

Interaction, Identity & Social Class

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Abstract

Social class is a longstanding locus of sociological inquiry. Prior research has investigated the phenomenon in an array of domains through a myriad of methodologies and theoretical perspectives. The heterogeneity that is posed by previous studies empirically and theoretically, however, is predicated upon a homogenous set of epistemological and ontological assumptions. This has resulted in a number of programmatic, enduring omissions. Most notably, research has neglected how social class is conceptualised and made relevant by members in forms of talk-in-interaction. Aligning with the commitments of Ethnomethodology (EM), and using Conversation Analysis (CA) and Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) specifically, this thesis addresses this lacuna. Data are composed of ordinary, naturalistic forms of talk-in-interaction conducted synchronously in the English language over the last half-century ($n=959$). The empirical contributions of this research concern the ontological affordances, formulative possibilities and praxiological functions of two families of interactional practices that occasion the relevance of classed identities recurrently – namely, “*membership categorisations*” and “*place references*”. Chapter 4 addresses the former, canvassing the agentic, ontological and intersubjective dimensions of linguistically classed membership categories. Chapter 5 introduces the latter as a resource used to actuate classed identities in a designedly referential and metonymic faculty. Chapter 6 then recovers the activity of “*accounting*” for which both practices are employed across action-types; specifically, “*assessments*”, “*complaints*” and “*teases*”. The central objective of this thesis thus concerns the “*respecification*” of social class as a “*members’ phenomenon*”; one that is made relevant within ordinary instances of talk-in-interaction through a stable set of interactional practices in order to accomplish a diverse range of practical tasks. The thesis concludes with a review of several candidate lines of analysis for future EM/(M)CA inquiry that are anticipated by the findings of this research uniquely.

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Dedication

For Rosie

Author's Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as references.

Iterations of several chapters have been presented for colleagues and students since 2016.

A version of Chapter 1 has been presented in two lectures at the Department of Sociology, University of York in the module “*Contemporary Research in Social Psychology*”.

Holmes, E. J. B. (2019a). Lecture: *Social Class & Social Interaction*. York: Department of Sociology, University of York, January 14th 2019.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is, broadly speaking, Ethnomethodological (EM) in orientation (e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1967). EM is a diverse intellectual enterprise centred on the practical methods, competencies and common-sense reasonings that are employed by individuals (*qua* “members”) as they (co-)operate in the social world and render their situated conduct intelligible (see Maynard and Clayman, 1991). Two derivative traditions of EM are “Conversation Analysis” (hereafter, CA; e.g. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974) and “Membership Categorisation Analysis” (hereafter, MCA; e.g. Hester and Eglin, 1997a). The remit of these traditions, and their tensions, are detailed subsequently in the thesis.¹ For current purpose, it will suffice to note, only, that EM, MCA and CA research (hereafter, EM/[M]CA) has focussed on a myriad of previously unanticipated dimensions of human sociality (see also, H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 340). *Inter alia*, this has included the analysis of “accountability” (e.g. Heritage, 1984a; J. Robinson, 2016), “categorizations” (e.g. Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]), “common-sense knowledge” (e.g. Wieder, 1974a), “lived-work” (e.g. Livingston, 1987: Ch. 15), “practical reasoning” (e.g. Pollner, 1987; Livingston, 2008), “typifications” (e.g. Sudnow, 1965), and even the “logic” (e.g. Coulter, 1991) and “structures” (e.g. Atkinson and Heritage, 1984a) of social action as they are exhibited within social interaction.

EM/(M)CA research, however, has not been occupied solely with “novel” areas of empirico-analytic inquiry. Investigations have also converged on a number of comparatively “orthodox” topics associated with classical sociological thought. Investigations of “bureaucracy” (e.g. Zimmerman, 1966), “economy” (e.g. Pinch and Clark, 1986), “identity” (e.g. Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998), “indexicality” (e.g. H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970), “jurisprudence” (e.g. Travers and Manzo, 1997), “polity” (e.g. Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986), “organizations” (e.g. Bittner, 1974 [1965]), “religiosity” (e.g. Drew, 1978), “social solidarity” (e.g. Clayman, 2002), and even

¹ For review, see §3.2.

“suicide” (e.g. Sacks, 1967; Atkinson, 1978), for example, illustrate this interface. As outlined subsequently, EM/(M)CA research differs in a number of respects to foregoing sociological studies (here, see §1.7). Focal for current purpose, only, however, is the availability of such domains for EM/(M)CA inquiry. It is this availability that furnishes the very basis for this thesis. Specifically, my research engages with another enduring locus of sociological theorising, one that has long awaited EM/(M)CA research; namely, *social class*. Ironically, this concept is considered an intellectual mainstay of the sociological discipline (see, e.g., Evans, 1992: 211), but has persistently avoided the gaze of EM/(M)CA research. This omission is stark – and weighs heavy upon the sociologist-*cum*-ethnomethodologist. It is my intention in this thesis, therefore, to take stock of this lacuna and to begin initial efforts at resolution.

1.2 Why social class?

At this point, some qualification is in order. There are, of course, a range of omissions, causalities and malnourished concepts in EM/(M)CA research, including other orphaned dimensions of social identity. Why, then, does “*social class*” warrant treatment here? And why now? ² Normatively, in EM/(M)CA, such a warrant is furnished endogenously. Instantiations of some phenomenon, for example, are identified within situated instances of talk-in-interaction and thereby form the operative basis by reference to which they can be discriminated, uniquely, for investigation. As the ensuing chapters attest (i.e. Chapters 4-6), such instances were identified within this research; however, they did not form its initial impetus. My rationale was, instead, comparatively *exogenous* in origin; in this case, precipitated by

² This line of inquiry is familiar to EM/(M)CA research; although not traditionally posed at this level of abstraction. Canonically, this refers to the ‘pervasively relevant’ (Sacks and Schegloff, 1973: 299), or ‘omni-relevant concern’ (Schegloff, 2007a: 28, fn. 1), regarding why some constitutive component of talk-in-interaction has been (co-)produced in/with that (com)position. This question, as Schegloff (1998a: 413-414) clarifies, can be posed at ‘various orders of granularity’. In the service of exposition, I direct this question not at some component of talk-in-interaction, however, but reflexively upon the research itself. This heuristic will prove explicative for contextualising my inquiry.

sustained engagement with sociological literature and motivated by the generative quality of the concept in/for the discipline.³

To outline the warrantable grounds for this inquiry, therefore, the remainder of this chapter will provide an abbreviated review of this literature. This review will serve a double-duty. Primarily, it will provide the backdrop against which social class qualifies as a conspicuous absence for EM/(M)CA research relative to the sheer of volume of sociological research conducted on the subject. Secondly, however, and more pertinently, it will canvass three homologies that interconnect dominant approaches to the study of social class within the Social Sciences. The first concerns the absence of research on the “lived-work” of classed incumbents, to borrow Livingston’s (1987: 94) term, in *everyday life*. The second concerns the enduring status of social class as an *analysts’ resource* in class-analysis. The third relates to admissibility of latent classed status and the non-requisite status of *participatory relevance*. In this chapter, these omissions are shown shared by three dominant approaches to class-analysis; namely, Marxian (§1.2.1), Weberian (§1.2.2) and Bourdieusian (§1.5) research. It is proposed, however, that these represent more generic assumptions of transdisciplinary forms of class-analysis. Variationist Sociolinguistics is outlined illustratively to this effect (§1.4). It is my proposal that these enduring lacunae are uniquely examinable through the lens of EM/(M)CA research – and that such an investigation is, to borrow Schegloff and Sacks’ (1973: 312, my emphasis; see also, Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977: 375) term, “ripe”.

³ My point of departure, in other words, is not with the analysis of a problem that is encountered by members within ‘talk-in-interaction’ (see Schegloff, 1999a: 408), and for whom this is made “demonstrably relevant” (see Schegloff, 1992a: 107-110; see also, Schegloff, 1984a: 36, 51; Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 472) through some course(s) of social action. The problem to which this thesis attends, instead, is one from the ‘sociologist’s standpoint’, as Sudnow (1967: 61, fn. 1) writes; namely, ‘problems [that] are not in the first instance known to be ‘problems’ that members occupy themselves with’ (Sacks, 1970: 9 in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 86; relatedly, see also, Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 290-291; Ryave and Schenkein, 1974: 267; Kitzinger, 2005a: 479-480).

To further qualify, these three approaches by no means exhaust the scope of class-analysis within the Social Sciences; nor do they represent its complete filiation, conceptual latitude, nor encompass the heterogeneous areas of research that it has since occasioned. The magnitude of such a genealogy clearly transcends the scope of this review and cannot be borne out here. I note only that social class has extensive etymology that precedes its assimilation into the Social Sciences,⁴ and the concept has since been progressively (re-)defined in a myriad of ways, under the auspices of diverse theoretical perspectives, rubrics and cosmologies (e.g. Giddens, 1973; Giddens and Held, 1982). Accordingly, in the survey that follows, my remit is confined to what are deemed, consensually, to be three of the cornerstones of sociological class-analysis (here, see E. O. Wright, 2005; Crompton, 2008). In the service of exposition, these traditions are first outlined individually and then synthesised conceptually. My central objective is thus to make available the rationale that governed this inquiry; one that intersects with both EM/(M)CA and sociological research. The chapter then concludes by adumbrating the contributions of this thesis and by précising each of the ensuing chapters (§1.7.2).

1.2.1 Marx

The work of Karl Marx (e.g. 1961 [1887]; 1962 [1894]) occupies a central position in the history of class-analysis (e.g. Edgell, 1993: 2). A key contribution of Marx's work was the articulation of a materialist theory of historical development (Cohen, 1978: Ch. I); one that accorded an agentic, antagonistic and emancipatory function to social classes, and to the working class, in particular (e.g. Marx and Engels, 2012 [1948]:

⁴ As Gobo (1993: 470) observes, the term instead antedates the emergence of the Social Sciences. Derivations can be traced to Ancient Rome (e.g. Gobo, 1993: 470-471; 1995: 445; see also, Edgell, 1993: 1), for example, and to uses within the Natural Sciences (see Gobo, 1993: 475-478). Social class was only integrated into the English language in the eighteenth century (see Rose, 1960: 197, Table 2). It was then in the following century that it was inherited by the primogenitors of the Social Sciences (see Ossowski, 1963: 122-125; Gobo, 1993: 480); a lineage that has since been recast by the nomination of diverse luminaries (e.g. Aristotle, 1967 [1943]; Transon, 1830: 49 in Gruner, 1968: 467; Lenin, 1947 [1914]: 492 in Wright, 1979: 16; Hegel, 1952 in Szacki, 1979: 139-140; Saint-Simon, 1965 in Giddens, 1973: 23-24).

e.g. 79). For Marx, one's classed position is determined by one's relationship to the "*means of production*"; the ways in which commodities are produced. In a capitalist economic system (e.g. Marx and Engels, 2012 [1848]: 74-84), the prevailing Western "*mode of production*", these classes are, fundamentally, the "*proletariat*" (i.e. "working class") and the "*bourgeoisie*" (i.e. "ruling class"). Members of the former are relevantly defined by their non-ownership of the means of production. These persons are, instead, impelled to sell their "*labour power*" (see Marx, 1961 [1887]: 167) to the latter, who, *inter alia*, alienate, dominate, estrange, exploit, oppress and subjugate the former through the extrication of "*surplus-value*" (see Marx, 1961 [1887]: 186-198); 'absolute', or 'relative' (ibid.: 315; see ibid.: Ch. XVI). It is only when the proletariat gains communal awareness of these exploitative conditions (i.e. "*a class for itself*") – and, commensurately, awakening from their "*false consciousness*", in the Gramscian sense (see, e.g., Eyerman, 1981: 45-46) – that an opportunity for socio-political change is secured (e.g. Marx and Engels, 2012 [1848]: e.g. 79, 82; Bendix and Lipset, 1967 [1953]: 8). Social classes, for Marx, in this way occupy an axial position in historical evolution. The working class, in particular, are distinguished as the fulcrum for the transition of socio-structural epochs and are organised principally vis-à-vis the means of production.

This model of social classes has been held as paramount in the Social Sciences, inspiring a number of differently centred neo-Marxian approaches (for review, see Eyerman, 1981). In terms of a coherent programme of empirical research, what has been recognised, conventionally, as of the most systematic developments of the Marxian project has been realised by E. O. Wright (e.g. 2005b: 19, italics in original) in his pioneering research on "*class structure*". One of the foremost achievements of this inquiry has been the development of models whereby the distributions and relations of social classes can be reconnoitred in the aggregate. Central to this project has been the concept of "*exploitation*" (see E. O. Wright, 1979: 14-17; 2005b: 23). Classically, as E. O. Wright (2002: 844-845) observes, this refers to the consequences of the inequitable distribution of resources between social classes as they are brought to bear in labour. Empirically, this concept forms the lynchpin of E. O. Wright's (e.g. 1997: Ch. 1) analysis. Operationalisation is achieved, in this case, by stratifying individuals according to their possession of different species of resource as gleaned through large-scale survey research. Specifically, these resources refer to 'labour-

power assets (feudal exploitation), capital assets (capitalist exploitation), organization assets (statist exploitation) and skill or credential assets (socialist exploitation)' (Crompton, 2008: 58). The positions that individuals occupy in relation to these resources are circumscribed, for E. O. Wright (1989: 277 in Crompton, 2008: 57), crucially, by their employment status, and by their "jobs", specifically. These differentials constitute bases for modalities of exploitation and, by proxy, for the discernment of class structures.

1.2.2 Weber

For Weber (e.g. 1978a; 1978b), classes are neither accorded comparable historical momentum, nor analytic primacy, as that which is proposed within the classical Marxian thesis. *Prima facie*, for instance, the concept simply does not feature with equitable frequency within the Weberian oeuvre (see Breen, 2005: 34). As Gane (2005: 212) notes, excurses appear save twice within Weber's (1978a; 1978b) "*Economy and Society*"; a work dedicated to a diverse array of subject matter (see, e.g., Schegloff, 2001: 287), but underpinned by an abiding focus on the social organisation of "*domination*" (for review, see Roth, 1978: lxxxviii-c). Thus, while other Weberian analyses have been discriminated – such as those concerning '*rationalization*' (e.g. E. O. Wright, 2002: 835, italics in original) – it is Weber's (1978a; 1978b) position, in "*Economy and Society*", that is framed, typically, as indicative of the wider Weberian perspective. In this case, it is in a section that concerns different species of power in which Weber (i.e. 1978b) addresses class occupancies directly.

Here, Weber (1978b: 927) introduces the notion of 'class situations'. In a vein comparable to Marx, this situation is organised, for Weber (1978b), with respect to individuals' economic positions (see Gerth and C. W. Mills, 1974: 69), and, specifically, according to the 'life-chances' (Gane, 2005: 216) that are differentially potentiated thereby. Crucially, this position is one stratified by the nature of an individual's relationship with the market (see Giddens, 1973: 43); otherwise referred to as their 'market situation' (e.g. Weber, 1978b: 928). Broadly speaking, positions along this axis are divided into two classes; namely, the 'propertied and the non-propertied' (see Gerth and C. W. Mills, 1974: 69; see also, E. O. Wright, 2002: 839; Gane, 2005: 216). However, as Weber (1978b: 928) specifies, these classes can be

bifurcated further according to the types of property acquired. This includes those 'usable for returns' and to 'the kind of services that can be offered in the market' (ibid.). Classes, for Weber (1978b), are, therefore, organised principally by the different relationships between individuals and the market, and by the structural consequences thereof. As Weber (1978b: 928) writes: 'Class situation is, in this sense, ultimately market situation.'

Akin to Marx, Weber's (e.g. 1978b) position has achieved an enduring legacy in sociological analyses of class-structure (see Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001: 25). Perhaps the most notable tradition that has sustained this approach has been attributed to John Goldthorpe and colleagues (e.g. Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and C. Payne, 1987). Programmatically, Goldthorpe (et al.) preserve Weber's (1978b) focus on individuals' market positions by operationalising the concepts of "work situation" and "market situation"; concepts derived proximately from Lockwood's (1958: n.p.g. [EJBH: e.g. 15-16] in Edgell, 1993: 28) study of the class-consciousness of clerical workers within Britain. Empirically, Goldthorpe (et al.) service this framework to organise occupations into social classes (see Crompton, 2008: 61, 158, fn. 4), culminating in the construction of numerous class schema (e.g. Goldthorpe and Llewellyn, 1977: 259-260; Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, 1979: 419-421; Goldthorpe, 2000: 209; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 35-47). Crucially, as Goldthorpe (2000: 207) has summarised, this has crystallised around a distinction between 'employers, the self-employed, and employees'. Thus, it is the primacy of '*employment relations*' (Goldthorpe, 2000: 206, italics in original) that has genealogised the schema of Goldthorpe (et al.) as an extension of the Weberian perspective. Hence, while proponents disavow any intended inheritance of the Weberian mantle (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 37; see also, Breen, 2005: 42, fn. 5; Savage, Warde and Devine, 2005: 32), continuities remain identifiable.

1.3 Synthesis

The conceptualisations of social class offered by Marx and Weber constitute what have been referred to as the 'towering contributions' (Edgell, 1993: 2) of class-analysis and, while both were left unfinished (here, see Giddens, 1973: 28; Gane, 2005: 212, respectively), have given way to a range of contemporary approaches. A review of the similarities and differences between these traditions, and their

subsequent permutations, transcends the limits of space. Moreover, as others have noted, distinctions between Marx and Weber constitute a ‘central motif’ (see E. O. Wright, 1996: 694; 1997: 29) around which extensive exegeses have since crystallised; namely, the so-called ‘Marx–Weber literature’ (Gane, 2005: 225, fn. 9; see, e.g., Giddens, 1973: Ch. 1-2; E. O. Wright, 2002).⁵ Three homologies that obtain between these two approaches, however, have considerable import for the present inquiry and warrant special attention here. The first refers to the procedure that is employed to adjudicate classed positions, and the resulting elision of *everyday life* from their purview. The second pertains to the jurisdiction under which the concept resides; specifically, as an *analysts’ resource*. Finally, the third relates to the shared criterion by reference to which classed identities are ascribed, and to the non-criterial status of *participatory relevance*. The three subsections that follow outline each of these parallels in turn.

1.3.1 Everyday life

The (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches above align in their joint recognition of classed “*dynamics*”. This component is incorporated both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, the approaches are both predicated on the status of classed incumbents relative to one-another (here, see E. O. Wright, 2002: 839). They have been identified as ‘relational’ (e.g. Crompton, 1995: 60) class schema to this effect. For the (neo-)Marxian approach, for example, the identification of social classes is based upon the exploitative relations between these groups. The (neo-)Weberian model, on the other hand, is organised around the different positions that individuals occupy vis-à-vis the market. The nature of these dynamics, therefore, differs, substantively; however, they cohere in their relational design. This opposes comparatively descriptive, “*gradational*” schema (here, see Ossowski, 1963: Ch. 3), such as increments of ‘income’ or ‘prestige’ (Crompton, 2008: 57), which do not recognise these components. The two approaches thus align conceptually insofar as both appreciate the interactions that occur between social classes. This parallel has been reflected in the areas addressed in empirical research. It can be qualified,

⁵ For an authoritative review, see, e.g., E. O. Wright (1997: 29, fn. 33).

however, that the sensitivity of this research, to interactional dynamics, has been restricted by the empirical purview of the two approaches.

The research in this tradition has been conducted at what has been referred to by Grusky and Weeden (2001: 206) as ‘a highly aggregate level of analysis’. It will be recalled that the schemata advanced by E. O. Wright (e.g. 1997) and Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (e.g. 1979), for example, were designed in the service of reconnoitring the class arrangements of various populations. E. O. Wright’s (e.g. 1997) scheme, for example, has enjoyed a cross-continental use, and derivations of Erikson et al. (1979) have been applied to countries across Europe (see Connelly, Gayle and Lambert, 2016: 4-5). This level of empirical “granularity” – to borrow the term (e.g. Schegloff, 2000a) – is, of course, coherent with analytic intent. The objective of researchers was, again, to canvass societal class-structures. It is notable only, that this analysis has constrained the investigation of classed dynamics, accordingly. Specifically, this has been limited to examples operative at this purportedly “macro” level (here, see fn. 89), or incorporated components which permit translation at this level. Examples of the former, for instance, include examinations of “social mobility” (e.g. Erikson et al., 1979; E. O. Wright, 1997, Ch. 6) and “class struggle” (e.g. E. O. Wright, 1979: 22; 1997: 382). Conversely, in the latter, the “lived-work” of classed occupants is assimilated through idealised, mathematicised models of proposedly “rational” conduct. The application of “Game Theory” (e.g. E. O. Wright, 2000: 969-976) and ‘deductive’ (e.g. Savage, 2000: 42, fn. 7) forms of “Rational Action Theory” (e.g. Goldthorpe, 2000: 164-167), for example, typify this enterprise (see Savage et al., 2005).⁶

The “lived-work” of social classes is thus accommodated both conceptually and empirically within the two traditions. Research has been confined, however, to the aggregate level, only, and what has not formed an empirical focus is the work of classed incumbents amidst their everyday lives. Again, this restriction has been

⁶ Concerns with how these calculi have been integrated into neo-Marxian and neo-Weberian research have been canvassed by Lebowitz (1988: 193-198) and Savage (2000: 85-88), respectively. More broadly, see Savage et al. (2005: 34-39). Relatedly, see Goffman (1969: e.g. 119, 132-136; 1972 [1961a]: 35), Schegloff (1992b: xlv-xlvi) and Clayman (2002: 249).

reflected by the purview of the two approaches. This treatment, however, is not necessarily an artefact of their operationalisation. Fundamentally, it represents an ontological entailment. In both traditions, after all, it is assumed that the class-structures of societies can be described through the use of particular criteria. The fulfilment of this objective thus rests upon the assumption of stability; namely, that the classed-structures of a population can be described and are, in some respects, durable. The recognition of classed dynamics remains limited, therefore, as the populations that are proposedly described are cast as stable incumbents upon their description (see E. O. Wright, 1997: 45-46; Wacquant, 2013: 275). This has implications for the nature of classed incumbencies. Specifically, they are treated, accordingly, as a veritable ‘*threshold*’ phenomenon, to borrow the term (see, e.g., Schegloff, 1991: 62; 1992a: 127; my emphasis). They are positioned, as such, as statuses that can be accorded upon the fulfilment of conditions/criteria that are specified by researchers and are stabilised as a result. The first notable parallel between these two traditions, therefore, is their joint appreciation of the relational design of social classes. However, the appreciation of this dynamism has been constrained by the empirical purview and the ontological assumptions of the two approaches.

1.3.2 Analysts’ resource

The second focal parallel relates to the conceptualisations of social class within the two traditions. To qualify, this homology is neither intendedly substantive nor thematic. Both the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches, of course, align broadly in terms of their “economic” foci (see Gerth and C. W. Mills, 1974: 69), however they diverge in their specifics (see, e.g., E. O. Wright, 2002: 844-845). Notable, here, instead, is simply the status of the concept within the two traditions, and the equivalent bases by reference to which the concept comes to be mobilised and treated as ascribable. The crucial similarity here relates to the shared underlying assumptions of class-analysis. In both cases, social class is treated as concept for which analysts are entitled to define the criteria that relevantly circumscribe their derivative instantiations, and are entitled to nominate, and even to prioritise the concept in their research. The concept is conceived jointly, in so doing, as an “*analysts’ resource*” (here, see Speier, 1973: 184-185; Smith, 1974: 42-43; W. Sharrock and Coleman, 1999: 20-28). Of course, within both traditions, uses of the

concept are not necessarily contingent wholly upon the volition of analysts. Applications are instead presumably regulated by their own internal constraints (relatedly, see Sacks, 1984a: 25; Schegloff, 1991: 50; Coulter, 1995a: 168-169). The matter of the alignment and/or coherence of contemporary innovations (e.g. neo-Marxian) with their comparatively classical harbingers (e.g. Marx), for example, presumably instructs applications of the concept. This notwithstanding, however, the concept of social class remains one for which analysts are treated as legitimately positioned to discriminate and privilege. This is an entitlement that obtains irrespective of differences in substantive theorisations.

1.3.3 Participatory relevance

The third notable parallel concerns the criteria by reference to which ascriptions of classed incumbencies are predicated. Crucial here is the status of classed-awareness – or *class-consciousness* – as immaterial. Both traditions are uniform, in this respect. The classed positions which persons proposedly occupy need not necessarily be relevant for these populations, and such an awareness does not form a condition on the basis of which the adjudication of classed statuses is contingent (see Grusky and Weeden, 2001: 206). This position is shared by exponents of both the classical Marxian and Weberian positions, canvassed above, and has been inherited by contemporary developments. Central to the Marxian thesis, for example, is the position that individuals only become cognisant of their classed position (and, with it, galvanised) upon the fulfilment of certain socio-structural conditions (Bendix and Lipset, 1967 [1953]: 8). While they only emerge as social classes, proper, when cognisant of such positions (see, *ibid.*: 10-11), they remain identifiable, for Marx, regardless (see Giddens, 1973: 29-30). Comparatively, for Weber (e.g. 1978b), it is this very basis that separates occupancy in social classes from memberships within “communities” (see E. O. Wright, 2002: 834); the former is distinguished from the latter inasmuch as it does not share a relevantly social basis (for review, see Gane, 2005: 216).

Participants’ reflexive awareness of their classed positions is thus treated in both traditions as unnecessary. It is not a condition for which fulfilment permits the ascription of classed incumbencies by analysts. The device functions, instead, an ascriptive resource that is mobilised by analysts, on the behalf of their participants,

and for which the relevance of ascribed statuses is inessential. Their demonstrable awareness of such incumbencies has therefore been elided, overwhelmingly, in the two approaches. Consideration has been given only to specific strata – canonically, the *working class* (here, see Devine and Savage, 2005: 4-5) – or have incorporated classed-awareness not as a requirement for issuing classed ascriptions, but as an outcome thereof. The ‘Structure-Consciousness-Action (S-C-A) model’ (see Lockwood, 1982; 1996 in Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, 2001: 877; see also, Pahl, 1989: n.p.g. in Savage, 2000: 26) typifies this approach, locating such a situational, intersubjective awareness not as criterial for classed ascriptions, but as precipitative of relevantly classed conduct.

1.3.4 Summary

Social class represents a perennial focus of sociological inquiry. The origins of this research are located consensually in Marx and Weber (cf. fn. 4). As outlined above, the contributions of these theorists are considerable and exceed the scope of the present review. Across this section, I have highlighted that two components remain missing from contemporary developments of these traditions. These concern the habitual, “lived-work” of classed incumbents and the recognition of their status, as such. To reiterate, these dimensions have not been presented as empirico-theoretical deficiencies, nor as reductions. They have been distinguished as programmatic omissions, only; absences within their classical formulations and which have been perdured by contemporary research. In §1.5, below, I introduce one additional approach that has partially redressed the former omission. This tradition has been referred to as the ‘cultural turn’ of class-analysis (here, see Chaney, 1994: n.p.g. in Devine and Savage, 2005 [2004]: 1) – or, eponymously, the “Bourdiesian turn” (Parker, Uprichard and Burrows, 2007: 905).⁷ Before this, however, it is first worth clarifying the status of the omissions introduced above. Specifically, these

⁷ This is not the only approach that has attempted to reconcile this deficit. Others include the lesser purveyed models of class-analysis that are associated with the neo-Durkheimian approach of David Grusky and colleagues (see Grusky and Galescu, 2005: e.g. 59), for example. For brevity, however, and provided the prevalence of the Bourdiesian paradigm, and its occasional integration with EM/(M)CA (e.g. §2.4.1; §2.5.2; see Flynn, 1991: 48-49, 243, 246), I detail this approach only.

homologies, as set forth here, have been derived from Marx and Weber, two of the foremost theorists of social class. In the next section, however, I show that these omissions are not limited to these approaches, nor bound to the Social Sciences. Instead, I propose that these are generic, transdisciplinary assumptions of class-analysis. Investigations of the concept in sociolinguistics offers one illustrative example of this conceptual congruence.

1.4 Variationist Sociolinguistics

Like sociology, the influence of social class in linguistics is widely felt and can be identified across several of its central domains of empirical inquiry. This includes “bi/multilingualism” and “second language acquisition/learning” (e.g. Block, 2014: Ch. 4 and Ch. 5, respectively). A discussion of social class and linguistics should, accordingly, situate it against this backdrop as a whole. As such a cohesive review would, however, transcend the limits of space, I confine my remit to a single subdomain; namely, “Variationist Sociolinguistics” (hereafter, VS). This area of inquiry, as detailed below, has not been discriminated as one that is, necessarily, representative of linguistics – nor, equally, as reflective of the discipline’s wider relationship with social class. Its perspicuity for the present discussion is furnished purely by virtue of the predominance of social class in this tradition (here, see Rampton, 2010: 4).⁸ Accordingly, it is on this basis, and for economy, that I restrict my discussion of social class in sociolinguistics to VS, alone.

The focus of VS concerns variations in linguistic conduct according to their stratification by ‘extra-linguistic factors’ (e.g. Kerswill and Williams, 2000: 93), or ‘social correlates’ (e.g. Llamas, Mullany and Stockwell, 2007: xvii). Procedurally, research involves the recruitment of participants who can be stratified according to particular sociodemographic criteria. Social class represents a modal aspect of social identity in this tradition. Broadly, the device has been organised by using what Labov (1990: 220; my emphasis) has referred to as ‘*objective indicators*’, such as ‘education,

⁸ The omission of Basil Bernstein’s (e.g. 1971; 1973; 1975) research, concerning the distributions of “restricted” and “elaborated” codes, is a regrettable shortcoming of this restriction. For review, see §7.4.2.

occupation, or income’ or, alternatively, by ‘*subjective measures*’ – such as ‘status’, for instance.⁹ These specifications are operationalised variously. As Snell (2014: 1-2) has observed, for instance, single indexes – such as ‘occupation’ (e.g. Horvath, 1985 in Ash, 2002: 411) – in addition to composite measurements (e.g. Trudgill, 1972: 181), are both customary in this tradition; the latter of which has been celebrated for the consistency of the findings it has uncovered (e.g. Dodsworth, 2009: 1316).

This research may proceed deductively or inductively. A definition of social class may, for example, be selected into which participants are distributed. Alternatively, strata may be deduced from within the data itself. These logics notwithstanding, VS research involves the collection of participants’ linguistic conduct. The ‘Labovian sociolinguistic interview’ (Johnstone, 2006: 47) is a classical elicitation method used in this tradition. Variations are then sought – or are sought to be “*falsified*”¹⁰ – between participants’ recorded conduct and aspects of their socio-demographic attributes. Thus, social class is employed as a potentially explanatory resource; one mobilised in the service of explaining intergroup discrepancies or consistencies as it pertains to some dimension(s) of conduct. Examples of this research has connected social class with a battery of linguistic practices, chiefly ‘phonological’ (see Cheshire, 2005: 480). Specifically, analyses of the relative (in) frequencies of conduct across classed schema (e.g. Macaulay, 2002: e.g. 400-403; Kerswill and Williams, 2005: 1041 in Kerswill, 2007: 57; Moore, 2010: 362-364; Kirkham, 2015: 631-633) are recurrent in this tradition. One study that is illustrative of this approach is Labov’s (2006 [1966]) study of variation in the Lower East Side of New York City.

Using an existing (composite) measure of social class (see Michael, 1962 in Ash, 2002: 406-407), Labov (2006 [1966]: 134) distinguished social classes, broadly, according to their ‘occupation, education, and income’. Three main groups were identified through this approach: ‘*lower class*’, ‘*working class*’ and ‘*middle class*’ (ibid.: 139, italics in original). Variations were then observed between the circumscribed groups with respect to their production of several productional features.

⁹ See Dodsworth (2009) and Labov (2006 [1966]: 132-141), e.g., for comprehensive reviews.

¹⁰ Popper’s (2013 [1959]: 411, italics in original) term.

The variables studied included: (*r*), in ‘final and pre-consonantal’ position (ibid.: 33; e.g. ‘*bore* or *bored*’ [ibid.: 33, italics in original]); (*æh*) ‘[t]he height of the vowel in *bad, bag, ask, pass, cash, dance*’ (ibid.: 33, italics in original); (*oh*) ‘the mid-back rounded vowel heard in *caught, talk, awed, dog, off, lost, all*’ (ibid.: 35); and (*th* and *dh*) ‘the initial consonants of *thing* and *then*’ (ibid.: 36, italics in original). A curvilinear relationship, for example, was identified with the variable (*oh*), where higher vowel use was found associated with the working class, and lower use by the lower and higher groups (e.g. ibid.: 142).

Whilst unique in scope, Labov’s (2006 [1966]) study typifies the procedure of VS research. To summarise, the focus of VS concerns the differential distribution of linguistic conduct across groups. Several components of this approach warrant independent discussion. The bifurcation of language and identity, for example, as distinctive ontological domains, is relevant provided the EM/(M)CA perspective of this thesis (here, see R. Watson, 1992a: 6; 1992b: 259; see also, Drew and Heritage, 1992: 7); specifically, insofar as it represents a contrastive approach (see §2.2.1; §3.3.1). What is noticeable here, however, is simply the isomorphic status of social class in VS relative to the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches, above. Focal, in particular, are their convergent perspectives on the “lived-work” of classed incumbents (§1.3.1) and participatory relevance (§1.3.3).

For review, social class is treated, once more, as an *analyst’s resource*, where the parameters of the concept are determined, normatively, by researchers.¹¹ Again, it is by satisfying the criteria privileged by analysts, on some occasions, that co-participants come to be treated as legitimately assignable into classed groups. The concept is therefore operationalised as an aspect of identity that can be fulfilled by

¹¹ This obtains even for approaches in which the habitual, processual and active dimensions of social class are emphasised (e.g. Dodsworth, 2009: 1320-1321). Participants, here, are nevertheless classed according to some criterion – or are assigned, by proxy, into some “community of practice” (here, see Mullany, 2007: 87-89) – that has been stipulated by analysts. How social class is defined, therefore, is retained as a matter of analysts’ determination, and the ascriptions that are eventuated, accordingly, are reified as static incumbencies.

reaching or exceeding some “threshold”. The nature of such thresholds varies substantively. They remain homogenous, however, insofar as participants’ classed-awareness are treated as non-criterial for their ascription. It remains equivocal, therefore, whether the classed positions that are accorded to participants are necessarily salient or meaningful, uniquely, for those participants when it comes to the (non-)production of the linguistic practices with which they are (dis-)connected (see Schegloff, 1993: 124, fn. 26). Indeed, even in the limiting case in which participants’ perceptions regarding the focal conduct is solicited, the nature of this relevance remains qualified both in terms of their relative analytic import and empirical parity.

In the former, participatory recognition appears to occupy a depreciated explanatory status in the tradition. The proposition of classed relevance in this way remains, fundamentally, an analytic decision, one ascribed with or without participatory avowals. Such recognition, therefore, is not necessarily treated to be criterial for classed incumbencies. Furthermore, empirically, the nature of this relevance is one that is displaced from the linguistic practices with which it is proposedly associated. Participants, in other words, need not explicate the relevance of social class for themselves when the conduct in focus is produced. The adjudication of this (ir)relevance is, instead, offset temporally (and, thus, sequentially) from the focal conduct, and is eventuated in different interactional milieux. When researching changes in practices, for example, that ‘operate within public consciousness’ (Dodsworth, 2011: 195), participants’ recognition, thereof, are not investigated endogenously, when (co-)produced, but gauged retroactively, such as through self-report methods. The classed relevance of practices are thus evaluated in an interactional environment (e.g. “interviews”) in which different (i.e. exotic) interactional relevancies are at stake (see, e.g., Heritage, 1984: 135-[1]78 in Drew, 1989: 113, fn. 3; Schegloff, 1998b: 252, fn. 18).

The two homologies educed from within the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches, introduced above, therefore, stand also in the different disciplinary context of VS research. The significant contributions of this body of research thus provides equally for a number of glaring omissions. The most significant, here, concern the matters of *how* and *where* “social class” is made *relevant* by and for

participants in the course of their habitual conduct in their everyday life. The most notable contribution to this line of inquiry has been conducted under the auspices of the ‘cultural turn’ (e.g. Chaney, 1994 in Devine and Savage, 2005 [2004]: 1).

1.5 The Cultural Turn

The pivotal dimension of this approach is the conceptualisation of classed identities as an ongoing, active accomplishment. Classed identities, in this tradition, are no longer conceived as passive, static attributes; instead, they have a revised status as processual and dynamic identities. This ontological disjuncture has reverberated substantively. The field of employment, for example, no longer represents the operative context upon which classed identities are uniquely relevant. Instead, as Johnson and Lawler (2005: §1.2) write, research has begun to uncover ‘the ways in which we are constituted as classed subjects long before we enter the workplace’ (see also, Crompton, 1995: 6). The cultural turn has in this way ushered in a new “*ecological niche*”¹² of and for class-analysis; specifically, *everyday life*. This is a field of study in its own right, for which numerous analyses have been posed by diverse theoretical and epistemic communities (see Lawler, 2017).¹³ The integration of this domain of inquiry within class-analysis, however, and in the “cultural turn” specifically, has been precipitated, to a considerable extent, by the increasing transition towards the scholarship of one theorist in particular; namely, Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. 1984 [1979]; 2006 [1986]; 1987; 1989).

1.5.1 Bourdieu

For Bourdieu (e.g. 1984 [1979]; 2011 [1986]; 1987; 1989), social classes are understood to represent positions in “social space”. In a similar vein to the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian traditions, the position that one occupies within this space is determined, to some extent, by virtue of one’s economic position within a mode of production. It is not this dimension in isolation, however, that dictates this position; nor is this determinant granted the same degree of analytic primacy as that

¹² Schegloff’s (e.g. 1997a: 455; 1998c: 535; 2006a) term.

¹³ For theorists relevant to the EM/(M)CA position, see, e.g., H. Garfinkel (e.g. 1967), Goffman (e.g. 1959; 1963; 1967; 1983 [1982]; cf. §2.3.1) and Sacks (e.g. 1992), *inter alia*.

which is endowed by both the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian perspectives (see Savage et al., 2005: 39-42). Bourdieu (e.g. 1984 [1979]; 2011 [1986]; 1989), instead, relaxes this focus, offering what has been described as a comparatively ‘multi-dimensional’ (Savage et al., 2013: 223) and agentic (see Savage et al., 2005: 39) conceptualisation. Here, individuals’ positions, vis-à-vis “production”, remain significant for determining classed statuses; however, this is also informed by their quotidian forms of “consumption” (see Burrows and Gane, 2006: 806; see also, Brubaker, 1985: 761 in Crompton, 2008: 100); a novel arena for class-analysis.

The positions occupied by individuals in this space are governed by their possession of different species of “capital” (see Bourdieu, 2011 [1986]). This includes both ‘generic’ forms of “economic”, “social”, “cultural”, “political” and “symbolic” capital, amongst other ‘field-specific’ modalities (Savage et al., 2005: 40). The distribution of these capitals, across populations, constitutes the structured space of different “fields” (ibid.: 42). Social classes are derived through the ‘volume’, ‘structure’ and ‘the relative weight’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 17) that are awarded to dimensions of capital across different fields. Social classes, for Bourdieu (e.g. 1984 [1979]; 2011 [1986]; 1987; 1989), are not then theorised merely as reflections of persons’ economic circumstance. Instead, it is through their habitual practices of cultural consumption that classed statuses come to be indexed and affirmed.¹⁴ This position is epitomised, most notably, in Bourdieu’s (1984 [1979]) “*Distinction*”; an investigation of the relationship between judgements of taste and social classes in 1960s France. Bourdieu (1984 [1979]: Ch. 1) not only investigates the consumption of canonical modalities of culture – such as perceptions of art (ibid.: 5) – but also comparatively prosaic activities, including ‘clothing, furniture and cookery’ (ibid.: 13).

Contemporary Bourdieusian research continues to uphold the primacy awarded to everyday life and connections have since been established with various aspects of consumption (e.g. Bennett, Savage, Silva, Warde, Gayo-Cal and Wright, 2009).

¹⁴ These classes, as Bourdieu (1987; 1989: 17-18) qualifies, however, are classes only on paper; they are not necessarily “real” groups”.

Again, this has addressed “archetypal” forms of culture – such as artistic aesthetics (e.g. *ibid.*: Ch. 7) – but it has also incorporated comparatively “mundane” activities; such as tastes in reading (e.g. *ibid.*: Ch. 6) and other forms of media consumption (e.g. *ibid.*: Ch. 8). The status of “everyday life” is therefore elevated within the Bourdieusian tradition; it is positioned as integral to the formation of classed incumbencies. As detailed below, this research has been predominantly quantitative in appreciation, paralleling the sociological and sociolinguistic approaches introduced above. This has been complemented, however, and further specified, through qualitative forms of class-analysis. Feminist Class-Analysis, in particular, has progressed this line of inquiry most notably (e.g. Adkins and Skeggs, 2004).

1.5.2 Feminist Class-Analysis

As a microcosm of class-analysis (see Crompton, 1995), Bourdieusian (e.g. 1984 [1979]; 2011 [1986]; 1987; 1989) forms of class-analysis have classically eschewed engagement with feminist social theory (see Skeggs, 2004: 19-20). Since at least the 1990s, however, a successful synthesis of the two traditions has been realised, culminating in a distinctive programme of Feminist Class-Analysis. Central to this interface has been the Bourdieusian (e.g. 2011 [1986]) model of “*capitals*”. In Feminist Class-Analysis, this schema is enlisted metaphorically (here, see Skeggs, 1997a; 1997b: 10; 161; 2004: 16; 48) in order to analyse the affective, habitual and experiential aspects of classed-belonging.¹⁵ This is in diametric opposition to alternative operationalisations in which the schema is used mathematically (see Walkerdine et al., 2001: 39) – that is, as a(nother) form of ‘political arithmetic’ (Skeggs, 2004: 20, 43, 62) class-analysis – in which it is employed to allocate individuals into social classes. Conversely, in Feminist Class-Analysis, the schema has been used to describe how classed identities are (re-)produced in everyday life (e.g. Skeggs, 2004: 3, 5, 100-101, 108, 117-118) and, specifically, how classed identities are forged *relationally*, through so doing.¹⁶ Skeggs (1997b) offers an

¹⁵ On “*metaphor*”, as a Formal Analytic resource, see §2.3.1.

¹⁶ This conceptualisation shares a number of similarities with the emerging “Critical Social Psychology of Class” (see K. Day, Rickett and Woolhouse, 2017: 475-480; see also, Holmes, 2019a).

illustrative example of this approach in her ethnography conducted with a group of working class, white women.

In this research, Skeggs (1997b) demonstrates how the classed identities of her participants came to be constituted through the details of their relational, quotidian practices. Skeggs (1997b: Ch. 5) observes, for example, that participants enacted a number of habitual practices to “dis-identify” with working class values, and so insulate themselves from negative judgements. Practices included, for instance, making ‘investments in their bodies, clothes, consumption practices, leisure pursuits and homes’ (Skeggs, 1997b: 95). The social class positions of Skeggs’ (1997b) participants were, in this way, enacted through the constitutive features of their different lifestyles. Further still, these identities were constituted *relationally*; constructed with respect to what they omit or negate. This habitual, relational perspective of class-formation is a key contribution of Feminist Class-Analysis, and has been furthered in subsequent research. Lawler (2005: 431), for example, has argued that the construction of middle class identities can be furnished through articulations of ‘disgust’ vis-à-vis working class values (see also, Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989: 30; Lawler, 1999: 14; Tyler, 2008: 19-20).

Feminist Class-Analysis, as conducted within the Bourdieusian idiom, has thus functioned to further respecify the active conceptualisation of social class promoted in the Bourdieusian oeuvre (Holmes, 2019a; 2019b). In summary, social class is positioned, here, as an aspect of social identity that is (re-)constructed actively and relationally in everyday life (see Crompton, 2008: 100; Tyler, 2015: 500). In contrast to the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches outlined above, the Bourdieusian position does not elide the “lived-work” of social class(es); nor is it treated simply as addendum through the mediatory lens of “Game Theory” and/or “Rational Action Theory” (see Skeggs, 2004: 43, 67). This comparatively agentic conceptualisation of social class instead forms a locus for sociological inquiry in its own right.

1.6 Summary

The Bourdieusian approach thus relocates social class to the realm of consumption and, with it, everyday life. The lived-work of classed occupants is thereby

accommodated in this tradition and informs the statuses they can be legitimately ascribed. Qualitative research conducted using this framework – such as Feminist Class-Analysis – appreciates this component most markedly. The Bourdieusian perspective is not employed here simply to classify populations in preparation for quantitative inquiry, and/or for their analysis in the aggregate (e.g. Savage et al., 2013). Focal, instead, are the quotidian elements of classed-belonging. Programmatically, therefore, this tradition, in particular, preserves the “*dynamic*” conceptualisation of social class advanced by Bourdieu. Furthermore, it also upholds this theorisation procedurally insofar as it does not focus on the ascription of individuals into fixed classed positions.

How Bourdieu’s approach has been operationalised, therefore, is distinctive of preceding approaches by virtue of the primacy awarded to everyday life and to its corresponding focus on the lived-work of classed incumbents. Classed statuses are treated, therefore, not as static ‘threshold’ phenomena (à la Schegloff, 1991: 62; 1992a: 127), but as performative social identities that are both achieved in and reflexively expressed through the details of persons’ everyday lives. Bourdieusian (e.g. 2011 [1986]) class-analysis can therefore be distinguished in this respect. However, this is not to say that it is, as such, completely removed from the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian traditions introduced above. Instead, homologies continue to obtain with respect to the use of social class as an *analysts’ resource* and regarding the status of *participatory relevance*. These two parallels are outlined subsequently. Before they are addressed, however, the extent to which Bourdieusian (e.g. 2011 [1986]) research investigates classed incumbencies within *everyday life* requires qualification.

1.6.1 Everyday life

The empirical study of everyday life has a central position in Bourdieusian class-analysis. As introduced above, such research has investigated this domain through both quantitative and qualitative methods. Feminist Class-Analysis in the Bourdieusian mould, for example, has attended to the perceptions and lived-experiences of classed incumbents, culminating in qualitative descriptions of how classed identities are formed and sustained relationally and habitually (see, e.g., Skeggs, 2004: 118), and so uncovering what have been described elsewhere as the

“hidden injuries” of social class (Sennett and Cobb, 1972: e.g. 32, 38, 49). Bourdieusian research, however, nonetheless remains limited in the investigation of this domain. Most notable, here, is the level of granularity upon which everyday life has been analysed. In this case, this research has restricted its purview, overwhelmingly, to participants’ accounts of their situated conduct, whereby perceptions are gleaned through “self-report” methods, such as interviews (e.g. Lawler, 1999; Reay, 2002; see also, Savage et al., 2001; 2005a; 2005b), focus groups (e.g. Skeggs, Thumin and Woods, 2008) and video-diaries (e.g. Walkerdine, et al., 2001).

What it remains unable to provide, therefore, are insights into the details of individuals’ situated conduct, itself. In other words, they cannot be employed to analyse the practices that make relevant persons’ classed identities by/for co-participants. This distinction, between *accounts* of situated conduct, and of the *conduct* itself, has been elaborated by Psathas (1990: 9), who notes that recollections may constitute ameliorated versions of the reported conduct, and which are subject to the contingencies of remembering and forgetting (here, see also, Heritage, 1984a: 234-238). It will also be recalled that participants’ retrospective reports are not only re-processed from howsoever they were experienced, initially, into some subsequent interdiscursive form (Psathas, 1990: 6), but participants’ very testimonies are equally conditioned by the vicissitudes of the local environments within which they are recalled (e.g. Schegloff, 1998b: 252, fn. 18). Bourdieusian research has, therefore, acknowledged *that* social class is reportedly and/or observably enacted in everyday life. But it has not investigated *how, where* and/or for what *practical purposes* it is relevant for individuals in their everyday interactions.

To qualify, this omission is, of course, surprising. As others have noted, Bourdieu articulates an elegant theory of social class; one that promotes the significance of everyday life. However, this approach has neither elaborated, nor borne out, a procedural apparatus that can be used to examine the naturally-occurring social interactions occurrent between individuals (see Schegloff, 1996a: 162; Maynard, 2003: 71; M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 161; see also, Ford, Fox and S. Thompson, 2002a:

7).¹⁷ It is paradoxical, therefore, that since (at least) the “cultural turn” of class-analysis, social class has been heralded as an agentic achievement; one that is produced and reproduced through quotidian praxis. In this sense, it has been respecified from a purely economic, “threshold” phenomenon, such as that which has been differently calibrated in the traditions of Marx and Weber, to a performative concept that is indexed through practices of cultural consumption (Holmes, 2019a; 2019b). Nevertheless, this research has not investigated how classed identities come to be occasioned in and through the details of individuals’ naturally-occurring conduct. Social class is re-conceived habitually, therefore, but how it features in situated interactions remains overlooked or obscured. The Bourdieusian tradition thereby aligns with the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches in this respect.

1.6.2 Analysts’ resource

Everyday life is therefore embraced by the Bourdieusian tradition, but only to a qualified extent. This contrasts the two remaining homologies which continue to obtain. These relate to the status of social class as an *analysts’ resource* – one that researchers are entitled to define – and to the absent requirement of *participatory relevance*. It is not that these homologies are incorporated but qualified by the Bourdieusian tradition, but rather that differences are negligible; both approaches align closely with the positions adopted in (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian research. The case of the former is most readily appreciable: Social class, here, remains a concept for which analysts are licensed to adjudicate. Whether this is determined ‘mechanically’ (see Savage, 2000: 110) through ratios of “capital” (Bourdieu, 2011 [1986]), or as ‘metaphors’ (see Skeggs, 1997b: 10; 161; 2004: 16; 48), the coordinates of the concept remain delimited by analysts who define the operative “‘cutoff’ points’ for “‘classed” incumbencies, to borrow the expression (here, see Cicourel, 1976 [1968]: 168). Substantively, of course, Bourdieusian research entails a considerable shift in priorities from (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian research; what has formed the prevailing focus of critical comparisons. How the phenomenon is adjudicated, for example, is no longer discriminated unilaterally through an economic criterion, but by way of Bourdieu’s (e.g. 2011

¹⁷ Susen (2013) is one notable exception.

[1986]) comparatively multidimensional schema (recall §1.5.1). However, this notwithstanding, the concept remains, fundamentally, an *analytic resource*; one circumscribed consensually by analysts.

1.6.3 Participatory relevance

Neither the qualified status of *everyday life* in the Bourdieusian tradition, nor the treatment of the concept as an *analysts' resource*, have formed the focus of considerable sociological reflection. The final homology, by contrast, is a much-discussed feature of the Bourdieusian approach. This concerns the status of *participatory relevance*. For both the (neo-)Marxian and the (neo-)Weberian traditions, it will be recalled that the populations proposedly described need not identify with the ascriptions that are issued by analysts in order to warrant their classification, as such. In other words, the approaches align inasmuch as neither operate on a basis of participatory relevance. This position is also shared by the Bourdieusian tradition. It is set forth explicitly by Savage (2000) in the following passage.

“Bourdieu’s approach allows us to see class relationships as fundamental to claims of legitimacy and entitlement. However, his arguments lead not to an emphasis on class as heroic collective agency, but towards class as implicit, as encoded in people’s sense of self-worth and in their attitudes to and awareness of others – in how they carry themselves as individuals. *Social distinctions that Bourdieu sees as lying at the heart of class processes might not always be apparent to people themselves, since if the culturally advantaged recognized their taste explicitly as part of that privileged class, this would devalue it, by contaminating it with a pragmatic and instrumental meaning utterly at odds with its claims to be universal, which lie at the heart of the entire Kantian aesthetic.* It is hence the very salience of class struggles over distinction which explains why it is so difficult for them to be explicitly named and identified by their protagonists, and to be tied down into a neat model specifying the relationship between social location and culture.”

(Savage, 2000: 107, my emphasis)

In order for phenomena to be cast in classed terms, therefore, these need not be recognised by participants, commensurately. Bourdieusian research does not, in this way, trade upon a criterion of *participatory relevance*. Social class is understood, instead, to undergird social relations implicitly; that is, sub-/un-consciously (see W. Sharrock and Anderson, 2016: 26). This conceptualisation is sustained in the quantitative tradition pioneered by Bourdieu (e.g. 1984 [1979]), using geometric methods of data-analysis (here, see Rouanet, Ackermann and Le Roux, 2000), in addition to the qualitative research conducted within Feminist Class-Analysis.

In the former, methods such as “Correspondence Analysis” and “Multiple Correspondence Analysis” (see Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010) are employed to explicate and to visualise latent homologies that potentially undergird sets of categorical data. What such methods do not yield, however, is whether such relationships are avowedly *relevant* for the co-participants intendedly described; a condition that is presumably orthogonal – even antithetical – to the use of latent methods of modelling. Social class positions are understood, accordingly, as a phenomenon that may be *educed* by the researcher through the construction of particular indices (e.g. Savage et al., 2013: 225-229), and where the boundaries between social classes are determined by using – and, specifically, by way of *comparing* (C. Mills, 2014: 441) – statistical methods of model selection; or, alternatively, through a criterion of theoretical coherence (e.g. Savage et al., 2015: 1030). A similar position regarding participatory relevance is upheld in qualitative Bourdieusian research; including that adopted in Feminist Class-Analysis. The research of Charlesworth (2000), for example, an ethnography conducted in Rotherham, typifies this position.

Charlesworth’s (2000: 7) approach involved looking ‘beneath what is said’ by participants. Through this approach, Charlesworth (2000) imputes the relevance of social class when participants do not articulate this relevance explicitly.¹⁸ Examples

¹⁸ I have limited myself, here, to one exemplar of this approach. Additional instances, however, proliferate in Bourdieusian research (e.g. Skeggs, 1997b: 30-31, Ch. 5, 151; 2005: 50-54; Savage et al., 2005a: 146; 2005b: 114-116, 121). Examples can also be located in related traditions of class-analysis (e.g. Willis, 1977: 119-126, 137, fn. 1, 173; 2001: 200-

of such an approach punctuate Charlesworth's (2000) research. This includes, *inter alia*, the production of "expletives" (e.g. *ibid.*: 114-115), "profanity" (e.g. *ibid.*: 231-234), "laughter" (e.g. *ibid.*: 146), the absence of "euphemism" (e.g. *ibid.*: 214-215, 227, 229), and use of "brevity" (e.g. *ibid.*: 231-232). Charlesworth (2000: 237) even ventures so far as to attribute the entirety of the working class 'articulatory style' to their classed status. For Charlesworth (2000), therefore, this absence of participatory avowals of their self-conscious awareness is not a requirement for ascriptions of classed relevance; nor is it an omission, thereof. It is conceived, instead, as affirmative of the classed positions that are occupied by participants. In other words, it is *because* participants are deprived of such reflexive resources that they could not frame their experiences in classed terms (e.g. Charlesworth, 2000: 143). The very absence of participants' orientations to social class is thereby transposed, *en passant*, into an instantiation of its putative omnirelevance (here, see fn. 252).

Participatory relevance thus occupies a non-criterial status in Bourdieusian class-analysis, aligning with the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian traditions previously arrayed. In this case, it is not by-product of how the concept has come to be operationalised in quantitative, aggregate focussed inquiries. Rather, akin to the position of Marx and Weber (§1.3.3), it is fundamentally ineluctable of the approach.¹⁹ Social class is conceptualised, as Skeggs (1997b: 74) writes, as a 'structuring absence', undergirding social relations implicitly. While Bourdieusian research has, then, reconfigured social class as an *everyday achievement*, this contribution is qualified with respect to the level of abstraction upon which this project has been realised (§1.6.1). Moreover, it has further retained the concept as an *analytic phenomenon* (§1.6.2); one that can be defined and ascribed by analysts, at their discretion, regardless of *participatory (dis-)consensus* (§1.6.3).

215). "*Feminist Psychology*", for instance, showcases a host of conforming examples (e.g. Reay, 1999: e.g. 90, 95, 102; Walkerdine et al., 2001: 46-47).

¹⁹ For EM/(M)CA reflections on this procedure, see, differently, e.g., Atkinson (1978: 211, fn. 8), Travers (1999: §5.1-§5.5) and W. Sharrock and Anderson (2016: 26).

1.6.4 Summary

This chapter has provided a partial review of transdisciplinary traditions of class-analysis. This has been conducted with modest ambition. I have shown that social class constitutes a longstanding locus of sociological inquiry; one that has been researched and theorised since the inception of the discipline (cf. fn. 4) under the auspices of diverse approaches. My purview here has been confined to three of the most predominant traditions of class-analysis; namely, Marxian (§1.2.1), Weberian (§1.2.2) and Bourdieusian research (§1.5). In turn, I have outlined how social class features within these traditions and underscored three novel homologies that are shared by these approaches and which also hold for other disciplinary traditions (e.g. §1.4). Condensed, these are as follows:

- (1) *Everyday life*. Social class has been overwhelmingly neglected in everyday life. When recognised, it has been investigated predominantly through theoretical models or self-report methods.
- (2) *Analysts' resource*. Social class is treated as a concept that is legitimately adjudicated and circumscribed by analysts.
- (3) *(Ir)relevance*. The ascription of an individual, or set of individuals, into a social class does not require avowed recognition of this incumbency by the population ascribed.

Together, this position has been shown to be differently sustained across a range of traditions of class-analysis. As ethnomethodologists have observed, however, this approach is not localised to this tradition of research but represents a more generic type of sociology. Livingston (2008), for example, captures this dimension, in part, under the rubric of “Sociologies of the Hidden Order”:

“In sociologies of the hidden order, the workings of society are believed to underlie, or be hidden within, the visible actions and behaviors of members of society ... In contrast, sociologies of the witnessable order examine how members of society produce and sustain the observable orderliness of their own actions.”

(Livingston, 2008: 124 in Heritage, 2018: 35)

To this effect, past sociological research has been content to treat social class as a status that need not be salient for the populations described, but one that can be employed by analysts at their discretion. A related dimension to this is what Bloor (1976 in Heritage, 1984a: 67; see also, Bloor, 1973; Benson, 1974: 127; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 235, fn. 11; Wooffitt, 1992: 1-2) has referred to as the ‘sociology of error’. Analysts, in this capacity, are not merely entitled to define the occasions in which social class is (ir)relevant, but that their very ascriptions, thereof, can be prioritised over participants’ own (dis-)identifications, irrespective of whether these align, compete with or contradict those stipulated by analysts. Taken together, these dimensions represent a distinctive form of sociology; what has been referred to elsewhere as ‘constructive analysis’ (e.g. H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 340) – or ‘formal analytic sociology’ (e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1991: 10; hereafter, FA).²⁰ As illustrated above, this has left a clear domain of inquiry available for EM/(M)CA research; namely, occasions in which classed social identities are made avowedly relevant for individuals, *in situ*, in the course of their everyday lives. Thus, it is to these comparatively “overt” orientations to social class that I direct my attention to here; that is, to the study of social class in the ‘witnessable order’ (see Livingston, 2008: 124 in Heritage, 2018: 35).

1.7 My contribution

My focus in this thesis concerns how social class is made relevant by individuals in their everyday lives; specifically, in their interactions with one-another, *qua* co-interlocutors. Again, these areas of inquiry are those which have been previously neglected in traditional forms of class-analysis. Notably, however, these same omissions are made available for study uniquely through the parameters of EM/(M)CA; an approach that is introduced in Chapters 2 and 3. Summarily, EM centres around members’ methods of sense-making in their *everyday lives*. The derivative approaches of CA and MCA, in particular, for example, enable this at an unprecedented degree of empirical granularity (see §3.2.1 and §3.2.2, respectively). Furthermore, EM/(M)CA research is unique insofar as it also relinquishes the

²⁰ The latter term is preferred here for acronymic clarity (i.e. “FA”); that is, so as not to overload the existing designation of “CA” (i.e. “Conversation Analysis”).

epistemic privilege that is ceded to analysts within “Sociologies of Hidden Order” (Livingston, 2008) and/or the “Sociology of Error” (Bloor, 1973). Focal to this tradition, instead, are how socio-cultural institutions, for example, are made relevant for individuals in their everyday lives (see §2.2.1). The enterprise is disinterested, therefore, in ascribing individuals into so-called “objective” classed positions (see Pollner, 1987 in Pascale, 2008a: 348), and further remains agnostic and uncommitted to any purportedly “correct” definition of the concept.²¹ For this reason, scare quotation marks will enclose the term “social class” hereafter.²² EM/(M)CA will therefore be introduced in the ensuing chapters as an approach committed to the analysis of “social class” as a *members’ resource*; and, more exactly, one that is analysed when *relevant* for individuals in the course of their *everyday lives*. The contribution of this research is therefore directed towards a domain that has been perpetually omitted from FA research.

1.7.1 Research questions

The central objective of this thesis is to investigate “social class” as a members’ phenomenon as it is occasioned, recurrently, within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction. This objective is one informed by existing FA research, and especially from the centrality of everyday life in/for the study of social class (§1.6.1). Nevertheless, it departs from this literature with respect to the position it adopts regarding *participatory relevance* (cf. §1.3.3 and §1.6.3). This thesis not only then attends to “classed” identities as they are (co-/re-)produced in interaction, but it also analyses those occasions in which it is made expressly relevant for co-interlocutors

²¹ On ‘ethnomethodological indifference’, see H. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970: 345).

²² This procedure is familiar to EM (e.g. Richards, 1955: 17-55 in H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 343) and CA research (e.g. Jefferson, 2004a: 118), amongst other traditions (e.g. Roth, 1978: cvii). The practice is not employed here ironically (see Clift, 1999: 530-531), but to reflect a commitment towards stipulative disinterest. It has been illustrated in this chapter, after all, that “social class” does not, perforce, designate nor privilege the same set of coordinates when referred to within FA. Instead, as others have noted, when used, it is likely to be theorised differently (e.g. Jarvie, 1972: 98). It is by virtue of this versatility, therefore, and to index an impartial position, thereon, that “scare” quotation marks are used hereinafter.

themselves. This is the overarching objective of this work, and translates into three research questions:

- (1) How is “social class” conceptualised and reflexively rendered see-able and accountable by and for co-interlocutors?
- (2) Which social actions, activities and interactional projects are accomplished, recurrently, when co-interlocutors make “social class” demonstrably relevant?
- (3) What can EM/(M)CA contribute to sociological investigations of “social class”?

As I detail in §1.7.2, these three research questions are taken up serially across this thesis. I begin, first, by establishing how co-interlocutors relevance “social class” in talk-in-interaction, focusing on the productions of “classed” *membership categories* (i.e. Chapter 4) and *references to place* (i.e. Chapter 5). Next, I then analyse the practical work accomplished through these two families of practices (i.e. Chapter 6). In my discussion, I recapitulate the possible contributions of EM/(M)CA for FA “class-analysis”, outlining candidate lines of inquiry for future research (i.e. Chapter 7). Together, these areas of inquiry constitute a coherent attempt to respecify “social class” as a *members’ phenomenon*; one that is made relevant for members within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction.

1.7.2 Thesis outline

My objectives are, then, principally, threefold. Note that the first two objectives, however, co-implicate three separate issues. These pertain to (1) how “social class” is treated as see-able by analysts; (2) how “classed” relevancies are occasioned by co-interlocutors; and (3) the social actions for which these practices are reflexively mobilised, *in situ*. These issues, I propose, follow on from one-another logically. That is, once I have outlined how “social class” is recognisable, the practices that co-implicate these instantiations can then be identified and then the practical work for which these practices are mobilised can be discerned. This thesis does not therefore foreground the analysis of social action directly; what will be distinguished in Chapters 3 (§3.2.1) and 6 (§6.2), as a hallmark of CA inquiry. Instead, this objective is deliberately held in abeyance (i.e. Chapter 6) until I have demarcated how the concept is operationalised (i.e. Chapter 4), and after two corresponding practices have

been described (see Chapter 4 and 5). Regrettably, this culminates in a layout that is not as linear as that which is desired customarily. Nevertheless, this organisation remains faithful to the process of empirico-analytic attrition that was entailed in this research, and it stands as a testament to the procedure that I have used in order to abrade a foothold on “social class”.²³ For clarity, this organisation is disaggregated by chapter, below.

Chapter 2 canvasses the ethnomethodological (EM) filiation of this thesis. This chapter introduces EM and outlines three recurring ways in which “social class” has been previously incorporated into EM/(M)CA research; namely, (1) “*instantial references*”, (2) “*ethnographic allusions*” and (3) “*propaedeutic commentaries*”. Two strands of substantive EM/(M)CA research concerning “social class” are then reviewed and two homologies which underpin research on *talk-in-interaction* are educed. It is against these parallels that the unique contribution of this thesis is positioned, specifically.

Chapter 3 reviews the data and methods utilised in this research. Conversation Analysis (CA) and Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) are first introduced as my two forms of ethnomethodological (EM) data-analysis. I then outline the underlying tenets and empirical practices which consensually underpin their use. The secondary- and primary-data analysed are then summarised, and the procedures used to collect my data are detailed.

Chapter 4 addresses my first research question concerning the recognisability of “social class”. Specifically, the chapter considers how “social class” is made see-able and accountable, by co-interlocutors, through the production of membership categories. The chapter begins by illustrating the prevailing EM/(M)CA approach to “social class”. In the remainder of the chapter, I propose a modified approach that involves the analysis of *linguistically* “classed” instantiations (e.g. “middle class”).

²³ To borrow Coulter’s (1973a: viii) phrasing, the organisation of this research ‘reflects the logic of my own understanding of the salient issues’. Differently, see also, e.g., Atkinson (1978: 6-7) and Pfaller (2017: 15-16).

This approach is shown to present three empirico-analytic affordances, concerning “agency”, “ontology” and “intersubjectivity”.

Chapter 5 introduces “place references” as a second family of practices used to occasion “classed” identities recurrently. The first half of the chapter attends to references to locations that are mobilised in the service of *referring* (*qua* “locational formulations” [Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b]). Four practices are introduced in this section; namely, (1) characterisations; (2) allusions, (3) co-selections and (4) intentional misidentifications. The latter half then addresses references to locations that are not invoked relevantly in the service of referring, but in a relevantly *metonymic*, “classed” faculty (*qua* “place references”). Two variations of this practice are introduced in this section.

Chapter 6, my final empirical chapter, addresses my second objective, concerning ‘*action formation*’ (see Schegloff, 2007a: 7, my emphasis). This chapter introduces three recurrent social actions that are accomplished by co-interlocutors through “classed” membership categorisations and references to place; namely, (1) assessments, (2) complaints, and (3) teases. How and where linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations are enlisted into these activities, recurrently, are detailed throughout this chapter. “Classed” orientations are distinguished, in so doing, to function in a relevantly *explanatory* capacity in each social action.

Chapter 7, my discussion, draws the thesis to a close. The chapter begins by recapitulating the key findings of the thesis as they pertain to my three research questions. My third research question is recovered explicitly in this section. The remainder of the chapter then adumbrates possible directions for prospective EM/(M)CA research on “social class” that are occasioned by this thesis and its shortcomings. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the novel contributions of this research.

1.8 Chapter summary

This chapter has introduced the focus of the thesis and has contextualised the novel contributions posed. The chapter began with an abbreviated review of past sociological approaches to “social class”. The purview of this review has been indicative and non-comprehensive. My focus here has been to underscore “social class” as a perennial focus in the sociological discipline, and one that has been conceptualised as a product of, and enactment in, everyday life. I have shown, however, that three homologies obtain to this literature consistently. These relate to the focus on the *everyday lives* of “classed” incumbents; how “social class” is mobilised as an *analysts’ resource*; and the non-criterial status of *participatory relevance*. In so doing, I have shown there to be a programmatic omission of how “social class”, defined by (co-)participants, is made relevant within their ordinary social interactions. Thus, it is against this backdrop that I have contextualised the novel contribution of this thesis. In the next chapter, I provide the counterpart to this review, distinguishing how EM/(M)CA has addressed “social class”, heretofore, and by introducing how my approach departs from the remit of existing research.

Chapter 2 – Literature review

2.1 Introduction

This thesis adopts an ethnomethodological (EM) approach to “social class”. The objective of this chapter is to explicate this perspective, and to outline how “social class” has been analysed previously in this tradition, and from within its derivative analytic programmes; specifically, Conversation Analysis (CA), Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) and Discursive Psychology (DP). The chapter begins with a review of EM, contextualising this perspective vis-à-vis the conventional coordinates of Formal Analytic sociology (FA), such as those embodied by the traditions of class-analysis introduced in Chapter 1. The EM approach to *social identity* is then outlined. How “social class” has been addressed in EM/(M)CA research is then individuated. Two homologies in existing studies of *talk-in-interaction*, and against which this research poses a novel contribution, are disaggregated. The chapter concludes as I situate how this thesis poses a novel contribution with respect to these similarities.

2.2 Ethnomethodology

EM is a diverse intellectual enterprise. It has proximate origins in the writings of Harold Garfinkel (e.g. 1967) and, differently, Aaron V. Cicourel (e.g. 1964) – although it is conventionally associated with the former (e.g. W. Sharrock and Anderson, 1986: 4-6); the latter considered ‘[p]roto-ethnomethodology’ (see Lynch, 1991: 83), and, latterly, “cognitive sociology” (à la Cicourel, 1973).²⁴ Programmatically, as introduced in Chapter 1 (see §1.1 and §1.7), EM is concerned with the structures of individuals’ – *qua* “members” – *common-sense knowledge*. Previously, this dimension of human sociality has been taken for granted in sociological research (see Zimmerman and Pollner, 1974 [1970]). It has been employed by the sociologist, in this sense, without interrogation; that is, ‘as an unexplicated resource’ (ibid.: 81). EM research, in contrast, focalises this domain, investigating the practical actions, reasoning and methods that are constitutive of “everyday life”. As Zimmerman and Wieder (1974 [1970]: 289, italics in original)

²⁴ On the changing status of the Cicourelian oeuvre, see, e.g., Flynn (1991: 153-156).

write, the principal interest of the ethnomethodologist – and of EM, more broadly – concerns ‘how members of society go about the task of *seeing*, *describing*, and *explaining* order in the world in which they live’.

This focus has culminated in a diverse programme of empirical research (for review, see H. Garfinkel, 1991: 15-16) from which numerous variants/sub-streams have emerged (e.g. Maynard and Clayman, 1991). EM remains coherent, however, with respect to its underlying status as a respecification of Parsonian systems theory, and specifically, its ‘voluntaristic’ and ‘neo-Kantian’ (see Heritage, 1987: 229, fn. 11) solution to the Hobbesian problem of social order (see Heritage, 1984a: Ch. 2). Centrally, in this case, it is not ‘socialization’ (Heritage, 1987: 227) that is distinguished as the crucial basis for intersubjective understanding, but the interpretative capacities of members (here, see W. Sharrock and Anderson, 1986: 32). This innovation is reflected in the preoccupations of EM. Primacy is awarded, accordingly, to the methods that (re)produce human sociality, and intersubjectivity, and render it ‘account-able’, in H. Garfinkel’s (1967: e.g. 1) terms. EM, in so doing, focuses on the repertoire of mundane, ordinary and/or institutional sense-making practices – or “ethnomethods” (e.g. Psathas, 1968) – that are employed by members in the (co-)construction of the social world, and on the basis of which its natural facticity is practically sustained (see Pollner, 1987). It is in this sense that EM is describable as a “*respecification*” of the Social Sciences (here, see H. Garfinkel, 1991). EM research on social identities illustrates this perspective.

2.2.1 Social identity

As Benwell and Stokoe (2006: 36) summarise, EM adopts an ‘indexical, context-bound understanding of identity’. Social identities are not conceived as inherent nor stable properties tied to individuals, but as interactional, ongoing accomplishments that are locally sustained, practically managed and (re-)negotiated (Berard, 2006: 243). Identities are treated, in other words, as ‘talked into being’ (Heritage, 1984a: 237). H. Garfinkel (1967: Ch. 5) furnishes a classical example of this understanding in his seminal research with a male-to-female transsexual pseudonymised as “Agnes”.

Through a series of preoperative and postoperative interviews, Agnes is distinguished as a ‘practical methodologist’ (H. Garfinkel, 1967: 180); one who manages her

changing gender identity through her everyday practice. Preoperatively, for example, this involved Agnes' use of resources to preserve the female identity with which she identified. Postoperatively, by contrast, this concerned how Agnes managed her status despite having undergone surgical reassignment, experiencing its anatomical, physiological and psychological ramifications, and continuing to lack a female biography. This study illustrates the EM understanding of social identity. Most notably, it shows how a "gendered" identity comes to be (re-)configured through its *doing*, and it is not, in contrast, an essentialised property that inheres to and/or is dictated by one's biological sex.

This approach towards identity has been furthered in subsequent EM research. Research using CA, by example, has specifically investigated how social identities come to be occasioned and sustained within situated instances of talk-in-interaction (e.g. Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998a). This interface between talk-in-interaction and social identity – as a form of social structure – has been referred to as the 'interaction/social structure nexus' (e.g. Schegloff, 1991: 48) – or, as J. Robinson (2006: 138, italics in original) writes, a '*constitutive* view of relationships'. In two papers, Schegloff (1991; 1992a) explicates the CA approach to "context" by contrasting it with the existing sociological (i.e. FA) procedure.

"One type of solution can be characterized as the "*positivist*" stance, in one of the many senses in which the term is currently used. In this view, the way to warrant one, as compared to another, characterization of the participants (for example, in interaction) is the "success" of that way of characterizing them in producing a professionally acceptable account of the data being addressed. "Success" is measured by some "technology" – by statistical significance, a preponderance of historical evidence, and so forth. Sometimes there is an additional requirement that the characterization which produces "successful" analysis be theoretically interpretable; that is, that the selection of descriptive terms for the participants converge with the terms of a professional/scientific theory relevant to the object of description."

(Schegloff, 1991: 50, my emphasis)

According to this solution – referred to, hereafter, as the “*positivist*” solution ²⁵ – individuals are classified at/upon the discretionary judgement of analysts. Classifications of persons are stipulated when intelligible, interpretable and/or defensible vis-à-vis one’s intellectual/professional commitments. For Schegloff (1991; 1992a), it is this solution that is implemented within sociology. The CA approach to “social structure” – and, operatively, *social identity* – is contrasted with this approach. Specifically, for an aspect of social identity to be awarded analytic primacy it must be oriented to by those co-interlocutors, as such. In this respect, it must be showable, endogenously, in the here-and-now of the talk-in-interaction described, that it is “demonstrably relevant” (see Schegloff, 1991: 49-52) and “procedurally consequential” (ibid.: 52-57) for the unfolding of the interaction in which co-interlocutors are momentarily embroiled.

The rationale for this requirement is simple. It is a longstanding proposition that descriptions can be (re-)formulated in an indefinitely extensible number of ways (see, e.g., Leibniz, n.d. in Waismann, 1960 [1951]: 122). In EM/(M)CA research, this has been expressed variously, such as ‘the etcetera problem’ (e.g. Sacks, 1990 [1963]: 91), ‘one-person identification problem’ (see Schegloff, 1992c: xxxvii), ‘problem of multiple description’ (see Schegloff, 1987a: 218), or the problem of ‘*selecting identifications*’ (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 588, italics in original), and has been explored empirically in a number of domains (e.g. Enfield, 2013). *Inter alia*, this includes references to *persons* (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 41; Sacks, 1972), *locations* (e.g. Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b) and *times* (e.g. C. Raymond and White, 2017). Members, for instance, could be categorised according to their “age”, “nationality”, “religion”, “sex”, “sexuality” or “social class”, *inter alia*. For select populations, of course, some categorisations will prove inapplicable. Crucially, however, at least *two* axes are available along which any member could be stratified (see Sacks, 1992, Vol.

²⁵ To qualify, how conduct comes to be interconnected with social identity needs not be “*positivist*” in some classical (e.g. Comtian) sense. Rather, as Schegloff (1991: 51) acknowledges, ‘the animating concerns may be drawn from quite anti-positivistic theoretical sources or commitments’. For further discussion, see Atkinson and Drew (1979: 19-20).

I: 418); namely, “sex/gender” and “age”.²⁶ There are, therefore, multiple ways in which individuals can be classified on the basis of their “correctness”, howsoever described (here, see, e.g., Coulter, 1991: 41; see also, fn. 74). To circumvent this dilemma, CA, therefore, adopts a local approach to “*relevance*”.

For CA research, it must be showable, by reference to the details of the analysed interaction-in-progress, how *this* facet of social identity is made relevant and consequential in *this* moment. Such categories must, in other words, pass a ‘relevancing procedure’ (Schegloff, 1987a: 218) whereby they are oriented to as *relevant* and *consequential* for co-interlocutors within the ‘observable details’ (Schegloff, 1996b: 25) of their ongoing interaction. It is by using these criteria that CA evaluates the putative relevancies of social identities for episodes of talk-in-interaction. As others have recognised (e.g. G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 679-680), this domain of inquiry has been explicated through the investigation of how socio-cultural institutions come to be made relevant within instances of talk-in-interaction.

2.2.2 Forms of talk

Interactional conduct has been analysed within a myriad of environments in CA research. Medical settings (e.g. Heritage and Maynard, 2006), beauty salons (e.g. Toerien and Kitzinger, 2007), courtrooms (e.g. Drew, 1978; Atkinson and Drew, 1979), classrooms (e.g. McHoul, 1978), helplines (e.g. Pudlinski, 1998), emergency telephone calls (e.g. Whalen, Zimmerman and Whalen, 1988), police interviews (e.g. Stokoe, 2010), political speeches (e.g. Atkinson, 1984a), and counselling sessions (e.g. Silverman, 1994), offer an indicative selection. This research has proved explicative in demonstrating how institutional identities are not preordained nor accorded aprioristically to some spate of talk-in-interaction. The relevance of identities instead remains a situated accomplishment, or an ‘achieved outcome’ (G.

²⁶ These classifications are, in Sacks’ (1972: e.g. 33; see also, Sacks, 1967) terms, ‘a Pn-adequate device, type 1’ – or “‘which’-type sets” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 40); devices applicable to any member. For discussion, see §7.3.4.

Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 696); achievements which are – at least in the first instance – actuated and sustained locally.

CA research on social identity has also been applied to forms of “*ordinary talk*”. Following harbingers in EM research (e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1967: 116-185, 285-288; West and Zimmerman, 1987; West and Fenstermaker, 1995a; 1995b), a predominant dimension of social identity has been “*gender*” (e.g. Hopper and LeBaron, 1998; Stokoe and Smithson, 2001; Kitzinger, 2009; Stokoe, 2010; Jackson, 2011a; 2011b; Speer and Stokoe, 2011). Since at least the 1990s, CA has been invested in the respecification and de-reification of essentialised conceptualisations, attending to the interactional mechanisms used to *relevance* “gendered” identities in ordinary instances of talk-in-interaction, and whereby they are *consequential* for co-interlocutors. This tradition remains the foremost area of CA research into social identity in ordinary talk. However, CA research has also addressed several other ‘cultural institutions’ (à la West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 34, fn. 15). Analyses of “age” (e.g. Nikander, 2001), “ethnicity” (e.g. D. Day, 1998; Hansen, 2005), “(hetero)sexuality” (e.g. Kitzinger, 2005a; 2005b) and “race” (e.g. Whitehead, 2007; 2009; 2011; 2013; 2015; Whitehead and Lerner, 2009), for example, populate CA literature, amongst other forms of interpersonal relationship (e.g. G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006).

In both institutional and ordinary interaction, therefore, there is a clear precedent for the study of social identities within CA research. As outlined in Chapter 6, this has centred largely around how identities come to be employed practically in the service of social actions and activities (recall §1.7.2). What is notable for current purpose, however, is that while there has been occasion for this study, “social class”, as an aspect of social identity, has not arrested a comparable degree of empirico-analytic attention to other facets. Rather, it has been comparably neglected. Thus, it is to the relatively peripheral status of “social class” within the EM/(M)CA tradition to which we now turn.

2.3 Social Class

The history of “social class” in EM/(M)CA research is one yet to have been written. Provided the constraints of space, this is not something that can be canvassed

adequately here. Instead, what follows is but a partial review of some of the most recurrent ways in which EM/(M)CA has addressed “social class”. This review is bifurcated into references to “social class” in EM/(M)CA texts (§2.3), and to substantive occasions in which it is analysed empirically (§2.4). The former is collapsed into three principal uses.²⁷

- (1) *Instantial references*: Statements which attest to the (in)capacity of EM/(M)CA research to address the relevance of “context” for social interaction.
- (2) *Ethnographical allusions*: “Classed” characterisations of individuals, locations, and/or topics that are co-implicated by, or within, the interactions analysed.
- (3) *Propaedeutic commentaries*: Preliminary, orthogonal, and/or hitherto unrealised analyses which position “social class” as eligible for EM/(M)CA research.

These forms of reference will be explicated serially across this section (§2.3). Subsequently, I outline how “social class” has been respecified through EM/(M)CA

²⁷ These usages are not exhaustive. Others can be acknowledged illustratively but not “tracked” (à la Jefferson, 1990: 82) systematically. This includes, for example, (1) their possible production in data cited in EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 60, 185; Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 386; Hester, 2000: 220; Stokoe and Smithson, 2001: 256-258; G. Raymond, 2003: 953-954; Stockill and Kitzinger, 2007: 230, 235, fn. 3; Whitehead, 2007: 11-13; Reynolds, 2011: 416-418; Clift, 2016: 103, 192); (2) references to “social class” as a device that contrasts the present object of inquiry (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 81; Maynard and Wilson, 1980: 292; Jalbert, 1989: 231-232, 234-235); (3) as a dimension that has been addressed in past research in relation to which the present inquiry is notably (dis)connected (e.g. Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963: 3-5; M. H. Goodwin, 1980: 689, 692, fn. 25; Benson and Hughes, 1983: 15; Emmison and Western, 1990; Heritage and Sefi, 1992: 362-365; Schegloff, 1972a: 433, fn. 16; 1972b: 130, fn. 13; Jefferson, 2004a: 119; W. Sharrock and Coleman, 1999: 20-28; Kitzinger, 2005b: 259-260, fn. 1); and (4), references to E. M. Albert’s (1964: e.g. 40-41) anthropological investigation of verbal behaviour and “social class”/“caste” in Burundi (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 481-482, 624-632, 643; 1970, Part 2: 33; Sacks et al., 1974: 698, fn. 6; differently, see Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 293).

research that is dedicated to the concept (§2.4). Before commencing, however, the scope of this review requires qualification.

