Power, policy and discourse: a comparative analysis of the neoliberal turn in three former French colonies

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Abstract

This thesis examines the role of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) in the development of three former French colonies. Comparing the experiences of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, it explores the ways in which the development trajectory of postcolonial countries has been shaped by international institutions and neoliberal ideology. It does this by examining two key periods of development lending: structural adjustment and poverty reduction strategies. Adopting a neo-Gramscian theoretical approach, this study understands neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project as well as a development paradigm. It examines both the practical content of the programmes, and the discourse, borrowing methodological insight from Critical Discourse Analysis.

The findings reveal important trends across the case studies and over time and are therefore both spatially and temporally significant. Over the thirty-year period, the World Bank and the IMF imposed a common neoliberal policy matrix, which centred on austerity, export markets, deregulation and privatisation. The *SAP*s undermined the sovereignty of the state, deepened dependency and impeded economic and social development. The poverty reduction strategies, in spite of claims of country-ownership and participation, continued to adhere to the neoliberal formula. Only the discourse evolved, co-opting counter-hegemonic ideals in order to legitimise the further embedding of the neoliberal agenda and the entrenchment of poverty.

The approach sheds light upon the interactive relationship between policy, power and discourse, demonstrating how the dynamics of power in these three countries are both coercive and consensual. I argue that the conceptual premise and operational framework of international development reflects continuity with the imperial legacy of circumscribed sovereignty. In this sense, the neoliberal development project is understood a form of neo-colonial control.

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Abbreviations

ARCC	*Autorité de regulation du café et du cacao*
BCC	*Bourse du café et du cacao*
BWI	Bretton Woods Institution
CAISTAB	*Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Productions Agricoles*
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CBP	Capacity Building Project
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CFA	*Communauté Financière d'Afrique*
CFAF	CFA Franc
CMT	Conceptual Metaphor Theory
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
DHA	Discourse Historical Approach
DUS	*Droit Unique de Sortie*
EPCA	Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance
EERP	Emergency Economic Recovery Programme
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPZ	Export Processing Zone
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
EXIM	Export-Import Bank of the United States
FDPCC	*Fonds de développement des activités des producteurs de café et cacao*
FFP	Fund For Peace
FRC	*Fonds de Régulation et de contrôle*
FSI	Fragile States Index
GDP	Gross National Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GPB	Pound Sterling
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HOPE	Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement
HTG	Haitian Gourde
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPE	International Political Economy
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IR	International Relations
JSA	Joint Staff Assessment
JSAN	Joint Staff Advisory Note
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MINUSTAH	*Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti*

MPEP	Management of the Petroleum Economy Project
MSPP	*Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population*
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NPRS	National Poverty Reduction Strategy
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum
PDPP	Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PFP	Policy Framework Paper
PRGF	Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PWC	Post Washington Consensus
RTA	Regional Trade Agreement
SAL	Structural Adjustment Loan
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SBA	Stand-By Arrangement
SMP	Staff Monitored Programme
TDS	Total Debt Service
TNC	Transnational Corporation
TOTCO	Tchad Oil Transportation Company S.A.
UNDP	United States Development Programme
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United Stated Dollar
WTO	World Trade Organisation
XGS	Exports of Goods and Services

Introduction

In January 2016, Oxfam calculated that the world's richest 1% own as much wealth as the rest of the world combined (BBC, 2016). In recent years there has been much talk both in academic scholarship and in the media about the bottom billion in reference to the global poor who live under the poverty threshold of $1.25 per day.[1] A growing wealth of literature has sought to answer questions about social and economic equality on both the local and international stage, through the fields of international relations (IR), development studies, postcolonial studies, international political economy (IPE) and more.

Increasing flows of people, goods and capital across national borders, understood in the literature as the process of globalisation, has led to a significant role for international institutions in regulating trade, maintaining global financial order and facilitating economic development. Trillions of dollars have been channelled through the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) over the last half a century via concessional and non-concessional loans and grants in the name of economic development. This culminated in a debt crisis in the late 1970s, with many peripheral nations facing severe financial difficulties.[2] Consequently, beginning in the 1980s, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in to provide credit, attached to economic policy programmes that borrowing nations committed to in order to obtain crucial funds. These programmes consisted primarily of reforms that sought to open up economies to foreign investment and unrestrained financial flows across borders (including the repatriation of profits), as well as to shrink the size of the state through fiscal austerity policies. This policy paradigm came to be known as the Washington Consensus, linked to the crystallisation of neoliberalism in policymaking in the global periphery (discussed in more detail in chapter one). By the mid-1980s three-quarters of Latin American countries and two-thirds of African countries were under some form of IMF or World Bank supervision (Peet, 2009).

[1] The $ sign refers to United States (US) dollars hereafter.

[2] Core-periphery terminology is derived from Immanuel Wallerstein's World-Systems Analysis, which is unpacked and critiqued in chapter one.

A decade and a half of this process, known as structural adjustment, did little to improve borrowing countries' financial predicaments (Ali, 2003; Costello, Watson, & Woodward, 1994; SAPRI, 2004) Many experienced deterioration in their social and economic indicators and others saw little to no improvement during this period. Instead of providing a route to economic development, extensive borrowing exacerbated the debt problem, starving countries of financial resources and trapping them in a vicious cycle of aid, followed by debt servicing, followed by more aid. Critics called for debt cancellation and the 1990s witnessed a number of significant global protests against globalisation and the international institutions perceived to be responsible for its proliferation. The World Bank and the IMF came under considerable scrutiny by the international community and civil society organisations. Structural adjustment was re-examined within international policy circles and the IMF commissioned an independent evaluation of structural adjustment lending (IMF, 1998e).

It was in this political climate that the *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* (*PRSP*s) were introduced in September 1999 as the new framework for regulating access to debt relief and concessional financing for low-income countries. Like the *Structural Adjustment Programmes* (*SAPs*), the *PRSP*s were prerequisites for financing. According to the BWIs, the *PRSP*s were a new way of doing development that valued country ownership and the participation of civil society organisations in the formulation of development strategy. This became known as the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC). The launch of the new lending framework was received with scepticism regarding the extent to which the *PRSP*s represented change or continuity from the *SAP* era. Many point to evidence that neoliberal values continue to undergird international development policy during the PRS era. A stark example of this is in the donors' guidance for countries undergoing the *PRSP* process, where they continue to favour policies strongly associated with the neoliberal Washington Consensus, including fiscal austerity, deregulated labour and export-led growth (World Bank, 2002a). In the years since the *PRSP*s were launched, the donors have been forced to repeatedly defend themselves against continued criticism from scholars and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who have negatively assessed the effectiveness of these new policy interventions and their impact upon poverty and inequality. A common accusation is that the new lending framework has simply been a way of rebranding structural adjustment whilst retaining the same prescriptive policies (Davidson-Harden, 2009; Weber, 2006; Cammack, 2005; Ndomo, 2005).[3]

Mainstream academic critiques of both the *SAP*s and the *PRSP*s fall broadly into two camps: those who attribute failure to poor or insufficient implementation of the programmes (a view espoused by proponents of the BWIs and the BWIs themselves); and those who highlight the inappropriateness of their policies (an argument proffered by their critics). There is a growing academic interest in placing the interventionist mechanisms of the programmes and the dynamics of power underpinning them at the centre of their analysis (Langan, 2018; Ruckert, 2007; Cammack, 2005; Radice, 2005). However, the fact that most of the available scholarship on the subject is, for the most part, aimed at improving the *status quo* rather than challenging it, is somewhat troubling.

Every country that underwent structural adjustment and its 21st century equivalent is a postcolonial nation.[4] Despite this reality, few scholars have approached the subject of World Bank and IMF interventionism through a postcolonial lens.[5] This is a serious oversight and neglects the crucial question at the heart of development: what is it about the postcolonial condition and its intersection with neoliberalism that makes countries more susceptible to financial and economic malaise in the first place? By contextualising these programmes within the legacy of colonialism, this study emphasises their political nature and accords them greater significance than mere instruments for development financing. Situating these programmes in such a way explicitly challenges their assertion as apolitical and highlights the damaging nature of masquerading as such.

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[3] Paul Cammack argues that the World Bank's conceptualisation of poverty reduction is firmly embedded in a neoliberal framework, reduced to the proletarianisation of the world's poor, serving the purpose of incorporating them into productive markets.
[4] The term 'postcolonial' is used here temporally, distinguishable from its use to refer to the academic field of 'postcolonialism'.
[5] A notable exception being Bond and Dor (2003)

Across international ratings and rankings of economic, political and social indicators, former colonies continue to fill the lower echelons year after year. Postcolonial countries are more frequently embroiled in conflict and subject to bilateral and multilateral military interventions.[6] This thesis will explicitly locate structural adjustment within this context, understanding it as reflective of an unequal and inequitable international order that emerged directly as a legacy of colonialism. Many postcolonial states remain dependent on financial flows from their former metropolitan centres, in the form of private capital investment, publicly guaranteed debt and concessional resource transfers (contingent upon the implementation of reforms contractually obliged by such transfers). The extensive neoliberal domestic interventions of policy programmes espoused by BWIs and their restructuring of the socio-political fabric of postcolonial countries firmly brings state sovereignty into question, on both a conceptual and practical level.

Perhaps even more neglected by the scholarship, and of significance for political theorists and development scholars alike, is a comprehension of *how* the neoliberal development paradigm has achieved hegemonic status and sustained itself through *SAP*s and *PRSP*s, despite its fundamentally poor track record in the developing world. In focussing primarily on the materiality of development programmes, the existing scholarship on BWI programmes tends to reinforce the authority of the neoliberal development paradigm upon which these programmes predicate. What is missing from this literature is an understanding of how the neoliberal development project reinforces itself discursively.

A large and growing body of literature has investigated neoliberalism beyond its material manifestations, from the Marxian poststructuralist tradition that understands it as a hegemonic ideology (Harvey, 2005) to the notion of

[6] Notable examples in Latin America include Paraguay and Panama in 1989 (Madsen, 2012; Gilboa, 1995) and Honduras in June 2009 (Weisbrot, 2014). On the African continent, recent interventions have taken place in Mali, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Côte d'Ivoire (Eads, 2014).

neoliberalism as governmentality, favoured by Foucauldian political economy (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996). Despite this wealth of research, there has been little attention to the actual discursive aspect of neoliberalism. It is often alluded to and mentioned, as an important feature of neoliberalism, but what is lacking is an investigation into the various discursive strategies of neoliberalism, particularly in the international development context, in order to pinpoint how neoliberalism rearticulates notions of states, markets, development and poverty in order to legitimise itself through discourse. Given how these institutions have had significant control over the international development landscape over the last four decades, it is crucial to recognise and understand how neoliberal discourse has become a weapon to perpetuate hegemonic power relations.

It is the ascendancy and continued hegemony of neoliberalism, through IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes, that provides the context of this thesis, which uses the contemporary development trajectory of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti as a frame for understanding postcolonial economic development and global neoliberalism. This thesis will address some of the questions and issues outlined above, thereby filling an important gap in the literature.

The purpose of this project is, in its simplest terms, to understand the way that the economic development of postcolonial nations has been and continues to be shaped by international institutions and neoliberal ideology. The enduring and evolving influence of neoliberalism is explored on two levels. At the policy level, I explore the modalities of the *SAP*s and the *PRSP*s, comparing across countries and over time. This examination of the practical content of IMF and World Bank-sponsored programmes reveals how they align with or diverge from neoliberalism.[7]

The second level of analysis is discursive, drawing on a careful reading of development discourse, as articulated in these programmes. This critical

[7] This thesis approaches neoliberalism as a development paradigm and a ideological hegemonic project, whilst acknowledging its complexity and indeterminacy. This is unpacked in chapter one.

perspective allows us to destabilise what appears as natural or common sense. The methodology borrows insights from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), particularly the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), developed by Ruth and Michael Meyer, as well as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) and techniques developed by Norman Fairclough. This approach seeks to understand how the discourse, and not just the policies, embodies the potential for unjustified exercise of power. Importantly, this approach understands discourse as both socially constituted and constitutive, i.e. there is a dialectical relationship between discursive events and the social institutions and structures that frame them (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In this context, it seeks to excavate the real dynamics of power that reside within the structural adjustment and poverty reduction strategy (PRS) initiatives. For example, problems may be couched in ways that articulate solutions in the form of specific development interventions, and limit the possibility for alternatives. In other words, development discourse produces development programmes, and vice versa. This approach seeks to understand the ways in which the neoliberal project has been promulgated by, and has shaped the development policy of the BWIs.

This thesis attempts this exploration of neoliberal development on these two levels (policy and discourse), via a comparative examination of the experiences of three Francophone former colonies: Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti. The French postcolonial context is particularly interesting due to France's reluctance to relinquish political, economic or military control over its colonies during and indeed after the period of decolonisation (Verschave, 2004). The ways in which this political landscape created the necessary conditions for neoliberalism to be implemented by the World Bank and the IMF are of special interest. The approach is interdisciplinary, straddling the academic fields of postcolonialism, IR, IPE, development, and CDA studies.

The case studies

Haiti achieved independence in 1804, following a long and bloody war of independence against the French colonialists. After two centuries of independence, Haiti is today the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, highly dependent on foreign aid and under military occupation since 2004. Haiti therefore provides an especially privileged site of investigation into the status of postcolonial development and the aforementioned question of the postcolonial condition and susceptibility to financial and economic malaise. Côte d'Ivoire and Chad were granted legal autonomy in 1960 but have both been sites of bilateral and multilateral military intervention on numerous occasions over the last 60 years. These countries have been selected as the area for this study as they exhibit a number of commonalities (which will be unpacked in more depth chapter two) and therefore provide a sound basis from which to draw conclusions. Importantly, they have all been under World Bank and IMF supervision since the 1980s and continue to have unsustainable levels of debt and poverty, despite (or indeed, as a result of) a multitude of different economic programmes geared at economic growth and poverty reduction. In comparing their experiences, this project explores the relationship between the postcolonial condition and the neoliberal development trajectory. Key research questions are: 1) how has neoliberalism shaped development policy across the three case studies and over the *SAP*/*PRSP* eras (i.e. do *PRSP*s differ in content and rationale from earlier *SAP*s); 2) how do the donors legitimise these programmes – what is the nature of the neoliberal development discourse; 3) are there power imbalances embedded in the structure and ideological orientations of the international donor institutions and how are these wielded; and finally 4) what is the meaning of sovereignty in this global, postcolonial context.

Chapter synopses

The first chapter reviews the theoretical literature associated with the key concepts within the aforementioned research questions: neoliberalism, globalisation, sovereignty and the colonial legacy. In the methodological chapter, I outline some philosophical considerations and provide a rationale for the comparative approach and the selection of case studies. This chapter develops the argument that the combination of discourse approaches I adopt, grounded in the assumptions of CDA, is the most appropriate for this study, since it allows the unveiling of interests, ideologies and powers.

The main analysis is then split chronologically into two parts: chapters three and four cover the structural adjustment era (1980–1999) and chapters five and six take the same structure for the PRS period (1999-2010). Within these parts, the chapters are divided along thematic lines. Chapters three and five compare the financial policy framework of development programmes over the two periods. Discussion is focussed on the public sector, looking at developments with government borrowing and public spending. Fiscal austerity, a key tenet of the neoliberal thesis, is a central theme of these chapters. Chapters four and six examine trade policymaking in the *SAP*s and *PRSP*s. These chapters focus on the principal export industry of each country, looking at the way that trade policies have been implemented to restructure or establish the oil, cocoa and assembly industries in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, respectively. These fields of policymaking were deliberately chosen due to their importance in influencing key development indicators, including rates of poverty, measures of income and income equality, access to and quality of social services, measures of education and health, and others. Each of these four chapters assumes a similar structure to enable more cogent comparisons. The policy content is first compared across the three case studies and, where data allows, a comparison of the economic and social impacts of SAPs is explored. The analysis of the discourse follows, highlighting commonalities and differences in the discourse across the three case studies, focussing on arguments, claims and discursive strategies. The chronological separation of parts one and two allows for a meaningful comparison of both rhetoric and practice under the two lending frameworks, and contributes to the debate about the continuity or change of the *PRSP*s.

The argument

The analysis reveals important trends across the case studies and over time and is therefore both spatially and temporally significant. Part one demonstrates that in the trade and financial policymaking domains, the *SAP*s were radical in their ambitions, policy content and consequences. A common discourse is identified across the three case studies in the way that the BWIs seek to legitimise these policies. This technocratic and depoliticised discourse builds on a discursive vilification of the state and the veneration of the market to portray the latter as the solution to all the economic and social malaise of the time. The underlying logic provides a narrative that unceasingly promotes marketisation therefore calculating inertia and perpetuating the dominant orthodoxy. I argue that this discourse is essential for legitimising the neoliberal agenda, which has ultimately had disastrous consequences for all three countries.

Part two acknowledges important discontinuity in the BWIs' discourse, which evolves significantly in the *PRSP*s, characterised by an emphasis on poverty reduction and the promotion of social inclusion as well as a renewed focus on the role of the state via the concept of good governance. This is without breaking with the macroeconomic prescriptions that characterised the *SAP*s; the renewed attention to social policy issues by the donors and the re-institutionalisation of the state remain firmly embedded within a neoliberal policy framework. The neoliberal policies of (uneven) global economic integration, privatisation, deregulation and austerity continue to be privileged in the *PRSP*s. I argue that the *PRSP* approach therefore represents an attempt to maintain neoliberal hegemony (understood in a neo-Gramscian sense), by co-opting counter-hegemonic narratives of social inclusion, poverty reduction, country ownership and participation, whilst maintaining business as usual.

In contextualising these three case studies within the broader picture of global governance structures and institutions, this thesis moves beyond the more traditional framework for understanding the development of francophone Africa: *Françafrique.* [8] The approach sheds light upon the interactive relationship between policy, power and discourse, demonstrating how the dynamics of power in these three countries are both coercive and consensual (in the neo-Gramscian sense). I argue that the conceptual premise and operational framework of international development reflects continuity with the imperial legacy of

[8] *Françafrique* refers to the neo-colonial relationship that France cultivated with its former African colonies post-independence, via a nebula of economic, political and military actors, in France and Africa. Its usefulness is discussed in more depth in chapter one.

circumscribed sovereignty. In this sense, the neoliberal development project is understood as a form of neo-colonial control.

To this day, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti are depicted in the Western media and in the literature as 'failed states' – states that have not succeeded, despite the generosity of rich countries' aid and much foreign investment. At its worst, this narrative postulates these countries as innately inferior parasites of the global economy, incapable of self-government and civilisation. Poverty, debt, war and devastating natural disasters are treated as a series of isolated events, decontextualised from the structures of global power. These false representations, imbued as they are with paternalistic ideas of the White Man's Burden, promulgate the neo-colonial developmental project, which has terrible human and environmental consequences. This study, in recontextualising these problems within structural change that has been imposed through decades of neoliberal reform, seeks to challenge these problematic representations. Situating the postcolonial experience within the wider neoliberal literature and discursive insights from neo-Gramscianism therefore delineates a new, and more appropriately robust, understanding of development over the last 60 years.

Chapter one: literature review

Introduction

In seeking to understand how international forces shape the development of postcolonial nations, this study takes an interdisciplinary perspective, drawing on accounts from IR, development studies and postcolonial theory, IPE and critical discourse studies. This chapter will engage with the literature from several sub-fields of these academic arenas in order to outline the theoretical understanding upon which this thesis is erected. It begins with a discussion of the terminology chosen to describe the selected countries and their relationship with other countries, highlighting the flaws of the commonly used paradigms and providing rationale for the choice of Core/Periphery.

The subsequent discussion examines the mainstream approach that has been dominant in the field of development studies: modernisation theory. The realist and liberal traditions of IR are outlined and commonalities in these three approaches are delineated and critiqued. I then advance an investigation into the origins of the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, a key conceptual marker of the present study. What follows is a critical discussion of neoliberalism and the process of neoliberal globalisation. I highlight the inadequacies of all of the above approaches for understanding and explaining poverty in the global periphery. This leads into the exploration of the more critical approaches to development and poverty, through a critical discussion of dependency theory and the neo-colonial literature. I argue that the neo-colonial approach represents an alternate paradigm through which a better understanding of the development of postcolonial nations can be achieved. Lastly, I consider the critical political economy approach, grounded in Gramscian theory, as a way of understanding how dominant development strategies sustain themselves through discourse, thus identifying neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project as well as a development policy paradigm.

A note on terminology

Discussions of global processes often make use of geographical terminology to distinguish between groups of countries and to describe the relationships between these groups. During the Cold War, the term 'Third World' emerged to describe the Non-Aligned movement, led by postcolonial countries. Over time, this terminology has come to apply more broadly to poverty-stricken, aid-dependent, primarily postcolonial nations. However, many journalists and scholars have moved away from employment of the term, in part due to its vagueness and irrelevance in the post-Cold War period. It has also been criticised for according a veneer of superiority to 'First World' nations (Hosle, 1992).

A common contemporary substitute, employed by scholars, journalists, international organisations and NGOs alike, is the developing/developed paradigm, which separates countries by their relative levels of industrial development and wealth. This appears to be a convenient label to use, but is equally problematic in that there is no clear consensus on what it means to be a developed country. Furthermore, it rests on the teleological, deterministic and fundamentally Eurocentric assumptions of modernisation theory; it assumes a desire to develop along the traditional Western model of economic development. Similarly to the 'Third World' label, it also implies a hierarchy between countries, perpetuating stereotypes about citizens of the 'developing' world as being backwards, lazy and irresponsible, according to Shose Kessi (cited in Silver, 2015).

In more recent decades, scholars, activists and development workers have engaged instead with geographic labelling. Based on the assumption that the majority of 'developing' or 'Third World' countries are in the Southern Hemisphere, whilst the wealthiest countries are in more northerly latitudes, the Global North/Global South terminology has become popular for distinguishing between rich and poor parts of the world, without the aforementioned value-laden judgements inherent in previous phrasing. There are obvious exceptions to this observation, most notably Haiti in the Global North, and Australia and New Zealand in the Global South. Furthermore, this distinction glosses over enormous differences within these broad latitudinal divides and is therefore overly reductionist (Sabzalieva, Martinez & Sá, 2020). For example, the Global South category lumps together the emerging economies of Brazil and Indonesia, with extremely poor countries like Chad, Burkina Faso and Yemen.

The 'Third World', 'developing' and 'Global South' labels are all limited further still by their inability to account for differences within borders. For example, large populations of Brazil and India live under the global poverty line, yet both these countries also host a wealthy middle class that plays a key role in the global production of goods and services. Consequently, in this thesis, I employ the terminology of core/semi-periphery/periphery/outer periphery.[9]Whilst aware of the limitations of World-Systems Analysis, the core/periphery distinction that it offers up avoids geographical and historical inaccuracy, and it does not suggest that these categories have emerged randomly, rather that they are a result of unequal relationships between wealthy and poor nations. The core/peripheral distinction is also more flexible than other terminology; it can refer to a core/peripheral distinction within a country itself. For example, urban areas may develop as the core and rural areas as the periphery, where urbanisation occurs and rural areas experience population and service decline.

Traditional approaches: modernisation theory and classical IR

Modernisation theory was developed during the post-war period in an attempt to explain the widespread poverty of formerly colonised nations. Importantly, the core assumptions of modernisation theory have influenced the work of economists, sociologists, political scientists and IR theorists (Gruffydd Jones, 2005). In the context of newly independent countries facing a myriad of development challenges, scholars found that existing theories could not easily be

[9] This conceptual framework is unpacked later in this chapter.

applied to understand these development challenges. The response was to employ existing methodologies – particularly comparison and correlation – to the analysis of the new states (Gruffydd Jones, 2005).

At the centre of modernisation theory is the assumption of a dichotomy between two ideal types of society: the traditional (also referred to as 'rural' 'backward' and 'underdeveloped') and the modern (or 'urban', 'developed' and 'industrial') (Larrain, 1989, p. 87). Modernisation theorists argued that all societies follow an evolutionary path to development from 'traditional' to 'modern' and that the problems of developing societies were a result of their traditional nature. The state of tradition is understood as a point of departure; development is conceptualised as a linear process. Leading modernisation thinker Bill Rostow theorised five economic development stages that undeveloped societies should progress through to become modern (Rostow, 1954). This paradigm sees undeveloped, traditional societies move from a low-productivity, agricultural economy to a mature economy with a focus on consumer durables and services (Larrain, 1989). Economic growth was understood as the key means to successfully transitioning through these stages. Importantly, the characteristics of the ideal state (its society, economic, political system, etc.) were based on an idealised analysis of societies in the global core. The theory sought to understand how 'traditional' states and societies could follow the same path of progress taken by the 'advanced', industrialised nations.

Modernisation theory has been subject to major critique. Branwen Gruffydd Jones takes the approach to task for its failure to historicise and explain the barriers preventing countries from developing. Rather than understanding poverty, corruption and authoritarianism as outcomes of distinct historical processes of social change, modernisation theory naturalises these conditions. In so doing, it fails to explain the external nature of these obstacles as rooted in the social relations and practices of colonial rule (Gruffydd Jones, 2005). Classical modernisation theory was largely discredited in the 1960s through the emergence of more critical theories, like dependency theory and world-systems analysis (which I discuss later in this chapter). Critics highlighted modernisation theory's failures as a Eurocentric, teleological and ahistorical approach. However, some of the underlying assumptions of modernisation theory continue to inform mainstream development economics.

In light of the inadequacies of early theories of development in identifying and understanding the causes of poverty and inequality in the global periphery, the field of IR appears to be an academic space where such issues might be addressed. Yet, such questions did not enter mainstream IR debates until the late 20th century (Gruffydd Jones, 2005). This can be in part explained by the dominant state-centric approach that has pervaded the discipline since its inception. Both the realist and liberal traditions of IR are concerned primarily with the relations between states in the context of an international system, and inform much of modern IR's theories of development (Gruffydd Jones, 2005). Indeed, liberalism is the foundation of neoliberalism, the ideology that has become dominant within mainstream development economics.

Realism has been the dominant theory of IR since the conception of the field. Kenneth Waltz theorised that international politics is, and always has been, a realm of conflict between states (whether these have been empires, city-states or nation states). The source of international conflict cannot, for Waltz, be identified by examining what goes on within national borders (Waltz, 1979). Rather, it is the fact that states exist within an anarchic realm that they must compete with one another, emulating the behaviour of strong states in order to survive and being constantly prepared for an attack: 'states are sovereign because there is no competing (overarching) governmental authority in the international system' (Biersteker & Weber, 1996, p. 5). An important consequence of the constant threat of war is the need for self-sufficiency through economic protectionism, like taxes and tariffs, since trading in this anarchic international system will inevitably lead to war.

In contrast, liberalism – finding its origins in Adam Smith's *magnum opus, The Wealth of Nations* (1776) – identifies such protectionism as a key problem in the international system of states. Central to the liberal thesis is the notion that an economy functions optimally when it operates free from state or political intervention. The assumption that individuals are rational and self-interested leads liberals to the conclusion that the market, when left to self-regulate, will inevitably lead to efficient economic outcomes. In other words, the selfish actions of human individuals can promote economic progress for all of society; ‘it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest’ (Smith, 1904, V1, p. 2). Classical liberalism insists that national economies should specialise in their area of comparative advantage. David Ricardo systemised a theory of comparative advantage, which posits that certain countries can produce certain goods more efficiently than others, and they should therefore specialise in that good and freely trade it in exchange for the goods that are more efficiently produced elsewhere (Ricardo, 1817/1969). In theory, this should result in an international division of labour in which each country is able to satisfy its needs efficiently, and increase its wealth. This way, all countries gain optimally. The theory of comparative advantage, although developed during the 18th century based on a trading system radically different to today’s global economy, has maintained its dominance within development theory and is a cornerstone of modern neoliberal economics.

In seeking to understand the role of the state, IR has paid special attention to the concept of sovereignty. In international law, the fundamental rule of Westphalian sovereignty is threefold: juridical equality between states, the respect of the territorial integrity of states; and a general agreement not to interfere in the domestic affairs of others. The doctrine is named after the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1684, which ended the Thirty Years’ War, in which the major continental European states agreed to respect one another’s territorial integrity. This historical moment is generally acknowledged in the classical realist account of IR as the birth of the sovereign state (Lake, 2003). Sovereignty is the foundation of both IR as an academic field and in existing fields of practice; it is regularly drawn on as a central point of reference in debates on international politics. George Lawson and Robbie Shilliam write that ‘sovereignty is a conceptual marker, normative frame and political tool without rival’ (Lawson & Shilliam, 2009, p. 657). The classical perspective, anchored in realist and neorealist assumptions about international politics, assumes that sovereignty is a fixed and exogenous attribute of states (Lake, 2003).

The evident contradiction within the concept of sovereignty and the imperial system, from which it emerged, is not something that classical IR accounts acknowledge. At the time of Westphalia, the concept of sovereignty could only be applied to European states. This was legitimised by the civilising mission, which emphasised a dichotomy between the advanced West and backward non-Western societies, a dichotomy that was recast in modernisation theories of development (Berger, 2003; Dossa, 2007). Indeed, the modern-traditional binary of modernisation theory means that postcolonial states must undergo economic development as a condition for sovereignty, and to do so, they must follow a Eurocentric linear path of development, regardless of want, need or even ability to do so (Pourmokhtari, 2013).

After decolonisation, IR concerned itself with understanding the phenomenon of 'new states', but did so within a traditional IR framework. Scholars turned their attention to the way that the 'new states' acted in the international system. Just like modernisation theory, traditional IR saw the transition to modern, sovereign statehood as essential and scholars identified the barriers to this process as internal cultural and socio-political weaknesses. These challenges were seen as the potential threat to the stability of the international order:

> 'Conflict is, in fact, such an enduring feature of new states – both domestically and internationally – that their emergence inevitably poses new burdens upon the institutions of the international political system' (Kilson, 1975, p. xi).

As a result of this Eurocentric assumption, IR severely limited the debate and thus curtailed its own ability to answer pressing politico-economic questions. By failing to challenge the notion that modern Western statehood was the apotheosis of development, the underlying logic of the field was reduced to myopic essentialism.

Some scholars challenged the extension of Westphalian sovereignty to the 'new states' on the basis that they do not have the capacity to regulate and control their societies to the same extent as states already accorded statehood; Robert Jackson labels these 'quasi-states' (Jackson, 1990). For Jackson, it is dangerous to value 'uncritical and widespread faith in self-determination and equal sovereignty' over the wellbeing of citizens (Jackson, 1990, p. 10). For states that lack the ability to provide basic public services, like law and order, sovereignty allows them 'legal freedom from outside interference' even when gross human rights abuses are being committed (Jackson, 1990, p. 74).

This notion that the explanation of development challenges is a result of the inherent weaknesses of some states continues to pervade both the discipline of IR and international policy circles. Neo-realists, like Stephen Krasner, endorse 'shared sovereignty' as a more effective tool to better promote governance and democracy (Krasner, 2005, p. 70). Through intervention on the part of 'powerful democratic states […] the disease, criminality, humanitarian crises and terrorist threats that such countries tend to breed will not remain within their borders forever' (Krasner, 2005, p. 69). When serving as a policy advisor to George W. Bush, Krasner wrote 'left to their own devices, collapsed and badly governed states will not fix themselves' (Krasner, 2004, p. 86). In an article entitled *In Defence of Empire*, Robert Kaplan suggested that even military intervention is sometimes defensible when 'overwhelming national interest is threatened' (Kaplan, 2014). Otherwise, interference in foreign affairs should be limited to economic inducements and diplomacy (Kaplan, 2014). For Jackson, military intervention in 'failed states' has been wholly insufficient; 'there is evidently a great reluctance on the part of major military powers to infringe upon the jurisdiction of even the least substantial sovereign state' (Jackson, 1990, p. 192).

According to this school of thought, the development challenges facing peripheral countries are the result of their inability to develop strong, capable domestic institutions. Importantly, classical IR has failed to acknowledge the relationship between imperialism and the development of capitalism on a global scale. Indeed, Darby and Paolini argue that 'imperialism receives cursory treatment in the standard texts as a historical category, reaching back almost unchanging to classical times' (Darby & Paolini, 1994, p. 379). In attributing state failure to internal weakness, traditional IR succumbs to the same problem as modernisation theory, divorcing contemporary development challenges from the historical social relations of capital and imperialism, in addition to inherent Eurocentrism.

A further important inadequacy of both realist and liberal approaches in the context of the present study is the way that power is conceptualised in the international economy. Both understand power in a largely one-dimensional way as a 'preponderance of material resources' of individual states (Keohane, 1984, p. 32). Both largely neglect the increasing role and influence of international institutions in the global system, including NGOs, banks and transnational corporations (TNCs). Where such institutions are taken into consideration, power is understood as the power of particular states to influence decision-making within those institutions. This limits the ability to conceptualise power relationships at the structural level (Ruckert, 2008). Whilst global disparities in material power are real and important, both liberalism and realism fail to understand power as ideational as well as material. In neglecting the significance of ideas and discourse, these theories are limited in their contribution to increasing our understanding of the structural power balances between social forces that prevail at any given time (Reinalda & Verbeek, 2004). The exploration of more critical traditions within IR, later in this chapter, will emphasise the importance of such an approach.

It is helpful at this stage to outline here how this project engages with the notion of power. Power is crucial in political science, although it remains an essentially contested concept. Indeed, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye state that 'power has always been an elusive concept for statesmen and analysts of international politics; now it is even more slippery' (Keohane & Nye, 1998, p. 125). Scholars have proposed a number of definitions and theoretical models for understanding power across a range of academic disciplines, which have been subject to contestation. It is not the intention of this thesis to contribute to these debates. I follow a neo-Gramscian understanding of power, which is unpacked later in this chapter.

This section has identified the tendency of both IR and modernisation approaches to base their universalistic theoretical constructs on Eurocentric, unrealistic assumptions that do not apply to vast swathes of countries in the global periphery, ignoring historical power relations and their legacy on development. This same problem reappears within the neoliberal development approach, something that the next section will delineate and critique.

Neoliberalism: a critique of theory and practice

As dominant as the concept of neoliberalism has become in political science and well beyond, discerning a clear and uncontested definition of the term has been a challenge. Indeed, as Kim England and Kevin Ward articulate, 'there almost appears to be an inverse relationship between the volume of scholarship produced on neoliberalism and the agreement over exactly what it means' (England & Ward, 2007, p. 8). It has been identified as a political and economic theory (Steger & Roy, 2010), a school of IR (Hobson, 2013), a development theory and framework (Brohman, 1995), an ideological hegemonic project (Dumenil & Levy, 2011; Harvey, 2005) and a process of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality (Barry, Osborne & Rose, 1996).

In spite of the contention over what neoliberalism means and how its power functions, most agree on a common story about its origins and the general principles that underpin it (Springer, 2012). Founded on Smith and Ricardo's liberal assumptions, neoliberalism emerged as a politico-economic ideology during the mid-20th century. Synthesised by Nobel Prize winning economists, including Friedrich Hayek, James Buchanan, Ludwig Von Mises and Milton Friedman, neoliberalism redefines the relationship between the state and the economy, applying Smith's classical liberal notion of the rational economic subject to all areas of social life. Neoliberal thinkers place the utmost importance on economic freedom as the foundation of freedom more broadly; in Hayek's own words, it is the 'prerequisite of any freedom' (Hayek, 1944, p. 489). Contrary to previous liberal ideas about government, neoliberalism's central assumption is that the market is more efficient than the state and should therefore be privileged above it in the necessary functions of fostering economic growth. Rather than supervising the market, the role of the state is therefore to favour individual property rights, the rule of law and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade (Harvey, 2005). According to this logic, economic problems that would previously have come under the remit of the government, such as employment creation and industrial growth, are better addressed by the market. Competition, as the defining characteristic of human relations, redefines citizens as consumers. Attempts to limit competition are treated by neoliberals as antithetical to liberty; competition is at the crux of Hayek's fusion of political and economic freedoms (Davies & McGoey, 2012).

The neo-classical economic theory that underpins the neoliberal approach is better understood when contrasted with the theory and model that preceded it: Keynesianism. Influential 20th century economist John Maynard Keynes accorded legitimacy and indeed necessity to regular government intervention in order to maintain full employment and to deal with the consequences of the unpredictable crises that he argued capitalist economies are prone to. Keynes understood monetary and fiscal policy as tools for ensuring full employment (Keynes, 1965). A long economic boom characterised the post-World War II era, in which Keynes' ideas and economic prescriptions were widely applied; the state played a direct role in core, capitalist economies, increasing spending and constructing extensive systems of welfare. However, a paradigm shift and counter-revolution occurred during the mid-1970s as rapidly increasing inflation and subsequent stagflation discredited Keynesianism (Hall, 1992). This opened up the space for neoliberal ideas, supported by neo-classical economics, to come to the fore.

In contrast to the Keynesian approach, neo-classical economics proposes two theses, which serve as the theoretical justification for the neoliberal notion of the efficient, self-regulating market. The first is that of income distribution, which holds that the factors of production (labour and capital) will always get paid what they are worth. This is due to the natural equilibrium that is established by the dynamic process of supply and demand – where a payment depends on a factor's relative scarcity (supply) and its productivity (which affects demand). The second is that of employment determination, which posits that free markets would not let valuable factors of production (including labour) go to waste (Palley, 2005). Proponents of these theories argue that economies will, therefore, inevitably self-adjust to full employment and the use of monetary and fiscal policy to raise employment, is thus considered to be futile (Friedman, M., 1976) Since the economy is inherently stable and self-regulating, policy-makers need only concern themselves with curbing inflation, through contractionary policies such as a high interest rates and fiscal austerity, and providing services only to enable the proper functioning of the market, such as property rights (Friedman, M., 1976).

These two theories of neo-classical economics are the intellectual foundations of neoliberalism. On the basis that the market ensures that factors of production are paid what they are worth, institutions of social protection and trade unions become redundant. Some social and economic inequality is understood as a necessary vehicle for progress - known as the trickle down effect, neoliberalism asserts that the increased economic growth that would come from more international trade, would improve living standards for all (Johnston, 2005).

Crucially, neoliberals advocate for capital mobility and the relentless advance of globalisation. In line with the notion of the self-regulating market, capital should be treated as a free-floating resource, free of national boundaries or state control. In this sense, both neoliberal proponents and their critics agree that globalisation is fuelled by the limitless nature of capitalism. Proponents identify neoliberal globalisation as a key solution to the global poverty challenge. Peter Martin is one such advocate, stating that the process of globalisation is the 'accelerated integration of previously marginalised societies' and a 'true collaboration across borders, across societies, across cultures' (Martin P. , 1997). Martin Wolf also understands globalisation as a means of raising living standards in the global periphery. In *Why Globalisation Works,* he remarks that the contemporary problem 'is not that there is too much globalisation, but that there is far too little'

(Wolf, 2004, p. xvii). The linear visions of progress, offered by the liberal school, present neoliberal globalisation as a natural necessity.

Although distinct phenomena, both neoliberalism and globalisation have become part of the same conflated agenda to the extent that we can now talk about the process of 'neoliberal globalisation.' However, globalisation is not a new phenomenon. The internationalisation of the world economy, identified by Marx as an inner tendency of capitalism, has seen the growth of international trade, the flow of capital and the establishment of a global economy (Marx, 1867/1976) These are not developments unique to neoliberalism. However, the contemporary stage of globalisation is characterised by growing financial transactions, the international mobility of capital, the concentration of world capital among TNCs and an increasingly powerful network of international institutions. This stage, which began during the 1970s and has been subsequently aided by technological change, can be identified as neoliberal globalisation (Chimni, 2004).

Having explored the theoretical doctrine of neoliberalism through some of its key historical and contemporary thinkers, the next section turns to identifying 'actually existing neoliberalism' in the real world, by tracing how it moved from theory to practice (Venugopal, 2015, p. 167). It was in 1973 that Chile became the first neoliberal laboratory. A US-sponsored military coup removed the country's democratically-elected government and a number of Chilean graduates of Milton Friedman's Chicago School for Economics were installed to radically transform the economy, privatising government enterprises, removing restrictions to foreign investment, and re-orienting the economy along more export-led lines. Violence played a key role in ensuring this transition, though this is not a prerequisite theoretical prescription (Klein, 2007). Similar policies were first democratically implemented in Great Britain and the US under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan respectively, during the early 1980s.[10]

[10] The neoliberal transition arrived later in France through a series of colocations between President and Prime Minister of opposing political affiliations, but was less radical; privatisation and the deregulation of financial and labour markets have been pursued although the welfare state remains generous (Howell, 2018)

Soon thereafter, neoliberalism found further policy applications all across the global periphery, following the debt crisis that broke out in the 1970s. A dispute between the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the US saw the OPEC raise the price of oil (Hobson, 2013). Oil-producing states accumulated large budgetary surpluses and commercial and investment banks in these countries increased the scale of their lending to nations in the periphery, recycling the petro-dollars that had been deposited in New York and London. Eventually, realising that many of the debtors were not able to repay their loans, the banks stopped lending, triggering what became known as the Third World Debt Crisis (Peet, 2009). As countries defaulted on their debts, international finance responded by offering debt relief, tied to 'stabilisation packages' and later *SAP*s. These programmes prescribed export-oriented strategies, a focus on comparative advantage, austerity, liberalisation and the deregulation of markets and privatisation. Although at first the *SAP*s were seen as a cure to the debt crisis only, they soon became the standard policy package for peripheral countries during the 1980s and 1990s. This was formally outlined as policy in the Washington Consensus, unveiled by English economist John Williamson in 1989 (Williamson, 1990). By the mid-1980s, three-quarters of Latin American countries and two-thirds of African countries were under some form of IMF-WB supervision, including Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti (Herrera, 2006). Growing concerns about poverty and inequality in the global periphery led to a renewed focus on pro-poor development in the discourse of international institutions. The launch of the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the BWIs' *PRSP*s were key moments in this shift. The authenticity of the transition from structural adjustment to poverty reduction at the World Bank and the IMF has been hotly contested, and is the subject of chapters five and six.

The uneven geographic development of neoliberalism has fuelled the competing understandings and definitions of the concept (Harvey, 2007). This thesis applies an understanding of neoliberalism both as a development paradigm, and as an ideological hegemonic project, rooted in neo-Gramscian theory, which is unpacked later in this chapter. For the former, I refer to Williamson's Washington Consensus as the neoliberal blueprint for developing countries, in line with other studies on neoliberal development in the periphery (Fine & Saad-Filho, 2014; Radice, 2005; Sheppard & Leitner, 2010). I outline some of the key points of Williamson's policy matrix in chapters three and four.

Neoliberalism's departure from its classical liberal foundations is notably felt in its interpretation of the concept of sovereignty. Understanding the role of the state within neoliberal globalisation has become 'a crucial concern' of social scientists (Bedirhanoglu, 2013, p. 125). A central tenet of the liberal literature, and one that remains intuitively attractive, is that the processes of globalisation are undermining the foundations of state sovereignty, eroding and constraining state agency and opportunities whilst simultaneously homogenising domestic institutions (Appadurai, 1993). This presents a challenge to both sovereignty in practice and its theoretical underpinnings. This premise is one of the most debated propositions in political science, but remains hugely influential in the political and journalistic spheres (Garrett, 2000).

The rise of non-state, trans-state and supra-state actors during the past forty years has led some scholars to the conclusion that we have now entered a new era in which political and economic power is deployed across and within national boundaries. They argue that the neoliberal era has witnessed the development of a network of international institutions in all areas of international relations – economic, social and political – that limits the autonomy of sovereign states, both at the economic and financial level (Chimni, 2004). The World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have taken on economic decision-making authority that has traditionally belonged to sovereign states through *SAP*s, their modern-day counterpart – *PRSP*s as well as trade agreements such as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs).

The globalisation of financial capitalism has weakened financial sovereignty too, as nations have had to delegate financial regulatory authority to international financial organisations such as the IMF, or to TNCs, whose monopolistic power allows them to exert impacts on global markets (Li & Zhou, 2015). The power of these TNCs has grown enormously in the neoliberal era; products and services of TNCs are now advertised and distributed globally, identified by brand names rather than countries of origin. This means that TNCs are not necessarily beholden to nation states but seek their own interests and profits globally; Barber argues 'by many measures, corporations are more central players in global affairs than nations' (Barber, 1995, p. 23). Arjun Appadurai therefore concludes that we are now moving towards 'a global order in which the nation-state has become obsolete and other formations for allegiance and identity have taken its place' (Appadurai, 1993, p. 421). For advocates of neoliberal globalisation, this is a positive development; sacrificing some degree of sovereignty to fully integrate in the global economy is essential for development. Thomas Friedman calls this phenomenon the 'Golden Straitjacket.' When a country subscribes to the neoliberal formula, it is rewarded with economic growth: 'the tighter you wear it, the more gold it produces and the more padding you can then put into it for your society' (Friedman, 2000, p. 106). According to this logic, the challenges of poverty and underdevelopment are therefore a result of the inability of states to resist the liberalising, progressive and rational impact of globalisation: 'the problem of the poorest is not that they are exploited, but that they are almost entirely unexploited: they live outside the world economy [...] the challenge is to bring those who have failed so far into the new web of productive and profitable global economic relations' (Wolf, 2004, p. 172). The role of international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, within this globalised system, is to independently guide countries towards cooperation and resolve 'collective action problems' (Miller-Adams, 1999, p. 10). This is therefore conceptualised as specifically apolitical.

Neoliberals therefore share the neorealist view that development in the global periphery – or in the 'failed states' – is often not possible without the cultural, economic and sometimes military intervention of a Western-led international community. One such liberal scholar is Harvard professor Niall Ferguson, who makes a radical case for 'liberal empire' over independent nations states. For ‘failed states’, he suggests that ‘some form of imperial governance, meaning a partial or complete suspension of their national sovereignty, might be better than full independence, not just for a few months or years but for decades’ (Ferguson N. , 2004, p. 170). The reason for poverty in these ‘rogue regimes’, according to Ferguson, is that their autocratic leaders are prone to corruption, which inhibits economic development and makes them more susceptible to civil war, which impoverishes them further still. He observes that life expectancy is declining and poverty on the rise in Africa, ‘despite aid [and] loans’ (Ferguson N. , 2004, p. 176). A recent contribution by Bruce Gilley also argued for the return of colonialism, on the basis that it is self-determination that is responsible for poverty and corruption in the formerly colonised parts of the world:

> ‘Anti-colonialism ravaged countries as nationalist elites mobilised illiterate populations with appeals to destroy the market economies, pluralistic and constitution polities, and rational policy processes of European colonisers’ (Gilley, 2017, p. 5).[11]

Gilley calls for the return of colonialism, either via colonial governance, direct re-colonisation, or by building new colonies from scratch. Both Gilley and Ferguson challenge the very notion of sovereignty in the postcolonial context, with the former arguing that the ‘conceptual abandonment of the myth of self-governing capacity is now mainstream’ (Gilley, 2017, p. 8).

The positions taken by neorealist and neoliberal scholars adopt a similar circular logic; they take as a point of departure the modern-day challenges of poverty and development facing former colonies and examine their progress since independence. This leads the more radical scholars to the conclusion that decolonisation has been a failed experiment. In placing the responsibility for state failure squarely on the shoulders of the state itself, these approaches wilfully ignore the historical processes that have contributed to their political and economic stasis/decline. Furthermore, in a globalised world where states are

[11] It should be noted that this article was retracted after its controversial reception in the academic community.

increasingly enmeshed in transnational structures, they cannot be treated as isolated entities, solely accountable for domestic strife. Both realist and liberal approaches to IR therefore ignore the 'history of structuring of the world order through imperialism and colonialism, the historicity, structure and development of capitalism, and the processes of dispossession which these have necessarily entailed and which continue relentlessly' (Gruffydd Jones, 2006, p. 29). Without understanding the legacy and character of colonialism and the effects of ongoing practices of international intervention, we cannot expect to explain current conditions of social, political and economic crisis.

Since the global spread of neoliberal policies, an upsurge of literature has sought to define, theorise and critique neoliberalism from a number of theoretical perspectives. Scholars have challenged the notion that unfettered globalised markets are the solution to the challenges of global poverty, pointing to theoretical flaws and the abysmal track record of neoliberal policies in the global periphery. Importantly, John Brohman highlights the similarities between modernisation theory and neoliberalism, arguing that both are 'rooted in the historical and social experiences of a few Western industrialised societies' (Brohman, 1995, p. 121). Modernisation theory universalised Western values and linked them with progress whilst simultaneously denigrating those of peripheral countries and tying them to stagnation and underdevelopment. This tendency reappears in the neoliberal development framework, which employs universalistic theoretical constructs based on unrealistic assumptions. The idealised concept of the 'free' market does not reflect the diverse realities of global markets, with their highly skewed power relations and structural inequalities (Brohman, 1995).

This is evidenced by neoliberalism's 'miserable economic record', according to economist Ha-Joon Chang. Chang observes that where economic growth has been achieved through structural adjustment, this has come at the cost of growing inequality, intensified social tension, emasculation of democratic institutions, environmental degradation and other social problems (Chang, 2003, p. 5). Chang observes that wealthy core nations achieved their economic success through protectionist policies – the antithesis of the free-market policies that they now espouse. For example, it was through tariff protections on its own wool industry that Britain crossed the threshold of the industrial revolution (Chang, 2011). David Harvey advances another compelling critique, stating that the 'main substantive achievement of neoliberalisation [...] has been to redistribute, rather than to generate, wealth and income' (Harvey, 2005, p. 159). After the implementation of neoliberal policies in the late 1980s, the share of national income of the top 1% of income earners in the US soared, to reach 15% by the end of the century (Harvey, 2005, p. 16). A similar situation is observed in Britain, where the top 1% doubled their share of national income from 6.5% to 13% between 1982 and 2005 (Harvey, 2005, p. 17). These statistics challenge the idea of trickle down economics, suggesting that whilst some of the wealth generated by the private sector does inevitably trickle down, this tends to be minimal, unpredictable and inequitable. Chang argues that the combination of trimming down of the welfare state, tax cuts for the wealthy, financial deregulation and trade liberalisation have all contributed to an increased income inequality in core countries (Chang, 2003).

The situation in the periphery is direr still. The World Bank estimates that almost half of the people in Sub-Saharan Africa live on less than $1.25 a day (World Bank, 2017c). Between 1970 and 2000, income inequality on the continent increased by 10%, with average per capita income at 10% less than its peak in 1974 by 2003 (Artadi & Sala-i-Martin, 2003, pp. 3-4). Per capita income in Latin America dropped by 7% between 1980 and 2000 (Hopenhayn & Neumeyer, 2004, p. 5). Critics insist that the neoliberal reforms attached to structural adjustment packages are largely responsible for plunging peripheral countries into ever-greater poverty; it is not 'despite aid and loans', that poverty has increased (as Ferguson argues), but rather, because of them (SAPRI, 2004). Certainly, development indicators suggest that the Washington Consensus has not delivered on its promises of wealth creation and poverty alleviation in those countries that have implemented it. Despite this, many argue that neoliberalism persists in its grand political and economic project, having achieved common sense status in much of the world. A growing body of literature asserts that the reasons for this persistence stem from the power of neoliberalism as a discourse (Demmers, Fernandez Jilberto, & Hogenboom, 2004; Harrison, 2010; Munck, 2005), a concept that is developed later in this chapter.

The theories discussed in this chapter thus far share a number of important weaknesses. Modernisation theory, and the realist and liberal traditions of IR, all privilege the development trajectory pursued by countries located in the global core. In generalising from the experiences of a restricted number of countries, and a restricted history, these theories are limited in their potential to understand and explain development and poverty in the global periphery. Neoliberalism succumbs to the same problem by universalising Western values and assumptions and making unsubstantiated claims about the nature of peripheral actors. By divorcing development challenges from their historical context, the current world order is naturalised; poverty is treated as a starting point, rather than an outcome of complex historical power relationships. The 'failed state' scholarship has come under fire from a number of more critical scholars, who label this literature as imperialist: 'a new version of the white man's burden [...] infused with militaristic impulses hidden by humanitarian and cosmopolitan gestures' (Fatton, 2014, p. 1). This is a key flaw of these approaches, and something that the theories explored in the next section seek to address.

Dependency theory and neo-colonialism

Having outlined the traditional approaches to development in IR and development studies, this chapter now examines the more critical approaches. Dependency theory as a school of thought arose in Latin America during the 1950s as a critique of core-periphery relations and of modernisation theories of development. Often linked to Marxist views of the world, dependency theory challenges the perceived Western ethnocentrism of modernisation theory and its assumption of inevitable modernisation. It arose among Latin American scholars, notably Andre Gunder Frank, as an alternative way of understanding historically embedded, politico-economic relations of capitalist countries within the context of the global economy (Frank, 1967). Rather than a universe of autonomous states with equal opportunity for growth and development (as understood within realist and liberal traditions), Wallerstein's world-systems analysis posits that the capitalist world economy, which emerged in Europe at the turn of the 16th century, generates patterns of exploitation between three fundamental types of states: core, peripheral and semi-peripheral. Core states focus on high skilled, capital-intensive production, whilst peripheral nations tend to monopolise relatively backward productive processes, representing low-wage areas. Semi-peripheral states lie midway between the core and the periphery, coming into existence from both developing peripheries and declining cores. The semi-peripheral country serves as a buffering middle sector, maintaining a hierarchic chain of exploitation by inspiring both aspiration to ascend to a higher stratum and fear of falling into the lower one (Fatton, 2014). World-systems theorists understand that the three zones of the world economy are tied together in an exploitative relationship in which wealth is drained from the periphery to the core. Furthermore, international aid, when considered via the world-systems framework, is a means of shaping the structures of peripheral nations in the interest of core nations, ensuring that they conform to this global system. According to this logic, nations like Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti are not failed or failing as a result of ill governance, but it is their incorporation into an unequal world system that keeps them in abject poverty; this is hugely significant for the conceptualisation of the state and the 'blame' that can be apportioned for their economic malaise. All nation-states in the world system claim sovereignty over their territories and receive international recognition of this claim, but the lower a nation's status in the world economy, the less able they are to control their boundaries and resist foreign intervention.

Fatton has extended Wallerstein's framework to include a new position at the very outer limits of this system – the outer periphery (Fatton, 2014). Economically, states in the outer periphery have been forced to the very bottom of the global production process, where workers are paid extremely low wages and the majority live in abject poverty. Politically, their governments have extremely limited independence, despite their nominal sovereignty. According to Fatton, the outer periphery constitutes 'a new zone of catastrophe… integrated into the margins of the margin of the global economy' (Fatton, 2014, p. 14).

Although it presents the most radical alternative to conventional IR theory, scholars have pointed to a number of problematic tendencies of world-systems analysis. For Chamsy el Ojeili, in reducing the many independent states of the world to just three positions, world-systems thinking presents a challenge to 'the drive for specificity and nuance' and is therefore overly reductionist (el-Ojeili, 2015, p. 14). He finds the neat categorisations to be linear, generic and woefully inadequate to account for the significant variability in history, culture, governance, mode of production, etc. that precipitates the contemporary environment. Furthermore, Stephen Sanderson charges world-systems analysis with the neglect of endogenous factors, such as class structures, political systems and geographical and population size, in shaping a country's development level (Sanderson, 2005). As a landlocked country, Chad faces unique structural challenges to accessing world markets that coastal Côte d'Ivoire does not. Similarly, other critics argue that by placing such heavy emphasis on the economic dimension, world-systems analysis succumbs to myopic economism and therefore overlooks the centrality of culture (Palumbo-Liu, Robbins, & Tanoukhi, 2011). Wallerstein has been accused of economic determinism by a number of scholars who see world-systems analysis as based only on an understanding of the dynamics of global economic forces and therefore as falling short of an adequate understanding of the forces that shape the development of the world (Rapkin, 1983; Skocpol, 1977).

Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti have all three been influenced by multilateral and bilateral external actors, including the BWIs, the US and France. In spite of these legitimate critiques, for this project world-systems analysis is therefore a useful tool for understanding the history and development of these countries. The neo-Gramscian approach that is outlined later in this chapter - with its focus on culture and ideas – enables this study to avoid the pitfalls associated with world-systems analysis, whilst benefitting from its insights on global power asymmetries. The periphery and outer periphery offer an alternative conceptual lens to the 'failed state' paradigm espoused by liberal and realist thinkers, which allows for a more critical assessment of external policymakers and scholars who have advocated a neoliberal approach to development.

Out of dependency theory, came the term neo-colonialism, which gained international attention in 1965 through the publication of Kwame Nkrumah's *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism,* which theorised the concept in the context of newly independent Africa. Ghana's first president, Nkrumah, developed the idea that control and power of the states and economies of the ex-colonies has been retained by the former colonial powers. Although Africa is nominally sovereign, 'in reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside' (Nkrumah, 1965, p. ix). As with formal colonialism, the neo-coloniser infringes upon sovereignty and self-determination, oppresses the people, exploits their labour and resources, and acquires wealth and power. Just like dependency theory, neo-colonialism as an analytical tool understands that the former colonial power gains political and economic benefits by taking advantage of the newly decolonised states.

For Nkrumah, the erosion of economic sovereignty is central to the maintenance of a neo-colonial system. By controlling the world market and the prices of commodities bought and sold there, core countries are able to extract primary resources cheaply, and sell the manufactured products back to the periphery at a fixed, high price (Nkrumah, 1965). This leads Nagesh Rao to suggest that neo-colonialism and dependency theory have become inseparable; both hold that capital accumulation in the countries of the imperialist core can never spread to the former colonies, because their peripheral status in the world-system keeps them trapped in a dependent relationship with the former colonisers (Rao, 2000). However, neo-colonial literature is explicitly political, avoiding the trap of economic determinism to which dependency theory succumbs. For Nkrumah, unequal terms of trade are just one element of a neo-colonial regime.

Economist and founder of *Association Survie,* François Xavier Verschave, coined the term *Françafrique* to denote the neo-colonial relationship that France cultivated with its former African colonies post-independence (Verschave, 2004). Although the literature diverges over whether this policy has been maintained into the 21st century, and to what extent the policy was a pre-meditated project, the notion that the first three decades of independence saw the establishment of networks of interdependent links ensuring French influence in political, economic, military and cultural spheres in its former colonies, is largely accepted (Bach, 1986; Bayart, 1996; Chipman, 1989; Golan, 1986; Gregory, 2000; Huliaras, 1998; Verschave, 2004). Verschave and the research published by his organisation have shown that whilst French President Charles de Gaulle officially granted independence to France's African colonies in 1960, at the same time he 'entrusted his right hand man, Jacques Foccart, who was already responsible for the Gaullist Party, its covert financing, and the secret service, etc., to serve as his behind-the-scenes operator in doing precisely the opposite of what he claimed publicly, namely to maintain a structure of dependence' (Verschave, 2004, p. 9). French policymaking was developed within a clandestine network of politicians, state officials, military officers, CEOs of oil and military companies and members of the African elite (Touati, 2007). This has allowed France to maintain a dominant position in international institutions like the UN, as francophone African states would usually vote along with them, therefore greatly increasing *de facto* French influence at a global level.

Since the 1990s, some important global developments have significantly changed French-African policy. The dismantling of the Soviet Union, the rise of the BWIs, an increasing European presence in Africa and France's move away from its traditional *dirigiste* paradigm to one that embraces a Washington-espoused neoliberal economic approach are all factors that have contributed to a different type of French interventionism. French companies once dominated African markets, but now they are increasingly competitive with participants from elsewhere in Europe, China and India. Both the US and the Chinese have shown particular interest in the continent, where the 'Beijing Consensus' directly rivals the dominant Washington Consensus with a competing conception of hegemony. On this basis, Tony Chafer has commented that the *Françafrique* framework is 'inadequate for understanding French Africa policy more than 50 years after African independence' (Chafer, 2014, p. 515). However, Bruno Charbonneau has cautioned that this shift 'does not inexorably mark an end to practices of neo-colonialism' (Charbonneau, 2008, p. 280). Rather, France's African policy has evolved with global developments, although not necessarily towards more legitimate practices of intervention. Despite changes in French interventionism, the *Françafrique* framework still reveals much about France's sphere of influence on the continent by placing the historical context of the modern Franco-African relationship at the centre of its analysis. Consequently, despite debates over the vicissitudes in contemporary *Françafrique* behaviour, the centrality of this relationship revealingly situates postcolonial nations in a problematic, asymmetrical association, and therefore provides ample opportunity to draw analytically rigorous conclusions.

Beyond the francophone context, neo-colonialism as a frame of analysis has been challenged by some scholars, who have pointed out that it cannot be applied to all postcolonial nations. Rao comments that 'neo-colonial dependency is not a permanent, inevitable or typical feature of third world development at all' (Rao, 2000, p. 171). Examples that are regularly cited are the Asian 'tigers' – South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, who achieved impressive levels of economic growth during the decades that followed independence (Rao, 2000). The success of the Tigers is largely discussed in terms of their impressive economic growth only. However, a number of scholars have criticised the heavy reliance on GDP as the sole measure of development, as it neglects and even encourages environmental plundering as well as masking inequality (Constanza, Hart, Posner, & Talberth, 2009; Kuznets, 1934; Seers, 1969). Indeed, since the Tigers shifted their policies to more neoliberal market reforms, they have subsequently seen an expansion of inequality; Singapore is among the most unequal of all 'developed' nations (Wembridge, 2015).

Other scholars have criticised the neo-colonial approach for downplaying, if not ignoring, the agency of the neo-colonised. Referring to Franco-African relations, Chafer remarks that 'African leaders have often taken the initiative in sustaining and deepening the relationship' (Chafer, 2014, p. 518). He points to the examples of Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire and Hiamini Diori of Niger as African leaders who played a significant role in influencing the *Elysée*'s African policy. Yet, the neo-colonial framework does indeed acknowledge the internal nature of neo-colonialism:

> 'In the days of old-fashioned colonialism, the imperial power had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the colony those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protection against any violent move by their opponents. With neo-colonialism neither is the case' (Nkrumah, 1965, p. xi).

Under neo-colonialism, local elites are less protected by the former colonial power and the population is exploited by those elites, unable to appeal to liberal sentiments regarding what constitutes a reasonable level of repression (Benjamin, 2011). The internal nature of neo-colonialism allows the distant neo-colonisers to remove themselves from responsibility, placing the blame on national dictators with whom they have colluded.

Furthermore, Jean-François Bayart has emphasised the agency of the neo-colonised through his concept of *extraversion.* In the African context, Bayart argues that governance personnel are not passive victims of asymmetrical relations, rather they actively align themselves to the narratives of the donors, in order to access greater resources into their state (Bayart, 2000). *Extraversion* is a policy employed by African officials in order to serve their own interests as an elite class. Mark Langan argues that the concepts of neo-colonialism and *extraversion* are compatible if we understand *extraversion* as a deliberate power strategy adopted by elites within a neo-colonial framework, a phenomenon that he calls 'imperialism by invitation' (Langan, 2018, p. 21). The agency of local elites and their collusion with the neo-colonial powers is therefore central to the neo-colonial thesis. Rather than denying the wrongdoing of some African elites, it acknowledges and contextualises instances of poor governance in terms of how external donors and TNCs often enable and encourage corruption in order to preserve lucrative economic arrangements.

The neo-colonial literature is not acknowledged within mainstream IR.[12] This constitutes a conspicuous hiatus given the centrality of the concept of sovereignty to IR as a field of scholarship and the significant implications for sovereignty that neo-colonialism poses. This is likely due to the reality that the concept is often regarded as an outmoded concept in IR and indeed in development studies (Chafer, 2014; Rao, 2000). However, scholars working within other academic disciplines have argued that the analytical insights of the approach remain relevant today.

For example, working within the field of international law, B. S. Chimni explores the relationship between the neoliberal agenda and neo-colonialism. He argues the sovereign state system has been transformed by a growing network of international institutions whose purpose is to realise the interests of core states and transnational capital in the international system to the disadvantage of peripheral nations and their citizens. Chimni dubs this a 'nascent global state' with an 'imperial character' (Chimni, 2004, p. 2). The group with the most influence in this global state, according to Chimni, is the transnational capitalist class, comprised of the owners of transnational capital – notably, TNCs and private financial institutions. He argues that: 'whereas the autonomy of the neo-colonial states are being eroded by seceding sovereign economic, social and political space to [international institutions], the Western imperial states are being strengthened by the act of secession' (Chimni, 2004, p. 2). The neo-colonial state therefore exists essentially in the service of transnational capital, whilst the core states continue to shape the form and content of the emerging global state. Importantly, Chimni argues for an understanding of the international financial institutions that is contextualised historically and politically. Rejecting both the neo-realist view that international institutions are simply an extension of state interests, and the neoliberal view that they play an independent role in resolving collective issues, Chimni assigns them an ideological role in legitimising particular policies and practices, in the interest of the transnational capitalist class.

[12] Gruffydd Jones (2015) is a notable exception.

Anthropologist Yarimar Bonilla echoes this view, asserting that claims to a 'waning' sovereignty through the 'natural' process of globalisation are dangerous as they permit core states to carry out interventions in the name of freedom, democracy and human rights. She writes: 'the fact that "failed" or "occupied" spaces are expected to retain their nominal sovereignty allows these forms of intervention to be cast as strengthening (rather than undermining) local states, while simultaneously allowing for actors to abdicate responsibility for the internal instability their presence might cause' (Bonilla, 2013, p. 162). Bonilla points to the non-independent territories of the Caribbean, as evidence for the fictions of postcolonial sovereignty (Bonilla, 2013). She argues that the disinterest of the local populations of both British and French controlled areas in the Caribbean in achieving political independence is due to an awareness of the troubles that it has brought to their officially independent neighbours:

> 'They are embedded in a sea of nominally sovereign nations that are mired in postcolonial crises of structural adjustment, NGO shadow states, interventionist humanitarianism, and the heavy hand of supranational institutions, and foreign governments who might relegate "ultimate sovereignty" but continue to wield political, economic and military power' (Bonilla, 2013, p. 163).

According to this thinking, postcolonial sovereignty does not, and cannot exist; the sovereign nation is a myth, which has long depended on colonial and now neo-colonial markets, labour and territories, in order to proliferate.

A key contribution to the neo-colonial literature is Mark Langan's book *Neo-colonialism and the poverty of 'Development' in Africa*, which sets out the case for recovering the concept. Langan argues that engaging with the concept of sovereignty does not necessitate 'an ontological fetish with physical borders', but allows for engagement with questions about the ability of the nation-state to genuinely exercise policy control over its future direction (Langan, 2018, p. 24):

> 'Sovereignty itself is forfeited when foreign powers are able to co-opt or coerce internal political elites, to the extent that domestic policies serve external interests rather than the national interest' (Langan, 2018, p. 24).

In adopting the concept of sovereignty, the neo-colonial literature does not ignore the role of transnational trends; indeed, Nkrumah acknowledged that non-state actors could also infringe upon the sovereignty of postcolonial states, including TNCs, financial institutions and donors, like the BWIs. This is crucial for the present study, as it is concerned with the role of these organisations in the context of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti. The role of transnational actors can also be conceived of as 'external' and therefore as relevant to discussions surrounding sovereignty and neo-colonialism.

