

**The Ideology and Translation of the Thai Prime Minister's
Weekly Addresses (2014-2016)**

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the May 2014 coup, Thailand's self-appointed Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha made his first Friday evening TV programme 'Return happiness to the people in the nation', broadcast in Thai with English subtitles. Emulating a format inherited from its precursors during the Thaksin, Abhisit and Yingluck premierships, this programme exemplified the junta's political marketing, aiming to dispel public anxieties and promote government policies both domestically and internationally. The study attempts to analyse the 124 General Prayut's weekly addresses and their official translations (30 May 2014 to 7 October 2016) in order to identify the translation patterns in the target text. It also explains as to how the ideologies expressed in the original were presented in the official translation and to what extent the institutional ideology condition the translation process. This study applies a combination of Critical Discourse Analysis and Systemic Functional Linguistics, especially the system of Appraisal (Martin and Rose, 2008) applied to Translation Studies (Munday, 2012). Interviews were also conducted to understand how the translation process operates.

The study found that there are four major translation patterns: (1) adding or shunning the attitudinal-rich words depending on groups of people with whom Gen Prayut identified in his speech, (2) rearranging information and inserting connective items to build a more cohesive textual organisation, (3) maintaining and improving the image of the military, (4) explicating pronouns and spatio-temporal location of the participants in the clauses. All these patterns are the textual manipulations to camouflage the reality of General Prayut's idiosyncrasy, or a defense mechanism to present and re-package the official Thai self. Knowing their task was politically sensitive, the translation team had to engage in censoring their own prime minister's improper use of language in order to improve the image of the junta's 'good men' before relaying the 'proper translation' to international audiences. Consequently, the conservative ideology of 'Nation, Religion and King' was presented in less explicit manner. The study also found that despite the considerable importance of the translated broadcasts, the quality of the management of the TV production and translation was meagre; only a handful of people were trusted to be involved in the whole process. There was no assessment after the show, and neither did the translators receive any critical feedback from the junta.

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Abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDC	Constitution Drafting Commission
NCPO	National Council for Peace and Order
NLA	National Legislative Assembly
NRC	National Reform Council
NRSA	National Reform Steering Assembly
NSC	National Security Council
PDRC	People's Democratic Reform Committee
PM	Prime Minister
ST	Source text
SFL	Systemic Functional Linguistics
TRT	Thai Rak Thai Party
TT	Target text

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Note on transliteration and Thai language conventions

This study relies on the Romanisation devised by the Royal Institute of Thailand as the main resource for transliterate Thai terms. The criteria of this Romanisation can be found at www.royin.go.th. However, the system does not employ superscript or subscript marks for long and short vowels or diphthongs. In case of Thai names of people and places that may be transcribed by other systems, the terms are used in accordance with their widely-known premises and conventions.

Exception are those terms which are transliterated with phonetic symbols, mainly in Chapter 4 Section 3.5. This is an attempt to make distinction of their tones and pronunciations and show their grammatical roles in a clause. The symbols are divided into three basic components; consonants, tones, and vowel symbols. For more information, see Prawet Jantharat's *Thai Pronunciation and Phonetic Symbols* (http://siamwestdc.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/Thai_Pronunciation.14781422.pdf).

1. Consonant sounds

a. Initial consonants

Symbol	English sample
ch-	' <u>ch</u> ief'
c-	slightly ' <u>j</u> ean <u>s</u> '
r-	trilled ' <u>r</u> ', as in Spanish
ŋ-	'str <u>an</u> ger'
ʔ-*	' <u>o</u> h'
p-	'sp <u>o</u> use'
t-	'st <u>a</u> ff'
k-	'sk <u>i</u> m'
ph-	'p <u>ea</u> r'
th-	't <u>a</u> me'
kh-	'c <u>o</u> y'

Symbol	English sample
b-	' <u>b</u> ank'
d-	' <u>d</u> im'
s-	's <u>a</u> ke'
f-	'f <u>a</u> y'
m-	'm <u>u</u> te'
n-	'n <u>a</u> p'
l-	'l <u>i</u> ve'
h-	'h <u>a</u> ppen'
w-	'w <u>ee</u> k'
y-	'y <u>e</u> sterday'

b. Final consonants

Symbol	English sample
-m	'se <u>m</u> '
-n	'ru <u>n</u> '
-ŋ	'str <u>o</u> ng'
-w	'n <u>o</u> w'
-y	'c <u>o</u> y'

Symbol	English sample
-p	'nap <u>k</u> in'
-t	'wet-p <u>a</u> int'
-k	'kn <u>o</u> ckdown'
-ʔ*	' <u>o</u> h'

* As a matter of convenience, the study drops this sound.

c. Consonant clusters

	-r-	-l-	-w-
k-	/kruu/	/klaan/	/kwaan/
kh-	/khraa/	/khlam/	/khwaam/
p-	/praakaan/	/plaa/	-
ph-	/phrom/	/phlaan/	-
t-	/trii/	-	-
th-	/inthraa/		-

2. Vowels

a. Simple vowels

Short sound	Long sound	English sample
/a/	/aa/	'farmer' without 'r'
/ə/	/əə/	'term' without 'r'
/u/	/uu/	-
/i/	/ii/	'free'
/e/	/ee/	'May'
/ɛ/	/ɛɛ/	'match'
/u/	/uu/	'bloom'
/o/	/oo/	'show'
/ɔ/	/ɔɔ/	'normal' without 'r'

b. Diphthongs and other combination with 'w' or 'y'

Short sound	Long sound
/iaʔ/	/ia/
/uaʔ/	/ua/
/uaʔ/	/ua/

-w	-y
/iw/	/ay/ or /ai/
/iaw/	/uy/
/eew/	/uay/
/ɛɛw/	/uay/
/aaw/	

3. Tone

Mark	Tone
/aa/	mid
/âa/	low
/áa/	high
/âa/	falling
/ãa/	rising

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Problem statement

The present study investigates the translation of the Thai prime minister's weekly broadcast addresses. The English translation was a new feature, building on the tradition of weekly addresses by former Thai prime ministers. This tradition has always had important implications for the political situation in each premiership. The study attempts to find out why the translation project took place and how the translation team intervened to mediate and rewrite the underlined source text ideologies. As Schäffner and Bassnett (2010: 13) put it, translation can be an integral part of political activity; for the question of which texts get translated from and into which language is already a political decision. Ideological motivation behind the translation commission for such politically-sensitive texts as prime ministerial weekly addresses was generated by the military government's decision to restore its image internationally after the coup d'état of 22 May 2014 in Thailand.

Before the coup was staged, there were mass demonstrations against the elected Yingluck Shinawatra government. Prime Minister Yingluck was accused of creating a fraudulent rice-subsidy scheme and of trying to bring back home her brother, former prime minister in exile Thaksin Shinawatra, who had been ousted in a 2006 military coup, accused of corruption. Martial law had been declared across Thailand on 20 May 2014 in a purported attempt to end the growing violence, and two days later the military announced their seizure of power. General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the then army chief, stated that the military had to step in and help ease the violence that had claimed more than 30 lives over the six months of protests. The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), established thereafter to govern Thailand, quickly began to detain public figures and curtailed political activities. The NCPO enforced a broad ban on criticisms of the regime and discussion about political issues, particularly such topics as democracy, freedom, and human rights. Many universities were forced to cancel their academic activities relating to the recent political disturbances. The self-appointed military government has also imposed tight restrictions on the media, charting the country's future by outlining the roadmap to reforms and a reconciliation process between conflicting groups. Paradoxically, the suppression of free expression and public assembly hardly legitimises the NCPO self-proclaimed process because it lacks wide-ranging participation and every sector has to follow the top-down strict guidelines.¹

¹ 'Thailand: unending repression 6 months post-coup', (2014, 24 November) *Human Rights Watch*, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/24/thailand-unending-repression-6-months-post-coup>. (Accessed: 10 April 2019).

In order to legitimate and institutionalise their rule, the military resorted to a tactic that the former Thai prime ministers had employed, and which became a central platform for promulgating their political discourse: the weekly TV address. Every Friday evening all television channels were required to carry General Prayut Chan-o-cha's broadcast, focusing on the junta's goals and accomplishments. The programme aimed to project a good image of the junta's and trumpet its slogan of 'Return Happiness to the People'. Its structure, theme and TV presentation are the embodiment of the authoritarian way of thinking, urging the audiences to take the panacea prescribed by the junta for the country's ailments. The presenter of the programme, Prayut himself, also typifies how strong the senior's influence could be over that of inferiors in Thai society. He was often described as volatile, many times wearing a stern-looking face and unsmiling in confrontation with news reporters, but sometimes treating them as if a subject of ridicule.² For his TV presentation he talked directly to his audience, standing on a podium with an impassive mien; sometimes avuncular and reassuring but frequently tough-talking and patronising (McCargo, 2015: 344). This reflects his personality as a senior military figure who is euphemistically seen by the pro-military camp as determined, resolute and kind to subordinates; ideal qualities that any good Thai leader should possess.

This political marketing was not to be only for domestic consumption, but was rather aimed at having a broader international impact. English subtitles were therefore provided during the show. The prime minister's TV appearance and the translation of his administration's ideologies into English could be considered pivotal to the justification of their power and thus legitimisation of their rule for international audiences. To give a chance for the public to later gain access to the recorded addresses, all the speeches are usually transcribed and uploaded onto the Thai Government website along with their English versions.³

Two points deserve close scrutiny. First is that the original texts, when translated, not only transfer their existence and meanings from the Thai into the English realm of public reception but also undergo a change of form from spoken utterances to written texts. The spoken and written discourses are innately different in such characteristics as repetition, textual organisation or lexical choice. It seems that the translators take three steps in converting the original spoken Thai into translated written English. Apart from changes in form, the final translated product could be even more different from the original since the texts have to be translated across a language pair exhibiting such a vast socio-cultural difference.

² Murdoch, L. (2015, 16 March) 'Thai PM Prayuth jokes he has power to 'execute' journalists', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, <https://www.smh.com.au/world/thai-pm-prayuth-jokes-he-has-power-to-execute-journalists-20150326-1m84rx.html> (Accessed 10 December 2018).

³ All transcriptions and their official translations can be retrieved from the Thai Government website (<http://www.thaigov.go.th/news/contents/index/45>). However, those from the first two years of military premiership were deleted when the website was renovated and the programme's title changed after King Rama IX's death.

Secondly, this translation project was commissioned by the military government, which largely controls the flow of their official discourse to the public, so as to safeguard their ‘heroic image’ after the coup. When closely compared, some parts of the Thai source texts that betray the speaker’s idiosyncrasy seem to be reborn into an entirely new life through the official translation. Many elements of the translation illustrate active mediation and bear the fingerprints of the translators, whose language choices could be pressured from political circumstances they consider vital not to contradict and therefore compromise their translation standards by sanitising their final version so as to make it more acceptable and proper for an international, second target audience. In so doing, the translator tends to intervene and use their own judgement to neutralise any negative elements and the straightforward tone considered as Prayut’s unique style of language use. As one of Toury’s ‘laws’ of how translators translate (Toury 1995) suggests, the translators’ evaluation of the source text inevitably occurs where ‘ambiguity’ needs to be interpreted, thus allowing for the translators’ intervention. But, in this case, their intervention seems to be propelled by a need to rewrite the ‘negativity’ of Prayut’s unique spoken language and Thai socio-cultural force under the higher network of influences.

Consequently, what is largely lost is the attitudinal value connoted in Prayut’s original speeches. Translation is a constant evaluative process, as Munday (2012: 155) opines in concluding his study of the translator’s/interpreter’s positioning when translating political texts. Choices made by translators are potentially indicative of their own ideas and beliefs (ideology) and values (axiology). These choices are made from a range of possible equivalents in the language they work into. Preferred or rejected candidates for equivalents echo the translators’ evaluation of whether those terms are suitable (in our case, for politically-sensitive texts) and, thereby, of whether their intervention will seriously add some diplomatic value to their product.

One could argue that institutional patronage of a particular political text similar to this translation commission may play an important role in communication of political agenda to international audiences. The question is: what topics and themes did the Thai junta attempt to promote or discourage, and are these presented as an ideological hard-sell? Are these themes highlighted or made implicit through these translation strategies? Seen in this light, how would the government be able to draw their international audiences’ attention, and how successful is the rendering of ideologically-loaded discourse into English, since the function of the texts is altered from an operative (advertising the junta’s activities for the Thai public) to an informative one (reporting Prayut’s speech in a form of subtitle for international audiences), which reflects the government’s intention to internationalise its political messages?

1.2 Aims and research questions

Following the procedures of Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS), the research aims are to uncover the underlying ideological assumptions in the source text (ST) and to detect translators’

intervention in the target text (TT). The research will study the Thai source language and English target language, which is both linguistically and socio-culturally different. It is expected to find the discursive features that imply the institutional ideologies in the original and to offer some explanations as to how they were transferred into the translations. The research also aims to emphasise the importance of the political context that gives rise to the ST and to try to answer the question of why the production of an English translation is brought about only during the current administration.

Theoretically, the translation of the Thai prime minister's weekly address can be regarded as a case where its institution/patron directly commissioned and controlled the project with requirements in the translation brief, as pointed out by Lefevere (1992/2016). However, it remains to be explored whether the translation represents entirely the institutional ideologies implied in the ST. In addition, since the group of translators are all Thais – the same nationality as the ST producers – how far were the texts adjusted to fit the expectations of the English as a dominant, more globalised language? The research will also consider the mode of presentation that is shifted from directly addressing the Thai audiences to subtitling for international ones. Furthermore, the translation processes are important in this respect because numerous factors might be at play such as time constraints, limited human resources and the agents who made the final decisions.

The main research questions are:

- (1) What translation procedures and patterns are identifiable in the official translation?
- (2) How are underlying ideologies expressed in the source texts presented in the target text?
- (3) To what extent does the institutional ideology condition the process of translation?

An analytical framework for this study is the incorporation of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which will be elaborated in Chapter 3. As for the data for analysis, the 124 transcribed texts of the programme 'Returning Happiness to the People in the Nation' and their English translations from 30 May 2014 to 7 October 2016 are collected as the ST and TT. The electronic copies of the two versions are retrieved from the Thai Government website. The reasons for the scope of data are two-pronged. First, using transcriptions is justified because they are officially publicised on the Government website which is the open source for the Thai public (including international audiences) to read the records after the Friday addresses. However, the segments I used for analysis were cross-checked with the videos to ensure the complete transcriptions. Second, I choose this timescale for the study because, despite the programme still running after King Bhumibol's death in October 2016, its title changed to 'From the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy to Sustainable Development Goals'.

Given the large amount of data, two sets of segments of transcriptions will be chosen for comparison according to themes. The criteria for selecting the themes are their relevance to

ongoing political situations and frequency of recurrence. These themes are (i) political reconciliation and unity through the roadmap and reforms in various sectors, and (ii) nationalism through the promotion of ‘Nation, Religion, and King’. They are considered the backbone of the military government’s justification for taking control of the country after their seizure of power. Apart from the written texts, the screen captions of the programme, different in each show, are also collected to analyse whether the symbols and the speaker’s presentation correspond with the contents of the address.

To complement the textual analysis, an ethnographic method using the Actor-Network approach can help investigate the network/institution influences over the translation of political texts, as proposed by Buzelin (2005). The translators and the production team were interviewed to get an insight into the programme production and process of translation. The informants who used to be involved in the production of previous weekly prime ministerial addresses were also interviewed, so as to compare the production processes and political motivations behind the programme of each premier. The information gleaned from the interview might not yield the same results as textual analysis. The solution is to carefully cross-check the information from interviews with the findings derived from the ST-TT comparisons.

1.3 Contributions to larger literature

Political discourse in Thailand

This research on weekly prime ministerial addresses forms part of the debate on current Thai politics. The present study is the first to delve into the translation of political texts in Thailand. Previously, Critical Discourse Analysis was applied only to research on other types of Thai political texts/utterances, such as former Thai prime ministers’ speeches (Yanisark, 2004), newspapers (Pennapa, 2010; Pornjan, 2012; Chanokporn, 2014), and no-confidence debates in the Thai parliament (Savitri, 2002), but never before on the translation against the backdrop of Thai politics.

This research is a reflexive study of Thai politics on the Thai public sphere; the first to examine an incumbent Thai non-elected prime minister’s addresses and their translations. It offers the first comprehensive overview of previous Thai weekly prime ministerial addresses by tracing their origin as political marketing designed to win over the Thai people in the past. To gain knowledge of the Thai PM’s address as a genre of political rhetoric, the present study looks at the radio and other recent communications media that each government exploited to disseminate their political discourse and achieve their goals in maintaining power. Its contribution is to conclude that the weekly prime ministerial television address, the model of which was imported from the US, has served as a political tool for both elected and non-elected governments. Establishing the addresses was a tactical move to dispel the junta’s anxiety and lend legitimacy to their rule after the decade-

long contestations of power between the conservative royalists and newly-emergent civilian-led liberalists.

This political marketing is further evidence that since the Thaksin premiership the contestation of power among Thai elites has been a kind of reality TV show (McCargo, 2009). Thailand often has a series of media events and episodes of political theatre, as instanced by the Red- and Yellow-Shirt protests, former Prime Minister Samak's cooking show and the weekly address. It can also be illustrated by the 'musical chairs' of controlling media, through which each side vies for public attention and grasps the opportunity to show to their supporting audiences that their actions are timely and justified. It started when Thaksin tried to win the media beachhead, including the 2006 'canary tour' to the upcountry region which attracted a large pack of news hounds and the At Samat Reality Show,⁴ highlighting his poverty eradication project in order to boost his populism (Nualnoi, 2009: 120). Prayut's recent weekly programme can also be regarded as a reality show following his rival's example, although the reason for Prayut's programme's existence and the manner in which its production was run fails to measure up to Thaksin's complete comprehension of media and sensitivity to a Thai audience.

Furthermore, the weekly address mirrors a number of ironic conditions found in Thai politics, one of which is the class-based democratisation. Previous studies have shown that the middle classes were major supporters of the 2014 coup (Asia Foundation, 2015; Baker, 2016: 390-2). They ironically took the reverse step from first embracing democracy to becoming anti-democratisers and staunch supporters of military coups (Kasian, 2016: 223-6). The present study contributes to the debates in Thai politics by proposing that one reason why the weekly address was revitalised by the military in the wake of the coup is for the purpose not only of informing the general public, but also of securing their middle-class 'fan base' by justifying the junta's rule and occasionally threatening and enticing the opposition to concede to them. This agrees with McCargo's view (2015: 337) that the junta's goals after the coup were to depoliticise Thai life and create a public sphere in which heated debates or any forms of resistance are suppressed. The weekly address is therefore moulded to persuade the Thai public to buy into the junta's narrative against that of Thaksin and his allies, and simultaneously serves as a warning sign to those who try to stir up any political activities inimical to the junta's security.

Moreover, the internationalisation of this political marketing supports Desatova's argument (2018) in her ongoing research on the junta's nation-branding propaganda. While 'Thailand 4.0' is one of the fanfares in internal nation-branding to enhance the junta's legitimacy, the translation of the

⁴ At Samat is a district of Roi Et province in north-eastern Thailand, one of the poverty-stricken areas and political strongholds of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party. Thaksin went to At Samat during 16-21 January 2006 to shoot a Reality Show broadcast on UBC cable TV. See more in 'เรียลลิตีี่แม้ว...สร้างและทำลายเรตติ้ง [Maew's reality show...rating created and falling]'. (2006, 5 October) *Positioning*, <https://positioningmag.com/9184> (Accessed: 19 October 2018).

weekly address is a medium employed to show the international community how the junta rebrands Thailand in the hope of conjuring up an image of a post-coup peaceful country. If the weekly address is a channel for selling propaganda to envision a Thai audience with a rosy future under the military's tutelage, 'Thailand 4.0' being one of them, its English translation is aimed at appealing to a new audience with Prayut's well-crafted written statements. This is largely because some messages in the source text are not originally intended for an international audience, and need to be modified accordingly.

Translation shifts

As this study positions itself in Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) (Toury, 2012), particularly on the product-oriented branch, its findings are expected to feed into the theoretical branch of partial area-restricted theories (Thai-English pair) in the discipline of translation studies. The concept of 'translation shifts' is explored in this research. Hatim and Munday's categorisation of translation shifts (2004, 88-90) helps the present study spell out any shifts that may occur when Thai texts are translated differently from their English counterparts. Particularly, this research epitomises the 'discourse shift' of Thai-English translation, which derives from the fact that Thai discourse semantics (ideational, interpersonal and textual values) are variegated in the English version as a result of ideological influences from the translators and their commissioner. This research seems to apply for the first time the Hallidayan model of language use in the study of the Thai-English language pair. With the aid of Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1985/2014) and Pattama's SFL interpretation (Pattama, 2006), the present study contributes to the knowledge by illustrating potential obligatory shifts caused by syntactical differences between Thai and English, and optional shifts resulting from ideological motivations which can be found after ST-TT comparisons.

One theoretical implication for the concept of translation shift is that the obligatory and optional shift especially between the Thai-English language pair cannot be straightforwardly classifiable. There are many borderline cases where the translators take advantage of lexico-grammatical differences to choose the English equivalences based on their own judgement such as the case of pronoun explicitation. Another borderline case which is also considered a major contribution is the translator's lexical choices when translating the Thai royal language. The study is the first one to address the problem that the socio-cultural values that attach to the special set of Thai language reserved only for the royal family are unable to appear fully fledged in the English version. When translated, all those highly positive values in the royal vocabularies that embody the concept of 'the divine' are inevitably shifted or even lost in the official translation due to the lack of equally grandiloquent, flowery terms to attribute to various activities referring or related to the Thai monarchy.

Another implication is that translation shifts can perform the function of building diplomatic relation between the junta (the original) and the international communities (the translation) to justify the Army's power seizure. By changing numerous critical points of General Prayut's attitudes in the source text the translation team purportedly re-constructs an improved narrative of the junta in order to persuade the international audiences to accept the version of post-coup Thailand only as described in English subtitles.

The study also extends the knowledge that originated from the study of US President Barack Obama's 2009 inaugural speech (Munday, 2012: Ch 2). It demonstrates that, with the same linguistics-oriented methodology, Thai written texts and utterances can be critically examined to interpret any ideologies loaded into them by tracing the translators' interventions and manipulations of the texts, as I shall explain in Chapters 5 and 6.

Moreover, it is the first study of translation phenomena in Thailand that corroborates the SFL model for textual analysis and CDA as a framework for contextual analysis. CDA will guide the study and help it take into account the socio-political factors contributing to the commission of translations of the weekly address. The methodological implications of this study is that it can shed some light on the research methods for the future study with similar sources of data and serve as an inclusive model to analyse translation shifts in the Thai-English language pair that is conditioned by Thai socio-political contexts.

Translation of political text, ideology and institution

The present study is the first to apply the concept of patronage (Lefevere 1992/2016) and institutional translation (Mossop 1988, 1990; Koskinen 2008) to the context of Thailand, to see if the Thai organisational culture can be discerned in the same way as the Western counterpart that has been central to the studies in those theoretical frameworks.

The results of this study will complement those of previous ones on ideology-laden texts. In Vald eon's investigation (2007) into ideological positioning in news translations of CNN and BBC, he distinguishes two types of mediation: positive (neutrality of text producers) and negative (import of text producers' ideologies). Despite a different set of data, his study and the present one come to the similar conclusion that the translations seem to operate in the interest of the domestic rather than that of the target readership, which serves the text producer's (in my case, the military government's) new purposes.

Another contribution to the study of translation of political texts is the issue of translation for institutions, which closely intertwines with the concept of censorship. With a broader definition of institution, Kang (2014: 469) opines that many recent research findings on institutional translation increasingly reveal that the translator's subordination to institutional pressure cannot be taken for granted, examples being the studies of news organisations in China by Li Pan (2014) and in Iran by Aslani (2016), or the idea of translation as governing function by Koskinen (2014).

The present study chimes in with Kang's opinion. Its findings in Chapter 2 will suggest that, although there is no clear translation brief nor institutionally controlled environments of translation process, the pressure inherently arising from the military government and its recent coup still play a crucial part in the translation strategy and in translators' decision-making. However, the results of the present study seem to differ from that of Li and Li (2015) who examine the English translations of Chinese leaders' speeches. They found that the translation shifts occur mostly to 'accommodate' the target readership, which is a new trend in the age of globalisation. It is partly true in the case of General Prayut, but the plausible reasons for their difference are Prayut's unique use of language and the unstated purpose of the translators to 'filter out' unwanted characteristics of his speech, rather than only to make it stylistically appealing to the target audience.

The findings of the research will further contribute to the evolving concept of 'new censorship' in translation. As Merkle (2018: 248) explains, the new censorship brings together the diverse forms of 'discourse regulation' that govern what one could say to whom, when, and where.⁵ This research will help push the boundaries of Merkle's concept by showing that the translation of Prayut's weekly address is a kind of discourse regulation; but in reverse order, given that it is the subordinates who regulate their superior. As Chapters 5 and 6 will argue, the translation is a form of denial stipulated by norms in such a hierarchical society to censor any political texts that Thais deem sensitive or inappropriate in order to save their superior's face and sell their good image.⁶ The translation team are the ones who select which part of their leader's discourse should be censored, rather than direct orders or top-down guidelines succinctly imposed upon the lower-level operators/translators.

The outline of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of Thai politics from Thaksin's premiership, during which the weekly address was initiated, until the run-up to the coup d'état on 22 May 2014. It will also trace the origin of the Thai premiers' approach to going public by directly talking to their constituencies. The production of the current weekly address programme will be explained with a short analysis of its intrinsically hierarchical process and external influences over agencies involved.

Chapter 3 explains the conceptual framework and methodology employed through the course of the thesis. It will set forth where the present study is situated in the realm of Descriptive Translation Studies. The notion of equivalence is discussed in relation to translation shifts, and this leads to an examination of the impact of ideology on translation. How the translators may

⁵ According to Merkle (2018: 248), the forms of discourse regulation include Müller's institutional censorship, (2004), Freshwater's constitutive censorship (2004) and Bourdieu's structural censorship (1980).

⁶ See more in Persons's (2016) account of how face value is significantly related to the flow of power in Thai society.

intervene in and the commissioner may exercise control over the translated texts is clarified, along with some recognition of the importance of institutional pressure.

Chapter 4 delves into Prayut's original weekly addresses and analyses their discursive presentation by looking at their objective as political marketing, their structure and how the programme is commissioned. Prayut's unique style of language use and the text status as a politically-sensitive one are the foci of the chapter because they are likely to cause various difficult conditions when the translation team has to make a decision upon Prayut's spoken discourse and political background.

Applying an integrated model of SFL and CDA, Chapter 5 examines and compares the recurrent themes of reconciliation and reforms in Prayut's speech and the official translation. It also shows how these themes are presented differently in the English version. With the same model, Chapter 6 investigates the differences in re-presentation of the conservative notion of 'Nation, Religion, King', another recurrent theme that bolsters the junta's self-legitimisation of ruling Thailand after the coup. It will also explain how the translation of royal language could be regarded as retention of positive appreciation but with a reduced effect in the target language.

The last chapter summarises and discusses the implications of translations upon the current political circumstances and how the nature of the translation commission is influenced far beyond what the normal process of translation should be because of indirectly-institutional control and the strange structure of the programme production and translation in themselves.

Chapter 2

Thai Politics and the Weekly Prime Ministerial Address

In this chapter the context of Thai politics and the importance of the weekly address will be presented in relation to three main topics: the run-up to the 2014 coup, the origins of the weekly prime ministerial addresses and the production of the current show. To begin with, I will explain the rather complicated political instabilities before and after the 2006 coup, which was closely related to the subsequent 2014 coup. Then I will trace the tradition of weekly addresses adopted by former Thai PMs as one of their vehicles for political rhetoric and find out who initiated it, and why. The last section will explain the production and translation processes of the incumbent Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha. The source of data for the last section draws largely upon the interviews with the translators and production team, whose identities remain anonymous.

2.1 The 2014 coup

Thailand witnessed another coup in 2014, the twelfth successful coup in its political history. Since the fall of absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand has seen intense contestation between different factions pulling in competing directions, including democratic, authoritarian and royalist. In fact, the course of Thai political history has been altered by some coups: Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat's coup in 1957 that revitalised the political role of the monarchy and established Thai-US relations in the Cold War, and the 1976 coup that initiated the era of 'democracy with the king as head of state'.

In the 22 May 2014 coup the military seized power after the Constitutional Court ordered Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra out of office. Prior to that, masses of protesters gathered around Bangkok and accused her administration of trying to bring back her brother, former prime minister in exile Thaksin Shinawatra who had been similarly ousted in 2006. Behind the scenes, it is argued that the key elements of Thailand's political struggle this time have been 'the military, monarchy, bureaucracy, a powerful capitalist class, a politically active middle class and repressed subaltern classes' (Veerayooth and Hewison, 2016: 372). For Sopranzetti (2016: 7), the 2014 coup reveals 'symptoms of the Thai body politic' that weakened and turned back to authoritarian structures and political attitudes, with a stronger alliance of elites, military, and middle classes. In Baker's view (2016: 402), the social forces behind the coup are deep-rooted and propelled by two forces. On the one hand, the oligarchy of monarchy, bureaucracy and military as the old force saw the challenge of popular Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006)'s electoral triumphs and struggled to find the ways to maintain their principles and oppose this challenge. On the other hand, the new force represented by the emergence of middle classes due to Thailand's rapid economic growth in the last decades tried to react to the political movement based in the rural

areas because they, especially Bangkok's middle classes, perceive a threat to their middle-class values of social order, and hence lend their hands to the old force in support of authoritarianism. The 2014 coup arguably inherited the unfinished mission of the 2006 coup that toppled the popular Thaksin administration, despite being sanctioned by the palace and supported by Bangkok's middle classes. One important question to be asked is: who is Thaksin? Why was he so successful in winning over the hearts of the majority of Thai voters in recent decades?

Thaksin: the new rise of people's power

Thaksin Shinawatra was the 23rd prime minister of Thailand and the most controversial political figure in recent decades. His political career was fast-tracked; only seven years from his first joining the Phalang Tham Party he became prime minister. He was born into one of the richest and most prominent families in Chiang Mai.⁷ He entered the police in the 1970s and received a PhD in criminal justice from a university in Texas (Thaksin, 2003: 93-4), but his success was in fact the combination of business and politics. His first venture into business by acquiring exclusive contracts to supply IBM computers succeeded through personal connections. Thanks to Thailand's booming economy and the advanced technology in telecommunications in the early 1990s Thaksin's chance for making lucrative profits in business was based on his political links. He resigned from the police in 1987 after finding that more money could be made from business, and later decided to enter national politics partly in order to intensify his business competition with his rivals (Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 61).

His foray into politics in 1994 was through Chamlong Srimuang – leader of the Phalang Tham Party – when the party needed to improve its electoral and financial prospects, but this move seemed to accelerate its own demise when the 1996 election came (McCargo, 1997: 292, 299). While a member of Phalang Tham, Thaksin served as foreign minister in 1994 and later as deputy PM in Banhan Silpa-archa's cabinet in 1995. He briefly became a deputy PM again in 1997 under Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. But this time his post lasted only three months when Chavalit stepped down after Thailand was hit hard by the economic crisis. While Chuan Leekpai, who took on the premiership after Chavalit, was wrestling with the economic downturn, in 1998 Thaksin started to build up his political alliances and founded the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT)⁸ – his political vehicle for a bid to become prime minister (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 11). During the same period of time, the deepened and prolonged crisis was making the Chuan cabinet vulnerable; it was seen as incompetent in negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thaksin seized the opportunity and focused his campaign for the 2001 election on the needs of small family businessmen and the rural masses (Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 48).

⁷ The most urbanised and prosperous province in Northern Thailand.

⁸ Thai Rak Thai literally means 'Thais love Thais'.

It is possible to identify two main factors contributing to Thaksin's political success as a rising star in the late 1990s. First, the increasing demand for reform of the money-based electoral system led to the creation of independent organisations designed to engineer a better political process. Second, there was the successful promotion of TRT images as a technocratic party after Chuan failed to please the critics of his mismanagement and his being subservient to IMF policies (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 11-3). But in plain sight, it was also Thaksin's electoral promises of universal healthcare, a debt moratorium for farmers and village funds as the main planks of his election campaign that paved the way for TRT to win the 2001 election with a near majority of the parliament (240 seats), unprecedented in Thai history.

After taking the PM position, not only did Thaksin keep his promises by initiating populist projects, but he also crafted his political machinations to maintain his economic and political influences. This is what McCargo and Ukrist (2005) call the 'Thaksinization of Thailand'.⁹ He took tighter control of the media and suppressed dissent while selling his image through political discourse, re-politicising the military and the police in favour of his cronies and creating a new economy to strengthen his own network of conglomerates. In maintaining his administrative power, he always claimed that all he did was in the interests of the grassroots who lived in the rural areas and had often been neglected in the past, and that the legitimacy of his government was rightfully derived from the majority of the people's vote - the people's power.

However, although TRT won another round of elections in 2005, Thaksin's premiership came to an abrupt end the following year, fulfilling McCargo and Ukrist's (2005: 252-3) prediction that Thaksin might be finally 'disincorporated'. Not only was Thaksin accused of abusing his overwhelming power in the parliament to consolidate his own business in telecommunications, but also his expanding political economy network increasingly challenged the old network based around the palace, the Privy Council, and senior bureaucrats. In early 2006, anti-Thaksin rallies under the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which attracted tens of thousands wearing yellow shirts, gradually intensified and allegedly gave way to military interference.¹⁰ Before being ousted by the military, Thaksin had been facing many allegations of, to say the least, corruption, parliamentary dictatorship, violating human rights after the 'war on drugs' campaign, and selling Thai companies' assets to foreign investors. On 19 September 2006 the military staged a coup against Thaksin while he was away in New York attending the UN General Assembly.¹¹

⁹ The spelling used in the original.

¹⁰ The alliance chose the yellow as their symbol, this being borrowed from the colour of the king's birthday. In traditional Thai culture, each day of the week is denoted by a colour, which derives from Hindu mythology. In this case, yellow is for Monday.

¹¹ 'TIMELINE: Thailand since 2006 coup ousted Thaksin'. (2008, 28 February) *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-coup-idUSBKK5906620080228> (Accessed: 15 February 2017).

The unfinished mission

One of the arguments to explain why Thaksin was toppled by the military in 2006 is given by Ferrara (2015). He contends that Thaksin attempted to cripple the network monarchy,¹² and posed a threat to the palace's influence on politics because of the growing popularity of his populist schemes for the rural constituencies. Furthermore, Thaksin's vision of 'capitalist revolution' seemed to conflict with that of the palace and hence to be presented as an indirect threat to the existing hierarchical worldview of class and social status (Ferrara, 2015: 234). This argument resonates with those of many scholars: the monarchists' effort to control the democratisation process (Thongchai, 2008), the royalist military's legitimisation by using royalist discourse (Ukrist, 2008), the military as arch-royalist and its monarchy protection against Thaksin's and his proxies' threats (Chambers, 2013).

However, after a 15-month rule of interim civilian government appointed by the junta, the pro-Thaksin alliance proved to be resilient, again winning elections in 2007 and 2011. Hence, some view the 2006 coup as a lost opportunity (Wassana, 2014: 248; Baker, 2016: 389) because it failed to remove Thaksin's influence from the political scene despite the re-written 2007 constitution that adjusted the power between independent organisations and the Constitutional Court (Mérieau, 2016). In fact, after the 2006 coup, there was the continuing effort to weaken all pro-Thaksin allies by constitutional and legal restrictions. This was illustrated by the order of the Constitutional Court in late 2008 to dissolve the People's Power Party (a new pro-Thaksin coalition), or what one may call a 'judicial coup' (Mérieau, 2016: 459). It paved the way for the military-supported Abhisit Vejjajiva government to assume power until 2011. However, in 2009 Thailand witnessed the return of colour-coded politics,¹³ when massive rallies by pro-Thaksin groups who wore red shirts as a symbol of TRT were held against Abhisit's 'undemocratic' government (Veerayooth and Hewison, 2016: 373). Eventually, Abhisit had to step down under extreme pressure and called an election in July 2011.¹⁴ This time the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai Party led by Thaksin's sister Yingluck won a landslide victory. During 2011-2014, Yingluck governed on the basis of an elite pact with the military and the palace, and hence her cabinet lasted nearly three years.

However, in November 2013 the major event that triggered another round of massive protests by anti-Thaksin coalitions took place. The Yingluck government tried to issue an ill-conceived amnesty bill that granted a 'blanket' pardon to all involved in various incidents of political unrest

¹² Coined by McCargo (2005), the term is referred to Thailand's network-based politics with which the monarchy is associated, while former prime minister and current Privy Council President General Prem Tinsulanonda is at the centre and said to have been pulling the strings behind many political scenes in past decades.

¹³ 'Profile: Thailand's reds and yellows'. (2012, 13 July) *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13294268> (Accessed: 4 February 2017).

¹⁴ 'Timeline: Thailand's political crisis'. (2011, 30 July) *CNN*, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/07/01/thailand.timeline> (Accessed: 16 February 2017).

since 2004. This bill was perceived as the rhetoric of reconciliation between political rivals, which would also dismiss Thaksin's conviction of corruption and pave the way for his return to the divided country.¹⁵ This gesture infuriated the already-formed alliances of anti-Thaksin and royalist groups in late 2013. Despite the bill being dropped, the angry protesters continued pouring into the streets, identifying themselves as the People's Committee for Absolute Democracy with the King as Head of State, later changed to the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) in order to 'distance the movement from the palace and to give the impression that it was pursuing popular democratic reform' (Veerayooth and Hewison, 2016: 374). This movement was joined by Bangkok's middle classes and lower-income people from the upper Southern provinces who formed the core electoral base of the anti-Thaksin opposition (Asia Foundation, 2014: 3-6; McCargo, 2015b: 339; Baker, 2016: 397-9). The protest became more violent with the constant theme of anti-corruption and political reform.¹⁶ When Yingluck decided to dissolve the lower parliament and call for an election in early 2014 with the hope of calming the protesters, the PDRC leader Suthep Thaugsuban aroused the furious gathering crowds by claiming that the election would not happen unless the reform to prevent corrupt politicians from destroying the country took place. He encouraged the angry crowds to block the election by whatever means they could find.

The situation was further complicated when Yingluck was ordered to step down from her position by the Constitutional Court. Back in 2011 Yingluck allegedly interfered in governmental affairs by replacing Thawin Pliansri, who was acting as the Secretary-General of the National Security Council (NSC), with Police General Wichian Photphosri. This was an unsurprising move, since Thawin was close to the opposition Democrat Party and Thai prime ministers normally prefer to have loyalists occupying such important positions. However, after a long campaign by Yingluck's opponent, finally in April 2014 the Constitutional Court ordered Thawin to be re-appointed to his post and later unanimously decided to remove Yingluck from office by ruling that her transfer of the National Security Council head was improper and illegal.¹⁷

During this time, the violence on the streets still continued for more than four months. Finally, after waiting for the situation to be 'ripe' for change (Wassana, 2014: 306) and after the turning point of the 19 May 2014 incidents around the Victory Monument, when three people were killed and many more injured, the military saw a chance. On 20 May 2014 they stepped in and intervened in the conflict by invoking martial law and the following day inviting seven parties to

¹⁵ For details, see Marshall, A. R. C. and Szep, J. (2014, 31 January) 'Insight: How Thaksin's meddling sparked a new Thai crisis for PM sister', *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-amnesty-insight-idUSBREA0U00620140131> (Accessed: 17 February 2017).

¹⁶ 'แอบดูข้อเสนอปฏิรูปกฎหมายคอร์รัปชั่น ตามแนวทาง กปปส. [Sneak peek of the proposal for corruption law reform according to PDRC]'. (2014, 24 January), *iLaw*, <https://ilaw.or.th/node/3024> (Accessed: 3 February 2017).

¹⁷ 'Thailand court ousts PM Yingluck Shinawatra'. (2014, 7 May) *BBC*, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-27292633> (Accessed: 3 February 2017).

talk and find solutions at the Thai Army Club, including representatives from senate, caretaker government, PDRC and pro-Thaksin leaders (Matichon Information Center, 2015: 199) before they declared a state of siege on 22 May. General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the coup leader, asserted that he had to take control of the country ‘because of the violence in Bangkok and many parts of the country that resulted in loss of innocent lives and property, which was likely to escalate’.¹⁸ But in fact there might be something more than what he told the reporters. In Chambers’ (2014) view, the objectives of the coup might have been to bring down the pro-Thaksin coalitions, re-write the constitution, and ensure the dominance of arch-royalist forces.

All in all, apart from the objectives of the 2014 coup that Chambers indicates, the reason why the coup took place is arguably because the military had learned the lessons of the 2006 ‘failure’ and then felt obliged to impose the moral notions and the worldview of hierarchical social status with the role of ‘good people’ so as, hopefully, to end the longstanding conflicts. However, after the bloodless coup the junta still felt insecure and, as Pavin (2014) claims, needed to boost its popular appeal. This was because, alongside pro-coup activities mainly led by PDRC and some political and religious figures, the anti-coup voices seemed to be louder than those in the past. The coup prompted many public protests which, due to the military’s feeling of insecurity, were fiercely suppressed in a short while. There were even more harsh measures to control social media: Facebook, Twitter and LINE.¹⁹ The factors contributing to these huge oppositions may have been the people’s disillusionment and new perception relating to coups. Encouraged by advanced technology in telecommunications and the growing market economy, the people, especially the ‘urbanised villagers’ who form the bedrock of Thaksin’s support (Naruemon and McCargo, 2011), do not passively accept the military discourse as they did in the past.

The public demand for the ‘full-fledged’ democracy has become greater in recent years. Each government, the incumbent in particular, has to assert its own version of democracy and seek the support of the wider population. However, both military and civilian governments seemingly have their own parallel problems. On the one hand, the military, although seizing power by force and then able to ignore their opposition, still feel the need to justify their rule and try to gain support from the people. On the other hand, the elected governments also found their rule constantly interrupted by the military, which undermines the credibility of their political discourse suggesting that Thailand is the country where electoral politics should rule supreme. Every government seems to have ruled the country with anxiety: apart from Thaksin’s first (2001-2005) administration, no elected government has been able to complete a four-year parliamentary term. Civilian governments feel vulnerable to the sense that their rule would not last long, while the

¹⁸ ‘Thailand military seizes power in coup’. (2014, 22 May) *BBC*, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-27517591> (Accessed: 10 March 2019).

¹⁹ Achara Ashayagachat. (2014, 23 May) ‘Anti-coup rally on streets, social media’, *Bangkok Post*, <https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/coup/411425/anger-on-the-streets-and-online> (Accessed: 3 February 2017).

current junta governs the country with the sense of insecurity unless they gain popular support from the sceptical population. The weekly broadcast of political marketing hence becomes a central instrument of the current administration in legitimising themselves and winning over the population, in a similar way to their rivals who had proved this means of propaganda to be a worthwhile exercise.

General Prayut's profile: the 2014 coup leader

General Prayut Chan-o-cha is the eldest son of a senior colonel and a teacher, with two brothers and a sister – two of whom hold high-ranking positions in the Thai Army. Prayut is said to have inherited his personal trait of speaking in a didactic, paternalistic and preachy manner from his mother, who was a teacher. His style of talking resembles that of a senior who is patronising the inferiors, a widespread mode of address among prominent people in Thai society. During his studies in pre-cadet school, friends were always impressed with his calm and composed manner. It was only when he entered the army and rose to a high position that he became easily irritable and hot-tempered (Wassana, 2014: 38, 55). His irritability often emerged during his press conferences during the first few months after the coup. His press conferences were full of reproaches, while he himself was always sour-faced despite his trying to crack not-so-funny jokes during the early months of his rule. After too much criticism he has tried to compose himself and be friendly to reporters, and even teases them on many occasions.²⁰ But old habits die hard, so that any unpleasant topics raised by news reporters easily exasperate him and his true colours will eventually show.

Prayut's life has emulated that of his father. His hardwork and determination to become a high-ranking military officer paid off after he finished the pre-cadet school and entered the army. He then made his way to become 'Queen's Tiger Guard', which is related to the 'Eastern Tiger' military faction – the same clique as his seniors General Prawit Wongsuwan (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense) and General Anupong Paochinda (Minister of Interior), prominent military figures backing his premiership (ibid.: 88-91). Prayut has good connections to the palace as one of the leading figures of the Queen's Tiger Guard (ibid.: 142-3); Chambers and Napisa (2016: 433) view that the rise of this clique could be seen as 'a new form of monarchised military' that is vying with the Prem network for the monarchy's favour.

As McCargo (2015b) points out, what happened after the 2014 coup is rather different from the previous ones. First, there was a fierce suppression of people who opposed, or were expected to oppose, the coup. They were ordered to report to the military and detained in the military facilities. Second, Prayut himself assumed the role of prime minister instead of assigning it to other respected figures, as in the 1991 and 2006 coups. Third, Prayut demonstrated his 'one-man show'

²⁰ 'The Great Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha: The funny multiple-personality leader'. (2015, 6 February) *Prachatai English*, <http://prachatai.com/english/node/4759>.

style of leadership. He also claims that he alone is the one who would be responsible for any consequences after the coup (Wassana, 2014: 198). His ‘one-man show’ style includes his Friday TV address to the nation. During his talks the audiences will see him in different modes: ‘avuncular, patronising, self-pitying, tough-talking and downright obnoxious’ (McCargo, 2015b: 344). Whether his style is loved or hated by audiences, this was an attempt by the junta to seek legitimacy from the public. It serves as a channel to reach out to laypeople in order to propagate many schemes that are handed down to the people as economic benefits, similar to Thaksin’s popular projects. This might be because, Pavin (2014: 17) argues, the junta’s legitimacy at least depends on its popular appeal.

In defending his idea of delivering the weekly address, Prayut once claimed that he did not plan to follow the example of previous governments (whether they were Thaksin’s or pro-Thaksin) in talking directly to the people through the mass media (Wassana, 2014: 428), because his approach was adapted from the US president’s weekly radio address. Ironically, this is in fact the same model that his predecessors followed.

2.2 The origins of the weekly prime ministerial address

Presidential rhetoric has been the subject of interest to many scholars of the US presidency for a long time. They trace the beginnings of the rhetoric back to the time of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, where the modern rhetorical presidency is referred to as a ‘middle way’. It is clearly shown in the way that both presidents used their rhetoric as a tool to ‘go over the heads’ of Congress and speak directly to the American people (Tulis, 1987: 4). Wilson initiated twice-weekly news conferences – a new style of ‘going public’ that created public support and connected the presidential self to the Americans (Scacco, 2011: 67). However, the mass rhetorical strategy of the weekly address was first launched during the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt with the innovation of his fireside chats.²¹ This set a precedent for his successors and encouraged the continuation of presidential rhetorical appeals. However, it was not until 1982 that the tradition was revived by Ronald Reagan with his broadcast talents in radio commentary during his time as the Governor of California. His Saturday address was considered a fixture in presidential communications (Foote and Curran, 2007). Bill Clinton followed suit with a seven-to-ten-minute weekly radio address. George W. Bush continued the broadcasts by using the popular technology of an audio podcast (Viser, 2014). Only when the popularity of radio waned did the video become the primary means of communication for Barack Obama. He delivered his three-to-five-minute weekly address only through video and uploaded it to YouTube with an embedded link to the White House website.²² After his inauguration, Donald Trump also used the

²¹ The full list of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s fireside chats can be found in the American Presidency Project website (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/fireside.php>).

²² All Obama weekly addresses can be retrieved from the White House website (<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/weekly-address>) and the videos from its YouTube channel (<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL263D206A36953C4A>).

same video address format to send his messages to the American people for the first time on 3 February 2017, using Facebook Live from his own official account.²³

In a study of weekly addresses across the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations, Scacco (2011: 70, 81) found that the strategic objectives of the address are to shape the weekend news and to respond routinely to the events that took place in the week. He also found that the major functions of the address are a secular sermon, mediated log and a means for marking capital time. His finding is similar to that of Meernik and Ault (2013) who studied the US presidents' weekly radio address from 1993 to 2003 and found that it represents presidential agenda-setting. The presidents can enjoy exercising their influence over the weekly agenda through their choices of topics in order to guide public attention to certain issues or divert it toward others. Interestingly, there has been a similar model of weekly or monthly addresses emulated by some of the leaders around the world; for instance, former Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and the current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Some deliver their speeches via radio, and others via video.

Former Thai prime ministers' rhetoric through the weekly address

Historically, since its inception the radio as the medium of PMs' rhetorical promulgation has been long exploited by Thai governments. Despite not giving the address weekly, every past military government used it to propagate their agendas. The origin of the radio address can be traced to the time when Field Marshal Phibulsongkram (hereafter Phibul) was in power in the early 1940s. He was said to indoctrinate his version of nationalism and modernity through Radio Thailand. For example, Phibul initiated a patriotic radio programme called 'the conversation of Mr Man Chuchat and Mr Khong Rakthai'²⁴ in order to promote the sense of nationhood and the idea of Thailand as a sovereign state (Sasi, 1994).

The development of the radio system in Thailand was never independent. For more than eighty years since its first introduction to the Thais the radio has been heavily controlled by state and military and become the government's tool for political propaganda and commercial gains.²⁵ It was also used on many occasions to gain legitimacy for military governments, from Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn to General Prem Tinsulanonda (Ubonrat, 1989). In the late 1980s the advance of technology came to

²³ Donald Trump's official Facebook account is <https://www.facebook.com/POTUS>.

²⁴ In the title, the names *Man* and *Kong* were separated from the word *mankhong* (stability), and the surname *Chuchat* means 'keep up the nation', while *Rakthai* means 'love Thailand'.

²⁵ According to Ubonrat (1989: 40), there were three radio networks operating in Thailand during the 1980s. First was Radio Thailand, owned by the Department of Public Relations. Second was Witthayu Tor Tor Tor, operated by the Mass Communication Organisation of Thailand (later known as MCOT). Third was Military Radio. Until now, the first two networks are state-run, while the last one is in the military's possession.

Thailand along with the rapid economic growth, and then there was the public demand for reform of the state-controlled radio and television, especially after the fall of General Suchinda Kraprayoon's former military government in 1992. Although there was increasing participation on the part of the people thereafter, the radio and television continued to be the state's and military's instrument for promoting national security and shaping public opinion (Thanapol, 2009: 187).

In recent times, the 'weekly' prime ministerial address was pioneered by Thaksin in 2001. It was broadcast via Radio Thailand and other military stations, as well as on the state-owned TV Channel 11. The medium of communication included a website (www.thaisnews.com) and the compilation of his addresses in book form. His radio addresses ran simultaneously with his TV show. On television Thaksin would be shown preparing for his talk in a recording studio (but in fact he phoned in to the programme) while the TV host opened the programme with a sign-language interpreter in the lower right-hand corner, as illustrated in **Figure 2.1**.



Figure 2.1 TV presentation of 'Prime Minister Thaksin talks to the people' on Channel 11 (Yanisark, 2004: 63)

Thaksin's broadcasts followed the radio model of Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chats during the Great Depression in the 1930s. The preface to the first volume of Thaksin's addresses compilation states that the official goals were to let the Thai people know about his government's activities and policy implementation in an attempt to promote understanding among the people at large and, in turn, to listen to people's opinions in a democratic way (National New Bureau, 2002). With the use of radio as a means of communication, the people in remote areas can conveniently listen to the talk just like 'doing their Sunday morning chores' (Suranand, 2009).

As *The Nation* newspaper wrote, each week Thaksin would present the show while the host would only open the programme without knowing in advance what topics he might cover. The host was not supposed to ask questions or raise points. The preparation for the show was such that the government spokesmen would double up as the editor, monitoring incidents and selecting interesting items during the past week. The number of issues presented would range from 10 to 30, depending on the situation each week. During the broadcast, Thaksin would set out to shape

the week's new agenda, courting controversy at times. To the press, this strategy seemed to represent the moral that 'the winner is the person who controls the game'.²⁶

This is similar to Yanisphak's study (2004) of Thaksin's weekly addresses. She found that the programme had five types of functions: describing current situations and problems, justifying his actions, explaining about national development, educating the people, and arguing with his critics. The functions led to the production of political discourse on his positive identity, political legitimisation and ideologies (capitalism, populism, reform of the country's administration). Similarly, McCargo and Ukrist (2005: 171) note that Thaksin's broadcasts represented his attempt 'to open a direct channel of communication with ordinary people, using a simple and intimate technology', largely because they served as a means for setting the news agenda for the week with issues selected by himself. During the same period Chuan Leekpai, former PM and the then leader of the opposition, tried to counter this radio address by appearing in a programme 'Chuan Online' every Sunday. This online programme also helped contribute to the news in the following week. According to Rattanawadee (2002: 162), Chuan's programme was an attempt to respond to any politically sensitive issues raised by Thaksin and to appeal for public support for the Democrat party, but his show did not seem to generate much interest.

In other administrations following Thaksin, there were also similar PM's addresses. General Surayud Chulanont, junta-appointed PM after the 2006 coup, gave a weekly address via television, but his soft-spoken style and reliance on prepared questions from TV personalities was dry and unpopular. The loquacious Samak Sundaravej in 2008 also used his remarkable public speaking skills in talking through the TV programme, sometimes exceeding his one-hour slot. But Somchai Wongsawat, the pro-Thaksin PM who briefly succeeded Samak, was not in office long enough to make any broadcasts. In late 2008, when Abhisit Vejjajiva became prime minister after a backdoor negotiation to remove pro-Thaksin politicians from office, he also adopted a similar propaganda strategy, but in a more formal studio setting than the Thaksin-style 'sitting down to have a chat with someone' (Suranand, 2009: para. 10). According to Pattara (2013), Abhisit's political rhetoric in various TV appearances was employed to address his government's central legitimacy problem: that he had become prime minister despite his party losing the 2007 election. This was especially so in 2010, when he had to deal with huge pro-Thaksin protests in central Bangkok against this illegitimate rule.²⁷ Two months after Yingluck Shinawatra won the general election in 2011, she began to follow her brother's model of talking to the people in the Saturday programme 'Yingluck government meets the people' for 30 minutes (later extended to one hour). For the first few months it was broadcast via radio and a short video recording for TV presentation before it changed to a TV interview format in 2012. Hardly outspoken and self-assured like her

²⁶ *The Nation*, 23 August 2002, cited in McCargo and Ukrist (2005: 169).

²⁷ The protest was carried under the name of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), commonly known as Red Shirts because of their wearing red shirts as the symbol of the Thai Rak Thai Party.

brother, Yingluck relied on her hosts to manage the show (Promtida, 2012). Yingluck's image in the programme was created by Suranand Vejajiva – her personal spokesman; his main task was to ensure that her image was projected 'correctly' in the media.²⁸

Other than Somchai, all post-Thaksin PMs have adopted the tradition of addressing the public every week, despite the fact that some of them miscarry. As illustrated by the case of the PM's weekly address, Thaksin saw the benefit of the mass media and used it to reach out to the people. This was similar to the military PMs' rhetoric in the past (Yanispark, 2004: 46). What made Thaksin's address distinct from other PMs' was the way in which he delivered his talk. Most of the time he talked casually with great confidence, which might be owing to the fact that his weekly talk was aimed at the people in the rural areas (Amara, 2004: 173); in other words, those who were the target of his populist policies.

Features of General Prayut's weekly address

The Prayut administration started its first weekly address on 30 May 2014, just a week after the coup. The programme production is under the responsibility of the Government Spokesman Bureau, the Secretariat of the Prime Minister – the same Bureau as for previous productions (Yanispark, 2004: 49). However, the format of weekly address reverted to a more military style, reflecting Prayut's own personality. All TV channels were obliged to broadcast the address every Friday's evening. On screen, Prayut, initially wearing his uniform, stood at the podium and talked directly to the camera with the script automatically running in front of him.²⁹ At the bottom of the TV screen a sign-language interpreter from Channel 5 was interpreting the PM's speech simultaneously, while pre-prepared English subtitles were running at the foot of the screen.



Figure 2.2 TV presentation of 'Returning Happiness to the People in the Nation' on 13 June 2014

In **Figure 2.2** the background shows various symbolic items: a Thai national flag fluttering with the programme title *Khuen khwamsuk hai khon nai chat* on the top, one of the important

²⁸ 'Suranand hired to provide 'correct image' for the PM'. (2012, 25 February) *The Nation*, <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/national/aec/30176669> (Accessed: 7 January 2017).

²⁹ After being appointed as prime minister in August 2014, he changed his garment to a formal suit and sometimes a silk jacket tailored in traditional Thai style.

government buildings, the Thai acronym of National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) in the upper right corner, and a small screen showing pictures related to what is being mentioned. All these items vary each week according to the topics being raised, but normally the flag and the programme title were regular features.³⁰

Each speech lasted from slightly less than 30 minutes to one and a half hours, always covering more than 20 topics. The featured topics were reportedly selected and written in bullet points by the PM himself (Wassana, 2014: 428). They include, for example on 4 July 2014, grassroots economy stimulation, annual budget expenditure, roadmap for reform, tackling corruption, and response to media criticism. On other days there was a related programme entitled *Doenna prathet thai* (Forward Thailand)³¹ broadcasting for 15 to 20 minutes right after the traditional playing of the national anthem at 8 pm. The programme was aimed at catching up with selected issues raised by the PM on Fridays. Each day the TV hosts would present and update the audience with selected topics in the news-reporting and documentary format.

However, after the two programmes had been on air for almost a year, their ratings steadily dropped, reflecting declining public interest. On 22 April 2016 Prayut's Friday programme was changed to an interview format, with a TV personality as host. But after a few tries it went back to the same one-man-show format.³²

The government also made use of social media by posting the transcribed texts and their translations on its official website and uploading the videos on its own YouTube channel *Raikan thorathat nayok rattamontri* (prime minister's television programme).³³ But, as of October 2016, less than 1,000 views for some videos and less than 2,500 subscribers to its YouTube channel clearly showed that the programme did not draw much attention. Whether or not Prayut hoped to set the news agenda in the same way Thaksin did, his address rarely influenced the news coverage the following day.

When comparing Thaksin's and Prayut's weekly addresses, we can see that they both share several similar features, but were slightly different in detail. First, in terms of speech style, Prayut

³⁰ After the death of King Bhumibol in October 2016, the format was changed to focus on the King's philosophy, and the background to a plain black (later soft golden) pattern of Thai drawing art as deference to the King.

³¹ All previous videos of the programme can be retrieved from its YouTube channel

(<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWmWSXif6XfVuNaOMTj6vzQ/videos>)

³² 'รายการคืนความสุขให้คนในชาติ เปลี่ยนรูปแบบ แต่เรตติ้งยังคง [The programme of returning happiness to the people in the nation changed its format, but rating still drops]'. (2015, 9 April) *Thai PBS*, <http://news.thaipbs.or.th/content/78> (Accessed: 9 January 2017).

³³ All addresses can be retrieved from the Royal Thai Government website (<http://www.thaigov.go.th>) and the videos from its YouTube channel

(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCSbNMvh_0czHteUnSqIQNVA). The channel title first appeared as 'The programme of returning happiness to people in the nation' (รายการคืนความสุขให้คนในชาติ), but was changed to the current one following King Bhumibol's death. The official programme title was also changed to 'From the sufficiency economy philosophy to sustainable development goals' (ศาสตร์พระราชาสู่การพัฒนาที่ยั่งยืน).

emulates Thaksin in employing one-way communication. It is common in Thai culture that when seniors speak, their inferiors only need to listen. Despite the difference in their source of power, both Prayut and Thaksin were inclined to teach or moralise excessively in the way they talked. This undeniably shows that they emphasise didacticism, the notion of which is traditionally based on Thai hierarchical social structure. The talks apparently reflect the paternalistic stance towards the public and electorate (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 173). The difference lay in how they delivered their speeches: Thaksin was more informal and relaxed, while Prayut tended to be rigid and at times demanding upon his listeners. Both premiers talked directly to the audience while the hosts (appearing only a few times in Prayut's show) had little to do. There was no audience participation during either show. For Thaksin's show, the production team reasoned that it was unable to include a phone-in to the live programme due to the limited time-slot and the difficulty in controlling the calls. Therefore, they set up an indirect form of participation through the government's 1111 hot-line number for general questions and complaints, but only some made it to the live show. In Prayut's time, the same hot-line number served the same basic purpose, but just for general petitions to the government, not for responses or questions relating to the show.³⁴

Both premiers always speak for a long time with too many topics to cover. Thaksin was even threatened with being taken to the Administrative Court by one radio DJ because his show exceeded its time slot and curtailed her promotional opportunities.³⁵ But what is different is the presentation of the prime minister's self. While Prayut hardly talks about his own life, Thaksin's life was treated as a message and a model worth following - 'the moral exemplar' for the wider population (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 175).

Both Thaksin and Prayut exploit social media and television to convey their messages to the public. However, the contrast is that, while Thaksin relied only on some radio stations and Channel 11 and let the people decide whether they want to watch his show, Prayut orders all TV channels to broadcast his address, seemingly forcing the audiences to listen to him. His intention is probably due to his military mind-set and paternalistic perception that every layperson (considered lower in social status and always causing trouble) needs to pay attention.

A new feature of Prayut's show is the English subtitles,³⁶ or the effort to appeal to international audiences. One possible explanation is his aspiration to rebrand Thailand in preparation for the coming ASEAN Economic Community, similar to the appearance of an English version of the military slogan 'For Nation, Religion(s), King and People' at various key military compounds long before the coup (McCargo, 2015a: 343). Another possible reason is the government's attempt to improve their image in the eyes of the international community, which had quickly condemned the seizure of power. For instance, the US Secretary of State John Kerry stated his disappointment

³⁴ There is a website especially for this hot-line number (www.1111.go.th).

³⁵ Associated Press, 19 May 2002, cited in McCargo and Ukrist (2005: 170).

³⁶ As for the sign language interpreting, Prayut's programme retains this feature as it is common in previous government programmes, especially when broadcast from Channel 11.

and considered reviewing their ‘military and other assistance and engagements, consistent with US law.’³⁷ The European Union announced that it would freeze bilateral cooperation in certain processes, including tourism, employment and the Free Trade Agreement, and it even imposed a travel ban for all members of the NCPO (Pavin, 2014: 175-6).

In a broader context, by initiating the weekly broadcast in 2001, Thaksin had changed the rules of the Thai political game by talking directly to the electorate before his successors followed suit. His tremendous success in gaining popular support for his elected government in turn created a huge challenge for the military to put forward the counter-narrative that an elected government was ultimately corrupt and went against the public interest. As discussed above, all governments after Thaksin employed this rhetorical strategy of the weekly address to capture the hearts of the people, despite having different perceptions towards ‘the people’. This is clearly illustrated by the case of the 2015 constitutional draft that was later rejected by the junta-handpicked National Reform Council. As McCargo (2015a: 344) observes, there are at least three competing imaginaries of ‘the people’, particularly during the 2015 constitution-drafting. First is the military’s view of the people as a depoliticised and unified mass that can be mobilised in the service of ‘Nation, Religion and King’. Second is the royal liberalists’ view (the 2015 constitution-drafters) of the people as ‘active citizens’ who have profound loyalty and the role of ethical overseers to prevent elected politicians’ corruption. The last is the faded view of those who contributed to the 1997 constitutional drafting that the people are independent-minded and able to assert their rights and advance their individual and collective interests. Obviously, the rejection of the 2015 draft in September 2015 shows that the military’s view was the most dominant. This is precisely because the junta felt that, in order to resume the country’s political stability and end the conflicts amongst all sides, ‘the people’ should be ‘subordinated to the greater needs of the nation, religion and monarchy, and acting under military tutelage’ (ibid.: 345). Therefore, it is unsurprising that this view of the junta was predominant in Prayut’s weekly address. He tried repeatedly placating his audiences with themes of reconciliation, reform, elimination of corruption and other populist projects, all of which figure in his rhetoric to justify the power seizure.

By and large, it can be argued that a national leader’s rhetoric is a political tool to help gain legitimacy. This is in line with the argument of Campbell and Jamieson (2008; cited in Scacco, 2011: 72), who study US presidential rhetoric and contend that ‘the [US president’s] weekly address is unique in its routine response to the week’s events packaged for both public and press consumption’. Its functions are therefore ‘to sustain the presidential institution and to enhance executive power’.

³⁷ Brunnstrom D. and Mohammed, A. (2014, 23 May) ‘Thai coup draws swift condemnation; U.S. says reviewing aid’, *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-protest-reaction/thai-coup-draws-swift-condemnation-u-s-says-reviewing-aid-idUSBREA4L0ZH20140523> (Accessed: 12 December 2017).