2.3.1 Parameters of the review

The occasions in which EM/(M)CA has been employed empirically in the service of respecifying “social class” are relatively few and far between. Anticipations (e.g. Rawls, 2002: 29, fn. 28), provocations (e.g. Roche, 1975: 134), (mis)attributions (e.g. Silverman and Gubrium, 1994: 180; Kitzinger, 2000: 172; Pascale, 2008a: 348) and oblique references (e.g. Wootton, 1975: 76-92) notwithstanding, “social class” remains conspicuously absent from empirical EM/(M)CA research. Speculative reasons for such an omission are numerous (e.g. DeMott, 1990 in West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 28-29; West and Fenstermaker, 2002: 539, 555), and indefinitely extensible.²⁸ This very omission has, itself, been incorporated and accounted for within criticisms of EM/(M)CA.²⁹ Recognition of this absence from

²⁸ See Ossowski (1963: 101-102), DiMaggio (2012: 16-17) and Block (2015: 169-171) for potential explanatory factors.

²⁹ Two variations of this indictment are recurrent. The first trades upon the status of “social class” as a second-order construct. On this basis, the concept has been considered ‘meaningless’ (e.g. Taylor, Walton and Young, 2003 [1973]: 199) or of ‘limited utility’ (Phillipson and Roche, 1971: 28 in Taylor et al., 1973: 199) for EM/(M)CA research. It is positioned as a phenomenon that EM/(M)CA is incapable of addressing (e.g. Gleeson and Erben, 1976: 476-477), or one that is ‘smuggled in’ in some other-than-analytic-capacity (e.g. Worsley, 1974: 9). Conversely, in the second, EM/(M)CA research is accused of ignoring social context, and/or of conceiving individuals as incapable of instituting social change. EM/(M)CA is positioned, accordingly, such that it either abstains from researching “social class” – alongside other ostensible modalities of “power” (e.g. Giddens, 1976: 53; see also, Coser, 1975: 696, 698) – or is simply considered unable to do so (e.g. Attewell, 1974: 181-182; see also, Miller, 1993: 351 in Pascale, 2007: 15). In so doing, EM/(M)CA is maligned for abrogating its purported mandate of catalysing “social change” (e.g. Gellner, 1975: 436; Eriksson, 1978: 109-110); a task for which it is reproached as ill-equipped (e.g. Gleeson and Erben, 1976: 476-477) or complacent (e.g. Freund and Abrams, 1976: 376). In consequence, EM/(M)CA has been upbraided, variously, as an ‘ahistorical’ (Gleeson and Erben, 1976: 475), ‘a-political’ (e.g. Gellner, 1975: 437), ‘atheoretical’ (e.g. Coser, 1975: 698) or “conservative”

EM/(M)CA practitioners, however, has yielded only sparse, concessionary comments (see, e.g., M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 221, Travers, 1999: §10.1; G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 680). For current purpose, however, what is crucial here is not the status of “social class” as a noteworthy omission, but how the concept *has* been addressed in this tradition. The review that follows begins to take stock of this literature.

To qualify, I have chosen to work inclusively in this review. Every effort has been made to review the contributions of analysts central to EM/(M)CA, but who have also been relatively neglected in this tradition, and/or consigned, by some, to its margins; that is, for example, as “outsiders” (see Flynn, 1991: Ch. 1) or “boundary” members (see Fehr, Stetson and Mizukawa, 1990: 473-474). Indicative examples include, for instance, Aaron V. Cicourel (1976 [1968]; 1981; Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963), Jeff Coulter (1971; 1982; 1995a; 1996) and Lena Jayyusi (2014 [1984]), Michael Moerman (1996 [1988]) and Edward Rose (1960).³⁰ Provided the parallel commitments of this work with EM/(M)CA, I have assimilated this research accordingly. Note that I have also chosen to include some research that has an uncertain status in the EM/(M)CA tradition. Two such texts are those by David Sudnow (1967) and J. Maxwell Atkinson (1978) on the social organisation of death and suicide, respectively. Both authors depreciate the status of their research with respect to the EM tradition (here, see Sudnow, 1967: 5; Atkinson, 1978: ix-xi, 187). As both have since been canonised (e.g. H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 341, fn. 6; Maynard and Clayman, 1991: 406, respectively), however, I have admitted these inquiries.

Not all research conducted by EM/(M)CA practitioners, or which has been located as EM/(M)CA, however, has been incorporated uncritically. Comparatively penumbral EM investigations have, instead, been omitted. This includes analyses conducted

(for review, see Lynch, 1993: 31) enterprise (see also, Rawls, 1989: 10-14); one that is reducible to the status of an ‘élite hobby’ (Gellner, 1975: 450).

³⁰ See, e.g., Lynch (1991: 83-84; see also, fn. 24), ten Have and Psathas (1995: xviii, fn. 3), Hopper (1990-91: [e.g. 162] in Nelson, 1994: 316-317) and Carlin (1999: 61), for review, respectively.

under related rubrics – such as “Ethno-methodos-Logos” analysis (e.g. Roche, 1975; see, here, Coulter, 1977) – in addition to independent research projects.³¹ Further notable omissions include the investigations of domains by practitioners characterisable as ethnomethodologists, but in ways that do not cohere with the consensual coordinates of EM/(M)CA (see §2.2). Noticeable omissions include analyses of “*Freak Culture*” conducted by Don H. Zimmerman and D. Lawrence Wieder (1971; see also, Wieder and Zimmerman, 1974; 1976) and the anthropological investigation of agricultural change by Michael Moerman (1986a). These analyses have been conducted by researchers identified as (“second-generation”) ethnomethodologists (see Flynn, 1991: 36) and both include recurring allusions to “social class”. In the former, for example, analyses of “middle class culture” are conducted using ‘ethnographic and ethno-semantic methods’ (Zimmerman and Wieder, 1971: ii); in the latter, “classed” observations are made concerning rice consumption (see Moerman, 1986a: e.g. 11). With the exception of subsequent inquiries (i.e. Zimmerman and Wieder, 1977; Moerman, 1996 [1988]), however, these analyses appear distant, intellectually, from the commitments of EM/(M)CA.³² They have, therefore, been omitted on this basis.

A final notable absence from this review is the research of Erving Goffman (e.g. 1959), a sociologist of profound influence on the study of social interaction and everyday life (see fn. 13). To qualify, Goffman does not identify with EM/(M)CA but occupies a uniquely orthogonal position to the enterprise; namely, as a notable influence-*cum*-critic of CA (see Schegloff, 1988; Schegloff, Ochs and S. Thompson,

³¹ This includes research by Gobo (1993; 1995), on the etymology of “social class”, Hiller (1973a; 1973b; 1975a; 1975b), on perceptions of the concept, and Green’s (1983) analysis of three nineteenth-century policy documents. While Gobo (1993; 1995) and Hiller (1973a; 1973b; 1975a; 1975b) have been identified as ‘ethnomethodological’ (e.g. Travers, 1999: §10.1, fn. 8), elsewhere, they are not situated in these terms. The absence of this avowal provides for their exclusion here. Conversely, Green’s (1983) avowedly EM/(M)CA investigation (i.e. *ibid.*: ix) has been omitted insofar as “social class” is co-implicated tangentially, only, such as through characterisations of the reports (e.g. “Minority Report”, 1909: 1214 in Green, 1983: 89) and the persons effected thereby (e.g. *ibid.*: 103, 161).

³² For reflections on the latter work, see Moerman (1992: e.g. 27).

1996: 13-14; see also, §3.2.1). Goffman's (e.g. 1959; 1963) work is also particularly notable on thematic grounds. References to "middle class" culture, for example, suffuse several of his major treatises; although, with the exception of a single paper (i.e. Goffman, 1951), this does not form a substantive focus of Goffman's analysis (see Drew and Wootton, 1988: 3).³³ However, it is neither the incidental status of "social class" within Goffman's oeuvre, nor the predominantly "ethnographic" form of these references which provide for its omission.³⁴ Goffman's oeuvre is instead relevantly excluded by virtue of the contrastive commitments that underlie this research. Most fundamentally, as R. Watson (1992a: 3-16) notes, are the different origins of "order". For Goffman, for example, order is sourced *exogenously*; that is, by way of 'order-enhancing procedures' (Anderson and W. Sharrock, 1982: n.p.g. [EJBH: i.e. 83] in R. Watson, 1992a: 4), such as through use of *metaphor* (see Silverman, 1998: 34-35) and/or *simile* (here, see R. Watson, 1998: 204, fn. 5). Conversely, for EM/(M)CA research, the orderly properties of human conduct are located *endogenously* to the observable conduct analysed. Accordingly, it is this ontological break that furnishes the operative reason for Goffman's omission hereafter.³⁵

2.3.2 Instantial references

There is a recursive criticism of EM – one inherited, latterly, by CA – that pertains to the legislative power of "context" (see Lynch, 1993: 28-30). This grievance has been formulated, variously. Distilled, its gravamen is as follows:

EM/(M)CA either cannot attend to context (e.g. Gleeson and Erben, 1976: 479-482); provides limited recognition (e.g. Bandyopadhyay, 1971: 19),

³³ This treatment of "social class" is consistent with Goffman's peripatetic approach and purview; referred to elsewhere as 'analytic pointillism' (see Schegloff, 1988: 101). Nevertheless, this omission is surprising considering the research to which Goffman contributed earlier in his career (here, see Collins, 1988: 43).

³⁴ A comparable form of reference recurs across EM/(M)CA texts (see §2.3.3). These are notable, however, provided their contradictory position relative to the coordinates of EM/(M)CA (cf. §2.3.2).

³⁵ See Psathas (1990: 25, fn. 4) on two potential exceptions in Goffman's oeuvre.

gravity (e.g. Goldthorpe, 1973: 458-459; Worsley, 1974: 9-12) and/or appreciation (e.g. Gellner, 1975: 443-445; Bernstein, 1989: 25; DiMaggio, 2012: 15) of context; and/or purposefully denies (e.g. Taylor et al., 2000 [1973]: 206-207), diminishes (e.g. Grabiner, 1975: 80), overlooks (e.g. Bourdieu, 1973: 72; Coser, 1975: 696, 698; McNall and Johnson, 1975: 59-60; Law and Lodge, 1978: 374-375) and/or relinquishes (e.g. McSweeney, 1973: 151-153; Attewell, 1974: 181-182) a focus on the influential role that *context* performs.

Whilst enduring, misplaced, and cogently refuted,³⁶ this critique has encouraged a proportionate sum of EM/(M)CA responses. These rebuttals are formulated more or less explicitly, and they vary in the extent to which they concede, weather and/or gainsay such statements. Relevantly, they remain connected insofar as they account for the EM/(M)CA position on “context” by invoking social identities. One such identity to which allusions are made is to “social class”. Harvey Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 502-505), the foremost progenitor of the CA enterprise, offers a prototype of this practice.

“The papers permit us to clearly and sharply pose certain fundamental problems for sociology: (1) The availability to members of alternative category collections by reference to any of which any population may be classified sets for the sociologist the pervasive task of describing in each and every case where members make some categorization how they do it; i.e., what methods they use so as to provide the relevance and propriety of the category collection which contains the categories they employ. Only when such methods have been described can the sociologist other-than-trivially assert that some person X is “white” or “male” or “*middle class*” where, when he [(sic)] does so, he [(sic)] intendedly conveys some information relevant to his [(sic)] analysis.” (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 803, my emphasis)

³⁶ See §3.2.1. For targeted rebuttals, see, e.g., Benson (1974) on Goldthorpe (1973), Maynard and Wilson (1980: 307-308) on Giddens (1976), Coulter (1982: 45, fn. 15) on Law and Lodge (1978) and Rawls (1989: 19, fn. 6) on Grabiner (1975).

This type of reference will be referred to, hereinafter, as an *instantial* usage. “Social class” is referred to here, “*en bloc*”,³⁷ alongside other ostensibly analogous dimensions of social identity (e.g. “age”, “ethnicity”, “gender”, “race”, “sexuality”, etc.), which can and/or should be analysed using the EM/(M)CA criteria of “relevance” and “consequentiality” (recall §2.2.1). As with the other identities with which they are abutted, “social class” is marked as an identity which can be appreciated in EM/(M)CA research by way of an endogenous analytic approach to “context”. Examples of this usage pervade EM/(M)CA texts. A review of contemporary literature furnishes a collection of illustrative allusions (see, e.g., Moerman, 1972: 176, 207; Maynard, 1984: 26; 2003: 83; W. Sharrock and Anderson, 1986: 100; Benson and Hughes, 1991: 123-124; Maynard and Clayman, 1991: 399; Hilbert, 1992: 195; Schegloff, 1987a: 215; 1992a: 106; 1997b: 182; 1999b: 577; see also, Schegloff in Čmerjková and Prevignano, 2003: 43-44; Lynch, 1993: 28-30; Silverman and Gubrium, 1994: 180; Edwards, 1995: 582; G. Raymond, 2003: 962; Berard, 2005: 213; 2006: 243; Land and Kitzinger, 2005: 411, fn. 1; Glenn, 2003: 173-174, fn. 1; Sidnell, 2010: 5; Clift, 2016: 30).

Thus, it is as an illustration of how EM/(M)CA accommodates the analysis of “contexts”, proper, that “social class” has subsisted. This usage is as a recurrent capacity in which “social class” is referred to within EM/(M)CA. It is curious, therefore, if slightly ironic, that the second form in which “social class” surfaces within the EM/(M)CA tradition are occasions in these very methodological and epistemological conditions are contravened – or waived.

2.3.3 Ethnographic allusions

The second occasion in which references to “social class” are frequent are those in which aspects of talk-in-interaction are categorised in “classed” terms *non-relevantly*. On these occasions, “social class” is effectively deployed, as it were, ‘as another Member’, to use Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 42) phrase. In other words, it remains unclear, in these cases, whether “social class” is, indeed, germane for the individuals classified.

³⁷ Schegloff’s (1996b: 22, my emphasis) term.

³⁸ They are instead simply ascriptions of “classed” statuses. Classically, such ethnographic allusions have been made to the types of persons recruited into EM/(M)CA research, generally, or to the co-interlocutors comprised within an interaction, or a dataset, specifically. In the former, the “classed” statuses of participants are alluded to unproblematically. Schenkein (1978a) supplies a clear example of such an orientation within his introduction to an edited volume of CA research.

“To begin with, they are all conversations conducted in English, although materials from many regions of North America and England are included here. They are all conversations conducted by persons for whom interactional competency is not obscured by accent, impediment, or other speech distortion, although materials from conversations among adults diagnosed as “mentally retarded” [(sic)] are included here. And they are, for the most part, conversation of the white *middle class*.”

(Schenkein, 1978a: 2, my emphasis)

In the latter usage, by contrast, reference is made to members’ “classed” positions when these are both pertinent to the objectives of the research (see, e.g., Sudnow, 1967: 5, 20, 29, fn. 7, 30, 31, fn. 4, 57, 107, 157, 171, 176; M. H. Goodwin, 1980: 674; 2006: 18-20, 24-25, 41, 59, 63, 71-78, 108, 160, 175, 182, 185, 187, 189, 203, 211, 217, 233, 239, 249, 251; Wetherell, 1998: 389; Duneier and Molotch, 1999: 1265; West and Fenstermaker, 2002: 559, fn. 17; Evaldsson, 2005: 763; 784; Pascale, 2007: 18; 2008a: 350; Scharff, 2008: 334-335; M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010: 179-180, 185), but also when ancillary. The latter are both distributional and targeted. They are made concerning co-interlocutors who populate a dataset broadly (e.g. Schegloff, 1979a: 27; M. H. Goodwin, 1982: 802; 1985: 316; 2001: 77, 101; 2011: 252; Maynard, 1985: 2; 1986: 261-262, 282; Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986: 119; Heritage and Sefi, 1992: 414, fn. 3; Antaki, 2002: 22, fn. 2; Pascale, 2008b: 726; Jackson, 2011a: 285;

³⁸ A subsidiary omission here is information concerning how the classifications were eventuated empirically or framed theoretically. To the former, notable exceptions include Cicourel (1976 [1968]: 33, 55, fn. 15), Heritage and Sefi (1992: 414, fn. 3) and West and Fenstermaker (2002: 559, fn. 17).

Haugh and Pillet-Shore, 2018: 265, fn. 4; C. Goodwin, 1979; 1982 in C. Goodwin and Heritage, 1990: 292) and about those who habilitated some interactions specifically (e.g. C. Goodwin, 1979: 114, fn. 4; 1981: 36; Schegloff, 1992d: 1308, fn. 10; Moerman, 1996 [1988]: 23; Edwards, 1998: 19; M. H. Goodwin, 2001: 83-84; Jefferson, 2004b: 21). Comparable references have also been made concerning “classed” locations (e.g. Sudnow, 1967: 5, 20, fn. 4, 96, 176; 1983: 201; Jefferson, Sacks and Schegloff, 1977: 27; Schegloff, 1987a: 211; M. H. Goodwin, 1990: 29, 31-33; 2006: 15, 35-36; Heeschen and Schegloff, 1999: 379) or when co-interlocutors addressed some “classed” norms (e.g. Zimmerman and Wieder, 1977: 203) or topics of conversation (e.g. C. Goodwin, 2007: 18; Wooffitt, Jackson, Reed, Ohashi and Hughes, 2013: 98).³⁹

EM/(M)CA literature is, therefore, replete with ethnographic allusions to “social class”. As referred to above, these allusions are invoked by analysts in the way in which contextual features were advised against in §2.3.2; namely, when they are neither shown to be “relevant” nor “consequential” for co-interlocutors in talk-in-interaction.⁴⁰ While “social class” is not then localised to methodological discussions of “context” in EM/(M)CA research, it is nonetheless referred to similarly; that is, superficially.

2.3.4 Propaedeutic commentaries

“Social class” has therefore perdured in EM/(M)CA texts, overwhelmingly, as a backdoor, token reference, and as an ethnographic or socio-biographical variable. In this sense, it has “*haunted*” (see Holmes, 2018a) EM/(M)CA as an un-explicated

³⁹ Hypothetically, see also, Schegloff (2004 [1969-1970]: 100, fn. 3). Relatedly, for *possible* references to co-interlocutors within specific interactions, or in which co-interlocutors are located to have come from, or to have attended “classed” locations, see Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 143), Schegloff (1968: 1090) and Schegloff and Lerner (2009: 95).

⁴⁰ On this irony, see Antaki (1998: 72), Edwards (1998: 19-20), Weatherall (2000: 286-287) and Stokoe and Smithson (2001: 249). Of course, as C. Goodwin (1981: 36) qualifies, such information is not necessarily enlisted with analytic intent; nor, equally, is it necessarily derived through procedures that are enshrined by EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Jefferson et al., 1977: 27, fn. 1).

resource, and eluded close empirical description. However, there are exceptions in which the concept has been reconfigured as a permissible field of inquiry; that is, as one available for “respecification”. These types of reference will be referred to hereafter as *propaedeutic commentaries*. In these instances, “social class” does not form the dedicated focus of the EM/(M)CA text but features of the device are, nonetheless, discriminated. These include observations that are made about the concept directly and those mediated through some designedly “higher-order” conceptual prism, such as “*difference*” (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 1995a; 1995b), “*ideology*” (e.g. Smith, 1974), “*inequality*” (e.g. Berard, 2006), “*prejudice*” (e.g. Speier, 1973) and “*ownership*” (e.g. W. Sharrock, 1974). Two observations concerning “social class” directly can be found within the lectures of Harvey Sacks (1992 [1964-1972]).⁴¹

The first observation pertains to “*perspective*”. Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 45-46) notes that “age” and “social class”, as ‘categorisation devices’, in Sacks’ (1972: 32) terms, possess a unique sense of ‘relativity’ (Schegloff, 1992b: xxxiv). For example, if a co-interlocutor is categorised in terms of these devices (e.g. “old”; “middle class”), it leaves that categoriser reflexively inspectable for how they, too, might be categorised using this device.

“If any Member hears another categorize someone else or themselves on one of these items, then the way the Member hearing this decides what category is appropriate, is by themselves categorizing the categorizer according to the same set of categories. So, if you hear B categorize C as ‘old,’ then you would categorize B to decide how *you* would categorize C. And again, the same procedure works for such a thing as social class.”

(Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 45, italics in original)

⁴¹ To qualify, while Sacks (1992) does not dedicate a lecture to “social class”, exclusively, this is by no means unusual – nor is it necessarily indicative of limited engagement (see Coulter, 1976: 508; Coulter, 1995b: 334). I limit my purview here to two of Sacks’ (1992) perspicacious observations in which “social class” is addressed both explicitly and uniquely.

As Schegloff (1992b: xxxiv) assesses, this is a novel observation regarding the constitution and utility of “classed” categories in talk-in-interaction (although, cf., Gobo, 1995: 457-458). Importantly, this contrasts with other devices, such as ‘race and sex’ (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 45), which do not necessarily co-implicate the same pragmatic and/or categorial implications provided their comparatively nominal constitutive logic and form.

Sacks’ (1988/1989: 53; 1992, Vol. I: 742; Vol. II: 122) second observation concerns some recognisable bases of “classed” incumbencies. Anticipating later studies (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 26-27), concerning optics, “social class” is distinguished, here, as a device that can be treated, by members, to be visibly appreciable – or ‘*perceptually available*’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 58, italics in original).

“It’s in parallel interesting that some of the things which work for kids’ groups, e.g., to be a hippie you have to have long hair, and things like that, are the sort of things such that you could be an acceptable hippie today and tomorrow an acceptable middle class kid, i.e., you go get a shave and a haircut and some new clothes. This can be compared to those sorts of memberships whose conditions are such as to make it not only work to get in, but work to get out.” (Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 122) ⁴²

In these sections, Sacks (1988/1989: 53; 1992, Vol. I: 742; Vol. II: 122) does not take the concept of “social class” for granted, as an ethnographic or socio-demographic variable, but explicates the social organisation of “classed” incumbencies.

⁴² On the “two-set” (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 47-48) formulation of “hippies”/“freaks” and the “middle class”, more generally, see Zimmerman and Wieder (1971: Ch. 1). Note, however, that “social class” is missing from Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 47) discussion of ‘two-set classes’. Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 48) does, however, recognise this practice to have been one used by ‘Marx’ (see §1.2.1), and subsequent explanations of this device have included the bifurcation of ‘proletarian/bourgeois’ (i.e. Drew, 1989: 113-114, fn. 8; see also, Atkinson, 1984a: 130, 154-157). For a linguistically “classed” example of this practice, see Extract 31 (e.g. l. 75). For further discussion, see §7.3.3.

Observations made in a similar faculty can also be derived from a diverse set of EM/(M)CA texts. Five notable accomplishments of these commentaries can be itemised as follows:

- (1) *Identity*: “Social class” is situated in terms of the EM/(M)CA approach to “social identity” (e.g. Mehan and Wood, 1975a: 521-522; H. Garfinkel, 1990 [1963]: 3-4; West and Fenstermaker, 1995a; 1995b), as introduced above (§2.2.1). Again, as West and Fenstermaker (1995a: 30) write, social identities are to be treated as an ‘ongoing, methodical, and situated accomplishments’. The potential “omnirelevance” (see, e.g., Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 515-522) of “classed” identities has also been proposed (see Schegloff, 1992c: xxxi; Heritage, 2005a: 111; G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 680). “Classed” identities are positioned, in this sense, as devices with an ever-present referential availability. Finally, the relevance of such identities has also been recognised through forms of “oppression” that are analysable through EM/(M)CA research (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 1995b: 508; Kitzinger, 2005a: 479-480).
- (2) *Second-order phenomenon*: The existence of “social class” is not necessarily contested in EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Hilbert, 1990: 796; Schegloff, 1991: 48, 51; 1992a: 106, 109; Coulter, 1995a: 168-169; Maynard, 2003: 71-72; J. Lee, 2016: 535). It is simply construed, instead, as an emergent product of members’ work (e.g. Dingwall, 1975: 495; Benson and Hughes, 1983: 15; Wilson, 1991: 26-27; G. Watson, 1992: xx; Eglin and Hester, 1999: 197; W. Sharrock and Coleman, 1999: 22-23). As Mehan and Wood (1975a: 519) write: ‘There are no things in the sensuous world like “bourgeois consciousness” or “class” or “the capitalist system,” there are only people doing their lives in a succession of here-and-nows.’⁴³
- (3) *Ordinary-language concept*: “Social class” is (re-)conceptualised as a device that is derived from ordinary-language use (e.g. Coulter, 1982: 36-38, 41; R. Watson, 1992b: 257, 260; Hester and Eglin, 2017: 301-310). The concept is understood as one that is employed by members in their everyday lives (e.g.

⁴³ See also, *mutatis mutandis*, Mehan and Wood (1975b: 216).

Speier, 1973: 185-186; Coulter, 1971: 314-315; 1996: 340-341; Berard 2006: 244-245; G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 680) and which possess meanings and/or functions that are comparatively primordial to the “*technical*” denotations that it has since been endowed professionally (e.g. Rose, 1960: 197, Table 2; differently, see also, Ossowski, 1963: 124; Gobo, 1993: 475-483).

(4) *Constitution*: Analysts have envisaged the warrantable bases for ascribing “classed” categories (e.g. Speier, 1973: 185-186), in addition to their corresponding forms (e.g. Jackson, 2011b: 45). Coulter (1996: 341, italics in original), for instance, distinguishes “social class” as a ‘*non-self membership*’ device; that is, ‘membership itself is not such as to require or presuppose any actual self-conscious “self organisation” such as characterises the various self-membership collectivities’. Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 52), similarly, identifies the Marxist conceptualisation of “social classes” as ‘morally organized’ vis-à-vis ideation.⁴⁴ The category of ‘the ruling class’ is also identified as classification potentially implicated by the obligations of other categories – such as the ‘police’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 131). EM/(M)CA research has also positioned “social class” as a device that can be gauged visibly, or through behavioural manifestations; that is, as ‘*perceptually*’ or ‘behaviourally available’, to borrow Jayyusi’s (2014 [1984]: 58, italics in original, 74, respectively) terms. “Classed” inferences have been drawn from occupational (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 26-27), institutional (e.g. Wieder, 1974b: 167, fn. 11) and domestic attire (e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1967: 119), signs of homelessness (e.g. Duneier and Molotch, 1999: 1291; Pascale, 2007: 80), names (e.g. Schegloff, 1972a: 91; 1972b: 111) and possessions (e.g. M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 184-186). Specialised forms of interactional work have also been discriminated through their “classed” interpretability. Sudnow (1965: 266), for example, in his investigation of public defenders (hereafter, P.D.s), identifies ‘putting in a request to see the P.D.’ as an activity oriented to by P.D.s such that it indicates a defendant’s

⁴⁴ On the Marxian position, see §1.2.1. On the EM/(M)CA analysis of “classed” collectives, see §7.3.

‘lower position in the class structure of the community’. Hester and Eglin (2017: 304-307), citing Sudnow (1965) and Maynard (1984), also discriminate ‘the public defenders’ pitch for a reduced sentence’ (ibid.: 304) as a further exposition of “class” status.⁴⁵

(5) *Procedure*: Approaches to researching “social class” by using EM/(M)CA have been outlined. W. Sharrock (1974: 51) and R. Watson (1974: 93), for example, have indicated how the notion of “owning knowledge” could be applied to “classed” membership categories (see also, Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 54-55; §7.4.1). Similarly, Hester and Eglin (1997b: 162) note how “social class” could be respecified through the MCA tools of ‘[c]ategory’ (see also, Coulter, 1982: 36 in Hester and Eglin, 1997c: 3) and ‘predicate’. Methodologically, Travers (1999: 6.1-11.9), developing Speier (1973), has proposed the use of ethnographies (ibid.: 11.4-11.6) and auto-ethnographies (ibid.: 11.3) as candidate approaches, and highlights the topics of “social mobility” (ibid.: 11.7-11.8), “industrial disputes” (ibid. 11.4, fn. 11) and “professions” (ibid.: 11.9) as possible heuristics.⁴⁶ In a further synthesis of existing EM/(M)CA research, Berard (2006: 247-252) has also indicated the availability of “social class” as an (in)explicit resource in talk-in-interaction. Lastly, Jackson (2011b: 45) has anticipated the production of “social class” through the resources of ‘person reference’ and ‘membership category devices’.

“Social class” has therefore been addressed in EM/(M)CA texts recurrently as a non-focal subject in the form of propaedeutic commentaries on the subject. These commentaries extend beyond the references introduced above, insofar as they do not

⁴⁵ The two editions of this text differently interpret Maynard’s (1984) analysis. In the first edition, Hester and Eglin (1992: 218-222) omit reference to “social class” save a single ethnographic, locational allusion (ibid.: 219). In the second edition, however, and in a new chapter on “social class” (Hester and Eglin, 2017: Ch. 7), “classed” identities are, comparatively, foregrounded.

⁴⁶ Relatedly, see Cicourel (1981: 72-76) on potential research on “social mobility”. This research may co-implicate an investigation of “social class” implicitly by virtue of how Cicourel (1981: e.g. 71) construes the subject.

merely state the eligibility of “social class” for EM/(M)CA research (cf. §2.3.2), nor broach the subject in ways that are distinctive (even *contradictory*) of underlying EM/(M)CA tenets (cf. §2.3.3). These commentaries instead adumbrate how “social class” could (and/or should) be researched empirically. Such research has, in effect, laid the foundation, therefore, from which concentrated, empirical EM/(M)CA research can commence. Thus, it is to this literature that we now turn.

2.4 Targeted research

The previous section has shown the recurrence of different allusions towards “social class”. These recurrences notwithstanding, however, efforts have – to borrow the phrase – proved ‘on the whole more promissory than productive, more programmatic than empirical’ (à la Sudnow, 1965: 256). That is, while “social class” has been situated iteratively within the EM/(M)CA tradition, this has yet to translate into a programme of empirical research. As Antaki (2011: 4) has observed, for example, even when ‘macro issues’ or ‘social problems’ – how “social class” has been traditionally bracketed (cf. fn. 89) – are focalised in CA research, this has not crystallised as the locus of sustained inquiry. Rather, only on a relatively scarce number of occasions has “social class” been formalised as the express focus of EM/(M)CA research, or in which it has been incorporated as an analytic focus. Broadly, such research has developed predominantly in two main ways: (1) Investigations of “social class” in observational and self-report studies; and (2), analyses of “social class” within talk-in-interaction. These two literatures are introduced below.

2.4.1 Observational and self-report

The analysis of “social class” by way of observational and self-report studies was distinguished in Chapter 1 (e.g. §1.6.1) as an established area of FA “class-analysis”. Notable for current purpose, is that EM/(M)CA research has employed such methods in the analysis of “social class”. In the former, investigations have proceeded by way of ethnographic, observatory methods. The most notable piece of research, to this end, is Sudnow’s (1967) investigation of death and dying. In this research, the concept of “social class” is deprived of an explicit definition. Nonetheless, clear attention is awarded in this research to how such un-explicated identities are made available through the situated conduct of co-interlocutors; in this case, by physicians and

service-users.⁴⁷ Instances of physician conduct, for example, includes allusive orientations to the “classed” demographics (ibid.: 5). Examples of the latter include the behaviour of “middle class” mothers with infants (ibid.: 87), their announcements of death (ibid.: 134-135), and how the “middle class” disseminate news of a death (ibid.: 154). Thus, while the concept of “social class” is taken-for-granted in this research, and like past observational studies (e.g. Sudnow, 1965: 266), is without definition, the differentials of “classed” conduct forms a central component of this research.

Central to self-report studies, by contrast, is how participants conceptualise and understand “social class”. This dimension has been incorporated into some EM/(M)CA studies as a subsidiary component (e.g. Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963: 70-73; Moerman, 1968b: 162). These are taken up most explicitly, however, in inquiries conducted by Pascale (2007; 2008a). In this case, under the auspices of EM/(M)CA and post-structuralism, Pascale (2007; 2008a) employs in-depth interviews to elicit participants’ discursive perceptions of their “classed” positions, or lack thereof. Pascale (2007; 2008a) demonstrates that some respondents (dis-)identified with established conceptualisations of “social class” by invoking comparatively folk theorisations that are not focalised in traditional “class-analysis”. Specifically, as Pascale (2007: e.g. 85, 106; 2008a: e.g. 346, 357) refers to “social class” in a Bourdieusian (e.g. 2011 [1986]) tenor – specifically, in terms of “social” and “economic capital” – participants who conceptualised “social class” differently were conceived in terms of “disorganization” (e.g. Pascale, 2008a: 352) and/or “irrelevance” (ibid.: 358).⁴⁸ In several interviews, for example, interviewees

⁴⁷ Following Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 73, italics in original), this will be referred to as ‘[b]ehavioural availability’. For discussion, see §7.3.1.

⁴⁸ Claims of ‘ethnomethodological indifference’ (see fn. 21) and ‘analytical bracketing’ (e.g. Pascale, 2007: 11) notwithstanding, this conceptualisation of “social class” is affirmed by Pascale (2007: e.g. 19, 75-76, 80, 82-84, 86, 88, 91, 94, 105-106) with varying degrees of explicitness. Passages, such as the following, betray such a position.

“Further, at a time of unprecedented gaps between rich and poor, the presence and meaning of class in daily life is arguably more vague than at any other time.”

responded to Pascale (2007) with “classed” identifications (e.g. “full-blooded Mexican” [Pascale, 2007: 93; 2008a: 355]; “transgender” [Pascale, 2007: 93; 2008a: 355]; “immigrant” [Pascale, 2007: 94; 2008a: 356]) which do not align with this implicitly Bourdieusian (e.g. 2011 [1986]) schema. These identifications are conceptualised by Pascale (2008a), accordingly, as *dis-identifications* of “social class”; an exigency conceived to have the socio-political consequence of ‘making it highly unlikely that shared class-based interests will emerge in the public imaginary’ (ibid.: 346).⁴⁹

A small body of EM/(M)CA has, therefore, taken up the analysis of “social class” in research mediated through observational and/or self-report methods. These studies have not given way to an established research agenda, however, and remain isolated. We turn next to the most established substantive approach towards “social class” in talk-in-interaction, where research has also addressed its operation as a concerted, scenic accomplishment. This is the area to which my research interconnects and departs.

2.4.2 Talk-in-interaction

The analysis of “social class” in talk-in-interaction, using EM/(M)CA, represents the most sustained form of its inquiry. In this area of investigation, there have been increasing moves towards an analysis of “social class” using methods that are derivative of EM. This includes the methods of Discursive Psychology (DP), Conversation Analysis (CA) and Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA), for example.⁵⁰ This research has addressed “social class” both independently and collectively alongside other dimensions of social identity. These two literatures are separated below for clarity.

(Pascale, 2007: 8)

Indicated, instead, is a quiet preoccupation to a *pecuniary* theorisation of “social class”.

⁴⁹ For a cognate case, see Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963: 70-71). For a similar instance in which EM research capitulates this position, see W. Sharrock and Coleman (1999: 20-28).

⁵⁰ For introductions to CA and MCA, see §3.2.1 and §3.2.2, respectively.

2.4.2.1 Independent

As an independent dimension of social identity, in its own right, “social class” has been addressed directly in a relatively shallow body of EM/(M)CA research. The majority of this research has been conducted on data collected for the purposes of social research. One example is captured by Moerman (1996 [1988]: Ch. 5) as they employ a ‘culturally contexted’ (ibid.: 7) form of CA to analyse data that they collected formerly in an ethnography conducted in Thailand (here, see Moerman, 1968a).

Focal here, for Moerman (1996 [1988]: 80), is their ethnographically derived distinction concerning the consumption of ‘glutinous rice’ and ‘ordinary rice’ (see Moerman, 1968a: 9-11, 195-197). In Moerman’s (1968b) earlier research, this distinction is established through anthropological, observational techniques. In his subsequent investigation, Moerman (1996 [1988]) analyses multi-party, recorded interactions whereby this distinction is relocated into participants’ orientations themselves. In this case, explicit allusions towards “social class” do not feature in Moerman’s (1996 [1988]) data – an event previously deemed expectably rare (e.g. Moerman, 1968a: 11). The former distinction around consumption is, for Moerman (1996 [1988]), is instead observed locally. The distinction between “glutinous” and “non-glutinous” rice is thereby treated, by proxy, as an orientation towards “social class” in action.

A similar investigation to Moerman (1996 [1988]) has been produced more recently by J. Lee (2016: 550) in a ‘sample’ MCA inquiry. J. Lee (2016: 537) analyses interviews conducted with two mothers, in South Korea, concerning an ‘English immersion policy’; namely, ‘a proposal to reform the current teaching system and improve Koreans’ English proficiency’ (ibid.: 537). J. Lee (2016: 549) observes how co-participants occasioned “social class” through the construction of membership categories concerning ‘social, educational, and locational memberships’. These categories, like those analysed by Moerman (1996 [1988]), do not refer to “social class” explicitly. Their interpretation, as such, is furnished, for J. Lee (2016), instead, by their use in constructing a situation of “inequality” between the pupils attending public and private schools. As with Moerman (1996 [1988]), “social class” is,

therefore, gauged as a locally produced interactional resource by proxy within research interviews; one that is used recurrently in the service of negative appraisals of the immersion initiative.

A third empirical investigation concerning “social class” has been conducted by Scharff (2008), using the method of DP. This research is an investigation of how “social class” was co-produced by co-participants during research interviews concerning their perceptions of feminism. Scharff (2008) focalises the rhetorical operations used to instantiate “classed” identities interdiscursively. This included establishing ‘respectability’ (ibid.: 335); casting oneself as ‘responsible’ (ibid.: 336); ‘critiquing existing systems of classification’ (ibid.: 331, 339); and ‘using rhetorical devices that allowed for the construction of a moderate and reflexive self’ (ibid.: 331). These resources are distinguished as practices that occasion “social class” in talk-in-interaction, albeit within research interviews. To note, however, this investigation is perhaps not as ‘close and empirically grounded’ (ibid.: 331) as it is claimed, neglecting, *inter alia*, a sequential analysis of the social actions for which these practices were serviced, *in situ*. These omissions are key components of an EM/(M)CA inquiries (§3.2.1) and have been substantiated in subsequent (M)CA research.

M. H. Goodwin (2006), for example, using CA, has investigated the (co-/re-)production of “middle class” values at an American school. Like the prior studies (e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; J. Lee, 2016), this research initially establishes the “classed” positions of co-participants (e.g. ibid.: 77) and designates indicative signifiers thereof (e.g. ibid.: 180, 275, fn. 31, 275, fn. 37). M. H. Goodwin (2006: 29, 248-250) then locates several activities which advance corresponding “classed” values. These include ‘storytelling[s]’, ‘[d]escriptions’, ‘bragging’ and ‘assessments’ (ibid.: 29). In the former, for example, co-interlocutors who were deemed not to possess requisite access to some “classed” referent were perceived, thereby, to be denied co-participation, and thus liable to “hidden injuries of class” (ibid.: 175; see Sennett and Cobb, 1972: e.g. 32, 38, 49).⁵¹ “Classed” values were therefore

⁵¹ On this practice, more generally, see Lerner (2003: 190-195).

considered perpetuated through “descriptions” and “brags” concerning members’ (non-)ownership of items that have a normative, cultural value – or “classed” currency. “Middle class” values were thus said to be perpetuated when participants who had been ascribed this status, and/or marshalled leisure activities indicative thereof, employed these social actions (see M. H. Goodwin, 2006: e.g. 174-175).

The final piece of relevant EM/(M)CA research, here, has been conducted by Robles (2016: 85). This is an analysis of group-formation – or ‘membering’. Using a combinatorial form of CA, ethnography of communication, and critical discourse analysis, Robles (2016: 97) presents one instance in which she produces a “classed” ascription of a “locational formulation” (see Schegloff, 1972; 1972b) *qua* co-interlocutor.⁵² The focal instance occurs in a group with respect to which Robles (2016: 87) has self-identified as an “outsider”, and whereby the “classing” of this location offers a means against which this status is negotiated. Specifically, this ascription operates aligns Robles (2016: 97) with a member of the group who has already delivered a criticism of the focal location. Like the interactional research previously discussed, “social class” is not named in the interaction explicitly. The relevantly “classed” status of the ascription is, instead, furnished retroactively.

In summary, these five studies illustrate a nascent body of scholarship. Following the tradition of Sacks (1988/1989: 53; 1992, Vol. I: 40-48, 742; Vol. II: 122), this research has contributed towards the analysis of “social class” in forms of talk-in-interaction. This research has not developed in isolation, however. Like FA research (recall §1.5.2), EM/(M)CA inquiries have also addressed how “classed” identities converge with other dimensions of personhood. “Gendered” and “racial” compounds, for example, have also been focalised (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 2002; Evaldsson, 2005; M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010; Whitehead, 2013; 2015: 387, fn. 3), addressing how “intersectional” (see Crenshaw, 1989: e.g. 140) identities are occasioned in interaction (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 2002; Evaldsson, 2005); how the common-sense knowledge associated with such categories are mobilised (e.g. Whitehead, 2013); and how intersections are accomplished without reference to “classed”

⁵² See §5.5.1.2 and fn. 167.

membership categories (e.g. M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010). The next section reviews this endeavour.

2.4.2.2 Intersectional

I have demonstrated, above, that a frequent reference to “social class” in the existing EM/(M)CA literature have been those prosecuted in an *instantial* capacity (§2.3.2); that is, where “social class” is referred to, alongside other dimensions of social identity, as one that can be analysed using the EM/(M)CA approach to context. This proposition, I have claimed, houses an implicit presupposition, whereby “social class” is marked as an aspect of identity that is supposedly analogous to other dimensions with which it is selectively accompanied (e.g. “gender”, “race”, “age”, etc.). In contemporary EM/(M)CA research, this longstanding presupposition has begun to form the focus of interactional research and has accrued empirical support. The research of West and Fenstermaker (2002), for example, typifies this tradition.

In focus in this research is how “classed”, “gendered” and “racial” identities are occasioned in the speeches delivered by participants in a UC Regents’ meeting; specifically, one that culminated, as they write, in the termination of ‘affirmative action policies at the University of California’ (ibid.: 538). Through this analysis, the authors find that whilst “gender” and “race” were indexed through practices of self-identification, and by reference to non-present parties (e.g. historical figures), “classed” identities were not made relevant as explicitly (e.g. ibid.: 553). Instead, these were implicated, by proxy, by reference to various surrogates. ‘[E]ducational background’ (ibid.: 553) and stories of overcoming ‘hardships’ (ibid.: 553), for example, represent two illustrative practices. West and Fenstermaker (2002) demarcate the latter as exhibiting features – or ‘core qualities’ (ibid.: 554) – of putatively “middle class” identities; namely, ‘character, industriousness and determination’ (ibid.: 554).

A second contribution to this tradition has been made by Evaldsson (2005). Using a combination of CA and MCA, and informed by supplementary ethnographic

information,⁵³ Evaldsson (2005) examines the structures and implicature of insult-exchange sequences (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 160-162) between “working class” and immigrant, preadolescent boys in Swedish playground interactions. Evaldsson (2005: 773) observes that membership categories were mobilised frequently within these sequences, including the pejorative ascription of “gender”, “ethnic” and “classed” categories. In two examples, co-interlocutors’ “classed” identities are understood to be intimated through the heuristic of “poverty”. As with other EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; J. Lee, 2016; Robles, 2016), this apparatus is not named explicitly, but is interpreted by Evaldsson (2005: 770-773) as one way in which the focal sequences were organised.

The research of M. H. Goodwin and Alim (2010) has also contributed to this programme of research. Focussing on the intersections of “race” and “social class”, the authors analyse the use of “transmodal stylisations” and “stance taking” by pupils in an American school. M. H. Goodwin and Alim (2010: 183) show that their participants stylise two intersectional identities in conflictual interactions; namely, “Valley girls” and “Ghetto girls”. Both identities are claimed to have “classed” and “racial” implications. The former is associated with ‘wealthy white’ girls; and the latter with ‘working-class black’ girls (ibid.: 179). For M. H. Goodwin and Alim (2010), therefore, the stylisations of these stereotypes, by co-participants, represent occasions in which “race” and “social class” are mobilised. The stylised production of a “neck roll”, for example, is identified as an index of the identity of ‘Ghetto girl’ (ibid.: 189). The production of this practice within an “insult-exchange sequence”, therefore, functions, for the authors, by proxy, to instantiate the relevance of this intersectional identity.

A final contribution to this area of research has been made by Whitehead (2013). In this research, Whitehead (2013) investigates how “social class” is made relevant through the production of membership categories. Analysing radio-show interactions in South Africa, Whitehead (2013) demonstrates that co-interlocutors interconnect “racial” and “classed” categories seamlessly and unproblematically through various

⁵³ On this practice, see fn. 86.

resources. One practice by which this is achieved involves ‘asymmetrical contrastive pair[s]’ (here, see Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 616; see also, §5.2.3 and §5.5.3). This practice involves the antonymic framing of categories drawn from different devices. One example, for instance, would be “a poor guy” and “a white guy” (Whitehead, 2013: 55). These categories do not form a “standardized” relational pair’, in Sacks’ (1972: 37) terms: the former is understood, for Whitehead (2013), in terms of “social class”, and the latter in terms of “race”. However, it is by contrasting these asymmetric categories that the latter becomes relevantly hearable in terms of the former; in this case, specifically, as antonymic thereof. Whitehead (2013: 52, italics in original) demonstrates that these intersections of “race” and “social class” function as ‘*interactional resources*’ on the basis of which various orders of social action are accomplished, including, for example, ‘complaining, accounting, answering, disagreeing, joking and so on.’ (ibid.: 61).

2.5 Homologies

A relatively small body of EM/(M)CA research has attended to *how* “social class” comes to be occasioned in synchronous forms of talk-in-interaction. This includes both *independently* (§2.4.2.1), as a standalone dimension of social identity, and its inclusion within *composite* forms (§2.4.2.2). Thus, it is against this backdrop that my research is situated. Specifically, this thesis is designed to complement this tradition in two respects. These concern the *contexts* of the interactions studied, and the *conceptualisations* of “social class” adopted. Past EM/(M)CA inquiries, I propose, have adopted comparable positions in relation to these domains, leaving scope for further research. The two subsections that follow outline these homologies and introduce the complementary and novel approach that my research provides.

2.5.1 Perspicuous settings

A conspicuous homology of the research reviewed above has been the study of interactions within “institutional” milieux, with Robles’ (2016: 96-97) single-case representing one notable exception. Previous EM/(M)CA research on talk-in-interaction, it will be recalled, has analysed playground encounters (e.g. Evaldsson, 2005; M. H. Goodwin, 2006; M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010), meetings (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 2002), radio-shows (e.g. Whitehead, 2013) and research interviews (e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; Scharff, 2008; J. Lee, 2016). Research conducted using

observational and self-report studies, has been distributed similarly. Sudnow (1967: e.g. 3-5) focuses on interactions in hospitals, for example, and Pascale (2007; 2008a) on research interviews. Thus, foregoing inquiries have confined their focus to “classed” identities within “institutional” contexts, leaving comparatively “ordinary” forms of talk-in-interaction unattended. However, this omission is not merely incidental. Institutional occasions have instead been privileged insofar as they represent what have been described elsewhere as a ‘fertile’ (à la Clayman, 1992: 167) or ‘perspicuous setting’ (here, see H. Garfinkel, 2002: e.g. 182) in which “classed” identities are mobilised.

The perspicuity of these domains, for the investigation of “social class”, is provided for variously. In some cases, this can be attributed to the interactional situations in which the analysed interactions were conducted. These include meetings into “affirmative action” policies (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 2002: 543; 557-558, fn. 6), or the context of “research interviews” (e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; Scharff, 2008; J. Lee, 2016). Alternatively, their auspicious quality is furnished by the wider socio-cultural-temporal contexts (howsoever formulated [see Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b]) – within which the research features. Analysing interactions between co-interlocutors in differently privileged schools (e.g. Evaldsson, 2005), hospitals (e.g. Sudnow, 1967) or in post-apartheid South Africa (e.g. Whitehead, 2013), for example, are three occasions in which “meso-” or “macro-contexts”, as they are referred to conventionally (cf. fn. 89), are understood to privilege the relevance of “classed” identities as an interactional exigency.

This body of EM/(M)CA research has therefore encountered “social class” in a number of contexts in which analysts have considered it prioritised. In so doing, research has been weighted inordinately – and nearly exclusively – to inquiries conducted within diverse forms of institutional contexts. Accordingly, it is in this initial respect that my analysis designedly departs from and complements this literature. Specifically, instead of researching occasions in which “social class” is expectably salient, I examine interactions in which “classed” identities are not comparatively privileged. In this case, I investigate orientations (co-)produced within *ordinary* instances of talk-in-interaction; that is, ‘forms of interaction that are not confined to specialised settings or to the execution of particular tasks’ (Heritage,

2005a: 104). Such instances, after all, have not been shown to possess any affinity with “classed” identities. Ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction are therefore considered eligible for my inquiry. My focus on “ordinary” forms of talk-in-interaction is not, then, elected merely by which to fulfil the terms of a comparative investigation (here, see Drew, 2003a; Drew and Heritage, 1992: 19; see also, §7.4.1). Instead, this affordance is purely a by-product of investigating “social class” in a domain in which it is not expectably privileged.

2.5.2 Analysts’ resource

The second way in which my research represents a development of previous EM/(M)CA literature concerns the conceptualisation “social class”. Indeed, to look back across prior EM/(M)CA research (e.g. observational; self-report; talk-in-interaction), “social class” has been conceptualised, recurrently, through a *three-step* procedure. This can be glossed as follows:

- (1) Co-interlocutors employ a device that is not framed, locally or explicitly, in terms of “social class”.
- (2) This device is selected by the analyst, directly or indirectly, as a felicitous index of the concept.
- (3) The index designated is then recast, retrospectively, as an unmediated instantiation of “social class”.

This procedure holds for the body of EM/(M)CA research that has addressed “social class” directly. Variation is present only in terms of whether indices are nominated directly or indirectly (i.e. Step 2). Instances of the former are itemised below:

- (1) “Consumption of rice” (Moerman, 1996 [1988]);
- (2) “Hardships in educational attainment” (West and Fenstermaker, 2002);
- (3) “Wealth/Homelessness” (Pascale, 2007; 2008a);
- (4) “Respectability” (Scharff, 2008);
- (5) “Wealth/Poverty” (Whitehead, 2013);
- (6) “Finances, parental circumstances and location” (J. Lee, 2016);
- (7) “Wealth” (Robles, 2016).

Conversely, occasions in which indices are selected *indirectly* can be found in Evaldsson (2005: e.g. 770-773) and M. H. Goodwin (2006: e.g. 174-175). In the former, “material inequality” is read-off as an index of “poverty” which, itself, is construed as an instantiation of “social class”. Similarly, in the latter, “differentiations of leisure activities” are read-off as an index of “wealth” which is treated as the operative basis for “social class”.

The common point of departure for past EM/(M)CA research has thus been to circumscribe what “social class” is on behalf of co-interlocutors. Analysts have, in other words, “*sublimated*”⁵⁴ the devices that are employed by co-interlocutors, *in situ*, as those which are interpreted as the relevant ontological bases of the concept. Research has, in this way, operated comparably to the FA research examined in Chapter 1 (§1.6.2), where “social class” is operationalised and preserved as an *analysts’ resource*. In this case, akin to the *ethnographic allusions* (§2.3.3), this manoeuvre can be treated unproblematically by analysts, in which it is neither explicated nor vindicated (e.g. J. Lee, 2016). Alternatively, when justified, this procedure is ratified through three recurrent lines of reasoning:

- (1) Received definition(s) of “social class” (e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; Evaldsson, 2005; M. H. Goodwin, 2006; Pascale, 2007; 2008a; Scharff, 2008);
- (2) Socio-cultural context(s) (e.g. West and Fenstermarker, 2002; Whitehead, 2013);
- (3) Tacit knowledge (e.g. Robles, 2016).

The first collection is dominated by a recourse to a Bourdieusian (e.g. 1984 [1979]; 2011 [1986]) – or Bourdieusian-inspired theorisations (here, see §1.5). M. H. Goodwin (2006: 160-161), Pascale (2007: e.g. 85, 106; 2008a: e.g. 346, 357) and Scharff (2008: 332-334), for example, invoke definitions of “social class” that are inherited from this tradition to justify “leisure activities” (here, see Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]), “social” and “economic capital” (here, see Bourdieu, 2011 [1986]) and “respectability” (here, see Skeggs, 1997b), respectively, as the operative indices of the

⁵⁴ Freud’s (n.d. in Jameson, 1973: 86) term.

concept. Moerman (1996 [1988]: 80) and Evaldsson (2005: 783), in contrast, invoke their professional and lay understandings to position the consumption of ‘glutinous rice’ (here, see Moerman, 1968a) and “poverty” as salient, respectively. Conversely, in the second collection, West and Fenstermaker (2002: 555) and Whitehead (2013: e.g. 52) invoke normative cultural conceptions of “social class” in America and South Africa, respectively, as the salient bases for deriving “social class”. These are positioned such that they provide for the indices of “educational hardships” and “wealth” as salient instantiations, respectively. And lastly, in the third case, Robles (2016: 97) invokes her “*tacit knowledge*”⁵⁵ to account for how “rich people” encompasses ‘anyone who is white and/or middle class’.

The substantive bases according to which “social class” is theorised therefore vary considerably in this tradition, as do the lines of reasoning behind the definitions that are privileged. Nonetheless, the procedural logic of this research approximates: “Social class” is retained as an *analyst’s resource*, where analysts, operating by way of ‘fiat’ – to borrow the term (e.g. Cicourel, 1964: 266, fn. 6) – are entitled to stipulate the remit and relevance of the concept on the behalf of co-interlocutors.⁵⁶ What has

⁵⁵ Polanyi’s (n.d. in Coulter, 1979a: 21) term.

⁵⁶ The constraints of space preclude a detailed evaluation of the propriety of each line of reasoning when situated vis-à-vis the assumptions of EM/(M)CA. Even a cursory review, however, indicates varying degrees of dissonance.

The use of *received definitions*, for instance, appears to contravene the kernel EM/(M)CA criterion of “demonstrable relevance” (see, e.g., Schegloff, 1991: 49-52). The devices (e.g. “wealth”) that are invoked by co-interlocutors, locally, after all, are not shown to be (co-)produced for those co-interlocutors in a relevantly “classed” tenor. The putative relevance of “social class” is, instead, emplaced by analysts at their discretion.

Recourse to the *contexts* (howsoever configured; see Schegloff [1972a; 1972b]) in which social interactions occur, and/or to the *psychological states* of co-interlocutors (howsoever formulated) also violate this principle. These lines of reasoning are distinctive, however, as they are compounded by secondary transgressions.

Selective invocations of context, for example, not merely foregoes “demonstrable relevance” (see §2.2.1), but also trades upon a “container-contained” (see Burke 1945 in Heritage, 1987: 242), or “bucket theory” of context (see Heritage, 1987: n.p.g. in Heritage, 2005a: 109; see also, Drew and Heritage, 1992: 19). The contexts in which the interactions

been comparatively neglected, therefore, are those occasions in which the concept, and/or its indices, are made relevant by co-interlocutors themselves. Thus, it is in this second respect that my research intendedly represents a novel contribution. Specifically, it is my intention in this thesis to analyse “social class” as device that is made *avowedly* relevant for co-interlocutors; that is, as a *members’ phenomenon*. In this case, in order to complement existing EM/(M)CA research, I choose to focus on those occasions in which the concept is (co-)produced explicitly (e.g. “middle class”), *in situ*. This represents a departure from past EM/(M)CA research, where “social class” is not demarcated, substantively, on the behalf of co-participants. This will be the starting point for my analysis. Subsequently, I will elaborate a candidate basis which enables the principled inclusion of the linguistically *non-“classed”* orientations (here, see fn. 102) that have been analysed heretofore in EM/(M)CA research (see Chapter 4). Focal here, therefore, is how “social class” comes to be defined and employed by co-interlocutors, in their own terms, in their habitual, ordinary interactions.

2.5.3 My contribution

Extant EM/(M)CA research that has been dedicated to “social class” is therefore homologous in two ways. Firstly, the focus of inquiries, I have shown, have been directed previously to those occasions in which “classed” identities have been

unfold, in this sense, are reified such that they are proposedly determinative of situated conduct. In this case, they are positioned to account for co-interlocutors’ ‘[p]ractical ontological work’, to borrow Rose’s (1967: 138) phrase from a different context.

Invocations of *tacit knowledge* also results in a joint infringement. As outlined in Chapter 3 (see §3.2.1), after all, EM/(M)CA research traditionally rejects the invocation of cognitive, mentalistic and psychological states when these are not made relevant by co-interlocutors, *in situ* (e.g. Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008: 217-221). Insofar as these lines of reasoning are therefore invoked in the service of establishing the salience of particular theorisations of “social class”, it thus contradicts this stance.

Each of these lines of reasoning thus differently (dis-)connect with consensual commitments of EM/(M)CA research. This notwithstanding, what is focal, for current purpose, is their practical upshot, only, whereby the concept is retained as an *analysts’ resource*.

identified to have some aprioristic relevance; be that relevance induced through received definitions, socio-cultural contexts, or by way of intuition (§2.5.1). Overwhelmingly, this has involved research in “institutional” settings. Secondly, I have shown that research has investigated a number of unique configurations of “social class”. These conceptualisations, however, remain theorisations selected by analysts. Three lines of reasoning were introduced on the basis of which this has been accomplished. In this section, I have proposed that these homologies have left considerable latitude for EM/(M)CA research. Moreover, I have claimed that the positions I have taken on these grounds distinguishes my research as a novel contribution. My analysis of “ordinary” interaction, for example, complements the existing focus of research on perspicuous, institutional fora. Equally, my focus on occasions in which “social class” is made avowedly relevant for participants, complements the substantive derivations of “social class” that have been privileged previously. Thus, it is chiefly in these two ways that my research offers a novel contribution not merely to FA “class-analysis”, but also to the allied body of EM/(M)CA research reviewed above. How this position was operationalised forms the focus of Chapter 4.

2.6 Chapter summary

This chapter has reviewed EM/(M)CA texts that have addressed “social class”. The chapter began with a review of the EM/(M)CA approach to social identity. A review was then provided of the three recurring forms in which “social class” has been incorporated into EM/(M)CA research (i.e. “instancial references”; “ethnographic allusions”; “propaedeutic commentaries”). How the concept has been addressed substantively was then detailed. This review was bifurcated into *observational* and *self-report* research, and into research conducted on forms of *talk-in-interaction*. The latter was stratified further into research that has addressed “social class” as an *independent* aspect of social identity, or as an *intersectional* component. The next section then introduced two homologies which obtain to this literature (i.e. “perspicuous settings”; “analysts’ resource”), and with respect to which my analysis offers a novel contribution. My alternative approach was then introduced in programmatic terms. The next chapter complements this focus with a review of the data and methods upon which this research is predicated.

Chapter 3 – Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The two preceding chapters have situated my research with respect to existing literature in sociology and EM/(M)CA. The focus of the present chapter concerns the design of my research. The first section introduces my methods of data-analysis; namely, Conversation Analysis (CA) and Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA). I begin first by extricating five of the central tenets of CA. MCA is then explicated, and its relationship to CA clarified. The section closes by reviewing my three stages of data-analysis. The second half of the chapter then introduces my dataset. For clarity, this section is bifurcated into secondary- and primary-data. This data is described by using the conventional cleavages of CA research. The section closes with a review of the procedure used to collect the latter, and of how this procedure conformed to ethical codes of conduct. The chapter concludes with a summary of my approach.

3.2 Method

Conversation Analysis (CA) integrated with Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) is the principal method of data-analysis used in this research. This chapter begins with an exposition of the former method, outlining five of its central tenets.⁵⁷

3.2.1 Conversation Analysis

Conversation Analysis (CA) was borne out of the lectures delivered by Harvey Sacks (1992 [1964-1972]) at University of California, Los Angeles, and subsequently developed and formalised in collaboration with Emanuel A. Schegloff and Gail Jefferson (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974). Broadly, CA involves the

⁵⁷ There is, of course, significant latitude, here. As Lynch and Bogen (1994: 75) write, ‘research in conversation analysis is diverse, and it would be inaccurate to suppose that it is governed by a single set of theoretical or methodological principles (Maynard and Clayman, 1991)’. Previous EM/(M)CA research has, however, disaggregated some stable tenets that undergird the enterprise (see, e.g., Heritage, 1984a: 241-244; 1989: 22-24; 1995: 394-398; Psathas, 1995: 2-3). It is a recapitulation of such consensual assumptions that follows hereafter.

description of the ‘methods persons use in doing social life’ (Sacks, 1984a: 21). It focalises the empirical methodicity of language-use within its “ecological niche” (recall fn. 12) of talk-in-interaction, investigating the interface of this domain with other non-vocal/non-verbal modalities – or ‘unspoken activity’ (Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 242-243, fn. 4). As an intellectual enterprise, CA is a ‘research stream’ (Heritage, 1984a: 241) that is derivative of EM (e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1967); however, it is also informed variously by other luminaries (e.g. Maynard and Clayman, 2003: 176). As introduced in §2.3.1, for example, Goffman’s (e.g. 1959; 1963; 1967; 1983 [1982]) influence is particularly notable. Together with EM, these two approaches furnish a mandate for the principled study of “everyday life” – or the “interaction order” (e.g. Goffman, 1983 [1982]). This domain is positioned not only as one that is viable for serious analysis, but as one that is conceptually primary to/for human sociality (see, e.g., Schegloff, 1996c: 54; 2006a; see also, §7.2.3). CA research sustains this focus on everyday life, awarding primacy to the study of social interaction. The principal focus of this research concerns how individuals – *qua* “co-interlocutors” – accomplish forms of social action through the observable details of their conduct, and how these trajectories come to be empirically and progressively realised in situated, comprehensible and reproducible ways. The abiding concern of CA research is thus with the description of the social actions employed by co-interlocutors, *in situ*. It is concerned, specifically, with the construction of ‘another grammar’ (Sacks, 1984a: 25; see also, Sacks, 1967) – that is, a ‘natural history’ (Heritage, 2003: 7), or ‘technique’ (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 421) – of talk-in-interaction.

The programmatic focus of CA is, thus, accumulative; to assemble an inventory of social actions which, together, as Schegloff (1996a: 209) writes, ‘compose the culture’s repertoire’ (see also, Schegloff, 1999c: 147, fn. 5).⁵⁸ In the realisation of this objective, CA is predicated upon a constellation of ‘analytic commitments’ (Pomerantz and Fehr, 1997: 64). For brevity, these can be condensed into five kernel predicates, concerning *social action*, *ordinary talk*, *order*, *sequence* and *context*. In practice, these tenets interdigitate empirically. They are individuated here, however,

⁵⁸ On the accumulation of findings in EM/(M)CA research, see Psathas (1995: 50) and, indirectly, Atkinson and Drew (1979: 235-236, fn. 15).

for clarity. In the first instance, this is included for any readers previously unacquainted with EM/(M)CA. However, it is further considered warranted, analytically, as CA has recursively incurred criticism for being ‘inexplicit’ (Levinson, 1983: 287) and/or for leaving ‘unarticulated’ (Kitzinger, 2000: 165) its underlying precepts (e.g. Segerdahl, 1998: 319-322). Like the criticism charged at EM (see Lynch, 1999: e.g. 213; e.g. Coser, 1975: 698) – and at Durkheim before it (see Heritage, 1987: 224, fn. 3) – this has culminated in an array of indictments.⁵⁹ This chapter does not present a forum in which to respond to such criticism. A layer of defence is intercalated here, however, prophylactically, by way of *exposing*, as opposed to *embedding*, such assumptions (here, see fn. 122). It is hoped that this procedure will, in so doing, obviate the need for further exposition.

(1) *Social Action*. Language has long been located as a domain within which forms of social action are realised in everyday life (e.g. Wittgenstein, 1968 [1953]: e.g. §23; Austin, 1975 [1962]: e.g. Ch. 1; Searle, 1976). CA upholds this focus, refining this through the analysis of *interaction* – or ‘talk in interaction’ (see Sacks et al., 1974: 720). This domain is understood as a – or, even, *the* – primary medium for social action.⁶⁰ This includes, *inter alia*, the actions of “accusing”, “disagreeing”, “inviting”, “offering”, “requesting” and “teasing”, for example. Talk-in-interaction, then, is not understood as redundant, nor otiose, nor is it conceived, simply, as the ‘behavioral realization’ (Clayman and Whalen, 1988/1989: 243), or ‘conduit’ (cf. Reddy, 1979: n.p.g. [EJBH: 288] in Clift, 2016: 6), of the cognitive processes implicated in the transferral of information, or meaning, only. Instead, as Schegloff (1997a: 500, italics in original) writes, talk-in-interaction is

⁵⁹ An indicative criticism of EM has been thematised in Chapter 2 (e.g. §2.3.2; see fn. 36). CA, by contrast, has been criticised, *inter alia*, for its ostensibly ‘a-theoretical’ (ten Have, 1997: n.p.a.) and ‘technocratic’ (Weltman, 2003: 355) character, ‘positivist orientation’ (Whelan, 2012: 281), as “‘anything goes’ sociology” (Heritage, 1987: 225) and a ‘method without substance’ (Heritage, 2008: 301). This has culminated in characterisations of the undertaking as putatively ‘bland’ (ten Have, 1997: n.p.a.), ‘dustbowl’ (Coser, 1975: n.p.g. in Heritage, 2008: 300) and ‘abstracted empiricism’ (R. Watson, 1997a: 58).

⁶⁰ On the latter reading, see Levinson (2005) and Schegloff (2005b; 2017).

conceived such that it ‘virtually always implicates *action*’. As Drew and Heritage (1992: 17, italics in original) observe, this veritable ‘*activity focus*’ constitutes the ‘decisive feature’ of CA and is implicated in the ‘bulk’ (Schegloff in Previgiano and Thibault, 2003: 166) of CA research.

(2) *Ordinary talk*. Talk-in-interaction is theorised as the most primary socio-cultural institution that underpins human sociality (see Schegloff, 1995a: 187; 1996a: 171a; 1996b: 4; 2006a: 70-71; 2007a: xiii). As Heritage (1995: 394; 2008: 305), writes, this is understood to antedate the inception of other institutions both ‘phylogenetically in the life of society and ontogenetically in the life of the individual’ (see also, Schegloff, 1996c: 54). The primary form of interaction is referred to in CA as “ordinary talk”. This rubric refers to ‘forms of interaction that are not confined to specialised settings or to the execution of particular tasks’ (Heritage, 2005a: 104). In CA research, this speech-exchange system is conceptualised as the ‘primordial site of human sociality’ (Schegloff, 1986: 112), and the relationship between ordinary and institutional talk is compared to ‘a master institution and its more restricted local variants’ (Heritage, 2005a: 108). Ordinary talk is treated, accordingly, as an ‘autonomous’ domain (e.g. Schegloff, 1992c: xxxi), and considered ‘the natural and cultural bedrock’ (Schegloff, 1996b: 3). In fine, it is understood as the most ‘predominant’ (Heritage, 1990: 45, fn. 6) and ‘among the most ancient’ (Heritage, 1984a: 239) mediums co-interlocutors employ to engage with and co-constitute human sociality. It is understood, as such, to constitute ‘sociological bedrock’ (Schegloff, 1996b: 4).

(3) *Order (possible) at all points*. Language-in-use has been assumed, traditionally, to represent an inappropriate domain of academic inquiry (e.g. Chomsky, 1965: 4, 58); one that is analytically subordinate to “*competence*” (ibid., italics in original) or “*langue*” (Saussure, 1966 [1959]: 9, italics in original; see also, Searle, 1970 [1969]: 17), abstract, hypothetical studies of language use. In CA research, however, this assumption is inverted. Talk-in-interaction is conceptualised and operationalised, in contrast, as a *potentially* systemic and systematic ‘*locus of order*’ (Schegloff, 2005a: 17, italics in original). Research has demonstrated, recurrently, that talk-in-interaction is ‘structurally organised’ (Heritage, 1989: 22), constructed, co-constructed (Schegloff, 1999a: 409) and reconstructed by co-interlocutors, methodically,

as a site of coordinated order (see Sacks, 1984a: 22; Psathas, 1995: 45). The upshot of this assumption is the injunction ‘order at all points’ (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 484); namely, that no province of human sociality, as it is instantiated through talk-in-interaction, may be ‘dismissed, *a priori*, as disorderly, accidental or interactionally irrelevant’ (Heritage, 1984a: 241, italics in original). This orderliness is not conceived as a worldview that is simply superimposed by the analyst, exogenously, but is exhibited by co-interlocutors endogenous to the interaction(s) analysed (see Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 290).

(4) *Sequence organisation*. Talk-in-interaction is analysed in CA as it is accomplished sequentially, turn-by-turn. The sense in which “sequence” is referred to here is in a ‘strong fashion’ (see Schegloff, 1972a: 76; see also, fn. 178), to borrow the phrase. Talk is not analysed simply in terms of its chronological production, but relationally. As Schegloff (in Čmerjková and Prevignano, 2003: 27) observes, a turn-at-talk is analysed for how it is ‘conditioned by its position in a stream of interaction’. In this respect, turns-at-talk are subject to what has been described as a ‘barely finite regress’ (Schegloff, 2002a: 289): In the moment in which they are (co-)produced, they are responsive to a prior whilst, at the same time, making “conditionally relevant” (see Sacks, 1967; Schegloff, 1968: 1075, 1083), who can/should contribute next, and how.⁶¹ Turns-at-talk are not, then, produced in a ‘null

⁶¹ To qualify, while talk-in-interaction (i.e. “first pair parts” [Schegloff, 2007a: 13]) is proposed to have a ‘sequential implicativeness’ (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 296, fn. 6), this organisation is not to be misunderstood as ‘regulative’ (Drew, 1978: 5) of conduct (see Coulter, 1973a: 37, 142, fn. 3; R. Watson and Weinberg, 1982: 60; Heritage, 1984: 256a; Schegloff, 1988: 118; Wootton, 1989: 252; Zimmerman and Boden, 1991: 10-11; Drew and E. Holt, 1998: 510-511). Certainly, social actions can be processed to privilege certain responses (e.g. Stivers and Rossano, 2010), ‘strengthened’ (e.g. Schegloff et al., 1977: 368, fn. 15) and rendered more ‘forceful’ (e.g. Clayman and Heritage, 2009: 303); however, they do not necessarily eventuate determinate occurrences or intended outcomes. The extent to which interaction can be described as empirically “*forcing*”, therefore, should not be overstated; although the moral implications of this position are worth entertaining (e.g. Psathas, 1990: 22-23).

context' (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984: 6), but are 'doubly contextual' (Heritage, 1984a: 242), both '*context-shaped*' and '*context-renewing*' (ibid., italics in original). Furthermore, as utterances are hearable against a prior, they can be inspected by co-interlocutors, *in situ*, and analysts, *ex post facto*, for how they have demonstrably (mis)understood prior turns. In this respect, the concepts of "intersubjectivity" (e.g. Schegloff, 1992d) and "meaning" (e.g. Clift, 2001), for example, are hypostatized sequentially – even 'incarnately' (à la H. Garfinkel, n.d. in Heritage, 1984a: 259) – as provisional and inspectable accomplishments.

- (5) *Context*. Talk-in-interaction is conceptualised in CA as a system, syntax or grammar that operates autonomously of the idiosyncrasies of co-interlocutors, and their psychologies (see, e.g., Schegloff, 1992c: xxxi). As canvassed in §2.2.1, however, this does not mean that dimensions of "context" are, by implication, necessarily occluded from the purview of EM/(M)CA research, nor are rendered inappreciable thereby (cf. Cicourel, 1981: n.p.g. in Mandelbaum, 1990/1991: 333; Thompson, 1984 in Hutchby, 1999: 85; Goffman, 1981: 32 in Heritage, 2003: 5). The salience of a "context" is, instead, adjudicated through the use of a 'relevancing procedure' (Schegloff, 1987a: 218) in CA research. Specifically, analysts must identify orientations to the "demonstrable relevance" (see Schegloff, 1992a: 107-110) and the "procedural consequentiality" (ibid.: 110-116) of that context by co-interlocutors. Forms of context, therefore, whether "*distal*" (see Schegloff, 1992e: 195, my emphasis) – such as 'institutional matrices' (ibid.) – or "*proximate*" (ibid., my emphasis) – such as "discourse identities" (see Zimmerman, 1998: 90) – in this sense, 'earns its way into the arena of analysis', as Schegloff (1992e: 215) writes. Context is treated, as such, as a contingent, situated achievement; one that is (re-)negotiated by co-interlocutors collaboratively, *in situ* (see Schegloff, 1999b: 579; e.g. Drew, 2002). It is not treated, in contrast, as either a 'threshold' phenomenon (see Schegloff, 1991: 62; 1992a: 127; see also, Schegloff in Wong and Olsher, 2000: 124) nor 'analytic object' (Schegloff, 1991: 47), to borrow the expression, wherein the scope and/or the magnitude of its putative (ir)relevancies are determined by the diktat of analysts (here, see Benson, 1974: 127; Lynch, 1993: 30; Schegloff, 1999b: 577). Instead, CA affords an

evidential apparatus to evaluate the relevance of “contexts” for co-interlocutors both endogenously and accountably (see §3.2.2).

These tenets, I propose, represent five central assumptions which undergird CA research. CA, as such, is underpinned by a coherent set of empirico-analytic convictions. Consequently, the approach is not ‘*merely* formalistic’ (Schegloff in Čmerjková and Prevignano, 2003: 29, italics in original; see also, Schegloff, 1988: 131), nor devoid of theoretical assumptions.

3.2.2 Membership Categorisation Analysis

Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) is a cognate enterprise to CA. Sharing heritage in the lectures of Sacks (1992 [1964-1972]), MCA is interested in the ‘methods’ and ‘reasoning’ of membership in interaction, and the social actions, activities and/or projects ⁶² for which these are accomplished upon production (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2015: 5). Central to this enterprise are the heuristics of “*membership categories*” and “*categorization device[s]*” (see Sacks, 1972: e.g. 32). As Hester and Eglin (1997c: 3) write, the former refers to the ‘classifications or social types that may be used to describe persons’. ‘[T]he middle class’, for example, as noted by Coulter (1982: 36 in Hester and Eglin, 1997c: 3), furnishes one topical example of this work. The latter concept, in contrast, refers to collections of membership categories that are interconnected by their shared relationship to some device (here, see Sacks, 1972: 32). The avowedly “classed” membership categories “middle class” and “working class”, for example, might be read-off, on some occasions, to constitute the device of “social class”, itself. ⁶³

Using these heuristics, *inter alia*, ⁶⁴ MCA studies the taken-for-granted methods of categorisation that are employed in everyday life and investigates how identities are invoked through discourse. In this way, it shares a number of assumptions with CA. Members’ classificatory practices, and the practical work for which these are

⁶² Schegloff’s (2007a: 244-249) distinction.

⁶³ Here, see R. Watson (1978 in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 260, fn. 29).

⁶⁴ See, e.g., Jayyusi (2014 [1984]), Hester and Eglin (1997a) and Stokoe (2012a).

mobilised, for example, are treated as (potentially) orderly (see §3.2.1). Social identity, as a form of “context”, is also treated as a situated, occasioned and accountable accomplishment, and not as an aprioristic, invariant and/or static phenomenon (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 46). Furthermore, MCA research has also attended to the social actions (e.g. “complimenting”; “complaining”) for which these classificatory practices are mobilised (see, e.g., Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 597-600). Thus, MCA shares the ‘*activity focus*’ (Drew and Heritage, 1992: 17, italics in original) of CA (see §3.2.1). As a result, MCA appears broadly compatible with CA, sharing several of its programmatic tenets. However, this confluence notwithstanding, the relationship between these enterprises remains, in some sense, equivocal.

3.2.3 Synthesis

For some, CA and MCA are distinct traditions of EM, with marginal intersections in their ambits. CA has been seen to prioritise the sequential organisation of talk-in-interaction, for example, whereas MCA focuses on members’ practices of categorisation (e.g. Hester and Eglin, 1997c: 2; R. Watson, 1997a). If and how these two approaches can/should be reconciled, therefore, has generated a range of perspectives. Some, for example, consider a convergence necessary (e.g. Stokoe, 2012a; 2012b); permissible only upon the fulfilment of certain conditions (e.g. Schegloff, 2007b: 477); and even superfluous for others still (e.g. Fitzgerald, 2012). As this research strives for an integrative approach, it is worth making my position clear. In this case, CA and MCA are treated as fundamentally compatible. As to whether my particular focus (i.e. “social class”), is occasioned through resources that have originated from MCA, and/or CA, I remain agnostic. Both will be employed where appropriate, hereafter. This approach is preferred to one that involves an arbitrary pledge to one enterprise at/to the expense of the other. That which is prioritised, instead, is whether my claims are *defensible*, where this is evaluated against the demonstrable orientations of co-interlocutors. This position has been informed by the approach adopted by Whitehead (2012) in the following passage.

“As a result, although I have been trained primarily in CA, under the direction of people who would most likely be viewed as representatives of a CA perspective, I am not overly concerned about whether my contributions are characterized as exemplifying a CA or MCA approach, or both. I am

concerned, however, with whether my work is *faithful* to the empirical details of the data on which it is based, and whether it makes a contribution to the understanding of social organization broadly, and social categories and talk-in-interaction in particular. I would thus argue that, regardless of where our research interests come from or how the data that we examine is selected, the crucial issue is whether, once we have the data in front of us, we are bound by its integrity (Schegloff, 2005).”

(Whitehead, 2012: 341, my emphasis)

The differences between the two enterprises are, therefore, moot. I will draw on resources that are differently associated with CA and MCA according to what is relevant for co-interlocutors in some moment. In so doing, this thesis aligns with a growing tradition – or ‘renaissance’ (Stokoe, 2012a: 278) – of analyses of social identity as occasioned sequentially in forms of talk-in-interaction (for review, see Whitehead, 2012: 338). In summary, MCA features in this research not as a distinct, second method of data-analysis, but as an analytic sensibility that is ‘mutually elaborative’ (Fitzgerald, 2012: 307) of CA.

3.3 Procedure

The application of EM/(M)CA is defined by a number of key empirical stages. For clarity, these are disaggregated into three activities: (1) recording, (2) transcription and (3) collection building. In practice, data-analysis did not follow these stages chronologically. This owed to the analysis of primary- ($n=59$) and secondary-data ($n=900$). As the latter comprised previously recorded instances of interaction, it thereby alleviated the need for recording. Thus, whereas primary-data required this step, secondary-data were, upon acquisition, available for transcription; if not collection building. Secondary-data were also not analysed in a discrete empirico-analytic stage, but as and when it was accrued, iteratively (see §3.4.2.4). As primary-data ($n=59$) was collected, for instance, a small proportion of secondary-data ($n=186$) was analysed, simultaneously, for which I possessed existing access. The three stages individuated below did not, therefore, necessarily obtain for each data corpus, nor

were they completed consecutively. As “*ideal-types*”,⁶⁵ however, this procedure characterises my process accurately, if not temporally. This procedure satisfied the requirements of the “Research Ethics Framework” (ESRC, n.d.) and passed ethical review conducted by the “Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics Committee” (i.e. “ELMPS”) at the University of York.

3.3.1 Recording

An initial stage in conducting CA research involves gaining access to recorded instances of talk-in-interaction. Recordings are criterial to CA research (see Psathas, 1995: 45; Schegloff, 1996a: 166) and, as a technology, represent one of the primary affordances that enabled the emergence of the enterprise (see Schegloff in Čmerjková and Prevignano 2003: 17-18). The limits of space preclude a review of the numerous affordances that are presented by this analysis. Suffice it to note only that recordings provide unparalleled access to the particulars of talk-in-interaction, allowing for the repeated inspection of materials that have not been distorted by, or deteriorated through, the recollection of analysts (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984: 3), and/or have been constrained by the horizons of their imaginations and/or intuitions (see Sacks, 1984a: 25; 1992, Vol. I: 115; Vol. II: 419), *inter alia* (see Psathas, 1990: 9; see §1.6.1).

The recordings analysed in this research include both audio- ($n=905$) and video-recordings ($n=54$). In the collection of primary-data ($n=59$), video-recordings of face-to-face interactions were prioritised in the assembly of this corpus. In total, these represent approximately two-thirds of the primary-dataset ($n=39$). This type of recording represents the ‘state-of-the-art form’ (Schegloff in Prevignano and Thibault, 2003: 167) in relation to face-to-face interaction, conferring the analyst with expectably greater (e.g. “holistic”) access to the contexture of the interactions than that made available through unimodal, audio-recordings (for review, see, e.g., Heritage and Sefi, 1992: 413-414, fn. 2; Mondada, 2006). Previous EM/(M)CA research, for example, has demonstrated the consequentiality of non-vocal modalities

⁶⁵ Weber’s (1978a: e.g. 9, my emphasis) term.

