

**Surviving the Wall: Daily Struggles in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory**

By

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Abstract

This thesis examines the conditions and struggles among dispossessed Palestinians as they attempt to survive Israeli policies of surveillance and occupation in the West Bank. The thesis focusses on the consequences and struggles against the Israeli separation wall. The thesis highlights the fact that the physical structure of the wall imposes isolation, hardship and suppression over Palestinian daily life; but what is equally important to the structure itself, is the accompanied complex set of overt and covert dehumanising, humiliating and restrictive surveillance procedures which severely impact Palestinian life. Palestinian forms of resistance are often nonviolent, unfrontational and disguised everyday acts of an affirmation of life and a determination to exist, all of which come under the heading of what Palestinians call '*sumud*' or steadfastness. This thesis examines how the wall serves the Zionist project in Palestine and how it has brought Palestinian *sumud* onto the frontline of politics.

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List of abbreviation

ATG	Alternative Tourism Group
BCCI	Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Ch	Chapter
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
EWASH	Advocacy Task Force Coordinator for Emergency, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
GC	Geneva Conventions
GNI	Gross National Income
GSS	Israeli General Security Services
ICBS	Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDF	Israeli defence forces
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMFA	Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
JNF	Jewish National Fund
Noor WEG	Noor Women's Empowerment Group
NSU	Palestinian Negotiations Support Unit
OCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
OPTs	Occupied Palestinian Territories
PA	Palestinian Authority
PIC	Palestinian Information Centre
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PWA	Palestinian Water Authority
UN	United Nations
WB	West Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WWII	World War Two

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Chapter 1

The wall versus the land and people of Palestine

1.1 Research questions and objectives

Since 2002 the Israeli wall has been subject to much controversial debate, mainly based on to what extent Israeli security claims for the necessity of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) are true; the apparently intrusive route running inside land of the West Bank (WB), and the devastating impact it has on Palestinian life. This study attempts to go beyond that broad set of issues to initially ask how the wall serves the ultimate Zionist project, that of consolidating a 'pure Jewish state' in all Palestine. It also investigates how the wall has brought Palestinian *sumud* (steadfastness) onto the frontline of politics and how this has become centred at the heart of Palestinian resistance as everyday acts of 'affirmation of life' and a Palestinian view that 'our existence is our resistance'. The research explores three main questions. To what extent does the wall serve the Zionist project in Palestine? To what extent do ordinary Palestinians living in the vicinity of the wall survive its consequences on their daily life? And what role does the wall play in bringing Palestinian *sumud* to the frontline of politics, and centring it at the heart of Palestinian resistance? There are in addition a number of sub questions:

1. What are the links between the wall and a changing strategy of Zionist expansion in the WB?
2. How does the wall impact on the daily lives of Palestinians in the research case studies?
3. What are the everyday forms of Palestinian *sumud* in the study cases to survive changing realities after the wall?
4. What challenges does the wall pose for the promotion of *sumud* in Palestinian communities?
5. What changes has the wall brought to the character of *sumud*?
6. Does the wall mark a continuation or a break in Palestinian *sumud*?

The objective of the research is to explore and examine the role of the wall in serving the Zionist project in Palestine, to identify Palestinian everyday struggles for survival while confronted by the wall, and how ordinary Palestinians living in the vicinity of the wall survive its effect on daily life. Also, to determine the role of the wall in bringing Palestinian *sumud* to the frontline of politics and centring it at the heart of Palestinian resistance. In doing this, a number of sub themes and lines of enquiry are raised. To explore and examine personal narratives by ordinary Palestinians of their everyday survival/*sumud*

experiences while confronted by the wall. To explore links between the wall and the changing strategy of Zionist expansion in the WB. To examine Zionist narratives and policies since 1948 in pursuit of a 'pure Jewish state' in Palestine compared to contemporary Zionist policies and narratives to serve and complete this goal.

1.2 Thesis argument

This thesis examines the conditions and struggles amongst dispossessed Palestinians as they attempt to survive the consequences of Zionist actions affecting their lives, including contemporary struggles against Zionist surveillance policies and the wall. It also sets out argument and evidence to clarify and understand Palestinian-Israeli debate over the contemporary wall: a security measure to protect Israeli civilians from Palestinian terror attacks versus a tool of combined Zionist goals of dominance and humiliation over Palestinians, territorial expansion, demographic domination and security for Israeli settlements in order to achieve their ultimate 'Zionist Project' in Palestine. All examined, discussed and evident throughout the thesis.

Moreover, the thesis argues that building the wall was not only to create a physical barrier, but rather a calculated and carefully planned strategic act to break Palestinian *sumud*. This would be through a more complex set of overt/covert dehumanising, humiliating and restrictive surveillance procedures, linked to the wall, aimed at severely impacting Palestinian life, making it unbearable, thus, forcing them to submit, lose hope and flee their land. Policies such as: closed 'Seam Zones'; ethnic segregation by exclusive settler gates and roads; *Haweya* (ID card) and *Tasreh* (permit). In addition to checkpoints and security checks that include ad-hoc running systems, interrogations, detentions, queues, inconsistency and unpredictability. It is to apply former Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan's request in 1967, that Palestinians "should continue living like dogs [...] and whoever wishes may leave, and we will see how this procedure will work out" (cited in Alaraby, 2017; Ofir, 2018).

In addition, the thesis researches role of the wall in bringing Palestinian *sumud* onto the political frontline. *Sumud* is not new to Palestinian history of struggle for survival since 1948. The wall marks a continuation of this *sumud*, but with a twist. This thesis argues that the wall has achieved the opposite outcome of what it was initially designed for. Instead of breaking Palestinian *sumud*, the wall increased Palestinian determination to challenge its impact on their existence and solidified their will to protect this existence despite all odds.

The thesis also argues that the wall revived Palestinian *sumud* to become strongly centred at the heart of Palestinian resistance as everyday acts of 'affirmation of existence' against a wall that aims to uproot Palestinians, and as 'affirmation of life' and

'anti-submission' against a wall that aims to dehumanise, humiliate and suppress Palestinians. In other words, following the wall, *sumud* has become a distinct Palestinian idea of affirmation of life and existence in search of a basic national concept and strategy for Palestinians, in order to prevent a colonial uprooting policy, to preserve identity and to restore dignity in their struggle for national liberty.

The thesis further argues that the wall and protest artwork on and around the wall stimulate each other in a process of mutual opposition. The wall has revived the role of artwork as a tool of political resistance that generates and solidifies *sumud* against the wall. While artwork on the wall exposes and comments on the ugly face of the wall as a tool of colonial apartheid which generates more opposition to the wall and more solidarity for Palestinians. This thesis researches the role of the wall in serving the ultimate Zionist project, following Ben-Gurion's vision of an exclusive Jewish state in the whole of Palestine (Morris, 1987; Palumbo, 1987; Khalidi, 1988; Massalha, 1997; Pappe, 1999; MidEast, 2005; Simons, 2006). Zionists concentrated on securing two elements for the survival of their ultimate project. First, continue working stealthily on completing expansion of the Zionist project in Palestine. Second, secure a Jewish majority within the new expanding borders inside the Palestinian land. In order to justify policies and tools of exodus and dispossession, Zionist military planners created a complex web of pretexts and lies (Davis, 1977; Khalidi, 1986; Pappe, 1992; Masalha, 1997; Gilmour, 1999; Usher, 2006; Kovel, 2007; Rubenberg, 2010).

This thesis argues that building the wall was based on considerations unrelated to the Israeli security pretext of protecting its citizens from Palestinian attacks. The wall should be perceived as another master tool designed to enable Zionists to continue their ultimate project in Palestine and pursue the dream of an exclusive 'Jewish state'. The wall is to secure major Zionist aims of gaining more Israeli territorial expansion, to secure a Jewish demographic majority within newly expanded borders/walls of a Zionist state and to have more control over Palestinians and their resources. The wall is a tool of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey, 2004), indicated by apartheid policies for control over Palestinian land and water.

For Zionists, the drive to control Palestinian land cleansed of Palestinians is a political goal, evident through Israeli policies and strategies against Palestinians since 1948. Nineteenth century Zionist rhetoric to resolve the 'Jewish problem' of persecution against Jews in Europe was to find "a land without people, for people without a land" (cited in Heikal, 1996, p. 75; Massalha, 1992, p. 10; Simons, 2006, p. 25). However, the chosen land for establishing this Jewish state, Palestine, was not empty; it was and still is a Palestinian homeland. The presence of Palestinians continues to impose a major threat to the success of the Zionist project in Palestine.

One early solution in 1937 was Ben-Gurion's; to "erect a Jewish state at once; even if it is not in the whole land, the rest will come in the course of time. It must come" (cited in Kovel, 2007, p.89). Following 71 years of endless colonial policies and strategies of annexation and exodus against Palestinians in pursuit of a 'pure Jewish state', Palestinians still exist in Palestine, and the project of consolidating a pure 'Jewish state' is still not complete. This incomplete project to Judaize all Palestine has led some contemporary Zionists to blame their predecessors. For example, Israeli historian, Benny Morris, who said that Zionists made a mistake in 1948 when they did not expel all Palestinians from Palestine, which would "have stabilized the state of Israel for generations" (cited in Shavit, 2004). In 2019, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, WB and in Israel, are estimated at over 5.3 million, exceeding the Jewish population of 5.2 million (World Population Review, 2019). By 2035, the Jewish population in Israel/Palestine is projected to reach 46%, Palestinians 54%. This is because the Palestinian population is growing at about 2.4% per year with a birth rate of over four children to every woman, 33% higher than Israel's growth rate. This demography worsened Zionist concerns for the survival of their incomplete project, especially when the Palestinian population is the youngest in the region with 40% under 14 years old and 57% between 15-65 (World Population Review, 2019).

Whilst the study is concerned with Palestinians surviving the impact of the wall since 2001, it is important to indicate that their struggle for survival is linked to a long history of struggle since 1948. In other words, in order to have a comprehensive and better understanding of Palestinian *sumud*, the study has to be perceived in the context of 71 years of Israeli occupation. Also, in order to understand links between the contemporary wall and Zionism, and to grasp the role of Zionism in setting a pattern for contemporary Israeli policies and strategies against Palestinians, Zionism is seen as an analytical base to highlight differences and similarities between old and modern political Zionism in Palestine. Paradoxically, over the last 71 years, it appears that Zionists got stuck in the continuum of a repetitive history when it comes to pursuing their Zionist project. Since 1948, Zionists have perused the same goals in Palestine, the only change has been in the type of tools used to achieve these goals. For example, the translated introduction of the 1948 Plan *Dalet* (Plan D) noted:

The objective of this plan is to gain control of the areas of the Hebrew state and defend its borders. It also aims at gaining control of the areas of Jewish settlement [...] located outside the borders [of Israel] (cited in Khalidi, 1988; Jewish Virtual Library, 2019)

This plan, devised by head of the Transfer Committee, Yosef Weitz, was a vital tool in the service of a Zionist project aimed mainly at gaining control over Jewish settlements located on the Palestinian side after partition (Khalidi, 1988). In his diary Weitz wrote:

It must be clear that there is no room in the country for both peoples [...] there is no way but to transfer all of them [Palestinians] not a single village must be left [...] only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb millions of our brothers, and the Jewish problem will be cease to exist (cited in Massalha, 1992, p. 131; Morris, 1987, p. 27; Qumsiyeh, 2004, p. 37; Simons, 2006, p. 29)

Plan *Dalet* called explicitly for the expulsion of Palestinians from Jewish-Palestinian mixed towns, and from locations deemed strategic for Zionists (Pappe, 1999; Morris, 1986; Khalidi, 1988; Masalha, 1997; Simons, 2006). Where expulsion failed, forced transfer was implemented. These same goals are served by the contemporary wall. The only difference between the two policies is that Plan *Dalet* used overt and on the spot procedures: cutting water supplies; setting fire to fields of Palestinian villages; and looting crops, which enabled Israeli troops to take over land and property (Ruedy, 1971; Fischbach, 1997; Usher, 2006). The contemporary wall uses a more complex set of contemporary overt and covert suppressive, dehumanising, and humiliating surveillance procedures aimed at severely impacting Palestinian life, making it unbearable, thus, forcing them to flee their land and property. This thesis shows that Zionists ideology has not changed.

This thesis discusses the transition between what has long been understood as Israeli 'creeping annexation' since 1948, carried out in most cases by Zionist stealth (Cook, 2019a), and contemporary blatant and unpredictable annexation, exodus and Judaization of Palestine under the protection and support of the US and other powerful actors. The wall is the consequence of overarching Israeli policies designed to consolidate a 'Great Jewish State' in Palestine with continued support and backing of imperial powers (Masalha, 2001; Salamanca et al., 2012). In 1930, pioneer Zionist, Ben-Yehuda, advised Zionists to become strong before annexing the rest of Palestine, "the thing we must do now, is to become as strong as we can, to conquer the country covertly, bit by bit" (cited in Kovel, 2007, p. 45). In this case, the contemporary blatant annexation of Palestine reflects the level of power Israel enjoys due to unconditional protection and support from the US administration.

Zionism in this thesis is discussed as an ideology and also as a political movement that subjects Palestinians to an on-going structural and violent forms of dispossession, land appropriation, and erasure in pursuit of a pure Jewish state. Therefore, thesis attempts to purposefully insert as many direct quotations of statements and evidences as possible to support arguments throughout and to draw attention to the core importance of the land

and people of Palestine in shaping on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict and contemporary Israeli policies against Palestinians continue to be influenced by political Zionism. In chapters 2-5, the thesis provides argument and supporting evidence to understand that the contemporary wall is another Zionist tool in a long list of tools to achieve the ultimate Zionist project of a Jewish state in Palestine. Chapters 5-7 provide argument and supporting evidence to understand Palestinian everyday acts of *sumud* as a weapon of the weak to undermine dominant power of the wall. It is to understand Palestinian *sumud* as a determination to defend the existence, dignity and hope of Palestinians against relentless Zionist efforts to break this *sumud*. The following section explains what it means the concept of *sumud* in Palestine.

1.3 The concept of *sumud* in Palestine

As a national Palestinian concept, *sumud*, represents the strong determination of Palestinians to stay on their land. For Palestinians, *sumud* is part of their collective consciousness of struggle to cling to land that goes back at least to the *Nakba* (the catastrophe) of 1948. It is also a socio-political concept that refers to ways of surviving the occupation and extreme conditions of adversity, lack of resources and limited opportunities (Marie, et al., 2017). Moreover, *sumud* is a representation of inner strength and hardiness of Palestinians to confront and survive these chronic conditions (Teeffelen, 2009; 2011). It is not surprising that the evergreen hundreds-of-years-old olive tree, with deep roots in the land that bears fruit only after several years of growth, is one of the most popular cultural and metaphorical symbols of Palestinian *sumud* (Teeffelen, 2009; Teeffelen & Biggs, 2011; Rijke & Teeffelen, 2013). Tony Teeffelen (2011) in his study on Palestinian *sumud* found that olive tree represents peace, reward and history over thousands of years; the roots represent steadfastness on holy land, the branches represent resilience and the wind represents colonizer (Teeffelen, et al., 2005). This explains why the destruction of olive trees in Palestine is at the heart of settler thievery.

Sumud is a Palestinian concept of personal and collective resilience and steadfastness (Marie, et al., 2017). It is also an indication of inter-dependence between resistance and power that leads one to “use resistance as a diagnostic of power” (Abu-Lughod, 1990, p. 42). Studies of everyday resistance show that they are not independent of systems of power, but rather are conditioned by them (Richter-Devroe, 2013). In this research, *sumud* refers to Palestinian attempts to confront and survive the wall as a means of improving their lives, growing socio-economic needs and to deal with changing realities after the wall. As a political strategy, it has been described as ‘the third way’; a position of steadfastness that is neither necessarily armed nor a passive acceptance (Shehadeh, 1984, cited in Hazou, 2013, p. 151).

Sumud might be static or dynamic and could include covert and overt acts. Static *sumud* focuses on the maintenance of life and homeland in the face of adversity, (Teeffelen, 2009), while dynamic *sumud* emphasises a form of personal and collective political resistance against violent Israeli practices (Marie, et al., 2017). *Sumud* acts do not emerge due to any formal organized coordination or centralized and planned political strategies. They are subtle, non-organized acts of resistance by ordinary individuals in response to their experience of domination (Johansson & Vinthagen, 2014). According to anthropologist Catherine Neveu (2015, p. 141), contemporary use of the socio-political category 'ordinary citizen' or 'ordinary people' often signals:

A non-political or uninvolved individual 'seen as more independent and detached than those involved in collective spaces or debates, and their opinions as more genuine, more 'authentic' and less biased, since they are not supposed to be structured by corporate interest or opinions, or organised groups or collectives

John Clarke (2010, p. 642) suggests that:

Ordinary people are valorised because they are not political. They are seen as occupying positions that are above or below politics: below, because they are seen to be concerned with more 'everyday' issues; above, because they are not engaged in the venal, corrupt or collusive pursuit of power and self interest in the manner of politicians

Research aims to identify ordinary Palestinian living in the vicinity of the wall in their everyday *sumud* while confronted by the wall in three cases in Bethlehem governorate discussed in the research methodology and case selection below.

1.4 Research methodology and case selection

The research aims to explore and examine daily life forms of Palestinian *sumud* against the wall. Therefore, the study uses an interpretive ontological approach. Such an approach involves studying beliefs, ideas and discourses with a focus on understanding meanings that shape actions (Marsh & Furlong, 2000). An interpretive ontological approach is an anti-foundational approach that believes the world is socially constructed (Stoker & Marsh, 2000). This approach also focuses on data production likely to reveal meaning and understanding people attach to politics (Stoker & Marsh, 2000). Qualitative data collection is more associated with interpretive theory, which favours participative fieldwork and a real involvement between researcher and subject. This research epistemological position is interpretative that focuses on how people create and maintain their social world (Heylighen, 2000). In order to arrive at an understanding of how people create and maintain their social worlds, interpretative epistemology uses systematic

analysis of social actions through direct detailed observation of people (Marsh & Furlong, 2000).

Moreover, the research utilises a bottom-up case study approach. Case study approach “involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence” (Yin, 1994; cited in Robson, 2002, p. 178). Catherine Hakim (2006, pp. 66-65) argues that case studies are studies of a single local community that seek to describe and analyse main aspects of community life. Furthermore, case studies provide a great deal of descriptive material (Hayes, 2006). While most studies may focus on a single community, the strongest involve a study of two or more communities. Therefore, this research conducted a case study of three Palestinian communities from the governorate of Bethlehem: Bethlehem city, Al-Walaja village and Aida refugee camp. The following section discusses the case studies in more details.

1.4.1 Research case studies

This section explains the reasons why Bethlehem Governorate has been selected for this study. It also introduces the research case studies; Bethlehem city, Aida refugee camp and Al-Walaja village, with specific focus on their struggles with Zionist policies of land annexation since Oslo 1995 Accord. This section sets the foundation for exploring the correlation between Zionist policies of land annexation for settlement expansion exercised in 1995, and land annexation for building the wall in 2001. Both policies solidify and expand the Great Zionist project in Palestine.

Occupations are intended to be temporary, and Oslo Accords promised the same (Cook, 2019a). But Israel ensured that both the occupation and land thefts sanctioned by Oslo continued, which indicate that the Zionist project in Palestine is still incomplete. Oslo Accord cemented Israel's absolute control over 62% of the WB, containing key agricultural land and water sources classified as area 'C' (Cook, 2019a). For Palestinians in Bethlehem governorate, Oslo meant that 87% of its land, that forms about 67.8% of total agricultural land and open spaces, fell in area 'C' and was annexed to Israel under the pretext of firing zones, natural reserves, spaces for settlement development, and as part of the unilaterally expanded boundaries of Jerusalem city (UN, 1997; MOA, 2008; OCHA, 2009; Isaac & Hrimat, 2010; Ghattas, et al., 2016; NAD, 2015; 2017). Paradoxically, since Oslo, Bethlehem governorate suffered intensive systematic on-going colonial policies to further control what has been sanctioned of Palestinian land in areas 'A' and 'B', increased by Israeli settlements and exacerbated with building of the Israeli wall in 2001.

Being the main historical and religious governorate in Palestine, the struggles of Bethlehem governorate exacerbated the most in the WB. Bethlehem governorate suffered from a wall that suffocates its people (Ch5 and Ch7) and dominates its tourism (Ch6). Bethlehem city, Al-Walaja village, and Aida refugee camp have been selected from the governorate of Bethlehem, based on their continuous struggle for survival during the Israeli occupation, because of their proximity to the wall and Israeli settlements, and because they have been most affected by the wall. For Palestinians in Bethlehem city for example, the wall has destructive impact. The wall completely blocks Palestinians and tourists from moving freely between the two main historic and religious cities in Palestine; Bethlehem and Jerusalem (Ch3) (Al-Rimmawi, et al., 2013). Likewise, the wall has a devastating impact on Al-Walaja village. It extends for 6.3km on Al-Walaja lands and confiscates 97% of the total land; majority of this land is agricultural land, forests, and open areas; (MOA, 2008; ARIJ, 2010c; Isaac & Hrimat, 2010; PCBC, 2012). Al-Walaja is surrounded and sealed off by the wall on east, west, and north sides.

Palestinians in Aida refugee camp became the most isolated. The wall separated Aida refugee quarters from the olive groves where they used to enjoy picnics and outdoor fun. Moreover, Aida camp's proximity to the wall presents severe problems (Ch5 and Ch7). A constant military presence and proximity to the 'Crossing 300' between Bethlehem and Jerusalem have made the camp vulnerable to number of protection concerns. These involve regular excessive force by Israeli military and incursions/clashes with camp residents, especially children, with an increasing number of injuries (UN, 2015). This is in addition to overcrowding in a camp known for its poor infrastructure, narrow streets and densely built apartments.

The Oslo II interim accord of 1995 took place after former Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin and former Palestinian president, Yasser Arafat, signed an Interim Agreement for transfer of further power and territory to the Palestinian Authority (PA) (IMFA, 1995; UN, 1997; BBC, 2019). For Palestinians, Oslo Accord meant more Israeli control over them and over their land, but by proxy; utilizing the PA to do this mission for them. This was due to the Oslo division of Palestinian land into areas 'A' 'B' and 'C' that fall under varying levels of Israeli control. Accordingly, the PA has full control over Palestinian areas 'A', while it has control over civil administration only in areas 'B'. Whereas, Israel continues to have full control over security in area 'B', retaining full over-riding control over both civil administration and security in area 'C' (JVL, 1995; UN, 1997; Isaac & Hrimat, 2010; Ghattas, et al., 2016) (Map 1.1). One of the aims of Oslo was to establish an interim self-governing PA in the OPTs, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement (IMFA, 1993; ProCon, 2008). Gradually, Palestinians would be allowed to take back more of their land to build a state. However, and after 24 years, Palestinians are still waiting for the permanent settlement to take place. The following

sections discuss briefly the profiles and land confiscation in each case study starting with Bethlehem city.



Map 1-1: OCHA, 2019. Oslo Agreement. West Bank Area “C” land. [Online]. Accessed on 27.6.19 via:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20131110130511/http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6B9EABA6D3EA5CE2852578410058A8C6>

1.4.1.1 Bethlehem city

Bethlehem was established and inhabited by Canaanites around 2000 BC. It was called ‘*Beit-Eilo-Lahama*’, (the house of the God of meat), for its cattle and sheep that used to breed and graze on the city’s fertile land. Today, the name ‘*Beit-Lahem*’ means (the house of meat). The New Testament identifies Bethlehem as the birthplace of Jesus, represented by the Nativity Church (UNESCO, 2012). Bethlehem is the capital of the governorate of Bethlehem, which is one of 16 governorates in the WB. This governorate includes 40 Palestinian localities covering an area of about 660 square metres (Isaac &

Hrimat, 2010; OCHA, 2009). These localities include: four cities; Bethlehem, Beit-Jala, Beit-sahour, and Ad-Doha, as well as three refugee camps; Aida, Dheisheh and Al-Aza, also several villages such as Al-Walaja and Al-Khader.

Bethlehem governorate is located south of Jerusalem city, in the southern part of the WB. It is bordered by Hebron to the south and southeast, the Dead Sea to the east and the Green Line to the west (ARIJ, 2010a). In 2016, and according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS, 2012) the population of Bethlehem governorate was estimated to be about 221,802 (Appendix A). Bethlehem is bordered by the city of Beit-Sahour to the east, Jerusalem to the north, Beit-Jala and Ad-Doha to the west, and Hindaza and Artas villages to the south (Maps 1.2 and 1.3). The city lies in a total area of about 10,611 dunums in the governorate, of which 6,535 dunums are considered arable land (Map 1.4), and 1,373 dunums as residential land (ARIJ, 2010a).

Bethlehem is located at an altitude of 772m above sea level with a mean annual rainfall, occurring during November through to February, of 501mm. Average annual temperature is 16.57C; with average temperatures ranging from 7C in winter to 22C in summer (Maps 1.5 and 1.6). Average annual humidity is around 60.4% (ARIJ, 2010a; Bethlehem Municipality, 2015).

The map displays the West Bank with various geographical and administrative features. The Segregation Wall is shown as a red line, and the Governorate Border is a black line. The map is color-coded to show different types of areas: yellow for Palestinian built-up areas, blue for Israeli settlements, green for areas for future Israeli settlements, red for Israeli military bases, and light green for nature reserves. The map includes a legend, a scale bar (0-6 km), and a north arrow. An inset map shows the location of the West Bank relative to Israel and the Mediterranean Sea.


Legend:

- Segregation Wall
- Governorate Border
- Palestinian Built-up Area
- Israeli Settlement
- Area for Future Israeli Settlement
- Israeli Military Base
- Area A
- Area B
- Area C
- Nature Reserve
- Closed Military Area


Scale: 0 3 6 Kilometers

Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem
ARIJ, 2010
GIS & RS Unit


Map 1-3:Isaac & Hrimat, 2010. Locality profiles and needs assessment in the Bethlehem Governorate. [Online]. Accessed on 2.7.2010 via:
[https://www.arij.org/files/admin/1Locality profiles and needs assessment in Bethlehem Governorate.pdf](https://www.arij.org/files/admin/1Locality%20profiles%20and%20needs%20assessment%20in%20Bethlehem%20Governorate.pdf)



Map 1-4:Isaac & Hrimat, 2010. Topography of the Bethlehem Governorate. [Online]. Accessed on 2.7.2019 via:
[https://www.arij.org/files/admin/1Locality_profiles_and_needs_assessment_in_Bethlehem Governorate.pdf](https://www.arij.org/files/admin/1Locality_profiles_and_needs_assessment_in_Bethlehem_Governorate.pdf)



Map 1-5:Isaac & Hrimat, 2010. Rainfall in the Bethlehem Governorate.
[Online]. Accessed on 9.7.2019 via:
https://www.arij.org/files/admin/1Locality_profiles_and_needs_assessment_in_Bethlehem_Governorate.pdf



Map 1-6: Isaac & Hrimat, 2010. Temperature in the Bethlehem Governorate. [Online]. Accessed on 9.7.2019 via:
[https://www.arij.org/files/admin/1Locality_profiles_and_needs_assessment_in Bethlehem Governorate.pdf](https://www.arij.org/files/admin/1Locality_profiles_and_needs_assessment_in_Bethlehem_Governorate.pdf)

The PCBS (2012) shows that the estimated total population of Bethlehem in 2016 was about 31,799 (Appendix A). While Data of the Bethlehem Municipality (2015) shows that the population in 2014 was approximately 32,000 with a total number of 5,211 families and 6,709 housing units. In 2007, there were 25,266; 50.5% (12,753) males and 49.5% (12,513) females; 34.1% under 15 years, 56% between 15-64 years, 4.9% 65 years and above, and 5% not registered (PCBS, 2012). Moreover, according to the results of the PCBS census (2012) the illiteracy rate among Bethlehem population is about 4.1%, of whom 67.6% are females (Directorate of Education, 2009). Bethlehem has two universities; Bethlehem University and Al-Ahliya University (Directorate of Education, 2009; Bethlehem Municipality, 2015).


Bethlehem provides work for 86% of employed people aged 15 years and over, the remaining 5% of labour force work within WB, and 9% work in Israel. The city depends on several economic sectors: government and private staff 30%; service (25%); trade (23%); industry (18%); Israeli labour market (3%); and agriculture (1%). The economy in Bethlehem is primarily tourist-driven (Al-Rimmawi & Butcher, 2015). There are many industrial activities, mainly: industry of eastern artefacts (shells and wood); concrete and textile factories; and stone quarries (Isaac & Hrimat, 2010; Al-Rimmawi & Butcher, 2015).

Unemployment in Bethlehem in 2009 was 20.2% compared with an average of 17.8% for the rest of WB (PCBS, 2012). In 2014, the city recorded the highest unemployment rate reached about 27% (Bethlehem Municipality, 2015). In 2015, 21% of the population were living below poverty line (NAD, 2015); those most affected by Israeli restrictions were workers in the tourism sector (Ch6). According to Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) unemployment rates in 2016 had increased to almost 29% (NAD, 2017; BCCI, 2018).

Bethlehem was exposed to Israeli confiscation of thousands of dunums of land for various Israeli purposes. For example, after 1967 the first confiscation of 3,939 dunums (amounting to 37.1% of total Bethlehem land) was annexed for the purpose of expanding Jerusalem municipality and redrawing its boundaries. Following Oslo, 4,603 dunums (43.4% of total land) was classified as area 'C', under full Israeli control while, 6,007 dunums (56.6% of Bethlehem) were classified as area 'A', under PA control (Isaac & Hrimat, 2010).

Since Israel has control over area 'C', Palestinians are prevented from constructing new houses or businesses, in the area. They are also prevented from farming or benefiting from this land in any way, unless they get permission, which is extremely difficult to obtain (ARIJ, 2010a). Bethlehem also lost 594 dunums (5.6% of total land) for construction of the Israeli settlement, Gilo, in north Bethlehem, while it lost 1,136 dunums (10.7% of total land) for the construction of Har-Homa (Abu-Ghneim), a settlement northwest of Bethlehem. This is in addition to losing over 3.54km of land for construction of Israeli by-pass roads (No.60 and No.356).

Moreover, the wall extends to 5.96km on Bethlehem lands; thus confiscating, upon its completion, 37.8% of total land (Ch4) (ARIJ, 2010a; Isaac & Hrimat, 2010). On September 2005, Israel announced the establishment of 10 crossing points in the WB. The crossings include two major border points with Jerusalem: the Mazmurya crossing and 300-Crossing (previously known as Rachel's crossing), located at the northern entrance to Bethlehem, opened in November 2005 (Map 1.7). Furthermore, Israel established 23 crossing points along the wall (Ahituv, 2018). Only Palestinians with an Israeli permit are allowed to cross and are forced to pass through strict surveillance procedures by Israeli military before crossing (Ch5). This takes the discussion to the second case study below.



Map 1-7:ARIJ. 2005. 300-Crossing in Bethlehem. [Online]. Accessed on 16.6.19 via:
<http://poica.org/2005/11/israel-inaugurates-gilo-300-terminal-in-bethlehem/>

1.4.1.2 Aida refugee camp

Aida camp (Map 1.8) is located 1.5km North of Bethlehem. Aida camp dates back to 1948 and residents originate from more than 43 villages and towns destroyed in 1948 and 1967. Aida camp is bordered by Beit-Jala city to the west and south and partially surrounded by the wall to the East and North and is near Har-Homa and Gilo settlements (UN, 2015). The camp was established in 1950 on land, which the UNRWA leased from the government of Jordan (Palestine News Network 2019; (UN, 2015). The name Aida goes back to the owner of the land where the camp was initially set up and where a coffee shop called Aida existed. As Aida means ‘the return’ in Arabic, residents of the camp decided to keep the name to show determination of their right to return (ARIJ, 2010b).



Map 1-8: IslamTimes. 2019. Wall route in Aida camp. The wall passes through Aida to the left and winds its way to enclose Rachel Tomb and a nearby military base. [Online]. Accessed on 17.7.19 via: <http://www.islamtimes.org.Eng/gallery/350768/2/camp-on-front-line-of-struggle-against-occupation>


According to PCBS (2012), the total population of Aida camp was 2,598; 1,300 males and 1,298 females. By 2016, the population had increased to 3,311 (PCBS, 2016). In 2019, there are approximately 6,500 Palestinians in Aida camp (Al-Qadi, 2018; MAP, 2018). Around 6,500 people inhabit just 0.071 square kilometres of land that has not grown significantly along with the increasing refugee population (UN, 2015; MAP, 2018). Distribution of age groups in Aida: 38.7% under 15 years; 57% between 15-64 years; and 3.7% 65 years and above (PCBS, 2012). Whereas 50.1% males 49.9% females. The population of Aida composes several refugee families, mainly: Abu-Srour; Abu-Hammad; Qaraqe', Odeh; Darweish; 'Ajarmeh; Malash; Al-Masa'eed; El-'Araj; Abu-Odeh; 'Ayyad; and Radi (ARIJ, 2010b).

After Oslo, Aida camp fell mostly in area 'A' under PA control, while some of the periphery (such as the main road running alongside the wall) fell in area 'C' under Israeli control. Since 1995 Aida camp has been governed by a service committee appointed by the PA Refugee Affairs Department. This service committee provides the camp with infrastructure, culture and sports services (ARIJ, 2010b). Illiteracy in 2007 was about 6.8%, of whom 77.8% were females (PCBS, 2012). There are two public schools run by UNRWA in the camp, one mixed and one only for boys (Directorate of Education, 2009).

Aida camp economy is dependent on the Israeli labour market, which absorbs 78% of the camp workforce, while 18% in government or other sectors, 3% trade and 1% service sector. In 2007, the unemployment rate was 64% (PCBS, 2012). Approximately 99.4% of housing units in the camp are connected to the electricity and water networks (PCBS, 2012). However, Israeli domination over Palestinian water resources represents Palestinians with major obstacles in water pumping and distribution. Based on Palestinian Water Authority (PWA, 2008) estimations, the rate of water supply per capita is about 100 litres per day, but this rate varies from one community to another. Due to Israeli control over Palestinian water resources (Ch4 and Ch5), residents of Aida receive only 66 litres per person per day (PWA, 2008). Increasing struggles with water inequality are found in Al-Walaja village discussed below.

1.4.1.3 Al-Walaja village

Al-Walaja literally means a place that passes into or through something (Al-Walaja Village Council, 2009), it is a Palestinian village located 5km west of Bethlehem and east of Jerusalem (Map 1.9). The village is bordered by Beit-Jala city to the East, Green Line to the west, Battir and Husan villages to the south and Israeli settlements of Gilo and Har-Gilo to the north (ARIJ, 2010c). In 1948, Israel occupied most of Al-Walaja land, and exiled inhabitants to the remaining village land. Therefore, current Al-Walaja residents are refugees living on what is left of their own village; the 'new' Al-Walajah, about 6,000 dunums that remained beyond the Green Line out of the total 18,000 dunums of village land (Holmes & Gutierrez, 2018). After occupation of the WB in 1967, about a third of the current village was annexed to Jerusalem's municipal jurisdiction, but unlike residents of other annexed villages, Al-Walajah residents did not receive Israeli residency status. About half of the village land was expropriated by Israel to build the Gilo settlement inside Jerusalem's municipal borders or seized by military order for the establishment of the Har-Gilo settlement (UNRWA, 2013; B'Tselem, 2014b).



Map 1-9: The Fundambulist, 2011. Al-Walaja village. [Online]. Accessed on 9.7.19 via: <https://thefunambulist.net/law/palestine-village-of-al-walajah-a-prison-to-be>

In 1995, according to Oslo agreement, 113 dunums (2.6% of the total area) was classified into area 'B' that falls under PA responsibility, leaving Israel with full control over security. The remaining 4,215 dunums (97.4% of land) were classified as area 'C', which comes under full control of Israel. Area 'B' is governed by a village council appointed by the PA. Since Israel has control of security, the council has limited authority in the area. Moreover, as area 'C' is also under full control of Israel, Palestinians are prevented from construction or benefiting from the land, unless they get permission, which is virtually impossible (OCHA, 2009; ARIJ, 2010c; Isaac & Hrimat, 2010; PCBS, 2012).

The total population of Al-Walaja in 2007 was 2,041; 1,041 males and 1,000 females (PCBS, 2016). In 2016 the total number had increased to 2,569. Age groups in Al-Walaja were; 31.6% under 15 years; 46.2% 15-64 years; and 3.3% 65 years above. Al-Walaja has about 390 households living in 388 housing units, mostly of families: Al-'Araj; Al-Hagagla; Abed-Rabbo; and Al-Wahadna (ARIJ, 2010c). Illiteracy rate in Al-Walaja is about 5.1%, of whom 78.3% are females (PCBS, 2012). There is only one school, run by UNRWA called Al-Walaja School with a total number of 276 students (Directorate of Education, 2009). Al-Walaja has no governmental or private health centres. In emergency cases, residents use Bethlehem and Beit-Jala hospitals and health centres, located about 4-6km from the village (Al-Walaja Village Council, 2009).

Al-Walaja is dependent mainly on the Israeli labour market, which absorbs 47% of the village workforce, while the other economic sectors; 30% services and government or private sectors; 20% agriculture; 2% trade; and 1% industry. Industrial activities in Al-Walaja are mainly metal workshops, water tanks, solar heaters and carpentry workshops

(ARIJ, 2010c). As a result of Israeli restrictions, the economic status of the population has severely declined; many residents have lost their work in Israel and become unemployed (about 40%) (PCBS, 2012). In the village, there is just one archaeological touristic site called 'Al-Badawi' considered to be the oldest olive tree in the world of more than 5000 years (Paliroots, 2016) and the symbol of *sumud*.

Al-Walaja lies within a total area of about 4,328 dunums of which 3,910 are considered arable land and 73 residential land. Agriculture production depends on rainwater, and irrigation. The village is located at an altitude of 756m above sea level with a mean annual rainfall of 601mm. Average annual temperature is 16C and average annual humidity 61% (ARIJ, 2010c), suitable for the cultivating of Tomato. Also, there are about 2 dunums of greenhouses, planted with different types of vegetables. Aromatic medicinal herbs are growing in the village, thyme and mint, on a total area of 2.5 dunums irrigated from the public water network. Also, wheat and barley are the most cultivated crops covering an area of 75 dunums, while dry legumes such as lentil and chickpeas are the second most cultivated crops. Most residents rear domestic animals such as chickens, sheep, goats, and keep bees.

A number of local institutions deal with social matters in the village. For example, the Agricultural Charitable Society (Al-Walaja Village Council, 2009) works with farmers in Al-Walaja and links them with donors; the Ministry of Interior founded the centre in 2005. There are also; sports club, founded in 1995 by the Palestinian Ministry of Youth Sports; the Ansar Centre for youth; and the women's club, founded in 2000. In terms of religious establishments, there are three mosques in Al-Walaja: Al-Huda; An-Noor; and Ar-Raja' Mosques (ARIJ, 2010c). Al-Walaja is connected to a public electricity network served by the Jerusalem electricity company. Approximately 98.7% of housing units in the village are connected to this network. There is a total of 6km of paved roads in the village (Al-Walaja Village Council, 2009).

The PWA provides water and about 99.7% of housing units are connected to this network, while the remaining units (0.3%) are dependent on Al-Hadfa and Al-Juwayza water springs. The PWA depends largely on water purchase from the Israeli company Mecerot to supply Palestinian areas (Ch5). The quantity of water supplied to Al-Walaja in 2008 was about 0.053 million cubic meters per year, therefore, the estimated rate of water supply per capita was about 134 litres per day (PWA, 2008). Yet, Al-Walaja people do not consume the amount of water indicated due to water loss, which is about 39%. This loss happens at the main source, major transport lines, distribution network, and at the household level (PWA, 2008), thus, the rate of water consumption per capita is reduced to about 94 liters per day.

Moreover, the wall has a destructive impact on Al-Walaja. It extends for 6.3km on Al-Walaja lands; thus confiscates 4,209 dunums (97% of total land); majority of this land is agricultural land, forests, and open areas; (MOA, 2008; ARIJ, 2010c; Isaac & Hrimat, 2010; PCBC, 2012). Al-Walaja is surrounded and sealed off by the wall on east, west, and north sides. On the southern side the village is surrounded by a 2.4km wall and sealed off by a fortified road. This road runs alongside a 2.5km Israeli bypass, 'Road 436', controlled and protected by the Israeli military, with barbed wire and ditches between 80-100 meters wide (MOA, 2008; ARIJ, 2010c; Isaac & Hrimat, 2010; PCBC, 2012). The road annexed 713 dunums of Al-Walaja land in area 'A'.

In 2006, Israel issued a military order to confiscate 39.8 dunums of Al-Walaja and Beit-Jala to construct a new Israeli crossing in the area called 'Har-Gilo Crossing'. The crossing is the only entry/exit access point controlled by Israeli military available for residents to services and work in Bethlehem governorate and WB (MOA, 2008; Isaac & Hrimat, 2010; PCBS, 2012; PCHR, 2019). Al-Walaja also lost around 137 dunums (3.2% of total land) for the construction of Israeli settlements of Gilo, and Har-Gilo.

In June 2004, Israeli authorities announced the construction of a new settlement, Giva't-Yael in Al-Walaja village as part of the Jerusalem envelope plan. 2,976 dunums of valuable agricultural land belonging to west Bethlehem governorate were confiscated, of which 1,126 dunums belonged to Al-Walaja village (ARIJ, 2010c; Isaac & Hrimat, 2010; Al-Qadi, 2018; PCHR, 2019). The settlement includes more than 13,200 residential units to accommodate 55,000 colonial settlers. Giva't-Yael settlement completed a cycle of Israeli settlements separating Jerusalem from rest of the WB. It also surrounds Bethlehem Governorate with Israeli settlements on all sides; Har-Homa in the northeast, Gilo and Har-Gilo in the north, Giva't-Yael in the northwest, and Gosh-Etzion in the south (MOA, 2008; ARIJ, 2010c; Isaac & Hrimat, 2010; PCBS, 2012).

1.4.2 Data collection

This is a qualitative research study using qualitative ethnographic methods. These include participant observation; review of official documents (archival and personal); personal narratives; life histories/oral testimonies; focus groups; semi-structured face-to-face interviews; and assessment of personal arts, specifically 'graffiti on the wall'. Qualitative research focuses on the meanings individuals assign to experiences. It seeks answers to questions by examining various social settings and how individuals who inhabit these settings make sense of their surroundings through actions, symbols, rituals, social structures and social roles. Qualitative research allows the researcher to share in the understandings and perceptions of others and to explore how people structure and give meaning to their daily lives (Berg, 1998).

Qualitative research has been criticised as being a non-scientific approach. Bruce Berg (1998) argues that this criticism is based on a mistaken correlation between the terms of 'empirical' and 'quantification' rather than of any real defect in the qualitative approach itself. In fact, scientific researchers are positivists who utilize empirical methodologies borrowed from the natural sciences to investigate phenomenon. They use quantitative methods that provide rigorous, reliable and verifiable data and statistical testing of empirical hypothesis (Stoker & Marsh, 2000). However, for the particular interest of this study, qualitative ethnographic methods are considered to be the most appropriate tools for collecting data as a means of accessing unquantifiable facts about actual people.

Initially, the research used semi-structured, face-to-face interviews, as these are more effective in giving a human face to research problems and are considered the best method for acquiring information on highly personal or socially sensitive topics (Mack, et al., 2005). They achieve this through in-depth exploration of participants' attitudes and beliefs in complex and sensitive situations. Information can also be supplemented with that gained from body language reactions (Sehd, 2010). In addition, interviews have a wide application for most sections of the population, including illiterate and elderly people, where the interviewer is able to repeat questions, or put it in a form easily understood by the respondent (Kumar, 2005). Literature has widely assumed that interviewers are more successful in gaining full answers when they have an understanding of the situation of the interviewees, (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). In this case, this research has benefited from the familiarity of the researcher with Arabic language, political/social conditions, context, culture, values and customs of the research environment which enabled the success of the interview method. For example, sharing language and background is an advantage in terms of understanding Palestinian body language, terminology, slang words and gestures.

Moreover, the research includes life histories, 'oral testimonies', as it is one of the most effective ways of addressing human problems. Life history is very important for the systematic collection of people's living testimonies about their own experiences; they offer a double validity in understanding the past (Moyer, 1999). It helps when showing the line of Palestinian strategies for survival before and after the construction of the wall, especially with elder Palestinians in the research cases. Such evidence is an important documentation of Palestinian history and of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Furthermore, the study used focus group interviews to access a broad range of views and opinions related to the research questions (Kitzinger, 1995). This allows participants to freely express their views, thoughts and experiences in a more accessible way than would be possible in one-to-one interviews or survey questionnaires (Gibbs, 1997). A focus group is also able to discover variety within a population, revealing a large amount

of information in a short period of time via group dynamics that stimulates conversation and reaction (Mack, et al., 2005). The researcher played the role of moderator: introducing the research issue; keep people focused on the topic; make sure no one dominates the discussion; and take notes, including non-verbal responses, to ensure no details are missed (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). Focus group interviews are not the best method for acquiring information on highly personal or socially sensitive topics, which is why the research used a combination of qualitative methods that complement and strengthen each other (Mack, et al., 2005). Focus group interviews included pre-set open-ended questions and prompt elaborate answers, in order to obtain as much information as possible for further analysis.

In addition, the research reviewed Palestinian documents, international NGOs; UNRWA (The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees), OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the OPTs), and from Israelis, where possible. Moreover, the study included assessment of personal art, including messages of graffiti on the wall. Qualitative approach provides a means of accessing unquantifiable facts about actual people represented by their personal traces, such as letters, diaries (Berg, 1998; Woods, 2006) art and graffiti. Using art and graffiti is similar to observing by proxy and helps build insight into struggles against the wall. Art and graffiti, in conjunction with other qualitative methods, formed the basis for interview questions, where the aim is to check for clarity, completeness, and validity.

To strengthen the research, an unobtrusive participant observation method was applied where subjects continue normal life. The study believes that the less the researcher disturbs the scene, the longer the time spent in it and deeper the penetration of research, the greater representation it could claim to be. In addition, the researcher used 'Triangulation' (Woods, 2006), which is a combination of semi-structured face-to-face interviews, focus groups and observation methods, to complement and confirm the findings. In the study cases, the observations test and fill out accounts given in interviews, and vice versa, increased depth and accuracy.

1.4.3 Study sampling

The study includes purposeful and random sampling. The purposeful sample targeted those people most affected by the wall, loss of land or property behind the western side of the wall or being annexed on the western side. Interviews were conducted using the snowball sample, where a sample is developed through personal contact and recommendation as the research proceeds also the opportunity sample, where initiatives of participation are being offered. A random sample allows a more even spread over the

population according to the number of households of each community and tends to give more reliable results on the overall character of survival in each community.

The number of interviewees should be determined based on two elements. First, saturation of information to the point where data collection no longer reveals new information (repeated responses) (Seidman, 2006). Second, sufficient to the number and range of participants needed to reflect the population (Seidman, 2006). The researcher conducted 90 interviews (Appendix C) addressed to both female and male heads of households and family members aged over 16 years. Each interview lasted for a maximum of 45 minutes. The research also included 9 focus groups (Appendix D). Each focus group included 8-12 participants (Fern, 1982) of mixed gender from age groups of 16 years and above. Each session lasted for 1-2 hours. Interviews took place after handing out consent forms and information sheets to participants.

In July 2012, the researcher made a preliminary visit to the research case study areas. She managed to establish a wide range of contacts within those communities and NGOs working in these locations, also official institutions, community leaders and activists. Between 2013-2014, the researcher spent one year in the governorate of Bethlehem where she conducted her fieldwork research study. She revisited the study cases twice in 2015 and in 2016, for six weeks in each visit. The researcher has regular contact with key people in the study communities via social media applications. The following section illustrates how the researcher ensured ethical issues of this research.

1.4.4 Research ethics

The ethical issues of this research were followed and ensured throughout the whole research process. For the researcher, confidentiality, anonymity, data protection and the responsibility to protect the safety of herself and participants from any harm arising from this research are core fundamentals. This would not be possible without the researcher total understanding, respect and commitment to the ethic codes which were primarily grounded in her previous work experience as a professional social worker and as a researcher in large organizations in Palestine and the UK. In other words, the skills obtained during the researcher work experience provided her with substantial insight into the processes under examination in this study, the mechanisms for promoting and facilitating field work and the ethical issues that this involves.

The participants were approached personally and were provided with a full face to face explanation of the research. Approaching participants personally assured that all participants were provided with verbal clarification that carefully explains what the research is about and answers any arising concerns or queries. Participants were made aware that their shared data and stories will be used for research purposes only and will

remain anonymous throughout the research study and after publication. Participants also made aware that their participation is voluntary, thus, they have the right to decline answering question or withdraw at any stage of the research.

All participants were asked to read a written information sheet in order to be familiarised with the study content and purposes prior to their participation (at least three working days in advance). This gave participants the enough time to decide whether to participate in the study or not. The information sheet included: the researcher contact details, the nature of the study, its goal and aims, nature of its questions, and an indication of any sensitive questions that might be asked; methods and tools of the research, what level of participation the research will entail and if there are any potential risks/inconveniences or benefits; why the prospective participant has been approached, how confidentiality will be protected and how data will be stored and published. This thesis has benefited from the familiarity of the researcher with Arabic language, political/social conditions, context, culture, values and customs of the research environment. First, it enabled the success of the interview method and second, it eliminated risks attached to maintaining confidentiality, such as the need for using interpreters or mediators.

Moreover, the participants were asked to sign a consent form in accordance with the Leeds university's rules and regulations. As part of the consent, participants were asked for permission to use audio recording and note taking for non-verbal responses, in order to ensure all details are included (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). Participants agreed to note taking only, due to security concerns and fears for their personal and family safety from the Israeli side. Interviews included pre-set open-ended questions that gave scope for participants to elaborate. Collected data was password protected, held on an encrypted flash drive and uploaded to the University (M: Drive) for purposes of data protection.

It should be mentioned that due to the sensitivity of the research interest set in the middle of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the objectivity and independence of the researcher was clear from the start. Furthermore, the researcher was aware that in some cases, the research might arise participants' expectations of help or positive changes to their life; this was managed through developing participants' full awareness of the academic aims and targets of the study. Moreover, the researcher was aware of observing the 'non-negotiable' values of participants and respect them. In this research there was a possibility of unlocking participants negative feelings due to discussing sensitive issues related to impact of the Israeli occupation on their lives. However, the researcher social work background taught her how to identify and deal with such situations. In addition, the information sheet enabled participants to be fully informed prior to their participation of the nature of the research and any expected inconveniences and hazards. Similarly,

Participants' freedom to decline answering questions or to withdraw at any stage of the study minimised such possible situations.

1.5 Study contribution, relevance and originality

This thesis claims that the systematic nature of the Zionist efforts to humiliate, dominate and break Palestinians *sumud* has necessitated that Palestinians develop the steadfastness of *sumud* in order to sustain their existence. The thesis affirms that after the wall, *sumud* became stronger Palestinian everyday act of affirmation of life and determination of existence in response to all-encompassing threats the wall imposes on Palestinian lives, specifically, their hope of a better life. *Sumud* has become an inextricable part of everyday life for ordinary Palestinians against endless colonial efforts to break their *sumud* and force them to submit. In this way, the study asserts that the wall construction has achieved the opposite outcome of what it was initially designed for. Instead of breaking Palestinian *sumud*, the wall has increased Palestinian determination to challenge its impact and solidified their will to protect their existence, restore their dignity and defend their hope of a better life.

The study's bottom-up approach presents human personal narratives of ordinary Palestinians in their everyday acts of *sumud* against the wall. In doing so, the study puts more human dimension on the present conflict, and contributes understanding of life experiences, perspectives and struggles for survival by Palestinians living in the shadow of the wall. The study also adds an essential addition to extensive literature on the wall that usually tends to overlook voices of the marginalized and their daily life struggles.

Moreover, the study contributes to an exploration of the powerless everyday acts of *sumud* and their symbolic and ideological underpinnings against not only the wall, but also the changing strategy of Zionist expansion in Palestine. On one hand, the study embraces debates within political science over concepts of false consciousness, hegemony and resistance. On the other hand, it contributes to an understanding of the character of *sumud* in Palestine and embraces debate about *sumud* and survival against Zionist colonialism.

For a more positive reading of *sumud* from a perspective of ordinary Palestinians living in the shadow of the wall and for more understanding of the meaning of *sumud* in this study, and therefore how the concept adds to resistance debates. This study uses empirical evidence drawn from a qualitative field research conducted in three case studies in Palestine (see case studies). Also, the study builds on existing literature on everyday acts of resistance (Bayat, 1997; 2000; Scott, 1985; 1989; 1990; 1997), specifically, literature on *sumud* in Palestine (Hanafi, 2009; Johansson & Vinthagen, 2015; Peteet, 1991; Ryan, 2015; Richter-Devroe, 2011; 2013; Rijke & Teeffelen, 2014;

Taraki, 2008; Teeffelen & Biggs, 2011). A key concept throughout Palestinian history is the 'right of return' that commonly expresses a Palestinian determination to return to ancestral land (Richter-Devroe, 2013; Rijke and Teeffelen, 2014). The right of return echoes the depth of *sumud* in Palestinian history. The study investigates role of the homeland, the *Nakba*, life of exile, memory and identity (Mi'ari, 1998; Masalha, 2012; Peteet, 1991; 1995; 1996; Schiocchet, 2011) in solidifying Palestinian popular *sumud* (Darweish & Rigby, 2015; Qumsiyeh, 2011) and in promoting the Palestinian survival (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Taraki, ed, 2006).

While conducting interviews with Palestinians about their experiences of, and resistances to, the wall, *sumud* emerged as the one core aspect of Palestinian resistance. The study argues that *sumud* in Palestine offers a different way of thinking about resilience and contributes a different approach to discussions of resilience and resistance. The shared stories in this study from Palestinian's everyday *sumud* against the wall may be seemingly insignificant, yet they are more or less reflect the Palestinians ability to develop their own *sumud* and make their life possible by building a survivable world in their unbearable colonised present. The study illustrates how those Palestinians who insist on challenging the wall and going around its suppressive surveillance policies use individual and collective modes of meaning-making that are rooted in their rich Palestinian history of sufferings, culture and tradition captured by the concept of *sumud* (Teeffelen & Biggs, 2011).

Palestinians show an adaptation to adversity and finding ways to cope with adversity and suppression extracted from their shared history of suffering and struggle (Hanafi, 2009; Johansson & Vinthagen, 2015; Peteet, 1991; Ryan, 2015; Richter-Devroe, 2011; 2013; Rijke & Teeffelen, 2014; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Taraki, 2008; Teeffelen & Biggs, 2011) Tonie Teeffelen and Victoria Biggs (2011) argue that suffering and ongoing resistance against oppression to protect home and land is part of the national struggle. In a lecture given in 2004, Peteet stated that perceptions of injustice and suffering often form part of what it means to be a Palestinian (Holt, 2012). In other words, the adhesive that holds Palestinians together and solidify their *sumud* is their prolonged shared history of injustice, on-going struggles and sufferings which form part of what it means to be a Palestinian. Emerged stories in this study show how Palestinians manage to utilise their adverse circumstances to solidify their own and their family's *sumud* against the wall.

Sumud is a mean of adapting to circumstances that are unbearable, unpredictable and uncertain due to discriminating surveillance policies of a wall that considers Palestinians as the unwanted others that should be erased. In her examination of the everyday Palestinian survival, and aspects of Palestinian victimization in a settler-colonial framework, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015), discussed how Israel criminalities which

include a demonization of space, a politics of suffocation and overkilling are made possible by Israel's racialization of Palestinians as non-human others. This violent racialization emanates from Israel's settler colonial structure, produces Palestinians as living dead, a native group that is inherently erasable. In a settler colonial contexts indigenous peoples must disappear; in fact, they must always be disappearing, in order to enable coloniser's rightful claim to land (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015).

For Palestinians, time at the wall have become constant reminders of their worthlessness in the eyes of their coloniser, of their missed opportunities, delays, waiting, boredom and queues. Julie Peteet (2018), argues that time and space have been always critical to colonial rule in Palestine, where both Palestinians and Israelis occupy different time and space zones defined by the wall, checkpoints, by-pass roads and permit systems. Israeli time becomes distinguished from Palestinian time by deploying methods aimed to suppress, block, or delay. Further it aims at killing Palestinian time to become eventually hollow, static, and discontinuous (Zureik, et al., 2010).

Within the *sumud* and resistance studies literature, there is a great deal of support for the idea of starting from women's daily lived experiences to understand survival, resilience and resistance (Johansson & Vinthagen, 2015; Peteet, 1991; Ryan, 2015; Richter-Devroe 2011; Rijke & Teeffelen, 2014; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015). Drawing on this idea and to fulfil the wish of highlighting role of hegemonic political and cultural identities in Palestine, specifically in Palestinian refugee community, in determining the character of *sumud* and forms for survival while confronted by the wall. This study dedicated a chapter to reflect on women's *sumud* in Aida refugee camp. Palestinian refugees were primarily identified as *samideen*, those whose willpower was tested to the extreme, due to daily struggles to secure their rights (Lindholm Schulz & Hammer, 2003). Despite the dominating power of a wall that physically locates a few meters away from Aida camp, women in Aida, are still able to develop a sense of a normal life for themselves and for their families.

For Johansson and Vinthagen (2015), occupation means not only losing land and homes, but also much self-confidence, self-reliance and self-respect. However, the shared stories in this study reflects that refugees in their *sumud*, as a strategy of challenging or breaking the wall's confinement, display forms of everyday acts that communicate and articulate their identity as Palestinians and highlight a strong connection with their national homeland roots (Masalha, 2012; Peteet, 1991; Teeffelen, & Biggs, 2011). For refugees, keeping self-respect alive is *sumud* (Darweish & Sellick, 2017, Seidel, 2017). *Sumud* in this study demonstrates the pride and insistence on being Palestinian refugees, and a commitment to celebrating Palestinian culture, food and dance, pursue education, and have large families to continue *sumud* against colonialism

(Teeffelen, 2009). Most women in Aida conceptualized *sumud* as an act of self-respect, heroism and a sense of dignity represented by their insistence on staying in the refugee camp despite all struggles. *Sumud* for them is the everyday acts of preserving family and community life despite: dispossession, hardship, injustices, lack of facilities, poor infrastructure, collective punishment, humiliation, loss and trauma (Peteet, 1997). This is the essence of *sumud*, a resilient resistance to the effects of colonial power that confines Palestinians, their families, and their spirit.

For Caitlin Ryan (2015) a resilient resistance, such as *sumud*, represents living despite the occupation rather than living with occupation. Indeed, *sumud* concept is interwoven with the social environmental idea of resilience, however, the study supports the argument that believes the two concepts are not the same (Teeffelen, et al., 2005; Teeffelen, 2011). In this study, some Palestinians stated that a Palestinian might be quite resilient but not necessary *samid*. Therefore, resilience might be the prerequisite for *sumud*. However, it should be noted that the relationship between resilience and *sumud* from a social ecological perspective that includes health and wellbeing is still under-researched, where new voices are beginning to make a contribution (Marie, et al., 2017).

The uprooting and loss experiences refugees suffered in the diaspora played a major role in Palestinian refugeehood identity (Peteet, 1995; Clemens, 2007). Nevertheless, Aida refugees exile experience is different from refugees in the diaspora. Aida refugees are still existing in the same geographical, topographical, social, and political environment as the rest of Palestinians of the WB. This includes seeing the same scenery of their homeland and breathing the same air. This experience gave refugees in the WB the opportunity to have a stronger bond with their homeland that they only been forcibly shifted from several miles or more. At the same time, this exceptional condition of refugees in the WB increased their suffering in exile, as their homeland is in front of their eyes, but they are not allowed to return. Emerged stories from Aida camp contribute inclusiveness and distinguishes.

The study illustrates how women in Aida camp distinguished themselves as *Laje'en* (refugees), as against them, *Mowateneen* (Palestinian citizens of the WB). For women in Aida camp, refugees in the camps are still paying a high price in their *sumud* against the colonial project. The study shows how the feeling of being distinguished in Aida refugee camp has played a central role in constructing Palestinian identity in refugee camps in Palestine. Peteet argues that place and identity simulate each other in a process of mutual construction where refugees produce place, and place shapes their identities (Holt, 2012). It is the refugee's insistence on being different from Palestinian *Mowateneen*. They argue this is to avoid assimilation with *Mowateneen* and thus maintain their distinguished refugeehood. In addition, the *Laje'en* versus *Mowateneen* is

an attitude practiced by refugees to protect 'right to return', from being forgotten. It is what Peteet (1996) calls a collective identity and a sense of unity formed amongst Palestinians in response to a common enemy; Israel. It is also what Shehadeh (1982, p. vii) describes as a "developing from an all-encompassing form of life into a form of resistance that unites Palestinians living under Israeli occupation".

In her analysis, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015), invoked the intimate settler politics of the everyday that centring the Palestinian body, family life, memory and memorialization, birth and death as critical sites from which to examine the settler colonial state's machineries of surveillance. The study shows how the powerless Palestinians expressed their refusal of humiliation and suffering the wall intended to have on their bodies, and how they instead, asserted on using their own bodies as arenas of *sumud* to affirm their existence. 'Embodied resistance' (Shinko, 2012) gives further explanation for this kind of resistance. When Palestinians, mainly women, use their bodies to display symbols of resistance in the face of colonialism, they are performing embodied, covert *sumud*. By wearing a *Thoub* (folkloric Palestinian embroidered dress), or a *Kofya* (traditional black and white scarf), refugee women are using their own bodies to display their *sumud*. It is sending embodied messages to their colonizer that they still exist; 'our existence is our resistance' and 'we will never forget'. James Scott (1997, pp. 323-325) argues that the powerless are aware of their disadvantages and weaknesses and react accordingly. Therefore, to avoid punishment from dominant power they use acts that "have a double meaning [...] so that they cannot be treated as a direct, open challenges" (Scott, 1989, p. 54). Through embodied hidden messages, women in Aida avoid punishment; "instead of a clear message delivered by a disguised messenger, an ambiguous message is delivered by clearly identified messengers" (Scott, 1989, p. 54–55).

Taraki (2006) established that household dynamics (marriage, fertility decisions, children's education, and living arrangements) cannot be fully grasped unless linked to traumas of the past and worries of the present. Following Taraki's idea and drawing on Scott's argument (1997, pp. 323-325) that there is undercurrent of ideological resistance lies beneath a surface of more "symbolic and ritual forms", *sumud* in Palestine would not make sense as a resistance outside of its specific social and political context, which is directly linked to Palestinian struggles, experiences, culture and history. In other words, everyday acts of *sumud* can only be understood in light of what the concept of *sumud* represents to Palestinians in relation to their on-going struggles for survival since 1948. When women wear the Palestinian '*kofya*' to cover their hair instead of the common '*Mandee*' (headscarf). Or when women wear a '*Thoub*', while taking part in a political activity against the wall, they are expressing *sumud* through cultural and social resistance (Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013). *Thoubs* are declaring *sumud* by displaying

their identity as refugees who have original roots. It is an attempt to highlight their strong connection to a homeland before the *Nakba* of 1948. Historically, women's place of origin was recognized by the *Thoub* (Sayigh, 2012), specifically, from the art of embroideries on the *Thoub*. Each Palestinian village and city have a unique hand embroidery symbols, colours and patterns that represent the place of origin. It is also about preserving Palestinian identity and history (Teeffelen & Biggs, 2011). This kind of resistance is a disguised act of *sumud* that creates unity and cooperation which evolves into a form of resistance (Scott, 1989, pp. 35-37).

Similarly, those young Palestinian refugees wearing symbolic chains with a map of Palestine (Peteet, 1995), or using names of places before the *Nakba*. Mahmoud Mi'ari (1998) found that many refugees still identify themselves with homeland villages and towns; that they currently left 71 years earlier. Lots of Palestinians in the study expressed how they were careful to name their children after their ancestors annexed cities/villages of 1948. Masalha (2012) explained how the destroyed Palestinian villages and towns were often kept alive by-passing place names down through generations of Palestinian family members. In Aida camp further, street signs displaying names of martyrs can be viewed as an attempt of refugees to claim space (Peteet, 1995) with symbols of *sumud*. It is what Caitlin Ryan (2015) and Lisa Taraki (2006) describe as inherently flexible practices of *sumud* that allow Palestinians to adapt to life under occupation. It is the Palestinian assertion of struggle, culture and identity in response to Zionist claims which posit Israelis as the sole legitimate inhabitants of the land.

Sumud is not only the Palestinian determination to continue under adversity, fortified by their roots in the land, it is also the strength of Palestinian traditions and family and kin solidarity (Taraki, 2008). Some scholars of resilience (Masten, 2007; Ungar, et al., 2007; Ungar 2008; 2011; 2012; Sousa, et al., 2013) argue that cultural values play a crucial role in collective resilience of individual and community within a politically violent context. Michael Ungar (2008, p. 225) notes that in the context of exposure to significant adversity family, community and culture are the individual's sources of resilience in culturally meaningful ways. Wearing a *Thoub* in this sense is an act of remembering by creating 'counter-history' and 'counter-memory' (Medina, 2011). Nur Masalha (2012) discussed links between Palestinian oral history, social history from below, narratives of memory and the formation of collective identity and Palestinian *sumud*. Masalha (2012) highlights role of remembering and commemorating the *Nakba* in forming Palestinian identity and also in enabling the rectification of the injustices which the Palestinians have endured.

Moreover, through shared stories, refugees in Aida expressed how their exile experience infuses them with high levels of nostalgia which eventually solidifies their *sumud*. This happens when refugee identity-formation coupled with a strong sense of nostalgia,

shaped out of loss, longing and grief for a homeland (Peteet, 1991), hardens refugees coping mechanisms to deal with unstable and uncertain circumstances in their camp (Clemens, 2007, p. 105). The shared stories reflect on how nostalgia and remembering are important, both for individuals to cope with their circumstances and for others to learn and draw strength from experiences they have not personally endured. Remembering in refugee camps considers *sumud*. Young generations rely on the recollections of a diminishing pool of eyewitnesses, those who made the journey of exile in 1948. By using nostalgia, stories and memories of heroism and loss, refugees manage to open imaginary windows within the confinement of colonialism and its walls where children can see their stolen homeland. It is what Appadurai's (1997, p. 189) considers "the transformation of spaces into places" by "constructing its locales of memory and commemoration". When older generations pass their narratives and memories of *sumud* to their children, younger generations become part of these narratives (Lindholm Schulz, 2003).

This explains why Palestinians in Aida camp, mainly women, believe that by educating their children about their refugee identity and struggles creates a more mature and politicized younger generation where children have a more complex insight into the political situation around them. For Palestinian this should create a more *samid* (steadfast) young generation that is willing to resist colonialism. Lots of Palestinians memorised the olive tree which represents history, strength and *sumud*. Tony Teeffelen (2011) in his study on Palestinian *sumud* found that olive tree represents peace, reward and history over thousands of years; the roots represent steadfastness on holy land, the branches represent resilience and the wind represents colonizer (Teeffelen, et al., 2005).

Masalah (2012) stressed that remembrance should be an act of liberation, hope and decolonisation. Teeffelen (2011) adds that *sumud* in itself is a liberating act as Palestinians are rarely offered the chance to make any sort of political choice. *Sumud* is preserving, integrating and developing the beauty of the Palestinian culture into family and community life. *Sumud* is also the capacity to enjoy life. Shared stories reveal the extent of Palestinian determination on enjoying life as their subvert acts of *sumud* to resist the effects that colonial policies of confinement intended to have on them and their families' spirit and agencies. The stories express the extent of *sumud*'s horizon, while pain and struggle are universally present in Palestinian expressions, *sumud* allows space for other experiences to be expressed, including a deep-felt joy, an appreciation of Palestinian culture, as well as a bittersweet, or even dark but transformative humour over and across the pain. Aida women have endured a real dilemma in the shadow of the wall, yet, choose to act productively rather than revel in self-pity. Taraki (2008, p. 17) described such *sumud* as a "very pursuit of happiness"; a manifestation of resilience and of resistance at the same time. These can be materially based survival strategies that

manifest itself through cultural resistance (upholding Palestinian traditions) and social and ideational resistance (upholding a sense of normality) a type of resistance is often associated with women's resistance (Peteet, 1991; Johnson, 2007; Richter-Devroe, 2008; Johansson and Vinthagen, 2015). In other words, pain and sacrifice do not determine the lives of Palestinians and their *sumud*; the horizon of *sumud*'s meaning is humanity, freedom, love and care (Barghouthi, 2009).