Thaksin's weekly address certainly served as the platform for the enhancement of his administrative power and popularity, and the justification of his capitalistic view on the country's management (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005; Yanispark, 2004). In Prayut's case, the official objective of the programme is stated clearly with the often visible slogan 'Return Happiness to the People'. The way in which key topics (such as roadmap, the 12 Thai values, Pracharat Rak Samakee Thailand Co Ltd, 'Thailand 4.0') were presented can be seen as his attempt to explain the current situation and justify the junta's initiatives. The functions of the address were not so very different from those of Thaksin's (Yanispark, 2004) or even the US presidents' (Scacco, 2011). What is clear is that the way he took advantage of the mass media to disseminate his political marketing is similar to that of his predecessors. Because of lack of public participation in the government's rule, the weekly address then serves as a tactical diversion and is expected to help relieve the feelings of insecurity concerning the junta's rule and to retain legitimacy by creating a form of received participation. However, compared with his predecessors', Prayut's rhetoric certainly has new features and more implications when it gets translated into English, for it can reach out to a wider target audience with new political agendas and purposes.

2.3 Production and translation of 'Returning Happiness to People'

The post-May 2014 weekly prime ministerial address builds on methods developed by recent Thai prime ministers since Thaksin Shinawatra launched a weekly radio show in 2001. As discussed earlier, Prayut's show is different from the previous elected governments' regarding duration, medium of communication and translation as a new feature. This section follows the Actor-Network concept (Latour, 1979, 1988, 1997) applied to Translation Studies by Buzlin (2005). It looks at how the translation as product for Prayut's address is the result of various actors' responses to initiatives from the internal (the commission team) and external sphere of influence (the junta). Based on interviews, observations, and final product as a measure of influence, the discussion is divided into two parts. The first part explains the performances of each of the production stages of Prayut's show and how they are closely monitored. The second half explains the variety of participants who are involved in strategic planning and decision-making, particularly related to translation.

Overall production process

Thaksin's and Yingluck's shows were handled by the then-team of the Government Spokesman Bureau, led by Suranand Vejjajiva who served as a minister in the Prime Minister's Office in Thaksin's cabinet and as secretary-general to Yingluck's. No English subtitles or translations of those addresses were produced during those times, only press releases or summaries that would help set the news agenda for the following week.³⁸ The shows of Thaksin (2001-2006) and

³⁸ Interview with Suranand Vejjajiva on 28 November 2017.

Yingluck (2011-2014) were produced by just two government agencies: the Government Spokesman's Bureau and the Government Public Relations Department (Yanisark, 2004). Prayut's show, however, has more sub-organisations involved, with the Royal Thai Army Radio and Television Channel 5 at the end of the production line. Research and topic selection is handled by a team from the Government Spokesman's Bureau. The team also prepares the scripts after the prime minister's reviewing of the gathered news primarily about the progress of policy implementation and social commentaries. The selection and screening of contents is hierarchical and centripetal in process. The officials who collect information during the week will pass them on to the director of the Government Spokesman's Bureau for final consideration before the scripts are submitted directly to the prime minister, who eventually approves them. Any parts he deemed important might be added, or irrelevant ones deleted.³⁹ This hierarchical process in preparing the scripts has ensured that the government policies or ideological stances are delivered to the public correctly according to the government's underlying aim.

The production process can be divided into three main stages: (1) studio recording, (2) translation and editing, and (3) subtitling and broadcasting. The overall process is under the responsibility of the Government Spokesman's Bureau, in the Secretariat of the Prime Minister, which distributes the products of each production stage to three different government bodies.

On Thursdays, the first stage takes place at the studio in the Government House where the prime minister stands on a podium to be filmed in the morning or, sometimes if his schedule would not allow this, in the afternoon. It is entirely dependent upon Prayut's other commitments that day. This stage is run by technicians from the National Broadcasting Services of Thailand (NBT) or Channel 11, affiliated with the Government Public Relations Department (PRD). After the recording, the video file is immediately sent to Channel 5 that evening for further enhancing of the visuals and inserting the computer graphics, while the audio file goes to the transcription and translation team who in fact work for the NBT as outsourcers. Over the Thursday night, the transcription is produced and then translated by a team of three translators (later only two) responsible for different parts of one transcription.⁴⁰

During the first few months before the new military government was formed in August 2014 those who translated the transcriptions were recruited from different government agencies: the Army, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government Spokesman Bureau. The international affairs officers of each agency were called upon to translate the transcribed address.⁴¹ After the programme started to gain ground, however, the NBT was assigned to

³⁹ Interview with Editor on 11 November 2017.

⁴⁰ One of translators received another government commission to translate a special exhibition '*Yen sira phro phra boriban*: Exhibition in honour of His Majesty King Bhumibol'. The example of translation of the visual exhibition can be found in the YouTube video at 14.42 mins (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKhQZX-EQmY>).

⁴¹ Interview with Editor on 11 November 2017.

commission a transcriber (who is also a coordinator) and translators.⁴² The criteria for translator selection are clear: any translator on the NBT list who has been hired to do similar jobs, is familiar with a number of governmental agencies' glossaries and protocols, and most importantly is able to finish the task within a short period of time.

After each translator has finished their parts, the translations are combined and then e-mailed early on the Friday morning to the editor who is in charge of all official government letters in English. This editor, a senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,⁴³ acts as a 'watchman' or 'gatekeeper' who inspects the flow of official discourse presented to the international community. When overseeing the task, the editor said he has to pay close attention to the translation because of 'the diplomatic nature of the assignment and its political sensitivity, so we [the team] will not translate word-by-word but only meaning' (12:26 mins). The translations would be divided into a table in Word format convenient for cross-checking with the Thai source text. Each row of original and translated text has to be carefully compared; if there are any unclear statements or improper use of language, they would be revised and rectified. Special attention is paid to usages such as royal language, slang or idioms. The incorrect tone of the address would be reset in accordance with the ruling government's ideological stances, sometimes to the point where the prime minister's distinctive spoken or colloquial language disappears from the official translation. During the early period the translations were more carefully monitored. The editor admitted that a number of civil servants who have a very good command of English were pooled together to undertake the newly assigned task over and above their regular assignment, the process of which 'was depended on Gen Prayut to call upon those who have a very good command in English' (09:25 mins).⁴⁴

After being edited, the translations along with the source texts are e-mailed to the technicians at Channel 5. They are required to work against the clock to ensure that the final presentation of the programme is on time. The process of subtitling is a complicated one. The technician needs to carefully cut the translated texts into two lines convenient for inserting on the screen. According to the head technician, the typical constraints for this stage are, for instance, too long a text and how to find visuals suitable for each topic in an address. In the first year of the programme the address lasted more than an hour, which made it difficult for them to manage to insert all the text before the final show. His team 'had to make do with what they have and insert the truncated subtitles during the live transmission' (09:03 mins).⁴⁵ Similar to previous stages, this last one

⁴² Interview with Transcriber on 21 November 2017.

⁴³ The editor working at the Office of the Prime Ministry normally has responsibility to draft and review the prime minister's official letters and announcements in English. This position is a rotating role customarily assigned from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for each premiership.

⁴⁴ Interview with Editor on 1 November 2017. Note that when the editor mentioned Gen Prayut's name, he in fact used the deferential term *than Prayut*, indicating deep respect.

⁴⁵ Interview with Technician on 28 November 2017.

relies on the chain of command with the head technician as the one who has the final say if there are any difficulties during the technical process.




Figure 2.3 The power relations and work flow in the production process of Prayut's weekly address

The production process and how the network is influenced are summarised in **Figure 2.3**. The work flow indicated by dash-line arrows starts from studio recording (by Channel 11), transcribing (by an outsourcer), translating (by outsourcers), editing (by the Government Spokesman Bureau), subtitling and broadcasting (by Channel 5). The power relations among agents indicated by bold arrows are established largely from the editor who works under the Government Spokesman Bureau, with the Office of the Prime Minister at the top.

This network is hierarchical; the power runs down from above, but is later concentrated largely in the hands of the editor who has a final say on the translation before subtitling and broadcasting. This small group of people is a virtual team working and coordinating from their own place, contacting one another only via phone or e-mail. Rarely do they have any meetings about the production process. Nevertheless, the absolute control of agenda setting rests in the hands of the Secretariat of the Prime Minister. The other stages of production, be they studio recording, transcription and translation or mandatory broadcast of the programme in TV channels, follow the same pattern that the chief of each governmental body keeps a tight grip on. All of these stages serves as a collective effort to reproduce and propagate the government's ideologies to the Thai public, and attempts to do the same for the international audiences. The transcriptions of each show, along with their translations, are directed to the Government's official websites later by the

commissioning team with the purpose of re-distributing Prayut's recorded discourse for general public and international audiences.⁴⁶

Agents of translation commission

The main people who deserve close attention are the editor and the translators. The editor focused his comments about the translation team on the pool of competent civil servants who served as 'translators', skirting around the outsourcing of freelance translators because 'this is the change of country's administration [for which the national interest must come first], it is impossible to use private service' (11:40 mins).⁴⁷ Despite the editor claim's that the translators were civil servants from various ministries, this was true only at the beginning. In reality the core team of translators are outsourced and coordinated by freelancers. One interesting point is about the PM's wife, Associate Professor Naraporn Chan-o-cha, who retired in 2011 from teaching English in Chulalongkorn University in Thailand to assume a full-time role as president of the Thai Army Wives Association. It is quite surprising that she does not at all get involved in the translation or editing processes despite her personal efforts to improve Prayut's image by helping 'keep his moods in check, advising him to stay calm and keep smiling before the public'.⁴⁸

The current group of translators reported that although they have no educational background in languages or any professional translation training (they hold Bachelor's degrees in engineering, business communication and marketing, respectively), their English proficiencies are of a high standard since they are half-Thai, half-Westerners who were born and raised bilingually.⁴⁹ One translator used to work as a news anchor in *Newsline* (the English news programme of Channel 11), while another creates an online English entertainment channel. The third lives in the United States.⁵⁰ However, their Thai writing skills were not as good as their English skills, so they primarily translate from Thai into English.⁵¹

There are four points worth commenting upon about the translators. First, although these translators are not civil servants like the initial group, they have been working as freelance employees for Thai governmental organisations for more than five years and are likely to comply with the government's official discourse by converging their interests in the translation project with that of the commissioner.

⁴⁶ When the title of the programme was changed after King Rama IV's death, the website was refurbished and all transcriptions and translations disappeared. There are only those of the new programme 'From the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy to Sustainable Development Goals'.

⁴⁷ Interview with Editor on 1 November 2017.

⁴⁸ Wassana Nanuam. (2014, 23 August) 'Prayuth to wear suits', *Bangkok Post*, <https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/428293/general-gets-ready-to-swap-into-civvies> (Accessed: 24 March 2018).

⁴⁹ Interview with Translator B on 30 November 2017.

⁵⁰ Interview with Translator A on 30 November 2017.

⁵¹ Interview with Translator B on 30 November 2017.

Second, although agreeing to follow the official guideline, two of the freelance translators admitted that there is no specific, written translation guideline at all; the only condition is to finish the assignments before the deadline. But they understood the nature of the task and confirmed that they translated the broadcast on diplomatic grounds, aiming to make it clearer, more understandable and reasonable. According to their personal view, their overall approach is to tone down and try to remove negative comments which might be politically sensitive. In the translators' view, some repetitions would not be taken seriously because they are not meaning anything in particular. Some Thai swear words are hard to translate precisely, so the options are to make them neutral or even get rid of them.

Third, although catering to the explicit interests of the junta and perceiving their work as a diplomatic effort, they do not necessarily and personally subscribe to the same view as their commissioner's. In the interview, they implied that for them 'this translation may not be a labour of love, but only a work of commission' (25:35 mins).⁵²

The last point is the selection of translators. Where professional translators hardly exist among Thai bureaucrats, it is normal that to take on such an important political marketing project the commission team employs these translators on the basis not of professionalism but of acquaintance and previous work. The average age of this group of translator is less than thirty years of age. Having no permanent job, two of the translators enjoy working in the entertainment industry, one creating their own channel on social media to promote traveling around Thailand, and another being given a minor role in an international movie shot in Bangkok. Although this group of translators is not professionally trained nor has enough experience, it might not fail in delivery of the whole of the translation objective since the editor, a government officer by position, is the last person who inspects any improper translation and corrects any unacceptable parts at the final stage.

Seen in a different light, however, the translation commission as part of the TV show production has two paradoxical natures. First, with all efforts being made to control every stage of production as well as translation and editing, it seems that the project team are engaged in censoring Prayut by carefully parsing their translations. Generally the purpose of censorship is to suppress or remove offensive, harmful or politically sensitive parts; however, it turns out that these 'unacceptable parts' are in fact coming from their own prime minister who needs to be rescued from his undiplomatic style of language use. Furthermore, despite the good intentions of censorship, this strange set-up subsequently generates a particular manipulation of language that results in systematic, deliberate mistranslation (which I shall explain in Chapters 5 and 6). The unexpected yet unsurprising outcome is that the international audience may feel sceptical about

⁵² Interview with Translator A on 30 November 2017.

Prayut's discourse when reading English subtitles that give a different impression from that suggested by his gestures and tones as presented on screen.

The second is that the different versions of political discourse given simultaneously are aimed at different target audiences. Prayut's spoken discourse delivered during the show is certainly intended for the Thai public. It is no exaggeration to say that this primary audience group has to experience first-hand his utterances, including his sanctimonious, patronising modes of address. In contrast, the international community as the secondary group receives a well-crafted, more comprehensible written version of Prayut's discourse. Despite the junta's effort to suppress anti-military sentiments and maintain the legitimacy of the current administration, it turns out that these paradoxical circumstances carry the counterproductive implication. Collaborators with the junta in the translation commission are apparently unaware of this strange arrangement.

To summarise, this chapter has contextualised the recent Thai political situation by showing the dynamic of political crisis from the toppling of Thaksin's elected government in 2006 until the coup in 2014. It explains the contestation of power between the network of royalists and that of Thaksin since 2001, when the Thai Rak Thai Party had gained popular support from the majority of Thai people. For a decade the weekly prime ministerial address has been instrumental in the process of political self-justification for both elected and non-elected cabinets. The explanation about the origins of the weekly address is given, as well as the comparison of Thaksin's and Prayut's in terms of features and production process. It also shows that the production of Prayut's programme is hierarchical and centripetal with regards to the power relations of each governmental organisation. The chapter ends with a discussion of the agents and of how the nature of this commissioned translation (to be precise, censorship) is paradoxical in itself. The next chapter discusses linguistic approaches and conceptual frameworks, and proposes a comprehensive model for analysing Prayut's addresses as the source texts and the official translations as the target texts

Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The aim of this chapter is to present the conceptual framework and research model for analysis. It begins with situating the present research within the discipline of translation studies. It goes on to introduce the notion of equivalence at different levels upon which translators' viewpoints, text purposes and contexts could be discussed to determine to which types of equivalence the target texts are assigned, thereby leading to shifts in translation. To explain whether shifts are obligatory or optional, the concept of ideology to which the translation of a political text is related is discussed in association with the translator's interventionist move to 'rewrite' the original and the idea of institutional influences on the translation process and procedures.

Regarding analytical tools, the chapter explains how the concepts of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) can be incorporated as a model to analyse the data at the lexicogrammatical level and used to link the linguistic findings to Thai politics as a socio-political environment surrounding the use of such language in the original speeches. By comparing the source text (ST) and the target text (TT), the research pays close attention to the structural differences between English and Thai, upon which the SFL interpretation of the Thai language by Pattama (2006) is employed. This model helps indicate the major grammatical discrepancies and cultural mismatches that the translators may render without strict faithfulness to the original, but rather according to their own ideological stance motivated from political circumstances or that of their commissioners.

3.1 Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS)

One of the most influential works on translation studies is James Holmes' seminal 1972 paper 'The name and nature of translation studies', originally presented in the Third International Congress of Applied Linguistics in Copenhagen. The essay explores translation theories before the 1970s and explains how the terms used for naming the discipline were greatly varied ones such as 'translatology', 'theory of translating', 'science of translation'. He goes on to propose an overall framework in order to describe what translation studies is about. His framework is later presented as a 'map' of translation studies by Gideon Toury as in **Figure 3.1**.




Figure 3.1 Holmes's 'map' of translation studies (Toury 2012: 4)

Holmes divides translation studies into 'pure' and 'applied' areas of research. Under the 'pure' branch he designates two subcategories: theoretical translation studies (ThTS) and descriptive translation studies (DTS). ThTS comprises general and partial theories. The former refers to the generalisations of translation phenomena into principles, theories and models. The latter refers to the study of restriction in different parameters (medium, area, rank, text-type, time and problem). DTS research can focus on product, function and process:

- (i) *Product-oriented DTS* is concerned with the research that describes existing translations. The study can be the description of individual translations (the study of a single ST and TT pair) and comparative translation description (the comparative analyses of the various TTs that are translated from the same ST);
- (ii) *Function-oriented DTS* deals with the description of translations' functions in the recipient sociocultural situation;
- (iii) *Process-oriented DTS* is interested in the cognitive perspective of translators during their process of translation.

According to the research questions mentioned in Chapter 1, the present study aims at investigating the patterns of translation procedures and overall strategies, as well as identifying trends in translation solutions to the weekly prime ministerial addresses. Therefore, this study is situated in the product-oriented DTS that examines the existing translations, and also partly in partial theoretical studies which are restricted by: *medium* (partly written to be spoken language, and written language for subtitle), *area* (the English-Thai pair), *text-type* (informative and operative text-type, political text) and *time* (Prayut's addresses from 2014 to 2016).

The present study also draws on Gideon Toury's three-phase procedures for systemic translation studies (2012: 31-4). The English texts of Prayut's weekly addresses as they appeared on the screen of the TV programme and on the Thai Government website are assumed to be translations. The transcriptions of Prayut's weekly addresses are established as ST and then mapped onto the

assumed English translations. The mapping is done speech by speech and segment by segment. After the paired speeches and segments are established, the translation relationships are inferred from the shifts elicited from the comparisons, and thereafter the concept of general translation that underpins the entire texts is formulated. The translation relationships and generalisations about norms or preferred models of translation would be explained in terms of translation equivalence.

3.2 Equivalence and translation shift

The notion of equivalence has been a key issue in debate among translation scholars and central to many areas of research. Roman Jakobson (1959/2000) discusses the key terms ‘meaning’ and ‘equivalence’ in his three kinds of translation: intralingual, interlingual and intersemiotic. He maintains that basically interlingual translation – translation between two different sign systems – cannot be fully ‘equivalent’ because different sign systems have different grammatical and lexical forms (2000: 114-5). However, some scholars totally deny its validity. For example, Snell-Hornby (1988: 22) states that the notion of equivalence is too abstract and unsuitable for the basis of translation theory. Chesterman (1997: 7) argues that total equivalence is ‘virtually unattainable’, hence useless in translation theory.

Nonetheless, the notion of equivalence remains crucial to the comparison between the ST and the TT in that their meanings and contents are measured in terms of the process and product of translations, especially in the case we are investigating. Nida’s *Toward a Science of Translating* (1964) proposes a scientific approach to translation by borrowing theoretical concepts from linguistics (semantics and pragmatics in particular) as well as from Chomsky’s generative-transformative grammar. Nida formulates two types of equivalence. *Formal equivalence* concerns itself with the message, in both form and content. That is, ‘the message in the receptor language should match as closely as possible the different elements in the source language’ (Nida, 1964: 159). This is later changed into ‘formal correspondence’ in the joint-authored *The Theory and Practice of Translation* (Nida and Taber, 1969). Gloss translation or the literal and meaningful reproduction of ST form and content is typical in this kind of translation. It is often accompanied by the translator’s footnotes for the readers to gain full comprehension, which would allow them to familiarise themselves with the source culture. *Dynamic equivalence* or ‘functional equivalence’ is based upon ‘the equivalence effect’ borrowed from Rieu and Phillips (1954). The principle argues that ‘the relationship between receptor and message should be substantially the same as that which existed between the original receptors and the message’ (Nida, 1964: 159). The important requirement in this kind of translation is ‘naturalness’; the translator seeks the most natural equivalent to the source language message, and thereby the adjustment of grammar, lexis, or cultural references is allowed in translation procedures.

Another scholar who approaches the concept of equivalence from a pedagogical viewpoint is Baker (1992/2011). She categorises equivalence according to linguistic levels. *Equivalence at the word level* focuses on the meaning of single words and expressions. She defines this level against the non-equivalence between a language pair; the lack of any words in the target language that have the same meaning as the source language. *Equivalence above word level* considers combinations of words and phrases (collocations, idioms and fixed expressions). Collocation patterns in the ST carry meaning and can be cultural-specific; therefore, the translator should avoid producing odd collocations in the TT. Idioms and fixed expressions can give rise to two main problems: the correct recognition and interpretation, and the difficulties in transferring all aspects of meaning that they convey into the target language. For example, the idiom *ban-plai* ‘spread out’ + ‘end’ in Thai has no exact corresponding English idiom. The two words are bundled to construe the colloquial meaning ‘to cost more money in the end’. If the translator renders it literally, it is impossible that the English reader will get the same meaning as the ST reader. *Grammatical equivalence* deals with grammatical categories. Differences in the grammatical structures of the source and target languages frequently affect the information content of the messages during the translation process. There are five major categories that the translator needs to bear in mind: number, gender, person, tense and aspect, and voice. These categories look at the syntactical structure of a clause which is varied in each language, especially English and Thai in our case. I discuss this problem in Section 3.5.

Textual equivalence relates to the word order which plays a crucial role in organising messages and controlling the flow or rolling-out of information. Based on Halliday’s information flow, Baker suggests that the translator looks at two main organisations of a clause: *thematic structure* and *information structure*. First, *thematic structure* is speaker-oriented in that a clause consists of two segments: (i) *theme* as the point of orientation where the speaker connects back to their previous stretch of discourse and forward to the next stretch in order to create a coherent point of view, and (ii) *rheme* as additional information the speaker provides about the theme to fulfil the communicative purpose of his/her utterance. Second, *information structure* is hearer-oriented in that the hearer considers what part of the message is known to them (given) and what part is new (new). Another way of looking at textual organisation is *cohesion*. Text can be coherent by using reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction and lexical cohesion. The level of *cohesion* can differ from one language to another, and therefore it is necessary for translators to pay attention to the language pair they are working with – whether each language has different patterns and ways of making text cohesive.

Pragmatic equivalence is concerned with the concepts of *coherence* and *implicature* among others that are central to pragmatics. First, *coherence* is defined (against the concept of cohesion in textual equivalence) as a network of relations that organise and create a text beyond textual cohesion or the surface relations which link words and expression to others in a text. Coherence

is also concerned with the way stretches of language are connected by ‘virtue of conceptual or meaning dependencies as perceived by language users’ (Baker, 2011: 231). The coherence of a text derives from interaction between knowledge presented in the text and the reader’s own knowledge and experience of the world (factors such as age, occupation, political affiliation). There are a number of language- or cultural-specific factors contributing to a shift in coherence; for instance, the failure in rendering specific meaning assigned to the item in the STs. Second, *implicature* (based on Grice, 1975) refers to what the speaker implies rather than what is literally said. How successfully the *implicature* in the STs is interpreted depends on the translator’s ability in harmonising it with the target reader’s expectation. In order to maintain *coherence* and *implicature*, Baker suggests avoiding discrepancies between the author’s worldview presented in the STs and the one that the target reader tends to be familiar with. The degree of intervention by the translator depends on two factors. First, if there is assumed to be more harmony existing between the ST model of the world and the TT one, it is likely that the translator would rely less on direct intervention. The second is the translator’s own view on loyalties – whether they should lie more with the ST writer or the target reader.

Baker’s equivalence (or non-equivalence) at the word level, plus her grammatical, textual and pragmatic equivalence are of particular relevance to our own case study. For example, it is crucial to understand how the translators render the politically-sensitive term *prachachon*, which can possibly mean ‘citizen’, ‘people’ or even ‘population’. It is because their version of translation can foreground or background the prime minister’s actual perception towards *prachachon* in his addresses. This model of analysis is further discussed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.

In *Exploring Translation Theories*, Pym (2014: Ch 2, 3) gives a new twist to the notion of equivalence as being ‘natural’ and ‘directional’. ‘Natural’ equivalence is presumed to exist between languages or cultures before the act of translating, in which Vinay and Darbelnet (1995/2004), to name but two scholars, tried to categorise the translation procedures used in order to maintain equivalent effect. ‘Directional’ equivalence concerns itself with an asymmetrical relation. By translating in a particular way, it does not ensure that the equivalence will occur if one translates in the other. It concerns itself with the translator’s choice of strategies (such as literal translation or domestication) that are not dictated by the source text. Translation memories, for instance, are seen as a way in which ‘directional’ equivalence was imposed upon the translators by drawing their attention to exact matches already compiled in a corpus between a given language pair.

All notions of equivalence have been developed through time and have been a key issue in translation studies. Some disregard the whole concept because of its unattainability at the textual level or its irrelevance in today’s theory. However, equivalence is still applicable in some areas, especially to analyse the ST and TT comparison in the present study. That is, equivalence can be

achieved in many ways, depending on translators' viewpoints, text purposes and contexts – the types of equivalence the TTs are specifically assigned to.

Furthermore, equivalence is intrinsically linked to 'translation shifts'. It is necessary to indicate which parts of the TT the translator renders differently from its original. Among others, Hatim and Munday (2004: 88-90) discuss the concept of translation shifts with emphasis on the level of discourse and the context of situation. Following the Hallidayan model of language, Hatim and Munday consider texts as vehicles to express a variety of sociocultural meanings. A translator has to deal with the rhetorical purposes of text, communicative events or genre, and attitude implied in a particular discourse. They advise three possible shifts that may be exhibited in translation. *Genre shift* occurs when the goals of communicative events in the original text are not strictly followed in the translation, and the original patterns of the ST that should appear similarly in both versions are to some extent mishandled or intentionally altered for the new audience. *Text shift* occurs when the rhetorical purposes such as arguing or narrating get mixed up or changed, for example, from concessive to adversative mode. *Discourse shift* occurs when a particular ideology and its attitudinal meanings which show a range of ideational, interpersonal and textual values (discourse semantic meanings) are rendered differently in translation. See Section 3.4.1 for the concept of discourse semantics.

The relevance to our case as a piece of research in DTS is to explain the shifts and the motivation behind them. Since there are various choices available for aiming at equivalence, the selection criteria would fall into the hands of the translators, who may allow other extralinguistic factors to affect their decisions. In other words, the results of translations of Prayut's weekly address are based not only on translators' own strategies in dealing with the syntactical differences between English and Thai (which may cause 'obligatory' shifts), but also on ideological directionality from their own institution (which may show that the shifts are in fact 'optional'). Therefore, the notions of equivalence and shifts will be useful when applied together with linguistic tools as a model of analysis that I will discuss later in Section 3.4.

3.3 Ideology and translation studies

This section discusses the central concept in the present study. It begins with the introduction of definitions of ideology in various academic fields, followed by translation studies that use ideology as a guiding concept in explaining the rationale behind translation activities.

Defining ideology

Since the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy coined the term *idéologie* to explain social phenomena, the term has been defined both positively and negatively by scholars across various fields of study. The negative aspect of ideology is introduced by the Marxist approach as a 'false

consciousness'; for example, the misguided ideas of the working class about its material conditions of existence are used by the ruling class as a means of exploitation and domination.

The definition that brings together the concepts of ideology, discourse and language is given by Fairclough (1989/2015; 2003: 106) which is adopted in our study here. For him, the concept of ideology relates largely to the notion of 'common sense' which is present when one accepts a certain thing without questioning it. 'Common sense' derives from the *coherence* of discourse production (from a text producer's viewpoint) and the processes of discourse interpretation (from a text receiver's viewpoint). The more coherent the construction of ideological assumptions in the text, the less likely that people will be aware of its existence and then take it as common sense. The operation of ideology (as the common sense of implicit assumptions) can be seen as ways to construct texts by imposing those assumptions *constantly* and *cumulatively* on text interpreters and text producers without them being aware of it.

How ideology becomes common sense is essentially through the process of 'naturalisation'. That is, when a dominant discourse loses its connection with particular interests and is accepted as a reasonable practice in an institution, ideology (implicitly accompanying that dominant discourse) then ceases to be ideology. It is because an ideological effect works best in its least visible way. If one becomes aware that a particular common sense is employed to sustain inequality in power at one's own expense, its capacity in such a way then comes to an end. This 'naturalisation' process can be seen in several ways. It can be when a meaning of linguistic expression is fixed (such as the dictionary meaning of words), through interactional routines (conventional ways in which participants interact with each other) and when a social subject is positioned in different situational types.

Fairclough's concept of 'ideological common sense' ties in closely with power relations in that 'common sense' serves to sustain unequal relations of power, directly or indirectly. Ideological common sense can be *foregrounded* in the aforementioned process of 'naturalisation' to establish, maintain and change social relations of power, domination and exploitation. In this respect, ideologies achieve their invisibility by being brought into any social practices through language use at lexicogrammatical level – the way text producers *textualise* the world in a particular way as well as the way interpreters interpret the text according to their own worldviews.

Fairclough (2003: 9) also maintains that ideology can have a durability and stability which transcends individual texts. It is associated closely with *discourses* (representing aspects of the world), with *genres* (enacting in ways of acting socially), and with *styles* (inculcating in the identities of social agents). I will discuss this point in the second half of Section 3.4.

Although approaching ideology from different angles, the above definitions are crucial to our study since they are the guiding concepts for inspecting the translation and its context to see if there is any ideological imposition on the texts studied. Fairclough's approaches on ideology,

discourse, and language will be useful for this present study, especially in analysing the Thai socio-political context of translation.

Translation of ideology and ideology of translation

Ideology has been the subject of interest among translation scholars since the 1990s. They attempt to explore the concept of ideology in translation; what is the meaning and implication, how it affects the translation process and how readers perceive it in the target culture. Fawcett and Munday (2009: 137) opine that translation studies takes an interest in ideology because of its link to the concept of language and power relations and how the source language and culture is distorted in the translation process. Many approaches related to ideology have been applied to translation studies, for example gender, post-colonialism, the translator's self and politics. All this research shares similar ideas of ideological manipulation and orientation – either by the dominant actors or the minority – through the use of language.

In their influential *The Translator as Communicator*, Hatim and Mason (1997) make the distinction between the ideology of translation and the translation of ideology. By re-examining the previous work on translation studies related to social context, they found that ‘the ideology of translation’ is concerned with those studies recommending translation choices orientated towards the wider readership or towards the individual voice of the text producer. The examples of those studies of choices are, among others, Nida (1964), Newmark (1988) and Venuti (1995). These choices made in translation are implicitly presented as ideological. Thus, they argue that translating is an ideological activity in itself (Hatim and Mason, 1997: 145).

In parallel, ‘the translation of ideology’ involves those studies showing how the ideology of the STs is made explicit or implicit in the TTs. They raise the example of the English translations of Hans Christian Anderson's fairy-tales (Knowles and Malmkjaer, 1989) which found varying degrees of explicitness of the Andersen-esque ideology in different translated versions. The translators as processors of texts ‘filter’ the ST world through their own ideology. Hatim and Mason (1997: 147) indicate that the above research finding illustrates the role of translation as a result of ‘mediation’ where one's own beliefs, assumptions or value-systems are incorporated in various degrees during translators' processing of utterances and texts. This is obviously to point out the possibility of translation creating ideological distortion of the ST discourse.

Translation as rewriting and intervention

The concept of ideology in translation was first discussed in a systematic way in 1992 when Lefevere's *Translation, Rewriting, and the Manipulation of Literary Fame* came out. The book discusses the role of the translator in manipulating the source text as a way of expressing one's own ideology. Lefevere (1992/2016) claims that translation is the most recognisable type of rewriting (2016: 3). This is because when a source text is transferred into another culture and

introduced to foreign readers, it lifts an author's works beyond the boundaries of their own culture of origin. The type of rewriting in Lefevere's thesis basically goes beyond translation; it includes historiography, anthologisation of texts, criticism and editing. All these text-manipulating activities fall into the concept of system (he himself focuses on the literary one). The system is controlled by two factors:

- (i) *Professionals* who work within the system and partly determine the poetics (or an inventory of literary devices and a concept of what literature should be);
- (ii) *Patronage* by those who operate outside the system and partly determine the ideology.

Lefevere (ibid.: 13-5) maintains that patronage (by individuals, groups or institutions) can obstruct or delay the process of reading, writing or rewriting of literature with their powers consisting of three elements:

- (i) an *ideological component*⁵³ relating to acts of constraining choices of literary forms and subject matters;
- (ii) an *economic component* relating to financial incentives for writers, rewriters and other professionals (such as critics, teachers);
- (iii) a *status component* relating to acceptance and integration of writer/rewriter in certain highly praised groups in the system.

Lefevere regards patronage as 'undifferentiated' when all three components can be provided by the same patronage, but as 'differentiated' when they do not necessarily bring about one another. For instance, best-selling authors with economic success may not get recognised in literary circles.

Although Lefevere's rewriting aspect of translation seems to focus mainly on the literary system, it can be applied to the translation of the Thai PM's weekly address because it provides the most important and useful consideration to translation of ideology, with the patronage of the Thai government and the three components as guiding principles for translators (rewriters) who actually work for this institution.

In retrospect, the terminology for the study of translation and ideology has developed further from the idea of translation as 'rewriting' (Lefevere, 1992) and as 'mediation' (Hatim and Mason, 1997). The more assertive and evaluative term 'intervention' is used to explain the way translators use their own evaluation in dealing with the STs. Munday (2012: 20) stresses that 'we [researchers in translation] crucially need to remember that all intervention is evaluative and to take account of both conscious and unconscious choices made by the translator'.

⁵³ Lefevere (2016: 13) adopts Jameson's (1974) definition that goes beyond the political aspect; ideology is the 'grillwork of form, convention, and belief which orders our actions'.

The idea of translation as ‘intervention’ began, in fact, in his previous work. In the special issue of *The Translator* contributing to the discussion of translation and ideology, Munday (2007a: 198) explores how ideology is presented and conveyed textually in the translations of speeches, political writings and interviews with revolutionary leaders in Latin America. He follows the critical linguistic consideration that language ‘reproduces’ and ‘constructs’ ideology and the asymmetrical power relations that exist between writer and reader, especially when one of the participants is a representative of an institution such as a government or a member of the mass media. It can be exemplified by (re-)naming or giving an attitudinal epithet to a particular participant or social actor in a certain text by the speaker/writer, which makes explicit their values and judgements. Therefore, regardless of whether or not the translator of the TTs and author of the STs share the same political ideologies, the former’s linguistic perspective will be inevitably dissimilar to the latter’s (Munday, 2007a: 199). He also concludes that while shifts found in translations of those political writings are largely ideologically motivated, some shifts may arise from the translator’s unique experience of the two languages.

In Munday’s edited volume of *Translation as Intervention* (2007b), the notion of intervention is expanded into multiple forms, thanks to contributors to the book. Mossop (2007: 18-37) contributes by focusing on the translator’s perspective on the ‘voice’ (particularly lexical-syntactic choice) that is selected by the translator to represent the ST, or an intervention through the projection of the translator’s self. In the same volume, Hatim (2007: 84-96) investigates how an intervention can take place at the level of text, discourse and genre. He stresses the need for the translator to be aware of diverging functions of language and register (in Hallidayan terms, Field, Tenor and Mode) in different linguistic cultures. Hatim’s notion of the translator’s intervention is relevant to the present study in terms of the distinction between Thai and English functions of language, which will be elaborated in Section 3.5.

Another aspect of intervention is shown by Kang (2007: 237-8) as a form of ‘collective effort’. She investigates ideological shifts in news translation about North Korea and found that the primary factor that influences the translators to ‘recontextualise’ the news stories is their institutional background (news agencies). In the process of English translation under the editorial teams, the Korean STs were re-perspectivised and differently foregrounded. Some voices in the STs were blended with others, or even silenced altogether. This intervention (in the writing, editing, and revising processes) is done by collective effort as part of an institutional routine. Her study refutes the commonly held view that translated news provides the accurate and complete representation of the STs. Rather, news translation is institution-oriented, the result of a recontextualised process and the preference of particular ideologies and voices.

All the above studies agree that translation results from the translator’s conscious or unconscious intervention. Its relevance to our case study is twofold. First is the role of the translator (or a group of translators) who intervenes in the process of producing translations of weekly prime ministerial

addresses, regardless of the socio-political context of their workplace. Second, although studying a different source of data, Kang's work is incisive and useful to the present study, for it shows explanations of institutionalisation as prime factors that affect the finished product of translation. Kang's work is, in part, similar to the literary system in Lefevere's thesis, but different in focus. Nonetheless, both remain crucial platforms for the analysis of our case.

Institutional translation

According to Kang (2009: 140-1), institutional translation is generally defined as a type of translation that occurs *in or for* particular institutions. Many translation scholars are interested in this topic; among others, Mossop (1988, 1990) and Koskinen (2008). Although their approaches to the study of institutional translation are different, they share the assumption that translation is a socially situated practice.

The first scholar who takes the lead in studying institutional translation is Mossop (1988: 65). He defines institution in a concrete sense, including corporations, churches, governments, newspapers. In his other paper, he maintains that translation is basically a result of institutional arrangement; the decisions towards any translation project are heavily 'pre-determined' by the goals, missions and visions of the institution under which the translator is working. The translator hence acts as an agent of that institution, not as an individual (Mossop, 1990: 343, 351). In this sense, Mossop's approach seems to resemble Lefevere's (1992) concept of patronage, but the latter emphasises the concrete persons and institution that support or block the development of literature in certain systems.

Also taking Mossop's view on traditional institutions into account, Koskinen (2008) studies translations in the European Union – the biggest translating institution in the world. She argues that institutional translation is a kind of *autotranslation*, in which translation is used as a means of 'speaking' by an official body (government agency, multinational organisation or a private company, as well as individual persons working on behalf of that body). The voice that is heard in translation belongs to that institution. In other words, the institution itself gets translated. In institutions like the European Union there are many documents needed to be translated to serve in multilingual contexts, which means the institution can be both STs and TTs (Koskinen, 2008: 22, 2010: 55-7). She further suggests that when one studies the phenomena of institutional translation, it is important to discern the dynamic nature of ideological and political agendas of the institution in question and its preferred translation strategies – apart from the fact that those strategies might be applied by the translator consciously or unconsciously.

All the above studies recognise the inherent characteristics of institutional translation which features the patron and translation commission. For them, the institution always seems to be the one that determines the translator's strategies and steers the translation process towards its own goals, regardless of the translator's experiences. This present study agrees with the above

considerations, especially Koskinen's (2010), that the political agendas or ideologies of the Thai government – as an institution which commissions the translation of the PM's weekly address – must be investigated. In doing so, we can see if those ideologies are really shown in the official translation – whether there is also the trace of the translator's own intervention, or purely and simply the institutional orientation in them.

3.4 A model of analysis

This section discusses two linguistic frameworks: Systemic Functional Linguistic (SFL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), both of which will be employed as a model of analysis in the present study. The first one relies primarily on the works by Halliday and Matthiessen (1985/2014), Eggins (2004) and Martin and Rose (2007), while the second is based on Fairclough (1989/2015, 2003).

Systemic Functional Linguistics

The analytical framework of SFL was developed by Michael K. A. Halliday and his colleagues during the 1960s by drawing on works from Malinowski (1944) and Firth (1957). They are also interested in how social contexts are related to one another by means of language. Halliday's 'social context' originally derives from Malinowski's anthropological work of the 1920s and 1930s. According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2014: 32-3), a given language is interpreted by reference to its 'semiotic habitat'; that is, the context determines and is constructed by language choices. They are interested in how language as a system with lexis and grammatical categories is connected with its 'context of situation' and 'context of culture' as the environment of the text. For them, 'context of situation' refers to the different types of situation collectively constituting a particular cultural domain, while 'context of culture' refers to the contextual potential of a community.

To understand the language and its contexts, systemic functional linguists use the method of discourse analysis as a tool to identify the role of wordings in passages of text and explain how people make meaning in a particular way. They see the relations between social activities, discourse and grammar (syntax) as intertwined concepts; that is, social contexts are realised as texts which in turn realise themselves as sequences of clause. To illustrate the idea, **Figure 3.2** shows the model of language in social context. A series of circles symbolise grammar, discourse and social activities. The small one nestles inside the bigger ones in complementary perspectives in a single complex phenomenon.




Figure 3.2 Point of view on discourse: from social activities and from grammar (adapted from Martin and Rose, 2007: 5)

The main construct used by SFL scholars is to understand the different elements of *language*, *register* and *genre* – or the model of context. **Genre** is the schematic structure of language use that is conditioned by socio-cultural environment, but itself determines a pattern of register. **Register** (or **register variables**) refers to the variation of language use in certain contexts, characterised by three dimensions:

Field - topic of situation or the activity in which we are engaged;

Tenor - the relationship between the people involved in any communicative situation;

Mode - the form of the interaction; written/spoken, spatial/experiential distance.

These three dimensions condition particular functions of language or **discourse semantics**, which are also called the metafunctions:

Ideational metafunction ‘construes’ our experience of the world;

Interpersonal metafunction ‘enacts’ relationships between interactants;

Textual metafunction ‘organises’ the pattern of a text.

This is the way the text producer exploits the discourse semantics in accordance with their perception of the world. This model of language is partly predictive (of the constituent features of the text) and partly constructive (helps to form the social context in which it operates). The relations between these concepts are shown in **Figure 3.3**. The largest and outer circle represents ‘context of culture’, the middle one ‘context of situation’, and the smallest one ‘text in context’.




Figure 3.3 Genre, register and language (Martin and Rose, 2007: 309)

Realisation is one of the most important terms in SFL. Martin and Rose (2007: 6) define it as a kind of re-coding or symbolising ‘since grammar both symbolises and encodes discourse, just as discourse both symbolises and encodes social activity’. The concept of realisation brings about **metaredundancy**, a notion borrowed from Lemke (1993). It helps describe the distinctive nature of how *language* would typically rebound on *register* at one level, and *register* on *genre* at another.

Another important element of Halliday’s model is how the text producer exploits discourse semantics or meanings. The answer is that strands of meaning are formed by **lexicogrammar** (lexis, grammar and syntax); the way to turn meanings into wordings.

Considering three **discourse semantics** that correspond with **register variables**, each of them is realised by some forms of lexicogrammatical systems. The following part is the summary from Eggins’ Chapters 6, 8, 9 and 10 (2004).

(i) *Field* (ideational meaning) is realised through the patterns of participants (nouns, subject-specific terms), circumstances (such as prepositional phrases of time, manner, place), and processes (verbs, passive/active, nominalisation) which can be called the **transitivity** patterns. Transitivity or process type is a grammatical system that shows a range of process choices in presenting experience in a clause, which is divided into six main types of process: material (process of *doing*, such as ‘walk’, ‘leave’), mental (process of *thinking/feeling* such as ‘believe’, ‘understand’), behavioural process (mixed process between physiological and psychological behaviour, such as ‘dream’), verbal (process of *saying*, such as ‘ask’, ‘state’), existential (process of *existing*; ‘there is/are’), and relational (process of *being*; ‘to be’).

Another meaning under *field* is logical meaning that can be realised by using conjunctions to logically connect clauses. A clause can expand another by elaborating (clarifying what has been given in the previous clause), extending (giving more information), and enhancing (multiplying the meaning of the previous clause by reference to time, space, manner, and condition).

(ii) *Tenor* (interpersonal meaning) is realised through the patterns of **mood** (the types of clause structure: declarative, interrogative and imperative). It can be realised through the patterns of **modality** (the degree of certainty or obligation in a clause with ideas such as ‘must’, ‘should’). The use of **pronouns** and **attitudinal words**, either positive or negative, can also help realise the interpersonal meaning. This is the indication of power and solidity between speakers’ relationships; the extent of their intimacy, their level of familiarity with each other, as well as their attitudes and judgements.

(iii) *Mode* (textual meaning) can refer to the role of language in interaction. The role involves two types of continua: the spatial distance (the possibilities of feedback between interactants, such as immediate feedback in casual conversation or telephone) and experiential distance (a range of situations according to language use and social process, such as playing cards where language is being used to accompany the activities). Textual meaning of *mode* is realised through the way in which a text is organised in a **cohesive** way (through lexical repetition, collocation, ellipsis, substitution). It can be also realised through **theme** and **information flow** (word order) which can foreground or show continuity in the organisation of a clause or paragraph.

The relations between lexicogrammar, discourse semantics and register variables are generally illustrated in **Table 3.1**.

Table 3.1 Relations between lexicogrammar, discourse semantics and register variables

Lexicogrammar (words and structures)	Discourse semantics (meanings)	Register variables
Transitivity, conjunctions	Ideational	Field (topic of text)
Mood, modality, pronouns, attitudinal words	Interpersonal	Tenor (social role between participants)
Conjunctions, cohesion, theme, information flow	Textual	Mode (role of language in interaction)

SFL as a linguistic tool is useful for diagnosing the role of discourses in a particular text and clarifying why social actors create meaning out of their utterance in a particular way. For example, analysing mood, modality, pronouns and attitudinal words will help elicit *interpersonal meanings* or the prime minister’s attitudes in the ST and the translators’ in the TT. By comparing transitivity and classification of ‘people’ and ‘things’ in the originals and their translations, we can see how both versions present the worldviews or *ideational meanings* differently. Furthermore, the understanding of *textual meanings* can be achieved by analysing the ways the translators connected the events in the TT with the different use of conjunctions and organised the TT information in a more logical way than the ST. This method of lexio-grammatical analysis pays close attention to the choice the translator makes when making meaning. It is largely because the

way the translator chooses a particular form of grammar and lexis is always conditioned by socio-cultural environments, a fact which has various implications for their translations.

Beside the texts, the programme of the weekly address has different visuals of symbolic items appearing on the background for each airtime. The multimodal approach will be employed as a supplementary method to analyse visual semiotic choices of the programme presentation. This approach (rooted in SFL) is expected to yield insightful results of the non-linguistic features such as visual or gesture. It is largely because communication is achieved not only by means of texts, but by choices of iconography, images and their attributes (ideas and values), settings, salience or features in composition (cultural symbols, size, colour, tone, and focus). The multimodal approach used in this study is based on the works by van Leeuwen (2005) and Kress (2010).

Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an approach that attempts to understand complex social phenomena. It emerged as the work of a network of scholars in the early 1990s, with its roots lying in many disciplines such as rhetoric, text linguistics, anthropology, and pragmatics. These scholars are interested in deconstructing ideologies and power through the ‘systemic’ and ‘retroductable’ investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual) to uncover ‘hidden, opaque, and visible structure of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in languages’ (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 4, 12).

The most important concept for CDA is ‘discourse’ and the use of language to control. According to Fairclough (1989/2015), *discourse as social practice* refers to the whole process of social interaction that a text is involved in (2015: 57). It is through discourse (or semiotic practices) that language users constitute social realities. Moreover, it is through discourse that *ideology as common sense* is formulated, reproduced and reinforced (see the definition of ideology in 4.3). Critical discourse analysts are interested in the persuasive influence of power, a concept borrowed from Gramsci (1971) who describes the ways the dominant groups in society can persuade the subordinate groups to accept the former’s own moral and political values. In doing so, discourse is exploited to construct predominant attitudes or beliefs in such ways that make them appear ‘natural’ and ‘common sense’ (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 24).

To explain the complex relations of texts, interactions and contexts, Fairclough (2015) categorises discourse into three dimensions: text, practice of discourse and socio-cultural practice. Discourse involves the social conditions of text production and text interpretation. These social conditions shape individuals’ behaviour, thereby leading to discourse (re)production and interpretation, which in turn shapes the way in which texts are produced and interpreted, as illustrated in **Figure 3.4**.




Figure 3.4 Dimensions of discourse as text, interaction and context (adapted from Fairclough 2015: 58)

To analyse the above three dimensions, Fairclough (2015: 59) proposes three parallel stages of analysis. *Description* is the linguistic analysis of formal properties of text: vocabulary, grammar, textual structure. *Interpretation* is concerned with how to interpret the values of ‘textual features’ against a background of social common-sense assumptions. *Explanation* is to portray how a discourse (as part of social process and social practice) is determined by social structures and how its reproduction in turn affects those structures – sustaining or changing them.

In order to get through those dimensions, it is necessary to understand not only how language is used in text production in order to *describe* its ‘textual features’, but also how the discourse is ‘socially conditioned’ and ‘determined’ by social structures in order to *interpret* and *explain* the texts in question. Fairclough (2003: 24) regards ‘social conditions and social determinations of discourse’ as ‘orders of discourse’. Derived from Foucault’s concept, ‘order of discourse’ is the social structuring of linguistic variation, which is constituted by social practices or the way to govern how the language is used to achieve certain things. The order of discourse comprises three elements.

Genres are diverse ways of *acting*, of producing social life, in the semiotic mode. Fairclough develops his thesis based on various social researchers such as Arendt (1958), Giddens (1991) and Habermas (1984) and proposes that genres can be identified at different levels of abstraction. *Pre-genres* based on Swales (1990) refer to genres at the highest level: Narrative, Argument, Description and Conversation. *Disembedded genres* based on Giddens (1991) refer to some elements of genres that are detached from one context and flow to another; for instance, there is the interview that transcends the different networks of social practices and scale – it can be a job interview, celebrity interview, or political interview. The lowest level is *situated genres* which refer to specific networks of social practices that occur in particular circumstances, such as an ethnographic interview.

Discourses⁵⁴ are diverse *representations* of social life which are inherently positioned. Social actors who are positioned differently in society see and represent social life in different ways. For example, the poor may be seen by the government as the people who always need help from them. Different discourses are different representations of social life or perspectives on the world. Not only representing the world as it is, discourses also project, imagine and present the possible worlds different from the actual one. The relationships between different discourses reflect the relationships between different people (complementing, competing, or dominating) because they are part of linguistic resources which people can deploy either to gain cooperation or to separate themselves from one another. If looking for ways in which it is represented, we can find a range of linguistic features such as vocabularies, semantic relations, and nominalisation that realise a discourse. This obviously links to the next element which shows how the individual use of language is conditioned by one's perception of the world.

Among other approaches, Fairclough's **styles** are the ways social actors reflect their *identity* and personality – how one speaks, writes, looks, or moves. Styles are linked to processes of identification; how people identify themselves and are identified by others. This process of identifying oneself (personal identity) is complex and involves defining oneself for/against social identity. Social identity is acquired in part from the social circumstances one grows up with (gender, class, religion) and in part from socialisation in later life into a particular 'social role' (politician, soldier, police officer). The full development of one's identity depends on 'social roles' being personally invested in a person who truly acts as a social agent in a society. Additionally, one's identity and styles (such as a military style) is constituted during one's life according to the discourses one encounters when socialising, and later is reflected in the ways one speaks, writes or moves. Characteristics of particular styles are presented in various linguistic features: phonological features (pronunciation, intonation, stress, and rhythm), vocabulary and metaphor (attitudinal adverbials, and swear-words). The interplay between language and 'body language' also contributes to characteristics of styles; different gestures encode different meanings.

According to Fairclough (2015: 206), 'order of discourse' is the way in which diverse genres, discourses and styles are networked together. It is a social structuring of semiotic differences; for example, interview or meeting (different genres), various representations using particular lexis or grammar (different discourses) and ways of pronunciation, attitudinal words in speaking/writing, or pronoun use (different styles).

CDA takes the view that if we want to point out that language is instrumental to the dominant group's manipulation, it is not enough simply to analyse the texts in question, or the processes of text production and interpretation, but rather that the whole relationship between texts, processes

⁵⁴ Note that 'discourse(s)' in the text here is used as a countable noun, while 'discourse' as an abstract noun refers to the use of language and social practice.

and social conditions (Thai politics in our case) must be considered. CDA believes that the systemic organisation of discourse leads to the systemic selection of linguistic categories and features in texts. Ideological content is expressed in linguistic items in two ways: (i) the sign of ideologically determined selections made by the speaker or writer, and (ii) the expression of ideological content exposed by any linguistic devices in a text. Therefore, ideological significance (or common sense assumptions imposed by dominant groups) can be inferred from the linguistic features in a particular piece of text.

CDA and SFL can be applied in the present study to analyse and explain the relationships between complex Thai political developments and dominant discourses in texts produced by the institution of dominant groups. We can integrate SFL as a linguistic model to Fairclough's three stages of analysis as follows:

(i) *Describe* linguistic features of Prayut's language use in his weekly address by means of lexicogrammatical analysis (and visual features by multimodal analysis) and compare the features found in the ST and the TT, segment by segment;

(ii) *Interpret* ideological assumptions by their situational contexts with the knowledge of language derived from the previous stage;

(iii) *Explain* effects of the shifts elicited from the comparison of the addresses and their translations that the wider audiences might have.

To successfully compare the selected segments, however, it is necessary to consider the fact that the Thai ST and the English TT are hugely different regarding their grammatical and socio-cultural aspects. The next section discusses the ways the two semiotic systems are different and how they potentially cause translation shifts (obligatory shifts) at various linguistic levels, as Baker (2011) suggests in her notion of (non-)equivalence.

3.5 Structural differences between English and Thai

This section focuses on the lexicogrammatical level and shows how the non-equivalent linguistic features between English and Thai can cause translation problems. It presents the Thai grammar in accordance with the system of lexicogrammar that helps realise the three metafunctions (Section 3.4), which is based primarily on Pattama's SFL interpretation of Thai grammar (2006). Generally, Thai can be characterised as a tonal language, with five tones in standard dialect (three static tones: mid, low and high; and two dynamic tones: falling and rising). Regarding lexicogrammar, Thai is an isolating language and does not have inflectional morphemes;⁵⁵ therefore there is no distinction in number, case, gender, tense, aspect, and mood. These are realised by lexis. Thai is regarded as a topic-prominent language in which the topic-comment is

⁵⁵ For example, *enslaving* in English has three morphemes *en-*, *slave-*, *-ing* combining to form one word.

emphasised at the beginning of a clause. As for nominal group, a modifier typically follows modified items (as in *khon di* ‘person’+‘good’ equivalent to ‘good person’). Thai also has a feature called serial verb construction, in which sequences of two or more verbs are constructed to convey various meanings simultaneously or present the sequence of events (as in *khao pai dulae* ‘enter’+‘go’+‘take care of’ implicating direction and metaphorical act of *entering* somewhere in order to *take care of* something).

Rather than using the Thai Royal Institute’s Romanisation for pronunciation of Thai words like in other chapters, the examples in the following section will be transliterated by the phonetic symbols because they provide the exact pronunciation of the Thai language and help non-Thai readers understand such features as serial verb construction and tones of modal particles. It will be followed by word-by-word translation to show how the system of Theme works in Thai. The tables of phonetic symbols is available on page xi. All examples are extracted from Prayut’s weekly address. To explain each example in detail, some abbreviations indicating the grammatical roles in a Thai clause are nominated as follows; future (FUT), auxiliary (AUX), aspect (ASP), imperfective (Ipfv), perfective (Pfv), negotiator (NEGO), negative (NEG), classifier (CLASS), while the symbol \emptyset means zero pronoun.

3.5.1 Ideational metafunction (logical and experiential meanings)

According to Halliday and Mattiessen (2014: 212), the experiential mode enables us to construe the flow of events; a configuration of a process that unfolds through time. There can be one or more participants directly involved in the process, and none or several circumstances of contingency, manner, matter, role, and angle that are attendant on the process. The grammatical realisation of this configuration is a clause. The system for modelling the configuration grammatically is the system of Transitivity.

Transitivity

Similarly to English, the key concept of Transitivity in Thai is Process which is a particular kind of action involving two participants (Actor bringing about the action and Goal being impacted by the first one). Both Thai and English typically configure the flow of events as **Actor + Process + Goal**. Process types are grouped according to the domain of experience. The domain of *doing* and *happening* comprises *material* and *behavioural* processes. The domain of *sensing* and *saying* comprises *mental* and *verbal* processes. The domain of *being* and *having* comprises *relational* and *existential* processes (cf. Eggins, 2004). One of the findings in Pattama’s research is that there are two additional process types as collective resources for construing experience in Thai: *temporal* and *meteorological* processes.

1) In the domain of *doing* and *happening*, material clauses in Thai can be either transitive (with the Actor as the only participant in the clause) or intransitive (with the Actor and the Goal

3) In the domain of *being* and *having*, a relational clause construes abstract relations between two entities; one entity is *ascribed* or *identified* by referring to another. The participant of a relational clause is labelled the **Carrier**, while the quality ascribed to the Carrier is called the **Attribute**. In Thai, the Attribute is conflated with the relational ascriptive Process such as มั่นคง /mángxhɔŋ/ ‘be: secure’; that means, qualities of the Carrier are construed as verbal groups. The ascriptive quality can be intensive, possessive or circumstantial.

(a) Intensive quality (showing the relation of Carrier and Attribute)

ผลผลิตทางการเกษตร ไม่ สมบูรณ์ ดี นัก

phǒnphálit-thaaxkaankàsèet mái sǒmbuun dii nak

Carrier	Process / Attribute	Manner: quality
phǒnphálit-thaaxkaankàsèet	mái sǒmbuun	dii nak
Product-agricultural	NEG be: complete	good really
‘the output of agricultural products is not fully supplied’		

(b) Possessive quality (presenting ownership)

รัฐ มี โครงการ หลาย โครงการ

rât mii khoŋkhaan láay khoŋkhaan

Carrier/ Possessor	Process: relational	Attribute
rât	mii	khonkhaan láay khonkhaan
government	have	project many CLASS
‘the government has many projects’		

(c) Circumstantial quality (locating an entity in time and space)

ธุรกิจ อยู่ ในพื้นที่เดิม

thûrâkit yùu nai phûnthí-dǎəm

Carrier	Process / Attribute	Location: space
thûrâkit	yùu	nai phûnthí-dǎəm
business	be-at	in area-old/same
‘the business is in the same area’		

In the identifying mode, one entity is used to identify another, which lies in the relationship between Token and Value. Prototypical identifying clauses appear with the terms เป็น /pen/, คือ /khuu/, ใช่ /cháí/, all of which denote the meaning ‘be’.

อันนี้ เป็น ก้าวแรก ของ แนวคิด e-Ticket

an-níi pen káaw-réek khǒwŋ nēwkhít e-Ticket

Token	Process	Value
an-níi	pen	káaw-réek khǒwŋ nēwkhít e-Ticket
thing-this	be	step-first of idea e-Ticket
‘this is the initiative idea for e-Ticket’		

In the same domain, the existential clauses construe the being in existence of an entity. The Process is typically realised by the verbs มี /mii/ ‘exist’, เหลือ /lǎa/ ‘remain or leave’, เกิด /kəət/ ‘exist-occur’, ปรากฏ /praakòt/ ‘exist-appear’.

เกิด ประโยชน์ทางเศรษฐกิจ

kəət pràyòot-thaansèetthàkit

Process: existential	Existent
kəət	pràyòot-thaansèetthàkit
exist-occur	benefit-economic
‘there is economic benefit’	

Moreover, Thai existential processes can be extended by any other process types, especially with the verb มี /mii/ ‘exist’.

อาจ มี วาระอื่นๆ ซ่อนเร้น

àat mii waarâ-nùnùn sównrêen

Process: existential	Existent	extension of existential process
àat mii	waarâ-nùnùn	sównrêen
AUX: probability exist	agenda-other	hide
‘there might be other hidden agendas’		

4) Among these distinct groups of processes there are two additional temporal and meteorological processes in Thai that lie between the relational and existential process types. The temporal process represents the outer world view of *time* and is considered borderline between the material and relational processes, while the meteorological process represents the outer world view of *nature* and is considered borderline between the material, relational and existential processes.

Temporal expression in Thai can be realised through the material processes with an implicit participant, such as ได้ เวลา นำมาพิจารณา /dái weelaa nammaa phícaarânaa/ ‘(Ø) **get** time to **take** into consideration [it’s time to take into consideration]’, with ได้ /dái/ and นำมา /nammaa/ as material process extension with an unspecified time. It can be realised through relational processes with or without an explicit participant, such as วันที่ 22 พฤษภาคม 2557 เป็นต้นมา /wanthíi 22 phrûsàphakhom 2557 pen tónmaa/ ‘The 22nd May 2014 (**be**) onwards’ [from 22nd May 2014 onwards], with เป็น /pen/ as intensive relational process extension with the specified time.

Meteorological experience can be construed by material processes and expressed by a meteorological participant (some physical aspects of nature) and a process. For example, ฝนตก /fǒntòk/ ‘it’s raining’, with ฝน /fǒn/ ‘rain’ as Nature and ตก /tòk/ ‘fall’ as material process. Likewise, it can be construed relationally by an ascriptive relational clause. The process is construed through a Carrier and the ascribed quality of the Carrier. For example, in the clause อากาศ ร้อน มาก /aakàat rǒon máak/ ‘it (weather) is very hot’, the Carrier อากาศ /aakàat/ ‘weather’ is

qualified by the adjectival verbal group ร้อน /rôon/ ‘be: hot’. Meteorological expression can also be realised through the existential processes, involving a geographical term or Nature as the only participant. For example, in the clause เกิด พายุฤดูร้อน /kəət phaayû-rûduu-rôon/ ‘**there occur** thunderstorms’, the process เกิด /kəət/ ‘exist-occur’ is construed through Existent พายุฤดูร้อน /phaayû-rûduu-rôon/ ‘thunderstorms’.

Aspect and Phase

There are two systems concerning the grammatical modelling of time: Aspect and Phase, operating at the rank of verbal group.⁵⁶ The two systems help realise the experiential meanings and logical meaning, respectively. The reason that they are included here is because Thai models of time in the grammar are different from English. First, in the system of Aspect a process can be construed as unfolding (imperfective), culminating (perfective), and neutral. If the event is unfolding, it means the process is ongoing or background to some other process. If it is culminating, the process operates in its closure or as a precondition to some other process. If it is neutral, the process operates without carrying any aspectual meaning, or a simple present clause. There are two types of aspect markers: verbal aspect (positioned before a process) and clausal aspect (at the end clause).

The perfective Aspect of process can lexicalise the concept of attainment (ได้ /dái/ + verbal group, as in ได้ดำเนินการ /dái damnənkān/ ‘has operated’), experienced complement (เคย /khəy/ ‘have done’), recent completion (เพิ่ง /phəŋ/ ‘just’), emerging completion (ชัก /chāk/ ‘be inclined to’ or ย่อม /yôm/ ‘tend to’), near completion (เกือบ /kəəp/ or จวน /cuan/ ‘almost/nearly’). The imperfective Aspect of process can lexicalise the concept of habituality (เคย /khəy/ ‘used to’) or continuity (เคย /khəy/ ‘keep doing something’ or กำลัง /kamlāŋ/ ‘be doing’). Moreover, the perfective Aspect of a clause can lexicalise the concept of capability (verbal group + ได้ /dái/, as in ทำงานได้ /thamŋaan dái/ ‘able to operate’) and resultivity (แล้ว /lêaw/ ‘have done something already’). The imperfective Aspect of a clause can lexicalise the concept of progressivity (กำลัง /kamlāŋ/ + verbal group + อยู่ /yùu/ ‘continuously doing’ or verbal group + อยู่ /yùu/ ‘be doing’). However, for the future time, there is only one modal auxiliary จะ /cà/ ‘will/would’ expressing a future event. It is typically part of the verbal group placed before the lexical verb, such as บ้านเมือง จะหยุด ไม่ได้ /bānmuang cà yùt mái dái/ ‘the county **would** not be able to get stuck’, with จะ /cà/ placed before a behavioural process หยุด /yùt/ ‘get stuck’ and the negative term ไม่ /mái/ ‘not’ placed before the clause aspect of capability ได้ /dái/ ‘able to’.

⁵⁶ Note that owing to limited space and its degree of relevance this section does not cover every aspect of ideational meanings such as Modification and Circumstantial type (adverbials).

Second, in Thai the meaning of a process does not imply its completion, but rather it needs a second verb to help construe a complete process. In other words, a process can be construed as either neutral (the process has no further implication) or completive (the process comes to an end). The latter is called the system of Phase: a process + a completive process. This system helps realise the logical meaning of ideational metafunction. The system of Phase has three subtypes according to the logico-relational expansion of the verbal group:

Elaborating expansion is expressed through the directional subtype; the terms of which are such as ไป /pai/ ‘go’ or ออก /wòk/ ‘exit/out’. For example, in the clause **หนี ออกไป แล้ว** /nǐi wòk pai lǎew/ ‘(he) ran away already’, the double completive processes ออก /wòk/ ‘out’ and ไป ‘go’/pai/ serve to elaborate the direction where the process **หนี** /nǐi/ construes the logico-relation of ‘run away’.

Extending expansion is expressed through the mental-resultative subtype; the terms of which are mostly mental processes. For example, in the clause **ท่าน พิจารณา ดู** /tháan phǐcaarânaa duu/ ‘you consider (it)’, the completive process ดู /duu/ ‘see’ serves to extend the result of the process of ‘considering’ to make the process พิจารณา /phǐcaarânaa/ a complete event.

Enhancing expansion is expressed through the directional-resultative subtype; the terms of which are such as ไป ‘go’ /pai/ or เข้า /kháo/ ‘enter’. For example, in the clause **ชาติ เสียประโยชน์ไป** /cháat sǐa pràyòot pai/ ‘the country loses the benefits’, the completive process ไป /pai/ ‘go’ serves to enhance the extent to which the process เสีย /sǐa/ construes the result and direction of ‘losing the benefits’.

