Korean Municipal Orchestras:
Current Problems and Future Prospects

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of Korean municipal orchestras which focuses on both the internal and external environment in order to examine and better understand arguments that they face 'challenges' that are not to be solved simply through 'efficiency' or 'better organisation', but are part of wider socio-cultural change that previous studies have failed to take adequately into consideration. This study, therefore, examines diverse aspects of the difficulties faced by contemporary Korean municipal orchestras while addressing five research questions concerning Korean cultural policy, the socio-economic context in which orchestras operate, job satisfaction, interpersonal conflict, and diminishing local government funding. In pursuit of this investigation, a triangulation methodology is adopted, which includes the scrutiny of documentation along with qualitative in-depth interviews (with orchestral players, administrative staff, and civil servants) and a quantitative questionnaire survey (with 128 players and 10 administrative staff).

The research findings are given in detail in relevant chapters, but the key findings may be summarised here as follows: Political, economic, historic, and socio-cultural factors have greatly influenced the cultural policy of the Korean central government, but Korean municipal orchestras are influenced more by policies of local governments who provide them with a source of funding. Players in Korean municipal orchestras are highly satisfied with their work but dissatisfied with present pay, lack of authority, and the hierarchical structure. Orchestral administrative staff are dissatisfied with lack of autonomy and promotion. Male players have higher perception of intrapersonal conflict and intergroup conflict compared to female players, and male players have a greater preference for using *integrating* and *compromising* styles when managing interpersonal conflict with peers. Korean municipal orchestras, having a public service role, have been used to receiving relatively stable financial aid from local governments, but this has created a lack of commercial awareness about what is required to bolster their legitimacy in the face of potential financial cuts and small audiences. The 'civilizing mission' of the arts is no longer accepted as automatic justification. Although a complete governance change is considered a key factor for the success of municipal orchestras, such change is inadequate in itself: the real challenge for a brighter future lies with players, administrative staff, and the cities and their cooperation.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This chapter contains an overview of contemporary Korean municipal orchestras in four sections. First, the background of the study is described; the aims and methodology are then explained, followed by an outline of the structure of the thesis.

1.2 Research background

After the establishment of Korea's very first orchestra, the Joongang Music Band in 1926, there were several orchestras operating under the Japanese regime (1910–45): the Kyungsung Imperial College Orchestra (1928), the Yeonhee College Orchestra (1934), the Kyungsung Orchestra (1934) and the Chosun Symphony Orchestra (1940). When Korea was given independence from Japan in 1945, the Goryeo Symphony Orchestra, which had the features of a modern orchestra, was established, and can be seen as a vital starting point for the presence of Western classical music in Korea. Some people consider that the Kyungsung Music Band was founded in 1920 as the first Korean orchestra (Min, 2006: p. 125), whereas others consider the Joongang Music Band as the first (Lee, 1986: p. 10; Lee, 1992: p. 28). The former, however, was established by five Japanese founders, and mainly consisted of Japanese players. In addition, the main purpose of the foundation was to rationalise Japanese colonial policy by providing opportunities to hear and to study music. Therefore, the Joongang Music Band seems to have the greater claim to being the first Korean orchestra.

Since the introduction of Western classical music to Korea a century ago, there have been remarkable developments, especially a rapid growth in popularity in post-independent Korea. This expansion is evidenced by the growth of academic courses on offer, which has seen in 1953, first and, so far, the only classical music course at Seoul National University grow to include over thirty music colleges, with around five thousand new graduates each year. According to a survey by Jung, in 2004, there were 40 public orchestras, 103 private orchestras, and at least 40 orchestras affiliated with universities. Thus, Western classical music in Korea has undergone a significant expansion in terms of quantity and quality in just sixty years: Korean orchestras were strongly promoted after World War II in a specific social, economic, political and cultural context—what we might call a cultural policy 'regime'.

The values of the municipal orchestras in Korea

The history of Korean orchestras began with the founding of the Joong-Ang Music

Society in 1926, under Japanese rule, and then symphony orchestras began to be established from 1950 onwards. Many municipal orchestras were established after the 1980s as a result of contemporary cultural policy (arts for all, and decentralisation) and remarkable economic growth. In contrast to the symphony orchestras in America and Great Britain which introduce a business concept into the orchestra, Korean municipal orchestras pursue the concept of a public service. They are established and controlled by local governments in terms of finance and administration, so that local politicians are decision makers and the amount of public funding towards an orchestra depends on the local financial situation and the cultural taste of local politicians (especially the mayor). The main objective of municipal orchestras has been to provide high-quality music to their local citizens as a public service, thus municipal orchestras have had little or no concern with economic or commercial aspects of their activities: they have not been concerned with earning or losing money because the total budget is subsidised from local governments. They have been concerned, instead, with the reduction of the total budget that is related to the quality of performance (for instance, inviting a guest player) and the total number of concerts, although municipal orchestras are currently about to be forced to look for more money in the commercial sphere, which I argue is influenced by the cultural industries trajectory of central government. Musicians in Korean municipal orchestras have a civil servant-like status, which gives stability in salary and job security.

Western classical music is not a part of the Korean tradition, but it is more appreciated by Korean than Korean traditional classical music (Kim, 1993: p. 9; Kim, 1997: p. 23). I would suggest that this is because South Korea has achieved its economic development under US hegemony, and traditional Korean culture was hidden and marginalized, compared to the western high arts. Western classical music is considered a 'cool' thing to the Korean younger generation.

According to the 'Survey report on cultural enjoyment'[1] in 2008, carried out by the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the main audience for classical music and opera performance was the 30–39 year-old age group (5.9%), followed by 20–29 (5.8%), 40–49 (5.6%), 10–19 (4.7%), 50–59 (4.6%) and over 60 (2.1%). It is interesting to note that the young age group (in the age range 20–39) is the main audience for classical music performances, compared to western countries, which are facing problem with ageing audiences: for instance, 45–54 and 55–64 year-old age groups are the main classical music attendees in Great Britain (Baker, 2000: pp. 16–17). One of the most outstanding violinists, Elmar Oliveira,

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[1] The survey was carried out among 4000 people whose age was over 15 years old throughout Korea from 3rd May 2008 to 11th April 2008 by one to one interview.

remarked that '...audience in U.S. is gradually decreased. Audiences are older people. However, there concert halls are full (in Korea). In addition, there is much energy from young audiences' (Lee, 2010). Studying at least one musical instrument[2] seems essential to a number of young Koreans regardless of whether it is their or their parents' wish, and this may be attracting a young audience to the concert hall: the earlier and the more consistently children are exposed to music education and music experience, the more likely they will be to appreciate classical music and become ticket buyers (Lin, 2008: p. 23)   Higher education graduates (7.4%) are more likely to go to concerts, compared with high school graduates (3.9%) and under or middle school graduates (2.5%).[3] Education is also an important demographic determinant of classical music attendees in Great Britain: 'people educated beyond formal schooling are nearly three times as likely to attend classical concerts as the population as a whole' (Baker, 2000: p. 16). There is little difference between the sexes: 6.1% of female respondents and 3.7% of male respondents attended classical music performances (p. 34). This trend also happens in Britain: females are more likely to attend classical music concerts (Baker, 2000: p. 16).

Municipal orchestras are important to Korean musicians (especially to local musicians). Most students studying musical instruments want to be a member of an orchestra (Lee, 2001, Nam, 2003, Jung, 2004) and a few of them want to be a member of staff of the orchestral executive constitution; thus, local municipal orchestras create direct employment for approximately 80 to 150 individuals (full-time and part-time musicians and full-time administrative staff). They provide musicians with a stable employment to develop their professional skills as well as providing the opportunity to develop secondary income streams such as private lesson or playing in an ensemble (a member of a municipal orchestra has a better chance to enjoy a secondary income, compared to those of private orchestras or freelancers). In addition, the orchestral executive constitution provides an opportunity to music graduates who might not want to be orchestral players, but would like to work in an orchestra surrounded by the music they love. There are around 120 music graduates from each university every year, and the municipal orchestra is the workplace they prefer most.

Players, administrative staff, and civil servants share similar ideas to the public about the value of municipal orchestra, that it has a duty to provide high-quality performances to citizens, and it is considered vital for improving the general quality of local citizens' life

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[2] Generally speaking, Korean public schools do not teach musical instruments, so that Koreans learn musical instruments from private tutors.
[3] Middle school is an academic institution between elementary (primary) school and high school.

as well as enhancing civic pride. Furthermore, they also believe that the symphony orchestra has a positive influence on the image of the locality, acting as a cultural icon that represents the city.

Early research on symphony orchestras in terms of musicology, philanthropy, non-profit management and sociological aspects was carried out by people from various western countries after 1960, and particularly after 1990 (Lehman, 2002), but since 1995 the majority of studies of symphony orchestras (on narrow themes) have been carried out by graduate student researchers in Korea. Other written papers do exist, but the majority are too short to discuss, and some articles simply repeat the same issues, albeit in different ways.   There are continually increasing numbers of Masters' degree papers concerning Korean professional orchestras, on various themes ranging from their history to revitalisation.

Korean Masters' studies of professional symphony orchestras, which are related to this study, numbered 43 between 1975 and 2007. As can be seen in Table 1, almost half of the studies indicated the current problematic situation of Korean orchestras, in terms of management, structure and systems, and finance, comparing Korean orchestras within different cities, or Korean orchestras with the top orchestras in the U.S., U.K. and Japan, and suggesting some possible solutions.

Table 1.1 Korean research on symphony orchestras

Year	Theme of Master's thesis
1975	Performing history
1981	Comparison of repertoire
1986	Orchestral history
1987	Orchestral development plan Private orchestra management
1993	Analysis of the situation of 3 public orchestras
1997	Situation and solution Comparative analysis of performing activity
1998	Business strategy
1999	Orchestra structure and audience
2000	Orchestra development—comparing with three foreign orchestra Comparison among Korean orchestras Orchestra situation and comparative analysis Orchestra management
2001	Problems of structure and management and the future Players' professionalism Repertoire
2002	3 Repertoire analysis studies
2003	Trend of repertoire Players' satisfaction Performing quality development
2004	3 studies on management situation and solution Marketing Business strategy Performing activities
2005	2 studies on development strategy for private orchestras 2 studies on management situation and the solution
2006	Repertoire Service quality Performing activity Private orchestra management Professionalism in orchestra management Management development
2007	2 studies of orchestral history Management development of a private orchestra Programme study

The majority of people involved in orchestras insist that money is an essential factor, and that if they had more money to spend, they could operate the orchestra effectively in terms of quality and quantity. In other words, many people who have researched Korean orchestras over the years (especially municipal orchestra) have identified that they have been suffering from various problems (which could be summarised as matters of finance and management) and I have come to understand this issue in the course of this research. Although there has been substantial research carried out on orchestral organisations, the research available is still very limited. Furthermore, many studies have tended to focus on the problems of the orchestra itself, to the exclusion of all challenges within the wider context of the cultural policy regime that Korean municipal orchestras face in the post-welfare state. That is, as we can see from the above table, organisational factors that focus on structure and finance have so far dominated the problems of Korean symphony orchestras, and other important aspects

of internal factors, such as organisational process, work environment, or group behaviour in orchestra have been ignored.

Significant questions facing contemporary Korean municipal orchestras are essential to be considered, before investigating further the problems of Korean orchestras: Is the current model of a Korean orchestra not working? Are orchestras struggling? If the current model is working, why would there be a need to change it? Are orchestras not producing work of a high standard, or are they not attracting sufficient audience members? It could be argued that the current structure of the Korean municipal orchestra is working, in spite of some hardships, and generally Korean municipal orchestras provide a relatively high standard of work to their citizens. However, Korean municipal orchestras do need to change in order to keep up with external changes: the post-welfare-state model, in which public funding is challenged; the growing role of the market; more links to cultural industries; and the arts becoming part of a wider cultural sector, all form part of a relatively widespread policy regime.
Therefore, it is imperative that comprehensive research be carried out into this complicated social organisation.

When I played a piano concerto with Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra when I was 14 years old, the orchestra leader was very friendly and the other members were also supportive, so I felt welcomed by the atmosphere whenever I had rehearsals with them: thus, my view of symphony orchestras does not differ from the preconceptions that are commonly held about orchestras. For me, the important experience was working at an opera company, which was rehearsing *Tosca*, with three different performing groups (Italian, Seoul, and a young musician team), and interest in Korean municipal orchestras was sparked by conversation with an administrative member of staff at the opera company, who had been working for seven years, and he told me of several difficult episodes they had experienced with orchestras and artists. My working experience at an opera company finally prompted me to begin this study and persuaded me that orchestras were a valid field of enquiry.

When I started studying Korean orchestras, it was a new territory, and presented a lot of challenges. Although I consider myself as a former pianist, having trained for 18 years, including 4 years studying music at university, I had little knowledge about symphony orchestras, so I spent a lot of time visiting the orchestral office of the CPO during my holidays in Korea, and helped with the work of administrative staff to prepare rehearsals and concerts. This was very helpful for better understanding the orchestra, because I was able to talk with staff and some of the players in an unofficial way, and to gain

insight into what lay behind various actions and events.

These early experiences affected my subsequent perceptions of Korean municipal orchestras especially when identifying their problems. Although a few professionals in performing arts organisations in Korea told me that there was nothing else to investigate about Korean symphony orchestras except management and finance, I felt that there had to be an another way to study the orchestras to make them important and effective arts organisations and improve players' and staff's professional development and job satisfaction. Hence, I was able to rebuild my view of symphony orchestras and sample the orchestras' hidden nature and behaviour. In other words, all these personal experiences along with having read deeply into various orchestral issues, have significantly developed my knowledge and perspective of Korean municipal orchestras and their problems, and my arguments differ from the views of most Korean researchers. Like other Korean researchers, my initial thought at the beginning of this study was that the various problems centering on the Korean symphony orchestras were caused by financial inefficiency, and could be overcome by more effective marketing, which would generate greater public interest, and thus increase money from ticket sales. However, the more I have read of orchestral organisations, the more I have come to recognise the fact that the structure of an orchestra is a reflection of an extremely complex social organisation: 1) reading about orchestral issues discussed from the viewpoint of economists, sociologists, psychologists, non-profit management experts, musicologists, public policy analysts (Lehman, 1995) helped to link my own experience of the music industry with the issues; and 2) it helped in the formation of my critical views on papers of Korean researchers about key problems and the solutions, and meant that I could look at the indicated problems in different lights.

As mentioned earlier, Korean symphony orchestras have achieved excellent outcomes regarding the quality of performance and have increased in number: in addition, Korean municipal orchestras have been running in accordance with financial and managerial support from their local authority, without radical changes. Despite its relative success and stability, there remain several problems in Western classical music in Korea as a consequence of the failure to keep pace with the changing environment. In particular, the current challenges of Korean symphony orchestras could be summarised in terms of the lack of finance, the internal organisational structure of the orchestras, and the job satisfaction and conflict of players and administrative staff. These challenges are likely to be caused by limited financial resources, inflexibility and inefficiency in the organisation, isolation from the audience and local community, and indifference in human resources. The following section examines Korean municipal orchestras' financial problems, organisational problems, and job satisfaction and conflict problems.

Financial problem

As for finance, it is difficult to run arts organisations, including orchestras, solely through box office income; therefore, such organisations need extra financial support from central and local government, private companies and individuals. However, less than 10% of total expenditure is earned from box office income (Kang, 2000) in Korea, and outside funds are strictly prohibited to municipal orchestras according to local regulations. Thus, subsidy from local governments is the only financial source. Although Korean municipal orchestras have received consistent financial support from their local authorities since their foundation, the amount of subsidy is not sufficient to provide additional activities, which are a way of communication with their local citizens: the main reason that orchestras have a limited number of concerts[4] is that personnel expenses are heavy, 'accounting for 80-95% of total expenditure in Korean symphony orchestras, and the rest of the expenses are used for concert giving' (Kang, 2000). According to Allmendinger and Hackman (1996: p. 6), public performance of orchestral works within the standard symphonic repertoire and nontrivial compensation for the members of orchestra are the key features in being defined as a professional symphony orchestra; thus it may be assumed that Korean municipal orchestras, in general, do not fulfill their core task.

One may suppose that limited funding arises from the fact that orchestras are not part of the Korean tradition, so state and local governments do not increase public funding for them, or do not give them attention, and, as a result, municipal orchestras are facing financial problems. However, it would be untrue to say that local governments are not satisfactorily funding their orchestras on the grounds that they are not part of Korean traditional culture.

Table 1.2 Central government's subsidy for arts and cultural activities (1973–2000)

(Unit: million won)

Classification	1973–95	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Total
Western performing arts	22,665 (£12.7m)	2,116 (£1.2m)	2,231 (£1.3m)	2,483 (£1.4)	4,574 (£2.6m)	4,928 (£2.8m)	38,997 (£21.8m)
Korean traditional arts	7,036 (£3.9m)	1,027 (£0.6m)	1,815 (£1m)	882 (£0.5m)	996 (£0.6m)	1,020 (£0.6m)	12,686 (£7m)

(Source: refer from Lee, 2000: p. 11)

As we can see from the above table, the Korean government's public support for western performing arts was much higher than for Korean traditional arts, even though Lee did not mention what performing arts were included here. In addition, private

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[4] Kang (2000) insists that the average number of performances of public orchestras was 25 in 1998, and the number is not enough to be considered a professional symphony orchestra standard.

support for western classical music was 6,745 million won (approximately £3.8m), whereas support the Korean traditional arts totalled 806 million won (£0.5m) in 2000 (Korean Business Council for the Arts, 2001: p. 41).[5] The following table further illustrates the popularity of western classical music as compared to Korean traditional music.

Table 1.3 Yearly number of performance (1995–2005)

Classification	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
WCM	3,047	3,193	3,892	3,934	4,168	4,628	4,957	4,855	4,834	4,082	4,444
KTM	1,146	1,381	1,440	1,884	1,801	2,192	2,076	2,301	2,535	2,680	2,685

(Sources: refer from Arts Council Korea, 2005a and 2006)
Note: WCM: western classical music; KTM: Korean traditional music.

From the above, we can see that the total number of performances of western classical music between 1995 and 2006 is higher than the performance of Korean traditional music. Thus, insufficient funding for the orchestra is not a matter of favouring Korean traditional culture or otherwise. Furthermore, it is interesting that western classical music, rather than Korean traditional classical music, appears to be more interesting to Koreans, although neither belongs to the top popular arts and cultural activities with regard to the enjoyment of Koreans.

Organisational problem

Another key problem of Korean municipal orchestras rests with organisational structure. Korean municipal symphony orchestras in each city are founded, owned and managed based on the regulations of local self-government, so that all municipal orchestras have almost the same governance structure (the regulations of most Korean municipal orchestras are driven from those of the KBS Symphony Orchestra). The orchestras are run by a Board Director (normally the Mayor or a Vice Mayor of the local city), Board Members (Members of Parliament or volunteers), an Executive Director (normally the Mayor or a Vice Mayor of the local city), a Music Director (a Conductor), an Orchestral Manager and Administrative Staff. The position of an Executive Director is generally more powerful than that of a Music Director. The president of the municipal arts centre also belongs to the local government (or is the Vice Mayor if the city does not have municipal arts centre), and is normally the Vice Executive Director, who is from a practical point of view in charge of the management.[6] With respect to this personnel

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[5] Private support for western classical music has been continuously huge compared to that given to Korean traditional classical music: from 2005 to 2008, 30,163 (approximately £16.9m), 29,172 (£16.3m), 22,512 (£12.6m), and 22,439 (£12.5m) million won was given to western classical music, whereas 2,386 (£1.3m), 1,595 (£0.9m), 1,872 (£1m), and 1,832 (£1m) million won was given to Korean traditional classical music (Korean Business Council for the Arts, 2009: p. 62).
[6] The city or the municipal arts centre uniformly manages the orchestras, along with other public arts organisations.

arrangement, many Korean researchers (Park, 2004; Kang, 2000; Jung, 2004; Ahn, 2006; Lee, 2005b; Han, 2000) suggest different balance of power structures: between Executive Director (sometimes Orchestra Manager) and Artistic Director; or between staff at orchestral executive constitution and civil servant, and argue as to which one should have more power than the other in an ideal structure.

Meanwhile, because of this governance structure, the Korean municipal orchestra has a dual management team: one in the city and the other one in the orchestral executive constitution. Actual plans regarding administration, finance, and concert giving are made by the staff in the orchestral executive constitution (although the orchestra manager has almost no flexibility in any decision making), while the civil servants are in charge of the administrative process in the arts centre or city hall; therefore, the work process can be increasingly complicated, overlapping and time consuming (Park, 2004). Overall, professionalism, enthusiasm, coherence and continuity in the management of orchestra are generally not expected, due to: 1) the high turnover of civil servant (who is in charge of orchestra management is regularly rotated in every two or three years); 2) homogeneous management with other public arts organisations (such as choirs, Korean traditional orchestras, or dance); and 3) role ambiguity and role conflict between the orchestral executive constitution and the city or within the orchestral executive constitution.

Namely, because of the way they are founded, it results in every local authority within a city being in charge of all matters regarding finance and management, and therefore conflicts between the city and the orchestral executive constitution,[7] or between the city and orchestral players are inevitable in this situation.

Financial or artistic crises and organisational instability or inefficiency are not a new issue for Korean symphony orchestras as it first surfaced in the late 1980s, and this is understandable because of their people-related nature, which may cause the most difficult and complex problems for the organisation: some problems such as finance, management, administration and artistic policy have always been there, but the problems became more recognised and emphasised with the arrival of newly educated arts or cultural management and policy people in the late 1990s. Thus, the cultural policy agenda coming from Europe and America, but also from the evolution of Korea and its thinking about the role of culture, has moved forward, leaving the orchestras feeling very outdated. Economic issues have been strongly emphasised to Korean symphony orchestras, and they are under pressure to become more commercial, and to

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[7] The Korean term is orchestral executive constitution (it can also be called the orchestral office) and it might encompass the whole team of orchestral management in the west.

justify the public spending they receive, mainly because they perform for a limited audience and are expensive to maintain. In other words, marketisation is crucial to the post-welfare-state model, which places an emphasis on cultural industries. Yet Korean municipal symphony orchestras were primarily established based on the welfare-state model, and still show the hallmarks of this in the lack of significant change in their operations.

Thus, financial inefficiency or power-position issues driven from organisational structure are a part of the problems relating to symphony orchestra management, and the key challenge facing Korean municipal orchestras is their future continuity, which currently depends heavily on job satisfaction and conflict reduction. They have continuously supported their orchestras at a workable level, in terms of finance and administration, but cities would like to see the tangible value of orchestras, both in economic reality and public services: therefore, if local governments are not satisfied with their orchestras, they could be abolished, or merge with other municipal orchestra nearby.

Job satisfaction and conflict problem

The issues facing Korean municipal orchestras are greater than financial pressures or organisational structure. People issues are also at the heart of this matter, and if existing misunderstanding among groups or individuals within an orchestra is not tackled, Korean municipal orchestras will not be able to resolve the challenges. In other words, municipal orchestras need to consider the preferences of their clients (who pay for concerts and artistic excellence), and the abilities and willingness of orchestral players, conductors, and administrative staff to engage in newly required activities. This cannot be implemented without reaching an understanding of the thoughts of the administrative staff and musicians (including the conductor) towards new challenges.

"The symphony orchestra world is one of the most complex, competitive, and stratified organizational sets in existence" (Faulkner, 1973: p. 336), and the lifestyle and career of orchestral musicians are unlike those of other professionals. Loebel (1977) states about the musicians that "To begin with, a life-long daily discipline, involving mind and body, is required [...] On the contrary, it is only the beginning of a never-ending effort toward the unattainable [...] Working hours are irregular and in no case conform to the traditional nine-to-five schedule. Free time will frequently occur when most other people are at work" (pp. 81–84).   Karen O'Connor also remarked to Graham Snowdon (2008: online) during her interview that "It's a physically demanding job and there's a huge amount of stamina required. It can be hard on tour, with not enough time to rest, or eat, or to generally recover, and then the show must go on. They can be tough times."

Furthermore, the physical and mental problems of orchestral musicians, ranging from 'bullying, burn-out and stage fright to hearing damage and dependence on drink or drugs' were noted by Higgins (2006: online). In addition, financial rewards are not fairly provided, despite the years of study and hours of work, compared to other professions: as a result, extra teaching is required to supply the shortage of income (Loebel, 1977). Due to these hardships of musicians' life, Loebel (1977), thus, insists that someone who wants to be a musician should initially have, and continue to have, a compelling love for music (p. 77).

According to Lee's survey in 2001, the players of Korean municipal orchestras exhibit two strong professional features (p. 42): 'service to the public', which refers to the idea that their work is necessary and beneficial for society as well as themselves; and 'sense of the field' which means that they show commitment at work and would like to continue to do their work although external compensation is decreased (Hall, 1968: p. 93). The interviewees of this study also said that they were themselves proud with their work; and did not mind having more concerts without extra payment if it meant they were providing more cultural activities for the public. In addition, they organised several ensemble groups to access their public more closely. Lee (2001) investigates the important factors influencing players' professionalism based on Hall's features (reference group, service to the public, self-regulation, sense of the field, and autonomy). The statistical results showed that most significant factor influencing 'service to the public' and 'sense of the field' was job satisfaction (Lee, 2001: pp. 56–58): if municipal orchestras wish to provide more activities in order to communicate with a wider audience while retaining the players' cooperation in addressing this challenge, it is important to ensure players feel satisfied.

Thus, it is important to understand the thinking of musicians (players and conductors) and staff regarding their current work environment, and to challenge them to erase existing misunderstandings: Are they happy to play various genres of music, or to expand repertoires? Do they have the ability to perform certain pieces of music? What restricts their job performance? What do they think of the current organisational structure? Is it working well or not? Do they mind increasing the number of performances? Do they have any concerns or difficulties doing their job?

In order to understand human relationships within the unique nature of the orchestra, and investigate personal issues within and across both orchestra and city, I focus on issues surrounding the job satisfaction of employees, and conflict that is closely related to their creativity (Tang and Chang, 2010), which is vital for reaching a desired goal and for organisational survival and success (Henry, 2004; Amabile, 1983; Beehr and Glazer,

2005; and Jex, 1998). Furthermore, employees' job satisfaction and conflict are investigated at a group level in the context of organisational behaviour, because this remains central to understanding people (Middlemist and Hitt, 1981).

1.3 Aim of the study and methodology

The aim of this study is to examine diverse aspects of the problems of contemporary Korean municipal orchestras, along with the cultural policy situation and the new cultural environment. The managerial, financial and cultural policy of contemporary, publicly funded Korean municipal orchestras is also investigated. In addition, this study attempts to explore the factors that lie behind the growing problems in Korean municipal orchestras, and how these problems might be addressed. In particular the study will look at:

- How does the changing context of Korean cultural policy impact upon orchestras?
- What is the context of Korean municipal orchestras?
- How and why do players and staff become satisfied or dissatisfied with their jobs, and does this link to turnover?
- What types and degrees of conflicts do players and staff experience, and how do they handle conflicts with supervisors and peers?
- Why is local government public funding to municipal orchestras restricted, and how far can Korean municipal orchestras adapt and grow in the current situation?

Answers to these questions are sought by using multiple methods. The main research method was a case study, along with interviews with players, administrative staff, civil servants and conductors to drive data collection and analysis through four periods of fieldwork and documentations, including a review and analysis of archives, white papers, programmes, orchestra regulations, newspapers and magazines. In addition, quantitative research was undertaken, in order to acquire tangible data on job satisfaction and conflict, and to produce deeper insights into the data provided by qualitative analysis.

Research design process

The research design process has developed based on my own knowledge of players and staff, with additional advice from experts of arts organisations in Korea. As far as I could understand, professionals in the music field were not easy to obtain access to, and might not open up their opinions to strangers.

I first decided to collect data using a qualitative research strategy, mainly using documentation and one-to-one in-depth interviews, which would provide the greatest insight into the work of orchestras. E-mail was not a good way to gain permission from

orchestras, so I began to use my personal relationship to start to contact target interviewees.

When I conducted interviews, I used a mixture of purposive, convenience, and snowball sampling within three case studies of Korean municipal orchestras. Because of the snowball sampling technique (due to difficulty of access), there are more brass players compared to string players, which I did not intend. However, I do not believe this is a problem because they are all highly trained players who have experienced a similar educational background and share the same long-term wish to be a member of a symphony orchestra: according to Lee's survey in 2001, players consult with their fellow players as a reference group when they need to think or decide something related to their work, because they all have expert knowledge through long-time professional education. Furthermore, I interviewed them *primarily* as a member of a municipal symphony orchestra rather than as a particular section player (such as woodwind, or brass).

The interview questionnaire was semi-structured, but questions could be flexible according to the interviewee's willingness and openness: Initially, I tried to ask all the questions in the questionnaire, but I subsequently learnt from very early interviews that I need to be more flexible about questions based on individuals: for example, if interviewee was willing to talk more about one question, I should allow more time and help him/her by listen carefully. If one was avoiding a question, I changed question in an indirect way or came back to this question later again.

To begin the quantitative research, I contacted the orchestra managers and players' representatives by e-mail, but no one replied.[8] Hence, I called each orchestra manager and players' representative of the three orchestras. As with the previous fieldwork, there was no problem distributing the questionnaires to the staff and players of the CPO. In the case of the KSO, although I considered that the players of KSO were the most difficult to gain access to, because of their being top-class musicians in Korea, it seemed relatively easy to set a timetable for the questionnaire, as the players' representative, who was a close friend of my friend, assured me of this possibility, despite some degree of worries by his last call that he was unable to force them to fill in the questionnaires. However, gaining access to the administrative staff of the KSO remained problematic. On the one hand, the head of the administrative staff changed, and I needed to look for another route to ask for help. On the other hand, the status of the KSO was unstable, because of serious conflict between the orchestra and the

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[8] I already conducted interviews with most of them, so I thought I could have answer from e-mail contacts.

company. Therefore, the administrative staff of the KSO were very sensitive about my questionnaire in case their answers were abused. It was fortunate that my friend's father was a presenter of the KSO, and he asked his colleague, a radio presenter of classic music programmes, to gain access to the administrative staff.

Although my personal connection with people involved in classical music was very helpful in conducting this research, it detracted from the collection of questionnaires from the BPO. Because of the unpleasant relationship between the orchestra manager and the former players' representative[9] (he was the players' representative when I interviewed him), the orchestra manager prevented me from having any access to the players, and asked me to send questionnaires to her by post, which she agreed she would ask the players to complete.

Therefore, overall, it was not easy to gain access to municipal orchestras (especially with research exploring job satisfaction and conflict relationship, which they did not want to be exposed to outsiders). I felt quite lucky to know people in the classical music fields who could introduce me to appropriate people for this research. Because of my personal relationships and experiences in music, I could gain deeper insights and information than many others. In addition, it also helped me to interpret the findings: although my understanding of municipal orchestras gradually increased and I was able to acquire relatively solid knowledge of the dynamics of the orchestras after several years of research, I still suffered some degree of limitation in understanding the nature of orchestras fully. Thus, I was open to contrary results or findings, and discussed these matters with orchestral players, and professionals and experts in the fields of classical music whenever I had a question or struggled with some interpretative points. This helped me to get rid of my bias; indeed, it may have increased my comprehension of the situation and enabled me to gain extra relevant information.

Having had the experience of conducting research in Korean municipal orchestras, I now think that if we do not have personal connections in the field of classical music (especially in symphony orchestras) it can be very difficult to conduct research. Thus, the key point in conducting this research is to assure willingness of cooperation from an orchestra manager and a players' representative and to keep a good relationship with

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[9] I first contacted the representative, and he agreed to help me. But he appeared to change his mind when I called him again, and asked me to call the orchestral manager. I explained again about the questionnaire by telephone (I had already sent e-mails and made calls before coming to Korea), and asked her permission for access to the players, which I believed was a way of maximizing the response rate. She asked me which orchestras I had already done the questionnaire survey with, and the result of the response rate; I told her that I had started with the KSO and the response rate was approximately 50% of total players. She accused me of lying to her, so I asked her to check it with the orchestral executive constitution of the KSO to ascertain this.

them by understanding the nature of their work and its environment; moreover, e-mail contact does not seem to be a good tool to access to people working in Korean municipal orchestras.

More specific information on data collection and analysis is discussed in Chapter 2.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

This present chapter is an introduction, describing the background of Korean symphony orchestras and the need for this study. It defines the aim of the study, the formulation of the research questions, and briefly explains the methodology used.

In chapter 2, I outline the methodology that was designed to answer the research questions. I used a combination of interview and documentation techniques to collect data over several months in three Korean municipal symphony orchestras, by means of a case study approach. Quantitative data collection was conducted through a questionnaire survey. I explain how I finally chose three municipal orchestras, and provide a detailed description of each fieldwork, research difficulties and analysis techniques.

Chapter 3 covers the background to Korean cultural policy and explains how cultural policy and environmental factors influence orchestras, aiming to provide a broader picture of the relevant circumstances. I outline four main themes of Korean cultural policy, which directly and indirectly influence Korean symphony orchestras.

Chapter 4 presents the findings for each of three cases studies, in order to provide general information and make the reader more familiar with Korean municipal orchestras. In each case, I outline the orchestra's organisational and environment context, including an overview and description of the main changes (if appropriate), the main activities, repertoire (if appropriate), audience and finance status. I then outline the government structure and the nature of the work for orchestral players, conductors and members of the management team. Three cases are generally similar, but the details of each orchestra vary slightly. Relevant tables and figures are provided.

Chapter 5 and 6 present the combination of the main findings using both quantitative and qualitative data to explore job satisfaction and conflict. Chapter 5 provides the results of data analysis regarding job satisfaction, attempting to identify the problematic factors for Korean municipal symphony orchestras. This chapter provides two different sets of data. The first half of chapter 5 presents the results of quantitative data using one of most esteemed questionnaires for measuring job satisfaction, the Job Descriptive

Index (JDI) invented by Smith *et al.*; the rest of the chapter presents the results of qualitative data. One-to-one interviews in accordance with the results of quantitative data and the direct narrations of interviewees are also provided.

Chapter 6 presents the results of the data analysis regarding conflict, aiming to identify the problematic conflicts between players, management teams, civil servants and conductors, using both quantitative and qualitative data. The first half of chapter 6 presents the results of quantitative data using reliable questionnaires measuring three types of organisational conflict and five styles of handling interpersonal conflict, the Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventory (ROCI) I and II are provided; the remaining part of the chapter presents the results of qualitative data, in parallel with the previous quantitative data.

Chapter 7 addresses the legitimacy of public subsidy toward Korean municipal symphony orchestras and the reasons why local governments do not sufficiently fund their orchestras. Finally, through the case of Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, it examines whether the decision to turn a municipal orchestra into a for-profit corporation in order to address the new challenges that Korean symphony orchestras are about to face is appropriate.

Chapter 8 summarises the main findings, and draws conclusions, followed by an assessment of the originality of this study, its implications (divided roughly into three parts) for the cities, players, administrative staff, and civil servants, the identification of some limitations, and brief recommendations for the future of Korean municipal orchestras.

Chapter 2 Methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the research methods used in gathering and analysing data. The first section presents the choice of the triangulation method. The second and third sections cover qualitative (interview and documentation) and quantitative (surveys using a questionnaire) research, along with the choice of sites, means of access, data collection and its analysis.

2.2 Choosing methods

The primary difference between qualitative research and quantitative research is that the former works with a few variables and many cases, while the latter deals with a few cases and many variables (Ragin, 1987). The detailed characteristics of qualitative and quantitative research are shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Contrasts between qualitative and quantitative research

Qualitative research	Quantitative research
• Words	• Numbers
• Points of view of participants	• Point of view of researcher
• Researcher close	• Researcher distance
• Theory emergent	• Theory testing
• Process	• Static
• Unstructured	• Structured
• Contextual understanding	• Generalization
• Rich, deep data	• Hard, reliable data
• Micro	• Macro
• Meaning	• Behaviour
• Natural setting	• Artificial setting

(Source: Bryman, 2008: p. 393)

To pursue the aims of this study, I initially use qualitative research rather than quantitative research. Creswell (1998) indicates several reasons for conducting qualitative research: the nature of the research questions, which frequently begin with a how or a what in order to describe what is going on; the topic which needs to be explored; the need to present a detailed view of the topic; and emphasis on the researcher's role as an active learner rather than as an expert (pp. 17–18).

Qualitative research was useful in this study to understand mechanisms, the relationships between players, administrative staff, and cities, meaningful information, general atmosphere, and key issues of Korean municipal orchestras (at the time of this study). More importantly, several questions arose during the process of conducting qualitative research with respect to job satisfaction and conflict relationships. With these questions, I wanted to acquire generalised, reliable, numerical, and statistical

data to measure job satisfaction and conflict around Korean municipal orchestras. To address these and to fill some of the gaps from the shortcomings of qualitative research, I conducted a quantitative questionnaire survey regarding job satisfaction using the *Job Descriptive Index* (JDI) and conflict using the *Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory* (ROCI) I and II. Simple random sampling was used in the survey questionnaire, which has the advantage of 'high generalizability of findings' (Sekaran, 2003: p. 281). The sampling design used in interview and survey are summarised in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Sampling design

There are a number of studies designed to show the relationship between job satisfaction, conflict, conflict management, turnover, job performance, age, gender, ethnicity or race, tenure (number of years of service), education, and absenteeism in organisations in order to demonstrate how to achieve organisational effectiveness.

Because of their validity and reliability through many years of studies (see pp. 38–40, pp. 43–44 in Electronic Resources for the JDI and JIG, 2000; see p. 27, pp. 30–31, pp. 43–46 in Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventories, 2004), the Job Descriptive Index (JDI) and Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventories (ROCI) I and II are frequently used to collect data about job satisfaction, three different types of organisational conflict, and five styles of handling interpersonal conflict. More importantly, these two instruments include all the themes of job satisfaction and conflict that I collected from interviews regarding job satisfaction and conflict. In addition, ROCI-II is the only instrument which contains five independent dimensions for measuring the styles of handling interpersonal conflict with a supervisor, subordinates, and peers (Rahim, 2004: p. 41). Along with job satisfaction and conflict, this study also investigates job turnover

regarding thoughts of quitting, thoughts of relative important facets influencing job satisfaction, demographic factors [10] developed by a researcher, and the cross-relationships between them.

To investigate these relationships, mixed methods, combining qualitative (interviews) and quantitative research (questionnaire survey) are used in a supporting role, and information was collected through both methods: data from qualitative or quantitative research in this study also help to explain findings generated by each method (Bryman, 2008: p. 609). For instance, according to the survey result, the players of the BPO have higher satisfaction in promotion, compared to the other two orchestras. This phenomenon is explained by the information from interviews: only the audition result of the BPO actually leads to players' promotion in the orchestra. In addition, according to interviews, conflict with the conductor is one of important issues among players and they described many episodes: this could be supported by the survey result that players have relatively higher perception of intragroup conflict (which is related to conductor).

The correspondence between survey and Interview instruments; and players and staff correlation table between JDI, ROCI-I, ROCI-II with peers, previous conductor, and current conductor, and job turnover is displayed in Table 2.11, Table 2.12, and Table 2.13.

Figure 2.2 Methodological triangulation design in this research

Sequential studies
Qualitative research (interviews) → Quantitative research (questionnaire survey)
Equivalent status of methods
Qualitative data = Quantitative data

(Source: adapted from Denscombe, 2007: p. 114–15)

Combining qualitative and quantitative research methods in the study of the same phenomenon is defined as triangulation (Denzin, 1970). According to Denzin (1989), there are four types of triangulation in terms of the combination of research methods and designs, theories, and data.

- Data triangulation refers to examining the object based on three dimensions—

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[10] According to Blazer and Smith (1990), demographic information is useful to calculate subgroup satisfaction and conflict indicating strong and weak areas within an organisation. It is also helpful to investigate the specific group of employee, and it allows a comparison to be made.

time, space, and person.
- Investigator triangulation refers to the use of multiple observers to examine the same object.
- Theory triangulation consists of more than one perspective on the same set of objects.
- Methodological triangulation includes a between-method or within-method approach: the former refers to use different methods on the same object, while the latter refers to use the same method on different occasions.

(pp. 237–44)

Thus, even though this study is grounded overall in qualitative research, methodological triangulation (between-method), a strategy designed to overcome the weaknesses of one method with the strengths of another (Denzin, 1989: p. 244), is adopted in order to investigate job satisfaction and conflict around Korean municipal orchestras. The linking of quantitative and qualitative approaches in this study follows the recommendations of Bullock:

- The quantitative findings are illustrated by qualitative case studies.
- Qualitative results are used to amplify the findings of quantitative research.
- Qualitative evidence is used to produce hypotheses, which are tested by quantitative research.

(Bullock *et al.*, 2003: p. 87)

Embracing these approaches, the results of surveys, which are more structured, will be placed first in Chapters 5 and 6, followed by the results of the interviews.

However, caution is needed when the results of some parts of the research are contradictory, even though Glaser and Strauss say reassuringly: 'there is no fundamental clash between the purposes and capacities of qualitative and quantitative methods or data' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: p. 17). The reverse data results yielded by methodological triangulation in this study, therefore, are to be respected.

To summarise, qualitative research in this study was designed to understand and explore internal and external problems of Korean municipal orchestras, such as their mechanisms, problematic issues and threats, concerns, relationships, and the work of staff and players. In contrast, quantitative research was designed to explore general trends and gain reliable data of job satisfaction and conflict among players and staff as a mean of expanding the qualitative research.[11]

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[11] As mentioned earlier, the results of quantitative research will be given prior to the qualitative research in Chapters 5 and 6, because of relatively unstructured and less systematic character of qualitative research.

2.3 Qualitative research

Case study approach

The case study is a common research strategy in the social sciences, such as psychology (Bromley, 1986), social work (Platt, 1981), and management studies (Eisenhardt, 1989). Denscombe comments that the case study has become 'extremely widespread in social research, particularly with small-scale research' (2003: p. 30). Yin (2003: p. 1) explains, 'case studies are the preferred strategy when how or why questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over the events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context'. Denscombe (2003) suggests five characteristics of the case study approach: the ability to put the spotlight on one case; to carry out in-depth study; to focus on relationships and processes; to look at the natural setting; or to use multiple sources and methods. Therefore, it is evident that the case study method is particularly appropriate to the study of a complex phenomenon in a natural setting such as an orchestral organisation, as it has the ability to 'discover how the many parts affect one another' (Denscombe, 2003: p.31) and investigate detailed relationships. Furthermore, a case study has more flexibility than other research methods because, according to Denscombe (2003: p. 31), it provides a chance for 'the researcher to use a variety of sources, a variety of types of data and a variety of research methods as part of the investigation' and 'whatever is appropriate can be used for investigating the relationships and processes that are of interest'. Thus, in spite of the argument about 'the credibility of generalisations' (Denscombe, 2003: p. 39) from case study findings and the difficulty in 'deciding the boundaries of a case' (Creswell, 1998: p. 64), I have chosen a case study for my research strategy. To minimise any disadvantages, I tried to identify distinguishing features among each group by setting up 'clear and consistent boundaries' (Denscombe, 2003: p. 38). To define the boundaries, decisions on what, when and where to sample were necessary. The study population can be divided into four factors: elements, sampling units, extent, and time (Tull and Hawkins, 1993), but I chose to omit one of factors, 'elements', as in my case it was similar to the 'sampling unit' (Kumar, 2005). Thus, the population considered in this study was:

- Sampling units: three Korean municipal orchestras having different governmental structures.
- Extent: three cities in Korea.
- Time: during the period of data collection (January 2007 to April 2007, May 2007 to July 2007, February 2008, May 2008 to June 2008).

Research methods

Creswell (1998) indicates four basic types of information: interviews, documents, observations, and audio-visual materials in qualitative research, which allow a 'deep

involvement in issues of gender, culture, and marginalized groups' (p. 19). The first two methods—interviews and documents, were preferred in this study.

Interviews

Although conducting interviews seems to be a reliable source for research (Denscombe, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000), this is not always the case. That is because 'the spoken or written word has always a residue of ambiguity; no matter how carefully we word the questions and how carefully we report or code the answers' (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: p. 645). However, Yin (2003: p. 89) considers the interview 'one of the most important sources of case study information'. Interviewing is one of the most common and powerful ways in which we try to understand people, by seeking to obtain a viewpoint based on their opinions and experiences (see Sykes, 1990; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Mason, 2002; and Patton, 2002). Thus, obtaining large amounts of data from various subjects, with the possibility of immediate follow-up and clarification and understanding of people's beliefs in their everyday activities, can be seen as particular strengths of interviews (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: p. 80).

An interview has a broad range of forms and a multiplicity of uses (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: p. 645). The term 'qualitative interviewing' is 'often referred to in-depth, semi-structured or loosely structured forms of interviewing' (Mason, 2002: p. 62). Denscombe (2003) describes six different types of interview in two groups: structured interviews, semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews, which are distinguished by 'the degree of control exercised by the researcher over the nature of the responses and the length of the answers allowed by the respondent' (Denscombe, 2003: p. 167); and one-to-one interviews, group interviews and focus groups, which are distinguished by the number of interviewees. Highly educated respondents (my interviewees are professionals in music and management holding high educational achievements) usually expect to have a chance to express their particular views. Very structured questionnaires that do not allow sufficient opportunity for them to respond in their own words can be unpopular and can lead to aborted interviews.

Therefore, the qualitative interviews conducted in this study were semi-structured; and these have provided in-depth investigations especially related to personal experiences and feelings, an allowance for the development of the interviewee's ideas, and a chance to 'speak widely on the issues' (Denscombe, 2003: p. 167), and 'a multiplicity of uses' (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: p. 645), via one-to-one interactions, taking place face to face, or via the telephone or the Internet (Mason, 2002: p. 62). Along with semi-structured interviews, I decided to carry out face-to-face interviews because of the

following advantages: their relatively high response rates and prompt corrections of clear misunderstandings (Robson, 2002: p. 282); their appropriateness, and fewer practical problems in use (Moyser, 1988: p. 112).

Documentation

It is undeniable that interview data is an important source of case study evidence, yet 'they [the data] are subject to the common problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation' (Yin, 1994: p. 85), so that Yin (1994) suggests using interview data along with other types of information such as documents and observations.

Although documentary research is considered old fashioned nowadays (McNeill and Chapman, 2005), this type of research is still useful. According to Tim May (2001), documents 'tell us about the aspirations and intentions of the periods to which they refer and describe places and social relationships at a time when we may not have been born, or were simply not present' (p. 176). In other words, we can gain access to the past and to areas of difficult, sensitive and taboo themes through various documentary resources.

Documentary research covers a wide range of sources (Bryman, 2004; May, 2001), and documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case study topic (Yin, 2003: p. 85). This type of information can take many forms and should be the object of explicit data collection plans (Yin, 2003: p. 85). For instance, consider the following diversity:

- Letters, memoranda, and other communiqués.
- Agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings, and other written reports of events.
- Administrative documents—proposals, progress reports and other internal records.
- Formal studies or evaluations of the same 'site' under study.
- Newspaper clippings and other articles appearing in the mass media or in community newsletters.

(Yin, 2003: pp. 85–86)

There could be personal documents, official documents from both government and private sources, and media outputs. Yin (2003) pointed out the usefulness of these different types of documents, in spite of some degree of inaccuracy and bias. Thus, careful use of documents is required. In addition, according to Denscombe (2003) the good researcher should always ask if he/she has evaluated the documents rather than accepted them at face value (p. 220). There are four criteria for evaluating documents in good document research: the authenticity of the article, credibility, representativeness, and meaning of words (Platt, 1981).

Denscombe (2003) describes the advantages and disadvantages of documentary research. The advantages are the easy and inexpensive access to data, its cost-effectiveness, and the permanence of data, but the disadvantages are the credibility of the source and its social constructions (subjective because of the interpretations made by the originator of the document). These disadvantages might be overcome by evaluating 'the authority of the source and the procedures used to produce the original data', as Denscombe mentions (2003: p. 228).

Therefore, after careful consideration, in accordance with the documentation above, the present research was derived from four major sources of documentation: 1) current and historical reports and documentation from each orchestra, central and local government offices, the Korean Assembly Library and Arts Council papers related to music policies; 2) regulations and laws related to the performing arts, especially Korean municipal orchestras; 3) newspapers; 4) e-mails; 5) journal articles; and 6) theses on orchestral studies.

Classifying documents
The classification of documents falls into three main groups (May, 2001): primary, secondary and tertiary documents; public and private documents; and unsolicited and solicited sources (p.180). As this research focused on three Korean municipal orchestras, the majority of documents were drawn from primary and secondary sources, public, and both solicited and unsolicited materials from three central government organisations, local cities, and the three Korean municipal orchestras. Because of their importance,[12] I will describe briefly the three central government organisations and their functions.

Three central government organisations

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), the Republic of Korea
The MCT is one of the most important central government agencies and operates on 1.06 percent of the total budget of the government. The ministry is responsible for affairs in the areas of culture, the arts, religion, tourism and sports. The ministry has one assistant minister, two main offices, six bureaus, one commission, six officers, 26 divisions, 6 teams, and nine subordinate organisations. The total staff is 1,884 (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2009a: online[13]). The MCT

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[12] As I was mainly in UK during my study, there was a difficulty in access to materials, and three central government organisations, which provide easy online access, were one of main secondary sources.
[13] Available at: http://www.mcst.go.kr/english/aboutus/history.jsp [Accessed 09 May 2009].

changed its name to the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in February 2008, with the start of the new Korean government.

As the Ministry of Culture and Tourism makes public its information, including the process of important decision making, on its website, I could easily access a variety of information. I also contacted the following departments to ask for relevant information (which was not on the website).

- Arts Bureau: Arts Policy Team, Performing Arts Team.
- Cultural Policies Bureau: Cultural Policy Team.
- Cultural Industry Bureau: Cultural Industry Policy Team.

The Art Way
This Comprehensive Culture and Arts Information System (CCAIS), runs as part of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism Information Policy, and is designed to provide culture and art related information online for the major organisations of culture and arts in Korea (Korea Culture Information Service, 2008a: online).[14]

Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Institute
On the 5th December in 2002, the Korea Cultural Policy Institute (KCPI) merged with the Korean Tourism Research Institute (KTRI), to form Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Institute (KCTPI) (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2007: online).[15] The cultural and tourism data centre of the Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Institute is open to scholars, students, and the general public through its webpage. It changed its name to the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute in February 2007. Many useful materials were provided through this website, especially in the following subsections:

- Periodical publication: Newsletter, Magazine.
- Statistics of culture and tourism.
- Research reports.

Other sources of information
In addition to the research resources I have mentioned previously, I also accessed the websites of local cities[16] and related orchestras; visited the offices of the three public orchestras (Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, Busan Philharmonic orchestra and KBS Symphony Orchestra); and browsed the digital content of the Korean National Assembly Library.[17]

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[14] Available at: http://www.art.go.kr/index.jsp [Accessed 09 May 2009].
[15] Available at: http://www.kcti.re.kr/index.dmw [Accessed 21 January 2010].
[16] Changwon City Hall (2006) [Online]. Available at: http://eng.changwon.go.kr/home/home.jsp [Accessed 09 May 2009]; Busan Metropolitan City (2009) [Online]. Available at: http://www.busan.go.kr/01_cityhall/05_administration/05_01_01.jsp [Accessed 26 October 2009].
[17] Available at: http://u-lib.nanet.go.kr:8080/dl/SearchIndex.php [Accessed 09 May 2009].

Choice of sites

Purposeful sampling

In quantitative research design, probability sampling and convenience sampling are commonly used (Maxwell, 1996: p. 70), while qualitative research design favours purposeful or purposive sampling (Patton, 2002: p. 230; Kumar, 2005: p. 179), which emphasises in-depth understanding (Mason, 2002; Patton, 2002).

In purposeful sampling, the researcher goes only to those people who, in his or her opinion, are likely to have the required information and are willing to share it (Kumar, 2005; p. 179). Purposeful sampling is extremely useful when the researcher wants to construct a historical reality, describe a phenomenon, or develop ideas about something of which only a little is known (Kumar, 2005; p. 179).

The crucial point that there must be understanding and evaluation of sampling and selection in qualitative research is emphasised (Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Mason, 2002; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). Thus, sampling decisions require considerable knowledge of the setting of the study and should also take into account the researcher's relationship with study participants, the feasibility of data collection, validity concerns, and ethics (Maxwell, 1996: p. 72).

The focus of purposeful sampling is to choose information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the research questions (Patton, 2002). One of the goals of purposeful sampling can be seen as 'maximum variation', which 'documents diverse variations and identifies important common patterns' (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p. 28). Purposeful sampling, then, provides the best way to obtain the kind of information for the present investigation. As a result, purposeful sampling is considered to be important when selecting cases and the criteria for this research.

Selection of the case studies

The importance of understanding how to take decisions about sampling and selection in qualitative research has been emphasised by several writers. There are a number of publications written on Western orchestras that focus on how those organisations are categorised. However, one of the most common classifications of Korean orchestras divides them into civic (municipal) or private. Public orchestras are usually founded by the province, city, or district in which the orchestra is based, whereas private orchestras are founded by individuals. Generally speaking, the majority of Korean municipal orchestras have comparatively stable funding, a long history, and qualified players (especially in big cities) compared to private orchestras. There are around 103 private orchestras, in contrast to 40 municipal orchestras (Jung, 2004). At the start of my research, I wished to include both municipal orchestras and private orchestras, but Korean private symphony orchestras are more or less *ad-hoc* orchestras, and the

continuity of such orchestras was not guaranteed during the periods of this research. Furthermore, information such as facts, figures, or management structure simply does not exist in written form. Thus, I decided to focus on the case of Korean municipal orchestras.

According to the available literature, three different government structure groups exist among Korean municipal orchestras: orchestras with an independent executive constitution who are directly communicated with and controlled by the city, orchestras with an executive constitution under the control of a municipal arts centre, and orchestras operated by a department of a public broadcasting company without their own executive constitution. These three types of public orchestras are reasonably homogeneous regarding funding resources, their main organisational structure and performing activities, but they differ in size, in the amount of funding received, and in their performance levels. Therefore, it was necessary in my research to select one case from each of the three different government structure groups.

In addition, I made every effort to involve all the key people working for municipal symphony orchestras. They can be categorised in three groups: players (including conductor), administrative staff of the orchestral executive constitution, and city staff (normally one civil servant who is in charge of managerial work and cooperates with the administrative staff). A Korean municipal orchestra cannot run if any of these personnel are missing: moreover, we would not be able to say that we know a Korean municipal orchestra without understanding how these groups interrelate. Therefore, each group is equally important.

While many orchestras in European countries, the U.K. and the U.S. place more attention on education, community work, and the recording industry, the primary work of Korean municipal orchestras is concert-giving. The types of concert-giving activities can be summarised as regular concerts, special concerts, national tour concerts, international concerts, and broadcast output. The average number of performances of public and private orchestras was 25 and 21.7 in 1998, respectively (Kang, 2000). Only one orchestra gives 71–90 concerts, and 11 orchestras provide 10–50 concerts per year among 14 Korean municipal orchestras (Ahn, 2006: p. 40). Thus, Kang (2000) and Ahn (2006) both insist that the number of performances is insufficient for professional symphony orchestras.

The young age group (20–29 and 30–39 years old age group), higher education graduates, and females are the main audience for classical music in Korea, based on

the 'Survey report on cultural enjoyment' in 2008. The important factors in choosing performances are satisfaction in terms of previous experience (3.68%), the performer's fame (3.43%), the programme (3.38%), the evaluation of arts critics (3.37%), the atmosphere of the performing venue and facilities (3.12%), and the ticket price (2.86%) (Koh, 1996). Korean municipal orchestras have gained some limited information on their audience from the subscription system, but they have not linked the subscription system to any efforts to develop their future audience.

The Korean municipal orchestras were founded by local governments, and are still owned, managed, and entirely subsidised by these local governments. However, significantly higher personnel expenditure, low box office income, and restriction of outside funds affect the financial difficulties of Korean municipal orchestras. The employment of players, administrative staff, and conductor is dependant on the local government's decision. Players are employed by open audition, with special appointments for principal players when there are vacancies: the duration of a contract is normally for two or three years, in line with local government regulations. The number of administrative staff varies, but fewer than ten staff generally work in orchestral offices: their contracts are also renewable every two or three years. The principal conductor is chosen by local government officials: the majority of municipal orchestras have a principal conductor and only a few orchestras such as Busan and Ulsan Symphony Orchestras also have a vice-principal conductor.

The selection criteria
In order to decide which specific Korean municipal orchestras should be researched, I put a priority on purposeful sampling, which would only involve those people who in my opinion were likely to have the required information. Although there are arguments for choosing both extreme examples and representative examples (see Miles and Huberman, 1994; Maxwell, 1996), I felt that it was important to select representative examples from three groups that differed in their administratively governed structure. I decided, initially, to target six orchestras (two orchestras from each group), but access to two of the orchestras I originally contacted was no longer available during the second period of the fieldwork, because of serious conflict caused by the researcher's use of the 'Korea Public Information Disclosure System'[18] (see Difficulties relating to information access in p. 38). As a result, the three orchestras selected for this study were chosen one from each of the three groups, and represent the 'low ground', 'middle ground' and 'high ground' position within the groups classified by overall

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[18] Republic of Korea, Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2006) [Online]. Available at: http://www.open.go.kr/pa/html/eng_main.htm [Accessed 20 January 2010].

reputation for level of performance, total numbers of regular concerts, and size of funds. The three municipal orchestras each possess an image of success, are reasonably wealthy, and programme a considerable number of regular performances with regular funding, but they differ in their budgets, their government structure, size, organisation and activities. They are Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, and the KBS Symphony Orchestra.

Gaining access

The first part of my fieldwork involved gathering documents, visiting archives, and conducting interviews mainly with administrative staff working in the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra as a 'low ground' orchestra. The CPO was convenient for regular access due to its location. I had relatively easy access to the CPO due to my previous relationship with the orchestra; in my early years I performed a piano concerto with them. Furthermore, when I worked as an assistant to the Artistic Director for the opera *Tosca* produced by the Kyungnam Opera Company in 2004, I built relations with administrative staff in the CPO. The orchestra manager and two administrative staff in the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra took MA degrees in arts management (two wrote theses related to orchestras; one wrote about the management of arts centres), so they were very interested in my research and willing to help. Thus, I had permission for unlimited access to the CPO. In my initial meetings, I explained the aims and necessary materials for this study and asked about the possibility of their participation, and if I could conduct interviews with the management team, with three or four players, civil servants, as well as with the conductor. I also asked about the possibility of attending relevant meetings and asked whether I could have access to archival and documentation related to this study. The orchestra manager and one administrative staff of the CPO agreed to these requests, apart from attendance at meetings as their schedule is fairly irregular and some are potentially sensitive in nature. From this, the aims of the first part of the fieldwork were to identify suitable orchestras for this study, to get to know the administrative staff of six orchestras that I had initially chosen, and to seek their favour in order to be introduced to players, civil servants, the executive directors, and to the conductors of the CPO and other orchestras[19] that I targeted.

The second part of the fieldwork was to concentrate on gathering archival information, documentation and qualitative information from interviews with orchestra managers, players and civil servants in six orchestras.

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[19] However, I was unable to have an interview with the conductors of the BPO and KBS Symphony Orchestras.

Data collection

I undertook fieldwork four times in Korea. From January 2007 to April 2007, I carried out many interviews across the orchestras to understand the basic mechanisms, the context, and the issues. My second fieldwork was done from May 2007 to July 2007 with more focused questions, and there were two follow-up fieldwork sessions in February, May and June 2008.[20]

Preliminary fieldwork

The aim of the first stage of fieldwork was to identify the managerial, administrative, financial and cultural policy context of the Korean municipal orchestras and, in particular, problematic factors within them. In addition, although I had studied music (especially piano) for 20 years, I was quite ignorant of the basic facts about orchestral funding, its structure, operation, and activities, so another aim of the first fieldwork was to increase my understanding of the orchestras. Before starting, I sent an email message to two staff of the management team in the CPO, and asked if they could participate in my study and cooperate with me in carrying it out. With their consent, in March 2007, I began the semi-structured interviews with the CPO, and pilot tested the appropriateness of my research questions with the interviewees.

Initially two interviews were held with the Planning Manager and Orchestra Manager of the CPO. As I met them whenever I went back to Korea, I was able to develop a fairly close and trusting relationship. They were both former wind players and had finished their MAs in Arts Management, so they were naturally interested in my study and tried to help me as much as possible.

When all interviews with relevant people in the CPO had been scheduled, I planned the rest of my interviews with the other five orchestras. At first, I thought I might be able to contact relevant people without anyone else's help, so I sent email messages, which explained my study and asked for permission from those I wanted to interview. It was relatively easy to obtain their official email addresses and telephone numbers through the websites and homepages of the city, the municipal arts centre, or the orchestra. However, the rate of response was very low and most of them were not willing to participate in my study, something I confirmed by telephone. Thus, I changed the way in which I accessed these potential interviewees: I contacted friends and acquaintances working in and around orchestras. Furthermore, at the end of each meeting I asked if the interviewee could suggest other relevant people in the other five orchestras. Using this snowballing technique and my personal relationship, it was relatively easy to contact and make appointments, and I started to interview relevant

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[20] Detailed interview dates are given in Table 2.8, Table 2.9, and Table 2.10.

people in other orchestras. At the end of March, I finished the interviews at the CPO. After completing my interviews with the CPO, I continued to visit the orchestra whenever I had time in order to collect relevant data and documents. Meanwhile, I began to interview players of the BPO during the first period of fieldwork. To pursue the aim of the preliminary fieldwork, I identified key issues for Korean municipal symphony orchestras, including typical management functions such as personnel, marketing and artistic systems which appeared significant to the orchestras.

The main question areas were as follows:

1. Personal information.
2. Job orientation and attitude.
3. Role, responsibility, and difficulties.
4. Process of decision making.
5. Orchestra government.
6. Conflicts.
7. Key issues around orchestra at the time of study.
8. Environmental changes.

Through this process I recorded the interviews for transcription and made notes during each interview. If an interviewee disagreed with the recording of the conversation, I tried to take notes as much as possible. A small number of interviewees allowed neither note taking nor recording, so I made notes right after the interview of as much as I could remember. Interviews were mainly conducted in offices, cafés, and restaurants and were recorded by a digital voice recorder and then transcribed in Korean-English translation in the early period.[21] Later, I changed entirely to using a tape recorder due to the technical faults of the digital recorder.

To increase my understanding of orchestras, I read and analysed relevant books, documents, and archives that I collected from newspapers, orchestra offices, municipal arts centres, the Arts Council Korea, the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, and the National Assembly Library. However, information on major issues that Korean orchestras are facing is very limited. Therefore, I continued to spend time with two of my key informants in the CPO in order to understand the orchestra and the main issues it was facing. I was particularly keen to collect financial information, orchestra programmes, information on main activities, their history, the regulation of orchestras, papers on cultural policy and cultural industries of each city, and the cultural policy of local governments.

After the first fieldwork, I came back to UK in April 2007 for a month to report and discuss the outcome with my supervisor. Then I modified the semi-structured interview

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[21] The first six interviews were recorded by digital voice recorder.

that I had used in the first fieldwork so that each questionnaire varied according to the participant's willingness to be interviewed. Before going back to Korea for the second stage of fieldwork, I arranged some interview schedules with other orchestras by telephone and email.

Second fieldwork

With confidence gained through the first stage of fieldwork, the aim of the second stage was to acquire deeper information and to understand issues in specific orchestras as well as to conduct further interviews. During the second stage, I interviewed people working in a variety of roles in the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, the Ulsan Philharmonic Orchestra, the KBS Symphony Orchestra, the Daejeon Philharmonic Orchestra, and the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, as well as three private orchestras: the Korean Symphony Orchestra, the Prime Philharmonic Orchestra and the Mostly Philharmonic Orchestra. Interviews with private orchestras were aimed at gaining a wide understanding of the current key issues facing Korean Orchestras.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with players, civil servants, orchestra managers, members of the management team, and conductors. Formal appointments were made mainly by telephone, and interviews were conducted in offices, restaurants, and cafés during their working time or after finishing work. Although all interviews were tape recorded, I took notes in case the recorder did not work or recording was not permitted by interviewees during the interview. The interviews lasted between 10 minutes and 4 hours. The main difference between this and the first stage of fieldwork was that, due to the ease of location, I spent between 4 and 5 hours per day meeting the interviewees of the BPO, UPO, and DPO in May. The rest of the orchestras—the KBS Symphony Orchestra, the Korean Symphony Orchestra, the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, the Prime Philharmonic Orchestra, and the Mostly Philharmonic Orchestra—are all located in Seoul which takes approximately 5 hours to reach from my residence and, because of this, it was necessary for me to stay in Seoul for a month in June. There was an unexpected conflict with the UPO and DPO in accessing information about these orchestras (see p. 38). After finishing the second fieldwork, I decided on my final three case studies: the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, and the KBS Symphony Orchestra.

I used the snowball technique as well as a number of acquaintances to introduce me to relevant people in these orchestras. Once I had their contact details, I called them individually and made an appointment. After finishing preliminary fieldwork, I modified question areas and questions to maximize the aim of my second fieldwork. I added questions on orchestra structure, audition system, financial resources, and the musicians' union, because I thought that each orchestras would have this information

and it would be open to everyone, but it was not. Thus, I asked interviewees about who might be able to explain or provide appropriate information. In addition, I made more detailed questions on decision making areas, because most interviewees in the preliminary fieldwork did not know the intention of my questions, and could not answer properly. The section on difficulties and conflicts was also expanded, because interviewees revealed several publicly covered stories. This category was not applied rigidly, as many answers overlapped between difficulties and conflicts.

The key question areas were as follows:

1. Personal information and job orientation.
2. Orchestra structure and the way of operation.
3. Role and responsibility.
4. Decision making areas, the process, and the degree and willingness of participation.
5. The audition system.
6. Difficulties, threats and any important change surrounding the orchestra.
7. Main financial resources and status.
8. Relationships, conflicts and personal difficulties.
9. Musicians' union (if appropriate).
10. Key issues around the orchestra at the time of study.

Although some question areas, such as orchestra structure, financial information and musicians' union, may be considered to deal with factual information obtainable through documents or archives from each orchestra, the information was sometimes hard to find. Thus, I added these question areas after the first fieldwork had been done and also requested this information from the management team.

After conducting several interviews in the above question areas, I modified the key areas as follows:

1. Personal information and job orientation.
2. Orchestra structure and management.
3. Role, responsibility and task difficulties.
4. The audition system.
5. Main financial resources and status.
6. Musicians' union (if appropriate).
7. Job satisfaction.
8. Conflicts and relationship.
9. Key issues around the orchestra at the time of study and changes (including auditions).

In contrast to the beginning of the second fieldwork, the decision-making processes and the degree and willingness of participation were omitted because of lack of information and relative insignificance. Question areas one to six were used to provide general information concerning Korean municipal orchestras; seven and eight were expanded in order to investigate job satisfaction and conflict (identified as an internal

problem); and finally, question area nine was expanded so as to examine external problems faced by Korean municipal orchestras. Question areas two, five and nine seemed more or less straightforward to answer, but I had been struggling to obtain information right up to the end of my study, and it led me to conduct the fourth fieldwork.

Documents and archives were continuously collected through orchestra sites, central government institutions, city halls, and the National Assembly library.

The third and fourth fieldwork

The third and fourth fieldwork were conducted during a relatively short period, and could be seen as 'follow up' activity to update the information data, collect more documents and explore archives. I conducted interviews that I could not have done in previous periods and used a similar approach to that which I had adopted in the first and second fieldwork. Interviews and documentation were key sources of information in each period of fieldwork. After coming back to the UK, I continued to contact interviewees via email and telephone whenever I had a question and needed to confirm information. In particular, I required information from the orchestras' management teams on local government regulations regarding municipal arts organisations.

Difficulties

Technical difficulties

At the beginning of the first stage of fieldwork, I made a huge mistake with the digital voice recorder. The software of the recorder was not properly installed, and I could not download the voice data. I should have fixed the problem earlier, but during that period I was totally exhausted by tightly scheduled interviews in other cities. Changwon is close to my home but took approximately one hour's travelling, whereas Busan took around two hours. When I finished the sixth interview, the battery of the recorder ran out and I used a tape recorder that I had prepared for emergencies. Although I replaced the new battery as soon as I arrived back home, the recorder did not switch on, so I went to the service centre to check the recorder the next day. The service centre reported that the recorder seemed seriously damaged and the data inside the recorder was most probably lost. As a result, I lost information from six interviews which contained information from difficult-to-access interviewees. I contacted these interviewees and explained what had happened, and then asked whether they would be prepared to answer the questions again via email (I did not have enough time to conduct it again and more importantly interviewees were not willing to do it again). Only half of interviewees replied to me with very short answers. It was an expensive lesson. After such a disaster, I began using a tape recorder and taking notes much more

seriously.

Interview difficulties

> No matter how careful you are about setting up your interview and no matter how hard you try to do all the right things to establish good rapport with your respondent, there will always be someone who is difficult to interview.
>
> (Keats, 2000: p. 136)

As Keats (2000) remarks, there can be difficulties with interviewees due to their 'hostility, anxiety, and prejudicial attitudes to an interviewer's gender, age and status' (pp. 136–37).

I had an initial belief that musicians would generally be confident, superior, and self-conscious, so I was expecting them to be hostile respondents. However, as soon as I conducted interviews with players, I realised it was only an imaginary fear. Some interviewees had had a poor experience with a previous interview, because the people who had conducted the interview had stressed the negative side. As a result, they were reproached by the city authorities; therefore, I felt that they were now very wary about their answers and that, consequently, they worded their responses very carefully. To handle hostile respondents, I needed to be responsive to both the interviewee's verbal and non-verbal signs, to create a friendly environment, and to prepare the interview schedule and appointment taking time into consideration. More importantly, I kept in mind that hostility should not be returned with hostility (Keats, 2000).

There are two signs of anxiety: some may not answer a question at all, whereas others are over excited, and keep talking (Keats, 2000: p. 138). In helping to reduce the respondent's anxiety levels, I tried to take time to build a rapport; to make the purpose of the interview clear; to begin with the least threatening questions; to provide a calm, quiet environment, free of distractions; and not to rush the interviewee for responses (Keats, 2000: p. 138). Fortunately, the majority of the interviewees did not show their anxiety during the interview and most questions that I asked were answered. They sometimes did not want to answer sensitive questions such as those about their satisfaction with the working environment or their relationship with others. Despite my concerns, the answers eventually emerged either directly or indirectly during my second or further visit.