(e.g. “embodiment”; “spatiality”) for unfolding instances of talk-in-interaction.⁶⁶ Video-recordings were, therefore, privileged inasmuch as they expectably afford greater access to non-vocal domains; domains which could, again, theoretically, inform aspects of the interaction. This was of particular importance for this research due to the paucity of empirical EM/(M)CA inquiries into “social class” (see §2.4). Specifically, as the parameters for how “social class” could be made relevant by co-participants were equivocal, video-recordings were privileged in order to capture as much of the interaction as possible. Once collected, recordings were available for repeated inspection. Where candidate orientations to “social class” were observed, these instances were transcribed.

3.3.2 Transcription

Transcription constitutes a ‘pervasive and elementary’ (Bogen, 1992: 280) component of CA research. Theoretically, this process is ‘never-ending’ (Coates and Thornborrow, 1999: 596); CA transcripts are ‘virtually endlessly revisable’ (Schegloff, 1988/1989: 238, fn. 3; 1992a: 133, fn. 9), and, in practice, are amended and added to iteratively (see Kitzinger, 1998). The transcription system devised by Jefferson (2004b) is the ‘de facto standard’ (Hepburn and Potter, 2006: 175) of EM/(M)CA research.⁶⁷ This system of modified orthography – or ‘symbolology’ (Coulter, 1995b: 336, fn. 1) – comprises a set of standardised conventions used to capture the details of talk-in-interaction (e.g. lexical, sequential, prosodic, temporal, etc.) as they are (co-)produced, sequentially, *verbatim*.⁶⁸ Jeffersonian (2004b) transcripts primarily attend to vocal communicative practice; however, it is also integrated routinely with systems of multi-modal transcription (see, e.g., Clift, 2016:

⁶⁶ On the former, e.g., see Stivers (2008). On the latter, see Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 281-284), LeBaron and Streeck (1997) and Schegloff (2000b: 5), differently.

⁶⁷ For the transcription conventions used in this research, see Appendix 1.0.

⁶⁸ As with other forms of transcription (see Ochs, 1979: 44) – and description more broadly (see Sacks, 1990 [1963]: 91-93) – the Jeffersonian (e.g. 2004b) system is irremediably selective. Nevertheless, the system furnishes analysts the opportunity to attend to such features.

52-53).⁶⁹ The Jeffersonian (2004b) system is, then, mutable, and provides the basis for the analysis of recorded instances of talk-in-interaction in CA research. Notably, the system also performs a regulatory function in the EM/(M)CA tradition. Specifically, the use and dissemination of Jeffersonian (2004) transcripts allows for the ‘public verification’ (see S. Albert et al., 2018: 401) of analytic claims. By reviewing transcripts in conjunction with their recordings, researchers occupy a position in which they can (dis-)confirm (un-)substantiated claims (see Whitehead, 2011: 5; see also, Widdicombe, 1993: 109 in Kitzinger, 1998: 138), and, moreover, are positioned such that they can authenticate these claims independently (e.g. C. Goodwin, 2003: 58-59). Thus, just as “sequence organisation” endows co-interlocutors with an “architecture of intersubjectivity” (see Heritage, 1984a: 254-260), the Jeffersonian (2004b) system reflexively emplaces an “*architecture of accountability*” upon analysts.

Jeffersonian (2004b) transcription was conducted manually in this research (see Bolden, 2015). Audio-files were replayed using the programme “*Audacity 2.1.2*” and video-files using “*Quicktime*”. Where secondary-data were already transcribed, their veracity was corroborated by repeated listening to audio-/video-files. Only the relevant segments of recordings were transcribed in this research. This resulted from the time-consuming nature of Jeffersonian (2004b) transcription. A transcription of the entire corpus ($n=959$) – one that is uncharacteristically large for EM/(M)CA research (see §3.4.2.4) – would have impinged upon the remaining time for analysis.⁷⁰ Excerpts of the recordings were thus transcribed only in the instances in which candidate orientations to “social class” were identified. On such occasions, detailed transcripts were constructed in order to attend to the range of components that the

⁶⁹ The utility of a number of variants (e.g. C. Goodwin, 1981; Kendon, 2004; Rossano, 2012) were tested in previous research (i.e. Holmes, 2015). In this research, Mondada’s (2014) system was selected for integration. Due to my focus here on vocal practices, however, this system has not yet been incorporated. Following previous EM/(M)CA research, I instead provide characterisations of the ‘grossly apparent [non-verbal/vocal] actions’ (see Drew, 1989: 99). A systematic analysis of such embodied practices awaits future EM/(M)CA research (see §7.3).

⁷⁰ For comparable concerns, see Atkinson and Drew (1979: 3).

Jeffersonian (e.g. 2004b) system appreciates. This inclusive procedure is one familiar to CA research (e.g. Wiggins, 2002: 81), and provides for the contingency that if co-interlocutors made “social class” relevant through some unanticipated interactional resource, or in the service of some unexpected social action, this could, theoretically, be incorporated into this research, and not excluded aprioristically and/or unknowingly.

3.3.3 Collection building

Once candidate instances had been transcribed, these were subject to dedicated individual analysis (here, see Schegloff, 1987b). As these analyses accumulated, putative “patterns” were observed, and which formed the substantive basis for emergent “collections” (see Psathas, 1995: 50). Collections, simply put, comprised more than one instance of the candidate phenomenon; conventionally, these include at least three cases (see Clift, 2016: xvi; Drew, 2006: 80, fn. 4; Clift and C. Raymond, 2018: 93; differently, see Sacks, 1978: 254; Jefferson, 1990: 66-68). The process of collection building involves accreting cases of the focal phenomenon which are, in some way, homologous; be that with respect to their form (e.g. syntactic, semantic, prosodic, etc.), function and/or intersubjective operation, for example.⁷¹ The accumulation of decidedly similar cases furnishes the context by reference to which the coordinates of core, “clearcut [(sic)]” (à la Schegloff, 1997a: 529) cases can be adjudicated, and whereby comparatively “deviant”, “equivocal” and/or “countervailing” cases (howsoever described) can be discriminated (here, see Heritage, 1999: 70; see also, Coulter, 1983: 373-374).⁷² Analytically, instances of the

⁷¹ On the processual analysis of these components in CA, see Heritage (2011a). For commentaries on collection building specifically, see Schegloff (1996a; 1997a: 501-502; 2009: 391-393; 2000 in Wong and Olsher, 2000: 118; in Čmetjková and Prevignano, 2003: 16) and Clift and C. Raymond (2018).

⁷² *Inter alia*, this includes so-called ‘aberrant event[s]’ (Whalen, Zimmerman and Whalen, 1988: 340), ‘ballpark phenomena’ (Jefferson, 2004c: 134), ‘boundary cases’ (Schegloff, 1997a: 502), ‘counter cases’ (Jefferson, 1983: 22), ‘deviant cases’ (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984: 2), ‘official absences’ (Schegloff, 1968: 1083ff in Clayman and Maynard, 1995: 29-30, fn. 8), ‘eventful absences’ (Clift and C. Raymond, 2018: 96), ‘negative cases’ (J. Robinson and Bolden, 2010: 526), ‘non-practices’ (Lynch, 1985: 295, fn. 17) and ‘relevant

latter (*qua* “outliers”), offer analysts opportunities to evaluate the stringency of a collection (see Silverman, 1993: n.p.g. in Silverman, 1994: 434). In some occasions, this proved explicative, whereby cases could be understood, profitably, as transgressions (howsoever characterised).

Collection building proceeded “*inductively*” in this research, with limited formal circumscription (here, see Psathas, 1995: 50). However, as others have qualified (e.g. Silverman, 1998: 59; Clayman and Gill, 2004: 596), pure “induction” is, of course, procedurally untenable. To investigate some phenomenon, one must have some preliminary notion (howsoever tentative), thereof. In this case, as I explicate in Chapter 4, candidate instances in which “social class” was made relevant for co-interlocutors, in some way, were adjudicated using a designedly inclusive, threefold criterion.

- (1) When and insofar as they aligned with Formal Analytic (FA) conceptualisations of “social class”; that is, resonating, in some capacity, with the analyst’s professional knowledge (*qua* “sociologist”).
- (2) When and insofar as “social class” was more or less explicitly named by co-interlocutors themselves.
- (3) When and insofar as some component of talk-in-interaction was otherwise simply hearable as “classed”; that is, resonating, in some capacity, with the analyst’s lay knowledge (*qua* “member”).

This trichotomy offers a broad and inclusive operationalisation of “social class” according to which candidate instantiations were accumulated. It is worth highlighting here that a FA understanding of “social class” was not “bracketed” (see Schegloff, 1992a: 118; see also, Heritage, 1987: 231-232) and divorced from this analysis – such as that associated with ‘ethnomethodological indifference’ (see H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 345; recall fn. 21). FA conceptualisations were, instead, retained in order to allow for the possibility that co-interlocutors serviced such “professional”

nonoccurrence[s]’ (Schegloff, 1996a: 192; see also, Schegloff, 1993: e.g. 107-110; 2007a: 19-21).

understandings so as to reflexively instantiate the relevance of this device. This criterion, however, was employed in order to glean *candidate* cases, only. Whether “social class” was demonstrably relevant for co-interlocutors required these co-interlocutors to explicate this relevance, *in situ*. Thus, where an instance resonated with some extant conceptualisation of “social class” (e.g. “lay”; “professional”), this did not equate with “demonstrable relevance” (see Schegloff, 1991: 49-52; 1992a: 107-110). The instances accrued through this criterion were, thereby, treated in the same way as “*intuitions*” in EM/(M)CA research.⁷³ As Levinson (1983: 287) writes, these ‘do not circumscribe the data’; instead, they are required to be ‘disciplined’ (Zimmerman, 1988: 421 in Clayman and Gill, 2004: 591) through the prism of “demonstrable relevance” (Schegloff, 1991; 1992). Thus, collections were formed inclusively when they contained putative orientations to “social class” in some recognisable and potentially reproducible capacity (here, see §3.4.1.2).

Like transcription (see §3.3.2; Bolden, 2015: 277), collection building is not a preliminary to EM/(M)CA research, and one undertaken prior to analysis, proper (Toerien, 2014: 331). Instead, it forms a crucial, constitutive part of the analytic process. Whether something constituted an orientation to “social class” was subject to revision as additional instances were transcribed. As more cases were encountered, these collections were streamlined through a process comparable to ‘analytic induction’ (see Wieder and Zimmerman, 1976: 339, fn. 3; Pomerantz, 1988: 361; Clayman and Maynard, 1995: 7; Heritage, 1995: 399), whereby the systematics identified within previous cases were (re-)applied to those newly discovered. The remit of collections was, thus, designed inclusively – even ‘generously’ (see Schegloff, 1996a: 176; 1997a: 502, 539) – with the intention being able to accommodate the contingencies of each case. My collections in this way sought to provide comprehensively, and not to represent only those cases considered “most clear” (see Znaniecki, 1934 in Clayman and Gill, 2004: 601). Accordingly, my collections mutated significantly as this research progressed. New collections

⁷³ Here, see, e.g., Schegloff (1967: 49-50; 1984a: 46), Coulter (1979a: 24), Heritage (1984a: 238), Zimmerman (1988: n.p.g. in R. Watson, 2008: §58), Schegloff in Wong and Olsher (2000: 118) and Clift (2005: 1642).

emerged; some were revised; others collapsed. Several ‘core collection[s]’ (Schegloff, 1996a: 177), however, stabilised. These comprised practices in which “social class” was actuated by co-interlocutors (e.g. Chapters 4 and 5), and the social actions for which these practices were serviced, *in situ* (e.g. Chapter 6).

3.4 Data

This section provides a descriptive overview of the data analysed in this thesis. For clarity, I focus first on the secondary-data analysed in this research (§3.4.1). I turn next to the primary-data that I have collected and analysed (§3.4.2). This distinction is, however, purely nominal. They are bifurcated here in interests of transparency, to facilitate interpretation; they were not treated, procedurally, as distinct.⁷⁴ In the chapters that follow, both the primary- and secondary-data are analysed in conjunction. Justification for this homogenising approach is elaborated in §3.4.1.2, below.

3.4.1 Secondary-data

The secondary-data comprised twenty existing corpora of naturalistic instances of talk-in-interaction ($n=900$; see Table 1).

⁷⁴ The distinctions here, regarding the constitution of my dataset, are confined to those considered explicative vis-à-vis the objectives of this research (§1.7.1). Theoretically, there are an indefinite number of axes by reference to which my dataset could be disaggregated; that is, for example, when adjudicated against some criterion of ‘correspondence’ (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 418; 1972: 33; Schegloff, 2004 [1969-1970]: 82; 1972a: 81; 1972b: 97), ‘descriptive’ (Schegloff, 1992c: xxxvii), ‘literal’ (R. Turner, 1974 [1970]: 208; Wooffitt, 1992: 59), ‘objective’ (Moerman, 1968b: 160) and/or ‘sheer correctness’ (Schegloff, 1992e: 195). The solution implemented in this section is, thus, comparatively ‘positivistic’ (see Schegloff, 1987a: 218; 1991: 51; 1992a: 108; 1997: 166; see also, Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 19-20; recall fn. 25) in orientation. The classifications imposed are not informed by the orientations of co-interlocutors, endogenously, but derived from the exogenous conventions of EM/(M)CA; a set of conventions to which this very caveat belongs (i.e. Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 291-292, fn. 4).

Table 1 – Secondary-data	
Corpus	Data count
CallFriend	119
CallHome	119
Conversation Analytic British National Corpus (CABNC)	35
CTS	75
Examples	1
Freelunch	6
Griffith Corpus of Spoken Australian English (GCSAusE)	39
Heritage	96
Holt	83
ISL	14
Movin	3
Newport Beach (NB)	26
Rahman	22
Saarbrücken Corpus of Spoken English (SCoSE)	17
Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBCSAE)	39
Santa Barbara Ladies (SBL)	21
Single calls	42
Switchboard (SWB)	37
UC Discourse Laboratory (UCDiscLab)	103
Wheatley	3
Total	900

These datasets combine both the so-called ‘classic’ and ‘contemporary’ CA corpora (see Kitzinger, 2005b: 225; Wilkinson and Weatherall, 2011: 66, fn. 4). The former is comprised of five datasets ($n=168$), for which a breakdown is presented in Table 2. These corpora comprise exclusively landline telephone calls collected over the 1960s-1970s and which include a number of “‘cult” fragments’ (Mondada, 2006: 53) frequently re-analysed in CA research (here, see Heritage, 1984a: 238). Since their collection, these data have been distributed at the discretion of CA practitioners and figure frequently in EM/(M)CA research (see S. Albert et al., 2018: 402, 419, fn. 3). Reflecting the anglophone heritage of CA (see Heritage, 1995: 391-393; see also,

Antaki, 1994: 91; Clayman, 2002: 247), this data is conducted by participants in American- ($n=47$) and British-English ($n=121$).

Table 2 – Classic data	
Corpus	Data count
Heritage	96
Newport Beach (NB)	26
Rahman	22
Santa Barbara Ladies (SBL)	21
Wheatley	3
Total	168

The remaining secondary-data ($n=732$) analysed forms the “contemporary” CA corpora, comprising fifteen datasets (see Table 3).

Table 3 – Contemporary data	
Corpus	Data count
CallFriend	119
CallHome	119
Conversation Analytic British National Corpus (CABNC)	35
CTS	75
Examples	1
FreeLunch	6
Griffith Corpus of Spoken Australian English (GCSAusE)	39
Holt	83
ISL	14
MOVIN	3
Saarbrücken Corpus of Spoken English (SCoSE)	17
Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBCSAE)	39
Single Calls	42
Switchboard (SWB)	37
UC Discourse Laboratory (UCDiscLab)	103
Total	732

Like the “classic” data, the “contemporary” corpora were predominantly telephonic ($n=465$), with a smaller proportion conducted as face-to-face interactions ($n=267$). Interactions were (co-)produced in American- ($n=495$), British- ($n=196$) and Australian-English ($n=41$) and were collected for academic analysis. The data have not, therefore, been repurposed. Access to eleven datasets ($n=497$) was mediated through the data repository TalkBank (i.e. MacWhinney, 2007).⁷⁵ Access to the CABNC ($n=35$) was provided through a separate databank (i.e. S. Albert, de Ruiter and de Ruiter, 2015).⁷⁶ The three remaining datasets ($n=200$) were made available by their respective custodians.⁷⁷

3.4.1.1 Summary

The secondary-data corpus initially contained 1034 interactions.⁷⁸ An initial analysis was conducted whereby each interaction was listened to and, where applicable, watched. The dataset was “cleaned” through this process so as to retain only ordinary

⁷⁵ Namely, “Examples” (n.d.), “UCDiscLab” (n.d.; see Ervin-Tripp and Kuentay, 1995), “CallFriend” (n.d.), “CallHome” (n.d.), “SWB” (i.e. Godfrey, Holliman and McDaniel, 1992; Graff and Bird, 2000), “Movin” (n.d.), “Freelunch” (n.d.), “SBCSAE” (n.d.), “SCoSE” (n.d.), “GCSAusE” (n.d.) and “ISL” (n.d.). I am grateful to Professor Brian MacWhinney for granting me permission to analyse these datasets.

⁷⁶ My thanks to Dr Saul Albert for facilitating access to this dataset. Only a sample of total recordings were incorporated for analysis after parsing their corresponding transcripts. This method of data-collection – while certainly ‘less exhaustive’ (Drew, 1997: 73, fn. 1) – is often employed in CA research (e.g. Drew, 2003a: 297; Clayman, 1992: 198, fn. 2). Additional orientations may, therefore, have been overlooked.

⁷⁷ The “CTS” corpus, for example, was collected, transcribed and provided by Dr Clare Jackson (for review, see Jackson, 2011a). It is not to be confused with the ‘*Children Tell Stories*’ corpus cited in classic EM/(M)CA texts (see Pitcher and Prelinger, 1963 35, 31 in Sacks, 1972: 430, fn. 15; 1992, Vol. I: 223, fn. 1). The corpus “Single Calls” includes a combination of “classic” data in addition to recordings made available by a number of colleagues. Special thanks to Dr Marc Alexander, Dr Rebecca Clift, Professor Charles Goodwin, Professor Marjorie Harness Goodwin, Professor Richard Ogden and Professor Elizabeth Stokoe for their generosity.

⁷⁸ This amounted to 361 hours, 50 minutes and 20 seconds, with an average length of 21 minutes, 20 seconds.

forms of talk-in-interaction conducted in English ($n=900$).⁷⁹ The data remaining amounted to 325 hours, 5 minutes and 47 seconds, with a mean duration of 21 minutes, 58 seconds per datum. This comprised an assemblage of telephone calls ($n=633$), both landline and mobile, and co-present, face-to-face interactions ($n=267$). Interactions were conducted in American- ($n=542$), Australian- ($n=41$), and British-English ($n=317$) and were largely discrete, with some oriented to as return-calls, and ‘conversations-in-a-series’ (Schegloff, 1980: 106; see also, Button, 1991). The co-interlocutors habitating the dataset also occupied various relationships with one another, including, *inter alia*, acquaintances, colleagues and relatives, amongst other ‘reason for the call relationships’ (Schegloff, 1992c: xxi). Accordingly, the secondary-dataset represents an eclectic corpus. The implications of this data for the nature of my claims, therefore, deserves qualification.

3.4.1.2 On generalisability

The bases by reference to which “*generalisability*” is adjudicated in sociological research are diverse (for review, see Gobo, 2008). One canonical line of reasoning revolves around the derivation of representative *sample* of the focal population. Observations that are made from this sample are then treated such that they can be extrapolated, legitimately, to the host population from which they have been derived. When situated in such terms, therefore, my research does not appear promising. Provided the heterogeneity of my secondary-dataset, it is difficult to imagine the broader population for which such a corpus could be considered representative. As outlined in Chapter 2 (§2.5.3), my purview has been confined to “ordinary talk” conducted within the English language. Beyond this, however, my data has not been further delimited. It was not circumscribed according to the interactions of particular co-interlocutors, for example, at particular times and/or in particular settings. My research may, therefore, be considered limited in the extent to which my findings could be considered “generalisable” when so evaluated; presumably constrained by interactional forum (i.e. “ordinary talk”) and language (i.e. English).

⁷⁹ Interactions were culled on the conditions in which data was duplicated ($n=6$), recordings corrupted ($n=2$), or in which participants oriented, predominantly, to their respective institutional identities ($n=125$).

It is worth qualifying, however, that this sense of “generalisability” was not an aspiration of this research (cf. §1.7.1) and, moreover, it also enshrines a set of commitments that are incongruent with those embodied by this inquiry.⁸⁰ Specifically, such a sense of “generalisability” is derived from an epistemology in which the stipulation of actor relevancies is permitted for analysts. This is required in two senses. Exogenously, analysts must select how their cohort (*qua* “sample”) qualifies as *representative* (howsoever delimited) of the population from which they have been derived. Concurrently, they are required to delineate what would constitute an *adequate* sample of the focal phenomenon itself. The former is obligated insofar as objects of description can be specified infinitely. It is therefore incumbent upon analysts, so invested, to nominate the salient bases in relation to which the sample can(not) be considered representative (recall §2.2.1). Similarly, regarding the latter, what counts as a satisfactory sample of an interactional practice – as explored elsewhere – remains unestablished (i.e. Holmes, Toerien and Jackson, 2017: 422, fn. 6). Thus, as these features form the basis for claims to ‘exogenous distribution’ (Clayman and Gill, 2004: 591), to borrow the phrase, they require stipulation by analysts.⁸¹

To resolve these problematics, therefore, and to claim “generalisable” results in the FA idiom, thus requires a “positivistic” solution to the problem of *relevance* (see fn. 25 and fn. 74). As this would be incongruent with the EM/(M)CA commitments of

⁸⁰ Whether the practices analysed could be localised and/or extrapolated to particular substantive conditions (e.g. persons, places, times, etc.), for example, is therefore, fundamentally extraneous. Furthermore, as observed elsewhere, the examination of “generalisability”, in this sense, would logically postdate the completion of the present inquiry. It is necessary, after all, to first delineate the object in relation to which a sample is proposedly representative before establishing the parameters of its purported genericity (for review, see Pomerantz, 1980: 234; Schegloff, 1993: 102, 113; Clayman and Gill, 2004: 591).

⁸¹ On the problem of “*adequacy*”, more generally, see, e.g., Coulter (1973a: 6-7; 1979a: 25; 1990: 182-183), Cicourel (1974: 197), Goffman (in Verhoeven, 1993 [1980]: 340-341), Schegloff (1993: 110-114, 123, fn. 17; 2000c: 210, 241, fn. 20; 2005b: 471, fn. 10) and Schegloff and Lerner (2009: 113).

this research, such a sense of “generalisability” was not therefore pursued. However, to qualify, this does not concede that my findings are purely an artefact of circumstance and/or the unique complexion of my corpus (howsoever formulated). Instead, following previous EM/(M)CA research, the type of generalisability at stake is one of a different order (see, e.g., Zimmerman and Pollner, 1974 [1970]: 97; Atkinson, 1978: 185-186; Silverman, 2000: 108-109 in Whitehead, 2011: 8). This concerns the ‘*possibilities of language use*’ (Peräkylä, 2011: 375, italics in original). Specifically, I claim that if “social class” has been made relevant by co-interlocutors once, such orientations are at least potentially reproducible by others (here, see Holmes et al., 2017: 422; see also, Ziferstein, 1972: 113-114). In this sense, the findings that are discerned from my data *potentially* represent durable social structures.⁸² Thus, while I am limited, empirically, and disinterested, epistemologically, in FA senses of “generalisability”, my integration of disparate sources data may still provide the potential for generalisable results, differently conceived. Accordingly, it is on this basis that I have predicated my inquiry on the analysis of a diverse corpus of secondary-data.

3.4.2 Primary-data

The second source of data incorporated in this research comprises a corpus (viz. “EJBH corpus”, titled acronymically) of face-to-face audio- ($n=20$) and video-recordings ($n=39$) collected between May-October 2016 in four counties across the United Kingdom (see Table 4).⁸³

⁸² On the *potential* of this order, see Schegloff (2005a: 17-18). Of course, this is not to deny that such practices may be culturally (see Schegloff, 1996d: 471, fn. 2) and/or historically sensitive (see Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 618). However, as others have observed, the purposes for which they are mobilised by co-interlocutors possesses a greater degree of stability than their form dictates (see Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 634; see also, Heritage, 2011: 268 in Clift, 2016: 31).

⁸³ Following previous research (e.g. Jackson, 2011a: 91), recordings have been assigned a three-part, alphanumeric identifier (e.g. EJBH_F1_01). This comprises the initials of the researcher (i.e. “EJBH”); the field site (e.g. “F1”) under the auspices of which the recording was conducted; and an integer that reflects the chronological assembly of the corpus (e.g. “01”). None of the “EJBH” extracts are to be reproduced without permission from the author.

Table 4 – Primary-data				
Field site:	Data count	Hours	Minutes	Seconds
#1	14	7	26	47
#2	7	7	1	4
#3	2	1	24	39
#4	36	52	4	18
Total	59	67	56	48

This dataset comprises a total of 78 participants from a diverse array of socio-demographic backgrounds. Some participants contributed to multiple interactions, amounting to a total of 170 interactants. The mean number of participants per recording was 3, with the minimum of 2 and a maximum of 6. It was envisaged, initially, that a corpus of exclusively video-recorded, co-present interactions would be accrued.⁸⁴ As data-collection progressed, however, audio-recordings were found to be preferred by participants. As the research also suffered from a low-participant response rate, unimodal audio-only recordings were treated as admissible. In total, the corpus comprises 59 face-to-face interactions including video-recorded ($n=39$) and audio-only ($n=20$). Interactions possessed a mean duration of 1 hour, 9 minutes, and 6 seconds, with a minimum of 6 minutes 59 seconds, and a maximum of 3 hours 14 minutes and 2 seconds.

The collection of primary-data followed two trajectories. The first involved the collection of data with members of the public, or “non-intimates”, at publicly accessible locations. The second, in contrast, was conducted with familiars, or “intimates”, in comparably private settings. In both cases, data was collected ethically, adhering to the guidelines of the ELMPS Committee (i.e. University of York), Research Ethics Framework (i.e. ESRC, n.d.), British Sociological Association (i.e. BSA, 2002) and Data Protection Act (1998). For clarity, these procedures are explicated serially below.

⁸⁴ Recall §3.3.1.

3.4.2.1 Non-intimates

A number of prospective field-sites were contacted, in person, to determine whether video-recordings, and/or audio-only recordings, could be conducted onsite. The majority of these locations included cafés and restaurants. These environments were selected not as the situs of some particular “classed” groups, but as species of “open place” (see Goffman, 1963: 134); locations in which diverse groups of persons expectably congregate. It was this dimension that furnished the perspicuity (see H. Garfinkel, 2002: e.g. 182) of these settings for my purpose; not their potentially “classed” connotations (howsoever described; cf. §2.5.1). After receiving permission to record, participant recruitment began.

Participants were recruited followed an opportunistic, non-random sampling strategy (see Peräkylä, 2011: 377). Prospective participants were approached in groups and invited to participate. I briefed prospective participants of what the research entailed, the benefits of their involvement, and the anticipated outcomes of the research. If prospective participants expressed interest in participating, they were invited to review the project information sheet (see Appendix 2.0) and to ask any questions. If prospective participants declined to participate, they were thanked and not re-approached (see BSA, 2002: §17). Those who expressed willingness were then provided a further opportunity to field questions, allay concerns, and ward off misunderstandings. Participants were then apprised of their entitlements.

Participants were informed that their data would be confidential (BSA, 2002: §18-19 and §34), remain anonymised by way of pseudonyms (see BSA, 2002: §36) and through the visual obscuration of video-recordings.⁸⁵ Participants also reserved the

⁸⁵ Like preceding EM/(M)CA research, pseudonyms were accorded to all (co-)participants, including references to non-present parties (e.g. Drew and E. Holt, 1988: 400, fn. 2) and to (co-)participants who have been identified within previous research (see, e.g., Whalen, Zimmerman and Whalen, 1988: 336, fn. 1; Clayman and C. Raymond, 2015: 389, fn. 1; cf. Lerner and Kitzinger, 2015: 58, fn. 1). The single exception here is Extract 37. The pseudonyms used in prior research (e.g. C. Goodwin, 1980) have been preserved in this instance to cohere with the established title of the data as it has been cited elsewhere. References to place, including those analysed within Chapter 5, have also been

right to withdraw from the research for up to two-weeks following their recording(s), at which point their audio/video recording(s) would be deleted, their questionnaire destroyed, and their video-recording release form void (see BSA, 2002: §25). Participants were also shown how to operate all recording equipment (detailed below), equipping them to terminate their involvement in the research at their discretion. Participants were also informed of a number of general and site-specific organisations they could contact if distress was experienced during their participation (BSA, 2002: §13, §26). Those who indicated having understood their rights, were then invited to complete an informed consent form (see BSA, 2002: §16; see Appendix 3.0) and video-recording release form (see Appendix 4.0). The latter enabled participants to specify the conditions under which their recording(s) could be reused. The template employed in this research was constructed by Jackson (2011a: 294-295) and represents a derivation of Ervin-Tripp (n.d. in ten Have, 1999: 220-221).

Audio-recordings were collected using two mobile, unobtrusive Dictaphones: a Tascam DR-07 and an Olympus WS833. Dictaphones were spaced between co-participants evenly. Video-recordings were collected using a wireless Kodak camera affixed to an extendable tripod. Emulating previous interactional research, the camera was set horizontally, simulating the viewpoint of an additional, static party (see LeBaron and Streeck, 1997: 23). The location of the video-camera was not specified in advance of the interaction but remained variable. This was contingent upon what has been described elsewhere as the spatial “*formation*” (see Kendon, 1980: 209, italics in original) adopted by participants. Whether I remained co-present for the interaction, operating recording equipment, or remained onsite, but out of frame, was determined by co-participants. Once participants completed their recording, they or I would switch-off all the recording equipment. Participants then completed a short socio-demographic questionnaire.⁸⁶

pseudonymised following existing EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Stivers, 2002: 300-301). However, with the permission of Professor M. H. Goodwin, Extract 37 has again been exempted to preserve the unique operation that is accomplished through the focal “misidentification” (i.e. §5.5.4).

⁸⁶ The questionnaire was used as a resource for preserving information about the “EJBH dataset” for future analyses; a recurring problem for secondary-data analysis (see

3.4.2.2 Intimates

Alongside recordings of non-familiars, a corpus of recordings was collected with participants at social occasions to which the researcher was privy. These recordings were conducted between familiar ‘recurrent parties’ (Schegloff, 1979a: 26) – such as relatives, colleagues and friends – at prescheduled events; events organised not for a recording, but other social functions (here, see Drew, 1989: 96) – or “dominant involvements” (see Goffman, 1963: 44). The procedure by which data-collection was conducted paralleled that performed with non-familiars (see §3.4.2.2) save three points of divergence. Firstly, not all recordings were conducted in public locations. The sites in which recordings were collected were instead contingent upon the nature of the occasion, resulting in recordings in both “public” and “private” environments, such as within cafés and homes, respectively. Secondly, these participants (*qua* “intimates”) could be contacted in advance of the recording. Prospective participants were thereby given greater opportunity in which to consider their participation. Thirdly, whereas I was excluded from the interactions between “non-intimates”, I frequently featured within these interactions *qua* co-participant.

This practice has an uncertain status in CA research. Traditionally, as Heritage (1988: 130; 1990: 29) observes, CA has been used to analyse data ‘which is as uncontaminated as possible by social scientific intervention’ (see also, Schegloff, 1967: 239-240; ten Have, 1999: 48-50). In this vein, to feature within one’s data effectively contravenes such a non-interventionist commitment. Illustrations of this position are readily available. This includes occasions in which analysts eschew recordings in which they feature (e.g. E. Holt, 1991: 64), or diminish the extent of their contributions *qua* co-interlocutors (e.g. C. Goodwin, 1996: 381; Schegloff, 2007a: 6; Schegloff and Lerner, 2009: 95) – casting themselves, in effect, as ‘out of

Hammersley, 2010: §3.4). To be clear, it was *not* employed in an attempt to eventuate explanations of/for participants’ interactional conduct, *ex post facto* (see R. Watson and Weinberg, 1982: 76, fn. 4; Psathas, 1990: 9), nor to appeal to their intentions thereof. On related concerns, see, e.g., Zimmerman and Pollner (1974 [1970]: 91, fn. 27), Heritage (1984[a]: 135-[1]78 in Drew, 1989: 113, fn. 3), Wootton (1989: 254), Nelson (1994) and Schegloff (1998b: 252, fn. 18).

play’, to borrow Goffman’s (1963: 40) phrase. One’s inclusion within one’s recordings, therefore, furnishes the basis for both pragmatic and professional dilemmas (see e.g., Maynard, 1984: 21-22).⁸⁷ One such concern, regarding the capacity of analysts to influence the trajectory of an interaction, has been assuaged above (recall fn. 61). Further concerns, however, warrant review.

One refers to that which Wowk (2007: 148, fn. 27) has referred to as ‘a post hoc “archaeology” of motives’. EM/(M)CA, it will be recalled, commits to a prohibitive stance towards non-relevant psychological ascriptions (e.g. Schegloff, 1996a: 184). Analysts, again, are not permitted to stipulate claims concerning the putative psychologies of co-interlocutors (howsoever described) when these are not demonstrably relevant to some locally unfolding sequences of social action. Traditionally in CA research, provided its non-interventionist commitment, this practice is associated with stipulating claims concerning the psychologies of co-interlocutors. In this respect, such a manoeuvre is not merely infelicitous, but, theoretically, defeasible. Recourse can be made, in other words, to the opinions of participants, *post hoc*, who can license or falsify such claims. The nature of this defeasibility is distorted, however, when analysts also figure as co-present co-interlocutors. Minimally, for instance, their participation, as such, affords an *additional* party onto which they could, theoretically, impute psychological states, intentions and/or motives. What is threatened uniquely, however, is that their joint status, as co-interlocutor and analyst, positions them as epistemic authorities over these claims (here, see §7.4.1). This entitlement, after all, is one that is endowed by their very opportunity to lay claim to continuity in personhood. Thus, provided the EM/(M)CA position on underhanded cognitivism, one’s involvement within one’s data represents a resource – or a temptation, at least – that analysts could use to accredit or demerit assertions by invoking some ostensibly privileged access to the interaction.

⁸⁷ This practice is, of course, no less erroneous than that of ascribing un-explicated mental states upon co-interlocutors with whom they do not share a transpersonal connection. Nonetheless, it does, presumably, alter the rhetorical (i.e. unassailable) status of such claims.

A second concern relates to the risk of adulterating the integrity of an interaction through the analyst's presence; a problem related to notions of "observer effects" or "demand characteristics" (see Wooffitt, 2007). On this reading, one might contend that the interaction would have progressed differently had the research not been conducted, and/or the researcher absent – a requirement of Potter's (2003 in Jackson, 2011a: 97) "Dead Scientist" test. Whether this would, indeed, be the case, however, remains equivocal; a contingency captured by Labov's (1972: n.p.g. in Clayman and Gill, 2004: 591; see also, Maynard, 1984: 20-21) "observer's paradox". It is possible, however, that providing an overview of the research to one's participants compromises the status of data as "naturally-occurring". Minimally, the very co-presence of the researcher, for example, might foreground, and/or inadvertently privilege the relevance of other than normative (e.g. "academic") relevancies (see Moerman, 1968b: 165; 1992: 27). Conversely, when conceived maximally, it is possible that co-interlocutors (*qua* "co-participants") could be understood to align with and/or to facilitate the interests of the researcher, and to be understood accordingly (i.e. to be "*in league*"). My research therefore contrasts inquiries on "social class" that resist foreshadowing such a focus (see, e.g., Lawler, 1999: 6; M. Holt and Griffin, 2005: 252).

Unique dilemmas are therefore occasioned by the study of data in which the analyst features. These problematics are not necessarily insurmountable, however. The former, for example, concerning privileged access to the interaction, would be rendered visible within my analysis, and would thus be available for sanctions. Furthermore, good reasons provide for this analysis despite the potential for researcher-effects. Conceptually, for instance, as C. Goodwin (1981: 44 in Clayman and Gill, 2004: 591) notes, the condition of being observed is generic to social interaction; it is not one that is unique to recording conditions. It is therefore considered unlikely that the presence of the researcher, or recording equipment, for example, would necessarily interfere with, and/or vitiate, the integrity of the interaction. Moreover, the inclusion of this data was also supported logistically. Specifically, these interactions would have been unavailable for recording in my absence; my presence at the occasion was, at once, a condition for their collection. The alternative scenario, of withdrawing myself, would have defeated the very possibility of recording; equally, not participating, but remaining co-present (*qua*

“bystander”), may have been more artificial than, indeed, participating. Thus, it was on conceptual and logistical grounds that I have aligned with previous EM/(M)CA research in which my presence within my recordings was not removed, but retained (e.g. Wiggins, 2002: 83-84; Jackson, 2011a: 97-104).

3.4.2.3 Summary

The EJBH corpus comprises 59 face-to-face interactions. Data was collected with “intimates” and “non-intimates” and included both video- ($n=39$) and audio-only ($n=20$) recordings. The total number of different participants in the corpus was 78, with several participants recurring throughout. When aggregated with the secondary-data, the total number of interactions analysed in this research were 959, after “cleaning”,⁸⁸ amounting to 393 hours, 2 minutes and 35 seconds, comprising both face-to-face ($n=326$) and telephonic ($n=633$) interactions. This is an uncharacteristically large quantity of data for CA research; a method that has been bracketed, traditionally, as a species of ‘microsociology’ (e.g. Scheff, 2006: 3005) – or ‘ultra-micro-analysis’ (e.g. Mennell, 1975: 300).⁸⁹ A further qualification on the quantity of data is therefore merited.

3.4.2.4 On quantity

Research in the CA tradition has typically been chastised for the ‘disinclination [...] to deal with large amounts of data’ (Schegloff in Čmerjková and Prevignano, 2003: 12).⁹⁰ Increasingly, however, a burgeoning association has developed between (M)CA and the analysis of ‘large conversational data corpora’ (Stokoe and Attenborough, 2015: 51). This approach has been undertaken both manually (e.g.

⁸⁸ 1093 interactions were analysed before cleaning, with a total duration of 429 hours, 47 minutes and 8 seconds.

⁸⁹ This misunderstanding is one inherited from EM (recall §2.3.2); an enterprise which has also been condemned to handle (ostensibly) diminutive, ‘microsociological’ problems (e.g. Szacki, 1979: 528). For a range of correctives, consult Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 65), Schegloff (1987a: 209; 1988: 100-101), Lynch (1985: 188), Hilbert (1990: 794-802), R. Watson (1992a: 16-17) and Coulter (1996: 339).

⁹⁰ Although, see Schegloff (1967: e.g. 42, 46-47; 1968: e.g. 1079; 1993: 115) and Jefferson (1989: 170, 176), for classical exceptions.

Ekberg, Shaw, Kessler, Malpass and Barnes, 2016: 312), but also facilitated by innovations in computing software (e.g. Rühlemann and O'Donnell, 2012). As clarified above (see §3.3.2), this research was conducted manually, and aligns with the former tradition. The analysis of such a seemingly significant quantity of data ($n=959$) was not, however, intended, *a priori*. This approach was obligated, instead, owing to the relative dearth of “clear” orientations to “social class” observed within my initial dataset ($n=186$).

This problem is one endemic to (M)CA research, and which owes to the inherent “contingency” of naturally-occurring instances of talk-in-interaction (e.g. Schegloff, 1996b: 21-22). That is, it cannot be known where, how or whether the focal phenomenon will be prosecuted by a co-interlocutor in some instance of naturally-occurring talk-in-interaction (here, see Egbert, 2004: 1482; Stokoe and Edwards, 2007: 343; Pomerantz and Mandelbaum, 2005: 154 in Stokoe and Attenborough, 2015: 52). In this research, this problematic pertained to categorial/characterological orientations, insofar as the relevance of social identities ‘resist’ anticipation.⁹¹ However, this problem is also a *generic* property of talk-in-interaction (see, e.g., Schegloff et al., 1977: 363; for review, see fn. 93). Thus, while this bind is not exacerbated by the investigation of “social class”, uniquely, it is nevertheless underscored acutely thereby. There are, however, at least two solutions that can be employed by analysts to increase the probability of encountering candidate cases through procedures that comply with the consensual remit of EM/(M)CA research.⁹²

The first solution is “*situational*” in circumscription. Analysts can increase the probability of encountering the focal phenomenon by relaxing or abdicating, the criteria for inclusion and by reverting to circumstances in which the phenomenon embodies a normative expectancy, and/or to which they share some affinity. This solution can be formulated in more or less constraining ways. It may, for example, entail recourse to particular ‘class-specific contexts’ (West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 31) in which the phenomenon is expectably co-implicated as an ‘item-of-business’, to

⁹¹ Coulter’s (e.g. 1976: 508; 1993: 262; see also, Coulter, 1995b: 334) phrase.

⁹² For non-EM/(M)CA solutions, see Atkinson and Drew (1979: 3-4).

borrow the phrase (see Button and Casey, 1988/1989: 64). Alternatively, inquiries might be confined to contexts in which orientations possess an ‘occasion-based omnirelevance’ (Whitehead, 2009: 330), such in as focus-groups (e.g. Whitehead, 2007), meetings (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 2002), interviews (e.g. Stokoe, 2010: 62-63), or (particular) radio-broadcasts (e.g. Whitehead, 2011; 2013), for example. More tenuous still, research might be delimited to contexts in which differently situated persons (howsoever described) are conferred the opportunity in which to interact, and whereby the relevance of the focal phenomenon (e.g. “social class”) represents a probabilistic outcome, thereof (see, e.g., M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 249; M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010: 180-181).

The second solution, in contrast, is “*brute-force*” in operation. Researchers can increase the probability of encountering the focal phenomenon by increasing the quantity of the data analysed originally. This solution, unlike the former, does not impose further delimitations upon what constitutes permissible data; nor does it circumscribe which ‘environments of *relevant* occurrence’ (à la Schegloff, 1993: 103, italics in original) qualify as eligible for analysis. Rather, to borrow the phrase, the solution enables the focal phenomenon to ‘proceed under its own imperatives’ (see Schegloff, 1991: 64). In other words, no attempt is made to subdue the effects of contextually extraneous and/or confounding variables. Candidate cases are, instead, accrued from within the ecological coordinates that are endogenous to the data previously analysed.

In this research, it was this second, “*brute-force*” solution that was adopted. After analysing my initial corpus ($n=186$), additional instances of ordinary talk were collected ($n=714$) and searched for candidate orientations to “social class”. Presumably, this solution was the least parsimonious of the two; that is, where parsimony is adjudicated relative to the quantity of data analysed. It amounted, in effect, ‘to a search for the proverbial needle in the haystack’ (Van Dijk, 1987: 18, 119 in Stokoe and Attenborough, 2015: 52; see also, Hiller, 1973b: 19). Economy, however, was not awarded a premium in this research. Focal, instead, was fidelity to my original research objective; namely, the analysis of “social class” in *ordinary* instances of talk-in-interaction. Recourse to a “situational” solution might then have optimised this inquiry – that is, for example, requiring the analysis of fewer

interactions in order to yield candidate cases.⁹³ However, this would have been potentiated only by depreciating or capitulating the interactional environment in which the phenomenon was originally pursued (i.e. “ordinary talk”). This approach would, therefore, have violated the coordinates of my inquiry as set forth originally – the specifics of which formed part of the initial motivation for this research (see §2.5.3).⁹⁴

3.5 Chapter summary

This chapter has presented an overview of the methods of data-collection and data-analysis employed in this research. An outline has been given to the underlying principles of CA and MCA and to the practices by which they were implemented in this research. The secondary-dataset ($n=900$) was then introduced and summarised, and an overview has been given of the primary “EJBH” corpus ($n=59$), and of the two conditions in which it was collected. Three issues that are relevant for this research have also been introduced. These have concerned generalisability, the inclusion of analysts in their data, and regarded the quantity of data analysed in EM/(M)CA research. The chapters that follow demonstrate how the approach introduced in this chapter has been employed.

⁹³ Of course, this affordance is promissory only (see fn. 61). For both solutions, there can be no guarantee that this probability will translate empirically – let alone proportionally (*pari passu*) – according to the quantity of data analysed. Even where “classed” identities are privileged, in some way, as an interactional exigency, their status as “expectable” – or even “preferable” – does not impel their occurrence. To borrow the term, other moves, or vicissitudes, are, instead, ‘legal’ (here, see Sacks, 1987 [1973]: 56). Concerning the “contingent” status of talk-in-interaction, see, e.g., Schegloff (1996b: 21-22), Schegloff et al. (1977: 363) and Holmes et al. (2017: 422, fn. 6).

⁹⁴ On this contingency (i.e. “*factum valet*”), see H. Garfinkel (1967: 20-21).

Chapter 4 – Membership categories

4.1 Introduction

Previous EM/(M)CA research has proposed that members' "classed" identities are occasioned, recurrently, through the production of membership categories. Research has proceeded by selecting conceptualisations of "social class" (e.g. "wealth"), that have been justified along one of three lines of reasoning (see §2.5.2), and by treating the derivative instantiations (e.g. "rich"; "poor"), thereof, as invariantly "classed" for co-interlocutors. This chapter takes stock of this approach. I argue that this procedure has proved invaluable for EM/(M)CA research, rehabilitating "social class" as a phenomenon negotiated upon the plane of talk-in-interaction. It is my contention, however, that this approach remains limited, empirically, and there remains further scope for the "*respecification*" (here, see H. Garfinkel, 1991) of "social class" as a members' phenomenon. I propose that analysts need not circumscribe the ontology of "social class", *ex cathedra*⁹⁵ – that is, aprioristically and exogenously – but can concentrate also on those occasions in which the device is *avowedly* occasioned, *in situ*. The co-production of *linguistically* "classed" membership categories (e.g. "middle class"), is one resource used to this effect. This chapter introduces the empirico-analytic affordances of this approach. It concludes by considering how linguistically *non-"classed"* membership categories (e.g. "rich") could be incorporated alongside this approach, offering an account for how this could be accomplished more cautiously.

4.2 Membership categories

A conventional point of departure for EM/(M)CA research into forms of "social identity" involves the analysis of "*membership categories*". Defined broadly, this refers to 'classifications or social types that may be used to describe persons and nonpersonal objects (see Jayyusi, 1984, p. 212)' (Hester, 1992: 157). In previous research, membership categories have been analysed in relation to a range of dimensions of personhood, including "age" (e.g. Nikander, 2001), "ethnicity" (e.g. Hansen, 2005), "gender" (e.g. Stokoe and Smithson, 2001), "race" (e.g. Whitehead,

⁹⁵ Schegloff's (1998b: 256) term.

2009), “sexuality” (e.g. Kitzinger, 2005a; Kitzinger, 2005b) and “social class” (e.g. Whitehead, 2013), *inter alia*. This programme of research has cohered through its abiding focus on *social action*. Membership categories are analysed for the practical purposes for which they are invoked on occasions of use (e.g. Edwards, 1991). Membership categories have thus been used as a window into the social actions for which social identities are occasioned in talk-in-interaction.

As the present inquiry examines “social class” as a dimension of identity, membership categories are adopted as the conventional, if not indeed the *logical* point of departure. My initial focus on this resource, however, departs from the prevailing focus of EM/(M)CA research. Specifically, I first address an antecedent problematic; namely, “What qualifies as a “*classed*” membership category?”.⁹⁶ This problematic underlies the traditional focus of EM/(M)CA research. After all, before the social actions for which “*classed*” membership categories are serviced can be reconnoitred, meaningfully, what counts as a “*classed*” membership category must first be delimited. As I demonstrate below, this matter of “apprehension”, or “recognisability”, is deceptive, and, if neglected, restrictive, even confounding (see §4.5). The focus of this chapter is, therefore, principally invested in this problematic. In the next section, I explicate the entailments of this issue more fully (§4.3). I then revisit how previous EM/(M)CA research has operationalised “social class” (§4.4), exploring the consequences of alternative renderings.

4.3 Recognisability

As introduced in Chapters 2 (§2.2.1) and 3 (§3.2.1), invocations of “context” and “social identity” are regulated stringently in EM/(M)CA research. It will be recalled that this approach is typified by the criterion of “demonstrable relevance” (see Schegloff, 1991; 1992a). According to this tenet, for any characterological attribute (e.g. “age”, “race”, “social class”, etc.) to be distinguished as salient and/or consequential for interactional conduct, this dimension must be made relevant, explicitly, by/for those co-interlocutors who are co-constitutive of that interaction.

⁹⁶ As Hester (1992: 156) writes in a different context, vis-à-vis “*deviance*”, this problematic is ‘a fundamental interpretive issue’.

When satisfied, the focal aspect of identity then qualifies as relevant (howsoever delineated), and can be enlisted, warrantably, into the analysis of that space. EM/(M)CA analyses of “gender”, for example, exemplify this approach. Here, co-interlocutors are not simply to be accorded a “gendered” social identity (e.g. “woman”) by virtue of their “correctness” as such (recall fn. 74). Instead, it is incumbent upon analysts to demonstrate *how* this social identity – irrespective of its putative (in)correctness – becomes occasioned through the conduct of co-interlocutors (e.g. Stockill and Kitzinger, 2007).

The problematic with which the EM/(M)CA researcher of membership categories is traditionally confronted is, therefore, as follows: To adjudicate whether some linguistically provided categories (e.g. “gendered”; “gender-neutral”) are (co-)implicated relevantly and consequentially on the occasions in which they are (co-)produced. This approach is integral to the EM/(M)CA analysis of membership categories and has been applied to various aspects of social identity. In the case of Stockill and Kitzinger (2007), for example, the category-concept “woman” is legislated as a linguistically “gendered” category, *a priori*. The objective of an EM/(M)CA inquiry is then to discriminate whether the (co-)production of such “gendered” or “gender-neutral” categories are serviced in a relevantly “gendered” faculty, and for what practical purposes (e.g. Kitzinger, 2007; Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 2017). With respect to the analysis of “gender”, this procedure has appeared unproblematic, culminating in a stable body of cumulative research (e.g. Speer and Stokoe, 2011). When translated for “social class”, however, this approach appears to be left wanting.

In large part, this problematic centres upon the comparatively *uncertain* ontological constitution of “social class” within the natural language. For “gender”, for example, the relationship between the focal phenomenon and its derivative membership categories is given over normatively. The categories “woman” and “man”, for example, are conventionally associated with the device as co-class members. For “social class”, however, a stable set of equivalent categories is not imparted this readily. “Social class”, in other words, does not correlate with a fixed index or epiphenomenon, *a priori*. As such, while “gendered” nouns and pronouns, for example, occupy durable positions within the English language (e.g. Speer and

Stokoe, 2011), there does not appear to be a comparably ingrained “classed” syntax or grammar.⁹⁷ The initial problematic with which analysts of “classed” membership categories are confronted, as a result, is not *whether* categories are relevantly “classed” for co-interlocutors, but indeed *which* categories qualify as consensually denotative thereof, for a cohort. The problems that are co-implicated when the EM/(M)CA approach to “gender” is applied to “social class”, therefore, crystallise around this disjunction; namely, the socio-cultural *stability* of the former relative to the *flexibility* of the latter.⁹⁸ Thus, the categories that are treated as derivative of “social class” are much less stable than, for example, linguistically “gendered” membership categories. West and Fenstermaker (1995a: 17, 27), for example, amongst others (see, e.g., Gobo, 1995: 456; Skeggs, 2004: 138), provide support for this observation.

“Admittedly, the normative conceptions that sustain the accountability of persons to class category are somewhat different from those that sustain accountability to sex category and race category. For example, despite earlier attempts to link pauperism with heredity and thereby justify the forced sterilization of poor women in the United States (Rafter 1992), scientists today do not conceive of class in relation to the biological characteristics of a person.

⁹⁷ This is not to say that co-interlocutors do not routinely impute such inferences; an aspect long recognised in FA research (e.g. Bernstein, 1964; 1972 in Schegloff, 1999a: 413). For examples in my dataset, see Samuel’s orientation to his putatively “classed” grammar in Extract 19 and Sarah’s orientation to Ellie’s “open-class repair initiator” (Drew, 1997), ‘Pardon?’ (l. 30), in Extract 43. Furthermore, for “*possibly*” (see §4.7) “classed” examples, see an orientation to the “*posh*” hearing of the term “*gastroenteritis*” in a healthcare consultation, in Clift (2016: 103); a complaint-implicative orientation to “doing being” (here, see H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 352; Sacks, 1984b) audibly “*posh*”, in Atkinson and Drew (1979: 60, 185); to a literary readership in Clift (1999: 543); and for orientations to “*fancy*” names in two successive “choral” moments (here, see Schegloff, 1995b: 36-37, 41, fn. 4; 2000b: 6, 48, fn. 7; 2002a: 291, fn. 1) in Lerner (2002: 229, 231).

⁹⁸ The distinction of these devices can be formalised using Sacks’ (e.g. 1967; 1972: e.g. 33) notions of “Pn-adequacy (Type 1)” and “‘which’-type sets” (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 40). Recall fn. 26.

There is, moreover, no scientific basis for popular notions of what persons in particular class categories “look like” or “act like.””
(West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 27)

“Social class”, in this sense, is *amorphous*. To borrow terms that have been used to describe vastly different phenomena, it may be conceptualised here as a “floating signifier” (Pascale, 2007: 27), to possess an “inner-moving complex” (Blumer, 1967: 91 in Coulter, 1973a: 41) and a veritable “anisotropic” (Jammer, 1964: 40 in Casey, 2000 [1987]: 185) quality. In other words, what it is that “social class” refers to conceptually, in the abstract, is unclear. In this regard, the device appears to be far removed from the identities (e.g. “age”, “gender”, “race”, etc.) with which it is routinely adjoined “*instantially*” within EM/(M)CA research (cf. §2.3.2). Instead, it aligns more closely with other consensually indexical devices, such as “*schizophrenia*”, for example; a locus of prior EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Coulter, 1973a; Land and Kitzinger, 2011: 53-55).

“In effect, then, ascriptions of ‘schizophrenia,’ lacking any uniformly interpretable indicators for diagnosis, do not function like ascriptions of physical ailments. They are not arrived at in the same kind of way, and they do not carry any clear latitudes of symptomatological or therapeutic information. For a reader or researcher, being informed that ‘X’ was diagnosed as a ‘schizophrenic’ and no more, is to be given far less informational content than being told that ‘X’ was diagnosed as suffering from pneumonia. Researchers in psychopathology, therefore, if they use the pre-established diagnoses of professional clinicians to generate their sample populations, must rely upon the tacit knowledge of their scientific readership in extreme measure to establish some correspondence between their research descriptions and the phenomena researched. [...] When replications are attempted, this issue becomes critical. As D. Bannister [(1968)] has pointed out in his important paper on the logic of research programmes in psychopathology into the schizophrenias, [...] the term ‘schizophrenia’ has tended to function as an *omnibus* category, an overarching classificatory concept covering such diverse features as flatness of affect, syntactic distortion, delirious elation, grandiose

yet articulate belief systems and hallucinatory experiences in various combinations.”

(Coulter, 1973a: 5, italics in original)

To be sure, a battery of differences distinguishes the aetiologies of “schizophrenia” from ontologies of “social class”. Nevertheless, the latter parallels the former with respect to its ambiguous constitution, inasmuch as it is similarly devoid of a consensual one-to-one correspondence with some default ontology (here, see also, Smith, 1978: 26-27). Thus, “social class” qualifies equally, as such, as another so-called “*omnibus* category” (à la Bannister, 1968: n.p.g. [EJBH: e.g. 183] in Coulter, 1973a: 5, italics in original).⁹⁹

“Social class” does not, therefore, necessarily correspond with a clear set of membership categories within the natural language. It is this characteristic, I claim, that problematises the procedure that has been applied to “gender”, where the categories “woman” and “man”, for example, are canonical. It is in the absence of such fixed categories that the remit of “social class” emerges as a “*live*” – or a ‘standing issue’, to borrow the phrase (here, see Lynch, 1985: 191), for empirical research.

This problematic, whether focalised or disattended, is empirically and analytically primary. It obtains to all research on “social class” and antedates any investigation of the practical purposes for which the device is mobilised in talk-in-interaction; the traditional object of EM/(M)CA inquiry. As such an initial problematic, the implications of this decision therefore form the focus of this chapter. In the next section, I reintroduce how EM/(M)CA research concerning “classed” membership categories has proceeded in previous research. In the remainder of this chapter, I then propose a novel, more cautious alternative.

⁹⁹ For additional examples in which “*signifiers*” make available (see §7.3.1) multiple categorial incumbencies, see Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 70).

4.4 “Classed” membership categories

As indicated in Chapter 2, “social class” has stymied as an area of empirical EM/(M)CA research relative to other aspects of “social identity”, such as “gender”, which continue to flourish (see §2.2.2). The reasons for this dearth of research, to reiterate, remains equivocal (see §2.3.1). This research has not been foreclosed entirely, however. On the contrary, this programme of research presently enjoys a veritable “second wind”, where “*propaedeutic commentaries*” (see §2.3.4) on the subject are progressively superseded by substantive EM/(M)CA inquiries (recall §2.4).

The foremost object of inquiry in this emergent field are the practical purposes for which “social class” is mobilised in interaction. The ontological coordinates of the device, in contrast, have not formed the locus of empirical research. Instead, this problem has been relegated as a subsidiary concern; one that is typically determined by analysts, *ex cathedra*, in preliminary conceptual expositions, and/or intercalated, *en passant*, only. As outlined in Chapter 2 (§2.5), this procedure follows a recurring pattern in EM/(M)CA research. This can be abbreviated as follows:

“Social class” is endowed, by analysts, with a first-order, observable referent (e.g. “wealth”). The nominated epiphenomenon (howsoever circumscribed) then obviates the problem of “relevance” by stipulating how enactments of and/or orientations to “social class” (howsoever defined) are to be derived empirically.

In this vein, the relevance of “social class” is determined upon the discretionary judgement of analysts by way of “*fiat*”.¹⁰⁰ It is adjudicated according to whether the conduct of co-interlocutors corresponds with the theorisation of “social class” prioritised by analysts, explicitly or inexplicitly, on some occasion. This understanding of the concept is subsequently advanced irrespective of whether this self-same conceptualisation is demonstrably upheld by those co-interlocutors for

¹⁰⁰ Cicourel’s (1964: e.g. 226, fn. 6) term.

whom this device is proposedly operative.¹⁰¹ This procedure is hegemonic in EM/(M)CA research and represents a version of the “positivist” solution outlined in Chapter 2 (i.e. §2.2.1; see fn. 25 and fn. 74). Previously, this approach has been predicated on three lines of reasoning.

- (1) Received definition(s) of “social class” (e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; Evaldsson, 2005; M. H. Goodwin, 2006; Pascale, 2007; 2008a; Scharff, 2008);
- (2) Socio-cultural context(s) (e.g. West and Fenstermarker, 2002; Whitehead, 2013);
- (3) Tacit knowledge (e.g. Robles, 2016).

By way of these manoeuvres, prior EM/(M)CA research has accrued an array of putatively “classed” indicators. For the purposes of illustration, Table 5 presents an indicative, non-exhaustive list of the categories gleaned from my dataset by using these approaches.

Table 5 – Linguistically non-“classed” categories					
Extract 01: CTS08	“Chav” (l. 92).	Extract 02: CABNC [KC7_2]	“the rich” (l. 91); “the poor” (l. 93).	Extract 03: CTS29	“Scally” (l. 505).
Extract 04: UCDiscLab [Ccon1b]	“Bourgeois people” (l. 43).	Extract 05: UCDisc Lab [Wcon1]	“Lower socioeconomic group.” (l. 40).	Extract 06: EJBH _F4_32	“toff.” (l. 14); “common” (l. 58); “posh” (l. 67).
Extract 07: CABNC [KBB_35]	“Highbrow” (ls. 31 and 35).	Extract 08: CallHome-eng-5866	“Whitetrash _z ” (l. 420).	Extract 09: Call Home-eng-4092	“Blue collar man.” (l. 118).

¹⁰¹ On ‘operative identities’, see Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 327, italics in original).

These categories are produced in a diverse array of contexts, both interactional and sequential. They are homologous, however, insofar as their recognisability, *qua* “classed” categories are contingent upon, and vindicated through, various lines of mediatory reasoning. In other words, the categories qualify as “classed” only when particular theorisations of the concept are deployed. They are describable as *linguistically non-“classed”*,¹⁰² in this respect, inasmuch as they do not “*self-explicate*”¹⁰³ their “classed” hearability through their linguistic form. Conversely, membership categories and descriptions which include such components will be described, hereinafter, as *linguistically “classed”* forms (e.g. “middle class”).

In summary, prior EM/(M)CA research has adjudicated what “social class” is to be on the behalf of co-interlocutors on/for some occasions, invoking explanatory lines of reasoning to derive *non-“classed”* indices thereof. As acknowledged in Chapter 2 (§2.5.2), this approach presents an array of analytic affordances, with which I sympathise. The central objective of this chapter, however, concerns how this approach can be recalibrated to appreciate how “social class” is employed as an ordinary-language phenomenon. This will be advanced by focusing on what I have characterised as linguistically “classed” categories; occasions in which co-interlocutors use terms which attest to their linguistically “classed” relevance. Two benefits will be underscored through this approach. First, I show that there are occasions in which aprioristically derived characterisations of “social class” (e.g. “wealth”) are defeated by co-interlocutors, *in situ*. Secondly, I propose that by analysing occasions in which co-interlocutors make this work explicit also makes

¹⁰² This term is borrowed from Stockill and Kitzinger (2007), regarding “linguistically *gendered*” and “linguistically *non-gendered*” categories. My use of the former (i.e. *linguistically “classed”*), however, is confined only to instances in which “class” is incorporated avowedly (e.g. “middle class”). It does not encapsulate resonant categories which do not include the term (cf. §4.3). The latter are reserved for the designation *linguistically (non-)“classed”*.

¹⁰³ That is, in which the sense of an object is made available reflexively within, and conterminously to, its situated (co-)production. Term derived from Pollner (1979 in Lynch, 1985: 289, fn. 2, my emphasis). See also, e.g., H. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970: 350), Heritage and R. Watson (1979: e.g. 128), R. Watson (1992a: e.g. 7) and Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: e.g. 83).

available an array of empirical and conceptual insights; insights hitherto unanticipated in preceding EM/(M)CA research.

4.5 Ambiguity and defeasibility

As illustrated in Table 5, defining “social class” can glean an array of putatively “classed” membership categories. Using the example of “wealth”, for instance, the membership categories “rich” and “poor”, might be derived accordingly, *inter alia*. What has been comparably neglected, however, are the limitations which inhere to this approach. Fundamentally, these are twofold. These crystallise around both the “ambiguity” of these categories as “classed”, for co-interlocutors, and their “defeasibility” as such. These problematics can be formulated as follows:

- (1) *Ambiguity*. Whether the membership categories (e.g. “rich”, “poor”) are employed by co-interlocutors in a *relevantly* “classed” faculty remains equivocal. It is unclear whether some other proximate/alternate (epi)phenomenon is, instead, superordinate (e.g. “wealth”).¹⁰⁴
- (2) *Defeasibility*. Whether the membership categories (e.g. “rich”, “poor”) are employed by co-interlocutors in a *relevantly* “classed” faculty remains defeasible. This approach is vulnerable to occasions in which the “classed” relevance of the selected membership categories is expressly defeated or otherwise (re-)specified by co-interlocutors.

The contingencies of the former have been explored above. Again, these have been resolved, conventionally, by way of analytic diktat: They are retained as “classed” by virtue of how analysts have construed the concept on particular occasions of use. Instances of the latter, however, have yet to be considered. On these occasions, a membership category is (co-)produced which *could* be endowed with a “classed” valence (howsoever characterised). Amidst the interaction, however, the focal

¹⁰⁴ Multiple senses of “ambiguity” have been discussed with respect to membership categorisations. To clarify, the sense of “ambiguity”, discussed here, is not one that is furnished sequentially (cf. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 671); it cannot be resolved using the “consistency rule” (cf. Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 220; 1992, Vol. I: 239), nor by ascribing “category-bound activities” (cf. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 584-585).

category is explicitly inoculated against such a “classed” interpretation by co-interlocutors. It is designated as a category that is *not* relevantly analysable as “classed” in this moment. The salience of “social class” that is arrogated, *ex cathedra*, is thus subsequently contradicted, *in situ*. This contingency can be illustrated with respect to the ontology of “wealth”; one that has been equated with “social class” in previous EM/(M)CA research through various prisms (recall §2.5.2). Extract 10, below, presents an example of such defeasance in action.¹⁰⁵ In this instance, the “classed” relevance of the linguistically non-“classed” category, ‘[The poorer people,]’ (l. 108), is explicitly rejected by its progenitor, Joseph (ls. 104-105 and 108).

Extract 10: CABNC [KB1_6]

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Joseph has complained about mortgage payments to Peggy and Maria.))

- 48 Jos: In thuh- (.) in ↓thee:. Especially in thee (.)
 49 whats↑ (.) name ↓count*ries.*
 50 (.)
 51 (?): (°.hhhhh°)=
 52 Chi: =(Mumbles)=
 53 Peg: =() [(↑)]
 54 Jos: [Communist] countries;
 55 (0.6)
 56 Jos: ↑Everything's owned by the °↓g::: b°:y
 57 d'Govern*↓ment*'an uh (.) I know it's not a right
 58 good ↑thing like ↓but .hhh if it could Work (0.2)
 59 ↑properly it would be a damn good ↑thi[ng];
 60 Mar: [W]atch
 61 she don't ↑bite yer.
 62 (2.0)
 63 Jos: I mean communism [in Eng°land.°]

¹⁰⁵ References to line numbers are abbreviated as “l. X”, following Jefferson (1978a: 246, fn. 6). The focal phenomenon illustrated is emboldened and indicated with the symbol “→”. On occasions in which multiple iterations of the same phenomenon occurs, instances are numbered (e.g. “1→”), following Schegloff (1987b: 105). On occasions in which a phenomenon is composed of multiple components, a second arrow is used (i.e. ⇒).

64 Chi: [(Mumbles.)] ((Mumbles. /
65 0.5))
66 [(Mumbles.)]
67 Jos: [In it's-
68 (0.9)
69 Jos: In ↑it- (0.3) proper (.) ↑form, (.hhh / 0.6)
70 °would be the ↑wonderful ↓thing.°
71 (0.5)
72 Jos: *.Hhh*hh (0.5) ↓But (0.3) t'er. (0.2) it's ↑on
73 (.) because (0.3) ↓t'er (1.8) It's ↑only the rich
74 people what make people (0.5) poor.=hhh.
75 (0.5)
76 Peg: °↑I know.°
77 (2.9)
78 Jos: The same as the (0.2) damned edu↑cation *↓like*
79 (.) the bloody ↑Tory: ↓sods.
80 (0.3)
81 Jos: .hhh (0.2) Jus' took all blin[↑kin':ǝ
82 Chi: [() (0.3)
83 ()
84 (0.3)
85 Jos: [For a-] (.) ↑for (.) ↑all these=
86 Chi: [()]
87 Jos: =[pe]ople what's [going to] col[le]ge.=
88 Peg: =[HARRY] [↑She's] [up]
89 Peg: =upstairs in bath*r[oom.*]
90 Jos: [Ev]ery time they('d) (.)
91 drop on holiday they've [got nothing to ↑keep]=
92 Chi: [()]
93 Jos: ='em.
94 (0.3)
95 Chi: ↑(Mu:[:m,])
96 (?): [°Sh]e's as↑l[ee::pǝ°]
97 **Jos: [So] in my**
98 **o (.) ↑pinio[n what this government's doing is]**
99 Chi: [↑()].]
100 **Jos: stopping °de-°**

101 (0.4)

102 Chi: (Peà,) (0.2) °(Peà).°

103 (0.2)

104 Jos: **Stopping the lower ↑cla-=well I say lower classes**

105 °(b-)° (0.6) the ↑l- °*↓uh*° the-

106 (0.8)

107 Mar: °Ca[re () >isn't there ↑now:.)<°]

108 Jos:→ **[The poorer people,]**

109 (0.3)

110 (J): °.hhhh°

111 (0.4)

112 Jos: **They stop 'em getting ↑educated.=That >I'm I'm<**

113 **(0.3) al[most] [↓con]=**

114 Peg: [°Yeah] [::°]

115 Chi: [()]=

116 Jos: **=[↑vinned&]**

117 Chi: **=[()] (.)**

118 (0.3)

119 Jos: [Becau °se-°]

120 Peg: [°It ↑seem] >everything they're ↑doing it

121 seems- seems to is going back to the eighteenth

122 century when you hear about these Ca-°< Catherine

123 ↑Cookson days an' (0.2)

124 (?): (That['s ↑it.)]

125 Peg: [You can't] be educa↑ted an' (0.2) cuttin'

126 back en'.

127 (0.4)

128 Jos: They're cutting [back on] [edu↑ca] [t↓ion.]

129 Mar: [Oh.] [Don't go] [tell]ing

130 me [(where I am).]

131 Jos: [They're ma]king it so only the rich can be

132 ↑educated.=

133 Peg: =↑Yeah.

134 (.)

135 Peg: [Trying to turn it back into (↑)]=

136 (?): [()]=

137 Peg: =[again.]

Joseph's complaint concerns the administration of mortgage payments. Over the course of this sequence, Joseph asserts that 'It's ↑only the rich people what make people (0.5) poor.=hhh.' (ls. 73-74). A parallel to this set of circumstances is then drawn on concerning the educational policy of the then Conservative government. Joseph asserts that the government is preventing what is adumbrated as the 'lower classes' (l. 104) from receiving education (ls. 97-98, 100, 104-105, 108, 112-113 and 116). As this linguistically "classed" membership category is produced, however, Joseph initiates "self-repair" (see Schegloff et al., 1977: 364; see also, Lerner, 2013: 108). After resurrecting the repairable, and then initiating a re-repeat, thereof,¹⁰⁶ Joseph replaces this category with a linguistically non-"classed" alternative; namely, '[The poorer people,]' (l. 108; see →).¹⁰⁷ By way of this "post-positioned" (see Schegloff, 1979b: 272) repair, Joseph marks that the partially produced category, 'the lower ↑cla-' (l. 104), a linguistically "classed" category, is not treated as synonymous with the locally ascendant linguistically non-"classed" category (see Jackson and Jones, 2013). Thus, while Joseph orients to the relevance of "social class" momentarily (i.e. ls. 104-105), he explicitly *annuls* this analysis by topicalising the projected troublesource over a 'postscript' (see Lerner, 1992: 267) or 'postmortem' (see Schegloff, 2007a: 146) to the repair, and by replacing it with a category that does not proclaim the relevance of "social class" through its linguistic form. Extract 10 therefore presents an instance in which the relevance of "social class" is explicitly repealed – or "*suppressed*";¹⁰⁸ and, specifically, disconnected with a category that is normatively indicative of "wealth".

To summarise, this section has focussed on the ambiguity and defeasibility of linguistically non-"classed" membership categories. I have shown that the prevailing, prescriptive approach to the EM/(M)CA analysis of "social class" is susceptible to

¹⁰⁶ On the former, see Schegloff et al. (1977: 376) and Schegloff (1993: 121-122, fn. 11; 1997c: 36). On the latter, see Jefferson (1996: 12-13), Glenn (1995: 53-54) and Hopper (1995: 58).

¹⁰⁷ On the "*replacement*" operation of self-initiated self-repair, see Jefferson (1972a: 28-35) and Schegloff (2013: 43-45). With respect to its use on membership categories, see Stokoe (2011).

¹⁰⁸ Schegloff's (2003a) term.

falsification (see fn. 10) by co-interlocutors, *in situ*, and can be thrown into sharp relief. Through a single-case analysis, I have shown that the putative “classed” relevance of such categories can be dispelled and overruled by co-interlocutors and that the relevance of this device is not corroborated, but unravelled, where the constitutive features thereof are re-particularised to a designedly alternative characterological domain. The prevailing procedure adopted in EM/(M)CA research on “social class” thus appears to be left wanting, leaving latitude for occasions in which the definitions that have been emplaced by analysts are explicitly unendorsed or are even respecified by co-interlocutors, *in situ*. Howsoever attractive, intuitive and/or totalising definitions of “social class” might appear, therefore, aprioristic definitions remain “*fragile*”,¹⁰⁹ and, fundamentally, defeasible – liable to forms of local falsification.

4.6 A respecification

The prevailing EM/(M)CA approach to “social class”, I propose, is susceptible to this contingency. Various solutions are available, however, to surmount this problematic (see Anderson and W. Sharrock, 1982). One resource introduced in Chapter 1 (§1.6.2; see fn. 18), for example, involves additional transformations by analysts. Variations of this approach ramify. Distilled, however, this involves (re-)conceptualising the instances in which the membership categories that are included in Extracts 01-09 are produced as “classed” irrespective of the orientations of co-interlocutors. These procedures include, for instance, reflexively (re-)construing co-interlocutors’ “*dis-identifications*” with “social classes” as (re-)affirmations, thereof (e.g. Skeggs, 1997b: Ch. 5).¹¹⁰ Alternatively, in cases in which such categories are explicitly denied, this might involve problematising the terms of falsification, for example, whereby the logic that proposedly underlies co-interlocutors’ reasoning is “*faulted*”,¹¹¹ in some way.

¹⁰⁹ Sacks’ (1992, Vol. II: e.g. 311) term.

¹¹⁰ On ‘*knowledge protected against induction*’, see Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 336, italics in original; see also, *ibid.*: 180) and Schegloff (1992b: xli; 2007b: 469-470).

¹¹¹ Wootton’s (1975: 79, my emphasis) term.

These two approaches differ procedurally, but their outcomes approximate: Membership categories qualify as “classed”, for co-interlocutors, but only ‘behind their backs’ (à la Heritage, 1984a: 30), as it were. Such solutions do not, therefore, cohere with the epistemic commitments of EM/(M)CA; an approach that rejects recourse to ironic correctives and/or distanciations (see R. Watson, 1992a). My objective in this chapter is, thus, to canvass a novel solution that satisfies these requirements. Specifically, I propose that primacy is awarded to linguistically “classed” conduct; occasions in which the relevance of this device is avowedly *proclaimed* or *disclaimed*. These enactments, I argue, affords access to how “social class” is theorised in talk-in-interaction, and the procedures that are employed to regulate this interpretive/constructivist/hermeneutic work, *in situ*. Thus, it is such perspicuous occasions within the natural language that I seek to exploit, displacing the onus of this “*ontological work*” (recall fn. 56) from analysts to co-interlocutors.

The principal focus of the remainder of this chapter thus concerns membership categories which declare their “classed” interpretability through the details of their categorial form/linguistic design; that is, linguistically “classed” categories (see fn. 102). One such category admitted through this approach is presented in Extract 11.

Extract 11: CABNC [KBM_11]

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Mike and Ellen have previously discussed the results of their local by-election.))

- 4 Ell: ((Yawning.))
 5 (28.0)
 6 Mik: Come on mum. °↑Talk to me.°
 7 (2.2)
 8 Ell: ↑No::.=I don't talk to Conservatives.
 9 (0.7)
 10 Mik: °↑Don't you.°
 11 (1.2)
 12 Ell: [°↑(No).°]
 13 Mik: [So]rry I forgot you're so (0.2)
 14 common.°↑Oh I don't talk ().°
 15 (0.3)
 16 Ell: Yes.

17 (0.3)
 18 Ell: There we ↑are then.
 19 (0.2)
 20 Mik: (You sure are ↓l:ow.)
 21 (1.0)
 22 Ell: ↑Yes.
 23 (0.3)
 24 **Mik:** → **You're jus' (.) lower class.**
 25 (5.2)
 26 Ell: ↑Mmç
 27 (0.6)
 28 Mik: <*Low:er::.*>=
 29 Ell: =↑Little- (0.3) capitalis:t.
 30 (0.6)
 31 Mik: °What's wrong with that,°

The focal category here is ‘lower class.’ (l. 24). This is produced by Mike, after two preceding categorisations (ls. 13-14 and 20) which proposedly accounting for why Ellen has refused to speak with him (ls. 8, 12 and 16). Holding such practical purposes and other categorial implications in abeyance, what is central for current purpose, is that the membership category mobilised by Mike is one that self-explicates its “classed” relevance overtly. This is accomplished by inclusion of the term “class” within the membership category of the ‘lower class.’ (l. 24). It is this type of membership category with which I am concerned, initially. Other membership categories which similarly satisfy this criterion are presented across Extracts 12-14 (see →).

Extract 12: CallHome-eng-4705

((A telephone call. Alice and Karen are discussing Alice’s meeting with the mutually-known non-present party, Alannah.))

22 Ali: .hhh But ↑let me just tell you a little bit
 23 about <↑Alan*nah.*>

((Twenty-nine lines omitted.))

53 Ali: An:::d ah:::. (0.7) She invited us (0.2) over
54 to her ↑home.
55 (0.5)
56 **Ali:** → **And it's a <ver:y nice> (0.4) you know (0.5)**
57 **she's (0.6) kind of from the Wealthy Class:.**
58 (0.3)
59 Kar: .h=
60 Ali: =You kno[w.]
61 Kar: [M]:hm.
62 (.)
63 Ali: And so her- she has a lovely ↓home an' (0.3)
64 she has a swimming pool a[n']
65 Kar: [↑H]::m:.

Extract 13: EJBH_F1_02

((A face-to-face interaction. Ben, Charlie and Adam have been discussing their family homes. A classed “formulation” from Ben [omitted from transcript] gives way to a flurry of “classed” identifications.))

282 Ben: [We're ↑sort of-] (.) We're
283 [sort of cat]egorising ourselves right=
284 Cha: [No: I haven't-]
285 Ben: =↓here.
286 (0.3)
287 **Ben:** → **Middle class, (.) ↓middle class. (.) ↑middle**
288 **class, °*like-*°=**
289 Ada: =↑Wh:↑ite, (.) [middle *↓class.*]

Extract 14: CABNC [KBF_46]

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Helen is moving home. Victoria's suggestion of renting touches-off a storytelling.))

39 Hel: °That's right.° (.hhh) But (.) I- (.) ↑I don't
40 know whether Paul has- I mean (0.2) you see (1.5)
41 my friend Julia ((Surname removed from
42 recording.)) whose husband Bi:ll (0.8) is an
43 airline *↓pilot* (2.0) ↑sh:e (.) knows quite a
44 bit about ↓this ↑because (1.3) Bill was (0.5) an

45 illegitimate *child.* (0.9) in Borough in North
 46 Town.
 47 (0.2)
 48 Vic: °Hm.°
 49 (0.3)
 50 Hel: His †mother was an office *cleaner.* (1.4)
 51 and. (0.5) she con†ceived Bill (.) by a
 52 married *man.*
 53 (1.2)
 54 **Hel:** → **Erm. (0.2) °a° poor (0.3) working *class**
 55 **man.***
 56 (0.6)
 57 Hel: No question of a divorce and *marriage* she
 58 just had to get on with it.

These categories are invoked in a diverse range of sequences for a wide array of practical purposes. This includes categories produced independently (i.e. Extract 12), listed (i.e. Extract 13)¹¹² and those aggregated as a ‘conjoined’ (see Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 638, fn. 23), ‘hybrid’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 55) or ‘*composite membership category*’ (see Lerner, Bolden, Hepburn, Mandelbaum, 2012: 198, italics in original; i.e. Extract 14). These productional variances notwithstanding, these membership categories are similar insofar as they each qualify as self-avowedly “classed”, containing the term within their linguistic form. The analysis of these categories, I propose, presents a number of affordances for EM/(M)CA research. I have shown above, for example, that it provides access to occasions in which co-interlocutors arbitrate this relevance, for themselves, and where it is not predetermined, *ex cathedra*. In the remainder of this chapter, I propose that two

¹¹² The nature of different listings is specified in §4.6.2 and §6.5.1. Note that “social class” is not the only device actuated through this practice. Such listings instead represent a resource for ‘*intersectionality*’ (Crenshaw, 1989: e.g. 140, my emphasis; here, see §2.4.2.2; §7.3) and ‘*cross-membership[s]*’ (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 590, my emphasis). As my focus concerns “social class”, in isolation, however, my analysis attends to the “classed” components, primarily. For a related qualification, see Whitehead (2013: 62, fn. 4).

additional affordances are enabled through this approach. Specifically, these relate to *ontology* and *intersubjectivity*. The two subsections that follow canvass these prospective insights. I then conclude the chapter by returning to linguistically non-“classed” categories and proposing a strategy for their disciplined integration.

4.6.1 Ontology

The capacity in which linguistically “classed” categories (e.g. “middle class”) have been introduced, above, is one of analytic defeasance: I have proposed that when analysts invoke a definition of “social class”, *ex cathedra*, linguistically “classed” categories may be consulted so as to appreciate the relevancies that are awarded primacy by co-interlocutors, *in situ*. As typified by Extract 10, and the proposedly epiphenomenal interrelationship between “wealth” and “social class”, these theorisations can compete with and even violate the parameters that are selectively enshrined by analysts. This affordance, however, is neither merely nor primarily available to analysts. Instead, in the first instance, it obtains, sequentially, as a members’ ontological resource. The following section illustrates this capacity. I demonstrate that the progenitors of linguistically “classed” categories accommodate ontologies of “social class” at three sequential-temporal positions:

- (1) *Prospectively*. In turns-at-talk that precede the focal category.
- (2) *Concurrently*. In the turn-at-talk in which the category is produced.
- (3) *Retroactively*. In turns-at-talk that follow the focal category.