In this sense, the study emphasizes how everyday acts of *sumud* in the study cases confirm with Sari Hanafi (2009) and Richter-Devroe (2013) conclusions that colonial practices of physical and spatial domination in Palestine are met by acts other than violence and martyrdom; indeed they are met with everyday acts of affirmation of life and determination to exist despite all odds. Nina Gren (2009) carried out a study in camps of the WB to explore ways of maintaining everyday life in spite of adversity during the second Intifada, including curfews, shelling and siege. The study shows that people used tactics and practices of *sumud* to survive including positive attitudes and strategies of *sumud*, which were upheld by the surrounding cultural context. Humour is one of these strategies. It should be noted that humour and jokes circulated extensively in pre-Intifada times differed in genre and spirit from what been circulated in post-Oslo cultural production. The former, according to Kanaana (1990), echoed frustration that reflected people's inability to challenge the colonizer. Post-Oslo black humour, on the other hand, emerges from a "context of social and political fragmentation, stagnation, and disappointment" (Salih & Richter-Devroe, 2014, p. 18).

Women in Aida camp use both types of humour genres to echo their inability to challenge the wall with an attempt to adhere to basic human values under extremely testing circumstances. Ruba Salih and Sophie Richter-Devroe (2014) suggest that dealing with the unbearable through irony, intimacy, and humour highlights people's quest for a normal life despite the abnormality around them. Palestinians insistence on enjoying life and laughing despite suppression and hardship come under the heading of what James Scott (1985; 1989; 1997) calls 'weapons of the weak' of 'everyday forms of resistance' and what Asef Bayat (1997) calls 'quiet encroachment' and 'everyday heroism'. For James Scott (1989, pp. 54-56), this kind of access to enjoyment considers a symbolic everyday resistance when the powerless survive, undermine and resist suppressive domination.

Scott (1989, p. 35-37), characterised "everyday resistance" as the only option practised by powerless "subaltern" groups to undermine domination and resist exploitation, through hidden acts such as black humour, sarcasm, cursing, foot-dragging, laziness, or even cringing silence. In this sense it is possible to understand some acts of *sumud* as conducting resistance whilst avoiding risk of punishment. These acts are often

characterized by being informal, disguised, small scale, relatively safe and deliberately subtle, which Scott (1998) calls “infrapolitics”. Similarly, *Sumud* acts do not emerge due to any formal organized coordination or centralized and planned political strategies. They are subtle, non-organized acts of resistance by ordinary individuals in response to their experience of domination (Johansson & Vinthagen, 2014). *Sumud* might be static or dynamic and could include covert and overt acts. Static *sumud* focuses on the maintenance of life and homeland in the face of adversity (Teeffelen, 2009), while dynamic *sumud* emphasises a form of personal and collective political non-violent resistance against violent Israeli practices (Marie, et al., 2017). As a political strategy, *sumud* has been described as ‘the third way’; a position of steadfastness that is neither necessarily armed nor a passive acceptance (Shehadeh, 1984, cited in Hazou, 2013, p. 151).

Asef Bayat (1997, pp. 56-57), found that James Scott’s ‘everyday forms of resistance’ perspective contributed to recovering the ‘Third World’ poor from “passivity” and “hopelessness” which are features of the “culture of poverty”. Stellan Vinthagen and Anna Johansson (2013) further, argue that Scott fundamentally transformed the understanding of politics, making the ordinary life of ‘subalterns’ part of political affairs. In this way, Scott managed to challenge the hegemonic theories of Gramsci, Lukacs, Althusser and Habermas that tend to present the powerless as passive and without agency. Following Scott and Bayat, several researchers have been inspired by how everyday of resistance can have a great impact on social change (Hammami, 2005; Richter-Devroe, 2013; Rijke & Teeffelen, 2013; Schiocchet, 2011; Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013). Sophie Richter-Devroe (2011; 2013), is one of these researchers that have demonstrated the ability of powerless Palestinian women to resist through everyday acts that on the one hand, communicates their essentials and, on the other, survive the existing suppressive power. *Sumud* is about a common refrain: ‘Al-Hayat-Lazem-Testamer’ which means (life must go on) (Hammami, 2005; Richter-Devroe, 2013; Rijke & Teeffelen, 2013; Schiocchet, 2011; Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013).

Drawing on Scott’s ‘infrapolitics’ argument (1998), *sumud* in the emerged stories in this study challenge the definitions of resistance that are mainly linked to forms of overt collective organized resistance that should have revolutionary consequences. Women’s acts of challenging or breaking out of the wall’s confinement are not about securing food or having a trip to the seaside. Likewise, women act to cross the neighbour’s roof to join a relative’s party is not about partying. These creative acts to fool the coloniser and go around its confinement policies, are flown from the women believe that *sumud* is more than just achieving personal gains or survival; it is their weapon to resist and exist. Therefore, this study does not agree with Scott’s argument (1989, pp. 49-53) that intent

is a more relevant indicator than outcome, since the quiet forms of resistance are often the only option for the powerless and do not always achieve the desired effect.

Many scholars similarly have criticized Scott's argument (O'Hanlon, 1988; Bayat, 1997; 2000; Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013; Lilja, et al., 2017). The critique generally suggests that Scott is not incorporating resistance in a dynamic and interactive process with power. Scott appears to apply a strong division between the powerful and the powerless, while simultaneously overstressing the role of resistance (O'Hanlon, 1988). Asef Bayat (2000, p. 542) also criticized Scott's definition of resistance where he limits activities of the poor to mere everyday survival. For Bayat (1997, p. 56), quiet struggles of dominant groups are not only to seek concessions from the powerful, but they are often able to initiate changes in the lives of their actors who strive to move forward and improve their lives. Asef Bayat (1997, pp. 56-57) presented the term "quiet encroachment" to describe the activism of often quiet, patient and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on the powerful in an effort to survive hardships, acquire the basic necessities and better their lives. Indeed, Aida women's small acts of *sumud* to fool their coloniser and to go around the confinement of the wall are more than acts of intention, they are always on the lookout for opportunities to bring about change, even if this change is relatively small. They are of what Teffelen and Biggs (2011) asserts as acts to enable Palestinians to remain standing as part of their community.

The study, moreover, shows how the political situation in the shadow of the wall in Bethlehem governorate has necessitated a new form of *sumud* that is '*sumud* tourism' (Al-Rimmawi & Butcher, 2015; Higgins-Desbiolles 2017a). Following the argument that systems of dominant power do not determine types of resistance, but they allow possibilities for distinct forms of resistance to emerge (Richter-Devroe, 2013). Palestinians launched small initiatives to regain their tourism from a wall that aims to direct it to the surrounding Israeli settlements. *Sumud* tourism acts in this study include inviting tourists to support Palestinian tourism by engaging with narratives of the political situation in Palestine.

Sumud in this study is an indication of inter-dependence between resistance and power that leads one to "use resistance as a diagnostic of power" (Abu-Lughod, 1990, p. 42). Ruba Salih and Sophie Richter-Devroe (2014) argue that unprecedented and enthusiastic interest in the political facets of protest art has often overlooked the affective dimension of music, graffiti, and poetry. The study shows the significant role arts on the wall in Bethlehem plays as part of *sumud* against the Zionist project in Palestine. The study also shows how Palestinians are starting to realise the importance of art and culture as tools of *sumud* in delivering their political messages. It further shows how the

solidarity *sumud* tourism is a developing segment that serves Palestine's tourism industry and the political/cultural riches of Palestine.

The study asserts that the apartheid approach actually, in some ways, backfired against the Israeli state. Artwork on and around the wall in Bethlehem, specifically graffiti, inadvertently turned the Bethlehem side of the wall into a highly attractive touristic site of modern apartheid in the heart of the Zionist project of WB. This includes the creation of awareness through stays at refugee camps cultural centres and with Palestinian families. The study further shows that the wall and protest artwork on and around the wall simulate each other in a process of mutual opposition. The wall revives the role of artwork as a political tool of *sumud* in Palestine, which generates more international solidarity with Palestinians and solidifies Palestinian *sumud*. While artwork on the wall exposes the role of the wall as an apartheid tool of colonialism, which generates more international opposition against the wall.

Existing literature on *sumud*, as well as, the findings of this study, undoubtedly support the assertion that *sumud* is an instrumental and foundational element of Palestinian resistance. The study shows that the wall plays major role in reviving the Palestinian *sumud* to become strongly centred at the heart of Palestinian resistance as everyday acts of 'affirmation of existence' against a wall that aims to uproot Palestinians, and as 'affirmation of life' and 'anti-submission' against a wall that aims to dehumanise Palestinians and break their *sumud*, thus, force them to submit.

The study adds empirical evidence to the *sumud* and resistance literature by illustrating how *sumud* as resisting impact of the wall is not exclusively the job of Palestinian women and men who are engaged in oppositional political activities. *Sumud* is part of the everyday life of Palestinians (whether living in a refugee camp, village, or city) who are forced to live in the shadow of colonialism but chosen to keep forward in their life and keeping their hope in a more just future alive. The study hopes to encourage more systematic research on *sumud* in Palestine that includes an assessment of a range of diverse voices of Palestinians who live under conditions of adversity and dispossession. The study also hopes to encourage a more nuanced understanding of everyday acts of *sumud* in Palestine, accordingly, shift the perceived negative image of the political life and struggle of Palestinians which is exclusively categorized in terms of violence and terrorism.

1.6 Theoretical and analytical framework

The study uses the 'Grounded Theory' approach because it aims to define how Palestinians survive the impact of a wall on their lives, and what forms and actions of *sumud* are there as a result of the wall. In this way the theory is grounded in data

collection through fieldwork. This theoretical approach is based on the belief that qualitative researchers do not necessarily have to start with a theory, rather, they start by generating a theory from collected data (Woods, 2006).

To further understand everyday acts of *sumud* in Palestine, specifically in the research cases studies, the study builds on existing literature on *sumud* in Palestine (Hanafi, 2009; Johansson & Vinthagen, 2015; Peteet, 1991; Ryan, 2015; Richter-Devroe, 2011; 2013; Rijke & Teeffelen, 2014; Taraki, 2008; Teeffelen & Biggs, 2011) (see contribution above). Also, the study builds on everyday acts of resistance which includes 'quiet encroachment strategies' of Asef Bayat (1997a; 1997b; 2000; 2002; 2010; 2013) and 'everyday forms of resistance' and 'weapons of the weak' of James Scott (1985; 1989; 1990; 1997). In addition, the study builds on existing literature on the homeland, the *Nakba*, exile, memory and identity in Palestine (Mi'ari, 1998; Masalha, 2012; Peteet, 1991; 1995; 1996; Schiocchet, 2011), Palestinian popular *sumud* (Darweish & Rigby, 2015; Qumsiyeh, 2011) and Palestinian survival (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Taraki, ed, 2006).

Data gathered around themes of: *sumud*, survival, land, refugee identity, memory and life stories of exile, suffering and heroism, sarcasm and black humour, dignity, hope and affirmation of life support this thesis. One of the main problems in qualitative work is having too much data rather than not enough (Neuman, 2003). Therefore, analysis of data was conducted daily to avoid the risk of becoming swamped in data increasingly difficult to analyse. The researcher began almost immediately, with 'primary analysis', conducted as research interviews and field notes of observation were compiled, and documents assembled. The researcher continuously examined data, highlighted certain points in the text or wrote comments in margins. These notes identified what seemed to be important points, note contradictions and inconsistencies, any common themes that seemed to be emerging, references to related literature, comparisons and contrasts with other data and so on.

As further data collection and analysis proceeded, a second stage occurred with category and concept formation' building on researched initial themes (mentioned above). During the data analysis phase of written materials, a thematic analysis, which is a version of content analysis, was used. Also, data was organised, classified and grouped into themes, according to participant responses to each question and/or to the most salient themes emerging across the set of interviews (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001; Mack et al., 2005). Finally, a third stage of analysing data and generating findings took place.

1.7 Thesis structure

Chapters 2, 3, 4 and the first part of 5, discuss contemporary Israeli policies of annexation, exodus and Judaization in relation to Zionism, including Palestinian

struggles with these policies and the wall. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 discuss Palestinian daily acts of *sumud* against the wall and Zionist policies.

Chapter two develops the argument that acquiring Palestinian land still drives Zionist ideology, planning and actions against Palestinians. It helps to understand the fundamental role of Palestinian in motivating previous and contemporary Israeli policies. The chapter explores how Zionists consolidated their monopoly over Palestinian land through systematic land dispossession policies. Moreover, it explores Zionist massacres, the exodus of Palestinians and discusses previous and contemporary Israeli-Palestinian debate. It attempts to show, in evidential terms, links between Zionist and contemporary justifications for policies since 1948, including the wall. The chapter also shows links between Zionist and contemporary dehumanising anti-Arab propaganda. This chapter shows in evidential terms that, although Zionist leaders throughout history often disagreed over attitudes and ideologies, they all shared the same Zionist aim; establishing a pure Jewish state in all Palestine, cleansed of Palestinian people.

Chapter three examines the Judaizing of Jerusalem and demonstrates policies and efforts used to force Palestinians to lose hope, submit and flee their land. It explains how Israel's colonisation of the WB was never accidental, defensive or reluctant as Israel claims. Israeli past and current policies against Palestinians: house demolitions, land annexation, settlements expansion and building a wall were and still are, calculated and carefully planned to force Palestinians to surrender the idea of a Palestinian nation state. The chapter also shows that the transition between Israel's former 'creeping annexation', in contemporary times has now become a blatant, violent and unpredictable race with the protection and support of the US administration.

Chapter four argues that the ideology of colonialism provides a solid premise for building the wall, perceived as an attempt to extend Israeli territory into the WB, increase domination over Palestinians and annex their resources. The chapter discusses the wall in relation to Israeli settlements and argues that the route deviation from the Green Line is not solely based on Israeli security measures to protect its citizens from Palestinian attacks. It is to annex Israeli settlements in the WB. The chapter examines facts on the ground created by the wall to highlight its role in facilitating the settler colonial project in the WB; establishing access and ownership over Palestinian land and water, expansion and securing an Israeli demographic majority within newly expanded borders.

Chapter five argues that analysis of Palestinian struggles with the wall solely on the basis of physical obstruction overlooks the imposition of a multi-layered apartheid surveillance system that dehumanises, suppresses and dominates Palestinians. The chapter argues that the role of an apartheid wall in transforming the 'geographic continuity' of Palestinian land is to advance and confirm perceptions of otherness; those unwanted Palestinians

living beyond the wall. The chapter highlights the surveillance policies used to dominate Palestinians and favour Israelis, which include: closed 'Seam Zones', *Haweyas* (IDs) and permits, exclusive settler 'gates and roads', checkpoints and queues. Shared stories by Palestinians in their daily struggles with dehumanizing, ad-hoc surveillance policies of queues, inconsistency and unpredictability at 'Crossing-300' in Bethlehem, are discussed.

Chapter six shows how Zionists use apartheid policies, including the wall, to further undermine Palestinian tourism and direct tourism of the Bethlehem governorate to surrounding colonial settlements. Moreover, the chapter highlights surveillance policies against Palestinians and their international supporters and visitors. Shared statements of Palestinians in Bethlehem governorate and restrictions on tourism are discussed. The chapter also examines how *sumud* tourism creates political and cultural awareness and discusses Palestinian stories about their reasons and experiences in *sumud* tourism. The chapter highlights how the apartheid approach has backfired against the Israeli state and examines how protest artwork on and around the wall has infused the wall with new meaning and purpose. *Sumud* tourism is discussed as Palestinian everyday acts of resisting the suppressive power of the wall, improving their lives and finding coping mechanisms of dealing with impacts on their tourism.

Chapter seven examines how women in Aida refugee camp are capable of holding a strong sense of *sumud* as a strategy concerned with affirmation of life and determination on securing a dignified existence in the face of the wall, and the links between this *sumud* and their prolonged history of suffering and struggles in a refugee camp. Role themes of exile, place, memories, life stories and heroism in constructing women's refugee identity and unity in the refugee camp and in solidifying their *sumud* against the wall are examined. The chapter highlights the role of hegemonic political and cultural identities in Palestinian refugee communities in determining the character of *sumud* and acts of everyday *sumud* against the wall. The chapter shows that refugee women in their *sumud*, as a strategy of challenging or breaking out of the wall's confinement, display forms of covert and subvert everyday acts of *sumud* that communicate and articulate their identity as refugees and highlight a strong connection with their homeland roots and with their right to return.

Chapter 2

The Political Zionist project in Palestine

2.1 Introduction

Zionism is a phenomenon of Jewish nationalism in the late Nineteenth Century. The creation of the State of Israel is partly a product of Zionism, and post-World War Two (WWII) European politics (Heikal, 1996). Ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and contemporary Israeli politics of security, including the wall, are influenced by political Zionism. In order to understand the socio-political context of the contemporary wall, and to grasp the role of political Zionism in setting the pattern for contemporary Israeli policies and acts against Palestinians, chapter one explores Zionism and its political project in Palestine. The structure of this chapter is chronological, but it moves beyond merely repeating a comprehensive history of Zionism and Zionist movements to explore Zionism in relation to the land and people of Palestine. It attempts to purposefully insert as many direct quotations of statements and evidences as possible to support arguments throughout and to draw attention to the core importance of land and people of Palestine in shaping Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Zionism emerged in response to persecutions and injustices against Jews in Europe, which reached their peak in 1881-1884 with the Russian pogroms (mob attacks) on Jews in Eastern Europe (Davis, 1977; Smith, 1992). Zionism was perceived as a solution to what was often known as the 'Jewish problem' in Europe (Shlaim, 2000; Rubenberg, 2010). Calls for a solution to the Jewish problem in Europe developed into a search for territory, a piece of land, where Jews would exercise sovereignty, establish a state of their own, and never be exiled (Herzel, 1970; IMFA, 2002; Rubenberg, 2010; Dror, 2011).

Zionists realised that without a land there would be no prospects of establishing their own Jewish homeland (Heikal, 1996). Thus, Zangwill Zionist rhetoric; "a land without people, for people without a land" (Massalha, 1992, p. 10; Heikal, 1996, p. 75; Simons, 2006, p. 25) is a political Zionist goal rather than just rhetoric; an undeniable element in Zionist thinking which has been evident throughout their policies and actions against Palestinians since 1948. Zionist policies including the contemporary Israeli wall should be understood in this context. Their goal is total hegemony of Palestine using all possible means.

This chapter develops the argument that acquiring Palestinian land, cleansed of its people in order to establish a "Great Jewish State", was and still is, the main drive behind Zionist ideology, planning and actions against Palestinians. An understanding of the role

of land and people of Palestine in relation to contemporary Israeli policies against Palestinians, clarifies the main focus of this thesis. Firstly, the contemporary wall, justified as a security measure to protect Israeli civilians from Palestinian terror attacks, is an additional Zionist tool serving the original Zionist political goal; acquiring “a land without people”. The wall serves combined Zionist goals of land confiscation, exodus of Palestinians, territorial expansion, security of settlements and further demographic control over Palestine (chapters 3, 4, and 5). Secondly, to explore daily struggles and strategies of Palestinians’ survival while confronted by the wall (chapters 5, 6 and 7).

Zionists achieved goals of acquiring Palestinian land cleansed of its indigenous people through policies of exodus and dispossession since 1948 (Davis, 1977; Khalidi, 1988; Pappé, 1992; Masalha, 1997; Gilmour, 1999; Usher, 2006; Kovel, 2007; Rubenberg, 2010), contemporary Israeli policies initially concentrated on removing land from Palestinians, rather than removing Palestinians from their land. The chapter extends the argument that the contemporary Israeli policies of house demolitions, exodus of Palestinians, land annexation and colonial apartheid surveillance policies (Ch5), specifically the wall (Ch4), serve the ultimate Zionist political goal of “a land without people”.

The chapter explores how Zionists consolidated their monopoly over the land of Palestine using systematic land dispossession policies such as manipulated land ordinances with the help of Britain, using corrupt Ottoman Land system for the benefit of secret land purchase by Zionists (Hyamson, 1950; Ruedy, 1971; Gilmour, 1980; Khalidi, 1988; Divine, 1994; Segev, 1999; Rubenberg, 2003). The chapter explores Zionist massacres and exodus of Palestinians and discusses previous and contemporary Israeli-Palestinian debates over the Palestinian ‘exodus’ (Morris, 1986; 1987; Khalidi, 1988; Masalha, 1992; 1997; Simons, 2006). It is an attempt to draw argument in evidential terms to show links between Zionist justifications for policies against Palestinians since 1948 and contemporary Zionist justifications for policies against Palestinians including the wall.

The chapter reflects on how Zionists managed to win support of the great powers for their Zionist project in Palestine; crucially the formal support of Great Britain in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (Marshall, 1989; Shlaim, 2000). The nature of Zionist-British interests in Palestine, the role of the British Mandate in supporting the Zionist project against the interest of Palestinians, and the deteriorating Zionist-British relationship are also examined. The chapter furthermore shows how in their search to win support of the great powers, Zionists managed to advance and implement anti-Arab ideologies in the West. Zionists portrayed themselves as representatives of western civilization in a land occupied by hostile, savages and backward Arab people (Ingrams, 1972; Gilmour, 1980;

Palumbo, 1987; Khalidi, 1988; Heikal, 1996; Gilmour, 1999; Masalha, 1999; Simons, 2006; Kovel, 2007). Targeting support of great powers for survival of the Zionist project in Palestine, was and still, a core element in Zionist planning and policies. The chapter highlights links between previously used Zionist dehumanising propaganda used against Palestinians, and contemporary Israeli propaganda; both serving the same Zionist goals of winning western support, making economic and political gains on the account of Palestinians by directing western investment to Israeli side (Ch6); and to justify Zionist apartheid policies and actions against those so claimed 'violent' and 'dangerous' Palestinians (Ch3, Ch4, Ch5 and Ch6).

This chapter introduces briefly Zionist ideology, approaches and contributions of the main four leaders of Zionism who played a major role in setting the patterns for contemporary Israeli national and foreign policies in regard to the land and people of Palestine. The leaders who consolidate the Zionist project in Palestine are Theodor Herzl, father of political Zionism and visionary of a Jewish state; Chaim Weizmann, architect of an alliance between Zionists and Great Britain (Balfour Declaration); Ze'ev Jabotinsky, Rightist Zionism and builder of the separation 'Iron Wall' policy; and finally, David Ben-Gurion, founder of Labour Zionism and builder of settler power in Palestine.

This chapter highlights some of the contemporary Liberal/rightist Zionist debates, notions and approaches in following the footsteps of their predecessors in Palestine. It is an attempt to show in evidential terms that although Zionist leaders throughout history often disagree over attitudes and ideologies in pursuing their Zionist project in Palestine, they all definitely share the same Zionist aim of establishing a pure Jewish state in Palestine, cleansed of its Palestinian people.

2.2 Jewish Shtetle communities and rise of Zionism

The situation of Jewish Masses in Eastern Europe in the Nineteenth Century was characterised by both poverty and marginalisation (Rubenberg, 2010, p. 161). Only a few Jews assimilated into European life, mainly in the more advanced countries of Western Europe, France and Britain, while the great majority in Eastern Europe experienced unwholesome conditions of segregation and poverty, particularly those in the tsarist Russian empire (Marshall, 1989, p. 30; Kovel, 2007, p. 32). Shtetle or the Jewish communities under tsarist rule were forced to reside in particular provinces along Russia's western border known as the Pale of Settlement. Shtetle was restricted in its social and geographical mobility by anti-Semitism; it was sealed off from society at large. The Jewish people were even restricted into in-group marriages, with the majority confined exclusively to employment designated to meet consumption requirements of the merchant and the landed nobility such as, tailors, cobblers and gold and silversmiths (Davis, 1977, pp. 21-22).

With the influence of the French revolution and its principles of freedom, justice and equality, anti-Semitism seemed to be on the decline in much of Western Europe with Jews being gradually granted equal legal status and citizenship rights. Assimilation on an equal basis, however, did not extend to most of Eastern Europe (Rubenberg, 2010). A cultural Jewish enlightenment movement the “Haskala” emerged in Eastern Europe calling for the assimilation of Jews into European society (Qumsiyeh, 2004). The Haskala fostered the emergence of a new form of secular Jewish identity that defined Jews as a national group rather than as a religious community, thus challenging Jewish religious traditions and a revivalist movement that countered assimilation and called for a return to the roots of Jewish culture (Smith, 1992; Tessler, 1994). The Haskalah movement gained strength in the middle of the Nineteenth Century under the rule of the relatively Liberal Tsar Alexander II of Russia (Smith, 1992; Tessler, 1994).

In 1871, Jews were again subjected to Russian persecution and their conditions worsened by the outbreak of a first wave of Russian mob attacks or “pogroms”, which escalated in 1881-1884 after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Russian pogroms undermined the hope of many well integrated and middle-class European Jews that the spread of education and social progress would secure their equal status in their native lands (Palumbo, 1987). As a result, many leaders in the assimilation movement became leaders of Zionism, calling for the establishment of a Jewish homeland where Jews could attain their independent Jewish statehood. This marked the emergence of Zionism in Europe (Leon, 1970; Marshall, 1989).

Shtetle Jewish communities had largely been rural, mercantile and financial agents of a feudal landed nobility and grand bourgeoisie of Central and Eastern Europe. It was only after the industrial Revolution that this tradition was eliminated. The industrialization of Europe and the transfer of European peasantry into industrial wage labour crushed the economy of the Shtetle (Leon, 1970; Davis, 1977; Marshall, 1989). Shtetle Jews started to migrate massively. Estimates show that by 1924, 2.65 million out of over 8.5 million Jews, living in Europe, emigrated overseas not only to escape anti-Semitism, poverty and oppression, but also to join the 1880-1924 wave of immigration to the US. Less than 2% of 2.65 million emigrants selected Palestine as a destination for migration (Palumbo, 1987; Tessler, 1994).

Those who did not emigrate were Jews who held fast to religious Rabbinic Judaism that rejected any engagement in politics. Rabbis generally rejected new secular ideas that were undermining their own status as communal leaders. For them, exile of Jews from the land of Israel, their desperation, and even their sufferings were manifestations of God’s will. Rabbis forbade a return to their ancestral Promised Land until after the Messiah had returned (Milton-Edwards, 2000). With increased calls for a solution to the

Jewish problem in Europe, some of the Rabbis broke with tradition by asserting that Jews should initiate their own redemption by returning to the Promised Land.

In 1881, Practical Zionism of Hibbat Zion, the Lovers of 'Zion' a biblical synonym for Jerusalem movement, developed in a number of Russian cities. It promoted the project of Jewish emigration and settlement activities in their ancestral homeland, Palestine; where through devotion, love and work on land, they could achieve personal and collective regeneration (Palumbo, 1987; Shlaim, 2000; Simons, 2006; Rubenberg, 2010). Calls for a solution to the Jewish problem in Europe developed into search for territory, where Jews could settle and never be exiled. This is argued to be the beginning of Zionist struggle over land; without a land there would be no national Jewish homeland. Leon Pinsker, a pioneer Zionist leader, stated that "Jewish homeland should be a piece of land, to be owned by Jews from which they could never be exiled" (cited in Heikal, 1996, p. 65).

Zionism has never been a monolithic Zionist movement but has encompassed a range of distinct political and ideological currents under different Zionist leaders. Leaders of Zionism shared the same Zionist aim of Jewish homeland for Jews only, but often disagreed over attitudes and ideologies of pursuing Zionism, explored in the following sections.

2.3 Herzl Political Zionism and the Jewish State in Palestine

With the emergence of Zionism and calls for a Jewish homeland, initially introduced by Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), father of political Zionism and visionary of the Jewish state, necessary steps were taken beyond suppositions and dreams to the ultimate goal of building a Jewish homeland (Tessler, 1994; Milton-Edwards, 2000; Kovel, 2007). Herzl was born into a well-to-do assimilated Jewish family in Hungary. He worked as a journalist and playwright in Vienna and in 1884 he was awarded a Doctor of Law from the University of Vienna.

Herzl was an assimilated Jew with no particular interest in Judaism or Jewish affairs. It was anti-Semitism in the early 1890s, which he covered as Paris correspondent of the Vienna daily newspaper that developed his interest in the Jewish problem (Shlaim, 2000; IMFA, 2002). Herzl concluded that Jewish assimilation and emancipation in Europe would never work because Jews were a nation; European Christians would inevitably see Jews as threatening aliens and subject them to exclusion. The only solution was to acquire a territory where Jews would exercise sovereignty and establish a state of their own (Herzl, 1970; IMFA, 2002; Rubenberg, 2010; Dror, 2011). Herzl's solution was advocated in his famous book *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State) in 1896 when he said:

Let sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves (Knesset, 2013)

Herzel left open the question of whether the location for the proposed state should be Argentina or Palestine (Marshall, 1989; Milton-Edwards, 2000; Rubenberg, 2010; Knesset, 2013) when he said:

Shall we choose Palestine or Argentina? We shall take what is given us, and what is selected by Jewish public opinion [...] Argentina is one of the most fertile countries in the world [...] The Argentine Republic would derive considerable profit from the cession of a portion of its territory to us [...] Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvellous potency (Knesset, 2013).

The publication of Herzel's book evoked various reactions; some strongly supported it, some opposed it, and some were sceptical. However, Herzel's solution to the Jewish problem in Europe no doubt identified his name with political Zionism, and put him into a position of leadership in Jewish affairs that lasted until his death in 1904 (Shlaim, 2000), Herzel's second core contribution into the history of Zionism and later the rise of the State of Israel was his Basel congress of 1897. In 29 August 1897, Herzel held the first Zionist Congress in Basel in Switzerland; he brought together the Eastern European Hibbat Zion movement, Zionist societies and personalities from Europe. The principal Zionist objective was declared to create a home in Palestine for Jewish people. To this end a number of measures were to be adopted including the systematic promotion of the settlement of Palestine. The congress established the World Zionist Organisation with Herzel as its first president (Shlaim, 2002; Simons, 2006; Rubenberg, 2010).

The Basel program spoke of a home rather than a state for Jews, but from the Basel congress onward the Zionist aim of political Zionism was to create a state for the Jewish people in Palestine (Shlaim, 2000). In his diary Herzel confided:

At Basel I founded the Jewish state. If I said this out loud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in 5 years, and certainly in 50 years, everyone will know it (cited in Shlaim, 2000, p. 3)

In 1903, the British government was willing to offer Uganda, a British protectorate, as a Zionist settlement; Herzel favoured pursuing this option, at least to secure a temporary haven for persecuted Jews. This proposal was approved in 1903 at the Zionist Congress by 295 to 178 with 98 abstentions, and a committee was formed to determine whether Uganda would be a reasonable place for settlement. The proposal almost split the Zionist movement of those who bitterly opposed anywhere but Palestine (Stevens, 1971;

Marshall, 1989; Heikal, 1996). Opposition won, and in 1905 the Zionist congress adopted Palestine as a Jewish homeland to which Jews should return and settle (Smith, 1992; Tessler, 1994; Heikal, 1996). The decision was “highly colonialist” (Marshall, 1989, p. 32).

A project that began not only with Herzl and his successors needed support of Jewish communities, but also Western imperialistic support. According to Herzl, winning imperialist backing was a core element and a necessity for establishing a great Zionist state in Palestine (Bober, 1972; Flapan, 1979; Smith, 1992; Tessler, 1994; Heikal, 1996; Milton-Edwards, 2000). Herzl first courted the Sultan of Turkey, ruler of the Ottoman Empire (Heikal, 1996). He then turned to Germany, to Kaiser Wilhelm, an Ottoman ally with trading interests in the region (Stevens, 1971; Elmessiri, 1977; Tessler, 1994), but his diplomatic efforts failed. He then approached Great Britain.

In each case Herzl presented his Zionist project in a manner best calculated to appeal to the listener. For example, to the Sultan he presented a Jewish capital, to the Kaiser he presented his project as an outpost of Berlin, and to the British colonial secretary he presented the project as a colony of the British Empire (Shlaim, 2000). Herzl’s approach to the west, forged a significant link between Zionism and Great Power imperialism (Kovel, 2007). He argued that a new Zionist state should form a portion of the fortification of Europe against Asia, and it should be an outpost of civilisation as opposed to Arab barbarism (Heikal, 1996).

Herzl’s approach to the west highlights a theme in contemporary Israeli government rationale for deepened relations with Europe and the US. For example, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, claimed in 2018 that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East (White, 2019). Further he confirmed that Israel is a model for human rights and tolerance (Jamal, 2019). In his criticism of Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Netanyahu bragged:

It’s best that he [Erdogan] doesn’t get involved with Jerusalem, our capital for 3,000 years. Erdogan can only learn from us how to respect every religion and protect human rights (cited in Jamal, 2019)

Netanyahu later told his cabinet, Israel is the nation state “only for the Jewish people” which contradicted his previous statement (above) (Jamal, 2019; White, 2019) (Ch3 and Ch5). That said, the ‘Jewish and democratic’ state is under a demographic threat, it is what contemporary liberal Zionist Tzipi Livni calls a “nightmare of Zionism” (Weiss, 2018). In 2018, Uzi Arad, former head of the Institute for National Security Studies, warned of this threat as the “birth rate” of Palestinians (Ofir, 2018a). The Jewish historian and professor of history at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, Benny Morris (2019), further

warned Israel that 'still calling itself a Jewish state' is in danger of being swamped in "a sea of Arab majority" (Gideon, 2019; Ofir, 2019).

In an interview in 2019 with Aderet Ofer (2019) columnist in Haaretz, Morris wandered how a Jewish state can still continue to exist while currently "already today there are already more Arabs than Jews between the [Mediterranean] Sea and the Jordan [River]", and as "we [Zionists] rule an occupied people that have no rights cannot persist in the 21st century, in the modern world" but as soon Palestinian's "do have rights, the state will no longer be Jewish" (Ofer, 2019). Morris further warned from a grim future to Israel, as once Palestinians have their right to return, Israelis will become a small minority in a large Arab sea of Palestinians, and would again suffer persecution, slaughter and exodus on the hands of Arab majority. Morris said:

This place will deteriorate into a Middle Eastern state with an Arab majority [...] The Arabs will demand the return of the refugees. The Jews will remain as a small minority in a large Arab sea of Palestinians, a persecuted minority or a slaughtered minority, as it was when they lived in Arab countries. Those among the Jews who can, will flee to America and the West (Ofer, 2019)

The whole contemporary Liberal Zionist discussion is framed against the notion of a possible annexation of area 'C' (Ofir, 2018a) of the WB that is under full Israeli control since Oslo Accords of the mid 1990's (Ch3 and Ch4). Area 'C' is viable target to Israel as it comprises more than 60% of the WB and surrounds some 165 Palestinian enclaves in Bantustanized enclaves. Area 'C' contains an estimated 350,000 Palestinians in a UN count of 2018 (Ofir, 2018a); a fact that does not serve Zionist goal of a Jewish demographic majority within Israel's expanded borders. Zionists believe that as long as Jews remain a minority amongst a non-Jewish population, they would always be persecuted (Marshall, 1989). A State for Jews only, or at least, of a majority of Jews would sort out this problem. The dilemma to contemporary Zionist project then is how to continue equating geography with demography while threatened by a majority of Palestinians. How to continue annexing Palestinian land cleansed of its Palestinian owners without undermining Israel's depicted image of democracy. This highlights the modern Zionist ideology of what Jewish historian, Ilan Pappé best frames as:

How can I have as much of Palestine as possible, with as few Palestinians in it as possible, without undermining my reputation as the only democracy in the Middle East (cited in Hearst, 2019)

This lays the foundation for understanding the drive behind contemporary Israeli policies of annexation and exodus in Palestine represented in the wall (Ch3). Demographic superiority was and still is a major goal for Zionists, and a core factor for the survival of their project in Palestine. Palestine to Zionists became not only a Jewish homeland

where Jews would seek security and safety; it became a Jewish state where they would attain power and control.

From the outset, Zionists were careful to secure a large number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine not only to protect them from persecution, or to solidify the Zionist state in Palestine, but also to secure a Jewish majority over Palestinians in the planned “Great Jewish State”. The demographic composition of Palestine prior to Zionist colonisation of Palestine in the Nineteenth Century comprised 96% ‘Arabs’ (80% Arab-Muslims, 10% Arab-Christians and 6% Arab-Jewish) out of a total population of 600,000, while the remaining 4% were Armenians and European expatriates (Abu-Lughod, 1971). Therefore, Zionists previously and contemporary, considered Palestinians a threat to their planned Jewish project in Palestine that should be terminated. When Weizmann was asked at the Paris peace conference what a Jewish national home meant, he famously replied, “to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English” (cited in Shlaim, 2000, p. 8). On 7 December 1937 when the British offered to save Jewish children from the Nazis by sending them to England, Ben-Gurion refused the offer because his target was sending Jews to Jewish state in Palestine and not to England:

If I knew that it would be possible to save all the children in Germany by bringing them over to England, and only half of them by transporting them to Eretz Yisrael [Israel], then I would opt for the second alternative, for we must weigh not only the life of these children, but also the history of the people of Israel (cited in Brenner, 1984, p. 23).

Zionists even tried to develop rapid hatred of Jewish Diaspora around the world either by downgrading the Diaspora Jewry as stateless and powerless, or by claiming that historicity of anti-Semitism is inherent feature of ‘Gentile’ non-Jews nature (Davis, 1977; Qumsiyeh, 2004). With the justification of saving Zionist activity from being diverted to a secondary priority, in 1943, Yitzhal Greenbaun, Director of the Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency, refused to donate from the resources of the Foundation Fund to the rescue of the Jewish in the Diaspora:

Zionism is above everything. I will not demand that the Jewish Agency allocate a sum of 300,000, or 100,000 pounds sterling to help European Jewry. And I think that whoever demands such things is performing an anti-Zionist act (cited in Segev, 1993; Torah Jews, 2019)

Greenbaum further confirmed:

When they asked me, couldn't you give money out of the United Jewish Appeal funds for the rescue of Jews in Europe, I said No! and I say again No! One should

resist this wave which pushes the Zionist activities to secondary importance” (cited in Davis, 1977, p. 25; Qumsiyeh, 2004, p. 79).

For Zionists, the worse the Diaspora became, the more emigrants to Palestine, the better chance there was for the Jewish state to survive (Brenner, 1984). For Herzl Jews were not merely a religious group, but a true nation waiting to be born. Thus, Zionist’s aim should not only be based on a sense of having a right to the Promised Land because of God’s will, but rather to return to Palestine to rebuild a Jewish state (IMFA, 2002; Dror, 2011). Herzl’s political Zionism was in contrast to practical Zionism of the Hibbat Zion movement, who promoted the immigration to Palestine, settlement activities and physical development of the Land as a revival of Jewish life in the Promised Land (Davis, 1977; IMFA, 2002; Simons, 2006). With the death of Herzl in 1904, his Political movement encompassed rival factions that questioned Herzl’s fixation on political Zionism (Rubenberg, 2010).

As a result, a new Zionist generation, mainly in Germany, disagreed with Herzl’s political Zionism and supported practical Zionism. They considered the establishment of Jewish settlements in Palestine more urgent than securing the diplomatic framework to which Herzl and his successors in the first generation had given preference. Many of these young Zionists were inspired by the ideas of Ahad Ha’am, father of cultural Zionism. The main goal for cultural Zionism was not the establishment of a Jewish state, as Herzl would have it, but of a Jewish cultural centre in Palestine which would serve as the spiritual foundation for the recovery of Judaism (Shlaim, 2000; Vogot, 2012). Political Zionism gave priority to diplomatic activities to secure international support for the Zionist project in Palestine, while, Practical Zionism gave priority to organising a systematic Jewish immigration to Palestine, land acquisition and settlement in Palestine. The Zionist leader Weizmann merged both political and practical Zionism of what he calls ‘Synthetic Zionism’ in 1907.

2.4 Zionist-British alliance of domination over Palestine

Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952), chief architect of the alliance between Zionist movement and Great Britain, was born in an isolated Shtetle close to Pinsk in Russia. Weizmann was known for his remarkable skills in diplomacy and persuasion. He received his Doctorate degree in 1901, and then moved to London to work as a researcher in Chemistry at the University of Manchester in 1904. He promoted the Zionist cause by making contacts and converts in the highest political circles. In 1920 he was elected president of the World Zionist Organisation until 1946, when he became the first president of the State of Israel in 1948. He served until his death in 1952 (IMFA, 1999a; 1999b; Shlaim, 2000).

One of Weizmann's early contributions was merging between political and practical Zionism. At the eighth Zionist congress, in 1907, Weizmann presented 'synthetic Zionism'. The implication of Weizmann's new policy was that the two approaches should be practiced simultaneously and should supplement each other, satisfying both factions (IMFA, 1999b; Shlaim, 2000). He forged an alliance with Britain and made it the cornerstone of Zionist policy in the course of a long and distinguished career. Weizmann's plans were grounded in his belief that:

Palestine will fall within the influence of England [...] we could easily move a million Jews into Palestine within the next 50-60 years, England would have a very effective and strong barrier and we would have a country (cited in Flapan, 1979, p. 21).

Weizmann became convinced that Britain's imperial interests in the region dictated a need for allies who would help secure its imperial control (Flapan, 1979). The strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean was emphasised. First of all, the region lay on the sea route to Britain's key imperial possessions; India, South East Asia and East Africa, and, Palestine neighboured Egypt, site of the Suez Canal. Furthermore, Britain's imperial rival France, had secured Syria, and Britain needed its own local base to ensure that its rival did not gain wider national influence (Marshall, 1989).

Weizmann debated that Britain should integrate the area into the imperial plan by declaring a protectorate in Palestine, to become a Jewish Palestine by permitting the settlement of European Jews, who would form a safeguard for England as a community committed to defend British interests (Heikal, 1996). Weizmann claimed that this providential coincidence of a British and Jewish interest in Palestine would be beneficial for both parties (Flapan, 1979). Lord Arthur Balfour befriended Weizmann and became a keen supporter of his Zionist project in Palestine (Milton-Edwards, 2000). In his capacity as British Foreign Minister, Balfour issued a statement on 2 November 1917 to the Zionist Federation in the person of Lord Rothschild, head of the Jewish Community in Britain, declaring Palestine as a potential national home for Jews:

His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this objective (cited in Marshall, 1989, p. 35; Milton-Edwards, 2000, p. 35; Shlaim, 2000, p. 7).

Support that Herzl had unsuccessfully sought from Turkey was secured by Weizmann, in the form of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (Shlaim, 2000). The Arabs, represented by Sharif Husain, guardian of the holy sites in Mecca felt betrayed at news of Balfour's declaration in support of the Zionists. They believed that Britain had promised them

Palestine in its Husain-McMahon Correspondence 1914-1915, in return for their support against the Ottomans during WWI.

The Balfour Declaration, Britain's false promises to Arabs, and biased policies that favoured Zionists, inflamed Arab anger. Minor Arab uprisings took place in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933 (Khalidi, 1997), but it was the major Arab revolt of 1936-1939 under leadership of Hajj Amin Al-Husseni, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, when the Palestinian national movement became active in opposition to Zionism (Pappe, 1994; Rubenberg, 2003). Resistance began with labour strikes, developed into mass civil disobedience, and then into armed conflict. A great majority of rebels were from the *fellahin* (peasants). The revolt lasted for three years but was crushed brutally by the British government in 1939 (Lesch, 1979; Tessler, 1994; Sakhnin, 2004). Some Jews, such as Sigmund Freud, father of psychoanalysis, refused to support the Zionist project and actions against Palestinians. In his reply to a Zionist request to sign a petition to condemn the Arab riots in Palestine, Freud wrote:

I cannot do what you wish [...] whoever wants to influence the masses must give them something rousing and inflammatory and my sober judgment of Zionism does not permit this. [...]. It would have seemed more sensible to me to establish a Jewish homeland on a less historically burdened land. But I know that such a rational viewpoint would never have gained the enthusiasm of the masses and the financial support of the wealthy. I concede with sorrow that the baseless fanaticism of our people is in part to be blamed for the awakening of Arab distrust. I can raise no sympathy at all for the misdirected piety which transforms a piece of a Herodian wall into a national relic, thus offending the feeling of the natives. Now judge for yourself whether I, with such a critical point of view, am I the right person to come forward as the solace of a people deluded by unjustified hope (cited in Yerushalmi, 1991, p. 13; Qumsiyeh, 2004, p. 80)

History reveals that Britain had played a political game in trying to defeat its Ottoman rivals and ensure the continuation of its imperialist interests in the region. Britain entered into three contradictory agreements: the Husain-McMahon correspondence, the secret Sykes-Picot Accord with France in 1916, in which they agreed to divide most of the Arab world between them; France was to have Syria and Lebanon, whereas Britain was to have Iraq, Transjordan (now Jordan) and Palestine. The final British agreement was the Balfour Declaration to Zionists in 1917 (Antonius, 1946; Za'iter, 1955; Milton-Edwards, 2000; Shlaim, 2000; Rubenberg, 2003). In 1920, Britain and France were given mandates for the Arab territories approved by the Council of the League of Nations. On July 1922, the mandate for Palestine contained the Balfour Declaration:

Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty [...] in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people (cited in IMFA, 1922)

The Balfour Declaration of 1917 was a turning point in Zionist history by legitimising the colonisation of Palestine. Paradoxically, on November 1917, Palestine was not yet under British rule, thus was not available to be promised to others. The declaration, nevertheless, was as “one nation negotiating and promising to a second nation the land of a third” (Za’iter, 1955, p. 14). In the period 1918-1922 Zionists put forward their maximalist interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. They demanded international recognition of their Zionist claim to Palestine, and they wanted their national home to stretch across both banks of the river Jordan. Weizmann though believed in working on his goal in gradual fashion so not to expose his plans to make Jewish minority master over an Arab majority. In 24 July 1922, British Mandate declared ‘Article 7’ to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine:

The administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law [...] so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine (cited in IMFA, 1922)

The ordinance initially allowed 16,500 Zionist immigrants per year. The ordinance was then amended several times for the benefit of allowing more Jewish immigration to Palestine (Simpson, 1930). Consequently, between 1919-1948 Palestine was subjected to three major periods of Zionist immigration as shown in the (Table 2.1).

Table 2-1:Zionist immigration waves. Researcher calculation. 2016. Based on (Tessler, 1994)

Jewish waves	Year	Number of Jewish immigrants
First Jewish wave	1919-1923	34,000-35,000
Second wave	1925-1931	116,000
Third wave	1932-1948	265,000

Jewish immigration had started as early as 1881 as mentioned earlier. The first Zionist group that succeeded in building settlement in Palestine was the ‘Bilu’ in 1881 with total settlers of 4,500 of whom some two thirds were employed in agriculture (Davis, 1977; Simons, 2006). Between 1881-1903, Bilu had been followed by the ‘Aliya’ settlers who by 1891 established 8 new Jewish agricultural settlements, occupied by 2,400 settlers mainly from Russia and Romania, while the rest of the settlers preferred to live in towns

(Rubenberg, 2010). Running settlements was expensive and settlers lacked sufficient resources including land, capital and agricultural knowledge, which resulted in the collapse of many settlements (Davis, 1977; Smith, 1992). It was financial support from the wealthy banker, Lord Edmond Rothschild (1845-1934), an assimilated French Jew, who saved these settlements (Rubenberg, 2003).

Rothschild was enthused by the plight of Eastern European Jewish masses, thus he did not encourage Jewish resettlement in France. This was linked to his worry that the influx of Eastern European, poor Yiddish-speaking Jews, and the bad reputation they had in relation to social disruption (cheating and prostitution) might inflame anti-Semitism and undermine the status that he and other assimilated Jews had secured in French society (Rubenberg, 2003). Therefore, during the 1880s, Rothschild paid 40-50 million francs to finance settlements in Palestine (Davis, 1977; Smith, 1992). He purchased land from absentee landlords for 7 agricultural settlements. The Rothschild administration had economic interests in the project, thus, it purchased more land with the aim of increasing Zionist settlements and made fundamental changes to agricultural methods, including the planting of vineyards to export wine; Rothschild himself took responsibility for marketing abroad (Giladi, 1975; Davis, 1977).

In 1905-1914, the Aliya created a new settler community in Palestine, 'Yishuv', who in effect laid the basis to coordinate the systematic Zionist colonisation of the land of Palestine (Davis, 1977; Simons, 2006). In the two years following Hitler's rise to power in 1933, another 150,000 Jews left Germany, Central Europe and Poland to join the Yishuv settlers in Palestine (Black, 1984; Qumsiyeh, 2004). Over the next years of Nazi policy in systematic elimination of Jewish populations in the 'Holocaust', a further 2.5 million Jews left Germany and neighbouring states. Paradoxically, and despite the best efforts of Zionist leaders to orient the destination of the Diaspora Jews to Palestine, the number that fled to Palestine was only 8.5% of total migrants (Black, 1984). Yet, this number was enough to make a difference to the Yishuv settler community enabling them to build a base on which the state of Israel was to be constructed (Marshall, 1989; Kovel, 2007).

The new wave contained many bourgeois and professionals motivated by commitment to the political Zionist ideas of homeland for Jews only, and at the same time, were able to mobilise large amounts of capital (Black, 1984). Much of this capital was used for continued Zionist land purchase (Kovel, 2007), which reached its peak under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion, father of Labour Zionism and founder of the State of Israel discussed below.

2.5 Ben-Gurion Labour Zionism and settler power over the land of Palestine

David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973), father of Labour Zionism known as Po'alei Zion (Workers of Zion), builder of the Yishuv military power and founder of the State of Israel, was born into a Jewish family in Poland, where his father was a member of Hibbat Zion movement. In 1906, he joined the second Aliya wave to work as a farmhand in Yishuv Palestine. Ben-Gurion believed in combining practical Zionism with socialism. He became Israel's first prime minister and minister of defence in 1948 (Shlaim, 2000; IMFA, 2013).

Labour Zionism laid down the foundation for an economically and politically autonomous Yishuv; it sought to create an exclusively self-sufficient Jewish economic sector in Palestine known as 'Histadrut'. Histadrut's main principal was the division of Jews from a majority Arab society by ensuring that Yishuv were served with Jewish labour and Jewish produce; and observed a total boycott of Arabs goods (Marshall, 1989; Rubenberg, 2010). Labour Zionism played a key role in turning the Yishuv community into independent socio-economic and political entities, by subsidizing capital investments and providing a political alliance between bourgeois Zionist leadership and labour Zionists (Simpson, 1930).

Yishuv became a successful colony controlling state institutions of military forces, education, health, industry, banks, and political parties (Tzur, 1999). It acted as an outgrowth of western capitalism, which enabled Labour Zionism to play the leading role not only in Yishuv, but also in the state of Israel and the international Zionist movement from 1930s into 1970s (Simpson, 1930; Rubenberg, 2010). Labour leadership subsidised systematic purchasing of the most fertile land in Palestine for their settlements and formed a nucleus for their planned state (Ruedy, 1971). Ben-Yehuda, a pioneer settler who settled in Jerusalem wrote:

The thing we must do now is to become as strong as we can, to conquer the country, covertly, bit by bit [...] we can only do this covertly, quietly [...] we will not set up committees so that the Arabs will know what we are after, we shall act like silent spies, we shall buy, buy, buy (cited in Kovel, 2007, p. 45).

The British Mandate of Palestine in 1917 put an end to almost four centuries of Ottoman rule. As British Mandate controlled land registry offices and land transfer ordinances in Palestine (Stein, 1984), they made land acquisition for Jews approachable (Porath, 1974; Stein, 1984). Prior to 1948 Palestinians owned nearly 90% of the land of Palestine (Hadawi, 1963; Davis, 1977; Usher, 2006). This figure changed dramatically in favour of the Zionists in Palestine because British manipulated land ordinances for the benefit of

Yishuv settlers and enabled Zionist organisations, to bring large areas of land under their control. For example, British deleted the ordinance that stated maintaining of sufficient land for Arab *Fellaheen* and their families in the event of land transfer; they put land on the Zionist market at low prices by issuing ordinances that lowered the prices of land (Stein, 1984; Kovel, 2007). Further, Britain prevented *Fellaheen* from obtaining credit to develop their land, by closing the Ottoman-sponsored Agricultural Bank. *Fellaheen* then had to sell part of their land to develop the rest, or to return some of their debts to landlords who were likely to charge 30% interest (Porath, 1974).

In order to consolidate an extended monopoly over the land of Palestine, Zionist established the '*Keren Kayemet L'Israel*' or the Jewish National Fund (JNF) in 1901, to raise money worldwide for the enterprise. While, the Palestine Land Development Company was to purchase land, foster Jewish emigration, and organise new settlements (Smith, 1992; Tessler, 1994). During Zionist project of land consolidation, Zionists realized that their allies could not be impoverished Arab *Fellaheen*, who under the Ottoman rule were divested of all legal rights. Their allies should be urban elite Merchants and feudal Arab absentee landowners from Beirut and Damascus who are hungry for cash in order to enter a capitalist market economy (Davis, 1977). Zionists knew how to target those landowners; they involved them in cash crops businesses, especially orange trade (Davis, 1977).

In the Ottoman era, Palestine was an impoverished province under the Ottoman rule, poorly administered and lacking basic infrastructure and services (Doumani, 1992; Manna, 1994). A corrupt Ottoman 'Land system' in Palestine facilitated illegal land transactions from feudal landowners to settlers (Rubenberg, 2003). It also created conditions for future conflict over land between settlers and Palestinians and laid the base for the on-going struggles of Palestinians in legally defending their land, specifically against contemporary Israeli policies of land annexation. For example, the contemporary Israeli law of 'State land', Israel uses a corrupt Ottoman Land Code from 1858 for claiming ownership of land belonging to Palestinians who do not have the relevant documents. According to the antiquated Ottomans land Code of 1858, and the land Registration Law of 1861, Palestinian *fellaheen* had to register their land in the official Ottoman registries (Rudy, 1971; Khalidi, 1988), but the high registration fees and taxes forced some of the *fellaheen* to avoid registration. It was also through fear of conscription into the Ottoman army, where their names would appear in the official records that made them avoid this procedure. Moreover, and according to Arab practices during the Ottoman era, dealing with land or leaving it to descendants did not involve any legal documentation. By re-writing the interpretation to the Ottoman law, contemporary Israel

managed to classify hundreds of thousands (about 900,000) dunums as 'state land' for the use of settlements between 1979-2000 (Shalev, 2012).

Moreover, in contemporary Israel, Palestinians are required to cultivate their land for at least ten consecutive years in order to be allowed to register this land as theirs, otherwise it is considered 'State land' (Shalev, 2012). Due to the wall, which severely restricts Palestinian access to their land (Ch3), Palestinians cannot fulfill this Israeli requirement. Consequently, in 2017, B'Tselem reported that 1,400 square km, equivalent to one quarter of the WB, had been declared 'State land' by Israel (B'Tselem, 2017).

Historically, corrupt Ottoman Laws allowed Merchants and feudal Arab absentee landowners to take advantage of *fellaheen* vulnerability and lack of documentations and registered villages and vast landholdings in their names. Tenant sharecroppers, *fellaheen*, and rural wage-labourers had no control over land they cultivated and were deprived of basic rights of land tenure (Hyamson, 1950; Ruedy, 1971; Gilmour, 1980; Khalidi, 1988; Divine, 1994; Rubenberg, 2003). Landowners secretly sold land to the JNF for cash which they then invested in the capitalist market. On the day of handing over ownership to Zionists, the process was attended by Ottoman police who drove the *fellaheen*, from their land (Davis, 1977; Simons, 2006).

Architect of Zionist colonisation, Dr, Ruppin, described land purchase as *fellaheen* dispossession, "on every site where we purchase land and where we settle people, the present cultivators will inevitably be dispossessed" (cited in Davis, 1977, p. 14). For example, then a Lebanese landowner (Sursocks family) sold 242,400 dunums between 1912-1925, they cashed about 750,000 Sterling. As a result, 21 Arab villages were flattened, and 8,000 Palestinian *fellaheen* were evicted (Barbour, 1946). Kalvaritsky, a polish-born Zionist, described the bitterness of expelling *fellaheen* families from their land:

I had to dispossess Arab residents of their land for the purpose of settling our brothers [...] they gathered around the fire, prepared coffee for me and the rest of the guests [...] they sang songs of mourning for their bad future which forced them to leave the cradle of their birth, those songs cut through my heart (cited in Segev, 1999, p. 114)

The situation created landless impoverished Palestinian communities, deprived from working on Jewish land; an easy target for further Zionist expropriation and exodus policies following Herzl recommendations of 1895:

We must expropriate gently the private property on the state assigned to us. We shall try to spirit the penniless population [Palestinian Arabs] across the border

by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it employment in our country [...] both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discretely and circumspectly (cited in Hirst, 1977, p. 18; Prior, 2001, p. 10; Simons, 2006, p. 24).

Kalvaritsky, regarded Arab absentee landlords as “just a bunch of ignoramuses and bootlickers willing to sell everything for a mess of potage” (cited in Segev, 1999, p. 115). From Herzl’s diary writing, it is argued, that those landowners believed that they were fooling Jews by selling them land and properties at high prices, but Zionists had something else in mind. Herzl wrote:

Let the owners of the immoveable property believe that they are cheating us, selling us things for more than they are worth, but we are not going to sell them anything back (cited in Hirst, 1977, p. 18).

Herzl’s philosophy set the pattern for JNF land domination policy; land that was bought by JNF was to be held in a common trust, to ensure that land and properties would be held in permanent Jewish ownership (Tessler, 1994; Rubenberg, 2003). According to the trust law, land could never be sold, but it could be leased to new settlers at very low rates of interest, on condition that it was cultivated by Jewish labour not Arabs (Simpson, 1930; Smith, 1992). In this way Zionists made sure that land could never be sold and would always remain Jewish land. The director of JNF, Abraham (Granot, 1952) recorded for example buying 245,581 dunums (1,000 square meters) between 1878-1914, of which only 30,836 dunums were from Palestinian *Fellaheen*, while 61,329 dunums were from Arab absentee landlords, and 91,001 dunums from sources including the Ottoman government, churches, and large foreign companies (Granot, 1952; Smith, 1992).

Another suitable target for Zionists at that time was Eastern Orthodox Patriarchate that had suffered a financial disaster when it was denied the donations previously sent by the Russian Church after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917; Patriarchate therefore had to sell much of its properties in Palestine (Gilmour, 1980). It is the on-going case in contemporary Israel with purchasing properties in East Jerusalem. In June 2019 (Alaraby, 2019), an Israeli court approved the sale of three Eastern Jerusalemite properties, located in the Muslim Quarter Jaffa Gate. The properties sold in 2004 by the Greek Orthodox Church to Ateret-Cohanim group that works on Judaizing East Jerusalem (Ch3) through systematic policies of property purchases. In 1925, a Revisionist/rightest, Zionist Alliance emerged. Their aim was to separate Palestinians from Jewish people under the leadership of Jabotinsky (IMFA, 1999b), as discussed below.

2.6 Jabotinsky Rightist Zionism and Iron Wall separation

Policy

Ze'ev Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940), founder of Revisionist Zionism, chief father of the Zionist Rightist opposition and leader of the Irgun gang (Simons, 2006), was born in Russia and worked as a Journalist in Vienna and Berlin (Brenner, 1984). Revisionist Zionism had two principles; first was Jewish statehood and territorial integrity on both banks of the River Jordan. The second was immediate declaration of the Jewish right to political sovereignty over the Land of Israel (Brenner, 1984; IMFA, 1999b; Shlaim, 2000).

Jabotinsky in two articles under the same title "The Iron Wall" (1923) presented the essence of Revisionist theory on the Arab question, what Zionists should do with the indigenous people of Palestine (Brenner, 1984; Shlaim, 2000). In his article Jabotinsky claimed that Arabs' inherent hostility to Zionism was an obstacle to peace. Therefore, Jews can live in peace with Arabs by constructing an "Iron Wall" of a Zionist military force between both peoples:

Both peoples will live in peace as good neighbours, but the sole way to such an agreement is through an Iron Wall [...] of a force that will in no way be influenced by Arab pressure (cited in Shlaim, 2000, p. 14).

Similar to Jabotinsky, Zionist revisionist writer, William Ziff, claimed that Palestinians were "a sickly, dangerous race and low on the scale of human development" (cited in Palumbo, 1987, p. 10). Following on this in contemporary Israel, Benny Morris for example, considered Arabs as "congenitally violent, hostile, and intent on the destruction of Israel" (cited in Leavy, 2017; Hearst, 2019; Ofer, 2019). Arabs, in Morris's idiolect, is code for backward and thus he is entirely representative of his Zionist predecessors. Israeli columnist, Gideon Levy ridiculed Morris's statements:

According to Morris and his ilk, the Arabs are born to kill. Every Palestinian gets up in the morning and asks himself. Which Jew shall I slaughter today, and which shall I drive into the sea? It's a kind of hobby! (cited in Hearst, 2019)

It is argued that Jabotinsky in his Iron Wall policy set the pattern for contemporary Zionist rhetoric of putting the blame on Arabs attitudes for the failure in achieving peace in Palestine. At the same time his policy justifies Zionist policies of constructing surveillance separation walls of force against Palestinians with the pretext of security against Palestinians inherent hostility to Israel. Rhetoric still influentially used in contemporary Israel led to building the wall in 2000 in the WB; to protect Israelis from the terrorist Palestinians (Ch4).

Separation in contemporary Israel is a central notion to maintain a Jewish majority in Israel (Weiss, 2018). Tsefi Livni, one of the contemporary liberal-Zionist politicians, of whom Illan Pappé, considers a “classical settler-colonialist” (cited in Hearst, 2019), confirmed that separation between Palestinians and Israeli is a must solution (Weiss, 2018). It is not to overcome fears of Palestinian hostility as Zionists claim, but to overcome fears of ‘demographics’.

Therefore, for those liberal Zionists, the Rightest Zionists such as Netanyahu and associates are threatening Israel. By annexing large portions of the WB creating a de facto one state solution (Ch3 and Ch4), Netanyahu incorporated a large Palestinian population to Israel, thereby risking the Jewish majority in Israel. Zionists are concerned about Israel losing its Jewish character by having too many Arabs as potential voters (Ofir, 2018a; Wiess, 2018). The ideology of separation was powerfully expressed in Livni’s statement below, that the only way to maintain Zionist ‘vision’ of a Jewish, democratic state of Israel is through separation with Palestinians (Weiss, 2018). She portrayed the separation between Israelis and Palestinians as “separation between the yolk and white” of an egg, in order to make “a good cake” (cited in Ofir, 2018a; Wiess, 2018).

Criticising the “indifference to the Palestinian majority annexationist policies” of Netanyahu and his Education Minister Naftali Bennett. On October 2018, Livni warned, that Netanyahu and Bennett are laying the foundations of “one state with an Arab majority– is that what we want?” (cited in Wiess, 2018). She further warned that Netanyahu’s choices are at the price of securing a country with a Jewish majority:

This government takes steps [...] prevent us from [...] separate from the Palestinians [...] when we go toward the goal of Jewish and democratic and safe, we stop at the station of separation from Palestinians. But when they take us to the greater Israel without a Jewish majority, they stop at a different station, which is not Jewish and is not democratic (cited in Wiess, 2018)

Livni is no different from her Zionist predecessors when it comes to pretexts used to justify policies/actions against Palestinians. She justified her calls to disconnect Palestinians from the Jewish state, under the pretext of wanting them to be neighbours:

I want to turn the Palestinians into our neighbours. Because at the moment they are not neighbours; they are inside us. They [Netanyahu/Bennett] want us all to live in one apartment, and it’s going to be a bloody conflict (cited in Wiess, 2018)

In 2016, the Israeli rightest movement ‘Saving Jewish Jerusalem’ released a video set in 2020, in which East Jerusalem Palestinian residents vote to elect a Palestinian mayor

for Jerusalem, the video portrays Palestinians as terrorists manipulate Israeli democracy to control Jerusalem (Ynet, 2016; Zonszein, 2016). Livini in this regard condemned Netanyahu:

You realize, that those who do not agree that there should be an Arab player on an Israeli soccer team, will allow that 300,000 Palestinians living in Arab villages, that are part of the municipal area of Jerusalem, determine if they want to who will be Jerusalem's mayor! (cited in Weiss, 2018).

Liberal Zionists forcefully use the threat of potential Jerusalemites voters, nearly 40% of the population in Jerusalem, who would impose danger on their democracy. Paradoxically, Jerusalemites despite having residency status, they do not have full Israeli citizenship (El-Batsh & Weizman, 2018). This means they have the right to vote only in municipal elections (that is responsible for most Jerusalem schools and garbage collection), but not allowed to vote in general elections for the Knesset (that is responsible for state policies and regulations). Moreover, for the last 50 years, Jerusalemites, largely boycott Jerusalem's municipal elections in protest of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem (Zonszein, 2016).

Liberal Zionist alarm regarding imposed danger from Jerusalemites majority on their democracy, is only another 'Zionist propaganda' to justify Zionist calls for separation policies against Palestinians. Their goal is to separate 28 Palestinian villages surrounding Jerusalem from East Jerusalem, yet, the solution calls to annex all colonial settlements surrounding these villages to 'Great Jerusalem' (Weiss, 2018); Zionist goal is to Judaize East Jerusalem to establish this "Great Jewish Jerusalem" (Ch3). Historically, the struggles between right and left Zionists have always existed and the essential factor in these debates is always Jewish demography. So, Zionist left-right debate is not about illegal Israeli policies, apartheid or expansion against Palestinians, but about the speed and rate at which "expansionism" needs to happen in Palestine (Ofir, 2018a). For example, Jabotinsky's original policy of the Iron Wall was applauded and supported by all Zionists, the only dispute at that time was should it be Jewish bayonets or British:

One prefers an Iron Wall of Jewish bayonets, the other proposes an Iron Wall of British bayonets [...] but we all applaud, day and night, the Iron Wall (cited in Qumsiyeh, 2004, p. 76).

In other words, everything suggested from Zionists, left or right, previously or contemporarily, is about separation between 'superior' Jews and 'dehumanised' Palestinians. For Zionists, the supposed 'safe and democratic' Jewish state could only be achieved by means of expulsion and apartheid in all means possible (Ofir, 2018a),

including Jabotinsky's Iron Wall in the past and contemporary separation wall in WB. Jabotinsky's claim that 'military power' is the only way to bring those 'hostile Arabs' to peace, symbolise the patronizing Zionist propaganda throughout history of dehumanising Palestinians in order to achieve ultimate goal of Zionism in Palestine, as discussed below.

2.7 Zionist dehumanising propaganda against Palestinians

Zionists portrayed Palestine as a deserted territory and Palestinians as having never existed (Menuhin, 1969), rooted in Zangwill famous Zionist rhetoric of: "A land without people" (Massalha, 1992, p. 10; Heikal, 1996, p. 75; Simons, 2006, p. 25). In 1914 Weizmann claimed that Palestine was an empty land that should be united to Jews the way man can be united to a woman when he said:

There is a country, which happens to be called Palestine, a country without a people, and on the other hand, there exists the Jewish people, and it has no country. What else is necessary than to fit the gem into the ring to unite this people with this country (cited in Massalha, 2001, p. 37).

Golda Meir Israel's Prime Minister in 1969, announced that Palestinians had in fact never existed:

There was no such thing as Palestinians [...] it was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them, they did not exist (cited in Gilmour, 1980, p. 12; Qumsiyeh, 2004, p. 31; Kovel, 2007, p. 39).

