

**The French Invasions of Portugal 1807-1811:
rebellion, reaction and resistance**

Anthony Gray

MA by Research

**University of York
Department of History
Centre for Eighteenth Century Studies**

June 2011

Abstract

Portugal's involvement in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars resulted in substantial economic, political and social change revealing interconnections between state and economy that have not been acknowledged fully within the existing literature. On the one hand, economic and political change was precipitated by the flight of Dom João, the removal of the court to Rio de Janeiro, and the appointment of a regency council in Lisbon: events that were the result of much more than the mere confluence of external drivers and internal pressures in Europe, however complex and compelling they may have been at the time. Although governance in Portugal had been handed over to the regency council strict limitations were imposed on its autonomy. Once Lisbon was occupied, and French military government imposed on Portugal, her continued role as entrepôt, linking the South Atlantic economy to that of Europe, could not be guaranteed. Brazil's ports were therefore opened to foreign vessels and restrictions on agriculture, manufacture and inter-regional trade in the colonies were lifted presaging a transition from neo-mercantilism to proto-industrialised capitalism. The meanings of this dislocation of political power and the shift of government from metropolis to colony were complex, not least in relation to the location and limits of absolutist authority. The immediate results of which were a series of popular insurrections in Portugal, a swift response by the French military

government and conservative reaction by Portuguese élites, leading to widespread popular resistance in 1808 and 1809 and, subsequently, Portugal's wholesale involvement in the Peninsular War with severe and deleterious effects on the Portuguese population and economy. Ultimately, these events would lead to demands for constitutional reform and civil war but not, as yet, the dismantling of mercantilism, the abolition of slavery or the separation of Portugal and Brazil as independent states. Ironically, the forces for change in this regard, in the years immediately following the Napoleonic Wars, would appear stronger in the metropolis and weaker in its former colony.

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Preface

The idea for this dissertation arose out of a determination to set the French invasions of Portugal in context with particular reference to economics, politics, government policy, diplomacy and their various and profound effects on Portugal and Portuguese society. As the research and writing progressed, it became increasingly apparent that the origins and effects of the French invasions were not only highly complex and multifaceted they were also either poorly recognised or misrepresented within the existing literature in English. In comparison, much has been made of the contradistinction and complementarity of continuity and change in the long eighteenth century within other European countries, for example the routes of transition from absolutism to democracy and the development of the modern European state.

Similarly, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars have received substantial attention. This period has often been represented as a disconnected and well-defined discontinuity shaped by (and itself shaping) political-military events and, in some cases, the coalescence of ideology and violence impacting on and shaping more gradual longer term, social, economic, cultural and political developments. That there is a need to combine aspects of these various approaches within historical studies of Europe in both the early-modern and modern periods is incontestable. The purpose and method of this research,

therefore, was to build upon these approaches and locate Portuguese experiences of the Peninsular War within a broader contextual framework encompassing both pan-European and extra-European perspectives.¹

There were three defining moments in drafting. The first came with the recognition that the transfer of the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro was the result of much more than the mere confluence of external drivers and internal pressures in Europe, however complex and compelling they may have been at the time. The consensus is as follows. On the one hand, Napoleon demanded compliance with the Continental System and threatened invasion to impose his will. On the other, Britain sent a fleet and a strongly worded ultimatum to Portugal: accede to the request to re-locate the court to Brazil or face the possible bombardment of Lisbon, the loss of the Portuguese fleet and isolation from her Empire. Meantime, relations between Portugal and Spain vacillated between military and economic conflict, both on the continents of Europe and South America, often involving one or other of these two European super-powers. However, although it is indisputable that small countries can often depend, or become dependent upon, larger and more powerful countries, they are often, also, capable of self-determinism and of having a specific trajectory,

¹ Stuart Woolf, The construction of a European world-view in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic years, *Past & Present*, vol. 137, no. 1, 72-101, esp. pp. 73-81.

economically, politically, socially and ideologically, for transition.² I argue here that in order to understand these external drivers, internal pressures and seminal events correctly, they need to be re-examined critically, not just in relation to other European powers but also in the context of north and west Europe's relations with the world's other continents and, in particular, the Atlantic and the political economy of Empire.³

The second moment came with the identification of interconnections between state and economy in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century that have not been acknowledged fully within the existing literature. In earlier periods, war had been driven by struggles of a religious nature and to preserve or challenge royal lines and, throughout the long eighteenth century, dynastic succession and the defence of absolutism. But the defining characteristics of conflict in the Seven Years War and after, the period often referred to as that of enlightened despotism, were economic, political, ideological and, increasingly, global in nature as well as military. In this, the French invasions of Portugal, Britain's response, and Spain and Portugal's involvement in the Peninsular War, were symptomatic of the convergence of highly complex developments in relation to commerce and trade - for example capital

² Barrington Moore jnr. *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world*, (London : Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1967 - pbk version, 1973).

³ John H. Parry, *Trade and Dominion: the European overseas empires in the eighteenth century*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971)

accumulation and investment, expertise in finance, shipping and insurance - and their interconnection with imperialism and military conflict. Suffice to say that the scale and costs of the latter for major European powers had become the single largest item of state expenditure.⁴ The interactions of state, ideology and political economy therefore must therefore be taken into account and critically assessed.

Viewing these developments in the two decades spanning the eighteenth century *fin de siècle* in these ways, and accepting economics as an increasingly important component of ideology, if not ideology in its own right, allows us to establish the links between mercantilism and the theory of free (or free-er) trade, within and between cores and peripheries, that defined and shaped this new age of global imperialism.⁵ The examination of these shifting and unpredictable contingencies, political and diplomatic relations, and complex alliances, helps us to understand why Portugal ultimately aligned with Britain, rather than France, and why the Portuguese court transferred to Brazil. But we also need to consider

⁴ C.A. Bayly, 'The first age of global imperialism, c. 1760–1830', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1998, vol. 26, no. 2, 28-47 (especially pp. 29-33) and George Modelski, 'The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1978, vol. 20, no. 2, 214-235.

⁵ For a review of the impact of state policy on economic development, trade and Empire see Ralph Davis, *The rise of the Atlantic economies*, (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) and for the origins and ideology of classical political economy and imperialism see Bernard Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism 1750-1850*, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1970 - pbk version, 2004).

these issues were mediated through multifaceted and often competing ideologies, for example the development of political economy as a science and form of discourse and the fundamental nature and meaning of Empire. ⁶

The third defining moment came with the proper appreciation of the rebellion of the Portuguese people in 1808, the reaction of the French and Portuguese élites and popular resistance in 1808 and 1809 and the need to explore these in terms of causes, lived experiences and effects. There is, still, no modern investigation of the Portuguese insurrections in English. Within historiography they have, in the main, been consigned as insignificant events; and their main impacts viewed extremely negatively - for example, their role in undermining formal military mobilisation and discipline. While they need to be seen in terms of their location within military conflict, they also need to be explored in terms of prevailing property relations, forms of land tenure and the social relations of production: the material conditions upon which the absolutist state was founded and perhaps also expressions of social consciousness such as agricultural unrest.

⁷ In the absence of access to archival material, best use has been made of published primary and near contemporary sources by way of historical and

⁶ Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism*, pp. 6-15 and Bayly, 'The first age of global imperialism', pp. 28-30

⁷ Charles J. Esdaile (ed.), *Popular resistance in the French Wars: patriotism, partisans and land pirates*, (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon's Cursed War: Popular Resistance in the Spanish Peninsular War*, (London - New York : Verso, 2008).

critical review. Of course this means taking the limitations and potential bias of these types of accounts into consideration: for example, their polemical and ideological form and intention.

That being said, there was clearly a groundswell, albeit uncoordinated, of popular uprisings and support for informal and formal military opposition to the French. That these insurrections have been deliberately misrepresented by Portuguese historians and incorporated into a nationalist narrative in the late nineteenth century, as in other countries, is not denied.⁸ But these issues have also been reviewed and analysed critically, and different conclusions about them have been reached, over the last hundred years or so, as examples of patriotic resistance or social and political revolution.⁹ They did happen and do need to be investigated fully. While they appear to have commonalities with insurrections in other countries there are also a number of particular features that cannot be fully understood by making generalisations with reference to other specific instances of similar insurrections taking place elsewhere. For these reasons, in order to examine the instances of rebellion, reaction and resistance

⁸. Mendo Castro Henriques, '1812 e a geopolítica da guerra peninsular', in Instituto da Defesa Nacional, *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da Europa dividida à união Europeia*, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005), 171-194, pp. 171-76 and 193-94,.

⁹. The overall conclusions, respectively, of Artur De Magalhães Basto, 'O Pôrto contra Junot', in Damião Peres (ed.), *Revista de Estudos Históricos*, 1.º Ano, n.º 4, 1924, pp. 51-61; 88-120; and 121-147 and Vasco Pulido Valente, 'O povo em armas: a revolta nacional de 1808-1809', *Análise Social*, vol. XV, no. 57, 1979, 7-48.

fully and correctly, we will need to inverse both the line of approach that has been taken thus far within military histories and critically examine the causal relationships and effects that have been attributed to them.

That the Portuguese insurrections and popular resistance during the French invasions need to be identified, described and explored then is undisputed.¹⁰ As we have seen, a range of contemporary sources, nineteenth century histories and more recent texts validate their existence, providing evidence for the scale and nature of the insurrections and affording insights into the complexities of their causes and effects.¹¹ A common link between left and right in later nineteenth century Portuguese literature was a growing resentment of British involvement in Portuguese affairs and, specifically, her role in precipitating the transfer of the court to Brazil, the loss of Portugal's foremost colony, and the development of underdevelopment within Portugal as a British protectorate or, worse still, informal colony.¹² The Portuguese historian Soriano, though, in contrast to the more strident republicanism of other late nineteenth century writers concludes that, despite the energy and enthusiasm of the Portuguese people, taking into account the lack of armaments, experienced officers and - above all - the lack of

¹⁰ Charles J. Esdaile (ed.) *Popular resistance in the French Wars*, pp.207-08 - although Esdaile's assertion that "not a single Lusitanian historian appears ever to have investigated the issue of the 'people's war' at all", p.215, is incorrect.

¹¹ See the discussion below: das Neves, Chaby and Soriano, p. 5; Valente and Matos, p. 62; and Basto p. 68.

¹² Henriques, '1812 e a geopolítica da guerra peninsular', pp. 172-75

military discipline, Portugal would not have been able to overthrow the French without the support of Britain.¹³ Moreover, and notably, all of these fundamental inadequacies were exemplified in Soriano's description of the defeated uprising in Évora. In comparison, other writers have asserted (somewhat unconvincingly) that Portugal overthrew the French alone and British intervention was neither requested nor needed.¹⁴ In resisting the temptation to hypothesise about the outcomes, were Britain not to have intervened, I would note that British motives were not solely, if at all, altruistic.

While the structure of the dissertation is broadly defined by the chronology of events leading up to and during the three French invasions of Portugal, there is an inordinate focus on the first two invasions. The rationale for this is twofold. Firstly, I have not set out to define or describe military conflict between 1807 and 1811: rather my primary interest lies in its causes and effects. Secondly, the almost wholesale militarisation of Portugal in the period 1810 to 1811, apart from one or two exceptional cases, precluded the sorts of spontaneous, popular insurrections and resistance that took place in 1808 and 1809. That these insurrections were prompted by the impositions and exactions of military

¹³ Simão José da Luz Soriano, *Historia da Guerra Civil e do estabelecimento do governo parlamentar em Portugal: compreendendo a historia diplomatica, militar e politica d'este reino desde 1777 até 1834*, (Nineteen Volumes, Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1866-1890).

¹⁴ See Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 1, pp. 353-54 and Henriques, '1812 e a geopolítica da guerra', pp 175-76.

government in 1808 rather than developing as measures of self defence in the face of invasion is unquestionable. However, the hectic, frenzied and - at times - rebellious, nature of these insurrections prompted, in turn, not only a ruthless reaction from the French but also a powerful response from Portuguese élites to harness and control excesses and direct, in some cases through coercion or social conditioning and in others through the promulgation of a fervid Franco-phobia, popular animosity towards the French invaders. Whilst it would be an exaggeration to claim total opposition to the French and support for the war effort by the Portuguese people, by 1809 the extent and intensity of popular resistance to the French was such that a non-military resolution to conflict was unthinkable. By 1810, despite the emergence of specific internal political conflict, in both Portugal and Britain, and disagreements as to the implementation of military strategy, the “common cause” prevailed.¹⁵ It would be unwise to claim total political support for, and popular compliance with, wholesale military conscription and mobilisation: but when in history has this ever been the case? Moreover, there are numerous examples in eyewitness accounts demonstrating

¹⁵ See, Donald D. Horward, ‘Wellington as strategist, 1808-14’, in Norman Gash, (ed.), *Wellington: studies in the military and political career of the first Duke of Wellington*, (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1990) and ‘Wellington and the Defence of Portugal’, *The International History Review*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Feb., 1989), 39-54. We await a similar study from the Portuguese perspective.

opposition to recruitment, reluctance to serve, desertion and insubordination.¹⁶

But again, why would Portugal, and popular responses to recruitment to the army, be any different to that in other comparable European country at the time? These issues are not conveniently ignored here, and they do deserve an objective review at some point in the future. But the balance of political and popular resolve to oppose the French from the summer of 1808 in Portugal had, in overall terms, undeniably, convincingly and decisively tipped away from collaboration towards resistance.¹⁷

This dissertation is organised as follows. An introductory chapter reviews the bibliography. We then set out and explore the origins of the French invasions in the long eighteenth century. The middle section of the dissertation takes up the analysis of political conflict between the various factions at the court of Prince João, explores the extension of conflict into the economic and social spheres, the Portuguese insurrections, and the establishment of the juntas. We also consider the mobilisation of the Portuguese military, the contribution of ordinary people to the war effort and the effects of the war on Portugal and its population. A final chapter provides a recapitulation of the research and some tentative conclusions and suggestions for further investigation.

¹⁶ See, for example, Charles J. Esdaile, *Peninsular Eyewitnesses: the experience of war in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1813*, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2008).

¹⁷ And therefore away from the "inner" Empire: Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon 1799-1815*, (London and New York : Edward Arnold, 1996).

Acknowledgements

Over a period of almost three years, in which this study has been researched and completed, a great deal of support has been received that needs to be acknowledged. I must first of all thank the various people who have contributed by way of debate and helped with bibliographical research. The knowledge and generosity of contributors to the *Napoleon Series*, together with the scholarly and amicable dialogue promoted by its editors and moderators, have helped to sustain and enrich the present study. That being said, a special word of thanks must go to the following colleagues and friends: Tony Broughton, Bob Burnham, João Centeno, Alain Chappet, Donald E. Graves, Tom Holmberg, Dominique Laude, Oscar Lopez, Isabel Soares de Luna, Ron McGuigan, Tim Mahon, Howie Muir, Jorge Quinta-Nova, Robert Ouvrard, Rafael Pardo, Ralph R. Reinertsen, Roberto A. Scattolin, Dominique Timmermans and last, but certainly not least, Steven H. Smith for thought-provoking discussion and generous help with sourcing texts. An especial mention must be made of the lively, continuous, and extremely productive, discussion with Moisés Gaudêncio throughout this research and for which I am hugely indebted. I would also particularly like to convey my thanks to Nuno Lemos Pires, Ian Robertson and Rui Moura for some very kind words, friendly advice and encouragement in a time of need.

I would like to thank Dr. Roger Lloyd-Jones for supporting my application to study for this MA; Dr. Rory J. Muir for signposting research material; Professor Charles J. Esdaile for, amongst other things, an enthusiastic endorsement of the research subject and some very useful and insightful comments on the initial draft of this dissertation and Dr. Geoff Cubitt for constructive criticism and sound advice. Special recognition is due to Professor Van J. Gore for not only introducing me to historical and critical studies but also

for providing extremely valuable comments on, and help with developing insights from, an earlier draft of the manuscript. I would finally like to pay tribute to my supervisor Professor Alan Forrest for excellent direction, stimulating debate, unremitting intellectual and moral support and, above all, relentless encouragement to complete and submit this dissertation. Bem hajam! The usual disclaimer applies in relation to errors of fact, inadequate analysis and interpretation, or any remaining ambiguity within the following pages, for which I alone bear responsibility.

Last, but not least, my heartfelt thanks go to my wife Christine as always for her support with, and tolerance of, an obsession.

Anthony Gray

Author's declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this dissertation. This is a true copy of the dissertation, including any revisions as required by my examiners.

Anthony Gray

Orthographical note

Modern Portuguese and Spanish spelling has been presented throughout the text except where quoted from contemporary sources (and Portuguese historical texts and documents printed prior to 1911). For example, when referring to individuals, Sousa Coutinho has been used in preference to the contemporary form of Souza Coutinho; and place names Viseu and Castelo Branco as opposed to Vizeu and Castello Branco. I apologise in advance for any unintentional errors related to spelling, orthography and diacritical marks in the Portuguese text presented in this study. ¹⁸

¹⁸ For a useful survey of the main orthographical changes following the revolution of 1911 see Maro Beath Jones, 'The revised Portuguese orthography', *Hispania*, 1921, vol. 4, no. 4, 168-74. A copy of the *Dicionário de Inglês-Português* (Porto : Editora, undated) has been a constant companion throughout this research.

Dedication

For Melvin: a much loved brother, historian, artist and friend.

Chapter one: bibliographical essay

A great many books in English on the Peninsular War have appeared in the last century or so. These publications have ranged from the seven volume study written by Professor Sir Charles Oman¹⁹ and published in a period spanning Britain's colonial wars and the depression between two great world wars, to the single volume survey by Professor Charles Esdaile in the first decade of the current century.²⁰ Two common characteristics of these standard texts, if not shared by a significant proportion of books that have appeared in the intervening years between their publication (or since), is that they attempted to provide a balanced account from the point of view of the major protagonists involved. Oman's study was not only substantially more comprehensive in scope than that undertaken by Napier (a participant in the conflict) and the near contemporary account offered by Southey (poet-laureate and Iberian traveller) it was also considered to be a major departure from the standard approach to historical work by his contemporaries in British

¹⁹. Throughout the twentieth century this work had remained the most important study on the Peninsular War, readily available in English, Sir Charles Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War*, (Seven volumes, Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1902-1930). It is probably important to note that although Oman insisted that this "new history" was not intended to supplant Napier's account, it did indeed prove to be a useful corrective to that work if not fully revisionist in nature. It is not coincidental that Oman acknowledged the support and insights of the military historians Commandants Balagny and Martinien (of the Section Historique in France) and the Spanish General Arceche and their respective supporting academic infrastructures.

²⁰. Charles J. Esdaile, *The Peninsular War: A New History*, (London : Allen lane, 2002).

universities.²¹ Oman corrected many, if not all, of Napier's prejudices: most particularly curbing his extreme anti-Spanish bias and obvious tolerances in relation to Soult and Napoleon. However, the first two volumes, and in particular his coverage of the first French invasion and occupation of Portugal in 1807 and 1808, were less comprehensive and authoritative than subsequent volumes. This is unfortunate given their seminal importance to this dissertation. Oman did make good use of the work of the Portuguese historian Soriano in later volumes, but non-military subject matters, and relatively obscure operations and campaigns, including those undertaken by irregular Portuguese and Spanish forces, often received uneven treatment throughout his work.²² Griffith's edited volume contributes substantially to our understanding of the strengths and limitations of Oman's history and of the milieu in which he worked, provides some very useful essays and is an invaluable secondary source for more detailed investigation of specific aspects or periods of the war in which Oman was less thorough.²³ In terms

²¹ William Francis Patrick Napier (1785-1860), *History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814*, (Six volumes, London : 1828-1840); Robert Southey (1774-1843), *History of the Peninsular War*, (Three volumes, London : John Murray, 1823-1832). Both Lord Byron and Southey espoused, romanticised and politicised opposition to Napoleon in Iberia, extolling Spanish patriotism and English heroism whilst denouncing French betrayal and treachery (although Byron also, famously, censured Britain's involvement in the Convention of Cintra).

²² David Gates, *The Spanish ulcer: a history of the Peninsular War*, (London : Pimlico, 2002), is a useful single volume survey that attempts, albeit not always successfully, to address some of these latter limitations – certainly in relation to Spain if not Portugal.

²³ Paddy Griffith (ed.), *A History of the Peninsular War volume IX: modern studies of the war in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814*, (London : Greenhill Books, 1999).

of the subject matter of this dissertation, the essays by Griffith himself, and those of Esdaile, Livermore and Muir, are particularly enlightening.²⁴

Despite being dated, and highly prejudiced, Napier's account still reveals some useful insights for the specialist politico-military historian. Meanwhile, Southey's account remains valuable, particularly in relation to the earliest years of the conflict and Portuguese and Spanish perspectives and, more specifically, for his detailed analysis of the first French invasion and occupation of Portugal in 1807 and 1808 (for much of which he follows das Neves). But Southey's overt Romanticism and Hispanicism, and that of other contemporary and near contemporary British accounts, need to be borne in mind,²⁵ just as we should view critically diaries, journals, memoirs and histories written later in the nineteenth century from specific authors of whatever nationality.²⁶

²⁴ Paddy Griffith, 'Oman's Peninsular War today'; Charles J. Esdaile, 'Oman's history in its Spanish context'; Harold Livermore, 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War'; Rory Muir, 'Britain and the Peninsular War'; in Griffith (ed.), *A History of the Peninsular War volume IX*.

²⁵ See Juan L. Sánchez, 'Byron, Spain, and the romance of Childe Harold's Pilgrimage', *European Romantic Review*, vol. 20, no. 4, 2009, 443-464, Lynda Pratt, 'Robert Southey, Writing and Romanticism', *Érudit*, no. 32-33, November 2003 - February 2004 and Diego Saglia, 'O My Mother Spain!': The Peninsular War, Family Matters, and the Practice of Romantic Nation-Writing', *ELH*, vol. 65, no. 2, Summer 1998, 363-393.

²⁶ The bibliographical appendices in Griffith provide some useful information in this regard: Griffith (ed.), *A History of the Peninsular War*, and see Ian Fletcher, 'Wellington's army: a bibliographical essay', in Ian Fletcher, (ed.), *The Peninsular War: aspects of the struggle for the Iberian Peninsula*, (Staplehurst : Spellmount, 1998) and Sir Charles Oman, *Studies in the Napoleonic Wars*, (London : Methuen, 1929). Unfortunately, the readily available literature is both in English and Anglo-centric.

A number of French histories have been published throughout the last century. The French generals Foy and Thiébault, both of whom participated in the first French invasion, subsequently published detailed surveys of the campaign, while Foy also wrote an incomplete history of the war and his memoirs were posthumously published.²⁷ From that time, standard French military histories almost consistently focused on those aspects of the Peninsular War in which the Emperor was personally involved, and therefore the struggle for Spain. Indeed, in French the war is generally referred to as *La Guerre d'Espagne*: see for example the work of Balagny, Grandmaison and Grasset.²⁸ Balagny later wrote a very useful article on the battle of Bussaco, which clearly influenced and enhanced Oman's account of the conflict, while the work of his colleague at the *Section Historique* of the French army staff, Martinien, provided Oman with very useful empirical evidence of the extent of French officer deaths, casualties and losses from volume three onwards.²⁹ Meanwhile, modern French histories have attempted less

²⁷ Paul Thiébault, *Relation de l'Expédition du Portugal, faite en 1807-8, par le 1er Corps d'Observation de la Gironde, devenu armée de Portugal. Par le Baron Thiébault, Lieutenant-Général.* (Paris : Chez Magimel, Anselin et Pochard, 1817), Maximilien-Sébastien Foy, *Histoire de la guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon par le général Foy*, (Four volumes & atlas, Paris : Baudouin Frères, 1827) and Maurice Girod de l'Ain, *Vie militaire du général Foy*, (Paris : Plon. Nourrit, 1900).

²⁸ Commandant Balagny, *Campagne de l'Empereur Napoléon en Espagne, 1808-1809*, (Five volumes, Paris : Berger Levrault, 1902-1907), Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *L'Espagne et Napoléon*, (Two volumes, Paris : Plon, 1908-1925) ; Alphonse Louis Grasset, *La guerre d'Espagne*, (Nancy : Berger-Levrault, 1914).

²⁹ Commandant Balagny, 'La bataille de Bussaco', *Revue d'Histoire, rédigée à l'État-Major de l'armée*, X^e année, no. 96, (1908) 515-36, XI^e année, no. 97, (1909) 128-60, and XI^e année, no. 98, (1909) 324-37 ; Aristide Martinien, *Tableaux, par corps et par batailles, des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de*

successfully than those available in English to widen the scope of study and retain academic credibility; see for example Molières and Bernard.³⁰ Finally, Montrossier provides a very useful comparative study of French and British memoirs, although we still await a comprehensive history of the invasions of Portugal and Peninsular War from the French perspective.³¹

Despite the arrival, during the last decade or so, of a number of modern and fairly comprehensive surveys of the conflict, incorporating Spanish and French perspectives in English, there has been no concerted effort to provide a commensurately balanced account from the point of view of Portugal (either in terms of the incorporation of contemporary accounts or more recent historiography). For these reasons, recourse to reliable Portuguese sources is indispensable.³² For the Portuguese economist and statesman das Neves, a primary importance of the history he was writing was to encourage popular opposition to the French, which is clear within his vehemently, anti French

l'Empire (1805-1815), (Paris : H. Charles-Lavauzelle, 1899) and *Tableaux, par corps et par batailles, des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l'Empire (1805-1815) : supplément*, (Paris : L. Fournier, 1909).

³⁰ Michel Molières, *Les expéditions françaises en Portugal de 1807 à 1811*, (Paris : Publibook, 2007) and Léonce Bernard, *Soldats d'Espagne : récits de guerre, 1808-1814*, (Paris : Giovanangeli, 2008) : the former lacks a proper scholarly structure and the latter is a collection of edited samples from well known journals and memoirs – neither provide a definitive bibliography.

³¹ Laurence Montrossier, 'Français et Britanniques dans la péninsule, 1808-1814', *Annales historiques de la révolution française*, No. 348, No. 2, avril / juin, 2007, 131-45.

³² Although concise and accurate, the utility of Livermore's review in 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War', in this respect, is severely restricted due to the omission of a scholarly apparatus. The two most comprehensive single volume surveys by Esdaile and Gates, respectively, *A new History* and *The Spanish ulcer*, between them cite just three Portuguese secondary sources.

perspectives. However, he provides us with some unique and extremely useful contemporary observations.³³ There is also a need to review the antecedents of the conflict, such as Portugal's diplomatic manoeuvres and involvement in the Revolutionary Wars. For this earlier period and the duration of the Peninsular War the detailed work of Chaby³⁴ and the history of Soriano³⁵ are obligatory, combining historical interpretation with primary documentation, and the more recent contributions by Amaral in this regard who, in addition to providing useful details of shifts in foreign policy also reviews politico- military development and social change in the final quarter of the nineteenth century.³⁶ However, as we have noted in the development of the historiography in English, French and Spanish there is an overriding need to ensure both historical accuracy and impartiality and apply modern historical research methods to ensure these accounts are comprehensive and brought up to date.

³³ José Acúrcio das Neves, *História geral da invasão dos Franceses em Portugal e da restauração deste reino*, (Five volumes, Lisboa : Simão Thaddeo Ferreira, 1810-1811).

³⁴ Cláudio de Chaby, *Excerptos históricos e collecção de documentos relativos á guerra denominada da Peninsula e ás anteriores de 1801, e do Roussillon e Cataluña*, (Five volumes, Lisboa : Portugal Comissão de investigações historicas, Imprensa Nacional, 1863-1882).

³⁵ Simão José da Luz Soriano, *Historia da Guerra Civil e do estabelecimento do governo parlamentar em Portugal: comprehendendo a historia diplomatica, militar e politica d'este reino desde 1777 até 1834*, (Nineteen Volumes, Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1866-1890).

³⁶ Manuel Amaral, 'Portugal e as guerras da revolução, de 1793 a 1801: do Roussilhão ao Alemtejo', in *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da Europa dividida à união Europeia*, (Lisboa : Tribuna da História, 2005) and *A luta política em Portugal nos finais do antigo regime: a proposta de reforma do exército português de 1803*, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2010).

For example, the concept of Portugal as a nation in arms would appear to have undergone a renaissance in the late nineteenth century by (serving) military historians, many of whom would appear to have also been (intrinsically) linked to the Republican Party in Portugal but also, paradoxically, opposed to (further) liberalisation of Portugal. The loss of Brazil presaged a greater interest in its other colonies, for example along the west coast of Africa and Mozambique. This would be a major factor influencing Portuguese politics, society and its economy well into the twentieth-century: indeed, unlike many other European states, Portugal retained her African colonies into the final quarter of that century. Understanding the concept is further complicated given the interest in Portuguese nationalism and colonialism by conservatives and socialists alike. An example of the former, Ramalho Ortigão commended Portugal to Britain in his satirical, some might argue vitriolic, address "To Mr. John Bull" on the occasion of a visit of the Prince of Wales to Lisbon, as "seu amigo, aliado e cliente, sempre explorado e sempre agradecido" (your friend, ally and client, always exploited and always grateful, my translation). Joaquim Pedro Oliveira Martins, as an example of the latter, reported in his *História de Portugal* that Portugal was "a ferramenta, o criado, a mula de carga de Inglaterra" (the tool, the servant, the pack mule of England, my translation), and asserted that Britain had inflicted more damage on Portugal than had the French

during the invasions of 1807-1811.³⁷ A common link between left and right therefore was a growing resentment of British involvement in Portugal and her role in precipitating the transfer of the court to Brazil, and therefore the loss of Portugal's foremost colony, and the development of underdevelopment within Portugal, or worse still, as a British protectorate and dependent state.³⁸

Both the early work of the progressive historian Oliveira Marques³⁹ and the more conservative Serrão⁴⁰ are helpful in this regard – but they too are now somewhat dated. Future histories of the conflict will need to take into account two modern, comprehensive and broad-ranging histories directed and edited, respectively, by the historians Mattoso⁴¹ and Serrão and Oliveira Marques.⁴² Although the volume in the Mattoso edition on the *antigo regime* is lacking in relation to Portugal's Empire and the commensurate volume in the latter edition is

³⁷ Ramalho Ortigão, *John Bull, depoimento de uma testemunha ácerca de alguns aspectos da vida e da civilização inglesa*, (Porto : Luga and Genelioux, 1887), pp. 95-97, Joaquim Pedro Oliveira Martins, *História de Portugal*, (Two volumes, Lisboa : Parceria A.M. Pereira, 1908), vol. 2, pp. 268 and 269.

³⁸ See the useful discussion in Mendo Castro Henriques, '1812 e a geopolítica da Guerra Peninsular', in *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações*, pp. 172-76.

³⁹ A.H. de Oliveira Marques, *História de Portugal: das origens às revoluções liberais.*, vol. 1 of *História de Portugal*, (Two volumes, Lisboa : Palas Editores, 1974).

⁴⁰ Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, (Five volumes: Lisbon : Editorial Verbo, 1977-1980): in particular *O despotismo iluminado, 1750-1807*, (1977) and *A instauração do liberalismo, 1807-1832*, (1977).

⁴¹ José Mattoso (ed.), *História de Portugal (vol. 4): O Antigo Regime (1620-1807)*, (Lisboa : Editorial Estampa, 1993) and José Mattoso (ed.), *História de Portugal (vol.5): O Liberalismo (1807-1890)*, (Lisboa : Editorial Estampa, 1993);

⁴² Joel Serrão and A.H. de Oliveira Marques (dirs. and eds.), *Nova história de Portugal*, (Ten volumes, (Lisboa : Editorial Presença). The most relevant volume is: vol. 9: *Portugal e a instauração do liberalismo*, (Lisboa : Editorial Presença, 2002). Thirteen volumes were planned but, unfortunately, the death of the two authors, the latter in 2010, has meant that the planned volume 8 of *Nova história de Portugal: Portugal, a crise do Antigo Regime*, has not been published.

missing entirely from the collection. The interested historian therefore has to be both diligent and resourceful. With the notable exception of Livermore, who provides a useful - albeit brief - summary of political, diplomatic and military issues in the late eighteenth century and *fin de siècle* Portugal, the literature in English is extremely sparse.⁴³ In addition to accessing Portuguese sources, a good understanding of the potential contribution of the literature in relation to Brazil is absolutely necessary in order to understand the interaction and interconnectedness of state and economy and the shifting, unpredictable and often unforeseen events in this crucial period. Alexandre and Cardoso are essential for our understanding of political economy and the symbiotic relationship between metropole and colony.⁴⁴ For data on the Portuguese population and economy I have relied upon Ferro and Serrão, Reis (and others) and Valério.⁴⁵

⁴³ Harold Livermore, 'Portugal on the Eve of the Peninsular War' in Paddy Griffith (ed.), *A History of the Peninsular War Volume IX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814*, (London : Greenhill Books, 1999), 385-398.

⁴⁴ Valentim Alexandre, *Os sentidos do Imperio. Questao nacional e questao colonial na crise do Antigo Regime portugues*, (Porto : Afrontamento, 1993); José Luís Cardoso, 'A guerra peninsular e a economia do império Luso-Brasileiro', in Instituto da Defesa nacional, *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da europa dividida à união europeia, Actas do congresso realizado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 2002*, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005),

⁴⁵ João Pedro Ferro, *A população portuguesa no final do antigo regime, 1750-1815*, (Lisboa : Editorial Presença, 1995); José V. Serrão, 'Foi o século XVIII uma época de crise ou de progresso para a agricultura Portuguesa?', *Seminários de História do Instituto de Ciências Sociais*, (Lisboa : 2004); Jaime Reis, Conceição Andrade Martins and Leonor Freire Costa, 'New estimates of Portugal's GDP per capita', paper presented at the *Portuguese Economic history Workshop*, ICS, University of Lisbon, 12 December 2011, 1-38; and Nuno Valério, 'Portuguese Economic Performance', in Juan Hernandez Andreu, José Luis Garcia Ruiz, José Morilla Critz and José Manuel Ortiz-Villajos (eds.), *Las Claves del Desarrollo Economico. Ensayos en Homenaje al Professor Gabriel Tortella* (Madrid : Universidad de Alcalá, 2010), 431- 44.

A growing number of works in English focussing on the situation in Brazil help to shed some further light for the non-Portuguese speaker on economic, social and political developments in the late eighteenth century in Portugal. For example, Lang, Maxwell, Schwartz and Schultz provide much needed details for Portuguese economics and society (albeit from the point of view of developments in Brazil).⁴⁶ For an excellent overview of mercantilism and colonialism to the end of the eighteenth century, and the rise of the Atlantic economies see, respectively, Parry and Davis.⁴⁷ While a critical, if not compelling, review of the development of under-development in Portuguese political economy and the exploitative role of Britain during the eighteenth century, is provided by Braudel.⁴⁸ For a very useful review of global politics, empire and relations within and between the two Iberian metropolises and their roles in an 'Atlantic system', see Maxwell and Paquette.⁴⁹ Finally, there is a fairly comprehensive review of the transfer of the court to Brazil

⁴⁶ James Lang, *Portuguese Brazil: the king's plantation*, (New York – London, Academic Press, 1979); Kenneth R. Maxwell, *Conflicts and Conspiracies, 1750-1808*, (New York - London : Cambridge University Press, 1973), *Pombal: paradox of the enlightenment*, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Stuart B. Schwartz, 'Magistracy and society in colonial Brazil', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 50 no. 4, 1970, pp. 715-30, *Sovereignty and society in colonial Brazil: the high court of Bahia and its judges, 1609-1751*, (University of California Press, Berkley, 1973).

⁴⁷ Parry, *Trade and dominion* and Ralph Davis, *The rise of the Atlantic economies*, (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973).

⁴⁸ Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation and capitalism, fifteenth to eighteenth century*, (Three volumes, London : William Collins, 1982), volume II, 'The wheels of commerce'.

⁴⁹ Kenneth R. Maxwell, 'The Atlantic in the eighteenth century: a southern perspective on the need to return to the 'big picture'', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series*, vol. 3, 1993, 209-236; Gabriel Paquette, 'The dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic monarchy', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 52, no. 1 (2009), 175–212.

in the work of Macaulay, Schultz and Wilcken.⁵⁰ In relation to Spain, for comparative purposes, Esdaile provides a very useful review of social and political conditions, and the crisis of the *antiguo régimen*, Ringrose reminds us that not all aspects of eighteenth century economic development were negative, Lynch describes that country's own dependence upon her Atlantic colonies, and Alden raises the question of colonial conquest and conflict in the Americas.⁵¹

This brings us to Portugal's involvement in the Revolutionary Wars, divergence from her preferred position of neutrality - the drivers of which were principally Franco-Iberian relations - and the Peninsular War. Soriano is essential for issues of diplomacy and the build up to the declaration of war and, together with Chaby, for the campaign in Roussillon until the return of the Portuguese troops, whilst Amaral provides a useful modern summary.⁵² Livermore emphasised the act of regicide, and Soriano the potential threats posed by the implementation of a constitutional monarchy to absolutism in Iberia, in

⁵⁰ Neill Macaulay, *Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986); Kirsten Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: empire, monarchy, and the Portuguese royal court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821*, (New York and London : Routledge, 2001),; Patrick Wilcken, *Empire adrift: the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821*, (London : Bloomsbury, 2004).

⁵¹ Esdaile, *A New History*, pp. 17-20 and David R. Ringrose, *Spain, Europe, and the "Spanish miracle", 1700-1900*, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), John Lynch, *Spanish colonial administration, 1782-1810: the intendant system in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata*, (Greenwood Press, 1969), Dauril Alden, 'The Undeclared War of 1773-1777: Climax of Luso-Spanish Platine Rivalry', *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 41, no. 1, (1961), 55-74.

⁵² Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 1., pp 485-506 and 507-602, respectively, Chaby, *Excerptos*, vol. 1, passim, and Amaral, 'Portugal e as guerras da revolução', pp. 46-50.

precipitating this major policy shift.⁵³ Herr has also stressed the threat posed to enlightened absolutism in Spain and, by extension, Portugal.⁵⁴ For the period 1795 to 1806, Livermore again supplies the basic information required, Soriano and Chaby a more detailed examination in Portuguese.⁵⁵ Vicente offers a revisionist viewpoint, attributing Portugal's aversion to the tenets underpinning revolution and republicanism to her relationship with Britain as opposed to examining the pervasiveness of the absolutist state, and its apparatus, and in particular the extremely reactionary policies of Dona Maria I during the period of Portuguese history referred to as *a viradeira*.⁵⁶ For European politics in the second half of the long eighteenth century see Schroeder, who provides a comprehensive treatment of the period and subject, and Kraehe, Connelly and Broers who are also very useful for the period in question.⁵⁷ For British policy and, in particular, British policy in relation to Portugal, Spain and South America see, respectively, Newitt and Robson

⁵³ Livermore, 'Portugal on the Eve of the Peninsular War', p. 385; Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 1., chapter iv, pp. 419-506.

⁵⁴ Richard Herr, *The eighteenth-century revolution in Spain*, (Princeton University Press, 1958): see especially pp. 435-44.

⁵⁵ Livermore, 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War', Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 1 and vol 2, and Chaby, *Excerptos*, vol. 1.

⁵⁶ António Pedro Vicente, *Guerra Peninsular, 1801-1814*, (Lisboa : Academia Portuguesa da História, 2007) and 'Portugal perante a política Napoléonica', in *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da europa dividida à união europeia*, Actas do congresso realizado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 2002, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005).

⁵⁷ Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848*, (Oxford University Press, 1994); Enno E. Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy: volume I the contest with Napoleon 1799-1814*, (Princeton University Press, 1963), Owen Connelly, *Napoleon's satellite kingdoms*, (New York : The Free Press, 1965), and Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon 1799-1815*, (London and New York : Edward Arnold, 1996).

and Lynch and Paquette.⁵⁸ In relation to economic conflict, the development and implementation of the Continental System and the British response see Crafts, Crouzet, Heckscher and O'Brien.⁵⁹

For a critical assessment of the campaign of 1808, and the ensuing Convention of Cintra, see Glover and for the understandable reaction of Portland's administration to the Convention and the subsequent activities of Canning and Castlereagh, see Hinde.⁶⁰ Muir has argued, convincingly, that Wellesley owed his re-appointment in 1809 as commander in chief to the British forces in Portugal to Canning, as opposed to the patronage of his friend Castlereagh, while Hinde argues that Wellesley's reputation after Cintra was saved by the steadfast defence put up by Castlereagh and Severn, meanwhile, stresses the influence of the Marquis

⁵⁸ Malyn Newitt and Martin Robson (eds.), *Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807-1820*, (Lisboa : Imprensa das Ciências Sociais, 2004); Martin Robson, *Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: alliances and diplomacy in economic maritime conflict*, (London – New York : IB Tauris, 2011); John Lynch, 'British Policy and South America', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1969, 1-30 and Paquette, 'The dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic monarchy',

⁵⁹ See N.C.R. Crafts, 'The eighteenth century: a survey', R.C. Floud and D.N. McCloskey (eds.), *The economic history of Britain since 1700*, (Two volumes, London - New York : Cambridge University Press, 1981), vol. I, and for the dislocation of trade, the effects of the Orders in Council on and other factors impeding growth in continental European economies, from a French perspective, see François Crouzet, 'Wars, blockade, and economic change in Europe, 1792-1815', *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1964, 567-588; Patrick O'Brien, 'European economic development: the contribution of the periphery', *The Economic History Review, Second Series*, vol. 35, no. 1, 1-18 and Eli F. Heckscher, *The continental system: an economic interpretation*, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1922).