The neo-colonial approach thus rejects the neoliberal notion that the waning of sovereignty of nation-states under the influence of globalisation happens in a powerless vacuum. Rather, there is a dramatic divergence in the experience of core and peripheral states under neoliberal globalisation; it is a dialectical phenomenon that involves processes that are complex, uneven and contradictory. Core states continue to play a significant role in shaping the world economy, evidenced by the power of the G20 in designing and establishing international trade agreements, organisations and legislation that support and govern contemporary globalisation. For example, voting power at the IMF is determined by a formula, which allocates quota shared to member countries on the basis of four variables: size of the economy, measured by GDP (50%); integration into the world economy, or 'openness' (30%); potential need for IMF resources, measured by 'variability' of current receipts and net capital flows (15%); and financial strength and ability to contribute to the IMF's finances (5%) (Vestergaard & Wade, 2014, p. 14). The method of allocation of vote share at the World Bank is less transparent; the organisation does not share details of its calculations (Vestergaard, 2011). The voting share varies across the different lending organisations that come under the World Bank umbrella. The International Development Association (IDA) is the fund for the poorest countries, in which Côte d'Ivoire has 0.24% of the vote, whilst Chad and Haiti have 0.18% each. The United States (US), the richest country in the world, has a 10.19% share of the vote (World Bank, 2019). Similarly, decision-making at the WTO has been criticised for allowing core states to use 'political instruments' to shape international economic decision-making in their interests, at the expense of peripheral nations (Gritsch, 2005).

Despite the reality that it is these asymmetrical power relationships that have allowed the propagation of neoliberal policies in the global periphery via IMF and World Bank-sponsored programmes, very few studies have sought to understand the relationship between neoliberalism and neo-colonialism. Giles Mohan and Tunde Zack-Williams contribute a notable exception; they argue that imperialism seeks a model neo-colony that will open its markets to its manufactured goods, provide a safe haven for its investments and unrestrained avenue for profit repatriation (Mohan & Zack-Williams, 2005). Hugo Radice is another anomaly; he points to the apparent contradictions of neoliberalism and imperialism; neoliberalism is about regulating economic life through 'free' markets, whereas imperialism has traditionally meant the exercise of power by one state over other states, through political and military means, thus directly curtailing freedom. He therefore articulates a new understanding of 'imperialism' not as formal colonial empires, but as 'a set of changing and contingent structures and processes that reproduce global inequalities of wealth and power' (Radice, 2005, p. 96). He concludes that the role of neoliberalism is to provide an ideological justification for this new form of imperialism that amounts to 'nothing less than the extensive "re-embedding" of capitalism across the world, as a social order that is at once global and national' (Radice, 2005, pp. 97-98). This thesis situates itself broadly within this more critical literature that understands neoliberal globalisation as furthering the process of capitalist accumulation in the postcolonial world. It examines the experiences of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti both as postcolonial nations *and* as a neoliberal states, thereby filling an important gap in the literature.

Postcolonial scholars have also engaged with the concept of neo-colonialism. Postcolonial theory seeks to explore the ways in which literature, sexuality, politics, political science, science and many other disciplines have been decisively shaped by colonialism and empire. Adopting a historical perspective, some postcolonial theorists have therefore necessarily sought to understand the impact that colonial structures have had on modern day trade and economic and financial sovereignty (Chakrabarty, 2000; Fanon, 1961). The term neo-colonialism is often employed by postcolonial scholars as a critique of cultural imperialism, where they perceive core nations to be controlling peripheral nations' values through media, language, education and religion. Whilst it is often referenced in postcolonial literature, it is seldom defined. Postcolonialism has therefore been criticised for being 'too caught up in a linguistic and cultural turn to be of much relevance to real history' (Krishna, 2009, p. 111). In other words, by neglecting political economy altogether, it ignores the present world situation and gives precedence to discourse over the material and social conditions prevailing under colonial and neo-colonial systems.

This critique of postcolonial theory, coupled with the failure of IR to consider the importance of ideas, has led some scholars to argue for the need to bridge the 'gulf' between these two fields (Darby & Paolini, 1994). Crucially, postcolonial theory interrogates the concept of power beyond the narrow state-centric understanding. As Langan argues, any modern application of the concept of neo-colonialism must concern itself with an analysis of language and power (Langan, 2018). Understanding the interaction between material and ideational forces as they relate to donor power in the postcolonial world is key to understanding how neoliberal development discourse is legitimised. Clearly, development discourse and material practices (development policy) are closely intertwined. This study follows Escobar in arguing for the need to change both the situation of economic exploitation as well changing the order of discourse; the problem is seen as a larger complex of power relations in representational and material practices, which can only be transformed together (Escobar, 1995). This is something that neo-Gramscian theory has sought to understand, which the next section unpacks.

Gramsci, Cox and Discourse

The explanatory power of the neo-colonial literature lies in its ability to demonstrate power relations. Whereas traditional theories of IR and development ignore global power asymmetries and their role in global poverty and inequalities, the critical approaches place the historical legacy of colonialism at the centre of analysis. However, both dependency theory and Nkrumah's neo-colonialism tend to emphasise the material aspects of development at the expense of ideational aspects (Langan, 2018). By failing to contend with the role of ideas, this overlooks the importance of language and thereby evades cultural, social and ideological explanations for material phenomena. Critical constructivists argue that if we are to understand language and power, it is necessary to assess the relationship between material forces and ideas, as it relates to global power (Fairclough, 2009; Van Djik, 2009).

Understanding how the discourse behind rules and norms that govern the aid relationship and the way that interventions in economic and financial affairs are legitimised by donors, is crucial to any modern understanding of postcolonial or neo-colonial relations. Antonio Gramsci's conceptions of power and hegemony can help contribute to this enquiry, and are useful in understanding current trends of neoliberal globalisation within this evolving global system. Gramsci's ideas have become particularly influential in the field of IPE and are compatible on an epistemological level with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the methodology adopted by this study. Gramsci was intensely interested in the issue of power, seeking to understand who holds power and how they wield it. Conceptualising power as Machiavelli's centaur, half-man half-beast, a mixture of coercion and consent, Gramsci introduced the concept of a hegemonic order, characterised by a degree of relative consensus for the status quo, constructed via dialectical processes between the material and socio-cultural (Gramsci, 1971).

Within this system, consent is manufactured and maintained by the hegemony of the ruling classes, which allows the values of the elite to be dispersed and accepted by the exploited majority, through the institutions of civil society, such as the media or the education system (Hobson, 2000). Coercion, associated with apparatuses of control and enforcement, is also used to maintain dominance:

> 'The "normal" exercise of hegemony [...] is characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 80)

The balance between these two instruments of control varies from society to society, with consent being more important where a prominent civil society exists. Civil society becomes part of an extended state, used by the ruling class to form and maintain its hegemony through a process of *transformismo,* or co-optation, through which the ruling class assimilates ideas that may threaten the status quo, thereby creating cultural and political consensus (Gramsci, 1971, p. 231). Limited freedom of self-expression is allowed to the subordinated groups, thereby maintaining the continued consent. This is achieved through cultural production; ideas and discourse are therefore central to this process. Gramscian thought stresses that ideas and social, political and economic conditions cannot be divorced from one another and that ideas and identities are underpinned by social relations. Power is understood as a social power, in its material and ideological dimension, which derive not from political authority as such (be it state-based or supranational) but from the social forces shaping the state's power (Apeldoorn, 2001).

Robert Cox has developed a neo-Gramscian approach that critiques prevailing theories of IR and offers an alternative framework for the analysis of world politics. It is important to acknowledge the Coxian distinction between problem-solving theory and critical theory (1981). This seminal observation flows from the argument that theory 'is always for some one and for some purpose', and therefore any concept that claims to be objective from social and political time and space, is in fact an ideology (Cox, 1981, p. 128). Cox takes IR theory to task for reinforcing the status quo whilst claiming to be objective. For Cox, realism, liberalism and world-systems analysis are all 'problem solving theories' in that they accept the parameters of the present order and seek to find solutions in order to manage the international system. Critical theory, in contrast, seeks to challenge the prevailing order by seeking out social processes that could potentially lead to social change (Cox, 1981).

Cox argues that in IR, hegemony generates consent in the same way as it does at the domestic level, but through international institutions.

> 'Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production, which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of international social relationships, which connect the social classes of the different countries. World hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic structure and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three. World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down the general rules of behaviour for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of production' (Cox, 1996, p. 137)

Cox lists five elements that are key to understanding how hegemony operates through international institutions. These are: 1) they embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; 2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order 3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; 4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and 5) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas (Cox, 1996, p. 138). A neo-Gramscian approach therefore helps us to understand the rise and reproduction of global neoliberalism, both as a development paradigm (as codified in the Washington Consensus) *and* as an ideological hegemonic project. Importantly, this enables a better understanding of the role of international institutions within this evolving system.

Indeed, Cox's insights have inspired a number of scholars to consider the role and power of the BWIs through a neo-Gramscian lens. Echoing Gramsci, Harvey argues that the spread of neoliberalism has occurred by means of both coercion and consent, with the equilibrium of these methods depending on the socio-political context (Harvey, 2005). Graham Harrison is another example, arguing that 'in itself, neoliberalism does nothing; its "presence" emerges through its embodiment in discourse and practice, and only then through the effort of interpretation and critical reconstruction' (Harrison, 2010, p. 29). As an economic doctrine, neoliberalism works within the economy to forge global, deregulated markets. As a discourse, it aims to change the way that we think about development by providing a different 'grammar' concerning social change and economic management (Harrison, 2010, p. 32). Building on this tradition, this study contributes to a growing scholarship that understands neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project.

Essential to such an enquiry, is an understanding of the role of language in perpetuating neoliberal norms. Indeed, Gramsci understood language as both an element in the exercise of power, and a metaphor for how power operates. The former is seen in the way that a discourse opens up or limits the space for the discussion of ideas, includes or excludes voices and in its role in the production of physical violence. The latter is demonstrated by the framework of rules inherent to language use; these rules guide how we understand and interact with the social and political worlds (Donoghue, 2017). A central mechanism in a Gramscian hegemonic system is common sense, defined by Matthew Donoghue as 'the internalisation and normalisation of a particular worldview, which takes subjective positions and makes them innocuous and therefore unquestioned' (Donoghue, 2017, p. 4). Ideologies conveyed through discourse are not imposed but are accepted and it is illustrative to examine the role of donor discourse in solidifying common sense understandings of development economics. Understood through a Gramscian lens, discourse has a hegemonic function in the building of consent in international institutions in the context of the present study.[13] Development discourse may serve ideological purposes in the sense of bolstering dominant world-views and common sense acceptance of the economic status quo.

This sheds interesting light on the normative project that is development. 'The task of deconstructing particular aspects of development discourse', Gardner and Lewis argue, 'can have a directly practical and political outcome, for to reveal what at first sight appears to be objective reality as a construct, the product of particular historical and political contexts, helps problematize dominant paradigms and

[13] Whilst this thesis focuses squarely on the institutional discourse of the BWIs, other Gramscian approaches also consider the role of civil society in creating consent for neoliberal globalisation (Bieler and Morton, 2004)

open the way for alternative discourses' (Gardner & Lewis, 2000, p. 19). Such a perspective is inevitably bound to discourse analysis to be able to assess how norms like free trade and the privatisation of assets are embedded and re-embedded within economic systems and how common sense acceptance of such economic ideas is constructed. This is something that the next chapter will explore in more detail, articulating the methodological framework and its relevance to the theoretical approach outlined in this chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the theoretical literature that is germane to the study of the development of postcolonial states, from the fields of IR, development studies, postcolonial theory and IPE. Although Eurocentric in its origins, sovereignty in its Westphalian conception remains relevant to the study of aid and development. The present study rejects the liberal and realist attempts to dismiss or reconceptualise sovereignty. In line with Langan's position, I argue that sovereignty is a useful category for understanding whether nations are able to govern themselves according to the political preferences and interests of their own people, or if they are instead compelled by external agents and forces, despite their status as sovereign nations. This will build on this recent tradition of critical political economy that seeks to question the 'state of the state' (Weiss, 2005, p. 345).

The academic field of IR seeks to describe the international system and its relations and is therefore well placed to answer questions about postcolonial sovereignty. However, there exists a significant lacuna in this space, where debates about state sovereignty are often reduced the 'national to global' story, ignoring the asymmetries of power embedded within the global capitalist framework, particularly with respect to postcolonial countries. The linear vision of progress of the liberal tradition transforms neoliberal globalisation into a natural necessity, denying the possibility of historical choices. This study follows neoliberal globalisation as a dialectical phenomenon, which generates contradictory tendencies, as acknowledged by the dependency tradition and neo-colonial scholars. These strands of literature place power and issues of political economy at the centre of their analysis, recognising the importance of colonial and postcolonial history in forging a negative development trajectory. This study broadly situates itself within this tradition, understanding the experience of postcolonial nations under neoliberalism as a result of asymmetrical power relations within the global system that are the result of the colonial legacy.

However, in placing such importance on the economic dimension, these frameworks risk overlooking the centrality of ideas. The political economy orientation, grounded in Gramsci's work, is compelling due to its critical nature and its emphasis on the ideational as well as the material. This study adopts a neo-Gramscian understanding of power – incorporating both coercion and consent – as the conceptual prism through which to examine the role of the BWIs.[14] This will bring a more nuanced understanding of the development trajectory of these countries, avoiding the economism inherent in the reductionist nature of neoliberalism. Only with this theoretical synthesis, can we more fully understand the postcolonial development experience and its intersection with the neoliberal hegemonic order. The present study seeks to re-engage neo-colonialism as a progressive analytical framework for the study of underdevelopment and the hegemony of neoliberalism in the global periphery. In doing so, it will critically examine the concept of sovereignty and assess its relevance for postcolonial states in a globalising world. Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, and postcolonial states more broadly, could serve as critical spaces for rethinking the concept of sovereignty.

Chapter two: methodology

This chapter illustrates the philosophical considerations with respect to the methodology and outlines the theoretical approach. It begins by establishing the epistemological framework for the thesis and introducing the rationale behind the comparative approach. It outlines the reasons behind the choice of countries by highlighting some of their key areas of commonalty and difference that give legitimate basis for insightful comparison. What follows is an exploration of the chosen methodological approach including an explanation of how Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) aligns with both the critical realist epistemology of the study as well as the neo-Gramscian theoretical approach. I outline and justify the interdisciplinary methodological approach, which borrows analytical insight from the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) of CDA, Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) as well as Fairclough's techniques for textual analysis.

Philosophical considerations

This section sets the epistemological framework for this study, from which flows a description of the chosen methodology. This study adopts a critical realist approach, rejecting both the positivist notion of permanent and a-historical causes and laws that can be discovered similar to those produced by natural scientists, as well as interpretivist/constructivist claims that the human experience is solely the creation of the mind (Fletcher, 2017). Critical realism emerged during the 1970s and 1980s primarily through the work of Bhaskar as an alternative to the positivist/constructivist dichotomy. Bhaskar accuses both approaches of reducing ontology (what is real, the nature of reality) to epistemology (our knowledge of reality) (Fletcher, 2017). Whilst positivism limits reality to what can be empirically known through scientific experiments, constructivist perspectives view reality as entirely constructed through and within human knowledge and discourse. Both therefore reduce reality to human knowledge and are accused by Bhaskar of promoting the 'epistemic fallacy' (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 28).[15]

In contrast, critical realists posit that there exists both a world independent of human consciousness, and a dimension that includes our socially determined knowledge about reality. It is therefore possible to attempt to understand and access the real social world through theory; it is theory-laden but not theory determined. Critical realism therefore allows the engagement in explanation and causal analysis, unlike constructivist approaches (Kurku, 2008). However, unlike

[15] However, it is worth emphasising that some scholars have challenged Bhaskar for misrepresenting constructivism as entirely relativist (Willing, 2016). Indeed, certain IR constructivist scholars acknowledge a mind-independent reality, but point out that it is subject to constant change (Wendt, 1999)

within the positivist paradigm, critical realism does not search for an objective truth. Rather, it accepts that the knowledge of truth is always contingent, shifting and partial. Epistemologically, this suggests that it is impossible to give definitive answers in any absolute sense. Researchers should instead strive to uncover the deep structures of reality, bearing in mind that their knowledge is by definition fallible and incomplete (Sayer, 1992). This epistemological relativism rejects the claim of judgemental relativism that all beliefs are 'equally valid' (Brown, 1994, p. 27).

Critical realism therefore 'reclaims' causal analysis for the critical traditions (Kurki, 2008). Whereas the positivist approach is in keeping with the Humean deterministic tradition of 'whenever event *x,* then event *y*', critical realists instead look for tendencies, not laws (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002). These can be seen, for example in rough trends or broken patterns in empirical data (Fletcher, 2017). Importantly, critical realists acknowledge the significance of discourse. In dispensing with the Humean notion of causation, critical realism understands 'discourses as causal' in that they 'shape, constrain and condition the possibility of agential actions' (Kurki, 2007, p. 376). The critical realist framework therefore allows us to explain the causal influence of social structures, via the dominant ideologies that sustain and reproduce them. This corresponds closely to the objectives of this thesis as it allows the development of a more nuanced causal, discursive narrative about how neoliberalism shapes development policy, including greater ontological depth.

In line with this approach, knowledge is acquired through a process of retroduction, as opposed to the purely inductive constructivist tradition (purporting to approximate what is the case) or the purely deductive positivist (purporting to prove what is the case). The retroductively reasoned explanation 'conjectures what is the case' by working backward or upward from some set of empirically observable social phenomena in order to postulate a real causal tendency or mechanism that shapes it (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 26). By carefully building knowledge through a critical lens, critical realists contend that it is possible to find the powers and structures hidden in the social world (Sayer, 2000). This is an appropriate paradigm for a project seeking to understand the evolution of development policy and its implications for postcolonial sovereignty, since they are necessarily bound up with particular global relations of power.

Comparative approach

The present study adopts a comparative approach. Comparative political analysis has a long history in the social sciences, employed by the founding fathers of modern social sciences Adam Smith and Karl Marx to find new ways of understanding new large-scale phenomena. Whilst one-country studies detail the individual path of a nation-state and offer in-depth analysis on a particular case, they may fail to capture epoch-shaping developments (Lichbach & Zuckerman, 1997). Neoliberal globalisation has meant that the international political arena has become increasingly complex and active, augmenting the demand for comparative studies. Case-oriented comparative methods provide the basis for examining how conditions combine in different ways and in different contexts to produce different outcomes. In doing so, comparative work helps to build theory by identifying single-case anomalies and revealing larger trends; as Wiarda argues, 'comparative politics is particularly interested in exploring patterns, processes, and regularities among political systems. It looks for trends, for changes of patterns; and tries to develop general propositions or hypotheses that describe and explain these trends' (Wiarda, 2000, p. 7). Comparative studies therefore permit a greater understanding of the development process, enriching the field for future practitioners.

In focussing on just three case studies, this study adopts a small-*N* approach. Whilst large-*N* studies of development benefit from greater breadth and can therefore test hypotheses with greater confidence, they tend to abstract particular phenomena from their context. They are able to explain the occurrence/non-occurrence of phenomena, but not explain their specific features, i.e.: why something occurred and the way it occurred. Working with many countries therefore increases the risk of building on insufficiently deep knowledge about each single country (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). The small-*N* approach, in contrast, benefits from a greater depth of analysis as the fewer cases there are, the more intensively they are studied. More detailed knowledge of processes is useful for discovering social mechanisms and therefore allows insight into the complexity of outcomes.

In line with the critical realist ontological and epistemological position, the small-*N* case study approach allows us to 'peer into the box of causality' to locate the intermediate factors lying between a structural cause and its purported effect (Gerring, 2011, p. 1146). The present study benefits from the detailed analysis of studying just three countries. Whereas large-*N* comparative studies tend to decontextualize phenomena, this approach is intended to provide a more sophisticated understanding of the case studies. The research is holistic and concerns itself with a thick description of events, spanning a time period of 30 years and covering a number of policy themes. At the same time, the choice of three countries with unique political and economic conditions, allows the study to capture trends that are not regionalised to the Caribbean, to Sub-Saharan Africa, to landlocked nations, or to countries with extractive industries, for example. Rather, patterns identified across these countries may be extracted to inform us more broadly about the intersection of neoliberalism and the postcolonial, in the Francophone context. This may help to indicate areas where further research is warranted in order to examine such patterns on a larger scale.

Case study selection

The starting point for comparison of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti is that all three were under French colonial rule for a significant period of their history. As chapter one argued, the current economic and political predicaments of these countries cannot be understood without reference to their experiences as colonies.

Haiti came under French colonial rule around the year 1700 having previously been under Spanish control. The economy of Saint-Domingue (comprising of modern-day Haiti and neighbouring Dominican Republic) was based on slavery and the practice there was regarded as the most brutal in the world (James, 1938).

Haiti exported enormous amounts of cocoa, coffee, tobacco, cotton and other exotic products to the metropole, but sugar was the foundation of the slave economy; the island produced three quarters of the world's sugar and was the richest colony in the world (James, 1938). In contrast, Côte d'Ivoire and Chad were part of the second French overseas empire, placed under French colonial authority in 1893 and 1900 respectively. Slavery was formally abolished in France and its overseas territories in 1848, but the degree of vigour with which this decree was applied was inconsistent. Indeed, unfree labour persisted during the second French empire, albeit less brutal than the practices documented in colonial era (Frith & Hodgon, 2015). *Corvée*, the practice of forcibly recruiting labourers, was used in the construction of railways, ports and roads as well as on agricultural plantations in both Chad and Côte d'Ivoire (Firmin-Sellers, 2000; Lanne, 1993).

Under French colonial rule, Chad and Côte d'Ivoire were also productive export economies. In Chad, the colonial administration established cotton plantations throughout the more fertile Southern regions of the country and cotton quickly became a major export. In Côte d'Ivoire, the French colonialists began the commercial production of cocoa during the early 20th century; by the 1930s it had become an important commodity (World Bank, 1977b). Like 18th century Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire was quickly established as the most economically successful territory in the Francophone Empire (Moncrieff, 2012). This trade helped to establish a structural dependency between France and its African colonies, like that which existed in colonial Saint-Domingue.

Despite this shared history, in many ways these countries appear to have followed quite different economic and political trajectories. They achieved independence from France at different times and under different circumstances. In 1804, following a long and bloody war, the slaves of Saint-Domingue overthrew their French colonial masters and declared the independent Republic of Haiti. It was the first French colony to achieve independence and remains the only colony to have overthrown slavery through revolution. The second French empire was among the last to dissolve in 1960; the African case studies have been nominally independent for just 60 years, compared with Haiti's three centuries of independent history.

Furthermore, since their independence these countries have pursued distinct development strategies. They have very different geographies and economies: one landlocked, one coastal and one island. The Haitian economy is highly specialised in the assembly industry; the lion's share of Haiti's textiles (which made up 89% of the country's exports in 2017) is exported to the US (OEC, 2017c). Chad is an oil economy, with 92% of its exports comprising of crude petroleum, of which almost half is destined for North America (OEC, 2017a). Côte d'Ivoire is specialised in cocoa and coffee; cocoa makes up 43% of the country's exports, with European countries purchasing most of the country's output (OEC, 2017b).

At first glance, it therefore appears that these three countries, from different parts of the world, with distinctive resources and economic focus, have little in common beyond their French colonial history. However, in crucial respects, they share certain important features that provide the basis for insightful comparison through which to investigate their development. The following section sets out these areas of commonality between Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti. They are: 1) their classification in journalistic, policymaking and academic accounts as 'failed states'; 2) postcolonial periods characterised by foreign military intervention; and 3) unsustainable debt burdens.

1. 'Failed' States

In the last few decades, a vast array of global indices and rankings have emerged to allow the comparison of most countries in the world for their progress across a wide range of areas, including economic, political, social, environmental, military, technological, scientific and cultural developments. Across these ratings and rankings, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti consistently perform poorly.

Since 2003 the Fund for Peace (FFP) has released the Fragile States Index (FSI) that ranks 178 nations according to measures of economic growth, poverty, inequality, corruption, human rights abuses, access to public services, sectarian violence and authoritarianism (FFP, 2015). In 2015, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti were classified as 'High Alert' on the Fragile States Index (FSI) all three featuring in the top thirteen most 'fragile' countries in the world.[16] The UN's Human Development Index (HDI) is another popular tool, which ranks countries according to their levels of social and economic development, based on life expectancy, education and Gross National Income (GNI). All three countries score poorly on this ranking too; in 2015, out of 188 countries, Haiti ranked 163rd, Côte d'Ivoire 172nd and Chad only fourth from the bottom at 185th (UNDP, 2015, pp. 210-211).

In 2013, both Chad and Haiti featured in an article published by the FFP, entitled 'The Troubled Ten', which sought provide some context and to begin to understand why they continue to score so poorly (Messner & Lawrence, 2013). The FFP highlighted poor climate, radicalisation and unemployment to explain Chad's poor performance, and wide scale corruption and limited government capacity in Haiti. As chapter one outlined, corruption is a common trope in mainstream IR literature. The World Bank 'considers corruption a major challenge to its institutional goals of ending extreme poverty […] and boosting shared prosperity for the poorest 40 percent in development countries' (World Bank, 2018). Billions of heavily tagged anti-corruption dollars regularly flow from the BWIs and donor countries to the periphery every year. The Berlin-based NGO, Transparency International, releases an annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which is 'based on expert opinion from around the world' and 'measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption worldwide' (Transparency International, 2015, p. 3) Nations that score less than 50 out of 100 are judged to have a 'serious corruption problem' (Transparency International, 2015, p. 4). In 2015, Haiti achieved only 17 and Chad 22, both ranking in the bottom 20 out of 167 countries. Côte d'Ivoire performed slightly better, attaining a score of 32 (Transparency International, 2015).

[16] This tool was formerly known as the Failed States Index, but was rebranded in 2013 as critics pointed out that its name created a false binary between failed and non-failed states (Leigh, 2012).

Rankings play an increasingly important role in the domains of IR and public policy. As tools of organisational power, they are designed to put pressure on states to improve their domestic institutions or policymaking. There is debate as to their utility, with more critical scholars taking these indices to task for focussing on internal government policies and ignoring the broader socioeconomic and global causes (Bukovansky, 2015; Cooley & Snyder, 2015), something that chapter one identified as a problematic tendency of traditional IR and development scholarship. However flawed, the FSI and other rankings inadvertently show a clear correlation between colonial history and underdevelopment; in 2015, every single state of the 16 that ranked under the 'Very High Alert' or 'High Alert' categories in the FSI is a former European colony, and of these, five belonged to the French Empire (FFP, 2015). Similar trends can be observed in the HDI, the CPI and other development rankings and indices.

This connection warrants further explanation. What is it about the postcolonial condition that has relegated these countries to the bottom of global rankings year after year, and led them to be written off by journalists as 'failed states' and 'basket cases'?[17] If the factors of underdevelopment truly are internal, as the FFP suggest, then why are the outcomes for these countries so similar?

2. Foreign military interventions

This brings us to the second area of commonality. Although each of the countries is recognised as formally independent, their attainment and exercise of sovereignty has not been straightforward. They have undergone significant periods of political instability and have been at the forefront of numerous French and multilateral interventions. This is important as it demonstrates the legacy of colonial ties and the hollowness of the promise of formal sovereignty.

After Haiti's declaration of independence in 1804, French invasion remained a very real threat until 1824, when the country agreed to purchase its independence from France for 150 million francs, to cover the loss of colonial property (Podur,

[17] See, for example Sykes (2006) and (Schifferes 2004)

2012). However, the US denied formal recognition and landed navy ships on Haitian shores 'to protect American lives and property' almost 20 times between 1857 and 1913 (Schmidt H. , 1995, p. 31). Finally in 1915, the Woodrow Wilson administration ordered the invasion of Haiti and established an armed occupation that would last until 1934. After the occupation, the US did not militarily intervene again until 1991, although it did prop up three decades of repressive dictatorship by providing money, weapons and troops to both François and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier between 1957 and 1986. Haiti's proximity to Cuba accorded the nation geopolitical importance in the context of the Cold War; François Duvalier took a firm anti-communist position (Gerlus, 1995).

In 1991, the US government involved itself in Haiti's politics once again, by funding the perpetrators of a military coup, which removed the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (Engler & Fenton, 2005). [18] Eventually the Clinton administration returned Aristide to Haiti in 1994, under a US-led multinational force. He was re-elected in 2000 only to be once again removed in 2004 by foreign powers – this time the Haitian political elite colluded with the US, Canadian and French governments to forcibly remove the President from power. [19] A UN peacekeeping operation has been in Haiti ever since. The occupation (1915-1934) and two military interventions in Haiti (1991 and 2004) invite serious questions about the extent to which Haiti has been able to exercise its sovereignty.

Chadian politics followed a similarly unstable trajectory after independence, with external agents intervening in the country's domestic affairs on a regular basis. France has maintained an almost permanent military presence in the country, at the request of various heads of state, since independence (Schmidt E. , 2013). The French military intervened in 1968 and again in 1971 to suppress a Libyan-

[18] Aristide was elected by a landslide in the country's first-ever democratic elections, winning the support of the Haitian people with his party *Famni Lavalas* taking 67% of the vote (Blum, 2004).

[19] At the time, the international press reported that Aristide had resigned in the face of popular resistance, but scholars, journalists and activists have all corroborated Aristide's own account that he was kidnapped by US soldiers and forcibly removed (Chomsky, Goodman, & Farmer, 2004; Engler & Fenton, 2005; Hallward, 2007; Robinson, 2007).

supported rebellion against President Tombalbaye. Tombalbaye was eventually toppled in 1975 and the subsequent decade saw France and Libya fighting opposite sides in the ongoing civil war in Chad. France sent their largest expeditionary force ever assembled in Africa (excluding Algeria's liberation war) *Opération Manta* in 1983, to prevent Libya from annexing Northern Chad. The US also joined in the conflict, sending economic and military resources to support rebel groups, undermining the French government (Schmidt E. , 2013). Cold War politics influenced this decision; the Reagan administration reasoned that the rebel groups were more anti-Communist than the incumbent President and would be more ready to challenge Libya, whose relations with the USSR at the time were deemed to be too friendly (Norland, 2003). This fundamentally altered the dynamic of the conflict from one between warring ethnicities supported by a postcolonial power, to one where a purportedly sovereign state became simply a pawn in the political agendas of much larger, more affluent states. Becoming embroiled in Cold War political machinations is another commonality shared by Chad and Haiti. In 1990, Idriss Déby toppled the leadership, with the support of the French secret services (Norland, 2003). Déby's government has been supported by both France and the US, in the form of military and financial assistance. In 2008, the French government aided Déby to defeat rebel forces by providing arms, aerial surveillance, intelligence and logistical support (Toingar, 2014).

In contrast to Chad and Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire's first early decades of independence were characterised by relative political stability, although French military and political influence was of equal importance; Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny personified neo-colonial *Françafrique* relations, agreeing a bilateral defence treaty in 1961 which gave France the right to station French forces in the country and the responsibility to intervene if an external threat is posed. Houphouët-Boigny's death in 1993 put an end to the mutual interests of the Ivorian and French governments. Indeed, when called upon for military assistance by then-President Gbagbo in 2002, the French government did not oblige. A civil war lasted from 2002 to 2007, with the leader of the attempted *coup* Alassane Ouattara taking control of northern parts of the country, with the support of

Liberia and Burkina Faso. Instead of honouring the 1961 treaty, the French government instead deployed 'impartial' troops in September 2002, birthing the French *Licorne* force. (Pigeaud, 2011). The operation stopped the rebels' advance and a government of 'réconciliation nationale' was formed, legitimising the rebels by bringing them in as ministers. A series of peace initiatives were adopted over a period of five years, but failed to resolve the conflict. The United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was formed in 2004 to ensure that the rebels disarm, but this was not achieved (Pigeaud, 2011). In April 2011, the French *Licorne* forces intervened again, to remove President Gbagbo and allow Ouattara to assume the role of president, following an electoral dispute in which both parties claimed victory in the election (Pigeaud, 2011).

This discussion demonstrates that military intervention has been a common theme in the postcolonial histories of these countries. The extent to which the former colonial power and indeed other international players have intervened in all three cases, playing a key role in deciding who is fit or unfit to govern, is evidence of the external interests at play in the governance of these economies. A myriad of different motivating political and social factors have driven these various external interventions, the exploration of which is beyond the scope of the present study. However, the pattern of military intervention is significant, as it suggests that the moment of independence cannot truly be understood as the birth of a sovereign nation. Rather, the legacy of colonial structures has endured and evolved, as bilateral coloniser-colony interventionism has developed into something more multilateral.

3. External Debts

This evolution is equally mirrored by a shift in the financial interests at play in these economies too, which have become more multilateral. Much of the external debts of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti are owed to multilateral institutions. As of 2017, Haiti's total external debt stands at $2,170 million, representing 136% of the country's total value of exports (World Bank, 2020b, p. 74). Côte d'Ivoire's debts total a staggering $13,444 million, 102% of the value of exports (World

Bank, 2020b, p. 54). Chad's external debts had risen to $3,145 million by 2017[20] (World Bank, 2020b, p. 47). All three countries are part of the group of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) with unsustainable levels of poverty and debt, making them eligible for special assistance from the BWIs.

Importantly, the origins of these high levels of external debts lie in their experiences as colonies, something that the introduction to chapters three and four explores in more detail. However, the period during which the debts have grown at the quickest pace is during structural adjustment. As *SAP* and *PRSP* credits were disbursed to fund the IMF and the World Bank's development programmes, all three countries saw their total external debts and debt service repayments reaching unsustainable levels. As the most recent indicators suggest, the debt-to-exports ratios have not much improved, despite development strategies and debt relief granted under the HIPC initiative. This is an important commonality of these three countries, which begs the question: why have such large quantities of external finance failed to achieve anything other than the accumulation of unsustainable debt burdens?

Table 2.1: Comparison of the case studies

	Haiti	**Chad**	**Côte d'Ivoire**
Political System			
18th century	French colony	African empire	African empire
1800 – 1900	Military Dictatorships	French colony	French Colony
1915 – 1934	Foreign Occupation		
1960	Military Dictatorship	Military Dictatorship	*De facto* One party State
	Multi-party system		
1990	Military Junta	*De facto* One party State	Multi-party system
1995	Multi-party system		
Economy			
Type	Island	Landlocked	Coastal

[20] There is no recorded debt-to-exports ratio for Chad in 2017.

Specialisation **Export partners** [21] **Import partners** [22]	Garments US, Dominican Republic, Canada US, China, Dominican Republic	Oil US, China, Netherlands China, France, Cameroon	Cocoa Netherlands, US, France China, France, Nigeria
Foreign military interventions	US Occupation (1915-34) Operation Restore Democracy (1994) *MINUSTAH* (2004-present)	*Manta* (1983)	*Licorne* (2002) UNOCI (2004) *Licorne* (2011)
Global rankings [23]	FSI: 'High Alert' CPI: score 17 (serious corruption problem) HDI: rank 163/188	FSI: 'High Alert' CPI: score 22 (serious corruption problem) HDI: rank 185 /188	FSI: 'High Alert' CPI: score 32 (serious corruption problem) HDI: rank 172/188

Table 1.1 summarises some of the key areas of similarity and difference across the three case studies. This section has highlighted three important areas of commonality between Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, which provide a sound basis for comparative analysis. These former French colonies have ended up in the lower echelons of global rankings, branded as 'failed', 'fragile' and 'corrupt'. They have also each been subject to numerous external military interventions in their postcolonial periods, suggesting that their journey to true sovereignty has not been straightforward and that power asymmetries continue to exist in the global political system, giving nations in the global core the capacity and legitimacy to exert their military influence over these former colonies. Lastly, they have accumulated unsustainable levels of external debts, having been the recipients of large quantities of international finance, which appear to have had very little positive impact on development indicators.

Yet, as the table and preceding discussion show, these countries have followed quite different development trajectories. They have each pursued different trade strategies – one agricultural, one mineral and one industrial. They have been

[21] Sources: OEC (2017a; 2017b; 2017c)
[22] Sources: OEC (2017a; 2017b; 2017c)
[23] Sources: FFP (2015); Transparency International (2015); UNDP (2015)

nominally independent from France for 60 years in the African cases, and for two centuries in the Haitian context, arguably ample time for them to have broken away from their colonial masters and forged more positive futures for their citizens. The reality of their economic predicaments throws out some important questions: how is it that three countries, with quite different postcolonial experiences, have found themselves facing very similar development challenges? Why have multilateral forces so frequently intervened in their domestic affairs, and why have they been unable to spend the development finance that they have borrowed from multilateral institutions to develop successfully, with strong economies, political institutions and welfare states?

Precisely by selecting three countries that have had different experiences, this study benefits from a comparative approach that can transcend the particularities of certain contexts, such as countries with extractive industries, or countries from the African continent, for example. In examining the evolution of an agricultural economy, an oil economy and an assembly economy, this study explores a spectrum of experiences and insights into the neoliberal turn in postcolonial states within a globalised capitalist economic system. The inclusion of a non-African country in the comparison, coupled with the complexity of interests across all three countries, problematizes the traditional *Françafrique* framework, which places at the centre of its analysis the collusion of French government officials with business interests and African elites. In Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, a mêlée of actors including TNCs, foreign governments, international institutions and NGOs have played some role in shaping economic development. This widens the scope of the study, as it seeks to explore the connection between neoliberalism and state 'fragility' in the Francophone postcolonial context, in a broader way, by studying the way that their development has been shaped and influenced by the BWIs.

Methodological approach

The method across the four chapters of analysis is as follows: comparison of the *policies* (and, to a lesser extent, the consequences of these policies) from careful study of the policy documents from the structural adjustment/poverty reduction periods; and comparison of the *discourse*, borrowing analytical tools and insight from CDA, in order to understand how the donors have framed and legitimised their polices, specifically the way that neoliberal ideology has influenced this framing. Supporting the discourse analysis with empirical evidence, via detailed discussion of the specific policies seeks to illuminate the specific interrelation between discursive and material practices. This combined approach seeks to produce original and convincing research, as well as a showing that a focus on discourse does not necessarily lead to the neglect of materiality.

This analysis is supported by secondary data analysis; sometimes the thesis draws on historical studies, journalistic accounts and theoretical analyses of the experiences of these countries to validate and corroborate data obtained from the primary documents. The thesis is separated into two parts, to discuss separately and to compare the two distinctive eras of development policy at the BWIs.[24] The period under study spans the Structural Adjustment era/Washington Consensus and the PRS/PWC period (up until 2010), presenting a useful vantage point from which to determine whether there has been a real shift in BWI development policy and/or rhetoric. For each period, two chapters explore the practical and discursive content of the development programmes, across two policymaking themes: financial and trade. The introduction to chapters three and four explains this thematic structure in more detail.

The CDA approach

In line with the retroductive approach of critical realism, the process of carrying out the discourse analysis was an iterative one, moving between theory and method/practice. I explain this process in the following section. Before outlining the specific tools of DHA, I consider several basic principles that broadly underpin the field of CDA and inform this research. CDA aims to explore the often-

[24] Policy shifts at the BWIs did not happen overnight in the transition from *SAP* to *PRSP.* Shifts were beginning to occur during the 1990s, which is explored in the discourse analysis in chapter three. However, for the purpose of the present study, and following previous studies (see Ruckert, 2008) I treat 1999 - the year that the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility was launched - as the beginning of the new epoch of policymaking at the BWIs and the start of the PWC

obfuscated relationship between language, power and ideology, regarding language as social practice. Rather than focussing on a detailed description of linguistic features, CDA is therefore more concerned with interpreting the relationship between discourses and social structures. CDA acknowledges that texts construct representations of the world, social relationships and social identities, and emphasises the way that relations of power ideologically shape practices and texts (Locke, 2004). This is articulated in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer's conceptualisation of discourse:

> CDA sees discourse – language used in speech and writing – as a form of 'social practice'. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 258)

Applying this definitional frame to this study suggests that events and ideas shaped the language used by the policymakers at the BWIs and, in turn, the language used by those policymakers reflected back on those events and ideas. CDA therefore proceeds from recognition of the discursive (or semiotic or linguistic) character of policymaking, broadly aligning it with a critical realist position. CDA is especially appropriate for critical policy analysis as it advances a detailed investigation of the relationship of language to other elements of social processes and its role within power relations. This focus on the relationship between the ideational and the material aligns CDA with the Gramscian approach outlined in chapter one (Donoghue, 2017).

To reiterate, the Gramscian conceptualisation of power emphasises its dependence on consent rather than solely coercion to sustain itself. In line with this theoretical approach, this thesis understands neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project. Wodak defines ideology as an '(often) one-sided perspective or world view composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes and evaluations, which is shared by members of a specific social group' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 88). According to CDA, ideologies help to establish and maintain unequal power relations *through* discourse, by constructing a common sense that appears natural and legitimate (Fairclough, 2013). This dovetails nicely with the Gramscian notion of common sense and it enables an understanding of the ways in which discourse, by naturalising certain representations (e.g. of development challenges), creates consent, disguising ideology and maintaining a hegemonic order.

CDA seeks to draw out ideologies, revealing them where they are hidden in texts, through the analysis of discourse. In this study, the CDA approach seeks to understand the influence of neoliberal ideology on the discourse of development at the World Bank and the IMF. Chapter one delineated the neoliberal development paradigm and argued for the usefulness of a neo-Gramscian approach in order to understand and conceptualise the hegemony of neoliberalism. Critical analysis of the discourse in the policy documents aims to illuminate the way that neoliberal discourse structures meaning, influencing and legitimising development policies. Discursive practices that appear natural and commonsensical, when analysed through a critical lens, reveal taken-for-granted assumptions that reproduce unequal power relations. Key questions that a CDA approach seeks to answer include: what are the main arguments, evidence and justification for *SAP*/*PRSP* policies? ; and what development views and discourses are being privileged in the process? By revealing the ways in which social structures and ideologies shape and reproduce social practices, CDA provides an opportunity to approach development policymaking in a radically critical, emancipatory way.

In line with the critical realist approach, ideology in this context is not understood as a 'falsehood' in binary opposition with the 'truth'. For example, in the 1997 World Development Report, authors at the World Bank wrote that 'competitive pressures from globalisation have made it increasingly urgent for government to privatise or contract out activities in which it lacks comparative advantage' (World Bank, 1997, p. 165). Casting a critical, discursive gaze upon this claim, we might find that the claim is ideological. This does not *necessarily* make the claim untrue. Contemporary economic relations have indeed increased pressure on governments to hand over state-owned enterprises to the market, but this is not the inevitable law of nature, as it is often represented as being. As such the concept of ideology is useful for distinguishing between the ways of seeing which serve to reinforce a certain (e.g. neoliberal) social order, and those that instead seek to reveal practices of dominance.

This study borrows from the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) to CDA, developed by Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl. The DHA concentrates its efforts in the field of politics, where it tries to develop conceptual frameworks for political discourse, and is therefore the most appropriate method for the present study. Importantly, the DHA focuses its analysis on the language of those in power, with the means and opportunities to improve social conditions (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). One of its central aims – in line with the aim of this study – is to 'demystify' the hegemony of specific discourse by deciphering those ideologies that establish and perpetuate dominance (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). Importantly, the DHA seeks to transcend the pure linguistic dimension, by situating specific discourses in their socio-historical context. By paying attention to the historical and political dimension, the DHA unearths greater insight into how discourse is subject to diachronic change over time. This makes it the ideal method to interrogate how development discourse has evolved over a 30-year period.

The DHA is made up of three different approaches to the critique of discourse. Of these three, the 'socio-diagnostic critique' is the most appropriate form of analysis for this thesis, since it is designed to expose the 'persuasive or "manipulative" character of discursive practices' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 88).[25] In making the socio-diagnostic critique, the researcher makes 'use of contextual knowledge and draw on social theories as well as other theoretical models to interpret the discursive events' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 88). In the context of the present study, the 'discursive events' are the creation of the *SAP*s and the *PRSP*s.

[25] The other two approaches are: text or discourse-immanent critique, which aims at discovering inconsistencies in the text-internal or discourse-internal structures; and future-related prospective critique, which seeks to contribute to the improvement of communication (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009).

Wodak and Reisigl outline the types of terms that a discourse is built from, labelled 'discursive strategies', that they define as:

> 'a more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal. Discursive strategies are located at different levels of linguistic organisation and complexity' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 94).

These strategies are: nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, framing or discourse representation, intensification, mitigation (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). Nomination strategies look at how social actors, objects and events are named and referred to linguistically, predication examines which characteristics and features are attributed to them, and argumentation is a process used to justify claims of truth.

Reisigl and Wodak delineate a substantial list of devices that are used order to enact these strategies, including *topoi*, negative and positive adjectives and nouns, tropes and metaphor. *Topoi* are the formal or content-related warrants or 'conclusion rules' that connect the argument(s) with the conclusion or the claim (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 102). Malgorzata Paprota's interpretation of *topos* is useful here:

> 'a mental short-cut, an argument made from a premise (or in other words, a claim justified by a warrant) that need not be stated explicitly, either because it is familiar to the discourse community or is considered self-evident, at least within the given discourse community' (Paprota, 2018, pp. 50-51).

The present study borrows from the DHA, by retaining the focus on context-informed textual analysis and concentrating largely on argumentation strategies and *topoi*, with some reference to nomination and predication strategies. I refer to *topoi* already mentioned in the literature but also coin new names for *topoi* that occur uniquely in this data. Argumentation strategies are the focus of the analysis because the objective is to investigate argumentative reasoning to legitimise or delegitimise policy paradigms. Predication and nomination are also important and are both linked to, and form the basis for, the argumentation.

As aforementioned, settling on the appropriate methodology was an iterative process. Preliminary discourse analysis of a selection of documents, borrowing only from the DHA, revealed some methodological shortcomings in the context of the present study. Firstly, in addition to the discursive *topoi* that were identified, the analysis also revealed the importance of metaphorical language in legitimising the development strategies of the World Bank and the IMF.[26] The DHA includes metaphor within its list of devices that can be used for nomination, predication and argumentation strategies, but it pays scant attention to how the metaphor functions as a device. The pilot analysis revealed the need for a more comprehensive theoretical framework through which to understand metaphor. I therefore chose to borrow from Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT).

Developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, CMT understands metaphor beyond its semantic or pragmatic expression, but as a cognitive phenomenon, as much part of ordinary thought as of language. Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors are 'among our principal vehicles for understanding' our physical, social and inner world, conceptual in nature and essential in the creation of social realities (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 159):

> 'A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions will, of course, fit the metaphor. This will, in turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense, metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies' (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 156).

Following Lakoff and Johnson, a conceptual metaphor is defined as understanding one conceptual domain (the target domain) in terms of another conceptual domain (the source domain). Source domains, according to Chilton, have a clear tendency to be based in human physiological experience whereas target domains are more abstract, problematic conceptual areas (Chilton, 2004). The

[26] The importance of metaphors in discourses of international political economy has been explored by Rorden Wilkinson in the context of the WTO. Wilkinson highlights the significance of the bicycle metaphor as a powerful discursive tool in reframing trade negotiations, presenting ideological positions as 'common sense' (Wilkinson, 2008).

interconnection between the two domains is established through mapping, i.e. the target is usually seen through the source. A key example found in this study's data is the 'economy is a human body' metaphor; the source domain is the functioning human body and the target domain is the economy. This metaphor aids to naturalise and depoliticise certain policies, by framing them as medical treatments to an objective economic problem, rather than deeply political neoliberal reforms. I explore this metaphor in more detail in the discourse analysis.

The neglect of the concept of metaphor is not unique to the DHA, but is representative of a broader trend within the field of CDA (Chilton, 2005). Yet, CMT and CDA have a shared aim in seeking to show how language can be ideologically significant.[27] Conceptual metaphors can function as part of argumentation and can play a key role in persuasive discourse. They can be used to shape or strengthen the way that we perceive certain realities, challenging or reinforcing a particular worldview. This chimes with Fairclough's statement on metaphor:

> 'Metaphors structure the way we think and the way we act, and our systems of knowledge and belief, in pervasive and fundamental ways. How a particular domain of experience is metaphorised is one the stakes in the struggle within and over discourse practices' (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 194-195)

Metaphor is understood therefore to have an evaluative function and power, making it of special interest in a CDA study. Semino (2008) warns that unconscious metaphorical associations are especially dangerous as they are difficult for audiences to perceive and therefore challenge; they come to represent a 'common sense' view of things (Semino, 2008). When used enough, certain metaphors can become political tools as their repeated use makes them invisible to the average audience as both metaphors and political devices. Critical analysis of conceptual metaphors can therefore provide insight into how and why discourses are successful. Within the discourse analysis, I therefore adopt a more

[27] Indeed, some scholars have integrated the conceptual metaphor into CDA studies (Guo, 2013)

conceptual approach to metaphor, drawing on CMT to understand metaphor as part of human conceptualisation as opposed to a simply linguistic expression.

A second weakness of the DHA, which was highlighted by the preliminary discourse analysis, is its lack of framework for conducting a more detailed linguistic analysis. For example, Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant argue that key to neoliberal discourse is the dismantling and delegitimising of the state as an economic agent, so that the market can become the central organising force within the economy (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2001). They identify the 'new planetary vulgate' of neoliberal globalisation, noting a series of oppositions and equivalences that are constructed in a neoliberal discourse of globalisation to represent a particular comparative image of the state versus the market. Within this discourse, the market has positive connotations of freedom, openness, flexibility, dynamism and above all, efficiency. This is in binary opposition with the state, which is associated with rigidity, closedness, stasis, weakness and inefficiency.

Figure 2.1 The 'new planetary vulgate' of neoliberal globalisation

State	**-> [globalisation] ->**	**market**
constraint		freedom
closed		open
rigid		flexible
immobile, fossilised		dynamic, moving, self-transforming
past, outdated		future, novelty
stasis		growth
group, lobby, holism, collectivism		individual, individualism
uniformity, artificiality		diversity, authenticity
autocratic ('totalitarian')		democratic
Source: (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2001)		

Since it pertains to neoliberal discourse, this is a useful conceptual framework for this thesis. The DHA allows for the association of some of the above binary oppositions – which are found in the policy documents – with particular *topoi*. This helps us to understand how the donors justify certain claims without giving explicit evidence. However, as Fairclough argues:

> 'Texts and interactions need to be analysed to show how some of the effects that Bourdieu and Wacquant identify are brought off, e.g. making the socioeconomic transformations of new capitalism and the policies of governments to facilitate them seem inevitable; representing desires as facts; and representing the imaginaries of interested policies – the interested possible realities they project – as the way the world actually is' (Fairclough, 2004, p. 104)

Fairclough's techniques for textual analysis offer a more detailed, linguistic approach to CDA (Fairclough, 2003). This enables a more thorough understanding of how a discourse is sustained at the linguistic level. Fairclough examines how authors construct particular relationships between social actors, groups or processes; he dubs this 'texturing'.

For example, paratactic, hypotactic and embedded grammatical relations between clauses can create relations of equivalence, difference or causation. An excerpt from the a policy document produced for Haiti offers a case in point:

> 'The government is committed to the goal of reducing protection and encouraging competition' (World Bank, 1985, p. 77)

There is a paratactic relationship between 'reducing protection', and 'encouraging competition', indicated by the conjunction 'and'. This affirms the relationship, since the coherence of the sentence depends upon it. Fairclough's analysis also helps to bring attention to where agency is obscured or emphasised, through passive or active sentence structures, or through use of nominalisation (where processes are presented as entities by their nominal form). This textual analysis enables an understanding of how discourses texture meaning in order to legitimise certain policies (Fairclough, 2003). It therefore represents as a useful addition to the insights offered by the DHA and CMT.

I have therefore drawn on Fairclough's techniques for textual analysis where appropriate to strengthen the analysis and demonstrate the multiple ways in which neoliberal ideology works its way into the development discourse of the BWIs. This multidisciplinary approach aligns with Fairclough's assertion that textual analysis is a resource for social research, which can enhance, provided it is used in conjunction with other methods of analysis (Fairclough, 2003). It is also in line with Wodak's view that CDA practitioners should exercise 'conceptual pragmatism', adapting the methodological approach to fit the research aims (Wodak & Weiss, 2005, p. 125).

Methodological challenges

In researching the programmes of this period, many documents were read to gain a full picture of the policy reforms and political context. For the purpose of the CDA, a selection was chosen. In some cases, the donors may assert that the strategy outlined within one document has been informed by another, or that one document summarises what has been discussed in several other documents. The most 'final' or summative document was selected in each case for analysis. The sample of texts under analysis is limited and intuitive rather than being rooted in a positivist attempt at exhaustively analysing all relevant documents. The aim is not to provide an exhaustive or representative sample as such, but rather to take some prominent examples and attempt to understand them and explain their connection to neoliberalism.

Gathering financial and economic measures is fraught with both conceptual and practical problems. Both inadequacy and inconsistency of data posed a practical problem. The problem extends to inconsistencies in published debt figures at the IMF and the World Bank. As much as possible, I rely on the BWIs for data sources as it enables easy and meaningful international comparisons. However, where necessary, data is supplemented with information obtained from secondary sources.

Conclusion

Chapter one outlined the theoretical approach, which places at the centre of this enquiry the intersection of the postcolonial development experience with neoliberalism, via a neo-Gramscian frame of analysis that understands power relations as wielded via both material and ideational means. This chapter has presented the analytical framework that I apply to the texts under study in the remaining four chapters, in order to realise this project.

In comparing three former French colonies, the four analytical chapters aim to advance our understanding of how neoliberalism, as a development paradigm (articulated in the Washington Consensus) and as an ideological hegemonic project, has influenced the World Bank and the IMF's lending in the periphery. In line with the neo-Gramscian emphasis on both the coercive and consensual dynamics of power, the approach involves comparison of both the practical content of their programmes *and* the discourse. This will enable an understanding of the questions of representation, language and identity, without neglecting the material questions of poverty and survival in a neoliberal capitalist system (Ziai, 2015). Borrowing insights from the DHA, CMT and Fairclough, the discourse analysis seeks to understand the ways in which the donors legitimise their development programmes in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti. The comparative approach, coupled with the unique synthesis of discourse approaches will augment our understanding of how neoliberal ideology has shaped and reproduced development policy, reflecting and reinforcing the asymmetrical power relationships in the international development system.

Part one – chapters three and four – applies this framework to the structural adjustment era, whilst part two – chapters five and six – considers the PRS era. By comparing across two supposedly distinct periods of policymaking, the approach seeks to understand the evolving nature of neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project, in line with the neo-Gramscian perspective. Within these two parts, the chapters are split thematically, to examine two separate but related policymaking areas: finance and trade. The following section, which introduces the *SAP*s and offers some important historical context on the case studies, articulates the reasons for these choices.

Part one: structural adjustment

This section introduces the structural adjustment era at the BWIs and highlights the importance of paying closer attention to these programmes, particularly at the level of discourse. It outlines the focus of the policy analysis, along the levels of finance (public spending and borrowing) and trade. The final part of this introductory section offers some historical context on pre-adjustment development trajectories of the three countries, before giving a descriptive timeline of each country's different programmes with the IMF and the World Bank during the structural adjustment period.

The structural adjustment era, beginning in the early 1980s and concluding in 1999 with the introduction of the next generation of aid packages – the *PRSPs* - was an instrumental period for many postcolonial states. Through structural adjustment the World Bank and the IMF intervened extensively in the economic, political and indeed social institutions of indebted countries across the world, redefining and reconceptualising the role of the state in relation to the market and to society more broadly. Understanding this process and the neoliberal ideology underpinning its design and orchestration is therefore key to understanding the development trajectory of postcolonial nations. The case studies serve as a frame for comprehending neoliberal regime and global power relations within a postcolonial context.

Worth highlighting again at this point, is that scholars in the field of development and IR, have concerned themselves with analysing the effects of treaties, trade deals and policy packages. Studies examining the impacts of structural adjustment on a particular industry or country abound (Dollar & Svensson, 2000; Jamal, 1994; Kawewe & Dibie, 2000; Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1991; Watkins, 1995). Such work has sought to understand whether and why liberalisation has failed to reverse economic decline in the developing world. Indeed, a number of studies coalesced around the notion that the failure of structural adjustment could be attributed to lack of or poor implementation, rather than poor design (Dollar & Svensson, 2000; Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1991). Even more critical studies have largely focused on the material impacts of structural adjustment, neglecting the centrality of the role of discourse within the bigger picture of the global neoliberal project. As chapters one and two argue, what is missing from the scholarship on structural adjustment is an understanding of how the neoliberal development project reinforces itself discursively. Through drawing on tools from critical discourse studies, the following two chapters will explore how the World Bank and the IMF propagated claims of truth and silenced alternative policy narratives, constructing a reality that rendered necessary radical reforms along the lines of the Washington Consensus policy matrix. In doing so, it seeks to shed light on the ideological underpinnings of the practices that are implicated in the structural adjustment framework and the power relations between the donors and the governments. Of key importance is the way that global power is exercised through the discursive legitimisation of external financial and economic interventions, represented by the neoliberal development agenda. Through critical interrogation of the power dynamics manifested in the structural adjustment framework, this approach will attempt to gain insight into the implications for postcolonial sovereignty. Such an approach is highly pertinent in light of 1) the persistent development challenges that the three case study countries continue to face at the time of writing, including unemployment, food insecurity, poverty and social and economic inequalities; and 2) the reality that the *SAP*s were envisioned to produce positive results for borrowing countries, in the context of the role of the World Bank in particular as an institution for development.

Introducing the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs)

A brief history of the BWIs will enable a better comprehension of their lending facilities and different instruments of policy reform. Today, the activities of the World Bank and the IMF have become so interlinked that it is not always easy to identify where the work of one ends and the other begins. Yet, upon their establishment at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the IMF and the World Bank had specific and distinct agendas. The IMF was set up to regulate the new system of fixed exchanged rates, making loans in times of crisis to ensure international stability. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (a lending arm of the institution that would later become known as the World Bank) financed the reconstruction of those countries whose economies had been ruined by World War II. During the 1950s, both institutions introduced conditionality into their lending (Peet, 2009). The IMF lent via its *Stand-By Arrangement* (*SBA*) whereby the borrower could make purchases from the IMF up to a specified amount during a given period, as long as it has met conditions established in the *SBA* that seek to restore its macroeconomic standing. The World Bank began to shift its focus towards peripheral countries, establishing the International Development Association (IDA) to offer concessional loans for development projects (Peet, 2009).

During the 1970s, their activities began to overlap further. The IMF lent through its Extended Fund Facility (established in 1974) with funds attached to 'stabilisation' programmes and the World Bank announced its *Structural Adjustment Loans* (*SALs*) in 1979. The two institutions joined forces during the 1980s, introducing informal cross-conditionality into their lending. In 1986, the IMF established the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) to lend to low-income countries for longer periods and on concessional terms (Peet, 2009). The advent of structural adjustment lending transformed the landscape of development financing by lending for policy reform ('adjustment') rather than funding specific development projects. Countries borrowing under the SAF were expected to develop macroeconomic and structural policy reforms for the economy as a whole. Some of the policy criteria that must be met to reach funds may be directly relevant to the repayment of the loan, but many of the conditions of *SAL*s go well beyond financial obligations and include much broader, transformational reforms in financial and economic policy. It was this unique conditionality of structural adjustment lending (as opposed to earlier types of development finance) that drew critique from those who viewed the *SAL*s as an instrument of economic coercion (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000).

Policy reform would be incorporated in a *Policy Framework Paper* (*PFP*), to be reviewed by Executive Directors of IMF and the World Bank. The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) replaced the SAF in 1987. The World Bank's *Country Assistance Strategy* (*CAS*) was introduced in 1990 for countries borrowing from the IDA. A *CAS* is prepared by World Bank staff in dialogue with country governments based on an assessment of priorities in that country, and forms the basis of all loan decisions undertaken by the IBRD and the IDA and is therefore a key document to study (World Bank, 2004b).

There is variation in the specific aims and objectives of these different policy instruments, but broadly these programmes set out to promote sustained higher economic growth and generate a positive balance of payments and financial situation where the external current account deficits could be financed by normal and sustainable capital flows (World Bank, 1981b). Importantly, as early as 1981, the World Bank stressed its commitment to 'mitigating poverty, improving health and nutrition, promoting family planning, raising educational levels and enhancing other living conditions' as key interrelated goals (World Bank, 1981b, p. 5). The human development agenda was an explicit priority of the World Bank from the beginning of its structural adjustment lending, and this must be borne in mind whilst studying the *SAP*s.

The scope of the study: policy themes

Part one is divided into two chapters. The first considers the financial policies of structural adjustment programmes, whilst the second is interested in trade. There is naturally some overlap between policymaking in these areas, but broadly the financial chapter focuses on the public sector, looking at issues around government borrowing and public spending. Financial policymaking extends well beyond these areas, into the realm of exchange rates, interest rates and the activities of financial institutions (Li & Zhou, 2015). However, since this study is concerned primarily with human development and is limited in its scope, the focus is upon the spending and borrowing elements of financial policy. This is due to the implications that these elements of financial policy can have for social policy, which is central to a study of development.

For example, historically, countries with higher standards of living have invested considerably in a strong social safety net, through a national health service, free education and a welfare state (Ozturk, 2001). Research (including that conducted or commissioned by the World Bank) points toward a strong correlation between illiteracy and poverty, and between ill health and poverty (World Bank, 2005). Literature also links health and education – educational status can be a major predictor of health outcomes, particularly in the global periphery, and vice versa (Zimmerman, Woolf, & Haley, 2014). A key consideration is the relationship between public spending and external debt. As fundamental factors of development, attention to spending in health and education, compared with spending on debt service, will be a necessary way to gauge the development priorities of the donors. Investment in public health and education, for example, is key for the alleviation of poverty and large debt service payments tend to drain scarce capital away from such social expenditure, thus retarding genuine, emancipatory development and undermining the self-governing capacity of states (Fosu, 2007).

As discussed in chapter one, neoliberalism emphasises the importance of a small state and small budget deficits. This commitment is enshrined in the first point of the Washington Consensus:

> '1. Budget deficits… small enough to be financed without recourse to the inflation tax' (Williamson, 1990, pp. 26-28)

Austerity is therefore a key element of the neoliberal development project, in line with the above objective of reducing the government's public deficit (the difference between what is spent and the revenue earned in a given year). Austerity measures can therefore include some combination of both public expenditure reductions and increased taxes, although austerity measures in the neoliberal age have largely centred on the former, in line with the neoliberal ideal of a small state (Blyth, 2013).

The trade chapter examines the *SAP*s for their reforms in the area of trade, looking specifically at the principal export industry in each country: cocoa in Côte d'Ivoire; garments in Haiti; and oil in Chad. This more focussed approach allows for greater depth in the analysis than a general study of the whole economy. The neoliberal economic development model emphasises export-led growth and the retrenchment of the state in the economy, through the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the deregulation of the economy. These priorities are also outlined in Williamson's Washington Consensus:

> '6. Quantitative trade restrictions to be rapidly replaced by tariffs, which would be progressively reduced until a uniform low rate in the range of 10 to 20 percent was achieved.
> 7. Abolition of barriers impeding the entry of foreign direct investment.
> 8. Privatisation of state-owned enterprises' (Williamson, 1990, pp. 26-28)

By examining structural adjustment reforms in each country's key export sector, this chapter will explore the implications of structural adjustment for poverty, since the effects of reforms in the largest industry have broad repercussions, not only for the workers in that industry (largely the poor working class) but also for government revenue and therefore resources available for spending in the social sectors. In line with the postcolonial approach, the extent to which commodity dependency – established under colonialism – has been perpetuated under structural adjustment is of special interest. A running theme through both of these chapters is the relationship between structural adjustment and sovereignty. This is essential to this study as it seeks to reinstate the importance of the postcolonial status of these countries in order to understand the way that historical asymmetries of power may be perpetuated in new ways through structural adjustment.

Historical context

Before beginning analysis of the *SAP*s, it is necessary to briefly examine the period that preceded them. As chapter two showed, these countries all score similarly poorly across a range of global rankings of political, economic and social progress with unsustainable debt levels further hindering their development. However, the evolution from newly independent French colonies into highly indebted countries in desperate need of international finance, did not take place overnight. Rather, the postcolonial, pre-adjustment periods of all three countries are characterised by the establishment of neo-colonial structures and relationships that helped to ensure a continued flow of resources from periphery to core.

Haiti has the longest period of nominal independence of the three countries. After the revolution, Haiti's sugar trade began to diminish and eventually disappeared as the plantations were taken over by the former slaves and broken up into peasant holdings. Early rulers of Haiti established tariffs and taxes on exports and imports, which provided most of the government's revenues. Throughout the 19th century the country continued to export crops like coffee and sugar but this was slowly declining, partially due to the heavy taxes that Haitian coffee was subject to in its main market of France (Bulmer-Thomas, 2012). French commercial interests were soon eclipsed by those of the US, as Haiti part of the United Fruit Company's impressive production and distribution network of bananas from Central America and the Caribbean back to the US. During the occupation of Haiti, the Wilson administration changed the Haitian constitution in favour of US business interests, allowing the purchase and exploitation of Haitian land by foreign companies (Chomsky, 1993; Schmidt, H. (1995).

Haiti's colonial debt of 150 million francs had a long-lasting crippling impact; the country had to borrow from the US and other European powers in order to make the first payments, creating a double debt which was not settled until 1947, despite decades of regular payments (Podur, 2012). Only after this point was the state able to begin investing in its economy, building essential infrastructure that the debt service – at one point occupying 80% of the government's total budget - had previously prohibited (Farmer, 2003).

The post-war period was characterised by higher levels of public investment and increasing per capita income (IBRD, 1957). A trade union movement emerged during 1946, whose leaders worked to improve working conditions and established minimum wage and a pension system (Gros, 2010). Important sectors of the economy were reserved for state ownership, including sugar, flour and cement mills, ports and the airport, banks, electricity and telecommunications (McGowan, 1997). However, development stalled drastically during the Duvalier dynasty; father and son taxed the poor population and pocketed any wealth that the state accrued. During the majority of François Duvalier's rule, external trade was restricted; all provincial ports were closed and imports were strictly limited (Gros, 2010). However, a shift was initiated during the 1960s, when Duvalier began to remove protections in order to open up the economy to foreign investment, understood as a way of retaining the crucial backing of the US government in order to secure a smooth transition to his son Jean-Claude who would continue the dynasty (Nicholls, 1986).

The period that preceded the country's first *SAP* saw the country's debts increase significantly; in between 1975 and 1987 the value of total external debt as a proportion of the value of exports of goods and services rose from 34.4% to 186.8% (World Bank, 1989b, p. 177). Importantly, much of this debt was accrued by Jean-Claude Duvalier, who is estimated to have embezzled between $300 million and $800 million during his dictatorship (World Bank; UN, 2007, p. 11). Human rights groups have argued forcefully that these debts ought to have been written off as 'odious debts', a concept in international law that states that such debts belong to the regime that incurred it and not to the state (Howse, 2007, p. 2). In addition, groups have raised the issue of debt reparations to Haiti, in light of the illegitimate French independence debt that stalled development for so many years (Macdonald, 2010). These calls have been woefully ignored by policymakers on the international stage.