Additionally, Phase can be expressed through the qualitative-resultative subtype. For example, in the clause **ต้อง เข้าใจ ให้ ดี** /thóung kháocai hái dii/ ‘(you) must understand (it) well (enough) [make good understanding]’, the completive process ให้ /há/ serves to enhance the process เข้าใจ /kháocai/ with the quality of ดี /dii/ ‘good/well’ at the end.

3.5.2 Interpersonal metafunction

In this section, we discuss the interpersonal meaning at the rank of clause (the system of Mood) and at the rank of nominal group (nominal person or pronoun).

Mood

The system of Mood comprises many elements. As with English, Pattama (2006: 94) divides the Mood into two main types: indicative (declarative and interrogative) and imperative. In a clause, they help realise the *speech functions* of statement (declarative clause), question (interrogative clause), and command (imperative clause). Unlike English, Thai differentiates two types of polar

interrogative clause: (1) a biased type realised by the clause-final interpersonal particles หรือ /rǔm/ or ใช่ไหม /cháimǎi/; and (2) an unbiased type realised by ใช่หรือไม่ใช่ /chái rǔm mái chái/ ('X or not X' construction).

Closely linked to Mood is the system of Modality: an optional system in the interpersonal clause grammar. Thai makes a distinction of two subtypes: *Modalisation* and *Modulation*. Modalisation is a modal judgement of the information exchanged in propositions, which can be presented in terms of probability (อาจจะ /àatcà/ 'might be') and usuality (บ่อยๆ /bòybòy/ 'often'). Modulation is an interpersonal evaluation for proposal, which can be presented in terms of obligation to commands (ต้อง /thówt/ 'must') and inclination for offers (จะ /cà/ 'will'). Modality in Thai has some special characteristics distinct from those in English. First, it is lexicalised. Second, it allows some combinations, such as คงต้อง /khontóng/ 'probably+must', ควรต้อง /khuantóng/ 'should+must', but they are limited in number. Third, both Modalisation and Modulation operate along the cline of degree, such as แน่نون /néenoon/ 'certainly'.

The core of interpersonal structure of a Thai clause is: *Subject* (nominal group) + *Predicator* (verb group) + *Negotiator* (interpersonal particle).

1) Predicator is one of the resources in the Mood system to realise interpersonal meanings.

It can be presented in four subsequent elements:

(a) A verb as event (one lexical verb)

ท่าน ติดตาม ด้วย นะ ครับ

tháan tittaam dúay nâ krâp

Subject	Predicator	Adjunct	Negotiator
tháan	<u>tittaam</u>	dúay	nâ krâp
you (polite)	follow	too	(attitudinal/ polite)
'you follow (omitted Complement) too'			

(b) A verb as event preceded by auxiliary verb (auxiliary/negative particle followed by one lexical verb)

เขา คง แจ้ง เร็วๆ นี้

khǎo khon céew rewrew nîi

Subject	Predicator	Adjunct	Adjunct
khǎo	<u>khon</u>	<u>céew</u>	rewrew nîi
they	probably	inform	quick-quick this
'They probably inform (you) soon'			

(c) Verbs as a series of events (serial verb construction)

แต่ละ จังหวัด ไป รวบรวม ไว้ ด้วย

tèelá caŋwàt pai rúab-ruam wái

Subject	Predicator	Adjunct
tèelá caŋwàt	pai rúab-ruam wái	dúay
each province	go collect ASP: enhancing	too
'Each province collects (the data) (with them) too'		

(d) A verb as an event comprising an aspect marker (perfect/imperfect) or a modal auxiliary จะ /cà/ (future)

ได้ มี การจัดการประชุมสัมมนา ภายใน ประเทศ

dái mii kaancàt-kanpràchum-sāmānaa phaaynai pràthét

Predicator		Complement	Adjunct
<i>auxiliary verb:</i> <i>aspect marker</i>	<i>lexical verb</i>		
dái	mii	kaancàt-kanpràchum-sāmānaa	phaaynai pràthét
ASP Pfv	exist	organising-meetings-seminars	in country
'There were meetings and seminars in the country'			

Another noteworthy point is that a Predicator can be presented with various lexical verbs with different levels of politeness. For example, the verbs denoting 'eat' can be lexicalised neutrally as กิน /kin/, politely as รับประทานอาหาร /râpprâthaan/, or impolitely as แดก /dèek/. Words with different levels are potentially misrepresented; the translator could downplay the intensity of highly sensitive utterances to comply with the new purpose of translation as a written text.

2) Negotiator (or Modality realised by means of lexis) is a prominent modal feature in Thai and varies depending on Mood types. It can be put at the beginning or the end of a clause. There are four types of Negotiator: *exclamatory* (exclaiming wonderment, disappointment, and sympathy), *polar* (choosing between two elements), *attitudinal* (giving judgement) and *politeness* (showing social distance). Negotiator is a feature occurring only in spoken discourse. Although the source text of the present study is spoken discourse, the English translation as subtitles is designated to consist of written texts in order to make it official. Therefore, I will not include the detailed discussion of Negotiator in my study since it is pre-emptively discarded by the translator as an unnecessary feature for subtitles.

3) Subject is semantically bounded with the Predicator and can be realised by a nominal group; namely, a common noun with or without Modifiers, a pronoun or proper noun, and a kinship term or social title. Unlike English, the Subject in Thai is frequently dropped, but it can be presumed from the discourse context. This nominal group as Subject is primarily concerned with the experiential meaning. But it will not be further discussed here (except for pronouns, see below) since English and Thai have the same way of construing the experience through the

configuration of the elements (people, things, places and qualities) in a clause. For more detailed discussion, see Martin and Rose (2007: Ch 3).

Nominal person or pronoun

Operating at the rank of nominal group, a nominal person can be an interactant or a non-interactant. An interactant is any of the speech roles in the exchange assigned to speaker, speaker plus others, or addressee (first or second-person in the traditional account). A non-interactant is any speech role in the exchange assigned to someone other than the speaker and/or the addressee (third-person in the traditional account). A non-interactant can be realised by different types of nominal group: common noun, proper noun, or pronoun as Thing. Some examples of each type of pronoun are as follows:

(a) *Interactant* type comprises (i) speaker such as ผม /phǒm/, ฉัน /chǎn/, ข้าพเจ้า /kháapácháo/ ‘I’, (ii) speaker-plus which can be singular เรา /rao/ or plural พวกเรา /phúak-rao/ ‘we’, (iii) addressee which can be singular คุณ /khun/, ท่าน /tháan/ or plural พวกคุณ /phúak-khun/ พวกท่าน /phúak-khun/ ‘you’;

(b) *Non-interactant* type comprises (i) conscious subtype which can be singular เธอ /thəə/ ‘she’, เขา /khǎo/ ‘he’ or plural พวกเธอ /phúak-thəə/ ‘they (female)’, พวกเขา /phúak-khǎo/ ‘they (male)’, and (ii) non-conscious subtype which can be numeral นี้ /níi/ ‘this’, พวกนี้ /phúak-níi/ ‘these’ or distance นั่น /nán/ ‘that’, พวกนั้น /phúak-nân/ ‘those’;

(c) The lexical noun can be title terms (ตำรวจ /sǎarâwât/ ‘police inspector’), kinship terms (ปู่ /pùu/ ‘paternal grandfather’) or gender terms (นาง /naaŋ/ ‘woman’).

There are some characteristics that make Thai pronouns significantly different from English. First, the pronoun selection in Thai demonstrates the social distance between the speaker and the addressee. Second, a Thai pronoun does not clearly distinguish the speaker from the addressee or other non-interactants. For example, เรา /rao/ may refer to (i) speaker him/herself, (ii) singular speaker-plus or (iii) singular addressee; ท่าน /tháan/ may refer to (i) singular addressee or (ii) singular conscious non-interactant. The way to differentiate the references depends on politeness, register, level of language, or context. Third, Thai is a pro-drop language (zero pronoun) in which certain classes of pronoun – no matter what their position in a clause – can be omitted if they can be inferred from the clue phrases, coherent relations, or anaphoric references in the hierarchical structure of discourse (Wirote, 2000: 144).

Another noteworthy point is Vocation – a set of items by which speakers address one another. Realised by a nominal group, these items serve as the vocative element in the interpersonal structure of the clause and may occur at either the beginning or the end of the clause. For example, in the clause ทุกคนครับ เราพบกันอีกครั้ง /**thúuktháan**-kráp rao-phôp-kan-iikkhrâŋ/ ‘all of you, we meet

again (this time)', ทูทห่าน /thúuktháan/ is the initial-clausal addressing term used by the speaker to attract the addressees' attention. The vocative items can be pronouns (as in the above example), proper nouns, kinship terms and title terms.

Attitudinal Epithet and Appraisal

According to Halliday and Mattiessen (2014: 376), Epithet is the indicator of quality, such as 'old', 'good', 'red'. Since qualities can be denoted by adjectives, although not always, Epithet too is often realised by adjectives. However, Epithet can construe both the experiential meaning (experiential epithet) and the interpersonal meaning (attitudinal epithet). In her overview of Thai grammar analysis, Pattama (2006: 36) briefly mentions the epithet in relation to experiential meaning due to its close association with the system of Thing (lexical noun that realises a class of person or thing such as 'citizen' or 'constitution'). For example, the nominal group ประชาชนคนไทยที่รัก /pràchaachon-khonthai-thíirâk/ 'people' + 'Thais' + 'dear' shows the sequence of **Thing + Classifier + Epithet**, while English presents it in reverse order: 'dear Thai people'.

As mentioned above, Epithet can be seen as the way to show the speaker's attitude, which in turn construes the interpersonal meanings towards a certain Thing. This concept is similar to what Martin and Rose (2007) call Appraisal. In the same example, the term ที่รัก /thíirâk/ 'dear' is the positive value ascribed to ประชาชนคนไทย /pràchaachon-khonthai/ 'Thai people'. In short, the attitudinal epithet is used to express the speaker's feeling towards the Thing represented in the nominal group.

Taking the interpersonal meaning from a different perspective, Martin and Rose (2007: 26) propose the system of Appraisal to analyse how we negotiate our social relationships by telling others how we feel about certain things and people. The most important concept in the system of Appraisal is 'attitude', or what results from the way we 'evaluate' things, people's character and their feelings. Not limiting itself to the rank of nominal group or adjectives like the experiential epithet, Appraisal considers all the speaker's/writer's attitudes that can be negotiated in the whole clause. It could be construed in any vocabulary items or 'lexis with attitude', such as แตกเป็นเสี่ยง /tèek-pen-siàng/ 'torn to pieces' (verbal group), อย่างแม่นยำ /yàng-náethêe/ 'precisely' (adverbial group). Appraisal has three basic options:

- (i) *Affect* is related to the speaker's feelings and emotional reactions. The attitude lexis can be such as ยินดี /yin-dii/ 'glad', เสียใจ /sǎa-cai/ 'sad', อนาคต /anáat/ 'feel pity';
- (ii) *Judgement* is concerned with behaviour, ethics capacity, and tenacity of people whom the speaker mentions. The attitude lexis can be such as ผิด /phít/ 'wrong', ชำนาญ /chammaan/ 'skillful', 狂妄 /kràng/ 'swaggering';

(iii) *Appreciation* refers to the evaluation of phenomena or processes (aesthetics, taste, worth) of things that the speaker mentions. The attitude lexis can be such as ปลอม /ploom/ ‘fake’, น่าเบื่อ / náa-bùu/ ‘boring’, ชวนคิด /chuan-kít/ ‘though-provoking’.

The attitude can be direct or indirect. Direct is when the speaker openly uses the terms to describe his/her feelings towards people and things (explicit evaluation). Indirect is when the speaker implies his/her feelings by using attitudinal tokens (implicit evaluation). The indirect way of provoking the listener’s/reader’s attitudinal response can be done by *metaphor* (เหมือนประเทศนี้ไม่มีชื่อแป /mũan-pràthê-t-nî-mái-mii-khùupεε/ ‘like the country without law’), or *non-core lexis* (ประท้วง /pràthũan/ ‘protest’ ขัดขืน /khàtkhũun/ ‘defy’ ไม่รับฟัง /mái-râpfan/ ‘do not listen’) that infuses a circumstance of manner into a core meaning of ‘opposing the government’. In addition, a piece of factual information or ‘common sense’ representation of the world can be used to evoke the positive and negative attitudes in favour of the speaker (เกษตรกรรายได้น้อย /kàsètràkoon-raaydái-nôy/ ‘the farmers have low income’).

The force of attitude can be *amplified* (with the term such as ยิ่งยวด /yĩng yúat/ ‘extremely’), and the focus can be *softened* (such as ประมาทนั้น /pràmaan nân/ ‘kind of’), and *sharpened* (such as เต็มที่ /tem thii/ ‘absolute’). The speaker can engage or disengage the other opinion towards what is being mentioned. *Monogloss* (single voice) is where the other voices are restricted (using reporting verbs such as แสดงว่า /sàd33ŋ-wáa/ ‘(it) shows that’). *Heterogloss* (different voice) is where other opinions, responses or truth are possibly included. To acknowledge the alternatives, the speaker can use (i) the projecting clause with the verb such as ได้ยินมาว่า /dái yin-maa-wáa/ ‘(I) heard that’, (ii) modal particles such as หรือ /rǎo/ showing uncertainty, or (iii) concession or ‘counter-expectancy’ such as แต่อย่างน้อย /tèε-yàaŋnôy/ ‘but at least’.

How attitudinal epithets are ascribed in Thai grammar can be adapted to analyse data in the present study. The above interpersonal resources can help compare Prayut’s unique language in the original and the official translation to see if there is any difference in attitudinal values when he talks about his political roadmap, reconciliation process, opponents and the concept of nationalism. Note that to help gauge the popularity of some terms focused upon in the study, especially Thai metaphors, the Thai National Corpus (TNC) is employed.⁵⁷

3.5.3 Textual metafunction

The textual metafunction gives resources for presenting the meanings as a flow of information or unfolding text in context, represented by the system of Theme. Theme has two main elements: **Theme** and **Rheme**. Theme as message serves as the point of departure of the clause and is realised at the initial position. Rheme is what follows the Theme, presented in the local context

⁵⁷ The Thai National Corpus (TNC) has been developed by the Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. It can be accessed at <http://www.arts.chula.ac.th/~ling/tnc3>.

of the clause. The analysis of structure of Theme + Rheme can contribute to an insight into text organisation. Theme choices which reflect the method of text development may include the elements from all three metafunctions: textual Theme, interpersonal Theme and topical (experiential) Theme.

The textual Theme provides the thematic prominence to textual elements with linking resources including: conjunction, relative element and clause binder. Although depending on genre, it comes almost always before the interpersonal Theme. Some possible combinations are shown below.

Theme (conjunction)	Rheme
อย่างไรก็ตาม	ประเทศไทย มี อีกหลายเรื่องที่สำคัญ
yàaŋraikhóotaam	práthét-chát mii iik-láay-rúan-thíisámkan
however	country-nation have other-many-issue-important
	'however, the country has many other important issues'

The interpersonal Theme foregrounds the speaker's judgment and comments. It can be the mix of one of the following components: Vocative element, Exclamatory element and modal Adjunct (Pattama, 2006: 207).

Theme				Rheme
interpersonal (Adjunct)	topical (marked, circumstance Adjunct)	topical (unmark, Subject)	textual (conjunction)	
น่าสงสาร	บางครั้ง	ชาวนา	ก็	นึก อะไร ไม่ ออก
náasǎŋsǎan	baaŋkhrâŋ	chaona	khóo	nǐk arai mái óok
sadly	sometimes	farmer	then	think what NEG exit
				'sadly sometimes the farmers then do not think clearly'

The topical (experiential) Theme is regarded as having a role in the transitivity structure of the clause that is positioned at the beginning. It can be participant (Subject, Complement), circumstances, or processes.

Theme (unmarked, Subject)	Rheme
สื่อ	ต้อง ระวัง การขยายความขัดแย้ง
sǐi	tǔng ráwǎŋ kaankhàyáay-kwaamkhàtyǐŋ
media	must be: careful expansion-conflict
	'the media must be careful with the conflict (so as not to expand it)'

Theme (marked, circumstance Adjunct)	Rheme
ในส่วน สภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติ	ได้ มี คำสั่งประชุม ...
nai-súan saphaanítibanyàt-hèŋchát	dái mii kǎsǎŋ-práchuum
in-part National-Legislative-Assembly	∅ ASP Pfv have order-meeting
	'as for the National Legislative Assembly, (I) have ordered to call the meeting ...

One causal element that deserves attention is **Adjunct**. According to Thompson (2014: 20), an Adjunct is an additional element providing some background information about the event or state to the clause grammar and is realised by an adverbial group or a prepositional phrase. An Adjunct can be divided according to its function in the clause corresponding to the metafunctional meanings. There are three types of Adjunct: circumstantial (ขณะนี้ /khà-nâ-nîi/ ‘currently’, indicating location and time), modal and comment (โดยสมมติ /dooy-sömmû-t/ ‘presumably’), and conjunctive (ทั้งนี้ /thâng -nîi/ ‘anyhow’).

In Thai more than one type of Adjunct may occur simultaneously in a clause and metafunctionally denote the different meanings.

Conjunctive Adjunct	Subject + Predicator (negotiatory element)	Modal Adjunct
ทั้งนี้	ไม่มีใครมุ่งหวังประโยชน์ส่วนตัว	อย่างแน่นอน
thângnîi	mái mi khai múŋwǎŋ pràyòot-sùantua	yàaŋ-néénwɔn
anyhow	NEG exist who hope-for interest-personal	definitely
‘Definitely, no one is hoping for their personal interest’		

It is worth pointing out that, since Adjunct is an additional item that provides necessary information to the clause, it is likely to be left out in the translation when the translator has to deal with too many repetitive terms or phrases, especially those in Prayut’s spoken discourse.

3.6 Conclusion

The chapter has discussed and shown that SFL at the textual level and CDA at the context level can complement each other in drawing a textual comparison and Thai socio-political environment analysis. Coupled with the knowledge of differences between Thai and English regarding discourse semantics, the proposed model can be a guiding platform for analysing shifts that might be found as a result of textual comparisons. They are expected to help distinguish between obligatory shift caused by structural difference and optional shift caused by the translator’s ideological intervention.

There are a number of possibilities of lexicogrammatical shifts in which the translator might miss out some crucial, ideologically-laden elements of the original. First, the shift in process type may occur if the translator is prone to make the target text concise and clear of negativity for a new purpose of the text as subtitles. Aspect is the feature that could make for a different interpretation if the translator is not careful about differentiating lexical verbs that could appear as a serial verb construction or the lack of clear Aspect in the original. Phase could also pose a problem since Thai relies heavily on verb construction to indicate the direction, emotion and result of an event of a clause, which tends to be overlooked when being translated into English.

Second, pronoun and obscurity in number (singular/plural) are two of the major differences between Thai and English. Identifying an exact Thai pronoun is difficult and evasive; a pronoun

can be interpreted into various persons despite having the same morpheme. The categorisation of Prayut's pronominal use in his address is elaborated in Chapter 6, where the meaningful demarcation between addressees is measured to see whom Prayut has involved in or dismissed from his nationalist discourse. Furthermore, grammatical number plays a large part in analysing the politically significant term ศาสนา /sàatsànáa/ 'religion'. It helps explain the difference between the ambiguous original term and its English counterpart, and its political implication derived from when the terms are misinterpreted by translators.

Third, the permitted combinations of Modality can affect the degree of probability, obligation, determination, etc., which makes it more difficult for a translator to pinpoint the degree of possibility or definiteness in English. In Chapters 5 and 6 Appraisal is largely employed to see how the translator intervenes to evaluate the original terms and assign new meanings to them in the target texts. The Appraisal comparisons between the original and its official translation help us understand whether the translation is ideologically motivated when the translator has to deal with politically-sensitive original speeches that are potentially full of negativity.

Fourth, it is common in Thai to have a marked Theme in a clause. This could pose a problem to translator when having to deal with a long Theme that foregrounds some information early in the clause. The translator is likely to omit some of the crucial interpersonal meanings, which could occur as a result of constraints such as limited spaces for subtitling or the common aim of getting rid of unnecessary slips of the tongue.

Chapter 4

Discourse analysis of General Prayut's weekly address

Eight days after the coup on 22 May 2014, Thais witnessed the first showing of 'Returning Happiness to People in the Nation' on every TV channel. This political marketing programme was presented by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, pooling together the resources of the state public relations machine to formulate and disseminate the new government's political discourse. This TV programme was a politically-motivated propaganda effort emulating that of the former civilian governments. However, the current show has its own features which are arguably different from the previous prime ministerial addresses in terms of production and translation. In this chapter I will try to answer the question as to how the production of the said programme provides the primary means of articulating Prayut's political discourse. It will show both how the production of the text itself is permeated with various ideological themes and maintains a certain kind of relationship between the speaker and his audiences, and how the speaker's language use is anchored in institutional logic and helps consolidate his version of the socio-political narrative.

4.1 'Return Happiness to the People in the Nation' as a discourse practice

By starting the weekly 'Returning Happiness to the People in the Nation', General Prayut attempted to reproduce the practice of this kind of political discourse deployed by previous Thai prime ministers to attain the similar goal of legitimising their rules and solidifying their power position. Prayut as text producer possessed by all means the most influential power to command every stage of production. His public speaking ability is beyond doubt; he can talk without pausing for nearly an hour. All TV channels compulsorily broadcast the address at the same prime time of Friday night and again at 8 am on Saturdays on Channel 11 and Channel 5. The re-broadcast takes account of any Thais who might have missed the previous night's address, especially those in the rural area who typically rise early in the morning for work,⁵⁸ and form the largest demographic group in Thailand. Although Prayut's language use sounds as if he deigns to talk to the people, most Thai audiences seem unconcerned and accustomed to the way the leaders speak to them in a patronising manner.

The discourse practice of the weekly address reflects many aspects of sociocultural practices governed by dominant ideologies in Thailand. This rings true to what Fairclough (2015: 106) proposes: ideology as common sense. There are several noticeable ideologies holding sway among Thais that appear repeatedly in the weekly address as they are instrumental in upholding the standard of discourse presentation and at the same time reiterate the ideological common sense

⁵⁸ Interview with the technician from Channel 5 on 28 August 2017.

throughout the address. Such are the ideologies of Thai-style democracy, lower-class development and nationalism, all being mentioned more or less in the show since its inception. The above ‘ideological common sense’ serves to sustain unequal relations of power between the speaker representing the top echelon of society and Thais in general, most of whom remain passively accepting Prayut’s version of the narrative. To maintain this ‘common sense’, many discourses are repeatedly practiced and propagated by Prayut’s self-appointed government, the like of which are the pleading of reconciliation among all disputing parties and reform before beginning the process of democracy, the denial of the previous elected governments’ populist schemes, but promotion of their economic provisions for the grass roots, and praise for the institution of the monarchy, for a unified nation and for different religious beliefs.

The reason why these discourses are successfully structured might be owing to the fact that the Thai inferiors have a habit of submitting themselves to those who have higher socio-economic status or political leaders who have immense power. It is coupled with the fact that the Thai power holders always nourish their patronage networks and have manipulated such social norms as *songkhro* ‘assistance offered to the less opportune’, *khaorop* ‘respect’ or *khwampakdi* ‘loyalty’ (Pavin, 2005: 15), fundamental tenets of Thai society. The most obvious forms of socio-political legacy are the ones bequeathed by the former Thai Prime Minister Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (in office 1959-63), typical of what Thak (1979: 186-209) calls *phokhun* – a military cult leader who governs the country with despotic paternalism. To a certain extent Prayut’s address seems to demonstrate the same following characteristics:

(1) Helping the ‘children’, meaning the direct personal benevolence in addressing the popular needs with decisive interventions to solve the problems for the ‘children’.⁵⁹ In Prayut’s case, the poor are those affected by the red tape and ineffectiveness of bureaucratic administration. For instance, in the address on 28 August 2015, an integration of work by appropriate ministries is always encouraged to improve water management for farming, flood and drought prevention, which has lacked effective management.

(2) Maintaining social properness, the creation of a social atmosphere appropriate for development and modernisation. The obvious example is the grand scheme of overhauling nearly every sector of society by arresting the *anthaphan* (‘hoodlums’ in Sarit’s case) or *phu mi itthipon* (‘influential persons’ in Prayut’s) engaged in various shady businesses,⁶⁰ persuading young people into adopting a more proper social life, or ‘revamping social norms and orderliness in society’ (7 August 2015).

⁵⁹ ‘Children’ is a metaphor of Thais in general, inversely yielding a sense of ‘Father’ or *pho* (in *phokhun*) to the military leader.

⁶⁰ Patsara Jikkham. (2015, 20 October) ‘Prayut wants mafia wiped out in 6 months’, *Bangkok Post*, <https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/crime/736812> (Accessed: 27 June 2017).

(3) Improving health and morals, the eradication of narcotics and suppression of crime. There is usually talk of various solutions to tackle these problems, for example, ‘drug smuggling from neighbouring countries and elsewhere is being intercepted’ (23 January 2015). The speaker often condemns the ill-intentioned people who ‘lack ethics and morality’ and try ‘to distort information for personal gains’ (5 February 2016). To cultivate morals, ‘the 12 values for Thai citizens’ were introduced so as to ‘be among the factors that assist in building the nation's future’ (10 October 2014).

(4) Imposing order, the wielding of legal power for political administration. Prayut’s legal basis of power to accelerate any sluggish policy implementation rests on Article 44 – the special authority according to the 2014 interim Constitution issued by his government. It stipulates such authority ‘for the sake of the reforms in any field, the promotion of love and harmony amongst the people in the nation, or the prevention, abatement or suppression of any act detrimental to national order or security, royal throne, national economy or public administration, whether the act occurs inside or outside the kingdom’.⁶¹ Article 44 gives Prayut absolute authority to override normal procedures, through which the junta aims at curbing any acts that they consider harmful to national peace and stability. As of November 2018, Article 44 has been invoked a total of 200 times.⁶² Through Article 44, he claims, for example, to be able ‘to decisively tackle issues in education, otherwise we [the government] will be delayed due to various procedures and laws’ (26 August 2016).

(5) Visiting the family, the personal or cabinet tour to the provinces to show the leader’s care for the rural people. This last characteristic of *phokhun* was hardly found in Prayut’s first year of his premiership. In the aftermath of the coup he focused on the attempt to respond to negative foreign reactions.⁶³ However, he started to organise the mobile cabinet meeting outside Bangkok for the first time in Prajauabkhirikhan province on 27-28 March 2015.⁶⁴ There were six mobile cabinet meetings in six regions across Thailand; the latest was on 25-26 December 2017 in Phisanulok and Sukhothai. Each meeting was usually followed by a huge development budget grant for these areas, which would arguably pave the way for his political bases and constituencies

⁶¹ ‘รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย (ฉบับชั่วคราว) พุทธศักราช 2557 [Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim), Buddhist Era 2557 (2014)]’. *Royal Gazette*. Bangkok: Cabinet Secretariat. 131, Part 55 A: 1.

⁶² ‘Report on the Exercise of Power under Section 44 of the Interim Constitution of Thailand’, (2018, 18 May) *iLaw*, <https://ilaw.or.th/node/3938> (Accessed: 10 April 2019).

⁶³ ‘โลกมองไทย หลังรัฐประหาร ผู้นำรัฐธรรมนูญฉบับชั่วคราว เข้าสู่เลือกตั้ง จัดระเบียบอำนาจเศรษฐกิจ การค้ากับมหาอำนาจใหม่...อีกครั้ง [The world views Thailand after the coup, anticipating interim Constitution and national poll, rearranging economic power...again]’, (2014, 19 July) *ThaiPublica*, <https://thaipublica.org/2014/07/foreign-reactions-to-the-coup> (Accessed: 19 March 2019).

⁶⁴ His cabinet meetings in the provinces are arguably inspired by Thaksin’s ‘canary tour’ in which the prime minister would visit the people and stay overnight in many provinces during the period January - August 2006.

in the future national polls, despite the government's denial of this and its assertion that they merely attempted to listen closely to the local voices.⁶⁵

These distinct characteristics reflect the authoritarianism as the foundation of rule in the Thai society. As Thak (1979: 209) observes, Sarit's rule with paternalism seems to connote a benevolent father, but is also likely to be a despotic one.⁶⁶ This cultural practice among Thai like-minded leaders tallies with the way the ruling government runs the country.⁶⁷ In Prayut's case, the paternalism is more or less implicit in the government's projects to help the people, but explicit in his promises made through his addresses. Apparently, the draconian Article 44 is likely the most powerful tool he uses to disguise a benevolent dictatorship to help solve whichever problem there is; a paternalism which lies behind the justification of authoritarianism. However, it is the matter of degree to which each trait of Sarit's resembles the incumbent prime minister's, for the time and context may not allow them to exert their power in the same manner. Both Sarit and Prayut share similar paternalistic views which are shown in the way Prayut invigorates the discourse of reconciliation and reform, unravelling the deep-rooted economic and social problems, and glorifying the royal institution, the un-colonised nation⁶⁸ and the reverent religious rituals.

4.2 Political discourse of General Prayut and its characteristics

Ideology can have a durability and stability which transcends individual texts (Fairclough, 2003: 9). What makes ideology durable and stable is closely linked to *genres* (what activity does it involve?), *discourses* (who and how does it represent?), and *styles* (what characterises its language use?). They are called the 'order of discourse', a concept derived from Foucault's, meaning the social structuring of linguistic variation that is constituted by social practices to control how the language is used to achieve certain things. This section and the next two look deeper into the textualisation of the address and try to reveal the unique characteristics of Prayut's political discourse; the representations of social actors, time and space, and events; and his style of language use that helps get his message across.

⁶⁵ 'กรม.อนุมัติวงเงิน 1.9 ล้านล้าน [Cabinet approve 1.9 trillion]'. (2015, 28 Mary) *Thairath*, <https://www.thairath.co.th/content/489617>, and 'ส่อง กรม.สัญจร สะท้อนอนาคตการเมืองประยุทธ์ [Looking through the mobile cabinet meetings: a reflection on Prayut's political future]'. (2014, 25 December) *BBC Thai*, <https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-42464282> (Accessed: 10 April 2019).

⁶⁶ It is an uncle in Prayut's case as in 'Uncle Tu', his nickname.

⁶⁷ Even the popularly elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra followed the same course of practice. It can be illustrated by the universal health care project, the village funds, the eradication of drug cartels or 'war on drugs' (Yanispak, 2004: 162-4). However, the 'war' brought about the extra-judicial killings of those who are involved, which resulted in 3,000-4,000 deaths in 2003 (<https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/12/thailands-war-drugs>).

⁶⁸ Despite the mainstream discourse on Thai history that praise King Chulalongkorn's domestic reforms and diplomatic policies averting colonial domination, many scholars argue for Siam/Thailand as semicolonised state with ambiguity (Harrison and Jackson, 2010) or crypto-colonised state (Herzfeld, 2017).

In complex political situations, the purpose of Prayut's weekly address is more strategic than communicative, in which the interaction is oriented towards gaining the audience's attention to legitimise the speaker. The structure of the weekly address is loosely organised and far too long for a normal individual attention span, especially in the early months of the programme, to the point where it could become emotionally taxing for anyone having to listen to a thread of his repeatedly self-righteous comments.⁶⁹ The opening of the address signifies the most important topics. It almost always presents news of the activities of the royals or Buddhist-related events. In the middle, Prayut presents his ongoing projects in helping relieve poverty, boosting the economy, and eradicating social problems. He usually ends his speech by pleading to the audience to anticipate the outcomes of the government's policy implementation or assuring the better future of his governing of Thailand.

His choice of topic is always given in positive terms with periodically belligerent comments directed to those who are in defiance of the coup and of his 'earnest' reform. The topics ranging from reconciliation efforts to long-standing social problems demonstrate his interests in convincing the public and quenching the enthusiasm for other dissenting voices. Other choices frequenting the address are the various solutions to the underlying socio-economic problems unable to be disentangled by the erstwhile government's apparent inability. Prayut's narrative can be seen in the description of his endeavours over the past week, which is not chronologically linked. The audience therefore has to follow the vignette of topics he chooses to present. His points are arranged according to prepared notes; for instance, in his address of 5 September 2014 he started his talk by mentioning the NCPO activities related to the late King, and then went on to raise the points about national administration, state welfare, the National Reform Council, narcotics, trade and investment, transparency of public expenditure, martial law, and floods, respectively.

Although Prayut does not systematically present his argumentative discourse, it can be generally inferred that he tries to put forward the notion that political reform and reconciliation should come before the general election. Thailand will be rid of the democracy 'problem' if Thais adhere to his version of democracy and various mechanisms to beget a better electoral process led by the current government. Thereafter, he seems to claim that the ultimate change to a better political system for the country as a whole would be achieved. This kind of loosely argumentative structure can be inferred as his basic ideological premise from nearly every address.

It is interesting when the format is changed by including the TV hosts, most of them holding different military ranks or working for military-controlled TV5. After being criticised for his one-man-show style and the talking-down format being proved to be unpopular, the programme changed into the format of an interview with the premier, which began on 15 April 2016 and

⁶⁹ Interview with Suranand Vejjajiva, former secretary-general to the prime minister during the Yingluck Shinawatra premiership, on 8 September 2018.

lasted till 3 June 2016. The format then reverted to the same narrative structure, with Prayut talking on the podium directly to the audiences. In comparison, dialogue is also the featured generic structure of Yingluck's and Abhisit's addresses. In a transparent attempt to gain more attention, Abhisit even hired the popular news anchor Sorayuth Suthassanachinda to conduct the interview on 4 October 2009. In Yingluck's case, she managed to exhibit her self-confidence after a rough start. Not only did she talk with the host by herself, but many times invited her cabinet colleagues to explain difficult topics on her behalf.⁷⁰ For example, Police General Pongsapat Pongcharoen, the then Secretary-General of Office of the Narcotics Control Board, was invited to explain the drugs eradication policy on 20 October 2012. Similarly, Prayut sometimes invited his deputy prime ministers to share their opinions on the topics pertaining to their ministries. For instance, on 1 May 2015 there was a group of ministers that appeared on the show to discuss policies concerning a health care system for the senior citizens and the disabled, education reform, and competitiveness in business.

The target audience for the address is the entire Thai population, although some of Prayut's topics seem to suggest he tried to appeal particularly to those who were former Thaksin supporters. In contrast, the English subtitle is officially aimed at the diplomatic corps, international media and other international organisations that might be interested in Thai affairs.⁷¹ However, the new audiences might not totally understand many of the ideas the commissioning team intended to put across. For example, the translation and editing team tried to promote a euphemistical translation of the term *prap thatsanakhati* as 'a moment of pause to de-escalate the tension'.⁷² But most English media outlets translate it as 'attitude adjustment', a literal translation that conveys a negative connotation.⁷³

The format of the weekly address programme is one-way communication by the medium of television and website,⁷⁴ but there might be some opportunity for controlled communication from the audience; for instance, the feedback from the public was reflected in a TV rating showing that they began to tire of Prayut's talk show after it had been on air for almost a year.

⁷⁰ Interview with Suranand Vejjajiva on 8 September 2018. Yingluck was so criticised for her inarticulateness that the government had to invite other figures who were in charge of a specific ministry to help clarify the policies.

⁷¹ Interview with the editor at the Government House of Thailand on 11 August 2017.

⁷² *Prap thatsanakhati* refers to when the opposition to the coup is summoned to the military compound in order to have a serious talk and be asked to refrain from any activities deemed 'improper' for the reconciliation process.

⁷³ Such newspapers are *Reuter* (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-politics/thai-pm-vents-fury-at-critics-threatens-attitude-adjustment-idUSKCN0RB00120150911>), *The Diplomat* (<https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/how-thailands-military-junta-tried-to-adjust-my-attitude-in-detention>), and *Asian Correspondent* (<https://asiancorrespondent.com/2015/09/attitude-re-adjustments-a-new-crackdown-by-thailands-military-junta/#lkEUbo3uFj1GV1SI.97>).

⁷⁴ According to Suranand (interviewed on 8 September 2017), in Thaksin's time the radio address format made it easier for the team to control the topics of the show and generate news headline for the next day, because the PM could evade any queries that might be posed by the audiences or news reporters like in the press conference.

The format of communication can bring together the particular form of multimodality such as photographs, visuals, and special graphics. These additional icons on the background of the premier's TV presentation significantly enhance his one-way communication. They allow the speaker to solidify his political discourse, especially in Prayut's case where many ideologically-induced symbols were used to refer to nationalism and the monarchy so as to justify his presence on television and ultimately his mission of 'returning happiness to the people'.



Figure 4.1 TV presentation of 'Returning Happiness to the People in the Nation' on 31 October 2014

Where to place any symbols on the screen is equally meaningful. For example, in his address of 31 October 2014, the tricolour Thai flag and the graphic of 'Returning Happiness to the People in the Nation' in the upper-right corner of the screen yields a high information value. Apart from the bright blue colour of the sky associated with tranquillity, peace and happiness, **Figure 4.1** also shows how strongly the symbols referring to nation, religion and monarchy are emphasised. The picture of the Temple of Emerald Buddha and the Grand Palace (with the graphic motto of the Royal Thai Army: 'For the Nation, Religions, King, and People') in the upper-left corner is assumed among Thais to be sacred and revered. The placement of the picture of these commonly agreed concepts shows the presenter heavily relying on these traditional symbols to support and justify his presence on TV.

The presentation of the national flag, however, varies depending on the political situation. After the address delivered on 21 November 2014, the flag disappeared and various pictures of tourist attractions and the royal family, if approaching any monarchy-related dates, took turns to appear as background. But right after the bomb blast at Ratchaprasong Junction on 17 August 2015 that left 20 people dead and hundreds injured,⁷⁵ the national flag re-emerged in the upper-right corner along with an English motto crafted especially for this incident: 'Our Home Our Country, Stronger Together'. In addition, a new picture of statues of seven great Thai kings was placed in the upper-left corner.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand. (2015) *News Summary of Thursday 20 August 2015*, <http://prnews.mfa.go.th/Fileroom/CABNEWS/DRAWERS/PRNEWS/DATA0173/00173433.PDF> (Accessed 10 October 2017).

⁷⁶ Built by the Royal Thai Army, *Utthayan Ratchaphak* is a controversial theme park honouring past Thai kings from the *Sukhothai* to the current *Rattanakosin* (Bangkok) period. The seven kings are King Ram



Figure 4.2 TV presentation of ‘Returning Happiness to the People in the Nation’ on 21 August 2015

The slogan and the flag similar to those in **Figure 4.2** remained in the background for two months, until the time when the late King’s birthday came around in December 2015 and the background reverted to images of the monarch and the royal activities.

In almost every show Prayut’s frontal angle is made visible to increase audience involvement. A medium shot showing his figure somewhere between the waist and the head suggests a relatively distant social relationship. The screen showing the premier looking directly at the viewer is what Kress and van Leeuwen (2006: 120) call a ‘demand’ picture – the person in the picture (in this case, a motion picture) symbolically demanding something from the viewer. The same goes for his facial expressions and gestures which demand deference, by looking down without blinking on the viewers, cracking a mocking smile, and sometimes hammering the podium with anger or waving his hand outwards in a manner of refusing something unsatisfactory. When trying to plead to the public for something, his gestures would tend to be more casual, as if talking to his offspring or subordinates.

The above modes, be they colour, gaze, or viewpoint, work as the ensemble to generate meaning potentials that help create complex and subtle relations between the prime minister and his audience. This visual communication forms a complement to his narrative and correlates with his speaking style, which is analysed in Section 4.4. With these characteristics that Prayut’s weekly address realises, what can be seen is his version of the truth presented by stressing certain topics, maintaining the social distance and exploiting communication technologies in order to convince the public. The reason for the use of this particular genre is crucial in that the weekly address is a traditional means of gaining credibility for the Thai governments, for they can exert their authority by assuming the role of (political) discourse producer.

Khamhaeng (r. 1279- 1298), King Naresuan (r. 1590-1605), King Narai (r. 1656-1688), King Taksin (r. 1767- 1782), King Phutthayotfa Chulalok or King Rama I (r. 1782-1809), King Mongkut or King Rama IV (r. 1851-1868), and King Chulalongkorn or King Rama V (r. 1868-1910).

4.3 Representations in Prayut's weekly address

This section deals mainly with how the people mentioned in the weekly address are presented and positioned (representation of social actors). It also looks at the purposes of the programme and what kind of discourses it reproduces to reinforce the prime minister's ideological stances (representation of events), and how the tempo-spatial orientation of the participants and events is constructed (representation of time and space). Note that hereafter, since I focus only on the analysis of the Thai source texts, the examples given in this section and the next will be my word-by-word translation of the quotes, so as to illustrate the exact original connotations, syntax, sequence and incoherence of Prayut's utterances. The original quotes in Thai and their official translations are available in Appendix 1.

Social actors and positioning

Looking at the roles in communication and social positions in Prayut's weekly address, we can analyse them from three different angles: (1) discourse presenter, (2) discourse recipients and (3) the 'Others'. It is obvious that the *discourse presenter* repeatedly presents his government and the NCPO as the good people who intervene in earnest on behalf of Thais to end all conflicts triggered by corrupt politicians, and strive for a better Thailand:

I can assure [you] that the NCPO and the current government sincerely have ideologies and determination to serve the people and the nation. No one is aiming for personal benefits, definitely.

(18 September 2015, 10:03 – 10:15 mins)

The incumbent government creates a good atmosphere for the country's economy to prosper:

This time we begin to have good news related to economy/investment in many sectors. There are investors from various companies having confidence [in us] and ready to increase their investment in Thailand ... Besides, the government aims to promote and develop Thailand to be the hub of car assembly and other industries ... So, the government investments in infrastructures such as rail, sky train, motor-way, road, etc. are being implemented, which will open for the joint venture between government and private companies, or what [they] call PPP [public private partnership].

(20 November 2015, 05:37 – 06:36 mins)

Repeatedly, Prayut illustrates how much the junta tries to uphold the Thai traditional values which revere the monarchs, put first the collective benefit of the country, and adhere to or support the moral principles of religions. They are not doing so for their own gain but the better lives of the underprivileged:

What is the core of our country? Nation, Religion and the King. If we venerate these things, it will create resilience for country, for people. Do everything for the collective goods. People is at the centre. Everyone already knows their duties to the country, to this land ... Therefore, if we can reduce the conflicts, create a moral person, create an

ethical society, be open-handed, and have all these ideologies, by applying the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy of His Majesty the King ...

(6 May 2016, 55:55 – 56:24 mins)

The *discourse recipients* to whom the government aims to appeal in general are Thais, or in political terms those who used to vote for their representatives in the democratic system. A wide range of audiences is addressed, with the focus on the lower-classes. Probably the show is targeted at the populations of the North and North-East who have a rather different identity from that of the people in Bangkok or Central Thailand,⁷⁷ and form the strong constituency bases of the pro-Thaksin parties.

The target audiences can be assumed by the way the speaker addresses the farmers, the poor and other laypeople who have low incomes and suffer from the long-standing economic and social problems. These groups of people seem to be synonymously referred to when he talks about those who need help with the reform of the country. For example, the terms *kwam-lueamlam* ‘disparity’, *kwam-yakchon* ‘poverty’ and *chongwang* ‘gap’ are so frequently used in close association with the terms *kasettakon* ‘farmers’, *khonchon* ‘the poor’ or *phumiraydainoy* ‘low-income earners’. They are told that they need to change their old way of life which inevitably repeats the vicious circle of destitution. These people are waiting for wiser solutions (than those offered by their former corrupt governments), so this particular government is obliged and determined to address all crying needs:

Today we want to raise the income and living standard for people, the majority of whom are farmers ... [The farmers] must make some changes to [their] production behaviour, creating added-value, lowering production cost. [I] want [you] to apply His Majesty the King’s Philosophy ... The agricultural zoning in cooperation with the government, adjusting the cultivated area according to the climate ... In other parts [of Thailand, they can] grow any crops that need less water, but yield a high price ... The government definitely gives support [to you].

(20 February 2015, 38:47 – 39:34 mins)

When addressing this group, the pronoun *than* (or ‘honorific you’) is frequently used;⁷⁸ particularly when Prayut talks about the problems arising from the lack of understanding of management initiatives put forward by his cabinet. The following example is when the farmers are lectured about their old way of cultivating rice without trying other crops that could yield higher values:

⁷⁷ For examples of the North-eastern identity regarding the diglossic relationship between standardised Central Thai and regional *phasa isan*, see Alexander, S. and McCargo, D. (2014) ‘Diglossia and identity in Northeast Thailand: linguistic, social, and political hierachy’, *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 18(1), pp. 60-86.

⁷⁸ The pronoun *than* was less frequently used in Thaksin’s speech; he focused his talk on himself in showing his progress in policy implementation, but hardly referred to the audience - or, if he did, omitted the audience’s pronoun.

You have to adjust and change yourselves. If **you** know that keeping on doing [it] this way leads to a lot of debt, **you** then need to acquire knowledge. We cannot go knocking on every house, every family. **You** have to listen.

(26 June 2015, 21:30 – 21:39 mins)

Apparently, the way this prime minister - and indeed also the former ones - have been addressing people with the 'honorific you' reflects the political tradition of honouring the lower classes in order to gain trust, or ultimately their vote. In Prayut's case, he normally uses the pronoun *than* to refer to those who seem unable to solve the problems and therefore need the government's help.

However, it should be noted that other groups of discourse recipients might be some of the middle classes based primarily in Bangkok and southern Thailand, most of whom supported the 2014 coup. Moreover, perhaps the weekly address serves as a signal to the traditional establishment who keep an eye on any aspects of performance by the NCPO and the government.⁷⁹

Another obvious target group is the civil servants and government officials at all levels. They are frequently told to be aware of their behaviour and not to get involved with graft or wrongdoings, that they should have motivation to do new things but obediently follow the orders and promptly act on the government's behalf to help out people in need (especially the poor, the farmers and those who are in miserably bad circumstances). Sometimes when addressing remarks to this group, Prayut refers to them as *than* 'you', but the people in need as *khao* 'they' or 'them':

Local administrative organisations too. Help oversee too. [Those] are all **your** people. **You** don't only think of the budgetary aspect. ... If **the people-they** are strong, the local administrative organisations will earn substantial income. [It can be] collected for further development. Today if **farmers-they** are not strong, **you** can't collect anything from them and [money] keeps being drained away.

(15 May 2015, 19:43 – 20:14 mins)

Note that in spoken Thai the third-person pronoun often shadows the noun (*prachachon-khao* 'the people-they', *chawna-khao* 'farmers-they'). To a certain extent, the inconsistency in choice of pronoun seems to discriminate 'them' (the farmers) against 'us' ('you' the civil servants plus 'me' the speaker) and make 'them' become more like the 'Quasi-others'.

However, the main group of the 'Others' involved in the making of this political discourse consists of those who oppose the government. The positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation is typical in any biased account of the facts in favour of the speaker's interests (van Dijk, 2008: 227). It is apparently true in Prayut's case. At times the speaker paints the 'Others' in negative terms by labelling them the ignorant, the uneducated and those who do everything for their own gains, destroy the good values of Thainess and hinder the development of the country.

⁷⁹ Interview with Suranand Vejjajiva, former secretary-general to the prime minister during the Yingluck Shinawatra premiership, on 8 September 2018.

Any forms of opposition to the reform process are also belittled and blamed, as are those who refuse to understand the need to overhaul the repulsive money-grabbing type of politics:

Today there are still those who resist [the nauthority], causing misunderstanding, twisting the truth both in and outside the country. We [the NCPO] have tried to explain. However, there are still **some people** who don't understand. So, I'm not sure whether [**they**] really don't understand or it's in order to cover or conceal [something]. I ask that [**they**] should stop, because today investigations under the judicial system are under way.

(25 July 2014, 29:59 – 30:28 mins)

The 'Others' are normally referred to in third-person *khoa* 'they', but often omitted as a feature of Thai spoken discourse.⁸⁰ However, when Prayut seeks to directly engage them in the discourse, they will be addressed in second-person. As indicated earlier, these groups of people are intentionally spoken to with the 'honorific you' when Prayut tries to blame them for their unpleasant and deviant behaviours. But from time to time he includes them in 'us' when trying to unify them in nationalism-related discourses. These choices of pronoun make it seem like the speaker is addressing them directly, giving them some respect, thereby cajoling them not to oppose or challenge the government in return:

Don't look only at the democracy [aspect]. If **you** look only at that, **we** can't move forward on other issues - if **you** object to every points. Some things haven't yet happened, [but] **you**'re worried about that, about this. The past is already a lesson learned. If **we** don't want it to be like the past, **we** need to cooperate today in order to move forward together in the future.

(25 July 2014, 29:03 – 29:20 mins)

Although Prayut as speaker intends to make himself sound well-mannered and gentlemanly by using honorific pronouns, the border between the apparent *discourse recipients* (general lower-classes who need help) and the 'Others' (those who oppose 'us') is at times a porous one. This is owing to his inconsistent choices of pronoun as shown in the above examples. In this sense, the speaker is trying one moment to engage them in reformist discourse, but in another trying to denounce unacceptable behaviour. Prayut's pronominal use will be further elaborated in Chapter 6, where the discourse on nationalism is discussed.

Events and morality

Moving on to how the purposes are deliberated and the events are portrayed, we can see that some elements of the social events are included or excluded in the addresses. For example, the forms of activities that have been prominently presented throughout his addresses are such as *kanpatirup* 'reform', *kanprongdong* 'reconciliation' or *khrongkan pracharat* 'Pracharat project'. These

⁸⁰ Omission of pronouns as a feature in spoken Thai that causes ambiguity will be elaborated in Chapter 6.

processes (as nominalisation) clearly show the version of events and to what extent the discourse presenter gives greatest salience to them.

During the two years before the referendum on the new constitution in August 2016, many important activities are recontextualised in favour of the junta. For example, the roadmap for democracy and socio-political reform (as a chain of events) are presented and arranged to demonstrate that the events are well-planned, but with a large degree of abstraction as to how they were to accomplish the final results according to Prayut's assertion:

Give the government and the NCPO another year and a half. [This is] the most important, [which] includes the cooperation to reform the country in the 1st phase. Many say [the NCOP] do nothing ... If [they] come to cooperate [with us], [they] will know what [we] are doing, how [they] can help in the right place. Not just keep criticising. What and how would it be of benefit? Because [we] just start doing, have never done before. So, [we] start from the 1st phase, followed by a 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th. Therefore, if related to the [national economic social development] plan, approximately 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, the 15th plan is the last one. Because of the first 20 years. Today [we] are in the early 12th plan. And then the 13th, 14th, 15th; five years each. Five multiplied by four is 20. I've said it many times.

(22 January 2016, 29:48 – 29:53 mins)⁸¹

However truncated and incoherent these statements may seem, Prayut seeks to further recontextualise the events by explaining to his discourse recipients about the necessity of introducing reforms in accordance with national plans. In his address, Prayut tries to give the reasons for reform by employing various explicit forms of legitimisation. Prayut legitimises himself by reference to the authority of tradition, law and of persons in whom the Thai institutional authority is vested. This clearly shows in his frequent claims of the necessity for Article 44, as explained in an earlier section.

The authority is also demonstrated by showing due reverence to the royals at the beginning of his address. The use of the royal family's aura and prestige is aimed at convincing the commoners that the junta's missions to bolster the country's development are imbued with royal authority, as for example:

Regarding the country's development plans, the government is inspired by His Majesty's sufficiency economy philosophy, which emphasises thorough and sustainable development on the basis of 'moderateness, reasonability, resilience'. So, [it is] for overcoming risks arising from changes, both internal and external.

(2 October 2015, 05:11 – 05:32 mins)

⁸¹ This particular segment appears in the official transcription posted on the Government website but is not included in the show. One possibility is that Prayut's negativity is so excessive and his statement is so incoherent that it was cut out by the technician while preparing the video record for the final show, because there is a slight error at 29.53 mins of the video.

His moral evaluation is inextricably linked to Thai value systems. The enshrining of ‘the 12 core values’ is the obvious example of the moral standard to which, he claims, Thais must aspire. This moral was encouraged in almost every address during the first year of his show:

- (1) Upholding the three main pillars: the Nation, the Religion, and the Monarchy;
- (2) Being honest, sacrificial and patient, with positive attitude for the common good of the public;
- (3) Being grateful to the parents, guardians and teachers;
- (4) Seeking for knowledge and education, directly and indirectly;
- (5) Treasuring cherished Thai traditions;
- (6) Maintaining morality, integrity, and well-wishes upon others as well as being generous and sharing;
- (7) Understanding and learning the true essence of democratic ideals, with His Majesty the King as Head of State;
- (8) Maintaining discipline, and being respectful of laws and of the elderly and seniority;
- (9) Being conscious and mindful of action in line with His Majesty the King’s royal statements;
- (10) Applying His Majesty the King’s Sufficiency Economy, saving money for times of need, being moderate with surpluses for sharing or expansion of business while having good immunity;
- (11) Maintaining both physical and mental health and unyielding to the dark forces or desires, having a sense of shame over guilt and sins in accordance with the religious principles;
- (12) Putting the public and national interest before personal interest.⁸²

The most apparent ideology cherished in the list is the trinity of Nation, Religion and King as the primary, requisite value upon which other values are firmly based. The late King-initiated philosophy is intensely and thoroughly promoted with the repeated emphasis of collective interest. As Connors’s study (2007: 75-82) of the 1967 *Project for Democratic Citizen* handbooks for state officials reveals, the government tried to create the mental frameworks of rationality and modernity by suggesting that the key to national security (against the Communist threat at that time) is to uphold the three pillars and to maintain social order; thus the basis of democracy is to advocate this national ideology. This conservative ideology is primarily nurtured and perpetuated by various Thai traditional values. As Pavin (2005: 14-5) argues, despite having no legal basis, Thai core norms play a crucial role in social regulation, prescribing the guidelines for moral and disciplinary social entity. A social norm such as *kwampakdi* ‘loyalty’ is instigated to strengthen human relationships based on obligation and commitment. Such norms are manipulated by the established powers to construct the concept of Thainess on which the patriotic conservatism is firmly based, and to sustain such asymmetrical relations between them and the laypeople.

⁸² Ministry of Education, Thailand. (2014). *ค่านิยมหลักของคนไทย 12 ประการตามนโยบายของ คสช. [Thais’ 12 core values according to NCPO]*, <https://www.moe.go.th/moe/th/news/detail.php?NewsID=38658&Key=news20> (Accessed 2 September 2018).

To illustrate Prayut's constant quests for legitimacy, Buddhist-related rituals and other important religious dates are frequently alluded to in order to signal that the government pays equal attention to all different beliefs, and that peaceful coexistence can be achieved under his rule. Despite his claim, Prayut's address largely inclines to favour Buddhism as his main religion-related topic. It is unsurprising since the idea of Buddhism as the basis of government thinking has always been stressed in official Thai state discourse. Down to the local administrative level is the perennial notion that the civil servants should apply the *Dhamma* principles to the way they govern the locals (Connors, 2007: 113). It remains true in the case of the incumbent junta, especially in Prayut's address where the mention of those principles precipitates an enhanced mindfulness of Buddhist values, thus providing a means to show that the junta always adheres to this pillar.

Additionally, Prayut tries to give a rational explanation to the government actions by reference to its utility in achieving the reform and by presupposing it is an agreed end. The condition of politics requires that Thais 'must' respond to it, as shown in what he said in one of his addresses:

The problem is can we accept it or not? If [we] can't, why not? If yes, why is so? If it is me, as a Thai. If yes, [it is] that we want to be able to reform, want transparent politics, want efficient politics. Therefore, [it] must be fixed. [It] might not be in the same course with other countries because they have already developed. But [we] get stuck here ... You think again, see how they did it.

(10 April 2015, 36:21 – 36:49 mins)

Many of these strategies are realised by connectors. The semantic relations to rationalise his utterances are explicitly and repeatedly marked by causal connectors to the point where they are redundant and seem to be futile. To foreground the rationality, all addresses are overwhelmingly filled with the connective items such as *phro* 'because', *phrochanan* 'therefore', *thangni* 'so that' or 'so' and *dangnan* 'thus'. For instance, in only 37 minutes of his address on 29 January 2016 the connective items *thangni* 'so that' are used 3 times, *phrochanan* 'therefore' 21 times and *phro* 'because' 31 times.

In effect, although some of his legitimatisations appear to contradict themselves, particularly the perception that democracy for Thais should come after the authoritarian reform, all these strategies continue to be employed regardless. The overall purpose of the weekly address can be interpreted by the way certain social events are excluded or made prominent and the way the above forms of legitimation are exploited. The objectives of producing his discourses can be generalised as follows: (1) to present information about the progress of policy implementation and his government's activities, (2) to report the problems and propose the solutions to them, (3) to instruct how to conduct one's life in according to Thai values, and (4) to explain and defend the junta's rule and argue one-sidedly against the 'Other'.⁸³

⁸³ This is by no means the official objective for which the government claims the weekly address was genuinely created. The primary official objective is to explain why the military had to seize power. The

Time and space

Time orientation in the weekly address is positively linked to the NCPO and the junta. They are presented as a timely hero who came to clean up the mess made by all conflicting parties and help the naïve Thais who were caught up in this political imbroglio. Not only is Prayut fond of particular connective items to weave the events purposively as shown above, but also particular temporal adjuncts related to their actions – *wanni* ‘today’ or *khanani* ‘at present’ thematising the clause – to show that some good things are happening. Take for instance the following extracts:

Today, most people have a greater harmony, unity and reconciliation. All groups of politicians are able to visit one another and go about personal business as usual. People are happy. There are no large-scale political conflicts.

(13 February 2015, 08:28 – 08:43 mins)

Or, it is used to justify why they have to take charge of the country’s current problems:

Today many people are ill, everyone may know. All dimensions are ill, all five [reform] working groups are ill ... **Today** [we] must provide the appropriate medicine, must cooperate each other. Finding a medicine [should] be like finding way to cure or prevent the epidemic. **Today**, don’t let it spread. The spread of Thai democracy disease makes it all in trouble. **Today**, I’m trying my best as the head of the NCPO and the government.

(3 July 2015, 43:27 – 43:50 mins)

Another positive presentation of time is the aspect of progressiveness related to the junta’s post-coup reforms and boosting the country’s economy. Although the Thai language has no aspect of verb to denote the progressive or non-progressive nature of events, the term *kamlang* which is a lexicalised form of aspect denoting progressiveness is frequently used in Prayut’s address. It is found especially in the clauses about policies being implemented; for instance, in his address on 26 June 2015 the progressive lexicalised aspect was used more than 17 times, including *We **are doing** this in a timely manner, it is like a race against time, We **are expediting** efforts to make sure that this will happen, We **are trying** to achieve this within three years*. The emphasis of progressiveness to fill the audience with anticipation makes the speaker sound committed and unwavering. Doing so can be interpreted as the junta’s insecurity in their own promise after the coup and their attempt to justify that what was promised is being executed despite their as-yet-undetermined outcomes.

Contrary to the ‘present’ discourse about the serious work being done by Prayut’s government, there are many terms denoting the ‘past’ associated with the previous elected governments, the corrupt politicians, the Thai problematic ways of life:

secondary is to communicate with the Thai public and the international communities by means of the English subtitle (interview with the editor on 11 August 2017).

The person responsible, every government that comes to administer the country needs to be more efficient. What has happened **in the past** is a problem. So we need reforms in order to ensure [that] the administration of the country under royal powers is in line with the principle of good governance.

(8 August 2014, 04:55 – 05:01 mins)

Today we build a full democracy. Whoever needs to help, be they, politicians, whatever **in the past**. If [they] want election again, [if they] didn't commit offenses, [they can] come [into the process].

(10 July 2015, 26:04 – 26:11 mins)

The similar Thai temporal adjuncts showing the past circumstances of the clauses are routinely textured in the texts. They are indicative of Prayut's attempts to distinguish himself and his cabinet from the former money politicians and their graft, so as to build trust and credibility by discrediting elected politicians.

Regarding representation of *space*, in most of Prayut's addresses *space* is oriented towards Bangkok, the centralised hub of the economy and administration. It shows the government is spearheading various development projects to enhance the lives of those in underdeveloped areas or places where farmers or planters are suffering from wrong agricultural practices. Although sometimes he talks about the decentralised system of management, it remains nevertheless within the hands of authorised bodies, such as local administrative ones. A good example is Damrongdhama Centres where the people who are in trouble could seek refuge.⁸⁴ This mind-set of administrating people in 'those spaces' is compatible with the 'we-give-you-help' discourse and reflects the firm belief in paternalism shared among the élites, since it is the only way for the discourse recipients to count on.

Another interesting point is *public space*, which is actively discouraged. Any protests or political gatherings of more than five people have been unquestioningly banned since the coup. In his speech, the prime minister apparently warned any pro- or anti-coup groups that try to assemble in public areas. The following example is the warning against the gathering of the pro-coup PDRC leaders who celebrated the success of military intervention and somehow took advantage of the event to associate themselves with the coup colluders:

[I] forbid the following: [you're] forbidden to hold events such as the political discussions, fund-raising dinners, no matter whom [it is] aimed to help. It is not the right time. If whenever there is [fund-]raising [or] discussion, it [would] be a group for politics, [so they would] have a talk to plan what [they] would do next. In which the other side must join in, all groups, all sides might come out, [then it] will return to the same old circle. [I] ask for your cooperation. Don't do it again. If [you] want to talk, [you] must talk at home privately between [you] two. If [you] come out to organise the gathering or hold the feast outside, it is impossible, [it is] against the

⁸⁴ Damrongdhama Centre under the Ministry of Interior is mentioned frequently in Prayut's address as a nationwide centre for receiving complaints and coordinating between the Ministry and the people in the vicinity of the centre. It also has its own website in Thai (<http://www.damrongdhama.moi.go.th>).

provision of the Martial Law Act. If [you] do it again, everyone involved will be summoned and prosecuted on the charge of violating the NCPO's order.

(27 June 2014, 39:40 – 40:15 mins)

The reason for this umbrella ban is for fear that this kind of pro-coup gathering may incite expressions of anti-coup sentiments. Any criticism of or protest against Prayut's tenure has prompted serious reactions. For example, many students were detained and charged for making the three-fingered *Hunger Games* salute which had become a symbol of opposition to the junta:⁸⁵

Today there is the raising of 3 fingers [in protest]. OK. [That] is about principles, [but those] are other countries' [principles]. I have no conflict with you. [If] you want to raise [them], do so [but] can you do it at home? Don't come and raise them outside. [It's] against the [NCPO's] order.

(6 June 2014, 52:42 – 52:50 mins)

The military government also banned the reading of Orwell's *1984* in public spaces. There was an incident where the student activists who ate 'anti-coup sandwiches' while peacefully reading the book in front of the US Embassy on 1 July 2014, were sent to the military camp.⁸⁶

Space and time are socially constructed and interconnected. We can see from Prayut's address that what is the 'present' comprises the assistance and development projects the government provides to those who live at the periphery of the country, while the 'past' is when the problems occurred and were caused by misbehaving politicians and people's ignorance of the corruption that plagues every corner of Thailand.

4.4 Unique style of General Prayut's spoken language

Characteristics of style are presented in various linguistic features. They can be interpreted from Prayut's judgment of probabilities or obligations, involved in what he is addressing or modal choices used in his statements. The others are modality that closely links to Prayut's speech functions (statement, question, demand, offer), grammatical moods (declarative, interrogative, imperative), and types of attitude (Affect, Judgement, Appreciation). This section therefore discusses how Prayut textualises his speech by analysing lexicogrammar that is closely associated with social role and status. Having been developed in the Army, Prayut's social role and status constitutes his present-day identity that can be seen through self-reflections in his speaking. Although Thailand's political situation caused him to move from army commander to being a prime minister who is supposed to speak in a diplomatic manner, he remains very much himself when textualising his discourse of political reform and adopting a bellicose attitude towards those

⁸⁵ Mackey, R. (2014, 2 June) 'Thai Protesters Flash 'Hunger Games' Salute to Register Quiet Dissent', *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/world/asia/thai-protesters-flash-hunger-games-salute-to-register-quiet-dissent.html> (Accessed: 12 May 2018).

⁸⁶ 'Police to summon 'sandwich protest' student activists for attitude adjustment' (2014, 1 September) *Prachathai English*, <https://prachatai.com/english/node/4180> (Accessed: 10 January 2018).

having different views. His language use is therefore unique, bound up with contradictions and prejudices towards certain groups. The following examples illustrate his special spoken characteristics in the weekly address.

Speech functions

The predominant grammatical mood in Prayut's address is that of declarative statements. This kind of mood is used to describe what he has been or will be doing in terms of reform and national development. However, it is also usually found in the genre of political speech that the speaker 'demands' something from the audience with an imperative. Take the following excerpts from his address on 22 January 2016 as examples:

- (1)
 - a. **Don't take advantage of** the low-income earners.
 - b. **Give** the government [and] the NCPO another year and a half to do [thier] work.
 - c. **Don't only teach** [students] to cause conflict. [They] don't get much knowledge [because you] teach only a few democracy and human rights [topics], [you] don't pay attention to the law. [You] can't teach like this. Dangerous.