Among these three interview difficulties, prejudice was the most worrying factor before starting the fieldwork. Prejudice here is created through the respondent's judgments on 'the interviewer's age, gender, appearance or ethnic background' (Keats, 2000: p. 139). As I was a 30-year-old female student, there seemed to be several prejudices about

me among the interviewees. The majority of interviewees who were older males ignored or lacked respect for me, because they perhaps considered me an inexperienced young female student. Although I could not change my age, gender, and ethnic background, I was able to reduce some prejudice, following Keats's advice, 'by avoiding extremes in dress style and personal appearance and by showing my own efficiency' (Keats, 2000: p. 139). In spite of my efforts to avoid prejudice, however, I encountered several difficulties. Some interviewees ignored my academic background and status as a student by saying that: 'you finished an MA in the UK that only takes a year? Is it useful?'[22] 'Have you ever worked before? If you only study and do not have practical experience, it's useless;' or, 'doing a PhD in Korea is much more difficult than doing it overseas'. Although I was not pleased with such questions, I tried to my best to respond positively to them and made the kinds of agreeable responses that they wanted to hear from me.

Another difficulty related to my status was that some interviewees forgot my appointment. Once I had made an appointment, I normally sent a reminder and confirmation of the appointment at least one day before via telephone. On the way to the city, I called the interviewee again to confirm the place and time of the interview. However, one completely forgot and went to another city, and I needed to return another time. It was a complete waste of time and money, and the only thing I could do in this instance was to reschedule. Regarding ethnic issues, Korea is a racially homogeneous nation and all interviewees were Korean, so I did not need to worry about this aspect.

Ethical issues were one of the difficulties encountered in conducting interviews, especially in the case of players, administrative staff, and civil servants, who were adversely affected by participation in surveys undertaken by previous researchers. I paid great attention to ethical responsibility towards the interviewees' confidentiality, as I was well aware that revealing personal information or contents of interviews might cause unnecessary burdens and problems to the interviewees. Thus, I continually checked myself during the process of the interview and assured the interviewees that confidential information would not be released without their permission, and the names of interviewees would not be identified unless they allowed me to use their name in this study. Furthermore, if interviewees were not comfortable with recording or in my taking notes, I respected their wishes. Transcription from the recorded interview and the coding process was entirely done by myself for confidentiality reasons.

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[22] This question represents a kind of ignorance; he/she thinks I could not learn enough during a one year course because the master's degree in Korea takes two years.

Difficulties relating to information access

One of the hardest parts of carrying out this research was to find factual information on budgets and funding, activities, information on organisational structure within the orchestra and, particularly, information on the role of members in the management team. I initially thought collecting information would be one of the easiest tasks; I was wrong. For instance, I had been in regular contact with a female member of staff in an orchestral office through a combination of emails and telephone (sometimes she avoided my calls) and it took over seven months to receive the relevant information. Despite her constant promises, she gave me nothing. Instead of giving me the required information, she reprimanded me for the way in which I had formulated my request. She said I needed to more fully explain my study, the reasons why I needed such information and ask clear questions about it, although I had already explained this comprehensively in the first email and meeting. When I visited her during my fourth stage of fieldwork, she gave me another promise and asked me to wait a month, but nothing was forthcoming even after three months. Finally, I had recourse to the 'Korea Public Information Disclosure System',[23] something I least wanted to use.

The advantage of this system is that it has relatively easy access and there is a 100% certainty of getting a response. However, it does rely on people working in public organisations to submit the relevant information. Therefore, in some cases I might not receive any information, or only very limited information. In addition, the open information system, which seems highly bureaucratic, causes more unnecessary work to those who work in public organisations, so many do not like to deal with the information required through the system. In brief, the 'Korea Public Information Disclosure System (KPIDS)' can be risky and unhelpful. The KBS provided more information than I expected, but the staff in charge of handling email requests asked me to contact them personally, instead of using the system for my further questions. However, as my use of KPIDS had caused extra work for them, and this had an adverse effect: members of the management team and one civil servant in two orchestras (DPO and UPO) that I interviewed were very upset by my action in using the open information system, and did not want to participate further in my study. According to my contact in one orchestra, people in municipal organisations hate the open information system because it creates lots of extra work for them.

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[23] It aims to 'ensure the people's rights to know and to secure the people's participation in state affairs and the transparency of the operation of state affairs by prescribing necessary matters concerning the people's claims for the disclosure of information and the obligations of public institutions to disclose their information in their possession' (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2006: online).

Data analysis

It has been acknowledged that analysing data is the most important part as well as the most difficult part of the process, although there has been limited discussion of analysis in spite of its usefulness and importance (Eisenhardt, 1989: p. 539).

After the period of data collection, there were various forms of material I used for analysis. At first, I transcribed them into Korean to better understand both the superficial and implicative meaning of texts, and then partly translated it into English. Meanwhile, I tried to keep the original words that the interviewees used as far as possible.

Once all the interview data was transcribed, I repeatedly and carefully read every interview to understand and familiarise myself with the context. Whenever I conducted this process of analysis, I asked myself: What are the main problems that the orchestra is facing? Why do they think 'A' is a problem?; And how do the others think about 'A'? Do they agree or disagree with the same issue? The second task was to identify key concepts, themes, events and topical markers that had arisen in the three orchestras. To do so, I went through all the interview transcriptions. Similar problems that orchestras and individuals were facing were repeatedly mentioned across the orchestras. I made a first-level coding, which is a summarisation mechanism for data segments (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p. 69): The problematic issues included the role of the people working in the orchestras, relationships and conflicts, the success of the orchestra, the level of bureaucracy, the role of the musicians' union, financial problems, the need for an independent orchestral office, government structure, decision making, the audition, and players' welfare. After the first-level coding, I turned to pattern coding, which groups issues into smaller themes (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p. 69): I made a note of where these issues were mentioned, and compared interview data to look for similarities and disparities. I then organised text chunks with the relevant narratives, under the problematic issues mentioned above. Moreover, I used a different coloured sticker for each issue: for example, whenever I found a reference to the musicians' union, I wrote musicians' union on top of the vocabulary card, and then put a small green sticker on the upper right-hand side. The text chunks were continuously organised and retrieved according to various categories. This process took considerable time before I derived my conclusions (Mason, 2002; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; and Miles and Huberman, 1994).

So far, details of qualitative research methodology have been described; the following section explains the quantitative research methods adopted.

2.4 Quantitative research

Survey strategy and research method

Survey is probably the most popular quantitative research strategy in the social sciences (Muijs, 2004: p. 34). Surveys can be divided into two types: structured interview and self-completion (or self-administered) questionnaire. A self-completion questionnaire with direct collection at the places of distribution was chosen in this survey rather than a mail or postal questionnaire with indirect collection, such as depositing completed questionnaires in a certain location or returning them by post.

Table 2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of surveys

Advantages	Disadvantages
Empirical data Wide and inclusive coverage—generalisability Cost and time	Tendency to empiricism Lack of detail and depth of the data Accuracy and honesty of responses

(Source: Denscombe, 2003: pp. 27–28)

As a part of methodological triangulation, questionnaire surveys concerning job satisfaction and conflict were conducted at the same time.

The aim of my survey was to conduct an exploratory investigation into job satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and the conflicts of orchestral life affecting players and administrative staff in Korean municipal orchestras.

Table 2.3 Overall response rate of the survey

		CPO	BPO		KBS
Players	Distributed copies	80	80	20	80
			1st collection	2nd collection	
	Suitable copies	40	28	18	42
	Unsuitable(uncontactable members) copies	3 (16)	5	0	6
	Response rate	66%	37%	90%	57%
Staff	Distributed copies	6	9		6
	Suitable copies	4	2		4
	Unsuitable/uncontactable members) copies	1	7		2
	Response rate	80%	100%		100%

The table above shows the overall collected response rate. The surveys on job satisfaction and conflict were composed broadly of five and four independent sections, respectively, and the sample numbers of each table are displayed in the attached CD.

Samples of 128 players are basically used throughout this study; and 40, 46 and 42 samples are used when analysing the case of the CPO, BPO, and KSO, respectively.

The use of surveys in social research does not necessarily have to involve samples of 1,000 or 2,000 people or evens. Whatever the theoretical issues, the

simple fact is that surveys and sampling are frequently used in small-scale research involving between 30 and 250 cases.

(Denscombe, 2007: p. 28)

Roscoe (1975) also suggests that sample sizes between 30 and 500 are appropriate for most research; and sample sizes in the range of 30 to 50 are normally enough for exploratory or in-depth study (Nichols, 1991). Nichols (1991) also proposes the inclusion of 'units from all subgroups of interest in the target population' (p. 53).

Job satisfaction and demographic variables (sub-divisions include age, marital status, Gender, and tenure[24]) within a group of players (see Table 5.13); and within each group of players of the BPO (Table 5.14), CPO (Table 5.26), and KSO (Table 5.27) are analysed. In such a subgroup analysis, we need to have at least 30 people in each group (Fink, 1995: p. 43): sample numbers used in sub-division analysis for all group of players, players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO are as follows.

Table 2.4 Sample number for JDI and demographic variables

JDI	Work (n)	Pay (n)	Supervision (n)	Promotion (n)	Coworkers (n)
All players	123	123	123	123	123
Players of BPO	44	44	44	44	44
Players of CPO	39	39	39	39	39
Players of KSO	40	40	40	40	40

Another subgroup analysis was conducted between all players' ROCI-I and demographic variables (see Table 6.12); and those of ROCI-II with peers and demographic variables (see Table 6.17). The sample numbers used for these analyses are also well above 30.

Table 2.5 Sample number for ROCI-I and ROCI-II

ROCI-I	IP	IG	NG1	NG2	-
All players	117	117	117	78	-
ROCI-II with peers	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO
All players	115	115	115	115	115

There is research supported by Harvard University and National Science Foundation aiming to investigate 'how symphony orchestra players cope with the frustrations and disappointments of orchestra life' by conducting a job satisfaction survey using two symphony orchestras (Mogelof and Rohrer, 2005). The total number of surveys received from two symphony orchestras was 68 (major symphony orchestra: 31; regional symphony orchestra: 37[25]), and the final sample was 29 and 37, respectively.

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[24] Sub-groups of the demographic variables regarding age and tenure were combined, where sample size of each sub-group seems very small.
[25] The methodology comprised case studies of an elite and a non-elite orchestra in the USA, the former located in a major metropolitan area and the latter in a smaller city in the same region in

Using this sample size, Mogelof and Rohrer (2005) analysed correlations (including inter-correlations) and OLS regression to compare two symphony orchestras.

Therefore, the sample sizes used for analysis between JDI and demographic variables; ROCI-I and demographic variables; and ROCI-II with peers and demographic variables at the group of all players and each group of players are all above thirty, which gave me confidence in looking at the results for each analysis (Nichols, 1991: p. 54).

On the other hand, I have a limited sample size when it comes to administrative staff,[26] because most orchestral executive constitutions of Korean municipal orchestra have approximately one to six administrative staff. The CPO and KSO had six administrative staff and the BPO had nine administrative staff at the time of the survey. The orchestral executive constitution of the BPO used to have six staff, including staff in charge of score and musical instruments, but merged with Busan Philharmonic Youth Orchestra in 2009, so that they now have nine administrative staff. It was very difficult to get access to staff of orchestral executive constitutions and gather questionnaires from them. They are overloaded with work, and also worry about some effects their answers may have when revealed. After various attempts to collect data from staff, I could include four samples (out of six in total) from the CPO and KSO: in the case of the CPO, one person was also a player of the CPO, so he was excluded, while the other missing person was someone not willing to participate in the questionnaire survey. Regarding the KSO, one member of staff was on holiday, and another was in hospital because of illness. Thus, I could not collect two samples from the orchestral executive constitution of either the CPO or KSO. As for the BPO, the planning staff did not allow me access to either players nor staff, so I could not do anything except wait for the questionnaire collection day scheduled by the staff. The result was quite disappointing.

Obviously, there is a certain limitation on the sample size in staff (n = 10), thus, it is probably too small to present accurate results. However, according to Gomm (2008), if I have 85% respondents of all people in a population, I can be pretty certain that the pattern of the response will come close to mirroring that for the same category in the population as a whole (p. 148).

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order to find contrasting environments where the nature of the work was similar but the resources and contexts varied greatly (Mogelof and Rohrer, 2005: p. 97).

[26] Due to small sample size of the staff group and each group of staff, JDI and demographic variables, ROCI-I and demographic variables, and ROCI-II and demographic variables are not analysed.

Figure 2.3 Response rate calculation

$$\frac{\text{Number of usable questionnaires}}{\text{Total Sample} - \text{unsuitable or uncontactable members of the sample}} \times 100$$

<div align="right">(Source: Bryman, 2008: p. 181)</div>

According to Bryman's response rate calculation, I have 80%, 100%, and 100% response rates from each orchestral executive constitution, which represents a good response rate. In addition, despite some difficulties in getting access to the staff of the KSO, I did have relatively high level of cooperation from staff of the KSO and CPO.

Table 2.6 Response rate calculation of the staff of the BPO, CPO, and KSO

CPO	KSO	BPO
$\frac{4}{6-1} \times 100 = 80$	$\frac{4}{6-2} \times 100 = 100$	$\frac{2}{9-7} \times 100 = 100$

A small sample, properly managed and carefully analysed, is always better than a poorly supervised, large sample which is never fully analysed for lack of time (Nichols, 1991: p. 53)

In practice, the complexity of the competing factors of resources and accuracy means that the decision on sample size tends to be based on experience and good judgment rather than relying on a strict mathematical formula (Hoinville *et al.*, 1985: p. 73).

When I measured different types of conflicts using ROCI-I, I included a 95% confidence interval, which indicates that something occurring at least 95 times out of 100 reflects the true population characteristic (Sekaran, 2003: p. 288). Therefore, although sample size of the staff (n = 10) is relatively small, we can see certain degrees of tendency on job satisfaction and conflict sharing among staff, which are likely to reflect the rest of population, and the data should be accurate because of the high response rate generated by enthusiastic data collection and by the careful analysis of that data.

Non-response bias is the most common, and seems inevitable in a quantitative research survey. The omission of answers in this survey occurred especially in the case of players of the BPO,[27] and non-response bias was examined. The responses from players of the BPO are divided into two groups according to the time of response, as in Dorsch *et al.* (1998): early respondents (spontaneous respondents) and late respondents (non-spontaneous respondents). To evaluate non-response bias, one-way analysis of variance was adopted. Table 2.7 presents the results of the test, showing

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[27] Armstrong and Overton (1977) define non-respondents as those who are not willing to participate in the questionnaire, or it takes a longer time to receive answers from them.

that there is one statistically significant difference found among 24 subscales between early and late responses, thus 95.9% of responses are free from non-response bias.

Table 2.7 One-way ANOVA statistics for non-response bias check

Subscales	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Early respondents	41.61	3.71	29.86	9.87	27.09	2.39	2.85	2.94
Late respondents	43.88	5.75	35.56	10.62	37.86	2.24	2.79	3.00
t	-0.840	-1.567[28]	-1.609	-0.479	-3.506**	0.932	0.644	-0.505
Subscales	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Early respondents	2.85	3.34	3.61	2.31	3.45	3.01	3.32	3.62
Late respondents	3.02	3.22	3.51	2.10	3.41	2.98	3.21	3.44
t	-1.281	0.517	0.577	0.891	0.189	0.118[29]	0.448	0.996
Subscales	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Early respondents	2.15	3.47	3.00	3.57	3.58	2.55	3.74	3.50
Late respondents	2.04	3.48	2.95	3.69	3.66	2.20	3.79	3.53
T	0.513	-0.050	0.216[30]	-0.566	-0.505	1.376	-0.255	-0.135

Note: ** indicates p< 0.01; subscales: 1-5=JDI, 6-9=ROCI-I, 10-14=ROCI-II with previous conductor, 15-19=ROCI-II with current conductor, 20-24=ROCI-II with peers.

Multicollinearity[31] was checked with all regression analyses used in this study, in order to avoid the problems of multicollinearity, which leads to unreliable and unstable results in regression coefficients (De Vaus, 2002). To detect a multicollinearity problem, a variance inflation factor (VIF) was used. All VIF values were less than 5, which was not considered to be a serious multicollinearity problem, and there was no multicollinearity problem found in the analysis.

Choice of sites

I conducted two surveys, job satisfaction and conflict, simultaneously. Although there are two independent surveys, the method for access, data collection, difficulties, and samples[32] was the same except for data analysis, data handling, and its interpretation. As this quantitative survey forms an extension of the qualitative research, the sites are the same: Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, and the KBS Symphony Orchestra.

Gaining access and data collection

After deciding to conduct this survey, I e-mailed the orchestra manager and the former representative of players of the BPO, the representative of players of the KBS, and a member of staff of the CPO. However, nobody replied, so I contacted the former planning manager[33] of the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra to ask the best way to

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[28] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[29] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[30] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[31] 'The term multicollinearity (or collinearity) is used to describe the situation when a high correlation is detected between two or more predictor variables' (Brace et al., 2006: p. 232).
[32] Sample numbers indicate the same person in two surveys.
[33] He is currently (in 2011) Managing Director of Gyeongnam Arts Center.

obtain a higher response rate from players and staff of the CPO, BPO, and KSO. As he strongly recommended me to return to Korea and conduct the survey, I contacted the representative of players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra (because this orchestra, for me, was the most difficult to access) asking whether he could help me inform the players and distribute questionnaires; and then I requested details of the rehearsal schedule. We agreed that I would visit the rehearsal place and display questionnaires on a desk with pens and small complimentary gifts. Although I expected a higher response rate, approximately half of the players returned questionnaires. The details of response rate are displayed in Table 2.3. I wanted to distribute questionnaires to players one more day, but the representative thought the response rate was quite high and that players were not likely to participate in the survey if I repeated it, thus I decided to conclude at this point with the KSO's players. Meanwhile, I met a friend's father, who is a reporter of the KBS, in order to have help in distributing questionnaires to the administrative staff of the KBS Symphony Orchestra immediately before meeting the players' representative. After collecting questionnaires from players, I met my friend's father and one administrative staff member; however, the staff member told me that all administrative staff had decided to refuse to fill in the questionnaires because they thought it was ridiculous to judge their co-workers and they feared the results of the survey might cause negative influence on the administration department of the KBS Symphony Orchestra.[34] Thus, I and my friend's father decided to contact the Head of Division of Audience Relations and ask him to persuade the staff. Finally, four staff returned questionnaires via email.

In the case of the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, I made prior contact with two of the administrative staff and the representative of players via email and telephone. I arranged a visiting time with the representative and decided to visit two days during their practice time.[35]

I also displayed questionnaires on a table with pen and complimentary drinks and players returned completed questionnaires to the table or to the administrative office. With cooperation from administrative staff and the representative of players, I was able to collect forty questionnaires. The response rate was slightly disappointing, as I expected a much higher rate because staff and players were more cooperative. The low response rate was mainly due to many absences of string players, who were on holiday. On my final visit, four staff returned questionnaires.

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[34] There were lots of articles (in 2008) comparing the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra and the KBS Symphony Orchestra, which described the SPO as a successful orchestra and the KBS as a regressed one.

[35] Players practiced for four days: two day for string parts and two days for wind parts, and I visited one day for string players and one day for wind players.

I also contacted a managing director of the BPO and the former representative of players, and obtained permission to visit them. I renewed contact with a managing director during the survey of the CPO; however, she suddenly changed her mind because she regarded the content of the questionnaire as too personal. So I asked her to explain, and I suspected that she was afraid of exposing the inner relationships of the orchestral office. Thus, she said that she could only give me an evasive answer rather than a proper answer. In addition, because of some friction between the orchestral executive office and players, my appointment with the former representative of players was cancelled. Instead, a managing director requested me to post questionnaires and prevented my direct distribution of questionnaires to players, although I had made the request several times. She said she would inform the players about the questionnaire and distribute it to them for a week, but told me not to expect too much because players are not cooperative. The response rate from the BPO players was low[36] on the data collection date arranged by the orchestra manager. I expected and imagined that this might happen, and made an appointment with the former representative and had a lunch together. I explained the results, and asked for his help. During the lunch, I found out that the relationship between them was problematic: he thought I was very close to the orchestra manager (she implied that she knew me very well when the former representative asked permission to get access to players) because she told him that she would help me and he should no longer be involved in this matter; thus, he thought I would get enough help from her with the questionnaires. Finally, extra 18 questionnaires from the players of the BPO were added later.[37] However, I could not obtain help with the data collection from the group of administrative staff at the BPO, although I asked the former orchestra manager to persuade them. Therefore, the total number of surveys received was 128 from player groups and 10 from administrative staff.

Difficulties

The greatest difficulty regarding this quantitative research was that of processing data. I needed to use the software SPSS, with which I was unfamiliar, so I asked a Korean analysis company and a PhD student at the school of mathematics, at the University of Leeds, to help to run the SPSS programme. This did not progress as well as I expected, and I repeatedly needed to modify the content. Nevertheless, I chose which data I wanted to use, and made a table accordingly.

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[36] I collected 28 questionnaires from players out of approximately 80.
[37] It was sent to me by mail delivery.

Another difficulty was collecting questionnaires from the BPO, as the orchestral manager did not allow me to directly contact players. So, I placed 80 questionnaires for players and staff in the reception of the residence of the orchestral executive constitution of the BPO, but the rate of respondents was disappointingly low. When I visited the residence of the BPO, the orchestral manager said, 'You see? As I told you, players are not likely to participate in this stuff'. But I could not see any chance of distributing questionnaires as she had promised me, since my questionnaires were placed in a box in the same state as I had first presented them.

The other difficulty was a fear of uncertainty, mainly caused by lack of preparation. Although the current representative of players of the KBS had promised to help me, I was very worried after talking to him in Seoul, because he could not guarantee how many players would participate in a survey, and said that it might be only five players. Moreover, after deciding to conduct the survey, I called the representative of players of the KBS, and he told me that they would only have enough time during the rehearsal taking place two days later. I did not expect to start the survey this soon, and I was unprepared. Just 16 hours after my arrival in Seoul, I had to distribute questionnaires to the KBS, and needed to prepare 80 questionnaire copies, each copy of which included approximately 14 pages. So it was hard to prepare and handle all these questionnaires, pens, and complimentary drinks on my own. Furthermore, I was careless with checking questionnaires: two items of the JDI on pay were missing, but I found out quite late, and could do nothing about it. Therefore, I decided that, in future, it would be better to bring questionnaires with me when I left the UK. Fortunately, I found an alternative way to interpret and analyse.

Data analysis

Coding the data was the first work in preparing for analysis. I first transferred marked data from questionnaires into Excel, in order to understand it more easily. I organised the data by grouping according to orchestra: Busan Philharmonic Orchestra was group number 1, Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra number 2, and the KBS Symphony Orchestra number 3. Demographic information, the ranking of the relative importance of facets of job satisfaction, the thoughts of job turnover, and each player's and member of staff's total scores for each of the five facets of job satisfaction were arranged as raw data. The same method of coding data was also used for conflict: each score regarding the intrapersonal, intragroup, intergroup 1 and 2, [38] and interpersonal conflict of each player and staff member was measured according to the

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[38] In the case of player, intergroup conflict 1 was about administrative staff and 2 was about civil servants, while in the case of staff, intergroup conflict 1 was about players and 2 was about civil servants.

manual of ROCI-I and II.

As mentioned in the previous section, I asked an analysis company and a PhD student to help in analysing data using the software package SPSS, due to my lack of technical skill in using SPSS. I produced lists and diagrams of what I wanted to discover, and the analysis company advised on the most suitable types of statistical tests that could be used. The running of SPSS with selecting appropriate statistic tests were conducted by the analysis company, and a PhD student conducted the same analyses to recheck the appropriateness of each statistic test (and the result) done by the company. The initial results of the analysis (the output) were then given to me. Therefore, the rest of the work, such as entering raw data into Excel and SPSS, selecting proper data from the initial results to make tables mainly in Chapter 5 and 6, data interpretation, and the data arrangement in appendices were all done by myself.

The statistic package for the social sciences (SPSS) 16[39] was used for data analysis. The explanation of particular statistical techniques used throughout the quantitative analysis and the rationale for tables in Chapter 5 (job satisfaction) and Chapter 6 (conflict) is summarised in Table 2.14 and Table 2.15. Terminologies to explore job satisfaction, conflicts, job turnover, demographic variables, and these relationships in this study were as follows:

Terminology
- ANOVA: Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a set of parametric statistical tests which assess whether the estimated variance between the groups or conditions differs significantly from the estimated variance within the groups (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 253): ANOVA is used when comparing the mean scores of more than two groups (Pallant, 2001: p. 186). However, it does not tell us which of the groups differ; and, for this, post-hoc tests need to be conducted (Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 186).
- Beta (standardized regression coefficient) is a measure of how strongly each predictor variable influences the criterion variable. β is measured in units of standard deviation. For example, if $\beta = 2.5$, a change of one standard deviation in the predictor variable will result in a change of 2.5 standard deviation in the criterion variable. Thus, a higher β value indicates a greater impact of the predictor variable on the criterion variable. The unstandardised equivalent, B is also provided by SPSS (Brace *et al.*, 2006: p. 231).
- Correlation: the strength and direction of a relationship between two variables (Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 76). It can only take on values from -1 to +1. The sign in front indicates whether there is a positive correlation[40] (as one variable increases, so does the other) or a negative correlation[41] (as one variable

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[39] The language used for this statistic tests were mainly Korean, so I changed the results into English.
[40] Positive correlation is a relationship between two variables, whereby as the values of one variable increase, the values of the other variable increase (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p.355).
[41] Negative correlation is a relationship between two variables, whereby as the values of one variable increase, the values of the other variable decrease (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 355).

increases, the other decreases). The size of the absolute value (ignoring the sign) provides an indication of the strength of the relationship (Pallant, 2001: p. 115). There are a number of different correlation coefficients. In general, the most common and most useful by far is the Pearson correlation coefficient (Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 76).

- Confidence interval: the difference between two values that express the minimum and maximum likely values of an unknown measure of an aspect of a population. The confidence interval is inferred from sample data and allows the analyst to express the likelihood that a sample statistic will be found in the population (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 355).
  - 95% confidence interval for mean: these values define the range within which there is a 95% probability that the parameter will fall (Brace *et al.*, 2006: p. 370).
- Crosstabulation: a joint frequency distribution of cases based on two or more categorical variables (Michael: online).
- Frequencies: the number of times a particular event or value occurs (Brace *et al.*, 2009: p. 402).
- Friedman test: a nonparametric equivalent of the one-way within-subjects ANOVA (Brace *et al.*, 2009: p. 402).
- Independent *t*-test: this test compares the performance of the participants in group A with the performance of the participants in group B (Brace *et al.*, 2006: p. 71).
- Kruskal-Wallis Test: a nonparametric equivalent of the one-way between-subjects ANOVA (Brace *et al.*, 2009: p. 404).
- Mann-Whitney test: an inferential statistical test used to analyse nonparametric data from two-sample independent groups designs (Brace *et al.*, 2009: p. 404).
- Maximum (score): the value of the highest score in the data for a particular variable (Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 45).
- Mean: a measure of central tendency that entails summing all values in a distribution of values and dividing the sum by the number of cases (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 360).
- Minimum (score): the value of the lowest score in the data for a particular variable. (Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 45).
- Missing data: data which are missing or are unclear. (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 360).
- Multiple regression analysis (enter method): multiple regression is a family of techniques that can be used to explore the relationship between one continuous dependent variable[42] and a number of independent variables[43] or predictors. Multiple regression is based on correlation, but allows a more sophisticated exploration of the interrelationship among a set of variables (Pallant, 2001: p. 134). There are a number of different types of multiple regression analyses. The three main types are:
  1. Standard or simultaneous;
  2. Hierarchical or sequential; and
  3. Stepwise.

(Pallant, 2001: p. 135)

This study adopted 'enter' (standard) method which is the most commonly used (Pallant, 2001: p. 135), especially when there is relatively low numbers of cases.

- Pearson's correlation (*r*): an inferential statistical test of correlation used to analyse parametric data (Brace *et al.*, 2006: p. 379).
- Percentiles: the cut-off points for percentages of scores. Thus, the 90th percentile is

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[42] Independent variable (predictor) is the variable being used to make the prediction. It is also known as the predictor variable or the X-variable (Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 87).
[43] Dependent variable is a variable that is affected by an independent variable (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 367). It is also known as the criterion variable or the Y-variable (Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 87).

the score that cuts off the bottom 90% of scores in terms of size. (Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 44).

- Post-hoc test: a test for seeing whether two groups differ significantly when there is no strong basis for expecting they will (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 362). There are different types of post-hoc multiple comparisons. LSD (Least Significant Difference) and Tukey's HSD test are used in this study.
- R Square (R^2) is the square of this measure of correlation and indicates the proportion of the variance in the criterion variable which is accounted for by the model. (Brace *et al.*, 2006: p. 231).
- Standard Deviation (SD): a measure that summarises the amount of dispersion in a sample and is based on the amount of variation around the arithmetic mean (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 360).
- Statistic significance (p): if a relationship or difference has an extreme probability of occurring by chance then that relationship or difference is likely to be a real rather than a chance one (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 365).
- Two-tailed test: a test that assesses the statistical significance of a relationship or difference in either direction (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 365).

Instruments

According to JDI and ROCI-I&II manuals, the content of any of the JDI or ROCI-I and II scales are not permitted to be published. However, readers can have access to these instruments from JDI Research Office at Bowling Green State University (phone: 419-372-8247; email: jdi_ra@bgnet.bgsu.edu) for JDI; and Center for Advanced Studies in Management (phone and fax: 270-782-2601; email: mgt2000@aol.com) for ROCI-I and II. Thus, only the interview instrument will be displayed in Appendix C.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has described the methodology used in this study. It explained the adapted methods along with the details of the choice of sites, data collection, difficulties, and the processes of data analysis were described in both the qualitative and quantitative studies.

Table 2.8 Interview dates and approximate length during preliminary fieldwork

Job title	Interview date	Interview length
Planning Manager	09 March 2007	1 hour
Former conductor	12 March 2007	2 hours
Public relationship & advertisement department	13 March 2007	2 hours
Orchestra Manager	13 March 2007	2 hours
Orchestra Manager	14 March 2007	3 hour
Publicity	12 March 2007	30 mins
Civil Servant	13 March 2007	1 and half hour
Clarinetist	17 March 2007	3 hours
Civil Servant	19 March 2007	2 hours
Former president of Seong San Arts Centre, Changwon Current president of Daegu Cultural Centre	20 March 2007	1 hour
Violist	21 March 2007	2 hours
Trumpeter	22 March 2007	1 hour
Violist	23 March 2007	40 mins
Public relationship advertisement	25 March 2007	2 hours
Horn player	26 March 2007	1 hour

Table 2.9 Interview dates and approximate length during second fieldwork

Job title	Interview date	Interview length
Civic Servant Culture and Tourism Bureau	23 May 2007	30 mins
Clarinetist	25 May 2007	1 hour
Former Orchestra Manager	28 May 2007 29 May 2007	4 hours 1 hour
Orchestra Manager	30 May 2007	20 mins
Civic Servant Busan Cultural Centre Performing Bureau	30 May 2007	10 mins
Former Orchestra Manager	31 May 2007	1 and half hour
Principal Trumpeter	08 June 2007	1 hour
Head of Audience Events Team	11 June 2007	1 hour
French Horn Player President of Musicians' Union	14 June 2007	1 hour
Principal Horn Player	14 June 2007	1 hour
Horn Player	14 June 2007	1 hour
Principal Horn Player	14 June 2007	1 hour
Former Head of Audience Events Team	16 June 2007	2 hours
Principal Conductor	21 June 2007	1 hour
Director of Artistic Administration /Education &Culture Project	22 June 2007	30 mins
Assistant Principal Horn Player	23 June 2007	30 mins
Secretary General	25 June 2007	3 hours
General Director	26 June 2007	50 mins
Former Conductor (Second Principal Conductor)	26 June 2007	25 mins

Table 2.10 Interview dates and approximate length during the third and fourth fieldwork and follow-up research

Job title	Interview date	Interview length
Tuba Player	24/25 March 2008 Telephone	50 mins
Former player	09 May, 2008 Telephone	20 mins
President of Seoul Arts Management	On occasion	10 mins to 30 mins
Former Orchestra Manager	31 May 2008	1 hour
Orchestra Manager	22 May 2008	15 mins
Former Head of Audience Events Team	20 May 2008	40 mins

Table 2.11 The Correspondence table between survey and interview instruments

Survey Instruments	Interview Instrument (Questionnaire)
Job Satisfaction (JDI)	Section B, Section C, Section D, Section E, Section F, Section G, Section I, Section J (Optional Section: Decision Making)
ROCI-I	Section C, Section D, Section E, Section F, Section G, Section H, Section I (Optional Section: Decision Making)
ROCI-II	Section C, Section F, Section G, Section H
Job Turnover	Section C, Section E, Section F, Section F, Section G, Section I, Section J

Notes: 1. Interview was conducted in a flexible way, and interviewees sometimes provided answers across interview sections; 2. The Results of interview and survey help to explain each other; 3. Results of survey mainly show empirical data: e.g. level of job satisfaction or level of conflict, while results of interview indicate causes and results of job satisfaction and conflicts; and different types of conflicts.

Table 2.12 Players' correlations

Variables		Turnover	JDI					ROCI-I				ROCI-II													
												(with) Peer					Current conductor					Previous conductor				
			A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X
Turnover		1																								
Work (A)		-	1																							
Pay (B)				1																						
Supervision (C)		-			1																					
Promotion (D)						1																				
Co-workers (E)		-					1																			
Intrapersonal conflict (F)		+	-	-				1																		
Intragroup conflict (G)									1																	
Intergroup conflict with staff (H)		+								1																
Intergroup conflict with civil servants (I)											1															
(with) Peers	Integrating style (J)		+				+					1														
	Obliging style (K)						+						1													
	Dominating style (L)								-					1												
	Avoiding style (M)														1											
	Compromising style (N)						+									1										
Current conductor	Integrating style (O)								-								1									
	Obliging style (P)								-	-								1								
	Dominating style (Q)																		1							
	Avoiding style (R)								-											1						
	Compromising style (S)																				1					
Previous conductor	Integrating style (T)																					1				
	Obliging style (U)						-	-		-	-												1			
	Dominating style (V)			+					-															1		
	Avoiding style (W)					-																			1	
	Compromising style (X)																									1

Note: inter-correlation is excluded; + indicates a positive correlation, whereas – indicates a negative correlation.

Table 2.13 Staff correlations

Variables		Turnover	JDI					ROCI-I				ROCI-II													
												(with) Peer					Current conductor					Previous conductor				
			A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X
Turnover		1																									
Work (A)			1																								
Pay (B)		-		1																							
Supervision (C)					1																						
Promotion (D)						1																					
Co-workers (E)							1																				
Intrapersonal conflict (F)								1																			
Intragroup conflict (G)									1																		
Intergroup conflict with staff (H)										1																	
Intergroup conflict with civil servants (I)											1																
(with) Peers	Integrating style (J)											1															
	Obliging style (K)												1														
	Dominating style (L)							-	-	-	-			1													
	Avoiding style (M)														1												
	Compromising style (N)															1											
Current conductor	Integrating style (O)																1										
	Obliging style (P)																	1									
	Dominating style (Q)			-															1								
	Avoiding style (R)																			1							
	Compromising style (S)			-																	1						
Administrative supervisor	Integrating style (T)							-														1					
	Obliging style (U)																						1				
	Dominating style (V)							-																1			
	Avoiding style (W)																								1		
	Compromising style (X)																									1	

Note: inter-correlation is excluded; – indicates a negative correlation.

Table 2.14 Reference for job satisfaction analysis

Table Number	Statistic	Rationale	Purpose[44]
5.1	Reliability Analysis	Reliability	Info
5.2	Frequencies	Players' Demographic Information	
5.3	Frequencies	Staff Demographic Information	
5.4	Crosstabulation Analysis	Demographic Information of the Players of the BPO, CPO & KSO	
5.5	Crosstabulation Analysis	Demographic Information of the Staff of the BPO, CPO & KSO	
5.6	One-way ANOVA	Level of Players' Job Satisfaction	Sub-objective 1
5.7	One-way ANOVA	Level of Staff Job Satisfaction	
5.8	One-way ANOVA	Comparison between Players of the BPO, CPO & KSO on Each Scale of Job Satisfaction	Sub-objective 2
5.9	Kruskal-Wallis Test	Comparison between Staff of the BPO, CPO & KSO on Each Scale of Job Satisfaction	
5.10	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison among Five Scales of Job Satisfaction of Players	Sub-objective 2
5.11	Friedman Test	Comparison among Five Scales of Job Satisfaction of Staff	
5.12	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison between Five Scales of BPO Players' Job Satisfaction	Sub-objective 2
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison between Five Scales of CPO Players' Job Satisfaction	
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison between Five Scales of KSO Players' Job Satisfaction	
5.13	One-way ANOVA	Difference between Age Group on Players' Job Satisfaction	Sub-objective 3
	t-test	Difference between Marital Status on Players' Job Satisfaction	
	t-test	Difference between Gender on Players' Job Satisfaction	
	One-way ANOVA	Difference between Tenure on Players' Job Satisfaction	
5.14	One-way ANOVA	Difference between Age Group on BPO Players' Job Satisfaction	Sub-objective 3
	t-test	Difference between Marital Status on BPO Players' Job Satisfaction	
	t-test	Difference between Gender on BPO Players' Job Satisfaction	
	One-way ANOVA	Difference between Tenure on BPO Players' Job Satisfaction	

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[44] The details of these sub-objectives are stated on page 137.

5.15	Frequencies	Relative rankings on Players' Job Satisfaction	Sub-objective 4
5.16	Frequencies	Relative rankings on BPO Players' Job Satisfaction	Sub-objective 4
	Frequencies	Relative rankings on CPO Players' Job Satisfaction	
	Frequencies	Relative rankings on KSO Players' Job Satisfaction	
5.17	Frequencies	Relative rankings on Staff Job Satisfaction	
5.18	Correlation	Player: JDI+JobTurnover	Sub-objective 5
	Correlation	Staff: JDI+JobTurnover	
5.25	Multiple Regression	JDI+JobTurnover	
5.26	One-way ANOVA	Difference between Age Group on CPO Players' Job Satisfaction	Sub-objective 3
	t-test	Difference between Marital Status on CPO Players' Job Satisfaction	
	t-test	Difference between Gender on CPO Players' Job Satisfaction	
	One-way ANOVA	Difference between Tenure on CPO Players' Job Satisfaction	
5.27	One-way ANOVA	Difference between Age Group on KSO Players' Job Satisfaction	Sub-objective 3
	t-test	Difference between Marital Status on KSO Players' Job Satisfaction	
	t-test	Difference between Gender on KSO Players' Job Satisfaction	
	One-way ANOVA	Difference between Tenure on KSO Players' Job Satisfaction	

Table 2.15 Reference for conflict analysis

Table Number	Statistics	Rationale	Purpose[45]
6.1	One-way ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference of Three Player Groups on Intrapersonal Conflict	Sub-objective1
6.2	Kruskal-Wallis Test	Comparison of the Difference of Three Staff Groups on Intrapersonal Conflict	
6.3	One-way ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference of Three Player Groups on Intragroup Conflict	
6.4	Kruskal-Wallis Test	Comparison of the Difference of Three Staff Groups on Intragroup Conflict	
6.5	One-way ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference of Three Player Groups on Intergroup Conflict with Staff	
6.6	Kruskal-Wallis Test	Comparison of the Difference of Three Staff Groups on Intergroup Conflict with Players	
6.7	One-way ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference of Three Player Groups on Intergroup Conflict with Civil Servants	
6.8	Kruskal-Wallis Test	Comparison of the Difference of Three Staff Groups on Intergroup Conflict with Civil Servants	
6.10	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between Four Conflicts (ROCI-I) of Player Group	Sub-objective 2
	Friedman Test	Comparison of the Difference between Four Conflicts (ROCI-I) of Staff Group	
6.11	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between Four Conflicts (ROCI-I) of the BPO Players	Sub-objective 2
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between Four Conflicts (ROCI-I) of the CPO Players	
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between Three Conflicts (ROCI-I) of the KSO Players	
6.12	One-way ANOVA	Difference between age groups on ROCI-I	Sub-objective 4
	t-test	Difference between Marital Status on ROCI-I	
	t-test	Difference between Gender on ROCI-I	
	One-way ANOVA	Difference between Tenure on ROCI-I	
6.13	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Previous Conductor	Sub-objective 3
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Current Conductor	
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Peers	
6.14	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between BPO Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Previous Conductor	Sub-objective 3
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between BPO Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Current Conductor	

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[45] The details of these sub-objectives are stated on page 171.

	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between BPO Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Peers	
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between CPO Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Previous Conductor	
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between CPO Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Current Conductor	
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between CPO Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Peers	
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between KSO Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Previous Conductor	
		Comparison of the Difference between KSO Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Current Conductor	
	Repeated measures ANOVA	Comparison of the Difference between KSO Players' Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Peers	
6.15	Friedman Test	Comparison of the Difference between Staff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Previous Conductor	Sub-objective 3
	Friedman Test	Comparison of the Difference between Staff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Current Conductor	
	Friedman Test	Comparison of the Difference between Staff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Administrative Supervisor	
	Friedman Test	Comparison of the Difference between Staff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Peers	
6.16		Comparison of the Difference between CPOstaff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Previous Conductor	Sub-objective 3
	Friedman Test	Comparison of the Difference between CPOstaff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Current Conductor	
	Friedman Test	Comparison of the Difference between CPOstaff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Administrative Supervisor	
	Friedman Test	Comparison of the Difference between CPOstaff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Peers	
		Comparison of the Difference between KSO staff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Previous Conductor	
		Comparison of the Difference between KSOstaff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Current Conductor	
	Friedman Test	Comparison of the Difference between KSOstaff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Administrative Supervisor	
	Friedman Test	Comparison of the Difference between KSOstaff Interpersonal Conflict (ROCI-II) against Peers	
6.17	One-way ANOVA	Difference between age groups on ROCI-II against Peers	Sub-objective 4
	t-test	Difference between Marital Status on ROCI-II against Peers	
	t-test	Difference between Gender on ROCI-II against Peers	
	One-way ANOVA	Difference between Tenure on ROCI-II against Peers	
6.18	Correlation	JDI & ROCI-I	Sub-objective 5

	Correlation	JDI & ROCI-II_Peers	
	Correlation	JDI & ROCI-II_Previous Conductor	
	Correlation	JDI & ROCI-II_Current Conductor	
	Correlation	ROCI-I & ROCI-II_Previous Conductor	
	Correlation	ROCI-I & ROCI-II_Peers	
	Correlation	ROCI-I & ROCI-II_Current Conductor	
	Correlation	JobTurnover & ROCI-I	
	Correlation	JobTurnover & ROCI-II _Previous Conductor	
	Correlation	JobTurnover & ROCI-II _Current Conductor	
	Correlation	JobTurnover & ROCI-II _Peers	
6.19	Correlation	JDI & ROCI-I	Sub-objective 5
	Correlation	JDI & ROCI-II_Peers	
	Correlation	JDI & ROCI-II_Administrative Supervisor	
	Correlation	JDI & ROCI-II_Current Conductor	
	Correlation	JobTurnover & ROCI-I	
	Correlation	JobTurnover & ROCI-II _Peers	
	Correlation	JobTurnover & ROCI-II _Administrative Supervisor	
	Correlation	JobTurnover & ROCI-II _Current Conductor	
	Correlation	JobTurnover & ROCI-II_Previous Conductor	Sub-objective 5
	Correlation	ROCI-I & ROCI-II_Peers	
	Correlation	ROCI-I & ROCI-II_Administrative Supervisor	
	Correlation	ROCI-I & ROCI-II_Current Conductor	
6.23	Mann-Whitney Test	Comparison between Players & Staff on Each Conflict of ROCI-I	Sub-objective 1
	t-test		
6.24	Mann-Whitney Test	Comparison between Music-Graduated Staff & Non-Music-Graduated Staff on Each Conflict of ROCI-I	Sub-objective 1
	t-test		
6.25	Percentile	Players' Percentile Norms of ROCI-I	

6.26	Percentile	BPO, CPO, and KSO Players' Percentile Norms of ROCI-I	
6.27	Percentile	Players' Percentile Norms of ROCI-II	
6.28	Percentile	BPO Players' Percentile Norms of ROCI-II	
6.29	Percentile	CPO Players' Percentile Norms of ROCI-II	
6.30	Percentile	KSO Players' Percentile Norms of ROCI-II	
6.32	Multiple Regression	Relationship between JDI & ROCI-I_Intrapersonal conflict	Sub-objective 5
6.33	Multiple Regression	Relationship between JDI & ROCI-II_Peers_Integrating Style	
6.34	Multiple Regression	Relationship between ROCI-I & ROCI-II_Current Conductor_Obliging Style	
6.35	Multiple Regression	Relationship between ROCI-I & ROCI-II_Current Conductor_Avoiding Style	
6.36	Multiple Regression	Relationship between ROCI-I & ROCI-II_Previous Conductor_Avoiding Style	
6.37	Multiple Regression	Relationship between ROCI-I & JobTurnover	

Chapter 3 Korean cultural policy

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between Korean cultural policy and municipal symphony orchestras. I believe that the contemporary situation for Korean municipal orchestras cannot be understood fully without investigating Korean cultural policy. An understanding of the way that cultural policy is developed is significant, because that informs the thinking of key participants, and sets the patterns of their behaviour. For instance, if government is more concerned about social aspects, orchestras need to reflect this to run their orchestras. In addition, articulating key cultural policies through different political regimes may be useful in helping to predict the future direction of cultural policy. Thus, this chapter investigates 1) the way cultural policy has shaped Korean municipal orchestras and 2) Korean cultural policy's impact on the future of these orchestras. This chapter presents four key themes of Korean cultural policy directed by central government, followed by decentralisation: the local autonomy system and the growth of a cultural industry.

3.2 National cultural policy of Korea

During the First and Second Republic (1948–60), the government's role in culture and the arts was simply that of operating and managing public cultural organisations, mainly controlling and inspecting, supporting the activities of artists belonging to public organisations, and providing limited funds for those writing on the literature of the enlightenment against a backdrop of constant political confusion, economic exhaustion and social insecurity (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003: p. 33). With the spectacular economic growth of Korea, the Korean government had concentrated more on a huge expansion of cultural investment and the construction of large-scale cultural facilities all over the nation. After recognising its economic value, the culture industry became a main issue of Korean cultural policy, and was further boosted in 1994. With the changes in the republic, the governments' priorities in cultural policy have been constantly changed whenever there was a new government.[46] However, an analysis of Korean cultural policy from the First and Second Republic (1948–60) to the Participant Government (2003–2008) reveals four key objectives 1) promotion of culture and arts, 2) cultural infrastructure and cultural welfare, 3) the

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[46] Since 1948, there have been 44 Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism by June 2009, but their average tenure is approximately one year, except the 17th Minister who had been working for four and seven months (and some for approximately two years) (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2009b: online). Available at: http://www.mcst.go.kr/web/introCourt/minister/historyMinConts.jsp?pPage=1 [Accessed 07 June 2009].

enrichment of national culture and prestige, and 4) the globalisation of Korean culture. The following sections will be concerned with the impact of those objectives on Korean municipal orchestras.

Promotion of culture and arts

The first Republic of Korea was established in 1948 after the end of the US military rule, which had followed the liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945. Western culture, introduced to Korea from the late nineteenth century onwards, spread rapidly following the Korean War (1950). In particular, during the process of modernisation after the 1960s, western popular culture, characterised by capitalist enterprise and commercialism, spread widely, greatly influencing the Korean life style. The young generation during that period was much more interested in western popular culture than Korean traditional culture.

Although the U.S. government's policy related to culture and arts was somewhat restricted mainly due to lack of understanding of Korean culture and traditions, its influence on Korean symphony orchestras was significant in terms of expanding the classical music audience. Kyung Seong Broadcasting Company changed its name to Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) in 1946. The U.S. government helped the KBS's development regarding its organisational operation, government structure, programme compilation, and production (Lee, 2006b). The government also gave more freedom to produce programmes, compared with the Japanese regime, and a western classical music programme was able to broadcast on radio. KBS has continuously been producing classical music programmes: 'KBS open concert' is one of representative and successful classical music programmes, which well balances western traditional classical music and classical cross-over music, and contributes to enlarge the number of audience (Lee, 2006b: p. 80).

Despite the beneficial effect of western culture from the U.S. government on the field of Korean classical music, it was later to cause a considerable conflict between Korean traditional culture and western culture. One problem regarding the introduction of western popular culture in Korea was the vast difference between Korean traditional culture, based on Confucianism, and western culture, broadly characterised by individualism, materialism and commercialism. Therefore, it was inevitable that an element of confusion and conflict would grow between the two different cultures, and that the government's policy towards western popular culture was somewhat restrictive, due to a critical view of its contrary character when compared to Korean traditional culture.

Promotion of culture and arts actually began when Park Jung-Hee's military government (The Fourth Republic) made a law for the promotion of culture and arts in 1972 (Park, 2009: p. 272) and the first systematic cultural plan designed for the long term, 'The First Five-Year Plan for the Promotion of Culture and Arts' (Baek, 1991: p.31): these helped to establish a basis for Korean cultural policy,[47] especially related to promotion of culture and arts. In 1972, there was a remarkable growth in music concerts (up to approximately 300 times in 1972, compared to 92 times in previous years). Although this achievement could be seen as the result of improvement of Koreans' standard of living caused by economic development, the Ministry of Public Information (1979) believed that the increase of quantity of music concert was surely influenced by the Fourth Republic's policy toward promotion of culture and arts (p. 231).

Another important government act to promote culture and arts was the foundation of the Korean National University of Arts in 1993. The government of Rho Tae-Woo (1988–93) embarked upon, and The Civilian Government (1993–98) completed, the opening of all six schools: drama, dance, music, film, TV and multimedia, visual arts, and Korean traditional arts. As the first music conservatory, its music department had the aim of training creative professional musicians without reference to age and academic background. Within 10 years, the music department of the Korean National University of Arts achieved significant results such as producing many winners from international music competitions: the winner of the 2006 Leeds International Piano Competition, Sun-wook Kim had no study experiences overseas, was from this school (after enjoying his career as a pianist, he wanted to be a conductor). Young graduates of this school become prominent musicians leading Korean classical music: especially when these outstanding young musicians play with symphony orchestras, more young audiences are pleased to attend concerts.

The Korean government did not recognise the importance of arts education until the early 1990s. However, arts education was included seriously in cultural policy in the Civilian Government (1993–98) as a means of promoting culture and arts: the government established the Korean National University of Arts and provided arts and culture related classes in selected local schools (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: pp. 63–64). The People's Government (1998–2003) continued to focus on supporting specialist arts schools (Korean culture and Tourism Institute, 2007: p. 64). In addition, the government operated fine arts classes among primary, middle and high school students in order to discover talented

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[47] It is not a basis for current Korean cultural policy but, rather, one that endured for the period of the Fourth Republic only.

young children; and the Korea National University of Arts launched a 'visiting arts performance' to culturally excluded areas from 1999 (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: p. 65).

Emphasis on arts education influences orchestras' programme and players' activities. Due to the government's priority over arts education, most Korean municipal orchestras have paid much attention on their educational work such as music outreach programmes over the last few years. Korean municipal orchestras started to change the way of access to their audience (orchestras started to visit audiences in different places rather than waiting them at their home venue such as the concert hall) and enlarged their public service to excluded social classes with various programmes for different social groups. In addition, as if a 'visiting arts performance', local governments make a connection between local artists and schools, which seems to be influenced by central government's policy toward arts education, so the members of municipal orchestras regularly visit local schools to give a music instrumental lesson to young students. These have been become a key part of Korean municipal orchestral activities. Visiting schools, or expanding various programmes, are not only of benefit to people who are socially isolated but also to the Korean municipal orchestras themselves, as a mean of developing a future audience (NACCCE, 1999: p. 151; Kim, 2006a) and to orchestral players who can earn extra income from their arts activities (Lee, 2001: p. 33; Jung, 2004: p. 73; Kim, 2006a).

The arts education of the Civilian Government (1993–98) and the People's Government (1998–2003) was more or less a provider-focused policy, while the Participant Government (2003–2008) was a more consumer-focused policy (people not only as an audience, but also as active participants) that recognised the importance of arts education. Furthermore, the Participant Government (2003–2008) chose arts education as a key area of cultural policy in 'Creative Korea', developed in 2004 in order to suggest a new vision of culture in the twenty-first century: this government might have believed that people's hostility or indifference to the arts was due to a lack of exposure from an early age, so that an overhaul in arts education by 'cooperation between the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Ministry of Education in 2003' was needed (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a), followed by establishment of a division of culture and arts education under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 2004 along with laws for supporting culture and arts education in 2005 (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: p. 65). During the Participant's Government (2003–2008), teachers who specialised in Korean traditional classical music, western classical music, drama,

film, dance and animation were sent to primary and middle schools: 1,520 teachers to 3,215 schools in 2005, and 1,431 teachers to 2,445 schools in 2006 (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: pp. 65–66). Cultural policy focused on arts education, especially on youth education, is continuously maintained by the current Lee Myung-Park government (2008–present). Therefore, Korean municipal orchestras continue to provide an opportunity for school children to get involved in music, as well as to contribute to society.

Cultural infrastructure and cultural welfare

Park Jung-Hee's military government (1961–79) was keen to pursue aggressive economic growth under a task-focused political regime. With the enormous economic growth[48] of Korea since the 1960s came an increase in Korean's cultural demands and this had an impact on cultural policy, ensuring that people not only witnessed arts activities, but also had the opportunity to participate in such activities. Therefore, the government increased arts facilities and its subsidy to arts organisations and artists in order to satisfy the demand for culture.[49]

The Fourth Republic (1972–81) grant of nearly 48.5 billion won (£24.3m) was invested; much more than the total anticipated budget of 27 billion won (£13.5m) (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1988a: p. 92), and provide cultural infrastructures. One of the most important cultural infrastructures was the establishment of the Korean Culture and Arts Foundation. The Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, whose aim was mainly promotional, was established in 1973. Part of its task since 1974 has been to help the activities of music organisations by providing funds (Arts Council Korea, 2005b: online).

Table 3.1 The subsidy for music performance

(Unit: 1000 won)

Year	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Subsidy	4,000 (£2,053)	10,000 (£5,135)	6,000 (£3,080)	-	4,831 (£2,480)	9,587 (£4,923)	10,100 (£5,186)
Year	81	82	83	84	85	86	87
Subsidy	11,000 (£5,648)	19,100 (£9,805)	19,100 (£9,805)	14,300 (£7,342)	19,000 (£9,755)	21,000 (£10,780)	28,000 (£14,375)
Year	88	89	90	91	92	93	-
Subsidy	38,000 (£19,507)	44,950 (£23,075)	68,000 (£34,909)	76,000 (£39,016)	60,000 (£30,801)	-	-

(Source: refer from Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1993a)

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[48] Per capita GNP was only 79,000 won (£40) in 1960, but 255,000 won (£125) in 1970, 1,660,000 won (£533) in 1980, 6,303,000 won (£3,150) in 1990, and it exceeded 19,231,000 won (£9,600) in 2008 (Bank of Korea, 2010).

[49] Supporting the establishment of cultural infrastructure in Korea is mainly the task of the government, rather than private companies.

The subsidy for music performance during the 18 years 1974–92 was gradually increased. Although subsidy from the Korean Culture and Arts Foundation is unavailable to municipal orchestras, we can gather from the above table that the orchestras' activities could have benefited from this subsidy: ensemble groups of municipal orchestras are eligible to apply for restricted funds.

The objective of 1980s cultural policy was to provide the benefits of cultural development to all, regardless of area, social class or generation, so the Korean government began to support more cultural facilities, both in Seoul and in local cities. One of the barriers to national touring for major orchestras in Seoul was the lack of performing centres in local or regional areas. The people's government emphasised, in particular, the establishment of the cultural infrastructure, which is evident from the following outcomes.

Table 3.2 Enlargement of the cultural infrastructure

Objects	1997	2002
Public library	370	462
Public museum	232	339
Regional arts and cultural centres	79	113
Public library books (per person)	0.38	0.64
Foundation of one local national museum per province New construction of the National Museum of Korea		

(Source: Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 2004: p. 414)

With more cultural facilities, it was possible to provide more concerts in local areas. For instance, the KBS Symphony Orchestra gave 21 regional concerts from 1972 to 1979, 52 concerts from 1980 to 1989, 58 concerts from 1990 to 1999, and 117 national concerts from 2000 to 2006 (KBS, 2006: pp. 171–384). There was a dramatic increase in national touring in the 1980s, compared to the 1970s, which was achieved by a growth in the number of performance venues in the provinces.

Although there is no direct evidence that the growth of cultural facilities led to the rapid formation of Korean orchestras, 13 public orchestras were established in the 1980s, compared to just three in the 1960s and 1970s.

Table 3.3 The annual establishment of Korean orchestras

	1956–60	1961–70	1971–80	1981–90	1991–98	Total
Public Orchestra	2	3	3	13	10	31
Private Orchestra	-	-	2	5	16	23
Total	2	3	5	18	26	54

(Source: Kang, 2000: p. 12)

With the increase of national touring from Seoul and the quantitative growth of regional orchestras, people outside Seoul had more access to orchestral concerts in the 1980s.

In addition, in line with cultural welfare policy in the 1980s, the Seoul Arts Center, significantly relating to Korean orchestras was established in 1984. When the Seoul Arts Center's auditorium was completed in 1988 (Seoul Arts Center, 2009: online), the Centre planned a 'Symphony Festival' programme in 1989, to celebrate its first anniversary (Shin, 2001: p. 2).

The aim of the 'Symphony Festival' was to invite orchestras throughout the nation to compete against each other under a specific theme, or to play contemporary music. It has been programmed continuously for 20 years since 1989, achieving the fame of a music festival with a long history (at least, compared to other festivals).

The 'Symphony Festival' has encouraged the foundation of local orchestras, removing the barrier between Seoul and other cities, and has increased the performing standard of Korean orchestras. This may lead to the enhancement of Korean arts. It is evident that 1980s cultural policy directly influenced the development of Korean orchestras, despite criticism that the programme for the 'Symphony Festival' was monotonous (Yonhap News, 1990; Lim, 1991; Shin, 1995; Shin, 2001).

In spite of continuous endeavour for enlarging cultural infrastructure and cultural welfare, the economic status of government influenced Korean municipal orchestras. The People's Government (1998–2003), Korea's economy was under the control of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1998. Financial difficulties in 1997 and 1998 also significantly affected Korean orchestras and classical music. Many classical music concerts planned before 1997 were cancelled, and festival sizes were reduced (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1999: p. 763). For example, there were 3,193, 3,832, and 3,934 concerts of western classical music in 1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively. Between 1996 and 1997 there was a 20% growth in total concert numbers, whereas there was only a 2.7% growth in 1998 (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1997, 1998 and 1999). Although the total number of western music concerts increased, the growth rate was rather low, compared to the previous year, and we may find the reason for this lower growth rate in the financial difficulties experienced in 1998.

Table 3.4 The number of orchestral music concerts

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Total number of orchestral music concerts	442	486	603	524	566
Total number of foreign orchestral concerts	58	88	91	30	43

(Sources: Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000)

As can be seen from the above table, there was a 13.1% decline in the total number of orchestral concerts between 1997 and 1998, whereas there was a growth of 24.1% between 1996 and 1997, and of 0.8% between 1998 and 1999. The decline in 1998 has been directly influenced by the reduction of the number of foreign orchestral

concerts from 91 concerts in 1997 to 30 concerts in 1998, which represents a drop of 67%. Thus, the considerable decline in the total number of orchestral concerts in 1998 can be seen as a result of financial difficulties, as the Korean central and regional governments could not afford the cost of inviting foreign orchestras.

The majority of Korean orchestras, including the two top orchestras, the KBS Symphony Orchestra and Seoul Symphony Orchestra, performed their seasonal concerts with guest conductors without having a principal conductor in 1998 (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1999: p. 765). On the one hand, Korean orchestras could not afford the annual salary of a principal conductor, due to financial difficulties. On the other hand, this was because of the lack of availability of talented conductors in Korea (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1999). In other words, many Korean orchestras generally did not have the option of choosing the right conductor for their orchestra, and had to manage without a principal conductor.

Nevertheless, the government's total budget for culture gradually increased, along with the consistent economic growth of Korea up to 1998. Therefore, more orchestras participated in international tours in the 1990s, compared to the 1980s. For example, the KBS Symphony Orchestra went abroad twice in the 1980s, and 5 times in the 1990s (KBS, 2006); the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra had its first international tour of four cities in the U.S. in 1997 after 35 years since its foundation in 1962. In addition, we can find continuous growth in government expenditure on culture and the arts after recovery from the financial crisis. The total subsidy for performing arts was 130 billion won (approximately £63m) in 2002, 156 billion won (£76m) in 2003, 196 billion won (£96m) in 2004, and 168 billion won (£91m) in 2005. The subsidy for music (both western classical music and Korean traditional classical music) was 7.6 billion won (£3.7m), 7.8 billion (£3.8m), 13.5 billion won (£6.6m), and 10.4 billion won (£5m) over the years from 2002 to 2005 (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2006: p. 332). Therefore, it can be seen that a nation's economic status and its expenditure are closely related.

A national culture and prestige

Korean governments seem to believe that if a country does not have its own solid national culture in internationalised modern society, it might end up being a 'cultural colony' of the western developed countries. Therefore, one of the Korean governments' tasks was to consider how to rebuild national culture, how to adapt effectively western popular culture, as well as how to successfully develop Korean traditional culture

simultaneously. A national culture was one of top priorities in Korean cultural policy especially from the First Republic (1948–60) to the Fifth Republic (1981–88) (Park, 2009: p. 274).

One of the most challenging issues for Korean cultural policy was the establishment of national culture (Park, 2009: p. 274): on the one hand, due to the assimilation policy under the Japanese rule between 1910 and 1945, Korea experienced difficulties in finding its unique cultural identity; on the other hand, because of the division of Korea into North and South, Korea suffered from the lack of decided cultural homogeneity as one people. Thus, the emphasis placed by the majority of Korean presidents on the importance of Korean traditional culture as the basis of national culture may be understood in this particular historical context.

After achieving independence from Japan in 1945, the most important task for Korean cultural policy was to recover the destroyed, dispersed and distorted Korean culture. Park Jeong-Hee (1961–79) was seen as one of the great Koreans[50] who saved the country from a national crisis, as well as rediscovering its traditional culture. The government of Jeon Doo-Hwan (1980–88) established the independence of Korea by researching the history of independence movements and in intensifying educational works. The government of Rho Tae-Woo (1988–93) embarked on the restoration of Gyeongbok Palace, destroyed by Japan, and the government of Kim Young-Sam (1993–98) demolished the official building of the Japanese Governor General of Choseon. As we can see from these examples, the effort of each Korean government was to recover Korean national identity from the influence of Japanese rule. Korean governments tried to remove the remnants of Japanese culture and, at the same time, restrict the import of Japanese culture until the beginning of the government of Kim Dae-Joong (the People's Government: 1998–2003). This government promoted cultural exchange with other countries (including Japan) for the development of a national culture, and started to successfully introduce Japanese culture from October 1998 to June 2000. Despite political and economic issues along with Koreans' negative image of Japan, which were the reasons for prohibition against Japanese culture, introduction of Japanese culture was mainly achieved because of president, Kim Dae-Joong's strong will and positive recognition of Japanese culture: he clarified his opinion on Japanese culture by saying that there is no need to be afraid of it (Kim, 2001).

Cultural policies of the 1970s that had the most influence on orchestras were those that

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[50] Although he was criticized for an authoritarian way of ruling and his long-term seizure of power.

placed an emphasis on national culture. Because of this focus, orchestras began to play more pieces written by Korean composers, something which, at that time, directly or indirectly promoted national identity. The KBS Symphony Orchestra,[51] for instance, played just two pieces written by Korean composers between 1956 and 1959, and thirteen pieces between 1960 and 1969. In contrast, there were forty-one pieces of music written by Korean composers played by the Korean Symphony Orchestra between 1970 and 1979, and forty-nine pieces between 1980 and 1989.

There was therefore a sharp increase in the number of performances of Korean compositions in the 1970s, compared to the 1950s (four years of programmes were analysed) and the 1960s. In addition, a concert titled 'Night of the Korean Composer' was launched in 1974, so as to provide more opportunity to hear Korean composers' music. Another 1970s cultural policy was to increase national prestige through cultural activities. Although international tours were almost impossible, due to the economic situation and the financial situation of orchestras at that time, the Korean National Symphony Orchestra (the antecedent of Korean Symphony Orchestra) undertook its first American tour in 1979, for 50 days. This international tour happened thanks to the Korean government's financial support, given in order to raise national prestige. As a result, the American media, especially the New York Times, recognised the ability of the Korean orchestra through its performances in Carnegie Hall, New York, the Kennedy Centre in Washington, and the Academy Hall in Philadelphia (National Theater of Korea, 1979: pp. 10–13). In addition, the Korean National Orchestra replaced the majority of its old musical instruments, upgrading to new ones, in order to contribute to the development of the orchestra by making improvements in sound (KBS, 2006: p. 80).

Furthermore, to continue to heighten national culture and national prestige Korean governments use international sports events or active international exchanges of culture and arts. The influence of the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, 1988 Seoul Olympic Game, and 2002 World Cup Games on Korean symphony orchestras was notable. The Tenth Asian Games were held in Seoul, 1986, and a number of music concerts related to this sports event were organised. One of the most important musical events was the Seoul International Music Festival. The Korean Music Festival, which was launched in 1975 to celebrate the 30th Independence Day, changed its name to the Seoul International Music Festival from 1986, in an attempt to broaden its appeal to every

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[51] Although there were two Korean orchestras in the 1950s: KBS Symphony Orchestra and Seoul Symphony Orchestra, I analysed only the programme of the KBS Symphony Orchestra from 1956 to 2006 because of a lack of programme information for the Seoul Symphony Orchestra.

country in the world regardless of political ideology.

The Seoul International Music Festival invited the Tokyo Metropolitan Symphony Orchestra, and this was seen as a significant move as the government did not open Korea to Japan until the late 1990s, and the majority of Koreans (especially the older generation, who had suffered under the Japanese rule) were still apprehensive regarding anything Japanese. Another important issue was the inclusion of an orchestra from a communist country, the Budapest Radio Symphony Orchestra. With communist North Korea as a neighbour, democratic South Korea was wary of communist rule. The famous German orchestra, the Stuttgart Radio Symphony Orchestra, was also invited in this same year.

The 1986 Seoul Asian Games helped to establish a starting point for cultural exchange with Eastern European countries and Japan. This meant that more and more orchestras could come to Korea, and Korean musicians could have concerts overseas. As with the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, there were numerous music activities around the 1988 Seoul Olympic Culture and Arts Festival. For example, there were 109 orchestral concerts in 1982, 175 in 1986, and 102 in 1987, but a remarkable 995 orchestral concerts in 1988, due to the Olympic Games (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1983, 1987, 1988b and 1989). In addition, there were 406 concerts in 1990, 414 in 1991, and 498 concerts in 1992, after the Olympic Games. We can therefore see a dramatic growth in the number of symphony orchestra concerts in 1988 compared to before and after 1988 (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1991, 1992 and 1993b). The most impressive event for the Korean classical music audience was the Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra's concert. It would have been almost impossible to invite this orchestra in early 1988 (The Korean government strictly closed the door to communist countries); however, the Bolshoi Ballet and the Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra visited Korea after accepting the invitation of Dong-A Il Bo (one of the newspaper companies in Korea), which marked its first visit since Korean independence.

Because of the opportunity of holding the Seoul Olympics in 1988, the government held the 'Arts and Cultural Festival', which included 30,000 artists from 80 countries. Throughout the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the most important experience for Korean orchestras was the cultural interchange with foreign countries, including communist countries such as Russia and China. There were limited foreign orchestral concerts before the Seoul Olympic Games, but the number of foreign orchestral concerts sharply increased after 1988. It might not have been entirely because of the effect of the Olympic Games, but also, in part, owing to Korean economic growth.

Table 3.5 The number of foreign orchestral concerts

Year	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Number of Concerts	8	16	18	27	42	62

(Sources: refer from Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1988b, 1989,1990,1991,1992 and 1993b)

Although the previous two sports events had positive effects on Korean orchestras, the story of the 2002 World Cup was slightly different.

Won-Chul Park (2007), who was the former orchestra manager of the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, claims, 'there is a cycle... many crises or opportunities might come according to social atmosphere or environment.... Most performances were not successful during the 2002 world cup season... everyone was just watching television...people went out at night for support on the street... we (Busan Philharmonic Orchestra) already expected (this situation) and hardly have concerts... people who planned concerts during the world cup period without taking such a side-effect into consideration were bankrupted... some concerts were cancelled...'

Table 3.6 Classical music concerts

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Western classical music	3832	3934	4168	4628	4957	4855
Instrumental music	1945	1963	2328	2597	2725	2747
Orchestral Music	603	524	566	660	707	661

(Sources: refer from Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003)

According to this table, there was a 2.7%, 5.9%, 11% and 7.1% increase in the number of western classical music concerts (including instrumental music, vocal, opera and mixed genre) in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively, whereas there was a 2.1% decrease in 2002. In addition, there was a 0.8%, 16.6% and 7.1% increase in the number of orchestral music concerts in 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively, while there was a 13.1% and 1.7% decrease in 1998 and 2001. Moreover, the number of visits of foreign orchestras to Korea declined from 82 in 2000 to 45 in 2001 (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 2001 and 2002). This obvious decline makes it evident that western classical music and orchestral music were negatively influenced by the 2002 World Cup Games.

On the other hand, the number of instrumental music concerts (including recitals, orchestral music and ensembles) did not reduce from 1997 to 2001, even if the growth rate between 2001 and 2002 was a mere 4.9%. Compared to the growth of 0.9%, 18.6% and 11.6% in 1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively, this growth in 2001 seems tame.