Although Chad and Côte d'Ivoire were not required to purchase their independence, in order to try to deliver on the promises made by the pro-independence arguments of improved living conditions, newly independent governments across Africa borrowed from external creditors in order to launch development programmes. Côte d'Ivoire's total external debt to exports rose from 45.2% in 1970 to 153.3% on the eve of the country's first SAP in 1981 (World Bank, 1989b, p. 101). Similarly, Chad's debt to exports ratio rose from a manageable 46.6% in 1970 to 158.6% in 1987 (World Bank, 1989b, p. 73).

An important contributor to Africa's accumulating debts and a key obstacle to economic and financial independence, as been the *Communauté Financière Africaine* (CFA) franc zone. Established during the colonial period, the zone perpetuates dependency in a number of ways. It operates on fixed parity with the euro (previously, the French franc) and it has traditionally been the *Elysée* that has led on any devaluations or amendments to the currency, with minimal influence from African states (Taylor, 2019). Furthermore, the zone requires members to deposit a minimum of 50% in their national reserves in an operations account located in the French treasury.[28] This entrusts the external value of the currency to the former colonial power, in the former colonial capital. In addition to handing over monetary control, this also accords a significant advantage to France, helping to subsidise the French national budget (Taylor, 2019)

As French colonies, wealth created by labour and resources flowed from periphery to centre; colonialism created a structural dependence whereby the colonies were reliant on exporting large quantities of a small selection of agricultural crops. The newly independent economies of Chad and Côte d'Ivoire therefore continued to focus on agriculture. Houphouët-Boigny fostered links between the bureaucratic Ivorian elite and French companies during his presidency, ensuring mutual benefits for both sides Africa (Blas, 2010). In 1988, the President attempted to increase falling prices by stockpiling cocoa. French company *Sucden* bought up 400,000 tonnes of the surplus, with French government assistance, and held 200,000 tonnes off the market to try to prop up the price. This strategy was unsuccessful and eventually *Sucden* dumped the cocoa, depressing the price further. However, in the short term it enabled the cash-strapped Ivorian government to service its debts and it established *Sucden* as a global player in the cocoa trade (Della Porta & Meny, 1997). This episode demonstrates the entanglement of French commercial and political interests with the Ivorian economy at the time. This was further strengthened by secret cooperation agreements that offered France privileged access to its former colonies raw materials (Lavallée & Lochard, 2018).

Chad focussed on the production of cotton for export, although less successfully since production was continually affected by volatile prices, political instability and climatic conditions. The country nevertheless became the leading cotton producer in West Africa, producing 40,000 tonnes each year and generating large profits for French company *CFDT*, who had a monopoly over the commodity (Baffes, 2007). Furthermore, Chad was also locked into an agreement with France

[28] This ratio was 65% until September 2005 (Taylor, 2019)

that forbade the development of natural resources without the agreement of the French authorities (Djimrabaye, 2005).

Importantly, the CFA franc zone has also played a role in perpetuating this commodity dependence, since the unlimited convertibility of the CFA into French francs permitted France effective exclusive rights of access to the zone and its commodity markets (Taylor, 2019). This perpetuated a dependence on the export of raw materials and the import of manufactured goods, locking CFA zone countries into a ‘comparative advantage’ of supplying cheap commodities (Taylor, 2019).

This historical background is significant as it reveals the colonial structures that sustained themselves beyond the moment of independence. Many of Haiti’s development challenges at the advent of structural adjustment had been largely determined by the colonial debt, foreign invasions and dictatorships propped up by the international community. In the African context, the influence of French commercial interests in the cocoa and cotton sectors, coupled with the pervasive role of the CFA franc zone, is evidence of the neo-colonial *Françafrique* relationship that the *Elysée* sought to maintain.

*SAP*s and the case studies: a timeline and corpus

Before launching the investigation into the specific policies and the discourse, a brief introduction to the policy documents that form the corpus of chapters three and four is first necessary.

Côte d’Ivoire was one of the first African countries to sign onto the economic reform package under the ESAF in 1981, in exchange for a loan of $150 million equivalent (World Bank, 1981a). In 1983, two years after the implementation of the *SAP*, a second loan agreement was signed with the IBRD for $250.7 million (World Bank, 1983c). In 1986, a third loan was disbursed, worth another $250 million for the third phase in the *SAP* (World Bank, 1986b). A series of loans were also disbursed for a number of sector adjustment programmes, of which two were for the agricultural sector and therefore form part of the corpus (World Bank, 1989a; World Bank, 1995). An extended arrangement covering a three-year period was agreed with the IMF in February 1981 (IMF, 1981). A series of *Stand-By Arrangements* (*SBA*s) were agreed over the next seven years. In 1994, Côte d'Ivoire entered into a three-year arrangement under the ESA. In 1994, the World Bank drew up a *CAS* (World Bank, 1994b) whilst the IMF prepared *PFP* for the period 1994-1996 (IMF, 1994). In 1998, a second three-year arrangement was agreed under the ESAF, with a second *PFP* prepared for the period 1998-2000 (IMF, 1998b).

Haiti was drawn into a series of *SBA*s with the IMF during the 1980s, but did not agree to its first *SAP* until 1986. Based on the World Bank's *Policy Proposals for Growth* (World Bank, 1985), a *PFP* was produced, detailing the current economic situation in Haiti in 1986, the loan and its conditions (IMF, 1987b). $20.0 million was disbursed for a transport project and a further $40 million in 1987 as part of an *Economic Recovery Programme* (World Bank, 1987a). The country was subject to a *Public Expenditure Review (PER)* in 1986 (World Bank, 1986a). The *SAP* was interrupted in 1987 when government paramilitary death squads and military forces retaliated against the Haitian population. External assistance was curtailed and the 1987 November elections were delayed. Haiti failed to service its debt obligations on schedule and was drawn into another arrangement with the IMF in 1987 (IMF, 1987c).

Haiti's relationship with the donors was complicated by the coup that removed the country's President in 1991, leaving the country in the hands of a military junta until 1994 (Farmer, 2004). Haiti's next policy reform package – the *Emergency Economic Recovery Programme* (*EERP*) was designed in Washington by a multinational task force of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, the IMF and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), whilst the US was preparing to intervene and reinstate the President (World Bank, 1994a). It was a 12-18 month blueprint for Haiti's economic and social reconstruction and was followed by a second phase programme in 1996 (World Bank, 1996a). The government agreed to a *PFP* with the IMF in 1996 (IMF, 1996c) and a formal *CAS* was drawn up by the World Bank (World Bank, 1996c).

Chad was the last of the case studies to enter into the IMF's *ESAF.* In 1987, the IMF approved a loan for a three-year period to support the implementation of a *PFP* (IMF, 1987a)*.* In 1990 the country experienced a military coup, which led to the suspension of credit from the donors and no new adjustment programmes until 1994. In 1994, Chad borrowed $20 million from the World Bank to support an *Economic Recovery Credit* (*ERC*) (World Bank, 1994e). A *PFP* was prepared by the IMF for the period 1995 – 1997 (IMF, 1995). In 1996, Chad borrowed $30 million from the IDA to support a *SAP*, described in a further *PFP* for the period 1996 – 1999 (IMF, 1996b) and the World Bank's *CAS* (World Bank, 1996b)*.* In 1998, Chad entered into a further agreement with the ESAF to support another *PFP* for the period 1998-2000 (IMF, 1998a).

These documents form the corpus of part one.

Chapter three: the austerity agenda

This chapter discusses the *SAPs* and their influence on financial policymaking in the case study countries. The chapter begins by outlining the intellectual rationale for austerity policies within neoliberal reasoning. What follows is an examination of strategy documents, loan arrangements and policy papers published by the IFIs. Chapters/passages relating to public expenditure are closely analysed to: a) extract and compare the similarities and divergences in policy across the case studies; and b) to expose and compare the discourse and ideological rationale behind the reforms. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of the findings for postcolonial sovereignty, both theoretically and practically.

These discussions demonstrate a common austerity agenda in the policy content of the *SAP*s, which helped to undermine development efforts in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti. Policy programmes explicitly targeted social sectors and the civil service for cutbacks in spending, which had far-reaching adverse social consequences. Importantly, this chapter argues that this agenda was imposed on these countries by the IFIs, in the context of increasing external debts and financial dependency, as well as the strategic placement of BWI officials in positions of financial authority within government. In line with the neo-Gramscian theoretical approach, I argue that the austerity agenda undermined sovereignty by means of both coercion and consent; the coercive power of the IMF and the Word Bank is evident through their financial leverage, whilst consent is generated by the restriction of ideas. The discourse analysis reveals a common austerity discourse, which persuasively argues that there is no alternative to spending cutbacks. In presenting these policies as apolitical, I argue that the discourse is key in generating the consent that helps to sustain neoliberal hegemony.

The neoliberal rationale for austerity

Since the structural adjustment era, the World Bank and the IMF have prioritised austere financial policies in policy programmes across the world, arguing routinely in favour of reduced deficits and the importance of 'macroeconomic stability', in line with Williamson's Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990).

Importantly, the meaning of macroeconomic stability has been transformed and narrowed over the past few decades. Macroeconomic performance can be, and for a significant period was, measured by levels of employment, trade balance, economic growth, fiscal balance and price stability. This is not a radical position; the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs endorsed this in a 2010 report (Saad-Filho, 2010). During the Keynesian era, a strong economy was characterised by full employment, stable economic growth, relatively low inflation and sustainable external accounts. These priorities explained the need for more interventionist policies, including counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies, whereby governments borrow during periods of recession in order to target employment and increase output, or increase taxes during boom periods. Budget deficits were understood to be acceptable and sustainable in the short-term, whilst the economy was in recovery. These Keynesian policies were ubiquitous in the industrialised world during the post-war period (Lapavitsas, 2005).

However, when viewed through a neoliberal lens, macroeconomic stability has a much narrower definition, focussing primarily on fiscal balance and price stability (low inflation), thus legitimising austerity measures (Ocampo, 2003). This is partly explained by the belief that there is a stable relationship between the rate of economic growth and the pace of inflation, although the evidence for this is contentious. [29] Within neoliberal reasoning, the counter-cyclical role of macroeconomic policy is therefore completely suppressed (Friedman, M., 1976). Instead, governments are expected to eliminate deficits; the Washington Consensus asserts this as a key priority. Traditionally, this is achieved by cutting expenditures and/or raising revenues, through increasing taxes. In the context of structural adjustment, raising revenues is more challenging due to limited extractive capacity of governments (their populations cannot afford to pay higher taxes) and so it is cutbacks in spending that are demanded in order to bring down the deficit, at the expense of other economic indicators, such as employment and equality levels. Specific measures include decreasing subsidies, public employment, public sector wages and both current and investment expenditures. The commitment to budgetary restraint is therefore tied to the commitment to maintain low levels of inflation, or macroeconomic stability, defined in neoliberal terms.

SAPs: cutting social sectors and scaling back the civil service

This section explores the macroeconomic policy framework – and its implications for social policy and poverty reduction – across the three case studies during the structural adjustment period, beginning with Côte d'Ivoire. During the first two decades of independence, Ivorian President Houphouët-Boigny had invested

[29] Whilst there is evidence that high and fluctuating inflation can lead to disinvestment and negative or slow growth, the notion that very low inflation lays the basis for long-term growth and/or prosperity is contentious among economic theorists (Krugman, 2015)

substantially in developing a welfare state; public expenditures rose steadily over the course of the 1970s (World Bank, 1981a). In the three *SAPs* that were implemented during the 1980s, the World Bank set out reversing this trend by demanding a number of spending reduction targets and areas for cuts. These cuts were targeted at education, with specific measures including the abandonment of student welfare policies, such as allowances, housing and transport; and restrictions on scholarships for secondary and higher education (World Bank, 1981a, pp. 17-18; 1983c, p. 12).

In housing, the World Bank insisted on the reduction of the number of people entitled to housing, and the introduction of maintenance fees for occupants of state-owned housing (World Bank, 1983c, p. 12). The civil service also came under fire for cuts; the donors pushed for the reduction of the wage bill as a proportion of total government expenditures. To achieve this, wages were repeatedly frozen and the government was also required to reduce the growth rate of civil service staffing, by cutting admissions to civil service schools and halving the number of new scholarships (World Bank, 1986b, p. 19). The austerity policy was also reflected in rate increases for public services and higher prices for certain consumer goods such as rail transport and gasoline, including a staggering 23% increase for rice, a staple for the country's poor (IMF, 1984, p. 12).

By 1994, the repercussions of these cuts were becoming evident. Primary school enrolment had dropped from 81% pre-structural adjustment to just half by 1994 (World Bank, 1977a, p. xi; 1994b, p. 5). Primary schools were coming under increasing pressure from the cuts made to secondary education, with many children repeating their final year. The World Bank also reported that health systems had worsened and that health care coverage reached just 30% of the population in 1994 (World Bank, 1994b, p. 5). The freeze on wages led to a decline in *per capita* income and rising levels of unemployment (World Bank, 1994b, pp. 8-9). The World Bank estimated that poverty rose from 10% in the mid 1980s to 37% in 1995 (World Bank, 2002e). These damning statistics highlight the incompatibility between the donors' desire for macroeconomic stability and the human development agenda.

There appears to be a shift in BWI policy during the 1990s, when the World Bank and the IMF begin to draw attention to the need to 'intensify poverty alleviation efforts', through a reallocation of resources for these priority programmes from other areas of the budget (World Bank, 1994b, p. 8). A public investment programme was announced during the late 1990s, but only a minute proportion of the dedicated funds were earmarked for the social sectors.[30] Priority spending in the social sectors increased slightly during the *PFPs* (1994 and 1998), but these small increases were achieved through a reallocation of resources rather than through an overall increase in public spending (IMF, 1994, p. 5; 1998b, p. 5).

With austerity continuing to underpin the overarching financial strategy, the donors began to focus their cuts more intensively on the civil service; the Ivorian government was required to continue to reduce the number of civil servants through voluntary redundancies (IMF, 1994, p. 9; 1998b, p. 8). The World Bank's *CAS* announced the curtailing of civil service wages which translated into a substantial decline in the real wage bill (World Bank, 1994b, p. 4). Disregard for the country's poor remained a key theme during the 1990s, as the IMF announced the elimination of subsidies that had been introduced on certain goods and basic public services to counter the 'adverse impact that certain initial adjustment measures were having on part of the population' by 1996. (IMF, 1994, p. 6). Primary government expenditure as a proportion of GDP was 41% in 1978 on the eve of the first *SAP* (World Bank, 1981a, p. 3). Under BWI supervision, this figure had fallen to 17.4% by 1999 (IMF, 2000a, p. 19). The downward trend was continuous over the two decades, with the largest reduction in spending taking place during the 1980s.

Table 3.1 Côte d'Ivoire: timeline of key austerity measures

Year	Programme	Key Reforms
1981	SAL I (World Bank, 1981a)	Education cuts: restriction in scholarships and student benefits; restrictions on wage increases (pp. 17-18)

[30] A total of 1,1139.8 CFAF billion was committed from 1995-1998. Of this sum, 49% was committed to economic development, whilst only 11% was dedicated to investment in education and a mere 7% for investment in health (IMF, 1995b, p. 51)

1983	SAL II (World Bank, 1983c)	15 billlion CFAF reduction in annual education spending, new budgetary controls; sharp reduction in civil servants housing progamme; maintenance fees to be paid by tenants in public housing (p. 12)
1984	Stand-By Arrangement (IMF, 1984)	Price increases on railway tariffs (10%), rice (23%), petroleum, electricity (25%), bus fares (25%) and water (25%) (p. 12)
1986	SAL III (World Bank, 1986b)	Civil Service Reform initiatied (p. 19)
1989	Stand-By Arrangement (IMF, 1989d)	Wage Freeze (p. 9)
1994	PFP (IMF, 1994)	Restrictions on non-wage expenditure; removal of subsidies on essential consumer goods and basic public services; reduction in wage bill (p. 9)
1998	PFP (IMF, 1998b)	Civil Service reduced from 117,545 to 110,185 through voluntary redundancies and limited recruitment. Nonpriority expenditures contained (p. 8)

The minor increases in allocations to health and education during the 1990s were reflected in social indicators; the incidence of poverty was reduced slightly to 34% in 1998, but this reduction was small compared to the increase that had occurred during the 1980s and 1990s during the earlier programmes (World Bank, 2002c, p. 5). Claims from the donors about the need to reinvest in the social sectors and to put in place 'pro-poor' measures must therefore be regarded with scepticism; the donors' continued to reduce expenditures overall, in spite of their own reporting of the adverse social consequences of austerity. This calls into the true motivations of the BWIs, highlighting starkly the contradictory objectives of austerity and improving the economic and social wellbeing of people living in these countries.

In contrast to the Ivorian case, the 1960s and 1970s in Haiti were characterised by limited government spending and routinely balanced budgets. This was achieved through high taxation, which fell most heavily on the poor, and a sharp reduction in public investment in health and education, under François Duvalier (IBRD, 1961). Jean-Claude Duvalier (in office 1971-1986) was less frugal, siphoning off funds into his personal accounts and intensifying the country's financial problems, but maintaining an austere policy with regards to pro-poor development (HRW, 2011). In early agreements, the IMF sought to curb the President's spending but their efforts were unsuccessful. This context is significant, since the base upon which expenditure cuts were made was already extremely low. In 1982, public spending on health was $3.11 per capita and $2.86 for education, compared to $10.69 and $64 in Côte d'Ivoire (see Appendix 1 and 2). The IMF set monthly limits on government spending; between 1981 and 1982, almost 99% of the reduction of total government expenditure came from slashing development investment programs (Lundahl & Silie, 2005). Duvalier continued to divert state funds into his own pocket and government expenditures increased from an average of 19% of GDP in 1976-79 to 22% in 1984 (World Bank, 1985, p. 19) – a significant increase but notably lower than the Ivorian government's 35.8% in that same year (World Bank, 1986b, p. vi).

The donors spelled out clear strategies to reduce this figure in a *Public Expenditure Review (PER)*, produced in 1986. Like in Côte d'Ivoire, education was a primary target for cuts. The World Bank advocated a slower expansion of education, with new primary intake increasing at the rate of 3% per year, well below the 10% average that was achieved between 1978 and 1982 (World Bank, 1986a, p. 97). In lieu of increasing salaries, the Bank proposed that the government employ less qualified teachers so as to maintain teachers without increasing expenditure. They suggested that the government divest from public vocational and technical training establishments and higher education; user fees were introduced in all faculties of the state university as well as in training establishments. The authors concluded that no new aid commitments in the area of education would be necessary in the period 1986 to 1989 (World Bank, 1986a, v. ii).

On top of the education cuts, the World Bank also targeted the health budget, demanding a $4.5 million reduction in investment and a $1.75 million in current health spending (World Bank, 1986a, p. 109). They proposed cutbacks in a number of ways: a reduction of the number of referrals; contracting out the delivery of services to the private sector and to NGOs; freezing jobs within the health ministry (the *MSPP*); halving the number of medical students in training; introducing some forms of private or social insurance to finance health care;

expanding user charges; delaying plans for hospital and health centre reconstruction and re-equipment; and scrapping plans for a new maternity hospital in Port-au-Prince (World Bank, 1986a, p. vii). The World Bank's proposals became policy through the 1986 *PFP* and the World Bank's *ERC.* In 1989, the World Bank issued a loan for $28.2 million for a Health Project (World Bank, 1989b). However, this was far from a pro-poor initiative; the main objectives of the project were the reduction of expenditures of the *MSPP*, and the improvement of patient contribution to the cost of services and drugs. Improving health outcomes by extending health service coverage were 'additional objectives' (World Bank, 2001b, p. 2). The project set out to reduce the MSPP's budget 35% in real terms over 5 years by cutting salaries (World Bank, 1989b, p. 13). The project also signified a further shift towards the privatisation of healthcare. Half of all health care establishments were privately operated and funded at the time. The project channelled financing through a number of NGOs to implement and deliver specific public health interventions, rather than through the MSPP. The project supported the continuation of user fees for medical services and drugs (World Bank, 1989b, p. 13). The need for such measures was reinforced by *SBA*s with the IMF, which set ceilings on spending; the government reduced government spending each year during the 1980s, from 20.4% of GDP in 1982 to 9.5% in 1990 (IMF, 1986c, p. v ; IMF, 1991, p. 24)

Like in Côte d'Ivoire, these austerity measures had deleterious effects on development indicators. Primary school enrolment fell from 96% during the early 1980s to 56% by 1996, giving Haiti the lowest school enrolment rates and the highest repetition and dropout rates in the hemisphere (World Bank, 1996d, p. 2). The number of physicians per person fell during the 1980s and in 1996 the World Bank estimated in 1996 that less than 60% of the population were receiving primary health care (Schneidman & Levine, 1998, pp. 5-6; World Bank, 1996d, p. 2). This is not surprising; the introduction of user fees into health systems in low-income countries excludes the poor from accessing vital services (Bond & Dor, 2003). The maternal mortality rate doubled from 340 per 100,000 live births during the first half of the 1980s to 600 in 1993 (World Bank, 1996d, p. 1).

In the case of Haiti, the start of the 1990s also signified a slight shift back in focus towards the social sectors. The 1994 *EERP* reallocated funding towards health, education, nutrition and other social programmes. It announced increasing expenditures on medical supplies and equipment, school textbooks and supplies and targeted nutrition programmes (World Bank, 1994c, p. 7). However, like in the Ivorian context, there remained significant pressure to comply with fiscal austerity. The 1996 *PFP* demanded the removal of price controls on petrol and increased electricity tariffs, both measures which impact the poor disproportionately (IMF, 1996c, p. 29). The *PFP* did not challenge user fees in heath or education. The programme announced the scaling back of the civil service, via early retirement and voluntary separation, to reduce the overall wage bill (IMF, 1996c, p. 8). Total government expenditures increased temporarily under the *EERP* from 6.6% of GDP in 1994 to 10.7% in 1995 (IMF, 1998d, p. 44) before dropping back down again 9.3% by 1998 (IMF, 2002b, p 40).

Table 3.2 Haiti: timeline of key austerity measures

Year	Programme	Key Reforms
1986	Public Expenditure Review (World Bank, 1986a)	$4.5 million reduction in health investment and $1.75 million reduction in current health spending through: jobs freeze; reduction of medical students; expanding user charges; postponing construction of new health centres/hospitals (p. 109) Public divestment from vocational and technical training establishments and higher education; introduction of user fees in all faculties of the state university. (p. 98) Reduction of growth of primary education intake from 10% to 3% (p. 97)
1989	Health Project (World Bank, 1989b) Stand-By Arrangement (IMF, 1989c)	15 billlion CFAF reduction in annual education spending, new budgetary controls; sharp reduction in civil servants housing progamme; maintenance fees to be paid by tenants in public housing (p. 12) Reduction of MSPP's budget by 35%: improved implementation of user fees for medical services and drugs (p. 13) No general wage increase (p. 8)
1996	PFP (IMF, 1996c)	Removal of price controls on petrol; increase of electricity tariffs Cuts to civil service: early retirements and redundancies (pp. 28-29

By 1998, the World Bank reported that 80% of the rural Haitian population were living in poverty and that the poverty situation had worsened over the past decade, with *per capita* income falling at an annual rate of 5.2% between 1985 and 1995 (World Bank, 1998b, p. v). Health indicators worsened during structural adjustment; rates of maternal mortality and child mortality rose between 1987 and 1999.[31] These worsening indicators reflect the severity of the austerity measures that were undertaken under the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank. The examples of Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti clearly demonstrate the BWIs' clear commitment to austerity over of the human development agenda, even after the adverse consequences of the cuts had become apparent, in their own reporting.

Similarly to Haiti, public investment in Chad's social sectors was very low during the early years of independence, as the country experienced ongoing civil war and a series of military dictatorships. In 1987, salaries were a mere 60% of the nominal salary scales established twenty years previously in 1967 and the IMF acknowledged that current expenditures were 'already at a critically low level' (IMF, 1987a, p. 33). Nonetheless, the IMF and the World Bank oversaw public sector cuts in Chad not dissimilar to those made in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, although focussed mostly on the civil service. The 1987 *PFP* identified numerous ways in which savings could be made, including a wage freeze and strict control over the number of civil servants, which meant reductions in some areas (IMF, 1987a, p. 15). This prompted a strike amongst the civil service (IMF, 1993, p. 25). The IMF demanded that the publicly owned electricity and water company lose its government subsidy and charge service users for water and electricity (IMF, 1989b, p. 10). Such measures, research has shown, increase pressures on the budgets of poor households and prevents many from accessing water at all (Jaglin, 2002). The promotion of such policies presents further evidence of the donors' disregard for the country's poor in their relentless pursuit of bringing down public spending. The Chadian government did not meet budgetary targets; current

[31] Child mortality (under five) rose from 22 per 1,000 to 118 per 1,000 in 1999. Maternal mortality rose from 267 per 10,000 live births to 523 per 10,000 in 2000 (World Bank, 2001b, p. 6).

expenditures actually grew under the programme, from 10% in 1988 (IMF, 1993, p. 20) to 14.6% in 1991 (IMF, 1996a, p. 20).

This was partly down to the expanding military but also civil service costs as the government responded to the strikes and removed the wage freeze. The social sectors were not subject to direct cuts under these programmes, but they continued to be neglected. For example, a public investment programme was in place from 1991 to 1995, almost entirely externally financed, but was concentrated in infrastructure, transport, agriculture, mining, industry and energy (56%) with relatively little allocated for human resources or development support (35%) (IMF, 1996, p. 25).

Like in the other two case studies, the post-1994 strategy renewed emphasis on improving service delivery, particularly in the sectors of health and education. The *CAS* announced plans to increase total enrolments, construct 1,700 classrooms, increase the number of teachers, and expand teacher training (World Bank, 1996b, p. 7). In health, the objective was to improve access to primary health care, decentralise services and increase appropriations for central drugs. This was to be financed by increasing the share in public expenditures accorded to these sectors, from 16% in 1994 to 20% in 1997 in education, and from 12% to 18% in health (World Bank, 1996b, p. 8). Like in Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, this was achieved by reallocating resources rather than increasing public expenditure overall. Indeed, the *CAS* planned to decrease public expenditure as a ratio to GDP over the next three years by 7% (World Bank, 1996b, p. 3). It was therefore a policy of restructuring, not investment. Like in Haiti, the World Bank funded a health project, which promoted user fees; the objective was to have patients financing up to 10.5% of total health expenditure by 2000 (World Bank, 1994g, p. 8). Again, the promotion of user fees in areas that might be considered basic human rights – water, education and health - is indicative of the relative importance placed on austerity, over poverty alleviation objectives.

Importantly, the *ERC* demanded the elimination of a number of pro-poor subsidies and price controls on consumer goods, including rice, flour, soap, edible oil and sugar, despite acknowledgement that these measures had ensured 'the temporary alleviation of the negative effect of devaluation [of the currency] on the most vulnerable classes, especially in urban areas' (World Bank, 1994e, p. 7).[32] Rice in particular, like the Ivorian case, was a staple of the country's poor and by allowing the price to rise beyond affordability for many Chadians, the donors displayed yet again, their total indifference to the economic and social wellbeing of low-income communities. The civil service continued to be targeted for cuts during the 1990s too: civil servant salaries were cut by 10-20% in 1992, the retirement age was lowered, the withholding tax rate on salaries was increased and recruitment was frozen (IMF, 1993, p. 27)**.** The *ERC* initiated a real wage decrease (World Bank, 1994e, p. 17) and the *SAP* announced a census to guide where deeper cuts could be made (World Bank, 1996e, p. 7). Government expenditures as a proportion of GDP dropped from 14.6% in 1991 (IMF, 1996a, p. 20) to 7.7% in 1998 (IMF, 2002a, p. 18).

In summary, the 1990s strategy paralleled that of the other two countries: limited increase in resources for social sectors remained anchored in a macroeconomic framework of austerity.

Table 3.3 Chad: Timeline of key austerity measures

Year	Programme	Key Reforms
1987	Public Expenditure Review (World Bank, 1986a)	Wage Freeze (p. 15.))
1989	SAP (IMF, 1989b)	Removal of government subsidy from electricity and water company: implementation of user fees (p. 10)
1994	ERC (World Bank, 1994e) Health Project (World Bank, 1994g)	Elimination of subsidies/price controls on: rice; flour; soap; edible oils; and sugar (p. 7) Real wage decrease, census to further reduce civil service (p. 7) Introduction of user fees for medical services and drugs (p. ii.)
1998	PFP (IMF, 1998a)	Civil service reform: reduction of wage bill; performance-based pay introduced into civil service (p. 4)

[32] The ERCs in Côte d'Ivoire and Chad in 1994 were implemented in response to the devaluation of the CFA franc.

Data scarcity complicates the task of comparing social indicators over the structural adjustment period. There was no indication of the incidence of poverty in any report produced during the structural adjustment period. This in itself is a sign itself of the lack of commitment on the part of the donors to understand the social impact of their work in Chad. However, the average life expectancy at birth has been recorded every year since the 1960s and can therefore give some indication of progress. In 1960, the average Chadian was expected to live just 38 years. This figure grew steadily over the 1960s and 1970s at an average of 0.8% per year during the 1960s and the 1970s. This rate of growth dropped to just 0.5% per year during the 1980s and further still to 0.15% during the 1990s (World Bank, 2020b). This is in spite of the relative political stability that the country experienced during this period, compared with civil war during the 1960s and 1970s, which resulted in many civilian deaths. This slowing growth is a reflection of an underfunded and under resourced health service. Another indicator that was recorded is the annual average income *per capita*, which fell from $200 in 1987 to $180 in 2000 (Republic of Chad, 2000, p. 3) This fall reflects the consistent salary cutbacks and wage freezes in the civil service over the structural adjustment period.

This discussion has shown that consistent in all three countries during the structural adjustment period, was the reduction of government spending, in line with the Washington Consensus development paradigm, aligned with the neoliberal emphasis on shrinking the state. In the cases of Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, where cuts were more heavily targeted at the social sectors, the indicators of development are more revealing still. As programmes made moves towards privatisation and decreasing public resources for health and education, access to and usage of these services decreased, and poverty rose. Consistently, the World Bank promoted user fees for cost recovery in the social sectors, without considering the ability of poor people to pay these fees. Today, consensus in the global health sector is that user fees are the most inequitable means of health system financing and a major barrier to access to care.[33] Equally, education research (including research conducted by the World Bank) suggests that user fees perpetuate low enrolment rates, since the inability to pay fees, and fear of public embarrassment due to the inability to make payments, are deciding factors for parents in keeping children out of school (World Bank, 2009a). Although the 1990s witnessed a renewed focus and investment in these sectors, this was insignificant in the wider context of the cuts that the earlier *SAP*s had made, reflected in the mostly unchanging social indicators.

Austerity: a nationally owned project?

The above analysis demonstrates that austerity was promoted by the BWIs and largely implemented by governments. A key question that arises from this discussion is to what extent were these policies *imposed* on the borrowing countries? This section considers some of the suggestions from the policy documents of resistance from both governments and communities, and a level of coercion from the donors to ensure that spending was indeed brought down.

The first of these has to do with debt. External debt levels are essential to the discussion, particularly given that the high levels of external debt and the risk of default in the global periphery were key triggers of structural adjustment lending in the first place. Increasing external debts are a sign of a dependent economy; in order to service the debt, more loans must be taken out, which accrue new interest and thus the cycle continues. This is a well-documented trend in the global periphery (Toussaint & Millet, 2010; George, 1991). An examination of indicators of indebtedness over the structural adjustment period reveals the increasing dependency of these three countries on the BWIs.

In Côte d'Ivoire, total external debts rose from $7,462 million in 1980 to $19,713 in 1996, soaring from 205% of the value of exports to 383% (World Bank, 1998a, p. 176). As a result, the amount of resources flowing from the Ivorian treasury to

[33] A documentary study of 140 documents published by 50 actors in the global health sector between 2005 and 2011 showed that nobody was in support of user fees (Robert & Ridde, 2013)

the BWIs as well as other bilateral creditors also increased drastically over the period. The increasing debt burden, when coupled with the direct cuts made to the social sectors through policy programmes, help to explain why spending on health and education were so dramatically reduced during the structural adjustment era. This is most acutely highlighted by social spending figures, when calculated as *per capita* spending, rather than as a proportion of government expenditure. *Per capita* spending on both education and health fell substantially over the 1980s and into the 1990s. In 1981, spending on education was $71 per capita and health was $12 per capita. By 1990, those figures had dropped to $60 and $10 per capita. The debt service *per capita* figure fluctuates wildly during the 1980s, peaking at $150 in 1986 (See Appendix 1). By 2000, spending on education had dropped further still, to $26 *per capita*, and health spending was down to $5 per capita, compared with $55 *per capita* on debt service, despite the of alleged redirection of resources to the social sectors (See Appendix 1).

In Haiti, the level of spending at the start of the structural adjustment era was much lower than in Côte d'Ivoire. *Per capita* social spending therefore increased rather than decreased over the period. However, when compared to the debt figures, it is clear where the bulk of treasury resources were flowing. Education *per capita* spending rose from just under $3 in 1982 to $5 by 1990, and health spending rose by just $1 per person, from $3 to $4 over the same period (see Appendix 2). Debt service *per capita* remained fairly constant, averaging around $3 per person over the course of the 1980s, whilst the total external debt burden almost tripled from $302.4 million in 1980 to $888.9 million by 1990 (World Bank, 1998a, p. 268). World Bank data on health and education expenditure during the 1990s is not available, making comparison in this area difficult. However, it is reasonable to assume that the ever-growing external debt, up to $1,169 million by 2000 (World Bank, 2004a, p. 252) and annual debt service (up to $4 per person in 1997 – see Appendix 2) pulled resources away from these crucial development sectors.

Data scarcity is also an issue for Chad, with regular data on government expenditure not available until the mid-1990s for education and 2000 for health.

Available data shows that public spending on education per capita dropped from $5 in 1993 to $4 in 1999 (See Appendix 3). Like in Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, the debt burden grew exponentially over the structural adjustment period. The Chadian government spent just 11 cents per person servicing its debts in 1980. By 1990 this figure had increased tenfold to $1 and then trebled by 1999 to $3 (See Appendix 3). Debt service as a proportion of exports and services jumped from 8.4% in 1980 to 13.9% in 2000 (World Bank, 1998a, p. 144; 2004a, p. 128).[34]

These figures highlight the contradictions of a development framework that lends large sums of money to cash-strapped governments, of which very little is allocated for social spending, whilst a significant proportion is returned to the donors in the form of debt service. This demonstrates the power imbalance between the governments and the multilateral donors, highlighting the circumscribed nature of the Chadian, Ivorian and Haiti governments' self-governing capacity. With the failure to implement the conditions of austerity presenting the very real possibility of the termination of assistance, the bargaining position of these governments is drastically reduced. With interest and principal due on their ever-increasing debts, government officials were left with little choice but to implement the donors' austerity agenda, in order to maintain the flow of funds necessary to prevent an economic collapse. This amounts to economic coercion and the blatant undermining of sovereignty, creating a deeply unequal relationship between lender and borrower. Furthermore, in the case of Haiti, the President-in-exile was required to agree to the *EERP* in order for the US to intervene to end the military junta and reinstate the President (Farmer, 2003). This is further evidence of the coercive power of the BWIs.

Another factor pointing towards the power and influence of the donors over national governments is the revolving doors phenomenon. This has been observed elsewhere in the global periphery, where staff turnover between the BWIs and government departments in borrowing countries creates cross-

[34] This reflected the increasing total debt, which quadrupled from $284.2 million in 1980 to $1,115 million in 2000, up from 39.3% of GNP to 91.3% (World Bank, 1998a, p. 144; 2004a, p. 128).

institutional networks, allowing specific ideas and practices to be implemented in borrowing countries (Bretton Woods Project, 2012). In 1990, Daniel Kablan Duncan, a former special appointee at the IMF, was appointed Minister of Economy and Finance in Côte d'Ivoire. He became Prime Minister in 1993, and publicly announced the continuation of austerity measures that his predecessor, Alassane Ouattara, also an economist at the IMF for a number of years, had overseen under IMF and World Bank supervision (Bavier, 2017). In Haiti, World Bank technocrat Marc Bazin was appointed as Finance Minister in 1982, at the behest of an international committee of foreign aid donors and following the suspension of Canada's biggest aid project on the ground in Haiti (Dewind & Kinley III, 1988). Bazin was ousted after 5 months in office and replaced with Leslie Delatour, who had been educated at the neoliberal University of Chicago. These appointments are significant, reflecting the shrinking space for alternative policy paradigms within a government increasingly infiltrated by neoliberal ideas; they exemplify the co-opting of elites that Cox highlights as key elements of a hegemonic order.

The bonds of debt and dependence that tie these countries to the donors, coupled with their infiltration into government via the strategic placement of their former employees, points to a deeply unequal power relationship. Austerity has had dramatic economic and social consequences, but governments have been compelled to continue to implement cuts, under the aegis of the World Bank and the IMF. This is evidence of the material power of the BWIs; the next section turns to understanding the ideational aspects of power.

Legitimising austerity: there is no alternative

Having compared the practical content of the programmes, this chapter now turns to the discursive element of analysis. By examining the language of the donors, the next section of this chapter seeks to lay bare the ideological basis for austerity measures. Given the donors' commitment to an austerity policy, in line with the neoliberal development paradigm, this analysis will shed light on the nature of neoliberal discourse, adding to a growing literature that seeks to understand how austerity policies have reproduced themselves across the world, despite little evidence of success (Boriello, 2017; Fonseca & Ferreira, 2015). The failure of austerity measures to improve living conditions throws out two important questions: 1) why did the donors continue with these measures, albeit less radically, into the 1990s when the signs of their failure had become apparent? ; and 2) how were they able to justify the introduction and continuation of these measures, in light of their poor track record? It has been established that there exists an asymmetry of power between the donors and the governments, given the heavy debt burdens and their positioning of Washington trained economists in government positions, but how is this power manifested in the discourse; in what ways can discourse prioritise or silence policies and agendas? The CDA seeks to expose the discursive processes that contributed to asserting the hegemonic position of austerity within the financial policy espoused by the donors.

The analysis reveals two key arguments that the donors used to legitimise austerity, finding significant parallels in the three case studies in their arguments, claims and the discursive devices. The first argument is one of allocation of blame; the donors advance an anti-state discourse, placing blame for economic malaise on the overspending of inefficient present and past governments.

The second is the framing of austerity as a pragmatic, logical and most importantly, inevitable response to all economic and financial problems. The crux of this argument is that there is no alternative to austerity. The analysis revealed a number of sub-arguments, or validity claims about the reasons for financial crisis and the way for policymakers to proceed. Together, these two arguments legitimise austerity policies, via four recurring, essential claims:

Claim 1. The fiscal crisis is a result of irresponsible spending
Claim 2. The social sectors are a burden on the economy
Claim 3. Austerity is rational
Claim 4. Austerity is necessary

The first argument identified above is represented by claims 1 & 2, whilst the second argument is represented by claims 3 & 4. For each claim, a table sets out the discursive devices that I identify with an example from each case study. The emphasised words are examples of the identified devices: the *topos* are italicised, the metaphors are in bold, and where the analysis draws attention to significant grammatical or semantic observations, the examples are underlined. Where the emphasis is from the original document, it is indicated in brackets. Whilst these tables include just one example per case study for each device, expanded tables with further examples are found in Appendix 4.

<u>Argument 1: The blame discourse</u>

The first claim is that the **fiscal crisis is a result of irresponsible spending.** When viewed this way, unsustainable debt levels and large budget deficits are the result of years of poor financial and economic policies. This claim therefore contributes to the first overarching argument, which is the blame and demonisation of the public sector. The strategies deployed by the donors to reinforce this claim are outlined in table 3.4 below, and discussed in more detail in the text.

Table 3.4: Claim 1

Device	Purpose	Example
Topos of stability	Frames macroeconomic stability as stability more broadly	'The immediate crisis and its subsequent worsening was met by the adoption of a stringent financial recovery and *stabilisation* program designed to reduce *imbalances* in public sector finances and external accounts (World Bank, 1983c, p. 4) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Much will be required of the new and *fragile* government' (World Bank, 1994c, p. 2) (Haiti) 'The Government […] has begun taking a number of measures designed to *stabilize* public finances' (IMF, 1987a, p. 34) (Chad)
Economy is a human body metaphor	Frames a large public sector in terms of disease	'It was evident that the Ivorian economy was **suffering** from a series of fundamental **weaknesses**' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 4) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Public sector investment […] will not attain the levels reached in the early 1980s, when it was **bloated by a large scale'** (IMF, 1987c, p. 13) (Haiti)
Economy is a machine metaphor	Frames public deficit as a mechanical fault	'The rapid rise in public spending clearly revealed **deficiencies** in the management of public sector resources' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 4) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'It is only since FY80 that Haiti's tradition of fiscal discipline has **broken down**' (World Bank, 1985, p. iii) (Haiti)
Topos of danger/ threat	Reinforces gravity of situation and	'Since end-1986, the economic and financial situation has again deteriorated *drastically*, as a consequence of which the country now faces an *extremely serious crisis'* (IMF, 1989d, p. 7) (Côte d'Ivoire)

	urgency of reforms	'The […] government now faces a *bewildering array of economic and financial problems:* the country's infrastructure is dilapidated by years of neglect, the treasury empty and finances *in shambles*, economic activities at a virtual stand-still' (World Bank, 1994c, p. 2) (Haiti)
Topos of burden	Frames public sector as a burden on struggling state	'The main cause of the expansion was an *inflated* and ill-conceived public investment programme' (World Bank, 1981a, p. 3) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'The third *impediment* to economic growth is the public sector' (World Bank, 1985, p. iii) (Haiti)

In both Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, this argument rests on the depiction of economies in crisis. In discussing the financial situation, the donors construct an image of an unstable economy, referring to 'imbalances', worsening financial 'equilibria' and describing the economy as 'fragile'. They refer to previous austerity measures as 'stabilisation' programmes or 'stabilising' measures, often in the context of the overarching objective and need for 'macroeconomic stability'. In these excerpts, the donors draw on the *topos of stability*, which presents 'stability' as the condition upon which austerity can be justified; the economy is presented as being in a precarious or unstable position and steps must therefore be taken to rectify this. Within this discourse, the meaning of stability is narrowed to refer to a selected number of financial indicators: public sector deficit, inflation (or price stability)[35] and public savings. As discussed earlier in this chapter, an alternative Keynesian view of macroeconomic stability would encompass a broader range of indicators, focussing on real economic activity. In addition to low inflation and sustainable and fiscal balance, a well-functioning economy would require sustainable debt levels, moderate long-term interest rates and competitive exchange rates, all contributing towards the ultimate goal of full employment. In these documents, the donors instead focus on the narrow neoliberal macroeconomic stability.

In deploying the *topos of stability* the donors are able to draw a link between macroeconomic stability, as they understand it, and stability more broadly - an inherently appealing concept. This is particularly misleading, as it excludes notions of stability elsewhere in the economy and indeed in society. Stability within the public sector to deliver quality and accessible vital services, for

[35] The donors use these two terms interchangeably.

example, was shattered by austerity measures. The stability of wages, jobs and pensions within the civil service was also disturbed. The *topos of stability* is convincing in reaffirming the notion of a crisis-facing economy, and is a more appealing way to frame austerity ('stabilisation programmes', or 'stabilising measures'). Indeed, the words 'austere' and 'austerity' are notably absent from many of the programmes over the structural adjustment era. This discursive redefinition of stability is key in the positive depiction of austerity measures.

The portrayal of the economy as facing crisis is aided by two conceptual metaphors. The first is the 'economy is a human body' metaphor, or the health metaphor. Within this metaphor, the economy (the target domain) is conceptualised as a living organism (the source domain) that can become ill, can be diagnosed, and can be prescribed with medical treatment. Its presence is noticeable through specific vocabulary that refers to the human body and its organs. The table demonstrates two examples where the donors use vocabulary related to ill health (weakness, suffering and bloated) to describe the public sector. The 'economy is a machine' plays a similar role in the crisis narrative. Like the human body, the source domain of the machine implies the existence of an objective 'normal functioning' that can be restored by political actors through policy in the event that something within the machine 'breaks down'. The mechanical analogy presents the economy an autonomous system and policy reform as a technical activity of maintenance, or 'adjustment'. The depiction of the financial crisis as a technical issue requiring repairs is reinforced by use of the terms 'deficiencies', 'distortions' and 'dysfunctions' to describe the public sector deficit. This metaphor provides a depoliticising function of depicting the economy as an autonomous system, and reforms and donor intervention as technical, apolitical measures. This is misleading in light of the inherently political nature of the donors' assessment, as it sets up the discursive legitimisation of austerity policies, serving the interests of a deeply political neoliberal agenda.

These crisis representations of the economy normalise the idea that the uncertain financial environment constitutes a continued risk which endangers the adjustment process. The discourse frames 'macroeconomic stability' as essential to the stability of the whole economy. The implication is that without austerity policies, the whole system (reinforced through the conceptual metaphor) could come crashing down. This deepens feelings of uncertainty and insecurity, thus incorporating the *topos of danger/threat,* closely linked to the *topos of stability* and evident in descriptions of the state as facing 'an extremely serious crisis' and 'a bewildering array of economic and financial problems'. This reinforces the gravity of the situation and legitimises radical policy responses as a means of averting the threat.

Within this discourse of crisis, the donors are also clear in their attribution of responsibility – to irresponsible governments and their overspending. A key explicit assertion of this argument is found in the World Bank's 1985 *Policy Proposals for Growth* for Haiti:

> 'Inadequate control of public expenditures has been at the root of Haiti's current fiscal problems' (World Bank, 1985, p. vii)

In the cases of Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, the donors predicate government spending policies negatively, using adjectives such as 'inappropriate', 'inefficient' 'overambitious' and 'ill-conceived', depicting the public sector as incompetent and irresponsible. In so doing, they operationalize the *topos of burden* to establish that the public sector is a drain on economic resources. This blame strategy conveniently ignores the role played by US monetary in the financial crisis that spread throughout the global periphery during the 1970 and 1980s, fuelling the need for emergency IMF loans, discussed in chapter one (Blyth, 2013).

By the 1990s, the donors acknowledged that the abandonment of crucial investments had contributed to Haiti's economic difficulties:

> 'The country's infrastructure is dilapidated by years of neglect' (World Bank, 1994c, p. 2)

The grammatical choice plays a discursive role here; the donors use a passive sentence structure, which enables them to avoid transparency about specifically which actor is responsible for this neglect. For example, if phrased more honestly this passage might have read: '*SAP*s demanded austerity measures that caused the government to neglect its infrastructure development', acknowledging the consequences of imposing budgetary ceilings and saddling a government with debts for projects that did not add to the government's capacity to facilitate development. Instead, the responsibility for the neglect is attributed to no one and the implicit assumption is that it is the fault of the government.

In contrast, in the case of Chad the donors are much less critical of previous and present government policies. The World Bank wrote that Chad 'does not have the baggage of poor policies [...] which hamper many other African countries' (World Bank, 1994e, p. 12). Here, they deploy the *topos of burden* in a positive way, to praise the small Chadian public sector. The donors do not blame the fiscal crisis in Chad on overspending, since governments of Chad had not invested 'excessively' or indeed at all in a welfare state during the early independence years. As the figures have shown, the Chadian government had not invested in developing its social sectors during its first two decades of independence before structural adjustment. Government social spending figures were low in comparison to Côte d'Ivoire, since much of the period was spent in civil war with many civilians caught in the crossfire. Despite this, the donors praise the Chadian government whilst they lambast the Ivorian government, writing:

> 'Chad is somewhat different from the cases usually discussed in the board, needing in many respects, more of a reconstruction, than an adjustment, program. Indeed, Chad has neither an overdeveloped public investment program nor a huge wage bill' (IMF, 1987d, p. 31).

This is significant as it displays clearly that the donors prioritised the austerity agenda above the development agenda. The donors' discursive treatment of a country with a relatively well-established welfare state and improving development indicators (Côte d'Ivoire before structural adjustment), compared with one that neglected these responsibilities entirely (Chad), is indicative of the low priority that social safety nets occupy in their policy agenda.

Although the discourse is less aggressively anti-state in Chad than in the other two case studies, the public sector is still framed as weak and inefficient: 'one of Chad's characteristics is the weakness of its institutions, especially the government administration' (World Bank, 1994e, p. 18). Overall, the examples discussed in this section work towards establishing the claim that the country's financial crises are a result of poor government policy. The presentation of these value-laden claims as value-neutral is also assisted by the use of passive sentence structures, for example:

'It was evident that the Ivorian economy was suffering from a series of fundamental weaknesses and economic policy deficiencies' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 4)

Here, the donors avoid stating which actor has deemed it evident that the Ivorian economy was in need of policy reform, thus portraying their analysis as objective fact rather than a subjective judgement. This tactic of depoliticisation is crucial to the austerity discourse as it denies the donors any accountability for the detrimental consequences of the measures that they demanded of these governments. Rather than understanding structural adjustment as a political project and an ideological response to the neoliberal problem of a large public sector and welfare state, the discourse instead presents the programmes as apolitical, technical solutions to a financial crisis that was entirely self-inflicted by government.

Closely linked to the first claim is the second claim that **the social sectors are a burden on the economy.** This claim is made in policy documents across all three case studies, using similar discursive devices, which are set out in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5: Claim 2

Device	Purpose	Example

Topos of burden	Frames social services as a burden on struggling state	'The recurrent *costs* of the education sector […] have become particularly *burdensome […]* the quality of the education is *high*, but so is the *cost* […] the continued expansion of the system along prevailing lines adds to the *burden* on public finances*'* (World Bank, 1981a, p. 3) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Significant cost savings can be identified […] if *costs continue to be prohibitively high'* (World Bank, 1986a, p. 111) (Haiti) 'The government will make a push during 1996-98 towards greater use of *burden-sharing* with local communities in the funding of public services' (World Bank, 1996e)(Chad)
Topos of self-reliance	Frames funding of social services as a shared responsibility	'The government will promote *community participation* in the delivery of social services in order to minimise the use of public resources and *encourage a sense of collective responsibility* for maintaining minimum welfare standards' (IMF, 1987a, p. 44) (Chad)

The recurrent costs of the social sectors (education, health, housing) are predicated as 'prohibitively high' 'burdensome', demanding' and are nominated as a 'heavy drain' on resources. This reframes public education and health, not as basic human rights or as essential tools of development, but as the problems of a struggling state.

Equally, the introduction of user fees for different services, such as health, education and housing, is nominated as 'cost-recovery':

> 'The project aims at […] implementing improved cost-recovery mechanisms for medical services' (World Bank, 1989b, p. 13)

This seemingly innocuous, technical term for the imposition of fees onto the poor for the most basic social services represents further discursive manipulation. It reverses the focus towards the service provider that must recover costs, and away from the user who must pay for the service, thus concealing the human consequences of the measure. These examples evoke the *topos of burden* by depicting public spending on health, education, housing and the civil service, as obstacles to the ultimate goal of 'macroeconomic stability', and therefore as something that should be removed or minimised.

This argument is best represented by the following excerpt from Haiti:

> 'Education is essential to long-term development. In the short-term, however, it represents a cost. This *cost* is necessary but should be minimised and used as effectively as possible' (World Bank, 1985, p. 45).

Here, the donors acknowledge the importance of education, but foreground the short-term priority of reducing public spending. This discourse divorces the social objectives from economic objectives, treating the former as a 'necessary cost', rather than a means of facilitating development, and the latter as the priority. This ignores the important relationship between poverty and economic development. Investment in the social sectors is reframed as consumption of public resources, rather than an investment that will return productivity. In framing the social sectors this way, the discourse espouses the view that ill health and illiteracy are consequences of poverty, rather than causes. Health and education are considered an outcome of development at best, rather than a means of achieving it. This is contradicted by the reality of the impact of the reforms; as health and education became less accessible in Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti during the 1980s and 1990s, poverty was increasing. The evidence from elsewhere in the global periphery as well as in the case studies, suggests that a broader approach to health is needed to strengthen health systems through investment - rather than their systematic weakening through cuts, user fees and privatisation (Bond & Dor, 2003).

In framing the social sectors as a burden on the economy, the donors use a configuration of linguistic forms to remove or attribute agency and responsibility. A key instance is the nominalisation of the social actors and processes that were targeted by the *SAP*s. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire:

> 'The Fund's EFF stressed the need for reforms in the education sector, particularly cutting the budgetary costs of the system' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 28)

By nominalising schools, teachers and children, all affected by the underinvestment and cutbacks in education, as 'costs', the donors obscure their agency and mask the real human consequences of austerity, that are evident from the social indicators. This example from the Haitian context demonstrates further evasive language:

> 'Temporarily putting less emphasis on social objectives than in recent years does not imply that these objectives should be revised downward' (World Bank, 1985, p. 45).

Here, the World Bank obscure the agency of those affected by the systematic weakening of the development sectors, thus evading responsibility and reinforcing their own authority as policymakers. On the other hand, the finances of these economies are placed in subject position, accorded agency by the grammatical structure of the language. For example:

> 'The expansion of the education system [...] was accompanied by growing inefficiency, increasing irrelevance to the needs of the economy and escalating recurrent costs' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 4)

Here, the economy, an abstract concept, is portrayed as a social actor, with needs that are prioritised over the needs of the education system and those who depend on it.

The claim that social services represent a burden on public finances is identified in the donors' discourse on Chad too, despite the tiny proportion of public resources that flowed to these sectors during the 1980s and the 1990s. In Chad, the analysis also reveals the *topos of self-reliance* in the legitimisation of the austerity strategy, through emphasis on 'collective responsibility' and 'burden-sharing' in announcing the shift in provision from the state to communities themselves. This is consistent with a conservative critique of the welfare state whereby the support provided by the welfare state prevents individuals from growth because it does not allow them to develop self-reliance. The reference to collective responsibility bears moral connotations used for manipulative purposes, to portray the removal of the state from the delivery of these services as not only necessary (due to costing difficulties) but also as morally right. In the excerpt outlined in the table, the communities themselves are grammatically in subject position, according them responsibility and agency for their own health and welfare, further removing accountability from the public sector. The *topos of burden* is again operationalised in these examples too, to portray the welfare state as a weight to be shifted, in the Chadian context, onto communities themselves. In diverting attention away from the need to strengthen publically funded health and education systems, the discourse mirrors the policies of the *SAP*s, as they diverted resources from these systems.

I identify this first overarching argument as the blame discourse. The crisis narrative plays a central role as it constructs the foundations for the blame allocation and the 'there is no alternative' argument that is discussed in the following section. The blame allocation attributes the blame to the irresponsibility of previous governments, in the cases of Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire. The Chadian government is somewhat exempted from this critique given how underdeveloped its public sector and welfare state were at the time of the *SAP*s. In all three cases, the analysis reveals the framing of social services as a particular burden on the economy. This represents a discursive redefinition of health and education, away from being universal basic rights and key areas to address in the fight against poverty, but instead as secondary priorities. This blame discourse represents the financial problems as fundamentally domestic in nature and cause, and thus glosses entirely over the role of external agents in the underdevelopment these countries (the donors themselves, via previous programmes, or the role played by the legacy of colonial and neo-colonial ties).

By locating the causes and nature of the countries' problems in the domestic arena, the donors pave the way for the legitimisation of austerity policies not only as the solution to the problem, but as the *only* solution to the problem. This argument is explored in the next section.

Argument 2: There is no alternative to austerity policies

The language of irresponsibility and inefficiency that is attributed to the state in the donors' first main argument contrasts starkly with the rational pragmatism associated with spending. This is the second overarching argument identified in the discourse, which presents austerity as a common sense, technical, and inevitable response to the economic problems facing the three countries. The first claim within this argument is that **austerity is rational.** Like the first two claims, a number of discursive strategies support this claim, which are outlined in table 3.6 below, and expanded on in the Appendices.

Table 3.6: Claim 3

Device	Purpose	Example
Topos of responsibility	Frames austerity measures as responsible	'The program calls for a strengthening of *budgetary discipline'* (World Bank, 1981a, p. 10) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Reflecting this view, the Government, in addition to pursuing *prudent* fiscal and monetary policies, has adopted a *more cautious* wage policy' (IMF, 1989c, p. 6) (Haiti) 'Fiscal *discipline* and conservative monetary policies are the most effective policy instruments to protect the country's international competitiveness' (World Bank, 1996e, p. 6) (Chad)
Topos of pragmatism	Frames austerity measures as rational	'However, this decrease [in public investment] resulted from <u>ad hoc</u> [emphasis in original] investment reviews undertaken by government. It did not represent a return to the more systematic and *rational* policies of the past' (World Bank, 1981a, p. 6) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'The Government is considering [...] a policy to *rationalize* the public wage bill and public employment' (World Bank, 1987a, p. 10) (Haiti) [The government] has also adopted a *pragmatic* approach to the problems facing the economy' (IMF, 1987a, p. 35) (Chad)
Economy is a machine metaphor	Frames austerity measures as a technical fix	'These provisions will soon be **fine-tuned** [...] in order not to undermine the macroeconomic and structural objectives of the medium-term programme' (IMF, 1994, p. 6) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'The Government that assumed office in early 1986 moved quickly to start **correcting** domestic and external imbalances in the economy' (IMF, 1989c, p. 6) (Haiti) 'The aims of this programme are to [...] **correct** macroeconomic imbalances' (World Bank, 1994e) (Chad)
Economy is a human body metaphor	Frames cuts to civil service as aiding public sector	'The government would like to overcome these impediments [...] by: (i) **rehabilitating** the civil service and clarifying its functions; and (ii) **rehabilitating** the public finances' (World Bank, 1996e, p. 7) (Chad)

This third claim builds on the earlier claims to represent austerity policies as a rational response to the financial crisis. The IMF articulate the rationale for this in the Haitian context:

> 'The most effective way to help create conditions conducive to sustainable economic growth in a setting of relative price stability is to deal effectively with the underlying sources of the financial imbalances' (IMF, 1989c, p. 11.)

In other words, in order to stimulate GDP growth whilst simultaneously keeping inflation down, it is necessary to reduce spending. This logic is underpinned by neoliberal assumptions about the importance of a low level of inflation and the relationship between low inflation and growth, a notion that is contested amongst economists. The policy documents do not engage with any such debate and rarely outline the logic behind the austerity policy as explicitly as in the above statement. For the most part, the assumptions are implicit within the discourse, aided by discursive strategies and devices in order to legitimise austerity. For example, the positive predication of austerity policies and government cooperation with the donors as 'prudent', 'rational' and 'cautious' all serve to depict austerity as rational. Cuts are nominated as 'rationalisation' and 'streamlining'. Within these excerpts, the *topos of pragmatism* and the *topos of responsibility* are deployed, leading the reader to the conclusion that implementing cuts to spending is both rational and responsible.

Within this discourse, the conceptual metaphor of the economy as a machine again plays a significant role in establishing cuts to spending as apolitical. Through the discursive depiction of the economy as a broken machine, austerity can then be framed as a technical solution to an objective financial problem, rather than an ideologically motivated political measure. The use of vocabulary such as 'mechanisms' and 'instruments' to describe policies assists in this metaphor. The nomination of reforms as 'corrective' features in all three cases fits within this image of a faulty machine in need of a technical fix by an objective expert, depoliticising the reforms. Again, the metaphor also plays down the impacts of austerity; in announcing the removal of measures that had been introduced by the

Ivorian government to support the poor during economic recession, the IMF nominated the measures as 'fine-tuning'. Likening the process of stripping vulnerable groups of price caps on essential foods, school books and tariffs on water and electricity, to a minor adjustment of a machine, downplays entirely both the human consequences and the political consequences, as discontent was brewing among the Ivorian citizenry.

The health metaphor is operationalised too, which again helps to present overspending and budget deficits as the sickness, and austerity as its treatment. In nominating the downsizing of the civil service (in order to be able to pay its wages on time) as its 'rehabilitation', the World Bank frame redundancies in a positive way, when in reality these cuts pushed civil service workers into unemployment and poverty. The reality of those who were negatively impacted by the austerity measures is consistently glossed over or ignored within this discourse.

Closely linked to this last claim, is the fourth and final claim: **that austerity is necessary**. In addition to the emphasis on the rational nature of the reforms, the donors also highlight their necessity, predicating austere fiscal policy with adjectives such as 'realistic' and 'necessary'. Scaling back health investments are described as a means of 'ensuring realism' whilst it is emphasised the government 'has to' operate within the confines of austerity.

Table 3.7: Claim 4

Device	Purpose	Example
Topos of reality	Establishes the necessity of austerity measures	'The Government *has to operate within the confines of a tight budget*' (World Bank, 1994, p. 8) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'These experiences underscore the need for a limited scope and size for the proposed project, and for ensuring financial *discipline* and *realism'* (World Bank, 1989b, p. 12) (Haiti) 'The government will implement a *realistic* investment program that is adapted to the country's needs and takes into account financial and other constraints' (IMF, 1987a, p. 40) (Chad)
Economy is a human body metaphor	Frames the country's ability to attract	'The first concern of the authorities is to avoid a **deterioration** of Ivory Coast's credit-standing abroad and an **asphyxia** of the economy at home. The second is to formulate a credible financial program providing for the elimination of all external arrears, a

	credit/balance the budget in terms of life or death	large reduction of internal arrears, and some **recovery** of the economic activity in 1984' (IMF, 1984, p. 11) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'The high priority of helping Chad move from an unsustainable public finance situation to a **healthier** fiscal performance' (World Bank, 1996b, p. 14) (Chad)

The *topos of reality* assists in reinforcing the argument that austerity is inevitable and the only course of action. Implied in this *topos* is the understanding that because reality is as it is, then a specific action/decision must be taken/made. In the above example, the constructed reality is that the government cannot afford to increase wages, without reducing the size of the workforce, and therefore the much-needed wage increase cannot be granted.

This argument builds on the earlier claim, which depicts a fragile economic situation requiring immediate and drastic action. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire, the donors make an explicit connection between the financial crisis and the vulnerability of the economy:

> 'The economy remains vulnerable and continues to face certain constraints that in the absence of more forceful corrective measures, could hamper the country's economic and social development' (IMF, 1998b, p. 1)

Here, the IMF suggests that without 'forceful' fiscal austerity, social as well as economic development could be jeopardised, drawing on the *topos of danger/threat.* This is a clear fallacy, since it was under consistent consecutive austerity programmes that Côte d'Ivoire's social development was reversed. This is indicative of the manipulative nature of the discourse, as it transforms harsh austerity measures that increased material poverty, into the very opposite: measures that without which, social development would be jeopardised.

This discursive relationship between austerity and (positive) social development is found in the Chadian context too, where the donors write that the main objectives of the *ERC* programme are:

> ‘To restore order to public finances and to lay the basis for growth and the alleviation of poverty’ (World Bank, 1994e, p. i)

The assumption is that through spending less, the economy will grow and this will lead to a reduction in poverty. The use of parataxis, indicated by the conjunctive ‘and’ associates the fiscal objective with the growth and poverty alleviation objectives. It creates a logical connection between these objectives, since the coherence of the phrase depends on a near-equivalent relationship. This allows the reader to associate austerity with GDP growth and poverty reduction, without the need for explanation on the nature of the relationship. Again, this is highly misleading in light of the reality that austerity policies had an adverse impact on human development objectives. In constructing a false equivalence between austerity, growth and poverty reduction, the donors are able to inoculate their programmes and themselves from critique.

Furthermore, building on previous claims of a financial crisis and the need for ‘stability’ in the narrowest sense of its macroeconomic meaning, the discourse reinforces the need for spending cuts by emphasising need to reassure international markets, investors and observers about the ability to guarantee the solvency of the country. The market again emerges as the external constraint rendering austerity an unavoidable response to outside pressures. The *topos of reality* plays a key role in supporting this claim, as the donors argued that spending policy and investment budgets must be ‘realistic’, ensuring the financial ‘credibility’ and ‘viability’ of the country. They refer to credibility specifically in the context of ‘financial markets’ and ‘private investors’, highlighting the importance of retaining the trust of international markets in order to borrow more funds:

> ‘The Government will strengthen its efforts to improve public finances and implement a rigorous fiscal policy that will ensure the internal and external financial viability of Côte d’Ivoire’ (IMF, 1998b, p. 7)

Importantly, they place cuts to spending in the context of this 'financial viability and in so doing make an important connection between government spending and the external debt, presenting austerity as a reasonable response to the ever-expanding debt burden. In reality, this reasoning ought to be flipped on its head. As we have seen, these programmes saddled governments with debt, which led to increasing debt burdens and increasing debt service. Yet here, it is the ability to borrow further from the donors that is depicted as the priority, as though these loans present no cost to the government, or harmful conditionalities.

Denying the political nature of the reforms

The four claims that this discussion has explored work together to legitimise the austerity policies that were central to the structural adjustment agenda. The analysis has revealed two principal arguments: 1) that financial difficulties are the result of overspending; and 2) that austerity is a rational and essential response to this reality. Through this framing of austerity not as a political choice but as a necessity caused by exogenous forces, the donors deny the political nature of the austerity agenda and the neoliberal ideology that undergirds these programmes. The depoliticised language allows the donors to present their own analysis of these countries' economic predicaments and their proposed solutions as technical, objective truths. This is exemplified in the following excerpt from the IMF on Haiti:

> 'We see no alternative but to implement drastic cuts in expenditures'
> (IMF, 1982, p. 6).

Within this discourse, the space for alternatives to market-conforming agendas is severely circumscribed. This explicit denial of the political nature of the SAPs is therefore deeply misleading. Cuts to the public sector are part of the neoliberal project of shrinking the state; indeed, the donors draw on neoliberal assumptions emphasising the incompetency of the state in order to legitimise these policies. The policies themselves have worked to limit the sovereignty of the governments of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti in two ways: 1) by imposing the agenda on unwilling governments and people; and 2) by undermining the state's capacity to function properly by providing basic social services and jobs. The depoliticisation is therefore a fallacy, since austerity is a deeply political project, which undermines financial sovereignty.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that austerity was a key priority of the donors during the structural adjustment era. In all three case studies, the donors demanded that public spending be reduced or restrained. In Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, they targeted the social sectors in particular as areas where spending could be reined in, and in all three countries the civil service was subjected to consistent cutbacks over the period. These austerity measures undermined basic development goals, reflected in deteriorating indicators in primary school enrolment, access to primary health care, and overall poverty indicators. During the 1990s the strategy shifted somewhat as resources were reallocated back to health and education, but austerity remained the paramount strategy and improvements in social indicators were minimal.