Examples (1a) and (1b) are concerned with the farmers' movement to complain about low prices for their agricultural products, while in (1c) his comments are on Thailand's education system. They show that, although he tries to explain his idea on future schemes, he seems to be naturally commanding the inferior-like audience by using clauses that connote 'demand'. With the frequent use of the imperative, Prayut's speech mirrors his confident assertion while investing his personal and social identity into his discourse.

The same applies to the rhetorical questions that play a prominent role in each address. Prayut employs the interrogative for rhetorical effects by pushing forward a certain assumption and arousing the audience's conscience in order to persuade them to believe his reasoning. Prayut's rhetorical question is habitually used to show that some circumstances are unsatisfied or hint that the speaker is in a black mood. The following example is a rhetorical question posed to his audiences (specifically, farmers) about water shortages:

- (2) The most important thing today is [that] everyone must prepare to use water economically in all activities, be they ordinary people in their consumption [or] the farmers for their agriculture. And everyone must help. [I] understand that [we] also need to funnel out salt water; otherwise tomorrow [we] can't plant anything. **Then who is going to help you?** The government can't help either.

(22 January 2016, 23:34 – 23:51 mins)

Again, he later on blames the media for their bias in presenting news which, according to him, stirs up the anti-coup resentment and reminds the viewers of the coup opposition's bitter experience:

- (3) But [you/the media] only show the pictures of conflicts, stages where people disagree or stages where people make demands. **How can it move forward? Is it balanced?** ... All in trouble. You [should] have a sense of duty here. Journalistic duty that has ethics.

(22 January 2016, 27:32 – 27:46 mins)

Attitude

Another linguistic aspect that reveals the premier's attitudes is the way he expresses feelings, judges people's character and appreciates things, or what Martin and Rose (2008) call Appraisal (see Attitudinal Epithet and Appraisal in Chapter 3). As a sole speaker in the weekly address, Prayut involves his audience in his narratives of socio-political development with his own particular expressions. Taking the same example of 22 January 2016, we can find the high level of direct inscription and positive realisations of his feelings towards such a topic as Thai athletes:

- (4) a. On behalf of the Thai people, I would like to **congratulate and praise** 'the Thai War Elephant' team [the national football team].
- b. [It is] **the first step to develop** the Thai football team for a bright future ... we still **have hope**.

Affect invoked by Prayut as the head of the NCPO and the government implies some levels of willingness and positive reaction to their policy initiation:

- (5) a. The government **has a duty to care for** the people, providing water [to you].
- b. The government **is ready to take care and support** [the people] on these matters.
- c. **We are developing** everything. The international indicators must be used **to assess [ourselves] too**.

But more often Prayut slips into his old self by showing his emotions or personal anecdotes:

- (6) a. Some TV channels [I] watched **gave me a headache**.
- b. I remember when I was a child; [I] **didn't misbehave ... paid attention to teacher ... luckily [I got] pretty good grades ... [I'm] not bragging ...** Why? [It is] because of **determination, wanting to test myself**.

With regard to Judgement, the farmers and sometimes Thais as a whole are generalised and referred to in a negative light:

- (7) a. On the matter of helping farmers ... you **always forget** [the fact]. When you are **in trouble**, you then **blame it [on us]**.
- b. You would **rather not listen, not pay attention** [to me] ... sometimes [you] **fight over** water.

Moreover, quite a number of examples of explicit negativity in moral terms are associated with the characters of the opposition forces, former governments and media:

- (8) a. Otherwise, [it is] equal to helping **destroy the country** ... [the media] teach people **to not grow up**.

- b. Because past governments were **not strong**, [they] **didn't solve the problem as a whole, didn't solve the problem in an integrated manner**. [Doing so] **isn't sustainable**.

These lexical indicators of socio-cultural values found in the address closely link to the prime minister's key message. There is the need for individual Thais to follow the government's development plans and fulfil their duty as citizens and help the country overcome whatever crisis was sparked off by the previous disputes.

Interestingly, two particular social roles whose importance Prayut underlines are those of teacher and soldier. The terms of positive propriety ascribed to these two groups are always there to be found in many of his addresses:

- (9) a. As I told [you] already, in the 12 Thai values that [children] must look after their parents and have discipline, **respect teachers and have gratitude**.
(5 September 2014, 07:05 – 07:14 mins)
- b. The role of **teacher is the most important** ... Therefore, a good education must have **quality teachers**.
(22 January 2016, 33:29 – 33:46 mins)
- c. The government will **make more revision to water sources, improving budgeting and planning [by] mobilising soldiers**, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperative, and the Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment.
(22 January 2016, 24:55 – 25:03 mins)
- d. I would like to invite the people to commemorate **the goodness and bravery of soldiers who sacrifice even their lives**.
(30 January 2015, 45:58 – 46:04 mins)

Regarding Appreciation, the feature most explicitly contrasting with Prayut's positive attitudes towards the government's development policies is his cynicism towards the problems persisting in Thai society. Take the excerpt from the address on 22 January 2016 as one such instance:

- (10) a. [This] is **Thailand's problem** ... All those are **the problems of the nation**.
b. Today everything is **in conflict**.

According to Prayut, although Thailand needs the reform brought about by the current government, this task facing them is met with negative views and reactions. Various social and political problems arose long ago without any civilian governments paying attention to them. The following excerpts are Prayut's requests for more time for whatever reform arrangements the government is engineering:

- (11) All of you would know the saying: '**Rome wasn't built in a day**'. [In order for] Thailand to be strong, people to have high, fair incomes, to reduce inequality, reduce conflict and to enhance Thailand's competitiveness, [they] **cannot take place in only one year or a few years**. It takes **a long time**, takes **a lot more time**.
(22 January 2016, 30:38 – 30:53 mins)

During the first year of the junta's rule this kind of request for solving the problem by showing the need for more time is prevalent in nearly every address. The similar negative Appreciation of the country's problems as the most obvious premise of his narrative appears sporadically throughout the texts.

Engagement

Drawing on the Bakhtinian concept of 'dialogism', Engagement is one of the Appraisal resources for reducing or expanding the possible range of other people's responses. It is categorised into 'monogloss' (single-voiced assertion) and 'heterogloss' (opening for alternative viewpoints). It can be realised by modal particles or reported verbs (Martin and White, 2005: 102; Munday, 2007: 85); however, for this study I mainly focus on *modality* because the obvious form of Engagement in Prayut's discourse is through the use of modal verbs.

The level of Engagement to Prayut's proposition is indicated with various markers of modalisation. The thrust of demanding and obligation towards the audience is seen in the modal auxiliaries such as *champen-tong* 'need to', *tong* 'must' and *khuan* 'should' that require the audience to follow. In the address on 22 January 2016, for example, the term *khuan* was used 6 times, while *tong* occurred 94 times, which indicates a high level of obligation in his statement. However, there are a few terms signifying the lower probability such as *atcha* or *at* 'maybe'. If ever uttered, they are mostly about the economic benefits or problems that the government intends to engage with, which shows how uncertain their mission is.

In contrast, at the mention of the future of their solutions or their promises for a better Thailand or any junta-prohibited activities that deserve punishment (12a), the terms signifying certainty such as *nae* or *naenon* 'certainly' are attached as comment adjunct to the clause, thereby limiting other possibilities. The same applies to the auxiliaries connoting inclination and high capacity such as *samat* or *dai* 'able to/can' and *cha* 'will'. But the modality denoting the lowest degree of usuality such as *mai-khoei* 'never' is closely associated with the past government or the people who oppose the current regime (12b):

- (12) a. I don't want to stir up rifts but this needs to be done Like in the past. Lower-ranked officials are about to be implicated in rice [pledging graft], in these various things. [I] warn [you] in advance. Therefore, don't let it happen again. You [will] be in trouble, **certainly**.

(6 March 2015, 26:07 – 26:22 mins)

- b. [You] oppose every issue. For certain issues, only thinking [about it] is already wrong. That is, [you] **never** consider any new thing. Those who oppose in every day.

(22 January 2016, 31:17 – 31:23 mins)

Related to the above forms of Engagement, another point that can show the speaker's assertion is his word choices with varying degree of modal responsibility in order to validate his stance to a

proposition (Thompson, 2014: 72-7). What can be generally found in Prayut's addresses is the high level of subjectivity indicating his personal assessment. When he strengthens his conviction, his interpersonal status is visible through the projection, either indicative or indirectly imperative, bound to the main clause (Pattama 2005: 366). Such clauses can be found, for example, in the address on 12 February 2016:

- (13) a. **I think that** if you keep doing like this, [it will] cause more misunderstanding. Who will gain [from doing this]? Or who will get the bad effect? Will the country get [the bad effect]? Won't you be responsible at all?
(21:43 – 21:54 mins)
- b. Today the government tries to do everything. **[I] ask [you to] understand. [I'm] sad** every time when [I've] done something [but you] don't understand.
(18:12 – 18:21 mins)
- c. **Don't only** think of elections, hold the votes of the majority [while] ignoring the minority, demanding only rights [without] helping others ... or doing whatsoever against laws, or expressing different opinions, uncooperativeness in the media, in social media without information and evidence. **I think that** many things are illegal. I understand that it is illegal.
(48:06 – 48:27 mins)

Prayut's assertions in (13a) and (13b) are put upon to counter the alleged news distortion and in defiance of criticism, while (13c) is the expression of his annoyance towards the public demand for a national poll and different opinions in the media. As a means of controlling the response, all these reporting verbs restrict other voices, casting his implicit subjectivity in order to criticise the people's indifference towards the junta's initiatives and lectures about the impracticality of the people's way of living.

Syntactic and lexical features similar to above examples are typical. The discourse markers as critical points that reveal his pessimistic outlooks on Thailand's multifaceted problems and optimistic comments on its future under the ruling junta can be found throughout 124 addresses. As a whole, his word choices – whether for expressing his own feelings or evaluating people and things – to a large extent help create the positive portrayal of his government and himself. What can be interpreted from the texts seems to depict him as the saviour of the poor, the honest and sincere person, the well-rounded and learned person and even the virtuous leader.

4.5 Discussion

By drawing upon their discourse types (contents, subjects, relations of people and language use), I have shown that the text production is full of the junta's self-important logic and portrays positive images of the prime minister and his administration. The purposes derived from the analysis of text production, be they topics, social actors and relationships or the speaker's profile of language use, chimes with the ideologies of Thai-style democracy, country development, and nationalism.

As the above examples illustrate, the way Prayut incessantly speaks and expresses his attitudes towards different groups of people and certain principles demonstrates the fact that there is a sense of anxiety surfacing in each of his addresses. Although Prayut and his allies in the NCPO hold guns and drive tanks, this anxiety still has to be calmed by reciting the tale of the government's achievements with the best intentions on a weekly basis, so as to convince the public to give them their allegiance and legitimise whatever schemes they design. This could be an explanation of why there is such a need for the prime minister to insinuate too much information into the minds of his audience or even inculcate them with a certain version of truth and beliefs that are known to favour his regime. He seems to keep chanting the same mantra of affirmation that Thailand has been weakened by the favouritism and nepotism of the corrupt politicians, at the same time trying to catch the tide of nationalism and praise the junta's own moral high ground to secure its power through consent. It is perhaps because his constant anxiety of being a usurper pushes him into exonerating himself time and again from all participation in the responsibility of changing the course of Thailand's democracy that has been struggling to be genuine since its inception in 1932.

It is noteworthy that the inconvenient truth for the junta and the establishment is perhaps too painful to be admitted: that Thailand in the twenty-first century is now so economically developed that the country will not blindly accept the authoritarian regime's political narrative. The people are no longer vulnerable to exploitation, especially those upcountry villagers who benefit from urbanisation. As Naruemon and McCargo (2011) observe, rapid improvements in the standard of living have taken place in most of the rural areas. There have emerged new lower middle-income farmers whose livelihoods are now relatively secure and so advanced that they know how to cast their vote to benefit themselves to the full. These urbanised villagers now have far better chances to make contact with the world than they did two decades ago; they are able to educate themselves, and thus to realise the truth about the inequality and manipulation being exerted on them. Therefore, one of Prayut's discourse recipients (or his so-called low-income earners who used to get benefit from the former government's populist policies) may cast doubt on his discourse about the necessity of this self-appointed government.

It is possible that, in fact, the ruling government acknowledges this growing trend, but seems unable to comprehend it and blindly sticks with the establishment's firm belief that they are the saviours and a kind of sacrifice for Thais, or is overwhelmingly dominated by the establishment's economic and political networks in pursuit of their own interests. Hence, they continue to put forward the same discourses because these fit the government's description of the need to help the underprivileged. The illusion that Thais still need the guided form of democracy has shown how much Prayut sticks to the way the past military leaders held firm to paternalism. At any rate, in an attempt to reconcile 'them' (the anti-coup groups) and 'us' (the junta and the NCPO), Prayut's choices of pronoun instead sound as though he is reluctant to sincerely include everyone

in the breadth of his political discourse, for he keeps silencing the other dissenting voices and blaming them for holding views opposite to his government's version of democracy.

It appears there are a few social roles of which the prime minister paints an optimistic picture; amongst these are teacher and, unsurprisingly, soldier. The reason why teacher and soldier seem to be positively valued is because of Prayut's own family background – his mother and his wife were teachers, while his father, two of his siblings and he himself were career soldiers. Nonetheless, the 'Others' and 'quasi-Others' such as the farmers, the poor and the opposition are under sustained attacks and depicted as the uneducated and the unaware who are easily misled by corrupt politicians. Prayut's negative attitude can be read off by his reference to other dissenting voices to show that they are wrong (examples being the media and academics), and the way he textures other favourable voices into his authoritarian one (such as his boasts of international acceptance, country ranking or the government-led opinion polls).

Furthermore, the assumption of certain values is clear, since Thai morals (being religious, upholding Thai culture and revering the monarchy) are highly valued as the platform of 'good citizens'. The 'Others' should therefore conform to the above common-sensical assumption held in unison among 'us'. This effect of power exercised by the government's dominance in the weekly address shows that there is binarism emerging from the reproduction of what has been socially constructed. It is done by the combining of several types of idea about 'us' who could help create a better Thailand by obediently following whatever the government see fit to be a proper Thai way of living (in social, political, ethical and economic aspects) and 'them' who are ignorant, stubborn and not yet convinced of the government's sincerity.

Seen in this light, Prayut's weekly show does not seemingly accord with his hope of reconciling all conflicting groups, as he frequently claims, but instead exacerbates the massive polarisation already existing in Thailand. His dubious paternalism with an impervious mien may not be appealing to the majority, but rather to some groups who already give him support and a base in the capital city and the south. Or else, he knows in his heart that the majority could be unsure about his narratives for legitimacy, so he has to devise a more convincing narrative that he is not a felon who caused the coup to happen so suddenly, but more precisely that it was political conditions that needed 'no one but him' to clear up the country's mess.⁸⁷

More than once in an address he would engage his audience with the phrase such as *please rest assured* or *please do not worry*. For example, in only 29 minutes of his address on 31 July 2015 there are more than 15 instances of this similar kind of Engagement, including *please understand that, I can assure you* and *please do not misinterpret*. Rhetorical questions are frequently used to appease the audiences' conscience and subtly influence them to agree with whatever the prime

⁸⁷ *Talk to Al Jazeera - Prayuth Chan-ocha: 'No one else could do the job'* (2015): Al Jazeera English [video]. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SD5wHimG5Fw&t=292s> (Accessed: 7 October 2017).

minister proposes. In the same example, there are 17 rhetorical questions appearing throughout his address. His language use is also filled with presuppositions. Take the same address as an example; the sentence *the government is trying to drive new developments – current technologies, as well as agricultural and industrial restructuring* assumes that Thai agricultural and industrial structure are so problematic that there is such a need for ‘new developments’ because the past governments neglected them, and that the public unconditionally need help from the current government. This presupposition is presented as not requiring any further explanation and is deeply ideological.

One of the reasons that might explain why this style of language use that reflects the junta’s anxiety is a trope in Prayut’s speeches is that, since seizing power in May 2014, the ruling government has faced extensive criticism for the lack of progress on the country’s economy and crackdowns on activists and media at the expense of freedoms and human rights. Although Prayut has repeatedly promised that his political roadmap would bring about ‘proper’ democracy, the date of national polls has never been firmly fixed since he rose to power.⁸⁸ Worse yet, the so-called reforms do not seem to have produced any tangible outcomes, but are instead an advertisement for branding the country with the government’s grandiose schemes such as Pracharat project, Thailand Startup, Smart Farmers or Thailand 4.0,⁸⁹ as well as this institutional self-translation. The attempt to implement this round of reform accords with McCargo’s (2001: 91) earlier observation that ‘Thai reform was at heart a means of preventing change, rather than a method of implementing change.’

The language use found in Prayut’s weekly address is unique, strongly reflecting his personal character. Therefore, as a source text for English translation, his paternalistic style and explicitly negative comments found in it certainly pose a huge problem to the translators as to how to translate all those discursal elements for such ‘diplomatic’ presentation to their intended receivers. According to the editor of the translation project, the final draft has to be carefully examined in order to fend off any possibilities of giving any ‘misleading’ impression regarding the prime minister’s original intentions. In this respect, the translation of Prayut’s speech into a form of subtitle is inevitably related to the notion of translation shift at different levels. Since the production team are staff employed in the same institution where the source text is produced, the shifts are likely to occur according to institutional rather than personal ideologies.

⁸⁸ Since the May 2014 coup the NCPO and the government have announced a time frame for the national poll on several occasions, none of which have come to fruition. On 30 May 2014 Prayut announced a Roadmap to Democracy with an election to be held sometime in 2015. One February 2015 the Japanese media was told of an election to be held in late 2015 or early 2016. In September 2015 the then-UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon was given to understand that an election could be in late 2017. In an NCPO meeting on 10 October 2017 he said an election would be held in November 2018. See ‘False prophecies’, (2017) *Bangkok Post*, 10 October 2017.

⁸⁹ See McCargo (2015) and Desatova (2017) for the ruling government’s nation branding.

In the next two chapters, the topics related to ideologies (reconciliation process, reform and nationalism) expressed in the source text will be compared to their translations segment by segment. The aim of these chapters is to examine whether there are any shifts in translation to the significant degree that makes Prayut's English version 'smoother' than the original or inadvertently changes his ideological stances or undermines his intentions.

Chapter 5

Reconciliation and Reform

This chapter is the analysis of shifts in translations derived from the comparison between General Prayut Chan-o-cha's addresses and their translations with the focus on reconciliation and national reform. The reason for their selection for study is because these topics together represent one of the most recurrent themes which the NCPO and the junta are trying to put forward, along with maintaining peace and order and administering the post-coup Thailand. The NCPO's three-phase roadmap sets forth their transition plans prior to attaining a sustainable democracy.⁹⁰ These plans stress the need for socio-political reform, transparency, checks-and-balances, and anti-corruption. Phase 1 includes the attempt to deal with imminent problems, national administration, and preparation for the national reform in the next phase. Phase 2 was the appointment of a new prime minister and a cabinet, the establishment of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) and the National Reform Council (NRC), and the passing of a new constitution by the Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC). Phase 3 was the national election.

To achieve all these, an Interim Charter with 48 articles was presented on 22 July 2014. The charter established the above three bodies.⁹¹ Although chosen from people in all sectors in each province, the members of the NRC were basically appointed by the NCPO. Their task is to provide recommendations for reforms in eleven areas (politics, legislative power, judicial process, energy, basic infrastructure development, mass communication, education, learning and wisdom, morals and virtues, economic and social differences and allocation of land, water and forest resources).⁹² The NRC was dissolved, however, after the draft constitution was rejected in September 2015 because of a lack of agreement over the notion of 'the people' between the professional constitution-drafters and the military who appointed them.⁹³ It was replaced with the National Reform Steering Assembly (NRSA). Directly appointed by the head of the NCPO, the members of the second team still comprise former members of the NRC, military and police officers. The junta finally geared the new draft up for referendum on 7 August 2016, while publicly rejecting any accusations of manipulating the voters in favour of it. Unfortunately, instead of reconciling

⁹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand. (2014) *One-month progress report of NCPO*, <http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/3756/47354-One-month-progress-report-of-NCPO.html> (Accessed: 03 January 2018).

⁹¹ '2014 Interim Charter to re-engineer Thai political landscape'. (2014, 24 July) *Prachatai English*, <https://prachatai.com/english/node/4244> (Accessed: 03 January 2017).

⁹² The Secretariat of the House of Representatives. (2016) *เอกสารประกอบการปฏิรูป [Documents on the reforms]*, <http://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/nrc2557-info.html> (Accessed: 03 January 2018).

⁹³ See McCargo (2015a), especially the 'Charter Struggle' section, pp. 345-8.

all conflicting groups as the junta had hoped, the result of the referendum has further revealed political division and distrust.⁹⁴

Prayut insisted in his weekly televised address on 22 August 2014 that the NCPO would not intervene in the reform process. In practice, the NCPO has been trying to micromanage it, all the time insisting that it has not been giving the NLA or NRC any orders. By setting itself the impossible target of eliminating corruption, the NCPO was arguably writing a script that could justify virtually indefinite extensions of the junta's rule. Historically, 'corruption' has always been at all levels of the Thai bureaucracy and political system; it is veritably a culture that involves a patronage system, albeit an unlawful one under modern legal codes (Pasuk and Sungsidh, 1994: 11, 21). Given the lack of transparency over defence budgets and arms procurement projects,⁹⁵ not to mention the affluent lifestyle enjoyed by military officers who received very low official salaries, the NCPO was a singularly implausible instrument for countering public sector corruption.

As for reconciliation efforts, Prayut announced in his address on 20 June 2014 that the NCPO would act only as a facilitator to create a conducive atmosphere for sharing opinions and would not tamper with any decisions. However, their actions contradict his words. Instead of opening a space for conflicting groups, the authorities vigorously maintained measures aimed at curbing free expression. Many intellectuals and those associated with political parties were summoned, detained, interrogated and subsequently told to sign a pledge never to engage in political activities. There were limits to the basic freedom of expression. The NCPO banned any information it deemed likely to instigate public discontent against the junta and blocks access to more than 200 websites and media outlets considered critical of the government.⁹⁶ It also imposed restrictions on academic freedom. Any intellectual discussions and seminars concerning politically sensitive topics were rigorously monitored or even ordered to be cancelled. For example, conference organiser Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, and four other Thai activists, at the 13th International Conference on Thai Studies during 15-18 July 2017 at Chiang Mai University were charged with violating the military junta's ban on political gatherings of five or more people.⁹⁷ The NCPO

⁹⁴ McCargo et al. (2017: 89-90) observe that the result resembled those of the 2007 one that 'approved an implicitly anti-Thaksin military-drafted constitution but proceeded to elect pro-Thaksin administrations in the subsequent 2007 and 2011 general elections.'

⁹⁵ 'Is Thailand now buying more arms from China?'. (2017, 14 June) *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/is-thailand-now-buying-more-arms-from-china> (Accessed: 25 October 2018).

⁹⁶ US Department of State. (2014) *Thailand 2014 Human Rights Report*, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236692.pdf> (Accessed 04 January 2018).

⁹⁷ Suluck Lamubol. 'International academic conference participants charged', (2017, 17 August) *University World News*, <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20170817142721609> (Accessed: 25 October 2018).

continued to enforce such bans on political gatherings; anyone engaging in symbolic actions to oppose the regime could face a possibility of detention or sentence of two years in prison.⁹⁸

The spectrum of harsh measures seems to go in an opposite direction to the way the reconciliation should proceed, despite Prayut's attempt to advertise his intention in unifying the country in his Friday speeches. It is obvious that all measures were executed, and their justifications echoed, in the name of Thai-style democracy, a long-standing and resilient ideology that underpins the military royalists' and Bangkok middle class's mind-set. The characteristic of this 'democracy' can be identified with the complex historiography of democratisation in Thailand, especially during the 1960s – 70s and becoming even more striking in the 1990s after the contestations of divergent views between the establishment represented by the military royalists and the new forces of political determination.

Since the dawn of democracy development in Thailand after the 1932 coup that terminated the country's absolute monarchy, there was no regime other than Sarit's in the late 1950s that propagated the unique style of democracy to justify the royalist rule with despotic paternalism (Thak, 1979). Based on the Buddhist world view, a Thai-style of government places the emphasis on the strong and moral leader under the monarchy's guidance. Sarit promoted the discourse of country development and the concept of Thainess as source of legitimacy to facilitate political stability and economic growth with respect to the aid coming from the US during the Cold War. Later, in the late 1960s, Kukrit Pramoj, a prominent upper-class scholar, propagandised royalism and Sarit's authoritarian legacy. He claimed Thai society would never be considered compatible with the idea of Thailand being democratised in a Western way; it is a 'good man' that should be governing the people instead of elected politicians who seek only their own interests (Saichol, 2007: 69, cited in Hewison and Kengkij, 2010: 188). After the economic crisis in 1997, however, Thai-style democracy was challenged by a new politics led by a civilian government that managed to win the majority vote; the rules of the political game were changed with the coming of Thaksin. Yet the discourse has long been entrenched in Thai society, especially among well-known public intellectuals. At the time of Thaksin's rise, there emerged an elite reformist movement or 'royal liberalism' that tried to promote the return of a paternalist ideology (Connors, 2008). This is largely because Thaksin is seen by royalists to have diverged from the political norms and undermined the influence of the network monarchy (McCargo, 2005). In the putsch against Thaksin and his party in 2006, the royalist military and the establishment arranged that Thai-style democracy remained appealing to the middle class. There were calls for a form of democracy suitable for the Thai way of life, rather than the Western style that gave rise to Thaksin's cronies. In the common middle-class perception, those who voted for Thaksin and his party, especially the

⁹⁸ 'Thailand: junta entrenched 3 years after coup'. (2017, 21 May) *Human Rights Watch*, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/21/thailand-junta-entrenched-3-years-after-coup> (Accessed: 04 January 2018).

poor and working-class, were ‘ignorant, bewildered, bought off, or coerced’ (Hewison and Kengkij, 2010: 198).

One of the justifications for the 2014 coup was to purge the wayward ‘parliamentary dictators’ who kept winning elections with majority votes. What is apparent is that the new constitution signals a change to an ‘electoral authoritarian regime’, reverting to the old system of the appointed senate and non-elected independent institutions justified in the name of rule by ‘good men’ who understand the true character of Thai values (Puangthong, 2015). These acts have clearly articulated a paternalist ideology that the country should be led by ‘good’ and ‘capable’ elites in order to carry out necessary ‘reforms’. The current junta are using Thai-style democracy as their cultural argument, which is frequently found in the Friday address, to justify their repressive regime and try to change the mind of the opposition.

Nevertheless, as van Dijk (2008) contends, to form people’s minds requires a multitude of discourse and interpersonal relations of information. Text processing and attitude formation cannot transform the public beliefs immediately, nor do they efficiently organise attitudes. It is the authorities who control the types, topics and amount of information, as well as the selection/censoring of arguments, so as to profoundly influence the ‘organisation of public knowledge, the hierarchies of beliefs and the pervasiveness of the consensus, which in turn are potent factors in the formation and the reproduction of opinions, attitudes and ideologies’ (van Dijk, 2008: 36). Translation as a form of reproduction of a certain discourse is therefore vital in this case. The shifts derived from the ST-TT comparison can divulge whether it faithfully reproduces any information or censors any statements.

To analyse how effectively the reconciliation and reform discourses are presented in the translation, the next sections investigate seven weekly addresses on 30 May 2014, 6 June 2014, 13 June 2014, 20 June 2014, 27 June 2014, 29 July 2016 and 5 August 2016, as the main source of data. The first five addresses cover the first month after the coup on 24 May 2014, while the last two were shortly before the constitutional referendum held on 7 August 2016. The results of analysis are expected to reveal the shifts, translation procedures and general strategies at certain critical points in the addresses. Due to the limited space, however, the examples provided hereafter are the compared incidences that show the differences of the ST and the TT in terms of shifts in attitudes (interpersonal function), identifications of people and things (ideational function), and logical connections (logical and textual function) (See Chapter 3).

5.1 Attitude in translation

The analysis of the shift of value systems will manifest the different realisations of interpersonal function between the ST and the TT. This section shows how value systems constructed in the ST are altered in translation by various procedures, including omission, addition, dilution, or expansion.⁹⁹ The main discussion is of the overall patterns of attitude by looking at the different displays of Appraisal (Affect, Judgement, Appreciation) Graduation and Engagement. The full version of 15 examples from selected addresses are numbered and listed in Appendix 2-A: translation shifts in expression of attitudes, along with their verbatim transcriptions and official translations.

Affect

The study found that direct inscription is the most common linguistic feature for the ST, given the nature of spoken discourse. Affect evaluation or the emotional reaction is prevalent when Prayut talks about justification for taking control of the country, the political roadmap, establishing new government and eliminating corruption that has plagued the country during previous administrations. In comparison with the official translations, **Table 5.1** demonstrates how Prayut expresses his own feelings and assigns emotional evaluations to different groups of people in his political discourse: the NCPO, the military government, protesters, former politicians and ordinary Thais. Numbers after the quotes are example numbers listed in Appendix 2-A.¹⁰⁰ All the examples quoted in this chapter are my literal translation (LT) compared with the official translation (OT). The expression of Affect is categorised into four major sets: in/security, un/happiness, dis/satisfaction (Martin and Rose, 2007: 69-7) and dis/inclination (Munday, 2012: 45-6). The sets include the emotional disposition such as *afraid* (8) or *secure* (10), surges of behaviour/mind such as *understand* (6) or *confirm* (10), and nominalisation of mental processes or a noun that conveys emotional evaluation such as *violation* (2) and *conflict* (1).

⁹⁹ For detailed discussion on and distinction between ‘translation procedures’ and ‘translation strategies’, see Munday’s *Introducing Translation Studies* (2016: 23-24).

¹⁰⁰ The example number also applies to **Table 5.2**, **Table 5.3**, **Table 5.4**, **Table 5.5** and **Table 5.6**.

Table 5.1 Different realisations of Affect (based on Appendix 2-A)

	Literal translation	Official translation
security (+)	overall peace and harmony (1) - - We understand (6) I would like to confirm you (8) not cause any doubt (9) Today the NCPO confirms that [it] doesn't want a single baht in help (9) secure (10)	- It is hoped that eventually (1) Let me assure you (2) We believe (6) I would like to reiterate (8) not to single out (9) - -
insecurity (-)	in the conflicts ... (1) force, intimidation ... bondage or human rights violation (2) don't believe (9)	- any physical violation (2) -
satisfaction (+)	- thoroughly satisfied (6) a full democracy like everyone wants (7) I don't forbid . Therefore, you cannot forbid me [from doing] this, [from doing] that (11) a democracy that everyone wants (13)	fully respected (2) - a full democracy (7) more than welcome to (11) a democracy (13)
dissatisfaction (-)	I'm afraid ... (8) neglected (10)	- left to fall apart (10)
happiness (+)	to promote love, reconciliation (3)	to put Thailand above themselves (3)
unhappiness (-)	burden that is messy (14)	to keep track of progress (14)
inclination (+)	- - to build [it] this year and use [it] next year... Anything that is a plan is a plan. Anything that we can do, we do (15)	Efforts (8) My intention (9) invest our efforts today for the long run (15)
disinclination (-)	-	-

There are many evidences of terms indicating the sense of in/security in the ST. However, the case of omission seems to overshadow other types of translation procedure. This is apparent when the translator has to deal with Prayut's remarks on the NCPO's operations:

LT: However, if that expression affects **the overall peace and harmony**, [those who do it] would be summoned to explain [their action], sorted out and looked after in order to calm [them] down... (1)

OT: These people were requested to report to officials in order to give them a cooling-off period. (1)

LT: [I] just raise examples that such organization needs cooperation in solving policy corruption. **Today the NCPO confirms that [it] doesn't want a single baht in help.** (9)

OT: ... just to give examples that cooperation is needed from such organizations to solve the conditions... (9)

In the above examples, the phrase *overall peace and harmony* (1) and the clause *Today the NCPO confirms that [it] doesn't want any help for a single baht* (9) disappear from the TT. The absence of these two subsequently makes the translations less self-assured regarding security evaluation on the summoning of people and the NCPO's vested interest in eradicating corruption. Omission is also employed to obscure Prayut's seemingly sarcastic evaluation when describing the concept of democracy, as in the exclusion of *like everyone wants* (7) when he talks about the justification of the coup and *that everyone wants* (13) when explaining the importance of a referendum:

LT: We came in to make [the country] strong ... in order to move towards becoming a full democracy **like everyone wants**. (7)

OT: We came in to make our country stronger ... to move towards becoming a fully functioning democracy (7)

LT: ... it [referendum] is a process within a democracy **that everyone wants**. (13)

OT: ... it is an essential process within a democracy. (13)

The most interesting example of omission is when the translator entirely excludes the whole clauses *I'm afraid [you] use a different calendar. Today it should be the same* (8) from the TT where Prayut reveals his personal feeling towards the NCPO's roadmap and those who remain sceptical of when and how to implement it. These clauses signify the dissatisfactory evaluation towards 'you' or Thais in general, especially the ardent anti-junta groups who want the general election to take place sooner. However, there is an example of omission that inadvertently makes Prayut less strong-willed when the whole of a positive evaluation clause *Both majority and minority voters must be thoroughly satisfied* (6) disappears from the TT:

LT: Give us time for changing attitudes ... beneficial to people in every group, every area.
Both majority and minority voters must be thoroughly satisfied. (6)

OT: All we are asking for is to give us time to reform ... and beneficial to all people. (6)

This kind of omission seems to do with the tendency for making his utterance look cohesive and concise in the textual organisation of his English written discourse, rather than concealing his expression of determination. The same applies to the omission of *in the conflicts* (1) when he described the type of people to be summoned, and *secure* (10) when he mentioned the future of the country after the reform is accomplished. In a place where Prayut defended his plan and vested interest in policy corruption, his insecurity evaluation in a form of imperative *don't believe* (9) is missing (see Speech functions). As a result, his command derived from an insecurity evaluation towards his listeners is concealed.

There is also the case of expansion of the meaning as in *We understand* (6) to *We believe* (6) to stress the premier's call for public support, thereby assuring the sense of security. Prayut's dissatisfaction at corruption that was rife before the coup with the term *neglected* (10) was also significantly expanded to *left to fall apart* (10). Addition of new words into the TT is primarily used to shine a more positive light on his sense of security as in *It is hope that eventually* (1) and

Let me assure you (2), satisfaction as in *fully respected* (2), inclination as in *Efforts* (8) and *My intention* (9). These phrases positively display that by invoking the opposition, planning the country's Roadmap and tackling corruption, Prayut is certainly trying to bring harmony and improve the unpleasant situation; hence, the Thai public ought not to be excessively disquieted.

The positive set of emotion is retained in the TT if the terms portray a good image of the speaker, but negative ones tend to be omitted or their meanings are diluted:

LT: ... there is no **force, intimidation, torture, incarceration** or **human rights violation** at all. (2)

OT: ... all human rights principles have been **fully respected** – there has been no **torture, threats** or **any physical violation**. (2)

This example is the remark on the treatment of the anti-coup individuals who were summoned to the military camp. Instead of retaining the insecurity set of evaluation towards the dissidents, the translator chooses to tone down the speaker's comments and modifies the negative viewpoint (*no force ... human rights violation*) to a positive one (*all human right principles have been fully respected*). Similar to this modification of viewpoint is an example in the satisfaction set in which negation is turned into proposition:

LT: ... whoever comes out to speak their opinion, **I don't forbid. Therefore, you cannot forbid me [from doing] this, [from doing] that, all the time**. (11)

OT: anyone who wants to speak their opinion is **more than welcome to**. (11)

This quote is about explaining that Prayut himself does not forbid anyone from voicing their concerns over the new draft constitution, and others should not forbid him from taking sides and showing his favouritism towards the draft. The translator changes Prayut's negative viewpoint to a positive one and makes the statement altogether more concise.

Among the selected examples, however, there is little evidence of the un/happiness set. The following example illustrates how Prayut's paternalistic leadership is enforced upon his audience in the ST and how the translator enhances his meaning to another level:

LT: All groups, all sides must turn to **cooperation, reinforce love, reconciliation, unity**, to stop violent action against each other. (3)

OT: [I] ... urge all sides to **put Thailand above themselves**, to cooperate and unite, and to stop violent action. (3)

The phrase connoting Prayut's sense of happiness towards his reconciliation effort for Thailand's future is changed into a sense of security. In doing so, the translation expands the sense of collectiveness and inserts the idea of patriotism in the TT, explicitly showing Prayut's mind-set on the Thai way of administering the country. In contrast, there is the case of optimistic modulation of the phrase connoting Prayut's unhappiness evaluation:

LT: [We] must follow up, prosecute plenty of cases. It is **a burden that is messy** at present. (14)

OT: ... things need to be followed up on in order to **keep track of progress**. (14)

This particular segment demonstrates how his viewpoint is changed from ‘that this task is burdensome’ to a positive judgement upon the junta’s credibility (see Judgement). There is also a trend in diluting Prayut’s long-winded clauses, sometimes replacing them with the emphasis on positive inclination *efforts*:

LT: [I] don’t think today to **build [it] this year and use [it] next year. Or to build it quick. Anything that is a plan is a plan. Anything that we can do, we do**. They call it systematic development. (15)

OT: ... we must **invest our efforts** today for the long run. This is part of a long-term systematic development project. (15)

As with any other positive Affect evaluation, the translator adds the inclination-evaluated terms *Efforts* (8) and *My intention* (9) in the TT where it concerns the NCOP’s roadmap and corruption elimination to highlight the junta’s ambition and determination in solving problems left by the civilian governments. While Prayut’s sense of inclination largely increases in the TT, there is no instance of disinclination in the selected address, which is presumably similar throughout other addresses.

Judgement

Although it is difficult to gain the precise figure for Prayut’s attitudinal values and their shifts, the close reading of the examples suggests that the most frequent occurrence of attitude is Judgement, and thereby their shifts. The expressions of Judgement in the ST are primarily directed at those who oppose the coup and protesters against or for Yingluck’s government, the NCPO, and the civil servants. The evaluation of how all these groups of people should or should not behave is apparent in the ST, but changed to be more positive or negative depending on the group the prime minister addresses. Judgement towards peoples in Prayut’s addresses can be divided into two groups. The first refers to ‘We’ including the current government, the prime minister himself, his cabinet, civil servants under his administration, the NCPO, and the collective entity of ‘our country’. The second refers to ‘the Others’, a term which includes former governments, former prime ministers, protesters, anti-coup individuals, Thais in general and the ‘quasi-Others’ (see Chapters 4 and 6). The expression of judgement can be positive and negative: admiration and criticism when the judged behaviours involved social esteem (should or should not do), or praise and condemnation when they involved social sanctions (can and cannot do).

Table 5.2 Different realisations of Judgement (based on Appendix 2-A)

Group of people		Literal translation	Official translation
'We'	criticism/ condemnation	summoned to explain [their action], sorted out and looked after (1) the control of the country administration (4) [PM's] instruction alone will not be 100 per cent effective (14)	requested to report (1) - Instructions alone will not do (14)
	admiration/ praise	- rebuild itself (7) like adding bricks, stones, concrete, steel (7) be strong (10)	well looked after (2) ready (7) laying firmer foundations (7) persevere (10)
'The Others'	criticism/ condemnation	influence symbolically to mobilise the mass and re-start the conflicts (1) condemned officers (5) what [they] have done in the past, which might be wrong or right in their personal belief or reason in order [for them] accept different views (1) policy corruption ... The over-priced procurement that is prone to corruption (9) It's up to your own thinking (11) [they] pressure the government ... (12)	politically-motivated opinion ... involved with the protracted political conflicts (1) - their beliefs and actions, and to listen to the others' opinions (1) prone to corruption practices through policies and overpriced acquisitions (9) - the government ... take responsibility (12)
	admiration/ praise	expressing the opinion in democratic system (1) - contribute and cooperate (1)	- have the opportunity (1) put our country before themselves ... live harmoniously and act constructively (1)

The indicators of criticism/condemnation and admiration/praise towards the two groups are listed in **Table 5.2**. The examples clearly display that in the TT Prayut seems to express more admiration towards the junta's policies and the NCOP's operations. For example, when Prayut straightforwardly says [*those who re-start the conflict would be*] **summoned to explain [their action], sorted out and looked after** (1) which can be considered negative behaviour and condemned under international norms, the translator dilutes those phrases into neutral ones *These people were requested to report to officials* (1). The same applies to the omission of *the control of the country administration* (4) and the dilution of the clause [*PM's*] instruction alone will **not be 100 per cent effective** into *Instruction alone will not do* (14). These two manipulations consequently lessen the degree of criticism of Prayut's own instruction.

On the contrary, the admiration and praise on 'We' is likely to be expanded and added to:

LT: In terms of **accommodation and diet**, there is no force, intimidation, torture, incarceration or human rights violation at all. (2)

OT: They were **well looked after and accommodated** ... there has been no torture, threats or any physical violation. (2)

It is worth underlining that in the above example the phrase *well looked after* appears from nowhere to present in a positive light the treatment of those summoned by the NCOP to report to military camps.

LT: If we want to see in the future that we must **be strong**, country is clean and orderly, everyone **has fair income** ... (10)

OT: We must **persevere**, and we will have a country that is clean and orderly, with people who **have good careers** ... (10)

The above example is when Prayut is talking about how to cooperate over social and political reforms. Prayut's Judgement towards ordinary Thais is expressed with the phrase *be strong* and *has fair income*, but the translator expands them into *persevere* and *have good careers*, respectively. Doing so inversely gives a more positive Judgement towards 'We' and 'our country':

There is a case of modulation of viewpoint when Prayut tries to justify his seizure of the country:

LT: We came in to make [the country] **strong like adding bricks, stones, concrete, steel** to things that were about to collapse [and let the country] **rebuild itself** ... (7)

OT: We came in to make our country stronger, **laying firmer foundations to prevent the structure from collapsing** so that our country will be **ready** ... (7)

The perspective towards 'our country' with the phrase *rebuild itself* is changed into *ready*, suggesting the positive stage of 'rebuilding our country'. In the same example, an admiration of the NCPO is expressed by a provoked simile in the phrase *strong like adding bricks, stones, concrete, steel*; but in translation, it is even more enhanced with a positive phrase that is less metaphorical and intense in attitude: *laying firmer foundations*.

The following examples show that whenever Prayut judges the characters of 'the Others' with the terms that criticise them, the translator tends to soften the ill effects of his comments. The phrase *influence symbolically to mobilise the mass and re-start the conflicts* (1) that describes 'the Others' behaviour before their being summoned by the army is diluted into *politically-motivated opinion ... involved with the protracted political conflicts* (1), making Prayut's Judgement subtler in criticising the opponents. To reduce the force of attitude in his Judgement on the second group's behaviour, the translator also omits *condemned* (5) and *It's up to your own thinking* (11). The translator also reshuffles his run-on comments about corruptions caused by former politicians and deletes his Affect evaluation (see Affect) and imperative clause (see Speech functions). These reshuffles and deletions allow for more precise and comprehensible statement:

LT: ... [I] just raise examples that such organization need cooperation in solving policy corruption. **Today the NCPO confirms that [it] doesn't want a single baht in help. Therefore, whoever would claim [so], you can check [with us], ask [us] all the time. Over-priced procurement that is prone to corruption will be investigated, don't believe [them].** (9)

OT: ... that cooperation is needed from such organizations to solve the conditions which are **prone to corruption practices through policies and overpriced acquisitions.** (9)

Furthermore, in Prayut's criticism of 'the Others' who *pressure the government* (12), the translator makes him look less cynical by replacing this disapproval with a new perspective on events: *the government ... take responsibility* (12), which instead shows his admiration towards 'We-the government'.

To make Prayut's evaluation less verbose yet more to the point, the translator shortens his criticism of anti-coup demonstrators:

LT: ... those who were [involved] in the conflicts ... [by] **expressing the opinions in a democratic system** ... [those who do it] would be summoned ... in order to calm [them] down and let them reflect what [they] have done in the past, **which might be wrong or right in their personal belief or reason in order to gain the acceptance of different views**, and realise how we would **contribute and cooperate** with every group and side in order to move the nation forward. (1)

OT: These individuals, such as protest leaders, key protest supporters ... are directly or indirectly involved with the protracted political conflicts. They now have **the opportunity** to reflect on their beliefs and actions, and to listen to the others' opinions. It is hoped that eventually all of them will **put our country before themselves and learn to live harmoniously and act constructively in a society where individuals can have differences of opinions.** (1)

In the same example, however, there are cases of addition and expansion of the admiration/praise for 'the Others'. Prayut in the English version sounds open-minded and reassuring concerning the supposed benefits of summoning the opponents by adding that they will have *the opportunity* to have their attitude adjusted in a military camp, and by expanding the collective behaviour of *contribute and cooperate* to a possibility of learning to *put our country before themselves and live harmoniously and act constructively* on the condition that they strictly follow the junta's order. Once again, the translator intervenes to insert the sense of collectiveness and patriotism into the TT, thus resonating with the concept of Thai-style democracy in which the unity of the country led by 'the good leader' comes first. Yet the praise to 'the Others' with the phrase *expressing the opinion in democratic system* prior to this segment is entirely omitted, presumably because it shows Prayut giving more credit to 'the Others' for their democratic way of behaving, which in turn would make him contradict himself if it were to be retained in translation.

Appreciation

Appreciation found in the selected addresses is expressed towards the impact, quality, composition or value of democracy, the reconciliation process, social and political reform and a

referendum on the draft constitution. As a way of expressing Appreciation towards his junta-initiated schemes, Prayut stresses the need for various ethical values that would unite the country after political disruption and help overhaul the problematic political system by having a new constitution. The examples of Prayut's Appreciation are listed in **Table 5.3**, in which positive evaluations towards political situations and related topics occur less frequently than negative ones.

Table 5.3 Different realisations of Appreciation (based on Appendix 2-A)

Evaluation	Literal translation	Official translation
positive <i>impact, quality, composition, value</i>	universal ... sacrificing (6)	right ... (6)
	a process (13)	an essential process (13)
	similar to when a teacher used to ask students whether you want [something] or not, like [it] or not (13)	similar to asking members of a group (13)
negative <i>impact, quality, composition, value</i>	problems (5)	deadlock (5)
	cannot go on (5)	paralysed (5)
	democracy that will need preparation for improvement (6)	a flawed democratic system (6)
	different calendar (8)	-
	a small leaking hole (9)	-
	fix the whole system (14)	structural adjustments and an overhaul of many of our systems (14)
	lots of people are involved [in structural adjustment] (14)	not to mention participation from many people (14)

Although not systematic, an analysis of Prayut's English version reveals the occasional omission of positive evaluations. When describing the quality of democracy in his very first address, he uses the terms *universal ... sacrificing* (6). These terms disappear, but at the same time another quality *right* (6) is substituted for the missing one, which therefore reduces the quality of democracy in translation. As with the case of positive addition, the translator inserts the word *essential to a process* (13), which ascribes the positive value to referendum. In the same example, there is the case of modulating Prayut's evaluation towards the process of referendum:

LT: ... [it is] **similar to when a teacher used to ask students whether you want [something] or not, like [it] or not**. Who likes [it] raise their hands. (13)

OT: It is **similar to asking members of a group** to raise their hands in favour or in opposition of a proposal. (13)

Prayut explains the similarity of referendum to the classroom vote with role of teacher as a referee and student as a voter. But in the TT the comparison is replaced by a different composition: *similar to asking members of a group*. This certainly shifts Prayut's worldview from seeing Thai voters as students (possibly schoolchildren) and the junta as a teacher who holds more power and

legitimacy in overseeing the polling, which reflects the leader's paternalism towards the Thai public. The translator instead makes the comparison a more familiar circumstance of voting.

As with other types of evaluation, the translator opts for excluding Prayut's negative Appreciation regarding quality and composition of 'improper things' that belong to 'the Others'. The phrase *different calendar* (8) disappears when he defends himself against 'the Others' and their misrepresentation of his three-phrase roadmap and forming a new government, as well as *a small leaking hole* (9) when he persuades his audiences of the junta's procurement policy and the need for eliminating 'corruption', something which had been neglected by former civilian governments. These omissions necessarily entail the reduction of attitudinal intensity and possibly make Prayut look less obsessed with constant attacks on 'Others'.

However, the omission of negative attitude is not only the translator's option, for there are some cases of changing core to non-core lexis, intensification and expansion of unpleasant political conditions, the civilian government's version of democracy that differs from that of the junta, and the problematic social and political structures:

LT: If every soldier and government officer did nothing, who would come to take care of you? Who would solve the **problems** for you when the full democracy **cannot go on...** (5)

OT: If government officials and the military did nothing, who would help the Thai people resolve this **deadlock** when the democratic mechanisms are **paralysed...** (5)

Rather than retaining the core term *problems* the translator makes it sound more refined with the non-core *deadlock*. This largely changes Prayut's straightforward evaluation of 'problems' of the political crisis before the 2014 coup and gives more weight to his justification. Greater is the intensification of viewpoint towards democracy that he perceives as a grave problem. The non-core term *paralysed* in the TT apparently conveys more force of attitude than a simple phrase *cannot go on* in the ST.

Likewise, when requesting public support and time to reform, Prayut blames this time-consuming task on the readjustment of the democratic system:

LT: We understand that everyone might have to choose country above **democracy that will need preparation for improvement.** (6)

OT: We believe that if you were in our situation for the past 9 years you would choose the well-being of your country above **a flawed democratic system.** (6)

The translator replaces the relative clause *that will need preparation for improvement* with a term displaying more focus on a negative quality: *flawed*. This instance thereby lays the basis for his disapproval of the usefulness of any civilian-led democratic system.

Additionally, there are cases of expansion of negative evaluation towards the necessity of reform:

LT: [We-the government] need to **fix the whole system, lots of people are involved**. (14)

OT: They [problems] need **structural adjustments and an overhaul of many of our systems, not to mention** participation from many people. (14)

In the above example, the composition of the clause *fix the whole system* is expanded into a more comprehensive one: *structural adjustments and an overhaul of many of our systems*. Apart from making Prayut sound eloquent, the translation clearly shows how strong his negative evaluation of the current social and political system is and the need for his role as protector of the country and pioneer of reform. Next to the previous clause Prayut's evaluation that simply says *lots of people are involved [in structural adjustment]* is changed to **not to mention** participation from many people. By changing the evaluation to counter-expectancy (see Engagement), the translator gives a surprise turn to the evaluative prosody of Prayut's text and has hinted that a condition of the junta's effort is 'more than expected' and 'really needs more hands', instead of plainly describing the composition of the concept of reform.

Graduation

Another distinctive discourse feature that amplifies or plays down Prayut's attitude is Graduation – how strongly he feels about a certain group or reconciliation process. Graduation of his attitude is generally not prevalent in the ST, but emphasised with high-grading terms in the TT. The examples listed in **Table 5.4** below indicate the increase in force and focus in Prayut's English version. The general trend of Graduation is high grading; out of eight, there are five incidences of adding the high intensity and prototypicality in Prayut's discourse. All these grading terms yield much more positive evaluation to the English translation than the original. Some of the following examples can be crosschecked with Affect or Judgement in the above sections, for these grading terms are indicative of an intensification of attitude.

Table 5.4 Different realisations of Graduation (based on Appendix 2-A)

Range	Literal translation	Official translation
high	-	fully respected (2)
	-	strongly and sincerely (3)
	full democracy (5)	democratic mechanisms (5)
	conflicts (5)	incessant conflicts (5)
	thoroughly satisfied (6)	-
	-	for the past 9 years (6)
	-	a long-term systematic development (15)
medium	soon (6)	-
low	-	-

The intensity is apparent in the TT where the matter is concerned with convincing the audience of the necessity of reconciliation led by the NCPO; the phrase *I strongly and sincerely* (3) is

added to his statement urging *all sides to put Thailand above themselves* and therefore strengthens his attitude towards nationalist discourse. Similarly, *fully respected* (2) appears in the TT to put more force on Prayut's reassurance on summoning the opposition. Addition is also the procedure the translator uses to sharpen the focus on things that are inherently non-gradable. For example, when Prayut refers to the conflicts between the anti- and pro-Thaksin groups, the term *conflicts* (5) is intensified by adding *incessant* (5), as well as *for the past 9 years* (6) to the clause *if you were in our situation* which shows the grave condition of political crisis and that the NCPO could therefore claim that the country needs reform to mend the democratic system. The same procedure is used to convince the international audiences by adding a *long-term systematic development* (15) to his account on benefits of government expenditure, particularly on new infrastructure investment required to be specified in the national economic and social development plans.

Unlike the cases of addition, omission is employed to lessen the grading of Appraisal related to his comments on how to mend Thailand's democracy. For instance, the translator does not translate the phrase *thoroughly satisfied* (6) that is supposed to explain the emotional reaction of *Both majority and minority voters* towards the constitutional amendment. The only medium grading *soon* (6), which tells over how long a period the improvement of democracy by the NCPO would take place, is also missing from the clauses *democracy that will need preparation for improvement. [It] will come soon* (6), and replace them with a shorter, intensified *a flawed democratic system* (see Appreciation). These two instances occur possibly because the translator intervenes to cut down Prayut's excessive comments. The translator further shies away from such strong grading terms as *full democracy* (5) and dilutes the quality of the term *democracy* into the more neutral phrase *democratic mechanisms* (5). This apparently lessens the focus on quality in the ST and makes Prayut in the TT less forceful as to what kind of democracy he wants it to be, albeit opposite to its universal value. One plausible explanation of why the translator lowers the high grading in Prayut's evaluation is that it is a part of a general strategy to soften Prayut's tactless remarks, while the increase in high grading is to affirm his aspiration to introduce reforms.

Engagement

Engagement is a resource that indicates the scale of the speaker's commitment. It also displays how a value judgement is projected, sets up a space between speaker and listener, opens room for contradiction, or highlights a potential challenge. In SFL, beside the use of pronouns the form of engagement includes such indicators as *modality* (the use of modal verbs/auxiliaries), *counter-expectancy* (the use of modal particles, attitudinal adverbials and discourse markers), and *projection* (reported verbs). The sources of attitude or where and who the evaluations are from is vital in Prayut's speech, especially regarding modality that establishes clines of probability, obligation, usuality and inclination. In the ST Prayut's spoken discourse is filled with modality of obligation, while in the TT those modal terms are omitted if they potentially generate the negative impression. In contrast, there are many instances of intensification of positive inclination

in translation where he mentions his political roadmap and hopes for the self-appointed government.

Modality in Thai is differentiated into two main types: *modalisation* and *modulation*,¹⁰¹ based on the type and value of Thai modality in Pattama (2005: 379-84). The first type is sub-divided into probability and usuality, while the second includes obligation and readiness (including inclination and ability). Negation is also included in modality and shows the strong value of opposing other potential voices in the clause; it is at the negative end of the modality cline, as in *it is, it must be, it might be, it isn't* (Martin and White, 2007: 53). **Table 5.5** lists the shifts of type and value of modality.

Table 5.5 Shifts in type and value of Modality (based on Appendix 2-A)

	Literal translation	Value	Official translation	Value
Modality <i>probability,</i> <i>usuality,</i> <i>obligation,</i> <i>readiness,</i> <i>negation</i>	must (3)	high	urge (3)	low
	might have to (6)	high	would (6)	high
	might have to (8)	high	will (8)	high
	should be the same (8)	medium	-	-
	might be (8)	low	will be (8)	high
	It's not that ... (9)	high	-	-
	You must not see that all is corruption (9)	high	-	-
	Today I already delivered policy (9)	high	-	-
	must (10)	high	-	-
	must (10)	high	Are you ...? (10)	low
	how can [one] do? (10)	low	it is necessary (10)	high
	it must ... (10)	high	Of course ... will (10)	high
	I don't guide [you] ... Think like I do ... (11)	high	-	-
	you cannot forbid me ... all the time (11)	high	-	-
	other points cannot either (12)	high	will have implications for the other remaining issues (12)	-
	must (12)	high	will (12)	high
	[I] don't think ... (15)	high	It is something that we must invest our efforts today for the long run (15)	low/ high
They call it systematic development (15)	medium	This is a long-term systemic development (15)	high	

The findings derived from analysis of Prayut's speech in Chapter 4 suggest the trend in obligation, followed by probability. The ST is full of such terms as *tong* 'must/have to', *khong-tong* 'might have to', *mai-dai* 'cannot'. These auxiliaries congeal around the high value in the cline of obligation and probability. His word-choice is possibly the result of his personality and sociolect of high-ranking military men who are familiar with issuing orders. However, in the TT the tone

¹⁰¹ Note that 'modulation' as a type of modality is different from 'modulation' as a translation procedure.

of obligation is likely to be softened because the modal auxiliaries or the whole phrase containing modality are omitted; such as, [*the timetable for the provisional constitution*] **should** be the same (8), *You **must not** see that all [the NCPO's procurement] is corruption* (9), *you **must** "open your hearts"* (10) and *I **don't** guide [you about referendum]. **Think** like I do a bit* (11). The last one is closely linked to grammatical moods and speech functions (see Speech functions).

Not only does omission lessen the sense of obligation in the TT but it also dilutes it, as in *all sides **must** turn to cooperation* (3) to *I ... **urge** all sides ... to cooperate and unite* (3). Another way to lessen the sense of obligation is to change it to other type of modality, as in *you **must** be ready to "adapt to" and accept new things* (10) to ***Are you** ready to adapt to get these things ...?* (10), [*To reform,*] *it **must** be in difficult time now* (10) to ***Of course** things **will** be hard right now* (10) and [*those who oppose the junta*] ***must** pressure the government and the NCPO* (12) to *the government and the NCPO **will** take responsibility to sort this out* (12). Although these changes lessen the obligation, they instead increase the positive inclination of the events Prayut mentions, especially about cooperation in social reform and the outcome of the referendum.

Nonetheless, there are also the cases of obligation being increased in the TT. By changing *For street-vending, I know that you are in trouble, but **how can [one] do [it otherwise]?*** (10) with low value of ability to ***it is necessary** to achieve [reorganisation of street-vendors] for your future* (10) with high value of obligation, the translator replaces Prayut's rhetorical question of capability in social reform that Thais should undergo with a fact (*it is ...*) of obligation (see Projection). Again, the clause *we **must** invest our efforts today for the long run* (15) with high value of obligation is simply added to where he mentions the reason for government expenditure in order to strengthen his views.

As for probability, the translator tends to intensify its value. For example, *might have to* in both (6) and (8) is transformed into *would* (6) and *will* (8), and *might be* (8) into *will be* (8). They are Prayut's requests for public support and for the establishment of the NLC and the cabinet, which raises the likelihood of these topics. Two high-value incidences of usuality in the ST are omitted. First is people's criticism of his support for the constitution to be drafted by a military-appointed committee, as in *you cannot forbid me ... **all the time*** (11) disappearing from the TT. Second is the loss of emphasis on time ***Today I already** delivered policy* (9). These omissions occur possibly because it obviously exposes Prayut's off-the-cuff comments on anyone who disagrees with his actions against corruption stemming, as he insists, from former elected governments.

Negation which overlaps with other modality (*must not, cannot*) tends to be omitted, as in *It's **not** that [I] want to cause you any damage* (9), by which Prayut opposes the idea of making trouble derived from his corruption eradication policy. Alternatively, it is changed into the opposite end of the semantic cline: *If this point [referendum] could not move forward, other points **cannot** either* (12) to *If we are unable to resolve this issue, then it **will have** implications for the other remaining issues* (12), and *[I] **don't** think today to build [infrastructure] this year and use [it]*

next year (15) to ***It is something that we must invest our efforts today for the long run*** (15). The first example is his talk about the result of the referendum, the second the reason for new investment. Note that the second one is also a change of projecting source (from speaker's subjectivity to a fact), making his own claim even more rational. The reason the translator tries to get rid of Prayut's projection is that it is a translation move to make it sound more universally accepted. Another example of the change of projection to reinforce the fact is when he gives the reason for the government's investment with a large sum of money: ***They call it systematic development*** to ***This is a long-term systematic development*** (15).

Counter-expectancy is another indicator of Engagement: the speaker's clues about showing a value judgement. This is the clearest form of the speaker's intervention and the translator's extension if a shift occurs in the TT (Munday, 2012: 66). The indicators of attitude in the selected examples of Prayut's address are equally omitted or added in the TT, as shown in **Table 5.6**.

Table 5.6 Shifts in Counter-expectancy (based on Appendix 2-A)

	Literal translation	Official translation
Counter-expectancy	-	at least (4)
	I just raise examples ... just raise examples (9)	just to give examples (9)
	-	However (9)
	But (10)	-
	-	only (11)
	anyway ... anyway (12)	-
	There is no difference from selecting the representative (13)	Instead of asking which political party a voter prefers (13)
	only (13)	-

The ST-TT comparison shows how both Prayut and his translator make use of counter-expectancy to give other potential voices to the texts or wipe them off altogether. Prayut's addresses contain the modal particles/adverbials *just* (9), *anyway* (12), *only* (13), and the initial-sentence discourse marker *But* (10), but all are removed or made concise in translation. These omissions result in the absence of negative attitude (force of command towards audiences), as in ***But** you have to be ready to "adapt" and accept new things ...* (10) when he urged ordinary Thais to follow the social reform plan; and, *it is necessary to arrange a new one **anyway** ... [they] must pressure the government ... **anyway*** (12) when he straightforwardly declares his new plan if the referendum fails to pass. When Prayut compares the process of casting votes in the referendum, the translator also unpins the stress on the situation by omitting the term *only* from the clause ***only** it changes the question from what number ... do you like to whether you agree with ... constitution* (13), thereby expanding the possibility to include situations other than 'the change of questions'. His repetitive clauses *I **just** raise examples ... **just** raise examples* is contracted to ***just** to give examples* (9), which makes his remark on tackling corruption in organisations short and right to the point.

On the other hand, the term *only* is added to the clause *I only have one voice, the same as you* (11) when he reassures his audience of the voting process for the referendum, making it as though he plays fair and favours the democratic way of choosing a certain thing. Another example of addition is that the translator puts the phrase *at least two to three months* (4) to the clause mentioning the duration of the reconciliation effort by the NCPO; it opens up to interpretation that the duration could be longer than ‘two to three months’. Similarly, the addition of the discourse marker *However* to the clause *there may be some proposals which cannot be reduced* (9) emphasises the inevitability of an overpriced proposal for the junta’s procurement. However, the modulation of viewpoint from the phrase *There is no difference from...* to *Instead of asking...* (13) does not change much of the implication Prayut gives when he explains the way of voting for/against the referendum.

Speech functions

One of the resources that convey interpersonal meaning by expressing the speaker’s attitude is speech functions. They are the exchanging roles initiated from the speaker and a variety of responses from the audience. This research analyses only the speaker’s initiating, for it studies Prayut’s original speech functions and those in translation. The basic speech functions can be *statement* (giving information), *question* (demanding information), *offer* (giving goods-and-services), and *command* (demanding goods-and-services). They are realised by different grammatical structures: a statement is naturally expressed by a *declarative* clause, a command by an *imperative*, and a question by an *interrogative*. Offer is the only one with no specific pair. However, despite the form-function pairs, the form is not always congruent to functions, depending on the speaker’s intention (Thompson, 2014: 48-50). Likewise, in Thai the declarative clause can incongruently realise different moves other than statement. The imperative clause can realise not only command, but offer and suggestion, depending on the word choices put at the beginning of the clause. But normally the strongest degree of command is realised with *chong* (instructing) and *ya/ham* (prohibiting) or when there is no initial-sentence marker, as shown in

Figure 5.1.




Figure 5.1 Cline of intensity in a Thai imperative clause (adapted from Pattama, 2006: 342)

Shifts in speech functions derived from the comparison of Prayut’s original and its translation are displayed below. Some of them are shifts in both grammatical structure and speech function, which expands the meaning potential. The expansion of meaning potential refers to the incongruent realisation of speech functions, or the possibility of more than one interpretation. The

variants in interpretation can indicate the social and semiotic distance between speaker and audience; they provide the speaker with ‘additional, powerful resources for enacting social roles and relations’ (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014: 709). As reasons for taking control of the country and reconciliation process, Example (1) below shows that although the grammatical structure and speech function do not entirely change, there are some expansions of meanings in the TT:

(1)

- a. LT: It is somewhat **necessary** that there **have to** be many activities ...
 OT: some activities **will have to** be carried out ...
- b. LT: Therefore, **this is** problem / **Please** understand my intention.
 OT: We **want to stop** all conflicts.

(06 June 2014, 11:09 – 11:35 mins)

In (1a) the modulation of the declarative contracts the function of the double command: *It is ... necessary ... have to*. Its strong meaning potential is therefore lessened in translation: ‘There really have to be some activities’ to ‘Some activities have to be carried out’. Likewise, due to the deletion of the imperative *Please understand ...* in (1b), the meaning potential derived from the command function, albeit mild, is completely lost from the TT.