⁶⁰ Michael Glover, *Michael Glover, Britannia sickens: Sir Arthur Wellesley and the convention of Cintra*, (London : Leo Cooper, 1970) and Wendy Hinde, *George Canning*, (London : Purnell Book Services, 1973), in particular pp. 201-205.

Richard Wellesley.⁶¹ In addition to Muir, Hall is essential for British strategy and the combination of military and naval resources committed to the Iberian theatre.⁶² Longford offers a liberal interpretation of Wellesley's campaigns in 1808 and 1809, while Bryant provides a more critical appraisal of the relevant issues relating to Wellesley's campaign in Spain and victory at Talavera, and conflicting perceptions of his qualities as a general and the title bestowed upon him.⁶³ Most recently, Moon has reviewed in detail a concept that has been raised repeatedly, by several of the historians interested in British policy referred to above, namely that of Wellington's two-front war.⁶⁴

Nowhere in the above is there a detailed study of the conflict from the perspective of Portugal, and most especially in relation to popular insurrections and resistance. The need and appetite for such a study is clear and, moreover, there is also a model and precedent for its development. As indicated above, Esdaile has produced a rich and broad ranging revisionist review of the Peninsular War,

⁶¹ Muir, 'Britain and the Peninsular War', Hinde, *George Canning*, John K. Severn, 'The Wellesleys and Iberian Diplomacy, 1808-12', in Norman Gash (ed.), *Wellington: studies in the military and political career of the first Duke of Wellington*, (Manchester University Press, 1990).

⁶² Christopher D. Hall, *British strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15*, (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1992) and *Wellington's Navy: Sea Power and the Peninsular War 1807-1814*, (London : Chatham Publishing, 2004)

⁶³ Elizabeth Longford, *Wellington: the years of the sword*, (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), see especially pp. 172-182, 184-190 and 198-199 and Arthur Bryant, *Years of victory, 1802 – 1812*, (London : Collins, 1944), especially pp. 310-24, and p. 358.

⁶⁴ Joshua L. Moon, *Wellington's Two-Front War: The Peninsular Campaigns, at Home and Abroad, 1808–1814*, (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2011)

incorporating a focused investigation of the origins of the conflict and a significant number of fresh insights into the war - especially those of a political and diplomatic nature. ⁶⁵ This work builds upon significant advances within the English literature, over the last few decades, in terms of our understanding of Spanish involvement in the war and its various components, for example, the complex relationships between King Carlos, Godoy and Prince Ferdinand, the *Junta Suprema* and Spain's armed forces. ⁶⁶ More recently, the seminal work of Lovett, Tone and Alexandre ⁶⁷ on *la guerrilla*, regional insurrections and counter insurgency operations have been supplemented by further works covering provincial governments, the *guerrilleros(as)*, bandits, adventurers and land pirates. ⁶⁸ More recently, this work has extended to cover the concepts of popular insurgency, resistance, coercion and control and logistics and attrition. ⁶⁹ The most recent contribution to this debate,

⁶⁶ Charles J Esdaile, 'War and Politics in Spain, 1808-1814', *The Historical Journal*, 31, 2, (1988), 295-317, 'Wellington and the Military Eclipse of Spain', 1808-1814, *The International History Review*, vol. 11, no. 1, (Feb., 1989), 55-67 and 'The duke of Wellington and command of the Spanish army', in Norman Gash, (ed.), *Wellington: studies in the military and political career of the first duke of Wellington*, (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1990) and David Gates, *The Spanish ulcer: a history of the Peninsular War*, (London : Pimlico, 2002).

⁶⁷ Gabriel Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain*, (Two volumes, New York : New York University, 1965); John L. Tone, *The fatal knot: the guerrilla war in Navarre and the defeat of Napoleon in Spain*, (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1994); and Don. W. Alexander, *Rod of iron: French counterinsurgency policy in Aragon during the Peninsular War*, (Wilmington : Scholarly Resources, 1985).

⁶⁸ Charles J. Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon, guerrillas, bandits and adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814*, (New Haven - London : Yale University Press, 2004), Charles J. Esdaile (ed.), *Popular resistance in the French wars: patriots, partisans and land pirates*, (New York : Palgrave, Macmillan, 2005).

⁶⁹ Esdaile (ed.), *Popular resistance in the French Wars*, Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon's Cursed War: Popular Resistance in the Spanish Peninsular War*, (London – New York : Verso, 2008) and John Morgan, 'War

and in particular the chapters dealing with the concepts of popular revolt and local resistance; territory and collective struggle in Galicia and Catalonia; and the (social) origins of the guerrilla, is no less revisionist than Esdaile's contribution, albeit for different reasons.⁷⁰

In comparison, with one or two exceptions such as the very informative research of Dores Costa, there has not been a commensurate focus on the origins of the war from a Portuguese perspective, the very great contribution made by Portugal and the Portuguese people or the effects of the conflict on that country and its people.⁷¹ Rather, the focus has been on the accomplishments of Beresford in equipping, mobilising, training and disciplining Portugal's front-line troops and their contribution to the victories enjoyed by the Anglo-Portuguese army under Wellington. For the former, see Livermore, Grehan, Cetre and Ward⁷² and, for the

feeding war? The impact of logistics on the Napoleonic occupation of Catalonia', *The Journal of Military History*, 73, (January 2009), 83-116.

⁷⁰ Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon's cursed war: popular resistance in the Spanish Peninsular War*, (London and New York : Verso, 2008)

⁷¹ Fernando Dores Costa, 'Army size, military recruitment and financing in Portugal during the period of the Peninsula War: 1808-1811', *e-JPH*, vol. 6, number 2, (Winter 2008) and 'Conflictos entre Wellington y los gobernadores de Portugal durante la campaña de 1810-1811 contra Masséna', *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna*, Anejo IX (2010), 123-145.

⁷² Harold Livermore, 'Beresford and reform of the Portuguese army', in Paddy Griffith (ed.), *A History of the Peninsular War volume IX: modern studies of the war in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814*, (London : Greenhill Books, 1999) , John Grehan, 'Wellington's fighting cocks: the Portuguese army in the Peninsula', in Ian Fletcher, (ed.), *The Peninsular War: aspects of the struggle for the Iberian Peninsula*, (Staplehurst : Spellmount, 1998), F. O. Cetre, 'Beresford and the Portuguese army', in Alice Berkeley (ed.), *New Lights on the Peninsular War: International Congress on the Iberian Peninsula -Selected Papers 1780-1840*, Calouste Gulbenkian Centre, Lisbon, Portugal 24th-26th July, (Lisboa : British Historical Society of Portugal, 1991) and S. G. P. Ward, 'The Portuguese infantry brigades, 1809-1814', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol. 53, no. 214, 1975, 103-12.

latter, the work of historians such as Glover and Robertson who, albeit unashamedly Anglo-centric, stand out amongst a plethora of recent, mainly derivative and reiterative, contributions.⁷³ That being said, the very recent work of Buttery provides some useful insights relating to the First French invasion and the British expeditionary force under Wellesley.⁷⁴ The bicentenary of the conflict has witnessed a resurgent interest, and some very insightful studies, over the last few years from Portuguese historians and publishers such as Mendo Castro Henriques, Rui Moura, Nuno Lemos Pires, Pires Nunes and the Tribuna da História.⁷⁵ It has only been possible to include the briefest summary of issues relating to the third French invasion, for example Wellington's protracted battle with the *Principal Sousa* (and the Bishop of Oporto) in relation to their opposition to his strategy for the defence of Portugal and the crucial involvement of Forjaz and Stuart in ensuring its successful implementation. Howard has written prolifically

⁷³ Michael Glover, *The Peninsular War: a concise military history, 1807-1814*, (London : David and Charles, 1974) and Ian Robertson, *Wellington at war in the peninsula: 1808-1814 an overview and guide*, (Barnsley : Leo Cooper, Pen and Sword, 2000).

⁷⁴ David Buttery, *Wellington against Junot: the first invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808*, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2011) provides some useful additional material but his work on the third invasion, *Wellington against Massena: the third invasion of Portugal, 1810-1811*, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2008), less so.

⁷⁵ See, for example, Instituto da Defesa Nacional, *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da Europa dividida à união Europeia*, Actas do congresso realizado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 2002, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005).

on this subject and, although dated and decidedly pro-French, this author's work remains the best source of information on this important period.⁷⁶

Finally, there is a considerable corpus of work developing our understanding of the personal and public spheres in relation to the six years of conflict known as the Peninsular War and even on the Iberian insurrections – although the focus of the latter is squarely on events in Spain with no commensurate study in English on Portugal. Firstly, in relation to specific features of the conflict and the memoirs of protagonists the work of Fletcher, Richards and - especially Esdaile – provide us with glimpses of the human aspects of war from the perspective of the main protagonists.⁷⁷ My reasons for omitting the wide range of primary sources from participants within the Anglo-Portuguese army are quite straightforward. The extent of British memoirs is extensive and their use plentiful and well known within the existing literature. Generally speaking, with one or two notable exceptions,

⁷⁶ Donald D. Horward: *The French Campaign in Portugal 1810-1811: An Account by Jean Jaques Pelet*, (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1973); *Napoleon and Iberia: The Twin Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810*, (University Press Florida, 1984); 'Wellington and the Defence of Portugal', *The International History Review*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Feb., 1989), 39-54, and 'Wellington as a strategist, 1808-14', in Norman Gash, (ed.), *Wellington: studies in the military and political career of the first duke of Wellington*, (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1990).

⁷⁷ Ian Fletcher, (ed.), *The Peninsular War: aspects of the struggle for the Iberian Peninsula*, (Staplehurst : Spellmount, 1998) and *Voices from the peninsula: eyewitness accounts by soldiers of Wellington's army*, (Stackpole, Pennsylvania : Greenhill, 2001), D.S. Richards, *The peninsula veterans*, (London : Macdonald and Jane's, 1975) and *The peninsula years: Britain's redcoats in Spain and Portugal*, (Barnsley : Leo Cooper, 2002) and Charles J. Esdaile, *Peninsular Eyewitnesses: the experience of war in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1813*, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2008). Despite the wider scope of the latter, none of these surveys provide insights into the human aspects of the war for the Portuguese unless refracted through the prism of the British soldier or officer.

their views of indigenous Iberians are negative and - often - exceptionally xenophobic.

With the objective of providing a fresh viewpoint, I have preferred to revisit and critically re-examine French memoirs. The perspective of French participants in the conflict is almost as well-served as that of the British, and no less partisan or chauvinistic in terms of their views of indigenous Iberians, if at times more elusive, but has received comparatively little attention within the English literature in relation to these research questions. Moreover, French protagonists were eye witness of the conflict with the Portuguese in the years 1808 and 1809; the British intervening decisively after the insurrections in the former and subsequent to the occupation of Oporto in the latter. The quality and consistency of French eyewitness accounts, as with that of the British can vary, and they are no less contradictory, subject to bias or polemical content - all of which, together with the date of publication, editor and sponsor have to be borne in mind. The interested reader is referred to the primary and secondary sources in the bibliography for further details of French works consulted.

In addition to das Neves, reference to Basto, Matos and Pulido Valente is crucial for a correct understanding of the popular insurrections in Portugal in 1808

and 1809.⁷⁸ Vicente and Caillaux de Almeida provide some additional and useful insights from a Portuguese perspective and an interesting, if not compelling, revisionist review of French intervention in Portugal.⁷⁹ Finally, two modern studies have proved useful in bringing a Portuguese perspective to assist with our understanding of the human and public sphere.⁸⁰

Hopefully the following dissertation will prove to be a useful start, in terms of addressing the above mentioned imbalances, but there is very considerable work to be done to bring our understanding of the Portuguese (and French) experiences of this war to the level enjoyed by those interested in the British and Spanish perspectives.

⁷⁸ Artur de Magalhães Basto, 'O Pôrto contra Junot', in Damião Peres (ed.), *Revista de Estudos Históricos*, 1.º Ano – N.º 4, Outubro-Dezembro, 1924, pp. 51-61; 88-120; and 121-147, Henrique José Martins Matos, 'As juntas minhotas de 1808 na reacção à ocupação francesa', *Revista de faculdade de letras: História*, Porto, III serie, vol. 10, 2009, 43-55 and Vasco Pulido Valente, 'O povo em armas: a revolta nacional de 1808-1809', *Análise Social*, vol. XV, no. 57, 1979, 7-48.

⁷⁹ António Pedro Vicente, 'Raisons de la défaite de Napoléon au Portugal', *Rives méditerranéennes*, 'Napoléon and le Portugal', 2010, n° 36, 2, 13-26 and Tereza Caillaux de Almeida, 'L'échec des campagnes napoléoniennes au Portugal dans les Mémoires des Officiers Françaises', *Rives méditerranéennes*, 'Napoléon and le Portugal', 2010, n° 36, 2, pp. 59-69. In an interesting twist of fate, two of the most celebrated of Portuguese generals to emerge in the period 1809 to 1814 were both of French origin: Champalimaud and Lecor.

⁸⁰ Tereza Caillaux de Almeida, *Memória das 'invasões Francesas' em Portugal (1807-1811)*, (Lisboa : Ésquilo, 2010) and Luís Maria Pedrosa Dos Santos Graça, 'Resistência e conspiração no tempo da guerra peninsular: um "francesismo" regional – acção e perseguição', in *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações*, pp. 361-441.

Chapter two: the origins of the French invasions of Portugal

Economic and political relations between Britain, France, Portugal and Spain at the turn of the nineteenth century were multifaceted. And the circumstances leading up to the French invasions of Portugal, between 1807 and 1811, and British intervention in the Iberian Peninsula from 1808, were also highly complex. Immediately prior to the third invasion of 1810-1811, Portugal had been invaded twice by French armies in 1807 and 1809 and once by a Spanish army, supported by France, in 1801. While there had clearly been attempts to draw Portugal within the arc of Consular influence, and ultimately to integrate the country into the Napoleonic Empire, the origins of French designs on Portugal do not begin with Napoleon's reign. Rather, they are to be found in the longer term, throughout the long eighteenth century and, most especially, in the thirty years leading up to 1807.

While Portuguese foreign policy was often in line with that of Britain, it was not solely directed by Britain or British interests. In the final quarter of the eighteenth century, at least four shifts in Portuguese foreign policy are visible: the first two of these were developed jointly with Spain while the third was a consequence of Spanish aggression and the fourth resulted from the development of the Coalition of European powers against the French Republic. Portugal could clearly try to steer her own course, but would continue to be subject to errant winds and wayward tides. Portugal and Spain negotiated a series of agreements and

treaties guaranteeing (mutual) security and neutrality. During the American War of Independence, the two countries signed a maritime and neutrality convention jointly and with Russia. Between 1789 and 1790 Spain requested the assistance of France (under an existing treaty between the two countries) in addressing a dispute over access to navigation rights and trade on the Pacific coast of North America. The refusal of France to assist Spain on this matter is not of immediate concern here, but two outcomes of direct relevance were: the repudiation of the existing treaty between Spain and France and resurgent hostilities between Spain and Portugal. Most importantly, perhaps, throughout this period, and especially during the development of the First Coalition and the early revolutionary wars, Portugal consistently articulated a well-thought-through policy of neutrality in all matters of European foreign policy.⁸¹

A major difficulty faced in addition to disputes within and between the four main protagonists involved, Britain, France, Portugal and Spain, were the complex interconnections with colonies in the southern hemisphere. The peripheral location of such a small state of fewer than 3 million people on the south west tip of Europe belied Portugal's importance in a Euro-Atlantic system spanning northern and southern hemispheres of the globe. In this respect also, it is not merely coincidental

⁸¹ For these shifts in foreign policy see Manuel Amaral, 'Portugal e as guerras da revolução, de 1793 a 1801: do Roussilhão ao Alemtejo', in *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da Europa dividida à união Europeia*, (Lisboa : Tribuna da História, 2005) and for the Iberian Atlantic Empire see Kenneth R. Maxwell, 'The Atlantic in the eighteenth century: a southern perspective on the need to return to the 'big picture'', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Sixth Series, vol. 3, 1993, 209-236.

that British and French policy, in the second half of the eighteenth century, became increasingly predicated upon the struggle for maritime supremacy and mercantile competitiveness.⁸² Moreover, the growth within European economies was progressively dependent upon “commercial intercourse” with the Americas.

According to O’Brien:

“[By] the 1790s, the geographical destination of commodity exports that crossed the boundaries of European states was: to other European states 76 per cent, to North America 10 per cent, to Latin America and the Caribbean 8 per cent, to Asia 5 per cent and to Africa 1 per cent. The “periphery” [the four last named destinations] purchased about 14 per cent of Europe’s exports ... [but if the “periphery” were to be] “redefined to include the Southern colonies of North America, where African slaves worked the tropical plantations ... by the end of the eighteenth century the flows of commodities transhipped between Western Europe and regions of the “periphery” of the “modern world system” might amount to 20 percent of exports and 25 per cent of imports.”⁸³

Britain and France had been at war since 1793: and Portugal was one of the last countries to sign a formal agreement of alliance against the French Republic, as she desperately tried to sustain her neutrality. But first Spain, and eventually,

⁸² See P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *The political economy of British expansion overseas, 1750-1914*, *The Economic History Review*, Second Series, vol. 33, no. 4, 1980, 463-490, especially pp. 471-474, Daniel A. Baugh, ‘Withdrawing from Europe: Anglo French maritime geopolitics, 1750-1800’, *The International History Review*, vol. 20, no. 1, 1998, 1-32 and Martin Robson, *Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: alliances and diplomacy in economic maritime conflict*, (London – New York : IB Tauris, 2011).

⁸³ Patrick O’Brien, ‘European economic development: the contribution of the periphery’, *The Economic History Review*, Second Series, vol. 35, no. 1, 1-18.

Portugal joined the anti-French coalition of European powers as Livermore reported quite succinctly:

“In 1793 France declared war on her [Spain] and sent a delegate to Lisbon to seek Portuguese neutrality. Britain negotiated an alliance with Spain, and in June Grenville sought a treaty with Portugal. In July, Portugal made an offensive and defensive alliance with Spain.”⁸⁴

The brief alliance of these two Iberian powers culminated in a joint military campaign and invasion of French territory in the south, while other allies threatened France from the north. The provision of a military force was Portugal's first act of open aggression against France on mainland Europe. Ultimately, with French victory in this conflict - the War of Roussillon - the Spanish abandoned their erstwhile allies and negotiated peace leaving the Portuguese contingent to make its own way home and Portugal to seek whatever terms it could from the victors.

Crucially, the decision to join the coalition had breached Portugal's long term strategy of remaining neutral in any pan-European conflict, a policy aim which it had maintained throughout the vast majority of the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The deciding factors that explain Portugal's resolve to send a military contingent to aid Spain, and directly intervene in the Revolutionary Wars, were the acts of revolution and regicide. The overthrow of the French monarchy and execution of Louis XVI represented a direct a threat to the security of the Bragança

⁸⁴. Livermore, 'Beresford and reform of the Portuguese army', p. 385

dynasty in Portugal, and to Bourbon rule in Spain: this common threat effectively underpinning the alliance of these two - previously antagonistic and highly competitive - Iberian powers. ⁸⁵

The outcome of the War of Roussillon was neither total peace nor all out war. Spain managed to build upon the peace negotiations to develop a more fully-fledged alliance with France by 1795. Britain and Portugal, meanwhile, continued to develop diplomatic and trading relationships. Despite, perhaps, some major disagreements in the two decades spanning the *fin de siècle*, the alliance between the two powers - one of the longest-standing in European history - prevailed. While the Anglo-Portuguese accord was primarily driven by a number of shared economic and political aims and reciprocal developments in trade and industry, it had developed by the end of the eighteenth century to the extent that Britain maintained a small military force in Portugal for short periods – notably in 1796 and also 1800. However, only a small number of these troops were British being comprised, in the main, of French émigré regiments and Dillon’s Irish. As will be detailed later, Portugal would have preferred a more substantial British military

⁸⁵ Harold Livermore, ‘Portugal on the Eve of the Peninsular War’ in Paddy Griffith (ed.), *A History of the Peninsular War Volume IX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814*, (London : Greenhill Books, 1999), pp. 385-398, Simão José da Luz Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil e do estabelecimento do governo parlamentar em Portugal compreendendo a história diplomática militar e política d’este reino desde 1777 até 1834* (Nineteen volumes, Lisboa : Imprensa Nacional, 1866-1890), 1.^ª época, vol. 1., chapter iv, pp. 419-506 and Richard Herr, *The eighteenth-century revolution in Spain*, (Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 435-44.

presence: instead Britain's response was to dispatch troops to the Mediterranean and Egypt and to occupy Madeira (much to Portugal's consternation).⁸⁶

Militarily, Portugal remained preoccupied with territorial integrity and, therefore, the border with Spain and threats presented by a Franco-Spanish alliance. Comprehensive plans were developed and implemented for a possible defensive campaign against land-based aggression. For example, in 1796, a military camp was created to mobilise a substantial part of the Portuguese Army, perfecting defensive manoeuvres to face a potential Franco-Spanish invasion. Inspections carried out by Baron Waldeck, in 1798, revealed a relatively well prepared defensive force of ten regiments, competent in undertaking military manoeuvres - but in various guises due to inconsistent implementation of new military regulations and the necessity of drilling with arms of various provenance and bore. In addition, a British expeditionary force was sent out to strengthen the Portuguese Army.⁸⁷ Spain, meantime, given its alliance with France, was soon forced to declare war on Britain, a move that had significant implications for both Spain and Portugal. For Spain, the enmity of Britain meant that Spanish ports were

⁸⁶ See Livermore, 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsula War', pp. 386-388, for a useful review of the salient points. See also pp. 91-95 in Edgar Prestage, 'The Anglo-Portuguese alliance', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Fourth Series, vol. 17, 1934, 69-100.

⁸⁷ Manuel Amaral, 'Portugal e as Guerras Da Revolução', pp. 54-55, citing documento n.º 98 "Plano de defesa, ou das posições que devem ocupar os exércitos de observação, feito em 4 de Setembro de 1796", in Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.ª época, vol. 3, pp. 450-59; and "Documentos publicados sobre as revistas passadas a regimentos de infantaria, cavalaria, artilharia e milícias assim como a ordenanças na Beira, Estremadura, Alentejo e Algarve pelo príncipe de Waldeck", in the *Boletim do Arquivo Histórico Militar*, 62.º volume, pp. 153-373.

blockaded, with considerable repercussions for both the domestic economy and, of course, international trade. At the same time, Portugal's frontier could only be truly secure if friendly relations with Spain were maintained. As a result, Dom João, the second son of Dom Pedro III, and Portuguese Regent since 1797, was coming under increasing pressure from France and Spain to join with them and declare war on Britain. ⁸⁸

Although joining the alliance would guarantee Portugal's mainland territorial sovereignty, it would also serve to undermine if not totally destroy, her maritime security and ultimately the Portuguese economy. Portugal was ultimately sustained by the enormous revenue derived from international trade and Lisbon's singular position as entrepôt for goods and raw materials from Portuguese colonies and particularly, at this time, those from Brazil. ⁸⁹ As Russell-Wood observed,

Whatever Portugal imported, be it spices, perfumed woods, and roots with medicinal purposes from Asia, ivory or slaves from Africa, wines from Madeira, or sugar,

⁸⁸. In relation to Spain see Charles Esdaile, *The Peninsular War: A New History*, (London : Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 17-20 and David. R. Ringrose, *Spain, Europe, and the "Spanish miracle", 1700-1900*, (Cambridge University Press, 1998). For mercantilism and colonialism to the end of the eighteenth century, see Parry, *Trade and dominion*. For the inter-dependence of Portugal and Brazil see Valentim Alexandre, *Os sentidos do Império: questão nacional e questão colonial na crise do Antigo Regime português*, Volume 5 of Coleção Biblioteca das ciências do homem: História, (Porto : Edições Afrontamento, 1993). Dom João, as the second son of Dom Pedro III, had ruled as prince regent of Portugal since 1797. His older brother José had died in infancy and his mother, Queen Maria, the first female ruler of Portugal had been declared mad (perhaps due to porphyria). The prince regent would become King of the United Kingdom of Portugal, the Algarves and Brazil 1816-1822 and, on Brazil gaining its independence, King of Portugal and the Algarves, 1822-1826).

⁸⁹. For details of the wide range of imports and re-exports into and from Lisbon see A.J.R. Russell-Wood, *A world on the move: the Portuguese in Africa, Asia and America, 1415-1808*, (Manchester : Cancarnet - Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1992), especially 'chapter iv: ebb and flow of commodities', pp. 123-47.

cottons and dyewoods from Brazil, there was an eager and insatiable market in Europe for these goods from overseas.”⁹⁰

Portugal did have a growing, albeit relatively weak, domestic market.⁹¹ But, in essence, Portuguese economic and, more particularly, commercial, prosperity was principally founded upon colonial aggrandisement and exploitation, underpinned by relatively favourable trading agreements. Moreover, the Portuguese economy was, increasingly, sustained by the “old alliance” with Britain and especially after 1805, by the Royal Navy’s unchallengeable maritime supremacy. Throughout the eighteenth century the British economy benefited from sustained and increasing demand for manufactured goods and therefore, given necessary limitations on growth of domestic demand, the growth of overseas markets. The intermittent discontinuities in the development of foreign markets, resulting from wars throughout the long eighteenth century, meant that exporting manufacturers and merchants increasingly sought new markets. The substantial rates of growth in the population of the Americas, of migrant Europeans, enslaved African and indigenous populations, fuelled demand for British exported manufactures such as cottons and worsteds, non-ferrous metal, glass and

⁹⁰ “This international dimension was not to change over the following centuries. For the years 1796-1807, products originating from Brazil and which had been re-exported from Lisbon were finding markets in Hamburg (29.1%), England (24.0%), Italy (20.2%), France (16.0%), Holland (3.7%), Spain (3.5%), Prussia (1.7%), Denmark (0.8%) and Sweden, Russia [and] Germany ... less than half a per cent.”, A.J.R. Russell-Wood, *A world on the move: the Portuguese in Africa, Asia and America, 1415-1808*, (Manchester : Cancarnet - Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1992), pp. 130-31.

⁹¹ José V. Serrão, ‘Foi o século XVIII uma época de crise ou de progresso para a agricultura portuguesa?’, *Seminários de História do Instituto de Ciências Sociais*, (Lisboa : 2004).

earthenware products and also the export of fine goods from the Portuguese metropolis such as silks, cottons and woollens.⁹²

Despite growth and specific improvements in the domestic sphere, and particularly in the agricultural sector⁹³, the Portuguese economy in the final quarter of the eighteenth century, was increasingly threatened, as Alexandre notes, by an inherent 'structural vulnerability'.

"The central interpretive concept [was Portugal's] vulnerability in geo-political terms. However, in underlining the permanent and structural nature of this vulnerability, throughout the eighteenth century, we would also equally stress an enhanced manoeuvrability within Portuguese foreign policy, from 1777, based upon increasingly close relations between the courts of Lisbon, Madrid and Paris whilst [at the same time] preserving the principal (and preferential) relationship with England. Portuguese foreign policy evolved into a multi-polar system of alliances, which (better) permitted resistance to British pressures."⁹⁴

Mercantilism, imperialism and, more specifically, the interdependence of the Portugal-Brazil-Africa trade triangle underpinned Portugal's absolutist monarchy

⁹² For the dislocation of trade, the effects of the Orders in Council on and other factors impeding growth in continental European economies, from a French perspective, see François Crouzet, 'Wars, blockade, and economic change in Europe, 1792-1815', *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1964, 567-588. Slavery had been prohibited from mainland Portugal since 1761: but for the slavery's importance to Brazil, Latin and South America see David Eltis, 'The nineteenth century transatlantic slave trade: an annual series of imports into the Americas broken down by region', *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 67, no. 1, 1989, 109-138, p. 114.

⁹³ Serrão, 'Foi o século XVIII uma época de crise'

⁹⁴ Valentim Alexandre, *Os sentidos do Império: questão nacional e questão colonial na crise do Antigo Regime português, Volume 5 of Coleção Biblioteca das ciências do homem: História*, (Porto : Edições Afrontamento, 1993), p. 795 (my editing and translation).

and her economy. Ironically, albeit for different reasons, this ‘structural vulnerability’ was a common concern of members of the *partido francês* and *partido ingles*. But here a note is required on the concept of political allegiance. There were, of course, no formal political parties in Portugal at this time. The terms *partido francês* and *partido inglês* reflected ideological commonalities of adherents to the two main groups that wielded political power. The *partido francês*, in general terms, looked inwards towards Europe and France (and also Spain) in particular, and was more acquiescent to French ideas and influence. The *partido inglês*, however, looked outwards towards the Atlantic and Portugal’s maritime Empire and, as a consequence, was amenable to British influence.⁹⁵ As such, their competing ideologies were predicated upon substantial differences in perspectives combining national and international economics and politics. They were further complicated by a complex and entangled web of political and familial connections and, of course, the pervasiveness of political patronage and vested interests as represented, for example, by the Portuguese and Brazilian mercantilist and proto-industrialist oligarchies.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ A useful stipulative definition for party at this time would probably include three essential components: an organised group of individuals with common interests; these individuals seek to control the state (even where representatives of more than one party are present within the “executive”); they will be competitive for the favour of the king, queen or prince regent (given the absence of elections) and thereby seek to control polity and political economy.

⁹⁶ For which see Maxwell, *Conflicts and conspiracies*, particularly the final chapter ‘compromise’.

French aggression and, from 1795, the Franco-Spanish alliance, represented a major threat to Portuguese sovereignty on mainland Europe. Additionally, France and Spain had designs on Brazil: the former from its territories bordering the north of that country, the latter from those bordering its southernmost reaches.

Appeasement was the preferred response of the *partido francês* to the threats posed in mainland Europe and Portugal's overseas dominions by this alliance. Britain, meantime, was perceived as a threat to Portugal's colonies in general, but principally to Brazil, Africa and some strategic island territories. However, Britain's aggressive pursuit of raw materials and markets, for example in the Americas, was not a principal concern for the *partido inglês* given its desire to placate, rather than antagonise, Britain and prevailing, and mutually beneficial, economic conditions and considerations, not least of which was Lisbon's exclusive position as entrepôt.

The drivers of European political economy were increasingly global in character throughout the long eighteenth century; resulting intermittently in continuity and change, conflict and compromise. Portugal's options were constrained as much by the tremendous distances separating metropolis and colony, and the relatively precarious nature of the Portuguese navy, as by territorial insecurity and the limited resources available to sustain her sovereignty in continental Europe. Maintaining the policy of appeasement, and the preferred position of neutrality in the face of European conflict, would appear to have offered

the only realistic and feasible diplomatic options to ensure economic stability and growth.⁹⁷ But this position would become increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of increasing hostility on the European continent.

In 1801, Napoleon effectively coerced Godoy, first minister of Spain, into a joint invasion of Portugal. Godoy though had his own designs. Military success against Portugal would help undermine his detractors, secure his power base and help divert attention from domestic issues. For Napoleon, the war afforded an opportunity, indirectly at least, to strike at Britain, make economic gains and, potentially, attain much-needed additional ships of the line to challenge Britain's overwhelming maritime superiority. While Portugal was not the maritime power of old, the overall size and importance of the Portuguese fleet had been substantially augmented under the ministry of D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho. The Portuguese navy and merchant fleet had benefited directly from a significant programme of ship building and related maritime improvements, and indirectly from continued investment in Brazil and overall growth of that country's economy and the scale and range of exported produce.⁹⁸ Moreover, the strategic location

⁹⁷. For the complex inter-relationships between the Luso-Brazilian economy and that of Britain (and continental Europe) see the very useful statistical appendices in Maxwell, *Conflicts and conspiracies*, especially pp 245-59. Parry argues that trade, rather than dominion, had already become the driver of British foreign and economic policy in the final quarter of the eighteenth century, Parry, *Trade and dominion*, part iv: 'alterations of course', p. 273 et seqs.

⁹⁸. José Luís Cardoso, 'Free trade, political economy and the birth of a new economic nation: Brazil, 1808-1810', *Revista de História Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, Año

and capacity of Lisbon's harbour were an unquestionably important factor in defining competitive economic advantage and a successful maritime strategy.⁹⁹

Despite some initially successful Portuguese diplomatic tactics delaying any offensive, France and Spain ultimately declared war on Portugal and the Spanish invasion force crossing the Portuguese frontiers in 1801. For Portugal, in addition to matters of international politics and diplomacy, there were a number of military considerations and issues to take into account. Firstly, Portugal had no appetite for European aggrandisement; although an aggressive policy of territorial acquisition in Brazil and surrounding territories was actively pursued throughout this period and beyond. Strictly in relation to continental Europe, though, neither Dom João nor Portuguese foreign policy was naturally belligerent. As a result, no significant reforms of Portugal's land based military forces had been implemented since Pombal's premiership. The current commander in chief, the very elderly Duc de Lafões, was not only a senior member of the Portuguese royal family, and a leading light in the *partido aristocrático*, the nearest Portuguese equivalent of the Whig party, but had also retained the appointment of Marshal-General of Portugal since 1791.

¹⁰⁰ Lafões had both managed to retain Portugal's highest military office and stubbornly resist any military reform, for over a decade, despite the army suffering

XXVII, Otoño 2009, no. 2, 183-204 and Parry, *Trade and Dominion*, in particular chapter 2, 'The South Atlantic and the West Indies', pp. 29-41.

⁹⁹. Robson *Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic War*, pp. 35-36.

¹⁰⁰. Manuel Amaral, *A luta política em Portugal*, pp. 28-29

a number of military setbacks under his overall command. The Portuguese army was therefore inadequately prepared for the war in 1801: its devastating outcomes, and the loss of Portuguese territories in Extremadura, presaged Lafões' final undoing and were the catalyst for subsequent military reforms.

Godoy meantime, in support of domestic political ambitions, had the triple aims of: defeating Portugal without the assistance of French forces (thus ensuring Spanish sovereignty); winning a quick war (thereby minimising the costs of war); and imposing terms on the Portuguese most favourable to Spain. The short-lived War of the Oranges, military operations and subsequent negotiations between the Spanish and Portuguese which ended in the Treaty of Badajoz are of no immediate concern here. However, two outcomes are. Firstly, as a consequence of the peace, French troops had no excuse to enter the Iberian Peninsula and become involved in the war against - and ultimately occupy - Portugal. Napoleon viewed the terms of treaty with some disdain, blaming his brother Lucien Bonaparte and Godoy for not imposing more strenuous terms on Portugal and, thereby, securing Portuguese submission to French foreign policy - especially on matters relating to the war against Britain. Secondly, Portuguese feelings were embittered by defeat and the loss of territories – Olivença and Jerumenha in Portugal to Spain and northernmost

Brazil (bordering French Guyana) to France.¹⁰¹ While ceding seemingly insignificant strips of territory may have appeared to have been a small price to pay, when so much could have been at stake, this issue also continued to be a bone of contention between Portugal, Spain and Britain throughout the Peninsular War, up to and beyond the Congress of Vienna. Thirdly, a small but important reinforcement to the existing British military force, mentioned above, had as recently as 1800 been promised to Portugal. However, just at the point when it was most required, all direct military aid subsequently had to be withdrawn. The removal of British troops from Portugal did nothing to either help smooth diplomacy between the two countries or convince Portugal of Britain's support at a time when relations with France and Spain were decidedly hostile. These troop movements were a necessary response to Napoleon's Egyptian campaign in pursuance of a long standing British strategy to support its continental allies by mounting small, diversionary, amphibious operations against relatively vulnerable French targets. However, Britain's argument was not entirely persuasive and, in addition, the mistrust was not one-sided. Finally, Anglo-Portuguese diplomacy at the time came to revolve around British concerns for what they saw as Portuguese acquiescence to, and subsequent collusion with, Spain on matters of trade. This

¹⁰¹. For a useful summary of military developments at a strategic and tactical level see Pedro de Avillez, 'Portugal nas guerras napoleónicas: uma visão global', in *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da Europa dividida à união Europeia*, (Lisboa : Tribuna da História, 2005), particularly pp. 465-66 and for the wider politico-military perspectives, see Shirley Black, 'Olivenza: An Iberian "Alsace/Lorraine' in *The Americas*, vol. 35, no. 4 (Apr., 1979), 527-537.

latter issue being inconsistent, from Britain's viewpoint, with Portugal's preferred status of neutrality. Ultimately, the effects of these developments at the turn of the century were substantial and, in addition, Anglo-Portuguese diplomatic relations soured somewhat in the period 1800 to 1802.

The Portuguese meantime, mindful of Moreau's and Napoleon's successes, respectively, at Hohenlinden and Marengo, were at pains to placate rather than risk enraging the Spanish (and, more particularly, their French allies) over trade related issues. A further factor underpinning the intricate nature of, and complex developments in, Portuguese foreign policy was that Dom João's wife Carlota Joaquina was of Spanish Bourbon stock. She maintained a significant influence on aspects of Portuguese policy and, particularly, regarding relations with Spain; that is, until the estrangement of the royal couple in the period immediately prior to the first French invasion in 1807. With the exception of the short-lived War of the Oranges, and the ongoing dispute over the ensuing cessation of the occupied territories to Spain, and taking into account Portugal's relatively aggressive policy for colonial aggrandisement and the prominence of its maritime capability, relationships were relatively amicable between these two neighbouring Iberian powers.¹⁰² However, arguments over trade and shipping were becoming an

¹⁰². Both Spain and Portugal managed to placate France (and also Britain) simultaneously by paying substantial indemnities to Napoleon in return for remaining neutral towards Britain: Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 555 et seq.

increasingly important feature of diplomatic relations between these four countries – even in this early period. While there is more than a hint of inconsistency and improvisation in British policy towards Portugal at this time, the greater and impending threat to British interests can be seen to be the driving force behind the shift in emphasis in British foreign policy – i.e. as opposed to a reluctance to support one of the British government’s few long-term allies when threatened by one, or more, (common) enemy.¹⁰³ Although the issues above were eventually resolved, for a time at least, firstly by the treaty of Badajoz between Spain and Portugal and secondly by the peace of Amiens between Britain and France (and their respective allies), they were to emerge and intensify again in the period 1804-1807. But for the time being, with French security on her natural borders, and the acceptance of further buffer or satellite states in the Netherlands and Italy, as ratified in the Treaty of Lunéville, the ensuing peace of Amiens proved to be the most substantial break in the war on continental Europe between 1793 and 1815. Napoleon’s designs on Portugal, for the time being, were put on hold.

Portugal steadfastly refused to take sides in face of increasing pressures, from both Britain and France at the turn of the century and, especially, after the

¹⁰³. See Frederick Black Jr. ‘Diplomatic Struggles: British Support in Spain and Portugal, 1800–1810’, (Unpublished PhD thesis : Florida State University, 2005), pp. 15-16, citing Grenville to Frere, October 1800 PRO FO 63/35. Britain had three underlying concerns with Portugal in relation to trade: the continued access to Portuguese ports enjoyed by Spanish vessels; Portuguese vessels carrying Spanish trade; and the activities of Spanish privateers against British shipping off the Portuguese coast – Grenville to Frere, 20 Jan., 1801, PRO FO 63/35 cited in Black, ‘*Diplomatic Struggles*’, pp. 22-23.

resumption of hostilities due to the collapse of the Peace of Amiens. Portugal's situation was perhaps made easier by her relatively peripheral location in Europe and Napoleon's more pressing concerns in central Europe. However, her attempts to remain neutral became increasingly more difficult to sustain. The revival of hostilities ratcheted up commercial conflict. Britain increasingly enforced its blockade on trade - particularly that from the Americas - with continental Europe, in response to Napoleon's extension of the exclusion policies against British shipping from France, and French controlled territories, along the North Sea coast to Hamburg and Bremen. Commercial war, and, in particular, these early 'skirmishes' in the continental blockade presaged further measures to restrict access to European markets by the closure of all ports in continental Europe to British shipping; measures that would have a more devastating impact should Portugal succumb to French diplomatic pressures.¹⁰⁴ Crucially, in this period, Portuguese foreign policy was driven by a leading figure in the *partido francês* at the centre of the Portuguese court and government, Dom António de Araújo de Azevedo.