In undermining the capacity of the state to provide basic public services, austerity demanded by the donors must be understood as both a political and economic project. Critical to this process of circumscribing financial sovereignty of the borrowing states, was the growing external debt. The debt became both a tool of coercion and a legitimising discursive strategy. Debt burdens rose over the structural adjustment period and the debt service, deepening the influence of financial capital and sustaining the dependency of the countries on the international creditors, thus undermining their self-governing capacity. The necessity of borrowing, both presently and in the future, to meet debt service demands, obliged the borrowing countries to meet the demands of the donors by adopting harsh austerity policies. The more they country borrow, the stronger the international creditors become, and the easier it is for austerity conditions to be written into loan agreements and policy packages. Furthermore, the ever-increasing debt service burden places further pressure on governments to make cutbacks in social spending in order to free up funds to meet debt repayments, whether such policies are initiated by the donors or not, as we can see through spending figures for health, education and debt service.

The CDA revealed considerable homogeneity in the austerity discourse across the case studies. Although the donors were less critical of the Chadian state than in the other two case studies, the depiction of the welfare state and civil service employment as a burden on a struggling state is common across all three countries. In all three cases, the donors constructed an anti-welfare state discourse, in accordance with the neoliberal aversion to distributional policies. The demonisation of the (welfare) state allows the donors to make the case for austerity and to ensure that it is the only policy to pursue, as well as discursively undermining the government's authority and sovereignty over financial decisions. It also supports the second overarching argument identified in the analysis, that there is no alternative to austerity policies. In presenting austerity as pragmatic and technical in nature (as opposed to ideologically driven alternatives), the donors make a compelling case that austerity is an urgent and necessary project for development. Even into the 1990s, as the deleterious impacts of the austerity policies became clear, the discourse maintains this stance, excluding from the narrative any responsibility for worsening social indicators to the austerity agenda imposed by the donors. All of the examined passages and texts largely reproduce and confirm the structure of the discourse, using strategies of argumentation that lead to the same conclusion: there is no alternative to austerity policies. This conclusion makes it an inherently depoliticising discourse; it denies the political nature of spending cuts by claiming that they are the inevitable result of an objective financial situation. Yet, the austerity discourse is clearly political for two reasons. Firstly, its claims can be identified with the discursive practices of a specific political project: neoliberalism. Secondly, the discourse has important performative effects, as it reinforces the imagined reality that it perceives to be objective. In other words, in legitimising austerity, it reinforces the neoliberal logic of the market's supremacy over the state. Through the process of structural adjustment, the donors have thus undermined sovereignty on both a practical and discursive level.

Chapter four: the neoliberal trade strategy

Introduction

The previous chapter identified a common austerity policy framework across the case studies, legitimised by a discourse that presented austere fiscal policy as both essential and inevitable, in line with the Washington Consensus. This chapter focuses on the development strategy of the donors during this same period in the policy arena of trade, thus widening the scope of the analysis of the *SAP*s. As discussed earlier, commodity dependency was a key legacy of colonialism. These countries, with their highly specialised economies (see table 2.1) in three different industries, offer a privileged site for understanding the role that neoliberalism has played in furthering the reliance on foreign trade.

The high levels of specialisation in these economies necessitate an understanding of the nature and impact of reforms in these sectors. They are likely to have far-reaching consequences, not only for those who work within these industries but also for the rest of the population, as government revenues are partially determined by the success of these exports. This is particularly pertinent in the context of the discussion in the previous chapter, as the *SAP*s heavily emphasised the 'necessity' of spending within one's means. In the context of peripheral countries, we might expect a pro-poor trade strategy to seek to secure regular and decent incomes for the poor, and increase tax revenues for the government so that they can set aside more funds for crucial social projects.

Consistent with the structure of the previous chapter, this chapter outlines the neoclassical rationale behind the two central tenets of the neoliberal development strategy for trade: export-led growth and a minimalist state. It compares the *SAP*s along these policy axes in the three main export industries, considering the ways in which government trade policy was influenced or determined by the donors during this period. It considers the material impacts of the trade policies, both on individuals working within these sectors and on communities more broadly. The discourse analysis enables a comparison of the ways that the donors legitimise the policy content, contributing to a growing scholarship which seeks to understand the way that neoliberalism reinforces itself discursively in regimes across the world. Lastly, a discussion brings together the findings from chapters three and four to discuss and critique the structural adjustment paradigm and draw some conclusions about the aid framework of this period and its implications for postcolonial development and sovereignty.

The discussion shows a common policy framework, in line with the neoliberal Washington Consensus emphasis on exporting to international markets and minimising the role of the state. Despite the different export focuses of these three countries, themes in both policy and consequences are remarkably similar. When considered alongside the findings and discussions of the previous chapter, the discussion offers a fairly damning assessment of the *SAP*s in these three countries and of the role of the BWIs in undermining sovereignty and increasing poverty. The discourse analysis reveals two key arguments upon which the donors rely to legitimise the trade strategy: the construction of a state-market binary, which vilifies the state and elevates the market; and the privileging of GDP growth above other development indicators. I argue that the donors portray these deeply political assumptions as common sense, which allows them to inoculate themselves from critique and legitimises the policies and programmes.

Export-led growth

The export-led growth paradigm is a core tenet of the neoliberal development thesis. This approach moves away from a development model rooted in domestic market growth towards one that seeks to grow productive capacity by focussing on exporting and 'free trade'. It rests on a fusion of different neoclassical arguments. One of these is the theory of comparative advantage, which assumes that there are advantages of trade between economies with different 'natural' advantages, based on capital and labour ratios (Ricardo, 1969). Another important argument concerns the benefits of 'openness' for economic growth, claiming that trade encourages the spread of technology and knowledge that contributes to faster growth (Love & Lattimore, 2009). Both these theories have played an important role in advancing the neoliberal agenda, since they chime with the neoliberal notion of the self-regulating market and the primacy of GDP economic growth, outlined in chapter one. As the introduction to chapters three and four outlined, the Washington Consensus argues for the 'abolition of barriers impeding the entry of foreign direct investment' and the reduction of tariffs or 'trade restrictions' (Williamson, 1990, pp. 26-28). According to the logic of the Washington Consensus, the state should use its powers to extend trade beyond its national boundaries, by removing and reducing tariffs, taxes and regulations that are perceived to discourage foreign investment. Trade policy should promote 'a rate of export growth that will allow the economy to grow at the maximum rate permitted by its supply-side potential' (Williamson, 1990, p. 14).

From the earliest days of its involvement in Côte d'Ivoire, the World Bank had advocated an export-led development strategy, praising President Houphouët-Boigny's administration in 1977 for recognising that the export sector 'would be the key to economic growth' (World Bank, 1977a, p. 2). The prices of both cocoa and coffee plummeted towards the end of the 1970s and by 1981 they had lost over 50% from their peak (World Bank, 1981a, p. 3). With declining terms of trade, the state-owned marketing board, the *Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien Des Prix des Productions Agricoles* (*CAISTAB*) saw large reductions in its surpluses from coffee and cocoa (World Bank, 1981a). Consequently, the first 1981 *SAP* demanded some initial structural reform to the cocoa sector. The World Bank argued that Côte d'Ivoire should seek to diversify and grow other crops, but maintained that the cocoa and coffee sectors would be central to increasing growth (World Bank, 1981a).

The main measure that the donors insisted on to boost exports from the cocoa sector during the structural adjustment period was the reduction of export taxes. The unitary export tax (*Droit Unique de Sortie* [DUS]) is paid by exporters when the cocoa cargo is loaded onto the vessel. In 1986, taxes on export crops represented just under one third of the government's total revenues, the majority of this from cocoa and coffee (World Bank, 1986c, p. 2). These taxes therefore played an important role in establishing the country's welfare state during the first two decades of independence. The 1989 *ASAL* demanded the elimination of the *DUS* on coffee and cocoa (World Bank, 1989a, p. 19). It was reintroduced in 1994 due to the financial downturn that the country was experiencing, but subsequent programmes demanded its further reduction (World Bank, 1995, Annex D, p. 10). The export tax decreased gradually over the period, costing the government important tax revenues. Cocoa production increased; after 1995 cocoa output was between 1 and 1.2 million tonnes, against levels generally between 700,000 and 800,000 tonnes during the 1980s (IMF, 2000a, p. 35). The economy remained highly specialised and therefore dependent on cocoa, making it more vulnerable to falling prices. An important consequence of the reduction of the *DUS* export tax was the transformation of the cocoa sector more broadly. Large TNCs became incentivised to participate in more extensive operations within Côte d'Ivoire, investing in the processing of cocoa and increasingly handling exports too, increasing the number of transnational players in the cocoa industry. Between 1980 and the early 2000s, for example, the number of cocoa trading houses in London decreased threefold, from 30 to less than 10 players (Gayi & Tsowou, 2016). The implications of this are discussed later.

Whereas Côte d'Ivoire was already an export-led economy when the World Bank arrived on the scene, pre-structural adjustment Haiti was not a big exporter. Agriculture dominated the economy and this was largely geared towards local consumption. The development strategy for Haiti, dubbed the 'American Plan' by its critics, designed by the World Bank, the IDB and USAID, set out to change this (Dewind & Kinley III, 1988). This strategy was articulated in a number of policy documents produced during the 1980s. The World Bank argued that Haiti's strategy 'must be export-oriented' (World Bank, 1985, p. vi) and that domestic consumption would have to be 'markedly restrained in order to shift the required share of output increases into exports' (World Bank, 1985, p. vi). They identified the assembly industry as the key sector for growth, and channelled resources to this area.[36] Importantly, as the previous chapter argued, these investments were being prioritised at the same time as cuts were being made to the civil service, health and education, calling into question the development priorities of the donors. The austerity discourse emphasised the absolute necessity of making cuts, yet millions of dollars of investment were channelled into the assembly sector.

Key changes implemented during the latter half of the 1980s included: the revision of the labour code to allow foreigners to work in the country; the revision of the Investment Code to guarantee a number of tax and tariff exemptions to encourage foreign investment; the removal of protections for domestic firms; and a textile agreement with the US which increased their import quota for Haitian textiles (World Bank, 1987a, pp. 17-19). These measures all worked to boost the assembly export industry and encouraged foreign investment into the country; between 1980 and 1990, exports from assembly grew from 31.2% of the total value of exports, to nearly 80%, demonstrating the increasing dependence on this sector for government revenues (World Bank, 1983b, p. 84; IMF, 1991, p. 1).

There were very few backward linkages to the Haitian economy from this strategy; US tariff legislation discouraged the use of local inputs in the production process. In 1990, 84% of the assembly sector's exports were composed of imported inputs (Weisbrot, 1997). Tax-free profits made from the assembly sector were repatriated by US investors, rather than reinvested in Haiti. This sector virtually ceased to exist during the trade embargo that followed the military junta from 1991 to 1994, but after the government was reinstated in 1995, firms quickly resumed operations and by 2000, exports from the assembly industry were worth a massive 85.6% of the country's total export value (IMF, 2005b, p. 78).

[36] In 1986, USAID funded an *Export and Investment Promotion Project* worth $7.7 million in order to promote the manufacturing and agro-industries (USAID, 1986).

Like Côte d'Ivoire, before the arrival of the World Bank and before the completion of pipeline project, the Chadian economy was already export-oriented, dependent largely on agriculture, with no oil industry or infrastructure. Both the African economies were monoculture economies under French imperial rule, exporting primarily one raw primary commodity to Europe. Before structural adjustment, about 90% of the Chadian population lived and worked in rural areas, with cotton as their main cash income. Political instability, poor climate and the landlocked nature of economy presented regular challenges; total exports represented just 21 billion CFAF in 1977 (World Bank, 1977c, p. 20), compared to 747.36 billion CFAF in Côte d'Ivoire (World Bank, 1981a, p. 35). *SAP*s during the late 1980s focussed on boosting agricultural exports, with the donors seemingly unsold on the benefits of a petroleum export project. In 1989, the IMF commented that '[oil] reserves in the south may not be sufficient to justify an export-oriented development' (IMF, 1989a, p. 15). However, plans were underway for a project for oil production and the construction of a pipeline, a mini-refinery and a power plant, with financial support from the World Bank.

In 1988, a consortium of oil firms, known as Esso, and the government of Chad signed the *Convention de recherches, d'exploitaiton et de transport des hydrocarbures entre la République du Tchad et Le Consortium Esso – Shell – Chevron.*[37] The *Convention* was drawn up by ExxonMobil (the leading oil company of the consortium) and provided for a thirty-year agreement between the Chadian government and the consortium. During the 1990s, Chad began preparing for the oil project, closely supervised by the World Bank. In addition to the export-oriented strategy, the World Bank also announced its support for the exploitation of oil reserves for domestic consumption. They estimated 700 million barrels of oil in the Doba basin in southern Chad and an additional 12-14 million barrels in Sédigui in northern Chad. They predicted that the exploitation of the Sédigui reserves for domestic consumption would improve the reliability of supply and reduce the cost of electricity and diesel fuel (World Bank, 1994e, p. 12.). The IMF commented that the Sédigui could allow Chad to be self-sufficient in petroleum

[37] Referred to hereafter as the *Convention*

products for 15 years (IMF, 1996b, p. 5). It was therefore a two-pronged strategy, with the aim of developing Chad through increased government revenues from the Doba project and local market supply from the Sédigui project. When these statements were published in the late 1990s, the project had not yet commenced. In the present chapter, analysis of the oil project is therefore based on the few references made in the policy documents, and the aforementioned *Convention*, since it established the legal framework upon which the project was erected.

Whilst the export-side of the project was the clear focus at this time, with the Sédigui element projected to receive 'a small catalytic contribution' relative to the Doba project, it is nevertheless significant that the donors were supportive of plans to develop domestic infrastructure and markets (World Bank, 1996b, p. 15). The dual approach that was described in the documents, of developing the country for both export and domestic supply, represents a slight divergence from the strategies pursued in the other two case studies – which focussed entirely on export markets, neglecting domestic markets altogether. The domestic, demand-led side of the oil project presented the opportunity to increase public infrastructure investment, lower power tariffs, as well as raising and linking wages to productivity growth, all outcomes with the potential to improve social as well as economic indicators. However, by the time the construction got underway, the domestic project was abandoned and only the Doba project was pursued to completion.

Rolling back the state

According to the Washington Consensus, an export-led growth strategy is most successful when pursued within an unregulated economy in which the state plays a minimalist role. This is because the market is not only the most efficient way to allocate resources but also the optimum way to achieve human freedom. Indeed, Friedman argued that 'every act of government intervention limits the area of individual freedom directly and threatens the preservation of freedom indirectly' (Friedman M. , 2002, p. 32). According to this logic, 'the scope of government must be limited' to three basic functions: preserving law and order, enforcing private contracts and fostering competitive markets (Friedman M. , 2002, p. 2). This principle is articulated in the Washington Consensus via Williamson's advocacy for privatisation of state-owned enterprises and deregulation (Williamson, 1990).

The rolling back of the state in favour of the market is theoretically supported by the neoclassical economic theories of income distribution and employment determination, introduced in chapter one, which propose that the price mechanism will always allocate value and efficiently distribute resources, including in the employment market. It follows that people get paid what they are worth in the market and this will be distributed in an efficient way (Friedman, M., 1976).

Any interference to this process by wage-setting institutions or trade unions, for example, would upset the natural equilibrium and ought to be removed. Practical policies to avoid this outcome, recommended by proponents of neoliberalism, are the undermining of trade unions, allowing the real value of the minimum wage to rise or fall in line with the market, and creating a labour market climate of employment insecurity by eroding labour protections (Montreal Economic Institute, 2006). In so doing, workers and employers can negotiate mutually advantageous labour contracts so that pay, working conditions and workforce size can fluctuate with ease.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the donors sought to integrate this logic into the cocoa sector. Before adjustment, *CAISTAB* set a cost and price structure (*barème*) at the start of each agricultural season, determining the minimum producer price after deducting all costs in the supply chain from the reference export price (World Bank, 1977b). They were able to do this by selling a significant proportion of the crop forward ahead of the time of harvest. When a cocoa sale was made, the exporter would compensate *CAISTAB* for any difference between the actual sale price and the reference price. If the actual sale price was lower than *CAISTAB*'s reference price, *CAISTAB* would compensate exporters by granting them a payment. *CAISTAB* was also responsible for domestic and external marketing (World Bank, 1977b). This system ensured consistency in price for the cocoa farmers. When the world cocoa price was high, farmers would receive a smaller share, but when prices were low their incomes were protected. This system represents a clear example of the state involvement in the economy that is reproved within neoliberal reasoning. The reform of the sector through structural adjustment therefore offers a useful case study for how these institutions respond to economic systems and practises that they consider as obtrusive state involvement.

Following the plummeting of cocoa prices, the donors persuaded the Ivorian government to reduce the producer price by half in 1989 (World Bank, 1989a, p. 29). Not content with this, in the mid-1990s the donors then demanded a reduction of the role of *CAISTAB* in domestic and external marketing, in favour of a new, private, auction system for export rights in the cocoa sector (IMF, 1994, p. 17). In 1998, they demanded that the *barème* pricing structure be dismantled altogether, through the elimination of the export reference price system and the guaranteed producer price (IMF, 1998b, p. 11). In January 1999, *CAISTAB* was fully liquidated.

Table 4.1: Côte d'Ivoire: timeline of cocoa reforms

Year	Programme	Key Reforms
1989	ASAL (World Bank, 1989a)	Suspension of export tax Producer price is reduced from CFAF 400/kg to CFAF 250/kg (p. 29)
1995	ASAC (World Bank, 1995)	Reduction of export tax Transfer of responsibilities of *CAISTAB* in internal and external marketing to the private sector (p. i)
1998	PFP (IMF, 1998b)	Suspension of export tax
1999		*CAISTAB* fully liquidated (p. 11)

The consequences of this move for the farmers were devastating; under the *barème* system, the farmers received an average of 71% of the export price of cocoa during the 1980s. (see Appendix 5). After the initial halving of the producer price in 1989, the farmers' share of the price dropped to 62%. By 1999 when the guaranteed producer price was removed altogether, the farmers' share sank lower still, dropping to 42% in 1999 (see Appendix 5).

The new system transferred the price risk from *CAISTAB* to the producers. Farmer incomes diminished by half, and with so many of the population engaged in agricultural activity, rural poverty increased rapidly (World Bank, 2002c, p. 5). A further phenomenon that was uncovered following the dissolution of *CAISTAB* was the use of child labour on cocoa plantations. In 2000, reports began to surface documenting extensive child and even slave labour on Ivorian cocoa farms (Blunt, 2000).[38] Although it is difficult to draw a direct causal link between the use of child labour and the reform of the cocoa sector, human rights and labour rights groups have forcefully argued that the two are connected. According to the International Labour Rights Fund (ILRF), decreasing incomes, coupled with the rising costs of education (thanks to the austerity measures explored in chapter three), farmers have been pushed to put their own children to work, or to use those supplied by traffickers (ILRF, 2004)

With the dismantling of *CAISTAB*, local exporters struggled to compete with the larger firms, increasing the power of TNCs further still. By 2001, 90% of exports from Côte d'Ivoire were being handled by companies that were subsidiaries of, or had close links with international trading companies (ICCO, 2001). That year, the Ivorian government tried to increase custom duties as a means of boosting its income from the cocoa trade, and the large exporters responded by stopping exports until the new custom duties were reduced (Essoh, 2014). This demonstrates the enormous power that a small handful of international companies were able to wield over the small Ivorian producers, following the restructuring of the cocoa industry. The reform of the Ivorian cocoa sector is exemplary of the way that the BWIs opposed and dismantled systems that did not adhere to the neoliberal logic of markets. The fact that the cocoa sector was a well-established industry that provided the government with significant revenues, and yet by 1999 it had been completely transformed, shows the ideological

[38] The US State Department estimated that there were approximately 15,000 children working on cocoa, coffee and cotton farms in Côte d'Ivoire. Many of these children work 12-hour days conducting hazardous types of work such as using machetes to open cocoa pods and carrying heavy loads (US Department of State, 2001).

commitment of the donors to the neoliberal project, as well as their relative power over borrowing governments.

As they had transferred the responsibilities of the state-owned marketing board over to the private sector in Côte d'Ivoire, in Haiti the development agencies sought to minimise the role of the state in the assembly industry, incentivising private industrial firms through investment and deregulatory measures. Unlike the Ivorian cocoa sector, the Haitian assembly industry was not well established or developed before the 1980s, and the government was not present within the sector in the same way as in the Ivorian cocoa industry. In 1985 there existed just one public industrial park (*SONAPI*) as well as some private ones. The public industrial park received some incentives, which gave it a competitive edge over the private ones, which drew criticism from the World Bank. The donors' investment in the sector was therefore channelled to private industrial firms and towards improving the infrastructure that served those zones (World Bank, 1985).

As they had favoured a policy of deregulated prices in Côte d'Ivoire, the donors pushed for deregulated labour in the assembly sector in Haiti. The World Bank consistently argued in favour of keeping the country's low minimum wage – the lowest in the Caribbean by a long way - and praised the country's Labour Code for its strict stance towards strikes and the absence of unions in the export assembly industries. The donors understood Haiti's low wages as key to attracting foreign investment into the country and particularly into the assembly industry. In April 1995, a new minimum wage rate of 36 Haitian Gourdes (HTG) per day was introduced, which institutionalised a real wage decrease for Haitian workers from the 1991 minimum wage (see figure 4.1)

Figure 4.1: Minimum Wages in Haiti (1981- 1999)



Source: See Appendix 6

In this context, it is not surprising that the growth of the assembly industry did little to improve the livelihood of the average Haitian. Whilst it created jobs, these jobs were of poor quality; wages remained low but the cost of living in Haiti rose during the structural adjustment period. This is unsurprising given that austerity programmes led to user fees in various public services, as explored in chapter three. Furthermore, the lack of labour laws meant that assembly plant managers were able to easily exploit their workers. The minimum wage, in reality, was often a maximum wage rate as workers would be required to meet a minimum daily production quota, set deliberately high, in order to reach the minimum wage (Dewind & Kinley III, 1988). Following the 1995 minimum wage increase, factory managers simply increased their production quota in order to avoid the increased wage bill; in 1996, the National Labour Committee found that more than half of assembly firms operating in Haiti were violating the minimum wage (Verhoogen, 1996). *Per capita* income declined by 25% between 1980 and 1990 (USAID, 1991, p. 3), and a further 15% between 1990 and 1999 (World Bank, 2002b, p. 25).

The two examples of Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti show how the donors set about applying a neoliberal model in two different contexts: a well-developed industry in which the state was a prominent player, setting prices and regulations; and a less developed sector in which the state had played a minimal role, providing some subsidies and establishing a basic regulatory framework. The case of Chad presents a completely different context, in which the export industry of focus (petroleum) had not yet been established. Chad represented an opportunity for the donors to establish an industry that fit the neoliberal model perfectly; the government was barely involved in the process of transforming Chad into an oil economy. Instead, the key player who led this process was the consortium, who (with the crucial support of the World Bank), set about laying the building blocks for the new oil industry during the 1980s. This section explores this process by examining the legal framework of the project, since this was created during the structural adjustment timescale, and which raises a number of interesting questions regarding the role of the state in the project.[39]

In Chad, three agreements established the legal foundation of the pipeline project. The 1988 *Convention* granted an exploration permit, valid until 2004 and a 30-year concession to develop the oilfields in southwestern Chad. It granted the consortium the rights to produce, transport, and market the oil from the Doba fields, and was signed by President Habré before he was deposed in 1990.[40] For the export portion of the project, the framework agreements became effective in 1998 when the *TOTCO Convention of Establishment* was signed into law, by President Déby. The World Bank accepted all the *Conventions* as a project partner, and played an integral role in preparing the country for the oil project.

Amnesty International produced a report on 2005 in which they scrutinise the *Conventions* and the pipeline project, warning that the provisions would endanger human rights in Chad (Amnesty International, 2005). This section relies on their

[39] The majority of the publications from the donors that undergird the pipeline project were published during the *PRSP* era, and will therefore be explored in chapter six.
[40] In 2004, the consortium signed an additional convention to renew the permit to explore and extract in Chad, valid for a period of 35 years, with an automatic extension of another 35 years if necessary.

translations and draws on their analysis. An understanding of the terms of the agreements that the World Bank accepted and that underpin the project, is necessary for a thorough comprehension of their intentions for the oil strategy in Chad. There have been no publications from either of the BWIs discussing the contents of the *Convention* or its implications for the project, nor did they respond to Amnesty's report.

Several aspects of the 1988 (and subsequently the 2004) *Convention* restrained the government from intervening with the project. Both agreements provide a minimum standard for oil exploration, which the consortium is under contractual duty to conform to. However, they also contain an enforceable ceiling on standards, stating that any regulation imposed by Chad must not contain standards that are inconsistent with international petroleum industry standards. Article 17.4 in both agreements states that 'no directive, restriction or injunction shall be given, imposed or made if it is not reasonable or in compliance with the measures of this Convention or international petroleum industry standards'. As the authors of the Amnesty report argue, this vague reference to 'petroleum industry standards' could be interpreted in a number of ways, not necessarily denoting best practice (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 24). The fear of arbitration, which was threatened in the *Convention,* could act as a disincentive for the Chadian regulatory authorities from applying regulations to the consortium.

Both *Conventions* also contained stabilisation clauses that granted the Consortium the right to overrule Chadian law passed by the current government or any government of the future:

> 'During the term of this Convention, the State guarantees that no governmental act will be applied to the Consortium, without prior agreement between the Parties, which has the duly established effect of increasing, directly, or by virtue of its application to Shareholders, the obligations and charges imposed by this Convention or which has the effect of adversely affecting the rights and economic benefits of the Consortium or its Shareholders as provided for in this Convention, including the effect duly established and passed onto [*sic*] the Consortium of the

> adverse effect on the charges of Affiliates or of the Contractors as a result of such act.' (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 22)

The language of this article is broad, and could apply to any laws that the Consortium deems to affect its 'rights and economic benefits', including labour laws, such as allowing unionisation or the raising of taxes on Doba oil production. An equilibrium clause is incorporated too, which stipulates that if the government does enact any such policy, without permission of the consortium, they must financially compensate the consortium:

> 'In the case where such changes are made by the government of the Republic of Chad without prior agreement of the Consortium, the Parties shall agree on the modifications necessary in order to ensure the Consortium has the same financial conditions, obligations and responsibilities, as well as the same rights and economic advantages, as existed before the said changes took place.' (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 47)

This makes sovereign Chadian law subordinate to a commercial agreement, and is therefore a clear breach of national sovereignty. This *Convention* is written in law for the duration of the project, which could be as long as 70 years. The Amnesty report lambasted the Consortium for these stabilisation clauses, arguing that the provisions in the laws protect the extractive industry at the expense of local communities or industry workers, and could be used in an attempt to 'frustrate any regulation in fulfilment of human rights obligations' (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 12).

A comparative study of stabilisation clauses in a number of resource extraction projects in developing countries found those outlined in the *Conventions* underpinning the pipeline project in Chad to be the 'most stringent, complex and extensive' and hugely favourable to the investors (Frank, 2014, p. 109). Sotonye Frank argues that the introduction of stabilisation clauses in such projects during the 1990s was largely the result of the strong bargaining power of the Word Bank over developing countries and that the World Bank often played a role in designing the legal framework (Frank, 2014). It is not clear whether this was the case in Chad, due to a lack of transparency around the *Convention.* In any case, as a financier and a key stakeholder of the project, the World Bank conducted a comprehensive appraisal of the *Conventions* and accepted the legal framework that they established. The privileging of TNC interests and a limited government role were therefore key to the World Bank's development strategy for Chad and is further evidence of the insincerity of any BWI claims to genuine domestic development.

Again, the impacts of this PRS will be considered in chapter six, following a discussion of the poverty reduction strategy trade policy and the birth and evolution of the Chadian oil industry during the 2000s. For the time being, suffice it to say that the World Bank oversaw and approved the legislative framework that set up Chad in an unequal relationship with the consortium, allowing the companies sovereignty over the Chadian parliament in affairs that might interfere with their business**.**

Export-led growth was central to the trade strategy in all three countries. Importantly, it was complemented by reforms geared towards a reduction in the role of the state in the economy. Just as the regulatory and stabilising powers of *CAISTAB* were gradually unpicked by the donors, the labour market in Haiti was left unregulated, reconfiguring the role of the state and private foreign investors in the economy, privileging the latter at the expense of the former. This strategy led to development with shallow roots – exemplified by the industrial zones in Haiti, which create a race to the bottom to gain competitive advantage, resulting in wage suppression, disregard for labour standards and poor workplace conditions. In Côte d'Ivoire too, the country did not own the industrialisation process; instead of establishing infrastructure and technology to process cocoa beans and add value at home, the model created a reliance on TNCs, exporting the beans at a cheap price and adding value once out of the country. This was at the expense of farmers, who saw their incomes fall rapidly as terms of trade declined for commodity-exporting goods. Chad can perhaps be seen as the more extreme of the three cases in terms of the rolling back of the state, because TNCs (the consortium) were key agents in the process, and were partly responsible for the legal framework which pushed out the government entirely. The Chadian case therefore demonstrates how neoliberal trade reforms are clearly a question of national sovereignty. By subordinating standard government practices (such as creating legislation) to commercial interests, the legal foundations of the project represent the erosion of the sovereignty of the Chadian government, all under the watch of the World Bank.

Neoliberal trade policies: a question of sovereignty?

The introduction to part one introduced the notion of conditionality within the lending of BWIs and highlighted that what made structural adjustment lending unique was that many of the conditions attached to loans had little to do with minimising the risk of debt default. Having explored a number of these conditions in this policy analysis, it is clear that the privatisation of the Ivorian cocoa sector and policies to attract foreign direct investment into Haiti's assembly sector, did little to improve these states' capacities to service their debts. Indeed, by reducing taxes paid by foreign investors and handing over economic operations to the private sector, these policies are more likely to have had the opposite effect. Yet, the act of reducing the role of the state within the economy in itself is not evidence of undermining state independence, if measures to do so are pursued by the government with democratic support. In Chad, the *Convention* circumscribed the state's present and future capacity to fulfil its responsibilities, thus representing a blatant example of undermining state sovereignty.[41] There is however, evidence from the policy documents and from secondary sources that point towards the imposed nature of the discussed trade policies in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, which this section will now discuss**.** Chapter three advanced an understanding of the *SAP*s as an infringement upon sovereignty, demonstrating considerable asymmetry in the power relationship between borrowing governments on the one hand, and the donors on the other. It showed how the donors were able to influence the governments of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti to comply with

[41] The Chadian example is complicated by the reality that the Déby government is an authoritarian regime with a track record of human rights abuses and anti-democratic practices. The complications that this poses for a discussion of sovereignty in the context of BWI lending are explored in chapter six.

austerity measures, through their large debt stocks – themselves a legacy of colonialism - by withholding or releasing credit needed to promptly and regularly service the debt. They used their financial leverage to ensure the implementation of trade policies too.

In Haiti, statements made by the donors (including USAID, a key partner in the 'American Plan') are indicative of the imposition of the donors' plan on a reluctant government. According to USAID, in 1981, Jean-Claude Duvalier had unveiled the government's own development plan, requesting $1 billion in development assistance for a project that would prioritise an increase of national production, particularly of agricultural and manufactured goods for local consumption. The international development agencies argued that the government lacked a clear strategy for national development and questioned how realistic the plan was. USAID reported that 'as a result of the donors' disappointment with last year's Joint Commission meetings, the [government] has *substantially revised* [emphasis added] the Commission process' (USAID, 1982, p. 21). The World Bank made clear that there would be no room for negotiation with the Haitian government, stating that 'the development strategy will have few degrees of freedom' (World Bank, 1985, p. vi). The government accepted the new strategy, but World Bank documents make clear that any resistance to the plan would have resulted in the freezing of international funds, upon which, as has already been established, the country was heavily reliant. The World Bank wrote:

> 'Under strong pressure from the international financial community and from governments of traditional donor agencies, the President of Haiti and the group surrounding him were made to understand that continued aid to Haiti would require major policy corrections' (World Bank, 1983a, p. 4).

It is therefore clear that a level of coercion was employed by the international institutions in order to make the government comply with their strategy. Furthermore, an increase in the minimum wage had been a key election promise of President Aristide's when first elected in 1990. Yet, in order to return to the country and job from which he was removed by a military coup, he was forced to accept a programme (the *EERP*) that maintained low wages, further evidence of the government's limited capacity to pursue policies outside of the donors' neoliberal policy matrix. In the *EERP*, the World Bank alluded to the reality that the neoliberal trade strategy would not be popular:

> 'The challenge faced by Haiti's leadership is to maintain democratic order while establishing a policy environment conducive to sustainable market based growth' (World Bank, 1996a, p. 1).

Clearly, the World Bank understood the difficult choice facing the President, between pursuing campaign promises and implementing the donors' agenda, a key condition for his return to the country.

In Côte d'Ivoire, President Houphouët-Boigny and his administration put up resistance to the strategy too. In the *Project Completion Report* for the 1989 *SAL*, experts at the World Bank wrote that 'the perception that some things were "too important to be left to the market" remained widespread at all levels of government' (World Bank, 1994d, p. 4). Houphouët-Boigny in particular, they wrote, was a 'firm believer in fixed prices for consumers and producers and a strong opponent to reliance on world markets as a means to assure Côte d'Ivoire the stable level of resources it needs to develop economically' (World Bank, 1994d, p. 4). Later, during the 1990s, the release of funds in tranches was conditioned on the government's commitment to reducing the powers and responsibilities of *CAISTAB* (World Bank, 1995). The World Bank acknowledged that many of their agriculture reforms were 'politically sensitive' and that staff would have to work 'very closely with the Government to carefully program and monitor the implementation of reforms' (World Bank, 1995, p. ii) As it had been in Haiti, the strategy was designed externally, and imposed upon the government without proper democratic process.

The legal foundation of the pipeline project and the trade reforms that were packaged within these programmes, represent three different examples of neoliberal economic models. This is significant, as it demonstrates the power and reach of the neoliberal agenda, as it was applied in three very different contexts. This section has demonstrated that this power comes from the material power of the donors, in their ability to withhold funds and even affect military assistance (in the case of Haiti). However, in line the neo-Gramscian theoretical approach, the hegemony of the neoliberal agenda is not only a result of these techniques of coercion, but crucially it is also exercised through consent. The generation of consent through discursive means is explored in the next section.

Legitimising the neoliberal trade strategy

The policy analysis has identified commonalities in trade strategy across the three case studies, in line with the Washington Consensus paradigm of export-led growth and a reduced role for the state, through deregulated and liberalised markets. Importantly, it has highlighted the lack of domestic ownership of the trade strategy. What the analysis has also revealed is the failure of this strategy to improve incomes or to address poverty; rather, the opposite has occurred. As in the previous chapter, this begs the question: how were the donors able to legitimise these policies, given their status as organisations operating in the service of development? This section therefore explores the way that the donors use discursive strategies to legitimise the neoliberal policy paradigm, thus shedding light on the nature of neoliberal ideology in the context of the *SAP*s. The methodology is consistent with the previous chapter, borrowing different theoretical approaches to discourse analysis in order to expose the discursive construction and reproduction of neoliberal common sense.

Within the relevant documents (some hundreds of pages in length), the sections that were incorporated into the CDA were: the executive summaries, sections pertaining to the industry in question and the broader sector in which that industry sits (cocoa and agriculture, in Côte d'Ivoire, for example), as well as the broader policy matrices. As already discussed, the oil industry was not yet established nor do the *SAP*s dedicate much time to discussing the oil project, beyond describing the two aspects (Doba and Sédigui) and the benefits that they might bring to the country. However, as we have seen, Chad was in the process of preparing for an oil project and laying the foundations for an oil-led economy, under the supervision of the World Bank as well as with the oil consortium. Documents from the Chadian context are therefore incorporated into the discourse analysis; the focus is on those passages relating to the upcoming oil project as well as sections considering trade and industry more broadly.

The analysis identifies two overarching arguments, upon which the donors build their justification for an export-oriented trade strategy with minimal state regulation. As in the previous chapter, there is significant commonality across the case studies in key arguments, claims and discursive strategies. The first argument identified in the policy documents relies on the positive representation of the market and the negative representation of the state, which serves to legitimise the handing over of responsibilities from the state to the private sector. The second is the conflation of economic growth with development. Together these two main arguments provide a legitimisation for the trade strategy that the donors have pursued, via four sub-arguments:

Claim 1. State intervention in the economy is a hindrance to growth
Claim 2. The market is the most efficient and valuable method of organisation
Claim 3. International markets are a better source of growth than domestic markets
Claim 4. Economic growth equates to/will inevitably lead to development

Claims 1 and 2 are associated with the first argument identified above, whilst claims 3 and 4 represent the second argument. As in chapter three, expanded discourse tables with further examples of the devices I explore are appended to this thesis (see Appendix 7).

Argument 1: state-market discourse

Chapter two introduced Bourdieu and Wacquant's 'new planetary vulgate' of neoliberal globalisation, which delineates a series of oppositions and equivalences that are constructed in a neoliberal discourse to privilege the market over the state (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2001). This framework demonstrates the binary opposition between the open, flexible, dynamic, efficient, modern market and the rigid, closed, static, weak, inefficient, out-dated state, a key assumption of neoliberalism. I refer to these oppositions in the analysis, examining the ways in which the donors represent this binary opposition as objective truth, thus legitimising the policies explored in the first half of this chapter. The first claim supporting the state-market discourse is that **state interventions in the economy are a hindrance to growth.**

Table 4.2: Claim 1

Device	**Purpose**	**Example**
Topos of burden	Frames government interventions in the economy as a burden on the otherwise self-regulating market	'Due to [CAISTAB's] *pervasive* role in the internal and external marketing, current *costs are high* compared to other countries' (World Bank, 1995, p. 12) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Protection has clearly become *excessive* in Haiti' (World Bank, 1985) (p. 73.) (Haiti) 'An *unsupportive* enabling environment, including *heavy public involvement* in the existing manufacturing sector' (World Bank, 1994e, p. 8) (Chad)
Economy is a human body	Frames government interventions as disease	**'Unsound** price and subsidy policies' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 4) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'These factors seem to be **symptoms** of a larger and deep rooted problem in Haiti' (World Bank, 1985, p. 39) (Haiti)
Economy is a machine	Frames government interventions as faulty machinery	'Structural reforms in agriculture, industry, transport and labour markets are **geared** towards the **dismantlement** of remaining regulatory barriers and market interventions that continue to hamper competition and private initiative' (World Bank, 1994b, p. 8) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Quantitative restrictions on imports would be removed and tariff policy overhauled to **correct trade regime distortions**" (World Bank, 1994a, p. 8) (Haiti) 'Chad's policy framework is relatively free of the deep **distortions** characteristic of most other developing economies' (World Bank, 1996e, p. 6) (Chad)
<u>Modal adverbs/verbs</u>	Present subjective opinion as objective fact	'CAISTAB expenditures are high and, <u>in fact,</u> an implicit tax on farm income' (World Bank, 1995, p. 12) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Protection has <u>clearly</u> become excessive in Haiti' (World Bank, 1985, p. 73) (Haiti)
Topos of freedom	Frames state intervention in economy as a threat to freedom	'The distortion of the system of incentives *imposed* further *constraints* on growth' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 62) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'State control of a broad range of enterprises and institutions [...] has *imposed* significant economic and social costs, and has *impeded* private sector development' (World Bank, 1996c, p. 11) (Haiti) 'Reduce *restrictions* on private sector activity' (World Bank, 1996b, p. 12) (p. 12.) (Chad)

Table 4.1 outlines some key examples of the discursive strategies used to support the notion of the state as a wasteful and inefficient manager of resources. In all three cases, government intervention in the economy (through price-setting mechanisms, regulations, tariffs and restrictions) is presented as normatively undesirable and specific trade policies are designated as both economically incompetent and unethical. The donors describe the trade policies of the state in the economy mostly by means of negative predications, such as 'excessive' 'unsupportive', 'high cost' and 'inefficient', thus operationalizing the *topos of burden* to support the premise that since the state is a burden on the otherwise self-regulating market, its powers to intervene in the economy should be reduced.

In depicting an economic policy context in which immediate and deep reforms are an urgent priority, the language takes on a metaphorical character. As was observed in chapter three, the use of health/disease lexicon is evidence of the 'economy is a human body' metaphor. Within this metaphor, disease is associated with low economic growth and low productivity. The 'symptoms' of this problem are described ('depressed' incomes and growth in 'decline') and framed as a result of the 'unsound' trade policies enacted by government:

> 'Faulty producer price policies [...] resulted in depressed rural incomes and a decline in agricultural growth' (World Bank, 1989a, p. 19)

The 'economy is a machine' metaphor also features in this claim and is present in the above example. Like in the examples outlined in chapter three, the discourse draws on the image of a broken economy, with 'faulty' policies and distortions in need of 'correction' through structural adjustment reforms.

Within this metaphor, the use of the lexicon 'distortion' to nominate trade policies is found across all three case studies. The implicit assumption is that without the unhelpful trade policies of government, the market would establish its own natural equilibrium; this is complemented by the nomination of the removal of certain trade policies as 'corrections'. The use of the lexicon 'correct' simplifies economic policymaking into a 'right way', which leads to the proper functioning of the economy, and a wrong way, which causes the economic machine to breakdown. Use of these metaphors aids in supporting the claim that the problems of the economy are a result of incompetent governments and can be resolved through a technical fix or a medical antidote of structural adjustment. In this case, that fix is the removal of the state from the private domain, in accordance with the neoliberal notion that the economy is an autonomous, self-regulating body or machine. Both metaphors simplify the reality of a complex, changing web of transactions between buyers and sellers, where power relations (held by price-setting TNCs) in the global market determine the ever-evolving system.

In addition to constructing state actors and policies by negative predications, the discourse nominates trade policies that result in state intervention in the market as 'distortions' and 'rigidities', and as 'impediments', and 'obstacles' to private sector development. Within the argumentation, the *topos of burden* again plays an important role in portraying the state as incompetent. This negative representation of the state forms the basis upon which neoliberal arguments in favour of deregulated markets are grounded. The use of nouns such as 'obstacles' and 'impediments' to describe particular trade policies is also a strategy of nominalisation, turning a complex process into nominal form, which serves to obscure the ongoing complex and contested nature of the structural adjustment reforms. For example:

> 'The basis does not yet exist to reform the entire price and subsidy system, but enough is known about prevailing distortions in specific prices and subsidies to form the basis for a series of steps' (World Bank, 1981a, p. 13)

Here, the World Bank simplifies the *barème* price-setting system as a 'distortion' thus rendering it a process without agency. This serves a depoliticising function, since those affected by *CAISTAB* and therefore by the reforms (cocoa growers, public sector workers, traders, etc.) are not represented in the discourse. The reality that this system guaranteed a consistent price and income for cocoa farmers is not acknowledged. The potential social consequences of removing this 'distortion' are equally ignored, and the agency of the farmers who rely on cocoa for their livelihood is denied. This enables the justification of the privatisation of the state-owned marketing board, on the basis that it is a simple, technical 'fix', rather than a politically and ideologically motivated move. The passive clause in this excerpt also serves a depoliticising purpose. In announcing that 'enough is known', policymakers at the World Bank are vague about who is calling for new policies, or who 'knows' enough about the 'distortions'; this removes responsibility from the donors, presenting their conclusions about the country's developmental and trade needs as objective truth. Similarly, in the Haitian context, the World Bank wrote:

> 'The trends of the past cannot be allowed to continue. Drastic policy changes are called for' (World Bank, 1985, p. 33)

Again, the agency of those who 'cannot allow' and 'call for' the policy changes, is blurred by the passive construction. Modal adverbs such as 'in fact' and 'clearly' and modal verbs like 'must' and 'should' further aid in the presentation of value-laden claims about the problems of government policy as factual and value-neutral.

Furthermore, the discourse suggests that government trade policies were 'imposed' on the private sector, evoking the *topos of freedom,* suggesting that the state's activities in the private sector are not only economically incompetent, but an infringement upon 'freedom' and therefore unethical. This represents the discursive reworking of freedom, redefined narrowly as the capacity of the private sector to act free from interference by the state. Alternative freedoms, such as the freedom of factory workers in Haiti to earn a living wage or the freedom of cocoa farmers to rely on their crop for their livelihood, are excluded from this narrow definition of freedom and from the discussion in the policy documents. As these chapters have argued, these programmes impeded the freedom of borrowing governments to decide on their own financial and economic policies. This freedom to act is closely linked to the notion of state sovereignty, but is entirely excluded from the donors' notion of freedom within the discourse on trade. The narrow emphasis on the freedom of the market therefore amounts to the re-articulation and narrowing of the meaning of freedom.

Importantly, this discourse presents challenges to economic development as the fault of the state. This blame allocation is not dissimilar to the austerity discourse, which also framed current problems as a consequence of government actions. At times, the donors are explicit in blaming the state:

> 'The role of the state through Haiti's history is essential for understanding the country's situation today' (World Bank, 1996c, p. 1)

This excerpt is exemplary of the way that the World Bank present internal factors as responsible for economic underdevelopment, ignoring the role played by external agents in cementing Haiti in the outer periphery of the global economic system. This same document fails to mention the impact of the colonial legacy or of the odious debts left by dictators who were supported by the international community. Such factors are deliberately masked by the discourse.

Equally, in the Chadian case, the World Bank wrote:

> Chad's turbulent history has also left positive elements: [...]; the economy is relatively unregulated' (World Bank, 1994e, p. 12)

Although describing two different situations, the message is the same: policies that work to create an unregulated economy in which the role of the state is minimal, are desirable.

Within this discourse, which vilifies the role of the state, the donors position themselves as the voice of reason and expertise, against the irrationality of politics and politicians. They argue that in those cases where the government did not agree with the policies that the donors had demanded, that this was due to their own political and ideological motivations, rather than out of any concern for the population. These three examples, from Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti and Chad respectively, are evidence of this argument:

'First, several sound but forceful actions […] are likely to be met with some opposition from vested interests' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 42)

'There remains opposition from […] those who are ideologically opposed *t*o structural adjustment' (World Bank, 1996c, p. 5)

'Temptations to adopt alternative policy agendas, or ideological biases against the liberalisation agenda of the Government, have not disappeared'
(World Bank, 1999a, p. 18)

Within these excerpts, the World Bank position alternatives to the structural adjustment agenda as irrational and ideologically driven. This is in stark contrast to the rational, apolitical, technical description of the donors' own roles and of the policies that they espouse.

This depiction of the state as inefficient and overbearing is in binary opposition to the market; the second claim is that **the market is the most efficient and valuable method of organisation.** Where the first claim designates the interventionist practices of the government as normatively bad – both economically incompetent and immoral, this claim designates the practices of the market as normatively good – economically competent and moral. In this discourse, the values associated with the market chime with those identified in Bourdieu and Wacquant's neoliberal planetary vulgate.

Table 4.3: Claim 2

Device	Purpose	Example
Economy is a machine	Reinforces notion of the market running according to economic laws	'Efforts should be intensified to create a climate that is more supportive of the private sector, so that it can fully play its role as **the main engine of** economic growth' (IMF, 1998b, p. 1) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Its essence is the use of market **mechanisms** to signal profitable opportunities to industries' (World Bank, 1985, p. 77)

		'The private sector could play a dynamic role, beyond the informal and rural production circuit, as a driving **force** in the formal economy' (World Bank, 1994e, p. 12) (Chad)
Economy is a human body	Frames policies associated with bolstering the private sector positively	'To exploit these advantages, it will take continued stability, a forceful reform of the public sector and **sound** economic policies. Successful reforms could send a strong signal to attract remittances and private capital back to Haiti in support of a **recovery,** particularly in the export assembly industry and tourism' (World Bank, 1996c, p. i) (Haiti)
Topos of freedom	Frames the deregulation of markets as enabling freedom	'The government's objective should be to *free* producer prices altogether, fully *liberalise* the marketing system' (World Bank, 1989a, p. 29) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'In the labour market, the industrial export sector should continue to benefit from *the free determination* of wages' (IMF, 1987b, p. 12) (Haiti) 'It has transmitted to the Parliament a revised labour code, which provides, inter alia, for the elimination of the setting of the minimum wage by the government and its *free* determination among social partners. The government will continue to promote the introduction *of greater flexibility* into the functioning of the labour market' (IMF, 1996b, p. 12) (Chad)

In passages pertaining to the overall development strategy and to the development of the export industry in question, the donors qualify the market with positive predications, praising markets as 'dynamic' and business managers as 'modern'. In the Haitian context, the health metaphor features again in this discourse, assisting in the positive depiction of the private sector; deregulatory reforms are nominated as 'sound' and increased exports as the 'revitalisation' and 'recovery' of the economy. The mechanical metaphor is central in establishing a positive depiction of the market, with the private sector nominated as the 'driving force' of the economy and the 'engine of growth', reinforcing the notion of the private sector as moving and dynamic. In conceptualising the economy as a machine, the assumption is that markets and the private sector are run according to economic laws (e.g.: laws of supply and demand, laws of competition, etc.). The emphasis on the mechanical order of the market aids in the construction of markets as efficient, law-governed mechanisms that gravitate towards equilibrium. This gives way to the discursive separation of the market from the state, suggesting an opposition between the natural course of the market and the unnaturalness of state interference. Within this metaphor, interventions on the part of the state create faults and distortions in an otherwise well-functioning, self-regulating system. This aids in the portrayal of neoliberal economics as a science, further depoliticising the donors' fundamentally political project.

The *topos of freedom* plays a key role in the elevation of the market too. In arguing for the removal of tariffs, the deregulation of labour (elimination or suppression of the minimum wage) and the dismantling of price setting, the donors associate the market with the freedom of choice and the freedom from the nefarious state intervention that the donors warn against. The term 'free market' itself merits rhetorical analysis. Chang points out that in the purest sense there is no such thing as a free or 'unfree' market; all markets have some government restrictions on what can be traded, who can trade, and how this trade is conducted (Chang, 2010). Chang suggests that societies often think of markets as being 'free' when they do not challenge the regulations underpinning them. For example, it is difficult to disagree with legislation against the exploitation of children. Choosing to discuss markets in terms of 'freedom' serves a political purpose; the superfluous adding of the adjective 'free' promotes the idea of markets representing freedom and liberty. Being a proponent of the liberation of markets is less provocative than being an opponent of government. The term 'free market' associates the market with free individuals, rational choice and freedom of contract or voluntary exchange. This is binary opposition to the doctrine of negative liberty associated with government intervention that is established in the first claim, setting up a dichotomous either-or opposition between state and market. Within this discourse, freedom is reduced to market behaviour.

The contradiction between the discourse of freedom and the reality of the consequences of the *SAP*s for alternative freedoms must again be emphasised at this point. Radical restructuring of the Ivorian cocoa industry led to the dramatic decline of the freedom of workers in the sector. Without claiming correlation, the use of child labour must be understood in the context of the neoliberalisation of the Ivorian economy, which highlights the very real contradiction at the heart of the neoliberal ideology: its emphasis on economic freedom as a precondition for other political and social freedoms. These case studies clearly demonstrate that in prioritising the freedom of transnational capital, the economic, political and social freedoms of those with the least amount of bargaining power are sacrificed.

In predicating low wages as 'flexible' the *topos of freedom* is again operationalised. The meaning of flexibility is narrowed to mean the absence of regulation within the labour market allowing the price mechanisms to operate unimpeded and establishing a very low minimum wage. The *topos of freedom* produces the sense of an inevitable value of a 'flexible' price and wage system. Having established that 'rigidities' were undesirable – flexibility is emphasised as desirable and in binary opposition to the 'rigid' model of setting wages and prices. As economists have observed, describing prices as flexible is a misnomer (Jackson W. A., 2015). Flexibility is usually used to describe objects that can bend and change shape, which prices are not able to do. Whilst they can be variable, they cannot be flexible. However, as William Jackson observes, the term 'variable prices' does not evoke the same positive connotations as 'flexible prices' and even suggests a certain instability or volatility that is not to be desired by economists (Jackson W. A., 2015).

Grammatically, throughout these excerpts, we see that the economy (the private sector, market prices, market conditions, etc.) is often in subject position. For example, from the Ivorian SAL I:

> 'The reforms are designed to [..] assure the rational prices and world market conditions would guide decisions to invest and produce' (World Bank, 1981a, Loan Summary)

Here, world market conditions and prices, which are abstract concepts, are portrayed as agents of process, since they become the subject for the verb 'guide' which denotes agency. Prices are also accorded an adjective usually reserved for humans – 'rational' – further reinforcing the representation of 'prices' as a social actor. Market prices, as social actors within this discourse, can therefore be 'restricted' or 'freed' by government policy. The reality, that prices do not have agency, rather - whether they are established by a state-owned marketing board or by international trading firms - this is a process that is decided by partisan social actors and not a perfect, autonomous machine, is denied by the discourse.

In contrast, those social actors who are an integral part of the processes discussed by the donors (the cocoa growers and the cocoa trading firms) are excluded from the discourse. In the introductory passages, the donors introduce the abolition of the price-setting mechanisms of *CAISTAB* as the 'liberalisation' of the cocoa sector. The social actors who are 'liberalised' by this process are not named.

In addition to the binary opposition that is constructed between the state and the market in the donors' discourse, there is also an important distinction between domestic and international markets, where the latter is predicated positively and the former more negatively. This supports the third claim, that **international markets are a better source of growth than domestic markets**, thus legitimising the export-led growth strategy and the deregulation of the economy to make way for foreign investment. This argument is identified primarily within Haiti's policy programmes, since it is in Haiti where the donors were demanding a shift from a domestic to an export-oriented economy, whereas in Chad and Côte d'Ivoire, the economies were already export-led. This is an important observation, since it confirms the necessity of the argumentation in order to legitimise the reforms.

Table 4.4: Claim 3

Device	**Purpose**	**Example**
Topos of modernisation	Frames a low-tariff economy as modern	'The growth of the Haitian economy – requires the adoption [..] of a *future-oriented* approach […] Broad consensus must be obtained on a dynamic development strategy**,** capable of accelerating output growth and employment, rather than *sheltering* local markets from outside *competition'* (World Bank, 1985, p. vi) (Haiti) 'External sector policies will be *outward oriented,* and favour *openness* and international competition' (IMF, 1995a, p. 13) (Chad)
Topos of corruption	Frames the domestic market as corrupt	'Its objective is a stable neutral incentive system to channel resources toward competitive rather than *rent-seeking* activities' (World Bank, 1987a, p. 4) (Haiti)

Topos of freedom	Frames protectionist measures as a threat to freedom	'The system of industrial incentives introduces *a very marked discrimination* between production incentives for the domestic market and for exports' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 86) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'The key recommendation for the industrial sector is to change the incentive system to remove the *anti-export bias*' (World Bank, 1985, p. 77) (Haiti)
Topos of burden	Frames the Sédigui project as a burden on finances	'The government recognises that it would take *much effort* on its part to make these two projects a reality […] in the case of the Sedigi [*sic*] in particular, the government is ready to undertake additional studies on *how to reduce the cost* and optimise the project structure in order to improve its economic and financial justification' (World Bank, 1996e, Annex V, pp. 10-11)

Across the case studies, a deregulated, low tariff, export economy is described as 'an open economy'. Like the adjectives 'flexible' and 'free', the lexical choice here is not an objective description of the type of economy that the donors are advocating. Rather, it is a more appealing way of describing what might otherwise be labelled an 'unprotected' or 'global' economy, which do not appeal to the values of transparency or accountability in the same way that 'open' does.

International markets are associated with the positive notions of 'growth' 'competition', 'success' and 'dynamism', whereas domestic markets are predicated negatively as 'narrow', 'sheltered', 'stagnant' and 'protected' from outside competition, in line with Bourdieu and Wacquant's framework.

The following excerpt from the Haitian context exemplifies this binary logic:

> 'Industrial firms tended to rely on rents from the narrow, protected domestic market rather than investing to correct inefficiencies and compete in the international marketplace.' (World Bank, 1987a, pp. 16-17)

The transition to a more export-oriented economy is framed as fulfilling the country's potential, predicated as a 'future-oriented' approach that is 'outward looking', in contrast to the 'stagnant' domestic approach. The *topos of modernisation* appeals to modernisation theory's Eurocentric assumptions about postcolonial nations and the necessity of developing their economies along a

Western, linear path of development. This is further evidence of the assertion made in chapter one about the relationship between neoliberal development theories and earlier modernisation theory. This discourse ignores the reality that highly protectionist trade strategies played in important part in the economic success of 'modern', 'developed' core economies (Chang, 2010).

In announcing measures of a deregulatory nature, the donors create a binary opposition between protectionist trade policies (tariffs, subsidies and taxes) and competition. This example from the Haitian context, offered in chapter two, highlights this:

> 'The government is committed to the goal of reducing protection and encouraging competition.' (World Bank, 1985, p. 77)

The paratactic relationship between 'reducing protection', and 'encouraging competition' is indicated by the conjunction 'and', indicating equivalence. Competition is contrasted with 'rent-seeking activities'; the *topos of corruption* aids in portraying protected, domestic markets as mired with vested interests, and aligning deregulated, international markets with freedom and fair competition. This is assisted by the *topos of freedom,* operationalised in excerpts where protectionist trade policies are predicated as 'discriminatory' and nominated as 'anti-export bias'*.* Again, the meaning of is narrowed, in this case to refer solely to the freedom of TNCs to invest and expatriate their profits, without having to pay tariffs and taxes.

This discourse ignores the reality that deregulated markets do not always lead to fair competition but can indeed lead to monopolies and rent-seeking behaviour amongst large firms. The Ivorian case is a good example of this, where competition in the cocoa global value chain decreased significantly after the industry was privatised. The reality that the neoliberal discourse promises a model of competition between firms, but in reality led to an industry characterised by non-competitive behaviour where an increasingly small number of firms dominate activity, is indicative of the importance of the neoliberal discourse to legitimise these policies.

Within this pro-globalisation, pro-deregulation discourse, the use of passive structures contributes to the elision of human agency and responsibility for processes in the export-oriented economy. For example:

> The open economy proved to be a strong attraction to foreign factors of production.' (World Bank, 1981a, p. 1)

Here, foreign factors of production might refer to the powerful cocoa trading and manufacturing firms that have invested in Côte d'Ivoire. By nominalising these actors, the discourse obscures their agency, helping to naturalise their presence and to remove political contestation. If the texts were to instead foreground the self-interested activities of multinational cocoa trading companies, the discourse would no longer portray the market (in which these firms are key players) as rational and political.

> 'Successful reforms could send a strong signal to attract remittances and private capital back to Haiti in support of a recovery, particularly in the export assembly industry and tourism.' (World Bank, 1996c, Executive Summary)

Equally, in the Haitian context, 'private capital' refers to US-headquartered TNCs wishing to take advantage of the cheap labour in Haiti by outsourcing their manufacturing, lowering their costs and making more profit. To explicitly name these actors does not just shift the wording but it shifts the discourse – ascribing some agency and accountability to TNCs within the process of deregulating the Haitian economy. Through excluding different interest groups, the discourse is depoliticised. Elsewhere, these implicit assumptions about the impartiality of the donors and their reforms are stated explicitly. For example, the World Bank declared of deregulating measures in Haiti that trade was moving towards 'a stable, neutral incentive system' (World Bank, 1987a, p. 17). This depoliticisation of deeply political reforms – that served the interests of TNCs first and foremost - is central to the legitimisation of the programmes and has been a common thread throughout the discourse in chapters three and four.

In the case of Chad, in discussing the two elements of the pipeline project (Doba and Sédigui) the domestic project is framed as a cost, assisted by the *topos of burden*. In contrast, the Doba export project is presented as an opportunity that would 'procure for Chad additional revenues that would radically transform its public finances' (World Bank, 1996e, p. 5). Experts at the World Bank wrote that:

> 'Private sector mining companies [...] indicated their strong interest in prospecting and exploring Chad's mineral resources, with a view to assisting the development of *commercially viable* projects' (World Bank, 1996e, p. 5).

In this excerpt, the authors draw on the *topos of reality* to highlight that the priority with the oil project is the export project since it represents the opportunity for private money-making, whilst the domestic oil project does not. These excerpts contribute to legitimising the decision to abandon the Sédigui project and pursue only the export side of the project.

Argument 2: the growth discourse

The analysis has thus far identified a discourse that privileges the market over the state, and international over domestic trade in order to justify a series of programmes that reconfigured the economy to become (or remain) export-oriented with a minimalist state. As we have seen, these policies failed catastrophically to improve living conditions or incomes in these countries. It is not surprising therefore, that in their discourse, the donors largely focussed on economic objectives, including increased efficiency, competition and, importantly, GDP growth.

However, as the introduction to chapters three and four highlighted, the human development agenda was in fact an explicit priority of the World Bank from the earliest days of its structural adjustment lending; improving living standards, reducing poverty and increasing incomes were key objectives of theirs in their 1981 development report. 10 years later in their 1990 World Development Report, the message was similarly poverty oriented, stating 'reducing poverty is the fundamental objective of economic development' (World Bank, 1990, p. 24).

Whilst they don't explicitly define the meaning of development in these reports, they attach some key targets to the term. They cited key social indicators as those relating to poverty, life expectancy, primary school enrolment rates and mortality of children.

Yet, in announcing, contextualizing and justifying the trade policies within the *SAPs* in the case study countries, the donors pay little attention to how the reforms will influence these social indicators, instead relying on presupposed assumptions about how increasing GDP growth will lead to development/poverty reduction. In this way, the discourse is heavily influenced by neoliberal assumptions. This logic takes the provision of the conditions for the private sector to produce growth as the principal aim of the economy. This means accepting inequality as an inevitable result and relying on the redistribution of some portion of the growth to help counter act the inequality that has resulted. Thus, increasing growth will lead to improved circumstances for all. This trickle down logic underpins much of the donors' discourse in the case studies; the implicit assumptions around economic growth and its benefits are communicated in a number of ways throughout the texts. This is identified as the second overarching argument, and the fourth and final claim: that **economic growth will lead to development.**

Table 4.5: Claim 4

Device	**Purpose**	**Example**
<u>Parataxis</u>	Creates relation of equivalence between growth and development	'A more fundamental approach is required which will enable the country […] to promote <u>adequate development and growth'</u> (World Bank, 1981a, p. 8) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Yet the pace of its <u>economic growth and development</u> is slow compared to its potential' (World Bank, 1985, p. 1) (Haiti) 'Whose main objectives are to restore order to public finances and to lay the basis for <u>growth and the alleviation of poverty</u>' (World Bank, 1994e, p. i) (Chad)
<u>Hypotaxis</u>	Creates relation of equivalence between growth and development	'Growing real appreciation thwarted efforts to restore growth and, <u>thereby</u>, reduce the growing poverty in rural areas' (World Bank, 1995, p. 9) (Côte d'Ivoire) '<u>Poverty alleviation through sustainable economic growth</u> based on private sector performance is the hallmark of the Bank's strategy' (World Bank, 1996a, p. 3) (Haiti) 'It would address key […] bottlenecks that constrain growth, <u>in order to</u> obtain substantial poverty alleviation results' (World Bank, 1999a, p. i) (Chad)

Economy is a human body metaphor	Frames GDP growth as good health	‘The economic **recovery** was sustained during 1997 and the rate of real GDP growth is provisionally estimated at 6 percent’ (IMF, 1998b, p. 4) (Côte d’Ivoire) ‘Haitian industry is still characterised by **stagnant** protected import substitution industries and a growing export assembly subsector; only the latter was responsible for possible growth in FY84.’ (World Bank, 1985, p. ii) (Haiti)

In some excerpts, the donors make an explicit argument about the relationship between economic growth and development:

> ‘Any development strategy for Haiti is bound to fail if economic growth cannot be revived’ (World Bank, 1996c, p. 12)

> ‘The resumption of economic growth is expected to contribute to a reduction of poverty in Côte d’Ivoire’ (IMF, 1994)

Both these examples state an explicit relationship between GDP growth and poverty reduction, with no explanation of their rationale. In the Ivorian example, the use of the passive ‘is expected’ rather than active structure ‘we expect that’ omits the agency of the IMF, as it is not stated *who* expects that GDP growth will contribute to reduced poverty. This again removes responsibility from the donors, portraying political assumptions (e.g. growth = development) as objective truths, when this is in reality a contested claim in the field of economics. Examples abound of countries that have achieved high levels of economic growth without improving living standards, a phenomenon that Tony Binns has termed ‘growth without development’ (Binns, 1994).

In particular, the donors indicate a positive relationship between growth and employment, and growth and income levels, for example, from the Chadian context:

> ‘The government is determined to achieve and maintain a high rate of economic growth sufficient to ensure an increase in per capita income and a reduction in poverty’ (IMF, 1996a, p. 3)

While evidence suggests that GDP growth can indeed spur job creation, studies show that the broader impact of job creation on the economy, such as increased income levels, is dependent on a number of factors. In order to achieve long-term real wage growth and increases in standards of living amongst the poor, many economists suggest that GDP growth or indeed increases in employment will not suffice (Seers, 1969). Whilst increase in *per capita* income can contribute to improved living standards, there is no guarantee, as the examples of oil exporting economies demonstrate, and did indeed demonstrate at the time of structural adjustment.[42] More recent studies point to the relationship between GDP growth and increased inequality (Piketty, 2015). Yet, these alternative viewpoints are not considered in the discourse; the notion that growth will lead to increased incomes and improved development indicators is portrayed as an objective truth.

Elsewhere, this conflation of growth and development is more implicit, achieved through grammatical relations between words and clauses. The table shows examples where the donors express the dual objectives of the programmes as 'growth and development'. The paratactic structure – indicated by the conjunctive 'and' - implies equivalence. In other examples, this equivalence is constructed through grammatical embedding:

> 'Since 1960, when GDP per capita was US $145, the country has experienced a 7 per cent per annum GDP growth rate**,** a pace of development that has surpassed that of most non-oil exporting countries' (World Bank, 1981a, p. 1)

The 7% growth rate is embedded as an element of the clause 'a pace of development'. This relationship, although implicit, also implies equivalence; the two processes are treated as interchangeable.

The health metaphor also plays an important role in supporting the conflation of growth with development, as well as emphasising the urgency of implementing

[42] An example that was relevant and accessible during structural is Trinidad with an average 5% per year growth in *per capita* income between 1953 and 1967, but over unemployment increased to more than 10% of the labour force. (Seers, 1969)

reforms to increase GDP growth. In framing low levels of GDP growth in terms of disease ('stagnation') and high levels of growth as signs of good health ('revival', 'resuscitation'), a connection is established between the economy and individuals. The hyperbole provokes an emotional response as the implication is that looking after the economy is as important as looking after one's own health; an economy that is not growing is conceptualised as a dying economy, in need of resuscitation. Within this metaphor, structural adjustment measures are the means of reviving the economy. In addition to emphasising the urgency and importance of economic growth, this metaphor also serves the purpose of simplifying the complex process of development. Nominalising one specific economic measure (GDP growth) as 'recovery' conceals the importance (and absence) of other development indicators, like *per capita* income, inequality or poverty levels. This metaphor also furthers the depoliticisation of the *SAP*s, as the primacy of economic growth is presented as an objective reality, like the health of a human body.

