The Politics of Development and Stagnation of Civil Society:
Experiences of Zambia and Botswana
(Volume 2)

Mitsugi Endo

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CHAPTER 4

CHURCHES: HISTORICALLY INSTITUTIONALISED ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN CIVIL SOCIETY

> "Christianity and its institutions could no longer be viewed as being imposed upon Africans, but rather as something now firmly entrenched in its country and its society" (Henkel 1989: 205).

In this chapter, my argument will be that churches have become institutionalised in civil society through their historical contribution to people by providing mainly educational and health facilities and their role in checking the state in "crises," and that churches are important actors in the process of democratisation. In fact, especially Christian churches have been regarded as one of the most important actors in democratisation (Bratton and van de Walle, 1993), and their roles in this process of a variety of countries have been documented (e.g., Gifford, 1994; Gifford ed., 1995: Haynes, 1996). However, it is necessary ask *why* Christian churches have been involved in the process of democratisation and what kind of role they have played and will play in the process (both in the transition and the consolidation phases). One of the important arguments on this issue have just come from Haynes as follows:

> "...[Christian] leaders have on occasion, in the absence of alternatives, become the focal point of opposition - the mouthpiece of public opinion, speaking on behalf of citizens who may well regard democratic change as a *sine qua non* for the achievement of both individual and collective material improvements" (1996: 107, original emphasis).

Basically, Christian churches's concern about democratisation derived from their interest in human development and human rights (see, e.g., CCZ, EFZ, and ZEC, 1987), which will be argued later in this chapter.

As stated in chapter 2, the main focus of this chapter will be the mainline Christian churches. Therefore, the roles of Christian fundamentalism, known as the New Right of American origin in southern Africa (Gifford, 1988), which are themselves very important issues in political and religious studies in the region, will beyond the scope of the current study. However, it is worthwhile to refer to that the new religious movements were to play an insignificant role in the process of democratisation (democratic transition), and even these churches were actively hostile to democratic movement (Ranger, 1995: 25)[1].

It is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term "church" in this chapter. By the term "church," I mean the religious organisations and institutions whose faith is rooted in the Christian faith. Although there are adherents of religious faiths other than Christianity such as Muslim and Hindus in southern Africa, they are not included in the argument because their numbers and influences are not so significant in Zambia and Botswana.

This chapter deals with (1) churches' involvement in development activities, (2) churches' political involvement, from the historical point of view to clarify their significance both in development and political affairs, although the main focus will be on the post-colonial era.

4.1 The Case of Zambia

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[1] According to Foston Sakala, the President of the Reformed Church of Zambia, and Chairman of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), "(s)everal fundamentalist groups denounced the participation of church leaders in the [election] monitoring, stating that politics was strictly an earthly affair and should be of no concern for true Christians' (quoted in Ranger, 1995: 25-26).

There have been a variety of studies of religion and churches in Central and Southern Africa and Northern Rhodesia from historical and anthropological points of view, including, for instance, a series of works by Ranger (e.g., Ranger and Weller, (1975), Van Binsbergen (1981), Weller and Linden (1984) and Gifford (1988). There are also studies which focuses on specific churches. On the issue of church union efforts focusing on the United Church of Zambia (UCZ), Bolink (1967) documented details of the process of the formation of UCZ. Johnson's case study was the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) (Johnson, 1977). In addition, the Reformed Church of Zambia (RCZ) was a detailed study by Verstraeleu-Gilhuis (1982). Furthermore, churches' involvement in social services, like education and health care have been documented in more recent studies (e.g., Ragsdale, 1986; Henkel, 1989).

Therefore, it is not necessary to repeat these descriptions in this chapter at length. Neither is it my intention to describe the historical activities of various churches in detail. Rather it is to consider the activities and policies of the main present church bodies, namely the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ), the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC), and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), with a special attention to the CCZ in terms of practice in the first half of the case of Zambia. In the second half, Christian Churches' political involvement will be considered from a historical point of view.

Here it is necessary to briefly refer to general religious situation of Zambia. As stated in the previous chapter, Zambia is considered to be a de facto Christian nation, considering the fact that a majority of people (72 percent) are Christians (Barret, 1982). This was a result of the wide infiltration of missionaries into central Africa. In this process, churches in Zambia have also been institutionalised as one of the most important actors in civil society through their economic and political involvement.

4.1.1 Church Groupings in the Contemporary Era in Zambia

There are three coordinating or mother bodies in Zambia, which are, the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC), the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ), and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ).

ZEC, which is the administrative body of the Catholic Church in Zambia, was founded in 1935 for the purpose of coordinating Catholic missionary work (Henkel, 1989: 53). The Catholic Church in Zambia consists of seven dioceses and two archdioceses (Lusaka and Kasama), which coincide with the nine Zambian provinces, and 26.2 percent of the population of Zambia was estimated to regard themselves as the Catholic Church (Barrett, 1982: 765). As Henkel showed, Catholics are evenly distributed over the country, but they are heavily concentrated in the rural dioceses of Kasama and Mansa and the urban dioceses of Ndola and Lusaka[2]. Day-to-day Church's activities are coordinated by the Catholic Secretariat in Lusaka.

In Zambia, the Catholic Church is notable in that it still has many foreign priests and other workers. In comparison with other African countries, Africanisation began much later in Zambia (Henkel, 1989: 53).

The Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ) is an umbrella body of Christian denominations which are more ecumenically oriented (See table 2-5 in chapter 2 for membership of the CCZ). The core of the CCZ are the United Church of Zambia (UCZ), the Reformed Church, the African Methodist Episcopal Church, the Salvation Army and the Lutheran Church (Henkel, 1989: 53). The Organisational form of the CCZ will be

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[2] Therefore, Henkel concluded that Catholicism has influenced most strongly on the Bemba area (Henkel, 1989: 54-55).

considered in detail later. The CCZ also functions as the official link between member churches and the World Council of Churches (WCC).

There is another umbrella body, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), members of which are mainly evangelically-oriented denominations (see table 2-6 for membership of the EFZ). In addition, one of the characteristics of the EFZ is that it is a loose union of the evangelical churches (Henkel, 1989: 69). Among the membership of the EFZ, the Seventh Day Adventist Church (SDA), which began in 1905 in Zambia and which is today the third largest Protestant denomination, is the main member. This group is supposed to be less political, in the sense that the EFZ is not so much interested in national political issues, in comparison with the other two. Even so, the EFZ has also collaborated with the others, when they faced political "crisis," as stated later in this chapter. Although the magnitude of the involvement in development schemes is still low, it has its own secretariat coordinating developmental activities.

Jehovah's Witness and the New Apostolic church are not included the above groups (Henkel, 1989: 77-80). Though Jehovah's Witness, which is known as "the Watch Tower," has been occasionally confronted with the state and repressed by the state[3], the church has continued to grow. On the other hand, the New Apostolic church seems to work more quietly to keep its profile lower that other churches (Henkel, 1989: 80). Therefore little is known on this church.

According to Barrett (1982: 765), at the time of survey around 1980, there are about 70 active indigenous (or independent) churches, many of which have been brought to Zambia from other countries. About 7 percent of the total population is supposed to belong to these churches (Henkel, 1989: 80). The largest independent churches are the African

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[3]Between 1967 and 1969, for instance, there were clashes between Jehovah's witness and members of UNIP, as the Witness refused to accept the new flag, to sing National Anthem, to become party members or to vote in elections (Henkel, 1989: 79).

Gospel Church and the Watchman Healing Mission, each with an estimated 60,000 adherents. Historically speaking, the best known independent church is the Lumpa Church led by Alice Lenshina because of its confrontation with the state (see e.g., van Binsbergen, 1981: 266-317)[4].

4.1.2 Churches' Involvement in Development Activities: Historical Achievements

There have been many efforts of churches in the area of development, such as education and health as well as economic development, since various missions arrived in central Africa.

At the beginning it will be suffice to show several examples concerning missions' or churches' contributions and attainments both before and after Zambia's political independence in the fields of education and health in order to show their significance in comparison with the state.

Following tables show us that churches have been one of the indispensable components in the fields of education and health service at least since the colonial era. In fact, almost all missions considered the schools to be their most important means of Christianisation (Henkel, 1989: 125). Table 4-1 shows that education was almost offered by mission schools.

At the level of aim of education, Catholics and Protestants have had different perception of the role of education. The Catholics provide education to develop the whole person, while the Protestant do for the converts to read the Bible on their own (Henkel, 1989: 127). This difference can be "understood in the context of the respective missions

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[4]There are some other works on independent churches in Zambia by Dillon-Malone 1983a, 1983b).

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aims: The Catholics wanted to incorporate their converts into the Roman Catholic Church, founding for this only a new church province, whereas it was the aim of the Protestants to found independent... churches run by Africans, which, ..., were to be independent of the European missionaries" (Henkel, 1989: 127). As stated later, the fact that education was provided by churches also means that churches produced political elites.

Table 4-1 Numbers of Schools and Pupils in Northern Rhodesia: 1935-1954 (aided and unaided)

	1935		1945		1954	
	schools	pupils	schools	pupils	schools	pupils
Paris Evangelical Mission	77	4,524	119	11,339	116	13,096
Christian Mission in Many Lands	76	5,297	116	11,846	59	8,552
London Missionary Society	98	4,269	99	9,362	47	8,642
Methodist Mission	85	2,500	62	5,412	41	5,067
Church of Scotland Mission	286	8,556	231	17,149	72	10,700
Dutch Reformed Church Mission	492	29,294	346	19,291	98	10,085
Universities Mission to Central Africa	74	2,853	115	6,946	62	7,084
South Africa General Mission	46	1,396	48	2,826	43	4,155
Seventh-Day Adventists	66	2,983	83	7,004	79	9,874
Brethren in Christ	19	896	31	1,928	31	3,327
Salvation Army	9	397	35	3,561	28	3,288
South African Baptists	6	256	7	727	9	947
Pilgrim Holiness Church	6	266	19	930	27	2,810
Church of Christ	13	393	19	1,670	17	2,007
African Methodist Episcopal Church			6	415		
Scandinavian Baptists			2	314	6	507
United Missions to Copperbelt			8	5,179		
White Fathers	501	23,040	463	29,447	255	32,085
Jesuit Fathers	116	4,100	121	8,376	85	11,386
Capuchin Fathers	6	259	88	8,797	89	9,705
Franciscan Fathers	14	264	16	1,410	24	2 558
All Mission Schools	1,190	91,516	2,034	153,9587	1,188	145 874
Government and Local Education Authorities Schools	12	1,268	51	10,727	193	41 102
All Schools	2,002	92,784	2,085	164,684	1,265	186 97o

Source: Henkel, 1989 Table 7 p.128.

After independence, however, under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda, who was a mission teacher himself, the government started to invest a lot in the development of the educational system because the government could secure enough fund to run primary schools. In this development effort, many primary schools, which were originally run by churches, were handed over to the government just after independence, though some churches and organisations are still running some primary schools in collaboration with the government like Nahumba in Choma. While in 1963 two thirds of primary schools were in the hands of the missions, by 1967 the situation has reversed and two thirds were government school (Henkel, 1989: 137). And only the Pilgrim Holiness, the Brethren in Christ Mission and the Catholic, Anglican and Reformed Churches retained their school at this stage, but they too transferred their school later. This transfer was convenient for churches because some churches could get rid of the personnel and financial burdens. But it was also true that other churches feared the loss of influence in this area.

In contrast, as is shown in table 4-2 and 4-3, in secondary education, churches are still running schools in cooperation with the government or they are still managing without any material support from the government. In fact, in contrast to the primary school, only few secondary schools were transfered to the state. Alongside the churches, the government also concentrated effort of the expansion of the secondary education. However, the government's effort in secondary education was not qualitative but quantitative expansion, in the sense that the quality of education was not satisfactorily maintained (Henkel, 1989: 136). As a result, especially Catholic churches have had good reputation in their

quality of education[5]. In addition, churches have been involved in running pre-school educational institutions, and deaf schools.

Table 4-2 Categorisation of Secondary Schools in 1987

Province	Govern-ment	Aided	Self-help	Private	Other	Total
Central	7	3	10	2	-	22
Copper-belt	23	3	7	13	9	55
Eastern	8	2	4	1	6	21
Luapula	6	2	4	1	3	16
Lusaka	10	5	2	15	3	35
Northern	10	3	6	1	30	50
North-Western	4	1	5	-	2	12
Southern	9	14	3	5	6	35
Western	5	4	4	1	3	17
Total	80	37	45	39	62	263

* Grant Aided School which are run jointly by churches and the government support
+ Self-Help Schools are not financially supported by the government. Some of them are run by churches.
@ These schools fall under either the fifth Education Project or other development programmes.

Source: CCZ 1987, p34.

In this area, what can be pointed out is that after the weakening government financial situation, the churches, especially the Catholic, have been requested by the government to take over their former primary schools again (Henkel, 1989: 137). This episode also clearly tells us churches' significance in this area.

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[5]According to Henkel, who refereed to the Catholic magazine "Impact" (No.48, 1973), reported that in the 1972 exam five of the six most successful schools were Catholic and that as regards the success rate, 17 out of 22 Catholic schools were in the top 30 of the country's 95 school at that time (Henkel, 1989: 136).

Table 4-3 Secondary School Run By Members of the Christian Council of Zambia Enrolement 1984-1985

Province School (Church)	1984 Boys	Girls	Total	1985 Boys	Girls	Total	1986 Boys	Girls	Total
Central Chipembi (UCZ)	-	495	495	-	497	497	-	489	489
Copperbelt Ndola Modern (UCZ)	-	-	-	197	187	384	-	-	-
St. Barnabas (Anglican)	95	107	202	84	75	159	32	24	56
Muflira (Anglican)	94	86	180	73	55	128	55	57	112
Eastern St. Mary's Mosoro (Anglican)	-	-	-	102	-	102	104	-	104
Lusaka Kafue (UCZ)	728	-	-	668	-	668	714	-	714
Ebenezier (AME)	103	97	200	146	146	292	214	269	483
Southern Njase (UCZ)	-	839	839	-	803	803	-	888	888
Chikankata (Salvation)	333	185	518	339	199	538	350	216	566
Choma(BIC)	606	345	951	612	354	966	710	380	1090
Kabanga (COC)	-	-	-	76	56	132	-	-	136
Masuku (Weslyan)	91	96	187	81	106	187	-	-	-
Mosi-Oa-Tunya Macha (BIC)	71	340	411	85	315	400	90	350	440
St.Marks Choma	680	-	680	512	-	512	775	-	775
Western Sefula (UCZ)	387	368	755	494	-	494	427	349	776
Total	3188	2958	6146	3611	2950	6561	3471	3022	6855

Source: CCZ 1987 p.36. * National Total Enrolment.

In the field of health, as table 4-4, 4-5, 4-6(a), 4-6(b) show, hospitals managed by churches under the Churches Medical Association of Zambia have played a substantial role. Table 4-4 shows that missions' medical care facilities have been relatively well provided in North-Western, Southern and Eastern Provinces, where there are major church hospitals at Katete (Eastern Province) by the Anglicans and at Chikankata (Southern Province) by the Salvation Army (Henkel, 1989: 149). Table 4-5 shows that

churches' medical facilities are still substantial in terms of numbers in the case of hospitals, and also in terms of facilities (numbers of beds) in the case of rural health centres. Tables 4-6 (a) and 4 6 (b) also suggest the importance of churches in this field. In the issue area of health, the government and churches can be considered to be complementary.

Table 4-4 Health Care Provision in 1964 and its Development to 1981

| Province | Beds | Population/bed 1964 | New beds between 1964 and 1981 | | |
			State and Mining Companies	Churches	Total
Copperbelt	2,699	216	526	270	796
Luapula	640	552	506	151	657
Lusaka	648	333	534	168	702
Northern	942	596	827	307	1,134
North-Western	934	230	421	317	738
Eastern	1,190	408	665	483	1,148
Southern	1,359	347	734	555	1,299
Western	775	477	770	271	1,041
Central	703	451	477	-70*	407
Zambia	9,889	361	5,460	2,452	7,912

* Facilities handed over to the Government
Source: Henkel, 1989 Table 15 p.150.

Table 4-5 Distribution of Medical Facilities in 1985

| Category | Hospitals | | Rural Health Centres | |
	Number	Beds	Number	Beds
Government	53	11687	629	5701
ZEC	13	1724	25	920
CCZ(Members)	7	1320	10	350
EFZ(Members)	1	118	2	84
Evangelical Christian of Zambia(Members)	2	296	-	-
Independent Churches	6	805	8	220
Other Missions' Rural Health Centre	-	-	20	-
Total	82	15950	694	7275
% of Churches' Contribution	35.4	26.7	10.1	21.6
Attendance (New cases of out-patients)	3,946,243		10,112,643	
% of children treated under out-patients	44.7		53.8	

Source: Compiled from CCZ, 1987. Table 3.13 p.48.

Table 4-6(a) Comparison Between Church and Government District Hospitals

Church		Government	
Name	Number of Beds	Name	Number of Beds
Chavuma	60	Chinsali	84
Chikankata	263	Chipata	419
Chingola	220	Chitembo	128
Chitokoloki	178	Choma	310
Kalene Hill	210	Gwembe	56
Kamoto	82	Isoka	75
Kasaba	85	Kabompo	78
Kishikishi	184	Kabwe	556
Katondwe	112	Kafue	62
Katete	432	Kalabo	99
Loloma	94	Kamuchanga	80
Luampa	132	Kaoma	57
Lubwe	103	Kasama	329
Lukulu	121	Kawambwa	47
Macha	208	Livingstone	420
Mangango	110	Luwingu	49
Minga	142	Lundazi	137
Monze	225	Mansa	257
Mpanshya	82	Mazabuka	169
Mpongwe	118	Mbala	233
Mtendere	75	Mbereshi	150
Mukinge	165	Mongu	347
Mwami	184	Mpika	53
Mwandi	110	Mporokoso	95
Nyanje	157	Mumbwa	97
Sichili	145	Mwinilunga	78
St. Theresa Luanshya	115	Namwala	59
Yuka	79	Nyimba	73
Zimba	68	Petauke	65
		Senanga	140
		Serenje	62
		Sesheke	120
		Siavonga	60
		Solwezi	167
		Thompson	115
		Zambezi	122
Total	4258	Total	5529

Source: Compiled from CCZ 1987, pp. 52-53.

Table 4-6(b)Comparison between Church and Government District Hospitals

Range	Church Number	Number of Beds	Government Number	Number of Beds
Small: Up to 80 beds	5	367	14	870
Medium: 80-120 beds	10	1047	7	690
Large : 120-200 beds	8	1286	6	846
Big Hospitals 200+ Beds	6	1558	9	3123
Total	29	4258	36	5529

Source: CCZ undated, p.53.

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Just after independence, health care received a high priority in the first development plans of the new government. In this context, it was possible for churches to receive a much larger share of enlarged budgets for health service from the government. In fact, in comparison with the colonial period when average 5 percent of the total budget was subsidy to the churches, the percentage rose to 13 per cent in 1967 and 15 per cent in 1968, averaging 10 per cent between 1964 and 1975 (Henkel, 1989: 151). At that time, when the state could secure sufficient fund for health care, the missionary societies, which were drown together into the UCZ, slowly withdrew more and personnel and finance from this area and Zambian church no longer had the means to run its medical facilities. Therefore, several hospitals[6] were handed over to the state.

Especially after the deterioration of the Zambian economy, however, the government could no longer afford to carry out its plan to expand the health facilities. It is also true that the government could not get necessary staff, medicine and equipment. Therefore also in this area, there have been attempts to return hospitals to the sponsorship of the churches whose hospitals are relatively well managed by the recruitment of mission doctors and so on (Henkel, 1989: 152).

Apart from education and health, there is another area in which churches have played an important role in terms of assisting members to engage into production for the purpose of income generation. Therefore they have been involved in projects providing skill training to the disadvantaged and the youth so that they can be self-reliant. We now turn to ongoing churches' project in the next section.

4.1.3 Ongoing Projects and Policies of Churches: With Main Attention to the case of the Christian Council of Zambia

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[6]The hospitals transferred were hospitals in Mbereshi, Chitambo and Senanga.

4.1.3.1 Projects

As stated in the previous section, a variety of churches have been involved in development activities especially in the areas of education and health. Although their emphases are different for theological reasons, churches in Zambia are supposed to share common attitudes toward development activities as will be shown in this part of the chapter.

In comparison with the Catholic Church which is composed of nine autonomous dioceses in their development activities even in terms of finance, the development activities of the CCZ are not so widely distributed in geographical terms (Henkel, 1989: 198). Even so, their activities have been by far more diversified and distributed than the EFZ whose activities have just recently started by its small secretariat.

The origin of the CCZ can be traced back to a loose confederation under the general Missionary Conference (GMC) which existed between 1914 and 1944. The members of the GMC were missionary societies working in Northern Rhodesia at that period. The role of the GMC was to forge cooperation among missionary societies and to work together in the fields of education, medical services and religious broadcasting. In addition, the GMC's role included to advise the colonial government on national issues because it was then dominated by missionaries from abroad. At this stage, there were few efforts to integrate native Africans into the administration of the GMC, though they not only had interests in the problem of "backwardness" of natives but also considered to treat with it, as can be found in the paper titled "The Future of the Native" read at the conference at Kafue in 1929:

"...We call the natives the backward races; and rightly so in many opinion. We need first to find out what is the cause of this backwardness".