Arthur James Balfour, British foreign secretary, was equally dismissive. For him Zionism was of far greater importance than the desires and prejudices of 600,000 Arabs inhabiting an ancient land (Abu-Lughod, 1971). For example, the Balfour Declaration, the document, which effectively decided the future of Palestinians, described those who formed more than 90% of the population at that time as existing non-Jewish communities. Balfour said:

It being clearly understood that nothing shall be done, which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine (cited in MidEast, 1922; Marshall, 1989, p. 35; Shlaim, 2000, p. 7).

However, if facts indicated that Palestinians do exist; then they have to be marginalised, dehumanised and transferred. Balfour said, "in Palestine we do not propose even to go through a form of counselling the wishes of the present inhabitants" (cited in Gilmour, 1980, p. 12). The clearest depiction of Arabs was present in a letter on the characteristics of the Arabs, sent by Weizmann to Balfour in 1918:

Though superficially clever and quick witted, he was by nature treacherous and blackmails as often as he can. If an official, he was rouge, corrupt, regretting the good old times when baksheesh [tip] was the only means by which matters administrative could be settled. If a *fellah* [peasant], he was at least four centuries behind the times, and if an *effendi* (noble), he was dishonest, uneducated, greedy, and as unpatriotic as he is inefficient (cited in Ingrams, 1972, pp. 31-32).

Zionists like the Jewish scientist, Redcliffe Salaman, managed to influence western attitudes by portraying Palestinians in a dehumanized image as incapable of developing their country without foreign power assistance (Redcliffe, 1920). When Weizmann was asked about the indigenous Palestinians, he replied: "The British told us that there are some hundred Negroes and for those there is no value" (cited in Massalha, 2001, p. 37; Simons, 2006, p. 22). The Russian Jew, Asher Ginsberg, regarded Palestinians as "savages who live like animals" (cited in Menuhin, 1969, pp. 64-65). Zionist Arthur Koestler further portrayed them as rapists of their own grandchildren:

The old ones will tie a mattress, and a bras coffeepot on a donkey; the old man will ride on it, wrapped in his *keffiyeh* [a male head scarf] and sunk in solemn meditation about the lost opportunity of raping his youngest grandchild (cited in Koestler, 1949, pp. 199-200).

The argument is that Anti-Arab policies were and still are the nucleus of the Zionist system, including its ideology and actions. Contemporary Israeli Zionist figures were careful to follow their predecessors lead in this field. In an interview published in 2002 in The New York Review of Books (Avnery, 2002), the former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak said:

They [Palestinians, and especially Arafat] are the products of a culture in which to tell a lie [...] creates no dissonance. They don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is seen as an irrelevant category [...] The deputy director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation told me that there are societies in which lie detector tests don't work (cited in Ofir, 2018b; Avnery, 2002)

In the Zionist pursuit to win great powers support; Zionists represented themselves as messengers of Western civilization who would return civilization to Palestine. Zionism for Jabotinsky was not the return of Jews to their promised land, but rather as implant of Western civilization in a backward East, who he even thanked God for have nothing in common with: "We Jews have nothing in common with what is denoted the East and we thank God for that" (cited in Simons, 2006, p. 20). Zionists claim succeeded in forming a geostrategic conception in which Zionism was to be permanently allied with European

colonialism against all Arabs in the Eastern Mediterranean (Shlaim, 2000). Palestinian intellectual, Edward Said (1980, pp. 25-26), summarized the Zionist-Western relationship as:

There was and still is a community of language and of ideology. So as far as the Arab was concerned, he was not part of this community

In 1891, the Zionist thinker Ahad Ha'am criticised the cruelty of Zionists (Gilmour, 1999) who he described as "tendency to despotism as happens always when a slave turns into a master" (cited in Kovel, 2007, p. 45). Ha'am condemned how settlers treated Palestinians as animals, "the attitudes of the colonists to their tenants and their families is exactly the same as towards their animals ((cited in Kovel, 2007, p. 45). He added, settlers even claimed that "the only language that the Arabs understand is that force [...] hit them [Arabs] shamefully without reason and even brag about it" (cited in Palumbo, 1987, p. 8).

Herzel viewed native Arab as barbaric primitive and backward (Shlaim, 2000), who should appreciate Zionist colonization that would civilise them and develop their country (Munayyer, 2019). In 1899, Herzel told the Palestinian mayor of Jerusalem:

Do you think that an Arab who owns land or a house in Palestine; worth three or four thousand francs, will be very angry to see the price of his land rise in a short time (cited in Munayyer, 2019)

Similarly, in 1930 Winston Churchill told a British commission that native Palestinians would benefit from colonialism, as they are incapable of advancement, "it is for the good of the world that the place [Palestine] should be cultivated, and it never will be cultivated by the Arabs" (cited in Munayyer, 2019). Palestinians, to Churchill, were an inferior people that colonializing was justified in civilizing. Churchill did not even admit that 'higher grade race' colonialists harmed native people:

I do not admit that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America, or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been done to those people by the fact that a stronger race, a higher-grade race or, at any rate, a more worldly-wise race, to put it that way, has come in and taken their place (cited in Munayyer, 2019)

Herzl's and his supporters patronizing questions over the capability of Palestinians to develop or rule themselves is still echoed in the contemporary politics. After 71 years of colonialism, similar dehumanising portrays of Palestinians are still used. On June 2019, ahead of the expected release of the so-called "Deal of the Century" (Ch3) peace plan, Zionist Jared Kushner, Trump's Middle East adviser and son-in-law, insisted that Palestinians are unable to govern themselves. Therefore, they are not ready to have

independent Palestinian state and cannot expect freedom from Israeli military interference (Axios, 2019; Independent, 2019; PressTV, 2019; The Guardian, 2019).

Kushner argues: "the hope is that over time they [Palestinians] can become capable of governing" (Trew, 2019). The Peace plan states that Israel will retain control over Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and colonial settlements in the WB (Elgindy, 2019; Baker and Landler, 2019) (Ch3). While Palestinians will only be given access to holy sites in East Jerusalem. The deal is another Zionist annexation tool to serve Zionist project in Palestine. The Kushner's deal considers also another Zionist dehumanising propaganda against Palestinians not only because it doubts their capable to govern themselves, but also because it suggests that Palestinians can be an easy/cheap people to give up their dignity, freedoms and rights in return for foreign investment in their economy.

Dehumanising Palestinians is a Zionist tool still used in contemporary politics to justify on-going western support to Israel on the account of Palestinians (Ch3). It is also a tool of what David Hearst (2019) best explains as; "lying school of thought [to] free Zionism of all guilt, and Israel of all responsibility". Hearst's explanation fits with Alan Taylor's (1974):

The dehumanized image of Palestinians, which Zionists developed and propagated, was instrumental in displacing the moral issue [...] legal justification around Zionist goals and activities (Taylor, 1974, p. 48)

When Kushner questioned Palestinian right and capability to self-determination, he puts the burden on Palestinians to prove they are worthy and deserving of freedom, justice, equality and their human rights (Munayyer, 2019). The distinction of being innately less deserving of human rights and freedom is reserved for peoples facing the brutal oppression of colonialism and racism. In the role of historical colonizers, white men considered themselves a superior people with a right to deny everything and anything to others who are less worthy; only the white man could know what is best for the backwards and savage peoples under his rule. This mind-set is embodied today in Trump's and Kushner policies/acts against Palestinians (Ch3).

Historically, this mindset has been a staple of U.S. domestic policy toward native people. For example, the U.S. government ethnically cleansed the indigenous people of America. The indigenous people could "be civilized if placed among civilized people" (cited in Maunayyer, 2019). Such attitudes were also prominent in the resistance to granting black people their civil rights. In the 1950s, writers like William Buckley (1957) using racist and patronizing arguments, arguing that black "backwardness" afforded the South the right to "impose superior mores for whatever period it takes to effect a genuine cultural equality between the races" (Buckley, 1957, p. 149).

The support of the great powers to Israel never was less for modern Israel. In 1991, when Adnan-Odeh, King Hussein's information minister, and his adviser on Palestine, was sent to Washington to find out what the Americans had in mind for the peace plan for the Palestine-Israel conflict. The response of James Baker who was US secretary of state at the time was:

Look, Mr Odeh, I will tell you one thing as secretary of state. There will be no Palestinian state. There will be an entity, less than a state, more than autonomy. Okay now? That is the best we can reach with the Israelis (cited in Hearst, 2019)

Yevgeny Primakov, Chief Soviet politician, told Odeh in 1981: "Adnan, forget it. There will be no Palestinian state" (cited in Hearst, 2019). Understanding the centrality of similar attitudes in Zionism and Western positions toward Palestinian cause and requests is crucial to understanding severity of the Israeli-Palestinian problem, which would more accurately be described as Zionist eager to delete Palestinians from the map of Palestine. Kushner and Trump only represent an extension of a lengthy tradition based on colonialist Zionist thinking.

When victims of anti-Semitism use anti-Arabs policies to secure their goals, it is argued that some Jews lost their human souls to the machinery of Zionism (Kovel, 2007). The Zionist statements against Palestinians mentioned earlier evidence that Palestine was a populated land, which contradicts Zionist's slogans that Palestine was a land without people. Claims that were challenged by Ahad Ha'ams, in 1891 who declared that Palestine was a "cultivable land" inhabited and "cultivated by Palestinians" (Khalidi, 1988, p. 216).


Since Palestine was not a deserted land, settlers who arrived in Palestine after the WWI, found a land, which had little in common with the rhetoric "land without people". In Zionist thinking, this difficulty would be solved by means of separation, partition; massacres, dispossession and mass exodus (discussed in the following sections). Weizmann in his meeting with Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to London on 30 January 1941, promoted the notion of Palestinians transfer, when he said:

If half a million of Arabs could be transferred, two million Jews could be put in their place, that of course, would be a first instalment, what might happen afterwards was a matter for history (cited in Morris, 2004)

2.8 1948 partition of Palestine and the State of Israel

On 1936 Ben-Gurion said, "we and they want the same thing, we both want Palestine, and that is the fundamental problem" (cited in Shlaim, 2000, p. 18; Teventh, 1985, p. 166). To solve the conflict in Palestine, the British government appointed a royal investigation commission, with Lord Peel as chairman. The commission concluded in

July 1937, that both sides have strong national movements and the only solution was to partition Palestine into two separate states, with Jerusalem and Bethlehem joint with an enclave to Jaffa to be under permanent British mandate (map 2.1) (Za'iter, 1955).



Map 2-1:MidEast. 1938. Original Royal (Peel) Commission Partition Plan, 1937 as elaborated by Palestine Partition Commission. [Online]. Accessed on 19.4.19 via:
<http://www.mideastweb.org/peelmaps.htm>

Ben-Gurion supported the Partition plan on the assumption that accepting it would enable Zionists to build their state; have unlimited immigration, to build their economy and their army. For him a state on part of the land would not be the end, but only the

beginning and the rest of land of Palestine will come in the course of time. In 1937, Ben-Gurion said his famous statement:

Erect a Jewish state at once; even if it is not in the whole land, the rest will come in the course of time. It must come (Kovel, 2007, p. 89).

Due to the WWII, Britain reassessed its commitments to Zionism in order to pacify Arabs in the Middle East to keep communication with India open. Britain thus had adverse shift in its policy in the region, by a gradual retreat from promises embodied in the Balfour Declaration reaching its climax (Verdery, 1971; Smith, 1992). In Winston Churchill's White Paper of 1939, Britain laid down specific criteria for Jewish immigration: any further Jewish immigration should be dependent on Arab agreement (Shlaim, 2000). Peel stated:

The Balfour declaration [...] could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the country (cited in Verdery, 1971, p. 323; Smith, 1992, p. 101).

Arabs rejected the White Paper because it did not stop Zionist immigration or Zionist land purchases, whereas Zionists under the leadership of Ben-Gurion responded by a campaign of military operations against both British and Arabs. Bombing, assassinations and violent attacks increasingly characterized the period. The Hagana, S'teirn, and Irgun gangs headed by young Zionists such as, Yitzhak Shamir, and Menahim Begin, who both later became Prime Ministers of Israel. Gangs conducted military attacks with the aim of ending the British Mandate in Palestine and obtaining their own independence (Milton-Edwards, 2000).

Despite efforts to restrict the Jewish acquisition of Arab land, the Jewish Agency's settlement scheme continued to expand (Simons, 2006). If the national home was to survive Weizmann's advice was to continue to build the Jewish national home "step by step, immigrant by immigrant, and settlement by settlement" (cited in Shlaim, 2000, p. 10). During the 1930s some 130 new settlements were established, some constructed in the middle of the night. Zionist settlers would occupy a land, build a 'fence' around the land and then upright a watchtower, which explains the term '*Homea u 'migdal*' (enclose and tower), for some of the settlements (Simons, 2006). A pattern still used in contemporary Israel in building secretly colonial outposts (Ch4).

This deterioration in Zionists-British relations was rooted in the clash of a Zionist goal to establish an independent Jewish state in Palestine, and a British desire to protect its interests in the whole of the Middle East (Marshall, 1989). In this context the Balfour Declaration, would be seen as disastrous not only for Palestinians, but also for British imperial interests (Gilmour, 1999). In 1946, the British member of the Anglo-American


Committee of Inquiry, Richard Crossman (1946), regarded the Jewish Agency for Zionist affairs as the “toughest and most efficient organisation” he ever seen, that is also “not afraid of the British” (cited in Crossman, 1946, p. 141).

In July 1946, the Zionist Irgun gang bombed British headquarters in King David Hotel in Jerusalem (Milton-Edwards, 2000). With increased conflict over control of Palestine between Zionists and British Mandate, by the end of the WWII the British decided to leave Palestine, and in 1947 handed Palestine to the UN (United Nations). Under strong US pressure, the UN General Assembly on 29 November 1947 approved Resolution 181 that calls for the division of Palestine into a Jewish state on 55% of the most fertile land of Palestine, and a Palestinian state on 45% of the land. Jerusalem was to be a united city under permanent UN trusteeship (Map 2.2 and 2.3) (Rudy, 1971; MidEast, 2002; Rubenberg, 2003).

Following partition, Zionist-Palestinian unofficial war erupted for less than six months, from 29 November 1947, until 14 May 1948. From the beginning the war was unequal; Zionists were highly trained by the British, strong and equipped with heavy weapons, whereas, Palestinian communities were exhausted and weak. After three decades (Ottomans-British-Zionists) of occupation and resistance, the Arab opponents were leaderless and had only light arms, mainly after the British executed, imprisoned and expelled Arab leaders during outbreaks of protest 1936-1939 (Rubenberg, 2003). On 14 May 1948, Israel declared its independence.

Israelis call the 1948 War ‘War of Independence’, whereas Arabs calls it ‘*Nakba*’ (catastrophe) (Pappe, 1992; Shlaim, 2000; Rubenberg, 2003). During the war, Zionist convictions of Herzl’s and alike against Palestinians were guidelines for the mass exodus policies of Palestinians (discussed below), which Weizmann, proudly bragged about as: “A miraculous clearing of the land” (cited in Gilmour, 1999, p. xii) examined below.





Map 2-3:MidEast. 2002. Original UN Partition Plan of Palestine 1947. [Online]. Accessed on 19.4.19 via: www.mideastweb.org/181.htm

2.9 Zionist massacres and exodus of Palestinians

In 1948, the Zionist military plan officially set up a transfer committee responsible for operations of Palestinian transfer and land confiscation. In the months of April-May 1948, units of the Haganah, the pre-state defence force that was the precursor of the IDF, were given operational orders that stated explicitly that they were to uproot the villagers, expel

them and destroy the villages (Shavit, 2004). The head of the transfer committee, Yosef Weitz, head of a Transfer Committee in May 1948, a member of David Ben-Gurion inner circle, and director of the JNF, aimed to transfer all Palestinians to neighbouring Arab countries (Morris, 1986; Khalidi, 1988; Masalha, 1997; Simons, 2006). Weitz wrote in his diary:

It must be clear that there is no room in the country for both peoples [...] after Arabs are transferred the country will become wide open for us [...] Land purchasing [...] will not bring about the state [...] there is no way but to transfer all of them [Palestinians] not a single village must be left, not one tribe. The transfer must be directed to Iraq, Syria [...] only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb millions of our brothers, and the Jewish problem will be cease to exist (Morris, 1987, p. 27; Massalha, 1992, pp. 131-132; Qumsiyeh, 2004, p. 37; Simons, 2006, p. 29).

The flight of Palestinians started as early as 1947, after the UN accepted the partition plan in November 1947. Once the British began to leave Palestine, the balance of power favoured a Zionist military take-over Palestine. The Palestinian scholar, Walid Khalidi, argues the partition increased fragmentation of the Arab while it advanced cumulative consolidation and extension of Jewish power (Pappe, 1999). Palestinians from upper and middle classes, estimated at about 30,000-70,000, left the country between November 1947 and January 1948. They hoped for a swift return leaving without their possessions and did not sell their properties. They were denied the right of return by Zionists, which resulted in a serious loss of many key people, and a breakdown in communications, economic and administrative services in Palestinian communities (Morris, 1987).

The first wave of voluntary flight by tens of thousands of Palestinians did not satisfy Zionist leaders. Jewish authorities prepared an expulsion plan, believing that Palestinians had to be expelled, and not merely persuaded to leave (Morris, 1987). Zionist policy Plan *Dalet* (plan D) of Yossef Weitz, insisted that where expulsion failed, transfer should be forced by every possible means; cutting the water supply to city neighbourhoods or by setting fire to the fields of Palestinian villages. Weitz even convinced the Israeli government to confiscate any looted Arab harvest in order to enhance survival prospects of their newly born state (Morris, 1986; Khalidi, 1988; Masalha, 1997). Israeli troops took over land and properties left by Palestinians (Ruedy, 1971; Fischbach, 1997; Usher, 2006).

Plan *Dalet* launched a series of military operations of destruction and expulsion of Palestinians recommended by the Jewish Agency. The plan was only accessible in Hebrew until Walid Khalidi (1988) translated it into English in the 1960s. The plan came

in 1948, after American president Harry Truman had second thoughts on the subject of the partition plan of 1947. It is argued that he was willing to recommend the State Department to replace the partition plan with an international trusteeship over Palestine. Plan *Dalet* can therefore be understood as being based on the assumption that military operations had to be rushed before any possible changes in American policy would freeze Zionist military situation on the ground in Palestine. The plan was designed to enable Jews to occupy Palestine, and to expel Palestinians following Ben-Gurion recommendations and vision of exclusive Jewish state of Israel (MidEast, 1948; Morris, 1987; Palumbo, 1987; Khalidi, 1988; Massalha, 1997; Pappe, 1999; Simons, 2006). The translated introduction of the plan was:

The objective of this plan is to gain control of the areas of the Hebrew state and defend its borders. It also aims at gaining control of the areas of Jewish settlement and concentration, which are located outside the borders [of the Israel state] (MidEast, 1948)

The plan aims mainly to gain control over Jewish settlement located on the Palestinian side after the partition. It appears as if Zionists are repeating history when it comes to pursuing the Zionist project in Palestine. The contemporary wall serves the same objectives as plan *Dalet* served 71 years previously. Throughout history, Zionists' aims in Palestine have not changed; contemporary Zionists still pursue their predecessors' ultimate goal of securing a pure Jewish state. However, the means of achieving this goal have changed and are currently represented by the wall. For example, in 1948 Zionists carefully calculated how to annex Palestinian land cleansed of its people through plan *Dalet*. Currently, the wall is used to annex Zionist settlements inside the WB. Walid Khalidi (1988), claimed the *Dalet* plan was a master tool in the Zionist project. The plan called clearly and explicitly for the expulsion of Palestinians from Jewish-Palestinian mixed towns, and from locations deemed strategic to Zionists (Pappe, 1999). Khalidi (1988, p. 8) said:

Zionists launched successive offensives in April and May 1948 in various parts of Palestine [...] calculated to achieve the military fait accompli upon which the state of Israel was to be based

Plan *Dalet* Operations commenced following the massacre of *Deir Yassin*, headed by Menachem Begin, who later became Prime Minister of Israel, on April 1948. The massacre killed 245 Palestinians "deliberately massacred in cold blood" as Jacques de Reynier, of the Red Cross, stated (cited in Khalidi, 1971, p. 764). Survivors were deliberately marched through Jerusalem to spread panic among local Palestinians and force them to flee (Kimche & Kimche, 1960). The panic caused among Palestinians by *Deir Yassin* made Zionists, such as Arthur Koestler, to honour it as, "the psychologically

decisive factor in this spectacular exodus" (cited in Gilmour, 1980, p. 69). Menachem Begin, former Prime Minister of Israel and founder of rightest Likud party, triumphed the massacre:

The legend in *Deir Yassin* [...] all the Jewish forces proceeded to advance through Haifa like a knife through butter, Arabs began fleeing in panic, shouting *Deir Yassin* (cited in Childers, 1971, p. 189; Turki, 1974, p. 20; Qumsiyeh, 2004, pp. 35-6).

The psychological warfare that Zionists used in their military operations against Palestinians was a successful mean of indirect expulsion of Palestinians (Morris, 1987; Massalaha, 1992). Zionist press and radio spread the news of the massacre everywhere, creating terror among Palestinians who left their homes to find shelter; whole towns were evacuated out of fear (Khalidi, 1971). A Christian missionary in Jerusalem recalls a loudspeaker sending a message to Palestinians, "unless you leave your homes, the fate of *Deir Yassin* will be your fate" (cited in Childers, 1971, p. 186). Leo Heiman, an Israeli expert of the 1948 War, talked about Zionist techniques to force Palestinians to flee:

Israelis brought jeeps which broadcast recorded horror sounds; shrieks, wails and anguished moans of Arab women [...] voice calling in Arabic: save your souls [...] the Jews are using poison gas [...] run for your lives in the name of Allah [God] (cited in Gilmour, 1980, p. 72).

There were 33 massacres in 1948 (Shavit, 2004), and over half of them were committed while the area was still under the protection of the British Mandate. Massacres of unarmed *fellaheen* (farmers) became a standard Zionist method in forcing Palestinians to flee their villages. On October 1948, massacres witnessed unusual high concentration of executions of people against a wall, or next to a well, in an orderly fashion (Shavit, 2004). At Ain-al-Zeitouna massacre, 37 boys were taken hostage and never seen again (Nazzal, 1978). One of the Zionists, who committed a massacre in Duwayma village, where hundreds of Palestinians massacred as Morris stated:

The children were killed by smashing their skulls with clubs [...] another soldier boasted that he raped an Arab woman and then shot her [...] this happened not in the storm of the battle and blind passion, but because of a system of expulsion and annihilation (cited in Gilmour, 1980, p. 69)

There were many cases of rape, but because neither the victims nor the rapists reported these events, Morris said "we have to assume that the cases of rape that were reported are just the tip of the iceberg" (cited in Shavit, 2004). A Palestinian woman from Safsaf village described the massacre and rape of women in her own village in October 1948:

As we lined up, a few Jewish soldiers ordered four girls to accompany them to carry water for the soldiers [...] they took them to our empty houses and raped them. About 70 of our men were blindfolded and shot to death one after the other in front of us (cited in Nazzal, 1978, p. 95).

The Zionist military plan razed some 370 Palestinian villages and towns, the original population of around 362 Palestinian villages and many cities such as Jaffa, Haifa and Acre were expelled (Morris, 1987), over 700,000-750,000 Palestinians became refugees; more than half the Arab population of Mandatory Palestine became refugees. Most of these refugees were *fellaheen* strongly attached to their land and homes, and not easily intimidated by acts of war; nor did they have the means to travel (Morris, 1987; Pappe, 1992; Gilmour, 1999; Usher, 2006), this indicates the level of brutality they faced to force them to flee. Yosef Nachmani, a high-ranking member of the underground Hagannah forces, and director of the JNF, compared the cruelty of massacre of Salha village like that of the Nazis:

In Salha, which carried a white flag, they carried out a real massacre, killing men and women, about 60-70 people. Where did they find such a degree of cruelty like that of the Nazis, they learned from them (Morris, 1986, p. 222)

Describing the scenario of mass exodus of Palestinians in 1948, delegate of the Red Cross to the Middle East Aubin De St, said:

Those from Galilee and the north coastal cities of Palestine fled to Lebanon and Syria. Others sought the nearest Arab-controlled territory in Syria and Transjordan [Jordan] [...] only a few were able to carry personal things and some money [...] many went on foot [...] in certain cases entire villages kept more or less together (De St, 1949, p. 252)

The Palestinian exodus and the refugee crises of 1948 is a highly charged issue. It touches raw nerves of both Israelis and Palestinians and is a fundamental element in formative debates by each side (Klien, 2006), discussed in the following section.

2.10 Israeli-Palestinian Debates over Exodus of Palestinians

An Israeli-Palestinian debate took place over the 1948 exodus. On the Israeli side, they denied exodus, and claimed it was due to orders from the Arab High Command, who promised a quick victory and quick return, and that Arab leaders have deliberately kept Palestinian refugees stateless to destroy the image of the Jewish state (Segev, 1986, p. 56; Klein, 2006, p. 87). Ben-Gurion, for example, on 4 December 1946, claimed that the coverage of the expulsion of Arabs was:

A fabrication designed to defame the state [and based on] an organised plan by the Arab states or the British, or even both [therefore, he called on the Knesset Committee to seek ways of combating] such disgraceful allegations (cited in Segev, 1986, p. 56).

Others alleged that the exodus followed rumours of Israeli terrorism that resulted in panic flights among Arab communities to avoid such attacks. However, the version that has been adopted by most Israeli officials and by Zionist apologists abroad was that exodus followed broadcast calls over the Radio from "*The Mufti*" (the President of the Arab Higher Executive), instructing Palestinians to flee (Childers, 1962; Pappe, 1999).

Palestinians on the other side, claimed that exodus was rooted in the Zionist aim of cleansing Palestine of its indigenous inhabitants and confiscating their land, which began prior to establishment of the state of Israel. Zionist underground gangs, such as Haganah, Irgun and Stern, practised terror activities and committed massacres in Palestinian villages, which added an spur to the flight of Palestinians (Morris, 1987). Palestinian allegations claimed also that British Mandatory was involved in helping Zionists by causing a panicky flight of Palestinians. British informed Haifa residents of Northern Palestine that they would not protect them (Schechtman, 1952).

During the 1950s investigations took place to examine Zionist claims regarding the exodus. Irish journalist, Dr Erskine Childers, and Palestinian historian Professor, Walid Khalidi, were the first scholars to investigate these claims (Ghazi, 1996). Childers and Khalidi have screened Arab documents, newspapers and in particular they tried to find evidence of radio broadcasts to investigate Israeli claims. Childers went to Israel in 1958 as a guest of the government and tried to find evidence. Since Israelis were unable to produce it, Childers decided to examine American and British monitoring records of all Middle East broadcasts throughout 1948. The only evidence Childers and Khalidi could find were threats by official and non-official institutes in the Arab world, including Palestinian groups, to punish those who were planning to leave their homes (Childers, 1962; Khalidi, 1971; Said and Hitchens, 1988). Childers (1962, p. 672) reported:

There was not a single order, or appeal, or suggestion about evacuation from Palestine from any Arab radio station, inside or outside Palestine in 1948. There is repeated monitored records of Arab appeals [...] orders to the civilians of Palestine to stay put

Despite Childers and Khalidi findings, it was the Israeli version that was mostly accepted (Said & Hitchens, 1988). This situation only changed in 1980s when revisionist new historians of Israeli scholars challenged the traditional historiography of the birth of the state of Israel and the first Arab War (Shlaim, 2000; Qumsiyeh, 2004:23). For example, Benny Morris, in 1987, countered many official Israeli claims for the making of the

refugee problem. He also agreed with Khalidi and Childers in regard to the absence of evidence to support Israeli claims for the exodus (Morris, 1987; Pappé, 1999). Same as Childers, Morris (1987) found no evidence of calls by the Mufti or any Arab leader to Palestinians to leave the country. All what he could trace were instructions by Arab higher Committees to local commanders to secure the evacuation of women, children and old men from areas of danger (Morris, 1987).

The Palestinian academic Nour Masalha (1992) examined the same documents as Morris and argued that exodus was an integral part of Zionist strategy for survival; it was a condition for the success of the Zionist project. Masalha (1991) criticised Morris for ignoring in his book the inherent link between exodus of Palestinians and the acquisition of their land, thus accommodating millions of Jewish immigrants. The confusion about whether the exodus of 1948 was a pre-planned Zionist policy of expulsion highlights the importance of examining the Zionist massacres against Palestinians in 1948 (Khalidi, 1988). In response, Benny Morris explained the exodus as a result of Israeli military operations, and not because of a “systematic plan to expel’ Arabs from Palestine (Morris 1991, p. 114). He considered the compulsory transfer of Palestinians as the only possible Zionist way of settling the conflict in Palestine (Masalha, 1991).

The irony that Benny Morris once described himself as a ‘New Historian’ along with other prominent ‘New Historians’ such as Avi Shlaim, Tom Segev and Ilan Pappé. Morris was known for his work in uncovering the truth about the birth of Israel, which Zionists who took part in spent time and energy obscuring (Hearst, 2019). His book, ‘The Birth of the Palestinian Problem’ (1987), detailed the mass expulsions, ethnic cleansing and war crimes involved. Morris has joined the ranks of historians who question traces of the evidence he himself helped to uncover (Hearst, 2019). He published articles in favour of Israel in ‘The Guardian’ newspaper (Shavit, 2004), where he claimed that “deep, basic Palestinian rejectionism” of Israel was at the core of Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Morris, 2017). He was trying to give what scholar, Daniel Levy (2017), called in his reply to Morris, “a veneer of intellectual respectability to a well-rehearsed lie” (cited in Levy, 2017; Hearst, 2019).

Morris (2017) called the dispossession of Palestinians a “justified ethnic cleansing of 700,000 Palestinians” (cited in Shavit, 2004; Levy, 2017). Morris was defending Ben-Gurion’s policy of exodus as the better option:

There are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing [...] I know that this term is completely negative in the discourse of the 21st century, but when the choice is between ethnic cleansing and genocide [...] I prefer ethnic cleansing (cited in Ofer, 2019)

Morris confirmed, “Ben-Gurion was right” as “if he had not done what he did, a state would not have come into being”. “Without the uprooting of Palestinians, a Jewish state would not have arisen here” (cited in Shavit, 2004). So, for Morris, “Ben-Gurion was a transferist”, because he understood “that there could be no Jewish state with a large and hostile Arab minority in its midst” (Shavit, 2004; Levy, 2017).

Moreover, Morris who has documented Israeli-Palestinian history regretted that a full ethnic cleansing was not completed in 1948 (Ofir, 2019b). He believed that David Ben-Gurion did not go far enough by expelling all Palestinians to the other side of the Jordan River in 1948 (Levy, 2017):

If the War of Independence had ended with an absolute separation of populations, the Palestinian Arabs on the east side of the Jordan River, and the Jews on the west side [...] the Middle East would be less volatile and both peoples would have suffered less over the past 70 years. They [Palestinians] would have been satisfied with a state of their own [Jordan], not exactly what they wanted; and we would have received the whole Land of Israel (cited in Levy 2017; 2019; Hearst, 2019)

As a solution, Morris suggested caging Palestinians:

Something like a cage has to be built for them [the Palestinians]. I know that sounds terrible. It is really cruel. But there is no choice. There is a wild animal out there that has to be locked up in one way or another (cited in Ofer, 2019)

Morris and other political allies reflect the nature of a Zionist mind-set; justifications and fabrications that always try to disconnect cause from effect (Levy, 2017). Morris’ claim, Levy (2017) argues, rests on the idea that Palestinians wrongly refuse to accept the legitimacy of their exodus. It is what he summarises as:

Yet the historian who described how it all began, who understood that the beginning entailed a terrible original sin dispossessing and expelling hundreds of thousands of people, then forcibly preventing their return, isn't willing to connect the cause with the effect (Levy, 2017; Hearst, 2019).

Creation of the state of Israel managed to partly achieve the Zionist goal of a land without people; the mission is still not complete. Fulfilment of the long-held Zionist ambition of an exclusive Jewish state over the whole Land of Palestine, following the recommendation of David Ben-Gurion in 1937, “Erect a Jewish state at once, even if it is not in the whole land. The rest will come in the course of time; it must come” (cited in Shlaim, 2000, p. 21; Kovel, 2007, p. 89).

Israel is still actively following Ben-Gurion's recommendation; to achieve the goal of domination over Palestine. Thus, it has used and is still using all possible means to cleanse Palestine of its people. In the process, Israel is following what Moshe Dayan, former Defence Minister, said to Arabs in the wake of the 1967 War, "we don't have a solution, and you will continue living like dogs [...] and we will see how this procedure will work out" (cited in Alaraby, 2017; Ofir, 2018a). Dayan's statement essentially summarises how the contemporary Zionist project in Palestine: building a wall, moving Palestinians around, dispossessing their land and properties, and constructing settlements, are all 'facts on the ground' aimed at making Palestinian life unbearable and the Judaizing of all Palestine (Ch3 and Ch4). This is political Zionism versus the land and people of Palestine.

2.11 Conclusion

This chapter explores Zionism and its political project in Palestine. On-going conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and contemporary Israeli politics of military surveillance over Palestinians, including the wall, are influenced by political Zionism. It argues that Zionism did not emerge only because of anti-Semitism in Europe, but also because of a combination of political, economic and social needs of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe. Zionists searched for salvation at the expense of native people of the land they claimed was designated specifically for this purpose; Palestine. Thus, the famous Zionist rhetoric of a land "for people without a land" is a political Zionist goal rather than just rhetoric; an undeniable element in Zionist thinking which has been evident throughout their actions against Palestinians since 1948.

The chapter also highlighted the role of political Zionism in setting the pattern for contemporary Israeli policies and acts against Palestinians. It explores Zionism in relation to the land and people of Palestine in order to draw attention to the core importance of those two elements in shaping Israeli-Palestinian conflict throughout its history. This chapter did not aim to quantify the extent to which Zionist thinking and attitudes violated Palestinian rights in order to secure their Zionist goal of "a land without people for people without a land", as much as it aims to highlight that they shaped Israeli policies and social attitudes towards Palestinians. The chapter identified key themes of land dispossession, militarisation and violations, leading to the creation of a Zionist state in Palestine in 1948. In this context, contemporary Israeli policies, including the Israeli wall, should be understood. Their goal is total hegemony of Palestine using all possible means. The chapter develops the argument that acquiring Palestinian land and cleansing its people, in order to establish "Great Jewish State", was and still is, the main motivation behind Zionist ideology; planning and actions against Palestinians who suffer the daily burden of surviving the consequences of Zionist policies and actions.

The chapter shows how Zionists achieved goals of acquiring Palestinian land and cleansing it of indigenous people through range of different violent interventions that have resulted from the characterisation of Palestinians in racist atrocities of massacres, exodus and dispossession. It links these atrocities and racist discourse against Palestinians with contemporary Israeli policies against Palestinians. It argues that contemporary policies against Palestinians, including house demolitions, exodus, land annexation and the wall, serve the innovative Zionist political goal of “a land without people”. The chapter summarises how contemporary Zionist settlers still carry on their Zionist project in Palestine following on the lead of their predecessors; build a wall, shift Palestinians around, dispossess their land and properties, and construct settlements ‘facts on the ground’ in order to ‘Judaize’ all Palestine. This is political Zionism versus the land and people of Palestine.

The chapter sets the foundation for the following chapters. On the one hand, the chapter sets the conditions and struggles amongst dispossessed Palestinians in an attempt to survive consequences of Zionist racist actions/atrocities on their life that now include contemporary struggles against the Zionist surveillance policies and the wall. On the other hand, it sets the evidence and argument to understand Palestinian-Israeli debates over the contemporary wall; a security measure to protect Israeli civilians from Palestinian terror attacks versus a tool of combined Zionist goals of land confiscation, exodus of Palestinians, territorial expansion, demographic domination and security for Israeli settlements.

Chapter 3

Judaizing Jerusalem with the support of Trump's administration and the Great Zionist project in Palestine

3.1 Introduction

Numbers of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, West Bank (WB) and in Israel, are currently estimated at over 5.3 million, exceeding the Jewish population of 5.2 million (World Population Review, 2019). By 2035, the Jewish population in Israel/Palestine is projected to reach 46%, while Palestinians 54%, because the Palestinian population is growing at about 2.4% per year with a birth rate of over four children to every woman; 33% higher than Israel's growth rate. This population is also the youngest in the region (World Population Review, 2019) with 40% of Palestinians under 14 years old. Palestinians 65 years plus account for just 2.9% of the population. This demography has raised Zionist fears for the survival of their Zionist project in Palestine (Ch2).

Following Zangwill's rhetoric of "A land without people for people without a land" (cited in Simons, 2006, p. 25; Heikal, 1996, p. 75), contemporary political Zionists are careful to secure two elements for the survival of their Jewish Zionist project in Palestine. First, protecting the on-going expansion of their Zionist project in Palestine; and securing a Jewish majority within the new borders of this project (Ch2). One Zionist method used to secure the above two elements was Judaizing Palestinian cities.

This chapter examines the Judaizing of Jerusalem to demonstrate policies and efforts forcing Palestinians to lose hope, to surrender and leave. In doing so, the chapter shows that Israel's colonisation of the WB was never accidental, defensive or reluctant as Israel claims. Israeli past and current policies against Palestinians; house demolitions, annexing land, expanding settlements, and building walls were and still are, calculated and carefully planned to force Palestinians to submit and surrender the idea and practice of a Palestinian nation state. The chapter also shows, the transition between what has long been understood as Israel's 'creeping annexation', carried out by stealth (Cook, 2019a), in contemporary times has become a blatant, violent and unpredictable race with the protection and support of the US Trump administration.

Examining Jerusalem's struggles with Zionism reflects a complex web of Zionist pretexts and efforts to seize territory. Land annexation exacerbated, mainly after the Oslo II interim accord of 1995 (Ch1). East Jerusalem was not within land division areas of 'A', 'B', and 'C'. However, for Jerusalemites, Oslo had the disastrous consequence of

Judaizing their city. A Palestinian scholar in Israel, and head of the Arab national democratic coalition in the Israeli Knesset, Jamal Zahalka (2010) states that Israel refused any commitment towards anything not mentioned in Oslo Accord, specifically, Jerusalem. Since then, Israel has used all means possible to use this omission to Judaize Jerusalem. After Oslo, the first step Zionists took was to clear the city of all features and key people related to the PA, starting with the closing of *Beit-El-Sharq*, (Orient House); headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Jerusalem (Zahalka, 2010). Thus, after Oslo, Jerusalem became a city with no Palestinian representation. Israeli Contemporary policies/efforts against Palestinians in Jerusalem; settlements; house demolitions; biased laws; nationalising Palestinian land; evictions and detentions to further Judaize Jerusalem are discussed below.

3.2 Judaizing Jerusalem

Kelly Colic, head of Jerusalem municipality, said that after 1967 Arabs in Jerusalem should not exceed 28% of the population (Zahalka, 2010; Kuttub, 2016). By June 1993, a Jewish majority was established in East Jerusalem of 155,000 Jews compared to 150,000 Palestinians (UN, 1994). However, by the end of 2008, the Palestinian population increased in East Jerusalem to 260,800 (57%) Palestinians, compared to 195,500 (43%) Jews (Choshen & Korach, 2010). Therefore, Israel used and is still using all means possible to Judaize Jerusalem to maintain a Jewish demographic majority in the city, following Colic's recommendation.

Zionist demographic fears in the OPTs began after almost tripling the size of Israeli occupied territory in the 1967 War. For example, in 1967, Israel found itself controlling many of those very same refugees, who had fled to the WB and Gaza, nearly 20 years earlier in 1948 (Konrad, 2019). Then, Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, assembled committees of academic teams called the 'Professors Committee' in 1967 to research Palestinian territories. Their mission was to find ways to establish long-term planning with policies to pacify Palestinian resistance to the occupation and force Palestinians to emigrate the newly occupied land of 1976 (Konrad, 2019). However, the findings were a non-starter for Israel as the professors committee found that Palestinian refugees were not interested in any political solution that did not involve returning to their 1948 land (Konrad, 2019; MEMO, 2019a).

Findings of the committee essentially set the foundation as to how Zionist policies look in the contemporary period. Israel realized that removing Palestinians by encouraging them to willingly leave Palestine, such as for education or for better work options in surrounding Arab countries, was not efficient. Accordingly, and in order to Judaize Palestinian cities, Israel switched to more coercive policies and methods some of them already used in 1948. Paradoxically, these policies are under intensive current

application in East Jerusalem. For example, one of the policies used in Jerusalem is a colonial settlement policy, which favours an apartheid state and a form of colonialism (Dagard, 2013).

In 2004, Israel planned to separate Jerusalem from its twin city, Bethlehem, by building a chain of Israeli settlements between the two cities. As a result, East Jerusalem became completely isolated from Bethlehem. In March 2015, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, referred to the illegal settlement of Har-Homa, built on the northeast side of Bethlehem, as a way of “stopping Bethlehem from moving towards Jerusalem” (cited in NAD, 2015). Leader of the Palestinian National Initiative, and a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Mustafa Barghouti, said that by annexing East Jerusalem, Zionists also annexed northern parts of Bethlehem; Beit-Jala and Beit-Sahour, where Beit-Jala alone lost 48% of its land to East Jerusalem (MATÉ, 2017). Further, Israel’s Planning and Building Committee in 2018 submitted a settlement project, the largest of its kind, to be implemented in East Jerusalem over two years, including the construction of 1,000 housing units with the aim of extending Pisgat-Zeev settlement east of Jerusalem (MEMO, 2018g). In the same year Israel approved a project for about \$379 million to build 20,000 new settlement units throughout Greater Jerusalem (MEMO, 2018i).

An additional Zionist policy used to Judaize Jerusalem, is through setting strict, biased Israeli policies that favour Jews to the detriment of Palestinians. Aims of these policies are to make Jerusalemite life unbearable. For example, Israeli officials in Jerusalem municipality intentionally implemented a restrictive, discriminatory planning scheme that made legal Palestinian construction in East Jerusalem almost impossible (LRC, 2018; OCHA, 2018a). As is the case in area ‘C’, where less than 1% is zoned by Israel for Palestinian construction, with a condition of obtaining Israeli permits that are impossible to get (OCHA, 2018a). Only 13% of East Jerusalem, most of it already built-up, is zoned for Palestinian development, with a condition of obtaining Israeli permits (LRC, 2018; MEMO, 2018m; OCHA, 2018a). Therefore, building, renovating or expanding houses in East Jerusalem has become impossible for Jerusalemites.

Building without a permit means more Jerusalemites are subject to coercive Israeli policies, such as eviction and house demolition. Israel has experience using these policies, which follow ones practiced against Palestinians in 1948 for colonial settlers. For example, in 1948, Zionist gangs demolished 39 villages around Jerusalem, displacing about 198,000 Palestinian residents (LRC, 2018). Between September 1948 and August 1949, 16,000 Jewish settlers were resettled instead of expelled Palestinians (MEMO, 2018n). A report by the Land Research Centre (LRC) in January 2018 noted that since 1967, Israel has demolished about 5,000 Palestinian houses in East Jerusalem (LRC, 2018; MEMO, 2018m), of which 1,706 were demolished between 2000

and 2017, displacing 9,422 Palestinians, including 5,443 children (OCHA, 2018a). The report further noted that there is currently an estimated 20,000 housing units built without permits (LRC, 2018; MEMO, 2018m). These houses now face risk of demolition under the pretext of lack of building permits.


This War of 1967 unleashed the settler movement in Palestine; a young generation of messianic Zionists designed to establish settlements in the WB and Gaza, territory occupied and not part of the state of Israel. It opened up the question of the Zionist movement's colonial nature. Instead of exchanging land for peace, as per UN Resolution 242, that called on Israel to give up the territories in exchange for peace with its neighbours at the end of the 1967 War, Israel began encouraging citizens to move into the territories it occupied and gave them support (Tahhan, 2018).

In 2018 an Israeli Civil Administration database noted that there was an estimated 100,000 Jerusalemites at risk of eviction, residing in unlicensed buildings (OCHA, 2018a; 2018b). The Public Trustee for the East Jerusalem File, and head of the economic unit, Hananel Gurfinkel, was responsible for handing over the houses of evicted Palestinians to right-wing settlement groups (MEMO, 2018n). Gurfinkel is also a member of Education Minister Naftali Bennett's extreme right-wing Habayit Hayehudi party. This might explain, why he set up a nongovernmental organization to fight the takeover of what he calls foreign entities (Palestinians) from conquest state property in East Jerusalem (Hasson, 2018a; MEMO, 2018n).

Batan-al-Hawa neighbourhood of Silwan village in East Jerusalem is an example of Zionist eviction policy against Palestinians. In 2002, the Israeli Ministry of Justice transferred approximately five dunums of Batan-al-Hawa land to the Benvenisti Trust, which included members of the right-wing Ateret-Cohanim settler organization (Hasson, 2019a; OCHA, 2018b; 2018d). Although this order is still pending, since 2002 Ateret-Cohanim has filed eviction cases against 21 buildings, housing approximately 85 Palestinian families, and placed about 400 Palestinians at risk of displacement. In 2018, Ateret-Cohanim managed to clear a total of six buildings in the area (OCHA, 2018d).

In June 2019, Israel further decided to demolish the entire Palestinian neighbourhood of Wadi-Yasul, close to Silwan (B'Tselem, 2019) making 550 Palestinians homeless and at risk of eviction (The Palestine Chronicle, 2019a). According to B'Tselem (2019), Jerusalem Municipality has issued demolition orders for the whole neighbourhood, under the pretext of it being adjacent to a national forest and located on privately owned land expropriated from Palestinian owners in 1970. In 2017 the Jerusalem municipality ordered the demolition of four high-rise buildings in Kafr-'Aqab (Map 3.1), but under a different pretext from Wadi-Yasul; that of being adjacent to the wall (OCHA, 2018a). Yet, the municipality plans to replace the buildings with an eight-metre-wide road to alter

traffic flows on Qalandiya-checkpoint, north Jerusalem (OCHA, 2018a; B'Tselem, 2019). In addition to eviction and house demolition, Jerusalemites who build without permits also face costly fines (OCHA, 2018a). Between 2000 and 2009 the Jerusalem Municipality collected about US\$ 5.8 million in fines each year from Palestinians, due to lack of building permits (HRW, 2010; OCHA, 2017).




Map 3-1: OCHA, 2018. Demolished structures in East Jerusalem in 2017 including Kafr-'Aqab and Sur-Bahir. [Online]. Accessed on 6.7.19 via: <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/high-numbers-demolitions-ongoing-threats-demolition-palestinian-residents-east-jerusalem>

In order to annex more Palestinian land, and to prevent Palestinian neighbourhoods from expanding in East Jerusalem, Israel used the pretext of nationalizing Palestinian land as public parks to protect landscape and heritage. Israel designated many areas in East Jerusalem as national parks, despite the fact that these areas are devoid of any significant archaeological findings or natural resources (B'Tselem, 2014a). This policy was an effective tool in serving Zionist political project than any municipal restriction on

Palestinian building. Declaring Palestinian land as a national park means that no construction or urban development could be implemented. It also means land free of Palestinian residents.

In 2013, the Regional Planning Committee approved new national parks in East Jerusalem; Refa'im Stream National, North of Al-Walaja village, in an area where construction by Palestinian residents is prohibited (B'Tselem, 2014b). The park, with an area of about 5,700 dunum is incorporated into a planned Jerusalem metropolis to encircle Jerusalem. It is also meant to safeguard open spaces that support the natural ecosystems (B'Tselem, 2014a). Also, in 2013 the Regional Planning Committee approved Mount Scopus Slopes National Park (Ir-Amim, 2012; Altro, 2019) (Map 3.2). This park interfaces with Gilo settlement Park and allows access on foot or by bicycle for Israeli residents of neighbourhoods around the park (B'Tselem, 2014b; 2014c).



Map 3-2: Bimkom, 2011. Mount Scopus national Park. [Online]. Accessed on 20.6.19 via:

<https://www.google.com/search?q=Bimkom+national+park+map&safe=strict&client=safari&rls=en&tbm=isch&source=iu&ictx=1&fir=xiLK2unIU-K30M%253A%252CRV1MMDs-q7aY5M%252C &vet=1&usq=A>

In 2013, Ilene Prusher (2013), wrote in Haaretz that Mount Scopus Slopes National park, which stretches from East Jerusalem to E-1 settlement block (Map 3.3), is considered to be potentially the most political park in the world. Israeli NGO Ir-Amim argues that the park will make the mission for any negotiator to outline a contiguous piece of WB territory for a Palestinian state impossible (B'Tselem, 2014b; 2014c).

To establish the park, new demolitions in East Jerusalem's At-Tor area were carried out. According to spokeswoman of Ir-Amim, Betty Herschman, in the first half of 2014, demolitions were conducted at twice the pace of total demolitions executed in 2012, with 67 demolitions (Tagari & Oppenheimer, 2015). Mount Scopus Slopes Park, an initiative of the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, backed by the Mayor Nir Barkat, stretching out in the direction of Ma'aleh-Adumim settlement, would effectively create a land bridge between Jerusalem and E-1; a corridor that will divide the northern and southern parts of the WB (Prusher, 2013). In 2000, the Tzurim Vally Park, was also declared. Approving national parks as Zionist policy is not a new initiative, but it goes back to 1974 (B'Tselem, 2014a) when Israel founded Jerusalem Walls National Park that encircles the Old City walls, and annexed parts of Silwan (B'Tselem, 2014c).



Map 3-3:Altro, 2019. E1 planned settlement block and Mt. Scopus Slopes area marked as national park in new plans. The area targeted by the park masterplan (see in the map the area between Issawiyya and At-Tur demarked by green lines) is adjacent to the E1 area. [Online]. Accessed on 2.7.19 via: <http://www.altro.co.il/uploads/252/File/plans%20around%20E1.jpg>

Israeli municipal policies do not apply only to East Jerusalem, but also cover areas under PA control in the WB (Tatarsky & Cohen-Bar, 2017). For example, and due to adjustments to the route of the wall in 2003, Wadi-Hummus neighbourhood in Sur-Baher village ended up on the Israeli side (Hasson, 2019b). Although legally Wadi-Hummus is considered to be part of the WB and under the PA control, in 2019 the Israeli High Court

of Justice ordered the demolition of 13 large buildings (Hasson, 2019b). The Israeli pretext for demolishing was for building in the area designated as a buffer zone to the wall since 2010. Paradoxically, for Palestinians, this claimed buffer zone covers some 160 dunums of Palestinian areas 'A' and 'B', and around 200 dunums in area 'C', and includes 200-250 Palestinian buildings (OCHA, 2018a). Israel uses biased policies of suppression, detention and neglect against Jerusalemites, which dehumanise them and force them to submit and leave Jerusalem see below.

3.3 Israeli policies of suppression, detention and neglect

Although residents of East Jerusalem retain permanent resident status, and pay municipal taxes, the municipality of Jerusalem effectively ignores their residential areas; basic facilities and services are either ignored or entirely non-existent (HRW, 2017). According to Ehud Tagari and Yudith Oppenheimer (2015) from Ir-Amim, it appears that no Israeli building inspectors have entered Kafr-'Aqab since 2005, which means 83% of the total number of neighbourhood buildings lack municipal supervision to ensure basic engineering and safety standards (Browning, 2013). The United Nations noted:

The Israeli government could go much further in meeting its obligations as an occupying power by acting with vigour to improve economic conditions in East Jerusalem and the well-being of Palestinian residents (UNCTAD, 2013)

Over 95% of East Jerusalemite Palestinians retain residency status rather than citizenship (Hasson, 2018b). Obtaining Israel citizenship is described as almost impossible. Obtaining an appointment for an interview alone can take up to three years, followed by another 3-4 years for a decision (Hasson, 2019d). Rejections include: lack of loyalty to Israel; centre of life is not Jerusalem but the WB; and not achieving a required level of Hebrew (Hasson, 2018b). A further illustration of Israeli policies of repression against Jerusalemites is weekly violent military search operations of Palestinian houses, mainly on the grounds of carrying out arrests. Arrests involve Palestinian children and often causing damage to Palestinian belongings (OCHA, 2018d). The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2018d) argued that there is a strong correlation between high rates of Palestinian child detention in residential areas with a strong Israeli settler presence. For example, between 2012 and 2018, OCHA documented more than 560 cases of child detention in East Jerusalem in Silwan, including Batan-Al-Hawa. This figure makes up close to a quarter of the approximately 2,400 documented cases of children detained during this period (OCHA, 2018d).

In other words, the mapping of the locales where Israeli detentions take place reveals a certain Zionist pattern. To support this argument, the Journalist in Haaretz, Netta Ahituv (2019) noted that the closer a Palestinian village is to a settlement, the more likely it is

that minors residing there will find themselves in Israeli military detention. For example, in Azzun town, west of Karnei-Shomron settlement, there's hardly a household that has not experienced an arrest; the main reason for their arrest is throwing stones. Residents say that in the past five years more than 150 pupils from the town's only high school have been arrested. According to data collected by the British-Palestinian organisation, about 97% of the young Palestinians arrested by Israeli military live in locales that are no more than two kilometres away from a settlement (Ahituv, 2019). Clashes followed by arrests usually occur in these areas due to physical and geographical friction between Palestinians and soldiers/settlers.

Conversely, according to Gerard Horton, from the British-Palestinian Military Court Watch, which monitors the treatment of children in Israeli military detention, the arrests occur in order to protect colonial settlers (Ahituv, 2019). Every year Israel arrests almost 1,000 underage children and youngsters, some of them not yet eleven years old wear large handcuffs to bind their small hands behind their backs (Ahituv, 2019). Some children are arrested at their homes between midnight and 5:00 am by heavily armed soldiers and some are arrested in the streets near their homes and also on bypass roads used by Israeli settlers, or at army checkpoints (UNICEF, 2013; Stein, 2017). A study by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF, 2013), on the practices related to Palestinian children in Israeli military detention between 2003-2013, highlights that what happens during and after arrest is frightening. Describing what happens during arrest and transfer stages, UNICEF (2013, p. 10) reported:

Many of the children wake up to the frightening sound of soldiers banging loudly on their front door and shouting instructions for the family to leave the house [...] furniture and windows are sometimes broken, accusations and verbal threats are shouted, and family members are forced to stand outside in their night clothes as the accused child is forcibly removed from the home and taken away with vague explanations such as 'he is coming with us and we will return him later', or simply that the child is 'wanted'. Children are often prevented from saying goodbye to their parents and from putting on appropriate clothing for the journey. Many children are subjected to ill-treatment during the journey to the interrogation centre. Some endure physical or verbal abuse; some suffer from painful restraints or from being forced to lie on the hard floor of the vehicle. The transfer process can take many hours and often includes intermediate stops at settlements or military bases where further ill-treatment is reported, including [...] a lack of water, food or toilet facilities

Descriptions of violations committed during the interrogation stage, UNICEF (2013, p. 11) reported:

No child has been accompanied by a lawyer or family member during the interrogation [...]. The children are rarely informed of their rights, particularly the right against self-incrimination, [...] there is no independent oversight of the interrogation process. The interrogation mixes intimidation, threats and physical violence, with the clear purpose of forcing the child to confess. Children are restrained during the interrogation, in some cases to the chair they are sitting on [...]. Children have been threatened with death, physical violence, solitary confinement and sexual assault, against themselves or a family member. Most children confess at the end of the interrogation. The interrogator prints out some forms and orders the child to sign them, though the child often lacks a proper understanding of their contents. In most cases the forms are in Hebrew, which the overwhelming majority of Palestinian children do not understand.

Luigi Daniele (2017, p. 27), Lecturer, Nottingham Law School, states that in Israel there is “no requirement that an arrest be preceded by a detention order, nor that the person be informed of the reasons for arrest at the time he or she is taken into custody, for up to 96 hours”. Some children have been held in solitary confinement for periods ranging from 2-30 days before a court hearing and after sentencing (UNICEF, 2013, p. 12). Confinement exceeds what Secretary-General, Manfred Nowak (2008, pp. 18-22), identified in his report (Torture and any other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 2008) as a period of 22-24 hours per day. Nowak (2008) further noted that the purpose of physical isolation in a cell is to reduce social and psychological meaningful contact to the bare minimum, which is insufficient for most prisoners to remain mentally stable, and thus obtain more information and confessions. He also warned of the serious and adverse health effects of solitary confinement within the first two weeks, which range from insomnia, confusion, hallucinations, to mental illness and increased rates of suicide and self-mutilation.

In 2014, the Public Committee Against Torture (Withnall, 2014) in Israel published a report accusing the Israeli government of torturing Palestinian children and subjecting them to outdoor caging during winter, including threats and acts of sexual violence and military trials without representation (Withnall, 2014). A joint report in 2017 from the Israeli human rights organisations, HaMoked and B'Tselem, researched and written by Yael Stein (Stein, 2017), details the subjection of Jerusalemite teenagers to many forms of brutal treatment during detention. Another report in 2018, from British legal experts, concluded that Palestinian children are subjected to all forms of physical or psychological abuse during arrest, transit and waiting periods, and during interrogations amount to torture (Ahituv, 2019). The use of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolutely prohibited under international law (Nowak, 2008). Israeli

practices from apprehension to court proceedings are illegal and contradict article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC):

(A) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below 18 years of age [...]. (C) Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect [...], and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age. [...] shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do so and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family through correspondence and visits [...]. (d) [...] shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance (cited in OHCHR, 1990, p. 10; UNICEF, 2013, p. 5)

A majority of Palestinian children prosecuted in Israeli military courts are charged with stone throwing. Under Article 212 of Israeli Military Order 1651 of 2009, the sentence for throwing stones varies between 10-20 years imprisonment (UNICEF, 2013). Daniele (2017, p. 34) argues that the imposition of Israeli sentences against Palestinians are “marked by an irrational severity and disproportionality”. For example, Article 212 (cited in No Legal Frontiers, 2009) states:

A person who throws an object, including a stone [...] in a manner [...] may harm traffic in a transportation lane [or] [...] property, with the intent to harm [...] shall be sentenced to ten years imprisonment, if the object is thrown at a moving vehicle with the intent to harm [...] shall be sentenced to twenty years imprisonment

However, applying the limitation on sentences that can be imposed, a child aged between 12-13 years can still receive a maximum sentence of 6 months, while a child aged between 14-15 years, could in theory receive the maximum penalty of twenty years (UNICEF, 2013, pp. 8-9). Both cases violate point (a) of article 37 of the CRC mentioned earlier. On the impact of detention on children, the special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez (2015, p. 4) reported in 2013 that “even very short periods of detention can undermine a child’s psychological and physical well-being and compromise cognitive development”. He also added (2015, p. 4):

Children deprived of liberty are at a heightened risk of suffering depression and anxiety, and frequently exhibit symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder. Reports on the effects of depriving children of liberty have found higher rates of suicide and self-harm, mental disorder and developmental problems

Responding to criticism of the prosecution of Palestinian children as young as 11-12 in adult Israeli military courts, and in order to maintain its so claimed 'democratic' image, in September 2009 Israel created what is believed to be "the first and only juvenile military court in operation in the world" (UNICEF, 2013, p. 6; Committee against Torture, 2009). The juvenile military courts highlight further biased/dual Israeli laws and policies as they only persecute Palestinian children, and do not persecute Israeli children (Withnall, 2014). In 2013, UNICEF (2013, p. 13) concluded in its review that the ill-treatment system Israel follows in dealing with Palestinian children in Israeli military detention appears to be widespread, systematic and institutionalized. Zionist detention policies targeting Palestinian children as young as 11, are planned and applied carefully to deprive them of any sense of security, happiness and hope. A long-term goal to turn the Palestinian people into passive, vulnerable and depressed young generation who would easily submit to their colonizer.

To complicate Jerusalemites life further, in 2018, Israel passed a law placing limits on Palestinian access to Israel's High Court of Justice, redirecting administrative claims over land or property rights to the District Court (Eglash, 2018). Critics say the law is meant to hamper Palestinian petitions against Jewish settlement construction in Jerusalem and the rest of the WB (Lis, 2018). This is because before the passage of this law the High Court was the court of first instance for WB Palestinians' petitions, rather than going through the judicial hurdle of district courts. The law is another step by Israel toward full annexation of any land Palestinians hope to use for a future national state (Eglash, 2018). Roni Pelli, of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, noted that the explicit aim of the bill is to make things easier for Israel to harm Palestinians and to make it more difficult for them to achieve justice (Eglash, 2018). Confirming this, Justice Minister, Ayelet Shaked, praised the law by saying, "the High Court petition party of Palestinians and extreme left organization against the settlements in Judea and Samaria [WB] is over today" (cited in Lis, 2018).

Another policy by which Israel managed to Judaize Jerusalem was by revoking 'Blue Haweyas' (Palestinian residency of Jerusalem). Under the pretext of security, in March 2018, the Knesset passed an amendment into Israeli Law, a 'Breach of Loyalty bill'. The amendment allows the Israeli Interior Minister to withdraw or revoke the status of any permanent resident in Israel due to perceived lack of loyalty or suspected 'terrorist activities' (Knesset, 2018; MEMO, 2018n). Typically, there is no clear definition of what terror or a breaching act is to Israel, which creates a deliberate environment of constant confusion and fear for Palestinians. Employing this state law enables Israel to revoke Palestinian residency in East Jerusalem.

Before the amendment took place, Israel was strongly active in revoking residency rights of Jerusalemites. For example, if Jerusalemites leave Jerusalem for more than seven years, their residency rights are revoked while Israeli citizens are allowed to leave indefinitely without penalty (Sherwood, 2011). Moreover, since 1995, Jerusalemites have been required to prove their 'centre of life' permanency is in East Jerusalem, or face having their residency rights revoked (Sherwood, 2011). According to Interior Ministry of Israel, between 1967 and the end of 2016, Israel revoked the status of at least 14,595 Jerusalemites (HRW, 2017). Israel justified this as failure to prove a centre of life in Jerusalem. According to Human Rights Watch (2017), revocations were also used to punish Jerusalemites accused of attacking Israelis, and as collective punishment against relatives of suspected assailants.

Regarding revoking status rights of Palestinians from the WB and Gaza; between the 1967 *Naksa War* (Setback War where Palestinians lost all what remained of their homeland to Israel) and 1994 (the year when the PA was established), Israel revoked residency of about 240,000 Palestinians (140,00 from WB and 100,000 from Gaza) (Sherwood, 2011; Eldar, 2012). Those Palestinians left Palestine to study/work abroad but have since been prohibited from returning to Palestine, effectively another Zionist policy to force Palestinians into permanent exile abroad and secure Jewish a majority in Palestine. In 2012, Haaretz journalist, Akiva Eldar (2012) argued that had Israel not followed a policy of revoking residency, WB and Gaza population would be around 10% higher, given the Palestinian population natural growth rate of about 3.3% a year in Gaza and 3% in the WB.

Paradoxically, revoking residency status/permits also includes any person who shows support for Palestinians by introducing the 'Entry into Israel' law on March 6, 2017. For example, the law "prohibits the grant of a permit for entry and residence in Israel to any person who [...] engages in a boycott against the State of Israel" (cited in Levush, 2017). In July 2018, Ariel Gold, an American activist, was deported to the US over links to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement (MEMO, 2018b). Julie Shayna Weinberg-Connors, an American who had already obtained a temporary student resident's visa to study in Jerusalem, was denied entry in 2018 on the basis that she had previously visited and supported Palestinians in the WB facing house demolition (Hass, 2018; Memo, 2018a).

In addition to Israeli military policing of Palestinians, settlers also practice self-appointed policing of Jerusalemites. Settlers in East Jerusalem give themselves the right to inspect tax records of Palestinian shops or file demolition cases against Palestinian structures (OCHA, 2018d). This coercive environment, generated by settlement-related violence/violation, house demolition, evictions, detention, and concerns over the safety

of children, have pushed some Jerusalemites to move to other areas. The local committee estimates that at least 30 households moved from Batan-Al-Hawa in 2017, and another seven left in 2018 (OCHA, 2018d).

The wall has increased settlement-related violations against Jerusalemites. According to (Ahituv, 2018) about 65,000 Palestinians cross-checkpoints in the wall every day to get to Jerusalem. This is because the wall passes through 220 Kilometres of Jerusalem land and divides the city into three areas: inside the wall 20,0000 Palestinians; outside the wall 80,000 Palestinians who have Jerusalem identity, but still have to cross checkpoints to get to the city; and about 120,000 Palestinians outside the wall in surrounding villages, but with no Jerusalem identity, and no access to Jerusalem (Zahalka, 2010). For example, residents of Sho'fat, Kalandia, Al-Ram and Kafr-'Aqab carry blue IDs, and are considered Jerusalem residents. However, the wall separates them from the rest of Jerusalem, thus, to enter Jerusalem residents are compelled to navigate checkpoints. About 90,000 Jerusalemites, constituting about one third of Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem, live in neighbourhoods left on the wrong side of the wall (Ahituv, 2018). In a more blatant Zionist declaration against Palestinian neighbourhoods of Jerusalem outside the wall, Yakir Segev, who holds the East Jerusalem portfolio in Jerusalem municipality, declared that they do not belong to Jerusalem (Hasson, 2010).

Israel follows what serves its political Zionist agenda in Jerusalem. Following Clinton's suggestion in Taba peace talks 2001: "what is Jewish is for Israel, and what is Arab is for Palestinians" (Zahalka, 2010), Israel only applied the first part of Clinton's suggestion, which was that Israel sovereignty should be over Jewish neighbourhoods (Eldar, 2002). Subsequently, Zionists created and fabricated Jewish facts within East Jerusalem in order to later claim them as Jewish (Zahalka, 2010).

A key part of Zionist fabricated facts on the ground of historic Jerusalem was the establishment of planning committees to oversee transformation of Palestinian sites into Jewish ones (Mabon, 2017). Israel was careful in the aftermath of the 1967 *Naksa* War in erasing the Palestinian Arab/Islamic identity of Jerusalem and displacing its people. For example, after seizing the Old City of Jerusalem from Jordan, Zionists erased the entire 770-year-old *Maghriba* Quarter neighbourhood to widen access to what the Jewish people call the Western Wall, (known to Muslims as the Al-Buraq Wall) (Mabon, 2017; Tahhan, 2018). Approximately 100 Palestinian families living in the quarter were ordered to evacuate their homes and the neighbourhood was bombed and completely demolished. The space was used by Israel to build the "Western Wall Plaza", an area that granted Jews direct access to the Wall (Tahhan, 2018). That year, around 70,000 Jerusalemites were displaced, including those outside the city and prevented from returning (LRC, 2018).

As a regular pattern, Zionists knew well how to utilize previous British building legislation to Judaize the city. In Jerusalem for example, in order to hide any possible differences between newly Israeli fabricated structures and the rest of historic Jerusalem Israeli planning committees applied British construction legislation, which allows that only '*Al-Hajar-Al-Qudsi*' (Jerusalem stone) can be used for building (Mabon, 2017). In addition to Zionist attempts to steal original stones (MEMO, 2017) from the Old City walls, fabricate Jewish symbols onto these stones and plant them in Palestinian areas in Eastern Jerusalem in order to erase Palestinian ownership of these places and to claim them later as Jewish.