It could be conjectured that Koreans were so deeply enthused about the football games that classical music concerts were no longer a matter of concern in 2002. As a result, many traditional classical music concerts were cancelled or postponed. Although the 2002 World Cup Games might have contributed to Korean national prestige, they clearly had a negative influence on the Korean classical music market.

Globalisation

The globalisation of Korean traditional culture, or international cultural exchange, was used to advertise the achievements of the government's reign until the Fifth Republic (1981–1988). After that, the government of Rho Tae-Woo (1988–93) emphasised internationalisation/globalisation throughout the '10-Year Cultural Development Plan' devised in 1990 (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003). Although the terms 'internationalisation' and 'globalisation' have different meanings, they are used synonymously in Korean cultural policy: internationalisation first emerged in the president of Doo-Hwan Jeon's speech at the national convention in 1983, but globalisation became the more common word some 10 years later. Globalisation in Korean cultural policy means introducing Korean culture and arts and delivering a taste of Korean culture via various cultural exchanges with other countries of the world (Byun, 2003: p. 45).

As a part of its policy, the government began an open-door cultural policy in the 1990s toward communist countries having hostile relations, after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003): the government opened up Korea to foreign culture, and started a cultural exchange. There are records of foreign orchestras visiting Korea in 1987 and 1989, and they show that foreign orchestras provided 8 and 18 performances in 1987 and 1989, respectively.

Table 3.7 The number of foreign orchestral performances

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Total number	27	42	62	29	32	58	88	91	30	43	82

(Sources: Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1991, 1992, 1993b, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001)

As we can see from the above table, there was a dramatic growth in the number of foreign orchestral performances in the 1990s, in spite of fluctuating trends, especially between 1997 and 1998, because of the Korean financial crisis (IMF era).

Although some might have felt concern about negative impacts from the increase in concerts provided by foreign orchestras to Korean orchestras, it did not adversely impact on Korean orchestras' activities: there was, in fact, a steady increase in

performances by Korean orchestras (see Table 3.8).

Table 3.8 The number of Korean orchestral performances

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Total number	406	414	498	412	439	442	486	603	524	566	660

(Sources: Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1991, 1992, 1993b, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001)

The globalisation policy of Korean governments also influenced the relationship with North Korea. After the division of Korea, anti-communism greatly influenced the cultural policy of the Republic of Korea (South Korea): The governments of Lee Seong-Man (1948–60), Park Jeong-Hee (1961–79), Jeon Doo-Hwan (1980–88), and Rho Tae-Woo (1988–93) all sought to emphasise anti-communism and democracy as a government ideology, so that arts activities related to socialism and communism were strictly prohibited until the late 1980s. However, focusing on anti-communism violated the freedom of expression of arts activities. Furthermore, there was no chance to meet or combine with the arts from North Korea as those were severely restricted in circulation in South Korea. At the end of the 1980s, the government from the republic launched a cultural policy for unification: the government of Rho Tae-Woo (1988–93) announced 'The 7.7. Special Declaration', which opened the way for interchange and cooperation with the arts of North Korea in 1988. With the motto of the Civilian Government (1993–98), 'a small but strong government moving towards globalisation, globalisation of Korean arts and culture[52] was continuously encouraged (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003; Park, 2006: p. 59): the government made a regulation that dealt with a social and cultural cooperation scheme with North Korea, and actively encouraged cultural exchange—although the actual exchange was very limited. Later (15 June 2000), the South Korean government announced 'the North-South Joint Declaration', which stimulated cultural exchange between North and South Korea. The People's Government (1998–2003) pursued a 'Sunshine Policy' with the aim of reconciliation and peace between the North and South (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003), and it might be seen as an extension of open-door policy of previous governments. As a result, 'the North and South Korea corporative concert' in Seoul and Pyungyang was held in 2000 and 2001: KBS Symphony Orchestra was sent to the North. Symphony orchestras had an important role as cultural ambassadors representing Republic of Korean.

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[52] Specific plans were managing 'Korea House', which was built in 1981 with the aim of 'introducing Korean traditional culture and way of life' (Korea Cultural Heritage Foundation, 2009: online), sending a Korean youth cultural service group overseas, appointing a Korean cultural ambassador resident overseas, and making Korean traditional classical music a 'world music' (Kim, 1995: p. 57).

So far, we have been looking at national cultural policy of Korea based on four key objectives: promotion of culture and arts, cultural infrastructure and cultural welfare, national culture and prestige, and globalisation, which directly and indirectly affect to Korean symphony orchestras. However, these relationships or influences are not part of a Korean government's cultural policy, but result from incidental effects: this is because Korean symphony orchestras are not the Korean government's top consideration when making or revising cultural policies.

The following section examines the influences of decentralisation on Korean symphony orchestras in terms of the local autonomy system and cultural industry: local autonomy system positively affects these orchestras' activities, while the cultural industry requires the orchestras to rethink their governance and operation.

3.3 Decentralisation

> For years decentralisation and local autonomy have been treated as closely related concepts. Decentralisation in itself may not be a very meaningful concept, but it has become important because of an underlying assumption that it causes more local autonomy, and that this is inherently beneficial to citizens.
>
> (Fleurke and Willemse, 2004: p. 523)

The Korean central government's decentralisation policy boosts the local autonomy system, and local governments are required to provide appropriate cultural activities in order to satisfy the citizen's demand and the local environment along with the promotion and development of local culture. The following section will investigate the impact of local autonomy system and cultural industry on Korean municipal orchestras. Even though the cultural industry is one of main concerns of the Korean central government's cultural policy, I would like to place the cultural industry under category of decentralisation because of their close linkage: the Korean cultural industry seems to accelerate in tandem with decentralisation.

Local autonomy system

According to the theses of Choi (2008: p. 3) and Jang (2002: p. 2), there is very limited information on regional cultural policy for literature reviews and most research is done after the 1990s. That is, local government's cultural policy received little regard from both central and local governments, nor did scholars pay attention to this matter.

A regional arts council was initially established in 1962 as a private foundation (Jang, 2002: p. 65). The Fifth Republic (1981–88) started to reestablish regional arts councils aiming to advertise administration of government (p. 132), and the government of Rho Tae-Woo (1988–93) promoted regional arts council, local festival to revitalise local culture (Park, 2009: p. 156). Since then, arts funding for local culture and arts, the establishment of the law for promotion of regional arts council, and specialised cultural industry clusters were all endeavors of Korean governments to develop and promote regional culture (Song, 2007: p. 16–9) in order to achieve balanced regional development.

As has happened in western countries, the decentralisation system in 1995 regenerated regional cultural policy. Before 1995, cultural policy was mainly led by the central government, so that the local government paid it little attention.[53] However, the local autonomy system, a part of the political process, provided a chance for the regional government to enhance its local cultural policy. The regional government gradually regarded culture or arts activities as a local development, and cultural policy enlarged its field, ranging from traditional local culture to cultural tourism and other cultural industries. In this way, regional governments showed that they recognised the economic value of culture and, as a consequence, non-profit organisations were gradually established to improve the effectiveness and rationalisation of arts and cultural administration. Although cultural policy making and administration transferred to local governments after embarking on the local autonomy system, the level of dependence on the finance and action plan from central government is still high (Jang, 2002: p. 69).

With the launch of full-scale local self-government in 1995, local government wished to possess and manage its own performing arts groups and arts centre.[54] As a result, 10 public regional orchestras were founded in the 1990s (Kang, 2000: p. 12). With the growth of orchestra numbers in the region, along with the decentralisation system, which was fully launched in 1995, regional areas were able to have more concerts than Seoul.

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[53] However, the Korean central government did not play the central role for local culture due to the late recognition of its importance.
[54] Local government cultural policy at this time was mainly focused on the establishment of cultural facilities, and there was lack of support and research about arts promotion to citizens; and networks and systematic connections between central government and local government for cultural promotion were insufficient (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: p. 69).

Table 3.9 The number of Korean orchestral concerts

Year	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Seoul	224	218	179	188	221	235	202	205
Regions	183	166	219	324	273	288	376	457
Total*	407	384	398	412	494	523	578	662

(Sources: Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002)

Note: *It was excluded the number of foreign orchestral concerts.

Before the beginning of the decentralisation system in Korea in 1995, the total number of orchestra concerts in Seoul was vast, compared to the total number of regional orchestra concerts. However, the number of regional orchestra concerts had been gradually increasing since 1995 (except in 1998, owing to the serious financial crisis).

One of the reasons that the regions were able to have more orchestra concerts than Seoul was the increased number of local orchestras. Another reason may have been the national tours of major orchestras from Seoul due to the increased number of performance venues in the regions. Under the decentralisation system, the establishment of local cultural facilities and the spread of the arts into more and more communities has been the main task of cultural policy since the end of 1980s, when the activation of local culture was regarded as an important part of cultural policy by central government. In addition, central governments have been given more authority to local government in order to achieve a balanced regional development (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: pp. 72–73). As a result, there are a number of local festivals and events throughout Korea, called 'Festival Republic' (Park, 2009: p. 204).

'Daejeon Expo 93' was the first international exposition held in a developing country appointed by Bureau International des Expositions in 1993. Because of this event, large-size culture and arts performances moved to Daejeon not only to venues inside the exposition park, but also to major culture and arts centres in Daejeon (Lee, 2006b: p. 80). Although Daejeon Philharmonic Orchestras was founded in 1984, this orchestra acquired their first principal conductor in 1991. Although there is no clear evidence, Daejeon Expo 93 may have influenced the appointment of the principal conductor of Daejeon Philharmonic Orchestra, in order to provide high level of classical music concerts and to allow the orchestra to be used to accompany expo events.

Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra could take an advantage the Tongyeong International Music Festival (TIMF), which is a yearly music festival, held in the city of Tongyeong near Changwon. Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra did not have its own musical characteristic features before accompanying this music festival. However, with

the enthusiasm of principal conductor Yoon-Seong Chang, they started to build their image with contemporary music pieces and are now recognised as the main symphony orchestra of TIMF.

Cultural industry

Emphasis on cultural industry, which seems to pursue pragmatism, significantly influences Korean orchestral governance and the future way of operation, so that traditional culture and arts including municipal orchestras will be required to survive in the market place. The arts organisations in Britain had already experienced such a requirement. Cultural policy under Thatcher's government could be more or less defined as a trial period. The basic idea of this government on cultural policy was that arts and culture should be placed in the free market, within the entertainment or leisure industries or business and tourism. The Thatcher government seemed to deny the ideology of national welfare that justified the cultural policy applied to high culture in the post war period. Thus, arts organisations were expected to be reorganised and "more market orientated than they had previously been" and the arts were no longer considered as a form of collective good because of the dominant public support, instead they needed to be more market dominated (Gray, 2000: p. 32). Finally, the statutory policy under the Thatcher government was to achieve 'Value for money', and it "entered the language of the arts, and then arts themselves [that they] were entering the period when they became 'cultural industries'" (Hewison, 1995: p. 256).

Justin O'Connor (1999) provides a distinctive definition of cultural industries by including the 'traditional art' sector, which is generally excluded in cultural industries: cultural industries are those activities which deal primarily in symbolic goods—goods whose primary economic value is derived from their cultural value... This definition then includes what have been called the 'classical' cultural industries—broadcast media, film, publishing, recorded music, design, architecture, new media—and the 'traditional arts'—visual art, crafts, theatre, music theatre, concerts and performance, literature, museums and galleries—all those activities which have been eligible for public funding as 'art' (O'Connor, 1999: p. 5). On the other hand, the definition of (Korean) cultural industries mentioned in the regulation of cultural industry promotion is those industries related to production, distribution, consumption of cultural products.[55]

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[55] Cultural product is defined as visible and invisible commodity that creates economic value, and includes film, recorded music and video, game, publishing, broadcast media, cultural properties, animation, design, advertisement, performance, traditional crafts, fine art, and new media (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2006).

Korean governments made use of the cultural industries to alleviate the supposed negative effects of popular culture until 1980s, because they believed that western popular culture was more or less violent, indecent, hedonistic, and emphasised materialism, whereas Korean traditional culture was more focused on morality and a spirituality influenced by Confucianism (Kim, 2001; Lim, 2003). In order words, the cultural industries were represented as popular culture in Korea until the 1980s, and their role was to control popular culture; the restriction over Japanese culture[56] is an example of that. The sixth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan formulated in 1986 recognised the economic importance of culture, and suggested a way of utilizing the cultural industries to improve people's cultural life; however, it could not be put effectively into practice (Lim, 2003: p. 150). The Fifth Government was likely to use the cultural industry (mainly considered as a popular culture industry) to form a link between culture and people who were more familiar with popular culture (despite the government's concerns about popular culture's violent character).

The Korean cultural industry was boosted when the Cultural Industry Bureau was re-organised in 1994. The Civilian Government's (1993–98) ideas about the cultural industry had changed: the Fifth Republic (1981–88) and the government of Rho Tae-Woo (1988–93) focused on its link-function between cultural production and consumption, whereas the Civilian Government (1993–98) recognised its economic value; the previous two governments' policies towards the cultural industry were designed to control, but this switched to support under the Civilian Government (1993–98) (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007b: p. 11). In spite of the government's ambitious plans, nothing practical was achieved due to lack of finance and of organisations to accomplish the plans (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007b: p. 16).

The Ministry of Culture and Gymnastics was abolished and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism was organised in 1998 with the People's Government (1998–2003), which aimed to deliver the 'construction of a cultural country', a 'cultural president', and to be 'a national government with a new cultural policy' (Byun, 2003: p. 43). The term 'cultural president' means a president who appreciates and understands the arts and culture, and implies someone willing to support the arts. Using this term (or that of 'cultural mayor') has become popular in Korea since the days of the Dae-Jung Kim regime.

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[56] Japanese culture was a restricted subject before the People's Government's open policy to Japanese culture. Korean governments strictly controlled Japanese culture because of the history of the Japanese colonial period as well as its reputation for violence and obscenity (Lim, 2003: p. 149).

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The government of Kim Dae-Joong (1998–2003), in particular, emphasised the need to develop a cultural industry, and the president announced that the cultural industry was a mainstay of the twenty-first century during the inauguration of president Kim, and Korean cultural policy opened its arms to the cultural industry along with information technology. The cultural industry's budget, which used to be restricted to publications and films, was expanded to include funds for music, animation, character comic books (e.g. *Hello Kitty*), and games (Lim, 2003: pp. 120–21). The cultural industry was stimulated by an increase in financial support during the People's Government (1998–2003), and the economic benefits of the cultural industry won it legitimacy for public support. The government's interest in the cultural industry resulted in several policies: the 'Five-Year Plan for Cultural Industry Promotion' (1999), 'Cultural Industry Vision 21' (2000), 'Plan for Film Industry Promotion' (2000), and 'Contents Korea Vision 21' (2001).[57] 'Contents Korea Vision 21' was an upgraded version of earlier plans. The 'Five-Year Plan for Cultural Industry Promotion' and 'Cultural Industry Vision 21' both aimed to pursue the development of the cultural industry and promote solid cultural identity (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2001).

'Cultural contents', a term coined by the Korean government after the establishment of the 'Korea Culture and Content Agency' in 2001, refers to a cultural commodity creating economic value based on creativity; and the Korean government considers cultural contents[58] to be an equivalent concept to cultural industry (especially in the 2008 White Paper on Cultural Industry).

The Participant Government's (2003–2008) cultural industry enjoyed sharp growth in terms of quantity: its market size had consistently increased; its exports between 2003 and 2005 increased by an approximate average of 40% each year; and the number of employees in the cultural industries had grown every year. The 'Korean wave',[59] which was a typical type of overseas expansion of the Korean cultural industries, contributed to national branding as a result of positive ripple effects such as tourist attraction, and the manufacturing and service industry. For example, after airing *The Great Jang Geum*, a 2003 TV series produced by the Korean TV channel MBC in Taiwan (shown in 2004), LG Electronics' PDP TV and washing machine first acquired a market share,

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[57] The objectives were to enhance the international competitive ability of the cultural industry and cultural identity, and the action plans were to modify laws and regulations, to educate people to become professionals in the cultural industry, and to expand the international side of Korean cultural industries through strategic marketing (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2001).
[58] In 2010, it includes film·video·DVD, animation, music, game, character, cartoon, mobile contents, edutainment contents, copyright licensing, printing, broadcasting, advertisement, publication, digital communication and media, handicraft, performing arts, and design.
[59] It refers to the growing popularity of (South) Korean culture and goods throughout East Asia, especially in China and Japan.

and exports of Hyundai motors sharply increased (3,743 in 2002 and 18,527 in 2005) (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007b: p. vi).

Thus, previously the role of the cultural industry was thought of as a medium between cultural product and consumption that would help to deliver cultural democratization (Lim, 2003: p. 150), then it was considered a value-added business. After the mid-1990s, culture and the arts were seen as an important resource to help encourage local development and its competitiveness, and central and local government started to emphasis on the economic importance of the cultural industry (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007b: p. 11).

Central government's cultural policy on the cultural industry and local culture is interlinked, and regional cultural industry clusters seem to be the outcome. However, when the cultural industry played an important part in cultural policy, the People's Government (1998–2003) and Participation Government (2003–2008) particularly wanted cultural infrastructures such as cultural centres to be backed up by administrative professionalism in supporting the arts (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003: pp. 33–34; Jeon and Oh, 2005: p. 36) in order to strengthen the supporting system for the promotion of culture and arts. This applied to two most famous Korean orchestras: Seoul Philharmonic Orchestras was one of performing company belonging to the city of Seoul, but the city gave the administrative authority to 'Sejong Performing Arts Center' in order to see more effective management and economic outcomes. Finally, SPO became a self-governing foundation in 2005, which might be considered an ideal model for a Korean municipal orchestra, and is entirely self-run. The KBS Symphony Orchestra also had to change their administrative authority several times (see Table 4.5), and the current authority body, the KBS, attempted to make their orchestra a foundation like SPO, but failed due to severe conflict with players.

Park Kwang-Moo (2009) predicts the future direction of Korean cultural policy based on his intensive research, and it is in accordance with current challenges that Korean municipal orchestras are facing. According to Park (2009), traditional culture and arts will actively combine with cultural industry (emphasis on economic benefits) regarding the promotion of culture and arts (p. 289); in addition, a number of cultural infrastructures have been established, but they depend too much on public subsidy, so the government will reduce their financial support for the culture and arts organisations in order to raise the financial self-support of those organisations (p. 290–91).

Thus, Korean governments' emphases on economic importance of culture industry,

marketization, and administrative professionalism have impacted on the future of Korean municipal orchestras. Local governments that own their orchestras would want their orchestras to address these issues and wish their orchestra to be independent. As a result, municipal orchestras were required to rethink their role, a more effective way of running the orchestra, earning more income, or how best to communicate with the audience. Professionals in Korean classical music have suggested that the formation of a foundation is the key solution to these challenges, and, as noted earlier, Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra changed its whole governance and now operates as a foundation: if SPO is considered a successful case, local governments will be willing to follow suit.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated how Korean cultural policy affects Korean municipal orchestras according to four key themes of central government, decentralisation, the local autonomy system and the cultural industry.

Korean cultural policy is, in the main, a powerful centralised model as in France. The basis of Korean cultural policy was established in the 1960s and early 1970s. Korean cultural policy, by the 1970s, was limited to Korean traditional culture, but the government processed cultural policy in support of creative arts activities and tried to increase access to the arts after the 1980s. Cultural policy in the 1990s expanded its field to cover arts development and cultural welfare, the cultural industry, culture and tourism, cultural information, and life-long arts education. Meanwhile, the focus of Korean cultural policy shifted gradually from high art to popular art, and from traditional culture to the cultural industries and media arts. The object of supporting the arts and culture moved from professional to amateur and the general public. Local culture and arts policy moved from central and metropolitan areas to local self-governing communities. The promotion of cultural policy was still carried out by central government, but the government increased its use of semi-governmental and private non-profit organisations. After the commencement of decentralisation, local people had more opportunities to get involved in arts and cultural activities.

There is no music policy made by central government. Municipal orchestras are in the charge of local governments, which founded, subsidised, controlled, and managed their municipal orchestras. Subsidising municipal orchestras is different from other cultural policy areas in Korea. Municipal orchestras sometimes seem to be placed second, after satisfaction with basic needs, and have to justify the importance of their existence

to politicians who are generally ignorant about arts and culture. Their status is insecure[60] because the amount of public funding can fluctuate depending on the mayor and economic situation. In addition, Korean cultural policies and environmental factors influencing Korean municipal orchestras happen automatically rather than intentionally; the cities do not have a clear direction, a big picture with a long term plan.

Local governments appear to observe how the top two Korean symphony orchestras are dealing with the current changing environment, and they imitate the changes of the orchestras without considering the situation of their own orchestra, or their performing capacity or budget.

Thus, it is evident that Korean municipal orchestras have been directly and indirectly impacted by Korean cultural policy and that the present cultural-industry thinking from the Korean central government sets a challenge for those orchestras. The following chapter will present the context of three Korean municipal orchestras: Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra (CPO), Busan Philharmonic Orchestra (BPO), and KBS Symphony Orchestra (KSO) in which this study is conducted.

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[60] Korean municipal orchestras, on the other hand, have a secure and steady position as they receive 100% funding from their city: thus, the main issue is the amount of money they receive.

Chapter 4 The context of Korean municipal orchestras: CPO, BPO, and KSO

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the context of three orchestras: Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, and KBS Symphony Orchestra, which are treated as three cases studies in this thesis. The following three sections discuss the organisational and environmental context, providing an overview and brief history, and outlining primary activities, repertoire, audience (including subscription if it is appropriate), finance, and governance structure.

4.2 Case study 1: Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra (CPO)

Overview and change

The Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra was founded in 1991 as a part of a cultural policy to develop culture and the arts in the city of Changwon. The initial objectives of the CPO were to improve the image of the industrial city, to cultivate the citizens' cultural life, and to develop local culture and arts. The CPO is formed of young and talented musicians from the Kyungnam province, mainly from the cities of Busan and Daegu.

According to the municipal ordinance of the city of Changwon, the orchestra should provide eight seasonal concerts per year, and may have extra concerts when the Mayor of Changwon requires them. The orchestra might include a Principal Conductor, a Second Principal Conductor, an Orchestral Leader, an Orchestral Manager and musicians within its 80 people. The Vice-Mayor of Changwon has automatic responsibility as an Executive Director of this orchestra (as well as other arts organisations including a choir, dance troupe and youth choir).

From its inception in 1995, the CPO consisted of approximately 60 musicians. The CPO was able to extend its size and purchase special instruments such as a harp and celesta, financially supported by the city of Changwon, in order to play large scale, contemporary music.

With the foundation of the Tongyeong Contemporary Music Festival in 2000, to commemorate 'I-Sang Yoon', the foremost Korean contemporary composer born in the city of Tongyeong, the CPO gradually became an orchestra that specialised in contemporary classical music, and was the main orchestra to be showcased within the

festival. The festival changed its name to the Tongyeong International Music Festival in 2002.

Although the CPO was founded by the city of Changwon, it was a kind of *ad hoc* orchestra until 2001. Since 2002, however, the CPO has been promoted as a permanent orchestra, as a result of its contribution to the city, along with an increase of the city's wealth.

The principal conductor, Do-Ki Kim, the founder of the CPO, [61] who had retained his position for 12 years, was forced to resign, as the city of Changwon wanted to appoint a young, talented conductor to develop the CPO in 2003, once it had become a permanent orchestra. Not only did the principal conductor change, but also the majority of musicians. Although there used to be a regular audition for musicians to extend their contract with the CPO[62] every two years (it changed to every three years from 2007 on) until early 2006, practically everyone could renew their contract with the CPO. However, with the promotion of the CPO's status, the City of Changwon wanted to see an instant improvement in the quality of performance, and musicians who did not reach the standard of audition, failed to extend their contracts in 2002, so this caused a degree of conflict between the city and musicians. As a result, several players were dismissed under an agreement between the conductor and players. In 2003, a new principal conductor of the CPO, Yoon-Seong Chang, was appointed, and remained in post for 4 years. With the appointment of the new conductor, there arose a conflict between him and the players around the matters of audition, and a few players were forced to quit.[63] He is considered to be one of top five conductors in Korea, and was well paid for his position. Generally, it is hard to appoint a talented, well-recognised conductor in a local orchestra, owing to lack of finance. The city of Changwon is a wealthy city in Korea, and can afford to pay a high salary. It was worth having a qualified principal conductor, because the CPO could develop its performance quality and enlarge its repertoire within a short period, becoming famous for contemporary music performance, as the city of Changwon intended. Despite the artistic contribution of this principal conductor, he resigned at the end of 2007. Whether this was the decision of Yoon-Seong Chang (a principal conductor) or of the city was not stated, and the CPO appointed a new principal conductor in 2008. Apart from these

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[61] Although the CPO is a municipal orchestra, Do-Ki Kim was the first person who proposed to have a professional orchestra in the city of Changwon and gathered musicians from university graduates. He is a professor of the School of Music in the University of Changwon.

[62] Most musicians of the municipal orchestras in Korea must have an audition every 1–3 years after being a formal player.

[63] After his resignation, the players evaluated that Yoon-Seong Chang was misleading the orchestra, because he was somehow unfair when he rated players.

artistic, structural and managerial changes, there was no significant change in this orchestra, or in its financial circumstances, as it was 100% subsidised by the city of Changwon.

Primary activities

The CPO is based in a city of Changwon, referred to as 'the Mecca of Korea's Machine Industry', in the Kyungnam province (Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009a: online[64]). As the main objective of this orchestra is to develop local culture and arts, as well as to provide an enterprise for the Changwon citizen, the majority of the CPO's work is based within the city of Changwon, having a residency at Seongsan Arts Hall since April 2000, and at cities in the area nearby.

Although the CPO is supposed to provide 8 regular/subscription concerts in the city, according to the municipal ordinance of Changwon, it normally performs 5–7 concerts. As a public orchestra, the regular concerts of the CPO are free. Special concerts are sometimes promoted by the city and elsewhere, and the performance fee is arranged differently according to the purpose. The CPO has an average of 25 special concerts per year. Overall, the CPO had approximately 30 concerts in 2007.

Interestingly, these hired engagements are not profitable for the CPO itself, as the ticket income is returned to the purpose of performance, such as arts management or charity, and a performance fee is given to individual players according to a musician's grade as decided by the city. The CPO does not have an educational programme, but these aims are sometimes achieved by means of a one-off concert, and certain parts of special concerts.

This orchestra rarely engages in national or international tours: there are on average 3–4 concerts per year in other towns and cities in nearby areas; the first international concert of the CPO took place in Osaka, Japan 2008, the orchestra having been invited by UNESCO.

Repertoire[65]

In the early period, from 1991 to 1996, there was no focus on particular repertoire. As do most orchestras, the CPO draws the majority of its music pieces from Classical and Romantic composers, especially Beethoven (9 pieces), Tchaikovsky (8 pieces), Dvořák (6 pieces) and Mozart (5 pieces). The CPO had 24 seasonal performances between 1991 and 1996, and provided an average of 4.5 performances per year. Three Korean

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[64] Available at: http://www.changwonphil.com/ [Accessed 09 May 2009].
[65] Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra did not adjust concert programmes before 2005 in a form of document, and I only could get repertoire from 1991 to 1996 and from 2005 to 2009 (from administrative staff).

composers' works and approximately 11 pieces of contemporary composers were played during this period. Although contemporary music was a minor part of the whole repertoire of the CPO, this orchestra's repertoire could be seen as progressive compared to other regional orchestras near Changwon, such as the Masan Philharmonic Orchestra and the Jinju Philharmonic Orchestra, which hardly played any contemporary western classical music or Korean composers' music.

The trend of repertoire has not been changed in the recent period, from 2005 to 2008. The CPO had 23 seasonal performances: five in 2005, six in 2006, five in 2007, and seven in 2008, respectively. The works of Classical and Romantic composers were dominant: Beethoven (17 pieces), Mozart (7 pieces), Wagner (5 pieces), Tchaikovsky (4 pieces), J. Strauss (3 pieces), and Rachmaninoff (3 pieces), and contemporary composers' work was nearly excluded in seasonal concerts (Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009a: online).[66]

Audience

A subscription system was started in 1992, but subscribers were limited to the local press and the heads of various organisations in this early period. The subscription is now more widely open to the general classical music admirer. Subscribers[67] of the CPO have gradually increased: (approximately) 1,200 subscribers in 2005, 1,300 in 2006, 1,500 in 2007, 1,700 in 2008, and 1,900 in 2009 (Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009b), with basic information such as addresses and telephone numbers, instead of having a systematic customer relationship management. The target of the CPO is to have 3,000 subscribers and to develop its audience data base. No characteristics of the subscribers are available for scrutiny.

Although all regular concerts given by the CPO are free (except twice in the history of the CPO), the main audiences of the concerts are the majority of subscribers of the CPO.[68]

Finance

100% of the CPO's income comes from the public subsidy of the local city, as is the case with most public orchestras in Korea. Grants from the Arts Council of Korea exclude public orchestras, because they have already been supported by the local

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[66] A piece of Ippolitov Ivanov (1859–1935) and two pieces of Joaquín Rodrigo Vidre (1901–99) were included and none of Korean composers' work was performed.

[67] Unlike the BPO and KSO, the CPO has no paid subscriber: joining in membership of the CPO is free.

[68] CPO gives 500 tickets to those who book their ticket through the CPO homepage, and collect their ticket at the venue on the day. The remaining the tickets are given on a first come, first served basis. Regular concerts are mostly not full.

government. There is no income from ticket selling, and donations[69] are also prohibited by the ordinances.

Table 4.1 Breakdown of the CPO's income and expenditure

(Unit: billion won)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Total budget	2.2 (£1,076,590)	2.2 (£1,076,590)	2.2 (£1,076,590)	2.3 (£1,125,525)	2.3 (£1,125,525)
Personnel expenditure	2 (£978,718)	2 (£978,718)	2 (£978,718)	2.1 (£1,027,654)	2.1 (£1,027,654)
Charitable activities expenditure	0.2 (£97,872)	0.2 (£97,872)	0.2 (£97,872)	0.2 (£97,872)	0.2 (£97,872)

(Source: Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009b)

Table 4.1 indicates that the budget of the CPO is overwhelmingly taken up by personnel expenditure (91%) and only 9% of total budget is for actual expenditure on concert activities, such as hire of the hall, publicity or expenditure for guest soloists: the funding of Korean symphony orchestras in recent years has not been changed, compared to 10 years ago when Kang (2000) indicated this budget problem. Thus, the CPO might experience shortage of funding for providing more charitable activities.

Governance structure

Figure 4.1   Governance structure of the CPO

The regulation of the city of Changwon (Changwon City Hall, 2009a: online[70]) states

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[69] Sponsorship and donations in form of restricted fund are partially possible, but such income sources are somehow unsustained due to complicated process of support.
[70] Available at: http://law.changwon.go.kr/ [Accessed 07 May 2009].

that the Vice-Mayor of Changwon is automatically the Executive Director of the CPO.[71] The Chief of the Welfare Bureau is the Deputy-Executive Director.

The board of the Changwon municipal arts organisation deals with basic plans, management and auditions. It consists of one chairman and eight members. The Vice-Mayor is appointed as the chairman, and the Chiefs of the Welfare Bureau, the General Affairs Bureau, and the Head of Culture and Tourism Division, together with the principal conductor, are automatically appointed as the members. A city councilor, a member of the municipal arts organisation, and an individual recommended by the Mayor with a deep knowledge of arts are also board members. The latter's membership as a board member is for two years (Changwon City Hall, 2009b: online).[72] As the Vice-Mayor has the roles of both Executive Director and Chairman of the Board, the Principal Conductor's position is lower than the Executive Director in this orchestra.

The CPO has five administrative staff working in the Seongsan Arts Hall, but also two civil servants (including the Vice Executive Director, the Chief of the Welfare Bureau) in the department of culture and tourism in Changwon city hall are also involved with the orchestra's administrative works as well as other municipal arts organisations' works. The actual planning is done by the orchestral administrative staff, while the civil servants are in charge of the administrative process in arts organisations; therefore, the work process is sometimes complex, overlapping and time consuming, and the governance structure of the CPO is highly bureaucratic.

Human resources and general roles

Artistic personnel
The Conductor
The CPO has had three principal conductors so far. Do-Ki Kim, the founder of the orchestra, who remained with them for 12 years. The financial and administrative situation was unstable during the early period; however, the conductor had more freedom in terms of managing the orchestra. The city of Changwon did not pay much attention to the orchestra, and financial support was very limited, so the principal conductor carried considerable authority. Conductor Kim's role was varied; he participated in both administrative and artistic matters. His contribution was to organise and shape the basic frame of the CPO, to expand the repertoire and to help the CPO

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[71] The Vice-Mayor is also the Executive Director of the other public arts organisations (choir, dance and youth choir) belonging to the city of Changwon.
[72] This article added in 2007.

become the permanent orchestra. Ironically, he was dismissed immediately after the CPO did become a permanent orchestra. There might have been complex reasons for such a decision. One criticism of Kim was that he held his position for a long time and delayed the CPO becoming a permanent organisation due to the uncertainty of his position. Furthermore, some players strongly disagreed with the principal conductor having another job, such as a professor, because if the conductor has another stable income source, he might not fully concentrate on the orchestra. One player indirectly criticised him for his artistic ability, saying: 'Players of the CPO already have enough musical ability and much experience in playing symphonies, as we have been trained since we were very young...And the repertory for concerts is not much varied... But he wanted to repeatedly practice for himself as he could not conduct well... So we normally used to practice a symphonic piece for three months, whereas when the new conductor came to our orchestra we only needed to practice one piece for a week'.

It might be true that Kim was not Korea's first-rank conductor, and needed more time to master a piece but, on the other hand, this might have been because of his personality, as some people considered him as a meticulous person. In addition, it could be the players' conceit, since they are not themselves first-rank musicians in Korea. Although there have been some criticisms about Kim's artistic and administrative ability, he founded the CPO when culture and the arts were not in mainstream in the city of Changwon, and he enthusiastically extended the repertoire of the CPO to include contemporary music.

In 2003, Yoon-Seong Chang was appointed as the second principal conductor of the CPO. He studied composition at Seoul National University and had conducted in Vienna and Russia. As the second prize winner of symphonic conducting at the first International Prokofiev Competition in 1993, and trained by Valery Gergiev, he brought a new identity to the CPO: he extended the repertoire, especially regarding contemporary music, and increased the technical and artistic quality of performance. The contribution of Yoon-Seong Chang to this orchestra was to give it the firm identity of specialising in contemporary music, or I-Sang Yoon's music.

He gave the first European performance of Krzysztof Penderecki's Symphony No.5 and the first Korean performance of Arnold Schoenberg's massive oratorio, *Gurre-Lieder* with the CPO and Seoul Symphony Orchestra in 2004. Compared to the first principal conductor, Chang was less keen to take part in administrative matters. One reason may have been that he was not a resident in Changwon and was also busy conducting other orchestras (mainly in Seoul) as a guest conductor; thus, he had less time to

spend on administration. Another reason may have been that he did not want to enter into conflict with administrative staff, especially with civil servants, who took charge of the orchestra. The final reason is, perhaps, that he simply did not think administrative matters were in his jurisdiction, and he only wanted to participate in specifically artistic matters. However, at the beginning of his appointment, he participated strongly in auditions, and some players spontaneously or involuntarily had to quit their job. This caused distrust among players against the conductor, and they formed a musicians' union after the audition in 2003. He left the CPO in 2007, as the city of Changwon did not renew his contract.

Recently, the CPO has had a third principal conductor, Chi-Yong Chung, a Seoul National University and the Salzburg Mozarteum graduate, trained by Michael Gielen in Austria. He has been conducting various genres such as orchestral music, opera, and contemporary music as well as Korean traditional classical music. He is particularly passionate about popularising operatic works and the orchestral works of I-Sang Yoon. He was the principal conductor of the Wonju (municipal) Philharmonic Orchestra from 1997 to 1999, and of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra from 1999 to 2001. He is currently a professor of the Korean National University of Arts, an honourary music director of the Wonju Philharmonic Orchestra, and he became the principal conductor of the CPO in 2008. Current administrative staff would like this conductor to lead the CPO in a more stable development, and to contribute to both art and administration.

Musicians

There are currently 73 full time players (Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009b).[73] A player's contract used to be renewed every two years until 2006, and it has been renewed every three years from 2007. When there is a vacancy, the city decides and announces the time of audition, whereas all present players have a regular audition at the beginning or end of every three years. The self governing committee makes some decisions about accepting engagements. Players may be unhappy about some engagements because they are concerned about lowering the reputation of the orchestra, or about the philosophical principle that their concerts should be open to the public. This committee may, though, be over-ruled by the city. In other words, if the city of Changwon forces the players, they normally have to leave some space for mediation. Overall, 95% of suggested hired engagements are arranged.

The union is a formal organisation representing the opinion of players (on matters such as players' welfare or salary) to the city of Changwon, and it does not participate in matters related to concerts. Each municipal arts organisation had an independent

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[73] There were 70 players in 2005, 76 in 2006, 73 in 2007, and 70 in 2008.

union, but the unions of dance, orchestra and choir were united in 2007. Apart from these two organisations, principal players hold an irregular meeting, and the members of this are 10 principal players and 7 sub-principals.

According to my follow-up research in April 2008, the self-government committee was disbanded in March 2007, and the principal player's meeting replaced the role of the committee dealing with decisions about hired engagement, practice time, programme, and all discussions on artistic matters.

The salary of players is decided by their musical ability, not by age. According to a municipal ordinance revised in 2007, there are extra emoluments such as an allowance, an extra grant, compensation, travelling expenses, and a welfare pension within the budget. Musicians are generally satisfied with their current job as a member of orchestra through an open audition. It is a dream job and a long time wish, and a positive experience apart from financial difficulties.

Two male players indicated that their salary was comparatively low compared to other employers who had been working in a company over 12 or 13 years, and this kind of comparison made them depressed. However, according to a veteran player, salaries have been gradually increased, compared to the past, when the CPO was an *ad hoc* orchestra, and financial satisfaction has been relatively raised. That is to say, in spite of lack of income (especially for married male players who are the head of family) compared to other kinds of professional occupation, they are enjoying being where they are, and players' job satisfaction seems relatively high. Thus, we find a 'professional feature' in a player's attitude, which emphasises high standards and ability rather than material reward (Couch, 1989: p. 293).

Administrative staff

As has been mentioned, 5 administrative staff operate the CPO.[74] All staff state that in considering the busy working of the CPO, the total number of administrative staff is not enough to cover the whole. Although their work is not clearly defined, each member of staff has a main role. All administrative staff of the CPO are involved with instrumental music, and three of them studied for an MA in arts management. The contract of administrative staff is renewed every two years, and can be continued unless there is serious mistake during the contract period. The CPO employs administrative staff only when there is a vacancy. In other words, there is no new employment until the current staff resign.

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[74] The CPO normally has five administrative staff, but one staff (planning and P.R Manager) left the CPO in the late 2008, and there are four staff in August 2011.

Managing Director/Orchestra Manager

The Managing Director of the CPO studied tuba as an undergraduate, and arts management at postgraduate level. He has been working for the CPO since 1987, when it was a private chamber orchestra, and was appointed Managing Director in 2002, when the CPO became a permanent municipal symphony orchestra; thus, he is the longest serving employer in the history of the CPO.

His main tasks are to be responsible for all official works, to operate planning and arbitration, to make plans for concerts, orchestra management, and the long-term arts business, to make contracts for hired engagements, to liaise and contract with guest musicians, to deal with matters related to local culture and arts, and to cooperate with other public arts organisations (belonging to the city of Changwon). In sum, he is in charge of most administrative works.

Planning and P.R. Manager

With an academic background of arts management, planning and P.R., the Manager of the CPO was a trumpet player of the Masan Philharmonic Orchestra in 1993, and started to work for the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra as a planning and P.R. Manager in 2002.

This main work within this position is the planning of programmes, analysing the result of hired engagements, writing reports related to planning, guiding visitors, taking care of the media and advertisements, subscribers, ticketing, supports and the CPO's homepage. He is also required to steward audiences in the concert hall and to cooperate in stage management, such as carrying and setting instruments in busy times before a concert.

Music Librarian

The Music Librarian deals with all matters related to scores, such as their purchase or rent. He takes charge of scores, arrangements, modification of scores, and passes out and collects then from players. Apart from this main task, he also participates in handing out tickets, attaching posters, guiding audiences to seats, and cooperative works. He studied trombone as an undergraduate, and composition at postgraduate level, and has been employed since 1991.

Instruments and Stage Manager

The main role of this position is purchasing and repairing instruments, carrying and setting instruments, accounting, taking charge of fixtures belonging to the orchestra, and stage management for rehearsal and concert. In addition, he cooperates with the Music Librarian, attaching posters and handing out tickets. He also studied trombone

and has been employed since 1997.

Communication and Information Manager

The current communication and information manager has been working since 1997. The post mainly deals with civil affair documents for players, taking care of documents, photos, recordings, designing for posters, advertisement booklets and pamphlets, and the production of corporate identity. In addition, he cooperates in the work of carrying instruments, stage management, attaching posters and passing out tickets.

Thus far, we have been looking at the details of the works of the five administrative staff. Although each member of staff's main work seems to be clearly divided, their work during the busy season overlaps due to a shortage of staff, and they can be overloaded. For example, the Planning and P.R. Manager's work may be divided into programme planning, public relations, and orchestra development, such as caring of patrons and subscribers, as well as ticketing, information and communications technology, and international affairs.

4.3 Case study 2: Busan Philharmonic Orchestra (BPO)

Overview and change

Busan is located in the South East of the Korean peninsula. It emerged as a leading city of economic growth and democracy between the 1950s and 1980s, and became a metropolitan city in 1995. With a population of 3,615,101 in 2007, it is the second largest city in Korea after Seoul. Busan held the 2002 Asian Games, the 2002 FIFA World Cup, and APEC 2005 Korea.

According to Lim *et al.* (2006), the city of Busan has been politically intervening in culture and arts because of urban development. The important value of culture and arts can be found in two aspects: economic value and social value. The cultural industries are considered as 'a high value added industry which tends to lead to economic development of an urban area', and the process of culture and arts enjoyment is contributing to social stability and unification as well as developing an individual's creativity by providing a cultural norm and an opportunity to share the local identity (Lim *et al.*, 2006: p. ii). The justification for culture and arts promotion can be found in the formation of urban development by raising a city's creativity (Lim *et al.*, 2006: p. ii). The cultural policy of Busan in 2006 focuses on cultural popularisation, cultural industrialization, and cultural globalization. Cultural popularisation is a policy to promote a citizen's cultural welfare through the expansion of the cultural infrastructure,

the enlargement in the variety of cultural activities on offer, and the increase in support for creative activities. Cultural industrialization is intended to contribute to promoting the local economy through film, developing the multimedia industry, nurturing the exhibition and convention industry, and revitalising the tourism industry through cultural events and festivals. Cultural globalization is intended to promote the image of a cultural city on an international level, and revitalise the exchange of national and international culture and arts performances (Lim *et al.*, 2006).

The policy objective of the Busan Culture and Tourism bureau in 2008, which is similar to the objective in 2007, is to improve the culture and tourism industries so as to make people want to visit, and there are seven main tasks for achieving this objective: improvement of cultural welfare and expansion of cultural facilities; promotion of live cultural events; developing the city's image as the best promoter of film and visual content; construction of a solid policy for the revitalisation of local tourism; development of a unique tourism resource and enhancement of advertising; making Busan an international exchange city; and revitalising the exhibition and convention industry (Busan Administration of Culture and Education Committee, 2008: p.8).

To achieve the first task (which is more closely and directly related to performing arts), the improvement of cultural welfare and expansion of cultural facilities, there are four sub aims:

1. Expansion of cultural facilities: establishment of the Busan National Center for Korean Traditional Performing Arts (2004–2008), Youngdo Cultural Center and Youngdo Library (2004–2009), Haeundae New City Library (2005–2009), Jungguan Museum (2007–2010), temporary water memorial exhibition and educational institution (2008–11), and Arts Center (2008–2009), 15 public library renovations (2008–2009), and Busan Cultural Center renovation (2008–12).
2. Culture and arts promotion: the establishment of cultural foundations, subsidies for culture and arts organisations for their self growth, support for creative activities in the culture and arts fields, support for specialized businesses in local culture such as Busan Arts Festival, cultural activities for excluded classes, and an arts programme for young people.
3. Preservation and transmission of traditional culture and heritage.
4. Expanding cultural service: management of cultural center, municipal museum, municipal museum of modern arts, Chungyeol Shine, and the citizen's center.
    (Busan Administration of Culture and Education Committee, 2008: pp.9–15)

There are different motivations and reasons for supporting the arts in developing countries and developed countries. The justification given by the government of the city of Busan for supporting arts and culture can be summarised by the city's economic development, social stability and unification, as well as the development of an

individual's creativity. Among numerous theories about the justification of public arts support, the government's motivations in Busan are probably best explained by Richard Titmuss's two government models (1968). The city of Busan seems to have adapted 'the service model' ('making a cultural resource widely available and generally accessible means the arts become one of the public services') and 'the commercial model' ('rulers and governments may regard their cultural assets as saleable products, or as economic levers to commercial profit') (Pick and Anderson, 1996: p. 65).[75]

Regarding the cultural policy of the city of Busan, cultural popularization seems to improve the cultural welfare of its citizens; cultural industrialization and globalization are likely to connect with urban regeneration particularly for benefits to the local economy. Although the city of Busan is trying to improve social welfare, which provides more cultural facilities for its citizens, it is more likely to give priority to cultural industrialization and globalization. Thus, it can be seen that municipal arts organisations including the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra do not play a significant part in influencing cultural objectives in the city of Busan. Busan's cultural policy is still at the basic stage of preparing cultural facilities, so that citizens in Busan are not yet really participating in and enjoying the cultural activities.

The Busan Development Institute surveyed 500 Busan citizens aged between 20 and 69 in August 2006. According to the results, the favourite cultural activity was watching movies (57.8%) followed by attending festivals (23%), and visiting visual arts exhibitions (16.8%). Only 7.5% of people in Busan had experienced western classical music[76] (Lim et al., 2006: p. 22). The cultural and arts events that Busan citizens would like to participate in if they had a chance in the future are movies (27.6%), Korean popular music concerts, entertainment (17.2%), and festivals (13.6%), while 8.4% preferred to participate in western classical music concerts (Lim et al., 2006: p. 23).

When the people in Busan participate in arts events, the most important factor is access followed by the quality and content of an arts performance, and the price and venue's comfort (Lim et al., 2006: p. 24). The major barriers to participation in cultural and arts activities are price (30%), lack of information (28.6%), and lack of time (25%) (Lim et al., 2006: p. 26).

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[75] Pick and Anderson (1996) outlined Richard Titmuss (1968)'s seven government motivations: the glory model, the placebo model, the education model, the reward model, the service model, the compensatory model, and the commercial model to support arts in the 'Commitment to Welfare' (pp. 65–66).

[76] But it is higher than Korean traditional classical music (3.4%) (Lim et al., 2006: p. 22)

Figure 4.2 Barriers to attendance at cultural and arts activities

Regarding the chance of participation in cultural and arts activities, 41.6% of citizens evaluated it as 'Neither agree or disagree' (Lim *et al.*, 2006: p. 40).

Figure 4.3 The chance of participation in cultural and arts activities

On the other hand, 51% of Busan citizens considered the level of cultural and arts activities as 'fair' (Lim *et al.*, 2006: p. 40).

Figure 4.4 The evaluation of the level of cultural and arts activities

Finally, in terms of advertisements for cultural and arts events made by the city of Busan, the majority of people (48.8%) thought it was 'fair', 34% 'not good', and 14.6% 'good' (Lim *et al.*, 2006: p. 41).

Figure 4.5 The publicity for cultural and arts activity

It can be seen that western classical music is not a favourite cultural activity of Busan's citizens, and the municipal arts organisations are not the main objective of the city's cultural policy. People seem to prefer popular culture, following the general trend in Korea. People in Busan indicated lack of information as the main barrier that stops them participating in cultural activities. An evaluation carried out on advertisements for arts and cultural activities showed that 48.8% answered it was normal and 34% of people answered that the advertisement was not effective enough to recognise arts and cultural events. Thus, we can say that although people in Busan are generally satisfied with the quality and the quantity of the cultural and arts activities, they cannot fully enjoy cultural or arts activities due to the individual's financial situation, life style, or the lack of information.

The culture and arts division, which falls under the Culture and Tourism Bureau, is the central part of the administrative structure of Busan's culture and arts policy. This division is categorised in five parts: cultural policy, arts promotion, cultural industry, film and visual contents promotion, and cultural property. It has 39 staff (Busan Administration of Culture and Education Committee, 2008).

Under the culture and arts division, there are four cultural establishments: the Busan Cultural Center, Busan Museum, Busan Museum of Modern Art, Chungnyeol Shrine[77] (Busan Administration of Culture and Education Committee, 2008). Two essential organisations relate to culture and arts promotion: Busan Cultural Center and Busan Museum of Modern Art. Busan Cultural Center's main role is to provide exhibition space for culture and arts activities, performing arts venues, and management of municipal arts organisations. The role of the Busan Museum of Modern Art is to provide exhibition space, provide a home to arts collections, and to lend art works. The collection and preservation of the arts can be understood as a business related to the

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[77] It is No. 7 of the city of Busan's tangible cultural properties. Chungnyeol Shrine was made in memory of those who fought against the Japanese troops in the Japanese Invasion in 1592 (Chungnyeol Shrine, 2009: online).

formation of local cultural identity and the revitalisation of creative activities (Lim *et al.*, 2006: p. 16).

The Busan Culture and Arts Promotion Institute is an organisation that, besides focusing on culture and arts promotion, investigates and considers basic policies and plans, fundraises, and considers applications for arts funding (Lim *at al.*, 2006). There are a total of 115 cultural facilities: 39 performing venues, 10 museums, 3 galleries, 29 libraries, 9 (foreign) councils, and 25 cinemas (Busan Administration of Culture and Education Committee, 2008). Regarding municipal arts organisations, Busan has a symphony orchestra, a choir, a dance group, a youth choir, a Korean traditional orchestra, a youth orchestra, a theatre, and a public information team.[78]

Busan Philharmonic Orchestra

Busan Philharmonic Orchestra (BPO) was founded in 1962. The BPO was the first local municipal orchestra and is the third oldest Korean symphony orchestra, after the KBS Symphony Orchestra and Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, which were founded in 1956 and 1957. The BPO initially suffered from a lack of players, unsuitable instruments, and low wages (Ryu, 1993: p 13). The orchestra was not fully organised, especially regarding orchestration and player's welfare. When the Busan Citizen's Hall was completed in 1973, it served as a practice space and concert hall. The BPO enlarged its size in 1977 after 15 years of establishment, and players' salaries were adjusted by an amendment to the regulations in 1977 in line with local government officials' salaries (Busan Cultural Center, 1993). With the Busan Cultural Center's establishment in 1988, the BPO acquired a high standard concert hall and players' salaries were increased by further amendments of regulations.

Primary activities

The BPO is resident in the city of Busan, the second biggest metropolitan city in Korea. It currently has 92 full-time members[79] and nine administrative staff in the orchestra office (Busan Cultural Center, 2007a: online).[80] As a municipal symphony orchestra, its main objective is to promote Busan's cultural life as well as to activate local culture and arts. Its primary activities mostly consist of concert giving in its residency of the Busan Cultural Center. With a relatively long history compared to other local municipal orchestras, 'the BPO currently provides approximately 50 concerts per year and has become a cultural delegation of an international city, Busan' (Busan Cultural Center,

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[78] In order of the year of establishment.
[79] The number of members was checked with administrative staff in the Busan Cultural Center in 2007.
[80] Available at: http://bsculture.busan.kr/ [Accessed 10 May 2009].

2007b: online).

The BPO's primary activities can be broadly divided into two parts: a regular concert series and special concerts. Regular-seasonal concerts are part of its residency in the Busan Cultural Center, whereas the special concerts can include special guest players or special programmes promoted by local authorities. The BPO provides 40 concerts per year (approximately 10 Regular concerts and 30 special concerts).[81] The municipal ordinance of the city of Busan does not state the details of the number of performances that the BPO has to provide, which differs from the municipal ordinance of the CPO. This was due to public opinion that criticised the performance regulations as a sign or the self-complacency of the municipal administration, so the city of Busan eliminated them in 1991 (Kim, 2000: p. 29).

Special concerts include national touring concerts, concerts with special guest players, youth concerts including educational programmes, such as 'classical music class', 'my friend, classical music', and 'youth concerto night', visiting concerts, the Busan musician's series,[82] lunch time concerts, lobby concerts, and the Busan Phil String Ensemble and Wind Ensemble. Through these various concerts, the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra has been trying to pursue its objectives as a municipal symphony orchestra. As with most municipal orchestras in Korea, any ticket income goes back to the city of Busan and is not used for the BPO. However, it can be regarded as a positive achievement, and the city may look favourably upon the BPO's endeavour when estimating the budget for the following year.

Hired engagements are the most profitable for the individual players of the BPO who participate in these activities, whereas regular concerts, which are its own promotion, are generally not profitable, but are a duty of the BPO. The BPO deepened its experience during its international tour including 'concerts in the United States, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, China and Japan' (Busan Cultural Center, 2007b: online). Importantly, the BPO has been participating in the 'Asia(n) Friendly Concert'[83] held in the Sun Palace Hall or Acros Symphony Hall in Hukuoka every year, since 1991 by sending 15–20 of its players to Japan.

With a relatively long history, the BPO's activities are more various and abundant, compared to other local municipal symphony orchestras. Thus, the BPO is more advanced in terms of quality and quantity of performance and orchestral management

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[81] According to the website of the BPO, it provides around 50 concerts per year but this seems to be overstated based on the recent total number of concerts.

[82] The series is to provide opportunities to local artists in Busan.

[83] The concert is performed by united players from different orchestras in Asia and the Oceania area.

than other local orchestras.

Repertoire[84]

The repertoire of the BPO's regular concert series can be divided into two periods: from 1962 to 1990, and from 1991 to 2000.

There were a total of 128 regular concerts from 1962 to 1990 and the number of pieces the BPO played totalled 1,135: 472 concertos, 311 orchestral music, 308 overture and 44 Korean composers' works. Regarding concertos, Mozart's works were played 95 times followed by Beethoven (82), Mendelssohn (45) and Saint-Saëns (25) and Haydn (22). Among 311 pieces of orchestral music, Beethoven's music was performed 98 times, followed by Dvořák (42), Haydn (31), Tchaikovsky (27), and Mozart (26). During these periods, pieces from the Classic period and Romantic period were performed 440 and 506 times respectively, whereas only 95 contemporary and national music pieces were played, and music from the Baroque period was not played at all. The repertoire of the BPO was overwhelmingly from the Romantic and Classic period, and the BPO's favourite composers were Mozart and Beethoven.

There were 129 regular concerts from 1991 to 2000 and the number of pieces the BPO played was 434. In that period, the number of pieces performed from the Romantic era, the Classical, contemporary, and Baroque periods were 245, 115, 72, and 2 respectively. From the Romantic period, Tchaikovsky's music was played 30 times, that of Brahms 22 times, and that of Dvořák 18 times. Regarding genres, 124 concertos, 105 symphonic music, and 98 overtures were performed. Mozart concertos were the most popular (28 were played), followed by Beethoven (13) and Bruch (8).

In sum, the BPO has a tradition of performing symphonic repertoire, especially works by the Classical and Romantic composers, whereas Korean composers and contemporary works do not really form part of the main repertoire. A similar repertoire can be found in the case of American orchestras: according to the 'Orchestra Repertoire Report', between 1992 and 1993 the top five composers were Mozart, Beethoven, Tchaikovsky, Brahms, and Haydn.[85] Even though there is no fixed way to programme repertoire, the BPO needs to carefully consider, develop and enlarge its repertoire, as it can be seen as key to the orchestra's cultural role in a changing Korean society.

Audience

The executive constitution of the BPO does not regularly update its information on audiences, so there is very limited information. The subscription system of the BPO

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[84] The analysis of repertoire is derived from the BPO's concert report.
[85] This report was surveyed based on respondents of 11,366 subscription concerts from 1987–88 through 1991–92 (American Symphony Orchestra League, 1993: p. 18).

was launched in 1985, whereas all the other Busan municipal arts organisations started one in 1997. Currently, the Busan Cultural Center conducts subscriptions for all municipal arts organisations. There is no independent subscription just for the orchestra, and a subscriber of the Busan Cultural Center automatically becomes a member of the orchestra and all other arts organisations: the total number of (paid) subscribers has been gradually increased (see Table 4.2). There are four types of subscription: VIP membership, general membership, concession membership (the disabled, the elderly, and persons of merit), and youth membership. According to the staff in the orchestral constitution, they have never tried to research their audience. The application form for subscription is very simple: name, phone number, address, occupation, motivation for joining, interest, and frequency of attendance. Thus, it is difficult to have basic information about the characteristics of subscribers. The BPO had an audience of 16,961 in 2008, and 14,895 of that was paid audience: and majority of audience for BPO's regular concerts are non-subscribers of the Busan Cultural Center (see Table 4.2 and Table 4.3).

Table 4.2 Number of subscribers

(Unit: people)

Variables	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009 (up to June)
Subscriber	1,283	1,226	1,515	1,619	871
Free subscriber	2,955	1,401	3,164	2,261	666
Total	4,238	2,627	4,679	3,880	1,537

(Source: Busan Cultural Center, 2009)

Table 4.3 Audience numbers for regular concerts

(Unit: people)

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009 (up to May)
Paid audience	12,306	16,758	15,303	14,895	7,576
Free rider	3,181	2,600	2,584	2,066	1,205
Total	15,487	19,358	17,887	16,961	8,781

(Source: Busan Cultural Center, 2009)

Finance

Similar to other municipal symphony orchestras, financial sources are limited.

The BPO's income is mainly supported by the city of Busan: 95% is spent on personnel expenses, and only 5% is used for performance (Park, 2007). Table 4.4 shows the income and expenditure of the BPO between 2005 and 2009: according to information of 2007, expenditure on charitable activities is (approximately) only 0.3% of total expenditure. Therefore, there might not be enough money for planning more performances. The details are as follows:

Table 4.4 Breakdown of the BPO's income and expenditure

(Unit: won)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009 (up to May)
Total budget	n/a	n/a	3.7 billion [1] (£1,850,000)	n/a	n/a
Personnel expenditure[86]	7.6 billion (£3,744,370)	8.1 billion (£3,976,928)	8.9 billion (£4,346,993)	8.6 billion (£4,196,516)	3.9 billion (£1,921,022)
Charitable activities expenditure	159 million (£78,156)	153 million (£74,774)	111 million (£54,450)	106 million (£51,990)	41 million (£20,053)
Charitable activities income	40 million (£19,778)	70 million (£37,116)	51 million (£24,893)	101 million (£49,488)	41 million (£20,300)

(Sources: Busan Cultural Center, 2009; [1] Kim, 2008b)

Basically material support (especially financial) from outside is severely restricted in line with the municipal ordinance. However, the city of Busan added an ordinance in 1991 stating that 'each municipal arts organisation[87] can establish extra operational funds separate from subsidy from the city, in order for the revitalisation of performance and the welfare of players' (Busan Cultural Center, 2008). Therefore, the fundraising of the BPO could more flexible, compared to other municipal orchestras. Afterwards, the BPO was able to undertake its first international tour with the extra operational funds. Busan set a good example for the other cities with municipal orchestras, as it showed financial flexibility for activities.

Regarding finance, the government of Busan's intervention in municipal arts organisations has advantages and disadvantages. As with most municipal orchestras, the BPO is entirely funded by the local authority and the BPO's funding is tightly controlled by the city of Busan.

With stable public subsidy from the city of Busan, the current funding level is enough to provide approximately 10 regular concerts, which has been the level at which the BPO has been operating at since the early days.

Governance structure

As previously mentioned, the governmental structure of the Culture and Tourism Bureau that is in charge of the BPO is highly bureaucratic. An organisational structure of the BPO is given in Figure 4.6.

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[86] The personnel expenses are for seven municipal arts organisations in the Busan Cultural Center.
[87] Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, Busan Philharmonic Youth Orchestra, Busan Metropolitan Chorus, Busan Metropolitan Junior Chorus, Busan Metropolitan Traditional Music Orchestra, Busan Metropolitan Dance Company, Busan Metropolitan Theatre Company.

Figure 4.6 Governance structure of the BPO

A Vice Mayor of the city of Busan automatically becomes the Executive Director of seven municipal arts organisations, and the president of the Busan Cultural Center is the Deputy Executive Director, in charge of operating the administration of the orchestra, as well as the six other arts organisations resident in the Busan Cultural Center. The Executive Director supervises seven arts organisations and directs players and staff, under the order of the Mayor. Interestingly, the city of Busan has a position for an Artistic Director, a person who supervises various operations of performance, but this has never been occupied. According to the former staff of the BPO, players believe that there might be some degree of disadvantage if an Artistic Director is not from their organisation, so players of each arts organisation disagree with appointing an Artistic Director from another organisation. On the other hand, if seven different Artistic Directors were appointed, this could potentially cause conflict with the Head of the Arts Centre, and high expenditure is required for the position. However, the Executive Director can require the principal conductor of the orchestra to act as an Artistic Director of six arts organisations, when necessary.[88]

According to the municipal ordinance, the Busan metropolitan orchestra committee was founded to listen to the opinions of professionals in different areas in terms of basic planning and management (Busan Cultural Center, 2008). The orchestral committee consists of 14 members: they are the Executive Director (President of Committee), the Deputy Executive Director (vice president of committee), and the Principal Conductor, and other professionals make up 10 members, related to arts and culture as an entrusted position for two years.[89] The head of the performing department is appointed

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[88] This was a revised regulation of 1997.
[89] The position is renewable.

as a governor to deal with administrative affairs (Busan Cultural Center, 2008). The main roles of the orchestra committee are basic concert planning, improving and developing schemes for management, deliberating over the appointment of the Principal Conductor, and selecting candidates for overseas study and training (Busan Cultural Center, 2008). Although the importance of the position of the orchestra committee has been indicated by several researchers (e.g. Judy, 1998; Hart, 1973); the BPO does not draw great attention to the position.

Under the control of the Busan Cultural Center, the BPO has its own executive constitution which mainly carries out daily managerial works and assists in the Principal Conductor's artistic decision making. The orchestral office is involved in the day-to-day running of the organisation, but has no actual power to make decisions at a lower governmental level. For example, even when the orchestral office needs to buy a teacup for a guest soloist, two to four steps are required to reach the decision.

Human resources and general roles

Artistic personnel
Conductor
The principal conductor of the BPO has a great deal of power: the principal conductor has the authority of decision making on artistic matters and also participates in players' auditions. The basic but foremost aim of his work is to organise a programme and repertoire within the orchestra office.

The BPO is already on its ninth principal conductor.[90] The first principal conductor was Tad-Gyun Oh, and he was appointed from 1962 to 1972 (Kim, 2000: p. 17). In spite of the orchestra's inadequate environment, the BPO, under the direction of Oh, provided concerts in several cities in Kyungnam province and invited guest conductors from overseas and Seoul (Ryu, 1993: p. 13). As a result, the BPO achieved the status of a top local municipal orchestra. The second principal conductor of the BPO was Byung-Ham Han, who was the Deputy conductor under the first principal conductor Oh, and appointed in 1972. He enlarged the orchestra from 50 players to 70 in 1972 and the BPO had 80 players in 1975 (Busan Cultural Center, 1993: pp. 29–48). With the completion of Busan Citizen's Hall, the BPO provided regular concerts as well as special concerts. In 1975, Han attempted to reorganise the players within the orchestra by organising a series of auditions. This backfired on him, and in 1979 he had to

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[90] The Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra has had only three principal conductors throughout its 19-year history.

resign due to a serious conflict with the current set of players (Ryu, 1993: p. 14).

After Han's resignation in 1979, Ki-Hong Lee was appointed as the third principal conductor. To improve the technical ability of players, and to reset the orchestra, he had an audition for all members. Although he gave more local touring concerts and enlarged the repertoire, he resigned in 1981 because of a conflict with many of the players; meanwhile, the BPO was disbanded in June 1981 (Lee, 1991: p. 206). Five months later, the city of Busan re-formed the BPO with 52 players and appointed Jong-Hyek Park as the fourth principal conductor. The BPO built its name throughout Korea by giving concerts in Seoul, by touring locally, and by holding a series of concerts in universities (Busan Cultural Center, 1993). The BPO improved its musical level under the conductor Park. However, he failed to unite the players, and he had to resign in 1988 as some players (especially young players) collected signatures campaigning for his resignation (Ryu, 1993: p. 15). After the fourth principal conductor's resignation, the position of principal conductor was vacant for one year and four months, and the BPO played with guest conductors (Ryu, 1993: p. 16).

As we can see, there were several conflicts between principal conductors and players. Therefore, the orchestral committee adapted the principle that 'a successor (a principal conductor) should be a foreigner who does not have any connection such as academic and regional relations in Korea, in order to eliminate a deeply rooted factionalism and to annul conflicts related to a power grab' (Busan Cultural Center, 1993). Therefore, the BPO appointed a Russian conductor, Mark Gorenstein, in 1989, and became the first municipal symphony orchestra to appoint a foreign conductor. He required perfect harmony among players, and his practice style was compared to the Spartan training described by the staff and players of BPO, so this changed players' practice attitudes. At first, the players trusted the conductor to develop their music ability, but after two years, they began to rebel against his training style (Ryu, 1993: p. 16). In the meantime, the city of Busan in 1991 enlarged the size of the organisation of the BPO, and revised its regulation, adding to its portfolio the position of Artistic Director. This divided the orchestra into two parts: a principal conductor who concentrated on music, and an Artistic Director who had a responsibility for managing the organisation. Mark Gorenstein disagreed with this revision, and finally left in 1992 after the new regulation was announced. Although Gorenstein left, he increased the performing skill of the players and tried to develop the repertoire (Kim, 2000: p. 19).

Vladimir Kin was appointed in 1992 as the sixth principal conductor. His contribution was to increase the number of concerts.[91] (He only worked in the position for three months, due to a conflict in the relationship between the players and the principal

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[91] The BPO provided approximately 24 concerts per year, but Vladimir Kin increased the number of concerts to 56.

conductor.). After Kin, Vanco Cavdarski was appointed from 1993 to 1995, and he tried various repertoire, including 20th-century classical music (Busan Cultural Center, 1999).

Going against the BPO's decision to appoint a Korean conductor, the organisation chose to appoint the Korean, Seong Kwak[92] in 1996 who had a great deal of authority and seemed to enjoy the power. His reign saw the BPO's first international tour in 1997, an East Asian concert tour in 2000, the development of various concert programmes and repertoire, and the development of the players' performance level (Kim, 2002: p.26). As Judy (1995) mentioned, the excesses of authoritarian conductors contributed significantly to the development of the orchestra's unionisation (p. 33), Kwak also contributed to the unionisation of the BPO's players who desperately wanted to stand against their conductor. He resigned in December 2003, due to serious conflict with players.

Right after Kwak's resignation, the Russian conductor Alexander Anissimov was appointed in 2005, and is still in post. My interview with the players shows that they were involved fully in the decision to appoint Anissimov. Although the players are not one hundred percent satisfied with this foreign conductor, they respect his artistic ability. As there were always conflicts with Korean conductors, the city of Busan seems to have decided that giving the authority and power to the players to appoint a conductor, would eliminate many of the problems seen in the past.

The poor relationship between the conductor and players of the BPO was not caused by the technical ineptitude of the conductors, but by disrespect, a lack of reciprocity, and mistrust which will be illustrated in Chapter 6. These kinds of conflicts provided the BPO with several fundamental risks.

Musicians
The current member count of the BPO is 102 (Busan Cultural Center, 2009).[93] The players in the BPO can be divided into five: a leader, a sub-leader, 13 principal players, and 13 sub-principals, and general players (Busan Cultural Center, 2008). Players' contracts are typically for a period of three years, so players can renew their contracts by audition. In the case of the BPO, there is a representative committee meeting, which is organised with approximately 10 players appointed by players' vote. The role of the representative meeting is to reflect players' opinions regarding issues related to the orchestra (such as decisions concerning hired engagements), or to indicate problems or difficulties.

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[92] He has American citizenship, and some people think he is not a Korean.
[93] There were 92 musicians from 2005 to 2007 and 102 musicians since 2008.

Apart from the salary they receive, orchestral staff and players have a position allowance, a grant in aid of arts research, bounty for encouragement, meals, and traffic expenses, national holidays, and they receive constant education and development. The players' welfare in the BPO seems much better than the CPO in the way of estimated salary, extra grant, and the opportunity for self development.

The formal role of players in any kind of decision making in the BPO seems to be limited. They have some input into decisions about the acceptance of hired engagements, but cannot refuse to play if the city or cultural centre over-rules them. This tends to support Fogel's more general view that 'it is not surprising that no role of importance has developed for musicians in the governance of orchestras'. One local exception is that the appointment of the latest principal conductor reflected the opinion of the players. The players want to be more involved, and their views will be presented later.

Administrative personnel

The BPO currently has its nine administrative staff in the orchestra's executive constitution (Busan Cultural Center, 2009). The number of staff has increased compared to 2007,[94] as the orchestral constitution of the BPO has been in charge of the youth orchestra's whole administrative works since 2008. In other words, the youth orchestra's administrative team was disbanded, and its works were united with the constitution of the BPO based on the amendment of the operation regulation of the Busan municipal arts organisations on 26 December 2007. Thus, there are four staff in charge of planning, two for scores, two for caring for instruments, and one for advertising. The positions among the nine administrative staff at the BPO are basically equal. But administrative staff designate and treat an experienced member of staff at the planning stage as a Managing Director, in order to achieve effective operation.

The number of staff in this orchestra is approximately twice the size of the CPO. Although the BPO has more administrative personnel, it can be assumed that some work might be mixed, as in the case of the CPO, because according to former staff of the BPO, nine staff are insufficient to operate the whole BPO and youth orchestra. However, it is impossible to look at the overlapping work became the senior staff at planning department strongly refused to provide me with detailed information.

Managing Director/Orchestra Manager

Officially, there is no position of Managing Director in the BPO; however a Planning

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[94] There were seven administrative staff, and this increased to nine staff from 2008.