When Prayut talks about prosecution of anti-coup and other politically-motivated wrongdoings, there is as well a trend in avoiding or lessening the impact of the command function prevalent in the ST:

(2)

- a. LT: ... the NCPO still allow [them] to be bailed out and defend their cases / This is similar to a normal process despite [their] being tried in a military court / But **don’t** be worried about military courts.
 OT: ... they are entitled to the rights of bail and to defend their cases similar to the normal judicial procedure.
- b. LT: If [you] come back, we will make sure that there is justice, ensure the legitimacy that you want ... / You **must** be prosecuted later
 OT: I urge them to return and I ensure their rights to justice ...
- c. LT: Therefore, **don’t** let these people influence the country at all.
 OT: We **should not** let these people influence our country / They **do not** have any credibility to do so.

(27 June 2014, 36:56 – 37:53 mins)

The imperative *don’t be worried about military courts* (2a) and the declarative *You must be prosecuted later* (2b) with a strong degree of command are omitted. As a result, the meaning potential in (2a) and (2c) is entirely changed to implying the speaker’s version of a ‘fact’, but without forcing it upon the audience. Similarly, the imperative *don’t let these people* (2c) is

changed into a declarative with modality *should not* that has a medium value in obligation (see Engagement), hence becoming inherently less strong in command.

Example (3) below is from Prayut's remarks on anti-coup protesters and politicians from previous elections; it illustrates that, although some grammatical structures remain the same, the speech functions still shift from strong to mild command:

(3)

- a. LT: [I] **want** everyone to think about how it would happen.
 OT: I **ask** that everyone be mindful of this and how we can make this happen.
- b. LT: **Don't** just talk / Help think and think out loud of what [it should be] ...
 OT: **Please don't** just talk. Think, and think out loud.
- c. LT: **How so? How would you** make of what they have complained in order to make these two words meaningful according to what you said?
 OT: ... **you should** consider the matter of accountability, or what will you do to make sure that these 2 things have meaning and merit for the people?

(29 July 2016, 28:57 – 29:29 mins)

The structures in the first two are retained in the TT, with only a slight change of process: [*I*] **want everyone** is slightly expanded to *I ask that everyone* (3a); and, **Don't just talk / Help think** has an additional polite term **Please don't just talk** (3b). But there is a marked change from the interrogative (rhetorical) to the declarative in (3c): from *How so? How would you ...* to *you should consider*. All these changes, whether slight or marked, diminish the strong impact in the TT meaning potentials: 'Everyone has to do it' to 'Everyone ought to do it' (3a) – (3b); 'You would make it happen' to 'you should do it' (3c).

In the same manner, Example (4) demonstrates how speech functions in Prayut's remarks on the possible result of the referendum on constitutional draft are slightly changed, but nonetheless causing a distinct shift in meaning potential:

(4)

- a. LT: But **please think** about the country, **think** about the future, **think** about our children, **think** about the stability of the government, **think** about the Roadmap, and other things. **Don't use** emotions that others try to manipulate right now.
 OT: However, **please** also **think** about the country, about our future and our children's future, about the stability of the government, and about the Roadmap, **rather than use** emotions that derive from the confusion spun by stories from others.
- b. LT: **Don't** be confused.
 OT: -

(05 August 2016, 20:27 – 20:48 mins)

Apart from avoiding the repetition of the imperative *think about*, Example (4a) exposes the change of the strong command *Don't use emotion* to a mild one *rather than use emotions* that is also conflated to a milder impetrative *please also think*. The change softens the strong value in command of their meaning potentials: 'You must not use your emotion' to 'try not to use it'. Example (4b) sees the removal of the whole imperative *Don't be confused*, leaving a vacuum in the TT with no meaning potential at all. However, one example found a few minutes after the above remark is interesting because the trend in lessening the sense of command is in reverse:

- (5) LT: If [it] passes or not, **could our country move forward? With peace or not?**
 OT: Whatever happens next, whether it passes or not, our country **must move** forward and make progress ... **while remaining peaceful.**

(05 August 2016, 21:21 – 21:33 mins)

Two interrogatives are rewritten into a longer declarative, which consequently generates a new meaning potential: 'it must move forward/ it must remain peaceful'.

In effect, the omissions/changes of grammatical structures and speech functions result in the new meaning potentials. The possible interpretations of the TT show the lesser extent of command in nearly every example, except for (5) that seems to imply the force of command. One possibility is that the translator intends to portray Prayut as a determined person by optimistically emphasising Prayut's remarks on the result of the referendum. That is, whether positive or not, the result must not hinder the country from moving forward and progressing. In the ST he poses rhetorical questions; but if retained in the TT, these interrogatives could make him look even more sarcastic. The translator instead renders it as a declarative with command function, thereby expanding its potential to project a new possibility for clearer understanding.

5.2 Logical relations

In a text, clauses are always linked to the previous one in some kind of logico-semantic relation using connective items. This section focuses on the system of conjunction, one of the resources that develop the textual and ideational meanings of General Prayut's discourse. Conjunctions can present discourse as a logically organised wave of information (hence interacting with textual meaning) and construing experience as logically organised sequences of activities (ideational) (Martin and Rose, 2007: 116). They help indicate the interconnections between events by linking clauses paratactically and hypotactically. The indicators that give logical relations to the text have many options; they can be **addition** (*and, besides, neither...nor*), **comparison** (*like, as if, rather than*), **time** (*after, once, until*), **cause** (*because, so, but*), **means** (*by, thus, even by*), **condition** (*if, as long as, even then*), **purpose** (*so that, in order to, lest*), and **consequence** (*accordingly, hence, however*). Like conjunctions, continuatives are a set of linkers that realises how the clauses are logically related to one another. But they are not clause-initial like conjunctions and typically

occur next to the processes that express tense or modality. The relations that continuatives imply include **addition** (*too, also*), **comparison** (*even, only, just*), and **time** (*already, still, again*).

In Thai, according to Pattama (2006: 94-99), there are three relational types of conjunctions: elaboration (clarify the previous clause), extension (adding new information to support or contradict the previous clause) and enhancement (showing spatio-temporal orientation, condition, comparison and means). The relations of each type in a clause can be **interdependency** (structurally linking more than two dependent clauses: *suan* ‘while’, *chueng* ‘so’, *phro* ‘because’) and **cohesion** (non-structurally linking an independent clause to others *dangnan* ‘therefore’, *sut-tai* ‘finally’, *to-pai* ‘next’). The cohesion type can be thought of as continuatives, while interdependency as conjunctions appears in Martin and Rose’s (2007) thesis. By that means, displaying connections in both ST and TT can reveal whether there are any different relations between clauses. The relations that connect clauses can be explicit by a conjunction appearing between clauses, or implicit by having no conjunction and opening room for interpretation from the context. The following examples display how the shifts in conjunctions occur in the TT and how they change the logical interpretation of Prayut’s discourse:

(6) LT: Concerning the Roadmap, I have said there are 3 phases. Don’t worry. Please try to understand a bit. Sometimes there have always been some misinterpretations. I don’t understand the way [they] interpret [my] messages. I think I said it clearly. That I said a lot. **When I said less, you didn’t understand. I said more, you found fault with trivia. I don’t know how to say. Today** we are working with dedication and sacrifice to solve the problems of the past nine years.

OT: On the three-phase Roadmap, do not be concerned and try to understand. I find that there have been some misinterpretations. I believe my message is already clear. **But the more I say the more faults you will find. This makes it difficult for me to explain.** We need to dedicate and sacrifice to resolve the prolonged problems which have existed for more than nine years.

(06 June 2014, 45:24 – 45:58 mins)

In (6), which is about Prayut’s disapproval of people’s misinterpretation of his roadmap, demonstrates how the translator makes the TT more cohesive than its original. First, the translator changes the conjunction of time *When* into comparison *But*. This results in a more logical connection with the previous clause *I believe my message is already clear* because it compares two notions by contrasting the succeeding clause with what has already been mentioned; while, the ST shows only the sequence of time. Second, the clause *I don’t know how to say* is modulated into ***This makes it difficult for me to explain***, which turns Prayut’s entire viewpoint from simply telling more information into cause/effect of the preceding clause marked by a logical metaphor *This makes it*. The last one is the omission of the time connection *Today*, but here the translation seems to hint at the cause/effect of the previous clauses *do not be concerned and try to understand ... [because] we need to dedicate*. The loss of focus on the temporal position of the speaker

suggests the trend towards avoiding Prayut's repetition of such terms as *wan-ni* 'today', *ton-ni* 'right now', *khana-ni* 'at present'.

Moreover, there are the cases of obvious omission of content, which leads to the removal of connective items and hence the loss of explicit connection:

(7) LT: As for work towards reconciliation that will lead to reform, now [it] is still in the first phase. The NCPO is just a facilitator, creating an atmosphere for talks. **If the atmosphere is not good, [they] cannot talk, [but] will quarrel from now onwards. Therefore**, it must create a good atmosphere for talks first, exchanging opinions. **Today** the NCPO will not conclude or guide anything.

OT: As for Reconciliation for Reform [*sic*], it is still in the first phase. The NCPO will act as facilitator and create a conducive atmosphere for exchanging and sharing opinion. The NCPO will not conclude or manipulate any decision.

(20 June 2014, 31:17 – 31:41 mins)

(8) LT: ... it will be under consideration by the NCPO to see whether there is anything needed to be amended. **If there is no amendment or some amendment, whatsoever, therefore**, [I] will work it quickly. If the restrictions that hinder national administration have been amended, **[and]** the country is peaceful, **then** [we] will forward the draft provisional constitution for Royal Endorsement to be effective within July, this year. **This is the process of drafting the provisional constitution.**

OT: ... it is under the consideration of NCPO for the needed adjustments. The NCPO expects that **once** the restrictions that hinder national administration have been amended, the draft constitution will be forwarded for Royal Endorsement to be effective within July 2014.

(27 June 2014, 45:36 – 46:08 mins)

In (7), when the clause *If the atmosphere is not good, [they] cannot talk, [but] will quarrel from now onwards* is removed, the condition with expectant *if*, implicit addition with concessive *but* and time with *from now onwards* are altogether missing from the TT. In fact, the removal of the conditional *if* is a trend, similar to that in avoiding repetition of the terms indicating 'present'. The omission of the condition here (and the whole clause that follows) means the degree of Prayut's expectancy is lowered in translation. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Prayut's discourse exudes conjunctions of reason and consequence such as 'therefore/so'. But in translation these terms appear less frequently, similarly to the trend of avoiding the terms with 'present' connotation and connective *if*. The same trend applies to the last clause in (7) when there is an omission of Prayut's temporal position *Today* from the clause *the NCPO will not conclude*. In (8) the conditional clause *If there is no amendment ... therefore ...* is omitted. This effaces the condition relations from the clauses that follow, as well as the change of *if* in *If the restrictions that hinder national administration ...* to *once the restrictions ...* that suggests succession rather than expectation of an event. The last clause *This is the process of drafting the provisional constitution* in (8) is another omission of the expository conjunction *ni-kue* 'this is' that elaborates and compares the

similarity of the clause that follows to many preceding clauses. But in the TT there seems to be no emphasis on this elaboration/comparison, making Prayut's remark on the process of drafting the provisional constitution less redundant.

The following section further compares the logical organisation of Prayut's discourse with that of its translation by using a reticulum that draws relations between clauses with explicit conjunctions and displays implicit ones (Martin and Rose, 2007: 143-48). To explain the relations between clauses, we use the abbreviations for conjunction types: *add* (addition), *simil* (similar in comparison), *diff* (different in comparison), *simult* (simultaneous in time), *consq* (cause, condition and concessive), and *purp* (purpose). The implicit conjunctions are in blue parentheses: (so), (therefore) and (because) referring to cause-condition; (however) to concession; (e.g.) and (that is) to similarity between clauses. In the diagram, there is external succession (the events unfolding in time) and internal succession (the arguments unfolding as a series of conditions). External succession is represented by dependency arrows on the right, while the internal is shown on the left.




Figure 5.2 Conjunctions between clauses in Prayut's address and its translation

Figure 5.2 shows the reticulum of connections in the address on 5 August 2016 (14.13 – 15.08 mins) and its translation (the whole literal translation and official translation are available in

Appendix 2-C). Apparently, the translation is more concise but its clauses are longer than the original because of the combination of more than two clauses. For example, the three clauses *we will be able to move forward*, *everyone has choices*, and *have opportunity* are contracted into *In order for the country to make progress everyone must have choices and opportunities*. In terms of clause relations, Prayut's English version has more explicit conjunctions (in bold), as well as conjunctions connoting consequence (cause-condition). These extra explicit conjunctions yield more logical connections to the translation. For example, the logical metaphor in *This is [what] they call 'national reforms'* (LT) only shows the comparison of similarity to its precedent *We must lay the foundation*. But the logical metaphor in *This is why our national reforms must have a clear strategy...* (OT) shows the consequence (cause/effect) of events.

With the same content, the original has only ten explicit relations of cause-condition including purpose, but the translation has 13 explicit ones with a shorter passage. Although the succession of arguments in both versions is quite the same, the translation is found with an external succession that unfolds the time, as in *when* and *while*. This may be due to the translator's attempt to vary the relations instead of repeating the relations of addition and comparison (similar) that overwhelm the original. Another interesting point is the omission of the last clause *Envision the future clearly* (LT), which makes the consequence of *country reforms* less obligatory to the audience because Prayut's imperative is lost in translation.

5.3 Identification of participants

In SFL, 'participant' refers to people and things in a clause, which is normally realised by a nominal group (Thompson, 2014: 92-3). This section analyses how people and things in Prayut's original are rendered in translation. Although looking at the textual meaning of Prayut's discourse, the identification of participants is also based on the alterations of Prayut's Judgement and Appreciation in the TT. What the discrepancies entail is a different portrayal of participants regarding mismatching characteristics of people and their anaphoric/cataphoric references.

Prayut's 'people' in translation

To begin with, the translation of participants in Prayut's discourse is not consistent with its original. This inconsistency may not reflect the prime strategy of translation, but it is undeniable that the result of such rendering makes the TT more cohesive and milder in tone. The literal and official translations for the following examples are listed in Appendix 2-D. Most of Prayut's unobtrusive style of speaking is adjusted to suit a diplomatic written discourse that requires both ideological and logical coherence:

- (9) LT: **The military** will act as a facilitator, observer and information provider...
[We] will let **them** talk. **Whoever** want to talk there, come to talk.
Whichever group wants to come, let [them] come, both political parties,
conflicting groups... Therefore, I invite **all sides** to talk.

OT: **The NCPO** will act as an observer, a facilitator and an information provider... We welcome **all sides**; conflicting groups, political parties, and we will discuss all issues and openly share information.

(06 June 2014, 09:49 – 10:25 mins)

In (9), which is about the method of reconciliation, the term *military* is specified with the name of the junta *The NCPO*, leading to a benevolent attribution to the NCPO. The terms *them*, *whoever*, *whichever group* is omitted because there is already a synonym in the ST: *all sides*. This contraction of his superfluous word-usage makes the translation clearer and more succinct, but at the same time conceals Prayut's Judgement towards participants with general terms that reflect his vagueness in specifying the exact group of people being referred to.

When talking about the prohibition on potential protests in (10), Prayut uses specific addressing terms that indicate kinship characteristics of the Thai hierarchical society, as in *younger brother/sister*, *students*, *grandchildren*.¹⁰² The translator changes the specification of addressing (hyponym) to their general term (hyperonym): *our younger generation*.

(10) LT: **All younger brothers/sisters, students, grandchildren** must understand. You must give time to the nation. [It is] rather called immunity.

OT: **To our younger generation, you** should understand that the nation needs time to improve and heal.

(06 June 2014, 50:20 – 50:29 mins)

In forbidding anti-coup activities potentially caused by these groups, Prayut tries to reason with each one of them and addresses them using kinship terms. In doing so, his social status in the ST seems to be that of an older brother/teacher/grandfather who tries to preach to his virtual siblings/students/offspring on unacceptable behaviours and persuade them into conformity; while, the translation only shows the leader's sincerity in convincing his fellow countrymen because the translator cuts off the kinship terms that might confuse the international audience. There is also the case of foregrounding the persons who should be responsible for the corruption that plagues the country:

(11) LT: As for inspection, [we] will inspect the projects that are pending implementation and the projects that have been approved.

OT: These include those projects that are pending implementation and those already approved by **the previous government**.

(13 June 2014, 09:39 – 09:47 mins)

The TT explicitly shows as the participant *the previous government* who approved all those projects under current inspection, while the ST only hints at its possibility. The foregrounding of

¹⁰² 'Younger brothers/sisters' is the literal translation of *nong-nong*, 'students' of *nakrian*, and 'grandchildren' of *lan-lan*.

the previous government in the TT seems to give Prayut more credit and to put any blame for potential corruption onto his predecessors.

On the other hand, the discrepancy in (12) below is the case of backgrounding, and seems to do with an attempt to shorten the statement on activities to returning happiness to the people:

(12) LT: In addition, [**the NCPO**] has the policy of requesting relevant agencies or **whoever wants to help us and has capability to relieve the trouble with living costs** to arrange activities to help the people. Such as **the Army, all armed forces and all agencies** that have capability to hold sales of low-price goods...

OT: **The NCPO** has also arranged for relevant agencies with the capabilities to help reduce living costs to provide assistance, such as by retaining sales of goods at reduced prices.

(13 June 2014, 16:04 – 16:29 mins)

By omitting *whoever wants to help us ...* and *the Army, all armed forces and all agencies*, the translator shortens Prayut's thorough description of participants and makes it concise, while simultaneously concealing the real agencies who may help him arrange reconciling activities. Although it might be convenient to credit the Army for helping return happiness to the people, it is probably better to lessen the effect of the military involvement in such activities in the English version. Note that the foregrounding of *The NCPO* in (12) is considered an obligatory shift because this is the case of a zero-pronoun in the ST; the translator has to anaphorically infer the exact subject of the clause from the context and then foreground it in the TT.

Prayut's concept of the Thai people is diversified in the TT. **Table 5.7** displays the shifts in translation of the term 'people'. The following example is the opening of the address on 20 June 2014. The ST is filled with the term *prachachon*, literally meaning 'people', but it is often modulated into other terms that share the taxonomic relation: *citizen* and *public*. In both the online Longman and Collins dictionaries, the term *citizen* carries the connotation of being 'legally accepted as belonging to a country', while the term *public* suggests 'not being a member of the government' or 'things that are done for the people by the state'.¹⁰³

Table 5.7 Shifts in translation of 'people'

	Literal translation	Official translation
1	Good evening to all dear people .	Good evening to all fellow citizens .
2	First of all I would like to thank all sectors ... for their joint efforts with the people to vigorously discharge their duties...	I would like firstly thank all sectors ... for vigorously discharging their duties in cooperation with the general public . For their joint efforts...
3	to drive Thailand forward and return happiness to the people ...	in driving Thailand forward and return happiness to the people ...
4	In this light, the NCPO received good cooperation from the people in all sectors...	The NCPO received exceptional cooperation from the general public and...

¹⁰³ *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* (<https://www.ldoceonline.com>), and *Collins Dictionary* (<https://www.collinsdictionary.com>).

5	through the NCPO's returning happiness to the people in various forms in every place...	This has been done through returning happiness activities in various forms...
6	... there must be communication with the people in an effective and inclusive manner.	... We are aware of the need to communicate with the public in an efficient and inclusive manner
7	It is necessary to create awareness and understanding of the people ...	by creating awareness and understanding of the people .
8	by listening to the voice of the people and responding to any questions and doubts...	We need to listen to the voice of the people , respond to doubts...
9	and together create a common vision with the people .	and create a common vision.
10	The people need to be aware of the direction in the country's development...	The people need to be aware of the direction in the country's development...
11	All important projects must pass the process [that involves] the people's participation.	All important projects must engage the public through participatory process...
12	[We] must not proceed hastily or exclude the people's knowledge acquisition...	We should not proceed hastily or exclude the public from acquiring knowledge.
13	by taking care of all people in the nation, every group, every sides, in an equitable manner.	We will take care of all groups of people in an inclusive and equitable manner...

Prayut always begin his speech by addressing his audiences with *Good evening to all dear people*. The translation, possibly influenced by text convention, always begins with *Good evening to all fellow citizens*, as shown in row (1). The way Prayut repeats the term *prachachon* reflects his perception towards Thais and the nature of his speaking style. But the translation seems to show awareness of the nuances and ensure their suitability for each clause and context. For example, *the people* in row (2), (4), (6), (11) and (12) is changed into either *the general public* or *the public*. What is also increased is the sense of decorum; the translation looks more official and correct in terms of language use. The shifts bring about the discrepancy of 'people' in translation, while Prayut's speech blurs the boundaries between the connotations of the 'people'.¹⁰⁴ Another translation trend is to minimise the repetition of *prachachon* as in rows (5) and (9). The translator might see that, if the term is to be retained, the official translation would sound less coherent but over-lexicalised.

It is worth pointing out that the term *prachachon* shares its space in the military slogan; *chat satsana phramahakasat lae prachachon* 'Nation, Religion(s), King and the People'. It is interesting how the translator shies away from the formation of 'the people' which can sound overdone in English. However, from a social science perspective the terms *fellow citizens* and *the public* in the TT evoke completely different socio-political imaginaries.

Prayut's abstractions in translation

To compare the less concrete things in the ST and the TT, the analysis focuses on Prayut's plans and political notions such as socio-political reforms, the reconciliation process, the previous government's populist projects and the junta-initiated projects. The comparison in **Table 5.8**

¹⁰⁴ The back translation of 'citizen' is *ponlamuang* and 'public' *satharana* or *satharanachon*.

reveals the shifts found in the TT in which Prayut's abstractions related to the junta's initiations are translated rather in a positive light.

Table 5.8 Discrepancies in translation of abstractions

Topic	Literal translation	Official translation
(1) <i>Abstractions related to the junta</i>	a) Laws will be modernised in all aspects, including regulations and rules to be amended. (30/05/14)	We will modernize existing rules and regulations in order to achieve a just legal system ready for the globalization age.
	b) In summoning individuals , [we] have received good cooperation from these people and [they] are ready to give a strong support to the peace and order maintaining and reconciliation process . (13/06/14)	In the summoning of individuals , these people have given cooperation and are willing to contribute to the reconciliation process and the operation of the NCPO.
	c) OTOP products called "Pracharat" today , have been around for a long time ... The government has continuously supported the Pracharat OTOP products by promoting sale of the OTOP products in the airports, on the plane, Pracharat Suk Jai shops, PTT gas stations, online markets and so on. (07/08/15)	OTOP products now developed through Pracharat projects , were around for a long time ... The government has helped to improve the quality of these products , while also promoting them through new distribution channels such as airports, commercial airlines, Pracharat Suk Jai shops, PTT gas stations, and online markets.
	d) Both domestic and international institutes and organisations have assessed that Thailand's corruption situation in international eyes is 'at its best' in 6 years. The appearance of transparency is 'the best' it has been for 10 years. (07/08/15)	International and domestic organizations have assessed that anti-corruption efforts in Thailand is at its best in 6 years, while its overall transparency is at its best in 10 years.
(2) <i>Abstractions related to former elected governments</i>	a) For the price of other agricultural products that is still a problem, [we] are finding measures to take care of [them] and create sustainability, [as to] how [we] will do in the 2015 fiscal year without leading to populist projects that will leave many problems behind in the future. (30/05/14)	We are considering measures which could manage the prices of agricultural products sustainably without bringing on more problems like measures applied in the past.
	b) Parliamentary dictatorship – majority voting without respecting the minority – must be fixed ... I ask that then "can you let it be like this any longer?" (06/06/14)	Parliamentary dictatorship has to be removed ... So I had to ask myself "can we let this continue?"
	c) Today the most serious [problems] are energy, taxation, prices of goods, logistics and capitalist networks. They are huge problems that must be fixed. The people must understand. If I do it today, then it is like populism . In the future, the problem will come up. Today, satisfied. In the future, mistaken. We then will be blamed. The civil servants will be blamed. (06/06/14)	But the most important problems we are facing today concern energy, taxation, prices of goods, and unchecked creditor networks. All these must be dealt with as soon as possible, but with careful consideration. If we rush into things and create more problems later, we will be held accountable and criticized.

Row (1a) is the most obvious case of positive rendering; *regulations and rules* is enhanced with a purposive conjunction *in order to achieve a just legal system ready for the globalization age* to provide a sound reason for the junta's legal reform. However, (1b) is the case of diluting the strong connotation of abstraction by replacing the phrase *the peace and order maintaining and reconciliation process* that sounds militaristic with its hyperonym *the operation of the NCPO*. In

(1c) Prayut's claim of former government's policy with the phrase *OTOP products called "Pracharat" today* is rewritten as *OTOP products now developed through Pracharat projects*. The blending of OTOP (successfully initiated by the past civilian government) to the junta's so-called *Pracharat* project therefore does not sound overly boastful in the TT. Furthermore, row (1d) shows how the translator clarifies Prayut's ambiguity and illogical use of language. In the original the phrase *Thailand's corruption situation* is illogically collocated with *at its best*; the translator, however, manages to rewrite them with more suitable collocations in English, as in *anti-corruption efforts in Thailand*. By choosing the term *efforts*, the translator also adds positive evaluation (inclination) to the translation (see Affect).

Interestingly, among these seven selected addresses, although Prayut seems to suggest that all problems with which the NCPO is dealing are caused by the previous elected governments' poor performances, direct criticism of their populism is quite rare. Even in places where Prayut directly attacks the previous governments' populist policies, the translator refrains from using exact terms to describe them or retaining their undertones. In row (2a), when mentioning the solution for the low price of agricultural products, Prayut tries to reason with the farmers by blaming it on *populist projects*. What are left in the TT are only the general terms in a nominal phrase: *measures applied in the past*. Likewise, the phrase *Parliamentary dictatorship – majority voting without respecting the minority* (2b) that explicitly criticises Thaksin's and Yingluck's governments is shortened to *Parliamentary dictatorship*. In the same example, the translation is even suffused with a positive light towards the speaker himself due to a change of perspective in the clause that follows. Instead of questioning the audience (*I ask that then "can you let it be ..."*), the translation sounds as if Prayut expects them to view him with compassion (*I had to ask myself "can we let this continue?"*). As with (2a), (2c) demonstrates how the translator evades the exact term, as in *If I do it today, then it is like populist* that Prayut criticises the problems caused by such policies, and instead uses neutral terms, as in *If we rush into things and create more problems later*. By minimising the effect of referring to populism, the translator somehow helps justify the junta's *Pracharat* project which, in fact, is the rebranding of a populist policy in cooperation with only a few Thai conglomerates - despite their attempt to condemn similar projects by former elected governments.

5.4 Discussion

This chapter has explored variations in the concepts of reconciliation and reform put forward in Prayut's speeches and how they are presented in the official translation. The ST-TT comparison allows us to understand how Prayut's attitudinal values, the relations between clauses and the presentation of people and ideas in his discourse, are construed and projected differently.

The trend of translation strategy or overall orientation of these particular translated texts is relatively obvious. More positive evaluation is assigned to the translation where Prayut talks about the NCPO, the current government and their projects on reconciliation and reform, such as the

twist of the clause *[they] must pressure the government into the government ... will take responsibility*. The expansion and addition of positive perspectives towards the junta's activities are ubiquitous in the TT; for instance, the terms connoting the positive inclination *effort* or *intention* emerge where the reform topics are concerned. The negative evaluation, by contrast, is decreased in some comments where Prayut starts to sound undiplomatic and indiscreet when criticising the opposition. Moreover, the scale of grading evaluation is likely to increase in the TT, possibly to affirm the junta's stance in driving their reform. In terms of modality, however, there is a tendency to make the obligation less imposing by ridding the TT of the terms such as *must* and substituting them with the terms indicating probability *will* or *would*. Although there are some places where there appears to be the obligation in the TT, it is more likely to be concerned with the NCPO's effort to bring about the economic development such as the large-scale infrastructure investment. The obligation that comes with command in an imperative clause is also diluted, if not omitted. The straightforward negative imperative (*don't*) or declarative (*cannot*) tends to be made milder with the term *please*, or changed into other grammatical moods that set a less commanding tone: *don't let these people influence the country* to *We should not let these people*. The interpersonal meaning of Prayut's discourse is, to a certain extent, distorted in the official translation, which affects its reading by different target audiences and the speaker-listener relationship.

Furthermore, there are shifts in sentence length, which is a clear trend towards averting the repetition of Prayut's utterances from the translation. Rather than becoming filled with long-winded explanations of the junta's and the NCPO's achievements, the TT is inclined to be shorter and more concise. Although Prayut's excessive use of consequence connective items (*pro-chanan* 'therefore', *dang-nan* 'so') is basically minimised in the TT, the translator shows a preference for more explicit connections to clearly display logical links between clauses instead of simple clauses with implicit relations. This, then, contributes to the enhancement of the textual and logical meanings in Prayut's English version.

The last translation trend is the foregrounding of participants in a clause. Although some cases are obligatory shifts because Thai is a pro-drop language, the official translations have a tendency not only for using more specific participants because English does not allow the concealing of pronoun in a clause, but also for foregrounding the positive portrayal of the NCPO and the military government and downscaling their negative ones. Interestingly, the concept of 'people' in Prayut's spoken discourse is general and sounds minimally engaged with politics. This is similarly illustrated by the case of the failed 2015 draft constitution because the military struggled to invoke a simple concept of 'the people' whose political participation was kept pacified, not as 'active citizens' who could share a role in policing the conservative and royalist notions of state and society (McCargo, 2015a). Wherever Prayut uses the Thai term *prachachon* that literally means 'people' in his addresses, the term repeatedly included in the official translation is distinguished

and lexicalised with other appropriate terms assigned to each context in which ‘people’ is mentioned such as *citizen* or *public*. The translation of the ‘people’ seems to reflect the translator’s own choice, ‘correcting’ the Thai according to English socio-semantic usages. This modification of the ‘people’ causes the ideational shifts in the official translation because it unintentionally adjusts and enhances the military perception towards the Thai public.

What remains to be resolved is why there is such use of language in Prayut’s discourse and why the translation is required to deliberately misconstrue his utterances. Apart from Prayut’s own military culture and personality, the most plausible answer for these questions is the longstanding and resilient political ideology of ‘Thai-style democracy’, as explained in the earlier section. This concept can be found thoroughly in his addresses and is clearly demonstrated in one of the aims for the 2014 coup, namely to purge the wayward parliamentary dictator who kept winning elections with a majority vote. But Prayut said in his first televised address on 30 May 2014 that it was for the greater good; the army asked for time to mend Thailand’s democratic system and make it right, just, responsible and beneficial to all people (30:35 – 30:49 mins). In the address on 8 August 2014, Prayut rekindled this longstanding political discourse by stating that Thai society should follow the Thai-style democracy:

Western-style democracy may not be a perfect model of democracy. Therefore, it is not necessary for every country to follow. As such, each country should seek appropriate means suitable for its own situation without greatly going against the democratic principles of the international community.

(19:57 – 20:18 mins)

Insomuch as the junta uses this cultural argument to justify their repressive regime, they also gave birth to an interim and a new constitution that depoliticalises the ‘people’ and returns the country to the old style of the appointed senate and non-elected independent institutions. The last one is justified in the name of rule by a group of ‘good men’ who are well aware of the genuine character of Thai values (Puangthong, 2015). These acts have pronounced a paternalist ideology to the effect that the country would be better off if led by ‘capable’ elites undertaking the necessary reforms.

As to why many lexico-grammatical choices in translation are realised differently from Prayut’s original, it is possibly because the shifts found in the analysis in this chapter have been intentionally created by the translators and the editor themselves. This was confirmed by information gleaned from the interview sessions with the translators and the editor who felt that the translation project was so politically sensitive that they were required to censor any impolitic statements on the part of their own leader in the national interest (see Chapter 2). As explained above, the reason for the shifts can be drawn from the ideological motivation and socio-political contexts of the texts that influence the unspecified translation brief shared among this virtual team of translators. Although it is hard to gauge the exact views of the translation team as to how profoundly they comprehend the Thai-style democracy, the empirical evidences derived from the

ST-TT comparison has clearly shown that they try to compromise their standard of translation by reducing, diluting or even omitting Prayut's criticisms, colloquialisms and commands that reflect his Thai-style democratic worldview in the official translation. At the same time, they foreground, expand and simply attach the values that convey the positive realisations of ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings to their works, so as to offer a more diplomatic presentation of Prayut's discourse.

To anticipate the next chapter, the concept of nationalism fundamentally related to the Thai-style democracy will be a prime topic for analysis. It will look at the spatio-temporal deixis and identity in Prayut's original addresses and their translations because they show how the speaker positions himself in the cline of time and space that is closely associated with the concept of nationhood. It will also provide the further analysis of 'people' and 'abstractions' (especially regarding the core value of Nation, Religion and King), and the Army's Cold War mindset that is linked to the current political crisis. In relation to the present chapter, Chapter 6 will try to explain the notion of the 'men in green's burden' to put a stop to any national crises, including political ones, by cultivating the veneration of Thainess.

Chapter 6

Representations of Nationalism

Chapter 6 analyses the translation shifts elicited from the comparison of Prayut's weekly addresses and their translations with a focus on the representation of nationalism. The purpose of this chapter is to explore how Prayut presents nationalism and how the translator renders his views differently, as well as the political implications derived from them. The chapter delves into the portrayal of the conservative concept of Nation, Religion and King that lends its support to Thai nationalism or Thainess. The concept of Nation is inseparably linked to the royal institution and Buddhism, in which the king supposedly elected by the assembly of the people should exercise justice 'as the protector and as the person to be relied on by the people under the restraint of the moral law of Buddhism' (Murashima, 1988: 80). The ideological construction of Thainess such as the promotion of Thai historical heritage and pride in indigenous culture is aimed at ensuring the socio-political structure that divided people into different classes according to their birth-right, with the king as the focal point of allegiance and social harmony (Saichol, n.d.: 4-5).

The original concept of the Thai nationalism can be traced back to the time when colonialism was menacing the Siamese independence during King Chulalongkorn's reign (Rama V, r. 1868-1910). To modernise Siam for the purposes of appeasing the West, the administrative structure became more centralised and other modernisation processes and reforms were introduced, including the cartography technology to decide and establish the geo-body of Siam.¹⁰⁵ The anti-colonial narrative of modern Thai historiography is another contributing factor that makes ancestral kings nationalist heroes, by glorifying ancient Siamese kings and presenting Burma as a perennial, formidable enemy. It is nationalist's history with the monarchy and the ruling class as competent, divine leaders – a royal-nationalism. The Siamese élite's version of history was ideologically reproduced to suit the interests and ideology of Bangkok's rulers, which remains legitimate and popular to these days (Thongchai, 2014: 265-7). However, it was King Vajiravudh (Rama VI, r. 1910-1925) who coined the slogan Nation, Religion and King and nurtured it into a full-grown concept. He was also a staunch advocate for the Siamese civilisation through literature, plays and drama. By translating Shakespeare himself, he put across to some extent the idea of Siamese civilisation by means of a translation of English/European civilisation. One of the processes was that the King – among other like-minded élites – strategically translated the Western literature but selectively contained some elements of foreignness in them. In her essay on the history of translation in Thailand, Phrae (2019) argues that the intellectual élites, including the King himself, were the ones who appropriated the foreign literature (both Asian and Western) into the Thai

¹⁰⁵ For more information on the geo-body of Siam, see Thongchai (1994).

literature repertoire and regarded them as distinctively Thai. Since the foreignness elements were deemed unrepresentable in Thai, they had to be ‘tamed and cloaked in a familiar form’ to make them compatible with Thai values. Translation is viewed as a form of containment that allows the translator to design and manage the relationship between Thainess and otherness. The term *plae* ‘to translate’, hence, refers to a reciprocal process of constructing the other and the Thai identity (Phrae, 2019: 122-4). Although educated at Sandhurst and Oxford, King Vajiravudh ironically criticised the importation of Western liberalism and was convinced that it was harmful to national harmony (Murashima, 1988: 89). The only right path to follow was to be loyal to the dynasty. The attempt to define the Thai self against the others that were seen as threats helps formulate and preserve through time the ideology of Thainess with the imagined nation, Buddhism and monarchy at its heart and the widespread conviction that Thailand’s non-colonisation had resulted from the diplomatic skills of both King Rama V and King Rama VI who were able to successfully show off Thailand’s civilisation to the Western colonisers.

In the following decades, even after the 1932 constitutional revolution, many prominent intellectual élites continued to uphold the construct of the king-centred ideology and its gradual institutionalisation. Among them was Kukrit Pramoj, a noble-born ultra-royalist and journalist who later became prime minister. Many of his speeches, newspaper articles and even novels successfully fortify the ideals of royalism and solidify the link between nationhood, Buddhist cosmology and kingship by demonstrating that Buddhism is the only source of ethics the king would rely on so as to be a righteous ruler. Hence, Thais with the notion of ‘know-thy-place’ should peacefully live together in such a society where the monarch is placed at the centre (Saichol, n.d.: 13). As always reflected in various versions of Thai constitutions, the king is presumed a constitutional monarch whose power is above all man-made law, but under the law prescribed by Lord Buddha’s teachings. The king would therefore never be an autocrat, but truthful, diligent and doing things with care (Kobkua, 2002: 64). This Buddhist-royalist idea results in the high reverence of the royal status as having superiority with Buddhist morality and supreme power at his disposal.

In politics, Kukrit’s definition of Thainess arguably paved the way for Field Marshal Sarit, a despotic, paternalistic prime minister who came to power in the late 1950s, to spread the ideology of Thai-style democracy (see Chapter 5) by using all kinds of mass media and the educational system in its indoctrination of Thai people. Sarit changed the National Day from 24 June (the anniversary of the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932) to 5 December (King Rama IX’s birthday). He required the secondary and high school textbooks to focus on the unity and security of the nation. Sarit’s process of political socialisation was aimed at cultivating citizenship consciousness, reinforcing national identity and essentialising the concept of Nation, Religion and King. As Connors’s study of the 1960s manual of democracy (2003: 75-83) illuminates, this national ideology was successfully promoted through the discourse of the Local Administration

Department in order to create the mental frameworks of a particular kind of democratic rationality among ‘good citizens’ who should faithfully follow it.

Once imbued in Thai people’s minds, the construction of Thainess has also provided the ideological base for later authoritarian leaders. For most Thais, any Thai-style ruler who can show that he is a devout Buddhist, kind to the public and loyal to the royal institution is perceived as an ideal ruler. This serves as a propaganda and political instrument for this ‘ideal ruler’ to stay in power and helps sustain the military regime and centralised administrative structure, but at the expense of freedom of political expression and participation. It is largely because, according to Kukrit’s conviction, politics at its best is when a society is led by a ruler who is not a politician and does not waste time in power struggles so that he can devote his time to helping others. Western democracy is not entirely compatible with the Thai way of life because it is prone to bring chaos where politicians vie for power, and there are more unpleasant social movements which are deemed against the Thai-style governance that seeks to preserve national order (Saichol, n.d.: 24-5, 30). However, not entirely consistently, Kukrit later founded a political party and in the 1970s became prime minister.

Prayut closely replicates a similar discourse when he continually gives prominence to the patriotic concept of Nation, Religion and King in his weekly addresses, which apparently shows the influence of this conservative notion over his line of thinking. Many themes in Prayut’s addresses function to sacralise the trinity and simultaneously legitimise military rule. This chapter therefore considers each of these themes to see how Prayut portrays them while selling his political schema for Thai-style governance.

The analysis in this chapter relies on the addresses when Thailand’s important days associated with national unity, Buddhism and the royal institution approach; for instance, the late King’s birthday and the National Day, Makha Bucha Day, or the Children’s Day. The reason for selecting these addresses is twofold. First, the designation of national holidays is often highly political, including the King’s and Queen’s birthdays during the Sarit regime, Buddhism-related holidays as the symbol of sole national religious belief, or the Constitution Day to mark the day when King Rama VII ‘bestowed’ the first constitution on the Thai people. All of them were arguably sources of legitimacy for both sides on the political spectrum. The legacy of the Thainess discourse has been carried on and exploited by different military regimes until the recent one. Second, Prayut usually explained in his speeches about how important these days are. Before the celebration of the late King Rama IX’s birthday Prayut always glorified the king’s accomplishments and high moral standing, including the philosophy of Sufficiency Economy that the junta promotes as a demonstration that they adhere to this important pillar of Thailand.

6.1 Prayut's nationalism and its translation

Since its inception the ideology of Thainess has been employed by the state, especially all military governments, as a political tactic to gain support for their agendas, as exemplified by the current junta. On many occasions, Prayut repeatedly reinforced the 12 core values that, as he himself announced, stipulate the deep devotion to the trinity of Nation, Religion and King. Especially on every Children's Day he tried to inculcate the children with these conservative values and teach them to behave like 'good Thais' by giving them the annual Children's Day motto. Prayut regularly expounded upon the importance of Thainess, claiming that it is a unique quality belonging to Thais who should be proud of their heritage:

I am very glad to see Thai people place more importance on preserving the Thai culture and traditions ... every Thai should love and pride themselves on having such unique cultural values which have become a part of everyone's daily life, especially for our children and youths, and should be passed on to future generations.

(1 May 2015, 19:00 – 19:14 mins)

The prime linguistic strategy to invoke the sense of unity and nationalism is the formulation of inclusiveness with the first-person plural. As van Dijk (2016: 73) argues, the pronominal use is a focal point in politically identifying in- or out-groups, their relations (friend or foe), as well as their properties and interests. It helps the speaker polarise between a positive representation of the in-group (*we*) and a negative representation of the out-group (*they*). The next two sections will analyse how Prayut makes use of various pronouns in drawing the line between groups and highlighting the pride in Thainess with reference to the glorious past of the Thai/Siamese nation. The sections are related in terms of Prayut's person, space and time deixis (Grundy, 2008: 26-32) and whether their translations support or change the ideological structure of discourse in the original.

6.1.1 Translation of pronouns

Prayut's weekly address is a site where confusion and ambiguity concerning pronoun use often takes place. The first-person plural *rao* 'we' is the most frequently used; for example, in the address on 1 May 2015 there are 168 instances of *rao* in an almost hour-long video. However, in Thai the pronoun *rao* can refer to many persons. It can be the first-person singular, the first-person plural, or even the second-person singular when a senior person talks to an inferior. All different uses primarily depend on the speaker's social status and register of the language use in different contexts (Kanokwan, 2013). As the specific time and place for a political text, Prayut's speech is found with only the first-person plural *rao*. In fact, as Munday (2012: 70) points out by referring to Wales's argument (1996: 62), it is relatively normal for a political speech that the first-person plural is used with a double reference and presumption that the speaker speaks not only on behalf of the government (the exclusive sense), but also on behalf of the audiences (the inclusive sense).

The way Prayut identifies himself with or against his audiences is crucial. Not only does the use of *rao* expose his political position, but it also defines a variety of addressees as a group of people who directly interact with him (*than*) or those whom he refers to as a third-party (*khao*). By addressing a certain group Prayut basically defines himself against ‘the Other’. **Table 6.1** shows the analysis of the pronominal use found in Prayut’s speeches. The first category is mostly based on Munday’s differentiation of pronoun *we* (2012: 71) in his analysis of Obama’s 2009 inaugural address.

Table 6.1 Categories of the use of pronouns in Prayut’s weekly address

Category	Description
<i>Interactant (speaker-plus)</i>	
(1) Inclusive <i>rao</i>	
(a) Broader temporal <i>rao</i>	Prayut and Thais sharing a common Thai history and identity
(b) Current temporal <i>rao</i>	Prayut and Thais at present having an imagined unified future
(2) Exclusive <i>rao</i>	The military, the government, the NCPO, the civil servants
(3) Ambivalent <i>rao</i>	The government acting on behalf of the people and Thais complying with the actions initiated by the government
<i>Interactant (addressee)</i>	
(1) General <i>than</i>	All Thais residing in/outside the country
(2) Specific <i>than</i>	
(a) Proximate <i>than</i>	Civil servants who need to implement the government’s initiation
(b) Distance <i>than</i>	Farmers, the poor and people prone to be victims of corruption
(c) Negative <i>than</i>	Those who oppose the government, former politicians and corrupt people
<i>Non-interactant</i>	
(1) Positive <i>khao</i>	
(a) Inclusive <i>khao</i>	Specific groups of Thais: soldiers, younger generations
(b) Distance <i>khao</i>	Farmers, the poor and people prone to be victims of corruption
(c) Remote <i>khao</i>	Foreigners, tourists and international organisations
(2) Negative <i>khao</i>	
(a) Material <i>khao</i>	Those who oppose the junta, former politicians and corrupt people
(b) Abstract <i>khao</i>	Threats against the nation

The interactant group is divided into speaker-plus (first-person) and addressee (second-person). The speaker-plus can be categorised as follows:

(1) **Inclusive *rao* ‘we’** is the presentation of Prayut himself together with ordinary Thais who live in or outside the country. It is an attempt to unify the people by presupposing the notion of Thainess. It can be further differentiated into two sub-categories:

(a) **Broader temporal *rao* ‘we’** – Prayut and Thais sharing a common Thai history and identity. This one is largely found when Prayut is showing his ‘Thailand-is-good’ mentality by referring back to the ancient and recent ‘Thai common history’. One of the examples is: *Thailand ... is curing itself of many ills ... so that we can live up to [our]*

traditions of being a land that is “Suvarnnabhumi”, which has been our dharma land, golden land, from past to present (18 September 2015);

(b) **Current temporal *rao* ‘we’** – Prayut and Thais at present having an imagined, unified future. For example, *[we] need to trust and have confidence in each other. I understand well what kind of problem the country faces, so do you. But, how are we going to find a way to move the country forward (18 September 2015).*

(2) **Exclusive *rao* ‘we’** is the grouping of the military, the government, the NCPO and the civil servants. Occasionally it is used solely to refer to individual groups (such as the military or the government), but often to more than two at the same time (the government plus the NCPO, or the government plus civil servants). The example of its usage is: *The military can do these tasks, as we have always been doing them in the Army ... We have to be well-prepared. I only use these experiences to drive those [process] to ensure operational integration (8 August 2014).*

(3) **Ambivalent *rao* ‘we’** is the case where there is an omission of the pronoun, but the missing pronoun can be anaphorically referred to either as *rao* the government-cum-Thais (the government acting on behalf of the people and the people complying with the actions initiated by the government) or second-person *than* (as a form of imperative; see below) who need to comply with those actions. The example is: *We need to be cautious ... [You or We] Look at their agreements, look at international laws [such as] WTO, FTO. Too many agreements (29 January 2016).*

The addressee can be categorised as follows:

(1) **General *than* ‘you’** is used to refer to all Thais residing in or outside the country; for instance, *Dear Thai citizens*¹⁰⁶ or *If you can do this by yourself according to advice, it would be easier for the government to manage (29 January 2016).* This category responds to exclusive *rao* and ambivalent *rao*, when Prayut distances himself and the government from the general Thai population, or takes advantage of pronoun omission and its ambiguity to criticise the addressee.

(2) **Specific *than* ‘you’** is used when Prayut addresses a specific group of people, which can be sub-divided into three main groups:

(a) **Proximate *than* ‘you’** – civil servants who need to implement the government’s initiatives;

(b) **Distance *than* ‘you’** – the farmers, the poor and people prone to be victims of corruption;

¹⁰⁶ The phrase *Thai citizens* is literally articulated as ‘fathers, mothers, older/younger brothers, older/younger sisters’, but the official translation has to be rendered in accordance with a standard English form of addressing the public. See Section 5.1 in Chapter 5.

(c) **Negative *than* ‘you’** – former politicians, corrupt people and those who oppose the government.

Although there are many second-person pronominal forms that reflect the interplay among the Tenor dimensions such as social status and contact (Pichai, 2016: 15), Prayut uses only *than* to address his target audience. This term is normally used in a circumstance where the addressee is higher in social status, which requires the speaker to give an honour to him/her. But it is also commonly used by politicians when addressing their constituencies, regardless of social status.

The non-interactant is the third-person which assumes a plural *they* by default, but in Thai *khao* can be referred as either third-person singular or plural. Some differentiation of *khao* can be made as follows:

(1) **Positive *khao* ‘they’** is found when Prayut refers to some specific groups of Thais corresponding with his recurrent theme of nationalism:

(a) **Inclusive *khao* ‘they’** are soldiers who sacrifice their lives for the greater safety of the nation, or Thai children who would carry on the ‘good Thai culture’ into the future. This group is, in a sense, identified with the inclusive *rao* when Prayut addresses ordinary Thais, but simultaneously points to this particular group for *us* to see;

(b) **Distance *khao* ‘they’** are the farmers, the poor and the people prone to be victims of corruption (or distance *than*). This group is defined against the exclusive *rao* and ambivalent *rao* when Prayut directly talks to civil servants and/or ordinary Thais (possibly, the middle class) about the need to help this group.

(c) **Remote *khao* ‘they’** is used to refer to foreigners, tourists and international organisations when Prayut addresses Thais by calling for unity and nationalism with the inclusive *rao*.

(2) **Negative *khao* ‘they’** is often used to show that the country is deteriorating and full of decadent people, so as to distinguish the junta from ‘the Others’ and to heighten the sense of patriotism:

(a) **Material *khao* ‘they’** – those who oppose the junta, former politicians and corrupt people;

(b) **Abstract *khao* ‘they’** – threats against the nation.

In his speech, Prayut uses pronouns to create positive effects on inclusive and exclusive *rao* and encourage solidarity by accentuating ‘our’ achievements. He also uses some pronouns to distance himself from some groups of addressees and disclaim responsibility for particular political gestures. When it comes to translation, the ambiguous pronominal use seems to pose a great challenge to the translators. On various occasions, Prayut’s pronominal use is vague; there are

more than one potential referents of the pronouns, especially when he omits the referents altogether in his spoken discourse.

The examples given below show the pronoun explicitation found in the ST-TT comparison of Prayut's speeches. Their originals in Thai, the official translations and my literal translations can be found in Appendix 3:

- (1) LT: 'Veteran's Day' is the day that **all Thai people** should commemorate the great sacrifice of heroes in 'the front line' ... I would like to invite **all of us 'the back line'** to express the kindness ...
- TT: It [Veterans' Day] is the day that **we all** commemorate the heroic acts of **our soldiers** standing in the front line ... I would like to invite **all of us who living** [sic] '**behind this wall of security**' to express **our appreciation and respect** to all veterans ...

(29 January 2016, 01:50 – 03:14 mins)

Example (1) is the case of explicitation of the inclusive 'we'. While mentioning Veteran's Day, Prayut merely says: *all Thai people should commemorate the great sacrifice of heroes in 'the front line'*. However, there is a shift in Prayut's perspective of *all Thai people* and an emphasis on the sense of collectiveness with the inclusive 'we': *we all* and *our soldiers*. Likewise, in later clauses where Prayut invokes the metaphor ('the front line' is soldiers; 'the back line' is civilians), the translator further elaborates the metaphor and stresses the inclusiveness with a possessive adjective: *all of us who [sic] living 'behind this wall of security'* and *our appreciation and respect*.

Like above example, the inclusiveness of 'we' in (2) is foregrounded:

- (2) LT: [It] doesn't matter if [**you**] are in the part of the people's, business or government sector. **All people are the people of the nation** ... if every government exercise good government, the people and the government can cooperate to work, cooperate to solve problems and hold hands and together walk forward without disputes or leaving anyone behind, and without creating groups and social divisions ...
- TT: No matter which part of the country **you** live in, **we** are all Thais ... a government that exercises good governance can cooperate with the people to solve problems and move **our country** forward without leaving anyone behind, and without creating groups and social divisions in **our society** ...

(25 June 2015, 05:32 – 06:39 mins)

Prayut does not specify the addressee or summarise *the people of the nation* as 'we'. In translation, however, the general 'you' and inclusive 'we' are made explicit, as in *No matter which part of the country you live in, we are all Thais*. The similar case is found in the clause that follows: *to solve problems and move our country forward*; and, *without creating groups and social divisions in our society*. The original text, however, has no emphasis on those pronouns at all. Next is the case where the translator takes advantage of the ambiguity caused by pronoun drop:

(3) LT: If **the farmers** think of addressing the problems sustainably, **you** must tell the truth. **You** don't help **them**, [**you**] must not fear that **they** will no longer rent **you** the land ... **You** must help **us** out ... Today, [**we/you**] need to be generous and share.

TT: In order for farmers' problems to be sustainably addressed, **you** have to tell the truth. **Farmers** need not fear that **they** will no longer be able to rent the land ... **You** must help **us** out ... **We** need to be generous and share.

(10 April 2015, 17:19 – 17:59 mins)

In the early clauses Prayut directly addresses the farmers with *than* 'you', together with some uses of the exclusive 'we' and negative material 'they'. However, the ambiguity occurs when Prayut drops the important pronoun in his last clause; this particular pronoun can refer either to the inclusive 'we' or distance 'you' (ambivalent 'we') as in *Today, [we or you] need to be generous and share*. But the translator opts for the intuitive sense of collectiveness: *We need to be generous and share*.

The omission of the pronoun continues to cause the ambiguity in the ST, as displayed in (4):

(4) LT: If only the middleman gets rich, **the farmers** will be poor like this, for however many years. Then [**you/they**] blame it on the government, blame it on whatsoever. Impossible ... Then [**you/ they**] have knowledge about modern agriculture, creating farming organisation. Then [**you/ they**] know about price ... So [**you/ they**] would know [and] don't quarrel any longer.

TT: **They** will remain poor if all sales continue to be made to middlemen. **Farmers** need to be knowledgeable and understand marketing and modern agricultural practices. **They** also need to gather into collectives and be aware of how to sell products and what the real prices should be.

(10 April 2015, 24:05 – 24:31 mins)

At first glance, Prayut's talk about how to oversee the farmers and dissolve the cycle of reliance on middlemen seems to be directed towards the local administrative organisations. However, due to the pronoun omission that makes the clause sound commanding (*Then ... have knowledge ... know about price*), the direct addressee can also be interpreted as the farmers themselves (distance 'you'). In fact, Prayut basically takes advantage of pronoun drop not to address directly the farmers (whom he aims his speech to), so as not to be so obviously condemning the farmers for their behaviour. The translator, however, tends to make it clearer but avoid directing it at the farmers by choosing the third-person, thereby distancing the farmers from Prayut himself and seemingly changing his addressee from the farmers to the civil servants who need to take care of this group of people (*Farmers need to be knowledgeable ... They also need to gather into collectives*). In doing so, not only does it make the farmers the indirect addressee, but it also highlights Prayut's reluctance to include this group of people in his inclusive 'we', hence making them 'the quasi-Other'.

The next example is about the traditional Songkran festival, which involves soaking people in water and sometimes can spill over into sexual play or harassment:

(5) LT: **We** must maintain the essence of ancient culture and traditions ... I saw in the past, parents complained to **me** as to why **[I]** let this kind of activity happen, be it form of dress, alcohol consumption or other things ... [Although] it's true [that such activities] are fun, **they** see [it] differently – why Thailand is like this? ... **[I]**'d like **[you]** to receive the foreign tourists with the goodwill.

TT: It is also essential that **we** maintain **our** cultural heritage through genuine traditional activities ... Many parents have made complaints to **me**, asking why improper celebrations were allowed, not to mention improper attire, and excessive alcohol consumption among others ... **We** should welcome **our** **guests** with a true expression of the warmth of Thai culture. Let's impress **them** with the uniqueness of **our** country.

(08 April 2016, 11:48 – 12.45 mins)

In (5) Prayut tries to give a warning about improper dressing for such cultural events. This is another case of explication of the inclusive 'we'. Instead of plainly rendering the clause as it is, the translator stresses the sense of inclusiveness by adding a possessive adjective: *we maintain **our** cultural heritage*. When mentioning the complaints made to Prayut on the harassment and indecent dressing in public places during the festival, Prayut uses first-person *phom* 'me' (*parents complained to **me***), but drops it in the clause that follows (*as to why **[I]** let this kind of activity happen*), which is a feature of Thai spoken discourse. The translator plays along by passivising the clause, which also helps conceal the participant responsible for the action (*Many parents ... asking why improper celebrations **were allowed***).

In the same example, Prayut also mentions the foreign tourists (the remote 'they') whom the junta seems to be so keen to please: *[Although] it's true [that such activities] are fun, **they** see it differently*. In doing so, he condemns any Thais who celebrate the events untraditionally and improperly, telling them how to behave themselves, though without an explicit pronoun: ***[I]**'d like **[you]** to receive foreign tourists with goodwill*. However, the translator again makes the sense of inclusiveness clearer by adding a new clause and referring to the tourists as ***our** guests* (***We** should welcome **our** **guests***). The translator then repeats the inclusiveness by twisting the declarative clause (***[I]**'d like **[you]** to receive...*) into an inclusive imperative (*Let's impress **them** with the uniqueness of **our** country*).

The last example is interesting because it shows how Prayut makes some links between the current socio-political reforms and the next generation. Prayut refers to this group with the inclusive 'they' as an extension to the inclusive 'we':

(6) LT: I can say that if [**you**] continue doing [it] in the same old way, you'll be poor like this until future generations. In the days to come it will be the same, if [**you**] don't cooperate with **us** today. According to what **we**'ve prepared for the 1st phase of reform, **you** must take the first step with **me**.

TT: However if people do not see this because **you** continue to revert back to the same old practices, then **your** children and the next generation will not be ready for development and cooperation to make progress. Today **we**'ve prepared to make progress according to the 1st phase of the reform roadmap.

(29 January 2016, 21:35 – 21:46 mins)

Prayut establishes the space and time frame by using the idioms such as *tung chualuk chualan* 'until future generations', *nai wankhangna* 'in the days to come' and a conceptual metaphor of the journey *roem kon* 'start first/ take the first step' as the continuation of the present. This is served as the temporal line running from the recent past which is framed with a series of processes: *yangkhong tham* 'continue doing [it]' and the phrase *baepdoem* 'the same ole way'. Although there is no change in the translation regarding pronoun use (only explication; the first *than* 'you'), the translator continues the thread of reference to the future by translating *until future generations* as **your children and the next generation**, thereby explicitly entrusting the responsibility to decide the future to the general 'you'.

All the above examples clearly show a trend in pronoun explication. Although finding a pronoun (participant) for a clause in English can be partly considered an obligatory shift, the pronoun explication in translation inevitably makes the translation more cohesive, and even shows how the translator re-evaluates Prayut's stance towards his audience.

6.1.2 Translation of Prayut's deictic positioning

This section links to Prayut's person deixis as presented above, but focuses more on his spatio-temporal markers and their translations. In evoking political meanings that encompass historical and traditional references, Prayut uses not only lexical items that inscribe time and space but also a variety of indirect tokens referring to the past, the present and the future. For example, in the first 10 minutes of his address on 29 July 2016 he conjures up a temporal line running from the past to the future by bringing together different nationalistic topics, so as to frame his reasoning and argument for being an incumbent government. When mentioning the pride in the national language and Thai scripts, Prayut used the past frame by alluding to history such as *King Ramkhamhaeng*, **our own national language for more than 700 years**, *one of the oldest languages in Southeast Asia*, and **we have a history that goes back a long way**. To wrap up, he produces his narrative with the sentences that link the past, the present and the future all at once: *We then don't abandon **the original** [khongdoem]. **To move forward**, please look back at **the original**. **Preserve it well**.*

He then links the past frame with today's success (*news about the education of **our children this July***) in international academic competitions, bringing to the audience all kinds of success

achieved by the Thai students who did well in STEM education. After that, he goes on framing the future through the realisation of a conceptual metaphor and some simple inscriptions of time: *[STEM education] is **the starting point** and support for the country development to **Thailand 4.0 in the future***.¹⁰⁷ What can be seen in just this simple example is a trend towards expressing pride in Thai history and success, but at the same time stressing the need to develop today's country for the greater good of the next generation.

However, there is another frame ascribed to the recent past. This frame is primarily targeted at the political crisis and the former corrupt civilian governments/politicians. For example, in his address on 30 January 2015, Prayut condemns those who conspire to incite violent protests:

I would like to mention the speeches of **former politicians** who are legally embroiled as well as those within political parties. **These individuals** have threatened the government with protests ... I consider these speeches very similar to threatening acts of terrorism.

Again, in his speech on the 2014 Constitution Day and the need for good governance, Prayut largely attributes blame for the political conflicts to corrupt people in the past:

Thailand is like being on a ship that **has been sailing through waves of corruption** [and] **people with power** who seek only their own interests, **over many years**.

Prayut's deictic positioning profile in the ST can be deduced from a disposition of pronouns (shown in Table 6.1), the allusions referring to the enriched Thai history endowed by Thai/Siamese kings to the present time, and the future frame with the constant references to the next generation who need to conform to social norms and uphold the traditional value of seniority-*cum*-authority. **Figure 6.1** sums up Prayut's person, space and time deictic positioning and gives the clear picture of how Prayut positions himself in the spacio-temporal cline and distances himself from or aligns himself with different groups of people in the ST.

¹⁰⁷ The number in *Thailand 4.0* is considered a future indicator, which is in fact emulated from Industry 4.0. The number 4.0 refers to the future technology that relies on cyber physical systems, as the continuation of 1.0 (mechanisation), 2.0 (mass production), 3.0 (computer and automation). (For more information, see Lasi et al., 2014).




Figure 6.1 Deictic positioning in Prayut's weekly address, adapted from Chilton (2004: 58) and Munday (2012: 76)

At the centre of the time axis is where Prayut positions and identifies himself with ordinary Thais by binding the broader temporal 'we' with the inclusive current 'we' (contemporary with and sharing the same space with the speaker). The time axis basically runs from the past where the Thai enriched culture/tradition and ancient kingdom are positively referred to (far back in time, but sharing the same space as the speaker). At the opposite end of the time axis is the future where Prayut refers to children as the future of the nation (far ahead of time, but sharing the same space with the speaker). On the space axis that shows the distance between Prayut (at the deictic centre) and each group of people he addresses and refers to as third-person. Starting from the exclusive 'we' which involves the government, the military, and the civil servants, the next point is the 'quasi-Other' represented by the farmers and the poor (distance 'you' or positive distance 'they'). The farthest is the 'Other' which refers to some national threat (abstract 'they') and to foreign entities (remote 'they'). Next to this farthest point but back in the recent past is a group of corrupt minds and powerful politicians (negative material 'they') who exploited ordinary Thais (general 'you' and inclusive 'we'). Although the third-person (such as 'they') is not usually used as deictics (Grundy, 2004: 27), it can still show how Prayut uses rhetorical devices to distance himself from those he refers to as *khao* 'they' by focusing attention on positive/negative information about *us/them* (van Dijk, 2008: 105). Finally, the askew axis is Appraisal. As Munday (2012: 69, 76) proposes, this axis is the extension of Chilton's modality axis (2004: 60). It shows how the political speaker apportions the morality of rightness to him/herself and depicts the reality with modality and attitudinal values. In this case, it reveals Prayut's Affect on the political crisis, Judgement on *rao*, *than* or *khao* and Appreciation on nationalism and reform.

When it comes to translation, the temporal locations in the official translation tend to be explicitly connected and more relevant to the contexts as a result of the pronoun explicitation explained in the previous section. Each point on the temporal cline is likely to be overarchingly linked. These following examples illustrate how the spatial and temporal locations are made explicit in translation:

(7) LT: I would like to use the words that **many Thais who are yet to be born. In the future [they] will be born. We** must lay the foundation for **them over there** too ... running out of resources, having no strength. **In the future** where will Thailand be? And when they are born, how will they have to face the hardships? Think like that ... And there must be no violence **again** under any circumstances **from now on**.

TT: This is not only for **us**, but for the sake of **our children and the next generations to come. We** must build a strong foundation for **them** ... How could **the next generation** cope when **our generation** causes all these problems and uses up all the resources? ... **From now on**, there must not be **any more** violence in **our nation**.

(29 May 2015, 05:37 – 06:27 mins)

There are two interesting points in (7). First is the case of the straightforward use of terms representing the people of the future. Prayut describes the next generations with relatively long phrases (*many Thais who are yet to be born. In the future [they] will be born ... foundation for them over there*), but the translator makes it short and concise by applying direct references (*for the sake of our children and the next generations ... a strong foundation for them*). The current temporal ‘we’ (*not only for us, our children*) also helps specify the location of Prayut and the current temporal Thais while sharing the same view of the next generations. However, the circumstantial adjunct *over there* – that somehow distances the next generation from the speaker while indicating the point in the future where the inclusive ‘they’ are supposed to be born – is altogether missing. There is left only *them* referring to the next generations in the TT. In a later clause the translator even makes the temporal location of the speaker clearer by distinguishing *the next generation* from *our generation*, as in *How could the next generation cope when our generation causes all these problems*.

The second point is the case of retaining the presupposition and explicit current temporal location of the speaker. The whole clause *there must be no violence again in any circumstances from now on* presupposes that at some point ‘in the past’ on the temporal cline there is violence because Prayut does not want such ‘violence’ to happen again. The translation manages to retain the presupposition (*any more*) by literally translating *from now on* by putting it in front of that clause as a marked theme, again with the emphasis on the current temporal ‘we’ (*violence in our nation*).

Example (8) below portrays how the reshuffling of the clauses and the time frame shifts the whole interpretation of the ST:

- (8) LT: For tomorrow is another important day – “National children’s day”. **Children are the country’s future**... I’d like to refer to **the children** first as “**the future of the nation**”, “**the maker of the future of the nation**”. Or even the **teachers** are also similarly “**the maker of the future of the nation**”. [So they] cooperate **for the future**.
- TT: Tomorrow will mark Children’s Day... I would like to refer to **our children** as the “**future of the nation**” as well as the “**makers of the future of the nation**”, who are **our teachers**.