Aljazeera Arabic documentary film (Aljazeera, 2018a) shows in evidential terms with official documents and eye witnesses how Israel managed to convert Jerusalem houses into Israeli ownership by using Arab mediators, to deceive Palestinians into thinking they were selling to Arabs, while in fact they were selling to Israelis. This urban transformation is a key part of current political life in Jerusalem where Stars of David are used to signify Jewish ownership (Mabon, 2017). Israel also used British emergency Laws of 1949 to justify destruction of Palestinian houses as collective punishment for Palestinians and also to eliminate these houses and Judaize Palestinian land. In 2002 interview with 'Democracy Now' channel (Goodman, 2002), leading former Knesset member head of the left Zionist party Meretz, Sholamit Aloni, said Israelis, as occupiers of Palestine, used British colonial laws in a more barbaric way against Palestinians:

We [Israeli Jews] have been occupiers oppressing Palestinians [...] we did terrible things one can't imagine [...] the destruction of houses and collective punishment are according to the British colonial laws of 1949 that we adopted (Aloni, 2002)

This distortion of the history and heritage of Jerusalem is one of the underlying Zionist policies to Judaize the city. It is what Raymond Baker, Shereen Ismael, and Tareq Ismael (2009) call 'cultural cleansing', where cultural consequences of a conflict affect heritage and identity. Glenn Perry (2010, p. 60) explained:

Cultural cleansing has served through history as a means of domination. Indeed, it is one species of the broader genus of ethnic cleansing. It comes in many varieties, ranging from destruction of monuments to the eradication of mother tongue, but it always aims at destroying people's memory and identity.

Cultural cleansing was and still is carefully planned and used by Israel as a means of domination to Judaize Palestine, and destroy Palestinian identity, memory and ownership. Zionist efforts to erase the culture and history of Jerusalem is aimed at not only destroying the collective historical memory of Jerusalemites, but also to erase western international recognition of Jerusalem as a Palestinian Arabic/Islamic city.

Moreover, archaeology and tourism government institutions and private settler organizations extended their domestic law to Palestinian historic sites in East Jerusalem and declared the majority of discovered and undiscovered artefacts as Israeli property (UNESCWA, 2018). Further, Israel uses 'touristic settlements' in Judaizing Jerusalem and erasing its Arab/Islamic identity. A leaked report in 2018 from EU Heads of Mission in Jerusalem warned about a "narrative based on historic continuity of a Jewish presence in the area at the expense of other religions and cultures" (Holmes, 2018a). For example, Israel promotes tours in historic sites in Silwan using a Jewish narrative, detaching the place from its Palestinian surroundings (see Ch5) of approximately 10,000 Palestinians (Holmes, 2018a).

Another government-funded project, about 130 metres from Al-Aqsa Mosque, aims to turn the world heritage site of Jerusalem into an Israeli commercial theme park, while local Palestinian residents are totally absent from the narrative presented to visitors (Holmes, 2018a). A cable car project is expected to be operational in 2020 to link West and East Jerusalem but serves only the Israeli population and visiting tourists. This touristic settlement project aims to transport more than 3,000 people per hour and will effectively act as a tool to Judaize Jerusalem (Cook, 2019b; MEMO, 2019b).

Judaizing Jerusalem with all means possible, could not take place without significant support of the American administrations, specifically, the current Trump administration. Trump's support encouraged Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu and his government to believe they could continue the grabbing of East Jerusalem with legitimacy. That 'legitimacy' led Shabtai Shavit, (2018) former chief of Israeli espionage agency (Mossad), to consider Trump as a dangerous mistake in the Middle East due to his incoherent policies (Shavit, 2018). In an interview with the Israeli daily *Maariv* newspaper on June 2019, Shavit criticised the Netanyahu leadership which believes it can overrun the Palestinian side (MEMO, 2019c; PPost24, 2019). He argues that Trump's support allowed the unethical leadership of Netanyahu (Haaretz, 2019a; Staff, 2019a), to believe the strong can dominate the weak (PPost24, 2019).

3.4 Judaizing Jerusalem with the support of Trump's administration

Despite all Zionist violations over East Jerusalem and its people Washington does not look like it would stand in their way. On the contrary, Trump's administration has normalised these violations, especially the annexation policies. In April 2019 for example, the Trump administration offered Netanyahu a campaign boost by recognising Israel's illegal annexation and sovereignty over of the Golan Heights, territory Israel seized from Syria in 1967 (Badie, 2019; Laub, 2019). David Friedman, US ambassador

to Israel, offered a similar election boost in June 2019, claiming that Israel was “on the side of God”, implying that Palestinians were not (cited in Alaraby, 2019; The New York Times, 2019). Friedman attended the 30th of June 2019 ceremony inaugurating a settler archaeological tunnel project, ‘Path of the Pilgrims’, running under the streets and homes on Palestinian land at Silwan (Hasson, 2011). Friedman, along with other Zionist figures, including Sarah, Netanyahu’s wife, symbolically broke open the new tunnel with a small hammer (Hasson, 2019e).

Friedman’s act was criticised by Palestinians as another blatant move by the Trump administration to recognize Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem. A move that would give the green light to more incursions by right-wing Zionists into the Al-Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem, further inflaming tension in the region (Arafah, 2017). In response, Friedman confirmed again that what happened was due to Israel’s “inalienable rights endowed by our creator”, and that “they are gifts and entitlements granted by God” (cited in Hasson, 2019e). Jason Greenblatt, US envoy to the Middle East, described the Palestinian criticism as “Ludicrous” as no one can Judaize what history already did:

The Palestinian Authority claims our attendance at this historic event supports the Judaization of Jerusalem and is an act of hostility against Palestinians. Ludicrous, we can’t Judaize what history/archaeology show (cited in Hasson, 2019e).

US support for the Zionist project of Judaizing Jerusalem reached its peak after Trump took Jerusalem off the negotiating table when he declared in January 2018, “By taking Jerusalem off the table I wanted to make it clear that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel” (cited in Aljazeera 2018b). Trump then declared Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the Jewish state, in December 2017 (MATÉ, 2017). He further decided to move the American embassy to Jerusalem, which took place on the 14th of May 20018. The opening ceremony of the American embassy in Jerusalem coincided with the 70th anniversary of the Palestinian ‘*Nakba*’ on 14th May 2018 (Holmes, 2018b; MEMO 2018s. So, what was a catastrophe-commemoration day for Palestinians, which refers to their mass exodus, loss of rights and loss of land, was an additional notable political gain for colonialism in Palestine with the blessing of the US Administration. Ahead of the opening day, Trump’s daughter and advisor, Ivanka, wrote on her Facebook (Trump, 2018):

I am honoured to join [...] this momentous ceremony commemorating the opening of our new US Embassy in Jerusalem, Israel. We look forward to celebrating Israel’s 70th anniversary [...] will pray for the boundless potential for the future of the US-Israel alliance

Yet, Daniel Shapiro, a scholar at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a former US ambassador to Israel was not satisfied with Trump’s process of support,

which he called “clumsy” (Borger & Beaumont, 2017). For him, “a better prepared, less clumsy process could have produced an announcement to actually move the embassy to Jerusalem, which is where it belongs” (cited in Borger & Beaumont, 2017). Internationally, Trump’s decision was met with near unanimous condemnation from the international community, international leaders and with the UN General Assembly voting to reject the move (MEMO, 2018p). In response, President Mahmoud Abbas said, “no measure or decision can change the Arab[ic] identity of Jerusalem” (Palestineun, 2017). Abbas’s spokesman, Nabil Abu Redayneh, warned of the dangers of such a decision to Middle East peace efforts as well as security and stability in the region and the world. The senior Palestinian official in Washington, Nasser Qudwa, stated that unilaterally recognising Jerusalem as the capital would be in breach of international law, and that Palestinians would seek to challenge the move at the UN Security Council (Borger & Beaumont, 2017).

Trump’s physical steps towards Judaizing Jerusalem were not that much of a shock to Palestinians. Trump’s decision actually fulfils a campaign promise made in 2016. It also pleases Republican conservatives and evangelicals who make up a sizeable portion of his domestic support (Holland & Lubell, 2017). American support for Israel goes back to June 1967 war, when US shifted the balance of power in the region in favour of Zionists, and cemented its role as the main backer of Israel on the international stage (MEMO, 2018r). The decision further was followed by a series of quick, unpredictable administration decisions; closing the Palestinian mission in Washington and systematically eliminating virtually every form of U.S. economic and humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, both inside and outside the occupied territories (Elgindy, 2019). For example, in 2018 Trump decided to cut-off the yearly donation of \$360 million that the US was providing to the United Nations for Rehabilitation and Working Agency (UNRWA) (MEMO, 2018p; Baker & Landler, 2019). Trump’s pretext for the cut, according to his Twitter site (2018) on January 2018, was due to lack of appreciation or respect from Palestinians when he tweeted: “we pay the Palestinians HUNDRED OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS a year and get no appreciation or respect”.

Trump’s decision was a political move to put a huge financial burden on the PA, resulting in an economic crisis in the WB. Thus, the PA accepts under force, the suggested so-called economic peace ‘Deal of the Century’. An economic deal developed by Kushner, Trump’s son in law, and Greenblatt, Trump’s special representative for negotiations. It aims to raise tens of billions of dollars in pledges from Arab, European, and Asian countries to help boost the Palestinian economy (Elgindy, 2019; Baker & Landler, 2019) in return of Palestinian submission to Israel. The deal shows full commitment to Israel’s survival and supremacy of the continued rapid march of a Greater Zionist Project in

Palestine. It intentionally ignored any mention of Israeli occupation of Palestine or the political rights of Palestinians including the right of return (Ramini, 2019). For the last quarter-century, under presidents of both political parties, America has never sought any deal that involves the creation of a Palestinian state (Baker & Landler, 2019).

Trump's economic approach to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not new to US intervention history. Former Presidents, from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, also tried to promote economic development and quality of life for Palestinians without directly challenging Israeli occupation (Khalidi, 2013). Moreover, the idea that a so-called economic peace could be a substitute for a meaningful political horizon has simply never panned out (Elgindy, 2019).

By focusing on economics, Trump's administration has fundamentally and intentionally ignored the problem. Numerous United Nations (OCHA, 2018a; UNCTAD, 2018) and other reports (Miles, 2018), have found, the greatest obstacles to Palestinian economic growth are restrictions imposed by Israeli occupation in the WB and its on-going siege of the Gaza Strip. For example, in 2018, there were over 700 road obstacles controlling Palestinian movement in the WB (OCHA, 2018a). The United Nations trade and development (UNCTAD) Deputy Secretary-General, Isabelle Durant, said, "every year the situation becomes more and more unacceptable and difficult" (UNCTAD, 2018). Mahmoud Elkhafif, coordinator of 2018 UNCTAD report stated that unemployment in the Palestinian territories was the highest in the world in 2017, at 27.4%, while agricultural production fell by 11% (Miles, 2018). For Elkhafif, the major reason for this "dark situation from the economic development point of view" is because:

A set of Israeli restrictions [...]. These measures include permit systems for Palestinians to work in Israel, you have road blocks, you have earth mounds, trenches, road check points, gates and separation barriers (UNCTAD, 2018)

In other words, what Palestinians lack is not funding, but freedom (Elgindy, 2019). Thus, it is clear what the deal is; it is about buying Palestinian surrender, to force them to give up hope of achieving any just cause. Indeed, billions of dollars are available in exchange for Palestinian "surrender", a term used by Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Danny Danon, when he published his article in the New York Times on 24 June 2019 (Danon, 2019). Danon's articles came out one day before the 'Mannama Peace to Prosperity' workshop in Bahrain, with the support of all Arab countries except Iraq, Lebanon, and Kuwait, to support Deal of the Century and promote investment in the WB and Gaza Strip (Elgindy, 2019; Baker & Landler, 2019).

Palestinians refused the deal. Abbas, in response, criticised Trump's policies by saying "shame on you" (cited in Mortimer, 2018), and that "Jerusalem is not for sale" (cited in Aljazeera, 2018b; Casey, 2018). Veterans of past negotiations have expressed deep

scepticism that Trump's effort will gain traction where previous efforts failed (Baker & Landler, 2019). Aaron David Miller for example, a former Middle East negotiator under Republican and Democratic presidents, warned from losing instead of gaining by sequencing a plan that sets "the proverbial cart before the horse":

What makes any plan attractive is the package, and where are they on statehood and Jerusalem? They can now delay that, having thrown up economic chaff (cited in Baker & Landler, 2019)

Trump's administration has long tried to undermine the importance of Israel-Palestinian conflict in the region. Greenblatt, in justifying US biased policies that favour Israelis, the policies are due to a lack of willingness on the part of Palestinians to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Also due to the PA position, that refuses to engage with the US, after Trump decided to "recognize the reality that Jerusalem has been, and will remain, the capital of Israel" (MEMO, 2018p). Accordingly, in order to sort out Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the US claims that it "does not rely on worn [out] ideas" (cited in MEMO, 2008q) suggested from previous US administrations. The US came with the so called 'Deal of the Century', as it reflects Trump and his administration business mentality that believes money can fix everything and therefore this 'economic deal' is efficient to end Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Trump's administration support to Israel intensified following Netanyahu's pledge during his campaign for re-election back in April 2019, of his intention to annex large parts of the WB (Young, 2019). Friedman in this regard supported Netanyahu by saying that Israel "has the right to retain some, but unlikely all, of the WB" (The National, 2019a; 2019b). This clearly suggests that Trump's administration will not object to any Israeli moves towards future annexation of the WB. In fact, Friedman's statement not only reflects his administration overlooking illegal mushrooming of settlements in the WB for the past decade, but also a willing position to bless the idea of annexation (The National, 2019b).

Development in US support led analyst Amos Harel, a veteran military analyst, to warn that Netanyahu might decide words are no longer enough to win the coming election on September 2019; thus, action is needed (Young, 2019). Possibly, in the form of an announcement on the eve of the election to the effect that as much as two-thirds of the WB will be annexed (Cook, 2019a). On July 2019, UN's special rapporteur for human rights in Palestinian territory, Michael Lynk, warned that Israel is moving much more rapidly towards annexing parts of the WB and tough rhetoric from Israeli politicians could presage a "dramatic" step in coming months (Reinl, 2019).

A number of US Democratic candidates have strongly criticized Netanyahu's policies against Palestinians. For example, Bernie Sanders, implied he would cut military aid to

Israel if they didn't "respect" the Palestinians (cited in Arria, 2019). Also, Pete Buttigieg said he wouldn't supply Netanyahu with funding if it would be used to annex the WB (Arria, 2019). PA senior diplomat, Saeb Erekat, described Friedman as "extreme Ambassador of settlers" and stated that annexing WB can only lead to "endless conflict" (cited in The National, 2019b; Young, 2019). Mustafa Barghouti considered US support of Israel as participation in a war crime that has "eliminated any future role of Trump's administration in any so-called peace process" (cited in MATÉ, 2017).

Trump's blatant support to Israel (BBC, 2017; Tibon, 2018; Usher, 2018) gave the green light to Netanyahu to exacerbate the Judaizing of Jerusalem by passing a controversial law declaring Israel as 'a state for Jews only' and Jerusalem as 'Israel eternal capital' (Borger & Beaumont, 2017; Aljazeera, 2018c; BBC, 2018; Berger, 2018; Eglash, 2018; ITV, 2018; NAD, 2018). Israeli national law stipulates that Israel is the historic homeland of the Jewish people and their exclusive right to national self-determination. The law has far-reaching implications for Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship by withdrawing their status as citizens, and stripping Arabic of its designation as one of the two official languages in Israel (Borger & Beaumont, 2017; Aljazeera, 2018c; BBC, 2018; Berger, 2018; Eglash, 2018; ITV, 2018). Israel's Palestinian population (about 1.8 million) comprises mainly of descendants of those who remained on their land after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 (Aljazeera, 2018c). The law also reiterates the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, withdrawing Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem and cutting final opportunities for a two-state solution. Annexing settlements and East Jerusalem in the WB, making the creation of a viable Palestinian state increasingly difficult to conceive.

Equally important, is a clause which stresses the importance of encouraging, promoting and developing Jewish settlements as a national value (Aljazeera, 2018c; BBC, 2018; Beaumont, 2018; Eglash, 2018). This sets the foundation for preparing to annex these settlements to Israel, following Netanyahu's pledge during his campaign for re-election back in April 2019 (Young, 2019), and again in September 2019, to annex up to a third of the WB if he is re-elected (Bennetts & Holmes, 2019; Hoffman, et al., 2019). Annexation includes Israeli settlements in addition to the Jordan Valley and parts of the WB in what he calls a "historic opportunity from a sympathetic White House to give Israel secure, permanent borders" (Halbfinger, 2019).

This National law has been under discussion since it was first introduced in 2011 (BBC, 2018). With the growing American support, and rightest support within the Israeli Knesset and the state of Israel, the legislation in 2018 was adopted by 62 votes to 55 (Wootlife, 2018). In March 2019, the Israeli well-known actress and TV personality, Rotem Sela, criticised the law by saying: "Arabs have equal rights" (cited in Staff, 2019b). Sela's

comment caused outrage against her in Israel, and in response Netanyahu tweeted: "Israel is the Nation-state of Jews Alone" (cited in Haaretz, 2019b; Staff, 2019d). At the 73 session of the UN General Assembly, Abbas said Israel "crossed all the red lines" in passing the "racist" Jewish Nation-state law that promotes "apartheid" (Aljazeera, 2018c). Netanyahu defended the bill as a "defining moment in the annals of Zionism and the history of the state of Israel" (cited in BBC, 2018; Eglash, 2018) where an "absolute majority" of Israelis want to ensure the "state's Jewish character for generations to come" (cited in Aljazeera 2018c; Beaumont, 2018). Netanyahu also praised the Law by saying, "'120' years after Herzl made his vision known, with this law we determine the founding principle of our existence (cited in BBC, 2018; Eglash, 2018)

The Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (Adalah) called the law an attempt to advance apartheid and ethnic superiority by promoting racist policies to guarantee an exclusive ethnic-religious Jewish character of Israel (Eglash 2018; Beaumont, 2018). While Palestinian Knesset MP, Ayman Odeh, considered the law as declaring Jewish supremacy and categorizing Palestinians as second-class citizens (Beaumont, 2018). Also, Ahmed Tibi, another Palestinian Knesset MP, announced the 'death of democracy' with this law (Aljazeera, 2018c; Beaumont, 2018).

Zionist policies have turned Jerusalem into ghost city whereas previously it was a thriving urban, cultural and commercial Palestinian centre for Palestinians from all parts of the WB and Israel (Holmes, 2018a). Moreover, in the wake of construction of the wall, access to Jerusalem became more difficult, and commercial activity in the eastern section of the city declined (NAD, 2018). Some 5,000 small businesses in East Jerusalem closed for lack of customers. In 2018, the poverty rate in Jerusalem was 46% compared to the national average (Hasson, 2018b). 60% of Palestinians lived below the poverty line before the wall, but subsequently rose to 80% after the wall (Ahituv, 2018), where it remains currently.

Jerusalem reflects the complex web of Zionist pretexts and efforts to seize land. However, other cities in WB are not far from this Zionist web. Closed military zones currently cover a third of the WB; firing ranges impact on 38 Palestinian communities; nature reserves annexed 6% of the land; nearly a quarter has been declared Israeli 'state' land; some 250 settlements have been newly established; dozens of permanent checkpoints control and survey movement; and hundreds of kilometres of walls and fences have been completed. Moreover, Israel currently has over 500 settlements across the WB, inhabited by approximately one million settlers (The Palestine Chronicle, 2019b). Many of these settlements have grown into 'settlement blocs', which extend far beyond the Green Line and cut deep into the WB, engulfing land on which any future

Palestinian state is supposed to be built. According to the UN investigator, Michael Link, Israel has:

Already crossed the bright red line into illegality [...] the whole point of putting settlers on occupied territory is to make those facts irreversible and to establish, with each new settlement unit, another drip of the sovereignty claim (cited in Reinl, 2019)

Paradoxically, on a talk in Jerusalem in June 2019, top envoy to US President Trump, Jason Greenblatt, linked the success of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks with recognising these settlements, which he prefers to call “neighbourhoods and cities” (The Palestine Chronicle, 2019b). ‘Conquer and Divide’ is an online joint project of B’Tselem (Israeli human rights group), and Forensic Architecture, (a London-based team that uses new technology to visualise and map political violence and environmental destruction) (B’Tselem, 2018). The project reveals how Israel managed to divide and destroy Palestinian fabric:

[Israel] torn apart Palestinian space; divided the Palestinian population into dozens of disconnected enclaves; and unravelled its social, cultural and economic fabric (Cook, 2019a)

Conquer and Divide project shows maps, which prove beyond doubt, that Zionist colonisation of the WB was never accidental, defensive or reluctant as Israel claims. It was coldly calculated and carefully planned as a weapon, along with increasingly draconian movement restrictions, to force Palestinians to submit, to surrender and as Danoni stated to give up hope (Cook, 2019a). The wall in the WB is another Zionist tool used to force Palestinians to lose all hope and submit to Zionist power in Palestine. This is examined in the following chapter.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter highlights how the contemporary Zionist project in Palestine is still careful to follow Zangwill’s rhetoric a land without people for people without a land. The chapter shows how Zionists are still careful to secure two elements for survival of their project; protecting on-going expansion of the Zionist project in Palestine and protecting a demographic Jewish majority within the expanded borders of this project by establishing massive Jewish neighbourhoods on the confiscated land.

Zionist demographic fears increased in 1967, when they found themselves still trying to manage the very same Palestinian refugees, who they had tried to exile in 1948. In addition, a research committee, formed by former Israeli Minister, Levi Eshkol, found that those same Palestinians would never give up their right to return. After careful planning,

Zionists applied a set of policies for exuding Palestinians, which essentially set the foundation for current cleansing policies in the WB.

The chapter uses Eastern Jerusalem as an example in order to demonstrate how Zionists use all possible means to force Palestinians to submit to Zionist power over them and over their land. It discusses policies of house demolition, land confiscation, Judaizing historical sites, building settlements and building walls. It also discusses settler related policies of suppression and dehumanising practices against Jerusalemites. The Zionist plan was to isolate Jerusalem from the rest of the WB with a chain of colonial settlements and the wall. While imposing strict policies and laws that marginalised Palestinians and favoured Israeli's to make Jerusalemites life unbearable. The restrictive discriminatory planning scheme for example, forced Jerusalemites to build without permits. Building without a permit means Jerusalemites are subject to coercive Israeli cleansing policies, such as house demolitions, fines, eviction and detention. Israel also used the pretext of nationalizing Palestinian land as public parks, which it found to be a more effective tool than building restrictions on Palestinians.

This chapter shows also that Israeli municipal policies surpassed East Jerusalem to reach areas under the PA control in the WB. The wall, which divides the city into three areas led to increased settlement-related violations against Jerusalemites; around 65,000 Palestinians cross the wall everyday to reach Jerusalem. In addition, Zionists created and fabricated Jewish facts on the historic grounds of East Jerusalem in order to claim them later as being originally Jewish.

Under the pretext of entitlements granted by 'God to Israel', and lack of Palestinian respect and appreciation, the Trump administration justified its blatant biased support for Israel. Trump's administration took Jerusalem off the negotiating table, declared Jerusalem the eternal capital of Israel, moved the US embassy to Jerusalem, normalised cleansing policies against Palestinians and imposed heavy restrictions on them to accept the biased 'Deal of the century'. A deal that offers billions of dollars in exchange for Palestinian submission. Trump's blatant support gave the green light to Netanyahu to pass controversial laws that favour Jews over Palestinians, and to declare his intention of annexing the WB. The aim of discussing Jerusalem in the chapter was to show in evidential terms strong links between Zionist policies to Judaize the land of Palestine, to force Palestinian people to lose all hope, and use of Israeli wall as another Zionist tool to achieve these aims.

This chapter shows that Israel's colonisation of the WB was never accidental, defensive or reluctant as Israel claims. Israeli past and current policies were and still are, calculated and carefully planned as weapons to force Palestinians to submit, give up all hope and surrender their national identity. The chapter also demonstrates that what has long been

understood as Israeli stealth annexation, in contemporary times, has become a blatant, rushed, violent and unpredictable race with the protection and support of the Trump administration.

Chapter 4

Route of the wall: an Israeli Zionist tool for expanding borders and annexing settlements in the West Bank

4.1 Introduction

This chapter argues that the ideology of colonialism provides a solid premise for establishment of the wall. It is an attempt to extend Israeli territory in the WB, to expand domination over Palestinians and to annex their resources. However, you cannot discuss the wall separately from Israeli settlements in the WB. For Palestinians and their supporters, the route of the wall is not solely based on considerations regarding Israeli security measures to protect its citizens from Palestinian attacks. Following Ben-Gurion's antipathy to anything Arab (Ch2) and his vision of an exclusive Jewish state of Israel (Morris, 1987; Palumbo, 1987; Khalidi, 1988; Massalha, 1997; Pappe, 1999; ICRC, 2004; MidEast, 2005; Simons, 2006). Data show that the wall is an attempt to secure an Israeli demographic majority within the new Israeli borders, represented by the wall east of as many settlements as possible in order to annex these Israeli settlements into Israel.

This chapter also argues that annexing Israeli settlements in the WB to Israel is one of the main factors determining the route of the wall inside land of the WB and its deviation from the Green Line. Grabbing Palestinian resources, land and water, in order to deprive Palestinians and supply Israeli settlements is another factor determining the route. The wall should thus be understood not simply as security for Israel, but as a dimension of colonization indicated by apartheid policies to control land and resources of Palestine.

The chapter examines facts on the ground created by the wall, by highlighting its role in facilitating the mission of a settler colonial project in the WB (Ch3 and Ch4); of establishing access and ownership over Palestinian land and water, gaining more Israeli territorial expansion and securing an Israeli demographic majority within new expanded borders. In this case, the chapter is a stepping-stone that sets the ground for following chapters which discuss the steadfastness, *sumud*, of Palestinians against the impact of the wall on their lives, spaces, and livelihoods, and the on the ground repercussions for Palestinians of the colonial project.

Links between the wall and Israeli settlements in the WB are the fundamental element in chapter debates. The chapter begins with reflection on Israeli-Palestinian debates regarding the wall, including the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A considerable amount of this chapter has been dedicated to discussing the strong association between the wall inside land of Palestinians and Israeli settlements in the

WB; this is to allow setting the foundation to support the argument that the wall is another Zionist tool to serve the ultimate Zionist Project in Palestine. The chapter uses Bethlehem to demonstrate the role of the wall as an annexing tool to facilitate and protect the expansion of the colonial project in the WB.

4.2 Israeli-Palestinian debates regarding the wall

Since 2002 the wall has triggered much controversial debate. Debate over the wall is based on three pillars; to what extent Israeli security claims for building the wall are true; the intrusive route of the wall inside Palestinian land; and the devastating impact it has on Palestinian life. This chapter focuses on the first two pillars of debates. Specifically, it explores security claims of Israel and route of the wall inside the WB. The third pillar, linked to impact of the wall (Lagerquist, 2004), has been covered throughout thesis chapters. Israeli-Palestinian debate reflects the diverse names that have been used to describe it: 'the wall', 'the barrier', 'security fence', 'ghetto wall', 'apartheid wall' and 'separation barrier' (Juma', 2003; Parry, 2017; Aarenau, 2018; Ahituv, 2018; Fisk, 2018). The title of a structure can be an indication of a political stance and a key indicator of a particular point view of a conflict.

The terms 'apartheid or segregation wall' are frequently used by those who oppose the wall, Palestinians and their supporters (Akram & Lynk, 2006; Tait, 2013), who focus on different realities; Israelis compared to those of Palestinians on the other side of the wall (Ch5). Palestinians perceive the wall as another Zionist tool serving Zionist policies which favour Israeli settlers inside Palestine. The wall represents the true face of apartheid colonialism aimed at uprooting Palestinians to secure the survival of the Zionist project. In 2004, Yaser Arafat, then Palestinian president, said, "no security and no peace can ever prevail between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples, [...] in the shadow of this [...] expansionist and racist segregation wall" (cited in Harel & Ettinger, 2004). Moreover, Arafat's senior Advisor, Nasser Kidwa, head of the Palestinian delegation to the UN, told the judicial body at the Hauge hearing, "Israel is continuously attempting to change the status, physical character, nature and demographic composition of that territory, most recently through the construction of the wall" (cited in Wallace, 2004).

The terms 'fence' or 'security barrier' are often used by Israeli officials and their supporters (Baverman, 2012), who focus on defensive purposes of the structure (HRW, 2003), underscoring that the structure is not a wall, but rather a barbed wire fence (Aarenau, 2018). For example, in the declaration of the Israeli Military Order of 2003 (Appendix B), which declared WB land between Israel's 1967 border and the wall as closed Zones, Israel described the wall as:

The obstacle [...] fences, walls and patrol paths, which are intended to prevent terror attacks and the exit of attackers from Judea and Samaria [The WB] regions into the State of Israel (cited in NAD, 2013)

According to Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) (2007; 2009), the 'fence' was intended to limit the ability of Palestinian terrorist organizations to enter Israel, and present operational obstacles making it difficult for them to carry out suicide bombing attacks within Israel. For the IMFA the construction is not a wall, but rather, a 'fence' for security reasons; to protect Israeli civilians from Palestinian bombing suicide attacks that began in 2000 (IMFA, 2004; 2009; NAD, 2005; Barak-Erez, 2006; Simons, 2006; Weizman 2007; Blank, 2011; OCHA 2011; Matar, 2012). Israeli Foreign Minister Spokesman, Gideon Meir, said in front of the Hague, "we decided we wanted [...] to send the world a message that we are the victims of terror" (cited in Wallace, 2004).

Israel deliberately used 'security' as a pretext to legitimise the wall. Israeli ministers adopted the decision for its construction as a 'security fence' on 14 April 2002, three months after George Bush, former US president, made his speech about an 'Axis of Evil' (Merand, et al., 2010). Which followed the '9/11' terrorist attacks against the USA in September 2001 (Assaf, 2008; IAGS, 2014). At that time, dramatic changes to American security took place after former president Bush launched his 'war on terror' (Merand, et al., 2010). Internationally, security concerns/fears became legitimate reasons for using state 'counter terrorism' means to defend 'homeland' and civilians. Israel knew how to utilize these concerns to justify building the wall which serves its political agenda in Palestine.

Palestinians use the term 'ghettos' (Juma', 2003) to describe impacts of the wall on their daily lives, and to stress that the wall and its associated regime of military monitored checkpoints and associated permit policies are ghettoization measures. In this regard, Arafat said:

This apartheid wall is another Berlin wall [...] aimed at swallowing 58% of our [WB] and transforming our towns and villages [...] into isolated ghettos illegally controlled by occupation settlements and prevent us from establishing our Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital (cited in Harel & Ettinger, 2004).

The term 'ghetto' has been criticized by the IMFA; by using the term, Palestinians choose to smear the name of Israel, and to manipulate a term linked to the most painful period of Jewish history, namely 'The Holocaust' (IMFA, 2004). Yet, the fundamental element in the Palestinian debate is not just the wall, but also, the route inside land of the WB to annex Palestinian land to Israel. In support of this claim, they note that only 15% of the wall coincides with the Green Line (Ch2), while the other 85% cuts into Palestinian areas (White, 2014; Parry, 2017; Ahituv, 2018). In 2004, the Permanent Observer of Palestine

to the United Nations (UN), Nasser Al-Kidwa, argued, in his presentation at the hearing before the ICJ, that if Israel needed a wall for security, it could construct it on its own land and then it is free to build “80 meters [high] rather than 8 meters, if it wished” (cited in Wallace, 2004). Further, Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (BBC, 2004), reiterated the EU position:

A country has the right to build a fence on its own territory, but we believe the route of this fence is contrary to international law (cited in Pardo & Peters, 2010, p. 27)


In their statements, Al-Kidwa and Solana, stressed the issues linked to the route of the wall rather than the wall itself, as if there is no real argument on the question of whether Israel has the right to build a wall or not. Moreover, their statements indicate they were both fine with a wall to separate the colonised and the colonialist, as long as the structure itself is on the Green Line or on the Israeli side of the Green Line (map 4.1).



United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

West Bank Barrier Route Projections

July 2010

**Area Affected**

The Barrier's total length is 707 km, more than twice the length of the 1949 Armistice Line (Green Line) between the West Bank and Israel.

The total area located between the Barrier and the Green Line is 9.4% of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and No Man's Land.

When completed, approximately 15% of the Barrier will be constructed on the Green Line or in Israel with 85% inside the West Bank.

Populations Affected

If the Barrier is completed based on the current route:

Approximately 33,000 Palestinians holding West Bank ID cards in 36 communities will be located between the Barrier and the Green Line.

The majority of Palestinians with East Jerusalem ID cards will reside between the Barrier and the Green Line. However, Palestinian communities inside the current municipal boundary, Kafr Aqab and Shufat Camp, are separated from East Jerusalem by the Barrier.

Approximately 126,000 Palestinians will be surrounded by the Barrier on three sides. These comprise 31 communities; the Biddya and Biddu areas, and the city of Qalqilya.

Approximately 28,000 Palestinians in 9 communities in the Az Zawiya and Bir Nabala Enclaves will be surrounded on four sides by the Barrier, with a tunnel or road connection to the rest of the West Bank.

Barrier Route

- Completed (434 km or 61.4%)
- - - Under construction (60 km or 8.4%)
- ... Planned (213 km or 30.1%)

Cartography and Barrier Themes: OCHA-oPt IMU
Map July 2010
Base data: MoPIC (2000) updates OCHA (2010)
Barrier data: OCHA Field work
Shaul Arieli (Council for Peace and Security) ARIJ, JRC
For comments contact <ochaopt@un.org>
Tel. +972 (02) 582-9962 <http://www.ochaopt.org>

Map 4-1:OCHA. 2010. Route of the wall. [Online]. Accessed on 15.3.2017 via:

http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_route_projection_july_2010.pdf

It is argued that the Green Line has converted actions of the Zionist ethnic cleansing of Palestine, into political gain (Ghanim, 2014). It also turned Israel, both regionally and internationally, into a state through theft and dispossession, as recognized by Professor Yehoshafat, when taking part in Jordanian talks in Rhodes stated:

Signing the agreements practically legitimized Israel's military achievements and

contributed to accepting Israel as a member of the UN, allowing it to start building its institutions and establish itself as a country (Yehoshafat cited in Ghanim, 2014, p. 485).

Critics of the wall can be found among both right and left-wing Israelis. This criticism is not related to its impact on Palestinians or because it annexes Palestinian land, but because they do not want Palestinians annexed into Israel. This reflects the political nature of Zionist mentality dominated by demographic fears (Ch2 and Ch3). It also shows that Israeli politicians are alike regarding Zionist ideology/goals and the only difference between them is in the way they express their ideology and approach their goals. Although Zionist political parties often disagree over attitudes and ideologies, they all definitely share the same Zionist aim of establishing a pure Jewish state in Palestine (Ch2).

To support their claim regarding security, in 2018 the IMFA stated that construction of the 'barrier' has resulted in a near 90% decrease in successful terror attacks from the WB (Aarenau, 2018), a line of argument often repeated by supporters of Israel, such as the Board of Deputies of British Jews (White, 2014). A great admirer of the wall is US President Donald Trump, who aims to replicate its "success" along the US border with Mexico (Kershner, 2017; Parry, 2017). In an interview with 'Fox News' in 2017, Trump appeared to be promoting Israel's wall as a model successful deterrent against unlawful entry into a country (Kershner, 2017; Parry, 2017; Staff, 2017). Trump said:

The wall is necessary [...] A wall protects [...] All you've to do is ask Israel. They were having a total disaster coming across and they had a wall. It's 99.9 percent stoppage (cited in Kershner, 2017; Parry, 2017; Staff, 2017)

In his speech to the Palestinian Central Council, in January 2018, Mahmoud Abbas, commented by saying "shame on you" for Trump's attitude towards Palestinians, and considered his policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ch3) as a "slap of the century" (cited in Aljazeera, 2018; BBC, 2018; Mortimer, 2018). Furthermore, and in criticism of Trump's assertion of the '99.9%' high stoppage efficiency of the wall, only two-thirds of the planned 815-kilometre route wall has been completed (Matar, 2012; Beinart, 2015). Trump seemed unaware of the unfinished section.

A principal at the Tantur Ecumenical Institute, a centre of theological research between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, related the efficiency of a partially completed wall "as effective as a mosquito net that covers two-thirds of you. Would you buy one to protect you?" (cited in Parry, 2017). In 2015, Peter Beinart (2015) correspondent for Haaretz argued that the wall had only worked superficially. For example, Israeli deaths from bombing attacks declined from 220 in 2002 to 15 in 2006 (IMFA, 2008). However, according to Beinart (2015), in 1999, the wall did not yet exist, and only eight Israelis had

died. The high number of attacks in 2002 was due to the Second Intifada in 2001 between Palestinians and Israelis.

The Israeli government justifies the unfinished wall as due to “budgetary concerns” (White, 2014). However, Shaul Arieli (2012), negotiator under three Israeli premiers, member of the Council for Peace and Security, co-author of ‘The Wall of Folly’, and Haaretz contributor, wrote that reasons for failure to complete the wall are due to tensions between rightist annexation plans on one hand, and limitations imposed by Americans and the Israeli High Court on the other. Israeli rightists realized that the High Court would not approve annexing the route in Palestinian areas, such as around Ariel and Qedumim settlements, referred to as ‘Fingers of the wall’ (see page 114), which are beyond the Green Line and inside WB. Deferring completion of the wall neglects the safety of Israeli citizens but, allows for the possibility to expand Jewish settlements at a future date.

Israel has 15 times more gross domestic product per capita than the Palestinian territories. According to Arieli (2012), the need for the wall is to stop the “tens of thousands of Palestinians” seeking work in Israel. Economist, Sylvia Piterman (2012), confirmed in her report ‘Invisible Prisoners, Don't Know Why, and There's Nowhere to Turn’ that the purpose behind Israeli denial of permits and restrictions on Palestinian movement is to continue and maintain the occupation. It is also a method that Haaretz correspondent, Amira Hass (2012), described as being “designed to reduce to a minimum the number of Palestinian workers in Israel, on the way to completing the policy of demographic separation”.

Depending on the season, up to 60,000 Palestinians without work permits find a way through and around the wall every year (Kershner, 2017). Estimates vary widely on the number of illegal Palestinian workers. According to Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, 30,000 is a reasonable estimate; a figure supported by Israeli workers’ advocacy group ‘Kav-LaOved’ (Zitun, 2014). Nitzan Nuriel, a retired Israeli brigadier general and former head of the prime Minister’s Counterterrorism Bureau, said 60,000 is closer (Kershner, 2017). Sources within Israel’s ‘defence establishment’ estimate that around 6,000 Palestinians cross through gaps in the wall every month (Zitun, 2014). Israeli Police spokesman, Mr. Rosenfeld, stated that hundreds of illegal Palestinian workers are picked up each week (Glanz & Nazzal, 2016). Whether they cross the wall legally or through local smugglers who charge several hundred shekels per person (Glanz & Nazzal, 2016), Palestinians need work and Israel needs workers. Thus, Palestinians are punished for supplying their labour. Palestinians Lieutenant Colonel Eli Jeno, of the Givati Brigade, indicated that infiltrators are in search of employment; “when an infiltrator is caught, he is released

shortly, unless he is caught a third time, in which case penalties are hardly deterring" however, "we faced seven incidents in which we were forced to shoot in the direction of Palestinians who tried to sabotage the fence" (cited in Zitun, 2014).

Professor of economics, Mushtaq Khan (2004, p. 49), noted that, contrary to requirements of furthering economic integration, as written into the Oslo agreement, only unskilled labour could find employment in Israel and could be terminated at short notice without significant cost to the Israeli economy. This exacerbates the vulnerability of Palestinian labour. Israel rapidly institutionalized the so claimed temporary system of checkpoints and closed 'Seam Areas' to restrict movements of goods and isolate Palestinians (Khan, 2004). He further noted (2004, pp. 49-50), that in addition to formalizing and intensifying existing methods of Zionist control over Palestinians, specifically labour in Israel, "Israel [also] established extensive controls over Palestinian trade and diplomatic relationships with the outside world, as part of the Oslo Agreements". This condition resulted in underdevelopment of the Palestinian economy (Roy, 2001).

Between October 2015 to February 2016, the 21 Palestinians who attacked Israelis according to Shin Bet, Israel's internal security agency, were already in Israel illegally (Glanz & Nazzal, 2016). Yuval Diskin, head of Shin Bet in 2009, indicated that the wall didn't need to be completed as Israeli military intelligence was sufficiently robust to frustrate any Palestinian attacks from the WB (Glanz & Nazzal, 2016). However, in defence of the wall, in 2012, IDF commander of the Paratroop Brigade, Amir Baram, told Haaretz "before the fence there was no efficient defence" (cited in Issacharoff & Harel, 2012). He further added that despite the IDF getting information from Israeli General Security Services (GSS) that a Palestinian suicide bomber was on the way, all what they were able to do was place soldiers on the road as "there wasn't much we could do [...] other than place soldiers on the road [...] and hoped for the best" (cited in Issacharoff & Harel, 2012).

Israel insists on highlighting the dramatic decrease in the number of suicide attacks that have occurred in Israel since the wall was first approved (Ahituv, 2018). On their website in 2008, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA, 2008) showed a graph (figure 4.1) demonstrating a decrease in Palestinian attacks after the building of the wall. While the death rate inside Israel was 220 deaths in 2002 due to 55 suicide attacks, it had declined to three by 2007 due to one suicide attack (IMFA, 2008). Human activist and columnist, Ben White (2014) states, using Israeli government and UN data, that in mid-2003, the wall was only 20% complete, and by mid-2006 had only reached 50% completion. The question remains, how can a wall whose route was never more than half finished and

crossed routinely by hundreds of Palestinians every week, be solely responsible for the almost total decrease in suicide bomb attacks?




Figure 4-1:IMFA, 2008. Suicide bombing attacks in Israel 2000-2007. [Online]. Accessed on 3.11.2018 via: https://mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graphics/MFA%20Gallery/2008/6/suicideattacks2000-7.jpg

Many analysts, including Israeli Geo-demographer, Shaul Arieli (2012), and human rights lawyer Michael Sfard (2018), maintain that while the wall has had a part to play in making these attacks more difficult, the decline in attacks has been due to a combination of several factors: the blow dealt to terror organizations in Israel Operation Defensive Shield in 2002; closer cooperation with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in security-related matters; and improved intelligence activity by Israel (Ahituv, 2018). In January 2006, Israel's intelligence agency (*Shin-Bet*), reported that the steep drop in attacks in 2005 was not due to the wall as much as to a tactical decision by Hamas and other Palestinian political organisations to suspend these attacks, focusing instead on imminent Palestinian parliamentary elections (Parry, 2017).

Indeed, a pervasive Israeli security intelligence network and military presence on the ground inside the WB exists, where Israeli military still operates on the other side of the wall, carrying out nightly raids on Palestinian towns, villages and refugee camps to arrest people suspected of being militants. In tandem with complicit PA 'security cooperation', this has played, a major role in reducing Palestinian attacks on Israel, noting the PA has a major interest in suppressing Hamas and other militants in the WB and preventing attacks against Israel (Kershner, 2017; Parry, 2017). Marwan Barghouti, one of the

mobilisers of the Second Intifada, and considered to be the designated successor to current Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, spoke out from his prison cell, where he is serving five life terms, to demand an end to security and economic coordination with Israel, as well as all forms of normalization with Israeli colonialism (Issacharoff & Harel, 2012). A demand that the PA tended to ignore by keeping tight security cooperation with the colonial side despite violations. The ICJ released an advisory opinion in regard to Israeli violations, specifically, the wall discussed below.

4.3 Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

Palestinians insist that the wall violates International Human Rights Law (IHRL). The wall is contrary to the Geneva Conventions (GC) of 1949, including the Fourth GC that covers responsibilities of an occupying power towards civilians under occupation, and violates International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that is part of the Hague Convention of 1907 (ICRC, 2004; Akram & Lynk, 2006; OHCHR, 2017). IHL protocols apply during armed conflict; they cover the treatment of civilians in time of war and contain provisions for the administration of occupied territories. According to IHL, the WB and East Jerusalem are considered as Palestinian Occupied Territories 'OPTs' that should be subject to special terms of IHL rules, and Israel as an occupying power should comply with a series of obligations towards these territories under its control (ICRC, 2004). Article 46 of the IHL for example, forbids the confiscation of private property. Article 47, forbids changes of status of the occupied territory to the detriment of protected persons, and Article 49 forbids causing individual or mass forcible transfers or deportations (Akram & Lynk, 2006).

In December 2003, UN General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the ICJ to render an advisory opinion regarding legal consequences arising from construction of the wall in the WB, including in and around East Jerusalem. Israeli authorities opposed the resolution claiming that of the 191 UN members 90 members of who Israel described as "undemocratic states", adopted this resolution in order to back the Arab campaign against Israel in the UN (IMFA, 2004).

On 9 July 2004, ICJ, the most senior legal body and the principal judicial organ of the UN rendered an advisory opinion that does not recognize the wall's legality and stated that construction of a wall within the WB, together with the associated regime of checkpoints, violate international law (Benn, 2004; ICJ, 2004; The Electronic Intifada, 2004; Akram & Lynk, 2006; World Bank, 2007; OCHA, 2011; 2014; Kershner, 2017; Parry, 2017; Ahituv, 2018). Further, ICJ stated that the wall violates Israel's obligations as an occupying power and is contrary to the GC. Consequently, the ICJ demanded that Israel, under its obligation as an occupying power, immediately terminate its breaches of IHL, including illegal settlements and permit regime (ICJ, 2004; OCHA, 2007; 2011;

2014a; OHCHR, 2017). The ICJ concluded that Israel should cease construction of the wall in the WB; dismantle sections already completed; cancel all legislative and regulatory acts relating to the wall and pay compensation to Palestinians who have been adversely affected by its construction (ICJ, 2004; McGreal, 2004; Ahituv, 2018). The Court also obligated UN member states to ensure Israel's compliance with international law (ICJ, 2004; OCHA, 2007; 2011; 2012; 2014a; B'Tselem, 2009; 2010; 2012; Feron, 2009; OHCHR, 2017).

In the aftermath of the ICJ ruling, the majority of UN member states voted overwhelmingly (150 against 6) for UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/15, calling on Israel to comply with ICJ opinion (ICRC, 2004; OCHA, 2007; 2014a; OHCHR, 2017). Former Palestinian president, Yasser Arafat, considered the decision as "a victory for the Palestinian people" (cited in McGreal, 2004). Arafat's senior adviser, Nabil Abu Rdainah, commented "as of today, Israel should be viewed as an outlaw state" and requested "the UN general assembly and security council to adopt resolutions to isolate and punish Israel"(cited in Taylor, 2004). Israel in turn criticised the ICJ and UN positions. Israeli Foreign Minister, Silvan Shalom, demanded a 'more balanced' position towards Israel (Black, 2003). Ariel Sharon, then Israel's Prime Minister and his Likud government said such position "stems from a new type of anti-Semitism that effectively denies Israel's birthright to exist" (cited in Black, 2003). He also demoted the ICJ opinion as having no jurisdiction over matters of national security (Wallace, 2004). Yosef Lapid, Justice Minister, challenged ICJ judges and doubted their liability:

We will abide by the ruling of our own high court, and not the panel in The Hague with judges from the European Union who are suspected of not being particularly disposed toward Israel (cited in Taylor, 2004)

Israeli courts have also dealt with the issue of the wall on many occasions. Their judgements have never taken the form of rulings against the wall; they have given ineffective expression to the view of some segments of its route as being disproportionate (Ahituv, 2018; Green, 2018). In a precedent-setting case, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the wall could be built inside the WB and that protection of Israeli settlers and settlements were legitimate security interests of Israel which could be factored into decisions about the route. The Court did state, however, that security requirements would need to be balanced against hardship caused to Palestinian residents of the WB in determining the route (World Bank, 2007).

Despite anti-wall discourse and criticism, Israeli authorities commenced construction of the wall and further announced plans to shift its route further into the WB in order to include Israeli settlements (Lein & Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005; World Bank, 2007). The wall raised further controversial debate on both sides of the conflict. A fundamental element

was and still is, the tight links between the route inside the WB and Israeli settlements, discussed in the following sections.

4.4 The wall: A tool for colonial protection of the demographic hegemony of a Zionist settler project in the WB

For Palestinians and their supporters, the wall is not based on considerations of Israeli security measures to protect its citizens from Palestinian attacks. Palestinians argue that the wall maintains an underlying demographic purpose (Ch2 and Ch3). In 2010, Jerusalem municipality official, Yakir Segev, publicly stated that the wall is “built for political and demographic reasons and not just security concerns” (cited in *The Electronic Intifada*, 2014). Further, Danny Tirza, an Israeli army colonel, who took part in planning the route was himself a settler living in an illegal settlement in the WB, later admitted that “the main thing” the Israeli government told him when giving him the job “was to include as many Israelis inside the “fence” and leave as many Palestinians outside” (cited in *The Electronic Intifada*, 2014).

In September 2000, seven government committees and five cabinet decisions called for construction of a ‘barrier’ ‘fence’ to separate Israel from the WB following the beginning the Second Intifada (Hass, 2012). Yet, right-wing ministers and their supporters were not keen to build a structure that might be construed as a future Israeli-Palestinian border, which might leave Israeli settlements abandoned on Palestinian land (BBC, 2005). In 2001, Ilan Tsi'on, co-founded “A Fence for Life”, an Israeli movement that supported a barrier which would not serve as a political border but rather as a security measure. He stated that while Palestinians and their supporters demanded that the fence be built on the Green Line, the main concerns in Israel were with just how much WB land the route could annex (Matar, 2012).

For example, Minister of Tourism, Uzi Landau, wanted the fence to run as close to the Green Line as possible, exclude as many Palestinians as possible. Minister of Finance, Dan Meridor, wanted the fence to run as far east as possible, to include as many Jews as possible (Eldar, 2003). Further, the Israeli government was split over the political implications between those who opposed the fence, fearing that all parts left outside would ultimately be handed over to Palestinians, and those who supported a ‘fence’ deep inside Palestinian land, to increase annexation. In this regard Ilan Tsi'on, explained:

If it was built unilaterally on the Green Line, we [Israelis] would never be offered peace by the Palestinians, who would have felt they had already won. The more land you keep between the fence and the Green Line, the more you can negotiate later (cited in Matar, 2012)


Ariel Sharon, tried by every possible means to prevent the construction of a wall in Jerusalem (Ahituv, 2018). Sharon's objection only evaporated because the wall was not being built on Israel's Green Line boundary but snakes several kilometres into the WB to annex settlements to Israel (BBC, 2005). Israeli Office of the State Attorney has noted that in some cases expansion of settlements was taken into account in planning the route of sections of the wall, and he further stated that part of the route was planned with the aim of providing protection for Israeli settlers (World Bank, 2007). Sharon was reluctant to put down any marker that could be interpreted as a future border between Israel and the territories it 'won' in the 1967 War, but which are claimed by Palestinians for an independent state. After the particularly bloody month of March 2002 (Second Intifada), in which 130 Israelis were killed, the Israeli military re-entered the major Palestinian cities of the WB, which it had evacuated under the peace accords of the 1990s (Kershner, 2017). At the same time, Sharon gave in to mounting experts and popular pressure that viewed the wall as a security essential (cited Hass, 2012). In this regard, Shaul Arieli, (2012) wrote on the power of the Israeli public in determining the building of a wall, despite all opposition:

We have learned that the Israeli public had enough power to determine that a barrier must be built, despite the firm opposition on the part of the country's leaders at the time: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Defence Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer and IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz and his deputy Moshe Ya'alon, along with settler leaders and their representatives in the Knesset

He criticised repeated modifications to the route;

We have learned that all the Israeli governments since Sharon's have been inclined to revise the barrier's route on the basis of political considerations that take the needs of settlements into account, considerations that are alien to real security needs (Arieli, 2012)

Criticism, such as Arieli's, feeds into Palestinian criticism; rerouting the wall to annex Israeli settlements. This argument is evident when observing repeated modifications and the continuous 'elasticity' of the route inside the WB, either prior to or during implementation (Weizman, 2007) (Map 4.2). For example, in the first plans the settlement of "Alfe Menashe" was east of the wall. However, according to Israeli NGOs: Information Centre for Human Rights 'B'Tselem' and the Israeli Planners for Planning Rights 'BimKom', after a visit in 2002, Sharon changed the route, so that the settlement would lie west of the wall (Lein & Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005).




Map 4-2: The revision of the wall-route. [Online]. Accessed on 15.3.2017 via:

http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_wb_barrier_july_2009_excerpts_english.pdf

In February 2003, the Yesha settler's council announced its proposal to make modifications to the route in order to annex additional Israeli settlement blocs in the WB. Therefore, the route was moved east, up to 16km inside the WB, in order to annex settlements such as: Ariel, Immanuel and Kedumim. Consequently, another 13 settlements: Atarot, Gilo, Givat-Ze'ev, Giv'on-Hakhadasha, Har-Adar, Har-Khoma, Kfar-Adumim, Ma'ale-Adumim, Mishor-Adumim, Neve-Ya'akov, Pissgat-Ze'ev, Ramot-Alon and Talpiot-Mizra'h, lie on the western side of the wall. Highways connect these settlements, mainly 'Highway 45', which is a major connection between Greater Tel-Aviv,

and Greater Jerusalem, in contrast to the isolated Palestinian eastern side of the wall (PALDIS, 2003; NAD, 2005; Hever, 2007) (Map 4.3).




Map 4-3:NAD. 2015. Israel's wall and settlements. [Online]. Accessed on 12.6.2017 via:
<https://www.nad.ps/en/publication-resources/maps>

Other evidence of rerouting the wall in order to facilitate further expansion is a modification made to the master plan affecting the natural connection Qalqiliya city, and the rest of WB. This connection was cut off and replaced by construction of the most

intrusive route to include Ariel and Qedumim settlements, referred to as 'Fingers of the Wall' (Map 4.4). This paved the way for controlling water resources and also effectively enabled Israeli authorities to illegally annex another six settlements in that region (OCHA, 2009; Al-Tamimi, 2003; Stop the Wall, 2003). In January 2007 Israel announced plans to shift the planned route another five kilometres into the WB to include two settlements near Modiin, and a new settler-only road to connect the settlements (World Bank, 2007). In the north area of Bethlehem, the wall helped to annex a network of settlements mainly, those between Har-Gilo, Gilo, Giv'at-Hamatos and Har-Homa. As a result, Bethlehem became completely isolated from areas of East Jerusalem (Ch3 and Ch6).

Map 4-4: Fingers of the wall. [Online]. Accessed on 15.3.2017 via:

http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_wb_barrier_july_2009_excerpts_english.pdf



This 'elasticity' poses questions as to what extent the pretext of Zionist security claims are true? Israeli researchers, Yehezkel Lein and Alon Cohen-Lifshitz (2005) published a joint report in 2005 exposing how settlement-expansion plans played a substantial role in planning the route. It provided an in-depth analysis of twelve cases in which settlement expansion plans significantly affected the route in certain areas. Consequently, in 2005, President of the Supreme Court of Israel, Aharon Barak, ruled that Israel lied to court by hiding the fact that some sections of the route were planned for the benefit of future settlement expansion, and not only for security reasons (B'Tselem, 2005; Haggai, 2012). The approved route of the wall in 2005 affected 55 settlements; 12 of them in East Jerusalem, separated from the rest of the WB and annexed into Israel (Lein & Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005).

There are two important points that need highlighting: Firstly, Shaul Arieli (2012) noted that rerouting the wall left gaps which allowed terrorists and Palestinian workers to penetrate into Israel (Hass, 2012). This begs the question, if the wall was so important for security, why the breaks? Secondly, the efficiency of the wall was questioned by former Supreme Court President, Dorit Beinisch, who raised questions considering previous cases in which the court had been made aware of the importance of maintaining the fence in crucial topographical positions (Haggai, 2012). He stated that leaving gaps and continuous rerouting endangered patrolling troops (Haggai, 2012). Due to elasticity and continuous modification and rebuilding of the wall, by 2012 some two billion shekels had been wasted (Hass, 2012). Arieli and Beinisch's opinions confirm Lein and Cohen-Lifshitz (2005) findings on how security could become of secondary importance to Israel if it conflicts with settlement expansion.

The route of the wall clearly contradicts the security picture portrayed by Israel. It has been influenced by the need to protect settlements, secure a Jewish majority within and provide space for any future expansion of settlements (World Bank, 2007). The construction of the wall is what the Israeli human rights lawyer, Michael Sfard, describes in his book 'Israel, Palestine, and the Legal Battle for Human Rights' (Sfard, 2018) as an "act of dispossession and a violation of international law". Accordingly, the major aim of building the wall east of as many settlements as possible is a de facto annexation of these settlements into Israel (BBC, 2005; B'Tselem, 2005; World Bank, 2007; Kershner, 2017; Tahhan, 2017).

Since 1967, colonial settlers have been divided into two competing positions regarding occupied Palestinian territories (Bard, 2017). 'The Land for Peace' supporters argue that Israel should expel Palestinians and annex their land in exchange for a peace agreement. In contrast, supporters of 'Greater Israel' argue that the land of Palestine is part of a biblical homeland of Jews (Bard, 2017). Paradoxically, every Israeli government

since 1967 has pursued the Zionist project of a 'Greater Israel'. A continuous expansion of colonial settlements in Palestine led consecutive Israeli governments to leave office with more settlers living in the WB (Zertal & Eldar, 2007). Despite criticism of the blatant Zionist aims behind the route of the wall, Israel insists on using 'security' pretexts to justify it. Also, it insists on committing significant financial, military and political Israeli resources to secure continuous growth of the Zionist project in Palestine. In this regard, Professor Gershon Shafir (2017, p. 154), noted:

A circular logic is in play here: Israel is able to use the stipulation of the temporary character of occupation to make long-term changes in the name of extended security risks, many of which are the result of the violations of the law of occupation

Michael Lynk, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in colonised territories since 1967, stated that the only rational explanation for the continuation of the occupation is to strengthen the settlement policy (OHCHR, 2017, p. 17). Consecutive Israeli Governments have not only expanded colonial settlements, but also encouraged Zionists to live in these settlements, yielding a population growth rate more than double that of Israel. The following section discusses the role of the wall in protecting Israeli settlement expansion in the WB.

4.5 The wall: A tool of colonial expansion of the Zionist Project in the WB


In addition to the importance of establishing a Jewish majority within new borders of Israel, Israel was careful to annex settlements into Israel following Ben-Gurion's antipathy to anything Palestinian (Ch2) and his vision of an exclusive Jewish state of Israel (Morris, 1987; Palumbo, 1987; Massalha, 1997; Pappé, 1999; MidEast, 2005; Simons, 2006). Therefore, Israeli authorities used policies intended to encourage Jewish citizens to migrate to Israeli settlements in the WB. Israel built thousands of new housing units in the WB, claiming that this was necessary in order to meet natural growth of the existing Israeli population (Lein, 2002).

One method used by the Israeli settler colonial project to encourage Jewish citizens to migrate to colonial settlements in the WB was by defining most of the settlements as national priority areas, divided into areas 'A' class and 'B' class. Accordingly, settlers and Jews from other parts of the world, working or investing in these settlements, are entitled to automatic Israeli citizenship, settlement housing, and governmental financial benefits. These benefits are provided by Israeli ministries; Ministry of Construction and Housing that offers generous loans for purchase of property in colonial settlements; Ministry of Education provides financial incentives for teachers and settlers to work in settlements;

Ministry of Finance that offers reductions in income tax for individuals and companies for established businesses in settlements (Lein, 2002; ReMillard, 2010). In 2000, average per capita grant in Jewish local councils in the WB was approximately 65% higher than average per capita grant in local councils inside Israel (Lein, 2002; ReMillard, 2010).

Despite the fact that colonial settlements violate international law, specifically Article 49 of the Fourth GC that prohibits transfer of parts of the Occupying Power's own civilian population into territory it occupies (ICRC, 2004), Israelis of high political status in the Israeli government, who supposedly should represent the law, reside in illegal colonial settlements. Former Israeli Foreign Minister and former Minister of Defence, Avigdor Lieberman, for example, lives in the illegal settlement of Nokdim in Bethlehem area; the senior Israeli member of the Israeli Parliament (*Knesset*), Zeev Elkin, lives in Teqoa settlement in Bethlehem area, and the *Knesset* speaker, Yuli Edelstein, lives in the Nevi Daniel settlement (NAD, 2017).

In 2010, settlement expansion was noticeable with construction of 1,819 Israeli units and 1,433 caravans in 133 settlements throughout the WB, including East Jerusalem (Map 4.5) (ARIJ, 2010). In that year, approximately 529,319 Israeli settlers lived in settlements in the WB, including those established in East Jerusalem (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018). According to data provided by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2018), the number of settlers in the WB in 2010, excluding East Jerusalem, was 328,774 settlers. At the end of 2017, settlers in the WB numbered 428,286.



Map 4-5: Israeli settlement expansion in year 2010. [Online]. Accessed on 15.3.2017 via:
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_route_projection_july_2010.pdf

In 2015, according to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS), there were 127 government-sanctioned Israeli settlements in the WB (not including East Jerusalem and settlement enclaves within Hebron) (cited in B'Tselem, 2017a). When combined with one hundred "settlement outposts", that usually do not have official government recognition, although many of them were established with governmental assistance, and 15 Israeli neighbourhoods inside the Jerusalem Municipality, these settlements are inhabited by over half a million settlers (B'Tselem, 2017a; MEMO, 2018e). According to ICBS (2018) annual growth rate for settler population (excluding East Jerusalem) in 2015 was more than twice that of the overall population in Israel. Furthermore, approximately 25% of the increase in numbers of settlers were the result of relocation by Israelis and the arrival of new immigrants to Israel who chose to live in settlements.

In 2016, the number of settlers in the WB including East Jerusalem were approximately 636,452. By 2017, the number had reached to 653,621 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018; B'Tselem, 2019; Peace Now, 2019). In 2018, the number increased to more than 700,000 living in 196 government authorised settlements, in addition to more than 200 settler outposts built without state approval (MEMO, 2018g; 2018h). Israeli authorities continue to approve further construction of new settlement units in illegal Israeli settlements. For example, in 2018 in the Bethlehem area, the Israeli Planning and Construction Committee approved construction of 500 new housing units in Eldad settlement, east of Bethlehem (MEMO, 2018f). It also approved 106 units in Efrat settlement, southern Bethlehem (MEMO, 2018e), and 20 new housing units in the settlement of Matzad, southeast Bethlehem, as part of the current government's plan to expand a settlement chain east of Bethlehem (Ahituv, 2018; MEMO, 2018f).

The decision to approve expansion of settlements was criticised by Meretz Chairwoman MK, Tamar Zandberg, who said the decisions are "like sticking a finger in the eye of any possible peace process. The government doesn't care about Israeli interests, only about the interests of settlers" (cited in Berger, 2018; MEMO, 2018h). In this regard, Zionist expansion in the WB destroyed any possibility for the suggested two states peace settlement, and thus the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has no hope of coming to an end.

The Palestinian Information Centre (PIC) reported in 2018 that Israeli authorities began a massive settlement project at a cost of about 185 billion shekels (MEMO, 2018j). The project would annex land in four Palestinian villages west of Bethlehem: Biter, Wadi-Fokin, Nahhalin and Hosan. In this case, homes of some 20,000 Palestinians would be appropriated by the settler project. The project includes digging a tunnel from Jerusalem to the settlements of Biter-Elite and Eli-Ezer, and expanding 'Route 60', a road linking Bethlehem to Hebron and surrounding Palestinian villages in an area that serves settlers only (Zion, 2019). The plan also includes constructing a railway link for settlements west

of Bethlehem to Tel-Aviv and Haifa (MEMO, 2018j). The idea of a railway plan for the WB was proposed in 2012, when Transportation Minister Yisrael Katz, requested building 11 new rail lines to serve settlements in the WB (Levinson, 2012).

Israeli settler communities do not always appreciate settlement expansion plans made by Israeli authorities. They complained in several announcements that the number of units authorised by government were few (MEMO, 2018g; 2018h). For example, Israeli settlers of Efrat rejected the first plan, previously approved by Israeli Civil Administration's Higher Planning Council, to construct 40 new housing units in the settlement; they managed to raise the number of units to 106 (MEMO, 2018g). Yesha, a right-wing settler's council, complained about the small number of authorised units for their settlements:

At past committee meetings some 2,000 to 3,000 housing units were advanced; this number is small compared to the tens of thousands of housing units authorised throughout the country (cited in MEMO, 2018h)

The Yesha council further demanded that their prime minister must allow them to construct in the WB with no restrictions:

Remove [building] restrictions and to allow for construction throughout Judea and Samaria [the WB], just as it occurs in the rest of the country. This must be done today (cited in MEMO 2018h)


Including East Jerusalem settlements, route of the wall puts some 87% of settler population into the Seam Zones, according to estimates of the Palestinian Negotiations Support Unit (NSU) based on the 2005 census (World Bank, 2007). Annexing colonial settlements to the western side of the wall serves Zionist project in Palestine as any criticism of these 'illegal' settlements is invalid anymore, because the settlements are now located on the Israeli side of the wall, and not on the Palestinian side.

Moreover, initial registration, by which Israel registers land that is previously unregistered in bodies recognized by Israel as publicly owned, is another colonial measure to annex Palestinian land. Palestinian owners must prove ownership through a very long and tedious process. Data about this type of confiscation are not readily available (Peace Now, 2009). Also, the colonial project using closed military areas under various pretexts to ease its annexation, is another colonial measure by which Israeli colonialists designate areas as closed military areas. In many cases, it is a prelude to seizure or confiscation, or intended to drive Palestinians out of a designated area. Over one half of Area 'C' lands, amounting to one third of the entire WB, are designated as closed military areas. Israeli settlers are allowed to cultivate over 14,000 dunams of land within closed military


areas even though, legally, both Israeli citizens and Palestinians are prohibited from entering them (B'Tselem, 2016).

Furthermore, the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem openly pursues what it calls a 'demographic balance' policy by which it seeks to secure a Jewish-Israeli demographic majority in the city (McGreal, 2006). With the hope of securing an Israeli demographic majority for the ultimate goal of a Zionist Project, the expanded border wall inside Palestinian land served to eliminate unwanted Palestinians by pushing them to the eastern side of the wall. There are now some 50,000 Palestinians, holding identification cards as residents of Jerusalem living east of the wall (Hasson, 2010) (Ch3). However, speaking at the Hebrew University, in 2010, rightist Yakir Segev, who holds an East Jerusalem portfolio in the Jerusalem municipality, declared those Palestinians and their neighbourhoods east of the wall as "no longer part of the city [...] and this is an irreversible reality in the region" (cited in Hasson, 2010). Segev confirmed that the wall was built for political and demographic reasons, not just security concerns (Hasson, 2010). In this way Israel managed not only to create/fabricate new facts on the ground with huge political, demographic and economic gains, but also managed to manipulate international law. This highlights the role of the wall in facilitating the mission of a Zionist project to annex Palestinian land cleared of its people for the idea of a pure Jewish State in Palestine.

The wall map (Map 4.6) highlights strong links between route of the wall and Israeli settlements in WB. Yet, Israeli colonial expansion is a result of implementation of consistent and systematic colonial Zionist policies since 1976, including colonial settlements, division of land after Oslo Accord 1995 (Map 4.7), and the wall since 2002. Israeli practices and measures since the 1990s have aimed at creating new facts on the ground, including consolidating and formalizing control of land, thereby pre-empting negotiations with Palestinians through formal and de facto annexation of land (OHCHR, 2017). For example, Bethlehem governorate, faced an intensive Israeli colonising project. In fact, Bethlehem governorate is one Palestinian governorate where colonial settlements have expanded most (NAD, 2017). The case of Bethlehem below, elaborates role of the wall in annexing Palestinian land for settlements.



Map 4-6:NAD. 2017. Route of the wall and settlements. [Online]. Accessed on 12.6.2017 via: <https://www.nad.ps/en/publication-resources/maps/israeli-wall-and-settlements-occupied-state-palestine>



Map 4-7: MidEast. 1995. Israel & Palestine after Oslo II 1995 Agreement. [Online]. Accessed 20.4.17 via: <http://www.mideastweb.org/palestineisraeloslo.htm>


4.6 The Zionist Project in Palestine: the case of Bethlehem Governorate between, Israeli settlements and the wall

The colonial settlement expansion in Bethlehem Governorate started after the 1967 War. Kfar Etzion settlement was the first Israeli settlement established in the governorate followed by a wave of Israeli settlements. Israeli settlement activities in Bethlehem governorate peaked between January 1994 and May 2013. In 2010, settlements occupied 2.7% of governorate land (ARIJ, 2010; B'Tselem, 2010). In 2017, settlements expanded to colonise about 3.5% of governorate total land. Taking into consideration future structural settlement scheme projects recently approved by the Israeli government in recent years, the occupied area will increase to 9% of governorate total land (NAD, 2017; 2015). In 2017, there were more than 18 colonial settlements and outposts surrounding Bethlehem governorate from all sides with a total population of over 100,000 Israeli settlers (NAD, 2017). This includes settlements of Har-Gilo, Gilo, Har-Homa, Nokdim, Tkoua, Efrat, Neve-Daniel and Betar-illit.