As the discourse analysis of this chapter and the preceding chapter has shown, the depoliticisation of the *SAP*s is a consistent theme. Some examples show an explicit denial of the political nature of the growth agenda, for example from the Ivorian context:

> 'Political ideology played a secondary role to practical considerations in promoting growth and development.' (World Bank, 1981a, p. 1)

In this excerpt, promoting growth (and development, implied through the paratactic conjunction) is framed as a practical exercise, in direct opposition to alternative economic strategies, portrayed as ideologically motivated. This carefully evades any acknowledgement of the commercial and indeed political interests behind these programmes.

Importantly, the discursive conflation of growth with development flies in the face of the material reality facing communities affected by structural adjustment. As the first half of the chapter argued, although cocoa exports and GDP both grew in Côte d'Ivoire, incomes did not, and poverty increased during the 1980s and

1990s.[43] In Haiti too, periods of growth were not accompanied by poverty reduction or improved incomes. This claim is therefore crucial in legitimising the *SAP*s. By constructing a discursive equivalence between GDP growth and development, the donors were able to frame what results they did achieve (growth of the export industries and GDP growth) as success, despite largely worsening social and economic indicators.

The discursive relationship between economic growth and development over the course of twenty-year period and across the three examples is not completely homogenous. During the 1990s, the donors begin to incorporate more social objectives into their programmes, placing particular emphasis on poverty alleviation. In documents produced during the 1990s, there is increasing reference to poverty, as an issue and its reduction as an objective. In all three *SAL* documents (1981, 1983 and 1986) for Côte d'Ivoire during the 1980s, there is just one reference to poverty. Haiti's *PFP* (1987) and Chad's two *PFPs* (1987 and 1989) and *SAP* (1987) make no mention whatsoever to poverty. This number begins to steadily increase into the 1990s, as poverty is mentioned 43 times in Haiti's *CAS* (1996), 26 times in Côte d'Ivoire's *PFP* (1998) and 16 times in Chad's *SAP* (1996). Whilst the frequency of the mention of poverty does not necessarily signify a practical shift towards more pro-poor policies, it is nonetheless significant when compared to earlier programmes. It is suggestive of the emerging pressure on the donors that influenced the shift towards the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) and the *PRSP*s that would become the next lending paradigm for peripheral countries.

Not only do they increasingly include discussions on the topic of poverty, the donors also begin to explicitly state poverty alleviation as a key objective of structural reform. For example, in Haiti's 1994 *EERP*, the donors highlight as a priority: 'poverty alleviation through strong sustained growth' (World Bank, 1994a, p. 3). Here, the hypotactic relation implies a subordinate relation, ordering a relationship of causality, whereby poverty alleviation is the cause of economic

[43] It should be noted that the pace of growth in Côte d'Ivoire during the structural adjustment era was much slower than during the first two years of independence.

growth. This grammatical shift, from parataxis to hypotaxis, reflects the donors' shift from the conflation of economic growth with development, towards the assumption that poverty alleviation will occur as a result of economic growth. In other words, GDP growth was no longer the development objective in and of itself, but it was a means of increasing economic activity, increasing incomes and government revenues, which could be channelled into the social sectors. This line of argument is articulated in the *CAS*:

> 'Clearly, the overarching objective of the Bank's strategy in Haiti must be poverty alleviation, to be achieved through a combination of strong growth, improved social services and a workable system of safety nets. (World Bank, 1996c, p. 6)

Yet, as these two chapters have demonstrated, very little commitment was made by the donors to ensure that poverty alleviation would occur. The neoliberal development strategy in all three countries was based on 1) an austerity policy that pulled resources away from the social sectors; and 2) an export-led growth strategy that removed protections for local industries and workers in order to incentivise foreign investment. The consequences of these reforms, in the form of deteriorating social indicators, demonstrate that these programmes failed drastically to facilitate development.

It is significant that the shift in discourse occurs during the 1990s, as discontent with the BWIs was becoming more widespread. Forceful critiques were emerging within policy, academic and activist circles, as the devastating consequences of structural adjustment became known not just in these three countries, but also all over the global periphery. The move towards acknowledging the need for some social safety nets in order to reduce poverty must be understood as a direct response to these critiques. When threatened by a growing social movement that sought to overthrow neoliberal globalisation, the donors began to reorient their discourse in order to place poverty reduction more centrally in their programmes.

The four claims explored in this analysis work together to legitimise the neoliberal trade paradigm. By constructing a binary opposition, aided by conceptual metaphors and argumentation devices, between the flexible, efficient, and modern international market and the inefficient, backwards, closed state, the donors were able to legitimise their policy of undermining and rolling back the state. The machine becomes a rich source domain for the economy and is particularly influential in this discursive construction of the market as a self-regulating and balanced system. By portraying the state, conversely, as corrupt, influenced by vested interests and ideology, the neoliberal strategy is legitimised. Taking this state-market binary as an objective truth, as the discourse falsely depicts it, retracting the powers of the state in favour of the market appears common sense. On its own, this argument is powerful but limited when faced with the reality that these policies failed drastically to improve living standards for individuals and communities affected by the cocoa and assembly sectors. The growth discourse is equally essential as it conflates GDP growth with development, thus portraying failure as success. Together, these two discourses present the strategies pursued in the *SAP*s as legitimate, and importantly, apolitical.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the *SAP*s pursued remarkably similar trade policies, in line with the neoliberal policy matrix of deregulated export-led economies with minimal state intervention. The similarities across the case studies are even more significant in this than in chapter three, since these were three very different industries. Deregulation has been a key commonality in all three cases: the legal foundations of the pipeline project ensure that the consortium have final say over the regulatory environment; cocoa prices became set by powerful trading firms, rather than the state-owned marketing board; and the minimum wage was essentially left to be established by the assembly sector. In all three cases, this has led to downwards pressure on labour rights and protections, the long-term consequences of which are explored further in chapter six. In all three cases, resource and authority has been transferred from the state to the market, creating a situation where TNCs possess more power than the bodies responsible for regulating them.

TNCs were quick to take advantage of the 'favourable' environments that were created through the removal of restrictions and regulations on their corporate activity and profit expatriation. Whereas the populations of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti saw their livelihoods worsen over this period, transnational capital has thrived. The profits of major players in the cocoa industry soared; Nestlé reported that net profit almost doubled from 2,272 million Swiss francs in 1990 to 4,291 in 1998 (Nestle, 1998, pp. 88-89). Forbes estimated that CEO Peter Brabeck Letmathe earned $5,000,0000 in 2003 (Forbes, 2003). In contrast, *per capita* income in Côte d'Ivoire declined by one sixth between 1999 and 2007, fuelled by the fall in rural incomes after *CAISTAB* was dismantled. In 1996, clothing contractors in Haiti producing garments for North American companies under license with Disney were in some cases paying as little as 12 cents an hour, well below the minimum wage. Contrast this to the $97,600 per hour that CEO Michael Eisner received that year from his salary, incentive pay and stock options (Verhoogen, 1996, p. 19). It is clear who are the winners in this neoliberal system.

The discourse analysis has shown that the donors portray the *SAP*s as apolitical, even technical in nature. In the three cases, the donors have used similar discursive strategies and devices in order to legitimise their reforms. The donors argue, both implicitly and explicitly, that: 1) the market is more efficient than the state; 2) global markets are superior to domestic ones; and 3) economic growth inevitably leads to development. The donors tell a story of freedom from the narrow perspective of transnational capital, framed as the right of TNCs to move all over the global and extract maximum wealth for their shareholders. This is not freedom, and has not led to an increase in economic, social or political freedoms in these countries. The depoliticisation of the discourse – aided by conceptual metaphors - is essential as it allows the donors to present themselves as technical, neutral experts, masking the inherently political project that is neoliberal development.

Conclusion to part one

At the start of the structural adjustment era, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti shared some important development challenges that were a legacy of their colonial experiences, including growing debt burdens and unequal relationships with their key trading partners. It is these disadvantages that enabled the BWIs to take such forceful control over the national development strategies of these countries. The desperate need for credit allowed the World Bank and the IMF to extend their economic and political influence via the *SAP*s, prescribing a series of one-size-fits-all policy reforms: austerity; deregulation; the removal of protective tariffs and taxes; and privatisation. Importantly, these chapters have shown that these policies were not owned by the governments, but designed and imposed by the BWIs and therefore represent the undermining of sovereignty. The ability to withhold finance and condition these reforms to much-needed credit is evidence of the coercive power of these institutions relative to borrowing countries. Far from facilitating an improvement in living standards, in many ways the policies pursued under structural adjustment have aggravated the development challenges facing these countries, as these chapters have demonstrated.

Importantly, the discourse approach has enabled these chapters to demonstrate *how* the donors generated consent for these reforms, in spite of their abysmal record. The comparative approach has allowed me to identify a common neoliberal discourse, which presents a number of arguments as infallible, scientific, objective economic realities. Contested subjective claims about the necessity of austerity and the virtues of the market are presented as common sense, thus limiting the possibility for alternatives. In this way, the discourse produces the policies and the policies produce the discourse, in line CDA (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Together, this has enabled an understanding of how power is wielded in the international development system, via coercion and consent, in the neo-Gramscian sense. The discourse, in internalising the problems of these countries and shifting the responsibility for underdevelopment onto inefficient, corrupt and overbearing governments, presents another dimension to this erosion of sovereignty. The deligitimisation of the role of the state in the discourse enables the donors to pursue the deligitimisation of the state in their programmes, via austerity measures and the reduction of the powers of government in the economy. These chapters have thus explored the ways in which the neoliberal ideological hegemonic project is able to reinforce itself discursively.

Importantly, the discourse analysis has revealed the myriad ways in which the donors depoliticise the neoliberal agenda. The BWIs operate ostensibly on the principle of economic neutrality, concerning themselves solely with economic consideration and not political concerns. This necessitates the powerful discourse that frames the *SAP*s in such a way that the undergirding neoliberal ideology is disguised.

The *SAP*s were indeed deeply political, as they undermined the institutional capacities of the state on a practical level, by: 1) increasing the debt burden and therefore dependency of these countries on international donors and financial institutions; 2) underfunding public services; and 3) reinforcing an unpopular export-led paradigm that cedes control of key industries to foreign TNCs. Sovereignty has been further undermined through the discourse, as the arguments unveiled by the CDA prepare a suitable base upon which neoliberal policymaking can be implemented by establishing legitimacy and illegitimacy for certain policy preferences, framing political issues from a narrow neoliberal perspective and limiting the existence of alternative forms of development policy.

Part two. Poverty Reduction Strategies: governance without government

Chapters three and four argued that structural adjustment failed drastically to facilitate development in the case study countries. Indeed, as we have seen, many *SAP*s resulted in profoundly damaging economic and social consequences. Key to the arguments put forward in these two chapters is the analysis of the donors' language. This revealed a discourse that legitimised neoliberal policies throughout the period of structural adjustment, despite their evident failures. The purpose of the second part of this thesis is to determine the extent to which the lending policy framework that replaced the *SAP*s – the *PRSP*s – represents discontinuity with the neoliberal prescriptions discussed in part one. This comparison is conducted at two levels: at the level of policy analysis and at the level of discourse. By interrogating the *PRSP* approach at these two levels, these chapters seek to address the key questions: to what extent do the *PRSPs* represent a paradigm shift towards country-owned and pro-poor development strategies; and if not, how have the donors evolved their development discourse in order to legitimise the continuation of neoliberal policies, given the latter's poor track record. This approach seeks to shed light on the way that the neoliberal development project maintains its hegemonic status through discursive means, in spite of sustained and well-founded criticism.

This introduction to part two begins by contextualising the BWIs' move to the *PRSP*s within a historical perspective, considering the factors that drove the donors to re-evaluate their approach. What follows is a brief description of the *PRSP* process and the HIPC initiative as it relates to development policy under the new framework. A short review of literature, looking at the World Bank's *Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies* as well as critical scholarship, serves to contextualise the research questions of the next two chapters within academic debate. Lastly, this introduction to chapters five and six delineates the different policy programmes that the case study countries have implemented over the first 10 years of the PRS framework.

Structural adjustment: a discredited model

As a tool to facilitate development, by the end of the century, the *SAP* model had been discredited by scholars and civil society movements the world over (Kawewe & Dibie, 2000; Watkins, 1995; Jamal, 1994). Both internal and external evaluations conducted during the 1990s identified a number of problems that hindered the effectiveness of programmes supported by the ESAF (IMF, 1998e). Social movements gained traction as they raised legitimate concerns about development financing, failure to address issues of social justice and unsustainable debt levels (Woodroffe & Ellis-Jones, 2000). Eventually, the donors were compelled to accept that a new policy paradigm was needed. It is significant that the disastrous results of these programmes alone (as they became clear during the period of *SAP*s) were not enough to convince the World Bank and the IMF to reconsider their approach. Rather, it was increasing hostility towards the BWIs as the Washington Consensus was exposed for its failures that necessitated a change.

It was in this political climate that the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PGRF) became the new lending facility in 1999, and *PRSP*s became the new policy framework, based on what eventually became known as the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC). Lending was to be embedded in a broader development agenda of poverty reduction, and *PRSP*s were to be anchored around country ownership and broad-based participation (unlike the more prescriptive *SAP*s). According to the BWIs, this move was informed by the realisation that 'developing countries need to develop their own mix of policies that reduce poverty, reflecting national priorities and local realities' (World Bank, 2001a, p. 7). Importantly, the BWIs did not call into question the content of the *SAP*s; rather, it was the process of formulating strategies that needed to be challenged.

Poverty Reduction Strategies: aligning with global development goals

The advent of the *PRSP*s coincided with a new global commitment to reduce poverty in its many forms; in 2000, the 189 UN member states signed the Millennium Declaration committing them to the achievement of the Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.[44] The MDGs set out to address several dimensions of well being, including eradicating poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary school education, promoting gender equality, reducing child and maternal mortality and fighting a number of lethal diseases. The World Bank and the IMF began to integrate the MDGs into the PRS framework, by encouraging countries to base their *PRSP* objectives on the long-term MDGs. Linking with the UN's MDGs was perceived as a response to criticism of the *SAP*s, showing that economic and financial measures were now linked with a broader agenda of social development (Weber, 2006).

At the time of writing, the *PRSP* continues to form the basis for lending to low-income countries by multilateral agencies and these programmes have become a prerequisite for receiving aid from most bilateral donors too (Tan, 2011). According to the IFIs, each *PRSP* is required to be 'nationally owned', i.e.: the strategies outlined in the paper are formulated by the government of the borrowing country, and is to be formulated in a participatory manner, involving a wide range of government and civil society actors (World Bank, 2002a). The *PRSP* must include a 'poverty diagnosis', in which the borrowing government identifies the root causes of poverty. They must also detail how the financial support that accompanies the *PRSP* will be disbursed to ameliorate these problems. In line with this more country-tailored approach, the IFIs declared that there would be no blueprint or rigid framework for the *PRSP* (World Bank, 2002a). However, all *PRSPs* are reviewed by the World Bank and IMF in a Joint Staff Advisory Note (*JSAN*).[45] The *JSAN* must raise inconsistencies, if any are judged to exist, between the *PRSP* and the policy framework of the IFIs and can insist on further analysis if these inconsistencies are too great (IMF, 2005a). The financing for the *PRSP*s is delivered through the PRGF and based on a three-year arrangement, which must be consistent with the overall *PRSP*.

[44] The MDGs were replaced in 2015 by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

[45] These were formerly called Joint Staff Assessments (*JSA*s) but were replaced by the *JSAN* in 2004 (IMF, 2004)

The HIPC: ending the debt trap?

An important element of the new development paradigm was the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which emerged as a response to the criticism leveled at the donors for creating unsustainable debt levels through the *SAP*s.

In 1999, Jack Boorman, then-Director of the Policy Development and Review Department at the IMF, wrote:

> 'At the heart of the new approach will be a closer integration than ever before in the operations of the two Bretton Woods institutions in these countries in pursuit of the fundamental objective of poverty reduction. And accompanying these efforts will be a bigger, better debt-relief package' (Boorman, 1999)

Initially launched in 1996, but broadened into the Enhanced HIPC in 1999, the scheme aimed to significantly reduce the net debt stock of 41 HIPCs, bringing their debt-to-export ratios below the critical threshold of 150% and reducing their debt service payments. The enhanced HIPC moved beyond these objectives and focussed on freeing up resources for poverty reducing programmes and investments. The IDA and the IMF predicted that social expenditure would increase significantly in HIPC countries (IMF & IDA, 2001b).[46]

Since the launch of the *PRSP*s in 1999, debt relief under the HIPC has been linked to progress in implementing a national *PRSP*. To become eligible for debt relief, or to reach 'Decision Point', a country must show a positive three-year track record of 'macroeconomic stability', prepare an interim-*PRSP*, and clear any outstanding arrears (IMF, 2001b). In theory, this should ensure that all HIPC eligible countries are committed to poverty reduction. At Decision Point, the country begins to receive marginal debt relief from the IFIs, which should signify a reduction in debt service payments. For the debts to be 'forgiven' in their entirety, the country must

[46] In 2005, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was introduced to provide 100% cancellation of eligible debt stock owed to the multilateral institutions (the World Bank, the IMF, the ADF and the IDA). Multilateral loans have made up the majority of new credits since the early 1990s and the MDRI was therefore expected to reduce the debt service burden too. These schemes are separate but linked; for a country to receive MDRI debt relief it must have fulfilled all conditions attached to the HIPC (IMF & IDA, 2011b).

reach 'Completion Point', by carrying out key structural reforms, agreed upon at Decision Point, and by implementing a *PRSP* 'satisfactorily' (to the satisfaction of the IMF and the World Bank) for one year (IMF & IDA, 2001b). The HIPC initiative is therefore highly conditional and closely linked to the PRS framework.

*PRSP*s: genuine shift or business as usual?

This new development architecture promised a fundamental policy shift from *SAP* conditionality to country-owned, participatory, poverty-centred development strategies (Boorman, 1999). The *PRSP*s were hailed as the magic bullet to the economic and social problems of peripheral countries throughout the world:

> 'Armed with poverty reduction strategies, countries become the masters of their own development, with a clearly articulated vision for their future and a systematic plan to achieve their goals' (World Bank, 2000, p. 3)

The launching of the PGRF in 1999 sparked a lively debate amongst politicians, aid practitioners, journalists and academics; critics argued that the new programmes were merely the continuation of structural adjustment policies under a different name: 'a re-branding of neoliberalism' (Davidson-Harden, 2009, p. 156) or 'sugar-coated structural adjustment reality' (Ndomo, 2005, p. 21). Proponents of the new development approach opined that the process would rebalance the power asymmetries; the World Bank stated that it would 'correct the major flaws in aid management of the recent past' (World Bank, 2003b, p. 41).

One of the key aspects that allegedly differentiate the *PRSP*s from the *SAP*s is the foregrounding of the concept of poverty reduction. The second essential difference is the participatory process of creating the *PRSP*, involving all levels of community to represent a bottom-up rather than a top-down governance approach. However, the necessity of World Bank and IMF endorsement, communicated through the *JSAN*, before the donors agree to release funds, highlights a clear contradiction in the objectives (Weber, 2006). Some scholars and practitioners have critiqued the process of formulating the PRSPs, arguing that they are not as participatory in nature as they claim to be as the participation process is set up in such a way that excludes civil society and poor groups in particular (Lazarus, 2008; Rowden & Irama, 2004; Fraser, 2005).

The World Bank's *Sourcebook* offers some insight into the evolution of the donors' development philosophy and framework. For example, the BWIs outline the areas that they consider to be priority and list a number of policy interventions and objectives that are conditions to be met before concessional lending for a *PRSP* can be approved. The priority areas are: 'macroeconomic and structural policies to support sustainable growth in which the poor participate; improvements in governance, including public sector financial management; appropriate sectoral policies and programs; and realistic costing and appropriate levels of funding for the major programmes' (World Bank, 2002a, p. 4). This suggests that the flexibility available to countries to determine their own policy agendas remains circumscribed by conditionalities related to both spending and trade.

The *Sourcebook* maintains the donors' narrow definition of macroeconomic stability as low inflation and balanced budgets, achieved by keeping government expenditures low. However, it also emphasises the importance of development human resources and infrastructure in the pro-poor sectors, especially health and education:

> 'Low educational attainment, illness, malnutrition, and high fertility are major contributors to income poverty. And education and health capabilities are among the primary dimensions of individual well-being' (World Bank, 2002a, p. 10)

Understanding how the donors navigated these new social priorities alongside the neoliberal agenda of austerity and deregulated export markets, in the context of the case studies, is a key objective of chapters five and six. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to the debate about the extent to which the *PRSP*s differ from *SAP*s, looking closely at the contextual and ideological underpinnings of the PRS development paradigm.

As demonstrated in part one, *SAP*s were produced by the donors, with minimal input from the borrowing countries. In contrast, *PRSP*s are ostensibly produced and designed by the borrowing government, in collaboration with the donors and based on consultation with civil society. Analysis of the *PRSP* documents is therefore complicated by the challenge of locating the separate or united voices of the government and the donors. Given the 10-year period of analysis, identifying a singular government voice is also problematic; Haiti had three different Presidents as well as a brief transitional government following the 2004 *coup*, for example. For this reason, the discursive element of the analysis focuses largely on the documents that are produced by the donors, in order to compare the discourse from structural adjustment to poverty reduction, or from Washington Consensus to PWC. For each *PRSP*, the IMF produces a *Joint Staff Advisory Note* (*JSAN*), commenting on and approving the government's development plan. Similarly, national development strategies continue to be informed by *Country Assistance Strategy* (*CAS*) documents, and then later, *Country Partnership Strategy* (*CPS*) documents produced by the World Bank. Outside of the PGRF lending arrangements that support the *PRSP*s, the IMF has *Staff Monitored Programmes* (*SMP*s), under which IMF staff monitor a country's economic targets and policies. *SMP*s do not entail financial assistance and the conditionality is non-binding, but they are understood by the IMF as a way of establishing a 'track record' for future lending (IMF, 2017, p. 11).

The *process* underpinning the formulation of the *PRSP* is beyond the scope of this discussion; practitioners and scholars elsewhere have investigated this by examining the different stakeholder groups included or excluded from the process, the method of engagement, and the extent to which competing voices are incorporated into the final *PRSP*.[47] Instead, the focus here is on the *policies* and the *discourse*. However, this study ought to shed some light on the nature of the process, without investigating it directly. Given the proclaimed participatory nature of the *PRSP*s, it is logical to expect much less homogeneity across the three case studies in both policy content and discourse within the *PRSP*s, given the

[47] See for example: Jubilee South; Focus on the Global South; AWEPON; Centor do Estudios Internacionales; World Council of Churches (2001)

unique political and economic circumstances that each country faces. A strategy that has been designed through the genuine consultation and with the participation of civil society (comprised of local nongovernmental and not-for-profit organisations with grassroots knowledge and experience) ought to vary considerably across the three countries, according to their unique needs and political contexts.

*PRSP*s and the case studies: a timeline

For the purposes of the next two chapters, it is the first ten years of the *PRSP* framework that are under consideration. This allows for consideration of the more long-term consequences of the policies implemented during the period. The corpus gathers key government and donor documents that form and inform the development strategy. These include the *PRSPs*, *JSAN*s, *CAS*, *SMP*s and documents that relate to the HIPC initiative.[48]

Côte d'Ivoire's first programme under the new PRS framework was a *SMP* with the IMF in 2001; this was the donors' first re-engagement with the country since financial assistance was suspended in 1999 (IMF, 2001e). In 2002, an interim-*PRSP* (*I-PRSP*) was drawn up to cover the period 2002-2004 (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2002) and the World Bank produced an accompanying *CAS* (World Bank, 2002c). Civil unrest disrupted aid relations for the next few years. Upon re-engagement in 2007, Côte d'Ivoire implemented a policy programme supported by an *Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance* (*EPCA*) from the IMF (IMF, 2007d). Finally in 2009 the IMF approved the country's full *PRSP,* which outlined a four-year strategy (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009). This was supported by a Country Partnership Strategy (*CPS*), produced by the World Bank in 2010 (World Bank, 2010b).

In Haiti too, political events complicated the government-donor relationship at the turn of the century. Disbursements to the government from previous loan agreements were suspended in 2000, in what many understood as a deliberate

[48] Given the myriad of document types, when discussing the donor strategy more broadly, I refer to all of these documents as '*PRSP*s' throughout the next two chapters.

attempt to destabilise the Presidency.[49] In 2003, the IFIs began working with the Haitian authorities once again to facilitate a resumption of lending and disbursement. The reengagement between Haiti and the World Bank was further bolstered by the approval of a *SMP* with the IMF in June 2003 (IMF, 2003b). This programme went 'off track' following a second coup in February 2004 and consequently a new *SMP* was drawn up for 2004 (IMF, 2004b). These programmes incorporated lessons from a *Country Assistance Evaluation* (*CAE*) conducted by the World Bank in 2002 (World Bank, 2002b). In 2004, the transitional government worked with the donors and the international community to produce the *Interim Cooperation Framework* (*ICF*), which outlined a plan for the period 2004-2006 (Republic of Haiti, 2004).[50] The World Bank produced a *Transitional Support Strategy* (*TSS*) to integrate its own assistance to Haiti with the *ICF* (World Bank, 2004c). This was followed by an interim-*PRSP* in 2006 (Republic of Haiti, 2006), drafted by the government of Haiti as a precursor to the *PRSP* scheduled for 2007, better known by its French acronym, *DSNCRP* (Republic of Haiti, 2007).

Following four major hurricanes and tropical storms that killed hundreds of Haitians in August and September 2008, the donors changed direction once again. In January 2009, economist Paul Collier authored a report, titled *Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security*, commissioned by the UN, in which he put forth a different strategy for Haiti (Collier, 2009). This quickly became policy in Haiti as the donors asked the government to 'update' its *DSNCRP*, incorporating the findings of the Collier report and a Post-Disaster Needs assessment that had been conducted (Taft-Morales, 2009, p. 7). Three weeks after the conference, the World Bank published a *CAS* for Haiti, announcing a three-year plan, which drew from both the Collier report and the report that the government had presented at the conference, entitled *Haiti: a new paradigm* (IDB, 2009). The Haitian context is

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[49] The context of the fallout between the donors and the government is beyond the scope of this study, but has been thoroughly covered by Dan Beeton (2006).

[50] Although the Government of Haiti officially launched it, the programme was largely dictated at an informal meeting held in Washington. USAID described the programme as 'the donor coordinated assistance programme for Haiti's recovery', and contributed the largest financial contribution, $194.8 million out of the total $600 million disbursed (USAID, 2006, p. 4).

therefore interesting as the country was persuaded to move away from its *PRSP* in a different policy direction, which will be explored in chapters five and six.

Chad was the first country of the three case studies to sign up to a *PRSP.* This programme was a prerequisite for the World Bank's endorsement of the all-important oil pipeline project. They produced three documents to accompany the loans that they distributed to the Government of Chad: the *Petroleum Development and Pipeline project* (*PDPP)*; the *Management of the Petroleum Economy Project* (*MPEP*); and a *Capacity Building Project* (*CBP)*. The *PRSP* was preceded by an *I-PRSP* in 2000 (Republic of Chad, 2000); the full programme was approved in 2003, which set out a three-year strategy (Republic of Chad, 2003). The World Bank drew up an accompanying *CAS* the same year (World Bank, 2003a). The World Bank withdrew from the oil project in 2008, but maintained lending relations with Chad. The IMF deemed the *NPRS* to have been largely unsuccessful, and a second *PRSP* was prepared for the period 2008 – 2011, and was approved by the IMF in 2010 (Republic of Chad, 2008). This was supported by a *SMP* with the IMF in 2009 (IMF, 2009a).

Chapter five: rebranding austerity

Introduction

The objective of the present is to compare the experiences of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti under the PRS policy paradigm. Chapter three found that the austerity was a key policy component of the structural adjustment era and identified a common austerity discourse across the three case studies that framed cuts to public expenditure as necessary, technical solutions to an objective, apolitical, financial situation. With the development of the HIPC initiative and the *PRSP*s, the donors acknowledged that heavy debt burdens were a contributing factor to underdevelopment, claiming that the initiative would seek 'to provide a "permanent" exit from debt rescheduling, promote growth, and release resources for social expenditures targeted at poverty reduction' (Gautam, 2003, p. xiv). The extent to which this has been achieved under the new framework is of particular interest. Linked to the debt-austerity relationship is an understanding of the extent to which the new lending paradigm has moved away from the sovereignty-circumscribing practices of the previous era, to allow for genuine participatory, country-owned strategies, as promised by the IFIs.

The structure follows previous chapters, firstly comparing key policy drivers across the case studies. It will contrast the social policy content and the macroeconomic framework of the *PRSP*s, considering some of the outcomes and the extent of continuity or change with the *SAP*s. The second half of this chapter examines the discourse to understand the way that the donors frame and legitimise the PWC, looking to expose the ideological underpinnings of the programmes.

A *PRSP* typically contains a thorough assessment of the current situation of poverty, identifying the scope and roots of poverty across themes and sectors. Its strategy section then outlines the vision and objectives across the key sectors that it identifies. A section is usually dedicated towards delineating the macroeconomic framework, and a timeline for implementation and monitoring progress of the *PRSP*. The discourse analysis examines the passages that discuss the macroeconomic framework and the strategy for the social sectors. The *SMP*s and the *JSAN*s are analysed in their entirety.

This discussion demonstrates that there is little discontinuity in the macroeconomic realm between previous *SAP*s and the *PRSP*s, with aid remaining highly conditional and sovereignty continuing to be undermined by this process. I argue that the HIPC actually entrenched conditionality further within the lending of the World Bank and the IMF, reinforcing the austerity agenda. Where divergence is observed, it is not within the policy framework but within the discourse. The CDA discussion shows that the discourse has evolved to co-opt the counter-hegemonic values of democracy, poverty reduction and social inclusion, in order to legitimise the austerity strategy and moralise it in a way that the *SAP*s did not. In this way, I argue that the *PRSP*s can be viewed as a tool for furthering the austerity agenda, and thus entrenching the ideological hegemonic project of neoliberalism. Far from being tools for 'poverty reduction', these programmes – both in practice and in language - are better understood as mechanisms of re-embedding the conditions of poverty in peripheral countries. The failure of the HIPC to relieve the debt burden has ensured that dependency remains entrenched, and sovereignty over financial decision-making a distant dream for these countries.

*PRSP*s: renewed investment in health and education?

Part one showed that as the 1990s progressed, the *SAP*s started to shift away from directly cutting health and education (as they had done in the 1980s) to making cuts elsewhere, and beginning to increase resources to these sectors through reallocating budgets. The next few paragraphs demonstrate that under the PRS framework, the donors (and now the governments) continued along this trajectory, identifying health and education as priority sectors, making commitments to increase investment and current spending ostensibly in order to improve access to basic services amongst the poor.

As the *PRSP*s were developed with poverty reduction as an explicit and prominent goal, it became difficult to deny the importance of investing in the social sectors, for both the borrowing governments and the donors. In all three cases, health and education in particular were upheld as key areas for investment with the announcement of specific targets around training and recruiting staff and building facilities. In Côte d'Ivoire's 2002 *I-PRSP*, the Ivorian government made a number of social commitments, including universal education and free primary education, as well as ensuring that the general public would have access to health care through a universal health insurance programme (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2002, p. 15). They planned for an increase in the proportion of government spending dedicated to improving access to basic social services, from 63.5% in 2001 to 66.5% in 2004 (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, p. 18). The 2007 *EPCA*-supported programme also accorded special priority to education and health services, with a focus on rehabilitating schools, health clinics and recruiting additional doctors and teachers for the affected areas (IMF, 2007d, p. 26). The full *PRSP* announced its ambitions to reduce poverty to 16% by 2015, and announced its health insurance programme again (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009, p. iv). All three of these programmes projected increases in allocations for poverty-relevant expenditures, in particular in primary education and health.

In Haiti too, health and education were repeatedly identified as key areas for investment, both by the donors and by the Haitian authorities. Successive *SMP*s with the IMF made commitments to prioritise 'social expenditures that benefit the poor' (IMF, 2004, p. 24). The 2004 *ICF* announced plans to develop 15 health districts, where resources would flow towards increasing access to essential drugs and medical supplies and preventative care for vulnerable people (Republic of Haiti, 2004, p. xv). Within education, the programme set out to finance school supplies and increase and improve professional training. The 2008 *PRSP* announced plans to improve enrolment and quality of education and the quality, accessibility and coverage of health services. To achieve this, the government planned the building and refurbishment of classrooms and the training of teachers, as well as the construction and rehabilitation of health centres and hospitals (Republic of Haiti, 2008, Annex II, p. 19).

Chad entered the era of *PRSP*s under slightly different circumstances than Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti. The economy was on the verge of huge transformations as the pipeline project was nearing commencement and the government was set to see its revenues increase significantly. The pipeline project, as chapter six will explore, had been legitimised on the basis that it would have significant poverty-reducing impacts, through social investment as a result of increased government revenues. The *I-PRSP* announced that the 'strategic aim of the government of Chad is to combat poverty and improve the living conditions of its citizens' (Republic of Chad, 2000, p. 5). The full 2003 *PRSP* included a more thorough assessment of the poverty situation and outlined the government's strategy in the oil era, setting out plans to provide the population with access to quality basic services, gradually extending health coverage to all districts (Republic of Chad, 2003, p. 68). In education, the government intended to improve both access and the teacher-pupil ratios, by increasing total spending on education (Republic of Chad, 2003, p. 83). In its second *PRSP*, the government vowed again to improve access to health care and to make more high-quality services more widely available, constructing health centres and hospitals, hiring more staff, and providing high quality drugs (Republic of Chad, 2008, p. 11). The proportion of the government's budget set aside for the social sectors was projected to increase over the period of the programme, from 14.1% in 2008 to 16.0% in 2011 (Republic of Chad, 2008, p. 108).

In all three cases, the *PRSP*s announced ambitious investments and interventions in the social sectors. Whereas the *SAP*s, particularly during the 1980s, had made direct and substantial cuts to the social sectors, the *PRSP*s identified health and education as key areas for investment, announcing specific interventions and investments in order to increase improve access to essential services. Reading these sections of the policy programmes and these sections alone suggests a significant departure from the structural adjustment austerity approach. However, a closer inspection of the macroeconomic framework that underpinned the development strategy in all three countries reveals that the social projects and programmes planned by the authorities would prove difficult to implement.

HIPC: ending the debt trap and freeing up resources?

Before looking at the extent to which these social objectives were achieved, by studying more closely the trends in social spending, this section first examines the debt situation and the HIPC initiative. Firstly, I examine the impact that the scheme had on debt levels during the time period, before looking at the conditionalities embedded within the scheme**.** Ostensibly, the HIPC scheme is a way of focussing more on strengthening the links between debt relief and poverty-reduction efforts, by linking the stages of the initiative to progress in implementing a national PRS. The donors argued that the initiative would relieve the financial pressures on developing countries by reducing their debt burdens, thereby freeing up resources for implementing critical social reforms as part of an integrated long-term development approach. If the HIPC initiative has been effective, then we would expect to see debt service progressively decreasing, freeing up public finance to spend on promoting development.

All three countries were at different moments in time drawn into the HIPC debt relief scheme. Chad was the first to reach Decision Point in 2001, with external debts totalling just over $1 billion, representing 214% of the value of the country's exports of goods and services (well above the 150% threshold required for eligibility) (IMF & IDA, 2001a, p. 19). Despite the fact that Haiti's debt-to-exports ratio exceeded that of Chad's at 279.1%, Haiti was deemed ineligible for debt relief under the initiative at the start of the decade, due to a purported lack of commitment in the areas of governance and poverty reduction, as well as availability to other sources of credit (IMF, 2000b, p. 37). Furthermore – and unusually - in 2000, when the donors suspended funds to Haiti, the government was still required to make interest payments on undisbursed loans.[51] It was not until 2006 that Haiti reached Decision Point. Côte d'Ivoire was deeply indebted at the start of the HIPC initiative, and was found eligible for the scheme as early as 1998 (IMF & IDA, 1998). However, due to the political crisis and subsequent fallout with the donors, Decision Point was not reached and the country did not receive any debt relief. The country was not considered for the initiative again until 2009 after two years of the *EPCA* with the IMF. Upon assessment, the donors found the country eligible, with $12.8 billion in external debts, equivalent of 153.7% of exports (IMF, 2009d, p. v).

In order to reach Decision Point under the HIPC scheme, the governments were required to first clear outstanding arrears to multilateral creditors. In the Ivorian case, arrears had reached an enormous $5.2 billion by the end of 2007 (the financial year in which the donors conducted their debt analysis). These arrears had been accumulated during the period of political crisis and were cleared through bridge loans provided by bilateral creditors in 2009 (IMF, 2009d, p. 12). In other words, in order to receive debt relief, the government had to first take out new loans, creating new debt to clear arrears on existing debt. This is reflected in the external debt stock to GNI figure, which rose upon meeting Decision Point, having been steadily falling in the years preceding entry into the HIPC scheme (see Figure 5.1). The Haitian authorities paid off $52.3 million in 2006 (IMF, 2006a, p. 8) and Chad cleared arrears of $8.2 million in 2001, in order to enter into the scheme (IMF & IDA, 2001a, p. 19).

Upon reaching Decision Point, each of the countries received interim debt relief. Only Haiti reached Completion point during the period under analysis – in 2009

[51] There is overwhelming evidence of US involvement in the suspension of funds to Haiti, in the context of their disapproval of the Haitian President. A letter from the US Representative to the IDB at the time to the IDB President set out the US position, writing that 'we [..] strongly urge you to not authorise disbursements at this time' (cited in Beeton, 2006)

(IMF, 2012b). This final stage, at which the full amount of debt relief pledged is released, was repeatedly pushed back, until 2012 for Côte d'Ivoire (IMF, 2012a) and 2015 for Chad (IMF, 2015b). This demonstrates the continued role for conditionality in the lending and debt relief instruments of the BWIs. IMF conditionalities remain present throughout the period between Decision and Completion point; for Chad this adds up to 14 years of waiting for debt relief whilst under IMF and World Bank supervision.

Figure 5.1 External Debt Stock to GNI (2000 – 2010)



Sources: See Appendices 8, 9 & 10

Figure 5.1 shows the trend of external debt stock to GNI.[52] The black data points represent the time at which the countries reached Decision Point and therefore received interim debt relief, whilst the yellow data point represents Completion Point and disbursement of the full debt relief amount (only applicable for Haiti). This shows that in each case, the interim debt relief that arrived with Decision Point had a fairly insignificant influence on the overall debt stock as a proportion

[52] The donors calculate eligibility based on total debt stock to exports of goods and services, but due to data scarcity on the value of exports in Chad, I here rely on the debt to GNI.

of GNI, which had been on a downward trend in all three countries prior to Decision Point anyway. The total external debt at any given moment is a useful measure as it corresponds to the total amount a country still has to pay to fully reimburse its debt. The debt service figure characterises the cash required over a given period for the repayment of interest and principal on a debt.

Figure 5.2 Annual Debt Service *per capita* ($) (2000 – 2010)



Sources: See Appendices 8, 9 and 10

Figure 5.2 shows the debt service *per capita* over the same period.[53] Again, there does not appear to be a significant decrease in debt service following the interim debt relief. In 2010, all three countries spent more per head servicing their external debts than they did in 2001. This is especially revealing for the case of Haiti, who reached Completion Point in 2009 and therefore received the full debt relief that was pledged under the scheme.[54] It is fair to say, therefore, that during

[53] Due to unavailability of data on debt service paid by the Chadian government, here I rely instead on debt service owed.
[54] Following the earthquake in 2010, a more serious multilateral commitment was made to forgiving Haiti's debt and meaningfully reducing the debt burden, but this did not occur under the HIPC initiative.

the studied time period, the HIPC initiative failed to alleviate the financial pressures on the governments of these countries in a way that would allow them to free up resources for much needed social services. Yet, in the hope of eventually receiving the full debt relief by reaching Completion Point, the governments were required to adhere to the many conditionalities of the scheme. In this way, the HIPC initiative served as yet another way to further embed conditionality into the lending of the BWIs.

HIPC and *PSRP*s: austerity remains the macroeconomic paradigm

This section lays out the contradictory conditionality within the HIPC and the *PRSP*s, as the donors continued to push the elements of fiscal and macroeconomic policy that they had done under the banner of *SAP*s: more restrictive budgets in order to maintain low inflation. At the same time, they also sought to tie debt relief and aid to increasing social spending and improving social indicators, all in the context of significant and fluctuating debt service payments over the period, as demonstrated by Figure 5.2.

The governments of Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti and Chad agreed to a number of 'floating point triggers' – conditions that must be met to reach Completion Point under the HIPC initiative, the point at which full debt relief is unlocked. These triggers were almost identical across the three countries and a number of them are directly related to poverty reduction efforts, including the preparation and implementation of a full *PRSP,* the use of savings originating from the debt relief for specific poverty reduction projects, and the improvement of indicators in the social sectors – particularly health and education (IMF & IDA, 2001a, p. 29; IMF, 2006a, p. 26; IMF, 2009d, p. 18).

However, at the same time, another common and key conditionality within the HIPC initiative was the maintenance of 'macroeconomic stability', which continued to be defined in narrow neoliberal terms, emphasising keeping down expenditures in order to balance the public budget. A closer look at the fiscal framework of the *PRSP*s, as they sought to meet the macroeconomic conditionalities of the HIPC initiative, demonstrates that these poverty alleviation objectives were constrained by this continued emphasis on macroeconomic stability. In other words, increasing access to basic services was ostensibly prioritised, but within an overall austerity budget. A greater portion of expenditures was to be set aside for supporting *priority* action in the social sectors, but this was a policy of shifting focus, rather than of increasing overall spending and investment.

One example of this is the continued reliance on budgetary ceilings by the IMF. In Côte d'Ivoire, the IMF demanded more austerity measures to cut the current account deficit, calling for 'rigorous spending controls' and imposing budgetary ceilings on current expenditures (IMF, 2001e, p. 5). *Per capita* spending on education fell from 2000 to 2001 (see Appendix 8) and in reviewing the government's *I-PRSP,* the donors persuaded the government to abandon its proposed health insurance scheme, arguing against some of the government's more expensive social plans (World Bank, 2002c, p. 11). After relations with the donors were suspended, spending on education increased substantially from $28 per capita in 2002 and reached $43 in 2006 (see Appendix 8). This was in spite of an ongoing political crisis and a prolonged suspension of external assistance.

The 2007 *EPCA* re-emphasised the need to rein in and restructure public spending, and demonstrates the relative emphasis that the IMF places on keeping expenditures down, over meeting basic service needs. Due to the 'considerable share' of the budget taken up post-conflict expenditures (redeployment, elections, etc.), the donors argued that increasing resources towards health and education would have to be long-term objectives and 'gradually increase' over time (IMF, 2007d, p. 57). In the short term, the strategy was to cut spending that they deemed to be 'non-essential', including in water and electricity (IMF, 2007d, p. 58). The share of funds dedicated to social spending was projected to increase. However, as we have seen elsewhere, the reality of restructuring rather than increasing expenditures translated in a reduction of *per capita* spending in the social sectors. Spending per person on education dropped from $43 in 2006 to $38 in 2007 and spending on health fell from $11 to $10 (see Appendix 8). Debt service *per capita* rose substantially over the same period, from $13 to $22, reflecting the donors' priorities and the conflicting imperatives of servicing the debt and investing in a welfare state. The reality that as the country was undergoing a period of political crisis and suspended aid, spending in the social sectors was increasing, whilst the opposite occurred under donor supervision, is telling of the sincerity of the poverty reduction objectives of the IMF and the World Bank.

In its *JSAN* on the 2009 *PRSP*, the IMF point to a number of areas where possible cuts could be made, including the wage bill, the civil service and subsidies to the electricity sector – an important pro-poor subsidy (IMF, 2009c, p. 5). However, the *PRSP* finally implemented some significant increase in spending to the social sectors, with annual spending on education averaging $57 *per capita* and annual spending on health averaging $12 *per capita*, up from previous decades, reaching similar levels to those of the late 1970s (See Appendix 9). Although this represents a significant improvement, the reality that the government spent more on education and health, when unsupervised by the BWIs, is indicative of the impact that pressure to comply with macroeconomic conditionality has on government budgeting for social services.

Haiti's *SMP* agreements with the IMF also outlined austere spending policy. One particularly draconian measure was the raising of the price of fuel by 45% in 2001 (IMF, 2001c, p. 11), and again by over 130% in 2004 (IMF, 2003b, p. 6). These measures amount to indirect taxes, known to fall disproportionately on the poor (UNEP, 2014). The 2004 *SMP* initiated further 'large expenditure cuts' over the next year (IMF, 2004b, p. 5). These were reflected in a reduction in education spending *per capita* from $8 in 2004 to $6 in 2005, and health spending stagnating at $2.50 (see Appendix 9). Equally, despite the *ICF*'s purported emphasis on improving social services, the programme remained anchored within an austerity framework (Republic of Haiti, 2004). It was not until 2006 and the implementation of the country's *PRSP* that spending in these sectors began to increase, with education spending averaging $15 per person over the period 2007 – 2009, and health spending averaging $5 per person over the same period (See Appendix 9).

Over the period of analysis, *per capita* social spending did increase. However, the growth rate of education spending (16%) and health spending (8%) was far outpaced by the growth in *per capita* debt servicing; this figure grew by 29% (See Appendix 9). This reflects the failure of the HIPC initiative to truly free up resources for social spending. For example, in 2004, the government spent $11 per person servicing its debts which amounted to more than its spending on health and education combined ($10) (See Appendix 9). Again, this reflects the contradictions of the triple imperative of increasing social spending, meeting debt obligations and keep expenditures in check. In 2009, at an Executive Board Meeting, representatives from the Haitian government appealed to the IMF for further financing, arguing that the IMF had put 'excessive emphasis' on austerity which was acting as a 'straightjacket [*sic*] that constrains the authorities' capacity to respond to critical social demand' (IMF, 2009f, p. 2). This statement is revealing of the importance that the IMF continued to place on low spending under the PWC, as well as the tensions between the policy agenda of the IMF and that of the government of Haiti.

In Chad too, the social objectives outlined in the *PRSP*s were forced to compete with the demands of austerity. In its *JSA* of the 2000 *I-PRSP*, the donors praised the Chadian government for keeping expenditures down (IMF & IDA, 2000). Amongst other austerity measures, the programme announced plans to replace the turnover tax with VAT, which the government acknowledged would lead to increases in prices that would 'negatively affect the population, especially the very poorest' (Republic of Chad, 2000, p. 23). In approving the *I-PRSP,* the donors expressed concern at the risk in developing the full *PRSP,* that the process of participation might generate 'a laundry list of wishes' with unrealistic expectations for change that was not feasible within the austerity budget. They therefore advised the authorities to focus the process on 'identifying strategic options and on analysing trade-offs' (IMF & IDA, 2000, p. 6). This is yet further evidence of the donors' insincerity with regards to 'participatory' and 'country-owned' values of the new lending framework. If listening to a range of stakeholders, including low-income communities, reveals the need for significant structural change, a genuinely participatory process would base its poverty-reduction strategy on that demand, rather than seeking neoliberal compromises.

When the full *PRSP* was reviewed by the donors, they expressed concerns again about the 'relatively ambitious' revenue and spending projections (IMF, 2003, p. 5). They approved the programme, agreeing that the spending projections were likely 'feasible' thanks to the expected oil revenues (IMF, 2003a, p. 5). However, budget execution was a problem under this programme; some sectors did not receive the resources that they were allocated, including health, which received just 88% of allocated funds, and education, receiving 90%. This, the donors suggest, was due to the crowding out by military expenditures (World Bank, 2011). Government revenues increased more than six-fold between 2003 and their height in 2008, reflecting increased oil production and higher than anticipated oil prices (World Bank, 2011, p. 1). Spending on health did not increase at anywhere near this rate; the government spent $10 per person on health in 2004, up from $4 in 2000, but this slowly dropped off to roughly $7 per person in 2006 through to 2010 (see Appendix 10). Education spending rose from $5 per person in 2001 to $9 in 2004, again not reflecting the rate of increased revenues (see Appendix 10).

The country's second *PRSP* was produced as oil revenues were falling, and so the programme's projections for expenditure reflected this; the Chadian authorities promised to 'redouble its efforts to contain the expansion of public spending', in particular wages (Republic of Chad, 2008, p. 7). The creation of 'social safety nets' and a health insurance policy were outlined as more 'long term' ambitions (Republic of Chad, 2008, p. 11). The donors approved the programme in 2010, commenting that 'the staffs encourage the government to streamline the scope and number of priority programmes and actions' (World Bank, 2010, p. 3). The extent of the cuts to spending was determined by the 2009 *SMP* (IMF, 2009a).

What this policy analysis has demonstrated is clear continuity from the *SAP*s through the *PRSP*s with regards to spending policy. Despite bold and ambitious projects and plans developed in the *PRSP*s, the governments were routinely circumscribed in their capacity to implement social programmes and maintain satisfactory levels of social spending, by spending ceilings and pressure to meet debt servicing. Yet, the conditionalities of the HIPC meant that they must increase spending in the social sectors. This was expected in the absence of any debt relief at all (in order to reach Decision Point) and following small amounts of interim debt relief (in between Decision Point and Completion Point) which, as this chapter as shown, was largely ineffective in reducing the debt service payments. Borrowing countries are therefore trapped in a difficult situation where they need debt relief to free up funds for social spending, but must increase the resources to social spending (all the while meeting increasing debt service payments), before they can receive debt relief. This is demonstrative of the ineffectiveness of the cold economic logic of the HIPC and its use by the donors as a tool for re-embedding conditionality and re-entrenching power inequalities between lending institutions and borrowing countries, via coercive means.

Austerity and privatisation: what consequences for poverty reduction?

How then, to improve the access of the poor to social services, within a restrictive macroeconomic policy environment? The answer: the private sector, NGOs and communities themselves, would take responsibility for service provision and financing. This section takes a look at some of the ways in which domestic and donor policymakers sought to respond to the desperate need for better-quality education and health, by transferring responsibilities away from the state. It also explores some of the human development outcomes after a decade of *PRSP*s.

One way of shifting the burden of social service provision from the state was through decentralising social services. In Côte d'Ivoire, decentralisation efforts have included the assignment of spending execution responsibilities and revenue raising functions for local health and education infrastructure, to municipalities. Funds for health centres and schools were transferred to local committees, who became accountable for these resources (World Bank, 2002c, p. 10). In Chad too, both *PRSPs* moved to decentralise the funding and management of healthcare and education systems, by sharing responsibilities and budgetary priorities between the state, local authorities and communities (Republic of Chad, 2003, pp. 66-67;

2008, p. 91). This had limited results in terms of making services more accessible and equitable, since devolving authority and responsibility cannot produce good quality and widely available services without sufficient capacity at the local level (Carnoy, 2004).

As well as devolving responsibility from central to local governments, the *PRSP*s also sought to shift responsibility for delivering services to the private sector. Vetoing the Ivorian government's proposed plans for Universal Health Insurance, the donors instead proposed that the government seek cheaper alternatives by building on existing private initiatives (World Bank, 2002c, p. 11). In Haiti too, the IMF encouraged the government to license and support private schools (IMF, 2006b, p. 4). This is in spite of the reality that in 2002, the World Bank wrote that privatisation 'proved to be contentious' (World Bank, 2002b, p. 6) and 'is a politically charged issue in Haiti and should be approached carefully' (World Bank, 2002b, p. 20). The proportion of primary school enrolment represented by private schools rose from an already high 80% in 2002 to 90% in 2009 (World Bank, 2009c, p. 53; 2002b, p. 9). In Chad, the government was also advised to channel finances through NGOs and the private sector; 'community' schools in particular were promoted. The government planned to increase the proportion of community teachers from 56% in 2000 to 80% by 2010 (Republic of Chad, 2003, p. 67). This was clearly a case of 'doing more with less' – in Chad, community teachers in 2007 were found to earn between 2 to 24 times less than state-employed teachers (World Bank, 2007b, p. xviii).

The introduction of marketised models of service delivery into the social sectors became the strategy. This includes the continued reliance on cost recovery; in none of the three countries' *PRSP*s, did the strategy involve the elimination of user fees in health care or education that had taken place under structural adjustment, with devastating effects, as shown in chapter three. Rather, in Chad, community schools were encouraged to collect student fees, asking for financial and in-kind support from communities (Republic of Chad, 2003, p. 66). In Haiti, by 2013, a staggering 93% of health facilities were charging user fees in Haiti (World Bank, 2017a, p. 9).

This continued charging of communities for health and education services has entrenched inequalities in the access to basic services. For example, in 2009, the Ivorian government acknowledged that many problems in health care were due to a lack of funding, and the poor recovery of health costs – itself a result of the 'pauperisation of the population' (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009, p. 57). In other words, attempts to introduce user fees into the health service had failed to cover costs, since the population was too poor to pay. Progress in health in Haiti has also been so slow; child and maternal mortality rates, although they dropped slightly over the period of analysis, remain the highest in the region (World Bank, 2017a, p. 4).

This same trend is observed in education. In 2010, a World Bank study found that the poor are much less likely to attend school and that in Haiti, 'fees are a major barrier to school attendance' (Demombynes, Holland, & Leon, 2010, p. 15). In 2006, the annual cost of sending a child to school in Haiti (including books, uniforms, transport) was estimated to be $131 (Adelman & Holland, 2015, p. 3), well out of the reach of three quarters of the population who were living on less than $2 per day (IMF, 2006b, p. 2). It is therefore unsurprising that enrolment dropped from 64% in 2002 to 55% in 2009 – with secondary enrolment as low as 20% (IDA & IFC, 2009, p. 10). Bolstering private schools in Chad also returned limited progress; although the primary school enrolment rate rose over the period of the two *NPRS*, completion rates stagnated at 28% from 2000 to 2009 (World Bank, 2013, p. 51). Furthermore, the marketisation of education entrenches inequalities because most families can only afford the cheapest, low-quality schools. It is worth highlighting that by the early 21st century, these institutions would have been well aware of the nefarious consequences of user-fees in essential basic services; in 2000 the director of poverty programmes at the UNDP declared that 'all we know from experience is that user fees are a deterrent to universal education and universal health' (Ka-Min, 2000).

Privatisation has political repercussions too; in Haiti, the IMF acknowledged that the process of using private providers for public services 'had the effect quite often of fostering the creation of structures parallel to public institutions, further weakening government structures and contributing to even greater lack of consistency of the action taken' (IMF, 2006b, p. 8). In other words, by channelling resources via private providers rather than public ones, the strategy pitted the government against NGOs, competing for resources – both human and financial, creating a parallel NGO state and a weakened public sector. This is all the more significant in the context of the donors' stated commitment to country-owned strategies that improve the quality and accessibility of basic services.

Overall, the development trends over the period of analysis are disappointing, albeit unsurprising, given the continued donor obsession with macroeconomic austerity. Côte d'Ivoire experienced the most regression; poverty increased from 38.2% in 2002 to 49% in 2008 (World Bank, 2010b, p. i.). The country was undergoing a significant period of political turmoil during the best part of the 2000s, which makes it difficult to attribute the increase in poverty fully to austerity, but a broader perspective, looking at the full period of donor supervision shows a continued increase from the 1980s and well into the *PRS* era. It is therefore fair to suggest that donor-sponsored austerity policies have contributed to the substantial increase in poverty rates. The country dropped from its position on the HDI in 1995 of 145th to 166th in 2008 (World Bank, 2010b, p. 4).

In contrast, Haiti's social indicators improved very slightly over the period; between 2000 and 2012, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty dropped from 31% to 24% (World Bank, 2014b, p. xiii). However, the country's position on the UN's HDI actually worsened over the decade; in 2000, Haiti ranked 156th out of 187 countries (Republic of Haiti, 2008, p. 30) and dropped down to 158th in 2011 (IMF, 2013, p. 10). This shows that despite some improvements, development was slower compared to other countries in the global periphery. Chad too saw some improvements in social indicators, the proportion of Chadians living below the poverty line dropped from 55% in 2003 to 47% in 2011. However, the absolute number poor rose over the period (World Bank, 2013, pp.

2-3). In 2011, Chad ranked 175th out of 182 countries in the HDI, representing no improvement from 2000 (World Bank, 2011, p. vii).

This section has shown that the 2000-2010 strategy – as articulated in *PRSP*s and other donor-produced programmes and documents - ostensibly sought to improve social indicators, but without significantly changing resource distribution. An increased concern for social issues also finds expression in the introduction of a number of social programmes that focus directly on the priority sectors of health and education with the view to reducing poverty. However, spending in the social sectors clearly remains circumscribed by the neoliberal macroeconomic framework within which the *PRSP* must operate. The fundamental conflict between the ambitions outlined in the *PRSP*s produced by the authorities, the donors' *JSAN*s and the IMF's *SMP*s, highlights that the *PRSP*s has not bolstered ownership or sovereignty. Rather, the new PRS lending represents an entrenchment of conditionality and thus the continued manifestation of coercive power under the PWC. In working towards eligibility for the programme (Decision Point), or working towards Completion Point, and adhering to strict austerity budgets, the HIPC impeded the ability of the governments to invest in much needed social sectors in any impactful way. The recourse to the private sector has a dually damaging effect: firstly, it reinforces inequalities by excluding the poorest from vital services; and secondly, it undermines the state as the provider of welfare by creating a parallel economy of NGOs.

Austerity rebranded: the necessity and *morality* of austerity

This chapter has shown that in establishing the financial framework, the donors (through the HIPC initiative and the conditionalities attached to *PRSP* loans) also set the parameters of what was possible in social policy terms. This limited the extent to which any significant improvements could be made on the development front. Yet, as the introduction to part two showed, the PRS framework was launched to address these same criticisms that were levelled against structural adjustment lending. It is therefore crucial to understand how the donors have been able to frame and legitimise the continuation of austerity measures. Essential to the enquiry is how austerity has been maintained as an economic truth within the discourse of the *PRSP* era after the widespread discrediting of structural adjustment. How has the discourse evolved to respond to criticism, and legitimise the policies of these programmes, in the context of this new policy paradigm? This section attempts to answer some of these questions. The neo-Gramscian emphasis on co-opting counter-hegemonic values will be especially illuminative here, in light of the new framework.

Two main arguments are identified: the first is a continuation from the *SAP* era. Chapter three identified an austerity discourse within the *SAP*s that built on the demonisation of the welfare state and the discursive construction of the social sectors as a burden on the economy. This supported the argument that austerity was both rational and a necessary response to the financial crisis. A similar argument is put forth in documents from the PRS era – emphasising the necessity and rationality of austerity in the context of a fiscal crisis. Many of the discursive strategies and devices are consistent with those used in the *SAP*s. This argument is identified primarily in the donor-produced documents: *SMP*s, *CAS*, and the *JSAN*s.

The second overarching argument is unique to the PRS era, and it serves to legitimise specific interventions in the social sectors, on the basis that they are pro-poor. This argument co-opts counter-hegemonic values of pro-poor spending, social inclusion and democracy, in order to legitimise the handing over of social service provision to the private sector, legitimising the austerity framework. This discourse is found in both the voices of the national authorities in the PRSPs and in the donors' documents.

These two arguments are supported by a number of recurring claims:

Claim 1	The country faces a financial crisis that is a result of poor government policy
Claim 2	Austerity is necessary
Claim 3	The development strategy is in the interests of the poor

Claim 4	The way to improve access to social services is by making resources more efficient, not increasing them
Claim 5	The privatisation and decentralisation of social services is democratic and pro-poor

The first argument identified above is represented by claims 1 and 2, whilst the second argument is represented by claims 3, 4 and 5. Tables 5.1 – 5.5 provide an overview of the evidencing excerpts for each of these claims and the discursive devices that I identify. As in the previous chapters, extended discourse tables with further evidence can be found in appendix 11.

Argument 1: there is no alternative to austerity

The first overarching argument identified in the donors' discourse – that there is no alternative to austerity – rests on the same claims and assumptions contained in the *SAP*s, and is often supported by the same discursive devices.

Across numerous programmes and across the three countries, the donors continue to depict a grave financial scenario, portraying the economy as facing a crisis. The first claim is that **poor government policy is responsible for the crisis.**

Table 5.1: Claim 1

Device	Purpose	Example
Economy is a human body metaphor	Assists in naturalisation of economy and framing of austerity as medicine	'The overall **health** of the financial system **deteriorated** somewhat in 2000' (IMF, 2001e, p. 9) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Haiti has **suffered** for the past three and a half years from a political climate that has led to the [...] postponement of structural reforms' (IMF, 2001c, p. 3) (Haiti) 'This fall in oil revenue will trigger a **sharp deterioration** of the fiscal position in 2009, which necessitates a fiscal adjustment' (IMF, 2009a, p. 3) (Chad)
Topos of stability	Frames macroeconomic stability as stability more broadly	'The fiscal situation became increasingly *precarious* in 2000' (IMF, 2001e, p. 7) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'There are risks to the program and its financing, especially in light of the *policy slippages* that occurred during FY 1999/2000' (IMF, 2001c, p. 19) (Haiti) 'So far, oil production has fuelled a fiscal expansion that has placed public expenditure on an *unsustainable* path and weakened financial discipline' (IMF, 2009a, p. 3) (Chad)

Topos of burden	Frames the public sector as a burden on the country's finances	'The workshop concluded that the major constraints to growth and equitable development in Côte d'Ivoire were: [...] (ii) an ineffective and *overly centralised public sector*, misguided public expenditure allocation and poor management and control of public finances' (World Bank, 2002c, p. 9) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'On the spending side, domestically financed expenditures are reduced by [...] reducing the *unwieldy envelope* of investment spending' (IMF, 2009a, p. 13) (Chad)

Like in the earlier *SAP*s, the health metaphor is evoked, aiding in the depiction of the economy as a natural phenomenon and the conceptualisation of financial crisis or financial difficulties as a disease. In describing the 'health' of the economy and referring to its 'deterioration', 'weakness', 'suffering' and 'recovery', physical illnesses become an effective metaphor for simplifying complex and abstract situations in the economy. This allows for the financial crisis to be imagined as a medical condition, austerity as a medical treatment, and the donors as expert doctors prescribing solutions.

The *topos of stability* remains a key device within this claim, as the donors emphasise the instability of the economies, using adjectives such as 'precarious' 'unsustainable', 'unstable' to depict the economic situation. However, as argued in chapter three, the instrumentalisation of this *topos* reduces the meaning of stability to a selected number of financial measures, namely the budget deficit and inflation. In deploying the *topos of stability* in this way, the donors attribute the broader economic, social (and sometimes political) crises that these countries were facing, fully to a fiscal crisis.

In the Haitian context, for example, the World Bank discursively link macroeconomic stability and political stability, framing the former as a condition of the latter:

> '[The strategy] seeks to maintain stability, [...] escape the current crisis, and ensure the country continues on a path towards economic security' (World Bank, 2009c, p. 14).

Here, the separate and distinct objectives of balancing the budget and ensuring political stability are blurred through paratactic grammatical relations, and the suggestion is that without macroeconomic stability (as understood through a narrow, neoliberal lens), political stability could not be achieved. This discursive conflation of fiscal stability with political stability is another example of the narrowing of the meaning of stability, which ignores other important reasons for the economic, social and political challenges that these countries experienced during the decade. As we have seen, neoliberal trade policies had devastating consequences on the economy, as well as austerity measures that fell disproportionately on the poor. Yet, the donors' framing blames exclusively the state's fiscal situation for what were multifactorial economic crises, thereby reinforcing the neoliberal discourse of state inefficiency.

Indeed, the donors also attribute many of the financial problems that they identify to the inappropriate policies of past and present governments – as they did in the *SAP*s**.** They predicate central government and public sector management negatively, using adjectives such as 'poor', and 'weak', to depict the public sector as incompetent, describing the 'lacklustre performance' of the economy in the Chadian context. They also nominate non-compliance with donor budgets or policies as 'policy slippages', again drawing on the *topos of stability.* This amounts to the depoliticisation of the discourse, as it presents policies preferred by the donors (including austerity measures), as objectively good policies, rather than political choices. This is again reminiscent of the structural adjustment blame discourse. It is interesting that this persists in the *PRSP*s, given the significant control that the donors had over financial and economic policy during the two decades that precede these programmes. Far from acknowledging the fundamental problems of their own programmes, the donors maintain the position that blame can be placed squarely at the door of government.

In some excerpts, we see a harking back to the anti-state rhetoric that characterised much of the donors' language during the structural adjustment period. In these examples, the government is portrayed as incompetent and their spending as 'misguided' or 'unwieldy', operationalising the *topos of burden* that was prominent in the *SAP*s to emphasise an oversized state sector and a weariness at the perception that governments have overspent and poorly spent, and cannot be trusted with public money. This discourse suggests that the role of central government ought to be reduced and their powers/influence in certain sectors curbed, therefore legitimising the withdrawal of the state from the social sectors.

In the Haitian context, the blame strategy is slightly different. Rather than focussing their criticisms on overspending and overinvestment, the criticism is widened to public governance more broadly:

> 'The causes of poverty are political instability, poor governance, and corruption; inadequate levels of investment; poor institutional capacity; underinvestment in human capital and poor quality of social spending; high fertility; and domestic insecurity' (IMF, 2001c, p. 15)

Interestingly, the donors cite underinvestment as a key reason for underdevelopment. This represents a divergence from the structural adjustment discourse – which explicitly argued against spending in the social sectors, portrayed as a burden on the economy. This excerpt neatly glosses over the reality that 'underinvestment in human capital' was a key policy of structural adjustment. The donors fail to acknowledge the role that they played in facilitating this process, or indeed the role that they continued to play in the poverty reduction era, in limiting the financial resources available for development expenditures.