In each instance, a linguistically “classed” category is (co-)produced (see →). By virtue of its sequential placement, it can be seen to encode a locally constructed ontology of “social class” (see ⇒). This accommodation will be shown to assume various forms. In the majority of cases, these categories are mobilised *synonymously*; they are positioned as an alternative reference to the same population differently described. Alternatively, the ontology can be further specified. For instance, they can denote the designedly constitutive/criterial feature of a categorisation, or function to distinguish it as a “category-bound” (see Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 222) or “-tied” (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 37) component thereof. As a result, I propose that linguistically “classed” membership categories represent an omni-available resource to co-interlocutors, the use of which can encapsulate an array of “classed” ontologies.

Notably, this can include potentially unexpected theorisations of “social class” for which there may not exist dedicated category-concepts in the natural language to envelop and simultaneously endow these ontologies with an accountably “classed” relevance. The use of linguistically “classed” categories in this way affords a flexible ontological resource.

4.6.1.1 Prospective

The turns-at-talk which precede the production of linguistically “classed” categories furnish a routine locus for ontological work. This may occur within the turn-constructional unit (hereafter, TCU; see Sacks et al., 1974) that precedes the production of the linguistically “classed” category or can be explicated over several anterior turns-at-talk. Extracts 15-17 illustrate this pattern.

Extract 15: SWB2446

((A telephone-call. Sandra and Richard have discussed American foreign policy. Richard has recalled his experience in South America.))

99 Ric: .hh Well you were in (.) ↑Chile;
 100 (0.4)
 101 San: .HH (0.2) Yeah I was in ↑Chile::.
 102 (0.9)
 103 San: ↑But, uh:::m:. (0.7) I- there weren't, (0.2)
 104 as I ↑recall::, (0.4) ↑are (.) uh- (.) least
 105 I wasn't ↑aware::=.hh (0.3) of that many
 106 Americans there ↑except (0.2) for*::* (.) a
 107 very heavy concentration of (.) ((Company name.))
 108 volunt*eers.= [This was*] >on the-< (0.2)=
 109 Ric: [Uhhuh.]
 110 San: =((Company name.)) first ↑Started, (.) [and it=
 111 Ric: [Uhhuh.=
 112 San: =wa]s=.hhhh (0.2) one of the ↑targets.
 113 Ric: =]
 114 (1.0)
 115 San: ↑An::d uhm. (0.6) I don't- (0.2) I don't
 116 think hh. at that time at leas' ((Company name.))
 117 *was::* (1.0) *uh::m. .hhh (0.7) an obnoxious

118 group in the sense tha- ((Voice creaks.)) that
 119 we were very controlled:: re↑garding, .hhh
 120 hu'eh- ↑number of days ↓OFF:: an' .hhh
 121 [an' you could]n't just hh. (0.3) ↑take up=
 122 Ric: [↓Oh.]
 123 San: =(0.3) uh- take off and lea::ve (.) your
 124 ↑group an' go explore *an'* an' things like
 125 that.
 126 Ric: °↑Uh huh.°=
 127 **San: =.hhh (0.4) ↑[But] (.) an- I was=**
 128 Ric: [(°Sure.°)]
 129 **San: ⇒ =working actually in the house and ↓home**
 130 **programme h. So. (.) that was quite**
 131 **↑specialised.=Although I was living in the**
 132 **→ ↑slums:: I was (0.2) really working with the**
 133 **↑middle ↓class::.**
 134 (0.3)
 135 Ric: Uhuh.

The linguistically “classed” category in focus is ‘the ↑middle ↓class::.’ (ls. 132-133) produced by Sandra. The focal sequence begins as Sandra adheres to Richard’s “itemised news enquiry” (l. 99; see Button and Casey, 1985: e.g. 6), concerning her time in Chile. In this telling, Sandra disconfirms the expectation that she came into contact with many Americans, recalling only the high density that accompanied her as part of her company (ls. 103-108). Continuing, Sandra enacts a move that is comparable to “defensive detailing” (see Jefferson, 1985a: e.g. 444): She reports that the company embodies different connotations today than it did when she was a member; specifically, the connotations of “not-working/skiving/truancy” are positioned as new acquisitions, and which did not obtain during her tenure (see ls. 115-121 and 123-125). Here, Sandra then transitions (i.e. ‘an-’ [l. 127]; ‘actually’ [l. 129]; see C. Goodwin, 1979: 111; Clift, 2001) into a topically-related telling concerning her role within the organisation. This is the backdrop against which the linguistically “classed” membership category, ‘the ↑middle ↓class::.’ (ls. 132-133), is produced.

Like Extracts 11-14, this linguistically “classed” category verbalises its “classed” hearability at its point of production through the inclusion of the term ‘↓class:.’ (l. 133). Sandra, however, does not self-explicate how concept and device is relevantly understood on this occasion – nor how it is delimited by this particular (i.e. ‘↑middle’ [l. 133]) gradation. In this case, how “social class” is understood appears to be furnished, instead, through Sandra’s preceding turns-at-talk. Firstly, this includes a designedly derivative assessment, ‘So. (.) that was quite ↑specialised.’ (ls. 130-131).¹¹³ This upshot specifies the nature of the work in which Sandra was involved. Accordingly, by explicitly categorising that same population as ‘the ↑middle ↓class:.’ (ls. 132-133), Sandra makes available “*the-specialised-nature-of-working-in-the-House-and-Home-programme*”¹¹⁴ as grounds by reference to which the category can be understood. The second feature, in contrast, invokes a disjunctive state of affairs. This is one with which incumbency in the linguistically “classed” membership category is expressly (i.e. ‘Although’ [l. 131]) contrasted: ‘=Although I was living in the ↑slums:: I was (0.2) really working with the ↑middle ↓class:.’ (ls. 131-133). This component, as an ‘asymmetrical contrastive pair’ (Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 616), demarcates what is explicitly *not* encapsulated within the category of ‘the ↑middle ↓class:.’ (ls. 132-133); in this case, again, ‘living in the ↑slums::’ (ls. 131-132).¹¹⁵

Thus, it is Sandra’s upshot (ls. 130-131), in addition to her contrast (ls. 131-132), which indicate how her avowedly “classed” membership category can be understood on this occasion. Again, this pertains to the “*specialised-nature-of-working-in-the-House-and-Home-Programme*”, and “*not-living-in-the-slums*”; a unique ontology of “social class”. These two features are instantiated over her preceding turns-at-talk and are positioned by Sandra such that they are accommodated by her linguistically “classed” membership category. Some indication is therefore provided of the operative ontology that underlies this category *prior* to its production. However, the status of these features remains equivocal. For example, they are neither positioned explicitly as a/the “*constitutive*” component(s) of the category (see Jayyusi, 2014

¹¹³ On “So”, as upshot adumbrative, see, e.g., G. Raymond (2004: 186-189).

¹¹⁴ This has been anonymised.

¹¹⁵ For the inverse, retrospective operation of this practice, see §5.5.3.2.

[1984]: 25-26), nor as explicitly “*bound*” (e.g. Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 221-224) to or “*generated*” thereby (see R. Turner, 1970: n.p.g. [EJBH: 184] in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 37). They are simply employed, instead, to describe the same population to which Sandra has previously referred. They are treated as practically *synonymous*, to this effect.¹¹⁶

Two comparable cases in which co-interlocutors encapsulate ontologies through the talk that precedes the (co-)production of linguistically “*classed*” categories are presented in Extracts 16 and 17.

Extract 16: UCDisclab [Bar]

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Hugh has topicalised Roger’s hitherto unsuccessful efforts at starting a relationship with Maggie, a non-present party.))

- 113 Jac: Maggie knows she’s missing out on a good thing.
 114 (0.2)
 115 Hug: What.
 116 (0.3)
 117 Jac: Maggie ↑Knows she’s missing out on a
 118 [°good (thing°).]
 119 Hug: [I think Maggie ju]st ↓Uh:: (1.5) is in
 120 transition. ((Staccato delivery.))
 121 (0.7)
 122 Jac: Yeah.
 123 (0.4)
 124 Hug: >She doesn’t know what’s going on< °I don’t
 125 think.°
 126 (1.0)
 127 **Hug: ⇒ Because she never (di) ↑really have a job::.**
 128 (1.0)
 129 **Hug: → She’s upper middle ↑Cla:ss.**
 130 (0.4)

¹¹⁶ On “*synonymy*”, see, e.g., Jefferson et al. (1977: 37-38) and Clift (2003). Regarding linguistically non-“*classed*” categories, see Whitehead (2013: 53-54).

131 Hug: And she's trying to snag a guy that's really way
132 up there.
133 (0.2)
134 Jac: Yeah.
135 (0.8)
136 Hug: An' (.) all power to her.=but at the same time is
137 there's () you gotta go for a (0.2)
138 () (packer) right;
139 (1.1)
140 Jac: I ↑think so.
141 (1.7)
142 Jac: I don't think she thinks so.

The linguistically “classed” category here is ‘upper middle ↑Cla:ss.’ (l. 129). This category is produced by Hugh in a categorisation of the non-present party, Maggie. Like the category within Extract 15 (i.e. ‘the ↑middle ↓class:.’ [ls. 132-133]), this category does not self-explicate how “social class” is understood in this moment; and nor Maggie’s status, specifically. It indicates only that the category is hearable as “classed”, and that whatever comprises or undergirds this category is stratified gradationally and that Maggie is classifiable as ‘upper middle’ (l. 129) along this undisclosed spectrum. Like Extract 15, however, once Hugh’s ascription is contextualised against his preceding turns-at-talk, greater access is afforded to the operative ontology of this category.

In this case, Hugh has asserted that Maggie is oblivious (ls. 124-125); a trait he attributes to her employment history – and, specifically, her lack, thereof: ‘Because she never (di) ↑really have a job::.’ (l. 127). Hugh’s classification of Maggie as ‘upper middle ↑Cla:ss.’ (l. 129) follows this account in the subsequent turn. This classification is neither explicitly nor directly bound to Hugh’s prior account – such as by way of “explanatory connective” (here, see Parry, 2013: 106), for example. Nonetheless, by virtue of its consecutive sequential positioning, it is hearable against this backdrop as a possible “formulation” (here, see H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970;

Heritage and R. Watson, 1979), follow-up categorisation and/or reworking of his previously (post-positioned) account.¹¹⁷

Hugh's categorisation of Maggie as 'upper middle ↑Cla:ss.' (l. 129) is therefore hearable such that it encompasses this predicate of "*never-really-having-had-a-job*", in some capacity. Thus, while this category does not announce how it is understood, at its point of production, Hugh's preceding account (i.e. l. 127) furnishes some specification of this category.

A final example of this prospectively organised ontological work can be observed in Extract 17; a telephone call between John and his father, Adam.

Extract 17: CallHome-eng-6298

((A telephone call. John has phoned Adam to discuss purchasing a land lot in Peru.))

- 405 Joh: Per [square metre. [They're three thousand=
406 Ada: [() [()
407 Joh: =sol per square metre. .hh[hh
408 Ada: [Oh man °I [can't=
409 Joh: [And Uh=
410 Ada: =believe it.°]
411 Joh: =]m:.=
412 Ada: =huh I Can['t Believe it.]
413 Joh: [THE SMALL]est, (0.8) the
414 smallest lot available.=
415 Ada: =people over there [don't] have any=
416 Joh: [(Yeah/Is).]
417 Ada: =Money how in the hell can (.) they (.) .hhh=
418 **Joh: 1⇒=No [no Dad]it- (0.2) jus- (.) just the=**
419 Ada: [(PAY that.)]
420 **Joh: =opposite is tr[ue.**
421 Ada: [Oh.
422 **Joh: .hhh Either they [have lot of money.=**

¹¹⁷ On this sequencing, see §6.4.

423 Ada: [People that DO have money.=
424 Joh: =] [Or they haven't.
425 Ada: =] [Oh yeah.
426 (.)
427 Ada: °Yea[h.°
428 Joh: [Have Lots of [it.
429 Ada: [°Yes,
430 Joh: People [that don't have any have absol[utely=
431 Ada: [Yes.° [°Yeah.=
432 Joh: =none.]
433 Ada: =Okay,°]
434 Joh: → .hhh[hh SO] but there is a growing middle=
435 Ada: [°Okay.°]
436 Joh: =class. And that's what these Lots are ↑targeted
437 at. tch. .hh[h
438 Ada: [°Mhm.°=
439 Joh: =*The growing middle ↑cla[ss.*]
440 Ada: ²⇒ [.hh]hh (.) But that
441 middle class [is] pretty high Class if they can=
442 Joh: [Eh-]
443 Ada: =spend that >kind of money.<

The linguistically “classed” category in this extract is the ‘growing middle [((...))] class.’ (ls. 434 and 436). This is produced by John within an assertion (ls. 415, 417 and 419), counter-assertion (ls. 418, 420, 422, 424, 428, 430 and 432), qualification sequence (ls. 434, 436-437 and 439; here, see Coulter, 1990), concerning the distribution of wealth (*cum* “social class”) in Peru. Like the linguistically “classed” categories produced in Extracts 15 and 16, this category does not explicate the salient property that underpins its organisation upon its point of production. It indicates only that the category is avowedly “classed”, and emergent (i.e. ‘growing’ [ls. 434 and 439]).¹¹⁸ Nonetheless, like Extracts 15 and 16, this property can be derived from the

¹¹⁸ On the “temporal” constitution of “classed” categorial incumbencies, see §7.3.2. For further instances in which “wealth” is reconstrued, retrospectively, in “classed” terms, see McHoul and R. Watson (1984: 292-293, 297) and Widdicombe (2017: 471).

immediately preceding talk. In this case, this ontology is supplied as a “qualification” or “modification” (see Lynch, 1985: Ch. 7: e.g. 208-209), by John, to his previous “counter-assertion”.

In the just-prior talk, John has counter-asserted that people in Peru either have lots of money, or none (ls. 418, 420, 422, 424, 428, 430 and 432); an assertion that designedly (e.g. ‘just the opposite is [((...))] t[rue.’ [ls. 418 and 420]) counters Adam’s prior generalisation (i.e. ‘people over there [don’t] have any [((...))] Money’ [ls. 415 and 417]). The focal membership category is then mobilised, by John, in the service of qualifying his counter-assertion (see $1 \Rightarrow$), inserting an interstitial category within his proposed polarity; namely, ‘a growing middle [((...))] class’ (ls. 434 and 436). Again, in this turn, John does not explicitly locate the salient ontology by reference to which “social class” – and/or, indeed, this particular stratum (i.e. ‘middle’ [l. 434]) – is relevantly organised. The focal category absorbs its meaning, instead, by virtue of its sequential placement and pragmatic function. Specifically, it is by *qualifying* the terms of John’s prior counter-assertion (e.g. ‘but’ [l. 434]) that he predicates the salient ontology of the category in terms of relative wealth. While the category is not then self-explicated through its linguistic form, its ontology is made available through the local sequential context that is established by the progenitor of this category; and, specifically, through the social action of *qualifying*.

Extract 17 thereby supplies a third case in which a linguistically “classed” category is produced by a co-interlocutor by which to environ a unique ontology that has been made available through their preceding talk. Worth noting, here, is that this analysis is not simply some logical derivation – or ‘academic’ (Schegloff, 1984a: 36) abstraction – that is divorced from the situated business of the ongoing interaction; nor, equally, is it a product of ‘reconstructed logic’ (see Kaplan, 1973: n.p.g. in W. Sharrock and Anderson, 1982: 80), or of intellectualising the ‘adequacy of members constructs’ (see Heritage, 1984a: 52; see also, Heritage, 1990/1991: 330, fn. 7), to borrow the fallacies. Instead, this self-same understanding of the focal category can be seen to be locally processed by the co-interlocutors themselves. Adam, for example – the recipient of the since-qualified counter-assertion – attests to this shared conceptualisation when he subsequently reconfigures the category of ‘=*The growing

middle ↑cla[ss.*]’ (l. 439), on these very grounds: ‘[.hh]hh (.) But that middle class [is] pretty high Class if they can [((...))] spend that >kind of money.<’ (ls. 440-441 and 443; see 2⇒). In this case, Adam predicates his reconfiguration of the category, ‘=*The growing middle ↑cla[ss.*]’ (l. 439), into ‘pretty high Class’ (l. 441), on the basis of its organisation in terms of “*relative wealth*”, proposing that the ability to spend that amount of money is one that is bound (here, see Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 221-224) to an avowedly higher (i.e. ‘pretty high’ [l. 441]) “classed” category. Adam, therefore, indirectly *accepts* the previously established premise set forth by the linguistically “classed” category insofar as he subsequently *upgrades* it in analogous terms (i.e. “*relative wealth*”).

In summary, Extracts 15-17 are examples in which linguistically “classed” membership categories are mobilised by co-interlocutors to admit unique ontologies of “social class”. These extracts are connected sequentially. In each case, the progenitor of the focal category makes available this ontology through the foregoing talk. In Extract 15 (i.e. ‘the ↑middle ↓class:.’ [ls. 132-133]), this was accomplished through a designedly derivative assessment (ls. 130-131), and the production of an ‘asymmetrical contrastive pair’ (ls. 131-132; Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: e.g. 616). In Extract 16 (i.e. ‘upper middle ↑Cla:ss.’ [l. 129]), this was “*premonitored*”¹¹⁹ by the terms of an anterior account (l. 127) and subsequent proposition (ls. 124-125). Lastly, in Extract 17, the membership category a/the ‘growing middle [((...))] class.’ (ls. 434 and 436) was predicated upon the terms of the progenitor’s preceding counter-assertion (ls. 418, 420, 422, 424, 428, 430 and 432). Aspects of co-interlocutors’ foregoing talk thus furnish an inferential context against which linguistically “classed” categories can be understood, and which, as Extract 17 has demonstrated, can be recognised by co-interlocutors, *in situ*.

4.6.1.2 Concurrent

Talk that precedes the (co-)production of linguistically “classed” membership categories is not the only position in which such categories are specified by progenitors. A second sequential environment in which ontologies are routinely

¹¹⁹ Jefferson’s (1980) term.

furnished is in and through the very (co-)production of those categories. The social actions for which these categories are (co-)produced, for example, is a primary mechanism that is employed to this effect. In Extract 18, below, for example, the membership category, ‘upper class> (0.2) ↑Indians’ (l. 167), is specified, to some extent, through the social action of “*accounting*” to which it contributes.¹²⁰

Extract 18: CallHome-eng-5712

((A telephone call. Beth and Adele have been discussing two non-present pupils to whom Beth teaches English as a foreign language.))

- 130 Ade: =.hh And what was the other language- a
131 language I never heard of before.
132 (0.3)
133 Ade: That some kid spoke.
134 (1.3)
135 Bet: Indonesian.
136 (0.3)
137 Ade: No.

((Thirteen lines omitted.))

- 151 Bet: [Oh ↑Ur]:du.
152 (0.2)
153 Bet: >Urd[u.<]
154 Ade: [<I](t')s (.) ↑Ur↓du:.>
155 (0.9)
156 Bet: Urdu is- is an Indian language.=hh.
157 (1.1)
158 Ade: Urdu is an (.) <Indian language?>
159 (0.6)
160 Bet: Uhuh,
161 (0.3)
162 Ade: ↓Oh:.
163 (1.5)

¹²⁰ The activity of “*accounting*” is recovered in Chapter 6.

164 Bet: Yeah I have Eh- Ehan Baqir.
 165 (0.8)
 166 **Bet:** → **.hh (0.2) Bu:t. (0.3) <Like most_ (.) of the**
 167 **upper cla:ss> (0.2) ↑Indians he speaks**
 168 **En*glis.h.***
 169 (0.5)
 170 Ade: Yeah.
 171 (0.2)
 172 **Bet:** **British English.**
 173 (0.2)
 174 Ade: Yeah.
 175 (1.6)
 176 **Bet:** **With a real slant to it.=.hhh**

The excerpt begins as Beth and Adele search for the name of a third student who is disfluent in English. After Beth identifies the sought-after student (l. 164), she then effects a ‘de-listing’ (Jefferson, 1990: 76; ls. 166-168), disqualifying the now-identified pupil from the list-in-progress of “*Beth’s-students-who-speak-English-poorly*”; the collaborative activity hitherto underway. This activity is instituted by Beth by invoking the pupil’s extant bilingualism (ls. 166-168, 172 and 176); a competence that she attributes, indirectly, to his linguistically “classed” status: ‘hh (0.2) Bu:t. (0.3) <Like most_ (.) of the upper cla:ss> (0.2) ↑Indians he speaks En*glis.h.*’ (ls. 166-168) – specifically, ‘British English.’ (l. 172; see Schegloff, 1997c), ‘With a real slant to it.=.hhh’ (l. 176). The student is ascribed into this “classed” category indirectly through the ‘transitivity of attributes’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 49): He is ascribed a “classed” categorisation by virtue of enacting an activity (i.e. speaking (British) English [ls. 168, 172 and 176]) – and/or for possessing a *capacity* for such an activity – that is, for Beth, proposedly bound/tied to the majority (i.e. ‘most_’ [l. 166]) of the incumbents of this categorial position (i.e. ‘upper cla:ss> (0.2) ↑Indians’ [l. 167]); a category with an avowedly “classed” organisation.¹²¹

¹²¹ See Extract 21 (ls. 107 and 109) for a second instance in which an avowedly “classed” ontology (i.e. “*whiteness*”) is positioned as similarly *non-constitutive*.

The linguistically “classed” category, ‘upper class’ (0.2) ↑Indians’ (l. 167), is thus produced by Beth as she accounts for the removal of the since-identified student from the list of “*Beth’s-students-who-speak-English-poorly*”. On this occasion, the student’s fluency in British-English, is treated as the salient factor which warrants his status as an exception. Specifically, it is positioned as a “*category-bound activity*” (e.g. Sacks, 1974 [1972]) or “*knowledge*” (e.g. W. Sharrock, 1974) that is attributed, reflexively, for Beth, to the avowedly (i.e. ‘upper class’ [l. 167]) “classed” status of the student. Thus, while the focal category does not self-explicate its substantive ontology through its linguistic form, this is furnished by Beth incrementally (see Schegloff, 2016 [2001]) through the action of the turn into which it contributes; namely, “accounting”. Like Extracts 15-17, then, this linguistically “classed” membership category encapsulates a unique ontology of “social class”; one that is operative for co-interlocutors amidst the interaction, and which might be unanticipated, and/or elided when extant, professional theorisations are selectively enforced.

Extract 18, therefore, presents a case in which the salient ontology of a linguistically “classed” category is specified through the social action of “*accounting*” to which it contributes. However, this is not the only practice whereby ontologies are made available at their point of production. A second resource concerns the *turn-design/categorial constitution* of the membership categories themselves. Two examples of this practice have been adduced in Extracts 12 and 14.

Extract 12 (Reproduced): CallHome-eng-4705

56 **Ali:** And it’s a <ver:y nice> (0.4) you know (0.5)
 57 → she’s (0.6) kind of from the **Wealthy Class**..

Extract 14 (Reproduced): CABNC [KBF_46]

50 Hel: His ↑mother was an office *cleaner.* (1.4)
 51 and. (0.5) she con↑ceived Bill (.) by a
 52 married *man.*
 53 (1.2)
 54 **Hel:** → Erm. (0.2) °a° poor (0.3) **working *class**
 55 **man.***

The two categories in these extracts differ from those in Extracts 11, 13, 15-18. Previously, the categories considered have each expressed their “classed” interpretability through their linguistic form (i.e. “*class*”), but they do not also proclaim their underpinning ontologies. In other words, they do not *necessarily* self-explicate how “social class” is substantively organised in the moments in which they are (co-)produced. Instead, these categories have been shown to “*expose*”¹²² only gradational/hierarchical specifications; what might be described, otherwise, as ‘measure terms’ (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: e.g. 322), ‘measuring categories’ (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 59), or ‘measuring terms’ (see Jefferson, 1996: 22), to modify the concepts.¹²³ These “classed” membership categories do not, then, announce how they are undergirded, phenomenally, through their linguistic design; nevertheless, they stipulate that such categories are ordered by reference to an “*underlying ordinality*”;¹²⁴ albeit one that is left unspecified, linguistically.

The linguistically “classed” categories in Extracts 12 and 14 differ notably in this respect. Both categories declare how they can be understood, to some extent, through the details of their categorial form. In each case, this is accomplished through their inclusion of what Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 26, italics in original) terms a ‘*descriptor concept*’. For Extract 12, this is the descriptor ‘Wealthy’ (l. 57), and in Extract 14, ‘working’ (l. 51). These two descriptors differ significantly from the gradational/hierarchical terms (e.g. “lower”, “middle”, “higher”, etc.) included in Extracts 10, 11, 13, 15-18, insofar as they both name comparatively *substantive* ontological bases upon their point of production. “Wealth” and “employment”, for example, are specified in these cases. These are positioned such that they should not

¹²² Jefferson’s (1987 [1983]) term.

¹²³ This is not to propose that such categories are, as a result, devoid of common-sense connotations. It has been established by Sacks (e.g. 1967; 1972; 1974 [1972]; 1992, Vol. I: 40-48, 113-125), after all, that the intelligibility of membership categories trades upon such knowledge. Furthermore, as Atkinson (1978: 81) notes, it is this very knowledge that has made ‘linguistic categories’ available as objects of sustained Sociological scrutiny (see also, Wootton, 1975: 20; Jayyusi, 1984: 3 in Hester, 1992: 156; see also, *ibid.*: 173 and 173, fn. 4; W. Sharrock and R. Watson, 1989: 433; Hester and Eglin, 2017: 307-308).

¹²⁴ Hardy’s (1993: 10, fn. 2, my emphasis) phrase.

be heard *proximately* as instantiations of these devices, but distally, and epiphenomenally, as the relevant indices of “social class”. Upon their point of production, therefore, these categories not only self-explicate the “classed” interpretability (e.g. “wealthy *class*”), but also announce how they are relevantly understood upon their point of production (e.g. “*wealthy class*”).

Of course, this is not to propose that such ontologies are necessarily, therefore, specified through their naming, alone. Nor equally, that such avowed ontologies cannot be “*refurbished*”,¹²⁵ sequentially, in ways comparable to designedly gradated “classed” membership categories. These categories are instead equally vulnerable to specificatory work. They retain an irremediable ‘second-order availability’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 27), to this effect. As Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 27), observes, ‘the constitutive feature is available in the naming’, however the bases by reference to which one qualifies as a ratified incumbent are left unspecified. Through the specification of their operative ontology through their naming, therefore, such categories are not somehow impervious to the vagaries of indexicality. They simply avow one such underpinning that can be (re)specified by co-interlocutors, *in situ*. Extract 19, and the production of the linguistically “classed” category ‘working ↑class’ (ls. 30-31), illustrates such a specification in action.

Extract 19: EJBH_F4_34

((A face-to-face interaction. Samuel, Tim, Luke, Simon, Nick and David are playing “*Texas hold ‘em*”).)

- 6 Tim: (Got / And) a great mix lined up >↓Luke.<
7 (0.9)
8 Tim: >Do you know what you’re [doing.<]
9 Sam: [Check.]
10 (0.5)
11 (?): °()-°=
12 Luk: =Y[eah] on Facebook=
13 Sim: [Check.]
14 Luk: =↑li[(h)ve.]

¹²⁵ Anderson and W. Sharrock’s (1982: 83) term.

15 Sam: [Got a]ce:.
16 (2.3)
17 (?): ((Sniffs.))
18 (0.6)
19 (?): ((Clears throat.))
20 (0.2)
21 (?): ((Sniffs.))=
22 (?): =.hhhhHH[HH.]
23 Luk: [↑OH::::]
24 (0.4)
25 (?): °hhhhh.°
26 (1.0)
27 Sam: I got ace:.
28 (0.3)
29 Nic: [<That you: said.]
30 **Sam:** → **[He's was- just gonna put me d]own as working**
31 **↑class inne.**
32 (0.2)
33 Nic: £Hy(h)eah.£
34 Sam: °Fuck.° ((Whispered.))
35 Nic: I heard that [as well and I did think that=
36 Sam: [(.hhhhh / hhhhh.) Tim.=
37 Nic: =straight away.]
38 Sam: =]
39 (0.4)
40 Tim: £S(h)am.£
41 (0.4)
42 Sam: I'm so sorry audi°en° () ((Trails off.))
43 (?): .hhh=
44 Nic: =°Nothing wrong with being working class Sam.°
45 (0.5)
46 Sam: .hhh (0.4) I got ↓ace:.
47 (1.6)
48 Nic: °Tim identified himself as working° CLASS,
49 (0.4)
50 Sam: Shoulda said I Ace.

The interaction is joined as Samuel (ls. 9 and 15) and Simon (l. 13) complete a hand of poker. The linguistically “classed” category in focus, ‘working ↑class’ (ls. 30-31), is produced by Samuel as he topicalises (relatedly, see Glenn, 1995: 54) – although inadvertently “re-formats” (see Schegloff, 2013: 62-68) – the linguistic form used to announce his holding initially (l. 27; cf. l. 15). This form is treated, by Samuel, to furnish warrantable grounds by reference to which the researcher, who is co-present, could classify him as ‘working ↑class’ (ls. 30-31). This is an inference that is ostensibly shared by Nick (ls. 35 and 37), but who subsequently vindicates this identification (see l. 44), dispelling its purportedly transgressive quality and, correspondingly, any putative need for Samuel to apologise (cf. l. 42; see Drew and Hepburn, 2016).¹²⁶

Like Extracts 12 and 14 – and the latter, especially – the ontology that underpins this membership category is provided, in part, upon its production, through the inclusion of the ‘*descriptor concept*’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 26, italics in original), ‘working’ (l. 30). Samuel, in this way, self-explicates the underlying ontology of this device, to some extent, concurrently with its production. Considered in isolation, for example, this might position “*employment*” as the operative underlying organisation of the concept. When the use of the category is contextualised sequentially, however, the details of the Samuel’s preceding talk reflexively furnish the ontological foundations of the category in ways that are comparable to the unspecified, gradated categories considered previously (e.g. “middle class”). In this case, the category is positioned by Samuel (ls. 30-31) as the identity he will be ascribed by the researcher on the basis of his hand-announcement (see ls. 15, 27 and 50). The relevant basis for the category is therefore furnished sequentially through the turns preceding the production of the category and is not simply provided for through the details of its linguistic design.

To summarise, therefore, the underlying ontologies of linguistically “classed” categories can also be furnished *concurrent* to their production, not only through specifications from the preceding talk. This work can be accomplished through the *social actions* (e.g. “accounting”) delivered through the turns-at-talk into which the

¹²⁶ On “‘performer’/‘audience’” partitions, see Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 593; Vol. II: 104-113).

membership categories feature (e.g. Extract 18). Alternatively, ontologies could be specified provisionally, on a ‘second-order’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 27), through the inclusion of a ‘*descriptor concept*’ (ibid.: 26, italics in original). The ontologies of linguistically “classed” categories are not merely rendered observable through the work enacted in the preceding turns-at-talks but can also be made available concurrently upon their point of production.

4.6.1.3 Retrospective

The previous sections have presented cases in which linguistically “classed” categories admit ontologies of “social class” that have been made available prophylactically, in the preceding talk, and/or which are furnished concurrently through the social actions for which these categories are serviced, and/or through the particulars of their categorial form. There are occasions, however, in which both of these structural opportunities for ontological (re)specification are foregone, and in which such categories are compassed *retroactively*. The two cases that follow illustrate this practice. Here, linguistically “classed” categories are introduced as a ‘*prospective indexical*’ (here, see C. Goodwin, 1996: 384, italics in original), and where their ontology is subsequently imbued following their (co-)production. Specifically, in Extracts 20 and 21, this is accomplished through the continuation or extension of the same TCU in which the linguistically “classed” category is (co-)produced.

Extract 20: EJBH_F1_01

((A face-to-face interaction. Amy is delivering a complaint-implicative telling about her father and his prejudices towards the unemployed.))

256 Amy: =Yeah, (.) But do you know what it's weird 'cuz
 257 like we're talking about how (.) .hhh (0.2)
 258 ↑ehm:: ((Voice wavers.)) (1.1) °.tch° (0.3) Like
 259 how <experience:> (.) is a way of (.)
 260 under[↑standing.]
 261 Rac: [°.tch° *Yeah.*]
 262 (.)
 263 Amy: And like broadening your view on the [*↑world*]=
 264 Rac: [Mhm.]

265 Amy: =.hhh (0.2) But ↑like- (0.4)
 266 ((Distortion. / Knocking. / (0.2)))
 267 (.)
 268 Amy: It doesn't seem ↑to work like that everyone; hh.
 269 (0.3)
 270 Amy: .hh[h][(.) li]ke (0.4) I mean my ↓Da::d. (0.7) I=
 271 Rac: [N][o:]
 272 Amy: =don't- (hh./ ((Sighs.)) (0.3) I don't have much
 273 to do with *my Dad*
 274 (.)
 275 Rac: Mhm hmm.=

((Eighteen lines omitted. Amy details her father's political, racial and regional allegiances.))

294 (0.4)
 295 Amy: Erm. (0.2) (.tch) I don't ↑think (0.3) he knows
 296 to many people who are.=.hhh (0.2) like Asian
 297 which is the main=
 298 Rac: =Mm hm[m.]
 299 Amy: [Eth]nic minority in our area?=.hhh (0.2)
 300 Uhm. (0.4) An'- (.) And also ↑he:: (0.2) doesn't
 301 (.) really know or didn't really °know many
 302 people° who (were / are) on ↑benefits?
 303 (.)
 304 Amy: .hhh (.) So I *↓thought ↑that-* (.) His: (.) Uhm.
 305 (0.4) that his: (0.6) °c:(hh.)°rappy, horrible.
 306 .hhh (.) like (0.2) narrow minded atti*tude.*
 307 (0.2) were to do with not knowing those
 308 peo[ple;]
 309 Rac: [Yeah.]
 310 Amy: And not having that ↑experience (.) .tch .hhh
 311 (0.3) ↑BUT. hh. (0.6) .tch (.) .hh ↑he was (.)
 312 ehm:: (.) .tch .hh (0.2) he got made re↓dundant,
 313 (.)
 314 Amy: From his job,=He'd done the same job from school.
 315 (.) .hhh [for like (.) t]wenty odd years (.) And=

316 Rac: [Mhm hmm.]
317 Amy: =then. .hhh (.) came into work one day and found
318 that ↑he:: (0.6) there's a letter saying >↑he'd
319 been made redundant?<
320 (0.4)
321 Amy: .hh[hh]
322 Rac: [.tch (.)] °God.°
323 (.)
324 Amy: Uh::m. (.) And so ↑he:: (.) had to go through the
325 whole ↑thing of like having .hhh (0.2) ↑Uhm::.
326 (0.4) >Being on jobseeker's allowance
327 [and having] to< sign on and=
328 Rac: [°Mhm hmm.°]
329 Amy: =and things¿=[.hhh] Which he used to talk about=
330 Rac: [Yeah]
331 Amy: =feeling really degraded, (.) ↑doing
332 [and] [(0.2) li]ke it was=
333 Rac: [Mh] [m hmm]
334 Amy: =demeaning and *that-*=.hh (0.2) he:: (0.2) 'cuz
335 as far as >he's concerned like he's< (.) paid
336 into a system:. and [there][fore he] sh:ould↑=
337 Rac: [.tch][*Yeah.*]
338 Amy: =(.) .hh (0.2) be able to get stuff. (.) out of
339 it without (.) being¿=.hh (0.2) without (.)
340 being.=°s- tre-° (.) °t-° being made to feel.
341 (.)
342 Rac: m' Yeah.
343 (.)
344 Rac: >B[ad about *it.*<]
345 Amy: [Like ↑de]gra[ded?]=.hhh (.) S:O,=
346 Rac: [*Yeah.*]
347 Amy: =(0.6) I would have thought that that might have
348 made him realise::, (.) a little ↑bit (.) about
349 his ↑prejudices?
350 (.)
351 Amy: [.hhh] (.) ↑Uhm:: (0.8) but it totally=
352 Rac: [Mhm hmm.]

353 Amy: =↑didn't.
354 (.)
355 Amy: → He'd ↑still=.hhh (.) >I mean the other thing<
356 *that he::* (.) *that 'e* (.) totally (.) doesn't
357 take into a↑ccount.=.hh (.) Is the fact *that-*
358 (.) *Yes:* he was unemployed.=.hh (0.2) but
359 because ↑he's¿ (0.3) *like* fr::om. (0.2) °.tch
360 .hhh° (0.3) quite a sort of (.) privileged family
361 an' his friends tend to be ↑more sort of (0.4)
362 ⇒ uhm. (.) middle class and like (.) [business]=
363 Rac: [<Mhm.>]
364 Amy: =owners and ↑things=.hh (.) that his:: (0.5)
365 friend who:. (0.5) has (.) busi*ness.* (.) .hh
366 (0.2) was able to like (.hh) (0.2) Ehm:. (0.2)
367 give him a- (.) you know create a job for 'im in
368 his (0.3) business. So [he] wasn't=
369 Rac: [(°.tch°)]
370 Amy: =unemployed for that long¿=.hh[h
371 Rac: [.tch y[eah.
372 Amy: ['cuz he had
373 ↑connections?=.hhh (0.3) Eh:m. (0.3) and he (.)
374 totally l- (.) like lost *th:at.* .hh (.) And
375 then (.) so the following *year* I was speaking
376 to him near christmas (.) ↑and .hh (0.3) You
377 know. (.) it was ↑christmas (.) ehm (.) and I
378 think they're with. (.) I think there was like a
379 scheme↓where. (0.4) uhm. (.) people who got
380 certain benefits could get like. (.) reduced (.)
381 pri[ce] st[amps¿]

The category in focus in this extract is 'middle class' (l. 362). This is produced by Amy over a complaint-implicative telling about her father.¹²⁷ As Amy formulates

¹²⁷ On 'Story-Complaints', see Coulter (1990: 195) and Jefferson (1996: 35). On 'intimate complaining', see Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 311; see also, H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 344, fn. 14). For an analysis of this extract, *qua* "complaint", see §6.5.2.

over lines 256-260 (here, see H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970; Heritage and R. Watson, 1979), the two have been discussing how individuals' "experiences" furnish a mechanism for understanding (ls. 258-260) and can inform their worldview (l. 263). As projected in Amy's formulation (e.g. 'it's weird' [l. 256]),¹²⁸ however, and realised over the course of her complaint-implicative telling, Amy cites a deviant case. This telling pertains to Amy's father, who, despite experiencing redundancy (ls. 310-312 and 314), and a spate of unemployment – and, with it, its ameliorative processes (e.g. ls. 324-327 and 329), and psycho-social "injuries" (here, see Sennett and Cobb, 1972; e.g., ls., 329, 331, 334-336, 338-340 and 345) – neither recognised nor rectified his existing "prejudices" (see ls. 345, 347-349, 351 and 353) towards persons who were similarly positioned; prejudices that were, for Amy, presumptively attributable to his inexperience with such persons (e.g. ls. 299-302 and 304-308). It is this lack of reflexivity that forms the basis of the ensuing complaint.

Focal in this extract is the successively extended turn-at-talk (here, see Lerner, 1991: 444) that is produced by Amy following what is projected as the dénouement of her telling-in-progress (ls. 351 and 353). Amy opens, here, with what is adumbrated (i.e. 'He'd ↑still-' [l. 355]) as an exposition of her prior paternal assessment (ls. 351 and 353).¹²⁹ This is cut-off before completion, however, as Amy initiates a designedly new, topically coherent turn-at-talk ('>I mean the other thing<' [l. 355]). In this turn, Amy does not volunteer some exposition of the veritable "punchline" of her complaint, and/or of the normative conduct transgressed by her father (see Drew, 1998: 306-309), previously projected (i.e. 'He'd ↑still-' [l. 355]). Instead, Amy cites a second, interrelated irony that pertains to her father's aforementioned prejudices. Amy explains that not only should her father's experiences of redundancy and unemployment (etc.), have precipitated some realisation and/or revision of his intolerances, but that he should also have gained awareness (ls. 372-374) of his privileged position relative to others undergoing the same experiences. This lack of

¹²⁸ On the adumbrative properties of "story prefaces", see, e.g., Sacks (1974: 340-341).

¹²⁹ On the use of "*still*" in complaints, see Drew (1998: 308) and E. Holt (2000: 437) and, differently, Gafaranga and Britten (2005: 80). For its use in maintaining a position, more broadly, see Sacks (1970, Ch. 4: 41-44; 1992, Vol. I: 344-345, 736-737) and Heritage (2011b: 178, fn. 3).

reflexivity is attributed by Amy to two reasons. Firstly, *ancestry*. Her father is positioned to lack this reflexivity by virtue of coming from ‘quite a sort of (.) privileged family’ (l. 360).¹³⁰ Secondly, and most focally, this is attributed to his *friendship network*; that is, the persons who are characterised as ‘↑more sort of (0.4) uhm. (.) middle class’ (ls. 361-362), and who are identified, by Amy, to have performed an integral role in extricating her father from his status *qua* “unemployed” (ls. 364-368, 370 and 372-374).

The linguistically “classed” category is thus produced by Amy in the service of qualifying why her father did not occupy the typical footing of persons equally describable as “unemployed”. What is most notable for current purpose, however, is that Amy produces a category which self-explicates its “classed” hearability, but that does not account for how “social class” is to be understood in that moment. This conceptualisation is instead supplied retroactively as Amy contiguously volunteers canonical examples of the type of jobs that these avowedly ‘middle class’ (l. 362) persons possess: ‘like (.) [business] [((...))] owners and ↑things=.hh’ (ls. 362 and 364). Amy’s linguistically “classed” category is thus mobilised to encapsulate what might be glossed as a type of “*managerial occupation*”, an ontology that is made available through the continuation of her TCU. What is relevantly denoted by the linguistically “classed” category (i.e. ‘middle class’ [l. 362]), then, is compensated retrospectively, obtaining its unique ontology from the sequential environment in which it is co-produced. A related example to this is produced in Extract 21, where the ontology of the focal category is furnished through the extension of a TCU-in-progress.

Extract 21: UCDisclab [Scon1]

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Luke and Owen are discussing the problems of majoring in science, and the implications this has for the attainment of “*power*”.)

- 52 Owe: .tch We asians man:.=
 53 Luk: =Hm.
 54 (0.3)
 55 Luk: Uh huh [huh huh (.) °↑huh.°]

¹³⁰ On indirect (e.g. ‘fr::om.’ [l. 359]) “classed” ascriptions, see §7.3.2.

56 Owe: [I'm telling you.]
57 (1.3)
58 Luk: S(hh)ciencə; (0.3) or n(h)o m(h)ajor.=↑Huh
59 huh-
60 (1.5)
61 Owe: °It's s-° sa:d;
62 (0.4)
63 Owe: In a way;
64 (0.5)
65 Luk: °Yeah.°
66 (3.3)
67 Owe: Because if you go into ↑science there's no
68 power really.
69 (0.4)
70 Luk: Um hmm.=
71 Owe: =There's not much power.
72 (0.2)
73 Owe: You got a go into political science and (0.5)
74 [(bunch a)] government.
75 Luk: [(Uhm)]
76 (0.6)
77 Owe: `Cuz (.) you know.
78 (1.8)
79 Luk: Yeah I'd think so too.
80 (2.4)
81 Owe: (See) you'd be ↑manipulated. (.) You know.
82 (0.6)
83 Owe: By the other.
84 (1.1)
85 Owe: They're mostly (0.6) ((Knocking.)) (1.2)
86 (.tch) uhm:. (0.7) people go into: uhm. (0.4)
87 .tch liberal arts are whites:.
88 (0.5)
89 Luk: Uhm hm[m].
90 Owe: [They're the one who's gonna control
91 the government;
92 (0.7)

93 ((Knocking.))
 94 (0.5)
 95 Luk: Yeah I think so.
 96 (6.6)
 97 Owe: That's kind of too bad though.
 98 (0.4)
 99 Luk: †(Y')no. (1.4) it's just like uh science
 100 people () especially if you're like (0.7)
 101 †now (0.2) minority- ethnic minority?=
 102 Owe: =Uhm hmm.
 103 (1.4)
 104 Luk: You're like working totally under the
 105 government you know?
 106 (0.4)
 107 **Luk: → All the government [people are those up]per=**
 108 Owe: [†Hmm hmm.]
 109 **Luk: ⇒ =class you know (.) mostly whites.**
 110 (0.5)
 111 Owe: That's true.
 112 (0.5)
 113 Luk: Yeah.=
 114 Owe: =.tch (0.6) All you're doing is- (0.5) is
 115 rubbing your ass really;
 116 (0.3)
 117 Luk: °Yeah.°
 118 (0.7)
 119 Owe: Rubbing their ass maybe.=T(hh)oo.=
 120 Luk: =Yeah. (0.3) I think so too.

This excerpt begins as Owen stipulates a putative homology between Asian students and the study of the natural sciences. This correlation is evaluated negatively by Owen, invoking the lack of power that inheres within and/or is afforded by the natural sciences, as opposed to reading 'political science' (l. 73); the students of which, he categorises, at first incipiently (see ls. 73-74), and then more fully, as those 'who's gonna control the government;' (ls. 90-91). Luke agrees with Owen's assessment (l. 95) and stipulates his own upgraded position, asserting that natural scientists are

completely subjugated by the government (ls. 104-105). It is here in which Luke self-explicates exactly what is denoted by the category ‘government [people’ (l. 107), disaggregating two constituent dimensions; namely, ‘All the government [people are those up]per [(...)] class you know (.) mostly whites.’ (ls. 107 and 109). It is the production of this latter linguistically “classed” membership category that is of particular import here.

Like Extract 20, at the point at which Luke has produced the focal category, ‘up]per [(...)] class’ (ls. 107 and 109), neither co-interlocutor has self-explicated how it is relevantly constituted in the moment in which it is (co-)produced. All that can be deduced, instead, is that this un-explicated category contributes towards the parent category of ‘the government [people’ (l. 107). Like Extract 20, however, further information concerning the underlying ontology of this category is then supplied *retroactively*. In this case, this occurs following the extension of Luke’s TCU-in-progress by way of the “modular pivot” (see Clayman and C. Raymond, 2015: 398-401; see also, Fox, 1993 in Lerner, 2004a: 176, fn. 3), ‘you know’ (l. 109): ‘All the government [people are those up]per [(...)] class you know (.) mostly whites.’ (ls. 107 and 109). The use of this pivot extends Luke’s TCU-in-progress, and it is in this extension that Luke specifies an underlying dimension of the category ‘up]per [(...)] class’ (ls. 107 and 109); namely, ‘mostly whites.’ (l. 109).

What might be glossed as “*whiteness*” is therefore positioned as the focal ontology that relevantly underpins Luke’s linguistically “classed” membership category (i.e. ‘up]per [(...)] class’ [ls. 107 and 109]) on this occasion. Akin to Extract 18 (l. 166), this ontology is cast such that underlies this category; however, it is not cast as its *constitutive* component (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 25-26). This is indicated through the inclusion of the qualifier ‘mostly’ (l. 109; see Edwards, 2000: e.g. 352, 358). Specifically, Luke, here, attests to the composition of the ‘up]per [(...)] class’ (ls. 107 and 109) in terms of “whiteness”, predominantly, but not exclusively. This ontology is therefore configured as the operative basis for the linguistically “classed” category, but it is not promoted as its criterial dimension. In other words, for Luke, ‘All the government [people’ (l. 107) are positioned as ‘up]per [(...)] class’ (ls. 107 and 109); however, incumbents of the ‘up]per [(...)] class’ (ls. 107 and 109) are not exclusively ‘whites.’ (l. 109).

Luke, in this extract, thus expounds one expressly non-criterial (i.e. ‘mostly’ [l. 109]) dimension of the linguistically “classed” membership category, ‘up]per [(...)] class’ (ls. 107 and 109), through their extension of the TCU in which the category is produced. In this case, this is realised by way of the “modular pivot” (see Clayman and C. Raymond, 2015), ‘you know’ (l. 109). Extract 21 thereby presents a second case in which a co-interlocutor furnishes a linguistically “classed” category, previously produced, with a unique ontology of “social class” retroactively.¹³¹

4.6.1.4 Discursus

This section has canvassed three sequential positions at which the ontologies of linguistically “classed” terms are made available in talk-in-interaction. These have been divided, broadly, into “prospective” (§4.6.1.1), “concurrent” (§4.6.1.2) and “retrospective” (§4.6.1.3) occasions. In each instance, linguistically “classed” terminology is mobilised that admits some ontology of “social class” that has been occasioned, locally, for some set of practical purpose(s). This finding, I have proposed, is novel and has procedural implications for EM/(M)CA research. Indeed, I have established that extant EM/(M)CA research on “social class” has limited its purview to circumscriptions (e.g. “wealth”) that are elected, *ex cathedra*. Again, there is good precedent for this approach (see §4.4), and for which affordances obtain. What is revealed through my analysis, however, is that resources are available to analysts such that they are able to glean what are treated as avowedly “classed” for co-interlocutors, *in situ*. This procedure is radically different from that of existing research. The former privileges a theorisation of “social class” (e.g. “wealth”) and hypostatizes that self-same conceptualisation as a members’ accomplishment. Conversely, my alternative approach displaces the onus of ontological work from analyst to participant, enabling co-interlocutors, not analysts, to designate the occasions that are expressly characterisable as relevantly “classed”. In other words, they are conferred *agency* to adjudicate the operative ontological bases of “social class”.

¹³¹ For a third case of this *retrospective* operation, see Extract 27.

As I have argued, this shift in purview aligns conceptually with the objectives of EM/(M)CA research. Specifically, I proposed that it enables analysts to respecify “social class” further as a “*members’ phenomenon*”. Moreover, this approach also opens-up novel lines of empirical inquiry. The ontologies captured in Extracts 15-21, for example, illustrate the prospects of this research clearly. These examples, it will be recalled, comprise a diverse array of examples. This includes variables privileged formerly in FA research (see Chapter 1), in addition to potentially extraneous or transgressive ontologies; that is, ontologies which transcend or contradict how the concept is defined by/for analysts. Examples of the former include “*never-really-having-had-a-job*” (i.e. Extract 16), “*relative wealth*” (i.e. Extract 17) and “*infelicitous syntax*” (i.e. Extract 19), *inter alia*. The latter, in contrast, include the comparatively heterogenous ontologies of the “*specialised-nature-of-working-in-the-House-and-Home-programme*” (i.e. Extract 15), “*speaking-in-British-English-with-a-real-slant-to-it*” (i.e. Extract 18) and “*whiteness*” (i.e. Extract 21). The former set illustrate that the ontologies enclosed by linguistically “classed” categories can intersect with theorisations that have been articulated previously in professional research and might even share parameters with concepts that are otherwise captured by existing category-concepts within the natural language.

What is particularly notable, however, is that the linguistic neutrality of these terms enables co-interlocutors to embed *diverse* ontologies of “social class” that have not traditionally been formulated (and, so, formalised) in these terms, and/or which transcend the taken-for-granted limits of extant categorisations. The latter set of ontologies indicate such esoterica and penumbra. It is this interactional and ontological work, I propose, that is made available, uniquely, by linguistically “classed” terms, and which is facilitated by the seeming vacuity/opacity of their linguistic form (e.g. “middle class”). Specifically, I contend that it is this quality that enables co-interlocutors to attune hitherto and/or consensually “unclassed” ontologies as expressly “classed” in some moment. After all, some other linguistically non-“classed” category (e.g. “*rich*”) might be formulated to accommodate such diverse ontologies. However, what is not achieved through such a classification, is an expressly “classed” valence. Linguistically “classed” terms, in this vein, are a versatile, generative resource for synthesising novel ontologies of “social class” in explicitly “classed” terms, including ontologies for which there may not be

extant category-concepts within the natural language that are recognised, consensually, to designate the self-same phenomena in an avowedly “classed” tenor.

To award primacy to linguistically “classed” categorisations, therefore, provides access to occasions in which the meaning(s) of “social class” are negotiated by co-interlocutors. The analysis of these categories thus opens up a possible array of “classed” phenomena that is not constrained by the perceptions, imaginations or allegiances of analysts and which cannot necessarily be foreknown nor intuited, *a priori*.¹³² Linguistically “classed” terms thus afford analysts a glimpse into how cohorts mobilise their own circumscriptions of “social class”, practically, and negotiate the terms of their natural “*facticity*” (e.g. Extract 17).¹³³

4.6.2 Intersubjectivity

Extracts 15-21 have illustrated how co-interlocutors routinely furnish ontologies of “social class” before, during and following their (co-)production. What has been previously neglected, however, are the status and reception of these categories in interaction. Indeed, what is particularly notable about such terms is that they are mobilised routinely to encapsulate a diverse (and, theoretically, *endless*) set of ontologies, yet they remain understood when (co-)produced, and treated unproblematically. That is, upon their (co-)production, co-interlocutors relinquish opportunities that are structurally provided for in which to pursue, clarify and/or (dis)confirm their understandings through the mechanics of “*repair*” (here, see Schegloff et al., 1977); one that is omni-available to co-interlocutors in talk-in-interaction (e.g. *ibid.*: 375). This repeated non-occurrence furnishes an important insight for EM/(M)CA concerning “*intersubjectivity*”. This can be formulated as such:

Despite the indexical and the indefinitely extendable uses of linguistically “classed” categories – and their veritable catch-all ontological affordances – they are routinely treated as procedurally understandable by/for co-interlocutors, and do not beget the initiation of “*repair*”.

¹³² On the limits of “*imagination*”, recall §3.3.1.

¹³³ H. Garfinkel’s (1967: 10) term. See also, e.g., H. Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston (1981).

This observation can be seen borne out across Extracts 15-21; none of which are subsequently implicated in repair. This capacity can be illustrated most clearly, however, with reference to the environment of what Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: Ch. 3) has termed “*cumulative-category lists*”. This is a genre of listing in which each component collocates with the co-selections as ‘a *gestalt*’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 78, italics in original). Focal about this sequential environment is that co-interlocutors do not make the undergirding ontologies of linguistically “classed” terms available, nor “*on-record*”.¹³⁴ Nonetheless, these membership categories are routinely exempt from repair, and are not pursued upon their production. What is designated as “classed”, in other words, is left acceptably absent, and procedurally *passable* (i.e. acceptable and/or admissible; relatedly, see Handel, 1982: 43-45), irrespective of the (hitherto unspecified) particulars of their constitution.¹³⁵ One example of this exigency is presented in Extract 22, below; an exchange that precedes the excerpt adduced in Extract 20.

Extract 22: EJBH_F1_01

((A face-to-face interaction. Rachel has detailed the plot of the film “*Me Before You*” [T. Sharrock, 2016].))

- 47 Rac: [Shou]ld he be allowed, to make that
 48 decision in *it's* (.)
 49 Amy: .hh (0.2) Se[e↑]
 50 Rac: [V]ery intere[st]*ing.*=
 51 Amy: [(.tch)]
 52 Amy: =.hhh (0.2) Like any big decision like that:.
 53 (0.2) There are >gonna be< multiple (.)
 54 perspect[ive] for different=
 55 Rac: [Yeah]
 56 Amy: =(.) >↑different individual
 57 circumstances.<=.hh[hh]=
 58 Rac: [Yeah.]

¹³⁴ Brown and Levinson’s (1987 [1978]: e.g. 19) term.

¹³⁵ On permitting ambiguities and misinterpretations to “*pass*” in interaction, see Schegloff (1984a: e.g. 50; 1997c: e.g. 37-38) and Wootton (1989: 254), respectively.

59 **Amy:** =And like, (0.3) That's the same for anything
60 → (↑I)=.hhh To m[e th]u- (.) thuh (0.8) The=
61 Rac: [(hh.)]
62 **Amy:** =interesting part is: (.) An:' maybe the part
63 that should be concentrated on is that .hhh
64 (0.3) Like. (1.0) °*uh:m.*° (0.4) °m::°iddle
65 class:: (0.3) white (.)=
66 Rac: =hh[hh.]
67 **Amy:** [M:e]n: without disabili*ties*=
68 Rac: =Mh[m.]
69 **Amy:** [.hhh (0.3) W:ouldn't (0.3) I don't think
70 they'd have the same reaction if they ↓watched
71 (0.2) a film that was not meant to be (.)
72 documentary that wa[s ↑fi]ction.=
73 Rac: [Yep.]
74 Rac: =Yea[h.]
75 Amy: [.hhh (.) And they saw a representation.
76 (0.2) that wasn't (0.2) <true to thei[r,>]
77 Rac: [M]hm:..
78 (0.3)
79 Amy: Life.
80 (.)
81 Amy: They'd be like (.) Oh it's a different. (0.2)
82 ↑Ju- (.) Just a dif[ferent] ↑thing .hhh (0.2) To=
83 Rac: [°Yep°]
84 Amy: =me; (0.3) Like, (0.2) the thing that makes the
85 difference (.) is firstly the minority *thing;*=

In the preceding talk, Rachel has introduced the film and situated it in terms of the then-ongoing debate, concerning end-of-life issues, that it precipitated. On the dénouement of Rachel's telling, Amy volunteers what she found most 'interesting' (l. 62) about the film; namely, that audiences of '°m::°iddle class:: (0.3) white (.) [(...)] [M:e]n: without disabili*ties*=' (ls. 64-65 and 67) would have had responded differently had the film portrayed its issues in a different genre (ls. 69-72), and if it had not accurately (i.e. '<true to thei[r,>] [(...)] Life.' [ls. 76 and 79] represented their experiences as members of this category (ls. 75-76 and 79). This is the local

interactional context in which the linguistically “classed” membership category (i.e. ‘middle class:’ [ls. 64-65]) is produced.

Unlike the pattern borne out over Extracts 15-21, this membership category is not produced by Amy by wedding it to some ontological domain retrospectively, concurrently nor prospectively. The focal membership category is (co-)produced, instead, as the inaugural component of Amy’s three-part list (ls. 64-65 and 67),¹³⁶ without additional specifications from the categoriser. In this way, the listing is not designed so as to house discrete, listable components. It is geared, instead, to contribute to the delivery of a cumulative, global and/or overall categorisation (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3). Amy has produced a linguistically “classed” category, therefore, without further specifying its underlying ontology. Despite this, the category is treated, nonetheless, as sufficient and admissible, practically, by both Rachel and Amy.

This unspecified production of linguistically “classed” categories recurs across my collection. Additional examples of this practice are emboldened across Extracts 23-26.

Extract 23: CallHome-eng-6071

((A telephone call. Malcolm and Kate discuss a letter sent by Malcolm to Kate and, specifically, his use of euphemistic neologism “*squanking*”))

- 84 Mal: We are going to be published h. in some like
85 (.) Linguistic surv[ey.]
86 Kat: [I] know I know I knuh.
87 hhh[h.
88 **Mal:** [The uses of squ↑anking among=
89 Kat: =↑Uh Huh [huh.]
90 **Mal:** → [Upper mid]dle class:: (.)
91 **Cauc[Asian adults.]**
92 Kat: [.hh Uhuh] huh-hu[h
93 Mal: [Hu] hhh.

¹³⁶ On the ‘*programmatically relevant*’ of this form, see Jefferson (1990: 66, italics in original).

Extract 24: EJBH_F1_02

((A face-to-face interaction. A continuation of Extract 13. Ben, Charlie and Adam discuss a newspaper headline.))

- 296 **Ben:** [Oh there was an] (.) there
297 was an article that ehm. (.) apparently (0.2)
298 → if you're: a w::white middle class:: straight
299 (0.8) ↑male. (0.6) then (0.2) you don't get
300 to go to this lecture thing;
301 (1.3)
302 Ada: [Well °↓what-°What was it about.=hhh.=
303 Cha: [Is this what- from somein-is this something=
304 Ada: =]
305 Cha: =Su]san *told you about;*=

Extract 25: SWB2353

((A telephone call. Alice and Brian are discussing American foreign policy; specifically, the benefits and consequences of missionisation.))

- 46 **Bri:** [And I think it wa]s Probably one of my (0.2)
47 largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences
48 → because I come from a nice:: (0.7) middle
49 class, White suburban home,
50 (0.2)
51 Ali: Uhuh,

Extract 26: CTS28

((A telephone call. Steve and Pam have been discussing pornography.))

- 284 **Ste:** [The usual female porn star
285 ye[ah co]mes=
286 Pam: [Uch:]
287 **Ste:** → =from like (.) a lower class background.
288 Ste: .hhh Erm has a lack of self-esteem and self-
289 respect.
290 (0.4)
291 Pam: [Yeah I could see that.]

In each extract, a linguistically “classed” category (e.g. ‘[Upper mid]dle class:’ [Extract 23: l. 90]; ‘middle class:’ [Extract 24: l. 298]; ‘middle class,’ [Extract 25: ls. 48-49]) or description (i.e. ‘lower class background.’ [Ex. 26, l. 287]) is produced in a cumulative-category listing, and, in each case, they are not furnished with additional specifications of their ontologies. This omission, however, does not, deter their recipients; nor do they engender reparative operations. Like Rachel and Amy in Extract 22, the recipients simply treat these membership categories as sufficient in and for the here-and-now. They are treated, in this sense, as ‘*stable*’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 66, italics in original; see also, Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 519). In this way, cumulative-category listings offer a recurrent sequential environment in which the ontological foundations of linguistically “classed” categories are not set forth explicitly – that is, they are (co-)produced “*enthymematically*” – ¹³⁷ and are not pursued by co-interlocutors subsequently. To borrow the phrase, they simply constitute one of their ‘silently tolerated inexactitudes’ (see Reichenbach, 1938: 7 in Pollner, 1979: 235).

The reasons why these categories are treated as “*passable*” are innumerable. This could be attributable, for example, to the turn-design of these categories, and/or to their local pragmatic function. The recurring production of linguistically “classed” categories in either the first or second position of three-part lists might also, for example, diminish the import of a response (see, e.g., Kitzinger 2000: 181-188; Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 626). ¹³⁸ Equally, the cumulative posture of listings might attenuate this relevance by ‘*masking their specifics*’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 79, italics in original), and depreciating the relevance of a response to the discrete components which, together, co-constitute the listing. ¹³⁹ In short, there are a myriad of potentially explanatory factors which might account for why recipients do not problematise the (co-)production of such categories, *in situ*. Linguistically “classed”

¹³⁷ Coulter’s (e.g. 1973a: 128; 1979b: 186, fn. 32; 1982: 33, fn. 1) term.

¹³⁸ For examples of this non-terminal recurrence, see Extracts 22-26.

¹³⁹ For an example of an ‘*itemized*’ listing (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 78, italics in original), see Extract 13 (ls. 287-288). For additional examples of their “*cumulative*” and “*itemized*” production, see Nikander (2001: 80-81, ls. 21-23 and 30-31) and, potentially, Klein (2011: 69), respectively.

categories thus offer insights concerning *intersubjectivity*; specifically, co-interlocutors treat these categories as normatively admissible even when devoid of ontological fixtures.

Of course, the production of linguistically “classed” categories does not ensure understanding, and there are occasions in which this intersubjective fabric ruptures, where such categories are treated as accountable and/or unwarranted.¹⁴⁰ Crucially, however, the analysis of linguistically “classed” categories also makes this exigency – that is, in which expressly “classed” categories are problematised – available for analysis. Indeed, where this has been investigated previously in EM/(M)CA research, this has involved analysts endowing linguistically non-“classed” membership categories with a “classed” relevance, *ex cathedra*. The analysis of linguistically “classed” categories, in contrast, affords analysts opportunities to identify occasions in which the foundations of “social class” become problematised, or interactionally “fatal”.¹⁴¹ An example of one such occasion is depicted in Extract 27.

Extract 27: UCDisclab [Din22]

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Dan, Ben, Chloe, Aaron and Frances are selecting a film to watch.))

- 16 Dan: =What did we decided on?
17 (1.3)
18 Ben: Robin hood I think?
19 (0.8)
20 Dan: [>Jungle book or rob]in< hood?
21 Chl: [()]
22 (0.7)
23 Dan: For ↑Chloe.
24 (1.6)
25 Ben: JUNGLE BOOK.

¹⁴⁰ On this rarity, see, e.g., Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 58-59), Schutz (n.d. in H. Garfinkel, 1967: 50), Wootton (1975: 19-20), Atkinson (1978: 81-82), Schegloff (1984a: 51-52) and Lynch (1993: 21).

¹⁴¹ Term borrowed from Pollner (1987: e.g. 88, 106, 107, 131, italics in original) and Bergmann (1992: 157, my emphasis).

26 (0.8)

27 (?): ((Clears throat.))

28 (0.5)

29 Chl: Uhm. †No I don't want Jungle book.=

30 Dan: =What do you want.

31 (0.5)

32 Chl: I want, (0.4) Robin hood.=

33 Ben: =I don't think she- >she's had these videos

34 and I've never watched all of them (the way

35 through) yet.<

36 (0.2)

37 Ben: >(But one of them).<=

38 **Fra:** → **=I like the upper class one that's [me.]**

39 Aar: [hh]hh.

40 [Huh huh huh=

41 Ben: [What do you=

42 Aar: =huh] [huh huh huh]

43 Ben: =mean.] [Upper class]=

44 Fra: =H'YEAH.

45 (0.3)

46 Ben: What- (.) d'what is it,

47 (0.5)

48 **Fra:** ⇒ **[fThe ki]nd that doesn't smell at all.f=**

49 Aar: [eh huh]

50 Ben: =eh heh heh heh heh heh heh heh.

51 (0.7)

52 Ben: .hhhh (0.7) G'hhh.

53 (1.7)

54 Fra: BAH HAH HAH HAH-

55 (0.4)

56 Ben: What.

57 (0.2)

58 Fra: £Huh nothin'£

59 Ben: What's so funny go ah[ead an' †say it.]

60 Fra: [.hhh >Huh huh<]

61 £th(hh)- the surprised one.=[†NO:.]

62 Ben: [eh heh heh.]

63 (0.3)
 64 ((Background noise.))
 65 Ben: £Can't you carry it on the surprise ().£
 66 (2.0)
 67 ((Film score plays.))

The linguistically “classed” category in this extract is ‘the upper class one’ (l. 38). This is produced by Frances in an assessment-*cum*-self-identification, the referent of which is verbally undisclosed and unspecified. Holding this ambiguity in abeyance, however, it can be noted that this category parallels those exhibited in Extracts 15-21 – and Extracts 20-21, specifically – whereby a linguistically “classed” category is serviced, retroactively, to instantiate a unique ontology of “social class”. In this case, the category is underpinned, for Frances, by the olfactory (i.e. “odourless”) criterion of “*not-smelling-at-all*” (l. 48; see ⇒) – an ontology of “social class” that is not otherwise provided in the natural language in an expressly “classed” faculty. There are, therefore, clear parallels which connect this category with those in Extracts 15-21. How this instance diverges, however, concerns the reception of this category by Frances’ co-interlocutors. In this instance, the category is not received unproblematically. Its ontology is, instead, pursued by Ben (i.e. ls. 41, 43 and 46), jocularly, through the “multiple” initiation of repair (see Schegloff et al., 1977: 369, fn. 15 in Egbert, 2004: 1471; differently, see also, Jefferson, 1985a: 436-438). This activity does not centre upon the referent of Frances’ assessment, but explicitly problematises what is designedly *denoted* by the linguistically “classed” category, ‘the upper class one’ (l. 38). Thus, the category in Extract 27 is not treated as intersubjectively shared (cf. Extracts 15-21), but as an accountable absence, culminating in pursuit.

Notable in this case is that Frances has not, hitherto, specified the ontology of her linguistically “classed” category. It is produced, here, instead, as a non-sequitur. It is proposed that this ontology appears to have been omitted as part of a designedly indeterminate reference; an activity evocative of Schenkein’s (1978b: 69) ‘Puzzle-Pass-Solution-Comment action sequence’. The ‘*Identity-Rich Puzzle*’ (ibid.: 67, italics in original; see also, Stokoe, 2012a: 281), here, involves Frances’ self-identification with a linguistically “classed” category. In this case, given the cohort’s ongoing

activity of watching a film, the referent of Frances' assessment (l. 38) is presumably made available scenically, perhaps '*perceptually available*' (here, see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 58, italics in original). In any case, by not explicating the ontology of the referred to category, or its referent, Frances effectively poses a puzzle to her co-interlocutors. Accordingly, while Ben's pursuit (ls. 41, 43 and 46) targets the referential ambit of the category – that is, what it denotes – it cooperates, more saliently, as an information solicit, furnishing a “go-ahead” for Frances' “solution” and “punchline” (i.e. l. 48; see \Rightarrow). This instance, therefore, is a case in which a category that is designedly “classed” is not only serviced to encapsulate a unique ontology but is explicitly problematised in these terms. ¹⁴²

Extract 27 thus presents a case in which a linguistically “classed” category is contested by a co-interlocutor. In so doing, I have demonstrated that a further benefit of analysing linguistically “classed” categories are the insights they make available concerning *intersubjectivity*. By focusing on linguistically “classed” categories, I have argued that analysts can yield occasions in which the understanding of designedly “classed” membership categories break down. Notably, three additional benefits are made available through the analysis of *linguistically* “classed” categories. Specifically, I have shown that co-interlocutors employ these resources so as to construe “social class” for themselves (§4.6.1), in a myriad of ways, including theorisations that may not be anticipated by analysts, *a priori*, nor which are necessarily encapsulated with a “classed” valence within extant categories in the natural language. Further, I have shown that such ontologies are encapsulated in a variety of sequential positions (§4.6.1.1-§4.6.1.3) and that they are routinely understood even when they are not furnished or disclosed by their categorial progenitors. Lastly, I have shown that linguistically “classed” categories also make available occasions in which they are problematised by co-interlocutors, and the interactional occasions which precipitate and arise from this contingency.

¹⁴² For an institutional example of this exigency, with a linguistically “classed” category, see Reynolds (2011: 416-418). The reader is encouraged to track this “interview-cum-confrontation” (here, see Schegloff, 1988/1989; 1992a) independently.

4.7 Possibles

The focus of this chapter, thus far, has been to canvass the hitherto neglected affordances of analysing “social class” through *linguistically* “classed” membership categories. This is an alternative point of departure from that adopted in previous EM/(M)CA research which has focussed, instead, on the analysis of comparatively linguistically *non-“classed”* categories; categories which do not underscore their “classed” relevance through their linguistic design (recall fn. 102). Having outlined three of the key benefits offered by this approach, the position of comparatively linguistically *non-“classed”* categories can be revisited.

I do not propose in this thesis that linguistically *non-“classed”* categories, or descriptions, should be *omitted* from the purview of EM/(M)CA. To do so would effectively confine the remit of one’s analysis to those expectably rare occasions in which persons use the modifier “class” to accomplish this work. Consequently, this would expectably occlude a host of common-sense knowledges that are held about certain categories (recall fn. 123), in addition to divesting the capacity and tolerance of co-interlocutors not only for non-standard (e.g. Jefferson, 1983: 12), specious (e.g. Jefferson, 1981: 30) and/or erroneous formulations (e.g. Jefferson, 1974: 182), but also for designedly equivocal conduct (e.g. Schegloff et al., 1977: 375; Schegloff, 1997a: 520; Stokoe, 2011: 111; 2015: 429; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 80).¹⁴³ The extent of this omission is captured by Robles and Kurylo (2017) in the following passage:

“Thus when we hear ‘auto-mechanic’ we associate activities such as ‘doing an oil change’ and ‘performing engine repairs’. Similarly, if you say ‘I got my car fixed up the other day’ it cues the category ‘automechanic’. It may also,

¹⁴³ More general theoretical limitations also preclude such a move. For example, on the inexorable reliance on cultural knowledge, see R. Turner (1971: 177 in Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 27; see also, *ibid.*: 234-235, fn. 9), Moerman (1972: 205), Bittner (1974 [1965]: e.g. 70), Schegloff (1987a: 231, fn. 19) and Antaki (1998), *inter alia*. On the liminal boundary between the “professional” and “common-sense” domain, see R. Turner (1971: 177 in ten Have, 1999: 35), Rose (1960) and, differently, Giddens (1976: 79, 162). On the status of this knowledge in EM/(M)CA research, see Antaki and Widdicombe (1998b: 10) and Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: e.g. 80, 95, 105, 111, 114).

however, index other categories expected to overlap with that of automechanic – for example, ‘man’ or ‘*working class*’.”
(Robles and Kurylo, 2017: 675, my emphasis)

Again, this would restrict observations to linguistically “classed” categories, only, further bracketing a variety of interactional work in which members enact and/or orient towards “social class”, in some way, but do so inexplicitly/implicitly. It is not recommended, therefore, that such research desists, and where linguistically *non*-“classed” categories are simply filtered from EM/(M)CA, wholesale, but only that their previously held status in this literature, *qua* “*bona-fide*”¹⁴⁴ “classed” categories, requires qualification. I propose that instead of reifying these categories as immutably “classed” on occasions of use, and when refracted through some heuristic (e.g. “wealth”), analysts require compelling “*talk-intrinsic*”¹⁴⁵ evidence that they are serviced *qua* “classed” categories for co-interlocutors, locally. Where linguistically *non*-“classed” categories are construed, indirectly, in avowedly “classed” terms, for instance, satisfies this endogenous criterion. One illustrative occasion that can be analysed to this effect are in which *linguistically* “classed” categories are designedly interconnected with linguistically *non*- “classed” categories. Extract 20 presents one example of this practice vis-à-vis a normatively “occupational” category; a previous locus of “classed” inferences (e.g. W. Sharrock and Coleman, 1999: 21-22; M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010: 188-189; Robles and Kurylo, 2017: 675).¹⁴⁶

Extract 20 (Reproduced): EJBH_F1_01

((A face-to-face interaction. Amy is delivering a complaint-implicative telling about her father and his prejudices towards the unemployed.))

345 Amy: [Like ↑de]gra[ded?]=.hhh (.) S:O,=
346 Rac: [*Yeah.*]
347 Amy: =(0.6) I would have thought that that might have
348 made him realise::, (.) a little ↑bit (.) about

¹⁴⁴ H. Garfinkel’s (e.g. 1967: 57, fn. 8, my emphasis) term.

¹⁴⁵ Mandelbaum’s (1990/1991: e.g. 333, my emphasis) term.

¹⁴⁶ On the inferential properties of occupational categories, see, e.g., Sacks (e.g. 1974 [1972]: 223, fn. 2; 1992, Vol. I: 46-47, 249-250, 578-579).

349 his ↑prejudices?
 350 (.)
 351 Amy: [.hhh] (.) ↑Uhm:. (0.8) but it totally=
 352 Rac: [Mhm hmm.]
 353 Amy: =↑didn't.
 354 (.)
 355 **Amy:** → He'd ↑still=.hhh (.) >I mean the other thing<
 356 *that he::* (.) *that 'e* (.) totally (.) doesn't
 357 take into a↑ccount.=.hh (.) Is the fact *that-*
 358 (.) *Yes:* he was unemployed.=.hh (0.2) but
 359 because ↑he's¿ (0.3) *like* fr::om. (0.2) °.tch
 360 .hhh° (0.3) quite a sort of (.) privileged family
 361 an' his friends tend to be ↑more sort of (0.4)
 362 ⇒ uhm. (.) middle class and like (.) [business]=
 363 Rac: [<Mhm.>]
 364 **Amy:** =owners and ↑things=.hh (.) that his:: (0.5)
 365 friend who:. (0.5) has (.) busi*ness.* (.) .hh
 366 (0.2) was able to like (.hh) (0.2) Ehm:. (0.2)
 367 give him a- (.) you know create a job for 'im in
 368 his (0.3) business. So [he] wasn't=
 369 Rac: [(°.tch°)]
 370 **Amy:** =unemployed for that long¿=.hh[h
 371 Rac: [.tch y[eah.
 372 Amy: ['cuz he had
 373 ↑connections?=.hhh (0.3) Eh:m. (0.3) and he (.)
 374 totally l- (.) like lost *th:at.* .hh (.) And
 375 then (.) so the following *year* I was speaking
 376 to him near christmas (.) ↑and .hh (0.3) You
 377 know. (.) it was ↑christmas (.) ehm (.) and I
 378 think they're with. (.) I think there was like a
 379 scheme ↓where. (0.4) uhm. (.) people who got
 380 certain benefits could get like. (.) reduced (.)
 381 pri[ce] st[amps¿]

As observed in §4.6.1.3, Extract 20 instances a case in which a linguistically “classed” category, ‘middle class’ (l. 362; see →), is explicitly interconnected with an avowedly occupational and generalised category, ‘[business] [(...)] owners and ↑things=’ (ls.

362 and 364; see \Rightarrow). Again, Amy has produced an extended telling concerning her father's lack of reflexivity concerning his experience of redundancy and unemployment. Over the course of this telling, Amy has attributed her father's ability to secure subsequent employment to his network of connections, and, specifically, as a result of their 'middle class' (l. 362) status. This is the linguistically category in focus in this extract. The linguistically non-"classed" category with which it is interconnected is produced immediately following this as Amy unpacks the linguistically category, analogically (i.e. 'like' [l. 362]; see Lerner, 1994: 24), by reference to the occupations of her father's friends: 'like (.) [business] [((...))] owners and \uparrow things' (ls. 362 and 364). In this turn, Amy not only self-explicates the underlying ontology of the focal category, as observed above, but, in so doing, inferentially "classes" the linguistically non-"classed" category, prospectively, designating it as a category that is to be relevantly interpretable in a "classed" faculty. Thus, this extract furnishes an instance in which a linguistically non-"classed" category becomes formulable as "classed" by reference to its epiphenomenal connection with a linguistically "classed" category.

Through a single-case, this section has shown that linguistically non-"classed" categories (e.g. '[business] [((...))] owners and \uparrow things=' [ls. 362 and 364]) can be situated in terms of "social class" (e.g. Extract 20), explicitly, via their interconnections with linguistically "classed" categories (e.g. 'middle class' [l. 362]). In summary, I have provided an indication of how linguistically non-"classed" categories can be connected, treated as indicative of and/or synonymous to linguistically "classed" categories. On this basis, there are good reasons for analysing linguistically *non*-"classed" categories, and to abandon such (co-)productions would not only be unduly constrictive, but would overlook a forum of co-interlocutors' ontological work. However, it is worth clarifying, further, that linguistically non-"classed" categories need not be anchored to linguistic instantiations to warrant their classification in this way. Alternatively, they could qualify as such, differently, if distinguished as *possibly* "classed" – akin to how Schegloff's (1996c; 2006b) use of "*possibles*" has been deployed by Whitehead (2015: 387, fn. 1) and Stokoe (2015: 429), for example. Specifically, they can be classified as *possibly* "classed", when understood as categories that are uniquely privileged on the basis of some

talk-extrinsic conceptualisation of “social class” that is reliant upon ‘extratextual knowledge’ (Antaki, 1998: 77), to borrow the phrase:

“The usage is not meant as a token of analytic uncertainty or hedging. Its analytic locus is not in the first instance the world of the author and reader, but the world of the parties to the interaction. To describe some utterance, for example, as “a possible invitation” (Sacks, 1992: I: 300-2; Schegloff, 1992a: xxvi-xxvii) or “a possible complaint” (Schegloff, 1988c: 120-2) is to claim that there is a describable practice of talk-in-interaction which is usable to do recognizable invitations or complaints (a claim which can be documented by exemplars of exchanges in which such utterances were so recognized by their recipients), and that the utterance now being described can be understood to have been produced by such a practice, and is thus analyzable as an invitation or as a complaint. This claim is made, and can be defended, independent of whether the actual recipient on this occasion has treated it as an invitation or not, and independent of whether the speaker can be shown to have produced it for recognition as such on this occasion. Such an analytic stance is required to provide resources for accounts of “failures” to recognize an utterance as an invitation or complaint, for in order to claim that a recipient failed to recognize it as such or respond to it as such, one must be able to show that it was *recognizable* as such, i.e., that it was “a possible X” - for the participants (Schegloff, 1995, frth). The analyst’s treatment of an utterance as “a possible X” is then grounded in a claim about its having such a status for the participants.”

(Schegloff, 1996c: 116-117, fn. 8, italics in original)

Thus, linguistically non-“classed” instantiations are not to be omitted from the purview of EM/(M)CA when they are not designedly connected with linguistically “classed” categories. After all, it is expectable that there are occasions in which members trade upon their hearability as “classed” to accomplish this work indirectly (here, see Stokoe, 2011: 111). Rather, it is simply qualified that unless these membership categories are oriented to as “classed”, locally, they are merely to be regarded as *permissively* “classed” on some specification. They can be proposed, in

other words, as a “*possible hearing*”.¹⁴⁷ Two examples of such qualifications can be found in EM/(M)CA literature (i.e. Klein, 2011: 69; Whitehead, 2011: 19, fn. 8). In the former, the “non-recognitional” (see Sacks and Schegloff, 1979) formulation of ‘black girl from the inner city’ (Klein, 2011: 69) is observed, parenthetically, as a form ‘(which maybe a proxy for socioeconomic class)’ (ibid.). In the latter, Whitehead (2011: 19, fn. 8, my emphasis) notes that the form of occupational identifications ‘*may*’ implicate racial and “classed” relevancies. To consider them otherwise, as unmediated instantiations, would verge on undue leniency, or to what has been labelled in a different context, as a “promiscuous” analysis (see, e.g., Schegloff, 1998b: 256; 2007b: 476). This characterisation is set forth by Schegloff (1992b) in the following passage:

“In my view, Sacks abandoned the use of ‘category-bound activities’ because of an incipient ‘promiscuous’ use of them, i.e., an unelaborated invocation of some vernacularly based assertion (i.e., that some activity was bound to some category) as an element of an account on the investigator’s authority, without deriving from it any analytic pay-off other than the claimed account for the data which motivated its introduction in the first place.”