With completion of the 50km long wall, on land of Bethlehem governorate, 176,054 dunums will be lost to the Israeli western side of the wall. Bethlehem governorate will effectively lose approximately 64sq.km of its most fertile land, which makes up nearly 11.5% of the province (608km). This translates to a confiscation of 70,000 dunums of Palestinian land, which stands to lose, in total, some 71% of its land to the wall (ARIJ, 2010). Looking at route of the wall in Bethlehem governorate (Map 4.8 and Map 4.2), it is clear that the wall is encircling its northern, western and southern rural areas where colonial settlements are concentrated (NAD, 2015).

SHRINKING BETHLEHEM

(SEPTEMBER 2015)




Map 4-8:NAD. 2015. Shrinking Bethlehem. [Online]. Accessed on 28.7.17 via:
<https://www.nad.ps/en/publication-resources/maps/shrinking-bethlehem>

Despite the fact that most of the Jordan Valley, is located within areas 'A' in the WB and under control of the PA, at least 44% of the total area of the Jordan Valley has been confiscated by Israeli authorities for military purposes and training exercises (MEMO,

2018I). For example, in September 2018, Israeli militants destroyed a water pipe under the pretext of making way for military training exercises in the area, making four Palestinian families homeless by evicting them from their houses in Khirbet-Al-Yirza in the Jordan Valley (MEMO, 2018I). By creating facts on the ground to serve expansion of the Zionist colonial Project in the WB, Israel managed to annex the only space for possible natural growth for the governorate of Bethlehem towards the Jordan Valley (including the Dead Sea). According to the Applied Research Institute–Jerusalem (ARIJ, 2010), more than 400,000 dunams (98,842 acres) of the 720,000 dunams (177,916 acres) that make up total area of the Jordan Valley have been transformed into closed military and firing zones, with at least 27,000 dunams (6,672 acres) confiscated for colonial settlement expansion (OHCHR, 2017).

Latest developments in the snaking route of the wall in Bethlehem governorate in an attempt to link two Israeli settlements, Har-Gilo and Gilo, the Israeli court released a decision in August 2015 to complete construction of the wall in the Cremisan Valley (Beaumont, 2015; Khalid, 2016) (Map 4.9). The Cremisan Valley is one of the last remaining agricultural areas of Bethlehem governorate and is home to the Salesian Monastery, which includes a Palestinian vineyard and Salesian Sisters of Cremisan's convent. Construction of the wall blocked access to the Salesian Sisters Convent and School, which provides education to more than 400 children from neighbouring Palestinian areas (ICN, 2015)



Map 4-9:NAD. 2016. Brief on Israeli excavations & latest settlement activities, Cremisan Valley.

[Online]. Accessed on 28.7.17 via: <https://www.nad.ps/en/publication-resources/maps/brief-israeli-excavations-latest-settlement-activities-cremisan-valley>

Several US based Christian communities have called upon the US government to take action on the Cremisan case. They demanded a stop to building the wall on account of Palestinians and their future independent state (NAD, 2017). In 2015, Bishop Oscar Cantu, on behalf of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, called upon US Secretary Kerry at that time to press Israel to stop work on the wall (Gaetan, 2016). The wall in western Bethlehem separate the urban area from agricultural land. It also reduces

access for over 23,000 residents in nine Palestinian communities to Bethlehem; to major services centre for health, education, markets and trade (Ch5) (OCHA, 2013). Route of the wall also resulted in loss of water resources in the WB, discussed below.

4.7 Route of the wall and Palestinian water resources

The inability of Palestinians to access their land on the western side of the wall has led to land confiscation under Israeli policy since 1979, which states that any land uncultivated for three consecutive years and is not listed in the land registry is subject to seizure (Stop the Wall, 2003; Lein & Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005). The approval rate for permits for landowners to access their land fell from 76% of applications in 2014 to 28% in 2018 (OCHA, 2019), usually denial of permits is due to not meeting the Israeli standard of proof for ownership of the land or due to alleged lack of security clearance of the Palestinian applicant (B'Tselem, 2017b). In other words, land that still remains property of the Palestinian owner, becomes forcibly annexed due to being uncultivated, as farmers are prevented from reaching it.

The wall also confiscated Palestinian water resources. It is important to examine the significance of the first phase of building the wall that was completed at the end of 2003 (HRW, 2003) on the Palestinian cities of Qalqiliya, Tulkarm and Jenin, to highlight this point. These cities, in northern WB, are considered a lifeline for hundreds of families and an integral part of the Palestinian economy (Khaled, 2003). In 2000, according to the Human Rights Watch (2003), these three regions accounted for 45% of WB agricultural production, and 42% of agricultural businesses with about 60% of the communities in these three cities dependent upon agriculture for income and direct subsistence.

Consequently, the route of the wall annexed the most fertile land in WB to the western side of the wall (Stop the Wall, 2003; ICRC, 2004). The special significance of the first phase is not only due to confiscation of the most fertile agricultural land in WB, but also due to its location in the Western Aquifer, known as the *Al'Oja* Aquifer. This includes 226 wells drilled in the 1960s, of which 75 wells are in Qalqiliya, 67 in Tulkarm and 84 in Jenin. In other words, by confiscating these areas, Israel now controls wells that represent the only Palestinian access to the western groundwater basin (Map 4.10) (ICRC, 2004; Palestinian Hydrology Group, 2003).



Map 4-10: Palestinian Hydrology Group. 2003. First phase and its affected Palestinian wells.

[Online]. Accessed on 15.5.2017 via: <http://stopthewall.org/downloads/pdf/book/impactonwater.pdf>

Under international law, water sources that Israel consumes to meet its needs, including that of settlements, should be shared equally and reasonably by both Israelis and Palestinians (Hass, 2014). However, Israeli water consumption per capita is more than four times higher than that of Palestinians (Hass, 2014) (see Ch5). An Israeli allowance is 250 litres per person per day, a settler allowance is 400 litres (Corradin, 2016), while a Palestinian allowance is 73 litres (Khalel, 2016). This leaves a Palestinian with 28 litres less than the minimum global standard of 100 litres necessary for human basic needs, set by the World Health Organization (WHO) (OCHA, 2007; Feron, 2009).

Structural Israeli policies exclude Palestinians and intensify water-related inequalities between Israelis and Palestinians (Niksic, et al., 2014). Water scarcity on the Palestinian side challenges dominant and simplistic Israeli portrayals and rhetoric for building the wall. For Palestinians, access to water is a prerequisite for achieving a minimum standard of health and to undertake productive activities. Water also plays a key role in enhancing agricultural and industrial productivity. Without adequate, safe and affordable water, Palestinians are unable to lead healthy lives and lack the ability to build secure livelihoods. Moreover, the wall and its associated checkpoints regime dictate that Palestinian farmers are isolated from water resources. In this case, farmers are responsible for water collection and can spend 1-3 hours per day transferring water between both sides of the wall. This time could be better used to focus on livelihood and agricultural activities (Al-Tamimi, 2003).

When the wall is completed, approximately 25,000 Palestinians in the WB will reside between the wall and the Green Line, in addition to a majority of the 270,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem (OCHA, 2010; 2011). Also, an estimated 100,000 Palestinians, including 60,000 in East Jerusalem, are at risk of displacement in areas under threat of eviction due to construction of the wall (BADIL, 2009; IDMC, 2009; OCHA, 2009; 2012). The impact the wall is having on Palestinians, by trapping them in what Palestinians call; the world's largest open prison (Parry, 2011) and by turning the WB into non-contiguous isolated areas hampers (and often makes impossible) Palestinian access to land, water resources, jobs, education, health services, markets and family ties (Butterfield, et al., 2000; Lagerquist, 2004; Miller, 2007; Save the Children, 2009; Iraki, 2010; OCHA, 2011; HRW, 2018).

Zionist colonial projects in the WB, to secure settlements, create a demographic majority and expand borders inside Palestinian land utilise a combination of racial, apartheid surveillance techniques. Further, the wall is a Zionist apartheid tool used by settlers to dehumanise Palestinians, examined and discussed in the following chapter. When Israeli Journalist, Amira Hass, was asked what does the wall say to her? She replied:

I think what it tells me [...], because it [Israel] realises it cannot drive the Palestinians away, it has to hide them. It has to conceal them from our [Jews] eyes. We don't need these areas [Palestinian areas], this is garbage, this is sewage. The wall is about how strong in the need to be pure, and how many people participated in this act of violence? (cited in Fisk, 2018)

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter examines the role of the wall in facilitating the mission of the Zionist Colonial Project, that of a 'pure Jewish State' in Palestine. It explains that the wall is another Zionist tool, but in contemporary terms is the most important for maintaining power over Palestinian land and water; more territorial expansion; and securing an Israeli demographic majority within their newly expanded borders. This chapter provides a stepping-stone to understanding the following empirical chapters that discuss everyday *sumud* (steadfastness) of Palestinians against the impact of the wall on their lives, spaces, and livelihoods.

The chapter also shows that the route of the wall is not merely based on considerations of security to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian attacks, but in building the wall east of as many settlements as possible makes it easier to annex these settlements into Israel. Annexing colonial settlements in the WB is one of the main factors in determining the route wall. Other important factors include seizing Palestinian resources, land and water, and securing a Jewish demographic majority. In the light of this settler Zionist agenda, the wall should be understood as a dimension of colonization indicated by apartheid policies for controlling the land and resources of Palestine.

Chapter 5

Israel's colonial wall and everyday struggles of Palestinians under apartheid surveillance

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the role of route of the wall in annexing and protecting colonial settlements and in expanding a colonial project inside the WB, and how it effectively annexes and protects Israeli settlements through expansion. The wall is part of what Eyal Weizman (2007, p. 6) has famously defined in his book 'The Hollow Land' as the 'architecture of occupation' made of walls, fences, checkpoints, bypass roads, road blocks, closed military zones and settlements. Palestinians are unable to travel inside the WB or to East Jerusalem and Israel without taking several diversions and passing through walls and checkpoints (Rijke & Minca, 2019). Physical obstruction is the visible means of the process, however, measures curtailing Palestinian movement are more complex.

This chapter argues that analysis of Palestinian struggles with the colonial wall solely on the basis of physical obstruction overlooks the imposition of a multi-layered apartheid surveillance system with practices, permit and policies that limit Palestinian freedoms. Apartheid surveillance of the colonial project in general, and the wall in specific, is a potent strategy for restricting Palestinian movement and access to resources. Specifically, the chapter discusses the role of apartheid surveillance; closed 'Seam Zones', 'IDs *'Haweyas'* and permits', 'settler only' gates and roads, walls and queues which dehumanise Palestinians and control resources.

Furthermore, the chapter argues that the role of an apartheid wall in transforming the 'geographic continuity' of Palestinian land is to advance and confirm perceptions of otherness; those unwanted Palestinians living beyond the wall. It also explains how ethnic affiliation and political allegiances of settler colonialists override human rights of Palestinians through discriminating apartheid policies and hybrid tech surveillance.

The chapter discusses how the colonial project depends on a hybrid of low-tech and high-tech surveillance tools and strategies, deceptively termed a 'security industry' in subjugating Palestinians. It also argues that settler colonial surveillance cannot be separated from their philosophy of the 'other' suspects; those dangerous Palestinians who form a constant threat to Israel's security. Therefore, Palestinians must be subject to round the clock surveillance.

The chapter further argues that wall surveillance policies are based on ad-hoc measures, verbally communicated to Palestinians and not supported by published rules or written policies, which creates a system of chaos and unpredictability that severely affects Palestinians (World Bank, 2007). The unpredictable ad-hoc system of checkpoints increases Palestinians anxiety (Lake & LaBar, 2011) is stressful and requires complex coping skills according to Jennifer Jordan (2016). For Palestinians, those complex coping skills when dealing with unpredictable Zionist policies are summarized in their '*sumud*' (see Ch6 and 7).

Zionist policies discussed in this chapter are linked to Sharon's goal of making life socially and economically unbearable for Palestinians so as to force migration (Falah, 2005; Zureik, 2015). This feeds into the ultimate goal of Zionism; a land with no people, to create landless impoverished Palestinians which then become an easy target for further Zionist expulsion and exodus, following Herzl's 1895 recommendation (Ch2):

We shall try to spirit the penniless population [Palestinians] across the border [...], while denying it employment in our country [...] both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discretely and circumspectly (cited in Hirst, 1977, p. 18; Prior, 2001, p. 10; Simons, 2006, p. 24)

The chapter moreover shares statements of Palestinians in their daily struggles with dehumanizing ad-hoc surveillance policies of queues, inconsistency and chaos at the busiest check point in the WB, 'Crossing 300' in Bethlehem (Aljazeera, 2018), in what Hana Barag from '*Machsom Watch*' (Checkpoint Watch), calls "cattle paths" (cited in Braverman, 2012, p. 312). Also discussed are discriminating surveillance policies used to ethnically and culturally dominate and dehumanise Palestinians and favour Israelis, including settler only 'road and gate' policies, closed 'Seam Zones', *Haweya* (ID) and permit policies (IDMC, 2006).

Moreover, the chapter argues that apartheid surveillance strategies, linked to a settler colonial philosophy of 'unwanted others', have ultimately served to dispossess and control Palestinians and their resources under an Israeli pretext of terror management and securitization. In other words, Israeli surveillance is a form of political power that hides a more worrying practice of colonialism (Zureik, et al., 2010). In the following section the chapter begins by discussing walls of colonial surveillance and ethnic segregation to show the apartheid side of the colonial project in the WB. Further examination of colonial dispossession of Palestinian water resources is followed by a discussion of wall apartheid surveillances of closed Seam Zones and *Haweya* and permit. Finally, the chapter discusses ethnic segregation through a system of exclusively settler gates and roads, and surveillance at 'Crossing 300' in Bethlehem. It specifically

focuses on the struggle for Palestinians with dehumanising surveillance policies of queues, inconsistency and unpredictability.

5.2 Walls of colonial surveillance and ethnic segregation

A paradox of our times the weakening of national borders associated with globalization and a growing tendency to erect walls between states. For example, long stretches have been built on the borders of US/Mexico, Botswana/Zimbabwe, India/Pakistan, and elsewhere (Blank, 2011). In political science borders are defined as divisions between political entities or countries, produced as a result of an agreement, war, or a perceived threat. In these cases, walls can be an attractive means of deterring hostilities (Davis, 2004), of establishing territory; regulating access; protecting against invasion or threats of any kind; fending off terrorists, traffickers or illegal immigrants (Blank, 2011; Issac, 2011; Ghanim, 2014). Yet, when ethnic affiliation, political allegiances or nationalities override citizenship and human rights (Camillo & Desmains, 2016) to define 'us' against 'them', walls become means of division, in which identities and otherness are rooted (Ghanim, 2014). Walls in this case are the backdrop to a global phenomenon of walling (Davis, 2004; Blank, 2011).

In Israel, the wall has transformed the 'geographic continuity' of Palestinian confirming perceptions of unwanted others, as those living beyond the wall. Jewish experienced the ability of walls to isolate, dehumanise and dominate unwanted others following their history with Nazi walls to create Jewish ghettos in cities of Eastern Europe (HEART, 2006). With building the wall in the WB, contemporary Zionists made sure to pass the struggle of their ancestors with Nazi walls to Palestinians.

A 'philosophy of otherness' in Israel colonial thinking can be traced back to the early 1990s when former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin called for Israel to take Gaza out of Tel-Aviv and in 1995 arguing that 'separation as a philosophy' will require a 'clear border' (Shindler, 2013). Ariel Sharon in 2003, then Israeli Prime Minister, defended plans to build a barrier around the WB, insisting it would encourage peace between Israelis and Palestinians. He also confirmed that a fence would bring friendship with Palestinians, evoking a line from Robert Frost's poem, 'Mending Wall': "good fences make good neighbours" (MG, 2003; Allen, 2019). Ehud Olmert in 2008 called for 'a physical separation' to isolate Palestinians, following Ehud Barak's campaign slogan in 2002; "good neighbours need good fences", "us here, them over there" (White, 2014).

In the WB a wall should be perceived as a symbol of an emerging new global regime of separation and segregation, of risk management, and of growing securitization (Davis, 2004; Blank, 2011). Israel depends on surveillance strategies, deceptively termed as 'security industry', in justifying and managing their colonial project in the WB.

Surveillance is frequently instituted as a means of reinforcing dominant relations of state power and control (Tawil-Souri, 2018). Michel Foucault (2007) argues; power of surveillance is coercive and productive, providing means for authoritative social institutions to construct a reality by shaping and managing populations, either for the benefit of such institutions and the classes they serve or for more tyrannous purposes. In other words, surveillance became fundamental to a new conception of politics (Haggerty & Ericson, 2006).

However, surveillance has both productive and repressive capabilities: surveillance is the focused, systematic, routine attention to detail for the purposes of influence, control, management, entitlement, protection, and/or direction (Lyon, 2007). Therefore, certain political contexts highlight its most sinister aspects and uses. Surveillance cannot be separated from context of when, where, and by whom. It reflects the kind of society being built, what kind of human relations exist, what dominant forms of power are sought, and how 'others' are oppressed (Tawil-Souri, 2018). For example, contemporary surveillance technologies and practices in the USA are informed by a long history of racial formation and methods of policing black life under slavery (Browne, 2015).

Israeli surveillance cannot be separated from their philosophy of the 'other' categories of dangerous Palestinian people and places. In fact, surveillance in Israel is manifested through a framework in which Palestinians are categorised as dangerous suspects who form a constant threat to Israeli security, and therefore, Palestinian women, men, and children must be surveyed continuously. For Israel, surveillance is not simply a set of technological tools, but, a system of belief and practices that structure used technologies, define sovereign territorial boundaries and construct and differentiate populations within that territory (Foucault, 2007). The result of this colonial structure has transformed the 'geographic continuity' of Palestinians and their space into isolated cantons, confirmed a perception of another otherness, of those living beyond the wall (Isaac, 2011).

Colonial surveillance uses tools of dominant power through minutely focused, routinized, and systematic applications that collectively define the surveillance management of territory and population (Zureik, 2015). Colonial surveillance uses an increasing number of high-tech tools, such as drones, remote controlled robots, biometric data collection, and computer viruses; they do not replace low-tech ones, they complement them. Israeli surveillance still relies on old fashioned intelligence and data gathering tools that were fundamental to early colonial and state control: censuses, population registries, identification papers including "*Haweyas*", police, collaborators, spies, informants, intelligence agents, imprisonment, torture and interrogation methods, direct and distant observations, territorial survey/mapping, urban planning, architecture, postal

interception, wiretapping, watch towers and x-ray machines (Tawil-Souri 2018; Zureik, 2015). All integral parts of a hybrid of low and hi-tech tools developed equally for defence and offense, for security and oppression (Tawil-Souri, 2018) that subjugate Palestinians as suspected terrorists. Essentially, Israeli high-tech companies lead the global market for advanced security equipment (Halper, 2015), paradoxically developed and tested at the expense of Palestinian freedoms and rights.

In colonial history, South Africa is a well-known example of colonial apartheid, intercepting people of different ethnicities and political allegiances. However, the colonial regime of Israel is an example of a contemporary apartheid in the WB. Comparative analysis between the two shows that Israel's settler-colonialism is a more extreme form of apartheid than the South African experience. The main differences: Zionist settler-colonialism is based on exploitation, brutal displacement and extermination of the indigenous population; South African settler-colonialism functioned through exploitation (Pappe, 2016; Clarno, 2017; Tartir, 2017). Moreover, what is inherent in both cases is the accumulation of land and wealth through oppression; apartheid in this case is defined as what Andy Clarno (2017) calls a 'system of racial capitalism', in his book, 'Neoliberal Apartheid, Palestine/Israel and South Africa after 1994'. For Clarno, a colonial wall should be understood as a symbol of ethnic, political and military surveillance over Palestinians via discriminating tools of isolation, dehumanising and separation, together with a system of land dispossession and extermination.

With intensified settler-colonial project in the WB, apartheid has become an increasingly important framework for understanding and challenging Israeli rule in Palestine. In March 2017, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) (UN, 2017) produced a report concludes that Israel has established an 'apartheid regime' that fragments Palestinian people and subjugates them to different forms of racial rule (White, 2014; Eid, 2017; Tartir, 2017; UN, 2018). The impact of the ESCWA report was apparent in the way the US and Israel reacted to it. The US Ambassador condemned the report and called on the UN Secretary General to reject it. The head of ESCWA, Rima Khalaf, refused to withdraw the report and resigned from her post (Tartir, 2017). The ESCWA report summarised colonial apartheid practices/policies and violations of international law as: land grab, land confiscation and seizure, displacement, revocation of residency permits, deportations, home demolitions, evictions and forced relocations, oppression, excessive use of force with impunity, arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and collective punishment (Eid, 2017; Tartir, 2017; UN, 2017).

Colonial policies have led to austere living conditions for Palestinians, including loss of resources (UN, 2018). Limited access to basic services and resources are social inequalities that are physically reinforced through racial, ethnic or class segregation

(Camillo & Desmaison, 2016). Regarding class segregation, it should be noted that there are segregation walls built along class lines, which exclude the poor and disadvantaged from wealthy gated communities. A three-meter thick concrete wall in Lima, Peru, is an exemplar. Social inequalities on both sides of the wall are striking. One of the cruellest insults of inequality for the Lima poor living on the other side of the wall is how cheaply the rich live inside the wall (Camillo & Desmaison, 2016).

In terms of water for example, Oxfam (cited in Mervin, 2015) estimates that a poor resident in Lima pays ten times more for water as someone living inside the wall. This is because most residents in informal settlements outside the wall do not have access to fresh running water; they have to pay for water to be delivered by lorries. Meanwhile, affluent neighbours across the wall, who are recognised by public authorities as landowners, have cheap fresh water piped straight to their houses. While these circumstances are alarming, they are far from new.

The scenario in the WB is not that far from the Lima's one. When it comes to colonial dominance over resources of the unwanted others beyond the wall. In fact, colonial surveillance strategies of the unwanted others have ultimately served to dispossess and control Palestinians under a pretext of terror management and securitization. Colonial policies actually led to austere water shortages and food insecurity (UN, 2018). In other words, Israeli surveillance is a form of political power that enables and hides a more radical practice of colonialism (Zureik, et al., 2010). The wall is used as a means of 'accumulation by dispossession' as stated by David Harvey (2004). This describes an inability to accumulate through ongoing extended reproduction on a continuous basis. The wall controls Palestinian access to resources, such as water and land, what some like to call 'the new imperialism' (Harvey, 2004).

Inequality in water allowances between two sides of the wall is severe, as fresh water per capita for Israelis is about four times that of Palestinians (World Bank, 2009; Hass, 2014; Niksic, et al., 2014). Whereas Israel is known for affordable efficient water infrastructure and management, Palestinians are struggling to pay for the most basic level of infrastructure and services with a low Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, almost 18 times less than Israel's GNI per capita (World Bank, 2009). The following section elaborates how Israel manages to control water resources of those Palestinians living beyond the wall.

5.3 Colonial dispossession of Palestinian water resources

In terms of water resources in the WB, under the Interim Agreement (Oslo II) signed in 1995, Israel retained control of all water resources and also limited the volume of water Palestinians can produce (World Bank, 2009; Hass, 2014; Niksic, et al., 2014; B'Tselem

2017a). Israel even imposed an uneven and humiliating division of water resources of the WB and further limited Palestinian capabilities to maintain and develop their own water infrastructure. Desperate Palestinian negotiators at the time deluded themselves that they would gain sovereignty within five-years, and thus gain control over their water resources (Hass, 2014). 23 years later, the supposedly five-year agreement is still in place (World Bank 2009; Al-Quds 2012; Hass, 2014; Niksic, et al., 2014; Corradin, 2016; B'Tselem 2017a). Camilla Corradin, Advocacy Task Force Coordinator for Emergency, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (EWASH), said that Israel is using:

Water as a weapon, EWASH believes that Israel has managed to achieve a water surplus, thanks to its advanced water and wastewater technology and its control over Palestinian water resources (cited in Khalel, 2016)

Division is based on almost fixed volume of water Palestinians can produce and consume where Palestinians were allotted 118 million cubic meters (mcm) per year from three aquifers via drilling, agricultural wells, springs and precipitation. Israel allotted 483 mcm per year from the same deal and the same resources (Hass, 2014; B'Tselem, 2017a). The five-year arrangement stipulated that about 80-85% of water in the WB pumped from the mountain aquifer, which is a joint Israeli-Palestinian water resource, would be allotted to Israeli use. In other words, about 15-20% goes to Palestinians living in the WB, from water resources in the WB only, while about 80-85% goes to Israelis, from water resources on both sides of the Green Line (World Bank 2009; Al-Quds 2012; Hass, 2014; Niksic, et al.; 2014, Corradin, 2016; B'Tselem 2017a). It should be noted that the Palestinians have been denied access to extraction from the Jordan River since 1967, which was estimated about 250 mcm (PWA, 2018).

In the Oslo agreement Israel agreed to sell Palestinians some 27-31 mcm of water per year. However, with increased demand in the WB, Israel currently sells about 60-64 mcm per year, more than it should to Palestinians based on the agreement. Thus, Israel makes extra profit from selling water meant simultaneously for Palestinians. Simultaneously Palestinians produce less than they should produce based on the agreement, just 87 mcm per year (Hass, 2014; B'Tselem, 2017a; World Bank, 2018). In 2012, head of the water quarter in the PA, Shadi Aletili, noted that an Israeli gets seven times more water than a Palestinian (Al-Quds, 2012). As a result, the PA must purchase from Mekorot (Israel's national water provider) more than double the amount of water specified in the agreement. According to Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) figures (2015), in 2015 the PA purchased an additional 63.8 mcm from Mekorot for use in the WB (PWA, 2015; B'Tselem, 2017a).

According to PWA figures for the WB, in 2015 average water consumption for domestic, commercial and industrial uses (excluding agriculture and leakages) was 84.3 liters per

person per day (PWA, 2015), while in 2016 it dropped to 83 liters (PWA, 2018). This falls short of the minimum recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO), which is “100 liters of water per person per day” for personal and domestic use only (cited in Corradin, 2016; Khalel, 2016). This 2015 figure includes both commercial and private Palestinian consumption, therefore, a Palestinian consumes even less than the WHO recommended allowance, which is about 73 liters (B’Tselem 2017a; Khalel, 2016). The individual allowance of water per day in some isolated areas is 45 Liters (Corradin, 2016), and can fall to 15 liters in areas like Hebron. Comparatively, an Israeli allowance is 250 liters, while a settler allowance is 400 liters (Corradin, 2016). Colonial policy is used to encourage Israelis to reside in colonial settlements in the WB, thus expanding their Zionist project of colonialism in the WB. In its official site on civil administration of Judea and Samaria (Towbin, 2012), Israel brags about its colonialist generosity. It claims that although no follow-up agreement was reached with Palestinians in 2000, therefore, it is still in the ‘interim period’. Israel still follows guidelines concerning the future needs of Palestinians and is still making more water available for them by allowing new water drillings (Hass, 2014; B’Tselem, 2017a; World, Bank 2009; 2018).

Despite the fact that Palestinian drilling has been granted for an additional 70-80 mcm per year, obstacles placed by colonialists deny Palestinians access to water (Corradin, 2016; UN, 2017; 2018; World Bank, 2009; 2018). For example, colonialists deny Palestinians drilling new wells under the pretext that it cuts off water before it reaches Israel (Towbin, 2012; Khalel, 2016). According to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), between 2011-2014, only 1.4% of building permit requests from Palestinians in Area ‘C’ were approved, including wells and other structures (cited in Khalel, 2016).

For Israel, unapproved wells are all located in areas where the water flows towards Israel and not towards the WB (Towbin, 2012). Further, Israel denies the WB to access underground aquifers because they spread out under Israel and the WB with the largest supply lying beneath Israel: 8900 km, while only 5600 lie under the WB (Towbin, 2012). Nonetheless, Israel deliberately ignores role of the wall in annexing water resources, thus increasing their share of underground aquifers (Ch4), and also its role in denying Palestinian access to water resources on the other side of the wall (see following sections).

Following the Oslo agreement, Israel managed to restrict Palestinian freedom to develop or maintain their own wells, replace decaying water pipes or drill new wells on their side of the wall in the WB. For example, Israel forced the PA to obtain narrow water pipes, thus carrying less water. Israel also refuses to approve PA proposals to repair pipeline infrastructure, which runs through area “C” and links Palestinian communities in the WB

and water grids; 30% of water supplied to the PA is lost due to leakage (Hass, 2014; B'Tselem, 2017a).

Water shortages in the WB are most acute in summertime. This is partly because Mekorot cuts back on supply to some Palestinian communities in order to meet seasonal high demand in certain settlements and also because wells in some parts produce less water during summer. Consequently, many Palestinians suffer lengthy water outages of two months or more (Corradin, 2016). In addition, low water pressure means that sometimes water does not reach distant locations or those at high elevations (Corradin, 2016; B'Tselem, 2017a). Therefore, and to ensure that all Palestinians receive water, the local PWAs have to supply communities and neighbourhoods according to allowances per area, per calendar rota.

For Palestinian communities located entirely, or in part of area "C", Israel bars connection to water infrastructure or digging of cisterns for collecting rainwater (B'Tselem, 2017a). OCHA (2013) identified 180 such communities, home to some 30,000 Palestinians with water consumption of 20 liters a day per person. As Israel restricts connecting to water networks, dozens of Palestinian communities in areas "C" and other Palestinian areas, (around 113,000 Palestinians), are forced to purchase water all year round (B'Tselem, 2017b). The tank price of 10 cubic meters ranges between 500-700 NIS (\$125-175) (Corradin, 2016), and could increase due to Israeli access restrictions and expenses of transporting water across rough terrain as Israel restricts some communities in area "C" to pave roads or to access paved roads. This impacts on household budgets and on health. Only 8% of WB Palestinian household income, on average, is twice the globally accepted standard (World Bank, 2009).

In 2009 a preliminary study by the World Bank estimated that expenditure on water in the WB represents one-sixth of their household budget. The extra cost to users of tanker water may add up to 1% of GDP (World Bank, 2009). In 2017, more than one-fifth of Palestinian households were found to be food insecure (UN, 2018). Health wise, there is evidence that water related illness is common due to poor water quality, often not safe for consumption, with poor sanitary conditions in tankers that transport it (World Bank, 2009; B'Tselem, 2017a). Public health costs associated with waterborne diseases in children below the age of five are estimated at 0.4% of GDP (World Bank, 2009).

While thick pipes of Mekorot leading to colonial settlements, cross the road, Palestinian tractors transport rusty tanks of water to Palestinian neighbourhoods and villages that are subject to a policy of water rotation. The colonial restrictions on development of water infrastructure in these communities are further exacerbated by additional actions taken by both settlers and colonial authorities, such as the takeover of natural water resources;

destruction of reservoirs and spring-fed pools and blocked access. These actions are part of the on-going Zionist agenda to drive Palestinian residents from their homes.

Furthermore, colonial hegemony over Palestinian access to water resources surpasses hegemony over Palestinian farming activities to secure water. Under a pretext of security, Israel refuses to approve Palestinian farmers any activity to secure water. Farmers in the Jordan valley for example, depend totally on the Mekorot supply that decreases over time. Large farms of 400-500 dunums suffer most as allocated allowances fell from 120 cubic meters in 2000, to only 20-30 cubic meters in 2017, which is not enough to water Palestinian fields (Corradin, 2016). Subsequently, farmers had to dig small reservoirs over a period of three years to gather water. They pump water with expensive Petrol using machines to water their fields. The daily cost of a pumping machine is 800 NIS (\$200), which covers only 70 dunums (Corradin, 2016). Small farms of 2 dunums face the same difficulties with pumping machines, as costs could reach to 30,000 NIS (\$7,500) per year.

What makes farmers' lives more unbearable is regular Israeli invasion onto their farms to seize pumping equipment and to abolish their water reservoirs. Farmers' struggles are not due to lack of water resources, but because of colonial restrictions and an uneven distribution of water. To cope with colonial restrictions, farmers either shrink farming land to reduce running cost and water consumption, change types of crops to ones that don't consume lots of water, or in most cases, abandon farming. An Aljazeera documentary film (in Arabic) about Palestinian water (Aljazeera, 2017), reflects an uneven water distribution on both sides. While thick 'Mekorot' pipes head to booming colonial farms in colonial settlements, where modern irrigating gadgets water their farms, a few meters away Palestinian farmers struggle to secure 20 litres of water a day to water their dry farms. Israeli dispossession of water resources has only increased the scarcity of Palestinian water and increased Palestinian dependence on their colonizer (Hass, 2014).

Hitherto, the Israeli government was furious over the remarks of Martin Schulz, (President of the European Parliament) in the Knesset in 2014, when he pointed out that Israelis use four times more water than Palestinians. On the same day the Economy Minister, Naftali Bennet, and other members walked out of the Knesset, demanding an apology from Schulz for lying propaganda. The Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Schulz of selective hearing over unverified claims (Lis & Ravid, 2014). In reply, Schulz denounced Israeli lawmakers who criticized his speech as 'extremists' (Aderet, 2014). Moreover, Israeli Justice Minister, Tzipi Livni, accused Palestinians of deceiving Schulz with lies:

You are wrong, they [Palestinians] intentionally misled you [...] that is not how the water is allocated. Israel gives the Palestinians more water than what we are committed to in the interim agreement (cited in Hass, 2014).

Livni's claims were criticised by notable Israeli intellectuals such as Amira Hass (2014), Haaretz correspondent for the colonised territories, and author of a widely acclaimed book, 'Drinking the Sea at Gaza'. Hass (2014) argued that Israel doesn't give water to Palestinians; rather, it sells it to them at full price. In fact, Palestinians would not be forced to buy water from Israel if it were not a colonising power that controls Palestinian natural resources (Ch4), if it were not for the Oslo II Accords (Ch3), and if it were not in a water war with Israel since 1967 (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).





Figure 5-1: Aljazeera, 2016. Israel's water cuts: West Bank 'in full crisis mode'. [Online]. Accessed on 13.11.2017 via: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/israel-water-cuts-west-bank-full-crisis-mode-160620133005799.html>

Israel's water wars

Every year the water supply to Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank is cut off for days - if not weeks.

Here is how much water each person in the West Bank has access to per day



In Area C, under Israeli administrative and military control
180 Palestinian communities
 are not connected to the water network

Vulnerable Palestinian households spend up to
one fifth
 of their salary on water



Sources: EWASH | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)



ALJAZEERA

Figure 5-2: Aljazeera, 2016. Israel's water cuts: West Bank 'in full crisis mode'. [Online]. Accessed on 13.11.2017 via: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/israel-water-cuts-west-bank-full-crisis-mode-160620133005799.html>

While Palestinians have suffered from injustice, discriminatory Israeli policies and numerous Israeli violations of international law at the expense of their rights (UN, 2018), Israeli political figures, like Livni, who represent the colonial project in the WB, insist on accusing Palestinians of misleading international opinion about their struggles with a colonial power. Colonial power over Palestinian access to water resources surpasses colonial apartheid over their access to social life. Ethnic apartheid surveillance of closed zones and permit systems of the wall are discussed below.

5.4 Colonial ‘closed Seam Zones’ and ‘*Haweya* and permit’ policies

The colonial project in the WB reinforced security of the wall and the majority of settlements in the WB with closed territories known as ‘Seam Zones’. Despite Oslo Accords on freedom of movement for Palestinians and vehicles in the WB which ‘will be free and normal and shall not need to be affected through checkpoints or roadblocks’ (World Bank, 2007). On October 2003, Israeli defence forces (IDF), issued an order declaring WB land between the wall and the Green Line as indefinite closed military ‘Seam Zones’ that Palestinians are barred from accessing without permits (Table 5.1) (Feron, 2009; NAD, 2013; B’Tselem, 2017b). Seam Zones on the western side of the wall dispossessed roughly 8.5% of the land of the WB. Further, on the eastern side of the wall, military orders created ‘Buffer Zones’ of 150-200 meters where Palestinian construction is not allowed (OCHA, 2009), creating a number of isolated small Palestinian enclaves (World Bank, 2007; 2009).

Moreover, Israel declared incorporated areas into the municipal boundaries of settlements as ‘closed areas’ where Palestinians are also barred from accessing without permits (World Bank, 2007). Built up areas of settlements cover about 3% of WB land, and the municipal boundaries of settlements an additional 6%. According to official government data of the Israeli Civil Administration agency in charge of settlements in 2006, nearly 32% of land incorporated into settlement jurisdictions was private land owned by Palestinians (Etkes & Ofran, 2007). Previous figures amount to some 20-25% of what is left from WB land seized on account of the colonial wall and settlements.


Palestinian residents of Seam Zones, to remain in their own houses and to work their own land, must obtain special written permits from the Israeli Civil Administration known as the ‘Green permit’ (World Bank, 2007; HaMoked, 2011; NAD, 2013; B’Tselem, 2017b). The 2003 IDF order (Appendix B) states, Palestinians eligible to access their houses and land in the Seam Zones must be:

A person, who has reached the age of 16, whose permanent place of residence on the date of entry into force of this declaration is in the seam area, will be eligible to enter the seam area and remain there, so long as he possesses a written permit given to him by me or one authorized by me, which testifies to the fact that his permanent place of residence is in the seam area, and this is all in accordance with the conditions determined in the permit (cited in NAD, 2013)

Although there is no definitive list of documentation necessary to establish proof of residency in Seam Zones contained in the IDF order (World Bank, 2007), Palestinians must prove they are residents of the area before getting the permit. One of the obstacles

in providing relevant documentation is the absence of land registry documents inherited since the Ottoman era (Ch2). Palestinians not residing in the Seam Zones, but either work or own a land or businesses, or are relatives of landowners and want to farm a relative's land, must provide proof of work or land ownership to obtain the permit.

Palestinian landowners must pass strict eligibility requirements for an Israeli visitor permit, to be allowed to visit their own land in closed areas (Map 5.1). For instance, they must submit documents to prove ownership of their land, such as land taxation documents. Because land ownership in the WB is passed on through traditional methods, and does not include formal inheritance documentation, only 33% of land in the WB is formally registered. Consequently, owners with no formal documents, relatives, labourers or sharecroppers find it increasingly difficult to work land due to these rigorous requirements (Feron, 2009; OCHA, 2007; 2011). Over 90% of the rejected applications for permits between 2006-2009 were because of failure to prove connection to the land, rather than Israeli security concerns (OCHA, 2011). The impact of this policy became more evident during the 2010 olive season, when all 70 applicants in "Wadi-Shami" village in Bethlehem governorate had their permit applications rejected due to lack of land ownership documents (OCHA, 2011).



Map 5-1:NAD. 2015. Israeli restriction on Palestinian land. 2015. [Online]. Accessed on 10.6.2017 via: <https://www.nad.ps/en/publication-resources/maps/israeli-restriction-palestinian-land>Order

Although the ICJ declared the permit system illegal, around 50,000 Palestinians in 38 villages and towns find themselves living in Seam Zones and must obtain permits (World Bank, 2007; Niksic, et al., 2014). Estimates of total restricted area are difficult to obtain, but it appears to be in excess of 50% (World Bank, 2007). More obstacles are imposed

on Palestinians in Seam Zones, as they must renew their identification *Haweyas* on periodically. In this case, Palestinians who spend time outside the Seam Zone for education, work or family purposes risk losing their right of residence. Moreover, for those over 16 years old, (the age of having *Haweya*), must have IDF 'written permits' to be able to access the area. Due to security considerations linked to young groups of Palestinians, obtaining permits is not easy as Israel considers them a high security risk (Abdulhadi, et al., 2011; OCHA, 2011; B'Tselem, 2017b).

In June 1967, Israel carried out a census of residents in colonized territories. Only those present in the territories at that time were registered and recognized as legal citizens of colonized territories. Palestinians were issued by Israel with different coloured *Haweyas*, based on their place of residence. Blue *Haweyas* for East Jerusalem; Orange for the WB and Gaza, (which changed to Green after the PA took over authority in 1994). As a result, only registered Gazans, issued permits by Israel, are allowed to use the Rafah crossing into Egypt, and only registered WB Palestinians can use the Allenby Bridge into Jordan. Gazan residents are rarely allowed to live in the WB even in cases of marriage or to attend higher education. For the majority of Palestinians, visiting between Gaza and the WB is forbidden. Only those with special permits, normally VIPs, high level government officials and certain businesspeople, can travel between the two Palestinian territories. Movement between East Jerusalem and the rest of WB is also problematic (World Bank, 2007).

From 1967 to the present, Israel retained full control over the population registry and residency status of Palestinians, despite that Oslo Accords required Israel to transfer this control, along with other civil matters, to the PA for areas 'A' and 'B'. After Israel's disengagement from Gaza, Israel still retains control of the registry and still employs it to control Gazan movement in the WB (World Bank, 2007). In practical terms, this means that Israel has total control over Palestinian residency in the WB, Eastern Jerusalem and Gaza. Thus, any change of residence for marriage, education or employment, between these territories is forbidden without Israeli permission, which is almost impossible to obtain. For example, Palestinians who have Gaza as their address in the *Haweya*, but live in the WB without permits, are regarded as illegally present in the WB and should be deported back to Gaza. Those Palestinians suffer fear and lack of stability or security as they are under constant threat of deportation. This can happen if caught by Israeli soldiers on 'flying checkpoints' that are usually sudden, unexpected, temporary checkpoints (World Bank, 2007; OCHA, 2006a; 2018a), where stop and search military activities take place. In 2018, Israeli Centre for the Defence of the Individual (HaMoked) noted that the number of deported Gazan people increased from 6 in 2016 to 27 in 2017 (HaMoked, 2017)

Colonial policies categorized Palestinians into different groups with different rights and entitlements as an act of domination, a 'divide and rule' policy. In this regard, the colour of *Haweya* decides Palestinian rights at the wall and entry points. The colour of your *Haweya* denotes your entitlements to entry. This relationship between Palestinians and their *Haweya* has become integral to their identity of who they are in relation to those in power. Palestinian identities at checkpoints are classified and discriminated by colour; blue or green. It is almost impossible to find a Palestinian over 16 years old, both females and males, not carrying their *Haweya*. For Palestinians this represents their existence in the eye of the colonizer and at the same time, protection from their colonizer. Not carrying a *Haweya* on a constant basis subjects Palestinians to harassment, interrogation or arrest. Being caught without your *Haweya* can put a Palestinian life in danger with the possibility of being shot on the spot under a pretext of 'hiding it with the intention of committing a terrorist attack'. Israel employs surveillance over Palestinian residents, isolating them into cantons affecting their ability to integrate and unite.

Colonial permit surveillance is not used to restrict Palestinian access to the Seam Zones only, but also access to the rest of the WB, Jordan Valley, and between areas 'A', 'B' and 'C'. Also, to what Israel defines as 'boundaries': Israel, East Jerusalem and settlement areas (World Bank, 2007). Therefore, Palestinians are often required to obtain permits for nearly all movement outside their greater municipal area. However, holding a valid permit to reach health services, schools, workplaces, and to maintain relations with family and friends does not necessarily guarantee the ability to cross the wall. It is up to soldiers on permanent or flying checkpoints to decide whether a permit is needed/valid or not.

Colonial permit requirements are rarely published, highly changeable and are often run by day-to-day ad-hoc management. Requirements can be changed without notice at particular checkpoints, and total closures, forbidden all movement, can be imposed at any time with or without a perceived security threat (OCHA, 2006a). Therefore, it should be noted that analysing movement restrictions solely on the basis of physical impediments of the wall overlooks the imposition of daily administrative surveillance. Administrative impediments have more impact on restricting Palestinian movement than the wall itself. For example, the *Haweya* surveillance feeds a 'permit system' that controls nearly all aspects of Palestinian movement outside an individual's municipal area (Amnesty International, 2006; B'Tselem, 2006).

Discriminating colonial surveillance policies against Palestinians supports the ESCWA report (UN, 2018) that concludes Israel is an apartheid state. The report documents formal discriminating laws against Palestinian in four domains: citizens of Israel; the dual legal system practiced in the WB between settlers and Palestinians; tenuous residency

rights of Palestinian Jerusalemites; and Israel's refusal to allow Palestinian refugees to exercise the right of return. On the latter one, millions of Palestinians living in the diaspora or in refugee camps across the region are denied right of return to their Palestinian villages and towns (US State Department, 2017).

Moreover, Palestinians not listed in the population registry, who wish to legally join their families and permanently reside in the WB, can only do so through the approval of Israel for family reunification (World Bank, 2007). After the Second Intifada (2002-2005) (Rijke & Minca, 2019), Israel stopped processing reunification requests and stopped issuing visitor permits to non-resident family members (HaMoked, 2011). The Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research in October (2005) noted that about 17% of families were affected by this discriminating policy to the extent that a first-degree relative (parent, spouse, sibling or son/daughter) not registered in the population registry was denied *Haweya*. Of this 17%, nearly 80% filed unification requests and are still awaiting an official response, which normally takes several years (HaMoked, 2006; World Bank, 2007; B'Tselem 2009). Israeli reunification procedures are designed to deny Palestinians the right to return and make their reunification, if allowed, only on 'humanitarian' grounds (Naamneh, et al., 2018).

For international Palestinians they can get three-month tourist visas to visit families in the WB, but if they want to extend their stay or reside in the WB, then they struggle. In order to renew a visa every three months, Palestinians must exit Israel to Jordan for example, even for a day, so they can obtain a new visa on their return (Hass, 2006). This coping mechanism became more difficult in 2006 when Israel denied entry to many overseas Palestinians for family or business purposes even with a visa (Benn, 2006). Impact of this denial was enormous on those who had invested in the WB and those working for Palestinian governmental bodies, academic institutions and NGOs, as well as those returning or visiting family members (World Bank, 2007).

Biased policies towards Palestinians in the WB contrast sharply to the generous treatment of Israelis who wish to take up residency in WB colonial settlements. Residency in settlements is open not only to Israeli citizens but to all foreign citizens eligible for citizenship in Israel under the Israeli Law of Return (World Bank, 2007). The definition of a Jew under Israeli legislation is anyone with a Jewish mother, however, family members of Jews, including grandchildren, are also permitted to immigrate and reside in Israel (World Bank, 2007).

Further, apartheid is obvious in the way the Israeli government deals with Palestinian complaints over settler violence in the WB. Settlers in WB enjoy full rights and protections afforded Israeli citizens residing in Israel (Stahl, 2015; Yesh Din, 2011; 2018), as they are subject to Israeli civil law protection. Palestinians in the WB remain subject to

colonialism and are under military orders enacted by the Military Commander of the WB. In practical terms, this means that Palestinians are subjected to military courts, which provide inadequate legal protection than Israeli civil courts. Moreover, and due to the Israeli movement restrictions, it is not easy for Palestinians to access police stations in the WB in order to file complaints against settlers and Israeli soldiers abuse. Police stations are located either within settlements or on military bases and therefore cannot be accessed by Palestinians without permits.

Yesh Din (2011), an Israeli civil society organization, produced a report 'The systematic failures of the Military Police Criminal Investigations Division (MPCID) regarding investigations into offences committed by Israeli soldiers against Palestinians'. From 2005-2011, Yesh Din monitored 192 complaints by Palestinians against Israeli soldiers and analysed 67 MPCID investigation files. Data revealed that 96.5% of the 192 complaints were closed without indictments being filed. In 2015, Zev Stahl from Yesh Din (2015), reported that following complaints from Palestinians regarding offences by Israeli civilians between 2005-2014, only 7.4% of Police investigations resulted in indictments, while the remaining investigations were closed due to investigative failure. According to Yesh Din, police rarely interview Palestinians, nor do they regularly take forensic evidence (B'Tselem, 2016; Yesh Din; 2018). Moreover, of 185 investigation files monitored by Yesh Din between 2014-2017, only 21 reached a final stage that led to prosecution, while 164 files were closed without indictment (Yesh Din, 2018)


Attorney General of Israel has noted that failure to prevent attacks on Palestinian harvesters is an "element of a broader phenomenon of lack of appropriate law enforcement against Israelis" in the WB (Alon, et al., 2006). The lack of law enforcement against Israelis is a deliberate tactic used against Palestinians in order to make their life insecure and unbearable with the aim of forcing them to lose hope and leave Palestine. As a result, the tendency of Palestinian victims to not file complaints with Israel Police increased from 30% in 2015 to 42% in 2016. Most of these victims quoted mistrust of Israeli authorities, while others cited fear of negative consequences for themselves or their families (B'Tselem, 2016; OCHA, 2018b).

Israeli soldiers at the wall surveillance gates practise discriminating apartheid laws in the WB. It is important to distinguish between the types of allocated gates as they have different opening aims (World Bank, 2007). Access gates, such as 14 access gates around Jerusalem (B'Tselem, 2017b; Ahituv, 2018). Gates also have different opening hours (OCHA, 2018a). School gates for example are often open twice a day to coincide with school hours. Whereas, 'seasonal' agricultural gates are determined by a seasonal calendar, which specifies how many access days are needed per harvest or type of crop (World Bank, 2007; OCHA, 2011) (Map 5.2). Along the wall there are 74 gates; 52 gates

only open during the olive harvest between October and December (Ahituv, 2018), while 22 gates open daily for a few hours only (OCHA, 2013). Therefore, agricultural livelihoods of thousands of families have been undermined due to the permit and gate system, which restricts not only farmers access, but also their agricultural vehicles, equipment and materials, which might not be allowed through the wall (Feron, 2009; OCHA, 2013).

While colonial settlers and internationals enjoy the freedom of using gates and roads made exclusively for their use, Palestinians are denied use of these facilities and limited to special military guarded gates made exclusively for the use of Palestinians. These gates often run on a temporary or ad-hoc basis (World Bank, 2007), which worsen the daily struggles of Palestinians.

Through discriminating Zionist polices of concentrating the Palestinian population into Areas 'A' and 'B' and colonizing Area 'C', it is clear that Zionist settlers managed to intensify their project of colonialism and segregation in the WB that impacts on all aspects of Palestinian life. Israel has established apartheid regime in the WB since Oslo that transformed the Palestinians into a disposable population, which enabled Israel to carry out its project in the WB. Mohamad Dalbah, a Washington-based Palestinian analyst, says the crisis confronting Palestinians today is rooted in the "catastrophic" Oslo agreement that Abbas and the late Yasser Arafat signed with Israel (cited in Younes, 2018), which has intensified rather than reversed Israel's settler colonial project in the WB (Tartir, 2017). Instead of granting Palestinians freedom and equality, Oslo restructured relations of domination between the coloniser and the colonised (Clarno, 2017). The following section discuss the role of apartheid surveillance by the colonial project in ethnically isolating and dehumanising Palestinians.



Map 5-2: OCHA. 2011. The wall and the agricultural gates. [Online]. Accessed on 15.3.2017 via: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_agricultural_gates_july_2011.pdf

5.5 Colonial ethnic segregation: discriminating policies and settler only gates and roads

On the wall Israel uses colonial policies that favour Israelis and subjugate Palestinians. For example, Palestinians entering or residing in a Seam Zone without a permit can result in a five-year prison sentence or heavy fine (World Bank, 2007). However, Seam Zone restrictions apply only to Palestinians; Israeli citizens, residents, settlers and even eligible migrants to Israel are exempted from regulations prohibiting access and construction (World Bank, 2007). According to the IMFA, Israelis are:

A. Citizens of the State of Israel; B. Resident of the State of Israel, registered in the population registry of Israel in accordance with Population Registry Law, 1965, amended in Israel from time to time. C. One who is eligible to emigrate to Israel in accordance with the Law of Return, 1950, and as amended in Israel from time to time (cited in NAD, 2013)

Israelis not only enjoy free access to Seam Zones, they also enjoy free use of 'settlers only road', '*Tareeq-AL-Mostawteneen*' as it is commonly known amongst Palestinians. Overall, it is estimated that Palestinians are restricted from around 41 sections of roads in the WB, covering an approximate distance of 700km (B'Tselem 2004; 2006). Those roads are completely prohibited for Palestinians by vehicle or on foot, for whatever purpose, including transport of goods, or in medical emergencies. For example, in the WB 40.22km of roads are completely prohibited, while 19km of roads are restricted, in addition to 7.22km of totally closed roads in Hebron (B'Tselem, 2017c).

Some settler roads need permits, however, Palestinians in this case have to apply for two separate permits: a permit for themselves and a permit for their private, public or commercial vehicles, which is difficult to obtain. In other words, even if a driver managed to obtain a personal permit, but denied a vehicle permit, he is not allowed to drive on these roads (World Bank, 2007). If a non-permitted Palestinian vehicle is caught on one of these roads, the driver will be punished with a huge fine and loss of driving points (B'Tselem, 2004). Soldiers can identify a Palestinian car from the colour of its plate; Green plates are exclusively for WB Palestinian, while yellow plates are exclusively for Israeli citizens, internationals and for East Jerusalem citizens (World Bank, 2007). Thus, to be able to use restricted roads, Palestinians from WB have to use yellow plate public transport, run by Jerusalem blue *Haweya* drivers.

A system of 'settler only' roads or apartheid roads (Hasson, 2019) is often maintained to the highest quality to ensure free travel for settlers between the WB, Israel and settlements. However, Israel forces Palestinian drivers and vehicles onto an inferior set of roadways between major Palestinian areas (World Bank, 2007). Roads for Palestinians are often narrow, less maintained; circuitous and sometimes rough terrain, long distanced and snake around the wall with traffic jams due to checkpoints. Road restrictions make movement of Palestinians and goods lengthy, more expensive, inefficient and unpredictable, especially when multiple linking transports are used to get to work or facilities on the other side of the wall (B'Tselem, 2004). In commercial and business terms, an economy cannot run effectively if there is significant uncertainty about the ability of workers to reach their jobs, of goods reaching their markets, and of entrepreneurs being present to manage their place of business (World Bank, 2007).

This heightened visibility of Zionist racial apartheid policies against Palestinians highlights the on-going policies Israel is practising to further humiliate and emphasise their worthlessness and invisibility in the eye of their colonizer. Paradoxically, throughout the history of apartheid, Nazis used David stars to label Jews as the unwanted others; white supremacists in South Africa and the US used segregation policies in schools, buses and neighbourhoods. Currently and under the pretext of security, Israel separates Jews and Palestinians in WB by denying Palestinians the use of roads and entry points assigned for Jews only. Zionists have become experts at using pretexts of securitization (Ch4) to silence any criticism of Israeli policies/atrocities against Palestinians. For example, Zionists justify the intensive network of settler only roads as “to prevent excessive friction between Palestinians and Israelis” (B'Tselem, 2004). A discriminating apartheid policy managed to enhance the security and mobility of settlers while denying Palestinian access to major roads in the WB.

Zionists have become experts also at using pretexts of the Holocaust and anti-Semitism to counter any criticism of their policies against Palestinians. In 2002, former Knesset Member and leader of a left-wing Zionist party 'Meretz', Sholamit Aloni, was asked in an interview with the 'Democracy Now' channel about her opinion of 'Jew haters' and 'anti-Semitic' propaganda which Israel uses to silence any dissent against its policies in Palestine (Goodman, 2002). Aloni replied:

Well, it's a trick, we always use it. When from Europe somebody is criticising Israel, then we bring up the Holocaust. When in this country [the US] people are criticising Israel, then they are antisemitic [...] the ties between Israel and American Jewish establishment are very strong [...] they have power, money and media [...] Israel, my country right or wrong [...] they're not ready to hear criticism. It is very easy to blame people who criticise Israel [...] as antisemitism, the Holocaust and the suffering of the Jewish people to justify everything we do to the Palestinians (Aloni, 2002)

It should be noted that even colonial administrative restrictions on Palestinian movement are defined and have the effect of law by order of the IDF Commander of the WB. These rules are deliberately based on ad-hoc measures, verbally communicated to Palestinians, rarely published and highly changeable. Palestinians learn of comprehensive closures banning all movement or changed opening/closing hours only when faced by soldiers at the wall or at checkpoints (B'Tselem, 2004; World Bank, 2007). The aim is to create a system of chaos and highly unpredictable movement restrictions (World Bank, 2007), thus increasing the daily struggle for Palestinians which has become unbearable. According to the IDF International Law Department, military commanders have the right to issue sudden verbal closures to any road for security purposes (OCHA,

2006b; World Bank, 2007). Based on Israeli government data on the number of comprehensive closure days imposed on Palestinians between 2000-2018, various between a few days to hundreds of days each year (Table 5.1) (B'Tselem, 2019).

Year	Total number of days of closure
2000	73
2001	244
2002	77
2003	178
2004	163
2005	132
2006	122
2007	34
2008	52
2009	55
2010	44
2011	31
2012	11
2013	7
2014	29
2015	2
2016	16
2017	32
2018	27

Table 5-1: Figures on comprehensive Israeli closure days. Researcher work. Based on (B'Tselem, 2019). [Online]. Accessed on 13.4.2019 via:

https://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/siege_figures.

Monitoring of unpredictability studies suggest that unpredictability increases anxiety levels (Grillon, et al., 2004; Lake & LaBar, 2011). Anxiety is defined as a state of protracted fear or alertness in response to a threat that is ambiguous or undefined (Lang, et al., 2000). This explains feelings of anxiety and fear Palestinians experience when crossing wall/checkpoints. According to Paul Whalen (1998), unpredictability, ambiguity and uncertainty link to a situation or context in which a threat (not knowing when and how likely an event is to happen) may take various forms, thus various expectations and different behaviours may subsequently occur. Deliberate unpredictable ad-hoc running checkpoints increase Palestinians anxiety expressed via their body language, verbal

expressions, facial expressions and anxious questions. For example, is the gate open or closed? Is the mood of the soldiers good or bad? Are we going to pass today or not? Questions common between Palestinians at Israeli crossing points. Being unable to predict what happens in one's environment is stressful and requires complex coping skills according to Jennifer Jordan (2016). For Palestinians, those complex coping skills in dealing with unpredictable Zionist policies is summarized in '*sumud*' (Ch6 and Ch7).

IDF dehumanizing measures of ruling Palestinians in the WB were criticized on air in March 2019, by Oshrat Kotle, the leading news anchor on Israeli 'Channel 13'. Kotle said: "we send the children to the army, to the territories, and get back human animals. That is the result of the occupation" (cited in Stern, 2019). Kotle comments caused death threats to her and stirred huge controversy in Israel. The New Right Party Chief Naftali Bennett for example rebuked on Twitter:

Oshrat, you're confused...IDF soldiers give their lives so that you can sleep soundly. Animals are those terrorists who murder children in their beds, a teen out for a walk or an entire family driving down the road. IDF soldiers are our children, our strength. Apologize (cited in Staff, 2019)

The Yisrael Beytenu party joined in on the criticism and said:

We send journalists to sit in the air-conditioned studio with huge salaries and get back condescension [...] we embrace the soldiers of the IDF (cited in Staff, 2019)

Israel occasionally tries to improve its discriminative colonial image in the international public eye. For example, Israel transformed some checkpoints into private ones, staffed by armed civilian guards employed by private security companies. The colonial aim is to improve services for Palestinians on checkpoints, but in reality it is a colonial way of creating an impression of positive change under supervision of the Crossing Directorate of Israeli Ministry of Defence forces 'IDF' (Braverman, 2012). For Palestinians, private management of checkpoints exacerbates their struggle with the wall; the new 'civilised' surveillance is an extension of the previous one, if not worse. 'Crossing 300' at the Bethlehem wall is an example of this so-called civilised management, discussed below.

5.6 The civilized 'Crossing 300': masked apartheid and Palestinian everyday struggles

In 2006, the IDF released a statement indicating its wish to civilise surveillance of checkpoints in which "security will be privatized, and civilians rather than soldiers will conduct all security checks" (cited in Weizman, 2007, p. 150). Shaul Mofaz, then Minister of Defence, took charge in appointing the head of the new administration (Handel, 2010; B'Tselem, 2012). The spokesperson for IDF declared the aim of this action is to

“humanize the process” and to “lessen existing friction in security checks” and to “improve standards of service” (cited in Braverman, 2012). It was with the objective of “taking the army out of the checkpoints” (Weizman, 2007, p. 150). With the transformation of the wall from military to civilian control, one would expect an easier life for Palestinians that civilian control would be more human and smoother (Handel, 2009), but in reality, managing the wall became much worse. Abu Salem, says:

Fieldwork interview 5-1: 15.6.14. Abu-Salem, 60 years, retired, Married, 5 children, Al-Walaja

I have three sons working in Israel. They all work in construction. When we heard about the privatization of the checkpoint, we thought things would improve. Salem, my oldest son, said at least we won't see the nasty faces of soldiers. It turned out to be all Israeli lies. In reality, the bad faces remain the same; the appearance of workers is militarized, and the awful treatment of Palestinians became worse

While Israel tries to create an impression of newness through civilization, it does not make this transformation visible to Palestinians who visit this space on a daily basis. Palestinians, like Abu Salem, hoped that with transformative management of the checkpoint their daily struggles would be alleviated. Instead, the new private guards seem like an extension of the old wall surveillance. On this front, the wall's civilian management is not to ease Palestinian struggles on the wall; it is argued to airbrush the colonial image of the wall in the international eyes.

For example, there are special gates on 'Crossing 300' that are totally open for Israeli citizens and international tourists who usually receive professional treatment from soldiers. The same gates are forbidden to Palestinians who must cross through a gate exclusively for them, with the precondition of having a valid permit (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017b). The crossing is over-crowded which has led Israeli border police to confirm expansion of the area to create more lanes, and introduce technological upgrades to manage the build-up (Ashly, 2019). Ethnic separation and dehumanising of Palestinians continues. Palestinians queue for hours in what Hana Barag from '*Machsom Watch*' calls “cattle paths” (cited in Braverman, 2012, p. 312), sometimes in cold weather, or under the burning sun, to pass through the only gate to Jerusalem. Moreover, queues are not designed to accommodate Palestinian groups with special needs, elderly, parents with children, and women (Ashly, 2019).

On checkpoints Palestinians have to cross a journey of hardship (Aljazeera, 2018) after a congested long queue, comes the turnstile, where it is physically impossible to move in any way other than one-at-a-time or in any other direction but forward (Braverman, 2011). Aljazeera News (2018) presents detailed photos of the journey of hardship on the busiest checkpoint in the WB where approximately 15,000 Palestinians pass through

'Checkpoint 300' each morning. Palestinians cross long monitored cattle paths with security cameras, and one-way monitoring windows. They must then put their belts, shoes and accessories through security ex-ray machines, similar to airport security checks. Men, women and children must then cross through security gates till they finally reach a guarded window where they have to show their *Haweya* and crossing permits. If all pass the security checks, Palestinians are then able to proceed to the end of the path on the Israeli side of the wall (Braverman, 2012; Aljazeera, 2018).

This mechanism of metal "cattle path" queues is hardly new, nor is it by any means sophisticated, however, it enables strict control of movement by Israeli soldiers without necessitating any direct physical contact with Palestinians. This new form of surveillance is built into the infrastructure of the wall; it becomes embedded, standardized, routinized and thus transparent (Crang & Graham, 2007). Worse, it has normalized discriminating wall apartheid surveillance. For Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin surveillance is:

One of the most powerful strategies of imperial dominance because it suggests the power to process and it objectifies the colonized subject in a way that fixes its identity in relation to the colonizer (cited in Zureik, 2015, p. 95)

The cameras, sniper windows and guard towers built along the wall serve this purpose effectively; they constantly remind colonized Palestinians crossing the wall that their confinement is monitored and that there is no exit or entry into the WB cage without colonizer permission (Falah, 2005). The Zionist aim is that, enclosing Palestinians in isolated enclaves under strict surveillance of the colonizer should turn their life into intolerable misery, thus forcing them to flee Palestine. This was the aim of former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, when he said: "the larger effect of quarantining Palestinians is to make life socially and economically unbearable and to cause their emigration, mainly to Jordan" (cited in Falah, 2005; Zureik, 2015).

Civilized management of the wall made work for local and international human rights activists, who monitors and advocate Palestinians on checkpoints, much more difficult (Braverman, 2011; 2012). If those activists try to document colonial violations on the wall, soldiers demand them to stop, or they will deny Palestinians from crossing the wall. In all cases, Palestinians are the ones to be punished and to pay a high price for their freedom and dignity. In this regard Roni Hammerman, '*Machsom Watch*' says:

We have less and less power to change anything. We are pushed to the margins: here [checkpoint path] we're not allowed to enter; there it's declared a closed military zone or Area 'A'. So, everything happens somewhere else, somewhere inside. And we are pushed further and further away from that 'inside.' Once, we were able to stand near the soldiers and watch. Now, the most we can do is pass through the terminals like the Palestinians, and this, too, we're only allowed in a

small minority of passages, where the other side is not in Area A. But even as we do this, the soldiers threaten us that if we don't move along, they'll stop checking Palestinians [...] the direct connection with the soldier has disappeared completely. There's no more eye contact, which used to be such an important part of our work (cited in Braverman, 2012, p. 313)

Palestinians rarely see the new face-lift and are instead confronted with confusion of the wall's increasing bureaucratization due to invisible and inaccessible departments of military bureaucrats. In the past Palestinians may have been able to identify higher officers who issue commands on the checkpoints, and sometimes were able to negotiate their rights of access, now such identification is almost impossible. This reinforces Israel's overall sophisticated bureaucracy of the "occupation" (Braverman, 2011) where wall crossings are the central node of this bureaucracy. Sarah, explains:

Fieldwork interview 5-2: 1.3.14, Sarah, 44, housewife, divorced, Bethlehem

Before the wall, I remember the checkpoint was only few meters long, where we could talk to soldiers, face to face. In 2000, I remember, soldiers on *Qubat-Rahil*, [Rachael's Tomb] checkpoint in Bethlehem, didn't allow me and my sister to cross to Jerusalem. On that day, my sister had a visa interview in the Canadian embassy. She waited two years for this appointment. She couldn't wait longer to join her husband in Toronto. We showed the soldiers the embassy appointment paper, but they didn't care, and ordered us to go back where we come from! I refused to go back and insisted on talking to his higher manager/officer, our luck on that day he was a bit flexible. I explained to him the importance of the appointment. I even offered him to keep my "*Haweya*" as a guarantee that the minute we finish the interview will go back. We managed to go through on that day. My sister granted her visa

Sarah further says:

Everything has changed now, soldiers behind secured windows, you hardly talk to them. The amount of frustration and humiliation on checkpoints is unbearable

Colonial restrictions on road usage, and wall crossing points could face sudden closure at any time without notice (Amnesty International, 2006; OCHA, 2018a). Also, they run based on ad-hoc management, not patrolled between scheduled opening times, and do not operate regularly (Amnesty International, 2006; IDMC, 2006; Feron, 2009). Israel typically, argues that freedom of Palestinian movement is important, and Israel is keen to avoid causing Palestinians any hardship. Israel also claims that it enables the movement of Palestinians and their goods through dozens of crossing points at gates and checkpoints (IMFA, 2003). In reality however, Palestinians have to go through critical stages in their everyday experiences of crossing over 700 road obstacles including the

wall that affect the very essence of life (OCHA, 2018a). Azmi Bishara, Palestinian political analyst describes life in the WB and its “maze of walls gates [...] as tantamount to the recreation of detention camps where the exception becomes the rule [...] and the state of emergency becomes permanent” (cited in Zureik, 2015, p. 168). The following section discusses through shared stories about Palestinians and their daily humiliates, experiences crossing the wall.