The drivers of Napoleonic policy towards Portugal were complex. Napoleon was attempting to secure closure of one of the few remaining breaches of the economic stranglehold he was trying to impose on Britain. He also had designs on

¹⁰⁴ Eli F Heckscher, *The continental system: an economic interpretation*, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1922), part II, chapter 1, and especially pp. 81-83, for the origins and development of commercial war prior to the Berlin decree, and Crouzet, 'Wars, blockade, and economic change in Europe', *passim*.

the Portuguese fleet and, given Lisbon's strategic location, potential opportunities for aggrandisement presented by Portuguese colonies (especially in relation to Brazil) and access to potentially lucrative South American markets. In this last regard though, Portuguese policy would ultimately be shaped by her long standing maritime and commercial agreements with Britain. Indeed, while Britain may not have been in a position to provide direct, land based, military support to Portugal, to face the French invasion, France could be denied access to South America. And a small British naval and military contingent duly set out for and landed in Madeira to secure this strategically important naval base; albeit for the duration of the present crisis, and amidst not a little Portuguese resentment and humility.¹⁰⁵

Britain's response to this crisis would appear to add weight to the argument that, from the signing of the Methuen Treaty a century earlier, Portugal was no more than a dependent economy of Britain. This assertion is not only a considerable distortion of the complex economic relationships between the two countries but also seriously undervalues the autonomy of Portuguese political economy and foreign policy. Four main influences shaped the development of Portuguese foreign policy from the seventeenth century onwards. The defence of Portugal against Spanish aggression - a particularly important consideration in

¹⁰⁵. Livermore, 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War', Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil* 1.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 438-39, and Desmond Gregory 'British Occupations of Madeira during the Wars against Napoleon', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol. 66, no. 266 (Summer 1988), 80-96.

those periods when Spain is allied with France (the “norm” during the “family pact” underpinning the Bourbon dynasty); the protection of colonial commerce - the single most important component of Portuguese international trade; the territorial integrity of Portuguese colonies (for example in relation to threats to Brazil from French Guyana to the north and Spanish Rio de la Plata to the south); and the preservation of the single most important mainstay of the Portuguese empire, namely the supply of slaves from African coastal states to its colonies and, in particular, Brazil. Security in neutrality was a possibility, but could only be achieved with the successful development and implementation of some very complex policy options in reaction to, or in attempts to mitigate, external drivers and internal pressures. ¹⁰⁶

Portugal’s best possible course was to try to sustain an increasingly precarious peace, particularly regarding relations with France and Britain, by reverting back to and maintaining the preferred position of neutrality. For this strategy to succeed, it would, at times, mean playing one country off against the other (a policy that once more came under pressure when Britain declared war on France in 1803, insisting

¹⁰⁶. See Alexandre, *Os sentidos do Império* and, in particular, the first two chapters concerning, respectively, ‘o comércio colonial português de 1796 a 1807’ and ‘a política colonial e “inconfidências”’: his conclusions in relation to Portugal’s structural vulnerability and manoeuvrability and a detailed examination of the positions of Araújo de Azeredo and Sousa Coutinho are presented, respectively on pp. 795 and 796. I am grateful to Moisés Gaudêncio for bringing this work, and these specific aspects of Portuguese foreign policy, to my attention and for helping with their interpretation. See also Parry, *Trade and Dominion*, pp. 190-192 and Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation and capitalism, fifteenth to eighteenth century*, (Three volumes, London : William Collins, 1982), volume II, ‘The wheels of commerce’, pp. 211-214.

that Portugal do the same). The period immediately following the War of the Oranges, and the re-commencement of hostilities between Britain and France following the Peace of Amiens, was interesting to say the least. Similarly, the period immediately preceding 1807 was marked by a series of political and military events, the dynamics of which were to continue to have repercussions for at least two decades. In addition to Portuguese domestic issues, a number of international developments featured prominently such as the resumption of hostilities between Britain and France, the crowning of Napoleon as Emperor in 1804, the development of the third coalition in 1805 and the resumption and intensification of European conflict.

Within Portugal, two main developments arose from the unsuccessful campaign of the War of the Oranges. Although officially exonerated of blame for the disastrous performance of the Portuguese army, the Duke de Lafões was replaced by Count von der Goltz as commander in chief of the Portuguese army (supported by Dom José Maria de Sousa Botelho).¹⁰⁷ Additionally, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State for War were reunited with the briefly independent portfolio of foreign affairs: the two portfolios were previously combined under the tutelage of Dom João de Almeida a leading light in the *partido-*

¹⁰⁷. For relevant military developments see João Torres Centeno, *O Exército português na Guerra Peninsular: Volume 1 - do Rossilhão ao fim da Segunda Invasão Francesa 1807-1810*, (Lisboa : Prefaço, 2008) pp. 73-77 and René Chartrand, *The Portuguese army of the Napoleonic Wars, Volume 1*, (Osprey, 2000) pp. 7-8.

inglês. One result of these changes, and, more specifically, of interventions resulting directly from the work of the military commissions, was the development of a modern structure for the recruitment and mobilisation of the Portuguese army and, for the first time, a professional general staff. These innovations, though, were not without their detractors (both political and military) and this period was marked by divisions amongst the higher echelons of the Portuguese military and a more discernible prominence in Portuguese politics and in government (if not outright power) of the *partido francês*.¹⁰⁸ Lannes' onslaught, during his first term at the Portuguese court against D. João de Almeida and D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, considered to be two of Portugal's more enlightened and pro-British politicians of the time, was a considerable and ultimately defining factor in Portuguese politics up to the declaration of war between Britain and France in 1803.¹⁰⁹ Lannes' return to that office, and the intensification of French pressures, resulted in the dismissal of these two ministers from government and the consolidation of power in the *partido francês* and, specifically, António de Araújo.¹¹⁰

The illness at the beginning of 1804, and ultimate death in April of that year, of Luís Pinto de Sousa Coutinho effectively resulted in the reduction of the

¹⁰⁸. For political developments in general and the ascendancy of the *partido francês* in particular see Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 2, chapter vi: Alexandre gives more emphasis to the actions of Araújo in terms of pro-actively defining Portuguese foreign policy in the period 1804-1807.

¹⁰⁹. Soriano, *ibid*, chapter vi. ¹¹⁰. Soriano, *ibid*, chapter vii.

functioning Portuguese government to two ministries and the concentration of power in the hands of two men, namely the Visconde de Anadia as secretary of state for war, and Luis de Vasconcellos e Sousa as president of the treasury (*real erário*).¹¹¹ Two further replacements had to be made to portfolios previously held by Luís Pinto de Sousa: the Conde de Villa Verde, D. Diogo de Noronha, was appointed to head foreign affairs and, most importantly, António de Araújo de Azevedo (recalled from the Portuguese legation at St. Petersburg) had replaced Anadia as secretary of state for war.¹¹² While these four ministers were decidedly more amenable to French influence their most vocal member, António de Araújo, had no desire for Portugal to become a de facto satellite of France, let alone be occupied by French troops, and his influence would be crucial in winning over those who might be beginning to be disillusioned with Britain (but who had not yet been convinced of the necessity of alliance with France). Araújo de Azevedo's influence at court grew as the council of ministers, although comprised of less

¹¹¹. Maxwell highlights opposition to D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho's vision for a political economy based upon a more federative structure for metropolis and colony underlying his decision to retire from public office at that time and his replacement by Anadia: *Conflicts and conspiracies*, pp. 232-33.

¹¹². António de Araújo de Azevedo (entitled Conde de Barca in 1815) was formerly Envoy Extraordinaire and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of The Hague and twice took the lead negotiating role in peace talks between France and Portugal. Whilst he negotiated and signed a formal peace treaty, in 1797, it was never ratified by the prince regent, D. João and he was subsequently imprisoned by the French as a result. He was later appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. For further details see Eurico de Ataíde Malafaia, 'António de Araújo de Azevedo – Conde da Barca: personalidade exemplar de coragem e dignidade', in *Estudos em homenagem ao Professor Doutor José Amadeu Coelho Dias*, vol. 1, (2006), 279-294.

senior figures, now met on a much more regular basis than hitherto. ¹¹³ A further result of French pressure was a significant reduction in finance allocated to the Portuguese armed forces, ¹¹⁴ and yet another the replacement of Pina Manique and the adoption of a less repressive attitude towards French republican sympathies and expressions whilst, at the same time, stifling pro-British sentiments: such as the “lighting” of Lisbon houses in celebration of the victory at Trafalgar. Meantime, John-Hookham Frere had been replaced as Britain’s envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Lisbon in 1802 by Lord Robert-Stephen Fitzgerald until 1806. ¹¹⁵ British influence in Portuguese politics commensurately and noticeably diminished in this period. ¹¹⁶

After becoming first consul, and increasingly on becoming emperor in 1804, Napoleon, intent on depriving Britain of her continental markets, and exploiting his continuing alliance with Spain, sought closure of the remaining ports of the Iberian coastline. Portugal’s resistance to Napoleon’s demands was met with an increasingly aggressive diplomacy with the aim of depriving Britain of her continental markets. The alliance with Spain closed her ports to British shipping and exports and, with the support of Portugal, the remainder would follow.

¹¹³. For a detailed review of the dynamics of these events, and the diplomatic and political changes, see Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 567-73.

¹¹⁴. Centeno. *O exército português*, p. 76.

¹¹⁵. *The Foreign Office list and Diplomatic and Consular year book*, 1857, p. 35.

¹¹⁶. See Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.ª época, vol. 2, pp. 620-22 for details of attempts to ensure a shift in allegiance from Britain to France.

Portugal's resistance to Napoleon's demands was met with the dispatch of two military ambassadors – first Lannes, and then Junot, to the Portuguese court. The aim of this increasingly bellicose foreign policy was to force Portugal's hand. Indeed, one of the effects of diplomatic pressures exerted on Portuguese ambassadors in France and the activities of these two French *sabreurs* was to isolate and eventually eliminate leading lights within the *partido inglês*, and therefore British influence on policy at the Portuguese court, and install ministers more amenable to French influence. ¹¹⁷

Napoleon was by now pre-occupied with defeating the third coalition; first Austria and Russia (1805), and then Prussia in (1806). Thereafter, from November 1806, he concentrated on implementing the continental system, as set out in the Berlin decree, in central Europe and was therefore less immediately interested in the affairs of Spain and Portugal. It was not until Napoleon was secure in northern and central Europe that he was able to turn his attention to imposing his demands to the remaining ports Europe through which Britain could still freely trade and, therefore, the implications of Napoleon's victories in 1806 became clear. Crucially, Portugal still had a significant fleet, the last independent European navy after Britain seized the Danish fleet from its harbour in Copenhagen, and offered access

¹¹⁷. For a useful summary of the military and diplomatic pressures see Margaret Chrisawn, 'A military bull in a diplomatic china shop: general Jean Lannes mission to Lisbon, 1802-1804', http://www.napoleon-series.org/ins/scholarship98/c_lannes.html (originally published in selected papers of the Consortium for Revolutionary Europe, 1996). See also Frederick W Kagan, *Napoleon and Europe 1810-1805: The End of the Old Order*, especially pp. 59-60, and p. 89.

to lucrative South American markets. An over-independent Holland “hindered the effective operation of the Continental System. But Napoleon decided to maintain the *status quo* [in that country] while he implemented his plans for Spain and Portugal which he considered more urgent.”¹¹⁸ Although the decree was announced towards the end of 1806, Napoleon would have to wait until his victory at Friedland, and the Treaty of Tilsit, in 1807 before he could fully implement it across the European continent in general, and in Portugal in particular, prohibiting the importation of British goods into all European states that were allied with (or dependent upon) France.¹¹⁹ By the end of 1807, with the effective closure of Portuguese ports, only those of Sweden remained freely available to British shipping. Given that British goods continued to find new markets and, apart from a brief period, had unconstrained access to the United States, “the effect of the continental blockade was not to cripple British export trade, but to inconvenience it, to diversify it, and the drive it into a greater variety of overseas channels.”¹²⁰

The Portuguese government had taken comfort in Napoleon’s preoccupation with matters in central Europe and his lack of interference in Iberian politics. Portuguese relations with France had been at their friendliest in 1806 and, in these matters, the influence of Araújo de Azevedo had been and continued to be crucial.

¹¹⁸. For Napoleon’s foreign policy towards Italy, Portugal and Spain, and the wider European context see Owen Connelly, *Napoleon’s satellite kingdoms*, (New York : The Free Press, 1965), p. 142.

¹¹⁹. Heckscher, *The continental system*, part II, chapter 3, ‘British counter-measures and French retort’, especially, pp. 122-123. ¹¹⁶. Parry, *Trade and Dominion*, p. 189.

Throughout 1807, Portuguese policy sought to placate France at all costs to forestall any potential invasion. There is no doubt that diplomacy between the two countries was eased by the lacklustre performance of the Conde de Villa Verde and, most importantly, the involvement of Araújo and the amenability of his fellow ministers to French influence and the increasing isolation of former ministers within the *partido inglês*. There is a clear consensus within the literature that the Portuguese government was increasingly amenable to French influence and estranged from that of Britain in a decisive period immediately prior to 1807.

Although Araújo remained in power until the flight of the court to Brazil, there were a number of developments that helped to limit his overall power, one of which was the estrangement of Dom João and Carlota Joaquina, which had the effect of limiting pro-Spanish influences at court. While domestic considerations were important, the major issue for Dom João (and his ministry) was the increasing pressure from Napoleon to close Portuguese ports to British shipping, arrest British citizens resident in Portugal and seize all British goods. The policy proved more or less impossible to implement: Portugal's increasing inability to pay the reparations agreed culminated first in impasse then crisis when Portugal defaulted on payments and Napoleon threatened to impose his will by force if his demands were not met.

Outstanding war reparations were one factor, not eased by the despatch of the Marquês de Marialva with diamonds to smooth the diplomatic process, in Napoleon's commitment to implement the Continental System fully. In due course, pressure was increasingly applied to ensure compliance with the terms of the decree given Portuguese insistence on neutrality and continued trade with Britain throughout the previous period. Despite the continuation of trade, the influence of Britain and of the *partido inglês* in Lisbon was at a very low point if not its absolute nadir, and Dom João appeared indecisive on these matters. The initiative had transferred to the *partido francês* and, in particular, to António de Araújo who consulted strategically placed Portuguese ambassadors across Europe on whether to continue to ally with Britain or, finally and completely, to turn to France. D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho's preferred policy of physically opposing the French, put forward during his period in office at the turn of the century, was not considered a serious option. However, a "Brazil plan" - the transfer of the court to Rio de Janeiro - was being afforded increasingly serious consideration, as Sousa Coutinho advised the prince regent most presciently:

"Portugal is not the best and most essential part of the monarchy'. In South America a mighty empire could be created ...[and, moreover] the [Prince] had very little choice

in the event of a showdown. If the French took Portugal, then the British would take Brazil. It was better to anticipate both by seizing the initiative.”¹²¹

A number of factors compounded these problems. Rumours concerning Dom João’s illness, the identification of a cabal in support of his wife Carlota Joaquina, and the deaths of the Conde de Villa Verde and Lafões, further concentrated power in the hands of António de Araújo who now had combined responsibility for foreign affairs, war and (literally) the defence of the realm. If any hopes for a favourable conclusion of affairs in northern and central Europe remained in Portugal, they were quickly dispelled with the crippling defeat of the Russian forces at Friedland. The ensuing treaty of Tilsit signalled Napoleon’s reinvigorated and unbridled aggression towards Britain via the wholesale implementation of the Continental System across Europe and its extension to Portugal.¹²² When all diplomatic pressures to ally Portugal to France had failed, Napoleon ordered Junot to invade at the head of *le Premier Corps d’Observation de la Gironde, devenu armée de Portugal*.¹²³

¹²¹. Kenneth R. Maxwell, *Conflicts and Conspiracies, 1750-1808*, (New York - London : Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 233-34, citing Ângelo Pereira, *D. João VI, Príncipe e Rei*, (Lisbon, 1953) ‘quadro da situação política da europa, apresentado ao Príncipe por D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, 16 August 1807’.

¹²². See the initial chapter ‘Exodus’ in Neill MacCaulay, *Dom Pedro: the struggle for liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834*, (Duke University Press, Durham).

¹²³. Paul Thiébault, *Relation de l’Expédition du Portugal, faite en 1807-8, par le 1er Corps d’Observation de la Gironde, devenu armée de Portugal. Par le Baron Thiébault, Lieutenant-Général*. (Paris : Chez Magimel, Anselin et Pochard, 1817)

But it was not until the army's imminent arrival at the gates of Lisbon that Dom João was eventually persuaded by his advisors of the hopelessness of the situation and the need to escape to Brazil. What is not well documented within British historiography is that he not only appointed a regency council to govern in his absence but also directed the Portuguese army and people to receive the French amicably rather than oppose them. Equally, the role played by the family Sousa Coutinho, in the negotiations and the convention agreed between Portugal and Britain, is also inadequately understood. As a result, the momentous decision to transfer court, government and its supporting impedimenta *en masse* to Brazil to escape falling into French control and its repercussions remain under-examined. Similarly, the important role of political economy underpinning the transfer remains substantially underplayed and misunderstood. Essentially, without this shift in the location of political power and authority, Portugal and the Portuguese economy would - to all intents and purposes - have ceased to exist. King Carlos and Prince Ferdinand retained a decidedly insecure independence for a while to come but, given the Royal Navy's victory in 1805, the Spanish "metropolis was ...[already] virtually eliminated from the Atlantic".¹²⁴ Moreover, although a policy option that was to be reversed in 1808, the Spanish Americas were

¹²⁴. John Lynch, 'Origins of Spanish American independence', in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *The independence of Latin America*, (Cambridge, 1987), p. 22 cited in Gabriel Paquette, 'The dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic monarchy', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 52, no. 1 (2009), 175-212, p. 178

vulnerable to land based assault. The ultimately disastrous Whitelocke expedition to Buenos Aires was a major factor in the shift in policy - the potential for provoking widespread rebellion or territorial conquest in the Americas being put on hold if not fully disproved.¹²⁵

Ultimately, saving the Portuguese royal family by taking the court to Brazil was not an impulsive reaction to the events of 1807, but was an integral component of the plan for the maintenance of the Portuguese monarchy and Luso-Brazilian empire, conceived by D. Rodrigo Sousa Coutinho as early as 1802 and afforded serious consideration in the crisis of 1806.¹²⁶ The plan now attracted support from adherents of the two main political factions alike. The principal dividing lines between Sousa Coutinho and Araújo de Azevedo were drawn on the subject of military opposition to French invasion. Sousa Coutinho believed, probably with no

little justification, that Portugal would be unable to oppose invasion: but, at the same time, favoured delaying tactics, the development of a robust plan for the defence of the realm, the mobilisation of Portugal's armed forces and direct British military intervention. Araújo refused to support either indigenous military resistance or direct military intervention from Britain; on the one hand he lacked confidence in the Portuguese military and, on the other, he completely distrusted

¹²⁵. See for example Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, p. 295 and Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon*, pp. 29-31.

¹²⁶. Robson, *Britain, Portugal and South America*, pp. 49-53.

British intentions. The court's transfer removed the immediate threat posed to the Portuguese monarchy by Napoleon. However, it subsequently served to undermine absolutism and the Bragança dynasty, led to a brief period of regional governance, prompted demands for constitutional reform and, eventually, civil war and revolution.¹²⁷ Clearly, Britain's refusal to support Portugal militarily in 1801 was uppermost in current considerations.¹²⁸ The prince regent received news of the imminent arrival of the French army of invasion, and a council of state was called at which a unanimous vote was taken for the royal family to embark for Brazil.¹²⁹

Both of these influential politicians agreed that the removal of the Portuguese court to Brazil, in the face of a Franco-Spanish invasion, was the only feasible way of preventing the Portuguese royal family and its court from coming under the direct control of an increasingly belligerent Napoleon and retain the intrinsic nature of polity underpinning the Bragança dynasty given the deep divisions at court. Retrospectively, Napoleon's treatment of King Carlos and Prince Ferdinand of Spain would serve in future, if needed, as a very practical reminder of the diplomatic manoeuvres that could be resorted to when faced by

¹²⁷. Kirsten Schultz, 'Royal authority, empire and the critique of colonialism: political discourse in Rio de Janeiro (1808-1821, *Luso-Brazilian Review*, vol. 37, no. 2, Special Issue: *State, Society and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century Brazil*, (Winter 2000), pp. 7-31.

¹²⁸. Robson, *Britain, Portugal and South America*, pp. 114-119.

¹²⁹. Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 671-72

non-compliant royalty and, therefore, the justification for such a momentous decision for the Bragança dynasty.¹³⁰

Though Araújo remained consistently and totally loyal to Dom João and Portuguese sovereign interests, his hand would appear to have been behind the royal decree establishing the regency council and the decision not to oppose the French invasion.¹³¹ In accepting British naval, as opposed to direct, land based, military intervention, to secure the successful transfer of the court to Brazil, Araújo's intention was to prevent a complete rupture of diplomatic relations with France in order to retain the option of negotiations in future, on the one hand, and to counteract the anticipated ascendancy of British influence over the Portuguese government in Brazil, on the other. For D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, and the *partido inglês*, the shift in the location of political authority to Brazil represented a substantial opportunity to wrest political power and economic influence from their erstwhile opponents at court.¹³²

^{130.} For the deleterious economic effects of the French Revolutionary Wars and alliance with Napoleon on Spain's maritime commerce see Paquette, 'The dissolution of the Spanish monarchy', esp. pp. 178-80.

^{131.} The nominated governadores were as follows: Marquês de Abrantes (Dom João's cousin); Francisco da Cunha e Menezes (lieutenant general); Principal Castro (Bishop of Oporto, and Regedor das Justiças); Pedro de Mello Breyner, Presidente do Real Erário (Treasury); Luiz de Vasconcellos e Souza; Dom Francisco Xavier de Noronha (lieutenant general); to be presided over by the Conde de Castro Marim (then the Monteiro Mór and subsequently Marquês de Olhão) and with a secretariat of two: the Conde de Sampaio (and in his absence he could be substituted by) Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz or João António Salter de Mendonça. Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 2, p. 672.

^{132.} Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 2, p. 679. For the declaration to the people of 26th November 1807, and the resultant consternation in the capital see Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 3, pp. 619-22, documents no. 127 and no. 127-A, respectively, for the proclamation to the

For Napoleon, the objective of denying the ports of Europe to Britain was temporarily fulfilled, although he was never able to fully implement the continental system given the continuance of British maritime supremacy. For Britain, the ensuing months would be spent in identifying the potential for further opportunistic intervention in the Americas, if not yet in the development of a coherent strategy, but the thought of countering Napoleon's designs by developing and sustaining a military presence on mainland Europe was not, at that moment at least, a realistic option.¹³³ For the time being, a total blockade was maintained on the port of Lisbon by the Royal Navy.¹³⁴ For Portugal,

“At a stroke, age old colonial sea routes were reversed, with edicts traveling eastward across the Atlantic, and with provisions, personnel and troops journeying out to the New World to supply the court. Lisbon, a venerable metropolis, was transformed into an outpost of its former colony; the court's new seat, the slave-market town of Rio de Janeiro, assumed the role of an imperial capital. There the court faced the contradictions found in all empires in a single city: Rio was both the seat of empire and the biggest slaving port in the Americas ... the mother country had become ... “a colony of a colony””.¹³⁵

Portuguese people relating to the transfer of the court to Brazil and Dom João's directive not to oppose the French in order to keep the peace. For a near contemporaneous publication of Dom João's proclamation and directive see, respectively: *Correio Braziliense ou Armazém Literário*, Volume 1 1808 pp. 5-6 and pp. 7-8.

¹³³. Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon*, pp. 29-31.

¹³⁴. Robson, *Britain, Portugal and South America*, pp. 179-195

¹³⁵. Isabel Nobre Vargues, 'O processo de formação do primeiro movimento liberal: a revolução de 1820', in José Mattoso (ed.), *História de Portugal, vol. 5, O Liberalismo*, (Lisboa : Editorial Estampa, 1993), p. 57 cited by Patrick Wilcken, "A colony of a colony": The Portuguese royal court in Brazil,

Chapter three: The invasion and occupation of Portugal 1807 to 1808

I

On concluding the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit, and returning to Paris, a triumphant Napoleon summoned the Portuguese minister D. Lourenço de Lima to hear demands that were then re-iterated by de Rayneval, minister in the French legation in Lisbon, to António de Araújo de Azevedo. Unless Dom João acquiesced to Napoleon's demands in full, declared war on Britain, recalled her ambassadorial presence from London and dismissed that of Britain in Lisbon, detained all British residents, sequestrated their goods and property, and closed all ports to British shipping by September 1st, France would invade Portugal.¹³⁶ A further request, that the Portuguese navy be placed at Napoleon's disposal, was already known to Dom João's ministers - who had forewarned Britain of Napoleon's designs on the Portuguese fleet as early as May 1807.¹³⁷

As in 1801, with one eye on trade with the Americas and the other on preventing Napoleonic aggrandisement, Madeira was uppermost in the thoughts of

Common Knowledge, vol. 11, no. 2, 2005, 249-263, p. 250.

¹³⁶. See Harold Livermore, 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War', in Paddy Griffith (ed.), *A History of the Peninsular War, Vol IX, Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814*, (London : Greenhill, 1999, 385-98, especially pp. 394-95, Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 644-48 and, for details of the demands, *ibid.* vol. 3, pp. 587-594.

¹³⁷. For the suggestion that Britain knew of Napoleon's designs on the Portuguese fleet, see Richard Glover 'The French Fleet, 1807-1814: Britain's Problem; and Madison's Opportunity', in *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 39. no. 3, 233-252, in particular see p. 3, and n3, where the author cites *The Diaries and correspondence of James Harris, first earl of Malmesbury*, vol. 4, p. 391 and Harold Temperley, *Life of Canning*, (London, 1905) in which the author offers verification of the general accuracy of Malmesbury's information regarding the Portuguese fleet.

both the foreign and war office in Britain. In 1802, upon formal agreement of the Treaty of Amiens, “the evacuation [of Madeira] had taken place. In the present emergency [of 1807], however, Madeira was too valuable a pledge to be risked.”. Britain’s response in 1807 mirrored that in the previous crisis, and a suitably equipped fleet carrying an expeditionary force was despatched to Madeira.¹³⁸ The Portuguese perspective and their response (at least at the time of the crisis) was, thankfully, somewhat different to that during the earlier occupation of the island, which was viewed to be unsupportive and, by some, to be outwardly aggressive. Moreover, Britain’s reluctance to offer financial and military aid to Portugal during the crisis of 1801, particularly given she was being threatened by a Franco-Spanish alliance and therefore a common enemy, amidst suggestions that Portugal should try to negotiate with Spain (and France) to avert war, was deeply resented. However, times had changed and both policy and military options open to Britain were much broader. The occupation of Madeira in 1807 was agreed in a secret treaty, negotiated between D. Domingos António de Sousa Coutinho and Canning

¹³⁸. Livermore, ‘Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War’, p. 395; Soriano, as might be expected, is much less charitable, asserting that the seizure of Madeira, albeit for the duration of hostilities between Britain and France, was for ulterior motives and (probably) seen as a form of indemnity for British support during the present crisis, Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 693-95, and see Gregory, ‘British Occupations of Madeira’, pp. 80-96.

in London: a major provision of the treaty relating to safe transportation of Dom João and the Portuguese court to Brazil. ¹³⁹

The failure of diplomacy, and finally the imminent arrival of Junot, was the catalyst for the Brazil plan to be implemented: a decision that was to have major political and economic repercussions for both metropolis and colony. Despite Strangford's insistence of the importance of his role in this decision ¹⁴⁰, there were a number of much weightier external drivers and internal pressures than localised British diplomatic pressure. As we saw earlier, the potential to transfer the court to Brazil had a well-established history as a strategic option. ¹⁴¹ But Britain's dispatch of a powerful fleet and a significant expeditionary force, with orders to escort the Portuguese royal family to Brazil and, if not, seize the Portuguese fleet, destroy or otherwise put it beyond use, were perhaps the decisive factors in the implementation of the "Brazil plan". ¹⁴² If further evidence of the determination of the British government in this period is required, the Portland administration were resolved to bombard and occupy the forts of Lisbon, if necessary, in a plan that

¹³⁹. Neill Macaulay, *Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 12-13 and fn 309-10.

¹⁴⁰. Frederick H. Black Jr. 'Diplomatic Struggles: British Support in Spain and Portugal'.

¹⁴¹. See Kirsten Schultz, 'The crisis of empire and the problem of slavery: Portugal and Brazil, c. 1700- c. 1820', *Common Knowledge*, vol. 11, Issue 2, Spring 2005, 264-282. Maxwell stresses the primacy of political economy and commercial strategy in the decision making process, the 'Brazil plan' comprised an important component of Sousa Coutinho strategy, see the final chapter of *Conflicts and conspiracies*, 'Compromise', pp. 204-39.

¹⁴². Martin Robson, 'The Royal Navy in Lisbon, 1807-1808', in Malyn Newitt and Martin Robson (eds.), *Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807-1820*, (Lisboa : Imprensa das Ciências Sociais, 2004).

matched the reaction of the Ministry of the Talents to the perceived crisis a year earlier in 1806.¹⁴³ Britain clearly intended to respond quickly and determinedly to French threats towards Portugal and her fleet.

The apparent indecision of the regency council that had been left to govern in the prince regent's absence (any matters of import had to be referred to the relevant ministerial portfolio in Brazil) and the decision not to oppose the French invasion, also had both immediate and long term implications for Portugal, her economy, people and the military. A further factor was that more people than had been anticipated sought to escape the occupation of Portugal by the French, and joined the mass migration of the Portuguese court and nobility. Not all who wanted to leave could do so. A small number of ships were not able to set sail either because they were not seaworthy or were prevented by the last minute arrival of Junot.¹⁴⁴ Even upon departing for Brazil, and hearing of the early reports of military intelligence concerning the French invasion route via the Beira Baixa and Abrantes, Dom João ordered his subjects to welcome the French and set out his justification

¹⁴³. Robson, *Britain, Portugal and South America*, pp. 41-59, esp. p. 54 et seqs.

¹⁴⁴. The consensus is that the prince regent set sail, with the royal court, a variety of dignitaries, ministers, army and navy officers, together with tonnes of documentation to support the continued governance of the realm from Brazil. In addition, somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 people also set sail for Brazil – many never to return. See the initial chapter 'Exodus' in Neill MacCaulay, *Dom Pedro: the struggle for liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834*, (Duke University Press, Durham, 1986) and Patrick Wilcken, *Empire adrift: the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821*, (London : Bloomsbury, 2004).

for doing so. This policy at one and the same time sought to appease Napoleon and placate the British government.¹⁴⁵

Negotiations were, therefore, certainly being undertaken until the very last possible day (if not hour). While these actions have led Dom João to be labelled indecisive in many accounts, we argue here that any apparent vacillation was due to the range of possible options being presented by his ministers and competing political and diplomatic pressures and, not least, the very great importance such a momentous decision would have for Portugal. Ultimately, the Portuguese council of ministers ordered the embarkation of the court on hearing of Junot's arrival at Abrantes on the 23rd November 1807. Interestingly, this would appear to be a policy option agreed upon and openly supported by the main political factions at court on this occasion. The transfer of the court and the whole apparatus of government were complex issues that could not possibly be managed in a matter of days; therefore a great deal of planning must have been undertaken behind the scenes to ensure its success. But the circumstances of, and manner in which, the transfer was implemented suggest that Dom João was ultimately still persuaded by the

¹⁴⁵. The treaty and its ratification are presented in José Ferreira Borges de Castro, *Collecção dos Tratados, Convenções, Contratos e Outros Actos Publicos*, (Four vols., Lisbon 1856-57), vol. 4, pp. 236-62, A further indication that diplomacy and discussions were being undertaken until the very last hour is that, under the provisions of the (secret) Treaty, the Royal Navy was to escort the prince regent, his family and court to safety in Brazil and was negotiated directly between the Chevalier de Sousa and Canning in London, on the 22nd October 1807. It was subsequently ratified in Portugal on the 9th November and returned to Britain on the 19th December 1807 – a very tight timeline given the exigencies of the situation and the nature of seaborne communications.

(domestic or continental) policy preferred by Araújo de Azevedo while the Sousa Coutinho faction held sway in relation to diplomacy with Britain (international policy and economic strategy).¹⁴⁶

Therefore, due in no small part to Portugal's lack of a coherently argued and consistently implemented foreign and military policy, Junot was able to invade Portugal with something less than 25,000 troops of all arms.¹⁴⁷ The enormous distance covered, difficulties posed by the terrain and inclement weather, meant that Junot arrived at the gates of Lisbon with a very much reduced, dishevelled and totally exhausted advance guard, having dropped the majority of the army, its artillery and baggage on the way.¹⁴⁸ Junot's urgency was dictated by Napoleon's designs on Portugal, its place in his strategy for the domination of Europe and the Mediterranean and economic war against Britain. In December 1807, Napoleon directed Clarke, his minister for war, as follows: "my intention is that as from 1st November the pay, all the regular financial needs and incidental expenses of the 1^{er} *corps de la Gironde* are [to be] paid by [extraordinary] contributions levied on the

¹⁴⁶. Livermore, 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War', pp. 396-97; Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 1, pp. 1-15. .

¹⁴⁷. Oman, provides a succinct but not altogether credible account of the French invasion and subsequent arrival in Lisbon at the end of November 1807. In particular, he avoids all consideration of the difficult decisions taken, and dangerous situation faced by, the Portuguese ministry, Oman *History of the Peninsular War*, vol. 1: 1807-1809, pp. 26-31.

¹⁴⁸. Paul Thiébault, *Relation de l'Expédition du Portugal, faite en 1807-8, par le 1er Corps d'Observation de la Gironde, devenu armée de Portugal. Par le Baron Thiébault, Lieutenant-Général*, (Paris : Chez Magimel, Anselin et Pochard, 1817), especially chapter 5 and, in particular, pp. 56-70, Jackson L. Sigler, 'General Paul Thiébault: his life and his legacy', (Unpublished PhD thesis : Florida State University, 2006), pp. 169 et seqs., and Livermore, 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War', passim.

kingdom of Portugal, and that as from the 1st December [so too, all of] the financial needs of the 2^e corps de la Gironde.”. ¹⁴⁹ There was no doubt in Napoleon’s mind that Portugal would (or must) foot the bill for the war to subjugate the Iberian Peninsula. Therefore, while it could be argued there was a disproportionate focus on the minutiae to ensure the strategy was implemented, and an under-estimation of the complex, and often conflicting, tasks these various invasion forces were set, in terms of financing operations, the strategy and its implementation were totally unambiguous.

An additional, and not unimportant factor, was that the higher echelons of the Portuguese military were divided on the options available to Portugal and the correct course of action to take. There were some very similar lines of allegiance drawn to those relating to the concept of military reform at the turn of the century. A major difference though was the absence of the militarily ineffective, but politically important, Duc de Lafões. ¹⁵⁰ Ultimately, a number of relatively senior and experienced army officers, including senior generals, members of the general

¹⁴⁹. Napoléon *Correspondance*, vol. xvii 13412. — AU GENERAL CLARKE, Ministre De La Guerre. Milan, 23 décembre 1807. Monsieur le Général Clarke, envoyez en Portugal quatre bons commissaires des guerres et deux bons inspecteurs aux revues. Envoyez-y également quatre auditeurs. Vous vous entendrez pour cela avec M. l'archichancelier. Faites partir sans délai tous ces individus ; cela est nécessaire à l'administration du pays. Mon intention est qu'à dater du 1^{er} novembre la solde, les masses et toutes dépenses quelconques du 1^{er} corps de la Gironde soient payées par les contributions du royaume de Portugal, et qu'à dater du 1^{er} décembre la solde, les masses et autres dépenses du 2^e corps de la Gironde soient également payées sur les contributions du Portugal. ... [signed] Napoléon.

¹⁵⁰. Manuel Amaral, *A luta política em Portugal*, pp. 28-29

staff and regimental personnel, helped to form a division of Portuguese troops in French service called *La Légion Portugaise*, some of whom accompanied Masséna's army in the 1810 invasion.¹⁵¹ A small but significant group of officers though evaded involvement in the process of demobilisation and subsequent service in French pay. Some fled to Brazil, embarking temporarily to Britain, others opting to return to Portugal once news of the insurrections arrived, to fight against the French in the *Leal Legião Lusitana* or the regular Portuguese army under Beresford. A number of those Portuguese officers who left for France, but did not serve against Portugal in the subsequent invasion of 1810-1811, were not only pardoned but also served their country in various capacities post 1820.¹⁵²

II

As a result of these complex events Portugal was devoid of direct governance and political leadership. But if there had been any uncertainty in the period immediately preceding the arrival of Junot as to the underlying reasons for invasion

¹⁵¹. Livermore, 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War', p. 397 and Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 1, pp. 50-88 and João Torres Centeno, *O exército português na guerra peninsular, Volume 1, do Rossilhão ao fim da segunda invasão francesa 1807-1810*, (Lisboa : Prefácio, 2008), pp. 102-105.

¹⁵². For further details of military service and the future government portfolios of individual officers of *La Légion Portugaise*, see (Commandant) Paul Boppe *La Légion Portugaise, 1807-1813*, (Paris : Berger-Levrault, 1897), Arthur Ribeiro, *A legião portuguesa ao serviço de Napoleão (1808-1813)*, (Lisboa : Livraria Ferin, 1901). For a popular history see Pinheiro Chagas. 'Historia da legião portuguesa' from *A Ilustração portuguesa*, vol. 2 (1885) and a more critical review, see Manuel de Castro, *Historia da legião portuguesa em França*, (Londres : Hansard, 1814).

these were quickly dispelled. Junot dismissed the regency council and installed, in its place, a military government as reported by das Neves:

“A few days later, Hermann was introduced into the government with the title of administrator general of finance in the (royal) treasury * ... but this was not the most extraordinary [event] Berthelot was similarly introduced (into government) with the title of inspector general of contributions and revenues of Portugal, nominated by the Emperor of the French himself, dated Fontainebleau 17th November 1807”¹⁵³

But he retained a few members of the former regency council charged with joint responsibility for portfolios alongside French counterparts in an effort to provide the government with some semblance of legitimacy. Some of the Portuguese members, for example the Conde de Sampaio and Pedro Mello de Breyner, were seen to be actively cooperating with the French and, as such, the regency council as a whole was tainted with collaboration in the eyes of their fellow countrymen. Suffice to say, for the moment, that those members more compliant with the military government were removed from the Council’s membership when it was reinstated by Dalrymple in the autumn of 1808. But the acute emotional response to perceptions of collaboration and betrayal would become key factors underlying popular resentment and anger.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³. * Por decreto de Junot de 3 de dezembro de 1807 (by Junot’s decree, 3rd December). José Acúrcio das Neves, *História Geral da Invasão dos Franceses em Portugal e restauração deste reino*, (Five volumes, Lisboa : Simão Thaddeo Ferreira, 1810-1811), vol. 1, pp. 225-26, (my translation).

¹⁵⁴. Thiébault paints the picture of a coalition government, with French and Portuguese appointees to each portfolio, excepting those of justice and religion: M. Hermann and Petro [Pedro] de Mello

For the time being, despite the imposition of the exactions demanded by Napoleon, the seizure of plate and other valuables in lieu of payment, the repression of public meetings and any overt expression against the regime, the replacement of the Portuguese national flag with the tricolour of France on the *Castelo de São Jorge*, the British blockade, rising unemployment and prices, and, finally, the proclamation on 1st February 1808 that the house of Bragança had ceased to reign in Portugal, the result was not opposition but rather a depressive helplessness amongst the Lisbon population.¹⁵⁵ The relatively quiescent state of the population in Lisbon, and especially across the country more generally, has been questioned by some historians arguing that the jurisdiction of the military government, its Portuguese adherents or *afrancesados*, and the newly appointed *corregedores mores*, was limited to those areas under direct French control. Clearly the military only had overwhelming control over the wider metropolitan area of Lisbon plus a limited number of cities and fortified places held by small French garrisons and their Spanish allies.¹⁵⁶ However, the almost total compliance of

[Breyner], (ministres des finances et de l'intérieur); M. Luuyt and le comte Saint-Payo [Conde de Sampaio], (ministres de la guerre et de la marine); M le principal de Castro (ministre de justice et des cultes); M. de la Garde, (intendant général de la police); and M. Viennot Vaublanc (inspecteur aux revues, ... nommé secrétaire d'état), Thiébault, *Relation de l'Expédition du Portugal*, pp. 99-100.