(Schegloff, 1992b: xlii)

To read “classed” implicature onto membership categories when this is not made relevant by co-interlocutors would qualify, in this sense, as *promiscuous*. After all, there are an indefinitely extensible array of connotations which could be (relevantly) inferred, furnishing the grounds for indeterminacy. To dismiss such categories, however, would thereby expectably omit a variety of interactional work in which persons enact and/or orient to “social class”, in some way, but conduct this work inexplicitly, in ways that are not accountably “classed”. The role of EM/(M)CA research, after all, is not to attempt to assuage or alleviate this *indexicality* but is, instead, to eventuate, as Atkinson (1978: 183) writes, ‘members’ methods for repairing indexical particulars’ (see also, Stokoe, 2012[a]: n.p.g. in Hofstetter and Stokoe, 2015: 729). Linguistically non-“classed” categories, therefore, may be

¹⁴⁷ R. Watson’s (1974: 97) phrase.

described as “*possibles*” to this effect; categories for which there is a reasonable basis, for the analyst, to adjudicate them as “classèd”, but for which evidence endogenous to the data is unavailable.

4.8 Chapter summary

The focus of this chapter has concerned “classèd” membership categories, and their adjudication in EM/(M)CA research. The chapter began with a review of the traditional EM/(M)CA solution to this problem. I demonstrated that when one selects the proxies of “social class”, *ex cathedra*, they may accrue a diverse gamut of linguistically *non*-“classèd” categories (§4.4; see Table 5); categories describable as “classèd” when refracted through a particular prism (e.g. “*wealth*”). This approach was recognised to have a multitude of affordances; not the least of which was potentiating a coherent dialogue with FA research (here, see R. Watson, 1994: 177; see also, §7.2.3). This benefit notwithstanding, however, this approach was shown to be variously limiting and, fundamentally, *defeasible* (see §4.5). Theoretically, the conceptualisations of “social class” that are processed by co-interlocutors, *in situ*, can disengage with the concept as prescribed by analysts. This approach leaves the potential, therefore, for local defeasance (see Extract 10). Accordingly, it is on this basis that I have proposed an alternative point of departure for the respecification of “social class” in EM/(M)CA.

The crux of my proposed alternative centres upon the analysis of *linguistically* “classèd” forms; categories which announce their “classèd” valence linguistically through their categorial design. The remainder of this chapter has detailed the prospective benefits of this approach and has concentrated on three affordances. The first concerned the matter of “*agency*”. I have shown that the availability of linguistically “classèd” membership categories in the natural language provides a means for analysts to rehabilitate the onus of ontological work from analysts – with whom it has formerly resided – to co-interlocutors. I have proposed that these co-productions furnish co-interlocutors with a resource by which to (dis)avow the relevance of “social class” for themselves, a matter previously shouldered by analysts (§4.4). The second affordance concerned “*ontology*”. I have shown that linguistically “classèd” categories are serviced by co-interlocutors in various sequential positions (§4.6.1) to institutionalise an indefinitely expansive array of avowedly “classèd”

ontologies (see §4.6.1.4). Notably, this includes conceptualisations of “social class” which might go unanticipated by analysts, contradict aprioristic theorisations and/or which might not even be encapsulated within the taken-for-granted remit of extant category-concepts within the natural language – at least in a recognisably “classed” faculty. Lastly, my third observation concerned “*intersubjectivity*”. Linguistically “classed” categories, I have shown, are routinely treated as sufficient for co-interlocutors even on those occasions in which they do not self-explicate their underlying ontology (see §4.6.2). In so doing, they simultaneously confer access to those occasions in which co-interlocutors problematise such productions.

These three observations, I propose, form the major empirical contributions of this chapter. The chapter concluded with a conceptual qualification. This concerned the residual status of linguistically *non*-“classed” categories; the exclusive locus of prior EM/(M)CA research. It was clarified, in this section, that the prioritisation of linguistically “classed” categories is not to forsake linguistically *non*-“classed” alternatives. This approach, I have proposed, need not be zero-sum, forbidding the analysis of designedly *implicit* resources (e.g. §4.7). Instead, two operations have been outlined that can be used to assimilate linguistically *non*-“classed” categories. The first was *empirical*. Analysts, for example, could focalise occasions in which co-interlocutors intertwine linguistically “classed” categories with linguistically *non*-“classed” instantiations. The second, in contrast, represents a *rhetorical* resource. On the occasions in which a membership category can be demarcated as “classed”, for analysts, according to some bases, but for which talk-intrinsic evidence is deficient, such categories could be positioned as *possibly* “classed” instantiations. The footing of these resources could be construed, in other words, as categories that might be enacted by co-interlocutors in a “classed” tenor when submitted to particular readings – readings for which the co-interlocutors, themselves, neither ratify nor demonstrably disavow.

To conclude, this chapter has proposed an alternative approach from which EM/(M)CA research on “social class” can depart. In this chapter, I have followed the suggestions of prior EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Whitehead, 2012) and proceeded by way of analysis. This has centred on the empirico-theoretic affordances of my proposed alternative. This chapter has thus attempted to carve a stable foothold from

which the EM/(M)CA analysis of “social class” can commence. In Chapter 5, I operationalise the framework established in this chapter to analyse formulations of “*place*”; a second recurring resource for which “social class” is mobilised in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction.

Chapter 5 – Place references

5.1 Introduction

It was shown in the previous chapter that “social class” can be made relevant by co-interlocutors through identifications and attributions of explicitly formulated “classed” categories. This chapter is devoted to a second practice that can make “social class” relevant, recurrently, in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction; namely, “references to place”. In this chapter, this practice is introduced as a multifaceted interactional resource that is (co-)produced by co-interlocutors to make “social class” demonstrably relevant – or at least permissibly, defeasibly and expectably salient – in some moment. The chapter begins with a review of how references to locations have been investigated previously in EM/(M)CA research. Drawing on a collection of naturalistic data examples, the remainder of the chapter demonstrates three interrelated, and hitherto un-explicated observations.

- (1) Co-interlocutors orient to the possession of a ‘common sense geography’ (here, see Schegloff, 1972a: 85; 1972b: 102), one that is organisable, at varying degrees of granularity (e.g. bars; cities; districts; villages, etc.), in terms of “social class”.
- (2) Co-interlocutors render this geography hearable/analysable as “classed” through various operations (e.g. “characterisations”; “allusions”; “co-selections”; “intentional misidentifications”); interactional practices which instantiate the relevance of this device at differing degrees of explicitness and accountability.
- (3) Co-interlocutors can relevance “social class” through references to locations that are not mobilised purely in the service of referring, thereby further confirming Schegloff’s (1972a: 81; 1972b: 97) suspicion that ‘formulating locations can be of help in understanding seemingly quite unrelated conversational practices’.

This chapter substantiates each of these observations. The first, however – as a comparatively substantive concern – is illustrated *en passant*; this is not pursued

explicitly but retrieved summarily. The chapter then concludes with a summary of each of my key findings.

5.2 EM/(M)CA research

References to place feature in EM/(M)CA literature in three recurrent capacities.

- (1) *Selection*: How are formulations of place selected in talk-in-interaction?
- (2) *Social action*: For what practical purposes are formulations of place produced?
- (3) *Practices*: How are formulations of place configured in talk-in-interaction?

The focus of this chapter crystallises around the latter literature on “*practices*” in particular. My focus here concerns how vocalised formulations of place are constructed by co-interlocutors; ¹⁴⁸ specifically, how such references are used to instantiate the relevance of “social class”. However, as this domain of inquiry intersects with the problematics of both “*selection*” and “*social action*” – as substantiated below – an abbreviated review of each strand of research will prove explicative.

5.2.1 On selection

All descriptions are, irremediably, *selections*. This proposition was introduced, initially, in Chapter 2 (§2.2.1), as the “problem of description” – or the ‘*etcetera*’ problem (Sacks, 1990 [1963]: 91), *inter alia*. The extension of this problematic to formulations of place represents the central contribution of the first body of EM/(M)CA research, above (see Schegloff, 1972a: 80; 1972b: 96). Focal to this literature, specifically, are the *criteria* with respect to which such references are *selected*, and the lines of reasoning – or communicative competencies – which underlie their selection. This problematic has been shown to obtain to locative references in two capacities.

¹⁴⁸ The research reviewed here is confined to vocal references only. This reflects the constitution of my collection. A comparative review of embodied practices (e.g. Enfield, 2013: 449) – *qua* ‘locationals’ (here, see Schegloff, 1984b: 282, 296, fn. 10) – and cartographic renderings of settings (e.g. Psathas, 1979), transcends the limits of space.

The first is *generic*. Locational formulations are positioned to be analogous to all objects of description (e.g. members) insofar as they too are liable to descriptive regress, relentlessly (see Sacks, 1990 [1963]: 91). In other words, howsoever a location is categorised, for some practical purposes – and with whatever degree of (in)certitude, (in)exactitude, (in)sincerity, etc. – there concurrently co-exist an indefinitely extendable array of alternative formulations of that self-same referent (see also, Schegloff, 1991: 52). The result of this, as Moerman (1968b: 160) writes in another context, is that ‘the “truth” or “objective correctness” of an identification is never sufficient to explain its use’ (see §2.2.1; recall fn. 74). Formulations of locations are, in this respect, describable as “*selections*”, generically. In other words, they are equally susceptible to the “problem of description” and are relativised accordingly.

The second is comparatively *particular*. This specialised dimension has been described by Enfield (2013: 451) as the ‘fractal’ constituency of place references. Formulations of locations, as objects of description, are unique in this respect, inasmuch as they can be constructed to ‘*contain* other places’ (ibid., italics in original). Accordingly, such formulations can not only be described in an infinite number of ways, theoretically, but they also permit constructions at endless degrees of geographical “granularity” (here, see Schegloff, 2000a: 715; see also, Schegloff, 1972a: 81; 1972b: 97). This problematic, as outlined by Enfield (2013) obtains uniquely to locational formulations. The problem of description for this object is, therefore, twofold, where the latter compounds the former and represents a unique capacity in which references to place are describable as “*selections*”.

These problematics have culminated in EM/(M)CA research on why particular formulations of locations are selected in talk-in-interaction, addressing both how locations are *formulated*, initially, as such, and *reformulated*. In the former, for example, Schegloff (1972a: 83; 1972b: 99) has demonstrated that the selection of locational formulations indexes a sensitivity towards, contingency upon, and appreciation of, three ‘orders of considerations’. These include: (1) the locations of co-interlocutors (i.e. “*Location analysis*”); (2) the categorial identities with which interactants are ascribed by use of particular formulations (i.e. “*Membership analysis*”); and (3), the topics and/or activities in/to which particular formulations have been selected to cohere (i.e. “*Topic or Activity Analysis*”). Conversely, in the

latter, Kitzinger, Lerner, Zinken, Wilkinson, Kevoe-Feldman and Ellis (2013) and Natrass, Watermeyer, Robson and Penn (2017) have distinguished the logics according to which formulations of place are *reformulated*. The particulars of these analyses transcend the limits of space. It will suffice to note only that the status of place references, *qua* “*selections*”, has furnished a preliminary area of inquiry in EM/(M)CA research.

5.2.2 On social action

The predominant modality in which locational formulations have featured in EM/(M)CA research pertains to their use in the production of *social action*. In EM/(M)CA research on locational formulations, this has been described as a ‘functional orientation’ (e.g. Auburn and Barnes, 2006: 45). This research focalises the range of social actions and activities for which the (co-)production – or the relevant non-production (e.g. Bergmann, 1992: 153-154) – of place references are used to effectuate. A comprehensive review of this literature also transcends the limits of space. It can be noted summarily, only, that locational formulations have been observed in a vast range of social actions. *Inter alia*, this includes accounts of/for conduct (e.g. Lynch, 1985: 244-245; Silverman, 1994: 438-440; McCabe and Stokoe, 2004; Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 615-616, 636, fn. 6; Whitehead, 2013: 58; 2015: 382, 387, fn. 3), assertions (e.g. Pomerantz, 1989: 107), challenges (see Pomerantz, 1986: 226), complaints (see W. Sharrock and R. Turner, 1978: 183-184; Jefferson, 1996: 40, 60, fn. 26; Barnes, 2000: 108-126; Stokoe and Wallwork, 2003; Barnes, Auburn and Lea, 2004; Whitehead, 2013: 59-60), identifications (e.g. Zimmerman, 1992: 46; Hester and Fitzgerald, 1999: 180-182; Glenn, 2003: 145), insults (see Stokoe and Edwards, 2007: 337, 356-357), jokes (e.g. Coulter, 1973a: 142, fn. 3), puns (e.g. Jefferson, 1996: 17), preliminaries (e.g. Schegloff, 1980: 114), repair (e.g. Schegloff, 1979b: 274; 1997a: 517-518; Kitzinger, Shaw and Toerien, 2012: 122, fn. 2) and storytellings (see Dingemanse, Rossi and Floyd, 2017; e.g. Jefferson, 1996: 23; Schegloff, 2007a: 238); specifically, to precipitate (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 760), furnish the tellability (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 13-15), recognisability (see Sidnell, 2010: 179-181), and to organise the hearability of the latter activity, as such (see

Sacks, 1986: 132-134; J. R. E. Lee, 1987: 29-30; Lerner, 1992: 263).¹⁴⁹ Formulations of place, in this regard, like membership categories (recall §4.2), are not only susceptible to descriptive regress, but they also furnish a resource for a vast array of interactional work.

5.2.3 On practices

The final predominant way in which formulations of place have been analysed in EM/(M)CA research are the *forms* in which they are (co-)produced in talk-in-interaction; that is, the *practices* in which they feature and are configured. This area of inquiry, whilst central, has not garnered equal attention to the study of “social action” (e.g. Kitzinger et al., 2013: 44). Two notable investigations, here, are Schegloff (1972a; 1972b), on “locational formulations”, reviewed in §5.2.1, and Psathas and Henslin (1967: 425) on “direction following” (here, see also, Psathas, 1968: 515-517; 1979; 1986a; 1986b) in ‘the “radio-dispatched order”’. These investigations cohere with respect to the attention they award to co-interlocutors’ locative *practices*; that is, how references to place are formulated in talk-in-interaction. These vocabularies, so delineated, are summarised in Table 6.

Table 6 – Formulations of place			
Schegloff (1972a)		Psathas and Henslin (1967)	
<i>Relational terms</i>	e.g. ““downstairs,” “in front,” “across the street,” etc.’ (ibid.: 88)	<i>Part of town (i.e. PT)</i>	e.g. ‘Clayton, Wellston, Ladue, Maplewood, etc.’ (ibid.: 430)
<i>Geographical Terms (i.e. G Terms)</i>	e.g. ‘street address (2903 Main Street) and	<i>Street name and number (i.e. SNN)</i>	e.g. ‘22 South Euclid’ (ibid.: 432)

¹⁴⁹ The purview of my review is constrained to singular actions only. Note that locational formulations also feature in orientations to topics (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 753-754, 758-761; here, see Schegloff, 1972a: 96-106; 1972b: 117-129) and in the production of “double-barreled” (here, see Schegloff, 2007a: 76; Kitzinger et al., 2013: 48-50) social actions (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 294-298; Jefferson and Schenkein, 1977: 99, fn. 4).

	latitude-longitude specifications' (ibid.: 97)		
<i>Relation to members (i.e. R_m)</i>	e.g. "John's place," "Al's house," "Dr. Brown's office" (ibid.: 97)	<i>Street name, intersection (i.e. SNI)</i>	e.g. 'California and Clark [...] at Leland's bar' (ibid.: 432).
<i>Relation to Landmark (i.e. R_l)</i>	e.g. "Three doors from the corner," "three blocks after the traffic signal," "the last street before the shopping center," "behind" (ibid.: 100)	<i>Name of place (i.e. NPI)</i>	e.g. 'Chase (hotel)' (ibid.: 432).
<i>Course of action places</i>	e.g. "where they leave the garbage" (ibid.: 101)	<i>Features of place (i.e. FPI)</i>	e.g. '5589 Pershing [...] at the garage'. (ibid.: 432)
<i>Place names (i.e. R_n)</i>	e.g. "Bloomington's" (ibid.: 101)		

The priority awarded to practices, in these investigations, distinguishes Schegloff (1972a; 1972b) and Psathas and Henslin (1967) in EM/(M)CA, where, in the main, these practices have not been "tracked" (see fn. 27), systematically, forming a subsidiary or an orthogonal focus to social action, only. One example of such a relegated focus has involved the analysis of how locational references themselves come to be *categorised*.¹⁵⁰ Whitehead and Lerner (2009: 616), for example, distinguish the practice of "asymmetrical contrastive pairs", where a locational formulation that is configured categorially (e.g. 'one is (down) like in the black section' [ibid.: 615]; i.e. "race") transforms another reference – one that is not formulated in commensurate terms (i.e. 'a hotel' [ibid.]) – such that it is to be

¹⁵⁰ This is related, but distinct of their ascriptive operation; that is, where the categorial incumbencies – or the 'discourse identities' (Zimmerman, 1992: 45; 1998: e.g. 90) – of speakers are co-implicated through their conduct (e.g. Coulter, 1990: 198-200; Eglin and Hester, 1999: 202; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 36; see also, Twer, 1972: 354-355; Egbert, 2004).

relevantly hearable in a relational capacity (e.g. ‘not black’ [ibid.]). This practice, elaborated below (see §5.5.3), is one resource that can be used to endow place references with categorial relevancies, including those pertaining to “race” (e.g. Whitehead, 2007: 42, 44, fn. 11), “social class” (e.g. J. Lee, 2016: 14), and their intersections (e.g. Whitehead, 2013: 57-58, 59-60). Nonetheless, this area of investigation has not formed the concentrated focus of EM/(M)CA research independently.

5.3 My focus

This chapter takes up this mantle. My focus concerns the practices used by co-interlocutors to “class” locations. This is an object of considerable sociological scrutiny,¹⁵¹ but marginal EM/(M)CA research.¹⁵² This attention to practices is governed by the warrant articulated in §1.7.2; namely, before the praxiological functions of “classed” orientations are extricated, the methodical practices that are employed to accomplish this work, recurrently, require exposition. Like Chapter 4 (§4.6.1), some of these practices revolve around the social actions for which they are (co-/re-)produced. These are recognised where appropriate. Nonetheless, a principled focus on “social action” will be held in abeyance until Chapter 6. The object of

¹⁵¹ The present confines of space preclude a serious review of this research. Three lines of inquiry can be noted, only. This includes (1) how “classed” incumbents feel attached (e.g. Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, 2005a; 2005b; Bott, 1971: n.p.g. in Savage, 2008: 597-598), protected (e.g. Charlesworth, 2000: 221-222) and entrapped (e.g. Bourdieu, 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 2008 [1962]: Part 1: Ch. 2, Ch. 4; Part 3: Ch. 2; Charlesworth, 2000: 8, 67, 97-100, 210-211; Wacquant, 2008: e.g. 46, 171) by locations; (2) how individuals are categorised into “social classes” by their locations (e.g. Burrows and Gane, 2006: e.g. 805-808; Parker et al., 2007); and (3), how representations of spaces are “classed” (e.g. Reay, 1999: 98, 100; M. Holt and Griffin, 2005: 256-257; Skeggs, 2005: 55; Back, 2015: 10).

¹⁵² Notably, interactions have been adduced in which locations are (co-)produced in linguistically (non-)“classed” terms (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol: II: 143, 386-387; McHoul and R. Watson, 1984: 292-293, 297; Stokoe and Smithson, 2001: 256; Ogden, 2004: 48-49; Reynolds, 2011: 416; Robles, 2016: 96-97). Such references have also appeared within “*ethnographic allusions*” (see §2.3.3), hypothetical cases (e.g. Speier, 1973: 186) and in instances in which “classed” categorisations of locations were expectable, but were not produced by co-interlocutors, *in situ* (e.g. Myers and Lampropoulou, 2013: 342, 344).

interest, here, centres upon the interactional practices that are serviced to “class” locations *in* talk-in-interaction, and whereby “social class” is instantiated *through* these references.

5.4 Practices

This section addresses the interactional practices employed by co-interlocutors to instantiate the relevance of “social class” when referring to locations in ordinary interactions. Primal, here, is a distinction articulated by Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 462, 758-759) and Schegloff (1972a: 81-82; 1972b: 98-99), between two forms of place reference. The first refer to those occasions in which references to place function relevantly in the service of “*referring*”. The second, in contrast, refer to those employed to accomplish other forms of interactional work. Extracts 28 and 29 illustrate this distinction (see →).

Extract 28: CallHome-eng-4610

((A telephone call. Abby has been on the phone with Bradley. The latter has since passed the phone to David. The interaction is joined following a “compressed” call-opening.))¹⁵³

- 111 Dav: [Where are] you an' ['ow'd you got a free=
 112 Abb: [°↑Huhuh, °] [Huh.=.hhhhhh=
 113 Dav: =call.]
 114 Abb: =]
 115 (.)
 116 Dav: [(↓Tell me] about [it.)]
 117 **Abb:** → [↑I'M] [£I]'m in the Alnicks£.

Extract 29: EJBH_F4_12

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Ray, George and Harry are playing cards outside a café-cum-bar in Towerview.))

- 104 Har: It's the fu[cking wor]st [°thing I've ever=
 105 Ray: [.hhh] [If I'm not back in=

¹⁵³ On “*compression devices*” and “*foreshortened call beginnings*”, see Schegloff (e.g. 1986: 130-132; 2007a: 89) and Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 169), respectively.

106 Har: =seen.°]
 107 Ray: =] ten minutes, (0.4) send he(h)lp.
 108 Chu[↑huh.]

((Five lines omitted.))

114 **Ray:** Is it the most m::iddle aged thing you've
 115 → s(h)ee(h)n.=**Like middle ↑aged middle ↓class**
 116 **Towerview thing you've seen in your life.**
 117 Geo: ↑Huh huh huh.

In Extract 28, Abby's reference to 'the Alnicksf.' (l. 117) typifies the former operation. The reference functions relevantly, in this case, to accomplish *referring*, forming a "type-conforming" (Schegloff, 2007a: 78; see also, Stivers and Heritage, 2001: 169), albeit non-contiguous (see Sacks, 1987 [1973]: 58, 60), response to David's "wh-interrogative" (i.e. l. 111; see Schegloff, 2002a: 297-298; see also, Laurier, 2001: 496-499). This type of reference will be referred to, hereinafter, following Schegloff (1972a: 81; 1972b: 97, my emphasis), as a "*locational formulation*". Conversely, in Extract 29, Ray's reference to the location of 'Towerview' (l. 116) does not function analogously in an exclusively locative capacity. Instead, it represents a 'non-place formulation', or 'non-locational formulation' (Schegloff, 1972a: 82; 1972b: 98-99), furnishing a candidate, un-explicated account of the activity about which Harry has previously complained (e.g. ls. 104 and 106). To distinguish this operation from the former, this practice will be referred to as a "*place term*".

5.5 Locational formulations

The initial focus of this chapter addresses the former practice of "*locational formulations*" (i.e. Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b). My focus concerns how these constructions are demarcated as "classé" through the production of linguistically (non-) "classé" terms. Specifically, this section details four resources employed recurrently, by co-interlocutors, whereby this relevance is instantiated; namely, "characterisations" (see Extracts 25, 30, 31 and 32), "allusions" (see Extracts 28, 33 and 34), "co-selections" (see Extracts 28, 25, 35 and 33) and "intentional

misidentifications” (see Extracts 36, 37 and 38). In so doing, it is shown that the “classed” relevance of “locational formulations” can be accomplished variously – and with a considerable degree of flexibility and greater or lesser degrees of explicitness. In the interests of brevity, each analysis zeroes in on the focal practice. Non-focal interactional particulars are disattended and glossed. The counterpart to this investigation, regarding “*place terms*”, is then outlined (i.e. §5.7).

5.5.1 Characterisations

The most overt and direct mechanism that is employed to “class” locational formulations in my collection is the production of designedly “classed” “*characterisations*”. On these occasions, a locational formulation is produced and categorised by its progenitor in “classed” terms. Broadly, this practice can occur directly or indirectly. In the former, co-interlocutors classify their locations in linguistically (non-)“classed” terms, positioning “social class” as a property of these locations straightforwardly through a “classed” description thereof. The second operation, in contrast, functions comparatively indirectly. On these occasions, the locations themselves are not classified in “classed” terms, but are constructed inferentially, as such, by reference to the “classed” composition of the referred to location(s). These two forms of “classed” characterisations are described in this section in turn.

5.5.1.1 “Classed” descriptions

The description of locational formulations in “classed” terms is a straightforward resource whereby the relevance of “social class”, as a device, can be instantiated. Extracts 25 and 30 present two variants of this practice. In both cases, the co-interlocutor who produces the locational formulation also produces the “classed” characterisation thereof (see →). Extract 25 presents a first linguistically “classed” version of this operation.

Extract 25 (*Reproduced*): SWB2353

((A telephone call. Alice and Brian are discussing American foreign policy; specifically, the benefits and consequences of missionisation.))

28 Ali: Uh=They’re encouraged to do that (0.2) .hhh
29 missionary work (.) .hhh an’ I bel- I really

30 believe that the people that do that h. (0.9)
31 Are:: (0.2) better people an' are make our
32 [society better.]
33 Bri: [You know I-] I really ↑agree with you.
34 (0.3)
35 Bri: Uhm. (0.3) .tch (0.2) I'uh (0.2) though I've
36 never done that myself, I-I'm (.) was a (0.2)
37 basically an education major when I graduated
38 from college, (0.2) .hh (.) an' I accepted a
39 ↑Job, (0.2) that at the time was jus' (0.2)
40 slightly above the Poverty level to teach
41 (0.6) to uhm (.) .tch (0.2) very Rural (0.6)
42 children in a very Low income district. (0.8)
43 and I (0.2) sp:ent a year teaching there.
44 (0.2)
45 Ali: [Uhuh,]
46 **Bri: [And I think it wa]s Probably one of my (0.2)**
47 **largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences**
48 **→ because I come from a nice:: (0.7) middle class,**
49 **White suburban home,**
50 (0.2)
51 Ali: Uhuh,
52 (.)
53 Bri: And I Did It (0.2) Uhm. (0.6) For one reason I
54 (won this) (.) I was (.) working on Masters'
55 degree so I wanted to stay close to where I was
56 working on a Masters' degree.=.hhh (0.2) But also
57 be↑cause: I just thought it would be interesting
58 to live someplace else (.) so totally different
59 then my own (.) ↑upbringing.

Focal here is Brian's reference to his 'home,' (l. 49); the location in which he was raised (see ls. 56-59). This formulation is classified by Brian, in linguistically "classed" terms, through a direct description of this location. In this case, this is produced as part of a "cumulative" categorial description (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]:

Ch. 3): ‘a nice:: (0.7) middle class, White suburban home,’ (ls. 48-49).¹⁵⁴ This description incorporates a linguistically “classed” descriptor as a medial list component; namely, ‘middle class,’ (l. 48). Brian’s ‘home,’ (l. 49) is characterised, accordingly, as designedly “(middle) classed”, in a cumulative and contributory respect. This is a direct mechanism whereby Brian’s formulation is depicted as avowedly “classed”; where the location is pronounced explicitly in linguistically “classed” terms.¹⁵⁵ This practice appears, accordingly, as an overt mechanism used by co-interlocutors to “class” locational formulations.

Extract 30 presents a linguistically non-“classed” example of this practice in action.

Extract 30: CABNC [KBB_38]

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Sue and Terry co-deliver a storytelling to Anne and Dennis.))¹⁵⁶

- 1 Sue: ↑Ooh you know that teapot we had on our welsh
2 dresser.
3 (0.2)
4 Ann: Yeah;
5 (0.4)
6 Sue: Some man [came] round.=Well (.) came round=
7 Ter: [Oh.]
8 Sue: =earlier in the ↑year we sold him °*bits.*°
9 (0.9)
10 Ann: [(°Oh.°)]
11 Ter: [Aye.] he'd (come rou-)]
12 Sue: [TEN poun]ds.
13 (0.7)
14 Ann: Ten ↑pound [(t-) that] [old] tea[pot.]
15 Ter: [Fer::] [()] [No.]
16 (0.2)
17 Ter: She- (.) ↑ that, you know, [ten (0.2)=

¹⁵⁴ On “cumulative-category lists” (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3), recall §4.6.2.

¹⁵⁵ For an additional linguistically “classed” example, see Stokoe and Smithson (2001: 256).

¹⁵⁶ On the “*elaboration*” of storytellings by consociates, see Lerner (1992: 263-264).

18 Sue: [I remember.=

19 Ter: =pounds,]

20 Sue: =]

21 Sue: It didn't really match (.) the things on our
22 Welsh dresser. He said, I'll [give you] ten=
23 Ter: [°Mm.°]

24 Sue: =pounds for *that.*
25 (0.6)

26 Ter: °Mm.°
27 (0.4)

28 Sue: °So [I said°] (.)=
29 Ann: [°↑hm°]

30 Sue: =you might [as° well,]
31 Den: [Might have Been] Worth A
32 THOUSAND.

33 Sue: ↑Hhhh. £D(hh)oubt [it.£] huh [huh.=
34 Ann: [>()<] [Do you=
35 Sue: =]

36 Ann: =wa]tch the [antique]=
37 Ter: [Well I-]

38 Ann: =ro[adshow.]
39 Sue: [Yes.]=
40 (?): = [°()°]

41 Den: [Antiques [↓Roadshow?]

42 **Ter:** [I ↑think-] I think what decided him
43 though I says, (0.2) funny enough I says there were
44 one just like this at Harrick (0.2) .hhh
45 and I didn't (.) ↑qualify where it was (0.2)
46 but it (0.2) he latched on to it imm- it's
47 → ↓er:: (0.4) °*a- a-*° posh place you know
48 [Harrick] one of [these]=

49 Den: [°M[hm.°] [°mm.°]
50 Ann: [Yeah.]

51 **Ter:** =(0.4) histori[cal.]
52 Sue: [Yeah.]
53 (.)
54 Ter: .hhh

55 Den: Mhm [hmm.]

56 Ter: [an]d only like a village but (0.2) `ter
57 [(.) very]=

58 Sue: [Yeah.]=

59 Ter: =old'n (0.2) .hhh I said there one in antique
60 shop (0.3) exactly like that but I said, but
61 it were (.) cracked (.) and they wanted
62 twenty six ↑pound for it.
63 (0.2)

64 Ann: ↑Mm[:.]

65 Ter: [I] said, I don't know whether (0.2)
66 it's, they've sold it. (.) As soon as I said
67 that he (.) [said I'll=

68 Sue: [He went in
69 anyway]=

70 Ter: =give you ten [pound.]

71 Den: [Hah hah]

72 Sue: =and [I thought we mi]ght=

73 Den: [hah hah.]

74 Sue: =as well have ten (.) [pounds be]cause .h=
75 Ann: [Yeah,]

76 Sue: =(.) eh- (0.2) It Was (0.2) we've Got (.)
77 >too many bits on the Welsh dresser [anyway.]

The locational formulation in focus, here, is ‘Harrick’ (ls. 44 and 48), produced by Terry; what is positioned, subsequently, as a location resembling a ‘village’ (l. 56). This formulation is produced by Terry in his co-telling of a story, with Sue, about a non-present party who purchased an errant (i.e. out-of-place; e.g. ls. 21 and 76-77) teapot from them. It features within this telling as the location in which Terry encountered the same item, albeit ‘cracked’ (l. 61), and of which he informed the prospective buyer of its price (i.e. ‘twenty six ↑pound’ [l. 62]); a purportedly strategic manoeuvre.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ Specifically, this formulation is deployed to qualify that Terry was aware of the possibly “classed” status of this location when this was recalled to the prospective buyer under the aegis of a topical “coincidence” (i.e. ‘I says, (0.2) funny enough’ [l.

Like Extract 25, this location is characterised as “classed” in a directly formulated assessment by Terry. Unlike in Extract 25, however, in which the location is incorporated within a cumulative listing, ‘Harrick’ (ls. 44 and 48) is classified, initially, using a linguistically non-“classed” description, only; that is, as a ‘posh place’ (l. 47). While the nature of the location is then progressively (re)specified by Terry, as a canonically (i.e. ‘one of [these]=’ [l. 48]; here, see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 80) historical location (ls. 51 and 59) – one that approximates a ‘village’ (l. 56) – its possibly “classed” relevance remains formulated directly upon its initial point of production.¹⁵⁸

Extracts 25 and 30 thus present two cases in which locational formulations are *characterised* directly in linguistically (non-)“classed” terms. In Extract 25, this involved the linguistically “classed” description, ‘middle class,’ (l. 48). This was produced in a cumulative listing, by Brian, contrasting this with the location in which he later worked. In Extract 30, in contrast, the *possibly* “classed” descriptor, ‘posh place’ (l. 47), was ascribed by Terry. Extracts 25 and 30 both then involve a co-interlocutor directly characterising a locational formulation in terms that could be considered relevantly “classed”. Describing locations directly in “classed” terms appears, therefore, to furnish a resource whereby the relevance of “social class” is asserted directly.

43]; here, see Kitzinger et al., 2012: 122, fn. 2). His orientation to this locational formulation in his reported interaction is constructed, in this respect, as a designedly intentional disclosure. It portrays Terry as deliberately making available the possibly “classed” relevance of this location to a party whom he had appraised, successfully, *qua* ‘*knowing recipient*’, to borrow the expression (here, see Goodwin, 1979: 100, italics in original; see also, Lerner, 1992: 250); that is, one who knows how to inspect this locational formulation appropriately upon the occasion of its (co-)production (relatedly, see Schegloff, 1972a: 91-92, 115; 1972b: 111, 130). It is in this capacity that the reference is depicted by Terry *qua* stratagem.

¹⁵⁸ On formulations of “classed” *collectives*, see §7.4.2 and fn. 267.

5.5.1.2 “Classed” composition

The “classed” descriptions in Extracts 25 and 30 have centred on the locational formulations themselves. They are described as “classed” directly in this respect. A comparatively indirect resource that achieves comparable work involves “classing” a component that is comprised *within*, and/or which is epiphenomenal *of* the referred to location. Descriptions of inhabitants – and/or the persons positioned to ‘own’ locations (here, see McHoul and R. Watson, 1984: 297) – is one resource used to this effect.¹⁵⁹ A linguistically “classed” example of this practice has been encountered in Extract 17. Here, the “classed” anatomy of Peru was self-explicated by John (ls. 418, 420, 422, 424, 428, 430, 432, 434, 436-437 and 439) as a competitive rendering (cf. ls. 415, 417 and 419) that was assimilated by Adam, subsequently (see ls. 440-441 and 443). Two further examples of this work are considered below, where a co-interlocutor “classes” a location (see →) by categorising its populace in linguistically (non-)“classed” terms (see ⇒).¹⁶⁰ Locational formulations are constructed as “classed”, in this way, through references to constituent categories. Extracts 31 and 32 present a linguistic and a linguistically non-“classed” version of this practice, respectively.

Extract 31: UCDisLab [Ccon1a]

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Eric, Derek and Chloe are discussing the works of Fyodor Dostoyevsky.))

- 24 Eri: You know what [his ↑point] ↓though is: °that=
25 Chl: [Mm:.]
26 Eri: =everybody is like that.°
27 (0.5)
28 (?): .tch .hhh=
29 Eri: =[His point was to] make you f:eel like that=

¹⁵⁹ Relatedly, see W. Sharrock (1974). See also, §7.4.1.

¹⁶⁰ For linguistically *non*-“classed” examples of this practice, see Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 386-387) and Robles (2016: 96-97). For *linguistically* “classed” cases, see McHoul and R. Watson (1984: 292-293, 297) and Reynolds (2011: 416). For a related practice within FA research, see M. Holt and Griffin (2005: 253-255). On the relevant absence of linguistically *non*-“classed” occupants, see Extract 35 and fn. 167.

30 Chl: =[↑No::.]

31 Eri: =then [make you see:] °god [you are°]

32 Chl: [He ↑thinks] [He stings] on

33 some people much wor=↑He hates the French:.

34 (0.5)

35 Chl: He zings. °Doesn't [he ↑talk]

36 Eri: [Yah he] you know what

37 he [does=

38 Chl: [zings on=

39 Eri: =because.] He's- [e's He zings] [ON THE=

40 Chl: =French] [much more often] [HE ()=

41 Eri: =FREN]CH only becau- (.) he doesn't really=

42 Chl: =]

43 Eri: =zing on the French. .hhh He zings on the

44 Russian intelle- intelligentsia.

45 (0.3)

46 Eri: ↓Who:=See you [gotta realise what was going=

47 Chl: [<He started speaking

48 Eri: =on at the time. [There] [was] a lot=

49 Chl: [French>] [()]

50 Der: [(Yeah.)]

51 Eri: =of shit going on at the time.

52 (0.4)

53 Der: [You see-]

54 Eri: [(Hate) stuff.]

55 (0.2)

56 **Eri: That ↓the right at the ()¿ there was**

57 **→ like (0.6) there's always been two ↓classes**

58 **⇒ in Russia. Always. And the intelligentsia**

59 **(0.5) just sh:it on (.) >the normal**

60 **Russians.< They never spoke Russian.**

61 (0.8)

62 Eri: The Russian (°the uh° / (0.4)) that's 'cuz

63 they: imported like (0.2) one this- (.) their

64 Tsars and ever ↑since then (0.3)

65 Chl: °Mm hmm.°=

66 Eri: =There wa- They had this German Tsar who >w-

67 w- we know< would always French or German but
68 would never speak ↑Russian.= [One of them=
69 Ch1: [°That's true.°=
70 Eri: =didn't] even know their ↑language.=
71 Ch1: =]
72 Ch1: =I know.
73 (0.4)
74 Eri: So they've always had this (0.2) like (0.3)
75 complete (.) dichotomy in the Russian people
76 who have never understood;
77 (0.6)
78 ((Banging.))
79 (0.2)
80 Eri: °You [↓know.°]

The focal locational formulation is 'Russia' (l. 58). This is produced by Eric as he distinguishes – specifically, “*formulates*” (i.e. ‘You know what [his ↑point] ↓though is:’ [l. 24]; see H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970; Heritage and R. Watson, 1979)¹⁶¹ – the central point of criticism in Dostoyevsky’s oeuvre; namely, ‘the Russian intelligentsia.’ (ls. 43-44). Reference to this location is made as Eric accounts for his assertion by invoking the socio-historical context in which Dostoyevsky was situated (e.g. ls. 46, 48, 51 and 54); what is subsequently transformed into a designedly immortal assertion (e.g. ‘always’ [l. 57]; ‘Always’ [l. 58]) assertion. It is in the elaboration of this context in which Eric “classes” Russia by articulating the bipartite “classed” topography of this location: ‘there’s always been two ↓classes in Russia. Always.’ (ls. 57-58).¹⁶²

The two “social classes” disaggregated by Eric in this description include ‘the intelligentsia’ (l. 58) and ‘>the normal Russians.<’ (ls. 59-60). These categories are depicted as the two “classes” of which this location consists. ‘Russia’ (l. 58), as a

¹⁶¹ On this construction, see Jalbert (1984: 32) and Drew (2003a).

¹⁶² For formulations of “social class” as a “*two-set*” (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 47-48) device, see fn. 42 and §7.3.3. On the “*temporal*” implications of this formulation, see §7.3.2.

locational formulation, is thus construed as “classed” indirectly. It is not categorised as such through some “classed” description, or by evoking its “classed” connotations or relevancies (cf. §5.5.1.1). This relationship is explicated by Eric, instead, as he outlines the endogenous “classed” systematics of this location, disaggregating the two constituent membership categories which together compose (and *exhaust*) this taxonomy.

A cognate example of this practice is shown in Extract 32. However, in this case, reference is made to a single “classed” membership category that occupies this location, only; not to the complete “classed” topography thereof (cf. Extract 17; Extract 31). This is produced by Pam in her characterisation of ‘Barley’ (l. 169); an institute of higher education.

Extract 32: CTS05

((A telephone call. Pam and Steve have just discussed their preferences for public transport.))

- 164 Pam: I'm going to get the bus to town when I go to
165 college.
166 (1.0)
167 Ste: Eh?
168 **Pam: I'll be getting the bus to town when I go to**
169 **→ college.<I got got a letter off Barley this**
170 **morning.**
171 Ste: Oh yeah
172 (.)
173 Ste: Saying what.
174 Pam: Saying er:m .hhh hhhh did I want to come and
175 erm .hhh
176 to the open evenings.
177 Ste: .hhh When's that.
178 (0.6)
179 Pam: When.=
180 Ste: =Yeah.
181 **Pam: I don't know. I'm not going to open**
182 **((Yawns.)) I don't want to go there now 'cuz**

183 ⇒ (0.6) ((Yawns.)) Apparently it's full of
 184 scallies.
 185 (0.8)
 186 Pam: ↑An' : :d=
 187 Ste: =>[I wouldn't-] I don't know; .Hhhhhh=
 188 Pam: [Appa-]
 189 Pam: =in my course there was like (.)

The membership “classed” category in focus in this extract is the linguistically non-“classed” term, ‘scallies.’ (l. 184).¹⁶³ This is produced by Pam as she explicitly accounts (‘‘cuz’ [l. 182]) for why she will not attend an open-event at ‘Barley’ (l. 169). The category features within this account as newly-acquired (i.e. ‘now’ [l. 182]) second-hand knowledge (i.e. ‘Apparently’ [l. 183]) of the location’s “classed” ecology, and regarding its predominant (i.e. ‘full of’ [l. 183]) “classed” grouping, specifically: ‘Apparently it’s full of scallies.’ (ls. 183-184).¹⁶⁴ Thus, ‘Barley’ (l. 169) is positioned as possibly “classed” in a vicarious manner. Like Extracts 17 and 31, this is accomplished not through a directly formulated “classed” characterisation of the location, but comparatively indirectly through reference to its “classed” categorial constituency.

In this case, Pam’s reference takes a different form to the categories adduced in Extracts 17 and 31. These locations, it will be recalled, have been designated in “classed” terms through reference to designedly *comprehensive* “classed” schema; that is, where all the occupants of these locations are designedly subsumed; specifically, as a trichotomy (i.e. Extract 17; viz. “no money” [ls. 415, 417 and 419]; ‘a growing middle [((...))] class’ (ls. 434 and 436); “lots of money” [ls. 422 and 428])

¹⁶³ This category refers to ‘working class, young, white, unemployed men’ (Jackson, 2011a: 103; fn. 36). For further information, see Stockill and Kitzinger (2007: 235, fn. 3).

¹⁶⁴ For further references to a categorial-majority *within* a setting, see Extract 20 (ls. 296-297 and 299) and Extract 37 (ls. 23-24). For an example that pertains to settings as a unit of analysis, see Extract 40 (ls. 23-25). Relatedly, concerning *categorial-density*, see Extract 38 (l. 264).

and a dichotomy (i.e. Extract 31; viz. ‘the intelligentsia’ [l. 58]; ‘>the normal Russians.<’ [ls. 59-60]), respectively. In these cases, therefore, all the categories which designedly compose the device (i.e. “social class”) are adduced; that is, articulated. The device is positioned, accordingly, such that it encapsulates all members of the population comprised (recall fn. 26 and fn. 98). Moreover, these groupings are positioned as those which are “generated”¹⁶⁵ by the locations from which they are derived and positioned as are unique in this respect.

In Extract 32, in contrast, the “classed” reference takes a different form. The category, ‘scallies.’ (l. 184), in this extract, is positioned only as the modal, free-floating category that purportedly (*qua* “hearsay” [see Lerner, 1992: 251]) inheres to this location. It is not situated, conversely, as the *exclusive/homogenous* category, nor situated as part of a broader taxonomy of “classed” categories. Pam does not, for example, proposedly classify all of the occupants of this location, and thereby cast “social class”, as such, as a referentially totalising device (here, see §7.3.4). Furthermore, it is produced in a reference that does not stipulate the relationship between this category and the focal location; nor claim referential exhaustion. It is positioned only as a predominant category (i.e. ‘full of’ [l. 183]) – not one that is necessarily tied/bound and/or generated thereby. These differences separate the membership category deployed by Pam from those in Extracts 17 and 31. Nevertheless, the work that is enacted by reference to this group approximates: ‘Barley’ (l. 169) is designated as “classed” through reference to the designedly prevalent status of this category.

Locational formulations are not “classed”, then, only by direct characterisation in linguistically (non-)“classed” terms. Rather, a comparatively inexplicit resource that can be used to this effect involves orienting to the “classed” composition of the referred to location(s). For Extracts 17 and 31, for example, these constitutions were arrayed exhaustively, whereby a complete “classed” system was “*distributionalised*”,¹⁶⁶ *in situ*. Alternatively, as illustrated by Extract 32, co-interlocutors can employ

¹⁶⁵ Relatedly, see R. Turner (1970: n.p.g. [EJBH: 184] in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 37).

¹⁶⁶ Sacks’ (1992: n.p.g. [EJBH: Vol. II: 422] in Drew and E. Holt, 1998: 498-499) term.

single “classed” membership categories to this effect; in this case, the purportedly prevalent, endemic category, ‘scallies’ (l. 184). Locational formulations can in this way be “classed” indirectly through reference to their designedly “classed” constituents.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ Extracts 31 and 32 offer cases in which this work is accomplished by references to linguistically (non-)“classed” membership categories (i.e. ‘the intelligentsia’ [l. 58; Extract 31], ‘>the normal Russians.<’ [ls. 59-60; Extract 31]; ‘scallies.’ [l. 184; Extract 32]) which proposedly occupy (and/or dwell at) these locations (e.g. ‘there’s always been two ↓classes in Russia.’ [ls. 57-58; Extract 31]; ‘Apparently it’s full of scallies.’ [ls. 183-184; Extract 32]). However, notice that this practice can also revolve around the *relevant absence* of linguistically (non-)“classed” categories. In Extract 35, for example, it is the normative inoccupancy of ‘scallies’ (l. 424) in the location of ‘(West Bar)’ (ls. 423-424) that accomplishes this work. For a related example, see Ogden (2004: 48-49).

Note that this practice also obtains for relationships *between* the incumbents of “classed” membership categories and locations, in addition to locations and alternative forms of “classed” *constituents*. Examples of both of variations can be observed in Extract 33, vis-à-vis the locational formulation, ‘The ↑Keys;’ (l. 59). The former, produced by Ruth, trades upon the ‘category-bound obligations and rights’ (R. Watson, 1978 in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 35; see Potter, 1996: 140-142; see §7.4.1) of a possibly “classed” (i.e. ‘=Really posh’ [l. 80]) non-present party (i.e. ‘Our boss’ [l. 76]) to designate this setting as the site for ‘work drinks.’ (l. 71). Conversely, in the latter, Faye orients towards the potentially “classed” (i.e. ‘↑So fancy.’ [l. 91]) cosmetics (i.e. ‘↑beauty products [l. 93]) that are available at this location (i.e. ‘They’ve got really fancy ↑beauty products in the bathrooms and everything.’ [ls. 93-94]).

Note that Faye’s orientation to “classed” objects in a location has already been seen in Extract 30 during Terry’s reported sale. In this case, the teapot is positioned as an object that was also for sale at ‘Harrick’ (l. 44). It is positioned, accordingly, as a type of object constitutive of this setting. Terry’s disclosure, however, unlike Faye’s (cf. Extract 33; ls. 93-94), is not hearable such that it directly “classes” this location. Instead, it trades upon the potential for his prospective buyer to position Terry’s teapot as an object that was “*in-stock*” at a location that is recognisably “classed” (i.e. ‘posh place’ [l. 47]) to motivate a sale (relatedly, see Pinch and Clark, 1986: 180). The forms and relationships between locations and designedly “classed” constituents are, therefore, diverse and can be exploited by co-interlocutors for a range of interactional work.

5.5.2 Allusions

A sister practice to characterising a location in terms of “social class”, upon its production, belongs to the recipients of locational formulations. Upon production, recipients can draw linguistically (non-)“classed” allusions (see →) about/from the focal location (see ⇒). This practice is distinguished from *characterisations* as their (possibly) “classed” relevance is not established by the progenitor of the locational formulation; instead, it is extracted as an *allusion* by a co-interlocutor. Extracts 28, 33 and 34 present three examples of this practice.¹⁶⁸ In each, the allusions produced invoke the linguistically non-“classed” status of the named locational formulation; they are describable as *possibly* “classed” in this respect.

Extract 28 (*Reproduced*): CallHome-eng-4610

((A telephone call. Abby has been on the phone with Bradley. The latter has since passed the phone to David. The interaction is joined following a “compressed” call-opening [see fn. 153].))

- 111 Dav: [Where are] you an' ['ow'd you got a free=
112 Abb: [°↑Huhuh, °] [Huh.=.hhhhhh=
113 Dav: =call.]
114 Abb: =]
115 (.)
116 Dav: [(↓Tell me] about [it.)]
117 **Abb:** ⇒ [↑I'M] [£I]'m in the Alnicks£.
118 (.)
119 Dav: ↑H'yeah?
120 (0.3)
121 Abb: Eh-
122 Dav: W[hich on]e.
123 Abb: [I'm-]
124 (0.4)
125 **Abb:** ⇒ **Uhm. (0.4) Actually I'm in (.) Roustam.**
126 Dav: [()]
127 **Abb:** ⇒ **[Which] is between:. (.) >United Alnick and**
128 **North Alnick I guess.**

¹⁶⁸ For a linguistically “classed” example, see Reynolds (2011: 416).

129 Dav: → **That sounds enormously Posh:**
 130 Abb: It's- (.) .hhh It's super Posh.=Here I Am
 131 going from S:acramento to the Alnicks. My
 132 summer is just filled with luxury.
 133 (0.2)
 134 Dav: Soun[ds ↑wonderfu][l.]
 135 Abb: [hhhh.] [>↑hu]h ↑huh ↑HUH<

The locational formulation in focus here is that which is produced initially as ‘the Alnicks£.’ (l. 117), by Abby. Subsequently, this reference is reformulated over the course of this sequence into a finer (i.e. ‘Roustam’ [l. 125]) and then a broadened (i.e. ‘[which] is between: (.) >United Alnick and North Alnick I guess.’ [ls. 127-128]; here, see Lerner et al., 2012: 209-210; Kitzinger et al., 2013: 45) degree of geographical “granularity” (see Schegloff, 2000a). The former follows a claim of recognition – or a ‘newsmark’ (see Jefferson, 1981a: 62-66 in Heritage, 1984b: 340, fn. 13; i.e. ‘↑H’yeah?’ [l. 119]) – and then a display of recognition, from David (i.e. ‘W[hich on]e.’ [l. 122]).¹⁶⁹ The latter, by contrast, is an unsolicited incremental expansion (here, see Schegloff, 2016 [2001]; Ford, Fox and S. Thompson, 2002b) in the form of an “intersectional” (Psathas and Henslin, 1967: 432) or “relational” construction (Schegloff, 1972a: 88, 98, 102; 1972b: 106, 119, 124; i.e. ‘[which] is between: (.) >United Alnick and North Alnick I guess.’ [ls. 127-128]).

Like the references to place produced in Extracts 25, 30, 31 and 32, this reference is serviced *qua* “locational formulation” (see Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b); that is, in the service of referring. Unique to this extract, however, is that the “classed” relevance of this location is not ascribed by its progenitor, Abby, upon its points of production. Neither in Abby’s initial formulation (i.e. l. 117), nor her subsequent reformulations (i.e. ls. 125 and 127-128), are “classed” relevancies endowed explicitly.¹⁷⁰ The

¹⁶⁹ On “*claimed*” and “*displayed*” recognition vis-à-vis locational formulations, see Heritage (2007).

¹⁷⁰ This is not to say, however, that Abby’s locational formulations are devoid of notable productional and structural features. Abby’s initial formulation (l. 117), for example, is delivered as *non-standard* through its increased amplitude and elevated

linguistically non-“classed” inference that is extracted about this location is instantiated, instead, by her co-interlocutor, David, in an unspecified (i.e. ‘That’ [l. 129]) allusion that is drawn in response to Abby’s turn: ‘That sounds enormously Posh:.’ (l. 129).¹⁷¹

The locus of this allusion is designedly equivocal in David’s turn. Nonetheless, it is clear that the possibly “classed” status of Abby’s formulation(s) is proffered by her recipient, David; positioned as an allusion that is drawn about/from some unspecified component(s) thereof. In this case, David’s allusion is subsequently ratified by Abby (cf. Schegloff, 1996a) and, further, upgraded (see Ogden, 2006: 1760). This is marked as Abby recycles David’s linguistically non-“classed” superlative (i.e. ‘Posh:.’ [l. 129]) – previously used in an evidentially mitigated formulation (i.e. ‘sounds’ [l. 129]) – and upgrades the degree (i.e. ‘super’ [l. 130]) to which it is classifiable as such: ‘It’s- (.) .hhh It’s super Posh.’ (l. 130).¹⁷²

Extract 33 presents a second example of this practice.

pitch (i.e. ‘[↑I’M]’ [l. 117]); in addition to the use of “smile-voice” (i.e. ‘[fI]’m in the Alnicks£.’ [l. 117]). The first two features are particularly notable as recurring features of “good-news” announcements (e.g. Freese and Maynard, 1998: 198).

Abby also orients to the salience of her initial formulation as procedurally indispensable. She withdraws from simultaneous speech (see Schegloff, 2000b) and “self-retrieves” (Jefferson, 2004d: 50-51; see also, Local, Auer and Drew, 2010: 139-143) her turn-beginning (i.e. ‘[fI]’m’ [l. 117]) at a point of David’s projected completion (i.e. l. 116; see Jefferson, 1984b; Drew, 2009). Abby’s initial announcement is thereby preserved as relevantly retainable (see Schegloff, 2004: 121).

What remains relevantly missing, however, is a specification of the import of these productional features by Abby, endogenously; such as, for example, by way of an explicitly “classed” characterisation (see §5.5.1).

¹⁷¹ It is unclear, for instance, whether this refers to Abby’s formulation, *in toto*, to one of her three locational formulations (viz. [1] ‘in the Alnicks£.’ [l. 117]; [2] ‘in (.) Roustam’ [l. 125]; or [3] ‘between: (.) >United Alnick and North Alnick I guess.’ [ls. 127-128]), or to some combination thereof.

¹⁷² On *lexical* gradations of “social class” (e.g. ‘enormously Posh:.’ [l. 129]; ‘super Posh.’ [l. 130]), see §7.3.3.

Extract 33: EJBH_F4_11

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Faye, Harry and Ruth are finishing a meal.))

38 Fay: =I really like it in here.
39 (0.5)
40 Fay: .tch (0.5) So much nicer than the other pubs.
41 (1.5)
42 Fay: I like the atmosphere.
43 (.)
44 Fay: It feels nice.
45 (1.1)
46 Fay: >And I like the food.<
47 (1.3)
48 Fay: And I feel like everything's quite (0.2) a
49 bit more reasonable.
50 (5.0)
51 (?): .Hhhh
52 (2.3)
53 **Har:** ⇒ **I like The Keys.**
54 (0.9)
55 Rut: °↑Really.°=
56 Fay: =Yeah::.. *It* feels a bit hostile.
57 (1.3)
58 Rut: >Who's hostile¿<=
59 **Fay:** ⇒ **=Have you ever been in The ↑Keys¿**
60 (1.4)
61 Rut: Y::es:, (0.4) Yeah.
62 (0.2)
63 Rut: That's the one on the corner isn't it¿
64 (0.6)
65 Fay: °↑Yeah.°=
66 **Rut:** → **=>Jus' that 'cuz it's-< (0.5) Slightly ↑Swanky.**
67 (0.2)
68 Fay: Yeah::.. *I* feel a bit out of place.
69 Rut: Yeah.
70 (1.2)
71 Rut: I used to go there (.) for work drinks.

72 (0.2)
73 Rut: When I worked but- (0.5)
74 Fay: °Yeah.°
75 (0.3)
76 Rut: Our boss was a nob.
77 (0.3)
78 Rut: >And he was< (0.7)
79 Fay: Yeah.=
80 Rut: =Really posh 'nd he Hhh.=
81 Fay: =Uh Huh huh ↑Huh .hhhh I went there for a
82 (0.6) after a funeral. (0.5) and it was jus'
83 really like. (0.5) with all these pictures of
84 this person and it was like.
85 (0.5)
86 Rut: N':: ye[ah.]
87 Fay: [Sa]d.
88 (0.2)
89 Fay: *But ye*ah.
90 (0.5)
91 Fay: ↑So fancy.
92 (0.9)
93 Fay: They've got really fancy ↑beauty products in
94 The bathrooms and everything.
95 (0.5)
96 Rut: Mhm::,

The locational formulation in focus here is 'The Keys' (l. 53), a local restaurant and bar. After its initial production by Harry (l. 53), this formulation is reproduced by Faye (l. 59) after Ruth has initiated repair (i.e. '>Who's hostile<='; l. 58) on Faye's foregoing assessment (i.e. l. 56). In her previous turn, Faye has produced a negatively-valenced assessment of this location in response to Harry (i.e. '=Yeah:: *It* feels a bit hostile.' [l. 56]). After recognition of this location is claimed (l. 61; see fn. 169) and then displayed by Ruth – the latter through a 'relation to landmark' (see Schegloff, 1972a: 100; 1972b: 122; see also, Schegloff, 1979b: 274; 1996a: 182; Natrass et al., 2017) reformulation – Ruth draws the focal, potentially "classed" inference: '=>Jus' that 'cuz it's-< (0.5) Slightly ↑Swanky.' (l. 66). This allusion centres upon the

designedly marginal (i.e. ‘Slightly’ [l. 66]), non-linguistically “classed” status of “The Keys” (i.e. ‘Slightly ↑Swanky.’ [l. 66]). Accordingly, it operates to nominate this device as the salient dimension in order to proposedly account (i.e. ‘‘cuz’ [l. 66]) for Faye’s negatively-valenced assessment (i.e. l. 56); one that begets agreement from Faye (l. 68).

Extract 33 thus presents a second case in which the potentially “classed” relevance of a locational formulation is produced responsively by a co-interlocutor as an “*allusion*”. Also notable in this case is that the practice is followed by successive orientations from Ruth (ls. 71, 73, 76, 78 and 80) and Faye (ls. 91 and 93-94) to possibly “classed” constituents of the focal location (see fn. 167). Ruth and Faye, in this way, differently reaffirm the “classed” relevance of this location through subsequent orientations.

A final example of a possibly “classed” allusion is produced in Extract 34.

Extract 34: UCDisclab [Lcon2]

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Angela, Keith and Karen have been discussing rich people from M.A.))

933 Ang: [My roommate] is from M.A.
934 (0.3)

((Eight lines omitted. Angela’s roommate is named.))

943 Ang: She’s from (0.2) North something;
944 (.)
945 Kei: Northdrobe;
946 (0.2)
947 Kar: Northdrive.
948 (0.3)
949 Kei: Northdrive.=
950 **Ang: ⇒ =Yeah North*drive.***
951 (0.6)
952 Kei: NorthDrive,
953 (0.3)

954 Ang: N'Yeah.
 955 (0.2)
 956 Kei: That's where M.T. is.
 957 (0.6)
 958 Ang: Yea::h,
 959 (0.5)
 960 Kei: That's where all the (0.2) Brick >lanes
 961 °people are.°<
 962 (0.8)
 963 Ang: Ye:ahç
 964 (1.7)
 965 **Kei:** → **[(She) must] be really °↑rich then.°**
 966 Ang: [(An-)
 967 (0.8)
 968 **Kei:** → **°She's got ↑Rocks if she lives up there.°**
 969 (1.5)
 970 Ang: I think her- (0.2) her parents: were well
 971 off.
 972 Kar: [°Mhm.°]

The locational formulation of interest here is 'North*drive.*' (l. 950); a particularisation of the broader location (i.e. 'M.A.' [l. 933]) in which Angela's roommate has been located. This location is partially (i.e. 'North somethingç' [l. 943]) introduced by Angela and subsequently derived (ls. 947 and 949), confirmed (l. 950) and reconfirmed (l. 954), collaboratively, over the course of a word-search (ls. 945-954). This location begets a series of responsive allusions drawn by Keith. The first invokes a locational formulation (l. 956); it discriminates an institution (i.e. 'M.T.' [l. 956]) that is also located in this setting. The second, by contrast, centres around personhood (ls. 960-961). Keith refers to the population that is designedly accommodated at this location (i.e. 'Brick >lanes °people' [ls. 960-961]). Keith's third and fourth allusions then provide two possibly "classed" upshots, concerning personhood, that are designedly (i.e. 'then' [l. 965]; 'up there' [l. 968]) derived from this location; namely, '[(She) must] be really °↑rich then.°' (l. 965) and '°She's got ↑Rocks if she lives up there.°' (l. 968). The subject of these allusions is Angela's 'roommate' (l. 933), who is positioned to have hailed from this location. This non-

present party is positioned, accordingly, by the production of ‘then’ (l. 965; e.g. Schegloff, 1996a: 197), and through the “locational pro-term”, ‘there.’ (l. 968; see Schegloff, 1972a: 87; 1972b: 105), as “*wealthy*”; a dimension that could represent a *possible* orientation to “social class”. The potentially “classed” status of this location is therefore articulated, on this occasion, by Keith, through two “classed” allusions (i.e. ls. 965 and 968); inferences which yield weak agreement from Angela, the progenitor (ls. 970-971).

Allusions thus pose a second resource that could be employed to articulate the “classed” relevance of a locational formulation. This differs from “classed” characterisations insofar as the practice is not enacted by the progenitor of the locational formulation. They are (co-)produced, instead, by recipients. Akin “characterisations” (see §5.5.1), however, allusions can be employed to “class” locational formulations variously. In the cases adduced, these have pertained to an undisclosed aspect of a locational formulation (e.g. Extract 28; see fn. 171); to the “classed” status of the named location (e.g. Extract 33; recall §5.5.1.1); and by referring to the occupiers of a location (e.g. Extract 34; recall §5.5.1.2). The production of “classed” allusions is in this way a pliable resource that is used by recipients to construct another’s formulation as (possibly) “classed”. In the next section, a comparatively inexplicit mechanism that is employed to accomplish comparable work is introduced.

5.5.3 Co-selections

The two preceding sections focussed on how single locational formulations come to be “classed” in talk-in-interaction. What has been held in abeyance, however, are the implications and inferential entailments of these ascriptions for other formulations (co-)produced in the interaction. In this section, I demonstrate that the inferential apparatus is available; one evocative of the practice of “*asymmetrical contrastive pairs*” (e.g. Whitehead and Lerner, 2009), introduced in §2.4.2.2 and §5.2.3. Specifically, I demonstrate that once a locational formulation has been classified in terms of “social class” – such as by a “characterisation” (§5.5.1), or an “allusion” (§5.5.2) – this can render another formulation – or a member (e.g. Extract 33) – hearable in corresponding terms (*qua* “co-selection”). This operation, I show, can operate *prospectively* (§5.5.3.1) and *retrospectively* (§5.5.3.2). Referents can be

“classed” *before* or *after* the co-production of the locational formulation that is “classed”. I show that this practice can ascribe the *same* categorisation applied to the first locational formulation (e.g. Extract 28) or can attribute a *different* category derived from this device (e.g. Extract 25, 35 and 33). For clarity, this apparatus is bifurcated into *prospective* and *retrospective* co-selections.

5.5.3.1 Prospective co-selections

The co-selections of “classed” locational formulations can have a *prospective* operation. On these occasions, a locational formulation is constructed as “classed” (see \Rightarrow), such as through an allusion (§5.5.2; e.g. Extract 28). The subsequent production of another locational formulation is then rendered hearable in the same terms (see \rightarrow). Various modalities can be serviced in order to perdure the relevance of “social class” between formulations. This includes, but is not limited to, *turn-* and *locational-design*, and *word-* and *locational-selection*. Extract 28, introduced above, illustrates these operations.

Extract 28 (*Reproduced*): CallHome-eng-4610

((A telephone call. The interaction is joined following a ‘*conversation restart*’.

Abby, the caller, has introduced her location “pre-emptively”.)¹⁷³

- 72 Bra: How is it?
 73 (0.3)
 74 Abb: .hh It's==
 75 Bra: =How are the Alnick.
 76 (0.5)
 77 Abb: It's Fab. Hh. (0.3) It's [Fabou.]
 78 Bra: [I've never be]en there.
 79 (0.4)
 80 Abb: †HUH?
 81 (0.7)
 82 Bra: When did you †get there.=
 83 Abb: =.hh (0.5) Uh:. I think we came out Sunday.

¹⁷³ On “*conversation restarts*”, see Jefferson (1984a: 193, italics in original; 1988: 436). On “*pre-emption*” techniques, see, e.g., Schegloff (1986: 117, 133-144).

84 (0.5)
85 Bra: Uhuh.
86 (0.7)
87 Abb: (.hhh) We came back from California on
88 Saturday, (.) Stayed in Queens for one
89 night, (.) and came out sunday.
90 (1.1)
91 ((0.5 / Baby with Abby cries.))
92 Abb: °tch.=.h[h°
93 Bra: [Where'd you stay in ↑Queens.
94 (0.8)
95 Abb: WHATǃ
96 (1.4)
97 Bra: Where'd you stay in ↑Qu[eensǃ
98 Abb: [At Sarah and
99 Tim's house.
100 (0.7)
101 Bra: ↓Uhuh.

((Nine lines omitted. Bradley passes the phone to David. A “compressed” call-opening ensues [see fn. 153].))

111 Dav: [Where are] you an' ['ow'd you got a free=
112 Abb: [°↑Huhuh,°] [Huh.=.hhhhhh=
113 Dav: =call.]
114 Abb: =]
115 (.)
116 Dav: [(↓Tell me] about [it.))]
117 Abb: [↑I'M] [£I]'m in the Alnicks£.
118 (.)
119 Dav: ↑H'yeah?
120 (0.3)
121 Abb: Eh-
122 Dav: W[hich on]e.
123 Abb: [I'm-]
124 (0.4)
125 Abb: Uhm. (0.4) Actually I'm in (.) Roustam.

126 Dav: [()]
 127 Abb: [Which] is between:. (.) >United Alnick and
 128 North Alnick I guess.
 129 Dav: ⇒ **That sounds enormously Posh:. .**
 130 Abb: → **It's- (.) .hhh It's super Posh.=Here I Am**
 131 **going from S:acra↓mento to the Alnicks. My**
 132 **summer is just filled with luxury.**
 133 (0.2)
 134 Dav: Soun[ds ↑wonderfu][l.]
 135 Abb: [hhhh.] [>↑hu]h ↑huh ↑HUH<

Extract 28 has been parsed previously in §5.5.2 with respect to the “classed” allusion drawn by David (l. 129) concerning the “classed” relevance of some unspecified aspect of Abby’s formulation of her current location. Focal here is Abby’s “rushed through” (see Schegloff, 1987c: 78-79) continuation after aligning with David’s “classed” allusion: ‘=Here I Am going from S:acra↓mento to the Alnicks’ (ls. 130-131). My summer is just filled with luxury.’ (ls. 130-132). In her continuation, Abby connects the previously established “classed” location (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 129]) – which has been analysed by David in linguistically non-“classed” terms, as sounding ‘enormously Posh:.’ (l. 129), and reformulated, by Abby, as ‘super Posh’ (l. 130) – to a second location, ‘S:acra↓mento’ (l. 131); an extension that can be heard to contribute towards the “*bragging*”, or the “[n]ame-dropping” (Schegloff, 1972a: 81, 91; 1972b: 97, 110) function of the turn.

It is my claim, in this extract, that this second formulation (i.e. ‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]) is not merely hearable as a *co-member* of the same classification (i.e. ‘super Posh’ [l. 130]) that was ascribed to the first locational formulation (i.e. ‘the Alnicks [l. 117]) by Abby,¹⁷⁴ but that it is demonstrably formulated as such. Crucial for such a hearing is the design of Abby’s ‘summary assessment’ (here, see Jefferson, 1984a: 211):

¹⁷⁴ This can be reached, in the first instance, by using the “*consistency rule*” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 239; 1972: 34; 1974 [1972]: 219). Vis-à-vis locational formulations, see Schegloff (1972a: 102; 1972b: 124) and McHoul and R. Watson (1984: 296-297).

‘=Here I Am going from S:acra↓mento to the Alnicks. My summer is just filled with luxury.’ (ls. 130-132).

In the first instance, this work is conveyed overtly by way of *turn design*: Abby explicitly classifies having travelled from (i.e. ‘going from’ [l. 131])¹⁷⁵ one location to the other in the same possibly “classed” terms: ‘My summer is just filled with luxury.’ (ls. 131-130). Note, however, that aspects of *word-selection*, specifically, contribute towards this work. The stressed verb ‘filled’ (l. 132), for example, as the past participle of the ‘measure term’ (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 322-324), “*fill*”, indexes the designedly persisting relevance of this device. Similarly, Abby’s selection of the temporal (i.e. seasonal) formulation, ‘summer’ (l. 132), as a designedly extensive, self-attentive (i.e. ‘My’ [l. 131]; see C. Raymond and White, 2017: 117-118) designation, accomplishes comparable work, extending the relevance of the first locational formulation to the second.

This work is also accomplished comparatively covertly; in this case, through the *selection* of the two locational formulations (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 117]; ‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]) and, further, by virtue of their *selected* formulations. These dimensions can be underscored through reference to Abby’s prior-to-switchboard conversation with her original co-interlocutor, Bradley, in which she has had occasion (i.e. l. 82) to detail her journey to the “the Alnicks”.¹⁷⁶ In this instance, Abby recalls leaving ‘California on Saturday’ (l. 87) after staying ‘in Queens for one night’ (ls. 88-89), at ‘At Sarah and Tim’s house.’ (ls. 98-99); a location selected in lieu of a different, mutually-known non-present party – ‘Jerry’s’ (omitted from transcript). In her subsequent interaction with David, however, this journey is reconstructed differently. Two notable transformations have taken place.

The first concerns *locational selection*. In her “second telling” (see fn. 200), with David, reference to “Queens” (howsoever formulated; e.g., ls., 93 and 98-99), as an

¹⁷⁵ On ‘*verbs of movement*’, see Psathas (1986a: 88, italics in original; 1986b: 238, my emphasis). On ‘crossconversation’ analysis, see Jefferson (1985: 442-451).

¹⁷⁶ On such ‘histor[ies] of recent movement’, see Schegloff (1972a: 88; 1972b: 106).

intermediary – even a ‘transitional’ (see Schegloff, 1972a: 100; 1972b: 122) location – is “*dispensed*”¹⁷⁷ with, wholesale: ‘=Here I Am going from S:acra↓mento to the Alnicks. My summer is just filled with luxury.’ (ls. 130-132). This elision is consequential. Specifically, it is on this basis that Abby can be considered to have *selected* the locational formulation of ‘S:acra↓mento’ (l. 131) as her relevant point of departure. It would have been equally correct, for example, to have substituted ‘S:acra↓mento’ (l. 131) with “Queens”; the location that is temporalised, by Abby, as the more proximate point of departure for their journey (see ls. 88-89). The production of ‘S:acra↓mento’ (l. 131), in this sense, can be distinguished ‘non-trivially’ (see Schegloff, 2007a: 19), and in a ‘*strong sense*’,¹⁷⁸ as a *selection*; that is, inasmuch as its production is not determined by virtue of Abby (et al.) having *only* departed from this location.¹⁷⁹ I propose, instead, that this formulation has been singled out from amongst alternative ‘vacation place terms’ (Schegloff, 1972a: 83; 1972b: 99) to cohere with the “classed” terms that David has previously analysed (l. 129) – and by which Abby has subsequently upgraded (l. 130) – some unspecified dimension of Abby’s first locational formulation (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 117]; recall fn. 171).

The second order of transformation concerns *turn-design*. Two conversions are notable here: (1) ‘California’ (l. 87) to ‘S:acra↓mento’ (l. 131); and (2) ‘Roustam’ (l. 125) to ‘the Alnicks.’ (l. 131). The first is derived from a comparison with Abby’s initial interaction, with Bradley (i.e. ‘California’ [l. 87]), to her subsequent conversation with David (i.e. ‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]). The second, in contrast, is a disparity that is drawn internally from within Abby’s exchange with David. In the preceding talk, Abby has respecified her initially formulated location (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 117]) to ‘Roustam’ (l. 125), a location that is constructed relationally; namely, ‘[Which] is between: . (.) >United Alnick and North Alnick I guess.’ (ls. 127-128). In the focal turn, however, Abby can be seen to *reselect* the non-minimal locational formulation of ‘the Alnicks’ (l. 131); a formulation for which David has previously solicited a respecification (i.e. l. 122). What is notable about this selection

¹⁷⁷ Schegloff’s (2004: e.g. 99) term.

¹⁷⁸ Jefferson’s (1972: 319, my emphasis) phrase.

¹⁷⁹ On such ‘*secondary starting points*’, see Psathas (1986b: 240, italics in original).

is that Abby departs from the structural preference for using minimised referential forms (i.e. ‘Roustam’ [l. 125]) when possible (see Sacks and Schegloff, 1979: 16-18; Schegloff, 1996d: 464; see also, Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 146-149; Schegloff, 1996b: 20). Abby’s selection of ‘the Alnicks.’ (l. 131), over ‘Roustam’ (l. 125), thus designedly flaunts this preference, reemploying (see l. 117) what has been previously uncovered, by David (i.e. l. 122) – and amended, retroactively, by Abby (i.e. ‘Actually’ [l. 125]; see Clift, 2001: 266-270) – as an “exaggerated”, or designedly *extravagant*, locational formulation.¹⁸⁰

In Abby’s summary assessment, therefore, two locational *reformulations* are committed. Again, the bases underlying their selection is not self-explicated, *in situ*, and remain equivocal. Nonetheless, it is at least permissible that these formulations are selected to cohere with the interactional work accomplished through the turn to which they contribute (see Kitzinger et al., 2013: 46-48). In this case, I propose that it positions the second formulation (i.e. ‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]), inexplicitly, in the same terms (i.e. “classed”) as those which have been ascribed to the first (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 117]) comparatively explicitly (e.g. ‘enormously Posh.’ [l. 129]; ‘super Posh.’ [l. 130]). Thus, Extract 28 provides a case in which a subsequent locational formulation (i.e. ‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]) is positioned as a *co-selection* by way of *turn-* and *locational-design* and *word-* and *locational-selection*; specifically, it is constituted as a co-member of the same type of location as an earlier, possibly “classed” destination (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 131]).

5.5.3.2 Retrospective co-selections

Locational formulations can also be co-selected as “classed” retrospectively. On these occasions, a locational formulation is (co-)produced which is *not* construed as “classed” (see →). Through reference to a subsequent formulation, however (see ⇒) – one that *is* understandable as “classed” – the initial formulation is then retrospectively recast, accordingly. An inverse directionality to the “*prospective*” operation is, therefore, available. Two examples of this operation have been

¹⁸⁰ On the production of “*exaggerations*”, see Schegloff (1972a: 86-87; 1972b: 104-105), Lynch (1985: 270-271, fn. 17) and Drew (1987: 231; 2003b).

encountered already, but focussed-off, in Extracts 25 and 33. These instances are substantiated in this section and interleaved with an additional example (i.e. Extract 35).

Extract 25 (Reproduced): SWB2353

((A telephone call. Alice and Brian are discussing American foreign policy; specifically, the benefits and consequences of missionisation.))

- 28 Ali: Uh=They're encouraged to do that (0.2) .hhh
29 missionary work (.) .hhh an' I bel- I really
30 believe that the people that do that h. (0.9)
31 Are:: (0.2) better people an' are make our
32 [society better.]
- 33 Bri: [You know I-] I really ↑agree with you.
34 (0.3)
- 35 Bri: Uhm. (0.3) .tch (0.2) I'uh (0.2) though I've
36 never done that myself, I-I'm (.) was a (0.2)
37 basically an education major when I graduated
38 from college, (0.2) .hh (.) an' I accepted a
39 ↑Job, (0.2) that at the time was jus' (0.2)
40 slightly above the Poverty level to teach
41 (0.6) to uhm (.) .tch (0.2) very Rural (0.6)
42 → children in a very Low income district. (0.8)
43 and I (0.2) sp:ent a year teaching there.
44 (0.2)
- 45 Ali: [Uhuh,]
- 46 Bri: [And I think it wa]s Probably one of my (0.2)
47 largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences
48 ⇒because I come from a nice:: (0.7) middle class,
49 White suburban home,
50 (0.2)
- 51 Ali: Uhuh,
52 (.)
- 53 Bri: And I Did It (0.2) Uhm. (0.6) For one reason I (won
54 this) (.) I was (.) working on Masters' degree so
55 I wanted to stay close to where I was working on a
56 Masters' degree.=.hhh (0.2) But also be↑cause: I

57 just thought it would be interesting to live
58 someplace else (.) so totally different then my
59 own (.) ↑upbringing.
60 (.)
61 Ali: Mhuh:ǀ
62 Bri: An' I- it ↑Change::d, hh. (0.5) it probably
63 changed my (.) political view:s, it changed my
64 understanding of the world around d'me,
65 (0.5)
66 Ali: Uhuhǀ=
67 Bri: =And uh I think uhm, (0.7) °mpt°=in fact I-if I
68 Had to do it all again. (.) uh I've you know I-
69 AFTER that you know I you never think of it
70 ↑because, .hhh (0.2) I guess because, (.) I paid
71 for all of my college education myself, (0.3) .hh
72 I never thought about (0.6) doing that because I
73 had all of these college loans. (0.2) I'had to
74 start paying ↑back.

In my previous analysis of Extract 25 (§5.5.1.1), this exchange has been examined purely for Brian's linguistically "classed" characterisation of his home: 'a nice:: (0.7) middle class, White suburban home,' (ls. 48-49). What has been comparatively neglected is the classificatory work that is accomplished, retrospectively, through this formulation, upon its production. In the just-preceding talk, Brian has referred to a previous locational formulation: 'a very Low income district.' (l. 42); the location Brian began working in after graduation (ls. 34-43). This locational formulation, unlike the latter (i.e. ls. 48-49), is not positioned explicitly in terms of "social class" upon its production. This category is, instead, situated in terms of "income" (i.e. 'Low income' [l. 42]). In this respect, it is describable as *possibly* "classed", only. Upon the production of the latter formulation, however, this location is then recast, retrospectively, in corresponding "classed" terms. In this instance, this operation trades upon the action of "*accounting*" for which the second, linguistically "classed" formulation (i.e. 'a nice:: (0.7) middle class, White suburban home,' [ls. 48-49]), is mobilised.

This locational formulation is serviced as Brian accounts for why his experience teaching in the former location qualified as a formative experience: ‘one of my (0.2) largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences’ (ls. 46-47; see also, ls. 62-64). Brian’s description of the latter category is thus evoked to furnish these designedly “*enlightening*” grounds. As acknowledged above, what is focal here is that this characterisation invokes the linguistically “classed” descriptor, ‘middle class,’ (l. 48). Accordingly, this rendering makes available how the earlier locational formulation is to be analysed, retroactively. In this case, these terms are not self-explicated by Brian. The former location (i.e. ‘a very Low income district.’ [l. 42]) is simply positioned contrastively, in antithetical terms to the latter (i.e. ‘a nice:: (0.7) middle class, White suburban home,’ [ls. 48-49]). In other words, it designates that the first locational formulation (i.e. ‘a very Low income district.’ [l. 42]) was not correspondingly classifiable as ‘middle class,’ (l. 48) insofar as this very classification, for Brian, contributes towards the edifying nature of this experience.¹⁸¹ Extract 25, as such, demonstrates that the apparatus of “co-selection” also functions *retroactively* to reconstrue how a preceding locational formulation (i.e. ‘a very Low income district.’ [l. 42]) was classified upon its production.

Extract 35 presents a further example of this practice in action. The locations in focus in this extract are those of ‘Liverpool’ (ls. 417 and 420) and ‘(West Bar)’ (ls. 423-424); a city and a nightclub, respectively. Like Extract 25, the former locational formulation is not designedly “classed” by its progenitor, Pam, at its point of production; rather, it is only subsequently rendered hearable, as such, through the production of the latter. In this instance, the latter is not “classed” directly by a “characterisation” (cf. §5.5.1.1; e.g. Extract 25), but through reference to a constitutively “classed” group (i.e. ‘scallies’ [l. 424]; recall §5.5.1.2) – and their relevant absence, specifically (see fn. 167).

¹⁸¹ Termed ‘relativity’ (Schegloff, 1992b: xxxiv), this property is addressed by Sacks (1992: Vol. I: 45) within his discussion of ‘perspective’. For review, see §2.3.4 and §7.3.3. In this case, this inference is subsequently explicated by Brian: ‘(.) so totally different then my own (.) upbringing.’ (ls. 58-59); ‘it probably changed my (.) political view:s, it changed my understanding of the world around d’me,’ (ls. 62-64).

Extract 35: CTS16

((A telephone call. Pam has recalled an unsuccessful night out to Steve.))