Manager[95] fills the role of Managing Director. The current managing director of the BPO does not have an academic background in music and was promoted when the previous managing director moved on to another arts centre. As Fogel (2000) demonstrated, the managing director of the BPO acts as a mediator between conductor and players; conductor and the Busan Cultural Center; and the players and the Busan Cultural Center. She deals with daily matters as well as planning the programme with the conductor, and also deals with the players' welfare along with other administrative staff in the orchestral constitution.

4.4 Case Study 3: KBS Symphony Orchestra

Overview and changes

The KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) Symphony Orchestra is one of finest orchestras in Korea and resides in Seoul, the capital of Korea. The key aims of the KBS Symphony Orchestra are to contribute to improving the standard of arts and culture of Korea and to raise national prestige, based on the articles of the KBS Labour Association.

The KBS Symphony Orchestra was founded in September 1956. However, due to the influence of the 4.19 revolution in 1960 against the first government of South Korea, and an inexperienced management team, the Orchestra was disestablished and played only as a private orchestra for a short while. The Korean Symphony Orchestra (former KBS Symphony Orchestra) was then established in February 1961, and changed its name to KBS Symphony Orchestra in September 1961. In 1969, the orchestra's management took over the running of the National Theatre and the KBS Symphony Orchestra became amalgamated into the arts companies which belonged to the Korean National Theatre. The orchestra also changed its name to the National Symphony Orchestra, and the KBS agreed to partly subsidise the National Orchestra which continuously played for the KBS broadcast performances. The authority of management of the National Symphony Orchestra and the orchestra's name had been changed several times. Table 4.5 below shows the detailed changes.

After the disbandment of the National Symphony Orchestra, it was re-founded as the Korea Philharmonic Orchestra (current the KBS Symphony Orchestra) and introduced management regulations and an orchestral committee. With the slogan 'an orchestra in the world', it started with an enormous budget, an improvement of the player's working environment, opportunities for overseas training, and the chance to work with first-class

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[95] According to a player, the planning manager and other administrative staff in the orchestra office of the BPO officially have same social position, but the previous planning manager who had been working in the BPO for a long time called himself the Head of the Planning Department and performed as Managing Director of the BPO.

conductors. It also introduced a robust administrative structure.

Table 4.5 The changes of orchestra name and the authority of management

Year	English name	Authority of management
1956	KBS Symphony Orchestra	The KBS
1961	Korea Symphony Orchestra (from February) KBS Symphony Orchestra (from September)	Private The KBS
1969	National Symphony Orchestra	The National Theatre
1971	National Symphony Orchestra	The KBS
1972	National Symphony Orchestra	The National Theatre
1981	Korea Philharmonic Orchestra	The KBS
1990	KBS Symphony Orchestra	The KBS

Even though the interest generated by concerts that the KBS Symphony Orchestra provided was enormous, the standard of the KBS Symphony Orchestra's playing could not reach the expectations of the classical music enthusiasts. Furthermore, the basic elements for running an orchestra such as an administration, a stable pool of players and secure finances, were very limited in the early period. The administrative aspect of the KBS Symphony Orchestra was especially insecure.

More recently, it has suffered from conflicts between the company and players regarding the audition process, as the KBS believed that radical change was necessary to improve quality. Despite arguments regarding auditions, these began in 1982 for all orchestra members, and about 10 players taking the audition failed.[96] After that, the company continued to hold further auditions in Korea and selected new players, then moved on and held third auditions in the U.S. and European countries, and chose 13 players (KBS, 2006: p. 92).

This orchestra has received its entire budget from the KBS. However, the KBS company wanted the orchestra to be partly independent, due to the financial difficulties of the company itself since 2005. As a result, there have been arguments between the company and players about the orchestra's change of status, which is more serious than the conflicts of 1982.

The Seoul citizen's common activities during weekdays are television watching (71.8%), taking a rest (37.2%), reading newspapers and books (21.2%), surfing the Internet (17.3%), followed by (observational) arts and cultural activities (1.7%) and participation in arts and culture (0.5%). On the other hand, spending time during weekends showed different trends: television watching (42.8%), taking a rest (40.4%), meeting friends (26.1%), physical exercise (17.0%), (observational) arts and cultural activities (5.2%)

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[96] Although there were 98 existing players, only 70 of these took the audition: 60 of them and 32 out of 56 external candidates passed (KBS, 2006: p. 91).

and participation in arts and cultural creative activities (0.1%).[97]

Regarding the experiences of arts and cultural activities between January 2001 and December 2002, the Seoul citizen participated in cinema (64.2%), fine art exhibitions (15.9%), theatre (15.2%), and popular music concerts (10.6%); other activities including dance, literature, Korean traditional performance, and classical music are under 10% respectively.

The barriers to participation in arts and cultural activities are lack of time (39.8%), price (21.2%), lack of interesting performances (13.5%), and distance (11.9%). More specifically, there are different answers based on sex, age, and occupation: the main barriers to males are lack of time (45.5%) and lack of interesting performances (17.4%), whereas lack of time (34.2%), price (27.9%), and lack of information (13.5%) are the barriers to females; compared to other age groups, 20-somethings chose price and lack of interesting performances, 30- and 40-somethings chose lack of time, and 50-somethings chose lack of interesting performance as key barriers; lack of time and price are the barriers to people who have a job, and to housewives and students.

The arts and cultural events in which the Seoul citizen would like to participate in the future are movies (68.9%), theatre (49.3%), popular performing arts (22.3%), Korean traditional arts performance (17.6%), and classical music and opera (17.6%): both males and females prefer movies, theatre, and popular performing arts; the citizens in Seoul prefer movies and theatre regardless of income, whereas classical music and opera are particularly popular with the high income group.

The main sources of information about arts and culture for Seoul citizens are television (36%), newspapers (23%), personal communication (14%), and the Internet (11%). Other information comes from a poster or placard (6%), or booklet published by Seoul or district (4%). The usage of the Internet to get cultural information among 20-somethings is relatively higher (45.7%), compared to middle or upper age group (40-somethings (8.9%); 50-somethings (2.0%).

Therefore, it can be seen that either observation or participation in arts and cultural activities that include western classical music is not a favourite enterprise of Seoul citizens, but the future willingness for participation in those activities are much higher, compared to the current rate of participation. The people of Seoul indicated lack of time as the main barrier participating in arts and cultural activities, and females are more

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[97] All the statistical sources regarding cultural activities of the Seoul citizen given here are from the Seoul Development Institute (2002).

likely to interest in those activities, compared with males. Although television and newspapers are the main means getting the information about arts and culture for Seoul citizens, the Internet is particularly popular for 20-somethings.

KBS Symphony Orchestra

As both a broadcasting orchestra and a public concert-giving orchestra, the KBS Symphony Orchestra has been the biggest provider of music in Korea since its founding in 1956. The Orchestra gives a variety of concerts throughout the year at the KBS Hall and the Seoul Arts Center's Concert Hall. The Orchestra also plays special concerts for broadcast on KBS Radio and TV, and regularly records musical pieces for CDs. Up to 2009, the Orchestra had released 14 CD series including a recording of Alan Hovhaness's symphonies. In spite of the early troubles, the KBS Symphony Orchestra was representative of Korean orchestras. It provided various concerts not only in Seoul and within the nation, but also overseas. In particular, it held a concert for the UN's 50th foundation celebration and the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the UN assembly hall in October 1995, which was conducted by Myung-Whun Cheong. In addition, it held 'the North and South Korea corporative concert' in Seoul and Pyungyang[98] in 2000 and 2001.

Currently, the KBS Symphony Orchestra has been suffering from serious conflicts between players and the company KBS, as KBS has been asking the orchestra to be a foundation since 2005.

Primary activities and repertoire

The current work pattern of the KBS Symphony orchestra is rather different from its inauguration in 1956 when there were more broadcasting activities. Although the KBS Symphony Orchestra is a broadcasting orchestra, its primary activities are public concerts. It currently provides approximately 80–90 concerts per year and its concert programme can be divided into six categories: regular concerts/subscription concerts, self-promotion concerts/hired concerts, special concerts, national touring concerts, broadcasting concerts, and international concerts. Apart from these six types of concerts, opera and ballet accompaniment and ensemble concerts are frequently in the fixed activities: the KBS Symphony Orchestra performed many opera and ballet accompaniments between 1957 and 1987; they began giving ensemble concerts in 1973, and regularly gave concerts until 1988 (except in 1987).

Regular concerts (subscription concerts) are monthly public concerts of the KBS Symphony Orchestra, and are key work. It currently provides between 20 and 30

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[98] It is the capital of North Korea.

concerts. During its approximately 50 years history, the most frequently played piece was Beethoven's Symphony No. 9.

Table 4.6   The yearly total number of concerts (1956–2006)[99]

Year	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Number	20(1)	34(5)	25(5)	16(8)	26(7)	23(8)	35(10)	41(14)	39(12)	50(12)
Year	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Number	43(7)	43(6)	24(3)	36(7)	41(15)	32(7)	26(8)	39(8)	74(11)	94(11)
Year	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Number	102(13)	86(15)	62(14)	79(14)	58(16)	62(14)	92(19)	90(22)	94(20)	88(22)
Year	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Number	94(17)	84(20)	91(16)	69(16)	56(15)	60(15)	89(32)	81(32)	83(30)	76(30)
Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005/2006
Number	74(30)	59(24)	66(24)	73(24)	82(20)	85(22)	80(22)	84(22)	93(24)	86(24)/84(28)

Note: ( ) is the number of subscription concerts.

Table 4.7   The number of repeat performances in regular concerts from 1956 to 2006

Composer	Work	Total number of performances
Beethoven	Symphony No 9 Opus 125	31
Brahms	Symphony No1 Opus 68	24
Brahms	Symphony No 2 Opus 73	20
Beethoven	Overture to Egmont Op 84	18
Beethoven	Symphony No 7 Opus 92	17
Beethoven	Piano Concerto No 5 Opus 73	17
Beethoven	Violin Concerto Opus 61	16
Beethoven	Symphony No 3 Opus 55	16
Rachmaninoff	Piano Concerto No 2 Opus 18	16
Dvořák	Cello Concerto Opus 104	15

(Source: KBS, 2006: p. 151)

It is evident that the range of repertoire of the KBS Symphony Orchestra was not wide. According to a survey among its subscribers and music professionals between 1997 and 2002 by a monthly magazine, *audience*, Beethoven's Symphony No. 9 was the favourite piece followed by Beethoven's Symphony No 5 and No 7 in second place, and Brahms Symphony No 4 in fifth place (Baek, 2002). Regarding concertos, Beethoven's Piano Concerto No 5 was in first place, and Rachmaninoff's Piano Concert No 2 and Dvořák's Cello Concerto were in joint fifth place (KBS, 2006: p. 150). Therefore, it can be seen that the repertoire chosen by conductors of the KBS Symphony Orchestra showed a relationship to the classical music audience's favourite pieces. In order words, the majority of conductors of the Orchestra considered and reflected the audience's taste in its regular concert programme although there were some conductors insisting that their own repertoire was played, regardless of the audience's taste.

Grieg's Piano Concerto, Dvořák's New World Symphony, Debussy's *La Mer*, R. Strauss's *Don Juan* and *Ein Heldenleben*, Rimsky-Korsakov's *Scheherazade*, symphonies of Mahler, Bruckner, Shostakovich, Schumann, Schubert, Berlioz, and

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[99] The table is reproduced based on the book, *The 50 Year History of the KBS Symphony Orchestra* (KBS, 2006).

symphonies and concertos of Mendelssohn and Tchaikovsky are also favourite pieces. Apart from the familiar repertoire, the KBS Symphony Orchestra also attempted to expand its repertoire and contribute to improving the quality of performance: The Orchestra performed unfamiliar works of Mahler and Wagner in the late 1970s with the second principal conductor. One of the objectives of the Orchestra since 1981 was to play the role of a mediator for Korean composers' creative works; however, it did not seem to fulfill this role when we look at the total number of Korean composers' works played. For instance, the works of Korean composers were not often played except at special concerts, such as 'the Korean Composer's Night'. The pieces written by Korean composers were hardly played in the repertoire of regular concerts.

'Double Concert', which is a core programme of regular concerts and plays twice with same repertoire and in same place, was first planned in the 1960s (KBS, 2006: pp. 70–71). It could be done mainly became of the interest of audience in the KBS Symphony Orchestra's performance. However, 'Double Concert' had only existed for 4 years, before the orchestra's regular concert was shifted to a single concert in 1966, as it was only popular among a small number of classical music enthusiasts. Despite several attempts to reinstate 'Double Concert' after 1966, it was resettled in 1992 and performed in two different venues (one in the south part of Seoul, and another in the north part of Seoul), in order to increase audience access to these venues.

Self-promotion concerts were started in 1984, and the purpose of this concert was to raise funds. Most Korean orchestras use self-promotion concerts and special concerts in the same term, although a special concert is a (non-profit) charitable public concert. Among various other programmes, 'Campus Concert' and 'Children's Concert' are prominent. 'Campus Concert' started in 1986: it was a touring concert going out to universities with the aim of spreading arts and cultural activities. Children's Concert began in 1998 and its aim was to reach under 8-year-olds who had not yet experienced classical music. It was successful and the orchestra now provides 5–7 concerts per year, and up to October 2006 had played 94 concerts (KBS, 2006: p. 118).

National touring started in 1972 and is an important part of the orchestra's activities, even now. In 1981, the orchestra's administration transferred from the National Theatre, and in that year, due to much restructuring, there was no national tour. Compared to other municipal orchestras, the KBS Symphony Orchestra was relatively ambitious in starting a national touring programme so early on, but it played an important part in developing people's cultural enjoyment throughout the nation.

In 1979 the orchestra embarked on its first American tour, playing in over 21 cities. The

aim of international concerts is basically to introduce Korean culture to overseas countries programming 3 pieces of three Korean composers' works, 2 piano and violin concertos, 4 symphonic pieces, and 4 pieces by Wagner, and to increase the performance level of players.[100] Thus, the purpose of international concerts of Korean symphony orchestras is different to orchestras in the western countries, where international tours are regularly undertaken in order to raise funds.

Apart from concert giving, another core activity is broadcasting.

At the beginning of its establishment, the majority of the Orchestra's work involved broadcasting, especially from 1956 to 1957, but it stopped its recording activities between 1958 and 1980. After the authority of administration moved to the KBS, the Orchestra restarted its recording activities from 1981.

Table 4.8 Total orchestral activities related to recording and broadcasting

Year	1956	1957	1958–80	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Number	19	21	None	10	35	21	13	17	29	33
Year	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Number	25	25	11	5	7	16	20	13	16	11
Year	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Number	9	8	6	9	16	19	20	7	17	6

(Source: refer from KBS, 2006)

As we can see from the above chart, its broadcasting activity is very limited, and it seems hard to say that it is a broadcasting orchestra. In addition, there has been no regular broadcasting programme that the Orchestra has participated in through its non digital TV broadcast since 2000 (Sohn, 2006). That is, although the KBS has been the top orchestra in Korea, it could not maximise its potential under an insolvent orchestral administration.

Audience

Compared to the other orchestras, the KBS Symphony Orchestra has a deeply rooted subscription system. The total number in the audience at regular concerts was 84,414 in 2005, 69,523 in 2006, and 123,585 in 2008 (KBS, 2009).[101]

Subscription system[102]

The KBS Symphony Orchestra embarked on its subscription system in 1985. Although

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[100] Majority of Korean orchestras cannot do an international concert tour owing to lack of a sufficient budget.

[101] I requested total number of audience from 2005 to 2009 to the KBS, but they do not have the information in 2007 and it is in process for 2009 audience number.

[102] Different to CPO and BPO, there is no free subscriber system in KBS Symphony Orchestra.

the supporting association existed when the KBS Symphony Orchestra was named as the Korean Philharmonic Orchestra, it was not practically activated: it was only known to a few groups of musicians, and support was also arranged by a few companies that had a personal relationship with the KBS Symphony Orchestra (KBS, 2006: p. 165).

The subscription system can be divided into three periods: introductory period, transitional period, and stable period.[103]

Introductory period: the 1980s

When the KBS Symphony Orchestra[104] was managed under the National Theatre, there used to be a membership system titled 'supporting association', which was a kind of current subscription system. Then it was upgraded to a formal subscription system in 1985 in terms of arts management (KBS, 2006: p. 165).

At the beginning, subscription was simply categorised into family membership and friend membership. Although the membership system was very basic, it was an effective way to enlarge the total number of members. In fact, it was quite popular (especially among classical music enthusiasts) and the members expressed their demands to the orchestra. With the success of its subscription members, the system changed to special membership and general membership in 1990, and then shifted to VIP membership, special membership, favourite membership and general membership in 1991.

The subscription began with 269 members in 1985, and built up to 554, 196, 303, 338 members in 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively. Therefore, the total subscription numbers fluctuated between 1985 and 1989. Yet, in spite of instability of the total members, the trend of subscription also showed a positive potential for its future development.

Transitional period: the 1990s

The subscription grew over the period as a whole, but numbers dipped in the late 1990s due to the Korean economic crisis.

The total number of Subscribers was 1,131 in 1990, and then 1,448, 2,050, 1,678, 1,477, 1,566, 1,106, 967, 677, 980, and 1,559 members from 1991 to 2000. Although the number sharply increased compared to the 1980s, it also showed some degree of instability. That is, the Korean economy dramatically increased in the early 1990s, and led to the growth of the number of subscribers, whereas the economic situation was particularly bad in the late 1990s under the International Monetary Fund, and this is

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[103] The statistical sources regarding subscription of the KBS Symphony Orchestra are mainly from 'The 50 Year History of the KBS Symphony Orchestra' (KBS, 2006: pp. 162–69).
[104] Its official English name was the Korea Philharmonic Orchestra.

evident in the decrease in subscribers as people seemed, at first, to reduce their expenditure on culture or leisure activities.

Stable period: the 2000s

Along with the recovery of the Korean economy, the subscription scheme started to be stable from 2000. There were 1,559, 1,557, 1,705, 1,960, 1,650 (KBS, 2006: p. 169), 1,396, 1,485, 1,506, and 1,418 (KBS, 2009) subscribers from 2000 to 2008.

Despite a fluctuation resulting from the stagnancy of the Korean economy in 2004, the overall subscription was stable and it helped the KBS Symphony Orchestra's income.

Table 4.9 Yearly subscription income (out of total ticket income)

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005	2005
Percentage	52.0%	53.2%	56.4%	63.0%	54.0%	54.0%

(Source: refer from KBS, 2006)

The KBS Symphony Orchestra is claiming that 'the change of social cognition happens rapidly and the quality of the moderns' life is increased, so that the number of classical music enthusiasts should definitely be increased' (KBS, 2006: p. 169): the orchestra believes a brighter future exists for its subscription system, but I do not think the future is as bright as the KBS Symphony orchestra believes, as there are many factors influencing its membership. One of threats might be the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra which is another fine orchestra in the same city and had an entire reform in terms of administration structure, financial support and players. The SPO changed its whole organisation in 2005: it used to be managed, controlled, and supported by the Sejong Arts Center, but it became a foundation, and now it is an independent organisation with an enormous financial subsidy from the city of Seoul. Before this reform, the KBS Symphony Orchestra had a slightly higher position than the SPO in terms of finance, administration structure, and the quality of performance,[105] but the situation seems currently to be reversed. The SPO appointed a first-class principal conductor and has been praised for their performance and programming, while the KBS Symphony Orchestra has not had a principal conductor since 2004 due to a serious conflict with the KBS. This, in turn, has affected their performance which is now not as good as before, and the audience of the KBS are worried about the whole situation. I also think that the number of classical music enthusiasts will not be hugely increased: a certain loyal classical music audience always exists, while the number is very limited and subscribers are changeable, so we cannot expect a great deal of growth in terms of the total number of subscribers and classical music enthusiasts.

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[105] The SPO appointed Myung-Whun Cheong, who was the music director and principal conductor of l'Opera de la Bastille, as an Artistic Director and principal conductor in 2005.

The KBS subscription system mentioned above only explained the yearly number of subscribers and the type of subscription, and did not locate the characteristics of its audiences. Although I could not access information on its audience when I requested it to the KBS, as they did not have such information, I could receive the audience survey done in 2003 from former administrative staff (KBS, 2003).

The KBS in 2003 aimed to analyse the audience (both subscribers and non subscribers) attending the 549th subscription concert held on 27–28th February. According to the survey, approximately twice as many women (65.5%) as men (34.5%) claim to attend concerts. This trend addresses the general feature that women are more likely to attend arts and cultural activities in Korea. The KBS Symphony Orchestra mainly performs in two venues: the KBS hall and the Seoul Arts Center. The audience prefers to attend the venue near their residence. Those in the age ranges 40–49 (23.9%), 20–29 (23.8%), and 30–39 (20.7%) are the main attenders.

A breakdown of audiences shows that 22.7% are students, 22.5% housewives, 17.1% professionals, and 16.3% are office workers. So, although generally classical music concert is considered to be for high class consumption, this concert could not be considered as exclusively the domain of the higher social groups, because the key attenders are students and housewives. There are many factors influencing arts attendance, however, and this phenomenon might be caused by a time factor. The concert was held on weekdays, so it might be hard to working people to attend. Although it is difficult to prove that price effects people's decisions whether or not to buy or attend something, as people are most likely to give misleading answers, price does partly influence the decision making (Baker, 2000: p. 47). Yet, the ticket price of the KBS subscription concert is very low, so that the majority of students could attend the concert.

There is a close relationship between income levels and attendance (Verwey, 1988) particularly among those on the lowest income (Hill et al., 2001), and income level is also closely related to social class. The proportion having a monthly income under 2 million won (£1,000) is 40.7%, whereas the proportion of those who have a monthly income over 2 million won (£1,000) is 59.3%. The higher income group is therefore more likely to attend this concert.

20.4% of attenders consulted the KBS Symphony Orchestra's subscription brochure and 16.7% the Internet as the primary source of information. By contrast, 10.9% cited broadcasting, 4.3% classical music magazine, and 3.4% newspaper. Press advertising is used slightly less than broadcast media (including television and radio). Different age groups used different information sources: the Internet is a main source among those aged 20–29; broadcasting to those 40–49; and newspapers to those 50–59.

A majority of attenders is generally satisfied with the conductor, soloist, performance level, repertoire, and ticket price: 85.5% are satisfied with the conductor, and only 1.1% dissatisfied; 80.6% are satisfied with the soloist; 81.3% are satisfied with the performance, 68.2% are satisfied with the repertoire; and 20% of attenders thought the ticket price was expensive, whereas 11.4% thought it was cheap and 68.7% thought it was reasonable.

The KBS researched its subscribers to gather basic information on 24–25th August 2006 (Kang, 2006). The proportion of women and men was 52.9% and 42.2%. Compared to research in 2003, the percentage between women and men was equalized (65.5% women vs 34.5% men). The main attendance group was 50-somethings (28.3%), followed by 40-somethings (17.4%), 60-somethings (16.8%), 30-somethings (14.3%), and 20-somethings (12.6%), but teenagers were only 3.1%. Therefore, the main attendance group among subscribers was 50-somethings, while 20-somethings and 40-somethings were the main audience group in the survey in 2003 (KBS, 2003).

Regarding occupation, professionals were 28.9%, housewives 21.8%, and office workers 16.0%. It has slightly different features to the 2003 survey: the majority of attenders were students (22.7%) and housewives (22.5%), followed by professionals (17.1%).

The percentage of subscribers with a monthly income of under 2 million won (£1000) is 17.6%, whereas over 2 million won (£1000) it is 74.8% (31.1% earn over 5 million won (£2500) monthly income). Thus, a majority of subscribers has a higher income.

The primary sources of information among subscribed attenders are the subscription brochure (32.5%), followed by the Internet (17.1%), and radio and television advertisements (14.3%). Newspapers (7.3%) and classical music magazines (6.7%) are relatively less used.

Regarding age group, teenagers and 20-somethings cited the Internet as the primary source of information, whereas 30-somethings used pamphlets and the Internet equally, and the pamphlet is the main source of information to 40-somethings.

Subscribers think the price of subscription is fair (55.5%) or cheap (8.1%). 20.4%

considered it expensive and 16.0% did not answer. Similar to the 2003 survey, subscribed attenders are very satisfied or satisfied with the conductor (68%), soloist (57.4%), performance (56.1%), and repertoire (45.9%).

Finance

The KBS Symphony Orchestra is 100% subsidised by the KBS. The total budget of the KBS Symphony Orchestra had been highest amongst Korean orchestra until 2004. Then the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra's annual budget became twice the size of the KBS Symphony Orchestra with its new start as a foundation. Although the SPO is totally independent in terms of administration and operated by its own administration body, finance is still heavily dependent on the city of Seoul, despite incredible growth in its own income from music activities.

Table 4.10 Breakdown of the KBS Symphony Orchestra's income and expenditure

(Unit: won)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Total budget	8.1 billion (£4m)	8 billion (£3.9)	7.7 billion (£3.7)	7.5 billion (£3.6)	7.3 billion (£3.6)
Personnel expenditure	6.2 billion (£3m)	6.2 billion (£3)	6 billion (£2.9m)	6.2 billion (£3m)	6 billion (£2.9m)
Charitable activities expenditure	1.7 billion (£830,045)	1.6 billion (£783,823)	1.6 billion £768,740)	1.1 billion £552,714	1.2 billion £601,369)
Income from charitable activities	1.2 billion (£583,853)	1.1 billion (£535,199)	1.6 billion (£778,471)	1.6 billion (£778,471)	0.9 billion (£437,890)

(Source: KBS, 2009)

Governance structure

The Executive Director of a Korean public orchestra is generally the Mayor or Deputy Mayor of the city, but currently there is no Chief Executive of the KBS Symphony Orchestra and the president of the KBS seems to have been the authority to appoint the Music Director and Principal Conductor since 1997, so we can say that the president of the KBS partly plays the role as a Chief Executive.

This orchestra has operated under various departments of the KBS, and has been managed by the Audience Business Team under the Audience Relations Division since 2004. When the KBS changes its governance structure, the structure and title of the orchestra's administrative team are likely to be changed. The staff in the Audience Business Team, which is in charge of administration of the orchestra, are consistently changed, as civil servants, who take charge of orchestra affairs of Korean public orchestras, are regularly rotated. Along with staff at orchestral executive constitution (the staff in the Audience Business Team), they are extra administrative personnel. The KBS contracts them as players but, in practice, they have charge of scores, instruments, and day-to-day managerial work.

Figure 4.7 Governance structure of the KSO

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┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│          CEO of the KBS         │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
                 │
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Head of Division of Audience Relations │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
                 │
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Director of Audience Business Team │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
                 │
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│        Managing Director        │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
                 │
     ┌───────────┴──────────────────┐
┌──────────────────────────────┐    │
│ Staff at Orchestral Executive │    │
│ Constitution                  │    │
└──────────────────────────────┘    │
                                     │
              ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
              │ (Managerial)                     │
              │ Supporting Players for General Affairs │
              └──────────────────────────────────┘
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
Orchestra committee

When the authority of management shifted to the KBS in 1981, the KBS Symphony Orchestra was totally rearranged, with a new constitution. According to operation regulations, the KBS Symphony Orchestra should have a Chief Executive, a Principal Conductor, an Assistant Conductor, 123 players including a Leader, a Sub-Leader, a Principal, a Sub-Principal, a player's representative, a Librarian, and a Stage Officer. The employment of players was done by open audition.

The orchestral committee is organised into 15 members: a President, Vice President, and 13 general members. Their main role is to consider the budget management and concert plan, to recommend and appoint a Chief Executive, to agree on the appointment of a conductor, and to evaluate the overall performance of the orchestra (KBS, 2008). The orchestral committee has regular and irregular meetings and members of committee serve a term of two years, which is renewable. Along with the orchestral committee, the KBS Symphony Orchestra has a personnel committee and the main roles are to examine players' hiring and firing, players' evaluation and reward and penalty, and personnel management (KBS, 2008).

Orchestral executive constitution

The KBS Symphony Orchestra does not have an orchestral executive constitution.

This orchestra is treated as a department of the KBS, and all administrative staff are employed as staff of the KBS and the company arranges the staffing of the orchestra. Therefore, the staff at the orchestra are more regularly changed, compared to the other public orchestra, which has an orchestral executive constitution. There are seven administrative staff: team leader, senior staff, and five staff under the Audience Business Team.[106]

Human resources and general roles

Artistic personnel
Chief executive

A Chief Executive is appointed by the president of the KBS, recommended by the orchestral committee, and he or she should be a selected member of the committee. The role of a Chief Executive is to recommend musicians: a principal conductor, a guest conductor, a leader, a sub-leader, a principal player, a sub principal, and a representative of players; to make a concert and rehearsal plan, to make an invitation plan for guest conductors and players; to require consideration on players' firing and hiring, evaluation, discipline, and all other affairs related to personnel management (KBS, 2006: p. 89). The contract is usually for two years, but it is renewable.

The KBS Symphony Orchestra had three Chief Executives. The first was Kang-Sook Lee, who was a professor at the school of music in Seoul National University and was appointed between 1981 and 1983. His contribution to the orchestra was to be a basis for future development and he increased the total number of concerts. He also opened up the entire audition process to all players in 1982 to raise performing levels. Man-Bok Kim was the second chief executive and he worked for seven years from 1983 to 1990. His key contribution was to develop the programmes that visited various venues to provide concerts. The orchestra was looking for audiences in various places, instead of waiting for audiences to come to the concert hall. In addition, as Kim had been working for Seoul Symphony Orchestra for a long time, he sometimes conducted the KBS Symphony Orchestra. After Kim's resignation, Dong-Seong Kim was appointed from 1991 to 1993. He had been a member of the orchestral committee since 1981 and was a Minister of Public Information (current by the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism). His contribution was to plan the 'Double Concert', which plays the same repertoire in different venues, and which helped people's access to the venue as the orchestra played in both the south and north parts of Seoul. Furthermore, due to his endeavours, the total number of subscribers reached 2000 people. He also enhanced

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[106] Despite several requests, the staff of the KBS said that they had no information on details of the work for each member of staff.

the KBS Symphony Orchestra's image and its performance level nationally and internationally. The KBS has not appointed Chief Executive since 1993. According to former staff, it is because they could not find proper person for that position, and a principal conductor takes the place from 1994.

Conductor

The KBS Symphony Orchestra has had six principal conductors.

The first principal conductor appointed from 1956 to 1970, Won-Sik Lim, contributed to the organisation and management of the Orchestra from its establishment. Many players who were members of other orchestras joined the KBS Symphony Orchestra because of Lim. When this orchestra was disestablished, the KBS Symphony Orchestra continued to work as the Korea Symphony Orchestra, a private orchestra, because of Lim's personal relationship in society. Therefore, if Lim had not established the Korea Symphony Orchestra, the KBS Symphony Orchestra might not exist today. After Lim's resignation in 1970, the KBS Symphony Orchestra experienced difficulties in finding a proper conductor. The second principal conductor, Yeon-Tak Hong, had been appointed between 1972 and 1981. Hong improved the players' working environment and welfare, enlarged the repertoire to include Mahler and Bruckner, developed programmes including a Youth Concert, Ensemble Concert, and Korean Composer's Night, expanded the orchestra to full size, and started national touring. He also reformed the players' position, which was decided by age rather than ability in 1978 a year before its 50-day American tour concert, and the result was seen in the improvement of the performance level (KBS, 2006: pp. 75–80). All these achievements helped to upgrade the KBS Symphony Orchestra's artistic quality. The KBS Symphony Orchestra appointed Kyung-Soo Won as its third principal conductor in 1986. He was keen to raise its value as a broadcasting orchestra, and created the 'FM Concert', which drew great interest and is still representative of the KBS's broadcasting programme today. During Won's period, there were many important national events, including the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, so the orchestra's participation in various events resulted in fewer regular concerts compared to the previous year: the orchestra provided 20 regular concerts out of a total number of 84 concerts in 1987, whereas 16 regular concerts out of 91 were given in 1988. A German conductor, Othmar Maga, was appointed as the fourth principal conductor in 1992. Although he did not exercise a charismatic leadership, he harmonized with the players and showed diligence during his service until 1996.[107]

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[107] The players and staff that I interviewed considered charismatic leadership as a significant factor for the principal conductor in Korea.

The fifth principal conductor was Myung-Whun Cheong, the most famous of Korean conductors. However, he worked for only four months, and left the KBS Symphony Orchestra due to a conflict, mainly caused by budget matters during the Korean financial crisis. In these four months, he only conducted one regular concert and programmed a youth concert, which seemed to promote his CD. Furthermore, he stayed in Korea for a very limited time, as he mainly lived in Paris. His salary may have been considerably higher than the fee he received from l'Opera de la Bastille, where he worked as an Artistic Director and Principal Conductor. The salary he received from the KBS Symphony Orchestra was equal to the amount of money that Riccardo Muti was paid in Paris for 32 concerts in 1990s. As a current principal conductor of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, he also received a great amount of money from the city of Seoul for this position. Therefore, I feel that his name value is rather exaggerated in Korea, as he is the only top Korean conductor in the world. As a successor of Cheong, Russia's famous conductor, Dmitry Kitaenko was appointed from 1999 to 2004. He spent 10 weeks per year in Korea and conducted many of the regular concerts, national tour concerts, broadcasting concerts, and recordings, so that he contributed to improving the orchestra's performance level and the degree of recognition inside and outside Korea, and enlarged the audience. Although some criticised his repertoire for being too strongly dependent on Russian composers' works, he was very popular with the Korean audience, and great interest was generated by his concerts.

According to the players that I interviewed, there is no serious conflict with its principal conductor as in the case of the BPO. It might be because the KBS was able to have top Korean conductors and foreign conductors since its foundation, unlike the other orchestras.

...A conductor should have both musical and administrative abilities.

[Player 1]

A conductor should artistically lead (players)...but we should consider the conductor's personal character as he will be a leader of group...A conductor should have musical knowledge and draw on players' hidden musical ability. In addition, he also has to be able to harmonize players.

[Player 2]

Like the players in the other two orchestras, the players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra also prefer a principal conductor who mixes both artistic and managerial competencies. However, it seems difficult for a principal conductor to have both

managerial and administrative authority under the system of the KBS Symphony Orchestra. The KBS Symphony Orchestra had a Chief Director, but the orchestral office, which is in charge of all administrative works, is a part of the department of the KBS and directly controlled by the KBS. Thus, the principal conductors of the KBS might have less administrative power compared to other public orchestras which generally do not have the position of Chief Director and are managed by an orchestral office that is not a department of the city or a cultural center.

Apart from the principal conductors, the KBS Symphony Orchestra had a senior conductor, an assistant conductor, and a principal guest conductor. Therefore, when the position of principal conductor was vacant, the principal guest conductor or senior conductor took the role of principal conductor. The KBS Symphony Orchestra has not had a principal conductor for a long time due to the issue of the orchestra's independence.

Table 4.11 The conductors of the KBS Symphony Orchestra

Principal conductors	Principal guest conductors	Senior conductor
Won-Sik Lim (1956–70)	Walter Gilesen (1982–84)	Nan-Sae Geum (1981–92)
Yeon-Tak Hong (1971–81)	Moshe Atzmon (1990–92)	
Kyung-Soo Won (1986–88)	Vakhtang Jordania (1990–96)	
Othmar Maga (1992–96)	Eun-Seong Park (2000–2002)	
Myung-Whun Cheong (1998)	Seung Gwak (2004–2006)	
Dmitry Kitaenko (1999–2004)		

(Source: refer from KBS, 2006)

Musicians

There are currently 89 players (KBS, 2009).[108] The players' contract with the KBS Symphony Orchestra is varied, ranging from 1, 2, 3, and 5 years to retirement age (61). Auditions are only held when KBS wants to improve the level of performance. Although all Korean public orchestras have a regular audition in every 2–3 year, the KBS Symphony Orchestra does not have regular auditions (KBS, 2008). The players have to perform and exercise for 6 hours per day during weekdays based on the orchestra regulation. The KBS Symphony Orchestra has a players' representative committee and their union. I asked the KBS about the representative committee and the union, but they refused to give me an answer. I could obtain only limited information on the musicians' union through the Internet information and the players.

Musicians' union

The musicians' union was founded to protect the players' rights in relation to the KBS. The players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra firstly organised a musicians' union and

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[108] There were 107, 98, 93, and 89 players in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively.

joined with other KBS arts companies under the Federation of Korean Trade Unions in 2001, and then formed an independent orchestra musicians' union and joined with the National Union of Media workers in 2004. Currently 95% of players have joined the union, but not a few foreign players. However, the union does not have strong powers to insist on and represent the rights of players with the company when there are problematic issues.

> The KBS disliked it (that players joined the KBS Labour Union)...it apparently does not show its emotion...but the company is irritated and the union is also unhappy (with players' entry to the union)...the orchestra's position is ambiguous...we (players) are not a favourable group to the union because they don't know our salary and think players' welfare is much better than them...they just guess players have similar salary or a bit less salary compared with them (staff of the KBS company)...sometimes we (players) only work in the morning and finish work, or we do not go to work and earn more money than them (staff of the KBS company) through music lessons in their point of view...But it is not true...it applies to only few players...the members of the union consider us (players) in that way, and it is quite hard to us...
>
> [Player 3]

The player explained the ambiguous position of players, since most people do not consider players as labourers, but as artists. Whether an artist is a labourer or not is an arguable issue in Korea. The new president of Korea, Myung-Park Lee, said critically, 'How could musicians make a union?' (here 'musicians' refers to the players of the Seoul Symphony Orchestra, and he was the former Mayor of the city of Seoul). The concept that the musician equals a labourer seems not to exist, according to Mr. Lee's viewpoint. However, the majority of members of orchestras are employed and receive a salary, and it is natural that players should be recognised as labourers in terms of their identity, although some players do not think of their work as labour.

A big issue—the orchestra's independence

The KBS Symphony Orchestra's biggest concern is its status. The KBS has wanted its orchestra to move out, but the orchestra does not want to, so the KBS Symphony Orchestra has not been stable. The issue concerning the KBS Symphony Orchestra's independence has been discussed, but the conflict between the KBS and the players is becoming serious, and it has resulted in a players' demonstration, which took to the street in 2005 protesting against the decision of the KBS, inefficient management, and a vacancy of the Chief Director and Principal Conductor. Although the KBS held two

conferences to explain and help the understanding of the orchestra's foundation plan in 2005, the company failed to make an agreement with the players. According to an announcement from the KBS in 2005, the orchestra should be shifted to a foundation from March 2006, however, it has not yet been accomplished.

The reason why the KBS wants its orchestra to be independent is that it is suffering from inefficient marketing, a lack of finance, and a non-professional government structure. To solve these problems, the KBS wants it to be a foundation (Lee, 2005a). Staff Member 7 claims that 'the aim of independence is not to expel the orchestra...we want to manage the orchestra with a frame, like a foundation...(if we keep the orchestra) it is a loss...if the orchestra is a foundation, it is possible to be supported and patronized (by private resources) as well as public subsidies...the current trend (of Korean orchestras) is pursuing the system of foundation...so, orchestra could be rehabilitated by its own effort and be effectively managed...the reason players disagree with our plan is due to the fear of audition...I think the KBS Symphony Orchestra should be a foundation'.

The KBS continually insisted that the orchestra's independence was totally for the orchestra's development in financial and administrative aspects. However, the players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra were against the KBS's standpoint:

> The KBS had a serious deficit, and they thought the orchestra was one of reasons that led to its deficit...so the KBS wanted the orchestra to move out...But I disagree with the orchestra's independence...Because the KBS does not make or prepare a basic plan for its orchestra's independence...in addition, if the orchestra becomes a foundation, personnel expenses are not guaranteed.
>
> [Player 2]

> There was no preparation period (for the KBS Symphony Orchestra to be an independent foundation)...the preparation period was approximately three or four months...before this time, the KBS Symphony Orchestra asked a research agency to find a way out of the KBS Symphony Orchestra's development, and there were many issues...to change the National Orchestra or to remain under the KBS and to be an independent foundation...But the KBS only paid attention to the orchestra's problematic matters. Based on this negative aspect, staff of the KBS reported to the president of the KBS that the KBS Symphony Orchestra needed to transform to a foundation for the development of the orchestra.
>
> [Player 3]

Regarding the independence of the KBS Symphony Orchestra, it did not occur because of the president of the KBS, Hyun-Joon Jung's rigid volition, but for accumulating his visible result...generally speaking, a government enterprise receives its budget from the National Assembly...And the Assembly started to mention that the KBS has spent too much money...It influences the president of the KBS, and he needs to show obvious contribution...He researched the way of restructuring the KBS like other companies, and then he pointed out the KBS Symphony Orchestra...The orchestra does not make a visible profit...we (players) don't think we are a part of the KBS's departments, but the company does...we are also a part of a department...to make a visible restructuring, they wanted the orchestra which does not make reasonable income to be removed from the KBS...Being an independent foundation is good in words, but it is just restructuring for the KBS.

[Player 4]

The KBS insists that the transformation of the KBS Symphony Orchestra into an independent foundation is to increase its competitiveness and to develop the orchestra, whereas the players think the plan is mainly due to having financial difficulties, and there is no long-term plan. Therefore, the KBS wants the orchestra to be separate. If an orchestra is to be an independent foundation as the KBS plans, it will cost a lot of money, as the total size of the organisation is bigger. Therefore, the orchestra cannot shift to being a foundation without money. On the other hand, the KBS's plan is partly to subsidise its orchestra after independence: the KBS wants to support approximately half the total budget of the orchestra (the current budget is 8 billion won (£4 million) and is entirely supported by the KBS), and the orchestra needs to find the rest of the budget itself. Therefore, although the KBS Symphony Orchestra needs administrative and financial changes, it might be impossible to accomplish these plans unless firm financial support is guaranteed to the orchestra. Furthermore, as the players mentioned, it seems to be taking the deficit of the KBS out on its orchestra. When there was a serious deficit in 2005, the KBS asked the orchestra to be separate itself, and then when its financial situation was recovered in 2006, the plan was postponed and the same situation has continued to today without any changes. Therefore, it is evident that the KBS does not have a rigid long-term plan. More basically, it seems doubtful whether the KBS wanted to see the orchestra's development, so the plan may have been designed to serve their own interest.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the social and economic context of three Korean municipal orchestras which represent all Korean municipal orchestras that this study is concerned with. It provides key features of orchestras as operational organisations. Although there are minor differences, such as size of public funding, orchestral executive constitution, and audience, or the existence of a musicians' union, the overall features of Korea municipal orchestras are more-or-less similar.

The next two chapters will examine job satisfaction and conflict using these three cases: the following chapter presents the results of qualitative (interview) and quantitative (survey) data collection on the job satisfaction of players and administrative staff in Korean municipal orchestras.

Chapter 5 Job satisfaction

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the quantitative and qualitative research regarding job satisfaction within Korean municipal orchestras. First, various theories of job satisfaction are discussed, and then previous job satisfaction studies on orchestra players in Korea are briefly explained. Third, the instrument measuring job satisfaction is explained. Next, the results of the author's quantitative analysis on job satisfaction and turnover are discussed and accessed by means of one-way analysis of variance and multi-regression analysis. Finally, the results of the qualitative research, which provide further insights by uncovering hidden intrinsic factors, are investigated. A brief conclusion follows.

5.2 Job satisfaction

There are many different definitions of the term 'job satisfaction' (Locke, 1976; Vroom, 1964; Herzberg et al., 1957; Scarpello and Campbell, 1983; Price and Mueller, 1986; and Hellriegel et al., 1998), and no single definition of job satisfaction with which everyone agrees. The definition of job satisfaction used in the Job Descriptive Index (JDI) is derived from Smith et al. (1969): 'Job satisfactions are feelings or affective responses to facets of the situation' (p. 6). According to Glick (1992):

> Job satisfaction can be measured globally to establish a general level of satisfaction or dimensionally to determine the various facets or variables of job satisfaction. Job satisfaction variables that have been identified and measured with dimensional or facet-specific instruments are financial rewards, working conditions, supervisory practices, company policies, co-workers, opportunities for advancement, security, and content of the job (p. 626).

In a similar fashion, this study will examine job satisfaction by scrutinizing five specific facets: work, pay, supervision, promotion, and co-workers based on the definitions by Smith et al. (1969).

5.3 Theories of job satisfaction

Job satisfaction and job performance

Study of relationships between job satisfaction and work performance has drawn much attention from researchers.

> The study of the relationship between job satisfaction and job performance is one of the most venerable research traditions in industrial-organisational psychology.
> (Judge et al., 2001: p. 376)

Job satisfaction/job performance relationship studies have 'at least seven different ways in which the satisfaction-performance relationship has been specified' (Judge *et al.*, 2001: p. 377). The seven models are:

1. Job satisfaction causes job performance.
2. Job satisfaction and job performance are reciprocally related.
3. The relationship between job satisfaction and job performance is spurious.
4. The relationship between job satisfaction and job performance is moderated by other variables.
5. There is no relationship between job satisfaction and job performance.
6. Alternative conceptualizations of job satisfaction and/or job performance.

(Judge *et al.*, 2001: pp. 378–81)

Most researchers consider the first four models old fashioned, and either the fifth or the sixth models are used if job satisfaction and performance show little relationship (Judge *et al.*, 2001: p. 383). Early studies were conducted by Brayfield and Crockett (1955), and Kornhauser and Sharp (1932) regarding '(job) attitudes and productivity in an industrial setting' (Iaffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985: p. 251). Brayfield and Crockett (1955), Iaffaldano and Muchinsky (1985), Doll and Gunderson (1969), Schriesheim and Murphy (1976), and Tharenou and Harker (1982) are more or less pessimistic on the correlations, while Herzberg *et al.* (1957), Bhagat (1982), Arvey and Gross (1977), Gould (1979), Locke (1965), and Porac *et al.* (1983), Petty *et al.* (1984) report more optimistic conclusions. Argyle (1989) concludes that the overall correlation between job satisfaction and work performance is at about +.15 (which is very low) and there is a higher correlation for white-collar workers. Thus, the relationship between job satisfaction and work performance might be different in each case. Although job satisfaction does not necessarily lead an individual to perform a specific task well, it is important for several reasons. Satisfaction represents an outcome of work experience, so high levels of dissatisfaction help managers identify organisational problems that need attention. In addition, job dissatisfaction is strongly linked to absenteeism, turnover, and physical and mental health problems.

Impact of demographic characteristics on job satisfaction

A representative study on job satisfaction and age was completed by Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson and Capwell (1957), who explained that job satisfaction and age have a U-shaped relationship. At the beginning of employment, an employee has a higher job satisfaction, but then it goes down before beginning to rise once more. After experiencing these steps, the employee keeps a balance on job satisfaction. The reason for high job satisfaction at the early stage of employment is the newness and expectation of the job, then job satisfaction drops when the expectation is not met. With

increasing experience and maturity, employees are likely to adjust their ambitions and expectations to a realistic level. When this adjusted expectation is pursued, job satisfaction increases again. However, Hulin and Smith (1965) did not find evidence of U-shaped relationships between age or tenure and job satisfaction, but did find positive and monotonic relationships between job satisfaction and age and work itself. Gibson and Klein (1970) also studied the relationship between job satisfaction and age and tenure, and they found a positive and linear relationship between job satisfaction and age, but a negative relationship between job satisfaction and tenure. Gibson and Klein argued that a U-shaped relationship is found between satisfaction and the combination of age and tenure. Furthermore, Hunt and Saul (1975) stated that 'the correlation between age and overall job satisfaction was found to be greatest among workers with less than 12 months tenure' particularly with males, but 'overall job satisfaction was found to be more strongly associated with age than with tenure for males' and 'there was, in fact, no evidence of a significant relationship of any kind between age and the overall job satisfaction of the females' (p. 699). Studies of the relationship between job satisfaction and age were also done by Muchinsky (1978) on a negative relationship, Ronen (1978) on no significant relationship, and by Glenn, Taylor, and Weaver (1977) on a less-than-significant relationship.

Keller (1983) studied absence frequency and job satisfaction, revealing that marital status, as well as tenure, gender, and group cohesiveness, are 'significant predictors of absenteeism' (p. 538); married employees have less absenteeism compared to unmarried employees. One might intuitively believe that absenteeism may relate to lack of job satisfaction; thus it might be implied that those who believe that Keller's study is sufficient evidence concerning absenteeism may consider married employees to be more satisfied with their jobs. However, the studies of Ilgen and Hollenback (1977), Dittrich and Carrell (1979), Johns (1978), Cheloha and Farr (1980), Watson (1981), and Matrunola (1996) could find no important relationship between job satisfaction and absenteeism. Therefore, we cannot conclude that married employees are more satisfied with their jobs than unmarried employees. Shea, Paines and Spitz (1970) also stated that job satisfaction might not be much affected by marital status, as the same degree of satisfaction was found between married and unmarried women. Despite the negative relationship between marital status and job satisfaction, Wild (1970) found that single employees had more complaints about their jobs than married employees among 2,159 female employees and 236 female ex-employees of electronic companies.

There are several studies on the relationship between education and job satisfaction

and the results are contradictory. Vollmer and Kinney (1955) found that better educated employees were more dissatisfied with their jobs: this is because higher educated individuals invest more money in education and expect a higher income, better working conditions and a more considerate supervisor. In contrast, less educated individuals expect less from the company and are ready to accept some inferior working conditions. Sulkin and Pranis (1967) found an inverse relationship between education and job satisfaction, as did Vollmer and Kinney (1955): higher educated workers had more dissatisfaction.

However, Gordon and Arvey (1975) studied education and job satisfaction among 259 clerical and managerial employees of a leading manufacturer of building materials, and found that education does not significantly influence job satisfaction in the work itself, but 'a significant inverse relationship was revealed on the practice of management factor' (p. 889). That is, the more educated employees were less satisfied with the general management of the organisation compared to less educated employees, as the former were more cognizant about 'effective and ineffective management techniques (p. 890–91). Shinha and Sarma (1962) indicated that there was no significance in the relationship between education and job satisfaction among 100 workers in India. However, Gallup (1973) and Goodwin (1969) both found a significant relationship between education and job satisfaction.

Regarding tenure and job satisfaction, there are different results in different studies. Hulin and Smith (1965) explained positive, monotonic relationships between satisfaction with company tenure as well as pay, work, and age (as it is indicated earlier). In addition, Hunt and Saul (1975) found that overall job satisfaction with company tenure of white-collar male and female workers had significant, positive, linear relationships (p. 699), which reversed Herzberg's U-shaped relationship hypothesis and also Gibson and Klein's (1970) hypothesis of a negative and linear relationship: that, as the length of time working increases, job satisfaction decreases.

Job satisfaction and job decision latitude in Denmark by gender was presented in *Measuring Job Satisfaction in Surveys: Comparative Analytical Report* (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007). If job decision latitude is high, men (89.5%) have higher job satisfaction than women (85%), but job decision latitude is above age, women (80.8%) have higher job satisfaction than men (77.3%): there is not much difference between the job satisfaction of men and women when the level of job decision latitude is below average or low. Varca *et al.* (1983) surveyed 200 male and 192 female workers ranging from low to high level

occupations, and found that male workers were more satisfied with pay and promotion in the higher levels of occupation, although less satisfied in the lower levels, compared to female workers. However, Varca et al. (1983) did not control over pay, type of job, organisation, and tenure, and the results should be considered with caution (Summers and DeCotiis, 1988: p. 680). Smith and Plant (1982) studied the case of university professors, and concluded that no significant gender difference in job satisfaction was found. [109] Summers and DeCotiis (1988) also studied gender difference in job satisfaction with a sample of 74 husband and wife teams. Although they found females were more satisfied with compensation and advancement than males, no evidence was found for the hypothesized gender difference in overall job satisfaction (p. 687).

Thus, it might be concluded that there is no absolute relationship between job satisfaction and demographic characteristics—age, tenure, gender, marital status, and education—but some degree of relationship cannot be denied.

Relationship between job satisfaction and turnover

Although job satisfaction and turnover seem to relate indirectly, most studies examine the direct relationship between them: Vroom (1964), Porter and Steers (1973), and Locke (1975) reported a negative relationship between job satisfaction and employee turnover, while Mobley (1977) explained the process of job dissatisfaction leading to turnover. Lee (1988: p. 263) summarised Mobley's various stages of loss of job satisfaction:

1. To think about quitting, which may in turn lead that employee
2. To evaluate the expected utility of searching for another job and the costs associated with quitting the present job. From the evaluation,
3. An intention to search for alternative jobs may emerge, which in turn likely leads the employee
4. To the actual searching for alternative jobs and
5. To the evaluation of the acceptability of any identified alternatives. From that second evaluation, the employee would be likely
6. To compare those alternatives to the present job, which in tern can lead to
7. An intention to quit, and eventual employee turnover.

The following studies examined parts of the employee turnover decision process described by Mobley (1977). In his previous study, *Job Satisfaction and Thinking of Quitting* (1975), Mobley found 'high negative correlations between satisfaction and frequency of thinking of quitting (Mobley, 1977: p. 239). Atkinson and Lefferts (1972) had already found a significant relationship between frequency of thinking of quitting and actual decision making. On the other hand, Irvine and Evans (1995) examined the

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[109] Income level was not controlled in the study of Smith and Plant (1982).

relationships between job satisfaction and eventual turnover, which is the final stage of job dissatisfaction, among nurses, and found 'a small negative relationship exists between job satisfaction and turnover': job satisfaction increases, turnover decreases (p. 247).

This study will explore the relationship between job satisfaction resulting from the Job Descriptive Index's five categories and thoughts of quitting among players and administrative staff in three Korean municipal orchestras. However, a limitation is that it does not examine the complete decision process of employee turnover as detailed by Mobley (1977), and it does not explore the actual results of turnover.

5.4 Job satisfaction studies of players of symphony orchestras in Korea

There are a number of studies of job satisfaction in Korea, but only two,[110] both conducted by Master's degree students, focus on orchestras: the first, conducted by Jung-Eun Lee (2001), concentrated on the professionalism of orchestral players in two private orchestras and two public orchestras, analysing 'the occupational features of professionals as orchestra musicians through questionnaire research' (p. 94) and, in part, describing players' job satisfaction. Lee's study investigated the professionalism of the orchestral player's job[111] based on the four professionalism scales devised by Hall (1968): 'professional knowledge and sense of the field, belief in social contribution, belief in self-regulation, [and] autonomy' (p. 95). She posed just one question related to job satisfaction, asking about the degree of general job satisfaction on a scale of five: very satisfied, satisfied, average, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied. If respondents answered 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied', then they needed to give the reason for dissatisfaction. The reasons may be limited in scope, as she excluded answers from respondents who chose 'average', 'satisfied', and 'very satisfied'. Players may be satisfied with one aspect of the job and considerably less satisfied with others (Hellriegel et al., 1998: p. 54), so this study on job satisfaction is inadequate. Moreover, information as to what extent players were satisfied and to which factor of the job they attributed their satisfaction was also excluded. Two items, satisfaction with co-workers and supervisor, were given with five scales, respectively, in order to investigate players' professionalism. Thus, there is limited information on players' job satisfaction.

Another study, conducted by Ki-Doo Nam (2003), focused on the satisfaction of players

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[110] Soo-Jin Jung (2004) also partly includes orchestral players' job satisfaction in her master thesis, but I do not count her study because her main study is focusing on managerial improvement of the public orchestras in Korea.
[111] It implies a 'professional job attitude' (Lee, 2001: p. 94).

among four Korean private orchestras in metropolitan regions, in order to find a proper means of development. To measure the job satisfaction of players, he used four satisfaction categories: job consciousness and responsibility, professionalism, pay, and working conditions. However, he considered each satisfaction category using only simple and descriptive data, and ignored the relationship with demographic variables. The following section will explain the instrument measuring job satisfaction (JDI) used in this study.

5.5 Job satisfaction: the Job Descriptive Index (JDI)

The most widely used method of assessing job satisfaction in an organisation is the Job Descriptive Index (JDI) developed by Smith, Kendall, and Hulin (1969). There are two reasons for its popularity: one is that 'the Job Descriptive Index is without a doubt the most carefully constructed measure of job satisfaction in existence today' (Vroom, 1964: p. 100),[112] the second reason is that the JDI is likely to apply to a wide range of demographic characteristics (Golembiewski and Yeager, 1978). The 1997 revised version of the JDI was used to collect data about specific levels of job satisfaction among respondents.[113] It is composed of five separate categories: work, pay, supervision, promotion, and co-workers. Internal reliability estimates for five subscales, and coefficient alpha[114] estimates of reliability are presented in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Coefficient alpha values for the JDI

	Cronbach's alpha if item deleted	Cronbach's alpha	N of items
Work	0.585		
Pay	0.688		
Supervision	0.670	0.679	5
Promotion	0.531		
Co-workers	0.607		

As Table 5.1 shows, the reliability of five subscales to measuring job satisfaction for this study is 0.679, which is considered to offer acceptable reliability.[115]

The 70-item instrument was designed to measure satisfaction scales covering five

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[112] Vroom's comments on JDI are based on six unpublished manuscripts developed by Smith and her associates (Smith, 1963; Hulin, Smith, Kendall, and Locke, 1963; Macaulay, Smith, Locke, Kendall, and Hulin, 1963; Kendall, Smith, Hulin, and Locke, 1963; Locke, Smith, Hulin, and Kendall, 1963; Smith and Kendall, 1963).

[113] I conducted another survey on conflict using ROCI-I &II (max. 138 items) at the same time, and thought too many questions would influence the rate of answer negatively. The Job in General (JIG) scale was excluded because the information it would provide would not affect the aim of this study.

[114] Coefficient alpha is also called Cronbach's alpha: a measure of the extent to which cases responds in a similar or consistent way on all the variables that go to make up a scale (Brace et al., 2006: p. 331; Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 363).

[115] The value of more than 0.6 is acceptable in exploratory research (Hair et al., 1998).

facets of the job: satisfaction with the work itself (18-items), pay (7-items),[116] supervision (18-items), promotion (9-items), and co-workers (18-items). The analytic techniques employed in this study are the same as those used by Smith *et al*. Items are recorded as follows: Yes = 3 points, ? = 1 point, No = 0, and reversed items[117] are recoded prior to analysis: for example, 'Yes' for positively phrased items and 'No' for negatively phrased items are given 3 points; 'Yes' to negatively phrased items and 'No' to appositively phrased items have 0 points; and responses with a question mark have 1 point. A middle-range score of 27 can be used as a neutral point in interpreting absolute JDI scores for each scale according to the JDI user's manual (Balzer and Smith, 1990), thus 'scores well above 27 (i.e., 32 or above) indicate satisfaction, while those well below 27 (i.e., 22 or below) indicate dissatisfaction' (Balzer and Smith, 1990, p. 23).

However, there is a possible highest score of 54 for work, supervision, and co-workers, 21 for pay, and 27 for promotion, because there are two items for pay scale missing in this study, thus the middle-scale score can be around a score of 27 for work, supervision and co-workers, around a score of 10.5 for pay,[118] and around a score of 13.5 for promotion.

The relative importance of each of the five JDI facets was measured in the second section using a 5-point scale: 1) most important, 2) important, 3) average, 4) less important, and 5) least important. In order to investigate the relationship between job satisfaction and employee turnover, the final section measured the opinion 'thinking of quitting' using the following 5-scales: 1) totally disagree, 2) disagree, 3) average, 4) agree, and 5) totally agree.

The subsidiary objectives of the job satisfaction research were:
1. To measure the each facet level of job satisfaction.
2. To determine if there is a difference in job satisfaction among the five scales.
3. To examine the relationship between job satisfaction and demographic characteristics.
4. To explore players' and staff's thoughts on the relative importance of determinants of job satisfaction.
5. To examine the relationship between job satisfaction and turnover.
6. To explore the reasons for the job satisfaction and dissatisfaction of players and staff.

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[116] Because of my technical mistake, survey questionnaires that I made only included 7 items in the pay scale instead of the original 9 items. Fortunately, after careful observation, two missing items have one positive and negative question each, and might not significantly influence the result of job satisfaction. Furthermore, I also consulted this matter with a JDI office manager, and he said that I could create my own neutral point in the way of original JDI score creates (despite the best way is to use all 9-items and convert it to the 54 points).

[117] Reverse scored items: Yes = 0, ? = 1, No = 3.

[118] I contacted a JDI office manager, and the alternative neutral score for pay can be 10.5.

5.6 Results of the quantitative research survey

Section I Profiles of samples[119]

Personal information of all players and administrative staff of three orchestras according to demographic characteristics—age, marital status, gender, education, and tenure—are summarised in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.

Table 5.2 Personal information concerning players

Category		Frequency	Valid percentage
Age	21–25	3	2.40
	26–30	13	10.60
	31–35	23	18.70
	36–40	21	17.10
	Over 40	63	51.20
Marital status	Married	85	69.10
	Single	38	30.90
Gender	Male	64	52.00
	Female	59	48.00
Education	High school graduated	1	0.80
	College	2	1.60
	University	120	97.60
Tenure	Less than 6 months	1	0.80
	6 months to 2 years	6	4.90
	2–5 years	17	13.80
	5–10 years	28	22.80
	over 10 years	71	57.70

Note: n = 123

The majority of respondents (51.2%) are over 41 years of age, followed by the age group 31–35 (18.7%) and 36–40 (17.1%). 69.1% of respondents are married and 30.9% are single, so the rate of married respondents is twice that of single respondents. There is no major difference in gender: 52% are male and 48% are female. Players are well educated: 97.6% are university graduates; only 0.8% of respondents are high school graduates, and 1.6% are college graduate. 57.7% of players have worked more than 10 years in their current orchestras, followed by 22.8% who have worked 5–10 years, and 13.8% who have worked 2–5 years—illustrating that most players work in one orchestra for a long time. This suggests that the rate of turnover of players might be low.

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[119] Total sample number of players measuring job satisfaction is 128, but five of them did not provide their personal information. All sample sizes (n) are listed in the attached CD.

Table 5.3 Personal information concerning staff

	Category	Frequency	Valid percentage
Age	21–25	0	0.0
	26–30	2	20.0
	31–35	2	20.0
	36–40	1	10.0
	Over 40	5	50.0
Marital status	Married	7	70.0
	Single	3	30.0
Gender	Male	7	70.0
	Female	3	30.0
Education	High school graduated	0	0.0
	College	0	0.0
	University	10	100.0
Tenure	Less than 6 months	1	11.1
	6 months to 2 years	2	22.2
	2–5 years	0	0.0
	5–10 years	1	11.1
	Over 10 years	5	55.6

Note: n = 10

If we look at the administrative staff's personal information, 50% of respondents are over 41 years of age, while those aged 26–30 and 31–35 are evenly proportioned at 20% for each category. Like the players, the group of staff is also mature. A large proportion of the sample, 70%, are married and 30% are single; 70% of respondents are male and 30% are female; 100% are university graduates. 55.6% respondents have been working in their current orchestras for over 10 years, followed by 6 months to 2 years (22.2%) and 5–10 years (11.1%). Thus, respondents in both the players' and staff's Tables share a similarity in matters of age, marital status, education, and tenure, and the only statistic out of line concerns gender balance.

Table 5.4 Personal information of players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO

Category		BPO (n = 44)		CPO (n = 39)		KSO (n = 40)	
		Frequency	Valid percentage	Frequency	Valid percentage	Frequency	Valid percentage
Age	21–25	2	4.5	-	-	1	2.5
	26–30	4	9.1	7	17.9	2	5.0
	31–35	5	11.4	12	30.8	6	15.0
	36–40	7	15.9	11	28.2	3	7.5
	Over 40	26	59.1	9	23.1	28	70.0
Marital Status	Married	33	75.0	19	48.7	33	82.5
	Single	11	25.0	20	51.3	7	17.5
Gender	Male	24	54.5	13	33.3	27	67.5
	Female	20	45.5	26	66.7	13	32.5
Education	High school graduated	-	-	-	-	1	2.5
	College	1	2.3	-	-	1	2.5
	University	43	97.7	39	100.0	38	95.0
Tenure	Less than 6 months	-	-	-	-	1	2.5
	6 months to 2 years	5	11.4	-	-	1	2.5
	2–5 years	3	6.8	13	33.3	1	2.5
	5–10 years	8	18.2	7	17.9	13	32.5
	Over 10 years	28	63.6	19	48.7	24	60.0

As shown in Table 5.4, there is a composition of 44 BPO players, 39 CPO players, and 40 KSO players among the 123 respondents. There are similar tendencies in the BPO and KSO regarding age band, marital status, gender, and tenure, compared to the CPO: First, the BPO and KSO have more older players: 59.1% of the BPO and 70.0% of the KSO belong to the age group over 41, whereas only 23.1% of the CPO are in this age group and the rates of other age bands are evenly spread. In other words, players of the CPO are relatively younger than those in the BPO and KSO. Second, married players are dominant in the BPO (75%) and KSO (82.5%), compared to the CPO (48.7%). Next, there are more male players than female players in the BPO (male, 54.5%) and KSO (male, 67.5%), contrary to the case of the CPO (male, 33.3%; female, 66.7%). Finally, the rates of players working over 10 years are 63.6% (BPO) and 60% (KSO), followed by 5–10 years at 18.2% (BPO) and 32.5% (KSO), while 48.7% (CPO) have worked for over 10 years and 33.3% (CPO) have worked 2–5 years. This might be the consequence of the severe open audition of the CPO in the year 2004, under a conductor, Yoon-Seong Chang, who aimed to improve the quality of performance.

Table 5.5 Personal information of staff of the BPO, CPO, and KSO

Category		BPO (n = 2)		CPO (n = 4)		KSO (n = 4)	
		Frequency	Valid percentage	Frequency	Valid percentage	Frequency	Valid percentage
Age	21–25	-	-	-	-	-	-
	26–30	1	50.0	-	-	1	25.0
	31–35	1	50.0	-	-	1	25.0
	36–40	-	-	1	25.0	-	-
	Over 40	-	-	3	75.0	2	50.0
Marital status	Married	1	50.0	4	100.0	2	50.0
	Single	1	50.0	-	-	2	50.0
Gender	Male	-	-	4	100.0	3	75.0
	Female	2	100.0	-	-	1	25.0
Education	High school graduated	-	-	-	-	-	-
	College	-	-	-	-	-	-
	University	2	100.0	4	100.0	4	100.0
Tenure	Less than 6 months	1	50.0	-	-	-	-
	6 months to 2 years	-	-	-	-	2	66.7
	2–5 years	-	-	-	-	-	-
	5–10 years	-	-	1	25.0	-	-
	Over 10 years	1	50.0	3	75.0	1	33.3

The personal information of all staff of the three orchestras is presented in Table 5.5. Administrative staff of the orchestral executive constitution of the BPO amount to 9, but only 2 of them (approximately 22%) returned questionnaires, thus the information regarding the BPO in Table 5.5 is less significant. 4 out of 6 staff (approximately 70%) in the CPO[120] and KSO returned questionnaires. 75% of the respondents in the CPO have been in the orchestral executive constitution for more than 10 years and 25% have been in the orchestra for 5–10 years, whereas 66.7% in KSO have been in the orchestral executive constitution for 6 months to 2 years, followed by 33.3% for more than 10 years. It indicates that the orchestral executive constitution has no regular rotation and few opportunities for promotion except in the case of the KBS Symphony Orchestra. In addition, although most staff contracts are approximately for 2–3 years, the average working period is much longer than the basic period of contract.[121] Thus, the renewal of staff contracts may be relatively easy, unless the person involved makes huge mistakes.

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[120] Officially, there are 6 administrative staff in the orchestral executive constitution in CPO, but the staff responsible for scores did not return the questionnaire and the person responsible for instrument care and transportation is also a player, thus was not counted in this sample.
[121] This situation can be found in most Korean municipal orchestras. However, the staff of the KBS Symphony Orchestra are the staff of the KBS, thus there is no regular contract after being employed.

Section II Job satisfaction

Table 5.6 Players' job satisfaction on JDI scales

(M±SD)

JDI scales	M±SD	Minimum	Maximum	Max. possible value
Work	41.56±8.60	17	54	54
Pay	4.58±4.36	0	21	21
Supervision	30.12±12.27	6	54	54
Promotion	7.22±5.13	0	21	27
Co-workers	31.74±12.31	0	54	54

Table 5.6 lists means (M), standard deviations (SD), minimum and maximum scores, and maximum possible values on five facets of job satisfaction classified by group of players, in order to discover player's job satisfaction on each of the five facets.

Group of players' satisfaction score for work is 41.56, for pay 4.58, for supervision 30.12, for promotion 7.22, and satisfaction with co-workers is 31.74. According to the absolute JDI scores, it can be interpreted that players are satisfied with work; and neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with supervision and co-workers, while the scores for promotion and pay are obviously below their neutral points, and players are dissatisfied by those two facets. As they said, they are happy with what they are doing and prone to less conflict between players. However, Table 5.6 does not show the comparative satisfaction between these five JDI scales. To compare players' satisfaction among these, the average value for each scale is presented in the Table 5.10.

Pay can be the fundamental reason for working, when it is needed to maintain the everyday living costs of one's family or oneself. Lawler (1973) defines job satisfaction on pay as the middle point between one's present pay and demanded pay, and job dissatisfaction will occur if current pay is lower than expectation. A player's present salary might be less than their standard of pay. Maslow (1970) considers food, water, air, and shelter to be important factors in a needs hierarchy: and Szilagyi and Wallace (1980, p. 107) state that such needs are presented by concern for salary in the workplace. Thus, people work for money (salary) and are primarily concerned about physiological needs, as a result it is impossible to be satisfied if there is not sufficient money for physiological needs. However, Herzberg et al. (1993) and Szilagyi and Wallace (1980) disagreed about the importance of salary: they thought of salary as a 'hygiene factor' which removes dissatisfaction but does not necessarily lead to an individual's satisfaction.[122]

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[122] Herzberg's two-factor theory will be described in Table 5.24.

Table 5.7 Administrative staff job satisfaction on JDI scales

(M±SD)

JDI scales	M±SD	Minimum	Maximum	Max. possible value
Work	39.39±9.83	19	53.78	54
Pay	6.60±6.52	1	21	21
Supervision	42.30±7.42	24	49	54
Promotion	4.40±3.53	0	11	27
Co-workers	38.60±10.36	17	51	54

Table 5.7 lists means (M), standard deviations (SD), minimum and maximum scores, and maximum possible values on five facets of job satisfaction classified by group of administrative staff, in order to discover staff job satisfaction on each of the five facets. The mean scores of staff satisfaction with work, supervision, and co-workers are all well above 32, showing that staff are quite satisfied with these three facets, compared to players, who are only clearly satisfied with work. The mean score for pay indicates staff are dissatisfied with their current pay (as the mean score was well below the middle scale value of 10.5). Staff are also clearly dissatisfied with promotion (because a mean score of 4.40 is 9.1 points below the middle-scale score of 13.5).