(09 January 2015, 28:24 – 28:49 mins)

In his speech about the annual Children’s Day and Teachers’ Day, Prayut refers to Thai children as *the country’s future*, *the future of the nation* and *the maker of the future of the nation*, and at the same time to Thai teachers as *the makers of the future of the nation*. He reasons that the children and the teachers would *cooperate for the future*. However, although retaining the framing of the children as the future, the translator seems to misrepresent Prayut’s muddled statement by re-evaluating his views towards teachers and re-assigning the value *makers of the future of the nation* only to the token *our teacher* with the relational process *are*. One possible explanation for this reshuffle of the future representation is because the translator attempts to rationalise Prayut’s analogy; since the children are the future, the one who makes the future (teaches the children at present) is supposed to be the teacher.

The last example is interesting because it does not seem to be in the same trend of explicating the time frame, but rather shows the blurring of future temporal location and how the translator reduces the constant repetition of the inclusive ‘we’:

- (9) LT: The specified vision is **our expectation** or **hope** [as to] how in **the next five years we** will be. Thai people must try to think like this. If **we** don’t think like this, **we** then have no future. **We** must foresee **our future in the next five years**. How will **we** be? **We** shall be a country with stability, prosperity and sustainability.
- TT: This vision is **our hope** and **aspiration** for the country. Everyone in the country needs to look at **the future that lies ahead of us**. This can only be achieved through cooperation, instead of sabotage in hopes of seizing power during volatile times. If successful, **Thailand** will become a stable and prosperous nation.

(09 January 2015, 18:40 – 18:59 mins)

In his pushing of the strategic planning for Thailand’s future, Prayut links the present to the future by using the current temporal ‘we’ and direct tokens (*our expectation or hope [as to] how in the next five years we will be*), as a political strategy to introduce consequences or conditions that will be fulfilled in the ‘near future’. Although retaining the sense of inclusiveness with *our hope and aspiration*, the translator seems to undermine this manoeuvre by vaguely showing the future frame (*Everyone in the country needs to look at the future that lies ahead of us*). Next is the reduction of too much emphasis on the pronoun *rao* ‘we’. In (9), there are five instances of the

inclusive *rao* within a short time, but all of these *raos* disappear from the TT. What is left is the highlighting of the term *Thailand*. One plausible reason for this disappearance might be an attempt to build the textual coherence in a written discourse as opposed to the nature of the speech that is always full of repetition, especially when Prayut goes off script.

Persuasion power here is partly indicated by Prayut's ability to shift between roles (inclusive *rao* and exclusive *rao*). The translation of these roles is therefore ideologically and politically motivated. As the above examples illustrate, by explicitating the pronoun and using the inclusive *rao* rather than exclusive *rao*, the translator to a larger extent re-presents Prayut's discourse spaces with a broader sense of collectiveness, but not so as to retain his repetitiveness.

6.1.3 Portrayal of the military in the translations

In the four months before the NCPO set up a military government in August 2014, one of Prayut's constant themes was the need for the military to carry out its mission of restoring peace and order in Thailand. This military's fanciful worldview is based on the Cold War paradigms as the one who could protect Thailand from national threats like that of the communists. It was the image of the uncorrupted army and provided the army with authority to define the national threat and the capacity to stretch the definition to cover any perceived challenges to its traditional position (Barany, 2012; cited in Janjira, 2015: 104).

The translation of Prayut's presentation of the army, however, seems to be a mixture of softening the strong influence of the army on the Thai way of thinking in language use and maintaining its popular image. One interesting shift is caused by the practice of ignoring Thai fossilised metaphors in the TT. Although not often mentioned, the metaphor of ATHLETES AS A TROOP (*kongthab nakkila* 'a troop of athletes') is used when Prayut urges national support for the Thai athletes in various international competitions.¹⁰⁸ However, all of them are generalised in the TT, with *kongthab* being left out, as presented below.

(10) LT: I would like everyone to express their support, together with me, in cheering **the troop of Thai athletes**.

TT: I would like to express my utmost support for **athletes** who are competing at the Asian Para Games 2014.

(24 October 2014, 24:16 – 24:19 mins)

In the same fashion, another military-related metaphor, one frequently ascribed to the Thai football team, is *chang-suek* 'war elephant' (and hence its official nickname), and this is also generalised.¹⁰⁹ All of its nine usages in Prayut's original text are changed by the translator to 'the

¹⁰⁸ The popularity of its usage can be exemplified by online searching; the collocation of *kongthab* 'troop' and *nakkila* 'athletes' has 7,570 hits on Google™ (as of 10 November 2018).

¹⁰⁹ The popularity of this particular collocation is high; it produces 1,860,000 hits in a Google™ search (as of 10 November 2018). Another indicator of its popularity is a hashtag #ช้างศึก in social media. The

national football team’, except for the address on 11 March 2016 when it is used to allude to the ancient Thai kings and their war elephants.

Another conceptual metaphor related to the military is SOLDIERS AS NATIONAL FENCE, which seems to sing the same tune as the idea of the ‘men in green’s burden’. For example, Prayut tries to convince the Thai public of the importance of nationhood and its defence by extending this metaphor:

(11) LT: ... the saying, “**the country is the home, the soldiers are the fence**”, today may not be enough. [We] might have to use the words “the country is the home, the people and all civil servants are the fence.” As for the outer fence, the soldiers mainly take care of [it].

TT: ... the phrase, “**the nation is the home, the soldiers are the fence**”, may not be enough, as the saying should go “the nation is the home, the people and civil servants are the fence, while the soldiers stand guard”.

(18 September 2015, 04:40 – 04:53 mins)

Unlike the metaphor of ‘a troop’, this particular nationalistic metaphor is retained. Apart from lessening the degree of modality (from *might have to* to *should*), the translator manages to keep the overall sense of this extended metaphor. One plausible explanation is that it is a marked utterance in which Prayut takes the widely used catchword *rua khong chat* ‘the fence of the country’ to another level. It is therefore necessary for the translator to continue presenting this military-patriotist reconfiguration in the TT.

Nonetheless, in other addresses where Prayut over-justifies military actions after the coup, patronises the addressees or aggressively criticises the opposition group, the translator tends to omit those phrases or rephrases them with a more cohesive textual organisation. For example, Prayut speaks at great length about the Army development plan which requires a substantial amount of budget, and how important the plan is:

(12) LT: As for the strengthening of the Army, **be it in terms of personnel, weapons**, I will oversee it according to the Army development plan [including] personnel, munitions, equipment, because [they] are expensive. **Today [they] are out of order, so [they] must be repaired, some very old parts need replacement.** All is in the development plan. **There is no organised corruption at all. [It] can’t be done so. We must be careful.** This is a national security matter which needs to be made understood at domestic and international level. Both the Ministry of ICT and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must create a better understanding about our administration, our intentions, **[so it] will lead to stability, more acceptance by foreign countries, from now on.**

TT: As for the development of the military, I will oversee the development process which includes personnel, structure, and equipment development. This will be in accordance with the existing plan. These are all national security issues which

metaphor is also symbolised into a logo of an elephant holding a ball with its trunk (<http://www.thaifootball.com>) after the re-branding of the Thai football team.

need to be conveyed to the international community through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology.

(6 June 2014, 20:04 – 22:55 mins)

All the clauses in bold are missing in the TT. What is left in translation is a simple and seemingly logical explanation of the need for the newly-formed government's spending on the Army development plan. The over-justified phrases get minimised or wrapped up neatly without having to mention such trigger terms as *weapons* or *organised corruption*. Some long-drawn-out excuses (*Today [they] are out of order, so [they] must be repaired, some very old parts need replacement and [so it] will lead to stability, more acceptance by foreign countries, from now on*) are cut out of the translation, so as to make the final English version less digressive but more consistent with Prayut's thought process, and thus show a cohesive unit of the written discourse.

Another example of diffuse speech is when Prayut persuades his audience to see sense in his choice of cabinet appointments. He exaggerates the topic by using attitudinal-rich terms:

(13) LT: **I think [you] shouldn't look at this [issue], more military, less military.** I have concluded that if there is no military at all, [it's] impossible. **Because of what?** Because in security there is a problem. In peace and order there is a problem. **Some said that [I] would bring in [my military] seniors, juniors.** If I don't have [my] seniors, juniors [and] friends I can trust to work [for me], [it's] impossible. **I try to distribute [them] proportionately.**

TT: I have carefully considered that we cannot leave out military officials as peace, order and security is still an issue. I need to have people I can trust which consist of a combination of my colleagues and acquaintances, seniors and juniors and many others.

(29 August 2014, 38:14 – 38:34 mins)

The translation presents itself with the case of omission of certain important evaluative terms. What is lost are: (1) a clause that shows Prayut's restriction of other views (*I think [you] shouldn't look at this [issue], more military, less military*); (2) a rhetorical question (*Because of what?*); a judgement on people's behaviour (*Some said that [I] would bring in [my military] seniors, juniors*); and, (3) his vague promise (*I try to distribute [them] proportionately*). The terms/phrases underlined show how the translator also replaces two conditionals (*if*) – a syntactical feature on which Prayut primarily relies when attempting to clarify his intention – with modality of obligation (*we cannot* and *I need to*). One possible explanation of this restructuring might be the fact that the translator tries to lessen the effect of the conditional clause that can make the English reader confused with too much information, thereby making the official translation shorter and more cogent than the original.

More often when expatiating on certain subjects, Prayut tends to bring out inappropriately negative comments and attitudes. The translator helps improve his style by altering it to a more reasonable one with a lucid explanation. For example, when defending the junta-handpicked National Legislative Assembly (NLA), Prayut is particularly loquacious on the topic:

(14) LT: The NLA has not been established to serve this or that group, [or] for the military. I haven't yet ordered anything for the military at all. I don't do anything for one side or another. [I] don't do it because it's a waste. I don't know why I should do so ... **The minority** must be looked after fairly. The officials can work conveniently. It's not that [I] only grant [their] authority to **hunt down and arrest** [the wrongdoers]. **Can they all be arrested?** If the people have other measures [such as] cooperating to reduce the problem, the law enforcement is then less applied. [It] must go that way

TT: **I would like to reiterate that** NCPO was not established to serve any particular group. **The minority which constitutes a majority** must be looked after fairly. The law enforcement officials must be facilitated in their work. We do not have the capability to **arrest** all the wrongdoers even if granted additional authority or power. So we need to have measures that would reduce the problems by not having to enforce excessive laws.

(8 August 2014, 1:06:18 – 1:06:55 mins)

The first long underlined clauses in the original are summarised into a mere clause *NCPO was not established to serve any particular group*, with an additional engagement *I would like to reiterate that*. Note that the acronym *NLA* is mistranslated as *NCPO*. In doing so, the translator simply backgrounds Prayut's overt reference and criticism (such as *the military* or *it's a waste*). There is an additional modification of the term *The minority* with a relative clause *which constitutes a majority*. The result is a more positive presentation of the term and shows that Prayut is aware of and assigns importance to this minority group.

One apparent shift is process. In the ST a series of processes is used: *laila kafan chapkum* literally meaning 'hunt down, slaughter, arrest'. It is an idiomatic serial verb structure that shares semantic relations and conveys a very negative connotation and clearly shows the speaker's emotional disposition or Affect (unhappiness, insecurity). But the translator selectively retains only the process *chapkum* 'arrest'. One plausible explanation is that this rhymical construction of processes/nouns, one of the features in Thai spoken language, cannot be rendered literally because it would be superfluous and redundant, and may contribute to an utterance with more negative values than the speaker intends. It would be unnatural in English if the translators were to retain all referential meanings of each process in the construction. So they are obliged to choose only a core meaning of the construction at the expense of meanings of other processes.

Right after the missing processes the rhetorical question *Can they all be arrested?*, an attitudinal token that to a certain degree shows Prayut's disapproval of the event, is also omitted. The last shift is the change of the textual meaning. A frequently used conditional structure (*If*) in the ST is intentionally shifted to the use of consequence connectives and a modality of obligation (*So we need to*). As a result, the clauses in the official translation look more logically connected, rather than containing a conditional that implies a different relationship to the previous clauses.

Mentioning the military to justify the role of the NCPO and the Army was more frequent and had more impact in the first few months after the coup. But after the military government was formed

in August 2014, extended justifications of the military's action and characteristics gradually faded away. The term *thahan* 'military' or 'soldier' appear only in passing together with other civil servants such as *chao-nathi thang phonlaruean tamruat thahan lae asasamak* 'officials in both civilian, police, military and volunteers'.

All in all, Prayut's linguistic style largely echoes his deliberate attempt to build up the military's common esprit de corps in Thai people's minds and put forward the security narratives by defining threats (the Cold War mind-set), so as to bring about unity and reduce the military's insecurity in controlling Thailand. The lines between in- and out-groups are drawn to support the traditional military contention that it is the military that protects the country more than any others, hence 'the men in green's burden'. To invoke the sense of nationalism, Prayut also uses some metaphors related to the military or war in a good way and portrays the military and its activities in a positive light. However, the translation loses all these senses when the translator denies Prayut's unique style of language use by not literally translating Prayut's straightforward references to the military. In doing so, the translator simply detaches the target audience from the vividness of Prayut's spoken discourse. One possible reason behind this strategy might be the translator's effort to discard Prayut's exaggerations in translation, for they would make him look self-obsessed and overly patriotic in the eyes of an international audience.

6.2 Inconsistency of religious pluralism

Buddhism and Thai politics are inseparably related to one another in terms of power relations. Through Thai *sangha* (official Buddhist hierarchy), Buddhism gives influence and power to some groups that are close to the *sangha*, but excludes others. It is one of the most important contributions to Thai identity from which the political leader develops. In identifying oneself with Buddhism, one simply embarks on the Buddhist cosmology that if one practises *dharma*, one also has *barami* (prestige and grandeur), especially those in the ruling class. Thai élites always made use of this idea to gain popularity and legitimise their actions and policies since its establishment as the state religion during the Sukhothai period (1238-1438). In modern times, the case of Field Marshal Sarit's exploitation of Buddhism as justification to suppress the communists and usher in his paternalistic style of governance during the 1960s can illustrate the significance of the power relations Buddhism gave to the military leader. Sarit also used Buddhism as a reason for refuting the liberalism of Western democracy that is deemed unfit for Thai society (Kobkua, 2003: 9-13). Thai Buddhism has been captured by the state and has become preoccupied with the preservation of orthodoxy and the maintenance of the established order. The symbiotic relationship between the state and *sangha* has provided Buddhism with the role of legitimating state power, while the core teachings of Buddhism have been overlaid with superstitious accretions and merit accumulations, thereby being subordinated to nationalist ideology (McCargo, 2004: 155-6).

Buddhism has long been a source of Thai people's identity, which comes from various images and rituals. In showing his Buddhist identity and reliance on its influence and power, Prayut particularly emphasises the essence of religious rituals, especially in the address whenever the Buddhist-related special days approach. Prayut's references to Buddhism obviously support his nationalist discourse. The following sections look at Prayut's view towards religions in Thailand, how the term 'religion' is misinterpreted by the translators several times, and how other religions are presented.

6.2.1 Unified religion(s)

In Prayut's spoken discourse, even if not actually specified, the generic term *satsana* 'religion' is equal to Buddhism. Pervasive are the allusions to Buddhist mythology or cultural specific items related to Lord Buddha's teachings such as *tham-bun* 'to make merits', *tak-bat* 'to offer alms to Buddhist monks', *metta* 'to be generous'. All these terms underpin his Buddhist-nationalist discourse and serve as an indicator which Prayut employs to convince the Thai audiences about his being a good Thai and his adherence to *dharma*. Every time he mentions *religion* in general, he refers solely to Buddhism, as shown by a list of some examples below:

If our society has **religion** as a main institution for one's adherence to be a good person ... (11 July 2014)

Today we have 5 fingers, 2 for the country because the country is more important than others, the other 3 fingers are **religion**, the king and the people (6 June 2014)

... the Thai scripts that are enriched with the academic values, including jurisprudence, ... **religion** and customs and traditions (19 July 2016)

Despite using *satsana* as a blanket term to refer to all religions in Thailand, Prayut often makes a reference to the heretics by alluding to Buddhist myth when confirming his stance on nationalism. For example, Prayut preaches the harmonisation of religions in Thailand by saying:

(15) LT: On religion too, **every religion** in the world can co-exist in Thailand. His Majesty the King is supporting [this]. **Every religion in the world. Every religion** teaches people to be good but there are some kind of people whom they call **Mara**. Then [we should] solve it.

TT: On religion, **every religion** can co-exist in Thailand and are all under the patronage of His Majesty the King. **Every religion** teaches people to be good but there are some who **are anti-religion** or **have ill intentions**.

(6 June 2014, 42:33 – 42:47 mins)

In translation the cultural specific item *man* 'Mara' is clarified as *anti-religion* or *have ill intentions*, thereby losing the reference to Buddhist mythical character who tried to hinder Lord Buddha's Enlightenment. In a similar vein, when continuing his nationalistic view by upholding Buddhism as the main religion of the country, Prayut states that:

- (16) LT: On the issue of religion, everyone must help out. We will use all mechanisms to accelerate the investigation, get rid of **Mara of religion** and support **Buddhism** and **every religion** to be respected by the Thai people forever...
- TT: On the issue of religion, everyone must help out. We will use all available mechanisms to accelerate the inspection, be rid of **deviants and heretics** and support Buddhism and every religion to be respectful for the Thai people...

(18 July 2014, 46:31 – 46:46 mins)

With or without intention, it shows that Prayut's world-view is largely dominated by the Buddhist way of thinking; even when trying to speak about all religions as a whole. This line of thinking noticeably reflects in the translation of the term *satsana* itself. However, its translation is inconsistent in number, especially when it is placed in the century-long ideological slogan. The lack of plurals in Thai makes the term *satsana* ambiguous; recently, though, the military has been promoting the translation of *satsana* in the military slogan as religions.



Figure 6.2 The Royal Thai Army slogan: For Country, Religions, Monarchy and People¹¹⁰

As explained above, this triumvirate is the underlining ideology that had become an axiom in Thai society and serves as a golden maxim of Thai people's lives. Although these three concepts underpin Prayut's theme in all his addresses, they are cited together as a collective dictum for eleven times. But only five out of eleven is rendered with a plural form. For example, on 11 July 2014 Prayut talks about the core values to which he encourages all Thais to adhere as a principle for the strong nation, and the translator renders *satsana* into the plural: *Upholding the nation, the religions and the Monarchy, which is the key institution*. But the second time he emphasises the triad motto on 19 September 2014 the translator uses its singular form: *Our key objectives are: permanently reducing inequalities in society/ promoting reconciliation and building national unity ... promoting loyalty to the nation, religion, and the Monarchy*.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ ‘ทหารบกกระทำสัตย์ปฏิญาณตนต่อธงชัยเฉลิมพล...วันกองทัพไทย [The Army took an oath of allegiance in front of the military victory flags...Thai Army's day]’. (2017, 18 January) *Siamrath*, <https://siamrath.co.th/n/8097> (Accessed: 3 January 2019).

¹¹¹ The full list of translation of *satsana* is available in Appendix 3-C.

For many Thais, if it is not specified with such modifiers as *lai* ‘many’, *uen-uen* ‘other’ or *tang-tang* ‘various’, the term *satsana* is singular by default. Coupled with unawareness of the military promotion of religious pluralism, the lack of plurals could be one of the reasons why, when any translators encounter the term *satsana*, they simultaneously equate it with Buddhism, hence the singular ‘religion’, unless the texts surrounding it determine otherwise. One compelling explanation for this inconsistency might be the fact that there are more than one translator, and the list of crucial terms that are supposed to be shared among the translators does not include this politically-sensitive *satsana*. Such translation is counterproductive to Prayut’s official propaganda to promote religion pluralism, but ironically seems to serve right to his underlined religious preference that leans towards Buddhism.

6.2.2 Translation of Prayut’s portrayal of religions

In defining Thai identity, and although it is always promoted as being a religiously co-existing society, the Thai authorities still grant supremacy to Buddhism over others, so that Buddhism as the national religion enjoys a higher priority than others. The most frequently-mentioned religion in Prayut’s addresses is Buddhism, while other religions are mentioned in passing, often as a series of terms dedicated to showing his desire for social harmony among religions. For example, on 4 December 2015, one day before the King Rama IX’s Birthday he speaks about religious ceremonies in honour of the late King: *Religious blessings for His Majesty the King will be conducted based on 5 religions, which are **Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Sikhism** at Sanam Luang*. The second most mentioned is Islam, primarily associated with the southernmost provinces where the majority is Muslim and which have allegedly posed a century-long problem to the central Thai authorities. Prayut’s talks about the southernmost parts of Thailand are basically the explanations as to why it is a moral duty of the military to go south to take care of the people’s well-being by claiming the moral high ground for military missions to protect ‘Thais in the south’ against the so-called ‘national threat’.

Below are examples that explain the different portrayals of religions between the original and the official translation. First is the change of Buddhism presentation, similar to the case discussed in the previous section:

- (17) LT: Therefore, [it] is the opportunity for the Buddhists to **participate** in activities to carry on the Buddhism, recall the Lord Buddha and **apply** the teaching to one’s daily life, and join in decorating [your house with] the national flag and **Dharma Chakra flags** in a show of oneself as **Buddhamāka**, going to the **Wat**, offering alms, listen to sermons, uphold **Sīla**, and avoid **Apāyamukha**.
- TT: This gives us the opportunity to **embrace** and **disseminate** the Lord Buddha’s teachings. We can join in and fly our national and **Dharma Chakra flags in a show of faith, make merit**, offer alms, uphold **Buddhist precepts**, and avoid **harmful actions**.

(29 May 2015, 00:51 – 01:16 mins)

There is a shift in process type from material (*participate, apply*) to behavioural/verbal (*embrace, disseminate*). This changes the action-orientation to more intuitive behaviour. Moreover, Prayut's spoken discourse is full of Buddhist-specific items (*Dharma Chakra flags, Buddhamāma, Wat, Sīla, Apāyamukha*). All these items in (17) - and similar ones elsewhere in Prayut's addresses - are prone to generalisation in order to give the target audience more understanding of various Buddhist concepts. In doing so, the sense of Prayut's Buddhist principles that he emphasises by using such specific terms is unavoidably lost.

Example (18) is how Prayut persuades the Thai Buddhists in the conflict over selection of the Supreme Patriarch:

(18) LT: **Don't forget**, over 90 percent of Thais are Buddhists ... **Why don't we preserve** this 90 percent, **why [do we] have to divide** this 90 into 60 – 40 under the same Buddhism.

TT: Over 90 percent of Thais are Buddhists ... The 90 percent of Buddhists in Thailand, **therefore**, should stay united and not divided.

(11 March 2016, 35:10 – 36:19 mins)

Prayut cites statistics, albeit without any source, to support his view that Buddhism is the main religious belief of Thailand by employing an imperative that shows obligation to the audiences (*Don't forget*). But the translation seemingly presents itself as a fact (*Over 90 percent of Thais are Buddhists*). To express his frustration over the conflict, Prayut further employs a rhetorical question to betoken his attitude towards living in a harmonised Buddhist society (*Why don't ... why [do we] have to*). But again in translation, these attitudinal tokens are turned into a connective *therefore* (consequence of the previous clause about the overwhelming percentage of Buddhism), which somehow cuts off Prayut's emotional responses to such an event by making it more reasonable and cohesive. For this topic, one has to accept that the secular politics are always vying for influence within the *sanga*. As McCargo (2012) observes, the *sanga* has operated as an instrument of state power and legitimation, the recent example of which has been the rise of Redshirt monks since 2005 in support of Thaksin Shinawatra and his appointment of Somdet Phutthacharn as the acting supreme patriarch, which caused outrage in the other camp who define themselves as royalist. The question of who should be the supreme patriarch became one of the reasons why Prayut talks about such a problem, while at the same time calling for support for Buddhist unity.

In his general reference to important religious days, Prayut normally speaks briefly of the Muslim rituals and practices (similar to other religions, except Buddhism) such as the fasting month and the Eid-al-Fitr. However, the most frequent reference is to the southern Muslims. The translation about this particular topic seems to agree with the original or sometimes be even more positive if related to military operations in suppressing the southern insurgency:

- (19) LT: At present, regarding the Southern Border Provinces, the NCPO **allowed** [*phonphan*] some community radio stations in in the Southern Border Provinces to temporarily broadcast in order to explain the correct practice of **the Thai Muslims** and disseminate information during the fasting period.
- TT: The NCPO **eased restrictions** on some community radio stations in the Southern Border Provinces and **allowed** them to temporarily broadcast in order to explain the correct practice of **the Muslims** and disseminate information during this fasting period.

(04 July 2014, 20:42 – 20:55 mins)

In (19) the translator put an additional group of non-core lexis *ease restrictions* to the core process *phonphan* ‘allow/permit’ (usually collocated with regulatory bodies). On the surface, they convey a similar meaning, but with the effect of the non-core lexis the translation provokes a more positive feeling in the reader than the original. Usually Prayut always modifies the term *Muslim* with *Thai*, attributing a sense of nationalism to those who practice a marginal religion in the Thai context. Prayut tries to expand this nationalistic sphere of influence to include those who are not Buddhists, but somehow the translator fails to capture his concept of this imagined community. The translation of ‘Thai Muslim’ is unsystematic; sometimes it gets literally rendered accordingly, but many times the modification *Thai* is left out.

The last example is related to Prayut’s deictic positioning and shows the distance he keeps from Islam while ironically advocating peace dialogues:

- (20) LT: It’s not harassing those who believe in **other religion(s)**, or unfair violation of rights...
- Don’t argue** with one another, **don’t express** the opiniosn [nor] criticise what is dangerous without evidence. **[You] don’t know** what the working principles used by military, **civilian** and police are...
- We then only cooperate with one another. [This] is not harassing those who believe in **other religion(s)**...
- TT: We are not harassing **anyone** because of **their religion** nor have we infringed on anyone’s rights...
- Please refrain from** making false statements on security matters without considering all the facts. **You may not understand** military or police procedures and practices...
- We must cooperate with one another and not make unsupported claims about human rights violations.

(17 July 2015, 41:20 – 42:36 mins)

In (20) Prayut refers to Muslims as *those who believe in other religion(s)*. The use of the term *other* itself presupposes that the speaker belongs to a particular group (Buddhists), being at the centre of a spatial cline. With the stress of the exclusive *rao* ‘we’, the translator follows the line by rendering the whole clause as *We are not harassing anyone because of their religion*. But the term *other* is lost, which changes Prayut’s perception of *other religion(s)* into a neutral one,

though not his deictic positioning. The foregrounding of the exclusive *rao* is also ambiguous in the sense that it can be either *rao* ‘the government’ alone or *rao* ‘the government plus the Buddhist’.

Furthermore, in justifying the military operations regarding keeping peace and order in the far south, Prayut makes emotional use of imperatives (*Don't argue*). The translation, in contrast, appears to be politer (*Please refrain from*). In the clause that follows:

LT: [You] **don't know** what the working principles used by military, **civilian** and police are

TT: You **may not understand** military or police procedures and practices

There are some changes that make the translation less negative in attitude: modality (outright negation, *don't* to probability *may not*), process (*know* to *understand*), participant (*civilian*). The loss of *civilian*, whether intentionally or not, takes off one of Prayut's idiosyncrasies in preaching that each person is supposed to do their jobs according to their social status and roles. You must behave, know your own place and keep doing your duty; if you are civilian, your social duty is to follow those who always ‘protect’ you and ‘refrain’ from challenging the status quo. The military mentality of ‘the men in green’s burden’ is stressed. But the translator fails to grasp what Prayut intends to impart.

One explanation for Prayut's Appreciation of other religions is that he may intend to promote a new concept of a multi-faith society as illustrated by the change in the English military slogan from a singular to a plural form of *satsana*: ‘For the Nation, Religions, King, and People’. However, coupled with the loss of Buddhist-specific items, the official translation is inconsistent with Prayut's intention because of the lack of grammatical number in Thai. This poses a huge problem for translators but at the same time gives them the leeway to interpret Prayut's political implications attached to his speeches. As the findings inform us, however, the loss of direct Buddhism references makes his political reliance on Buddhism seem incomplete and misplaced. The portrayals of religion(s) are uneven; political treatment on other religions are more positively explained in the official translation.

6.3 Praise of the monarchy

Prayut almost invariably began his weekly address with the mention of the royal family's various activities, lauding the monarchy's morality and benevolence to all Thais in various charity activities. The late King Bhumibol's intelligence and ability were often referred to as Prayut tried to explain how to solve the economic and social problems. Thai kingship is fundamentally based on the Buddhist socio-political concept which requires a ruler to be mindful of the *dharma* (merit/virtue) – a grounded concept of *dharma* (an ideal King of righteousness who rules by the merit/virtue in accordance with the prescribed precepts for Theravada Buddhist kingship). The Buddhist political ideology of *dharma* has always granted the supreme power to the Thai kings ‘whose great store of merit claimed for him the unquestionable right to rule over those in

his kingdom' (Kobkua, 2003: 21). In his speeches, Prayut's references to the monarchy's grace and blessing for Thais predominantly provides political justification for the junta's rule.

One of Prayut's strategies in preaching to his audiences to conform and take up his political narrative is to make constant suggestions to follow the King Rama IX's Sufficiency philosophy. In a show of honour to the late King, he strenuously advises people to assume their civic duties, political responsibility and public service. In his address on 12 December 2014, he emphasises that *civic duties are crucial. Politician's duties, civil servant's duties, people's duties are different. [It is] necessary that each individual has their own role, [they] must behave properly ... HM the King [Rama IX] once said [if] everyone performs their duties with honesty to the best of their ability, the country will definitely move forward with sustainable happiness.* His references to the late King's words serve as a rhetorical strategy to achieve the social and political conformity he repeatedly urges the general *than* 'you' to agree upon. He reasons that if Thais fail to hold on to their duties according to the late King's words, the problem will linger, the country will remain subject to conflicts and unable to overcome the challenges that come with a democratic system; that is, freedoms without responsibility that lead to disrespect for the fundamental rights of one another, hence the social disturbance that Thai-style governance tries to suppress.

Many issues in Prayut's address link back to the royal institution. Occasionally, when trying to defend his royalist stance, his bluntness is shown through his negative words. For example, Prayut was riled by those who try to defame the institution and threatened to invoke the draconian Article 112, the concept of which is derived from the traditionalist view that the king is regarded as inviolable and free from any accusation (Connors, 2007: 129):

(21) LT: As for the violation of Article 112, **don't bring** the [royal] institution **down**. They stay in their place, above all conflicts. When there are two sides, one would [try to] defeat the other. Each side must find tool for fighting. One side would use money, budget or propaganda, whatsoever. **The other side would bring the institution to fight back. So They have to come down [because you] drag Them down, [which is] illegal.**

TT: **I am urging** everyone to **not bring** any members of the Royal Family **into any conversation** that could defame the highest institution. **Please don't** use the Royal Family as a tool to seek victory over rivals.

(10 October 2014, 48.35 – 48:58 mins)

The translator opts to smoothen the already-intense topic and Prayut's irritating speech into a mere statement, along with the omission of *Article 112* and the change from imperative to declarative (*don't bring the [royal] institution down* to *I am urging everyone to not bring...*). His original long explanation of illegal activities that are equal to *bring the institution to fight back* is also changed into a polite request to the audience (*Please don't*). With its less pessimistic and disapproving tone, the translation is therefore the concise and summarised version of Prayut's speech that is originally filled with harsh criticisms towards the anti-royalists.

6.3.1 Different evaluations of ‘the people’ and ‘the King’

Prayut’s presentation of the royal institution is extremely positive. One of many indicators for such an explicitly positive presentation are his attitudes and the use of collocations in relation to the royals. However, in the official translation all these features are missing, since the English cannot entirely extend its semantic features and referents to cover all sociolinguistic meanings that are attached to the Thai special vocabularies reserved for and naturally collocated with the royals.

The examples below display the different presentations of the Thai people and the King in the same or nearby passages. There is a case of Field-specific terms in the first two examples. The nominal classification of various terms meaning ‘people’ in the ST is infused into one core meaning of those words. In fact, Prayut’s lexicalisation shows that he follows the norm and traditional collocations of some words that socio-linguistically apply in the circumstances where the term ‘people’ is mentioned in relation to the royals:

- (22) LT: Both Their Majesties waved and smiled, which gave **delight to the people** [*phasoknikon*] who came to greet and all groups of **Thais** [*prachachon-khonthai*], **immeasurably** [*pen-lonpon*].
- TT: It was **especially most touching** when Their Majesties smiled and waved to **the crowds; further bringing happiness to all Thais**.

(19 September 2014, 01:26 – 01:37 mins)

In (22), the original *phasoknikon* and *prachachon-khonthai* share the same meaning ‘Thai people’, but the first one is always used in association with the monarchy,¹¹² while the second is a core lexis for ‘Thais’. In translation, however, the first one is generalised as *the crowds*, and the second with the core terms *all Thais*. In the same example, there is also the shift in Affect from *delight* to *most touching* with the amplification *especially*, which emphasises the already-positive evaluation towards the monarchy. Normally collocated with the royals, the modal adverb *pen-lonpon* ‘immeasurably’ that amplifies the force of the whole clause (*which gave delight to the people*) is changed into a phrase that is significantly related to the junta’s theme (*further bringing happiness to all Thais*). This noticeably shows that the translator totally embraces and brings to the fore the junta’s propaganda about ‘Returning happiness to the people’. Example (23) continues along the same track:

- (23) LT: **The Thai team of ‘warriors of war elephants’** was able to turn the tide after having received moral support from His Majesty the King through [communication] from the deputy principal private secretary [of His Majesty]. And [the team] was able to present its victory to **the Royal Father** [*pholuang*] and **Thai people** [*poungchon-chaothai*], ultimately.

¹¹² According to the Thai National Corpus (TNC), all 248 tokens of *phasoknikon* are collocated with various terms related to the monarchy.

TT: **Thailand's team** was uplifted and was able to turn the tides after having received moral support from His Majesty the King through communication from the deputy principle private secretary of His Majesty. The team was ultimately able to present its victory to **His Majesty and the Thai people**.

(26 December 2014, 00:51 – 01:04 mins)

Apart from the epithet *warriors of war elephant* being generalised as shown in the previous section, the term *puangchon-chaothai* also meaning ‘Thais’ is translated with the core lexis *the Thai people*.¹¹³ There is also a case of diluting the epithets of the late King *pholuang*, which literally means ‘the Royal Father’ and normally refers to the late King Rama IV because its connotation gets carried away. What is left is only the mere fact of stating the royal style *His Majesty*.

Example (24) shows how the inclusive ‘we’ is employed to further enhance the sense of nationalism in connection with the monarchy:

(24) LT: One more important point is **[I] ask [you]** to adopt the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy in **[your]** daily lives, by taking the middle path and **behaving oneself** according to His Majesty’s **example** ... There have been lauded that His Majesty is the example of **the Sufficiency King** [*kasat-phuphophiang*].

TT: **I would also like to encourage us** to adopt His Majesty’s Sufficiency Economy Philosophy in **our** daily lives, by taking the middle path and His Majesty’s approach **as our inspiration and example** ... as His Majesty is lauded as **the Development King**.

(06 May 2016, 04:04 – 04:21 mins)

In advocating the King’s philosophy Prayut puts it neutrally (*[I] ask [you], [your] daily lives, behaving oneself*); the translation, however, invokes the inclusiveness (*encourage us, our daily lives, our inspiration*). Another point is the shift in the late King’s antonomasia. Prayut apparently lauds the King Rama IX as *kasat-phuphophiang* ‘the Sufficiency King’ to correlate it with the King’s philosophy, but the translator slightly twists his epithet into *the Development King*. One plausible explanation is that this is a case of intertextuality, given that the term *Development* is also ascribed to the Kings in other discourses.¹¹⁴ The last example sees ideational shifts and a positive extension of the remote ‘they’:

(25) LT: I’d like “Father’s Day” to be the day that Thais are happy, together ‘do good deeds for **the Father**’ ... Thais would be able to **express the love to the [royal] institution, love** the nation and **love** each other in Thai society, in one’s own family too, regardless of ethnicity, religion. In **the land of the Father**, we must extend the love, smiles, especially to **foreign visitors** too.

TT: I would like “Father’s Day” to be a happy occasion for all Thais and for all to perform virtuous deeds for **their fathers** ... **This way**, Thais will be able to

¹¹³ In the Thai National Corpus search, the term *puangchon* produces 210 tokens, all of which are associated with the monarchy or the government.

¹¹⁴ On Google™ there are 44,800 hits of the epithet *kasat-nakphattana* ‘the Development King’ (as of 17 November 2018).

express their devotion to our Monarchy, the country, and fellow Thais, as well as their family members, regardless of ethnicity or religion, not to mention genuine kindness and friendship to **all our guests** who visit **the Kingdom**.

(04 December 2015, 02:40 – 03:07 mins)

In (25), the translator misinterprets the metaphor *do good deeds for **the Father*** by translating it as *perform virtuous deeds for **their fathers***. This largely shifts Prayut's metaphorical homage to the late King to a general goodwill statement for his fellow Thais. In the clause that follows a shift in ideational metaphor occurs. There can be found in the ST the use of the nominal form to express the process meaning (*express **the love** to the [royal] institution*). Apart from the addition of a logical metaphor (*This way*) that gives more logical consequence to the next clause, however, the translator replaces *the love* with a process that incrementally enforces Affect (*express **their devotion** to our Monarchy*). The shift in process therefore indicates the increase in positive attitude towards the monarchy.

The next points to note are the loss of ideational meaning and explicit identification of the remote 'they'. The ideational meaning of the phrase *the land of **the Father*** that represents Prayut's intention to evoke the sense of royalism in his audience's mind is missing because the translation is presented only with the generic term *the Kingdom*. Similarly, the translator changes Prayut's perspective by replacing the phrase referring to the remote 'they' (*the foreign visitors*) with *all our guests* with the use of the inclusive 'we'. This consequently shifts the way Prayut perceives the remote 'they'; instead of pointing it out from his own position, the translation seems to point it out from his position plus that of all Thais.

6.3.2 Shift in royal language

In Thailand the royal language is required when an ordinary person writes or talks about members of the royal family. This distinctive register reserved for the royal-born comes from the idea found in both Buddhism and Hinduism that the king is a deified man. The divine king or *dhevaraja* is regarded as the reincarnation of Lord Buddha, and the king's status as that of Indra God in Hindu mythology. The etymology of this unique language derives from Pali-Sanskrit and the Khmer language. These are sets of special terms for describing the actions, body parts and belongings of the royals. The different set of terms applied to different levels of royal status indicates the rigid class hierarchy in Thai society; the higher one is in royal status, the more complex and lengthy becomes the use of phrases in writing and conversation. As Sombat (1992) observes, this special language functions to naturalise the linguistic divide and elevate the royals above commoners. Between such a distant language pair as Thai and English, it is a socio-cultural shift that causes the loss of equivalent effect in the English translation and inevitably impacts on the whole picture of Prayut's royalism and hence nationalism in the eyes of his foreign audience, who can be considered outsider addressees.

The examples below display the decrease in Prayut's highly positive attitude towards the monarchy when shifts in the register of language and the royal epithets occur:

- (26) LT: The extensive Royal duties that **She** [*phra-ong*] has been conducting for a long time clearly demonstrate **[Her] great intelligence and ability** to improve the living quality of children, youth and the people in the rural areas and the underprivileged, [so they] can stand on their own ... The Thai people regard **Her** [*phra-ong*] as '**Chao Fa of ordinary people**.
- TT: The extensive Royal duties conducted by **Her Royal Highness** clearly demonstrate **Her Royal Highness's commitment and ability** to improve the living quality of children and the underprivileged in rural areas, thus allowing them to stand on their own. This has made Thais regard **Her Royal Highness** as truly **the "people's princess"**.

(03 April 2015, 01:16 – 01:38 mins)

In (26), the third-person pronoun *phra-ong* (literally meaning 'great body') and special modifier *phra* (*phra-pricha-samat* 'great intelligence and ability') that is reserved only for the royal family are rendered with the direct reference *Her Royal Highness*, instead of literally translating them as 'She' or 'Her' that would somehow deviate the customary use. The translator avoids this common reference with the normal third-person, but to a certain extent its underlying positive attitude (towards 'the divine') that comes with the pronoun *phra-ong* is inevitably carried away. In the later clauses, the royal epithet is also shifted when the translator opts for the equivalent meaning in English of the fossilised metaphor *Chao Fa*, which literally means 'a celestial princess', instead of transliterating it. Another shift occurs in the translation of *ordinary people* only as *people*; the first one is the interpreted meaning of the metaphor *khondoendin* 'a person who walks on earth'. This shift in royal epithet inevitably weakens the metaphorical concept of 'the divine' vs 'the commoners' that has long framed Thais' way of thinking.

Example (27) similarly shows the translator fails to capture the sense of magnificence and devoted veneration in the court language:

- (27) LT: As many regions across Thailand are encountering the prolonged drought situation, HRH the Crown Prince **has extended His royal grace by bestowing** 200,000 bottles of "**His royal kindness** [in] Bike for Mom [event] to break the drought" too.
- TT: As many regions across Thailand are encountering with [sic] the prolonged drought situation, HRH the Crown Prince **has graciously bestowed** 200,000 bottles of **drinking water** to help alleviate drought in affected areas.

(07 August 2015, 02:24 – 02:38 mins)

The positively-attitudinal phrase *has extended His royal grace by bestowing* was thinned out as *has graciously bestowed*. This is a borderline case of optional shift, because despite the Thai series of process the translator may try to follow the Gricean Maxims; especially the maxim of manner, when one tries to be as clear, as brief, and as orderly as one can in what one says, and where one avoids obscurity and ambiguity (Grundy, 2000: 73-5). The translator also fails to unpack the

actual meaning of the royal word *nam-phrathai* which is equal to the core term *nam-chai* ‘kindness, generosity’ in common language. On a deeper level, this term is also used metaphorically as ‘water from the heart’ that can be filled in a bottle. Therefore, the clause that portrays the royal benevolence to the Thai people (*bestowing 200,000 bottles of “His royal kindness ... to break the drought”*) is reduced to a mere piece of information about what had happened (*bestowed 200,000 bottles of **drinking water** to help alleviate drought*).

The last example reveals the optional shift in which the translator struggles with making the new target audience comprehend the history of the Thai monarch:

- (28) LT: **“Wan Piyamaharaj Day”** is the **day resembling the heaven-ascending day** for HM King Rama V who **extended his royal grace and great kindness** [to Thais] and is **well-loved among every group of Thai people** [*phasoknikon*].
- TT: **“King Chulalongkorn Day” or “Wan Piyamaharaj Day”**, the **memorial day** for HM King Rama V who **during his great reign devoted himself to the country and his people**.

(23 October 2015, 00:30 – 00:48 mins)

Besides offering the additional explanation of *Wan Piyamaharaj* with *King Chulalongkorn Day*, the problem that the translator encounters is the term *wansawankot*, literally meaning ‘the day the king ascending to heaven’. The translator only replaces it with a phrase that shares the concept of the death: *Memorial Day*, a holiday in the US to remember soldiers who have died in wars.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the whole phrase lauding the former king’s manner and philanthropy (*extended his royal grace and great kindness*) is unable to be fully fledged in the TT which shows only *devoted himself* despite the translator’s attempt to compensate for the loss of royal glorification with the adjunct *during his great reign*. Worse still, Prayut’s attitudinal inscription *well-loved* is missing, and so is the term *phasoknikon* ‘people’ usually collocated with the royals. What is left is only the nominal phrase *his people* (see Section 6.3.1).

All the above examples demonstrate the inequality in social status and language use, in addition to the translator’s struggle to find the appropriate terms/phrases to re-present the royal vocabularies in the English version. It is undeniable that a term/phrase for a certain concept is not a mere symbol, but is profoundly tied to the fundamental concept and the speaker’s attitude. The point is that the lack of a corresponding special register in the target language means that Prayut’s stance of overtly positive evaluation towards the monarchy has to be irrevocably reduced. The translation therefore presents itself with the decrease in the sense of overt royalism, which possibly appeases the outsider addressees who may regard the use of such language as the expression of an excessive reverence for the Thai monarchy.

¹¹⁵ *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online* (<https://www.ldoceonline.com>).

6.4 Discussion

From the time of the May 2014 coup, the military government has ruled the country with the assistance of the long-established ideology of Thainess. In their view, the social hierarchy and conformity outweigh other liberal ideas in the Thai political order, in which the phenomena of disunity and different voices are deemed unwelcome. To usher in silence to a political order strengthened with the conservative notion of Nation, Religion and King, Prayut suggested many times in his speeches that the hierarchical social structure attached to that ideology is already proper, for it gives Thai society order, stability and peace. As Saichol Sattayanurak (n.d.) points out, the idea that Thai society exists naturally without conflicts has itself been firmly settled for decades, because the society with a display of exercising freedom and entitled rights is considered chaotic and damaging to the national image, reducing its attractiveness for foreign investment and tourism. This way of thinking is reflected in Prayut's speeches; especially in the aftermath of the coup, he discouraged all kinds of protests deemed to be disturbing the peace and order that the National Council for Peace and Order had just installed. If the harsh measures imposed by the NCPO to crack down upon the dissidents are considered 'a stick', then 'a carrot' could be Prayut's Machiavellian attempts to entertain the public with various programmes of 'Returning Happiness to the People' while the junta assumed authoritarian rule over the country.

In the provision of such entertainment, the mentality of 'Thailand-is-good' strongly influences most parts of Prayut's speech-making. On many occasions, he has used statements and phrases that foster Thai pride such as *we Thais are never inferior to other nations in the world* (1 May 2015), *preservation of Thai good culture* (10 April 2015). This mentality, as Saichol argues, functions as an instrument to make Thais accept the dictatorial power, which leads to ignorance of social and political problems and repeated failure to find any solutions for them. Since this nationalist ideology firmly lodges itself in the public consciousness, it also becomes clear in Prayut's speeches that he follows suit by raising the people's collective conscience. He is particularly fond of using the terms signifying the idea of collectivism such as *ruam-kan* 'coordinate/cooperate', *ruam-palang* 'join force', *duay-kan* 'together'. To solve the conflicts and maintain peace and order, however, the military seems to be the only one who can do it since it has immense power. According to Prayut's first address on 30 May 2014, the Army's priority is to return the country to normality and safeguard the peace and security of Thailand. As Janjira (2015: 98-9) argues, the junta has already defined threats to national order: the risk of civil war, a destabilising democracy and national disunity caused by prolonged conflicts. The junta seized its chance to depict itself as 'the timely saviour' or the most capable agent in dealing with this year-long political instability. The way the military presumes the existence of threats shows the persistent military mentality of 'the men in green's burden'. To convince the Thai people to play along and appreciate the junta's version of newly defined threats, the sense of collectiveness is spurred with the use of the inclusive 'we'. Likewise, the burden that the military government

would shoulder for the sake of ordinary Thais is made imposing and explicit with the use of this exclusive 'we'. At the same time Prayut defines different sets of his addressees, which demarcates 'us' from 'them'. Nonetheless, Prayut's deictic positioning is somehow fluid due to some omissions of his pronouns as commonly applied in the Thai language and the way he shifts his position in and out of the inclusive 'we'. This consequently contributes to an ambivalent pattern of addressing the second-person and referring to the third-person.

The findings from the comparisons of Prayut's original text and its translation are illuminating. The official ideology aiming at creating the moral citizens with the three pillars at its heart seems conflictual in translation. Despite the loose use of pronouns in Prayut's original speeches, the English translation still conveys a sense of Thai collectiveness to the international audience. Prayut's deictic positioning and its relation to each point of his spatio-temporal cline is even solidified, largely because there is the tendency towards pronoun explicitation. As a result, Prayut's security discourse that comes with the set-up of groups by pronoun use is dramatically highlighted, a fact which echoes the deep-rooted political culture that lays much store on social hierarchy and collective harmony. Nevertheless, although more positive self-positioning is formulated in translation, the true military image is both slippery and hazy. Prayut's presentation of the Army accurately reflects several fossilised metaphors about the military in the Thai language and stresses its stereotypically good image; in turn, the translator downplays Prayut's meaning potential related to the military in those metaphors (such as 'a troop of athletes'), shortening Prayut's lengthy and rather tiresome descriptions of military achievements in dealing with opponents. The outcome of this de-emphasis on such activities could be that the target audience would understand and see only the positive side of the junta.

As discussed in previous sections, Prayut cherishes the conceptual trinity on which Buddhist values stand firm in an almost incantatory fashion. His reference to Buddhism undeniably illustrates his deliberate attempt to follow the Thai state's effective exploitation of religious belief. This is one of the types of evidence supporting McCargo's argument (2004: 167-8) that the Thai state always manipulates Buddhism to put its citizens in a less important position, employing an officially sanctioned form of religion as a source of legitimacy. The state normally resorts to any means to defend a highly conservative orthodox and authoritarian mode of Buddhism against the other open political orders. Despite promoting religious pluralism in Thailand by often directly claiming that Thailand is a land of religious freedom, Prayut still clings on to Buddhist-nationalist notions when mentioning any activities concerning religion for Thais to adhere to. Ironically, the translation adversely shows his reluctance to support such pluralism, failing consistently to render the plural form of *satsana* in many places where Prayut cites the mantra of Nation, Religion and King. Nonetheless, the translation of Prayut's portrayals of other religions makes his attitudes towards them look more positive. Any military operation concerning the Southern conflict related to Muslims is presented in a positive outlook.

For the last important elements of the three pillars, Prayut's reproduction of the nationalist discourse by faithfully repeating King Rama IX's Sufficiency philosophy demonstrates the junta's struggle to gain trust from the Thai people. He urges all Thais to implement the principle of King Rama IX's philosophy to improve their lives.¹¹⁶ It is to a certain degree a prescriptive fealty to this royally-bestowed wisdom. Many times, Prayut strongly advises Thais to carry out virtuous deeds in honour of the monarchy because it is one of those traditional practices that have been always called for and used as a sign of loyalty, especially on royal birthdays. Prayut's sacralisation of the monarchy is arguably aimed at calming the anxiety about usurpers, as shown in the way the junta had returned to the bygone pattern of past military governments by intensely upholding the idea about defending the monarchy. This process is reflected in Prayut's glorification of the late King with the traditional use of royal language and epithets.

In translation, however, the epithets applied to the late King become different, as do various elements of the Thai world-view of kingship. Although the military's status as defender of the monarchy is obvious in Prayut's original with the deification of the monarch through many lexical devices and a special register of the Thai language, the official translation is unable to convey the same idea in which the junta tries to extol the virtues of the royal institution in order to buttress its sense of post-coup control since it fails to employ equally flowery royal language in the target language. The aggrandisement of the royal courses, activities and contributions to the Thai society becomes ineffectual. Although still praising the monarchy, the English translation to a certain extent makes Prayut look less ridiculous without those grandiloquent terms/phrases. His strongly approving attitude toward the royals is therefore amplified, but in a lesser degree. Such values that link Prayut's use of language to a royalist intuition of public-spirited dedication are partly missing. The attempt to unify the people with their different opinions by encouraging the collective worship of this particular pillar of society for nationalistic purposes may seem inconceivable to the foreign audience.

This point about Prayut's new addressees is noteworthy. Fundamentally, his original addressees are those he refers to either as the general 'you' or specific 'you' in his speeches. However, when it comes to the translation, the whole body of texts and the junta's newly-polished messages are specifically directed at the English-speaking world – a new group of addressees. This second-order audience can be called the 'meta-addressee' or the outsider audience to whom the military government is trying to reach out in order to inform and to portray themselves with a positive outlook.

In terms of the translation process, it is interesting to consider closely that the group of translators may not bear in mind the nuances in translating the triumvirate of Nation, Religion and King, as reflected in the explicitation of pronouns, inconsistency of pluralising and the limitation of royal

¹¹⁶ A well-known scholar on Thai politics, Kevin Hewison, argues that this philosophy is an essential principle devised to keep the poor in their place; see more in Farrelly (2007).

language rendition. Some of these translation strategies such as pronoun explicitation or future frame of the next generation may be ideologically motivated, but some may not, as is suggested by the devaluation of positively-attitudinal royal vocabularies.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Immediately following the May 2014 coup, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) was established to take control of Thailand's administration before a fully-fledged military government was formed in August. The resulting cabinet was headed by Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the then head of NCPO and commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Army. To explain the coup, Prayut presented the first episode of a Friday evening TV show 'Return Happiness to the People in the Nation' on 30 May 2014, broadcast in Thai with English subtitles. Emulating a format inherited from its precursors during the Thaksin, Abhisit and Yingluck premierships, this show exemplified the junta's political marketing, aiming to dispel public anxieties and disseminate the regime's governing rationale to the Thai public and to international audiences.

Focusing on the use of an English translation as a new feature of the show, the present study has been conducted to determine the translation shifts and their political implications found in the official translation of Prayut's speeches. The core data collected comprises 124 transcribed texts of the TV show and their translations from 30 May 2014 to 7 October 2016. The research has focused on two main themes: reconciliation and reform, and nationalism through which the conservative concept of Nation, Religion and King is thoroughly enshrined. Interviews with the translation team were conducted to gain insights about the programme production and translation process. To carry out the textual analysis, the research has applied two major concepts as an integral model. Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (1985/2014) as a linguistic methodology and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), primarily drawing on the work of Fairclough (2015) and van Dijk (2008) as a conceptual framework, were integrated into Fairclough's three stages of analysis to produce a model appropriate for the analysis of the translation of the speeches, as follows: (1) describe linguistic features found in the texts studied, (2) interpret ideological assumptions in accordance with their situational contexts, and (3) explain the effects of the shifts derived from the ST-TT comparisons that the wider audiences might be subjected to. Given the differences in both grammar features and socio-cultural values between English and Thai, Pattama's SFL interpretation of the Thai language was drawn upon to determine the transition shifts at different linguistic levels.

7.1 Summary of findings and interpretations

Although somewhat resembling weekly TV addresses by previous prime ministers, Prayut's show is produced with English subtitles aiming to make international audiences understand the junta's rationale for the coup against the civilian government. To explain it from a CDA perspective, the weekly address and its translation are evidence of the military government's determination to exercise control over public discourse. As van Dijk (2008: 67) maintains, it is only the dominant clique that can have the influencing power and access to discourse production. Despite the digital era in which the marginal voices can be easily heard, it is still the case that General Prayut as the prime minister and his propaganda team had special access to such resources of communication, crafting the discourse in favour of the junta and their agenda.

The recurrent themes of Prayut's TV show are the reconciliation process, socio-political reform, the conservative shibboleths of Nation, Religion and King and economic initiatives, which illustrate his attempts to bring to centre-stage the discourse of national development as the junta's source of legitimacy. All these themes, and indeed their modes of presentation, clearly reflect the social relations between the junta and the Thai public, many characteristics of which are similar to those of the Sarit regime in the 1960s. They reflect the social hierarchy that has been firmly established in Thai society, such as the royalist language through which the nationalist discourse is repeatedly articulated. The findings gained from a multimodal analysis of the TV programme indicate that the sense of nationalism is dramatically highlighted. Visuals such as the national flag, Buddhist sites and pictures of the royal family take turns to appear on the screen. With the help of such symbolic power, Prayut's weekly address functions as a useful instrument for erasing the image of the usurper, justifying the military's rule and making strong claims for legitimacy.

However, as the findings in Chapter 4 demonstrate, Prayut's speaking style and language use strongly reflects his character as a career general who is familiar with orders and commands. His paternalistic style of talking is filled with overtly negative words. He frequently repeats himself, causing a disorganised and illogical textualisation of discourse. Prayut is fond of imperative sentences – making demands of or giving commands to the audience – especially in places where he preached at civil servants and farmers or pleaded with the public to give him more time to administer the country. Apart from explicit negativity in his judgement towards people, other strategies found in Prayut's discourse are denials of discrimination against other religions, mistreatment of those who have different voices and the infringement of free speech rights. His distinctive paternalistic and condescending manner and his frequent use of negative words pose huge problems for the translators.

The translation team felt the need to 'rewrite' some of the negative utterances. They had to 'intervene' in Prayut's oral narrative in order to adjust its undiplomatic, disconcerting style for its new purpose of engaging with the international community. It is likely that when delivering the

address, Prayut did not have a non-Thai audience in mind at all. If this is the case, the arduous role of the translation team becomes that of adapting the message for the new target readership.

What translation procedures or patterns are identifiable in the translation?

The trends observed in the translation procedures/patterns can be summed up as follows:

(1) The first trend is the shunning or adding of attitude-rich words. These are critical points where the negative or positive values are attributed in Prayut's emotion and judgement, which realises the interpersonal function of the text. Such words/phrases are reduced or omitted to a large degree if they expose too much his criticism or colloquialism, but retained or straightforwardly added if they help replenish the stores of the junta's image. In case of explicitly negative terms, examples in Section 5.1 illustrate that the translator tends to replace them with terms that convey neutral meanings, so as to control the risk of showing a false impression of the prime minister's. There are many occasions when Prayut's expressions of Judgement on people's behaviour are changed to be either more positive or negative, depending on which political side they are on. Prayut's Affect shows up primarily when he talks about the justifications for seizing power, invoking the political roadmap and reconciliation process or eradicating corruption. All his positive emotional reactions are made explicit, broadening the more positive outlook of his administration. Prayut's Appreciation of ethical values towards the government's plans and policies is also enhanced. The way to make those attitude-rich words/phases more positive is not only by lexicalisation, but also by stressing their meaning with explicit markers of force and focus such as adverb/modal particles.

Furthermore, Prayut's original text oozes the sense of command realised by imperative clauses and modality of obligation. In the English translation, however, the sense of command is found to a far lesser degree because the translator tends to change those speech functions into declaratives that rather show the speaker's neutral position. The translator also omits or shifts the modality of obligation to other types and values of modality in order to make the translation less demanding and much milder in tone and thereby avoid exposing Prayut's imperious personal traits as a military officer.

(2) The second pattern is related to the textual and logical functions of Prayut's spoken discourse. As the findings inform us, any original passages the translators consider to be superfluous (such as Prayut's slips of the tongue) are prone to deletion. The translators, who might also have the forethought about the next step of subtitling with its specific constraints and norms, tend to rearrange any unnecessary information and insert connectives between clauses to build a more organised texture of the text and a cohesive wave of information. When a confusing and verbose passage appears, they do not translate the original clause by clause, but bind the clauses into a tighter, cohesive textual organisation. As a result, the translation becomes shorter and more compact, with variation of connectors. This interventionist move clearly alters the texture of the

text, as illustrated by the clause relation analysis in Figure 5.2 which reveals the tendency for shift in sentence length and an explicitation of clause relations with logical connectives in the target text.

This translation pattern seems to accord with Baker's translation universal of *simplification* (1996: 180-1), a tendency to resolve ambiguity and avoid ungrammatical structures. It also exemplifies Toury's first law of translation (1995), *the law of growing standardisation*: 'the textual relations in the original are often modified [...] in favour of (more) habitual options offered by a target repertoire' (Toury, 1995: 268). One plausible explanation is that the ST is originally in a form of spoken language, but had to be rendered in English as a written one. Many features of Prayut's spoken discourse were therefore reduced to accommodate 'a repertoire' of the written English. Another explanation is that translators had to use their own instinctive judgement as to the perceived needs of Prayut's new audience who might need not to encounter such long-winded and disorganised utterances.

(3) The influence of military government on the translation process is a tendency towards maintaining the positive aspects of the military. The true 'military' image is made indistinct by means of generalising several metaphors about the military. Such manipulation inclines to presenting the military with a slightly obscure image, thereby realising different ideational meanings in the target text.

Another major finding is the ideational shift in the term *prachachon* 'people'. In the original, this term was often used uncritically, without pinpointing exactly who Prayut really meant. The translator often replaces *prachachon* with other terms that share semantic relations (such as *citizen*, *public*). From a political perspective, these variant translations contain very different connotations and evoke completely different social and political imaginaries. The term *prachachon* can be linked to the Army slogan 'For Nation, Religions, King and the People' which regards the notion of 'people' as apolitical, untroublesome and complying to the junta's aspirations. In this sense, the translators seem to shy away from the original sense of 'the people' in the slogan because it sounds overdone and repetitive in English if the term gets straightforwardly translated as *people* in every passage.

(4) Prayut's pronominal use demonstrates his political positioning between himself and his audiences, representing his 'mental classification of the addressees' (van Dijk, 2008: 226-7). Prayut's selection of pronoun also defines his addressees and referents into distant and proximate, positive and negative groups. Examples in Table 6.1 clearly show the ambivalent, slippery pattern of pronominal use because of a common feature of pronoun drop in Thai. This systemic difference in the two languages inevitably leads to some obligatory shifts in the target text, something which is illustrated by the case of dropping the third-person pronoun *khao* 'they' used in the source text. Once Prayut's intended pronoun as a subject of a clause is dropped, the whole clause could be assumed, from a different viewpoint, as an imperative (the command towards the second-person

pronoun *than* ‘you’). The translator reacts by re-inserting the third-person *they*, but is unable to preserve all the ambiguities of the source text.

This ties in with the general findings of Section 6.1.2 on Prayut’s deictic positioning, where there is a tendency for explicitation of spatial and temporal locations as a result of the re-insertion of the missing pronoun. Many terms symbolising Prayut’s future and past deixis are exhibited to overarchingly connect his imagined glorious past of Thailand/Siam to its hopeful, brighter future as a country. These explicit links between times conjures up the nationalistic picture in the audience’s mind and alludes to the recent past’s political turmoil caused by unreliable elected governments.

Eventually, the above interventions result in the less digressive but neutral and cohesive unit of English written discourse. The new target audience at whom the whole of Prayut’s discourse is directed receive only the translator’s interpreted version of the original. The changing of the addressees reflects the new purpose of translation – a new function of a text for a new audience. To explain it in terms of the Skopos theory (Reiss and Vermeer, 1984/2013; Nord, 1997/2018), this translation stresses the adaptation of the target text to fulfil the translation purpose and meet the target text audience’s need. But it seems, in this case, that the need is one arising from the editor’s and translators’ interpretations; and furthermore, the answer to the question as to how much adaptation is appropriate is one predetermined by the team.

Owing to the newly arranged purpose, all these procedures, the study found, are the target text manipulations. The translators do not feel the need to explain the true attitudinal values of Prayut’s speech in the interests of the target audience, but rather they camouflage the reality of his distinctive language use. I therefore contend that this approach to translation is a defence mechanism; whenever the ‘official’ Thai image projected by the military government needs to be translated, it has to be adjusted and re-packaged. In doing so, it ‘denies’ to a greater extent the uniqueness of Prayut’s language use. The fact that the translators try to defend their subject by denying his true language characteristics leads us to the second research question.

How are underlying ideologies expressed in the source text presented in the target text?

The study has focused on the junta’s policy of reconciliation and reform that is linked to the century-long ideology of Nation, Religion and King. The findings in Chapter 5 reveal that the translation shifts frequently occur to improve the presentation of reconciliation and reform. Similarly, the ST-TT comparisons in Chapter 6 show that the omission of negative elements regarding the Army’s activities and the generalisation of military-related metaphors create a far better image for the junta and the Army, the defenders of the nation.

However, one of the major findings is the inconsistency in presenting religious pluralism in translation, based on all examples where the trinity of Nation, Religion, and King is collectively manifested. The explanation is threefold. Firstly, Prayut’s original is replete with references to

Buddhism, suggestive of Buddhist-nationalistic notions shared among like-minded military leaders. By contrast, the translator stays away from literally rendering those religious-specific items, which results in the loss of Buddhist allusions. Prayut's persistent invocations of Buddhist morality are distorted or even lost in the target text, thereby toning down his religious partisanship.

Secondly, the fact that Thai does not distinguish clearly between singular and plural makes it impossible for Prayut to thoroughly promote in translation his propaganda about the diversity of religious beliefs, despite the unequal status of other religions in Thai society suggesting otherwise. The ambiguity often occurs when he does not specify which religion he is referring to in his speech, which seems to suggest he means only Buddhism. Worse still, the translation of the term *satsana* 'religion' itself is inconsistent. Instead of clarifying his ambiguous statement and helping him promote pluralism by using only the plural form of 'religion', the translator uses its singular form as frequently as the plural one.

Lastly, such inconsistencies, I have argued, may be due to the lack of a common glossary shared among translators and their own lack of awareness of the political implications behind some terms. The outcome of this translation is therefore contradictory to Prayut's purpose in advertising pluralism in the society where the national unity is often urged. Furthermore, the translation of Prayut's portrayal of other religions, especially Islam, always looks positive, while in the original passages Prayut speaks somewhat negatively about military operations against the Muslim-related Southern insurgency. But, as examples in Section 6.2.2 show, the operations to suppress them in turn are presented in a positive light in the TT.