5.7 Palestinian daily struggles: dehumanizing surveillance, strategies of queues, inconsistency and unpredictability

It is almost impossible to find a Palestinian who does not have a personal story about their own experience with the wall as an apartheid border/checkpoint, which suffocates and isolates Palestinians from each other and from the world. Rashid Khalidi (1997), on the special relationship between Palestinians and borders argues that the experience of crossing borders is integral to Palestinian identity. In order to understand the meaning of Palestinian identity it is necessary to understand the relationship between the experience of crossing and repositioning oneself within walls and checkpoints of colonialism. On the wall and checkpoints, Palestinians face the humiliation and vindictiveness of racist apartheid policies.

Palestinians feel an extreme state of alertness the moment they present their *Haweya* at a checkpoint where they are forcibly reminded of how much they are seen as contemptible by their colonizer and how they differ from others. They are constantly reminded of their low status and robbed of their rights by their supreme colonizer. Amal, relates her story:

Fieldwork interview 5-3: 18.5.14, Amal, 50, teacher, widow, 3 children, Aida camp

A soldier, who might be younger than my grandchildren, can humiliate us [Palestinians] at the checkpoint for no reason. I had a medical appointment at 11.00 am in Jerusalem. In order not to miss my appointment due to queues and waiting, I went to the wall at 7.00 am. The queue was long, crowded with Palestinians who were going to Jerusalem for various reasons. Soldiers ignored us; they were chatting with each other. After about 90 minutes, a soldier told us that the gate is closed, without any explanation. I tried to talk to them in English, I showed them my medical report and appointment paper, I told them I am sick and need to see the doctor. One soldier hardly 19 years old shouted at me and forced me to go back. I felt angry, but helpless, worthless and so humiliated

For Palestinians, when crossing the wall, or any Israeli checkpoint, queuing becomes the most critical stage. It affects the very essence of life for Palestinians, including depriving them of reaching their full social and economic potential. Many Palestinians

secure their position in the queues hours before the crossing is officially open. Insherah, works in Jerusalem says:

Fieldwork interview 5-4: 11.4.14, Insherah, 39, teacher, married, 3 children, Bethlehem

I'm working in Beit-Hanina school for more than 20 years. Since the start of building the wall I have to queue at 5.00 in the morning, to be at work by 8.30. Everyday I go through three travel stops before reaching my work. From my house to the wall I face the nightmare of queuing and slow progress, then searched [...] checked and allowed through to the crossing in the Israeli side of the wall. I use public transport; usually there are tens of East Jerusalem vans/taxis waiting to take us to "*Bab-Al-Amoud*" in Jerusalem. I get the final transport to my work in Beit-Hanina in northern Jerusalem. This is the daily schedule of a one-way journey! Since the more sophisticated regime of inspections and ad-hoc crowded turnstiles in the morning, I must now begin to queue at 5.00 in the morning. It is very hard way of life we [Palestinians] face on a daily basis. If it were not for income to support my family, I would have left my work ages ago

Research indicates that life in the shadow of the wall and checkpoints makes Palestinians lose a sense of time. This might be called "racialized time" (Zureik, et al., 2010, p. 18) where discriminating treatment of Palestinians at the wall shows the ability of colonial settings to inject racialism and affect one's mastery and use of time (Zureik, et al., 2010, p. 17). While time for other nations might mean punctuality, planning ahead, meeting appointments and deadlines, making money, progress and development. For Palestinians, like Insherah, wall surveillance strategies empty time of value and meaning. Samiha, says:

Fieldwork interview 5-5: 15.6.14, Samiha, 46, Headteacher, Single, Aida camp

We can't organise any school trip to the seaside without applying for *Tasreeh* [Israeli permit] in advance. Nothing is predictable or guaranteed [...] we could waste the summer term waiting, Israel can deny us *Tasreeh*, or soldiers can deny us entry to Israel even if we obtained the *Tasreeh*. Imagine the student's frustration if this happens. I have people in my school who have never seen the sea, which is only 40 minutes away from our camp

Samiha expresses the struggles of planning ahead or being productive. Time at the wall, and the discriminating surveillance policies in general, have become constant reminders of their worthlessness in the eyes of their coloniser, of their missed opportunities, delays, waiting, boredom and queues. Julie Peteet (2018), argues that time and space have been always critical to colonial rule in Palestine, where both Palestinians and Israelis occupy different time and space zones defined by the wall, checkpoints, by-pass roads

and permit systems. Israeli time becomes distinguished from Palestinian time by deploying methods aimed to suppress, block, or delay. Further it aims at killing Palestinian time to become eventually hollow, static, and discontinuous (Zureik, et al., 2010).

Several years prior to construction of the wall, checkpoints and roadblocks were sometimes passable in the sense that Palestinians soon found routes around them to cross into Israel. Palestinians in Bethlehem for example used to find their way around a checkpoint stop before the wall and 'Crossing 300'. Nawal, describes:

Fieldwork interview 5-6: 20.6.14, Nawal, 44, nurse, married, 4 children, Aida camp

When I was in my twenties, I worked as a nurse in Al-Makassed hospital in Eastern Jerusalem and had to queue at the checkpoint in the early morning to go to my work. Israel used to give me a 3-month permit. On expiry date I had to apply for a new permit. I remember the awful waiting period, up to 2 weeks. Yet, I had to keep going to my work, or lose my job. The struggle was entering Israel and not on the return trip [exiting Israel]. On my way to work I had to avoid the checkpoint; I wouldn't be allowed without a permit. Therefore, I had to find my way around the checkpoint. The only way was by using the 'Cremesian Hills' with other Palestinians in a similar situation as mine, or Palestinians just wanting to visit Jerusalem for a day. The hills were cross the road, and directly opposite the checkpoint. Soldiers can clearly see us while crossing. They knew we were heading to Jerusalem without permits. It was a game for them; sometimes after the hassle of crossing the hills, we find them waiting for us on the other side to return us to Bethlehem. Once, it was raining and I fell down while crossing the hills. I felt so embarrassed, people rushed to help me. We were falling down one by one in the slippery mud. I can't forget the painful scene of an old man falling on his back, and I can't forget my anger when I saw the soldiers watching and laughing at us

Following Nawal's story, the difficulties and mainly psychological stress as a result of long waiting hours, going around the confinement of the wall, and the unpredictability of what mood the soldiers must be in makes Palestinians feel fundamentally powerless with no real possibility of developing a collective strategy (Hammami, 2005). Despite the daily hardship, humiliation and exhaustion Nawal endured, but she considers those days as golden days when at least she was able to reach Jerusalem:

Those days were the golden days for me. At least we had the chance to sometimes get to Jerusalem without permits. Now, all gone, even the Cremesian Hills vanished behind the wall

Paradoxically, the only consistent theme at the crossings is inconsistency. This inconsistency is yet another form of randomness where people never know what obstacles they might encounter, and they never know what to expect. Rajab, says:

Fieldwork interview 5-7: 12.6.14 Rajab, 45, accountant, married, 2 children, Bethlehem

Queues might take hours, depends on soldier's mood. If soldiers have bad mood waiting could take longer. I have to queue on my way to work, and also on my way back. I finish work at 2.00 and supposed to be home about 3.00. Sometimes I get home around 5.00 and sometimes 6.00. By the time I'm home I'm ready to go to bed from exhaustion and frustration. We have our lunch around 3.00, but I asked my family not to wait for me. The kids come home from school hungry and it is not fair for them to keep waiting. Usually our social life starts after 4.00, either visiting our parents or some close friends. I asked my wife to go without me as I don't know when I'll be home. I don't interact with my children as much. I feel I became isolated and distant from my family

Queues and inconsistency at crossing points not only affect Rajab, but also his family. They disrupt their life and put stress on all family members. Because wall gates are the only way for Palestinians to reach hospitals, schools, workplaces, family and essential services, ad-hoc opening hours cause serious problems for Palestinians, especially in cases of medical emergencies. Ismael, says:

Fieldwork interview 5-8: 5.2.14 Ismael, 33, driver, married, 6 children, Al-Walaja

While I was queuing, a man in front of me started arguing with the soldiers. The man was with his pregnant wife who obviously wasn't feeling well. The man was shouting, [We've waited nine years to have this baby], [please let my wife go through, she needs to go to the hospital in Jerusalem]. The man's shouting started getting louder towards the soldier's [I don't care attitude]. Suddenly, the soldiers fired gas grenade near the jammed queue. We couldn't see or breathe; a burning sensation in our eyes, nose and throat. I saw two old women collapse in the turnstile. Some men helped them [...] we all started running away. I couldn't see the man and his wife amongst the running crowds. If only I could know what happened to them and their unborn baby?

Colonial surveillance in Ismael's traumatic story is linked to the faces and attitudes of Israeli soldiers. Therefore, daily confrontations with soldiers on the wall, represents the bare face of colonialism that has immense power over Palestinians destiny (Hammami, 2010). Discriminating surveillance of the gate and permit system also obliges relatives and friends to acquire visitor permits in order to visit family and friends behind the wall on the Israeli side. However, it is nearly impossible to obtain this permit. As a result, the social life of Palestinians and their social connections have deteriorated so that now the

religious holidays, weddings and funerals that take place behind the wall are held without the attendance of extended families (OCHA, 2009). This in turn has affected cohesion of family life, customary social life and Palestinian traditional norms. Abu Sultan, says:

Fieldwork interview 5-9: 16.1.2014, Abu-Sultan, 75, retired, married, 7 children and 23 grandchildren, Bethlehem

I come from a large extended family with very strong family ties. As a family we always stand by each other. Attend family gatherings, family wedding and funerals. We never hesitate to support each other or protect each other. For instance, we collect money to help family youths to get married or establish a life or build a house; we support our youth in their education and relatives in need. The wall has destroyed this strong bond. Now we can't be there for our cousins at their weddings, or their funerals. Last week I couldn't attend my uncle's funeral because of the closure. It was the most devastating day of my life

Moreover, traditionally Palestinian women should move to their husband's locality after marriage, but due to the wall and its gate and permit system, women who get married outside their own village/city face difficulties visiting family and relatives (HEPG & LACC, 2003; NAD, 2003). A study by Dr Helga Brunborg in 2004, found that prior to the wall, 14.4% of Palestinian households "found it problematic for a person to marry a person living in the area that later would end up on the other side of the wall" (2004, pp. 44-45). After the wall this percentage increased to 50.4%. Brunborg found that the percentage was the same for households on both sides of the wall. This shows that the wall is affecting the marriage pattern in Palestine on both sides. It is particularly problematic for those who have limited marriage options in relatively small population communities on the west side of the wall. Rema from Aida refugee camp explains:

Fieldwork interview 5-10: 13.2.14, Rema, 38, administrator, single, Aida camp

I couldn't attend my own sister's [Samia] wedding in Beit-Safafa; a 1948 Palestinian village on the other side of the wall, to the north of Bethlehem. Actually, none of my family did, it was impossible to get a permit to attend the wedding party on the Israeli side. My sister's husband is an 'Arab Palestinian' citizen of Israel, and in our culture the wedding party should be held in the groom's house. However, we made Samia a small, simple celebration on the night of her wedding and we invited all our friends and relatives. She wore her wedding dress at the party. We were all sad; Samia was leaving us for the unknown, behind the wall. The party turned into a gathering full of tears. My mother was crying, everybody at the party was crying. We won't be able to visit Samia in her new house. Samia is now pregnant and trying desperately to find a way for my mother to attend her birth and to help with the new arrival. My mother

and my brothers regret approving Samia's marriage. They say: if we could turn time back, we would never accept sending our daughter behind the wall

Not only the wall dramatically changed family life, it has also destroyed many cultural norms. Indeed, the increasing difficulty in visiting relatives has forced parents to become reluctant to endorse any matches that would necessitate their daughters moving behind the wall or to one of the closed 'Seam Zones' communities (OCHA, 2009). In other words, the wall has reduced the choice options for a spouse (BADIL & IDMC, 2006).

Cultural cleansing or cultural occupation happens when cultural consequences of a conflict affect heritage and identity (Baker, et al., 2009) (Ch3). Zionist goals of widening physical gaps between Palestinians are used as means of domination to destroy Palestinian social and cultural life. Donia, shared her story with me. She had to break-up with the person she loves because he resides on the other side of the wall:

Fieldwork interview 5-11: 9.1.14, Donia, 27, social worker, single, Al-Walaja

Tayseer from 'Om-el-Fahem'; a 1948 Palestinian town in Israel, works as an advocate for Palestinian victims of torture in Israel. I met Tayseer in one of the workshops in Ramallah. It was love at first sight. After two years we decided to get married. My father and brothers totally refused this marriage; 'He is not from our side, my father told me'. It was the biggest shock ever. We both tried our best to change my family decision. Tayseer even sent well-respected figures from his side to convince the family to reconsider their decision. We suggested living in Bethlehem or Ramallah just to sort out the problem, but Tayseer's family, mainly his mother, refused the idea. Tayseer is an only son, and his mother insisted that he should live close to family and in the flat his father built for him in their building. I thought about of running away with Tayseer, but fears for my family's reputation, which would be socially stigmatized, stopped me. What will happen to my mother, to my younger three sisters? The fear that no one will knock on my family's door to propose to my sisters, paralyzed me

Donia's statement highlights not only the role of the wall in determining the successes and failures of marriages and relationships between Palestinians accordance to their place of residence around the wall, but also, shows the ability of the wall to turn people's lives into misery by denying their desire to live on the same side of the wall. Due to conservative social and cultural standards relating to women in Palestine, the wall has a greater impact on women than men, not only in choosing a spouse, but in all social aspects. For example, most Palestinian women do not travel alone after dark or stay overnight away from their homes.

Therefore, the wall restricts women's freedom, movement, progress and employment more than men. Muna, had to quit her work in Ramallah due to daily delays she faced

on her way back from work. Muna had to use '*Wadi-Al-Nar*' the 'Fire-Road' that twists around the wall linking Bethlehem to northern parts of the WB, mainly Ramallah city:

Fieldwork interview 5-12: 2.3.14, Muna, 25, Bank worker, single, Bethlehem

I had a very good position in one of the Banks in Ramallah, but my brothers insisted that I must quit my work because they weren't happy that I come home late from work. Sometimes for unpredictable reasons, soldiers might close checkpoints on our way back to Bethlehem. Of course, we have to wait and wait, for hours sometimes with long lines of cars queuing to pass through. In addition to the closure of checkpoints in all Jewish religious occasions, where I had to sleep over couple of times in my friend house in Ramallah. My brothers weren't happy with that. I tried to convince them to rent in Ramallah; a flat with other girlfriends. They refused; this is not acceptable in our family. Consequently, I had to quit my job and I am now without a job for eight months

Palestinian struggles for liberation are perpetually strangled by the apartheid of the colonial project. Palestinians in return try to preserve their ordinary life and livelihoods. Van Teeffelen states: "when the home itself becomes a place of oppression, even a prison, staying does become an extraordinary choice to preserve an ordinary life" (cited in Ryan, 2015, p. 306). Being one of the main historical and religious governorates in Palestine, Bethlehem suffers most from colonial apartheid policies that dominate its tourism. Specifically, the wall, which completely blocks Palestinians and tourists from moving freely between the two main historic and religious cities in Palestine; Bethlehem and Jerusalem (Al-Rimmawi, et al., 2013). The following chapter discusses settler colonial efforts to direct Palestinian tourism into surrounding colonial settlements in the WB. Also, it discusses how Palestinians in Bethlehem resist and survive imposed apartheid restrictions on their tourism, and how they preserve an ordinary life while resisting.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter argues that the impact of surveillance on the wall affects Palestinians more than the physical wall itself. Specifically, it discusses the role of apartheid surveillance strategies of closed Seam Zones, *Haweyas* and permits, settler only gates and roads, walls and queues, which dehumanise Palestinians and control their resources. The chapter shows that surveillance of the wall is based on a set of apartheid administrative practices and permit policies that prevent Palestinians from living an ordinary life.

Moreover, the chapter highlights the role of the apartheid wall in transforming 'geographic continuity' of Palestinian land to confirm perceptions of unwanted otherness, as those Palestinians living beyond. The chapter also reveals how ethnic affiliation and

political allegiances of settler colonialists override human rights of Palestinians to define 'us' against 'them' through a set of discriminating apartheid policies and hybrid tech surveillances. It discusses how the colonial project depends on a hybrid of low-tech and hi-tech surveillance tools and strategies, deceptively termed 'security industry', which subjugate Palestinians. It also shows that settler colonial surveillance cannot be separated from their philosophy of the 'other' suspects of dangerous Palestinians who they claim are a constant threat to Israel's security. Therefore, Palestinians must be under surveillance around the clock.

The chapter argues that settler colonial surveillance strategies linked to a colonial philosophy of the 'unwanted others' have ultimately served to dispossess and control Palestinians and their resources under the pretext of terror management and securitization. In other words, Israeli surveillance is a form of political power that hides the more worrying practice of colonialism. The chapter also discusses the discriminating surveillance policies that subjugate Palestinians and favour Israelis, including settler only road and gates policies and the closed Seam Zones and permit policies.

The chapter moreover illustrates how the wall accumulates by dispossession via ethnical control of Palestinian access to resources, mainly water and land. The chapter also examines how wall surveillance policies are based on ad-hoc measures verbally communicated to Palestinians and not supported by published rules or procedures. Ad-hoc surveillance policies create a system of chaos, of non-transparent and highly unpredictable movement restrictions (World Bank, 2007), thus serving Sharon's goal of making life socially and economically unbearable for Palestinians in order to cause their emigration (Falah, 2005; Zureik, 2015). All feed into the bigger goal of Zionism, Land with no people.

Finally, the chapter shares statements of Palestinians in their daily struggles with dehumanizing ad-hoc surveillance policies of queues, inconsistency and unpredictability at 'Crossing 300' in Bethlehem, in what Hana Barag from '*Machsom Watch*' calls the "cattle paths" (cited in Baverman, 2012, p. 312). Overall, the chapter demonstrates how an apartheid settler colonial project has transformed Palestinians into a disposable population struggling to preserve ordinary life.

Chapter 6

Colonial tourism and *sumud* tourism of Bethlehem

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the role of apartheid surveillance and its impact on all aspects of Palestinian life. Tourism, potentially a significant income-generating sector in the WB, with important religious sites (UN, 2018), has been hit severely. Examining the harmful role of Israeli tourism in Palestine, which suffocates Palestinian tourism, is a crucial component when challenging Zionist projects in the WB. Discriminating policies of Judaizing the Holy Land (Ch3), a set of complex surveillance policies of the wall (Ch5) and colonial settlements (Ch4), managed to break physical links between the iconic landscape of the Holy Land (Bethlehem and Jerusalem). As a result, both Palestinians and tourists are now prevented from travelling freely between the two cities (Al-Tamimi, 2003; Al-Rimmawi, 2003; Cohen-Hattab, 2004; Chaitin, 2011; Issac & Hodge, 2011; Al-Rimmawi et al., 2013; Issac, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2013; Al-Rimmawi & Butcher, 2015), Bethlehem has become a city of constant struggle with complex and severe colonial restrictions on tourism, its main source of livelihood (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017a).

This chapter shows how Zionists use apartheid policies, including the wall, to further undermine Palestinian tourism. These policies dehumanise Palestinians and direct tourism to surrounding colonial settlements (NAD, 2015). To enhance the role of colonial tourism in the WB, local Israeli and International tourism companies promote tourism as being a part of Israel.

The chapter also examines colonial efforts to overpower Palestinian tourism to ensure that tourist expenditure goes to Israel and not to Palestinians. One mechanism for this is the role played by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the most powerful pro-Israel lobby group in America supporting colonial tourism in the WB. The chapter discusses a growing encounter between AIPAC and American human rights organisations, including some members of Congress. Moreover, it highlights surveillance against Palestinians and also international supporters and visitors, and also the struggles of Palestinian shop owners and tour companies in Bethlehem with colonial restrictions on tourism.

It is argued that systems of power do not determine forms of resistance but do create possibilities for distinct types of resistance to emerge (Richter-Devroe, 2013). To counter the hegemonic system of tourism Palestinian *sumud* community activities defy the confinement of the wall. *Sumud* acts include inviting tourists to support Palestinian

tourism by engaging with narratives of the political situation in Palestine. These acts have been called 'alternative tourism', also referred to as activist, justice, political, solidarity tourism (Salazar, 2006; Chaitin, 2011; Al-Rimmawi, 2015; Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017a), and tourism for peace

The chapter highlights how the apartheid approach actually, in some ways, backfired against the Israeli state. In Bethlehem, the wall inadvertently turned into a highly attractive touristic site of a modern apartheid in the heart of the colonial project of WB (Salih & Richter-Devroe, 2014). The chapter highlights the role of wall tours, graffiti on the wall, murals, and film projected on to the wall, infusing the wall with new meaning and purpose. For example, graffiti of the British artist, Banksy, on the wall and his museum hotel, the 'Walled Off Hotel' (2019), highlights how different forms of tourism can attract tourists to the wall and deepen their understanding of the Palestinian struggle. Controversial debates about the political *sumud* of Banksy's artwork, graffiti and the 'Walled Off Hotel' are also discussed.

The significant role 'arts on the wall' plays as part of *sumud* against Zionist project in Palestine is examined and the chapter discusses how graffiti on the wall has inadvertently managed to turn the Bethlehem side of the wall into a highly attractive touristic site of modern apartheid (Salih & Richter-Devroe, 2014). The chapter argues that the wall and protest artwork on the wall simulate each other in a process of mutual opposition. The wall revives the role of artwork as a political tool of *sumud* in Palestine, which generates more international solidarity with Palestinians and solidifies Palestinian *sumud*. While artwork on the wall exposes the role of the wall as an apartheid tool of colonialism, which generates more international opposition against the wall.

The chapter looks at how *sumud* tourism creates political and cultural awareness through stays at Aida refugee camp and shares Palestinian statements about their reasons and experiences in hosting tourists in Aida camp. *Sumud* tourism in Aida camp helps to generate money for improving living standards of host families and at the same time helps to bridge social, cultural and political differences between Palestinians and the rest of the world. Individual and group projects highlight the role of Palestinians in finding ways around confinement of the wall and its surveillance policies and colonial tourism.

Importantly, tourists, during their stay with Palestinians, experience what it means to be a Palestinian living in the shadow of the wall and under colonialism. Specifically, tourists get the chance to see the human face of Palestinian daily life and witness their strong determination to affirm a normal life for themselves and for their families, despite all odds.

This chapter discusses Palestinian acts of *sumud*, (steadfastness), as acts of existence and affirmation of life. For Palestinians *sumud* represents inner strength or hardiness of Palestinians to confront and survive extreme conditions (see *sumud* Ch1). It is an attempt


to improve their lives, their growing socio-economic needs and to deal with changing realities after the wall. *Sumud* tourism is discussed as acts of determination to find coping mechanisms to confront impacts on their tourism as a result the colonial project and associated apartheid policies. The chapter discusses Palestinians acts of *sumud* to compete with colonial efforts which undermine their tourism, dehumanize them, and direct their tourism to surrounding colonial settlements. The chapter also shows how Palestinians protect their tourism in Bethlehem via *sumud* acts, linked directly to colonial policies imposed upon their tourism. For instance, 'alternative tourism' in Bethlehem represents *sumud* acts meant to attract tourists to their city to counter Israeli efforts to control tourists and direct them to colonial settlements.

6.2 Colonial power over Palestinian tourism

Since the onset of the colonial project, Israel has deliberately used tourism as a tool to advance its political agenda. In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, Israel effectively prevented the WB and Gaza Strip from potential global tourism through obstructive realities of colonialism, or negative representations of Palestinians seen in Western media (Al-Tamimi, 2003; Al-Rimmawi, 2003; Cohen-Hattab, 2004). This severely hampered tourism flows to the archaeological heritage of WB and its associated growth potential. In the 1980s, the Jordanian government played a central role by creating a desirable investment climate for regional tourism, partly to support neighbouring Palestinian economic growth (Al-Rimmawi 2003; Hazbun, 2008; Stein 2008). From Oslo to the Second Intifada (1993-2000), both Jordan and Israel invested heavily in regional tourism. In the interim period of 1995 Oslo II Accords (Elkhafif, et al., 2014), and following the 29 April 1994 protocol of Paris regarding Economic Relations, fiscal and trade relations between Israel and the PA were regulated.

As a result, in the years 1994-1999 Israel retained full control over Palestinian trade and tax revenues (Elkhafif, et al., 2014). However, collected taxes and duties would no longer flow into the Israeli treasury but would be handed over to the PA (Fanack, 2016). With this source of income, a substantial portion of PA expenditure went on tourism. Consequently, Bethlehem expected to emerge as one of the most promising pillars of a new economic era for attracting Christian pilgrims and cultural tourists.

Between 1999 and 2011, 1999 was the best in regard to tourism (Al-Rimmawi, 2003). This was due to a period of calm between Palestinians and Israelis resulting from the Oslo Accords. Implementations on both sides and high international expectations for prolonged peace in the region stimulated growth in tourism numbers. However, on artificial cap has been placed on potential development of the sector with imposed colonial restrictions on Palestinian movement and land (map 6.1).



Map 6-1:NAD, 2017. Christmas procession route. [Online]. Accessed on 1.4.19 via:
<https://www.nad.ps/en/publication-resources/infographics/christmas-procession-route>

A conservative backlash to the perceived concessions Palestinians were receiving from the Oslo process led to escalation and the 2000 uprising which ended the period of inclusion, cooperation and growth for Palestinian tourism (Stein, 2008). 2000 was a turning point where peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis in Washington reached a dead-end, and shortly after, the former Israeli Prime minister Ariel Sharon, in

a purposefully provocative move, visited Al-Aqsa mosque with armed guards (Goldenberg, 2000). Sharon's visit was the spark that ignited the Second Intifada of 2001 which was disastrous for Palestinians on all levels, including economic growth and tourism, as Israel locked out the WB and Gaza Strip to travellers (Aljazeera, 2003).

Consequently, fewer tourists arrived and those who did arrive via Israeli-owned tourist operators. Palestinian tourism, compared to Israeli tourism operating in Palestine, was hit hard in the aftermath of the uprising and has not appreciably recovered. Relationships with dominant colonial authorities, supported by the US administration, started to deteriorate with what Isaac (2010b) described as a 'bait-and-switch' tactic with the end game of expanding Israeli realities on the ground. It deteriorated further with extension of the colonial tourism-industry and settlers, as part of an Israeli WB integration strategy after Oslo (Al-Rimmawi, 2003). The gap between the two sides worsened after building of the wall, with ghettoization of the WB.

Palestinian tourism was and still is particularly vulnerable. The division of Palestinian land into 'A', 'B' and 'C' areas facilitated not only a colonial land grab, but also domination over tourism in the WB. Under Oslo, Israeli tourist itineraries expanded to include Palestinian sites and Arab-owned tourism related industries, especially hospitality services and local handicrafts. General Secretary of the Palestinian National Initiative, Mostafa Barghouti states that, since 2004 Israel has exerted effective control of territories that under Oslo agreements, were handed over to exclusive control of the PA (IMEMC, 2017). Israel doesn't rule these areas directly as it once did, but still controls them using the PA as a proxy.

Israel further utilised apartheid policies to take over Palestinian land, particularly areas with historical and religious sites. For instance, Israel managed to utilise land division in area 'C' to annex Palestinian historical and religious sites. Mar-Saba Monastery in Bethlehem, En-Nabi Musa, Qumran caves and shores of the Dead Sea in Jericho are examples of colonial annexation (Falah, 2014). Israel's control of these sites has halted efforts by the PA and the Palestinian private sector to further develop tourism and maximize economic returns (Falah, 2014). Worse, Israel managed to utilise the wall to destroy Palestinian sites that are not part of its control. The Palestinian Ministry of Tourism reported that Israel damaged/destroyed around 1,000 Palestinian historical sites in the process of building the wall (State of Palestine, 2017).

In this regard, PA figure Hanan Ashrawi (NAD, 2017), noted that Israel actually promotes Palestinian Islamic sacred places and presents Christian holy sites in a Jewish-Zionist context. Israel has assumed control over several important sites in the WB, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem, the Baptismal site, Church of Imwas (Emmaus) in the Latrun Valley and other shrines in the Jordan Valley (NAD, 2017). In

Palestinian sites that Israel does not have full control over, such as the Nativity Church of Bethlehem, colonial settlers used alternative policies to control them. With construction of Israeli settlements and the wall, Israel has managed to control Bethlehem by isolating it from the rest of the WB, and importantly, from Jerusalem. As a result, Bethlehem has suffered most in the tourism sector, with being one of the main historical and religious cities in Palestine.

Colonial restrictive actions since Oslo have resulted in Palestinian economic hardship and collapse (UN, 2018). Tourism for example, which plays a vital role in Bethlehem, represents one of the most important and potentially profitable economic sectors in Palestine. With its touristic and religious status, it is the second major tourist attraction, after Jerusalem. However, colonial restrictions on mobility have severely impacted the very essence of life in Bethlehem, depriving Palestinian full economic potential. Bethlehem governorate suffered most with having the highest unemployment rate in the WB (NAD, 2017).

Israeli restrictions have created a high percentage of unemployed, yet educated young people in Bethlehem, with approximately 30.2% unemployed in 2018 (Trading Economics, 2018). The unemployment rate in Palestine increased to 29.1% in the fourth quarter of 2018 compared to 24.5% in 2017. Unemployment rates in Palestine averaged 23.65% between 1995-2018, reaching an all-time high of 35.60% in the third quarter of 2002, and a record low of 8.80% in the second quarter of 2000 (Trading Economics, 2018). Hanan Ashrawi, said in this regard:

The Israeli government has imposed a draconian system of restrictions on Palestinian movement in Occupied Palestine, and it continues to fragment Palestinian land and families with its illegal settlement enterprises, military checkpoints and apartheid walls, as well as settler extremism and violence which constitute serious impediments not only to tourism, but also to the very essence of life in Palestine (cited in NAD, 2017).

Moreover, colonial violations of Oslo Agreement on 'Movement and Access' provided that, "consistent with security needs Israel will facilitate the movement of people and goods within the WB and minimize disruption to Palestinian lives" (World Bank, 2007). The common basis for all these undertakings is the acknowledgement that without efficient and predictable movement of people and goods, there is very little prospect for a sustainable Palestinian economic recovery (World Bank, 2007). Therefore, the tourism sector in the WB has been unable to reach its potential due to the practises and policies of the colonial project (UN, 2018). However, it is not only colonial restrictions and domination over Palestinian tourism, but also colonial efforts to direct expenditure of tourism to surrounding colonial settlements, which is discussed below.

6.3 Colonial efforts to undermine tourism in the WB

On-going campaigns of colonization and apartheid policies, in specific the wall and its surveillance policies (Ch5), managed to completely disconnect bonds between two major historic, religious and touristic cities in Palestine-Bethlehem and Jerusalem. Decades ago, Bethlehem was on the verge of being connected to Jerusalem (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017a). The link between the two cities would have established a vital historical, religious access to a major global tourism destination hub, where tourists and pilgrims begin their tour from Jerusalem and end in Bethlehem. Although the city lies just three miles from Jerusalem's southern outskirts travel between the two cities is logistically complicated.

Tourists must navigate an Israeli checkpoints, often involving a wait of about 90 minutes, to move between the two cities, and the wall reinforces the impression that Bethlehem, a scene of fierce fighting during the Second Intifada and the following clashes 2017-2018, is still not entirely safe (Stewart, 2010). A study in 2014, sheds light on colonial tactics that hit Palestinian tourism in Bethlehem, including distorting the image of Palestinian tourism. Data shows that about 23% of inbound tourists indicated that they were warned by Israeli tour agencies or Israeli tour guides about safety if visiting the WB. About 16% were advised not to visit the WB (Falah, 2014).

Controversially, Israel undermines Palestinian tourism in the WB, but at the same time recruit international celebrities, politicians, and pilgrims to enhance Israeli tourism on colonised land. These acts obscure the reality of state violence. Trips are usually part of the Brand Israel campaign (Winstanley, 2017), as Israel engages well known figures to promote a false image of Israel as a fun, exotic, and safe haven in a sea of hostile Arab countries, rather than an on-going perpetrator of violence and apartheid against the native population of the WB (USCPR, 2019).

A discriminating set of complex surveillance policies (Ch5) together with the wall and settlements (Ch4) led Palestinians to lose control over their tourism and revenue from it. At the same time Israel intensified its efforts to develop and fund tourism in surrounding colonial settlements in the WB (NAD, 2015). All Israeli tourism related projects located on land of the WB are funded, promoted and managed by the Israeli government and institutions: the Israeli Ministry of Tourism; Israel Nature and Parks Authority, and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) are all involved in funding and managing touristic projects in colonial settlements within the WB (NAD, 2017). It is what Ashrawi refers to as "colonial acts" to ensure that tourist expenditure goes to Israel and not to Palestinians (cited in NAD, 2017).

In further efforts to undermine tourism in the WB, and to divert the economy to their side, the Israeli government, with the support of colonial settlers, individuals and families, has developed a complex network of funded services. For example, Israeli settlements

intensified winery and organic food industry projects to compete with Eco tourism in the WB. The major two-winery development sites are in northern WB, around 'Shomron' settlements and in central WB around Bethlehem and Hebron (Kamisher, 2016). On the Israeli Ministry of Tourism's website, those two areas are listed alongside the colonised Golan as major wine areas.

Other settlement-linked tourism projects are Israeli restaurants, souvenir shops and farms catering to tourist buses on their route to historical/religious sites in the WB (Mortensen, 2018). In this case, tourists arrive in Palestinian areas without the need to shop or dine and wine. For example, on the route from Jerusalem to the Jordan Valley, roads are crowded with new Israeli restaurants offering tourists affordable dining options. Such establishments can also be found along the border with Jordan, in areas that are largely restricted to Palestinians, despite being located firmly within the WB.

A few hundred metres from the north-western banks of the Dead Sea there is the 'Ahava Visitor Centre', decorated with Israeli flags, which sells Dead Sea products such as 'With Love from Israel' skincare gift sets to tourist groups, mainly American, Russian and Korean, that arrive in buses every ten minutes (Mortensen, 2018). For visitors, it is not easy to tell that one is no longer within the internationally recognised borders of Israel, but in the colonised WB, in an Israeli colonial settlement, illegal under international law.

Colonial efforts appear determined to shut out Palestinians, rendering them both uncompetitive and unable to provide the same services as their Israeli counterparts (Al-Rimmawi & Butcher, 2015). This is achieved by denying Palestinians control over the entry and exit of tourists in the WB, including East Jerusalem. Palestinians are restricted by their coloniser when it comes to receiving economic benefit from tourists who visit the WB. It is because Palestinians do not control their own borders, collect touristic data, or even control revenues from tourists (Al-Rimmawi & Butcher, 2015). Israel controls Palestinian touristic sites by proxy, as the flow of tourists is monopolised by Israeli. When analysing trends of tourism in Palestine in relation to Jordan and Israel, data shows that while impediments of colonialism and international borders create relative disadvantages for Palestinian (Al-Rimmawi, et al., 2013). Jordan and Israel reap the rewards in areas cut off to Palestinian businesses, such as Jerusalem and across the Jordan River (Al-Rimmawi, et al., 2013).

To support tourism in colonial settlements, Israeli private and public sectors have developed networks of cultural entertainment activities aimed at attracting international visitors. For example, shooting ranges at Etzion settlements in south Bethlehem and cultural activities in historical sites such as the 'Old city of Jerusalem festival', funded by the Municipality of Jerusalem. According to Brian Reeves of the Israeli NGO, 'Peace

Now', locations where settler organisations establish tourist sites work as a 'land grab' from Palestinians. He says in this regard:

Touristic settlements also attract Israeli domestic tourism, which works to cement in everyday Israelis' minds a need to forever hold on to the territory (cited in Mortensen, 2018)

Tourism activities in the WB are too few to compete with Colonial ones representing only 3% of total tourism (Falah, 2014). One weakness in WB tourism is related to the branding of tourism in Palestine as religious, with little attention paid to the potential of other touristic resources, including entertainment, archaeology and culture. Moreover, most folkloric and cultural festivals and events are clustered in a few cities, mainly Bethlehem and Ramallah (Falah, 2014), while Hebron and Nablus rarely host any.

Lack of Palestinian tourism activities and facilities has negatively affected demand for accommodation services in the WB; hotels are mostly centred in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Jericho. A study by Bilal Falah (2014), Birzeit University in Palestine, shows that the level of tourism activities is directly linked to political stability and restrictions imposed by Israel. For example, data shows that demand for hotel services declines sharply in periods of political turmoil. Numbers of hotel guests at the end of 2013 amounted to more than 500,000 compared to 51,000 in 2002, during the Second Intifada. A politically calm period of 2005-2008 coincided with an 800% increase in overnight bookings in Palestinian hotels (Al-Rimmawi, et al., 2013), which ended with Israeli bombing of the Gaza Strip in late 2008.

Unfortunately, the 'Jacir Hotel', awarded 'Best historical hotel' (Abu-Sa'adi, 2017), predicted to be the 'signature of Palestinian hotels', by Yaser Arafat, suffers low numbers of guests (Kaufman & Katz, 2006). This is because it is located a few meters from the wall at 'Crossing 300' (Ch5). It sits directly in front of Aida refugee camp where intensive surveillance measures and clashes with Israeli soldiers take place on an almost daily basis (photo 6.1). The 1910 Palestinian palace was converted into a hotel with 250 rooms, covering over 35 dunums (Shams, 2015), the largest and most historical hotel in Palestine, and important symbol of Palestinian *sumud*.



Photo 6-1: The Jacir Palace Hotel, Bethlehem clashes along the wall and Aida refugee camp.
 [Online]. Accessed on 4.5.19 via: <https://www.nhregister.com/nationworld/article/Weeks-of-violence-dampen-Christmas-spirit-at-11348744.php#photo-13336238>

Marwan Katan manager of the Jacir Hotel states that the hotel is older than Israel and is a symbol of *sumud* (Abu-Sa'adi, 2017). The palace survived the era of the British colony when it was converted into a prison; when visiting the hotel, you still can see remains of torture rooms (Abu-Sa'adi, 2017). It was then converted into a Palestinian school until the PA took control of the WB and Yaser Arafat requested converting it back into a hotel to invest in the Palestinian touristic sector. However, in the Second Intifada, Israeli soldiers took over the hotel for eight years, ejected the staff and used it as a military tower to control Aida camp and the wall area.

Director of sales, Amir Jaber says the struggle continues (Stewart, 2010). Due to unpredictable delays on the wall gates (Ch5) some touristic agencies that bring tourists groups from cruise ships in Ashdod and Haifa in Israel to Bethlehem are thinking of dropping Bethlehem from their itineraries (Stewart, 2010). Consequently, a sharp drop in overnight stays has accompanied a decrease in the number of visitors. In 2015, some 981,315 tourists stayed overnight in Palestinian hotels, compared to 1,211,561 in 2014. In 2015, loss to the tourism sector amounted to approximately 15% of Palestinian GDP (Maan, 2015; Fanack, 2016).

Israel took advantage of deteriorating Palestinian tourism and targeted tourists and pilgrims visiting the WB, offering them different types of accommodation in colonial settlements as affordable, approachable and, more importantly, safe. For example, Israel

has developed and funded massive hotel infrastructure plans to cater mainly for the pilgrimage industry. Settlers promote tourism in settlements, with emphasis on strong biblical imagery, neglecting the fact that those establishments are built illegally on Palestinian land. Israel built a belt of hotels between Bethlehem and Jerusalem to compete with Bethlehem hotels. Hotels in three colonial settlements north of Bethlehem, Gilo, Givat-Hamatos and Har-Homa are examples of this competition. Touristic search engine, 'Booking.com', offers rooms in the 'Garden Suite Apartment', which the website says is located in Jerusalem (Israel), but the accommodation is actually situated in Gilo settlement in northern Bethlehem (Mortensen, 2018).

Also, in their efforts to attract larger number of tourists to colonial settlements, settlements supported by government funds developed their marketing methods to advertise more touristic services such as 'To Let' agencies, home rental 'Airbnb' and Bed and Breakfast services that usually satisfy tourist's budgetary demands (NAD, 2017). Dozens of listings on the online accommodation service Airbnb show immaculate cottages, elaborate breakfasts and rolling hillside views in Israel, but do not state that the properties are located in Jewish settlements and outposts on colonised WB land (Shuttleworth, 2016).

Tekoa settlement in south Bethlehem has listings on Airbnb. The accommodation has been advertised as being located fifteen minutes from Jerusalem. It offers well equipped, decorated and tastefully furnished properties in authentic oriental style. It also offers lavish rooms, balconies, grape arbours, orchards and a sitting area overlooking the spectacular Judea desert landscape (Shuttleworth, 2016). Itzhak Levit who listed the property in Tekoa says:

Israel has never agreed that the Geneva Convention resolutions applied to the territories occupied in 1967. According to Israeli law, Tekoa, and the vast majority of settlements in the WB, are authorised settlements, therefore entirely legal and consistent with national law (cited in Shuttleworth, 2016)

Under the Oslo Accords, Tekoa was planned to be returned to the PA by 1999, but this never happened. Airbnb have received condemnation from the Palestinian community. In 2019, a Palestinian family living in the US sued settlers in an American court over profiting from listed properties in Airbnb built on their stolen land (Abunimah, 2019). The lawsuit was in the form of a counterclaim against the settlers, who themselves filed a lawsuit against Airbnb over its decision in 2018 to remove hundreds of listings of illegal settlement properties in the WB (Barrows-Friedman, 2018; Zonszein, 2019). The withdrawal decision was a success for the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign to defend Palestinian rights (Barrows-Friedman, 2018). However, in 2019 Airbnb froze the decision of removal due to settler pressure and lawsuits against

the firm backed by the Israeli Tourism Minister (BBC, 2018). For example, the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, a US-based Jewish human rights organisation urged Jewish communities around the world to boycott Airbnb (BBC, 2018). As a result, Airbnb listings of dozens of Israeli settlements offering “biblical views,” a “rustic caravan,” and a “Judean desert lookout” are still active (Zonszein, 2019).

Israel organizes tours within Israel as well as sites in the WB as though they belong to Israel, without mentioning that there are Palestinians living in the area. ‘Thomas Cook’, and ‘On the Go Tours’ make stops while in tours without telling tourists they are on colonised land (Mortensen, 2018). Online booking agencies are fuelling human rights violations against Palestinians by listing hundreds of rooms and activities in Israeli settlements on colonised Palestinian land, including East Jerusalem (Amnesty, 2019). None of the companies informs potential customers that they will be visiting an illegal settlement, and only six imply that one will be outside Israeli territory (Mortensen, 2018). The main photo on ‘TUI’s’ website is from colonised East Jerusalem, while the headline about a round trip in ‘Jerusalem and Bethlehem, Israel’ (Mortensen, 2018).

Tourism in Palestine has been affected since the PA withdrew its official application to join the international tourism organisation, due to American-Israeli politics and economic pressure (Abu-Sa'adi, 2017). Israeli-American efforts to enhance colonial tourism on colonised land in Palestine are discussed below.

6.4 Efforts of US travel agencies and AIPAC in enhancing colonial tourism in the WB and the American encounter

US based ‘Airbnb’, ‘TripAdvisor’ and ‘Expedia’ currently list numerous properties and attractions in settlements in the WB (Amnesty, 2019). In this regard, John Dugard, former UN special rapporteur on Palestinian human rights says:

The tourists ought to have a cause of action against the tour companies and claim compensation for having been fraudulently misled and exposed to criminal activity (cited in Mortensen, 2019)

Dugard further added that the travel agencies' customers are unknowingly "aiding and abetting" the crime of establishing illegal settlements. For example, the large travel agency ‘GoEco’, which describes itself as ‘a leading eco-tourism company’ with a selection of ‘ethical volunteer projects abroad’, offers 2-8 week volunteer programmes in the Mountain Eco Lodge in what is supposedly Israel (Mortensen, 2018). According to ‘GoEco’, the lodge is an example of ‘modern sustainable living’ on ‘one of the highest peaks in Israel’, in Nimrod area. It does not mention that Nimrod is an Israeli settlement in the colonised Golan Heights. One of the main activities as a volunteer is the rewarding

experience of building structures from the ground up which means that tourists/participants directly contribute to settlement construction (Mortensen, 2018).

A youtube video of a journey to Bethlehem clearly shows how Israeli tour guides are involved in this monopoly over Palestinian tourism (Hoosier, 2009). Tour guides not only try to normalise colonialism, but also overlook and dehumanise Palestinians by distorting the reality of the political situation in Palestine. In the video, the Israeli guide portrays Israelis as innocent victims, and Palestinians as terrorists who kill Israelis on a regular basis. For him, the colonial wall and apartheid surveillance policies against Palestinians are “last resort” policies for Israel to protect itself (Hoosier, 2009). Rami Isaac, a Palestinian lecturer on tourism says:

Tourism is becoming an effective way to reproduce the official Israeli narrative. Many of these tours to settlements in the Golan Heights or the WB eventually serve to normalise these places being considered parts of Israel (cited in Mortensen, 2018)

Despite efforts to control Palestinian tourism, more international awareness of colonial atrocities against Palestinians is taking place. Anti-colonial acts take place due to social media internet sites and humanitarian groups that support Palestinians. For the last 19 years, the American touristic-educational program of ‘Birthright’ has been a rite of passage for hundreds of thousands of young American Jews, who get a free trip to Israel along with a tour that shows Israel in an extremely positive image distant from its atrocities against colonised Palestinians (Bruton, 2018).

The far-left ‘IfNotNow’ American organization, claims that Birthright does not address the conflict sufficiently and that when it does, it does so in an unbalanced manner (Sharon, 2019). However, the discomfort that many American Jews feel about the Netanyahu rightest government, in particular its continued colonialism of the WB, has been reflected in some recent tours. IfNotNow youth organized walkouts by a few Birthright participants, hoping the resultant publicity would inspire other young tourists/participants to make the same gesture, and pressure American Jews to reassess their support for Israeli policies (Bruton, 2018).

In June 2018, an American Jewish participant of ‘Birthright’, Bethany Zaiman from Washington, made a statement on one of the tour buses that led to a chaotic scene. Bethany announced that she and four others would like to leave the bus to learn about colonialism from a Palestinian perspective and visit the WB (Riesman, 2018). In response to ‘Birthright’, the anti-occupation ‘JStreet Group’ announced that it was establishing free nine-day trips to Israel for young North American Jews, to give participants exposure to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The first trip took place in July 2019, and will include tours of Israeli settlements and Palestinian villages in the WB, a

visit to Hebron and conversations with residents of the settlements, Palestinians and peace activists from both sides (Sharon, 2019). Organisers of JStreet tours announced on social media:

We will only participate in trips that include meetings with both Israelis and Palestinians and that show participants how the “occupation” impacts the daily lives of Palestinians living beyond the Green Line (cited in Sharon, 2019)

In addition, ‘Diaspora-Solidarity Volunteer Programs’, such as ‘Dalia Association’ (Diaspora Solidarity Volunteer Program, 2019) engage the Palestinian Diaspora and friends in solidarity. In a 10-day program, participants learn about the political reality for Palestinians living under colonialism since 1948 (USCPR, 2019). This program includes visits to different sites in the old city of Jerusalem and surrounding towns, explaining the difference in the treatment between local Palestinians and Jewish Israeli settlers within and around Jerusalem (Diaspora Solidarity Volunteer Program, 2019).

The Palestinian Campaign for Academic and cultural Boycott of Israel (PACCB) asks travellers to keep in mind that they are privileged to travel to Palestine while Palestinians are denied free movement and are unable to return to their homeland (PACCB, 2019). Also, the US Campaign for Palestinian Rights (USCPR) (2019) asks people to resist racism by listening to the voices of those impacted by these systems, rather than normalizing and contributing to those systems through tourism.

Interestingly, some Zionist groups fund trips for US public/municipal officials to reinforce US political support for Israel by whitewashing violations of Palestinian rights. AIPAC is the most powerful pro-Israel lobby group in America to fund such trips. AIPAC trips are among the lesser-known traditions for freshmen members of Congress. Typically scheduled during the first August recess in every legislative session they feature a weeklong tour of Israel and meetings with leading Israeli figures in business, government, and the military (USCPR, 2019).

Both critics and proponents of AIPAC freshmen trips say the endeavour is incredibly influential, providing House members with a distinctly pro-Israel viewpoint on complex controversies in the region (USCPR, 2019). For instance, Congress representative, Betty McCollum, a supporter of Palestinian rights, criticized the dangerous influence of AIPAC by saying:

There should be no illusion among newly elected Members of Congress that AIPAC sponsored travel to Israel is intended to do anything other than advance the right-wing Netanyahu-Likud agenda of settlement expansion, occupation, and eliminating the opportunity for a two-state solution (cited in Fang & Kane, 2018).

Human rights activists contend that AIPAC trips are a major factor in tilting the scales in Washington, D.C. toward policies that reflect interests of the Israeli government over Palestinians (USCPR, 2019). In 2003 for example, and after his AIPAC funded trip to Israel, Congressman, Jim Langevin, became more sympathetic towards Israel and declared his support for Israel's apartheid wall, saying that the trip gave him a new appreciation of Israel's commitment to putting security first and foremost. In an interview with the Jewish Telegraph Agency (JTA) (2003) , he said:

It gave me a better understanding of why things, like the fence, are a necessary and rational response to the terrorist threats Israel faces (JTA, 2003)

Nonetheless, many AIPAC trips have been challenged. Activists encouraged Congress to skip AIPAC propaganda trips that whitewash Israeli crimes (Fang & Kane, 2018). The JStreet group has tried to compete with AIPAC but has only a fraction of their resources. Over the last decade, specifically, between the years 2009-2018, according to data from the Office of Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, AIPAC has spent \$12.9 million on trips to Israel for 363 lawmakers and 657 congressional staff members (Fang & Kane, 2018).

A typical 'house freshmen' trip usually costs between \$9,300-\$10,500 per participant, which covers all expenses, including business-class flight and a luxury hotel in Jerusalem. Moreover, lawmakers are invited to bring one family member with them to Israel (Fang & Kane, 2018). In contrast, J Street has spent a little over half a million dollars over the same period flying 63 lawmakers and staff to the region.

Former Congress Representative, Brian Baird, once described AIPAC trips as "virtually obligatory" due to Democratic leadership pressure on members to embrace AIPAC (Bruck, 2014). In 2018, Palestinian-American Democratic representative, Rashida Tlaib, announced her intention to lead her own delegation to Palestine as a rebuke to the tradition of newly elected members traveling on AIPAC-sponsored trips to Israel (Fang & Kane, 2018; USCPR, 2019). Tlaib criticised IPAC tours:

[They] have these lavish trips to Israel, but they don't show the side that I know is real, which is what's happening to my grandmother and what's happening to my family there (cited in Fang & Kane, 2018)

AIPAC's trips to Israel are considered to be a major factor in persuading American policymakers to disregard Israel's continued colonialism of the WB, its colonial settlements, and discriminating apartheid surveillance policies (Ch4 and Ch5). In 2002, leading former Knesset member Sholamit Aloni, former head of left-wing Zionist party 'Meretz', stated that AIPAC is powerful because they serve the right-wing of Israeli policies and are backed by the US administration and congress (Goodman, 2002).

Unconditional American support for Israel through AIPAC, similar organisations and supporting public figures, encouraged Israel to expand its colonial surveillance polices not only against Palestinians, but anyone who dares challenge its colonial policies. Therefore, Israel has started to persecute international tourists, supporters and visitors sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, who wish to visit the WB (CNN, 2010; Fanack, 2016; Wafa, 2019). Colonial surveillance over visitors of the WB is discussed below.

6.5 Surveillance tourism against visitors to Palestine

Writing on tourism John Urry (2007), talks about the culture of mobility and the importance of freedom of mobility in order to travel and experience other cultures. For Urry (2002), those who are immobile, for example due to poverty, remain cut off from surrounding world. For him, immobile people can always host tourists and thereby obtain advantages from others' mobility. Urry's argument is not applicable in the Palestinian case because although Palestinians are immobile and cut off from the world due to Israeli restrictions on their movement and travel, but tourists visiting Palestine are also restricted.

Colonial efforts to obstruct international tourists/visitors from freely and independently visiting the WB, are actually acts of power with the aim of preventing tourists from getting the full picture of what is actually going on in the WB, which does not serve Israeli propaganda. For Israel, allowing international visitors to freely approach Palestinians; women, children and families, in their houses, schools and in their refugee camps, might mean more solidarity to Palestinians. Also, witnessing Palestinian daily struggles with Zionist policies, exposes the ugly face of colonialism. It is what former American congressman, Brian Baird, explained as: "If you can't see these things yourself, you're left with the official version of events" (cited in CNN, 2010), which is usually misleading and fake. He further said:

If all that happens is that you come to this region and you are led around by the hand to see the things that someone wants you to see, hear the stories that someone wants you to hear, you will not get the full impression of what's actually going on (cited in CNN, 2010)

Brian Baird's comments came following his independent visit to the Gaza Strip in 2010. He said that being able to witness living conditions and the damage created by 2008 'Operation Cast Lead', when Israel killed some 1,400 Gazans, opened his eyes to the imbalance of US policy in the region. Baird's comments have stirred controversy among some Jewish groups who called on former American President, Barak Obama, to reject the congressman's comments (CNN, 2010; Ramsey, 2015). Spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Yigal Palmor, criticised Baird's support of Palestinians and wondered

whether he would have extended the same support to Berlin Jews under the control of Nazi Germany (CNN, 2010).

Israel has sought to discourage international tourists/visitors from visiting Palestinian territories by imposing direct and indirect punishment procedures and conditions. For example, Israeli tourism companies have set strict conditions for groups planning to visit the Palestinian Holy Land; one of these conditions is that accommodation must be in Israeli hotels (Fanack, 2016; Wafa, 2019). Israel imposes indirect punishment on tourists/visitors as soon as they land at the airport, or when crossing a border, where Israeli officers/staff harass tourists with searches, questioning, interrogation and in some cases illegally restricts their visit to the WB to 'access only' (Fanack, 2016).

Moreover, tourists are purposely delayed with queues at the wall, checkpoints and entrance points to the WB, which makes their visit burdensome. Correspondingly, visitors cannot arrive in Bethlehem without going through an Israeli-controlled entry point. Surveillance methods restrict tourists entering or exiting Bethlehem to a heavily militarised wall gate, known as 'Checkpoint 300' (Ch5) (NAD, 2015). Consequently, most tourists tend to stay in hotels in East Jerusalem and Israel and take day tours to sites in the WB (Al-Rimmawi, et al., 2013). Ironically, even day tours to the WB are restricted by Israel; tourists visiting Bethlehem can only visit for a limited period of time on the day and by means of an intense Israeli policed system of state-approved minibuses (Bradshaw, 2014).

Visitors wishing to stay in the WB are advised not to highlight this part of their travel itinerary and are warned that telling Israeli border authorities they are visiting the WB may attract unwanted attention (The Walled Off Hotel, 2019). On the hotel site, Banksy warns visitors to the WB through his hotel site by cynically saying:

Airport security at Tel Aviv, however, is legendary. Expect to be asked about the purpose of your stay and if you intend travelling to the WB. If you answer "yes" you may be held for some time. A new Israeli law recently implemented also bans supporters of the Palestinian BDS from entering the country. Consequently, many visitors choose not to highlight particular parts of their holiday and stick to discussing the weather (The Walled Off Hotel, 2019)

Worries about being punished by colonial authorities, make tourists hesitant when declaring their reasons to visit. Marlin for example, a member of the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign, takes part in the October olive harvest in Bethlehem, a sign of solidarity with Palestinians. Marlin said that when she lands at Tel-Aviv airport she informs the security interrogation as to why she is visiting Israel:

Fieldwork interview 6-1: 12.2.14, Marlin, 47, activist, single, England

For a holiday, to enjoy Israel's beauty and as a Christian to visit the Nativity Church in Bethlehem [...] I have to give them what they want to hear. If I say the truth; that I visit Bethlehem to show my solidarity with Palestinians in the olive harvest season, I would be seeking trouble. I don't want to be blacklisted, or denied entry by Israeli government

Marlin's worries of denied entry are based on facts. Israel has sent threatening messages to international activists not to support Palestinians or they will be denied entry. In 2017, Israeli authorities and the media targeted an American student, Ariel Gold (Landau & Berger, 2018), due to her long history of activism and support for Palestinians. Ariel had come under attack after Israeli right-wing newspaper, 'Hayom' wrote an article describing Ariel's entry into Israel as a failure, and accused her of fooling Israeli authorities to gain entry (Landau & Berger, 2018).

Several high-profile Israeli ministers were involved in denying Ariel entry. Public Security Minister, Gilad Erdan, recommended preventing Ariel entry into Israel, after which Israeli Interior Minister, Arye Dery, revoked her student visa. Public Security Minister, Gilad Erdan, wrote on Twitter: "Whoever acts for a boycott of Israel and comes here to cause damage will not enter the country" (cited in Bandler, 2018; MEMO, 2018; Staff, 2018). Efforts to ban Ariel from entering Israel following the introduction in May 2017 of a new Israeli law forbidding entry visas or residency rights to foreign nationals who call for economic, cultural or academic boycotts of Israel, or illegal Israeli settlements in the WB.

The Israeli government has also targeted BDS advocates, with Security Minister Erdan attempting to label them as "terrorists" (cited in Memo, 2018). In January 2018, Israel published a blacklist of more than twenty international NGOs whose employees and/or members are banned from entering Israel due to their alleged support of BDS campaigns. Hassan Jabareen, director of the Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 'Adalah centre', described the move to limits on foreign visitors to the WB as "reminiscent of South Africa's apartheid regime" (cited in Memo, 2018).

Regarding main touristic activities, religious sites are the most visited followed by archaeological, historical and natural sites, respectively (Falah, 2014). Restrictions over visiting tourists and international supporters have significantly affected development of the Palestinian tourism sector (Fanack, 2016). Palestinian tourism in Bethlehem is discussed in the following section.

6.6 Bethlehem Shop owners, tour companies and colonial tourism

Israel imposes strict restrictions on Palestinian tour companies and workers, while facilitating the work of International and Israeli companies (Al-Rimmawi & Butcher, 2015;

UN, 2018). Israeli companies control touristic trips and numbers of tourists visiting WB which makes it difficult for Palestinians to compete (Fanack, 2016). For example, while Israeli tour operators continue daytrips to sites on colonised territory, Palestinian operators are mostly restricted from crossing into Jerusalem or Israel (Mortensen, 2018). This lack of freedom of access is contrary to the 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):

Tourism companies and agencies licensed by either side shall enjoy equal access to tourism, related facilities and amenities in border points of exit and entry according to the regulations of the authority operating them (UNCTAD, 1994)

The wall and its accompanied surveillance methods severely impact on tourism in Bethlehem. For example, it denies Palestinian access to Rachel's Tomb in northern Bethlehem. Only 5 out of more than 60 Palestinian shops and cafes, once a booming business and tourist destination, remain open (Stewart, 2010). These restrictions have resulted in fluctuating visitor numbers (Fanack, 2016). Palestinian Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities indicated that tourists/pilgrims need to spend at least 3-4 nights in the WB to effectively contribute to growth of the Palestinian tourism sector (NAD, 2015). The community of Bethlehem struggles to receive visitors and overnight stays due to colonial restrictions (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017a). Souvenir vendors watch with frustration as tourists stream out of Church of the Nativity and head back to their buses for the drive back to Jerusalem (Stewart, 2010). International tourists in Israel usually visit Bethlehem for few hours and then go back to Israeli hotels (Al-Rimmawi, et al., 2013). Abu-Elias, states:

Fieldwork interview 6-2: 19.4.14, Abu-Elias, 64, souvenir shop owner, Widower, 4 children, Bethlehem

From the moment the buses drop tourists in Nativity Square, they are given four hours only to spend in Bethlehem. Take two hours minimum for their tour in the church and Nativity Square. This leaves them with only two hours to go around the city! What are they going to do within only two hours? Go around the city, meet people, do their shopping, have a snack or have a drink? No wonder then that I go home with empty buckets every night! My main duty in this shop these days is dusting the unsold products!

Shop owners in Bethlehem, describing how Israeli tour guides prevent tourists from heading into the winding, narrow alleyways of Bethlehem, where lots of souvenir/gift shops are situated, and instead guide tourists to specific souvenir vendors owned by rich Palestinian families where guides receive their private commission. Zeyad, says:

Fieldwork interview 6-3: 20.4.19, Zeyad, 33, worker in souvenir shop, married, 5 children, Bethlehem

Only a few of us [Palestinians] benefit from tourists' expenditure. If you drive through *Share'e Al-Mahed* [Nativity Street] that links Jerusalem 'Checkpoint 300' directly to Nativity Church, you will see tour buses stop and drop tourists in certain shops of those who can afford paying commissions to the Israeli companies and tour guides

Fouad olivewood craft shop owner says:

Fieldwork interview 6-4: 14.4.19, Fouad, 48, souvenir shop owner, married, 3 children, Bethlehem

In the past, in my father's time, tourists were coming from all over the world. I remember seeing them wandering around the city, eating our food and drinking our coffee. I remember my father used to sell them olive woodcrafts such as the mother '*Miriam*' and son '*Isa*' sculptures. He used to craft with his own hands. Tourists enjoyed spending time in Bethlehem. People were competing over tourists to invite them home for a meal or coffee. The happy one at that time was who has the tourist's acceptance to spend time at his house. Those days are gone. Today, we hardly see tourists in our off-sight hidden shops. Tourists don't have time to come to our shops, and what is the point and they already done their shopping on their way to Bethlehem

Fouad reflects not only his personal opinion, but also, the majority of workers in the touristic industry in Bethlehem, mainly those who have their shops in isolated old parts of the city. By restraining all linking facilities between Palestinians and tourists, Israel managed to put not only physical barriers between the Palestinians and the international community, represented in the wall, but also, managed to put a cultural barrier between the two sides. Israeli restrictions over time and movement make it difficult for tourists to experience the culture and lifestyle of Palestinians. In this way, Israel intentionally manages to isolate the international community from getting to know the real human face of Palestinians, as opposed to the image that it always tries to promote; terrorists and killers. At the same time, it presents the international community from seeing the true face of colonialism and the impact it has on the people and culture of Palestine.

Israel monopolises Palestinian tourism including denying licenses for tour guides and refusal of building permits to renovate tourism infrastructures in Area 'C' (approximately 62% of WB). Around 7,150 Israeli tour guides work in Israel, including Jerusalem, but only 40 Palestinians out of 185 Palestinian tour guides are licensed by the Palestinian Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, to work in Jerusalem because they need permits to enter and other Israeli controlled heritage sites. Those guides are not allowed to receive tourists at Ben-Gurion International airport in Tel-Aviv, and their entry permits are

renewed periodically without guarantee from the Israelis (NAD, 2010; State of Palestine, 2017).

Israel violated Protocol by denying Palestinian tourism professionals permits to work in Israel (State of Palestine, 2017). By 2015, there were 25 Palestinian tour guides working in Israel, while 8,000 Israeli tour guides had access to sites in Area 'C', as well as historic sites in Areas 'A' and 'B' (which are technically off limits to Israeli citizens (NAD, 2010; 2017; State of Palestine, 2017). In an interview with Akram, he says:

Fieldwork interview 6-5: 13.4.14, Akram, 34, tour guide, married, 3 children, Bethlehem

I had been working as a touristic guide for seven years, I was only granted a permit to Jerusalem in 2014. It was the first and last time. I have been denied access to Jerusalem because of my teen age cousin, who was caught throwing stones at the wall in the area of Aida Camp. My cousin is in prison since that time. The tourism industry is so competitive, and the employment rate is so low! I lost my work, so I decided to keep working with tourists, but not as a tour guide. I started selling wooden crafts, embroideries, and touristic cards in the area of Nativity square...most days, I spend the whole day under a boiling sun or in freezing cold without selling a thing, I have a wife and three children to feed, what shall I do

Holy places are interesting locations and if managed sustainably, can be potential generators of economic growth. If these places managed unequally, or incubated hostilities and conflict, they become less desirable for foreign tourists (Cohen-Hattab, 2004; Neumayer, 2004; Hall, 2013). This is the case of tourism in Bethlehem (Al-Rimmawi & Butcher, 2015). A study by the World Bank has estimated income that could be generated by tourism at approximately \$1.2 billion, if the artificial cap placed on it by Israel's occupation is removed (NAD, 2017). However, presently tourism only generates \$271 million. Unequal laws and various restrictions give Israeli tour guides and tourism companies an unfair advantage over Palestinians. Israel has blocked Palestinians from being able to compete and refuses to negotiate with the PA over new regulations, thereby creating a sense that Israeli tour operators will go the extra mile for their customers, unlike their Palestinian competitors.

Interestingly, Israeli restrictions over tourism kind of enhanced tourism in Bethlehem instead of undermining it. For some religious pilgrims, enduring hardship during the travel experience is considered an important psychological aspect of pilgrimage (religious tourism). Thus, pilgrims will visit important sacred areas of insecurity because it amplifies feelings of devotion in the pilgrimage (Collins-Kreiner, et al., 2006). This explains why religious tourism continued despite political periods of unrest in the WB, especially in Bethlehem.

However, systems of dominant power do not determine types of resistance, but they allow possibilities for distinct forms of resistance to emerge (Richter-Devroe, 2013). For Palestinians in Bethlehem, the political situation has inspired a new form of tourism. In order to resist colonial efforts to undermine Palestinian tourism or to direct its economic gains to surrounding colonial settlements, Palestinians launched small initiatives to regain their tourism. This has been called alternative tourism, also referred to as activist, justice, political or solidarity tourism (Al-Rimmawi & Butcher, 2015; Higgins-Desbiolles 2017a) or 'tourism for peace' (Salazar, 2006; Chaitin, 2011). In this chapter it is called '*sumud* tourism'. *Sumud* tourism is a pillar of tourism development for Palestinians and invites tourists to support Palestinian tourism by engaging with narratives of the political situation in Palestine. Palestinian *sumud* tourism in Bethlehem is discussed below.

6.7 Alternative tourism of Bethlehem

Efforts to undermine tourism in Bethlehem have driven Palestinians to carry out *sumud* tourism acts, which challenge the Zionist efforts and defy confinement of the wall. Wall tours, graffiti, murals, and projecting films onto the wall are what Palestinian scholar on tourism, Rami Isaac (2011) calls "dark tourism" that may play a role in providing different forms of tourism as an add-on to existing dominant pilgrimage types of tourism. *Sumud* tourism also holds as its central goals the creation of economic opportunities for the local community: positive cultural exchanges between guest and host, and political/historical education (Isaac, 2010a; Isaac and Hodge, 2011).

Freya Higgins-Desbiolles (2017a), lecturer in tourism, says that those who organise and host tourism for political advocacy demonstrate commitment to its efficacy. American-based human rights organisation 'Global Exchange', has offered human rights tours to sites around the world as advocacy for justice (Global Exchange, 2019). In Palestine, Palestinian Alternative Tourism Group (ATG), specializing in promoting tourism for pilgrims to Palestine has invited churches, social movements and faith-based organizations to promote pilgrimages to Bethlehem (ATG, 2010; Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017a; 2017b). They invite people from around the world to visit, see and learn from Palestinians about the Holy Land's issues, history, culture, politics and *sumud*:

Today you are invited to a journey of truth and transformation that will reveal the love of God to you through the eyes of Palestinian people who, despite having suffered decades of occupation and dispossession, maintain their dignity, faith, and capacity for hope (ATG, 2010)

Tour itineraries/programmes for visitors and pilgrims (ATG, 2019a) include two-day tours to give tourists the chance to spend more time in Bethlehem governorate in the company of Palestinians. Tourists experience walking tours that highlight UNESCO-listed heritage

sites in Bethlehem, such as Star Street and Nativity Church. They also experience walks in the Palestinian landscape around Bethlehem, in Battir and Irtas villages, Mar-Saba Monastery, and Solomon's Pools (Visit Palestine, 2019). Tour programs include trying Palestinian food, walks along the colonial wall and meeting Palestinians in Aida refugee camp (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017b; Open Bethlehem Campaign, 2019).