It can be concluded from Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 that both players and administrative staff are satisfied with what they are doing and dissatisfied with current pay.

Table 5.8 The players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO' job satisfaction on JDI scales

(M±SD)

JDI scales	BPO	CPO	KSO	F-value
Work	42.50±8.92	39.23±8.61	42.77±7.97	2.20
Pay	4.51±3.93	4.05±3.90	5.15±5.18	0.66
Supervision	32.09±11.93	28.96±12.25	29.06±12.66	0.93
Promotion	10.17±5.13[a]	5.78±5.38[b]	5.35±3.09[b]	14.53***
Co-workers	31.30±11.36	29.12±11.21	34.70±13.87	2.19

Note: *** indicates $p < 0.001$; according to the results of Tukey's HSD test, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a] and [b].

Table 5.8 shows different levels of job satisfaction on five facets among the players in each orchestra; each group of players, however, is very satisfied with work (well above the middle score of 27). The players of the BPO are satisfied with supervision, but dissatisfied with pay and promotion, and neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with co-workers; the players of the CPO are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with supervision and co-workers, but clearly dissatisfied with pay and promotion; finally the KSO's players are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with supervision, satisfied with co-workers, and dissatisfied with pay and promotion.

When it comes to promotion (within the JDI's five categories), a statistically significant

difference is found among the different groups of players ($F(2,125) = 14.53$, $p < 0.001$): according to the result of Tukey's HSD test, the players of the BPO are more satisfied with promotion, compared to those of the CPO and KSO. According to former administrative staff that I interviewed, there is a real chance of being promoted as a consequence of the regular audition in the case of the BPO, but not in the case of the CPO and KSO.

The positions of players in the CPO are mainly decided when they are newly employed, and they rarely have an opportunity to be promoted. However, their positions can be downgraded according to the results of the regular audition; thus, the CPO is considering implementing a more flexible promotion system. In the KBS Symphony Orchestra, there is no regular audition and no promotion after employment. [123] Therefore, the players of the BPO are more satisfied with promotion, compared to those of the BPO and KSO.

Promotion, which Mondy *et al.* (1990) define as 'advancement to a more responsible job in the organisation', (p. 288) is an important factor in job satisfaction. According to Gilmer and Van (1971), lack of opportunity for promotion is an important reason why employees dislike their work. In addition, quickly promoted employees have higher concentration on their work than slowly promoted employees (Bray *et al.*, 1974). Players' personnel promotion in symphony orchestras is different to promotion in other fields: advancement to a limited position within an orchestra, such as first or second principal player, requires superior performing ability rather than length of job tenure. Morris Stemp, who used to play as a rank and file second violinist in the Hallé, states his dislike of 'the lack of prospects for promotion' and describes his job as 'Boredom. The heavy workload. The hours. No promotion, office politics, feeling trapped' in an interview with Anna Price (2006). Thus, the players of the BPO may well work harder than the players of the CPO and KSO.

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[123] The players' positions are mainly decided when they first join the orchestra.

Table 5.9 The administrative staff of the BPO, CPO, and KSO's job satisfaction on JDI scales

(M±SD)

JDI scales	M±SD[124]	X^2
Work	39.39±9.83	0.67
Pay	6.60±6.52	2.97
Supervision	42.30±7.42	0.33
Promotion	4.40±3.53	1.43
Co-workers	38.60±10.36	2.08

Table 5.9 lists means (M), and standard deviations (SD) of five facets of job satisfaction classified by each group of staff, and the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test on five job facets are listed. Based on the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test, there is no statistically significant difference in each of the five job facets among the three groups of staff. Thus, the three different groups of staff share similar tendencies in job satisfaction regarding work, pay, supervision, promotion, and co-workers.

Table 5.10 Players' relative job satisfaction among the JDI scales

(M±SD)

JDI scales	M±SD	Minimum	Maximum	Max. possible value
Work	2.31±0.48[a]	0.94	3.00	3.00
Pay	0.65±0.62[c]	0.00	3.00	3.00
Supervision	1.67±0.68[b]	0.33	3.00	3.00
Promotion	0.80±0.57[c]	0.00	2.33	3.00
Co-workers	1.76±0.68[b]	0.00	3.00	3.00
F-Value	236.77***			

Note: *** indicates $p < 0.001$; according to LSD multiple comparison, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a, b, or c].

Table 5.10 shows means (M), standard deviations (SD), minimum and maximum scores, maximum possible value of group of players' job satisfaction, and the results of repeated measures ANOVA (F) and of LSD multiple comparison, in order to discover player's relative job satisfaction among five facets.

As shown in Table 5.10, there is a statistic significant difference among five facets (F (4, 508) = 236.77, $p < 0.001$). Based on LSD multiple comparison, players are most satisfied with their work (M = 2.31, SD = 0.48), followed by satisfaction with co-workers (M = 1.84, SD = 0.68) and supervision (M = 1.67, SD = 0.68); and promotion (M = 0.80, SD = 0.57) and pay (M = 0.65, SD = 0.62). Thus, players are most satisfied with work, whereas least satisfied with pay and promotion.

[124] Due to small size of sample, each group of staff's mean score and standard deviation are not calculated.

Table 5.11 Administrative staff relative job satisfaction among the JDI scales

(M±SD)

JDI scales	M±SD	Minimum	Maximum	Max. possible value
Work	2.19±0.55	1.06	2.99	3.00
Pay	0.94±0.93	0.14	3.00	3.00
Supervision	2.35±0.41	1.33	2.72	3.00
Promotion	0.49±0.39	0.00	1.22	3.00
Co-workers	2.14±0.58	0.94	2.83	3.00
X^2	27.28***			

Note: *** indicates p < 0.001.

Table 5.11 shows means (M), standard deviations (SD), minimum and maximum scores, maximum possible value of group of staff's job satisfaction, and the results of the Friedman's test, in order to discover staff's relative job satisfaction among five facets.

According to the result of the Friedman's test, there is a statistic significant difference (X^2 (df = 4) = 27.28, p = 0.000): although the Friedman's test does not show where those differences occurred, it has a tendency that administrative staff are satisfied with supervision (M = 2.35, SD = 0.41), work (M = 2.19, SD = 0.55) and co-workers (M = 2.14, SD = 0.58), but relatively less satisfied with pay (M = 0.94, SD = 0.93) and promotion (M = 0.49, SD = 0.39).

Table 5.12 The players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO's relative job satisfaction among the JDI scales

(M±SD)

JDI scales	BPO	CPO	KSO
Work	2.36±0.50[a]	2.18±0.48[a]	2.38±0.44[a]
Pay	0.64±0.56[d]	0.58±0.56[c]	0.74±0.74[b]
Supervision	1.78±0.66[b]	1.61±0.68[b]	1.61±0.70[b]
Promotion	1.13±0.57[c]	0.64±0.60[c]	0.59±0.34[c]
Co-workers	1.74±0.63[b]	1.62±0.62[b]	1.93±0.77[b]
F-value	84.35***	90.04***	81.80***

Note: *** indicates p < 0.001; according to the results of LSD multiple comparison, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a, b, c, or d].

Table 5.12 shows means (M), standard deviations (SD) of each group of players, and the results of repeated measures ANOVA and LSD multiple comparison among five facets, in order to discover each group of players' relative job satisfaction among those facets.

According to the result of the ANOVA, each group of players has a significant difference in five subscales of job satisfaction (BPO: F (4,180) = 84.35, p = 0.000; CPO: F (4,156)= 90.04, p = 0.000; KSO: F (4,164) = 81.80 p = 0.000): although there are differences in the middle ranks of the five facets on job satisfaction, LSD multiple

comparison shows that each group of players in the three orchestras is most satisfied with work.

Table 5.13 Analysis of demographic effects on the JDI category scores of all players
(M±SD)

Demographic Variables		Work	Pay	Supervision	Promotion	Co-workers
Age	21–30	42.80±8.16	7.38±6.40[a]	35.82±14.06	9.00±5.75	34.13±12.79
	31–35	42.46±6.51	4.83±5.04[b]	35.13±9.91	8.44±4.84	34.09±10.85
	36–40	41.14±8.22	5.49±3.25[b]	29.28±9.99	5.61±4.56	28.07±10.08
	Over 40	41.14±9.85	3.41±3.55[c]	27.47±12.80	6.96±5.29	31.75±13.62
F-value		0.25	4.22**	3.56*	1.80	1.07
Marital Status	Married	42.59±8.55	4.29±4.25	30.54±11.65	7.63±5.07	32.76±12.21
	Single	39.41±8.94	5.11±4.83	29.77±14.16	6.47±5.48	29.88±13.09
t-value		1.88	-0.94	0.32	1.14	1.18
Gender	Male	41.16±9.96	3.78±4.10	29.18±13.55	7.06±5.31	31.16±14.03
	Female	42.09±7.29	5.37±4.66	31.52±11.05	7.50±5.13	32.64±10.67
t-value		-0.59[125]	-2.02*	-1.05[126]	-0.46	-0.66[127]
Tenure	Less than 5 years	43.27±7.19	7.13±6.32[a]	34.94±13.56	8.50±5.70	34.33±11.55
	5–10 years	39.05±9.36	3.69±3.24[b]	31.56±12.93	6.56±4.74	29.36±12.88
	Over 10 years	42.05±8.89	4.01±3.77[b]	28.23±11.48	7.13±5.21	32.03±12.65
F-value		1.74	5.48**	2.89	0.95	1.04

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$, ** indicates $p < 0.01$; according to the results of Tukey's HSD test, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a, b, or c].

Table 5.13 shows means (M), standard deviations (SD), and F-value and t-value of the group of players' five subscales of job satisfaction and demographic variables, in order to find the relationship between the subscales and demographic variables. According to one-way analysis of variance (F), there are statistically significant differences found in the demographic variables of age with pay ($F(3,119) = 4.22$, $p < 0.01$) and supervision ($F(3,119) = 3.56$, $p < 0.05$): the results of Tukey's HSD test indicate that players in the age group 21–30 are more satisfied with pay than the others. Older players have more family responsibilities, and may be less satisfied with pay. Pay as a factor of job satisfaction does not apply to Herzberg's U-shaped relationship, nor to Hulin and Smith's (1965) and Gibson and Klein's (1970) positive relationship, but does apply to Muchinsky's (1978) negative relationship between job satisfaction and age among a group of players in a Korean symphony orchestra. Regarding supervision, Tukey's HSD test did not differ significantly between different age groups.

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[125] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[126] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[127] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.

There is a statistically significant difference between gender and pay ($t = -2.02$, $p < 0.05$): according to t-test, female players are more satisfied with their pay than male players. This applies to Varca et al. (1983)'s study regarding the relationship between gender and pay in the lower levels of occupation.

Another significant difference is found when linking tenure and pay ($F(2,120) = 5.48$, $p < 0.01$): according to Tukey's HSD test, more satisfaction is found among players with less than 5 years on the job, than for those with 5–10 years and with over 10 years on the job. Although Herzberg et al. (1993) and Blum and Naylor (1968) believed in a positive relationship between age and tenure—that job satisfaction increased by length of work—it does not happen in the case of the players' group in the three Korean municipal orchestras (BPO, CPO, and KSO). Although much research studies the relationship between job satisfaction and demographic characteristics (see pp. 131–34)—age, marital status, gender, education, and tenure—no significant relationship was found between job satisfaction and marital status in the present study.

Thus, the results of the Table 5.13 show that age, gender, and tenure are significantly related to pay in the case of the players of Korean municipal orchestras.

Demographic effects on the five facets of job satisfaction among the players in three different orchestras were analysed, and significant differences were found in the case of the BPO (Table 5.14), the CPO (Table 5.26), and the KSO (Table 5.27).[128]

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[128] Tables 5.26 and 5.27 are displayed at the end of this chapter.

Table 5.14 Analysis of demographic effects on the JDI category scores of the BPO's players

(M±SD)

Demographic Variables		Work	Pay	Supervision	Promotion	Co-workers
Age	21–30	45.14±8.89	7.50±6.22	44.78±10.56[a]	10.17±3.82	40.33±7.74
	31–35	48.43±3.26	6.00±4.95	42.60±9.40[b]	14.00±3.74	39.80-±7.46
	36–40	44.43±7.39	5.86±2.67	31.07±6.58[ab]	8.68±4.28	26.91±8.83
	over 40	40.51±9.84	3.19±3.09	28.15±10.97[c]	10.11±5.76	29.15±12.02
F-value		1.45	2.86*	6.13 **	1.10	3.20*
Marital status	Married	43.43±8.61	4.00±3.61	30.90±10.62	10.93±5.12	30.63±11.53
	Single	40.36±10.40	6.09±4.93	37.42±14.61	8.52±5.19	34.22±11.60
t-value		0.97	-1.52	-1.37[129]	1.35	-0.89
Gender	Male	40.38±10.15	3.33±3.14	29.34±12.90	9.70±5.64	29.17±12.84
	Female	45.40±6.83	5.95±4.55	36.35±9.55	11.09±4.62	34.36±9.23
t-value		-1.95[130]	-2.25*	-2.01	-0.88	-1.51
Tenure	Less than 5 years	45.00±7.58	7.00±5.76	38.63±12.35	9.38±4.60	39.88±8.29
	5–10 years	42.50±10.68	4.00±4.00	36.21±15.09	11.42±5.03	30.63±10.27
	over 10 years	42.04±9.18	3.96±3.28	29.73±10.20	10.29±5.49	29.40±11.85
F-value		0.32	1.94	2.34	0.30	2.83

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$, ** indicates $p < 0.01$; according to the results of Tukey's HSD test, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a, ab, b, or c].

Table 5.14 shows means (M), standard deviations (SD), and *F*-value and *t*-value of the players of the BPO, in order to find the relationship between the subscales of job satisfaction and demographic variables.

The results of one-way analysis of variance (*F*) linking age with supervision ($F(3,40) = 6.13$, $p < 0.01$) and co-workers ($F(3,40) = 3.20$, $p < 0.05$) reveal significant differences: according to Tukey's HSD test, the age group 21–30 is more satisfied with supervision than the age group of those 31–35 and over 41. Scanlan (1976) explains that an essential factor in job satisfaction is supervision: Vroom (1964), Badin (1974), and Szilagyi (1977) point out the positive relationship between supervision and job satisfaction. Moreover, Fleishman and Harris's (1962) study showed that satisfaction with supervision could reduce turnover rates and complaints. Thus, according to these scholars, the players of the BPO who are 21–30 years of age may have fewer turnover wishes and complaints about the job than the other age groups.

Based on an independent *t*-test, the next significant differences are found linking gender with pay ($t = -2.25$, $p < 0.05$): the female players of the BPO (M = 5.95, SD =

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[129] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[130] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.

4.55) are more satisfied with pay and supervision than the male players (M = 3.33, SD = 3.14). The female players of the BPO may have less financial responsibility than male players for living costs.[131]

The results of Table 5.14 show the statistically significant differences between age and supervision and between gender and pay.

The only significant difference among the players of the CPO ($F(3,35)$ = 3.38, p < 0.05, see Table 5.26) is found when coupling age with work satisfaction: Tukey's HSD test shows that those 21–30 years of age are more satisfied with their present work than the over 41 age group. On the other hand, there are two significant relationships found in the demographic variables of tenure with pay ($F(2,37)$ = 10.91, p < 0.001) and promotion ($F(2,37)$ = 4.15, p < 0.05): the age group of 5–10 years and over 10 years are less satisfied with pay and promotion than those of less than 5 years, in the case of the players of the KSO (see Table 5.27).

Section III The relative importance of the five JDI components

To measure the relative importance of the five JDI components, a 5-point scale was used: 1 for most important, 2 for important, 3 for average, 4 for less important, and 5 for least important.

Table 5.15 Players' relative influential rankings regarding job satisfaction

Ranking	Work N (%)	Supervision N (%)	Pay N (%)	Promotion N (%)	Co-workers N (%)
1. Most important	69 (57.5)	5 (4.2)	39 (32.5)	1 (0.8)	6 (5.0)
2. Important	22 (18.3)	12 (10.0)	60 (50.0)	6 (5.0)	20 (16.7)
3. Average	15 (12.5)	21 (17.5)	11 (9.2)	13 (10.8)	60 (50.0)
4. Less important	10 (8.3)	47 (39.2)	9 (7.5)	33 (27.5)	21 (17.5)
5. Least important	4 (3.3)	35 (29.2)	1 (0.8)	67 (55.8)	13 (10.8)

Table 5.15 shows that 57.5% of the players consider that work is the most important facet (influencing job satisfaction) and 18.3% consider work as a second important facet among the JDI's five categories. 82.5% of the players indicate that pay is a more than average category contributing to job satisfaction. Although Scanlan (1976) said supervision is an essential factor in job satisfaction, supervision seems far from essential to job satisfaction in the case of Korean orchestral players: 68.4% of players chose supervision as a less than average category that contributed to job satisfaction (this contradicts Scanlan's (1976) assumptions). This leads to the conclusion that promotion, supervision, and co-workers are not important influences on job satisfaction.

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[131] A male player said in interview that working in a symphony orchestra was like a hobby for women, and a way of escaping from family life.

50% of respondents rank co-workers as the third important facet; the fourth important category is supervision (about 39%) and the least important aspect is promotion. A similar tendency is found among players in the BPO, CPO, and KSO. This is shown in Table 5.16.

Table 5.16 The players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO's relative *influential* rankings regarding job satisfaction

BPO					
Ranking	Work N (%)	Supervision N (%)	Pay N (%)	Promotion N (%)	Co-workers N (%)
1. Most important	21 (51.2)	2 (4.9)	15 (36.6)	0	3 (7.3)
2. Important	8 (19.5)	1 (2.4)	21 (51.2)	3 (7.3)	8 (19.5)
3. Average	6 (14.6)	10 (24.4)	1 (2.4)	4 (9.8)	20 (48.8)
4. Less important	5 (12.2)	10 (24.4)	3 (7.3)	16 (39.0)	7 (17.1)
5. Least important	1 (2.4)	18 (43.9)	1 (2.4)	18 (43.9)	3 (7.3)
CPO					
Ranking	Work N (%)	Supervision N (%)	Pay N (%)	Promotion N (%)	Co-workers N (%)
1. Most important	21 (55.3)	2 (5.3)	13 (34.2)	1 (2.6)	1 (2.6)
2. Important	8 (21.1)	8 (21.1)	16 (42.1)	1 (2.6)	5 (13.2)
3. Average	5 (13.2)	3 (7.9)	6 (15.8)	5 (13.2)	19 (50.0)
4. Less important	2 (5.3)	16 (42.1)	3 (7.9)	10 (26.3)	7 (18.4)
5. Least important	2 (5.3)	9 (23.7)	0	21 (55.3)	6 (15.8)
KSO					
Ranking	Work N (%)	Supervision N (%)	Pay N (%)	Promotion N (%)	Co-workers N (%)
1. Most important	27 (65.9)	1 (2.4)	11 (26.8)	0	2 (4.9)
2. Important	6 (14.6)	3 (7.3)	23 (56.1)	2 (4.9)	7 (17.1)
3. Average	4 (9.8)	8 (19.5)	4 (9.8)	4 (9.8)	21 (51.2)
4. Less important	3 (7.3)	21 (51.2)	3 (7.3)	7 (17.1)	7 (17.1)
5. Least important	1 (2.4)	8 (19.5)	0	28 (68.3)	4 (9.8)

Table 5.16 shows that the most important job aspect among the five categories of the JDI is work, followed by pay and co-workers in the BPO, CPO and KSO. The fourth and fifth important job aspects are supervision and promotion in the CPO and KSO, whereas promotion is ranked fourth and promotion and supervision are ranked equally as the least important facet[132] in the case of the BPO. Thus, the relative importance of each of the given JDI components is similar among the groups of players in the three orchestras.

Table 5.17 Administrative staff relative *influential* rankings regarding job satisfaction

Ranking	Work N (%)	Supervision N (%)	Pay N (%)	Promotion N (%)	Co-workers N (%)
1. Most important	8 (80)	0	1 (10)	1 (10)	0
2. Important	1 (10)	0	5 (50)	1 (10)	3 (30)
3. Average	1 (10)	1 (10)	3 (30)	3 (30)	2 (20)
4. Less important	0	5 (50)	1 (10)	0	4 (40)
5. Least important	0	4 (40)	0	5 (50)	1 (10)

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[132] This result reverses Scanlan's (1976) study on the importance of supervision in producing job satisfaction.

Table 5.17 shows that job importance in the group of administrative staff is slightly different to those of players: the most important job aspect is work (80%), the second is pay (50%), the third is both pay and promotion, the fourth is supervision, and the least important is promotion. Co-workers are excluded as the respondents in this sample spread them fairly evenly across the range of possible responses. Like the players, 90% of respondents consider that work is a more than average category that contributes to job satisfaction, while 90% of respondents rank supervision as less, and least important to them.[133] Thus, it could be concluded that both groups of players and administrative staff consider work and pay significant aspects contributing to job satisfaction, while promotion is the least important aspect among the five categories of the JDI.

Section IV The correlations and multiple regression analyses

This section presents correlations between job satisfaction and turnover, along with inter-correlations of the JDI with multiple regression analyses where applicable. The total sample numbers of each subscale in the following correlation table are varied due to missing values.

Table 5.18 Summary of correlations among JDI and turnover

Variables	JDI					Turnover
	Work	Pay	Supervision	Promotion	Co-workers	
Work	**1.000**	*0.206**	*0.480***	*0.273***	*0.420***	*-0.391****
Pay	-0.288	**1.000**	*0303****	*0.154*	*0.167*	*-0.134*
Supervision	0.817**	0.170	**1.000**	*0.361****	*0.472****	*-0.308***
Promotion	0.020	0.654*	0.270	**1.000**	*0.206**	*-0.113*
Co-workers	0.378	0.367	0.467	0.226	**1.000**	*-0.416****
Turnover	0.066	-0.635*	-0.204	-0.378	-0.570	**1.000**

Note: Players' correlations denote as *Italic*, Staff's correlations denote as normal; * indicates $p < 0.05$, ** indicates $p < 0.01$, *** indicates $p < 0.001$.

Players' correlation between JDI and job turnover

The results of Pearson's correlation between players' job turnover and the five subscales of job satisfaction show that there are significant negative correlations between turnover and work ($r = -0.391$, $p < 0.001$), supervision ($r = -0.308$, $p < 0.01$), and co-workers ($r = -0.416$, $p < 0.001$), respectively (see Table 5.18).

Satisfaction with supervision is significantly inter-related to satisfaction with work ($r = 0.480$, $p < 0.001$) and pay ($r = 0.303$, $p < 0.001$): players who are satisfied with supervision are likely to be satisfied with work and pay; satisfaction with promotion is inter-correlated to satisfaction with work ($r = 0.273$, $p < 0.01$) and supervision ($r = 0.361$,

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[133] Once more, the result of Table 5.17 shows that supervision seems far from essential to job satisfaction, in this case of the satisfaction of administrative staff.

$p < 0.001$), whereas satisfaction with promotion is unrelated to satisfaction with pay (r = 0.154, $p > 0.05$); satisfaction with co-workers is significantly related to satisfaction with work (r = 0.420, $p < 0.001$), supervision (r = 0.472, $p < 0.001$), and promotion (r = 0.206, $p < 0.05$). Finally, work and pay (r = 0.206, $p < 0.05$) are significantly associated. Thus, inter-correlations for job satisfaction have significant positive relationships.

The result of multiple regression analysis using the enter method shows that the overall relationship between players' turnover (dependent variable) and the five subscales of job satisfaction (predictors) is significant ($R^2 = 0.203$, $F(5,116) = 7.147$, $p < 0.001$): work (β = -0.249, $p = 0.010$) and co-workers (β = -0.290, $p = 0.003$) are negatively significant predictors of players' job turnover: if players are satisfied with work and co-workers, they are unlikely to think of job turnover; however, pay, supervision, and promotion do not have statistical significance (see Table 5.25).

Staff correlation between JDI and job turnover

The results of correlation between staff job turnover and the five subscales of job satisfaction show that there is only one strong negative correlation, that between turnover and satisfaction with pay (r = -0.635, $p < 0.05$) (see Table 5.18): if staff are unsatisfied with pay, they are likely to think of job turnover.

Regarding the inter-correlation of job satisfaction, satisfaction with supervision and satisfaction with work (r = 0.817, $p < 0.01$); and satisfaction with promotion and satisfaction with pay (r = 0.654, $p < 0.05$) have strong positive inter-correlation, respectively, whereas satisfaction with supervision is unrelated to satisfaction with pay (r = 0.170, $p > 0.05$), promotion (r = 0.270, $p > 0.05$), and co-workers (r = 0.467, $p > 0.05$) (see Table 5.18).

Summary of survey findings

So far, the results of survey on job satisfaction and its relationship with demographic characteristics and turnover were investigated, and this section summarises the findings.

Each facet level of job satisfaction

Players were satisfied with work, dissatisfied with pay and promotion, and neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with co-workers and supervision, while staff were satisfied with work, supervision, and co-workers, and dissatisfied with pay and promotion (see Table 5.6 and Table 5.7).

Regarding each group of players' job satisfaction on five facets, promotion has the only

statistically significant difference: the players of the BPO are more satisfied with promotion, compared to those of the CPO and KSO, because the BPO's audition offers a real chance to be promoted (see Table 5.8).

According to the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test, there was no significant difference in the each five subscales of job satisfaction among each group of administrative staff, and each group of staff showed similar tendencies (see Table 5.9).

Difference in job satisfaction among the five scales

The following table 5.19 (rearranged from Table 5.10) indicates the different job satisfaction of players related to five facets: players are most satisfied with work and least satisfied with pay.

Table 5.19 Relative ranking of *actual* job satisfaction of players

Ranking of job satisfaction	Players
1	Work
2	Co-workers
3	Supervision
4	Promotion
5	Pay

Note: 1 = most satisfaction, 5 = least satisfaction.

According to Table 5.20 (rearranged from Table 5.12), players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO are most satisfied with work and those of the BPO and CPO are least satisfied with promotion and pay: the salary of players in the KSO is higher than the BPO and CPO; but players of the KSO are the least satisfied with promotion, because they have very little chance of being promoted once employed.

Table 5.20 Relative ranking of *actual* job satisfaction among players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO

Ranking of job satisfaction	BPO	CPO	KSO
1	Work	Work	Work
2	Co-workers	Co-workers	Co-workers
3	Supervision	Supervision	Supervision
4	Promotion	Promotion	Pay
5	Pay	Pay	Promotion

Note: 1 = most satisfaction, 5 = least satisfaction.

The relationship between job satisfaction and demographic characteristics

An overall relation between players' job satisfaction and demographic characteristics is not *generally* associated: among 20 relations, four have statistically significant differences: satisfaction with pay and age, with supervision and age, with pay and tenure, and with pay and gender. However, there is no significant difference between marital status and the five subscales of the Job satisfaction. Generally speaking, the

younger age group is more satisfied with pay and supervision; those with short tenure are more satisfied with pay than those with long tenure (see Table 5.13); in addition, female players are more satisfied with pay than male players. Players classified by all demographic variables are satisfied with work based on the JDI absolute score, but the other four facets show more variety.

As for the players of the BPO, there was a significant difference between age and supervision: the results of Tukey's HSD test showed that satisfaction with supervision was higher in age group 21–30, and lower in the age groups 31–35 and over 41. According to the result of independent t-test, female players of the BPO are more satisfied with pay than are male players (see Table 5.14).

Players and staff's thoughts on the relative importance of different facets of job satisfaction

Table 5.21 Relative important facets *influencing* job satisfaction of players and staff

Ranking	Players	Staff
1	Work (57.5%)	Work (80%)
2	Pay (50%)	Pay (50%)
3	Co-workers (50%)	Pay (30%)/ Promotion (30%)
4	Supervision (39.2%)	Supervision (50%)
5	Promotion (55.8%)	Promotion (50%)

Note: 1 = most satisfaction, 5 = least satisfaction.

According to Table 5.21, players choose work as the most important facet *influencing* job satisfaction, followed by pay, co-workers, supervision, and promotion.

In comparison to players, staff are keener on promotion. Although there is rarely chance to be promoted within the orchestral executive constitution, they may desire the opportunity to work in an organisation with higher authority (such as an arts centre) that systematically controls orchestras. Staff did not rank co-workers as an important facet in job satisfaction, so that 50% of staff considered that co-workers were a less-than-average category contributing to job satisfaction (see Table 5.17).

Thus, it can be concluded from Table 5.21 that players and staff consider work to be the most important facet *influencing* job satisfaction, and promotion the least important.

Table 5.19 and Table 5.21 show that there is a large gap between players' *actual* job satisfaction and important facets *influencing* job satisfaction: players ranked pay as the second most important facet *influencing* job satisfaction, but their *actual* satisfaction with pay was ranked lower than work, co-workers, and supervision. Thus, players are obviously dissatisfied with their present pay, and pay could negatively influence players' job satisfaction. Meanwhile, promotion may be an important facet in job satisfaction.

According to Gilmer and Van (1971), few opportunities for promotion are an important reason that employees dislike their work. In addition, rapidly promoted employees have higher concentration on their work than slowly promoted employees (Bray *et al.*, 1974). However, this does not seem to affect the players of Korean municipal orchestras: although they are dissatisfied with promotion, it is apparently not a problem, because it is not an important facet *influencing* their job satisfaction.

Table 5.22 Relative important facets *influencing* job satisfaction among players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO

Ranking	BPO	CPO	KSO
1	Work (51.2%)	Work (55.3%)	Work (65.9%)
2	Pay (51.2%)	Pay (42.1%)	Pay (56.1%)
3	Co-workers (48.8%)	Co-workers (50.0%)	Co-workers (51.2%)
4	Promotion (39.0%)	Supervision (42.1%)	Supervision (51.2%)
5	Supervision (43.9%) Promotion (43.9%)	Promotion (55.3%)	Promotion (68.3%)

Note: 1= most important, 5= least important

Table 5.22 shows that each group of players ranked similarly for job satisfaction, with the exception of promotion: the players of the BPO chose promotion as the fourth important facet *influencing* job satisfaction and supervision as the fifth, because they have a practical chance of being promoted, a result that leads to an increase of pay and better orchestral position.

With the exception of pay, there is no contradictory relation between *actual* satisfaction (see Table 5.20) and important facets *influencing* job satisfaction among players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO (see Table 5.22). All groups of players had a big difference between facets *actual* and *influencing* job satisfaction regarding pay, and each group of players also showed the same tendency: thus, pay is a predominantly negative facet in each group of players' job satisfaction.

The relationship between job satisfaction and turnover

Players' job satisfaction is associated with turnover: turnover with work, with supervision, and with co-workers have negative correlations, respectively; regarding the inter-correlation of players' five subscales of job satisfaction, 7 out of 10 inter-correlations are significantly associated. The result of multiple regression analysis indicates that if players are less satisfied or dissatisfied with work and co-workers, they are more likely to think of turnover (see Table 5.25).

On the other hand, regarding the correlation between staff job satisfaction and turnover, pay is negatively associated with turnover: if players are dissatisfied with, or less satisfied with pay, they are likely to think of job turnover. Among 10 inter-correlations of

staff's five subscales of job satisfaction, two inter-correlations are significant.

The following section will discuss players' and staff job satisfaction from the results of interview.

5.7 Results of qualitative research interviews

Players' job satisfaction and dissatisfaction

From (mainly) one to one in-depth interviews, I was able to gather some factors of satisfaction and dissatisfaction from players and staff in the BPO, CPO, and KSO. I will explain the reasons for job satisfaction and dissatisfaction of players first, and then move on to those of staff.

Orchestral musicians are highly trained artists who have devoted years of practice and personal sacrifice towards a career in the orchestra (McManus, 2010: online). Several players that I interviewed said that becoming a member of an orchestra through an open audition was a dream job and a long-held ambition, and they were positive about their current job. Players' desired jobs before becoming a member of an orchestra[134] were to be an orchestral player (47.5%), followed by a professor in university (37.7%) and a soloist (8.8%) (Lee, 2001: p. 51). Lee (2001) stated that approximately 63% of players responded that they are satisfied or very satisfied with their job, while 5.6% responded that he/she was somewhat dissatisfied with the current job because of low salary and over-interference of supervisors (p. 49).[135] A similar survey was conducted by Jung (2004)[136] as a part of her Master's thesis *managerial development of the public orchestras in Korea*: an orchestral player (49%) is the most desired job 49%, followed by a processor in university (26%) and soloist (12%) (p. 61); in addition, 56% of respondents are somehow satisfied with their present job and 29% were very satisfied, whereas 7% were somehow dissatisfied with job (p. 63). The result of this study also reveals that players have the highest *actual* satisfaction with work, and 57.5% of respondents think that work is the most important facet *influencing* job satisfaction. Thus, it can be concluded that orchestral players are generally satisfied with what they are doing.

As we have seen in Tables 5.10, players are relatively satisfied with co-workers. The finding is supported by Lee's (2001) thesis *Analysis of Orchestra Musicians from the*

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[134] Although Lee's samples of orchestras are two municipal orchestras and two private orchestras from the Seoul and Kyunggi areas, I only used information from the two municipal orchestras for purpose of this study.

[135] A supervisor, here, is a Music Director or Conductor.

[136] Jung surveyed 130 players of Bucheon municipal orchestra and Suwon municipal orchestra.

viewpoint of Sociology of Occupation: 62.5% of respondents are satisfied with co-workers, 31.9% choose average, and 5.6% are dissatisfied with co-workers. Further dissatisfaction with co-workers will be described in relation to conflict in Chapter 6.

Players barely mention promotion in interviews: it may be because they accept the limitations of promotion and can do nothing, so they do not think about it: according to the results of the survey, promotion is a low-satisfaction facet among players (see Table 5.10) and 55.8% of players think promotion as the least important facet *influencing* job satisfaction (see Table 5.15).

As there are only one or two principals and vice-principals in each orchestral section, there is a limited opportunity for promotion, and limited promotion opportunities and job insecurity may be facets in players' low satisfaction.[137]

Despite the players' general satisfaction with their work and co-workers, they indicate a reason for dissatisfaction: a lack of control over work activities.[138] Levine and Levine (1996) stated that orchestra musicians' internal motivation is higher than any of the other groups, [but] their level of general job satisfaction is quite low, below that of federal prison guards...This dissatisfaction is due to the levels of stress they experience and [...] much of this stress is due to their lack of control over their working environment' (p. 16). Most musicians are not involved in organising rehearsal, producing music, orchestral operations, and decision making (American Symphony Orchestra League, 1993: p. 70), although Cahn (1992) believes that players in symphony orchestras have a certain amount of control over the interpretation of music (p. 34). Nevertheless, a player's role in an orchestra is very limited, and they hardly ever participate in decision making. Therefore, players feel they are controlled by the orchestral executive constitution off stage and by the conductor both on and off stage.

As players do not like control over their work (especially from the conductor), they are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with supervision of senior players (see Table 5.6): yet it might be interpreted that senior players (e.g. principal players) are also their co-workers, thus encouraging fellow feeling and the maintenance of a harmonious working environment. On the other hand, it is an unwritten rule that players have to obey the principal players' musical instructions during rehearsals or concerts, thus players may

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[137] Players are generally against the regular audition, which closely related to promotion or salary, held by the city, and it causes a bad relationship with administrative staff and civil servants as well as the conductor.

[138] It might be related to the over-interference of supervisors mentioned in Lee's (2001) thesis.

become used to following musical requirements from principal players. Because the senior player's supervision mainly concerns music, there are not many things that lead to problematic relationships among them.[139] However, satisfaction with a supervisor in the JDI's five scales in this chapter was not fully explored as 'supervisors' meant 'senior players' (e.g. first principal, second principal). The relationship between players and conductor will be further discussed in relation to conflict in Chapter 6.

Another major factor was that every player I interviewed complained about financial difficulties.

> ...Although families of musicians are (generally) rich, they are keen on salary...
> [Civil Servant 1]

Although Civil Servant 1 believed that most players are affluent, the financial situation of each player can vary. The salary from an orchestra is the main income for the players' living expenses, and it is natural that players are keen on it. As orchestral players seem dissatisfied with their salary, they seek extra income from private lessons and performing activities. Lee (2001: p. 33) notes the poor salary of orchestral players in her Master's thesis: some players' income from extra activities is considerably higher than that from the orchestra (she did not offer detailed information about how many players are in this situation). According to Jung's survey (2004), 100% of players in two municipal orchestras fill their lack of salary from extra activities (excluding orchestral activities) (p. 73) and the reason for job dissatisfaction is mainly because of inadequate salary (p. 63).[140] The financial difficulty experienced by players in symphony orchestras was the substance of a complaint by British orchestral musicians: Anna Price (2006) wrote an article describing the despair of orchestral musicians, commenting, 'of the 600 or so orchestral string players in full-time work across the country, few earn more than £25,000 a year. Many are on much less'. A former player of the London Symphony Orchestra who had worked for 20 years told her that music was a fantastic hobby but difficult to do every day for a living. Despite the low salary, players are continuously working as orchestral players. One of reasons I found from interview is that holding the position of an orchestral player helps towards generating extra income, especially from private lessons: it signifies that students can trust the musical ability of their teacher if they are members of an orchestra, and orchestral players are more likely to have private lessons, compared to those teachers who are not, although this also depends on the particular musical instrument (as Civil Servant 1 remarks). Players' financial

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[139] The conductor's supervision in Korea is not only related to music but also to administration, thus it may cause dissatisfaction and conflict between conductor and players.
[140] 10 out 11 choose pay as the reason of dissatisfaction (Jung, 2004: p. 63).

difficulties are supported by the information from the results of survey on job satisfaction (see Table 5.6 and Table 5.10).

Staff job satisfaction and dissatisfaction

The majority of staff in orchestral executive constitutions that I interviewed said that they were satisfied overall with what they were doing, because of the nature of the work[141] and the feelings of achievement,[142] but they were dissatisfied with their working conditions and salaries.

> I am satisfied with where I am...doing this job because I like it and feel a sense of duty, compared to past times...working conditions were very poor...work with a sense of duty, without any salary...then the orchestra has a relative solid management system with professional staff...salaries are gradually increased...I will choose this job if I could begin again...this job (orchestra manager) is the objective and destiny of my life.
>
> [Staff Member 1]

> ...Although I am not an orchestra player anymore, I am generally satisfied with my job, because I can hear music everyday and stay near an orchestra...when I first joined the orchestral executive constitution, my satisfaction was very high...the degree of satisfaction now is less than that time...but I would love to work as staff again...it is not only limited to orchestra managerial work. I want to work anywhere related to arts and culture.
>
> [Staff Member 2]

As their words explain, the administrative staff that I interviewed were comprised of both music graduates and former members of orchestras, and they liked to work in an orchestral office. It is supported by the information from Tables 5.7, which show that staff are satisfied with work. Although staff are satisfied with what they are doing, there are some barriers reducing their job satisfaction.

The first barrier to disturb the job satisfaction of administrative staff is low pay, which was given very low (*actual*) satisfaction mean score in Table 5.7, and the second important facet *influencing* job satisfaction (see Table 5.17), followed by promotion. Staff complaints about bad pay are as follows:

> ...I wanted to leave because of financial difficulty...but I couldn't leave my current job due to some reasons...if I get another chance to choose my job, I will definitely choose a different life...
>
> [Staff Member 3]

> ...Because of financial aspects, I find it very hard...when I think of the fact I've been working in the same place for years, it makes me a bit depressed

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[141] Staff love classical music and the main reason for job satisfaction is that they can always listen to classical music.

[142] Staff of the orchestral executive constitution feel a great satisfaction when a concert is successfully finished.

(because of the very slow growth of salary)...

[Staff Member 2]

Staff of the orchestral executive constitution think their salary is lower compared to the salaries of other jobs and the years they have worked. The position of staff might be defined as a semi civil servant and their ranks are similar to the eight ranks of local government officials.[143] They work from 9am to 6pm based on the regulation of local government officials, but their salaries are slightly lower than those of government officials.

Another barrier to staff job satisfaction is promotion, which had the lowest satisfaction mean score when work, pay, supervision, and co-workers were all considered (see Table 5.11). As veteran staff employee Staff Member 1 remarked, 'rotation can be needed for (development of) individuals ... if there is a promotion of position, it would be better'. In his case, he had been working almost 17 years, but his job position had remained the same and the work was repetitive. The only change during his 17 years was that the CPO had more staff compared to the beginning. Other staff have to keep their current positions, too, as there is no promotion in practical terms unless the managing director resigns. This means that the current government structure within the orchestral office may lead to a lack of motivation in work.

At the beginning of working as a member of the administrative staff in the orchestral executive constitution, it was so challenging, and I felt a huge responsibility and worked hard...then I got used to my work and gained know-how...so I am sometimes lazy...If staff are promoted to the position of orchestral manager (which is the top position within the orchestral executive constitution) and have nowhere to be promoted further, staff should quit after some years of becoming an orchestral manager...Outsiders think it is a good job, but it is very tough...

[Staff Member 4]

In addition to the above comments, Staff Member 4 admitted that he was sometimes lazy because there was nothing new to challenge him in his role. Other administrative staff reported feeling bored at work as they felt their roles to be repetitive. This is evident in Robbins (1988, p. 47) and Hellriegel *et al.* (1998)'s statements on job rotation, which mainly aims to reduce boredom of workers (p. 47).

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[143] Korean local government ranking ranges from one to nine (one being the highest rank).

Table 5.23 Rotation of the orchestral executive constitutions of the BPO, CPO and KSO

Name of orchestra	KSO	BPO	CPO
Frequency of Rotation	1–2.5 year	Fixation	Fixation
The way of employment	Personal preference among experienced staff of the KBS	When there is a vacancy	When there is a vacancy
Year of contract	-	3	2
Average year of working*	4.33	7.66	5.66

Note: * referred from Park, 2004.

As we can see, the orchestral executive constitution has no rotation except in the case of the KBS Symphony Orchestra. In addition, there are few opportunities for promotion, so that positions within the orchestral executive constitution appear to be highly rigid. Thus, such issues as boring and repetitive work may influence job satisfaction.

In spite of several criticisms of Herzberg's 'two factor theory'—for instance, that it only explains the degree of job satisfaction and ignores external influences and limits 'application to manual workers' (Mullins, 1989: p. 263), the Herzberg theory is widely used in organisations because it is 'easy to appreciate and readily applicable' (Kakabadse *et al.*, 2005: p. 61). Crainer and Dearlove (2001) remark, 'Herzberg's work has had a considerable effect on the rewards and remuneration packages offered by corporations' (p. 361). Herzberg's theory could address administrative staff's job satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

Table 5.24 Herzberg's two-factor theory

Hygiene factors (dissatisfiers)	Motivators (satisfiers)
Company policy and administration	Achievement
Supervision	Recognition
Salary	Nature of the work
Interpersonal relations	Responsibility
Working conditions	Growth and advancement

(Source: Herzberg *et al.*, 2003)

Herzberg called the dissatisfiers 'hygiene factors' and the satisfiers 'motivators' (Herzberg *et al.*, 2003). Hygiene factors serve to prevent dissatisfaction and poor job performance, which is not directly related to positive motivation to work (Herzberg *et al.*, 2003), and draw the motivation up to a 'zero point' (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1980: p. 112), whereas motivators will affect feelings of satisfaction or no satisfaction, but not dissatisfaction (Herzberg *et al.*, 2003). The idea seems to be quite confused that the opposite of dissatisfaction is no dissatisfaction, instead of satisfaction (Mullins, 1989: p. 261). That is, if hygiene factors are removed, the individual has no dissatisfaction, which does not mean the individual will be satisfied. Thus, staff in orchestral executive constitutions will have no dissatisfaction as long as staff dissatisfiers—salary and poor working conditions—disappear and leave motivation in a zero state.

Among the five motivators, achievement and work itself are recognised and satisfy staff

in the orchestral executive constitution, whereas responsibility and growth and advancement, which relate to personnel promotion (Mondy *et al.*, 1990: p. 288) and job rotation, are negative parts of staff job satisfaction. To improve the work of the orchestral executive constitution, the city or Executive Director could consider giving appropriate attention to staff (such as job rotation[144]) and encouraging their positive endeavours in terms of objectives or goals of the orchestra itself, or individual projects, in order to motivate them.

Regarding satisfaction with co-workers, staff that I interviewed did not deny that there was an uncomfortable relationship with co-workers, but they did not indicate any specific conflict. It might be because they wish to avoid awkward situations. The conflict handling style of staff towards co-workers will be described in Chapter 6.

In contrast to the group of players, the *actual* staff satisfaction mean score for supervision is highest among the five JDI scales[145] (see Table 5.11); this finding supports by the hypothesis of Scanlan (1976) that supervision is the first determinant of job satisfaction.[146] Like the players, staff think they are all in the same boat and would like to help and cooperate each other. Otherwise, staff try to keep a peaceful working environment and avoid an embarrassing relationship as they have to work together everyday. None of the administrative staff mentioned problems with senior staff, and it may imply that staff do not think seriously about the nature of supervision. The staff's style of conflict management will be explained in Chapter 6, and the deeper relationship between staff satisfaction and conflicts will also be dealt with.

Summary of interview findings

The job satisfaction and dissatisfaction of players and staff and its reasons

According to the results of interviews, players and staff are very satisfied with their work, because it is what they want to do. The reason for players' dissatisfaction is lack of control over work, even though players fully recognise the orchestral hierarchy: players have to accept the musical opinions of the principal or deputy principal players, leader, or conductor. Players refuse to use the term subordinate or supervisor to indicate other players, and consider all players as colleagues.

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[144] Job rotation in the orchestral executive constitution could have the desired effect, because all the tasks are rarely similar (although it is more or less routine) (Hellriegel *et al.*,1998: p. 474).
[145] However, it does not mean that staff are more satisfied with supervision than work or co-workers, even though there is a tendency that they are satisfied with supervision, followed by work and co-workers based on mean score.
[146] The result of the administrative staff's relative rankings of the influences on job satisfaction challenges the assumption that the staff choose supervision as the least important factor (see Table 5.17).

The second source of players' dissatisfaction was salary: although players occupy a position in Korean municipal orchestras that is half civil servant, and have a monthly salary based on the city's regulations, their regular income is not enough to cover their family's living expenses, and they need to fill the gap with extra activities.

Staff pointed out similar sources of dissatisfaction—salary and work conditions—but they were more keen on promotion than were players: there is only one position (Managing Director) to be promoted to within the orchestral executive constitution,[147] and it causes frustration.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the results of quantitative research and qualitative research on job satisfaction, along with relevant theories. Before analysing the data, the response rate, non-response bias check, and multicollinearity were checked.

The results of the quantitative research showed players' and staff's demographic characteristics, the trend of job satisfaction regarding work, pay, supervision, promotion, and co-workers, their thoughts about relative importance among the five subscales, and thoughts of job turnover. The result also showed the relationship between job satisfaction and demographic characteristics, job satisfaction and turnover, and turnover and demographic characteristics using Pearson's correlation and multiple regression analysis. The results of the qualitative research, on the other hand, showed the sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, along with personal narratives.

Players and administrative staff are both *actually* satisfied with work, but dissatisfied with promotion. Players and administrative staff both chose work as the most important facet *influencing* for job satisfaction, and promotion as the least important facet (see Table 5.15 and 5.17). Thus, it can be concluded that they are enjoying their jobs, despite their disappointment with promotion and pay.

The players' and staff job satisfaction is not generally associated with their demographic variables; the players' job satisfaction is generally associated with turnover; there is no overall significant relationship found between staff job satisfaction and turnover.

The next chapter presents an analysis of the results of qualitative (interview) and

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[147] Staff could only have smaller yearly promotion in pay grade during every three year contract: their salary increases in accordance with pay grade and tenure—15,000 won (£ 7.5) for Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra and 35,000 won (£ 17.5) for Busan Philharmonic Orchestra.

quantitative (survey) data collection on conflict in Korean municipal orchestras.

Tables of data used in Chapter 5: from Table 5.25 to Table 5.27

Table 5.25 Players' multiple regression analysis of the JDI and job turnover

Predictors	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	5.050	0.502		10.060	0.000		
Work	-0.036	0.014	-0.249	-2.605	0.010*	0.721	1.387
Pay	-0.004	0.024	-0.015	-0.175	0.861	0.898	1.114
Supervision	-0.007	0.011	-0.066	-0.633	0.528	0.610	1.638
Promotion	0.010	0.022	0.040	0.455	0.650	0.843	1.186
Co-workers	-0.029	0.010	-0.290	-3.061	0.003**	0.736	1.358
$R^2 = .203$, F = 7.147, P = .000***							

Note: dependent: turnover; * indicates $p < 0.05$, ** indicates $p < 0.01$, *** indicates $p < 0.001$.

Table 5.26 Analysis of demographic effects on JDI category scores of the CPO's players

(M±SD)

Categories		Work	Pay	Supervision	Promotion	Co-workers
Age [1)]	21–30	44.14±6.09[a]	5.43±5.88	31.00±16.18	8.00±7.48	29.29±16.02
	31–35	39.87±6.08[ab]	3.58±3.40	35.26±7.77	6.93±4.26	34.08±8.24
	36–40	40.91±8.13[ab]	5.48±3.93	26.84±12.42	3.55±4.30	25.64±10.20
	Over 41	32.22±10.87[b]	1.78±1.56	21.44±11.23	5.11±6.11	26.34±11.57
F-value		3.38*	1.95	2.59	1.25	1.32
Marital status	Married	39.53±8.16	3.86±4.17	29.54±11.36	6.43±5.52	29.74±10.01
	Single	38.82±9.40	4.20±3.83	28.35±13.60	5.10±5.45	28.40±12.72
t-value		0.25	-0.27	0.30	0.76	0.37
gender	Male	35.85±11.72	3.15±3.18	24.69±14.28	6.38±7.14	29.16±12.01
	Female	40.82±6.39	4.47±4.27	31.05±11.05	5.43±4.51	29.00±11.25
t-value		-1.43[148]	-0.98	-1.54	0.44[149]	0.04
Tenure	Less than 5 years	41.57±7.00	5.15±4.56	32.78±14.72	7.62±6.44	30.92±13.24
	5–10 years	33.29±8.14	4.04±3.38	30.86±13.75	3.77±3.24	24.43±8.60
	Over 10 years	39.68±9.35	3.26±3.71	25.59±9.67	5.20±5.22	29.48±10.93
F-value		2.27	0.88	1.43	1.34	0.76

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$; according to the result of Tukey's HSD test, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a, ab, b].

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[148] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[149] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.

Table 5.27 Analysis of demographic effects on JDI category scores of the KSO's players

(M±SD)

Categories		Work	Pay	Supervision	Promotion	Co-workers
Age	21–30	35.00±8.72	11.67±8.08	29.15±5.45	9.00±6.00	33.00±10.39
	31–35	42.67±6.71	6.33±7.69	28.67±11.08	6.83±3.54	29.33±16.26
	36–40	34.33±8.62	4.67±2.31	34.00±4.36	6.00±2.00	39.67±4.73
	Over 41	44.59±7.67	4.13±4.23	28.78±14.60	4.62±2.47	35.91±14.77
F-value		2.77	2.15	0.14	2.70	0.47
Marital status	Married	43.50±8.54	4.84±4.90	30.75±13.03	5.01±2.22	36.62±13.29
	Single	39.57±5.47	6.14±7.15	21.78±10.31	7.14±5.67	27.29±16.41
t-value		1.16	-0.59	1.71	-0.98[150]	1.62
Gender	Male	44.40±7.77	4.48±5.13	31.19±13.76	5.04±2.40	33.89±15.86
	Female	39.52±8.29	6.29±5.57	25.00±10.32	6.11±4.26	37.27±9.70
t-value		1.82	-1.02	1.44	-0.84[151]	-0.83[152]
Tenure	Less than 5years	46.00±7.55	16.00±8.66[a]	34.48±14.02	10.00±6.25[a]	34.33±6.66
	5–10 years	40.02±8.33	3.31±2.87[b]	29.08±11.27	5.08±2.81[b]	31.23±16.00
	Over 10 years	43.93±8.06	4.65±4.35[b]	28.58±14.03	4.98±2.42[b]	37.11±13.70
F-value		1.23	10.91***	0.27	4.15*	0.72

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$, *** indicates $p < 0.001$; according to the results of Tukey's HSD test, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a or b].

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[150] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[151] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[152] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.

Chapter 6 Conflict

6.1 Introduction

Conflict was at one time thought to be bad, and was viewed negatively in the arguments which dominated in 1930s and 1940s. [153] The traditional view aims to eliminate conflict by designing mechanistic or bureaucratic organisation structures (Rahim, 1986: p. 9) such as planning an elaborate bureaucracy, framing an efficient task plan, hiring appropriate people, and clear rules and regulations for every contingency (Chung, 2008: p. 10). From the late 1940s to the mid-1970s, conflict has been considered both negative and essential for organisational efficiency, because it is an inevitable phenomenon (Robbins, 2005: p. 194): thus, conflict is recognised and accepted, but people still try to 'eliminate it by improving the social system of the organisation' (Rahim, 1986: p. 9). Since the 1980s, conflict has been 'considered as legitimate, inevitable, and even a positive indicator of effective organisational management' and conflict could even be 'essential to productivity' under 'certain limits' (Rahim, 1986: p. 7): this modern view of conflict aims to use conflict actively.

The definition of conflict varies, and is ambiguous in nature. Although Rahim (1986) argues that 'the term conflict has no single clear meaning' (p. 12), he later defines conflict as 'an interactive process manifested in incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance within or between social entities' (Rahim, 2004: p. 7). There are various aspects of conflict, and they can be classified in three different ways: sources of conflict (affective conflict, conflict of interest, conflict of values, cognitive conflict, goal conflict, and substantive conflict); the basis of the levels of conflict (e.g. individual, group);[154] and the styles of handling conflicts (integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding, and compromising).

Although different periods have emphasised different views of conflict, I believe that conflict is a natural and inevitable phenomenon, and can have positive, as well as negative outcomes. In order to discover levels and sources of conflicts, and the styles of handling conflicts within Korean symphony orchestras, this study adopts the *Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventory* (ROCI)-I, dealing with the levels and sources of conflicts; and ROCI-II, dealing with the styles of handling conflicts. *Managing Conflict in*

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[153] Frederic W. Taylor, Elton Mayo, and Henri Fayol are representative of this viewpoint.

[154] Various numbers of levels of conflict have been presented by different researchers such as March and Simon (1958): individual conflict, organisational conflict, and interorganisatinal conflict; Robbins (1983): interpersonal conflict, intergroup conflict, and intragroup conflict; Stoner (1978), Schermerhorn (1985), and Hellriegel *et al.* (1998): interpersonal conflict, intergroup conflict, and interorganisational conflict.

Organisations (1986) and *Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventories: Professional Manual* (2004), written by M. Afzalur Rahim are much used in this chapter.

This chapter presents the results of quantitative and qualitative research regarding various conflicts occurring within Korean municipal orchestras. First, the introduction of two instruments measuring conflict is explained. Second, the results of the quantitative research survey form the basis for examining the conflicts through the *Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventory* (ROCI)-I and II: ROCI-I contains three independent scales to measure three types of organisational conflict: intrapersonal, intragroup, and intergroup; ROCI-II contains five styles of handling interpersonal conflict: integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding, and compromising. Each description of this taxonomy is explained, and the conflicts are investigated together with the source of each conflict. Third, as an extension of second section, the results of correlation and multiple regression analysis among ROCI-I, ROCI-II, JDI, and turnover will be given. Fourth, the result of the qualitative research interview regarding conflict will be presented, and a brief conclusion will then follow.

6.2 Conflict

To measure types and handling styles of conflict among players and administrative staff of Korean municipal orchestras, I adopted the *Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventory* (ROCI-I and II), which were devised by M. Afzalur Rahim.

ROCI-I

Conflicts on the basis of levels were discussed by Kahn *et al.* (1964) and Rizzo *et al.* (1970) regarding role conflict and ambiguity (within interpersonal conflict level), and by Corwin (1969) and Walton and Dutton (1969) regarding interpersonal and intergroup conflicts (Rahim, 1983a: pp. 189–90). Compared to other instruments, ROCI-I, which includes three types of organisational conflict, was developed with considerable care (Rahim, 1983a: p. 197). The initial instrument of ROCI-I was revised following the critiques of four management professors,[155] and Rahim made 'the items free from social desirability response bias' (Rahim, 2004: p. 25). Retest and internal consistency reliabilities of the ROCI-I's subscales are both satisfactory. ROCI-I is therefore a reliable instrument for measuring different types of conflict.

It has in total 21 items: 7 for intrapersonal conflict, 8 for intragroup conflict, and 6 for intergroup conflict, based on a 5-point Likert scale ('strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'), as well as personal information such as tenure, age, gender, educational

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[155] They thought the items of the initial ROCI-I were difficult, ambiguous, or inconsistent (Rahim, 1983a: p. 191).

background.[156] Scoring is relatively easy. For each subscale, you need to add all scores of respondents marked, then divide it into the number of items, and missing items are excluded after this division. For example, if a respondent ranked only 4 of the 8 items of intragroup conflict, the total score for intragroup conflict should be divided by 4 (not 8). However, it is important that before adding scores, some scales of items are reversed: for example, changing the value of 1 to 5, 2 to 4, 4 to 2, and 5 to 1. 'A higher score represents greater amount of one type of conflict' (Rahim, 2004: p. 7).

ROCI-II

While ROCI-I is designed to measure different types of conflict: intrapersonal (IP), intragroup (IG), and intergroup (NG), ROCI-II deals with five styles of handling interpersonal conflict with supervisors, subordinates[157] and peers.

There are several five-conflict instruments: the Hall Conflict Management Survey (1969), the Thomas-Kilmann conflict MODE Survey (1974), the Putnam-Wilson Organisational Communication Conflict Instrument (1982), the Ross-DeWine Conflict Management Message Style (1982), and the Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventory-II (1983b). ROCI-II appears to measure the five styles of handling interpersonal conflict based on Blake and Mouton (1964): domination, confrontation, smoothing, avoidance, and compromising, and Thomas (1976): avoidance, competition, cooperation, accommodation, and compromise. In spite of some weaknesses, I finally decided to choose Rahim's instruments. Womack (1988a) summarised the positive and negative points of these five conflict instruments. The strengths of ROCI-II are that it is carefully developed and tested with a large sample (Rahim, 2004; Hatfield, 1988; and Womack, 1988a). Several reports estimate the reliability of ROCI-II questionnaire using Cronbach alpha coefficients of internal consistency. Although dominating, obliging, and compromising (the terms used in ROCI-II) are below Nunnally's (1978) suggested minimum standard of 0.80 for internal consistency (Womack, 1988b; King and Miles, 1990), Rahim insists (2004) that the reliability coefficients of internal consistency are satisfactory and 'the test-retest and internal consistency reliability coefficients compare quite favorably with those of other existing instruments' (p. 43). Furthermore, ROCI-II is able to measure conflict for different targets such as supervisor, subordinate, and peer. Another advantage is, 'researchers can obtain information about the appropriateness or effectiveness of each style for particular situations' (Hatfield, 1988: p. 351). On the other hand, the weaknesses of ROCI-II are that it is more difficult to score than Hall's CMS or Thomas-Kilmann's MODE; and specific communication is excluded. These two

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[156] Although I included demographic information at the end of ROCI-I (in case the respondent did not give it in the JDI), I did not use much information from ROCI-I, as the questionnaire of JDI already contained such information.
[157] Subordinates are excluded from this study.

weaknesses did not interrupt this study; just because the scoring of ROCI-II is more complicated than the other instruments does not mean that it is difficult: in practice, it is fairly easy to score. In addition, this study combines qualitative research interviews, so that lack of explicit communication was not a problem.

ROCI-II includes 28 items: 7 for integrating style, 6 for obliging style, 5 for dominating style, 6 for avoiding style, and 4 for compromising style on a 5-point Liker scale ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. ROCI-II has three forms that differ only in reference to conflict with supervisor (Form A), subordinate (Form B),[158] and peer (Form C) (Rahim, 1983b: p. 370; Hatfield, 1988: p. 368). In contrast to ROCI-I, scoring of ROCI-II does not need values of each item to be reversed, but the rest is the same as for ROCI-I: for example, the requirement to simply add all values of integrating style, and then divide the total by the number of items.[159]

The secondary objectives of the conflict research were:

1. To ascertain the level of intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict: a) among players and staff of the BPO, CPO, and KSO, respectively; b) between players and staff.
2. To ascertain the relative level of intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict (with two variables): a) within all groups of players and staff, respectively; b) within each group of players.
3. To ascertain the styles of handling conflict with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers (the administrative supervisor is added for staff).
4. To examine the link between types of conflicts and demographic characteristics, and styles of handling conflict together with demographic characteristics.
5. To examine the relationship between: a) JDI and ROCI-I; b) JDI and ROCI-II with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers (and the administrative supervisor in the case of staff); c) ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers, current conductor, and previous conductor (and the administrative supervisor in the case of staff; d) job turnover and ROCI-I; and e) job turnover and ROCI-II with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers (and the administrative supervisor in the case of staff).
6. To explore the sources of conflict occurring in Korean municipal orchestras.

6.3 Results of the quantitative research survey[160]

This section presents intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict with their sources, and the results of the case studies of the Korean municipal orchestras, followed by five styles of handling interpersonal conflict.

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[158] Although I asked questions regarding subordinates, I finally decided to exclude it, as players dislike the term 'subordinate' (I also thought ROCI-II: Form B was not appropriate to an orchestra) and most administrative staff do not have subordinates.

[159] As with ROCI-I, 'a higher score represents greater use of a conflict style' (Rahim, 1983b: p. 370; Rahim, 2004: p. 9).

[160] The respondents' characteristics are the same as in the survey on job satisfaction, and are omitted in this chapter.

Intrapersonal conflict

> Intrapersonal conflict occurs when a person is required to perform a task which does not match his or her expertise, interests, goals, and values. Such conflict also occurs when the role a person expects to perform and the role that is demanded of him by the organisation are incongruent.
>
> (Rahim, 1986: pp. 114–17)

It is not easy to define the terms of a role, because 'any individual's role is a combination of the role expectations that the members of the role set have of the focal roles' (Handy, 1999: p. 62). However, the most common definition of a role is 'the set of prescriptions defining what the behaviour of a position member should be' (Biddle and Thomas, 1966: p. 29). A careful review of the definitions of a role by Biddle and Thomas (1966) has revealed that the concept is connected with the behaviours of particular persons.

According to Gross, Mason, and McEachern (1966), literature on role conflict has different meanings to different social scientists: some have used it to denote incompatible expectation situations to which an actor is exposed, whether he is aware of the conflict or not, whereas others use role conflict to refer to situations in which the actor perceives incompatible expectations (p. 287). In addition, Huczynski and Buchanan (2001) have defined role conflict as being the simultaneous existence of two or more sets of role expectations on a focal person[161] in such a way that compliance with one makes it difficult to comply with the others (p. 474). Here, role conflict results from the necessity for one person to carry out two or more roles in the same situation (Handy, 1999: p. 65).

Role ambiguity is closely related to the concept of role conflict (Rahim, 1986: p. 45). If the focal person or the members of the role set have some uncertainty as to their role and the conception of one person's role is different from the expectation from others within the role set, it leads to role ambiguity, although this ambiguity also provides a sense of there being freedom to shape one's own role (Handy, 1999). The following section investigates intrapersonal conflict around Korean municipal orchestras, especially related to role conflict, [162] which Rahim (1986) considers as part of intrapersonal conflict and role ambiguity.

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[161] The focal person is the specific individual concerned with the analysis of any situation (Handy, 1999).

[162] Here, role conflict implies a mismatch between the expected role and the role that needs to be performed.

Table 6.1 Players' intrapersonal conflict

Variables	N	M	SD	F	95% Confidence interval for mean	
				1.12	Lower bound	Upper bound
BPO	44	2.33	0.54		2.17	2.50
CPO	35	2.37	0.60		2.16	2.57
KSO	41	2.19	0.49		2.04	2.35
TOTAL	120	2.29	0.54		2.20	2.39

Table 6.1 lists the sample size (N), mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of intrapersonal conflict classified by the players in the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra (BPO), the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra (CPO), and the KBS Symphony Orchestra (KSO), and the results of one-way analysis of variance (F) along with 95% confidence interval for mean. According to the result of the F-test, there is no statistically significant difference in intrapersonal conflict among each group of players. The percentile norms of the players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO will be shown in Table 6.26, respectively. The percentile score of an individual shows each player's relative position on intrapersonal conflict scale compared with other members.

Table 6.2 Staff intrapersonal conflict

Variables	N	M	SD	X^2	95% Confidence interval for mean	
				1.113	Lower bound	Upper bound
BPO	2	2.72	0.40		-0.91	6.34
CPO	4	2.39	0.58		1.47	3.31
KSO	3	2.81	0.30		2.07	3.54
TOTAL	9	2.60	0.46		2.25	2.95

Table 6.2 shows the sample size (N), mean (M), and standard deviation (SD), classified by staff of three orchestras, and the results of Kruskal-Wallis test (Chi-square) along with 95% confidence interval for mean. There is no significant difference among them, according to the results of a Kruskal-Wallis test: H (df = 2) = 1.113, p = 0.573.

According to the results of the t-test and the Mann-Whitney test, no statistic significant difference is found in intrapersonal conflict (t = -1.67, p = 0.098; U = 342.00, p = 0.066, see Table 6.23) between the group of players and staff: that is, players and staff may have a similar degree of intrapersonal conflict.

One of main sources of intrapersonal conflict is that of organisational structure, which significantly influences role conflict (Rahim, 1986: pp. 49–50). Korean municipal orchestras have an organisational structure with 'multiple lines of authority', which is closely related to role conflict and organisational inefficiency (Evan, 1962; Kaplan, 1959). There is no formal important role for administrative staff and players in decision making within Korean municipal orchestras, and it is also a potential source of intrapersonal conflict (Morris et al., 1979): for instance, some degree of intrapersonal

conflict among the players might be caused by reluctance to give a performance that a city requires them to give. A further source of intrapersonal conflict in Korean municipal orchestras is that of position. According to Rosen (1970), the middle position suffers between supervisors and subordinates because of incompatible demands, and this position is more exposed to role conflict: the role of the orchestral executive constitution in Korea is that of a medium position between players and conductor or orchestra (including players and a conductor) and the city. More contact with the outside is likely to lead to more role conflict: the Korean orchestral executive constitution has 'boundary-spanning activities' (Kahn et al., 1964). Therefore, it may be concluded that administrative staff are more exposed to role conflict, which is a part of intrapersonal conflict, but the result of one-way analysis of variance does not show a statistically significant difference between the group of players and the group of staff.

Furthermore, the position of the Executive Director is automatically given to the Mayor or Deputy Mayor of the city, and the Conductor has the role of Music Director, who has a certain administrative authority. The mayor is unlikely to have an 'appropriate expertise, aptitude, and commitment', which can lead to undesirable frustration (Rahim, 1986: p. 49) in orchestral operation. Conductors, Executive Director, and administrative staff may experience role conflict, as they have to perform more than one role at the same time: Conductor as well as Music Director, Executive Director as well as Mayor or Deputy Mayor. These roles may overlap with those of administrative staff due to staff shortages, and indeed, most small-sized arts organisations have people in multiple roles.

Intragroup conflict

Intragroup refers to conflict among the members of a group, or between two or more subgroups within a group regarding its goals, tasks, and policies, and so on. Such a conflict may also occur as a result of incompatibilities, disagreements, or inconsistencies between some or all the members of a group and its leader(s).

(Rahim, 2004: p. 8)

This section explains the overall intragroup conflict of players and staff, and conflict related to leadership and the composition of orchestra members.

Table 6.3 Players' intragroup conflict

Variables	N	M	SD	F	95% Confidence interval for mean	
				2.51	Lower bound	Upper bound
BPO	44	2.83	0.31		2.73	2.92
CPO	35	2.65	0.44		2.50	2.80
KSO	41	2.66	0.45		2.51	2.80
Total	120	2.72	0.41		2.64	2.79

Table 6.4 Staff intragroup conflict

Variables	N	M	SD	X²	95% Confidence interval for mean	
				0.276	Lower bound	Upper bound
BPO	2	3.00	0.35		-0.18	6.18
CPO	4	2.97	0.12		2.78	3.16
KSO	3	3.09	0.32		2.30	3.87
Total	9	3.01	0.22		2.85	3.19

Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show the sample size (N), mean (M), standard deviation (SD) of intragroup conflict classified by the group of players and staff, and the results of one-way analyses of variance (F) and a Kruskal-Wallis test (Chi-square) along with 95% confidence interval for mean, respectively. The percentile norms of the players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO are shown in Table 6.26. The percentile score of an individual shows each player's relative position on the intragroup conflict scale compared with others.

According to the result of the F-test, there is no statistically significant difference in intragroup conflict among each group of players (F (2,117) = 2.51, p > 0.05). The results of a Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that there is no significant difference in intragroup conflict among each group of staff, H (df = 2) = 0.276, p = 0.871.

Meanwhile, there is a statistically significant difference between the group of players and staff (t = -2.16, p = 0.033; U = 295.00, p = 0.023, see Table 6.23) based on the result of an independent t-test and Mann-Whitney test: it can be interpreted that staff have a higher intragroup conflict than players. Thus, it may be seen that staff have more 'incompatibilities, disagreements, or inconsistencies' between themselves and their conductor or the city (Rahim, 2004: p. 8) than the group of players.

Rahim (1986)[163] indicates six sources of intragroup conflict: leadership style, task structure, group composition, size, cohesiveness and groupthink, and external threats, and three sources of intragroup conflict are found within Korean municipal orchestras.

The first source of intragroup conflict is that of leadership style. Maier and Verser (1982: p. 153) have explained three situational sources of intragroup conflict related to leadership style. The first situation (see Figure 6.1) occurs when the leader (conductor) treats group members differently: players that I interviewed talked of their conductor's discrimination based on his personal favour. If the player is on conductor's side, he/she could obtain a kind of advantage, especially related to audition. A male player cynically explained that some female players' behaviour supported their conductor, but that this

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[163] These details are not mentioned in Rahim 2004, so I used Rahim's 1986. Rahim's 1986 and 2004 works are different, although both are about conflict.

was merely to take advantage of him.