Despite the slight nuance in the blame discourse across the three cases, the factors that the donors identify as contributing to the country's problems are all endogenous; the authors accept no responsibility for the role of international institutions in exacerbating poverty. The general view of the donors across the three countries is that national finances have been mismanaged and that a good deal of repair work is/was needed to place these countries' economies back on a more stable plane. Importantly, in depicting the countries to be facing a crisis, and in attributing the causes or contributing factors of this crisis to weak policy performance, the donors establish a rationale for reform and begin to not only legitimise austerity measures but also present them as inescapable. This legitimation is supported by the second claim: **austerity is necessary to ensure financial credibility.**

Table 5.2. Claim 2

Device	Purpose	Example
Topos of reality	Establishes necessity of austerity measures	'The budget would need to accommodate the costs of these programs, including the *realistic* costing, domestic support, and domestic resources' (IMF, 2007d, p. 15) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Large expenditure cuts were *required* to keep the fiscal position in check' (IMF, 2004b, p. 5) (Haiti) 'The authorities fiscal policies in 2002 seek to increase public spending on poverty-reducing areas while maintaining a *financeable* budgetary position' (IMF, 2001a, p. 15) (Chad)
Economy is a machine	Frames austerity measures as a technical fix	'The failure to take appropriate **corrective** measures in the face of a deteriorating fiscal situation contributed to the disappointing economic performance' (IMF, 2001e, p. 20) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'The Staff welcomes the significant **corrective** actions taken by the authorities' (IMF, 2003b, p. 12) (Haiti) 'The World Bank Group will assist the government in: (i) monitoring the budget process and designing **corrective** actions (World Bank, 2003a, p. 18.) (Chad)
Economy is a human body	Frames austerity measures as an economic antidote	'Achieving this objective will critically depend on [...] **sound** macroeconomic policies' (World Bank, 2002e, p. 11) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'In order to continue maintaining a **sound** macroeconomic framework, the Government has prepared, and intends to fully implement, a macroeconomic stabilisation program' (World Bank, 2004b, p. 7) (Haiti) Over the last CAS period, a **sound** strategy for education was developed [...] (World Bank, 2003a, p. 14)
Topos of responsibility	Frames austerity measures as responsible/ moral	'The implementation of *prudent* macroeconomic policies [...] reduced financial imbalances and alleviated structural rigidities' (World Bank, 2002e, p. 14) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Lastly, prospective macroeconomic programs should take into account the vulnerability of Haiti's economy to domestic and external shocks, and include *prudent* elements of contingency planning' (World Bank, 2004c, p. 45) (Haiti) 'Against this background, the authorities have committed to prepare a *responsible* budget' (IMF, 2009a, p. 15) (Chad)

This argument builds on the notion of a self-induced fiscal crisis to make the case that austerity measures are both pragmatic and essential to ensure financial credibility. This is an argument found in the donors' discourse, usually expressed in the *SMP*s or in the *JSAN*s. In this way, the donors use this argument to both approve the ongoing austerity measures, and to criticise the governments where they feel that austerity has not gone far enough, e.g. in the *PRSP*s.

Across the three cases the donors stressed that budgets must be ‘realistic’, ‘financeable’ and must take into account the resource and capacity constraints of the economy. Within this discourse the emphasis is consistently on the absolute ‘necessity’ of austerity, as the donors argued that cuts were ‘required’ and that there exists an undeniable ‘need to economise’. The discursive subordination of political decision-making to perceived economic necessities is supported by the *topos of reality* within these excerpts.

The donors focus mainly on the financial implications of spending cuts, with a notable silence around the question of the deleterious social impacts of austerity. The withdrawal of the state subsidy on petrol, diesel and kerosene in Haiti proved hugely unpopular, leading to widespread protests. The government launched a public relations campaign to sell the price increase to an agitated population, which the IMF describes:

> ‘[Raising fuel prices] was socially and politically very sensitive, but a strong public information campaign of the authorities appears to have succeeded in explaining its necessity’ (IMF, 2003b, p. 6)

The IMF nominate this as ‘information campaigns’, presenting pro-austerity propaganda as neutral ‘information’. This admission also reveals the insincerity of the donors’ stated commitment to country-owned and participatory strategies; surely nationally owned reforms that had been designed through broad-based participation would not provoke protest and require such a response?

This insincerity with regards to the needs of the population is evident in the case of Chad too, where staff at the IMF expressed their concern that the participatory process that would precede the full PRSP would ‘generate a laundry list of wishes’ that ‘cannot be met in the short term’ (IMF; IDA, 2000, p. 6). The risk that the sound logic of austerity might be trumped by populist temptations is articulated here. The *topos of reality* assists in the privileging of the priority of containing public spending over the transfer of resources to the poor. The argument is that, regardless of the support for public investments in welfare amongst the population, the government simply *cannot* increase spending. This is perhaps best exemplified by the following quote from the donors *JSAN* on Haiti's *I-PRSP* from 2006:

> 'As in many fragile states, Haiti is faced with many pressing priorities and, on the one hand, high expectations among citizens and, on the other, capacity constraints. Thus, the need to balance expectations with the capacity to deliver on the implementation and monitoring of the PRSP is also a challenge' (IMF, 2006b, p. 6)

In emphasising the necessity of austerity, the discourse not only legitimises unpopular reforms, but it also conceals their political nature and the ideological bias of the lending institutions themselves. Rather than reveal themselves as the propagators of a particular neoliberal agenda, the discourse serves the purpose of veiling the donors from political criticism, on the basis that the reforms are driven by economic necessity rather than political choice. Indeed, in the Haitian context, the World Bank stated that it would continue dialogue and consultation with civil society, 'to ensure the Bank's credibility as a neutral development partner' depicting the Bank as an impartial expert rather than an organisation with an ideological or political agenda (World Bank, 2004c, p. 36).

Both the health and mechanical metaphors are identified again in the discourse, playing a key role in representing the economy as a broken system that can be fixed through technical austerity measures, or an ill patient that can be treated with a sound dose of austerity. These metaphors reinforce a dichotomy between 'right and 'wrong', and 'good' and 'bad' economic policies, depoliticising austerity and delegitimising any potential opposition as being either ideological or self-serving.

The donor draw on the *topos of responsibility,* to suggest an association of the fundamental economic goal of balanced budgets with a government that is 'prudent', 'disciplined' and 'responsible', and not indulging in unnecessary spending. This conflates austerity with rationalism and common sense, and in doing so constructs a logic of equivalence between fiscal responsibility and limited public spending. Just as stability is reduced to fiscal stability, the sense of responsibility is associated uniquely with fiscal responsibility. This allows the discourse to associate responsibility, an unquestionable personal virtue, with an economic austerity policy paradigm that can and must be questioned for its devastating consequences. These two claims, of a self-induced financial crisis and the imperative of austerity, set up the discursive legitimisation of austerity policies in a very similar way to the structural adjustment discourse.

Argument 2: inclusive austerity

This section articulates the second main argument found within the *PRSP*s, which represents a divergence from earlier programmes. This is the moral justification of austerity: specifically, cost-saving interventions, including privatisation and decentralisation - in the social sectors - on the basis that doing so aids the poor and strengthens democracy. It is this argument that differentiates the language in the *PRSP*s to that found in the *SAP*s. Since the *PRSP*s promised a PWC with a new focus on alleviating poverty and improving other social and economic indicators beyond just GDP growth, the donors could no longer justify austerity purely on the basis that the macroeconomic situation demanded it. As we have seen, this claim remains within their discourse, but was not in itself a sufficient argument to legitimise ongoing austerity in the context of the perceived failure of structural adjustment and the development of the MDGs. Diverging from the explicitly anti-welfare state discourse of earlier programmes, the *PRSP*s go beyond arguments of necessity and instead appeal to morality and the values of social inclusion and social protection of vulnerable group. In the context of continued austerity measures, this argument discursively links continued austerity and privatisation of the social sectors to the goals of poverty reduction and democracy. In so doing, it co-opts counter-hegemonic arguments in order to portray the *PRSP*s as pro-poor, and therefore legitimises and entrenches the austerity agenda.

The third claim – and the first claim supporting this second argument – is that **the development strategy is in the interests of the poor.** The policy analysis showed that conditionalities in the *PRSP*s have expanded into the sphere of social reproduction with various conditions directly linked to poverty spending targets and the expansion of social services to the poor – albeit limited by contradictory spending ceiling conditionalities.

An obvious manifestation of this expansion of donor policy is the discursive foregrounding of poverty reduction in the *PRSP*s. The frequency of references to poverty in the *PRSP*s is significantly greater than in the earlier SAPs: in Côte d'Ivoire's *I-PRSP* the word poverty is identified 290 times in 100 pages and 276 in the 199 pages of the full 2009 *PRSP*. In Haiti's 2006 *I-PRSP*, this frequency is 105 times in 56 pages, and then 375 times in the 277 pages of the full 2009 *PRSP*. Chad's *I-PRSP* mentions poverty 491 times in 194 pages, the full 2003 *PRSP* 288 times in 142 pages, and the later 2008 *PRSP* 494 times in 194 pages. This in itself does not indicate a social justice or pro-poor discourse, but it represents a significant shift from the *SAP*s, in which there was scant mention of poverty or poverty reduction objectives.

Excerpts from the *PRSP*s do indicate a rhetorical shift towards the values of social inclusion, equality and protection. These excerpts are each taken from the Executive Summary section within the country's *PRSP* and are therefore indicative of the discursive emphasis on these values within the strategy:

> 'Outcome 3: *"Ensuring Social Welfare for All*" will be attained through the effects of the implementation of Strategic Orientation 4: "Improvement of the *Accessibility and Quality of Basic Services*, Protection of the Environment, Promotion of Gender Equality and *Social Protection*". This implementation will help attain, by 2015, the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and ensure *for each citizen his inalienable rights to quality of life and access to basic services*' (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009, p. iv)

> 'The promotion of *greater social equity* through education and health will prove to be key to *reducing poverty and inequality during* this period' (Republic of Haiti, 2007, p. 9)

> 'The main objective is to ensure that all Chadian children have access to high-quality universal primary education, to *eliminate inequalities* - by gender and region - in access to education, health, nutrition, and nonfarm employment, and *to put in place the social policies and institutions necessary for improving the living conditions of vulnerable groups*, particularly homeless children, the disabled, women, and the elderly' (Republic of Chad, 2008, p. 4)

These excerpts appear to present an alternative version to the *SAP*s, appealing to morality in their emphasis on social inclusion and social protection, particularly for vulnerable groups; they are examples of a more inclusive discourse. However, the problems of these groups and their capacity to access to social services are represented somewhat superficially within the policy programmes.

This is indicative in the fourth claim, that **the way to improve access (to social services) is by improving the efficiency of resources**. The economic efficiency argument, consistent with neoliberal ideas, trumps the priority of social protection. Having set out in their Executive Summaries their purported commitment to the values and objectives of social inclusion and poverty reduction, a closer look at the narrative around public spending in the development sectors in both the donors' commentaries and the *PRSP*s reveals that these values were far from embedded in the development strategy.

Table 5.3. Claim 4

Device	Purpose	Example
Topos of efficiency	Frames the challenges in the social sectors as a result of inefficient spending rather than insufficient spending	'The I-PRSP places too much emphasis on developing infrastructure in the social sectors and contains little or no analysis of the *current inefficiencies* in the allocation of resources, the *quality of services* delivered, or the *effectiveness* of the programmes in achieving specified goals' (World Bank, 2002e, p. 4) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'The education system is characterised by *extremely low quality* and *internal inefficiency'* (World Bank, 2004c, p. 13) (Haiti) "Efforts to improve the *quality of expenditure* will strengthen its impact on the development goals. *Greater efficienc*y may then make it possible to achieve the MDGs at less cost, with the added benefit of a more sustainable level of expenditure' (Republic of Chad, 2008, p. 12) (Chad)

Instead, the dominant focus is on market values of efficiency, value for money and competition. Across the case studies, the donors and the authorities argue for improving the 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness', 'quality' and 'performance' of public spending. The needs of the social sectors are regularly discussed in terms of efficiency gains, optimisation and doing more with less. Both governments and donors highlighted the difficulties of 'low quality' and 'inefficiencies' within the health and education sectors. In the Ivorian context, the donors criticise the *PRSP* for not dedicating enough attention to these challenges in their analysis, and for focussing too much on investment.

Rather than addressing broader systemic issues of underinvestment and underfunding, the language used to discuss the spending strategy is technocratic, relegating the role of the state to putting in place appropriate institutional settings to provide services. As we have seen, the consequences of such superficial focus on the social sectors in practice led to disappointing outcomes in terms of social indicators and poverty reduction. However, in all three cases, the donors make a direct link between improving the efficiency of spending and meeting social objectives. Rather than increasing investment in new facilities, or training new professionals in health or education, the emphasis is on more effective and 'focused' spending, to achieve 'maximum results'. A pertinent example of this logic is found in the donors' comments on Haiti's *PRSP*, in which they argued that 'improving health outcomes will depend on the effectiveness of public expenditure management in the sector' (IMF, 2008, p. 6).

Central to this argument is the idea that curbing spending and meeting development priorities are not mutually exclusive goals, exemplified by the Chadian authorities' comment in their 2008 *PRSP:*

> 'Efforts to improve the quality of expenditure will strengthen its impact on the development goals. Greater efficiency may then make it possible to achieve the MDGs at less cost, with the added benefit of a more sustainable level of expenditure' (Republic of Chad, 2008, p. 12)

Within this discourse, the notion of quality and even equity of social services is reduced to cost-effectiveness and efficiency. In other words, focussing, optimising and rendering more efficient social spending, is sufficient to improve health and education indicators, within a framework of limited public spending, as argued by the donors' comments on the same programme*:*

> 'Fiscal consolidation need not come at the expense of development priorities; it can be achieved while focusing spending on priority areas' (World Bank, 2010c, p. 4)

The *topos of efficiency* is deployed in these excerpts, leaning on the accepted notion that if an action reduces cost and inefficiency, then this action should be taken. In consistently framing current spending as 'inefficient', the donors frame an austere fiscal approach as efficiency enhancing, and thus legitimise spending reductions. This also leads the reader to the conclusion that it is efficiency, rather than investment, that is key to improving the quality and accessibility of services. This discourse serves to downplay both the scale and impacts of austerity. This notion of improving the existing services of public organisations, without increasing current and investment spending, appeals to reason in the context of the established financial crisis. Austerity is thus framed as targeted cuts and performance and efficiency-related improvements in the social sectors; this also aids in the discursive construction of austerity as technical reforms, rather than political ones.

However, as we have seen, it is the underinvestment and underfunding of social services that led to worsening social indicators during the *SAP*s, and very limited progress – and even some reverse progress - under the *PRSP*s. This misrepresents the material reality facing these countries. In emphasising the need to improve the efficiency of public spending and articulating a connection between cost-effectiveness and poverty reduction, the donors were able to frame the social sectors as a priority, without meaningfully diverging from the structural adjustment era policies of austerity. As we have seen, resources that flowed to the social sectors remained circumscribed by the austere macroeconomic framework during the years under analysis, but the discourse maintains that it is sufficient to improve the 'quality' of spending and therefore services, which will lead to poverty reduction. As the policy analysis argued, this was not the case in the three case studies – rather, continued budgetary restraint pushed governments to pursue cheaper ways of financing services, such as charging for services, which had adverse consequences on health and education. The discourse therefore manipulates the reality that in these countries, fiscal consolidation *has* come at the expense of development. The focus on 'doing more with less' supports the notion that improving the quality of basic services is indeed a priority of these programmes, masking the real consequences. This discourse reflects the managerial culture of efficiency and profit-driven organisation that are key characteristics of neoliberal ideology. This is not to deny that efficiency gains through increased effectiveness remain important considerations in low-income countries seeking to improve the access of their health and education coverage. However, the ongoing incorporation of these neoliberal ideas within the policy prescriptions and the discourse of the BWIs serves to reinforce politically the credibility of damaging austerity policies.

As the policy analysis demonstrated, a key way that the *PRSP*s sought to improve the efficiency of public service delivery, was via privatisation. The fifth and final claim is that **the privatisation and decentralisation of social services is democratic and pro-poor.**

In announcing plans to shift provision of services from the state to the private sector, across the three case studies, the discourse couches the reforms in the language of democracy and participation, in order to frame them as both progressive and pro-poor. Key to this claim is the notion that private groups are better providers of services than statutory ones. As this thesis has argued throughout, this notion of efficient markets and inefficient states is germane to neoliberal thinking. The theoretical assumption that unfettered markets lead to better utilisation and allocation of resources, can even apply to areas that are widely considered as public goods or even basic human rights. As I have argued, neoliberalism holds that the private market mechanisms (supply, demand and price) are more efficient than public ones, since they allow the benefits (choice, quality and accessibility) to trickle down to all citizens. This logic has been applied by some groups espousing neoliberal ideas to social service provision too

(McGregor, 2001). The legitimisation of marketised methods of delivering health and education is essential to sustaining these practices in the *PRSP*s.

Table 5.4: Claim 5

Device	Purpose	Example
Topos of efficiency	Frames private providers as more efficient than public providers	'Government […] has agreed to using a variety of implementing agencies and appropriate and *efficient financing mechanisms*, including direct financing of NGOs, community-based organisations and the private sector' (World Bank, 2002c, p. 22) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Private schools, often run by non-governmental and private organisations, including faith-based groups which play an important role in the education sector, *enroll three times more children than public schools*' (World Bank, 2004c, p. 13) (Haiti) 'With a growth rate of 20 percent per year, these [community] schools are the most dynamic part of Chad's primary education system and account for a large part of the remarkable progress made by Chad in primary education' (World Bank, 2003a, p. 14) (Chad)
Topos of democracy	Frames privatisation of social services as increasing democratic participation	'*Beneficiaries' participation* […] will be systemically sought through […] the *empowerment of stakeholders* in the education and health sectors' (World Bank, 2002c, p. 10) (Côte d'Ivoire) '*Community participation* is a key element in the local development dynamic' (Republic of Haiti, 2004, p. 20) (Haiti) 'The Bank […] will support the government in […] *strengthening the capacity and responsibility of local communities* […] The focus during the CAS period will be on *empowering communities'* (World Bank, 2003a, p. 23) (Chad)
Topos of social inclusion	Frames privatised/decentralised services as more inclusive	'Decentralisation as a means *of participation of the population in the process of development and reduction of regional disparities'* (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009, p. 92) 'This includes *community-driven development approaches* to build *social inclusion, participation, transparency, trust* and public-private partnerships at the local level while improving basic social economic, and infrastructure services' (World Bank, 2004c, p. ii)(Haiti) '*Greater equity* in access to education will be sought by *supporting community initiative*s and through their *participation* in the management and financing of education' (Republic of Chad, 2003, p. 67) (Chad)

Haiti's 2001 *SMP*, in justifying the channelling of resources to private schools, the IMF resort to blaming the government for low-quality education, arguing that 'many years of weak government involvement in education, the private sector and NGOs have stepped in to fill the void' (IMF, 2001c, p. 16). In framing the rise of the role of the private sector in education as a result of poor government policy, the IMF misrepresents the reality that chapter three explored: that the continued underfunding of education through *SAP*s was the result of BWI-owned and imposed policies, not the policies of the Haitian government. This is a blatant denial of reality, legitimising the donors' roles as neutral experts, advising an inefficient and incompetent government. Furthermore, the donors present privately provided services as offering a better quality service than state providers, drawing on the *topos of efficiency,* emphasising the enrolment rates of private schools. In the Chadian context, private schools are praised as 'dynamic' and having 'flourished', in contrast with state schools, which are described as being in a 'dilapidated and precarious' state (Republic of Chad, 2003, p. 41). This binary description is in line with Bourdieu and Wacquant's framework; it assists in the presentation of privatisation as a logical and common sense solution to the problem of poor state provision, rather than a driver of it. This legitimises the continued underfunding of state services, on the basis that they are not efficient; the discourse is therefore is responsible for re-embedding poverty.

Furthermore, as this chapter has demonstrated, the progress made in education was limited to an increase in enrolment rates, with primary completion rates – which give a more complete picture of the education system – remaining the same throughout the period. Again, this privileging of the private sector allows the discourse to legitimise the marketisation of social services that was pursued via the *PRSP*s, by falsely depicting private schools as both more grassroots and better quality. This bears little resemblance to the reality that the increase of private provision of health and education exacerbates inequalities and excludes many low-income communities from accessing essential basic services, as both the present chapter and chapter three have shown.

Instead, increasing the role of non-public organisations in the provision of social services, as well as the decentralisation of health and education services, were legitimised with an appeal to democratic values. Emphasis was placed on the 'participation' and 'empowerment' of communities and stakeholders in 'decision-making' and 'democracy', with examples highlighted in Table 5.4. Implicit in this discourse are assumptions about the category of civil society. Civil society is seen to lie outside of the domain of the state, mediating between the state and the people. By increasing the role of civil society organisations in social service provision, and by devolving services (but not funding) out to municipalities, the argument is that the government will become 'closer to the people' and the delivery of services 'closer to beneficiaries'. Emphasis on the 'local', 'grassroots' and 'community' when praising non-public education or health initiatives reinforces this argument. This assumption of proximity to the people is explicitly stated in the Ivorian government's *I-PRSP*:

> 'Civil society steps forward to express the needs and aspirations of the people' (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2002, p. 88)

The active sentence structure accords agency to civil society, placing it in subject position, reinforcing the notion that civil society is one united category that represents the wishes of the general populace. The *topos of democracy* is used in conjunction with the *topos of social inclusion*, as the donors argue that privatised and decentralised social services will lead to better equity in access to basic services. Examples of this set out in Table 5.5 and include references to 'inclusion', 'equity' and the need to reduce 'disparities' in social service provision. When coupled with the earlier argument of the inefficient and overbearing state, this claim leads to the framing of reduced spending as being more honest and therefore more virtuous. The moral argument is reinforced by the notion that NGOs and the private sector are more efficient than the state; where the public sector has failed, the private sector will step in. It is worth repeating that this is highly misleading, given that structural adjustment policies had cut health and education funding and actively promoted their privatisation.

Furthermore, as we have seen, the policies that this discourse seeks to legitimise do nothing to challenge power and very little to redistribute resources to the poor. The discursive emphasis on the virtues of participation, empowerment and decentralisation, are deceptively appealing, suggestive of active support for the ideas and aspirations of the common people. Within this image, civil society emerges as the medium through which to channel resources to ensure better participation and democracy. However, NGOs are not politically accountable organisations. They tend to be well-structured interest groups, accountable to their (foreign) funders, who are sometimes bilateral donors, such as USAID, accountable to the US, not to their stakeholders in the countries where they operate. In Haiti, the tendency of donors to channel aid through international, rather than local, NGOs has been well documented and criticised, for example (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012). Importantly, as I have argued, the increase of NGOs operating in the health and education systems in these countries has failed to improve the access of the poorest to basic services. Equally, decentralisation has simply shifted restricted budgets from the state to the local level and therefore has not delivered increased capacity of local authorities to improve the access and quality of services*.* Indeed, inequity can be a negative side effect of decentralisation when localities have different levels of resources.

This framing of privatisation and decentralisation therefore amounts to the co-opting and transformation, in the neo-Gramscian sense of counter-hegemonic ideas of social inclusion, poverty reduction and democracy in order to suggest that the *PRSP*s have the interests of the poor at their core, and that the redefinition of the roles of the state and the private sector in the delivery of services is a democratic exercise*.* This serves the purpose of legitimising, modernising and moralising the neoliberal austerity agenda, in the context of the new lending framework and its purported emphasis on poverty reduction. I identify this discourse as a discourse of inclusive austerity; it retains the Washington Consensus notion of 'there is no alternative', but it also emphasises 'inclusion' in order to frame the continued pursuit of austerity as compatible with the human development agenda.

<u>Inclusive austerity: making neoliberalism more palatable</u>

The five claims that this discussion has explored build upon each other to legitimise continued austerity and the channelling of social services through non-governmental and private organisations. The discourse analysis has revealed two principal arguments: 1) that there is no alternative to austerity; and 2) that the particular measures taken to cut costs in social service delivery are pro-poor and democratic. Together, these two arguments form an inclusive austerity discourse that both depoliticises the macroeconomic framework of austerity, and renders political – by appealing to democratic and moral values – privatisation and decentralisation. In arguing that there is no alternative to reducing spending – as they did in the *SAP*s - the authors present austerity as an exercise of technocratic, economic management. Privatisation is dressed up as the reclamation of democratic values and bottom-up development. Devolving responsibility away from the state towards the private sector, civil society and NGOs is legitimised as more efficient and more responsive to community and local needs. It is this second claim – that *PRSP*s are more responsive to local needs – that was a key part of the criticisms levelled at *SAP*s during the 1990s. Counter-hegemonic movements decried the heavily prescriptive, top-down approach, and called for more bottom-up strategies. In the *PRSP*s, these concepts have been co-opted into the neoliberal framework and their meanings transformed from the ability to influence decision-making processes, to meaning the private provision of services and the transfer of responsibilities from the state to communities. This gives the impression that the concerns of the critics were heard and taken seriously, thus legitimising the contested policy reforms in the *PRSP*s. The discourse retains some elements of the *SAP* discourse, in that it undermines the traditional role of the state as caretaker of the public good, but does so through use of more inclusive language.

Conclusion

Under the PWC, the BWIs promised a break with the previous prescriptive, one-size-fits all development approach, with a new emphasis on participatory, country-owned, poverty-centred strategies, and on tackling the problem of debt dependency. This chapter has challenged this notion through an examination of the financial policy content of the development programmes under the new approach and a critical analysis of the discourse underpinning them.

The discussion has argued that the financial content of the *PRSP*s diverges only slightly from its predecessor programmes, with a new focus on social safety nets and some conditionalities in the form of emphasis on progress with social indicators. It has identified the central contradiction of the *PRSP*s as the incompatibility of neoliberal macroeconomics and poverty-sensitive social policy.

The limits of social compensation (for other damaging neoliberal policies, discussed in chapters four and six) were set by the overall expenditure framework, which continues to be dictated by neoliberal monetarist thinking. Whereas earlier programmes were explicit in their intentions to cut the social sectors, the continued underfunding of social services has been more of an unintended outcome of overall expenditure restrictions. Increasing budgetary allocations to the social sectors might be understood as an afterthought to the primary priority of neoliberal macroeconomic conditionality. The HIPC initiative, far from freeing up resources to increase poverty-related spending, failed to reduce the debt service burden in these three countries in any meaningful way during the period of analysis.

The discourse analysis has revealed an inclusive austerity discourse that retains the *SAP* notion of the inevitability of austerity, leaving no room for contradiction and contributing to the naturalisation of austerity as part of the unquestionable political order of the world. This discourse is remarkably similar across the three countries, despite the claims of 'national ownership' and 'participation' in the formation of the *PRSP*s, suggestive of the hegemonic status of neoliberal logic, as well as the power of the donors to influence policy and politics. The inclusive austerity discourse is unique in disingenuously framing the reduction or restriction of spending as more efficient, democratic, and pro-poor, representing a rebranding of austerity, rather than any fundamental policy shift. This represents the co-opting – in the neo-Gramscian sense – of counter-hegemonic ideals and transforming them to the ends of the prevailing ideological hegemonic order of neoliberalism. It is this discourse that is essential to the justification and therefore implementation of the *PRSP*s, since the launch of the new lending framework was accompanied with promises of commitment to pro-poor, country-owned strategies. The austerity discourse therefore had to be modernised and moralised in order to negotiate the conflicting objectives of restricting public spending and improving social and economic indicators, and create consent for unpopular austerity measures.

Much of the power of the neoliberal project under the PWC therefore derives from its ability to offer misleading but compelling arguments and explanations for economic situations that appeal to morality, in line with the neo-Gramscian theoretical approach. In reality, austerity choices have had far reaching negative consequences in many aspects of social life, throughout the two periods of lending. The persuasive attributes of the inclusive austerity discourse serves ideological commitments, in its defence of a small state, as well as material interests, in the important impacts that austerity has on the distribution of public services – whereby the wealthy can count on the private provision of services. In this way, the discourse, as Wodak argues, is socially constituted and socially constitutive. The inclusive austerity discourse in the *PRSP*s therefore serves to further entrench poverty and inequalities, by sanitising underfunded and privatised welfare systems as pro-poor and democratic.

Chapter six: consolidating neoliberalism

Introduction

Chapter five explored the similarities and differences in between the *PRSP*s and previous adjustment programmes on both a practical and discursive level, in the area of financial policymaking. It argued that the *PRSP*s and the HIPC served to further entrench the neoliberal austerity agenda in these three countries, undermining both sovereignty and the human development agenda. The goal of the present chapter is to conduct a similar analysis within trade policy. This therefore broadens the argument to encompass a wider socio-economic analysis and further situates postcolonial nations in a problematic, asymmetrical, global power relationship. Chapter four explored the neoliberal trade paradigm pursued under structural adjustment, demonstrating that the pursuit of export-led growth over domestic development and the rolling back of the state in the economy, were common policies in the case study countries. It identified a discourse that advanced a state-market dichotomy, vilifying the state and celebrating the market, in addition to a discourse that promoted economic growth as the sole and primary objective of economy policy, in order to legitimise the *SAP*s. The present chapter seeks to understand the extent to which the policy content of the *PRSP*s as well as the discourses that underpin them, represent a continuation or divergence from the *SAP*s.

Consistent with the structure of the previous three chapters, the analysis begins with a discussion of the trade content of the *PRSP*s,[55] with a focus on the main export industries. This is followed by a discussion of the discourse, to analyse the ways in which the donors (and the governments) frame and legitimise their policies. A CDA of the policy documents from 1999 onwards, compared with the earlier analysis of the *SAP*s, will illuminate the evolution of the development discourse from the Washington Consensus structural adjustment era into the PWC, *PRSP* epoch. It will examine the multitudinous ways in which the donors frame the reforms in a continual process of legitimisation.

In addition to the *PRSP*s, *CAS* (and *CPS*) and *JSAN*s some further policy documents that governed the pipeline project are incorporated into the analysis.[56] As established in chapter four, the World Bank played a key role in supporting the establishment of the oil industry in Chad, both as a financier and as a supervisor of the process.

The discussions in this chapter demonstrate that, in the realm of trade – just like in the financial realm – policymaking has remained wedded to the ideology of neoliberalism. As previously established, we can firmly situate neoliberalism in the domain of ideology, rather than simply a political or economic theory. Donor strategies have consolidated the export-led growth strategy, continuing to reduce the role of the state in the economy. In a similar way to the austerity discourse, the discourse on trade and the economy has also evolved in order to falsely translate what is largely 'business as usual' as a medium for pro-poor development. I therefore argue that the *PRSP*s, both through their financial and economic content, represent a way of furthering the neoliberal configuration of the global economy and legitimising and entrenching unequal power asymmetries between core and peripheral – and formerly coloniser and colonised - nations. These unequal power relations are manifest via both coercive and consensual mechanisms.

From structural adjustment to poverty reduction: a new trade paradigm?

Chapter four demonstrated that under structural adjustment, the export industries of Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti were radically transformed during the 1980s and 1990s according to neoliberal principles. They represent two different contexts for neoliberal trade reforms: one well-established industry in which the state is a key player, and one relatively young sector without much history of government involvement. The case of Chad offers a third context: the industry was established through the World Bank-sponsored Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, during the PRS period. It therefore presents the unique opportunity to examine the establishment of a new industry, under the supervision of the World Bank, making for interesting comparison between the

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[56] A reminder of abbreviations: *Country Assistance Strategy* (*CAS*), *Country Partnership Strategy* (*CPS*) and *Joint Staff Advisory Note* (*JSAN*)

three cases as well as across the two time periods. All three contexts demonstrate the remorseless ability of neoliberalism to entrench, legitimise and adapt itself to different situations given the prevailing actors and power asymmetries.

Given that the Chadian pipeline project was initiated as the BWIs had transitioned into the era of the PWC, we might expect a greater emphasis on poverty reduction and country ownership of the project from the World Bank. In light of the failures of structural adjustment and the reality that the pursuit of export markets led to neither improved incomes for cocoa farmers nor for factory workers, we might expect more focus on trade models more conducive to raising incomes and serving the human development agenda. Yet, in policy programmes and strategies produced between 2000 and 2010 for Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, there is little sign of divergence from earlier strategies. Policymakers at the BWIs focussed economic activities on export markets and furthering the retrenchment of the state from the economic realm. It is this fundamental strategic myopia that most clearly expressed the practical and discursive continuation between the *PRSP*s and previous adjustment programmes.

The policy analysis is divided into two sections, in line with the structure of chapter four. Firstly, I examine the extent to which the WC policy of export-led growth has been furthered by the interventions of the donors during the first ten years of *PRSP*s. Within this discussion, I consider the conflict between nationally owned strategies and donor-imposed agendas. The previous chapter identified some conflict between the ambitious social agendas outlined in the *PRSP*s and the donors' austerity agenda, with the austerity imperative ultimately eclipsing bold social investments, such as Universal Health Insurance. Contention over the most appropriate approach can also be identified in economic policymaking, where the authorities (within the *PRSP*s) express the desire to pursue more domestic-oriented policies versus the export-led agenda. The second part of the policy discussion turns to role of the state in the economy, considering the ways in which the trade strategy has circumscribed the ability of government to regulate and manage the economy and society. These sections also consider some of the consequences of these strategies, demonstrating the fundamental conflict between a development strategy predicated on regressive trade relations and a sustainable cycle of national economic, social and human development.

<u>Continuing the pursuit of export-led growth</u>

During the 2000s, the World Bank continued to encourage the growth of exports from Côte d'Ivoire. The *I-PRSP* planned a growth rate of 2.5% for the agricultural sector in 2002, with the vast majority of this growth (2%) to occur in export crops (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2002, p. 58). However, as political turmoil embroiled the country, exports of cocoa actually declined; rather than seeing this as an opportunity to diversify, in the IMF's 2007 *EPCA*, the donors sought to refocus attention onto agriculture, particularly for export, outlining plans to grow the sector (IMF, 2007d, p. 5). The value of cocoa exports as a proportion of total exports rose over the next few years, from 26% in 2007 (IMF, 2009b, p. 31) to 35% in 2009, reflecting the further specialisation, rather than diversification, of the Ivorian economy (IMF, 2010, p. 19).

However, in the full 2009 *PRSP*, the government set out an alternative strategy and were relatively candid in their criticisms of structural adjustment. They identified the continued focus on the export of cash crops as sole sources of income over the last few decades as a cause of collective poverty (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009, p. 16). The authorities laid out plans to enhance the domestic processing of agricultural produce locally in order to add value and absorb local production, in the context of the increased supply of commodities like cocoa (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009, p. 41). As well as creating wealth and employment, the government hoped that this value adding would increase the price paid to producers, outlined as the second main strategy to achieving its development goals (after increasing *per capita* growth). Overall, agriculture for export was not the main focus of the *PRSP*; instead the government planned to diversify and grow more crops for domestic consumption with a view to achieving food self-sufficiency, in particular in rice (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, p. 116). Indeed, they proposed to reduce the share of agriculture in GDP from 23% in 2008 to 19.9% in 2013 (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009, p. 114). This appears a real divergence from the previous strategy of exporting cheap, unprocessed cocoa beans to Europe. In their *JSAN*, the donors argued that they ought to rethink the reduction in the share of GDP proposed for agriculture, in light of the country's comparative advantage in cocoa (IMF, 2009c, p. 7). The government complied; the value of agriculture as a proportion of GDP remained steady at 22% in 2011 (World Bank, 2012, p. 8). This calls into question the claimed participatory nature of the *PRSP*s given that the government's own strategy of moving away from export-dependency to self-sufficiency was discouraged by the donors and ultimately abandoned.

Some progress was made in increasing local processing of cocoa; by 2012, domestic companies were processing around 40% of the annual harvest of cocoa beans (World Bank, 2012, p. 19), up from 27% in 2009 (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, p. 27). However, the export price still accounted for only 11% of the final value of chocolate (when final manufacture and marketing are taken into account), demonstrating that very little of the value-adding activities ultimately took place in Côte d'Ivoire (World Bank, 2012, p. 19). Furthermore, the majority of the processing that takes place in Côte d'Ivoire is undertaken by TNCs, with very little involvement from local companies. In 2014, the 5 major grinding companies in Côte d'Ivoire were TNCs or their local subsidiaries (Gayi & Tsowou, 2016, p. 8). The value of cocoa remains largely secured by foreign investors (Gayi & Tsowou, 2016). Fundamentally, the capture of the local economy by TNCs has both stymied local development but also directly undermined the economic strategy of the sovereign government. This means that even if the government had been allowed to realise the strategy of increased value-add activities, economic rents would still largely be seized by foreign-owned TNCs, since they control the supply chain and resources.

The process of concentration – which began following structural adjustment and was documented in chapter four - has accelerated not only in cocoa processing but elsewhere in the cocoa-chocolate global value chain since the start of the century. Higher operating costs, including transport costs, as a result of the dismantling of *CAISTAB,* have strengthened the position of TNCs who have better access to resources, therefore smaller traders have therefore been pushed out or have merged with TNCs. By 2013, the three largest trading and processing companies

– Barry Callebaut, Cargill and ADM - traded roughly 50 - 60% of the world's cocoa production (Gayi & Tsowou, 2016, p. 14). There has also been increased concentration in national markets of consuming countries – largely driven by commercial marketing strategies - which has led to a handful of chocolate manufacturing companies enjoying significant market shares (Gayi & Tsowou, 2016, p .15). The deregulation and removal of the state from the cocoa sector in Côte d'Ivoire has created the conditions that have allowed TNCs to increase their bargaining power, creating a cocoa-chocolate value chain that has become oligopsonic.[57] This is quite the opposite of the competition that is expected to occur when markets are allowed to operate without state interference, according to the *SAP*s.

In Haiti, analysis of the policy programmes produced by the donors compared with the government's own *PRSP,* also suggests some conflict between the objectives of the donors and the objectives of the government**.** At the start of the decade, the development strategy continued to hinge on the promotion of the export assembly sector. In 2002, the Haitian parliament passed two laws that helped to consolidate this strategy. The first was to facilitate the development of export processing zones (EPZs), where companies operating within these zones receive generous fiscal and customs incentives, including exemption from a number of taxes (Le Moniteur, 2002a). Importantly, the law demanded that 70% of goods produced or assembled within the zones be exported outside of Haiti. It also allowed investors to expatriate interests, dividends and profits made in Haiti without restriction. The second law afforded foreign investors the same rights and protections as Haitian investors (Le Moniteur, 2002b). Clearly, US commercial interests stood to benefit from these laws, as the US is by far Haiti's largest trade partner.

These were not written conditionalities of any IMF and World Bank programme since at the time of their ratification, both had suspended assistance to Haiti.

[57] Oligopsony occurs when a few firms dominate the purchase of goods or services, meaning that those few firms have considerable market power in paying low p rices for inputs.

However, in 2001, USAID reported that the aid freeze might soon be over, depending on the government's progress in an 8-point agreement that the Clinton administration had negotiated with the Haitian government. This agreement is not a publically available document, but according to USAID, one of these points related to the government's commitment to engaging with the BWIs on economic reforms to promote private and foreign investment (USAID, 2001, pp. 51-52). It is therefore likely that these two laws, engineered to promote foreign investment in the assembly sector, were driven by external actors, if not by the BWIs themselves. It is impossible to ignore the staggering pressure on the financially struggling Haitian government to adopt neoliberal reforms in order to re-engage the international community, and therefore provide access to markets, resources and aid that the country so desperately required. Moreover, the new laws were welcomed by the donors; the IMF declared that 'Haiti's investment code of 2002 offers ample incentives to the export industry' (IMF, 2005b, p. 45). In 2004, the World Bank's lending body, the IFC, invested $20 million in a garment manufacturing textile producer based in neighbouring Dominican Republic, to finance the start-up of an EPZ and industrial park on the Haitian/Dominican border in Ounaminthe (World Bank, 2004c, p. 33). As chapter five demonstrated, this was happening in the context of an austerity budget and minimal resources for improving basic social services, indicative of the real priorities of the donors in Haiti: integrating the economy into global markets.

The full *PRSP* – known by its French acronym *DSNCRP* – brought with it an apparent policy swing, as government's trade strategy focussed largely on agriculture, for both export markets and domestic consumption. The government highlighted the risks inherent within the 'preponderance of the US market and the intense concentration on a single product category' (Republic of Haiti, 2007, p. 80). The programme announced intentions to diversify exports, earmarking 75% of funds for infrastructure, 23% for agriculture and only 2.5% for tourism, commerce and industry (Republic of Haiti, 2007, Annex 1, no. 4). The assembly sector was entirely left out of the paper, although policies to entice investment were announced, including the revision of economic and tax laws and the law on EPZs (Republic of Haiti, 2007, Annex 2, p. 8).

However, this approach was short-lived; after the 2010 earthquake, the new strategy, as laid out in the Collier report (Collier, 2009), the 2009 *CAS* (World Bank, 2009c), the IDB 2009 report (IDB, 2009) and the 2010 *PARDH* (Republic of Haiti, 2010), returned its attention to private sector investment, particularly the assembly export industry. It sought utilise regional trade agreements, particularly the HOPE II act (World Bank, 2009c, p. 24).[58] Over the next few years, the expansion of EPZs and the construction of infrastructure to support them, was to be funded by both foreign and national direct investments (Republic of Haiti, 2010). In 2011, Caracol Industrial Park was built, supported by the IDB. This significant shift in policy came in spite of the IMF's admission that as the 'participatory process on which its legitimacy is based, the DSNCRP is the government's framework of reference for the developing the economic policy for growth' and 'it serves as a guide' (IMF, 2012b, p. 17). Significantly, the event that spurred the policy change was the 2010 earthquake, creating 'a new situation' that demanded an alternative strategy (IMF, 2012b, p. 17). The earthquake provided the donors the opportunity to once again locate the country within the global landscape of apparel production, with the vulnerable Haitian government left with little choice but to accept the donors' plans, given their desperate need for foreign assistance. The post-earthquake strategy should be understood as another example of what Naomi Klein has dubbed 'Disaster Capitalism': using natural or man-made disasters to advance the interests of global capital (Klein, 2007).

[58] In 2006, US President George W. Bush signed into US law a set of 'special rules for Haiti', known as the HOPE Act. This Act extended special preferences to Haiti. Rather than requiring all the raw materials used in the production of the garments to originate from the US in order to gain duty-free access, 50-60% must originate in the US, or any other country currently in a free trade agreement with the US. HOPE II expanded preferential treatment further still and eased some quantitative restrictions of HOPE I. However, HOPE II excludes t-shirts and sweatshirts, which make up three quarters of Haiti's exports. This means that these products enter the US under different preference programmes, with strict yarn forward rules ensuring that American yarn is incorporated (Elliott, 2010).

Apparel exports to the US began to increase substantively during the 2000s, and the economy became much more specialised.[59] By the IMF's own admission in 2004, the textile assembly sector 'imports 85% of its inputs from overseas, especially from the United States' and the goods assembled from those inputs are shipped 'almost exclusively' back to the US (IMF, 2004a, p. 42). The industry is highly concentrated among a small number of US firms and Haitian manufacturers; in 2009, there were 23 manufacturing firms producing apparel in Haiti, 13 of which are Haitian-owned and the remainder owned by foreign (mostly US) investors (World Bank, 2009b, p. 28). The ultimate result therefore nearly echoes the cocoa experience in Côte d'Ivoire discussed above.

In both Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, the governments set out their visions for alternative trade strategies in their *PRSP*s, but ultimately, it was the export-led paradigm that the BWIs had been promoting in both countries for several decades, that prevailed. The case of Chad presents another example of this. As discussed in chapter three, the pipeline project in Chad was originally envisioned as a two-pronged strategy of oil extraction for both domestic consumption and export, with plans to build a petroleum refinery to fuel a power plant in the country's capital, N'Djamena. However, the plan to develop the reserves in Sédigui field in Lake Chad was not realised. According to the IMF, the firm in charge built a conduit from Sédigui to N'Djamena that was of such poor quality that it was unable to transport oil. As a result, plans to access Sédigui reserves to reduce Chad's domestic petroleum costs were 'postponed' and remain undeveloped at the time of writing (IMF, 2007b, p. 47). The export project, on the other hand, quickly got underway and was actually completed ahead of schedule (IEG, 2009, p. 12).

The World Bank provided loans for around $300 million through the IBRD and the IFC. With the World Bank on board, access was opened up to significant finance streams.[60] The project entailed the development of oil fields in the Doba regions,

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[59] Apparel exports represented 78% of total exports in 2000 (IMF, 2005b, p. 78). In between 2010 and 2013, these exports accounted for 90% of exports (IMF, 2015a, p. 6)

[60] French credit insurer *COFAC*E and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) supported the project with approximately $200 million each (IFC, 2001). The Tchad Oil Transportation Company S.A. (TOTCO) was established to own and operate the Chad

which included the drilling of about 300 wells and associated facilities and infrastructure, as well as the construction of a 1,070km pipeline, to transport Chadian oil across Cameroon to Kribi in the Gulf of Guinea, from where it would be shipped off the coast. No refineries were constructed in Chad or Cameroon, despite the evidence supporting a correlation between refineries and a decrease in mineral dependence (Baur, 2014). This is an important parallel with the Ivorian case; both industries were structured in such a way that the value-added took place outside of these countries. The number of Chadians actually employed through the pipeline project was minimal and mostly came in the form of short-term construction work during the building of the pipeline (Werner, Inkpen, & Moffett, 2016).

The export-led policy paradigm that was identified in chapter four in Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti was therefore still the bedrock of World Bank policy during the 2000s. Chad represents a further example in a different industry context – mineral extraction. Although each of the industries under analysis is very different, having adopted a neoliberal model they share some essential features: the expatriation of profits by foreign firms; little investment in domestic value-added activities; and few backward linkages to the economy. The absence of expanded investment opportunities, such as garment inputs in Haiti, cocoa processing in Côte d'Ivoire or oil refining in Chad is emblematic of the neoliberal export-led growth model.

Furthering the roll back of the state

This section considers the ways in which the donors continued with the Washington Consensus policy of rolling back the state in the economy, in order to further the export-led agenda, directly benefitting foreign investors. It also outlines further evidence within the documents under analysis of tension between the donors' agenda and that of government.

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portion of the export system. The Chadian government borrowed $32.5 million from the IBRD and $15 million from the European investment Bank to purchase its equity share in TOTCO (World Bank & IFC, 2000).

Chapter four argued that the devastating consequences of the cocoa producer price drop were instrumental in worsening economic and social indicators – particularly the disproportionate increase in poverty in rural areas. Despite this, the 2000s saw the donors press on with the completion of the cocoa reforms. During 2000 and 2001, the government created several small organisations to help fill the institutional gap left by the dismantling of *CAISTAB.*[61] The BCC was charged with establishing a producer price, and in theory, the ARCC could instruct the FRC to increase this price if it was too low. However, a few years in to the new system and there was little evidence that this role was being carried out, as the gap between the farm on board (f.o.b) export price and the producer price widened under the new system (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1: Export and producer prices of cocoa 2000-2010



Sources: See Appendix 12.

Aware of these concerns, the World Bank therefore initiated the piloting of a 'price risk management strategy' within the cocoa sector, with the objective of reducing the exposure of farmers to price fluctuations on the world market (ICCO, 2008).

[61] These were the regulation authority, *Autorité de regulation du café et du cacao* (ARCC); the coffee and cocoa exchange, *Bourse du café et du cacao* (BCC); the regulatory fund, *Fonds de Régulation et de contrôle* (FRC); and the producers' development fund, *Fonds de développement des activités des producteurs de café et cacao* (FDPCC).

This was to be achieved through the hedging of cocoa beans on futures markets. They planned to train staff from the BCC, a number of smallholder cooperatives, exporters and local banks in how to use hedging instruments in order to provide cocoa farmers with a floor price. The hedging strategy proved expensive, and farmers were still exposed to fluctuations due to the exchange rate – as they were trading in CFAF but the futures markets were trading in Pound Sterling (GBP) and US dollars (ICCO, 2008, p. 7). Furthermore, many farmers in Côte d'Ivoire do not have the access to financial services or the expertise in order to use such instruments (Gayi & Tsowou, 2016, p. 34). Ultimately, forward buying and minimum price guarantees have not proven strong enough to protect farmers; producers have been reduced to 'price takers' with very low bargaining power compared to the powerful TNCs who dominate the industry, acting as 'price makers' (Gayi & Tsowou, 2016, p. 18).

Taxes in the cocoa sector have continued to be a further source of contestation between the Ivorian government and the donors. With the multiplication of cocoa institutions, the government increased export taxes on cocoa in order to fund their operations; the *Droit Unique de Sortie* (DUS) peaked at 27% in 2004 (IMF, 2007c, p. 102). The IMF continued to argue for further reductions in the *DUS* export tax but the Ivorian government did not agree that the removal of the tax would translate into higher prices for farmers, and saw a continued role for the taxes to finance rural infrastructure (IMF, 2007d, pp. 25-26). However, the reduction of the export tax to a maximum of 22% of the export price was written into the conditionality of the HIPC, as a floating trigger in order to reach Completion Point and unlock debt relief, giving the Ivorian government little choice but to comply (IMF, 2009d, p. 20). Whilst high export taxes can undermine the sector by making prices uncompetitive, in the context of the global cocoa sector moving towards an oligopsonic model, studies have shown that export taxes can be a useful tool for producing countries to extract rents from the sector, which, if effectively invested, can help cocoa communities (Sexton, McCorrison, & Wang, 2007).

The period was clearly characterised by conflicting interests between the Ivorian government and the donors. The World Bank highlighted as a 'major risk' that the

Ivorian government might limit of reverse the ongoing restructuring of the cocoa and coffee sectors, emphasising the importance that the donors keep their progress on track (World Bank, 2002c, p. iii). They also acknowledged that there would be 'strong' public opposition to reforms in the cocoa sector. This flies in the face of the ostensibly 'nationally-owned' and 'participatory' nature of the donors' lending in the PWC. Ultimately, the reforms were pursued to completion, as they constituted key conditions for financial assistance and debt relief over the period. This therefore demonstrates the coercive power that the BWIs wield over borrowing countries and their willingness to usurp national sovereignty in order to implement neoliberal trade reforms.

The consequences of the transformation of the cocoa sector have been far-reaching. In 2010, just seven years after their completion, the World Bank acknowledged the failure of the reforms to improve producer incomes (World Bank, 2010b, p. 2). By the time of this admission, 60% of cocoa growers were living below the poverty line, accounting for 28% of the poor nationwide (World Bank, 2010b, p. 28). Tulane University reported a 51% increase of the total number of children working in the cocoa sector, a 41% increase of the percentage of children working in the sector, and a 39% increase of those children working in hazardous conditions (Tulane University, 2015, pp. 82-83). This has likely been exacerbated by the transfer of power and wealth to a small handful of TNCs who are able to effectively fix the price for cocoa, diminishing incomes and increasing rural poverty. Studies have pointed to these factors as key in the decision of producers to resort to cheap or even unpaid child labour (UNICEF, 2018).

In Haiti, despite the decline in *per capita* income over the two decades of structural adjustment, and the evidence of many assembly plant workers living in poverty, the donors continued to put downward pressure on wages and labour regulation in the industry during the first ten years of the PRS framework**.** This was also a struggle between the donors and the government. The Aristide administration doubled the minimum wage in 2003 to 70 HTG per hour, but given the rapidly rising cost of living in Haiti, in reality this did not represent an improvement in terms of the purchasing power of assembly workers (WRC, 2013, p. 12). Labour regulation in Haiti has long been insufficient to protect workers, particularly in the assembly sector, as chapter four demonstrated. Concerns about rights to labour organising within the EPZs have been raised by a number of groups, including Haitian and international trade unions, and local and international NGOs (Coughlin & Ives, 2011; ITUC, 2011; Solidarity Center, 2014; WRC, 2013). Regulations were so lenient in 2006 that to fire someone in the formal sector, the equivalent of just 26 weeks' salary was required to be paid in compensation, compared to 131 in Ecuador, 100 in Guatemala and 96 in Bolivia (World Bank, 2006b, p. 22). The Labour Code allows workers just a one-hour strike. The World Bank have consistently praised the government for the lack of regulation in the sector, and even encouraged the government to take deregulation further in order to encourage foreign investment in the country (World Bank, 2006b).

In 2009, the Haitian Parliament moved to increase the minimum wage to 300 HTG per day, or the equivalent of about $5, an increase that would still have seen (largely North American) factory owners paying Haitian workers less a day than the minimum hourly wage of $7.25 in the US at the time. Factory owners lobbied heavily against the increase, controversially with the support of the US State Department, and eventually a compromise was reached (Coughlin & Ives, 2011). In September 2009, the Haitian parliament passed a law that established a two-tier wage system with a reduced wage for the assembly sector. The daily minimum wage under this new law was 300 HTG per day for all other sectors, and 200 HTG ($4.65) for apparel workers (Le Moniteur, 2009). The wage increase was spread out over a four-year period, so that by 2012, workers in the assembly sector must be paid a minimum of 200 HTG per day, the equivalent of about $58 cents per hour (WRC, 2013). The Collier report – upon which the post-2009 development strategy was based – emphasised the need to keep wages low, and the donors have continually praised the country's low wages for their appeal to foreign investors (Collier, 2009). Furthermore, the pressure from the donors to pursue the export-oriented strategy and in particular the pursuit of the EPZ model, puts a downward pressure on wages and regulations, creating a race to the bottom in the Caribbean where Haiti and other peripheral nations are competing for investment. The sweatshop conditions and low pay in Haiti factories has been widely documented by journalists and NGOs. The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) found that the actual wages paid to Haitian garment workers were 'substantially below' the legal minimum wage, and leaves workers with incomes that are 'dramatically short' of what they need to sustain their families (WRC, 2013, p. 6). A report produced in 2014 found that the average cost of living for an export worker in Port-au-Prince was about $607 per month, meaning that they must earn $23.34 per day to adequately provide for themselves and their families (Solidarity Center, 2014, p. 6). As in the Ivorian cocoa sector, the workers in Haiti's assembly industry have not seen their livelihoods improve as a result of the trade strategy that their government has pursued under the aegis of the BWIs.

Nor did the oil project bring prosperity to the citizens of Chad, as its proponents had insisted that it would. Chapter four argued that the very foundations of the pipeline project – the legal *Conventions* – were engineered in such a way as to exclude the role of the Chadian state from the very beginning. The legal framework rendered Chadian law subordinate to the commercial interests of the consortium. The World Bank's contribution to the project also undermined the role of the government in the oil economy. Just as they had done with the removal of subsidies and the privatisation of *CAISTAB* in the Ivorian cocoa sector, the World Bank asserted that the government's strategy must be designed to leave almost all aspects of the project – exploration and production, importing, marketing and distribution – to the private sector (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 7). The government's role was reduced to the 'technical, financial and fiscal aspects' of the pipeline project (World Bank, 1999c, p. 5).

The government's minimal role in the project was also reflected in the revenue split. Chad was to receive a royalty payment from the consortium of 12.5% on the sales of crude oil, a rate much lower than royalty rates negotiated by almost all other African oil producers.[62] In addition, the government receives a corporate income tax from the consortium, from TOTCO, and dividends from its small equity

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[62] From 2002 to 2010, the government retention of oil value was 60% in Equatorial Guinea and Angola, 66% in Congo-Brazzaville, 75% in Cameroon and Gabon and 80% in Nigeria (Johnston, 2007, p. 72).

in TOTCO (World Bank & IFC, 2000).[63] At the start of the project, assuming oil price to be $15 per barrel (price in 1999), the World Bank predicted that the total project revenues would amount to $12 billion. Of this, the government of Chad would receive $1.82 billion, just 15% of the total (World Bank & IFC, p. 12). The World Bank concluded that 'returns to Chad are reasonable' having examined a comparative study made of oil production agreements in other countries (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 24). The comparative study is not cited by the World Bank. The *Convention* exempts the consortium from VAT and custom duties (IMF, 2007b, p. 50).

With little involvement in the management of the pipeline, and a widely-considered meagre share in the profits, the Chadian government was nevertheless held by the World Bank as ultimately responsible for protecting the environment and for addressing the indirect social and health impacts of the project. The IDA disbursed two loans to the Chadian government for managing the oil economy. The centrepiece of the poverty reduction side of the project was the establishment of an oversight committee, responsible for monitoring the consortium's adherence to an Environmental Management Plan and the Revenue Management Law, which earmarked the oil revenues for poverty reduction purposes (World Bank & IFC, 2000).

However, as chapter four demonstrated, the legal framework of the pipeline was designed in such a way so as to curb the Chadian government's capacity to regulate the consortium. This was how it played out in reality too; the oversight committee complained about a lack of access to information from both the oil companies and from the Chadian government. The role of the state under the pipeline project – far from holding it to account, was instead reduced largely to reinforcing the authority of the consortium (IEG, 2009)**.** The *Convention,* in obliging the government to protect the pipeline and the operations of the consortium, pitted

[63] Although described as a 'Joint Venture Company', the Chadian government held a mere 15% share in TOTCO, with the consortium of companies sharing equity of the remaining 85%.

the government against its citizens. The government took this contractual duty very seriously. As a means of ensuring the security of the pipeline, the *gendarmerie* enforced an evening curfew. Local people complained on numerous occasions about harassment, extortion and violence by the *gendarmerie* (Brugger, 2013; ECMG, 2012; Barclay & Koppert, 2007).

Despite the unfavourable take in oil profits for the Chadian government, the oil revenues nevertheless had a significant impact on the economy. Oil prices were higher than projected and so the government's revenues and the country's economy grew significantly; annual GDP grew by 31.3% on average between 2003 and 2004, the highest growth rate in the world that year, and significantly higher than the country's average during the 1980s and 1990s (IEG, 2009, p. 16). The impacts of the oil revenues in the area of poverty reduction, on the other hand, are yet to materialise. The government spent one-fifth of the initial $25 million signing bonus on its military budget and continually defied the Revenue Management Plan, even rewriting law so as to bypass the contract terms and divert funds into an unmonitored account.[64] In September 2008, the World Bank withdrew from the project, and in doing so cut funding for those bodies set up to monitor the environmental side of the project, effectively leaving the consortium to self-regulate (IEG, 2009).

This was undeniably a difficult situation for the World Bank. On the one hand, it sought to uphold its (questionable) international reputation as an institution that promotes development and poverty reduction. On the other hand, it sought to protect the commercial interests of the consortium by creating an enabling environment for oil extraction. Ultimately, continuing to endorse a project that was directly financing the President's crackdown on rebels in the country was untenable for the World Bank. However, the political and historical context of Chad's leadership is important. Déby was brought to power with the support of the French secret services in 1990 and has received continued support from

[64] Detailed accounts of the political situation during the pipeline timeline and the showdown between the Chadian government and the World Bank can be found in (Hicks, 2015) and (Gould & Winters, 2012)

France (even as recently as 2019) and indeed from the US over the course of his nearly three-decade reign (Chafer, 2019). Whilst the country holds multi-party elections, the democratic process his hotly contested and widely viewed to be fraudulent. Discussions about the sovereignty of the Chadian government are therefore problematic, as the stage of electoral democracy has never truly arrived in Chad. Whilst democratic processes in Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti have not been without contestation, corruption in elections and politics is much more widely documented in Chad.[65]

Explanations and understandings of the pipeline project and the roles of the Chadian government, the World Bank and the consortium, must be contextualised within this historical relationship between the Chadian government and the international forces that have propped it up. As this thesis has argued, the government was fairly powerless in the early stages of this project, as reflecting in the legal documents that undergird the entire project. The state's minimal role in the project and – relative to its other petrol-exporting African counterparts – a minimal take in the profits, coupled with its track record of corruption and human rights abuses, rendered inevitable the outcome of the pipeline project. Once the pipeline had been completed, the government began to re-assert its power, by defying the World Bank and their revenue allocation obligations.[66]

The Chadian people, in addition to being denied government investment in their communities and services, were also subject to further negative consequences of the oil project. In their original planning, the World Bank predicted that fewer than 150 households would be displaced by the project (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 141). In 2007, independent consultants commissioned by the consortium to evaluate the compensation and resettlement programme reported that 1,640 households had actually been affected – or about 12,000 people (Barclay &

[65] For example, freedom of expression came under attack in 2002 ahead of the legislative elections; non-state radio stations were banned from broadcasting political programmes or debates, and violent crime increased in 2003 (Amnesty International, 2004)

[66] In August 2006, the government announced the establishment of its own national oil company, the *Société des Hydrocarbures du Tchad* (SHT) that would become the fourth member of the consortium, selling and marketing Chadian oil (Hicks, 2015).

Koppert, 2007, p. ii). Furthermore, the process of compensating those who lost land and livelihoods was far from satisfactory; one-time payments to cover the loss of land were either insufficient or not received, justified on the basis of colonial law, which stipulates that the land did not belong to the farmers in the first place (Leonard, 2016). In departing the project, the World Bank handed power back to the consortium, which – when left to self-regulate – was not incentivised to ensure the fair resettlement and compensation of those affected by its operations.

In evaluating the pipeline project as a model for poverty reduction through oil extraction, the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) (commissioned by the World Bank) gave the project a rating of 'unsatisfactory' (IEG, 2009, p. v). Chapter five discussed some of the socio-economic indicators over the period, in the context of continued austerity in the *PRSP*s. The failure to significantly reduce poverty is even more shocking in the context of the immense profitability of the pipeline project, which represents 'a serious shortcoming for a program whose main objective was poverty reduction through the use of oil revenue' (IEG, 2009, p. xiii).[67] This meant that the IEG was unable to analyse poverty developments since 2000. In 2009, the report stated that there was 'as yet no evidence of the hoped-for positive improvements' (IEG, 2009, p. xii). In 2017, an independent study found that poverty actually increased in the oil-producing region of Chad between 2003 and 2011, as did inequalities between poor and non-poor households (Aristide & Moundigbaye, 2017, p. 48).

As already established, discussing the sovereignty of the Chadian government in the context of the pipeline project is complicated by the reality that President Déby has established himself as an authoritarian ruler and has used the oil revenues to tighten his grip on power, financing his fight against rebels and co-opting political opponents (Hicks, 2015). However, this thesis is primarily concerned with the development policy pursued by the BWIs. Understanding

[67] Although the World Bank and the bodies that it created to oversee different aspects of the project tracked government spending of the oil revenues, they did not measure the impact of those investments on poverty in Chad (IEG, 2009).

whether setting up the project in such a way that gave the government more ownership over the oil project would have improved the outcomes, in the context of the political situation, is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is under scrutiny here, are the actions of the World Bank in enabling and indeed facilitating a project that handed over power to an oil consortium. The consortium has proven its commitments to developing Chad were disingenuous, through its neglect of its resettlement and compensation duties, amongst other environmental scandals (Hicks, 2015). Far from having mitigated the disproportionate accumulation of corporate wealth and capital – as they argued that they would - the World Bank has provided the political legitimacy and the policy infrastructure for this project, which tipped the balance of power heavily in favour of the oil consortium.

To sum up, in the area of trade, far from moving away from the export-led model that excludes the state in favour of private markets, the first ten years of *PRSP*s in the case study countries actually saw the consolidation of the strategy pursued during the 1980s and the 1990s. Today, these three quite different industries, having been subjected to neoliberalisation (or established in a neoliberal mould), share several important features. In focussing on export-markets, a race to the bottom has emerged where, by seeking competitive advantage, countries (advised by the donors) have pursued the suppression of wages, labour market deregulation and the creation of EPZs. As a result, these sectors have failed to improve incomes or reduce poverty. Furthermore, more sinister trends have been documented, such as state-enforced violence and unfree labour. This is not to say that the World Bank and the IMF are solely responsible for the emergence of slavery in Côte d'Ivoire, lack of adherence to minimum wage laws in factories in EPZs, or abuse by the *gendarmerie* along the pipeline. However, in pursuing - and indeed imposing – their neoliberal agenda, the donors have created conditions, which have handed power over to transnational capital and in the case of Chad, a corrupt government. It is the imposition of these policies that is especially shocking, in light of the discourse around the launch of PWC and the *PRSP*s, which emphasised country-owned strategies, participation and poverty reduction. Instead, the first ten years under the PRS framework is symptomatic of a 'business as usual' outcome and the further consolidation of reforms begun under structural adjustment. This represents the continued fracture of economic sovereignty in favour of TNCs. These actors are the ultimate beneficiaries of these reforms that financialise, commodify and extract resources, people and economic rents from postcolonial countries in the global periphery. The PWC agenda ultimately serves these needs more effectively than any discursive claims to human and economic development.

Legitimising the *PRSP*s: governance without government?

As the introduction to part two demonstrated, the new lending framework launched in 1999 was presented and widely perceived as marking a break with the *SAP* model of prescriptive, neoliberal policies and offering a new way of doing development, reconsidering the role of governments, markets and wider society. Yet, we have seen that the policies pursued were often, in the context of the case studies, neither country-owned nor participatory, but rather continued along the same trajectory of prescriptive deregulation to attract foreign private investment. How then, to legitimise these strategies in the context of the widespread discrediting of this development model? This section borrows from CDA to try to understand how the neoliberal trade agenda has sustained itself discursively, during this transition period from the *SAP* framework to the ostensibly different *PRSP* model. The analysis identifies two overarching arguments, upon which the donors continue to legitimise neoliberal trade reforms, in the context of the discredited structural adjustment model. The first argument identified in the policy documents is effectively the repackaging of the state-market binary discourse, to incorporate the new imperative of 'good governance' whilst continuing to discursively favour a market-led economy. This argument rests on a technocratic and managerial representation of the role of the state.

The second argument is that inclusive growth is a/the route to poverty reduction. This argument differs from the earlier *SAP* growth discourse, as it emphasises the importance that the growth that is generated through *PRSP* reforms should evenly spread throughout the economy and support pro-poor development. Within this argument, the Washington Consensus notion that growth is the most important route to development remains dominant. Like the austerity discourse that was identified in chapter five, the *PRSP* trade discourse also co-opts the values of social inclusion, democracy and poverty reduction, in order to repackage remarkably similar neoliberal trade reforms as democratic and serving the interests of the poor.

Together these two main arguments legitimise trade policy, via six sub-arguments:

Claim 1. The failure of structural adjustment trade policies was due to poor governance
Claim 2. The PRSPs are not about 'less state' but about a 'better state'
Claim 3. Good governance is the enhancement of effectiveness and efficiency
Claim 4. The market is the most efficient and valuable method of organisation
Claim 5. (Inclusive) economic growth is a/the route to poverty reduction
Claim 6. Poor countries need export-led growth more than TNCs need them

These claims and the overarching arguments are essential to legitimising the *PRSP*s and therefore it is critical to interrogate and understand this discourse in the context of neoliberal reforms in the case study countries. The first argument identified above is concerned with governance and is represented in more detail by claims 1-3. The second argument is concerned with growth and is represented by claims 4-6. Expanded discourse tables are found in Appendix 13.

Argument 1: good governance: from less state, to a better state

Part one of this thesis demonstrated that *SAP*s actively discouraged government involvement in the economy, legitimised by a discourse that portrayed state interventions as synonymous with inefficient and even oppressive tendencies. In the policy documents produced in the *PRS* era, the discourse around the state-market relationship is more nuanced, in line with the donors' shift towards 'good governance' and institutional reform, as opposed to the vilification of the state that was so central in the *SAP* discourse. The discourse on trade policy reinstates the importance of state participation and involvement in development processes, emphasising the need to make states more effective and efficient; it shifts from 'less state' to a 'better state'. The central problem, in the *PRSP* discourse, is the gap between demands on states and their capabilities.

The discourse therefore attributes the poor record of structural adjustment to poor governance as opposed to market failure, which is the first claim identified in the three case studies. To establish the need for improved governance across the case studies, the donors make the case that the failure to grow their economies and alleviate poverty was the result of 'bad governance' as opposed to market failures, reinforcing the idea that neoliberal policies themselves were sound, but their implementation had been impaired due to fundamental institutional weaknesses.

