to be taken as wives.

With regards to the allusion of the vocable (*ishārah al-naṣṣ*), al-Ghazalī defined it as the meaning included in the vocable, without being primarily intended "*mā yattasiʿ al-lafẓ min ghayr tajrīd qaṣd ʾilayh*" (al-Ghazalī, 2015, P. 2/193). The speaker originally intended to deliver another meaning and the allusion of the vocable which comes clearly with it. Muslim scholars, for example, deduced that the least possible length of time babies could live during pregnancy was six months. They deduced this from Q 46: 15, which addresses the duration of the pregnancy and weaning {and his pregnancy (i.e., the time he is in the womb) and his weaning are thirty months}. The Qurʾān stated in another verse that his weaning is two seasons {and his weaning was in two seasons} Q 31: 14. The conclusion is that the least possible length of time babies could live during pregnancy was six months. The first verse was meant to talk about pregnancy and weaning, but it alluded to the least time of pregnancy (al-Ghazalī, 2015, pp. 2/193-4).

The meaning that is deduced here is yielded from the overall formal logic based on the deduction from the whole text of the Qurʾān. Nevertheless, why did al-Ghazālī consider the allusion in the classification of implication despite its clarity? Since he stated that this signification is apparent but not primarily intended by the speaker, it would have been better if al-Ghazālī suggested another division for this from the implicatures. This is because it is, in my point of view, closer to *rationality of the speech,* based on the overall logical form of the texts.

Furthermore, there is another issue which can be inferred from the definition, where al-Ghazālī avoided stating that the allusion of the text is not entirely intended. Instead, he said it is not in the core of the intention. This will consequently lead us to concluding that the allusion of the text might be intended towards certain speakers in certain contexts, or it may not. Moreover, the example provided by al-Ghazālī fails to provide any sign that the allusion of the text is intended, but there might be other examples laid under this. Specifically, that can lead to the conclusion that the allusion of the text is partially intended, which will be appreciated through the Ḥanafī schools' classification (4-3-2). This term originates from the Ḥanafī classification, but a more thorough discussion will be had, when the Ḥanafī classification is discussed.

Regarding the indication of the vocable *eamāʾ al-naṣṣ,* al-Ghazālī defines it as understanding ratios or reasons, by means of relating an attribute to a ruling (*ḥukm*) as found in this statement: hard-working students will be taken on a trip. This statement indicates that being hardworking is the reason for going on a trip, despite it not being explicitly declared (al-Ghazālī, 2015, P. 2/195).

The verses 13,14 from Q 82, can illustrate the case further. The verse says {Indeed, the righteous will be in pleasure. And indeed, the wicked will be in Hellfire} and indicates that righteousness is a reason for pleasure, and wickedness is a reason for Hellfire. The previous verse was subsumed under independent signification, according to al-Bāqillānī's classification. Al-Ghazalī elaborated al-Bāqillānī's classification into many categories.

Respecting congruent implicature (*mafhūm al-muwāfaqah*) and counter implicature (*mafhūm al-mukhālafah*), have already been explained with examples from al-Juwaynī's classification (al-Ghazalī, 2015, Pp. 2/195-6).

Al-Ghazalī opened the door for logic to be involved in the classification of signification. This might be because of his philosophical background. The logical classification (*muṭābaqah*, *taḍammun* and *iltizām*) was followed by the US after al-Ghazalī, as visible in the US's works.

Despite using a logical approach to classification, al-Ghazalī mentioned logical classification in his introduction, but did not include it in his main classification. He explained that he wanted to introduce his classification with the classification of single vocable (al-Ghazalī, 2015, p. 1/73, 1/81). He, therefore, classified them into *muṭābaqah*, *taḍammun* and *iltizām* significations. He, accordingly, meant by the composed and the implied meanings the significations of speech *al-kalām*. The signification of speech can be derived from its composed (*manẓūm*), i.e. from utterances or the composed speech (*manṭūq al-kalām*) or from *what implied by the composed speech* (*mafhūm al-kalām*). In sum, al-Ghazalī classified the signification of single vocable and the signification of the compound or composed speech.

It can be noted that al-Ghazalī considered the literality as the base of his classification because most of the implied classifications are not cancellable, except the counter implicature. He asserted in his book *al-Mustaṣfā* , echoing al-Bāqillānī, that explicit (*naṣṣ*) (which is not cancellable according to its definition) can be divided into *what is said* and the congruent implicature (see section: 4-2-1).

I can draw on al-Ghazalī's classifications as follows:

The classification of single words

muṭābaqah   taḍammun   iltizām

Figure 9. Al-Ghazālī's classification of single words

signification

composed (*what is said*)   implied meaning   rationality of the speech

explicit   manifest   ambivalent

completion   allusion   indication   congruent implicature   counter implicature

Figure 10. Al-Ghazālī's classification of signification

It is worth noting that al-Ghazalī added the signification of the rationality, which is based on analogy (*qiyās*) to the classification. It is important to draw attention to other scholars, such as ibn ʿAqīl al-Ḥanblī (d. 1119) who agreed with al-Ghazalī in classifying analogy (*qiyās*) within the classification of signification (ibn ʿaqīl, 1999, P. 1/37). Al-Ghazalī and other scholars expanded the concept of classification to include the rational categories and appreciated the mental role in deducing meanings.

4-2-4- Al-Rāzī's Classification of Signification

Al-Rāzī (d. 1210) provided a broad and distinct classification compared to the previous

ones. He divided signification into primordial *waḍʿ-based* and rational. The primordial one includes the equivalent (*muṭābaqah*), in comparison to the rational one, which includes incorporation (*taḍammun*) and entailment (*iltizām*) echoing al-Ghazalī in countig the three types in the classification.

Al-Rāzī considered only the equivalent signification as the semantic *waḍʿ* one; however, the other two are rational.

He then divided the equivalent into two types: predominant (*muḥkam*), which has preference in its signification over other possible significations. The other type is the non-predominant (*mutashābih*), which suggests that all possible meanings are equal without any preference for one over the other.

The predominant is classified into explicit or manifest corresponding to the previous scholars, whereas the latter one is divided into ambivalent (*mujmal*) and allegorical interpreted signification (*muʾawwal*) (al-Rāzī, n.d. pp. 1/230-1). His definition of ambivalent mirrored the thoughts of previous scholars. As for *muʾawwal,* he categorised it to be a counter for the manifest signification, and that manifest holds the preferable meaning over the other possible one. This other possible one is the weighted signification *muʾawwal.*

Concerning the rational signification, which includes the incorporation (*taḍammun*) and the entailment (*iltizām*), he divided the entailment into what is required for the equivalent meaning (*sharṭ lah*) or pertaining to the expressed meaning (*tābiʿ lah*). The required for the equivalent meaning is the *completion* (*iqtiḍāʾ*). It has the same features as al-Ghazālī proposed. The equivalent meaning cannot be adequately understood without it, so, it is a condition in order for the equivalent meaning to be reasonable (see the example of completion in the prvious section). The completion is divided, also, into rational and legal as done by al-Ghazālī (al-Rāzī, n.d. pp. 1/232-234).

The *pertaining to the expressed meaning* is not required for the equivalent meaning to

make sense, but it is connected to it in terms of meaning. He divided it into the supplement (*mukammil*) to the expressed meaning or not supplemental (*ghayr mukammil*). The supplemental is the congruent implicature because it is necessary to the primary meaning as seen in the verse of honoring parents,

{And your Lord has decreed that you should not worship any except Him (only) and (to show) fairest companionship to parents; in case ever one or both of them reaches old age (Literally: being great "in years") in your presence, do not say to them, "Fie!" nor scold them; and speak to them respectful words {Literally: say to them an honorable saying} Q 17: 23.

The supplement meaning is necessary because it is meant and intended by the verse although the uttered (*manṭūq*) meaning does not require it to make a full proposal as happen in the case of completion where the sentence will not be understood without estimating the hidden part.

The supplement meaning is necessary because it is meant and intended by the verse although the uttered (*manṭūq*) meaning does not require it to make a full proposal, as in the case of completion where the sentence will be incomprehensible without estimating the hidden part.

The supplement signification is divided into two types, positive (*thubūtī*) and negative (*ʿadamī*) or what called by the US the *counter implicature*. By positive, Al-Rāzī meant the positive (*thubūtī*)is the signification of indication because he presented the same example given by al-Ghazālī in the section on indication.

We can discuss another example to illustrate the positive. We can take this statement from Q 2: 187. {So now go in to them, and seek whatever Allah has prescribed for you. And eat and drink until the white thread becomes evident to you from the black thread at dawn}. The verse explains that Muslims can have relations with their wives until the dawn time. The supplement signification or the indication, as al-Ghazālī called, is that Muslims

can start fasting even if they are impure without any consequences on their fasting; otherwise, the time of relation should finish before dawn with an adequate time to perform purification (al-Rāzī, n.d. p. 1/234).

Al-Rāzī's classification is complicated because of its unique terms of classification.

I can draw al-Rāzī's classification as follows:

Figure 11. Al-Rāzī's classification of signification

Al-Rāzī followed al-Ghazalī and distinguished three significations: *muṭābaqah, taḍammun* and *iltizām,* but he considered two of them rational. He also did not distiguish the signfiication of single vocables from the signification of composed speech. There are some problems in this adoption, as will be discussed in (4-4-1).

It can be observed that al-Rāzī expanded the role of inference in his classification. Al-Rāzī put the linguistic and the rational entailments under one section. He considered anything deduced under rational signification. *What is said* is restricted only for literal signification. The congruent and the counter implicatures were counted under the entailment despite the conventional merits of them.

The base of classification, according to al-Rāzī is inference and rationality. He refused to include anything apart from what was literally said. He was consistent with himself although the argument can be raised upon the base of his classification. He counted many possible meanings but placed them according to his method. He considered cancellability in categorising explicit and manifest as the previous scholars had done.

His classification and adoptions will be discussed further in the following sections of this chapter.

4-2-5- Ibn al-Ḥājib's Classification

Ibn al-Ḥājib who worked on al-Āmidī's legacy followed him and followed his teacher al-Ghazalī in the main contours of classification. Ibn al-Ḥājib classified single vocable at three types as al-Ghazalī did, *muṭābaqah taḍammun* and *iltizām* (ibn al-Ḥajib, 2006, Pp. 1/221). Ibn al-Ḥājib agreed with al-Ghazalī counting both *muṭābaqah* and *taḍammun* under the *waḍʿ* signification, unlike al-Rāzī who counted only the *muṭābaqah* under the *waḍʿ* signification.

He turned to the linguistic classification and proposed something new. He expanded the concept of what is said (*manṭūq*) to include what is *literally* said and what is *required* for the accomplishment of the proposal. Ibn al-Ḥājib, then confined what is implied into the congruent implicature and the counter implicature.

With regard to *what is said* (*manṭūq*), ibn al-Ḥājib divided it into explicitly (*al-manṭūq al-ṣarīḥ*) and implicitly (*al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ*). *Implicitly said* is divided into intended and unintended. Intended is then divided into completion (*iqtiḍāʾ al-naṣṣ*) and indication

(*eamāʾ al-naṣṣ*). Unintended includes only the allusion (*ishārah al-naṣṣ*) (ibn al-Ḥajib, 2006, Pp. 1/924-34). Dividing *manṭūq* into explicitly (*al-manṭūq al-ṣarīḥ*) and implicitly (*al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ*) is exclusive to ibn al-Ḥājib. No one, within PJ, before ibn al-Ḥajib proposed these terms. Ibn al-Ḥajib coined the term *al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ,* which is roughly equivalent to the modern term *impliciture* and his ideas meet with Bach and Recanati in the concepts of these terms (see sections: 1-3-2 and 1-3-3). What Ibn al-Ḥajib meant by *implicitly said* and what completes the *explicitly said* in order to make it full proposal, is similar to what Bach proposed. He meets with Recanati in incorporating this term with the semantic meaning and the ingredients taken by the context, visible in the catergorisation of *what is said*. *What is said* has two categories; one explicitly and the other implicitly supported by context. The conception of what *implicitly said* meets with Bach since it refers to completion and enrichment (see: 1-3-2).

Ibn al-Ḥajib counted under *al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ* the *completion* or (*iqtḍāʾ),* which is required to consider the truthfulness of the speaker or to make sense of the statement. We discussed an example taken from this Ḥadīth (verily Allah has pardoned for me my ummah: their mistakes, their forgetfulness, and that which they have been forced to do under duress) (ibn Mājah, n.d. 1/659). We concluded that mistakes cannot be forgiven but their results or affects can. This is the completion required in the statement.

As mentioned above, what is said was divided into two types; *explicitly and implicitly said*. With respect to what is *implicitly said,* I am going to choose Bach's term *impliciture* to label this category as I think, with some expansion, that it can also include intended and unintended meanings under it.

Ibn al-Ḥājib added a new term *al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ* and also reclassified the terms proposed by al-Ghazalī, but with a different perspective at the classification. Al-Ghazalī considered the literality as a base for his classification, and hence subsumed most of the classification under *what is understood*, whereas ibn al-Ḥājib did the opposite. He subsumed most of the divisions under *what is said*. The disagreement is within the concept and the inclusion of *what is said,* whether it is semantically or pragmatically developed.

I think that ibn al-Ḥājib's base of classification focused on what is pragmatically explicit from the expression. Every explicit meaning, is, therefore, a part of *what is said manṭūq*.

Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 1370) went further than Ibn al-Ḥājib and considered what is subsumed under impliciture (*al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ*) as parts of *what is said*. So, what is said is only one type and contains all categories of *explicitly and implicitly said* together. He thought that every meaning generated on the *what is said* (*fī maḥal alnuṭq*) as a part of *what is said* (al-Subkī, 2003, P. 2/22).

I can draw Ibn al-Ḥājib's classification as follows:

Figure 12. Ibn al-Ḥājib classification of signification

However, scholastics' classification needs more revision because there is a big disagreement in defining *what is said* and *what is implied*, and that will be processed later in this chapter.

4-3- The Ḥanafī Classification of Signification

This school has their own way of classifying meanings and there is an agreement amongst their scholars in the main classification, without any significant changes as will be explained. They worked, in fact, as a school.

The Ḥanafī school has two main perspectives in classifying signification: classification of texts and classification of signification.

4-3-1- The Classification of Texts

Texts are divided into two criteria: according to the clarity (*wuḍūḥ*) and to the ambiguity (*khafāʾ*).

4-3-1-1- The Classification of The Clarity of The Signification

The Ḥanafī school distinguishes four types of this classification: unequivocal (*muḥkam*), perspicuous (*mufassar*), explicit (*naṣṣ*) and manifest (*ẓāhir*).

Unequivocal (*muḥkam*) is the text which is completely clear in denoting meaning and does not accept abrogation (*naskh*) or allegorical interpretation (*taʾwīl*). That is because of the nature of meaning delivered by the text, like ethical wills in the Qurʾān. It is not cancellable, and its signification is completely clear (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 117; al-Sarakhsī, n.d. pp. 1/165; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/80). This term has two merits: clarity and not is not subjected to abrogation. Abrogation is a term in PJ that refers to the situation when a new text from the Qurʾān or Sunnah is revealed to replace and invalidate another one (al-Shāfiʿī n.d. pp. 16-108; Zaydān 2009, pp. 306-307). This process was limited to the time of revelation because the process of abrogation could not happen after the death of the prophet Muḥammad since divine inspiration had stopped. For example, {no God but Allah}, Q 47: 19. This verse is *muḥkam*, because it is impossible to be cancelled or changed in Islam.

Perspicuous (*mufassar*) is the text whose meaning is evident and another meaning has not arisen. It is like *muḥkam* in terms of clarity. However, the distinction is that the *mufassar* is susceptible to abrogation (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 117; al-Sarakhsī, n.d. pp. 1/165; al-Bukharī, 1997, Pp. 1/77). There is no need for *ta'wīl* in *mufassar*, but it is still open to being cancelled or changed. Its power comes from its wording, unlike *muḥkam* whose power comes from the nature of the meaning and wording.

In the following example, *the penalty for parking in this area is £50*, it is evident in terms of its wording as the meaning is clear, and it especially since it refers to a penalty by number. This ruling is susceptible to change by increasing or decreasing the amount of money. It is open to abrogation, but it is like *muḥkam* before it has been changed.

The two *muḥkam* and *mufassar* are at the same level in terms of clarity and interpretation. The difference is the susceptibility to abrogation.

Explicit (*naṣṣ*) is unequivicol, but it is open to allegorical interpretation (*ta'wīl*). Due to the possibility of the *ta'wīl, naṣṣ* downgrades from the rank of *mufassar*. Explicit (*naṣṣ*) has two features according to the Ḥanafī school. It is evident and, by the context, known that the speaker intends it (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 116; al-Sarakhsī, n.d. p. 1/165; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/73). The key feature is that it is intended by the speaker, despite the possibility of allegorical interpretation (*ta'wīl*).

An example from the Qurʾān can illustrate this type {That is because they say, "Trade is [just] like interest." However, Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest}, Q 2: 275. The primary purpose of this verse, according to the context, is to distinguish between trade and interest. This is also referred to as the *naṣṣ*. The meaning itself can be explicitly understood and this verse, thus, has driven (*masūq*) in order to deliver a specific purpose *differentiating between the trade and interest*. Moreover, the meaning being delivered is explicit and intended.

The difference between the *naṣṣ* and the *mufassar* is that the *mufassar* is not subjected to

taʾwīl because it is elaborately delivered *mufaṣṣal* so that there is no possibility for *taʾwīl*, unlike the *naṣṣ,* which is not elaborately conveyed*;* so, there is a possibility of *taʾwīl.* Wording and context play roles in determining the distinction between them.

The Ḥanafī school disagreed with the scholastic school in the definition of *naṣṣ.* The scholastics defined *naṣṣ* as not subjected to allegorical interpretation (*taʾwīl*). *Naṣṣ,* according to scholastics equals *mufassar,* according to the Ḥanafī school.

Manifest (*ẓāhir*) downgrades from the rank of the *naṣṣ* because it refers to the apparent and unintended meaning by the speaker. And yet, it is open to *taʾwīl* (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 116; al-Sarakhsī, n.d. pp. 1/163-4; al-Bukharī, 1997, Pp. 1/72)*.* Manifest is subjected to *taʾwīl* like *naṣṣ* but it is not intended as *naṣṣ.*

The previous example can be reused here. The verse came primarily to say that interest is not like the trade, i.e. to distiguish trade from interest. This is, accordingly, the *naṣṣ.* It is intended and explicit. At the same time, the verse brings to light that interest is forbidden and trade is permitted. This conclusion is clearly understood by virtue of the wording, although it is not intended by the speaker. The *naṣṣ*, in the previous example, is *that the trade is not like interest*, whereas the *ẓāhir* is that *trade is permitted and interest is forbidden*. The manifest is taken from the wording despite the purpose of the verse.

The following chart can explain the difference between the previous significations:

Text	Evident	Intended	*No-taʾwīl*	No-abrogation
Muḥkam	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mufassar	✓	✓	✓	×
Naṣṣ	✓	✓	×	×
Ẓāhir	✓	×	×	×

Table 6. The classification of the clarity of the signification

These are briefly the classification of the clarity of signification. The next section is allocated to discuss the classification of the ambiguity of signification.

4-3-1-2 The classification of the Ambiguity of the Signification

The previous four categories have other four counterparts: *ẓāhir* is opposite to obscure (*khafī*). *Naṣṣ* is opposite to difficult (*mushkil*). *Mufassar* is opposite to *mujmal*. *Muḥkam* is opposite to (*mutashābih*).

The order of these, beginning with the most ambiguous is:

The intricate (*mutashābih*).

The ambivalent (*mujmal*).

The difficult (*mushkil*).

The obscure (*khafī*).

The intricate (*mutashābih*) refers to the texts whose meanings are impossible to access because the text is beyond the knowledge of the hearers at that point (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 118; al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/169; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/88). The intricacy comes from the hearer's ability to grasp the meaning.