Figure 6.1 Situation A

(Source: Maier and Verser, 1982: p. 153)[164]

The second situation (see Situation B in Figure 6.2) occurs when the group members are against the leader, which increases intragroup conflict. This might happen among players of the BPO and CPO when they have an audition,[165] because the result of the audition can change the orchestral position, and remove some privileges.[166] However, the CPO does not implement practical changes based on the results of the audition, and the KSO does not have regular auditions. Korean municipal orchestras have regular auditions (generally every three years) because the cities believe that auditions are a way of improving the artistic standard of their orchestras: the idea is that players will be unduly relaxed if there is no audition, but will practice in order to prepare for the audition.[167]

Regular auditions are held by local cities, which players in my interviews generally consider to be an unfair and unfavourable in the way regular auditions are run. They are thus an external threat, and another source of intragroup conflict. When this happens, players put aside their differences and unite against the common enemy (it can be the city or conductor) (Sherif, 1958), and conflicts among players are significantly reduced. When the players of the BPO had serious conflict with their previous conductor, this phenomenon occurred and players tried to expel him. In other words, even though the group is disunited, it becomes a unified community for common interest, profit, and aim (Adorno, 1976: p. 116–17).

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[164] L in Figure 6.1 stands for leader.
[165] The conductor has a great influence on the result of the audition.
[166] Thus, some players that I interviewed feel insecure in their job positions.
[167] However, the efficiency of regular auditions is still debatable.

Figure 6.2 Situation B and Situation C

Situation B   Situation C

(Source: Maier and Verser, 1982: p. 153)[168]

The third situation (see Situation C in Figure 6.2) occurs when group members have different status and work interests, and show conflict between them and the leader. Orchestral players are likely to favour players in the same instrumental section or within a similar age group.

The third source of intragroup conflict to be found in Korean municipal orchestras is that of group composition. According to Kelly (1974), a change of group membership can intensify conflict (p. 565), because a newcomer may negatively influence group stability as he/she has 'different attitudes, backgrounds, and experiences' (Rahim, 1986: p. 88). The players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra have uncomfortable feelings about new members: if they go to a rehearsal venue and find a new player sitting beside them, they feel uncomfortable. Namely, the orchestral executive constitution of the KSO hires new players without giving any notice to current players. It also takes them some time to be unified with newcomers, and they prefer to play with old members.

Intergroup conflict

Intergroup conflict refers to disagreements, differences, or incompatibilities between the members or their representatives of two or more groups. This conflict is often caused by task interdependence, jurisdictional ambiguities, cultural differences.

(Rahim, 2004: p. 9)

To measure intergroup conflict, which is regarded as an 'inevitable part of organisational life' (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1986: p. 42), I modified Rahim's intergroup conflict: in the case of players, I asked about their intergroup conflict with administrative

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[168] L stands for leader.

staff and civil servants; in the case of staff, I asked about their intergroup conflict towards players and civil servants.

Table 6.5 Players' intergroup conflict with staff

Variables	N	M	SD	F	95% Confidence interval for mean	
				4.83*	Lower bound	Upper bound
BPO	44	2.97[a]	0.34		2.86	3.07
CPO	35	2.95[a]	0.56		2.76	3.14
KSO	41	2.66[b]	0.59		2.47	2.84
Total	120	2.86	0.52		2.76	2.95

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$; according to the results of Tukey's HSD test, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a or b].

Table 6.6 Staff intergroup conflict with players

Variables	N	M	SD	X^2	95% Confidence interval for mean	
				0.861	Lower bound	Upper bound
BPO	2	2.92	0.59		-2.36	8.19
CPO	4	2.63	0.72		1.48	3.77
KSO	3	3.17	0.67		1.52	4.82
Total	9	2.87	0.64		2.38	3.36

Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the sample size (N), mean (M), and standard deviation (SD), F-value, Chi-square of the Kruskal-Wallis test, and 95% confidence interval for the mean of intergroup conflict, classified by the players and staff of the three orchestras, respectively. The result of the one-way analysis of variance (F) shows that there is a significant difference in the intergroup conflict with staff among groups of players (F (2,117) = 4.83, $p < 0.05$): according to Tukey's HSD test, players of the BPO (M = 2.97, SD = 0.34) and the CPO (M = 2.95, SD = 0.56) have higher intergroup conflict with their administrative staff, compared to those of the KSO (M = 2.66, SD = 0.59). The percentile norms of the players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO are shown in Table 6.26. The percentile score of an individual shows individual players' relative position on this intergroup conflict scale compared with other members.

Unlike groups of players, there is no statistically significant difference to be found in the intergroup conflict with players among groups of staff: H (df = 2) = 0.861, $p = 0.650$.

The result of the *t*-test and the Mann-Whitney test shows that there is no significant difference between the groups of players and staff (t = -0.08, $p = 0.937$; $U = 515.00$, $p = 0.816$, see Table 6.23) in intergroup conflict as to staff and players.

Table 6.7 Players' intergroup conflict with civil servants

Variables	N	M	SD	F 3.82	95% Confidence interval for mean	
					Lower bound	Upper bound
BPO	44	2.92	0.43		2.79	3.05
CPO	35	2.68	0.64		2.46	2.90
KSO[169]	0	n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a
Total	79	2.81	0.54		2.69	2.93

Table 6.8 Staff intergroup conflict with civil servants

Variables	N	M	SD	X^2 0.151	95% Confidence interval for mean	
					Lower bound	Upper bound
BPO	2	2.92	0.59		-2.36	8.19
CPO	4	2.83	0.83		1.52	4.15
KSO	3	3.06	0.51		1.79	4.32
Total	9	2.93	0.61		2.45	3.40

Tables 6.7 and Table 6.8 show the sample size (N), mean (M), standard deviation (SD), F-value and Chi-square of the Kruskal-Wallis test, and 95% confidence interval for the mean of intergroup conflict with civil servants, classified by the players and staff of the three orchestras, respectively. According to the result of the t-test and Kruskal-Wallis test, there is no significant difference in the intergroup conflict with civil servants among the groups of players ($F (1,77) = 3.82$, $p > 0.05$) and groups of staff (H (df = 2) = 0.151, $p = 0.927$). The percentile norms of the players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO regarding intragroup conflict with civil servants are demonstrated in Table 6.26.

Based on the result of the t-test and Mann-Whitney test, there is no significant difference in intergroup conflict with civil servants between the group of players and staff ($t = -0.59$, $p = 0.558$; $U = 307.50$, $p = 0.507$, see Table 6.23): the group of players and staff might have a similar degree of perception on intergroup conflict with civil servants.

The sources of intergroup conflict indicated by Rahim (1986: pp. 102–105) are system differentiation, task interdependence, dependence on scarce resources, jurisdictional ambiguity, and socio-cultural differences, and I found two sources of intergroup conflict. Regarding system differentiation, intergroup hostility is directly caused by 'the number of differences between the groups' (Manheim, 1960: p. 426) and difficulties of communication. Different interests and goals, and different levels of perceptions cause interlevel conflict (Smith, 1966).

Communication difficulty and different perceptions are often mentioned by players, staff, and civil servants (especially between the players and civil servants): generally

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[169] Questions regarding the KSO players' intergroup conflict against civil servant are omitted, because the orchestral executive constitution of the KBS Symphony Orchestra is a part of the KBS: players consider the staff of the KBS equal to the administrative staff of the KBS orchestral executive constitution, as they are also staff of the KBS.

speaking, cities emphasise managerial issues and organisational goals, whereas orchestras emphasise creative ideas and artistic goals. This view is supported by Castañer (1997), who distinguishes basic differences between artistic and managerial work based on Chiapello's (1994) analysis of artist-management conflict. Several features mentioned below could be the reasons of conflict between city (management) and orchestra (arts).

Table 6.9   Differences between artistic and managerial discourses

	Artistic	Managerial
Task features	Risk Innovation Exploration Low value if it can be planned Cannot be absolutely assessed Money is not the only measure	Calculation Standardisation Exploitation High value if it can be planned Everything can be measured Money is the universal measure
Actors	Sensitive Intuitive Bohemian Unpredictable	Judicious Rational Conformist Predictable

(Source: Castañer, 1997: p. 390)

The details of communication difficulty and different perceptions will be shown in the section on intergroup conflict in qualitative research.

A further source of intergroup conflict is that of socio-cultural differences, which result from differences between the personality and demographics of the leaders (see Walton and McKersie on leadership, 1965). Although orchestral players dislike using the term leader or supervisor,[170] players show their intergroup conflict through age: if the principal, sub-principal player, or leader is younger than the general players, this causes some degree of conflict among them. A specific example will be shown in the section on intergroup conflict resulting from qualitative research.

Relative levels of conflict

So far, intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict with staff (or players) and civil servants have been discussed along with the different degree of these conflicts among groups of players and staff, respectively, and comparisons made between the group of players and the group of staff.   The following two tables show relative levels of conflict within player and staff group, respectively; and within each group of players in the three orchestras, respectively.

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[170] Although there is a difference in personnel position between general player and principal player, sub-principal player, or leader, players are likely to consider them as peers, or colleagues.

Table 6.10 Relative levels of conflict among groups of players and staff

Variables	Group of player (n = 79)			Group of staff (n = 9)		
	M	SD	F	M	SD	X^2
Intrapersonal conflict	2.35^c	0.56	30.91***	2.60	0.46	6.77
Intragroup conflict	2.75^b	0.38		3.01	0.22	
Intergroup conflict with staff (player)	2.96^a	0.45		2.87	0.64	
Intergroup conflict with civil servants	2.81^b	0.54		2.93	0.61	

Note: *** indicates $p < 0.001$; according to the results of LSD multiple comparison, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a, b, or c].

As Table 6.10 shows, there is a statistically significant difference among four facets (F $(3,234)$ = 30.91, $p < 0.001$) regarding group of player: and LSD test indicates that players have more intergroup conflict with staff, compared to intergroup conflict with civil servants, intragroup conflict, and intrapersonal conflict, whereas the Firedman's Chi-square shows that the group of staff has no significant difference among four facets (X^2 (df = 3) = 6.77, $p = 0.080$). The percentile norms of player group are presented in Table 6.25.

Table 6.11 Relative level of conflicts in each player group of the BPO, CPO, and KSO

Variables	BPO (n = 44)			CPO (n = 35)			KSO (n = 41)		
	M	SD	F	M	SD	F	M	SD	F
Intrapersonal conflict	2.33^b	0.54	25.55***	2.37^b	0.60	9.63***	2.19^b	0.49	12.04***
Intragroup conflict	2.83^a	0.31		2.65^b	0.44		2.66^a	0.45	
Intergroup conflict With staff	2.97^a	0.34		2.95^a	0.56		2.66^a	0.59	
Intergroup conflict With civil servants	2.92^a	0.43		2.68^b	0.64		n/a	n/a	n/a

Note: *** indicates $p < 0.001$; according to the results of LSD multiple comparison, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a or b].

According to the results of repeated measures ANOVA, each player group has a significant difference among four facets (BPO: F $(3,129)$ = 25.55, $p < 0.001$; KSO: F $(2,80)$ = 12.04, $p < 0.001$; CPO: F $(3,102)$ = 9.63, $p < 0.001$): LSD test indicates that the players of the BPO have less intrapersonal conflict, compared to intergroup conflict with civil servants and staff (respectively) and intragroup conflict; the players of the KSO also have less intrapersonal conflict, compared to intragroup conflict and intergroup conflict with staff; on the other hand, players of the CPO have higher intergroup conflict with staff, compared to intergroup conflict with civil servants, intragroup conflict, and intrapersonal conflict. Thus, each player group has relatively higher degree of intergroup conflict with their staff. The percentile norms of each player group are presented in Table 6.26.

Table 6.12 Players' demographic variables and the ROCI-I subscales[171]

Variables		IP M±SD	IG M±SD	NG1 M±SD	NG2 M±SD
Age	21–30	2.21±0.72	2.68±0.45	2.65±0.55	2.72±0.32
	31–35	2.31±0.45	2.67±0.38	2.91±0.39	2.63±0.39
	36–40	2.23±0.64	2.69±0.43	2.93±0.51	2.70±0.74
	Over 40	2.33±0.52	2.76±0.41	2.89±0.53	2.98±0.51
	F-value	0.28	0.38	0.94	2.14
Marital status	Married	2.30±0.50	2.75±0.41	2.87±0.50	2.83±0.57
	Single	2.28±0.66	2.66±0.42	2.89±0.52	2.76±0.49
	t-value	0.15[172]	1.05	-0.19	0.60
Gender	Male	2.40±0.55	2.71±0.39	2.99±0.48	3.01±0.59
	Female	2.18±0.52	2.73±0.43	2.74±0.51	2.63±0.43
	t-value	2.22*	-0.27	2.69**	3.26**[173]
Tenure	Less than 5 years	2.28±0.69	2.76±0.36	2.94±0.51	2.88±0.42
	5–10 years	2.39±0.48	2.73±0.45	2.87±0.45	2.74±0.52
	Over 10 years	2.26±0.53	2.71±0.41	2.86±0.53	2.80±0.60
	F-value	0.48	0.13	0.21	0.28

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$, ** indicates $p < 0.01$; IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = intragroup conflict, NG1 = intergroup conflict with staff, NG2 = intergroup conflict with civil servants.

Table 6.12 shows the mean (M), and standard deviation (SD) of intrapersonal, intragroup, and intergroup conflict (with two variations) shown by players' demographic characteristics and the results of one-way analysis of variance (F) and t value. According to the result of the t-test, there is a statistically significant difference between gender and intrapersonal conflict ($t = 2.22$, $p < 0.05$): male players (M = 2.40, SD = 0.55) have higher intrapersonal conflict, compared to female players (M = 2.18, SD = 0.52). According to Rahim (1986), intrapersonal conflict is closely related to job dissatisfaction,[174] and female players who have less intrapersonal conflict should have more satisfaction; but the result shows that job satisfaction regarding five categories (work, pay, supervision, promotion, and co-workers) between male and female players has no statistically significant difference, except pay (see Table 5.13). The reason for this may be that players simply do not have much intrapersonal conflict,[175] because they have the same 'expertise, interests, goals, and values'[176] for their job. Thus, it may

[171] The staff demographic variables and the subscales of ROCI-I were omitted, due to a limited sample size.
[172] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[173] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
[174] More intrapersonal conflict leads to job dissatisfaction.
[175] There was no specific example on intrapersonal conflict of players in the results of qualitative research.
[176] These are regarded as sources of intrapersonal conflict by Rahim (1986).

be concluded that Rahim's (1986) theory of the relationship between intrapersonal conflict and job dissatisfaction does not apply to the players of Korean municipal orchestras, except job satisfaction with pay. Based on the results of the independent *t*-test, there are another significant differences in the perception of intergroup conflict with staff and civil servants between gender ($t = 2.69$, $p < 0.01$; $t = 3.26$, $p < 0.01$): male players' intergroup conflict with administrative staff (M = 2.99, SD = 0.48) and civil servants (M = 3.01, SD = 0.60) are higher than female players (M = 2.74, SD = 0.51; M = 2.63, SD = 0.43, respectively). The reason may be that most male players are members of musicians' union and are likely to become a representative of players, and have more opportunity to meet and communicate with staff and civil servants.[177]

Thus far, three types of organisational conflict—intrapersonal, intragroup, and intergroup conflicts—have been explained with case studies of players and staff of Korean municipal orchestras. The next section explores players' and staff's styles of handling interpersonal conflict.

Interpersonal conflict
ROCI-II was designed to measure five styles of handling interpersonal conflicts: *integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding,* and *compromising,* based on the basis of lengthy and repeated feedback from the subjects and factor analyses of various fields of studies (Rahim, 1983b: p. 370).

Rahim and Bonoma (1979) provide 'combination of the two dimensions results in five styles of handling interpersonal conflict' (Rahim, 2004: p.10), and it is shown in Figure 6.3.

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[177] The civil servants in this study include both male and female. Gender may not have much impact on players' intergroup conflict toward civil servants, because the players that I interviewed had similar difficulties.

Figure 6.3 The dual-concern model of the styles of handling interpersonal conflict

CONCERN FOR SELF

High   Low

Integrating	**Obliging**
Compromising	
Dominating	**Avoiding**

(with left-axis label: CONCERN OF OTHERS, High / Low)

(Source: Rahim, 2004: p. 10)

The specific description of five subscales is as follows:

1. Integrating: this style involves high concern for self, as well as the other party involved in conflict. It is concerned with collaboration between parties, i.e., openness, exchange of information, and examination of differences to reach a solution acceptable to both parties.

2. Obliging: this involves low concern for self and high concern for the other party involved in conflict. An obliging person attempts to play down the differences and emphasise commonalities to satisfy the concern of the other party.

3. Dominating: this style involves high concern for self and low concern for the other party. Dominating may mean standing up for one's rights and/ or defending a position that the other party believes to be correct.

4. Avoiding: this involves low concern for self, as well as for the other party. This has been associated with withdrawal, passing-the-buck, sidestepping, or 'see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil' situation.

5. Compromising: this style involves moderate concern for the self as well as the other party. This is associated with give-and-take or sharing, whereby both parties give up something to make a mutually acceptable decision. A compromising party gives up more than a dominating but less than an obliging party.

(Rahim, 2004: pp. 10–11)

Although an integrating style is traditionally preferred, Rahim (1984: p. 63) indicates that all the five styles of handling conflict are useful, depending on situations, and the styles of handling interpersonal conflict where they are appropriate or inappropriate will be shown in Table 6.31. Although following normative data (as well as percentile norms) is useful in determining whether the members of an organisation are making too little, too much, or moderate use of each style of handling interpersonal conflict, it cannot indicate whether the styles are properly used to deal with different situations (Rahim, 1986: pp. 67–68). The following section presents players' and staff's five styles of

handling conflict with their previous conductor, current conductor, and peers, respectively.[178]

Table 6.13 Players' styles of handling interpersonal conflict

Variables	Integrating		Obliging		Dominating		Avoiding		Compromising		F
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Previous conductor	3.55^b	0.71	3.85^a	0.57	2.44^d	0.83	3.68^b	0.68	3.25^c	0.82	95.56***
Current conductor	3.28^b	0.70	3.64^a	0.56	2.24^d	0.67	3.52^a	0.67	2.97^c	0.69	72.90***
Peers	3.82^a	0.66	3.70^b	0.59	2.49^c	0.86	3.84^a	0.58	3.69^b	0.72	118.07***

Note: *** indicates $p < 0.001$; according to the result of LSD multiple comparison, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a, b, c, or d].

Table 6.13 lists the mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of the five styles of handling interpersonal conflict classified by group of players, and F-value. The results of repeated measures ANOVA show that there are significant differences in styles of handling interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor $(F\ (4,460) = 95.56,\ p < 0.001)$, current conductor[179] $(F\ (4,300) = 72.90,\ p < 0.001)$ and peers $(F\ (4,468) = 118.07,\ p < 0.001)$, respectively: according to LSD multiple comparison, players preferred to use *obliging* style when handling interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor; regarding the current conductor, they prefer to use *obliging* and *avoiding* styles, followed by *integrating, compromising*, and *dominating* styles; players equally use *avoiding and integrating*, then *obliging* and *compromising* styles when handling conflict with peers, whereas they use the *dominating* style less.

Table 6.27 shows the percentile norms of players. The percentile score of an individual shows each player's relative position on one of the five scales of the styles of handling interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor, current conductor, and peers, compared to other members.

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[178] In the case of staff, five styles of handling interpersonal conflict with administrative supervisor is added (See Table 6.15).
[179] The players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra experienced the same interpersonal conflict with regard to the previous conductor and current conductor, owing to the vacancy of the conductor position.

Table 6.14 Players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO's styles of handling interpersonal conflict

Players of the BPO											
Variables	Integrating		Obliging		Dominating		Avoiding		Compromising		F
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Previous conductor	3.26[a]	0.69	3.56[a]	0.54	2.26[c]	0.73	3.45[a]	0.70	3.00[b]	0.60	32.26***
Current conductor	3.26[a]	0.73	3.54[a]	0.56	2.13[c]	0.64	3.50[a]	0.69	2.98[b]	0.60	42.51***
Peers	3.62[a]	0.63	3.61[a]	0.54	2.42[b]	0.81	3.76[a]	0.59	3.51[a]	0.64	42.15***
Players of the CPO											
Variables	Integrating		Obliging		Dominating		Avoiding		Compromising		F
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Previous conductor	3.40[a]	0.61	3.81[a]	0.58	2.44[b]	0.64	3.60[a]	0.66	3.13[a]	0.81	30.39***
Current conductor	3.29[a]	0.67	3.76[a]	0.55	2.38[c]	0.68	3.55[a]	0.64	2.95[b]	0.80	31.17***
Peers	3.72[a]	0.66	3.60[a]	0.59	2.45[b]	0.73	3.86[a]	0.54	3.60[a]	0.78	44.50***
Players of the KSO											
Variables	Integrating		Obliging		Dominating		Avoiding		Compromising		F
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Previous conductor	3.97[b]	0.60	4.20[a]	0.42	2.62[d]	1.03	3.98[b]	0.60	3.62[c]	0.90	33.82***
Peers	4.12[a]	0.61	3.87[a]	0.61	2.61[b]	1.02	3.90[a]	0.61	3.95[a]	0.69	36.76***

Note: *** indicates $p < 0.001$; according to the result of LSD multiple comparison, different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as [a, b, c, or d].

Table 6.14 shows the results of repeated measured ANOVA, and there are statistic significant differences in each group player's styles of handling interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor, current conductor, and peers, respectively.

LSD multiple comparison shows that the players of the BPO prefer to use an *integrating, obliging,* and *avoiding* styles rather than a *compromising* or *dominating* style to deal interpersonal conflict with their previous and current conductors, whereas they clearly use the *dominating* style less, compared to the other four styles in dealing with their interpersonal conflict with peers. The players of the KSO prefer to use an *obliging* style to manage interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor, meanwhile they have the same tendency as those of the BPO and CPO regarding styles of handling interpersonal conflict with peers. On the other hand, the players of the CPO prefer to use *obliging, avoiding, integrating, and compromising,* while they use *dominating* style less, in order to handle their interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor. They also use *dominating* style less compared to the other four styles when handling interpersonal conflict with their conductors. Their style of handling interpersonal conflict with peers is the same as the players of the BPO and KSO. The percentile norms of each group player's styles of handling interpersonal conflict are presented in Tables 6.28, 6.29, and 6.30.

Although this study was not designed to collect comments on the instruments of ROCI-I and II from the respondents, spontaneous comments were written on the paper of the survey. Some said that the questions[180] of the ROCI-II (form A) regarding the styles of handling interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor and current conductor were inappropriate, so they took notes and suggested that I needed to study more about the orchestra before making this questionnaire because they (players) have almost no power/authority to decide on any matters, and to handle relationship with conductor, and they usually have to follow the decision of their conductor. This unequal relationship between players and conductors, and the limited role of the players, are frequently mentioned topics in orchestral studies: this tends to support the view of Levine and Levine (1996) on the power of the conductor as 'omniscience' (p. 19). Thus, it might be concluded that orchestral players in Korean municipal orchestras are using an *obliging* style, by which concern for other parties (conductors) is higher than that for themselves, and using a *dominating* style less,[181] in order to handle their interpersonal conflict with conductors.

Table 6.15 Staff styles of handling interpersonal conflict

Variables	Integrating		Obliging		Dominating		Avoiding		Compromising		X^2
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Previous conductor	3.86	0.61	3.17	0.47	2.30	0.42	3.00	0.24	3.00	0.71	7.05
Current conductor	3.93	0.38	3.83	0.71	2.73	0.48	3.47	0.53	3.63	0.59	15.26**
Administrative supervisor	3.91	0.32	3.80	0.56	2.88	0.65	3.58	0.42	3.75	0.58	13.86**
Peers	3.96	0.47	3.53	0.44	2.48	0.82	3.65	0.43	3.73	0.62	19.28**

Note: * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01, *** indicates p < 0.001.

Table 6.15 shows the mean (M), and standard deviation (SD) of the interpersonal conflict classified by group of staff, and the results of Friedman test. The results of the Friedman test show that there are statistic significant differences in staff's interpersonal conflict with current conductor (X^2 (df = 4) = 15.26, *p* = 0.004), administrative supervisor (X^2 (df = 4) = 13.86, *p* = 0.008), and peers (X^2 (df = 4) = 19.28, *p* = 0.001), respectively, whereas no statistic significant difference is found in staff's interpersonal conflict with previous conductor(X^2 (df = 4) = 7.05, *p* = 0.133). The Friedman test shows an overall significant difference in handling interpersonal conflict, but does not report where those differences occurred. However, it might be assumed based on the mean score that staff are likely to use a *dominating* style less, compared to the other

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[180] Such as 'I use my authority to make a decision in my favour', or 'I often go along with the suggestions of my supervisor'.

[181] The dominating style would mean their concerns for other parties were lower than those for themselves.

four styles when dealing their interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor, current conductor, administrative supervisors, and peers.

Table 6.16 Staff of the CPO and KSO's styles of handling interpersonal conflict[182]

Staff of the CPO

Variables	Integrating		Obliging		Dominating		Avoiding		Compromising		X^2
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Current conductor	3.89	0.14	4.17	0.56	2.95	0.38	3.71	0.48	3.94	0.13	10.19*
Administrative Supervisor	3.86	0.12	4.08	0.62	3.05	0.47	3.67	0.47	4.00	0.00	9.47*
Peers	3.89	0.49	3.71	0.25	2.70	0.62	3.63	0.50	3.94	0.24	7.34

Staff of the KSO

Variables	Integrating		Obliging		Dominating		Avoiding		Compromising		X^2
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Administrative Supervisor	3.93	0.25	3.83	0.33	3.00	0.85	3.79	0.08	3.88	0.60	3.29
Peers	4.00	0.65	3.46	0.60	2.45	1.06	3.79	0.46	3.75	0.84	10.64*

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$, ** indicates $p < 0.01$; values of X^2 are from the result of Friedman test.

Table 6.16 shows the mean (M), and standard deviation (SD) of the five styles of handling interpersonal conflict, classified by staff of the CPO and KSO, and the results of Friedman test. The results of the Friedman test show that there are statistically significant differences in handing styles of interpersonal conflict with their current conductor (X^2 (df = 4) = 10.19, p = 0.037) and administrative supervisor (X^2 (df = 4) = 9.47, p = 0.050) in the case of the CPO: although the Friedman test does not indicate where those differences occurred, the staff of the CPO have a tendency that they use a *dominating* style less than an *integrating, obliging, avoiding,* or *compromising* style, in order to deal with interpersonal conflict with their current conductor.

There is no statistically significant difference in the case of staff of the KSO when handling their conflict with the administrative supervisor (X^2 (df = 4) = 3.29, p = 0.510), while there is statistically significant difference in handing styles of interpersonal conflict with peers (X^2 (df = 4) = 10.64, p = 0.031): there is a tendency that dominating style uses less, compared to the other four styles in dealing with their interpersonal conflict with peers.

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[182] Due to a limited sample number (n = 2), one-way analysis of variance was not conducted in the case of the BPO.

Table 6.17 Players' demographic variables and the subscales of ROCI-II with peers

Variables		IN	OB	DO	AV	CO
		M± SD	M± SD	M± SD .	M± SD	M± SD
Age	21–30	3.65±0.58	3.63±0.49	2.40±0.69	3.63±0.41	3.68±0.55
	31–35	3.76±0.58	3.75±0.64	2.52±0.95	3.83±0.69	3.44±0.77
	36–40	3.66±0.75	3.61±0.65	2.76±0.66	3.84±0.44	3.56±0.68
	Over 40	3.94±0.68	3.73±0.59	2.38±0.90	3.91±0.60	3.81±0.76
F-value		1.44	0.30	1.02	0.97	1.58
Marital Status	Married	3.83±0.70	3.68±0.60	2.47±0.83	3.80±0.57	3.67±0.76
	Single	3.82±0.60	3.74±0.59	2.48±0.91	3.97±0.59	3.73±0.68
t-value		0.06	-0.49	-0.08	-1.51	-0.41
Gender	Male	3.98±0.66	3.77±0.58	2.46±0.84	3.88±0.56	3.93±0.68
	Female	3.65±0.64	3.63±0.60	2.48±0.86	3.81±0.60	3.42±0.70
t-value		2.74**	1.25	-0.16	0.66	3.90***
Tenure	less than 5 years	3.77±0.56	3.75±0.62	2.52±0.91	3.75±0.56	3.63±0.74
	5–10 years	3.77±0.73	3.65±0.59	2.68±0.80	3.81±0.65	3.80±0.73
	Over 10 years	3.86±0.69	3.70±0.59	2.38±0.84	3.90±0.55	3.66±0.74
F-value		0.29	0.14	1.23	0.65	0.42

Note: ** indicates $p < 0.01$, *** indicates $p < 0.001$; IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style.

Table 6.17 shows the mean score (M), and standard deviation (SD) of five styles of handling conflict with peers, and t-value and F-value, classified by demographic variables of players. Based on the independent t-test, there are statistically significant differences between the demographic variables of gender and integrating style ($t = 2.74$, $p < 0.01$) and compromising style ($t = 3.90$, $p < 0.001$), respectively: male players are more likely to use an integrating style and compromising style than female players when handing conflict with peers.

Correlations (including inter-correlations) and multiple regression analyses

The following section presents correlations and multiple regression analyses related to job satisfaction, turnover, ROCI-I, and ROCI-II, classified by players and staff. The total sample numbers of each subscale are varied due to missing values.

Table 6.18 Players' correlations

Variables		Turnover	JDI					ROCI-I				ROCI-II with peer			
			W	P	S	Pr	Co	IP	IG	NG1	NG2	IN	OB	DO	AV
ROCI-I	IP	0.231*	-0.380***	-0.186*	-0.176	-0.001	-0.130	1.000	\	\	\	\	\	\	\
	IG	-0.048	-0.107	-0.101	0.029	-0.051	0.037	0.188*	1.000	\	\	\	\	\	\
	NG1	0.308**	-0.107	-0.109	-0.064	-0.053	-0.150	0.212*	0.049	1.000	\	\	\	\	\
	NG2	0.111	-0.214	-0.082	-0.199	-0.028	-0.012	0.227*	0.279*	0.600***	1.000	\	\	\	\
ROCI-II Peer	IN	-0.068	0.185*	-0.031	0.101	-0.090	0.305**	-0.072	-0.151	0.053	0.008	1.000	\	\	\
	OB	-0.127	0.124	0.040	0.083	0.019	0.294**	-0.070	-0.162	-0.007	-0.039	0.721***	1.000	\	\
	DO	0.102	0.070	0.083	-0.025	0.049	-0.003	0.058	-0.222*	-0.020	0.091	0.097	-0.034	1.000	\
	AV	-0.033	0.022	-0.075	0.016	-0.141	0.131	0.021	0.005	0.079	-0.091	0.525***	0.515***	-0.086	1.000
	CO	0.021	0.124	-0.046	-0.008	-0.049	0.235*	-0.049	-0.174	0.174	0.136	0.696***	0.564***	0.155	0.459***
ROCI-II Current conductor	IN	0.059	0.057	0.065	0.093	-0.018	-0.064	-0.002	-0.190	-0.127	-0.232*	ROCI-II with Current conductor			
	OB	0.169	-0.129	-0.157	-0.004	-0.162	-0.191	-0.189	-0.270*	-0.123	-0.378**	0.444***	1.000	\	\
	DO	-0.080	0.024	0.068	0.030	0.096	0.060	0.092	-0.110	-0.202	-0.041	0.206	-0.064	1.000	\
	AV	0.041	-0.140	-0.058	-0.004	-0.059	-0.045	0.010	-0.410***	0.033	-0.128	0.308**	0.531***	-0.066	1.000
	CO	0.017	0.130	0.076	0.104	0.189	0.148	0.015	-0.027	0.018	0.146	0.576***	0.050	0.431***	0.063
ROCI-II Previous conductor	IN	0.048	0.122	0.060	0.088	-0.175	0.046	-0.167	-0.140	-0.064	-0.188	ROCI-II with Previous conductor			
	OB	0.097	-0.087	-0.078	-0.004	-0.249**	0.055	-0.226*	-0.116	-0.193*	-0.234*	0.510***	1.000	\	\
	DO	0.085	0.037	0.194*	-0.003	0.061	-0.047	-0.023	-0.279**	-0.031	-0.040	0.291**	-0.058	1.000	\
	AV	0.031	-0.071	-0.066	-0.023	-0.206*	0.081	-0.070	-0.143	-0.054	-0.127	0.340***	0.551***	-0.096	1.000
	CO	0.031	0.136	0.031	0.092	-0.070	0.147	-0.092	-0.058	0.077	0.095	0.659***	0.150	0.446***	0.109

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$, ** indicates $p < 0.01$, *** indicates $p < 0.001$.
Work (W), Pay (P), Supervision (S), Promotion (Pr), Co-workers (Co)
IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = intragroup conflict, NG 1 = intergroup conflict with staff, NG 2 = intergroup conflict with civil servants
IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style

Table 6.19 Staff correlations

Variables		Turnover	JDI					ROCI-I				ROCI-II with peer			
			W	P	S	Pr	Co	IP	IG	NG1	NG2	IN	OB	DO	AV
ROCI-I	IP	0.083	0.297	0.557	0.410	0.217	0.274	1.000							
	IG	0.577	-0.246	-0.130	-0.346	0.033	-0.519	0.173	1.000						
	NG1	0.553	0.387	0.000	0.364	0.179	-0.147	0.674*	0.693*	1.000					
	NG2	0.534	0.368	-0.039	0.270	-0.160	-0.160	0.595	0.644	0.887**	1.000				
ROCI-II Peer	IN	-0.216	-0.214	0.505	-0.096	0.059	0.480	0.578	-0.196	-0.022	0.036	1.000			
	OB	-0.326	0.295	0.403	0.351	0.387	0.610	0.080	-0.603	-0.249	-0.138	0458	1.000		
	DO	-0.395	-0.155	0.324	0.076	0.449	0.091	-0.717*	-0.724*	-0.809**	-0.805**	-0.171	0.542	1.000	
	AV	-0.175	0.315	0.489	0.496	0.271	0.411	0.646	-0.420	0.167	0.214	0.682*	0.722*	0.119	1.000
	CO	-0.372	-0.064	0.391	-0.016	0.196	0.428	0.052	-0.569	-0.432	-0.327	0.704	0.812**	0.379	0.707*
ROCI-II Administrative Supervisor	IN	-0.226	0.246	0.112	0.437	-0.150	0.529	0.102	-0.677*	-0.246	-0.249	ROCI-II with Administrative supervisor			
	OB	0.171	0.009	0.006	-0.118	-0.245	-0.095	0.168	-0.197	-0.071	0.168	0.384	1.000		
	DO	-0.607	0.071	0.498	0.264	0.599	0.261	-0.276	-0.786*	-0.624	-0.599	0.205	0.180	1.000	
	AV	0.309	-0.215	0.074	-0.232	-0.111	-0.463	0.147	0.172	0.145	0.274	0.157	0.856**	0.040	1.000
	CO	-0.321	0.082	0.148	0.052	0.123	0.130	-0.064	-0.608	-0.449	-0.375	0.498	0.745*	0.632*	0.566
ROCI-II Current conductor	IN	0.145	0.342	-0.437	0.552	-0.310	0.438	-0.053	-0.790	-0.118	-0.153	ROCI-II with Current conductor			
	OB	0.685	0.086	-0.549	-0.088	-0.304	-0.521	0.079	-0.064	0.098	0.305	0.283	1.000		
	DO	-0.267	0.304	-0.903*	0.146	0.425	-0.155	-0.649	-0.692	-0.568	-0.548	0.217	0.272	1.000	
	AV	0.810	-0.154	-0.492	-0.306	-0.221	-0.697	0.097	0.078	0.071	0.198	0.177	0.946**	0.173	1.000
	CO	0.330	0.057	-0.902*	-0.097	-0.015	-0.498	-0.419	-0.492	-0.401	-0.276	0.400	0.804	0.739	0.762
ROCI-II Previous conductor	IN	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	ROCI-II with Previous conductor			
	OB	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	1.000		
	DO	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	1.000	
	AV	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	1.000
	CO	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\	\

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$, ** indicates $p < 0.01$, *** indicates $p < 0.001$; it is impossible to conduct Pearson's correlation, due to low sample numbers of staff regarding ROCI-II against previous conductor.
Work (W), Pay (P), Supervision (S), Promotion (Pr), Co-workers (Co)
IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = intragroup conflict, NG 1 = intergroup conflict with players, NG 2 = intergroup conflict with civil servants
IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style

Players' correlation

Players' correlation between JDI and ROCI-I[183]

The players' Pearson correlation between the subscales of JDI and ROCI-I and the significance of each correlation coefficient are tested (see Table 6.18[184]).

There are two negatively significant correlations between job satisfaction and ROCI-I among 20 correlations: intrapersonal conflict and satisfaction with work ($r = -0.380$, $p < 0.001$) and pay ($r = -0.186$, $p < 0.05$), respectively. Thus, these indicate that job satisfaction is not generally associated with the subscales of ROCI-I (see Table 6.18).

According to the result of the correlation, it was assumed that there might be a significant relationship between satisfaction with work and intrapersonal conflict and intergroup conflict, respectively. The results of multiple regression analysis, using subscales of JDI as predictors an intrapersonal conflict of ROCI-I as a dependent variable, shows that the overall relationship is significant ($R^2 = 0.087$, $F = 2.494$, $p = 0.038$), but there is only one negative significant relationship found, that of players' intrapersonal conflict being negatively related to work ($\beta = -0.371$, $p = 0.008$), which could mean that if player is satisfied with work, he/she has less perception of intrapersonal conflict.

Players' correlation between job satisfaction and ROCI-II with peers

The statistical result shows that although players' job satisfaction is not generally associated with five styles of handling conflict with peers,[185] there are four positive correlations between the players' satisfaction with co-workers and *integrating* ($r = 0.305$, $p < 0.01$), *obliging* ($r = 0.294$, $p < 0.01$), and *compromising* styles ($r = 0.235$, $p < 0.05$); and the players' satisfaction with work and integrating ($r = 0.185$, $p < 0.05$) when handling interpersonal conflict with their peers (see Table 6.18).

The overall result of multiple regression analysis between the players' job satisfaction (predictors) and *integrating* style when handling interpersonal conflict with peers (dependent variable) is significantly related ($R^2 = 0.094$, $F = 3.433$, $p = 0.006$): players' *integrating* style handling interpersonal conflict with peers is positively related to co-workers ($\beta = 0.306$, $p = 0.004$), and it may be interpreted that players, who use a *integrating* style more in order to deal with their interpersonal conflict with their peers, are more satisfied with co-workers.

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[183] All results of multiple regression analysis are presented from Table 6.32 to Table 6.37 in the attached CD.

[184] Adequate distinct validity is demonstrated and the Table also indicates whether or not each ROCI-I is significantly inter-related (see Table 6.18).

[185] Among the 25 correlations, only four are significant.

Players' correlation between job satisfaction and ROCI-II with previous conductor

There are one positive and two negative correlations between the players' job satisfaction and ROCI-II with their previous conductor: pay and *dominating* style ($r = 0.194$, $p < 0.05$), promotion and *obliging* style ($r = -0.249$, $p < 0.01$), and promotion and *avoiding* style ($r = -0.206$, $p < 0.05$): if players are satisfied with their pay, they prefer to use *dominating* style to handle their interpersonal conflict with previous conductor; meanwhile, if players are satisfied with promotion, they use *obliging* and *avoiding* style less.

Players' correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers

The players' correlation between conflict styles and conflict handling styles with peers shows that there is a weak negative correlation between *dominating* style and intragroup conflict ($r = -0.222$, $p < 0.05$) (see Table 6.18). The remaining correlations are marginal, with no significance.

Players' correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with current conductor

According to the players' correlations between the four subscales of conflict (ROCI-I) and the styles of handling conflict with their current conductor (see Table 6.18), there are four correlations. Intragroup conflict and *obliging* style ($r = -0.270$, $p < 0.05$), intragroup conflict and *avoiding* style ($r = -0.410$, $p < 0.001$), intergroup conflict with civil servants and *integrating* style ($r = -0.232$, $p < 0.05$), and intergroup conflict with civil servants and *obliging* style ($r = -0.378$, $p < 0.01$) are negatively correlated. It could be interpreted that if players have more intragroup conflict, they use *obliging* and *avoiding* style less when handing interpersonal conflict with their current conductor. Furthermore, If players have more intergroup conflict with civil servants, they use *integrating* and *obliging* style less against their current conductor.

Multiple regression analyses were conducted regarding players' different types of conflict (ROCI-I) and styles of handling interpersonal conflict with their current conductor. The first result of the analysis shows that there is an overall significant relationship between the players' *obliging* style handing interpersonal conflict with their current conductor (dependent variable) and the four conflicts of ROCI-I (predictors) ($R^2 = 0.144$, $F = 4.116$, $p = 0.005$). Players' intergroup conflict with civil servants is a negative predictor of *obliging* style ($\beta = -0.397$, $p = 0.007$): if players have more perception of intrapersonal conflict, they use less of an *obliging* style in dealing with interpersonal conflict with the conductor.

In addition, there is a significant overall relationship between the players' avoiding style when handing interpersonal conflict with the current conductor (dependent variable) and four conflicts of ROCI-I (predictors) ($R^2 = 0.132$, $F = 3.803$, $p = 0.007$) and players' intragroup conflict is negatively related to *avoiding* style ($\beta = -0.389$, $p = 0.001$). if players have more perception of intragroup conflict, players use an *avoiding* style less when handing interpersonal conflict with the current conductor.

Players' correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with previous conductor

The results of the players' correlations between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with previous conductor indicate four negative correlations: *obliging* style and intrapersonal conflict ($r = -0.226$, $p < 0.05$), intergroup conflict with staff ($r = -0.193$, $p < 0.05$), intergroup conflict with civil servants ($r = -0.234$, $p < 0.05$), respectively, as well as *dominating* style and intragroup conflict ($r = -0.279$, $p < 0.01$). The result of multiple regression analysis reveal the overall relationship between avoiding style (dependent variable) and four conflicts of ROCI-I (predictors) is significant ($R^2 = 0.114$, $F = 3.389$, $p = 0.014$): there are negative significant relationship found, that of players' intragroup conflict being negatively related to avoiding style ($\beta = -0.335$, $p = 0.006$), which could mean that if players have higher perception of intragroup conflict, he/she is unlikely to use an *avoiding* style when handling interpersonal conflict with the previous conductor.

Players' correlation between job turnover and ROCI-I

There are positive correlations between the players' job turnover and intrapersonal conflict ($r = 0.231$, $p < 0.05$) and intergroup conflict with administrative staff ($r = 0.308$, $p < 0.01$) at the orchestral executive constitution: if players have higher intrapersonal conflict or intergroup conflict with the staff, they are likely to think of turnover (see Table 6.18).

As is expected from the result of Pearson's correlation between job turnover and ROCI-I, the result of this multiple regression analysis does produce an overall significance between job turnover (dependent variable) and ROCI-I (predictors) ($R^2 = 0.114$, $F = 3.421$, $p = 0.013$), and job turnover is positively related to intergroup conflict ($\beta = 0.368$, $p = 0.010$): if players have a perception of intergroup conflict, they are more often thinking of job turnover.

Players' inter-correlation: ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers, current and previous conductor

Regarding the subscales of ROCI-I, intrapersonal conflict has a weak positive inter-correlation with intragroup conflict ($r = 0.188$, $p < 0.05$), intergroup conflict with staff ($r =$

0.212, *p* < 0.05), and intergroup conflict with civil servants (r = 0.227, *p* < 0.05), respectively. Intergroup conflict with civil servants is significantly related to intragroup conflict (r = 0.279, *p* < 0.05) and intergroup conflict with staff (r = 0.600, *p* < 0.001), respectively (see Table 6.18).

ROCI-II with peers has six significant inter-correlations (see Table 6.18). The inter-correlations range between -0.086 and 0.721: players' *integrating* style has strong positive relations with *obliging* style (r = 0.721, *p* < 0.001), *compromising* style (r = 0.696, *p* < 0.001), and *avoiding* style (r= 0.525, *p*< 0.001), respectively; another strong positive inter-correlations are found between *obliging* style and *avoiding* style (r = 0.515, *p* < 0.001) and between *obliging* style and *compromising* style (r = 0.564, *p* < 0.001); finally, *avoiding* style and *compromising* style also have a positive inter-correlation (r = 0.459, *p* < 0.001).

Table 18 also shows five inter-correlations of styles of handling interpersonal conflict with their current conductor. The inter-correlations range between -0.066 and 0.576: *Integrating* style and *obliging* style (r = 0.444, *p* < 0.001), *integrating* style and *avoiding* style (r = 0.308, *p* < 0.01), *dominating* style and *compromising* style (r = 0.431, *p* < 0.001) have positive inter-correlations. In addition, *integrating* style and *compromising* style (r = 0.576, *p* < 0.001) and *obliging* style and *avoiding* style (r = 0.531, *p* < 0.001) have strong positive inter-correlations.

There are notable inter-correlations of the ROCI-II with previous conductor (see Table 6.18), and the tendency is very similar to those of their current conductor. The inter-correlations range between -0.960 and 0.659: *Integrating* style has a positive inter-correlation with *dominating* style (r = 0.291, *p* < 0.01) and *avoiding* style (r = 0.340, *p* < 0.001), respectively, and *dominating* style and *compromising* one (r = 0.446, *p* <0.001); in addition, *integrating* style has a strong positive inter-correlation with *compromising* style (r = 0.659, *p* < 0.001) and *obliging* style (r = 0.510, *p* < 0.001). Another strong positive inter-correlation is found between an *obliging* style and an *avoiding* style (r = 0.551, *p* < 0.001).

Staff correlation[186]

Staff's correlation between JDI and ROCI-II with current conductor[187]

The staff's Pearson correlation between the subscales of the JDI and ROCI-II with current conductor and the significance of each correlation coefficient is tested.

The result of Pearson's correlation shows two strong negative correlations between pay and *dominating* style (r = -0.903, p < 0.05); and pay and *compromising* style (r = -0.902, p < 0.05): if staff are satisfied with current pay, they use *dominating* style and *compromising* style less when handling interpersonal conflict with current conductor.

Staff correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with the administrative supervisor[188]

The statistic result indicates that staff subscales of ROCI-I are not generally associated with the five styles of handling conflict (ROCI-II) with regard to their administrative supervisor, as only two correlations out of 20 are significant: and intragroup conflict have strong negative correlations with *integrating* style (r = -0.677, *p* < 0.05) and *dominating* style (r = -0.786, *p* < 0.05) (see Table 6.19).

Staff's correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers

Staff's ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers have four strong negative correlations: ROCI-II with peers and intrapersonal conflict (r = -0.717, p < 0.05), intragroup conflict (r = -0.724, p < 0.05), intergroup conflict with players (r = -0.809, p < 0.01), and intergroup conflict with civil servants (r = -0.805, p < 0.01), respectively (see Table 6.19). It can be interpreted that if staff have less interpersonal conflict with peers, they have more perception of intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict with players, and intergroup conflict with civil servants.

Staff's inter-correlation: ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers, current and administrative supervisor

There are three significant inter-correlations of ROCI-I (see Table 6. 19): the result of Pearson correlation shows strong positive inter-correlations between intergroup conflict with players and intrapersonal conflict (r = 0.674, *p* < 0.05) and intragroup conflict (r = 0.693, *p* < 0.05), respectively. In particular, intergroup conflict with players and intergroup conflict with civil servants have a very strong positive relationship (r = 0.887, *p* < 0.01): a member of the administrative staff who has a perception of intergroup conflict with regard to civil servants might have the same for intergroup conflict with the

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[186] Multiple regression analysis for staff is not conducted, due to the limited size of the sample.
[187] Staff's Job satisfaction (JDI) is not associated with ROCI-I, ROCI-II with peers, and ROCI-II with administrative supervisors. In addition, there is no significant correlation between staff's job turnover and ROCI-I, ROCI-II with peers, ROCI-II with administrative supervisors, and ROCI-II with current conductor, respectively.
[188] There is no correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II of staff with the current conductor.

players.

Regarding staff's inter-correlations of ROCI-II with peers, there are four strong positive inter-correlations: *obliging* style and *avoiding* style (r = 0.722, *p* < 0.05), *obliging* style and *compromising* style (r = 0.812, *p* < 0.01), *avoiding* style and *compromising* style (r = 0.707, *p* < 0.05), and *integrating* style and *avoiding* style (r = 0.682, *p* < 0.05), respectively.

A very strong positive inter-correlation of ROCI-II with current conductor is found between *obliging* style and *avoiding* style (r = 0.946, *p* < 0.01) (see Table 6.19): if staff prefer to use an *obliging* style to deal the conflict with their current conductor, they were also likely to use an *avoiding* style.

Three strong positive inter-correlations of ROCI-II with administrative supervisor are found between *obliging* style and *avoiding* style (r = 0.856, *p* < 0.01), *obliging* style and *compromising* style (r = 0.745, *p* < 0.05), and *dominating* style and *compromising* style (r = 0.632, *p* < 0.05) (see Table 6.19).

Thus, there is no correlation between job turnover and any form of ROCI-II (with previous conductor, current conductor, and peers[189] in the cases of both players and staff.

Summary of survey findings

So far, the results of quantitative research have been given: three types of organisational conflict—intrapersonal, intragroup, and intergroup (with two variables), five styles of handling interpersonal conflict with their previous, current conductor, and peers (and administrative supervisor was added for staff), and its relationship with demographic characteristics were examined, along with correlation and multiple regression. This section summarises all the key findings.

The level of intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict

Intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict classified by players and staff of three orchestras, and comparisons among players and staff and between players and staff were presented. The results of one-way analysis of variance *(F)* indicated each group of players and staff had no significant difference in intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, or intergroup conflict with civil servants. However, in the case of each group of players, there was a statistically significant difference in

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[189] As well as administrative supervisor in the case of the staff.

intergroup conflict with administrative staff: the players of the BPO and CPO had a higher perception of intergroup conflict with their administrative staff, whereas those of the KSO had a lower perception of such conflict (see Table 6.5).

On the other hand, in the case of staff, there was no statistically significant difference in intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict with players, and intergroup conflict with civil servants (see Table 6.2, Table 6.4, Table 6.6, and Table 6.8).

Between groups of players and staff, there was no statistically significant difference found in intrapersonal conflict, intergroup conflict with staff (players), or intergroup conflict with civil servants, but staff had a higher perception of intragroup conflict than players (see Table 6.23).

The relative level of intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict (with two variables)

Among intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict with staff, and intergroup conflict with civil servants, the players of Korean municipal orchestras had different levels of these conflicts: they had more perception of intergroup conflict with staff than intergroup conflict with civil servants, intragroup conflict, and intrapersonal conflict (see Table 6.10). On the other hand, staff show no significant difference among these four facets (see Table 6.10).

Regarding each group of players, each group had a statistically significant difference among four facets based on the result of *F*-test. According to the LSD test, the players of the BPO and KSO had less perception of intrapersonal conflict than the other facets, while those of the CPO had more perception of intergroup conflict with staff compared to intergroup conflict with civil servants, intragroup conflict, and intrapersonal conflict (see Table 6.11): thus, the CPO needs to pay attention to the sources of the conflict between players and staff in order to improve the relationship.

The styles of handling conflict with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers (the administrative supervisor is added for staff)

Regarding the styles of handling interpersonal conflict, groups of players prefer to use an *obliging* style when handing conflict with the previous conductor and current conductor, whereas they prefer to use *integrating* and *avoiding* style when handing conflict with peers. Interestingly, players are prefer not to use a *dominating* style—which implies selfishness—to handle interpersonal conflict with conductors and peers (see Table 6.13).

Players of the BPO and CPO preferred to use an *obliging, avoiding,* and *integrating* style, while players of the KSO preferred to use an *obliging* style to deal with interpersonal conflict with the previous conductor and current conductor. Except for *dominating* style, the other four handling styles were adopted to deal with players' interpersonal conflict with peers (see Table 6.14).

Each group of players chose an *obliging* style—which implies self-sacrifice—to deal with interpersonal conflict with conductors, and it implied an unequal position between players and conductor. Korean municipal orchestras have a hierarchical structure that facilitates the conductor's and supervisor's wishes, and the conductor holds a position of great authority. Thus, orchestral players have to obey the conductor without complaint or challenge, as it is a rule of the orchestra (although they are sometimes frustrated by this relationship).

Because of frequent critical talk about the previous conductor among players of the BPO, different styles of handling conflict between the previous conductor and current conductor were expected, but players chose the same way of dealing with their conflict with conductors (see Table 6.14): whether or not the conductor was severe and arrogant, the conductor was superior to the players and they had to accept the conductor's musical direction.

The link between players' types of conflicts and demographic characteristics, and styles of handling conflict together with demographic characteristics

The players' demographic variables and the subscales of ROCI-I were analysed by one-way variance (*F*), independent *t*-test, and three statistically significant differences were found: between gender and intrapersonal conflict; and between gender and intergroup conflict with staff and civil servants, respectively. It could be interpreted that male players have a higher perception of intrapersonal conflict and intergroup conflicts than female players (see Table 6.12).

Meanwhile, players' demographic variables and styles of handling conflict (ROCI-II) with peers had two significant differences: male players preferred to use an *integrating* style and *compromising* style in order to deal with interpersonal conflict with peers, compared to female players (see Table 6.17).

The relationship between job satisfaction, ROCI-I, ROCI-II, and turnover

Players' inter-correlations of ROCI-I are positively associated: among the 6 inter-correlations, 5 are significant (see Table 6.18). The inter-correlations of ROCI-II (with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers, respectively) are generally associated: ROCI-II with peers and with previous conductor have 6 positive

significances out of 10, while ROCI-II with current conductor has 5 positive significances (see Table 6.18).

The overall result of multiple regression analysis indicates that players' job satisfaction and ROCI-I are significantly associated: players' work has a negative relationship with intrapersonal conflict[190]; there is also an overall relationship between players' job satisfaction with co-worker and ROCI-II with peers; players' ROCI-I is significantly associated with interpersonal conflict against the current conductor; in addition, there is overall significance in the result of multiple regression analysis regarding turnover and intergroup conflict of ROCI-I, whereas turnover and ROCI-II with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers (see Table 6.18) do not have any correlation, and multiple regression analysis was not conducted. The summary of those relations is given in Table 6.20.

Table 6.20 Players' relations to job satisfaction, ROCI-I, ROCI-II, and turnover

	Overall relation of multiple regression analysis
Job satisfaction and ROCI-I	Significant Work and IP: negative
Job satisfaction and ROCI-II with peers	Significant Co-worker and IN: positive
Turnover and ROCI-I	Not significant
ROCI-I and ROCI-II with current conductor	Significant NG2 and OB: negative IG and AV: negative

Note: IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = intragroup conflict, NG2 = intergroup conflict with civil servants; IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, AV = avoiding style.

The staff's inter-correlation of ROCI-I is generally associated (among 6 inter-correlations, 3 have a strong positive relations); inter-correlation of ROCI-II with peers (4 inter-correlation out of 10) and with administrative supervisors (3 inter-correlation out of 10) are generally associated, but the inter-correlation of ROCI-II with the current conductor are not generally associated (only one inter-correlation out of 10).

Staff job satisfaction and ROCI-II with current conductor have two negative correlations; staff ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers have four negative correlations; and ROCI-I and ROCI-II with administrative supervisor have two negative correlations. However, staff job satisfaction and ROCI-I, job satisfaction and ROCI-II with peer, job satisfaction and administrative supervisors, turnover and ROCI-II with peer, with administrative supervisors, and with current conductor have no correlation.

6.4 Results of qualitative research interviews

This section presents the results of interviews, classified according to intrapersonal

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[190] Rahim (2004) states that intrapersonal conflict seems to create dissatisfaction with work, and this applies in the case for players of Korean municipal orchestras.

conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict, from the point of view of players, administrative staff, and civil servants.

Intrapersonal conflict

All the orchestras (under consideration) have two powerful management structures[191]: the orchestral executive constitution and the city hall are the managerial bodies for the CPO and BPO, while the Audience Business Team[192] and the KBS undertake those roles for the KBS Symphony Orchestra. The orchestral executive constitution is a core management team, in charge of most managerial work, ranging from mailings to annual concert plans, and is a confident supporter of the orchestra. It also acts as a mediator among civil servants, conductors and players. Although some Korean researchers have criticised the non-existence of an independent orchestral executive constitution and of non-professional staff, which could maintain stable administrative practice, it seems that the criticism no longer applies to the current situation facing Korean orchestras. The majority of Korean municipal orchestras have an executive constitution with differing numbers of support staff. It is difficult to define the term 'professional staff'. However, professional staff,[193] to most Korean researchers, means staff who have knowledge or experience in music or arts administration. According to Won-Chul Park's survey in 2004,[194] 46.22% of staff are music graduates, while 16.8% work in administration, 6% in accounting, and 4% in marketing (p. 42).

> I was the only member of the administrative staff of the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra in 1987 when it was a private symphony orchestra...without salary, I worked with pride...But now, there are specialised position (within the orchestral executive constitution) and salaries have been increased...the achievement of the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra has been increased, and job satisfaction too...
>
> [Staff Member 1]

As the above narrative indicates, the role and organisational structure of the orchestral executive constitution was trivial in the early period. The orchestral executive constitution of Korean symphony orchestras did not exist from the beginning. It has gradually emerged because of the complexity of running an orchestra.

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[191] This study considers this dual management structure as a source of intrapersonal conflict, but it could also be a source of intergroup conflict, in terms of the task interdependence of the dual management structure of Korean municipal orchestras.

[192] It plays a role as an orchestral executive constitution, and is considered a part of departments of the KBS company.

[193] 100% of the staff of the orchestral executive constitution of the CPO are music graduates, and approximately 60% of the BPO are music graduates, whereas the KBS has no music graduates.

[194] He surveyed the academic background of orchestral executive constitution's staff among nine Korean orchestras in 2004.

Table 6.21 The year of formation of the current organisational structure

Name of orchestra	KBS	Seoul	Suwon	Daegu	Ulsan	Busan	Changwon
Foundation	1956	1945	1982	1964	1990	1962	1991
Current structure	1981	1988	2002	1987	1996	1992	1997

(Source: Park, 2004: p. 40)

With the formation of the organisational structure of Korean symphony orchestras, the total number of administrative staff has gradually increased. Therefore, it may be seen that there has been a growth in the orchestral executive constitutions of Korean symphony orchestras, regardless of their effectiveness.

Table 6.22 The number of administrative staff in the orchestral executive constitution

Year	1993[1]	2000[2]	2004[3]	2009
Busan Philharmonic Orchestra	4	6	7	9
Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra	1			5
KBS Symphony Orchestra[4]	10	12	15	-

(Sources: refer from [1] Ryu, 1993: p. 45; [2] Kim, 2000: p. 44; [3] Park, 2004: p. 40; [4] KBS, 2006: pp. 458–59)

The orchestral executive office does a lot of things... making a budget plan, applying for a budget, setting the yearly schedule of players, planning for the concert schedule, selecting a guest player, making a contract, publicity, checking the presence and absence of players, arranging auditions, purchasing scores and music instruments...everything (related to the matters of orchestral management) is handled by the orchestral executive office...

[Staff Member 5]

It is evident that the orchestral executive constitutions of Korean orchestras have gradually changed in visible aspects (such as size, name, or task). Despite self-development and the importance of the role of the orchestral executive constitution, its deficiencies have not changed. The orchestral executive constitution is at the centre of the management of the whole orchestra, but the administrative authority of Korean municipal orchestras lies with the city and its staff, and the orchestral executive constitution can only decide on limited matters. The following narratives explain the multiple lines of authority, which cause a lack of authority in the executive constitution.

[There is] no authority for decision making regarding whole tasks...If I make a pamphlet or placard, all final decisions are up to the city hall...

[Staff Member 3]

If the orchestra needs to buy an instrument or music score, I prepare everything to get permission from the Executive Director...the process of buying something is very complicated.

[Staff Member 4]

The orchestral executive constitution has much work to do; meanwhile there is nothing that can be done (by the orchestral executive constitution)...No authority of decision making...when a conductor wants to choose a soloist for 5 million won (£2,500), we need to get a permit from a civil servant...if civil servant says, 'no, there is no money', then we cannot invite that soloist...the

administrative system of the orchestra is a duality... there is an orchestral manager (in the executive constitution)...he/she does not seem to take charge of orchestra management...it's like winding up (civil servant's affairs) not managing the orchestra's managerial affairs...

[Staff Member 6]

These narratives explain some lack of decision making, along with the highly bureaucratic structures and dual management figures. On the one hand, the role of the orchestral executive constitution is significant in orchestral management; on the other, all final artistic decisions are made by the conductor and the city,[195] and financial and personnel decisions are made by the city. Although other parties give their input, the final say always lies with the city (and the KBS for the KBS Symphony Orchestra). This is different to traditionally structured western orchestras, in which managers play a key role in the running of an orchestra, in decision making processes and final decision making: the board of orchestral management, working with others, acts as a decision maker and implementer.[196] Thus, the dual management figures of Korean municipal orchestras, which are the main cause of lack of authority, can be seen as a problem which is likely to lead to managerial inefficiency.

Regarding intrapersonal conflict among administrative staff, I asked Staff Member 2 several times whether or not administrative staff have conflicting relationships, and he always replied 'no'. Then, after several informal meetings, unexpected conflicting relationships between administrative staff were mentioned, whereby staff suffered from communication difficulties with colleagues related to work: in particular, shortages of staff appear to influence the relationship between them. According to the statistical result on intrapersonal conflict of administrative staff (see Table 6.2), it could be concluded that each group of staff has experienced a similar level of intrapersonal conflict related to these orchestral government structures.

Intragroup conflict

Players' intragroup conflict

There are deeply rooted relationship conflicts and a good deal of distrust between players and principal conductors, and this has been evidenced by the frequent changes of principal conductor[197] throughout the history of Korean municipal orchestras.

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[195] The role of the city in all artistic matters is a formal process of decision making, and the conductor has the entire influence on artistic matters.

[196] However, there are different models, where the balance of power between Executive Director and the senior managers depends on a number of factors.

[197] Although the final say always lies with the city, players' opinion is partly reflected in the conductor's contract renewal: if the cities want to extend the contract, they may consider the opinion of players.

> Our previous conductor was so personal (it might be inferred as selfishness) and likely to ignore players...he would like to appeal to others, especially government officials...he showed himself off...but he never cared about the player's poor welfare, particularly regarding salary...I admitted that the player's performing ability might not reach the expectation of the principal conductor...(however) he commented on such a thing (player's performance) in an extremely irritating way...'You cannot play such a easy thing! If I were you, I would disembowel myself'....So, some players got very angry at the conductor, and left...if a player's performance is so bad, (I understand) he can say so, but the way of speaking...if the conductor requests how they should play, then players can understand that they are not fools, but he (conductor) always speaks in that way...this situation was (repeatedly) over and over again...

[Player 5]

Player 5 describes the rudeness of the conductor's attitude toward players and the limitations of the player's actions against the conductor. When Player 5 told me about this, he could not contain his emotions, and he still harboured negative feelings towards his previous conductor.

Player 2 also described a similar attitude on the part of the conductor in the following narrative.

> Yes, we had a problem with a previous conductor, especially due to the conductor's arbitrariness and complacency. Our previous conductor went to the city hall and complained that the players' salaries were too high, whereas his salary was too low. He used violent language, and indulged in personal remarks to players...And concerts were for himself (to show off) ...In addition, he did not take part with the players...therefore, (it can be said that) players were almost attacked by the conductor...but there was not much that the players could do when they were personally insulted by the conductor in the middle of a rehearsal...practically, there is an audition which is related to a conductor...so it is difficult to talk or fight back with a conductor, unless a player wants to quit the orchestra...the only thing players can do is leave the place...the players' action is very passive...(because) stronger action can be a problem (as it may be reported to the city or the orchestral office), and players control themselves...He made a conflicting relationship with players in every orchestra he worked...when a city needed to dismiss problematic players, then cities employed 'XXXX'[198]...that is, municipal orchestras only employ him when they need a rearrangement of the orchestra...[199]

[Player 2]

Player 2 indicated similar points to Player 5, stating that the previous conductor treated players unfairly, and without any respect, whilst creating unequal relationships. As Levine and Levine (1996) explained, challenging the conductor's position was seen as taboo, and musicians and conductors pretended that the conductor stood on the podium by divine right, in order to prevent things from degenerating into chaos, thus internalising behavioural norms and taboos and protecting that authority from any challenge (p. 19). Therefore, it can be seen that there are not many things that

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[198] The conductor mentioned by the player is not named for ethical reasons.
[199] His comments on the conductor seem exaggerated.

musicians can do against the wishes of the conductor, as the conductor has complete authority and controlling power over them. Visible conflict, such as assertive verbal attacks could be seen as having relatively high conflict intensity (see Figure 6.4). As Levine and Levine (1996) say, this might be one of the reasons why the players in symphony orchestras are not smiling.

Conflicts between players and conductor could be seen on different occasions. In the current government system, the principal conductor has complete authority in terms of artistic decisions, and he has a certain power in auditioning players. Therefore, the conflict of players with the conductor is partly caused by auditions, because players believe that a conductor judges a player not only by his/her musical ability, but also by their private relationship. One interviewee explained an episode which showed a conductor's partial judgment of players.

> Once, a principal conductor asked us to have individual interviews right after his appointment. He said, 'ok, you are grade F, because your performance is good but your personality does not fit in with an orchestra... you are grade A because you are diligent and have a good relationship with other players'. In addition, the conductor has the authority to choose examiners for audition, and the examiners are generally appointed 3 or 4 days before the audition and they almost decide the result of the audition in advance based on the conductor's opinion of the players. As a result, 5 or 6 players quit their job, either before the audition or after the audition.
>
> [Player 3]

> A conductor in Korea is like a family member, and players need to follow the conductor's schedule.... Conductors looks at a player as an individual (probably this means that the conductor builds up personal friendship with players who are in his side), whereas a conductor in Germany is like an invited guest and he/she gives consideration to the players' schedule.[200]
>
> [Player 4]

According to Player 5, Player 2 and Player 3, an audition judged by the conductor cannot readily be objective if the conductor has a personal relationship with players. In addition, it seems that conductors in Korea have the power to control players in terms of auditions, and the relationship between the player and conductor cannot be equaled. This might result from the government structure of most Korean municipal orchestras, as there is no position which can control and compete with the conductor.

As Player 2 said, players cannot do many things against a mighty conductor. However, when the players' conflict reaches the top, they can unite and show strong reaction against conductors, such as a signature collecting campaign to expel their conductor, or putting in place a concert boycott. Even though there is contradictory opinion among

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[200] This may not address every orchestra in Germany.

players regarding a concert boycott, players occasionally show their unhappy feelings about some decisions to the principal conductor by boycotting certain concerts. Some players prefer to solve the conflict through a conversation rather than this, because they believe that their main role is to provide concerts for people, and boycotting concerts leads to the reduction of concerts which contradicts this aim. On the other hand, some players are probably against boycotting concerts because it means losing their extra income.

From the above narratives, auditions which could be an external threat (Rahim, 1986) or a *territorial violation*[201] seem another source of conflict; the following examples show varying opinions on audition.

> I don't think auditioning is a burden. Only players who do not have enough musical ability as an orchestra member say that...In fact, the orchestra hardly dismisses players, and there is nearly no player dismissal unless he/she loses his fingers! ...So orchestral auditions should open the door to every part (not only be open to the vacant position).
>
> [Player 5]

> To improve orchestra's performance level, auditions should be open to all positions...the current audition system doesn't work properly... (players are) hardly being fired because of the audition in practice...(but) players have the burden of a grade decided by audition result...
>
> [Civil Servant 1]

Although Player 5 and Civil Servant 1 think auditions are needed for the artistic development of the orchestra, most players are against having a regular audition, due to its ineffectiveness and their pride:

> ...if auditions are a really useful and effective way to improve the performance level of the orchestra, Korean orchestras should be the world's top orchestras by now, as we have had auditions every 2–3 years...
>
> [Player 6]

While auditions are not a source of conflict to Player 5 and Civil Servant 1, they are to Player 6. This opposite view on conflict is supported by Robbins (2001) that 'Conflict must be perceived by the parties to it; whether or not conflict exists is a perception issue' (p. 383).

So far, we have been looking at various relationship conflicts between players and conductor: the main source of conflict was derived from the conductor's obstinate attitudes, and the authority structure, which gives enormous authority to the principal conductor. Thus, the intragroup conflict between players and conductor, from the

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[201] Handy (1999: p. 304) explains a territorial violation thus: 'If in one's job, territory is either taken away or infringed upon by another group, there will be retaliation and conflict'.

players' point of view, could reach a relatively high intensity level, according to the following Figure.

Figure 6.4 Conflict intensity continuum

Annihilatory Conflict	─┬─	Overt efforts to destroy the other party
	─┼─	Aggressive physical attacks
	─┼─	Threats and ultimatums
	─┼─	Assertive verbal attacks
	─┼─	Overt questioning or challenging of others
	─┼─	Minor disagreements or misunderstandings
No conflict	─┴─	

(Source: Robbins, 2001: p. 391)

Intergroup conflict

The results of interviews show that Korean municipal orchestras have more episodes related to intergroup conflict, compared to the other two conflicts. This section presents players' intergroup conflict with civil servants and the orchestral executive constitution, and the intergroup conflict of administrative staff at orchestral executive constitution with players and conductors. Civil servants' intergroup conflict with player, conductor, and administrative staff will be explained, along with different sources of intergroup conflict.