"If Christianity is to save Africa it seems to me that it must be the Christianity of Christ in its simple form" (ZNA, RC/365, pp.9-10).

In 1944, the GMC was changed to the Christian Council of Northern Rhodesia (CCNR), which was used until 1963 just before Zambia attained independence. This was the crucial period when Northern Rhodesia was struggling for independence. Attitude of the CCNR to the liberation struggle will be mentioned later in this chapter.

Even at this stage, natives were excluded from the CCNR's activities, though the CCNR had experienced pressure and need for native Africans to be involved in the CCNR. This is also the period when the CCNR struggled to solve internal problem of inimical sectionalism on the issue of "racism" within the members particularly in the Copperbelt.

It was at the first pre-independence meeting held in Kitwe that the members of various denominations formally formed the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ). This was the first time when S.H. Chilehse, an African, was elected chairman and four Africans were also elected members of the first executive committee. In 1965, Rev. P. Kazhila was elected general secretary, and the CCZ has been administrated by Zambians since then.

Since its inception, it has passed through three distinctive stages (CCZ, 1987:2-3): (1) From 1964 to 1971, (2) from 1972 to 1984, and (3) from 1985. In the first stage, the efforts the CCZ were devoted to promote cooperation, fellowship, unity and Evangelical work within Zambia. During this formative period, the CCZ played an active role in promoting dialogue with Government on matters related to stability, freedom of worship, health, social welfare, race relations, human rights and dignity of

mankind. The strengthening of Local Christian Council in Zambia was given top priority. In the second stage, however, the main focus of the CCZ was shifted to promote it to be known in the international scene and exert its involvement in such World Christian bodies as the World Council of Churches, All Africa Conference of Churches. In the country, its activities include education, skills training, women activities, refugee work, construction of the Church House, and creation of the Local Christian Councils. Even though members churches and organisations were deeply involved in development work, the CCZ has not yet got its development policy at this stage. It was in the third stage when the CCZ and other church organisations were pressed to answer the call of people in the worsening economic situation in Zambia that they stressed the need for embarking on "total liberalisation process". In this process, the CCZ organised a workshop for member churches and organisations with other mother bodies in October 1986 to plan together a new development strategy, which resulted in a booklet *Christian Liberation Justice and Development: The Churches' Concern for Human Development in Zambia*, which is the basic but crucial document which contains churches' recognition of deteriorating economy and their way of involvement to solve problems. Also the CCZ itself issued a Development Projects for the period of 1986-1988 towards People's Liberation Through Social Justice and Development with more than hundred pages.

The organisational structure of the CCZ is shown in figure 4-1.

The General Conference, which is represented by two delegates from member churches, plus a proportion based on Church membership, and one delegate for associate members like Christian organisations, is the top decision-making body and is held at least once in every three years. The Executive Committee carries out the general policy of the Council with the assistance of the Standing Committee which is appointed by the

Executive Committee. There are other Committees which are appointed in the General Conference that deal with special matters like women's work, refugee work, development involvement, education and youth work. The General Secretary, who is the chief executive for the Council, is responsible for implementation of the decisions of the Council and the day to day running of affairs. Under the General Secretary, various departments are carrying out projects.

In spite of the involvement in some refugee projects including education, general assistance, and awareness building, the three main areas in which member churches of the CCZ and the CCZ itself have been involved are education, health and income generating activities.

Figure 4-1 Organisational Chart of the Christian Council of Zambia

Among various projects carried out by the Project Department of the CCZ, the "Twafwane Programme" (Twafwane, in Cibemba meaning "Let us work together") has been quite important in some ways. This programme began in its pilot stage in 1975, and it has been expanded since 1980 when the Projects Department was established to revamp the activities of the programme for school leavers, a programme aimed at training of school youths with skills for self-employment in their communities of origin. "The Twafwane experience has clearly demonstrated that for a programme as radical in approach as the Twafwane programme, a limitless amount of commitment by the implementing staff is necessary" (CCZ, undated: 6). Two identified components of approach through this project's experience in implementing school leavers projects are (1) the organisation of the local Committee of the CCZ for the purpose of conscientising the local community on the development process, and (2) the identification of appropriate training structure, relevant in content to the local conditions. In 1990, there had been 52 school leavers projects established by using the Twafwane approach in such areas as agriculture, carpentry, and tailoring. These projects had successfully trained and settled youths in their communities of origin. Therefore the first importance of this project is that this project has fostered community relation patterns among youths and has promoted an awareness of their isolation and deprivation of institutional allocation of resources. The second importance of this project is its influence on a change of government structure and policy. By adopting this approach as the official policy of youth training, the government created the Ministry of Youth and Sport during the Third National Development Plan (TNDP) between 1979 and 1983, after failing to establish the Department of Youth under the Ministry of Education during the Second National Development Plan (SNDP). When we read

the section of the youth development in the TNDP, we can find the similar programme as the Twafwane, namely production skill training, community-based skill training, youth settlement schemes (TNDP: 412). Therefore, it can be considered that CCZ kept some influence on state policy in this regard.

Another important project of the CCZ, the Small Projects Fund, was initiated in 1983 with assistance from the EZE of West Germany. It is a programme that offers grants and a wide range of community development services for poor rural, peri-urban and urban people as well in the areas of agriculture, livestock, carpentry and cottage industry. This has been designed to provide a fast flexible response for local self-help activities to overcome poverty and shortcomings for further development and has funded 43 projects around the end of 1980s. We can read the premise and vision behind this programme as follows:

> "The Small Projects Fund is based on the premise that for a vast majority of population to have poverty is a social sin. It is immoral because the style and structure that continue to maintain man in dehumanised stance are created by man. It is from this view that we recognise that the onslaught against poverty can need be achieved by radical changes in societal structure. Hence the need to mobilize the small local groups at the grassroots for effective control of social-political-economic structures that influence their destiny"(CCZ, undated leaflet, *The Small Projects Fund Programme: "Tool for Development"*: 4).

Here, in order to consider Zambian churches' philosophy of development activities, I return to and review briefly the booklet *Christian Liberation justice and Development: The Churches' concern for Human Development in Zambia* (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987), in which the leaders of the Christian churches in Zambia expressed their responsibility

and concerns as members of their society. Their basic stance is shown as follows:

> "The mission of the churches is religious but, for Christians, religion is not merely a private or spiritual matter reduced to acts of Evangelical piety or ritual. Indeed, from this religious mission comes a light, an insight and an energy which contribute greatly to the development of human societies. The churches have a vision of the individual dignity of men and women and the Christian society of shared interests and social justice"(CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 14).

They recognised their roles and limitations by writing:

> "The churches have always been involved in the fields of social welfare, health, education and the promotion of human development. However, it can be argued that their role in the overall development of the country has not been comprehensive enough. Many feel that the determination of the churches to protect human rights and religious freedom has not always been sensitive enough to the many forms of social and economic exploitation and injustice from which people seek liberation" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 10).

One of the important concerns of churches in Zambia shown explicitly in this document is criticism of the tendency of the widening gap which separates the 'haves' from 'have-nots.' They interpret this "crisis" through class analysis, when they wrote that:

> "Economic and social classes ... reflect institutionalized injustice... Instead of increasing divisions in the nation between rich and poor, they should aim at a more equal distribution of the national wealth. They should also strive for a more just sharing out of the sacrifices which need to be made. No one sector of the population should be expected to have to bear a disproportionate burden"(CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 26).

Their concern is thus to relieve this kind of injustice by being involved in programmes for the disadvantaged, especially peasant farmers in rural areas. They feel the necessity to participate in bodies responsible for the planning and monitoring of rural development at local or district level (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 28) and the importance of allocating additional resources including health, education, transport and recreational facilities in order to make rural life more worthwhile and more attractive (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 29). These attitudes can be summarised in a following paragraph:

"As it is an essential dimension of the church's mission to uphold the rights and interests of the under-privileged, we shall give our full support to measures designed to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, and to alleviate the hardships of low-income groups" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 31).

Considering these dimensions of churches' concerns, it is possible for us to find that several features of churches' approach for development projects. In fact, churches' terminology like peasant farmers, under-privileged, and the poor have to be clarified. In a part of the document, titled "Suggestions for Special Areas of Concern," more specific target groups are mentioned. They are small peasants who did not have any organisational forms of "pressure groups," and female-headed household (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 26-27). They were considered to be "voiceless" and becoming more and more vulnerable and marginalised (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987). In fact, projects of the CCZ are almost situated in rural areas[7]. In the case of Catholic Churches, however, their development projects are geographically more widely distributed and include some urban projects like homecraft centre

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[7]Henkel's conclusion that all projects are in rural areas in the case of the CCZ (1989: 200) is now misleading because there is a women's project in the semi-urban area of Kaunda Square.

in the Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces. Therefore, churches' target groups are poor urban dwellers as well as poor peasants.

Even so, Zambian churches have been more ideologically oriented and active in political affairs, because they sometimes use "language" containing political connotations. This tendency is more apparent when they talk about churches' relationship with the state to which I turn shortly.

4.1.3.2 Financial Resources

The mainline churches' financial resources are mainly from "ecumenical partners" overseas. This fact offered relative strength of these churches financial position in Africa. In this section, their financial dependence on "ecumenical partners" will be briefly considered by refering to the case of the CCZ (see Table 4-7).

The CCZ received funds from "ecumenical partners" through its projects and individual department not through the central administration. Therefore, there are multiple channels in the organisation of the CCZ in terms of receiving funds.

According to an available report of auditors of the CCZ (1982), which details of sources of grant can be identified, almost all income for general administration for the CCZ, apart from rent income of the Church House, derived from its "ecumenical partners," namely the World Council of Churches (WCC), the Methodist Church (USA), the United Church of Canada, United Presbyterian Church (USA), and the United Methodist Church (USA). Also in the Department of Refugee, the WCC contributed 30 per cent of its funds. Unfortunately, the date appeared in the document was not completed. However, roughly speaking, between 25

to 30 per cent of total budget for activities of the CCZ was covered by grants from these "ecumenical partners."

Table 4-7 Ecumenical Partners of the CCZ

Agricultural Missions, New York
All Africa Conference of Churches, Nairobi
Bread for the World, Stuttgart
Christian Aid, London
CODEL, New York
CUSO Projects, Lusaka
Dan Church Aid
Diakonisches Wer EKD, Germany
Dienste in Urbarse, Stuttgart
Discipline of Christ, Dutch, Indianapolis
EMW Communication Commission
ESP, Stuttgart
EZE, Germany
Gossner Mission, Germany (then East)
Heifer Project International, Arkansas
ICCO, Netherlands
Inter Church Aid Evangeliches, Netherlands
Lutheran World Federation, Uppsala
Lutheran World Federation, Lusaka
National Council of Churches, USA
National Council of Churches of Christ, New York
Netherlands Missionary Council
Norwegian Church Aid
Presbyterian Hunger Programme, Atlanta
Presbyterians in the USA, New York
The Hunger Project, New York
United Church of Canada
United Church of Christ
United Methodist Church
United Presbyterian Church, USA
World Council of Churches
World Vision International

Source: Compiled from CCZ, 1987: 68

Apart from them, rent income was a major part of financial resources, and other sources of income were donations from member churches, fund gained as a result of raising activities, grants from other international organisations like UNHCR.

It is also necessary to refer to government grants. In fact, the financial year of 1982, there was quite limited grants (only 60 kwacha to the

Multi-purpose centre) from the state, which was almost nothing considering the total amount of income of this year (341,905 Kwacha).

## 4.1.4 Political Involvement of Zambian Churches

In this section, I will deal with Zambian churches involvement in political affairs. Firstly I will briefly take the case of churches' concern about the issue of the Central African Federation before independence. Secondly, my focus will shift to the case of controversy of introduction of "scientific socialism" in educational institution. And thirdly I will consider the political involvement of churches in the process of transition to multi-party politics.

4.1.4.1 From Colonial Period to Political Independence

The Churches' concerns about "national affairs" have been concisely documented (Weller & Linden, 1984: 191-200). These include the effective campaign by missionaries against the tax systems which were imposed on Africans by the British Colonial Office in early colonial administration days, and the opposition to the Federation. Their limited political characteristics can be observable concerning the case of their concern about the issue of Federation. At the fifth meeting of the Christian Council of Northern Rhodesia in 1953, member churches resolved that:

> 'The Christian Council of Northern Rhodesia recognises that it is
> primarily the right of every Christian to hold his own view on the
> issue of Federation in the light of his own conscience, but it wishes to
> express deep concern that the Government has found it necessary to
> proceed with Federation while African opinion remains so strongly
> opposed to it. The Council respectfully requests Government to issue
> such a declaration of Rights for all men within the territory as

shall remove all doubts as to their future well-being within the State. The Christian Council hopes that Africans will be given an increasing share in the educational, industrial and political life of the State... The Christian Council reminds all sections of the Community of the importance of avoiding any action which might possibly lend to violence and of promoting goodwill between races in every possible way" (CCNR, 1953: 13).

This resolution can be read that the Council was not united on the matter, and in fact this is a period when the unity of the Missionary Conference was beginning to show cracks, even though this showed churches' protest against the idea of the Federation to some extent, writing that "African opinion remains so strongly opposed to it." Therefore this limited involvement actually "did not prevent a deep and wide feeling of betrayal among African Christians" (Weller & Linden, 1984: 197).

It was when Federation was not fulfilling the promises that were made when it was imposed at the end of the 1950s and the Federation's leaders were campaigning for Dominion status that the churches expressed explicitly their political position seeking independent status of the Northern Rhodesia (Weller & Linden, 1984: 198-199), as was shown in a Kenneth Kaunda's remark; "there is one bright light in Northern Rhodesia; the churches have come out and said what they think is wrong," when he read a statement of the Executive of the Christian Council in 1959:

"Under normal circumstances the Church is bound to support the State and the forces aimed at preserving law and order, but this obligation is qualified by the Church's higher loyalty to the law of God. Where the State is misguiding its stewardship of power; where it is not adequately fulfilling its function of protecting the God-given freedom of all citizens; where it is favouring one section of the community to determinant of the others, then Christian is called to

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protest and to take whatever action is compatible with the Christian Gospel" (quoted in Weller & Linden, 1984: 199).

This position can be also ascertained in the eighth meeting of the Council held in the same year, when they resolved that:

> "The Christian Council of Northern Rhodesia (recognising the opposition to the concept of Federation which already exists among the great majority of the inhabitants of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland), believes that any increase in the powers of Federal Government forward complete autonomy within the Commonwealth may only rightly be granted when it is based upon the full consent of the majority of the people of the Federation"(CCNR, 1960).

With the achievement of political independence, the opportunities for Christian influence became greater than ever, because President Kaunda "showed himself willing to seek the advise, not only of Colin Morris[8], and of other trusted missionaries, but also of the Zambian leaders who were now achieving position of authority in all the churches" (Weller & Linden, 1984: 199-200). In fact, there have been regular consultations which President Kaunda has held with clergies (Tasie & Gray, 1978: 8) and as in the case of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, the churches' network has provided as effective bridge between the local communities and the wider, national leadership (Cook, 1978: 288-293). Therefore, it is possible to consider that mainstream Christian churches gained a influential position *vis-a-vis* the ruling elites in post-colonial Zambian politics. This shows us a dimension of mainstream churches' institutionalisation in Zambia.

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[8] Colin Morris, who was a minister of one of congregations in Chingola of the United Church of Central Africa in Rhodesia, played an important role in the political life of the country before and after independence. He was the only person who was willing to incur unpopularity from members of one party, who gained the confidence of the opposing one, and who gained the confidence of African nationalists to a remarkable degree. After independence, he was one of most trusted advisers of the new president, Kenneth Kaunda.

Here it is also necessary to briefly refer to the role of churches' contribution to elite formation. It is generally well known that the mission had a influence on, especially the first generation of, national elites who got political power after political independence. Zambia is also the case. For instance both Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe, the former vice President and founder of the banned United Progressive Party, were pupils at Lubwa mission school and teachers at mission schools. In historical terms, Munali and Chalimbana are most famous schools where the first generation national elites attended. According to Henkel (1989: 138), there is a degree of balance between the denominations in state leadership in comparison with Malawi, where the Presbyterian Church is dominant in upper leadership level. As we see below, relatively close link between churches and political elites has sustained churches' influence on Zambia's political affairs.

4.1.4.2 Church's Opposition to the Introduction of "Scientific Socialism" in the Educational System

As Haynes characterised, Zambia is supposed to be a case that:

> "it was highly important even for apparently stable regimes to have a reasonable working relationship with mainstream religious organizations, because otherwise the latter may form their own alliance with important interest groups to engineer a situation where the government finds itself under heavy pressure to amend its policies" (1996: 102).

Therefore, generally speaking, churches' approach to the state was not necessarily hostile, but basically collaborative as far as their interests were not in danger of being damaged. It is only particular times when not only churches but also the country faced "crisis" that church leaders "felt

compelled to speak out ... on issues for national development" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 44).

The case of churches' strong resistance against the UNIP government's introduction of "scientific socialism" in all educational institution within the context of the nationwide educational reform between 1976 and 1982 is a dramatic example of the upsurge of civil society against the one-party state and its ideology. This event had basically two aspects. On the one hand, seemingly, it was a debate concerning the philosophical interpretation of "Zambian Humanism", the official ideology of Zambia. On the other hand, it was a power game between the state and churches. It was agreed that it was the churches that won over the game[9], considering the outcome of this controversy that the government did not introduce scientific socialism as a subject in the educational system. In other words, churches seceded in preventing the introduction of scientific socialism by effectively resisting against the state.

In this controversy, in my view, the most important factor working during this debate was not moral superiority on the side of the churches but the political power of Zambian churches as actors in civil society, which I will prove in this section.

Problems which prompted the UNIP government to initiate educational reform, which resulted in a government document *Education for Development: Draft Statement on Educational Reform* in 1976, included the shortage of places for education at various levels of the school system which caused problems of drop-outs and unemployment of youth. Originally churches were in favour of the reforms and participation in the debate. But two problems occurred at this stage, heightening churches' criticism. There were (1) the exclusion of religious education

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[9]It was when President Kaunda banned open discussion on this issue in 1982 that this debate itself was practically over (Lungu, 1986: 400).

from the proposed curriculum, and (2) uses of all suitable churches and church buildings as classrooms to alleviate the shortage of school accommodation. The first problem was related to the shift to a socialist interpretation of Zambian Humanism. Against this proposal, churches used a theological interpretation of churches' building as "holy places", which could not be allowed to be used for secular purposes. On the first problem, which was supposed to mar the church's interests, churches developed their own interpretation of Zambian Humanism as an ideology which safeguarded selected aspects of Zambian traditions as well as Christian norms and values (Draisma, 1987: 344-346) in order to prevent the intrusion of atheistic tendency of communism and Marxism. As will be clarified soon, this was also one of the tactics of churches' opposition to the introduction of "scientific socialism" in the following years (cf. Lungu, 1986: 399). As a result, a new draft of proposal, which came out in 1977, *Educational Reform: Proposals and Recommendations* took churches' opinions into consideration and included spiritual and moral education among important areas of learning.

In 1979, there arose another, more severe, tension between the state and churches after several statements of a plan for the introduction of "scientific socialism" as a subject at all educational institutions. For example, in one of the addresses made by UNIP Secretary General Mainza Chona, who was charged to lead the debate on Scientific Socialism as an instrument to achieve Humanism, at Lusaka's Roman Catholic Cathedral to mark World Peace Day in January 1979, he expressed his view of the co-existence of Christianity and socialism. In addition, in late 1978 when the Union of Working Class Youths was set up by UNIP, the union's publicity secretary Njekwa Anamela announced the Party's intention to arm the working class youth with revolutionary theory founded on the basis of scientific socialism (*National Mirror*, February 1979: 1). Therefore,

seemingly, there was division among leadership within UNIP (e.g., Draisma, 1989: 417). The church was suspicious and concerned about this issue because scientific socialism is identified with Marxism which condemns Christianity as the "opium of the masses" in their interpretation, a view which the churches felt was also shared by some UNIP advocates.

The churches' effective reaction to this problem was initiated with the issue of a pastoral letter from the leaders of the Christian Churches, which has been sometimes used as a tool by Zambian churches to inform people of important issues, entitled *Marxism, Humanism and Christianity*. It was published in August 1979 by leaders of three mother bodies of churches in Zambia, including two archbishops and seven bishops of the Zambia Episcopal Conference, General Secretary of the Christian Council of Zambia, and James Hess of the Zambia Evangelical Fellowship. This is a document in which the church explicitly showed the areas of disagreement between scientific socialism and Zambian Humanism.