- 407 Ste: .hhhh Yeah. So. Yeah sounds a bit of a
408 rubbish night really. Doe'n' it.
409 Pam: Yeah. Oh it rea[lly was]
410 Ste: [Well well] we'll have to go
411 out like I said. [()]
412 Pam: [Yeah. I want to Man.]
413 I want to.
414 (0.6)
415 **Pam: .hh hhhhh .hh [For some] reason I don't want=**
416 Ste: [()]
417 **Pam: → =to go out round Liverpool.**
418 Ste: I just- yeah. What?
419 **Pam: hhh S'noth- for some reason though (0.8)**
420 **→ Liverpool does not appeal to me anymore.**
421 (0.6)
422 Ste: Yeah
423 **Pam: ⇒ But hhh I suppose it's alright in (West**
424 **Bar) in that you you don't get any scallies**
425 **in there. .hhh But- oh no right hhh**
426 ((Swallows.)) there was uhm .hh there was
427 like these sort of older men on the dance
428 floor. And stuff like that. And there was one
429 guy who had no ea:rs. And he [was like]
430 Ste: [(No/Had) what]

At the point at which the first locational formulation (i.e. 'Liverpool' [ls. 417 and 420]) is produced by Pam, this is not positioned in "classed" terms – linguistically or non-linguistically. It is produced (ls. 415 and 417) and reproduced (ls. 419-420) purely as a location that she does not wish to continue (i.e. 'anymore' [l. 420]) frequenting. The reason for this is formulated as unknown and/or unattributable (i.e. '[For some] reason' [l. 415]); it is repositioned simply as a location that has lost its former 'appeal' (ls. 419-420). In this case, it is possible that the formulation contributes towards an 'inability' account (see Drew, 1984: 129; see also, Heritage, 1984[a]: 269-274 in Clayman, 2002: 235) occasioned by Steve's designedly non-initial (i.e. 'like I said'

[ls. 410-411]) proposal. This initial formulation is then followed by Pam's reference to a second location: 'But hhh I suppose it's alright in (West Bar) in that you you don't get any scallies in there.' (ls. 423-425). It is this subsequent locational formulation, I propose, which endows Pam's first formulation, 'Liverpool' (ls. 417 and 420), retrospectively, with a "classed" relevance.

Like Extract 25, this formulation is constructed by Pam in "classed" terms. In this case, this is accomplished not by a "classed" description, but through reference to a regionally specific linguistically non-"classed" membership category; namely, 'scallies' (l. 424; recall fn. 163). Specifically, this is formulated indirectly in this extract. The location is "classed" not through reference to the purported incumbency of members of this category in this location (cf. Extracts 17, 31 and 32), but by the relevant absence, thereof. This is produced as Pam accounts for her positively-valenced assessment of this location. Thus, it is Pam's selection of this category, as a notable absence, that positions it as a normative category in 'Liverpool' (ls. 417 and 420). The use of this category in Pam's account for her positive assessment of this locational formulation thus functions relevantly as a qualification of her foregoing assessment (i.e. ls. 415 and 417). In other words, Pam discriminates that which she has said about Liverpool does not obtain to '(West Bar)' (ls. 423-424) – a location subsumed within Liverpool – for this reason. As such, by nominating the absence of this group, Pam positions the presence of 'scallies' (l. 424) indirectly in this location and deploys this as a possibly contributing factor for why the appeal of the first locational formulation has decayed (see ls. 419-420). Like Extract 25, therefore, this retrospective co-selection trades upon the activity of accounting for which this latter is produced.

Extracts 25 and 35 are thus two cases in which this operation functions to assign "classed" hearings to locational formulations that have been produced by the progenitors of the latter category in "classed" terms. Before moving on, it is worth noting that this retrospective operation can also operate to classify *co-interlocutors*,

comparably. Extract 33, introduced above (§5.5.2), furnishes one example of this contingency.¹⁸²

Extract 33 (Reproduced): EJBH_F4_11

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Faye, Harry and Ruth are finishing a meal.))

38 Fay: =I really like it in here.
39 (0.5)
40 Fay: .tch (0.5) So much nicer than the other pubs.
41 (1.5)
42 Fay: I like the atmosphere.
43 (.)
44 Fay: It feels nice.
45 (1.1)
46 Fay: >And I like the food.<
47 (1.3)
48 Fay: And I feel like everything's quite (0.2) a
49 bit more reasonable.
50 (5.0)
51 (?): .Hhhh
52 (2.3)
53 **Har:** → **I like The Keys.**
54 (0.9)
55 Rut: °↑Really.°=
56 Fay: =Yeah::: *It* feels a bit hostile.

¹⁸² For a second, related example, see Extract 36. Holly, in this instance, disaffiliates with Emily's designedly idiosyncratic formulation (see fn. 192) of the searched for location as 'the posh shop' (ls. 24-25), reformulating the *relevant* dimension of the shop as a 'select second shop [((...))] in't it really' (ls. 27 and 29). Holly, in so doing, avoids agreeing with Emily's classification of the shop as 'posh' (l. 25), and so effaces the possibly "classed" relevance of this formulation. Holly thereby further avoids aligning with Emily and so jointly occupying her implied position as someone that is classified in different terms than those which are ascribed to the 'shop' (l. 25); that is, someone for whom its 'posh' (l. 25) status qualifies it as distinctive (i.e. '[Yeah no] I call it the posh shop' [ls. 24-25]).

57 (1.3)

58 Rut: >Who's hostile¿<=

59 **Fay:** → =Have you ever been in The ↑Keys¿

60 (1.4)

61 Rut: Y::es:, (0.4) Yeah.

62 (0.2)

63 Rut: That's the one on the corner isn't it¿

64 (0.6)

65 Fay: °↑Yeah.°=

66 **Rut:** ⇒ =>Jus' that 'cuz it's-< (0.5) Slightly ↑Swanky.

67 (0.2)

68 Fay: Yeah::.. *I* feel a bit out of place.

69 Rut: Yeah.

70 (1.2)

71 Rut: I used to go there (.) for work drinks.

72 (0.2)

73 Rut: When I worked but- (0.5)

74 Fay: °Yeah.°

75 (0.3)

76 Rut: Our boss was a nob.

77 (0.3)

78 Rut: >And he was< (0.7)

79 Fay: Yeah.=

80 Rut: =Really posh 'nd he Hhh.=

81 Fay: =Uh Huh huh ↑Huh .hhhh I went there for a

82 (0.6) after a funeral. (0.5) and it was jus'

83 really like. (0.5) with all these pictures of

84 this person and it was like.

85 (0.5)

86 Rut: N':: ye[ah.]

87 Fay: [Sa]d.

88 (0.2)

89 Fay: *But ye*ah.

90 (0.5)

91 Fay: ↑So fancy.

92 (0.9)

93 Fay: They've got really fancy ↑beauty products in

94 The bathrooms and everything.
 95 (0.5)
 96 Rut: Mhm::,

Previously focal in this extract was the linguistically non-“classed” allusion (i.e. ‘Slightly ↑Swanky.’ [l. 66]) drawn by Ruth about the locational formulation, ‘The ↑Keys.’ (l. 59). Relevant now is the function for which this allusion is extracted, and the retrospective implicature thereof. In this case, the allusion is drawn as a candidate explanation for Faye’s foregoing categorisation of this location as ‘a bit hostile’ (l. 56). In this respect, Ruth nominates this device to account for Faye’s perceived (i.e. ‘feels’ [l. 56]) hostility. Accordingly, it is my claim, in this extract, that this categorisation also functions to co-select a category, previously produced, also in “classed” terms. Unlike Extracts 25 and 35, however, in which prior locational formulations are “classed”, this case extends instead to personhood. Specifically, it is by virtue of Ruth’s classification that Faye is positioned, here, as relevantly classifiable in a way that is incongruent to how this location is classified (i.e. ‘Slightly ↑Swanky.’ [l. 66]). This is provided through the action of Ruth’s turn where the “classed” description is levied – and later corroborated (see l. 68) – as an explanation for Faye’s negatively-valenced assessment thereof. Like Extracts 28, 25 and 35, Ruth, in this instance, does not articulate exactly how Faye is positioned vis-à-vis the “classed” status ascribed to this location. It is made available, however, only inferentially: Faye is simply proposedly incongruent, for Ruth, by virtue of her “classed” status; an incongruity that is subsequently affirmed by Faye – albeit in non-“classed” terms: ‘Yeah:: *I* feel a bit out of place.’ (l. 68).¹⁸³

The apparatus of “*co-selections*” is thus a flexible interactional resource. This section has canvassed a bilateral directionality for this practice. Extract 28 has introduced the *prospective* operation, where the production of a “classed” locational formulation renders a subsequent formulation hearable in corresponding (i.e. “classed”) terms. Extracts 25, 35 and 33 then introduced the inverse, *retrospective* operation. On these occasions, a locational formulation, or a co-interlocutor, is constructed in non-“classed” terms. This formulation is then recast, as such, through the production of a

¹⁸³ Relatedly, on locational improprieties, see Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 172-174).

recognisably “classed” formulation. This resource has been shown to be available for a range of locations designed as “classed”, including those “characterised” (§5.5.1) directly (e.g. Extract 25) and indirectly (e.g. Extract 35) and those produced through “classed” “allusions” (§5.5.2; e.g. Extracts 28 and 33). Lastly, a number of resources have also been introduced which sustain the relevance of “social class” across locational formulations. This includes the social action of “*accounting*” (e.g. Extracts 25, 35 and 33) in addition to turn and locational design and word and locational selection (e.g. Extract 28). Presumably, these methods do not exhaust the resources that can be employed in order to accomplish “classed” co-selections.¹⁸⁴ Again, however, it will suffice it to illustrate, only, the diverse availabilities of this practice in action.

5.5.4 Intentional misidentifications

The focus of this chapter, so far, has been occupied with the practices employed to “class” locational formulations in talk-in-interaction. A matter that has remained focussed-off, until this stage, are whether these formulations are, descriptively, *correct*. Rather, as addressed in Chapters 2 (§2.2.1) and 4 (§4.3), this matter is immaterial, in the first instance. Focal, instead, are how locations come to be “classed”, and the social actions for which these practices are serviced, *in situ*. The matter of correspondent correctness (recall fn. 74) – i.e., whether the forms of locational formulations correspond with that which is intendedly denoted – is positioned as an area of interest only when this dimension is made relevant by co-interlocutors. One example of this exigency has been encountered previously in Extract 28 (e.g. §5.5.3.1). It will be recalled, in this case, that a named locational formulation (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 131]) was re-selected (i.e. l. 129) from an array of equally correct alternative renderings previously produced (e.g. ‘Queens’ [l. 88]; ‘Sarah and Tim’s house’ [ls. 98-99]; not at ‘Jerry’s’ [omitted from transcript], ‘Roustam’ [l. 125]). Specifically, Abby re-invoked a form that has since been established (e.g. l. 122) as an exaggerated, non-recognitional description (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 131]). This selection, it was argued, was mobilised in the service of

¹⁸⁴ See Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 141, fn. 1), for example, in which a non-“classed” example of this practice is accomplished through a ‘*gist preserving error*’ (ibid.: 143, italics in original).

endowing a second, subsequently produced locational formulation (i.e. ‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]) such that it was hearable/analysable in the same “classed” terms.

In this section, I focus on a comparatively explicit variation of this practice. Like Extract 28 (‘the Alnicks’ [l. 131]), this involves designedly “*misidentifying*” a correspondently correct version of a locational formulation – or by “punning” on it (see →). Specifically, it involves referring to a location such that the reference is recognisable for its recipient, but that the reference is, in some way, recognisably *erroneous*, and where the nature of the designedly recognisable error accomplishes more than simply referring, in this case occasioning and privileging a “classed” hearing (relatedly, see fn. 252). This practice will be referred to hereafter as “*intentional misidentifications*”.¹⁸⁵ This phenomenon has been acknowledged previously in EM/(M)CA texts vis-à-vis locational formulations (e.g. Schegloff, 1972a: 432, fn. 15; 1972b: 129, fn. 12); it has not, however, garnered attention as an ascriptive categorial resource. In this section, I focus on those occasions in which locational formulations are explicitly assigned a “classed” valence through their misidentification. Two variations of this practice occur in my dataset; namely, *substitutions* (e.g. Extract 36) and *modifications* (e.g. Extract 38). In the former, the relevance of “social class” is instantiated by supplanting a known-in-common and non-“classed” formulation with one that attests to the relevance of “social class” in its naming. In the second, comparable work is accomplished but through the modification of a non-“classed” locational formulation such that it includes a linguistically non-

¹⁸⁵ This term is also inherited from Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 417-426, 544-546, 675-684; 1970, Part 3: 50) and Moerman and Sacks (1996 [1971]: 185) on the use of “address terms” (here, see also Schegloff, 1996d: 472, fn. 5) in “second insults/insult returns” (for review, see Coulter, 1995b: 331). On related phenomena, see Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 84) on ‘teaching actors to learn to make an error’; Schegloff (1984a: 45; 2007a: 29) on “intentional misunderstandings” and on ‘intendedly incorrect identification[s]’ (Schegloff, 1979a: 31); Ziferstein (1972: 89) on turns-at-talk that are ‘intendedly so mis-hearable’; Glenn (2003: 60) on being ‘playfully incorrect’; and Burke (1935/1954: n.p.g. in R. Watson, 1992a: 4) on ‘planned misnomers’. For published examples, see Wacquant (2004: 175, 246, fn. 8) and H. S. Thompson (2005 [1973]: 361-362, 397, 399, fn. 1) for references to persons and locations.

“classed” category. In both cases, therefore, the salience of “social class” is rendered explicit (cf. Extract 28) by designedly altering – even *manipulating* – the format of a referentially sufficient, non-“classed” formulation. Extracts 36 and 38 exemplify these subtypes, respectively.

Extract 36: CABNC [KCG_15]

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Holly recounts a number of her activities to Emily.))

- 1 (1.5)
 2 Hol: °Tah Emily.°
 3 ((Baby cries.))
 4 (2.0)
 5 Hol: Went and took Ed out didn't we.=Give him a
 6 bit of a wal::k.
 7 (0.2)
 8 Emi: You've been for a ↑walk eh, h[hh.]
 9 Hol: [Mm w]e went in
 10 that- (0.8) we went and got me ↑barm:: cakes
 11 and a bit of- (1.2) a few veg and that (1.4)
 12 went>↑Oh I bought (.) ()- Jessica a little set
 13 (.) <of er: easter instead> of an Eas::ter egg.
 14 (0.4)
 15 Hol: ↑It's quite nice, I got it from that shop
 16 (0.8) You know erm (0.3)
 17 Emi: °Mhm:.°=
 18 Hol: =Next to Louis and ↓Fith.
 19 (0.6)
 20 Emi: °*Oh yea[hç*°
 21 Hol: [er::=
 22 Emi: =[(↑)]
 23 Hol: [What's it called.= [° () °]
 24 **Emi:** → [Yeah no] I call it
 25 **the posh shop.**
 26 (0.5)
 27 Hol: Yeah.=it's- [it's ↑like] a select=
 28 Emi: [((Clears throat.))]

29 Hol: =second shop in't [it really but uh]
 30 Emi: [↓Yeah: but uh] huh
 31 (0.3)
 32 Hol: I mean [↑s:ome-]
 33 Emi: [fabout a hundred] times [dearer.ɛ]
 34 Hol: [Yeah::.]
 35 (0.2)
 36 Hol: But I mean, (0.3) <the stuff is cheaper
 37 compared to what you pay [to other shop.>]
 38 Emi: [°Hm:::.°]

In this extract, Holly and Emily are collaborating in a search for the name of a ‘shop’ (l. 15) from which Holly has purchased a gift for ‘Jessica’ (l. 12) – a non-present party (ls. 11-13). This location is specified, by Holly, initially, in a ‘relation to landmark’ formulation (i.e. “R_l”; Schegloff, 1972a: 100; 1972b: 122), ‘Next to Louis and ↓Fith.’ (l. 18); a construction that yields an incipient display of recognition from Emily (l. 20; here, see Heritage, 1998: 292). It is as Holly further pursues the name of this location (i.e. ‘[What's it call]ed.’ [l. 23]) that Emily proffers the designedly idiosyncratic (i.e. ‘I call it’ [l. 24]) non-linguistically “classed” formulation: ‘[Yeah no] I call it the posh shop.’ (ls. 24-25).

It is through the form of this reference that the hitherto undisclosed “classed” (i.e. ‘the posh shop’ [l. 25]) relevance of location is asserted by Emily. Like Extracts 25 and 30 in §5.5.1.1, this is accomplished by the inclusion of a linguistically non-“classed” descriptor (i.e. ‘posh’ [l. 25]). In this instance, however, the term is not used merely as a description of this location (cf. §5.5.1.1); nor by which to characterise a population that is relevantly subsumed therein (cf. §5.5.2.2), or notably exempt therefrom (cf. Extract 35; recall fn. 167). It is positioned, by Emily, instead, as its designedly *salient* factor, as the operative basis from which it is distinguished from other co-class members (i.e. “shops”). In this case, this is produced by using a ‘the X’ formulation (here, see Schegloff, 1972a: 97; 1972b: 117), where the linguistically non-“classed” descriptor (i.e. ‘posh’ [l. 25]) prepends (i.e. precedes) the ‘place-category’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 36; i.e. ‘shop.’ [l. 25]). The relevance of “social class” is therefore asserted through the name awarded to this formulation.

This named formulation is oriented to by Emily not as the formulation sought-after by Holly, but as an alternative, designedly idiosyncratic formulation. Specifically, upon its point of production, Emily disqualifies herself from the search-in-progress (i.e. ‘[Yeah no]’ [l. 24]) and produces this formulation as an “alternative recognitional” (see Stivers, 2007) to that which is pursued by Holly. It is in this respect that this instance represents a form of “intentional misidentification”, where the linguistically non-“classed” (i.e. ‘posh’ [l. 25]) formulation is produced by Emily explicitly as a *substitute* for the mutually-known (e.g. l. 20), sought-after (e.g. l. 23), and as yet unnamed formulation that is collectively unavailable.¹⁸⁶ This operation therefore represents a more explicit version of the practice comprised in Extract 28, where the formulation of ‘Roustam’ (l. 125) was replaced, by Abby, with ‘the Alnicks’ (l. 131).

The substitution of a formulation – named (e.g. Extract 28) or unnamed (e.g. Extract 36) – with an intentionally mis-designed form therefore represents a highly explicit resource by which the relevance of “social class” can be asserted, where the salient feature is self-explicated in its naming, and is not left inexplicit, nor implicated by inference. Notably, however, this practice also represents a *generic* resource whereby the relevance of other devices can be co-implicated. For illustrative purposes, a cognate example of this practice is adduced in Extract 37 vis-à-vis “*gender*” and “*stage-of-life*”.

Extract 37: CLACIA¹⁸⁷

((A face-to-face interaction. Dianne and Clacia are “*reminiscing together*”¹⁸⁸ about college.))

- 1 Cla: Y’know when we were at the first semester we
 2 were there an (‘er) (0.6) °down at the hotel
 3 we had (a) nympho↓maniac which was (really a)
 4 () .°

¹⁸⁶ On the ‘momentary non-recognition’ of locational formulations, see Schegloff (1972a: 94; 1972b: 114).

¹⁸⁷ See fn. 85. My thanks to Professor C. Goodwin and Professor M. H. Goodwin for allowing me to include this extract.

¹⁸⁸ Lerner’s (2002: 238-239, my emphasis) phrase.

5 (0.5)
6 Dia: >Oh there [were always-<] [(0.4)]=
7 Cla: [(Drawing) ↑gu] [ys]=
8 Dia: =[>↑dozens of ↑tho:↓]se.
9 Cla: =[back to their ↑roo:m.]
10 (.)
11 Dia: (.hh) [(Had ↓`em-)]
12 Cla: [Oh ↑re]ally;≥They had only one
13 (gal) at the halls °and she was (real awful
14 ↑bad).≥She was (n)-< (0.2) not there very
15 ↓long.
16 (0.4)

((1 minute, 3 seconds omitted.))

17 **Dia: £We used to do some£ really awful things**
18 **Though to some really things though to >some**
19 **of the girls< i- (.) in the <hotel:> >you**
20 **→ know we used to call it Menopause**
21 **£↑Manor↑£**
22 (0.2)
23 Dia: A'hem (((Clears throat.)) >°Because of all
24 the old ladies.°<
25 (0.8)
26 Dia: .tch £↑And£ (.) we'd get on the elevator and
27 we'd be s:m:oking awa::y you know. Like
28 ((coughs)) .hh So we used to take smoke and
29 blow it £in front of their >fa:ces< an'
30 (0.8)
31 Dia: M(h)y o(h)n(h)e roommate °she was (very)
32 (ba:d) >(she really was).< (0.2) Used to
33 knock on door:s and these little old ladies
34 would open SHH-SHH-SHH £An(h)d she'd
35 squirt them a(h)l(h) [l(h)]
36 Cla: [O]h [*g] [od::.*]
37 Dia: [↑Huh] [↑hah]

Clacia and Dianne are reminiscing about their time in college and their accommodation, specifically; what has been referred to, by Clacia, as ‘the hotel’ (l. 02). Talk on this topic is then suspended as a third-party, temporarily joins the dyad (omitted from transcript). Following their departure (omitted from transcript), Dianne re-topicalises this location – using the same recognitional construction (i.e. ‘the <hotel:>’ [l. 19]) – as she launches an unsolicited confession of lamentable (e.g. ‘really a:wful’ [l. 17]) collective “*misdeed*”¹⁸⁹ to which she contributed (e.g. ‘£We’ [l. 17]) in this location (see ls. 17-20). It follows the initiation of this admission that Dianne reformulates her previous locational formulation (i.e. ‘the <hotel:>’ [l. 19]) into a designedly “*misidentified*” form; namely, ‘Menopause £↑Manor↑£’ (ls. 20-21).

The design of this reformulation bears resemblances to the formulation of ‘the posh shop’ (l. 25) in Extract 36. In both cases, a locational formulation is substituted for a reference that indexes categorial relevancies through its designedly misidentified formulation. In Extract 36, the referent of this ascription was cast as temporarily unavailable (see fn. 186), and the reformulation is positioned as a designedly idiosyncratic, self-explanatory substitution (i.e. Extract 36: ‘I call it’ [l. 24]); one that is upheld contemporarily, and which endowed the hitherto unnamed location with a possibly “*classed*” relevance. In Extract 37, by contrast, this misidentification is positioned as a historical substitution (i.e. ‘£We used to’ [l. 17]) of the previously referred to locational formulation (i.e. ‘the <hotel:>’ [l. 19]) a reformulation that is deployed by a collectivity (e.g. ‘£We’ [l. 17]; see also, §7.4.2). In this case, this is produced not to actuate “*social class*”, but a ‘hybrid’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 55) categorisation of “*stage-of-life*” and “*gender*” (i.e. ‘old ladies’ [ls. 24 and 33]); a device that is made available in Dianne’s explicitly formulated account (i.e. ‘>°Because of all the old ladies.°<’ [ls. 23-24]).

While this example does not then co-implicate the relevance of “*social class*”, it nevertheless parallels the practice deployed by Emily (ls. 24-25) in Extract 36.

¹⁸⁹ Term borrowed from Jefferson (1985a) and Bergen and Stivers (2013).

Extracts 36 and 37 therefore present two differently explicit examples of misidentifications. In both instances, these are presented as *substitutions*, where a location – unnamed (i.e. Extract 36) or named (i.e. Extract 37) – is substituted with a designedly *incorrect* reference; the form of which attests to the relevant identity of the location. In the next example, Extract 38, a slight modification of this practice is presented.

Extract 38: EJBH_F4_26

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Oliver, Harry, Ray, Jenny and Faye are discussing their local town, Towerview.))

146 Oli: There's not really any ↑c:rime::.
147 (2.9)
148 Oli: You know- you know that (0.9) fairly pleasant
149 *it is.*=°there's not a lot of problems:
150 like. you know.°
151 (0.6)
152 Oli: We're away from ↑like. (0.7) If you're in a big
153 city (an' you) (0.9) you're Much more likely to be
154 like yeah you probably shouldn't walk down that
155 (0.2) stree::t.=You know li(h)ke (.) 'cuz it's
156 really late at night. (0.6) whereas you don't
157 really get that here.=You can walk around (1.2)
158 here at like at (elev-) (0.3) twelve one o'clock
159 in the morning you know where like (4.8) that's my
160 ↑story.=
161 Har: =>There isn't really a rough end of
162 Towerview.
163 (1.4)
164 Har: £Or is that just Bamwich.£
165 (1.0)
166 Ray: ↓Mhm huh huh huh.=
167 Har: =Ch'huh::.=
168 Jen: =I ↓dunno. [Near like the Goat]head=
169 Oli: [°There's not a rough end.°]
170 Jen: =and *stuff.*

((Seventy-six lines omitted.))

247 (1.3)
248 Jen: .tch (0.4) To be fair where (w-) (0.4) like
249 down my road (.) is not pretty.
250 (1.4)
251 **Jen:** → **Scally Alley**ǃ
252 (0.4)
253 Ray: ʃhhh. huh.ʃ
254 (0.3)
255 Fay: Huh huh ↑huh °huh°=
256 Oli: =Nah:.
257 (0.3)
258 Ray: °Nuh:..°=
259 Oli: =But it is still like a nice- (0.2) Nice (up for
260 state), it's got the gree:n and stuff at (.) the
261 top of the road.=
262 Jen: =See it's rea- it's just your neighbours.
263 (0.4)
264 Jen: Like half of them are (drug) ↑dealers.
265 (1.4)
266 Oli: ↓Hmm:..=↑Hm.
267 (0.7)
268 Oli: °*Yeah.*°

The co-interlocutors in this extract have been discussing the town of 'Towerview' (l. 163) and its purlieu (e.g. 'Bamwich.' [l. 165]); specifically, whether there is a 'rough end of Towerview' (ls. 162-163). After a candidate area has been proposed by Jenny (i.e. '[Near like the Goat]head and *stuff.*' [ls. 169 and 171]), and which has been discussed by the co-interlocutors (omitted from transcript), a "lapse" is engendered (l. 247; here, see Sacks et al., 1974: 714-715). It is in the termination of this silence that Jenny produces a sequence-initiating (i.e. 'tch.' [l. 248]; see M. Wright, 2011), independently formulated (i.e. 'To be fair' [l. 248]; see Edwards and Fasulo, 2006) and self-depreciative (i.e. 'down my road (.) is not pretty.' [ls. 248-249]; see Pomerantz, 1975: Ch. 4; 1984: 77-78) "delayed reply" (see Hoey, 2017: 57-58). This

takes the form of an assessment of the area in which Jenny lives in Towerview: ‘.tch (0.4) To be fair where (w-) (0.4) like down my road (.) is not pretty.’ (ls. 248-249).

This location is produced, here, in a “relation to members” format (i.e. “R_m”; see Schegloff, 1972a: 97; 1972b: 117): ‘down my road’ (l. 249). Following an extended silence (l. 250), however – a potential harbinger of a dispreferred response (e.g. Pomerantz, 1975: 104-106; Schegloff, 2007a: 67-68; see also, Sacks, 1987 [1973]: 64) – Jenny then respecifies this R_m formulation geographically, as a ‘G term’ (see Schegloff, 1972a: 99; 1972b: 120): ‘Scally Alley;’ (l. 251). This is a reversal of the preference observed by Schegloff (1972a: 99; 1972b: 120) for the use of “R_m” formulations over “G-terms”. The reason for this reconstruction is unclear. It is conceivable, for instance, that it is produced in the service of securing audience recognition (see Kitzinger et al., 2013: 45-46). Alternatively, it could function as a ‘resumption’ of Jenny’s self-depreciative assessment (ls. 248-249), treating her tellable as known-in-common (here, see Pomerantz, 1975: 106-109). This notwithstanding, it is the construction of this locational reformulation which is in focus in this extract.

Prima facie, this reformulation parallels Extract 36, where a linguistically non-“classed” term (i.e. ‘Scally’ [l. 251]) is integrated into what is designed as a *substitution* for a correspondently correct formulation; in this case, for example, the “R_m” construction, ‘down my road’ (l. 249). Furthermore, the outcome of this reformulation is such that it endows the substituted location with a possibly “classed” relevance. Thus, the extract parallels Extracts 36 and 37 whereby comparable categorial work is accomplished through a designedly mis-referred formulation. Conservatively, therefore, Extract 38 offers a third example of an intentional misidentification that is delivered by way of *substitution*. In this case, however, it is by virtue of exogenous ethnographic knowledge that this reformulation achieves comparable interactional ends but differs procedurally. Specifically, I claim that the misidentification here operates by way of *modifying* a formulation of this location of correspondent correctness. My awareness of this difference centres around the location to which Jenny refers, and of the formal “G-term”: “*Scalene Alley*”.

To qualify, this locational formulation is not produced by Jenny in the remainder of the interaction – nor in the “EJBH corpus” (see §3.4.2), more broadly. Instead, just as Jenny formulates this reference as common-knowledge for her co-interlocutors – i.e., by virtue of using the “R_m” formulation (l. 249) – it is known exogenously to denote this consensual “G-term”, and therefore to represent a manipulation thereof. In this case, through wider ethnographic knowledge, it is known that there is no location within ‘Towerview’ (l. 162) that is referred to as ‘Scally Alley’ (l. 251). Rather, this is known to be a sobriquet – a pun or play on words for which its recognisability, as such, trades upon the known-in-common status of the correspondently correct street-name, “*Scalene Alley*”. The subtleties of Jenny’s recalibration (i.e. ‘Scally Alley_i’ [l. 251]) can therefore be further appreciated when this awareness is accommodated. Specifically, such a knowing makes it possible differentiate this “intentional misidentification” from the two substitutions adduced above (cf. Extracts 36 and 37).

In the first instance, ‘Scally Alley_i’ (l. 251) is distinctive as but a *partial* substitution. In this case, Jenny appears to replace the correspondently correct odonym (i.e. “*Scalene*”) with the linguistically non-“classed” category, ‘Scally’ (l. 251), whilst at the same time retaining the correspondently correct ‘place-category’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 36), ‘Alley’ (l. 251). The relevance of “social class” appears to be integrated, in this way, through a comparable *replacement* operation, substituting one aspect of the correspondently correct formulation with a category that resonates, for the author, with “social class”. How ‘Scally Alley_i’ (l. 251) operates as an intentional misidentification is initially distinctive, therefore, due to Jenny’s partial preservation of the correspondently correct formulation. This contrasts the two preceding cases which are either designed as complete substitutions (i.e. Extract 36), or which are knowable to the author only as such (i.e. Extract 37).

Furthermore, Jenny’s misidentification, in Extract 38, is also notable provided the form of the substituted category, ‘Scally’ (l. 251), itself. The category selected by Jenny, is differentiated from those in Extract 36 and 37 as it appears to trade upon a

“*sound-relationship*”¹⁹⁰ with the correspondently correct formulation, “*Scalene Alley*”. Specifically, the mis-referred form is constituted through a combination of the first syllable of the first word (i.e. “*Scalene*”; ‘Sca’ [l. 251]) and the second syllable of the second (i.e. “*Alley*”; ‘ley’ [l. 251]). Together, these combine to form the linguistically non-“classed” category – and “*portmanteau*” (here, see Carroll, 1998 [1872/1898]: 187, my emphasis) – ‘Sally’ (l. 251).¹⁹¹ Jenny’s misidentification in this way is distinctive of the two preceding substitutions insofar as it represents a *modification* of a correspondently correct version. In this case, the modification has an apparently acoustic genealogy, whereby the correct “G-term” (i.e. “*Scalene*”) is modified by synthesising the constituent components of a correspondently correct version.¹⁹²

Jenny’s locational misidentification, ‘Sally Alley_ç’ (l. 251), is therefore unique procedurally. Unlike Extracts 28, 36 and 37, it does not involve the replacement of a correspondently-correct formulation (i.e. “*Scalene Alley*”) in its entirety. Instead,

¹⁹⁰ See Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 261, fn. 1, 265, 291-293, 303-309, 318-325, 340-344) and Jefferson (1996). See also, §7.4.2.

¹⁹¹ On related phenomena, see Jefferson (1996: 26-28) on ‘Fractured Idioms’, Whitehead and Lerner (2009: 623, 637, fn. 15) on ‘Spoonerisms’, and McHoul (1978: 203) on ‘phonetic parallelism’ vis-à-vis “place names”.

¹⁹² To qualify, the origin(s) of this category is not self-explicated, *in situ*. It is notable, however, that the formulation *is* delivered as self-explanatory. Jenny, for example, neither positions herself directly as the “*author*” (here, see Goffman, 1981: 124-157 in Clayman, 1992: 164-165) of the formulation, nor accounts for it. This contrasts the misidentifications produced by Emily and Dianne in Extracts 36 (i.e. ‘the posh shop’ [l. 25]) and 37 (i.e. ‘Menopause £↑Manor↑£’ [ls. 20-21]), respectively. The former, it will be recalled, was positioned as designedly idiosyncratic (i.e. ‘I call it the posh shop.’ [ls. 24-25]), and was accounted for subsequently (see fn. 117) insofar as the shop is positioned as ‘[£about a hundred] times [dearer.£]’ (l. 33) than a ‘select [(...)] second shop’ (ls. 27 and 29). Similarly, in Extract 37, ‘Menopause £↑Manor↑£’ (ls. 20-21) is positioned to have been derived and employed by a collective (i.e. ‘>you know we used to call it’ [ls. 19-20]). The reasoning in this case is predicated by Dianne on the categorial-majority (recall fn. 164) within the focal setting: ‘>°Because of all the old ladies.<’ (ls. 23-24).

Jenny replaces the street-name, with a linguistically non-“classed” category (i.e. ‘Scally’ [l. 251]) only. This construction is also further differentiated insofar as the linguistically non-“classed” category, ‘Scally’ (l. 251), appears to represent a modification of the correspondently-correct version; specifically, one derived through the acoustic possibilities that are made available through the correspondently-correct form (i.e. “*Sca-ley*”); what is oriented to by Jenny, through her misidentification, as known-in-common in the here-and-now. Extract 38 thus provides a variation of the operation employed in Extracts 36 and 37. This section has, therefore, provided a non-exhaustive overview of a hitherto neglected family of practices that instantiate the “classed” relevance of locational formulations directly in/through their *misnaming*.

5.6 Summary

This section has explicated some of the practices employed by co-interlocutors whereby “locational formulations” (Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b) are rendered hearable as relevantly “classed”. Four practices have been discriminated in this chapter; namely, *characterisations* (§5.5.1), *allusions* (§5.5.2), *co-selections* (§5.5.3) and *intentional misidentifications* (§5.5.4). Accordingly, this section has attended to the first objective of my chapter, identifying a range of recurrent practices in ordinary interaction that are used by co-interlocutors to demonstrably “class” locational formulations more or less explicitly, as such. The next section of this chapter complements and extends this focus. Here, I show how co-interlocutors reflexively mobilise references to place that are *not* prosecuted relevantly in the service of referring; that is, *qua* “*place terms*” (recall §5.3). The focus of this section thus concerns the *metonymic* function of locative references, and how they can be mobilised to instantiate the relevance of “social class”, specifically.

5.7 Place terms

Place terms have long been recognised as “inference-rich” (see fn. 123 and fn. 217) referents for a diverse array of referential work. This capacity is taken to its acme in environments in which their (co-)production not merely makes available such implicature, to recipients, but functions referentially as a substitute for this work. Extant EM/(M)CA research, for example, has distinguished a number of such *metonymic* accomplishments (e.g. Zimmerman, 1966: 277; Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 519; Schegloff, 1972a: 82; 1972b: 99; 2000c: 229). With respect to place terms,

specifically, documented uses include indexing activities (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 462, 758-759; Schegloff, 1972a: 81-82; 1972b: 98-99; Jayyusi 2014 [1984]: 174) and social identities.¹⁹³ The latter, for instance, includes indications of “*deviance*” (e.g. Hester, 1992: 174, fn. 6), “*ethnicity*” (e.g. Wilkinson, 2011: 86, 90-91), “*indigeneity*” (e.g. Sacks, n.d., p.c. in Goffman, 1963: 130, fn. 9; Schegloff 1972a: 88-89; 1972b: 107-108; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 248, fn. 8), “*occupations*” (e.g. Suttles, 1968: 46, 100 in Schegloff, 1972a: 432, fn. 5; 1972b: 98, fn. 5), “*promiscuity*” (e.g. Silverman, 1994: 438-440),¹⁹⁴ “*race*” (e.g. Whitehead, 2015: 381-382), “*religiosity*” (e.g. Drew, 1978: 9) and “*stages of life*” (e.g. Schegloff, 1972a: 81-82; 1972b: 98), *inter alia*.¹⁹⁵ Place terms have been canvassed as a *generic* metonymic resource, in this respect; as a practice that can be used to configure a wide array of identities, inexplicitly, for a range of social actions.¹⁹⁶ In this section, I show the availability of this resource for *specifying* the relevance of “social class”; a dimension of identity that has been consigned to parenthetical remarks only vis-à-vis this resource (e.g. Klein, 2011: 69). I show that this can be accomplished both in *conjunction* with the production of linguistically (non-)“classed” terms (§5.7.1) and, speculatively, *independently*, without combination with these components (§5.7.2). On both occasions, this work is accomplished, differently, in the environment of “*cumulative-category listings*” (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3; recall §4.6.2).

5.7.1 Conjunctive production

When produced alongside (non-)linguistic instantiations of “social class”, place terms function relevantly in a reflexive, “*particularising*” faculty. On these occasions, they do not operate, perforce, to *instantiate* the relevance of “social class”. Rather, they

¹⁹³ For recognition in FA research, see Skeggs (2004: 50, 112, 113, 163).

¹⁹⁴ My gratitude to Dr Rebecca Clift (p.c.) for bringing this paper to my attention.

¹⁹⁵ Places references can also be accomplished by employing this resource. On the use of references to persons, see, e.g., Psathas (1968: 516), Psathas and Henslin (1967: 430, fn. 13, 437, 440), Zimmerman (1992: 47) and Stokoe (2015: 437). Differently, see Rose (p.c. [1994] in R. Watson, 1998: 207) on ‘the Goffmanizing of the world’. On temporal and spatial references, see Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 518-519; Vol. II: 396).

¹⁹⁶ This includes *accusations* (see Drew, 1978; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 105-135) and *explanations* (e.g. Silverman, 1994: 438-440), *inter alia*.

indicate that these components should be understood – or *stratified* – through what is denoted by these place terms. In effect, they circumscribe the referential remit of the other items, co-listed. In this respect, they perform an ‘elaborative role’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 80), distinguishing how the linguistically (non-)“classed” category with which the place term is co-produced should be understood on this occasion. Extract 29 presents a single linguistically “classed” (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]) example of this practice (see →).¹⁹⁷

Extract 29 (Reproduced): EJBH_F4_12

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Ray, George and Harry are playing cards outside a café-cum-bar in Towerview.))

- 87 Ray: If I- If [I buy you a drink would you drink]=
 88 Geo: [((Shuffles.))]
 89 Ray: =it.
 90 Geo: Yeah::ç
 91 (0.2)
 92 Ray: What do you want.
 93 (0.6)
 94 Geo: Uh::: another ↑Ghost ↑ship would be greatç
 95 (1.2)
 96 Har: C’d you get me another ↑wate[r].
 97 Geo: [((Shuffles.))=]
 98 =(0.5)]
 99 Geo: =]
 100 Har: I ↓can’t (0.2) get through the dancing
 101 again.=I almost cried °when I went through
 102 the [(third) time°.]
 103 Ray: [Is it pretty in]tense in thereç
 104 Har: It’s the fu[cking wor]st [°thing I’ve ever=
 105 Ray: [.hhh] [If I’m not back in=
 106 Har: =seen.°]
 107 Ray: =] ten minutes, (0.4) send he(h)lp.

¹⁹⁷ For a linguistically *non*-“classed” version in which the possibly “classed” category (i.e. ‘Yuppie’ [l. 80]) does not precede (cf. Extract 29), but *follows*, the focal place term (i.e. ‘Lansing’ [l. 78]), see Extract 41.

108 Chu[↑huh.]
 109 Geo: [↑Huh] ↑Ha ↑Ha ↑Ha. £We'll go in the(h)re
 110 and he's like-£
 111 (0.7)
 112 Har: It's impressive.
 113 (0.5)
 114 **Ray: Is it the most m::iddle aged thing you've**
 115 → **s(h)ee(h)n.=Like middle ↑aged middle ↓class**
 116 **Towerview thing you've seen in your life.**
 117 Geo: ↑Huh huh huh.
 118 (0.6)
 119 Ray: S::[weet (good lord.)]
 120 Geo: [((Shuffles.)] It is, (0.2) Glorious.
 121 (5.7)

The listing in focus here is produced by Ray (ls. 114-116). Previously, Harry has requested that Ray gets him another glass of water from the bar (l. 96). This request is accounted for by Harry's reported inability (i.e. 'I ↓can't' [l. 100]) to do so; this is attributed to the dancing at the bar and, specifically, as a result of his intolerance thereof (see ls. 100-102, 104 and 106). It is following a second, comparatively moderate assessment of this dancing, from Harry (l. 112), that Ray proffers his own characterisation of this activity: 'Is it the most m::iddle aged thing you've s(h)ee(h)n.=' (ls. 114-115). This initial characterisation, by Ray, proposes the 'm::iddle aged' (l. 114) quality of this activity as its relevantly complainable dimension. Upon completion, however, Ray reformulates this characterisation by way of inserting a "specificatory" (see Wilkinson and Weatherall, 2011: 72-77), 'reference recalibration' (Lerner et al., 2012: 196) repair: '=Like middle ↑aged middle ↓class Towerview thing you've seen in your life.' (ls. 115-116). It is this repaired formulation that furnishes the focal cumulative-category three-part listing in this extract.

This repaired listing is composed of three categories: 'middle ↑aged middle ↓class Towerview thing' (ls. 115-116). The first two are avowed components and comprise references to the devices from which they are drawn; namely, "age" (i.e. 'middle ↑aged' [l. 115]) and "social class" (i.e. 'middle ↓class' [l. 115]), respectively. The function of the terminal list-component (i.e. 'Towerview thing' [l. 116]), however, is

comparatively equivocal. Theoretically, this could perform an indefinitely extensible array of referential work. This could include anything from *locating* to *generalising*.¹⁹⁸ However, I propose, that this component contributes to this list in a relevantly *particularising* faculty; that is, to specify the two preceding list components (i.e. ‘middle ↑aged middle ↓class’ [l. 115]) according to what can be said, for these recipients, about the location of ‘Towerview’ (l. 116). The place term therefore specifies the relevancies of both “age” and “social class”.¹⁹⁹ In this case, this is accomplished by virtue of immediately following the production of a linguistically “classed” description (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]).

Extract 29 therefore instances a single-case in which a place term specifies the relevance of a linguistically “classed” description in the service of complaint-implicative conduct (relatedly, see §6.5.1). The relevance of “social class”, in this instance, is actuated through Ray’s reference to a linguistically (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]) “classed” description, initially. The place term, ‘Towerview’ (l. 116), then operates to *preserve* – and, further, to *particularise* – the relevance of this device. Place terms, in this respect, are a versatile interactional resource that can be employed in order to delimit possibly “classed” relevancies.

5.7.2 Independent production

The delimiting function of place terms is not limited to their production following the linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations. A more radical, economical, albeit speculative operation instead involves the (co-)production of place terms *independently*, without linguistically (non-)“classed” components. Place terms, in this capacity, still function to specify the relevance of “social class” according to the places to which they refer – and for how these places are to be understood by/for their recipients. They are unique, however, insofar as they *inaugurate* this relevance upon their production, and they do not specify a linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiation (e.g. Extract 29: ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]). Only a single-case of this practice was

¹⁹⁸ On the former, see Wilkinson and Weatherall (2011: 72-73). On the latter, see Atkinson (1984a: 57-58), Jefferson (1990: 65-68; 1996: 46), Drew (1992: 496) and Lerner (1994: 22).

¹⁹⁹ Relatedly, see Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 80-81).

observed in my collection that resonated with this *possible* work; this is presented in Extract 39 (see →).

Extract 39: EJBH_F1_02

((A continuation of Extracts 13 and 24. The discussion of a newspaper headline precipitates a topically coherent “*second telling*” from Adam.))²⁰⁰

- 344 Ben: [*↓No:..*=if you,]
 345 Cha: [No- well no]
 346 (0.4)
 347 Ben: [(Fair) enough.]
 348 Cha: [I wouldn't (si)t) thr[ough that]
 349 Ada: [.hhh] [Yeah I got an e]mail
 350 from ((Company name.)) which was like to ev-
 351 All the interns which was promoting their
 352 like (0.2) diversity programme.
 353 (0.2)
 354 Ada: And I was like [↓ah well] I can't- (0.2)=
 355 Ben: [Woo:,]
 356 Ada: =>and it was like [oh-]
 357 Ben: [They have] a ↑dance
 358 [group.]
 359 (?): [°.hhh°]
 360 (0.2)
 361 Ada: Eh'heh Huh ↑huh huh=
 362 Ben: =HEH H(HH)UH HER [HER .HHH .Hh]
 363 Ada: [That's a terrible du]de.
 364 [£Th(h)at's aw(hh)ful.£]
 365 Ben: [UH HER Hah hah.Hhh] hee hee [.hhh h]h.=
 366 Ada: [.hhh]
 367 Ben: =.hh h. Hhh.
 368 (0.2)
 369 Ben: <Eh [huh huh heh]heh> ↑ha ha ha >°ha ha ha=
 370 Ada: [°*Oh wow:.*°]

²⁰⁰ See, e.g., Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 3-16), Jefferson (1978a) and Mandelbaum (2013: 505), for review.

371 Ben: =ha ha°<=.hhh=
372 Ada: =.Hhh h.=Her:: >I'm not even gonna finish my
373 £story.£=heh[Heh heh hehheh][.h'huh]
374 Cha: [Eh Heh heh heh][heh heh]=
375 Ben: [TUH Hee Heh.]
376 Cha: =[heh.] .hhhh=
377 Ada: =[.Hh huh]
378 Ben: =[£Go on::,£]=[((Company name.))];
379 Ada: [.hhhh] [H:uh.
380 (0.5)
381 Ada: *Uh::.* (0.7) Anyway, (0.3)
382 Ben: ↑H[EE::.]
383 Ada: [Yeah they-] They just promoted <this
384 thing.>=>and it was like< you could only join if
385 you're (0.4) (>*uh*<) *like* (0.4) from a diverse
386 (0.2) background.=[and I was *like*]
387 Ben: [Are you gend]er fluid now
388 then,
389 (0.6)
390 Ada: No that doesn't count as a diverse back*ground.*
391 (0.4)
392 Ben: ↑That's kinda *diverse.*=
393 Ada: =That's not a diverse background.=it doesn't
394 change your [ethnicity.]
395 Ben: [>Oh I didn't realise] it was
396 [about background<]=
397 Cha: [.Hhhh]
398 Ben: =>I thought you just wan-I thought *that like*
399 [((Company name.)) were hyping their ↓diversity.
400 Ada: [↑No::.
401 (0.2)
402 Ada: Oh: they- no they wanted diversity in terms of
403 (0.2) like (0.7) *↓err:m* either black or
404 chinese: studen- No not chinese they w- >they
405 how-< they were happy with their levels of
406 chinese °wh°=
407 Cha: =°hm[::°]

408 Ada: [qui]te high I thi[nk.=

409 Ben: [>.hh .hh< °h]oo hoo hoo=

410 Cha: [°.tch'kay.°]

411 Ben: =hoo hoo°=[.↑HHhhh,]

412 Ada: [uh- >No honestly i]t's like (0.2)

413 Ben: [((Sniffs.))=

414 Ada: [*ah-*

415 Ada: =They only- (.) they were only= recruiting

416 s[pecific]ic.

417 (?): [((Coughs.))]

418 (0.4)

419 Ben: °What are you *then.*°

420 (0.7)

421 Ada: ↓What (0.3) £white male british.£

422 (0.6)

423 **Ben:** → [°Cambridgesh*ire:. *°]

424 [((Delivered with "Received pronunciation".))]

425 (0.3)

426 Ben: [°(Likky) lik[ky]°

427 Ada: [Yeah.] [So I don't fit into any (0.4)

428 ethnic=

429 Ben: =Hhh[hh.]

430 Ada: [(mh-)] Like- (0.4)

431 Ben: Useless Adam.

432 (0.5)

433 Ada: Background do ↑I °it's° (0.7) They wante- They

434 were looking for specific (0.9) uh::m. (0.5)

435 ↓backgrounds.

436 (0.4)

437 Ada: And I think they wanted.

438 (0.3)

439 Ben: I feel so disadvantaged right [now.]

The extract is joined as Adam delivers a storytelling about the 'diversity programme.' (l. 352) hosted at his place of work. At a number of points over the course of the telling, the "progressivity" (see Schegloff, 2007a: 14-16) of this activity is vitiated by iterative interjections produced by Ben (e.g., ls., 355, 357-358, 382, 387-388, 392, 409, 411

and 419). One “*heckle*”²⁰¹ that has been “stabilised” (see Jefferson, 1984a: 202; Schegloff, 1988/1989: 236; relatedly, see also, Schegloff, 1992e: 214), topically, concerning the nature of “diversity” (e.g. ls. 387-388), culminates as Adam specifies the eligibility criteria for the programme (ls. 412 and 415-416). This engenders a designedly responsive (*then.*° [l. 419]) inquiry, from Ben, targeting Adam’s identity: °What are you *then.*° (l. 419). Adam’s response to this query is produced in the form of a challenging (i.e. ‘↓What’ [l. 421]) self-categorisation produced over the course of a cumulative-category listing: ‘↓What (0.3) £white male british.£’ (l. 421). It is in response to this self-identification that the focal place term, ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423), is produced by Ben.

The interactional work accomplished by this place term is equivocal. It can be noted only that it is treated, by Adam, such that it reinforces his expressed ineligibility for the diversity programme (see ls. 427-428 and 430). Multiple interpretations, therefore, obtain. It might be produced as “re-formulation” (e.g. Heritage and R. Watson, 1979), for example, of the sum of Adam’s previously listed components. Alternatively, it could be produced in the service of “other-correction” (here, see Schegloff et al., 1977), targeting some ostensibly troubling component(s) of Adam’s listing. Conversely, it could even furnish a claim of categorial ‘*precedence*’ (e.g. Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 23, 70, 137, italics in original; see also, fn. 254), addressing some relevantly withheld component of Adam’s listing. These notwithstanding, the most persuasive hearing, in this case, is of (additive) ‘List Assimilation’ (see Jefferson, 1990: 81-89). The place term, in this usage, is audibly appended to Adam’s prior listing (i.e. l. 421) as a numerically fourth component. Nonetheless, even when it is heard in this capacity, its operative referential work remains unclear.

It is my proposal, in this extract, that Ben’s production of ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423) operates in relevantly “classed” faculty in the service of a “tease” – or a “*wisecrack*” (see Schegloff, 1980: 104; 1988: 126; 2000b: 28).²⁰² The place term functions, in this sense, *metonymically*: It is produced not in a relevantly *locative*

²⁰¹ See, e.g., Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 286-288) and Atkinson (1984a: e.g. 58), differently.

²⁰² On *teasing*, see §6.6.

capacity but, instead, to potentially index Adam’s saliently “classed” identity (howsoever characterised), and to adjoin this to the previously completed listing (i.e. l. 421); one that does not expressly refer to this device.²⁰³ To be sure, this proposed function is not calibrated, as such, in linguistically (non-)“classed” terms, before (cf. Extract 29: ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]), during or following its production; nor, equally, is it received in these terms by Adam. For this reason, this “classed” operation will be considered a speculative “*possible*”, only. The claim that this term operates to instantiate and particularise the relevance of “social class” turns centrally upon my knowledge ‘as another Member’ – to again borrow Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 42) phrase. More precisely, it trades upon my knowing that this connotation can obtain, standardly, for references to this place. Features are observable, therefore, which privilege this possibility, but this analysis cannot be established for this cohort conclusively.

The form of the place term, ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423), contributes to this hearing. Whether or not it is heard in terms of “social class”, it is notable that the reference is not formulated *grammatically* in a straightforwardly locative capacity; that is *qua* ‘reference [...] *simpliciter*’ (Schegloff, 1996d: 440, italics in original). The production of a demonym (i.e. “*Cantabrigian*”),²⁰⁴ geographical specification (e.g. “*Cambridgeshire resident*”),²⁰⁵ or vicariously through reference to biographical ties (e.g. “*With family in Cambridgeshire*”), for example, would index locational work explicitly, marking Adam’s indigenous membership vis-à-vis this location. In any such alternative, ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423) would be expressly advanced as Adam’s *base location*, indicating locational membership. The production of ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423) independently, however, as a free-floating ascription, like Adam’s previous listed components (i.e. ‘£white male british.£’ [l. 421]) – and like that of ‘Towerview’ (l. 116) in Extract 29 – permits alternative

²⁰³ On the “*economy rule*” see Sacks (1972: 34-35). Relatedly, on the preference for “*minimization*”, vis-à-vis list-construction (cf. Sacks and Schegloff, 1979: 16-17), see Lerner (1994: 22-23).

²⁰⁴ See, e.g., ‘New Jersey*ans.’ and ‘Alabamians’ (Extract 42: ls. 8-9 and 16, respectively).

²⁰⁵ See, e.g., ‘Brick >lanes °people’ (Extract 34: ls. 960-961) and “Lancashire lass” (see Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2007: 215-218).

metonymic hearings. “Social class”, as one device that is not incorporated within Adams’ self-identification (i.e. l. 421), represents one such candidate hearing.

The productional features of this turn-at-talk are promising for such a hearing. Two notable components include Ben’s delivery, *sotto voce*, in addition to his use of “received pronunciation” (hereafter, RP). These two features differently resonate with “social class” as device. As outlined in Chapter 7 (§7.3.5), for example, the former appears to be a recurring productional feature in the ascription of “classed” membership categories, whereby they are treated, designedly, as “delicates” (see Lerner, 2013: 96-97). Conversely, the latter embodies a resource that has traditionally resonated with the actuation of “classed” identities in preceding research (e.g. Rampton, 2006 in Spencer, Clegg and Stackhouse, 2013: 130; see also, Kerswill, 2007: 51, 53). While the relevant feature of Ben’s reference therefore goes without specification in this extract, two productional features are available which resonate with a hearing of ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423) in a potentially “classed” faculty. It is at least possible, therefore, that the use of place terms offers a resource to stylise “social class”, “*off-record*” (see fn. 134).

In summary, Extract 39 supplies a speculative case in which a place term (i.e. ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ [l. 423]) is produced in lieu of a “classed” membership category. The place term, in this respect, likely performs a *metonymic* function: Potentially, it actuates the relevance of “social class” inexplicitly. This differs from Extract 29, where comparable work was rendered observable through the initial production of a linguistically “classed” category (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]), and where the place term produced specified the remit of this term. In Extract 39, in contrast, a linguistically “classed” component is omitted. For this reason, it is considered a speculative hearing. Nonetheless, for those for whom this “classed” operation is resonant, and acceptable, such an isolated production may also perform a *particularising* function. This is provided for by the place term itself. It delimits that “social class” is to be understood howsoever the place term should delineate it for these co-interlocutors. Uniquely, however, this relevance is not merely *particularised* by the place term produced, but it *instantiates* the relevance of this device in its own right. While this goes without explicit acknowledgement amidst Extract 39, it could represent a *possible* illustration of this work.

5.8 Chapter summary

This chapter has addressed two objectives directly. Firstly, I have introduced how co-interlocutors in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction formulate *locational formulations* as “classed”. Four practices were canvassed to this effect: (1) characterisations (§5.5.1); (2) allusions (§5.5.2); (3) co-selections (§5.5.3); and (4), intentional misidentifications (§5.5.4). These practices have each been explicated as resources that can “class” locational formulations in the service of various practical purposes. As Extract 37 illustrated, vis-à-vis “stage-of-life” and “gender”, these practices are not necessarily unique to the device of “social class”. Instead, it is permissible – if not, indeed, expectable – that these practices represent generic resources that can be prosecuted to actuate the relevance of other devices (see, e.g., fn. 185). This warrants a systematic and independent empirical inquiry. This chapter has thus first concentrated on the explication of these four practices.

The second focus of this chapter concerned the “metonymic” use of *place terms* (see §5.7). On these occasions, references to place were not produced relevantly in the service of referring (*qua* locational formulations). I have proposed that their function was, instead, to instantiate and particularise the relevance of “social class”. This practice has been shown in previous EM/(M)CA research to obtain for an array of devices. In the latter portion of this chapter, I have extended this function to “social class”. In the cases adduced, co-interlocutors produce place terms in “cumulative-category listings” (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3) by which to particularise the relevance of “social class”. In the first type, these listings comprised linguistically (non-)“classed” components in their own right (i.e. Extract 29). The second species, by contrast, represent speculative cases in which this work *could* be produced without additional linguistically (non-)“classed” components (i.e. Extract 39). References to place have thus been introduced as practices which can be “classed” in various ways – *qua* “locational formulations” (§5.5) – but also as resources that may potentially instantiate the relevance “social class” in their own right – *qua* “place terms” (§5.7).

The combination of these objectives, I propose, has also contributed towards an understanding of the ‘common sense geography’ (here, see Schegloff, 1972a: 85; 1972b: 102) of “social class”; an implicit, underlying objective this chapter (recall §5.1). The data adduced have shown that the practices canvassed here operate at

various degrees of geographical granularity. *Inter alia*, extracts are comprised references to bars (e.g. Extract 33), clubs (e.g. Extract 35), colleges (e.g. Extracts 32), college accommodation (e.g. Extract 37), shops (e.g. Extract 36); neighbourhoods (e.g. Extract 34); streets (e.g. Extracts 38); towns (e.g. Extract 29); villages (e.g. Extract 28 and 30); districts (e.g. Extract 25); cities (e.g. Extracts 28 and 35), counties (e.g. Extract 39) and countries (e.g. Extracts 17 and 31). To reuse Enfield's (2013: 451) term, place references thus furnish a 'fractal' resource; specifically, one that could be serviced to instantiate the relevance of "social class" variously. Co-interlocutors, in so doing, exhibit an exquisite common-sense "classed" geography. The next chapter develops this finding further, reflecting on social actions for which these geographies, in addition to the production of membership categories, are mobilised recurrently.

Chapter 6 – Social Action

6.1 Introduction

The two preceding chapters have pertained to the first objective of this thesis, specifically. These have addressed how “social class” can be treated as *recognisable* for EM/(M)CA research and introduced two interactional practices that occasion “social class”, recurrently, within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction; namely, “*membership categories*” (Chapter 4) and “*references to place*” (Chapter 5). This final empirical chapter turns now to the second objective of this thesis; one that has been intentionally focussed-off previously. This concerns the recurring lines of *social* action for which these practices are employed in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction. My focus in this chapter, specifically, regards how linguistically (non-)“classed” orientations are employed in order to *account* for components of three recurrent social actions; namely, “*assessments*”, “*complaints*” and “*teases*”. In these instances, “social class” is treated as a or the salient basis upon which an activity is positioned as “assessable”, “complainable” and “teasable”, respectively. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the novel observations that are furnished by this analysis.

6.2 The pragmatics of social identity

It has been acknowledged repeatedly across the preceding chapters that the central focus of CA research crystallises around the analysis of “*social action*”.²⁰⁶ This has been referred to as the ‘*activity focus*’ (see Drew and Heritage, 1992: 17, italics in original) of CA. It denotes that when co-interlocutors are engaged in talk-in-interaction, they are not simply considered to be ‘language idling’, as Wittgenstein (n.d. [EJBH: 1968 [1953]: §132] in Drew, 2005: 74) writes, but are, instead, irremediably, “*doing things*”;²⁰⁷ even through the apparent minutiae of their situated conduct (recall fn. 89). This programmatic concern translates empirically in CA research into a focus on how the constitutive components of talk-in-interaction are serviced in order to accomplish species of social action, activity and interactional

²⁰⁶ Recall §1.7.2, §2.2.2, §3.2.1, §4.2 and §5.2.2.

²⁰⁷ Austin’s (1975 [1962]) phrase.

project (see fn. 62). The activity of “*categorisation*”, as one such constitutive component, has therefore been subsumed in CA research, accordingly.

As Rapley (2012: 326) writes, ‘doing categorization, be it directly and/or indirectly, is a central resource for members’ social orders of action’. This empirical attitude towards categorisation has been exhibited consistently across CA research since Sacks’ (e.g. 1967: Ch. 6; 1972: 57-58; 1974 [1972]: 222-223; 1992, Vol. I: 585-586) earliest studies of social interaction. Furthermore, it is also to this end that, as Schegloff (2005c: 474) notes, the analysis of membership categories in talk-in-interaction should not be detached from the practical purposes for which they are recruited. As acknowledged in Chapter 4 (§4.2) and Chapter 5 (§5.2.2), this approach to the analysis of categories constitutes the predominant locus of/for EM/(M)CA research on social identity (e.g. Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998a), and serves as the central heuristic that has mediated CA research into categorisation (e.g. Edwards, 1991). This has been referred to as ‘the ‘reflexive co-determination’ (Schegloff, 2007a:473) of action and membership’ (Butler and Fitzgerald, 2010: 2463). As reviewed in Chapter 2 (i.e. §2.4.2), extant EM/(M)CA research on “social class” exhibits a clear commitment to this approach.

Prior CA research has identified linguistically non-“classed” categorisations to be produced in the service of a range of social actions. This has included the production of ‘storytelling[s]’, ‘[d]escriptions’, ‘bragging’ and ‘assessments’ (e.g. M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 29), negative appraisals (e.g. J. Lee, 2016), self-identifications (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 2002), insult-exchange sequences (e.g. Evaldsson, 2005; M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010) and ‘complaining, accounting, answering, disagreeing, joking and so on’ (Whitehead, 2013: 61).²⁰⁸ Some of these actions have been observed, similarly, in data adduced across Chapters 4 and 5. Examples of these

²⁰⁸ Examples can also be found when linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisations are not the focus of the research. For an example of a linguistically non-“classed” description in a “complaint”, see Atkinson and Drew (1979: 60, l. 5, 184-185, l. 5, 242, fn. 34, l. 5). For linguistically “classed” categorisations in an “accusation” and “negative assessments”, see Dersley and Wootton (2000: 404, fn. 5, ls. 10-11) and Nikander (2001: 80-81, ls. 21-23 and 30-31), respectively.

actions have been acknowledged, where (co-)implicated, but have not formed the express focus of my inquiry. This analysis has, instead, been “*doubly displaced*”²⁰⁹ by two preliminary problematics. These concerned how “social class” can be analysed in EM/(M)CA research (i.e. Chapter 4) and the recurrent practices used by co-interlocutors during which linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations are (co-)implicated (i.e. Chapters 4 and 5).

This chapter recovers this focus on *social action*. My attention, here, is directed to how orientations to “social class” are employed within three recurrent activities; namely, “*assessments*”, “*complaints*” and “*teases*”. For each, I show how that linguistically (non-)“classed” orientations serve as a resource for co-interlocutors in *accounts* of/for an array of phenomena, thereby furnishing an *accountable* resource. Furthermore, I demonstrate that like other aspects of social identity (e.g. “*race*”; see Stokoe and Edwards, 2007: 343), their (co-)production recurs in a stable set of sequential positions.

6.3 Accounts

How individuals account for aspects of conduct embodies a longstanding locus of classical sociological theorising (e.g. C. W. Mills, 1940; Scott and Lyman, 1968) and research (e.g. Gilbert and Mulkay, 1982; Mulkay and Gilbert, 1982), and one enshrined as a focal dimension within the EM/(M)CA tradition (e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1967: Ch. 1; see Leiter, 1980: Ch. 6; Heritage, 1984a: Ch. 6; Lynch, 1993: 14-15). As Heritage (1988: 128, 138-141) and J. Robinson (2016: e.g. 2) have distinguished, two interrelated senses of “*accounting*” inhere to this programme. The first relates to “*accountability*” as a structure or institution that undergirds, and which is exposed through, talk-in-interaction. It refers, broadly, to the expectation of/for the intelligibility and the mutual comprehensibility of conduct. The second sense, in contrast, refers to the production of situated “*accounts*” in talk-in-interaction; occasions in which co-interlocutors engage in explanatory work, accounting for conduct.

²⁰⁹ To borrow Schegloff’s (1980: 106) phrase.

It is this latter dimension that forms the focus of this chapter, where accounts are analysed as a recurrent property of talk-in-interaction. Previously, this activity has been investigated in EM (e.g. Sacks, 1967: Ch. 6; Coulter, 1975; Pollner, 1987: Ch. 2), CA (e.g. Moerman, 1972: 172-180; Heritage, 1988) and MCA research (e.g. McCabe and Stokoe, 2004). *Inter alia*, this has addressed the *position* (e.g. Waring, 2007), *composition* (e.g. Pomerantz, 1986: 222; Wooffitt, 1992: Ch. 6; Parry, 2013) and *distribution* (e.g. Antaki, 1994: Ch. 5; Heritage, 1988: 136) of accounts in various social actions within *ordinary* (e.g. Zimmerman and Wieder, 1977: 205; Bolden and J. Robinson, 2011) and *institutional* forms of talk-in-interaction (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: e.g. 4-6; Firth, 1995). Research has also addressed how identities become enlisted into this activity (for review, see Sacks, 1974: n.p.g. in Antaki, 1998: 79; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 1; Hester, 2000). This has included how identities, as occasioned by and inferred from descriptions, are (co-)produced in accounts (e.g. McCabe and Stokoe, 2004: 608-610, 611-617; Silverman, 1994: 433-435, 436, 438, 440-442), and how membership categories are employed to accomplish this work explicitly (e.g. Maynard, 1984: Ch. 6; Silverman, 1994: 435; Hester, 2000: 220; Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 615-616, 618-621, 631-632; Stokoe, 2010: 63-70) and tacitly (e.g. Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: e.g. 37; Kitzinger, 2005a: 493-494).

My focus in this chapter extends from this latter tradition of research, concerning *social identity*. I am interested, specifically, in how orientations to “social class” figure in accounts of/for recurring social actions and, more exactly, how the practices canvassed in Chapters 4 and 5 are enlisted to accomplish this work. In my corpus, linguistically (non-)“classed” membership categorisations and references to place were observed recurrently within accounting sequences for various action-types. The three foremost actions will be considered here; namely, “*assessments*”, “*complaints*” and “*teases*”. The sections that follow introduce how co-interlocutors employ “social class” as a sequenced and explanatory resource in/for each of these actions. I demonstrate, in so doing, that while used in diverse activities, the two practices are homogenous with respect to their explanatory function.

6.4 Assessments

Assessing conduct is a ubiquitous activity in talk-in-interaction and forms an established focus of EM/(M)CA inquiry. Previous CA research, for example, has

investigated the vocal (e.g. Ogden, 2006) and non-vocal (e.g. Ruusuvuori and Peräkylä, 2009; see also, Heritage, 2002: 222-223, fn. 22) aspects of their delivery. The latter literature, for example, has investigated their *turn-designs* (e.g. Pomerantz, 1975; 1984), *directionalities* (e.g. Antaki, 2002), *second-order functions* (e.g. Shaw, Potter and Hepburn, 2015: e.g. 329-335), *solicitations* (e.g. Pomerantz, 1975: 13-14), *sequential structures* (e.g. C. Goodwin, 1986: 209-214), *epistemic contextures* (e.g. Heritage, 2002; 2011b: 169-171; Heritage and G. Raymond, 2005) and *preference organisation* (e.g. Pomerantz, 1984), *inter alia*, in addition to the responses they precipitate (e.g. Heritage, 2002). My focus in this section concerns vocal “*evaluative assessments*” (see Antaki, 1994: 82). Centrally, I am concerned with accounts of/for assessments which involve orientations to “social class”; where the terms of an assessment (see →) are accounted for through the orientation produced (see ⇒). In my collection, these accounts are exclusively self-initiated (cf. Bolden and J. Robinson, 2011), and the assessments (co-)implicate a range of referents. Locations and non-present persons are, notably, modal, and the status of the latter is considered further below (§6.5.4). An example of this practice has been seen already, albeit abbreviated, in Extract 12. The sequence is reproduced here more fully.

Extract 12 (*Reproduced*) – CallHome-eng-4705

((A telephone call. Alice and Karen are discussing Alice’s meeting with the mutually-known non-present party, Alannah.))

- 22 Ali: .hhh But ↑let me just tell you a little bit
 23 about <↑Alan*nah.*>
 24 (0.2)
 25 Ali: An[d I want-]
 26 Kar: [Al↑ri:ght.]
 27 (0.6)
 28 Ali: Because. (0.6) She (.) call::ed.
 29 (0.7)
 30 Ali: And (.) at that point she didn’t mail me l- your
 31 letter.
 32 (0.2)
 33 Ali: >You know.< Sh[e]: (0.3) could have mailed it.
 34 Kar: [Hm-]
 35 (0.3)

36 Ali: But she (.) uhm waited and wanted to give it to
37 me †personally.
38 (0.2)

39 Ali: .hhh But- (0.9) So I didn't know †who she was.
40 (0.5)

41 Ali: You know because,
42 (0.2)

43 Kar: M:h[m̩]
44 Ali: [I didn't,] (.) read your †letter.
45 (0.2)

46 Ali: >'Cuz I didn't †have it.<=
47 Kar: =Mhm.
48 (0.4)

49 Ali: But anyway she explained that she had met you at
50 the <Ce:ntering Prayer Retreat.>
51 Kar: °Mhm.°
52 (0.8)

53 Ali: An:::d ah:::. (0.7) She invited us (0.2) over to
54 her †home.
55 (0.5)

56 **Ali: → And it's a <ver:y nice> (0.4) you know (0.5)**
57 **⇒ she's (0.6) kind of from the Wealthy Class:.**
58 (0.3)

59 Kar: .h=
60 Ali: =You kno[w.]
61 Kar: [M]:hm.
62 (.)

63 **Ali: → And so her- she has a lovely †home an' (0.3) she**
64 **has a swimming pool a[n']**

65 Kar: [†H]::m:.
66 (0.2)

67 Ali: Uh:::m. (0.3) >H'you know we had a really nice
68 (0.2) day we went< (0.2) *er::* (0.2) you know we
69 got here around eleven o'clock in the morning and
70 we stayed till about three or four?

Karen and Alice have begun discussing their mutual-friend, and non-present party, Alannah, with whom Alice has recently become acquainted. The focal instantiation of “social class” is produced as Alice halts what is adumbrated as a “*high-grade*”²¹⁰ assessment of Alannah’s home (i.e. ‘And it’s a <ver:y nice>’ [l. 56]) and ascribes her, instead, into a linguistically “classed” category: ‘you know (0.5) she’s (0.6) kind of from the Wealthy Class.’ (ls. 56-57). Continuing, Alice then repurposes her “classed” categorisation of Alannah (i.e. ‘And so’ [l. 63]) as an *explanation* for Alannah’s possession of ‘a lovely ↓home’ (l. 63), and for her since-upgraded (cf. ‘<ver:y nice>’ [l. 56]) assessment thereof (ls. 63-64; see Antaki, 1994: 82). Alannah’s proposed incumbency within a linguistically “classed” membership category is thus first produced within a locational-assessment-*cum*-categorisation, by Alice, retreating from the delivery of what has been projected as an assessment of her home (i.e. ‘And it’s a <ver:y nice>’ [l. 56]). This classification is then mobilised, by Alice, retroactively, following its production, to account for Alannah’s ‘lovely ↓home’ (l. 63) – an action that is possibly projected, here, by virtue of its incipient suspension (ls. 56-57).

This excerpt offers an initial example in which a co-interlocutor marshals a non-present party’s linguistically “classed” status (i.e. ‘she’s (0.6) kind of from the Wealthy Class.’ [l. 57]) to account for their evaluative assessment. In this case, this “accounting” work is conveyed explicitly. This conducted overtly through the details of Alice’s turn-design (i.e. ‘And so’ [l. 63]) and by virtue of retroactively inserting (see Wilkinson and Weatherall, 2011) Alice’s categorisation. Through so doing, Alice indicates that it is the “classed” status of Alannah that furnishes the consequential pretext, for Alice – and instructively, for Karen – against which Alice’s positively-valenced assessment of Alannah’s home (e.g. ‘a lovely ↓home’ [l. 63]) should be understood. Alice’s invocation of Alannah’s linguistically “classed” status is, therefore, positioned such that it accounts for Alice’s incipient (i.e. l. 56) and then later recalibrated (i.e. l. 63) assessment of Alannah’s “*possessable*”.²¹¹

²¹⁰ Antaki’s (2002) term.

²¹¹ Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 382-388) term.

This practice of accounting for an assessment by way of a “classed” categorisation is recurrent across my collection. Routinely, these unfold over two sequential positions: *pre-positioned* and *post-positioned*. In the former, co-interlocutors repurpose a linguistically “classed” categorisation that has already been produced in their preceding turn-at-talk, and then invoke this as the relevant inferential backdrop against which the subsequent production of an evaluative assessment can be understood. This sequencing is classified as “*pre-positioned*” insofar as linguistically “classed” categorisations (see \Rightarrow) are produced *before* their function, as an *account* for a forthcoming assessment, is put “on-record” (see \rightarrow ; see fn. 134). In this vein, the practice is somewhat akin to “retro-sequences” (see Schegloff, 2007a: Ch. 11) inasmuch as they ‘retroactively locate something else as the first element of the sequence of which the retro-object is the second, although it was not such a “source” until the retro-object targeted it as such’ (Schegloff, 2005c: 460). Extract 12 has offered a clear illustration of this sequencing. In this case, the activity of accounting is initiated, explicitly, only after Alice has ascribed Alannah into a linguistically “classed” category (i.e. ls. 56-57). This classification, once produced, is then *pre-positioned*, retrospectively, such that it supplies the relevant context against which a previously suspended assessment (i.e. ‘And it’s a <ver:y nice>’ [l. 56]), now subsequently produced (i.e. ls. 63-64), can/should be understood.

A cognate example of this practice can be observed in Extract 40. In this case, the referent classified is not a linguistically “classed” category (cf. Extract 12), but a “locational formulation” (see Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b). While no instances of this practice were observed within ordinary talk, Extract 40, an indicative institutional example, illustrates this exigency. This excerpt is taken from a call between Jane and Charles. Jane is representative of a course for which Charles is a prospective student. The linguistically “classed” formulation in focus is produced by Jane in an extended (e.g. ‘And’ [l. 23]) response to Charles’ question (see ls. 1-2), concerning whether accommodation is located onsite.

Extract 40: CallHome-eng-6313

((A telephone call. Jane is a representative of an educational course in Guanajuato for which Charles is a prospective applicant.))

1 Cha: ↓And:: (0.3) uh- are the accommodations there on

2 ↑premises or::.=

3 Jan: =No. (.) .hh .tch. ↑We:: ↑we offer several

4 options. th- >The ↑Vast majority of our students

5 take (.) host family homes.=.hhhh a(hhh.)s'uh.

6 (0.5) the way to go when they're here in

7 Guanajua*to.*=.hhh They pay. (0.3) *uh::m.* A

8 base price of eleven dollars a day, and that

9 includes a private room.

10 (0.5)

11 Jan: ↑An::d uhm. (1.6) Full breakfast.

12 (0.3)

13 Jan: And it may or may not include a private bath it

14 really depends on each family.=We tell the

15 students that (0.2) it's not a hotel it's- it's

16 a- it's a home.

17 (.)

18 Jan: .hhh[hh

19 Cha: [M'huh.=

20 **Jan:** =An::' the idea isn't so much for luxury it's

21 more for:, (0.6) uhmꞤ (1.0) really communicating

22 with people and >to getting to< know::: the

23 ⇒ culture by way of the people. .hhh (0.2) **And >the**

24 **vast majority of the homes are upper middle**

25 → **class< to: lower upper class, they're very nice**

26 **homes and they're families that we've (0.2)**

27 **worked with for years.** hh. .hhh (.) Uhm::: if a

28 student wishes (.) Other me:als:. (.) with the

29 host family, (0.3) for an additional ↑four

30 dollars a day the student can have comida >which

31 is the large midday meal.<

32 (0.5)

33 Cha: MhmꞤ=

34 Jan: =An'::: you can eat (.) very very well in

35 Guanajuato on four dollars?

Like Extract 12 (ls. 56-57), the linguistically “classed” classification, in this extract, is produced initially as a classification in its own right: ‘And >the vast majority of the

homes are upper middle class< to: lower upper class,’ (ls. 23-25). This classification is complete upon its point of production. It is not produced, in this moment, for example, as an *account* for an assessment that has been produced previously; such as, for example, for why this accommodation ‘isn’t so much for luxury’ (l. 20),²¹² but facilitative of cultural transmission (e.g. ls. 20-23). To reapply Jefferson’s (e.g. 2004 [1975]: 55, my emphasis) phrase, Jane’s categorisation is instead produced “*in the clear*”. However, like Alice’s categorisation of Alannah in Extract 12 (i.e. ls. 56-57), this categorisation is then *pre-positioned*, retroactively, by Jane, to account for a positively-valenced assessment of this referent: ‘they’re very nice homes and they’re families that we’ve (0.2) worked with for years.’ (ls. 25-27).

Akin to Extract 12, therefore, a linguistically “classed” categorisation – in this case, of a “locational formulation” (see Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b), ‘the homes’ (l. 24) – is first produced. Retroactively, this is then demonstrably repurposed by its progenitor to contribute the relevant grounds for a subsequent assessment. Extract 40 therefore aligns with Extract 12 in this respect. Although, in this case, Jane’s “classed” categorisation furnishes the basis for an account for a positively-valenced assessment of the *same* referent (cf. Extract 12), the account for which is not tied, explicitly, to her previously “classed” classification (cf. Extract 12: l. 63); rather, like her prior “gist” formulation (see Heritage and R. Watson, 1979; ls. 14-16), this is rendered hearable, as such, through its contiguous production. This type of account is in this sense describable as an ‘account-containing sequence’ (Parry, 2013: 115); one that accomplishes the work of accounting positionally, without marking that which is being accounted for with an ‘explanatory connective’ (ibid.: 106).

Extracts 12 and 40 thus provide cases in which a “classed” category and locational formulation, respectively, are produced *qua* categorisations, and are then repositioned, by the same co-interlocutor, such that they account for the assessment, subsequently produced. Notably, the inverse of this sequencing also occurs across my dataset. On these occasions, an evaluative assessment is first produced which does not, upon its point of its production, co-implicate nor intersect with “social class”. This assessment

²¹² On “*litotes*”, see Bergmann (1992: 148-151). Relatedly, see Drew (2006: 69).

is then accounted for by virtue of the “classed” status of a person and/or location. This sequencing will be referred to as *post-positioning*, to this effect.²¹³ Extract 25, previously adduced, illustrates this operation.

Extract 25 (Reproduced): SWB2353

((A telephone call. Alice and Brian are discussing American foreign policy; specifically, the benefits and consequences of missionisation.))

- 28 Ali: Uh=They're encouraged to do that (0.2) .hhh
29 missionary work (.) .hhh an' I bel- I really
30 believe that the people that do that h. (0.9)
31 Are:: (0.2) better people an' are make our
32 [society better.]
33 Bri: [You know I-] I really ↑agree with you.
34 (0.3)
35 Bri: Uhm. (0.3) .tch (0.2) I'uh (0.2) though I've
36 never done that myself, I-I'm (.) was a (0.2)
37 basically an education major when I graduated
38 from college, (0.2) .hh (.) an' I accepted a
39 ↑Job, (0.2) that at the time was jus' (0.2)
40 slightly above the Poverty level to teach
41 (0.6) to uhm (.) .tch (0.2) very Rural (0.6)
42 children in a very Low income district. (0.8)
43 and I (0.2) sp:ent a year teaching there.
44 (0.2)
45 Ali: [Uhuh,]
46 **Bri: ⇒ [And I think it wa]s Probably one of my (0.2)**
47 **largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences**
48 **→ because I come from a nice:: (0.7) middle class,**
49 **White suburban home,**
50 (0.2)
51 Ali: Uhuh,
52 (.)

²¹³ This is unrelated to Schegloff's (1979b: 273, my emphasis) reparative sense of “*post-positioning*”.

53 Bri: And I Did It (0.2) Uhm. (0.6) For one reason I (won
54 this) (.) I was (.) working on Masters' degree so
55 I wanted to stay close to where I was working on a
56 Masters' degree.=.hhh (0.2) But also be↑cause: I
57 just thought it would be interesting to live
58 someplace else (.) so totally different then my
59 own (.) ↑upbringing.
60 (.)

61 Ali: Mhmhuh:ç

62 Bri: An' I- it ↑Change::d, hh. (0.5) it probably
63 changed my (.) political view:s, it changed my
64 understanding of the world around d'me, (0.5)

65 Ali: Uhuhç=

66 Bri: =And uh I think uhm, (0.7) °mpt°=in fact i-if I
67 Had to do it all again. (.) uh I've you know I-
68 AFTER that you know I you never think of it
69 ↑because, .hhh (0.2) I guess because, (.) I paid
70 for all of my college education myself, (0.3) .hh
71 I never thought about (0.6) doing that because I
72 had all of these college loans. (0.2) I'had to
73 start paying ↑back.

The extract begins as Alice proffers several reasons for why she considers public service worthwhile (e.g. ls. 28-32). After expressing his agreement (l. 33), Brian recalls a comparable experience (ls. 35-43); namely, teaching rural children 'in a very Low income district' (l. 42). After a slight gap (l. 44), and whilst overlapping a go-ahead, from Alice (l. 45), Brian produces an evaluative assessment of his experience: '[And I think it wa]s Probably one of my (0.2) largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences' (ls. 46-47). Contiguously, Brian explicitly (i.e. 'because' [l. 48]) accounts for the enlightening quality of this experience (recall fn. 181) over a "cumulative" (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3; recall §4.6.2) characterisation (see §5.5.1.1) of his 'home,' (l. 49): 'because I come from a nice:: (0.7) middle class, White suburban home,' (ls. 48-49).

As outlined in §5.5.1.1, this characterisation functions accumulatively. Notable for current purpose is that it includes reference to a linguistically "classed" categorisation,

‘middle class’ (l. 48), in list-medial position. For this reason, Extract 25 provides an example of a *post-positioned* account: Brian first produces an evaluative assessment which bears no explicit reference to “social class” (ls. 46-47). However, this “classed” relevance is then co-implicated through the explanatory design of Brian’s subsequent account (ls. 47-48). The account, in this instance, therefore, postdates the production of the evaluative assessment. This differs from Extracts 12 and 40 in which “social class” was first made relevant (*qua* categorisation) before mobilising the terms of this categorisation in the service of an account. The account produced in this extract is, therefore, contrastively, *post-positioned*.