Players' intergroup conflict with civil servants

Generally speaking, players hardly have chance to have any direct contact with a civil servant. However, they have a strong prejudice against civil servants, believing they are ignorant of the arts (especially referring to music), and cannot or do not want to understand the arts and musicians. A player in the CPO who holds a position of the Regional Head of the labour union and often liaises between civil servants and players gives one example of how civil servants think of players and the work of the orchestra:

> When I talked about salaries with a civil servant, he told me, 'players' working is different to us... we start work at 9am and finish it at 6pm. But players only work a very short time compared to us'. However, you know... even though we don't play, it does not mean that we are not practicing...this kind of thought makes a conflict with the civil servant... the civil servant thinks that the orchestra is not a productive organisation as there is no product (it probably refers to the fact that the orchestra does not provide a visible result)...it is such a communistic idea... but what we (players) provide is a cultural product...And if we appeal in terms of what we are producing, civil servants cannot understand, as they are not experts (especially about music) and do not want to listen to what we are saying...The way of thinking is quite different... The city reduced the number of concerts due to a lack of money, and then blamed us for not playing and having free time. Frankly speaking, we (players) do not

> complain about having more concerts, because playing is our job.
>
> [Player 10]

> As a representative of the players, I sometimes meet civil servants to speak for our players...But I cannot communicate with them...so I often argue...
>
> [Player 5]

> ...musicians...they have a convenient job where they only have to work for 4 hours...then they complain about their salary. The players in our orchestra work from 10am to 1pm...the salary, based on 3-4 hour daily activity, is not little.
>
> [Civil Servant 1]

The above comments show how players distrust civil servants and the relationships that exist between them. Player 10's remarks indicate the differences in the perceptions of civil servants, regarding 'working time' and 'orchestras'. Working time, to players, includes official attendance time, as well as free time (because they are also practicing or give lessons that relate to music activities), whereas civil servants calculate players' working time based on official attendance time from 10:00 to 17:00.[202] As Civil Servant 1 mentioned, civil servants think players' salaries are too high, compared to themselves, while players consider their visible working time to be only a part of their working time. There is another different perception with regard to orchestras: civil servants think that an orchestra is a non productive organisation, as music is invisible, while players firmly believe that orchestras provide a cultural product. Differences in perception as a potential source of organisational conflict are mentioned by Smith (1966) and Mullins (2007). Meanwhile, Player 5 describes the experience of communication difficulty and a lack of communication with civil servants. Robbins (2001) and Handy (1999) saw poor communication as a potential source of conflict and Robbins (2001) argued that 'the potential for conflict increases when either too little or too much communication takes place' (p. 386).

From the above narrative we can see two key sources of intergroup conflicts between players and civil servants: differences in perception and poor communication between players and civil servants.

Players' intergroup conflict with the staff at the orchestral executive constitution
There are different degrees of conflict in the relationships between players and the orchestral executive constitution in different orchestras. According to the results of interviews among players and administrative staff, the CPO, BPO and KBS Symphony Orchestras share common relationship conflicts: players complain about the unpleasant attitudes of the administrative staff and misunderstandings related to auditions or orchestra regulations. Along with these matters, the unique relationship

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[202] This is official working time to players in most municipal orchestras, whereas actual working time is generally from 10am to 1pm.

conflict within the KBS Symphony Orchestra was derived from significant issues in terms of the orchestra's independence from the KBS. The players and administrative staff of the BPO and CPO mentioned each other's positive and negative points, whereas those of the KBS Symphony Orchestra (KSO) merely complained about the others. Both players and administrative staff said that if staff were music graduates, it was better for the operation of the orchestra, and also helped in understanding each other, and might reduce conflict. Thus, according to the results of the interviews conducted, it appears that the BPO and CPO have fewer degrees of relationship conflict, compared to the KSO. However, my expectation as to the degree of intergroup conflict between players and staff was wrong, based on the results of quantitative research: among the three municipal orchestras, the players of the BPO and CPO have the higher perception of intergroup conflict with their administrative staff, and the players of the KSO have the lower perception of conflict (with statistical significance, see Table 6.5): it can be interpreted that the players of the KSO are more likely to understand their administrative staff (otherwise, the players simply hide their real feelings in order to avoid the problematic situation produced by their answer). On the other hand, there is no statistically significant difference found among staff of the BPO, CPO, and KSO: each group of staff of the three orchestras has a similar degree of intergroup conflict with their players (see Table 6.6).

Apart from analysing all staff's intergroup conflict with players, I also divided the group of staff into two parts: music graduate and non-music-graduate group; and the results of the t-test and the Mann-Whitney test showed that there was no statistically significant difference between them regarding intergroup conflict with players (t = 1.03, p = 0.339; U = 6.50, p = 0.381) (see Table 6.24); thus, it can be concluded that whether or not the member of administrative staff is a music graduate does not affect their intergroup conflict with their players.

Players generally believe that the orchestral administration office should help players both physically and mentally; administrative staff should provide a comfortable practice environment, both in the home residence and in external venues, in order for them to play without any disturbance; and the administrative office should represent the situation of the players and should have a role as a mediator, connecting players and the city. However, some players feel that administrative staff have more regard for the city's opinion than for that of the players, and do not deliver the opinion of players to the city; thus such an attitude on the part of the administrative office indirectly helps to create unpleasant decisions (such as unwanted concert engagements).

...the orchestral executive constitution has to represent player's standpoints,

instead of just reading the city's countenance...Administrative staff should look at players from a musical point of view, not as part of a superior and inferior relationship...

[Player 11]

This interviewee was discontented with the attitude of the administrative staff towards the players, because of a feeling that administrative staff look down on them.

There was no serious conflict relationship with administrative staff. However, one conductor believed and trusted the staff who were in charge of planning, so that he named himself as chief of planning[203] and acted as if he had power...(but) the orchestra office did not have him under its thumb, although I don't know what it looked like from outside, and what he wanted to do with the BPO...Anyway, he could not greatly influence the players...also the administrative staff tended to be on the side of (our previous) conductor and the city, so the conflict between players and administrative staff was becoming worse.

[Player 5]

The two remarks above show that conflict between players and the administrative staff is caused by unpleasant attitudes toward players. Mullins (2007), Rahim (1986), and Reynecke and Fourie (2001) support the idea that attitudes can be a potential source of organisational conflict. Although Player 5 dislikes the attitude of one administrative staff member, the conflict intensity seems moderate. On other hand, the players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra express great anger toward the Audience Business Team, with no positive evaluation of the managerial affairs of the KBS Audience Business Team.

We have so many conflicts with the Audience Business Team[204]...The Audience Business Team can be seen as a representative of the KBS...the team leader only forces the idea of the KBS onto us (regardless of our opinion)...

[Player 12]

There was a 'KBS 80th Anniversary Concert'...it could be a very important event for the KBS...awful plan and an accompaniment for a (popular music) singer...the programme for that concert was not decided even a week before... haphazard and time consuming are the ways they work...

[Player 3]

...we don't have a serious conflict with administrative staff, but we feel very bad when the preparation for performance is not well planned...

[Player 13]

Player 12 and Player 3 are dissatisfied with the Audience Business Team, owing to that team's inefficient work: Player 3 is especially disappointed that the KBS did not give

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[203] A Planning Chief in the BPO is practically in charge of the orchestral office, and the Orchestral Manager or Managing Director is another job title that other orchestras use.
[204] The Audience Business Team of the KBS Symphony Orchestra acts as an orchestral executive constitution.

them an important task in an important ceremony, and gave the role of accompanist to popular music singers. Although players dislike the result, they do not reveal this conflict through their behaviour. Player 13 also indicated that there was disorganised concert preparation. Due to this, she might think that administrative staff are uncaring with regard to players. Again, players do not take any action over this inefficient preparation of work by the orchestral executive constitution: players have to see the staff everyday, and sometimes they need help from the orchestra office. Moreover, administrative staff observe players' everyday life in order to record players' journals (which is reflected slightly in the marks of auditions), so that players may not reveal their angry feelings, as long as they can tolerate the situation.

The orchestral executive constitutions of the CPO and BPO play roles as mediators between players and the city, whereas the KBS Symphony Orchestra's Audience Business Team does not act like this, as it is a direct department of the KBS, and the team represents the idea of the KBS. Thus, because of this mediator role, I anticipated that the players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra would have higher intergroup conflict with their administrative staff than those of the BPO and CPO, but the results are reversed: as was indicated earlier, the players of the KSO have the less intergroup conflict with administrative staff, whereas the players of the BPO and CPO have the higher (see Table 6.5).

Thus far, we have been looking at the relationship between players and the orchestral executive constitution, mainly from players' viewpoints. There is a different story of intergroup conflict from the viewpoint of administrative staff of the orchestral executive constitution.

Intergroup conflict of administrative staff

There is another example of intergroup conflict due to different perceptions about the task of the orchestral executive constitution. According to the administrative staff, the orchestral office was given the authority to control and supervise the players. Therefore, administrative staff warn or legally restrain players. They know that players see these actions negatively. There is a regulation concerning the outside activities of players, which means the players' time needs to be checked with the office's schedule in advance. If a player has an external ensemble or concerts, it could be a plus point to his/her audition, as a part of the player's duties, but players consider the regulation as a way for the administrative staff to restrict the player's freedom. Thus, on the one hand, the regulation can be a controlling tool over players; on the other hand, it could be a useful tool, if players report their external activities to their office; in addition, the regulation can be recognised as a conflict for players, not but for administrative staff (or

civil servants) (Robbins, 2001).

There are many misunderstandings and miscommunications between administrative staff and players in terms of auditions. One administrative member of staff insisted that although they did not have any power to influence audition results, some current players considered administrative staff as spies, reporting their everyday life to a conductor or a city. However, players who have an audition for a vacancy misunderstand the role of administrative staff. As auditions are a sensitive matter, the orchestra needs to open its audition process, and the results of this, so as to reduce miscommunication and to avoid unpleasant experiences.

Relatively high conflict occurred in relation to the CPO's audition in 2006, as it led to a few players' resignations. The staff of the CPO described it as follows:

> ...there was an audition last year (2006) and we had a conflict with a few players. The principal conductor, orchestra leader and myself participated in the interview, but the players disliked my attendance [...] my role was to confirm the attendance of players, not to discover someone's fault [...] it was a pretty hard experience during which I was attacked by players through internet slander related to the audition...

[Staff Member 1]

> an unpleasant relationship with players relating to an audition made it difficult to devote myself to the orchestra...and these relationships made me worried about my ability as a staff.

[Staff Member 2]

This conflict was due to the audition in 2006. An audition is a most sensitive matter to the players, and an audition as a kind of environmental change is a source of conflict, leading to communication difficulties and misunderstandings between players and administrative staff. The players who attacked Staff Member 1 showed their intergroup conflict through Internet slander and distrust.

Players, conductors, the city, and the orchestral executive constitution all have different perceptions regarding auditions: players regard an audition as a tool of control, whereas others think of it as a chance to develop the performance level of the orchestra. Thus, one may suppose that there will always be such relationship conflict between orchestras (as employers) and players (as employees) so long as the current system of audition and different perceptions exist.

Although Player 11 and Player 5 previously indicated the unfair and superior attitude of administrative staff towards the players, the administrative staff that I interviewed understand the role of the administrative office as a supporter for players and mediator between musicians and the city. However, administrative staff found that some players

were more demanding than others. If these demands were not met, then some degree of conflict arose.

> ...players...should understand the Audience Business Team and the KBS through communication...there is misunderstanding and conflict...players only insist on some points which only benefit themselves...the KBS also tries its best to help as much as it can...players should partly concede (their demands)...not just request...
>
> [Staff Member 7]

> When there is a conflicting relationship with players, it makes me feel things are very difficult...another difficulty is the relationship with a conductor, if he insists on inviting a guest soloist sole due to his personal taste (he did not mention the details, but some conductors in Korea want to invite a guest soloist based on his personal relationship related to school, nepotism, or region).
>
> [Staff Member 1]

As the position of musicians and administrative staff is different, conflict relationships are naturally understandable. However, players and staff should consider each other, instead of insisting on their own rights or ideas: they may firstly try to remove mistrust and prejudice between them, and try to cooperate with each other.

Meanwhile, staff gave their opinions on conductors: many conductors in Korea abuse their power to pursue private benefits, as the current government structure allows them strong control, both administratively and artistically. It would appear that schemes need to be put in place to control the current authority of the principal conductor.

Civil servants' Intergroup conflict
Despite my concerns that civil servants do not show their real opinions because of their position, one of the interviewees in the civil servant group gave me an unexpected account of his thoughts on musicians.[205]

> ...and art is a creative activity...because of non-music graduates, my understanding of art is very limited... Musicians, to me, seem very stubborn... they think they are best, and don't care about others...for example, as a municipal orchestra, we have to play even though we don't want to do. But whether there is an element of pride, playing 'high art' music or not, musicians are not likely to play popular music...that is, they can't play popular music... so I am skeptical about musicians who think of themselves as the privileged classes...in my opinion, orchestras should not be only for a minority class...Although families of musicians are generally rich, they are keen on salary...
>
> [Civil Servant 2]

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[205] Musicians include players and conductors.

He first admitted his lack of ability to understand music,[206] which players and staff in the orchestral executive constitution consistently mention, then he delivered some negative impressions and prejudices about players. It might be true that some players pretend to belong to the privileged class. However, his idea that musicians are born into rich families and because of this, are rich, appears dubious.[207] Whether he/she is rich or not is a totally separate matter. They are in charge of their family's living, and it is a natural thing that they are keen to make money for themselves. Therefore, the idea of Civil Servant 2 on players' living expenses seems a little one-sided.

> Lead players and the deputy conductor refused to communicate with me...they have a prejudice against an administrator, such as the fact that they are too serious, bureaucratic and such...I could hear lots of negative stories about civil servants...I really want to help musicians, but they refuse...if we can talk and communicate, I can explain what we (city) can support and we can't, and can solve (problems)...communication is interrupted, and there is no communication at all...for example, a string quartet was disorganised when one of the members left the group...in this case...in my opinion, anyone from the orchestra could have taken the place, and they could continue to play...but the three remaining players said 'no, it is impossible'....the reason is that making an ensemble takes around 3-4 years...but what I asked them for was just playing background music or creating a good mood...music is not the main thing...that is, the thing is the background of an event, not the highest quality of classical performance...
>
> [Civil Servant 2]

According to Civil Servant 2, players express their disagreeable relationship with civil servants by avoiding communication. He continued to explain the opposite idea concerning performance. Players and civil servants have different perceptions on performance. Thus, lack of communication between civil servants and players, civil servants' prejudice about players, and players' prejudice about civil servants could be seen as potential sources of conflicts. If, as Civil Servant 2 said, the orchestra is a municipal orchestra designed to give pleasure to its citizens, the first thing players should think of is the initial objective of the orchestra.

> ...the role of the Managing Director in the orchestral executive constitution is one of dissatisfaction...the administrative ability of the administrative staff in the orchestral executive constitution is very poor...especially, they don't have any idea about money...taxes are not their money...they have no idea how to save money...regarding the execution of the budget, excessive execution of the budget is carried out...there is also a lack of responsibility related to performance...for example, they spend 50 million won (£25,000) or 60 million won (£30,000) on producing a concert...if the concert fails, they lay blame upon the lack of the citizen's cultural level and also a lack of publicity from the administration department of the cultural centre [...] In the case of the

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[206] Rahim (1986) considers lack of ability as a source of intrapersonal conflict.

[207] In Korea, generally speaking, the children of parents generally inherit their parents' fortune and children are not financially independent after entering university or even after marriage.

Managing Director, his administrative ability, the use and choice of vocabulary are very limited...he (managing director) holds fast to his opinion on the title of a concert or on administrative matters.

[Civil Servant 2]

Civil Servant 2 shows his mistrust of the administrative capacity of staff in the orchestral executive constitution and complains about the lack of responsibility of the managing director. It might be true that the administrative capacity of the managing director is not as good as a civil servant, since the majority of managing directors of Korean municipal orchestras have previously been orchestral players, who have no administrative training, and learn managerial skills through their experiences in work. However, it may not be true that administrative staff do not have a good sense of management: a member of the staff said that they possess a certain know-how through working experience and more staff learn arts management or administration at university. The mistrust of civil servants toward administrative staff could be caused by a lack of communication and their prejudice against civil servants. Thus, both civil servants and administrative staff in the orchestral executive constitution need to open their minds to each other.

Civil Servant 2 gives an example of a conductor's unreasonable decision making related to choosing guest players or soloists. The following example demonstrates a source of intergroup conflict: that of an unethical attitude.

...in the case of the conductor, he chose a soloist from those with whom he has an academic relationship (alumnus, his teacher or student), is related to, or, worst case, his wife, and asked for top guarantee...I can't understand...if (the soloist) graduated from a good university and performance is reasonable...it could be understandable...otherwise...really can't understand...they are financially secure, but much too keen on money... as I am a civil servant who is responsible for the orchestral administration, I often meet a conductor...but it's so difficult. And if I disagree with his opinion or decision, he tells me that he wants to talk directly with the mayor...

[Civil Servant 2]

Just as administrative staff have previously indicated the principal conductor's abuse of power, civil servants also complain about similar matters, and there needs to be an alternative way to control the principal conductor's behaviour, or to ask for responsibility over artistic decisions.

Interpersonal conflict
This section presents the relationship conflicts among players due to personality, age and gender and the task conflicts between players and conductors, and among players. Because age and gender could be indirect sources of intergroup conflict—a part of

socio-cultural differences, I consider both of them as sources of interpersonal conflict.

Although a few interviewees in the players group said that there was no conflicting relationship among players, conflicts do exist. Examples are as follows:

> ...there is a conflict, but it is very personal thing. [Player 3]
> There is a conflict among the players...generally speaking, there is only insignificant conflict...among them...because players have high tension when they play, and they scatter right after performance?...they (players) don't have unity...like a grain of sand...no one attends a house of mourning or wedding ceremony (of other players)...they are absolutely individualists.
> [Staff Member 8]

> Players don't have any conflict at all. [Player 6]
> We hardly have conflict between us...there are conflicts with conductors or among players in the artistic aspect...but almost no conflict amongst players.
> [Player 5]

The features and individualism of players are described by a former administrative staff member, Staff Member 8. A low degree of conflict is indicated by both Player 3 and Staff Member 8, which indicates that some players may identify a conflict, whereas others may not: players may want to hide any conflict from outsiders, as 'it is common that people within a professional group do not criticise their colleagues to outsiders' (Koivunen, 2003: p 105). An orchestra's in-group unification against outsider and especially critics is indicated by Adorno (1976, p: 116). Otherwise, these opposing views on conflict among the group of players are caused by different perceptions of the term conflict.

> Generally speaking, players are timid and very sensitive...so when their pride is hurt or when there is arguable issue, players don't easily forget about it, then it also influences music (when the uncomfortable things exist) in the long term...if players are men, we can solve these problems after boozing up...working with female players is harder (than with male players)...they harbour bad feelings for a long time...When there is a problem, sometimes they avoid conversation...I often see players' selfish sides and self-consideration... Approximately 90% of male players are members of the musicians' union. But junior players, especially female players say, 'I can't join...because I only want to focus on music', or 'I will be scolded by patents'...
> [Player 7]

Player 7 explained the personal thoughts of players and the hardship of the relationships with players, and he found the main cause of relationship conflict in gender. According to Player 7, it is hard to deal with problematic relationships with women, due to their personality. Player 7 used the word 'avoid conversation', which shows the female player's conflict handling intentions. But the result of the survey does not support this opinion that female players are more likely to use an *avoiding* style with peers than male players. According to the result of the survey, there is no statistical

significant difference between male (M = 3.88, SD = 0.56) and female players (M = 3.81, SD = 0.60) using *avoiding* style when handling interpersonal conflict with peers; and it is reasonable to interpret that it is not true that female players prefer to use more *avoiding* style in order to handling interpersonal conflict with peers, compared to male players (see Table 6.17).

The following narratives illustrate players' interpersonal conflict due to age.

> I feel things are quite difficult because of conflict relationships with other players...For example, people who act without manner or consideration...What I cannot understand is that some players speak to me thoughtlessly (without consideration) simply because I am younger than them...in terms of (my private) life...not my performance...In my opinion, audiences or outside people judge us by our performing ability, whereas the inside of the orchestra considers the relationship with other players as a matter of judgment...I don't want to booze, but I need to join in...when senior players speak to me in a very bad manner, I can do nothing...My age is younger than the other male players...as they have seen me since I was a undergraduate...So (senior players) treat me like a student, not a colleague...
>
> [Player 9]

> The worst relationship is (among players)...Why the relationship among players is so conflict is that as players get older, a principal player moves his/her position to a second principal, and then a general player...Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, Masan Philharmonic Orchestra, and Ulsan Philharmonic Orchestra have a relatively short history (so that they do not have this problem), whereas Busan philharmonic Orchestra has approximately 50 years history, and a student player can be the principal player in the BPO and a teacher can be a general player...Players have to follow their principal player's artistic decision including bowing...Similarly, a principal player is only 25 or 26 years old, and has had training under a famous teacher overseas right after high school graduation, whereas a general player is 40 years old...in orchestras if a player has talent and skill, then he can be a principal player regardless of his age...Therefore, the relationship cannot be good...
>
> [Staff Member 5]

Player 9 explained the young player's hardship with elder players due to age. His uncomfortable feelings might be caused by the age gap, as younger generations and older generations have a different way of building a friendship: old players prefer to do it by boozing together, whereas young players prefer things another way. On the other hand, Staff Member 5 illustrated a further relationship conflict caused by age. The age problem might be specific to Korean orchestras because Korea is a country which has been significantly influenced by Confucianism for a long time. The general Confucian idea is that a junior needs to respect and obey a senior's opinion. Therefore, if the principal player is younger than the general players, this might create an awkward situation. As a result, the relation of age to the Chinese philosophical system could be seen as another source of interpersonal conflict between junior and senior players, which might not happen in western orchestras.

The following three examples illustrate task conflicts between players and conductors and among players.

> ...In terms of music...beat or sign is important...this conductor really penetrates into music, and then conducts, and that conductor likes music, so that he conducts differently...he said he will be slightly tenuto, but he conducts in original tempo...he asked us to do so, but he didn't...it's strange...then he passes the buck to us...a principal conductor should lead the orchestra with excellent ears...it's really a basic matter in music...but we don't have many qualified conductors in Korea...Our conductor repeats a lot...makes music through repetition...so players tend to look down on our conductor...he lost our (players) trust...he is really an excellent pianist, but not a conductor...
>
> [Player 14]

A principal conductor could lose the trust of the players when his musical ability does not reach players' expectations, and lose the confidence of his orchestral executive constitution and the civil servants when he makes injudicious decisions.

It is obvious that the conductor of Player 14's orchestra lost trust from players due to his lack of skill. It is currently a popular trend that famous pianists attempt to conduct an orchestra in Korea. However, the pianist's debut as a principal conductor is generally not successful, because their conducting skill, without any relevant training, is poor. The principal conductor of Player 14's orchestra fits this case. A conductor who was formerly a pianist might not have charismatic leadership, due to his lack of conducting technique: or it might be that he has charismatic leadership, but simply not the technical skills needed to transmit his wishes to the players. As a consequence, when the principal conductor does not fulfill his task role, players may have a task conflict against the conductor, which can then lead to a fundamental crisis in the orchestra's existence, as the orchestra's initial objective is to provide co-ordinated and synchronized music.

> When we have a rehearsal, players who make a mistake or whose performing ability is lower than average make me so annoyed...it is a visible thing...but I can't tell them directly...if I think someone is annoying (by mistakes), then others also feel the same...
>
> [Player 7]

> ...players understand each other and try to cover technical mistakes during rehearsals or concerts as anyone can in that situation. Such conflicts among players can be found anywhere in social life.
>
> [Player 9]

Player 7 notes that he is annoyed by other players who make mistakes. This may be a potential source of conflict. He used 'annoyed' when he explained his emotion; however he cannot show this to the others. Instead, he pretends and hides his conflict toward other players, because they share similar experiences: it is evident from the

survey result that players prefer to use an *avoiding* style of interpersonal conflict with peers (see Table 6.13). As a result, there are not likely to be any visible outcomes from this task conflict. Even though it is arguable whether this is a task conflict or not, I would like to conclude that it could be seen as a task conflict: 'When one party blocks the means to a goal of another, a conflict state exists' (Robbins, 1988: p. 153).

Summary of interview findings

The sources of conflict occurring in Korean municipal orchestras
The results of the interviews on conflict revealed the sources within and between players, conductor, staff, and civil servants.

Players did not give much information about intrapersonal conflict, but cited change and attitude as the sources of intragroup conflict. They cited different perception, prejudice, and communication difficulty as the sources of intergroup conflict, and gender, age, and task capability as the sources of interpersonal conflict.

On the other hand, staff indicate multiple lines of authority, and dual management system for the sources of intrapersonal conflict, environmental change for the sources of intragroup conflict, and different perception and distrust (misunderstandings and miscommunication) as the sources of intergroup conflict.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the results of quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to investigate existing conflicts and ways of handling conflicts. The sample size used in the results of the survey is varied, due to missing values in each subscale of ROCI-I: intrapersonal, intragroup, and intergroup conflict (with two variables), and ROCI-II: five styles of handling interpersonal conflict. Before analysing the data, the response rate, non-response bias check, and multicollinearity were checked, and there was no serious bias identified in the collected data.

There are different types and styles of handling conflict that exist around Korean municipal orchestras, and this chapter categorised these conflicts into four parts based on Rahim's ROCI-I and ROCI-II: intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict, and interpersonal conflict, and these conflicts are used both in the section of the results of the quantitative research survey and the qualitative research interviews, respectively.

Each of the four conflicts has its sources, related to either relationship or task, or both: the quantitative analysis showed the degree of the four conflicts classified by players

and staff of three Korean municipal orchestras; the comparison between players and staff; and players' and staff's preferred styles of handling interpersonal conflict, along with brief identification of each conflict's source. The results of the survey analysis also revealed the relationships between conflict types, conflict handling styles, job satisfaction and turnover, using one-way analysis of variance (F and t-test), repeated measures ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis test, Friedman test, Pearson's correlation, and multiple regression analysis, in order to identify the inner problems of Korean municipal orchestras related to conflict. Meanwhile, the analysis of the results of the interviews has been more concentrated on showing the sources of each of the four conflicts via narratives.

The following chapter will investigate new challenges for Korean municipal orchestras and their responses, together with reflections on the case of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra.

Tables of data used in Chapter 6: from Table 6.23 to Table 6.31

Table 6.23 Comparisons of subscales of ROCI-I between players and staff

Types of conflict		N	M	SD	t	U
Intrapersonal Conflict	Player	120	2.29	0.54	-1.67	342.000
	Staff	9	2.60	0.46		
Intragroup Conflict	Player	120	2.72	0.41	-2.16*	295.000
	Staff	9	3.01	0.22		
Intergroup Conflict with staff	Player	120	2.86	0.52	-0.08	515.000
Intergroup Conflict with players	Staff	9	2.87	0.64		
Intergroup Conflict with civil servant	Player	79	2.81	0.54	-0.59	307.500
	Staff	9	2.93	0.61		

Note: * indicates p < 0.05.

Table 6.24 Non-music-graduated and music-graduated staff degree of conflict

Types of conflict		N	M	SD	T	U
Intrapersonal Conflict	1	5	2.77	0.30	1.29	6.000
	2	4	2.39	0.58		
Intragroup Conflict	1	5	3.05	0.29	0.57[a]	8.500
	2	4	2.97	0.12		
Intergroup Conflict with players	1	5	3.07	0.57	1.03	6.500
	2	4	2.63	0.72		
Intergroup Conflict with civil servant	1	5	3.00	0.47	0.38	9.000
	2	4	2.83	0.83		

Note: 1 indicates non-music-graduated staff; 2 indicates music-graduated staff; [a] Levene's test indicates unequal variances.

Table 6.25 All players' percentile norms of intrapersonal, intragroup, and intergroup conflict with staff and civil servants

Mean Scores	Intrapersonal Conflict	Intragroup Conflict	Intergroup conflict with staff	Intergroup conflict with civil servants	Mean Scores
5.00					5.00
4.85					4.85
4.70					4.70
4.55					4.55
4.40				99	4.40
4.25			99	98	4.25
4.10					4.10
3.95			98	97	3.95
3.80			97	96	3.80
3.65	99		95	93	3.65
3.50	98	99	94	87	3.50
3.35	96	97	87	86	3.35
3.20	92	96	80	80	3.20
3.05	88	81	74	72	3.05
2.90	83	69	56	65	2.90
2.75	81	57	44	49	2.75
2.60	74	47	43	34	2.60
2.45	68	26	33	33	2.45
2.30	63	22	23	22	2.30
2.15	55	12	14	15	2.15
2.00	36	9	11	8	2.00
1.85	24	4	8	3	1.85
1.70	16	1	4	1	1.70
1.55	4				1.55
1.40	3		3		1.40
1.25					1.25
1.10			2		1.10
1.00	1		1		1.00

Note: IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = intragroup conflict, NG1 = intergroup conflict with staff, NG2 = intergroup conflict with civil servants.

Table 6.26 Players' percentile norms of the three types of conflict

Mean Scores	Percentiles											Mean Scores
	BPO				CPO				KSO			
	IP	IG	NG1	NG2	IP	IG	NG1	NG2	IP	IG	NG1	
5.00												5.00
4.85												4.85
4.70												4.70
4.55												4.55
4.40							99	99				4.40
4.25							96	96				4.25
4.10							94	94				4.10
3.95				99			93	93				3.95
3.80				95	99		92	92				3.80
3.65	99		99	91	96		91	86			99	3.65
3.50	97	99	93	88	95		88	85		99	95	3.50
3.35	94	96	88	87	93	99	78	83		95	91	3.35
3.20	90	92	78	78	85	88	70	81	99	85	90	3.20
3.05	87	83	70	67	84	82	59	77	91	77	88	3.05
2.90	83	65	52	54	76	70	46	76	88	70	70	2.90
2.75	81	51	32	37	73	63	40	65	87	58	61	2.75
2.60	69	24	24	26	66	41	29	46	86	45	49	2.60
2.45	63	17	13	13	64	30	19	38	76	35	45	2.45
2.30	60	10	11	11	61	28	16	27	67	29	23	2.30
2.15	51	1	8	1	55	20	11	22	57	20	21	2.15
2.00	28		6		44	11	1	19	35	16	19	2.00
1.85	22				22	5		6	24	9	11	1.85
1.70	15				11	1		1	21	1	10	1.70
1.55	4				8					7	8	1.55
1.40	1				4					5	6	1.40
1.25					1					4	4	1.25
1.10			4							3	3	1.10
1.00			1							1	1	1.00

Note: IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = intragroup conflict, NG1 = intergroup conflict with staff, NG2 = intergroup conflict with civil servants.

Table 6.27 All groups of players' percentile norms of styles of handling interpersonal conflict with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers

Mean Scores	Percentiles															Mean Scores
	Previous Conductor					Current Conductor					Peers					
	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	
5.00	99	99		99	99	99	99		99		99	99		99	99	5.00
4.85	96	96		96	98	96	97		97	99	91	97		96	91	4.85
4.70	94	91		95	97	94	92		96	97	89	96		95	90	4.70
4.55	92	88	99	92	96	93	88		92	96	84	88		88	86	4.55
4.40	88	87	98	88	91	90	87	99	88	92	77	85		84	84	4.40
4.25	82	75	97	77	89	83	76	98	77	90	76	80		71	8	4.25
4.10	72	74	96	72	84	82	67	97	72	86	74	78	99	66	79	4.10
3.95	69	55	94	60	83	72	56	94	58	85	63	68	98	53	78	3.95
3.80	67	54	93	59	73	66	55	93	52	77	46	55	96	52	61	3.80
3.65	57	45	91	50	70	57	36	92	50	74	39	53	95	43	60	3.65
3.50	54	33	88	41	69	53	34	88	42	73	30	42	89	31	47	3.50
3.35	48	22	87	33	55	44	23	87	34	72	24	32	84	26	32	3.35
3.20	36	14	84	24	54	38	14	85	25	59	22	25	82	25	21	3.20
3.05	26	13	82	21	48	32	13	84	20	58	20	19	76	15	20	3.05
2.90	18	11	72	20	47	22	11	74	19	51	19	18	68	4	10	2.90
2.75	14	10	66	13	30	18	10	73	13	50	15	6	58	3	9	2.75
2.60	8	3	64	10	29	13	5	68	12	31	14	5	57	2	6	2.60
2.45	7	2	57	9	27	11	4	62	11	30	5	3	51	1	4	2.45
2.30	4	1	48	8	26	4	2	53	8	27	4	2	44			2.30
2.15	3		47	6	16	3	1	52	7	26	3	1	35		3	2.15
2.00	1		34	5	15	1		40	5	17	2		34		2	2.00
1.85			26	2	8			39	2	9	1		25			1.85
1.70			21	1	7			27	1	8			16			1.70
1.55			16		3			22		5			15			1.55
1.40			15		2			16		4			12		1	1.40
1.25			14		1			15		3			9			1.25
1.10			7					8		2			8			1.10
1.00			1					1		1			1			1.00

Note: IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style.

Table 6.28 The players of the BPO's percentile norms of styles of handling interpersonal conflict with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers

Mean Scores	Previous Conductor					Current Conductor					Peers					Mean Scores
	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	
5.00	99	99				99					99			99	99	5.00
4.85	97	97				96	99				95			96	94	4.85
4.70	95	96				95	97				90	99		95	93	4.70
4.55	91	95		99	99	94	96		99	99	88	91		89	92	4.55
4.40	90	94		96	97	93	95		94	97	87	89		85	91	4.40
4.25	88	92		83		89	94		80	96	86	87	99	78	90	4.25
4.10	86	83		76	96	81	85		76	95	78	83	97	76	89	4.10
3.95	82	76	99	71	92	76	71		69	92	76	74	96	55	76	3.95
3.80	78	67	97	67	91	74	62		67	91	64	61	95	44	75	3.80
3.65	72	51		60	90	71	53		65	90	50	44	94	35	62	3.65
3.50	69	48		58	88	64	48	99	53	88	43	41	89	33	60	3.50
3.35	64	35	96	44	70	59	·37	97	42	75	36	37	88	30	38	3.35
3.20	50	24	94	34	61	57	26	96	35	64	29	31	86	25	30	3.20
3.05	40	19	91	33	60	50	19	95	29	62	26	24	82	23	27	3.05
2.90	26	8	76	20	37	31	11	83	17	35	25	23	64	6	6	2.90
2.75	22	7	68	19	35	24	10	81	15	33	6	4	58	4	5	2.75
2.60	17	6	65	13	27	22	9	79	13	27	5	3	55	1		2.60
2.45	12	5	59	12	19	16	5	68	11	21	4	2	52			2.45
2.30	8	1	52	11	17	6	4	64	9	20	1	1	48		4	2.30
2.15	7		39	5	6	5	1	46	6	6			39			2.15
2.00	1		37	4	5	1		44	4	5			37			2.00
1.85			35	3	4			38	3	1			31			1.85
1.70			34	1	3			34	1				20			1.70
1.55			23		1			23					13		3	1.55
1.40			20					20					12		2	1.40
1.25			11					11					10		1	1.25
1.10			10					10					8			1.10
1.00			1					1					1			1.00

Note: IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style.

Table 6.29 The players of the CPO's percentile norms of styles of handling interpersonal conflict with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers

Mean Scores	Previous Conductor					Current Conductor					Peers					Mean Scores
	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	
5.00	99	99		99		99	99		99		99			99	99	5.00
4.85	97	93		95		97	96		96		96			95	90	4.85
4.70	96	92		91		96	94		94		94	99		92	86	4.70
4.55	95	84		90	99	95	88		91	99	86	90		85	84	4.55
4.40	94	82	99	89	90	94	87		90	93	83	87		84	83	4.40
4.25	91	79	97	85	86	91	79		87	89	82	85		77	82	4.25
4.10	80	74	96	83	82	88	74		82	87	72	82	99	68	81	4.10
3.95	77	55	95	74	72	80	66		71	83	66	71	97	55	63	3.95
3.80	71	47	94	55	71	77	47		59	82	52	61	94	44	62	3.80
3.65	68	44	93	47	70	71	46		55	81	44	53	91	41	49	3.65
3.50	65	41	92	44	69	68	44	99	52	80	35	50	90	36	48	3.50
3.35	57	31	91	36	65	51	31	91	42	73	23	33	85	22	37	3.35
3.20	43	17	90	30	61	43	14	90	31	66	20	26	83	10	30	3.20
3.05	32	1	89	20	59	40	12	89	23	65	12	20	80	9	27	3.05
2.90	23		85	16	41	31	5	82	19	46	11	12	78	1	21	2.90
2.75	17		77	15	40	26	3	74	17	44	9	7	66		19	2.75
2.60	8		75	10	39	17	1	72	7	40	8	6	63		12	2.60
2.45	1		65	5	19	15		70	5	22	7	4	56		8	2.45
2.30			46	1	17	6		49	1	20	6	3	46		5	2.30
2.15			30		10	4		38		13	5	1	30		4	2.15
2.00			27		1	1		36		11	4		27		1	2.00
1.85			12					15		8	3		20			1.85
1.70			8					13		7	1		13			1.70
1.55			7					10		6			10			1.55
1.40			1					8		5			9			1.40
1.25								5		4			7			1.25
1.10								3		3			6			1.10
1.00								1		1			1			1.00

Note: IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style.

Table 6.30 The players of the KSO's percentile norms of styles of handling interpersonal conflict with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers

Mean Scores	Percentiles															Mean Scores
	Previous Conductor					Current Conductor					Peers					
	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	IN	OB	DO	AV	CO	
5.00	99	99		99	99	99	99		99	99	99	99		99	99	5.00
4.85	95	95		94	92	95	95		94	92	81	93		94	87	4.85
4.70	90	90	99	93	91	90	90	99	93	91	76	88		93	83	4.70
4.55	83	83	95	86	90	83	83	95	86	90	71	82	99	89	81	4.55
4.40	73	73	94	77	85	73	73	94	77	85	61	77	97	82	78	4.40
4.25	68	68	93	62	82	68	68	93	62	82	57	68	93	58	76	4.25
4.10	53	53	91	58	72	53	53	91	58	72	56	67	92	54	65	4.10
3.95	45	45	90	36	58	45	45	90	36	58	47	59	91	52	45	3.95
3.80	36	36	88	31	57	36	36	88	31	57	23	45	90	47	43	3.80
3.65	31	12	86	22	48	31	12	86	22	48	22	38	83	45	32	3.65
3.50	29	1	74	20	46	29	1	74	20	46	14	35	82	26	31	3.50
3.35	23		68	17	30	23		68	17	30	12	26	75	21	22	3.35
3.20	16		66	10	26	16		66	10	26	10	19	73	13	21	3.20
3.05	7		64	8	25	7		64	8	25	6	13	67	12	10	3.05
2.90	6		57	7	17	6		57	7	17	1	1	61	6	8	2.90
2.75	5		53	6	16	5		53	6	16			54	5	7	2.75
2.60	4		51	5	15	4		51	5	15			52	4	6	2.60
2.45	3		47	4	14	3		47	4	14			46	3	5	2.45
2.30	1		45	1	13	1		45	1	13			39	1	4	2.30
2.15			38		11			38		11			38		2	2.15
2.00			36		9			36		9			35		1	2.00
1.85			30		6			30		6			24			1.85
1.70			21		5			21		5			19			1.70
1.55			16		4			16		4			18			1.55
1.40			14		3			14		3			16			1.40
1.25			11		1			11		1			12			1.25
1.10			10					10					11			1.10
1.00			1					1					1			1.00

Note: IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style.

Table 6.31 Styles of handling interpersonal conflict and the situations where they are appropriate or inappropriate

Conflict style	Situations where appropriate	Situations where inappropriate
Integrating	1. Issues are complex. 2. Synthesis of ideas is needed to come up with better solutions. 3. Commitment is needed from other Parties for successful implementation. 4. Time is available for problem solving. 5. One party alone cannot solve the problem. 6. Resources possessed by different parties are needed to solve their common problems.	1. Task or problem is simple. 2. Immediate decision is required. 3. Other parties are unconcerned about outcome. 4. Other parties do not have problem-solving skills.
Obliging	1. You believe that you may be wrong. 2. Issue is more important to the other party. 3. You are willing to give up something in exchange for something from the other party in the future. 4. You are dealing from a position of weakness. 5. Preserving relationship is important.	1. Issue is important to you. 2. You believe that you are right. 3. The other party is wrong or unethical.
Dominating	1. Issue is trivial. 2. Speedy decision is needed. 3. Unpopular course of action is implemented. 4. Necessary to overcome assertive subordinates. 5. Unfavorable decision by the other party may be costly to you. 6. Subordinates lack expertise to make technical decisions. 7. Issue is important to you.	1. Issue is complex. 2. Issue is not important to you. 3. Both parties are equally powerful. 4. Decision does not have to be made quickly. 5. Subordinates possess high degree of competence.
Avoiding	1. Issue is trivial. 2. Potential dysfunctional effect of confronting the other party outweighs benefits of resolution. 3. Cooling off period is needed.	1. Issue is important to you. 2. It is your responsibility to make decision. 3. Parties are unwilling to defer, issue must be resolved. 4. Prompt attention is needed.
Compromising	1. Goals of parties are mutually exclusive. 2. Parties are equally powerful. 3. Consensus cannot be reached. 4. Integrating or dominating style is not successful. 5. Temporary solution to a complex problem is needed.	1. One party is more powerful. 2. Problem is complex enough needing problem-solving approach.

(Source: Rahim, 2004: p. 60)

Chapter 7 Korean municipal orchestras' response to new challenges

7.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the justification for public support of municipal orchestras, and outlines their features as a public service in Korea. Then, using the case of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra as an example, I investigate the restricted public funding, and attitudes towards the challenges that Korean municipal orchestras are facing.

Three examples of municipal orchestras that are representative of all types of Korean municipal orchestras were given in Chapter 4: the purpose of this chapter is to provide information about their background and working environment, in order to help the reader's contextual understanding of Korean municipal orchestras and to explain findings that are revealed by my analysis of interviews and survey questionnaires.

Other municipal orchestras share similarities in organisational factors, but a significant change in the history of Korean symphony orchestras was made by the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra (SPO) in 2005: the SPO has been the only Korean orchestra to address the current challenges, by adapting the model of organisational structure established by western symphony orchestras—that is, a for-profit corporation [208]—with enormous financial support from the city of Seoul. As such, the SPO aims to be a world-class, symphony orchestra that is representative of Korea. The newly founded SPO is totally different from other municipal orchestras and it is therefore the sole case study of Chapter 7. The other orchestras were based on a particular organisational structure (including the size of the executive constitution), the process of managerial work, the scale of finance, the aims and objectives, the programmes, the nature of the musicians' contract, audition, salary, working hours, and the performing level of the players. If this transformation is seen as successful, other local cities will want to follow this change for their orchestras. However, this does not in itself imply that other local governments will be willing to provide sufficient funding to support such a transformation, or indeed, to support their orchestras in the same way that the city of Seoul has done. Most local cities seem to have limited comprehension of the changes potentially required: an entire organisational such as that of the SPO can only be achieved with sufficient financial support; yet local cities merely focus on the fact that they no longer need to continuously provide 100% of public funding if the status of an

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[208] Korean researchers and experts insist that the organisational structure of the western symphony orchestra is the ideal model for Korean symphony orchestras (see Jung, 2004; Park, 2004).

orchestra is a profit corporation. This implies that orchestras need to be 'free-standing'. Given the reasoning above, the purpose of Chapter 7 is to examine the success of the SPO, and to ask whether it could be a model for other municipal orchestras, helping them to address the challenges currently being faced.

The distinctness of the SPO has the disadvantage of making comparisons difficult, but it has the advantage of serving as a future model that is more artistically and financially successful.

7.2 Public support for Korean municipal orchestras

Justification for government support for arts in Korea may be summarised under five headings: economic character, citizens' welfare, artistic diversity, maintaining quality, and future generations. Local government support for municipal orchestras is derived from both welfare state ideology and political motivation.

Korean local governments have been providing relatively generous support for their municipal arts organisations, compared to the U.S. and Britain, where orchestras are more aware of commercial dimensions. The view of the U.S. and Britain regarding symphony orchestras has not prevailed in Korea for a long time, because municipal orchestras are supported in order to provide arts and cultural activities to local citizens. However, Korean local governments are asking their municipal orchestras to find audiences and business sponsors who will pay, which entails marketing and linking with cultural industries. Thus, Korean municipal orchestras need to develop the organisational, managerial, and administrative capacity to deal with government requests and to prepare for a reduction in public subsidy.

Many of these orchestras exist in large or medium size cities, and the majority of them can be considered as mediocre in terms of musical excellence, calibre of musicianship, wage, government structure, or number of musicians. The KBS Symphony Orchestra and the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra are the top orchestras in Korea, although the performing level of these two orchestras was not internationally admired until recent years.

Korean municipal symphony orchestras may be referred to as public services, due to their essential features: first of all, their legal status is supported and controlled by local government, and they are administratively and financially operated by the city in association with an orchestral executive constitution that has limited autonomy. Thus, local politicians are the main decision makers, and the amount of subsidy for orchestras is decided by the financial status of the city.

Second, the amount of local subsidy for these orchestras is relatively high, as cities cover 100% of their total budget. Only 4% of the total orchestra budget in the U.S. and 20% in Japan is usual (Kurabayashi and Matsuda, 1987: p. 69).

Third, the objectives of Korean municipal orchestras are very similar because the regulations of municipal arts organisations within all local cities are based on the regulations of the KBS Symphony Orchestra. There are no objectives for orchestras in themselves, so I investigated the local regulations of municipal arts organisations. The objectives of local regulations on municipal arts organisations among 28 cities,[209] where there is at least one municipal arts organisation, are exactly the same, except for the city of Chuncheon. The objectives are to cultivate citizens' arts and cultural sensibility, and to promote local arts and culture. Chuncheon adds one more objective, namely to enlarge the base of local arts. Therefore, we can see that municipal orchestras do not pay much attention to financial considerations. Instead, they focus on providing music performances to local citizens as much as possible, to raise the standard of performances, and to improve the image of cities (this applies to a few orchestras only).

Finally, the status of musicians in the municipal symphony orchestras is similar to civil servants. Some orchestras have a musicians' union to protect them, especially regarding salary, although the power of the musicians' unions is weak, and does not normally influence the decision making. There is no national musicians' union, and each union of an orchestra works independently, sharing no information of their hardships. Cities dislike the presence of musicians' unions within their orchestras. Players' positions within municipal symphony orchestras are quite stable, in spite of the regular auditions, which are used as a way of determining a player's position within the orchestra, as well as a means of raising the standard of orchestral musicians, rather than as an excuse to dismiss musicians.[210]

Therefore, these orchestras have been little concerned with economic and commercial aspects, as they can rely on support from the city. In other words, Korean municipal symphony orchestras adhere to a status of stable stagnation in terms of finance and administration, relying on consistent public support. Local governments also support

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[209] These include Ulsan, Daejeon, Gwangju, Incheon, Daegu, Busan, Suwon, Seongnam, Uijeongbu, Anyang, Changwon, Masan, Jinju, Yangsan, Gumi, Kimcheon, Pohang, Yeosoo, Sooncheon, Mokpo, Jeongeup, Iksan, Gunsan, Jeonjoo, cheonan, Cheongju, Gangneung, Chuncheon and exclude Seoul, although the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra is supported as an independent trust.

[210] Regular audition is a matter of debate, but considered a necessary evil.

orchestras in terms of cultural policy related to political motivation. Zimmer and Toepler (1999) explain that public support for the production and consumption of the arts and culture is closely related to national history in most continental European countries, so government support today is given because of former policies, not because of market failures that draw attention to government support for arts and culture. To explain further, although Korean local government support for culture and the arts still seems to be mainly situated within welfare state doctrine, the support of local governments for their municipal orchestras may be considered as the consequence of former policies.

> A Mayor for the city is elected by citizens...the preferred role for the Mayor in the 1980s and the 1990s was to build apartments and bridges...culture and arts are the main thing in 2000s...the trademark is to be a cultural president or mayor...how can I (candidate of president or mayor) make culture appeal to citizens...the success of Mr. Lee (Myung-Park) is...he made a cultural square in Cheonggyecheon. Who could imagine such a change?[...] To investigate and to develop culture is the work of the mayor and local governments...for example, if I were a Mayor or President, and I took a municipal orchestra away...it would follows me forever. Namely, I removed the root of culture...there are so many artists outside...as a result, I would become a notorious mayor [...] None of the mayors in the local cities attempted elimination of the municipal arts organisations...(They) want to be cultural mayors...the only way that they can survive is culture... (therefore) mayors protect the arts to survive without any trouble...Myung-Park Lee could process cultural projects aggressively...his dream was not to be a mayor but a president...if he tried to be reelected as a mayor, he couldn't do that... he fired the members of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, and many people are against him...but he didn't plan to be a mayor again...This is why every mayor protects municipal arts organisations...their role is simply protection...
>
> [Staff Member 5]

Staff Member 5 goes on to explain the changing priority of the mayor's public service from construction to culture, and states that the current big issue is culture. Regardless of the value or use of municipal arts organisations, local governments might subsidise them in order to use them as a political tool. Politicians give attention to culture and arts as it is one of the voters' preferences: more Koreans are interested in arts and cultural activities in accordance with economic growth, the introduction of the five-day week system, increasing numbers of people in higher education, and demands for enjoyment of life, as well as a high quality of life. If a mayor were to scrap an arts organisation, he would lose significant political standing. Many local governments simply support arts and culture as a means of being reelected, with little consideration for the art form itself.

7.3 Restricted public support

Municipal symphony orchestras remain the responsibility of local government. On the one hand, it might be concluded that local governments support their orchestras for two

reasons: welfare state doctrine and political calculation. On the other hand, despite receiving almost 100% public funding from local governments, financial support for orchestras has barely covered minimum operating costs, which merely maintain the orchestra and allow them to provide a limited performance schedule each year. For instance, 3 out of 31 municipal orchestras provide over 60 concerts per year, and the majority of them do less than 20 concerts, with 7 of them providing less than 10 concerts per year in 2000 (Korea Culture Information Service, 2008b: online).[211]

Local governments are well aware of the importance of arts and culture, although most municipal performing arts organisations have neglected the issue, rather than focusing on it. Thus, the total budget of municipal orchestras is restricted. I would argue that there are three reasons behind this limited funding of orchestras: the central government's indifference, the citizen's indifference, and the orchestra's inefficient role.

Although arts and culture may provide economic benefits and have broad commercial dimensions, an orchestra is neither a core part of the cultural industries nor of cultural policy in Korea but, rather, a nonprofit organisation, which will never recoup all its costs. Measuring the economic impact of artistic genres has become part of the strategy of the cultural industries. Different classifications of creative and cultural industries have been summarised by Comunian (2007).

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[211] Available at:
http://www.art.go.kr/encyclopedia/directory/DirectoryView_sum.jsp?ar_vvm_cd_seq=7423
[Accessed 03 July 2009].

Table 7.1 Indexes of cultural industries

Creative Industries DCMS (1998, 2000)	Cultural Industries, O'Connor (1999)	Creative Industries Caves (2000)	Cultural Industries (Hesmondhalgh, 2002)
Advertising			Advertising and Marketing
Architecture	Architecture		
Arts & Antiques			
Crafts	Crafts		
Design	Design		
Fashion		Fashion	
Film	Film	Cinema	Film Industries
Interactive Leisure Software	New Media		Internet Industry
Music	Music Theatre Recorded Music	Sound Recordings	Music Industry (including live performance)
Performing Arts	Theatre, Concerts And Performance	Performing Arts (Theatre, Opera, Concerts, Dance)	
Publishing	Literature, Publishing	Book and Magazine Publishing	Print and Electronic Publishing
Software Design			Internet Industry
TV and Radio	Broadcast Media	TV Films	Broadcasting
Visual Arts	Visual Art	Visual Arts (Painting and Sculpture	
	Museums and Galleries		
		Toys and Games	Video and computer games

(Source: Comunian, *Different classifications of creative and cultural industries*, 2007: p. 11)

As the Table 7.1 demonstrates, an orchestra can be placed among the creative and cultural industries in the category of music or performing arts (DCMS, Caves), theatre, concerts and performance (O'Connor), or music industry (Hesmondhalgh). The Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism also placed performing arts among the cultural industries, and Korean municipal orchestras may be seen as belonging to the performing arts category.

Korean municipal orchestras are heavily subsidised and the effects of economic benefits such as the image of the city or tourism are hardly addressed, but they still have large commercial dimensions, because the money is spent on people involved in operating, marketing, and design. In addition, orchestras have a commercial arm, such as recordings (although this is uncommon for Korean municipal orchestras) or ticket selling, even though this rarely covers all their costs. Both Korean central and local governments oversee an orchestra's cultural and economic value; and the latter supports an orchestra partly in order to ensure they become more professional and efficient in terms of playing and administration. When the government decides on public spending, it considers what is culturally or economically valuable. According to a 2007 White Paper on the cultural industries (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2008b), the Korean government still focuses its efforts on

constructing or renovating arts centres and supporting the genres of Korean traditional music, theatre, film, dance, and animation. These are what Korean government believes are valuable. It is possible that the central government's limited interest[212] in orchestras has prompted local governments to publicly fund their municipal orchestras.

Another reason is that orchestras are not popular with citizens. According to Khakee's study (1988),[213] the most important factor influencing decision making on public expenditure to the arts is public opinion (p. 7), and the second most important factor affecting municipal support for different art forms is the voters' preferences for various arts activities (p. 9). In other words, the more people there are who enjoy western orchestral music, the bigger the budget will be: politicians are keen to follow the citizens' interest in order to gain popularity, which is essential for re-election. In this way, local government decides on the amount and the distribution of its subsidy, in accordance with the preference of their voters.

Furthermore, the current role of a municipal symphony orchestra does not appear to a great need, and cannot appeal on the grounds that it is a necessity to citizens.

> ...if I think of my greed, I hope our status is exactly the same as that of civil servants, but it is an excessive requirement to our citizens in the current position of the municipal orchestra...because we don't encompass the necessity of great service...the mood is that nobody cares, even if municipal orchestras were to become extinct tomorrow. There are some audience members ...but these are family members of players... (if I were a citizen) I wouldn't support a municipal orchestra [...] we may play like a SPO or the KBS Symphony Orchestra at least after 20 years...
>
> [Player 9]

> Classical music is not the main theme in Korea...investment in western classical music within the investment of arts and culture has decreased...especially, the total number of performances of opera, which has dramatically dropped. Furthermore, private operatic and orchestral companies are gradually disappearing, so only national operatic companies and municipal orchestras are surviving [...] only popular music is currently successful...
>
> [Staff Member 10]

Player 9 describes the unfulfilled role and poor performance level of his orchestra, and believes that the citizens' indifference and limited support derive from the failure of the orchestra. In contrast, Staff Member 10 points to the unpopularity of classical music,

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[212] Korean central government does not have music policy under categories of the cultural policy; and its public subsidy is excluded from municipal orchestras except a few one-off programmes.

[213] He conducted a questionnaire survey on urban governments' public support for arts among 48 (public) decision makers and civil servants, who have responsibilities for cultural policy in Goteborg and Umea (p. 4).

and explains that, because of its unpopularity, orchestras are poorly funded. Although both Player 9 and Staff Member 10 consider western classical music (including orchestral music) as non-mainstream, Player 9 finds fault with the orchestra, whereas Staff Member 10 locates it in the consumer's taste. The following narrative from Staff Member 7 describes the unpopularity of classical music.

> Western classical music is declining because of a new custom led by the new generation...interest in classical music is reduced...if there are a number of orchestra audiences and performances, then we can give more (financial) supports. But it is hard under the current situation...orchestras survive today due to the public's interest, but the degree of interest has also decreased...performance should be enjoyable...the reaction from audiences and the total number of audience members has declined...The yearly budget for the orchestra is very high and it increases every year...if there are large audience groups for western classical music, we can have support...but it is a fading industry, so why should it continue to be supported? The situation is like this, so it is hard to guarantee the budget for the orchestra...
>
> [Staff Member 7]

The viewpoint of Staff Member 7 is similar to that of Staff Member 10. Financial sponsors do not increase support for orchestras, because there is insufficient audience for orchestral concerts. Without an audience, subsidies will not increase. He also mentions in a later interview that the orchestra has very high production costs. Although local governments or the KBS provide a certain amount of fixed financial support, orchestras are suffering from a deficit, and will never make a profit, something Baumol and Bowen (1968) refer to as a 'cost disease'.

To summarise, Korean municipal orchestras are characterised as a public service, and have been heavily supported by local cities in accordance with cultural economics and cultural policy. Under such public support, it can be said that Korean municipal orchestras are financially and administratively in a stable condition. However, many people who have researched Korean orchestras over the years (especially municipal orchestras) have identified that they have been suffering from severe problems, a point confirmed by my own research. Of course, the current structure of the municipal orchestra is working in spite of some hardships, and generally these orchestras provide a relatively high quality of performance to their citizens. However, it seems that the real problem is that municipal orchestras do not themselves consider that they have a problem, and are simply not recognising the need to evolve with the times. The unchanging circumstances that surround municipal orchestras include stable but minimum subsidies, indifference from the audience, and poor role accomplishment as a public service. Current municipal orchestras are not keen to respond to new challenges, but they may need to deal with them in order to survive.

Musicians and administrative staff interviewed in the present research, within the orchestra office, have already recognised that Korean municipal orchestras need to change.

> The hardest thing is how to reach an agreement between a conductor and general manager...that is, administrative staff give priority to administration, whereas conductors are more focused on artistic matters...Nowadays, if there is no audience, an orchestra is useless...whether classical music is dead or not...To survive...we need to do something to remove the barrier between classic music and popular music...Orchestras can visit audiences, and play anywhere...but conductors are against it...they say, 'how can I play in such a place? I can play in a theatre or concert hall...I can't play in tube station'...but we (the administrative team) think we have to do so...booking has declined...audiences don't join the subscription...The administrative team says one thing, but the conductor says another...such a barrier is difficult...To survive, orchestras need to play in places audiences prefer and want...if not, classical music will not survive...The most popular arts organisations are those that travel and take their music to their audience...if they don't do likewise, orchestras can't survive...artists also notice it now...the administrative department felt it a few years ago, but artistic directors didn't accept it...
>
> [Staff Member 5]

This interviewee consistently emphasises the importance of the audience. To develop audiences, orchestras should play regardless of the venue or genre, and they need to offer various types of performance. He also pointed out that orchestras need to discover a negotiable point between traditional classical music and popular music to develop the audience. There are opposing attitudes between players and conductors: players seem to understand where orchestras are now, and the value of audience, whereas conductors are more conservative, and likely to adhere to a typical formation of concerts, with less consideration for external factors.

> ...the audience come to concerts because of the municipal orchestra...there is no audience in academic concerts, but people come to the concert hall if popular music is played...this is a reality...who knows a Shostakovich string quartet? But everybody knows Jo Kwan-Woo (Korean popular music singer) and his concerts...the lack of audience is not because of the ticket price [...] art is following the way where money comes, so popularity is necessary...classical music in the repertoire of municipal orchestras is not the answer...classical music is also written because of money...classical music as art is a bit exaggerated...
>
> [Player 9]

He describes the unpopularity of classical music. The indifference of the audience is not so much about money as about preference and prejudice concerning classical music as high art. Thus, orchestras need to find a programme or repertoire based on the taste of the audience.

> The most important thing for our orchestra is to attract audiences and publicity...the role of the administrative staff in the orchestral executive constitution is to make an orchestra more efficient, and to maximise the number of audience members...The success of the orchestra is dependent on artistic matters...the feeling of listening to classical music through CDs and in a concert hall is different...there is something to attract people....if we (players) work hard and pay attention to our work, people may appreciate our hard work regardless of their understanding of music...
>
> [Player 5]

He also explained that the success of the orchestra is dependent on the quality of the music that they play. It might be that live music conveys something special, and is more enjoyable to listen to, and this could be a good reason in itself to attend a concert; where one might disagree is with his idea that people merely like music because the orchestra works hard. If it is hard to understand the music, people may perhaps not attempt to listen to it again, and it can be very hard to attract a new audience. In fact, people may only be concerned with the quality and repertoire of the music, so that the actual skill of making music might be ignored.

> Currently our financial situation is tougher than other orchestras...the budget of our cultural centre declined by 10% (this year), so they can't cut our salary and reduce the number of performances. But players asked them to cut our salary instead of reducing the performances...if we do visiting concerts at schools or hospitals, the city pays us about 20,000 Won (£ 10) per hour. But players don't care much about the amount of pay and spontaneously want to provide more concerts...we should care more about our citizens than civil servants...the first thing that local government reduces in a financial crisis is arts subsidy...this is a reality...citizens can eagerly desire the existence of municipal symphony orchestras in the city...when citizens want, city or government moves, so we wish to have more chances to meet audiences...probably, over 90% of players would like municipal orchestras to be more relevant to their citizens...
>
> [Player 6]

In the narrative above, Player 6 seems to understand completely what the municipal orchestra is for, and the importance of the audience for its future: in addition, players know their role within the municipal orchestra, and try to provide more concerts for citizens.

> ...I don't know when it started exactly, but orchestras give many concerts for the audience especially for youth...the majority of them have a commercial intention...there are very few youth programmes really made for the emotional purification of youth[214]...it is a kind of learning enterprise...as I suggested, the best thing for youth is for us to visit middle and high schools, and give concerts

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[214] In Korea, students are suffering from high levels for study stress, and Korean believe that emotional purification, which refers to clean and refresh their mind, can be helped by listening classical music.

with a commentary...The first youth concert was created by Geum Nan-Sae at the Seoul Arts Centre. It was extremely successful...tickets were always sold out...then municipal orchestras imitated the programme...Geum Nan-Sae is an idea bank about concerts...he really tries hard to develop audiences. He is a superstar in local cities...so many people come to him to get his signature...he really did a good job for audience development...as a matter of fact, we need such a star...

[Staff Member 9]

We may see the endeavour of orchestras to expand their programme, developing 'youth concerts' as a main strategy. A case can hardly be made that financial considerations are wrong, since the arts cannot be entirely free from money matters. Orchestras may, at first, have good intentions in devising a suitable education programme, with financial benefits seen as a by-product. The order may be reversed. As long as youth concerts are interesting to citizens, orchestras should continue that programme. Staff Member 9 also mentions the popularity of the conductor. The conductor can be a factor in attracting audiences, and more conductors need to open their minds to communicating with the audience.

There are five narratives above, all emphasising the importance of the audience and mentioning ways in which to attract new members: 1) audience-focused concerts, 2) concerts based on the audience's taste, 3) variety of programming, 4) marketing, and 5) an increase in the number of performances. Playing classical music alone is no longer appealing to today's audiences, so all municipal orchestras currently focus on this issue when trying to attract more listeners. Most of the orchestras are in a situation of stagnation, making minor changes around audience development, pursued for the particular objectives of each orchestra, rather than in concern for general economic and commercial aspects. Thus, although it is no real success story, the cities, along with their respective orchestral executive constitutions have somehow managed to maintain their municipal orchestras without yet facing any major crisis.

A necessity for Korean municipal orchestras is that should they respond to the challenges represented by the change in audience preferences, the increase of nation-state cultural/arts centres (although this is more relaxed now), the increase in the forms and means of cultural consumption, the increase in attention to the cultural and media industries, the emphasis on tourism, and the impact of urban regeneration. It may be that municipal orchestras need to respond to these current issues in order to escape from chronic problems, to bring a fresh mood and energy into their activities, and to prepare for the time when local cities suddenly change their funding regime.

Orchestral executive constitutions have been considering these issues. However, their

home cities are more likely to highlight the issues for economic reasons rather than as a matter of orchestral development. Studies investigating the relationship between cost and production for the performing arts, focusing on symphony orchestra performances, have been undertaken by Baumol and Bowen (1968), Throsby (1977), Lange *et al.* (1985), Lange and Luksetich (1993), Heilbrun and Gray (2001), and Andersson and Andersson (2006). According to research by Lange *et al.* (1985), 13 orchestras operated efficiently, whereas 84 orchestras had declining marginal costs. This data was taken from a sample of 111 U.S. orchestras (p. 81). In contrast, the marginal cost of performances performed by Korean municipal orchestras always lies below the average cost. These orchestras are a good example of the 'cost disease' that Baumol and Bowen (1968) identified. Thus, local cities that have municipal orchestras (especially in the case of the KBS) that invariably make a deficit, would like them to be independent, in order to free themselves from funding support. Even though these cities are likely to push their orchestras into the market, which might start with changing the funding regime towards orchestras, they have no clear plan for achieving such changes. Most municipal orchestras have imitated the model of the KBS Symphony Orchestra, so local cities are likely to follow its changes, and those of another Korean flagship orchestras, Seoul Philharmonic. It appears that perhaps municipal orchestras are sometimes troublesome for local city authorities: some cities may not be able to find good reason for public support for their orchestras, but they cannot simply eliminate it. Meanwhile, more orchestral executive constitutions and their home cities desire governance changes, especially after 2005, when the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra achieved the recognition in western countries that Korean professionals have insisted it deserved for a long time. Thus, some cities started to think about emulating the transformation of the SPO. The following section explores these changes of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, which may be considered a future example for Korean municipal orchestras by adapting a new governance system—a foundation.

7.4 Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra

There was a significant change in the history of Korean orchestras in 2005. That year, the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, one of Korea's flagship orchestras, and with the longest history, shifted to being a foundation. This has been regarded as the ideal status of a municipal orchestra among Korean researchers and experts. This change was allowed mainly due to Myung-Park Lee, who was a former mayor of Seoul and is currently (2011) president of Korea.

In 2005, the city of Seoul celebrated its 'Cultural Year'. The city embraced the

transformation of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra into a foundation, to enhance its competitiveness and economic benefit. The city was interested in seeing the orchestra as an independent organisation, and saw that it should be run as a public service as well as a profit-making institution. After this announcement, the members of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra (SPO) rebelled against the decision because of job insecurity, and they demonstrated by playing Beethoven's Funeral March from the Eroica on the street. Despite the players' disagreement, the city of Seoul continued with the orchestra's organisational transformation, and asked players to prove their musical capacity if they wanted to continue working in the SPO. Some people criticised the selfishness of the players, saying that many of them believed they should have continued job security regardless of their musical ability. Ultimately, despite severe conflict between the city and the players, the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra became a foundation, aiming to be recognised globally as the first world-class orchestra in Korean. To achieve this, with a large amount of subsidy from the city of Seoul, the orchestra changed its entire organisational structure, appointed Myung-Whun Cheong as Music Director, and Pal-Seung Lee, who was considered a successful CEO as President (formerly the Chief Executive Officer of Woori Investment and Securities and an Executive Managing Director of Hanil Bank). It also established new goals, and scheduled auditions for every position throughout the orchestra. As a result of the open audition, 40% of the existing players were dismissed. Up to now (2011), the SPO has continued to hire outstanding players from Korea, as well as from overseas.

There are 21 administrative members of staff in the management team of the SPO: one is the Head of Division of Management, four are in artistic administration, three in the education and culture department, five in marketing and PR, and there are five administrative staff, one Stage Manager, one Librarian, and an assistant to the Music Director. As can be seen from the chart below, administrative and artistic fields are clearly divided, with four management teams. There is not, however, an equal position between the Executive Director and the Music Director, for which Won-Chul Park had consistently asked. In this government structure, the position of President of the SPO seems very close to the position of Executive Director, and the position of Music Director is the lowest rank. The current organisational structure of the SPO embraces the biggest administrative team in the history of the Korean symphony orchestra.

Figure 7.1 The organisational structure of the SPO

(Source: Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009a: online)

The SPO had three objectives:

- To enlarge the opportunity for the cultural enjoyment of citizens by providing regular visiting concerts and outside performances, a visiting school programme, and an open educational programme.
- To provide the best performances: inviting outstanding conductors and soloists; continuing the training of musicians; planning the best programme; and providing accurate and speedy information on concerts.
- To provide a customer satisfaction service.

The first two objectives are similar to those of other municipal orchestras, but the third was a new initiative. Suddenly, with this objective, the SPO showed an interest and concern in not only attracting its audience but also retaining it. A further interesting point is that the SPO is also keen to provide relevant information on its activities in order to offer a better customer service. The Orchestra displays an economic and commercial mindset and has an audience development plan. To pursue these aims, the SPO tries to provide an efficient management structure, a variety of marketing activities, a broader range of business in order to increase profit, and a better customer service (Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009b: online).[215]

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[215] Available at: http://www.seoulphil.co.kr/about/customer_01.jsp [Accessed 08 June 2009].

As with any orchestra, the primary activity of the SPO is to be a concert giving outfit, and since 2005, it has provided over 100 concerts a year, including various outreach concerts. Between 2006 and 2008, the orchestra has provided at least nine visiting/outreach concerts throughout Seoul each month. All of these concerts were free of charge. The visiting concert programme is categorised in three parts: 'Enjoyment of Orchestral Music', the 'Beauty of Ensemble', and 'Playing with the Orchestra'. The first part of the programme plays traditional classical music in a medium or large-scale venue. The second focuses on providing light or easy listening classical music, such as soundtracks from movies or themes from soap operas, which are played in venues such as libraries or disability centres. The last part of the programme takes music to primary schools: students learn to play musical instruments, and take instructions from the professional musicians. As well as the visiting concert programme, in 2008 the SPO provided a nine-concert 'Masterpiece Series' conducted by the principal conductor along with four 'Russian Music Series' concerts and three 'Concerto in the Classic Period' concerts conducted by guest conductors. Furthermore, the SPO has a series titled 'Ars nova', which plays only contemporary Korean and western music, and provides pre-concert lectures to encourage audience appreciation.

The subscription system of the SPO is called 'SPO Friends'. There are two types of membership of the SPO: paid subscription and unpaid subscription. Paid subscription is divided into three: youth subscription (applying to students of middle school and high school), general subscription, and corporation subscription. The benefits of paid subscription include an emailed newsletter, membership card, invitation to SPO concerts, the monthly magazine of the SPO, one CD per year, ticket discount, and a souvenir of the SPO. On the other hand, the benefits of unpaid subscription include an access to the website of the SPO and an email service on concerts.

Regarding finance, approximately 80% of the orchestra's income is from the city of Seoul. The total estimated budget of the SPO in 2008 was 16 billion won (£8 million). 13 billion won (£6.4 million) came from the city, and 2.8 million won (£1.4 million) was the income made up from ticket sales, etc. The total budget of the SPO is the highest among Korean orchestras, and is twice as much as the KBS Symphony Orchestra which had a total budget of 8 billion Won (£4 million) in 2007 and 2008. However, the SPO is still heavily dependent on a subsidy from the city, despite achieving the highest self-earning income of any Korean orchestra.