In this document, leaders of churches argued that the "Scientific Socialism," which the UNIP government planned to introduce as a subject of education, is completely contradictory to UNIP's official philosophy, Zambian Humanism. The churches' basic stance can be read that "Zambian Humanist Socialism has a completely different basis from Scientific Socialism"(*Marxism, Humanism and Christianity*: 11). They showed their understanding of Zambian Humanist Socialism by quoting a paragraph of Kaunda's Humanism in Zambia, Part 1 as follows: in Zambian Humanism,

> "Man is the centre of all human activity. All of us are God's creatures
> and this is a firm enough foundation to see us through what we are
> about to do -- that is to lay down a solid foundation on which to build

One Zambia and One Nation. The world, then, and all that is in it
must serve man, while man himself is centred on God" (*Marxism,
Humanism and Christianity*: 9).

On the other hand, scientific socialism, in this document, was interpreted
to be

"thoroughly opposed to Christianity and even to a simple belief in
God" (*Marxism, Humanism and Christianity*: 7),

because it is "uncompromisingly atheistic" (*Marxism, Humanism and
Christianity*: 6). Therefore,

"... We differ profoundly from Marxists in our understanding of the
human person, so that Marxist Humanism is also radically different
from Christian Humanism" (*Marxism, Humanism and
Christianity*:12)

and

'The Christian Churches find it necessary to reject only those forms
of Socialism which do not respect the dignity and religious
dimension of man and which, therefore, can never lead to real
humanism. Scientific Socialism is one of these" (*Marxism,
Humanism and Christianity*: 4).

In conclusion, this pastoral letter gave the clear message to Zambians,
which implied strong stances against the oppressive political system
related to the view of "liberation theology" developed in Latin America:

"Dear Brothers and Sisters, we must warn you that, if Zambia
follows a Marxist-Leninist, Scientific-Socialist path, then the
freedoms enshrined in our constitution will be threatened. We can,
indeed, expect the kind of pressure on religion and personal freedom

that is found wherever this inhumane doctrine is applied. Before it is too late, we call on all our Church members to take a stand so as to protect our present liberties. Many members and leaders of the Ruling Party are Christians. We ask them to do all in their power to keep the Party true to its own principles. Now is the time for every one to take political life seriously and not to allow an oppressive system to be introduced because of their indifference and inactivity" (*Marxism, Humanism and Christianity*: 21-22).

Also in 1979, on the church-owned monthly newspaper, the *National Mirror*, there appeared various articles on Marxism, including its history (no. 80) and relationship with Christianity (no. 81). One of Kaunda's responses to this issue can be found in his address to the 14th UNIP National Council (*National Mirror*, no. 88). In this address he argued several topics related to the churches' concerns, including problems of capitalism, relationship between Marxism and Christianity, and denial of the replacement of Humanism by scientific socialism. But he did not mention relationship between Humanism and scientific socialism which was the main churches' concern. What he suggested was that he found the Marxist condemnation of religion as the opium of the masses "an interesting and important case for deeper study and analysis insofar as I understand religion in the form of Christianity", and that "Marxists and church leaders should meet from time to time and discuss matters of common interest" (*National Mirror*, no. 88). Apart from this address, there had not been any comments on this issue from the UNIP side for some two years, although there appeared several articles related to the topic of Christianity, socialism and Zambian Humanism in the *National Mirror* (e.g., no. 124, no. 132, no. 133). In addition, in one issue, there appeared an article entitled "Marxism Scores", which took the issue of the Syllabus for Political-Ideological Education published by the Ministry of education and Culture for Teacher Training College containing a section

of political education at every level (*National Mirror*, no. 137), to which church leaders were opposed in the following year.

It was in 1982 when the first church leaders' seminar on Humanism and Development was held at Mulungushi Hall that President Kaunda again gave voice to the issue of the introduction of scientific socialism in schools with the intention that this was "an exercise to try and get to the root cause of our misunderstanding" (*Daily Mail*, 29 April 1982). He addressed that

"We will start the teaching of scientific socialism in schools
not because of fear but out of conviction. We want our children
to know what scientific socialism is all about because it exists
and this will be part of their political education,"

and stressed that the Party has no intention to indoctrinate young people with scientific socialism and would not suppress all youth organisations in favour of the Young Pioneers (*Daily Mail*, 19 March 1982). At this time, the reaction from church leaders' was quite similar as that in 1979. They

"reiterated that in order to better Zambian society, we accept
Zambian Humanism as opposed to Scientific Socialism as the
vehicle to organise our society. We do not need any other form
of socialism to support or even achieve the Humanism we
have accepted. Therefore, we totally reject 'Scientific
Socialism'. Further, we endorse the open letter written by our
Church leaders. In that letter they have spelt out clearly our
opposition. We would like to avoid a stage where class
conflict, loss of basic human rights and mutual trust, and
violation of conscience by coercion in the development of our
society" (Christian Responses made at the First Church
Leaders' Seminar on Humanism and Development: 18,).

In the same year, another churches' response on this issue came from the United Church of Zambia (UCZ) to which Kaunda himself belongs. They expressed their disagreement quite frankly as follows:

"We the Synod of the UCZ fear that the embracing of the foundation principles of scientific socialism will lead to the Marxist system being imposed on our nation. With its rigid doctrine governing not only social, political, and economic theory, but hampering Christians as it has been imposed upon people of other nations. The UNIP Party claims that "believers of Marxist/Leninism of communism are allies of those who believe in Humanism." We do not accept believers in Marxist/Leninism of communism as our allies, because of their treatment of Christians. While this does not mean the UNIP will automatically follow the examples of the Marxist parties, it is not foolish of the church to worry that might become true in some future" (UCZ, 1982: 10-11).

And they warned and suggested that:

"... we would like to reiterate our fears of the Party's intentions to introduce Scientific Socialism at primary schools and teacher training colleges. This approach is similar to the strategy that has been adopted in countries which have Marxist/Leninist Parties who try to influence tender minds beginning at kindergarten levels and systematically going up the educational system. Our concern is that if we emulated this programme blindly and introduced it into our educational system, we shall be sowing seeds of contradictions in the nation's thought process, and consequently destructive political instability would become the order of the day" (UCZ, 1982: 14).

and that

"The Synod of the United Church of Zambia is disappointed at the lack of Zambia's self-confidence and consistency in developing its own philosophy. Instead, the political leaders seem to be vacillating between and being swayed hither and thither by foreign ideologies. We should have thought that as a non-aligned country, we should retain this alignment in political ideologies as well. Our approach would have been to

incorporate into the philosophy of Humanism a balanced
assortment of constructive concepts and practices from other
nations and which fit into our unique experiment of nation
building" (UCZ, 1982: 15).

In this controversy, we should not overlook another aspect of
conflict between the state and the church. It is that of control of churches
by the state. In the opening address of the seminar held at Mulungushi
Hall, Kaunda said that:

> "We regard religious organisations and you the leaders as *important
> instruments of the Party* and its task of transforming our present
> society into a Humanist one" (*Daily Mail*, 19 March 1982, emphasis
> added).

and after mentioning that the Party has no intention to indoctrinate
young people with scientific socialism and would not suppress all youth
organisations in favour of the Young Pioneers, he continued to say that:

> "If this were so, organisations such as scouts, girls guides, boys'
> brigade and others would be banned. what the Party is doing is to get
> all these other organisations affiliated to the Party Youth League"
> (*Daily Mail*, 19 March 1982).

The United Church of Zambia sharply opposed this interpretation
of the role of the church in society when they said that:

> "It is our concern that UNIP in its statements misunderstands the
> role of the church in a society... We the Church owe our existence to
> God alone. On Him alone are we dependent. We are not the
> instrument of a political party or a government... If the task that we
> have received from God coincides with the interests of a Party or a
> government, the relationship between the church and the state will
> be one of mutual benefit. If the task received from God differs from
> the interests of the Party, there will be conflict when the Party or
> government seeks to impose its will on the independent church.
> Conflict will also arise when each seeks to influence the direction of

a nation. If the state recognises the independence of the church, the conflict over direction will be creative and will benefit the nation" (UCZ, 1982: 10, emphasis added).

This clearly shows us the churches' intention to keep their autonomy from the state in both political and economic fields. This can be taken as the basic churches' idea of their relationship with the state in Zambia.

What is important in this case is that, as Lungu pointed out (Lungu, 1986: 400), churches' reactions were not confined to these letters and there were several prayer meetings against socialism. Christians in the country was called to pray and fast by church leaders on 29 May 1982 to reflect on the proposed introduction of scientific socialism in schools (*Daily Mail*, 27 May 1982). Actually "hundreds of Christians on Saturday converged at Ndola's Cathedral of Christ the King for ecumenical service to pray, reflect and fast against the proposed teaching of scientific socialism in schools" (*Daily Mail*, 31 May 1982).

One episode which shows us the unpopularity of the introduction of scientific socialism in the period was that one of lecturers of Zambia Institute of Technology (ZIT) was shouted down when he supported its introduction in schools (*Daily Mail*, 17 May 1982).

In fact, there was no clear end of this debate. Apparently, this controversy faded away without any clear compromises between the church and the state. Even churches' leaders do not clearly know the result (Personal Interview with the Acting General Secretary of Zambia Episcopal Conference, 16th January 1992), but the fact is that "scientific socialism" was not introduced. In the process of this debate, even issues to be discussed were not so clear, because the churches resisted the ideology of scientific socialism itself in its relationship with Zambian Humanism, while Kaunda's argument was limited to the introduction of scientific

socialism as a subject. It is unclear that "what exactly the Zambian advocates of introducing scientific socialism in education have in mind" (Draisma, 1987: 421) at this stage.

What is interesting is that, in 1987, there appeared a work by Henry Meebelo, a "brain" and politician of UNIP, titled *Zambian Humanism and Scientific Socialism: A Comparative Study*, in which he wrote that "the type of socialism referred to in Zambian Humanism is neither the so-called *African Socialism* nor *democratic socialism* or *social democracy*, ... but *Scientific Socialism*" (Meebelo, 1987: 6, original emphasis). This fact eventually shows us that there was no confirmed idea of the relationship between Zambian Humanism and various kinds of socialism, especially scientific socialism as early as 1982 among top UNIP members as mentioned above, which tells us a reason of ambiguity of the intention of advocates in the UNIP. This was why the controversy in 1982 seemed not to be a philosophical debate *per se*.

Therefore, it is possible to assume that there were other reasons for the apparent victory of the church. Now we are turning to the reasons from which churches' power in its relation to the state has been derived. As pointed out by Lungu (1986: 400-401), several reason can be identifiable. What he pointed out were (1) the strong Christian background of the leadership, (2) churches' role in social development, and (3) the churches' style of criticism against the state. The first point is quite true, taking into consideration the fact that Kaunda himself is a practicing member of UCZ and other high-ranking politicians are either Catholic or Protestant. This is a natural result of the missions' involvement in the field of education. Especially Kaunda came from the "mission milieu" and had his closest advisers from missionaries (Henkel, 1989: 138). Also Kaunda's Humanism clearly has a religious aspect, whose origin can be traced back to his close association with G.A. Krapf, a German theologian working at the Mindolo

Ecumenical Centre (Henkel, 1989: 138) as some scholars have pointed out (e.g., Dillon-Malone, 1989). Furthermore, churches are supposed to play important roles for the attainment of Humanism. We can find this tendency when Kaunda said, at the 25th anniversary of the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation in 1983, that:

> "As we move to the high stage of Humanism in the next five years, I see the Church as the living spiritual fountain of this nation. No other institution can play this role because no other institution is adequate even to claim this role itself" (*National Mirror*, no. 187).

There is another episode which shows churches' influence derived from leaders' Christian background. In fact, there was suggestion from top politicians to Kaunda to arrest some church leaders during the period of this controversy. But Kaunda himself declined this suggestion (Personal Interview with Rev. F. Sakala, 23rd December 1991). Therefore top politicians also had to seriously take the meaning of "prayers" which are seemingly "symbolical" forms of resistance of Christians.

The second factor is also important because the state and the church in Zambia have played complementary roles in development activities both in attitudes and practices. The churches themselves appreciate "the importance of good relationships and collaboration between the churches and the state for well-being of the nation," and they "have indeed been loyal in our collaboration with the state especially in the fields of health, education and rural development" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 14), as already stated in the earlier part of this chapter. Actually this attitude of churches was confirmed even in practical terms by my interviews with some church leaders and officers working for churches' development projects. Responding to my questions if there have been any conflicts between the government and churches in development fields, and if there have been any interventions from the government in churches' development

projects, all respondents said "no." This involvement certainly has institutionalised churches as indispensable component in Zambian society, 'which has been appreciated by the government. Also in weakening financial conditions, churches became more important vehicles in developmental activities.

The third factor is quite manifestly shown in the letters issued in 1979 and 1982. Churches "praised the government for introducing what amounts to Christian Humanism, and even join the leadership in condemning exploitative capitalism, yet politely but firmly rejected scientific socialism" (Lungu, 1986: 401). In the second republic, churches repeatedly praised and appreciated Zambian Humanism because it "has its root in our traditional values. It has helped the Zambian people to rediscover their identity. It is person-centred but not materialistic. It fits our idea of development as being progress from what is less human to what is more human" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 4). But it is quite doubtful if all church leaders really appreciated the Zambian Humanism, when we can find a passage written by a church leader, who is General Secretary of the EFZ:

> "The political ideology of Humanism was attacked by the church as
> a philosophy which puts man at the centre of society, instead of
> God, this never works. Humanism is a disaster. Most Zambians don't
> even understand humanism anyway" (Rev. Imakando, 1992: 3).

This was written after Zambia's multi-party election in October 1991, when the UNIP's one-party rule was over, and Humanism was almost abandoned as national policy. Even so this interpretation is completely contradictory to the previous one. This contradiction itself tells us that churches have acted based on political calculations, and thus how they can be institutional critics of the state in Zambia. Therefore the "style" of criticism is considered to have been deliberately created. But there is what

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we should not miss. It is that the usage of "letters" and especially "prayers" have never been only religious "symbols" which are used to express churches' concerns. But these have been used by church leaders as "political tools" to influence the state. This experience of controversy confirmed churches' tactics in order to respond to national crises.

Another factor which should be taken is churches' mobilisational power. In any sense, forms of opposition such as letters and prayers have to be substantially supported by a large number of people in order to be influential. On this point, churches have quite vast networks all over the country. Moreover a majority of Zambians are Christians. Therefore, as it happened in cases of "prayers" against the introduction of socialism, churches can gather a lot of support among members, when the main three church bodies take concerted actions.

These factors were also working in the process of transition to multi-party politics in Zambia, to which we turn next.

4.1.4.3 The Churches' Role in the Transition Period to Multi-party Politics and in the Third Republic

Since the controversy of the introduction of scientific socialism was over, there had not been conflicts between the state and Christian churches. In the meantime, however, Christian churches continued to express its concerns in the form of pastoral letter. One of the most important documents in this period is *Christian Liberation : Justice and Development*, prepared by the CCZ, the EFZ and the ZEC in 1987, which was already refered to in the present study. This document covered wide aspects of human life, including such issues as socio-economic development, democracy and human rights and duties. However, Christian churches did not explicitly criticise Zambia's one-party political system. In general, Christian leaders deliberately chose words so as not too

critical of the government. However, they emphasised the importance of "civil society," by refering to the meaning of freedom of the press (pp. 41-42) and public opinion as well as the importance of political participation, namely "regular consultations between the Party and its government on the one hand and the rest of the national community[10] on the other" (p.37). In this document, there is a following passage:

> "They [members of national community] also minimize any possible tendency within the party to suppress constructive opposition by demanding total allegiance from citizens or by unduly voting candidate vetoing candidates for election. In spite of the tensions which sometimes result from such discussions, the positive value of constructive criticism should not be underestimated... They [citizens] should rather make use of every opportunity to contribute to the building of the country In this way, they restrict the power of the state by constantly influencing the decisions of the government" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 37)

This passage shows us that Christian churches have had concerns for a "more democratic" political regime where more participation is allowed.

Against this background, in the process of transition and beyond, the church has played various roles. These include conscientisation through church publications like the *National Mirror* and the *Icengelo*, advocacy of the re-introduction of multi-party system, their involvement in the formation of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), organisation of political seminars, reconciliation between UNIP and the MMD, monitoring of elections, and consolidation of democracy in the Third Republic.

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[10] By national community, leaders refered to families, PTAs, trade unions, churches, and other intermediary groups and voluntary associations (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 37).

It was around early 1990 when the debate on the referendum to test public opinion on whether or not Zambia should go back to the multi-party system arose. Among churches, particularly the Catholic Church showed its support to the proposal of re-introduction of multi-party system. The first favourable stance to the multi-party system was explicitly shown in the Roman Catholic Bemba magazine *Icengelo* in its issues in April, May and June. The editor of the Ndola-based publication, Father Umberto Davoli, said that the magazine was promoting the interests of advocates of the multi-party system in Zambia (*National Mirror*, no. 347: 1). But generally speaking, the church was discreet at this early stage. The CCZ, for example, just showed their welcome to the President willingness to allow people to express themselves through the referendum (*National Mirror*, no. 361: 1), and two other bodies, namely the EFZ and the ZEC, still kept their positions neutral (*National Mirror*, no. 361: 2) on the issue. In the case of the Catholic Church, they said that:

> "It is clear that there is no one 'ideal' political system. No system has ever succeeded in fully protecting and promoting the rights of its people and in completely realising the goal of a just and equitable society. Both one-party and multi-party systems have their strengths and weaknesses. It is to be expected that these will emerge more clearly in the public exchange which will take place before the Referendum on 17 October 1990" (Catholic Secretariat, 1990: 7, emphasis added),

although the MMD already existed as a civic organisation in July. It is clear that churches kept their neutrality in order to be adaptable to any situations. In September 1990, UNIP determined to have multi-party elections in 1991 without the referendum. In this context, the church, especially the Catholic Church explicitly showed their favourable attitude toward multi-party politics:

"As regards our nation's political situation, we appreciate the peace and security that we have enjoyed during the first quarter of our independence. we now welcome the reintroduction of multi-party politics. It gives all citizens a better chance to take part in decision-making. Political competition will allow for a greater accountability on the part of our leaders" (Catholic Secretariat, 1991: 15).

What should be pointed out concerning the church's involvement in the period of transition is that there were close, but temporary collaborations between the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and Catholic churches at the district level to establish branches so as to mobilise people (Personal Interview with Mr. P. Mulenga and Mr. P. Chiala at ZCTU Lusaka Office, 20 February 1992). In this process, the *Icengelo* which contained articles by Chiluba was quite effectively used for mobilisation and district committees worked as springboards to get popular support all over the country. This was one of the important reasons that the MMD could form vast networks in the country within a short period (Personal Interview with the Secretariat of the MMD, Mr. Mwela, 31 January 1992).

Between January and June 1991, there were held several seminars considering "democracy" and "the churches' role in the Third Republic" organised by churches and related organisations. These included "The Zambia We Want Seminar 1991" in January at the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation, the EFZ political seminar at the Apostolic Faith Mission Church in Lusaka in June, and the CCZ Women's Conference in Lusaka. In these seminars, "churches' roles in politics" were widely discussed. We can find "Christian thinking on democracy" in a paper presented to the EFZ political seminar:

"Democratic participation enlarges the horizons of people, empower them as citizens and limits the power of

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governments. The expression of opinion through representative elections, political parties, public debate and loyal opposition, together with respect for political office and open and accountable government, are intrinsic to responsible democracy. No party or grouping may claim special legal privileges..." (Bishop. Pule, 1991: 1).

In addition, the church, as the voice of the voiceless, the mirror, "conscience" and the "soul" of the nation, regarded itself "to be free in its activities to speak out where it is convinced that this or that programme of a party goes against faith, morals or the dignity of the human person" (Fr. Mwewa, 1991: 24-25). These seminars offered opportunities to consolidate the churches' basic stance in the transition period towards the plural politics and beyond.

The constitutional issue is another area of the churches' involvement during the period of transition. Basically there were two involvements. Firstly, it is the church leaders' participation in the Mvunga constitution commission. Secondly, it was their role of reconciler between UNIP and the MMD on the constitutional issues to avert political impasses. Concerning the first issue, among 22 members of the commission appointed by the UNIP government, two church leaders, namely Bishop Tresford, the Vice Chairman of the ZEC, and Rev. P. Simuchoba, the Chairman of the CCZ, were included. On this appointment, some church leaders showed their displeasure, by saying that:

"The government should have approached the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC) on behalf of the Catholics, Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) for the Pentecostals and the Christian Council of Zambia to make nominations out of which the government could have chosen our representatives from... That's the way we understand democracy" (*National Mirror*, no. 365).

This problem of appointment caused the feeling that the commission represented only a narrow part of the political community[11]. In addition, the process of submitting the draft constitution to the Parliament was further narrowed by the White Paper of the Government, which ruled out, without any wide discussion and consultation, important points like the point if Ministers would be appointed from Members of Parliament among the commission's recommendations for the proposed constitution. This constitutional issue caused a big political impasse between UNIP and the MMD in which the MMD continued to refuse the meeting with President Kaunda in spite of his invitations to discuss the proposed constitution. It was churches' leaders that averted this political impasse.