In this way tours help to better understand the multi-layered life in Bethlehem by introducing tourists to political and socioeconomic situations in Bethlehem. For ATG, meeting Palestinians living under colonialism and seeking to understand their lives are acts of solidarity. Director of ATG, Rami Kassis, says that Justice tourism is one of the most effective means of promoting economic exchange; tourists with a commitment to social justice have the opportunity to provide positive economic contributions and also show solidarity with Palestinians (ATG, 2019b).

ATG also invites Christian pilgrims to live their faith by worshiping with Palestinian Christians in the Holy Land and by showing concern for Palestinians (ATG, 2010). In 2009 the coalition of Christian leadership in Palestine in cooperation with Ecumenical Coalition on Tourism, Kairos Palestine and the World Council of Churches released a statement known as the 'Kairos Document' (Kairos Palestine, 2019). The document shares Palestinian daily realities and sufferings of life under colonialism and calls on Christian followers and churches worldwide to witness these realities, be in solidarity and take action (ATG, 2010).

This statement further sparked an attempt to marshal a religious coalition of prominent international Christians, Muslims and Jews to persuade Israel's government to open up the birthplace of Jesus in the simple interests of commerce and ecumenical tourism (Bradshaw, 2014). The attempt was known as the 'Open Bethlehem Campaign' (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017a), aimed at engaging internationals with Bethlehem as a living, vibrant city and to allow tourists to visit the city freely and for as long as they wish. One campaign idea is 'The Bethlehem Passport' (Open Bethlehem Campaign, 2019) that invites internationals to become ambassadors for Bethlehem and advocates for accessibility. A documentary film, 'Open Bethlehem', by Palestinian filmmaker, Leila Sansour, supported the campaign by showing realities and impacts of the apartheid wall on Palestinians in Bethlehem and the importance of keeping Bethlehem open (Bradshaw, 2014; Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017a; 2017b; Open Bethlehem Campaign, 2019; Visit Palestine, 2019).

ATG (2019b) have also initiated olive harvest tourism since 2000, despite Israeli policies of apartheid represented by the wall, repression, closure, blocked streets, confiscation of agricultural land, and repeated attacks against Palestinian farmers by Israeli settlers and military (Ch5). With continuous expansion of colonial settlements at the expense of

agricultural land in Palestine (Ch4), many farmers are separated from their trees, and help is most needed. Building on experience from previous years, the Joint Advocacy Initiative of Palestinian charities and other Palestinian charities have planned annual Olive Picking Program in Palestine; a special event to encourage international solidarity with farmers (ATG, 2019b).

The objective of this program is to mobilize as many people as possible for olive picking, especially in areas situated in proximity to Israeli settlements and bypass roads, in order to help Palestinian farmers to harvest their olives, which they might not be able to do without international support. Also, the event has created an awareness for hundreds of people from many countries around the world about Palestinians life under Israeli colonialism, referred to by several participants as a life changing experience.

Besides picking olives, the program features introductory presentations about the organizing institutions; the current situation in Palestine and effects of the wall; touristic tours in the old city of Jerusalem, the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and Hebron; cultural evenings such as presentations on the refugee question with BADIL Resource Centre (BADIL, 2019) on Palestinian Residency and Refugee rights.

Justice tourism tours to keep Bethlehem open to tourists include visiting the 'Walled Off Hotel', designed by British graffiti artist Banksy, his souvenir shop and viewing his graffiti on the wall (Green Olive Tours, 2019). Palestinian hotel manager, William Salsaa, says the 'Walled Off Hotel' encourages alternative tourism in Bethlehem (Abu-Sa'adi, 2017). The role of Banksy's 'Walled Off Hotel', graffiti on the wall in enhancing *sumud* tourism in Bethlehem, and various debates over this role are discussed in the following section.

6.8 Political tourism of Bethlehem

The most popular graffiti on the wall to attract tourists are the 'Flower Thrower', 'The Armoured Dove', 'The Girl frisking a Soldier', and 'A Soldier checking a donkey's ID' (Green Olive Tours, 2019; The Walled Off Hotel, 2019). The wall has insinuated itself into the cultural folklore of this conflicted land (Ahituv, 2018). The Palestinian folkloric dance "*Dabka*", graffiti on the wall, stencils, songs, music, plays, and slogans of *sumud* do not merely visualize or echo political events or carry militant message, they sometimes operate as affective arenas activating political subjectivity on their own terms (Salih & Richter-Devroe, 2014).

In this regard, Mona Abaza (2013) noted how graffiti in 'Muhammad Mahmud Street' in Cairo documented and narrated the battlefield of the Arab Spring, and how it infused the street with a new meaning and purpose. After the revolution, plastic chairs transformed the street into an open-air, informal cafe, where ordinary people sat drinking tea and observing the events unfolding around them. Similarly, Ted Swedenburg (2012) argues

that protest music on 'Tahrir Square' in Cairo aimed to move the crowds into an affective state, such as anger, mourning, nostalgia or patience.

Similarly, graffiti and certain activities around the wall have managed to infuse the wall with new meaning and purpose and contributed to increased touristic attendance at the wall, and at the same time deepens their understanding of Palestinian struggles. In this case, the apartheid approach has actually backfired. Graffiti on the wall has helped to connect Palestinian voices, struggles and causes to the world. Banksy's shop even provides tourists with spray paint so they can add their own graffiti to the wall as an act of solidarity with Palestinians (The Walled Off Hotel, 2019). The wall was also been used as a projection screen for Al-Rowwad centre, the first outdoor film festival in Aida refugee camp (Zimanyi, 2016). Al-Rowwad festival was not only a political act to compact the wall, but also an act to highlight lack of resources/facilities in the WB, which has only one formal film venue, the 'Al-Kasaba' theatre, in Ramallah city (Woldt, 2009).

The most recent development in Bethlehem's efforts to engage the world is Banksy's 'Walled Off Hotel' (photo 6.2) that brought international attention to the wall in Bethlehem since it opened in March 2017 (Al-Laham, 2017; Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017b; Maan, 2017a; Sanchez, 2017; Telegraph, 2017; Cook, 2018; IMEMS, 2018; Porter, 2018). The five-star hotel based on 187 reviews on 'Trip Advisor' (Trip Advisor, 2019) offers tourists the "Worst view of any hotel in the world" because it overlooks the wall (Bednarz, 2017; Loucaides, 2017; IMEMC, 2018). Due to the 'Walled Off Hotel', Bethlehem managed to achieve the major touristic international award of having the 'Best artistic hotel' (Abu-Sa'adi, 2017).



Photo 6-2: Cook, 2018. The Walled Off Hotel. Arts and Culture. [Online]. Accessed on 20.4.19 via: <https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/inside-banksy-s-the-walled-off-hotel-in-bethlehem-1.804845>

The art-filled hotel is credited with an upsurge in international arrivals to Bethlehem (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2017b; Sanchez, 2017; Cook, 2018). The hotel also was one of the factors behind the tourism boost in Bethlehem as it became to be on the top fastest-growing touristic destination of 2017 (Alaraby, 2017). The 'Walled Off Hotel' celebrated its first anniversary in 2018 (Abu-Sa'adi, 2017) bringing world attention to Bethlehem's struggle, with over 50,000 visitors (IMEMC, 2018). This highlight role of external advocacy in impacting settler colonialism and in supporting Palestinians. The hotel artworks of audio, visual, and 3-D installations detail impact of colonialism on Palestinians (Al-Laham, 2017). For example, in the guest room dedicated to besieged Gaza, a phone rings, then an English-speaking voice ask the guest to pick up the phone to hear:

This is captain Danni from the Israeli intelligence. You have five minutes to evacuate the house before planes bomb it, you have been warned (cited in Taylor, 2014; Al-Laham, 2017)

Banksy's art is a display of colonial power over Palestinians and the logic of bombing civilian houses as collective punishment. Banksy phone call art is also an act of mimicking Israeli logic, justifying atrocities of death trolls against Palestinian civilians, women, the elderly and children. It warns Palestinian civilians to flee the house, however, the phone call only allows five minutes before bombing. The phone call also reflects the

level of colonial power over all aspects of Palestinian life, including communication facilities routed through Israeli servers (Weizman, 2012). In this regard Eyal Weizman highlights the political gains of domination over Palestinian telephone networks and Internet infrastructure and the gathering of intelligence and delivery of rumours/propaganda to spread fear amongst Palestinians.

Conversely, not all Palestinians are happy with Banksy's hotel and graffiti on the wall (Khader, 2017; Loucaides, 2017). Banksy is brilliant British artist, but no one knows who Banksy is, or what his real motives are. Some critics have accused Banksy of making money of it and from Palestinian suffering in addition to normalising colonialism (Khader, 2017). Some Palestinians further argue that graffiti on the wall distracts tourists from seeing the ugly military apartheid structure that turns Palestinian lives into misery (Loucaides, 2017). Other Palestinians further criticise some of the artwork exhibited in the 'Walled Off Hotel'. According to Palestinian-American journalist and author, Ramzy Baroud, who considers one of Banksy's paintings hung in a \$265-per-night suite in the hotel as deeply offensive to Palestinians (Maan, 2017a). Baroud considers the painting of an Israeli soldier having a pillow fight with a Palestinian protester (photo 6.3) as demeans the sacrifice of Palestinians (Maan, 2017a).



Photo 6-3:Maan, 2017. Banksy's painting of a billow fight between an Israeli soldier and a Palestinian protestor. [Online]. Accessed on 5.5.19 via:
<https://www.maannnews.com/Content.aspx?id=775854>

One of the most controversial elements of Banksy's hotel is the stated aim of welcoming Israelis, with the hotel itself being constructed in an Israeli-controlled area of Bethlehem. The hotel's manager, Wissam Salsa'a, in response says that one focus of the project is to "educate Israelis on Palestinian suffering caused by the wall" (cited in Maan, 2017a).

Another controversial element is a statement written in Arabic, English, and Hebrew hanging at the entrance to the hotel (photo 6.4). The statement is asking guests not to “choose sides” in the conflict (Pak, 2017). It also claims that most Israelis are “opposed to the cruelties inflicted by the wall,” while the ones who support it “are deeply fearful for their security” (Pak, 2017).



Photo 6-4: Pak, A. 2017. Banksy's statement on the entrance of the 'Museum of the Wall'. [Online].

Accessed on 4.3.17 via:

<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1832962576969685&set=a.1404180503181230&type=3&theater>

In debate, Palestinians argue that if Israelis truly oppose cruelties the wall causes Palestinians why do they not do anything about it, and why did the majority of Israelis (Scheindlin, 2019) re-elect a far rightest Netanyahu coalition in April 2019 (Landau & Berger, 2018; Halperin & Gottesman, 2019; Gadzo, 2019; Reuters, 2019). According to a poll released in 2017 (Sharon, 2017), 62% of Israelis believe that Israel should not cease construction of settlements in the WB claiming that all Israelis are afraid for their security, which feeds into colonial justifications for constructing the wall in the first place (Ch4). The political arena in Israel did not change after the election in September 2019 (Holmes, 2019). An Israeli majority re-elected a Zionist rightest party, who continue to fund and support apartheid policies, WB annexing and settlement expansion. Politically, right wing parties still dominate (Kershner, 2019). Despite criticism of Banksy's work, his art manages to draw international attention to the Palestinian reality of living in the shadow of the wall. Banksy's work highlights the role of external advocacy in generating political awareness and its impact on settler colonialism. Palestinian professor, Jamil Khader, considers the Banksy Hotel an act of anti-colonialism, and as apologies for Imperialism and the Balfour Declaration (Aljazeera, 2017b; Khader, 2017). Khader says:

Banksy exposes, subverts, and lampoons the naive Western liberal fantasy, by which Western travellers disconnect the struggle and travel itself from its colonial history, ignore gross Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights, and present Israelis and Palestinians in the language of moral equivalency and parity (Khader, 2017)

Moreover, Higgins-Desbiolles (2017b) noted that Banksy's 'Walled Off Hotel' invites people to consider the value of tourism as a political tool. Palestinians want to be heard, and Banksy has used his celebrity platform to draw attention to the injustices of occupation. Rather than viewing the 'Walled Off Hotel' as an art installation offering political commentary, it is more useful to see it as a hotel with a capacity for sparking political awareness.

A new generation of Palestinians are starting to realise the importance of art and culture in delivering their political messages. Salih and Richter-Devroe (2014) argue that unprecedented and enthusiastic interest in the political facets of protest art has often overlooked the affective dimension of music, graffiti, and poetry. The wall in Bethlehem inadvertently turned the Bethlehem side of the wall into a highly attractive touristic site of modern apartheid in the heart of the Zionist project of WB (Salih & Richter-Devroe, 2014). Solidarity *sumud* tourism is a developing segment that serves Palestine's tourism industry and the political/cultural riches of Palestine. This includes the creation of awareness through stays at refugee camps cultural centres and with families in Aida refugee camp. The role of solidarity *sumud* tourism in Aida camp is discussed below.

6.9 *Sumud* tourism of Aida camp: Group and individual stay-in projects

Aida camp is becoming known for its stay in projects for visitors to Palestine who wish to experience life in a refugee camp, discover Palestinian culture, and taste traditional Palestinian food. *Sumud* tourism of Aida camp is generating money to improve livelihoods of hosting families and at the same time it helps to bridge social, cultural, and political gaps between Palestinians and the rest of the world. Noor Women's Empowerment Group (Noor WEG) (2019) is known for its *sumud* tourism (photo 6.5). The group started in 2000 as a mother's club to overcome financial burdens that prevent their disabled children from receiving adequate education or care (UNRWA 2015; Noor WEG 2019). Their first achievement was securing nappies for disabled children by pooling their money to purchase wholesale quantities from a Palestinian factory in Hebron. The factory makes nappies for hospitals and clinics much less expensive than those sold by local pharmacies. The collective success of the group empowered women to expand their income generating work to improve their families' lives. That is where the

idea of offering cooking classes to visiting tourists and organising tour trips in the camp and along the wall began (UNRWA 2015; Noor WEG 2019).



Photo 6-5: The Noor Women's Empowerment Group 'Noor WEG'. 2019. [Online]. Accessed on 5.5.19 via: <https://noorweg.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/2-1.jpg>

The group offers tourists weekly classes cooking traditional Palestinian food. Every week they take a small group of tourists on a tour around their camps and along the wall and end up having a cooked meal. Interestingly, the group is rated with five stars on the Trip Advisor travel site (Trip Advisor, 2019) with comments such as, “the highlight of my journey”, “an amazing cultural experience”, and “beautiful food and beautiful people” (Trip Advisor, 2019). The women decide how to use the collected money; twice a year they buy clothes and shoes for their disabled children and once a year they organise a day trip for their families to sites in Palestine. The group even published their first cooking booklet in English called “*Zaaki*”, which means delicious (Noor WEG, 2019). Moreover, and for the last seven years the group have organised home stays in Aida for visitors to Palestine who wish to experience life in a refugee camp (Noor WEG, 2019). All proceeds from home stays go to hosting families. This effectively strengthens women's *sumud* and a determination to continue their struggle against an oppressive colonial power and the wall, which aims to break their steadfastness. It is their affirmation of life against all sorts of hardship.

Essentially, many similar individual initiatives take place in Aida camp. Sabah and Mahmoud, offer their extra room on the roof to tourists for a short stay:

Fieldwork interview 6-6: 15.4.14, Sabah, 40, housewife, and Mahmoud, 42, unemployed, married with 4 children, Aida camp

We believe tourists appreciate staying in Palestinian houses and with the company of Palestinian families more than staying in hotels. With us they can experience daily Palestinian life and they can try our delicious homemade food. For example, we offer our guests every morning homemade Falafel, Humus, and freshly baked Palestinian bread. We also offer our guests olives from our land. Guests enjoy our company and we also enjoy theirs. With each guest, we and our kids learn something new about the outer world that is impossible to reach with Israeli barriers

Jaber says:

Fieldwork interview 6-7: 15.4.14, Jaber, 22, university student, single, Aida camp

We try to make guests feel at home and as part of our family. We invite them to attend our Palestinian special occasions. Anna, from Germany, is conducting research study in Bethlehem. You can't imagine her happiness when we invited her to our cousin's wedding. She was astonished with our Palestinian wedding traditions such as the Henna night before the wedding day. Also, she fell in love with our folkloric songs and Palestinian dance, the "*Dabka*". She even started having *Dabka* classes in one of the youth centres in the camp

Farah, has stay in rooms for female guests only says:

Fieldwork interview 6-8: 16.4.14, Farah, 25, pharmacist, single, Aida camp

I convinced my mother to host tourists. My mother accepted with one condition; men are not allowed. My parents are conservative, and I have a teenage sister. One of my brothers is studying abroad, and the other two are in Israeli prisons. We ended up using my brothers' empty rooms as guest rooms. We have two guests. We agreed with Linda from the US and Debby from the UK to teach us English, in exchange, we will teach them Arabic. Every afternoon we gather on the roof under the vine tree and on a cup of coffee we talk about anything and everything. Usually our neighbours join in. We live in a camp where we all know each other, and we consider each other as one big family

Musaab, says:

Fieldwork interview 6-9: 14.4.14, Mussab, 38, ex-prisoner, independent writer, married, 2 children, Aida camp

I host tourists because I believe it is one of the *sumud* means to fight Israeli apartheid. It is my way to get engaged with the rest of the world. Hosting people enables me to have friends from all over the world. They can come and see our

struggles on a daily basis. I charge visitors what covers their expenses of food and bills. My aim of hosting tourists is not financial; my aim is to get my people's cause out to the rest of the world. I hope in their turn, my guests will become advocates/ambassadors for Palestinians in their own countries

Stay-in projects highlight the role of Palestinians in coping with the confinement of the wall, its surveillance polices and colonial tourism that for so long has tried to suffocate them financially, dehumanise them and isolate them from the rest of the world. Through Palestinian *sumud* tourism, both Palestinians and tourists enrich their cultural knowledge of each other's religion, language, food and customs/traditions. More importantly, tourists experience what it means to be a Palestinian living in the shadow of the wall and under colonialism. Specifically, tourists get the chance to see the human face of Palestinians' daily life and witness their strong determination to affirm a normal life for themselves and for their families, despite all odds.

6.10 Conclusion

This chapter discusses how Zionists utilise the wall, discriminating surveillance policies and settlements to further control Palestinian tourism and direct it to surrounding colonial settlements. It also shows how Israel manages to appropriate Palestinian areas with historical and religious sites and by proxy those Palestinian areas that they do not control. For example, through construction of Israeli settlements and the wall, Israel has managed to completely disconnect ties between the two major historic, religious and touristic cities in Palestine, Bethlehem and Jerusalem.

The chapter sheds light on colonial tactics that undermine Palestinian tourism, specifically in Bethlehem, including distorting the image of Palestinian tourism and recruiting international celebrities, politicians, and pilgrims to enhance Israeli tourism on colonised land. The chapter discusses how tourists visiting Bethlehem can only visit for a limited period of time on the day by means of an intense, Israeli policed system of state-approved minibuses. It shows how Israeli surveillance methods restrict tourists to a heavily militarised wall gate, known as 'Checkpoint 300'. Consequently, tourists tend to stay in hotels in East Jerusalem and Israel.

This chapter also shows how Israel promotes Palestinian Islamic and Christian holy places in a Jewish-Zionist context, as belonging to Israel through organized tours within sites in the WB without mentioning that there are Palestinians living in the area. It is Zionist strategy to normalise these sites as being part of Israel. The chapter discusses how tourism has become an effective means to reproduce an official Israeli narrative that serves to normalise occupation.

The chapter underlines extensive colonial surveillance against tourists and visitors to the WB. It discusses how Israel imposes indirect punishment on tourists and visitors as soon as they arrive at the airport or when crossing a border. It argues that colonial efforts to obstruct international tourists/visitors from freely and independently visiting the WB are acts of power aimed at preventing them from seeing the real face of colonialism in the WB. For Israelis, allowing international visitors to meet Palestinians: women, children and families, in their houses, schools and in their refugee camps, might initiate solidarity with Palestinians.

The chapter demonstrates Zionist relentless efforts to prevent tourism in Palestine, rendering Palestinians both uncompetitive and unable to provide adequate services. Unequal laws and restrictions affecting Palestinians allow Israeli tourism companies unfair advantages over Palestinians. It discusses how Israeli policies effectively deny Palestinian control over possible visitors/tourists to the WB, including East Jerusalem. Also, how Palestinian tourism companies are restricted when it comes to freedom of access and economic benefit. Restricting and humiliating Palestinians in this way creates a sense that they do not have the ability or are inferior to Israeli tour operators. This is part of Zionist ideology aimed at suppressing Palestinian *sumud*.

This chapter also shows how Israel undermines tourism in WB by intensifying efforts to develop and fund related tourism projects in surrounding colonial settlements. These efforts include: offering more comprehensive types of accommodation; more affordable facilities and activities for tourists, and most important, are safer. Shared statements from Palestinian shop owners and tour companies in Bethlehem and restrictions on tourism are also discussed.

The chapter discusses the role of AIPAC in supporting colonial tourism in the WB and growing criticism and actions against AIPAC by American human rights organisations and public figures. It reflects on the active work of these groups in pressuring US citizens to reassess their support for Israeli policies.

This chapter also examines everyday acts of determination to find alternatives and coping mechanisms of dealing with the suppressive power of the wall and surveillance polices. In Bethlehem the political situation inspired new forms of tourism to resist and survive changing realities after the wall. Hosting tourists is one form which enables both tourists and Palestinians to bridge cultural and political gaps. Shared statements of Palestinians from Aida camp show their affirmation of life and describe acts of generating income and creating political and cultural awareness.

The chapter highlights how the apartheid approach has backfired against the Israeli state. It discusses how art and graffiti on the wall has inadvertently turned the Bethlehem side of the wall into a highly attractive tourist site. Tours, graffiti, murals, and film

projected onto the wall have infused the wall with new meaning and purpose. Most importantly, it highlights the role of internal and external advocacy in generating political awareness. These are alternative everyday acts of *sumud* tourism to existing dominant religious types. The chapter shows that these acts are pillars of tourism development for Palestinians by engaging tourists with narratives of the political situation in Palestine. In this chapter these acts are referred to as *sumud* tourism'

Chapter 7

Expressions of refugee identity, right of return and unity in women's *sumud* against the wall in Aida refugee camp

7.1 Introduction

In chapter six Palestinian *sumud* was discussed as overt/covert acts of determination to develop alternative tourism as a way of competing with settlers who direct their tourism to surrounding colonial settlements, utilizing the wall. This chapter discusses *sumud* as covert acts of affirmation of life, maintaining dignity, navigating confinement of the wall and improving their lives. The concept of covert *sumud* as a strategy is concerned with affirmation of life for refugee women in Aida camp against the power of the wall. In particular, it examines how refugee women are capable of holding a strong sense of *sumud* as a pulse of resistance against the wall and links with their prolonged history of struggle in a refugee camp. This chapter shows how refugee women display various forms of everyday acts of *sumud* that communicate and articulate their identity as refugees and highlight a strong connection with homeland roots and their right to return.

Sumud is discussed as acts of preserving family and community life despite: dispossession, hardship, injustices, lack of facilities, poor infrastructure, collective punishment, humiliation, loss and trauma, all due to colonial power in refugee camps (Peteet, 1997). Women in Aida camp are still able to develop a sense of a normal life for themselves and for their families. *Sumud* in this chapter demonstrates an insistence on being Palestinian refugees, and a commitment to celebrating Palestinian culture, food and dance, and have large families to continue the struggle against colonialism (Teeffelen, 2009).

The chapter highlights role of hegemonic political and cultural identities in the Palestinian refugee community in determining the character of *sumud* and forms for survival while confronted by the wall. It examines links between refugee identity and refugee unity that spring from memories, life stories and personal histories of living in Aida camp. Through themes which include: the right to return, refugee camps, refugee identity, memory, figures and narratives, the chapter examines the relation between women's *sumud* as an act of affirmation of life and being a refugee woman in a refugee camp. It shows how refugee women manage to utilise their circumstances to solidify their own and their family's *sumud* against the wall.

The chapter focusses on the strong relationship between a life of exile in a refugee camp, the homeland before the *Nakba* of 1948, and *sumud*. A key concept throughout

Palestinian history is the 'right of return' that commonly expresses a determination to return to ancestral land. The right of return echoes the depth of struggle in Palestinian history (Richter-Devroe, 2013; Rijke and Teeffelen, 2014). This history of struggle led refugees in camps to distinguish themselves as us *Laje'en*, as against them, *Mowatenee*' (other Palestinian citizens of the WB). This has played a central role in constructing Palestinian identity in refugee camps. The chapter also investigates the contribution of refugee camp community in solidifying women's *sumud* against colonialism in general, and against the wall in particular. It asks in what ways the refugee camp constructs refugee identity and *sumud*.

To show the relevance between the above and the particular circumstances of daily life for refugee women in Aida camp, the chapter discusses how both *sumud* and the right of return engage various associative meanings that allow them to become applicable to daily *sumud* in the shadow of the wall. It also investigates women's *sumud* against the wall in Aida camp, expressed in covert acts. Women's *sumud* acts consist of both materially based survival strategies and various coping strategies at the ideological level. Focusing on the latter, the chapter highlights links between being a Palestinian refugee in the WB and *sumud* against the wall.

The following section focuses on what it means to be a Palestinian refugee living in a camp in the WB, and the effects of this in constructing a united refugee identity. Other sections include: discussions of refugee identity and *sumud* in Aida camp; refugee memories and narratives in solidifying *sumud* against the wall; Palestinian embodied acts of *sumud*; and Aida women's acts of *sumud* as affirmation of life against the suppressive power of the wall.

7.2 Refugee camps as zones of constructing *sumud*

The Palestinian refugees cause is directly related to what Palestinians call the *Nakba*, which means literally (the catastrophe), a Palestinian term that refers to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and creation of the Palestinian refugee dilemma (Schicocchet, 2011). In that year a majority of Palestinians fled from British Mandate Palestine following a mass exodus of Palestinians at the hands of Zionist gangs (Ch2).

After the 1967 War, additional numbers of Palestinians became refugees under military occupation. Ever since, those refugees have experienced on-going collective punishment, trauma, suffering, social distress and political oppression (Giacaman, et al., 2010). The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) recommended *sumud* (steadfastness) as an act of helping Palestinians to remain on their land in Palestine, and *sumud* has become a national symbol for '*samideen*' (those who are steadfast) almost by definition in their struggles against the colonial power. *Sumud* had been

practiced by every Palestinian; it is to learn how to cope with, and resist, struggles of being conquered person (Shehadeh, 1982). However, after the 1960s, the discourse of *sumud* as a national symbol became primarily associated with Palestinian refugees in refugee camps, especially when PLO resistance movements emerged as leading organizations in refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon (Salih, 2013; Rijke & Teeffelen, 2014).

Palestinian refugees were primarily identified as *samideen*, those whose willpower was tested to the extreme, due to daily struggles to secure their rights (Lindholm Schulz & Hammer, 2003). For example, a high level of constant *sumud* was required from Palestinian refugee *samideen* when they had to defend their besieged camps during the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s and 1980s. Due to setbacks in the Palestinian struggle in Lebanon, the discourse of *sumud* shifted to refugees living on Palestinian land. The popular struggle of Palestinians against the colonial project in Palestine gave a much-needed focus and drive to overall Palestinian national movements (Rijke & Teeffelen, 2014). On everyday acts of *sumud* of Palestinian refugees in Palestine, Raja Shehadeh (1982, p. viii), a Palestinian author and human rights lawyer, writes:

Sumud is watching your home turn into a prison and you choose to stay in that prison because it is your home, and because you fear that if you leave, your jailer will not allow you to return

Shehadeh's statement represents all Palestinians in the WB, not only refugees. However, when talking about the fear of not being allowed to return might be more applicable to refugees because, as Salah, states:

Fieldwork interview 7-1: 8.5.14, Salah, 52, handyman, married, 6, Aida camp

We will never repeat our ancestors' mistakes. They left their homeland due to fear for their families after Zionist massacres of Palestinians. Look where we are now. We are scattered all around the world for decades and no one cares. We will never repeat this mistake and leave our camp despite all struggles. The only case in which we will leave our camp is when we return to our homeland villages

Ironically, after the exodus of 1948, Palestinians refuged to what they imagined would be temporary refugee camps in Palestine and in neighbouring areas. They took their house keys and some basic stuff only, thinking they would soon return to their homes. Months stretched into years, and years into decades (Peteet, 1997), and now, after 71 years of living in refugee camps Palestinians are still denied their right of return. Munther, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-2: 11.5.14, Munther, 47, unemployed, single, Aida camp

The biggest mistake our ancestors made was that they transformed their temporary refugee tents into stone houses. They made the task of their coloniser easier when they turned the supposedly temporary refugee camps into more permanent replacements

Refugee camps in Palestine have long been characterized as zones of popular resistance in the struggle against colonialism. However, *sumud* as 'determination to exist' in refugee camps changed the dominant militant discourse that tends to associate Palestinian resistance with armed struggle (Rijke & Teeffelen, 2014). Instead, resistance in relation to *sumud* in refugee camps became a very distinct, Palestinian, idea. *Sumud* became a basic national concept and strategy for refugees in order to prevent the colonial uprooting policy, to preserve identity and to restore dignity in the struggle for national liberty. *Sumud*, practised at individual, family and community levels became the art of living to survive and thrive in refugee camps despite hardship and suppressive colonial practices.

The wall has turned the space of Aida camp into a borderline of a continuous presence of colonial forces in the camp, and increased exposure to their violence and punishment mechanisms. The devastation by continuous military incursions, flushing and spraying skunk water on residents and houses of the camp, day and night, house-to-house searches and imprisonment, in addition to a chronic decline in socio-economic situations in the refugee camp, and ongoing lack of infrastructure facilities, make daily life in Aida camp extremely difficult and hard to bear. On October 2015, for instance, an Israeli border officer issued a shocking threat to Palestinians in Aida camp after some children from the camp threw stones at the wall (Hanna, 2015; O'Toole, 2015; Sheren & Al Qaisi, 2015; Staff, 2015). Colonial troops raided the camp and fired tear gas. An officer in a jeep, driving slowly through the camp, sent a threatening message in Arabic over a loudspeaker:

People of Aida refugee camp [...] you throw stones, and we will hit you with gas until you all die. We won't leave any of you alive. Children, youth, and old people, you will all die. We won't leave any of you alive [...]. We have arrested one of you. He is with us now. We took him from his home, and we will slaughter and kill him while you watch if you keep throwing stones (cited in Hanna, 2015; O'Toole, 2015; Sheren & Al Qaisi, 2015; Staff, 2015)

Previous incidents of deaths amongst Aida people due to inhaling tear gas after colonial raids on the camp (O'Toole, 2015), these threats spread fear in the camp, especially for those families with children and elderly people. The BADIL Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights called it intimidation "a clear and grave threat to collectively punish the population of Aida camp by way of lethal force" (Matter, 2015).

A report by academics from the University of California (Haar & Ghannam, 2018) found that 100% of population of Aida camp had been exposed to tear gas in 2017 (MAP, 2018). Their findings underline a statement made by UNRWA Commissioner-General, Pierre Krahenbuhl, that Palestinians in Aida camp are “exposed to more tear gas than any other population surveyed globally” (Mshasha, 2017; MAP, 2018). Paradoxically, Aida residents are used to being collectively punished by the colonizer. Dalia spent two days in hospital after breaking her hip while trying to save her little nephews from tear gas which hit their house from a wall tower. Dalia says:

Fieldwork interview 7-3: 15.5.14, Dalia, 20, shop assistant, single, Aida camp

Every day we expect to smell tear gas in our camp, it became part of our daily life mainly after construction of the wall. The adjacent Israeli military sniper tower in the wall is so close to our houses in the camp, it is as if they were living with us. If the soldiers didn't like any Palestinian gathering in front their tower/wall they disperse them with tear gas. The gathering might be a group of children trying to provoke soldiers with words or gestures. Last week two tear gas canisters broke the window to my brother's bedroom where his two children, Ayat four years old, and Mohammed five were sleeping. My brother and his wife were at work. I went up to the kids' room like crazy and carried both of them out of the room. The burning hot canisters ignited fires in the corner of the room. I fell down the stairs while trying to jump down holding the petrified children. I broke my hip, but the kids were safe. If I weren't there for them in the right time, we would have lost both of them

The ever-lasting struggles and hardships in refugee camps has made Palestinian resilience stronger. A study by Mohammad Marie, Ben Hannigan, and Aled Jones (2017) suggests that *sumud* is linked to the surrounding cultural context and can be thought of as an innovative, social ecological approach to promote resilience. The study argues that resilience is a prerequisite to *sumud*, and this is embedded in pre-existing cultural contexts, meaning that the individual has to be resilient in order to stay and not leave their place, position or community. This explains why Palestinians stay on their land/camp and resist colonial policies and walls. Um-Dalia, (Dalia's mother) notes:

Fieldwork interview 7-4: 15.5.14, Um-Dalia, 61, housewife, married, 8, Aida camp

We became experienced in dealing with tear gas that hit our camp every day. We usually use wet towels, bicarbonate Soda diluted in water in the best, to cover our faces so as not to inhale the gas. We sometimes use onions or perfume to counter the gas smell. If you can hold the canister, you can throw it away or put it in a water bucket to stop its affect. Not an efficient way to protect ourselves

from gas, but it is better than nothing

Um-Dalia added:

Salma, my daughter in law became terrified for the safety of her children. She will go to stay with her family on the other side of the camp for few days. She wants to stay away from the wall, and I don't blame her for doing that

The *sumud* concept is interwoven with the social environmental idea of resilience though the two are not the same (Teeffelen, et al., 2005; Teeffelen, 2011). In this sense, for Palestinians, Salma who is leaving her house to be away from the wall might be quite resilient, but she is not *samida* 'steadfast'. Therefore, resilience might be the prerequisite for *sumud*. However, the relationship between resilience and *sumud* from a social ecological perspective that includes health and wellbeing is still under-researched, where new voices are beginning to make a contribution (Marie, et al., 2017).

To be able to understand *sumud* and the resilience of Palestinian refugees, the role of loss and exile must be understood. Focusing on the place in its spatial definition in the form of national territories, divisions and boundaries, the organisation of space into territory is one key to a national identity, along with feelings of belonging and a framework within which social order can be framed and people can share meanings, values and intentions (Cox & Connell, 2003; Isaac, 2011). For Palestinian refugees in camps who have experienced enforced displacement, loss of land and belongings, and forced to live as refugees, this has become an inextricable part of their refugee identity. As settling in another place other than homeland become an exile identity (Malkki, 1995) and a construct "refugeeness" (Blommaert, et al., 2003, p. 434). The role of Palestinian refugee identity in solidifying *sumud* in Aida camp is discussed below.

7.3 Refugee identity and *sumud* in Aida camp

Palestinians are deeply connected to their homeland, which is an integral part of their lives (Teeffelen, 2011). The uprooting and loss experiences they suffered played a major role in their refugeeness identity (Peteet, 1995; Clemens, 2007). "Identity is a cognitive scheme closely related to specific definitions in which we find ourselves" (Elbedour, et al., 1997, p. 219). The importance of human agency is in the development of identity where "people recognize that their power to influence their material and social environments is critical to their ideas of who they are" (Elbedour, et al., 1997, p. 219). While complex variables in our past and present conditions help us define our own identity, the process of forming this identity is constantly in change and is influenced and reinforced not only by how we view ourselves, but how others view us. In the case of Palestinian refugees, identity is not only influenced by displacement but is reinforced by how Palestinians view themselves and how the outside world views Palestinians.

Mahmoud Mi'ari (1998, p. 48) cites concepts of identity:

Viewing identity as a social object frequently re-evaluated by the person and others, [...] objective public identity (the person as viewed by others), subjective public identity (the person's perception how others view him) and self-identity (the person as viewed by the self)

Public identity, both subjective and objective, is a concept that is more readily open for investigation. A quick glance at popular media sources can demonstrate how particular groups of people are identified and more often, stereotyped by others. But self-identity is "ultimately an internal construct" and the problem with trying to understand the self-identity of others is that we are always on the outside looking in (Elbedour, et al., 1997, p. 221).

Within refugee groups, solidarity in national identity strengthens in response to a real or imagined threat from an enemy group. So, while Palestinian identity is fragmented along lines of geography, experience, and legal status (Peteet, 1996), a collective identity and a sense of unity are formed amongst Palestinians in response to a common enemy; Israel. In this case, *sumud* as Shehadeh (1982, p. vii) says "is developing from an all-encompassing form of life into a form of resistance that unites Palestinians living under Israeli occupation". Moreover, women's *sumud* against the wall contributes inclusiveness and distinguishes refugee's *sumud* in refugee camps in the WB as an act of dignity and heroism. Most women in Aida camp conceptualized *sumud* as an act of heroism and a sense of dignity represented by their insistence on staying in the refugee camp despite all struggles. Salima, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-5: 20.5.14 Salima, 28, housewife, divorced, 3 children, Aida camp

The wall took our land and imprisoned our children, but this is nothing new for us, we have been living in imprisonment of exile for decades now. They [colonialists] have stolen our houses and land, and they hampered our life. Ever since, the only life we know is a life of struggles and agony. '*Ihna As-hab-El-haq*' [We have the right cause], with or without the wall, we will never stop resisting the occupation

Even families who are able to establish a decent life in the city, such as Rabiha's family, could not lose their refugee community. Rabiha, explains:

Fieldwork interview 7-6:23.5.14, Rabiha, 55, teacher, married, 3, Aida camp

Me and my husband work as teachers. My twin sister is married to someone from Bethlehem city. Both families managed to buy and share a piece of land in southern Bethlehem, and over the years we built our houses. I moved with my

family to the new house to be next to my sister. However, 90% of our time is still in the camp where we feel we belong. The camp, for us, is our home

Don Peretz (1977) writes that many of the earliest refugees were Palestinians from upper and middle classes. These Palestinians sought refuge with family or friends in neighbouring areas, until conflict scattered people further and further away from their kin groups. Palestinian refugees found themselves united more by the common experience of exile rather than a reliance on family bonds. For example, Julie Peteet (1995, p. 183) noticed that in refugee camps in Lebanon, it was common for widows to “prefer to live in proximity to others from [the camp] rather than their own kin because of their common experience”.

In a word, the glue that holds Palestinian refugees together is their shared camp and shared struggle to attain their right to return. Some Scholars of resilience research (Masten, 2007; Ungar, et al., 2007; Ungar 2008; 2011; 2012; Sousa, et al., 2013) tried to understand resilience by focusing on cultural context and other social sources. They argued that cultural values play a crucial role in collective resilience of individual and community within a politically violent context Michael Ungar (2008, p. 225) notes:

In the context of exposure to significant adversity, whether psychological, environmental, or both, resilience is both the capacity of individuals to navigate their way to health-sustaining resources, including opportunities to experience feelings of well-being and the individual's family, community and culture to provide health resources and experiences in culturally meaningful ways

Further, women in Aida camp, say that refugees in the camps are still paying a high price in their *sumud* against the colonial project. Ahlam, states:

Fieldwork interview 7-7: 16.5.14, Ahlam, 38, housewife, widow, 5 children, Aida camp

We ‘refugee women’ are the symbol of Palestinian women's *sumud* and struggle. We spent all our lives in exile and sufferings and between loss, hardship and suppression. I know that nearly it is impossible to find a Palestinian family clear of suffering or loss due to the occupation. Yet, we still the people who paid the highest price in our *sumud* all these years

Asma, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-8:15.5.14, Asma, 36, solicitor, single, Aida camp

I truly believe that Palestinian refugees represent the foundation underpinning the struggle for Palestine and are the main defenders of its cause

Um-Khalil a strong activist in Aida camp states:

Fieldwork interview 7-9: 19.4.14, Um-Khalil, 49, activist, married to a prisoner, 5 children, Aida camp

Wall, poverty and imprisonment which we [women in Aida camp] are faced with on a daily basis, do not affect our confidence and our pride in taking on active part in the life of our camp. On the contrary they increase our confidence and pride in challenging them and increase our *sumud*

In Aida camp the struggle for daily life and national rights requires a consistently demanding level of *sumud*. Um-Khalil in her statement reveals that women in refugee camps have been able to develop agency in order not to be obliterated by the overwhelming viciousness of their life in exile under colonialism and in the shadow of the wall. Women in the refugee camps construct their identity as resisters who resist colonialism and its tools of humiliation in order to secure, as much as they can, a dignified existence for themselves and for their families. This act of existence is inclusive to refugees and is in the context of the camp itself.

Being a refugee contributes strength to refugee women's *sumud* and unity in the face of the wall. In a lecture given in 2004, Peteet stated that perceptions of injustice and suffering often form part of what it means to be a Palestinian (Holt, 2012). In other words, the adhesive that holds Palestinians together is their suffering and struggles. Palestinian refugees in general, and mainly those living in refugee camps in the WB in particular, are no exception to this. Indeed, the prolonged history of injustice, struggles and sufferings in the camps of exile form part of what it means to be a Palestinian refugee living in a refugee camp.

Peteet also argues that place and identity simulate each other in a process of mutual construction where refugees produce place, and place shapes their identities (Holt, 2012). In exile, away from original home and land, the focus shifts to other considerations, such as memories, narratives and even myths to solidify identity and unity. Women's *sumud* in Aida refugee camp is about maintaining memories and life stories of the exile to solidify contemporary *sumud* against the wall. It is the determination to keep remembering who they are and where they come from and to where they must return one day. It is also about teaching children to learn lessons from their ancestor's stories to solidify their *sumud* against the colonial apartheid project.

Drawing on the Arabic common saying "repetition teaches people not to forget", the right of return in Aida camp function as generative concepts for sharing countless and unique old and new stories and narratives of struggles and sufferings imposed on refugees in the shadow of colonialism, and in the shadow of the wall. Right of return constantly reminds refugees of their losses, sufferings, of lessons learnt from the past and of their

utmost goal of not forgetting their cause. Interviews in Aida camp show that *sumud* and right of return are more about lengthy and patient actions of resistance of a marginalized people, to preserve and not give up on their identity and their rights in a colonial context. They are about the Palestinian determination to exist with dignity. It confirms that *sumud* is an act of resistance and an impulse of existence (Gould, 2014).

Despite dignity and pride or refugee identity, Palestinian identity is strongly influenced by a sense of victimization (Clemens, 2007). Without national boundaries to secure national sovereignty and give geographical basis to a shared, inherited and on-going history, the most convincing context through which Palestinian identity is 'kept alive' is the one thing which all Palestinians share; a common sense of victim suffering, which involves being exiled and being excluded from the right to return to original land (Cox & Connell, 2003). In their research on identity formation, as studied through Palestinian and Israeli child drawings, Salman Elbedour, David Bastien, and Bruce Center (1997) found that in conflict situations, self-identity is influenced not only by membership within a particular group (in this case Palestinians), but also with reference to the 'other' group (Israelis). Inter-group identity (manifested through nationalism) increases with the level of conflict:

the greater the external conflict the greater the tendency to align one's identity with the group, and the greater the external placidity the greater the tendency toward concern with individual identity (Elbedour, et al., 1997, p. 226)

Where conflict occurs notions of 'us' and 'them' overwhelm identity, however, the 'us' versus 'them' notion is not applicable only to Palestinian versus colonialist. It is also applicable amongst Palestinians themselves. Drawing on Yuval Davis (1997, p. 43) description of identity of "specific forms of cultural narratives which constitute commonalities and differences between self and others". Palestinian refugees, specifically those who live in refugee camps in the WB, are always careful to distinguish themselves from those Palestinian citizens (*Mowateneen*), who did not experience uprooting in 1948, and still live in their cities and villages in the WB. Palestinian refugees grab the opportunity on any occasion, personal or national, to highlight their identity as '*Laje'en*' refugees living in refugee camps, who have suffered a long history of sacrifice and suffering in exile. *Laje'en* identity and the role of this identity in resisting the colonial wall are discussed below.

7.4 Refugee camps as zones of constructing 'us refugees' '*lhn-Laje'en*' against 'them citizens' '*Hom-Mowateneen*'

For Palestinian refugees in WB refugee camps the situation is different from those in

diaspora refugee camps. Refugees in the diaspora are deprived of almost all their rights and not treated equally. For example, refugees of diaspora in Lebanon have no rights of citizenship while in Jordan they do, but at the same time they are subjugation to specific and diverse forms of control and exception of the host country (Salih, 2013). As Palestinian refugees scattered all over the world, in the diaspora and inside Palestine their refugee identity is as Peteet (1996, p. 200) suggests, 'increasingly fragmented and highly nuanced around differences in geography, experience and legal status'. Moreover, those in diaspora, refugee identity is influenced by 'here' and 'there', past and present which, may come together uneasily and ambiguously as both exist within their lives simultaneously (Mavroudi, 2008). Yasemin Soysal (2000, p. 2) notes: "diaspora is a past invented for the present, and perpetually laboured into shapes and meanings consistent with the present". The spaces those in diaspora create are a reflection of this 'in-between-ness' of past and present and of 'here' and 'there'. Diasporic spaces within the country of residence needs to be placed within this tension between constructing unities and dealing with disunities as well as a need to advocate a cause 'here' that is inevitably linked to the homeland 'there'. For Palestinians in WB refugee camps however, it is not only the tension between 'here' and 'there', but also the tension between 'us' and 'them'.

Under the colonial project in the WB, there are no significant differences between refugees in refugee camps and the rest of *Mawateneen* regarding rights and responsibilities. The only difference is the place; in cities and villages in the *Mawateneen* case, and in refugee camps for refugees. However, the experience of living in refugee camps is best expressed in terms of 'exclusion' rather than 'inclusion' (Cox & Connell, 2003). The specificity of refugees living in refugee camps in the WB derives in this sense. Refugees of the WB share the paradoxical situation of living in refugee camps in their own homeland, which led them to feel distinguished as 'us Laje'en, refugees' from 'them, *Mawateneen*' other Palestinian citizens of the WB.

The feeling of being distinguished is a central aspect of Palestinian refugee identity in refugee camps. It is their insistence on being different from Palestinian *Mawateneen*. They argue this is to avoid assimilation with *Mawateneen* and thus maintain their distinguished refugeeeness. This is an identity that they have paid a high price for in their cause against the colonizer. In addition, the *Laje'en* versus *Mawateneen* is an attitude practiced by refugees to protect their 'right to return', from being forgotten by both international and Arab communities and governments.

Refugees in the WB are not far from their homeland, on the contrary, they still live in their homeland, 'Palestine'. The colonizer, however, has forcibly shifted them several miles or more from their homes and land. This means refugees of the WB still exist in the same

geographical, topographical, social, and political environment as the rest of Palestinian *Mawateneen* of the WB. This includes seeing the same scenery and breathing the same air. Refugees still live with their people who share the same blood, language, religion, culture, customs and traditions, which makes their exile experience different from refugees in the diaspora.

This experience gave refugees in the WB the opportunity to have a stronger bond with their homeland/land, and, more physical contact. Such as when a refugee might pass by his stolen homeland on the Israeli side. At the same time, this exceptional condition of refugees in the WB increased their suffering in exile, as their homeland is in front of their eyes, but they are not allowed to return. Um-Saleem, describes the day when she, her husband and two cousins got a permit to go into Israel:

Fieldwork interview 7-10: 12.1.14, Um-Saleem, 86, housewife, married, 7 children, 15 grandchildren, Aida camp

The first thing we did was to see our village, Beit-Nateef, on the Israeli side. The village is only 30 minutes away from our camp, but that was our first time to see it in more than 70 years. We sat down on top of a hill staring at the ruins of our homes. I remember my cousin Sobhyia, who is about my age, asking me at that moment; do you remember that house on your left; it is Abu Ali house. We used to play marbles with their daughter Seham, she was popular for her red hair. I wonder what happened to her and her family, I heard they fled to Jordan. My other cousin Latifa, asked: Do you remember how we used to collect the wild *Za'ter* [thyme] from the hills around the village and how our mothers used to make us the stone baked bread topped with *Za'ter* in the back garden. We spent the whole day reminiscing and remembering our days in the village. At the end of that day, and on our way back to our camp, we were drained, exhausted and all quiet like we ran out of words. I can't explain what happened to us on that day. All I know is that we all experienced a weird mixture of muddled feelings of contentment for finally seeing our home again, and at the same time, painful grief suffocating our hearts for having to leave it again

Women in Aida camp strongly emphasize the role of their identity as refugees, living in a refugee camp, and their insistence on their right to return as a base for their active involvement in *sumud* against the wall. Refugee women of all ages, from young girls to grandmothers, tend to use the '*lhna*' term (we). It is the 'unity *lhna*' that reflects refugees' high sense of themselves as a whole unit of united identity and existence. In other words, for Palestinian refugees, the termination of Palestine in 1948 and subsequent displacement, provided a powerful and combined influence on refugee unity and what it means to be a Palestinian refugee in WB refugee camps. Rashid Khalidi (1997, p. 194)

highlighted the importance of exile and homeland in constructing Palestinian identity and belonging when he said:

If the Arab population of Palestine had not been sure of their identity before 1948, the experience of defeat, dispossession and exile guaranteed they knew what their identity was: they were Palestinians

Refugee women are persistent and powerful in *sumud* against the wall in attachment to their identity as Palestinian refugees and as owners of the right cause. Um-Emad, uses the term 'one body' to describe her community:

Fieldwork interview 7-11: 14.1.14, Um-Emad, 65, falafel shop owner, married, 5 children, Aida camp

It doesn't matter a woman or a man, old or young, we share the sorrows and the joy in our camp. That day some clashes erupted between our young men and soldiers on the wall. Israeli troops punished the camp with skunk water. The house of my friend Fatima was hit directly by skunk water, and for her bad luck it got inside the house through one of the open windows. You can't imagine the awful smell; it lasted for days and days. The house was cleaned, but still Fatima and her family couldn't stand the smell. I have a tiny house, so I offered Fatima and her daughters to stay with me in my house. The men scattered amongst other houses in the camp. Fatima would do exact the same for me. We [refugees in the camp], as one body; if one part of this body gets hurt, the whole body suffers

Based on Um-Emad's statement, one could follow Martha Kent's (2012, p. 111) comment on resilience: "It is an interactive process that requires something or someone to interact with. It is dependent upon context or environment, including our relationships". *Sumud* is an act of interaction between Palestinians operating within social values of support, giving, sympathy and affection, especially during adversity. Palestinians teach their children from a young age the importance of unconditional giving and support of each other for the survival of their community and for the strengthening of their *sumud*. Honour, protection of others and generosity are core values in Palestine. Abu-Ahmad, states:

Fieldwork interview 7-12: 14.1.14, Abu-Ahmed, 59, teacher, married, 3 children, Aida camp

In Palestine we still follow our ancestors' values and traditions. As a Palestinian, if someone comes to me asking for help, or someone came to my house or my shop seeking protection, he becomes under me and my family's protection. No one is allowed to touch this person, or it will become a direct insult to our name as a family. Other people who are chasing the person send respected, high status

family men to talk to counterparts from both families to discuss the problem. The men will make fair judgement based on provided facts and evidence

The relationship between notions of 'the individual' and 'the collective' is key to understanding resilience, as shared identity, community collaboration and increased social ties promise to enhance the wellbeing of individuals under stress (Murray & Zautra, 2012). The collective strength underpins individual strength (Berliner, et al., 2012), where enhanced social networks and formulated values feed into strengthening individual and community resilience (Berliner, et al., 2012). Palestinian refugees have only memories and narratives of parents and grandparents, and a sense of a place that is rightfully theirs but has been unjustly denied them (Christoff, 2004) which has had significant implications for the construction of their '*Ihna Laje'en*' identity. The role of memories and narratives in solidifying *sumud* in Aida camp is discussed below.

7.5 Refugee memories and narratives in solidifying *sumud* against the wall

Refugee families are careful to keep their refugee identity alive. This is done by relating their old and contemporary life stories, narratives, memories, and experiences to their children and to the next generations. In this sense, family is seen as a fundamental institution in creating a Palestinian identity in exile (Lindholm Schulz & Hammer, 2003). For Palestinians, family is the starting point for educating future generations from an early age about their refugee identity. Palestinian refugees use 'generation' to describe their own identity (Richter-Devroe, 2012). This might include passing on stories about the horrors of uprooting (Elbedour, et al., 1997). The past and present circumstances of refugee hardship are explained in these stories as consequences of the uprooting experience (Peteet, 1995).

Teaching children not to forget that they are Palestinian refugees and to stay determined to pursue the right of return are essential requirements of *sumud*. Palestinians in Aida camp, mainly women, believe that by educating their children about their identity and struggles creates a more mature and politicized younger generation where children have a more complex insight into the political situation around them, thus more strength to resist colonialism. Um-Kamal says:

Fieldwork interview 7-13: 12.5.19, Um-Kamal, Manager, 47, widow, 5 children, Aida camp

We should pass on our stories of struggle to our children and students. We must teach them how to be tough and strong like us. They must know how to survive the hardship, and how to resist their colonizer as we did, and still do. However, we must give them hope, and make them believe in a just world. So, we share with them stories of our ancestors as role models

Constructions of the homeland play a major role in specific and politicized discourses of Palestinian identity and unity in refugee camps. According to Lindholm Schulz (2003, p. 9), diasporas need to have “strong collective images of the homeland”, which may be constructed for political reasons because a defined territory is seen as necessary to strengthen constructions of political unity (Robins & Aksoy, 2001). Refugees in the WB are no exception to this. They do this via active and consistent remembering of their homeland of 1948. The remembering is done through constant romanticizing of their ancestral villages, and descriptions and narratives of their life before 1948. It is about their weddings and their social gatherings in the villages, their houses and their farms that were once lived in by their families.

However, constant remembering of homeland does not awaken only feelings of yearning, good nostalgia and memories of childhood. It is also important to appreciate the complex of feelings that develop when it comes to talking about memories of exile, mainly ones that are linked to the trauma of the exile. I visited Haja Sarah in her house. On that day, the house had 26 women of Haja Sarah’s descendants, daughters and granddaughters. In her remembering of the *Nakba*, she deliberately insisted on romanticising her memories of exile, and she avoided talking about any painful memories. Haja Sarah says:

Fieldwork interview 7-14: 7.2.14, Haja Sarah, 82, widow, 10 children, 32 grandchildren, Aida camp

I miss homeland a lot. Whenever I close my eyes, I can see the swing that my father made from a piece of wood and a thick rope tied to the olive tree in the front garden. Sometimes, I feel, as I can smell the first drops of rain mixed with the soil of our land. I can taste the sweet grapes of the vines of our back garden

Ahlam, Haja Sarah’s granddaughter adds:

Fieldwork interview 7-15: 7.2.14, Ahlam, 33, social worker, married, 5 children, Aida camp

My grandmother used to wonder what happened to the swing. Do their children play with it or not, she means the colonialists who stolen her house! My grandmother suffered a lot in her life. When they fled their village in 1948, she lost her little sister Halima who was only three at the time. Halima was never found again. Still, my granny is a strong woman. Actually, she is the anchor of this family and we all get our strength from her

Maysoon, Haja Sarah’s daughter adds:

Fieldwork interview 7-16: 7.2.14, Maysoon, 51, teacher, married, 6 children, Aida camp

Israeli troops killed my son, falsely accused of trying to stab a soldier. He was on his way to college. He was only 23 years. My other son, 18 years, is in the Israeli prison accused of throwing stones at the wall. I get my strength and *sumud* from

my mother, she managed, despite all her struggles, to establish a family and to raise and educate 10 children

When older generations pass their narratives and memories of *sumud* to their children, younger generations become part of these narratives (Lindhom Schulz 2003). Khadija, states:

Fieldwork interview 7-17: 9.2.14, Khadeja 45, centre manager, married, 3 children, Aida camp

The power of passing on experiences, memories, and narratives from older generations shouldn't be underestimated. The role of this passing on in constructing our younger generation's high sense of identity is massive

The story of Haja Sarah and her descendants show narrative representations of *sumud*. Stories reflect how the notion of *sumud* is important, both for individuals to cope with their circumstances and for others to learn and draw strength from experiences they have not personally endured. Refugee identity coupled with a strong sense of nostalgia for a homeland reflect the importance of keeping refugeeness (Peteet, 1995). It is a process of becoming, rather than a one-time event, and exile imbues refugees with nostalgia as a coping mechanism to deal with unstable and uncertain circumstances (Clemens, 2007, p. 105). Abu-Ferial, in this regard says:

Fieldwork interview 7-18: 1.6.14, Abu-Ferial, 64, carpenter, married, 8 children, Aida camp

Sumud stories we've heard over and over from our ancestors helped our generation to bond with our homeland that we've never seen. Now it is our turn, to pass these stories to our children and grandchildren for the same purpose, and so on

Haja Sarah's insistence on mentioning the more positive side of her story is her *sumud*/cope mechanism of dealing with loss and exile. It is her own way of expressing *sumud* by bringing up beautiful images and feelings of her life at the family house before *Nakba*. By remembering a beautiful sense of smell and taste from the past, Haja Sarah managed to bring that place from the past to her camp through positive memories, to give her comfort and warmth. Young generations rely on the recollections of a diminishing pool of eyewitnesses, those who made the journey of exile in 1948. This is what in Appadurai's (1997, p. 189) argument is "the transformation of spaces into places" by "constructing its locales of memory and commemoration". In this sense, by using nostalgia, stories and memories of heroism and loss, refugees manage to open imaginary windows within the confinement of colonialism and its walls where children can see their stolen homeland.

Being Palestinian means being intimately connected to intense personal and emotional upheavals regarding places of living and identity (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2002, p. 176). It

is true that those stories might communicate vulnerability and traumas of ancestors, but they also reveal *sumud* and strength. Maysoon in her expression showed how Palestinians inherit confidence and strength from the experiences of their ancestors. Maysoon learnt how to be *samida* 'steadfast' against the loss of her son, imprisonment of her other son and against the confinement of the wall from losses her mother suffered and from acts her mother used in order to stay *samida*.

This explains role of memories and narratives in transferring strength to younger generations. Haja Sarah memorised the olive tree which represents history, strength and *sumud*. Tony Teeffelen (2011) in his study on Palestinian *sumud* found that olive tree represents peace, reward and history over thousands of years; the roots represent steadfastness on holy land, the branches represent resilience and the wind represents colonizer (Teeffelen, et al., 2005). Hidden symbols of *sumud* against confinement of the wall are discussed below.

7.6 Palestinian embodied acts of *sumud* in Aida camp

Michel Foucault's (1978, p. 95) said; "where power is, resistance is, and any following acts of daily actions or activities might potentially be a form of resistance". Similarly, James Scott (1985; 1989; 1990; 1997) and Asef Bayat (1997, 2000) consider hidden forms of 'everyday resistance' as the only option for those powerless to resist and survive suppressive domination. Scott (1989, p. 35-37) characterised this "everyday resistance" as the only option practised by powerless "subaltern" groups to resist exploitation, which is often invariably quiet, disguised, small scale, informal and deliberately subtle, which he calls "infrapolitics". He (1989, p. 35) further outlined how relatively safe acts: foot-dragging, passivity, laziness, and avoidance often represent a form of self-help which avoids direct confrontation with authority. In this sense it is possible to understand some acts of *sumud* as conducting resistance whilst avoiding risk of punishment. Scott also argues (1997, pp. 323-325) that the powerless are aware of their disadvantages and weaknesses and react accordingly. Therefore, they use acts that "have a double meaning [...] so that they cannot be treated as a direct, open challenges" (Scott, 1989, p. 54).

'Embodied resistance' (Shinko, 2012) gives further explanation for this kind of resistance. When Palestinians, mainly women, use their bodies to display symbols of resistance in the face of colonialism, they are performing embodied, covert *sumud* to escape punishment. For example, when women wear the Palestinian '*kofya*' (traditional black and white scarf) to cover their hair instead of the common '*Mandeel*' (headscarf). Or when women wear a '*Thoub*', (folkloric Palestinian embroidered dress), while taking part in a political activity against the wall, they are expressing *sumud* through cultural and social resistance (Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013). Historically, women's place of origin

was recognized by the *Thoub* (Sayigh, 2012), specifically, from the art of embroideries on the *Thoub*. Each Palestinian village and city have a unique hand embroidery symbols, colours and patterns that represent the place of origin. Today, women, mainly in refugee camps wearing their *Thoub*s, are declaring *sumud* by displaying their identity as refugees who have original roots. It is an attempt to highlight their strong connection to a homeland before the *Nakba* of 1948. It is also, sending embodied messages to their colonizer that they still exist; 'our existence is our resistance' and 'we will never forget'. In this case, "instead of a clear message delivered by a disguised messenger, an ambiguous message is delivered by clearly identified messengers" (Scott, 1989, p. 54–55). Rabab, states:

Fieldwork interview 7-19: 2.6.14, Rabab, 19, student, single, Aida camp

Whenever we organize a political or cultural activity, specifically against the wall, we [young women of the camp] make sure we wear our *Thoub*s to highlight our roots of origin. Each one of us is from a different city or village from our pre-1948 homeland. Our *Thoub*s are beautiful with their vibrant colours, and hand embroideries. Many international supporters who usually join our activities show their interest in our *Thoub*s. They are amazed with what a *Thoub* represents to us as Palestinians, and the message it sends to our colonizer. It says that we still exist, and our existence is our resistance, and that we will never forget our right to return. My friend Emily from Canada asked me to get her a *Thoub*; she wears it at Palestinian activities around the world

In this case wearing a *Thoub* is a disguised act of resistance that creates unity and cooperation which evolves into a form of resistance (Scott, 1989, pp. 35-37). It is also, an act of remembering by creating 'counter-history' and 'counter-memory' (Medina, 2011). By wearing a *Thoub* or a *Kofya*, refugee women are using their bodies to display their *sumud*, and to show their determination in refusing a colonial attempt to dismiss their existence. It is also about preserving Palestinian identity and history (Teeffelen & Biggs, 2011). Similarly, those young Palestinian refugees wearing symbolic chains with a map of Palestine (Peteet, 1995), and names of Palestinian places before the *Nakba*. For instance, Um-Yaffa (mother of Jaffa), was very careful to name her daughters after their ancestors annexed cities of 1948:

Fieldwork interview 7-20: 5.5.14, Um-Yaffa, 45, social worker, married, 2 children, Aida camp

I insisted, as many other Palestinian women do, to name my daughters after names of their stolen cities in 1948. I named my first daughter 'Yafa' (Jaffa), the original city of her mother's ancestors. Also, I named my second daughter 'Bissan,' the original city of her father's ancestors. In this way our young

generations will never forget their homeland. Every time someone calls their name, these stolen cities will be remembered

Aziza, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-21: 2.6.14, Aziza, 17, student, single, Aida camp

I am wearing this golden chain [Palestine map] since I was born. It was a present from my auntie. When I was a child, I didn't know what it means. I liked it because it was a beautiful piece of jewelry. But after I learnt the value of its meaning, I became more attached to it and never took it off

What makes women's *sumud* like Rabab, Um-Yaffa and Aziza unique is that it is not organized or centralized and it is without a clear political agenda. More importantly, the majority of this kind of *sumud*, would not make sense as a resistance outside of its specific social and political context, which is directly linked to Palestinian struggles, experiences, culture and history. For Scott (1997, pp. 323-325), an undercurrent of ideological resistance lies beneath a surface of more symbolic and ritual forms.

The sense of place is also an important factor in creating the Palestinian identity and is directly linked to the refugee experience and *sumud*. In WB, street signs displaying names of martyrs can be viewed as an attempt of refugees to claim space with symbols of resistance (Peteet, 1995). Mahmoud Mi'ari (1998) found that many refugees still identify themselves with those places (homeland villages and towns); that they currently left 71 years earlier. Remembering in refugee camps considers *sumud*. In this regard memories are frequently emphasised through artwork and symbols. *Sumud* and the expressions of Palestinianness (Schicchet, 2011, p. 75) in refugee camps are intertwined and saturate the everyday life of the camp. Elizabeth Mavroudi (2008, p. 6) argues that:

Homeland-orientated or diasporic politics can, be seen as the merging of collective imaginings of belonging 'there' [Palestine] to the daily realities of living and being politicised 'here' [hosting country] within political spaces

Following on this, refugee politics can, therefore, be seen as the merging of collective imaginings of belonging to the 1948 homeland to the daily realities of living and being politicised in refugee camps in the WB. The public use of powerful symbols of being Palestinian refugee; artwork; graffiti, hanging up the Palestinian flag; sticking posters; photos of Palestinian figures, prisoners and martyrs; wearing accessories such as the symbolic key of return or map of Palestine are continuous attribution of 'Palestinianness' (Schicchet, 2011, p. 75). Along the length of the wall in the camp a graffiti attributes *sumud* and Palestinianness. Much of the graffiti on the wall was created in response to the enclosure policies associated with the wall and that are increasingly suffocating

Bethlehem city (Gould, 2014). Tamara, describes the view from her window and what impact this graffiti has on her *sumud* against the wall:

Fieldwork interview 7-22: 17.5.14, Tamara, 33, housewife, married, 3 children, Aida camp

My window looks out on graffiti of some young men faces in front of the wall. I know the faces; they are for young men from Aida in the Israeli prisons. One young man in particular grabs my attention every time I look through my window. It is Ashraf who was sentenced to 130 years! I feel ashamed from myself to feel depressed or frustrated from our situation. Those heroes scarified their life and freedoms for our sake. We should maintain our *sumud* strong. We owe these heroes and that why we have to be strong and carry on what they have started, otherwise, will be betraying them

In Tamara's statement she expressed her options between either accepting the feelings of being trapped within the confinement of the wall, and of feeling victimized and depressed, or defeating these feelings and be *samida*. This confirms to a big extent with Raja Shehadeh's (1982, p. viii) statement:

Sumud is watching your home turn into a prison and you choose to stay in that prison because it is your home, and because you fear that if you leave, your jailer will not allow you to return. Living like this, you must constantly resist the twin temptations of either acquiescing on the jailer's plan in numb despair or becoming crazed by consuming hatred for your jailer and yourself, the prisoner

Tamara's statement highlights also role of graffiti in supporting *sumud*. Graffiti on the wall reflects Palestinian suffering, history and struggle and at the same time gives Palestinians hope, support and strength (see Ch6). Graffiti of the prominent Palestinian freedom fighter, Layla Khalid, on one wall of an Aida house, is located directly opposite a sniper tower on the wall. Layla was part of a team that hijacked the plane carrying an Israeli football team while it was on its way from Rome to Tel-Aviv in 1969 (MacDonald, 1991). Khalid's picture, wearing the *Kofya* and holding a gun, highlights the high sense of pride and appreciation residents of the camp have for their heroes and for their heroic acts of resistance.

The high sense of refugee identity more obvious in women's expression of *sumud* that is linked to artwork and graffiti in the camp. The symbolic reflections of refugee history and identity are found all over the camp, on the walls of the camp, and on the apartheid wall itself. They are mainly linked to their *sumud* as resistance and to their right of return as existence. This explain why much of the art, both on the wall and on Aida homes, touches on themes linked directly to the geographical space of the location of this art, nature of people who did it, in addition to the nature of people who view it. Taking a quick

comparison between the art on the wall in Aida camp and the art on the wall in Bethlehem side that is actually only few blocks from the Aida camp. Starting with the latter, Rebecca Gould (2014) noticed while staying in one of the houses of Bethlehem near the wall that the graffiti on the wall in Bethlehem appeared to have nothing to do with colonialism taking the mural near her window as a case in point. While graffiti on the wall in Aida camp and on the walls of the camp itself, including houses, are directly linked to the camp residents of exile memories, refugee identities and struggles.