Examples of this can be found in the verses of the Qur'an, which are based on similarities between humans and God, in terms of attributing human properties to deliver God's properties. It carries complexity because it is impossible to describe God and accurately identify His characteristics. So, for example, the verse {God's hand is over their hands} Q 48: 10. shows the intricacy that appears in the description of God's hand not being fully accessed. This part of the verse is impossible to interpret, despite understanding the total meaning of the verse, and that it is God supports them.

This is the opposite of the *muḥkam. Muḥkam,* referring to something which can be completely understood, contrary to, *mutashābih* which is not entirely understood.

The ambivalent (*mujmal*) is the text whose meaning cannot be perceived, or the meanings are jostled, so there is a limited possibility to access to them (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 118; al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/168; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/86). The main merit of the ambivalent is that there is no way, by the same text, to reach the meaning under different reasons. The reason might be that there are many possible meanings with the same grade of clarity, and the meaning is not fully perceived, such as being asked to pray without being taught the way of prayer, and so forth. Ambivalence, however, needs the speaker to articulate the meaning (al-Sarakhsī, p.1/168). There is no need for a further explanation because this category refers precisely to what scholastics meant by it (see: 4-2).

The difficult (*mushkil*) is the text whose meaning is accessible with difficulty. It is not impossible without an extra statement from the speaker, as seen in *ambivalent*, but still rather difficult and needs some contemplation in order to obtain the meaning (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 118; al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/168; al-Bukharī, 1997, Pp. 1/83; al-Taftāzānī, 1996, P. 1/234). The source of difficulty, according to al-Dabbūsī (d. 1039), is the accuracy of the meaning, which requires the hearer to contemplate further (*taʾmmul*) to get to the meaning. This is the opposite of *mufassar*, which is explicitly articulated, and the stubbornness of the intended meaning can be solved by contemplation.

Homonymy (*mushtarak*) can be one of the problems that make a text difficult (*mushkil*). An example from the jurisprudential books explains the case. *Maghrib* prayer time finishes at twilight (*shafaq*). There are, however, two twilights after sunset, so which one is meant here? There are consequently two opinions in the Islamic jurisprudence regarding this case because of the *difficultly* of the text (al-Zarkashī 1992, p. 2/135). Each opinion has chosen a twilight. The issue of *mushkil* needs research and contemplation to be solved. *Mushkil* texts can be one of the reasons standing beyond different opinions as one issue in Islamic jurisprudence, because research and contemplation can lead to different opinions.

The obscure (*khafī*) is merely an unclear meaning due to a factor unrelated to the wording which might distract the hearer. The expression itself is clear, but there is uncertainty that some cases are not included in the text, as in the following example.

The verse of punishing a thief *sāriq* in the Qurʾān seemingly includes every *thief*. The Muslim jurists raised some questions regarding the inclusion of the verse. They asked about *nabbāsh the one who disinters graves to steal shrouds*, and the *ṭarrār who takes people's properties publicly but in dexterity* (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 118). Are they incorporated in the definition of thief, and hence, will receive the same punishment or do they fall out of the definition of thief and will receive a different punishment?

Furthermore, *nabbāsh* and *ṭarrār* have the same attributes of stealing, but they have their own names which are based on the type of theft they commit. The text is obscure because it includes them in terms of the general meaning, but not explicit in their specific meaning of stealing, by their specific names.

Khafī needs research like *mushkil,* but not in the same way according to the Ḥanafī scholars. *Khafī* needs research into the wording, whereas *mushkil* needs a higher level of research like al-Dabbūsī proposed, such as researching the conventional styles of communication.

I think that the distinction between *khafī* and *mushkil* are very sensitive and can be explained as the following: ambiguity of *khafī* is based on including **cases**. However, the ambiguity of *mushkil* is based upon and includes **meanings**. The latter is more difficult because it suspends interpretation until the intended meaning can be accessed. However, the former interpretation is accessed and clear, but the ambiguity emerges from cases where the wording does not include specific names. Due to this, there is a disagreement amongst scholars. In my point of view, what is meant by "*khafī's* ambiguity is not taken from wording", however, "ambiguity of *mushkil* is taken from the wording". The *mushkil's* ambiguity is based upon the meaning whereas *khafī's* ambiguity is based on

inclusion. *Mushkil* is not applicable until we find out the intended meaning. Conversely, *khafī* is applicable but the problem is related to the quantity of the inclusion.

This example can explain the difference between the two levels of ambiguity. We can take this statement; *the rent must be reconsidered*.

The word *rent* can mean *the amount paid to someone for the use of something* and can mean *to tear something into two or more pieces*. This statement is difficult (*mushkil*) because in the absence of a context to define what is meant by rent, we need to find clues that can help in defining the intended meaning. In case we find the intended meaning, which is, assumingly, *the amount paid someone for the use of something,* there are other questions that are related to the term rent. Does it include lease? Which is a type of rent but at the same time has its own name. Here we have the *khafī* in terms of including *lease* with the term *rent*. In sum, ambiguity in the inclusion does not abolish the signification of the text; however, ambiguity in meaning abolishes interpretation (al-Qarāfī, n.d. 2/88). The following chart can clarify the differences among the ambiguity categories:

Unclear Texts ⬇	Need search	Need contemplation	Need explanation	inaccessible	⬅ Properties
Obscure	✓				
Difficult	✓	✓			
Ambivalent	✓	✓	✓		
Intricate				✓	

Table 7. The classification of the ambiguity of the signification

Based on the classification of texts, it appears that the Ḥanafī school are more consistent in their goals than the scholastics. The Ḥanafī school classified their meaning to fit the texts analysed (the Qurʾān and the Sunnah). Their classifications were primarily allotted to address the Qurʾān and the Sunnah's texts.

There is something unique that can be found in the Ḥanafī classifications of texts. This classification can be considered a semiotic classification, which is interested in the types of signs, since texts are types of signs in PJ. The Ḥanafī school's scholars, therefore, conclude their classification of clarity and ambiguity by discussing the action required towards these texts. They divided the texts to identify which one was an active sign, and which text was not an active sign to distinguish which text could be approached for interpretation (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 117; al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/169; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 2/50). They asserted that the classifications for the clarity of signification should be activated in interpretation and people should work in accordance with their meanings. With regards to the classifications for the ambiguity of signification, the Ḥanafī school's scholars confirmed that intricate should be accepted as it is, ambivalent should be paused, waiting for the articulation, and regarded that difficult and obscure should be subject to research to be fully interpreted.

This is a minimised semiotic classification of the Islamic texts related to the indicators (*adillah*) in order to evaluate the certain (*qaṭʿī*) signs from the probable (*ẓannī*) signs. The Ḥanafī school considered the semiotic classifications minimally to fit their purposes.

4-3-2- Ways of Classification of Significations

This is the main classification of the Ḥanafī school. After discussing the textual classification, we will now discuss the meanings and significations of speech. Under this category, the Ḥanafī school distinguishes four types of signification:

The expression of the text (*ʿIbārah al-naṣṣ*)

The allusion of text (*Ishārah al-naṣṣ*)

The denotation of text (*Dilālah al-naṣṣ*)

The completion of the text (*Iqtiḍāʾ al-naṣṣ*)

The expression of the text (ʿibārah al-naṣṣ) refers simply to the explicit meaning derived from the text without any need for contemplation. This meaning is intended by the speaker, and the text has been laid to deliver this meaning, i.e. this meaning is the purpose of the text (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 130; al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/236; al-Taftāzānī, 1996, P. 1/242; ʾAmīr Bādshāh, 1931, Pp. 1/87; al-laknawī, 2002, p. 1/441). ʿIbārah al-naṣṣ is derived from the types of explicit texts (see: 4-3-1-1).

An example from the explicit text (4-3-1-1) can be repeated here taken from Q 2: 275 in the Qurʾān to explain this type. {That is because they say, "Trade is [just] like interest." However, Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest}. The primary purpose of this verse, according to the context, is to distinguish between trade and interest. This is, hence, the expression of the text because the meaning is clear and the text is meant to deliver it. The text is meant to differentiate between trade and interest, and the meaning being delivered is explicit.

The allusion of the text (ishārah al-naṣṣ). There is disagreement amongst the Ḥanafī scholars concerning the definition of ishārah al-naṣṣ. This type of signification has already been studied in al-Ghazalī's work (see 4-3-1-1). In fact, the two schools refer to the same thing.

Al-Dabbūsī, al-Sarakhsī and Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah al-Maḥbūbī (1346) define ishārah al-naṣṣ as the explicit meaning in a text without being explicit (masūq) or placed mainly for it, but for the expression of the text (ʿibārah al-naṣṣ), i.e. the text is primarily laid and driven to ʿibārah al-naṣṣ primarily, but there is another explicit meaning that can be derived from the text (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 130; al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/236; Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah al-Bukhārī, n.d. p. 1/242; al-laknawī, 2002, p. 1/441-42). Al-Bukharī (d.1310) defined it as having an explicit, but unintended meaning because the text is driven and intended for expression. Al-Bukharī's definition states that the allusion of the text is not intended; however, the former definition states that the text is explicit in its actions.

By considering al-Ghazālī's definition, we now have three definitions. Al-Ghazālī's definition for the *allusion of the text* affirmed that the intention was not primarily delivered for the *allusion of the text*. This implies that the alluded meaning is intended, but not primarily. We have three different definitions due to the existence of three different attributes.

The first one confirmed that the text is not driven (*masūq*) or meant for the allusion of the text.

The second one confirmed that the alluded meaning in text is not intended.

The third one confirmed that the alluded meaning text is not primarily intended.

This difference in definitions requires us to distinguish the relationship between the driven text and the intended meaning. The distinction leads us to four types of meanings linearly ordered from the strongest:

1- A meaning is intended

2- A meaning is not primarily intended

3- A meaning is not the text-driven or placed for it

4- A meaning is not intended

The intended meaning obviously requires that the text is driven entirely or partially. The un-intended meaning entails that the text is explicitly neither driven nor intended at all. The second one implies that the allusion of the text is intended but subsidiarily. The third, *the meaning not the text driven for it* entails that the allusion of the text may or may not be intended. The text, merely, is not driven for it, but it might be subsidiarily intended. Therefore, unintended does not equal not driven.

I think that the difference in the definition is based on the confusion between the unintended meaning and the meaning of the text driven is no to it. It would have been better if al-Bukharī followed his masters in the defining allusion of the text to make his definition broader by including the explicit meaning even if it was unintended. Al-Bukharī's assertion that the allusion of the text is unintended will exclude the explicit meaning, partially intended from the allusion of the text. Al-Ghazalī's definition considered the allusion of a text as partially intended.

It is better, from my point of view, to adopt the first definition *ishārah al-naṣṣ as the explicit meaning in a text without the text being driven masūq or placed mainly for it* because it is more comprehensive and can include the alluded meanings whether or not they are intended.

Al-Sarakhsī (d. 1090) articulated the two *ʿibārah al-naṣṣ* and *ishārah al-naṣṣ* by this example, imagine that you are looking at someone and by the time you are recognising him you are recognising others on his right and left side, despite your intention to only look at the specific person (al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/236). The primary person represents the *ʿibārah al-naṣṣ*, and the others represent the *ishārah al-naṣṣ*. This process needs a high level of insight in relation to the hearer. Al-Sarakhsī, therefore, considered it as a type of eloquence on the part of the speaker.

The example given in the manifest text is the same one used by the Ḥanafī school scholars to articulate this since *ʿibārah al-naṣṣ* is the signification, whereas the manifest text is the text signifying. Another example, from the Qurʾān, Q 59; 8, illustrates the distinction between the two types,

{For the poor emigrants who were expelled from their homes and their properties, seeking bounty from Allah and [His] approval and supporting Allah and His Messenger, [there is also a share]. Those are the truthful}.

The verse was revealed in the context of distributing money from the state. Some of the

people are the emigrants who were forced to leave their city by the non-believers in Makkah. The verse states that the emigrants have shares in the money. This is the expression of the text (*ʿibārah al-naṣṣ*) because it is explicitly delivered, and the text is driven and laid for this purpose. The allusion of the text is that the emigrants' ownership of their properties in Makkah have been taken. This is the allusion of the text (*ishārah al-naṣṣ*), which is derived from word *poor* in the verse, which identifies them as destitute. Poor people are those who do not have money. The properties of emigrants no longer belong to them because the non-believers took them.

The former example works by means of the allusion of the intended expression , despite the fact that the text is not driven to it, otherwise; the qualification (*qayd*) *emigrants* is useless.

Another example can articulate the case further. The verse, Q 2: 233, states {And it is for the man to whom children are born to offer them provision and raiment with beneficence}. This verse means that the father has to bear the responsibility of feeding and clothing the children who have been born unto him. The verse's purpose was to convey that the father is responsible for his baby's living costs. This is the meaning that the text is driven towards. This meaning is derived from the expression *ʿibarah*. However, there is another meaning that can be derived from the text, although the text is not driven towards it. The other meaning is that child's descent is solely attributed to the father. This meaning is taken from the word *to him*. The text is not placed for this purpose, but it is explicit, and in my point of view, intended, despite not being the core focus. *ʿIbarah* confirms the responsibility of the father towards his children. The allusion is that the child's descent is solely attributed to the father.

In the previous example, the allusion is intended because the context is referring to responsibility, and this correspond to the allusory meaning. The verse declares that this is your son and he is your responsibility. Moreover, in Arabic culture children are attributed to their fathers.

According to the Ḥanafī, the allusion of the text is derived from the manifest text (see section: 4-3-1-1). The meaning is clearly delivered, but it is not in the speaker's focus.

The allusory meaning of the text needs a slight insight into the hearer to yield the signification. Al-Sarakhsī, therefor, considered rhetoric as a way of discovering this meaning (al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/236).

The denotation of text (*dilālah al-naṣṣ*). This signification is exactly the as what the scholastics call the congruent implicature. This signification has different definitions by the Ḥanafī scholars, but all definitions are situated around the same conception.

Al-Sarakhsī defines it as the signification derived from the meaning of a composed speech by virtue of language, not by the analogy (al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/241; see also, al-Jassas, 1994, pp. 1/289-290). Al-Bukharī asserted that this signification is the same as the scholastics *congruent implicature*. He, therefore, followed the scholastics in defining the *denotation of text* (al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/241). He, thus, defined it as the signification not *that is not said ghayr manṭūq* but derived from what is said by virtue of context (al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/115).

It is noted that the two scholars al-Sarakhsī and al-Bukharī confirmed that this signification is derived from the language and linguistic conventions, as the scholastics did, in order to distinguish this signification from the one yielded by analogy. There is an argument among the US to considering this meaning not obtained by analogy, but instead by convention. This discussion will be deferred to the next chapter when different types of implicatures will be addressed (see section: 5-1-1).

It can be noted as well that al-Sarakhsī considered that the denotation of the text (*dilālah al-naṣṣ*) is signified by the expression of the text (ʿibārah al-naṣṣ). We discussed that (*dilālah al-naṣṣ*) is derived from the convention. Al-Sarakhsī wanted to communicate that what is said is a sign for its meaning. The meaning of what is said is a signifier for the denotation of text. I.e., the meaning plays a role as a signifier (see section, 4-1-3).

What is said ⟶ the meaning of what is said ⟶ the denotation of text

This signification is deduced from the meaning and is intended by the speaker, as al-Sarakhsī considered it like the one deduced from the expression itself as the main goal of the speech (al-Sarakhsī, p. 1/241).

Examples for this signification can be taken from the congruent implicature that has been discussed through the scholastics' significations (see: 4-2-2), since the two significations are the same, but termed differently, as previously explained.

The process of obtaining the denotation of text (*dilālah al-naṣṣ*) needs higher qualifications in the language in order to be deduced. Al-Dabbūsī considered the two levels of signification; the allusion of text (*ishārah al-naṣṣ*) and the denotation of text (*dilālah al-naṣṣ*), as belonging to rhetoric, where *ishārah al-naṣṣ* is rhetorical in terms of its vocable, and *dilālah al-naṣṣ* is rhetorical in terms of its meaning. *Ishārah al-naṣṣ* is rhetorically based on choosing a vocable that can incorporate two meanings. On the other hand, *dilālah al-naṣṣ* is rhetorically based on a meaning that can contain many issues (al-Dabbūsī, 2001, p. 135).

The completion of the text *iqtiḍāʾ al-naṣṣ*. As pointed out before, I am using the term *completion* because it accurately represents the intended content under the concept of *iqtiḍāʾ al-naṣṣ*.

There is an agreement among the scholastics and the Ḥanafī school in dealing with term, so, there is no need to explain it again (see: 4-2-3).

It is important to close the section by drawing attention to the fact that the Ḥanafī's four categories are not cancellable unless there is a clash among them. They are based on the classification of clarity relating to the intention of the speaker. The first three are intended by the speaker, although there are not equally intended. The first one is mainly intended. The second one is explicit because of the rhetoric in the wording. The third is also intended

by the speaker through its rhetoric in meaning as explained. The fourth is necessary and explicit in order for the speech to make sense.

4-4- Revision of The Classifications

The previous sections in this chapter have presented the scholastics and the Ḥanafī school's classifications of signification. This raised certain questions about the nature of the classification. However, they also made us question why the two schools' classifications are entirely different? Is the difference a variance in the terminologies, as repeated in the studies about PJ, or is the difference more profound than this simple conclusion? These questions are will be addressed in the following sections.

4-4-1- The Perspective of Classification

We have already learnt that the US stated that *fahm* is the attribute of the hearer, whereas *ifhām* is the attribute of the speaker. There are, accordingly, two opposite perspectives in meanings. The question is, which perspective have the US adopted?

By browsing the categories and the definitions of the two schools, they have two opposite sides as a starting point for classifying meanings. The Ḥanafī's definitions considered the speaker's intention. This can be explicitly noted from the definition from the expression of the text ʿibārah al-naṣṣ, the allusion of the text ishārah al-naṣṣ and the denotation of text dilālah al-naṣṣ, which is (dilālah al-naṣṣ) related to speech and the speaker's rhetoric in meaning, explained in (4-3-2). *Dilālah al-naṣṣ* is defined unlike the congruent implicature, which was defined by scholastics as an implicature understood by the hearer. The definitions of the quadratic classification, according to the Ḥanafī school, can confirm this conclusion as well. The definitions are based on the speaker's intentionality, i.e. what he aimed to deliver. The Ḥanafī school, accordingly, **considered the principle of *ifhām* as the criterion of classification**. They were concerned with what the speaker wants the hearer to understand by his statements.

The Ḥanafī school highly considered the intention of the speaker when classifying texts. A category can upgrade or downgrade, according to its level of intentionality, as seen in the *naṣṣ*, *ẓāhir* and the other categories.

The scholastics' definitions of the categories, on the other hand, relied on the interpretation and possible meanings of the speech. Interpretation is accomplished on the hearer's side, i.e. the scholastics adopted **fahm-based** in classifying meanings. *Fahm* can lead to deconstructing the text away from the speaker's intentions because meanings are processed by the hearer's understanding. Not all *fahms* can necessarily comply with the speaker's intentions. This fact motivated al-Āmidī to state that the hearer should not understand more than what is required by the speaker (al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/132). Al-Shāṭibī confirmed this as discussed in section (2-3-3) by stipulating that the understanding of the hearer should comply with the *ifhām* of the speaker. The scholastics consider the principle of *fahm* in light of convention, as discussed in the second chapter (see section 2-2-2).

The scholastics' classifications are broader because it is open to interpretation. The Ḥanafī school's classification is limited because it is restricted to the speaker's intentions, and also relies on the context to reach to the speaker's intentions.

The different points of starting in classifying meanings engender two different perspectives and two different classifications. Moreover, the difference is not only in the label, as always claimed in approaching the two classifications, but rather profound and different in its principles.

4-4-2- Revision of The Scholastics' Classification

This section will discuss the classification within the scholastic school to uncover the main contours of each classification, and further identify the agreements and disagreements among the scholastics. Furthermore, I will present the background of the scholastics and then move onto analysing their classifications.