"Being the 'Mirror of the country', the Church leaders found it necessary to bring together the two parties" (*National Mirror*, no. 385). On 19th July 1991, representatives from the CCZ, the EFZ, and the ZEC met the President at the State House. Apart from the constitutional issue[12], the issues of delayed official announcement of election days, squashing of the State of Emergency, and unavailability of the registration lists were also discussed. At this meeting, the church offered to assist in the promotion of the necessary reconciliation to move the country forward in a democratic electoral process. Two days later, there was held another meeting with the President and top officials of the MMD at the Catholic Secretariat. The single topic of this meeting was to promote reconciliation through a meeting between UNIP and the MMD to discuss the constitution. The agreement reached at this meeting was that the meeting between UNIP and the MMD would be chaired by the church in order to keep it neutral.

Immediately, the three church bodies hosted a meeting from 23 to 25 July at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Lusaka, which provided an

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[11]This means rather that the commission is dominated by UNIP cadre.
[12]See, *National Mirror*, no. 385 on the agreed contents related to the constitution.

opportunity for both UNIP and the MMD to discuss the proposed constitution to facilitate an orderly election. During the meeting, which was chaired by the Lusaka Anglican Bishop Stephen Mumba with assistance from other church leaders, a joint committee of experts was formed to examine areas of the constitutional bill to which the MMD had raised objections. As a result of the meeting, it was agreed that the Ministers would be appointed from Members of Parliament and that a clause be included in the Constitution the introduction of the Chamber of representatives be considered by Parliament after the 1991 presidential and general elections. Also some other important matters like the squashing of the State of Emergency were discussed. This churches' involvement redirected the Zambian democratic process in the right way.

The church in Zambia was also involved in election monitoring. Even though there was one local monitoring team, namely the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT), including three church leaders, this team was criticised by the public which expressed doubt to its neutrality and credibility. Against this background, the three church bodies called a meeting on 19th September 1991, when there were less than six weeks left before the elections, at the Catholic Secretariat to review the political situation of the country and the growing problems arising with the preparation of the coming elections, when 15 representatives met and talked about the churches' role in election monitoring. It was at this time when they formed the Christian Churches' Monitoring Group (CCMG). Almost immediately, five other organisations, namely the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), the University of Zambia Student Union (UNZASU), the National Women's Lobby Group (NWLG), the Non-Governmental Organisations Coordinating Committee (NGOCC), and the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), joined with the CCMG to form an umbrella body, the Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee

(ZEMCC), whose stated objective was to ensure that the elections of 31 October 1991 and any other elections would be free and fair.

The first action taken by the CCMG was the circulation of a "Letter to All Christians Before the 31 October Elections" dated 23rd September 1991 to inform people of the importance of the elections, to call the churches to promote peace, reconciliation and justice in Zambia, to outline some key electoral principles, and to stress several key electoral guidelines. More practically, ZEMCC's activities before the elections included the monitoring of the nomination process for President candidates at the High Court as well as that for Parliamentary candidates in several constituency offices in Lusaka and the sponsorship of a two-day Training Session at the University of Zambia in early October, which was attended by about 250 participants who became the core of local monitors recruited and trained. The ZEMCC also prepared Summary of the Electoral Act and Electoral Regulations with experts of law in the ZEMCC, and *Monitor's Manual*, and *Quick Count Team Manual* with technical assistance from Z-Vote (a project of the United States-based National Democratic Institute and the Carter Centre).

Apart from these practical involvements, the ZEMCC, especially the CCMG, cautioned all church pastors and leaders to avoid directly partisan remarks as they encourage members to participate responsibly in the elections and condemned strongly violence disrupting the peaceful process. In addition, the CCMG held several meeting with President Kaunda and MMD President Chiluba and their associates for the purpose of creating a peaceful environment necessary to assure free and fair elections, even though their strong efforts to bring both President Kaunda and Chiluba together for a pre-election meeting in order to have them issue a joint appeal for peace and ready acceptance of the election results did not materialise. However, on October 20, both Kaunda and Chiluba

were at Lusaka's Cathedral of the Holy Cross to pray for peaceful electoral process following efforts of the CCMG (*Times of Zambia*, 21 October 1992). Just before the elections, on 27th October, the churches distributed a prayer format to assist in the church sponsored National Day of Prayer. On the day, special services were held throughout the country emphasising the theme of confidence in choosing leaders of integrity and justice, and praying for peaceful acceptance of the results of the elections. On the election day, about 3500 trained monitors were involved in nine provinces mainly made up of church members, students, members of Rotary and other civic clubs (see ZEMCC, 1991 in detail).

In the first press statement of ZEMCC after the elections, Chairman Rev. Sakala said that:

> "... we are aware that the efforts to build true democracy in our land has only just begun. As President Chiluba has consistently reminded the Zambian people, there are times of great difficulty and tasks of hard work facing us all. For this reason, the Board of ZEMCC, are seriously considering our next steps. We are currently in the process of forming a new institution which will serve the nation with the broader aims of civic education" (ZEMCC, Press Statement 26 November 1991).

In the Third Republic, which is supposed to be the phase of "democratic consolidation," the church has shown the importance of the new political culture of civic responsibility through *civic education* to attain true democracy from below. In this new political culture, what are considered to be important are *accountability* in the sense that those who have been put into office would see as their task the improvement of the lives of others, overcoming political apathy and economic lethargy which have developed over the years, and doing away with vandalism (ZEMCC, Press Statement 26 November 1991). For this purpose, ZEMCC transformed itself into the Foundation for the Democratic Process (FODEP) in 1992.

Such terms as civic education, accountability started to be used in the document of ZMECC, and eventually those of FODEP[13]. However, it remains to be seen how this institution will work so as to consolidate newly introduced multi-party system.

Apart from the formation of the new church-initiated institution, churches' "symbolic" and "practical" influences can be seen in several events after the elections. In early November 1991, the newly elected Chiluba was anointed at a Church service ceremony at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Lusaka. At the anointment, the Anglican Archbishop Mumba told the President:

> "be strong and show yourself a man, keep the charge of the Lord your God, walk in his ways, keep his status, his commandments, his precepts and his testimonies as it is written in the first and second testaments" (*National Mirror*, no. 397).

At this ceremony, the new government ministers, top church leaders, and various members of parliament attended. This set the church a influential position on the newly elected president, Chiluba, who is also a religiously influenced person. One example happened when some houses, which were illegally built in Lusaka's Kanyama compound, were demolished by the Lusaka Urban District Council. On this occasion, one church leader Rev. Sakala directly phoned to the State House to stop it effectively (Personal Interview with Rev. Sakala, 23rd December 1991).

It is apparent that in this process the four factors, especially the educational background of the leadership, churches' mobilisational power through their "political tools", as described in the previous section, were working. The Christian church was the only actor which could reconcile

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[13]According to Bratton and Liatto-Katundu (1994), there was limited improvement of democratic attitudes among voters.

both UNIP and the MMD as mediator in order to break through the political stalemate.

4.2 The Case of Botswana

One of the most remarkable aspects of the Christianity developed in Botswana is that the Christian congregations grew up around the *kgotlas*, which are traditional meeting chaired by chiefs, owing to the early acceptance of the missionaries by the chiefs (Sales, 1973: 1). Since Christianity began about half a century before the establishment of a British Administration, the only way for missionaries to start their work was, thus, to obtain the sympathy of the chief. For this purpose, missionaries' involvements in the fields of health and education began as we consider below.

Concerning independent churches in Botswana, there is not so much well documented work apart from a recent research in Francistown done by van Binsbergen (1993), who observed their interactions with the state. These interactions occurred at registration. His observation will be briefly refered to later.

In terms of political involvement, churches in Botswana have not been so active as that in Zambia, although they have just recently started to be involved in the issues of human rights, especially that of Basarwa.

4.2.1 Characteristics of Christian Churches in Botswana

According to Barrett (1982: 184), about half of population in Botswana (50.2 per cent) is considered to be Christians[14]. The Protestant churches have been a significant force in Botswana since early 19th

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[14]In a most recent study, only about 30 percent of population is considered to be Christian, and more than 60 per cent of them are estimated to belong to Independent churches (Amanze, 1994b).

century. Among Christians, 26.6 per cent are Protestant, 9.4 percent Catholic, and 11.8 per cent indigenous by the mid-1980s. In Botswana, the major Protestant denomination is the United Congregational Church, as a result of the pioneering efforts of the London Missionary Society (LMS). The Seventh-Day Adventist is the second.

In contrast with Zambia where there are three interdenominational bodies, there is only one body in Botswana, namely the Botswana Christian Council (BCC). The BCC membership includes the Catholic[15], but the influence of the Protestant is strong. In addition, the BCC developed in a unique way, because the BCC includes some African independent churches (Hambira, 1990: 16), although this does not necessarily mean that the BCC have had enough assistance to churches at the grassroots. Internationally, the BCC is associated council of the World Council of Churches (WCC).

Concerning African Independent Churches in Botswana, there is general agreement that it is in the past quarter of a century that they growth remarkably, especially in the north of the country (Barret, 1982: 185; van Binsbergen, 1993: 28). However, there is almost no study that provide a reliable data on these Independent Churches[16]. It is only van Binsbergen who provided quantitative data, which demonstrate the extreme fragmentation of these religious organisations[17].

4.2.2 Church Involvement in Development Activities: From a Historical Perspective

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[15]According to Hambira (1990: 25-6), the membership of the Catholic in the BCC was influenced by the Second Vatican Council (1962-65).
[16] See Amanze (1994a) on the most recent compilation of churches in Botswana, which includes independent churches.
[17]There are 233 African Independent Churches having on the average fewer that 800 members (van Binsbergen, 1993: 29).

There is a close relationship between the territory of each ethnic group and the mission working there. Therefore development of health and educational facilities of one mission tend to be concentrated in one area of the country, which can be typically observed in the field of health. I will show this relation briefly.

In contrast with Zambia, missions' involvement in education was quite limited just before independence. But this does not mean that there had not been any mission efforts in educational development (see e.g. Parsons, 1983)[18]. Rather, there had been various missions' activities in this field, especially at earlier stage and actually the first schools were established by the London Missionary Society during the first half of the nineteenth century. By the time of independence, however, there were only three church-run secondary school in the territory, namely St. Joseph's at Kale, Mater Sepia in Francistown both run by the Catholic and Moeding College near Lobatse run by the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa (UCCSA), although there were few secondary schools of any sorts in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. This is mainly because Bechuanaland relied on assistance from neighbouring countries, especially South Africa, for all forms of post-primary education after the LMS established the Tiger Kloof Institution not within the territory but just south of Mafeking instead for the purpose of serving the Batswana on both sides of the Molopo river[19]. As a result, in contrast with the case of

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[18]According to Grant, after the loss of their primary schools in the early 1920s, the mission church had been discouraged to run schools and had lost their interests to be involved in education (Grant, 1980: 41). Therefore the mission church had been most actively working in education before the 1920s.

[19]There was a "tribal" enthusiasm for post-elementary education was most evident among the baNgwato. What they wanted was a college, basically academic, but with industrial courses. Their idea was to use the substantial stone-built church and mission buildings a t Phalatswe (old Palapye) for an educational complex comparable to Lovedale. The idea crystallised in 1902, when Phalatswe was finally abandoned for a new capital site. But it did not materialise in 1902, when Phalatswe was finally abandoned for Serowe, because the London Missionary Society had set up Tiger Kloof Institution to serve the baTswana as a whole. (Parsons, 1983b: 30-31).

Zambia, early leaders were educated in South Africa and were not so identified with churches in the territory. There were also only 12 primary schools, as shown in table 4-8, because primary schools were mainly administrated by the local tribal committees, which were composed of representatives of the district administration, missionary societies in the area, and tribal representatives (*Annual Report of Bechuanaland*, 1958: 49-50). In technical/vocational education, the Dutch Reformed Church ran the Homecrafts Centre at Mochudi, which was the only institution in the Protectorate before the 1960s.

Table 4-8 Mission Primary Schools 1967 in Botswana

	Denomi-nation	Classes	Class Rooms	Students	Teachers
Grant Aided					
Forest Hill, Khale	RC	7	5	98	6
Our Lady of the Desert, Francistown	RC	16	16	857	17
St. Martin's, Papatlo	RC	7	4	204	6
St. Conrad's Ramoutsa	RC	17	12	992	17
St. Theresa, Lobatsi	RC	10	9	440	11
St. Gabriel, Serowe	RC	2	4	88	2
St. Peter's, Mmadinare	Anglican	7	6	300	6
D'kar	DRC	3	2	66	4
Unaided					
St. Patrick's, Mahalapye	RC	8	4	404	8
St. Bernard's, Ramoutsa	RC	4	2	82	3
Our Lady of Carmel, Morwa	RC	6	4	141	3
Ramokgonomi	Seventh Day Adventist	6	2	138	5
Total	12	93	70	3,810	88
National Total	252	1,674		77,577	1,713
% of Missionary schools	4.5	5.3		4.7	4.9

Source: Compiled from Grant, 1968: Table 4.

In the area of health, by 1968, there existed five hospitals run by missionaries. In 1921, the Seventh Day Adventists established the first hospital in Kanye, which was the Kanye Hospital, for the Bangwaketse. In the early 1930s, two important hospitals were established in Molepolole

and Mochudi. On the one hand, the United Free Church of Scotland Mission, which selected the Bakwena, opened the Scottish Livingstone Hospital in Molepolole. On the other hand, the Dutch Reformed Church, which concentrated their missionary activities on the Bakgatla, built the Deborah Relief Memorial Hospital in Mochudi. The Hamennsburg Mission, which chose the Bamalete, established a clinic in Romatswa in 1934, and in 1969 it opened a completely new hospital with financial assistance from the Mission and Bread for the World. And the Anglicans, selecting the Bamangwato, founded St. Peter's Mission Hospital in Mmadinaire in 1959. Apart from these hospitals, there were several health facilities run by missionaries like a maternity centre by the London Missionary Society and a clinic run by the Seventh Day Adventists in Maun (see table 4-12).

In the area of education, as is shown in the tables (4-9, 4-10, 4-11), the churches' role has been decreasing since independence. It is because the government has played the major role in (1) planning and supervision, and (2) provision of education and training. Actually, in 1990, in primary education 568 our of 636 schools and in secondary school 169 out of 170 schools were directly financed by the government (NDP7: 313).

In the area of health, the role of the mission hospitals is still important (see table 4-13), even though the role of government has been gradually increasing. However this does not mean that the church has played only a limited role in other areas of development. Now I turn to church involvement in developmental activities since independence, especially paying attention to the Botswana Christian Council.

Table 4-9 Categorisation of Primary Schools in 1990: Schools and Pupils

District	Local government No.. of School (No. of Student)	Grant Aided* No. of School (No. of Students)	Private No. of School(No. of Students)	Total
North East	32 (11,670)	0	0	32 (11,670)
Central N	47 (24,531)	0	1 (126)	48 (24,657)
Central C	94 (49,281)	3 (1,744)	8 (1,691)	105 (52,788)
Central S	40 (20,720)	2 (1,752)	3 (1,316)	45 (23,788)
Kgatleng	31 (12,411)	1 (254)	4 (566)	36 (13,231)
Kweneng	67 (36,021)	0	4 (856)	71 (36,877)
Southern	91 (35,719)	1 (161)	0	92 (35,880)
South East	11 (7,408)	1 (107)	5 (939)	18 (8,454)
Kgalagadi	25 (6,969)	0	0	25 (6,969)
Ghanzi	18 (4,232)	1 (276)	0	19 (4,508)
North West	51 (20,886)	0	1 (62)	52 (20,948)
Gaborone	23 (17,459)	0	3 (1,545)	26 (19,004)
Francistown	11 (9,130)	1 (815)	2 (457)	14 (10,402)
Lobatse	4 (3,453)	1 (644)	2 (723)	7 (4,820)
Selebi-Phikwe	7 (7,078)	0	1 (381)	8 (7,459)
Jweneng	3 (1,893)	0	1 (240)	4 (2,133)
Total	555 (268,861)	12 (5,753)	35 (8,902)	602 (283,516)

* Schools relying largely on Government funding but being run by the missions and trusts which started them.
Source: compiled from Republic of Botswana, Educational Statistics 1990 Table A1, p.30.

Table 4-10 Church Secondary Schools in 1967

	Student	Teachers	Classes	Class Rooms
St. Joseph's	292	15	11	11
Mater Spei	160	9	6	10
Moeding	241	11	9	9
Total	693	35	26	30
National Total	2,299	128	n.a.	89
Homecraft Centre Mochudi	61	3	-	-

Source: Compiled from Grant, 1968: Table 5.

Table 4-11 Categorisation of Secondary Schools in Botswana: Recent Trend

Year	Government School	Government Class Rs	Grant Aided* School	Grant Aided* Class Rs	Community+Junior School	Community+Junior Class Rs	Total School	Total Class Rs
1978	13	229	5	67	17	125	35	421
1979	15	249	5	89	16	117	36	455
1980	18	287	4	79	16	121	38	487
1981	18	340	4	86	19	141	41	567
1982	18	339	4	86	20	158	42	583
1983	18	338	4	86	20	174	42	598
1984	19	393	4	89	35	207	58	689
1985	19	410	4	127	42	199	65	736
1986	19	483	4	117	50	226	73	826
1987	19	455	4	118	58	327	81	900
1988	19	441	4	101	68	499	91	1,041
1989	18	483	4	121	97	910	119	1,514
1990	19	592	4	139	120	1,134	143	1,865

* Schools relying largely on Government funding but being run by the missions and trusts which started them. (Rs= Rooms)
+ Includes private schools. Community Junior Secondary Schools (CJSS) are established by the joint government-Community participation in the construction and management.
Source: compiled from Republic of Botswana, Educational Statistics Table 9. p.18.

Table 4-12 Mission Hospitals and Clinics in 1967

Centre	Number of Beds	Number of Doctors
Molepolole	166	2
Health Centre, Thamaga	14	-
Maun Maternity Centre	43	-
Mochudi	111	2
Mmadinare	40	-
Ramoutsi	44	1
Khale	6	-
Kanye	220	2
Total	644	7
National Total	1,626	17

Source: Grant, 1968 Table 3

Table 4-13 Comparison Between Government and Church District Hospitals in Botswana in 1984 and 1990 (Primary Hospitals and Clinics are not Included)

Facility	1984 (Number of Beds)	1990 (Number of Beds)
National Referral Hospitals:		
Princess Marina	273	241
Nyangabgwe	-	372
Government District Hospitals:		
Jubilee*	187	-
Athlone	133	224
Sekgoma	194	164
Mahalapye	95	99
Scottish	166	264
Mental	111	111
Selebi-Phikwe	65	65
Maun	181	181
Mine Hospitals:		
BCL Limited	27	27
Orapa	61	97
Jweneg	40	72
Sub-Total	1,497	1,873
Mission Hospitals:		
Seventh Day Adventist	167	167
Deborah Relief Memorial	130	131
Bamalete Lutheran	107	117
Sub-Total	404	425
Total	1,901	2,288
% of Mission Hospitals	21.3	18.1

* Jubilee Hospital, which was a district hospital in 1984, lost that status during NDP 6 with the commissioning of Nyangabgwe.

Source: Compiled and calculated from Table 15.11 NDP7, p.371.

4.2.3 The Establishment and Development Activities of the Botswana Christian Council

4.2.3.1 Establishment and Activities

More active church involvement in development works, which are not limited to the areas of education and health, was initiated by the establishment of the Botswana Christian Council in 1966, which was formed largely through the initiative of churches' leaders in Francistown who had already been responsible for the creation of the Northern Bechuanaland Council. Externally, the formation of the BCC was influenced by the formation of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1948 and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) in 1963 (Amanze, 1994b: 24). Internally, the social concern to cooperate in relief efforts in times of drought, famine and epidemics necessitated the formation of an inter-church relief programme, which promoted the formation of the BCC (Amanze, 1994b: 24). This formation was also "to seek ways of co-operating so as to speak in one strong voice which will have an input on government policy" (Hambira, 1990: 13).

In spite of its original organisational weakness in terms of its membership and composition (see Grant, 1968: 3, 11), at the time of independence, this council was the only "indigenous non-governmental support agency." In fact the BCC General Secretary pointed out to the Inter-Church Meeting on the Projected Mining Areas in March 1969, "(t)he BCC came out into existence out of an emergency need like in the issue area of refugee - and imposed from outside - it did not come into being due to a drawing together of the churches" (Flood, 1974: 327-328). Between 1968 and 1974, however, it has gradually been involved in many projects in the

country and strengthened its structure. Currently it has the structure shown in figure 4-2.

The General Assembly, which is represented by up to six delegates of each member church and a maximum of two delegates of member organisations, is the top decision making body and is normally held once a year. The Executive Committee, which is the governing body of the Council, substantially decides on policy matters, appoints sub-committees and three members in addition to the Treasurer to serve a financial sub-committee, keeps full and accurate minutes of all its proceedings, convenes at least quarterly between each ordinary General Assembly, and decide the establishment of new department. As is shown in figure 4-2, there are three major department involved in developmental activities in collaboration with Standing Committees in respective areas. The Administrative Committee, which is composed of the elected members of the Executive Committee[20], acts on behalf of the Executive Committee. The General Secretary is the Chief Executive Officer of the Council who is responsible for the execution of the decisions of the General Assembly, the Executive Committee and the Administrative Committee.