¹⁵⁵. Acúrsio das Neves, *História Geral da Invasão*, vol. 2, pp. 148-49 and pp.157-58 and Soriano, *Historia da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 1, pp. 188-199.

¹⁵⁶. During April the following officials were appointed as *corregedores-mores* with responsibility for five provinces: Estremadura, Mr. Pepin de Bellisle; Beira, Sr. José Pedro Quintela; Entre-Douro-e-Minho, Mr. Tabureau; Alentejo, Mr. Lafond; and the Algarve, Mr. Goguet. In addition, a number of *juizes de fora* and *juizes de crime* were appointed with responsibility for the subjugation of strategic

civil, judicial and military authorities with French demands ensured Junot's reach was much wider than those areas under direct military control: a cause of further infuriation for the Portuguese population.¹⁵⁷ Once Junot had begun to impose military law and collect the extraordinary contributions demanded by Napoleon, the legitimacy of this imposed government was increasingly being questioned but, as yet, aggravation had not led to open insurrection. However, there is considerable evidence that increasingly, between April and May, the violent nature and extent of exactions, together with perceived collaboration, was leading to much more widespread discontent than the existing historiography would have us believe.¹⁵⁸

Detailed investigation of the evidence highlights a number of significant issues. Popular insurrections were prevalent throughout rural provinces of Portugal, particularly so in the most northerly regions and particularly that of Trás-os-Montes, spreading to Beira (Alta, Baixa and Litoral), Estremadura and the Algarve and also, albeit assuming a quite different form, in the Alentejo. The only region that remained quiescent was Lisbon - Junot's military base. Even with some

cities. António Ventura, 'A propaganda francesa durante a guerra peninsular', Catedrático de História, Faculdade de letras, Lisboa, undated essay.

¹⁵⁷. The compliance of the Portuguese apparatus of state does not appear to have been taken into account as a factor in enabling Junot's control over Portugal by Esdaile, *Popular resistance in the French wars*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁵⁸. See, for example Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*, vol, 1, pp. 210-18 and Esdaile, *A new history*, pp. 90-91 who reports "Whether this movement amounted to anything more than a glorified *jacquerie* is unclear."

welcome reinforcements, Junot had just 30,000 troops at his disposal and therefore relied heavily on the Spanish for the military subjugation of Portuguese territory that lay outside his immediate jurisdiction. However, paradoxically, he could count upon the compliance of the provincial and local representatives of the absolutist state. The extent of compliance with Dom João's request not to oppose the French ensured monetary exactions were gathered and the demobilisation of the military implemented. Therefore, although the vast majority of French troops were concentrated in Lisbon, and fortified cities such as Abrantes, Almeida and Elvas, there were other factors underpinning the general compliance and quiescence of the Portuguese population.¹⁵⁹ Apart from some limited opposition to the military occupation of strategic points, the demobilisation of the army and the character and scale of exactions, there had still been no significant outbreaks of insurrectionary violence: the form and nature of nascent of opposition, if not more established insurrectionary activities, was starting to take shape.¹⁶⁰ One indirect consequence of these brutal actions was the strengthening of the *partido inglês*. If not yet totally

¹⁵⁹. Vasco Pulido Valente, 'O povo em armas: a revolta nacional de 1808-1809', *Análise Social*, vol. XV, no. 57, 1979, 7-48.

¹⁶⁰. *Correspondance*, vol. xvii, 13416. au général Junot, Commandant L'armée De Portugal. Milan, 23 décembre 1807, pp. 212-214. 'Le grand nombre de troupes que je suis obligé de lever rend mes dépenses énormes. J'ai fixé la contribution extraordinaire à cent millions ; toutes les villes doivent payer en raison de leurs moyens, et avec cela vous ne manquerez pas du nécessaire; mais, je vous le répète, il faut renvoyer les troupes portugaises et désarmer le pays.' The amount of war reparations were fixed at 100 million French Francs, or 40 million Cruzados. Thiébault asserts that Junot had estimated that less than half of the extraordinary contribution demanded by Napoleon could be collected, even after seizing all the church plate and other valuables and sequestering British goods, and reports that Junot, therefore, requested the amount be reduced to 50 million francs, Thiébault, *Relation de l'Expédition du Portugal*, pp. 90-91.

in control in government, the faction was certainly much more able to exert influence on Dom João and the court in Rio de Janeiro, the court of St. James and, from 1809 onwards, the regency council in Portugal – such that by May 1808 a state of war had been declared with France. ¹⁶¹

Following the revolt of the Spanish people, insurrections erupted across almost all provinces of Portugal. The scale and nature of the insurrections, and participants involved, varied from locality to locality. But, from contemporary records, it would appear that participants in the insurrections, with one or two specific exceptions were ordinary people and, moreover, people from within the lower classes of society with little or no property: small farmers, *jornaleiros* (day-wage labourers), artisans and “mechanics” (for example locksmiths), and non-commissioned officers of the *milícia* or *ordenanças*. ¹⁶² There would appear to be only a limited number of occasions where people of higher status joined in the insurrections and very limited evidence that the initiative was taken by civil and judicial authorities or military governors. ¹⁶³ In the vast majority of cases, the involvement of the state’s representatives, and subsequently the clergy, was as a

¹⁶¹. Dom João declared war on France, from Brazil, on 1st May 1808, João Torres Centeno, *O exército português na guerra peninsular, Volume 1, do Rossilhão ao fim da segunda invasão francesa 1807-1810*, (Lisboa : Prefácio, 2008), p. 107.

¹⁶². Valente, ‘O povo em armas’, pp 16-17.

¹⁶³. Valente, ‘O povo em armas’, passim. Matos, though, affords a much more pro-active role to the representatives of the state in the insurrectionary activities. See Henrique José Martins Matos, ‘As juntas minhotas de 1808 na reacção à ocupação francesa’, *Revista de faculdade de letras: História*, Porto, III serie, vol. 10, 2009, 43-55.

direct result of the insurrections rather than precipitating them – although individual members of the clergy were actively involved in these preliminary insurrections at a local level. ¹⁶⁴

Additionally, there were quite distinct variations in the nature of the élite's response to these insurrections which, in order to understand correctly, need to be seen within the context of territorial organisation and the various forms of governance combining civil and judicial powers at regional and local level. Some officials attempted to maintain the rule of law: that is they continued to support French decrees. Other officials did just enough to placate the mob and keep their heads, or pro-actively sought to harness and control the excesses of the mob and direct it towards the French. Another, more sinister, side to the insurrections was the settling of old scores against local officials, nobles, the church and the state: a phenomenon that is well documented in literature dealing with Spanish responses to French occupation. To a certain extent though, it could be argued, that these antagonisms resulted as much from the people's anger at the compliance of the state's representatives with French demands as the exactions themselves. It was not the French invasion itself, therefore, but the implementation of military rule that was the catalyst for these specific forms of rural revolt, the people's anger clearly focused on anyone perceived to have collaborated or to have profited from

¹⁶⁴. Valente, 'O povo em armas', pp. 24-25.

collaboration. A further issue was that, in many cases, the authorities imposing exactions, either in the absolutist regime or French military regime, were one and the same. Therefore, once the crises had subsided and the civil, judicial and military authorities had regained control, in some areas there was a crusade to identify, root out and bring the full weight of the law to bear upon the perpetrators of these “crimes” against the state’s local representatives - as in the cases of Vila Nova de Foz Côa and Arcos de Valdevez.¹⁶⁵ The criminalisation of specific insurrectionary activities was therefore one of the components of élite counter measures to gain control of the situation.

Even after taking into account the evidence presented above, it is still not clear how such a small force of occupation was able to exert such powerful control over an entire country with a population in excess of three million. Contrary to the assertion that Portugal continued to benefit from a period of enlightened despotism throughout the second half of the eighteenth century¹⁶⁶, she had been subjected to an intense programme of measures in the thirty years to 1807 that could best be described as counter-reformationary.¹⁶⁷ Upon the demise of Dom José I, and the fall from grace of the Marquês de Pombal, Dona Maria I implemented a programme of reactionary policies that were as ruthlessly implemented as those of Pombal had

¹⁶⁵. Valente, ‘o povo em armas’, pp. 15-16 and Esdaile *A new history*, pp. 90-91.

¹⁶⁶. Esdaile, *A new history*, pp. 5-6.

¹⁶⁷. Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal: O despotismo iluminado (1750-1807)*, (Lisbon : Editorial Verbo, 1977), pp. 295-96 underplays the significance of the counter-reforms.

been. The role and power of the monarchy, aristocratic élites and the church (including the Jesuits and the inquisition) were firmly re-established. Conversely, leading academics in Coimbra, liberals, deists, encyclopaedists, were imprisoned, purged from office or exiled. A substantial number of Pombaline reforms were reversed, the exceptions generally being those that served to strengthen, rather than undermine, absolutist authority: for example economic and political reforms reinforcing the dominance of the metropolis and the subservience of Portugal's colonies irrespective of the potentially negative longer term implications for the preservation of the Luso-Brazilian Empire.¹⁶⁸

These considerations are important for two reasons. Firstly, they help us to understand the pervasiveness of the absolutist state and its apparatus in Portugal and, in particular, the reinforcement of the role and importance of the first two estates - the nobility and clergy in government, at national and provincial level. Secondly, they helps us to understand the opposition to military reform upon Portugal's defeat in the War of the Oranges - given the continued power of the *partido aristocrático* within the military and, most especially, in terms of the role of the military élites in the provinces of Portugal. Suffice to say, the third estate had no real involvement in government, there was neither a *partido popular* nor a numerous and powerful stratum of society that could be identified as comprising a

¹⁶⁸. See, for example, Maxwell, *Conflicts and conspiracies*, pp. 82-83.

burguesia (apart from in Lisbon and its environs) and, moreover, their activities were restricted to the economic and social sphere as opposed to the political.

As we saw earlier, starting with the Spanish insurrection in Madrid referred to from the date of its occurrence as the *dos de mayo*, the Iberian Peninsula began to rise up against French occupation. ¹⁶⁹ Uprisings in Madrid led to further insurrections across Spain which, in turn, was the catalyst for the revolt to spread to Portugal in the following month. It was only at this stage that the growing, albeit passive, animosity towards French rule was eventually transformed into positive and active opposition and open insurrection. But the insurrection had still not, during these early days, erupted in Lisbon itself. ¹⁷⁰ For Junot this was crucial, given the importance of his base in Lisbon was due entirely to the inordinate concentration, historically, of the country's population, economic base, social élites and political power in the capital and its immediate environs. Moreover, Junot was, even at this stage, still able to rely upon Spanish troops to control the north and south of Portugal. However, upon receiving news of the rebellion in Spain, Junot was forced to first deceive and then disarm the Spanish contingent helping to secure Lisbon. At the same time, General Belestá the commander of the Spanish contingent in Oporto, became aware of the revolt of his compatriots and incarcerated Quesnel the senior French officer in the city, together with the small number of French officers

¹⁶⁹. Esdaile, *A new history*, pp. 37-40,

¹⁷⁰. Esdaile, *A new history*, pp. 90-92

and troops stationed there, called a meeting with the Portuguese authorities in Oporto to advise them of his actions and to take control of the situation and marched off to Galicia with his captives. ¹⁷¹

These actions by the Spanish garrison in Oporto meant that the insurrection could quickly spread throughout the north of Portugal and into the Beiras. Similar insurrections took place in Estremadura; quickly spreading into the provinces of the Alentejo and the Algarve, given they too had previously been controlled by troops who had now departed for Spain. However, these insurrections were successively and brutally repressed, starting with the first of these three regions; as Loison and other French generals were despatched at the head of flying columns to systematically and rigorously put down the Portuguese rebellion. In a small but significant number of cities, French reprisals attained a level of brutality that forewarned of the scale, nature and intensity of the forthcoming struggle: the most notable of which took place in Leiria, Caldas da Rainha and Évora.

A brief review of events in Oporto, hopefully, will serve as an example of the confusion and disorder in the north of Portugal at this time and the extent to which popular opposition to the French also came up against determined resistance amongst some of the Portuguese élites. Despite the departure of the Spanish troops, a small number of Portuguese notables retained control in the city in the

¹⁷¹. Livermore, 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War', pp. 397-98, and Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War*, vol. 1, pp. 215-17.

name of Junot: the *Brigadeiro* Luís de Oliveira da Costa, who had been appointed *governador das armas*, had managed to retain control of the city's military forces and its arsenal, had taken down the national flag previously hoisted by the patriots, replaced the tricolor in its stead and arrested one of the major instigators of the revolt, Raimundo José Pinheiro (although he subsequently escaped). Meantime, the *desembargador* Joaquim Rodrigues Botelho tried to formally organize popular insurrections. Between the 6th and 9th June various attempts were made to organise public support for an insurrection, eventually calling a meeting which was attended by a number of the city's civil and judicial authorities including: the *Presidente da Câmara* and *Juiz de Fora*, Luís Barbosa e Mendonça; the *vereadores*, Bernardo de Meio Vieira da Silva e Menezes and Tomás da Silva Ferraz; and six *desembargadores*, Estanislão José Brandão, João de Carvalho Matheus da Silva Ferrão, Vitoriano José de Cerveira Botelho do Amaral, João Bernardo Cardoso, Francisco Sabino da Costa Pinto and António Pedro de Alcântara Sá Lopes.

During this same period the people of the Minho and Trás-os-Montes had risen in revolt and had appointed the two generals Sepulveda and Silveira as *governadores das armas* for the two regions acclaiming their allegiance to Dom João and the *Casa de Bragança*. The insurrection in Oporto was ultimately successful during the night of the 18th to 19th of June prompted in part by the strength of popular insurrection in the surrounding provinces, a patriotic proclamation by the

desembargador José Feliciano da Rocha Gameiro and a successful uprising amongst the city's population led by a captain of artillery, João Manuel de Mariz – the catalyst for which was quite possibly the broadcast of false news of the imminent arrival of a French expeditionary force.¹⁷² On the 19th the *Junta Provisional do Supremo Governo* was declared in the name of the prince regent. However, not only Mariz and a fellow officer of artillery who assisted in the uprising, but also general Luís Cândido Pinheiro Furtado - who had been nominated military governor for the city's defences, were subsequently prevented from participating further in the establishment of the *junta* by a highly influential conservative faction led by the Bishop of Oporto that, thereby, managed to wrest control from those of a more radical persuasion.¹⁷³

That these uprisings remained uncoordinated, provincial insurrections rather than a national uprising was due, in no small part, to the power vacuum left when the Portuguese court departed for Brazil, the limited powers entrusted to the regency council and its subsequent dismissal by Junot substantial divisions amongst the civil, judicial, military and, most importantly, clerical authorities.

There was no credible centre for opposition in the capital Lisbon. Popular

¹⁷² Artur de Magalhães Basto, 'O Pôrto contra Junot', in Damião Peres (ed.), *Revista de Estudos Históricos*, 1.º Ano – N.º 4, Outubro-Dezembro, 1924, pp. 51-61; 88-120; and 121-147. A further work that looks to be of interest but unfortunately was not available at the time of writing is José Augusto dos Santos Alves, 'A opinião pública em Portugal (1780-1820)', Teses // Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, Departamento de Ciências Humanas, (Lisboa : Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2000).

¹⁷³ Valente, 'O povo em armas', pp. 29-30

perceptions of specific, prominent members of the former regency council, and the apparatus of the state at local levels, were extremely negative; based upon quite visible evidence of collaboration with French rule.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, these insurrections were important occurrences. They provided substantial indications of the extent of determined popular, indigenous opposition to the French occupation of Portugal or the compliance of Portuguese élites with French rule. Crucially, they also help to define the centres for that opposition and the forms the opposition took, albeit not providing a definitive and comprehensive record of the social basis of popular resistance.¹⁷⁵

Some local, temporary successes were achieved and, given the limited number of French troops, much of Portugal was reclaimed. However, despite widespread support for the *juntas* and the insurrection, the Portuguese were not able to totally overthrow the forces of occupation – given the inherent deficiencies of the Portuguese military following Junot’s programme of demobilisation. But the insurrection did succeed in disturbing French rule and substantially dissipating the forces of occupation. Ultimately, British intervention in Portugal was greatly

¹⁷⁴ Pedro Mello de Breyner, for example, was despatched by Junot to moderate, if not totally suppress, insurrectionary activities in Oporto until French forces could be dispatched to intervene; but he was stopped at Leiria by the groundswell of popular opposition to the military government and its repressive activities.

¹⁷⁵ It has not been possible to obtain a comprehensive idea of the social basis leading and supporting this opposition in all of these areas to support the current study, but analysis of the signatories of the many proclamations issued by the *juntas* would be a useful start in investigating these types of issues in future: for example, Manoel Jorge Gomes de Sepulveda, *Collecção de papeis officiaes da Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo*, (Porto : Typographia de Antonio Alvarez Ribeiro, 1808).

assisted by the insurrection given the majority of French troops were dispersed and hard pressed, as an increasingly substantial proportion had to be dispatched to subdue uprisings in the Algarve, Alentejo, Estremadura, Ribatejo and the Beiras. In the main, the timeliness of responses and the number of troops deployed meant Junot was able to quickly and efficiently deal with the hastily and ill-organised, military opposition. But the limits of Junot's military jurisdiction, and the precarious nature of his tenure of Portugal, were demonstrated by Loison's ultimately unsuccessful expedition to quell insurrections in the north of Portugal. Moreover, given that many of these points had been formerly held by Spanish troops, Junot was forced to detach a number of troops to garrison the main settlements and to suppress disturbances as they occurred in a desperate attempt to control the rapidly increasing scale of the insurrection. Despite having received some limited reinforcements in the meantime, increasing his total available force to around 30,000, these detachments seriously undermined the security of his central base in Lisbon and Estremadura where approximately 15,000 troops held down a population perhaps twenty times that number.

There was a great deal of popular support for the widespread insurrections across the length and breadth of Portugal. Civilians and volunteers helped to defend major settlements which had risen against the French: often fighting alongside first line troops (*infanteria*) second line troops (*milicia*) and the locally

organised levies in the companies of *ordenanças*. Moreover, in Évora, both Spanish and Portuguese insurgents and armed forces disputed the French reprisals. As a result of the ill-coordinated but passionate resistance they encountered, both from the impromptu gatherings of armed troops and volunteers defending major towns and cities, but also the passionate and stubborn resistance of the general population in dispersed settlements they passed through, the French inflicted dreadful reprisals in retaliation against the civilian population (in Beira, Estremadura, and Alentejo). These reprisals against Portuguese patriots, as against those in Spain, served only to stiffen resolve and incite, rather than stifle, further opposition.¹⁷⁶

As indicated above, a provincial government was hastily formed in Oporto called the *Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo*. Declarations were published to assure the citizens of Oporto, and the nearby provinces, of the steps being taken, in the name of the prince regent, for the defence of Portugal. One of the *Junta Suprema's* first initiatives was to put troops within its jurisdiction on a war footing, with specific proclamations calling officers and soldiers of the two regiments of the city - that had been disbanded by Junot earlier in the year - to the colours and setting out terms of service and payment.¹⁷⁷ These public proclamations served a number of purposes. They helped to assure people of all classes that the *junta* had been established, that its members were being pro-active in the defence of the

¹⁷⁶. Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 1., passim.

¹⁷⁷. See Gomes de Sepulveda, *Collecção de papeis officiaes da Junta Provisional*, passim.

realm, and that these activities were in the name of the legitimate ruler of Portugal, our lord the prince regent "*em nome do príncipe regente: nosso senhor, a junta provisional do governo supremo*". This gave the *junta* at one and the same time power, legitimacy and, crucially, control over the masses.

Meantime, the *Junta Suprema* had already not only started to organise volunteer corps but had also called out the troops of the line (*infanteria*), second line (*milícias*) and *ordenanças* within the *Partido do Porto*, in which it could claim legitimate jurisdiction, but also across the other military regions of northern Portugal. To raise funds, the *Junta Suprema* had also implemented taxation on some of the principal exports from the region's ports, for example on wine, *aguadente*, oil and vinegar, and had requested the loan of a substantial sum in coin from the British government in the sum of 1.2 million Cruzados (in the event, somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000 *patacas* or dollars was furnished). Importantly, the *Junta Suprema* had also requested the assistance of military forces (troops), arms, and equipment from Britain. As such the *Junta Suprema* was essentially requesting, retrospectively, official authorisation for the assumption of power and - in a quite unprecedented step - assuming responsibility for, and power over, not only the *Partido do Porto* but also vast majority of northern Portugal encompassing the

Minho, Trás-os-Montes and Beira Alta regions.¹⁷⁸ An obvious concern, appearing frequently in the various proclamations of the *Junta Suprema*, was the need to maintain public safety and public order: clearly these would appear to be responses to significant and, at times, uncontrollable, acts of public disorder and related in various British memoirs and accounts. Some of the scenes of public disorder will, no doubt, have been due to popular discontent not only with the invasion itself but also the perceived lack of an appropriate, official national response to the invasion. In many cases they would appear to have resulted directly from perceptions of collaboration by the apparatus of state with the French regime and the coercion of the Portuguese population.

We can now address the concept of ideology in some further detail and specifically the assertion that it had no, or a very limited, role in the insurrections and opposition to the French.¹⁷⁹ At first sight, the evidence would appear to bear out this assertion in that the focus of the violence would appear to have been directed against perceived collaborators and *afrancesados*. Moreover, the nature of the insurrections and activities of insurrectionists appeared more retributory than revolutionary. However, these concepts are difficult to disentangle given the association of the established élites with the French impositions and the extent of

¹⁷⁸. See Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 1, pp. 309-313. Soriano asserts that while the written request for support was made on the 2nd July a deputation (comprising the Visconde de Balsemão and the desembargador João de Carvalho Mártens da Silva Ferrão) arrived in London on the 27th July.

¹⁷⁹. Esdaile, *Popular resistance in the French wars*, p. 22.

coercion and social conditioning underpinning the absolutist regime in Portugal. In relation to the former, to counter some of the more excessive examples of violence the *juntas* acted quickly to criminalise certain aspects of insurrectionary behaviour. In terms of the latter, the energies of civil and clerical authorities were combined in articulating the divine right of Dom João to rule and provide justification and encouragement for popular resistance.

At first sight, then, the evidence suggests the motivation was, in the main, economic and social and, in some cases, criminal, rather than political. There is some evidence that the violence was justifiably directed against persons who were suspected of collaboration, and in many cases of course this was correct. But there were other, less rational, examples of victimisation - for example the number of recorded attacks on members of the Jewish population, perceived heretics, and some which would appear to be no more than the settling of old scores.

The ideological nature of the insurrections does not become apparent until later, that is after the assumption of power by the ruling élites. There is a clearly defined chronology and pattern for the establishment of the *juntas*, across the north of Portugal, and some useful indicators for the social basis of their membership. Moreover, the centres for these *juntas* were the centres of military governorship, Oporto (Partido de Porto), Viana, Braga, etc – many of which were conterminous with (or approximately followed) the boundaries of clerical diocese. The

establishment of civil, judicial and military authority restored absolutism, and curbed the excess of the masses. Rather than supporting and empowering the people to oppose the French, their enthusiasm was harnessed: in some cases by relatively limited forms of coercion, but in others enforced by means of rigorous application of the rule of law. In these matters it is clear that inadequate recognition has been afforded to the extent to which Portuguese society was marked by ascription and deference, an acceptance of the existing hierarchical structures and the subaltern status of commoners and – especially - the non propertied majority of both the rural and urban population. How else are we able to explain the ability of the élites to harness and suppress popular enthusiasm?

The ideological underpinning, for this phase of the insurrection, was unquestionably that of the (absent) Bragança absolutist monarchy and, as such, we have to allow for social conditioning and élite manipulation in establishing control given the precarious hold the civil and judicial authorities had over the masses.¹⁸⁰ One further factor in establishing authority and directing public anger against the French was the role of the church, from the ultra-conservative high clergy such as the Bishops of diocese to parochial priests and friars. Given the important role played by the Catholic Church in Portuguese society, and the extent of illiteracy

¹⁸⁰. There is some agreement on this aspect of the role of the state and church in relation to insurrectionary activities, see for example Esdaile, *Popular resistance and the French wars*, and Fraser, *Napoleon's cursed war*. For the role of the magistracy in Portuguese society in the eighteenth century see Stuart B. Schwartz, 'Magistracy and Society in colonial Brazil', *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 50, no. 4 (Nov., 1970), 715-730.

amongst the general population, the general perception and conflation of Napoleon and the French invaders as regicidists and atheists is, perhaps, to be expected. But the role of the church does not become apparent until after the insurrections had occurred and civil, judicial and military authority had been re-imposed on “patriot” forces. However, from that point on members of the clergy not only actively participated in insurrectionary activities they clearly gave them an ideological basis – whether in terms of the fight against the French enemy, personified as *Jacobin*, anti-Christ or both, or in terms of further defining the insurrections as conservative and reformatory, rather than a revolutionary force for change.¹⁸¹

Power was assumed by the *juntas* and, in the north, the *Junta Suprema* assumed a pan-regional role, issuing proclamations requesting public subscriptions to support the development and implementation of provincial civil and judicial administration in the absence of more formal governance and finance at a national level. Despite a lack of consensus on all matters, the membership of the *Junta Suprema* was united in relation to the pressing need for arms, munitions and finance to sustain popular opposition to the French. All soldiers of the first and second line, who were either still under “licence” to serve, or who had served at some point since 1801, were recalled to their respective regiments. The *Junta Suprema* defined the territorial limits for recruitment to each regiment and announced an increase in

¹⁸¹. Valente, ‘O povo em armas’, pp. 25-26.

pay for both first and second line troops. In these ways, the *Junta Suprema* was successful in mobilising the eight infantry regiments pertaining to the northern provinces, three regiments of cavalry and, in addition, four battalions of *caçadores* were raised, respectively, in the Entre Minho e Douro, Partido do Porto, Trás-os-Montes and Beira Alta. The lack of finance and more particularly the deficiency in officers and staff, and therefore military discipline, organisation and logistics, would continue to present problems. The civil and judicial authorities were armed in an effort to maintain the rule of law and ensure public safety. To provide an infrastructure and raise funds, the *Junta Suprema* implored the population to make patriotic donations of arms, equipment, horses, and money to sustain military mobilisation. In addition to imposing new taxation, in coin, on staple exports such as wine, oil, vinegar and *aguadente*, the *Junta Suprema* requested a loan from the Portuguese treasury of two million Cruzados and sought a similar amount of finance from the British government. D. Domingos António de Sousa Coutinho wrote to the *Junta Suprema* from London on the 18th July to report that all almost all requests for aid had been agreed to, or were to be met, in full. ¹⁸² Not only money,

¹⁸². Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 1, pp. 309-312. As to the Bishop of Oporto's separate and private request to Sousa Coutinho in London for the loan of a British general, the minister plenipotentiary advised of the delicate nature of such a request, and the implications it had for both nations, but that it might be possible to explore the possibilities for such an appointment amongst the British generals that were being dispatched to the Peninsula. Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, vol. pp. 313-14. As far as can be ascertained, there is no mention of this private correspondence between the Bishop of Oporto and the Portuguese minister in London, Sousa Coutinho, within secondary sources in English.

arms and equipment were to be sent but also a British expeditionary force under Wellesley.¹⁸³ Finally, a treaty was drawn up and agreed between the *Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo* in Oporto and the *Junta Revolucionaria da Galicia* declaring mutual support for all military efforts in relation to resisting and expelling the French from their respective countries.¹⁸⁴

In Portugal, there was clearly a groundswell of public support for the establishment of the *juntas*, and formal opposition to the French, as evidenced by the donations given, the extent of military mobilisation (in such a short period of time) and the numbers voluntarily enlisting in the numerous volunteer battalions; some of which were of much more military significance than others. For example, many of the volunteer light infantry battalions formed the cadres of the first six battalions of *caçadores* to be officially incorporated into the Portuguese regular army in late 1808 whilst other volunteers enlisted into the *Leal Legião Lusitana*: a unit that had a chequered history and which, ultimately, was disbanded; its officers and troops providing the nucleus for six additional battalions of *caçadores* in 1811.¹⁸⁵

Undoubtedly, the activities of D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz was a major factor

¹⁸³. Sir Arthur Wellesley was created Viscount Wellington in recognition of his victory at Talavera in July: throughout the period 1808, and during the campaign in Portugal in the second quarter of 1809, he should be referred to as Wellesley.

¹⁸⁴. See Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, vol. 5, part1, Document no. 17, pp. 58-59, and, for example, the exaltations for public donations in *Collecção de papeis officiaes da Junta Provisional*, p. 10.

¹⁸⁵. These *caçador* units were subsequently integrated into the official Portuguese army establishment in the royal decree of 30th September, 1808: for details of their origins and formal development see Centeno, *O exército português na guerra peninsular*, respectively, pp. 110-13 and 114-16.

underlying the successful re-organisation of Portuguese armed forces in the north, the Junta Suprema had responsibility for recruitment and mobilisation of almost one half of the Portuguese regular armed forces. ¹⁸⁶

Meanwhile, the British expeditionary force under Wellesley had already been given to orders to embark: although, as is well understood within British historiography the eventual destination for this force had not yet been decided. Up until the very last hour before embarkation, this force had been destined for South America, the defining moment in the decision making process being the Spanish uprising against Napoleon. ¹⁸⁷ British preferences were probably still, even at this point, for intervention in Spain or even on two fronts – Cadiz and Lisbon. The decision to intervene in Portugal was determined by the unfolding of events in the Iberian Peninsula including the critical mass of Spanish troops located in the northern regions of Spain and a combination of Spanish pride and unease at a further British military presence in mainland Spain. ¹⁸⁸ The initial British expeditionary force which sailed from Cork had previously been committed to an expedition to Venezuela. It was joined by an ad hoc combination of other troops that had previously been intended to serve in a variety of other operations, for

¹⁸⁶. *ibid.* pp. 116-17.

¹⁸⁷. John Lynch, British policy and South America, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1969, 1-30, pp. 22-24 and Martin Robson, *Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars*, (London : IB Tauris, 2011), pp. 214-22.

¹⁸⁸. For details of which see Esdaile, *A new history*, pp. 95-97, Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon*, pp. 46-49; Muir, 'Britain and the Peninsular War', p. 342; and Michael Glover, *Britannia sickens: Sir Arthur Wellesley and the convention of Cintra*, (London : Leo Cooper, 1970), pp. 56, and 59-60.

example in the Mediterranean and the Baltic: a relatively small expeditionary force under Sir Brent Spencer already off the coast of Spain and a much larger force that had been prepared for an expedition to the Baltic under Sir John Moore was also dispatched to Iberia, but did not reach Portugal in time to take part in the campaign of 1808. The decision to divert all of these troops from their various operations and for them to concentrate on the Iberian Peninsula came after requests for support from Asturian delegates despatched to London, and no doubt similar requests from the Portuguese, and resulted in a wide ranging brief being given to Wellesley by Castlereagh. However, the Spanish delegation sent to London and (subsequently) the authorities in La Coruña refused the offer of direct military intervention but not the provision of finance, arms and equipment. This shift in emphasis, coupled with the direct requests for military aid by, and more recent intelligence from, Portugal (as represented by the *Junta Suprema* in Oporto and the minister plenipotentiary in London convinced the British government of the wisdom of intervening in Portugal. The government's views (expressed in a fairly wide ranging brief to Wellesley) were immediately confirmed when Wellesley arrived off the coast of Spain. Wellesley quickly determined to sail on to Portugal, agreed the most appropriate point for the army's disembarkation, and sent on reports to London

confirming their increasing interest in concentrating the efforts of the combined expeditionary forces in the liberation of Portugal from the French. ¹⁸⁹

Wellesley wrote to Castlereagh from La Coruña to apprise him of the intelligence he had gained from the *Junta Revolucionaria de Galicia* and from Charles Stuart who had been dispatched on a particular mission to northern Spain. He informed him of the extent of the Spanish insurrection, the most likely basis for British military intervention and his intention to sail on to Oporto. Writing again from Oporto, he detailed the extent of insurrection in Portugal, in all provinces to the north of the Tagus, the very limited indigenous military forces and the general lack of arms and equipment for the same. Wellesley estimated there were approximately 5,000 formal troops of which only 1,000 were properly armed and accoutred; and, taking into account local intelligence relating to French deployment, determined to disembark the British expeditionary force at the mouth of the Mondego. ¹⁹⁰ The details of the disembarkation and subsequent campaign are well documented, and need to not detain us here, except in relation to Portuguese

¹⁸⁹ For a succinct yet comprehensive review of the campaign, see Rory J Muir, 'Wellington and the ingredients of victory', in Rory Muir, and others, *Inside Wellington's Peninsular Army*, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2006), in particular pp. 1-2, and for coverage of the strategic, political and other considerations (such as military hierarchy), and details of the military briefing given to Wellesley and subsequent commanders, see Rory Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815*, (London : Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 42-43, and 65-69 and Charles Esdaile, *The Peninsular War: A New History*, (London : Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 94-97.

¹⁹⁰ Wellesley to Castlereagh, HMS Crocodile, Coruña, 21st July, 1808, pp. 23-24, same to same, pp. 24-29; same to same, HMS Crocodile off Oporto, 25th July, 1808, pp. 30-31 et seq., same to same, HMS Donegal off the Mondego River, 1st August, 1808 pp. 39-43. For details of the expeditionary force, its remit and composition, see the correspondence in WD iv, pp. 15-18, in particular *ibid.*, Castlereagh to Wellesley, Downing Street, 15th July, 1808, pp. 15-17.

perceptions and expectations of the British expeditionary force and developing Anglo-Portuguese relations. ¹⁹¹ Crucially, in relation to these issues, we will need to take into account the developing civil, judicial and military power base in the north of Portugal.

III

Bernadim Freire de Andrade played a substantial role in the mobilisation and deployment of Portuguese armed forces in 1808 and 1809. His relationships with the *Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo* in Oporto, and the British general Sir Arthur Wellesley, were both difficult and complex. An investigation of the activities of this general, his links with the *Junta Suprema* in Oporto, and his relationship with Wellesley and the Portuguese army, provides an excellent opportunity to explore in more detail some of the issues identified and outlined in the previous section. The focus will be on Freire's capacities, activities and responses as a general, the circumstances and experiences of the troops under his command, and the intervention in military matters of Portuguese civil and judicial authorities in the form of the *Junta Suprema* and the governor of Coimbra. ¹⁹² Freire had both his defenders and detractors: amongst the latter, the editor of the *Correio Braziliense*, Hipólito José da Costa; amongst the former, Frei Joaquim de Santo

¹⁹¹. The interested reader is referred to the relevant passages in Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*, vol. 1. and Glover, *Britannia sickens*, for further details. ¹⁷⁰. See also pp. 103 et seq. below.

António de Brito França Galvão to whom the anonymous *Reflexões sobre o Correio Brasiliense*, was attributed: a refutation of various accusations against Freire and the Regency (and Portuguese politics and policy in general) made in the *Correio Brasiliense*. The journal was a Portuguese/Brazilian periodical published in England; da Costa the author of the journal lived in exile in London, being banned from publishing in Portugal, after asserting greater Brazilian autonomy and advocating changes to the Portuguese political “constitution”. Da Costa was viewed as a dangerous *Jacobin* by the church and the political establishment in Portugal. ¹⁹³

Immediately following its establishment, the *Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo* appointed Bernadim Freire de Andrade, a veteran of the Roussillon War as *governador das armas*. His immediate tasks were to mobilise and lead the military forces under its jurisdiction. Formal military forces in the north of Portugal were furthest from Junot’s immediate authority in Lisbon, and were therefore spared some of the more excessive reductions in manpower experienced by regiments in Lisbon and the surrounding province when the army was ordered to disband. While the Spanish occupying forces had been tasked with ensuring compliance with that decree, in those areas over which they had jurisdiction, it is likely that some if not all of the sequestered arms would subsequently become available upon

¹⁹³. I am grateful for the assistance of Moisés Gaudêncio for help with these insights into Freire.

the departure of the Spanish. But the departure of such a substantial number of Portuguese troops for France and the deleterious effects of the process of demobilisation meant that it was only with great difficulty that Bernadim Freire de Andrade was able to mobilise and march 7,600 Portuguese troops, from the provinces of Partido do Porto, Trás-os-Montes, Minho and Beira (Alta), to assist with the eviction of the French from Portugal in the summer of 1808. The small Portuguese army Freire managed to assemble was not only recruited from four different provinces, it was composed of a wide variety of troop types, was poorly officered, inadequately trained, and almost entirely deficient in proper arms and equipment.¹⁹⁴

Bernadim Freire de Andrade and Manuel Pinto Bacelar, two senior Portuguese generals, met Sir Arthur Wellesley at Montemor-o-Velho whilst the British troops were still disembarking at the mouth of the Mondego River. Initially, it was agreed that all the Portuguese troops under their command would act jointly with the British force under Wellesley. Wellesley and Freire de Andrade would manoeuvre on Lisbon, via Leiria and the coastal road, while the troops of Manuel Pinto Bacelar would move from Castelo Branco towards the fortress city of Abrantes to observe,

¹⁹⁴ Fortunately, the civil, judicial and military authorities there had not totally lost the confidence of an enthusiastic population and the insurrections were backed by military commanders, for example general Manuel José de Sepúlveda, the *governador das armas* of Trás-os-Montes who ordered the mobilisation of all military forces in that province, and lieutenant colonel Francisco Pinto da Fonseca ordered the formation of the *Caçadores Voluntários de Vila Real*, an impromptu enlistment of loyal volunteers that would become the nucleus for the future *Batalhão de Caçadores N.º 5*. See Centeno, *O exército português na guerra peninsular*, p. 108.

and contain, the activities of the French in that region. The British troops moved off on the 10th August via Pombal, towards Leiria; the intended rendezvous point for the Anglo-Portuguese forces. The Portuguese moved down from their cantonments, meeting the British expeditionary force for the first time on the 12th August in Leiria as had been initially agreed. ¹⁹⁵

There is still no clear consensus amongst Portuguese and British historians as to the actual reasons for Freire's subsequent inactivity, and reluctance to cooperate further, when the two generals met again in Leiria. One possibility was the perceived difficulties with procuring supplies the Portuguese troops ordered towards the Beira Baixa province would encounter. Indeed, Wellesley had already recognised the extent of the problem for the British expeditionary force, profiting from a number of sources of military intelligence, not least of which from Lt. Col. Brown and Lt. Col. Trant who were engaged on "particular service" in Portugal. Despite the eagerness with which the British were received, and the willingness of

¹⁹⁵. WD, iv, Wellesley to the *Juiz de Fora* at Figueira, 1st August, 1808 pp. 44-45; Wellesley to Brown, Lavaos (sic), 4th August, 1808 and Wellesley to Trant, Lavaos, 6th August, 1808 pp. 49-50. In the latter dispatch Wellesley informed Trant of his intention to "meet General Freire at Monte Mor at twelve to-morrow". For a useful, if somewhat one-sided summary of the campaign, see Glover, *Britannia sickens*: the nature of the meeting and the character of the Portuguese general is described on pp. 75-76. Soriano provides a useful account of the meeting, confirming both Freire and Bacelar attended, and by inference D. Miguel Pereira de Forjaz – given he was aide to Freire and also a near relation, Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 1, p. 371.

the Portuguese to support the British in any way they could, Wellesley complained of the lack of provisions and of draught animals.¹⁹⁶

A more plausible possibility was that the French deployed in and around Santarém (the more usual route to Lisbon tracked alongside the right bank of the Tejo) posed a significant threat to Coimbra and, thereafter, Oporto. In addition, a further argument put forward was that better resources would be available in the interior (Ribatejo) and, perhaps also, this manoeuvre would provide an opportunity to strike against Loison, as opposed to merely containing the threat his command posed towards Coimbra (if the allies concerted their operations along the coastal road). Loison, it will be recalled, had been despatched to overpower the insurrection in the Alentejo region, and had defeated a joint Portuguese – Spanish force defending Elvas, its major city. But he had subsequently been called in by Junot towards the province of the Ribatejo to assist in the campaign against the forces that were now expected to combine against the French; both those that were already being mobilised by the Portuguese and, upon their arrival, the British expeditionary force.