The last and highest pillar of nationalist ideology is the King. By referring to the late King Bhumibol's grace and blessing for Thais, Prayut attempts to legitimise his government's rule of the country by appealing to the Thai royalists. In presenting monarchy-related topics, Prayut rhapsodises over the royal family's charity, morality and clemency. The study demonstrates, however, that the collocations related to the royals which traditionally show Thai socio-cultural values are unable to be fully translated.

There are shifts in ideational meaning towards the royals. Epithets referring to the late King with the connotation of 'the Father' have a tendency to be presented merely as *His Majesty*. The vivid example is the glossing over the term *Chao-fa* and its metaphor as 'a celestial prince/princess', when the translator found the necessary equivalence in the term *Her Royal Highness*. The custom of using formal referents for the royals when translating them into English makes the translator automatically opt for the obvious choice of English equivalence of royal ranking, rather than transliterating them to show the core meaning.

Another key finding is concerned with *ratchasap*, or royal language, a special set of vocabulary reserved for the royals. The special language undeniably carries its own exceptional attitudinal values. Due to the enormous socio-cultural differences between Thai and English, the

corresponding special set of language in the target text is insufficient for covering such a highly embellished way of speaking/writing. Although the translator tries to achieve the equivalence of royal language in the target text, there is always a shift of attitudinal values. This bears out the finding, for instance, from examination of the translation of a process *sawannakhot* ‘to pass away’. Its Sanskrit-rooted meaning ‘to ascend to heaven’ is simply lost. Prayut’s attitude that is linked to the use of royal language showing a highly hierarchical society is consequently and unavoidably missing because Thai socio-cultural values and his deep admiration of the monarchy cannot be thoroughly preserved in the target text. There are two implications. On the one hand, due to the lack of socio-cultural equivalence of such royal language in English, the translator cannot conjure up the full picture of the Thai monarchy’s public-spirited dedication to non-Thai audiences’ eyes, neither does it express the strong sense of allegiance to the monarchy in the English version. On the other hand, Prayut’s image in translation could turn out to be more sensible and reasonable from the international audiences’ point of view because the praise for royal contributions becomes less glorified without the addition of such equally flowery English words.

In effect, although the final product of translation should promote nationalism with Nation, Religion and King at the focal point, the above findings show that some presentations in the translation are conflicting. Prayut’s profoundly Buddhist worldview is moderated because Buddhist-specific references are generalised or totally omitted. As a military defender of the monarchy, Prayut deifies the monarchy with the use of a special Thai language register. But the English translation of this register that has particular values of the Field and Tenor cannot absorb the same conceptual metaphor of ‘the divine’ versus ‘the commoner’.

To what extent does the institutional ideology condition the translation process?

The military government as the owner of the weekly address definitely has strong control over (re)production of ideology through control of their discourse formation and distribution. In the attempt to control ‘social cognition’, to borrow van Dijk’s (2008: 63) term, the government and its subordinate agencies have created a form of politically passive public participation in order to manage the public knowledge and beliefs, as well as to counter the competing narratives of previous elected governments such as those of Thaksin and Yingluck that retain the affections of many Thais.

The textual outcome from the ST-TT comparisons reveal traces of institutional influence throughout the translation process. Koskinen (2010: 59) observes that to study the translation coming from a certain institution, one should scrutinise the dynamic nature of the ideological and political agendas of that institution according to which its preferred translation is designed. In this sense, the institution seems to be the one that determine the translation strategies. In our case,

they are the government's ideology and translation norms in such hierarchical Thai governmental organisations that influence the translation team to follow those dynamisms.

Applying the Actor-Network Theory (ANT), the study delved into the formation of this translation commission and translator network in Chapter 2. The result reveals that this group is relatively small, comprising three main freelance translators (and some government officers serving as translators only at an early stage), a transcriber/coordinator, an editor and a team of technicians for the subtitling. The group is restrictive of other actors in the real translation process, but subject to extensive, external spheres of influence according to the hierarchy in their organisations (see Figure 2.3). The interactions and influence among people involved are defined by their previous works. The selection of the translators is based on their acquaintance with the commissioner (Channel 11), which proves their strong and durable connections.

Although each actor engages in this collaboration to produce the English versions of Prayut's discourse, power positions in Thai society have a huge impact on actors' behaviours. To make their job run smoothly they were required to subscribe to the unwritten guideline governed by translation norms in those governmental organisations. I contend that they know what is supposed to be done for such a politically-sensitive text at the expense of a somewhat different version from the original, as the results of the ST-TT comparison show in Chapters 5 and 6.

This account demonstrates the empirical evidence of human interaction. Ostensibly, the power relations in this small translation network are established largely by the editor, who by virtue of his position has the power to revise the translators' work and adjust any passages deemed unfit for such a political source text – a second 'filter' after that of the translators themselves. Given the variegation of translation procedures identified in an earlier section, the editor clearly shows an interventionist attitude by admitting in his interview that he would assume his power to correct any improper translation segments and shape the final products in pursuit of political and ideological agendas.

The fact that there are only a small number of people involved in the actual translation process leads to the question of whether there are any conflicts of purpose among them. The study found that actors such as technicians and editors lean heavily towards a default compliance with ideology because they are directly employed by state organisations. One of the principles persisting behind its unwritten translation policy is to create a good image for the junta: the editor reiterated that they are working for the sake of the country. This belief is shared among the editor, transcribers, and even the technicians who oversee the subtitling. But it is not the case for the outsourced translators. Instead, according to their interviews, the outsourced translators do not seem to subscribe to the military government's version of nationalism. All of them are half-Thai, half-Westerners who were raised in international environments to which the Thai conservative ideology cannot be extended.

Most importantly, Prayut's translated discourse is a product derived from various actors' interactions within the translation team and responses to initiatives from an external sphere of influence (that of the government). The translation process is considered the internal network between small groups of people in a real translation situation. It is understandable, however, if one were to look beyond this small network of activity. As Latour observes (1996, cited in Hekkanen, 2008), networks do not exist in isolation, but are always part of a larger whole. To link back to the fundamental concept of institutional ideology, I argue that this translation commission with its relatively small actor-network correlates with more extensive ones such as those of the Thai bureaucracy and, perhaps even, the network monarchy (McCargo, 2005). One possible significant factor coming from these larger networks is the effect of the 2014 military coup that puts political pressure upon the translation team. Although there is no specific translation brief for the translators to strictly follow, the pressure from the commissioning agency and the translation norms for such politically sensitive work speak volumes. They have to conform by adjusting and re-purposing the original in favour of the junta's campaigns. The process reflects constant negotiations between the needs of the junta on the one hand, and the editor's and translators' own delicate positionality on the other.

Apart from this macrostructure of translation context, another point worth discussing is the light-touch management of TV production and translation. One might expect that for such an important project to create legitimacy for the NCPO the translation process would need a much larger team of people who could embark on tasks, from transcribing to quality control of the final production. In fact, the translation team is tiny and their processes are unsystematic and improvised. For such a national and international discourse formation/distribution, the number of people involved is surprisingly small in the TV show production and even smaller in the translation team itself. They work largely from home, contacting each other only via email. Seldom do they meet in person to officially set agreed translation guidelines or to review their previous translations as a quality control measure. Neither do they receive any obvious feedback from the prime minister himself or indeed from his wife, a former university lecturer in English.

Interpretation of the research findings

When interpreting both empirical linguistic findings in above section and the interview information, the study comes to the conclusion that the translation of Prayut's weekly address is a triple irony, packed with internal contradictions. The first level of irony is embedded in the presentations of the military government's official ideology and image. The translation outcome that should continue nurturing those aspects of ideology and image does not succeed in fully presenting them as they are supposed to be. As the linguistic evidence suggests, the translators and the editor intervene to reset the negative tone and rearrange the unreasonable, repetitive utterances, but the inadequate socio-cultural equivalences in English for royal language and the lack of a plural form of the term 'religion' at times undermine these efforts. Although the junta's

pledges concerning reform and reconciliation are enhanced, Prayut's patriotic promotion of Nation, Religion and King is presented in a subtler manner. I contend that if looking from the international audience's point of view, we can see the whole body of the translation product is unexpectedly against the junta's initial intention to uphold this longstanding conservatism. It is because the translation ends up offering a failed re-presentation of the nationalism, unable to convey the same ethos as the junta intended to put across in order to tighten their bonds with the royalists and secure their post-coup position.

The second level of irony is the nature of the translation team's common aims. According to interviews with the translation team as shown in Chapter 2, the institutional ideology is likely to influence the overall translation strategy and solutions to translation problems. In the guise of diplomacy and political correctness, the group of translators headed by the editor has to engage in censoring their own leader with a strategy that produces a more formal, coherent target text, before relaying the 'proper translation' to an international audience. They are obliged to sanitise the relentlessly patronising, pessimistic overtones of the original Thai texts through such translation procedures as deletion of negative tone and addition of logical relations between clauses. The international audiences should not receive such spurious impressions of the Thai leader in the same way as the domestic ones do. The implication of this intrinsic contradiction is that the Thai public as a primary audience receive the unabridged version of Prayut's discourse, while the international community as a secondary audience receive the well-crafted and more comprehensible one. With this censoring, the study sees the translation of Prayut's weekly speeches as a form of *denial*. There is a default defence mechanism to deny the fact that Prayut deploys idiosyncratic language use and regularly displays his blatantly negative views towards 'Others'. Many translation approaches would agree that a certain translation, despite being influenced by the target socio-cultural environments, is supposed to be a new vessel to convey the idea (field), manner (tenor) and form (mode) of its source to the target readers, with or without a redefined purpose. However, the translation under investigation denies the characteristics of the original in many ways. First, it denies the prevalence of Prayut's careless speech by *mitigating* its harmful effects.¹¹⁷ The more irrational and cynical the spoken discourse, the more the translators tend to have recourse to mitigations, including toning down bitter remarks, shunning outright negations and rearranging syntactic structures. Second, the translation involves intentional denials or *excuses* on behalf of the leader. The translators made the target text look as though Prayut does not intend to use such negative words or pander to preconceived prejudices. What the international audiences receive in the end is a seemingly 'real' dialogue in which Prayut engages, after the translators discard all unnecessary information and leave only a more cohesive English prose. Finally, it is a *modification* of the new addressees' potential viewpoint because it fails to provide insights into Prayut's personality and the military government's true nature.

¹¹⁷ Such mitigation is a form of denial in van Dijk's analysis of racism in the press (2008: 126, 142).

The third irony lies at the heart of management of the TV production and translation commission itself, as explained above. It is common practice that for such important political propaganda the TV production staff and translation team must include a large number of people who specialise in each area, from studio recording to assessment after the show. But it is a question of trusting only a handful of people who were involved in the whole TV production and translation of Prayut's weekly address, despite the enormous size of the Thai bureaucracy system, the personnel of which could be pooled in order to take on such a politically sensitive task. Worse still, this translation team were left to find the way out by themselves when facing some difficulties in translating their leader's embarrassing statements. They successfully achieved their goal, though, by bearing in mind the government's ideology and pressure exerted especially on the editor and technicians who are government officials by position.

7.2 Evaluations, limitations and further work

Conceptual framework and methodology

The study operationalised two major conceptual frameworks: the combination of Systemic Functional Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis. The reason for this combination is due to the CDA limitation. Although CDA is substantially useful in explaining the socio-political contexts surrounding the texts studied, the main drawback derives from its unclear method of analysis for such a linguistic-oriented study. As van Dijk (2008: 2) maintains, there is no complete method for analysis. CDA uses any method that is relevant to the aim of the research. This opens up an opportunity to integrate other linguistic methodologies into this present model. SFL was chosen to help describe the discrepancies of the language use between the original and the translation because of its capability in linking the metafunctions to the socio-cultural environment.

The study is aware of the ethnographic methods as encouraged by Schöffner (2012) to examine agencies involved in the translation process in a similar way to that of the Actor-Network Theory. It acknowledges that the ethnographic research requires a direct, extensive participating observation of the networking and real translating situation, which this study is unable to fulfil, managing only an ephemeral observation of the internal working process. This is largely due to the nature of the organisation under investigation, one that does not encourage the regular access to its officers and the availability of their time for repeated interviews. Nonetheless, I maintain that information obtained from these interviews is considerably useful to describe the actors' struggling to influence each other and the pattern of their workflow.

The interdisciplinary analytical model proposed in this study succeeds in generating both linguistic and socio-political analyses of the traditional prime ministerial address. On the one hand, the model allows me to expound the translation shifts with linguistic evidences to support the arguments. On the other hand, it further provides me with guidelines for exploring the political

contexts and other Thai customs influencing the way Prayut uses language. However, there is some limitation on its usage. Although the detailed method provided by multimodality, such as visual interpretation, is helpful in many analytical points on the TV screen captures, the study limited itself to analysing only the presentation of symbolism appearing on the background and Prayut's facial expressions and gestures, but not the way of actually using his voice and intonation.

Data and analysis

The study initially relies on the transcriptions of the speeches in the TV show posted on the government's websites. I found that some of them, especially in the early months of the show, are not exactly the same as the English subtitles running below the screen in the same episode. I therefore paid attention to each example quoted in this study to ensure their correctness. The reason for this unevenness is possibly that, according to the technician, during the beginning of the broadcast where the production process had not yet settled down, there was not enough time for reviewing the final translation before the subtitle being inserted into the screen. To solve such a problem, I use the English version that appeared on the screen as the main data since it was shown at the same time as Prayut himself spoke.

The quoted examples also pose a problem. Due to the limited space, I am obliged to provide only the literal translation and the official one in the body of each chapter. This restriction is solved with the appendices of the full examples (see Appendix 1, 2, and 3). Three versions of the same text, including the Thai original segments, my literal translation and the official translation, are provided according to their appearance, which will be useful for the readers who understand Thai to cross-reference with the original. Moreover, some literal translations provided by me may fail to convey its entire socio-cultural connotation as pronouncedly as the Thai original should, particularly in the use of royal language. But I am confident that my literal translations are adequate to explain the translation shifts and their implications as elicited from the comparisons.

Further work

The present study focuses on the different representation of ideologies underlining the political texts that are especially associated with the 2014 coup. Future research can shift its focus to a pure pragmatic study of the original that remains to be investigated in detail. A contrastive analysis could be carried out to examine in the similar manner the translation of the post-October 2016 addresses, to see if there are any differences in presenting the same ideologies, when the political tide has slightly turned and other new challenges such as domestic pressures have increasingly emerged. The findings of the study using this second set of data might strengthen my findings that the translation shows only the positive side of the military government and is devoid of negative images that attached to any of the junta's performances. With the same set of data further research could focus on the other representations of such topics as economic policies, the

role of civil servants in implementing Prayut's policies as advertised in the address, and responses to international pressure.

The three-stage model (the integration of SFL and CDS) is another area in which its usefulness can be tested. The proposed model can be replicated using a different set of data in the similar English-Thai and Thai-English translation of political texts, and possibly other language combinations. This methodology may be useful for examining the translation product and process of such texts as press conferences of the Thai government and the record of political interviews in book or in video format with English subtitles. It might be the case that the commissioner and the translation team do not come from the same side as the discourse producer, as well as that the agents involved in the process may or may not come from the speaker's side. There could be other conditions and constraints in which the images of the speaker in translation could not be portrayed in the same way as when most of the agents in the translation process are actually employed by the government.

7.3 Concluding remarks

In this research, I have traced the origins of the Thai weekly prime ministerial address and how it has become political marketing for different governments to ensure their legitimacy by selling the narrative of their boons and benefits to the Thai public. I have also shown how the denial of Prayut's negative language, the contradictory presentation of conservative ideology and the meagre management quality of the programme all contribute to a triple irony in this particular translation commission.

Although this study does not deal with the reception of the discourse distribution, one indicator of its success is to gauge the popularity of the show by a public opinion poll. If Prayut's discourse and its translation genuinely succeeds in reproducing the junta's ideology for domestic and international audiences at all, they have to impress some Thais to change their positive opinions towards the former civilian governments and successfully re-inculcate the spirit of patriotic conservatism. The aim of the original to some extent has been accomplished for some of the military's sympathisers. But having a legitimacy deficit from the start, Prayut's spoken discourse is therefore nowhere close to being an elixir to 'cure' the majority of the Thai people who are purportedly still in thrall to Thaksin's and his allies' popular narratives, let alone for the international audiences who can merely enjoy this political farce played out between the Thais and their unelected leader.

It would be an exaggeration to say that the justification for the military rule by means of this received participation has been a total failure, but it is certainly safe to say that the public opinion as shown in the ratings during the TV show proves that it is not at all popular. In terms of translation, although in his interview the editor defended the government's stance that the English translation is for the international audience's benefit, the innate hierarchical system among

governmental organisations that commissions the project rests on the fundamentals that the translation team has to manage it within their means to adapt the original to suit the new type of audience in order to satisfy their superiors' enthusiasm and political purpose. This ironically disregards both the importance of translation and the real political implications for the target audience.

Appendix 1

Examples of Thai Source Texts in Chapter 4

Note: The author's literal translations of the speeches are followed by the official translations.

Appendix 1-A: Chapter 4 Section 4.3

Social actors and positioning

ผมขอยืนยันว่า คสช. และรัฐบาลนี้ มีอุดมการณ์และความมุ่งมั่น อย่างจริงใจที่จะทำทุกอย่างให้กับพี่น้องประชาชนและประเทศชาติ โดยไม่มีใครมุ่งหวังประโยชน์ส่วนตัวอย่างแน่นอน

I can assure [you] that the NCPO and the current government sincerely have ideologies and determination to serve the people and the nation. No one is aiming for personal benefits, definitely.

I can assure you that the NCPO and the current government have the determination and sincerity to serving the people and the nation. We are not here for personal benefits.

(18 September 2015, 10:03 – 10:15 mins)

ช่วงนี้ เราเริ่มมีข่าวดีเกี่ยวกับเศรษฐกิจ/การลงทุนในหลายเรื่อง มีนักลงทุนจากหลายบริษัทให้ความเชื่อมั่นและพร้อมจะเพิ่มการลงทุนในประเทศไทย ... นอกจากนี้ รัฐบาลยังมีเป้าหมายในการส่งเสริมและพัฒนาให้ไทยเป็นศูนย์กลางการผลิตรถยนต์ และอุตสาหกรรมอื่น ๆ ... ทั้งนี้ การลงทุนของภาครัฐเอง ไม่ว่าจะเป็นโครงสร้างพื้นฐานต่างๆ เช่น รถไฟ รถไฟฟ้า มอเตอร์เวย์ ถนน ฯลฯ ก็กำลังเร่งดำเนินการอยู่ทุกโครงการ โดยจะเปิดให้เป็นการลงทุนร่วมระหว่างภาครัฐและเอกชน หรือที่เรียกว่า PPP

This time we are beginning to have good news related to economy/investment in many sectors. There are investors from various companies having confidence [in us] and ready to increase their investments in Thailand ... Besides, the government aims to promote and develop Thailand to be a hub of automotive assembly and other industries ... So, the government investments in infrastructures such as railways, skytrains, motorways, road, etc. are being implemented, which will open for the joint venture between government and private companies, or what [they] call PPP [public private partnership].

There have been some positive developments for the economy and investments recently. There have been a number of investors expressing their confidence in making additional investments in Thailand ... In addition, the government is looking to make Thailand hub for car production and other industries. Thailand will improve its infrastructure to be fully ready for new investments, some of which are under negotiations now. The government is also making investments of its own, in railways, electric trains, motorways and roads. The government welcomes all interested parties to join these projects under the public-private partnership (PPP).

(20 November 2015, 05:37 – 06:36 mins)

แก่นแท้ของประเทศเรามีอะไรบ้าง ชาติ ศาสนา พระมหากษัตริย์ ถ้าเรายึดมั่นในสิ่งเหล่านี้ มันก็จะเป็นการสร้างภูมิคุ้มกันที่ดีให้กับประเทศ ให้กับประชาชน ทำทุกอย่างเพื่อส่วนรวม มีประชาชนเป็นศูนย์กลาง แต่ละคนมีหน้าที่ของตัวเองต่อประเทศชาติแผ่นดินนี้อยู่แล้ว ... ฉะนั้นถ้าเราลดความขัดแย้งลงได้ สร้างคนที่มีคุณธรรม สร้างสังคมที่มีจริยธรรม มีจิตสำนึกที่ผ่องแผ้ว แบ่งปัน มีอุดมการณ์เหล่านี้ โดยใช้หลักปรัชญาเศรษฐกิจพอเพียงของพระบาทสมเด็จพระเจ้าอยู่หัวมาประยุกต์ใช้

What is the core of our country? Nation, Religion and the King. If we venerate these things, it will create resilience for the country, for the people. Do everything for the collective good, the people are at the centre. Everyone already has their duties to the country, to this land ... Therefore, if we can reduce the conflicts, create moral people, create an ethical society, be open-handed, and have all these ideologies, by applying the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy of His Majesty the King...

What is the core of our country? It is our nation, religions and the monarchy. If we venerate to [sic] these institutions, we will be creating resilience for our country. People must do things for the greater good, where everyone knows their duties in the grand scheme of thing. We must reduce our conflicts and create a just society with righteous people who care and are principled and embrace the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy of His Majesty the King.

(6 May 2016, 55:55 – 56:24 mins)

วันนี้เราต้องการจะยกระดับรายได้ความเป็นอยู่ของประชาชนส่วนใหญ่ที่เป็นเกษตรกร ... ต้องมีการปรับเปลี่ยนพฤติกรรมในการเพาะปลูก เพิ่มมูลค่าสินค้า ลดต้นทุน ก็อยากให้เห็นแนวทางของพระบาทสมเด็จพระเจ้าอยู่หัว ... การทำโซนนิ่งร่วมมือกับรัฐ ปรับพื้นที่เพาะปลูกให้เหมาะสมกับสภาพอากาศ ... ภาคอื่นก็ปลูกพืชที่ใช้น้ำน้อย แต่ให้มีราคาสูง ... รัฐสนับสนุนให้อยู่แล้ว

Today we want to raise the income and living standards for people, the majority of whom are farmers ... [The farmers] must make some changes to [their] production behaviour, creating added-value, lowering production costs. [I] want [you] to apply His Majesty the King's Philosophy ... The agricultural zoning in cooperation with the government, adjusting the cultivated area according to the climate ... In other parts [of Thailand, they can] grow any crops that need less water, but yield a high price ... The government definitely gives support [to you].

The government is determined to raise the income and quality of life for the people, most of whom are farmers. The government will draw on His Majesty the King's guidelines in mobilizing the agricultural sector, especially in the establishing of agricultural zones according to geographical climate. The farmers must make some changes to their production, create added-value, and lower production cost. I urge that all agriculturists take His Majesty's advice on farming. I ask that you cooperate with the government and apply the idea of agricultural zoning to your planting ... Northern farmers should grow cool climate crops while other provinces should grow crops that require less amount of water or organic crops that create added-value to the products ... The government will do what it can to support you.

(20 February 2015, 38:47 – 39:34 mins)

ท่านต้องปรับเปลี่ยนตัวเองด้วย ถ้าท่านรู้ว่าท่านทำต่อไปแล้วเป็นหนี้เป็นสินมาก ๆ ท่านก็ต้องมาหาความรู้ เราไม่สามารถจะไปเดินบอกทุกบ้านได้ ทุกระอบครัวได้ ท่านต้องฟัง

You have to adjust and change yourselves. If you know that keeping on doing [it] this way leads to a lot of debt, you then need to acquire knowledge. We cannot go knocking on every house, every family. You have to listen.

You have to adjust yourselves. You can't continue this way. You need to acquire more information and knowledge. The state cannot knock on every door and tell you what to do. You have to listen.

(26 June 2015, 21:30 – 21:39 mins)

องค์กรบริหารส่วนท้องถิ่นด้วย ช่วยกันไปดูแลด้วย เป็นประชาชนของท่านเองทั้งสิ้น ท่านอย่ามองเรื่องงบประมาณกันอย่างเดียว ... ถ้าประชาชนเขาเข้มแข็ง อปท. ก็จะมีรายได้ที่เป็นกอบเป็นกำ เก็บมาเพื่อการพัฒนา วันนี้ถ้าเกษตรกรเขาไม่เข้มแข็ง ท่านก็เก็บอะไรเขาไม่ได้สักอย่าง ครัวไหลไปโน่น ไปนี่หมด

Local administrative organisations too. Help oversee too. [Those] are all your people. You don't only think of the budgetary aspect. ... If the people-they are strong, the local administrative organisations will earn substantial income. [It can be] collected for further development. Today if farmers-they are not strong, you can't collect anything from them and [money] keeps being drained away.

Local administrative organizations must also help with this. The farmers are people within your own locales and so you should not only think of the budget aspect. ... All of us need to be empowered. If the people are empowered, local administrative organizations will earn substantial income that can be used for further development. If farmers are not empowered, you cannot collect any taxes from them and money keeps being drained away.

(15 May 2015, 19:43 – 20:14 mins)

ปัจจุบันยังมีคนที่ต่อต้านอยู่ มีการสร้างความเข้าใจผิด บิดเบือนข้อเท็จจริงทั้งในและต่างประเทศ เราได้พยายามที่จะชี้แจง ถึงอย่างไรก็ยังมีคนที่ไม่เข้าใจอยู่ ผมจึงไม่ทราบว่าจะไม่เข้าใจจริงหรือไม่ ไม่จริง เพื่อจะปกปิดหรือบิดเบ่งหรือไม่ ซึ่งอยากจะขอรับรองให้เล็ก เพราะการตรวจสอบในปัจจุบันในเรื่องของขบวนการยุติธรรมยังคงมีอยู่อย่างต่อเนื่อง

Today there are still those who resist [the authority], causing misunderstanding, twisting the truth both in and outside the country. We [the NCPO] have tried to explain. However, there are still some people who don't understand. So, I'm not sure whether [they] really don't understand or it's in order to cover or conceal [something]. I ask that [they] should stop, because today investigations under the judicial system are under way.

There are still opposition, creation of misunderstandings, and distortion of facts, both in and outside of the country. Although the NCPO and various governmental agencies have tried to explain, there are still some groups of people who have not understood. I am not sure whether they really do not understand or whether they are trying to conceal something. I ask that this should end. Probing measures under the judicial system still exist.

(25 July 2014, 29:59 – 30:28 mins)

อย่ามองเฉพาะประชาธิปไตยอย่างเดียว ถ้ามองเฉพาะเรื่องนั้นจะไปเรื่องอื่นไม่ได้ ถ้าท่านต่อต้านในทุกประเด็น บางอย่างที่ยังไม่เกิด ท่านเป็นห่วงแบบนั้นแบบนี้ ที่ผ่านมาก็ถือว่าเป็นบทเรียนอยู่แล้ว ถ้าเราไม่ต้องการให้เกิดอย่างเช่นในอดีตที่ผ่านมา เราต้องร่วมมือกันในวันนี้ เพื่อจะเดินไปในวันข้างหน้า

Don't look only at the democracy [aspect]. If you look only at that, we can't move forward on other issues - if you object to every point. Some things haven't yet happened, [but] you're worried about that, about this. The past is already a lesson learned. If we don't want it to be like the past, we need to cooperate today in order to move forward together in the future.

Do not look solely at the democracy aspect otherwise we cannot move forward on other issues if there is opposition on every issue. Expressions of concern were made even when things have not happened yet. The past has already provided a lesson which we want to avoid. So we need to cooperate in order to move forward together in the future.

(25 July 2014, 29:03 – 29:20 mins)

Events and morality

ขอเวลาให้ รัฐบาล คสช. ทำงานอีกปีครึ่ง สำคัญที่สุด รวมถึงร่วมมือกันในเรื่องการปฏิรูปประเทศ ในระยะที่ 1 ด้วย หลายคนบอกไม่ได้ทำ ...

ถ้ามาร่วมมือจะรู้ว่าทำอะไรอยู่ จะได้ช่วยตรงไหนได้ ไม่ใช่อ้างไปเรื่อย แล้วจะได้ประโยชน์อะไร จะได้อย่างไร เพราะเพิ่งเริ่มทำ ไม่เคยทำมาก่อน

ทั้งนี้จะเริ่มระยะที่ 1 แล้ว ปฏิรูปจะเป็น 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 เพราะฉะนั้น ถ้าเกี่ยวกับแผน ประมาณแผน 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 อันที่ 15 สุดท้ายนี้อีกที เพราะแค่ 20 ปีแรก วันนี้กำลังอยู่ในแผน 12 ในช่วงต้น แล้วต่อไปก็ แผน 13 แผน 14 แผน 15 แผนละ 5 ปี 5 x 4 20 พุดหลายครั้งแล้ว

Give the government and the NCPO another year and a half. [This is] the most important, [which] includes the cooperation to reform the country in the 1st phase. Many say [the NCPO] do nothing ... If [they] come to cooperate [with us], [they] will know what [we] are doing, how [they] can help in the right place. Not just keep criticising. What and how would it be of benefit? Because [we] just start doing, have never done [it] before. So, [we] start from the 1st phase, followed by a 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th. Therefore, if related to the [national economic social development] plan, approximately 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, the 15th plan is the last one. Because of the first 20 years. Today [we] are in the early 12th plan. And then the 13th, 14th, 15th; five years each. Five multiplied by four is 20. I've said it many times.

Please give the government and the NCPO another year and a half to do its work. Most importantly, this is a time to help reform the country. Some people say nothing has been done. If you join in, you will see what has been done and what else can be done. These things take time and haven't been done before. We're in the 1st phase of reform and which will be followed by a 2nd, 3rd, and 4th for the next 20 years. The 5th phase is after 20 years.

(22 January 2016, 29:48 – 29:53 mins)

สำหรับแนวทางในการพัฒนาของประเทศของไทยนั้น รัฐบาลได้รับแรงบันดาลใจจากปรัชญาของเศรษฐกิจพอเพียงของพระบาทสมเด็จพระเจ้าอยู่หัว

ซึ่งเน้นการเจริญเติบโตอย่างยั่งยืนและทั่วถึง บนหลักของ "ความพอประมาณ มีเหตุผล มีภูมิคุ้มกัน"

ทั้งนี้ก็เพื่อเอาชนะความเสี่ยงที่เกิดจากการเปลี่ยนแปลงต่าง ๆ ทั้งปัจจัยภายในและภายนอกประเทศอีกด้วย

Regarding the country's development plans, the government is inspired by His Majesty's sufficiency economy philosophy, which emphasises thorough and sustainable development on the basis of 'moderateness, reasonability, resilience'. So, [it is] for overcoming risks arising from changes, both internal and external.

Regarding the country's development plans, the government has adhered to His Majesty's sufficiency economy philosophy, which emphasizes thorough and sustainable development on the basis of sufficiency, prudence, and resilience. All of these are believed to help us overcome future changes and risks, both internal and external.

(2 October 2015, 05:11 – 05:32 mins)

ปัญหาอยู่ที่เรายอมรับได้หรือไม่ ยอมรับไม่ได้เพราะอะไร ถ้าได้ ได้เพราะอะไร ถ้าเป็นผมในฐานะที่ผมเป็นคนไทย ถ้าได้ ก็คือเราอยากให้ปฏิรูปได้

อยากให้การเมืองโปร่งใส อยากให้การเมืองมีประสิทธิภาพ เพราะฉะนั้นก็ต้องแก้ไข อาจจะไม่ตรงกับประเทศอื่น ๆ เพราะประเทศอื่น ๆ เขาพัฒนาไปแล้ว แต่ติดอยู่ตรงนี้ ... ท่านไปคิดใหม่ ไปดูว่าเขาทำอย่างไร

The problem is can we accept it or not? If [we] can't, why not? If yes, why? If it is me, as a Thai: If yes, [it is] that we want to be able to reform, want transparent politics, want efficient politics. Therefore, [it] must be fixed. [It] might not be in the same course with other countries because they have already developed. But [we] get stuck here... You think again, see how they did it.

Can we accept that Thailand has a problem? If we can, then it is necessary to forge ahead with national reform. If you don't accept this process, then you must give a reason why. As a Thai, I want to see transparency in Thai politics. I want to see a strong political structure. This is why a reform is needed. We cannot be stepping backwards when other

countries are moving towards growth. We cannot keep focusing on the wrong problem and falling behind other nations. Please think about this carefully.

(10 April 2015, 36:21 – 36:49 mins)

Time and space

วันนี้ประชาชนส่วนใหญ่ มีความสมัครสมาน สามัคคี ประองตองมากยิ่งขึ้น นักการเมืองทุกพวกทุกฝ่าย สามารถเดินทางไปมาหาสู่ เยี่ยมเยียนกัน ประกอบธุรกิจส่วนตัวกันได้เป็นปกติ ประชาชนมีความสุข ไม่มีความขัดแย้งขนาดใหญ่จากการเมือง

Today, most people have a greater harmony, unity and reconciliation. All groups of politicians are able to visit one another and go about personal business as usual. People are happy. There are no large-scale political conflicts.

Today, most members of the public have achieved greater reconciliation. All groups of politicians have been able to visit one another and go about personal business. People are happier because of the lack of large-scale political conflicts.

(13 February 2015, 08:28 – 08:43 mins)

วันนี้คนป่วยมากทุกคนคงทราบ ป่วยทุกมิติ 5 กลุ่มงานป่วยทุกอัน วันนี้ก็ต้องหาหาให้เหมาะใส่เข้าไป ก็ต้องร่วมมือกัน คิดยาเหมือนกับคิดวิถีทางแก้ไขหรือป้องกันโรคระบาดแล้วกัน วันนี้อย่าให้ระบาดต่อไป โรคประชาธิปไตยไทยระบาดทำให้วันวายไปหมด วันนี้ผมพยายามเต็มทีในฐานะหัวหน้า คสช. คณะรัฐบาล

Today many people are ill, everyone may know. All dimensions are ill, all five [reform] working groups are ill. Today [we] must provide the appropriate medicine, must cooperate each other. Finding a medicine [should] be like finding way to cure or prevent the epidemic. Today, don't let it spread. The spread of Thai democracy disease makes it all in trouble. Today, I'm trying my best as the head of the NCPO and the government.

The illness encompasses all five dimensions of reform. The appropriate medicine has to be provided. We need to work together to find the cure. The illness must not be allowed to spread. At present, I am trying my best to solve problems of state administration as the leader of the NCPO and the government.

(3 July 2015, 43:27 – 43:50 mins)

ผู้รับผิดชอบ ทุกรัฐบาลที่เข้ามาบริหารประเทศ ต้องมีประสิทธิภาพให้มากขึ้น สิ่งที่ผ่านมาเป็นปัญหา เราถึงต้องมีการปฏิรูป เพื่อให้การบริหารราชการ โดยใช้พระราชอำนาจเหล่านั้นเป็นไปตามหลักธรรมาภิบาล

The person responsible, every government that comes to administer the country needs to be more efficient. What has happened in the past is a problem. So we need reforms in order to ensure [that] the administration of the country under royal powers is in line with the principle of good governance.

Every government in charge of administering the country and bearing the responsibility needs to be more efficient. What has happened in the past remains our problems in the present and that is why we need to reform to ensure that the administration of the country is in line with the principle of good governance.

(8 August 2014, 04:55 – 05:01 mins)

วันนี้เราสร้างประชาธิปไตยที่สมบูรณ์ ใครก็ต้องช่วยกัน ไม่ว่าจะป็นนักการเมืองอะไรก็แล้วแต่ในอดีต ถ้าจะเลือกตั้งต่อไปก็มีความผิดอะไรต่าง ๆ ก็เข้ามา

Today we build a full democracy. Whoever needs to help, be they politicians, or whatever in the past. If [they] want elections again, [if they] didn't commit offenses, [they can] come [into the process].

At present, we are building a comprehensive democracy. Everybody needs to help. Former politicians should come to contribute, provided that they have not committed offenses.

(10 July 2015, 26:04 – 26:11 mins)

ขอห้ามไว้ตรงนี้ว่า ห้ามการจัดงานลักษณะเช่นนี้อีก เช่น การจัดการพูดคุยทางการเมือง รับประทานอาหารระดมทุน ไม่ว่าจะไปช่วยเหลือใคร สิ่งนี้ยังไม่ถึงเวลา ถ้ามีการระดมได้เมื่อไหร่ พูดคุยได้เมื่อไหร่ เป็นกลุ่มเรื่องการเมืองก็จะไปหาหรือว่าจะทำอะไรต่อไป ซึ่งอีกฝ่ายหนึ่งต้องมา ต้องมาทุกพวกทุกฝ่าย ต้องกลับไปสู่วงจรเก่า ๆ อีก ซึ่งขอความร่วมมือ อย่าทำอีก ฉะนั้นถ้าอยากพูดคุยต้องไปคุยที่บ้านเงียบ ๆ สองคน ถ้าออกมาจัดการชุมนุมหรือจัดงานเลี้ยงข้างนอกไม่ได้ ผิดข้อกำหนดของ พ.ร.บ.กฏอัยการศึก ถ้าทำอีกจะถูกเรียกตัวทุกคนที่เกี่ยวข้องมาดำเนินคดี ฐานฝ่าฝืนคำสั่ง คสช.

[I] forbid the following: [you are] forbidden to hold events such as political discussions, fund-raising dinners, no matter whom [it is] aimed to help. It is not the right time. If whenever there is [fund-]raising [or] discussions, it

[would] be a group for politics, [so they would] have a talk to plan what [they] would do next. In which the other side must join in, all groups, all sides must come, [then it] will return to the same old circle. [I] ask for your cooperation. Don't do it again. If [you] want to talk, [you] must talk at home privately between [you] two. If [you] come out to organise the gathering or hold the feast outside, it is impossible, [it is] against the provision of the Martial Law Act. If [you] do it again, everyone involved will be summoned and prosecuted on the charge of violating the NCPO's order.

Right now, these kinds of activities are prohibited, for example, the holding of political forums or fund-raising dinners by various groups which often involve discussions to maintain their votes from the public in an open manner or in the presence of the media. The continuation of such activities will be considered as a violation of the provisions of the Martial Law Act. The leader and everyone involved will be prosecuted on the charge of violating the NCPO's order.

(27 June 2014, 39:40 – 40:25 mins)

วันนี้มีการชู 3 นิ้ว ก็โอเค เป็นเรื่องของหลักการ เป็นเรื่องของต่างประเทศ ผมก็ไม่ไปขัดแย้งอะไรกับท่าน ท่านอยากจะทำก็ชู ชูในบ้านได้ไหม
อย่ามาชูข้างนอกแล้วกัน ก็ขัดต่อประกาศ

Today there is the raising of 3 fingers [in protest]. OK. [That] is about principles, [but those] are other countries' [principles]. I have no conflict with you. [If] you want to raise [them], do so [but] can you do it at home? Don't come and raise them outside. [It's] against [NCPO's] orders.

There have been gesture of holding in protest – that is fine. I have no conflict with you.

(6 June 2014, 52:42 – 52:50 mins)

Appendix 1-B: Chapter 4 Section 4.4

- (1) a. อย่าใช้ผู้มีรายได้น้อยเป็นเครื่องมือ

Don't take advantage of the low-income earners.

Please don't manipulate people with low income

- b. ขอเวลาให้ รัฐบาล คสช. ทำงานอีกปีครึ่ง

Give the government [and] the NCPO another year and a half to do [thier] work.

Please give the government and the NCPO another year and a half to do its work.

- c. อย่าสอนให้มีความขัดแย้งอย่างเดียว ความรู้ไม่ค่อยได้ สอนประชาธิปไตย สิทธิมนุษยชนอยู่ 2-3 อย่างเท่านั้น กฎหมายไม่สนใจ
สอนอย่างนี้ไม่ได้ อันตราย

Don't only teach [students] to cause conflict. [They] don't get much knowledge [because you] teach only a few democracy and human rights [topics], [you] don't pay attention to the law. [You] can't teach like this. Dangerous.

Please don't teach people to cause conflict. You teach about democracy and a few human rights topics without teaching about civility, citizenship and the rule of law.

(22 January 2016)

- (2) สิ่งที่สำคัญที่สุดวันนี้คือทุกคนต้องเตรียมการ ใช้น้ำอย่างประหยัดในทุกกิจกรรม ไม่ว่าจะประชาชนทั่วไปที่ใช้ในการอุปโภคบริโภค
เกษตรกรใช้ในการเกษตร และทุกคนจะต้องช่วยกัน เข้าใจว่าต้องผลัดดันน้ำเค็มออกไปด้วย ไม่เช่นนั้นวันนี้หน้าปลูกพืชอะไรไม่ได้เลย
แล้วใครจะช่วยท่านได้ รัฐบาลก็ช่วยไม่ได้

The most important thing today is [that] everyone must prepare to use water economically in all activities, be they ordinary people in their consumption [or] the farmers for their agriculture. And everyone must help. [I] understand that [we] also need to funnel out salt water; otherwise tomorrow [we] can't plant anything. Then who is going to help you? The government can't help either.

Everyone needs to use water wisely in all activities, whether it is the public in its consumption or the agricultural sector. We also need to funnel out salt water; otherwise we won't be able to plant anything.

(22 January 2016, 23:34 – 23:51 mins)

- (3) แต่เอาภาพของความขัดแย้ง เวกที่ประชาชนขัดแย้ง หรือไม่ก็เป็นเวกที่ประชาชนเรียกร้อง จะไปกันได้ใหม่ สมดุลกันใหม่ ...
เดือดร้อนไปทั้งหมด ท่านสำนักในหน้าที่ตรงนี้ด้วย หน้าที่ของสื่อที่มีจรรยาบรรณ

But [you/the media] show only the pictures of conflicts, stages where people disagree or stages where people make demands. How can it move forward? Is it balanced? ... All in trouble. You [should] have a sense of duty here. Journalistic duty that has ethics.

... just air trivial content, how then can we live in balance? I ask that the media exercise ethical journalism for the citizen.

(22 January 2016, 27:32 – 27:46 mins)

- (4) a. ผมขอเป็นตัวแทนพี่น้องปวงชนชาวไทย ในการแสดงความยินดีและชื่นชมกับ “ทีมช้างศึกไทย”

On behalf of the Thai people, I would like to congratulate and praise ‘the Thai War Elephant’ team [the national football team].

On behalf of the Thai people, I would like to praise the Thai national football team’s effort and spirit.

- b. ก้าวแรกของการพัฒนาสู่อนาคตของทีมลูกหนังไทยที่มีอนาคตสดใส ... เรายังมีความหวัง

[It is] the first step to develop the Thai football team for a bright future ... we still have hope.

It will pave the way for a better future of Thailand’s football ... there is still hope.

(22 January 2016)

- (5) a. รัฐบาลมีหน้าที่ดูแลประชาชน จัดหาน้ำให้ได้

The government has a duty to care for the people, providing water [to you].

It is the government’s duty to care for the public ...

- b. รัฐบาลพร้อมจะไปดูแลส่งเสริมตรงนี้

The government is ready to take care and support [the people] on these matters.

The government is ready to assist the public on these things.

- c. เรากำลังพัฒนาทุกอย่าง ตัวชี้วัดของต่างประเทศต้องเอามาจับตัว

We are developing everything. International indicators must be used to assess [ourselves] too.

We are developing everything. We need to assess ourselves based on international indicators.

(22 January 2016)

- (6) a. บางช่องดูไปปวดหัว

Some TV channels [I] watched gave me a headache.

[no official translation]

- b. จำได้ตอนเด็กๆ ไม่ใช่นคนเกร ... ตั้งใจฟังครูสอน ... ก็โชคดีคะแนน ไม่ได้ไอ้อวด ... เพราะอะไรละ ความตั้งใจ อยากรจะวัดตัวเอง

I remember when I was a child; [I] didn’t misbehave ... paid attention to teacher ... luckily [I got] pretty good grades ... [I’m] not bragging ... Why? [It is] because of determination, wanting to test myself.

I remember when I was a student, I liked to read and study. My grades were pretty good ... I’m not bragging ... Why? Because I was determined and wanted to test myself.

(22 January 2016, 31:59 – 32:23 mins)

- (7) a. เรื่องช่วยเหลือเกษตรกร ... ท่านลืมไปตลอด พอท่านเดือนร้อน ท่านก็โทษ

On the matter of helping farmers ... you always forget [the fact]. When you are in trouble, you then blame it [on us].

You may have forgotten this fact.

- b. ท่านไม่ค่อยฟัง ไม่สนใจ ... บางทีก็แย่งน้ำกัน

You would rather not listen, not pay attention [to me] ... sometimes [you] fight over water.

[no official translation]

(22 January 2016)

- (8) a. ไม่เช่นนั้นก็เท่ากับช่วยกันทำลายประเทศ ... สอนให้ประชาชนไม่โตสักที

Otherwise, [it is] equal to helping destroy the country ... [the media] teach people to not grow up.

[no official translation]

(22 January 2016, 28:23 – 28:32 mins)

- b. เพราะรัฐบาลที่ผ่านมาไม่เข้มแข็ง ไม่แก้ปัญหาเชิงองค์รวม ไม่แก้ปัญหาในเชิงบูรณาการ ไม่ยั่งยืน

Because past governments were not strong, [they] didn't solve the problem as a whole, didn't solve the problem in an integrated manner. [Doing so] isn't sustainable.

Because past government have not implemented multilateral reform and don't offer sustainable solution

(22 January 2016, 28:36 – 28:43 mins)

- (9) a. อย่างที่ผมบอกแล้วในค่านิยม 12 ประการที่พูดไปแล้วต้องดูแลพ่อแม่ และก็อยู่ในระเบียบวินัย เคารพครูบาอาจารย์กตัญญู

As I told [you] already in the 12 Thai values, [children] must look after their parents and have discipline, respect teachers and have gratitude.

As I mentioned before about the 12 Thai values, children should look after their parents, have self-discipline, respect their teachers and have gratitude.

(5 September 2014, 07:05 – 07:14 mins)

- b. บทบาทของ "ครู" สำคัญที่สุด ... เพราะฉะนั้น การศึกษาที่ดี ก็ต้องมีคุณครูที่มีคุณภาพ

The role of teacher is the most important ... Therefore, a good education must have quality teachers.

The role of teacher is very important ... Therefore we must have quality teachers.

(22 January 2016, 33:29 – 33:46 mins)

- c. รัฐบาลจะปรับเรื่องแหล่งน้ำ ปรับงบประมาณ ปรับแผนมาให้มากขึ้น ใช้ทหารด้วย กระทรวงเกษตรและสหกรณ์ กระทรวงทรัพยากรธรรมชาติและสิ่งแวดล้อม

The government will make more revisions to water sources, improving budgeting and planning [by] mobilising soldiers, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperative, and the Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment.

The government will make revisions to water distribution, budgeting and will be more strategic by mobilizing soldiers along with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Natural Resources.

(22 January 2016, 24:55 – 25:03 mins)

- d. ผมขอเชิญพี่น้องประชาชน ร่วมรำลึกถึงคุณงามความดีและวีรกรรมของทหารผู้เสียสละแม้กระทั่งชีวิต

I would like to invite the people to commemorate the goodness and bravery of soldiers who sacrifice even their lives.

I would like to invite the people of Thailand to reflect on the courage and service of soldiers and their sacrifices.

(30 January 2015, 45:58 – 46:04 mins)

- (10) a. คือปัญหาประเทศไทย ... ทั้งหมดนั้น คือ ปัญหาของชาติ

[This] is Thailand's problem ... All those are the problems of the nation.

This is Thailand's problem ... This is a national issue.

- b. วันนี้ทุกอย่างขัดแย้งกันไปหมด

Today everything is in conflict.

[no official translation]

(22 January 2016)

- (11) ทุกท่านรู้อยู่แล้ว คำว่า “กรุงโรมไม่ได้สร้างเสร็จภายในวันเดียว” ... ประเทศไทยจะเข้มแข็ง ประชาชนจะมีรายได้สูง เป็นธรรม ลดความเหลื่อมล้ำ ลดความขัดแย้ง เพิ่มขีดความสามารถของประเทศไทยในการแข่งขันนั้น ไม่อาจจะสร้างได้ภายในปีเดียว หรือ 2 ปี – 3 ปี ใช้เวลาอีกเนิ่นนาน ใช้เวลาอีกมาก

All of you already know the saying: ‘Rome wasn’t built in a day’ ... [In order for] Thailand to be strong, people to have high, fair incomes, to reduce inequality, reduce conflict and to enhance Thailand’s competitiveness, [they] cannot take place in only one year or a few years. It takes a long time, takes a lot more time.

I will cite a phrase that you all are familiar with: “Rome wasn’t built in a day.” Thailand will be strong and incomes will increase. Inequality and conflict will be reduced. The country will enhance its competitiveness. These things don’t happen in a few years.

(22 January 2016, 30:38 – 30:53 mins)

- (12) a. ผมไม่ต้องการให้เกิดความแตกแยกแต่มันจำเป็นก็ต้องทำ ... เหมือนกับที่ผ่านมานี้ มันท้าทายจะมีพัวพันเจ้าหน้าที่ระดับล่าง เรื่องข้าว เรื่องอะไรต่าง ๆ เหล่านี้ เดือนไว้ก่อน เพราะฉะนั้นอย่าให้เกิดขึ้นอีก ท่านเตือนร้อนแน่นอน

I don’t want to stir up rifts but this needs to be done Like in the past. Lower-ranked officials are about to be implicated in rice [pledging graft], in various things. [I] warn [you] in advance. Therefore, don’t let it happen again. You [will] be in trouble, certainly.

I do not want to stir up rifts but this needs to be done ... Lower-ranked officials are about to be implicated in rice pledging graft. I give you prior warning so the occurrences will not re-occur – you will definitely be in trouble in such case.

(6 March 2015, 26:07 – 26:22 mins)

- b. คัดค้านทุกเรื่อง บางเรื่องแค่อคิดก็ผิดแล้ว คือไม่เคยคิดใหม่เลย ไร้ที่ต่อต้านกันทุกวันเนี่ย

[You] oppose every issue. For certain issues, only thinking [about it] is already wrong. That is, [you] never consider any new thing. Those who oppose in every day.

[no official translation]

(22 January 2016, 31:17 – 31:23 mins)

- (13) a. ผมคิดว่าถ้าท่านยังทำอย่างนี้ต่อไป ก็สร้างความไม่เข้าใจไปมากขึ้น แล้วประโยชน์เกิดกับใคร หรือผลเสียเกิดกับใคร เกิดกับประเทศชาติใช่หรือไม่ แล้วท่านไม่รับผิดชอบกันเลยหรืออย่างไร

I think that if you keep doing like this, [it will] cause more misunderstanding. Who will gain [from doing this]? Or who will get the bad effect? Will the country get [the bad effect]? Won’t you be responsible at all?

But if you do otherwise, people will only misunderstand the truth while you often do not take responsibility of your actions.

(12 February 2016, 21:43 – 21:54 mins)

- b. วันนี้รัฐบาลพยายามทำทุกอย่าง ขอให้เข้าใจด้วย ก็เสียใจทุกครั้ง เวลาที่ทำอะไรไปแล้ว ไม่เข้าใจ

Today the government tries to do everything. [I] ask [you to] understand. [I’m] sad every time when [I’ve] done something [but you] don’t understand.

The government is doing everything it can in this area.

(12 February 2016, 18:12 – 18:21 mins)

- c. อย่ามองเลือกตั้งอย่างเดียว ถือเสียงส่วนใหญ่ ไม่สนใจส่วนน้อย เรียกร้องสิทธิอย่างเดียว ไม่ช่วยเหลือเกื้อกูลซึ่งกัน ... หรือเป็นการทำอะไรก็ตามที่ผิดกฎหมาย หรือแสดงความเห็นต่าง ความไม่ร่วมมือ ตามสื่อ ตาม Social Media โดยที่ไม่มีข้อมูล ข้อเท็จจริง ผมคิดว่าหลาย ๆ อันผิดกฎหมาย ผมเข้าใจว่ามันผิดกฎหมายนะ

Don't only think of elections, holding the votes of the majority [while] ignoring the minority, demanding only rights [without] helping others ... or doing whatsoever against laws, or expressing different opinions, uncooperativeness in the media, in social media without information and evidence. I think that many things are illegal. I understand that it is illegal.

It is not only about elections and the will of the majority while ignoring the minority and demanding only your rights without helping others becoming strong as well. I understand that the deliberate spreading of false information in the media as well as online [it] may be an offense [illegal].

(12 February 2016, 48:06 – 48:27 mins)

Appendix 2

Examples of Thai source texts in Chapter 5

Appendix 2-A: Translation shifts in expression of attitudes

Note that the shifts related to attitudes are bold, highlighted in red if missing and blue if added.

(1) *Summons of protesters and anti-coup individuals*

สำหรับการเชิญบุคคลมารายงานตัวนั้นมีความจำเป็น ทั้งนี้เป็นการเชิญผู้ที่มีความขัดแย้ง ทั้งโดยตรงและโดยอ้อม เช่น แกนนำ ผู้สนับสนุน นักวิชาการและอื่นๆ ซึ่งอาจเป็นคู่ขัดแย้งโดยตรง หรือโดยอ้อมที่อาจเกิดขึ้นได้ รวมทั้งบุคคลบางคนที่มีอิทธิพลในเชิงสัญลักษณ์ ในการระดมมวลชนสร้างความขัดแย้งขึ้นมาอีก จากการแสดงความคิดเห็นตามกระบวนการประชาธิปไตย อย่างไรก็ตามหากการแสดงออกดังกล่าว มีผลกระทบต่อความสงบสุขโดยรวม ก็จะถูกเชิญตัวมาชี้แจง คัดแยก ไปดูแล เพื่อสงบสติอารมณ์ และคิดทบทวนว่าที่ผ่านมาได้ทำอะไรไปบ้าง ซึ่งอาจผิดบ้าง ถูกบ้าง ตามความเชื่อหรือเหตุผลส่วนตัว เพื่อให้เกิดการยอมรับความคิดเห็นที่แตกต่าง และคิดว่าเราจะมีส่วนช่วย และร่วมมือกับทุกกลุ่มทุกฝ่าย เพื่อนำพาประเทศไทยไปข้างหน้าได้อย่างไร

For the summons of individuals, [it] was necessary. [They are] the summons of those who were [involved] **in the conflicts, directly and indirectly**, such as protest leaders, supporters, academics and others who may be directly or indirectly involved with conflicting groups, including someone who may **influence symbolically to mobilise the mass and re-start the conflicts [by] expressing opinions in a democratic system**. However, if that expression affects the **overall peace and harmony**, [those who do it] would be **summoned to explain [their action], sorted out and looked after** in order to calm [them] down and let them reflect **what [they] have done in the past, which might be wrong or right in their personal belief or reason in order to gain the acceptance of different views**, and realise how we would **contribute and cooperate** with every group and side in order to move the nation forward.

Regarding the summons of certain individuals, it was necessary for us to request that they report to the officials. These individuals, such as protest leaders, key protest supporters, certain thinkers, and **politically-motivated opinion** leaders, are directly or indirectly involved with the protracted political conflicts. These people were **requested to report** to officials in order to give them a cooling-off period. They now **have the opportunity** to reflect on **their beliefs and actions, and to listen to the others' opinions**. **It is hoped that eventually** all of them will **put our country before themselves** and learn to **live harmoniously and act constructively** in a society where individuals can have differences of opinions.

(30 May 2014, 07:45 – 08:46 mins)

(2) *Summons of protesters and anti-coup individuals*

ในส่วนของความเป็นอยู่หลับนอน อาหารการกิน ไม่มีการบังคับขู่เข็ญ ซ้อมทรมาน พันธนาการ หรือละเมิดสิทธิมนุษยชน แต่อย่างใด

In terms of accommodation and diet, there is **no force, intimidation**, torture, **incarceration** or **human rights violation** at all.

They were **well looked after** and accommodated. **Let me assure you once again** that all human rights principles have been **fully respected** – there has been no torture, threats or any physical violation.

(30 May 2014, 09:22 – 09:31 mins)

(3) *Reconciliation effort*

ทุกกลุ่มทุกฝ่ายต้อง หันมาร่วมมือกัน เสริมสร้างความรักความสามัคคี ความปรองดองสมานฉันท์ ยุติการใช้ความรุนแรงต่อกัน

All groups, all sides **must** turn to cooperation, **reinforce love, reconciliation**, unity, to stop violent action against each other.

I **strongly and sincerely urge** all sides to **put Thailand above themselves**, to cooperate and unite, and to stop violent action.

(30 May 2014, 10:27 – 10:36 mins)

(4) *Roadmap and its three-phrase schema*

ช่วงแรกของการควบคุมอำนาจการปกครองประเทศ จะดำเนินการในเรื่องการปรองดองสมานฉันท์ ให้เร็วที่สุด ในกรอบเวลา 2-3 เดือน

In the first phase of **the control of the country's administration**, [we] will achieve reconciliation as soon as possible in the time frame of 2-3 months.

The first phase will involve efforts to achieve national reconciliation as soon as possible, **at least** within two to three months.

(30 May 2014, 25:53 – 26:02 mins)

(5) *Justification for seizing power*

ถ้าทหารและข้าราชการทุกคนไม่ทำอะไรเลย ใครจะมาดูแลท่าน ใครจะแก้ปัญหาให้ท่าน ในเมื่อประชาธิปไตยโดยสมบูรณ์เดินหน้าต่อไปไม่ได้ด้วยความขัดแย้ง เจ้าหน้าที่ถูกตำหนิ ประชาชนเกิดความไม่ไว้วางใจ การบังคับใช้กฎหมายปกติทำไม่ได้

If every soldier and government officer did nothing, who would come to take care of you? Who would solve the **problems** for you when the **full democracy cannot go on** because of **conflicts**? **The officers were condemned.** People lost confidence in [the government]. The law enforcement didn't work.

If government officials and the military did nothing, who would help the Thai people resolve this **deadlock** when the **democratic mechanisms** are **paralysed**; when there are **incessant conflicts**; when people do not trust the government; and when the rule of law does not work.

(30 May 2014, 29:39 – 30:02 mins)

(6) *Request for the public support*

ขอให้เวลาเราในการปรับเปลี่ยนทัศนคติ ค่านิยม และอะไรอีกหลายอย่าง เพื่อแก้ประชาธิปไตยของไทย ให้เป็นสากล ถูกต้อง ชอบธรรม รับผิดชอบ เสียสละ นึกถึงประโยชน์ของประชาชนทุกกลุ่มทุกฝ่าย ทุกพื้นที่ ทั้งประชาชนเสียงข้างมากข้างน้อย ต้องได้รับความพึงพอใจอย่างทั่วถึงกัน ... เราเข้าใจว่าทุกคนคงต้องเลือกประเทศชาติก่อนประชาธิปไตย ที่จะต้องเตรียมการแก้ไขปรับปรุงนั้น จะมาถึงในระยะเวลาไม่นานนัก

Give us time for changing attitudes, values and many other things, in order to mend Thai democracy to be **universal, just, responsible, sacrificing** and beneficial to people in every group, every area. **Both majority and minority voters must be thoroughly satisfied.** ... **We understand** that everyone **might have to** choose country above **democracy that will need preparation for improvement.** [It] will come **soon.**

All we are asking for is to give us time to reform in order to mend our democratic system and make it **right, just, responsible** and beneficial to all people. ... **We believe** that **if you were in our situation for the past 9 years** you would choose the well-being of your country above **a flawed democratic system.**

(30 May 2014, 30:32 – 31:23 mins)

(7) *Justification for seizing power*

เราเข้ามาเพื่อสร้างความเข้มแข็งเหมือนกับเราเข้ามาเติมอิฐ เติมหิน เติมคอนกรีต เติมเหล็ก เข้าไป ให้สิ่งที่กำลังจะพังลงมานั้น ได้ก่อร่าง สร้างตัวขึ้นมาใหม่ เพื่อเข้าไปสู่การเป็นประชาธิปไตย โดยสมบูรณ์ เหมือนกับที่ทุกคนต้องการ

We came in to make [the country] strong **like adding bricks, stones, concrete, steel** to things that were about to collapse [and let the country] **rebuild itself**, in order to move towards becoming a full democracy **like everyone wants.**

We came in to make our country stronger, **laying firmer foundations** to prevent the structure from collapsing so that our country will be **ready** to move towards becoming a fully functioning democracy.

(06 June 2014, 01:28 – 01:48 mins)

(8) *Political roadmap and the new government*

ในส่วนของสภานิติบัญญัติก็เช่นเดียวกัน คงต้องเกิดขึ้นมาก่อน พร้อม ๆ กับการประกาศใช้รัฐธรรมนูญชั่วคราว เมื่อหลังเดือนกันยายนไปแล้ว ก็คือเดือนตุลาคม ที่ผมย้ำเดือนนี้เพราะว่ามีคำถามมาโดยตลอด แล้วเมื่อไร อย่างไร ผมก็เลยเกรงจะใช้ปฏิทินกันคนละฉบับ วันนี้น่าจะใช้ฉบับเดียวกันแล้ว เพราะฉะนั้นผมขอยืนยันกับท่านว่า ตั้งแต่เดือนตุลาคมเป็นต้นไป คงจะเป็นการบริหารประเทศ ในลักษณะเป็นรัฐบาลที่มี ครม. แล้วพยายามจะขับเคลื่อนไปในทางที่ใกล้เคียงกับการบริหารราชการแบบปกติที่ผ่านมาให้ได้มากที่สุด

The national registration likewise **might have to** be set up in parallel to the announcement of a provisional constitution after September, which is October. That I reiterate the month is because there are questions all along as

to when and how [to implement]. **I'm afraid [you] use a different calendar. Today it should be the same.**

Therefore, I would like to confirm that from October onwards it **might be** the country administration in a manner of a government with cabinet. Then [they] would try to move as close to a normal way of the administration in the past as possible.

The national legislative council **will** be set up in parallel to the announcement of a provisional constitution. Questions have been raised about the timing of the implementations. I would like to reiterate that from October onwards there **will be** a cabinet to administer the country in a way a normal administration would. **Efforts toward reform (urgent/short-term/long-term) will lead to a general election in the third phase which is estimated to be done in about one year.**

(13 June 2014, 07:10 – 07:49 mins)

(9) *Plan to tackle corruption and denial of the NCPO vested interest*

ทั้งนี้ เพื่อจะไม่ให้เกิดความสงสัยหวาดระแวงของประชาชนหรือสังคมทั่วไปในอนาคต ผมยกตัวอย่างเท่านั้น ไม่ใช่ว่าจะให้ท่านเสียหายอะไร

เพียงแต่ยกตัวอย่างว่า อาทิเช่นหน่วยงานเหล่านี้จะต้องร่วมมือกันในการแก้ปัญหา การทุจริตเชิงนโยบาย วันนี้ คสช.

ยืนยันว่าไม่ได้ต้องการความช่วยเหลือแม้แต่บาทเดียว เพราะฉะนั้นใครจะไปอ้าง ท่านไปตรวจสอบมา ถ้ามามาได้ตลอดเวลา

การจัดซื้อจัดจ้างในราคาที่สูงเกินความเป็นจริง มีแนวโน้มส่อไปในทางทุจริต จะทำการตรวจสอบ อย่าไปเชื่อเขา วันนี้ผมได้ให้นโยบายไปแล้วว่า

ถ้าเราสามารถจัดการทุจริตได้ สามารถจะลดการใช้จ่ายงบประมาณไปได้อย่างน้อยน่าจะ 10 – 30 เปอร์เซ็นต์ ถ้าลดได้ บางอย่างก็ลดไม่ได้

ท่านต้องอย่ามองว่าทุจริตทั้งหมด บางอย่างราคาก็เป็นธรรม บางอย่างอาจจะมิจุดรั่วไหลนิดหน่อย ก็ไปติดกัน

This is **not to cause any doubt** among general people or society in the future. **I just raise examples. It's not that [I] want to cause you any damage. [I] just raise examples** that such organizations needs cooperation in solving **policy corruption. Today the NCPO confirms that [it] doesn't want a single baht in help. Therefore, whoever would claim [so], you can check [with us], ask [us] all the time. Over-priced procurement that is prone to corruption will be investigated, don't believe [them]. Today I already delivered a policy that** if we can eliminate corruption, we can reduce expenditure at least 10 – 30 %. If we can reduce [it]. Some [proposals] cannot reduce. **You must not see that all is corruption.** Some quotes [for procurement] are fair. **Some may have a small leaking hole, so think together.**

My intention is not to single out these organizations but **just to give examples** that cooperation is needed from such organizations to solve the conditions which are **prone to corruption practices through policies and overpriced acquisitions.** If we can eliminate corruption, we can save 10 - 30% of the state budget. **However,** there may be some proposals which cannot be reduced and some which are fair.