Scholastics followed the Muslim philosophers in classifying the inferences of the vocables. This can be observed in the *equivalent*, *corporation* and *entailment* definitions. Al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) distinctly referred to the very famous Muslim philosopher ibn Sīnā (d. 1037) in defining the relations between the vocable and the signification (al-Qārāfī, 2004, P. 25).

The philosophical background broadened the scholastic perspective and drove them to design a broad classification more than their need for the religious texts. Their classifications can work with all linguistic texts, not only with the Qurʾān and the Sunnah's texts.

It was noted that each scholar added new terms to the classification and determined his principle of dividing the meanings.

The scholastics' classification varied and disagreed, despite the unity of the school. The difference, in my point of view, returns to the criterion that designed each classification. Therefore, I can conclude that there are four criteria that engendered those differences among the scholastics. These are:

Literality

Cancellability

Inference

Pragmatic perspective

With regard to al-Bāqillānī', whose classification was based on cancellability, he considered *what is said* and the congruent implicature both together under one category *the independently signifier* because both of them are not cancellable.

Al-Juwaynī considered the literality as the criterion of the classification. Everything that is not explicitly spelt out is not considered from *what is said,* despite its force of explicitness. The congruent implicature is subsumed under what is implied, although it is not cancellable, and as previously explained, it is more intentional than the expressed meaning.

Al-Ghazālī loomed and followed al-Juwaynī's criterion. The literality also considered the criterion of his classification with more categories.

For al-Rāzī's classification, which is broad, complicated and comprehensive, *inference* whether it is linguistic or rational, overwhelmed his classification because he subsumed what is not obvious under the category of *entailment,* which refers to considering the inference process. The problem of his criteria lies in considering lots of pragmatic and semantic meanings, such as the completion and the congruent implicature being subjected to the inference process, despite their clarity to language users. This process ignores the rhetoric and conventional ways of communication. Congruent implicature as al-Bāqillānī asserted is derived from the conventional styles and more appropriate to the ruling than *what is said* (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 343). If we expand the inclusion of inference, we can, hence, consider allegory as a kind of inference.

As for ibn al-Ḥājib, he adopted the fourth criterion, which is the pragmatic. He extended the concept of *what is said* to include what can be pragmatically considered as a part of *what is said*.

Concerning the definition of the scholastics categorises, the scholastics agreed on the definitions of each category but differed in placing it. *Naṣṣ, ẓāhir, mujmal* and the other terms have the same definitions and concepts, but can sometimes include different wording. However, each scholar has their own method of classification.

Al-Bāqillānī instituted the concept of classification. It is not surprising that his classification is therefore basic. As for al-Ghazālī, he brought the philosophers' terms into

uṣūl al-fiqh PJ such as the equivalent, incorporation and entailment. Al-Rāzī expanded the role of inference in processing meanings. He also took the logical terms from al-Ghazālī, (*equivalent, incorporation* and *entailment*) as the head categories, despite the confirmation by al-Ghazālī, that they are related to the single vocables (4-2-3).

Putting *equivalent, incorporation* and *entailment* as the headers of the classification will generate serious problems. The classified meanings can relate to the single vocable or to the composed speech. Making the equivalent the head category for significations of text entails that sentences are *waḍʿ-based* (assigned by the language creator) like the single words, because the classification (*equivalent, incorporation* and *entailment*) relates to the assigning language. This conclusion requires dictionaries to include sentences, as they include single words (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 2/10). In fact, al-Zarkashī discussed this issue and concluded that the sentences are not *waḍʿ-based* but only its rules and types (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 2/10). Al-Qarāfī (d.1285) therefore confirmed that *equivalent* cannot include sentences, unless the sentences are *waḍʿ-based*, i.e., assigned by the language creator. He found a contradiction between al-Rāzī and his proposal.

There are serious questions relating to al-Rāzī's claim like of how a vocable can denote equivalent meaning (*bilmuṭābaqah*) where the meaning can be manifest (*ẓāhir*) or ambivalent? Did the language assigner *wāḍiʿ* aim to confuse people? The language assigner will allocate the meaning of explicit words, but using language will make some meanings explicit or implicit. Al-Ghazālī was very careful in classifying equivalent, incorporation and entailment, as he placed them under the classification of single words. The issue of *waḍʿ* regarding the single vocable or sentence was discussed in detail in the US's works ((al-Qarāfī, 1995, pp. 2/575 ; al-Zarkashī, 1992, pp. 2/9-11). The US disagreed on it despite deriving it from al-Ghazālī, who confirmed that it is related to single vocables. However, this is beyond the scope of this chapter and will therefore not be expounded upon here.

Ibn al-Ḥājib presented a solid classification, but he considered the allusion of the text under the unintended category. He did so by expanding on the concept of what is said to

include what can be obtained by the text's ingredients with their completions and enrichments. His distinction was to coin the term *al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ,* and which in my opinion, corresponds roughly to Bach's term *impliciture.*

However, some changes and additional categories can be placed to enrich it, according to the finding of defining the meaning in section (4-4-2).

We discussed in section (3-2-2-2) the similarity between the scholastics and Grice regarding the *indication of the text* (see: 4-2-3)*.* The US asserted in fact that it is not cancellable, and it is a valid way of discovering ratios, through associating rulings to a ratio by means of conjunction (al-Rāzī, n.d. p. 5/144; al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 5/197). It is important to point out again that the indication of the text is close to what Grice called *conventional implicature*. Grice articulated this implicature through the example of "he is an English man, he is, therefore, brave" (see section 1-2-2; 3-2-2-2). This is what the US accurately called *the indication of the text* and presented examples equivalent to Grice (3-2-2-2; 4-2-3).

Al-Juwaynī's distinction was through dividing the congruent implicature into two types cancellable and not cancellable, which can make some congruent implicatures cancellable, unlike the confirmation of the US that it is not cancellable. More about this issue is discussed in (5-1).

As a conclusion of this section, scholastics varied in their principles of the classification, and thus, different classifications were proposed as a result. This is what can explain, in my point of view, the diverse classifications within a school. They differed in expanding and narrowing the concept of *what is said* and *what is implied* because of the base of the classification, and due to the denotation of *what is said* and *what is implied* through their possibility of inclusion.

We can summarise the merits of the scholastics' classifications based on the previous discussions. Firstly, despite the difference in classification, they maintain the lane of

classification, which is the *fahm* principle that can represent the hearer's side.

Secondly, their classifications were broader than their purposes. They discussed that meanings could be taken from any Arabic speech. It is broader because the scholastics discussed it theoretically. It therefore, can work for any Arabic texts and is not restricted. Thirdly, their classifications were designed from a pragmatic perspective, as it included meanings that can be dreived from the language in use or communication as seen.

Fourthly, their classifications were concerned with meanings as they are subjected to the understanding of the ones who hear it. We concluded that meanings are related to the users of language, whereas signification is related to the vocable. The scholastics mainly classified meanings, as they adopted the hearer's perspective in classification. They included in their classifications every meaning that could be raised on the part of the hearer. However, the term *signification* refers to meanings of vocables mainly. Again, the two terms *meaning* and *signification* were interchangeably used in Isalmic tradition.

4-4-3- Revision of the Ḥanafī's Classification

The Ḥanafī school presented, as shown, two types of classifications. The first one is concerned with the textual classifications, and the second one is concerned with the meaning and signification of vocable.

With respect to the textual classifications, it can be noted that the divisions depended on the certainty of inferred meanings of texts. Certainty refers, according to the Ḥanafī school, to two principles; the first one is cancellability and the second is the possibility of abrogation. The higher level is the one that is unsubjected to any of the previous principles. The weakest is the subjected to both principles. Another factor that can be noted in their textual classification, is that is meant to serve the classification of meanings in terms of categorising texts to know undertake analysis. We saw that each category of the meaning behind classification is taken from a classification of the texts. The expression of the text (*ʿibārah al-naṣṣ*) is derived from *mufassar* or *naṣṣ*. The allusion of text (*ishārah al-naṣṣ*)

is derived from the expression of *ẓāhir*. The denotation of text (*dilālah al-naṣṣ*) is also from the meaning *ẓāhir* (al-Sarakhsī, n.d. p. 1/242).

The textual classification is similar to the scholastics' classifcation. I think that the reason is that the Ḥanafī school classified texts neutrally to classify the specific meanings, since the four classifications are derived from the general textual classification.

With respect to the four categories of the Ḥanafī's classification, it has been explained that they are remarkably based on the intention of the speaker and the principle of *ifhām*. This base impelled the Ḥanafī school not to include counter implicature or any equivalent to it in their classification and a refusal to consider it because it is not primarily or secondarily intended. This issue is broadly discussed in the next chapter. However, it has been observed that the Ḥanafī school confined their classification to what is explicitly derived from the text, as they relied on the speaker, rather than the convention of classifying meanings. However, they considered convention when they classified texts, as they are discussing factors belonging to the real world or to Qurʾānic texts.

Relying on the speaker's intention, allots the Ḥanafī's classification to the Islamic realm because different speakers could have different intentions.

I think there can be a broader classification than the four identified above, based on the types of texts and the sources of the meanings. As previously explained, the Ḥanafī school has four levels of ambiguous texts, so they can lay more signification according to the texts. They can include meanings that can be cancellable, and they can take more meanings from *ẓāhir* or *khafī*. Moreover, they can incorporate into their classification eight further categories according to their eight types of texts. I think that they did not do this because they focused on texts to accommodate the purposes of the Qurʾān and Sunnah. They preferred to dedicate their classification to the strong significations only.

The denotation of a text which is, according to the scholastics, the congruent implicature (*mafhūm a-lmuwāfaqah*) has a different name. Ḥanafī's term is stronger as it includes the

understood meaning. It is called the denotation (*dilālah al-naṣṣ*), which refers to the intended and primary meaning of the text. This means that it is not cancellable, according to the Ḥanafī school since it is the intended and primary meaning. Hence, they agree with the scholastics in considering that this category is not cancellable. However, the term *dilālah al-naṣṣ,* confirms the Ḥanafī school's perspective of *ifhām* since the meanings belong to the speech not to the *fahm* of the hearer.

The quadratic classification *the expression of the text (ʿibārah al-naṣṣ), the allusion of text (ishārah al-naṣṣ), the denotation of text (dilālah al-naṣṣ), the completion of the text (iqtiḍāʾ al-naṣṣ)* can work as criteria to examine the interpretation and divert it to the intention of the speaker. The four classifications require a knowledge of the context and the speaker's intention in order to assign the level of the meaning.

In summary, the Ḥanafī's classification of meaning has been accomplished by jurists, rather than philosophers or linguists as raised in the introduction of the research. It is made to accommodate the needs of the texts of work and specified to the analytical area of the Ḥanafī school. I can summarise the main merits of the Ḥanafī's classification of meanings. Firstly, their classification fits the Islamic texts *the Qurʾān and the Sunnah*. Secondly, their classification is based on *ifhām* and the speaker's intention. Thirdly, the classification is agreed upon among all schools inside the Ḥanafī school, which gives it the school character, and confirms the claim that it is made to substantiate their jurisprudential opinions, as discussed in the introduction of this thesis. Finally, the classification is practical and relates to the practised text. It is not theoretical as the scholastics one.

4-4-4- The Proposed Classification

The previous discussion raised a need to reclassify the meanings to avoid confusion and to add new additional terms and elaborations.

I shall reclassify the meanings according to the premises that are presented in this chapter, particularly in terms of the definition of meaning, which is the cognition of things.

The modern pragmatics' terms are used when they can express the concept, or they can serve more accurately than the literal transitions of the Islamic terms.

The head categorises are *what is said* and *what is implied.* I shall consider the definition of *what is said* as follows: requiring a full proposal. Everything that participates in forming the full proposal of what is explicitly said will be considered as part of *what is said*. What is compulsorily required to form the cognition or the mental image (meaning) will be categorised under *what is said* or the explicit. Another full proposal is implied by the meaning of *what is said* and will be placed under *what is implied*. I am adopting ibn al-Ḥājib's conception of *what is said.*

What is said will be divided into two categories as ibn al-Ḥājib did: the explicitly said, and the implicitly said. I shall use Bach's term *impliciture* since it expresses the same linguistic idea of ibn al-Ḥājib's term *what is implicitly said* (*al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ*) (see: 4-2-5). Explicitly will be assigned to what is obvious, despite its ability to be cancellable by the allegorical interpretation (*taʾwīl*). Whereas the term impliciture will be allocated to what is not explicitly observable but requires explicit speech to complete its full proposal. Impliciture will also include meaning that is indicated or alluded to by the discernible text, whether or not it is intended.

Under *explicitly*, three terms will be placed explicit (*naṣṣ*) as, meant by scholastics, manifest (*ẓāhir*) and ambivalent (*mujmal*) as defined at scholastics' works.

Impliciture will include the allusion (*ishārah al-naṣṣ*) and completion (*iqtiḍāʾ al-naṣṣ*) because completion is required to make *what is said* a full proposal, and allusion refers to another full proposal, whether or not is is intended.

Regarding *what is implied*, this part will include any full proposal after the explicitly said proposal. *What is implied* can be derived from either convention or the second level of interpretation, which is the level of causation (*al-taʿlīl*) as discussed in (3-1; 3-2).

I will argue with ibn al-Ḥājib, who considered the indication of text (*eamāʾ al-naṣṣ*) as a category of *what is implicitly said.* I shall instead follow al-Gazālī to consider the indication of the text under *what is implied* because it is derived from the convention as seen in section (3-2-2-2) and does not require *what is said,* in order to make sense of the utterance.

What is implied will include four categories: indication of text, congruent implicature, counter implicatures and finally, analogical implicature.

Returning to what was discussed in the unmentioned case would have a counter ruling because it lacks the attribution of the *what is said* case. What about similar cases that have the same attribution or ratio? There is a possibility of a new implicature, which is called the **analogical implicature**. I propose in my classification this new category. It has been derived from ratio by analogising the stated expression. In the following example, where a boss is asking his employee *not to speak on the phone during work time*, whether other interaction should also be refrained from. What about playing on the phone during work time. What about chatting with friends face to face? Are these factors also banned? If the ratio (*ʿillah*) of the boss's statement is not to waste time, all analogous cases are implied. This implicature is taken from the ratio of a statement which arbitrates similar cases with the same ruling (*ḥukm*). The US discussed this implicature in the analogy (*qiyas*) as seen in (3-2). Analogical implicature is fully discussed in the next chapter.

These four implicatures are different in their derivation. I, regardless of the force of each meaning, classified them under *what is implied* without combining them under sub-categories.

The proposed classification has been mainly derived from the scholastics. It was also inspired by modern pragmaticians. I originally relied on ibn al-Ḥājb by expounding his classification and inlaid it with the modern pragmatic proposals. I added a new category as seen. I did not consider, as ibn al-Ḥājb did, the allusion of the text (*ishārah al-naṣṣ*) as unintended, but rather classified it into two categories; intended and unintended, which I

explained in (4-3-2).

I can conclude this section by ordering the implicatures according to their importance:

- *Eamāʾ al-naṣṣ* and the congruent implicature are at the forefront because both are not cancellable.
- The analogical implicature is next because it is based on ratio and some ratios are explicitly derived. The analogical implicature is also based on equality with the main case (*what is said*) unlike the counter implicature (al-Taftāzānī 1996, p. 1/267).
- The counter implicature is last because it is cancellable and on the grade of the manifest.

It is noteworthy to learn that the US gave preference to analogy over the counter implicature (al-Farrāʾ 1990, p. 2/635; al-Zarkashī 1992, p. 3/386).

I can draw my classification as follows:

Figure 13. The proposed classification of signification

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the broad views of Muslim scholars regarding the meaning and its considerations. The two schools' classifications have been presented in the clearest manner, in order to be accessible to scholars. The critical points of the classifications between the two schools have been discussed. I, after that, proposed my own classification.

In section (4-1-1), the components of meaning were discussed to show the methods in which different categories and meanings could be yielded. I will return to this point to show its conclusion. For example, the explicit meaning is obtained by means of (*full statement* with the convention, i.e., 1+2. Where (1) is from the components of meanings group and (2) is from the domain's group). Completion is yielded by means of (*incomplete statement but it cannot be sensible or make a full proposal without the estimated part* with the convention, i.e., 2+2). The congruent implicature is obtained by means of (*full statement* with the *convention and context* i.e., 1+2-3). The counter implicature is obtained by means of (stating the contrary with the context or convention, i.e., 4+3). The greater the result, the weaker the meaning. Counter implicature, therefore, is considered weaker than congruent implicature by the US as will be discussed in section (5-3-3).

This chapter showed the historical development of classifications and terms from al-Bāqillānī to Ibn al-Ḥājb.

Foundations of classifications have been laid to examine the classifications of the US. I raised the differences between the meaning and signification supported by the US's arguments. This is the first thesis, as far as I am aware, that discusses the difference between the Ḥanafī school and the scholastics school, where the difference between the two schools was not considered as a difference in categories' names only. The conclusion confirms that the two schools stand on the counterpart perspectives of classification *fahm* and *ifhām*.

The chapter discussed the principles of the scholastic scholars in their classifications as they varied in their classifications. We concluded that there were four types of principles that play roles in the difference of the scholastic's classifications, which are the cancellability, the literality, inference and pragmatic one. These four criteria helped to compare the different classifications.

I proposed a new classification, which is based on combing the two perspectives: the uṣūlī and the modern pragmatics ones. Then, I employed Grice, Bach and Recanati's terms within Islamic classification, in order to form my own classification. The features of each school's classifications were concluded to discover more on the nature of each school's linguistic perspective.

A new implicature, which is the *analogical implicature,* has been developed in this chapter through investing the US's topic analogy (*qiyās*). The next chapter is dedicated to implicatures only. The analogical implicature has been derived from the level of causation, as discussed. This implicature came into being as an application of what had been introduced in Chapter Three concerning the two levels of interpretation.

This chapter links to the previous one as the practical application of interpretation. The interpretation process will generate different meanings, and some of these meanings are explicit, whereas some are implicit. The next chapter will concern different types of implicatures, which are obtained by the previous classifications.

Chapter Five

Types of Implicatures

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In the previous chapter, the classifications of meanings and significations were discussed. We concluded that there are different meanings; some are classified under *what is said* and some under *what is implied*. This chapter discusses and expands on *what is implied* or implicatures, and shall discuss their conceptions, their conditions and their relations to the principles of interpretation.

Four types of implicatures have been identified: indication, congruent, analogical and counter implicatures. With respect to indication, this has been discussed in detail in Chapter Three as a method of uncovering ratios (*ʿilal*) (see: 3-2-2-2). Therefore, there is no need to discuss it again here.

This chapter is going to highlight how these three implicatures articulate the principles which they have been based on, and the arguments of the two Ḥanafī and scholastic schools in validating these implicatures. Ibn Taymiyyah combined these three implicatures in this statement,

"Jurists say that the signification of what is implied varies. It can have a preference over *what is said* as in the congruent implicature (*mafhūm al-muwāfqah*). It can be the opposite of *what is said* as seen in the counter implicature (*mafhūm al-mukhālafah*), or it can look similar to *what is said* (*al-qiyās*)" (ibn Taymiyyah, 1995, p. 6/179).

I shall start with the congruent implicature by explaining its meaning and the principles that yield it. Then, I will discuss the analogical implicature, and finally, I shall move onto the controversial implicature, i.e., the counter implicature to illustrate the dispute of its principles and the different types of the qualifications (*quyūd*) that give rise to the counter implicature. I shall, also consider the way that counter implicature has been discussed and evaluate the extent to which the different scholars have accounted for it.

5-1- Congruent Implicature

Congruent implicature has been discussed in chapter four (4-2-2; 4-4-3-2). It was explained that the two schools, Ḥanafī and scholastic agreed on validating this implicature using different terminology. The scholastic school calls it *mafhūm al-muwāfaqah,* whereas the Ḥanafī school calls it *dilālah al-naṣṣ*. Both schools refer to the same concept in their classification using different names.