Grant, who was the development organiser of the BCC, wrote its importance just after independence as follows:

> 'This particular development greatly improved the non-government agencies range of external contacts and sharply increased the resources available to them. In 1968, for instance, the Christian Council had a development income of P16,000. By 1974 this had

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[20]The Executive Committee of the BCC is composed of (1) one correspondent from each member of the Council appointed accordingly and (2) office bearers being, the President, fist and second Vice-Presidents, the treasurer, the General Secretary who shall be non-voting member of the committee and the moderators from each existing standing committees. Among them, the President, first and second Vice-Presidents, and the moderators of the various standing committees are elected at the General Assembly by secret ballot. The treasurer is appointed by the Executive Committee at its first meeting after the general Assembly and the General Secretary is appointed by the General Assembly. An Administrative Committee is composed of office bearers of the Executive Committee.

become 166,000 and in between these years it had committed a total
of P607,000 to some 60 different projects finding partners in the
churches, the new Brigade Trusts, the District Council and
government itself" (Grant, 1980: 42).

The projects sponsored by the BCC shortly after independence were comprehensively documented by Flood (1974). At this stage, the Christian Service Department was the only department directly involved in the projects. In this process, the BCC, backed by three major partners, namely the Church World Service, the Christian Aid and the Bread for the World, was the agency which could support pioneering and experimental projects and could take important new development initiative.

In addition, after a Catholic Bishop Muray joined the Christian Service Committee and became chairman of the BCC, which had been mainly composed of the Protestant churches, in 1970, "inter-church development cooperation began to be a reality for the first time" (Grant, 1980:43). Also this cooperation was followed by the establishment of the Association of Medical Missions of Botswana.

In practical terms, the issues of the steady growth of the settlement at Selebi-Phikwe, where a new copper and nickel mines had been developing rapidly, and the increasing tempo of various activity including building of town itself and laying of new roads and rail offered an opportunity for the BCC and its member churches to establish a more close working relationship. It is because in such issue areas as refugee and famine relief, the BCC's main partners had been foreign counterparts, while in the area of urban mission, the BCC inevitably would involve itself in activities of local communities where member churches were working. Therefore more concrete demarcation of responsibility was necessary (Flood, 1974: 328). It was from this necessity that the BCC's Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) was set up and its project started in 1972. As

figure 4-2 shows, it is a part of the Christian Service Department. This is one of the projects in which the BCC has been involved for a long time. So far it has covered the following components: Adult education (i.e., Adult Night Primary School), a regular day primary school at Botshabelo, Carpentry training, textile training and secretarial training (BCC, 1991: 36).

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│ Member Churches and Member Organisations             │
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│ Annual Assembly                        │
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│ Executive Committee                            │
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        │ Finance Sub-Committee         │
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Editorial Committee

Social Concerns Committee

Faith and Unity Committee

Christian Service Committee

Centarl Administration
General Secretariat
Finance and Administration
Communication

Social Concerns Dept.

Faith and Unity Dept.

Etsha Ecumenical Community

Christian Service Dept.

UIM Selebi-Phikwe

Old Naredi Upgrading

Figure 4-2 Structure of the Botswana Christian Council

Source: BCC Assembly Book 1992, p.3.

The other projects of the Christian Service Department in which the BCC has been involved for a long time are the Etsha Ecumenical Community Project and the Old Naledi Upgrading Project. The former is originally a refugee settlement projects of the BCC for some 3,500 people of the Mambukushu tribe who came across the Caprivi Strip into Botswana's northern western corner, where they were resettled in 13 sub-villages fringing the swamps at Etsha. The BCC has supported a resident missionary and has employed the Settlement Officer since April 1972. The activities in Etsha have four aspects: strengthening the worshipping community that resulted from the mission of Father Wynne (1970-1982) and the Etsha Team (1982-); Bible translation; Adult Education; Development. In the area of adult education, it includes literacy classes, English classes, courses on cooking, hygiene, sewing, gardening and so on. These courses are integrated with the fourth activities of development, especially projects to help people to generate some cash income. The Old Naledi Upgrading Project, which started in 1979 concerning house upgrading in Old Naledi after some conflict with the government as mentioned below, has developed into integrated community development with various components. It covers house upgrading, training in brick laying, social work and income generating activities in order to benefit the low income groups of Old Naledi and around Gaborone. In spite of some problems with the government at the initial stage, currently, these involvements have been recognised by the government. One of the indication was that the BCC was invited to important conference on housing by the government (BCC, 1991: 36). In this area there are collaborative relationship with the government.

Furthermore, the BCC has concerned itself with the Remote Area Dwellers (RADS) development since 1981. There have been a lot of projects undertaken with the financial assistance of the BCC's ecumenical

partners (BCC, 1991: 34). These projects include health post, water supply and primary school hostels at Kokotsha and Kang, income generating activities and seven small cooperatives around Gantsi District.

At the 1991 assembly, the Christian Service Department (CSD) presented a document whose aim is to create a holistic and comprehensive tool which can be used by the CSD and the BCC to stimulate projects by the churches in the local communities. This is probably the first one in which the BCC showed its development philosophy comprehensively. According to the document, the basic development philosophy of the BCC is:

> "to fulfill the diaconical work of the churches as it is rooted in the Holy Bible. Through the diaconical work in the field of development, the BCC/CSD strive to fulfill the calling of the Triune God to promote justice and life in all its fullness for all humanity" (BCC, 1991: 38).

The document also said that the programmes of the BCC should "reflect the churches' 'preferential option for the poor', the marginalised and the disadvantaged in our society" (BCC, 1991: 38). It is because they

> "aim at participating in the creation of a more just and sustainable society for all" (BCC, 1991: 38).

For this purpose, the BCC/CSD will act as a facilitator for participation in development by the Botswana churches and local congregations. "In doing this, BCC/CSD will stimulate action in the local communities through work-shops, needs-assessment, project advice, funding of locally based projects, cooperation with other NGOs and advocacy with district and central governmental structure". In this document, three main programmes are (1) Programme on Urban Poverty, (2) Programme on Rural Poverty, and (3) Programme on Remote Area Dwellers. This is the

first time that the BCC clearly showed its vision for development and its priorities.

Based on this development philosophy, the BCC has evolved areas of their activities. In addition to the Christian Service Department, it established the Social Concern Department in August 1984 to work in the fields of women and children, youth, refugee, education, human rights and general social concerns. For this purpose units which work in respective field have been created. This does not mean that there had not any efforts of the BCC in these areas before that time, but this was an institutional expansion of the BCC's activities in social problems which had been also churches' concerns.

In 1992, another Department for Faith and Unity, whose responsibility is the implementation of the BCC's constitutionally based work for unity among the churches in Botswana, was established. This is the department which will be involved in mentally- or spiritually-oriented development projects in cooperation with the SCD which is catering for material needs of the disadvantaged.

The BCC has also been involved in publishing the newsletter *Mokaedi* which contains news from member churches, the BCC itself, and social issues through its Communication Department. This used to be issued only two or three times a year, but from April 1992 *Mokaedi* became tabloid in four pages monthly paper distributed with a private weekly *Mmegi*.

4.2.3.2 Financial Resources

The BCC received funds from "ecumenical partners" through its projects and individual division of the departments as in the case of the CCZ in Zambia.

According to a recent financial statements approved by the Executive Committee of the council in the 26th annual assembly of the BCC in 1991 (BCC, 1991), 50 per cent of central administration income was funded by "external contribution," although details were not disclosed. Etsha Ecumenical Community Project was 100 per cent funded by the Reformed Church of Netherlands and the Methodist Church Overseas (UK). This is also true in the cases of youth and refugee division in the Department of Social Concerns and Refugees. the World Council of Churches and the Reformed Church of Netherlands are main contributors. Other departments also nearly totally funded by "ecumenical partners" overseas.

Therefore, even in comparison with the case of CCZ, the BCC depends almost totally dependent on funds from overseas.

4.2.4 Cooperation and Conflict with the State and Other AOs

4.2.4.1 The Case of the BCC

As stated in the previous section, just after independence, the BCC was the only non-governmental agency which support many projects all over the country. It is because the BCC had the advantage of getting resources from external counterparts. Also the government could not offer enough facilities, for example, in medical service as we can find in the first development plan:

> "While recognising the inadequacy of the existing medical facilities, the Botswana Government is unable to allocate sufficient resources to the health sector to raise the standard of medical services to an internationally acceptable level. Faced with limited resources and pressing demands for productive investments in all

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sectors, the Government is forced to restrict medical plans to modest targets" (NDP2: 60).

But the surroundings of developmental activities of the BCC have been changed since around the 1972/73 financial year when Botswana's recurrent budget was balanced without requiring grant-in-aid from the British Government and financial situation was dramatically improved, as stated in chapter 2. After the establishment of sound financial basis, the Botswana government started to be involved both in development projects which were originally initiated by churches or other non-governmental agencies, and in other new projects.

In addition, this government involvement in these areas have to be considered in terms of political calculations of the ruling BDP (see, e.g. Picard, 1987: 240-243). It was, in November 1973, about a year before the 1974 election that the Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP), which emphasised the implementation of a highly visible, physical infrastructure spending program in all ten districts during the twelve months prior to the election, was announced. There was a clear contrast between the financial year 1972/3-1973/4 and 1974/5-1975/6 (see table 4-14).

Following this change, there arose the problem of uncertainty of intentions of both the government and non-governmental agencies. In this situation, the BCC tried several times to bridge this gap by asking the government to give it five priority areas from which it could select two or three for action and support. However, the responses from the government was that interested groups could only refer to the development plan and that government had no wish to point them in any particular direction (Grant, 1980: 46). This was a quite puzzling attitude of the government, which caused inevitable misunderstandings and

conflicts between non-governmental agencies, including the BCC, and the government.

Table 4-14 Accelerated Rural Development Programme (Achievement)

Item	Units Provided 1974/5-1975/6	Units Provided 1972/3-1973/4
Primary School Classrooms	489	44
Teachers' Houses	425	68
Primary School Stores	80	-
Health Posts	42	-
Clinics	21	2
Maternity Wards	8	-
Nurses' Houses	30	-
Council and Government Staff Houses	178	17
Village Water Supplies	31	11
Boreholes	190	57(approx.)
Dams	30	12
Livestock Saleyards	6	-
Rural Roads	133(km)	30(km)
Major Village Roads	76(km)	0(km)

Source: Botswana, Republic of, *NDP4*: 75, Table 4-2.

There are two contradictory cases which occurred between the BCC and the state (Grant, 1980: 46). One case concerns the establishment of Lentswe la Odi, which is one of non-governmental agencies. At first, the detailed proposals of the creation of this agency was rejected by the Ministry of Local Government and Lands and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, whose advice was accepted by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. However, this decision was eventually reversed. According to Grant (Grant, 1980: 46), this reversion happened especially because the Botswana Development Corporation, CUSO, the BCC, the Kgatleng District Council and the District Development Committee strongly supported the establishment of Lentswe la Odi. Therefore, the BCC, in collaboration with some other actors, including both governmental and non-governmental organisations, was influential on the decision of the central government in this case.

The other case concerns BCC's housing project in Naledi. At first, the BCC was allowed to publicise its intention in 1976 to start the project of supporting those who would not qualify for Gaborone Town Council Loans to build houses, but a confusion arose because both the government and the Town Council were also starting the same task. As a result, the BCC was asked to withdraw and clear the field in 1978. There arose a disruption of a good relationship between two parties. However, after a new negotiation with the Gaborone Town Council and Self Help Housing Agency and settling this problem, there has developed a collaboration between the government and the BCC in Old Naledi projects, as stated above.

Apart from these cases, the government has taken over several church projects. As can be observed in tables above, the ownership of two big hospitals, namely the Scottish Livingstone Memorial Hospital in Molepolole run by the United Free Church of Scotland and the Maternity Centre at Maun run by the London Missionary Societies was transferred to the government in late 1970s. According to Grant, who used to be secretary of the CSD/BCC, these projects were taken over by the government after the increased communication which led to a better understanding of their respective wishes and needs (1980: 47) and thus with good reason. In fact, the Scottish Livingstone Memorial Hospital faced a financial problem. Therefore, in the issue area of health, there has been a collaboration as is written in the NDP6:

> "...The policy towards mission health facilities is that they are integral part of the health care system and that they should be treated as such. The Ministry (of Health) has cooperated with them satisfactorily over the years. They have been plagued by financial problems and have negotiated for a yearly subversion from the Government through liaison with the Association for Medical Missions for Botswana (AMMB)" (NDP6: 312).

As far as development activities are concerned, there has been collaboration between the church and the state in Botswana. The churches' significance in the development scene in Botswana has been less in the more specific fields of formal education and health, and more in other areas like rural development. It is basically because of the government sound financial situation which have supported its accomplishment of development plans in these fields effectively.

The BCC has been also in cooperation with other AOs. For about a decade after independence, when there were not national service development associational organisations (NSDAOs), the BCC worked collaboratively with brigades. Especially for the Kweneng Rural Development Association (KRDA) established in 1969, the BCC had been the only major donor at the initial stage as Flood documented (1974: 65-81). Up to the end of October 1972, the BCC's investment to the KRDA composed of almost 85 per cent. But the pattern of collaboration has been changed, and after the establishment of NSDAOs since around early 1980s, there has established a project-based working relationship with them. Some recent cases include Low Cost Income Housing Committee which is coordinated by the Botswana Technology Centre involving such organisations as the Cooperation for Research, Development and Education (CORDE) and the Rural Industry Innovation Centre (RIIC), and the inter-sectoral Committee on income generating activities at Naledi coordinated by the Christian Service Department. The latter involves CORDE and Bana Ba Rona Trust, apart from some governmental bodies (BCC, 1991: 35).

But as mentioned above, the BCC has been concerned about various social problems as in the case of Zambia. Even so, in fact, there have been few political conflicts between the church and the state since independence. What is necessary to be pointed out is that there were quite

limited political awareness among churches just after independence. This can be found out in a document of BCC in the early 1970s, concerning churches' relationship with the government:

> "During the early development of this Council it was seen that it had an important function to perform on behalf of the Churches in relationship with the Government. We are a young country, standing on the verge of major changes and developments necessitating new legislation which can be quite strange to the average Motswana. With the absence of adequate communications, particularly a national newspaper, and an efficient Hansard system, legislation comes into being effecting Churches without the majority of Church member knowing anything about it" (BCC, 1972: 3).

In this context, as I wrote in the previous section, the BCC was the main actor to bridge the gap between the government and other actors. One of the issues in which the BCC was involve to influence the National Assembly's decision was the early case that in 1971 the executive committee of the BCC sent a letter to all members of the National Assembly on the issue of the casino bill which would make the Assembly legal for casinos to be established in Botswana. The church's concern was such social problems caused as a result of casinos as crime, heavy drinking. However the bill had become law. At this stage, the BCC was the only voice.

There were a few recent cases. Let me begin to quote words of the General Secretary of the BCC. In the reports of the 26th annual assembly of the BCC in 1991, he wrote as follows:

> "The role of the Church ... must not get lost in an utopian vision, but use this vision to challenge and encourage of this reality towards a more egalitarian liberated society where people can articulate their own needs and can act together to meet their needs..." (BCC, 1991: 2).

and

"The good news is for every person regardless of location or situation
in life. But since the good news is news of liberation it has a definite
bias toward those who are most in need of liberation - the poor, the
weak, the defenseless. For Christians, our primary role is to aid in
the process of liberation... Christians therefore have *an advocacy
role*, to proclaim the good news and to work towards the fulfillment
of its promise" (BCC, 1991: 3, emphasis added).

Recent involvement in a few issues of the BCC seems to be based on this idea of advocacy. One of them is concerning "Abortion Bill" (Bill no. 25 1990: Penal Code Bill Section 160). On this issue, however, the BCC could only issue a comment. It is because of the nature and composition of the BCC as well as the nature of the issue itself. The BCC is no more than a coordinating body of churches of Botswana including the Roman Catholics and the Protestant churches altogether as members. Therefore, member churches have different point of view on this issue. As a result, they could not get unanimity. As can be imagined, the most fierce opposition came from the Roman Catholic Churches. But the majority view of the BCC was that under certain circumstances Abortion can be accepted. Even so there was an attempt to stop the passing of the bill which was mounted a part of the BCC when its member staged a peaceful demonstration outside the Parliament and read out a petition, criticising the introduction of the bill in vain.

One of the most effective actions taken by the BCC in cooperation with Emang Basadi was on the issue of Mrs. Dow's case. It is a legal issue concerning the 1984 Citizenship Act. According to the Act, her two children cannot be accorded Botswana citizenship because their *father* is a non-Motswana. On the other hand, a Motswana man will have his children as Batswana irrespective of where they were born. Mrs. Dow's argument was that the 1984 Citizenship Act was contrary to the

Constitution and should therefore be amended to enable her to pass citizenship rights to her children. On this issue the BCC issued a press statement to support Mrs. Dow and has financially supported her. In this case, Mrs. Dow won the first round. Related to this issue, the BCC has set up a Human Rights Special Funds which can be used in similar cases or any case that hinges on human rights (BCC, 1991: 31). Apart from this fund, there have published several occasional papers concerning poverty and human rights of Remote Area Dwellers (RADS) to set up agendas for further involvement.

Exemplified by these cases, recently the BCC has been involved in the protection of human rights, especially of the marginalised. At the BCC Roundtable Conference held at the Anglican Cathedral in Gaborone 23rd and 24th in March, 1992, there set an agenda for churches to take actions. In this conference, the president of the BCC, Rev. Matshego called churches to voice the problems of the marginalised and speak out loudly against policies that destroy the poor and trample on their human rights" (*Mokaedi*, April 1992: 1). It remains to be seen what actions the church will actually take, but this can be a start for the church in Botswana to strengthen its position in civil society.

4.2.4.2 The Case of Independent Churches

In this part, examples of interactions between independent churches and the state are briefly refered to by citing cases researched by van Binsbergen (1993).

An interesting phenomenon was observed in interactions between independent churches and state officials (notably the Registrar of Societies) in the context of the Societies Act (van Binsbergen, 1993). It is that the Registrar imposed the far-reaching demands on churches, particularly

during churches' registration phase. In this phase, the threat of non-registration was used to change their constitution favourable to the Registrar's demand (van Binsbergen, 1993: 32), or, in other words, in order to accommodate these churches to the state. This is a case of St. Anna's Church in Francistown.

There were also cases which show interesting dimensions of state-independent churches relations. Among them, Guta Ra Jehova was the case that its registration was cancelled because of its failure to submit a list of annual returns (van Binsbergen, 1993: 32). There were also cases that changes of names of churches were imposed (van Binsbergen, 1993: 33-37).

These practices of the state can be considered that the state has a strategy "*not so much to prohibit but to control*" these churches (van Binsbergen, 1993: 35) in order to exercise influence over these organisations by encapsulating them in a bureaucratic structure. It is quite correct that van Binsbergen concluded that "the state seeks to co-opt non-state organizational powers without the slightest insistence on its prerogatives or hegemony" (van Binsbergen, 1993: 43) by controlling independent churches in a variety of ways , not by using forces.

The growth of Independent Churches has an aspect of symbolic, organisational and healing responses to the emerging deteriorated socio-economic conditions. Therefore, the case of responses of the Botswana state shows some ideological struggle to show its, apparent, strength.

4.3 Christian Churches in Civil Society in Zambia and Botswana: From a Comparative Perspective

There is a logic of the church concerning their choice to be involved in "politics" in the sense that it refers to activities so as to influence on policies of the state, which are areas of churches' concerns. For the church

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the ultimate source of authority is that it is derived from the God. The state thus is supposed to derive its authority from God. Even so, in fact, both the political structure and the appointment of rulers are left to the free choice of the people from whom authority comes from. As far as the state uses its power in a morally acceptable way and keeps its eyes on the common good, people are obliged to obey the state (churches' view of legitimacy of the state). However, they can stand up for their rights if "power" is abused. In fact, there is never the unitary approach among different churches to political and socio-economic problems[21], as stated earlier part of this chapter. In this context, the, mainly mainline, church becomes an important vehicle to express people's will as the mirror of the nation in Africa. In the recent process of democratisation, therefore, as Gifford stated, "churches have become so important to Africa's democratization" (1994: 533), because the state has lost its legitimacy from their criteria.

Therefore, it is quite apparent that "visions" (ideological base) of the Church and attitudes and approaches to development and politics are closely related. And the churches' network in both countries and its relati.e financial autonomy from the state have put it in a unique position in civil society, to which will be refered later. Based on what has been written in this chapter, I will argue several important points which are relevant to consider conditions of "growth" and "stagnation" of civil society.

4.3.1 "Visions" of the Church and Political and Economic Involvement

[21]As Gifford offered one of the interesting developments in African Christianity in the 1980s. It was, what he called, the new Pentecostal wave, which has North American background (1994: 517-518). He observed that, as a result of this "wave," the mainline churches lost their young people to new churches. Therefore, the 1980s can be considered a decade when there was a big change in African Christianity. In the case of Zambia, he quoted a case of the United Church of Zambia, the largest Protestant community, which split in August 1993 over Pentecostal practices (Gifford, 1994: 521).