¹⁹⁶. The declaration of the merchants of Coimbra, in Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 5, part 1, pp 94-95, provides evidence of popular support for the "common cause": but logistics posed a serious problem for armies in the Iberian Peninsula. Wellesley had written to his superiors, whose arrival he expected, that the Portuguese would give everything they could provide in the way of sustenance, but that it would be little given their desperate situation. Additionally, it would be very difficult to arrange transport (ox carts) for logistical support (except in stages). He had taken steps to order 150 mules from Oporto, which they could use on arrival. But he had procured all the mules available in the vicinity to support the logistical needs of the army, Glover, *Britannia sickens*, p. 78.

Freire's dilemma was not confined to the inadequately armed and provisioned troops at his disposal; he had become embroiled in an increasingly difficult political situation. Contrary to the agreement reached at Montemor-o-Velho, Freire now asserted that he could only continue to operate jointly with Wellesley if the British general undertook to provide food for the entire Portuguese force. Wellesley could not comply with this request in its entirety but was able to provide 5,000 muskets, and commensurate ammunition, to arm and equip a good number of the troops that had marched south without weapons and agreed to the necessary logistical support and food for a small contingent of Portuguese troops: essentially the Oporto and Chaves regiments of line infantry – and for the Portuguese cavalry and artillery in which the British were decidedly deficient.

In justification of Freire, it has been argued that the governor of Coimbra wrote to the *Junta Suprema* in Oporto, to outline the potential threat to Coimbra and Portugal's second city (Oporto), posed by the French force in the Ribatejo. The inference was that, as the allied forces moved towards Lisbon, this French force could strike against the undefended city of Coimbra and subsequently move against Oporto. The *Junta* intervened, and ordered Freire to defend against the threat to Coimbra and Oporto rather than act jointly with Wellesley. This was an important intervention at two levels. The *Junta Provisional do Supremo Governo* in Oporto was the recognised authority in the north and was presided over by the

Bishop of Oporto, a former member of the regency council and one of the most senior clergymen in Portugal. Freire had been appointed to command by the *Junta Suprema*, but his warrant was from the prince regent. The *juntas* had declared themselves the recognised authority within their respective jurisdiction, but there was no royal charter approving them officially. However, they assumed full authority in the name of the prince regent to make these types of demands. Freire was put in an uncomfortable position. He could proceed on the basis of sound military judgement and assist Wellesley in securing the capital, which would mean disobeying the directives of his political superiors. He was also mindful of the relative lack of experience of a substantial proportion of the troops in the Portuguese force; many of whom were recent volunteers and had little or no previous army service. However, in this he would seem to be unduly concerned – they would appear to have been both prepared for the rigours of the campaign and willing to fight. Alternatively, he could comply with his political superiors.¹⁹⁷

Wellesley, not without some justification, had considered Freire's proposed plan impractical. He could not undertake to provide for all the Portuguese troops, his argument being that if the Portuguese could not provide for their own subsistence along Freire's proposed route of manoeuvre; how could the British be expected to sustain the manoeuvres of the combined force, especially taking into

¹⁹⁷. Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 1, pp 371-74, and *ibid*, vol. 5, part 1, pp. 100-05.

account the limitations of the logistical support available? Moreover, Wellesley could not undertake manoeuvres at any great distance from the coast and the all-important littoral road given his reliance for logistical support and supplies from the transport ships that accompanied his expeditionary force.¹⁹⁸ Leaving aside local considerations, Wellesley's strategy was dictated by the limitations of his remit, the knowledge that he was to be superseded by two senior generals and no little pressure from the British government. He needed to retain clear lines of communication with the transports in the event of a significant setback or defeat and to cover the disembarkation of the expected reinforcements. Ultimately, Freire and the majority of the troops under his command took no part in the battles of Roliça and Vimeiro. Both British and Portuguese generals, it would seem, had one eye on military matters and the other on political considerations.¹⁹⁹

These issues are important if only in that the main focus of secondary sources, particularly - but not only - those in English, has been on the intervention of the British expeditionary force under Sir Arthur Wellesley and the relatively small Portuguese contingent serving with it. Rather than the broader issues pertaining to the situation in Portugal, these accounts focus on Wellesley's victories over

¹⁹⁸. Michael Glover, *Britannia sickens: Sir Arthur Wellesley and the convention of Cintra*, (London : Leo Cooper, 1970).

¹⁹⁹. For the complex and often difficult relations between "soldiers and statesmen", see Rory J. Muir and Charles J. Esdaile, 'Strategic Planning in a Time of Small Government', pp. 13-21.

Delaborde and Junot, respectively, at Roliça and Vimeiro in August 1808.²⁰⁰ There has been no concerted focus on the political, economic or military difficulties faced by the Portuguese. Suffice to say here that although Wellesley had been allowed to continue in command at the battle of Vimeiro, he had already been superseded by Sir Harry Burrard who in turn was out ranked and replaced as Commander in Chief by Sir Hew Dalrymple shortly afterwards.²⁰¹ Dalrymple was a very senior officer and well regarded. He was also, immediately prior to being appointed to command the expeditionary force, governor of Gibraltar and acquainted with British foreign policy in respect of the Iberian Peninsula. However, his appointment reveals more about the conservative nature of, and protocol for, military appointments – and therefore also highlights the rather extraordinary nature of Wellesley’s appointment to command in 1808 and, especially, 1809.²⁰²

Although limited in scale, the participation of a small but significant Portuguese contingent greatly helped the “common cause”, and gave a much needed legitimacy to British intervention in Portugal. Despite the appalling circumstances and embarrassing outcome of the Convention of Cintra, the campaign had demonstrated the determination of the Portuguese to oppose the

²⁰⁰ For further details see: Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*, vol. 1, Glover, *Britannia sickens*, and David Buttery, *Wellington against Junot: the first invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808*, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2011).

²⁰¹ See Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon*, pp. 44-47, and Esdaile, *A new history*, pp. 95-96.

²⁰² Ron McGuigan, ‘The origin of Wellington’s peninsular army’, in Rory J. Muir and others, *Inside Wellington’s Peninsular Army*, (Barnsley : Pen and Sword, 2006).

French invaders and resist the occupation of their country, while Britain had resolved to continue to make a substantial intervention in the Iberian Peninsula.

The regency council had been re-instated following the eviction of the French, albeit by one of the discredited British commanders, Dalrymple. But its very legitimacy had been questioned by the perceived acquiescence, and outright collaboration, of some of its members in the French military government.

Additionally, there were some overtly political outcomes to take into account. The *Junta Suprema* had set itself up as an authority, had authorised the mobilisation of Portuguese armed forces. Crucially, the *junta* had intervened in military decision making in order to provide for the defence of Coimbra and Oporto – and undermined its appointed Commander in Chief.

The disorganised nature of the troops under his command and Freire's own timidity and inactivity called into question the capabilities and capacities of senior Portuguese officers and the army, as it was presently constituted, to oppose the French independently. In some ways the experiences of the campaign of 1808 matched many of those witnessed in the War of Roussillon; in others, they presaged the disastrous events that were to unfold in early 1809. Nevertheless, the present campaign had not only demonstrated that the Portuguese were prepared to offer

vigorous resistance to future invasions; it had also provided a positive, albeit limited, example of their ability to combat the French.²⁰³

There were a number of fairly complex outcomes of British intervention in 1808 that had important repercussions for Portugal. The Convention of Cintra, and more specifically the manner in which the French were permitted to return to France, transported in British ships, together with the enormous controversy surrounding the contents of their baggage, led to national uproar in Britain and a commission of enquiry.²⁰⁴ Wellesley was eventually exonerated and his undoubted military abilities were in no way diminished at the Portuguese court as a result. He would return again to Portugal in 1809 as commander in chief, while the two senior generals never again saw active service. When Wellesley was called back to England, to face the inquiry, Beresford began to develop what was to become a long and, in the main, very positive relationship with Portugal. He was unrelenting in his efforts to limit the worst and unrestrained behaviour of French officers in relation to property and valuables they had acquired during the occupation of Portugal. Meantime, Sir John Moore, who was *en route* from the

²⁰³. See Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 1, p. 372; Soriano rejects the possible political justifications for Freire's inactivity in their entirety, suggesting the timidity of Freire de Andrade lay behind the Portuguese commander's reasoning and stresses the willingness of the Portuguese army to fight outside their own provinces, and - prior to receiving them from the British - without proper military arms and equipment.

²⁰⁴. For the understandable reaction of Portland's administration to the Convention and the subsequent activities of Canning and Castlereagh, see Wendy Hinde, *George Canning*, (London : Purnell Book Services, 1973), pp. 201-205.

Baltic to join the expeditionary force, assumed overall command of British forces in the Iberian Peninsula: subsequently undertaking a diversionary expedition in support of the Spanish forces in the north of Spain in the last months of 1808.²⁰⁵ His eventual retreat and the return of the expeditionary force to Britain in January 1809 are important in relation to understanding the complexities of the overall struggle for the Iberian Peninsula and in relation to developing British strategy. Moreover, this initial British intervention in Portugal (and Spain) would have a considerable impact on the struggle for Portugal: both for the nation and the Portuguese people.

Portugal still lacked a functioning army and the necessary resources to support its recruitment, continued mobilisation, logistics and supplies. Success in Portugal in 1808, tempered by the substantial losses incurred in Moore's campaign would also have significant implications for the development of an extremely cautious British foreign policy and subsequent military strategy in the Iberian Peninsula between 1809 and 1811. Suffice to say that Dalrymple, who superseded Wellesley, left as a legacy a small British force in the environs of Lisbon (soon to be commanded by Sir John Cradock) and re-installed the regency council. Additional problems faced by the Portuguese government were numerous. They included the

²⁰⁵. Wellesley showed remarkable prescience in writing to Castlereagh on 1st August, as the British troops disembarked, advising the financial support of 30,000 Portuguese troops within a combined Anglo-Portuguese force of over 50,000, in order to ensure successful intervention in the Iberian Peninsula, see Muir, citing Wellington's private correspondence, in 'Wellington and the ingredients of victory', p. 2.

continuing power vacuum, created by the transfer of the court and the apparatus of Government to Brazil, the somewhat tainted profile of specific members of the regency council - given the inclusion of some of its former members in the military government imposed by Junot, the lack of funds, troops, capable officers, armaments and equipment, and - most importantly in February of 1809 - the renewed threats to Portugal's territorial sovereignty posed by French forces in Spain. ²⁰⁶ Finally, one important and very positive feature of the expulsion of the French in 1808, was the emergence to a position of much higher authority of Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz; a man who was to become very important in promoting and sustaining the "common cause". ²⁰⁷ The "common cause" was a term used to describe the alliance in defence of Portugal and opposition to the French in the Iberian Peninsula. Particularly after the trials and tribulations of joint campaigning with the Spanish in the summer of 1809, and with Stuart's replacement of Villiers and the steadfast support of Forjaz in the regency council, the "common cause" became a particular focus of British and Portuguese policy. Underpinning the "common cause" were common goals, close cooperation in military operations and financial planning to support the war effort. According to Fryman, the financial

²⁰⁶. The legitimacy of the regency council was even called into question by the Portuguese minister plenipotentiary in London, D. Domingos de Sousa Coutinho (the Chevalier de Sousa), see Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon*, p. 83.

²⁰⁷. See, Francisco de la Fuente, 'Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz: his early career and role in the mobilisation and defence of Portugal, 1807-1814', (Unpublished PhD thesis : Florida State University, 1980) and Mildred L. Fryman, 'Charles Stuart and the Common Cause'.

stability and administrative efficiency of Portugal was crucial to the successful conclusion of the campaign against France in the Iberian Peninsula. Stuart was instrumental in applying pressure on the regency council to support and bring to fruition the majority “of Wellington’s plans for alterations and improvements in the realm of Portugal’s domestic affairs” in the regency council.

Chapter four: the invasion of 1809 – the onset of total war?

I

In the winter of 1808-1809, Napoleon left Spain, directing Soult to pursue and defeat the British army of Sir John Moore and, thereafter, to invade Portugal. He had made no fresh provision, by way of significant reinforcements, for the subjugation of Spain and Portugal, on the supposition that the forces already committed to the war beyond the Pyrenees were adequate for the tasks they had been set. This may have been a reasonable assumption, given the relative ease with which the disparate Spanish armies in the north of Spain had been overcome in the campaign of late 1808. He did order Victor to support Soult from his base in Castile and Estremadura. What Napoleon could not have foreseen was that increasingly, from 1809 onwards, the nature of the conflict in the Iberian theatre has led to it being described as *guerre à outrance*.²⁰⁸ Moreover, the potential scale and nature of popular opposition to this second French invasion do not appear to have been taken into consideration.²⁰⁹

Portugal faced two immediate military threats: namely a direct strike against Lisbon along the Tagus (Victor) and indirectly via Oporto (Soult). There remained

²⁰⁸. *Guerre à outrance* (war to the utmost; to the bitter end; or to the death): see David Gates, *The Spanish ulcer: a history of the Peninsular War*, (London : Pimlico, 2002), 'Part three: guerre à outrance'.

²⁰⁹. Napoleon pursued Moore only as far as Astorga and, on departing, ordered Soult to pursue and defeat Moore and invade Portugal, via Oporto in the north, and Victor to support from his bases in central Spain, as he wished to subdue Portugal completely in 1809: CN XIX, pp. 116-17, cited in Donald D. Horward, *The French Campaign in Portugal 1810-1811: An Account by Jean Jaques Pelet*, (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1973), p. 7.

also the possibility of further threats via the Beiras, should French forces in northern Spain be successful in subjugating Spanish opposition and move against Portugal via New Castile and Leon (for example, the troops commanded by Lapisse). In the event, Soult would invade northern Portugal in March, with the aim of taking Lisbon, from his base in Galicia. This decision was to have a significant impact on both the invasion of Portugal and French efforts to subjugate the north west of Spain. However, in order to understand correctly the issues and implications of military invasion and occupation, we also need to consider the social origins of popular opposition to the French alongside consideration of political and military strategy.

These social origins were clearly linked to land tenure, property relations and the social relations of production as much as to political and ideological factors. A number of recent studies have pointed to the importance of, the specific forms of land tenure and social relations of production underlying popular opposition to the French invasion and occupation. The potential for Spanish opposition to the French already existed in the form of irregular militia, in Galicia the *Alarma*, in which all men were liable to serve (unless exempt from service due to age or prescribed occupations). The *Alarma* was organised and officered within each parish, and operated with not a little encouragement from the local clergy. But the catalyst for its mobilisation and deployment was not the French occupation of Spain per se, but

French exactions, reprisals and retributions against any opposition.²¹⁰ Further major factors defining the numbers involved, and the form, nature and pattern of irregular warfare in Galicia, were the prevailing social, economic and geographical conditions specific to borderland regions in Spain.²¹¹ In addition, there were specific linguistic and dynastic commonalities, combined with similar forms of land tenure, property relations and social relations of production, between Spanish Galicia and the Portuguese regions of the Minho and Trás-os-Montes that would be a key factor in defining the sustained and fierce popular opposition to the French in these regions.

But in addition to commonalities, we also need to consider variations within and between regions: more specifically insights afforded by a new history of Spain that has been developing throughout the second half of the twentieth century and, by extension, Portugal – for example in terms of our understanding of the situation in specific regions such as Navarre. This new history has revealed that the *labradores* of Navarre were both land owners and tenant farmers, and their landholdings had developed and benefited from capital investment and the application of specific agricultural methods. To economic drivers such as land tenure and soil utilisation must be added factors such as the investment of capital, creation of surplus, profit taking, taxation, dues and also rights (for example to

²¹⁰. Esdaile, *Popular resistance in the French wars*, p. 6, p. 11, Esdaile, *A new history*, pp 168-70.

²¹¹. Fraser, *Napoleon's cursed war*, pp 337-38.

common land) that were particular to certain provinces of Spain. The importance of this revisionist view is that it challenges both popular perceptions of the social origins of the *guerrilla*, as a form of warfare, and the *guerrilla* fighter as patriot, replacing the uni-dimensional figure represented in both Spanish and English secondary sources with the much more complex and multi-faceted concept of the *guerrillas* as partisans, but also bandits, smugglers and deserters.²¹² A further point to be borne in mind is that the economic system, and supporting infrastructure, that had been developed in this (sub) region was atypical – in particular when compared the Montaña (the northern province of Navarre) to the Ribera (its southernmost province) and other regions and provinces of Spain. The complex economic, social and political relationships in Spain at the turn of the century meant that it is not possible to make logical generalisations about the social origins of popular opposition from one region to another, or indeed, in this case, from one province to another in the same region.²¹³

According to the revisionist history of *la guerrilla* in many, if not the majority, of cases, the *guerrilleros(as)* were mainly self serving, driven by greed and as exploitative of the local population as the French. In the most extreme cases they detracted from, rather than complemented, patriot Spain's struggle against the

²¹² See John L. Tone, *The fatal knot: the guerrilla war in Navarre and the defeat of Napoleon in Spain*, (Chapel Hill and London : University of North Carolina Press, 1994), chapter one: 'Guerrilla country' and chapter two: 'Economy and politics in Navarre'.

²¹³ Charles Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon, guerrillas, bandits and adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814*, (New Haven - London : Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 90-93.

invader. Moreover, it has recently been claimed that a significant number of *guerrilleros* were themselves former officers, soldiers, deserters or escaped prisoners from the French (either prisoners of war or incarcerated civilians), and that much of the overall *guerrilla* activity was undertaken by dispersed military units engaged in a partisan-type war of attrition against the French – as opposed to popular, armed insurrection. Recent work has provided a specific and detailed analysis of the insurrection in Galicia and the Asturias, investigating the concepts of popular revolt and local resistance, territory and collective struggle. But, despite a detailed examination of the social origins of the popular opposition, there is still no clear model that can be extrapolated to other regions – a key factor underpinning the development of opposition being the specific material and ideological conditions encountered at a regional and even local level.²¹⁴ The terms *la guerrilla*, and *los guerrilleros* are constructs that are specific in both a temporal and spatial context. In the early nineteenth century the term *la guerrilla* meant literally *petite guerre* or little war. It signified the activities of small groups of armed troops, engaging in a war of

²¹⁴. See Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon*, in particular, specific chapters devoted respectively to the guerrilla in history; the guerrillas in context; and their (social) origins. Esdaile asserted in this work that the research undertaken by Tone, taking into account the limited generalisations that can be inferred from such a detailed, monograph, was definitive – but the conclusions about the underlying drivers were specific to Navarre and, moreover, the province of Montaña, Tone, *The fatal knot*, in particular pp. 9-41. Unlike Tone, Esdaile's conclusions are that the guerrillas, were a complex phenomenon but probably contributed much less to the defeat of Napoleon than the canons of Spanish and English secondary sources have asserted – and their motivation cannot be reduced simply to faith in *dios, rey y patria* or the inducements of a fanatical clergy. In the main, not only were the guerrillas in reality *malhechores, contrabandistas y bandoleros* as opposed to partisans and patriots, they detracted from, rather than contributed to, formal military opposition to the French.

outposts or *guerre des postes* in a formal military context. However, given the particular focus in Spanish secondary sources on popular opposition to the French, and the concepts of spontaneous and armed civilian insurrection, *la guerrilla* has come to symbolise not only the overall concept of armed civilian insurrection but also the groups from within the general population who engaged in these activities and took up arms against the French occupational forces. The concept of guerrilla warfare, then, has undertaken a transformation of meaning and been absorbed into modern English usage as a war of the people, as partisans, in a struggle against formal military opposition and - in its widest sense - a nation in arms. Similarly, the *guerrilleros(as)* have become the guerrillas – the fighters who engage in a guerrilla war or *guerra de guerrillas*.²¹⁵

The north of Portugal, though, has not been the subject of such a detailed and protracted study in English: although there is a developing strand within Portuguese historiography and a number of detailed studies of the war from the perspectives of specific regions. The northern regions of Portugal, the Partido do Porto, Entre Minho e Douro, Trás-os-Montes and Beira (Alta), were not homogenous in their economic geography but did share some common features, both within and between themselves and with some northern Spanish regions. The contemporary economy, agricultural production, trade and commerce, and in some

²¹⁵ See, for example, Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon's cursed war: popular resistance in the Spanish Peninsular War*, (London and New York : Verso, 2008).

cases language, customs and currency, were not strictly encompassed or constrained by national or international boundaries in northern Iberia. While there were some large landowners, Portuguese *lavradores* could work land that was wholly or partly owned, rented or leased from the nobility and clergy; as did their counterparts in Spain. The principal forms of agricultural activity, and the social relations of production, were based upon the parcelisation of land and at least a limited sense of ownership and control of the land worked. It has also been argued that population growth in these provinces was sustained by the introduction of new crops, crop rotation and more intensive farming methods, but also by bringing marginal lands into cultivation. The rural population of the Montaña, Galicia and Asturias in Spain, and the Trás-os-Montes, the Minho and Beira in northern Portugal, were used to fighting, physically and metaphorically, for their land, its productive capacities and its outputs. As a result, they had developed specific relations with the local state representatives, civil, juridical and military, the nobility and clergy. Whilst, in the main, economic progress was most likely to take place at the level of the individual farmer, there are some identifiable “collective” gains. One example of this can be found in the particularly beneficial relationships with the clergy in relation to land use and the expropriation of seigneurial and clerical dues, and the introduction of new and high yield crops.

These material conditions are further compounded by structural change within the economy in the eighteenth century and resulting demographic features such as population density. Overall, some 41% of the Portuguese population resided in *comarcas* lining the Atlantic seaboard from Setúbal, just to the south of Lisbon, to the north above Oporto; indeed, the development of these agglomerations was largely driven by improvements in agriculture, proto-industrialisation, rising demand in domestic markets and the expansion of external trade.²¹⁶ Population change was very unevenly distributed in Portugal in the late eighteenth century. In 1801 there were 32.8 inhabitants per km² across Portugal in total. In the north of Portugal population density was highest in the Minho region (96.0) but much lower in the region of Beira (52.4). In Trás-os-Montes, the most northerly province, one of the least well developed areas of Portugal, encompassing an extremely mountainous terrain and, as such, with a very limited proportion of the land under cultivation, population density was much lower (24.7). The Minho was a very fertile province and therefore was able to support a much higher population density and witnessed an annual percentage increase in population of around 1.8% in the last decade of the eighteenth century to the census of 1801.

While the Partido do Porto was similarly well endowed with naturally fertile

²¹⁶ João Pedro Ferro, *A população portuguesa no final do antigo regime, 1750-1815*, (Lisboa : Editorial Presença, 1995), p. 36 et seq. See Fraser, for the specific forms of land tenure and crop innovation in Galicia, *Napoleon's cursed war*, pp. 285-86 and Carr for a comparative study of the predominant forms of regional agriculture, Raymond Carr, *Spain 1808-1975*, (Oxford : Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982).

terrain, the population did not increase much above the average annual rate of 0.4% p.a. in many areas that were not immediately bordering the Douro River. In contrast to the above, the Alentejo had been witnessing depopulation and had a population density of just 11.1 per km². Although the description relates to the early nineteenth century, the Alentejo was typified by a significant disequilibrium between property owners and those without land, absentee landlords from the lesser nobility, an extremely rural and sparsely populated countryside, and a great number of beggars and idlers (*mendigos* and *ociosos*), the population suffered from cachexia, were malnourished, exhibited lower levels of fertility and / or retarded puberty.²¹⁷ As an aside, these considerations are fundamental to disentangling consensus and dissension in relation to observed variations in the extent of Portuguese military recruitment and mobilisation by region.

We have a number of studies based upon primary sources, then, that confirm the need to take into account interconnections within and between material conditions and the operation of state apparatus, regional economic and social development, in order to understand correctly the forms and nature of popular opposition to the French in the north of Spain and Portugal in 1809. In addition, not only was there cross border collaboration between the respective *juntas*, and joint military operations, but there were clearly also spontaneous forms of cooperation

²¹⁷. Ferro, *A população portuguesa*, p. 35.

and assistance between irregular forces disputing the occupation and pacification of Spanish and Portuguese territories by the French. Much of this fierce opposition no doubt directly resulted from the French approach to war, the occupation of Spanish and Portuguese settlements, enforced seizure of property and foodstuffs, and their treatment of the local population. ²¹⁸ A French diarist reported that whilst the inhabitants in one specific canton of Galicia ran away on the approach of the French, they pitilessly massacred small detachments in isolation. The French retaliated against those insurgents they were able to catch, shooting anyone out of uniform, one diarist declaring the roads were strewn with French and Spanish corpses. ²¹⁹ Another French source casually mentions the razing of two Spanish villages to the ground and the murder of hundreds of their inhabitants. ²²⁰ No doubt the inability to cross the river, given it was disputed by masses of poorly armed and organised insurgents, was one factor driving the frustration of the French, while another would be the hit and run tactics of both the Spanish and Portuguese insurgents. A French secondary source, published mid century, acknowledges that the French had previously fought in Portugal, in campaigns marked by insurrection, retaliations and cruelties on both sides, with specific

²¹⁸. See Fraser, *Napoleon's cursed war*, passim.

²¹⁹. Fantin des Odoards, *Journal du général Fantin des Odoards, étapes d'un officier de la grande armée 1800-1830*, (Paris : Plon 1895), respectively, pp. 209-10 and p. 215.

²²⁰. De Naylies, *Mémoires sur la guerre d'Espagne*, pp. 64-5.

negative effects on the morale of the French forces.²²¹ There is therefore a considerable historiography and evidence base to support the development of some tentative conclusions about the social basis of popular resistance to the French invasions.

II

To return to the immediate crisis facing Portugal, Dom João and his advisors in Brazil had already taken steps to help resolve some of their immediate military problems by requesting a British general to help organise, train and command the Portuguese military forces. Beresford had been appointed to overall command of the Portuguese forces and Wellesley would soon take over responsibility for British forces in Portugal from Cradock.²²² Moreover, Britain had resolved to provide unqualified support for a substantial proportion of Portuguese troops (providing sufficient funds to recruit, mobilise, equip and arm, ultimately, 30,000 troops).²²³ But all of these changes would take time to be implemented in full. But while the

²²¹. *Campagnes des généraux français, depuis la révolution de 1789 jusqu'à nos jours: annales militaires, campagnes du maréchal Soult (Espagne et Portugal) 1809*, (Paris : Bonaventure et Ducession, 1851), see, for example, p. 25.

²²². Sir John Cradock had been appointed to command the remnants of the British forces that remained in and around Lisbon in November 1808, taking up his post in Lisbon along with John Villiers the minister plenipotentiary to Portugal, in December 1808. According to Muir, Cradock had an even more difficult task than that set for Villiers, see Rory Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon*, pp. 83-84.

²²³. Hall estimates that Britain had "invested" £2.5 m in the conflict in Iberia in 1808, the majority of the investment in Portugal being arms and clothing as opposed to finance: Hall, *British strategy*, pp. 173-74. By the spring of 1809, not only had Britain decided to make a commitment to saving Portugal, but also to allocate to 30,000 British troops: see Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon*, pp. 83-87 and Esdaile, *A new history*, pp. 193-94.

regency council was soon to receive official notification from the Portuguese court in Brazil of Beresford's appointment, the evacuation of the British army from La Coruña, the relatively small numbers of British troops in the environs of Lisbon and the proximity of French forces, meant there was a need for immediate action. The political context in Portugal in 1809 was also complex. By autumn 1808, with the French evicted and the regency council re-installed there was no apparent need for the continuance of the *juntas*. It could be argued that while they had served an important purpose throughout the summer of that year, the precarious hold that the social, political and judicial élites, as "elected" members of these *juntas*, had over the mass of the population and their reliance on the fervid Franco-phobia displayed by the mass of volunteers that flocked to the cause of the restoration of the prince regent, the possibility of further armed insurrection posed a problem not only for the French but also for the Portuguese ruling class and state.

But the exigencies of the time were many and pressing and, consequently, the *Junta Provisional do Supremo Governo* set up the year previously was immediately re-established, proclaiming a "call to arms" to the people of Oporto and its surrounding provinces. However, the same problems that had emerged in the previous year persisted. While there was a great deal of outward patriotic fervour, the same levels of indiscipline and violent disturbances also surfaced: with denunciations of anyone suspected of sympathy with the French cause; the targets

of these denunciations referred to as *Jacobins*, or *Franc-maçons* rather than *afrancesados* as they were also frequently called in Spain. Not only in Oporto, but in many of the major settlements in the north of Portugal, confusion and public disorder were common place, and the authorities struggled to restore some limited form of authority and control. The people had been exalted and called “to arms” by the regency council and the élites realised that should a second invasion take place, and from December this threat seemed imminent, they would once more have to rely on the people to resist. However, they neither wanted uncontrolled insurrections nor for the population’s enthusiasm to arm themselves and to protect their localities to detract from the process of formal military recruitment and mobilisation. ²²⁴

Throughout the north of Portugal, there was widespread support for military opposition to the French and volunteer enlistment, but the authorities did have considerable difficulty in organising and recruiting to the regular, organised military. Indeed, it has been argued that an underlying reason for support for the *Leal Legião Lusitana*, was political and based on the need to maintain an independent military presence, solely for the defence of Oporto and adjacent provinces in the north of the realm. The activities of the *Junta Suprema*, moreover, were not restricted solely to addressing the immediate political situation. Given the lack of

²²⁴. Valente, ‘O povo em armas’, pp. 34-37.

central political authority, it could not otherwise be so. For example, the *Junta* ordered the lifting of the embargo on British shipping and trade in British goods in order to stimulate the economy. Indeed, throughout the period 1808 to 1810 it has been estimated that, rather than diminishing, the volume of British shipping and trade with Britain was maintained, and even increased, with no perceptible effects on the free passage of shipping.²²⁵ Clearly, then there were many indications of popular support for more active and organised resistance to the French in the north and specific, tangible outcomes in the form of new civil, judicial and military structures – or rather, their combination in a new and highly political regional authority. Certainly, in these areas, the vast majority of the Portuguese people vocally and physically supported these new forms of provincial government and a substantial number of them were ready to physically oppose the French if necessary in future.

Throughout Portugal in early 1809 the situation was desperate. The authorities had to raise and fund the necessary military forces to oppose invasion to all intents and purposes from nothing. And they did so, in the main, by public subscription and, as in Galicia, with support from the church. The regency council had started to reorganise and recruit to both the first line regiments (*infanteria*) and

²²⁵. Jorge Borges de Macedo, *O bloqueio continental: economia e guerra peninsular*, vol. 2, Estudo & Ensaio, (Lisbon : Delfos, 1962), pp. 89 and 96. It is worthwhile noting that Oporto was spared the excesses of the occupation of 1808, was only briefly held by Soult in 1809, and was similarly outside the zone experiencing major economic and political disturbances during the invasion and occupation of Portugal by Masséna in 1810-1811.

those of the second line (*milícia*). However, a substantial proportion of these regiments were mere cadres, destitute of officers, armaments and equipment and - most of all - lacking in discipline. A major difference, though, between the situation faced by Portugal in early 1809 when compared with the previous invasion threat in late 1807, and the early stages of the occupation in 1808, was that the Portuguese government, the military and the people were united in their determination to resist the French. So, too, of course, were the court in Brazil and, therefore, the regency council. ²²⁶ The *Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo* had not only an established and legitimate role in the organisation of military and popular opposition to the French in the north in 1808 there was a great deal of continuity into 1809. While the *juntas* had technically been dissolved once the regency council had been appointed, the Bishop of Oporto remained in the northern power-base of Oporto in preference to taking up his seat on the regency council in Lisbon and continued to preside over the activities of the *Junta Suprema*. There is more than a hint of suspicion that the Bishop did not want to leave this power-base in the north, or lose the authority he had enjoyed in 1808, when he had presided over the activities of both the *Junta Suprema* and the appointed military commander, Bernadim Freire de Andrade. One of the underlying reasons was the extent of continuing popular animosity towards the civil, judicial and military authorities in the north of Portugal. Indeed,

²²⁶. See fn. 137, p. 61.

Bernadim Freire de Andrade had written to Dom Miguel Pereira de Forjaz on this very subject, presciently warning him about the violent and unpredictable nature of popular activities and the extent of animosity towards the authorities. Again, the participants in these insurrectionary acts were people from the lowest classes within Portuguese society, agricultural workers, day wage labourers, and artisans – people with little or no property.²²⁷ A further development in contradistinction to 1808 was the very active role of the clergy. An extreme example was the establishment of an ecclesiastical regiment in Oporto, formed of two battalions. Similarly in Spain, ecclesiastical companies were formed, styled on those of the *miqueletes*, and which played an important role in the struggle against the French – notably in the defence of Gerona.²²⁸

By early 1809, general Bacelar commanded a force of all arms of approximately 6,400 troops in Beira Alta, general Bernadim Freire de Andrade had command of 10,700 troops to protect against a potential invasion via the Entre Douro e Minho region and to cover the city of Oporto, while general Silveira had 7,800 troops in the Trás-os-Montes region.²²⁹ But, it is not clear how the process of

²²⁷. Valente, 'O povo em armas', pp 42-44 and compare with the situation in 1808 presented on pp. 16-17. The letter dated from Porto 17th January 1809 is cited in António Pedro Vicente, *Um soldado da guerra peninsular, Bernadim Freire de Andrade e Castro*, (Lisboa : 1970), p. 197: see Valente, *ibid*, p. 43.

²²⁸. For the former, Centeno, *O exército português*, p. 111 and for the latter, Fraser, *Napoleon's cursed war*, pp. 298-300.

²²⁹. Fernando Dores Costa, 'Army size, military recruitment and financing in Portugal during the period of the Peninsula War: 1808–1811, *e-JPH*, vol. 6, number 2, Winter 2008, pp. 4-5. See also Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 108-09.

recruitment and mobilisation had been progressing immediately prior to the invasion of 1809. Even after taking into account the very substantial progress that had been made, numbers would not be enough:

“The country people declare that they will fight ... they are willing to think ... that they are capable of performing wonders. But let a formidable French army present itself ... [and] confusion, dismay and distraction [will] be mingled in the probable annihilation of thousands.”²³⁰

The Portuguese in the north, though, were also helped by the good relations they were developing with the Spanish across the border. Silveira, the commander of the most northerly armed forces, was in contact with the Spanish general La Romana; and Oporto received regular reports from these two outposts. The peripheral location of Chaves, the centre of Silveira's operations and Braga, Freire's base, assisted in the intelligence-gathering process. And the information they collected was also very useful in understanding the military situation throughout northern Portugal in 1809. While the two Portuguese military forces, concentrated in the north of Portugal to oppose the invasion threat, appear adequately resourced, in reality they comprised an imprudent mixture of first, second and third line troops of variable quality. The firearms available were of inconsistent quality and calibre. Moreover, the majority of troops were poorly armed and only a small

²³⁰ A. Hayter, *The backbone: diaries of a military family in the Napoleonic Wars*, (Bishop Auckland, 1993), p. 211, cited in Charles Esdaile, *A New History*, (London : Allen Lane, 2002).

number of the volunteers and *ordenança* had personal firearms, the majority of these ancillary troops had only agricultural implements or pikes made from whatever materials were to hand. ²³¹

Silveira quite possibly commanded a total force of between 10,000 and 12,000 troops of variable quality and unpredictable temperament to protect the north against Soult: less than one half of which were from first and second line regiments and the remainder were composed of inadequately trained and poorly armed *ordenanças* and civilian volunteers. ²³² The Spanish under La Romana were pushed back by Soult; therefore Silveira, the commander of the Portuguese forces in Trás-os-Montes, resolved to take up a better defensive position beyond Chaves. However, the Portuguese commander was undermined by the indiscipline of a minority of the forces under his command and, as a result, his small force was split. He therefore had to retire even further than he originally intended, losing Chaves in the process to the French. Eventually, though, Silveira was able to retake Chaves, capturing 400 French combatants, and a similar number of wounded and convalescents, and taking back into service those elements of the Portuguese regiment no. 12 that had surrendered and taken up in French service. He thereafter

²³¹. Centeno, *O exército português na guerra peninsular*, p. 129 and Fernando Dores Costa, 'Army size, military recruitment and financing in Portugal during the period of the Peninsula War: 1808–1811, *e-JPH*, vol. 6, number 2, Winter 2008, for example p. 5.

²³². Oman acknowledges that Silveira had but two "incomplete" regiments (n.º 12 and n.º 24) with him - and four of militia - out of a total force of around 12,000 the majority of which were *ordenanças* and civilian volunteers. De Naylies confirms the number and composition of the Portuguese forces: de Naylies, *Mémoires sur la guerre d'Espagne*, respectively, pp. 79-80 and p. 107.

continued to successfully harass and disrupt the lines of communication of the invading French army. Silveira was forced into this situation by the indiscipline of a minority of his own troops and the lack of coordination with his Spanish allies.²³³ French losses at Chaves are difficult to determine given some may have been lost in taking the town and others in its subsequent capitulation. The 31^{ème} léger had lieutenant Galabert wounded, the 4^{ème} Suisse reported captain Thomas wounded and the 4^{ème} léger reported a surgeon called Mauget was lost in that town (although the date given, the 4th April, may be a mistake or when he died from his wounds) and the *chirurgien aide-major* Soum was wounded in the *affaire de Chaves* (although the date of 20 mai must surely be mistaken). Total casualties cannot have exceeded 150 (see appendix, table 1). But Soult was forced to leave behind a substantial number of invalids and a small guard of walking wounded, that had accumulated through the campaign, with a small number of able bodied troops to try to ensure their safety.²³⁴

²³³. It is unsurprising, therefore that there was a great deal of indiscipline and unpredictability. Oman, based upon Brotherton's correspondence (a British military attaché) suggests some 6,000 of the total troops available to Silveira were properly armed. For a useful summary of Silveira's problems and military capabilities, see Livermore, Beresford and reform of the Portuguese army, pp. 128-29.

²³⁴. Aristide Martinien, *Tableaux, par corps et par batailles, des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l'Empire (1805-1815)*, (Paris : H. Charles-Lavauzelle, 1899) pp. 62, and Aristide Martinien, *Tableaux, par corps et par batailles, des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l'Empire (1805-1815) : supplément*, (Paris : L. Fournier, 1909). I am grateful to Professor Charles Esdaile for suggesting the relevance of this source to help establish the extent and effects of opposition to the French in 1809.

Bernadim Freire de Andrade was much less fortunate, totally losing the confidence and support of the forces he commanded, and faced with a great deal of animosity (and outright anarchy) from the local population. Bernadim Freire had ordered the retreat from Braga following the loss of the pass at Salamonde given his orders were to defend Oporto. In his military opinion, he discounted the defence of Braga, believing from a strategic point of view it was not worth defending. His orders were refused and, ultimately, he paid with his life. The consensus view is that he was undermined by a combination of indiscipline and fervid animosity towards the French amongst the assortment of regular troops, *milícia* and *ordenanças* under his command and the mass of civilian volunteers who rallied in a determined effort to resist the French.²³⁵ The Portuguese troops had stubbornly, but ultimately unsuccessfully, defended the passes against overwhelming numbers of well armed and disciplined French troops, determined to dispute every defensible position in what was, after all, their homeland. When Bernadim Freire ordered his troops to retire from positions they wanted to defend in compliance with his orders from the *Junta Suprema*, they rebelled. Baron Eben, a German officer in Portuguese service was able to impose a modicum of discipline over the troops and volunteers and, although the *corregedor* had vanished, he appointed two capable people to

²³⁵. Soriano attests to the anarchic character of the insurgents in Braga and to the extent to which *afrancesados* were hunted down and killed and, not least, some settling of old scores, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 109-10. Freire's force probably comprised no more than three very weak regiments of first line troops (2,200 other ranks including artillery) and eight equally deficient battalions of *milícia*, *ibid.* p. 115 and was severely deficient in experienced officers.

undertake the sourcing and forwarding of supplies to troops. He communicated his intention of disputing the terrain in front of Braga to officers in command of the outposts, and distributed his regular troops (and the few pieces of ordinance available) to strengthen the forward positions and demonstrate to the French they had regulars to their front. By doing so, the Portuguese were able to mount a credible, if ultimately unsuccessful, defence of Braga. ²³⁶

It is impossible to say how many French casualties were incurred on the approaches in front of Braga and during the combat for the positions immediately in front of the town itself: the total number of killed and wounded officers suggest a possible total of some 350 to 400 French casualties. Portuguese losses were disproportionately much higher, therefore suggesting the passes in front of Braga and the town itself were disputed quite vigorously and some intense fighting took place – albeit not between two armies equally well led, armed and disciplined (see appendix, table 2). ²³⁷ That the Portuguese were still numerous to be considered a threat to his lines of communication is evidenced by Soult detaching Heudelet's division to ensure against a counter attack against his rear whilst manoeuvring on

²³⁶. For a useful biographical sketch for Bernadim Freire de Andrade see Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 76-84 and see *ibid* pp. 149 et seq. for details of the campaign and his murder in Braga. For Eben's report see Soriano, *ibid*, pp. 137-40. Livermore, 'Beresford and the reform of the Portuguese army', pp. 127-28 provides a less partial summary of Freire's problems and activities in relation to the defence of Braga.