A similar example of this practice, using a linguistically non-“classed” and a linguistically “classed” category can be observed in Extract 06; tabulated previously in Chapter 4 (see Table 5). This extract is a multi-party, face-to-face interaction conducted between Faye, Ruth, Oliver and Harry. Prior to this extract, the interaction has “*schismed*” (see Sacks et al., 1974: 713-714; Schegloff, 1995b: 32) into two dyads: Oliver and Harry, and Faye and Ruth. The interaction between the latter is focal here. In this instance, both the evaluative assessment and post-positioned account is produced by Faye as she responds to Ruth’s foregoing assessment (see ls. 50, 52 and 54) of the non-present third-party, Elijah Stocks; a mutually-known acquaintance with whom Ruth has recently reconnected.

Extract 06 (Reproduced): EJBH_F4_32

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Ruth recalls an encounter with a mutually-known non-present party, Elijah, to Faye.))

- 38 Rut: >He’s like an [estate agent in Leaves;=<=
39 Oli: [(↓ ‘Bout to count a square of=
40 Rut: =]
41 Oli: =spaghe] £he had [no id(h) ea;£]=
42 Fay: [↑Really:,]=
43 Rut: =Yeah.
44 (.)
45 Oli: £Let me <te(hh)ll you£ [about]=
46 Rut: [Erm.]=

47 Oli: = [°that.°]=
48 Rut = [↑the-]=
49 Har: =Go on [then.]
50 Rut: [Likeç]
51 (0.2)
52 Rut: Pleasant.
53 (0.6)
54 Rut: >As well*:, < *
55 (0.3)
56 (?): (.tch)=
57 **Fay:** ⇒ =It's just [↑sad 'cuz he bullied at=
58 Oli: [(<The case for the thingç>)=
59 **Fay:** =Tower]view school=
60 Oli: =]
61 **Fay:** → = [° 'cuz like° (0.4) commo*n.*]
62 Oli: [Spent about a' hour (prat][tering=
63 [(0.4)=
64 Oli: =around) with <s]=
65 =]=
66 Oli: =[paghett][i:>][trying to=
67 **Fay:** → [But then he came][to Herring][ton ()=
68 Rut: [↑Really.]
69 Oli: =make it <↓square> for £the c(hh)ase.£
70 **Fay:** =and he got (bullied) <£because he
71 was£> (.) *posh.* (.)
72 Har: Mhm::[:.
73 Oli: [.£Hh[hh£]
74 Rut: [°↑Elij]ah [Stocks° ↓common.=
75 Oli: [(Tried spent *a*=
76 Rut: =]
77 Oli: =↓who)][le °day*::.*°]=
78 Fay: [<↑I know::.>]
79 Oli: =Essent[ially just (=
80 Rut: [(Don't think ↑there's (.) =

81 Fay: [(Loves (.) ↑anything) [(but) =
82 [((RP.))
83 Oli: =) ;]
84 Rut: =anything-)]
85 Fay: =doe]sn't have boat.]
86 =]

Faye responds to Ruth’s assessment with a designedly affiliative, although, to this point, unelaborated assessment: ‘=It’s just [↑sad’ (i.e. l. 57). Like that produced by Brian, in Extract 25 (ls. 46-47), this assessment is not overtly interconnected, by Faye, to “social class”. Instead, this is only then instantiated as Faye contiguously and explicitly (“‘cuz’ [l. 61]) accounts for this assessment: ‘=It’s just [↑sad ‘cuz he bullied at [((...))] Tower]view school [((...))] [°‘cuz like° (0.4) commo*n.*] [((...))] [But then he came][to Herring][ton () [((...))] and he got (bullied) <£because he was£>] (.) *posh.* (.)’ (ls. 57, 59, 61, 67 and 70-71).

Faye’s account trades upon the lamentable and ironic status of Elijah during school. This is a state to which direct access can be claimed, whereas Elijah’s *present* status, by contrast, is one to which Ruth alone has been privy (relatedly, see C. Goodwin, 1996: 370-371; Heritage, 2011b: 168-169). Specifically, Elijah is assessed to have been regrettably and differently “out-of-place” within his two schools (see ls. 57, 59, 61, 67 and 70-71; recall fn. 183). This irony is formulated by Faye in potentially “classed” terms through the categorisation of Elijah into designedly contrastive, relativised and locatively disjunctive linguistically non-“classed” categories (i.e. ‘commo*n.*’ [l. 61]; *posh.*’ [l. 71]).

Faye, therefore, like Brian in Extract 25, produces an assessment of a referent (i.e. a non-present party) which is not formulated in “classed” terms. However, Faye then leverages the possibly “classed” status of the focal referent in the service of a *post-positioned* account for her assessment. Extract 06 thus parallels Extract 25, in this respect; it is an example in which the linguistically non-“classed” status of a referent is mobilised to account for an assessment previously produced.

6.4.1 Summary

Extracts 12, 40, 25 and 06 have provided examples in which linguistically (non-)“classed” orientations to “social class” are produced in the service of self-initiated accounts that are produced for “evaluative assessments” (Antaki, 1994: 82). Two sequences over which these accounts are (co-)produced have been illustrated in this section: *pre-positioning* and *post-positioning*. Extracts 12 and 40 have illustrated the former. In these cases, the linguistically (non-)“classed” status of a membership category and locational formulation are established independently by co-interlocutors. This status is then retrieved as the salient inferential backdrop against which an evaluative assessment of a referent (i.e. the same or different) is, subsequently, predicated. The positions in which the accounts are (co-)produced are, in this sense, *pre-positioned*. Extracts 25 and 06 then illustrated the *post-positioned* operation. These two cases have shown how linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisations of locations and membership categories are mobilised in the service of accounting for evaluative assessments, previously produced. These differ from Extracts 12 and 40 insofar as they postdate the (co-)production of the assessments for which they account. This sequencing is characterised as *post-positioned*, on this basis. This section has therefore indicated how linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations are utilised recurrently in two sequential positions to account for the production of evaluative assessments. What remains to be considered, however, is *why* linguistically (non-)“classed” statuses are mobilised in order to accomplish this work. This warrants independent discussion.

6.4.2 Discursus

To a considerable extent, why “social class” is incorporated into unsolicited accountings for evaluative assessments is laid bare, by co-interlocutors, endogenously, through the very business of *accounting*. Co-interlocutors, in this sense, explain why they have invoked a linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisation through the very terms of their account. In Extract 12, for example, Alice’s invocation of Alannah’s linguistically “classed” status is mobilised to account for her possession of ‘a lovely ↓home’ (l. 63). Thus, the reason for which Alannah’s linguistically “classed” status (i.e. ‘she’s (0.6) kind of from the Wealthy Class:.’ [l. 57]) is discriminated here, as opposed to some other dimension (recall §2.2.1), is, therefore, explained to some extent, through the social action for which it is enlisted. In other words, for Alice, in

this moment, “social class”, and, specifically, Alannah’s inherited status within ‘the Wealthy Class:.’ (l. 57), is treated such that it accounts for her possession of these objects.

This type of internal reasoning for the use of “social class” obtains similarly for Extracts 40, 25 and 06, where, again, the reason for which “social class” is actuated, in some capacity, can be explained by reference to the phenomena for which they are enlisted to account. In some cases, however, while co-interlocutors nominate linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations to account for various phenomena, they do not disclose why “social class” is invoked in order to accomplish this work uniquely; that is, as opposed to some alternative device (e.g. “gender”).²¹⁴ Extract 12, again, furnishes a clear example of this exigency. In this case, Alice, through the details of her turn-design (i.e. ‘And so’ [l. 63]), and by virtue of its retroactive placement (see Wilkinson and Weatherall, 2011), indicates that the linguistically “classed” status of Alannah furnishes the operative reason, for her recipient, Karen, against which Alice’s positively-valenced evaluative assessment of Alannah’s home (l. 63) should be understood. What is not explicated by Alice, however, over this sequence, is *why* Alannah’s linguistically “classed” status qualifies as explanatory on this occasion. Instead, this is left as taken-for-granted, viable in its own right and, presumably, known-in-common.

Extracts 25 and 06, on the other hand, provide instances in which this reasoning is explicated to a greater extent. In Extract 25, for example, Brian invokes his linguistically “classed” identity as one-of-many accumulative reasons that account adequately for why working in ‘a very Low income district.’ (l. 421) qualifies as one of his ‘largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences’ (l. 47). The reason for which “social class” is invoked here, then, *inter alia*, is explicitly accounted for through the terms of his assessment; that is, the “classed” status of his home is positioned to furnish the basis for Brian’s evaluative assessment. A similar case can be seen in Extract 06. In this case, the “classed” status of Elijah is treated, by Ruth and Faye, as the operative

²¹⁴ On this form of ‘*contrastive explanation*’, see A. Garfinkel (1981 in Pilnick, 2004: 459, my emphasis).

explanatory feature for why he was differently out-of-place at the two institutions named. Why “social class” is discriminated in this telling, as opposed to some other (in)correct dimension of personhood, is thus made explicit through the very terms of this assessment. Co-interlocutors can, therefore, not only disclose *that* “social class” confers the relevant explanatory resource by which to account for phenomena at varying degrees of explicitness, but that they can also mark *why* it qualifies as explanatory in the same terms, and at greater or lesser degrees of explicitness.

The consequentiality of invoking “social class” in the service of accounting for evaluative assessments is, therefore, determined locally on each occasion of use. Expectably, this entertains an indefinite extendibility; presumably it can be used to align with whatever domains are required in accordance with the practical purposes of co-interlocutors. However, the recurrent invocation of “social class” in the service of *positively*-valenced evaluative assessments, across Extracts 12, 40, 25 and 06, is notable and contrasts with the actions of *complaining* (§6.5) and *teasing* (§6.6) for which this identity is also invoked in an explanatory capacity.

6.5 Complaints

The second social action in which co-interlocutors routinely mobilised linguistically “classed” categorisations as an explanatory resource is the delivery of *complaints*. Complaints, like accounts, have long formed an object of EM/(M)CA scrutiny and have been analysed both in *ordinary* (e.g. Schegloff, 1988: 119-131) and *institutional* interactions (e.g. Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 60, 184-185, 242, fn. 34). This research has disaggregated their *subtypes* (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 597-600; Vol. II: 311; Sharrock and R. Turner, 1978: 179; Coulter, 1990: 194-195; Mandelbaum, 1991/1992; Jefferson, 1996: 60, fn. 26; Dersley and Wootton, 2000: 380; Ogden, 2010: 84-88, 92-96; G. Raymond, 2018: 84, fn. 11), *constitutive components* (e.g. Jefferson, 1978b: 136; Pomerantz, 1986: 220-221, 227-228, 228-229, fn. 2; Drew and E. Holt, 1988; Schegloff, 1988: e.g. 121; Lerner, 1996: 254-255; Lerner and Takagi, 1999: 55-56; E. Holt, 2000: 435-439; Edwards, 2005: 9; Schegloff, 2005c; Edwards and Fasulo, 2006: 359; Bolden and J. Robinson, 2011: 99, 113-114; Maynard, 2013; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 77-78), *division of labour* (e.g. Sacks, 1970, Part 2: 35-36, 39; Drew and Walker, 2009), *placement* (e.g. J. Robinson, 1998: 110-111), *recognisability* (e.g. Sacks, 1970, Part 2: 37; R. Turner, 1974 [1970]: 205-212; Atkinson and Drew, 1979:

31-32; Clift, 2007: 124-126, 149; Ogden, 2010: 83) and the different *responses* they occasion, *in situ* (e.g. Sacks, 1970, Part 2: 38, 40-41; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 49-51; Heritage and R. Watson, 1979: 140; Schegloff, 1980: 136; Schegloff, 1984a: 34; 1988: 122; 124-125; 2007a: 14, 61, 160; Drew, 1987: 238, 252, fn. 13).

Like “*assessing*” (§6.4), “*complaining*” is also an activity that has been investigated in past EM/(M)CA research into social identity (e.g. Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 44-45). One locus of this research has been the production of membership categories. Complaints have been investigated in relation to categories indicative of “*age*” (e.g. Jefferson, 1996: 23-25, 60, fn. 26), “*heterosexuality*” (e.g. Land and Kitzinger, 2005: 397), “*ethnicity*” and “*race*” (e.g. R. Watson, 1974; Stokoe and Edwards, 2007), *inter alia* (e.g. R. Turner, 1974 [1970]: 205-212; Wootton, 1989: 251-252). Complaints have also been identified, heretofore, in past EM/(M)CA research on “social class”. This has included the analysis of linguistically “*classed*” (e.g. Dersley and Wootton, 2000: 404, fn. 5) and *non-“classed”* categories (e.g. Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 60, 184-185, 242, fn. 34; Whitehead, 2013: 52-54; Stokoe, 2015: 439). The sub-sections that follow therefore develop existing EM/(M)CA research, situating how and where co-interlocutors mobilise linguistically (non-)“*classed*” identities to account for complainable conduct. The focal distinction advanced in this section pertains to whether “social class” is nominated to account for the complainable *directly*, or employed to account for an epiphenomenal component, thereof, and employed comparatively *indirectly*. This use was observed across two forms of complaints; namely, those produced in response to transgressions enacted by co-present co-interlocutors (see Dersley and Wootton, 2000; Edwards, 2005), and those produced in response to “*talk-extrinsic*” (recall fn. 145) matters and/or non-present parties (see Drew, 1998; Stokoe and Edwards, 2007; Drew and Walker, 2009). Following Edwards (2005: 6, italics in original), these will be termed ‘*direct*’ and ‘*indirect*’ complaints, respectively.²¹⁵

²¹⁵ For the use of comparable distinctions, see Dersley and Wootton (2000: 380) on “*complaints*”, and Heritage and C. Raymond (2016: 6) on “*apologies*”.

6.5.1 Accounting for complainability

The “classed” implicature of an activity and/or event is routinely treated, by co-interlocutors, as the explanatory basis for the “*complainability*” of some state-of-affairs. Instantiations of “social class”, on such occasions, are positioned by co-interlocutors (*qua* “complainants”) such that they account for why a tellable qualifies as relevantly *complainable*, in some moment. To qualify, “classed” identities are not necessarily that which is being complained about on these occasions. Instead, the device is invoked to justify the bases in respect to which a tellable is treatable *qua complainable* (see →). A clear example of this work has been seen previously in Extract 19, reproduced below. As introduced in Chapter 4 (§4.6.1.2), this fragment features the delivery of a “direct complaint” (see Edwards, 2005) by Samuel. For context, Simon and Samuel have reached the final round of betting in a “hand” of poker, and Simon, who is positioned as “last-to-act”, has “checked” (l. 13). Vis-à-vis game-relevancies, this makes relevant that Samuel announces his own “hand”; an obligation that is fulfilled promptly: ‘[Got a]ce:.’ (l. 15).

Extract 19 (*Reproduced*): EJBH_F4_34

((A face-to-face interaction. Samuel, Tim, Luke, Simon, Nick and David are playing “*Texas hold ‘em*”).)

6 Tim: (Got / And) a great mix lined up >↓Luke.<
7 (0.9)
8 Tim: >Do you know what you’re [doing.<]
9 Sam: [Check.]
10 (0.5)
11 (?): °()-°=
12 Luk: =Y[eah] on Facebook=
13 Sim: [Check.]
14 Luk: =↑li[(h)ve.]
15 Sam: [Got a]ce:.
16 (2.3)
17 (?): ((Sniffs.))
18 (0.6)
19 (?): ((Clears throat.))
20 (0.2)
21 (?): ((Sniffs.))=

22 (?): =.hhhhHH[HH.]
 23 Luk: [↑OH::::]
 24 (0.4)
 25 (?): °hhhhh.°
 26 (1.0)
 27 Sam: I got ace:.
 28 (0.3)
 29 Nic: [<That you: said.]
 30 **Sam:** → **[He's was- just gonna put me d]own as working**
 31 **↑class inne.**
 32 (0.2)
 33 Nic: £Hy(h)eah.£
 34 Sam: °Fuck.° ((Whispered.))
 35 Nic: I heard that [as well and I did think that=
 36 Sam: [(.hhhhh / hhhhh.) Tim.=
 37 Nic: =straight away.]
 38 Sam: =]
 39 (0.4)
 40 Tim: £S(h)am.£
 41 (0.4)
 42 Sam: I'm so sorry audi°en° () ((Trails off.))
 43 (?): .hhh=
 44 Nic: =°Nothing wrong with being working class Sam.°
 45 (0.5)
 46 Sam: .hhh (0.4) I got ↓ace:.
 47 (1.6)
 48 Nic: °Tim identified himself as working° CLASS,
 49 (0.4)
 50 Sam: Should'a said I Ace.

It is the syntax of Samuel's announcement (i.e. l. 15) that forms the locus of his ensuing complaint in this extract. Following this announcement, and after producing

(what is designed as) a repetition, thereof (i.e. l. 27),²¹⁶ Samuel orients to the “*inference rich*”²¹⁷ status of the semantic content of his turn-design and to the categorial, ascriptive upshot that is proposedly generated, thereby: ‘[He’s was- just gonna put me d]own as working ↑class inne.’ (ls. 30-31).

Samuel, in this turn, anticipates that his announcement will furnish a basis for the researcher, who is co-present, to classify him as ‘working ↑class’ (ls. 30-31); an inference, and anxiety, that is endorsed by Nick (ls. 35 and 37). It is this upshot that is marked as the focus of/for Samuel’s complaint; an activity that is put “on-record” through his negatively-valenced “response cry” (l. 34; see also, Ogden, 2010: 85, 86, 93; Lerner, 2013: 96-97).²¹⁸ Samuel, therefore, is not complaining about being identifiable, for the researcher, as “working class”, *per se*, but that he has rather proposedly, and regrettably, divulged his classificatory potential, as such, and thereby exposed its prior “*concealment*” (here, see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 69).²¹⁹ It is, then, Samuel’s predicted allocation into this membership category, that is treated as the operative basis for which this constitutes a complainable, and which expectably eventuates his subsequent apology (i.e. l. 42; see Heritage and C. Raymond, 2016: 8-9).²²⁰

This phenomenon, of accounting for a complainable through a “classed” categorisation, was observed recurrently across my collection. In the case of Extract 24, this was invoked by Samuel as the singular explanatory component of/for his complaint-in-progress. More recurrently, however, “social class” was invoked as *one-of-many-contributing-factors*. On these occasions, a “classed” categorisation is mobilised by a complainant, alongside others, under the auspices of either a ‘cumulative’ or ‘itemized’ three-part listing (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3, for

²¹⁶ This practice is evocative to repeating a repairable (see fn. 106). Relatedly, see Glenn (2003: 132-141) on the preservation and renewal of errors vis-à-vis ‘verb tense’ (ibid.: 132).

²¹⁷ Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 40; see also, Schegloff, 2007b: 469) phrase. Relatedly, see fn. 123.

²¹⁸ Goffman’s (1981) term.

²¹⁹ On ‘*revelatory matters*’, see Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 68, italics in original).

²²⁰ See also, fn. 126.

review). Examples of both of these lists are presented in Extracts 41 and 13, respectively.

Extract 41 – SWB2830

((A telephone call. Meg and Tina have been discussing television programmes.))

- 44 Tin: [°>ch- Oh that's ↑funny.<°]
45 Meg: [And now I'm tryin]g to think of ↓the
46 only other (.) [Show I watch.]
47 Tin: [.hhhh I-] (.) [↑Seen]
48 Meg: [(ing.)]
49 (.)
50 Tin: Cheers probably five ↑times.=An' i've (.)
51 seen, (.) .hhhh Uhm. (0.3) Cros. (.) ↑Cosby
52 show probably ten times,
53 (.)
54 Meg: YEA::h=I don't even [into] ↑Cosby.
55 Tin: [HHH.]
56 (0.3)
57 Meg: (↑Elliot love) (.) probably uh. (.) ↓I've
58 seen Cheers more than that I hate to admit
59 but- (0.2)
60 Tin: °↑Uhuh; h.°
61 (0.2)
62 Meg: UH:[::↓M::.]
63 Tin: [That's pretty ↓co]o::l I like (.) ↓that
64 whenever I ↑watch it. h.
65 (0.3)
66 Meg: Cheers;
67 (.)
68 Meg: ↑Yea:h? I thought it was a good. (.) >I've
69 actually been to that bar in Lansing.<=↑It's a
70 ni- 'ou know it' (I thought) a pretty funny
71 [show.]
72 Tin: [Oh you ha]ve;
73 Meg: ↑Yea:h.
74 Tin: ↓Yeah I've heard [it's >prett]y cool,<

75 Meg: [Kind of a-]
76 (0.4)
77 **Meg:** → **It's just a you know over price (0.3) *uh***
78 **(.) uh h.↑HUH .hhh (0.4) [downtow]n Lansing =**
79 Tin: [Yeah.]
80 **Meg:** **=Yuppie you know.=**
81 Tin: =Yeah.=
82 **Meg:** **=↑Tourist attraction.**
83 (0.5)
84 Meg: ↑I'm trying to think what else is on.
85 [*I*know it]'s like, (0.2)
86 Tin: [ch:::]

Extract 13 (Reproduced): EJBH_F1_02

((A face-to-face interaction. Ben, Charlie and Adam have been discussing their family homes.))

258 Ada: So [how many] living rooms do you have.
259 Ben: [We got]
260 (0.2)
261 Ada: Th[reeʒ]=↑eight,
262 (?): [°two°]
263 (0.6)
264 Cha: Eh h(h)eh
265 [heh Heh heh heh heh.hhh]
266 Ada: [Huh ↑Heh .Hhh hh.]
267 Ben: [He's ↑got- he's ↑got- he's ↑got two boa]ts
268 [like that's enough ɛl(h)i(h)ke.ɛhhhh]
269 Ada: [↑Heh heh heh.]
270 .Hhhh (0.2)
271 (?): .hhhh=
272 Ben: ((Coughs.))=Isn't this thing about like class
273 or some s:hit.=
274 Ada: =[Yeah=
275 Ben: [()]
276 Ada: =I kno[w.]
277 Cha: [Ye]ah heh heh huh ɛ()ɛ.]
278 Ben: [Heh Huh .hh .hh ɛ(is i(h)t)ɛ.]=.HH'heh

279 h[eh..hh]

280 Ada: [I thought I may as well give] him some

281 useful infor[mation.]

282 Ben: [We're ↑sort of-] (.) We're

283 [sort of cat]egorising ourselves right=

284 Cha: [No: I haven't-]

285 Ben: =↓here.

286 (0.3)

287 Ben: Middle class, (.) ↓Middle class. (.) ↑middle

288 class, °*like-*°=

289 Ada: =↑Wh:↑ite, (.) [middle *↓class.*]

290 Ben: [Te hee hee [.hh]

291 Cha: [uh ↑Heh heh]

292 Ben: =hh]=

293 Cha: =↓huh.]

294 Ben: =[hh]

295 Ada: [£Congra]tulations.£ [You've ticked.]

296 **Ben:** → [Oh there was an] (.)

297 **there was an article that ehm. (.) apparently**

298 **(0.2) if you're: a w::white middle class::**

299 **straight (0.8) ↑male. (0.6) then (0.2) you**

300 **don't get to go to this lecture thing¿**

301 (1.3)

302 Ada: [Well °↓what-° What was it about.=hhh.=

303 Cha: [Is this what- from somein-is this something=

304 Ada: =]

305 Cha: =Su]san *told you about¿*=

306 Ben: =No no no. This was uhm (.) some stupid

307 thi:ng.

308 (.)

309 Ada: Eh heh ↑heh. Hhh=£It's only

310 stu[pid because we're not=

311 Cha: [Uh'hh.=↑.Hhhh:=

312 Ada: =invite][d.£=Heh huh huh .hhh]

313 Cha: =] [huh huh D(hh)jeh'huh .hh] Fuck

314 £there.£=>huh [huh huh< .H]hh

315 Ada: [.HHhh hh.]

316 (0.9)

317 Ada: £What was it about.£

318 (0.3)

319 Ada: *Though.*

320 (0.5)

321 Ben: I ↑dunno.

322 (0.2)

323 Ben: ((Company name.)) () lectures ban ↓straight

324 white men.=eh °huh huh,°

325 (0.2)

326 Cha: Ok[ay:,,]

327 Ada: [Well.] Yeah 'cuz we're already incredibly

328 advantaged so I don't really (0.6) mind that

329 I'm not invit[ed.]

330 Cha: [We]ll no but it's a bit of a

331 dick move.

332 (.)

333 Cha: [If ↑they-]

334 Ada: [Yeah[:..]=hey-]

335 Ben: [You still sh]ould [really like.]

336 Cha: [>Trying to-<>yeah]

337 exactly.< And=

338 Ada: =Y[ou probably sh- you shouldn't ex]

339 Cha: [↑preach- preach equal]ity

340 [you gotta use like]

341 Ada: [No you can't]exclude people ↑but (0.5)

342 I wouldn't a gone anyway so.

343 (0.3)

344 Ben: [*↓No:..*=if you,]

345 Cha: [No- well no]

346 (0.4)

347 Ben: [(Fair) enough.]

348 Cha: [I wouldn't (si)t) thr[ough that]

349 Ada: [.hhh] [Yeah I got an e]mail

350 from ((Company name.)) which was like to ev-

351 All the interns which was promoting their

352 like (0.2) diversity programme.

Like Extract 19, Extracts 41 and 13 present two cases in which an initial (or first) complaint is co-produced in which the complainant attributes the complainability of some phenomenon to its linguistically non-“classed” (i.e. ‘Yuppie’ [l. 80]) or linguistically “classed” (i.e. ‘middle class:’ [l. 298]) status. In Extract 41, the complaint delivered by Meg pertains to the previously topicalised (e.g. l. 72) bar in ‘Lansing.’ (l. 69). In Extract 13, by contrast, following a ‘two-on-one tease’ (here, see Glenn, 2003: 97-98) of Charlie – one framed explicitly in terms of “social class” (ls. 272-273) – Ben issues a designedly “disjunctive” (l. 296; see Jefferson, 1978a: 221; see Heritage, 1984b) complaint concerning the alienation of a particular socio-demographic from an event.

The complainability of these tellings is formulated variously. In Extract 41, this is rendered hearable through its production in response to Tina’s positively-valenced, and designedly ‘mediated’ (see Heritage and G. Raymond, 2005: 17) assessment of this location, and by aggregating the linguistically non-“classed” category, ‘Yuppie’ (l. 80), with the possible complainables ‘over price’ (l. 77) and ‘↑Tourist attraction.’ (l. 82; relatedly, see McCabe and Stokoe, 2004: 613-617). In Extract 13, in contrast, the category ‘middle class:’ (l. 298) is positioned – at least temporarily (cf. ls. 323-324) – as one of the grounds for Ben’s complaint as it is a basis according to which the group is segregated (perhaps persecuted): ‘you don’t get to go to this lecture thing_i’ (ls. 299-300). Both of these cases therefore parallel Extract 19, inasmuch as they are sequentially *first* complaints that are predicated, by their complainants, on linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisations; in this case, these turn on the linguistically non-“classed” status of a location, in Extract 41 (i.e. ‘that bar in Lansing.’ [l. 69]), and a linguistically “classed” membership category in Extract 13 (i.e. ‘middle class:’ [l. 298]).

These extracts differ from Extract 24, however, insofar as the linguistically “classed” categorisations are not produced as independent explanations but are positioned as one-of-several contributing factors which provides for the complainability of this referent. In Extract 41, for example, the linguistically non-“classed” category, ‘Yuppie’ (l. 80), is produced as part of a cumulative listing, where it collocates with the classifications ‘over price’ (l. 77), ‘=↑Tourist attraction.’ (l. 82) to account for the

complainable status of this location. Similarly, in Extract 13, ‘middle class:’ (l. 298) is also constructed as one-of-many contributing factors. In this case, however, the linguistically “classed” category is not part of an explanatory ‘*gestalt*’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 78, italics in original) but produced within an “itemized” listing, as Ben invokes additional prohibited dimensions of socio-demographic status, including “race” (‘w::white’ [l. 298]), “heterosexuality”, (‘straight’ [l. 299]) and “gender” (‘↑male’ [l. 299]).

Extracts 41 and 13 therefore show that linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisations can be invoked independently (i.e. Extract 19), or collectively (i.e. Extracts 41 and 13), to account for complainable conduct in “direct” (i.e. Extract 19) and “indirect” (i.e. Extracts 41 and 13) complaints (see Edwards, 2005). Finally, it is notable that this explanatory work was also accomplished not only by original complainants, but also by co-complainants. In this exigency, a recipient of an indirectly designed complaint-in-progress (see →) either proposes the relevance of “social class” to account for a complaint that has been articulated, previously, by another co-interlocutor, or introduces “social class” to escalate a complaint beyond the terms of its initial telling (see ⇒).²²¹ Extract 29, introduced previously in §5.4 and §5.7.1, offers a clear example of this practice.

²²¹ Additional examples of this work have been introduced in Extracts 33 and 21. The former presents an example of a *touched-off* case. Ruth follows Faye’s initial complaint, regarding “*The Keys*” (see l. 56), with a locatively occasioned (i.e. l. 71) – albeit incumbent-focussed (§5.5.1.2) – linguistically non-“classed” (i.e. ‘Really posh’ [l. 80]) complaint (see ls. 71, 73, 76, 78 and 80); one that is projected to concern the behaviour of her erstwhile boss. However, the complaint is subsequently “*aborted*” (see Schegloff, 2013: 52-55), “*deleted*” (see Jefferson, 1985a: 459; Schegloff, 1992e: 210), “*lost*” (see Ziferstein, 1972: 82-85), or “*quit*” (see Schegloff, 1997b: 176); displaced by virtue of Faye’s differently organised telling (see ls. 81-84 and 87).

In Extract 21, Luke’s linguistically “classed” (i.e. ‘upper [(...)] class’ [ls. 107 and 109]) complaint does not commence a touched-off second (recall fn. 200) but designedly “*laminates*” (see Goffman, 1974: 82, 156-157 in C. Goodwin, 1979: 116, fn. 13) upon Owen’s antecedent (e.g. ls. 99-101; here, see Drew and Walker, 2009). It will be recalled that this concerns the ‘*trajectory of incumbency*’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 66, italics in original) for

Extract 29 (Reproduced): EJBH_F4_12

((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Ray, George and Harry are playing cards outside a café-cum-bar in Towerview.))

- 87 Ray: If I- If [I buy you a drink would you drink]=
88 Geo: [((Shuffles.))]
89 Ray: =it.
90 Geo: Yeah::;̣
91 (0.2)
92 Ray: What do you want.
93 (0.6)
94 Geo: Uh::: another ↑Ghost ↑ship would be great;̣
95 (1.2)
96 Har: C'd you get me another ↑wate[r.
97 Geo: [((Shuffles.))]=
98 =(0.5)]
99 Geo: =]
100 **Har:** → I ↓can't (0.2) get through the dancing
101 **again.=I almost cried °when I went through**
102 **the [(third) time° .]**
103 Ray: [Is it pretty in]tense in there;̣
104 **Har: It's the fu[cking wor]st [°thing I've ever=**
105 Ray: [.hhh] [If I'm not back in=
106 **Har: =seen.°]**
107 Ray: =] ten minutes, (0.4) send he(h)lp.
108 Chu[↑huh.]
109 Geo: [↑Huh] ↑Ha ↑Ha ↑Ha. £We'll go in the(h)re
110 and he's like-£

students reading 'political science' (l. 73) and/or 'liberal arts' (l. 87) and the exploitative implications that obtain for students of the natural sciences (e.g. ls. 81 and 83). In this case, Luke (*qua* co-complainant) assents to (ls. 79 and 95) and bolsters (e.g. ls. 99-101, 104-105, 107 and 109) Owen's previously subsided (e.g. l. 95; see Drew and E. Holt, 1998) "safe" complaint (here, see, e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 597-600).

Extracts 33 and 21 therefore provide two cases that are related to the exigency examined in Extract 29. Note, however, that in neither extract do co-complainants service "classed" categorisations in the service of *accounting*. Extract 29 is unique in this respect.

111 (0.7)
 112 **Har:** **It's impressive.**
 113 (0.5)
 114 **Ray:** **Is it the most m::iddle aged thing you've**
 115 **⇒ s(h)ee(h)n.=Like middle ↑aged middle ↓class**
 116 **Towerview thing you've seen in your life.**
 117 **Geo:** ↑Huh huh huh.
 118 (0.6)
 119 **Ray:** S::[weet (good lord.)]
 120 **Geo:** [((Shuffles.))] It is, (0.2) Glorious.
 121 (5.7)

As seen in §5.4 and §5.7.1, the initial complaint in this extract, delivered by Harry, targets the dancing occurring in the bar. This complaint is first hinted-at through Harry's production of a complaint-implicative, 'inability' account (i.e. ls. 100-102; see, e.g., Drew, 1984: 129); one volunteered after producing a high-entitlement request (l. 96; here, see Curl and Drew, 2008) for Ray to bring him another glass of water: 'I ↓can't (0.2) get through the dancing again.=I almost cried °when I went through the [(third) time°.]' (ls. 100-102). Following an inquiry from Ray (l. 103), Harry's complaint is made explicit through his "extreme-case" (Pomerantz, 1986: 220-221, 227-228, 228-229, fn. 2) formulated, and expletive-imbricated, "non-conforming" (Raymond, 2003), "transformative answer" (see Stivers and Hayashi, 2010): 'It's the fu[cking wor]st [°thing I've ever [(...)] seen.°]' (ls. 104 and 106). Harry's complaint is, at this point, put "on-record" (recall fn. 134). Notable, in this case, is that this has not intersected with "social class" directly. For example, neither in his comparatively "hard" (ls. 100-102, 104 and 106) nor "weak" formulations (l. 112) has Harry made recourse to this device a means of accounting for its complainability. Harry's complaint, therefore, differs from Extracts 19, 41 and 13, insofar as it is neither lodged nor accounted for, by its original complainant, in "classed" terms.

Extract 29 is, instead, unique insofar as this "classed" relevance is only subsequently installed by Harry's co-interlocutor, Ray, as he escalates and affiliates with Harry's designedly complete (e.g. l. 112; here, see Jefferson, 1984a: 211) complaint: 'Is it the most m::iddle aged thing you've s(h)ee(h)n.= Like middle ↑aged middle ↓class

Towerview thing you've seen in your life.' (ls. 114-116). This turn, as analysed in §5.7.1, is produced following an affiliative (see Stivers, 2008) and jocular (see Schegloff, 1996c: 94-95) receipt from Ray (ls. 105 and 107), and George (ls. 109-110), to Harry's telling, and after a tempered rendering of the original complaint, by Harry (l. 112), has been produced. It is here that Harry's original complaint is then recast. Ray, here, preserves the magnitude of Harry's complaint – that is, “*of-things-Harry-has-ever-seen*” – but substitutes the previous axis (i.e. ‘the fu[cking wor]st [°thing’ [l. 104]) with one constructed in both linguistically (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]) and, potentially, metonymic (i.e. ‘Towerview thing’ [l. 116]) “classed” terms.

How Ray's characterisation implicates “social class” has been excavated previously in Chapter 5 (i.e. §5.7.1). It will suffice to add, only, that Ray's characterisation is hearable, in this regard, such that it proposedly *accounts* for Harry's foregoing complaint. This is conveyed in two respects. The first is comparatively innocuous: Ray's characterisation is hearable such that it could serve purely as a candidate understanding. If accepted, Ray, in this respect, poses a hearing that is supportive of Harry's complaint, but which is alternatively formed; in this case, trading upon categorial grounds. On the more insidious reading, however, Ben's categorisation could, equally, elucidate that which Ben understands to be the *unsaid* dimension of Harry's complaint; namely, that which has occasioned, underlies and proposedly accounts for its production. Harry's initial complaint is at risk of discovery, to this effect, as a “*cover*” (relatedly, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 592, italics in original), or ‘*surrogate complaint*’ (Jefferson, 1996: 60, fn. 26, italics in original); a complaint precipitated, relevantly, in ways other than those which have been volunteered explicitly.²²²

Extracts 19, 41, 13 and 29 have demonstrated, therefore, that “classed” categorisations are invoked by co-interlocutors, routinely, to account for a diverse array of complainable objects in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction. Substantively, this includes the discovered incumbency of a co-interlocutor in a “classed” membership category (i.e. Extract 19) and the “classed” status of a location (i.e. Extract 41),

²²² On this practice, see §6.5.4. Relatedly, on categorial revelations, recall fn. 219.

amongst other “classed” ineligibilities (i.e. Extract 13) and activities (i.e. Extract 29). Furthermore, this activity has been enacted, observably, with various productional differences. “Classed” categorisations have been produced, for example, both as a singular explanatory resource (i.e. Extract 19) in addition to but one of many contributing factors in “itemized” (i.e. Extract 13), “cumulative” (i.e. Extract 41) and “elaborative” (i.e. Extract 29) listings. Finally, this activity has been observably enacted when differently distributed amongst complainants. This has included their production in sequentially initial/first complaints (see Extract 19, 41 and 13), and by co-complainants in the escalation of a forerunner (e.g. Extract 29; see also, fn. 221). Categorisations of “social class”, as such, represent a variegated interactional resource for accounting for complaints. These differences notwithstanding, however, Extracts 19, 41, 13 and 29 are fundamentally homologous insofar as co-interlocutors position the “classed” status of a referent as a/the avowed (i.e. Extracts 19, 41 and 13), or proposed reason (i.e. Extract 29) for which a complaint is co-produced, and upon which it is predicated. They are framed explicitly, as such, as complaints *about* “classed” identities, in this respect.

6.5.2 Accounting and complainability

A second recurrent capacity in which “classed” orientations feature in complaints are to classify a *constitutive component* of a complaint-in-progress. In these cases, complainants do not mark the “classed” status of a referent as a/the *reason* for its constitution *qua* complainable; they intercalate it, instead, as a/the dimension that accounts for a designedly ancillary aspect of the complaint. The explicitly explanatory use of “social class” is thereby moderated, offset, or distanced to this effect. It is configured such that it accounts for some part of the complaint (see →), but it is not catalysed as the dimension that has expressly encouraged the telling (cf. §6.5.1). It will be recalled that an example of this practice has been seen in Extract 21, within Luke’s extension of Owen’s complaint. The “classed” membership category (i.e. ‘up]per [((...))] class’ [ls. 107 and 109]), on this occasion, was employed not to account for Luke’s complaint, *per se*, concerning the “*distribution of power*”,²²³ but to self-explicate the nature of the category, ‘government [people’ (l. 107). It is not

²²³ Weber’s (1978b: 926) phrase.

employed not to account for the complainable, but to sidelight and explain an epiphenomenal component thereof. Extracts 20 and 42 provide two further illustrations of this practice.

Extract 20 (Reproduced): EJBH_F1_01

((A face-to-face interaction. Amy is delivering a complaint-implicative telling about her father and his prejudices towards the unemployed.))

256 Amy: =Yeah, (.) But do you know what it's weird 'cuz
257 like we're talking about how (.) .hhh (0.2)
258 ↑ehm:: ((Voice wavers.)) (1.1) °.tch° (0.3) Like
259 how <experience:> (.) is a way of (.)
260 under[↑standing.]
261 Rac: [°.tch° *Yeah.*]
262 (.)
263 Amy: And like broadening your view on the [*↑world*]=
264 Rac: [Mhm.]
265 Amy: =.hhh (0.2) But ↑like- (0.4)
266 ((Distortion. / Knocking. / (0.2)))
267 (.)
268 Amy: It doesn't seem ↑to work like that everyone; hh.
269 (0.3)
270 Amy: .hh[h][(.) li]ke (0.4) I mean my ↓Da::d. (0.7) I=
271 Rac: [N][o:]
272 Amy: =don't- (hh./ ((Sighs.)) (0.3) I don't have much
273 to do with *my Dad*
274 (.)
275 Rac: Mhm hmm.=

((Eighteen lines omitted. Amy details her father's political, racial and regional allegiances.))

294 (0.4)
295 Amy: Erm. (0.2) (.tch) I don't ↑think (0.3) he knows
296 to many people who are.=.hhh (0.2) like Asian
297 which is the main=
298 Rac: =Mm hm[m.]

299 Amy: [Eth]nic minority in our area?=.hhh (0.2)
300 Uhm. (0.4) An'- (.) And also ↑he:: (0.2) doesn't
301 (.) really know or didn't really °know many
302 people° who (were / are) on ↑benefits?
303 (.)
304 Amy: .hhh (.) So I *↓thought ↑that-* (.) His: (.) Uhm.
305 (0.4) that his: (0.6) °c:(hh.)°rappy, horrible.
306 .hhh (.) like (0.2) narrow minded atti*tude.*
307 (0.2) were to do with not knowing those
308 peo[ple;]
309 Rac: [Yeah.]
310 Amy: And not having that ↑experience (.) .tch .hhh
311 (0.3) ↑BUT. hh. (0.6) .tch (.) .hh ↑he was (.)
312 ehm:: (.) .tch .hh (0.2) he got made re↓dudant,
313 (.)
314 Amy: From his job,=He'd done the same job from school.
315 (.) .hhh [for like (.) t]wenty odd years (.) And=
316 Rac: [Mhm hmm.]
317 Amy: =then. .hhh (.) came into work one day and found
318 that ↑he:: (0.6) there's a letter saying >↑he'd
319 been made redundant?<
320 (0.4)
321 Amy: .hh[hh]
322 Rac: [.tch (.)] °God.°
323 (.)
324 Amy: Uh::m. (.) And so ↑he:: (.) had to go through the
325 whole ↑thing of like having .hhh (0.2) ↑Uhm::.
326 (0.4) >Being on jobseeker's allowance
327 [and having] to< sign on and=
328 Rac: [°Mhm hmm.°]
329 Amy: =and things;=[.hhh] Which he used to talk about=
330 Rac: [Yeah]
331 Amy: =f:eeling really degraded, (.) ↑doing
332 [and] [(0.2) li]ke it was=
333 Rac: [Mh] [m hmm]
334 Amy: =demeaning and *that-*=.hh (0.2) he:: (0.2) 'cuz
335 as far as >he's concerned like he's< (.) paid

336 into a system:. and [there][fore he] sh:ould↑=
337 Rac: [.tch][*Yeah.*]
338 Amy: =(.) .hh (0.2) be able to get stuff. (.) out of
339 it without (.) beingç=.hh (0.2) without (.)
340 being.°s- tre-° (.) °t-° being made to feel.
341 (.)
342 Rac: m' Yeah.
343 (.)
344 Rac: >B[ad about *it.*<]
345 Amy: [Like ↑de]gra[ded?]=.hhh (.) S:O,=
346 Rac: [*Yeah.*]
347 Amy: =(0.6) I would have thought that that might have
348 made him realise::, (.) a little ↑bit (.) about
349 his ↑prejudices?
350 (.)
351 Amy: [.hhh] (.) ↑Uhm:. (0.8) but it totally=
352 Rac: [Mhm hmm.]
353 Amy: =↑didn't.
354 (.)
355 **Amy:** → He'd ↑still=.hhh (.) >I mean the other thing<
356 *that he::* (.) *that 'e* (.) totally (.) doesn't
357 take into a↑ccount.=.hh (.) Is the fact *that-*
358 (.) *Yes:* he was unemployed.=.hh (0.2) but
359 because ↑he'sç (0.3) *like* fr::om. (0.2) °.tch
360 .hhh° (0.3) quite a sort of (.) privileged family
361 an' his friends tend to be ↑more sort of (0.4)
362 uhm. (.) middle class and like (.) [business]=
363 Rac: [<Mhm.>]
364 **Amy:** =owners and ↑things=.hh (.) that his:: (0.5)
365 friend who:. (0.5) has (.) busi*ness.* (.) .hh
366 (0.2) was able to like (.hh) (0.2) Ehm:. (0.2)
367 give him a- (.) you know create a job for 'im in
368 his (0.3) business. So [he] wasn't=
369 Rac: [(°.tch°)]
370 **Amy:** =unemployed for that longç=.hh[h
371 Rac: [.tch y[eah.
372 Amy: ['cuz he had

373 ↑connections?=.hhh (0.3) Eh:m. (0.3) and he (.)
374 totally l- (.) like lost *th:at.* .hh (.) And
375 then (.) so the following *year* I was speaking
376 to him near christmas (.) ↑and .hh (0.3) You
377 know. (.) it was ↑christmas (.) ehm (.) and I
378 think they're with. (.) I think there was like a
379 scheme ↓where. (0.4) uhm. (.) people who got
380 certain benefits could get like. (.) reduced (.)
381 pri[ce] st[amps;]
382 Rac: [.hh] [(y)]YES::
383 (0.2)
384 Amy: .tch .h[hh
385 Rac: [°*Yeah*°=
386 Amy: =And ↑he was ↓like (0.4) ↑proper::.hh (0.2)
387 given ↑out about how. (0.2) [You know.]
388 Rac: [↑Really.]
389 (0.2)
390 Amy: That was like really ↑wrong that is jus::
391 SCROUNGES £and t(h)hings like that and how they
392 just get so much ↑given and stuff;£=.hhh (.)
393 [And I'm like .hhhh]
394 Rac: [Even though ↑he'd >been it<]
395 (.)
396 Rac: ↑Ooh::
397 (0.2)
398 Amy: I'm like for fuck's sake. Do you not remem-
399 eh.=.hh (.) [eh ()] JUST CAN'T YOU MAKE THE=
400 Rac: [Yeah.]
401 Amy: =↑LINK.=
402 Rac: =.hhh Yeah.=
403 Amy: =Uhm:, (0.4) But *'e* didn't.
404 (.)
405 Amy: °And° (hh.) (0.5)
406 ((Knocking.))
407 (0.2)
408 Amy: °Mhm.°
409 (0.2)

410 Amy: °.tch° I dunno but (0.2) [so I] [don't know]=
 411 Rac: [.tch] [↑Yeah.]
 412 Amy: =↑how. .hhh (0.8) When s:ome of us like really
 413 look like really take on our experien*ces*
 414 =[.hhh] (.) Uh:m:. (0.6) [and really↑-=
 415 Rac: [Yeah.] [°Doesn't >for=
 416 Amy: =] [hhh.]
 417 Rac: =e] [veryone]::.<°
 418 (0.3)
 419 Amy: ↑Uh (.) >an' 'e-<='cuz 'e's:t he's really?
 420 ↑clever. He's a [really in]telligent Ma:n.=.hhh=
 421 Rac: [Yeah.]
 422 Amy: =(0.6) but jus' (1.1)
 423 Amy: So::. (0.5) tunnel ↑vision (though).
 424 (0.4)
 425 Rac: .tch ↑Ye:ah.
 426 (0.6)
 427 Amy: °Anyway.°

The category in focus in this extract is 'middle class' (l. 362). Amy's complaint-implicative telling, in this extract, has been introduced previously in Chapter 4 (§4.6.1.3 and §4.7). It will be recalled that the focal transgression on which this activity turns, pertains to what might be glossed as Amy's father's lack of reflexivity: His purported inability to transform experience into understanding. The nature of this complaint has been projected in the preface of Amy's extended telling (i.e. l. 268; recall fn. 128; see also, Edwards, 2005: 9), and is later recapitulated in her collaboratively eventuated story 'exit' (ls. 412-414 and 423; see Jefferson, 1978a: 237). The complaint, itself, trades upon two illustrations of this infraction as committed by her father.

In the first instance, Amy has complained that her father did not become cognisant of his '↑prejudices?' (l. 349) towards persons 'on ↑benefits' (ls. 299-302) after being made redundant (ls. 310-312, 314-315, 317-319), and after experiencing a period of unemployment, himself (ls. 324-327, 329, 331-332, 334-336 and 345). Her father's complainable beliefs were, instead, reaffirmed, for Amy, when he subsequently

inveighed against a welfare initiative to support benefit claimants (ls. 374-381); a category for which he constitutes a former member – or *ex*-incumbent (see §7.3.2). His former (i.e. pre-redundancy) attitude was thereby demonstrably upheld, for Amy, in so doing; an attitude, concerning which, Amy has previously complained (ls. 304-308, 386-387, 390-393, 398-399, 401 and 403).

In the second instance, Amy cuts-off what is projected as an exposition of her complaint (i.e. ‘He’d ↑still=’ [l. 355]), and, “sequence-jumping” (see Schegloff, 2013: 56-59), parenthetically overlays, and so compounds, her father’s prior transgression. The focus here pertains to her father’s continuing (i.e. ‘doesn’t’ [l. 356]) ignorance regarding the ameliorative processes that were involved in terminating his unemployment.²²⁴ Specifically, he is positioned by Amy such that he fails to recall (i.e. ‘lost’ [l. 374]; ‘Do you not remem- eh.’ [l. 398]) that his status as unemployed was qualified, both experientially (e.g. ls. 358-362 and 364-368), and temporally (i.e. ‘So [he] wasn’t [((...))] unemployed for that long_i=.hh[h’ [ls. 368 and 370]), by virtue of his avowedly “classed” (i.e. ‘middle class’ [l. 362]) social network; a member of which was not merely able to ‘give him’ (l. 367) a job, but, rather, generatively, ‘create’ (l. 367) him a position (ls. 355-362, 364-368, 370 and 372-373).

Amy’s complaint-implicative telling, in this extract, thus crystallises around her father’s obduracy; the hypocrisy of not recalibrating his beliefs despite enduring the complained experience himself (i.e. unemployment), and, furthermore, despite qualifying as “privileged” vis-à-vis the mechanisms employed to terminated the corresponding categorial incumbency (i.e. unemployed) about which he now complains (i.e., ls., 314-315, 317-319, 345, 347-349, 351-353, 355, 398-399, 401, 419-420 and 422).²²⁵ Amy’s grievance, in this extract, is not, therefore, accounted for through the production of a “classed” categorisation. Instead, it addresses Amy’s father’s conduct its own terms. Nevertheless, it is notable that a “classed” classification is still co-implicated, by Amy, as an explanatory resource in order to

²²⁴ On the extensible potential of tense shifts, see §7.3.2. See also, fn. 216.

²²⁵ On “*hypocrites*”, see R. Watson (1997b: 86-87).

account for some hitherto un-explicated component that is epiphenomenal of her complaint-in-progress.

The “classed” categorisation, in this case, is produced to characterise the type of people with whom her father was generally (i.e. ‘tend to be’ [l. 361]) and predominantly (i.e. ‘↑more sort of’ [l. 361]) connected and, by implication, the party that was equipped to appoint him: ‘an’ his friends tend to be ↑more sort of (0.4) uhm. (.) middle class and like (.) [business] [((...))] owners and ↑things=’ (ls. 361-362 and 364). Amy’s complaint is not then positioned such that it is *about* “social class”, thematically, nor that it is produced in the service of accounting for her complaint, directly. Rather, the classification is designedly orthogonal to this telling; it is produced to account for how this second instantiation of hypocrisy (i.e. “*not-remembering-that-his-experience-of-unemployment-was-qualified*”) was potentiated.²²⁶

A second example of this work, this time featuring a linguistically non-“classed” categorisation, is displayed in Extract 42. This extract is joined as Joe produces a sequentially “second story” (recall fn. 200); one that echoes the structure of his co-interlocutor’s (i.e. Laura’s) initial telling. Glossed, this story concerns the stance assumed by a non-present party (*cum* “complainee”), Melissa, vis-à-vis Alabama, a location that has been self-avowed by Laura (i.e. l. 14), in her telling, and what has been educed (cf. ‘↑Birmingham’ [l. 96]) and announced by Joe’s reported co-interlocutor, Melissa (i.e. l. 98), as their shared point of origin.²²⁷

Extract 42: CallFriend-eng-6974

((A telephone call. Laura and Joe deliver a pair of related storytellings.))

- 1 (3.0)
2 Lau: °↑Actually.°
3 (2.3)
4 Lau: ↑I know what I was gonna tell you-.hhh (0.3)
5 we were *i-* when we were in ↑line::.

²²⁶ On the structural basis of comparable accusations, see Smith (1978: 41-42).

²²⁷ On “*place of origin*” formulations, see Atkinson and Drew (1979: 248, fn. 8).

6 (0.8)

7 Lau: ((Swallows.)) Outside of ((Cinema name.)) we
8 were-(0.5) standing in front of two New
9 Jersey*ans.*hh. (0.5) and of course (.) they
10 automatically ask where we're from;
11 (1.3)

12 Lau: £When they- when they£ (0.2) (he-) hear us
13 talking you know and (0.4) we said from
14 Alabama an' (0.5) and the guy said that he
15 recognised: our accent(s);=He had worked
16 (0.3) some with Alabamians (0.5) ↑up- (0.4)
17 they had come up to Trenton (0.2) .hhh for
18 some kind of (0.4) financing class
19 [or some]thing.

20 Joe: [Mhmhm.]
21 (0.2)

22 Lau: .hhhhh ↑an' uhm. (0.6) Wh= we were talking
23 about how Slow we tal*k.* (0.5) and we
24 ↑realised ↓why northern people talk so fast;
25 (0.2)

26 Joe: (Wl') ↓Why.
27 (0.4)

28 Lau: It's because when you're trying to give
29 someone directions. (0.2) >You have to tell
30 them real quick-<
31 (0.4)

32 Lau: Hhhhh.huh y(h)ou kn(h)ow.
33 (0.7)

34 Lau: .HHhh and in the (0.2) ↑sou- you know. (0.2)
35 being ↑southern, (0.2) we're Talking real
36 °↑slow:° when we're telling them (0.3) turn
37 ↑right; (0.8) Hee-hh. £but it takes us so
38 long to say it that they've missed though
39 d(h)on'we tell `em£.
40 (0.2)

41 Joe: £M::n' ↑kay£;
42 (0.2)

43 Lau: £Someone (.) *f[igur]ed out£ǃ*

44 (J): [hhh.]

45 (0.2)

46 Joe: hhh. (0.4) On my flight to:. (.) ↑Spain I

47 was're was this old lady from Colorado. (0.2)

48 .hhh <that was going over for a weddi*ng and*

49 she was big golfer *an'- ↑an'* .hhh (0.4) So

50 we started talking about, (0.2) I mean she

51 was °jus'-° she had a lot to *↑sa::y.*

52 (0.5)

53 Joe: *I [mean. She would] not be qui::et.*

54 Lau: [Mh:hhh. >↑huh huh<]

55 (0.3)

56 Lau: ↑Huh ↓hu[h-

57 Joe: [Once I got'er *↑star:ted.*

58 (.)

59 Joe: .hhh (0.2) But anyway, (.) Uhmǃ (0.4) .hhhh

60 It was neat talking to 'er.=I mean she had

61 played ↓golf. (0.3) (°*m'huh m'huh*°) Pretty

62 much. (0.2) I mean *uhm.* (.) ↑well in Europe

63 in England, (0.2) *and* (.) in ↑Australia:' (I

64 mean) (.) b--all over the States. (0.2)

65 t'Pine ↓Valley you knowǃ

66 (.)

67 Joe: → .hhhh (0.3) I mean she's just (.) one of

68 these.>(* *) (0.3) wealthy old people that

69 live in Colo↓ra*do.*

70 (0.4)

71 Lau: ↑Right,

72 (0.6)

73 Joe: mh=.hhhhh (0.2) And ↓uhm. (.) I mean I

74 thought she was really nice.=*an'

75 everything.*=and then one-once we ↑land and

76 I'm down at (0.3) *uhm,* (0.5) The- (0.3)

77 *uhm,* Sh:uttle, (0.8) *uhm.* (1.2) ↑de↓*pot*

78 I guess (0.3) .hhh (0.2) waiting for *uh:m*

79 >the shuttle to come pick me up and taken me

80 to the hotel, <=She's walking by, .hhh (0.3)
81 And ↑uh- (0.8) She had her golf *clubs* and
82 all this *↓stuff.* (0.4) And uhm, (0.4) .hhh
83 (0.6) I mean she came ↑By: an' (0.3) kind*a*
84 hugged me and said here are my golf clubs and
85 I said well good luck and play well and she
86 goes (.) thank you and she said uhm. (0.7)
87 .hhhh (0.7) *Uhm::,* (0.5) if you're ever
88 in=hhh.Hm Hm *Col*or↓ado Springs or wherever
89 it was=If you're ever in Colo↑rado (.) .hhhh
90 (0.2) We're. the ↑Jakobs. (0.2) you know.
91 (0.4) Melissa an' Gavin; (0.4) .hhhh ↑Call me
92 an'- an' (.) *oh I'd l-* you know I'd love to
93 play or ↑whatever and I'm *just like* yeah
94 ↑right and so I sai- Well I should have given
95 you some information if you're *over in*
96 ↑Birmingham. (.) .hhh (0.5) ↑you should call
97 ↑Me to *↓play* (0.2) .hhhh (0.5) and she
98 ↓goes Alabama no ↑I don't think so.
99 (0.3)
100 Joe: Hhhh.=Hh.
101 (0.3)
102 Lau: £HHhh.=.h[h£
103 Joe: [And I was like well what would make
104 you- What would make you think then that I
105 would come to Colorado.=
106 Lau: =Oh really;
107 (.)
108 Lau: We've been there before.=
109 Joe: =*Aye exact↑ly.* [I mean she just] got=
110 Lau: [Well then-]
111 Joe: =through say- I mean an', she Started when we
112 °*↓w-*° jus' (.) conversation started, (.)
113 .hhh (0.2) she said she was from eh- from
114 Colorado where everything's (.) ↑Fake.
115 (1.2)
116 Joe: *So [I mean, I 'o]n't ↓kno[w.*

117 Lau: [(an' then)] [An' then: you're
118 >talking ab[out<]
119 Joe: [An]d ob[viously] she=
120 Lau: [(Why) people:]
121 Joe: =right because then .hhh (0.2) her
122 hospitality and her uh .hhhhh (0.5) °*↓no-° (0.8)
123 her c(hh.)ourteous. (0.4) courteousness* I
124 gue:ss; (0.8) was Fake as *↓well::.*
125 (0.3)
126 Lau: ↑Ri:ght.
127 Joe: (An') That pisse*d me ↓off::.*

In this extract, Joe's telling begins as an innocuous story about a chance interaction with a hitherto unknown party, Melissa (l. 91); a co-passenger aboard Joe's flight. Melissa is positioned in this telling, initially, in comparable terms to the dyad encountered by Laura: Melissa, like Laura's unnamed co-interlocutors (e.g. 'New Jersey*ans' [ls. 8-9]), is situated, by Joe, to live in a different state – in this case, Colorado (ls. 69, 88, 105 and 114). Moreover, similarly to Laura (e.g. 'we were in ↑line::' [l. 5] 'Outside of ((Cinema name.))' [l. 7]), Melissa is reportedly happened upon, by Joe, whilst engaged in a disconnected activity (i.e. 'On my flight to: (.) ↑Spain' [l. 46]) outside of his home state (i.e. Alabama). Thus, Joe's telling commences as a homologue to Laura's in two these respects. However, the architecture and valence of Joe's telling subsequently transforms as he recalls his parting exchange with Melissa.

Here, Joe recalls having tendered a locationally-circumscribed and activity-bound invitation, to Melissa; namely, to join Joe for golf (i.e. 'to *↓play*' [l. 97]) if she is ever in '↑Birmingham' (l. 96). This is a designed (e.g. ls. 94-96) reciprocation of Melissa's own prior invitation vis-à-vis '*Col*or↓ado Springs' (l. 88). Melissa, however, does not accept Joe's invitation,²²⁸ and, instead, effectively dismisses the possibility of its fulfilment, citing geographical grounds: 'and she ↓goes Alabama no

²²⁸ On "ostensible invitations", see Isaacs and Clark (1990).

↑I don't think so.' (ls. 97-98).²²⁹ It is this *snub* – or ‘verbal *squelch*’ (Drew, 1998: 303, italics in original; here, see also, Sacks, 1978: 264) – that forms the initial transgression upon which Joe's initial impression of Melissa is subsequently retuned *qua* complainable.

Like Amy in Extract 20, however, Joe's complaint is then further overlaid as he protests the hypocrisy of Melissa's infraction. Melissa is positioned, in this case, to have only “just” (ls. 109 and 112; see D. Lee, 1987: 388-393) characterised her avowed (e.g. ls. 88-89 and 114) and reported (e.g. ls. 47, 69, 105 and 114) point of origin (i.e. Colorado) in terms of complete inauthenticity: ‘where everything's (.) ↑Fake.’ (l. 114). Accordingly, for Joe, Melissa's dismissive response to his reciprocal invitation functions to verify her characterisation of this location (recall §5.5.1.1) by virtue of Melissa's categorial status as an indigenous incumbent: ‘[An]d ob[viously] she [(...)] right because then .hhh (0.2) her hospitality and her uh .hhhhh (0.5) °*↓no-*° (0.8) her c(hh.)ourteous. (0.4) courteo*usness* I gue:ss; (0.8) was Fake as *↓well::.*’ (ls. 119 and 121-124).²³⁰

Joe's telling thereby develops, in this respect, into a distinctive “Story-Complaint” (recall fn. 127); the direction of which has only been hinted at previously (e.g. ‘I thought’ [ls. 73-74]; here, see Jefferson, 2004c). Furthermore, this departs from the dénouement of Laura's telling, in which the dyad encountered collaborate (e.g. ‘we’ [l. 23]) with Laura in a *joyful* characterisation (i.e. ls. 22-24, 28-30, 32 and 46-47) of Laura's locational membership (i.e. ‘being ↑southern,’ [l. 35]). Extract 42 is therefore evocative of Extract 20 insofar as the complainable dimension of the telling is predicated upon the objectionable-*cum*-hypocritical behaviour of a reported, non-present party. As such, it contrasts the excerpts in §6.5.1, in which a “classed” categorisation was utilised in an *explanatory* capacity for complainability. Nevertheless, Extract 42 displays an affinity with Extract 20 insofar as the

²²⁹ For a linguistically non-“classed” locational reformulation at a “broader” degree of granularity, see Extract 28 (l. 131).

²³⁰ On this practice, see §5.5.1.2.

linguistically non-“classed” categorisation is produced by Joe to account for some *orthogonal* component of his complaint.

The possibly “classed” ascription, in this case, is produced by Joe to categorise the complainee directly (cf. Extract 20): ‘.hhhh (0.3) I mean she’s just (.) one of these.=(* *) (0.3) wealthy old people that live in Colo↓ra*do.*’ (ls. 67-69). Again, like Extract 20, this categorisation is produced in the service of an account, but not one of/for the focal complainable. In this instance, it is produced in the service of accounting for the non-present party’s ability to golf in various locations (ls. 60-65). This activity has been referred to previously, and it is positioned as a category-bound/tied component to this effect. Accordingly, it aligns with Extract 20, insofar as it accounts for a subsidiary dimension of Joe’s complaint; although in this case it is delivered in *post-position* and not as a *pre-positioned* account (recall §6.4). Nonetheless, the explanatory work to which it contributes approximates.

Extracts 20 and 42 are, therefore, analogous. In both cases, a “classed” categorisation is produced by the teller (i.e. Amy and Joe, respectively) to categorise members involved in the events related to the complainable. In Extract 20, a linguistically categorisation (i.e. ‘middle class’ [l. 362]) was ascribed to Amy’s father’s ‘friends’ (l. 361), and in Extract 42, a linguistically non-“classed” categorisation (i.e. ‘one of these.=(* *) (0.3) wealthy old people that live in Colo↓ra*do.*’ [ls. 67-69]) was accorded to the complainee. In both cases, these ascriptions are employed in a designedly explanatory capacity not to account for a complainable, *per se*, but to account for some epiphenomenal component. In Extract 20, this was produced to account for how Amy’s father’s ‘friends’ (l. 361) were able to generate him a job, post-redundancy, and in Extract 42, to account for the activity of golfing, in different continents, as undertaken by the complainee (see ls. 60-65). Neither complaint, therefore, is constructed such that it is see-able, for story-recipients, as complaining about “social class” (cf. §6.5.1). Incumbents of the “classed” categorisations are, instead, implicated into this activity, orthogonally, in accounts of/for epiphenomenal components of complaints.

6.5.3 Summary

This section has introduced how “classed” categorisations are enlisted in the production of direct (e.g. Extract 19) and indirect complaints (e.g. Extracts 41, 13, 29, 20 and 42). Two recurrent capacities in which these categorisations are integrated have been introduced. Firstly, these have been shown to figure, focally, as *a* (e.g. Extracts 41, 20, 29, 20 and 42) or *the* (e.g. Extract 19) resource employed to account for the complainability of some state of affairs by the original complainant (i.e. Extracts 41, 13, 20 and 42) or co-complainant (i.e. Extract 29). Secondly, “classed” categorisations were then shown to feature not as the heuristic with respect to which the tellable qualifies *qua* complainable, but where it is invoked to account for a constitutive component of the complaint-in-progress (see Extracts 20 and 42). “Social class”, on these occasions, was implicated into the production of complaints not as their ‘first order of business’ – as Stokoe and Edwards (2007: 367) put it – but feature, instead, as an ancillary account, or as an “*extra kick*”.²³¹ “Classed” categorisations therefore feature in complaints in two different capacities. The implicature of both are deserving of further exploration.

6.5.4 Discursus

It will be recalled that in the former collection, “classed” statuses were accepted by co-interlocutors as a legitimate dimension about which they can, justifiably, complain (e.g. Extracts 41, 13 and 29), and/or levy in order to account for diverse species of complainables (e.g. Extracts 20 and 42). In the latter collection, however, the complaint-in-progress is not interconnected with/to “social class” – nor is it ‘aggravated’ or ‘displaced’, thereby; exigencies examined by Schegloff (2005c: 453) and Edwards (2005: 16-19), respectively. The “classed” identities invoked are, instead, disconnected from the terms of initial complaint and, consequently, “de-economized” (here, see Sacks, 1978: 257). They share parallels, as such, with what Whitehead and Lerner (2009: 625-632) have referred to as the (seemingly) “gratuitous” production of “racial” categories, and intersects with Stokoe and Edwards’ (2007: 345-355, 367) observations regarding the *non-first* production of “ethnic” and “racial” categories in the delivery of institutional complaints.

²³¹ Schegloff’s (2005c: 465; cf. Jefferson, Sacks and Schegloff, 1987: 196, fn. 23) term.

However, in my collection, these classifications neither uncover the relevance of a hitherto “invisible” membership category (cf. Whitehead and Lerner, 2009), nor function to exonerate complainants from the position of persons who are motivated to complain about categorial statuses (cf. Stokoe and Edwards, 2007). They appear, instead, almost incidental to the complaint-in-progress. Nevertheless, they remain incorporated. In Extracts 20 and 42, their production is even unsolicited; the matter for which they account has not been problematised nor pursued by complaint-recipients. The complainants, on these occasions, therefore, instantiate the relevance of “classed” identities, but they neither attribute nor explain the complainable by referring to this status. The reasoning that underlies their production thus remains equivocal.

Candidate explanations for this recurrence are theoretically innumerable, and it is expectable that the collection of further cases will prove explicative in this regard (recall §3.3.3). In the interim, however, the function of these accounts encourages speculation. It is at least possible, for example, that it contributes to the work of accounting indirectly. Such instances could be described as ‘*surrogate complaint[s]*’ (see Jefferson, 1996: 60, fn. 26, italics in original; recall fn. 222), to this effect; complaints that are formed explicitly concerning non-“classed” matters (e.g. “hypocrisies”; see fn. 225), but which shroud the “classed” nature of its complainability – and, thus, attenuate the relevance of the set of membership categories that are co-implicated by/for the complainant (e.g. “classist”, “elitist”, “snobbish”, etc.).

Of course, this analysis remains indeterminate for my collection. Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter 4, such an attribution, without evidence, would verge upon an ironic manoeuvre. It is notable, however, that my collection, like Jefferson’s (1996: 23, 60, fn. 26) racial example (i.e. ‘he’s a [colored] guy’ [ibid.: 23]), includes the production of membership categorisations. The device of “social class”, in this instance, is, therefore, actuated by the complainant, and it is not “*suppressed*” (recall

fn. 108) wholesale.²³² It is possible, as a result, that the categorisation might be implicated to this effect. After all, it is difficult to imagine exactly how one might deliver an *indirect* complaint concerning “social class” without disclosing the device. Indeed, it will be recalled from Chapter 4 (e.g. §4.3) that the constitution of “social class”, in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction, remains in flux; the indexicality of which provides for its traction as an interactional resource. The resulting bind into which the complainant finds themselves thrust, therefore, is to ensure that such a “classed” hearing is made available for their recipient and is not supplanted by an equally viable alternative hearing.²³³ To put “social class” on record explicitly, therefore, but still *indirectly*, may offer a solution for this interactional dilemma.

Theoretically, therefore, it is possible that complaints can be designed to involve “classed” identities as an explanatory resource, and these can be formulated more or less clearly. The boundaries of this exposition, however, remain unclear. I have operated upon the premise that such components represent a *potential* locus of order (recall §3.2.1). Future EM/(M)CA research, however, could interrogate this assumption more rigorously.

6.6 Teases

The previous section introduced “classed” categorisations as an explanatory resource in the production of complaints; both direct and indirect. The latter form was modal across my collection. Instances of the former, by contrast, in which “classed” categorisations were ascribed to co-present co-interlocutors were, curiously, absent. Speaking theoretically, such an omission is unsurprising. To complain about something that can be accounted for by reference to “social class”, explicitly, leaves complainants vulnerable to attributions of discrimination (e.g. ‘classis[m]’ [Kitzinger, 2005a: 479], ‘class oppression’ [West and Zimmerman, 1995b: 508], to borrow the terms). There are, in this sense, “moral” impediments which expectably discourage this type of ascriptive work. Furthermore, were a co-interlocutor to account for a complainable through the invocation of another’s putatively “classed” conduct, the

²³² See also, Jefferson (1996: 8, 18, 20, 24 and 39), Schegloff (2005a) and Lerner (2013: 107).

²³³ On the problem of description, see, e.g., §2.2.1, §3.2.2, §3.4.1.2, §4.6.2 and §5.2.1.

complainee is positioned such that they can dispute the constitution of “social class” and/or the derivative category into which they are ascribed. What “social class” is, after all, as outlined in Chapter 4, is a “*live issue*”; one that can be contested and negotiated by co-interlocutors, *in situ*. For these reasons, it is unsurprising that co-interlocutors do not account for the complainable conduct of co-interlocutors in terms of “social class” explicitly.

One social action, however, in which the “classed” statuses of co-interlocutors are deployed in an explanatory capacity are *teases*. Akin to assessments and complaints, “*teases*” have long formed the focus of EM/(M)CA inquiry. Notable research in this tradition has canvassed their *form* (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 666; Vol. II: 99-100, 278-279; Glenn, 1995: 45, 48; Hopper, 1995: 58-59, 62-68, 69, fn. 1; Lerner, 2003: 197, fn. 5; Margutti, 2007: 644-648; Schegloff, 2007a: 29; Kendrick, 2015: 182-183; Artamonova, 2018), *recognisability* (e.g. Drew, 1987: 230-232; Schegloff, 1998b: 252, fn. 17), *sequelae* (e.g. Drew, 1987: 232-243; Lerner, 1992: 254; Hopper, 1995: 58-68; Margutti, 2007: 649; Haugh and Pillet-Shore, 2018: 255), the alternative *responses* they occasion (e.g. Drew, 1987; Hopper, 1995: 59-60; Haugh and Pillet-Shore, 2017: 260-264) in addition to their *social functions* (e.g. Drew, 1987: 250; Haugh and Pillet-Shore, 2018: 260; Artamonova, 2018: 19). Furthermore, teases have been recognised, similarly, as a resource used routinely in the service of *ascribing* (e.g. Antaki, 1998: 77-80; D. Day, 1998: 158-161; Artamonova, 2018), *forming* (e.g. Jackson, 2011b: 35) and *performing* (e.g. Rintel, 2015: 130-131, 141-148) social identities.

“Classed” identities have yet to be investigated in relation to this activity in EM/(M)CA research.²³⁴ In this section, I show that co-interlocutors ascribe “classed” categorisations to their co-interlocutors to account for both designedly dis-affiliative (e.g. Extract 43) and affiliative (e.g. Extract 44) teasings.²³⁵ An example of the former,

²³⁴ See Clift (1999: 543) for a discussion of a candidate case. For FA research, see Willis (1977: 29-34, 55, 96-97; 2001) on teasing by members of the “working class” and, differently, review Hollingworth and Williams (2009: 474-475) on ‘mockery’ in ‘class distinction work’.

²³⁵ An example of this practice was presented in Extract 11. Here, Ellen was ascribed an linguistically non-“classed” description (i.e. ‘common’ [l. 14]) and then classified into an

as produced through a “place term” (i.e. “[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ [l. 423]) has been considered in depth in Extract 39. It will be recalled, in this case, that the place term permitted a potentially “classed” metonymic hearing, adding to a list of socio-demographic dimensions with respect to which Adam is classifiable. In this section, I limit my focus to extended examples of this practice as they are made available through the ascription of “classed” categories (see →). Extract 43, a telephone call between Ellie and Sarah, presents an initial example of this exigency.

Extract 43 – CTS08

((A telephone call. Ellie and Sarah are discussing their holiday plans for the upcoming year.))

- 1 Sar: [Are you gonna come] ski:ing with me next=
 2 Ell: [()]
 3 Sar: =year huh huh
 4 (0.4)
 5 Ell: I’ll have to pay though. I don’t have any
 6 money to me pay with.
 7 (0.5)
 8 Sar: No::::
 9 (0.8)
 10 Sar: I don’t think it will happen anyway because
 11 they never take me on holiday
 12 Ell: Huh huh
 13 (2.3)
 14 Ell: Oh well if I c- if I start saving no:w (0.5)
 15 I’ll go on holiday in the summer.
 16 (0.5)
 17 Ell: When I’m ((age omitted)). huh huh huh

iteratively formulated linguistically “classed” category (i.e. ‘(You sure are ↓l:ow.)’ [l. 20]; ‘You’re jus’ (.) lower class () [l. 24]; ‘<*low:er:.*>’ [l. 28]), by Mike, owing to her “disattention” (see Mandelbaum, 1991/1992); specifically, her refusal to speak (i.e. ‘talk’ [l. 8]) with Mike *qua* allegiant of the Conservative Party (here, see Heritage and R. Watson, 1979: 140); a refusal that operates here, quite literally, as a “generative paradox” (à la Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 422).

18 Sar: Huh huh huh

19 Ell: I'll be there like woo: huh huh

20 Sar: Huh huh huh

21 Ell: I'll go for like two weeks or something.

22 (0.7)

23 Ell: I'll be celebrating finishing year eleven as

24 well.

25 (0.9)

26 Ell: That'll be go[od.

27 Sar: [I can't believe we're going

28 into year ten

29 (.)

30 Ell: Pardon?

31 Sar: I can't believe we're going into year ten

32 Ell: I know

33 Sar: And since when do you use that word

34 (1.7)

35 Ell: Year ten

36 (.)

37 Sar: Huh n(hh)o .hhh

38 (.)

39 Ell: What you on about

40 (0.3)

41 Sar: .HHH Then you normally just go what or eh and

42 you went (.) pardon? huh huh .hhhh hhhhhh

43 Ell: I sometimes say tha::t. I've just started

44 saying it. I don't know why

45 (1.7)

46 **Sar: → You decided to be a posh mosher huh huh huh**

47 **huh**

48 Ell: Huh huh huh .hhhhh that's quite funny.

49 (0.8)

50 Sar: [What?]

51 Ell: [Huh huh huh] huh .HHHHH

52 (7.2)

53 Ell: You don't have to be posh just because you

54 don't (0.2) talk like a scruff.

55 (0.9)
 56 Sar: Yeah. I know.
 57 (1.1)
 58 Ell: You can just be a nice mosh ()
 59 (1.9)
 60 Sar: You talk really quiet.

The tease in this extract, produced by Sarah, crystallises around Ellie’s selection of the “open class repair initiator” (hereafter, OCRI; see Drew, 1997) ‘Pardon?’ (l. 30).²³⁶ This repair initiator has been produced by Ellie in this extract as she orients to Sarah’s display of disbelief (ls. 27-28) as troublesome, infelicitous and/or inauspicious, in some way. After Sarah acquiesces to Ellie’s repair initiation (l. 31), Sarah then appends (‘And’ [l. 33]) a tease-implicative inquiry that concerns and, explicitly, topicalises (see Schegloff, 2007a: 155), an unspecified aspect of Ellie’s lexical choice: ‘And since when do you use that word’ (l. 33). This inquiry yields a designedly solemn, ‘po-faced response’ (see Drew, 1987: 251, fn. 3) from Ellie, who disattends to its tease-implicative valence by responding seriously, proffering a candidate troublesource, ‘Year ten’ (l. 35; see Schegloff et al., 1977: 363).

This candidate is demurred by Sarah, who preserves the tease-implicative valence of her inquiry through imbricated laughter: ‘Huh n(hh)o .hhh’ (l. 37; see Jefferson, 1985b: 28-29). It is here that Sarah then explicitly problematises Ellie’s choice of repair initiator (i.e. ‘Pardon?’ [l. 30]), putting the tease on-record: ‘.HHH Then you normally just go what or eh and you went (.) pardon? huh huh .hhhh hhhhhh’ (ls. 41-42). In this turn, Sarah contrasts the repair-initiators that are employed by Ellie, normatively (i.e. ‘what or eh’ [l. 41]), with what is cast as her comparably deviant selection on this occasion (‘and you went (.) pardon?’ [ls. 41-42]). Sarah orients to these practices (e.g. ‘what’ [l. 41] and ‘eh’ [l. 41]) as co-class members (i.e. “*Ellie’s-normative-forms-of-OCRI*”), but not as “*symmetrical alternatives*”.²³⁷ This differentiation is disputed by Ellie who furnishes three consecutive accounts for her

²³⁶ On the use of other-initiated repair (see Schegloff, 1997a; 2000c) in categorial and relational work, see Egbert (2004) and J. Robinson (2006), respectively.

²³⁷ Schegloff and Sacks’ (1973: 314 in Schegloff, 2007a: 59) phrase.

lexical choice (ls. 43-44). It is positioned as a resource that she does employ occasionally (i.e. ‘I sometimes say tha::t.’ [l. 43]); repositioned as a new acquisition (i.e. ‘I’ve just started saying it.’ [ls. 43-44]); and, finally, cast as a practice for which she cannot account adequately (i.e. ‘I don’t know why’ [l. 44]; see Bolden and J. Robinson, 2011: 105).²³⁸

These accounts are challenged by Sarah. Sarah counter-proposes that it is neither a practice that Ellie uses intermittently (cf. ls. 43-44), nor, indeed, that it has been serviced here unknowingly (cf. l. 44). Ellie’s OCRI is positioned, instead, as a categorial resource that has been employed *intentionally* (e.g. ‘decided’ [l. 46]; see, e.g., Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 161-162, 698-699; Heritage, 1988: 136-137; Schegloff, 1988: 124; 2002b: 331; Drew, 1998: 298; here, see also, Smith, 1978: 40-41), by Sarah, in a foiled attempt to design herself as an incumbent of a ‘hybrid’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 55), linguistically non-“classed” membership category; namely, ‘a posh mosher’ (l. 46).²³⁹ Sarah orients to Ellie’s OCRI (l. 30), in effect, inferentially, as a category-bound/tied component, or as a/the constitutive dimension thereof.²⁴⁰

In this case, it is unclear whether, for Sarah, this performance is regarded as an appropriate enactment, and/or a successful stylisation; where Ellie is treated, accordingly, as a “*bona-fide*” (see fn. 144) or ‘*genuine* member’ (here, see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 51, italics in original) – or, simply, as successfully ‘*passing*’ as such (here, see H. Garfinkel, 1967: 137, italics in original). Conversely, on an alternative hearing, Ellie’s conduct is treated as “fraudulent” (Goffman, 1951: e.g. 296-301) and/or ‘subversive’ (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 120); as a pretence, “hoax” (differently, see W. Sharrock and R. Turner, 1978: 185) or form of ‘social misrepresentation’ (see Goffman, 1963: 82). Sarah is thus cast, accordingly, as a “phoney” (see Sacks, 1992,

²³⁸ On ‘rehearsed “carelessness”’, see H. Garfinkel (1967: 172).

²³⁹ As Jackson (2011b: 36, fn. 5) notes: ‘A mosher is a UK term for a member of a youth culture that involves dancing (or ‘head-banging’) to rock/punk music and often dressing in dark clothes.’ Note also the “sound-relationship” (recall fn. 190) here with ‘posh’ (l. 46). I owe this observation to Professor Jenny Mandelbaum (p.c.).

²⁴⁰ On the use of “*pardon*” in the indication of ‘formality or distance’, see Schegloff (2005c: 468; see also, *ibid.*: 473).

Vol. I: 580; Sudnow, 1965: 269; H. Garfinkel, 1967: 163; Drew, 1987: 246),²⁴¹ and “degraded” (see H. Garfinkel, 1956) from the portrayed (or *feigned*) incumbency, thereby. This ambiguity notwithstanding, Sarah’s tease centres, nevertheless, on the generative implicature of Ellie’s word-selection, and its interpretation, by/for Sarah, as ‘hinting at an identification’ (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 580; see also, *ibid.*: 595; Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 223; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 100).

Extract 43 therefore supplies one initial example in which the “classed” implicature of a co-interlocutor’s co-present activity – the production of the OCRI, ‘Pardon?’ (l. 30) – explicitly furnishes the basis for a dis-affiliative tease. A contrastive and more affiliative example of this action is captured in Extract 44.