The Ḥanafī school's term *dilālah al-naṣṣ*, literally refers to the denotation of the text (the speaker's side) whereas the scholastics' term *mafhūm al-muwāfaqah* refers to what is understood or implied (the hearer's side). The Ḥanafī school considers congruent implicatures as a part of *what is said* because it is yielded by the meaning of the text as explained in (4-3-2). Al-Sarakhsī (d. 1090) clarified this by saying: "That words are required for meanings and deriving a signification from meaning is like deriving the signification from the words" (al-Sarakhsi, p. 1/241). Al-Bukharī (d. 1330) asserted the notion of al-Sarakhsi and said, "this signification means combining the explicated and the implicated under the linguistic meaning" (*hiya al-jamʿ bayn al-manṣūṣ wa ghayr al-manṣūṣ bi al-maʿnā al-laghawī*) (al-Bukharī, 1997, p. 1/115).

Al-Sarakhsī, however, noted that this argument lays the congruent implicature in the same level of the *express meaning of the text* (*ʿibārah al-naṣṣ*), which is at a higher degree in terms of its clarity (see: 4-3-2). He articulated that this type of classification is a valid signification, but not at the level of the *ʿibārah al-naṣṣ* because it is not obvious. It is understood that al-Sarakhsī aimed to say that *dilālah al-naṣṣ* is the same as *ʿibārah al-naṣṣ* in terms of their power, i.e. In addition, neither of the two significations are not cancellable.

The most used example of this implicature is found in the Qurʾān, Q 17: 23. {And your Lord has decreed that you should not worship any except Him (only) and (to show) fairest companionship to parents; in case ever one or both of them reaches old age (Literally: being great "in years") in your presence, do not say to them, "Fie!" nor scold them; and

speak to them respectful words (Literally: say to them an honourable saying}. The explicated meaning of *what is said* is to refrain from uttering *fie.* The congruent implicature is not to abuse them in any way.

Another example can be taken from the Qurʾān, Q 4: 2. {And bring the orphans their riches, and do not exchange the wicked (you have) for the good (they own); and do not **eat up** their riches with your riches; surely that is a great outrage}. The explicated meaning of the verse is not to eat up their riches, and this is an allegorical use. The congruent implicature is for example not to consume their money or give it to someone else.

Regardless of the different terminologies used to refer to congruent implicature, the two schools confirm that this implicature has the same attributes which will be exhibited in the next section.

5-1-1- The Attributes of Congruent Implicature

Investigating the US arguments can lead to the attributes of the congruent implicature as following:

- **Non-cancellability**: It has been clearly stated by the two schools that this implicature is a non-cancellable one. This conception is asserted from al-Bāqillānī to al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazalī and the Ḥanafī school. (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 1/342; al-Juwaynī, 1979, Pp. 1/451-2; al-Sarakhsi, p. 1/241; al-Ghazalī, 2015, P. 2/195; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/115).

Al-Juwaynī presented an opinion of some scholars that there is a type of the congruent implicature which is cancellable (al-Juwaynī, 1979, Pp. 1/452) and he called it manifest *ẓāhir* as a counter to the non-cancellable *naṣṣ.* Al-Juwaynī presented an example from the Qurʾān to illustrate this, Q 4: 92.

{And whoever kills a believer by mistake - then the freeing of a believing slave and a compensation payment presented to the deceased's family [is required] unless they give

[up their right as] charity}.

Whoever kills due to a mistake – needs to free a believing slave or compensation is required, and hence *a fortiori* (al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/453). The congruent implicature is that there needs to be an act of freeing a believing slave or compensation is required for deliberately killing, as it is a fortiori. Al-Shāfiʿī, adopted this conclusion, whereas al-Juwaynī stated that this is not derived from the text. It can be argued, as al-Juwaynī proposed that there is no compensation for this, but there needs to be another application of, due to the deliberate intention. This congruent implicature, according to al-Juwaynī, is therefore cancellable. It can be explicitly seen that this implicature is based on the conception of *priority,* since deliberately killing is a worse act than killing by mistake.

I would argue with al-Juwaynī in counting (*that there is freeing of a believing slave or compensation is required for deliberately killing*) as a congruent implicature in the previous verse. I would not consider it because the priority in its meaning is not linguistic, but rather a **jurisprudential priority** for these reasons:

- That congruent implicature obtained by the verse does not come into mind immediately (*yatbādar*). It needs research to be deduced, and this research needs jurisprudential knowledge.
- According to the US, the priority that is ascribed to congruent implicature should be a linguistic priority that comes from linguistic elements, such as the specific styles and context so that the congruent implicature comes to mind, either alongside with what is said, or before as al-Bāqillānī pointed out (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 1/342). Al-Juwaynī himself also assented that congruent implicature requires a specific composition (*naḍd makhṣūṣ*) (al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/413)
- The manifest congruent implicature, according to al-Juwaynī in the previous example, is an analogy supported by jurisprudential background, and requires research to be reached. This conclusion arises because communicators might not reach the ratio by means of language, or indeed agree upon it.

I do not think that the previous example, that is only mentioned by al-Juwaynī, belongs to the congruent implicature if we consider the congruent implicature linguistic and conventional. I think it is rather a legal analogy.

Furthermore, I think that the confusion comes from understanding the conception of the *congruent implicature*. Is the implicature based only on property of *priority* or are there other attributes that form it?

- A second attribute is that this implicature is based on linguistic **convention**: This implicature is understood by the virtue of convention (al-Juwaynī, 1979, Pp. 1/451-2; al-Sarakhsi, p. 1/241; al-Ghazalī, 2015, P. 2/195. al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/115), so, "anyone learns the language and its rules and styles can obtain this implicature from the speech" (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 1/342). This attribute enhances the first attribute and strengthens the power of this implicature. Putting it another way, it is non-cancellable because it is conventional. The conventional nature hints to the next feature.

- The third attribute is that the congruent implicature comes in a **specific composition "**hiya muqtaḍā lafẓ ʿalā naẓm wa naḍd makhṣūṣ**"** (al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/413).

- The fourth attribute understood from the US works is that this implicature is supported by **clues** (*qarāʾin*) and context (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 1/342; al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/452). This means that the context comes to explicitly deliver both the expressed meaning and the congruent implicature.

- The fifth is the **priority** (*awlawiyyah*)*,* the force of the congruent implicature is equal to force of *what is said* if not stronger. This attribute is stipulated by al-Bāqillānī (1998, P. 1/342). Al-Bāqillānī's argument meets with the Ḥanafī that there is a comprehensive meaning delivered by the text so that the two: expressed meaning and congruent implicature meanings are subsumed under it. This attribute confirms that the text is meant to assure the congruent implicature, alongside with the expressed meaning or a fortiori. All scholars of the two schools agree on the equality between the expressed meaning and the congruent implicature in the context and style of wording (al-Juwaynī,

1979, P. 1/451-2; al-Sarakhsi, p. 1/241; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/115; al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/5). However, al-Bāqillānī thought that the congruent implicature had priority over the expressed meaning. I think that al-Bāqillānī considered the purposes of the text, which are meant to confirm a comprehensive meaning that indicate to the congruent implicature via the expressed meaning. He agreed with the Ḥanafī school, who adopted the term of denotation of text (*dilālah al-naṣṣ*) to say that the text is meant to confirm this purpose. The expressed meaning is a sign to refer to the congruent meaning employing the linguistic style.

Congruent implicature is based on the five attributes discussed above. The five attributes are required to form this implicature. One of them is not enough to form it, as seen in the manifest congruent implicature proposed by al-Juwaynī. I think that the feature of priority itself is not enough to generate the congruent implicature without the style (*uslūb*) being conventional. This priority can be jurisprudential, social or anything else. However, we are exploring the linguistic conventions, which were confirmed by the US as the main criterion.

Al-Ghazalī followed by al-Bukharī from the Ḥanafī school observed that the priority is not enough to engender the congruent implicature and gave an example to illustrate the matter. "A king may order to kill another king by saying: do not say *uff* or *fie* to him but kill him." (al-Ghazalī, 2015, P. 2/195; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/115). Al-Ghazalī then stated that relying on a feature of priority to generate the congruent implicature is not enough, but also the context and style of the communication. Hence, the five criteria placed before are required in forming a congruent implicature.

Al-Ghazalī's conception looks reasonable because the statement is delivered to apply a certain sentence without need of any insult. I mean that the expression is not delivered to a comprehensive meaning that can include the two meanings, *killing* and *saying uff* or any kind of insult.

Al-Ghazalī's notion of priority has been problematic to some scholars such as ʿAlī (2000), and Hishām Khalīfah (2015) who addressed the congruent implicature.

ʿAlī thought that congruent implicature might be cancellable based on the al-Ghazalī's example without noting al-Ghazalī's comments and conclusion, that the congruent implicature is derived from clues (*qarāʾin*). Alī, following al-Juwaynī, concluded that it can be cancellable (ʿAlī, 2000, P. 191). ʿAlī, unlike the US, consider the congruent implicature as cancellable.

Hishām Khalīfah followed ʿAlī (2015, P. 7371) and has considered cancellability as one of the features of congruent implicature, unlike the US's statements. I think that the two scholars wanted to match the Western approach to the Islamic one, by confirming the same property of implicature, namely cancellability. I think they misplaced the congruent implicature according to our discussion above.

The two scholars might rely only on al-Juwaynī, who set out some problematic analyses of congruent implicatures by dividing it into two types; manifest and explicit as seen in (4-2-2), and because he was not explicit, he made them problematic. Some scholars, like ʿAlī have taken them up as justified counter implicature analyses. However, congruent implicature is considered by all US as noncancellable for reasons mentioned previously.

However, al-Juwaynī implied that the congruent implicature is explicit like the expressed meaning, because it is based on a specific style and composition that gives rise to the congruent implicature (al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/413). He thought that most of congruent implicatures are not cancellable. I have already stated that al-Juwaynī's example can be placed among legal implicatures, but not amongst linguistic ones.

In sum, the central feature of congruent implicature, according to the US, is the convention, which can govern the congruent implicature through linguistic conventions, and not by the power of deduction. Hence, anyone who can use the language knows that the style is meant for this meaning, i.e. the congruent implicature.

The discussion before drives us to another matter, which is related to the basis of the congruent implicature, whether or not the criterion priority is enough to generate it.

5-1-2- The Bases of Congruent Implicature

In Chapter Three, we discussed the principles of implicatures, namely that there are two levels of interpretation: the linguistic, which relies on the principles of interpretation such as the convention and immediacy; and the causation , which depends on ratios *ʿilal.*

The question raised here is, to what level of interpretation does the congruent implicature belong? And what triggers it?

From the previous discussion among the US, it can be explicitly understood that this implicature is derived from the first level of interpretation, i.e. it is subject to the principles of interpretation to be yielded.

We can analyse its nature to know which principles engender it.

The scholars argued, in the previous section, that the rehtorical style, (as al-Dabbūsī and al-Sarakhsī from the Ḥanafī school satetd) (see, 4-3-2), composition, convention and the context play roles in generating it.

The US stipulated that the congruent implicature comes up with a specific style supported with clues and context (al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/413; al-Ghazalī, 2015, P. 2/195; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/115) so that anyone "speaks Arabic and knows its communicational rules simply understand that the congruent implicature is the primary intended meaning of the speech" (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 1/342). Specific style and composition confirm that the congruent implicature is derived from the convention, which plays a role in identifying styles of sentences and their significations. Relying on context, as well, affirms that the principle of immediacy (*tabādur*) plays a role in assigning it accurately, because, as seen in section (3-1-3-2-4), immediacy plays a role. Through allotment, the meaning is carried

by convention, since immediacy works by reflecting on the context, which can be sometimes br narrower than the convention, in terms of identifying the purposes of certain linguistic styles.

Rhetoricians think that the specific style comes to confirm and emphasise the meaning, such as the style of congruent implicature, where, the specific style comes to raise attention to the intended meaning (al-Maydānī, 1996, P. 1/47). Delivering the congruent implicature in this style is eloquent and effective.

Al-Sakkākī (d. 1229) considered the allegory as more eloquent than the literal meaning, and metaphor and metonymy more effective than explicating *ṣarīḥah* meanings (al-Sakkākī, 1987, P. 412). The congruent implicature is a kind metonymy (*kināyah*), according to some rhetoricians (al-Maydānī, 1996, P. 1/47).

The scholastics and the Ḥanafī both strongly assert that the congruent implicature is not derived from analogy *qiyas* (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, Pp. 1/342-3; al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/451; al-Ghazalī, 2015, P. 2/196; al-Sarakhsi, p. 1/241; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/115.) because deriving it from logical analogy requires a search for ratios or reasons because the wording does not denote the implicature, and individuals might differ in assigning ratios (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, Pp. 1/342-3). However, the congruent implicature is explicitly derived from the conventions of the language.

This implicature, in summary, is derived from linguistic interpretation, from the principles of convention and immediacy. The style (*naḍd makhṣūṣ*) with which the speech is delivered triggers the implicatures in minds of the communicators. This style is reflected in conventional suggestions.

Before we move to discuss the next implicature, it is noteworthy to state that the scholastics divided the congruent implicature into two levels:

- The sense of the discourse (*faḥwā*), is when the congruent implicature has priority over the expressed meaning, or when the ruling *ḥukm* is more

suitable to the congruent implicature than the expressed meaning. An excellent example of this can be found in the verse referring to respecting one's parents.

- The connotation of the discourse (*laḥn*), it is when the congruent implicature and the expressed meaning are equal in terms of understanding, as in the verse of *eating up* the money of orphans or burning them, because both situations (eating up or burning) prevent orphans from owing their money.

Both types *faḥwā* and *laḥn* are non-cancellable. This case is not related to the force of the congruent implicature.It is just a categorical case.

5-2- Analogical Implicature

This type of implicature is one of implicatures have been developed in this thesis. To my knowledge, it has not been linguistically discussed. The US did not discuss it in the linguistic topics, and this may be the reason beyond it not being seen in modern scholarly writings that have worked in the PJ's tradition. The US discussed the issue of conveying a ruling from one case to another by means of analogy (*qiyās*). The US's works are concerned with the jurisprudential process, not with the linguistic role of this implicature. My work, in this implicature, is an investment in the jurisprudential arguments concerning linguistic issues. I, however, believe that this type of implicature is found in our communications regardless of its jurisprudential roots. I am going to give an example to explain this implicature and discuss the principles that generate it.

An example previously mentioned can be placed here: if someone was at work, and his director said: *please do not speak,* there are a number of implicatures that can be raised here, since the director has not explicitly stated the reason. If the hearer infers that the reason is due to work's time, analogical implicatures such as not playing, or not receiving guests will be raised by virtue of the mutual reason *the time of work*. However, if the employee infers that the reason is beyond the order of not distracting other employees, another set of implicatures such as speaking quietly to colleagues at the office, or not using

tools loudly will be raised due to the new reason of *silence*.

The hearer tries to find the ratio and analogies of the mentioned case and apply it to all cases that have the same ratio share. There is no more to be discussed here, because the primary issue in this implicature, is about the way with which the ratios are uncovered, and these have been covered in Chapter Three (3-2) when the levels of interpretation were discussed. There is, however, a need to articulate the way of generating it and distinguishing it from the congruent implicature.

5-2-1- - The Bases of Analogical Implicature

It can simply be seen from the implicature's name that it is derived from the analogy (*qiyas*) which has been discussed in detail in (3-2). As elaborated in Chapter Three, analogy (*qiyas*) is based on four pillars:

- The original case
- The ruling (*ḥukm*) of the original case
- The new case
- The ratio (*ʿillah*) of ruling *ḥukm* (3-2-2)

The previous example, in the first proposed ratio, can be allocated as follows:

- The original case *please do not speak*
- The ruling *ḥukm* of the original case *preventing speech*
- The new case *not playing*
- The ratio of ruling *ḥukm, time of the work*

There are many examples in Islamic jurisprudence regarding analogy. It is considered by both schools as a source of legislation (al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 3/396; al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 5/16-17; al-Shawkani, 2000, P. 2/843). The following examples can illustrate the ways in which analogy works. Prophet Muḥammad said in one Ḥadīth "Do not induce someone to cancel a sale he has already bargained upon with someone in order to sell him your own

goods, unless he buys or changes his mind"[37] (al-Tirmidhī, 1998, p. 2/431; Zaydān, 2009, P. 196-7). The Ḥadīth refers that a man should not interfere between two people negotiating on goods by saying to one of them, "I can buy or sell it at a higher price or so". The US (ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah 2002, p. 5/33) found out that the ratio encourages the emergence of hatred amongst people in society, which breaches the purposes of the Qurʾān and Sunnah in protecting societies. A set of implicatures will be raised here, such as not to interfere in renting a flat, a car or any transaction between two parties, because the mutual ratio which causes hatred amongst people within society can also be found here.

Selling or buying at the time of Friday prayer is not permitted because of this verse, Q 62: 9. {O you who have believed, when [the adhan] is called for the prayer on the day of Jumu'ah [Friday], then proceed to the remembrance of Allah and leave trade. That is better for you, if you only knew}.

An implicature such as visiting friends, renting, or anything else can obstruct the action of prayer. The mutual ratio is *obstruction of the Friday prayer*.

This implicature belongs to the second level of interpretation and derived from analogy (*qiyās*). The mechanism therefore needs to seek ratios, by means of one of the ways explained in Chapter Two (3-2-2). After obtaining the ratio, we can compare and analogise another case on the mentioned one. Obtaining ratios can be easy or difficult according to the clues around speech. It can be easier when the speaker states the ratios, and can require further effort if the ratio is less obvious, there can be, hence, different ratios and different implicatures. It can be said that the less effort that is made to discover the ratio, the stronger the relationship between the implicature and the original case. Sometimes, reaching ratios can be impossible for some reasons. Texts, therefore, will be literally interpreted or under the light of higher purposes of Islamic jurisprudence.

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[37] The translation is based on this website, sunnah.com. (https://sunnah.com/nasai/44/56).

These types of implicatures depend on ratios and reasons. As explained in Chapter Three, the ruling *ḥukm* pertains to its ratios in validity and cancellability (*al-ḥukm yadūr maʿ ʿillatih wujūdan waʿadamā*)[38] (al-Sarakhsī, n.d. p. 2/182; al-Samʿānī, 1998, P. 4/224; al-Qarāfī, n.d. p. 2/43; al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 5/251). This arbitration means that the ruling *ḥukm* will be valid when the ratio is valid and cancelled when the ratio is changed, hence the implicatures will be changed according to this formula.

One point is left to be articulated, since the two implicatures are apparently based on analogy. What is the difference between this implicature and the congruent implicature?

Al-Bāqillānī and other scholars explain this by asserting that the congruent implicature is not an analogical implicature because it is merely derived from language, however the true analogical implicature is based on inferential process to yield it. Further, this process might involve access to the ratio because of varying mental capabilities in finding ratios of speeches (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, Pp. 1/342-3; al-Sarakhsi, p. 1/241; al-Ghazalī, 2015, P. 2/196; al-Bukharī, 1997, P. 1/115).

The other difference is that the congruent implicature is based on the style and composition, i.e. related to the rhetoric which is associated with linguistic convention. People, in general, are aware of the conventions of their language. However, people are not necessarily aware of methods of uncovering ratios. Because of the similarity between the two concepts; the congruent and the analogical implicature, scholars call the first one the visible analogy *al-qiyās al-jalī*, whereas they call the latter the hidden analogy (*al-qiyās al-khafī*).

The last question is about the factor that triggers this implicature. This implicature is triggered by the process of causation (*al-taʿlīl*), which formulates a reason that can be applied to many individual cases, and our minds link this reason to the new cases.

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[38] The US say that ruling *ḥukm* might be found without its ratio. It can happen with another ratio. This issue is related to juriprudence more than linguistics. There is no need to elaborate it.

Thus far, we have discussed two types of implicatures: one belongs to the first level of interpretation and the other one belongs to the second level. We can now turn to the most controversial implicature in PJ and examine its principles and its mechanisms.