In all three countries, the donors identify two key factors contributing to economic troubles: institutional capacity and poor governance. This is the first claim: **the failure of structural adjustment trade policies was due to poor governance.** Table 6.1 outlines the key discursive devices deployed to support this claim and offers some examples; it demonstrates important parallels with the *SAP* anti-state discourse.

Table 6.1: Claim 1.

Device	Purpose	Example
Economy is a human body metaphor	Associates government policy with disease	'Inadequate producer incentives and **poor** management in the sector's agencies have limited its contribution to rural growth' (IMF, 2007d, p. 25) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Governance and state capacity to effectively formulate and implement **sound** policies and to deliver core public services to the population, are **weak**' (World Bank, 2009c, p. 4) (Haiti) 'Chad's capacity **weakness** is of particular concern. This **weakness** is all encompassing and greater than most sub-Saharan African countries' (World Bank, 1999b, p. 3) (Chad)
Topos of burden	Frames poor governance as a burden on	'Years of political and military crisis and poor governance have *taken a heavy toll* on the country, transforming the once-model African nation into a fragile state' (World Bank, 2010b, p. i) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Poor governance is the greatest *impediment* to effective development assistance in Haiti' (World Bank, 2002b, p. 3) (Haiti) '*Costly* mistakes in public investment for petroleum exploration or public subsidies for petroleum consumption should be avoided' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 7) (Chad)
Topos of corruption	Creates a false binary of the	'Agricultural incomes have dropped due to a combination of deep-seated governance problems, weak or non-existent agriculture

	neutral market and the corrupt state	research and extension, *predatory* tax policies and related *corruption* in the cocoa sector' (World Bank, 2010b, p. 12) (Côte d'Ivoire) *'Non-transparent management* of public enterprises (*used in recent years to serve interests other than the collective good*) have further compounded the problem' (World Bank, 2004c, p. 18) (Haiti)

Once again the economy is a human body metaphor plays an important role in reinforcing the argument; negative predications of the state, state institutions and state capacity as 'weak', 'poor', 'blighted' and 'fragile' associate disease or ill health with low institutional capacity and governance problems. This metaphor activates a binary between the state, which is described using metaphor of ill health, and the policies proposed by the donors, described using metaphor based on restoring health, or 'recovery'. The problem-solution pattern suggests illness that is in need of treatment, setting up the legitimisation for policy intervention in order to treat governance and capacity weaknesses of the state.

Some passages echo the more aggressively anti-state rhetoric, in line with Bourdieu and Wacquant's neoliberal planetary vulgate, discussed in chapter four. Significantly, across all three cases, the discourse uses negative predications to describe government policies in the economy. The *topos of burden* is indicated by adjectives such as 'costly', 'cumbersome', 'excessive', and having 'a heavy toll' on the economy, representing the barriers to development as the fault of the state. This representation is misleading; as this thesis has consistently shown, across the two policy eras and across the three countries, BWI-sponsored reforms have had devastating consequences for those directly impacted by the industry in question (such as cocoa and assembly workers, and farmers and residents displaced by the pipeline). In presenting these market failures as failures of the state, the donors distort material reality and insulate themselves against criticism. The discourse also nominates particular government policies, and governance problems more broadly as 'mistakes', 'impediments' and 'obstacles'. By nominalising complex processes – such as regulation and price setting - and evaluating them negatively, the discourse backgrounds the complexity of these processes and obscures the agency of those who are affected by their removal.

In the cases of Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, the *topos of corruption* is instrumentalised as the donors portray the governments as not only ineffective but also immoral and corrupt. For example, the World Bank argued that the Haitian government had used publicly owned enterprises to 'serve interests other than the collective good'. The suggestion is that the 'collective good' - or the economic and social wellbeing of wider society - should be served and that the World Bank seeks to serve this good, whilst the Haitian government does not. Again, this discourse is a gross misrepresentation of reality, when the impacts and the beneficiaries of their policies are taken into account. The profits from the assembly sector are largely expatriated due to the tax-free status of the EPZs, where most of the economic activity in this industry takes place in Haiti. The suggestion that neoliberal policies always serve the public good is both inaccurate and dangerous, as is the negative representation of the state as an economic agent, since both are essential to the legitimisation of neoliberal trade policies. It is worth highlighting that the *topos of corruption* does not feature in the Chadian context, despite the reality that the Chadian government had the worst reputation of the three countries for political corruption. This further exemplifies the way that the discourse misleads in order to legitimise the activities of the donors. In Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, the trade strategy was based upon dismantling state functions, whereas in Chad the World Bank sought to defend the decision to work with the Chadian government on the pipeline project.

Central to the blame discourse is the total absence of any critical reflection on the neoliberal policy paradigm or the role of the BWIs. This is evident in the World Bank's analyses of the economic situation in each country:

> 'Years of political and military crisis and poor governance have taken a heavy toll on the country, transforming the once-model African nation [of Côte d'Ivoire] into a fragile state' (World Bank, 2010b, p. i).

> 'Poor economic governance and weak institutional capacity across the entire public administration have been a key impediment to economic growth and poverty reduction in Haiti' (World Bank, 2006b, p. 18)

> 'Chad's underdevelopment and poverty can be traced to a large extent to a difficult climate, its landlocked position, extended periods of civil strife, and Government policies that until recently have not been conducive to development' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 4).

In these three excerpts, the donors implicate certain factors in these countries' economic, political and social underdevelopment, whilst masking others. Poor governance in particular, is presented as a key reason for slow or reverse development. This line of argument deliberately excludes exogenous factors, such as IMF and World Bank-sponsored austerity, the debt burden, interruptions in foreign aid, the damaging legacy of colonial exploitation, volatile prices for exports, or the neoliberal trade reforms pursued under structural adjustment, which were instrumental in the entrenchment of these countries in the global periphery. This reinforces the notion that poor government policy is responsible for the country's development difficulties, contributing to the undermining of the state, both discursively and practically, by legitimising limiting its role in the economic sphere. In the two African cases, the donors invoke civil conflict as a cause of underdevelopment. In doing so, the discourse leaves out alternative explanations, for example that poverty and inequality – exacerbated by structural adjustment - can be drivers of societies more prone to conflict. The suggestion in these excerpts is that conflict has produced poverty, not the other way around. This contradicts academic research on the subject of the conflict-poverty nexus, and allows the donors to escape criticism by shifting the responsibility for poverty onto internal factors (Braithwaite, Dasandi, & Hudson, 2016)

Even in those excerpts that display some discussion of what went wrong with structural adjustment, the donors avoid accepting any responsibility. A key example comes from the World Bank's comments on the Ivorian cocoa sector reforms in 2010:

> 'Between 2001 and 2007, it is estimated that a staggering CFAF 3.2 trillion were extracted from the sector as fiscal and quasi fiscal levies and only a modest share, 35 to 40 percent of the world market price went to farmers. As a result, roughly

> 60% of cocoa growers now live below the poverty line' (World Bank, 2010b, p. 28)

The first clause (on taxation) and the second clause (about producer prices) are conjoined by 'and', making them paratactically related, inferring. The use of the conjunctive adverbial 'as a result' indicates further a cause-and-effect relationship between the taxing of the cocoa sector and the increase in farmers living below the poverty threshold. The authors rely on the logic of appearances rather than any explanation, leading the reader to the conclusion that it is the overtaxing of the sector that has increased rural poverty, by reducing the price paid to the producers. This is fundamentally misleading as it ignores the reality that it was the dismantling of *CAISTAB* and the *barème*, that was immediately followed by a dramatic fall in producer prices, that precipitated the increase in poverty: a policy that was directly demanded by the World Bank and the IMF. By leaving this out of the discussion, the discourse instead places the responsibility onto the Ivorian government for poor management of the sector and removes any indication of blame from the donors and their *SAP*s. More importantly still, any contestation of the reforms themselves is avoided, amounting to the depoliticisation of neoliberal trade policies.

Together, these strategies attribute economic shortcomings to fundamental institutional weaknesses combined with inappropriate policies, as opposed to market failure. The discourse avoids engaging with any challenge or critique of the underlying assumptions of the neoliberal school of thought, which therefore retains its credibility. This is not to argue that borrowing states do not share in the responsibility for their circumstances. Rather, it is to show that in shifting the blame entirely onto internal problems of corruption and governance and downplaying their own responsibilities, the donors and their neoliberal policies remain uncontested and legitimate. This reinforces the subsequent course of action, which is to continue the pursuit of neoliberal policies. The discourse therefore reifies the ongoing processes of neoliberalisation; the solution to the failure of neoliberal reforms is identified as *more* neoliberal reforms.

The solution to the problems of implementation of structural adjustment therefore emerges as the improvement of governance and building the capacity of state institutions. In all three countries, when broadly discussing the development strategy – within executive summaries, introductions, and strategy overviews - the donors and the authorities consistently put 'good governance' at the top of the development agenda. They also recommend 'capacity building' and 'institutional strengthening' so that public institutions would be better able to manage and govern the economy. This represents a more nuanced discourse around the state-market relationship than that of earlier programmes, whose response to the critique of the state was to 'limit', 'roll back' and 'constrain' state institutions in the economy. This new discourse emphasises instead the complementary roles that the state and market should play, depicting the trade strategy as one that will 'strengthen', 'support' and 'build' the capacity of public institutions. The argument, identified as the second claim within the discourse, is that capacity building and governance reforms are the missing link to addressing the failures of structural adjustment: **the *PRSP*s are not about 'less state' but a 'better state'**.

Table 6.2. Claim 2

Device	Purpose	Example
Topos of democracy	Portrays the development strategy as democracy building	'This strategy focuses on promoting broad-based economic growth and employment creation, improving public service delivery, and improving *governance* and *capacity building'* (World Bank, 2002e, p. 9) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'The TSS defines a two-year strategy for the Bank to deliver hope to the population and *restore credibility in public institutions* by helping the government deliver quick wins and launch reforms that promote longer-term *economic governance* and institutional development' (World Bank, 2004c, p. i) (Haiti) 'The Government has the objective of *transparency* and sound governance' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 117) (Chad)

As Table 6.2 demonstrates, reference to 'transparency' and 'good governance' and 'capacity building', particularly at the 'local level' draws on the *topos of democracy,* in order to portray the aid strategy as being closely linked to the objective of democratisation and participatory development. This is significant in the context of the critique of *SAP*s for their lack of transparency and the reality that policies were often decided on behind closed doors, insulated from public debate or scrutiny and without the participation of recipient country's governments or citizens. By utilising the appealing language of good governance in order to argue that *PRSP*s will strengthen state capacity and participatory democracy, rather than undermine it, the donors can discursively reject critiques that their programmes are a breach of national sovereignty, despite the reality that the policy analysis in chapters five and six has shown.

This represents a divergence from early *SAP* discourse, whose focus was on constructing a state-market binary and contained little conception of 'governance'. Rather than legitimising their assault on the state by pitting government inefficiencies against the efficient private sector, the PWC argument brings efficiency into the public sector, via 'good governance' and 'capacity building'. However, as the policy discussion of the present chapter has demonstrated, the trade policy over the 10-year period remained firmly embedded within the neoliberal tradition of minimising the role of the state in the economy, across numerous arenas including labour rights, regulation and taxes. Further examination of the discourse around economic governance demonstrates the superficiality of the donors' claims to be strengthening state institutions, in the discourse as well as in their actions.

Claim 3. Good governance is the enhancement of effectiveness and efficiency
Before analysing the treatment of governance within the donors' discourse, it is worth first considering the concept more generally. Governance, as a term, corresponds to the action of governing; in the context of the *PRSP*s, it therefore broadly refers to the processes in government actions and how things are done. It is a multifaceted concept, involving a number of key principles: participation; decency; transparency; accountability; fairness; and efficiency (Alizadeh & Zarei, 2016). Germane to the concept, therefore, are issues of power, politics and democracy.

Indeed, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) understands governance as central to better development, proposing the following definition:

> 'Good, or democratic governance as we call it at UNDP, entails meaningful and inclusive political participation – basically people having more of a say in all of the decisions which shape their lives' (UNDP, 2011)

Their emphasis is on empowerment and the political dimensions of governance. If the objective is to improve democratic governance to alleviate poverty, we might expect capacity building activities to empower communities to participate in decision-making, and to build capacity at all levels of government, strengthening government ministries and the civil service.

However, upon closer analysis, the meaning of 'good governance' within the discourse of the PWC (and indeed in practice) is problematically reduced to a normative view of governance. Just as the inclusive and pro-poor language that accompanied austerity and privatisation of public services was underpinned by neoliberal reasoning of 'doing more with less', the conceptual understanding of good governance is also narrow. In discussing the need and plan to institute better governance, the donors understand economic governance issues predominantly in terms of reducing corruption, maintaining macroeconomic stability, and providing the conditions for effective and efficient markets. Capacity building, within this narrow understanding of governance, is reduced to supporting institutions to achieve these objectives.

The following three excerpts from the World Bank's *CAS* for Côte d'Ivoire (2002), Haiti (2009) and Chad (2003) and are exemplary of the limitations of governance reforms and capacity building in World Bank thinking and practice:

> 'The I-PRSP also emphasizes the importance of good governance for (i) improving transparency and enhancing the capacity of the public sector to deliver services and efficiently manage the economy; (ii) improving the pass-through of market prices to farmers; and (iii) promoting private sector confidence and investments

through a predictable and reliable legal/regulatory environment and judiciary system' (World Bank, 2002c, p. 10)

Strengthening the Haitian state is particularly critical in the following areas [...] economic governance (sound macroeconomic management, public administration, and market formulation and regulation) (World Bank, 2009c, p. 5)

'The first is strengthening governance, including institutional arrangements for public resource management and service delivery, the rule of law, and environmental and social safeguards for oil exploitation.' (World Bank, 2003a, p. i)

Within these excerpts, good governance is couched in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. In the Ivorian example, the expectation is that good governance will lead to more transparent public spending and better public services, as well as more efficient management of the economy, although this is vague and undefined. Importantly, the policymakers at the World Bank expect a better-governed state to improve the proportion of the producer price that is received by farmers. This reduced role for the public sector, to providing the institutional framework to allow a great proportion of the price to accrue to producers *naturally*, rather than intervening more directly in price-setting, or supporting farmers to negotiate better prices, is clearly at odds with the notion of strengthening the state. However, by discursively linking this neoliberal management of the cocoa sector with the concept of 'good governance' the discourse veils this reality. In all three excerpts, the emphasis is on the role of governance is understood as creating an enabling milieu for the private sector. Providing the appropriate regulatory framework for 'market formulation', 'private sector confidence' and 'oil exploitation' is therefore central to the World Bank's understanding of governance.

Furthermore, it is clear that the focus is on the *implementation* of economic reform and governance, rather than the policies themselves. Reavealingly, this demonstrates that the agenda has clearly already been set, and capacity building is reduced to monitoring, reporting, implementation, coordination and oversight. This is perhaps best exemplified by this excerpt on the World Bank's Capacity Building Project for the Chadian government to prepare for the oil project:

> 'The [capacity building project] will fund the following activities: […] overall coordination of the program of […] economic reform, and of capacity building:
>
> - Coordination of the preparation of adjustment programs, monitoring and reporting;
> - Public information on the design and implementation of adjustment programmes;
> - Seminars on good governance;
> - Coordination and oversight of national capacity building initiatives' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 174).

The World Bank reduces the meaning of capacity building to a few technocratic and apolitical roles. The donors' narrow understanding of governance as the effectiveness and efficiency of governmental institutions demonstrates that their discourse remains firmly embedded within a dominant neoliberal tradition. Improving governance is therefore not about improving the systematic conditions to create an enabling environment for poverty reduction, but maintaining and improving the conditions to create a favourable environment for the private sector. This goes some way to explaining the superficial nature of the capacity building and governance reform projects undertaken and financed by the donors.

The World Bank's 'capacity building' efforts within the cocoa industry included the pilot project to train cocoa producers and organisations to minimise the volatility of cocoa prices through hedging on futures markets (ICCO, 2008). The hedging strategy showed promise of being able to somewhat counteract the volatility of prices, but these remained at levels so low that many cocoa growers were plunged into poverty. Ultimately, the transformation of the global cocoa-value chain – enabled in part by the neoliberalisation of cocoa in Côte d'Ivoire - has meant that the cocoa price is set at the ports by increasingly powerful TNCs in an increasingly concentrated industry. In Haiti, strategic investments were made in physical infrastructure that would support the assembly sector, such as transport, electricity, ports and EPZs as well as 'strengthening' legal infrastructure - favourable regulation to foreign direct investment. In reality, the continued downwards pressure on wages and labour rights is better understood as the systematic weakening of legal infrastructure, to the detriment of factory workers and their families. In Chad, millions of dollars were invested into institutions whose role was ostensibly to monitor the oil consortium. Yet, these efforts were focussed on temporary entities with no political or operational authority (IEG, 2009). The oversight committee was unable to play its role of monitoring the pipeline project due to a lack of transparency both from the consortium and from the Chadian government. In the end, the IEG concluded that 'the [consortium] is almost entirely self-regulating, since there is no independent government presence on the ground' (IEG, 2009, p. 88).[68]

What is common here, and cannot be overemphasised, is that these efforts to 'strengthen capacity', whether genuine or not, have ultimately been limited by deeply unequal power relationships between the TNCs investing in these industries and domestic stakeholders. They have not resulted in strong regulatory bodies able to enshrine workers' rights, fair wages or just resettlement and compensation for displaced people. This is because they have taken place within a neoliberal development paradigm that has systematically weakened the state and increased the power of transnational capital, at the expense of almost everything else. This paradigm seeks to entrench power asymmetries and thus directly undermines the discourse of equitable and participatory development.

As others have argued, the discourse on 'capacity building' and 'good governance' is appealing because it is able to translate complex and sometimes contentious economic processes into manageable issues of governance and policy (Demmers, Jilberto, & Hogenboom, 2004). It has allowed the donors to present their trade strategies - which remain very much influenced by the ideology of neoliberalism - as a depoliticised and technical exercise. This new discursive emphasis on

[68] The IEG found that the capacity building project had been 'unsatisfactory', arguing that 'whatever nascent capacity was being built within [the oversight committee] and its field staff collapsed for lack of […] funding' (IEG, 2009, p. 88)

governance represents the co-optation of democratic values, in order to distract attention from the ailing neoliberal policies themselves, thereby reifying them. It shifts attention from the systemic problems of the neoliberal development framework – unfair markets and inappropriate reforms – to the borrowing governments' lack of capacity to manage the process. Ultimately, the discourse analysis shows that 'good governance' is understood as what is needed to create an enabling environment for the private sector, which retains its position as the rational, self-regulating machine where all social and economic activity should be concentrated. This is the fourth claim, which again demonstrates that beneath the rhetoric of working to alleviate poverty through supporting public institutions, the state/market binary still pervades the thinking of the BWIs well into the *PRSP* era.

The analysis reveals that, within the official documentation, the donors continue to construct a discourse that prioritises the private sector – particularly export markets, in line with Bourdieu and Wacquant's 'neoliberal planetary vulgate' that was explored in chapter four. This is the fourth claim: **the market is the most efficient and valuable method of organisation.**

Table 6.3: Claim 4

Device	Purpose	Example
Economy is a machine metaphor	Reinforces the state/market opposition and notion of market as a self-regulating machine	'The following objectives […] **jump starting** economic recovery and growth through the consolidation of liberalisation of the agricultural sector and the restoration of the country's reputation as a dynamic business centre for the private sector' (World Bank, 2002c, p. 16) (Côte d'Ivoire) '**Engines** of job creation: […] Harnessing the employment potential of manufacturing zones' (IADB, 2009, p. 3) (Haiti) 'The Government is convinced that the private sector remains the **engine** of economy growth' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 117) (Chad)
Topos of freedom	Frames the deregulation of markets as enabling freedom	'The marketing of cocoa took place in a transitory system allowing actual farm-gate prices to be *freely* determined by market' (World Bank, 2002d, p. 10) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Haiti's labour market is *flexible*, imposing few *restrictions* on hiring and firing, as compared with neighbouring and competitor countries' (IMF, 2005b, p. 44) (Haiti) "The economy has become more open. External trade and prices have been *liberalised'* (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 113) (Chad)

Topos of self-reliance	Shifts responsibility for farmers' welfare onto farmers	'A more competitive and *resilient* rural economy would raise performance overall and also produce for the farmers a growing share of the value of their products' (World Bank, 2002d, p. 4) (Côte d'Ivoire)
Topos of pragmatism	Presents neoliberal trade policies as rational	'This new strategy, adopted in April 2008, focuses on *a sensible set of priorities*, notably on creating a business climate that is conducive to private sector growth' (World Bank, 2010c, p. 1) (Chad)

Within policy documents, the World Bank continues to portray the market as the most efficient method of organisation within the economy. Like in earlier programmes, we see the donors suggest that the more that economic responsibilities are handed over to the private sector, the more efficient the economy will become. The donors employ the mechanical metaphor to elevate the private sector, by identifying policies that transferred responsibility to the market as the 'engine' of, and means of 'jump-starting' and 'accelerating' economic growth and employment, contributing to the portrayal of the private sector a self-regulating mechanism that will itself result in a natural equilibrium.

The use of the *topos of freedom* remains a key device within this argumentation, as the donors continue to refer to the 'liberalisation' of the cocoa sector in which prices had become 'freely determined', the EPZs being set up in Haiti are nominated as 'free zones' and trade in Chad had been 'liberalised'. This *topos* is particularly prominent in the Haitian case, when discussing the country's labour regulations. Low wages and regulation are evaluated positively, predicated as 'flexible'. For example, the easy disposal of workers, compared to other countries in the region, is discussed positively, using the *topos of freedom*, as allowing 'few constraints' and 'restrictions' to economic growth. Clearly, the very narrowed understanding of flexibility that was discussed in chapter four remains central to the World Bank's discourse. Flexibility is reduced to minimal regulation, which allows factory managers to remove employees without notice or justification.

In the Ivorian case, the donors frame the issue of volatile prices as the responsibility of farmers and producers, rather than the responsibility of government. In introducing the price risk management programme as a means of ‘allowing producers to manage their own risk’ and in outlining intentions to create a more ‘resilient’ economy, the discourse draws on the *topos of self-reliance* to transfer ownership for mitigating the risk that was created through privatisation, from the state or the private sector to the individual farmers, not dissimilar to the way the austerity discourse shifts responsibility for financing education from the state to communities. This language places the onus on the farmers to be self-responsible in a way that the market desires.

Grammatically, this assertion that economic activities are best handed over to/left to the private sector, is also reinforced by the position of the economy as a subject. For example:

> ‘The marketing of cocoa took place in a transitory system allowing actual farm-gate prices to be freely determined by market.’ (World Bank, 2002d, p. 10)

> ‘Haiti’s assembly sector benefits from low labour costs.’ (IMF, 2005b, p. 44)

By assigning agency to abstract concepts such as the market and the apparel industry, the discourse reinforces the notion of these actors as rational and capable of self-regulation. In reality, the newly privatised system and the setting of prices were determined by a small number of TNCs. By nominating this group of commercial players as ‘the market’, the discourse reinforces the notion of a self-regulating system, as opposed to a small group of self-interested TNCs.

Equally, the obscuring of human agency is achieved through the nominalisation of complex processes. The above example from the Haitian context might instead have been phrased instead as:

> ‘TNCs headquartered in the US benefit from outsourcing their assembly operations to Haiti, where the minimum wage paid to factory workers is low.’

This rewording ascribes agency to the domestic assembly sector and the textiles companies who profit from a very low minimum wage, foregrounding their political interests. The donors’ discourse fails to acknowledge that political rather than economic forces played a key role in promoting the geographical mobility of apparel production, through US policies such as the HOPE Act and the US Department of State's role in suppressing the minimum wage in Haiti. The discourse depoliticises the neoliberal low-wage economy. Equally, the exploitation of factory workers is backgrounded in the original text, nominalised as 'labour costs' – removing the human agency from exploited factory workers. In thinking about the social effects of texts here, this silence on the real human consequences of the consistent downward pressure on wages and regulation from the donors and the private sector, contributes to the legitimisation of the trade strategy, and therefore its persistence during and beyond the 10 years under analysis.

Implicit assumptions about the benefits of the trade reforms are also conveyed through semantic relationships between clauses. For example, the World Bank assert that:

> 'The ERC-supported program is expected to contribute to a reduction of income poverty in rural areas, as higher pass-through of world market prices to producers of cocoa and coffee happens in a more competitive environment' (World Bank, 2002d, Credit and Programme Summary)

This statement relies on a number of implicit assumptions. The conjunction 'as' indicates a causal relationship between the high pass-through of prices to farmers and the reduction of income poverty. What has actually happened is that the price has dropped to such low levels that the proportion of the price that the producers receive becomes irrelevant – it cannot be sufficient to raise their incomes and begin to reduce rural poverty. A further implicit assumption within this excerpt is that a 'more competitive environment' will be a certain outcome of the *ERC.* The authors at the World Bank offer no explanation for this assumption, and as the policy analysis demonstrated, this is a gross misrepresentation of the reality. Indeed, the cocoa sector has become more concentrated (less competitive), incomes have diminished and rural poverty has increased. Importantly though, this emphasis on reducing rural poverty is unique to the PWC era. As chapter four showed, the dismantling of the *barème* was largely justified on the basis of 'freeing' the market from the 'predatory' state, with little discussion of poverty reduction motives.

This first section of the discourse analysis has shown that the legitimisation of the continued rolling back of the state in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire in these policy documents continues to rest on the neoliberal rationale that the private sector is efficient and self-regulating. The critique of the state is more nuanced than in earlier programmes, attributing the failures of structural adjustment to issues with implementation and capacity. The World Bank's good governance discourse appeals to the democratic values inherent in the notion of governance, but when unpacked is exposed as a narrow and superficial conceptualisation of governance, focusing on institutions and the technical, over the policies and the political. A good government is presented as a government able to provide a favourable environment for the private sector. The donors are thereby able to inoculate both themselves and the neoliberal agenda, from critical contestation, thus reifying and legitimising the process of neoliberalisation.

Argument 2: Inclusive Growth

The second overarching argument, identified through analysis of the policy documents, is that *inclusive* export-led growth is essential for poverty reduction. This argument, as this section will demonstrate, represents an evolution from the earlier *SAP* discourse that prioritised GDP growth above all other objectives. Instead, the PWC discourse emphasises the importance that growth created through private sector investment be pro-poor, broad-based and inclusive.

As the previous section argued, the state-market discourse that was identified in chapter four has evolved under the *PRS* framework, co-opting values of democracy in order to construct development policies that support a more capable and democratic state, whilst retaining the state-market binary in order to legitimise the continued handover of economic activities and resources to the private sector. Equally, the growth discourse has continued to shift within these programmes. What can be seen within the policy papers is the donor attempting to discursively negotiate the new development priorities of poverty reduction, in the context of the discredited *SAP*s. This represents the fifth claim, that **(inclusive) economic growth is a/the route to poverty reduction.** In the programme papers examined, the authors begin to prefix growth with adjectives not seen in *SAP*s, such as 'sustainable', 'inclusive', 'pro-poor' and 'broad-based', examples of which are included in table 6.5.

Table 6.5: Claim 5

Device	Purpose	Example
Topos of social inclusion	Aligns GDP growth with human development	'The promotion of social services, environmental preservation, social protection and gender equality will address the non-pecuniary dimensions of poverty *and ensure that growth is shared'* (IMF, 2009c, p. 10) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Policies that promote *pro-poor* growth are needed' (World Bank, 2006b, p. 76) (Haiti) 'Pillar 2 – Ensuring *inclusive, broad-based growth* as the country embarks on oil production' (World Bank, 2003a, p. 21) (Chad)
<u>Parataxis</u>	Creates logic of equivalence	'The ERP aims to create the conditions that would permit a return <u>to strong and sustained high growth and the development of human resources</u> able to participate in and contribute to such growth' (World Bank, 2002d, p. 19) (Côte d'Ivoire) For Haiti to put the current economic crisis firmly behind it and set out on a path of <u>sustainable growth and development'</u> (World Bank, 2009c, p. 9) (Haiti) 'The PRSP rightly emphasises this unprecedented developmental opportunity, with a particular focus on using oil resources <u>to promote growth and reduce poverty</u>' (IMF, 2003a, p. 1) (Chad)
<u>Hypotaxis</u>	Creates logic of equivalence	'Accelerated GDP growth, with direct links to the rural economy, will clearly be required <u>in order to</u> make significant inroads in poverty' (IMF, 2009c, p. 3) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'Policies that promote <u>pro-poor growth are needed to reduce poverty</u>' (World Bank, 2006b, p. 76) (Haiti) 'Chad's central development objective is to <u>reduce poverty by accelerating sustainable economic growth</u>' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 4) (Chad)

By predicating growth with these adjectives, the discourse draws on the *topos of social inclusion* to align GDP growth with human development outcomes. In the context of the failures of the *SAP*s to fairly distribute growth, the donors suggest an understanding that growth is not inherently pro-poor or inclusive, but that growth processes must be calibrated in a way that benefits everyone in society equally. However, this does not reflect a true decoupling of growth from poverty reduction. Rather, the trickle-down narrative remains embedded in the discourse.

In a 2009 report entitled *What is inclusive growth?*, policymakers at the World Bank set out some definitions of different types of growth, stating that 'sustained poverty reduction requires inclusive growth that allows people to contribute to and benefit from economic growth' (Ianchovichina & Lundstrom, 2009, p. 1). The authors emphasised their preference for the expression 'inclusive growth' over 'pro-poor growth', since the latter is mainly interested in the welfare of the poor, whereas inclusive growth is concerned with opportunities for the majority of the workforce – poor and middle-class alike. 'Broad-based' refers to growth that is spread across sectors (Ianchovichina & Lundstrom, 2009). Yet, the terms 'pro-poor' and 'inclusive' as prefixes to growth are used interchangeably in policy documents, without unpacking what either term means. This vagueness is suggestive of their superficiality.

Like in earlier SAPs, the discursive conflation of growth and development is achieved implicitly within the texts. Both paratactic and hypotactic relations between clauses allow the reader to associate growth with poverty reduction, without having to explain the relationship. This amounts to the discursive alignment of the neoliberal agenda to human development outcomes. The claim is that the fruits of GDP growth will be shared in an equitable way that drives a reduction in poverty. This rests upon trickle-down assumptions about how wealth created by foreign direct investment will be filtered down through workers, to their dependents and wider society.

The donors additionally argue more explicitly about the ways in which growth leads to poverty reduction. They introduce a logical relationship between growth and development: GDP growth leads to increased government revenues, which are invested into poverty-reducing programmes – such as investments in health and education – which in turn, reduce poverty. For example, from the *JSA* of Côte d'Ivoire's *I-PRSP:*

> 'The I-PRSP recognises the central importance of increasing government revenue as a means of enhancing government's ability to pursue poverty-reducing policies effectively' (World Bank, 2002e, p. 3)

This argument is reinforced when the programmes, in defining quantitative objectives, consistently base the poverty reduction projections on the growth projections. For example, also from the Ivorian context:

> 'With such a growth rate [...] the country can reduce poverty by 27.6 percentage points between 2009 and 2015 through economic growth' (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009, pp. 90 – 91).

This reinforces the discursive relationship between growth and poverty reduction. However, the discursive conflation of these objectives does not mean that they have equal standing within the donors' development agenda. GDP growth remains privileged – it is poverty reduction that is drawn into the implementation of the economic growth agenda, rather than the other way around. The discourse prioritises GDP growth as the central driver of poverty reduction, underscored not only by the normative trickle-down assumption that growth and natural redistribution go hand in hand, but also that resources will flow through government to the poor.

Comparing the discourse across the two lending frameworks, there is clear continuity in the way that economic growth is perceived as the bedrock of economic activity without which development outcomes are not possible. What separates this discourse form the *SAP* discourse is the renewed emphasis on 'pro-poor' and 'inclusive' growth. Rather than treating growth as an end in itself, the *PRS* discourse envisages private sector growth as a source of social prosperity and as a tool for improving public welfare.

The discrepancies between this discourse and the tangible realities of these programmes are stark. The articulation of the export-led growth strategy as 'pro-poor' and 'inclusive' serves to sanitise deeply unequal trade systems. The reality of impoverished factory workers in Haiti, child labourers in Côte d'Ivoire and displaced farmers in Chad, bears little material resemblance to the donor-constructed images of pro-poor private sector growth. The constructed relationship between growth and poverty therefore amounts to the co-opting of counter-hegemonic values of social inclusion and pro-poor development. The donors have incorporated some of the main concerns of critics of structural adjustment into their discourse only to transform them to create consensus around their policy agenda, ensuring that neoliberalisation would continue to be adopted, legitimised and implemented. This is not to deny that increasing growth rates can, and have, played an important role in reducing poverty in many peripheral countries. Undoubtedly, increasing growth in public revenues is essential for countries to be able to increase social spending. However, as chapter five showed, austerity remained the macroeconomic paradigm even during under the new *PRS* lending framework, in spite of vastly increased revenues in the case of Chad. This fatally undermines the neoliberal discourse that implies using growth as the 'engine' of poverty reduction.

Through this discursive conflation of export-led growth with poverty reduction, the donors mask the true beneficiaries of the neoliberal transformation of these economies. The underlying assumption in the conflation of growth with development - and in the neoliberal ideology more broadly - is that these countries *need* foreign investment. What is masked by the export-led growth leads to poverty reduction myth is the reality of who benefits from this strategy. This is the sixth and final claim, that **poor countries need export-led growth more than TNCs need them.** In all three countries, although particularly in the cases of Haiti and Chad, we can see the donors further linking the export-led growth strategy with poverty reduction objectives, by framing export markets as an opportunity for these country's populations, rather than for transnational capital.

Table 6.6: Claim 6

Device	Purpose	Example
Topos of danger/ threat	Highlights the necessity of urgent and radical investment	'In recent months, the situation improve but *daunting challenges remain* on the road to economic recovery and institutional/social rebuilding' (World Bank, 2002c, p. 27) (Côte d'Ivoire) 'A delayed recovery and deviation from the path of stability and economic security would *have severe consequences and come at great social costs*' (IADB, 2009, p. 2) (Haiti) 'Chad must *drastically increase investment [...] to make up for the development lag* created by its post-independence history and to

		meet its development objectives' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 5) (Chad)
Topos of opportunity	Frames opportunity for investors as opportunity for low income communities	'Agricultural policies and prices are therefore key determinants of income and employment opportunities, and thus of poverty, in rural areas' (World Bank, 2002c, p. 5) (Côte d'Ivoire) "The textile sector has *a unique opportunity* with the HOPE II Act, which gives duty-free, quota-free access to the American market for the next nine years' (World Bank, 2009c, p. 10) (Haiti) 'The proposed project offers a *unique opportunity* to improve Chad's development prospects significantly' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 7) (Chad)

This is achieved through the emphasis on the enormity of the development challenges facing the countries, with the *topos of danger/threat* serving to reinforce the image of these countries as desperately needing urgent investment. The donors portray foreign investment as the only viable options for these countries to improve their development indicators. The *topos of opportunity* plays a key role here. The donors present the pipeline project (the expansion of three oil giants into new areas for exploitation) and the development of the assembly industry (the outsourcing of manufacturing for North American clothing brands) as an opportunity for the people of Chad and Haiti. For example, the World Bank commented on the HOPE trade agreement:

> 'Haiti is well placed in some aspects to exploit this' (World Bank, 2009c, p. 10)

By placing Haiti in subject position, as the 'exploiter' of the market, the discourse reframes what amounted to the exploitation of low-income factory workers, as the positive exploitation of a market opportunity. This serves to downplay the material benefits accrued to the TNCs, who are able to gain competitive advantage by selling cheap garments and expatriate their profits back to the US. In the Ivorian context, the World Bank argued that:

> 'The crisis broke the momentum of trade and investment growth and shattered the image of Côte d'Ivoire as a preferred regional location for foreign direct investment. Economic performance declined, investment levels plummeted, private investors left the country in significant numbers, and poverty levels worsened' (World Bank, 2002c, p. i)

Here, the authors suggest that the departure from the country of private investors is a cause of the worsening of poverty, through the hypotactic 'and' connecting the two phenomena. This serves two purposes: it conflates private investment with development; and it removes the responsibility from the donors for their role in increasing poverty levels – through harsh austerity measures and exposing farmers to volatile cocoa prices – shifting the blame onto internal factors, like the political conflict. This is not to suggest that the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire did not play role in impeding investment, nor that investment isn't important for economic development. However, it represents a gross simplification of the complex development situation, ignoring the reality that the benefits of investment for the poor have been fairly elusive in the postcolonial context.

Within this picture, the oil giants, confectionary companies and textiles firms are envisioned, not as self-serving corporations, but as champions of pro-poor development. These images bear little resemblance to the reality; ExxonMobil, the majority shareholder in the consortium, saw its earnings per share more than double from \$3.24 in 2003 to 7.36 in \$2007 whilst poverty actually increased in the oil-producing area of the pipeline (ExxonMobil, 2007, p. 41).

Within this second overarching argument, private sector growth is not portrayed as the private domain of self-interested entrepreneurs, but rather it is fervently reimagined as a source of social prosperity and a means of improving the welfare of even the poorest in society. Through co-opting the counter-hegemonic values of poverty reduction, equality and inclusivity, the programmes can be seen as evidence that the lessons of the failure of *SAP*s have been learned and incorporated into the new framework. In reality, the neoliberal transformation (or conception, in the case of Chad) of these three industries has not promoted pro-poor outcomes, at this chapter has shown. What has been achieved through neoliberal reforms is the creation of a global production zone in which TNCs can establish export-production platforms for markets in the global core. The discursive moralisation of neoliberal trade strategies disguises the true consequences of the export-led commercial development model. The *PRS* lending framework is therefore better understood, not as a tool for country-owned, participatory and pro-poor development, but as an instrument for maintaining hegemony and the embedding of poverty through strategic discourse.

In summary, the discourse analysis has revealed two key arguments that serve to legitimise the consolidation and intensification of the neoliberal trade strategy in the case study countries. Much like the austerity discourse, the discourse has retained some elements of the *SAP*s, including a fundamental favouring of the market over the state in the economy, regardless of circumstance. However, it has also co-opted, through a) its incorporation of 'good governance' and 'capacity building' into its programmes; and b) the notion that private sector can be not only a vehicle for improving business competitiveness, but also a medium through which pro-poor development can be achieved, counter-hegemonic ideals in order to legitimise the furthering of neoliberal trade policies. The discourse is therefore essential to legitimising neoliberal theory and reproducing neoliberal practice.

Conclusion

Thirty years of trade reforms under these institutions has further entrenched deeply unequal trade relationships, where the economies of Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and Haiti rely heavily on the export of one commodity to the detriment of the rest of the economy. Such exports are made at prices that producers are powerless to influence. The viable alternative of value-adding activities takes place offshore, or by large TNCs, thus creating a feedback loop that stymies backward linkages to the economy and traps the producer nations in a cycle of debt, poverty and resource exploitation.

This chapter has shown that across the three case studies, the economic development strategy pursued by the donors under the *PRS* framework has continued along a startlingly similar trajectory to the structural adjustment era. The overall approach remains anchored in a neoliberal vision of export promotion, support for large TNCs and world market integration. Despite the donors' discursive emphasis on good governance and poverty reduction, in all three countries, the role of the state – both as a policymaker, and as an economic agent, has been circumscribed by the BWIs. Across the case studies, the discourse remains rooted in market ideology, critiquing the state, elevating the market and prioritising economic growth as an imperative. However, there are clear areas of divergence from the structural adjustment discourse, with a new emphasis on strengthening and building public institutions and improving social indicators, such as poverty and inequality. This is a more nuanced understanding of economic development in which development is no longer simply the process of increasing per capita GDP, although this remains the key priority.

The good governance discourse represents *PRSP*s as a more technocratic and managerial approach to development, aimed at promoting a more conducive political environment for the successful implementation of neoliberal reforms. This depoliticised notion of governance allows the discourse to present donor policy as different from the *SAP*s in its rediscovery of the state. Beneath the notion of good governance, remains the neoliberal ideology that underlines the importance of an enabling private sector environment for market forces. The new discursive emphasis on the linkages between a market-based economy and pro-poor development objectives represents the co-opting of counter-hegemonic ideals. This is crucial to legitimising the continuation of dependency-deepening, poverty-increasing neoliberal reforms and extending the influence of the BWIs over borrowing countries.

Conclusion to part two

Chapters five and six have analysed the extent to which under the PWC, development policy in Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti and Chad has become more pro-poor and country-owned, as its proponents argued that it would, or whether *PRSP*s represent a mere rebranding of *SAP*s. Although a thorough exploration of the modalities of the *PRSP* process is beyond the scope of this thesis, the comparative approach has demonstrated that the programmes contained remarkably similar policy matrices, casting doubt on the claims of national formulation and ownership. Indeed, very little has changed on the policy front from the *SAP* era; austerity, privatisation, export-led growth and deregulation continue to dominate the policymaking arena at the World Bank and the IMF.

By tying the conflicting objectives of poverty reduction and fiscal austerity as conditions for much-needed debt relief, the donors have further entrenched conditionality into their lending, deepening dependency and undermining sovereignty. Importantly, reading of the *PRSP*s has shown that when governments sought to diverge from the neoliberal agenda, by making ambitious social investments, or investing in domestic markets, they have been dissuaded from doing so. The debt burden has continued to play a key role in according coercive power to the BWIs, allowing them to dictate the policy agenda and determine the extent to which much-needed investments in the social sectors could truly be realised.

The discourse analysis demonstrates how the donors create consent for the PWC. Importantly, the way that the donors have framed the financial crisis and the failures of structural adjustment as the fault of the state, has served as a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which the notion that the failure to improve human development indicators is a result of *not enough* structural adjustment. Within this logic, the solution to the problems created by neoliberalism, is more neoliberalism. The co-opting of counter-hegemonic values, identified as unique to the *PRSP* era, is evidence of the ways in which neoliberalism is able to evolve and legitimise itself discursively. The neoliberal agenda is presented as a humanitarian project, serving to protect democracy, promote poverty reduction and social and economic freedoms. In reality, it is driven by a political agenda that seeks to re-establish the conditions for the expatriation of profits by transnational capital, undermining the sovereignty and genuine emancipatory development. Together, the policy and discourse analysis have demonstrated how the neoliberal hegemonic order continues to prevail under the PWC, through both coercive and consensual means.

Chapter seven: concluding thoughts

This concluding chapter reviews the findings of this study and synthesises the arguments put forward in this thesis. I return to the concept of neo-colonialism and argue for its continued relevance and applicability to the development architecture of the World Bank and the IMF. This discussion considers this study's unique academic contribution and its limitations, and articulates potential areas for further research.

The approach

In seeking to understand the forces behind the expansion of global poverty and inequality, this thesis presents a critical exploration of the role of international institutions in the economic development of former French colonies Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti. It set out to challenge dominant Eurocentric narratives in academic, journalistic and policymaking spheres, in which state 'failure' is cast as a result of the ineptitude of peripheral countries and their inability to take advantage of the myriad opportunities of globalisation. Diverging from mainstream accounts that have been myopically focussed on the effectiveness of implementation, or the appropriateness, of the policies of the BWIs, this thesis has instead approached the development question through a postcolonial lens. In placing questions of power and discourse at the centre of the enquiry, it has thus provided an important space for an alternative interpretation of economic development in the global periphery.

In many ways, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti are exemplary of the contemporary development episteme, trapped in the outer periphery of the global system, heavily dependent on aid and international finance, subject to economic, political and military intervention by an international community that perceives them as 'failed states', incapable of self-governance. This study set out to understand how these three Francophone ex-colonies, with very different core industries at the heart of their economies and with unique political histories, have ended up in such similar and unyielding predicaments. The often-overlooked connection between neoliberalism and underdevelopment was of central interest. It has built on more critical approaches to development, which understand neoliberal globalisation as a dialectical phenomenon and contextualises the role of the BWIs historically and politically.

Borrowing from neo-Gramscian insights has enabled a more nuanced comprehension of how power operates in the sphere of international development. In line with this theoretical approach, the neoliberal development agenda has been conceptualised not only as a set of policies and practices, as codified in the Washington Consensus, but also as an ideology, which sustains itself through a synthesis of coercion and consent. The four analytical chapters of the thesis set out to understand how neoliberalism shaped development polices across the case study countries over the two periods of policymaking at the World Bank and the IMF. By examining the practical policy content of the programmes, the asymmetrical power relationship between the donors and the borrowing countries, *and* the discourse, the objective was to advance our understanding of how material and ideational power interacts in the context of the World Bank and IMF lending. The study applied this framework of analysis to two key periods of policy development at the BWIs: structural adjustment and poverty reduction strategies.

*SAP*s and *PRSP*s: embedding neoliberalism, entrenching poverty

The *SAP*s ushered in an era of conditionality that firmly imbued the course of domestic trade and financial policy with neoliberal principles. They were radical in their scope and ambitions – not to improve economic and social wellbeing - but to transform the relationship between the state and the market, rolling back the former in favour of the latter. Contrary to claims that governments voluntarily entered into these programmes, this study has considered the 'choice' to sign up to *SAP*s within the context of the asymmetry of power between lender and borrower. At the start of the structural adjustment process, all three countries were in dire need of development finance, as their debt burdens had increased drastically in the preceding decade. Throughout numerous policy programmes, the IMF and the World Bank asserted that many of the conditions that have been explored in this study were necessary prerequisites to the unlocking of credit. By refusing conditionalities, governments therefore risked defaulting on their debts, which could lead to serious difficulties securing credit in the future from the global financial markets. The imposition of neoliberal reforms through these lending mechanisms is therefore tantamount to economic coercion and the erosion of national sovereignty.

In addition to coercive techniques ensuring the implementation of the Washington Consensus, the donors constructed a discourse that sought to create consensus regarding both the benefits of neoliberalisation, and an exigency that these countries accept. The discourse presented as common sense a number of fallacious arguments and assumptions about the necessity for austerity, the virtues of the market and the vices of government, as well as the ultimate objective of GDP growth. Contrary to the economic projections of the donors in their *SAP*s the decade of the 1980s and 1990s witnessed poor economic performance and a deterioration of human development indicators in all three countries. The earliest *SAP*s deepened poverty by demanding radical austerity programmes that cut health, education, public sector jobs and pro-poor subsidies. Although the austerity policies of the 1990s were less severe, 'fiscal discipline' remained preponderant, which, when coupled with the pursuit of export-led markets at the expense of protecting local industries and workers, had devastating consequences. By the end of the millennium, the stark failure of structural adjustment had become so evident that even the World Bank could not deny the reality that:

> 'At times, however, reform programmes have failed to deliver as much as expected – and at times reforms have failed entirely [...] The grim lessons of these failures, and the heavy burdens they place on poor people, underline the importance of a measured and realistic approach to reforms to ensure that their objectives are attained' (World Bank, 2001a, p. 64).

The limitations of the Washington Consensus had become visible across the world, fuelling a push towards a new development agenda that would prioritise poverty reduction and social inclusion, as well as country-owned and participatory programmes. Consequently, the key interest of the latter half of this thesis was the extent to which the PRS approach signified a genuine shift towards the values it claimed to espouse, in the context of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti.

The new lending framework has brought with it *some* changes in BWI policy. The PWC discourse places renewed emphasis on social safety nets and ensuring equity in access to public services, as well as creating inclusive markets that work for the poor. On the policy front, the donors have linked increased pro-poor spending to debt relief; a key demand of civic organisation. Private sector and export-led growth has been explicitly linked to poverty reduction objectives, as the donors emphasise that increased resources for social spending would be made available through GDP growth. Yet, the focus on poverty alleviation remains embedded within a policy framework derived from the same neoliberal principles that dominated the structural adjustment era. The neoliberal trade strategy has therefore been consolidated under the poverty reduction era, as all three countries have been persuaded to focus on export markets, removing regulations and creating the conditions for TNCs to exploit cheap labour and resources. Fiscal austerity has continued to dominate the donors' macroeconomic policymaking, despite the discursive emphasis on poverty reduction and social inclusion, and the increasing awareness of the sophistic arguments of neoliberalism.

The homogeneity of both the policies and the discourse of donor programmes in all three countries directly undermines the BWIs' claims of 'country-owned' and 'participatory' strategies. The analysis of all four analytical chapters exposes the blatant contradiction that lies in the tension between neoliberalism and the human development agenda. Expansive social policies cannot be implemented alongside a restrictive fiscal policy, as the *per capita* spending on health and education figures in these countries show. Importantly, the HIPC initiative has further embedded conditionality, reinforcing the dependency dynamic between borrowing states and the BWIs, and circumscribing their national and economic sovereignty. This is again strongly redolent of the coercive element of the neoliberal hegemonic project.

The discourse analysis presented in chapters five and six demonstrates how the *PRSP* discourse continues to manufacture consent for the neoliberal agenda. By defending the record of structural adjustment, the discourse shifts the blame for the failures of the *SAP*s away from the policies and institutions themselves and onto governments, the state apparatus, and communities. The progressive critiques of structural adjustment are co-opted by the donors under the PWC, in order to legitimise the further embedding of the neoliberal development agenda. In this way, the discourse was essential in further embedding neoliberalism, shielding the BWIs from criticism, and entrenching poverty and inequality in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti.

Power, policy and discourse

This thesis has demonstrated that over the course of a thirty-year period of policymaking at the BWIs, the *SAP*s and *PRSP*s myopically embedded a neoliberal development agenda in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti. By creating a unique analytical framework, which is grounded in neo-Gramscian theory and considers how both material (policy) *and* ideational (discourse) power manifests within these programmes, this study has shown how the World Bank and the IMF have entrenched neoliberalism and restricted sovereignty in three countries, thereby offering a unique framework to examine the interaction of power, policy and discourse.

The postcolonial lens has shed light on the reality that structural adjustment did not take place in a vacuum. Rather, the position that these countries found themselves in at the start of the structural adjustment process was a direct legacy of colonialism. In the African context, the *Françafrique* network ensured the continued exploitation of resources – natural, human and financial – after decolonisation to protect French commercial interests. Haiti's ability to develop independently was impeded by a crippling debt burden and consistent exploitation and intervention by US commercial and political interests. At the start of the 1980s, all three countries faced rising external debts and poor terms of trade that derived from power imbalances in the international order that can be traced directly to colonialism. This is significant, as it demonstrates that the arrival of the neoliberal development agenda was enabled and sustained by the reality that these countries have never truly been in a position to exercise their independence.

This thesis has demonstrated how the power imbalance inherent in the coloniser-colonised relationship finds a contemporary host in the relationship between these nominally independent states and the BWIs. Over the thirty-year period of development policy, conditional lending has entrenched debt dependency and further weakened the national sovereignty of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti. In this way, it is the asymmetrical power relations embedded in the international aid system that have played a crucial role in embedding neoliberalism in these former colonies. The process of embedding neoliberalism has dovetailed with the process of circumscribing sovereignty, due to the anti-state nature of the neoliberal development policy agenda. Fiscal austerity has further undermined government capacity to carry out basic functions, which has both fuelled, and been fuelled by, the privatisation of social services and capture of resources by TNCs. The neoliberal trade strategy has largely removed the state from the economy, leaving an environment where value and profit are created and extracted externally, representing a further affront to sovereignty and removing key mechanisms by which an independent state can develop organically.

Equally central to ensuring the continued implementation of the neoliberal policy framework, and the concomitant erosion of sovereignty, is the discourse espoused by the BWIs. The CDA approach has enabled the analysis of policy texts to make explicit, and provide critical evidence, as to *how* the development discourse operates and evolves over time, perpetuating neoliberal common sense and legitimising the neoliberal project. The unique combination of analytical discourse approaches has facilitated a structured and consistent approach, enabling the demonstration of how argumentation devices and conceptual metaphor work to legitimise the neoliberal development agenda. This approach has demonstrated how the donors created a depoliticising discourse, which conveyed the inevitability of neoliberal policies and perpetuated Eurocentric myths of the inability of the periphery to self-govern. Removing politics from the development discourse has been crucial to building and sustaining the hegemony of the neoliberal development project, in the context of the World Bank and the IMF's position as development finance agencies, without a mandate to interfere in the political affairs of nation-states.

The discourse analysis is especially illuminating in the context of the post-2000 development strategy. Sustaining the neoliberal agenda under the PWC demanded the evolution of the discourse to generate consent for what had proven to be unworkable and unpopular policies. Under increased scrutiny, the donors negotiated the conflicting objectives of poverty reduction and neoliberalism, not by substantive policy change, but by co-opting the progressive ideas of the critics of structural adjustment. The discourse analysis in chapters five and six reveals the enormous power of neoliberal ideology and its capacity to react to and absorb critical ideas, transforming them to its own ends. In this way, the discourse has been essential in further embedding neoliberalism, shielding the BWIs from criticism, and thereby entrenching poverty and inequality in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti.

The approach adopted by this thesis therefore sheds a unique light upon the relationship between policy, power and discourse. The implementation of the neoliberal development agenda has been enabled by a power imbalance in the global economy that has its roots firmly in colonialism. This policy framework is legitimised by a neoliberal discourse, which reproduces those power imbalances already present in the global system by presenting neoliberalism as the only possible policy agenda.

Neoliberalism as neo-colonialism

Chapter one introduced the neo-colonial literature as a potential theoretical tool to help make sense of the international capitalist system defined by Nkrumah in 1965:

> 'The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.' (Nkrumah, 1965, p. ix)

In light of the discussions and arguments put forward in this thesis, Nkrumah's insights appear to remain relevant for understanding the role of the BWIs in the global periphery. This study has demonstrated how sovereignty has been circumscribed by *SAP*s and *PRSP*s, as the donors have strongly determined the development trajectory of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti. The economic architecture of all three postcolonial states has been fundamentally moulded in the neoliberal image, ingratiating them in a global economic system that they were neither ready nor willing to join so readily.

Thirty years of trade reforms have further entrenched deeply unequal trade relationships, leading to a situation where the economies of Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and Haiti rely heavily on one export commodity. Three very different industries – an agricultural commodity, a mineral resource and an assembled good – have been subjected to radical neoliberal reforms, or established within a neoliberal mould, and now share several important features. In focussing on export-markets, a race to the bottom has ensued, leading to the suppression of prices, wages and labour rights. The viable alternative of value-adding activities takes place offshore, or by large TNCs, thus creating a feedback loop that stymies backward linkages to the economy and traps the producer nations in a cycle of debt, poverty and resource exploitation. This has led to the redistribution of wealth and power from public to private and from poor to rich within these countries, as well as from the peripheral economies of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, to core economies. The documentation by journalists of more sinister trends, such as state-enforced violence and unfree labour must be placed in the context of these reforms. This is not to claim that the World Bank and the IMF are entirely responsible for the emergence of child labour in Côte d'Ivoire, or a lack of adherence to minimum wage laws in factories in Haiti's EPZs, or abuse by the *gendarmerie* along the Chadian pipeline. However, their reforms have created the conditions, which have handed power over to transnational capital and - in the case of Chad - a corrupt government.

The parallels with the colonial experience are stark. Imperialism constituted a major process of primitive capital accumulation, through the coercive extraction of value, which produced systematic impoverishment. This thesis has demonstrated that by exporting neoliberalism to the global periphery, these processes have been further embedded in the global political economy. In essence, the colonial system has evolved into a new, more complex system, in which a growing network of international institutions are working to realise the interests of transnational capital, by extracting asymmetric politico-economic benefits from former colonies.

This is not to argue that the governments of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti are not culpable, accountable or without agency in the development process. Rather, it is to challenge the dominant narrative, which shifts the blame entirely onto governments and the state apparatus, inoculating external agents from any responsibility for the drastic failures of development finance. I do not seek to reduce these governments to mere victims. Indeed, in the case of Chad and the country's pipeline project, President Déby used the World Bank to his own advantage, gaining access to credit and using the revenues from the oil in order to maintain his precarious grip on power. This does not contradict the neo-colonial nature of the relationship between Chad and the international community. As Nkrumah argued and Langan emphasises, the elites of neo-colonial regimes can play the game in order to secure advantages for themselves (Langan, 2018; Nkrumah, 1965). Fundamentally, therefore, the postcolonial states retain agency as political and economic actors, however this has been circumscribed by increasingly powerful institutions that act within a highly asymmetrical power relationship that manufactures coercion and consent.

Modern applications of Nkrumah's work have asserted the necessity of contending with the ideational aspects of neo-colonialism. As Langan articulates, 'it is important to recognise [...] the construction of discourse is a crucial part of neo-colonial relations' (Langan, 2018, p. 230). This study – enabled by techniques of discourse analysis – has demonstrated *how* the development discourse sustains itself, thereby offering a unique contribution to the neo-colonial literature. The salience of power – both coercive and consensual - in the manner in which the BWIs dictated policy space in the economies of these countries reinforces the relevance of the theoretical lens of neo-colonialism for making sense of the *SAP*s and the *PRSP*s.

Limitations of the study

This thesis has created a model for exploring the interaction between policy, power and discourse in the context of the development policy of the World Bank and the IMF. This triumvirate model demonstrates how the BWIs have embedded neoliberalism in these former colonies, elucidating the ways in which power is wielded through coercion and consent, restricting sovereignty and solidifying a neo-colonial relationship.

In adopting a small-*N* approach, this study has inevitably sacrificed a level of depth for the insight that can be gleaned by using a comparative lens. This thesis has been ambitious in its scope, examining the development experience of three countries with distinctive economic and political contexts over a thirty-year period. As a result, some of specificities of the three case studies may have been lost in the analysis. Moreover, other policy themes within the BWI programmes have been intentionally neglected. Reforms in the wider arena of finance (exchange rates, currency, financial deregulation) and trade beyond the primary export industry, could tell us more about the nature of the neoliberal order. However, and crucially, in opting for a cross-country comparative approach across two distinct periods of policymaking, this thesis has been able to demonstrate that the specific failures of development cannot be dismissed as one-off incidences of poor policy. If this were the case, we would have seen the donors abandon the neoliberal policy paradigm during the 1990s as the evidence condemning the Washington Consensus mounted. The temporal and comparative scope of the thesis has therefore allowed me to demonstrate the intent of the donors and their commitment to neoliberal ideology over the course of time, even after it was proven to have negative consequences for human and economic development.

An important question that arises from the findings of this study is the extent to which this neoliberal, neo-colonial order is unique to the French postcolonial context. The *Françafrique* literature argues that there is something distinct about the Francophone postcolonial experience. Indeed, this thesis has shown that the fostering of neo-colonial relations played a key role in enabling the implementation of the *SAP*s. However, in Haiti, the US had long eclipsed France in terms of its commercial interests and political influence in the country by the 1980s. This complicates any conclusions that we might draw from these three former French colonies. Moreover, having focussed uniquely on the Francophone experience, this study is unable to confirm whether this phenomenon is unique to the French postcolonial context, or is something that extends throughout the formerly colonised world.[69] It would be interesting to investigate the extent to which the findings can be applied to other postcolonial countries, beyond the Francophone context.

Where do we go from here? Suggestions for future research

Despite the apparent consensus within the corridors of power in Washington, opposition to the neoliberal agenda has not dissipated. In focussing so heavily on the BWIs, this thesis may stand accused of denying agency to peripheral actors. More attention could be given to the alternative voices that drove the transition into the era of the PWC and beyond. Highlighting the agency of counter-hegemonic forces in the global periphery would be an important step towards overcoming the exclusion of peripheral actors from the analysis of development and global politics. Future research could seek to understand the role of local NGOs and civil society organisations in challenging and influencing the World Bank and the IMF.

This thesis has exposed the gap between rhetoric and reality and deconstructed the underlying interests and motivations of the IFIs in the introduction of *SAP*s and *PRSP*s, namely the interests of transnational capital in constructing neoliberal hegemony. At the time of writing, development lending at the World Bank and IMF, although still operating through the PRGF, has continued to evolve. For example, in 2012, the BWIs played a key role in reversing the privatisation of the cocoa sector, reinstating a pricing structure to ensure a minimum price for cocoa

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[69] Existing studies on the relationship between the French government and structural adjustment include Lassou and Hopper (2016) and Wilson (1993).

producers. Developments like this highlight the need for continued research into the practices and discourse of these organisations, in order to establish whether such changes represent a true rupture from the neoliberal development agenda, or a new stage of neoliberalism – in which the logic of the market continues to be at the centre of the strategy, in spite of a more progressive discourse. As long as development policy at the World Bank and the IMF continues to be fundamentally embedded within a neoliberal framework, evidence suggests that there is little chance of these countries overcoming the vast development challenges that they face.

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Appendix 1: Selected Indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, 1981 - 2000

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Education Spending [70] (CFAF Million)	162.2	182.6	184.9	183.3	187	-	208	216.9	215.7	213.6	206.8	197.8	199.7	213.9	236.3	252.7	277.4	302.4	312.3	298.8
Health Spending[71] (CFAF Million)	27.6	30.5	30	32.5	31.1	-	40.3	41.3	36.8	35.4	38.9	49.7	43.4	52.9	62.7	65.5	69.7	77.5	67.9	70.1
Debt Service [72] ($ Million)	921	964	798	635	1192	1537	1318	1060	1106	941	1004	912	917	1137	929	1285	1229	1285	1367	904
Population [73](million)	8.413	8.699	8.995	9.301	9.617	-	10.698	10.8	11.1	11.6	12.1	12.5	13	13.5	14.2	14.7	14.9	15.4	15.9	16.4
Exchange Rate[74]	271	328	381	436	449	-	300	297	320	272	282	265	283	555	499	511	584	590	615.7	712
Education *per capita*[75]	71.14	65	53.95	45.20	43.31	-	64.81	67.62	60.73	67.70	60.61	59.71	54.28	28.55	33.55	33.64	31.88	33.28	31.90	25.59
Health *per capita*[76]	12.11	10.69	8.75	8.01	7.20	-	12.56	12.88	10.36	11.22	11.40	15	11.8	7.06	8.85	8.72	8.01	8.53	6.94	6
Debt Service *per capita*[77]	109.47	110.82	88.72	68.27	123.95	149.12	123.2	98.15	99.64	81.12	82.98	72.96	70.54	84.22	65.42	87.41	82.48	83.44	85.97	55.12

[70] Sources: 1981 - 1985 (IMF, 1986b, p. 112); 1987 - 1991 (IMF, 1992, p. 67); 1992 – 1994 (IMF, 1995b, p. 52); 1995-1996 (IMF, 1998c, p. 73); 1997 - 2000 (IMF, 2004a, p. 25)
[71] Sources: 1981 - 1985 (IMF, 1986b, p. 112); 1987 - 1991 (IMF, 1992, p. 67); 1992 – 1994 (IMF, 1995b, p. 53); 1995-1996 (IMF, 1998c, p. 74); 1997 - 2000 (IMF, 2004a, p. 26)
[72] Sources: 1981 – 1984 (World Bank, 1988b, p. 99); 1985 – 1989 (World Bank, 1991, p. 80); 1990 – 1996 (World Bank, 1998a, p. 176); 1997 – 2000 (World Bank, 2004a, p. 160)
[73] Retrieved from World Bank online data repository: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CI [accessed 20 January 2020]
[74] $1 = CFAF. Historical exchange rates retrieved from: https://fxtop.com [accessed 20 January 2020]
[75] Calculated by multiplying education expenditure by exchange rate, and dividing by population.
[76] Calculated by multiplying health expenditure by exchange rate, and dividing by population.
[77] Calculated by dividing debt service by population.

Appendix 2: Selected Indicators for Haiti, 1982 - 2000

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Education Expenditure[78] (HTG Million)	85.86	87.32	93.4	99.01	104.3	160.5	173.2	177.5	181.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Health Expenditure[79] (HTG Million)	93.23	81.51	90.03	89.5	97.8	143.4	153.4	141.9	140.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Debt Service[80] ($ Million)	15	14.1	17.6	18	14	23	23	24	11.5	12.4	0.7	0.4	0.5	54.8	20.7	31	32	34	33
Population[81] (millions)	5.995	6.096	6.240	6.384	6.527	6.675	6.813	6.956	7.099	7.243	7.387	7.531	7.675	7.819	7.966	8.112	8.258	8.404	8.549
Exchange Rate [82]	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	9.8	12.8	15	15.2	15.7	16.7	16.8	16.9	17.46
Education per capita[83]	2.86	2.86	2.99	3.10	3.20	4.81	5.08	5.1	5.12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Health per capita ($) [84]	3.11	2.67	2.89	2.8	3	4.3	4.5	4.08	3.97	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Debt Service per capita ($)[85]	2.4	2.21	2.70	2.70	2.05	3.31	3.24	3.31	1.56	1.65	0.09	0.05	0.06	6.76	2.51	3.69	3.74	3.91	3.74

[78] Sources: 1982 – 1986 (IMF, 1986c, p. 27); 1987- 1990 (IMF, 1991, p.31)
[79] Sources: 1982 – 1986 (IMF, 1986c, p. 27); 1987- 1990 (IMF, 1991, p. 31)
[80] Sources: 1982 – 1984 (World Bank, 1988b, p. 175); 1985 – 1989 (World Bank, 1991, p. 114); 1990 – 1996 (World Bank, 1998a, p. 268); 1997 – 2000 (World Bank, 2004a, p. 252)
[81] Retrieved from World Bank online data repository: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=HT [accessed 22 January 2020]
[82] $1 = HTG. Historical exchange rates retrieved from: https://fxtop.com [accessed 20 January 2020]
[83] Calculated by multiplying education expenditure by the exchange rate and dividing by the population.
[84] Calculated by multiplying health expenditure by the exchange rate and dividing by the population.
[85] Calculated by dividing debt service by population.

Appendix 3: Selected Indicators for Chad, 1981 - 2000

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Education Expenditure[86] (CFAF million)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,900	10,600	10,800	12,200	15,300	15,700	17,700	19,700
Debt Service[87] ($ Million)	0.5	1.2	0.3	3.3	12	5	5	6	5	6.5	8.7	9.6	14.1	15	7.4	22.9	22	22	27	24
Population (million) [88]	4.61	4.715	4.829	4.954	5.091	5.243	5.408	5.584	5.768	5.957	6.15	6.349	6.555	6.772	7.001	7.241	7.493	7.759	8.042	8.342
Exchange Rate [89]	271	328	381	436	449		300	297	320	272	282	265	283	555	499	511	584	590	615.7	712
Education per capita ($)[90]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.8	2.82	3.09	3.30	3.50	3.43	3.57	3.32
Debt service per capita ($) [91]	0.11	0.25	0.06	0.67	2.36	0.95	0.92	1.07	0.87	1.09	1.41	1.51	2.15	2.21	1.06	3.16	2.94	2.84	3.36	2.88

[86] Sources: 1993 – 2000 (World Bank, 2007, p. 11)
[87] Sources: 1981 – 1984 (World Bank, 1987b, p. 23); 1985 - 1989 (World Bank, 1991, p. 66); 1990 – 1996 (World Bank, 1998a, p. 114); 1997 – 2000 (World Bank, 2004a, p. 128)
[88] Retrieved from World Bank online data repository https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=TD [accessed 22 January 2020]
[89] $1 = CFAF. Historical exchange rates retrieved from: https://fxtop.com [accessed 20 January 2020]
[90] Calculated by multiplying education expenditure by exchange rate and dividing by the population.
[91] Calculated by multiplying health expenditure by the exchange rate and dividing by the population.