Gould (2014) wondered what a dove, a rainbow, and a book with the word 'peace' inscribed on its blank pages has to do with Palestinian resistance. She came to the conclusion that by combining political activism with artistic vision, signs and symbols have a great deal to say about contemporary interaction between Palestinians and Israelis. For Palestinians in refugee camps, the deliberate and stubborn insistence on remembering is considered *sumud*. Graffiti on the wall emphasises Palestinian memories of struggles with exile and colonialism and represents their determination not to forget or be forgotten. In this regard, graffiti in Aida camp has great significance for Palestinian nationalism and *sumud*. Slogans and symbols of the right of return, pictures of resisters and names of martyrs cover the wall. Billig (1995, p. 6) points to the presence of "banal nationalism":

National identity [...] is to be found in the embodied habits of social life. Such habits include those of thinking and using language. To have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about nationhood [...] nationhood is still being reproduced: it can still call for ultimate sacrifices; and, daily, its symbols and assumptions are flagged

A nine-meter high steel sculpture of the key of return, fixed at the main northern entrance of Aida camp, parallel the wall (ICAHD, 2016), is a clear representation of the identity boundaries of Aida refugees. It reflects their *sumud* against the wall (Porro, 2018). The symbolic key sends a clear message to the colonizer that Aida refugees still exist, are still resisting and will never forget. It represents the family home when Palestinians were forced to flee in 1948, which they took with them in anticipation of their eventual return (ICAHD, 2016). Symbolic keys often have the number '194' engraved on them, a reminder of UN Resolution 194 (UNRWA, 1940):

Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible

Paradoxically, the arch that holds the key is supported on the right side by a wall parallel to the apartheid wall. Fadwa, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-23: 2.6.14, Fadwa, 18, student, single, Aida camp

When the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and 1967 left their homes, they took their keys with them in the belief that their return was imminent. The keys have been passed on from generation to generation as a keepsake, as a memory of their lost homes and as lasting symbols of their right of return. By choosing to locate the art figure of the key opposite the sniper towers of the wall we are sending our occupier a clear message that we are the holders of the key of return

Manal, added:

Fieldwork interview 7-24: 2.6.14, Manal, 19, student, single, Aida camp

Also, by choosing to locate the key opposite the sniper towers of the Zionist wall, we are sending a clear message to the rest of the world that we are not afraid of our occupier and will never give up our right to return

Rasha added:

Fieldwork interview 7-25: 2.6.14, Rasha, 20, Secretary, single, Aida camp

The key even went further than just sitting in the face of the wall. It travelled to take part in the 7th Berlin Biennale in Germany. The key travelled thousands of miles to remind the whole world of our right to return. The workshops were packed with discussions of meanings of homeland, memory, and identities for us refugees. We are careful to highlight the damages Israel causing us on daily basis, mainly with its most visible symbol of colonialism that is the wall

The work of art that Palestinians have created in connection with the wall can certainly be read as expressions of rejection of the terms of how the land and people have been divided. Yet, the art figures in the streets of the camp and the graffiti on the wall speak of another response to the division of space and people. Through their comments, Fadwa, Manal and Rasha are not only resisting colonialism, but are overcoming the victimization usually associated with marginalized groups of Palestinians, mainly, women and children. When these young women invoked such statements, they are expressing *sumud* in its most idealistic forms as they are envisioning a life, and a future full of strength and hope, a world that cannot be destroyed by the occupier and its walls.

However, attempting to redress Foucault's (1978) opinion (see above), Lila Abu-Lughod (1990) long ago warned against "romanticizing resistance," and suggested instead that scholars study resistance as a "diagnostic of power". Such an approach helps us to better understand the material and ideational matrix of power in which and against which actors are strategizing and resisting. Sherry Ortner (1995) similarly stressed her discomfort with

resistance studies and suggested the need for a 'thick description' of the broader political, cultural, and economic contexts in which cultures of resistance emerge. In addition to internal politics and subjectivities of those who produce, market, and consume them (Geertz, 1973).

Most refugees are aware that an idealised picture of Palestine bears little relation to reality and returning home is not easy to achieve. But they also recognise the importance of transforming memories and stories of home to younger generations, in order to maintain their own sense of hope and control over their lives. Um-Na'eem, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-26: 10.2.14, Um-Na'eem, 53, housewife, married, 6 children, Aida camp

What do people mean by confinement in walls? As if we were not living in a confinement for all our lives. I know that struggles didn't stop us from hoping and dreaming for a better future; if not for ourselves, at least for our children. You never know, tomorrow might be better, if it is not in our time, I hope it will be in our children's time, and if it is not in their time, we still hope it will be in our grandchildren's time, and so on

In some parts of her statement, Um-Na'eem was talking not only on behalf of herself or on behalf of the refugees of her camp; rather she was talking on behalf of all Palestinian refugees around the world. It reflects her high sense of 'refugeeness' and unity with her cause and with related refugees around the world. As discussed earlier, suffering is the glue for refugee's identity and unity. Um-Osama, a friend of Um-Na'eem, comments:

Fieldwork interview 7-27: 10.2.14, Um-Osama, 49, nurse, married, 5 children, Aida camp

'*Ya Allah*' [oh my God], I used to hear the same sentences from my mother who used to hear the same sentences from her mother. Sometimes you don't realize the limits of your patience till you look back and count the years of your life spent in praying, wishing, hoping and waiting for something positive to happen, and we are still waiting!

Also, as the stories are told to pass lessons to children about *sumud* and how to maintain dignity and refugee identity, refugee parents might adjust the story to serve this target. Thus, people often tend to enact their memories and life stories in relation to the nature of audience, place and time of the story. In this sense, Samia, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-28: 13.4.14, Samia, 43, housewife, separated, 5 children, Aida camp

Frankly I adjusted some of the details in my ancestor's narratives to suit my aim. I have three teenage daughters, 17, 15 and 13. For example, when I don't want them to do something, such as going out with male friends, or wearing too much makeup or staying late outside the house at night-time. I focus on the side of narrative that serves my aim. Such as talking about how some women in the

family were known for their well manners and shy characteristics that their husbands saw them for the first time on the wedding night! My message to my daughters; at least keep some traces of those manners, especially because they are living in a conservative community. However, when I want my daughters to stand up for their rights, I talk about how other women in the family were known for their strong stands and bold opinions in advocating themselves in the face of colonial troops

In other words, people adapt their narrative forms of relating to the setting and purposes of the interaction, which confirms (Johnstone, 1991) idea that people construct their identities in stories through a sense of where they tell the stories. It is a process by which “we draw on discourses culturally available to us in order to construct narrative accounts, enabling us to tell particular stories at particular times” (Jackson, 1998, p. 47). Moreover it argues that nations are “like narratives who lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realise their horizons in the mind’s eye” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 1). Layla, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-29: 11.4.14, Layla, 31, teacher, single, Aida camp

I heard the same story many times from my grandmother and from my mother when I was a child; it was about their journey of exile from their village. The story was full of sad details and loss. On the ‘Palestine Land Day’, I told the same story to my little students. Intentionally, I skipped the sad details. I replaced them with a kind of heroism, and in certain places, funny details, that made the kids laugh. Our children have enough sadness and struggle in their life; it’s enough to see the wall to be depressed

Layla’s statement correlates with Tonkin’s (1992, p. 12) suggestion that “memories with which people interpret the present and go on to make the future”. Layla assessed that children have enough worries and sadness in their life. Therefore, she gave them a kind of support to advance their *sumud* through adjusted heroic, positive narratives that give them some hope for a brighter future and at the same time advance their respect for their ancestors’ history.

The stories also expressed a community aspect of *sumud* through the act of social sharing of their daily life stories. By doing so they symbolically shared each other’s burdens and created a narrative community based on solidarity and caring. By sharing stories, women reclaimed their place within society and within history. In this regard, I heard numerous accounts of heroism stories of refugee women not only from the generation of exile, but also from the Oslo generation. After the 2001 colonial invasion of Bethlehem and beginning of the establishment of the wall, Aida camp was subjected by air raids many times. Also, many Aida camp men were imprisoned by the Israelis, which made women solely responsible for their families.

Some women undoubtedly experienced significant change during periods of conflict. Miriam Cooke (1988, p. 166) has written about the transformation of “women’s enforced passivity” into “identity formation”, as a result of their exposure to conflict. For Palestinian women, adjusting in the violent invasion of Bethlehem in 2001, despite the fact that it was characterised by a myriad of horror and death, but it was also regarded as a key mobilising period for many women, mainly in refugee camps. In Aida camp for example, some women became politically active and affirmed the development of their identity from static to resistor. Aysha, became socially and politically active after 2001:

Fieldwork interview 7-30: 15.4.14, Aysha, 60, housewife, married, 7 children, Aida camp

It was a horror period and yet, it was my first time to be involved in conducting activities to serve my people. We, some women of the camp, established a committee for emergencies. For instance, due to school closures as a collective punishment from our colonizer, we organised teaching classes for children of the camp. I coordinated with teachers, men and women, from the camp and we turned one of the community centres into a teaching arena

Aysha highlighted the integral of strength to her refugee identity; not only did she survive the myriad horrors of conflict and invasion, but also managed to discover unexplored strengths. Aysha’s statement also revealed *sumud* as an affirmation of life. Asef Bayat, (1997, p. 57) argues that virtue of the powerless way of life becomes a collective force that generates common interests. To defend those common interests, Bayat coined the term “quiet encroachment” of “silent, patient, and pervasive advancement in an effort to survive hardships and better their lives”. *Sumud* as affirmation of life in Aida camp is discussed below.

7.7 Aida women’s *sumud* as affirmation of life against the power of the wall

Sumud is about a common refrain: ‘*Al-Hayat-Lazem-Testamer*’ which means ‘life must go on’ (Hammami, 2005; Rijke & Teeffelen, 2013; Richter-Devroe, 2013). Nina Gren (2009) carried out a study in camps of the WB to explore ways of maintaining everyday life in spite of adversity during the second Intifada, including curfews, shelling and siege. The study showed that people used tactics and practices of *sumud* to survive including positive attitudes and strategies of *sumud*, which were upheld by the surrounding cultural context. Humour is one of these strategies. During the First Intifada jokes and humorous registers were pervasive (Kanaana, 1990). The new genre, which Sharif Kanaana (1990) defines as ‘Intifada humour’ was tied to resistance and mainly targeted at the Israeli army. Jokes at that time show the powerful, vernacular, and subversive strategies

through which ordinary Palestinians, often women and children, ridiculed the colonizer and represented the reality beneath the one imposed on them.

For Scott (1989, pp. 54-56), symbolic resistance negation such as: black humour, sarcasm, cursing, or even cringing silence are not always what they seem to be, but instead are demonstrations of 'everyday resistance'. Humour and jokes circulated extensively in pre-Intifada times also, but they differed in genre and spirit from what we see in post-Oslo cultural production. The former, according to Kanaana (1990), echoed frustration that reflected people's inability to challenge the colonizer. Post-Oslo black humour, on the other hand, emerges from a "context of social and political fragmentation, stagnation, and disappointment" (Salih & Richter-Devroe, 2014, p. 18). In this sense, women in Aida camp use both types of humour genres to echo their inability to challenge the colonial policies of their colonizer with an attempt to adhere to basic human values under extremely testing circumstances.

Aida women insist on their affirmation of living a normal life with the satisfaction of achieving small gains. They use dark humour as an act of *sumud* that helps them cope with the absurdity of their life in the shadow of the wall. Ruba Salih and Sophie Richter-Devroe (2014) suggest that dealing with the unbearable through irony, intimacy, and humour highlights people's quest for a normal life despite the abnormality around them. Aida women share countless stories that reflect their *sumud* as affirmation of life. Feryal, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-31: 19.3.14, Feryal, 27, shop assistant, married, 1 child, Aida camp

We will stay *samideen* till patience itself gives up on us [the women laughed]. We deserve to live, start families and be happy despite all struggles. My brother's wedding is next week. We decorated the street opposite our house as a dancing area for men, and we prepared the roof on top of our house to be a dancing area for women. On our roof, my father built for my brother a small room, a toilet and a kitchen, so he starts his new life in it. Life goes on and we must keep going forward, this is *sumud* for us

Like Feryal, women in the camp practice *şumud* at the ideational level through maintaining hope, joy and a vision for the future. It is this form of *şumud* that Palestinian refugee women continuously stress; everyday acts in order to maintain a normal and to some extent a possible, enjoyable life for themselves, their children and families. Despite the impact of the wall on their daily life, women in Aida organize weddings and parties for their families, they sing, dance and enjoy their day despite imprisonment, destruction, frustration and death around them. Women also, despite economic hardship, take their families to visit relatives and friends in other parts of the WB, and they go on trips, defying

Israeli-imposed restrictions on mobility. Bushra, enjoys friends and family gatherings and trips:

Fieldwork interview 7-32: 15.3.14, Bushra, 32, nurse, married, 4 children, Aida camp

As the children's day off school is Friday, we like to get out of our camp for a day. We like a change of scenery from the wall. So, we go on trips to '*Berak-Solayman*' [Suleiman Pools] in the southern part of Bethlehem, although poor facilities in this historical place of three pools, which are usually, empty of water, and despite regular attacks from surrounding settlers. It is the only available place to go to and we insist on going to enjoy our day off

Najwa, who is Bushra's cousin, 34, added:

Fieldwork interview 7-33: 15.3.14, Najwa, 34, housewife, widow, 3 children, Aida camp

On such days, we usually spend the first part of the day in preparing and making food. Rest of the day we just eat and drink [women laughed]. We do nothing but eat, talk, and laugh. We are thirsty to have a laugh, to feel free and to feel alive

The Zionist policies of confinement against Palestinians remind them of their reality; people with no rights who must consent to their colonizer's control over their bodies, time and space (Ch5). This reality is obvious in the type of questions Palestinians receive from friends and family after crossing the wall/checkpoints. Sana, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-34:26.3.14, Sana, 25, nurse, single, Aida camp

I work in Jerusalem. Each time I cross the wall my family ask me, did they [Israeli soldiers] give you too much trouble? Were they in good mood today? Did they shout at people? Every day I should call my mother to tell her that I crossed the wall, or she will stay worried at me. It is not me only, I hear other people talking to their families to inform them that they did it, they passed the wall and to express their relief

Sana added crossing the wall became a big achievement deserves celebration:

I was in a taxi in Bethlehem and a woman was talking to her sister on mobile. She said: Wow sister, thank God you passed the wall, you should celebrate now. If I were in your place, I will go to Al-Aqsa mosque to pray for this achievement, then I will celebrate the rest of the day in Jaffa Street [Israeli western side of Jerusalem]

The type of questions and reactions Palestinians receive when passing through the wall, reveal the extent to which the experience of crossing checkpoints defines Palestinian

identity; a colonized identity that is controlled, helpless and worthless. However, a controlled Palestinian identity does not necessarily mean a controlled spirit. In other words, Palestinians may not be able to prevent the physical impact of confinement on their bodies, space and time (Ch5), but can prevent 'their spirit' from being trapped by this confinement. Palestinians insist on defending what they see as the remaining free element in their life is obvious in their overt efforts to go around the confinement of the wall and this what *sumud* is about. For example, Palestinians have to meet certain specifications to be able to obtain a *Tasreeh* (permit). Being in need of medical treatment in Israel or accompanying a patient are examples of these specifications. Therefore, Nawal and her sister Isra had to fabricate a medical appointment in Jerusalem to be able to get a *Tasreeh* and pass the wall and enjoy life on the other side. Nawal says:

Fieldwork interview 7-35: 27.3.14, Nawal, 26, administrator, single, Aida camp

My cousin works in Al-Makassed hospital in Jerusalem. I begged him to manage an appointment for me in the hospital, so I could use it to support my application for a *Tasreeh* to enter Jerusalem. He used his connections and got me an appointment. Israeli regulations allow each WB patient to have one person to accompany them into their medical appointment, so I added my sister. We both granted our permits. On that day we had the best time in our lives. It saw the sea for a first time in many years! So, we finished our day on the beach in Jaffa city, 30 minutes from Jerusalem. [Sarcastically laughed] I promised my best friend that she would be my companion on the next visit

Shared stories reveal the extent of women insist on enjoying life is their subvert acts of *sumud* to resist the effects that colonial policies of confinement indented to have on them and their families' spirit and agencies. The stories express the extent of *sumud's* horizon, while pain and struggle are universally present in Palestinian expressions, *sumud* allows space for other experiences to be expressed, including a deep-felt joy, an appreciation of Palestinian culture, as well as a bittersweet, or even dark but transformative humour over and across the pain. In other words, pain and sacrifice do not determine the lives of Palestinians and their *sumud*; the horizon of *sumud's* meaning is humanity, freedom, love and care (Barghouthi, 2009). For qualities that comprise *sumud* of refugee women in camps of Lebanon, Peteet (1991, p. 153) noticed:

Characteristic for femininity, silent endurance and sacrifice for others, family and community. The prominent place accorded *sumud* in popular Palestinian discourse paved the way for many ordinary women to see, and for others to see their actions as politically significant

Paradoxically, media coverage surrounding the Palestinian struggle for self-determination often see women as helpless victims of circumstances beyond their

control (Hanna, 2015; O'Toole, 2015). They are presented as marginalised victims trapped in a conflict in which they play no part in but to wail their martyrs and demolished houses, or as poor women trapped in a backward patriarchal society (Baroud, 2018). Some of biased Western media endeavour at whatever costs and power to legitimize the prejudices and give the sense of credibility. It is noticeable, therefore, that this biased media shore their claims up with 'evidences', 'arguments' and 'facts' in order to demonstrate that the Arabs' actions, 'thought' and 'intention' are demonic (Ridouani, 2011).

The invisibility of Arab or Muslim women in western media is argued to be rooted in a long history of colonialism. Edward Said (1978) introduced the term 'orientalism' to define the cultural and ideological representations of the orient in the western/colonial literature, which represents the white west in a superior position to the east. As a result, the west is portrayed as rational and advanced. In contrast, the east, is described as irrational and backward (Alhayek, 2014). Arab women are hardly seen as agents of change. Such misconceptions and misrepresentations undermine the political and humanitarian role Palestinian women play as actors of *sumud* and agents of change.

Moreover, the broader social and cultural context, family unity and sense of coherence, which play crucial roles in understanding the resilience of these people are often overlooked in western understanding (Panter-Brick & Eggerman, 2012), the ability to survive and exist is an important focus of resilience. Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2008) conducted a study on zones of political unrest such as South Africa during the apartheid period. She noticed that in politically conflicted areas, there is an everyday form of resilience within oppressed and politically excluded communities. She also noticed that west understanding of this resilience is insufficient due to differences in cultural context. In this sense, *sumud* for women in Aida is similar to what (Taraki, 2008, p. 17) describes as:

Resilience and steadfastness [*sumud*] have been staples of Palestinian ethos for generations now. *Sumud*'s incarnations have been many, but the dominant motif has been Palestinians' determination to continue under adversity, fortified by their roots in the land, strength of their traditions, and family and kin solidarity [...]. A new conception of resilience has been taking root, one that is not based on an ascetic denial of frivolity, joy, or entertainment, but rather renders the very pursuit of happiness a manifestation of resilience and of resistance at the same time

Aida's *sumud* is of a popular nature (Gideon & Levac, 2014), often individual and non-organized everyday resistance (Richter-Devroe, 2008) developed as something more proactive and captured in the common refrain, '*Al-Hayat-Lazem-Testamer*' (life must

goes on) (Hammami, 2005; Schiocchet, 2011; Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013; Rijke & Teeffelen, 2013; Richter-Devroe, 2013). Women's everyday acts of *sumud* against the wall is relevant to the daily life of all Palestinians who actively wish to maintain their refugee identity and dignity. Aida women's small acts to fool the coloniser and to go around the confinement of the wall to achieve small individual gains are sometimes called 'weapons of the weak' and 'everyday forms of resistance' (Scott, 1985; 1989) and the 'quiet encroachment' (Bayat, 1997). Acts of *sumud* also confirm with Sari Hanafi (2009) and Richter-Devroe (2013) conclusion that colonial practices of physical and spatial domination in Palestine are met by acts of *sumud* other than violence and martyrdom. Suzzane, mother of two in her 40s, managed to get her pregnant sister "Kae'k-Al-Qudes", (Jerusalem bread), through the wall. Suzzane says:

Fieldwork interview 7-36: 29.4.14, Suzzane, 44, housewife, married, Aida camp

Don't talk to me about walls and colonialism. For me they are joy wreckers that I avoid thinking about in order to enjoy my life. But since the Zionists restricted movement from Jerusalem to Bethlehem. 'Kae'ek Al-Qudes' [sesame bread made specifically in Jerusalem] became difficult to get. However, it was my sister who stirred things up. She was pregnant with her first baby and she craved Kae'ek. At that day the camp was under curfew due to clashes on the wall. So, I decided to fight the confinement of the soldiers and the wall in the name of Kae'ek, I mean in the name of my 'beloved baby nephew'. [Suzanne was talking and laughing hysterically]. I phoned Nazar, a friend lives in Jerusalem. I asked him to get me 40 pieces. I explained to him the process of delivery. The meeting point was the wall! At that moment, I felt as one of those in a Hollywood action movie [she was laughing]. I went with my nephew Tayem and waited for the delivery at the agreed spot of the wall. We took advantage of a cracked hole in the wall to smuggle the Kae'ek through. It was the joy of my life to go home with all that Kae'ek; I knocked on my neighbour's and gave them some. It was the most delicious Kae'ek we ever had

Not only Suzanne was laughing while narrating her story, but also all who were in the room that day. They were laughing more at her facial expressions and body language that were full of cynicism, challenging the danger and joy of tricking the colonizer. In their repertoires, women like Suzanne show their skills in creating covert *sumud* tactics to get over their misfortunes. These women's defiance is not to be isolated by the wall, but instead embark on dangerous strategies of getting around its confinement, are clear acts of *sumud* as affirmation of life. Palestinian *sumud* is practiced also in how to get around colonialism in order to be able to attain small gains or reach your aim (Allen, 2008). The statements also reflect women's stubborn *sumud* against Israeli control over their spaces

and bodies, by keeping their souls and spirits free. Their covert acts against colonial policies, one of which is to retain optimism, laughter and hope. This confirms De Certeau's (1984, p. 18) argument:

In these combatants' stratagems, there is a certain art of placing one's blows, a pleasure in getting around the rules of a constraining space. We see the tactical and joyful dexterity of the mastery of a technique

Women in Aida camp realize that with such acts they do not change their actual reality as people under a vicious colonialism, Humour, sarcasm and ridicule do not bring Zionist power down: "those who laugh [...] are not necessarily bringing about the collapse of power or even resisting it" (Mbembé, 2001, p. 110). Yet, Palestinian women in their laughter, dreams, hopes and acts to feel alive, they stress their right to live an ordinary human life. This endorses De Certeau (1984) when he described such tactics as subvert gains, which are usually individual, temporary, and small. Asef Bayat (1997, pp. 56-57) argues that powerless 'quiet encroachment' are offensive acts in efforts to survive hardships which include obtaining basic necessities and bettering their lives. In this case, women in Aida resist being isolated or deprived of basic needs. Women's *sumud* represents a more proactive mentality where life must go on '*Al-Hayat-Lazem-Testamer*'. In this regard Samar says:

Fieldwork interview 7-37: 28.4.14, Samar, 17, student, Aida camp

I was on my way with my mother to attend my Aunt's '60th' birthday party. However, we couldn't leave our house at that time because soldiers invaded our camp with tear gas and centered in front of our house. We couldn't dare to go out. I suggested an alternative; instead of using the main door, why not using the roof. With humour I said living in a crowded camp with houses nearly sharing the same roof due to proximity has got its benefit after all. We soaked our *Manadeels* (scarfs) in a homemade gas counter of Bicarbonate Soda diluted in water and used them as masks to protect ourselves from the tear gas. We went to the party after all as nothing was going on in our neighborhood

Sumud is not about partying in Samar's story. It is about enhancement of hope, confidence, self-esteem, laughing, and keep engagement and participation in social life despite colonial restrictions. Flexibility in adjusting to changes/difficulties in life circumstances, is best described by Marwa and Um-Khaled. Marwa says:

Fieldwork interview 7-38: 23.2.14, Marwa, 30, housewife, married, 3 children, Aida camp

Women of our neighborhood or extended family usually gather to congratulate a family for the freedom of their son from Israeli prisons, or when we give our condolences to a martyred family. Then life just goes on; we just go back to our

houses and carry on with our life, cooking, listening to music and taking care of our families

Um-Khaled, other women from the same focus group at that day, added sarcastically:

Fieldwork interview 7-39: 23.2.14, Um-Khalid, 50, housewife, married, 5 children, Aida camp

Sometimes, and after giving condolences to a martyred family, the same group of women attend a wedding party in another house. We are so used to attending funerals and weddings on the same day. Of course, we did not lose our sense of pain and loss, but we are used to feeling pain and joy on the same day if not on the same hour. We are used to adjusting to live the moment as it is and to keep going forward

Women in Aida described living in the shadow of colonialism and what it means to live in poverty, confinement, marginalization and lack of facilities. Education would provide them with more life choices, security and a better future. Through education, Palestinian refugees, mainly women, would secure better jobs and more income to support their families. Education would provide them with improved chances to serve their cause on a bigger scale and at a higher standard. This highlights the role of education in promoting Palestinian women's ability to survive the effects of colonialism (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2014). The importance of education for refugees was evident in the 1992 survey examining refugee and non-refugee conditions (education, housing, amenities, colonialism, home ownership, and wealth) highlighting an important difference; UNRWA registered refugees have a significantly higher educational level than non-refugees (Sayigh, 1998). Fatima about importance of education says:

Fieldwork interview 7-40: 12.3. 14, Fatima, 33, accountant, married, 3 children, Aida camp

Education is our weapon. Education is our strongest form of resisting Israel. Israel could steal our land, imprison us within walls. It could demolish our houses and close our roads and schools, but it will never be able to stop us from learning and getting education. My sister, Seham, 22 years old, is dying to continue her higher education. She managed to get an acceptance in Germany. On the visa appointment day, the soldiers refused to let her pass the wall to get to the German embassy in Jerusalem. Therefore, she tried to use a ladder to climb over the wall. Thank God we stopped her at the last minute before the soldiers noticed her!

Seham's action was her expression of *sumud*. She was trying to trick her colonizer by using a ladder to go around the confinement of the wall/colonizer. More importantly, it was Seham's act of rejection of being denied the right of education that would secure her a better future. A study on Palestinian youth found that females find resilience and support in reading, writing, drawing, and the pursuit of education (Nguyen-Gillham, et al.,

2008). Ibrahim Makkawi (2012) undertook a similar study on female high school students in the WB. He found that specific personal characteristics, such as, self-esteem, self-confidence, persistence and motivation to reach academic goals enabled young women to succeed. Young women's willingness to prove themselves and share in the public space was a significant resource within their cultural context. Support students had from their family played a major role in their success. For Palestinian youth, resilience is embedded in their capacity to conduct their lives as normally as they can in the face of a challenging context and lack of infrastructure resources.

Differences between sources of resilience among boys and girls were due to cultural context influences in Palestine. Therefore, most girls developed their sources of resilience inside their homes and schools (Taraki, 2008; Gren, 2009; Kartveit, 2010; Isaac, 2011). It could be argued that this is due to the dominant conservative culture in Palestine. Women in Aida camp are no exception. Women's *sumud* in Aida camp in the face of the wall is not sacrificing for the sake of sacrificing, but in the service of human values (Barghouthi, 2009; Richter-Devore, 2013). Aida have endured a real dilemma in the shadow of the wall yet choose to act productively rather than revel in self-pity, and it's that defiance that defines the people of Palestine. Khilda, says:

Fieldwork interview 7-41: 15.3.14, Khilda, 37, NGO worker, married, 4 children, Aida camp

I decided with my sister to take our kids to Suleiman Pools for a day out. The minute we arrived we smelled tear gas. We are used to smelling gas in our camp, my sister sarcastically said: the gas is after us wherever we go, even here. For our bad luck there were some clashes on the checkpoint near Al-Khader village opposite Suleiman Pools. The Israeli soldiers rained the Palestinian protesters with tear gas. We quickly took our stuff back to the cars, and fled the area, but not back to our camp. The kids were crying from frustration after all the preparations for our day, so we decided to move the picnic to Al-Karetas garden; the only public garden in Bethlehem that is very small and usually overcrowded. Personally, it gives me the feeling of being trapped, but it doesn't matter, I do believe if you want to be happy, you will be happy. It is a matter of determination on not giving up

These women's defiance in not to be isolated in their refugee camp and instead embark on unpredictable trips in an unsettled political environment, despite risks and costs, is an example of their *sumud*. This *sumud* could be in the challenge of inner confused feelings, as when Khilda decided not to be defeated by the settlers and moved location of the picnic from Suleiman Pools to the Al-Karetas garden despite what the garden represents to her of correlated feelings with the confinement of the wall. Khilda challenged the

negative feelings she has for the sake of bringing joy and happiness to her children and this is the essence of *sumud*.

Being *samideen* entails for Palestinians a certain way of life in which care for the community is important. Lori Allen (2008, p. 92) explained:

In these conditions where routine and assumptions of daily life are physically disrupted, purposefully and as part of the political program of Israeli colonialism, everyday life in Palestine, in its everydayness, is itself partly the result of concerted, collective production

Sumud is explained by Allen (2008, p. 92) as “the agency of everyday acts that prevent Israel’s successful subordination of Palestinians”. What can be seen here is that *sumud* represents a more inclusive notion of the personal responsibility of resistance. Resisting colonialism is not exclusively the job of men and women who engage in oppositional activities such as demonstrating. Resisting colonialism is also part of life for people focused on going forward and keeping their hope in a more just and human future alive (Rijke & Teeffelen, 2014). Aida women’s insistence on enjoying life in their refugee camp are their subversive acts of *sumud* to resist effects that the wall is intended to have on them and their families’ bodies, spirit and agencies.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter highlights how *sumud* became a defining feature of refugee national identity. It effectively strengthened their struggle, separately from the *Mowateneen*, and became a foundation of commonality, which keep their ideality and unity alive. After nearly 71 years in the exile, refugee loyalties, dreams and hopes are to be *samideen* with pride against any suppress from colonialism, including the wall, and to exist with dignity until they attain their freedom and the ultimate right, to return to their homeland.

The chapter explores links between Aida refugee women’s forms of *sumud* against the wall and being a Palestinian refugee living in a refugee camp in the WB. The key question investigated in this chapter was how refugee women in Aida camp manage to create a sense of normal life for themselves and for their families, despite the difficult life they have in the shadow of the wall and in the shadow of their own refugee camp.

The chapter also examines role themes of place of living, memories, life stories and heroism in constructing women’s refugee identity and unity in the refugee camp and in solidifying their *sumud* against the wall. In addition, the chapter traces and analyzes women’s acts of *sumud* against the wall which express liberating and humanizing concepts of *sumud* and the right of return, as opposed to messages of closure and immobility imposed by the wall. The chapter shows that the source of forming what it means to be a Palestinian refugee woman living in Aida refugee camp is linked directly

to her exile experiences and her history of suffering and struggle. In this sense, exile and the wall, as sources of suffering and struggle, both represent the adhesive that unites women in Aida camp and keeps them strong in the face of the wall and colonialism.

This chapter examines women's contemporary *sumud* against the wall in relation to the main central concept in Palestinian history that expresses Israeli dispossession and right of return. The chapter shows that both *sumud* and the right of return engage various associative meanings that allow them to become applicable to women's daily life in Aida camp in the shadow of the wall. The chapter reveals that women's *sumud* and the right of return in Aida camp function as generative concepts for sharing countless and unique old and new stories of daily struggle and sufferings in the shadow of the wall, which strengthens refugee *sumud* and unity.

The chapter also shows that *sumud* in Aida refugee camps is also about maintaining memories and life stories of exile to solidify contemporary *sumud* against the wall. It is the determination to keep remembering who they are and where they come from and to where they must return one day. It is also about teaching children lessons from their ancestors to solidify *sumud* against the wall. The chapter also demonstrates the role of memories and life stories in the construction of refugee identity and how Palestinian refugees are always careful to distinguish themselves from the rest of the Palestinian *Mowateneen* even from those Palestinian refugees who do not live in camps. Refugees in camps, with their history and their insistence on staying in the refugee camps, have paid and are still paying a high price for their *sumud* and struggle against colonialism, higher than other Palestinians.

The chapter highlights that women in their stubborn insistence to protect their distinct refugee identity are not only determined on resisting colonialism that was responsible for creating their refugee problem, but they insist on being different from Palestinian *Mowateneen*. They argue that this is to protect the source of their strong determination on being *samideen*, avoid assimilation, and for their cause not to be forgotten.

The chapter shows that women in refugee camps have been able to develop agency in order not to be obliterated by the overwhelming viciousness of their life in exile under colonialism and in the shadow of the wall. Women in refugee camps construct their identity as resisters who resist colonialism and the humiliation of its apartheid walls, in order to secure a dignified existence for themselves and for their families. Moreover, the chapter illustrates how these women are capable of holding a strong sense of *sumud* as a pulse of resistance and as a pulse of existence in the face of the wall. It also shows how they are still able to develop a sense of a normal and, to a certain extent, joyful life for themselves and for their families.

The chapter explains that Aida women's *sumud* is about lengthy and patient acts of resistance of a marginalised people. It is about women's determination to exist with dignity in their *sumud* against the wall. It also emphasizes how everyday acts of *sumud* in Aida camp confirm the conclusions of Sari Hanafi (2009) and Richter-Devroe (2013) that colonial practices of domination in Palestine are met by acts other than violence and martyrdom. The chapter shows that refugee women in their *sumud*, as a strategy of challenging or breaking the wall's confinement, displayed forms of everyday acts that communicate and articulate their identity as refugees and highlight a strong connection with their homeland roots and their right to return. Women's insistence on joking, and laughing despite suppression and hardship are everyday acts of powerless *sumud* which come under the heading of what James Scott calls 'weapons of the weak' of 'everyday forms of resistance' (1985; 1989; 1997), and what Asef Bayat calls 'quiet encroachment' and 'everyday heroism' (1997). This is the essence of *sumud*, a resistance to the effects of colonial power that confines Palestinians, their families, and their spirit.

Chapter 8

Thesis conclusion

This thesis has argued that Zionism is not only an ideology, but also a political movement that subjects Palestinians to structural and violent forms of dispossession, erasure and land theft in pursuit of a 'pure Jewish state'. It demonstrates how the relationship between Jews and Palestinians has been shaped by relentless Zionist efforts to achieve this throughout all Palestine. It has also examined how the Zionist project, in its different forms, has determined patterns of contemporary Israeli policies against Palestinians, including the building of a separation wall. The existence of Palestinians imposes a threat for the survival and success of the Zionist project. Following the 1967 War, Zionists realized that they not only faced Palestinians in their newly occupied land, but many were Palestinian refugees who had fled Zionist massacres and atrocities in 1948. Contemporary Zionists still face the same dilemma.

The thesis has shown that Palestinians remain determined not to repeat the mistakes their ancestors made when they left their land, mainly in 1948. Despite suppressions and hardship, they are *samideen* (steadfast) and will never leave. To attain their ultimate goal of 'the Great Jewish State', Zionists realize that breaking these *samideen's sumud* is critical. In this thesis, the wall and its accompanying surveillance procedures are designed to achieve this Zionist mission. It highlights in evidential terms how Zionists continue to repeat history when it comes to pursuing their Zionist project; the only change has been in the methods and procedures used to achieve this goal. Currently, with the unconditional support and protection from the US and other powerful actors, more complex surveillance procedures, linked to the wall have been introduced.

The wall has imposed isolation, dispossession, hardship and suppression over Palestinian lives and their resources. It has also promoted an accompanying complex set of overt and covert dehumanising, humiliating, and restrictive surveillance procedures. Building the wall was a calculated and carefully planned strategic act to break Palestinian *sumud*, under the pretext of terrorist management and securitization. Palestinians are isolated into cantons; deprived of social, economic, cultural and religious freedoms and rights; and humiliated. The intension of Israeli state policy has been to severely impact Palestinian everyday life, making it intolerable, forcing submission, loss of hope and dispossession.

The thesis has argued that contemporary procedures of closed 'Seam Zones'; ethnic segregation by exclusive settler gates and roads; *Haweya* (ID cards) and permits; security checks, which include interrogations and queues that are inconsistent and

unpredictable, are all designed to break Palestinian *sumud*. The thesis illustrates how the wall and settler colonial surveillance procedures are a continuation of Zionism and cannot be separated from their predecessors' ideology of the 'unwanted others'. These procedures override the human rights of Palestinians to define 'us', superior settler colonists, against 'them', dehumanised, unwanted, worthless Palestinians who pose a constant threat to Israel's survival. The thesis shows that the wall is an additional Zionist tool to achieve combined Zionist goals of land confiscation, exodus of Palestinians, territorial expansion, demographic domination and security for Israeli settlements. It then also explains how the role of the wall has brought *sumud* onto the frontline of politics.

Sumud, against a suppressive power and dynamic of the wall apparatus, is at the heart of Palestinian resistance in everyday acts as an 'affirmation of life' and a Palestinian view of 'our existence is our resistance'. To study these acts, the research focused on the use of ethnographic semi structured qualitative study on ordinary Palestinians in three locations in Bethlehem governorate: Bethlehem city, Aida refugee camp and Al-Walaja village. By using an interpretive ontological approach and interpretative epistemological position, the research focuses on how Palestinians create and maintain hope and an affirmation of life, despite the power of the wall over their lives. Data was gathered around themes of *sumud*, survival, land, refugee identity, memory and life stories of exile, suffering and heroism, sarcasm and black humour, dignity and hope.

The thesis has built on arguments of the relationship between suppressive power and in many ways powerless and 'futile' acts of resistance. Palestinian everyday acts of *sumud* can only be understood in light of what the concept of *sumud* represents to Palestinians in relation to their on-going struggles for survival over the last 71 years under Israeli occupation. Palestinians have experienced a prolonged history of enforced exile, displacement, dispossession, struggles, sufferings, hardship, and loss of people, land and belongings since 1948. *Sumud* is a basic national concept that reflects Palestinian steadfastness against those uprooting policies.

This thesis has asserted that the systematic nature of the Zionist efforts to humiliate, dominate and break Palestinians *sumud* has necessitated that Palestinians develop the steadfastness of *sumud* in order to sustain their existence. The thesis has affirmed that after building the wall, *sumud* became stronger Palestinian everyday act of affirmation of life and determination of existence in response to all-encompassing threats, humiliation and suppression the wall imposes on Palestinian lives, specifically, their hope of a better life. *Sumud* has become an inextricable part of everyday life for ordinary Palestinians against endless colonial efforts to break their *sumud* and force them to submit. The study confirms that the wall marks a continuation of Palestinian *sumud* for survival and the wall construction has achieved the opposite outcome of what it was

initially designed for. Instead of breaking Palestinian *sumud*, the wall has increased their determination to challenge its impact and solidified Palestinian will to protect their existence. For Palestinians, protecting their existence, restoring their dignity and defending their hope of a better life are their essence of *sumud*.

Shared Palestinian statements describe the adhesive that shapes Palestinian *sumud* and holds Palestinians together against the power of occupation, including the wall. This thesis shows that refugees in camps are distinguished by their strong *sumud* against the power of the wall. Palestinians in villages and cities, such as Bethlehem and Al-Walaja, also have unique acts of *sumud*. In the study cases this was present as an affirmation of life and determination to exist in the face of occupation, also, a resulting dynamic against being extinguished 'for good'; the differences are in the sources of strength that solidify *sumud* and in the acts of *sumud*.

Evidence shows that the source of forming *sumud* for refugee women living in Aida refugee camp is linked directly to their exile experiences and their history of suffering and struggle. In this sense, exile and the wall represent the adhesive that unites women in Aida camp and keeps them strong in the face of the wall and occupation. Womens' *sumud* and determination on the right of return function as generative concepts for sharing countless old and new narratives of daily struggle in the shadow of the wall, which strengthens their *sumud*. Aida women in their everyday acts of *sumud* as a strategy of challenging or breaking the confinement of the wall, are communicating and articulating their identity as refugees and highlighting a strong connection with their homeland and their right to return. For Palestinians, loyalties to their cause, a history of struggles and hopes of a better future life with dignity and freedom, solidifies their *sumud*. Palestinian everyday acts of *sumud* echo their ability to challenge the Zionist policies in search for basic rights, preserve identity, restore dignity, and a strategy to prevent colonial uprooting policies while struggling for national liberty

On the question of tourism, the thesis demonstrates Zionist relentless efforts to prevent tourism in Palestine, rendering Palestinians both uncompetitive and unable to provide adequate services. It shows how Israeli policies effectively deny Palestinian control over possible visitors and tourists to the WB, including East Jerusalem. Israel undermines tourism in WB by intensifying efforts to develop and fund related tourism projects in surrounding colonial settlements. Further, the thesis highlights how the apartheid approach has backfired against the Israeli state. *Sumud* tourism demonstrates how art and graffiti on and around the wall has inadvertently turned the Bethlehem side of the wall into a highly attractive tourist site at the heart of the Zionist project in WB. Tours, graffiti, murals, and film projected onto the wall have managed to infuse the wall with new meaning and purpose. This has contributed to increased touristic attendance at the

wall, and at the same time deepened international understanding of Palestinian struggles. Most importantly, art, specifically graffiti, emphasises the role of internal and external advocacy in generating political awareness.

Despite the suppressive power of the wall, Palestinians still look to improve their lives, maintain social ties, learn, work, get married and establish a family. They still organize parties and weddings for their families. Palestinians practice *sumud* through maintaining hope for a better future and celebrating life while facing possible imprisonment, destruction, frustration and death. Shared stories reveal the extent of their insistence on resisting the effects that colonial policies of confinement are intended to have on them and their families. These stories express the extent of *sumud*'s horizon, while pain, loss and struggle are comprehensively present in Palestinian expressions, *sumud* allows space for other experiences to be expressed and celebrated, including an appreciation of Palestinian identity and unity.

The study adds empirical evidence to the *sumud* and resistance literature by illustrating how *sumud* as resisting impact of the wall is not exclusively the mission of Palestinian women and men who are engaged in oppositional political activities. *Sumud* is part of the everyday life of Palestinians (whether living in a refugee camp, village, or city) who are forced to live in the shadow of colonialism but chosen to keep forward in their life and keeping their hope in a more just future alive. *Sumud* is often practised through informal, nonviolent, quiet, and disguised everyday acts to protect the very distinct Palestinian idea of affirmation of life, anti-submission and determination to exist with dignity. In its most idealistic form, as an inclusive strategy and contribution to resist and survive suppression of the wall. Palestinian *sumud* managed to change the dominant militant Israeli discourse that tends to associate Palestinian resistance with armed struggle and terrorism. Colonial domination in Palestine is met by acts other than violence and martyrdom. It is met with everyday acts of affirmation of life and determination to exist. This explains Zionist determination on the necessity to break Palestinian *sumud*.

Although on the surface *sumud* in Palestine appears solid, there can be friction and anxiety due to the pressure of confinement and occupation. Yet, when Palestinians try their best to maintain a decent life for themselves, their children and families, they are practicing *sumud*. When they use their bodies, houses and streets as platforms to display their powerful symbols of being Palestinians, they practice *sumud*. When they use covert acts against confinement of the wall, they are also practicing *sumud*. Through: murals, artwork, graffiti, displaying the Palestinian flag, posters, pictures of Palestinian heroes, prisoners and martyrs, symbols of the right to return, they send a clear message to the colonizer that Palestinians still exist.

Palestinians realize that with such acts of *sumud* they do not change their reality as suppressed people under a vicious colonialism. They also realize that they do not bring their colonizer suppressive power down. Yet, Palestinians in their laughter, dreams, hopes and acts to feel alive, they stress their right to live a human life. Moreover, Palestinians are aware that an idealised vision of breaking the confinement of the wall and returning is impossible to achieve, but they also recognise the importance of maintaining *sumud* as a source of strength that should be transferred to their children through re-production of memories and narratives of homeland and heroism. It is Palestinian *sumud* to maintain a sense of hope and control over their lives to continue protecting and defending their existence.

The study shows that *sumud* in Palestine offers a different way of thinking about resilience and contributes a different approach to discussions of resilience and resistance. The shared stories in this study from Palestinian's everyday *sumud* against the wall may be seemingly insignificant, yet they are more or less reflect the Palestinians ability to develop their own *sumud* and make their life possible by building a survivable world in their unbearable colonised present. The study illustrates how those Palestinians who insist on challenging the wall and going around its suppressive surveillance policies use individual and collective modes of meaning-making that are rooted in their rich Palestinian history of sufferings, culture and tradition captured by the concept of *sumud*.

The thesis presents human personal narratives of ordinary Palestinians in their daily life struggles for survival while confronted by the wall. Through its bottom-up approach the thesis contributes to the understanding of life experiences, perspectives and struggles for survival by Palestinians living in the vicinity of the wall. It also adds an essential addition to the extensive literature on the wall that generally focuses on numbers and statistics of impact of the wall on Palestinians and tends to overlook the marginalized and their everyday acts of *sumud* to survive and resist. This study contributes to an exploration of Palestinian everyday forms of survival '*sumud*' and their symbolic and ideological underpinnings against not only the wall, but also the changing strategy of Zionist expansion in Palestine. On one hand, the study embraces debates within political science over the concept of resistance. On the other hand, it contributes to an understanding of the character of *sumud* in Palestine and it embraces debate about *sumud* and survival against Zionist colonialism.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Localities in Bethlehem Governorate by Type of Locality and Population Estimates

2007-2016

Locality Name	Locality code	Locality Type*	Years									
			2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Al-Walaja	452170	2	2,015	2,071	2,129	2,187	2,248	2,310	2,373	2,438	2,503	2,569
Battir	452175	2	3,917	4,026	4,137	4,252	4,369	4,490	4,613	4,738	4,865	4,993
Al 'Ubeidiya	452180	1	10,618	10,913	11,215	11,525	11,843	12,170	12,504	12,843	13,186	13,533
'Ayda Camp	452185	3	2,598	2,670	2,744	2,820	2,898	2,978	3,059	3,142	3,226	3,311
Khallet An-Numan	452190	2	171	176	180	185	191	196	201	207	212	218
Al 'Aza Camp	452195	3	1,510	1,552	1,595	1,639	1,684	1,731	1,778	1,826	1,875	1,924
Al-Khas	452200	2	389	400	411	422	434	446	458	471	483	496
Al Haddadiya	452205	2	53	55	56	58	59	61	63	64	66	68
Khallet Hamameh	452208	2	1,397	1,436	1,476	1,517	1,558	1,601	1,645	1,690	1,735	1,781
Bir Onah	452209	2	664	682	701	720	740	761	781	803	824	846
Beit Jala	452210	1	11,610	11,933	12,263	12,602	12,950	13,308	13,672	14,043	14,419	14,798

Locality Name	Locality code	Locality Type*	Years									
			2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Dar Salah	452225	2	3,331	3,423	3,518	3,615	3,715	3,818	3,922	4,028	4,136	4,245
Husan	452230	1	5,481	5,633	5,789	5,949	6,114	6,283	6,455	6,630	6,807	6,986
Wadi Fukin	452235	2	1,153	1,185	1,218	1,252	1,286	1,322	1,358	1,395	1,432	1,470
Bethlehem(Beit Lahm)	452240	1	24,949	25,641	26,351	27,079	27,827	28,596	29,380	30,176	30,983	31,799
Beit Sahur	452255	1	12,212	12,551	12,898	13,254	13,620	13,997	14,381	14,770	15,165	15,565
Ad Doha	452265	1	9,631	9,898	10,172	10,453	10,741	11,038	11,341	11,648	11,960	12,275
Al Khadr	452270	1	9,651	9,919	10,194	10,475	10,765	11,062	11,365	11,673	11,986	12,301
Ad Duheisha Camp	452275	3	8,626	8,866	9,111	9,363	9,621	9,887	10,158	10,434	10,713	10,995
Hindaza	452280	2	4,739	4,870	5,005	5,143	5,285	5,432	5,580	5,732	5,885	6,040
Ash Shawawra	452285	2	3,690	3,793	3,897	4,005	4,116	4,230	4,345	4,463	4,583	4,703
Artas	452300	2	3,617	3,717	3,820	3,926	4,034	4,146	4,259	4,375	4,492	4,610
Nahhalin	452325	1	6,741	6,928	7,120	7,317	7,519	7,727	7,939	8,154	8,372	8,592
Beit Ta'mir	452335	2	1,214	1,247	1,282	1,317	1,354	1,391	1,429	1,468	1,507	1,547
Khallet al Louza	452345	2	571	587	603	619	637	654	672	690	709	727
Al Jab'a	452355	2	885	909	934	960	987	1,014	1,042	1,070	1,099	1,128
Za'tara	452360	1	6,210	6,382	6,559	6,740	6,926	7,118	7,313	7,511	7,712	7,915

Locality Name	Locality code	Locality Type*	Years									
			2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jannatah	452385	1	5,348	5,496	5,649	5,805	5,965	6,130	6,298	6,469	6,642	6,816
Wadi Rahhal	452400	2	1,401	1,440	1,480	1,521	1,563	1,606	1,650	1,695	1,740	1,786
Jubbet adh Dhib	452405	2	160	164	169	174	178	183	188	193	199	204
Khallet Sakariya	452415	2	183	188	193	198	204	209	215	221	227	233
Khallet al Haddad	452430	2	402	413	424	436	448	461	473	486	499	512
Al Ma'sara	452440	2	793	815	837	861	884	909	934	959	985	1,011
Wadi an Nis	452445	2	762	783	805	827	850	874	898	922	947	972
Jurat ash Sham'a	452460	2	1,472	1,513	1,555	1,598	1,642	1,688	1,734	1,781	1,828	1,877
Marah Ma'alla	452470	2	676	695	714	734	754	775	797	818	840	862
Umm Salamuna	452480	2	933	959	986	1,013	1,041	1,070	1,099	1,129	1,159	1,189
Al Manshiya	452490	2	428	439	452	464	477	490	503	517	531	545
Tuqu'	452495	1	8,769	9,013	9,262	9,518	9,781	10,052	10,327	10,607	10,891	11,177
Marah Rabah	452500	2	1,303	1,340	1,377	1,415	1,454	1,494	1,535	1,577	1,619	1,661
Beit Fajjar	452525	1	10,866	11,167	11,477	11,794	12,119	12,454	12,796	13,142	13,494	13,849
Al Maniya	452535	2	999	1,027	1,055	1,085	1,115	1,145	1,177	1,209	1,241	1,274

Locality Name	Locality code	Locality Type*	Years									
			2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Kisan	452565	2	448	461	473	487	500	514	528	542	557	571
'Arab ar Rashayida	452660	2	1,435	1,475	1,515	1,557	1,600	1,645	1,690	1,735	1,782	1,829
Urban Total			122,086	125,476	128,949	132,510	136,169	139,935	143,769	147,666	151,616	155,607
Rural Total			39,201	40,290	41,405	42,549	43,723	44,932	46,164	47,415	48,683	49,965
Camps Total			12,734	13,088	13,450	13,821	14,203	14,596	14,996	15,402	15,814	16,230
Total Bethlehem Gov.			174,022	178,853	183,804	188,880	194,095	199,463	204,929	210,484	216,114	221,802

* Locality Type: 1- Urban. 2- Rural. 3- Camps

Table A-1:PCBS, 2016. Localities in Bethlehem Governorate by type of locality and population estimates, 2007-2016. [Online]. Accessed on 25.5.2019 via:

http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/betlhm.htm

Appendix B

Concerning Security Directives (Judea and Samaria) (number 378), 1970

Declaration Concerning the Closure of Area Number s/2/03 (Seam Area)

In the framework of my authority as commander of the IDF forces in the Judea and Samaria region and in accordance with articles 88 and 90 of the Order Concerning the Security Directive (Judea and Samaria) (number 378), 1970 (herein: the "Order") and the remainder of my authorities in accordance with all laws and security legislation, and in wake of the special security circumstances which exist in the region and in order to take necessary measures to prevent terror attacks and the exit of attackers from the area of Judea and Samaria into the State of Israel, I hereby declared "The map"-

1. DEFINITIONS	"The map" - The map, dimensions of which are 1: 150,000, bearing the name "Declaration Concerning Closing Area Number s/2/03 (seam area)," signed by myself and forming an integral part of this declaration. "Israeli" - Each one of the following: A. Citizen of the State of Israel; B. Resident of the State of Israel, registered in the population registry of Israel in accordance with the Population Registry Law, 1965, and as amended in Israel from time to time C. One who is eligible to emigrate to Israel in accordance with the Law of Return, 1950, and as amended in Israel from time to time. "The obstacle" - fences, walls and patrol paths, which are intended to prevent terror attacks and the exit of attackers from the Judea and Samaria region into the State of Israel, that were erected under the authority of the confiscation orders detailed amended from time to time. "Seam area" - All of the area surrounded by the obstacle, marked on the map with the color red, in the direction of the State of Israel.
2. CLOSURE OF TERRITORY	I declare that the seam area is a closed zone as intended by this declaration.
3. PROHIBITION OF ENTRY AND REMAINING	A. No person will enter the seam area and no one will remain there. B. A person found in the seam area will be required to evacuate it immediately.
4. RESERVATION OF APPLICABILITY	A. Article 3 of the declaration will not be applicable for: i. An Israeli. ii. A person given a permit by me or by someone authorized by me to enter the seam area and to remain there, and this is

	in accordance with the conditions determined in the permit. A permit according to this determination can be general, for certain categories, personal or special. B. Despite the aforementioned in sub-article (a), the military commander is authorized to determine that the directive of article 3 of this declaration will apply to a person or a type of persons who enter the seam area or who remain there.
5. PERMANENT RESIDENTS	A. A person, who has reached the age of 16, whose permanent place of residence on the date of entry into force of this declaration is in the seam area, will be eligible to enter the seam area and remain there, so long as he possesses a written permit given to him by me or one authorized by me, which testifies to the fact that his permanent place of residence is in the seam area, and this is all in accordance with the conditions determined in the permit. B. (i) A person, who has not reached the age of 16, whose place of permanent residence is the seam area, will be eligible to remain in the seam area without a written permit as stipulated in sub-article (a). (ii) A person, who has not reached the age of 16, whose place of permanent residence is the seam area, will be eligible to enter the seam area in one of the following ways: a) If he possesses a written permit, as noted in sub-article (a), as long as he has reached the age of 12; b) If he is accompanied by a person whose entry is permitted in accordance with sub-article (a). c) In all other ways as determined by me or someone authorized by me.
6. PASSAGES	A. Entry into the region and exit from it will be via passageways detailed in Part B of the attachment to this declaration, and marked in the color blue on the map, and all in accordance with the conditions to be determined by me or one authorized by me. B. In the matter of this article: "Entry into the seam area" - entry into the seam area from the direction of the territory of the region which is not part of the seam area; "Exit from the seam area" - exit from the seam area to the direction of the territory of the region which is not part of the seam area.
7. AUTHORIZATION	The Head of the Civil Administration is authorized to determine directives and arrangements in all matters concerning this declaration.

8. PUBLICATION	A. Copies of this declaration and the attached map will be placed for the review of all persons during regular working hours in the following offices: i. The regional District Coordinating Offices (DCO); ii. The police station in the Judea and Samaria region; iii. Office of the Legal Advisor of the Judea and Samaria region; iv. Offices of the Head of the Infrastructure Unit of the Civil Administration in the Judea and Samaria region. B. Copies of the declaration and the attached map will be hung on the notice boards of the regional DCO offices, as noted in sub-article (a)(1), for a period of three months from the date of publication of the notice concerning the signature on this declaration. C. The Head of the Civil Administration is eligible to determine additional means of publication, apart from those detailed in sub-articles (a) and (b).
9. UPHOLDING LAWS	This declaration will not impair the applicability of declarations concerning the closure of territory or other orders applicable in the seam area.
10. ENTRY INTO FORCE	The date of entry into force of this declaration is the date of its signature.
11. THE NAME	This declaration will be entitled: "Declaration in the Matter of Closing Territory Number s/2/03 (seam area) (Judea and Samaria), 2003".

Table B-1: Israeli military order declaring WB land between Israel's 1967 border and the wall as a 'Closed Zone'. Cited in Palestine Negotiation Affairs Department. [Online]. Accessed on 19.5.17 via: <http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=46>

Appendix C

Study Face-to-Face Interviews:

Bethlehem city interviews

Number	Date	Name	M/F	Age
1	6/1/2014	Noha	F	18
2	7/1/2014	Ameera	F	29
3	7/1/2014	Khadir	M	19
4	8/1/2014	Sawsan	F	47
5	8/1/2014	Intisar	F	63
6	13/1/2014	Adam	M	17
7	16/1/2014	Abu-Sultan	M	75
8	2/2/2014	Jamal	M	56
9	2/2/2014	Abu-Emad	M	80
10	3/2/2014	Saeed	M	38
11	3/2/2014	Nader	M	59
12	17/2/2014	Reem	F	32
13	1/3/2014	Sarah	F	44
14	2/3/2014	Muna	F	25
15	5/3/2014	Hosam	M	20
16	5/3/2014	Merna	F	36
17	6/3/2014	Yousef	M	49
18	11/4/2014	Insherah	F	39
19	13/4/2014	Akram	M	34
20	14/4/2014	Fouad	M	48
21	19/4/2014	Abu-Elias	M	64
22	20/4/2014	Zeyad	M	33
23	12/6/2014	Rajab	M	45

24	12/6/2014	Um-Rosa	F	77
25	13/6/2014	Malak	F	54

Al-Walaja village interviews

Number	Date	Name	M/F	Age
1	9/1/2014	Donia	F	27
2	10/1/2014	Yara	F	19
3	17/1/2014	Um-Anwar	F	66
4	17/1/2014	Saleem	M	53
5	18/1/2014	Um-Ahmad	F	58
6	23/1/2014	Derar	M	24
7	26/1/2014	Abu-Saber	M	74
8	5/2/2014	Ismael	M	35
9	5/2/2014	Mahmoud	M	18
10	6/2/2014	Majeda	F	42
11	8/2/2014	Abu-Ashraf	M	46
12	18/2/2014	Abu-Khadir	M	68
13	19/2/2014	Sereen	F	30
14	19/2/2014	Haneen	F	25
15	15/6/2014	Abu-salem	M	60

Aida camp Interviews

Number	Date	Name	F/M	Age
1	12/1/2014	Um-Saleem	F	65
2	14/1/2014	Um-Emad	F	65
3	14/1/2014	Abu-Ahmad	M	59
4	7/2/2014	Haja Sarah	F	82
5	7/2/2014	Ahlam	F	33

6	7/2/2014	Maysoon	F	51
7	9/2/2014	Khadeja	F	45
8	13/2/2014	Rema	F	38
9	7/3/2014	Ehab	M	27
10	7/3/2014	Mazen	M	18
11	8/3/2014	Haya	F	19
12	12/3/2014	Fatima	F	33
13	19/3/2014	Feryal	F	27
14	20/3/2014	Haja Lolya	F	70
15	26/3/2014	Sana	F	25
16	27/3/2014	Nawal	F	26
17	4/4/2014	Haja Fadda	F	85
18	5/4/2014	Bashar	M	17
19	5/4/2014	Haja Ayda	F	88
20	9/4/2014	Um-Samah	F	57
21	9/4/2014	Danya	F	18
22	10/4/2014	Abu-Basam	M	76
23	11/4/2014	Layla	F	31
24	13/4/2014	Samia	F	43
25	14/4/2014	Mussab	M	38
26	15/4/2014	Aysha	F	60
27	16/4/2014	Farah	F	25
28	19/4/2014	Um-Khalid	F	49
29	22/4/2014	Aya	F	18
30	22/4/2014	Yasir	M	26
31	26/4/2014	Mervat	F	59
32	28/4/2014	Samar	F	17
33	29/4/2014	Suzzane	F	24

34	5/5/2014	Um-Jaffa	F	45
35	8/5/2014	Salah	M	52
36	11/5/2014	Munther	M	47
37	12/5/2014	Um-Kamal	F	47
38	15/5/2014	Dalia	F	20
39	15/5/2014	Um-Dalia	F	61
40	15/5/2014	Asma	F	36
41	16/5/2014	Ahlam	F	38
42	17/5/2014	Tamara	F	33
43	18/5/2014	Amal	F	50
44	20/5/2014	Salima	F	28
45	23/5/2014	Rabiha	F	55
46	1/6/2014	Abu-Ferrial	M	64
47	15/6/2014	Samiha	F	46
48	16/6/2014	Nadia	F	78
49	19/6/2014	Huda	F	72
50	20/6/2014	Nawal	F	44

Appendix D

Study Focus Group Interviews:

Aida camp focus Group one conducted on **10/2/2014**.

Number	Name	F/M	Age
1	Um-Na'eem	F	53
2	Um-Osama	F	49
3	Khadija	F	34
4	Salma	F	42
5	Um-Aziz	F	58
6	Um-Muneer	F	67
7	Haja Fadela	F	83
8	Nehaya	F	29
9	Amera	F	19
10	Haja Khadra	F	73
11	Lamya	F	18
12	Haja Sobhya	F	78

Aida camp Focus group two conducted on **23/2/2014**.

Number	Name	F/M	Age
1	Marwa	F	30
2	Um-Khalid	F	56
3	Tahany	F	37
4	Badrya	F	42
5	Kadra	F	57
6	Kefaya	F	32
7	Um-Hasan	F	66
8	Heba	F	28

9	Um-Ismael	F	71

Aida camp Focus group three conducted on **15/3/2014**.

Number	Name	F/M	Age
1	Bushra	F	32
2	Naela	F	61
3	Halima	F	25
4	An'am	F	46
5	Ghadeer	F	49
6	Khilda	F	37
7	Nabela	F	40
8	Najwa	F	34
9	Heyam	F	55

Aida camp focus group four conducted on **15/4/2014**.

Number	Name	F/M	Age
1	Sabah	F	40
2	Mahmoud	M	42
3	Jaber	M	22
4	Nowar	F	24
5	Abu-Amjd	M	60
6	Sondos	F	20
7	Teyala	F	18
8	Younis	M	39
9	Mustafa	M	47
10	Um-Marzouk	F	65
11	Naeema	F	52

Aida camp focus group five conducted on **2/6/2014**.

Number	Name	F/M	Age
1	Rabab	F	19
2	Aziza	F	17
3	Fadwa	F	18
4	Manal	F	19
5	Rasha	F	20
6	Salwa	F	22
7	Nancy	F	17
8	Lojayan	F	18
9	Lama	F	17
10	Rana	F	21

Bethlehem focus group one conducted on **28/1/2014**.

Number	Name	F/M	age
1	Abu-Waleed	M	63
2	Abeer	F	54
3	Salim	M	31
4	Raya	F	44
5	Fadi	M	23
6	Manar	F	22
7	Fawzi	M	29
8	Maher	M	38
9	Kareem	M	47
10	Miriam	F	40
11	Um-Tawfek	F	74
12	Sherin	F	50

Bethlehem focus group two conducted on **7/4/2014**.

Number	Name	F/M	age
1	Fayez	M	38
2	Tamer	M	18
3	Shadia	F	49
4	Hasna	F	31
5	Tia	F	17
6	Ansar	F	43
7	Jameel	M	55
8	Fadi	M	23
9	Lamis	F	53
10	Abu-Majdi	M	64
11	Abu-Radwan	M	71

Al-Walaja focus group one conducted on **15/1/2014**.

Number	Name	F/M	age
1	Abu-Adham	M	57
2	Shokri	M	45
3	Haja Nasra	F	77
4	Sawsan	F	49
5	Wa'el	M	20
6	Anas	M	31
7	Abu-Hamid	M	67
8	Kholod	F	35

Al-Walaja focus group two conducted on **4/3/2014**.

Number	Name	F/M	age
1	Abu-Hussien	M	70
2	Abu-Yasin	M	75
3	Yasin	M	27
4	Fadila	F	19
5	Um-Jasem	F	48
6	Manal	F	29
7	Tayseer	M	57
8	Sahar	F	33
9	Khawla	F	41
10	Um-Hafeth	F	66
11	Um-Jassar	F	60

Appendix E

Sample Questionnaire

Questions on the wall:

1. What is the wall? Describe the wall for me?
2. Why do you think the wall has been built?
3. Do you think the wall would be dismantled one day? Why you think so?
4. What does the wall represent/mean to you?
5. What changes the wall bring to your and your family and community life?
6. How does the wall impact your and your family and community life?
7. Tell me about your daily routine/experience/struggles in living in the shadow of the wall?
8. Tell me about your experience in crossing the wall? Tell me a story about your experience in crossing the wall?
9. What changes do you think the wall has brought to 300-crossing (previously known as Rachel's crossing) between Bethlehem and Jerusalem?
10. Describe to me how was your crossing experience before and after the wall?
11. Describe surveillance procedures on the wall? What changes in this regard from before the wall?
12. What does it mean to you the need for *Tasreeh* (permit) to cross the wall?
13. What impact does the wall movement restrictions bring to your and your community; social life, health, work, culture and tradition? Give me examples/stories?
14. Describe your life before and after the wall? What changes has the wall brought to your, your family and community life?
15. What are the daily struggles in the shadow of the wall?
16. Do you think the wall was successful in impacting your and your family's life? In what way? Why you think so?
17. How do you manage your everyday life in the shadow of the wall? Give me examples.
18. On daily basis, what do you do to cope with with/go around the confinement of the wall? Give me examples.
19. What do you do to improve your life in the shadow of the wall? Give me examples.

Questions on *sumud* and *Nakba* (including role of memories/nostalgia and narratives):

1. What is *Nakba*?
2. As a Palestinian, what the *Nakba* represent/mean to you, your family and your community?
3. What lessons do you think have been learnt from the *Nakba*, specifically in regard to fleeing the land? Why you think so?
4. Tell me about the *Nakba*? What stories/memories you know about the *Nakba*? How do you know these information/details on *Nakba*? where about you get your information?
5. Tell me a story/memory on *Nakba*? Where did you hear this story/memory? What does this story/memory mean to you? Why you mentioned this particular story/memory?
6. What is *sumud*?
7. As a Palestinian, what *sumud* represent/mean to you, your family and your community?
8. Do you consider yourself *samid* Palestinian? Why?
9. How do you express your *sumud* against the wall?
10. What do you know about embodied *sumud*? Give me examples/stories? Why do you use such *sumud*?
11. What changes has the wall brought to your, family and community *sumud*? Why you think so?

Specific questions to refugees in Aida camp:

- 1 As a Palestinian refugee, what the *Nakba* and *sumud* represent/mean to you, your family and your community?
- 2 What does it mean to you to be a refugee? Living in a refugee camp?
- 3 Describe to me how is it to be a refugee living in a refugee camp?
- 4 What does it mean to you to live few miles far from your original homeland?
- 5 What do you know about your homeland? where you get your information?
- 6 What impact of homeland stories/narratives/nostalgia/memories has on your generation? What importance of such stories/narratives/nostalgia/memories to be transferred to younger Palestinian generations? Explain?
- 7 If it is up to you would you prefer to live in a different place, where? Why?
- 8 What is the role of *sumud* in your camp, community and in your life?
- 9 Do you believe there is a link between your exile experience, history of suffering and struggles and *sumud* against the wall? Why? Explain?
- 10 What do you think about the art on and around the wall? What messages do you think it sends to your coloniser and to the world?

11 What is the role/impact of this art on Palestinian's *sumud*? Why you think so?

Questions on tourism:

- 1 In what ways do you think the Israeli side uses the wall to impact your tourism?
- 2 In what ways do you think the wall impacts tourism in Bethlehem governorate?
- 3 Describe to me how was tourism in Bethlehem governorate before and after the wall?
- 4 What changes has the wall brought to tourism in Bethlehem governorate, tourists visiting Bethlehem governorate and impact of that on you and your community?
- 5 What restrictions do you think the wall/Israeli side impose on tourists to Bethlehem governorate? Impact of that on you, your community, tourism and your cause as a Palestinian?
- 6 In what ways do you cope with/go around the wall confinement on your work in tourism?
- 7 What is *sumud* tourism? Give me examples.
- 8 Tell me a story about your own experience with the wall restrictions on your work in tourism?