In both countries, it was only recently that documents have set out both churches' recognition of socio-economic and political conditions and their basic attitude to the problems which they thought that they faced. According to these documents, we can find similar tendency of churches' basic attitudes in their development activities, although there are various approaches by different Christian churches, as briefly refered to earlier in this chapter. In terms of terminology, they use such words as "injustice" to describe real situations, and "liberation" as the mission of the mainline Church[22]. For the purpose of overcoming "injustice" and promoting the process toward "liberation," they set the poor, the weak and the disadvantaged as target groups and take people-oriented and people-centred approaches. This partly reflects the influence of their "ecumenical partners" overseas which offer financial support, especially projects initiated by people themselves because there projects are more viable than those initiated from above (NGO-isation of churches). Therefore we can find the features which are common in churches' development activities as follows, including both advantages and limitations (e.g., Henkel : 193-195):

(1) Emphasis on "grass roots" initiatives.
(2) Centrality of the principle of self-help.
(3) Disadvantaged people as the main target group.
(4) Access to the level of motivation of communities.
(5) Time and patience to wait for developments.
(6) Lack of fundamental strategic decisions, just mirrors of the mission's activities.
(7) Limited resources to carry out integrated programme.

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[22]As I raised earlier, the fundamentalist churches do not share the similar development approach as those mainline ones.

The first feature is mainly because churches can use existing structures and forms of organisation. Therefore administrative costs are normally lower than those of other organisations which have to establish necessary infrastructure at the beginning. The second one arises not because self-reliance is the aim but rather as a prerequisite for development projects from the standpoint of the western counterparts which offer aid. In fact, this is one of the important criteria which determine viability of projects. The third characteristic is that churches' main concern is to benefit those who are often neglected by the government programmes. The fourth is that the churches can influence people's commitment by stressing the ethical side of the Christian belief. The fifth is that people, who have been working as missionaries have developed and can develop the trust of people over a long period. However churches have limitations. As the sixth feature indicated, some institutions developed over a long period and have become fossilised despite the necessity to adapt themselves to new circumstances. And the problem of resources holds true for the case of churches. It is because they are financially dependent on their domestic and overseas "ecumenical partners" as stated above.

However, it is apparent that the scopes which were covered by the document *Christian Liberation Justice and Development* by three main church bodies of Zambia was much wider than that of the BCC. Apparently there reflected differences of churches' economic and political experiences in both countries as I have described so far. There is a clear contrast between Botswana, on the one hand, where multi-party system with rarely growing economy in Africa have existed, and Zambia, on the other hand, which had one-party system creating problems of political corruption and deteriorating economy. It is thus natural that churches' concerns became, eventually, much wider in Zambia than in Botswana.

What should be pointed out here is, therefore, the factor of "crises," whether "to a nation" or "to churches," in which churches are given opportunities to consolidate their unity. The controversy of the introduction of scientific socialism was a crisis in which the Church had to defend its own interest against the state. In the 1980s, the mainline churches continuously expressed their areas of concern in the form of pastoral letter, *Christian Liberation, Justice and Development*, as stated above, which contained a variety of issues (agenda) which related to the recent process of democratisation, emphasising the importance of political participation as well as human rights and actors in "civil society" in democracy, although there was not any clear indication to support the re-reintroduction of *multi-party* politics in the document. In the period of transition to the multi-party politics in the early 1990s, it was when there occurred a political stalemate concerning the constitutional issue and some prospect for violence at elections that the church explicitly appeared in the political scene as mediator and monitor.

In contrast, Botswana has been relatively free of this kind of "crisis" since independence, even though the BCC was the most active actor in development activities in Botswana until around 1974 when the government's financial condition was dramatically improved. Thus, it is also by economic conditions and the financial capacity of the government that churches' involvement in development activities are conditioned. In Botswana, especially in the fields of health and education, churches' significance have been diminished after they handed over their projects to the government since independence. In this context, the BCC's recognition of realities can be found in an address of the president of the BCC, which not only recognised economic and political stability in the country, but also pointed out not crises but emerging problems created

behind the stability in whose solutions the member churches and organisations have to fully and aggressively participate as follows:

> "Having enjoyed relative peace and political stability that prevailed in the country, these developments have been accompanied by massive urbanisation, disintegration of the traditional extended family, discarding of Setswana traditional values, atomising of the family, breakage of families through divorces and a general tendency to play down Christian values and principles... While there has been showing some negative signs: the wealth of the country is in the hands of a minority; the various aid schemes have resulted in benefiting the well-to-do-people at the expense of the needy; the gap between the rich and the poor is getting wider; there are policies that may lead to most of the usable land in the country being owned by a few citizen; the number of landless citizens is likely to rise; the poor groups in our society such as Basarwa are being more and more marginalised" (*Mokaedi*, April 1992: 1).

Although there has been relatively limited political involvement, this new vision has let the BCC to be involved in more actively in the field of the protection of human rights as we have seen.

On the other hand, in Zambia, as we have seen, enfeebled government's financial conditions, which have caused "crises," have enforced churches to expand their activities, or "NGO-ization" of the mainline churches (Gifford, 1994: 521). It was clearly stated in the document as follows:

> "Our contribution to the solution of *the present crisis* is offered on three different levels. First, we call our church members to action. Secondly, we present general principles for social, economic and political development. Finally, we make suggestions for special areas of concern. As we respond to the demands of the situation, we constantly strive to maintain a positive and constructive attitude as we make our measured contribution towards the development of our country" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 10, emphasis added).

4.3.2 Autonomy, Cooperation and Advocacy

In both countries, the Church has never been coopted into the state structure, although there seemed to be one case in Zambia that the UNIP intended to use the church as an instrument to attain its objectives, which was fiercely criticised by the church (organisational autonomy). This is one of the most important characteristics in Africa where, according to Gifford (1994: 520), many churches effectively lost much of their independence.

One of the advantages of churches is that they have "ecumenical partners" based in de eloped countries who support activities of churches in developing country in terms of finance and personnel (financial "autonomy"). These assistances are in some case directed to specific projects, and in others to churches themselves or the councils. In the case of the BCC, as briefly stated above, they have financial supports derived from "ecumenical partners," including Christian Aid, World Council of Churches and Methodist Overseas Division (BCC, 1991). In addition, some new projects are all financed by them. For example, Human Rights Special Funds, whose establishment was decided by the BCC Executive in 1991, are financed by Dan Church Aid. Also in the case of the CCZ, its members in programme/project financing is largely dependent on contributions from "ecumenical partners" as mentioned above. Although this does not mean that there is no financial constraints on the churches' activities[23], the existence of "ecumenical partners" at least have kept the church

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[23]For the church in both countries, it is a big concern to overcome their financial dependency on "ecumenical partners" and to be financially independent. In fact, they can only manage to run limited number of projects financially supported by "ecumenical partners", and it is impossible to be involved in more integrated programmes to combat the factors which have been hindering "development." Also in the case of the CCZ, there was financial deficit in the 1980s.

financially independent of the state. Therefore the church has stood on its own feet[24].

Based on this relatively autonomous position, churches has kept its basic collaborative relations with the state in Zambia. They stated as follows:

> "The specific response of the Christian churches to the
> challenge of today's reality is preceded by a general outline of
> the Christian mission. Particular reference is later made to the
> *distinct* and *independent*, though complementary, relationship
> of church and state to one another" (CCZ, ZEC, EFZ, 1987: 11,
> emphasis added).

> "The work and activity of the churches is different from that
> of the state. While church and state depend on each other in
> many ways, nevertheless the two are quite distinct and
> independent of each other. They have their own particular
> missions to perform for the total human development of the
> nation. It is thus important that the *autonomy* of each be fully
> recognised and accepted" (CCZ, ZEC, EFZ, 1987: 13, emphasis
> added).

Also in Botswana, there has been much cooperation on independent basis between the BCC and government department as exemplified by the financial support from the Ministry of Local Government and Lands for the marketing of handicrafts survey for remote area dwellers (RADS) which was facilitated by the BCC's Service Department (BCC, 1991: 35).

As we have seen in this chapter, however, churches in both countries have also taken the tactics of "advocacy" in its relation with the state. It is clear that church autonomy has made it possible to take this option. In Zambia, it was more "resistance," which accompanies

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[24]In more recent research by the author, the BCC's financial resources from "ecumenical partners" overseas have been dwindling, so that its activities have been inevitably scaling down (interview with, J. Potter, the Acting General Secretary of the BCC, 8 August 1996).

"mobilised" people, than just "advocacy" in the case of the controversy of the introduction of scientific socialism. In the situation of crises, the church in Zambia, especially the Catholic, has used the form of "pastoral letters" directed not only to the state but also to *all* Christians in the country. This style seems to have worked well not only to avert "crises," but also to generate pressure to the state especially in Zambia where the influence of Christianity on political leaders has been strong. Actually this combination of collaboration and advocacy has progressively strengthened churches' position in civil society in Zambia, and also it has made churches in a unique position in the process of democratic transition in Zambia. Furthermore, the FODEP, whose role is supposed to spread civic education so as to share democratic values among Zambians in the consolidation phase, seems to be one of the important actors.

In comparison, from the experience of the church in Botswana, it has never attained its strength in civil society to the same degree as in Zambia. The administrative capacity of the state owing to the sound financial basis has made the government possible to keep it as the main agent of development, and, therefore, there remained relatively less room for the church to work. Moreover, lack of severe confrontation between the state and the church and the legitimacy of the elected government has not offered opportunities to consolidate unity among churches as happened in Zambia. Although there have been several "statements" or "comments" on government policies, these are only directed to policy-makers.

In addition, there is a difference of organisational strength between churches in Zambia and those in Botswana. Although there are three different mother bodies of churches in Zambia, they acted quite cooperatively, mainly at the time of "crisis." As was exemplified by the cases of the Catholic involvement in the formation process of the MMD

and election monitoring, there have existed well-connected networks in Zambia. Because of these networks, people can be symbolically and practically "mobilised."

In Botswana, however, as is pointed out by the president of BCC, which is the coordinating body of the mainline churches including Catholics, at an opportunity of the Roundtable Conference, the BCC has not yet reached out to many local churches, which are not members of the Council (*Mokaedi*, April 1991: 1).

It is these independent churches that have interacted with the state in so interesting a manner as briefly refered to above. These churches are not only challengers against the mainline churches which have relatively collaborating relationship with the state, but also symbolic challengers against the relatively strong Botswana state. These interactions actually shows the state's intention to effectively control these churches and keep its hegemony.

4.3.3 Difference of the Degree of Institutionalisation in Civil Society: Factors

Generally the church has been institutionalised in the historical process. It is, however, apparent that the degree of institutionalisation of a type of AO, even a church, in civil society in one country is likely to be different from that in another country. As we have seen in this chapter, the process of institutionalisation is influenced both by internal factors of AOs and external factors. The former includes the churches' organisational network for "mobilisation", and the significance of development activities in a country. The latter refers to economic conditions, administrative capacity of the government, and the state's policies. Also as we have seen, the church's tactics are influentially

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working to be more deeply entrenched in civil society by using its political tools like "pastoral letters" to Christians in a country.

In the case of Zambia and Botswana, there has been a clear contrast. In Zambia, where the church has become one of the most influential components in a relatively vigorous civil society, the church has strengthened its organisational structure and firmly entrenched itself in the society through its continuing contribution in the fields of health, education, which produced early political elites in the territory in historical terms, and rural development. As a result it has also strengthened its influence on political leaders, complementary development role in cooperation with the post-colonial state in deteriorating national economy and enfeebled state's administrative capacity, and effective advocacy and "resistance" by using established networks for "mobilisation."

In Botswana, on the other hand, where the churches are voices in its incipient civil society, the churches' roles in civil society have been limited because of a relatively narrow space for their activities regulated and controlled by the financially and ideologically relatively strong state, which has been guaranteed by the dramatic improvement of the government administrative capacity owing to its firm financial bases, and Botswana's political stability. In comparison with Zambia, it is also possible to point out that early political elites were educated not in schools in the Protectorate but in South Africa in historical terms. Also the autonomous activities of independent churches, which are very much fragmented themselves, have been effectively intervened in by the state.

CHAPTER 5

NATIONAL SERVICE DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATIONAL

ORGANISATIONS: EXPERIENCES FROM ZAMBIA AND BOTSWANA

Chazan gives us a useful vision on the state, considering the issue treated in this chapter, when she wrote:

> "Viewed *from below*, the state is seen as both a distributor of
> benefits and an intruder" (1988: 333, emphasis added).

In general, the state in most of Africa seems to have been functioning only as an intruder and seems to have failed to distribute many benefits to the ordinary people. This has been one of the most characteristic phenomena in the post-colonial period. It has occasionally been referred to as the "failure of the state." It is against this background that the importance and popularity of non-governmental actors has been recognised in distributing services as well as in facilitating or promoting development.

In Zambia and Botswana, there have been a variety of National Service Development Associational Organisations (NSDAOs), which serve others, as detailed in chapter 2. In this chapter, based on the data and materials obtained during the field research, I will consider (1) how NSDAOs' emergence and activities are related to the capacity of the state as a major distributor or supplier of services in a country, (2) what kind of achievements and problems NSDAOs have experienced, and (3) how the state regards NSDAOs activities and what kind of relations there are between the state and specific NSDAOs. In addition, in the latter part of the chapter, NSDAOs working in the issue area of family planning will be comparatively analysed from these points of view.

My main argument is (1) that the NSDAOs tend to appear and work in a "policy vacuum," where the state has been expected but has failed to

offer sufficient services because of scarcity of resources (decline of material bases), and (2) that the relationship between the state and a specific NSDAO is better in the area where there is less competition between the state and an NSDAO both in terms of practice and ideology, and therefore that the state tends to rigidly control NSDAOs which are involved in the areas of the state's concern and which have different ideological inclinations from the state, so that the state may keep its hegemony.

For the purpose of analysing the aspects of NSDAOs mentioned above more in depth, it is also necessary to consider NSDAOs in their relationship with, especially, poor people[1] which they have been targeting[2]. The one reason for taking target groups into account is that NSDAOs as intermediary organisations can be evaluated not only in terms of the effectiveness of their organisational management but also in terms of their impact on target groups and results derived from their activities. The other reason for taking target groups into account is that NSDAOs' impact on rural community is never "neutral." In other words, activities of one NSDAO impact favorably on only a part of community. In fact, in some cases, NSDAOs activities are against the poorest among the poor. As de Graaf correctly pointed out from his experience in Zimbabwe, "undifferentiating strategies [of NSDAOs approaching 'rural poor'] in an environment which is in fact differentiated might in the end benefit only the strongest group or class" (1987: 290).

It has been a recent general assumption that what are called NGOs are more effective instruments to uplift the poor in developing countries through their flexible approaches and comparative advantage in "micro-

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[1]The concepts of the poor adopted by a variety of NSDAOs are differ nt in terms of area of concern of each NSDAO. In some case, the poor means those who are the poorest peasants in rural areas, and in other cases, the poor means those who are living in urban squatters. Therefore, it is necessary to be careful to use the concept by various NSDAOs.
[2]If the poor is targeted, NSDAOs tend to be more involved in activities of advocacy and the promotion of participation.

development" than the post-colonial African states which have failed to come up to people's expectation. It can be true that NSDAOs have been important actors providing benefits otherwise not available. But it is also true that people among the "NGO community" in Southern Africa felt that:

> "(t)hroughout Southern Africa we see examples of a pretense at organisation which is in the end a betrayal of the 'grassroots' that NGOs claim to serve. The institutionalisation of grassroots development must mean the increasing empowerment of popular organisations rather than then increasing bureaucratisation of the development process by unrepresentative and self-serving intermediary NGOs" (Andersson, 1989: 1).

NSDAOs are intermediary organisations (e.g., Carroll, 1993) whose success can be assessed only in the degree to which their activities and their (un)intended results have improved people's capabilities to obtain and maintain access to and control over the resources they need to solve their problems. And proper evaluation requires paying attention to what happens after the delivery of services (de Graaf, 1987: 282-283). Therefore some effort will be made to consider the effect of NSDAOs on the "grassroots" by using self-evaluation reports of specific NSDAOs, to identify both positive and negative roles of NSDAOs in rural democratisation.

In this chapter, firstly several NSDAOs, which do not necessarily have their own counterparts in the other country, are considered as case studies after reviewing the general characteristics of NSDAOs in both countries. Secondly, NSDAOs involved in the issue area of population and family planning will be comparatively analysed.

5.1 The Case of Zambia: Characteristics of NSDAOs

In Zambia, apart from such associations as the Red Cross, the Girl Guide and the Boy Scout which were formed for the purpose of "social welfare" with international influence before independence, most NSDAOs were established in the 1970s and the 1980s. In the early 1970s, the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ), and the Zambia Pre-school Association were formed by progressive people who eventually became leading members of these associations. But it was after the establishment of the Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD) in 1974 that the emphasis of NSDAOs was changed from "social welfare," which had been the main objective of non-governmental sector, especially missions, since the colonial period and which had focused on assistance to orphans and the disadvantaged, to "self-reliance" of, especially poor, people. The ZCSD had been the umbrella and coordinating body, to which local NSDAOs were affiliated, during the period of one-party politics.

In the 1980s, there appeared NSDAOs like the NGO Coordinating Committee (NGOCC), which coordinates activities of DAOs working in the issue area of WID, and the Human Settlement of Zambia (HUZA), which involved themselves not only in providing services but also in projects for the purpose of empowering target groups. Also some NSDAOs like the YWCA, which used to be involved in leadership training and establishment of its own institutions, have started programmes of a conscientisation (awareness rising) nature to empower target groups.

It was these NSDAOs, especially those involved in "women in development," and which have had empowe.ment-oriented programmes like the NGOCC and the YWCA, that have been actively working both in the transition period in the area of election-monitoring and in the Third Republic on issues area constitutional amendment (*New African*, December 1993).

Therefore, using Korten's "four generation category"[3] (1990: 117), NSDAOs in Zambia seem to have evolved into the "second generation" aiming at small scale self-reliant local development, out of the "first generation" aiming at relief and welfare by distributing benefits.

5.1.1 Failure of the State in a Declining Economy: Emerging Areas of Activities of NSDAOs

It is in the declining economy as described in chapter 2 that the state has failed to provide social services such as education and health care. The "quality" of education has been deteriorating due to lack of material, facilities and personnel and the functional literacy programme has been constrained by a shortage of fund (Freund, 1986: 877). In terms of the proportion of government expenditure on education, there had been a range between 5.1 per cent (in 1986) and 11.1 percent (in 1980) in the 1980s, and 8.6 percent in 1990 (*World Development Report* 1992)[4], which is quite unstable, as table 5-1 shows.

In the financial problems, primary and secondary education suffered relatively more than university education, with their share of recurrent educational funds falling from 68.9 per cent in 1970-75 to 61.1 per cent in 1985-86. As a result, especially at the primary level, the allocation for teaching materials has been decreased, even though currently all educational materials that reach primary schools are funded by donor agencies (Hoppers, 1989: 17-18). In this situation, the community has by and large been responsible for the extension of many primary schools to

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[3] According to Korten's earlier article, the first generation NGOs are involved in relief and welfare, the second generation NGOs in small-scale self-reliant local development, and the third generation NGOs in sustainable systems development (1987: 147-149). In his more recent work (1991: 117), he added fourth generation NGOs which are involved in "people's movements."

[4] In more recent issues of World Development Report, data on the proportion of government expenditure on education have not been appeared.

become "basic schools" through the addition of two extra grades (8 and 9) (Hoppers, 1989: 17-18).

Table 5-1 Government Expenditure on Education in Zambia (Current), 1980-1990*

Year	(K'000)	% of Government Expenditure
1980	120,377	11.1
1981	83,005	6.7
1982	107,997	8.2
1983	120,043	10.4
1984	110,869	10.1
1985	173,788	8.0
1985	275,270	5.1
1985	279,109	6.2
1986	474,539	5.7
1987	936,756	9.7
1988	2,274,239	8.6

* Includes Capital Expenditure from January, 1985.
** 1990 Total is up to September.
Source: Compiled from Monthly Digest of Statistics April-June, 1991 Table 32b.

In the area of health care, the consequences of a deteriorated economy have been also severe, so that the quality of service has been declining. This has been reflected in such examples as increased morbidity and mortality from diseases and malnutrition, reduced physician to population ratios, and decreased real government expenditure per capita as the following tables show (Freund, 1986).

Although the proportion of total expenditure on health has recently grown up to 7.4 percent in 1990 (*World Development Report,* 1992) and 8.4 percent in 1992 from 5.1 percent in 1987 (*African Development Indicators 1994-95*), annual average of the proportion has been declining from 6.9 percent between 1975 and 1979 to 6.7 percent between 1980 and 1985, and to 6.3 percent since 1986 (*African Development Indicators 1994-95*). Also, the per capita health expenditure has, in general terms, declined drastically for 15 years, as table 5-2 shows. This is one of the consequences of the serious financial constraints derived from the reduced Zambian economy. Actually, new capital building projects had virtually stopped, maintenance

backlogs became more acute. In addition, the problems extended and came to have serious consequences for planned PHC programmes where projected expenditures exceeded expected revenues (Freund, 1986: 878). Also as table 5-3, which is based on collected data at the University Teaching Hospital (UTH) in Lusaka, shows, there has been a tendency for a general deterioration of the nutrition situation. The malnutrition mortality for the 1-14 age group comprised more than 62 percent of the total mortality in 1984.