Appendix 4: Expanded discourse tables for chapter three

Claim 1. The fiscal crisis is a result of irresponsible spending

Excerpt	**Devices**
Côte d'Ivoire	
'There are four main areas of **weakness** in government policy which need to be addressed. First, the public sector *expanded excessively*, contributing to a **deterioration** in public savings and rising external debt. Second, while current expenditures increased, the main cause of the expansion was an **inflated** and **ill-conceived** public investment program.' (World Bank, 1981a, p. 3)	**Economy is a human body metaphor** [92] / *topos of burden*
'The first objective of the financial **recovery** plan is to reduce the public sector deficit, which is at the roots of *present external imbalances*' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 3) 'The rapid rise in public spending <u>clearly</u> revealed **deficiencies** in the management of public sector resources' (*Ibid.,* p. 4.) 'Whereas the immediate crisis and its subsequent worsening was met by the adoption of a stringent financial **recovery** and *stabilisation* program designed to reduce *imbalances* in public sector finances and external accounts, <u>it was evident that</u> the Ivorian economy was **suffering** from a series of fundamental **weaknesses** and economic policy **deficiencies'** (*Ibid.*)	**Human body /** *topos of stability* <u>Modal adverb</u> **Human body**/ *topos of stability*
'The Government embarked on an overambitious public investment programme […] the overexpansion of economic activity […] contributed to a **rapid deterioration** in internal and external financial *equilibria'* (World Bank, 1986b, p. 2)	**Human body** *Topos of stability*
'Since end-1986, the economic and financial situation has again **deteriorated** *drastically*, as a consequence of which the country now faces an *extremely serious crisis.'* (IMF, 1989d, p. 7) 'In view of the *particularly pressing short- term financial difficulties*, the Government intends initially to concentrate on *stabilizing* the financial situation' (*Ibid.,* p. 8.)	**Human body /** *topos of danger/threat* *Topos of danger/threat / topos of stability*
'The country's renewed fiscal and balance of payment crisis at the end of the 1980s revealed not only inadequate macroeconomic policies but also persisting **distortions** in the economy. The latter include […] an inefficient and ***bloated*** public sector, with limited capacity to provide basic services to the population.' (World Bank, 1994b, p. 3)	**Economy is a machine metaphor** [93] **/ human body /** *topos of burden*

[92] Referred to hereafter in the expanded discourse tables as 'human body'

[93] Referred to hereafter in the expanded discourse tables as 'machine'

Haiti	
'The third *impediment* to economic growth in the public sector**.** This is also a relatively new phenomenon; it is only since FY80 that Haiti's tradition *of fiscal discipline* has **broken down**' (World Bank, 1985, p. iii)	*Topos of burden / topos of responsibility* **Machine**
'Financial control has been inadequate, including of the public enterprises.' (World Bank, 1986a, p. i)	
'Public sector investment […] will not attain the levels reached in the early 1980s, when it was **bloated by a large scale'** (IMF, 1987c, p. 13)	**Human body**
'The […] government now faces a *bewildering array of economic and financial problems:* the country's infrastructure is **dilapidated** by years of neglect, the treasury empty and finances in shambles, economic activities **at a virtual stand-still** […] much will be required of the new and *fragile* government including the imposition of *discipline* over the budget' (World Bank, 1994c, p. 2) 'The Government intends to pursue to improve the **functioning** of the state, to achieve sustainable growth in a *stable* macroeconomic context' (*Ibid.,* p. 7.)	*Topos of danger/threat* **Machine** *Topos of stability / topos of responsibility* **Machine/** *topos of stability*
A public administration in ruins and an *overextended public sector*, which barely provides services**,** *hampers* implementation of aid projects**,** and cannot adequately support private sector development and growth' (World Bank, 1996c, p. 5)	*Topos of danger/threat/ topos of burden*
Chad	
'At end**-**1986 Chad faced a very **weak** economic and financial situation' (IMF, 1987a, p. 9) 'Among these constraints are (i) **weak** institutional capacity to program and monitor investments (*ibid.,* p. 40)	**Human body**

<u>Claim 2. The social sectors are a burden on the economy</u>

Excerpt	**Devices**
Côte d'Ivoire	
'The recurrent *costs* of the education sector […] have become particularly *burdensome'* (World Bank, 1981a, p. 3) 'The quality of the education is *high*, but so is the *cost* […] the continued expansion of the system along prevailing lines adds to the *burden* on public finances' (*Ibid*)	*Topos of burden*
'The expansion of the education system, while impressive, was accompanied by growing inefficiency, increasing irrelevance to the needs of the economy *and escalating recurrent costs'* (World Bank, 1983c, p. 4) 'In the housing sector a particularly *heavy drain* on current expenditure has arisen' (*ibid.,* p. 9.)	*Topos of burden*

'The Fund's EFF stressed the need for reforms in the education sector, particularly *cutting the budgetary costs* of the system' (*Ibid.,* p. 28)	
'On the expenditure side, fiscal policy will seek to reduce the *weight* of the wage bill' (IMF, 1998b, p. 7)	*Topos of burden*
Haiti	
'Temporarily putting less emphasis on social objectives than in recent years does not imply that these objectives should be revised downward. It has to be recognised, however, that the *recent expansion of investment in the social sectors* has not stimulated economic growth' (World Bank, 1985, p. 45)	*Topos of burden*
'Significant *cost savings* can be identified: efficient use of existing hospital resources, reduction of referrals beyond the primary-care system, more intensive use of dispensaries and health centres, more complete shift of ministry operating budgets to finance primary rural care and, possibly, devolution of tertiary care to private providers if *costs continue to be prohibitively high'* (World Bank, 1986a, p. 111)	*Topos of burden*
'Past investments in Haiti's health sector […] have been characterised by a general failure to achieve project goals. These shortcoming can […] be attributed, in part, to *overly ambitious* and complex project designs, and to the underestimation of *recurrent cost requirements' (*World Bank, 1989b, p. 12)	*Topos of burden*
Chad	
'The government will promote *community participation* in the delivery of social services in order to minimise the use of public resources and *encourage a sense of collective responsibility* for maintaining minimum welfare standards' (IMF, 1987a, p. 44)	*Topos of self-reliance*
'IDA has been implementing a minimal programme of support to **alleviate** poverty through activities that address basic poverty issues, place minimal *demands* on Government administration and finances, [and] make maximum use of non-Government capabilities' (World Bank, 1994e, p. 14) 'Strengthening *community participation* in the management of the system, with individuals, households and communities *ensuring their own health'* (*Ibid.,* p. 16.)	**Human body /** *topos of burden* *Topos of self-reliance*
'The government will make a push during 1996-98 towards greater use of *burden-sharing* with local communities in the funding of public services' (World Bank, 1996e, p. 7)	*Topos of burden / topos of self-reliance*

Claim 3. Austerity is rational

Excerpt	**Device**
Côte d'Ivoire	

'Towards the end of the 1970s, Government began to realise the problems created b the expanded public investment program, and began to change its policies […] However, this decrease [in public investment] resulted from ad hoc [emphasis in original] investment reviews undertaken by government. It did not represent a return to the more **systematic** and *rational* policies of the past' (World Bank, 1981a, pp. 5-6) 'The program calls for a strengthening of budgetary *discipline* and a centralisation of public finances' (*Ibid.,* p. 10)	**Machine** / *topos of pragmatism* *Topos of responsibility*
'In the field of public investment control and programming, commendable progress was made both in improving the **mechanisms** of the systems involved and in the actual results achieved' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 38)	**Machine**
'A set of policies and structural reforms designed to improve the efficiency of the Government's **administrative machinery'** (IMF, 1989a, p. 9) 'This objective will be pursued within the framework of a reform of the administration and of the tax system, *a rationalisation of budgetary management*' (*Ibid.,* p. 9.)	**Machine** *Topos of pragmatism*
'These provisions will soon be **fine-tuned** […] in order not to undermine the macroeconomic and structural objectives of the medium-term programme' (IMF, 1994, p. 6)	**Machine**
Haiti	
'The Government that assumed office in early 1986 moved quickly to start **correcting** domestic and external *imbalances* in the economy' (IMF, 1989c, p. 6) 'Reflecting this view, the Government, in addition to pursuing *prudent* fiscal and monetary policies, has adopted a *more cautious* wage policy' (*Ibid.,* p. 11)	*Topos of stability* / **machine** *Topos of responsibility*
'These experiences underscore the need for a limited scope and size for the proposed project, and for ensuring financial *discipline* and *realism'* (World Bank, 1989b, p. 12)	*Topos of responsibility/topos of reality*
Chad	
'[The government] has also adopted a *pragmatic* approach to the problems facing the economy' (IMF, 1987a, p. 35)	*Topos of responsibility*
'The aims of this programme are to […] **correct** macroeconomic *imbalances'* (World Bank, 1994e) 'Regarding financing, the strategy adopted is aimed essentially at *rationalisation* with a view to maximising savings' (*Ibid.,* p. 16.)	**Machine** / *topos of stability* *Topos of pragmatism*
'There is a risk that the Chadian authorities will become *less frugal* in their fiscal management as the prospects of large oil reserves become more concrete' (World Bank, 2006b, p. 16).	*Topos of responsibility*
	Human body

‘The government would like to overcome these impediments […] by: (i) **rehabilitating** the civil service and clarifying its functions; and (ii) **rehabilitating** the public finances’ (World Bank, 1996e, p. 7)	
‘Fiscal *discipline* and conservative monetary policies are the most effective policy **instruments** to protect the country’s international competitiveness in a system of fixed exchange rate administered by regional monetary institutions’ (World Bank, 1996e, p. 6) ‘The high priority of helping Chad move from an unsustainable public finance situation to a **healthier** fiscal performance’ (*Ibid.,* p. 14)	*Topos of responsibility* / **machine** **Human body**

Claim 4. Austerity is necessary

Excerpt	**Device**
Côte d’Ivoire	
‘The *need* is to limit expenditures, external borrowing, and public sector activities to those which can be *prudently* financed, and therefore, to become systematically more selective in identifying high priority projects and programs’ (World Bank, 1981a, p. 8)	*Topos of reality / topos of responsibilty*
‘The first concern of the authorities is to avoid a **deterioration** of Ivory Coast's credit-standing abroad and an **asphyxia** of the economy at home. The second is to formulate a *credible* financial program providing for the elimination of all external arrears, a large reduction of internal arrears, and some **recovery** of the economic activity in 1984’ (IMF, 1984, p. 11)	**Human body** *Topos of reality*
‘Côte d’Ivoire development strategy **hinges** on export growth and fiscal and monetary discipline as the basis for sustained growth under *realistic conditions* for external debt amortisation’ (World Bank, 1986b, p. 42)	**Machine** *Topos of reality*
‘The Government *has to operate within the confines of a tight budget*’ (World Bank, 1994b, p. 8)	*Topos of reality*
‘The Government will strengthen its efforts to improve public finances and implement a rigorous fiscal policy that will ensure the internal and external financial *viability* of Côte d’Ivoire’ (IMF, 1998c, p. 7)	*Topos of reality*
Haiti	
‘These three compound problems – the pressure of population on the land, the effect of protection on domestic industry, and the *inadequacy and poor allocation of public resources* – are the root causes of Haiti’s **economic stagnation** and of its current economic and *financial disequilibrium*. The latter also reflects, of course, the impact of the world economy on the small, open economy of Haiti and the repeated failure *to adjust public expenditure to the reality of public receipts*.’ (World Bank, 1985, p. iv)	*Topos of burden* / **human body** *Topos of stability / topos of reality*

'*Stabilisation* is essential before any steps can be taken to achieve sustained economic growth. The government's top priority <u>must</u> therefore be a renewed (*Ibid.)*	*Topos of stability / topos of reality* <u>Modal verb</u>
'Public expenditure <u>*must*</u> *be* adjusted to increase the returns to existing private and public investments' (World Bank, 1986a, p. i) '[The Department for Health] has <u>rightly</u> recognised […] that the extension of coverage within current budgetary restrictions *requires* giving up some urban hospital services as well as achieving greater efficiencies' (*ibid.,* p. 111.)	*Topos of reality* / <u>modal verb</u> <u>Modal adverb</u> / *topos of reality*
The government has moved rapidly to reduce *financial imbalances* […] these objectives were to be fostered by […] the resurgence of confidence on the part of both private investors and the donor agencies in the context of the new policies' (IMF, 1987b, pp. 2-3)	*Topos of stability*
Chad	
'The government will implement a *realistic* investment program that is adapted to the country's needs and takes into account financial and other constraints' (IMF, 1987a, p. 40)	*Topos of reality*
'The adjustment is designed to restore Chad's *credibility'* (World Bank, 1994e, p. 5)	*Topos of reality*
'The timely rehabilitation of the public finances is crucial to achieving durable progress toward financial *viability* and steady economic growth' (IMF, 1995a, p. 7)	*Topos of reality*
'This risk will persist as long as Chad's public finances remain in a *precarious* state. This argues for a more *stable* pipeline of adjustment funding, subject to predictable timing and degree of conditionality' (World Bank, 1996b, p. 16)	*Topos of stability*

Appendix 5. Cocoa Prices 1981 - 1999

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Producer Price per kilo [94]CFAF	300	300	350	375	-	400	400	400	376.2	200	200	200	200	315	320	320	455	455	300
Export Price f.o.b. per kilo [95] CFAF	411.9	418	504.1	529.1	-	629.4	650.5	626.6	517.9	272.6	261	262	258.1	722.1	660.2	700	827.6	869.1	707
Producer Share of f.o.b price (%)[96]	73	72	69	71	-	64	61	64	73	73	77	76	77	44	48	46	55	52	42

[94] Sources: 1981 – 1984 from IMF (1986b, p. 79); 1986 – 1987 (IMF, 1992, p. 55); 1988 – 1993 (IMF, 1995b, p. 40); 1994 – 1996 (IMF, 1998c, p. 61); 1997 – 1999 (IMF, 2004a, p. 15)
[95] Sources: 1981 – 1984 from IMF (1986b, p. 79); 1986 – 1987 (IMF, 1992, p. 55); 1988 – 1993 (IMF, 1995b, p. 40); 1994 – 1996 (IMF, 1998c, p. 61); 1997 – 1999 (IMF, 2004a, p. 15)
[96] Calculated by dividing producer price by export price and multiplying by 100.

Appendix 6. Minimum Wages in Haiti, 1981 - 1999

Year	Wage Rate (HTG per day)[97]	Real Wage Index[98]	Real Wage (HTG per day)[99]
1981	13.2	100	13.2
1982	13.2	92.4	12.2
1983	13.2	85.2	11.2
1984	13.2	78.9	10.4
1985	15	72.8	10.9
1986	15	67.1	10.1
1987	15	70.6	10.6
1988	15	68.7	10.3
1989	15	61.9	9.3
1990	15	51.4	7.7
1991	15	43.2	6.5
1992	15	35.6	5.3
1993	15	30	4.5
1994	15	21.8	3.3
1995	36	16.7	6.0
1996	36	13.7	4.9
1997	36	11.8	4.2
1998	36	10.5	3.8
1999	36	9.7	3.5

Appendix 7: Expanded discourse tables for chapter four

Claim 1. State interventions in the economy are a hindrance to growth

Excerpt	Devices
Côte d'Ivoire	
"**Symptoms**: declining surpluses, rising costs' (World Bank, 1981a, p. 45)	**Human body**
'**Unsound** price and subsidy policies produced **distorted** supply and demand responses' (World Bank, 1983c, p. 4) 'The **distortion** of the system of incentives *imposed* further *constraints* on growth' (*Ibid.,* p. 62.)	**Machine / human body** *Topos of freedom*
'**Faulty** producer price policies [...] resulted in **depressed** rural incomes and a **decline** in agricultural growth' (World Bank, 1989a, p. 19)	**Human body**
'Structural reforms in agriculture, industry, transport and labour markets are **geared** towards the **dismantlement** of *remaining regulatory barriers* and market interventions that continue to *hamper* competition and private initiative' (World Bank, 1994, p. 8)	**Machine** *Topos of burden*
'Internal and external marketing of both crops **still suffer** from inefficiencies and rigidities caused by controls and regulations *imposed* by the CAISTAB. Moreover, operations of CAISTAB continue to be *elaborate, high cost*, and often not transparent.' (World Bank, 1995, p. 10) "CAISTAB expenditures are *high* and, <u>in fact</u>, an implicit tax on farm income" (*Ibid.,* p. 12) 'Due to [CAISTAB's] *pervasive* role in the internal and external marketing, current *costs are high* compared to other countries' (*Ibid.,* p. 12.)	**Human body** *Topos of freedom/ topos of burden* *Topos of burden/* <u>modal adverb</u> *Topos of burden*
'The encouraging results obtained under the program were also due to the effective implementation of a number of structural reforms aimed at **correcting the distortions** in the Ivorian economy' (IMF, 1998b)	**Machine**
Haiti	

[97] Source: IMF (2002b, p. 38)
[98] Last Quarter of 1981 = 100. Deflated by consumer price index for Port-au-Prince until 1991. Deflated by an index covering the whole country beginning in 1992. Source: IMF (2002b, p. 28)
[99] Calculated by multiplying wage rate by real wage index/100.

‘Protection has **distorted** the structure of prices. **Distortions** have led to *inefficient high cost production* that cannot supply either the assembly industry or foreign export markets’ (World Bank, 1985, p. x) ‘Trade policies often act as *impediments’* (*Ibid.,* p. 48.) ‘Protection has clearly become *excessive* in Haiti’ (*Ibid.,* p. 73)	**Machine** *Topos of burden* Modal adverb/ *topos of burden*
‘Major public sector initiatives included limiting the scope of state activity in the productive sectors and providing an enabling milieu for private initiatives and productive investments. With respect to international trade, quantitative restrictions on imports would be removed and tariff policy overhauled to **correct trade regime distortions**” (World Bank, 1994c, p. 8)	**Machine**
‘The public sector in Haiti is both extremely weak and *overextended*; its objectives are not well defined, its structure *anachronistic*, its staff demotivated and ill-equipped, and its procedures not suited for supporting a *modern market-oriented economy and society*.’ (World Bank, 1996c, p. 11) ‘State control of a broad range of enterprises and institutions […] has *imposed* significant economic and social costs, and has *impeded* private sector development’ (*Ibid.)*	*Topos of burden* *Topos of modernisation* *Topos of freedom/topos of burden*
Chad	
‘An *unsupportive* enabling environment, including *heavy public involvement* in the existing manufacturing sector’ (World Bank, 1994e, p. 8)	*Topos of burden*
The government will aim at reducing labour-market rigidities with the objective of promoting employment in the formal sector. It has transmitted to Parliament a revised labour code, which provides, inter alia, for the elimination of the setting of the minimum wage and for its *free* determination among social partners’ (IMF, 1996b, p. 12)	*Topos of freedom*
‘Create favourable environment for Private Sector Development: Reduce *restrictions* on private sector activity’ (World Bank, 1996b, p. 12)	*Topos of freedom*
‘In order to end the economic losses *imposed* by parastatals, the government liquidated 7 public enterprises’ (World Bank, 1996e, p. 5)	*Topos of freedom*

Claim 2. The market is the most efficient and valuable method of organisation

Excerpt	**Devices**
Côte d’Ivoire	

'Gradual evolution from a system of administered prices toward a system where prices are *set freely* in the framework of a *liberalised* import regime' (World Bank, 1986b, p. 26)	*Topos of freedom*
"The *realignment* of domestic prices of agricultural products with world prices [...] will substantially reduce the budget deficit and contribute to the *stabilisation of the economy'* (World Bank, 1989a, p. 7) 'Agricultural price **distortions** created by government policy need to be reduced through either prices *free to move in* response to foreign and domestic supply and demand, or changed by the Government in response to these **forces** (*Ibid.,* p. 21) 'The government's objective <u>should</u> be to *free* producer prices altogether, fully *liberalise* the marketing system' (*Ibid.,* p. 29)	*Topos of stability* **Machine /** *topos of freedom* *Topos of freedom*
'Private sector development still needs further consolidation; efforts <u>should</u> be intensified to create a climate that is more supportive of the private sector, so that it can fully play its role as **the main engine of** economic growth' (IMF, 1998b, p. 1) 'The government will pursue vigorously the *liberalisation* of the economy, particularly in the coffee and cocoa sectors, to enhance domestic and external competitiveness' (*Ibid.,* p. 6)	<u>Modal verb</u> **Machine** *Topos of freedom*
Haiti	
'Wages in Haiti are therefore *extremely flexible*, responding quickly and fully to supply and demand on the labour market' (World Bank, 1985, pp. 51-52) 'Wage *flexibility* and low unskilled labour costs are considerable strengths of the Haitian economy, especially when combined with the excellent motivation which Haitians are said to possess' (*Ibid.)*	*Topos of freedom* *Topos of freedom*
'In the labour market, the industrial export sector <u>should</u> continue to benefit from *the free determination* of wages' (IMF, 1987b, p. 12)	<u>Modal verb /</u> *topos of freedom*
'Exports increased, benefitting from a **recovery** in the light assembly industry' (World Bank, 1996a, p. 1) 'A very encouraging response from the private sector was felt, immediately **revitalising** the sector' (*Ibid.,* p. 8)	**Human body** **Human body**
To exploit these advantages, it will take *continued stability*, a forceful reform of the public sector and **sound** economic policies. Successful reforms could send a strong signal to attract remittances and private capital back to Haiti in support of a **recovery,** particularly in the export assembly industry and tourism' (World Bank, 1996c, p. i) "It has significant comparative advantages setting it apart from many other IDA countries: a class *of modern entrepreneurs*, proximity to North-American markets and strong links to a large and relatively prosperous diaspora' (*Ibid.,* p. 6)	*Topos of stability /* **human body** *Topos of modernisation*
Chad	

‘For the most part, this will be achieved through **market forces,** *as prices are free to determine their own level’* (World Bank, 1994e, p. 7) ‘The private sector could play a dynamic role, beyond the informal and rural production circuit, as a driving **force** in the formal economy’ (*Ibid.,* p. 12)	**Machine /** *topos of freedom* **Machine**
‘In the new economic strategy, the private sector will be expected to become **the engine of growth** in the economy**.** In the first instance, this will require […] *removal of obstacles* to the creation of an *open and competitive business environmen*t’ (IMF, 1995a, p. 14)	**Machine** *Topos of burden / topos of modernisation*
To ensure the market-clearing role of prices in a competitive environment, prices and sales margins will be maintained *freed* over the program period.’ (IMF, 1996b, p. 11) It has transmitted to the Parliament a revised labour code, which provides, inter alia, or the elimination of the setting of the minimum wage by the government and its *free* determination among social partners. The government will continue to promote the introduction *of greater flexibility* into the functioning of the labour market’ (*Ibid.,* p. 12)	*Topos of freedom* *Topos of freedom*

<u>Claim 3. International markets are a better source of growth than domestic markets</u>

Excerpt	**Devices**
Côte d’Ivoire	
‘The system of industrial incentives introduces *a very marked discrimination* between production incentives for the domestic market and for exports’ (World Bank, 1983c, p. 86)	*Topos of freedom*
‘The government will substantially reduce the *obstacles* to the development of the private sector in agriculture, industry, and services, in particular by: […] eliminating *discriminatory* trading practices’ (IMF, 1994, p. 17)	*Topos of burden / topos of freedom*
Haiti	
‘Haitian industry is still characterised by **stagnant** protected import substitution industries and a growing export assembly subsector; only the latter was responsible for possible growth in FY84.’ (World Bank, 1985, p. ii.) ‘The growth of the Haitian economy – requires the adoption [..] of a *future-oriented* approach […] Broad consensus <u>must</u> be obtained on a dynamic development strategy**,** capable of **accelerating** output growth and employment, rather than *sheltering* local markets from outside *competition*. (*Ibid.,* p. vi) ‘The key recommendation for the industrial sector is to change the incentive system to remove the *anti-export bias* and create a *stable* policy environment in which there is a demonstrated government commitment to expand exports and keep export activities profitable […] Its essence is the use of market **mechanisms** to signal profitable	**Human body** *Topos of modernisation* <u>Modal verb /</u> **machine** *Topos of freedom/topos of stability* **Machine**

opportunities to industries and allow the industrial structure to *evolve* consistent with international comparative advantage' (*Ibid.,* p. 77)	*Topos of modernisation*
'Its objective is a *stable* neutral incentive system to channel resources toward competitive rather than *rent-seeking* activities' ERP (World Bank, 1987a, p. 17) 'Industrial firms tended to rely on rents from *the narrow, protected domestic market* rather than investing to **correct** inefficiencies and *compete* in the international marketplace' (*Ibid.,* pp. 16-17)	*Topos of stability / topos of corruption* *Topos of modernisation /* **machine**
Chad	
'External sector policies will be *outward oriented,* and favour *openness* and international *competition'* (IMF, 1995a, p. 13)	*Topos of freedom*
Private sector mining companies [...] indicated their strong interest in prospecting and exploring Chad's mineral resources, with a view to assisting the development of *commercially viable* projects' (World Bank, 1996e, p. 5) 'The government recognises that it would take *much efforts* on its part to make these two projects a reality [...] in the case of the Sedigi [*sic*] in particular, the government is ready to undertake additional studies on *how to reduce the cost* and optimise the project structure in order to improve its economic and financial justification' (*Ibid.,* Annex V, pp. 10-11)	*Topos of reality* *Topos of burden*

<u>Claim 4. Economic growth will lead to development</u>

Excerpt	**Devices**
Côte d'Ivoire	
"From the outset, the Government has pursued economic growth as its primary objective. A political framework was established that promoted an *open* and *stable* economy.' (World Bank, 1981a, p. 1.) 'A more fundamental approach is required which will enable the country [...] to promote <u>adequate development and growth'</u> (*Ibid.,* p. 8)	*Topos of modernisation / topos of stability* <u>Parataxis</u>
'Growing real appreciation thwarted efforts to restore growth and, <u>thereby</u>, reduce the growing poverty in rural areas' (World Bank, 1995, p. 9)	<u>Hypotaxis</u>
'Côte d'Ivoire made considerable progress in reducing financial imbalances, controlling inflation, liberalizing the economy, and establishing a **sound** basis for sustainable economic growth [...] Despite <u>the positive results</u> obtained and <u>the achievement of the program's main economic objectives...'</u> (IMF, 1998c, p. 1)	**Human body** <u>Embedding</u> **Human body**

'The economic **recovery** was sustained during 1997 and the rate of real GDP growth is provisionally estimated at 6 percent' (*Ibid.,* p. 4.) 'There are a number of structural and social reforms that <u>must</u> be carried out to **alleviate** the remaining rigidities in the Ivorian economy, set the stage for strong and <u>durable economic growth, and continue to reduce poverty'</u> (*Ibid.,* p. 5)	<u>Modal verb /</u> **human body** <u>Parataxis</u>
Haiti	
'Haiti's economy has **suffered** from **stagnation'** (World Bank, 1985, Synopsis) 'This report proposes some designed to **stimulate** <u>economic growth and employment creation</u>, the objective of the Government's development strategy' (*Ibid.,* p. i) 'Haitian industry is still characterised by **stagnant** protected import substitution industries and a growing export assembly subsector; only the latter was responsible for possible growth in FY84' (p. ii) 'Yet the pace of its <u>economic growth and development</u> is slow compared to its potential' (*Ibid.,* p. 1.)	**Human body** **Human body /** <u>parataxis</u> **Human body** <u>Parataxis</u>
'<u>Poverty **alleviation** through sustainable economic growth</u> based on private sector performance is the hallmark of the Bank's strategy' (World Bank, 1996a)	**Human body** <u>/ hypotaxis</u>
Chad	
'The proposed credit would support the [...] program as outlined in the Government's Statement of Economic and Social Policy whose main objectives are to restore order to public finances and to lay the basis <u>for growth and the **alleviation** of poverty'</u> (World Bank, 1994e, p. i)	**Human body /** <u>parataxis</u>
'The most powerful **instrument** for poverty **alleviation** is economic growth that <u>increases employment and raises income levels</u>, and it is in recognition of this fact that the government is undertaking its economic and structural adjustment program' (IMF, 1996b, p. 13)	**Machine /** <u>parataxis</u>
'It would address key [...] bottlenecks that constrain growth <u>in order to</u> obtain substantial poverty **alleviation** results' (World Bank, 1999a, p. i)	<u>Hypotaxis</u> / **human body**

Appendix 8: Selected Indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, 2000 - 2010

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Education Spending (CFAF million)[100]	298.8	292.3	338.3	377.1	384.3	392.8	411.2	345	496.9	533.1	590.1
Health Spending (CFAF million)[101]	70.1	55.2	96.1	97.7	110.9	99.4	107.6	88.8	98.3	118.4	113.6
EDT/GNI (%)[102]	124.8	117.1	109.2	93.6	89.4	76.2	76.9	73.3	56	52.6	48.6
XGS [103] ($ million)	-	-	-	-	-	7,873	8,726	9,522	11,338	12,562	12,811
TDS/XGS [104] (%)	-	-	-	-	-	5.5	2.8	4.4	9.2	9	5.9
TDS ($ million)[105]	904	518	716	831	572	433	244	419	1043	1131	756
Population (million)[106]	16.4	16.9	17.3	17.6	17.9	18.2	18.5	19.1	19.5	19.9	20.4
Exchange Rate 1$ = CFAF[107]	712	733	696	581	528	528	523	479	449	472	460
Education *per capita* [108] ($)	25.59	23.60	28.10	36.88	40.66	40.88	42.50	37.71	56.75	56.76	62.88
Health *per capita* [109] ($)	6	4.46	7.98	9.55	11.73	10.34	11.12	9.71	11.23	12.61	12.11
Debt Service *per capita*[110] ($)	55.12	30.65	41.39	47.22	31.96	23.79	13.12	21.94	53.49	56.81	37.05

100 Sources: 2000 – 2002 from IMF (2004a, p. 25); 2003 -2006 from IMF (2007c, p. 113); 2007-2008 IMF (2009b, p. 63); 2009 -2010, IMF (2011, p. 72)
101 Sources: 2000 – 2002 from IMF (2004a, p. 26); 2003 -2006 from IMF (2007c, p. 114); 2007-2008 IMF (2009b, p. 63); 2009 -2010, IMF (2011, p. 72)
102 Sources: 2000 – 2003 from World Bank (2006a, p. 123); 2004 – 2008 (World Bank, 2010a, p. 106); 2009 – 2010 (World Bank, 2014a, p. 75)
103 Value of Exports of Goods & Services. Sources: 2005 – 2008 from World Bank (2010a, p. 106); 2009 from World Bank (2014a, p. 75); 2010 from World Bank (2017b, p. 64)
104 Total Debt Service as a proportion of value of exports of goods and services. Sources: 2005 – 2008 from World Bank (2010a, p. 106); 2009 from World Bank (2014a, p. 75); 2010 from World Bank (2017b, p. 64)
105 Sources: 2000 – 2002 from World Bank (2004a, p. 160); 2003 – 2004 from World Bank (2006a, p. 123); 2005 – 2010 calculated by dividing XGS by TDS/XGS ratio and multiplying by 100.
106 Retrieved from World Bank online data repository: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CI [accessed 20 January 2020]
107 Historical exchange rates retrieved from: https://fxtop.com [accessed 20 January 2020]
108 Calculated by multiplying education expenditure by exchange rate, and dividing by population.
109 Calculated by multiplying health expenditure by exchange rate, and dividing by population.
110 Calculated by dividing debt service by population.

Appendix 9: Selected Indicators for Haiti, 2000 – 2010

	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
Education Expenditure[111] (HTG million)	-	2,898	3024.7	1,718.3	2,639.6	1,957.5	4,134.8	5,329.8	5,508.7	5,960.4	-
Health Expenditure (HTG Million)[112]	-	1,331.8	1,266.6	695.3	809.2	796.2	1,142.7	1,597.7	1,773.1	1,840.5	-
EDT/GNI (%) [113]	31.1	35	36.6	45.8	33.1	30.3	30.3	25.8	27.8	22.3	14.8
XGS[114] ($ million)	-	-	-	-	1,450	1,591	1,771	2,026	945	1,065	1,049
TDS/XGS[115] (%)	-	-	-	-	6.9	3.6	3.4	4.5	6.1	4.2	12.5
Debt Service ($ Million)[116]	33	21	15	35	100	57	60	91	58	45	131
Population (million) [117]	8.55	8.69	8.83	8.98	9.12	9.26	9.41	9.56	9.71	9.85	9.99
Exchange Rate 1$ = HTG [118]	17.46	21.3	25.8	35.8	40.8	35.9	43.4	36.9	36.5	39.2	40.3
Education *per capita*[119] ($)	-	7.13	6.21	4.55	8.17	6.34	10.13	15.11	15.5	15.43	-
Health *per capita*[120] ($)	-	3.28	2.60	1.84	2.50	2.58	2.80	4.53	5.01	4.77	-
Debt Service *per capita*[121] ($)	3.74	2.34	1.64	3.78	10.63	5.99	6.20	9.25	5.76	4.57	13.12

[111] Sources: 2001 – 2005 from World Bank (2008, p. 189); 2006-2007 from IMF (2009e, p. 29); 2008 – 2009 from IMF (2012, p. 28)
[112] Sources: 2001 – 2005 from World Bank (2008, p. 189); 2006-2007 from IMF (2009e, p. 29); 2008 – 2009 from IMF (2012, p. 28)
[113] Sources: 2000 – 2004 from World Bank (2007a, p. 189); 2005 – 2008 (World Bank, 2010a, p. 144); 2009 – 2010 (World Bank, 2014a, p. 94)
[114] Sources: 2004 – 2007 from World Bank (2010a, p. 144); 2008 – 2010 from World Bank (2015, p. 77)
[115] Sources: 2004 – 2007 from World Bank (2010a, p. 144); 2008 – 2010 from World Bank (2015, p. 77)
[116] Sources: 2000 from World Bank (2004a); 2001-2003 from World Bank (2006a); 2004 – 2010 calculated by dividing XGS by TDS/XGS ratio and multiplying by 100.
[117] Retrieved from World Bank online data repository: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=HT [accessed 20 January 2020]
[118] Historical exchange rates retrieved from: https://fxtop.com [accessed 20 January 2020]
[119] Calculated by multiplying education expenditure by exchange rate, and dividing by population.
[120] Calculated by multiplying health expenditure by exchange rate, and dividing by population.
[121] Calculated by dividing debt service by population.

Appendix 10: Selected Indicators for Chad, 2000 – 2010

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Education Expenditure[122] (CFAF million)	-	30,115	26,188	47,249	47,600	-	-	-	-	-	-
External Debt to GNI (%) [123]	83.4	67.6	68.8	71.9	44.1	32.7	33.2	30.9	26.1	27.4	23.1
Debt Service ($ Million)[124]	26	23	26	47	46	61	47	56	123	65	62
Population (millions)[125]	8.343	8.663	9.002	9.353	9.710	10.067	10.422	10.776	11.113	11.503	11.887
Exchange Rate $1 = CFAF [126]	712	733	696	581	528	528	523	479	449	472	460
Education *per capita* ($)[127]	-	4.74	4.18	8.69	9.28	-	-	-	-	-	-
Health *per capita* ($)[128]	3.87	4.1	5.2	5.7	9.9	9.5	7.1	8.2	7.4	7.5	7.7
Debt Service *per capita* ($)[129]	2.76	3	5.22	4.92	6.28	4.67	5.37	11.41	5.84	5.39	5.22

122 Sources: 2001 – 2004 from IMF (2007b, p. 11)
123 Sources: 2000 – 2003 from World Bank (2007a, p. 99); 2004 – 2008 (World Bank, 2010a, p. 90); 2009 – 2010 (World Bank, 2014a, p. 68)
124 Sources: 2000 – 2005 from World Bank (2007a, p. 99); 2006 – 2008 from World Bank (2010a, p. 90); 2009 – 2010 (World Bank, 2015, p. 51)
125 Retrieved from World Bank online data repository: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=TD [accessed 20 January 2020]
126 Historical exchange rates retrieved from: https://fxtop.com [accessed 20 January 2020]
127 Calculated by multiplying education expenditure by exchange rate, and dividing by population.
128 Retrieved from World Bank online data repository: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.GHED.PC.CD?locations=TD [accessed 20 January 2020]
129 Calculated by dividing debt service by population.

Appendix 11 – Expanded discourse tables for chapter five

Claim 1. Poor government policy is responsible for the crisis

Excerpt	***Devices***
Côte d'Ivoire	
'The fiscal situation became increasingly *precarious* in 2000' (IMF, 2001e, p. 7) 'The overall **health** of the financial system **deteriorated** somewhat in 2000' (*ibid.,* p. 9.) 'Against the backdrop of *serious slippages* in program implementation in the past' (*ibid.,* p. 11.) 'The failure to take appropriate **corrective** measures in the face of a **deteriorating** fiscal situation contributed to the disappointing economic performance' (*ibid.,* p. 20.)	*Topos of stability* **Human body** *Topos of stability* **Machine / human body**
'The workshop concluded that the major constraints to growth and equitable development in Côte d'Ivoire were […] an ineffective and *overly centralised public sector*, *misguided* public expenditure and *poor managemen*t of public finances' (World Bank, 2002c, p. 9)	*Topos of burden*
'A decade of political instability accompanied by a **deterioration** of the country's relations with its neighbours and suspension of support form the international financial community resulted in a break in social cohesion, increasing insecurity and the spread of poor governance' (IMF, 2009c, p. 3)	**Human body**
Haiti	
Haiti has **suffered** for the past three and a half years from a political impasse that has led to the loss of external assistance, low investment, postponement of structural reforms, and insufficient growth to reduce the high rate of poverty' (IMF, 2001c, p. 3) 'There are risks to the program and its financing, especially in light of the *policy slippages* that occurred during FY 1999/2000' (*ibid.,* p. 19.)	**Human body** *Topos of stability*
'Serious weaknesses in financial management practices […] have been found in Bank projects' (World Bank, 2002b, p. 4) Given the history of **weak** governance/*corruption* and non-compliance with conditionalities this phase will be a key test' (*Ibid.*, p. 35)	**Human body** *Topos of corruption*

'Financial conditions worsened further during the first semester of FY 2002/03 (October 2002–March 2003), **fuelled** *by a widening fiscal* deficit largely financed by the central bank' (IMF, 2003b, p. 6) Haiti is facing a very difficult economic situation […] the already *precarious* economic and social conditions of the population took a further turn for the worse' (*Ibid.*, p. 25) 'During FY 1999/2000, an SMP negotiated with the authorities could not be approved by the Fund's management because of significant *fiscal slippages* and the lack of progress on structural reforms' (*Ibid.,* p. 37)	**Human body** *Topos of burden* *Topos of stability* *Topos of stability*
The programme seeks to *maintain stability***,** safeguard the progress already achieved, escape the current crisis, and ensure that the country continues on a path towards economic security**'** (World Bank, 2009c, p. 14)	*Topos of stability*
Chad	
'The Chadian economy had a reasonably good year in 2001, clearly reversing the *policy slippages* of 2000' (IMF, 2001a, p. 5) 'Revenue performance had **weakened** recently and the near-term outlook for revenues remained *precarious'* (*Ibid.,* p. 15.)	*Topos of stability* **Health metaphor**
'So far, oil production has fuelled a fiscal expansion that has placed public expenditure on an *unsustainable* path and **weakened** financial discipline. This poor policy performance has **strained** relations with doors' (IMF, 2009a, p. 3) 'This fall in oil revenue will trigger a **sharp deterioration** of the fiscal position in 2009, which *necessitates* a fiscal adjustment' (*ibid.,* p. 3.) 'On the spending side, domestically financed expenditures are reduced […] by cutting non-defense current spending, and reducing the *unwieldy envelope of investment spending* by rescheduling ongoing investment projects to later years' (*Ibid.,* p. 13)	**Human body** / *topos of stability* **Human body /** *topos of reality* *Topos of burden*

Claim 2. Austerity is necessary

Excerpt	Devices
Côte d'Ivoire	
'Attainment of the fiscal program targets **hinges** *critically* on the authorities' efforts to improve revenue performance and their putting place rigorous expenditure controls, whilst avoiding off-budget spending' (IMF, 2001e, p. 5) 'The staff emphasised *the need* […] to regain full control over the central government's budget […] they stressed that cost-cutting measures were *necessary* and would be taken to ensure the financial *viability* of the electricity sector.' (*Ibid*., p. 14)	**Machine** *Topos of reality*
'Achieving this objective will critically depend on […] **sound** macroeconomic policies' (World Bank, 2002e, p. 11) 'The implementation of *prudent* macroeconomic policies […] reduced financial *imbalances* and **alleviated** structural rigidities' (*ibid.,* p. 14.)	**Human body** *Topos of responsibility / topos of stability* / **human body**

'Implementation of macroeconomic policies along these lines should contribute to *domestic stability* ' (IMF, 2007d, p. 5) 'The budget would need to accommodate the costs of these programs, including the *realistic* costing, domestic support, and domestic resources' (*Ibid.,* p. 15) 'The authorities recognised that progress in meeting these challenges *needed* to be supported by *prudent financial policies* aimed at securing fiscal and debt sustainability' (*Ibid*.) 'Spending […] will be contained through strict application of budget ceilings and continued efforts to enhance the government entities' awareness of *the need* to economise**'** (*ibid.,* p. 58.)	*Topos of stability* *Topos of reality* *Topos of reality/ responsibility* *Topos of reality*
The *realism* of fiscal projections would need to be regularly checked against this overall macroeconomic target, and revenues and expenditures adjusted accordingly. Should the revenue objectives *become unrealistic,* staffs recommend that the expenditure ambitions be scaled down accordingly. For the PRS to be successful, *prudent* fiscal policies would need to be supported by implementation of a medium-term program of deep structural reforms of public finance management' (IMF, 2009c, p. 5) The costing of the PRSP would benefit from further refinement *and greater realism*' (*Ibid.)*	*Topos of reality* *Topos of responsibility* *Topos of reality*
Haiti	
'They stressed that maintaining *stability* prior to elections would *require* resisting wage pressures and adhering strictly to the cash management system to control expenditure' (IMF, 2001c, p. 4)	*Topos of stability/ topos of reality*
'The Staff welcomes the significant **corrective** actions taken by the authorities' (IMF, 2003b, p. 12) '[Raising fuel prices] was socially and politically very sensitive, but a strong public information campaign of the authorities appears to have succeeded in *explaining its necessity*' (*ibid.,* p. 6.) 'The authorities in early 2003 took **corrective** action to *stabilise* the economy' (*Ibid.,* p. 25)	**Machine** *Topos of reality* **Machine /** *topos of stability*
Large expenditure cuts were *required* to keep the fiscal position in check' (IMF, 2004, p. 5)	*Topos of reality*
'In order to continue maintaining a **sound** macroeconomic framework, the Government has prepared, and intends to fully implement, a macroeconomic *stabilisation* program' (World Bank, 2004, p. 7)	**Human body /** *topos of stability*
'However, staffs urge the authorities to reconcile the budget and the sectoral costing strategies to be consistent with *realistic estimates* about how much spending can be increased' (IMF, 2008, p. 8)	*Topos of reality*
Chad	
'Fiscal policies have returned to a *more* prudent path, structural reforms have advanced broadly as programmed or even **accelerated**, and past **slippages** in transparency and governance have been **corrected'** (IMF, 2001a, p. 5) 'The authorities fiscal policies in 2002 seek to increase public spending on poverty-reducing areas while maintaining a *financeable* budgetary position' (*Ibid.,* p. 15)	*Topos of responsibility /* **machine** *Topos of reality*

'An early emphasis on participatory monitoring and evaluation of existing policies [...] could help foster a *realistic and concrete approach'* (IMF & IDA, 2000 p. 6.)	*Topos of reality*
'Maintaining *prudent* macroeconomic policies will be crucial as oil revenues begin flowing in' (World Bank, 2003a, p. 2) 'The World Bank Group will assist the government in: (i) monitoring the budget process and designing **corrective** actions (*ibid.,* p. 18.)	*Topos of responsibility* **Machine**
'The authorities are committed to introduce a *realistic 2010 budget* to Parliament by end-October 2009' (IMF, 2009a, p. 14) Against this background, the authorities have committed to prepare a *responsible* budget (*Ibid.,* pp. 14.-15) 'The SMP focuses on a few key measures to signal the return to *fiscal discipline*' (*Ibid.,* p. 15.)	*Topos of reality / topos of reponsibility* *Topos of responsibility*

Claim 4. The way to improve access is by improving the efficiency of resources

Excerpt	Devices
Côte d'Ivoire	
'The I-PRSP places too much emphasis on developing infrastructure in the social sectors and contains little or no analysis of the *current inefficiencies* in the allocation of resources, the *quality of services* delivered, or the *effectiveness* of the programmes in achieving specified goals' (World Bank, 2002e, p. 4)	*Topos of efficiency*
'To further strengthen the I-PRSP, the JSA made recommendations in a number of areas, including: [...] better balancing of the focus on social infrastructure with attention to current *inefficiencies* in the allocation of resources, service delivery and *effective* program implementation' (World Bank, 2002c, p. 11)	*Topos of efficiency*
'Staffs note that the success of the PRSP implementation also depends on the capacity of the authorities to *execute high quality* public spending' (IMF, 2009c, p. 5)	*Topos of efficiency*
Haiti	
'The education system is characterised by *extremely low quality* and *internal inefficiency'* (World Bank, 2004c, p. 13)	*Topos of efficiency*
'*Innovative* approaches are being discussed to enhance *competition* among the multitude of private service providers and ensure that the contribution of NGOs *achieves maximum results'* (IADB, 2009, p. 5) (p. 5.)	*Topos of modernisation / topos of efficiency*
'Ensuring these core institutions **function** appropriately and coordinate with each other, is key for improving service delivery as well as for promoting a steady flow of resources and their *efficient* use' (World Bank, 2009cp. 5)	**Machine /** *topos of efficiency*
Chad	
'Emphasis has been placed on improving transparency, accountability, and the capacity to manage public resources *efficiently'* (IMF; IDA, 2000, p. 3)	*Topos of efficiency*

‘The World Bank Group will assist the government in […] ensuring the *rational and efficient use of new resources’* (World Bank, 2003a, p. 18)	*Topos of pragmatism / topos of efficiency*
‘Improving access to education with cost control involves *rationalising* the supply side’ (Republic of Chad, 2003, p. 66)	*Topos of pragmatism*
“Efforts to improve the *quality of expenditure* will strengthen its impact on the development goals. *Greater efficienc*y may then make it possible to achieve the MDGs at less cost, with the added benefit of a more sustainable level of expenditure’ (Republic of Chad, 2008, p. 12)	*Topos of efficiency*
‘Fiscal consolidation need not come at the expense of development priorities; it can be achieved while focusing spending on priority areas’ (World Bank, 2010c, p. 4) ‘A strategy for *cost-effective* school construction needs to be developed’ (*Ibid.*, p. 7) ‘The staffs recommend that public health expenditure be made *more effective’* (*Ibid.*, p. 9.)	 *Topos of efficiency*

<u>Claim 5. The privatisation and decentralisation of social services is democratic and pro-poor</u>

Excerpt	***Devices***
Côte d’Ivoire	
‘To bring government closer to the people by creating decentralised structures at the regional and local levels; (ii) to *strengthen citizen participation in democracy*, in order to *engage the people in the managements of their own affairs’* (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2002, p. 16)	*Topos of democracy / topos of self-reliance*
‘*Beneficiaries’ participation* […] will be systemically sought through […] the *empowerment of stakeholders* in the education and health sectors’ (World Bank, 2002c, p. 10) ‘The Government was encouraged to explore less costly *grassroots approaches* […] which would be more accommodating of capacity and resource constraints’ (*ibid*., p. 11.) ‘Government […] has agreed to using a variety of implementing agencies and appropriate and *efficient financing mechanisms,* including direct financing of NGOs, community-based organisations and the private sector’ (*Ibid.,* p. 22)	*Topos of democracy* *Topos of democracy* *Topos of efficiency*
‘Civil society […] must play a role *of intermediation between the rulers and the populatio*n’ (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 2009, p. 23) ‘Decentralisation as a means *of participation of the population in the process of development and reduction of regional disparities’* (*Ibid.,* p. 92.)	*Topos of democracy* *Topos of social inclusion*
Haiti	

'One model that appears to *be relatively effective* in Haiti's difficult implementation environment is the use of NGOs or autonomous agencies to distributes services and funds (World Bank, 2002b, p. 13)	*Topos of efficiency*
'*Community participation* is a key element in the local development dynamic' (Republic of Haiti, 2004, p. 20)	*Topos of democracy*
'This includes *community-driven development approaches* to build *social inclusion, participation, transparency, trust* and public-private partnerships at the local level while improving basic social economic, and infrastructure services' (World Bank, 2004c, p. ii) 'Private schools, often run by non-governmental and private organisations, including faith-based groups which play an important role in the education sector, *enrol three times more children than public schools*' (*Ibid.,* p. 13) 'The past ten years have included some positive experiences, however, notably the push for increased *local participation and inclusion in development projects* and the recognition of the important role of civil society' (*ibid.,* p. 20.)	*Topos of democracy/ topos of social inclusion* *Topos of efficiency* *Topos of democracy*
What is therefore needed is a redefinition of the role of the central government and the local governments with a view to attaining the objectives of providing *community-based service*s and fostering *inclusion* and *participation* on the part of all levels of society' (Republic of Haiti, 2006, p. 21)	*Topos of democracy / topos of social inclusion*
Chad	
'Increasing the *participation of local communities* in health service operations' (Republic of Chad, 2000, p. 8)	*Topos of democracy*
'Over the last CAS period, a **sound** strategy for education was developed […] It emphasises the role and progressive integration of community schools in the national education system' (World Bank, 2003a, p. 14.) 'With a growth rate of 20 percent per year, these [community] schools are the most dynamic part of Chad's primary education system and account for a large part of the remarkable progress made by Chad in primary education' (*Ibid.,* p. 14) 'The Bank […] will support the government in […] *strengthening the capacity and responsibility of local communities* […] The focus during the CAS period will be on *empowering communities'* (*ibid*., p. 23.)	**Human body** *Topos of efficiency* *Topos of self-reliance / topos of democracy*
'*Greater equity* in access to education will be sought by *supporting community initiative*s and through their *participation* in the management and financing of education' (Republic of Chad, 2003, p. 67)	*Topos of social inclusion / topos of democracy*
'In the health sector […] in respect of the *protection of vulnerable populations*, the basic strategy will be to promote complementary programs within the framework of a partnership involving the public sector, the private sector, and NGOs' (Republic of Chad, 2008, p. 11) 'Improvement of the organisation of the national [health] system – in cooperation with the private sector and traditional medicine – will be based on effective decentralisation, to ensure the harmonious development of the three levels of the system. Quality services will be made available to *reduce or eliminate geographic, economic, and cultural disparities'* (*Ibid.,* p. 93)	*Topos of social inclusion* *Topos of social inclusion*

Appendix 12 – Cocoa Prices 2000 - 2010

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Producer Price per kilo [130]CFAF	313	473	662	516	306	328	350	467	620	990	799
Export Price f.o.b. per kilo[131] CFAF	539	719	1189	1063	802	785	803	855	1008	1334	1552
Producer Share of f.o.b price (%)[132]	58	66	56	49	38	42	44	55	62	74	51

[130] Sources: 2000 - 2002 (IMF, 2004a, p. 15); 2003 – 2006 (IMF, 2007c, p. 102); 2006 – 2010 (ICCO, 2012, p. 30)
[131] Sources: 2000 - 2002 (IMF, 2004a, p. 15); 2003 – 2006 (IMF, 2007c, p. 102); 2006 – 2010 (ICCO, 2012, p. 30)
[132] Calculated by dividing producer price by export price and multiplying by 100.

Appendix 13 – Expanded discourse tables for chapter six

Claim 1. The failure of structural adjustment trade policies was due to poor governance

Excerpt	**Device**
Côte d'Ivoire	
'The government may lack the critical financial and/or institutional capacity to sustain the *stabilisation* and structural reforms which underlie the **recovery** effect' (World Bank, 2002d, p. iii) 'The workshop concluded that the major constraints to growth and equitable development in Côte d'Ivoire were: (i) *inadequate* policies, *excessive* public intervention, a *cumbersome* regulatory environment, and governance problems' (*ibid.,* p. 9.)	*Topos of stability /* **human body** *Topos of burden*
'Côte d'Ivoire is the world's largest cocoa producer – cocoa amounts for one quarter of its exports; yet inadequate producer incentives and **poor** management in the sector's agencies have limited its contribution to rural growth' (IMF, 2007d, p. 25)	**Human body**
'Years of political and military crisis and poor governance have *taken a heavy toll* on the country, transforming the once-model African nation into a *fragile* state' (World Bank, 2010b, p. i) 'A lack of legitimate producer representation and *inadequate* producer incentives and poor management of the sector's agencies have limited cocoa's contribution to rural growth and poverty reduction' (*ibid,* p. 12.) 'Agricultural incomes have dropped due to a combination of **deep-seated** governance problems, **weak** or non-existent agriculture research and extension, *predatory* tax policies and related *corruption* in the cocoa sector' (*ibid*)	*Topos of burden / topos of stability* *Topos of uselessness* *Topos of corruption*
Haiti	
'**Poor** governance is the greatest *impediment* to effective development assistance in Haiti' (World Bank, 2002b, p. 3) 'Economic mismanagement and the international embargo led to a dramatic **decline** in living standards' (*ibid.)*	*Topos of burden* **Human body**
'The two administrations […] were **blighted** by infighting, *corruption*, **weak** institutions and **poor** political and economic governance' (World Bank, 2004c, p. 2). **'Poor** economic governance and **weak** institutional capacity across the entire public administration have been a key *impediment* to economic growth and poverty reduction in Haiti. (*ibid.,* p. 18.)	**Human body** *Topos of corruption* *Topos of burden* *Topos of corruption*

‘**Weaknesses** in key institutions for revenue mobilisation and policy formulation and implementation, poor institutional coordination and *non-transparent management* of public enterprises (*used in recent years to serve interests other than the collective good*) have further compounded the problem.’ (*ibid.*)	
‘Underlying factors that contribute to instability include […] the **chronic weakness** of political and government institutions’ (World Bank, 2009c, p. 4) ‘Governance and state capacity to effectively formulate and implement **sound** policies and to deliver core public services to the population, are **weak**. The state’s ability to provide basic public goods has been undermined by a *history of neglect, political capture and corruption*’ (*ibid.)*	**Human body** **Human body** *Topos of corruption*
Chad	
‘Chad’s capacity **weakness** is of particular concern. This **weakness** is all encompassing and greater than most sub-Saharan African countries’ (World Bank, 1999b, p. 3)	**Human body**
‘*Costly* mistakes in public investment for petroleum exploration or public subsidies for petroleum consumption <u>should be</u> avoided’ (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 7) ‘Given Chad's institutional **weaknesses**, the project relies heavily on the private sector operators’ (*ibid.,* p. 21.) ‘Since 1994, the Government has implemented a policy aimed at *liberalizing* the economy and reducing the role of the State, and promoting the private sector. This policy has yielded promising results, but many *obstacles* still remain’ (*ibid.,* p. 117)	*Topos of burden* / <u>modal adverb</u> **Human body** *Topos of freedom / topos of burden*

<u>Claim 2. the *PRSP*s are not about ‘less state’ but a ‘better state’</u>

Excerpt	**Device**
Côte d’Ivoire	
‘The I-PRSP provides a clear statement of the government's strategy on poverty reduction, which rests on six pillars […] promotion *of good governance and capacity building* to allow for better resource allocation and use’ (World Bank, 2002e, p. 2)	*Topos of democracy*
‘This strategy focuses on promoting broad-based economic growth and employment creation, improving public service delivery, and improving *governance* and *capacity building’* (World Bank, 2002e, p. 9)	*Topos of democracy*
‘The focus of the authorities’ program for 2007—on short-term measures to promote economic recovery, *rebuild government services*, *and ensure transparency* in public resource management—is appropriate’ (IMF, 2007d, p. 29)	*Topos of democracy*

Haiti	
'The TSS defines a two-year strategy for the Bank to deliver hope to the population and *restore credibility in public institutions* by helping the government deliver quick wins and launch reforms that promote longer-term *economic governance* and institutional development' (World Bank, 2004c, p. i)	*Topos of democracy*
'The authorities are strongly committed to strengthening governance in the public sector' (IMF, 2004b, p. 8)	*Topos of democracy*
'The Government's three-year macroeconomic program provides the framework to *support strengthening of institutional capacity* and increased provision of key social services' (IMF, 2006b, p. 3)	*Topos of democracy*
Chad	
'The main objectives of the Petroleum Sector Management Capacity-Building Project are to: (i) *strengthen the capacity of the Government of Chad* to manage the development of petroleum resources in an environmentally and socially **sound** manner, beginning with the development of the Doba oil fields in southern Chad; (ii) minimize and mitigate the negative impacts of the Doba project, and *build capacity at the regional level* and; (iii) increase revenues from oil production and exports' (World Bank, 1999c, pp. 2-3)	*Topos of democracy* **Human body**
'The Government has the objective of *transparency* and sound governance' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 117)	*Topos of democracy*

Claim. 3. The market is the most efficient and valuable method of organisation

Excerpt	Device
Côte d'Ivoire	
'A more competitive and *resilient* rural economy would raise performance overall and also produce for the farmers a growing share of the value of their products' (World Bank, 2002d, p. 4)	*Topos of self-reliance*
'In the agriculture sector, the authorities' medium-term policy goals are to promote **the role of market forces** in the productive chain of the main crops so as to raise the share of value added that accrues to producers (*ibid,* p. 8.)	**Machine**
'The *BCC,* is in charge of trading coffee and cocoa, including a **mechanism** *to allow producers to manage their price risk*' (*ibid.,* p. 9.)	**Machine /** *topos of self-reliance*
'The marketing of cocoa took place in a transitory system allowing actual farm-gate prices to be *freely* determined by market' (*ibid.,* p. 10.)	*Topos of freedom*

'The following objectives […] **jump starting** economic **recovery** and growth through the consolidation of *liberalisation* of the agricultural sector and the **restoration** of the country's reputation as a dynamic business centre for the private sector' (World Bank, 2002c, p. 16)	**Health metaphor** *Topos of freedom*
'In the cocoa/coffee and cotton sectors, output **declined**, structural reforms **stalled**, and financial conditions **deteriorated'** (IMF, 2007d, p. 10)	**Human body / machine**
'The average growth rate of 6 percent should be achievable and sustainable in the long run <u>subject to</u> […] deep structural reforms in the cocoa/coffee sector'	<u>Parataxis</u>
Haiti	
'Haiti's labour market is *flexible*, imposing few *restrictions* on hiring and firing, as compared with neighbouring and competitor countries' (IMF, 2005b, p. 44)	*Topos of freedom*
'Of notable importance, during this decade the manufacturing sector doubled its production mainly due to the growth of the apparel assembly that *took advantage* of the proximity of Haiti to the US, low labour costs and tax incentives' (World Bank, 2006b, p. 3) 'In the same vein, labour costs are low and labour legislation is *flexible*, thus they do not represent a *constraint* to growth' (*ibid.,* p. 23.)	*Topos of opportunity* *Topos of freedom*
'**Engines** of job creation: […] *Harnessing the employment potential* of manufacturing zones' (IADB, 2009, p. 3) 'The Haitian private sector in particular sees the *new economic opportunities* and stands ready to make significant contributions' (*ibid.,* p. 5.)	**Machine /** *topos of opportunity* *Topos of opportunity*
The DSNCRP identifies four major challenges for the country to address: […] (ii) creating a *modern, competitive economy* (World Bank, 2009c, p. 13.)	*Topos of modernisation*
An adequate incentive policy will also need to be elaborated to favour the establishment of manufacturing industries, *free zones*, industrial areas and areas for the development of tourism (Government of Haiti, 2010, p. 26)	*Topos of freedom*
Chad	
'Remove barriers and provide a *rational* legal and fiscal framework that would allow **accelerated** petroleum exploration and production' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 7) "The economy has become more *open*. External trade and prices have been *liberalised'* (*ibid.,* p. 113.) 'The Government is convinced that the private sector remains the **engine** of economy growth' (*ibid.,* p. 117.)	*Topos of pragmatism* / **machine** *Topos of freedom* **Machine**
'This new strategy, adopted in April 2008, focuses on *a sensible set of priorities*, notably on creating a business climate that is conducive to private sector growth' (World Bank, 2010c, p. 1)	*Topos of pragmatism*

Claim 5. (Inclusive) economic growth is a/the route to poverty reduction

Excerpt	Device
Côte d'Ivoire	
'The specific objectives are to: (i) create the conditions for renewed *broad-based* growth, in particular in the rural and private sector development' (World Bank, 2002d, p. 15) 'The ERP aims to create the conditions that would permit a return to strong and sustained high growth and the development of human resources able to *participate in and contribute to such* growth' (*ibid.,* p. 19.)	*Topos of social inclusion* Parataxis *Topos of self-reliance*
'**Accelerated** GDP growth, with direct links to the rural economy, *will clearly be required* in order to make significant inroads in poverty' (IMF, 2009c, p. 3) 'The promotion of social services, environmental preservation, *social protection and gender equality* will address the non-pecuniary dimensions of poverty *and ensure that growth is shared'* (*Ibid.,* p. 10)	**Machine** / *topos of necessity* / modal adverb / hypotaxis *Topos of social inclusion*
Haiti	
'The Bank's longer-term objective in Haiti: *inclusive growth* and poverty reduction through local development, institutional strengthening and support for productive sectors' (World Bank, 2004c, p. i)	*Topos of social inclusion* / parataxis
'Policies that promote *pro-poor* growth are needed to reduce poverty […] such policies include increasing human capital and creating an enabling environment for job creation' (World Bank, 2006b, p. 76)	*Topos of social inclusion* / hypotaxis
'To reduce poverty and promote growth the I-PRSP emphasises the importance of achieving private-sector led growth, enhancing physical infrastructure, expanding access to social services, and providing support for the productive sectors' (IMF, 2008, p. 2)	Parataxis
'The CAS has three pillars: (i) promoting growth and local development' (World Bank, 2009c, p. i) 'For Haiti to put the current economic crisis firmly behind it and set out on a path of sustainable growth and development' (*ibid.,* p. 9)	Parataxis Parataxis
Chad	
'Chad's central development objective is to reduce poverty by accelerating sustainable economic growth' (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 4). 'Development of its important human and natural resources could accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty. (*ibid.,* p. 112.) 'Progress towards poverty reduction, however, remains slow. Chad must **accelerate** economic growth and invest more in its human resources. (*ibid.,* p. 112.)	Hypotaxis Parataxis Modal adverb / **machine**

‘The PRSP rightly emphasises this unprecedented developmental opportunity, with a particular focus on using oil resources to promote growth and reduce poverty’ (IMF, 2003a, p. 1)	Parataxis
‘Pillar 2 – Ensuring *inclusive, broad-based growth* as the country embarks on oil production’ (World Bank, 2003a, p. 21)	*Topos of social inclusion*

Claim 6. Poor countries need export-led growth more than TNCs need them

Excerpt	**Device**
Côte d’Ivoire	
‘Agriculture has traditionally been the backbone of the economy, and there is *ample opportunity* to improve the livelihoods of those engaged in the sector. The PRSP’s emphasis on coffee-cocoa and cashews is welcome. Cocoa is the single most important export sector involving the poor’ (World Bank, 2002e, p. 6)	*Topos of opportunity / topos of social inclusion*
‘The crisis broke the momentum of trade and investment growth and shattered the image of Côte d'Ivoire as a preferred regional location for foreign direct investment. Economic performance **declined**, investment levels plummeted, private investors left the country in significant numbers, and poverty levels worsened’ (World Bank, 2002c, p. i) Agricultural policies and prices are therefore key determinants of *income and employment opportunities*, and thus of poverty, in rural areas’ (*Ibid.*, p. 5) ‘In recent months, the situation improve but *daunting challenges remain* on the road to economic recovery and institutional/social rebuilding’ (*Ibid.,* p. 27)	**Human body /** Hypotaxis *Topos of opportunity* *Topos of danger/threat*
Haiti	
‘The *inability of poor Haitians* to *exploit growth-promoting opportunities* for investment in physical and human capital has created a vicious circle of weak economic growth and persistent poverty and inequality’ (World Bank, 2006b, p. i) ‘The Free Trade Zones (FTZs) notably apparel assembly, *have significant growth and employment generation potential* in Haiti, in light of the country’s wage competitiveness, the proximity to the US and Dominican Republic, and changes in international trade policy’ (*Ibid.,* p. 24)	*Topos of self-reliance / topos of opportunity* *Topos of opportunity*
‘A delayed recovery and deviation from the path of *stability* and economic security would *have severe consequences and come at great social costs*’ (IADB, 2009, p. 2)	*Topos of stability / topos of danger/threat*
‘For Haiti to put the current economic crisis firmly behind it and set out on a path of sustainable growth and development requires targeted actions and investments to *address urgent needs*, removing key constraints to economic growth and taking full advantage *of the opportunities available’* (World Bank, 2009c, p. 9)	*Topos of danger / threat / topos of opportunity*

‘Two promising **drivers** of growth […] are agriculture and manufacturing, particularly textiles’ (*Ibid.,* p. 9) The textile sector has *a unique opportunity* with the HOPE II Act, which gives duty-free, quota-free access to the American market for the next nine years. Haiti is well placed in some aspects to exploit this. Its labor costs are fully competitive with China’ (*Ibid*., p. 10) ‘*Taking advantage* of HOPE II will require a good environment to attract private sector investments’ (World Bank, 2009c, p. 10)	**Machine** *Topos of opportunity* *Topos of opportunity*
Chad	
‘Petroleum activities are therefore an *exceptional opportunity* to maintain a viable fiscal situation and underpin sustainable development’ (World Bank, 1999c, p. 71)	*Topos of opportunity*
‘The proposed project supports these Group efforts, using the country’s oil resources as the **engine** of Chad’s economic program. In particular, oil revenues would generate additional funding for the poverty reduction sectors. The project also fits well with Bank Group’s strategy of **stimulating** private sector-led growth by playing a leading role in attracting significant foreign direct investment to Chad’ (World Bank & IFC, 2000, p. 4). Chad must *drastically increase investment […] to make up for the development lag* created by its post-independence history and to meet its development objectives’ (*Ibid.*, p. 5*)* ‘The proposed project offers a *unique opportunity* to improve Chad’s development prospects significantly’ (*Ibid.,* p. 7)	**Machine** **Human Body** *Topos of danger/threat* *Topos of opportunity*
‘Oil revenues […] represent an *exceptional opportunity* for Chad’ (World Bank, 2003a, p. i)	*Topos of opportunity*