²³⁷. For the defence of Braga see Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 131 et seq. Soriano also asserts that the continued harassment of the French by parties of irregulars resulted in the French killing all partisans they came across rather than taking them prisoner. *ibid*, pp. 142-43

Oporto. Indeed, the general of brigade Henri Antoine Jardon was killed whilst securing the lines of communication at Guimarães on the 25th March. ²³⁸ And the French recorded substantial losses defending the ponte de Amarante.

The loss of Chaves and Braga, and the impending arrival of the French in front of Oporto, led to further and increasingly violent insurrections in the regional capital. The mob seized the former *brigadeiro* Luís de Oliveira along with 14 other alleged traitors from prison, murdered them and paraded their corpses through the city then established an impromptu court to arraign further suspects and *afrancesados* who they sought out in the streets of the city. ²³⁹ The city of Oporto was defended by approximately 24,000 troops of which only 4,000 to 4,500 were first line; and many of these were either former soldiers who had completed their military service or new recruits and hardly trained or drilled in military manoeuvres let alone the defence of a strategic position. ²⁴⁰ The remainder were comprised of *milícias* and *ordenanças*, of whom only a minority were armed with firearms and those of various calibre and provenance. ²⁴¹ The defence of Oporto was a disaster for the Portuguese forces, the most substantial part of the irregular forces defending the entrenchments deserted their posts as soon as the line of

²¹³. Martinien, *Tableaux*, p. 18.

²³⁹. Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 144-45.

²⁴⁰. Soriano asserts the number of regulars was fewer – perhaps only 4,400, *ibid.* p. 146.

²⁴¹. Oman states the two Oporto regiments n.º 6 and n.º 18, and two single battalions from the regiment n.º. 21 Valença and n.º. 9 Viana plus the second battalion of the *Leal Legião Lusitana*. See also Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 108-09 and 149-50.

entrenchments had been pierced, the defence left to the small number of regulars under the command of *brigadeiro* Victoria, and the senior officers Champalimaud and Azeredo.²⁴² Although the city's defence has variously been described as a fiasco and massacre, the taking of the city would appear to have been neither as easy as described nor without consequences for Soult. Table 3 in the appendix provides a summary of French losses in the various combats in front of Oporto and its seizure at the end of March 1809. Four officers were wounded in preliminary operations. Detailed investigation confirms more than 47 casualties between the 29th and 30th March amongst whom general of division Merle and captain Pagaud of the *état-major* (wounded), four *chefs de batallion* (two killed, two wounded), inferring perhaps a total loss of up to 900 officers and other ranks (see appendix, table 3).²⁴³ Portuguese losses were much more substantial, but the vast majority, both civilian and military, resulted from the stampede over the bridge of boats: many drowning when the bridge submerged or were crushed under the weight of the masses evading capture. While not a few were killed under the crossfire of artillery and some slaughtered during the subsequent sack of the city by the French. The seizure of Oporto added little to the glory of Soult or to the French army he commanded. More importantly for the Portuguese, the dispersal and disorganisation of the French army as a result of protracted manoeuvres and two substantial combats and

²⁴² *ibid.* pp. 149-56.

²⁴³ Martinien pp. 33, 44,

the demoralising effects of the nature of the campaign, the loss of many sick and wounded to the Portuguese (for example in the retaking of Chaves), and the constant harassment of their lines of communications meant the French could not push on towards Lisbon. Indeed, with the limited resources at his disposal, Soult was struggling to retain the ground he occupied. ²⁴⁴

Accordingly, despite the lack of success in terms of formal military operations, the extent of determined, popular resistance to the French invasion was such that, as in Spain, French troops controlled only the territory they occupied. They were, with one or two exceptions, able to subdue the Portuguese during the first invasion, but the second invasion of 1809 was a somewhat different experience. After taking the city of Oporto, Soult was obliged to make provisions for a number of possible eventualities. One portion of the disposable troops was needed to provide a garrison for Oporto itself: despite the Portuguese army having been pushed back some way, it continued to represent a threat. A detachment, of considerable size needed to be posted south of the Douro to observe and, if necessary, contain these Portuguese troops. The division that had been detached on leaving Braga had to be sent north to replace the garrisons, temporarily lent to Soult and controlling the settlements of Tuy and Vigo, and to establish communications with Ney in Galicia. Loison, who had substantial experience of counter insurgency work in the first

²⁴⁴. Gates, *The Spanish ulcer*, p. 142

invasion, was despatched with a view to driving away Silveira and establishing communications with Lapisse. ²⁴⁵ The ongoing losses of detached troops, such as the 3^{ème} Suisse, attest to the difficulties the French had in maintaining outposts such as that of Tuy. ²⁴⁶

However, rather than stressing the importance of this popular opposition and the scale of resistance “sapping the strength” of the French, the focus within both Portuguese and English histories of the second invasion has been on the negative impacts, for example the resulting indiscipline of the armed forces. To date historians have tended to view these insurrection and popular opposition from a military point of view, rather than trying to understand it from the perspectives of those involved. Clearly, one of the underlying factors for the insurrections was the sense that the people had “lost faith” in the ruling authorities. In relation to popular opposition and resistance in 1809, it is clear from the discussion above that in addition to the social and economic drivers, we must also consider political and ideological factors given that insurrections resulting from a loss of faith in political

²⁴⁵. Gates suggests that these were very necessary precautions, “Soul’s position remained precarious. The population was more hostile than ever and the partisan war ceaselessly sapped the strength of his field army.”: Gates, *The Spanish ulcer*, p. 142. While Le Noble’s account of the campaign of 1809 is perhaps questionable in some respects he was an eye witness. Le Noble, *Mémoires sur les opérations des Français en Galice, en Portugal et dans la Vallée du Tage en 1809, sous le commandement du maréchal Soult, duc de Dalmatie*, (Paris : Chez Barois l’Ainé, 1821.

²⁴⁶. According to Martinien, in addition to the loss of capt. Tscharner, lieut. Kunckler and s.-lieut. Garrard who were *assassinés ... par des brigands*, lieut. Hermann of the 3^{ème} Suisse was also wounded on both the 13th and 28th March in the defence of Tuy.

direction are not the same as revolts against the availability or price of foodstuffs in times of need and famine. ²⁴⁷

While none of the French diarists involved in this second invasion, and that have been viewed in the current study, would appear to have participated in more than one invasion of Portugal, they were veterans of the struggle in Spain throughout 1808. They reported a number of similarities between the scale and nature of popular opposition in Galicia and Entre Minho e Douro. They are also unanimous in their descriptions of the total dedication of the local population to protecting their homes and property and the cumulative and deleterious effects of consistent, if at times desultory, guerrilla war and formal military opposition. That Soult had to march a considerable distance inland in order to be able to cross the Minho given the resistance of popular forces to his efforts to force a crossing further downstream is sufficient testimony in itself, although the lack of formal bridging equipment would also have been a factor to take into account. A French diarist reported:

“On the 16th, at daybreak, we saw a multitude of Portuguese peasants, lining the opposite bank [of the Minho]. In spite of torrents of rain, their numbers grew with every minute that passed. They wore overcoats of straw, their form merged with that

²⁴⁷. A fairly comprehensive review of the generally available literature has been undertaken, but so far nothing has been uncovered investigating the concept of ideology in relation to popular opposition to the French in Portugal between 1807 and 1811, although more recent work on Spain would suggest that this has been generally, but not completely, discounted as a possible interpretation of day to day struggle and resistance individually and collectively.

of rocks, several of them advancing to the river's edge, firing on all who approached the river." ²⁴⁸

A number of casualties were incurred in the manoeuvres into Portugal. For example, three officers of the 3^{ème} Swiss were *assassinés* by brigands in Spain, Captain Gard of the 4^{ème} léger was wounded on the 7th February 1809 (*contre les insurgés Espagnols*). Capt. Spitzer of the 22^{ème} chasseurs was wounded and died on the 16th February, another officer, lieutenant Narjot of the 15^{ème} ligne, was drowned in attempting a crossing of the Minho on the same day. Captain Garreau of the same regiment was wounded on the 1st March in an *affaire* at Port Marin and sous-lieutenant Moré of the 86^{ème} ligne on the 5th of that month at Vérin, while lieutenant Sialleli was killed on the 13th March (*dans une maison en Portugal par des paysans*) and his colleague captain Gaulis was wounded on the 13th March in an *affaire* at Bascara and two sous lieutenants, Maurin and Fabre, of the 22^{ème} chasseurs were wounded between the 20th February and 5th March. ²⁴⁹ The 17^{ème} léger reported one officer killed and seven wounded defending Amarante in April. ²⁵⁰ Leaving aside the drowning of one officer, which could have been as a result of reconnaissance as

²⁴⁸. De Naylies, *Mémoires sur la guerre d'Espagne*, p.61 But by the time the French had taken Braga, according to Fantin des Odoards, the fate of the Portuguese was already sealed, Fantin des Odoards, *Journal*, p. 216. Esdaile, *A new history*, pp. 176-78 paints a very bleak picture of the ability of the Portuguese to oppose Soult and, perhaps, significantly understates popular resolve in the north – in common with many other studies which have a primary focus on military aspects of the struggle.

²⁴⁹. Martinien, *Tableaux and supplement. Tableau p. 152*,

²⁵⁰. Défense d'Amarante, April 1809, 17^{ème} léger : s.-lieut. Jouanne +, capt. Itaralde *, cdb. Schroffer, capt. Barelier, lieut. Darraq, lieut. Jacquier, lieut. Lacomblée, s.-lieut. Meunier. + killed outright, * died 20th April, Martinien, *Tableaux, Martinien, Tableau*, p. 432.

opposed to action, the above casualties clearly show the French had to fight their way into and through Portugal. Similarly, Portugal it would appear was one of those places that was relatively easy to get into, it was not a place in which it was easy to remain in position or from which it was easy to leave. Leaving aside losses incurred during the French defence of Oporto in May in which they were engaged with British troops only, French casualties throughout the campaign were fairly substantial – the majority of which were incurred in front of and assaulting the defences of Oporto from the Portuguese at the end of March.

To recapitulate then, the invasion of Portugal, the various combats along the route and the taking of Oporto was a much more sanguinary affair than we have been led to believe in some accounts. Moreover, a substantial number of officers were wounded in small combats at specific points along the retreat route that confirm they were wounded or killed in action against Portuguese troops that had closed in behind them when they took Oporto. For example lieut. Citron and Tixier of the 1^{er} *hussards* at the combat of Santillo on the 10th May were amongst many killed, wounded or missing in the retreat from Portugal – although it is difficult to ascertain how many resulted from combats against Portuguese or British troops. The desperate bravery displayed by the French in the *coups de main* at the bridges over the Cávado and ponte de Misarella may have obviated substantial losses had the French been caught between the pursuing allies and the Portuguese irregulars

to their front.²⁵¹ But in total, over 100 officers were wounded and not a few killed (or perished due to the severity of their wounds) as a result of combat action against the Portuguese in the campaign: probably equating to some 2,000 casualties in total or around 10% of Soult's invasion force, after taking into account some troops had to be left behind in garrison duties in Spain.²⁵²

These data suggest that, for the purposes of this study, much of the subject matter in the French diaries is entirely appropriate and relevant to a study of the second French invasion of Portugal, specifically in order to establish the extent of popular resistance. Of course, the majority of French losses were incurred in formal combats – most especially in front of the defences of Oporto and during its taking. But we know from French accounts, confirmed by Martinien's tables that a substantial number of casualties resulted from much smaller affairs, during the invasion and when consolidating their positions upon taking Oporto – losses being reported at Ponte de Amarante, Ponte de Lima, Ponte de Misarella, Mesão Frio and Guimarães to name but a few.²⁵³ It may be that some of the French dairies

²⁵¹. For example, s.-lieut. Charas (killed) and s.-lieut. Lottin (wounded) of the 32^{ème} léger on the 12th May, major Dulong de Rosnay of the 31^{ème} léger and capt. Charvais of the 15^{ème} léger on the 16th May at the *ponte de Misarella*.

²⁵². Estimates for losses incurred between February and May, excluding those incurred during the defence and evacuation of Oporto against the British, based upon details for officer casualties in Martinien, *Tableaux and supplement* and the principle established by Oman relating to the ratio of officers to other ranks in the French army.

²⁵³. Capt. Laguette killed and Lieutenant Duston of the état-major wounded at Pont de Amarante, p. 44, s.-lieut. Mondot of the 26^{ème} ligne (supplement p. 34) and s.-lieut Mondot of the 36^{ème} ligne, p. 203, capt. Roy of the 70^{ème} p. 279, s.-lieut. Desbiats of the 66^{ème} at Guimarens [Guimarães] on the 4th May, pp 270, capt. Brige (killed) and s.-lieut. Chev  (wounded) of the 82^{ème} Pont de Lima, p 202,

overstate matters and we do have to take into account the questionable nature of the texts. Their reliability as sources is at times problematic, for example in relation to the number of French troops involved in combats and those of their adversaries as seen, for example, in Le Noble's estimate for Soult's force committed to the invasion of Portugal and is well documented.²⁵⁴ Nevertheless, they remain the best sources we have and, together with the documented evidence set out above and secondary Portuguese accounts, they point to significant indigenous and popular opposition to the French during this invasion.

There are numerous examples in these French diaries and journals of individuals, families and the population of small settlements, fighting to the death to protect their farms and homes (on both sides of the border) and of cooperation between Spanish and Portuguese irregular forces. Men and women alike opposed the invader. In one instance women dug defensive earthworks alongside their men, their children who were too small to work carrying their wine and food, to prevent the crossing of the Minho; in others women fought against the French and exacted retribution on the wounded and sick left behind the main army.

capt. Basle of the 2^{ème} léger (killed) and capt. Rafy (wounded) at Amarante, p 388, lieut. Dorthon, *Mésinfrio* [Mesão Frio], p, 388, capit. Péruset, wounded *affaire de Maison-Froide* [Mesão Frio], p. 426, major Dulong capt. Charvais wounded at Misarella (both of the 15^{ème} léger). Martinien also lists lieut. Decto as wounded *dans une émeute* in Spain on the 4th May and two captains Doldenel and Burgel as wounded in a combat at Coimbra on the 10th May p. 503.

²⁵⁴. Le Noble, *Mémoires sur les opérations militaires des Français en Galice, en Portugal, et dans la vallée du Tage, en 1809, sous le commandement du maréchal Soult, duc de Dalmatie*, (Paris : Chez Barois l'Ainé, 1821). Oman used French sources extensively to support his account of the invasion: Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*, vol. 2, pp. 223-72.

“In few hours they had constructed a battery, in which they placed two iron guns of a very small calibre. More than four hundred women, among whom were many nuns, working on the embrasures, some with shovels or picks in hand, competing with the strongest men; others carrying the earth in baskets or in their skirts, throwing it out of the trench.”²⁵⁵

One French diarist, de Naylies, was not only convinced that the entire population was armed and prepared to fight, he also reported the women in some cases exacted cruel retribution, however refusing to provide further details relating to the nature of the exactions committed against one French officer.²⁵⁶

It is often claimed in these sources that the larger Portuguese forces that attempted to oppose the invasion lacked formal military discipline and organisation. The lack of uniformity, arms and equipment, and the extent of indiscipline was a direct result of the demobilisation of the Portuguese military by Junot in early 1808 and the absence of a powerful military authority. This meant that the French did not know exactly who it was they were fighting against, often reporting they had engaged with large groups of armed peasants, or a combination of armed peasants and soldiers.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵. De Naylies, *Mémoires sur la guerre d’Espagne*, p. 62.

²⁵⁶. *ibid.* p.94. See also Journal du général Fantin des Odoards, p295 confirming the exasperated and energetic defence of the line of the river and of the involvement of women and children in its defence.

²⁵⁷. De Naylies account confirmed the composition of the forces defending Chaves and Fantin des Odoards provides corroborative information to this effect.

The civil and judicial authorities were able to call up the cadres of line regiments, and reform regiments around the limited number of experienced officers and other ranks (those who had been demobilised and had not been dispatched to serve in *la légion portugaise*, or who had avoided mobilisation or deserted French service). However, despite popular enthusiasm for military recruitment and mobilisation, the lack of officers, uniforms, arms, equipment and, most importantly, military training led to the formation of highly undisciplined and ineffective forces. The cases of Chaves and Braga clearly exemplify this. A major difference between 1808 and 1809, despite similarities in outcomes when the Portuguese forces came up against the better organised, if numerically inferior, French, was that by 1809 the state, the regional and local authorities, and the military, were more or less united in their resolve to oppose the French. And, so, too, it would seem, were the people.

IV

Britain had made a number of important changes in strategy. Since Beresford's appointment Canning had been pressing the cabinet to commit to the defence of Portugal as the "most suitable strategic objective for Britain in the Peninsula", Wellesley's memorandum on the defence of Portugal in March 1809 set out a compelling case for the defence of Portugal and her transformation as Britain's "most powerful ally" in the Peninsula. This document, together with intelligence from Villiers in Lisbon and his argument for a stronger and more active military presence, unabated pressure from Canning in the cabinet, and the convergence of several separate British detachments into a more substantial force in Portugal appear to have tipped the balance. The cabinet and the King reluctantly agreed both to Wellesley's appointment as commander in chief and Portugal as the main theatre of operations.

"More by good luck than good judgement the ministers had hit upon the best possible strategy for the British to pursue in the Peninsula, although it took a considerable time for them to appreciate the fact." ²⁵⁸

Wellesley's successful campaign to retake Oporto is not of immediate concern here. However, Beresford's efforts had resulted in a number of more or less completed regiments of first line infantry, in formal brigades, well trained, equipped and officered in direct contrast to the inadequacies in resources,

²⁵⁸. Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon*, pp. 84-87, Hall, *British strategy*, pp. 176-77.

equipment, training and military experience of the Portuguese who faced the invasion of Soult. ²⁵⁹ The Bishop of Oporto, and the *Junta Suprema*, presented further complexities given their insistence on dictating military strategy, undermining the authority of the appointed general, and *governador das armas*, Bernadim Freire de Andrade. Some officers refused to obey orders and openly challenged military authority.

Beresford's appointment changed all this. Close analysis of the movements of Beresford in the summer and autumn of 1809 reveals the improvements he had instilled in the Portuguese army and the development of the system for its brigading. This system was to take shape, more fully, in 1810, but the nucleus for the brigading first becomes apparent in the campaigns of 1809. When Wellesley returned from the Oporto campaign, via Coimbra, Tomar and Constância [contemporaneously named Punhete], arriving in Abrantes on 17th June, Beresford also returned with the Portuguese army under his command, leaving three or four battalions to strengthen Silveira in the north, to the cantonments between the Zêzere and the Tejo and the neighbourhood of Castelo Branco. Beresford was to cooperate, with the remaining (Portuguese) troops under his command, with Wellesley against Victor who had concentrated on the Guadiana. ²⁶⁰

²⁵⁹. Gates, *The Spanish ulcer*, pp. 139-42, Esdaile, *A new history*, pp. 178-79

²⁶⁰. Soriano *História da guerra civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 281-82

Essentially, Beresford and the Portuguese army were to form a strong independent corps, protecting the vulnerable left flank of the Anglo-Spanish army as they advanced towards Victor. By the end of July Beresford had crossed into Spain and one week later had managed to coordinate the movements of all of the Portuguese troops, including those in the north not yet under his immediate command, and had concentrated on the position Wellesley had chosen for him on the Agueda. In contrast to the Portuguese forces that had been mobilised until now, this was a substantial combined force in excess of 10,000 men: fully armed, adequately equipped, well-officered manoeuvring under proper military discipline. The Portuguese division maintained its position and discipline and, in addition to securing the vulnerable flank of Wellesley's line of operations, gained very useful experience of mobilisation, deployment, manoeuvres and outpost work. The Anglo-Portuguese army envisaged by Wellesley in August 1808 was finally coming into being.²⁶¹

Soult had failed to seize Portugal. Joseph, together with Victor, was defeated at Talavera and, despite at least a semblance of better coordination, the French were ultimately disappointed in their efforts to entrap and defeat either the British army

²⁶¹. Beresford's total force comprised some 18,000 of all arms: *Infanteria* - 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, & 23; *Caçadores* - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6; two independent regiments, the *Leal Legião Lusitana* and the *academicos de Coimbra*; *Artilheria* - four brigades of 9, 6 & 3 calibre. *ibid.*

of Wellesley or the Spanish army of Cuesta. ²⁶² Sir Arthur Wellesley remained in the vicinity of Badajoz for a while but, despite the entreaties of his brother Richard Marquess Wellesley as ambassador to Spain to maintain joint Anglo-Spanish military operations, he retreated into Portugal to concentrate on its defence when he became convinced of the futility of such joint operations. ²⁶³ A variety of Spanish forces continued to hamper French occupation and subjugation of Estremadura and Andalucía. Meantime, informal popular opposition and guerrilla warfare intensified.

On the surface, the period towards the end of 1809 was a relatively quiescent time for Portugal. But the year was an important moment if not a definitive watershed, in terms of the struggle for supremacy in the Iberian Peninsula. Although Wellesley had resolved to retreat into Portugal he still, at this stage, had to continue to convince the cabinet in London that the struggle should be maintained, if not intensified, and that the main theatre of operations should be Portugal.

²⁶² For further details of the temporary deviation from the defence strategy (for Portugal) the campaign in Spain in the summer of 1809, and the outcomes of the battle of Talavera, see Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon*, 94-99; and for domestic intrigues and some fluctuation, but not complete about turn, in foreign policy, *ibid.* pp. 105-12. Hall is also mindful that the scare of invasion was still a factor, even until 1809, and therefore a consideration in relation to the cautious approach to escalation of the war in the Iberian Peninsula, Christopher D. Hall, *British strategy in the Napoleonic war, 1803-15*, (Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 83.

²⁶³ John K Severn, 'The Wellesleys and Iberian diplomacy', in Norman Gash, (ed.), *Wellington: studies in the military and political career of the first duke of Wellington*, (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1990).

Chapter five: the effects of the French invasions on Portugal

I

As we have seen, Portugal's involvement in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars resulted in substantial economic, political and social change and yet the existing literature in English has not considered the scale, nature and effects of many of these changes in detail. However, these changes should be taken into account and critically assessed given they inform not only our understanding of events and outcomes in Portugal but also British foreign policy in relation to Iberia and South America.

Economic and political change was precipitated by the flight of Dom João, the removal of the court and Portuguese ministries to Rio de Janeiro, and the appointment of a regency council in Lisbon. In relation to Portuguese political economy, the government of the metropolis and its apparatus were transferred to its major colony, Brazil. The French occupation of Lisbon precluded its continued role as *entrepôt* and, in order that the Luso-Brazilian economy could continue to function, Brazil's ports were therefore opened to foreign vessels and restrictions on manufacture and inter-regional trade in the colonies were lifted. However, an alternative viewpoint is that the opening up of trade, and British occupation of

Madeira, was the price Portugal paid for British support.²⁶⁴ Day to day governance in Portugal was handed over to the regency council but with strict limitations imposed on its autonomy. Even the unprecedented decision to transfer the Portuguese court and government to Brazil, and the repercussions for Portugal and Brazil, despite their importance for British military and economic strategy, remain under-examined. As Parry observed, “The removal of the court from Lisbon to Rio [de Janeiro] had stood the Empire on its head, and powerful vested interests had been created in [Brazil’s capital city].”²⁶⁵

Ultimately the intensely profound nature of these changes would encompass the collapse of the Luso-Brazilian colonial system, and a transition to neo-mercantilism and an embryonic form of proto-industrialised capitalism in Brazil. In Portugal the scope of political change included demands for constitutional reform and a constitutional monarchy, civil war, the establishment of parliamentary democracy and, ultimately, a republic.²⁶⁶ The period heralded a major shift in the nature of inter-dependency between Portugal and Brazil and the complex relationships between the Portuguese crown, the colony of Brazil and citizens of the

²⁶⁴. For former see Fernadon Dores Costa, ‘O governo a seis meses de distância. A relação entre a Corte do Rio de Janeiro e os governadores do reino em Lisboa a consagração de um governo misto’, Departamento de História - ISTCE, undated and, for the latter, Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 1.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 438-39.

²⁶⁵. Parry, *Trade and Dominion*, p. 199.

²⁶⁶. José Luís Cardoso, ‘A guerra peninsular e a economia do império Luso-Brasileiro’, in Instituto da Defesa nacional, *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da europa dividida à união europeia*, Actas do congresso realizado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 2002, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005), see especially, pp. 239-40.

empire's territories.²⁶⁷ Paradoxically, and despite the commencement of a political process that would lead to Brazilian independence, conservative vested interests in Brazil would resist the abolition of slavery. Ironically, the force for change would appear stronger in the metropolis and weaker in its former colony.²⁶⁸

While the majority of these changes fall outside the scope of the present study, it will necessary to identify and analyse a few that are pertinent to understand how and why Portugal and Brazil were changing during this period and would continue to evolve in future years. For now, the focus will be on the paradoxical nature of political authority and representation in Portugal and Brazil. The Portuguese were confronted by a “world turned upside down” in which governance, while ostensibly in the hands of a regency council, had been relocated to Dom João's “tropical Versailles” in Brazil.²⁶⁹ Dom João insisted that royal authority remained his sole prerogative as prince regent in the palacial *Quinta de Boa Vista* in Rio de Janeiro: as such, all matters of importance were subject to discussion and agreement

²⁶⁷. Kirsten Schultz, ‘Royal authority, empire and the critique of colonialism: political discourse in Rio de Janeiro (1808-1821)’, *Luzo-Brazilian Review*, vol. 37, no. 2, *Special Issue: State, Society and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century Brazil*, 2000, 7-31 and ‘The crisis of empire and the problem of slavery: Portugal and Brazil, c. 1700- c. 1820’, *Common Knowledge*, vol. 11, no. 2, 2005, 264-282.

²⁶⁸. Kenneth R. Maxwell, ‘Why was Brazil so different? The contexts of independence’: John H. Parry Memorial Lecture, April 25th 2000, Harvard University, 1-24

²⁶⁹. Schultz reports the term “tropical Versailles” was first used by the Brazilian historian Manuel de Oliveira Lima comparing the palace of the Sun King Louis XIV to that of the Portuguese King Dom João VI (the prince regent would become the first King of the United Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil). See Kirsten Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: empire, monarchy, and the Portuguese royal court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821*, (New York and London, Routledge, 2001), pp. 1-2, citing Manuel de Oliveira Lima, *Dom João no Brasil (1808-1821)*, (Three vols., Rio de Janeiro, José Olympio, 1945) – not viewed.

in *minha real presença*.²⁷⁰ In relation to political economy and foreign affairs, the first administration formed by Dom João in Brazil, with three powerful ministers sharing responsibility for six portfolios, policy was decidedly pro-British (*anglófilo*) than that witnessed in the period prior to 1804. However, this was entirely due to the dynamism of D. Rodrigo, and lethargy of the other portfolio holders D. Fernando José de Portugal and the Conde de Anadia, in dictating policy and in which he was poles apart from his fellow ministers: “These ministers were like three clocks. The first, D. Rodrigo, was always ahead of his time, D. Fernando José de Portugal kept poor time; while the third, the Conde de Anadia, had stopped entirely.”.²⁷¹

Even so, with the French invasion of 1807, the occupation and insurrections in 1808, and continued and intensified British military, political and economic intervention it could not otherwise be so. In January 1809 a *carta régia* was sent from Rio de Janeiro to reaffirm the strict limitations imposed on the remit and activities of the regency council, the intention of which was to prevent the development of a potentially conflicting power base in Lisbon.²⁷²

²⁷⁰. Fernando Dores Costa, ‘O governo a seis meses de distância. A relação entre a Corte do Rio de Janeiro e os governadores do reino em Lisboa a consagração de um governo misto’, Departamento de História, ISTCE, undated, p. 2.

²⁷¹. This contemporary observation by Hipólito da Costa is cited slightly incorrectly, as a comparison between the two ministers Sousa Coutinho and the Conde de Anadia, in Maxwell, *Conflicts and conspiracies*: p. 232. For the full text see António Paim, ‘A Corte no Brasil. D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho’, *Estudos Filosóficos*, n^o 3, 2009, 266-269.

²⁷². Dores Costa, ‘O governo a seis meses de distância’.

Although António de Araújo remained influential, these shifts in policy were underpinned by the concentration of ministerial and diplomatic power within a triangle connecting Brazil, Lisbon and London. Increasingly, the Sousa Coutinho family were determining the direction of Portuguese political economy and foreign affairs. But their attempts to seize and retain control were by no means straightforward or undisputed. While localised governance and administration in Portugal was nominally undertaken by the regency council, there continued to be a number of competing interests, economic, political and familial, both in the short and long term. This period was therefore a watershed, resulting in a defining shift in Luso-Brazilian political economy and national governance – both in metropolis and colony.

As we have established, the influence of the Sousa Coutinho faction had been relatively influential in Portuguese politics at the turn of the century but was now the dominant force behind the Portuguese throne. D. Domingos António de Sousa Coutinho was the Portuguese minister plenipotentiary in London. Amongst other tasks, he edited *O Investigador portuguez em Inglaterra*, a politically motivated periodical opposed to the equally polemical *Correio braziliense*, edited by Hipólito José da Costa; a Brazilian radical and critic of the excesses of mercantilist capitalism (for which see chapter two). D. Domingos would later briefly have tenure of office in the regency council in 1821 and is often referred to in the literature as *Cavaleiro de*

Sousa (or *Chevalier de Sousa*). D. José António de Meneses e Sousa Coutinho (also known as the *Principal Sousa*) would soon be appointed *governador* on the regency council in 1810 following the illness and death of the Marquês das Minas. He continued in that office representing the clergy, until 1820, given his status as Deacon of the Patriarchal Church in Lisbon and was also instrumental in calls for the return of D. João in 1817.

The *Principal Sousa*, and other members of the regency council, came into conflict with Wellington over the implementation of his strategy for the defence of Portugal. Despite having agreed to the construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras, the *Principal Sousa* employed delaying tactics preventing the implementation of the strategy for withdrawal in face of the French invasion and put forward plans to oppose the French on the frontier with Spain. Wellington fought a running battle with Sousa Coutinho holding him personally responsible for the intransigence of the regency council during the campaign of 1810 to 1811.²⁷³ However, detailed examination from a Portuguese perspective reveals growing resentment towards the subordination of the Portuguese administration to British military strategy was an underlying factor. It has only been possible to include the briefest summary of the main points relating to Wellington's protracted battle with the *Principal Sousa*

²⁷³. The interested reader is referred to two excellent articles by Donald D. Horward: 'Wellington and the Defence of Portugal', *The International History Review*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Feb., 1989), 39-54, and 'Wellington as a strategist, 1808-14', in Norman Gash, (ed.), *Wellington: studies in the military and political career of the first duke of Wellington*, (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1990).

(and the Bishop of Oporto) in relation to their opposition to his strategy, or the crucial involvement of Forjaz and Stuart in ensuring its successful implementation, but clearly these issues evidence divergence on defence strategy.²⁷⁴

Although the focus of the current study is on changes effected in Luso-Brazilian political economy, specific changes of a political-cultural nature were brought about by the transfer of the court in Brazil. For Brazilians, their world would be irrevocably changed. For example, the right to directly petition the monarch was a key feature underpinning the rule of the Bragança dynasty. When the monarchy resided in Portugal this was a right that could not be enjoyed by vassals in Brazil without an expensive and arduous journey to the metropolis. Moreover, the right of slaves to petition the crown was unimaginable prior to the transfer of the court; the opportunities afforded by open audiences at court in Brazil were therefore enormous for Brazil's citizens. Conversely, Portuguese subjects who were not able to travel to Brazil personally, or who did not have recourse to political, commercial or familial representation by proxy, were effectively denied these rights. In the short term, expedencies such as being forced to relinquish their homes to accommodate the massive influx of nobles, and high ranking officials, were outweighed by advance in personal and political privileges.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴. Does Costa, 'O governo a seis meses de distância'.

²⁷⁵. Whilst it has not been possible to identify and analyse these changes in detail to support the current study, see Kirsten Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: empire, monarchy, and the Portuguese royal court in*

At the heart of these shifts in absolutist power and political authority, and the pre-eminence of Brazil in determining the trajectory of foreign and economic policy was the third member of the Sousa Coutinho faction. D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho (later entitled Conde de Linhares), had served as minister plenipotentiary in Turin and from 1796, held the portfolio in government for the navy and colonies (*Secretário de Estado da Marinha*) and the influential treasury portfolio (*Presidente do Real Erário*) until his resignation in 1803. As we saw above, D. Rodrigo now held the crucial portfolio for war and foreign affairs, (*Ministro da Guerra e dos Negócios Estrangeiros*) at court in Rio de Janeiro.²⁷⁶ Increasingly, and as *de facto* prime minister, his influence was instrumental in determining the direction of political economy and, therefore, ironically the budget deficit in Portugal and the accumulation of sovereign debt.

Paradoxically, the Sousa Coutinho faction were diametrically opposed to French invasion and occupation, but at the same time sought to undermine British influence and their most stalwart supporter in the regency council, D. Miguel

Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821, (New York and London, Routledge, 2001), pp. 1-2, and 151-72 and André Mansuy-Diniz Silva, 'Imperial re-organisation, 1750-1808' and Dauril Auden, 'Late colonial Brazil, 1750-1808', in Leslie Bethell, (ed.), *Colonial Brazil*, (Cambridge University Press, 1987).

²⁷⁶. I am grateful for many of the above insights into the Sousa Coutinho faction to Jorge Quinta Nova and Moisés Gaudêncio. While it has not been possible to source the following works to support the current study, it will be useful to investigate the Sousa Coutinho faction, the governance of Portugal and rule from Brazil in further detail in future: Brian R. April, *The Sousa Coutinho family and the influence of Portugal on British policy, 1808-1812*, (Unpublished PhD thesis : University of Cambridge, 1994) and Ana Canas Delgado Martins, *Governança e arquivos: D. João no Brasil*, (Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais, 2007).

Pereira de Forjaz. The Sousa Coutinho faction sought to address both their waning influence in Portugal and the imbalance of power between the secretaries of the regency council and its members. Their intention was to achieve the appointment of the *Principal Sousa* and others amenable to their influence to the regency council. British policy and activities in Portugal and, in particular, the important position held by Forjaz as secretary to the regency council were increasingly becoming obstacles to the achievement of their political objectives. Forjaz was not only a *protégé* of António de Araújo (Sousa Coutinhos' nemesis), but was also attaining a more prominent position and relationship with the British undertaking day to day management of the portfolio of Secretary for War and Foreign Affairs in Portugal.

²⁷⁷ There were also signs of change at a micro-political level, not least of which was the improved working relationship that Charles Stuart quickly developed with specific members of the "new nobility" and, in particular, Dom Miguel Pereira de Forjaz. ²⁷⁸ The designs of the Sousa Coutinho faction had already, according to Charles Stuart, undermined [Cypriano] Freire's position and prompted his resignation from the council. Their jealousies and intrigues were now focused on Forjaz and were fuelled by political and familial interests according to Nogueira – one of the newly elected council members. Forjaz was related to both D. Fernando

²⁷⁷. In a further bizarre twist of fate, Hipólito José da Costa, the editor of the polemical *Correio braziliense* and champion of Brazilian independence, was the recognised *protégé* of D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho.

²⁷⁸. De la Fuente, 'Dom Miguel Pereira de Forjaz', p. 225 et seq.

José de Portugal e Castro, the Conde de Aguiar, and D. João de Almeida Mello e Castro, Conde das Galvêas, the former of whom was politically opposed to D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho (Minister for War and Foreign Affairs). Ironically, then, Forjaz received strong support at court from men who were most closely aligned with the *partido francês* and the former (and disgraced) members of the regency council despite, perhaps, his instrumental role supporting British policy and interests in the regency council. At the same time, Strangford in Brazil sought to promote the interests of the Sousa Coutinho faction, and the appointment of the Conde de Redondo and subsequently that of the *Principal Sousa* to the regency council and, thereby, helped to undermine the very man who most fervently supported Stuart in the council, Wellington's strategy for Portugal's defence and British interests in Iberia. ²⁷⁹

Paradoxical as many of these potentially conflicting alliances and interests are, they help to explain the pervasive power of the absolutist state and the relative ease with which the state's apparatus and Portuguese hierarchy were able to impose the rule of law despite the lack of central power and authority. Careful consideration of the relatively informal governance, sustained by a juxtaposition of appointment, patronage and privilege, underpinning the extension and imposition of royal

²⁷⁹. For all of these important considerations, see De la Fuente, 'Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz', pp. 109-113 although I think De la Fuente does not correctly cite the identity, and political allegiance, of Conde das Galvêas. See, Maria Graham (Calcott), *Journey of a voyage to Brazil and residence there, during part of the years 1821, 1822, 1823*, (London : John Murray, 1824), p. 51.

authority throughout the history of Portuguese empire illustrates the innate capacity of the Portuguese absolutist state to impose its authority despite an ostensibly weak political and juridical colonial apparatus. In comparison to Spanish dominions in the Americas, for example, Portuguese captaincies in the Atlantic islands and the Brazils, appear to have been sustained with much less elaborate structures underpinning imperial rule compared to those supporting Spanish territorial domination. The same echelons of political authority maintaining colonisation, supported by powerful *magistrados* and *corregedores*, that had enabled the successful imposition of the various strata of society into Portuguese colonies such as India and Brazil, sustained royal authority in the metropolis, despite the inverted direction and the enormous distance separating the new seat of the Luso-Brazilian empire and Portugal. ²⁸⁰

II

Accordingly, some of these changes were wrought by necessity, and were therefore more pragmatic and short term in nature. Others were founded upon ideological principles and resulted in profound politico-economic change. For example, the easing of trading restrictions and the development of Brazilian domestic production resulted in some very specific long term effects on the Portuguese and Brazilian economies and, for both of these states, trading relations

²⁸⁰. Schwartz, magistracy in colonial Brazil.

with Britain. Disruption to Portuguese domestic output and international trade in this period, while well-known within the Portuguese literature, has only recently become the focus of historical investigation in English. Moreover, despite British subsidies, the enormous deficiency in fiscal receipts to the Portuguese treasury resulting from the transfer of the court, the resultant loss of revenue on imports and exports, and the limitations that war and wholesale military mobilisation imposed on the productive capacity of the domestic economy and its principle sector, agriculture, restricted Portuguese autonomy still further. ²⁸¹ While they were welcomed, the prorogation of specific seigneurial and clerical dues provided little meaningful amelioration of popular well-being. Moreover, the imposition of customs duties, which went some way in adjusting the burden of taxation from the point of consumption (given the significant increase in demand for imported foodstuffs), did little to augment fiscal receipts in the metropolis or ameliorate economic conditions for the Portuguese population. ²⁸² The flight of the court to Rio de Janeiro presaged the end of the primacy of colonial-mercantilist economics, and the relative dependency of the colonies towards the metropolis. Prior to the opening of Brazilian ports to the shipping of friendly nations, exports that could not be carried on Portuguese ships were transported by foreign vessels under licence to

²⁸¹. See Donald D. Horward, 'Wellington and the Defence of Portugal', *The International History Review*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Feb., 1989), 39-54 and Fernando Dores Costa, 'Conflictos entre Wellington y los gobernadores de Portugal durante la campaña de 1810-1811 contra Masséna', *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna*, Anejo IX (2010), 123-145.