Table 5-2 Trends in Real Government Health Expenditure per Capita in Zambia (Kwacha)

Year	Recurrent	Capital	Total
1970	16.1	5.8	21.9
1971	17.1	6.0	23.1
1972	17.3	3.9	21.2
1973	17.1	1.9	19.0
1974	16.9	1.8	18.7
1975	17.4	2.1	19.5
1976	17.2	2.0	19.2
1977	16.4	1.4	17.8
1978	14.3	0.6	14.9
1979	12.2	0.2	12.4
1980	13.1	0.7	13.8
1981	12.4	0.6	13.0
1982	13.6	1.7	15.3
1983	12.0	1.3	13.3
1984	11.6	0.3	11.9
1985	6.0	0.2	8.2

Source: Freund, 1986: 897 Table 1.

These economic constraints, which became more severe under structural adjustment, have consequently exacerbated the phenomenon of "poverty" and have most severely hit children and women as recent researches have shown (GRZ/UNICEF, 1986; Clark and Allison, 1989; Muntemba, 1989; Banda, 1990).

Table 5-3 (a) Malnutrition Mortality, UTH (1974-1984) (Zambia)

Year	Mortality 0-11 months	Malnutrition Mortality	Malnutrition as Percentage of Total Mortality
1974	1243	32	2.6
1975	993	29	2.9
1976	1155	49	4.2
1977	1129	31	2.9
1978	1219	33	2.9
1979	1423	38	2.9
1980	1331	32	2.4
1981	1606	42	2.6
1982	1631	61	3.7
1983	1708	98	5.7
1984	2161	123	5.7

Source: Freund, 1986: 885 Table 9

Table 5-3(b) Malnutrition Mortality, UTH (1974-1984) (Zambia)

Year	Mortality 1-14 years	Malnutrition Mortality	Malnutrition as Percentage of Total Mortality
1974	573	106	18.5
1975	370	73	19.7
1976	563	93	16.5
1977	351	134	24.3
1978	857	305	35.6
1979	815	321	39.3
1980	769	292	38.0
1981	874	329	37.6
1982	985	484	49.1
1983	1301	698	53.7
1984	1659	1032	62.2

Source: Freund, 1986: 885 Table 9

It is in such areas as education and health, where the state has failed to meet people's expectations, that most NSDAOs as well as northern NGOs have been working[5]. In the area of health, NSDAOs working include the Child Care and Adoption Society of Zambia which has provided substantial assistance for homeless children, adoption facilities, and a nutrition rehabilitation centre for malnourished children refereed from the University Teaching Hospital (UTH), the Family Life Movement

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[5]As discussed in chapter 4, churches and related organisations are also important actors in this regard.

of Zambia (FLMZ), which has promoted family planning by using natural methods, the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ), which has been involved in activities of disseminating information on family planning and population issues and of providing family planning services as we consider at a length in later in this chapter, and the Red Cross Society working in broad areas of health and emergency relief and some other church sponsored organisations like the Christian Children's Association.

Also in the area of education including "non-formal education,"[6] various NSDAOs have been working. Among them, the Zambia Pre-school Association (ZPA) is a case of an NSDAO actively working in "policy vacuum" where the government involvement is weak. Actually "pre-school education"[7] has constituted an integral part of Government policy, but the Ministry of General Education and Culture has not run pre-schools and its role has been to provide a grant to the ZPA for payment of staff and organisation of in-service courses and coordination of pre-school activities. This is because financial constraints have limited the state's actual involvement in pre-school education (GRZ/UNICEF, 1986: 110). In fact, District Councils have been considerably involved in pre-school education in coordinating pre-school institutions in the district, while the ZPA has been working in the training of teachers, organising national

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[6]"Non-formal education" was defined as "any organised, systematic, education activity carried on outside the framework of the formal system to provide selected types of learning to particular sub-groups in the population, adults as well as children" (Coombe and Ahmed, 1974 quoted in GRZ/UNICEF, 1986: 112).

[7]"Pre-school" has been defined in a government document, the Education Reform document (1977), that pre-schools are organised institutions that cater for the total development of the child before the attainment of seven years of age. They look into the social, educational and health aspects of the growing child and strive to assist him in his all-around development; this is, his physical, mental, social, emotional, moral and aesthetical development. Thus, pre-schools do not primarily exist for the preparation of the young to enter into formal primary schools as participation in pre-school education is not a pre-requisite for entry into Grade 1 in Zambia.

level workshops and seminars, producing play materials, and providing pre-school services to the marketeers' children.

Some other AOs, especially church related ones, have been active both in the areas of health and education. In practice, health and education, as detailed in the previous chapter, are closely intertwined and inseparable in such cases as family health education and home economics. Therefore it is relevant to consider that working areas of service-oriented AOs, including both NSDAOs and other AOs, are more or less concentrated in the area where the state has not sufficiently served.

It is necessary to point out that the role of NSDAOs in the area of service provision has been also enhanced under the implementation of structural adjustment, which eventually stimulate NSDAOs to fill the gap. Under structural adjustment, with neo-liberal orthodoxy, the World Bank and the IMF emphasised the withdrawal of the state from the economic activities and de-emphasise state-led development strategies (Gary, 1996: 150). Against this ideological background, the promotion of "NGOs" activities in development field was also emphasised. Therefore, the factor of structural adjustment will be necessarily include to consider the state-NSDAOs relation in the 1980s later in this chapter.

5.1.2 Some General Characteristics of NSDAOs (including quasi-NSDAOs) in Zambia

The main initiators of NSDAOs in Zambia are relatively diversified and include the government (e.g., the Village Industry Service, the Small Industry Development Organisation), international agencies or groups from overseas (e.g., the Zambia Association for Research and Development, the Human Settlement of Zambia), churches and some church leaders (e.g., the Family Life Movement of Zambia, the Makeni

Ecumenical Centre), and progressive people with the assistance of international bodies (e.g., the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia).

Organisationally, NSDAOs in Zambia have relatively similar structures. Constitutionally the top decision-making bodies are the general meeting/conference, held regularly, but in practice the main policies are made by the executive committee composed of members elected at the general meeting, namely a chairperson, vice-chairperson, secretary, and treasurer, and several coopted members. Under the executive committee, there are usually some committees to formulate projects, the number of which depends on the areas of activities of individual NSDAO. The projects made by these policy-making bodies are implemented by an NSDAO's administrative body headed by the executive secretary (director) and other staff members. Even so, this organisational structure does not guarantee effective organisational management. In some cases, members of the executive committee as the top policy-making body are not active because of relative lack of enthusiasm[8], as in the case of the Self Help Development (interview with the project coordinator of the SHD, 6/1/92). Also lack of skilled manpower has hindered activities and self-evaluation of NSDAOs as pointed out below. In addition, many NSDAOs had been more or less controlled by UNIP in the Second Republic. During this period, members of the Central Committee of UNIP often occupied posts of executive committees of various NSDAOs, and President Kaunda himself took posts of "patron" of NSDAOs like the Zambia Council for Social Development. In particular, quasi-NSDAOs like the Village Industry Service were controlled by politically appointed executives. Therefore, the organisational structures of such NSDAOs as the ZCSD and

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[8]In the case of SHD, members of the executive committee are nearly voluntarily involved in the activities. Therefore, it often happens that they are reluctant to attend monthly meetings.

the VIS have been changed to adapt themselves to multi-party politics following the period of political transition.

In terms of finance, NSDAOs including quasi-NSDAOs like the VIS, have got quite limited grant from the government which has also faced severe financial constraint. In the cases of the Zambia Pre-school Association and the Girl Guides, which received relatively big financial support from the government, the amount is 100,000 kwacha consisting of less than 10 percent of the annual budgets of the associations. Even in the case of the Village Industry Service established by President Kenneth Kaunda, the government annual grant consists no more than 10 percent of its annual budget. Normally, the NSDAOs have depended heavily for their financial resources on several donors or international organisations, including NORAD, CIDA, OXFAM, NOVIB, CUSA, the European Foundation, and UNDP/UNIDO.

Generally speaking, NSDAOs in Zambia have also faced serious problems in the deteriorated economy. One observer regarded the situation where NSDAOs have been as follows:

"As the economy changes radically, NGOs and agents of development are affected. The programme of work of NGOs is affected, and as it lives within the environment, the NGO itself is internally affected. To both the external and internal effects, NGOs react. They adjust and overcome, or just manage to survive, or sometimes they are overwhelmed and made to decline by effects on programme work and the NGO. Sometimes NGOs end up concentrating on their own survival" (Banda, 1990: 114).

Actually most of the NSDAOs with which I interviewed have felt the shortage of funds. 10 out of 11[9] (90.9 percent) of NSDAOs have faced

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[9] These are the Village Industries Service, Red Cross Society, the Human Settlement of Zambia, the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia, the Pre-school Association of Zambia, the Family Life Movement of Zambia, the Self Help Development, the NGO

the problem of the shortage of funds to operate their programmes. The only NSDAO which has not felt the problem is the Human Settlement of Zambia which has received enough financial assistance from the European Foundation. Therefore it often happens that the monthly salary for staff is below the poverty datum line. Moreover, more or less, the problem of shortage of fund has caused a difficulty in recruiting qualified full-time personnel (63.6 percent). The lack of qualified manpower has also caused another difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness of NSDAOs' past programmes (interview with the director of HUZA, 21/1/92). Also lack of transport (90.9 percent), which derived from the shortage of fund and quite bad condition of roads, has made the monitoring activities of NSDAOs quite difficult. There is actually a "vicious circle." In this situation, NSDAOs are often criticised as follows:

> "NGOs have failed to keep pace with the people's own effort at survival. NGOs executives still sit in their offices designing development while the people are engaged in their own development initiatives that are usually *at variance with* the NGOs perceived programmes" (*Weekly Post*, 7-13 February, 1992: 9, emphasis added).

In Zambia, the main posts of NSDAOs have been almost completely localised, which is one of the main characteristics in comparison with Botswana as we see below, although NSDAOs depended on expatriates at the initial stage. This effort of Zambian NSDAOs seems to sustain autonomy from, so called, Northern NGOs and international agencies. However, this does not mean that the manpower shortage has been solved. For example, the YWCA experienced a serious manpower problem with the end of the contract of their expatriate staff members and the

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Coordinating Committee, the Zambia Association for Research and Development, and the Boy Scout Association.

resignation of other staff members (Touwen, 1990: 49). Therefore, the posts which require technical knowledge and skills have occasionally been occupied by expatriates. More recently to cope with this manpower shortage, several NSDAOs have started to share an expatriate staff member with special skills such as in bookkeeping (personal communication with the General Secretary of the NGOCC, 4/12/1991).

As stated in chapter 2, there has been a coordinating body of NSDAOs, the Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD), to which most NSDAOs as well as social service departments of district councils, and community service divisions of Mining Companies have been affiliated. Also organisations working in the areas of WID have had their coordinating body, namely the NGOCC. Apart from the coordination through the ZCSD ad the NGOCC, there has been a variety of cooperation among NSDAOs at project level and in such issue areas as AIDS.

In addition, there has been established, what can be called, a sort of "NSDAO community," where main staffs working in NSDAOs, especially progressive women, know each other, and share information concerning activities of a variety of NSDAOs and potential donors for their organisations. Especially for newly formed NSDAOs, it is difficult to get information of fund available for their activities. Therefore, it is important for them to keep in touch with relatively "established" NSDAOs. This informal interaction has been usually taking place through participation in seminars and conferences. These occasions have, in fact, offered good opportunities to exchange information and to establish future cooperation (personal observation by participating in two seminars). These gatherings are considered to be functioning as an alternative to the national coordinating bodies of NSDAOs.

5.1.3 The State and NSDAOs

In Zambia, during the one-party era, what should be pointed out is that it was not "non-political associations" but "political parties" that were constitutionally prohibited. This is why various actors in civil society could exist, which is not the case in many other authoritarian political regimes. In the *Report of the National Commission on the Establishment a One Party Participatory Democracy* (1972: 8), it was written that:

> "We came to the conclusion that it was not in the interest of the nation to prohibit the formation of non-political associations based on tribal loyalties. Such an action would retard the cultural growth and development of Zambia... WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND that apart from the freedom to belong to the only political party, people be free to form and to belong to non-political associations provided they are not prejudicial to the national interest."

Therefore, in effect, the formation of NSDAOs was constitutionally guaranteed.

During the period of one-party politics, however, there was control of NSDAOs by the United Independence Party (UNIP) in various forms. Basically NSDAOs have to register at the Registrar of Societies and submit information on their annual turnover. Therefore *registration* and *monitoring* have been basic tactics of the state. In addition, by occupying top policy-making posts of several NSDAOs, members of the Central Committee of UNIP influenced activities of NSDAOs to some extent.

Apart from these controls, NSDAOs involved in women's issue have to affiliate to the Women's League of UNIP, which used to be the Women's Brigade before 1983. The Women's League has the task of implementing the party side of women's activities, and therefore NSDAOs working in the area of Women in Development had been

almost *coopted into* the party structure, although in the transition period these NSDAOs delinked themselves from the party structure.

Moreover, it was quite difficult for NSDAOs to work beyond the policy framework of the UNIP government, which can be observed even in the quotation above, which emphasises the importance of the national development priorities and the government intention to monitor activities of NSDAOs. One of the examples which the Zambia Council for Social Development faced, in its relation to the Ministry of Labour and Social Services is as follows:

> "On 14th April 1977, a delegation of the Council met senior officials of the Ministry to discuss relationships between the two bodies. The delegation was surprised to hear that the Ministry objected strongly to certain aspects of the Council's constitution, as well as to some of its activities. the following were the Ministry's main submissions:-

> '1. The Zambia Council for Social Development should *not be allowed to be independent and consider itself as the supreme body* that should be consulted on matters related to social development. it has to operate within the Ministry's overall Social Development policy. In other words the Council should operate through the Ministry's specialised departments of social Welfare and Community Development. This is to enable the Ministry to *supervise the activities of the Council in order to ensure that whatever activities the Council is engaged in are of acceptable standard.*

> '2. The Council's desire to enlist membership of the Director of Social Welfare and the Commissioner for Community Development is not acceptable since the Government should *monitor the work of the Council* through these professional department and vice versa.

> '3. The Council's co-ordinative role should be confined only to the voluntary organisations and not extend to functions of government agencies carrying out social development services. The Council should merely be an umbrella organisation for voluntary organisations contributing to social development....

> In line with these submissions the Ministry listed a number of amendments which it wished to be made to the constitution of the Council" (ZCSD, Chairman's Report, 1978: 3-5, emphasis added).

In these quotations, it is clear that there was the intention of the government to tightly control activities of NSDAOs and to limit their

autonomy within the government policy framework. NSDAOs were not supposed to be allowed to be working beyond the framework. Therefore, NSDAOs themselves had to choose their survival strategy deliberately during the one-party era, especially before structural adjustment was introduced in the 1980s.

The UNIP government did not recognise the developmental work of NSDAOs in Zambia for a long time. It was only in 1987, when the government unilaterally abandoned the first structural adjustment programme, that NSDAOs (in this study's category) were mentioned for the first time in government documents as channels to be used in development efforts in the *New Economic Recovery Programme: Interim National Development Plan*. It seems that the government had learned the importance of NSDAOs in development from experiences during the first SAP period. In this document, it was proposed to set up an NGO-desk within the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) to improve communication between the government and NGOs. However, at least until the period of my field research, this proposal had not been materialised. In the NCDP, there is only women's desk to cooperate with NGOs involved in women in development (WID).

In the *Fourth National Development Plan* (FNDP), the government referred to the importance of NGOs more explicitly and also repeated the proposal in the Interim Plan as follows:

> "The New Economic Recovery Programme (FNDP) recognises NGOs as vital source of relief and development assistance... the FNDP will generally aim at defining more clearly, the structures and procedures for liaison between Government and NGOs. The NGO Unit in the Department of Economic and Technical Cooperation at NCDP will be responsible *for close monitoring*; in consultation with the Zambia Council for Social Development of the relief and development activities of NGOs and ensure that their programmes and projects

are *in line with the country's development priorities.* The NGO Unit will also ensure that NGOs submit their projects and programmes as well as progress reports to NCDP for incorporation in Annual Plan and Economic Report" (FNDP: 47-48, emphasis added).

In addition, in relation to the issue of WID,

"Non-governmental Organisations in Zambia play a major role in supporting Government's efforts in integrating women in development. Non-governmental Organisations ... include ... organisations working in various fields including health, education agriculture, family planning, water and sanitation, technology, specific developmental needs, and focus on certain sectors such as children, women, hunger, the disabled etc.... Historically, Non-Governmental Organisations in Zambia, as in many other African nations, have been pioneers in development and have been channels for development resources... The objectives of the Fourth National Development Plan is to promote the existing working relationship of Non-Governmental Organisations and Government and strengthen local, indigenous Non-Governmental Organisations so that they may improve and increase their participation in the integration of women development process" (FNDP: 47-48: 457-8).

It is possible to insist that during the period of structural adjustment state-NSDAOs relations became more collaborative and less conflictive, which will be shown in the cases of HUZA and PPAZ later in this chapter. More recently there was close collaboration between the state and NSDAOs in formulating the Social Action Programme (SAP) in the *New Economic Recovery Programme: Economic and Financial Policy Framework 1991-1993.* SAP is a programme in the areas of health and population, education, and protection of vulnerable people, where the state has failed to be accountable for people and the activities of NSDAOs have been concentrated. On this occasion, NSDAOs in collaboration with donors formed the NGO Forum in early 1991 with the initiatives of the

World Vision International and NGOCC. One of the reasons to form this body was because the ZCSD was under reconstruction. Apart from the main forum, there were several sub-fora composed of NSDAOs and representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the NCDP in order work on specific issues (interviews with an official of the NCDP and officers of NSDAOs). Therefore, a collaborative relationship between the state and NSDAOs has been gradually developed.

5.2 The Case of Botswana: Characteristics of NSDAOs

According to Grant (1980), the period 1962-1980 falls into three distinct parts in Botswana - that from 1962 to 1968, from 1968 to 1974, and from 1974 to 1980. What was recognised as "non-governmental organisations" in this stage were basically the Brigades, the Botswana Christian Council, the Botswana Council of Women, the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), the Red Cross and so on. In this periodisation, what can be pointed out is that there is a clear contrast before and after 1974 when "the inspiration which had galvanised so much of this non-government development effort began to fade," suggesting that "one period was ending and a new one starting" (Grant, 1980: 43). At this stage, NSDAOs in Botswana were still in the "first generation" (Korten, 1987). One of the important changes was that the government began to be more involved in development works like refugee relief, the brigades which were initiated by non-governmental efforts before 1974, when Botswana faced desperate shortage of cash and qualified manpower.

In the 1970s, a few quasi-Service Associational Organisations (NSDAOs) like the Rural Industries Promotions (RIP), the Rural Industrial Innovation Centre (RIIC), the Botswana Technology Centre

(BTC) were formed, which were initiated by the government. It is actually in the 1980s that a number of NSDAOs were established in Botswana. Since then, NSDAOs in Botswana has gradually moved into the "second generation" by emphasising self-reliance of local people.

5.2.1 Working Spaces for NSDAOs in a "Well-Managed" Economy

In the good economic performance, as stated in chapter 2, public services including health and education have been effectively delivered (Harvey and Lewis, Jr., 1990: 283-292). This tendency can be also confirmed by the relatively stable proportion of government expenditure in these areas as shown in the following table 5-4, which is contrasting with Zambia. Also several data available from the World Development Report 1992 show drastic improvement of standard of living. The infant mortality rate, which is a number of deaths per 1000 live births, has been improved from 112 in 1965 to 38 in 1990, which is the lowest in southern Africa. The primary net enrollment has also been improved from 58 per cent in 1975 to 93 per cent in 1989.

Table 5-4 Proportion of Total Expenditure in Health and Education in Botswana (Percentage)

Year	Education	Health
1982/83	15.8	4.4
1983/84	16.7	4.8
1984/85	14.9	4.1
1985/86	15.8	4.4
1986/87	16.6	5.3
1987/88	16.2	6.6
1988/89	16.5	4.5
1989/90	17.1	4.0
1990/91*	15.5	4.4
1991/92**	17.1	4.4

* Revised
** Estimated
Source: Compiled from Central Statistics Office, 1991: 30

What has been shown in macroeconomic and other national level indicators is actually a rare and good performance of the government by African standards, which is "good governance" in the sense that public affairs have been effectively, responsibly and accountably managed, as commented by an observer (Diamond, 1992: 40). Therefore, working sphere for NSDAOs has been relatively limited in contrast with Zambia, because the state has preoccupied more working space with its administrative capacity.