When the SPO belonged to the city of Seoul, every regulation or management

structure was created by civil servants. However, this is not always suitable for arts organisations, and makes it hard for orchestral executive constitutions to carry out their work. Decision making was an arduous process, often involving several people before reaching a conclusion. To overcome this problem, the authority of the orchestra shifted to the Sejong Performing Arts Centre, where the orchestra is based. This, however, created another problem for both the orchestra and the Sejong Performing Arts Centre, because the deficit of the SPO is entirely a matter for the Sejong Performing Arts Centre (SPAC) to deal with. The KBS Symphony Orchestra is facing the same situation with the KBS that the SPO and the SPAC had.

> ...so the orchestra was treated with inhospitality...SPAC is a foundation, and needs to work hard to raise its own achievements...when the SPO was a municipal orchestra, every problem was solved if there was an obligation that works for citizens, but the orchestra was treated coldly by the arts centre...After the independence of the SPO, the orchestra is in the middle of every thing...administration only for the orchestra, marketing only for the orchestra...this is an advantage...on the other hand, more staff for administrative support, a bigger organisational structure to exist as a foundation, and bigger budget are necessary...this is a disadvantage...However, the recent two-year activities after becoming a foundation achieved the highest profit in the history of Korean symphony orchestras...
>
> [Staff Member 11]

Staff Member 11, who has been working in the SPO over 24 years, described the changes. The SPO was a municipal orchestra in the city of Seoul, and then it was under the Sejong Performing Arts Centre, which shifted to a foundation in 1999. The Sejong Centre is more or less like a municipal arts centre that is financially and administratively supported by the city of Seoul. Nine municipal arts organisations[216] in Seoul have been in charge of the Sejong Centre. Finally, the SPO became an independent foundation in 2005. If the independence of the SPO is to be successful, the Sejong Centre and the city of Seoul will plan to transform the structure of other municipal arts organisations into something similar.

Table 7.2 The significant changes of the SPO

Year	1957–99	1999–2005	2005–present
Authority of management	The city of Seoul	The Sejong Performing Arts Centre (SPAC)	Independence
Status	Municipal orchestra	Arts organisation of the SPAC	Foundation
Justification	Cultural welfare	Cultural welfare	Cultural welfare; a symbol of Seoul; and a pride of Korea

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[216] The Seoul Metropolitan Orchestra (current Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra), Seoul Metropolitan Dance Theatre, Seoul Metropolitan Chorus, Seoul Metropolitan Musical Theatre, Seoul Metropolitan Theatre, Seoul Metropolitan Opera, Seoul Metropolitan Youth Orchestra, Seoul Metropolitan Junior Chorus, and Seoul Metropolitan Youth Traditional Music Orchestra.

In Table 7.2, it can be seen that when the authority of management shifts, the status and justification of the SPO changes.

Within the past three years, the transformation of the SPO has been considered very successful and the details are as follows.

Table 7.3 Successful figures of the SPO

(Unit: won)

	Audience [1]	Concert [2]	Earned income [3]
2005	59,000	65	670 million (£ 334,000)
2006	171,000	95	2.3 billion (£ 1.1 million)
2007	164,000	121	3.3 billion (£ 1.6 million)
2008	-	-	3.5 billion (£ 1.7 million)

(Sources: refer from [1] Ryo, 2006; [2] [3] Kim, 2008a)
Note: the total number who paid for a ticket was 78% (in 2006) compared to around 40% in 2005 (Ryo, 2006).

According to research among 20 Korean orchestras in 2008 based on the data of 2007, the SPO was top in five sections, including the total number of performances and audience members, the number of audience members who bought a ticket, income from charitable activities, and total budget (Kim, 2008b). The SPO was followed by the KBS Symphony Orchestra,[217] which was considered the best orchestra before the re-organisation of the SPO as a foundation, but the situation now is reversed. The slump of the KBS Symphony Orchestra was caused by an absence of a principal conductor since 2004, severe conflicts between the KBS and the players, unsystematic management, and the forced resignation of the President of the KBS, whereas the SPO has been making rapid progress since 2005 with its maestro, Myung-Whun Cheong.

To ensure its financial independence, which is one of new objectives of the SPO in 2006, the SPO changed the ticket price: the majority of concert tickets for the SPO used to be either free or very cheap, and since its reorganisation the orchestra has introduced ticket pricing with more economic awareness. However, this pricing structure has not deterred audiences, and if anything, it has encouraged people to attend, as they believe the higher ticket prices imply a higher standard of playing. As the president of the SPO, Pal-Seung Lee stated:

the level of the SPO sharply increased after being transformed into a

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[217] The KBS Symphony Orchestra had been leading the total earning income budget as well as the total number of audience until June 2005. What is more, the salaries of the musicians of the SPO are only 65–70% of the salary of the KBS Symphony Orchestra.

foundation with the appointment of Myung-Whun Cheong as Music Director...the total earned income including ticket selling and sponsorship was 30 times increased compared to before...the present subsidy from Seoul is approximately 12 billion won (£5,976,000)...but the city is reducing its support as the self-income of the SPO increases...the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra receives 50% of its budget from the city and 50% from private support...the SPO is also pursuing this model...the model of the SPO is almost 20 years behind the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, but the gap has been narrowed to 10 years now.

(Jeon, 2007)

Therefore, it can be seen that the SPO became a successful nonprofit organisation. The outcomes were visible and positive: an increase in the total number of audience members (especially those who paid for a ticket), of self-earned income (including ticket sales and private support), and an increase in performance level along with the introduction of various programmes (such as outreach concerts). However, despite all these positive signs, certain doubts remain as to the future success of the SPO.

First, the city of Seoul gives significant support to the SPO from a financial point of view, but this subsidy can be changeable, and continuous support may not be guaranteed. The administrative staff interviewed for this project remained quite positive about consistent financial support, because they consider that the amount of money that the city provides is small, considering its wealth. The Music Director, Myung-Whun Cheong, also expressed an optimistic point of view regarding the subsidy of the orchestra:

...The promise of the government [the city of Seoul] that they will support us is not a private thing...a future principal conductor also carries out the previous conductor's agreement...so it won't happen [that the next mayor of Seoul will not fulfill the promise of the former mayor]...

(Myung-Whun Cheong's interview with Kim, 2006b)

Despite such an optimistic view of future financial support, it cannot be denied that municipal arts organisations in Korea are much influenced by the intentions and attitude of city mayors. It is fine if the mayor has an interest in arts and culture, but the orchestra could be in trouble if a mayor who lacks this interest takes over. Therefore, public support received from the city of Seoul can be seen as being under a potential threat.

Second, the increase in audience numbers, ticket selling, private support and the rise of performance quality may have only been achieved because of the skill and popularity of Myung-Whun Cheong. If concerts are conducted by Myung-Whun Cheong, the price of tickets is much higher than for the concerts conducted by guest

conductors.

Table 7.4 shows the comparison between the ticket price of the 'Masterpiece Series', conducted by Myung-Whun Cheong in 2008; the ticket price without him; the highest ticket price of the SPO before 2005; and the highest price of other Korean municipal orchestras.

Table 7.4 Ticket prices compared

Group	Ticket price				
A	100,000 won (£50)	70,000 won (£35)	50,000 won (£25)	30,000 won (£15)	10,000 won (£5)
B	50,000 won (£25)	30,000 won (£15)	20,000won (£10)	10,000won (£5)	-
C	30,000 won (£15)	-	-	-	-
D	60,000 won (£30)	50,000 won (£14)	-	-	-

Note: A. 2008 ticket price of the SPO with Myung-Whun Cheong;
B. 2008 ticket price of the SPO with guest conductors;
C. SPO's highest ticket price before being a foundation;
D. The highest ticket price of other Korean municipal orchestras.

Approximately 80% of the SPO's total income was granted from the city of Seoul. Generally speaking, the ticket price of the SPO is costly in real terms. Inevitably, some people criticise the ticket prices of the SPO, because the price may prevent certain people from attending. The excuse the SPO makes is: 'raising the ticket price after the appointment of Myung-Whun Cheong is true, but the quality of the performance was increased and we reasonably adjusted the ticket price based on the initial cost' (Kim, 2007). However, the ticket price thought reasonable by other municipal orchestras is an average 30,000 won (£15), or 40,000 won (£20) according to Kim (2007). In addition, the leader of the advertising team, Byung-Yoon Jeon, explained that 'the regular concerts of the SPO with Myung-Whun Cheong are expensive, but we are increasing the number of free concerts (with the principal conductor) to counterbalance the rise in ticket prices' (Kim, 2007).

Table 7.5 Concerts of the SPO

Year	Total concerts (including visiting concerts)	Free visiting concerts	The number of concerts conducted by Myung-Whun Cheong	The number of visiting concerts conducted by Myung-Whun Cheong
2006	81	33	27	9
2007	101	54	21	6
2008	88	48	17	3

As we can see from Table 7.5, the principal conductor has been providing 9, 6 and 3 visiting concerts in 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively. The percentage of visiting

concerts out of total concerts was 40% in 2006, 53% in 2007 and 55% in 2008, and the SPO ensures a balance between free concerts and subscription concerts. Yet the participant rate of the principal conductor in the visiting concerts is gradually declining: 30% in 2006, 29% in 2007 and 18% in 2008—only limited high-quality concerts are provided for the general audience, thus Byung-Yoon Jeon's explanation about the increasing numbers of free concerts conducted by Cheong is not true. In other words, although the SPO provides a number of free concerts, the high-quality performances of the SPO conducted by Myung-Whun Cheong are only for those who can afford the ticket price. If people cannot afford the ticket, then they have to attend a free concert. Thus, the objective of providing the best performance and customer satisfaction only succeeds for those who have money.

High-priced tickets may not a problem for audiences who want to see the new principal conductor of the SPO, and this is evidenced by healthy ticket sales; but ticket sales and audience numbers are not so good when the conductor is not Myung-Whun Cheong (Lee, 2006a). In addition, the concert schedule of the SPO is reliant on the schedule of Myung-Whun Cheong. The majority of concerts are programmed in January, April, July, August, and December when Cheong is based in Korea (Kim, 2008c). He is currently also the Music Director of the Orchestre Philharmonique de Radio, and Special Artistic Adviser of the Tokyo Philharmonic Orchestra, as well as a Music Director of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra. He also works as a guest conductor for major symphony orchestras such as the San Francisco Symphony Orchestra, Staatskapelle Dresden Orchestra, the Royal Concertgebouw Orchestra, and La Scala Orchestra.

Figure 7.2 SPO concert in 2006

(Source: refer from SPO 2005/2006 Season brochure)

**Figure 7.3 SPO concert in 2007**

(Source: refer from SPO 2006/2007 Season brochure)

**Figure 7.4 SPO concert in 2008**

(Source: refer from SPO 2007/2008 Season brochure)

Figure 7.5 BBC Philharmonic concert in 2008

(Source: refer from BBC Philharmonic 2007/2008 Season brochure)

Figure 7.6 BBC Philharmonic concert in 2009

(Source: refer from BBC Philharmonic 2008/2009 Season brochure)

Therefore, Cheong is likely to stay in Korea when foreign orchestras take a rest,[218] so the SPO practices and performs intensive concerts within a short period, and this may influence the quality of performance. Continuous and more intensive training with a long term plan might be a consideration for a brighter future of the SPO.

The performance level of the SPO is also a matter of debate. According to Cahn (1992), one of the most challenging questions of all is to define quality in music (p. 29). The performance quality of the SPO might be evaluated with rather more focus on 'objective technical terms' (i.e. unison of ensemble) than 'subjective humanistic terms' (i.e. enrichment of people's feeling by a performance) (Cahn, 1992: p. 30). Generally speaking, reports, especially those written in 2008, have evaluated the overall standard of performance as significantly improved, but the quality of performance does vary considerably, depending on the conductor. A player of the SPO admitted the difference, and said: 'when our music director conducts, several players of the Orchestre Philharmonique de Radio France join as guest players. It may not show in appearance, but I wonder whether it is our sound or not' (Kim, 2008c). On the other hand, one of the successful strategies of the SPO is its continuous effort to hire excellent players throughout the world to raise the level of performance. Of course, it is important to employ well-trained professional musicians, as the sound of individual musicians in the orchestra is also a key element: 'the evaluation of artistic quality depends on personal characteristics of the performers, such as education, previous experience, prior information, and on personal states of mind and taste' (Lesle, 1984). But collecting a number of excellent individual musicians does not set the seal on an orchestra's artistic quality, because the degree of synchronization between all musicians is an essential quality in orchestral performance (Boerner et al., 2004: p. 467).

> ...high artistic quality of the orchestra requires constant process coordination— the interplay of the musicians both within a section of instruments (strings, wind and percussion) and between those sections (Weeks, 1996)... A major part of orchestral achievement is coordination in the artistic sense. Coordinating a crescendo or playing with the same articulation requires musicians to be in unison not only technically, but emotionally (Boerner, 2004; Williamon and Davidson, 2002). The musical unison necessary for a coherent interpretation by the orchestra will not be achieved until the group is emotionally in unison with itself.[219]

A Korean player indicated how members of the SPO are changed.

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[218] Cheong said during a press conference held by the city of Seoul after his appointment as a music director of the SPO that he might stay about 10 weeks per year (City of Seoul, 2005).
[219] Quoted from Boerner and Streit, 2007: p. 133.

...my friend who is a current member of the SPO told me that the SPO consistently changes its members, so if he went to a place for practice, a newcomer sat next to him...without any notice, he had to play with new member, and felt very weird...If we (orchestra players) play with old members, we could notice each other's thinking without exchanging a word and could know their body condition from the way of their playing. We have been training together for a long time, so we know how to cooperate each other and make a good ensemble... an excellent young player is also definitely needed, but making a music as an orchestra member is totally different to playing alone...So, firing elder musicians because their technical ability is not as excellent as young musicians... then filling the places with young musicians is not a right decision.

[Player 2]

World-class orchestras have their own characters, whereas none of the Korean symphony orchestras seem to have a special feature to distinguish them from other orchestras. Thus, for the SPO to pursue its objectives, it needs to find its own character and halt the continual change of players.

Another reason for regarding the success of the SPO with suspicion is that it undertakes many hiring concerts to raise income, which is understandable. However, some concerts given by the SPO are contentious. As the SPO receives a great deal of subsidy from Seoul, the regular/subscription concert that is the main programme of the orchestra should be open to everyone, giving priority to citizens, and emphasising its role as a public service rather than as a commercial outfit. The regular concert on 12 December 2006 was held with the famous clarinetist Paul Meyer as a guest conductor and Pianist Nicholas Angelich, but the public found it difficult to purchase tickets because the SPO sold only 500 tickets and the rest (2500) were given to commercial sponsors (Kim, 2006b). This happens in other concerts as well, and some concerts are not open to the public at all, so that although the public want to see a certain concert by the SPO it is impossible to buy a ticket. It seems that the SPO chooses its audience for a particular concert. The SPO is a nonprofit arts organisation, supported by the city of Seoul for the cultural welfare of its citizens. Therefore, the SPO might need to hold onto its role as a public service, and should strike a balance between commercial concerts and non-commercial concerts. In addition, the mixture of artistic programmes and popular programmes might be considered more carefully.

Finally, The SPO is dependent on the principal conductor. There is no doubt that the role of the conductor is significant, because the musical charisma, harmony with players and administrative staff and enthusiasm influence the entire orchestra. However, some Koreans believe that the success of the orchestra is half-dependent on the conductor. They have illusions that if the orchestra is conducted by a famous

conductor, its concerts will automatically be internationally successful; and if the conductor is famous, the orchestra will, by default, become famous. This may not be true: according to Sang-Woo Han[220] (2005), Korean symphony orchestras need a principal conductor who can spend most of his time with the orchestra more than they need a worldwide first-class conductor. In addition, spending money on inviting a famous conductor is the way that the name value of the orchestra is automatically higher in accordance with the fame of the conductor, so more attention should be given to developing the orchestras itself, instead of relying on a celebrated name. The important thing needed to be a good orchestra is to be able to make an ensemble, and an orchestra needs a conductor who can draw ensemble and harmonic capacity from players instead of simply being a star (Wadman and Köping, 2005, Boerner and Streit, 2007, Cahn, 1992, and Boerner et al., 2004). Il Lee (2008a) rigorously criticised the decision of the SPO for choosing Myung-Whun Cheong as a principal conductor.

> ...in the case of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, it chose the wrong conductor...the SPO undertook a risky adventure that destroyed the previous SPO and made a new orchestra...but it tried to make a new orchestra with a famous conductor without considering the situation of Korea. The orchestra cannot establish itself just with one famous name. Music is made by a harmony of players rather than by the conductor's baton...so the players and the conductor must be harmonised ...to do so, they should spend a lot of time together and try to understand each other...but he (Myung-Whun Cheong) does not have the enthusiasm or time for the SPO [...] an internationally famous conductor should give intensive training, and raise the performance level of players up to an international level...conducting real regular/subscription concerts without training the players is bad behaviour, like stealing a fruit...The best orchestra is created where there is devotion and sacrifice...Look at Myung-Whun Cheong and ask whether he has such things...the success of an orchestra is dependent on the pure passion of people to make the best orchestra...
>
> (Lee, 2008a: pp. 54–61)

As Il Lee (2008a) remarked above, the SPO seems to have made the wrong choice and put too much confidence in its principal conductor. Sang-Woo Han (2005) had earlier pointed out that Cheong might not be able to devote his time to the SPO, and could not lead any remarkable development of the SPO. Now, it might be time for the SPO to prepare a firm musical structure and improve its musical capacity without inviting famous guest players.

So far, I have been examining the new governance of the SPO, along with its primary activities, subscription, finance, government structure, successful achievements and problematic factors (its financial dependency, dependency on the principal conductor,

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[220] One of most famous classical music critics in Korea.

and the balance between public service and commercial aspects). The change of the SPO is significant because it is the first example and is likely to influence approximately thirty other municipal orchestras. The KBS Symphony Orchestra and the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra have tried on numerous occasions in the past to become world-class orchestras, but failed. If the new-born SPO is not a success, the city of Seoul may dismantle it and establish another SPO as they have done in the past. The city tends to believe that complete organisational change is a panacea when their orchestra is not working well, and repeatedly makes the same errors. To ensure this does not happen again, the city of Seoul may need to support and encourage the SPO in developing a long-term plan.

Despite some drawbacks, the overall outcome of the SPO may be viewed optimistically, and the president of the SPO insists on the need for more financial support 'to reach the level of global orchestras' (Lee, 2008b). However, it might be worth questioning how many municipal orchestras in local cities could afford the enormous financial support that is required to be a foundation.

Table 7.6 The annual budgets of Korean municipal orchestras

(Unit: billion won)

The Name of Municipal Orchestras	2004 [1]	2007 [2]
KBS Symphony Orchestra	6 (£3,000,000)	8 (£4,000,000)
Seoul Symphony Orchestra (Current Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra)	5 (£2,500,000) [3]	13 (£6,500,000)
Daejeon Philharmonic Orchestra	3.5 (£1,750,000)	3.4 (£1,700,000)
Suwon Philharmonic Orchestra	3.3 (£1,650,000)	6 (£3,000,000)
Ulsan Symphony Orchestra	3 (£1,500,000)	2.6 (£1,300,000)
Incheon Philharmonic Orchestra	3 (£1,500,000)	2.9 (£1,450,000)
Busan Philharmonic Orchestra	2.8 (£1,400,000)	3.7 (£1,850,000)
Bucheon Philharmonic Orchestra	2.5 (£1,250,000)	3.3 (£1,650,000)
Daegu City Symphony Orchestra	2.5 (£1,250,000)	2.5 (£1,250,000)
Jeju Philharmonic Orchestra	2.3 (£1,150,000)	n/a
Gwangju Symphony Orchestra	2.2 (£1,100,000)	n/a
Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra	2 (£1,000,000)	2.2 (£1,100,000)
Cheongju City Philharmonic Orchestra	1.2 (£600,000)	n/a
Jeonju Symphony Orchestra	1.2 (£600,000)	1.4 (£700,000)

(Sources: refer from [1] Ahn, 2006; [2] Kim, 2008b; [3] Jang, 2005)

As can be seen from Table 7.6, the yearly budget of municipal orchestras, excepting the KBS Symphony Orchestra and the Seoul Symphony Orchestra, is very limited. The average budget is around half of the total budget of these two top orchestras. The current budget of the SPO is approximately twice as much as in 2004 (meanwhile, they are seeking yet more money in order to be in securer position), whereas the current

budget of other municipal orchestra is more or less similar to the budget of 2004.[221] The SPO was able to be transformed into a foundation mainly because of the powerful policy drive of the city of Seoul initiated by the former mayor (and current president of Korea) Myung-Park Lee. It was exceptional subsidy that came with the justification that the SPO was to be a cultural representative of the city of Seoul and a world-class orchestra. This justification might apply in the case of the SPO (and perhaps the KBS Symphony Orchestra) but could not be made as the case for others to raise their subsidy. Moreover, most local governments do not have the financial capacity to support their orchestras like this. Therefore, municipal orchestras may need to focus on their role as public services, and find ways to maximise this role without significant organisational changes. At the same time, they may need to communicate more often with a wider audience, and explore ways of steering their audiences in a commercial direction.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the role of the Korean municipal orchestra as a public service, the public support given by local government, and the restricted funding available. It has also examined changes in the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra that might serve as a future model for Korean municipal orchestras, helping them to respond to a new environment.

As has been indicated earlier, local governments support their municipal orchestras with the minimum of funding needed to maintain them. This is simply because orchestras are not something that local governments need to give priority to, compared to other public services catering for more basic needs, such as housing or health care. An orchestra forms no part of Korean cultural industries, which have become a main area of cultural policy, and municipal orchestras cannot even be assured of their value to cities.

The changing governance of orchestras, in imitation of the organisational structure of western top orchestras, has been regarded as something that would ensure a bright future for municipal orchestras in Korea. In recent years, the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra has experienced the biggest change. Although the SPO is facing up to some new challenges, such as communicating with a wider audience, developing a new programme, and setting a more commercial direction, it may not prove the appropriate

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[221] The KBS Symphony Orchestra has had its budget increased by 2 billion won (£ 1 million) and the current total budget is around 8 billion won (£ 4 million).

future model for the remaining municipal orchestras, especially in medium and small-sized cities. What is more, the SPO continues to have difficulty in balancing its dual role as a both a public service and a business.

A summary and integration of the previous chapters, addressing the main research questions, will be presented in next chapter.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

The key objective of this study was to examine the diverse problems in contemporary Korean orchestras along with cultural policy and new performance environments. This chapter summarises the findings in relation to the research questions; and it draws some conclusions regarding the originality, implications, and limitations of this study.

8.2 Summary of findings

The following sections are structured according to the study's five research questions. The first section covers Korean cultural policy and its impact on municipal orchestras. The second section describes the context of three Korean municipal orchestras, which represent types of organisational structure of municipal orchestras. The third section examines players' and staff's job satisfaction and turnover. The next section covers players' and staff's different types of conflicts and styles for handling interpersonal conflict. The final section covers the research questions regarding restricted public funding to municipal orchestras, and illustrates one way of responding to new challenges, through a case study of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra.

How does the changing context of Korean cultural policy impact upon orchestras?
As Chapter 3 revealed, Korean cultural policy has been strongly influenced by political, economic, historical, and socio-cultural factors. In the beginning, the government's cultural policy was used in the main for political purposes and as a means of controlling cultural and arts activities. Then, Korean cultural policy became more focused on people's cultural welfare and entertainment, along with more awareness of commercial and economic aspects.

Government centered Korean cultural policy has invariably changed whenever there has been a change of regime, and it is difficult to expect consistent and rooted cultural policy. The changes also affect the personnel of public arts and cultural organisations: after the new Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism was established in 2008, the president of the KBS, the chair of Arts Council Korea and, more recently, the chancellor of the Korean National University of Arts were each changed before the existing tenure of their predecessors was completed.

It may be that Korean municipal orchestras are not appropriately directed, and they are ignored to some extent by local authorities. They cannot fully deliver their role as public services because of restricted public funding and shortage of staff. According to Maitlis (1998), the advantages of contract orchestras (such as Korean municipal orchestras) are that they are able to develop a consistent pattern of work, and long-term artistic development is ensured by the presence of a stable salary structure (p. 49). However, Korean municipal orchestras possess none of these advantages. Thus, they need to work to achieve them, in order to justify their public funding, which private symphony orchestras lack.

Although a few professionals claimed that there was no connection between Korean cultural policy and orchestras, there did appear to be some relationship, even though not very strong, because Korean municipal orchestras are primarily supported by their local governments, rather than the central government. Thus, local politicians led by the mayor are the final decision makers, and the budget is also decided upon by these local authorities, based on local financial status. It is important to justify or explain municipal orchestras' existence to local government in order to secure their future, but it is sometimes difficult to persuade politicians about the significance of arts or culture.

I found that local governments did not pay attention to their municipal orchestras and often overlooked what they might be able to do for the orchestras, leaving them alone rather than giving more support: local governments provide enough money to maintain only the minimum of stability for their orchestras. They restrict public funding because they are not a main object for consideration by local politicians (compared to other public services). Moreover, the reason that local governments do not disband their orchestras is that they wish to avoid criticism from local citizens and orchestra lovers, and to prevent an adverse verdict from voters when the time comes for reelection. As a result, local politicians aim to support orchestras at the existing level of funding but no more.

What is the context of Korean municipal orchestras?

Chapter 4 explored the nature of the contexts of three Korean municipal orchestras, which between them offer examples of each type of organisational structure with which this study was concerned. Although there are some differences, Korean municipal orchestras share overall similarities in the way of managing and funding, and their actions are formulated in response to a government structure that operates in a similarly consistent fashion.

All municipal orchestras, being public services, are full-scale professional ensembles aiming to provide cultural and arts entertainment to citizens. They mainly provide public concerts in their home cities, but the KBS Symphony Orchestra (KSO) gives more regional concerts and tours internationally. The KSO operates under auspices of the KBS broadcast company, in a similar fashion to the BBC orchestras in the UK, but its primary remit is not to record for broadcasts. Although the KSO has been considered a representative Korean symphony orchestra and presents itself as a high-quality orchestra with celebrated conductors,[222] there is no distinguishing feature for which the orchestra is known.

Korean municipal orchestras undertake concert engagements mainly within their local cities in order to gain extra income. However, commercial CD recording and national or international engagement concerts, which are significant parts of western orchestras' income, are not a primary source of income for Korean municipal orchestras.

Traditionally, all Korean municipal orchestras are 100% financially supported by local governments, but this funding is restricted: the majority of the budget is used for personal expenses, because an orchestra is a labour intensive organisation, so there is a limited budget for activities. Thus, orchestras are barely capable of maintaining their current status, and they try to provide as many concerts as possible within their budget allowance.

Because of the 100% public funding from the cities (or from the KBS in the case of the KBS Symphony Orchestra), Korean municipal orchestras are administrated and controlled by authorities: this funding structure might lead to dual management structure (orchestral executive constitution and city, although the final say rests with the city), which creates an inefficient operation, as roles and responsibilities overlap and are unclear. The three municipal orchestras differ slightly in their government structure. The CPO is, in practice, run by its orchestral executive constitution, cooperating with civil servants at the city hall. The BPO is run by its orchestral executive constitution, along with staff [223]

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[222] However, this orchestra has not had a principal conductor since 2004 until now (November 2011).
[223] Most staff at the arts centre are civil servants.

at the municipal arts centre.

The KSO is managed by staff in the Division of Audience Relations within the KBS broadcast company. The orchestras' decision-making power is centralised in the cities and the KBS broadcast company, and players' opinion on management matters[224] is almost ignored, except during the principal conductor's appointment, when the authorizing body includes players (although the final decision always lies with the authority). However, most players interviewed in this study are not keen to be involved in decision making, and this might support Fogel's view on musicians: musicians are 'more comfortable not participating in the decision making processes', because this makes it easier to criticise decisions and to avoid the difficulties of responsibility (2000: p. 17). The membership of the orchestral executive constitution generally consists of between 5 and 10 people led by the Managing Director (orchestra manager)[225] and the head of the division of audience relations in the case of the KSO.

All the orchestras have a musicians' representative selected from the players and a musicians' committee. The CPO and KSO have a musicians' union, but not the BPO, because the city of Busan does not allow this (although the BPO had one formerly).

Although Korean municipal orchestras have received substantial funding from their cities (or from the KBS broadcast company in the case of the KBS Symphony Orchestra) and been less focused on profit or loss, they are under pressure because of anxiety about the reduction of public funding, the competitive market,[226] and the need for more commercial awareness.

How and why do players and staff become satisfied or dissatisfied with their jobs, and does this link to turnover?

In addressing this research question, Chapter 5 has discussed the job satisfaction of players and staff in relation to five facets: work, pay, supervision, promotion and co-workers and its relationship with job turnover. A summary of the research question is displayed in the following Table 8.1.

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[224] Players do not play a significant role in decision making on artistic matters such as programming: this is mainly done by the principal conductor and orchestral executive constitution (and civil servants).
[225] The Managing Director in a Korean municipal orchestra has responsibility for the day-to-day running of the orchestra.
[226] Unlike western orchestras, Korean orchestras face less competition with other orchestras, but more competition with other arts organisations or entertainments. However, the KBS Symphony Orchestra is exposed to competition with other public and private symphony orchestras in Seoul and adjacent areas.

Table 8.1 Summary of job satisfaction

	Players	Staff
Actual job satisfaction		
Overall job satisfaction based on the absolute JDI score		
Satisfaction	Work	Work Supervision Co-workers
Dissatisfaction	Pay Promotion	Promotion Pay
Neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction	Supervision Co-workers	N/A
Relative job satisfaction		
Most satisfaction	Work	N/A
Least satisfaction	Pay	N/A
Influential facet regarding job satisfaction		
Most important	Work	Work
Least important	Promotion	Promotion
Sources of job dissatisfaction	Lack of control over work Hierarchical structure in orchestration Salary	Work conditions: lack of administrative autonomy Salary Promotion
Overall relations		
Job satisfaction and demographic variables	Pay and age Pay and gender Pay and tenure	N/A
Job satisfaction and turnover	Work and turnover: negative Co-worker and turnover: negative	N/A

Players and staff are satisfied with their current work, but dissatisfied with pay and promotion. The results of the survey and interviews indicated that although working as an orchestral musician is mentally and physically hard work, players and staff do something they love: especially in the case of players, they do exactly what they have been trained for years. Thus, symphony orchestra musicians, who have the most internal motivation compared to twelve other job groups based on the study of Allmendinger, Hackman, and Lehman on life and work in symphony orchestras (1996), are happy with what they are doing in tandem with their own pride and professionalism, and so are administrative staff. However, players and administrative staff are not happy with their current pay: both players and staff consider pay as the second most important facet influencing their job satisfaction, followed by work. Thus, they have complaints about current pay. Players' financial difficulties found in this study are in line with the articles of Glynn (2000), Loebel (1977), Allmendinger, Hackman, and Lehman (1996), Faulkner (1973), and Price (2006), which mentioned lack of financial rewards: in addition, the Ford Foundation in 1965 described orchestra musicians as "one of the most underpaid professional groups in American society (Flanagan, 2008: p. 18).

Players and staff are indeed unhappy with the promotion system, and Faulkner (1973) indicates that improving one's position is a main concern of orchestral players. As mentioned in Chapter 5, there are very limited opportunities to move up to the position of principal player or managing director: because players and administrative staff normally stay in an orchestra for a lifetime (dismissal is rare), and could be promoted only when higher positioned players or staff leave or retire. However, dissatisfaction with promotion does not seem to be a focal problem to Korean symphony orchestra musicians and administrative staff, because they considered promotion as the least important facet influencing their job satisfaction. Thus, the working environment of the orchestra needs to encourage the motivation of players and administrative staff, increase prestige, and find alternative means of financial rewards.

The interview results indicate that another source of players' dissatisfaction is lack of involvement and influence in the orchestra. The American Symphony Orchestra League quotes from an anonymous participant in a forum about players' involvement in decision making: 'The Board decides, while we go play'. Although musician involvement does not always result in advantageous outcomes, the Symphony Orchestra Institute believes that 'musician involvement increases the effectiveness of symphony organizations [...] Musician involvement is seen as a factor working for the overall good of the organization' (Symphony Orchestra Institute, 1997: pp. 1-2). Similarly, the American Symphony Orchestra League (1993) states that orchestral organisations could increase their effectiveness when musicians' participation is properly processed for achieving the mission of the orchestra (p. 182). Albert K. Webster, the former managing director and executive vice president at the New York Philharmonic, also explained the benefits of musician involvement (Symphony Orchestra Institute, 1997: p. 2).

On the other hand, administrative staff are not happy with lack of authority in relation to decision making. Unlike the managers of U.S. symphony orchestras, who have a remarkable degree of autonomy (Flanagan, 2008: p. 16), Korean administrative staff (including managing directors) have very little autonomy on most areas of decision making, such as artistic direction, music performance, or music-related community service: absence of autonomy could negatively influence satisfaction on work, based on Spector's study (1986) on the relationship between autonomy and a variety of outcome variables. Thus, in order to decrease staff job dissatisfaction on this matter, Korean municipal orchestras might require flexibility on sharing the power of organisational governance between the orchestra's management office and the local government authority.

The results of the analyses cited above indicate the relationship between players' job satisfaction and demographic variables and turnover, respectively. More specifically, the players in the younger age range, female, and short tenure groups are more satisfied with their pay, compared to those of the older age, male, and long tenure groups: it might be because the former groups have less responsibility for their family's living.

This study also examined the relationship between job satisfaction and turnover, and the overall result shows that co-worker and work are negatively related to players' turnover. The interviewees were generally well satisfied with their relationships with colleagues (although some slightly complained about a few of their co-workers' deterioration of performance skill), thus the tendency of turnover in Korean municipal orchestras might be low. In addition, players of Korean municipal orchestras are highly satisfied with their work, so lower turnover could be expected.

What types and degrees of conflicts do players and staff experience, and how do they handle conflicts with supervisors and peers?

Players and staff experienced various conflicts from different sources. Chapter 6 sought answers to the research question above together with six subsidiary objectives.

The relationships among players, conductor, administrative staff, and civil servants are complicated: the dual management structure (orchestral executive constitution and the city), hierarchical government structure (which gives enormous power to the conductor, without a controlling tool), and mistrust, lack of communication, and prejudice make such a complicated relationship worse. The majority of orchestras experience the culture of conflict, and a major challenge for orchestras is to resolve the conflict (American symphony Orchestra League, 1993). Sometimes, lifts between musicians and the administration team leads to a musicians' strike (Glynn, 2000), and players of Korean municipal orchestras, such as the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra or the KBS Symphony Orchestra, also exhibited their conflict towards orchestra office and local government by concert boycott.

When comparing group of players' different types of conflict, intergroup conflict with staff is higher than intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict with civil servants: the group of players might experience communication difficulties and different

perceptions (to their staff) or differences between personality, which were uncovered as sources of intergroup conflict in this study. The musicians' strike mentioned above could also be caused by intergroup conflict with administrative staff related to ob concern..In the case of the KSO, the players have less intergroup conflict with their administrative staff than do those of the BPO and CPO.

There is significant difference between gender and intrapersonal conflict, intergroup conflict with staff, and intergroup conflict with civil servants: female players experience fewer of those conflicts than male players: thus, orchestra office and local government may need to pay more attention to male players.

In handling interpersonal conflict with their conductor, players prefer to use an obliging style. Using an obliging style means that players try to satisfy the conductor's demands, and show less concern for themselves: the conductor of a Korean symphony orchestra has absolute authority over the organisation on and off stage, and the players seem to be obedient to the conductor as members of team. Meanwhile, when players are handling interpersonal conflict with peers, they are likely use a dominating style, which would mean their concerns for themselves are greater than those for others: however, the degree of this conflict with peers may be not serious, because the players interviewed in this study seem to understand and support each other when a concert takes place, and also describe some conflicts as a small personal matter.

Loebel (1977) advises potential future orchestral musicians that "there should be some basic understanding about the conflict of interests among the parties involved in the running of an orchestra [...] a certain amount of conflict is inevitable and understandable" (p. 84). He continues that although the motivation and aims of the various parties may differ, a willingness toward accommodation should lead to the solution of mutual problems. According to the American Symphony Orchestra League (1993: p. 76-78), "orchestras exist in order to make good music and to serve as a resource for their communities", and the League recommends them to open "the doors of communication to break down barriers that lead to suspicion and mistrust." Therefore, it might profitable for orchestra to share their thinking, concerns, and organisational information by increasing communication, which could "break down barriers that lead to suspicion and mistrust" (American Orchestra League, 1993: p. 78). Table 8.7 summarises various conflicts occurring in Korean municipal orchestras.

Table 8.2 Conflicts in Korean municipal orchestras

Type of conflict	Sources of relation conflict	Subject	Issues
Intergroup conflict	Different perception	Orchestra player as a job/gender	Male player: a main means of living Female: a side job or an escape path
		Orchestra (art appreciation)	Players: productive subject Civil servant: unproductive subject
		Working time	Players: official attendance time plus outside activities related to music Civil servant: official attendance time
		Regulation to enroll on an outside activity	Players: controlling tool Administrative staff: helpful tool for players' achievement
		Ensemble	Players: an important activity, and it takes long time to make a good ensemble Civil servants: a kind of background music for the main event; an ensemble can be organised anytime as long as there are players; the quality of performance is not important
		Audition	Players: controlling tool Civil servant and Administrative Staff: orchestra's development
Intragroup conflict	Environmental change	Audition	Increasing competition between players Cause of major conflict
Intergroup conflict	Prejudice		Players: civil servants are ignorant of the arts; civil servants cannot or do not want to understand arts and musicians Civil servants: musicians are stubborn; musicians are rich; musicians are not likely to play popular music
Intrapersonal conflict	Age		Different life style between younger generations and older generations Related to Confucianism
Intragroup conflict	Attitude		Rude attitude of conductors towards players Unfair attitude of conductors towards players Unfair attitude of administrative staff toward players
Intergroup conflict	Communication/ gender		Male players: difficult to communicate with female fellow players Players: poor communication with civil servants Civil servants: communication difficulties with musicians and administrative staff in orchestral executive constitution
	Sources of task conflict	Issues	
Intrapersonal conflict	Inefficient work	Players: inefficient working of orchestral executive constitution Civil servants: inefficient work of managing director Players: mistakes of fellow players Conductor's lack of conducting technique	
Intragroup conflict	Attitude	Oppressive attitude of conductors towards civil servants	

Why is local government public funding to municipal orchestras restricted, and how far can Korean municipal orchestras adapt and grow in the current situation?

As an extension of the previous two research questions, Chapter 7 explored the reason for the restricted funding given to municipal orchestras and, by examining the activities of the SPO, the response to the current situation in which Korean municipal orchestras find themselves.

The municipal orchestra is not a significant sector for local government when compared to other public services or other areas of cultural policy, and the cities provide a marginal level of funds, with which orchestras are able to pursue limited activities. Along with a strong emphasis on cultural industries, due to their economic benefit, local governments would like to push or encourage their orchestras into the market. Although musicians and staff of the orchestral executive constitution perceive pressure from the city and new environmental changes, the majority of Korean municipal orchestras appear to be incapable of responding to these challenges.

Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra is the only Korean symphony orchestra to respond effectively to the new challenges, aided by strong support from a previous mayor of Seoul. They have transformed themselves into a completely independent organisation in terms of administration,[227] but still receive an exceptionally high amount of subsidy from the city of Seoul: public funding covered about 80% of their total budget in 2007. In spite of the strong objections and protests from the musicians about their having a civil servant-like status, the SPO was able to process sweeping changes of governance because the city of Seoul gave them financial and political support. Their aim was not only to please the citizens of Seoul, but also to have the SPO's name acknowledged abroad as the premier Korean symphony orchestra. Seoul has potential to enlarge its classical music market, and the SPO could experiment with their activities, and attract and hire talented musicians from abroad by offering high salaries: Korean major symphony orchestras in Seoul relate to their roles as national metropolitan orchestras and are more exposed to global influences and connect more closely with the global aspirations of Korea, whereas the other orchestras, being more local in character, become locked into local power networks. Thus, it is almost impossible for middle-ranking municipal orchestras to emulate the transformation of the SPO. In addition, the result of the SPO's change—whether or not it is successful—is still a matter of debate, and it is too early to draw conclusions.

Korean municipal orchestras will perhaps become financially self-sufficient, because most symphony orchestras (including municipal symphony orchestras in France and

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[227] The SPO has the largest administrative team in the history of Korean orchestras.

Germany) 'suffer from perennial budget concerns' (Lehman, 2002: p. 207). The local governments have a general tendency to believe that if the municipal orchestra becomes a legally autonomous foundation, this is a seal of the orchestra's success, and relieves them from financial burden. However, without proper preparation, such a change might not lead to their ultimate development, or mean they respond effectively to all new challenges. If they try to do this, they may lose both old and new audiences, dilute their initial aims, and weaken their legitimacy. The real challenge for Korean municipal orchestra lies with players, administrative staff, and the cities, along with their cooperation.

There is, however, no organisation uniting and supporting professional orchestras in Korea, comparable to the Association of British Orchestras (ABO) or the American Symphony Orchestra League (ASOL).

The objectives of the ABO, for example, are:

- To be an advocate for the orchestral profession of the UK, ensuring that the voice of British orchestras is heard by all relevant parties.
- To provide the principal forum through which members communicate collectively with each other to facilitate shared knowledge, collaborative initiatives and problem solving.
- To provide accurate, timely and comprehensive information on issues and events that impact on the management, development and legal responsibilities of orchestras.
- To provide and enable training and continuing professional development opportunities at all levels of orchestral management.

(ABO, 2009: online[228])

These activities of the ABO can be recommended to Korean municipal orchestras, in order to protect the orchestras from outside influence and to efficiently and flexibly manage orchestras via cooperation. However, although having a professional orchestral association is desirable, it may be difficult to establish because Korean municipal orchestras have very limited autonomy; they are inward looking and not likely to share information each other, and the way each orchestra differs (for example, in size of orchestra and management, team, or budget) also has to be considered.

So far, the research findings have been discussed alongside the research questions. The findings can be integrated into three parts, as follows:

The key facts regarding context
- Local cities' emphasis on economic benefits in the aspect of cultural industries and financial independence of municipal orchestras.

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[228] Available at: http://www.abo.org.uk/About-Us/Mission/ [Accessed 11 June 2009].

- Financial insecurity following a political election.
- Local government's ignorance about the orchestra, and no long-term plan or music policy for the orchestra.
- No orchestral association.
- Lack of sustainability of the municipal orchestra in terms of developing a consistent pattern of work, long-term artistic development, and audience development.

The key facts regarding job satisfaction

- Dissatisfaction with pay to both players and staff.
- Great satisfaction with work of both players and staff.
- Pay and age are positively associated: the younger age group of player is more satisfied with pay; pay and tenure are positively significant: players with shorter tenure are more satisfied with pay; pay and gender are negatively associated: female players are more satisfied with pay, compared to male players.
- Players' job turnover is negatively associated with work and co-workers, respectively: if players are satisfied with work and co-workers, they think less of turnover.
- Players are dissatisfied with the lack of authority, the hierarchical structure, and salary, whereas staff are dissatisfied with the lack of administrative autonomy, salary, and promotion.
- Despite players' complaints, auditions that are closely related to promotion might be a good method to encourage players' motivation if the result of the auditions practically affect to the players' orchestral position or salary.

The key facts regarding conflict

- Gender and Intrapersonal conflict, intergroup conflict with staff and with civil servants: male players have a higher perception of intrapersonal conflict, intergroup conflict with staff, and intergroup conflict with civil servants, compared to female players.
- Male players use more *integrating* and *compromising* style when handling conflict with peers than are female players.
- When comparing intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict with staff, and intergroup conflict with civil servants, players have higher perception of intergroup conflict with staff.
- Players do not prefer to use a *Dominating* style when there is interpersonal conflict with conductors or peers.
- There is no statistic evidence that female players use more *avoiding* style when there is a conflict with peers, although male players believe that to be so.
- Players and staff generally believe that if staff are music graduates, there is less conflict between them. The result of this study indicates that the staff's educational background only influences intragroup conflict of staff, which occurs related to goals, tasks, and policies, or a result of incompatibilities, disagreements, or inconsistencies: non-music-graduated staff have more perception of intragroup conflict than music-graduated staff.

8.3 Originality

This research is a unique study of Korean municipal symphony orchestras in relation to cultural policy and changing environments, and has been achieved through an investigation of the thoughts, attitudes and values in everyday practice. Several studies

have been carried out regarding Korean professional symphony orchestras and have indicated current problematic situations in terms of finance, managerial structure, and administration (see Table 1.1). A flagship study on Korean orchestras was written by Seok-Heung Kang in 2000. Kang's thesis made a large contribution to the systematisation of studies on Korean symphony orchestras by clearly classifying features and problems in three different areas: organisational structure and management systems, performing activities, and the status of financial management. However, although Kang's (2000) studies make a significant contribution to understanding the management and organisation of symphony orchestras in Korea using examples from other developed countries, the limitation is that he simply describes the problematic situations within Korean symphony orchestras without regard to the external environmental factors or issues that Korean symphony orchestras are facing. Moreover, he does not explain how the various management methods of other orchestras might be applied to Korean orchestral management. After Kang's thesis, the majority of studies on symphony orchestras have been carried out by Korean student researchers. However, most of the studies simply repeat the same issues using different cases, and continue to neglect contemporary Korean realities.

The second original contribution of this study is its different approach to orchestra structure. Korean researchers have suggested a particular model of orchestra government structure, especially as related to power position. For example, Won-Chul Park (2004) insists that the orchestra needs an independent executive constitution controlled by an Executive Director and that a stable management system can be obtained if the Artistic Director and Executive Director have an equality of position and active communication. Soo-Jin Jung (2004) points to the unequal position between Artistic Director and Executive Director as a problem of the Korean orchestra structure[229]. However, some people are of a different opinion concerning the power position: Kyung-Ok Lee (2005b) considers that giving the highest position to the conductor (or Artistic Director) is the most appropriate solution for the organisational governance structure. These comments show that Korean researchers are likely to focus mainly on the power balance between Artistic Director and Executive Director and to insist on the independence of the orchestral executive constitution. However, with examples of the organisational structure of American orchestras described by Fogel (2000), Levine (2001), and Morris (2002), it became apparent that the important things are each component of organisational structure and its role in performance rather than in the power structure. In addition, this study emphasis the importance of

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[229] However, she did not mention a preferred power structure between the Artistic Director and Executive Director.

the orchestral executive constitution for managerial efficiency, along with its lack of authority and the welfare of staff, which negatively influences motivation and job satisfaction.

This study has investigated the interrelationships between players, conductors, civil servants, and administrative staff in orchestral executive constitutions, focusing especially on conflict relationships. Previous Korean orchestra studies overlooked the conflicts occurring within an orchestra, despite its significance for the smooth operation and artistic quality of an orchestra. It may be that Korean researchers are likely to think conflict exists everywhere, and so it is of no great import. There are a number of business and economic studies on conflict and stress, and their influence on outcomes, but this study is unusual in being a comprehensive attempt to gain a deeper understanding of organisational behaviour in the context of Korean municipal orchestras.

Finally, no previous Korean researchers have considered seriously why local governments have been supporting their municipal orchestras without making any major changes in terms of administration and finance. Instead, researchers have merely criticised the limited funds from local government given to municipal orchestras. To address this neglect, this study considered the justification of local government subsidy, along with an investigation of the reasons for restricted public subsidy and an assessment of the new challenges facing municipal orchestras.

8.4 Implications

Korean cultural policy has mainly evolved in tandem with the Korean regime. Korean municipal orchestras, however, are directly influenced by the local government and its circumstances rather than state cultural policy or the state itself: there is very little connection between Korea cultural policy and Korean municipal orchestras because most of them were founded by local government.

Like musicians in German classical orchestras, players and administrative staff in Korean municipal orchestras have civil servant-like status regarding salary and job security (Schulze and Rose, 1998: p. 228); the public funding from local government is exceptionally high, as Korean municipal orchestras rely on a 100% public subsidy of their total budget. The economic effects and importance of art and culture have received attention, and have been placed at the centre of Korean cultural policy, with the exception of classical music.

The legitimacy of public spending on Korean municipal orchestras is a thorny topic because they are for a limited audience, yet it is expensive to maintain and support

their activities. Also, orchestras are perceived to be opposed to popular music, so justification needs to be very strong here: it is evident that there is pressure on orchestras to become more commercial. More economic awareness is inevitable, and Korean municipal orchestras are being encouraged to consider the market. However, they may not feel able to deal with the challenges they face.

Some problems such as finance, management, and artistic policy have always been present, but the arrival of newly educated Koreans in arts management have made this even more difficult: the cultural policy agenda has moved forward, leaving the orchestras feeling outmoded. It is also an ideological shift away from the public subsidizing of elitist arts to making them find audiences and business sponsors who will pay. This means marketization, which links to an emphasis on cultural industries.

However, this shift may not undermine the original function or goal of Korean municipal orchestras. We can change this goal to deal with the modern audience, but without its necessitating performing only popular classical music. Korean municipal orchestras might want to develop and expand new audiences by looking to new kinds of work— new kinds of programming, focusing on modern music, Korean music, young people's workshops, and better presentation involving interesting marketing and a website. It would mean that they could modernize their goals without this being described as commercialization. In addition, they could use subsidy to experiment, or to provide new kinds of social and cultural services. These activities make an orchestra a commercial enterprise, and demand organisational changes. However, these changes may find more support from the orchestral executive constitution and musicians, because they could expand their artistic vision rather than requiring that all their energies are put into making money at any cost.

Cities may see the need to speak to a wider audience and raise more money as a way of pursuing a commercial direction. Korean municipal orchestras have not yet been and will never become fully self-sufficient, and if they try to accomplish this, they might merely become poor quality orchestras and lose both old and new audiences. Thus, the cities may have to rethink how their orchestras can become relevant, and this is the challenge for the local cities (part of the wider challenge to their existing cultural policies). Certainly, they should continue to fund their orchestras, but they may need to rethink policy.

A part of this study was conducted in the context of organisational behaviour, and examined job satisfaction and conflict in municipal orchestras. The study revealed

players' and staff's factors of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. They both show strong loyalty to their work, and it was evident by the result of multiple regression analysis and factual information that their turnover rate in the last 5 years was insignificant. Players' satisfaction with co-workers is significantly related to turnover. According to Boerner (2004), the artistic quality of an orchestra is highly dependant on the degree of the musicians' synchronization. Boerner and Von Streit (2007) state that 'the musical unison necessary for a coherent interpretation by the orchestra will not be achieved until the group is emotionally in union with itself' (p. 133). Therefore, it is important that players maintain good relationships each other and reduce the rate of turnover, in order to achieve a high quality of performance.

The experience of authority in an orchestra depends on the type of decision being made (Broughton, 2001: p. 337). As this study found, it is not surprising that players have little or nearly no authority in influencing decision making in matters of music and administration. This power structure within Korean municipal orchestras has many similarities in spite of differing musical histories. Players dislike the orchestral executive constitution and civil servants, but they have an ambivalent attitude to the conductor: they allow the conductor control in return for a brilliant performance (Adorno, 1976: p. 110), but they consider the conductor as belonging to the opposite side, tell negative stories, and readily criticise conductors.

To unify musicians, who are often described as individualistic and even self-centred by many musicians themselves (Wadman and Köping, 2005), and to deliver a great performance, the conductor inevitably needs to exercise a certain authority over the musicians (although, in general, authority may be perceived as a negative term). When players are employed, they are aware of the circumstances around the orchestra, including the hierarchical relationship with the conductor, and joining an orchestra entails a willingness to accept such conditions.

Musicians may complain about their conductors and their own lack of authority, but they may need to recognise that these are natural parts of their job and that the conductor's authority is a necessary evil: conductors should practice their authority with caution as a conductor's leadership style relates closely to the quality of performance. According to Wadman and Köping (2005), conductors often appreciate the importance of each member of the orchestra, and the conductors' job is to make each of them realise that. Such action by conductors helps to develop a positive interaction between players and themselves (Wadman and Köping, 2005: p. 7), and interaction is a key factor determining an orchestra's artistic quality (Faulkner, 1983). The players of Korean municipal orchestras are thereby given the will to cooperate with each other in order to achieve high quality performances. It is the conductor's job to encourage,

motivate, and drive players to achieve performances of high artistic quality. Players should know that if they want authority it comes with responsibility.

The model for the organisational structure of Korean municipal orchestras follows neither the American nor the London variety. It springs from a different origin: whereas western symphony orchestras have been founded by wealthy individuals or a group of players, most Korean municipal orchestras have been intentionally founded by the local city following a particular cultural policy, especially that related to the local autonomy system in the 1990s.[230] Because of this background, the major administrative and musical responsibilities of Korean municipal orchestras are given to civil servants of a city, who often do not have general knowledge about the nature of an orchestra. As was shown in Chapter 6, the orchestral executive constitution of Korean municipal orchestras occupies a middle position between the city and musicians, handling the day-to-day operating of the orchestra with limited autonomy. This is a main reason for the staff's job dissatisfaction. Although a dual management structure seems inevitable under the present funding regime, local governments could think of sharing administrative authority with orchestral executive constitution, and grant artistic decisions to this constitution and the conductor. It would mean that the orchestral executive constitution and conductor would have a legal responsibility for their decision making. Furthermore, local governments might think of providing proper training in managing municipal performing organisations to those civil servants who intend to work in the culture and tourism division at city hall, or appoint those who are interested in arts and culture, rather than giving orders to officials at random. This might help to decrease conflicts caused by misunderstanding and distrust among staff, players, and civil servants.

Although this study did not pay it much attention, staff complained about their lack of numbers in the orchestral executive constitution, and cite this as the reason (along with lack of funding) that they provide only a restricted range of activities to citizens. Thus, it may be useful to think of offering unpaid internships to those who are willing to participate in the operation of orchestra. The city and orchestras might consider linking this opportunity to departments of arts administration, or music, in local universities.

Players and staff are very dissatisfied with their present salary. Regarding public support, Korean municipal orchestras receive an exceptionally high subsidy. German public orchestras receive direct public funding for over 80% of their total budget

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[230] The BPO and the KBS Symphony Orchestra were not established under the influence of 1990s cultural policy, as the BPO was founded in 1962 and the KSO in 1956. Nevertheless, the objective of its foundation was the same.

(Schulze and Rose, 1998: p. 228), and the Orchestra of Paris receives public funding that covers about 90% of total cost (Guillard, 1985: p. 36). An orchestra is a labour-intensive non-profit organisation. A significant disadvantage of a contract orchestra, indicated by Maitlis (1998), is 'the considerable overhead the orchestra carries, regardless of the amount of work available' (p. 49). That means it may be extremely difficult to increase the salary of players and staff under the present funding regime. One of the world's most successful orchestras, the Berlin Philharmonic, is not an exception for the salary issue. The Principal Conductor, Simon Rattle, supported the musicians' demand for a higher wage, but it took some time to increase the salary (Lehman, 2002). It is not likely that the principal conductors of Korean municipal orchestras would become involved in the fight with cities for an increase in players' salary, as Simon Rattle did.

An expansion of orchestras' engagements, along with a new goal and artistic vision, could help to decrease the players' dissatisfaction with current pay; however, the matter of players' salary seems less severe than that of staff. As a member of an orchestra, players have more chance to earn extra income from various activities (compared to those who are not a member of an orchestra), and the cities are also aware of this. Staff have no source of extra income, and this makes it difficult (especially for married men[231]) to keep working in an orchestra. Administrative staff have a civil-servant-like status, but the salary and pension are lower than usual for civil servants; the rate of salary increase is also lower despite long tenure, and staff are excluded from the welfare benefits offered to civil servants.[232] Therefore, the cities might wish to rethink the wage system of staff in order to remove some degree of pay-related job dissatisfaction.

Regarding finance, arts promotion funds or other public arts and culture funds from central government and private sector sponsorship are not available to Korean municipal orchestras. Thus, plural funding, such as subsidies from local municipalities, the federal government, the state, or private individuals (which many western public orchestras receive), might ease municipal orchestras' financial difficulties. In addition, the cities or central government could revise the law that restricts external financial support.

There is a complicated network of relationships within Korean municipal orchestras. As

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[231] Traditionally, in Korea, family living expenses are mainly the responsibility of male.

[232] The salary of staff in the three Korean municipal orchestras studied here is high compared to the other municipal orchestras such as Jinju Symphony Orchestra and Masan Symphony Orchestra as players and staff in these two orchestras are excluded from welfare benefit or pension.

has already been mentioned, older male players are likely to have more responsibility for their families' living expenses than younger players and female players, so some of them might secure their position in the orchestra by making much of their work experience rather than emphasizing their performance ability. Similarly, although there is a clear need for a musicians' union, this might not be used to protect players whose lack of performance ability disqualifies them from the orchestra. Although players' self-protection is understandable, such attitudes may harm their orchestra's reputation, because orchestras are evaluated by the quality of their performance, and they need to be ever more brilliant in the current challenging environment.

The *avoiding* style, which involves sidestepping and withdrawal, is the players' preferred way of dealing with interpersonal conflict with peers. Yet they may need to change their attitude, because low concern for self and others offers no fundamental solution.

Folklore indicated that players and staff experienced less conflict between them when members of staff were music graduates: players trusted staff who were music graduates more than they did others, because they were considered to be on their side. However, this study reveals that whether or not staff are music graduates makes no difference to handle intrapersonal conflict, intergroup conflict with players, and intergroup conflict with civil servants (except intragroup conflict).

For players, the audition was one of most significant issues and generally considered a bad thing. But if the audition has the practical outcome of changing a player's position within the orchestra, it helps to increase that player's job satisfaction with promotion.[233] There are contradictory opinions about auditions: some say they are necessary for improving the quality of orchestras; others say it is not the solution. It might not be true that regular audition leads the development of an orchestra, but regular audition could motivate players if the result really does give players a chance to be promoted. Local governments should revise their orchestral auditions so that they lead to practical results. Regular audition may be a necessary evil under the present organisational structure, but might not be as bad as players think if it is appropriately and objectively processed.

8.5 Limitations of the study

The first limitation is the extent of generalisation, which was due to the small sample size (especially of staff). Although this study chose three orchestras that covered the

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[233] This could also help orchestras that might have top players amongst its staff, which could mean they play better.

different organisational structures of Korean municipal orchestras, the results from each orchestra may not represent other orchestras because there are many variable factors influencing players and staff, such as organisational culture, size, and history. Furthermore, there is no way of concluding decisively whether the differences in job satisfaction and conflict resulted from the differences of individuals or from the differences of organisation.

The second limitation concerns the case of the KSO: at the time this study conducted, the players of the KSO were engaged in acts of resistance against the KSO, due to the long time absence of a principal conductor, unfilled vacancies of orchestral position, and the announcement that the orchestra's status was changing to a legally autonomous agency. The results of both qualitative and quantitative research may, in these circumstances, have been distorted, and research conducted in future may produce different results on job satisfaction and conflict.

Third, data could not be collected from conductors due to the difficulty of access,[234] so the data on conductors' relationships with players, staff, and civil servants is incomplete. In addition, the data collected from civil servants were not abundant, as most of them were not willing to say much about the issues being investigating.

This study focused partly on the relationships between job satisfaction, tenure, and conflict. Although job satisfaction was measured using five subscales, overall job satisfaction was not included. Job turnover was measured based on the degree of thinking about quitting; thus, the whole process of how job dissatisfaction leads to players' and staff's turnover, the relation between thinking about quitting and eventual turnover, and the reasons for turnover were not included. The amount of the three types of conflict, the five styles of handling interpersonal conflict with different parties, the sources of conflict, and the relationship between the amount of conflict and conflict-handling styles were all measured; these data are useful in determining whether the members of an organisation are making too little, too much, or moderate use of each conflict, but whether the five styles of handing interpersonal conflict were properly used to deal with different situations were excluded (Rahim, 1986: p. 37 and p. 68). The relationship between job satisfaction, turnover, and conflict and job performance was omitted due to the ambiguity of how to evaluate the success of job performance in an orchestra—for instance, should it be by judged by artistic quality or by how many

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[234] I was able to gain interview permission from two conductors, both previous principal conductors of the CPO (one of them was the current conductor at the time of the interview); however, conductors in other orchestras could not be accessed, so I decided to omit data collected from conductors.

tickets were sold?

8.6 Conclusion

This study began with a recognition of the diverse problems faced by Korean municipal orchestras. Debates regarding finance, authority, leadership, and organisational structure could all be found in professional orchestras. This study has provided information regarding Korean cultural policy, the changes in cultural industries and their affect on Korean symphony orchestras, the contexts of Korean municipal orchestras, job satisfaction, conflict, and new challenges; and it has also provided several recommendations.

The study found that even though Korean municipal orchestras have been faced with pressure and concern given the economic and commercial aspects of their activities in recent years, it is worth considering that local governments might choose not to push their orchestras further, and might not decide to make their orchestras legally autonomous agencies like symphony orchestras in western countries. Korean municipal orchestras were founded as a public service to local citizens, and economic or commercial outcomes used to be of little concern, compared to the orchestras in the west, where economic aspects are significant for their survival. Korean municipal orchestras are simply not ready to be in the market, and this form of autonomous agency might not be appropriate to most Korean municipal orchestras in local cities, due to a lack of audience infrastructure and no recognition of the importance of orchestras. Therefore, rather than having its legal status changed, the Korean municipal orchestra might need to keep to its original role as a public service and provide better services to its citizens with a solid aim and mission and a readiness to respond to the taste of audiences.

Despite some negative features regarding job satisfaction, the findings indicate that the players and staff of Korean municipal orchestras enjoy their job, even if severely dissatisfied with present pay. The financial difficulty faced by staff is more serious than that for players. It is, thus, imperative that the local government (should) consider the current pay system of municipal orchestras.

Various conflicts were found in Korean municipal orchestras. Conflict is not a new issue in symphony orchestras, but the conflicts between players, administrative staff, conductor, and civil servants found in this study need further consideration. Strong conflict between players and conductor were, from the viewpoint of players, a consequence of the conductor's partiality to certain players, or excessive charismatic

leadership that caused disrespect, mistrust, and (in some cases) verbal violence. Thus, conductors might use their leadership more carefully in order to reduce players' complaints, to achieve players' synchronisation and coherence, and to ultimately achieve a climate of cooperation, which is a key feature of an orchestra's quality.

Although it is understandable that an orchestra is not the primary issue for local government when compared with other social services, local government might revise its policy toward municipal orchestras with respect to the audition system, fundraising, and the autonomy of the orchestral executive constitution.

To conclude: players, administrative staff, the conductor, and civil servants experience unpleasant relations and are prone to blaming each other for these, but their common aim is to make their orchestras better. To achieve this, they need to be open-minded, interactive, and try to cooperate with each other rather than resorting to complaints and slander. Finally, each of them is important to the success of the orchestra, and they should feel a strong responsibility for what they are doing to ensure a bright future for Korean municipal orchestras.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Letter of introduction

Dear_____

My name is Young-Mi Song, a PhD student at the school of performance and cultural industries at the University of Leeds, UK. The aim of this research is to examine diverse aspects relating to the problem of contemporary Korean municipal orchestras, along with the cultural policy situation and the new environment. In order to discover the problems of Korean orchestras related to job satisfaction and conflict, the information from your own unique experiences working in an orchestra is crucial to this study.

The interview will last approximately one to two hours. All information you provide will be treated in strict confidence, and you do not need to worry about the possible risks associated with your participation.

I would like to hear from you. If you have any questions *about the interview, please* contact me at <u>pcuyms@leeds.ac.uk</u> or <u>songsario@hotmail.com</u> or by calling at +44-7796-420-260. You may also contact Justin O'Connor at M.J.O'Connor@leeds.ac.uk. Once I obtain permission from you, I will contact you again to make arrangements for the interview.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Young-Mi Song

Appendix B. Letter of consent

I have agreed to be interviewed by Young-Mi Song under the supervision of Professor Justin O'Connor and Mr. Peter Collis of the School of Performance and Cultural Industries of the University of Leeds. I have read the information letter, and my participation in this interview is entirely voluntary. I understand that all information will be kept in complete confidence, and my name will not be used in the study or any associated publications under any circumstances (except with your permission). I am also aware that the interviews will be tape recorded and transcribed. However, I understand that I am free to withdraw from my decision of participation at any time; and also free to refuse to answer any questions or to request to stop tape recording.

I am informed that if I have any concerns or questions resulting from my contribution to this interview, I may contact Young-Mi Song.

Print Name_____

Signature of Participant_____

Date_____

Appendix C. Interview schedule for staff

Note: This interview schedule is intended as a guide and not as a rigid questionnaire. The following questions are designed for administrative staff, and modified questions (based on questions here) are used for players and civil servants in the participating orchestras. The interview will be conducted in a flexible way, based on the attitude of the interviewee and the flow of the conversation.

Interviewee's name:

Date:

Place:

Time:

Section A. Personal information

1. Birth date:
2. Age:
3. Sex:
4. Current position:
5. Academic background:
6. Tenure with current orchestra:

Section B. Job orientation

7. How did you start to work at orchestra? Is there any particular reason or motivation?
8. What was your work experience before joining an orchestra?
9. What do you think are the most fundamental elements as a member of the administrative staff? Please give reasons for your answer.

Section C. Role, responsibility, and task difficulties

10. How would you describe a typical day as a member of the administrative staff?
11. What would you regard as your main duties?
12. Which aspects of your work are you most comfortable with? Why? Which of your works are you least comfortable with? Why?
13. What is your contribution to your orchestra? Please explain your answer.
14. Do you think that the city or arts centre plays a role as an authority body of the orchestra as well?
15. In general, how do you evaluate players' work within your orchestra?
16. How about the conductor? Does he show his enthusiasm for training orchestra?
17. Who are the most impressive people in your work?
18. What was the worst memory in your work experience? Why?

19. Do you have any difficulties or constraints in carrying out your daily work? If so, please give reasons for your answer.

20. Have you have any colleague who you found it difficult to get along with (related to work)? Why?

21. What is the most difficult part of managing an orchestra, from your personal experiences? How do you deal with this problem?

(Decision making: optional)

22. What kinds of decision making occur in your orchestra? Do you have any role in decision making?

23. If yes, what sort of decision making do you participate in? And do you have any influence on the decision?

24. What is the whole process of decision making? And who is the decision maker? Please explain your answer.

25. Are you willing to participate in the decision making of orchestras? Do you think it is effective if all administrative staff join the decision making? Please give reasons for your answer.

26. What do you think of the players' participation in decision making? Do you support it?

Section D. Orchestral structure and management

27. Can you explain the orchestra's structure and how it operates (e.g. staff members, work process)?

28. How far does decision making in daily-based work affect your work? Do you think that it positively or negatively influences your ability to carry out your work?

29. Do you think having an independent orchestral executive constitution helps orchestral management?

30. What do you think about the current power relationship between the executive director and principal conductor in your orchestra? Are they equal or unequal?

31. Which power structure do you think works most effectively?

32. What is most needed in terms of effective orchestral management? Why?

Section E. Job satisfaction

33. Are you generally satisfied with your work and position? Please give reasons for your answer.

34. What factors make you less satisfied with your work?

35. Has your job ever disrupted your personal?

36. Do you have any promotion prospects?

37. Has your job satisfaction varied in the past when working for an orchestra? If so, how has it differed, and why?

38. Have you ever thought of quitting your job? If so, when and why? What is the main reason? How did you deal with that matter?

39. Would you choose your current job again if you had the opportunity to do so?

40. Has your training been adequate when joining an orchestra? Which relevant training have you received since joining an orchestra? What supervision do you receive in your current role?

Section F. Conflicts and relationship

41. How would you describe your general relationship with players? How would you describe your general relationship with civil servants? And how would you describe your general relationship with conductor?

42. Is there any conflict with players, conductors, or civil servants (if applicable)? If so, why? Please give reasons for your answer.

43. How about your relationship with other administrative staff? Is there any conflict relationship?

44. What do you think about the relationship between players and conductor; and between players and civil servants?

45. Have you ever had the experience of changing a conductor as a result of conflict with players?

46. In your view, what are the causes of conflict among players?

47. Have you ever experienced any problems with colleague or supervisor? If so, how did you deal with it? How could these problems be prevented?

Section G. Key issues and changes

48. What do you think about transforming municipal orchestras into independent charitable foundations which are considered as an ideal formation for future Korean orchestras?

49. (in case of KSO players and staff) Do you agree with the decision of the KBS that asks to KBS Symphony Orchestras to be independent? Please give reasons.

50. (in case of KSO players and staff) Your orchestra has been performing without a principal conductor and several players because of the KBS's decision regarding orchestral independence. Does KBS have any plan to invite a principal conductor and fill vacant orchestral positions?

51. As an administrative staff, how do you define a success of orchestra? Please explain your answer.

52. Some believe that orchestra's success is decided by principal conductor. Do you agree with this opinion? If so (if not), why?

53. What kind of conductor do you prefer? Do you think he/she needs to have a role in orchestral management, or to focus on music?

54. Is there any priority change regarding orchestral management when the executive director or principal conductor changes? Please give examples.

55. Related to the objectives of municipal orchestras, how does your orchestra pursue the objectives?

Section H. Musicians' union

56. Does your orchestra have a musicians' union?

57. What does your city think of musicians' union? If city is not favorable, do you know the reason?

58. (in case of players) Are you a member of a musicians' union?

59. How many players belong to the musicians' union? What is their role? Is there any other players' representative body? If so, what is the name of organisation; how many people joined?; and what is its role?

60. Do you know why some players do not join the union?

Section I. Audition

61. Do you have a regular audition in your orchestra? If so, how often do you have?

62. What do you think about regular auditions? Do you think they are necessary for an orchestra's development?

63. What is your opinion about having regular audition? Any suggestions?

Section J. Financial resources

64. What is the main source of income? If your orchestra has extra income from engagement concerts, does this go into the orchestra's account or the city?

65. Has your orchestra experienced financial difficulties? If so, how did you deal with it?

66. Can I have a financial statement for your orchestra later?

(Final comments)

67. Do you have any other comments or suggestions you would like to give?

Thank you very much for your cooperation.