²⁸². Dores Costa, 'O governo a seis meses de distância', pp. 4-5.

the crown. To address the resultant loss of revenue, an *ad valorem* impost was levied on cargoes – with preferential rates for British shipping. The lifting of long standing prohibitions on the manufacture or process of raw materials and primary products in Brazil was a further factor in ultimately establishing free trade and reducing income that would normally have found its way to Portugal by way of taxes on the import and re-export of Brazilian produce.²⁸³ Therefore, the scale and nature of disruption in the volume of trade, exports to Brazil and Brazil's exports to and re-exports from Portugal were substantial. Portugal had maintained a position of some strength due to Pombal's reforms in the third quarter of the century and she retained an intrinsic involvement in the general development of Euro-Atlantic trade in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

“During the second half of the eighteenth century and early years of the nineteenth ...Portuguese colonial policy was largely in the hands of three remarkable men: Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo [the Marquês de Pombal; holding office as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and War and later Secretary for internal Affairs and President of the *Érario Régio* (Treasury) and effectively Portugal's prime minister between 1750 and 1777] ... Martinho de Mello e Castro [Conde de Galveias; Secretary of State for the Navy and Overseas Territories (1770-1795)] ... and Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho [Conde de Linhares; Secretary of State for the Navy and Overseas

²⁸³. Cardoso, *ibid.* p. 239-40.

Territories (1796-1801, President of the *Érario Régio* (Treasury, 1801-1803) and, finally, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and War (1808-1812).”²⁸⁴

Throughout this period, then, the most important components of Portuguese government had remained unaltered during a period in which the interdependency of metropolis and Brazil intensified. Brazil had attained an unparalleled position in relation to wealth creation; despite the reduction in gold output, the range and volume of Brazilian produce became a principal contributor to the Portuguese crown through a complex system of imposts on consumption in the colony and metropolis, internal colonial trade and exportation and - especially - re-exports from Lisbon to a wide range of commercial centres across Europe and beyond. Therefore the secretary of state for the treasury, for the navy and colonies, and for foreign affairs maintained a significant influence on Portuguese policy development. All three of these ministers upheld the principal aim of strengthening Brazil’s position as mainstay of the Portuguese economy by concentrating and reinforcing the absolute power of the monarchy and the “colonial pact ... to the exclusive benefit of the metropolis.”²⁸⁵

This position was now irrevocably altered. For example, one of the most notable characteristics of Portuguese economic growth in the final quarter of the century was the export of domestic manufactures to Brazil: exceeding one third of

²⁸⁴. Andréa Munuy-Diniz Silva, ‘Imperial reorganization’, in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Colonial Brazil*, (Cambridge University Press, 1987).

²⁸⁵. *ibid.*, p. 246-47.

total exports to that colony and outstripping the share comprised of European goods (the balance of which was derived from Asian markets, including cotton and silk cloth). As O'Brien notes, in many ways the relationship between core and periphery was more often uni-directional rather than symbiotic.

“Connexions between trade and growth are not exhausted by a consideration of trade’s impact on the accumulation of capital. And the new history of development is also properly concerned with the gains Western Europe derived from the patterns of specialization promoted by trade with other continents... But the trend in the core was towards variety and specialization while the trend in the periphery was towards monoculture.”²⁸⁶

Portugal’s involvement in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, whilst not immediately fatal, by 1808 had stifled this component of economic growth and irrevocably interrupted her development as a major trading nation. In the short to medium term, the changes signalled a significant increase in Brazil’s gross domestic output and, therefore, the Luso-Brazilian empire’s overall aggregate product, with a commensurate and substantial decline of output, and fiscal receipts, in Portugal. In the longer term these changes presaged the development of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves and, ultimately, the development of Brazil as an

²⁸⁶. Patrick O'Brien, ‘European economic development: the contribution of the periphery’, *The Economic History Review: Second Series*, vol. 35, no. 1, 1-18, pp. 9-10.

autonomous economy and ultimately as an independent state.²⁸⁷ The value of re-exports of Brazilian goods exhibited an almost consistent year on year increase in the last quarter of the eighteenth century: peaking in the period 1801-02 at 15 billion réis compared to 2.7 bn réis in 1776. Despite a short trough in the interim years, re-exports briefly rose to a value of 14.5 bn réis in 1806, after which time they declined year on year to a nadir of 0.5 bn réis in 1811. Exports to Brazil exhibited a similar pattern, peaking in 1801 and 1804, respectively, at 10.6 bn réis and 10. bn réis; falling to a low of 1.4 bn réis in 1808 and not rising above 3 bn réis until 1813. The exports of Portuguese goods also followed a similar pattern: comprising approximately one third or more of total exports to Brazil in the decade to 1804, but their share of total exports to the colony fell significantly between 1806 and 1810. The scope of Portuguese trade and exports was not merely confined to its colonies: “At the turn of the century, [the value of] foreign trade per capita was larger in Portugal than in Spain, Italy or Germany, and 5 to 7% of all European exports moved through Portuguese ports.”²⁸⁸ The minister exercising a most significant influence on Dom João and Portuguese policy at this time was D. Rodrigo de Sousa

²⁸⁷. See in particular, Valentim Alexandre, *Os sentidos do Império: questão nacional e questão colonial na crise do Antigo Regime português*, Volume 5 of *Colecção Biblioteca das ciências do homem: História*, (Porto : Edições Afrontamento, 1993), and José L. Cardoso, ‘Free trade, political economy and the birth of a new economic nation: Brazil, 1808-1810’, *Revista de História Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, Año XXVII, Otoño 2009, no. 2, pp. 183-204.

²⁸⁸. Jorge M. Pedreira, ‘From growth to collapse: Portugal, Brazil and the breakdown of the old colonial system (1760-1830)’, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 80, no. 4, 2000, 839-864, see especially pp. 845-53.

Coutinho. Formerly as Secretary for the Navy and Colonies and now as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and War, he energetically and ruthlessly effected the change to a political economy increasingly based upon proto-industrialisation and liberated commerce rather than state monopoly, protectionism and barriers to inter- and intra-national trade. ²⁸⁹

The effects on the Portuguese economy were nothing short of disastrous. Two years after arriving in Brazil, the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce of 1810 was negotiated, representing a further and decisive shift in Luso-Brazilian political economy and the emergence of an Anglo-Brazilian economic and political axis.

“The decree [of 1808] proclaiming Brazilian ports open to the ships of all friendly nations ... was envisaged as a temporary solution ... but, in fact, put an end to the old colonial system.” [First blockade, invasion and then all out war meant that] “the Portuguese merchant economy collapsed ... Destruction and turmoil hampered both industrial and agricultural production. International trade was almost paralyzed and large quantities of foodstuffs were imported from 1811-1815.” ... “exports of [Portuguese] national commodities to Brazil ... [fell] to 22.4 percent of the value reached in 1796-1806. Re-exports of Brazilian goods [sank] to 11.6 per cent of the pre-war yearly average and overseas shipments of European goods fell to 10 per cent of the former value.”. ²⁹⁰

²⁸⁹. Cardoso, ‘A guerra peninsular e a economia do império Luso-Brasileiro’, pp. 239-40 and 252-54.

²⁹⁰. *ibid.* p. 850.


However, while there was an identifiable relationship between the fall in international trade to blockade, invasion and war, the invasion of 1807-08 had only a temporary effect on longer term trends. The substantial decline in shipping tonnage derived directly from the implementation of the continental system and the Royal Navy's blockade, but was also symptomatic of a "broad economic structural change ... within the emerging capitalist world economy... and represented the demise of the old-world Atlantic economies dependent upon luxury colonial products and the emergence of modern trade servicing the development of the Industrial Revolution."²⁹¹

Taking the above into account, the following chart provides an indication of the effects on the Portuguese economy of the French invasions. Due to missing data, the measures for fiscal receipts (*receitas fiscais*) and public expenditure (*despesas públicas*) are based upon an average for those years for which data are available – the data therefore provide an indication of scale for the period in question rather than actual trend lines. From the data available they do not appear to have exceeded, respectively, 11 and 12 *milhares de contos* per annum during the period before and after the war. The apparent deficit of receipts over expenditure therefore also indicates the accumulation of public debt. In contrast, imports and

²⁹¹. Gavin Daly, *Inside Napoleonic France*, (Aldershot : Ashgate Publishing, 2001), pp. 134-137 citing François Crouzet, 'Wars, blockade, and economic change in Europe, 1792-1815, *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1964, 567-588.

exports averaged, respectively, 30.8 and 31.1 *milhares de contos* per annum in the decade prior to the first French invasion. The consensus would appear to suggest Portugal enjoyed a favourable balance of trade during the period immediately spanning the *fin de siècle*.²⁹² In contrast, imports peaked at 43 *milhares de contos* during the war in 1811: the balance of trade deficit gradually receding from -35 to -12 *milhares de contos* between 1811 and 1814.

Figure 1 Portuguese imports, exports, receipts and expenditure, 1799-1831



Source: Nuno Valério, 'Avaliação do produto interno bruto de Portugal'²⁹³

²⁹². For example, see Maxwell, conflicts and conspiracies, p 234.

²⁹³. Nuno Valério, 'Avaliação do produto interno bruto de Portugal', Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão – GHES Documento de Trabalho/Working Paper nº 34, 2008.

The data clearly show the catastrophic effect of the war on the Portuguese economy, taking into account the increase in public expenditure, and the commensurate decline in income from taxation due to the commitment to the war effort.

The maintenance of the Luso-Brazilian Empire was almost solely predicated upon the relationship with Britain from 1808 and the Portuguese economy was increasingly and ultimately totally committed to the war effort. Certainly, in addition to British subsidies, there was a substantial demand for funds to sustain the war effort drawing on Portuguese reserves, national income, private capital and, crucially, human resources and economic assets.

III

The extent and intensity of human resources devoted to preventing a repeat of the invasions of 1807 and 1809 and French occupation and subjugation of the country have, until recently, received little proper assessment and analysis. Although, there has been a recognition of the most visible indications of the investment of human capital, the numbers of men called up for service and the manpower committed to constructing the Lines of Torres Vedras, there has been no study examining the effects of wholesale military mobilisation.²⁹⁴

²⁹⁴. There are a number of important studies in respect of the military including: Manuel Amaral, 'Portugal e as guerras da revolução, de 1793 a 1801: do Roussilhão ao Alemtejo', in *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da Europa dividida à união Europeia*, Actas do congresso realizado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 2002, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005); ~, *A luta política em Portugal nos finais do antigo regime: a proposta de reforma do exército português de 1803*, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2010); and ~, "Fontes da História Militar dos Séculos XVIII / XIX"; and João Torres Centeno, *O exército português na*

As early as October 1808 the process of recruitment and mobilisation had been afforded priority by Forjaz. In principle, the foundations for military re-organisation had already been laid but not fully implemented in the period 1806 to 1807. The first French invasion of 1807 and the subsequent mobilisation of many of the senior officers and more experienced troops into *la légion portugaise* resulted in a significant reduction in military capacities. Attempts to mobilise troops in 1808 were severely constrained by the low ratio of good officers and troops available with training and experience in each regiment and these deficiencies would continue to pose substantial problems for some time to come. On November 21st 1808 all men who had been discharged between 1801 and 1807 were recalled to their respective units; deserters pardoned if they returned within one month; the terms of service reduced to four years; and, finally, all troops were promised preferential consideration upon demobilisation for employment. By December 1808, a further decree ordered all males to arm themselves, those between the ages of 15-60 were to present themselves for military training, and each settlement was to take measures for its own defence.

The very substantial efforts made to mobilise in the summer of 1808 were made infinitely more difficult in that the model or pattern for military mobilisation

guerra peninsular, Volume 1, do Rossilhão ao fim da segunda invasão francesa 1807-1810, (Lisboa : Prefácio, 2008). I am grateful to João Centeno for clarifying specific aspects of military history in connection with a review undertaken of this first volume; and the second volume to accompany this title has now been published.

at a national level had been shattered, but the establishment of the *juntas*, together with wholesale popular support, ensured that localised recruitment and mobilisation remained intact. The result was an enthusiastic but defective military force comprising regulars, irregulars and civilian volunteers, inadequately provided for in terms of arms, equipment, officers and, most importantly, training and discipline.²⁹⁵

Within this re-organisation, the twenty four regiments of the line were each to comprise a total of 1,550 officers, rank and file (plus a staff complement); each of the 12 regiments of cavalry was raised to a total effective force of almost 600 (although the continued lack of suitable mounts meant whole regiments were assigned garrison duties and a smaller number of serviceable regiments formed for active service); the organization and complements of the four regiments of artillery remained unaltered at 1,200 each; and the regiments of *milícia* were increased to 48 in total each comprising a strength of 1,100 troops. The paper strength of the first and second line troops therefore exceeded 105,000.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁵ French eye witness accounts testify to the general lack of uniformity of the forces mobilised against them, their lack of formal military attire, arms and accoutrements. They also stressed the extent of popular opposition throughout settlements, particular in close proximity to the border with Spain both in 1809 and also in 1810. Whilst those firearms that were available were of a wide variety, and the general absence of firearms amongst the hastily organised *ordenança* created problems in terms of military capabilities, the great problem for the senior officers was the lack of military organisation and discipline amongst the forces they were able to mobilise.

²⁹⁶ AHM 1/3 caixa 2, decree of October 27, 1807; AHM 1/14 caixa 286, decree of 14 October, 1808; and AHM caixa 25 decree of December 11, 1808; cited in Francisco A. De la Fuente, 'Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz: his early career and role in the mobilization and defence of Portugal', (Unpublished PhD thesis : Florida States University, 1980), pp. 182-85 – in this latter edict two further stipulations

Military recruitment and mobilisation continued to be supported by the 1807 royal charter (*alvará*), which established a supporting infrastructure comprising twenty four *brigadas de ordenança*.²⁹⁷ The recruiting districts varied in terms of their jurisdiction for physical territory in order that approximately similar populations were covered. Each was tasked with recruiting and mobilising one regiment of *infanteria* (first line) and two regiments of *milícia* (second line) troops. Two districts combined to provide recruits for one regiment of cavalry. Finally, the artillery was recruited from the combined area covered by all of the defined territories *districtos da circumscripção*, which contained the twenty four component *brigadas*. For obvious reasons, recruitment and mobilisation were more difficult in relatively sparsely populated areas, and a further complicating factor was that the boundaries for civil, judicial, military (and religious) jurisdiction were not necessarily coterminous. The regions and number of regiments supported were as follows: Algarve, 1; Alentejo, 2; Beira, 5; Estremadura, 6; Oporto, 4; Minho, 4; and the Trás-os-Montes, 2. Their distribution took into account population densities and the pattern of major settlements in each of the seven *regiões militares*.

decreed aiding the enemy to be a crime punishable by death and settlements not resisting the enemy would be razed to the ground *ibid.* pp185-86. Grehan though asserts that the total number of effective first line troops did not exceed 44,000, Grehan, 'Wellington's fighting cocks', p. 176.

²⁹⁷. The law of 1807 therefore represented a notable progression in these methods for recruitment. Fryman refers erroneously to a "feudal" system of recruitment: a description that fails to acknowledge a complex set of procedures that took into account age, marital status, occupation, number of dependants and previous service, see Fryman, 'Charles Stuart and the "common cause"', pp. 68-75.

Eligibility for, and terms of, military service were quite complex. All males between 17 and 40 years were liable for ten years service in the first line *infanteria* (*no activo*) and thereafter eight years in the *ordenanças*. Recruits joining the second line (*milícias*) served for 14 years in the first instance and a further eight years in the *ordenanças*. From 1808, and particularly following the appointment of Beresford, various (progressive) reforms increase eligibility, and reduced exemptions, thereby eventually extending compulsory military service (potentially) to all (single) males aged between 18 and 60. Moreover, some males previously exempted from service in the *infanteria* (for example, married males with dependants) were subsequently decreed eligible for active service (i.e. as opposed to more limited terms of service within the *milicia* and *ordenança*).²⁹⁸

There are two further, and fundamental, issues to take into account.

Recruitment and mobilisation for military service would under normal conditions be to provide replacements for casualties and to replenish the losses incurred by regiments due to retirement (completion of the terms of service) and natural wastage due to sickness, disabilities or infirmities. Although recruits continued to be drawn by lot (*sorte*), the number of recruits required to bring each respective regiment up to a proper combat effectiveness and to replenish its needs throughout

²⁹⁸. V Cesar, A evolução do recrutamento em Portugal: desde os seus primórdios até a lei de 1807, *Revista Militar*, 2.^a Epoca, n.º 8, Agosto de 1909, pp 513-24; and A evolução do recrutamento em Portugal: desde 1809 até 1901, *Revista Militar*, 2.^a Epoca, n.º 9, Setembro de 1909, pp 577-92.

five years of almost continuous campaigning were both substantial and unprecedented.²⁹⁹ And while energetic and enthusiastic popular support for military mobilisation assisted recruitment, the specific conditions of 1809 and the lack of experienced officers meant that in some cases the extent of popular support for opposition and resistance to the French created problems of a different kind. Indeed, indiscipline and disobedience were key factors undermining the performance of the Portuguese military, most particularly in 1809.

Clearly it was difficult to develop a military strategy for the defence of the northern regions of Portugal when order could not be maintained and the local population had their own priorities for defence. Furthermore, an ongoing problem, underpinned by a complex combination of political, military and economic factors, was the fragmentation of the officer class into distinct military factions. Whilst neither faction could be said to be steadfastly pro-French or pro-British, at this time, they had become much more clearly defined as such with the impending third French invasion of Portugal, and most particularly, once the invasion had commenced and the French army approached Lisbon's defences - the Lines of Torres Vedras - in October 1810.

The theoretical establishment suggested above relate solely to the establishment at any given point in time and do not take into account additional

²⁹⁹. *ibid.*

and replacement demand for manpower between 1808 and 1810 to make up losses sustained in battle, or due to sickness, injury and desertion. The following data have been put together to establish the stocks and flows of military recruitment in the capital and two regions - Lisbon and Estremadura. As indicated above, each regiment was composed of just over 1,500 other ranks. However, in addition to the standing complement of regiments, additional recruits had to be furnished to make up losses sustained in campaigning and through natural wastage. In 1809, 1,250 recruits were forwarded to make up the deficiencies in line regiments n.º 4 and n.º 19: approximately 950 of which came from the capital, Lisbon, and just over 300 via the *capitães móres* from their recruiting *comarcas*, and a further fifty or so recruits for the *milícias* of Alcacer, Leiria and Soure. In 1810, the numbers recruited to meet demand had swelled to almost 5,200. Of these, 2,700 men were recruited directly for the general reserve and line regiment n.º 22, during the months of June and August from Lisbon, while a further 2,400 were furnished for the general recruiting reserve by the *capitães móres*, the majority of which were furnished in June with almost 300 more in November. A further 40 *milícia* recruits were furnished for the regiments of Alcacer, Setubal, Louzã and Tondella. In June and October 1811, mostly in the earlier month, 1,900 men were forwarded by the *capitães móres*, for the general recruiting reserve, and 930 for regiment n.º 22 from Lisbon.

In addition to meeting this level of demand, which equated to a total exceeding 9,000 recruits in these three years, a further 3,800 recruits in 1812 and almost 1,840 in 1813, were required for the general recruiting reserve. Almost 3,000 additional recruits were needed to make good losses in the seven regiments of the line, two regiments of cavalry and one of artillery, which recruited from Lisbon and Estremadura, within a return of October 1813.³⁰⁰ Even after taking into account that the capital Lisbon and its environs were home to around one in ten Portuguese people, and Estremadura was one of the most fertile and populous regions, the sustainability of such intensive recruiting methods must have been seriously questioned.

These intensive recruitment methods (and for such a sustained period of active service) were a relatively recent development, traditionally recruitment had been managed within the recruiting district (*comarca*) by the *capitães móres*, the allocation to first, second and third line being undertaken once the lot (*sorteamento*) had been drawn; with varying eligibility criteria and conditions of service. Service in the first line had normally been restricted to those best able to serve away from home, single men without dependants, with service in the *milícias* being a preferred option for married men with dependants, and service with the *ordenanças* compulsory for anyone not already in first or second line service. Although it has

³⁰⁰. All data from Chaby, *Excerptos Historicos*, vol. VI, pp. 481-82: the line regiments were n.º 1, 4, 7, 13, 16, 19 and 22, cavalry regiments n.º 1 and 4, and artillery regiment n.º 1.

been argued that the provisions for recruitment were adequate and that the reforms instigated by Beresford and Forjaz were both excessive and repressive, this argument fails to consider properly the extraordinary demand for manpower, given the sustained and unprecedented nature of the armed conflict to 1814.³⁰¹

To return to the total under arms for 1810, of almost 435,000 including those serving in the *ordenança*, this total represented approximately 43% of the total male population eligible for military service, which could be estimated at approximately 1,000,000 based upon data from the Census of 1801. The population of the Minho, which had exhibited much faster rates of population growth would have been better placed to meet such extensive recruitment, certainly in comparison to Estremadura where population change had flat-lined, and that of the Alemtejo which was declining substantially (promoting an agricultural crisis due to the lack of land labourers – a factor that impacted substantially on military recruitment in this region).³⁰² Of course, men serving in regiments of *milícia* would be allowed furlough when their posts were not in immediate danger, *ordenança* operations were localised and more temporary nature, and all family members would contribute to household productivity. However, even after allowing for these factors, a reduction of this magnitude on the potential agricultural and productive labour force would

³⁰¹. V Cesar, 'A evolução do recrutamento em Portugal'.

³⁰². João Pedro Ferro, *A população portuguesa no final do antigo regime (1750-1815)*, Lisboa, 1995 pp 29-34, and see Oman for the difficulties of recruiting in the Alentejo, Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*, vol. ii, pp. 629-31 and vol. iii, pp. 556-57

have had substantial negative effects, for example in terms of the aggregate output of the agricultural sector, food production and processing of foodstuffs. Moreover, a substantial and growing proportion of the population - perhaps 600,000 people, or one fifth of the population, lived in urban areas and almost twice this number, 1,100,000 overall, did not contribute to agricultural output.³⁰³ As we have seen above, quite apart from agriculture the effects of the war on Portugal's other productive sectors and - most importantly - international trade were also significant.³⁰⁴

Data for the Beira Alta demonstrate the effect of mobilisation of the *milícias* on the economy in that region and also, in a similarly negative sense, on military efficiency. The fortress city of Almeida was garrisoned by two regiments of the line and six *milícia* regiments. Cox, the British governor of Almeida, decided to disband three under-strength regiments of *milícia* and distribute their equipment and accoutrements to the remaining three. The three disbanded regiments went home to Arouce, Tondella and Viseu, while the remaining three regiments were from Guarda, Arganil and Trancoso.³⁰⁵

³⁰³. Jaime Reis, Conceição Andrade Martins and Leonor Freire Costa, 'New estimates of Portugal's GDP per capita', paper presented at the Portuguese Economic history Workshop, ICS, University of Lisbon, 12 December 2011, 1-38, pp. 15-16

³⁰⁴. See above pp. 155-57

³⁰⁵. Arganil is situated in the *comarca* of Coimbra, a substantial city and important seat of learning, with a population of over 16,000 in 1801. Trancoso is a settlement in the *comarca* of Pinhel: the most populous settlements of which were Almeida (2,296), Villa Nova de Foz Côa (1,904), Pinhel itself (1,990), Trancoso (1,377), Sirdim (1,293) and Almendra (1,190).

That these men represented a significant proportion of the adult male population, had been in service for a protracted period and away from their homes, is in no doubt. Viseu, Tondella and Arouce are a considerable distance from Almeida, and it must be remembered that many men although belonging to the respective recruiting *comarca* would have lived even further away than the main settlement within these districts. Many of them deserted. Initially, Cox reported 800 men of the remaining three regiments were absent without leave, five weeks prior to the investment of the fortress, by the end of June this number had risen to 1,000. The total paper strength of these three *milícia* regiments would have been around 3,300; so clearly around one man in three had left his post. At this time there were serious complaints about the failings of the Portuguese commissariat and Cox himself had complained on numerous occasions about the lack of provisions for the troops at his disposal. It would appear that where men remained at their posts for prolonged periods of service, this had deleterious effects on the agricultural economy. Furthermore, the problem of desertion affected both military efficiency and morale. Cox concluded that it would be impossible to defend the fortress of Almeida with *milícia* regiments, given they had to be retained by physical force and, where caught, examples made of deserters by summary execution.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶. Wellington consistently complained about the lack of logistical support and provisions for the Portuguese regiments, eventually undertaking to supply those units incorporated within the divisional structures by the British commissariat. For further details of the problems Cox faced see

Crucially, though, the vast majority of these enlisted men would have been recruited from rural areas in each *comarcas*, compounding still further the naturally lower agricultural productivity of the region. The rural population accounted for around 85% of the total population in Portugal at the turn of the century. However, the distribution was uneven and north of the capital the concentration of population in non agricultural urban settlements was more marked. For example, the rural population comprised 86% of the total population in the *comarca* of Guarda, 84% in Trancoso but only 80% in Pinhel, 77% in Arganil and just 73% in Viseu. In the Beiras overall, with a population of almost 806,000, the rural population was ten times larger than the population living in urban settlements (82,000. These data confirm that the burden of recruitment fell disproportionately on the rural poor of each region, with a commensurately negative effect on the economy and the livelihoods of the inhabitants of these rural settlements.³⁰⁷

Wellington observed:

“By the first of May [1810] a total of 51,280 troops of the line and 54,229 militiamen were under arms, seconded by 329,016 ordenanza (sic) mobilised for the defence of the Kingdom. “The Portuguese are in a good state“ [he] declared. “We have arms for the militia and, upon the whole we have an

Donald D Horward, *Napoleon and Iberia: The Twin Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida*, 1810, University Press Florida, 1984, pp 267-68. Southey provides a somewhat contradictory, and more positive, account of the conduct of the three *milicia* regiments at capitulation.

³⁰⁷. Ferro, *População portuguesa*, pp 47-51.

enormous military establishment at our command. We only want money to put it in operation and to keep it up.””³⁰⁸

But however significant a factor as the mobilisation and recruitment of such an enormous proportion of the male population of working age into the Portuguese military was, it does not equate to the concept of a nation in arms, which implies a much more substantial contribution over and above national military service.³⁰⁹

The mobilisation and recruitment of a substantial proportion of the male working-age population into the Portuguese military was a major factor precipitating social and economic change. There were three main stages to reform of Portuguese military service and mobilisation representing a significant shift in relation to former methods of recruitment to, and deployment of, the Portuguese military. The result was a discernible change in the social basis of military service on all levels. At one end of the military spectrum, the scale and nature of recruitment and military mobilisation resulted in a significant expansion in the standing army, the involvement of a wider range of men by social class and status, and the development of the *milícias* and *ordenanças* into a more capable, military

³⁰⁸. Donald D. Howard, *Napoleon and Iberia: The Twin Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810*, (University Press Florida, 1984), p. 78. PRO/FO, 342/19, “Mappa geral em rezumo da força armada em todo o Reino em mez do abril de 1810”, cited in Howard, *Twin sieges*, p. 78, fn 17.

³⁰⁹. However, the concept had significant currency within Portuguese historiography of the late nineteenth century, see Mendo Castro Henriques, ‘1812 e a geopolítica da Guerra peninsular’, in *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações*, especially pp. 172-76, but its earliest use that I have been able to find is in the *Gazeta de Lisboa* and the work of the historians Mario and Soriano, all of which in relation to the Miguelite or civil war that took place between 1820-1834. Investigation of the politicisation of the military, of course, is a relatively recent development within historiography.

force.³¹⁰ The combination of these two factors resulted in a metamorphosis in the inter-relationships between the armed forces and Portuguese society and the emerging concept of a nation in arms (*nação em armas*) if only in terms of the wider social base for military service. The concept of Portugal as a nation in arms (*nação em armas*) has been the focus of considerable attention within Portuguese historiography and is inextricably linked to the concept of the nation state. However, its applicability to Portugal at this time is probably somewhat anachronistic.³¹¹

In relation to the officer class, the changes led to the formation of a discernible, albeit at this stage nascent, politico-military elite. As indicated above, one of the unexpected results of the disastrous War of the Oranges was a programme of military reform that was begun in December 1801 and completed in early 1802. That reform was necessary was not in question: defeat by the French in the War of Roussillon in 1793, continued neglect, driven in part by supposed savings on military expenditure, poor military leadership and the deplorable and ever-deteriorating state of the Portuguese army, resulted in the humiliating defeat by the

³¹⁰. It would be inaccurate to describe the *milícias* as a citizen force, but their mobilisation and recruitment had a much more ideological foundation in this period than previously and their social basis much more representative of the population at large. As Esdaile suggests, the *ordenanças*, could with some justification, be likened to a form of "home guard", incorporating younger and older Portuguese subjects, those with familial responsibilities and those too infirm for more regular military service.

³¹¹. See the chapter on 'popular proto-nationalism' in Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality*, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Franco-Spanish alliance in the War of the Oranges in 1801.³¹² Although many of the proposed reforms instigated by the commission were not thoroughly, or immediately, implemented, the commission represented a clear shift in military policy. Moreover, those reforms that were implemented challenged not only the social basis of localised military and judicial power but also the hierarchy of Portuguese military command and control of the standing army.

I would argue that the social basis of the officer class within the Portuguese regular army changed dramatically between 1808 and 1814. Firstly, as a direct result of the exodus to Brazil, secondly the raising of *la legion portugaise* - many senior and very able officers helped with its mobilisation and left to take up service in France.³¹³ Thirdly, Beresford's reforms, purges of antiquated, incapable and inefficient army officers and the involvement and promotion of a new class of officer on the basis of merit and commitment to the "common cause" led to a major shift in the social basis of the serving officer class.³¹⁴ A fairly recent Portuguese work on the social history of the Portuguese army has calculated, based upon the work of Veríssimo Ferreira da Costa, that more than 900 officers left the service of

³¹². Amaral, 'Portugal e as guerras da revolução'

³¹³. Livermore, 'Portugal on the eve of the Peninsular War', passim.

³¹⁴. Amaral, Beresford, Ordens do dia. 1809, 1810 and 1811, passim.

the Portuguese army throughout this period, during the French invasions and Peninsular war and almost 350 British officers took up service in that arm. ³¹⁵

Army officers throughout the eighteenth and into the early nineteenth century “enjoyed the respect of others for both their military role and for their position as members of the local nobility.” ³¹⁶ While a general statement relating to the European military, it would appear to be entirely appropriate for the Portuguese military. All senior general officers in the *fin de siècle* Portuguese army were titled nobles (*fidalgos*): throughout the eighteenth century, the nobility retained all of the most elevated military ranks and completely dominated its higher echelons. A specific rank of *cadete* had been created by Pombal in the mid eighteenth century specifically to promote access for nobles to a career in the military. Until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, at the very least, access to this specific rank and accelerated career path was restricted to the higher nobility with strictly controlled eligibility including provenance of candidates’ noble status. It would appear that only upon attaining the rank of major, could a *cadete* be considered a *fidalgo* both in terms of his military rank and status and position in society. Lesser ranks in the Portuguese

³¹⁵. Fernando Pereira Marques, *Exército, mudança e modernização na primeira metade do século XIX*, (Lisboa : Edições Cosmos, 1999), p. 83 et seq. This work, and the following work by the same author, has only been viewed cursorily, to support the current study, but would appear to warrant much further detailed investigation: Fernando Pereira Marques, *Exército e Sociedade em Portugal no declínio do antigo regime e advento do liberalismo*, (Lisboa : Publicações Alfa, 1989).

³¹⁶. Alan Forrest and others (eds.), *Soldiers, citizens and civilians: experiences and perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820*, (Basingstoke and New York : Palgrave, Macmillan, 2009), p. 5.

army could be attained by officers who had gained promotion on merit and dint of service. The contemporary observations of Dumouriez and Halliday confirm that “the subaltern ranks (for example *alferes* and *porta bandeira*) are filled from the inferior classes” and “even captains had not the rank of gentlemen”.³¹⁷

These types of institutional barriers to progression were soon to change. Immediately upon his appointment in February 1809, Beresford acted with speed and ruthlessness “[B]etween 15 March and 4 July 1809” ... he “relieved 108 officers of their commissions and a month later he ordered a further 107 to be retired.”³¹⁸ British officers were encouraged to serve in the Portuguese army, the initial 24 officers who volunteered and who were already serving in Portugal amongst Cradock’s small force were given a step in rank in the British army and one in the Portuguese army; subsequent appointments receiving a single step in Portuguese rank. Not a little Portuguese pride was dented, and some British humility imposed, by the policy of replacement and advancement given the importance of seniority in both armies. But it proved to be a workable and successful solution to the operational difficulties brought about by the lack of training, poor organization, and indiscipline of the Portuguese troops and limitations of the officer class.

³¹⁷. Dumouriez (1776), p. 17 and Halliday, *Observations on the present state of the Portuguese army*, (1811), p. 106 both cited in Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*, vol. 2, p. 209. I am grateful for the insights into the rank and career path of *cadete* to Jorge Quinta Nova and Moisés Gaudêncio.

³¹⁸. John Grehan, ‘Wellington’s fighting cocks: the Portuguese army in the Peninsula’, in Ian Fletcher (ed.), *The Peninsular War: aspects of the struggle for the Iberian Peninsula*, (Staplehurst : Spellmount, 1998), pp. 174-75.

That Beresford was able to fulfil his intentions to get the Portuguese army to submit to his will was due in no small part to the support he received from Wellington, Charles Stuart and, most importantly, Dom Miguel Pereira de Forjaz. Beresford's reforms caused quite a number of upsets (in the regency council and at court in Rio de Janeiro) but eventually he was able to implement the changes required, dismiss old and inefficient officers, re-model the army along British lines, and promote those who were deserving – British and Portuguese alike. Despite a number of setbacks, in less than a decade spanning the turn of the nineteenth century, three major innovations in Portuguese military policy had already taken shape. Firstly, the reforms led to the re-organisation of military structures on all three levels, troops of the first line (infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineer corps), the *milícia(s)* and the *ordenanças*. While reform principally reaffirmed the traditional methods for recruitment to, and mobilisation of, the landed armed forces, the processes of recruitment, mobilisation and training were given a modern footing. Secondly, and linked to this first point, there was a more concerted effort to ensure that the burden of military mobilisation reflected the spatial distribution of the population and the prevailing structures of the Portuguese economy.

IV

An indication of the extent of devastation in Portugal resulting from the third invasion, and of government policy, is provided in near contemporary

documentation and accounts. There are two important reports providing empirical evidence. Firstly, a report relating to devastation in the diocese of Coimbra during the invasion itself and, secondly, the specific instructions for the investigation of devastated areas and summary of the distribution of funds voted by the British parliament to alleviate the suffering in the affected areas – both of which focus on two regions, Estremadura and Beira. There is a wide range of evidence within secondary sources in English, for example summarising first-hand accounts in British journals and diaries, attesting to the scale and nature of devastation. From French *mémoires*, it is clear that the indiscipline, unwarranted aggression, unbridled cruelty, and indiscriminate looting of valuables and foodstuffs accompanying French foraging *à la debandade*, directly affected morale and the operational abilities of the French army of Portugal. ³¹⁹

The French army could not rely upon supplies forwarded from their depots. Not only had the army's *ordonnateurs* exhausted the foodstuffs available in their forward magazines in order to put together transportable rations for the initial stages of the invasion, the scarce supplies they brought with them were quickly used up. The troops very quickly resorted to widespread and wholesale pillage. A

³¹⁹ Oman, citing Guingret's account, provides an indictment of the typical outcomes of these foraging parties as follows. "Guingret of the 39th in Ney's VI Corps, mentions in his diary that he had seen a detachment return to camp, after having surprised a half deserted village, with a number of peasant girls, whom they sold to their comrades, some for a couple of gold pieces others for a pack horse.", Guingret, *Relation historique et militaire de la campagne de Portugal sous le maréchal Massena, prince d'Essling*, (1817) pp. 124-6; cited by Oman, *A history of the peninsular war*, vol. 4, p. 12.

detailed report made in 1812 for the Diocese of Coimbra sets out the following atrocities perpetrated in the advance along the valley of the Mondego by French troops. Six villages in the *Serra* were razed to ground. In the *freguesia* de Espinho (just over one league distant) eight small hamlets were reduced to ashes, in the *freguesia* de Pala, 34 houses were torched, in Santa Comba Dão almost two entire villages were destroyed and in the *freguesia* of Sobral, three smaller settlements suffered the same fate. When considering this evidence, the geography of rural Portugal, especially in these areas to the north of Lisbon, needs to be taken into account. The distribution of settlements is quite distinct: the rural provinces in the regions of Estremadura and the Beiras were, and remain still, typically comprised of relatively densely populated *concelhos* and more sparsely populated *freguesias*; with the largest settlements in each *freguesia* and the *concelho* itself acting as epicentres for administration, trade and commerce.

The implications for the rural population therefore went much deeper than the loss of their homes: as devastating as this undoubtedly was. Moreover, all of the above mentioned settlements are located on the right, or northern bank, of the Mondego and therefore must have occurred during the initial stages of the invasion. The French not only laid waste the built infrastructure, but also destroyed the agricultural base and, in particular, staple resources such as vines and olive trees, which are expensive to replace given the lead time before they could begin to yield

fruit. The reports suggest the French carried away all the crops they could, destroyed all they could not and drove the cattle in front of them. ³²⁰

A table detailing the atrocities committed in each locality, and from which the extent of incendiary activities, robbery and murder committed by the French army of Portugal can clearly be seen, presents a terrible indictment of the activities of the French army *en route* for Lisbon. Even leaving aside the relatively flimsy nature of peasant houses in these more rural settlements, compared to major towns and cities and which, with a modicum of finance, tools and other resources, can be rebuilt, it is possible to obtain an idea of the extent of wholesale destruction caused to the built environment, people's homes and livelihoods as well as the long term damage to the economy and its principal sector, agriculture. In addition to the 3,000 that were assassinated by French troops it has been estimated that a further 35,000, 12.5% of the regional population, died from disease and pestilence as a result of the invasion and occupation of Portugal. ³²¹

Following the expulsion of the French, two commissioners were appointed to visit the devastated areas, consult with local public officials and distribute funds,

³²⁰ All this is taken from *Memoria breve dos estragos causados em Coimbra pelo exercito Francez commandado pelo maréchal Massena*, (Impressão Regia, anno de 1812) and cited in Soriano, *Historia da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 3, pp . Soriano details the following acts of pillage in respect of cereals. In the *arcyprestado* de Aréga (an enumeration district within the Diocese), to the south east of Pombal, the French took 12,054 "*moios de cereaes*" – one moio being the equivalent of a bushel. In Miranda, 10,897 alqueires (the nearest equivalent measure would appear to be somewhere between 15 and 20 litres), freguesia de Alvarge 19,240, Arganil 20,000, Levegada 5,551, São Martinho do Bispo 3,619, Coja 5,044 and Salviza 4,002 more.

³²¹. Dores Costa, 'Conflictos entre Wellington y los gobernadores', p. 124.

cattle and other resources (such as metal and timber) to alleviate distress in those areas most affected and assist with their reconstruction, for example the rebuild or refurbishment of destroyed and damaged houses and the construction of carts.

While government policy dictated that resources should be allocated on the basis of evidenced need, there was a clearly defined prioritisation for the allocation of funds, oxen and cattle. The prioritisation was those families whose sons had died on active service, or who were currently serving in the army; the families of those who had served or continued to serve in the *milícia* over a considerable period of time; those who had only recently served; those people who had fled the invaded areas and lost their cattle. In contrast those people who had refused to obey the government's decree to abandon the invaded and occupied territories were excluded from the programme of compensation altogether.

A cursory examination of the data reveals that the largest single group of recipients of aid, receiving the largest share - if not the majority - of resources allocated, were the families and dependants of those men serving (or who had served in) the *milícia*. The population of Estremadura received almost 1,800 oxen, and over 220 head of cattle; and the population of Beira received, respectively, approximately 1,500 and 250 oxen and head of cattle. Population density and the extent of cultivable land would need to be taken into account when interpreting the data but the programme of reconstruction was to be focused on those areas in

which the army was actively engaged and the *comarcas* receiving monetary aid were as follows: Estremadura – Alcobaça, Alemquer, Cinco Villas, Leiria, Ourem, Santarém, Tentugal, Tomar; Beira – Arganil, Aveiro, Castelo Branco, Coimbra, Crato, Guarda, Linhares, Pinhel, Trancoso, Vizeu. The more fertile Estremadura had a significantly greater concentration of the population and proportion of land under cultivation in comparison to Beira which then, as now, is typified by a more mountainous terrain, a relatively dispersed pattern of settlements, and a lower ratio of good quality arable land. ³²²

V

The construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras as a ‘cornerstone’ of Wellington’s strategy for the defence of Portugal is widely known. Yet while they have received considerable treatment in the historiography, there has been no comprehensive assessment of the cost of their construction over and above the direct financial costs involved. Indeed, based purely upon construction costs they have been described as one of the cheapest investments in military history at £200,000. Wellington had anticipated the invasion of Portugal would be via the Beira Alta. His proposals for the successful defence of Portugal, given that the French could bring an overwhelming force, was based upon a judicious combination of military

³²². See Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 5, part 2. The commissioners were the desembargador João Gaudêncio Torres and Mr John Croft. The guidance and instructions for the commission and their activities are set out in Documento n.º 100-D (cited in the narrative of vol. 3, on p. 497) pp. 286-89; and a summary of the oxen and cattle distributed in Documento n.º 100-E (cited in vol. 3., p. 502) pp. 289-291.

technology, Portugal's naturally defensive topographical features, and the expected difficulties of finding and gathering sufficient provisions, foodstuffs and forage to sustain such a substantial invading army. Work had commenced on the lines of Torres Vedras more or less one year prior to the appearance of the French army in front of the outlying positions at Sobral de Monte Agraço in October 1810.