5-3- Counter Implicature

Counter implicature is the most complicated implicature in Islamic pragmatics, due to the complexity of its principles and sensitivity of its derivation. It has already been discussed by some scholars like ʿAlī (2000) and Hishām Khalīfah (2015). The two scholars examined most of its issues; however, neither of them identified the sources of the problem between the two opinions of the counter implicature. Complexity and the massive details might be the reason beyond failing to locate the source of the problem, which is the starting point of discussing the counter implicature. Another issue is raised here, which is that the disagreement of this implicature is not between the scholastics and Hanafi schools. The dispute occurred amongst scholars of the same school. The scholastics differed as to whether this implicature was a source of legislation. I will try my best to present this implicature with minimal complexity, ordering its issues in such a way that can help to understand the implicature's philosophy.

I will introduce this part of the thesis with the definition of counter implicature, moving to the point of dispute between the two opinions, explaining then the arguments regarding the consideration of counter implicature. And, finally discuss the different types of this implicature. It is very important to point out to some analyses in previous studies to show the extent of their accuracy.

5-3-1- Definition of Counter Implicature

Counter implicature as ʿAlī (2000) translated it, is known in the PJ literature as '*mafhūm al-mukhālafah*'. This implicature is discussed extensively within Islamic intellectual writings.

Counter implicature denotes "that the ruling *ḥukm* in an unmentioned case is the opposite to the one in the case mentioned" (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, 3/331; al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/449; ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, p. 3/266; al- Āmidi, 2003/1424, p. 3/49;). An example from the prophet Muhammad's Sunnah can illustrate this definition, "there is an alms-tax upon free-grazing sheep" (al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/449; ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, p. 3/266). If the law states that an alms-tax is levied upon free-grazing sheep, it is implicated that there is no alms-tax levied upon sheep which are not free-grazing, by virtue of counter implicature.

Another example can be drawn here. If the law says:

(1) There is no tax on bikes bought in April.

   This sentence implicates that:

(2) Other bikes which are not bought in April have tax.

If the law says:

(3) There is a tax on European cars.

   It implicates that:

(4) Other cars do not have tax.

The previous implicatures are based on counter implicature. Counter implicature is the opposite of the congruent implicature. This conclusion is evident from the names of the two conceptions.

Counter implicature, in one word, is allocating (*takhṣiṣ*) a ruling with a qualification (*qayd*) so that this allocated attribute or qualification entails (*yastalzim*) the ruling in the case mentioned and entails the counter ruling to the unmentioned case.

There are three main points that can be observed in the previous explanation:

- Allocation *takhṣiṣ* (there is an alms-tax upon free-grazing sheep)
- Qualification or attribute *qayd* (free grazing)
- Entailment *istilzām* (not free-grazing sheep has the counter ruling)

These three features help us in defining the point of dispute and the basis of the counter implicature. They are going to be discussed in the next sections, but there is first a need to explore the point of dispute.

5-3-2- The Point of Dispute

There is a disagreement among scholars in counting whether or not this implicature is yielded. There is, however, a need to know what point they are disputing on before exhibiting their arguments. Finding the point of disagreement is necessary to be able to define the principles of the counter implicature. The previous researchers (ʿAlī and Khalīfah) fell into contradiction, as because they did not recognise the importance of realising the point of dispute.

As discussed before, the congruent implicature is derived from linguistic conventions[39], whereas the analogical implicature is derived from the logical analogy. The scholars claiming the validity of counter implicature and the opposite party are disputing the **derivation** of the counter implicature.

Those who claim the validity of counter implicature think that this implicature is derived from language, as al-Samʿānī (d.1096) stated: "and the correct claim is that this implicature is linguistic and taken from the Arabic tongue norms" (*wa al-ṣaḥīḥ annah dalīl min ḥaythu al-lughah wa waḍʿ lisān al-ʿarab*) (al-Samʿānī, 1998, Pp:2/19; al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/15; al-Shawkani, 2000, P. 2/767). It is, hence, subject to the principles of interpretation in obtaining it. All arguments and evidence that are conveyed in the next section support this claim.

This claim was not accepted by the opposite group, who refused that language could support this claim (al-Jassas, 1994, P. 1/291; al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 3/334; al-Ghazalī, 2015, p. 2/1/197). Some scholars, as al-Zarkashī conveyed, claimed that it is a valid way

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[39] Language or linguistic will be used in this section as a counterpart to the logical analogy or inference.

to generate rulings but not by the linguistic conventions, but rather in terms of legal or intellectual perspectives (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/15; al-Shawkani, 2000, P. 2/767).

Al-Juwaynī proposed a compromise between the two parties. He stated that counter implicature can be considred linguistic when the qualifications or the attributes fit the ruling, as happens in ratios (al-Juwaynī, 1979, P 1/466-7). Al-Juwaynī's proposal was strongly refuted by his peer al-Samʿānī as he considered al-Juwaynī's proposal led to allocating this implicature at analogy (al-Samʿānī, 1998, P. 2/29-30). Al-Zarkashī from the scholastics agreed with al-Samʿānī on this point and stated that al-Juwaynī's proposal carries the attributes of ratios and allocates this implicature at the analogical implicature (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/32).

The point of dispute is in the linguistic derivation of this implicature, so, all arguments from the two parties will be placed to confirm or to refuse the linguistic characteristic of this implicature. In cases where qualifications are considered as ratios, the two groups might accept it, but they will discuss it under issues relating to ratio and not under linguistic implicatures.

5-3-3- The Validity of Counter Implicature

The US were concerned with validity of counter implicature with obtaining ruling *ḥukm* from texts; thus, they wondered whether or not counter implicature could be considered as a valid method for this purpose. Can you take ruling *ḥukms* depending on counter implicature, so that you give the opposite of *ḥukm* to the unmentioned case or not? This makes the task quite sensitive.

Considering the counter implicature linguistically means that it can be derived from language by considering its rules and conventions. On the other hand, considering it based on ratio requires lots of effort, and people might identify different ratios and thus, draw different implicatures. In this perspective, implicature will be, therefore, the counter of analogical implicature. However, pro-counter implicature Pro-CI thinks that this

implicature emerges in the minds of language users by the power of linguistic conventions and rules.

Pro- CI placed their evidence to support the claim of the linguistic nature of this implicature. Anti-CI placed their rules to negate that this implicature is linguistically obtained. The key evidence in the coming arguments is around the purpose of qualification or attribute (*qayd*). Is this attribute specifying a ruling (*ḥukm*) to an attribute and therefore negating the ruling from the unmentioned case? Or does the attribute have different purposes, not only simply to negate the ruling from the unmentioned case? There is, hence, a need for another piece of evidence to extrapolate the ruling from the unmentioned case.

The Ḥanafī school and some scholastics, such as al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī following their master al-Bāqillānī, refused the counter implicature as a valid method for formulating rulings derived from language, and the Ḥanafī school call it the mentioned (*almakhṣūṣ bil-zikr*) (al-Jassas, 1994, p. 1/291; al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 3/332; al-Ghazalī, 2015, P. 2/197; al-Rāzī, n.d. p. 2/136; al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/13; al-Ḥājj, 1996, pp. 1/155-156).

On the other side, some of scholastics such as al-Samʿānī and alʿUkbarī (d. 1037) confirmed the linguistic nature and the validity of counter implicature. They conveyed that the masters of the schools such as Mālik bin Anas (d. 795), al-Shāfiʿī (d.820) Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal (d. 855) consider the validity of counter implicature and its derivability from language (ibn al-Qaṣṣār, 1999, P. 232; al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 3/332; al-ʿUkbarī, 1992, P. 86; al-Farrāʾ, 1990, P. 2/453. ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, P. 4/390; al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/14-5).

Lot of evidence, rational, linguistic, jurisprudential have been placed to support the validity of counter implicature or refuse it. I shall try to discuss the evidence and choose the most relevant ones to the nature of this research.

1- Pro-CI think that an attribute mainly specifies a case, with a ruling based on a certain attribute. So, it is reasonable to argue that the absence of the qualification implies the negation of the rule (al-Samʿānī, 1998, p. 2/31; al-Amidi, 2003, pp, 3/99-100. ʿAlī, 2000,

p. 194). However, this argument can be declined as the correlation between the ruling and the qualification is not determinate, since there could be other justifications and purposes for the qualification, and there are many cases where the unmentioned cases take the similar ruling of the mentioned case (al-Jassas, 1994, pp. 1/294-6; al-Samʿānī, 1998, p. 2/31; al-Subkī, 1981, pp. 1-376). Al-Jassas from the *Ḥanafī* school gave some examples where the unmentioned cases take the same ruling of the mentioned case such the verse, Q 3: 30. {O you who have believed, do not eat *riba*, (i.e., usury; interest and other unlawful gains) doubled (and) redoubled, and be pious to Allah that possibly you would prosper}. The mentioned case confirms that eating *riba* is not allowed, doubled and redoubled, and the unmentioned case is *eating riba lightly*. The two cases have the same ruling, according to all Muslim scholars, which is not ever eating *riba* (al-Jassas, 1994, p. 1/292-6; al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 3/335). Eating in this context refers to use the gains from *riba.* He placed other examples from the Qurʾān and the Sunnah that confirm his claim, and all examples are agreed upon amongst scholars. He concluded that counter implicature is not valid.

2- Pro- CI argued that some of prophet's companions such as ibn ʿAbbās, who is one of the most knowledgeable companions used counter implicature in his inferences. Some Arabic linguists such as Abū ʿUbayd used counter implicature in his inference (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 3/339; al-Samʿānī, 1998, p. 2/21; Ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, p. 3/267). Abū ʿUbayd understood from this Ḥadīth of the prophet (If one who can afford it delays repayment, his honour and punishment become permissible)[40] (al-Bukhārī, 2001, 4/118) The aforementioned case suggests that delaying repayment by who can afford it makes his honour and punishment permissible. The unmentioned case is that punishment is not permissible for one who cannot afford repayment. Anti- CI refused this evidence. They said that linguistic scholars or companions probably said this as a personal inference. We accept their evidence if they claim that the Arabic language adopts the method of counter implicature. Ibn ʿAbbās did not narrate that Arabs use this in their language (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 3/342).

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[40] Translation is taken from Sunnah.com. https://sunnah.com/nasai/44/242.

3- Anti-CI group says: If the attribute of the ruling implicates the negation of the ruling to the unmentioned case, hence, making any statement that attributes the ruling of what is mentioned to what is unmentioned would be a form of contradiction (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 3/338; ibn Al-Ḥajib, 1983. 961); however, this is not correct because it is possible to provide a counter case to the same ruling without a contradiction; for example, if the lawgiver says:

(5) There is a tax on European cars.

This implicates that:

(6) There is no tax on other cars.

We can however say:

(7) In fact, there is a tax on European and non-European cars.

It is possible to say (7) without any contradiction to (5).

Pro- CI replied that counter implicature does not have the level of explicit *naṣṣ*, so that it is non-cancellable. It is on the grade of manifest *ẓāhir*, which is cancellable (al-Samʿānī, 1998, p. 2/31; ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, p. 3/285) (see 4-2-4; 4-2-5). Al-Juwaynī confirmed this. He thought that "counter implicature is not independent of *what is said* and not part of the discourse itself. So, the expression and its other implicatures would not be affected if counter implicature is canceled" (al-Juwayni, 1979, pp. 1/473-474). In other words, when any utterance is expressed, it always denotes and sometimes implicates, regardless of the intentions of the speaker; speakers can make their intentions clearer by asserting what has been denoted explicitly and cancelling what has been implicated. A speaker can say, *I did not mean that there is no tax on non-European cars. In the fact there is tax upon them*. He might say that he did not know about, or that he was not interested in this case. None of these clarifications contradicts the utterance, even though they cancel the implicature.

4- Al-Bāqillānī (1998, P. 3/335) presented a further argument against counter implicature, that he referred to as the *appropriate acceptance of enquiring (ḥusn al-istifhām)* He noted

that it is typically appropriate for the hearer to ask about the ruling in counter implicature. If counter implicature was a valid inference, enquiring about the ruling of what is unmentioned, it would not be appropriate (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P. 3/335; al-Ghazali, n.d. pp. 3/416). Al-Bāqillānī provides the following example:

(8) If Zayd hits you intentionally, hit him back.
It implicates that:
(9) If Zayd hits you unintentionally, do not hit him back.
(10) But if Zayd hits me unintentionally, shall I hit him back?

Al-Bāqillānī questions in this example why it would be appropriate for the hearer to ask (10) if he understood this from (8).

Al-Bāqillānī's notion of *appropriate acceptance of enquiring* can be compared to Sadock's concept of 'reinforceability' as ʿAlī (2000, p.198) intelligently pointed out.

Since conversational implicatures are not part of the conversational import of the utterances, it should be possible to make them explicit without being guilty of redundancy. Conversational implicatures, that is, ought to be reinforceable, whereas conventional implicatures should not. In the clearer cases, this test accords well with intuition. Thus, the second clause of *It's odd that dogs eat cheese and they do* is redundant because it restates what is conventionally implicated by the first clause. But no redundancy shows up when a clearly conversational implicature is made explicit, as in *Maggie ate some, but not all, of the cheddar*" (Sadock, 1978, p. 376). The implicature is that she did not eat all of cheddar, so there is no redundancy if we ask about it.

Counter implicature has been studied extensively by scholastics (al-Ghazali, 2015, Pp. 3/416-446; al-Zarkashī, 1992, Pp. 4/13-60.). Both groups presented different evidence based on examples from the Quraʾān, Sunnah and the Arabs, where they deduced or refused the validity of counter implicature. The later of the US used some arguments, which do not, from my point of view, respond to the nature of this implicature, as such

implicature is not a part of the equavalent (*muṭābaqah*) or incorporation (*taḍammun*) signification, it is, hence not linguistic (J. a.-D. al-Isnawī n.d. 2/215). However, this is inaccurate because we discussed that *muṭābaqah* or *taḍammun* are related to the single significations of vocable in section (4-4-2). Implicatures are not based on *waḍʿ* but rather on use, so, implicatures cannot be approached from this perspective.

There is no need to draw on all the evidence being advanced by the two parties; however, it is important to discuss the main proposals and the main evidence.

The main difference between the two points of the two parties (I maintain the use of *party* instead of using the Ḥanafī and the scholastics because this implicature makes opinions overlap even within one school) is that scholars who support the conception of counter implicature count it as being a valid method for formulating laws and rulings. In their perspective, the implicatures deduced would be considered in the signification, unless they have been cancelled for any reason. For the other group, however, that implicature cannot be confirmed and acknowledged as forming part of the signification unless there is a further proof to confirm this. They maintain that counter implicature is not valid as an inferential method to produce rulings, because there are no proofs that Arab considered it (al-Jaṣṣāṣ 1994, p. 1/308).

Pro-CI think that: counter implicature is a valid method to produce rulings (*ḥukm*) by the virtue of language. This view will hold, until we have another proof to prevent that. This means that considering counter implicature is the rule, and cancelling it, is the exception.

Anti-CI think that counter implicature is not a valid method to produce *ḥukm* by the virtue of language until we have another proof to support that. This means that considering counter implicature is the exception, and cancelling it is the rule, because mentioning attributes comes from different purposes and one of them - but not the main - is allotting the ruling with the attribute. There will be a need for further evidence to confirm that the attribute is specifically assigned for this ruling.

Pro-CI think that the language produces this implicature and all arguments provided by the other party are considered as exceptions on this basis. They think that the qualifications and attributes to allocate the ruling primarily to the mentioned case, and to prevent the ruling from the unmentioned case. All the evidence provided against this are exceptions. Pro-CI tried to count the situations where qualifications do not work on their primary function, as will be discussed in the next section.

5-3-4- Exceptions of Generating Counter Implicature

Pro-CI from scholastics tried to collect the exceptions where counter implicature will not be generated, or the attribute will not be dedicated for allotment. They think that counter implicature should not be obtained if it falls under one of the following situations. Some of the exceptions are correlated to the mentioned case and some are correlated to the unmentioned case. The exceptions are as follows:

1- "That which is unmentioned is no more fitting to the ruling than that which is mentioned nor is one equal to the other" (al-Qarāfī, 1973, p. 174; ʿAlī, 2000, p. 206). For example, in the Quranic verse, Q 17: 31. {Kill not your children for fear of poverty}, the counter implicature *kill your children if you do not fear poverty* is cancelled here because the ruling *the prohibition of killing children* is more relevant to the unmentioned *killing children without fearing poverty* and here it can be thought of as a kind of congruent implicature (*faḥwá al-khiṭab)*, because you are not allowed to kill your children if you are poor, then, a fortiori, you are not allowed to kill them if you are not poor. The counter implicature is cancelled here because it conflicts with the congruent implicature, which is stronger than the counter implicature. So, the counter implicature will be overruled.

2- If the qualification is a result of a dominant custom, then it will be counted as a description rather than a condition (al-Qarāfī, 1973, p. 174; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 4/19). We can take this expression from Arabic culture, *everybody will be punished on what his hands commit*. The counter implicature here, namely, that the other body parts are excluded from the punishment once they commit a wrong deed. This implicature is

cancelled because *hands* were not used here as a qualification, but rather used in Arabic conventions to describe the common custom that it is the hands that mainly commit wrongdoings.

A further example may be cited to illustrate this condition from ʿAlī(2000, p. 207),

(11) A- Are you going abroad this summer?

(12) B- It depends on how much money I have in my pocket (ʿAli, 2000, p. 207).

The counter implicature is excluding the money deposited in the bank. This counter implicature is not found because using qualification *in my pocket* refers to a common expression which points to possession (ʿAli, 2000, p. 207).

3- The text that obtains the qualification is not uttered as an answer to a particular question because the answer here was not made to exclude the unmentioned case, but to refer to the question being made in this case (al-Sūbki, 1999, p. 3/500; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 4/19). Thus, it is not valid to take a counter implicature from the example about the *free-grazing sheep* because it was a response to a specific question. The speaker in this case does not intend to withdraw the ruling from the unmentioned case.

Another example can be placed here. Someone accompanies his friend when buying something and the price is five pounds. The shopkeeper asks to be paid in cash. A asks his friend,

(13) A- Do you have money?

(14) B. Yes. I have five pounds.

B does not mean that he has only five pounds, but rather means that he has the required money to buy the item.

Levinson provides an appropriate example concerning this condition to note that unmentioned case is not excluded:

Suppose that in order to get the lavish subsidy under the EEC Cow Subsidy Scheme one must have three cows, and the inspector asks John's neighbour the following question:

I: Has John really got the required number of cows?

N: Oh sure, he's got three cows all right

In such a situation, the neighbour does not mean that John only has three cows, because it is clear from the context that the neighbour wants to say that John has more than the required number for subsidiary payment, not to tell the inspector about the exact number of John's cows (Levinson, 1983, pp. 115-116).

4- There is no supposition by the hearer that the speaker does not know the ruling of the unmentioned, otherwise the hearer would think that the speaker ignored this because he does not know its meaning, not because it has an counter ruling (al-Sūbkī, 1419-1999, pp. 3/501; ʿAlī, 2000, P. 208). Imagine a situation in which a legal expert is being consulted about European car tax, and the hearer supposes that the speaker *legal expert* specializes only in European cars, and the expert replies: *Yes, there is tax on European cars*. The hearer cannot infer a counter implicature that stipulates that there is no tax on other cars, because, from his position, he supposes that the speaker is not interested in other cars, and he may not know the rulings that apply to them, so the speaker did not mean to exclude all other cars.

5- There is another condition that can be drawn here, I noted from the US's arguments, where the qualification is not akind of loquacity (*laghū*). The US placed some examples to explain this condition; *the Jewish does not see if he died. The Sudanese, if they feel thirsty, only water can make them full* (al-Ghazalī, 2015, p. 2/215; al-Juwaynī, 1979, p. 1/463). The counter implicature being taken from this example is that he *who is not Jewish can see, or other people drink something else if they feel thirsty*. Al-Ghazālī and al-Juwaynī considered this example as a kind of playing and nonsensical speech, and the problem comes from the expression itself (al-Ghazalī, 2015, p. 2/215; al-Juwaynī, 1979, p. 1/463). This qualification is explicitly useless. Pro-CI uses this implicature to say that counter implicature is a valid way of generating rulings because even in this example, the mind tends to lean towards the counter implicature. This asserts that counter implicature "conventionally emerges in mind" (al-Subkī, 1995, p. 1/374). ʿAlī thinks that this example is wrong because it leads to the wrong counter implicature. I disagree with him because

we have already established that the counter implicature is considered manifest and is cancellable without affecting *what is said* as al-Juwaynī stated (see, 5-3-3).