Extract 44 – CallHome-eng-6071

((A telephone call. A continuation from Extract 23. Kate and Malcolm are discussing Kate’s possible involvement with a here-unnamed non-present third-party.))

- 183 Mal: [.hhh] £O: [kay: .£]
- 184 Kat: [.hhh] [I- ↑I have a]feeling he does have
 185 an interest in me `cuz he’s >always-< (.)
 186 pulling my hair and rubbing my shoulders and
 187 looking straight into my eyes.= ↑He may just
 188 be a flirty *↓type* so we’ll find *↓out.*
 189 (0.2)
- 190 Kat: [.hh]
- 191 Mal: [Y]ou (sh)ould jus’ ↓do him: get it out of
 192 your sy*stem.*
 193 (0.3)
- 194 Kat: I mean the ↑thing is is that (.) I- (.) I’m a
 195 woman with (.) ↓cl:ass even though I’m

²⁴¹ Categories which accommodate such forms of (im-)personation include, e.g., “*conpersons*” (here, see Zimmerman, 1966: 230), “*finks*” (see Sacks, 1979 [1966]: 12; see also, *ibid.*: 14, fn. 1; 1992, Vol. I: 400), “*frauds*”, “*imposters*” (see Atkinson, 1976: n.p.g. in Atkinson, 1979: 270; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 96) and “*wannabes*”, *inter alia*.

196 basically a- (.) an aniɸmal hh[h. like a=
 197 Mal: [hh(hh)h.=
 198 Kat: =Pi][:g.ɸ].h[h]h >(h) [I'm li]ke [.hh]=
 199 Mal: =][°hah°] [°hah°] [Hah] [↑hah]
 200 Kat: =[h] ↑just=
 201 Mal: [°Hah°]
 202 Mal: =°hah hah°=
 203 Kat: =[↑ju]st
 204 Mal: [hah°]
 205 **Mal:** → **ɸCLASSY ↓ch[ick.ɸ]**
 206 Kat: [drip.]=
 207 Mal: =°hah° [°huh° [°hah° ↑hah °h[ah°
 208 Kat: [.hh [.hhh [.hhh ɸJust is
 209 like y(hh.)ou know .hh (.) don't talk (0.2)
 210 ↑jus' hhh.ɸ
 211 (0.5)
 212 Kat: .hhhh (.) ɸI'm a [↑nut.ɸ]
 213 **Mal:** → [**(ch')You're a] woman with**
 214 **class.**
 215 (.)
 216 Mal: Mmhmmɸ
 217 (.)
 218 Mal: [hh.]
 219 Kat: [Ah]a'right.
 220 Mal: [<ɸ↑OKAY.> HHh[hhh]h.
 221 Kat: [°(Classy)°]
 222 (0.3)
 223 Mal: °hu[h huh°]
 224 Kat: [h. .hh]hhh (0.2) [↑I (.) am::.]
 225 Mal: [So wait. (.) I ↑gue]ss:
 226 (.) I'll start (.) r:eally working from the
 227 eighth.

This interaction is re-joined as Kate rejects Malcom's previously resisted, and sexually allusive, "*just*"-formulated advising (ls. 191-192; see Holmes et al., 2017), casting herself "defensively" (i.e. 'I mean' [l. 194]; see Maynard, 2013), "self-depreciatively" (see Pomerantz, 1975: Ch. 4), and "elaborately" (see Drew, 1987: 235-243, 250), as

an incumbent of a designedly exculpatory category: ‘I’m a woman with (.) ↓cl:ass even though I’m basically a- (.) an ani£mal hh[h. like a [((...))] P*̄*i][:g.£].’ (ls. 194-196 and 198). This classification is treated, through Kate’s continuation, post-self-depreciation (i.e. ‘like a [((...))] P*̄*i][:g.£].’ [ls. 196 and 198]), as a class of ‘matters already established and accepted between the parties’ (Pomerantz, 1975: 107). However, more focal, for current purpose, is that Kate’s incumbency in the linguistically “classed” category is treated by Kate (ls. 196, 198 and 200), and Malcolm (ls. 199, 201-202, 204 and 207), *qua* laughable (see Pomerantz, 1975: 107-109; Glenn, 1995: 45; 2003: 113), but incommensurable with Malcolm’s proposed ‘course of future action’ (i.e. ls. 191-192; here, see Heritage and Sefi, 1992: 368). It is here, as Kate projects a further self-characterisation (see ls. 198, 200 and 203),²⁴² that Malcolm initiates the focal teasing.

Compared with Extract 43, the nature of this teasing is comparatively inexplicit. At a gloss, Malcolm indicates that the manner in which Kate has self-identified is, in some respects, flawed. This is accomplished in this sequence through the consecutive ascription of Kate into linguistically “classed” membership categories; a practice seen previously in Mike’s teasing in Extract 11 (ls. 13-14, 20, 24 and 28; see fn. 235). The first iteration of this activity begins in an “anticipatory completion” (see Lerner, 1991: 444-446; 2004b: 247-249) as Malcolm ascribes Kate into the linguistically “classed” category of a ‘£CLASSY ↓ch[ick.£]’ (l. 205).²⁴³ This is a ‘hybrid’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 55) ascription, or “formulation” (e.g. Heritage and R. Watson, 1979), of her own, comparatively “*over-built*”²⁴⁴ self-avowal (i.e. ls. 194-195). A second ascription then occurs following Kate’s designedly jocular “insanity ascription” (i.e. l. 212; see R. Turner, 1974 [1970]; Coulter, 1973a; 1975; Smith, 1974). Kate is newly ascribed, by Malcolm, here, into a second linguistically “classed” membership category: ‘[(ch’)You’re a] woman with class.’ (ls. 213-214; recall fn. 106). In this formulation, the avowed relevance of “social class” is preserved, not dispensed; it simply reverts from a “category-constitutive” (i.e. l. 205; Jayyusi, 1984 [2014]: 35) phenomenon,

²⁴² On this “post-overlap hitch”, see Livingston (1987: 67-72). Relatedly, see Schegloff (2000b: 17-18).

²⁴³ On “subversive” and/or “nonserious” completions, see Lerner (1994: 27).

²⁴⁴ See Atkinson and Drew (1979: 263-264, fn. 10).

back to the “category-bound/tied” (ls. 213-214) formulation advanced by Kate (see ls. 194-195).

These ascriptions work to account for the teasing component in this extract; namely, Kate’s potentially serious identification within the linguistically “classed” category ‘a woman with (.) ↓cl:ass’ (ls. 194-195). Extract 44, in this vein, parallels Extract 43, offering a second case in which a teasing is attributed, by the teaser, to hinge on the linguistically “classed” incumbency of the ridiculed party. In this case, this identity is not one that has been educed from Kate’s situated conduct (cf. Extract 43) but is self-avowed (i.e. ls. 194-195). This case also differs from Extract 43 as the tease is produced in a designedly “*affiliative*” context. The teased-party, in this case, self-positions as a “*butt*” (see Glenn, 1995: 45; 2003: 113, italics in original), and a modification of the teased identity is even appreciated by Kate (i.e. l. 221; see Glenn, 1995: 54; 2003: 131), *sotto voce*. This contrasts with the previous teases which are responded to seriously (here, see Drew, 1987), denied (cf. Extract 43: ls. 53-54; see D. Day, 1998; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1998), treated as self-validating (e.g. Extract 39: ls. 427-438), or which occasion recriminations (cf. Extract 11: l. 129; see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 40-48; Coulter, 1995b: 331; see also, see Glenn, 2003: 126-127).

6.6.1 Summary

Extracts 43 and 44 therefore present cases in which co-interlocutors mobilise a linguistically non-“classed” and a linguistically “classed” formulation of a co-interlocutor’s (*qua* “tease-recipient”) “classed” identity, respectively, in order to account for tease deliveries. In Extract 43, the category of ‘posh mosher’ (l. 46) was ascribed to Ellie for producing the OCRI, ‘Pardon?’ (l. 30). In Extract 44, Kate was ascribed the categories of a ‘£CLASSY ↓ch[ick.£]’ (l. 205) and ‘a] woman with class.’ (ls. 213-214) on the basis of her self-depreciative categorisation (ls. 194-196 and 198). Extracts 43 and 44 thus present two cases in which a co-interlocutor (*qua* teaser) delivers a tease that is accounted for by reference to the “classed” identity of a co-interlocutor. This identity has been made “behaviourally available” (recall fn. 47); implicated (e.g. Extract 43) and/or avowed (e.g. Extract 44). The ascription of “classed” identities appears, in this way, as a constitutive property involved in accounting for teases. Drew’s (1987: 243) observation, that teases can be serviced to attribute ‘deviant action/categories’, therefore resonates.

6.7 Chapter summary

The two empirical chapters that preceded have addressed how “social class” is rendered see-able and analysable for EM/(M)CA research. In this chapter, I have operationalised the practices described in Chapters 4 and 5 to investigate the pragmatics of linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations. This is a focus that has been acknowledged, but not focalised, across the previous chapters. In this chapter, I have shown that the practices introduced in Chapters 4 and 5, of membership categories (Extracts 12, 06, 19, 13, 20, 42, 43 and 44), locational formulations (i.e. Extracts 40, 25, 41), and place terms (i.e. Extracts 29 and 39), are serviced to accomplish *explanatory* work in a range of social actions. Recurrently, these included *evaluative assessments* (§6.4), *complaints* (§6.5) and *teases* (§6.6).

With respect to assessments, I have shown that this work has a sequenced production; namely, *pre-positioning* (see Extract 12 and 40) and *post-positioning* (see Extract 25 and 06). For “*complaints*”, I have distinguished their production as *a* (e.g. Extracts 41, 20, 29 and 42) and *the* (e.g. Extract 19) explanatory resource; their use in accounting for *direct* (e.g. Extract 19) and *indirect* complaints (i.e. Extracts 41, 13, 29, 20 and 42); their production by either the *original* complainant (i.e. Extracts 41, 20, 42, 19 and 33) or by a *co-complainant* (i.e. Extract 29); and their use to account for a complaint *wholesale* (i.e. Extracts 41, 19, 13 and 29), or for some *subsidiary* aspect thereof (i.e. Extracts 20 and 42). Finally, for “*teases*”, I have demonstrated that the linguistically (non-)“classed” status of the teased-party is routinely mobilised to account for the teasable nature of a tellable-in-progress. Their production in *affiliative* (see Extract 44) and *disaffiliative* teases (e.g. Extract 43) were differentiated in this section.

The practices canvassed in Chapters 4 and 5 have therefore been introduced as a flexible interactional resource; one that co-interlocutors can mobilise, routinely, to *account* for a variety of social actions in a number of sequential positions. As acknowledged previously, in Chapter 2, existing EM/(M)CA research conducted in institutional settings (see §2.5.1) has upheld this focus consistently; however, it has accommodated linguistically non-“classed” orientations exclusively (see §2.5.2). Minimally, therefore, this chapter furnishes a novel contribution by extending this purview to “*ordinary talk*” and, further, by analysing *linguistically* “classed”

instantiations; occasions in which co-interlocutors themselves avow “classed” relevancies. Furthermore, this chapter also offers an important contribution to the study of how social identities are (co-)produced across social actions, while at the same time remaining attentive to their sequenced production. A contribution is therefore made to the growing body of EM/(M)CA literature that upholds this dual focus (for review, see Whitehead, 2012: 338).

Chapter 7 – Discussion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a summary of the foremost contributions of this thesis. For continuity, these are situated in relation to the three research questions introduced in Chapter 1. The second section outlines a notable omission from my research. Five directions for future EM/(M)CA inquiries are then outlined which redress this omission. These areas of analysis have been partially prefigured by my inquiry but have not formed an abiding focus. A section dedicated to the limitations of my research then follows, in which I address empirical and conceptual omissions. I conclude with a summary of my research and of the status of “social class” for EM/(M)CA research more broadly.

7.2 Summary of findings

The novel findings of this thesis have been presented, predominantly, over Chapters 4, 5 and 6; my three empirical chapters. These have attended to the first two of my three research questions directly (recall §1.7.1); namely:

- (1) How is “social class” conceptualised and reflexively rendered see-able and accountable by and for co-interlocutors?
- (2) Which social actions, activities and interactional projects are accomplished, recurrently, when co-interlocutors make “social class” demonstrably relevant?

Chapters 4 and 5 have addressed my first research question, concerning the *interactional practices* employed by co-interlocutors which make “social class” relevant. Chapter 6 then recovered my second question, concerning *social action*. These chapters have each yielded a number of novel empirical findings. For a complete review, my respective chapter summaries should be consulted. The subsections that follow provide an abbreviated review of key contributions, only, for economy.

My third research question, I propose, while comparatively focussed-off, has been addressed through the *sum* of these contributions:

- (3) What can EM/(M)CA contribute to sociological investigations of “social class”?

Notable contributions to this effect have been outlined programmatically across Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 has provided the methodological terms of this contribution. Illustrative empirical contributions have then been documented over Chapters 4, 5 and 6. A summary of these different contributions are recapitulated below.

7.2.1 Interactional practices

My first question concerned how “social class” is conceptualised within talk-in-interaction and, with it, how members’ conceptualisations can be observed, *in situ*. This research question, I have claimed, represents a prerequisite for the analysis of “social class”. Before the practical activities for which “classed” orientations are mobilised can be pursued, it is necessary to first adjudicate what qualifies as an orientation towards “social class”. My first research question targeted this concern; one that has been addressed in this thesis explicitly over Chapters 4 and 5. Two families of interactional practices have been introduced in these chapters. These involve the ascription of “classed” membership categories (i.e. Chapter 4) and “classed” references to place (i.e. Chapter 5).

Chapter 4 began by distinguishing “social class” from other dimensions of social identity; aspects that have formed a more recurrent locus of EM/(M)CA research (§4.3). The procedures used in extant EM/(M)CA research (see §2.4) to analyse “social class” were introduced (§4.4). Using “*wealth*” as an illustrative ontology, I indicated the empirical “*defeasibility*” of the prevailing procedure (§4.5): When analysts define “social class” on behalf of co-interlocutors, they not merely risk stipulating its relevance when it is not demonstrably imparted, *in situ*, but they also risk encountering deviant cases. This can include instances in which co-interlocutors construe “social class” differently – even in ways that can explicitly contradict definitions nominated by analysts, *a priori*. The remainder of this chapter made a

case for the initial focus on the ascription of *linguistically* “classed” categories (e.g. “middle class”), specifically.

Three of the key affordances of this approach were then introduced; specifically, “agency”, “ontology” and “intersubjectivity”. Respectively, I demonstrated that linguistically “classed” categories afford members “agency” to determine how “social class” is conceptualised in moments of their avowed use (see §4.6.1.4). This differed from the analysis of linguistically non-“classed” categories (e.g. “rich”) which permit comparable forms of ontological work, but which are not set forth in avowedly “classed” terms. Their adjudication as relevantly “classed” relies instead on the determinations made by analysts, *ex cathedra*. Secondly, I proposed that linguistically “classed” categories can be configured by co-interlocutors to afford their recipients access to the operative *ontologies* which demonstrably underpin expressly “classed” membership categories (see §4.6.1). This ontological work was shown to be accomplished at various sequential positions and to accommodate a diverse, and a potentially indefinitely extendable repertoire of designedly “classed” theorisations. Lastly, I demonstrated that the analysis of linguistically “classed” occasions furnishes important observations for “intersubjectivity” (see §4.6.2). It was shown that while “social class” can be defined by co-interlocutors in a myriad of ways, they routinely remain understandable. Even when linguistically “classed” categorisations were not self-explicated, they were not expressly problematised on this basis. Instead, such occasions were motivated pragmatically, troubled by virtue of their praxiological functions, and not as a by-product of referential inadequacy. The chapter then concluded by reconciling the status of linguistically *non-“classed”* categorisations (i.e. §4.7); the exclusive focus of preceding EM/(M)CA research regarding “social class” (see Chapter 2). The notion of “possibles” (see Schegloff, 1996c) was introduced in this section to accommodate the analysis of these occasions but to distinguish them from avowed orientations.

Chapter 4, in so doing, has provided a focussed investigation of my first research question, concerning how “social class” is conceptualised and made witnessable by co-interlocutors in talk-in-interaction. The chapter has canvassed a recurrent interactional practice employed by co-interlocutors in ordinary talk; namely, the ascription of linguistically “classed” membership categories. This was identified as a

recurrent practice whereby “social class” comes to be occasioned within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction. The chapter extracted a number of novel empirical features of this practice in addition to proposing conceptual and methodological recommendations for EM/(M)CA research. The distinction between linguistically “classed” and linguistically non-“classed” orientations, for example, has formed the central architecture around which the remainder of the thesis has been organised. Not only has this been upheld across Chapters 5 and 6, but it also furnishes a basis for cumulative, reproducible EM/(M)CA research. In this vein, Chapter 4 has addressed my first research question; a contribution furthered by Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 introduced a second family of practices which renders “social class” see-able in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction; specifically, “classed” references to place. Two species of this practice were introduced. The first concerned “classed” categorisations of “*locational formulations*” (see Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b); references to place that are (co-)produced in the service of referring. Five practices that were employed to situate such references in “classed” terms were introduced: “*characterisations*” (§5.5.1), “*allusions*” (§5.5.2), “*co-selections*” (§5.5.3) – both “*prospective*” (§5.5.3.1) and “*retrospective*” (§5.5.3.2) – and “*intentional misidentifications*” (§5.5.4). By so doing, it was shown that the “classed” categorisations of locations are a recurring resource in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction whereby “social class” is occasioned, made see-able and, therefore, accountable. The second species of place reference was the production of “*place terms*”; references to place that are (co-)produced in an alternative *metonymic* capacity. Locations, I claimed, are not merely a resource that can be “classed” by co-interlocutors but can also actuate the relevance of the device in its own right.

Chapter 5 coheres with Chapter 4, in this vein, in contribution to my first research question, concerning the practices that occasion and make observable and/or accountable “social class”. Most notably, it has been shown that co-interlocutors possess an extensive range of practices which relevance of “social class” through locational formulations, and/or can actuate “classed” relevancies in their own right through the production of place terms. References to place thus accompany the production of “classed” membership categories as a second family of practices in which “social class” is oriented to within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction.

Chapters 4 and 5 have, therefore, designedly addressed my first research question. It has been this analysis which has provided the basis for subsequent focus on social action; my second concern.

7.2.2 Social actions

As I have outlined in Chapter 3 (§3.2.1), a key commitment that underpins CA research is its '*activity focus*' (Drew and Heritage, 1992: 17, italics in original). Focal here are the "pragmatics" of talk-in-interaction; the work for which constituent components are mobilised on occasions of their use. This dimension of inquiry was introduced in Chapters 3 (§3.2.1) and 6 (§6.2) not only as a central focus of CA research, generally, but as the predominant heuristic assumed by foregoing CA research in order to investigate "categorisations" and orientations to "social class", specifically (see §2.4). This focus has been acknowledged across my analyses in Chapters 4 and 5, iteratively. However, a concentrated praxiological analysis was offset by my focus on interactional practices; a prerequisite for this investigation (§1.7.2). Only in Chapter 6, after interactional practices were detailed, was social action then retrieved.

The specific focus of Chapter 6 concerned the activities for which the families of practices introduced across Chapters 4 and 5 were mobilised. Three social actions were disaggregated across this chapter; viz. "*evaluative assessments*" (§6.4), "*complaints*" (§6.5) and "*teases*" (§6.6). As I have qualified, these activities did not exhaust the nature of the work for which the practices outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 were employed; instead, they simply represent three recurring activities across my dataset in which orientations to "classed" identities were employed consistently. In this case, the activities cohered insofar as "classed" orientations operated in a relevantly *explanatory* capacity within each activity. "Classed" orientations were produced to account for how some state-of-affairs could be treated as a relevantly "*assessable*", "*complainable*" and "*teasable*" object – or to account for some component that is configured as designedly epiphenomenal, thereof (e.g. §6.5.2). To summarise, Chapter 6 has introduced "social class" as a resource for social action, highlighting its use in the service of accounting within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction.

My second research question has in this way been addressed in Chapter 6 most explicitly. I have shown that when co-interlocutors service linguistically (non-)“classed” orientations, they are neither “*language idling*”,²⁴⁵ nor are they invested in abstract “*ontological work*”.²⁴⁶ Instead, the purposes for which they are mobilised are, fundamentally, mundane, situated and practical. This is not only with respect to the practices upon which this work is predicated, but also their praxiological utility. As outlined in Chapter 6, the activity of “*accounting*” (see §6.3) represents a central function of this work and obtains across heterogenous action-types. Presumably, however, “social class” is not limited to this function. The analysis of its use in additional, potentially variegated even unanticipated social actions (here, see, e.g., Sacks, 1984a: 22; Schegloff, 1996a; Clift, 2012: 71; Sidnell, 2017; G. Raymond, 2018: 75-81) therefore pends the commitment of future EM/(M)CA research.

7.2.3 Sociology

My third research question concerned the contributions that are posed by EM/(M)CA research for the sociological forms of “class-analysis”. Unlike the two previous research questions, my contributions here have not been addressed in a dedicated empirical chapter. My contribution, I propose, is, instead, comparatively pervasive, and is addressed through this thesis *qua gestalt*.

Chapters 1 and 2, for example, have set forth the terms of this contribution *programmatically*. Chapter 1 demonstrated that sociological and sociolinguistic research has consistently omitted the study of three areas of inquiry that are accommodated through EM/(M)CA uniquely. The study of talk-in-interaction; occasions in which individuals (*qua* co-interlocutors) define “social class” for themselves; and in which “classed” identities are made relevant by individuals, represent three foci of EM/(M)CA, but are omitted from FA traditions of “class-analysis”. Chapter 2 articulated the potential contributions of EM/(M)CA research through reference to its unique approach towards social identity. The collection of insights that have been anticipated (i.e. §2.3.4), and/or gleaned (i.e. §2.4), through

²⁴⁵ Wittgenstein’s (n.d. [EJBH: 1968 [1953]: §132] in Drew, 2005: 74) phrase. Recall §6.2.

²⁴⁶ Rose’s (1967: 138) phrase. Recall fn. 56.

prior EM/(M)CA research were here reviewed and the terms of my contributions adumbrated (i.e. §2.5.3).

Chapter 3 outlined further novel contributions that are provided for through the EM/(M)CA approach and with respect to its unique set of methodological commitments. I demonstrated that the use of CA and MCA not merely offers the means to study the domain of talk-in-interaction rigorously (see §3.3), through a coherent set of underlying commitments (see §3.2.1), but that it also affords a reproducible, empirical apparatus that can be used to gauge how co-interlocutors define “social class” for themselves, and thus whereby “*participatory relevance*” can be adjudicated. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 presented the results of this operationalisation, illustrating the potential insights that can be gleaned through this strand of empirical research. I have shown, in so doing, that the EM/(M)CA apparatus can be used to identify how “social class” is theorised (e.g. Chapter 4), formulated (e.g. Chapters 4 and 5) and employed (e.g. Chapter 6) within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction.

The contributions posed by EM/(M)CA research for sociological “class-analysis” have therefore been made available *programmatically* (see Chapters 1-2), *methodologically* (see Chapter 3) and realised *empirically* (see Chapters 4-6). It is worth qualifying, however, that the exact nature of this contribution remains, irremediably, perspectival, and will be relativised according to the commitments valorised by sociological readerships. The primacy that is assigned to “social interaction”, for example, is one expectable axis along which import could be processed differently. As it is upheld in this thesis, for example, talk-in-interaction could be understood to represent a/the primary form of human sociality, and a constitutive domain that underlies the organisational properties of social life (see §3.2.1). Submitted to such reading, the (co-/re-)production of “classed” identities would be understood, accordingly, to undergird sociality as a *primary* resource. Alternatively, when positioned differently, my analysis could, theoretically, be situated simply as an *extension* of FA sociological research; as a qualitative exploration of “classed” orientations in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction. For readers so inclined, my analysis could be reconciled as a progressively granular specification of existing research conducted in the domain of everyday life (see §1.6.1).

In this case, I have aligned with the former reading; a “radical” as opposed to an ‘incorporationist’ (R. Watson, 1994: 177; see also, Eglin and Hester, 1999: 197) interpretation. Nonetheless, I trust to have shown that the novelty of my thesis does not rely upon such a reading. Whether readers share my perspective – or simply assimilate EM/(M)CA as a(nother) form of “micro-analysis” (recall fn. 89) – EM/(M)CA nevertheless offers a valuable, novel resource that can be employed in order to examine “social class” in talk-in-interaction. In either case, I trust to have distinguished EM/(M)CA as neglected form of “class-analysis”; one that has been employed on only a handful of occasions (§2.4), exclusively on interactions in perspicuous, institutional settings (§2.5.1), and with a sole focus on linguistically non-“classed” orientations (§2.5.2). To whichever interpretation the reader subscribes, therefore, does not diminish its novelty, it simply configures it differently and affords an opportunity to commence an oft-neglected dialogue between EM/(M)CA and FA research (here, see Goffman 1980 in Verhoeven, 1993 [1980]: 345; Schegloff in Čmerjková and Prevignano, 2003: 27; relatedly, see Sudnow, 1978: 153-154; Maynard and Clayman, 2018: 128).²⁴⁷ In this respect, EM/(M)CA is available for “class-analysis” and is an approach that betokens a number of diverse, potentially hitherto unanticipated observations.

7.2.4 Summary

The three research questions set forth at the outset of my inquiry have thus been addressed across Chapters 1-6. *Inter alia*, I have demonstrated that “social class” is occasioned through a recurring set of practices in ordinary talk; two of which have been focalised in Chapters 4 and 5. These practices, I have shown, are mobilised in the service of an array of social actions within Chapter 6. My focus, here, has crystallised around their use in “*accounting*” across a range of action-types. It is on the basis of this analysis, *qua gestalt*, that this thesis has illustrated the potential of EM/(M)CA as a distinctive, hitherto underutilised approach that is available for

²⁴⁷ On the availability of such a dialogue, see, e.g., Maynard (1984: 13), Pollner (1987: xvi), Schegloff (2005b: 457, 475) and Maynard and Clayman (2018). On sequencing, see, e.g., Sacks (1990 [1963]: 89-90, fn. 8; see also, Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 41-42).

“class-analysis”. This contribution has been articulated in programmatic, methodological and empirical terms. On this basis, I have proposed that EM/(M)CA represents a novel and productive domain for sociological research regardless of whether a “radical” or an “incorporationist” (see R. Watson, 1994: 177) interpretation of this thesis is preferred.

7.3 Future research

My three research questions have, therefore, been explored. However, this is not to say that the EM/(M)CA respecification of “social class” research has been fully realised, nor that this research is without enduring omissions. Several prospective projects that could be taken up elsewhere have been interwoven into my analysis, to this effect. This has included, for example, EM/(M)CA positions on *representative* research and *generalisability* (§3.4.1.2; §5.7, respectively) and the analysis of *non-vocal practices* (§3.3.1; fn. 69) and *intersectionality* (§2.4.2.2; fn. 112) as they pertain to “social class”, specifically. In the subsections that follow, I choose to salvage only those novel “*threads*”²⁴⁸ that have been occasioned by my research, uniquely. The four areas highlighted above, for example, have each been situated in terms of EM/(M)CA research in authoritative expositions (e.g. Peräkylä, 2011; Gobo, 2008; M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010; Whitehead, 2013, respectively). Thus, while the EM/(M)CA positions, thereon, have not been situated vis-à-vis “social class”, specifically, the thrust of these standpoints, I propose, obtains readily. I therefore refrain from further engagement to avoid repetition.

In this section, I restrict my remit to *orientations* to “social class”. As clarified in Chapter 4 (§4.4), this is but one medium that can be used to investigate “social class” in EM/(M)CA research. An alternative line, for example, acknowledged previously, would involve analysing *enactments* of “social class” – and/or “social classes”. The effectuation of “received pronunciation” (RP), for example, is one possible oral resource that could be analysed to this effect (here, see Extracts 06 and 39). Enactments of “social class/es” are, therefore, available for future EM/(M)CA research. However, as this focus contrasts the prevailing scope of my thesis,

²⁴⁸ Mandelbaum’s (1991/1992: 109) term.

concerning *orientations*, I confine my remit here accordingly, for the sake of continuity.

My purview here will be limited to five lines of inquiry that arise from my analysis directly and that are interconnected as constitutive components of “classed” orientations. This dimension has been selected as it has not been pursued in detail in this thesis. While it formed the focus of my research in Chapter 4, concerning “*ontology*”, further inquiries were not pursued. The five lines of inquiry that follow have therefore been selected to respond to a deficiency of the present research. Respectively, these concern: (1) how “classed” membership categories are cast as *available* by co-interlocutors (§7.3.1); (2) how they are *temporalised* (§7.3.2), (3) *organised* (§7.3.3) and (4) *distributed* (§7.3.4); and (5) the *delicacy* with which orientations are (co-)produced (see §7.3.5). For completeness, and fidelity, each candidate line of inquiry is connected back to extracts cited previously into which indicative cases are smuggled; a practice borrowed from previous EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Schegloff et al., 1977: 366, fn. 11). While these extracts cannot be not reproduced here, in the interests of space, they remain eligible for repeated, re-examinations at the discretion, and patience, of the reader.

7.3.1 Availability

How “social class” is theorised by co-interlocutors, *in situ*, has formed the focus of Chapter 4. A related line of inquiry that has not been addressed explicitly, however, concerns the bases by reference to which co-interlocutors come to derive and credential “classed” memberships. This relates to “*availability*” (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 2); that is, how “classed” identities are produced by co-interlocutors to index how these categories have been derived. It will be recalled from Chapter 2 (§2.3.4) that this dimension has been recognised in previous “*propaedeutic commentaries*” on “social class”. “Classed” identities have been oriented to as both those which are ‘*perceptually available*’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 74, italics in original; e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1967: 119; Schegloff, 1972a: 91; 1972b: 111; Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 122; West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 26-27; Pascale, 2007: 80, 84-85; see also, Wieder 1974b: 167, fn. 11), in addition to those treated as ‘*behaviourally available*’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 74, my emphasis), such as through aspects of situated and

reported conduct (see, e.g., Sacks, 1988/1989: 53; 1992, Vol. I: 742; Vol. II: 122; M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 183-186).

These two species of availability, as canvassed by Jayyusi (2014 [1984]), have not been focalised in this thesis. Examples of cases in which co-interlocutors orient towards these categories in corresponding terms, however, can be found enclosed. Instances of the latter, concerning ‘[b]ehavioural availability’ (ibid.: 73, italics in original) are predominant within my collection. Endogenously, regarding co-interlocutors’ conduct, this included the selection of OCRIs (see Extract 43), infelicitous syntax (see Extract 19), and the purposive reticence of co-interlocutors (see Extract 11). Conversely, exogenously, concerning non-present parties, this included (forms of) ownership (i.e. Extract 12), language (e.g. Extract 18), occupational status (e.g. Extract 16), and (an absence of) odour (e.g. Extract 27). Future EM/(M)CA research, therefore, could address the study of such categorial insignia, and how these are oriented to by co-interlocutors. This represents a line of inquiry in its own right, but it could also be furthered through a praxiological investigation of the work for which availabilities are put by co-interlocutors (e.g. “*accounting*”; see Chapter 6).

Future EM/(M)CA research could progress this line of analysis, identifying the common bases by reference to which “social class” is made *available*, and the social actions/activities for which availabilities (e.g. perceptual, behavioural, etc.) are serviced, *in situ*. Together, these would make available a number of comparatively nuanced areas for future analysis. Concerning “*perceptual availabilities*”, for example, a candidate investigation concerns whether co-interlocutors treat “social class” as a device that is made see-able *directly* through their orientations, and/or whether it is positioned as mediated (e.g. derived, inferred) vicariously through some directly observable set of corresponding indicators (e.g. “wealth”/“homelessness”, etc.).²⁴⁹ Equally, concerning “*behavioural availabilities*”, subsequent research might

²⁴⁹ For comparable distinctions, see Jayyusi’s (2014 [1984]: 68) contrast between “stage-of-life” membership and natural “age”, where the former is available ‘on sight’, while the latter is ‘assignable or disclosable’. Relatedly, see also Sudnow (1979: Ch. 21) on “hearing” and

investigate how availabilities come to be preserved in, and/or policed by co-interlocutors (see, e.g., Sacks, 1979 [1966]; 1992, Vol. II: 118-119). Examples of status incongruities, for example – or forms of ‘social misrepresentation’ (Goffman, 1963: 82) – have been encountered in Extracts 19 and 43. Samuel and Ellie, in these cases, were differently classified as persons who mis-represented themselves in possibly “classed” terms. In both cases, they are cast as revelations betrayed communicatively (recall fn. 219); namely, infelicitous syntax and non-standard reparative conduct, respectively. Whether investigated in their own right, therefore, or for their practical uses, the constitution of “classed” availabilities represents an expectably profitable area for future EM/(M)CA research.

7.3.2 Temporality

A second line of inquiry for future EM/(M)CA research concerns the *temporal* dimensions of “classed” incumbencies. This component has been considered in programmatic terms only within this thesis. The FA research reviewed in Chapter 1, it will be recalled, has treated “classed” identities, recurrently, as *enduring* statuses. This has been achieved by operationalising the concept as a veritable “*threshold phenomenon*” (see Schegloff, 1991: 62; 1992a: 127, italics in original); a status that can be ascribed to members upon their fulfilment of conditions that have been nominated by analysts. EM/(M)CA research, in contrast, has respecified this approach. As outlined in Chapter 2 (§2.2.1) and 3 (§3.2.1), social identities are not treated by default as “*omnirelevant*”²⁵⁰ incumbencies; instead, they represent contingent properties that are occasioned and made relevant over the course of determinate sequences of conduct. This is the procedural, programmatic sense in which the temporal components of social identity have been accommodated in this research. What has been comparatively neglected are those occasions in which “classed” statuses are *temporalised* by co-interlocutors, *in situ*. Like the study of categorial “*availabilities*” (§7.3.1), this represents a further area of inquiry for EM/(M)CA exploration.

“listening”. On different “knowables”, generally, see Labov and Fanshel (1977: e.g. 62), Pomerantz (1980: 187-191) and Heritage (2012a: 4).

²⁵⁰ See Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 515, italics in original).

One initial line of prospective inquiry, for example, could investigate how temporalities are built into the (co-)production of linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisations. Some categories, after all, can be delimited by co-interlocutors as *transient* statuses. Illustrative examples of this work include “action-” or “event-consequent/specific/tied categories” (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: e.g. 62, 66, 115, 261, fn. 7). These membership categories are tied to and/or generated by temporally bounded activities, and/or which are particularised to certain characterological or epistemic domains (here, see §7.4.1). Alternatively, “classed” incumbencies may be cast as comparatively durable, lasting and ‘*stable*’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 66, italics in original; see also, Zimmerman and Pollner, 1974 [1970]: 97; Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 519); that is, for example, amplified, stabilised and/or tenured, as a ‘transportable identity’ (see Zimmerman, 1998: 91) and/or ‘indefeasible status’ (see Coulter, 1973a: 158). An example of this is Eric’s orientation to the constituent “classed” categories which compose ‘Russia’ (l. 58) in Extract 31. In this case, the categories that populate this location (§5.5.1.2) are cast as *eternal* both adverbially (i.e. ‘always’ [l. 57], ‘Always’ [l. 58]) and through use of the ‘historical present’ (i.e. ‘And the intelligentsia (0.5) just sh:it on (.) >the normal Russians.<’ [ls. 58-60]; here, see Edwards and Fasulo, 2006: 360). Co-interlocutors, therefore, are equipped with resources to delimit temporal incumbencies. How “classed” categories become temporalised differently (e.g. eternalised), therefore, represents a further area of possible inquiry. The practices employed to this effect, in addition to the nature their practical import, await description (e.g. G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 700).

Two further lines of inquiry that have been touched-off within this thesis concern forms of ‘incumbency entry’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 57, 66), and how “classed” identities are avowedly “dispensed” (recall fn. 177), exited and/or terminated by members. One indicative distinction for the former, for example, concerns being “locatable *in*” or “coming *from*” “classed” categorisations. Three variations of this formulation have been encountered in this thesis, but which have been otherwise disattended. This includes the constructions of “*growing up in*” (e.g. Extract 05) “classed” settings, being “*conceived by*” avowedly “classed” incumbents” (e.g. Extract 14); and “*coming from*” “classed” locations (e.g. Extracts 25, 28 and 34) and groups (e.g. Extracts 12; see also, Extract 20). These formulations are markedly *offset*,

and differ from comparatively direct, unmediated ascriptions in which parties are cast directly as incumbents of “classed” categories (cf., e.g., Extract 16).²⁵¹ However, whether this distinction translates pragmatically, in which mediated and unmediated categorisations are employed in different species of interactional work, awaits EM/(M)CA research.²⁵² A related distinction that pends inquiry relates to whether “classed” categories are constructed to be statuses that can be exited, ceded and/or treated as ‘erasable’ (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 61; see also, Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 262, fn. 18), or whether they are cast as obdurate and/or everlasting. Both accession and secession from “classed” categories, after all, is provided for through terms in the natural language (e.g. “*parvenu*”; “*nouveau riche*”). How these categories are employed *in situ*, however, remain unexplored.

7.3.3 Organisation

A third potential area for future EM/(M)CA research concerns the structural *organisation* of “classed” membership categories. This component, like the dimensions of *availability* and *temporality*, have been addressed previously in my analysis, but not focalised. Two design features of “classed” categories have been noted, in particular. The first concerns how incumbents can be “*partitioned*” (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 590; see also, *ibid.*, Vol. II: 110). It was recognised in Chapter 2 (recall fn. 42), for example, that “classed” categories could be formulated as what Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 47) has referred to as a ‘two-set class’ device. Examples of this configuration recur across this thesis (e.g. Extracts 02, 06 and 31).²⁵³ Extract 31, for example, renders this explicitly. Eric, in this case, through the division of ‘the intelligentsia’ (l. 58) and ‘>the normal Russians.<’ (ls. 59-60) in avowedly “classed” terms (i.e. ‘two ↓classes’ [l. 57]), formulates this relationship explicitly as a

²⁵¹ This division is evocative of Linton’s (1938 in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 58) distinction between ‘*acquired*’ and ‘*ascribed*’ statuses.

²⁵² Intuitively, it is possible that distinctions function as resource for *distanciations* – or for accomplishing “role distance” (see Goffman, 1972 [1961b]: e.g. 95). They may operate as “modifiers” (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 44-45) in this respect: occasioning whilst simultaneously liberating the population described from the inferences that are normatively associable with the category of persons from which they are divorced.

²⁵³ On the persistence of “two-set” constructions, see Ossowski (1963: 33-37, 87).

‘dichotomy’ (l. 75), and the constitutive categories, subsumed, are polarised, accordingly, as a “*contrastive pair*” (here, see Atkinson, 1984a: 73-82, 130, 154-157).

A second organisational feature relates to the composition of “social class”. It was recognised in Chapter 4, for example, that linguistically “classed” categories frequently contain a *hierarchical*, ordinal design; cast explicitly as ‘*positioned categories*’ (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 585, italics in original; see also, Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 222).²⁵⁴ This is marked, for example, by the (co-)production of categories that are composed of ‘*measure terms*’ (e.g. ‘*lower class.*’ [Extract 11: l. 24]; ‘*Middle class*’ [Extract 13: l. 287], ‘*upper middle* ↑Cla:ss’ [Extract 16: l. 129]; ‘*lower upper class.*’ [Extract 40: l. 25]; ‘*upper cla:ss>*’ [Extract 18: l. 167]), to modify Sacks’ (1992, Vol. II: e.g. 322, my emphasis) phrase. Alternatively, such as in the production of linguistically non-“classed” categories and descriptions, these gradations can be accomplished lexically. The descriptions ‘*pretty high Class*’ (Extract 17: l. 441), ‘*Slightly* ↑*Swanky*’ (Extract 33: l. 66), ‘↑*more sort of* (0.4) uhm. (.) *middle class*’ (Extract 20: ls. 361-362), ‘*really fancy*’ (Extract 33: l. 93), ‘↑*So fancy*’ (Extract 33: l. 91), ‘*Really posh*’ (Extract 33: l. 80), ‘*enormously Posh.*’ (Extract 28: l. 129) and ‘*super Posh.*’ (Extract 28, l. 130), for example, typify this practice, casting the “classed” descriptions and categories to which they prepend along an un-explicated cline.

As with *availabilities* and *temporalities*, these features represent eligible areas of inquiry for future EM/(M)CA research in their own right. It would be beneficial to investigate, for example, the differences in various stratifications (e.g. dichotomies [Extract 31], trichotomies [Extract 17], etc.) and the use of comparatively monistic (e.g. Extract 32) renderings of “social class” in talk-in-interaction, and their formational possibilities. Equally, it would be interesting to contrast those categories which somehow explicate a hierarchical position (e.g. ‘Middle class’ [Extract 13: l. 287]), and those which elide, subdue, or obscure it, linguistically (e.g. ‘the *Wealthy*

²⁵⁴ My focus here concerns *intra*-categorical hierarchies. On *inter*-categorical hierarchies, see, e.g., Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 64-65) on the discovery of suicides, Sudnow (1967 [EJBH: Ch. 5] in Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 561) on announcements of death, and, differently, Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 23, 70, 137, italics in original) on ‘*categorical precedence*’.

Class:.’ [Extract 12: l. 57]; ‘*working* ↑class’ [Extract 19: ls. 30-31]). This is an exigency examined by Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 178), generically, and a line of inquiry that has been situated in relation to “social class” in previous EM/(M)CA texts (e.g. Benson and Hughes, 1983: 15). However, the possibilities of empirical research have yet to be canvassed and represent domains that are touched-off from this thesis.

In both cases, the praxiological upshot of such investigations is an important area of investigation and remains available for future EM/(M)CA research. The two-set constitution of “classed” categories, after all, has been lauded by Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 47-48) for its comparative potential. Two pragmatic functions of the hierarchical design of “classed” membership categories have also been anticipated. Depending upon the typology from which a “classed” category has been drawn, for example, can function not only to “*relativise*” (here, see Schegloff, 1992b: xxxiv) “classed” statuses (e.g. Extract 06), but can also position the classifier such that they are inspectable for how they can be classified, reciprocally; a property set forth by Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 45-46) on “*perspective*”, “*topics*” (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 754-755) and “*category-bound activities*” (see Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 223; 1992, Vol. I: 249).²⁵⁵ How “social class” comes to be differently configured, therefore, and how these different configurations are employed as consequential, practical resources, is an area eligible for future EM/(M)CA research.

²⁵⁵ For review, see §2.3.4 and §5.5.3.2. Note this is also implicit to Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 60-61, 464, 598) analyses of “safe compliments” and “complaints” (see §6.5.1; fn. 221), and connects with what Schegloff (1984a: 49; 1996b: 20), building upon Sacks (e.g. 1992, Vol. I: 60-61), has referred to as “derived actions”. Furthermore, this research, in so doing, would also provide a counterpart to comparable observations made regarding the ascription of categories indicative of “*stages of life*” (see, e.g., Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 222; 1992, Vol. I: 249, 585-586, 587; Speier, 1973: 188-189, 195, fn. 53; W. Sharrock, 1974: 51; Cuff, G. Payne, Francis, Hustler and W. Sharrock, 1979: 146-147; Coulter, 1991: 46; Hester, 1992: 171-172; Schegloff, 1992b: xlii; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 217; McHoul and R. Watson, 1984: 286-288; Jalbert, 1989: 238), “*ethnicity*” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 586), “*gender*” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 241), “*race*” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 241, 586; R. Watson, 1997b: 80, 82) and “*sexuality*” (e.g. *ibid.*: 80).

7.3.4 Pn-adequacy

A fourth area for future inquiry concerns orientations towards the *distribution* of “social classes” and their members. This area of inquiry has been anticipated in this thesis through discussions of ‘the etcetera problem’ (e.g. Sacks, 1990 [1963]: 91). It will be recalled, for example, that for any member, more than one category is, theoretically, applicable. The focal upshot, therefore, is that the correctness of a membership category is not, necessarily, the salient criterion on the basis of which categorisations are warranted, uniquely. In previous EM/(M)CA literature, this quality has been articulated, classically, using Sacks’ (1972: e.g. 33; see also, Sacks, 1967) notions of ‘a Pn-adequate device, type 1’ and “‘which’-type sets” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 40).²⁵⁶ To borrow Schegloff’s (1992c: xxxvii, fn. 27) formulation, “Sex/Gender” is treated, conventionally, as a device that may be employed by members to categorise any population of persons (i.e. “P”) irrespective of whether it has (i.e. “a”; see Sacks, 1972: 430: fn. 8), or has not (i.e. “n”) been prespecified – that is, ‘counted, characterized or bounded [...] in some fashion’ (Schegloff, 1991: 49). Thus, the outcome of this procedure is that no member of the population analysed is left uncategorised (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 213; Schegloff, 1992a: 108). Insofar as “Sex/Gender” is serviced within talk-in-interaction, therefore, the device can be treated as “Pn-adequate (Type 1)”.

“Pn-adequacy”, I propose, offers an underutilised heuristic for the analysis of “classed” distributions, and is one that is curiously absent from previous considerations of the notion in EM/(M)CA texts. Research could therefore begin by exploring this equivocal status. As it has been indicated in Chapter 4 (§4.3), after all, “social class” is not understood to correspond with a consensual nor stable set(s) of first-order referents. Both their nature, and the terms of their constitution, can instead be relativised depending on the indices of “social class” that are enshrined by co-interlocutors, *in situ*, and/or by analysts, *ex post facto*. It is possible, for instance, that whether the device qualifies as “Pn-adequate (Type 1)” can vary according to its

²⁵⁶ For FA reflections, see, e.g., Ossowski (1963: 142-143) on ‘exhaustive’ and ‘non-exhaustive’ conceptualisations. See Pascale (2007: 92) and Savage et al. (2001: 882) for participant orientations to the latter.

underlying bases. Were it conceptualised by way of “*occupation*” (e.g. “blue-collar”, “white-collar”; e.g. Extracts 09 and 20), for example, the phenomenon would be unlikely to satisfy the conditions of “*Pn-adequacy*” – at least when adjudicated contemporarily on a Eurocentric purview.²⁵⁷ Future EM/(M)CA research could, therefore, begin by clarifying this status through empirical research. Occasions could be investigated, for example, in which “social class” is constructed, variously, as *P(n/a)-(in)adequate*, and which could distinguish the practices and/or the purposes for which these alternative theorisations come to be (de)activated in talk-in-interaction.

7.3.5 Delicacy

A fifth and final candidate for investigation in future EM/(M)CA research concerns the *productional* features of “classed” categorisations. This aspect of inquiry is a further line of inquiry that has been acknowledged (e.g. Extract 39) but not focalised in this thesis. One dimension that is of particular note, and which warrants further exploration, is the designed “*delicacy*” with which orientations to “social class” are frequently (co-)produced. This feature forms an extant locus of inquiry of/for EM/(M)CA research. Features of lexical choice (e.g. Jefferson, 1978b: 137), turn-design (e.g. Bergmann, 1992: 148-154; Silverman, 1994: 432, 433-435; Lerner, 2013), sequential organisation (e.g. Schegloff, 1980: 131-134; Kitzinger, 2000: 185-187; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2007: 224) and footing (e.g. Clayman, 1992: 169-171, 195-196), for example, have long been identified as indices of delicacy.²⁵⁸ EM/(M)CA research has further observed that expressed incumbencies within membership categories can be treated as “*delicate*” interactional work (e.g. Silverman, 1994; Widdicombe, 2017), for which various practices are available by which co-interlocutors can varnish this relevance (here, see Schegloff, 1996d: 447, 448-449; Jackson, 2011a: 216).

²⁵⁷ Members of the category “*children*”, for example, could fail to fulfil this criterion (see Sacks, 1967: 18-20; Speier, 1974 [1970]: 205-206; Atkinson, 1978: 192); that is, without additional allowances. For one “unless clause” (here, see Wootton, 1975: 61) from FA research, see, e.g., E. O. Wright (1997: 27, italics in original) on “*mediated class locations*”.

²⁵⁸ Relatedly, on instantiations of “*cautiousness*”, see Drew and Heritage (1992: 45-47).

The investigation of these indices of this designed delicacy thus represents a clear avenue for future research. The “classed” orientations adduced in this thesis, for example, have illustrated a number of suggestive components. Orientations were produced, for example, *sotto voce* (e.g. Extracts 34 and 39; see Lerner, 2013: 96-97) with *qualifiers* (e.g. “sort of” [Extract 20]; “kind of” [Extract 12]; “slightly” [Extract 33]; e.g. Bergmann, 1992: 151-154; Lerner, 2013: 95-96), *hesitance markers* (e.g. “uhm”; Extracts 20, 22 and 30; e.g. Lerner, 2013: 101-102), and followed the emergence of *lapses* (e.g. Extract 16, 32, 38, 43; see Sacks et al., 1974: 714) and *intra-turn pauses* (e.g. Extracts 06, 11, 12, 14, 20, 22, 25, 26, 30, 33, 41, 42; e.g. Silverman, 1994: 432; Lerner, 2013: 104-106). These features have been recognised in previous research as possible instantiations of “*delicacy*”. The implications and consequences of this recurrence have not yet been examined, however, for “classed” identities, specifically, and warrants future EM/(M)CA research. Such an inquiry might also prompt the discovery of novel interactional exigencies. A link might be made, for example, to occasions in which the ascription of “classed” social identities is withstood (e.g. Extract 43). The designedly “*delicate*” production of “classed” categories therefore invites future research independently, but also represents a possible mainspring for further insights.

7.3.6 Summary

Several prospective lines of inquiry have been outlined in this chapter that are occasioned by the remit of this thesis, and into which examples can be found in extracts previously cited. Specifically, I have limited my remit to the constitutive features of “social class”. To qualify, these dimensions I have highlighted are not exhaustive. I have instead limited myself to a dimension of inquiry – namely, the constitution of “classed” orientations – which has not been pursued in this thesis in depth. I have shown in this section, however, that the analysis of linguistically (non-)“classed” orientations is “*ripe*” (here, see Schegloff et al., 1977: 375) for several prospective inquiries, concerning “availability”, “temporality”, “organisation”, “pn-adequacy” and “delicacy”. Each of these aspects have been introduced as an area of inquiry in their own right. At the same time, however, future EM/(M)CA research can also investigate the practical purposes for which these dimensions are (co-)produced. The realisation of both projects, I propose, will enhance our understanding of the logic of “classed” orientations, allowing for the

discovery of both the practices used to occasion their relevance (e.g. Chapters 4-5) and the social actions for which they are (co-/re-)produced (e.g. Chapter 6).

To qualify, the contribution of such work would not be an attempt to delineate, exhaustively, every plane along which “classed” orientations could be stratified. As “occasioned” properties (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 35), such an endeavour would not merely be ‘incorrect’ (Drew, 1978: 21, fn. 13), but ‘logically unobtainable’ (à la Coulter, 1973b: 173; here, see also, R. Turner, 1974 [1970]: 199; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 249, fn. 12; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 166); inhibited by the indefinitely extensive transformative possibilities that are afforded through the natural language (here, see Coulter p.c. in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 260, fn. 15). Furthermore, evaluations of the “truth” or “falsity” (howsoever adjudicated) of these components would also be immaterial (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 569; Smith, 1978: 28); that is, unless occasioned, *in situ* (e.g. Edwards and Fasulo, 2006) – or in which their procedural bases are interrogated (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 549-556, 557-566). Instead, the objective of this inquiry would simply be to canvass the different ways in which “classed” orientations are indexed and made consequential for co-interlocutors, *in situ* (see Speier, 1973: 185; M. H. Goodwin, 2011: 254).²⁵⁹ The five lines of inquiry outlined above in this way offer an indicative point of departure for research occasioned by my inquiry.

7.4 Limitations

The previous section has highlighted one area that future research can progress; namely, the study of the constitutive dimensions of “classed” categories. Five candidate lines of analysis that have been touched-off from this thesis have been highlighted to this effect. These domains exceeded the scope of this research and would, I claim, reward substantiation in future EM/(M)CA inquiries. I turn now to address two pitfalls of my research. The first is empirical. It concerns the level of detailed analysis that has been achieved on the data fragments analysed across Chapters 4-6 ($n=44$). The second is conceptual. This concerns what might be

²⁵⁹ There are parallels here with Drew’s (1987: 230-232) analysis of “teases” and their “recognisability”.

considered insufficient engagement with influential theorists and notable concepts within FA “class-analysis”. For both shortcomings, inquiries are proposed which could advance the *respecification* of “social class” that has been initiated in this research.

7.4.1 Empirical omissions

This research has used EM/(M)CA to reveal a host of novel insights regarding orientations towards “social class” in ordinary, naturalistic forms of talk-in-interaction. This has been my express intention from the outset, reflected in my research objectives (see §1.7.1 and §7.2). As detailed in Chapter 1 (i.e. §1.2), the dearth of EM/(M)CA research on “social class” formed the initial impetus for my inquiry, and the contours of existing empirical analyses informed its remit and trajectory (see §1.7 and §2.5.3). Specifically, as “social class” was a largely uninterrogated area for EM/(M)CA, I have taken the opportunity here to begin respecifying this domain vis-à-vis the consensual coordinates of EM/(M)CA. Practically, this has translated into a focus on several analytic concerns (e.g. “ontology” [i.e. Chapter 4]; “praxis” [i.e. Chapters 4 and 5]; and “praxiology” [i.e. Chapter 6]), culminating in the lamination (see fn. 221) of EM, MCA and CA sensibilities. To qualify, this multifaceted approach is unusual in the tradition of EM/(M)CA – and within CA research, especially (recall §3.2.3). It has been an “*unintended consequence*”, thereof,²⁶⁰ that the depth of my analysis has been necessarily constrained, and it is on this basis, I propose, that it is not therefore representative of CA research in the classical mould.

The resources I have enlisted from the inventory of EM/(M)CA have also been restricted in their selection and application. Occasionally, these have figured minimally, only, or have even been eclipsed by competing (e.g. “ontological”) concerns. It is conceivable that a more judicious selection of data fragments would have better potentiated a more thoroughgoing analysis. Equally, a more consistent focus on “social action” (cf. Chapter 6) would have likely enriched my study of “ontology” and “praxis”, two domains in which the activity of “accounting”

²⁶⁰ Term associated with Weber, *inter alia*. Relatedly, see Merton (1936: 902-903).

underpinned multiple operations (e.g. §4.6.1 and §5.5.3.2, respectively). Future investigations that are devoted to EM, MCA and CA, independently, therefore, deserve recovery, and will be refined through research dedicated to their core apparatuses (e.g. “indexicality”, “predicates”, “sequence”, respectively). Such analyses will advance our understanding of the activities for which “classed” orientations come to be (co-)produced; how they are interconnected (e.g. “-bound” [see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 584-589]; “-constitutive” [see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 25-26]; “-generated” [see R. Turner 1974 [1970]: 211]; “-relevant” [see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 104]; “-tied” [ibid.: 35]) with/to “predicates” (see R. Watson, 1978: 106; e.g. “activities” [see Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 222]; “enablements” [see Enfield, 2011: 293]; “perquisites” [see Jefferson and Lee, 1992: 534]; “obligations” [see R. Watson, 1978: 106]); and how members rely upon the “*inference-rich*” (recall fn. 123 and 217) qualities of linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations in the management of their quotidian affairs. In so doing, research is likely to yield social actions beyond “*accounting*” (cf. Chapter 6) for which “classed” orientations are (co-)produced, recurrently, in addition to further insights concerning the practical uses of linguistically *non*-“classed” orientations both inferentially and sequentially. My analyses of “complainability” (§6.5.2) and “place terms” (§5.7), for example, are promising directions for subsequent EM/(M)CA inquiry in these two respects.

The use of novel analytic resources may also prove illuminating for future research. An analysis of “*epistemics*”, for example, following Heritage (e.g. 2005b; 2008: 309-310; 2011b; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2012d; 2013a; 2013b) and colleagues (see e.g. Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Raymond and Heritage, 2006; Stivers and Rossano, 2010), is one resource that has not been employed in this inquiry. Provided its ‘omnipresence’ (Maynard and Clayman, 2018: 137, fn. 15) and primordial status (here, see Drew, 2012), however, an exploration vis-à-vis “classed” orientations and/or enactments offers a clear frontier-in-waiting.²⁶¹ In one capacity, this might

²⁶¹ The predominance of this research in the contemporary *zeitgeist* of CA might also furnish such a warrant. A recent debate on “epistemics” has documented (perhaps catastrophized) the advent and purported ascendancy of such a focus. Lynch and Macbeth (2016), Lindwall, Lymer and Ivarsson (2016), Lynch and Wong (2016), MacBeth, Wong and Lynch (2016) and Macbeth and Wong (2016) offer the most recent rendition of these concerns. For responses,

involve an investigation of if/how “classed” social identities can be instantiated through the (in-)congruencies of members’ “epistemic statuses” and “stances”. The analysis of G. Raymond and Heritage (2006), for example, on the identity of “*grandparent*”, is at once a precursor and paragon in this respect, illustrating the relational and praxiological insights that are made available through an epistemic hiatus (here, see also, Clift, 2012: 74). Alternatively, where avowedly “classed” orientations are pursued, *epistemics* also offers a method for discerning their constitutive ontologies. How linguistically “classed” categories are constructed to accommodate, and even to *own* (here, see Moerman, 1974 in G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 680; W. Sharrock, 1974; Sacks, 1984b: 424-427; Heritage, 2005b: 196-200; 2011b: 160, 182-183) particular phenomena, for instance – howsoever prised or programmed – ²⁶² remains poised for exploration.

Future EM/(M)CA research might also further the empirical breadth of my investigation. The present research, it will be recalled, has had a unilateral, anglophone focus (for review, see Chapter 3). A comparative investigation of alternative communities (e.g. cultural, linguistic, etc.) would help diversify this analysis. This approach is already familiar to the EM/(M)CA tradition (see, differently, Moerman, 1996 [1988]; Lerner and Takagi, 1999; Zimmerman, 1999: 196-198; Jefferson, 2002); ²⁶³ however, how familiarities with different cultures or

see Button and W. Sharrock (2016), Steensig and Heinemann (2016), Bolden (2018), Clift and C. Raymond (2018), Drew (2018a; 2018b), Heritage (2018), Maynard and Clayman (2018) and G. Raymond (2018). For an earlier discussion, see Clift (2012), Drew (2012), Heritage (2012c) and Sidnell (2012).

²⁶² On the former, see Schutz (1964 in Sidnell, 2012: 55, fn. 2), Heritage (2013a: 392-393) and, differently, Bellman (1981: 8, 15-16) and Cuff (1993: Ch. 1). On the latter, see §4.6.1.

²⁶³ For a burgeoning catalogue of interactional universals, see, e.g., Hopper, Doany, Johnson and Drummond (1990/1991) on telephone call-openings; Stivers, Enfield, Brown, Englert, Hayashi, Heinemann, Hoymann, Rossano, de Ruiter, Yoon and Levinson (2009) on turn-taking; Dingemanse, Torreira and Enfield (2013) regarding the OCRI (Drew, 1997), “*Huh*”; and Dingemanse, Roberts, Baranova, Blythe, Drew, Floyd, Gisladottir, Kendrick, Levinson, Manrique, Rossi and Enfield (2015) on other-initiated repair, generally. On the *genericity* of

societies, for example, impact upon investigations of social identities, and on “classed” incumbencies, specifically, have not been inspected. It is expectable, for example, that my analysis of interactions that have occurred within communities which transcend my native and/or analytical competencies, has been insensitive to cases in which “classed” identities are occasioned. Interactions conducted in American-English ($n=542$), for example, are likely to represent a situs of probable neglect on this basis, and thereby warrant further research. This corpus might also justify special review provided the unique socio-cultural discourses and/or connotations concerning “social class” in America (recall fn. 28). Recordings of interactions from America and Britain, for example, may warrant comparison provided the different portraits of “social class” that have been painted within FA research vis-à-vis these societies (see Gerteis and Savage, 1998). Thus, it will be a task for future EM/(M)CA research to dissect if/how different socio-cultural competencies stratify and/or strain empirico-analytic insights, and to grasp their repercussions for the analysis of “classed” identities.

7.4.2 Conceptual omissions

Chapter 1 opened with a review of FA “class-analysis” in sociology and sociolinguistics. From Chapter 2, however, my focus has concerned extant EM/(M)CA research, specifically. Accordingly, my engagement with the former literature has been limited in scope, culminating in an abbreviated review of FA traditions, in addition to the wholesale omission of some influential theorists and noteworthy concepts. The seminal contributions of Basil Bernstein (1971; 1973; 1975), for example, regarding “social class”, speech practices and educational attainment, were omitted from Chapter 1 for economy (recall fn. 8). To clarify, retrospectively, for Bernstein (1971; 1973; 1975), “social classes” undergird social structure, performing a regulative function in a moral and cultural faculty (see Bernstein, 1975: 23). The different values that are delimited or legitimated (see Bernstein, 1971: 61, 186-187) ideologically, thereby, are mediated by family-types (e.g. *ibid.*: 152-163; Bernstein, 1973: 8; 1975: 24-26) and exert constraints on the

CA findings, recall fn. 80; see also, e.g., Drew (2003a), Clift and C. Raymond (2018: 109-111) and Margutti, Tainio, Drew and Traverso (2018).

linguistic “modes” (e.g. Bernstein, 1971: 28, 133) and “codes” (e.g. *ibid.*: 76-77; Bernstein, 1975: 24) that are awarded primacy. This transmission is regulated by systems of control (e.g. Bernstein, 1971: 156-160, 164-165) from which arise differently privileged species of “meaning” (*ibid.*: 175-176) and ‘role relationships’ (*ibid.*: 180). The distribution of these values has implications for educational attainment (e.g. *ibid.*: 34-35, 36, 37, 136-137) and object-relations (e.g. *ibid.*: 25, 42). Critically, this furnishes the basis for systemic (e.g. “educational”) (in-)congruities (e.g. *ibid.*: 37, 51-53, 58, fn. 16 and 17, 136, 143-169, 183-184, 186, 190-201, 228, fn. 4; Bernstein, 1973: 9-10; 1975: 16, 27-28, 42, 116-145; see also, Bernstein and Young, 1973 [1967]: 21, 22; Bernstein and Henderson, 1973 [1969]: 42-43) for differently “classed” personnel, and has further ramifications for their “perception” (e.g. Bernstein, 1971: 28, 34, 35-38, 61-62) and “consciousness” (e.g. Bernstein, 1975: 23-24, 29-30), more generally.

Space does not permit a comprehensive statement of Bernstein’s (e.g. 1971; 1973; 1975) theory, nor of how it coheres with the approaches detailed across Chapter 1. However, for illustration, one affinity visible in Bernstein’s (1971; 1973; 1975) “*Class, Codes and Control*” (Vol. 1-3) is his preservation of the concept as an “*analytic resource*” (i.e. §1.6.2). Specifically, “social class” is retained here as a concept that can be defined and prioritised by researchers, legitimately, at their discretion (e.g. Bernstein, 1971: 24-25, 61-62, 135, 143, 161-163, 175-176, 195-196, 228, fn. 4; 1973: 4; 1975: 23-24, 136, fn. 3; Bernstein and Young, 1973 [1967]: 13, 15; Bernstein and Henderson, 1973 [1969]: 25).²⁶⁴ Such a willing determination of “classed” paramouncy, *ex cathedra*, dovetails Bernstein’s (1971; 1973; 1975) programme alongside other pre-eminent FA traditions of “class-analysis”; a homologue elaborated in Chapter 1. How this research figures relative to the

²⁶⁴ This proclivity is also shared by Bernstein’s (i.e. 1973) collaborators and colleagues. See, e.g., Henderson (1973 [1971]: 49), Hawkins (1973 [1969]: 81), G. Turner and Pickvance (1973 [1971]: 95), W. Robinson and Creed (1973 [1968]: 124), G. Turner (1973: 149), W. Robinson (1973: 205, 219, 225-226) and Hawkins (1973: 236).

alternative commitments of EM/(M)CA, however, has eluded audit.²⁶⁵ Whether manifestations of linguistic “codes”, for example, are deployed in a *relevantly* “classed” capacity by/for executants (here, see Bernstein, 1971: 132; see also, G. Turner, 1973: 179), and/or have a *relevantly* “classed” genesis (here, see Bernstein, 1971: 114, 128, 135), awaits determination in future EM/(M)CA research (recall §1.6.3). Such an inquiry will not merely contextualise the novelty of EM/(M)CA relative to another FA programme of “class-analysis”, but it may also potentiate further lines of dialogue.

Substantive examinations of FA concepts have also been missing from my remit. “Class-consciousness”, for example, is an abiding preoccupation that has unique significance for EM/(M)CA research. A respecification of “consciousness”, for instance, has been foreshadowed since Sacks’ (1984b: 416, 418, 424; 1992, Vol. II: 218, 219) remarks regarding “*doing being*” ordinary (see also, Jefferson, 2004c; Wooffitt, 1992: Ch. 6) as a ‘cast of mind’; that is, whereby one’s perception is refracted, normatively, through a prism of mundanity.²⁶⁶ Consciousness has been further embedded within (if not *explicit* to) analyses of “*poetic*” phenomena (e.g. “equivokes”, “puns”, etc.) in introspective narratives (e.g. Wooffitt and N. Holt, 2011), talk-in-interaction (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 261-268, 291-331, 396-401; Beach, 1993; Jefferson, 1996; Schegloff, 2003a) and anecdotes of conduct (e.g. Schegloff, 2003b; 2005a; Wooffitt, 2018a; 2018b; 2019a; 2019b; see also, Peräkylä, 2019). It has also been revived as a practical accomplishment (e.g. Mehan and Wood, 1975a: 519; 1975b: 216), moral heuristic (e.g. Komter, 1997), sense-making practice (e.g. R. Watson, 1998); respecified as an ordinary-language concept (e.g. Coulter, 1973a: 80; 1994: 293; 1999: 170-171; 2010: 278-279; Button, Coulter, J. R. E. Lee, W. Sharrock, 1995: 46-49; Read, 2008: 63-70); and substantiated by the analysis of data derived from experiments which concern “consciousness”,

²⁶⁵ For a partial sketch, regarding “socialisation”, see Cook (1973; see also, Bernstein, 1973: 7-8). See also R. Watson (1992a: 6-7), Heritage and G. Raymond (2005: 20, fn. 6) and Wootton (1975: Ch. 5), for review.

²⁶⁶ I owe this observation to Professor Robin Wooffitt (p.c.). Any errors are my own. For alternative readings of Sacks (e.g. 1992) on the “*mind*”, see R. Watson (1994: 182-184) and Coulter (2005: 88-91).

substantively (e.g. Wooffitt and Allistone, 2005; Allistone and Wooffitt, 2007; Wooffitt, 2007; Wooffitt and N. Holt, 2010; Wooffitt, N. Holt and Allistone, 2010). One aspect that future analyses might address concerns how co-interlocutors can configure, alias or camouflage some activity in terms of “class-consciousness”. This would address “consciousness” not as an academic (e.g. metaphysical) disposition imputed by analysts on the behalf of members, but as a concept hypostatized within talk-in-interaction. Alternatively, this research might address how members unite, collectively (see, e.g., Ryave and Schenkein, 1974; Wootton, 1977; Sudnow, 1979: Ch. 22, Ch. 27; Atkinson, 1984a; Atkinson, 1984b; Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986; Clayman, 1993; Capps and Ochs, 2002; Glenn, 2003: Ch. 3; Lerner, 2004b); how they are formulable, as such (see, e.g., Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 144-149, 333-340, 568-577);²⁶⁷ and how, specifically, members may demonstrably impart or proselytize intersubjective positions and/or perceive activities through an avowedly shared “classed” lens (e.g. “attitude”, “ideology”, “worldview”, etc.).²⁶⁸ The analysis of “class-consciousness” as an occupant of talk-in-interaction or as a heuristic are, therefore, two plausible routes for EM/(M)CA *respecification*.

7.5 Conclusion

This research represents the first focussed examination of “social class” using EM/(M)CA in *ordinary* forms of talk-in-interaction. The prevailing objective of this thesis has been a modest one; namely, to investigate how “social class” is mobilised recurrently as an interactional resource. This has been identified not only as a programmatic omission of FA “class-analysis” (see Chapter 1), but also an area neglected, overwhelmingly, in extant EM/(M)CA research (see Chapter 2). My

²⁶⁷ That is, e.g., *qua* ‘aggregations’ (e.g. Lerner and Kitzinger, 2007: 536), ‘alliances’ (e.g. Egbert, 2004: 1478), ‘collectivities’ (e.g. Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 52), ‘consociates’ (e.g. Lerner, 1992: 249), ‘ensembles’ (e.g. Lerner, 1993: 216), ‘groups’ (e.g. Schegloff, p.c. in Egbert, 2004: 1469), ‘parties’ (e.g. Schegloff, 1995b: 33; see also, Schegloff, 1988: 126; Jefferson, 1990: 81-89), ‘partnership[s]’ (e.g. Stivers and Barnes, 2018: 1332), ‘team[s]’ (e.g. Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 220; see also, Schegloff et al., 1977: n.p.g. [EJBH: 380] in Lerner, 1992: 264) and ‘unit[s]’ (see Clayman, 1992: 166).

²⁶⁸ Two EM/(M)CA texts that address cohesion even include reference to “class-consciousness” (i.e. Lerner, 1993: 236; Coulter, 1996: 341).

research has been directed towards the resolution of this lacuna and has resulted in a number of novel contributions. As summarised above (see §7.2), I have investigated how “social class” comes to be conceptualised by co-interlocutors (see Chapter 4); identified two families of practices that are employed to (co-)produce “classed” orientations (see Chapter 4 and 5); and distinguished three social actions into which they are employed recurrently (see Chapter 6).

The analysis of “social class” within ordinary forms of *talk-in-interaction*, as a *members’ phenomenon* made *demonstrably relevant* by co-interlocutors, therefore encapsulates the substantive empirical contribution of this thesis. The findings gleaned, however, are not the only novel components. My findings are instead predicated reflexively upon a set of empirico-analytic contributions and methodological novelties in their own right. Illustrative of the former, for example, are the hitherto undescribed, interdisciplinary genealogies of “class-analysis” elaborated in Chapter 1 and 2. These two reviews are not only notable for their extensive purview but have further served to define the parameters of the present inquiry; a remit to which EM/(M)CA is positioned as uniquely equipped. Indicative of the latter, by contrast, is the scope of my inquiry. The analysis of a considerable corpus of interactions ($n=959$) distinguishes this research in its own right, and my commitment to ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction complements the focus of existing EM/(M)CA research.

This thesis, therefore, is a significant investigation of “social class”; one that has been conducted on an unprecedented scale and which has been constructed through an extensive dialogue with existing research. This has culminated in a multifaceted investigation that has uncovered an array of novel findings and generated a number of lines of inquiry for future research. Focally, I have demonstrated that “social class” is not only eligible for EM/(M)CA “*respecification*”, and can be analysed profitably and productively through the consensual coordinates of the enterprise, but that it further represents a consequential resource that is defined, co-constructed and utilised by co-interlocutors within ordinary instances of talk-in-interaction, recurrently. What remains to be seen, only, is whether future research will recover this mantle, realising the promise of EM/(M)CA for “*class-analysis*” and the

promise of “social class” for the study of “*social action*”. The incipient turn towards the study of “classed” identities in perspicuous, institutional settings are heartening in this respect; however, the consolidation of this domain of inquiry requires a concerted commitment. It has been the aim of this thesis to offer the first focussed examination of this subject and to provide a stable foundation from which such a programme may not only proceed, but flourish.

Appendices

Appendix 1.0 – Jeffersonian transcription conventions

* Reproduced from Reuber, Chappell, Jackson and Toerien (2018: 121), *mutatis mutandis*, with the permission of Dr Merran Toerien (p.c.). Derived from Atkinson and Heritage (1984b) and Jefferson (2004b).

A. Some aspects of the relative timing of utterances	
[] square brackets	Overlapping talk.
= equals sign	No discernible interval between turns.
(0.5) time in parentheses	Intervals within or between talk (measured in tenths of a second).
(.) period in parentheses	Discernable interval within or between talk but too short to measure (less than 2 tenths of a second).
≥	‘Jump’ started talk.
B. Some characteristics of speech delivery	
. period	Closing intonation.
, comma	Slightly rising intonation (a little hitch up on the end of the word).
? question mark	Fully rising intonation.
- dash	Abrupt cut off of sound.
: colon	Extension of preceding sound – the more colons the greater the extension.
<u>here</u> underlining	Emphasised relative to surrounding talk.
.tch	Tongue click.
hhh.	Audible outbreath (number of h’s indicates length).
.hhh	Audible inbreath (number of h’s indicates length).
>Talk<	Speded up talk.
<Talk>	Slowed down talk.

*	Croaky or creaky voice.
£	Smiley voice.
Hah hah or huh huh etc.	Beats of laughter.
() empty single brackets or words enclosed in single brackets	Transcriber unable to hear words or uncertain of hearing.
((word)) words enclosed in double brackets	Transcribers' comments.
↑↓	Marked change in pitch.

Appendix 2.0 – Project information sheet

Introduction

Thank you for expressing interest in this research. If you are considering taking part, it is important that you understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please read through this leaflet carefully before you decide whether you wish to take part. If there is anything you don't understand, please ask me and I'll be very happy to discuss the research further with you.

What is this research about?

I am a PhD (doctoral) research student in Sociology, based at the University of York. My research focuses on how “social class” is made relevant for people during their ordinary conversations with one another. It is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and has passed ethical review at the University of York. In this research, I am not interested in the social class of individuals. I am aiming, instead, to find out how, where and for what purpose, class is made meaningful for people in their everyday conversations.

Why have I been invited to take part?

Previous research into “social class” in ordinary conversations has looked only at talk between children. This research aims to extend such research by looking at the conversations of adults.

What will it involve?

If you are willing to take part, this research first involves the completion of an “**Informed Consent Form**” and a “**Video Recording Release Form**.” These forms will show that you have given permission for your conversation(s) to be recorded. You will be given copy to keep and I will keep a copy on record as well. These forms also give you the opportunity to choose what happens to your recordings after they have been collected. The research itself involves the completion of a short questionnaire and then having your conversation(s) recorded. It will **not require you to talk about “social class” or any topics in particular**. Instead, where possible you should have your conversations as if there is no recording equipment present, without

altering what you ordinarily say. It doesn't matter whether you speak about "social class," this research is just interested in ordinary conversations.

Why does my conversation need to be recorded?

While there is a lot of research into people's experiences of "social class," there has been almost none into how it is actually **made meaningful** in everyday conversations. We need to make recordings, therefore, as we are interested in the details of real interactions. There are many theories about social class, but we are interested in what actually takes place in our everyday conversations with one another. We are collecting video-recordings as it would help us to know what is happening in moments which cannot be captured by audio-recording alone, such as during silences. Video-recording will provide the researcher with access to the same visual information that is available to participants.

What happens to my recording?

After it has been collected, your recording will be transcribed and anonymised – so no one will be able to find out who has been recorded. This will involve changing any information which may be used to identify you, such as names and locations. Your recording(s) will then be studied alongside an existing collection of approximately two-hundred telephone calls. Your recording(s) will be studied by Edward Holmes and his two supervisors, Dr Merran Toerien and Dr Steph Lawler, using a research method known as Conversation Analysis. When it is not being studied, your recording will be kept on a password protected external hard drive in locked cabinet, in a locked office.

What is Conversation Analysis?

Conversation Analysis is a method used to study how "**actions**" are done through talk. It understands that when people are talking with one another, they are not simply exchanging information. Instead, they are accomplishing actions. For example, in our everyday lives we are not just talking with one another; we are doing things: like "offering," "requesting," "inviting" and "advising." This is what Conversation Analysis is interested in – "**action**," not necessarily the "**content**" of conversations themselves.

What are benefits of this research?

The main benefit of this research is its potential for real-world impact. By studying the details of how social class is made meaningful for people in their everyday conversations, we can begin to get a better understanding of the nature of “social class.” As a result, we can use the findings of this research to get a better understanding of class inequalities. The study may not have immediate benefits for those who take part but will alter how we understand the very nature of “social class.”

What are the disadvantages of taking part?

Completing the questionnaire and having a recording will take a little bit of time, and you may find yourself inconvenienced by taking part. There is also a slight risk that you find yourself uncomfortable answering the questions included in the questionnaire, or by having your conversation recorded. Firstly, if there are any questions you would prefer not to answer, it is perfectly okay to miss these out. Secondly, before the recording begins, the researcher will show you how to switch on, pause and to switch off the recording equipment. So, if at any time you wish to stop the recording, you may do this at any point. You may also choose to withdraw your recording from the study at any point up to two weeks after the recording is made. If in the unlikely event you have been distressed by this research, there are a number of welfare services available for you to contact.

Samaritans:

Telephone:

Address:

Email:

Web:

Citizens Advice:

Telephone:

Web:

Can I hear about the findings?

If you provide your contact details in the informed consent form, the researcher will send you (electronically, or physically) a written summary of research findings. Your

contact information will not be distributed to any third-parties; stored with your recording or completed questionnaire; or included any publications.

Many thanks for taking the time to consider taking part in this research. Please do ask if you have further questions that are not answered by this leaflet.

Appendix 3.0 – Informed consent form

Name of Researcher: Mr Edward J. B. Holmes

Name of Supervisors: Dr Merran Toerien

Dr Steph Lawler

Before signing this form, please read it through carefully and ask any questions that you might have. Through its completion, you are giving informed consent for the use of your recorded conversations for the purposes described in the ‘**Project Information Sheet**’. You understand that the information given in both the questionnaire and recordings are being collected by Edward Holmes for his PhD thesis. You understand that the information collected using these methods will be analysed by him and his two academic supervisors, Dr Merran Toerien and Dr Steph Lawler. You understand that the information you provide may be included in Edward’s PhD thesis and in its resulting publications. Here your recording will be included in the form of a **written transcript**, unless you have indicated otherwise in the ‘**Video Recording Release Form**’.

Please also note that **no information which may be used to identify you** will be included in these publications, such as names or locations. Your transcribed recording will be anonymised thoroughly and pseudonyms will be given to disguise your identity. Furthermore, your information and recordings will not be shared with anyone, unless you have indicated otherwise in the ‘**Video Recording Release Form**’. If you have any questions or concerns about this research, you can contact Edward Holmes and his two supervisors using the contact information below.

Please tick one box only for each of the eight questions.

1. I have read and understood the project information leaflet.

Yes No

2. I have been given an opportunity to ask questions about the research.

Yes No

3. I understand that my conversation(s) is being recording and collected by Edward Holmes for the purposes of his PhD research.

Yes No

4. I have been shown how to use the video-camera and understand that I can turn this equipment off at any time.

Yes No

5. I understand that my information will be anonymised and kept confidential by the research team.

Yes No

6. I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this research up to **two weeks** after my conversation has been recorded. At which point, I can have any/all of my data deleted by Edward Holmes.

Yes No

7. I have been told about a range of support services available to me if any distress is caused by this research.

Yes No

8. I agree to take part in this research.

Yes No

Name of Research Participant (*in BLOCK letters*)

I consent to the recording of my conversation with the following participants:

(Please complete where appropriate.)

Participant 2:

Participant 3:

Participant 4:

Participant 5:

I understand that I can be informed of the findings of this research by Edward Holmes upon its completion. These will be given to me via _____ in the form of a written summary. In giving my contact information, I understand that this will not be distributed to any third parties; stored with my recordings or completed questionnaires; or included in Edward's PhD research or in its resulting publications. *(Please complete where appropriate.)*

Email: _____

Address: _____

Name: _____

Signed:

Date: _____

Appendix 4.0 – Video-recording release form

* EJBH: Reproduced from Jackson (2011a: 294-295), *mutatis mutandis*, with permission of Dr Clare Jackson (p.c.). Derived from a template constructed by Ervin-Tripp (n.d. in ten Have, 1999: 220-221).

As part of this research, you have consented to the recording of your conversation by Edward Holmes. Please indicate below what your recordings can be used for, signing all of those which apply. Please note that your transcribed recording(s) will be anonymised during this research and no identifying information will be released.

1. The recordings of my conversations can be studied by Edward Holmes and his supervisors, Dr Merran Toerien and Dr Steph Lawler, for the purposes of Edward's PhD research.

Signature: _____

Date: _____

2. The recording of my conversation can be reused by Edward Holmes in his future academic work, such as publications and conferences. (*Please circle those you consent to.*)

Signature: _____

Date: _____

3. The recording of my conversation can be reused by Edward Holmes for the purposes of teaching.

Signature: _____

Date: _____

4. The recording of my conversation can be archived online at the University of York Filestore and made accessible for others to listen to and watch when reading Edward's written publications.

Signature: _____

Date: _____

5. The recording of my conversation can be used by other researchers in their future academic work, such as publications and conferences. (*Please circle those you consent to.*)

Signature: _____

Date: _____

6. The recording of my conversation can be used by students in their future assessed academic work.

Signature: _____

Date: _____

Abbreviations

BSA	–	British Sociological Association
CA	–	Conversation Analysis
DP	–	Discursive Psychology
ELMPS	–	Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics Committee
EM	–	Ethnomethodology
EM/(M)CA	–	Ethnomethodology; Membership Categorisation Analysis; Conversation Analysis
ESRC	–	Economic and Social Research Council
FA	–	Formal Analysis
MCA	–	Membership Categorisation Analysis
OCRI	–	Open class repair initiator
P.D.	–	Public Defender
RP	–	Received pronunciation
VS	–	Variationist Sociolinguistics

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