However, "The Lines" as they came to be known, had been identified as an integral component of Wellington's strategy for the defence of Portugal as early as March 1809. The works stretched for 24 miles from end to end, from the Tejo to the Atlantic, and comprised the construction of redoubts and abbatis, scarping of the terrain, and the blasting of roads to render the ground impracticable for French troops.³²³

What has not been considered is that the construction of the fortifications would effectively subsume a substantial geographical area, much of which was good quality agricultural land, and effectively deny its use to the inhabitants of the region for over three years. The land was taken without reference or compensation to its owners. Moreover, even once the land had been turned back over to its previous owners and agricultural uses it would be many more years before some of

³²³. See John Grehan, *The lines of Torres Vedras: the cornerstone of Wellington's strategy in the Peninsular War, 1809-1812*, (Staplehurst – Spellmount, 2000); Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, 2.^a época, vol. 3, p. 8; and pp. 12-13.

the destruction could be addressed and the land become productive again.³²⁴ The main period of construction itself lasted from October 1809 to October 1810, and the French were in place in front of the lines and in their cantonments in and around the Santarém quadrilateral for a further five months. Although the French retreated in March 1811, the majority of the land in the environs of the fortifications would be unavailable for agricultural production for at least two years up until 1812, however construction was still being undertaken to complete the fortifications for two further years. Even after the expulsion of the French, and the advance into Spain in the campaigns on 1812 and 1813, the land would not begin to yield until at least one year after agricultural activities had been re-commenced. Moreover, whilst arable crops, cereals and vegetables, could be grown more or less immediately, and the re-planting of vines and olives undertaken almost as quickly, it would take many years before vines and trees would begin to yield fruit.³²⁵

Accordingly, it is clear that although arable use (and the production of annual crops such as cereals and vegetables) comprised a substantial component of agricultural production, the region had a complex ecological structure and its inhabitants and livestock were dependent upon mixed land use, forestry, arable

³²⁴. A very promising work was obtained, unfortunately too late to be of substantial use in the current study, Fernando Manuel da Silva Rita, 'Os exércitos de Massena e Wellington no concelho de Santarém (1810-1811): reflexos no quotidiano social, político, económico e castrense', (Unpublished Masters Thesis, Universidade de Lisboa, 2010). See in particular the geographical context of Santarém set out between pp. 8-27.

³²⁵. For a detailed description of the works see Soriano, *História da guerra civil e do estabelecimento do governo parlamentar em Portugal*, 2.^a época, vol. 2, pp. 541-604.

farming and animal husbandry, olives, and of course vineyards. Other land would have been in the form of *montado*; a term more usually associated with agricultural terrain in the Alemtejo describing land given over to mixed agricultural uses, wild and managed woodland, and supporting the husbandry of swine and the rearing and hunting of small animals and game etc. With such a complex and inter-related ecosystem it would have been much longer than the two to three years in which the land was unavailable due to the construction and defence of the fortifications for it to start to become productive, and still longer for it to become fully productive – taking into account the predominant forms of agricultural use, crop production, food processing and the complex operations of domestic and export markets.

To support and oversee the construction of “The Lines”, Wellington appointed Colonel Fletcher as engineer in overall command. No person was to be permitted to interfere with this work irrespective of rank. To work on road blocking, Beresford was ordered to send 6,000 troops of the *milícias* to Torres Vedras, 500 to Sobral, and 800 to São Julião. In addition, works were also undertaken to block the main Torres Vedras–Loures–Lisbon road. Even if the area had not been given totally over for military purposes, the blocking of these main arteries would have had significant repercussions for agricultural and commercial activities. Moreover, “Fletcher observed there were a great many trees on both sides of the road and he recommended they should be cut down and left to lie where they fell to

further impede the French advance.” In addition, 20,000 palisades and 10,000 fascines were constructed – obviously the majority of material procured would be local, thereby negating its use for any other agricultural purposes. ³²⁶

The total manpower committed to construction of these fortifications was substantial and included both forced labour and volunteers. Forced labour was supplied via conscription of eligible males within a forty mile radius of the works; four entire regiments of *milícias* were used as pioneers, undertaking alternate “tours” in pairs of regiments. On 20th December 1809, notices were placed in the region’s settlements, exhorting volunteer labourers and “skilled mechanics” (*artisanatos*) to help with the construction programme. The *milícia* were paid an additional two *vintems* per days, labourers paid six and “mechanics” twelve *vintems*, respectively, in total per day. Although the labourers and craftsmen were provided with rations, a deduction was made from their weekly payment for their provision. In total, approximately 5,000 to 7,000 men were working on the lines at any one time throughout the entire period of their construction. ³²⁷

Collectively provide substantial evidence of the material effects of the invasions on Portugal and her people, the majority of which were extremely negative and long lasting. However, some less immediately tangible outcomes appear to presage substantial longer term economic, social and political change.

³²⁶. Grehan, *The Lines of Torres Vedras*, pp. 48-52.

³²⁷. *ibid.* pp. 49-53.

Chapter six: the French invasions of Portugal - a recapitulation

As we have seen, the antecedents of the French invasions of Portugal are many and complex. It has been necessary to retrace historical alliances, dynastic pacts, political and familial allegiances and territorial conflicts beyond the Revolutionary, Consular and Napoleonic wars. By the time of the French revolution, war had become increasingly, if not exclusively, predicated upon economic causation as opposed to dynastic aggrandisement or religious motivations. But to argue the primacy of economics is not the same as economic determinism: individuals, accidents and nature could all be decisive influences at one point or another. In addition to consideration of conflict, the investigation of these origins needed to trace a course across the Atlantic Ocean and travel overland through Spain and France into Europe in order to understand correctly the influence of trade. The spectre of revolution and regicide has needed to be weighed alongside polity and political economy. While we have seen that demands for economic and constitutional reform in Iberia did not mature fully in this period, they had begun to take shape as a force to overthrow absolutism in the near future.

Consular aggression towards Portugal resulted in a short but disastrous war in 1801, the ceding of frontier territories to Spain and substantial reparations to France. While subsequent attempts to draw Portugal fully into the sphere of

Consular influence failed, the bullying diplomacy of Lannes and Junot after 1804 and the death and resignation of key figures within the *partido inglês* culminated in the appointment of ministers decidedly more amenable to French pressures and the ascendancy of the *partido francês* at the Portuguese court. Events in 1805, the crowning victory of Austerlitz and the equally momentous triumph of Trafalgar did nothing to resolve the predicament that Portugal found herself in. Indeed, they may have worsened it. These victories presaged an interminable and irresolvable commercial war, given France's invincible *grande armée* and Britain's unquestionable maritime supremacy, which was ratcheted up by Napoleon in 1807 when at the pinnacle of his success in central Europe. Thanks to the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon was able to implement the continental system fully in an attempt to defeat Britain by economic means by preventing British trade with all continental European states. A further objective was to secure the deep water harbour of Lisbon and the Portuguese fleet.³²⁸ Canning had denied seventeen Danish ships of the line to Napoleon by their successful seizure from the harbour of Copenhagen. Although six Portuguese ships of the line accompanied the prince regent to Brazil, Canning was resolved to either the capture or destruction of the Portuguese fleet in the event the royal family did not set sail for Brazil.³²⁹

³²⁸. Glover, 'The French fleet, 1807-1814', pp. 233-34.

³²⁹. Robson, 'The Royal Navy and Lisbon 1807-1808'.

As a result, Portugal was unable to continue the policies of diplomacy and appeasement that had proved successful in the past. Napoleon's ultimatum to Dom João to close all Portuguese ports to British shipping precipitated a crisis, but he could not have envisaged the invasion of Portugal would presage quite such change of a political, economic and social nature. A definitive choice had to be made between the two super powers. But while the invasion in 1807 effectively ended the prevarication and ambivalence in Portuguese politics, the transfer of the Portuguese court to Brazil prompted Portugal to turn away from France, rather than side with her, and towards Britain. Moreover, ultimately it resulted in the commitment of the Portuguese economy and a substantial proportion of its people to the overthrow of French aggression in the Iberian Peninsula.

While the transfer of the Portuguese court to Brazil was a pragmatic response to the French invasion of 1807, its conception was predicated upon ideology, political economy, preservation of the Luso-Brazilian empire and, ultimately, the maintenance of hegemony. The act precipitated the transition of the Luso-Brazilian economy from its mercantilist, colonialist and protectionist foundations onto the cornerstones of *laissez-faire* economics, free trade and competitive advantage. As such it was an unprecedented step for a European monarchy in terms of the relocation of political authority, state policy and international political economy. With the waning influence of the *partido francês* the initiative passed to the *partido*

inglês and the Sousa Coutinho family. While Portugal's economy, and specifically its dependence upon mercantilist colonialism, had been the key driver of state policy throughout the eighteenth century, the renaissance of the Sousa Coutinho family at the heart of Portuguese government heralded a historic sea change in Luso-Brazilian political economy.

The analysis and discussion undertaken within the current study has confirmed that a proper examination of the French invasions of Portugal requires at one and the same time consideration of Iberian and European polity and the Euro-Atlantic economy. Both Spain and Portugal were economically dependent on colonial territories – not least of which in the Americas – and this dependency shaped both foreign and domestic policy in the two countries. While for Spain a long standing enmity of Britain had developed upon disputes over trade with its colonies, the seizure of a substantial treasure fleet and, more recently, direct military intervention in South America, Portugal treated Britain as a long term ally – although disputes over trade related issues had started to emerge at the turn of the nineteenth century, involving Spain, Portugal, France, Britain and the Americas. ³³⁰

Portugal looked to the Atlantic, south to its colonies in Africa and westwards to Brazil for its wealth, to ensure the provision of slave labour, the accumulation of

³³⁰ In addition to the seizure of Buenos Aires and occupation of Montevideo, the British expeditionary force ultimately dispatched to Portugal was initially assigned to assist in the insurrectionary forces commanded by Miranda in Venezuela, Esdaile, *A new history*, p. 23.

gold and diamonds, the production of raw materials for importation and re-export, and also protected markets for its domestic agricultural and industrial produce. The Portuguese economy was founded upon classical mercantilist principles and a complex trade triangle. Slaves, principally from the east coast of Africa, Guinea Bissau and Angola, furnished Brazilian plantation and sugar mill owners with the necessary labour to clear land, plant and harvest cotton, sugar and coffee and, of course, extract minerals, and manage and harvest forests. Staple Brazilian products, brown sugar, raw cotton, coffee beans and red wood, were exported to Portugal for domestic consumption and, crucially, re-exported throughout Europe, the Mediterranean and the Baltic, the British Isles, France (and many of its satellite or client states) and the Russian Empire. State monopoly on all colonial trade comprised one of the principal revenues to the Portuguese treasury in the form of imposts exacted, as value added, on all imports and re-exports of Brazilian produce and domestic and foreign exports to the colonies transported on Portuguese and foreign shipping. Indeed, the state monopoly on the harvesting, supply and re-export of Brazilian hardwood was retained when Brazilian ports were opened to foreign merchant vessels and the stranglehold on primary production and processing industries released to allow foreign, principally British, investment, technical innovation and processes to improve productivity. Finally, the colonies

themselves provided opportunities for capital accumulation and investment, voluntary emigration and also avenues for enforced expatriation.³³¹

Consideration of trade then, commercial and competitive advantage, the protection of metropolitan industries and exploitation of dominions, and the development of both formal and informal colonialism, were drivers of policy and helped to determine the relationships between Britain, France, Portugal, Spain and the Americas. Just as Spain and Portugal had substantial colonial territories, and were dependent upon them for raw materials and produce for internal consumption and re-export, and for the revenues they attracted and their enormous contribution to the balance of trade, these satellite dominions and their economic potential received the attention of both Britain and France.

While Britain and France had formal colonies, both their own and European economies were also dependent upon the outputs and markets of the Ibero-American colonies and therefore the monopoly on trade that Spain and Portugal enjoyed with their respective dependencies. If British people could neither legally own slaves, nor directly profit from their exploitation, they could establish and sustain significant mercantilist interests in Portugal (for example the English Factory in Lisbon and Oporto). And, by virtue of the treaty of 1808 they could own and

³³¹ Russell-Wood, *A world on the move*, passim and, for the Luso-Brazilian political economy, Cardoso, 'Free trade, political economy', passim.

manage estates, and invest in production and processing enterprises, in Brazil and therefore continue to profit indirectly from slavery. Trade with Brazil and the Americas was an important factor: and played a crucial role in the development of state policy in Britain and throughout Europe. The French economy was no less dependent upon staple imports such as cotton for its own industrial and manufacturing sectors, much of which it sourced from Brazil (via Lisbon) and later, ironically due to implementation of the continental system, from North America and the Levant. Although the abolition of slavery formed an important clause in the subsequent treaty of 1810, between Portugal and Britain, this iniquitous practice managed to flourish in Brazil despite decades of British gun boat diplomacy given the strength of vested interest enjoyed by a slave owning and mercantilist oligarchy.

At the risk of being accused of teleological causation, the analysis strongly suggests the primacy of economic interests in determining British involvement in South America. Its primacy can be seen in the development of trade treaties, the occupation of Madeira to sustain the triangulation of slave trade, exports and re-exports of colonial produce, capital investment and “informal colonialism”, and the development of export markets for British manufactures.³³² There were political

³³² Parry asserts (pace Gallagher and Robinson) that British policy, even in this mercantilist period, was formed on the basis of “Trade with informal control if possible, trade with rule when necessary”. Parry, *Trade and dominion*, p. 276, citing Gallagher and Robinson, ‘The imperialism of free trade’, *Economic History Review, Second Series*, VI, 1953, p. 13. The “neo mercantilist” stranglehold exerted by the metropolis, according to Maxwell, was exemplified by the imposition of a decree prohibiting

and individual influences to consider also: the policies espoused by Talleyrand, Godoy, Pinto de Sousa Coutinho and Canning are but four of many possible examples. The French invasion of Portugal, and the subsequent war with Spain and Portugal created a power vacuum in these two countries. That in Spain was caused by the seizure and imprisonment of Charles and Ferdinand and was partially filled by a process of regional politicisation and the election of a national, and liberal, *Cortez*. The political void in Portugal resulted from a relatively powerless regency council installed by Dom João to govern Portugal in his absence on leaving for Brazil. Although quickly dismissed by Junot, even upon their reinstallation in September 1808 the *governadores* fluctuated between prevarication and inactivity due, firstly, to the restricted powers bestowed upon them and, secondly, to their limitations as individuals. In both countries, the absence of a monarch had significant long term effects. In both cases, constitutional reform was neither a principal nor direct determinant of popular opposition of the French, but was a substantial longer term outcome of the seven year long struggle in both countries – along with civil war.

manufacturing (in 1785) amongst other reforms designed to be even more beneficial to Portugal (and at the expense of Brazil) than had the policies of Pombal; while reforms of the taxation system led to direct conflict between Brazilian mine owners and the Portuguese state. For the first time in its history Portugal had a favourable balance of trade with Britain, deriving from longer term effects of Pombaline reforms and policies, rising sugar prices and the British textile industry's insatiable demand for cotton: see Maxwell, *Conflicts and conspiracies*.

The position of Spain has received considerable attention, particularly recently, whilst that of Portugal has not been afforded the deliberation it deserves within English historiography of the Peninsular War. The reasons for this are complex and not unrelated. The contribution of Spain, and the Spanish people, to the expulsion of the French from the Iberian Peninsula has been overshadowed, with notable exceptions, in a historiography that has principally focused on British intervention and the activities of the Anglo-Portuguese army. Portugal's wider contribution has been overlooked, and in some cases entirely dismissed. These accounts range from hagiographic studies of Wellington, with Britain helping Portugal *in extremis*, to an unholy alliance of left and right polemical literature with Portugal reduced to an English "colony" or "protectorate". In reality both British and French intervention in the Iberian Peninsula was determined by a combination of factors including the design and mishap of military opportunism and economic aggression. The lines of analysis to help understand this conflict therefore can be no less comprehensive or complex in order to address these difficult concepts.

While the Peninsular War is the dominant expression in English historiography, the war is referred to in France as the Spanish War *Guerre d'Espagne*, in Spain as the war of Spanish Independence (*Guerra de la Independencia Española*) and in Portugal as the French Invasions (*as invasões francesas*). However, they have been increasingly been referred to in Portugal in the context of a wider struggle and

as distinctive episodes within a protracted war for the Iberian Peninsula (*episódios da Guerra Peninsular*).³³³ French and Spanish experiences in the Peninsular War were characterised by the scale and protracted nature of military conflict, the complex juxtaposition of formal and irregular warfare, and the specific contribution of ordinary Spanish people and, yes, *guerrilleros*.

The experiences of Portugal were somewhat different, being predicated upon the power vacuum, the establishment of the *juntas* and popular opposition to the French, during the first and second invasions, and on the enormous scale of military recruitment and mobilisation throughout the third invasion until the end of the conflict in 1814. The dislocation of political authority is therefore an important consideration and warrants further investigation and the findings of this study support a number of linked conclusions about popular action and intervention in the economic, social and political spheres. Firstly, popular insurrections in 1808 were a response to the violent exactions of the French military government but were also directed against perceived collaborators. They resulted in turn in violent French reprisals and a powerful response from the provincial ruling elites: the nobility, the magistracy and the clergy. Although there were clearly economic and social grievances underlying specific insurrectionary activity, and indeed one

³³³. See for the example the collection of papers in Instituto da Defesa Nacional, *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações: da europa dividida à união europeia*, Actas do congresso realizado em 28 e 29 de Outubro de 2002, (Lisboa : Tribuna de História, 2005)

response of the ruling élite was to criminalise these acts, the balance of political and popular resolve to oppose the French from the summer of 1808 in Portugal had, in overall terms decisively shifted towards resistance and away from appeasement. The ruling élite ultimately embraced popular fervour and, together with the clergy, sought to harness and control its power and excesses, and direct it against the French.

One result was that popular support for issues such as constitutional reform was a later and longer term outcome of the war in the Peninsula: at the time, these types of demands were not a driving force within Portuguese politics. Neither were they linked to popular opposition to the French. The influence of the *partido francês* would remain important at court in Rio de Janeiro, but was no "French Party" as such in Portugal. Moreover, after 1807 anyone who supported the French was denounced as a *jacobin*, *franc-maçon* and traitor – see for example the treatment of the *setembristas*. There were some people in Portugal and Brazil who espoused greater political and economic independence, and who were either banished or had to live in exile, perhaps one of the reasons why vested interests in Portugal, the rural nobility and the clergy, and the population in general were even more determined to oppose the French. ³³⁴

³³⁴. That the Portuguese did not accept the French as liberators, and that subsequent Portuguese history continues to treat the French as aggressors, is a constant theme in the work of Caillaux de

British and French intervention resulted directly from the implementation and escalation of Napoleon's Continental System, and the resulting, and direct, confrontation via the Orders in Council and naval blockade of Europe. But, as set out in the introductory chapter, the context and contest was not restricted to the struggle for European supremacy but also operated at the level of global political-economy. For France, given the alliance with Spain until the insurrection in May 1808, Portugal represented one of the final gaps in a continental economic system to deny European outlets for British trade (and also access to a substantial navy and colonial commerce). While for Britain, appeals for financial (and military) aid from Spanish and Portuguese deputations presented an opportunity for a shift in policy from opportunistic strikes at targets in the Mediterranean and Americas, to sustained military intervention on continental Europe (in addition to the denial of Portuguese naval and economic resources to France).³³⁵ For Portugal, the acceptance of direct British intervention represented a major shift in foreign and domestic policy and resulted from and helped to consolidate the ascendancy of the *partido inglês*, in general, and the growing influence of the Sousa Coutinho family, in particular, in Portuguese politics.

Almeida and Vicente. A key issue for these historians is the paradox that the Portuguese were subjects of an absolutist monarchy, yet opposed the French armies: which they see as revolutionary liberators as opposed to military oppressors. See *Rives méditerranéennes*, n° 36, 2010/2 Napoléon and le Portugal, in particular António Pedro Vicente, 'Raisons de la défaite de Napoléon au Portugal' pp. 13-26 and Tereza Caillaux de Almeida, 'L'échec des campagnes napoléoniennes au Portugal dans les Mémoires des Officiers Françaises', pp. 59-69.

³³⁵ Michael Glover, *The Peninsular War*, pp 56-61.

A final consideration is that the decision to oppose Napoleon militarily in Portugal was not taken centrally. Rather it came in response to spontaneous, localised, popular opposition to the French occupying forces. Despite that much of the opposition to Junot in 1808 was localised and sporadic in nature, it nevertheless represented a significant transformation: in effect, overturning the prince regent's decree to the Portuguese nation to receive the French amicably. But, despite the establishment of a number of localised *juntas*, in defence of the Portuguese absolutist monarchy, the call for a *Cortez* style government, and regional representation, did not come until much later and was strenuously resisted by the Portuguese government. It has been argued that popular support for the absolutist state, in defiance of the French, represented a paradox, but the Portuguese and Spanish people, obviously, "did not like armed missionaries". Much of the opposition in Spain was directed against old enemies, not necessarily against the French. In Portugal, the insurrection took the form of an anti-French fervour in defence of "*o principe regente nosso senhor*": but the unifying factors, in both cases, were not necessarily an uncomplicated patriotism or nationalism. ³³⁶

It may be anachronistic to use the term populist, but there would appear to be a case for investigating the complex nature and form of relationships within and

³³⁶ See Esdaile, *The Peninsular War: a new history*, p. 268 and *The Spanish army in the Peninsular War*, p. 75 for a useful discussion of complex concepts in relation to Spain such as "*Dios, Rey y Patria*" and "*rey, patria y religion*". As yet, as far as has been ascertained in the present study, there is no commensurately sophisticated analysis of these concepts in relation to the struggle in Portugal.

between the clergy, the apparatus of provincial governance, and the rural population in the north of Portugal. Like Spain, there were a great many factions: but a unifying factor was anti-French fervour, the drivers of which included the political vacuum, the questionable legitimacy of the regency council, the role of the clergy and, moreover, the alienation of the population. Demagoguery had a part to play in the complex set of factors that resulted in insurrection and indiscipline. In two instances in 1809 the rule of the mob in defiance of military discipline resulted in a number of Portuguese murdered, mainly on suspicion of pro-French sympathies, and the arrest and murder of the Portuguese general Bernadim Freire de Andrade and his staff – accused of treasonous behaviour.

It is clear that by 1810 the regency council was undertaking a much more active role in domestic affairs and, particularly due to the activities of Forjaz, in the re-organisation of Portuguese military forces. The restoration of legitimacy, and active governance, of the *governadores* came at a price: for example with the admission of the Principal Sousa (Coutinho) to and the dismissal of the Monteiro Mór from their number. Moreover, there was direct British representation on the regency council in the form of the minister plenipotentiary to Lisbon, Charles Stuart. Beresford was Marshal of the Portuguese military and Wellington Marshal General of the Portuguese army and commander in chief of the Anglo-Portuguese army and, as such, eligible to attend regency council meetings convened to discuss the defence

of the realm, matters related to the military and finance. In practice, this responsibility devolved to Charles Stuart with no little help from Forjaz and amidst much opposition from the Principal Sousa and the Bishop of Oporto. Indeed, there is a great deal of irony that Forjaz received the support of members of the *partido francês* at court whilst his authority was constantly challenged and undermined by members of the *partido inglês* in Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro.

However, the study of this formative period of Portuguese history should not simply concern itself with “conflicts and conspiracies” of a political or diplomatic nature or of battles between armies. The period witnessed some clear shifts in public opinion and attitudes: although, again, there has been much less focus on these changes in Portugal compared to that in Spain. Within recent historiography, there has been a considerable focus on popular resistance to French occupation in Spain and, in particular, the role and contribution of the *guerrilla*. In the orthodox historiography, British and Spanish, the activities of the *guerrilla* have epitomised the struggle against the French at a popular level. Recent, revisionist history based principally upon Spanish archival sources suggests that the *guerrilla* were more like the *banditti* referred to in official French correspondence than the Spanish patriots eulogised by Lovett, pace Arteché. While making a compelling argument, and paving the way for further studies, including a similarly focused investigation of French and Spanish archival sources, in addition to the memoirs and journals of

serving French officers and the writings of ordinary Spanish people, the complex nature, role and contribution of the *guerrilla* has started to be uncovered.³³⁷

But there has been no commensurate study of Portuguese popular opposition to the French, although a recent work has investigated contemporary pamphlets, along with nineteenth century Portuguese literary and historical sources, to try to understand the underlying reasons for, if not the social basis of, popular resistance to the French. In addition to reviewing the existing historiography, the current study has examined the memoirs and journals of serving French officers, contemporary documentation available within published sources, in order to begin to develop a better understanding of the social basis of this popular resistance. In addition, analysis of military returns and the census of population have enabled an estimate for the extent of military service. It is clear, from contemporary Portuguese military sources that a very substantial proportion of the Portuguese male population served, in some capacity, in the Portuguese military. Moreover, not only was the extent of service in the traditional form of military service, for the majority of the population, in the *ordenança* and *milícia*, substantial in terms of the numbers involved, it was also more intensive in nature – for example in the length of continuous service, the distance in which service was required (i.e. from place of

³³⁷ For a succinct and definitive review, see Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon*, and in particular the concluding chapter pp. 193-204.

residence) and the activities undertaken. In this sense at least, the activities of the *ordenança* mirrored some of the activities undertaken by the *guerrilla* in the orthodox historiography for Spain. ³³⁸

Whilst not providing a definitive account of a nation in arms, the analysis has pointed up some of the salient features, and ambiguities, in relation to Portuguese military forces and the nature of military service. There was clearly a substantial proportion of the eligible male population in military service at one point or another throughout the conflict. But this is not the same as asserting that Portugal was a nation in arms. Although it is also clear that there was very substantial popular support for anti-French activities, like *la guerrilla*, the population enthusiastically supported localised opposition (as opposed to regional, let alone national service). And it would appear that, as in Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, the Castilles, Leon, and Galicia across northern Spain, a common characteristic underlying popular resistance was land tenure, property relations and the social relations of production. French memoirs speak of Portuguese irregular opposition on the Spanish frontiers, large bands of irregular and poorly armed *paysans* - although the organisation of the companies of *ordenança* were much better organised and disciplined during the third invasion – men, women and children constructing fortifications to protect river

³³⁸ Does Costa argues that military service was not necessarily universally or enthusiastically supported by the entire male population: citing avoidance of conscription and desertion, Does Costa, 'Army size, military recruitment and financing'

crossings and fighting to the last to protect their homesteads, entire towns and rural areas depopulated and laid waste. ³³⁹

But what of popular resistance from the summer of 1809 to the eviction of the French from Portuguese soil in April 1811? Wholesale military mobilisation and the almost total commitment of the Portuguese economy and her people to the defence of the realm, and the subjugation of the Portuguese military to British discipline, whether this is accepted in whole or in part, or rejected outright, would appear to have precluded the development of independent guerrilla forces and warfare. Certainly, the consensus is that independent brigades of *milícias*, operating on the rear and flanks of the French, harried columns, disrupted communications and, in many cases, prevented all but the strongest and most determined foraging parties. However, there is also some evidence that the *ordenanças*, if not *milícias*, acted entirely independently of the command structure of the Anglo-Portuguese army and in the form of guerrilla bands as evidenced by the following order of the day.

“Upon the invasion of the enemy ... and the desertion of the majority of the capitães móres and officers of the Ordenanças, the men formed into guerrilla bands; and – now the enemy has been evicted from Portuguese territory, these bands have become unnecessary, and so, acknowledging their good service, Marshal [Beresford] orders them

³³⁹ The nearest Portuguese equivalent, *paisano*, literally means a countryman whilst, more recently, *à paisana*, signifies someone in civilian clothes as opposed to military service. Given the number and variety of people working in rural areas, specific words such as *lavrador*, share cropper / farmer, would be used as opposed to generic terms for people working in the rural economy.

to disband and joining to the Companies of Ordenanças to which they properly belong, in order that the proper organization of the same Ordenanças can be restored, [and empowers] ...the Generals of the Provinces for the total fulfilment of this Order. His Excellency [Beresford] is going to reorganise the Ordenanças, and Provedencias ... [to prevent further incidences] ... [and] so that the Ordenanças can operate properly.”³⁴⁰

Albeit one example, the above suggests that guerrilla bands, similar to those that formed and acted independently against the French in 1808 and 1809, given the breakdown of proper military command and discipline, operated in a similar manner during the French invasion of 1810-1811. The possible conclusion from this evidence, taking into account that one swallow does not a summer make, is that men in many localities behind the French lines and along their lines of communication, organised themselves in groups to harass and disrupt the French. Indeed, there is much evidence to support the view that the *milícias* and *ordenanças* performed these functions very well in 1810 and 1811: the assumption being that this was properly organised opposition under military command. The order above cannot have been in response to one or two isolated incidents, otherwise why would Beresford have had to resort to an order of the day to disband these formations, and ensure their reintegration into the companies of *ordenanças*? Also,

³⁴⁰. Beresford: *Collecção das ordens do dia do illustrissimo e excellentissimo senhor Guilherme Carr Beresford, commandante em chefe dos exercitos de S.A.R. o principe regente nosso senhor*, (Twelve volumes, Lisboa : Antonio Nunes dos Santos, Impressor do quartel geral), *Ordens do dia*, 1811, pp 67-68, Quartel General d’Almendralejo 28 de Abril de 1811.

the direction (and authority to enforce the order) is given to generals in command in the provinces – not to an individual general of one province.

Detailed analysis of the remainder of the order, exhorting the men operating in these guerrilla bands to return home and report to the civil authorities (in their respective villages and towns) and become reintegrated into the *ordenanças* would appear to be not only a military measure, but is also a measure for political and social control (to avoid further problems arising from armed men roaming the countryside). The inference is that some of these armed bands were already presenting problems of this nature – hence the severity of the order and that it was addressed to, and instructed, the military commanders in each province such as Bacelar and Silveira, as opposed to generals in the field army, to fully implement this order. A key issue here is that these generals have military, civil and judicial powers and responsibility for policing and maintaining security in the provinces.

The Portuguese reaction is wholly understandable. British memoirs relate the numbers and pitiable state of the Portuguese people, of all social groups, taking with them the little of their possessions they could gather together and carry off, and their inexorable journey to the safety of “The Lines of Torres Vedras”. Both French and British memoirs corroborate the extent of damage unveiled by the French retreat and, in addition, contemporary documentation (for example citing murder, incendiary activities and other damage to property, and the allocation of

compensation for damages), substantiate the degree and distribution of wastage and loss resulting directly from the French occupation and the social and economic status of the population affected. In addition, assessment of the damage during the construction of “The Lines” and the extent of land put beyond productive use demonstrates a substantial proportion of agriculture and its supporting infrastructure was laid waste and its output denied to the Portuguese economy and dependent population.³⁴¹

There was by no means universal support for military service. In addition to the preference for localised service, and the extent of desertion and sickness from *milicia* and first line regiments, there was also considerable evidence for draft evasion and unwilling service. Similar exemptions for military service existed in the Portuguese and Spanish military: conscription was by lot, and those with money could avoid service or pay for substitutes. From the evidence available, it would appear that the majority of the burden of military service was borne by the rural poor. Moreover, oxen and carts, the principal means of rural and agricultural transportation and all inland boats – both in terms of the means of river transportation and river fishing – were expropriated for military service. The supporting infrastructures for the principal sectors of the productive Portuguese

³⁴¹ The interested reader is referred to the various edited works presenting excerpts from British diaries and French memoirs within the bibliography.

economy were given over to the needs of the military (despite which, the Portuguese commissariat still managed to under-perform, to the extent that want and desertion amongst Portuguese regiments was rife). On top of this, a substantial proportion of the principal infrastructure of the rural economy was destroyed or otherwise put beyond use: bridges, mills, ovens were destroyed, crops, foodstuffs and grain stocks carried off or ruined, olive trees and vineyards torn down, houses, agricultural and church buildings incorporated into fortifications, razed or otherwise put beyond use or human habitation. ³⁴²

The effects on Portugal, and the extent of devastation, would need to include the number of people who emigrated never to return, men recruited to military service, wounded, killed and missing in action. They would also need to include the losses to the agricultural sector, land, crops, and supporting infrastructure. Finally, there would need to be an estimate for the losses caused both directly and indirectly by the war, malnutrition, starvation, disease, increased rates of morbidity and mortality and, from a counterfactual perspective, the children who would have been born had the war not taken place. The existing literature has put forward estimates, albeit largely unsubstantiated, for the total loss sustained by the population of Portugal. Analysis of available data from the census of population, clerical and military estimates undertaken to support conscription and taxation, the

³⁴² The definitive study in English remains that presented in Oman, *History*, vol. 3 and vol. 4, passim.

various estimates for lives lost as a result of the war, and the surfeit of deaths over live births and unfulfilled births, suggest a total in excess of 200,000 (perhaps as high as seven per cent of the Portuguese population in 1801).

If strategic direction for British military intervention in the Peninsular and for the defence of Portugal was provided by Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington), strategic direction for state policy and support for the Anglo-Portuguese alliance - albeit not unconditionally - was provided by the Sousa Coutinho family. Just as the Sousa Coutinho faction determined Portuguese policy by virtue of the triangulation of political power between Lisbon, London and Rio de Janeiro, so too the family Wellesley played a not dissimilar (if somewhat less pivotal role) in that of Britain, Portugal and Spain. But the period also presaged the ascendancy of new political and military elites, ironically with many complex French connections. The ultimate success of the regency council in supporting Wellington and his strategy for the defence of Portugal was due, in no small part, to the relentless industry of Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz and the relationship he forged with Beresford, Charles Stuart and Wellington in support of the "common cause".

There was also an identifiable shift in the social basis of the officer class serving during the Peninsular War and in comparison to previously. Although Vicente has argued that the opposition to the French was paradoxical, given later

support by many of these officers for constitutional reform, this misses the point. The Portuguese military was polarised by the French invasions: many Portuguese officers left to serve in the *Légion Portugaise* whilst others fought for Portugal against the French in the *Leal Legião Lusitana*, some of those who left Portugal to undertake French military service actively supported the third French invasion, and served in the French army of Portugal, while others refused to serve or otherwise avoided service. A substantial number of Portuguese officers rose to significant rank, and served with distinction throughout the war. Many of these officers went on to fight in the ensuing civil war - some for constitutional reform others to maintain absolutism – others to serve in government. ³⁴³

Whilst nationalism and patriotism were in no short supply during the Peninsular War they were not necessarily the only cause of opposition to the French invasions: alienation, disaffection and marginalisation were also very tangible drivers of popular and populist resistance. The war did not bring about much immediate social and political change. Demands for constitutional reform, and perhaps also citizenship, were longer term outcomes of the war and the ways in which it was fought. The war acted as a catalyst for change, precipitated arguments and support for and against absolutism and constitutional reform, was the harbinger

³⁴³ António Pedro Vicente, *Guerra Peninsular, 1801-1814* and 'Portugal perante a política Napoleónica', in *Guerra peninsular, novas interpretações*.

of civil war, and - more positively - presaged the development of the modern Portuguese nation state. Much remains to be done. But if the current study has helped identify and develop some new lines of analysis for further research, it will have served a useful purpose.

Appendix

Table 1: Combat of Chaves, 11th March 1809

| | Près de Chaves | Chaves | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| | | Killed | Wounded |
| 4 ^{ème} léger | | chirurg. Mauget * | lieut. Glaise lieut. Basavet |
| 17 ^{ème} léger | s.-lieut. Marcouire # | | |
| 31 ^{ème} léger | | | lieut. Galabert ^ |
| 2 ^{ème} Suisse | capt. Weiland ^ | | |
| 4 ^{ème} Suisse | | | capt. Thomas |

* died 4th April, # wounded 5th April, ~ cited as 11th March

Source: Martinien, *Tableaux*, p. 394, p. 432, p. 495 ; ^ *Supplement*, p. 76 and 84

Table 2: Combat of Braga 18th to 20th March, 1809

| | Braga, 18 th to 20 th March, 1809 | | Braga, 29 th March | |
|-------------------------------|---|---|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Killed | Wounded | Killed | Wounded |
| General staff | | gdb. Foy | | |
| 26 ^{ème} ligne | | lieut. Glaise lieut. Basavet | | |
| 17 ^{ème} léger | lieut. Muirogès | lieut. Bonnaire lieut. Braquemont | | |
| 31 ^{ème} léger | | | | lieut. Rondeau capt. Savina * |
| 1 ^{er} Hussards | s.-lieut. Cassini | s.-lieut. Fargeot | | |
| Légion Hanovrienne (infantry) | capt. Weyhaupt | cdb. Blum capt. Hermann capt. Stamm s.-lieut. Leibhader s.-lieut. Sauer | | |
| Légion Hanovrienne (cavalry) | | capt. Eberhard capt. Burgel lieut. LaCourte | | |
| Génie état-major | | capt. Boulanger | | |

* (lost or missing)

Source: Martinien, *Tableaux*, pp. 181, 432, 459, 502, 503, 615, 663.

Table 3: Combats in front of the city and the battle for Oporto, 1809

| | Devant Oporto | 28 th , 29 th , 30 th March, 1809 | Subsequent to the battle for Oporto | |
|-------------------------|--|---|--|--------------------------------------|
| | | | Killed | Wounded |
| General staff | capt. Taillandier capt. De Chevilly | | gdd. Merle capt. Pagaud | |
| 15 ^{ème} ligne | | capt. Baron capt. Valet s.-lieut. Cotterelle | cdb. Molet capt. Pron capt. Teisseré lieut. Delarue lieut. Fages s.-lieut. Colsin s.-lieut. Guilhem s.-lieut. Perret capt. Dumas ^ | |
| 47 ^{ème} ligne | | | major Dauture capt. Mercier lieut. Faes | major Dauture ^ |
| 66 ^{ème} ligne | | | lieut. Montannier | |
| 70 ^{ème} ligne | | | capt. Gratieux * lieut. Puton | s.-lieut. Gorjus ^ |
| 86 ^{ème} ligne | | cdb. Guerrain # capt. Parisot lieut. Bourgogne | cdb. Dolosie capt. Candy capt. Eyma s.-lieut. Desplantes s.-lieut. Lhuissier s.-lieut. Thierry s.-lieut. Paschali s.-lieut. More ^ | |
| 2 ^{ème} léger | s.-lieut. Dreux | | s.-lieut. Caplain s.-lieut. Argaud s.-lieut. Dédonnaire | |
| 4 ^{ème} léger | s.-lieut. Cumin ~ | | capt. Flandin ^ | capt. Roche ^ |
| 17 ^{ème} léger | | cdb. Roger **^ | | capt. Wallebrant + |
| 31 ^{ème} léger | | lieut. Dardé | capt. Menguin s.-lieut. Gay s.-lieut. Marmy s.-lieut. Chastain | lieut. Rondeau = lieut. Campéry = |
| 32 ^{ème} léger | | | s.-lieut. Raffali ! | |
| 2 ^{ème} Suisse | | | | capt. Fuslin + |
| 4 ^{ème} Suisse | | | capt. Bleuler | |
| Légion Hanovrienne | | | s.-lieut. Leibhader | |

Abbreviations : cdb. *chef de bataillon* ; capt. captain ; lieut. lieutenant ; s.-lieut. , sous lieutenant.

* Gratieux died 15th April, # Guerrain died 10th June, ~ Cumin died 12th May, + Fuslin wounded 28th April, = Rondeau 1st May, ! Raffali died 5th April, ** Roger "*assassiné le 28 mars, dans la ville d'Oporto, par la par la populace.*"

Source: Martinien, *Tableaux*, pp. 33, 44, 152, 227, 270, 278, 299, 388, 394, 432, 459, 461, 492, 495. Named casualties marked ^ from Martinien, *Supplement*, pp. 30, 40, 48, 50, 66 and 90.

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