There are more exceptions discussed in the US's works. However, most arguments are about the function of qualification. In fact, what we have discussed is adequate for the purposes of this chapter.

5-3-5- The Preferable Proposition

At the end of the discussion between the two parties, it is difficult to adopt one of the two opinions, because of the substantial evidence offered by the two parties. The complexity of this implicature made scholastics into two parties: one supports and the other refuses this implicature.

It is not easy to override the evidence that confirms the linguistic nature of this implicature, because it was full of examples from language that affirms that this implicature is yielded in our communications.

On the other hand, the evidence provided by the Anti-CI group affirm that there are situations where counter implicature cannot be obtained.

Both parties depend on examples from the language to support their claims, and both, in fact found examples that boost their claims.

It is not easy to adopt one opinion over the other, because the two pieces of evidence are concrete. The confusion comes, in my point of view, from the way in which this implicature happens. We might adopt a view if we analyse the nature of this implicature. As discussed in (4-1-1), the meaning components play the primary role in the strength of signification. Counter implicature is obtained by stating the contrary to a convention or a context. This is weaker than stating the case straight, and opens possibilities of meanings.

The claim that this implicature is linguistic and not an analogical one raises a question about the principles of interpretation, and their role in generating it. We discussed that all US agreed that immediacy (*tabādur*) is the criterion of consideration for *ḥaqīqah* and allegory (2-2-4). This implicature, in my point of view, is yielded by means of immediacy. Minds tend to allot the qualification to the mentioned case. Allotment itself entails the opposite, which does not obtain the qualification. So, it is very important that interlocutors consider the qualification in its active and negative works because one requires the others. Since our minds lean to this conclusion, the counter implicature is yielded by the means of immediacy. The process of allotment (*takhṣīṣ*) is responsible for triggering counter implicatures in our minds.

I will present a question to articulate the case further. Can the rival give the unmentioned case the same ruling of the mentioned one without a proof? Or which decision is more reasonable, to give the unmentioned case the same or the counter ruling when there is no further evidence, apart from the one who refers to the counter implicature? I think, first, that we cannot obviously provide the opposite case the same ruling without extra evidence, because the unmentioned case is clear from the qualification. Secondly, it can be claimed that the unmentioned case can take the opposite ruling because there is no evidence to give it the mentioned case's ruling. In fact this evidence is only manifest, but not certain. The counter implicature can, hence, be considered valid but only to the level of manifest (*ẓāhir*) as Pro-CI argued. Context can support the signification of this implicature. The meaning derived by counter implicature can be more explicit if context or clues interfere in the process. This implicature can, therefore, be considered as a particularised implicature. I consider it as a particularised implicature (see section 1-2) because context is required in order to avoid the exceptions from counting. The exceptions placed by the pro-counter implicature group will not be observed without contexts. In sum**, the counter implicature is conventionally triggered and contextually asserted**. The process of allotment (*takhṣīṣ*) triggers this type of implicature because minds tend to negate ruling from the opposite cases.

From the previous discussion, the features of this implicature can be identified as follows:

- Counter implicature is in the level of manifest *ẓāhir* meaning but not explicit *naṣṣ*. This leads to the next feature.

- Counter implicature is cancellable without affecting the uttered or the expressed meaning.

- Reinforcability. The hearer can ask to confirm it without it being considered as a redundancy.

- Nonconventionality. An utterance can be valid although its implicature is false. Cancelling the triggered implicature does not affect the truthfulness of the uttered sentence, because it does not contribute to truth condition as seen in (1-2). This property agrees with our conclusion of considering counter implicature as a particularised implicature. According to Pro-CI, although this implicature is linguistic, it is on the level of manifest and cancelling it does not affect the uttered case.

- Motivated. This implicature can be intended by the speaker to perform the implicit meaning because the speaker assigns the qualification to restrict ruling to the mentioned case, and hence negates it from the unmentioned case by means of a clue (*qarīnah*).

It can be explicitly said that the properties of conversational implicatures are similar to counter implicature since counter implicature is a conversational one.

Considering counter implicature linguistically means that it is governed by the level of interpretation, not by the level of causation. This induces us to ask about the principles that play roles in engendering it. The next section will address this matter.

5-3-6- The Bases of Counter Implicature
5-3-6-1- Introduction

Before presenting my proposed bases of the counter implicature as concluded in the last section, it is noteworthy to introduce and discuss some of the scholars who worked on this, especially ʿAlī (2000) who discussed the bases of the counter implicature and Hishām

Khalīfah (2015), who discussed and compared counter and congruent implicatures to the modern implicature. After that, I will move to propose my bases that are responsible for engendering counter implicature.

ʿAlī (2000, p. 201) proposed three bases that are responsible for generating counter implicature: *iʿmāl*, quantity and relevance. I will begin with the principle of quantity.

The Principle of Quantity

ʿAlī proposed that counter implicature is based first on the principle of quantity. The principle of quantity in speech denotes that consideration is given to any extra factor within speech that changes its meaning. The extra item is the qualification *qayd* or the attribute which give rise this implicature. The implicature is not yielded if this qualification is absent.

The role of quantity is appreciated in Arabic linguistics. The US and Arabic linguists such as ibn Ginnī, who is one of the most well-known linguistic Arabic scholars (d. 1002) expressed this conception as an "addition to structure is addition to the meaning" "*zīyādāt al-mabna tadol ᶜlā zīyādāt al-maᶜnā*" (ibn Ginnī, n.d. p. 3/268). For example, al-Baīḍāwī (1286) distinguished for example, two words: *Rahman and Rahim*, and he said that *Rahman* has more in its meaning than *Rahim* because it has more letters by virtue of the rule: "*zīyādāt al-mabna tadol ᶜlā zīyādāt al-maᶜnā*" (al-Baīḍāwī, p. 1/27). The previous example concerns the more quantity in words. The same can be applied on quantity in sentences. It is significant to note that Grice did not mean the length of words in his principle quantity. Grice talks about the utterance level, which is above the level of the clause and certainly above the level of the word. The difference might be related to the nature of the Arabic and English languages.

The base of quantity, as agreed, plays a role in meanings. However, there are two queries regarding this base:

The first one is related to the ʿAlī proposal. ʿAlī (2000, p. 203) did not propose in his model of interpretation the principle of *quantity*, as seen in Chapter Three (3-1-2-1). This means that ʿAlī did not root his implicature back to his principles, but rather to Grice's maxims. Islamic implicatures should be rooted in the Islamic principles of interpretation. This means that ʿAlī's principles are not adequate enough to generate implicatures, and there is a lack of his principles to conclude his implicatures. Grice proposed the principle and maxims to conclude that implicatures are rooted back to them.

The second query is related to the principles' validation. We discussed that the two parties of the US agree that there is a purpose for the qualification (*qayd*) in the mentioned case. The problematic issue was in employing and directing this qualification towards negating the ruling from the unmentioned case or towards something else. i.e. this principle is not one of the decisive factors in generating counter implicature because the qualification does not imply, according to the Anti-CI group, that the counter implicature is yielded. They think that the quantity, which is the qualification that can be delivered to another purpose, apart from negating the ruling from the unmentioned case. Even the Pro- CI think that the counter implicature is yielded by the function of the qualification, which is through the allotment, not by the qualification itself.

Khalīfah (2015, pp. 7369-70) considered the US derived both, congruent implicature and counter implicature from the Q principle which goes in a negative direction in order to say the minimum as explained in chapter 1 (1-2-4). He built his argument on one example of the congruent implicature that is derived from this verse, Q 17: 23.

{And your Lord has decreed that you should not worship any except Him (only) and (to show) fairest companionship to parents; in case ever one or both of them reaches old age (Literally: being great "in years") in your presence, do not say to them, "Fie!" nor scold them; and speak to them respectful words (Literally: say to them an honourable saying}.

This verse is based on different features for the congruent implicature as previously explained in this chapter (4-2-2). The convention, the specific composition and priority

play roles in deriving this implicature, therefore al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī considered the level of explicitness concerning the clarity of its meaning (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, P.1/342; al-Juwaynī, 1979, P. 1/413). Khalīfah relied only on one priority of congruent implicature to subsume it in the category of scalar implicature. Furthermore, he considered only the *quantity* to subsume the congruent and the counter implicatures under the scalar implicature. As explained in the bases of congruent implicature, congruent implicature is based on convention, specific composition and priority. The quantity principle is inadequate in obtaining either congruent implicature nor counter implicature because they are, according to the US, governed by many factors as explained in section (5-2-1).

The Principle of Relevance

ʿAlī (2000) discussed this principle as a base of the counter implicature.

I will argue with this principle as well. ʿAlī also did not consider this principle in his model, hence he rooted his work back to Grice's model.

We discussed in Chapter Three (3-3) the difference between the PJ and modern pragmaticians.

Relying on relevance in generating counter implicature has two issues:

The first one, the US means something different by the relevance from what is meant in the modern pragmatics as shown in Chapter Three (3-3). The problem comes from the translation of the word *relevance.* Relevance means in PJ that an attribute pertained to a ruling *ḥukm* is leading to obtaining the purposes of the lawgiver. Relevance, according to the US is a way to examine ratios.

Because *relevance* in the PJ tradition is considered part of ratio, using *relevance* as a principle here would mean that the Pro-CI position of seeing counter implicature as entirely linguistic would not be tenable. It would have to be seen as part of analogy, thus meeting more with the Anti-CI position. This was explicitly refused by the party due to adopting the linguistic nature of the counter implicature, as discussed above.

ʿAlī relied on al-Juwaynī in considering the how the counter implicature can be obtained in case there is relevance between the ruling and the attribute. It was, however, seen that scholars such as al-Samʿānī and al-Zarkashī discussed that on the one hand, this would put this implicature in the analogical implicatures and on the other hand, the concept of relevance, even according to al-Juwaynī, is different from the one in modern pragmatics.

Before leaving this section, it is useful to draw attention to al-Rāzī who put the counter implicature within the rational inference, as seen earlier in Chapter Four (4-2-4). He categorised both the congruent and the counter implicatures under the entailment (*iltizām*) classification. Al-Rāzī's position is justified since he refused to consider the counter implicature as linguistically derived. However, it is less justifiable to assign congruent implicatures to inference rather than language.

What concerns us from this discussion is that relevance cannot be considered as a valid base for the counter implicature because it moves it to the analogical implicatures, and this is not intended by the party who claimed that the counter implicature is linguistic.

The Principle of *Iʿmal*

ʿAlī proposed that the principle of *iʿmal* plays a role in generating the counter implicature, and this principle was explained in chapter three (3-1-3-2-2). We discussed his definition, which refers that the linguistic amount in utterances that should be used and applied in interpretation, rather than ignoring it. ʿAlī considered this principle as a principle of his model. It is reasonable as ʿAlī stated that this principle plays a role in interpretation generally, and it belongs to the Islamic model of interpretation. However, this principle will collide again with the Anti-CI group, which did not argue on the role of this principle, but rather on the function of *iʿmal*. *Iʿmal* confirms that there is a benefit sought from connecting this qualification to this ruling, but this principle does not solve the dispute between the two parties, which is: where is the direction of *iʿmal*? Is it to negate the ruling from the unmentioned case, or towards something else as discussed in (5-3-3)? This principle, despite its importance, does not alone provide an answer to this question. It is,

accordingly, not effective in generating implicatures, where the main concern was related to the role of qualification as seen in (5-3-3; 5-3-4).

5-3-6-2- The Bases of Counter Implicature

After this long discussion proposed by ʿAlī, I shall move on to discuss the principles that I think generate counter implicature.

Based on the earlier analysis, the counter implicature as an allotment (*takhṣiṣ*) a ruling with a qualification (*qayd*) so that this allocated attribute or qualification entails (*yastalzim*). This is the rule in the case mentioned, and entails the counter ruling to the unmentioned case, and the nature of counter implicature will help us to connect it to the right principles.

Thus, we learnt that there are three pillars of this description:

- allotment (*takhṣiṣ*)
- entailment (*yastalzim- istilzam*)
- qualification (*qayd*)

It is required then to examine these three components of the counter implicature.

Descending from General to Specific

Counter implicature is considered a case descending from the general (*al-ʿāmmi*), to the specific (*al-khāṣṣ*) as pointed out by al-Shīrāzī (al-Shīrāzī 1988, p. 1/433). In Islamic pragmatics, the inference of general should be applied when there is no inference yielded by a specific text. In case the two types of texts *the general and the specific* are placed, there will be a need to go back to the rules that govern the relationship between the general and the specific texts, since it is agreed that the Qurʾān and the Sunnah work as one text. There are two bases related to our case as follows:

1. Specific has preference over the general when they clash (al-Farrāʾ 1990, p. 2/615; Āl Taymiyyah n.d. p. 1/134).

2. Stating some general ʿāmm cases does not make the general specific khāṣṣ. (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 3/220).

With regards to the first base, consider these two sentences:

(15) Do not give money to anyone.
(16) Give money to orphans.

In this case, where the two statements are clashing, Muslim scholars would argue that the specific case (example 16) has preference over the general case (15) meaning that money should only be given to orphans as exception.

With regards to the second base, we can take this example,
(17) Give money to orphans.
(18) Give money to Ahmad (who is an orphan).

According to the second base, there is no counter implicature raised in this statement (give money only to Aḥmad) because there is no clash between the two sentences, *Ahmad can one of the orphans*. This example is more suitable to be ruled by the second base.

Another example can be cited from al-Ghazālī who argued that when we say, "the black man stood up or left or sat down" (al-Ghazali, n.d. p. 3/416), this does not imply that the white man did not. Al-Ghazali's example is governed also by the second base in descending from the general (ʿāmm) to the specific (khāṣṣ), which is the core idea of counter implicature. In the previous example, al-Ghazali discussed one case of the general, but he did not aim to specify the general, and for that we do not deduce counter implicature here. Al-Ghazali meant that all people can stand, the black man is an *example* here not a particular case.

With the bases of general and specific, one can understand why sometimes there are implicatures created and sometimes there are not. There will not be counter implicatures generated in case the qualification or attribute mentioned as an example or as an individual case of the general base. This will tell us more as to why most of the US refused to derive counter implicature from some qualifications. This rule also explains why Pro-CI proposed the exception from considering CI as discussed in (5-3-4). They proposed the exception to avoid such cases.

Counter implicature cannot be raised when there is an expectation that the utterance is an example of one case of the general. Should there be an expectation that the qualification is driven to specify, counter implicature can be obtained. This issue, however, was discussed in the exceptions of counter implicature (5-3-4).

Entailment *Istilzam*

This section will not elaborate on the previous sections, rather, we will focus on entailment. Entailment refers to two types of entailment; rational and communicational entailments.

The rational entailment has been discussed with the alleged relevance base, and it is concluded that this base will take the counter implicature to the analogical implicatures.

The intended meaning from the communicational entailment is the one taken from the convention. Pro-CI think that the nature of entailment is linguistic, not rational. Counter implicature, accordingly, is subject to the language contentions. Being a qualification found in an utterance makes interlocutors specify the ruling to the case that obtains the qualification. The process of allotment entails negating the ruling from the unmentioned case.

Entailment is the entrance for the counter implicature to take him into consideration for the principles of interpretation. The minds of communicators tend to opposite case by the

process of allotment.

This conclusion, i.e., the conventional entailment makes counter implicature subjected to the principle of interpretation as will be discussed in the following sections.

Principle of Predisposition

This principle, as explained in chapter three, (3-1-3-2-1) refers to the communicational situation at which the speaker and hearer are engaged, where they deliver and receive the speech. This principle plays a role in generating counter implicatures where the interlocutors are involved in a situation that raises or directs meanings towards the counter. This role can be explained in this example cited from the US writings. If there are two people in a quarrel, and one of them said to the other: *I do not have a mother a sister who is a fornicator*. It will come into consideration that this adversary is attributing adultery to the mother or the sister of the other adversary. Some scholars from the Aḥamad and Mālik's schools, therefore, stated that this person should be accused with defamation of the adversary's mother or sister, and should, therefore, be sentenced with the punishment of the defamation (ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, P. 3/287-8; al-Āmidī, 2003, P. 3/121).

The triggered counter implicature, according to al-Āmidī, has been raised because of the situational clue *qarīnah* since the two adversaries are involved in a quarrel, and both of them are at predisposition of delivering or receiving assaults – this predisposition triggers the counter implicature. It is vital to remember that it is concluded that counter implicature, in my point of view, is a particularised one, so, it is derivable according to the context and clues.

Principle of Convention

The principle of the convention meant here is the particular convention, which occurs in a particular context, or which is related to a particular person or group as concluded in (3-1-3-2-3). We concluded that the counter implicature can be counted in particularised implicature. It will therefore be governed by particular factors, such as the particular

convention between communicators, where one of them can understand that the other intends the counter implicature, by the convention running between them. For example, someone might maintain the delivery of counter implicature in his speech to avoid stating his intentions explicitly, such as these set of utterances (among people who live at one house, where one of them always keeps hinting) *I am not lazy at homework*, *I am very fast in tidy.* His mates at home will continue generating counter implicatures from his speech as they are aware of his particular convention.

Example from US's works can be placed here as well to articulate this issue. Some US claim that if it is said, the *Shāfiʿiyyah jurists are good imams*, the *Ḥanafyyah* scholars will feel angry with that, despite not mentioning anything about them (al-Amidi, 2003, P. 3/104; al-Qarāfī, n.d. p. 2/59; al-Ṭūfī, 1987, p. 2/723). However, the counter implicature is triggered here because of the general intuition in the field of Islamic jurisprudence, where the two schools *Shāfiʿiyyah and Ḥanafyyah* are the most prominent schools and taking about one of them evokes the other school. Hence, allocating an attribute only to one of them will trigger a question about the other school, and this is the counter implicature. The convention principle plays a role in triggering counter implicature according to Pro-CI group.

It is worth indicating that the previous example was narrated in two ways, one gives preference to *Ḥanafyyah* over *Shāfiʿiyyah* and one to the contrary, which indicates that the implicature has been triggered between the scholars in the two schools.

Principle of Immediacy

This principle plays a role in generating and confining counter implicature since it is concluded that this implicature is a particularised one. The principle of immediacy, which governs the context as explained in (3-1-3-2-4), and has a cardinal role in raising the counter implicature, or cancelling it. With its context, it can be deduced whether or not this utterance intends to carry a counter implicature or whether it is from the exceptions that are not counted in considering counter implicature, as seen in the example in the role

of the predisposition principle above. At the immediacy section in chapter three, it has been discussed that there are many reasons to take the interpretation from the literal to the allegorical meaning. For example, if a teacher says: that he will give a reward to students who get a certain grade in the test. He implies that the students who do not get the specified degree will not receive the reward. This counter implicature is derived by virtue of the context where the objective of the teacher's promise is to motivate students to work hard for their exam. Moreover, it is important to remember again that this implicature is cancellable and the teacher can state the opposite of the counter implicature.

Concerning the role of qualification (*qayd*) in generating counter implicature, the next sections will present the different types of qualifications and discuss their effectiveness and the positions of scholars upon them.

As seen in this section, just completed that many principles have been discussed to conclude the principles generating the counter implicature. This is because of the complexity of the this implicature has many arguments relating to it. In summary, this implicature is triggered by a convention through *allotment* and is confirmed by immediacy through *context*.

5-3-7- Types of Qualification - *Types of Counter Implicature*

In this section, types of qualifications (*quyūd*) will be presented. The role of qualifications is to descend the statement from general to specific. These qualifications include any type of operators which raise the attention of counter implicature. Moreover, it will be shown how scholars differ in considering the different types of qualifications.