(13 June 2014, 40:52 – 41:45 mins)

(10) *Final remarks on cooperation in the social reform*

อีกประการหนึ่ง ผมขอฝากถึงพี่น้องประชาชน ท่านต้อง “เปิดใจ” ยอมรับ การกำหนดเป้าหมายในชีวิตที่ต้องการ

ผมทราบดีนะครับว่าประชาชนต้องการมีชีวิตที่ดีกว่าเดิม มีรายได้ที่สูงขึ้น มีอาชีพที่ดี เป็นหลักเป็นแหล่ง ยั่งยืน

และต้องการความมีระเบียบเรียบร้อยของบ้านเมือง แต่ท่านก็ต้องพร้อมกัน “ปรับตัว” ยอมรับสิ่งใหม่ ๆ ที่กำลังทำร่วมกับเรากันอยู่

ไม่ว่าจะเรื่องการจัดระเบียบนครรับ เรื่องอะไรต่าง ๆ ที่เคยปล่อยปะละเลย เรื่องกฎหมายมันต้องกลับเข้าที่เข้าทาง การขายของ ผมรู้ว่าท่านเดือดร้อน

แต่จะทำยังไงได้ ถ้าเราต้องการ มองในอนาคตที่เราต้องเข้มแข็ง บ้านเมืองสะอาดเรียบร้อยมีอาชีพมีรายได้ที่ทั่วถึงเป็นธรรม การประกอบการต่าง ๆ

ไม่มีการทุจริต มันก็ต้องลำบากกันตอนนี้แหละ

One more thing I would like to leave with the people is that you **must** “open your hearts” to accept and determine your life goals that [you] want. I know very well that people want better lives, a higher salary, a good, **secure,** sustainable career. [They also] want the country to be orderly. **But you must** be ready to “adapt to” and accept new things that we are working on together. No matter the type of reorganization, whatever issues that were **neglected,** the law must be brought back. For street-vending, I know that you are in trouble, but **how can [one] do [it otherwise]?** If we want to see in the future that we must **be strong,** country is clean and orderly, everyone has fair income, and business with no corruption, it **must** go through difficulties now.

One more thing I would like to leave with the people is that you open your hearts and create life goals for yourselves. I know very well that the people want better lives. You want a better salary, a better career, sustainability, and orderliness within your communities. **Are you** ready to adapt to get these things that we are working together with you on? No matter the type of reorganization that needs to be done, whatever issues were **left to fall apart** - they **must** be brought back together under the law. I know this **will** create problems for some of you, but **it is necessary** to achieve them for your future. We must **persevere,** and we will have a country that is clean and orderly, with people who have good careers, and it will operate with no corruption. **Of course** things **will** be hard right now.

(29 July 2016, 34:37 – 35:26 mins)

(11) *Referendum on the draft constitution*

ท่านมีชัยก็ได้ออกมาชี้แจงแล้ว ทาง สนช. ท่านประธาน สนช. ได้ออกมาชี้แจงแล้วทั้งในเรื่องของรัฐธรรมนูญ เรื่องคำถามพวงอะไรเหล่านี้ ก็ฟังอยู่ผมก็คิดแล้ว ใช่ไม่ใช่ แต่ผมว่าก็ดีนะ แล้วแต่ท่านจะคิดเอาแล้วกัน ผมไม่ได้ชี้แนะ คิดแบบที่ผมคิดกันบ้าง 1 คน 1 เสียง ผมก็มี 1 เสียงเท่าท่านนั้นล่ะ เพราะฉะนั้นใครก็ตามที่ออกมาพูดแสดงความคิดเห็นเหล่านี้ผมก็ไม่ได้ห้ามอะไร เพราะฉะนั้นท่านจะมาห้ามนี้โน้นกับผมตลอดเวลาฉันก็ไม่ได้

Mr. Meechai has already come out to speak, the president of the NLA has already spoken on the topic of constitution and those additional questions [in the ballot]. I listened to them and thought about it. **Yes or no. I think it is good. It's up to your own thinking. I don't guide [you]. Think like I do a bit.** One person, one voice. I have one voice the same as you. Therefore, whoever comes out to speak their opinion, I **don't forbid. Therefore, you cannot forbid me [from doing] this, [from doing] that, all the time.**

Mr. Meechai has already come out and spoken on behalf of the CDC on the topic of the new constitution. He answered numerous questions and as I listened to him, I formed my own opinions. We each are one person with one voice. I **only** have one voice, the same as you. Therefore, anyone who wants to speak their opinion is **more than welcome to.**

(05 August 2016, 20:49 – 21:08 mins)

(12) *Referendum on the draft constitution*

ถ้า "ไม่ผ่าน" ก็จำเป็นต้องจัดทำรัฐธรรมนูญฉบับใหม่อยู่ดี จะต้องทำให้แล้วเสร็จโดยเร็ว ไม่ให้กระทบกับ Roadmap ซึ่งหลายคนจับจ้องตรงนี้ ถ้าตรงนี้ไปไม่ได้ ก็ถึงตรงโน้นไม่ได้ และท้ายสุดก็ต้องกดดันรัฐบาล คสช. อยู่ดี

If [it] 'does not pass', it is necessary to arrange for a new constitution **anyway**. [We] have to finish [it] quickly. [So that it] does not affect the Roadmap. Many people are watching this point. If this point could not move forward, **other points cannot either**. In the end [they] **must pressure** the government and the NCPO, **anyway**.

If we do not vote to adopt this draft, then we will still have to arrange for a new one. Therefore, we will have to work quickly on this so it will not affect the Roadmap. Many people have highlighted this point. If we are unable to resolve this issue, then it will **have implications for the other remaining issues**. In the end, the government and the NCPO **will take responsibility** to sort this out.

(05 August 2016, 21:45 – 22:00 mins)

(13) *Referendum on the draft constitution*

อธิบายง่าย ๆ ว่าเป็นขั้นตอนหนึ่งในระบอบประชาธิปไตยที่ทุกคนต้องการ ก็ไม่ต่างจากการเลือกตั้งผู้แทน เพียงแต่เปลี่ยนคำถามว่าชอบเบอร์อะไร พรรคอะไร มาเป็นคำถามว่าเห็นชอบหรือไม่เห็นชอบกับกฎเกณฑ์กติกาการปกครองที่เรียกว่ารัฐธรรมนูญ ครอบคลุม กว้าง ๆ คล้ายกับที่ครูเคยถามนักเรียนว่า เอาไม่เอา ชอบไม่ชอบ ใครชอบยกมือ

Explained simply, it is a **process** within a **democracy that everyone wants**. There is **no** difference from selecting the representative; **only** it changes the question from what number or party do you like to whether you agree with the laws and regulations called constitution. In a broader sense, [it is] **similar to when a teacher used to ask students whether you want [something] or not, like [it] or not**. Who likes [it] raise their hands.

In simple terms, it is an **essential process** within a **democracy**. **Instead of** asking which political party a voter prefers, it asks whether the voter agrees with the laws of governance as stipulated by the draft constitution. It is **similar to asking members of a group** to raise their hands in favor or in opposition of a proposal.

(05 August 2016, 12:04 – 12:23 mins)

(14) *Necessity of the reform*

ไม่ได้แก้ง่าย ๆ ต้องแก้ทั้งระบบ หลายคนเกี่ยวข้อง สิ่งไปอย่างเดียวกันก็ไม่ได้ผลร้อยเปอร์เซ็นต์อยู่แล้ว ต้องติดตาม ดำเนินคดีมากมายไปหมด มันเป็นการที่จริงจังอยู่ขณะนี้

[These issues] are not easily solved. [We] need to **fix the whole system, lots people are involved. Instruction alone will not be 100 per cent effective**. [We] must follow up, prosecute plenty of cases. It is a **burden that is messy** at present.

These things are not easily solved. They need **structural adjustments and an overhaul of many of our systems, not to mention participation from many people. Instructions alone will not do**; things need to be followed up on in order **to keep track of progress**.

(05 August 2014, 23:09 – 23:23 mins)

(15) *Investments in infrastructure*

เป็นการวางแผนทางยุทธศาสตร์ ไม่ได้คิดว่าวันนี้ สร้างปีนี้ แล้วปีหน้าใช้ หรือสร้างให้มันเสร็จเร็ว อะไรที่มันเป็นแผน ก็คือแผน อะไรทำได้เราก็อำนาจ
เขาเรียกว่าการพัฒนาอย่างเป็นระบบนะครับ ไม่มีผลเสียต่องบประมาณโดยรวมของประเทศด้วย

[It] is the strategic plan. [I] don't think today to build [it] this year and use [it] next year. Or to build it quick. Anything that is a plan is a plan. Anything that we can do, we do. They call it systematic development. There won't be adverse effect on the overall country's budget.

This is part of our strategic plan. It is something that we **must invest our efforts today for the long run**. This is part of a **long-term** systematic development project that will not adversely affect the country's national budget.

(05 August 2016, 10:55 – 11:10 mins)

Appendix 2-B: Translation shifts in speech functions and grammatical moods

- (1) วันนี้ผมมาเข้าดำเนินการจัดให้เพื่ออำนวยความสะดวกให้ทุกคนมาพูดคุยกันเท่านั้นเอง ก็จำเป็นอยู่บ้างที่ต้องมีการใช้กิจกรรมหลายๆ อย่าง เช่น ดนตรี บันทึกลง ให้เขาได้คลี่คลาย ให้เขาได้ลดความกดดันของเขา ไม่อย่างนั้นคนคุยกันไม่ได้ บ้านเดียวกันคุยกันไม่ได้ สาบิกรรยาคุยกันไม่ได้ พ่อแม่ลูกคุยกันไม่ได้ บ้านติดกันคุยไม่ได้ เพราะฉะนั้นนี่คือปัญหา ขอให้เข้าใจในเจตนาของผมด้วย

Today I only came to arrange for and facilitate everyone to talk. It is somewhat necessary that there have to be many activities including music and entertainment, in order for them to ease up, to relax, otherwise a person cannot talk, the same family cannot talk, husband and wife cannot talk, parents and children cannot talk, neighbours cannot talk. Therefore, this is a problem. Please understand my intention.

In order to achieve reconciliation, some activities will have to be carried out including recreational and entertainment activities so the people are relaxed and ready to talk. We want to stop all conflicts.

(06 June 2014, 11:09 – 11:35 mins)

- (2) ...คสช. ยังสามารถให้ประกันตัวผู้คดีได้ ตรงนี้ก็เหมือนกับวิธีการปกติ โกลัเดียวกันมาก ถึงแม้ว่าจะเป็นกรณีขึ้นศาลทหารก็ตาม แต่อย่าไปกังวลกับศาลทหาร คดีตัวอย่างเช่น ท่านจารุพงศ์, ท่านจักรภพ ซึ่งมีคดีอยู่มากมาย หลายคดีที่เกี่ยวข้องกับท่านและเรียนว่าให้กลับมา ถ้ากลับมาเราจะดูแลให้เกิดความยุติธรรม เกิดความชอบธรรมตามที่ท่านต้องการ วันนี้ถ้าท่านยังต่อสู้แบบนี้ ผมว่าคดีท่านคงมากขึ้นเรื่อย ๆ เกี่ยวข้องกับอาวุธสงคราม เกี่ยวกับเรื่องกฎหมายหมิ่นประมาทมากมาย ท่านต้องถูกดำเนินคดีต่อไป ฉะนั้นอย่าให้คนเหล่านี้เป็นคนชี้หน้าประเทศไทยโดยเด็ดขาด ถ้าเรื่องใดเชื่อว่าเป็นคดีทางการเมือง ต้องไปพิสูจน์หลักฐานกันและนำไปแก้ไขในระยะที่ 2

...the NCPO still allow [them] to be bailed out and defend their cases. This is similar to a normal process, very close, despite [their] being tried in a military court. But don't be worried about military courts.

Examples of these are the cases of Mr. Jarupong and Mr. Jakrapob. Many charges are related to you and, please be informed that [you] come back. If [you] come back, we will make sure that there is justice, ensure the legitimacy that you want. Today if you're still fighting like this, I think your charges related to war-grade weapons and lese majeste law will increase. You must be prosecuted later. Therefore, don't let these people influence the country at all. If any cases are believed to be political, the matter will be proved and resolved in the second phase.

they are entitled to the rights of bail and to defend their cases similar to the normal judicial procedure. Examples of these are the cases of Mr. Jarupong and Mr. Jakrapob. I urge them to return and I ensure their rights to justice. If they persist, they will be charged with more cases, especially if involved in the use of war-grade weapons and lese majeste law. We should not let these people influence our country. They do not have any credibility to do so.

(27 June 2014, 36:56 – 37:53 mins)

- (3) สิ่งต่างๆ ที่เป็นปัญหาในอดีตนั้น เราทุกคนต้องช่วยกันว่าจะต้องไม่ย้อนกลับไปอีก อยากให้ทุกคนคิดว่า แล้วมันจะเกิดขึ้นได้อย่างไร ก็ฝากนักการเมืองที่ดีๆ ทุกพรรค ทุกคน ทุกกลุ่ม กรุณาช่วยคิดดีๆ ออกมา อย่าพูดอย่างเดียวช่วยคิดด้วยแล้วก็คิดดีๆ ออกมาว่า อะไรนอกจากคำว่า "ประชาธิปไตย" ที่ผมไม่ขัดแย้งกับท่านหรือ คำว่า "เสียงเรียกร้องประชาชน" ที่ว่า ยังไงนะครับ ที่เขาร้องมาแล้วท่านจะทำอย่างไร เพื่อให้ 2 คำนั้นมีความหมายตามที่ท่านพูดออกมา

Everything that was a problem in the past, we all must help together in order not to [let it] come back. [I] want everyone to think about how it would happen. I urge good politicians from every party, every person, every group to please think out loud. Don't just talk. Help think and think out loud of what [it should be] apart from the word "democracy" that I don't oppose you, or the so-called "voice of people". How so? How would you make of what they have complained in order to make these two words meaningful according to what you said?

...the problems that have occurred in the past are things that we must come together and work towards preventing from occurring again. I ask that everyone be mindful of this and how we can make this happen. I'll leave it up to the respectable politicians from every party to think aloud on this. Please don't just talk. Think, and think out loud. In addition to the word "democracy" or the "voice of the public", you should consider the matter of accountability, or what will you do to make sure that these 2 things have meaning and merit for the people?

(29 July 2016, 28:57 – 29:29 mins)

- (4) ท่านจะลงมติอย่างไรที่สุดแต่พิจารณาของ ท่าน ตามความพอใจของท่าน แต่กรุณาคิดถึงบ้านเมือง คิดถึงอนาคต นึกถึงลูกหลานของเรา นึกถึงความมีเสถียรภาพของรัฐบาล นึกถึง Roadmap อะไรต่าง ๆ เหล่านี้
อย่าใช้อารมณ์ความรู้สึกที่มีคนพยายามสร้างภาพกลับไปกลับมาทันทีอยู่ตอนนี้ อย่าสับสน

How you decide to vote is up to your own judgement and your own satisfaction. But please think about the country, think about the future, think about our children, think about the the stability of the government, think about the Roadmap, and other things. Don't use emotions that others try to manipulate right now. Don't be confused.

Whatever you decide to vote is up to your own judgement and what you are satisfied with. However, please also think about the country, about our future and our children's future, about the stability of the government, and about the Roadmap, rather than use emotions that derive from the confusion spun by stories from others.

(05 August 2016, 20:27 – 20:48 mins)

- (5) รัฐบาลยอมรับได้ทุกอย่างและขอให้ประชาชนยอมรับไปด้วยว่าจะเกิดอะไรตามมา ถ้าหากผ่านหรือไม่ผ่าน บ้านเมืองของเราจะเดินต่อไปได้มั้ย อย่างสงบสุขได้หรือไม่ นี่คือการถกเถียง

The government can accept everything and asks the people to accept together no matter what would ensue. If [it] passes or not, could our country move forward? With peace or not? This [voting in the referendum] is the rule.

The government will accept whatever outcome you decide and so should you. Whatever happens next, whether it passes or not, our country must move forward and make progress while remaining peaceful.

(05 August 16, 21:21 – 21:33 mins)

Appendix 2-C: Translation shifts in logical relation

- (6) ในส่วนของ Roadmap ต่าง ๆ นั้น พูดไปแล้ว มี 3 ระยะ อย่างกังวล กรุณาเข้าใจหน่อย บางทีไปตีความหมาย แปลความหมายผิดตลอด ผมไม่เข้าใจวิธีการแปลสื่อความหมาย ผมว่าผมพูดชัดเจน ที่พูดเยอะ พอพูดน้อยท่านก็ไม่เข้าใจ พูดเยอะท่านก็ไปเอาสิ่งเล็ก ๆ น้อย ๆ มาจับผิดจับถูกอีก ผมไม่รู้ว่าผมจะพูดอย่างไร วันนี้เราจะทำงานด้วยความทุ่มเท เสียสละ แก้ปัญหา 9 ปีที่ผ่านมาให้ได้

Concerning the Roadmap, I have said there are 3 phases. Don't worry. Please try to understand a bit. Sometimes there have always been some misinterpretations. I don't understand the way [they] interpret [my] messages. I think I said it clearly. That I said a lot. **When I said less, you didn't understand. I said more, you found fault with trivia. I don't know how to say.** **Today** we are working with dedication and sacrifice to solve the problems of the past nine years.

On the three-phase Roadmap, do not be concerned and try to understand. I find that there have been some misinterpretations. I believe my message is already clear. **But the more I say the more faults you will find. This makes it difficult for me to explain.** We need to dedicate and sacrifice to resolve the prolonged problems which have existed for more than nine years.

(06 June 2014, 45:24 – 45:58 mins)

- (7) การดำเนินงานในด้านการสร้างความสมานฉันท์เพื่อนำไปสู่การปฏิรูปนั้น ปัจจุบันยังอยู่ในระยะที่ 1 ซึ่ง คสช. เป็นแต่เพียงผู้อำนวยความสะดวก สร้างบรรยากาศให้เกิดการพูดคุย ถ้าบรรยากาศไม่ดีก็พูดคุยกันไม่ได้เกิดการทะเลาะกันตั้งแต่วันนี้ ฉะนั้นต้องสร้างบรรยากาศที่ดีให้เกิดการพูดคุยกันก่อน แลกเปลี่ยนความคิดเห็นซึ่งกันและกัน วันนี้คสช. จะไม่สรุปหรือชี้หน้าใดๆ

As for work towards reconciliation that will lead to reform, now [it] is still in the first phase. The NCPO is just a facilitator, creating an atmosphere for talks. **If the atmosphere is not good, [they] cannot talk, [but] will quarrel from now onwards. Therefore,** it must create a good atmosphere for talks first, exchanging opinions. **Today** the NCPO will not conclude or guide anything.

As for Reconciliation for Reform [sic], it is still in the first phase. The NCPO will act as facilitator and create a conducive atmosphere for exchanging and sharing opinion. The NCPO will not conclude or manipulate any decision.

(20 June 2014, 31:17 – 31:41 mins)

- (8) ... จะเป็นการพิจารณาของ คสช. ว่าจะต้องแก้ไขอะไรเพิ่มเติมอีกมั้ย ถ้าไม่มีการแก้ไขหรือแก้ไขอะไรบ้างก็แล้วแต่ เพราะฉะนั้นจะดำเนินการให้รวดเร็ว หากมีการแก้ไขข้อขัดข้องต่าง ๆ ในการบริหารประเทศแล้ว บ้านเมืองมีความสงบเรียบร้อยแล้ว ก็ให้นำร่างรัฐธรรมนูญฉบับชั่วคราวขึ้นทูลเกล้าทูลกระหม่อมถวาย เพื่อทรงลงพระปรมาภิไธย ให้มีผลบังคับใช้ภายในเดือน กรกฎาคม ศกนี้ นี่คือการดำเนินการจัดทำรัฐธรรมนูญฉบับชั่วคราว

... it will be under consideration by the NCPO to see whether there is anything needed to be amended. **If there is no amendment or some amendment, whatsoever, therefore,** [I] will work it quickly. **If** the restrictions that hinder national administration have been amended, [and] the country is peaceful, **then** [we] will forward the draft provisional constitution for Royal Endorsement to be effective within July, this year. **This is the process of drafting the provisional constitution.**

... it is under the consideration of NCPO for the needed adjustments. The NCPO expects that **once** the restrictions that hinder national administration have been amended, the draft constitution will be forwarded for Royal Endorsement to be effective within July 2014.

(27 June 2014, 45:36 – 46:08 mins)

The Thai source text in Figure 5.2

คสช. และรัฐบาลก็ได้แถลงว่า การที่เราขอเวลาเข้ามาแก้ปัญหาเดิม ๆ นั้น ก็เพื่อที่จะขอเวลาทำในเรื่องของการยุติความขัดแย้ง และคืนความสุขให้แก่ประชาชน แน่แน่นอนครับ ทุกคนคงพอใจไม่ได้ทั้งหมด แต่อย่างน้อยมันก็ทำให้เกิดเห็นภาพอันชัดเจนขึ้นว่า ความสุขของทุกคน มันมีหลายคนหลายพวก หลายหมู่หลายเหล่า ไม่ใช่เฉพาะกลุ่มนี้ กลุ่มโน้นมันไม่ได้ การทำอะไรต่าง ๆ นั้น ที่ทำให้คนส่วนใหญ่ นั้นยากที่จะทำให้ทุกคนพอใจทั้งหมด แต่มันเป็นอนาคต เราจะได้สามารถก้าวไปข้างหน้า ทุกคนมีทางเลือก มีโอกาส เราจะต้องวางรากฐาน เพื่อแก้ไขปัญหานั้นที่ค้างค้ำมายาวนาน รวมไปถึงการเตรียมการแก้ปัญหาใหม่ๆ ที่จะเกิดขึ้น อย่างนี้เขาถึงเรียกว่า “ปฏิรูปประเทศ” มันจะต้องมียุทธศาสตร์ที่ชัดเจน เป้าหมาย เราจะก้าวเดินต่อไปอย่างไร ทิศทางใด มีกรอบให้ชัดเจนขึ้น มองภาพอนาคตให้เห็นให้ชัดเจนนะ

The NCPO and the government then announced that [the reason] we ask for time to solve old problems is for asking for time to stop the conflict and return happiness to people. Of course not all could be satisfied. But at least it has been clearly shown that happiness for everyone includes many groups, many parties. Not only this group, that group, it is impossible. Doing something for the majority is very hard to please all. But it is the future. We will be able to move forward. Everyone has choices, have opportunities. We must lay the foundation to solve these longstanding problems, as well as to prepare to solve new problems that would happen. This is [what] they call ‘national reforms’. It must have a clear strategy, objective. How and when we will move on, [it must] has a clear-cut framework. Envision the future clearly.

The NCPO and this government therefore announced that we will work to solve issues, in order to put an end to this conflict and thereby return happiness to the Thai people. Not all have agreed with all of our actions, but at least it has been clearly shown that our happiness and prosperity must be shared among many, and not reserved for one particular group. It is always hard, when doing something for the majority of the people, to satisfy everyone. But this is what our future entails. In order for the country to make progress, everyone must have choices and opportunities. We must lay the foundations of the solutions to our longstanding problems, while preparing ourselves to tackle new problems that may arise. This is why our national reforms must have a clear strategy and well-defined objectives, so that we can move forward with a clear-cut framework and direction for our future.

(5 August 2016, 14:13 – 15:08 mins)

Appendix 2-D: Translation shifts in identification of participants

- (9) ทหารจะทำหน้าที่เป็นผู้อำนวยความสะดวกและเป็นผู้สังเกตการณ์ เป็นผู้ให้ข้อมูล ... จะให้เขาไปคุยกัน ใครอยากจะมาคุยตรงนั้นมาคุย กลุ่มไหนอยากจะมาให้มา ทั้งการเมือง คู่ขัดแย้ง ... เพราะฉะนั้นผมก็เชิญชวนทุกฝ่ายให้มาคุยกัน
- The military will act as a facilitator, observer and information provider ... [We] will let them talk. Whoever want to talk there, come to talk. Whichever group wants to come, let [them] come, both political parties, conflicting groups ... Therefore, I invite all sides to talk.
- The NCPO will act as an observer, a facilitator and an information provider ... We welcome all sides; conflicting groups, political parties, and we will discuss all issues and openly share information.
- (06 June 2014, 09:49 – 10:25 mins)
- (10) น้อง ๆ นิสิต นักศึกษา หลาน ๆ ทุกคนต้องเข้าใจ ท่านต้องให้เวลาชาติ เรียกว่าภูมิคุ้มกันมากกว่า
- All younger brothers/sisters, students, grandchildren must understand. You must give time to the nation. [It is] rather called immunity.
- To our younger generation, you should understand that the nation needs time to improve and heal.
- (06 June 2014, 50:20 – 50:29 mins)
- (11) การตรวจสอบนั้น จะตรวจสอบโครงการที่ยังไม่ได้ดำเนินการและโครงการที่ได้อนุมัติดำเนินการไปแล้ว
- As for inspection, [we] will inspect the projects that are pending implementation and the projects that have been approved.
- These include those projects that are pending implementation and those already approved by the previous government.
- (13 June 2014, 09:39 – 09:47 mins)
- (12) นอกจากนั้นยังมีนโยบายให้หน่วยงานของรัฐที่เกี่ยวข้อง หรือใครก็ตามที่อยากจะช่วยเรา ที่มีขีดความสามารถในการบรรเทาความเดือดร้อนปัญหาค่าครองชีพ ได้จัดกิจกรรมช่วยเหลือประชาชน อาทิ ให้กองทัพทุกเหล่าทัพ และทุกหน่วยงาน ที่มีขีดความสามารถจัดการจำหน่ายสินค้าราคาถูก...
- In addition, [the NCPO] has the policy of requesting relevant agencies or whoever wants to help us and has capability to reduce the living costs issue to arrange activities to help the people. Such as the Army, all armed forces and all agencies that have capability to hold sales of low-price goods...
- The NCPO has also arranged for relevant agencies with the capabilities to help reduce living costs to provide assistance, such as by retaining sales of goods at reduced prices.
- (13 June 2014, 16:04 – 16:29 mins)

The Thai source text in Table 5.7

สวัสดิ์พ่อแม่พี่น้องประชาชนที่รักทุกท่าน ก่อนอื่นผมต้อง ขอขอบคุณทุกๆ ภาคส่วน ... ที่ร่วมกันกับประชาชนในการปฏิบัติหน้าที่อย่างเข้มแข็ง เพื่อร่วมกันขับไล่คนประเทศไทย และนำพาความสุขคืนสู่ประชาชน... ทั้งนี้ คสช. ได้รับความร่วมมืออย่างดียิ่งจากพี่น้องประชาชนทุกภาคส่วน... โดยผ่านกิจกรรมคืนความสุขสู่ประชาชนของ คสช. ในรูปแบบต่างๆ ในทุกพื้นที่ จะต้องมีการสื่อสารกับประชาชนให้มีประสิทธิภาพและทั่วถึง ต้องสร้างการรับรู้ และความเข้าใจที่ถูกต้องกับประชาชน โดยการรับฟังเสียงของประชาชน ต้องตอบคำถามทุก ๆ คำถามที่เป็นข้อสงสัยเคลือบแคลงใจ และร่วมกันสร้างวิสัยทัศน์ร่วมกันกับประชาชน ประชาชนต้องรับรู้ถึง แนวทางในการดำเนินงาน การพัฒนาประเทศในด้านต่างๆ... โครงการที่สำคัญจะต้องผ่านกระบวนการมีส่วนร่วมของประชาชน ... จะต้องไม่เร่งรีบหรือกีดกันการรับรู้ของประชาชน โดยดูแลประชาชนทุกคนในชาติทุกกลุ่มทุกฝ่ายอย่างเท่าเทียม

Good evening to all dear people. First of all I would like to thank all sectors ... for their joint efforts with the people to vigorously discharge their duties... to drive Thailand forward and return happiness to the people... In this light, the NCPO received good cooperation from people in all sectors... through the NCPO's returning happiness to the people in various forms in every place... there must be communication with the people in an effective and inclusive manner.

It is necessary to create awareness and understanding of the people... by listening to the voice of the people and responding to any questions and doubts... and together create a common vision with the people. The people need to be aware of the direction in the country's development... All important projects must pass the process [that involves] the people's participation. [We] must not proceed hastily or exclude the people's knowledge acquisition... by taking care of all people in the nation, every group, every sides, in an equitable manner.

Good evening to all fellow citizens. I would like firstly thank all sectors ... for vigorously discharging their duties in cooperation with the general public. For their joint efforts... in driving Thailand forward and return happiness to the people... The NCPO received exceptional cooperation from the general public and... This has been done through returning happiness activities in various forms... We are aware of the need to communicate with the public in an efficient and inclusive manner by creating awareness and understanding of the people. We need to listen to the voice of the people, respond to doubts... and create a common vision. The people need to be aware of the direction in the country's development... All important projects must engage the public through participatory process... We should not proceed hastily or exclude the public from acquiring knowledge. We will take care of all groups of people in an inclusive and equitable manner...

(20 June 2014)

The Thai source text in Table 5.8

- (1a) กฎหมายทันสมัยในทุกด้าน รวมทั้งกฎระเบียบ กติกาต่างๆ ได้รับการแก้ไข
Laws will be modernised in all aspects, including regulations and rules to be amended.
We will modernize existing rules and regulations in order to achieve a just legal system ready for the globalization age. (30/05/14)
- (1b) การเรียกบุคคลมารายงานตัว ได้รับความร่วมมือจากบุคคลเหล่านั้นเป็นอย่างดี และพร้อมที่จะร่วมสนับสนุนงานรักษาความสงบเรียบร้อย การปรองดองสมานฉันท์เป็นอย่างดี
In summoning individuals, [we] have received good cooperation from these people and [they] are ready to give strong support to the peace and order maintenance and reconciliation processes.
In the summoning of individuals, these people have given cooperation and are willing to contribute to the reconciliation process and the operation of the NCPO. (13/06/14)
- (1c) สินค้า OTOP ที่เรียกว่า "ประชารัฐ" วันนี้มีการจัดตั้งมานานแล้ว ... รัฐบาลได้ส่งเสริมให้เป็นสินค้า OTOP "ประชารัฐ" อย่างต่อเนื่องโดยสนับสนุน การนำสินค้า OTOP เหล่านี้ไปจำหน่ายในสนามบิน บนเครื่องบิน ร้านค้าประชารัฐสุขใจ บมข ปตท. ตลาดออนไลน์ อื่นๆ
OTOP products, which are called "Pracharat" today, have been around for a long time ... The government has continuously supported Pracharat OTOP products by promoting sale of OTOP products in airports, on planes, in Pracharat Suk Jai shops, at PTT gas stations, in online markets and so on.
OTOP products now developed through Pracharat projects, were around for a long time ... The government has helped to improve the quality of these products, while also promoting them through new distribution channels such as airports, commercial airlines, Pracharat Suk Jai shops, PTT gas stations, and online markets. (07/08/15)
- (1d) สถาบันและองค์กรต่างๆ ทั้งในประเทศและระหว่างประเทศ ก็ได้ประเมินว่า สถานการณ์คอร์รัปชันของไทย ในสายตานานาชาติ ว่า "ดีที่สุด" ในรอบ 6 ปี มีภาพลักษณ์โปร่งใส "ดีที่สุด" ในรอบ 10 ปี เป็นต้น
Both domestic and international institutes and organisations have assessed that Thailand's corruption situation in international eyes is at its best in 6 years. The appearance of transparency is the best it has been for 10 years.
International and domestic organizations have assessed that anti-corruption efforts in Thailand is at its best in 6 years, while its overall transparency is at its best in 10 years. (07/08/15)
- (2a) สำหรับราคาพืชผลทางการเกษตรอื่นๆ อีกหลายอย่างที่มีปัญหา ก็กำลังหามาตรการดูแลให้เกิดความยั่งยืนว่าจะทำอย่างไรในปีงบประมาณ 2558 โดยไม่ให้นำไปสู่โครงการประชานิยม ซึ่งจะทำให้เกิดปัญหาตามมาอีกมากมายในอนาคต
For the price of other agricultural products that remains a problem, [we] are finding measures to take care of [them] and create sustainability, [as to] how [we] will do in the 2015 fiscal year without leading to populist projects that will leave many problems behind in the future.

We are considering measures which could manage the prices of agricultural products sustainably without bringing on more problems like measures applied in the past. (30/05/14)

(2b) อานาจเผด็จการ รัฐสภา เสี่ยงข้างมาก ไม่เคารพเสียงข้างน้อยต้องแก้ไข ... ผมถามว่าแล้วท่านจะปล่อยให้แบบนี้เป็นแบบนี้ต่อไปได้หรือไม่

Parliamentary dictatorship – majority voting without respecting the minority – must be fixed ... I ask then “Can you let it be like this any longer?”

Parliamentary dictatorship has to be removed ... So I had to ask myself “Can we let this continue?”
(06/06/14)

(2c) วันนี้หนักสุดคือ เรื่องพลังงาน ภาษี ราคาสินค้า ขนส่ง ระบบนายทุน มีปัญหามากต้องแก้ไข ประชาชนต้องเข้าใจ ถ้าหากว่าผมทำวันนี้ก็เป็นเหมือนประชานิยม วันหน้าก็เกิดปัญหา วันนี้พอใจ วันหน้าผิดพลาด พวกเราก็ถูกตำหนิ ข้าราชการถูกตำหนิ

Today the most serious [problems] are energy, taxation, prices of goods, logistics and capitalist networks. They are huge problems that must be fixed. The people must understand. If I do it today, then it is like populism. In the future, the problem will come up. Today, satisfied. In the future, mistaken. We then will be blamed. The civil servants will be blamed.

But the most important problems we are facing today concern energy, taxation, prices of goods, and unchecked creditor networks. All these must be dealt with as soon as possible, but with careful consideration. If we rush into things and create more problems later, we will be held accountable and criticized. (06/06/14)

Appendix 3

Examples of Thai source texts in Chapter 6

Appendix 3-A: Pronouns and deictic positioning

- (1) “วันทหารผ่านศึก” เป็นวันที่ประชาชนคนไทยทุกคนควรได้รับระลึกถึงความเสียสละอันยิ่งใหญ่ของวีรชนใน “แนวหน้า” ที่พร้อมจะเสียสละ...
ผมขอเชิญชวนพวกเรา “แนวหลัง” ทุกคน ได้ร่วมกันแสดงออกถึงความมีน้ำใจ...

“Veteran’s Day” is the day when all Thai people should commemorate the great sacrifice of heroes in “the front line” ... I would like to invite **all of us ‘the back line’** to express **the kindness** ...

It [Veterans’ Day] is the day that we all commemorate the heroic acts of our soldiers standing in the front line ... I would like to invite **all of us who [sic] living ‘behind this wall of security’** to express **our appreciation and respect** to all veterans ...

(29 January 2016, 01:50 – 03:14 mins)

- (2) ไม่ว่าจะอยู่ในภาคประชาชน ภาคธุรกิจ หรือภาครัฐ ทุกคนก็คือประชาชนของชาติ ... หากรัฐบาล ทุกรัฐบาลมีธรรมาภิบาล
ประชาชนกับรัฐบาลก็จะร่วมมือกันทำงาน ร่วมมือกันแก้ไขปัญหา จูงมือเดินไปพร้อม ๆ กัน ไม่มีความขัดแย้ง ไม่ทิ้งใครไว้ข้างหลัง
ไม่มีการแบ่งประชาชนออกเป็นกลุ่ม...

[It] doesn’t matter if [**you**] are part of the people’s, business or government sector. **All people are the people of the nation** ... If every government exercises good governance, the people and the government can cooperate to work, cooperate to solve problems and hold hands and together walk forward without disputes or leaving anyone behind, and without creating groups and social divisions...

No matter which part of the country you live in, **we are all Thais** ... a government that exercises good governance can cooperate with the people to solve problems and move **our** country forward without leaving anyone behind, and without creating groups and social divisions in **our** society...

(25 June 2015, 05:32 – 06:39 mins)

- (3) ถ้าเกษตรกรคิดว่าแก้ปัญหามาแบบยั่งยืนท่านต้องบอกความจริง ท่านอย่าไปช่วยเขา ไม่ต้องกลัวว่าเขาจะไม่ให้ท่านเช่าที่ดินต่อไป...
ท่านต้องช่วยเรา... วันนี้ต้องเผื่อแผ่แบ่งปัน

If the farmers think of addressing the problems sustainably, **you** must tell the truth. **You** don’t help **them**, [**you**] must not fear that **they** will no longer rent you the land... [**You**] must help **us** out... Today, [**you/we**] need to be generous and share.

In order for farmers' problems to be sustainably addressed, **you** have to tell the truth. **Farmers** need not fear that **they** will no longer be able to rent the land... **You** must help **us** out... **We** need to be generous and share.

(10 April 2015, 17:19 – 17:59 mins)

- (4) ถ้าพ่อค้าคนกลางรวยอย่างเดียว เกษตรกรก็จนอยู่แบบนี้ ก็ปีก็ชาติ แล้วก็โทษรัฐบาล โทษอะไรไปเรื่อยเรื่อย ไม่ได้...
แล้วมีความรู้เรื่องเกษตรสมัยใหม่ การรวมกลุ่มเกษตรกร แล้วก็รู้ราคา... จะได้ว่าไม่ต้องทะเลาะกันต่อไป

If only the middleman gets rich, the **farmers** will be poor like this, for however many years. Then [**you/they**] blame it on the government, blame it on whatsoever. Impossible... Then [**you/they**] have knowledge about modern agriculture, creating farming groups. Then [**you/they**] know about prices... So [**you/they**] would know [and] don’t quarrel any longer.

They will remain poor if all sales continue to be made to middlemen. **Farmers** need to be knowledgeable and understand marketing and modern agricultural practices. **They** also need to gather into collectives and be aware of how to sell products and what the real prices should be.

(10 April 2015, 24:05 – 24:31 mins)

- (5) เราเองต้องอ้างไว้ ซึ่งแก่นแท้ของวัฒนธรรมประเพณีดั้งเดิม... ผมเห็นแล้วว่าที่ผ่านมา พ่อแม่ก็ร้องเรียนมาที่ผมมากว่าปล่อยปละละเลยให้มีการจัดกิจกรรมอย่างนี้ได้อย่างไร ไม่ว่าจะการแต่งกาย การเมาสุรา อะไรต่าง ๆ ... สกปรกก็จริง แต่เขาก็มองอีกอย่างว่าประเทศไทยทำไมเป็นแบบนี้... ก็อยากให้ต้อนรับนักท่องเที่ยวต่างชาติด้วยไมตรีจิต
- We must maintain the essence of ancient culture and traditions... I saw in the past, parents complained to me as to why **[I]** let this kind of activity happen, be it forms of dress, alcohol consumption or other things... [Although] it's true [that such activities] are fun, **they** see [it] differently – why Thailand is like this? ... **[I]**'d like **[you]** to receive foreign tourists with goodwill.
- It is also essential that **we** maintain our cultural heritage through genuine traditional activities... Many parents have made complaints to me, asking why improper celebrations were allowed, not to mention improper attire, and excessive alcohol consumption among others... **We** should welcome our guests with a true expression of the warmth of Thai culture. Let's impress them with the uniqueness of **our** country.
- (08 April 2016, 11:48 – 12:45 mins)
- (6) ผมสามารถพูดได้เลยว่า ถ้ายังทำแบบเดิมอยู่ก็จะจนอยู่แบบนี้ ถึงชั่วลูกชั่วหลาน วันข้างหน้าก็เป็นแบบนี้ ถ้าไม่ร่วมมือกับเราในวันนี้ ตามที่เราได้เตรียมการเรื่องของแผนการปฏิรูป วันนี้ระยะที่ 1 ท่านต้องเริ่มกับผมก่อน
- I can say that if **[you]** continue doing [it] in the same old way, you'll be poor like this until future generations. In the days to come [things] will stay the same, if **[you]** don't cooperate with **us** today. According to what **we**'ve prepared for the 1st phase of reform, **you** must take the first step with **me**.
- However if people do not see this because **you** continue to revert back to the same old practices, then **your children** and **the next generation** will not be ready for development and cooperation to make progress. Today **we**'ve prepared to make progress according to the 1st phase of the reform roadmap.
- (29 January 2016, 21:35 – 21:46 mins)
- (7) ผมอยากจะใช้คำว่าคนไทยที่ยังไม่ได้เกิดมามีอีกมากมาย วันหน้าก็มีเกิดมาเพิ่มเติม เราต้องวางพื้นฐานให้เขาตรงนั้นด้วย ... ทรัพยากรก็หมดไป ความเข้มแข็งก็ไม่มี วันหน้าประเทศไทยจะอยู่ตรงไหน แล้วเขาเกิดมาเขาต้องเผชิญกับความยากลำบากอย่างไร คิดอย่างนั้นนะ ... และจะต้องไม่มีเหตุการณ์รุนแรงเกิดขึ้นอีก ในสถานการณ์ต่อจากนี้ไป
- I would like to use the words **Thais who are yet to be born. In the future [they] will be born. We** must lay the foundation for **them over there** too ... running out of resources, having no strength. **In the future** where will Thailand be? And when they are born, how will they have to face hardships? Think like that ... And there must be no violence **again** under any circumstances **from now on**.
- This is not only for **us**, but for the sake of **our children and the next generations to come. We** must build a strong foundation for **them** ... How could **the next generation** cope when **our generation** causes all these problems and uses up all the resources? ... **From now on**, there must not be **any more** violence in **our nation**.
- (29 May 2015, 05:37 – 06:27 mins)
- (8) สำหรับในวันพรุ่งนี้ ก็จะเป็นวันสำคัญอีกวันหนึ่ง "เป็นวันเด็กแห่งชาติ" เด็กก็คืออนาคตของประเทศ ... ผมอยากจะทำมาถึงเด็ก ๆ ก่อนว่า เป็น "อนาคตของชาติ" เป็น "ผู้สร้างอนาคตของชาติ" หรือแม้กระทั่งคุณครู ก็เป็น "ผู้สร้างอนาคตของชาติ" เช่นเดียวกัน ร่วมมือกันเพื่ออนาคต
- For tomorrow is another important day – "National children's day". **Children are the country's future** ... I'd like to refer to **the children** first as "**the future of the nation**", "**the makers of the future of the nation**". Or even **teachers** are also similarly "**the makers of the future of the nation**". [So they] cooperate **for the future**.
- Tomorrow will mark Children's Day ... I would like to refer to **our children** as the "**future of the nation**" as well as the "**makers of the future of the nation**", who are **our teachers**.
- (09 January 2015, 28:24 – 28:49 mins)
- (9) วิสัยทัศน์ที่กำหนดไว้คือ การคาดหวังหรือความหวังของพวกเราว่า 5 ปีข้างหน้า เราจะเป็นอย่างไร ประชาชนคนไทยต้องพยายามคิดแบบนี้ ถ้าเราไม่คิดแบบนี้ เราก็ไม่มีอนาคต เราต้องมองอนาคตของเรา 5 ปีข้างหน้า เราจะเป็นอย่างไร เราจะต้องเป็นประเทศที่มีความมั่นคง มั่งคั่ง อย่างยั่งยืน

The specified vision is **our expectation or hope** [as to] how in **the next five years we** will be. Thai people must try to think like this. If **we don't** think like this, **we** then have no future. **We** must foresee **our future in the next five years**. How will **we** be? **We** shall be a country with stability, prosperity and sustainability.

This vision is **our hope and aspiration** for the country. Everyone in the country needs to look at **the future that lies ahead of us**. This can only be achieved through cooperation, instead of sabotage in hopes of seizing power during volatile times. If successful, **Thailand** will become a stable and prosperous nation.

(09 January 2015, 18:40 – 18:59 mins)

Appendix 3-B: Portrayal of the military

- (10) ขอให้ทุกคนได้ร่วมกันส่งแรงใจไปกับผมด้วย ไปเชียร์กองทัพนักกีฬาไทย

I would like everyone to express their support, together with me, in cheering **the troop of Thai athletes**.

I would like to express my utmost support for **athletes** who are competing at the Asian Para Games 2014.

(24 October 2014, 24:16 – 24:19 mins)

- (11) คำว่า “ประเทศเป็นบ้าน ทหารเป็นรั้ว” วันนี้อาจจะไม่พอแล้ว อาจต้องใช้คำว่า “ประเทศเป็นบ้าน ประชาชน ข้าราชการทุกหมู่เหล่าเป็นรั้ว” สำหรับรั้วชั้นนอกก็ให้ทหารดูแลเป็นหลักอยู่แล้ว

... the saying, “**the country is the home, the soldiers are the fence**”, today may not be enough. [We] may have to use the words “the country is the home, the people and all civil servants are the fence.” As for the outer fence, the soldiers mainly take care of [it].

... the phrase, “**the nation is the home, the soldiers are the fence**”, may not be enough, as the saying should go “the nation is the home, the people and civil servants are the fence, while the soldiers stand guard”.

(18 September 2015, 04:40 – 04:53 mins)

- (12) ในส่วนของการเสริมสร้างกำลังของกองทัพ ไม่ว่าจะเป็นคน อาวุธยุทโธปกรณ์ต่าง ๆ นั้น

ผมจะกำกับดูแลให้เป็นไปตามแผนการพัฒนากองทัพ ทั้งด้านบุคลากร ยุทโธปกรณ์ สิ่งอุปกรณ์ต่าง ๆ เพราะมีราคาสูง วันนี้นำชุดก็ต้องซ่อม ส่วนที่ต้องทดแทนที่มีอายุมาก ๆ ทั้งหมดอยู่ในแผนพัฒนาทั้งสิ้น ไม่ได้มีกระบวนการทุจริตอะไรต่าง ๆ ทำอย่างนั้นไม่ได้ครับ เราต้องระมัดระวัง อันนี้เป็นงานฝ่ายความมั่นคง ซึ่งต้องทำความเข้าใจกันทั้งในประเทศและต่างประเทศ

ทั้งกระทรวงเทคโนโลยีสารสนเทศและการสื่อสาร (ICT) ทั้งกระทรวงการต่างประเทศ ก็ต้องสร้างความเข้าใจให้มากขึ้นในการบริหารของเรา ในความมุ่งหมายของเรา จะทำให้เกิดความมีเสถียรภาพ การยอมรับนับถือของต่างชาติให้มากขึ้น จากนี้เป็นต้นไป

As for the strengthening of the Army, **be it in terms of personnel or weapons**, I will oversee it according to the Army development plan [including] personnel, munitions, equipment, because [they] are expensive. **Today [they] are out of order, so [they] must be repaired, some very old parts need replacement**. All is in the development plan. **There is no organised corruption at all. [We] can't do so. We must be careful**. This is a national security matter which needs to be made understood at domestic and international level. Both the Ministry of ICT and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must create a better understanding about our administration, our intentions, **[so it] will lead to stability, more acceptance by foreign countries, from now on**.

As for the development of the military, I will oversee the development process which includes personnel, structure, and equipment development. This will be in accordance with the existing plan. These are all national security issuers which need to be conveyed to the international community through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology.

(6 June 2014, 20:04 – 22:55 mins)

- (13) ผมว่าอย่ามาดูตรงนี้ทหารมาก ทหารน้อย ผมใคร่ขวัญคุณกันแล้ว ถ้าไม่มีทหารเลยก็ไม่ได้ เพราะอะไร เพราะว่าความมั่นคงก็มีปัญหา ความสงบเรียบร้อยก็มีปัญหา บางคนบอกว่า เดี่ยวต้องเอารุ่นพี่ รุ่นน้อง ถ้าผมไม่มีรุ่นพี่ รุ่นน้อง เพื่อนที่ไว้ใจเข้ามาทำงานก็ไม่ได้อีก ผมพยายามที่จะเกลี้ยสัดส่วนต่าง ๆ ให้ดี

I think [you] shouldn't look at this [issue], more military, less military. I have concluded that if there is no military at all, [it's] impossible. **Because of what?** Because in security, there is a problem. In peace and order, there is a problem. **Some said that [I] would bring in [my military] seniors, juniors**. If I don't

have [my] seniors, juniors [and] friends I can trust to work [for me], [it's] also impossible. **I try to distribute [them] proportionately.**

I have carefully considered that we cannot leave out military officials as peace, order and security is still an issue. I need to have people I can trust which consist of a combination of my colleagues and acquaintances, seniors and juniors and many others.

(29 August 2014, 38:14 – 38:34 mins)

- (14) สนช. เขาไม่ได้จัดมาเพื่อกลุ่มนี้กลุ่มนี้ เพื่อทหาร ผมยังไม่ได้สั่งอะไรให้ทหารสักอย่างเลย ผมไม่ใช่สิ่งที่เป็นขนาดนี้ มาทำให้ฝ่ายใดฝ่ายหนึ่งไม่ทำเพราะจะเสียเปล่า ไม่ทราบจะทำไปทำไม ... คนส่วนน้อยต้องได้รับการดูแลที่เป็นธรรม เจ้าหน้าที่ทำงานได้สะดวก ไม่ใช่เพิ่มอำนาจหน้าที่อย่างเดียวไปไล่ล่าฆ่าฟันจับกุม มันจับไหวไหมละ ถ้าประชาชนมีมาตรการอื่น ร่วมมือลดปัญหา มันก็ใช้กฎหมายน้อยลง ต้องไปอย่างนั้น

The NLA has not been established to serve this or that group, [or] the military. I haven't yet ordered anything for the military at all. I don't do anything for one side or another. [I] don't do it because it's a waste. I don't know why I should do so ... The minority must be looked after fairly. The officials can work conveniently. It's not that [I] only grant [their] authority to chase after and arrest [the wrongdoers]. **Can they all be arrested?** If the people have other measures [such as] cooperating to reduce the problem, the law enforcement is then less applied. [It] must go that way.

I would like to reiterate that NCPO was not established to serve any particular group. The minority **which constitutes a majority** must be looked after fairly. The law enforcement officials must be facilitated in their work. We do not have the capability to arrest all the wrongdoers even if granted additional authority or power. So we need to have measures that would reduce the problems by not having to enforce excessive laws.

(8 August 2014, 1:06:18 – 1:06:55 mins)

Appendix 3-C: Inconsistency of religious pluralism

- (15) เรื่องศาสนาเหมือนกัน ทุกศาสนาในโลกอยู่ประเทศไทยได้หมด พระบาทสมเด็จพระเจ้าอยู่หัวท่านทรงสนับสนุน ทุกศาสนาในโลก ทุกศาสนาสอนให้คนเป็นคนดี แต่มันก็มีคนบางจำพวกที่เขาเรียกว่าเป็นมาร ก็แก้ไขกันไป

On religion too, **every religion** in the world can co-exist in Thailand. His Majesty the King is supporting [this]. **Every religion in the world. Every religion** teaches people to be good but there are some kinds of people whom they call **Mara**. Then [we should] solve it.

On religion, **every religion** can co-exist in Thailand and are all under the patronage of His Majesty the King. **Every religion** teaches people to be good but there are some who are **anti-religion** or have **ill intentions**.

(6 June 2014, 42:33 – 42:47 mins)

- (16) เรื่องศาสนานั้นทุกคนต้องช่วยกัน เราจะใช้กลไกทุกกลไกได้ช่วยกันเร่งรัดตรวจสอบจัดมารศาสนาออกไป และส่งเสริมพระพุทธศาสนา และทุกศาสนา ให้เป็นที่เคารพนับถือของประชาชนคนไทยทั้งประเทศตลอดไป

On the issue of religion, everyone must help out. We will use all mechanisms to accelerate the investigation, get rid of **Mara of religion** and support **Buddhism** and **every religion** to be respected by the Thai people forever...

On the issue of religion, everyone must help out. We will use all available mechanisms to accelerate the inspection, rid of **deviants and heretics** and support **Buddhism** and **every religion** to be respectful for the Thai people...

(18 July 2014, 46:31 – 46:46 mins)

List of translation of the term *satsana* in the official translation

Upholding the nation, the **religions** and the Monarchy, which is the key institution (11 July 2014)

Our key objectives are: permanently reducing inequalities in society/ promoting reconciliation and building national unity; suppressing corruption in every dimension; creating sustainable reform; meeting the public's expectation as much as possible; instilling the 12 core Thai values; promoting loyalty to the nation, **religion**, and the Monarchy (19 September 2014)

Take me for example. Everything I do, I do it for the nation, **religion**, the King, and the people. I will do as much as I can and do my best (27 February 2015)

So use your discretion while preserving our own culture. In a larger sense we must preserve the pillars of our nation, our **religions** and our monarchy (23 October 2015)

This is a mechanism by which we can move our country forward into the future and highlight the importance of ethics, such as the 12 core Thai values and faithfulness in this country's key institutions - the nation, **religion** and monarchy - in our children. (4 March 2016)

What is the core of our country? It is our nation, **religions** and the monarchy. If we venerate to these institutions, we will be creating resilience for our country (May 2016)

What really moved me was his statement. He said his teachers told him that the national flag represents nation, **religion**, and the Monarchy, and thus should be revered (24 June 2016)

These historical sites are an enduring symbol of our sacrosanct institutions, namely, the nation, **religions**, and the Monarchy (24 June 2016)

So I encourage us all to have a role in fostering a strong social conscience, with kindness, piety, and respect for our nation, **religion** and the Monarchy (24 June 2016)

The Thai people must develop an appreciation for lifelong learning for self-development and improvement, as well as a consciousness on what it means to be Thai citizens who uphold the national institutions of the nation, **religions**, and the monarchy (22 June 2016)

There are also other important infrastructure projects, such as those that strengthen the foundations of our civility and our nation, such as in language, education, arts and craft, traditions, culture, as well as the three national institutions of nation, **religion** and monarchy (12 August 2016)

Appendix 3-D: Translation of Prayut's portrayal of religions

- (17) ทั้งนี้ถือเป็นอันโอกาสดีที่พุทธศาสนิกชนจะได้ร่วมกิจกรรมสืบทอดพระพุทธศาสนา น้อมรำลึกถึงพระพุทธองค์ และนำหลักธรรมคำสอนไปปฏิบัติในชีวิตประจำวันและร่วมกันประดับธงชาติและธงธรรมจักร เพื่อแสดงตนเป็นพุทธมามกะ เข้าวัด ทำบุญตักบาตร ฟังพระธรรมเทศนา รักษาศีล ลด ละ เลิกอบายมุข

Therefore, [it] is an opportunity for Buddhists to **participate** in activities to carry on Buddhism, recall the Lord Buddha and **apply** the teaching to one's daily life, and join in decorating [your house with] the national flag and **Dharma Chakra flags** in a show of oneself as **Buddhamāka**, going to the **Wat**, offering alms, listen to sermons, uphold **Sīla**, and avoid **Apāyamukha**.

This gives us the opportunity to **embrace** and **disseminate** the Lord Buddha's teachings. We can join in and fly our national and **Dharma Chakra flags in a show of faith, make merit**, offer alms, uphold **Buddhist precepts**, and avoid **harmful actions**.

(29 May 2015, 00:51 – 01:16 mins)

- (18) อย่าลืมว่าคนไทยกว่า 90 % นับถือศาสนาพุทธ... ทำไมเราไม่รักษาตรงนี้ให้ได้ 90 ทำไมจะต้องแบ่ง 90 เป็น 60 – 40 หรืออย่างไร ในภายใต้ของศาสนาพุทธอย่างเดียว

Don't forget, over 90 percent of Thais are Buddhists... **Why don't we preserve this 90 percent, why [do we] have to divide** this 90 into 60 – 40 under the same Buddhism.

Over 90 percent of Thais are Buddhists... The 90 percent of Buddhists in Thailand, **therefore**, should stay united and not divided.

(11 March 2016, 35:10 – 36:19 mins)

- (19) ปัจจุบัน ในส่วนของพื้นที่จังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ นั้น คสช. ได้ผ่อนผันให้สถานีวิทยุชุมชนในพื้นที่จังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้บางแห่งออกอากาศเป็นการชั่วคราว เพื่ออธิบายวิธีปฏิบัติที่ถูกต้องของชาวไทยมุสลิมและเผยแพร่ข่าวสารในเทศกาลถือศีลอดนี้
- At present, regarding the Southern Border Provinces, the NCPO **allowed** some community radio stations in in the Southern Border Provinces to broadcast temporarily in order to explain the correct practice of **the Thai Muslims** and disseminate information during the fasting period.
- The NCPO **eased restrictions** on some community radio stations in the Southern Border Provinces and allowed them to temporarily broadcast in order to explain the correct practice of **the Muslims** and disseminate information during this fasting period.
- (04 July 2014, 20:42 – 20:55 mins)
- (20) ไม่ใช่เป็นการรังแกผู้นับถือศาสนาอื่น ๆ หรือเป็นการละเมิดสิทธิไม่เป็นธรรม...
- It's not harassing those who believe in **other religion(s)**, or unfair violation of rights...
- We are not harassing **anyone** because of **their religion** nor have we infringed on anyone's rights...
- อย่ามาได้แย้งกัน อย่ามาแสดงความคิดเห็นวิพากษ์วิจารณ์ในสิ่งที่มันอันตรายโดยไม่มีข้อเท็จจริง **ไม่รู้**ว่าหลักการปฏิบัติทางทหารเป็นอย่างไร พลเรือน ตำรวจเป็นอย่างไร ...
- Don't** argue with one another, **don't** express opinions [or] criticise what is dangerous without evidence. **[You] don't know** what the working principles used by the military, **civilian and** police are
- Please refrain from** making false statements on security matters without considering all the facts. **You may not understand** military or police procedures and practices...
- เราก็ร่วมมือเท่านั้นเอง ไม่ใช่เป็นการรังแกผู้นับถือศาสนาอื่น ๆ
- We then only cooperate with one another. [This] is not harassing those who believe in **other religion(s)**.
- We must cooperate with one another and not make unsupported claims about human rights violations.
- (17 July 2015, 41:20 – 42:36 mins)

Appendix 3-E: Praise of the monarchy

- (21) เรื่องการละเมิด มาตรา 112 อย่าไปนำสถาบันลงมา ท่านอยู่ของท่าน อยู่เหนือความขัดแย้งทั้งปวง เมื่อมี 2 ฝ่าย ฝ่ายหนึ่งก็เอาชนะอีกฝ่ายหนึ่ง ต่างฝ่ายต่างก็ต้องหาเครื่องมือที่จะมาต่อสู้กัน ฝ่ายหนึ่งก็อาจจะใช้เงิน ใช้งบประมาณ หรือใช้การโฆษณาชวนเชื่อหรืออะไรก็แล้วแต่ อีกฝ่ายก็นำสถาบันมาสู้ ก็เลยทำให้ท่านต้องลงมา ดิ่งท่านลงมา และก็มีผิดกฎหมาย
- As for the violation of Article 112, **don't bring** the [royal] institution **down**. They stay in their place, above all conflicts. When there are two sides, one would [try to] defeat the other. Each side must find tools for fighting. One side would use money, budget or propaganda, whatsoever. **The other side would bring the institution to fight back. So they have to come down [because you] drag them down, [which is] illegal.**
- I am urging** everyone to **not bring** any members of the Royal Family **into any conversation** that could defame the highest institution. **Please don't** use the Royal Family as a tool to seek victory over rivals.
- (10 October 2014, 48:35 – 48:58 mins)
- (22) ทั้งสองพระองค์ได้ทรงโบกพระหัตถ์ และแย้มพระสรวล ซึ่งสร้างความปีติยินดีให้กับพสกนิกรที่มารับเสด็จและประชาชนคนไทยทุกหมู่เหล่าเป็นล้นพ้น
- Both Their Majesties waved and smiled, which **gave delight** to **the people** who came to greet and all groups of **Thais, immeasurably.**
- It was **especially most touching** when Their Majesties smiled and waved to the crowds; **further bringing happiness** to **all Thais.**
- (19 September 2014, 01:26 – 01:37 mins)

- (23) ทีม “ขุนพลช้างศึก” ของไทยนั้น สามารถพลิกสถานการณ์หลังจากได้รับพระราชทานกำลังใจจากพระบาทสมเด็จพระเจ้าอยู่หัวฯ ผ่านทางพระราชเลขานุการ และได้นำชัยมาถวายพ่อหลวง และปวงชนชาวไทยได้ในที่สุด

The Thai team of ‘warrior war elephants’ was able to turn the tide after having received moral support from His Majesty the King through [communication] from the deputy principal private secretary [of His Majesty]. And [the team] was able to present its victory to **the Royal Father** and **Thai people**, ultimately.

Thailand's team was uplifted and was able to turn the tides after having received moral support from His Majesty the King through communication from the deputy principle private secretary of His Majesty. The team was ultimately able to present its victory to **His Majesty** and **the Thai people**.

(26 December 2014, 00:51 – 01:04 mins)

- (24) สำคัญอีกประการหนึ่งก็ขอให้พร้อมนำแนวทางหลักปรัชญาของเศรษฐกิจพอเพียงมาประยุกต์ใช้ในการดำรงชีวิตประจำวัน โดยยึดถือแนวทางสายกลาง และประพฤติตนตามแบบอย่างของพระองค์ ... ได้มีการกล่าวกันว่าทรงเป็นแบบอย่างของกษัตริย์ผู้พอเพียงนะครับ

One more important point is **[I] ask [you]** to adopt the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy in **[your] daily lives**, by taking the middle path and **behaving oneself** according to His Majesty’s **example** ... His Majesty has been lauded an example of **the Sufficiency King**.

I would also like to encourage us to adopt His Majesty’s Sufficiency Economy Philosophy in **our daily lives**, by taking the middle path and His Majesty’s approach **as our inspiration and example** ... as His Majesty is lauded as **the Development King**.

(06 May 2016, 04:04 – 04:21 mins)

- (25) ผมอยากให้ “วันพ่อ” เป็นวันที่คนไทยมีความสุข ร่วมกัน “ทำความดีเพื่อพ่อ” ... คนไทยจะได้แสดงถึงความรักต่อสถาบัน รักประเทศชาติ และรักกันในสังคมไทย ในครอบครัวตัวเองด้วย ไม่ว่าเชื้อชาติ ศาสนาใด ในผืนแผ่นดินของพ่อ เราต้องเผื่อแผ่ความรัก รอยยิ้ม โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งกับผู้มาเยือนชาวต่างประเทศด้วย

I’d like “Father’s Day” to be the day that Thais are happy, together ‘do good deeds for **the Father**’... Thais would be able to **express the love to the [royal] institution, love the nation and love each other** in Thai society, in one’s own family too, regardless of ethnicity, religion. In **the land of the Father**, we must extend love, smiles, especially to **foreign visitors** too.

I would like “Father’s Day” to be a happy occasion for all Thais and for all to perform virtuous deeds for **their fathers**... **This way**, Thais will be able to **express their devotion** to **our Monarchy**, the country, and fellow Thais, as well as their family members, regardless of ethnicity or religion, not to mention genuine kindness and friendship to **all our guests** who visit **the Kingdom**.

(04 December 2015, 02:40 – 03:07 mins)

- (26) พระราชกรณียกิจที่พระองค์ท่านได้ทรงปฏิบัติมาอย่างยาวนาน ทำให้เป็นที่ประจักษ์ชัดในพระปรีชาสามารถ ในการพัฒนาคุณภาพชีวิต เด็ก เยาวชน ประชาชนในถิ่นทุรกันดาร และผู้ด้อยโอกาสให้ดีขึ้น สามารถยืนหยัดด้วยลำแข้งของตนเอง ... ประชาชนชาวไทยยอมรับว่า พระองค์ทรงเป็น “เจ้าฟ้าของคนเดินดิน”

The extensive Royal duties that **She** [*phra-ong*] has been conducting for a long time clearly demonstrate **[Her] great intelligence and ability** to improve the living quality of children, youth and the people in the rural areas and the underprivileged, [so they] can stand on their own ... The Thai people regard **Her** as ‘**Chao Fa of ordinary people**’.

The extensive Royal duties conducted by **Her Royal Highness** clearly demonstrate **Her Royal Highness's commitment and ability** to improve the living quality of children and the underprivileged in rural areas, thus allowing them to stand on their own. This has made Thais regard **Her Royal Highness** as truly **the “people’s princess”**.

(03 April 2015, 01:16 – 01:38 mins)

- (27) ในช่วงที่ประชาชนในหลาย ๆ พื้นที่ ยังคงต้องเผชิญกับปัญหาภัยแล้ง สมเด็จพระบรมโอรสาธิราชฯ สยามมกุฎราชกุมาร ได้ทรงมีพระมหากรุณาธิคุณพระราชทาน “น้ำพระทัย Bike for Mom” พระราชทานดับภัยแล้ง” จำนวน 200,000 ขวดด้วยครับ

As many regions across Thailand are encountering the prolonged drought situation, HRH the Crown Prince **has extended His royal grace by bestowing** 200,000 bottles of “**His royal kindness** [in] **Bike for Mom** [event] to break the drought” too.

As many regions across Thailand are encountering with [sic] the prolonged drought situation, HRH the Crown Prince **has graciously bestowed** 200,000 bottles of **drinking water** to help alleviate drought in affected areas.

(07 August 2015, 02:24 – 02:38 mins)

- (28) “วันปิยมหาราช” เป็นวันคล้ายวันสวรรคตของพระบาทสมเด็จพระจุลจอมเกล้าเจ้าอยู่หัว รัชกาลที่ 5 ผู้ทรงมีพระมหากรุณาธิคุณอันยิ่งใหญ่หาที่เปรียบและทรงเป็นที่รักของพสกนิกรชาวไทยทุกหมู่เหล่า

“**Wan Piyamaharaj Day**” is the **day resembling the heaven-ascending day** for HM King Rama V who **extended his royal grace and great kindness** [to Thais] and is **well-loved** among **every group of Thai people**.

“**King Chulalongkorn Day**” or “**Wan Piyamaharaj Day**”, the **memorial day** for HM King Rama V who **during his great reign devoted himself to the country and his people**.

(23 October 2015, 00:30 – 00:48 mins)

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