1- The Implicature of designation (*Mafhūm Al-laqab*). This qualification triggers counter implicature using the title or designation as a qualification. *Al-laqab* here refers to names in human, groups in animals *free-grazing sheep or stall-fed sheep*, manufacturing company for cars or any designation that has become a sign to identify something (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/24). For example, saying: *give charity to*

Muḥammad or to Human Care Organisation. Pro-CI differs in considering this qualification as valid to raise counter implicature.

Most scholars, even the ones adopted counter implicature considered this type invalid (al-Samʿānī, 1998, pp. 2/12-3; al-Ghazalī, 2015, P. 2/209; al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/24). Abū Bakr al-Daqqāq (d. 1002) and some from the Ḥanbalī school such as abū Yaʿlā (d. 1066) and ibn ʿAqīl considered it (abū Yaʿlā, 1990, p. 2/455; Ibn ʿAqīl, 1999, p. 3/289; al-Zarkashī, 1992, 4/24). Al-Ghazālī, in his book *al-Mankhūl* (alGhazālī, 1998, p. 301) adopted this qualification if there are clues to support it. It is, however, the weakest qualification, according to the US, because, according to al-Samʿānī, who is one of Pro-CI, he found that there is a difference between attribute and designation in generating rulings. Al-Samʿānī thought that "names are merely signs to refer to things, whereas attributes are meant to notify for the sense" (al-Samʿānī, 1998, pp. 2/34). He then went onto say that "names might differ despite the agreement among senses." People might have different names despite mutual features. On the other hand, it cannot be "imagined that attributes can differ despite the agreement among senses" because attributes are assigned in order senses to be taken into consideration (al-Samʿānī, 1998, pp. 2/34). Ibn Daqīq al-ʿAyd (d. 1302) accepted it if there is a clue that the designation is considered as a ratio for the ruling (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 4/28).

2- The implicature of a restrictive attribute (*Mafhūm Al- Ṣifah*): Most discussions among scholars regarding counter implicature were meant to address this qualification. When we relate an attribute to a case so that we can descend from general (ʿamm) to specific (khāṣṣ) by this attribute. The main role of attributes, according to the Pro-CI, is to assign the ruling to the case that contains the attribute. This allotment entails negating the ruling from the unmentioned case. Attribute, according to the US is not the one meant in grammar. It includes any qualification that can restrict the general apart from condition (*al-sharṭ*) and time limit (*al-ghāyah*). It includes adverbs of time, adverbs of place, adverbs of manner *al-ḥāl,* and so on (ʿAlī, 2000, p. 210; al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 4/30).

An example for the attribute can be found in this statement, *give this money to a poor man*, it implicates not to give it to a rich man. An example for adverb of time can be found in this instance, *attend on Friday*, it implied *do not attend* on another day. For the adverb of place, we can place this example, *play the ball forward*. It implicated not to play behind. With respect to the adverb of manner, I can lay this example, *he read the book quickly*. This implicates that he did not read it slowly.

The US stipulated that not any attribute can work. The attributes that come to restrict absolute (*takhṣīṣ*) *al-muṭlaq* or clarify definite names (*tawḍīḥ al-maʿārf*) can only generate counter implicature (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/36; al-Taftazani, n.d. p. 1/144). We can illustrate the condition by giving these examples.

The attribute does work if it comes for the purpose of praise (*thanāʾ*) as in this example, *give this money to the respected person.* The attribute *respected* is used to praise, and not for restriction. The attribute might come for the purpose of condemning (*dhamm*) as in this example, *may Allah protect you from an evil person*. It might come for the purpose of emphasis *tawkīd* as in this example, he scored a *good* goal. In the previous cases they were not counter implicatures.

In summary, the attribute should be restricted to yield counter implicature. It is drawn to our attention that the previous exceptions, which are particularised to the qualification *attribute*, should be conjoined to the general exceptions of counter implicature to be taken into consideration, while we are processing counter implicature. This, repeatedly, confirms the particularised quality of counter implicature, since the context will determine the role of attributes.

3- The implicature of a condition *(Mafhūm Al- Sharṭ)*: when we relate the happening of something with a condition, in this case, we give to the unmentioned case the counter ruling because it lacks the condition (al-Zarkashī, 1992, Pp. 4/37; al-Shawkani, 2000, p. 774). This is the strongest type according to understanding the US. Al-Juwaynī, as al-Zarkashī conveyed that most scholars accept it (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/37).

However, there are some scholars who refuse to use this type of counter implicature, such as al-Bāqillānī (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 363). For example, if a manager says to his employee *if you do this task, you would be rewarded*. The implicature here is that *if you do not do it, you will not be rewarded*.

So, the main question that arises in this type of implicature is whether the condition negates the ruling from the unmentioned case, or does it leave it to its original ruling? Pro-CI goes to the first. However, Anti-CI adopt the latter (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/38). In the previous example, the statement implicates that the manager will not reward the employee if he does not fulfil the mission. According to Anti-CI, the stipulation of rewarding will be removed, and the manager might give or not. The point is that rewarding is not stipulated in the absence of doing the mission. Anti-CI think that if the condition is absent, the case will return to its original status before condition, which is not to reward. Yet, we have to note that this conclusion is based on the original case before condition, not on the power of condition (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/40).

4- The implicature of a time or place limit *(Mafhūm Al-Ghayh)*: This implicature happens we connect the ruling with a time limit. It indicates that the ruling will not work out of this limit, or it will be applied opposite it. An example can be taken from this verse, {And eat and drink until the white thread becomes evident to you from the black thread at dawn; thereafter complete (Literally: perfect) the Fast to the night} Q 2: 187. The triggered implicature is that people are not allowed to eat or drink after the time limit in the verse.

This type of implicature was agreed among most of the scholastics (al-Bāqillānī, 1998, p. 3/ 358; al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/47; al-Shawkani, 2000, p. 2/776). Al-Āmidī from the scholastics and the Ḥanafī school refused this type of implicature (al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 3/116). Al-Āmidī said that all scholars agreed that there is a possibility that the ruling after the time limit can be the same as the one before the time limit. Hence, there is no difference between this implicature and the other types. It is very important to remember that al-Āmidī is one from Anti-CI.

Another example I can use here from the Qurʾān, Q 5: 6. {And wash your hands until elbow}. The verse talks about the required quantity to be washed in ablution. It declares that it is until elbow. This implicates that the parts after elbows are not included (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/46; al-Shawkani, 2000, p. 2/776).

5- The implicature of a stated numeral *(Mafhūm Al-ʿAdad)* (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 4/41; al-Shawkani, 2000, p. 2/775). Again, scholars differed in the validity of these types of implicature. For example, the fine for this traffic violation is £80 pounds. It excludes numbers before and after from the ruling.

One of the significant issues addressed by the US in this type of implicature is whether the number is placed for augmentation, not for restriction. Pro-CI excluded numbers being brought for exaggeration from counting them as a valid qualification (al-Zarkashī, 1992, P. 4/42). Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī extensively discussed this type of implicature (see, al-Baṣrī 1964, p. 1/157-159).

There are some other types of *mafhūm al-mukhalafah* some scholars counted ten types of it (al-Zarkashī, 1992, p. 4/24-54). More of counter implicature' qualifications can be reviewed at the US's works. It is meant, here, to discuss the derivation of the counter implicature, and discuss the arguments of the two parties in considering it and put some of its types at the end. Counter implicature is a vast and complicated issue, although I attempted to the best of my ability to address its main issues.

It is worth noting that the central mutual merit among all types of counter implicature is the qualification (*qayd*), which restricts the ruling case to the qualification, and hence, it removes it from the unmentioned case. Any qualification that can retract the mentioned case can play a role in generating counter implicature. All types of implicature are on the level of the manifest, i.e., all of them are cancellable. Of course, some qualifications are stronger than others because of their ability to restrict is higher than each other. This can further substantiate the difference in number of Pro-CI or Anti-CI in each type of counter implicature.

5-4- An Applied Text

I shall put here an example of the Ḥadīth to show how the principles of interpretation work and how we can obtain meanings from the Ḥadīth. The prophet said, "it is not permitted (*lā yaḥillu*) for any woman who believes in Allah and the judgment day to travel a distance of a day and a night without being accompanied by an unmarriageable person (*muḥrim*)" (al-Bukhārī, 2001, p. 2/43).

Our four principles will work as follows:

The hearer is at a predisposition where he believes in the speaker's ability of expression and truthfulness. He is going, therefore, to do his best to interpret it. The hearer is at a predisposition towards the domain. The Ḥadīth belongs to the Islamic convention. He is going, therefore, to understand the speech in accordance with the legal convention's rules. With respect to the principle of (*iʿmāl*), the hearer will consider the Ḥadīth and every linguistic element because it is delivered by the prophet where all the linguistic elements are intended.

The power of the principle *convention* will appear in interpreting the words in their legal or jurisprudential meaning, such as the word not permitted (*lā yaḥillu*). Not permitted legally means forbidden (*ḥarām*), although, semantically it means it is not allowed.

The immediacy principle confirms that word *not permitted* (*lā yaḥillu*) means *forbidden* (*ḥarām*), and not only recommended because it emerges in minds within this legal convention from a hand, and the clue *qarīnah* from the other hand. The clue is *woman who believes in Allah and the judgment day*. This clue confirms that the meaning intended by *not permitted* (*lā yaḥillu*) is *forbidden* (*ḥarām*) because it asserts that this action would not be made by a woman who fears Allah.

Moving onto the level of causation, we will ask what is the ratio of this forbidding? There is a need to propose the possible attribute in order to identify the appropriate ratio.

Is travelling the reason? Is it the unsafe way? Is it related to the situation of women when she is alone among men?

Examining the suggested attributes by means of relevance will exclude the first two attributes.

Travelling itself is not a relevant reason because people need it, and there is no difference between man and woman.

Concerning the second proposal, it cannot be the ratio because in case the way is unsafe, both men and women are not allowed to travel because of the higher purpose *self* (*nafs*) so that people should protect their selves as discussed in section (2-3-1).

We have the last proposed attribute, which is the *situation of women when she is alone among men*. Women travelling alone for a long journey without a *muḥrim* could have been subject to harassment and attack by men, mainly during the times governing their culture and society. For instance, Arabs used to travel in deserts at that time and women were not safe, understandably, then. Hence, this attribute meets with the higher purposes of the Islamic law (*maqāṣid al-sharīʿah*) because its aims indicate that women should be provided with extra care against harassments.

There is another clue from another Ḥadīth, which confirms the conclusion in this statement, which is "the women will travel one day from al-Ḥīrah to Mecca to perform pilgrimage does not fear anything but Allah" (al-Bukhārī, 2001, p. 4/197). This Ḥadīth confirms that the ratio is the safety of way of place. The two Ḥadīths will interpret each other because all the Ḥadīths are considered as one, and entity as explained in section (3-1-1). Also, it is worth mentioning that the four jurisprudential schools do not allow women to travel alone (al-Nawawī, 1972, p. 9/104; ibn Ḥajar, 1959, p. 4/76). They interpreted the Ḥadīth literally.

According to the ratio deduced, women can travel wherever if they think they are protected

from these types of harassments. They can travel using train or plane according to our inference because laws are strict against harassments. The strict legislations against harassment and women abuse will make a kind of a safe environment, and of course, these legislations might differ from time to time, and from one place to another.

According to the ratio, women can go anywhere if they feel they are safe from abuse or harassment, whereas they are not allowed to travel, nor go anywhere, if they feel that they are unsafe in this place. The case according to the ratio from the Ḥadīth is not only restricted to travelling.

As for the meaning that can be derived from the Ḥadīth, we can take the explicit (*naṣṣ*) meaning from the wording of the Ḥadīth because it is clear for this meaning supported by the clue, as explained.

We can derive some implicatures, also. The congruent implicature confirms that women cannot go further than the distance defined in the Ḥadīth. The counter implicature confirms that they can go less than the distance without a *muḥrim,* whereas the analogical implicature confirms that they cannot be in any situation where they think that they will be harassed or abused, but can go anywhere they will be safe.

Of course, after we assign the ratio, the congruent implicature and the counter implicature might be affected if the ratio changed the interpretation. This is what we have learnt from the ratios that govern the individual meanings, although I have presented the way to derive meanings, according to the US.

Conclusion

Within this chapter, three types of implicatures have been discussed. Congruent, analogical, and counter implicatures. It is explained that congruent implicature belongs to the first level of interpretation, which has been discussed in chapter three, namely, the interpretive level. The principles that play roles in generating it, is mainly the linguistic conventions, which include styles and specific composition (*tarkīb*). These bases made

this implicature non-cancellable, according to all of the US, unlike what ʿAlī and Khalīfah have concluded.

Concerning analogical implicature, it is one of the developed implicature in this thesis, and is one which has not been addressed before, linguistically. This implicature belongs to the second level of interpretation, which is the level of causation (*taʿlīl*). This implicature is correlated to its ratio (*ʿillalh*), and hence, dominated it in presence and cancellability.

The most controversial implicature is counter implicature, and for this reason, there are lots of arguments among scholars. Therefore, I attempted to explain it in the best possible way, and I drew attention to the point of dispute which had not been discussed in the previous researches. Moreover, the point is the nature of this implicature, which can divert its bases from the linguistic level to ratio's level, and Pro-CI, strongly refused to consider this implicature to have been subjected to ratios' level. Rather, they proposed lots of evidence that this implicature is governed by language and convention, whereas Some scholars thought that it belongs to the level of causation, where ratio can play the role in generating it, and some refused to accept it entirely.

Pro-CI did not claim that counter implicature can work in any situation, and therefore proposed some exceptions to draw attention to the situations at which this implicature cannot be yielded. The nature of counter implicature guided us to its bases, which is mainly the convention, and immediacy. These two principles make this implicature a particularised one because it is subjected to the context, so that the exceptions can be taken into consideration.

Additionally, the conception of counter implicature varies its qualifications. We have, accordingly, had many qualifications that play roles in generating this implicature.

It is noteworthy to observe the similarity between the counter implicature and the scalar implicature, both of which are somewhat based on the conception of giving the unmentioned case the opposite rulings. Although, the persuasion that scalar implicature is wider than counter implicature is worth mentioning too, as it addresses not only the counter scale, but any scale.

The modern pragmatics has been observed in this chapter in terms of categorising the different implicatures, drawing their theoretical frames, explaining the properties of each implicature and associating them back to their principles.

Conclusion

Introduction

Throughout the thesis, we addressed the issues relating to implicature in Islamic pragmatics. We tried to answer a few questions that can lead us to frame and organise data and arguments of implicatures within PJ theoretically. This mission was implemented by employing modern pragmatic insights and frames around the conception of implicature.

We raised the question at the beginning of this research:

- To what extent can the modern notions and insights developed by the modern pragmaticians help in formulating models in implicature?

And the previous question subsumed some other questions, which include:

- What is the linguistic perspective of the US that controls their principles of interpretation? What is the US's perspective regarding the conception of *use* and its relation to intentionality? How did they approach the concept of intentionality in their pragmatics?
- What are the principles that generate different types of meanings and implicatures?
- How did the two schools classify meanings? Where are the implicatures in their classifications, and what are the reasons behind the difference in classifications?
- How many types of implicature has each school counted, and what are the reasons behind the disagreement in the validity of some implicatures?
- What are the bases and properties of Islamic implicatures?

The research aimed to answer these questions, and this thesis revealed deep and true insights within PJ regarding issues of meanings, and especially implicatures. We could access a massive quantity of notions and arguments which spanned over twelve centuries

ago or more, and therefore put them in a methodical frame. Nevertheless, many concepts relating to pragmatics were discussed in Islamic pragmatics.

The principles proposed by the modern pragmaticians guided me in finding and exploring thoughts and arguments in Islamic pragmatics. The modern theoretical frames, especially Grice's model helped me considerably in placing the data and arguments in a systematic body.

The diverse background of the two schools, i.e., the scholastics and the Ḥanafī schools enriched the conception and features of implicatures in Islamic pragmatics. The influences of this were observed in the difference of classifying significations and the validity of some types of meanings. We found that the diverse perspectives of the linguistic issues were found even in the same school.

This thesis tried to answer the research questions, and further led us to some findings in Islamic pragmatics.

Findings and Outcomes

The US early perceived the role of *use* in making meanings, although their perceived meanings will differ according to use. Moreover, meanings are not always derived from the language in its abstract states *waḍʿ*, but also from use. The US knew that *use* was not consistent, and that each domain, culture or community had their own uses. The US, therefore divided domains of use into three domains based on their purposes. They divided them into a domain relating to semantic (*lughawī*), customary (*ʿurfī*) and legal or juridical (*sharʿī*), but they also pointed out that domains of use could be more than three as meanings and significations were considered to be biased according to the power of use in this domain or that.

The US classified meanings, according to use into two types. They called the salient meaning within a domain of use *ḥaqīqah* and called the non-salient meaning at a specific

domain allegory (*majāz*). They counted, thus, three types of *ḥaqīqah*s and three types of allegories according to the three domains; semantic (*ḥaqīqah lughawiyyah*)*, customary* (*ḥaqīqah ʿurfiyyah*) *and legal or juridical* (*ḥaqīqah sharʿiyyah*).

Ḥaqīqah or allegory are determined based on the convention of use. We therefore drew attention to the mistake made by some scholars of translating *ḥaqīqah* as a literal meaning, because the literal meaning is determined by *waḍʿ* of language, whereas *ḥaqīqah*s are determined by the conventional use. Furthermore, the US used the word (*ḥaqīqah*) to denote the salient meaning to declare that this is the actual use according to a particular domain, as the word *ḥaqīqah* means right or fact. As for the literal meaning, they indicated static meanings that do not belong to conventions or contextual situations, but rather to *waḍʿ*.

For meaning to be *ḥaqīqah*, it needs three bases as we concluded from the US's works. First, we cannot consider the meaning of *ḥaqīqah* in an absolute sense, because *ḥaqīqah*s are in fact restricted by their realms. Also, what has been considered as *ḥaqīqah* at a convention is thus unnecessary to be *ḥaqīqah* at another convention, but it can be an allegory in the new domain. And the other base that required meanings to be counted *ḥaqīqah*s is the predominance of use (*ghalabah al-istiʿmāl*). Meaning needs to be assigned by the communicators to a particular word, so that meaning becomes predominant over other possible meanings when it is consistently used. The predominance of use is a required phase so that the meaning becomes the conventional one since convention relies on the predominance of use. The last base that makes a meaning *ḥaqīqah* or allegory is the base of immediacy (*tabādur*), which refers to the process at which minds of language users incline to the salient meaning in a particular convention, or context. This is considered, according to the US, the primary factor in investigating *ḥaqīqah* and allegory, since meanings reflect language in the first instance, and this can further determine *ḥaqīqah* and allegory in PJ. Additionally, Immediacy is an examiner *for ḥaqīqah* and allegory.

The most crucial notion in this base is that the US expounded in the role of immediacy as it was considered a sign of *ḥaqīqah* without a clue (*qarīnah*). However, immediacy with a clue is considered a sign of allegory. This conclusion drew our attention consequently, to the inaccuracy of addressing this principle by ʿAlī (2000) who relied on this principle to distinguish two streams in his study. He did not recognise the conditions of immediacy, but rather, considered immediacy as a sign of *ḥaqīqah* in general. He then concluded that Salafī stream is more pragmatic than the classical one, since it does not rely on the stage of *ḥaqīqah has preference in general*. His conclusion was based on imperfect data, because *ḥaqīqah* has a preference without a clue, whereas allegory has preference with a clue.

Due to the difference between *ḥaqīqah* and allegory, the US proposed some rules that control the interpretive relationship between *ḥaqīqah* and allegory. They further proposed some rules like interpretive bases, which states that *ḥaqīqah* has preference over allegory, and allegory is dependent on denotation. However, allegory requires a relation to *ḥaqīqah* to be understood in its light.

The previous conditions were placed in order to access the interlocutors' intentions. The US addressed the issue of intentionality extensively, since the Qurʾān and the Sunnah are revealed to deliver the meanings intended by the lawgiver. Intentionality consequently was considered the umbrella that governs the processes of interpretation guiding the intentions of the lawgiver.

The US discussed the purposes from the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, covering three levels: necessity (*ḍarūriyyat*), needed (*ḥājiyyat*) and commendable (*taḥsīnyyat*). These three levels are ordered from the upper to the lower, and the first one refers to the necessity that life cannot continue without, such as the self (*nafs*), religion, intellect (*ʿaql*), property (*māl*), family (*nasl*). The second level refers to the needed provisions like eating different types of food or carrying out different commercial transactions. The third level reflects on social conventions in some habits, and according to these three levels, the interpretations should consider these levels as they are the higher purposes of revelation.

Intentionality was theoretically addressed by al-Shāṭibī and extensively discussed. We categorised the levels of intentionality at three types, including, the purposes of the speaker, which are the three types mentioned above. They include the purposes of the language, and the purposes of the hearer. The purpose of language, according to the US, is the *ifhām*, which literally means: to make someone understand something. *Ifhām* is the higher purpose of using language and encompasses controlling meaning delivered by speech to be under the condition of *ifhām*. With regards to the purpose of the hearer, the comprehension by the hearer should correspond to the purposes of the speaker who uses language to deliver *ifhām* of something to the hearer. The hearer should understand what the speaker wants him to know – and neither more, or less. The hearer will not be able to do so unless the speaker delivers the speech in such a way that allows the hearer to understand the meaning adequately.

We managed to conclude and identify the nature of the linguistic studies and their philosophy regarding language and intentionality. The philosophy of language and intentionality instructed us to propose the levels of interpretations and also the principles of interpretation.

We found that the US discussed linguistic meanings and reasons (or *ratios*) as proposed by the adopted translation for the term *ʿillah*. I propose a system that includes the principles that generate meanings and reasons, and I have categorised levels of interpretations into two levels. The first is the level of linguistic interpretation, and the second is the level of causation (*taʿlīl*). The level of interpretation discusses the meanings of the words and sentences under the language's norms, whereas the level of causation discusses the reasons behind the speech, which requires more factors to be involved, such as the rational process to be implemented. On the first level, I discussed the previous work implemented by ʿAlī (2000) and explained that his attempt despite its significance faced some troubles because it was, at some points, based on imperfect information, such as the concept of immediacy.

I proposed a model of interpretation inspired by Grice's frame as seen in section (3-1-3-2). I divided the principles of interpretation into two factors, as done by Grice. I called the central principle the *primary purpose,* whereas I used the term principles to refer to the bases that work under the comprehensive purpose.

I found that the primary principle that dominates the intentionality and effective communication is the *ifhām,* and this principle is counted by the US as the main purpose of language or communication. Under this purpose, I proposed four principles:

1- Principle of the hearer's predisposition *al-istiʿdād* or *al-tahayyuʾ al-takhāṭubī.*
2- Principle of *iʿmāl.*
3- Principle of communicational convention *al-ʿahd*
4- Principle of immediacy *tabādur*

With regards to the purpose of language *ifhām,* we concluded that there are some conditions needed in order to implement *ifhām* adequately. The quantity of speech should not be more than required to be understood. Otherwise, the hearer will understand more than is required, and this is not accepted by the US because the hearer should understand only what the speaker wants him to know as al-Āmidī stated (al-Āmidī, 2003, p. 1/132). Another condition is that for, the process of *ifhām* to become effective, the speaker should consider the linguistic ability of the hearer and his predisposition. Considering the linguistic and special conventions by the speaker would also make the process of *ifhām* successful.

Ifhām, as opposed to *fahm* is required by the hearer, because *ifhām* is pertained to the speaker's intentions, whereas, *fahm* is pertained to the speech regardless of the speakers' intentions. *Fahm* means understanding.

Concerning the principle of predisposition, the US thought that the speaker delivers a speech to who is expecting it, followed by a predisposition to receive a message from the

speaker, that is relevant to the topic and context. I therefore classified this principle into three categories.

The first is the communicational predisposition, versus the speaker. This essentially means to judge the intentions in terms of truthfulness, or the ability of explanation *bayan*. Hearers' expectations will direct their understanding, based on their expectations and supported by other factors. The hearer will interpret the speaker's statement either in its *ḥaqīqah* or allegory. Moreover, we concluded that effective or successful communication would occur when the hearer's understanding meets with the speaker's speech, or *ifhām-based,* since this is the message the speaker wants to deliver to the hearer. If, however the hearer understands the hidden intention that is unintended by *ifhām,* the speaker will therefore have failed in the process of *ifhām.*

The second category is the communicational predisposition versus the context. The hearers are directed to the context and will interpret and respond according to the context. In case the context is absent, the hearers will respond, according to the convention. The convention in this study is assumed to be wider than the context, as it refers to a domain of use.

The third category is the communicational predisposition, versus the topic. This predisposition is narrower than the context, and is related to the topic discussed amongst interlocutors. The hearer, within any topic is communicatively oriented, to the topic being discussed, and will interpret vocables by the relationship to the topic. The uṣūlī rule that expresses this predisposition is "the question is iterated in the answer" which means that the response of the hearer is based on the question.

With regards to the principle of *iʿmāl,* the US thought that the hearer should be oriented by the speech to any possible meaning, before deciding to ignore it. The other factor is that the more the quantity, the more the meaning is, bu the speech should be biased as much as possible, so that it carries more interpretive benefit. These rules can be applied in general, or in the case of the absence of context.

Employing the principle of *iʿmāl* allowed us to point out some rules in PJ, such as:

- Allegory should be considered if considering *ḥaqīqah* is impossible.
- Absolute (*muṭlaq*) will be operated in its absolute meaning until evidence of qualifying (*taqyīd*) has been presented.
- Specific (*khāṣṣ*) would be preceded over general (*ʿāmm*).
- Expressing indivisible statement is like uttering the entire statement (*dhikr baʿḍ mā lā yatajazzaʾ kadhikr al-kul*).
- Originality is over tautology (*al-taʾṣīl dūna al-ziyādah*).
- The speech can be only ignored if there is no way to be operated. (*Idhā taʿadhdhar iʿmāl al-kalām yuhmal*).

The principle of *iʿmāl* is operated in general when there are no clues to orient the speech towards a specific meaning. The role of this principle is limited by the language of use, since interpretation does not occur in a semantic sense only. There is a need for the other principles to work with this principle to make the process of *ifhām* effective.

The third principle was the communicational convention of *al-ʿahd,* which reflects the domain of use, or the habits of users. We concluded that there are two types of conventions, general (*al-ʿahd al-ʿāmm*) related to the domain of use and specific (*al-ʿahd al-khāṣṣ*) related to the users and their habits. We considered how this principle divided *ḥaqīqahs* into three types of Islamic pragmatics, and we concluded that its properties make it dynamic. Hence, we reached the conclusion that its properties are as follows: spatial, so that it might differ from a place or a time to another. It can also be commonly related to groups, or communities, or a contextual sense. So that it can happen in small groups, or particular contexts, making it far more personal. Because of the previous reasons, there is a need to know its stipulations, and we therefore concluded that we would rely upon the convention if it is general, recurrent, and valid when the case or issue arises.

Because of the previous reasons, there is a need to know its stipulations. We concluded that we would rely upon the convention if it is general, recurrent, and valid when the case or issue happens.

The fourth principle in my proposed model is the principle of immediacy (*tabādur),* which is the main criterion, according to the US in distinguishing *ḥaqīqah* from allegory. We found out that the US divided immediacy into two types, immediacy, without a clue and an immediacy with a clue. I explained that ʿAlī (2000) did not consider this difference between the two types of immediacy and built his model without observing this difference.

ʿAlī considered immediacy as the only way to *ḥaqīqah*, and proposed another principle derived from this premise, which is *istiṣḥāb*. This confirms that the US think that immediacy leads interlocutors to *ḥaqīqah*, then move to allegory, in case *ḥaqīqah* is not applicable. I explained that immediacy is two types; one without clue that leads to *ḥaqīqah* and the other one with clue that leads to allegory without the need to go through the principle of *istiṣḥāb*. There is no need, hence, to the principle of *istiṣḥāb,* which is, according to ʿAlī, is the main difference between Salafī and the orthodox groups that had been discussed in his research. As a conclusion, the two groups, from my point of view, have the same models in interpretation.

Immediacy as we concluded reflect the context, which is narrower than the convention, and it is governed by clues. It was explained that the US divided clues into many, but clues' works are either as divert clues (*qarīnah ṣārifah*) or guide clues (*qarīnah hādiyah*). The different types of clues, according to the Ḥanafī school, can be counted under five categories; denotation of use (*dilālah ʿurf al-istiʿmāl*), the denotation of vocable itself (*dilālah al-lafdh*), the context of the speech, situation of the speaker (*dilālah al-mutakallim fī sifatih*), and situation of the speech (*dilālah maḥal al-kalām*).

Employing the sights from the relevance theorists in modern pragmatics with the US's insights, I could stipulate and conclude the conditions of the acceptable immediacy, which are:

- The right immediacy is the one that precedes to minds (*tasbiq ilā aldhihn*).
- The right immediacy is the one that requires less effort.
- The right immediacy is the one that has the strongest clue.

At the level of causation (*al-taʿlīl*), we discussed the ways of uncovering ratios of speech. These ways are not only derived from language, but the different process involved in deriving ratios, as explained. The proposed ways by the US were presented, and accompanied by the proposed new way, which I introduced as immediacy (*tabādur*). This new way is one of the findings in this research paper, and I supported my proposal by some arguments from the PJ and concluded that this way can be valid. Furthermore, that the ratio obtained by this way could be on the level of the manifest (*ẓāhir*), which is cancellable.

The significance of immediacy either at the level of interpretation or causation reflects that the US look at communication as a mutual benefit among language users. The language users tie themselves to the conventional norms to make the process of *ifhām* effective. The US appreciate the cooperation among communicators to be able to express their intentions.

Another significant point was discussed in the chapter, which is the point of relevance. I explained that the terminology *relevance* refers to two different conceptions between modern pragmatics and PJ. I explained that it refers to the link between the utterances and their context or topic in modern pragmatics. Conversely, in PJ, the relationship between ratios and the higher purposes of Islamic law are different, and also have different conceptions carried in the same word. Some scholars considered them the same and employed them imperfectly, by discussing the principles of counter implicature.

I proposed my own model of interpretation to redress the shortcomings that the previous attempts fell in. I proposed a system, of three levels, derived from the PJ, where each level govern the level lower. The higher purposes govern ratios, and ratios govern the level of

interpretation because ratios are the profound meanings behind the interpretive meanings. By obtaining ratios, the proposal will be completed. We can then move to implicatures, specifically, identifying ratios, which plays an important role in directing implicature. If for example, someone says, I *do not eat or drink this*. If the ratio is the *high price* ratio for not eating or drinking, the congruent implicature will be not eating or drinking more expensive things, and the counter implicature is to eat what is cheaper. However, if the ratio is the *harm*, the congruent implicature will not be to eat is worse, and the counter implicature, to eat is better, and the same for the analogical implicature. These ratios will be examined through *relevance* to fit the higher purposes of Islamic law. This is what is meant by ratios are the profound meanings or meanings of meanings.

Many meanings emerged as a result of the interpretation process. The two schools have two different ways of classifying meanings, as explained, and the difference happened within the same school. In order to identify the reasons behind the different classifications, I set some foundations to help in analysing the different classifications, and finding of the reasons behind the difference.

I proposed a set of differences between meaning and signification, where I concluded from the US's arguments that meaning is pertained to the users of language, either to the speaker or the hearer. Meaning is a result of an interpretive process, whereas signification is a result of signifying. Signification is the attribute of the vocable, whereas meanings are related to the language users either in comprehension *fahm* or *ifhām*. We pointed out that the US considered the *ifhām* is the attribute of the speaker, whereas the *fahm* is the attribute of the hearer. Meaning as a conclusion is considered as a stage between vocable and signification.

Fahm or *ifhām,* which consist of the two sides of the communication process are the bases behind the different perspectives between the scholastics and the Ḥanafī schools. The Ḥanafī school considered the speaker's side and his purposes. They proposed their classification at four levels:

1. The expression of the text (*ʿibārah al-naṣṣ*).

2. The allusion of text (*ishārah al-naṣṣ*).

3. The denotation of text (*dilālah al-naṣṣ*).

4. The completion of the text (*iqtiḍāʾ al-naṣṣ*).

They were also interested in the textual classification as they classified the text at eight levels in terms of the clarity and ambiguity, manifest (*ẓāhir*) which is opposite to obscure (*khafī*), explicit (*naṣṣ*) which is opposite to difficult (*mushkil*), perspicuous (*mufassar*) which is opposite to ambivalent (*mujmal*), unequivocal (*muḥkam*) which is opposite to intricate (*mutashābih*).

The scholastics varied in classifying meanings and I proposed the most significant classifications within this school. The conclusion comes up that each scholar considered a particular base in his work.

The central point is that the scholastics considered the hearer's side in classifying meanings. This side is wider than the Ḥanafī's perspective since it derives meanings without being restricted to the speaker's intention. This perspective concerns with all possible meanings.

We concluded that there are four bases on which the scholastics relied in classifying meanings. These four bases are *literality*, *cancellability*, *inference* and *pragmatically*.

Al-Bāqillānī's classification was based on cancellability, whereas al-Juwaynī considered the literality as the criterion of the classification. With regard to al-Ghazālī, the literality was also considered the criterion of his classification. Ibn al-Ḥājib was more pragmatic and broadened the conception of *what is said*. His base was the pragmatic one. Al-Rāzī was unique in his classification and considered inference as the base of the classification. He considered what is literally spelt out under one section and put all categories that are inferred under the entailment (*istilzām*), whether it is rational or linguistic.

This research revealed the deep, diverse and elaborated classifications according to the US.

We discovered the similarity between the modern pragmaticians and the US in adopting some terms such as the similarity between Bach and the US in the term completion and *iqtiḍāʾ*, impliciture and *al-manṭūq ghayr al-ṣarīḥ*. We also recognised the similarity between Recanati and ibn al-Ḥājib in the inclusion of the term *what is said*.

Theses classifications were based on the two levels of interpretation. We managed in this chapter to identify the number of implicatures in order to discuss them separately.

We further concluded that PJ discussed four types of implicatures, the congruent implicature, the counter implicature, the indication of text, and the analogical implicature, which is developed in this thesis.

The modern insights and arguments regarding the conception of implicature helped in categorising implicatures and finding out their properties. It also helped in discussing implicatures theoretically by discussing their properties and rooting them back to their principles.

With regard to the indication (*eamāʹ*) of the text, it has been discussed as a way of uncovering ratio. This implicature contribute to finding the ratio of a speech. We found out that this implicature is close to what is called by Grice the conventional implicature since the two implicatures are derived in the same way as we discussed.

Concerning the congruent implicature, we found that it is a non-cancellable implicature because it is derived from the convention and required in a specific composition and contextual. It has, therefore, a preference over *what is said* according to the US. All the previous conditions made this implicature non-cancellable. We drew attention to the mistake that some scholars made when they consider this implicature as a kind of cancellable implicatures. It is explained that they depended on imperfect information to allocate it among the cancellable implicatures despite the assertion by the US that it is not cancellable but rather some of the US think that the ruling is more appropriate to it than *what is said* as al-Bāqillānī alluded.

This implicature is derived from the first level of interpretation. The convention principle and the immediacy play essential roles in generating it.

Given the analogical implicature, it was explained that it is derived from the second level of interpretation, i.e. the level of causation. This implicature is pertained to the its ratio. It emerges with it and disappears when the ratio is disappeared.

The counter implicature, which is the most controversial one, was extensively discussed. This research could not cover all arguments around this implicature as it requires a particular work to be done. The primary issues that related to the purpose of this research were discussed. It is highly recommended to be discussed as a particular thesis, especially the mutual issues between it and what is called in modern pragmatics *scalar implicature*. The central point being discussed in counter implicature is the point of dispute. Pro-CI insist that counter implicature is a linguistic implicature and is obtained by the language's norms. On the other hand, Anti-CI refused this claim entirely. Some views accepted counter implicature if the qualification (*qayd*) was relevant and counted a ratio, and hence, counter implicature can be yielded if the ratio disappeared. This compromising solution was not accepted by Pro-CI, who claim that attributes are primarily brought for restriction despite playing other roles exceptionally. Anti-CI refused this claim and thought that attributes come for different purposes and supported their claim with evidence.

The evidence that contradicts the claim of considering counter implicature motivated Pro-CI to propose some stipulations where the qualifications are not brought to restrict and hence, counter implicature cannot be valid.

We concluded that this implicature is valid despite not reaching the level of explicit, which is not even claimed by Pro-CI groups. This implicature is considered on the level of manifest, which is cancellable. We concluded that because this implicature comes into the minds of language users by means of immediacy, which is one of the interpretation principles. We concluded that this implicature could be considered a particularising implicature due to the exceptions proposed by the Pro-CI group since we need to consider

the context in order to determine the role of attribute.

Considering counter implicature as linguistic, means that the principles of interpretation from level one will play the role of engendering it. This note is further related to the point of dispute.

I explained next, the ways that the principles of interpretation could generate counter implicature. The principle of predisposition, the convention and the immediacy play roles in counting counter implicature. The principle of convention works for counter implicatures that emerge in the minds under the domain of use or a particular convention. Immediacy will respond to the context to examine the validity of attributes.

I finally, presented the types of qualifications that generate the counter implicature according to the US, such as the restricted attribute, condition, designation, time limit (*mafhūm al-ghayh*) and stated numeral. We concluded that the properties of counter implicature are; cancelability, Reinforcability and the level of manifest.

The modern pragmatics helped me in framing the data and arguments theoretically, and they also guided me in finding out the properties of counter implicature and discuss them. These are the answers to the questions raised at the beginning of this thesis, and the hope was that this research could present work to formulate models in interpretations and frame the conceptions in PJ in a theoretical frame. I hope that this thesis could analyse the reasons behind the differences in PJ and ease the way for those whom are interested in PJ to make it accessible and fill in the gap in the Arabic library. I hope that this research could help in explaining the linguistic topic within the Islamic PJ to be able approached by the scholars in linguistics.

The addition to the Arabic and the pragmatic library is that this research is a work derived from an Islamic heritage and presented in a modern way. In this regard, we have presented an authentic Arab theory that is neither borrowed nor fabricated for the conformity of Western pragmatics. Hence, there is no doubt that an original Arabic theory of discourse

analysis will fit in better with the issues of the modern Arabic discourse analysis, since the proposed theory has been generated in the context of the Arabic culture and its language of use.

Limitations and Further Works

There were many issues I chose to avoid as they were beyond the scope of my research and I did not want to digress. However, it is highly recommended that scholars explore PJ and uncover the huge heritage of arguments and data related to modern theories in linguistics.

We have observed the similarity between counter implicature and scalar implicature. However, Counter implicature and scalar implicature deserved an independent research since there were many mutual issues between Islamic and modern perspectives.

The exceptions of counter implicature can be considered an independent research to invest in the issues of scalar implicature, since there were lots of arguments in generating implicatures in some examples.

During this research, we explored the relationship between immediacy and the conceptions of relevance. It is an invitation for scholars to address such an issue as well. Modern pragmatics supported the relevance theory by psychological arguments, and which can be invested in discovering the role of immediacy within Islamic pragmatics.

We have noted the similarity between Grice's term conventional implicature and the Islamic one *indication of the text*. We have learnt that the US presented many ways that indicate the reason for speech, and deserves a deeper study in comparison to the two perspectives in these similar terms.

The other issue benefitting from the principles of interpretation proposed in this work is to apply them in different types of texts. The outcome of PJ was applied for centuries on

the Islamic texts, and posed the question: why would we not apply these rules and principles of PJ in different texts? The sources of the US's principles are linguistic, and based on Arabic rules and conventions. Moreover, some of the Arab linguists invested PJ's outcomes in their studies, as seen in the introduction. We can, therefore, try to invest the principles and rules in analysing the different types of texts, since linguistics is universal, and not limited to a certain language.

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