However, it is also true that there have been inequality and "poverty" in Botswana in the process of development as have been often criticised (see, e.g. Cliffe, 1984 and especially on education, Kann, 1984). And some other "new" problems have been emerging in the context of "development" of Botswana which the state has not effectively coped with. For example, a 1989 Poverty Datum Line (PDL)[10] study based on data from the 1985/86 Household Income and Expenditure Survey estimated that 64 per cent of rural households and 30 per cent of urban households had income below their PDL. Also there is the regional difference in the proportion of households living in poverty, although such differences have been quite poorly reported. In addition, poverty is more severe and widespread in remoter areas of the country where employment opportunities are more limited (Kgosidintsi, 1992: 6-7)[11].

It is in these working spaces that Botswana NSDAOs which emerged have been working since the 1980s. Therefore it is valid to consider that NSDAOs have been emerging in response to a perceived

[10]The PDL can be defined as the basic minimum income needed to maintain a decent standard of living. The first poverty datum line for Botswana was derived from the findings of the Rural Income Distribution Survey of 1974. From this survey it was determined that 45 percent of rural households had incomes equal to or below their PDL. A study of households in four urban areas in 1976 determined that at least 36 per cent and possibly as many as 47 per cent of urban households had incomes below their PDL (Kgosidintsi, 1992: 6).

[11]According to Kgosidintsi, the regional differences are still poorly documented because of the tendency to focus on national level data (Kgosidintsi, 1992: 7-8).

need and working in order to tackle issues which had not been properly managed by the state and other existing social institutions. In other words, NSDAOs tend to appear in issue areas "newly" perceived, especially by progressive people in urban areas. NSDAOs like Thusano Lefatsheng have been involved in projects of income-generation for the rural poor, especially women in remote areas where there are otherwise limited chances for employment and income-generating activities. NSDAOs also appeared in such issue areas as environment, street children in urban areas, and the promotion of self-managed producer groups.

5.2.2 Some General Characteristics of NSDAOs (including quasi-NSDAOs) in Botswana

Considering initiators of NSDAOs in Botswana, there is a variety in Botswana. Although there are a few NSDAOs initiated by the government and some by international efforts, what is characteristic is that organisations are often led by the "founding father/mother" as Inger pointed out (*Mmegi*, 24-30 May 1991: 2). One of the examples of "founding fathers" is Patrick van Rensburg, who was the founder of the Brigade movement. The idea of education with production or employment has been kept alive in such NSDAOs as the Foundation for Education with Production (FEP) and the Co-operation for Research, Development and Education (CORDE). In addition, the Mmegi Publishing Trust which has issued a popular weekly Mmegi has its origin in the Swaneng Hill School where *Mmegi* used to be a small school paper. Thusano Lafatsheng (TL) (Terre Aide Botswana) was also formed "largely as a result of the enthusiasm and vision of an expatriate, Françoise Horenburg" (Thusano Lefatsheng, 1990: 2). Apart from these, such NSDAOs as the World View International and the Botswana Family Welfare Association (BOFWA)

were established as a branch of international bodies, and some others were formed by groups of expatriates and thereafter were localised like the Child to Child Foundation.

Most of NSDAOs in Botswana, which are composed of voluntary members who are interested in activities of each NSDAO, have their own decision-making body. The regularly held general meeting attended by members is usually the ultimate policy-making body. But in practice the executive committee composed of both elected and coopted members makes policies and in some cases it is assisted by the steering committee meetings held more occasionally. Policy implementation is conducted by its administrative body. Even so, there is a variety of, in some cases unique, organisational structures and experiences of NSDAOs derived from their organisational structure. TL, which is not a membership organisation, has only the board as decision-making body but it has been dormant, causing disorganisation of TL's activities as stated later in this chapter. CORDE, whose members are producers' cooperative societies and agricultural management associations, has the management committee as policy-making body, which is composed of elected members of member cooperatives and associations, as well as staff of the Technical Support Team which is headed by the coordinator and supports activities of members. Therefore, in principle, support staff who are normally supposed to be administrative staff, are "employees" of "target groups" for which they are working.

According to my survey based both on interviews and on written documents, NSDAOs in Botswana have faced relatively fewer problems than those in Zambia. Among 11 NSDAOs researched[12], 5 have felt the

[12]These include the Botswana Family Welfare Association, the Cooperation for Research, Development and Education, the Botswana Technology Centre, the Foundation for Education with Production, the Mmegi Publishing Trust, the Rural Industries Promotions, the World View International, the Red Cross, Thusano Lefatsheng, the Child to Child Foundation, and Bana Rona Trust.

problem of the shortage of manpower, and also 5 the problem of shortage of funds. Also in Botswana, transport or the shortage of vehicles to access to their target groups is not so serious a problem as in Zambia. This seems to be partly because NSDAOs are relatively free from their financial restraints to get vehicles and because access to the rural area is easier because of well-maintained road condition and therefore the maintenance of vehicles is better.

In terms of finance, among 10 NSDAOs from which some financial data were obtained, 5 have received financial assistance from the government. Among them, quasi-NSDAOs, namely the Botswana Technology Centre gets 90 percent of its budget from the government and the Rural Industries Promotions 50 percent. The Botswana Family Welfare Association receives 20 percent from the government and the Thusano Lefatsheng gets some. 9 out of 10 NSDAOs received funding from foreign donors[13]. Concerning the problem of funding, Inger, who is the Executive Director of the RIP pointed out,

> "One of the biggest mistakes therefore, and one that has been made
> by several NGOs in Botswana, is to rely exclusively or primarily on
> one donor; when the donor pulls out, the NGO collapses" (*Mmegi*, 24-
> 30 May, 1991).

One of such cases, which is not an NSDAO, was that of the Southern Rural Development Association (SRDA), which has been facing the collapse because of withdrawal of the main donor, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

There is a striking contrast with the case of Zambia in terms of manpower, in that in the case of Botswana important management posts

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[13]The Bana ba Rona Trust, which has only started its activities and therefore has still limited scope of activities, has been dependent on individual subscription and donation from American and British Embassies and other NSDAOs.

of the most active NSDAOs have been occupied by expatriates, mainly white Europeans. These NSDAOs include the Botswana Family Welfare Association, the Co-operation for Research, Development and Education, the Forestry Association of Botswana, Rural Industry Promotions, and Thusano Lefatsheng. This phenomenon of "expatriate dependency" shows us that there is still a problem of shortage of qualified Batswana manpower in non-governmental sector. Also this dependency has caused organisational weakness as happened in the case of TL as stated later.

In terms of cooperation with other NSDAOs, there have been "informal" cooperation among NSDAOs in forms of joint participation in various projects, although formal "networks"[14] have not yet been established. Even so, as in the case of Zambia, there has been, what can be called, an "NSDAOs' community" composed of prominent activists in developmental fields. This community is composed of expatriates, and Batswana with progressive ideas. They knew each other quite well through their participation in various seminars and they are relatively well informed on situations of other NSDAOs. Also there is cases that an occupier of top management post of one of the NSDAOs is a member of other NSDAO's executive committee or chairman[15].

5.2.3 The State and NSDAOs

Generally speaking, the Botswana state has taken registration and monitoring as basic tactics. It is necessary for NSDAOs to register under Societies Act or Companies Act. Apart from registration, the state has

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[14]During the period of field research, there was a movement to establish a formal coordinating body of local NSDAOs involved especially those in projects for community development and disabled persons. On 23 March 1992, representatives from 17 NSDAOs met to discuss this issue. There was also another meeting on 26 May 1992 to set up the body (information from the public relation officer of the Red Cross, 3/4/92).

[15] For example, Mr. David Inger, who is Executive Director of the RIP (the top management post), is at the same time a chairman of the Forestry Association of Botswana.

monitored their activities by consulting with NSDAOs and through *kgotla*. This attitude was exemplified in an interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Local Governments, Lands and Housing as stated below. Financial control has been also used towards AOs involved in "Women in Development" because all donor money is offered not directly to individual AOs but through the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs. The case of the NGO consortium was that collaboration among NSDAOs was eventually collapsed as a result of the state intervention, as stated later. Therefore there is a tendency that the state is relatively a strong "intruder" as well as a strong "distributor of benefits" in Botswana.

At any rate, it is only in *National Development Plan 7: 1991-1997* that the roles of NGOs were mentioned for the first time. Even so, such roles were mentioned piecemeal rather than systematically. Examples are as follows:

> "NGOs, such as the Forestry Association of Botswana, are particularly active in forestry, and successful development will be assisted by active collaboration. The possibility of contracting out certain research activities is being explored. In addition, in recognition of the need for people's participation in forestry activities, provision will be made during NDP7 to assist individual farmers, groups, communities and NGOs to undertake forestry project" (NDP7: 269)

> "[In the issue area of Maternal and Child Care Health/Family Planning] To deal with the problem areas identified..., NGOs, such as the Botswana Welfare Association, the Botswana Christian Council and women's organisations, will be encouraged to disseminate information about family planning, population and teenage pregnancy" (NDP7: 377).

From the point of view of senior government officials, NSDAOs have been recognised as no more than developmental "assistants" or even "tools." In fact, one undersecretary of the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing (MLGLH) responded to me that NGOs are allowed to work as far as the government knows their activities (interview, 5/5/92). Therefore it is difficult for NSDAOs to work beyond the knowledge of the government to mininise the conflict with the government. Inger wrote the Botswana government's attitude from his experience as follows:

> "Government's attitude to development NGOs (including the brigades and so on) has been ambivalent, but generally 'laissez-faire'... A positive aspect of the Government-NGO relationship is that Government, as in most democracies, has responded to lobbying on the part of NGOs, to greater or lesser extent, especially on such issues as conservation and the environment. On the other hand, *there have also been some conflicts, and a lack of understanding on the part of some government officials as to the resources that NGOs have to offer in support of government development policies*" (*Mmegi*, 24-30 May, 1991: 11, emphasis added).

Although the government's attitude toward NSDAOs has not been very clear, there are several observable tendencies. First, an NSDAO which has been involved in an issue area which does not overlap that of the government, and which has similar development strategy as that of the state, tends to receive more favourable responses from the government. This is the case of the Thusano Lefatsheng (TL) which has been involved mainly in providing job and income-generating opportunities through collecting grapple plants, and researching and developing the production and processing of wild and cultivated medical and aromatic plants. Among the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the TL's activities have been highly appreciated (personal communication with

several officials of the Ministry). In 1991, half of the African Hunger Prize awarded to President Masire, 50,000 pula were personally gifted to this association. In addition, the General Manager of the TL was the only participant from the "NGO community" on a government trip organised by the MLGLH to Europe to consult the Remote Area Dwellers Programme (RADP) (personal Interview with the General Manager of the TL, 12/4/92).

The reverse is also true. In other words, NSDAOs, working in the areas where the government also has been involved and having different development strategy, have experienced some problems. One of the examples is the Cooperation for Research, Development and Education (CORDE), which is made up of 21 producers' cooperative societies, agricultural management associations and so on, and has been involved in providing extension services to member cooperatives. This means that CORDE's area of work "falls within the domain one regarded as the sole province of the Department of Cooperative Development (CODEC)" (Andersson, 1989: 4). In order to avoid conflicts with the department, CORDE have continued to inform CODEC of its programmes and progress. Also CORDE asked to appoint two of CODEC officers to the CORDE Consultative Committee. Despite these efforts, even medium-level cooperative officers are ill-informed about the organisation and on occasion have attacked CORDE and attempted to curtail its activities (Andersson, 1989: 4). In these case, CORDE responded to these actions by appealing to the Commissioner of Cooperatives for assistance. Responding to my questions on CODEC's stance to CORDE, medium-level officers in particular showed their hostile attitude to CORDE by insisting that "CORDE has no legal power for audit (of its member cooperatives)" (Personal Interview with officers of CODEC, 20/5/92). This is also the case of the Forestry Association of Botswana (FAB). The FAB is in a

competitive position with the Forestry Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture. Its field officers occasionally face a "negative and hostile attitude" from the government's (Ministry of Agriculture) extension workers derived from "jealousy" (Personal Interview with Officer of FAB, 25/3/92). Also the FAB has experienced uncollaborative attitudes on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture by excluding the FAB's involvement in a big forestry project in the North which should have been more effectively managed by cooperating with the FAB which has accumulated vast knowledge and experience (Interview with the Director of the FAB, 5/5/92).

The second tendency, which is related to the first one, is that, as CORDE felt, lack of understanding and being viewed with suspicion by the government have been one of the major hurdles the local NGOs faced (*Mmegi*, 24-30 May, 1991: 11). This tendency was clearly shown in the recent case of the NGO consortium as we consider later at length.

Thirdly, there is quite limited, in fact almost no opportunities for NSDAOs to take part in national *policy-making* process although there has been collaboration between the government and NSDAOs in the *policy-implementing* process. The government stance in this sense has been quite clear and it is that the planning and decision-making process, especially in rural development, be dominated by top rank bureaucrats. It is proved by considering the membership of important "Inter-ministerial Committees and Institutions for Coordination of Rural Development" that there are almost no representatives from NSDAOs in 16 committees (ROB, 1988). The only exception is that the Botswana Technology Centre, which is a quasi-NSDAO, has a capacity send a representative to the Industrial Extension Coordinating Committee.

5.3 Case Studies

In this section, several NSDAOs' experiences in Zambia and Botswana will be considered in order to identify the problems and achievements by reviewing some individual experiences.

5.3.1 Human Settlements of Zambia (HUZA)

The Human Settlements of Zambia (HUZA) is one of the NSDAOs which can be classified as a second generation NGO (Korten, 1987: 148). HUZA's guiding projects philosophy is as follows:

> "Human Settlements of Zambia's project guiding philosophy is based on helping the *communities to help themselves*. Playing the role of service organisation not a control power, for the benefit of all those community development projects based on realistic community participation in planning implementation and maintenance of their human settlement in all endeavours of human life" (HUZA, undated: 3, *emphasis added*).

In addition, one of the purposes of HUZA is "not to speak out for people but to help people to speak out by themselves" (interview with the director of HUZA, 21/1/92).

5.3.1.1 The Origins and Pre-history of HUZA

HUZA's origin is traced to the initiation of a small-scale self-help housing project in Kafue, by one international organisation, namely the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in 1968, which was invited by the government to participate in the housing project (Rakodi, 1990: 10-12). In this project, which was based on notions of community, self and mutual help, as a means of enabling poor people[16] to improve their

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[16]In the case of HUZA, the poor is basically poor people in urban areas.

residential conditions in urban areas, 19 groups, containing 228 low-income household were able to successfully build improved houses of local materials with technical assistance of community development workers (Rakodi, 1990: 10).

In the 1970s, when the problem of housing became more serious because of rapid growth of population in Lusaka derived mainly from rural-urban migration, a proposal for the upgrading of a large squatter settlement (George) was developed (see, e.g., Rakodi et al., 1981). It was in 1973 when the World Bank began to consider partial financing of a sites-and- services and upgrading project in Lusaka that the AFSC and its local workers, who had already been involved actively in upgrading projects, were drawn into the project planning process. In project making and complementation process, local residents themselves had become involved on a small scale in community projects to which they contributed labour and on a wider scale in house construction and improvement although people's involvement was only partially fulfilled for a variety of reasons (Rakodi et al., 1981).

The AFSC had not regarded its role either purely in terms of providing services to the upgrading project of housing in low-income areas or as a permanent development programme externally controlled. It had both a wider interpretation of the role of NGOs in improving the conditions of low-income urban residents and a long-term intention of handing over to a locally run organisation (Rakodi, 1990: 12). It is against this background that HUZA was formed.

5.3.1.2 The Formation and Development of Human Settlements of Zambia and the Areas of Concern

It was in mid-1982, when the World Bank funded project was drawing to a close, that HUZA was formed. At this time, the AFSC pulled out from its immediate support, leaving HUZA with six Zambian staff and a budget of 54,000 kwacha for HUZA's first year operation (Rakodi, 1990: 12).

The essential element of HUZA's project strategy is *the participation of the target community in the development programme.* "This approach implies that true development can succeed *only if the members of the target community have control over their situation*; it makes them more self-reliant" (HUZA, undated: 1, emphasis added). Therefore, all projects undertaken by HUZA give the members of the target community decision-making power; by increasing their skills, freedom of choice, and economic independence through self-help house building and other economic promotion ventures; and by building a stronger community through community action and development programmes (HUZA, undated: 1).

Membership of HUZA is open to anyone who subscribes to the objectives of the organisation. HUZA is administered by the executive committee which is a policy-making body composed of eight invited members chosen to represent a range of skills and necessary contacts, including a lawyer as chairman and an architect as vice-chairman, an accountant as treasurer, a private school-owner as publicity secretary, a *member of the UNIP Central Committee,* a former teacher and trade unionist, and the General Manager of the Credit and Savings Union as ex-official members in the one-party era (Rakodi, 1990: 13). "HUZA employs a nucleus number of full time field staff engaged in teaching skills to target communities" (HUZA, undated: 4). HUZA started with six staff in 1982 and it has grown, deliberately slowly, to about 20 staff in 1992. Since its inception, there has been a close co-operation between HUZA and the

Lusaka Urban District Council (LUDC), because the projects undertaken by HUZA have been within the Council's boundaries. In addition, HUZA has been provided an office in the Council headquarters in return for HUZA's role as advisors to elected ward councilors (Rakodi, 1990: 13).

HUZA has been an exceptional case in Zambia in the sense that it has not faced a serious financial problem because adequate funds have been obtained from several overseas donors[17], but HUZA's problem is shortage of qualified manpower, especially to conduct some evaluation research in order to be "accountable" to donors (interview with the director, 21/1/92).

HUZA's projects, which have been changed from its original emphasis on settlement up-grading and sites-and-services programme in a declining copper-based economy, cover three main areas, (1) economic promotion focusing on income-generating activities, (2) conservation of natural resources, (3) community health including health and nutrition education. All these projects are carried out in settlements around Lusaka, e.g. Kalingalinga, Chawama, George, Chipata, and Kanyama compounds (HUZA, undated: 2).

In the first area, until 1984 HUZA had been involved in training, research and development activities at a community centre in Kalingalinga, one of the squatter areas in Lusaka. Training programmes, which were supplemented by research and development to improve materials and methods of manufacture, were to improve productive skills of those who want to establish their own enterprises. In 1984, HUZA withdrew from Kalingalinga and subsequently continued ꜧ promote the development and use of locally produced materials by means of training, credit provision and dissemination of innovations. Since then, three types

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[17]HUZA's major partners and long-term contributors to its core budget are Oxfam UK (25 per cent), EZE of Bonn (37.5 per cent), and ICCO of Zeist, Netherlands (37.5 per cent) (Rakodi, 1990: 13).

of training programmes were offered at the Chawama Skills Training Centre, which offers skill training to women and the youth. These full-time 18 month courses are (1) tailoring and designing, (2) carpentry, (3) income-generating like producing soaps, cement-blocks, cradles, cooking-oil, fibre-cement roofing sheets and coffee substitute from soya beans. In addition, another centre was newly established at Bauleni to offer a training course to produce building materials (Rakodi, 1990: 13-14; interview with the project coordinator of HUZA, 21/1/92).

In the second area of the conservation of natural resources, HUZA has placed emphasis on people taking responsibility for their own environment. Therefore its work has focused on community education, tree planting, involving residents and primary school children in these activities and the manufacture of improved charcoal stoves. Tree planting has been encouraged by HUZA in all the serviced and upgraded areas. Since Zambia adopted a national conservation strategy, HUZA has been particularly actively involved in tree planting in Lusaka. HUZA's first tree planting exercise was during the first tree planting on 15th December 1986 to 15th January 1987. And in 1987/88 tree planting month, HUZA encouraged the wider community to participate in tree planting activities (*Energy and Environment*, vol. 4: 1). In addition, one of the quite important projects is that of the manufacture of improved charcoal stoves, which have been widely used in cooking and heating in daily life, because the improved one enable a 30-40 per cent saving in charcoal, which means efficient use of energy and potentially conserve forests and a way to reduce the monthly household charcoal expenses (see a case in Clark and Allison, 1989: 33-35). However, production itself is constrained by the availability of raw materials (*Energy and Environment*, vol. 4: 5). However, in

theoretical terms, there is a problem of public/collective goods[18] management in forestry/environment conservation, which is a big issue beyond the scope of this study.

In the third area of community health, or more generally, community development, HUSA's programmes have three components: health and nutrition education, a project for food production and processing, and a project for urban self-help (PUSH). As Rakodi properly pointed out (1990: 15), in local communities, ignorance of health, hygiene and nutrition is only a part of the problem and in fact it itself is not a problem because people know what is necessary but they do not have enough resources to carry it out. Therefore what is important is to tie health and nutrition education to practical solutions to generate income and products. HUZA's approach is based on the idea of integrating three components. PUSH is a new attempt to support self-help improvement of community infrastructure, including road, drainage, bridges, pit latrines. In order to motivate people to be involved in works, HUZA offers food stuffs, namely 25 kg mealie meal, 1 kg beans, 750ml cooking oil, 1 kg sugar, and 2 kg soya beans every ten days (interview with the project coordinator of HUZA, 21/1/92). This attempt was working well.

Therefore, HUZA has expended its working space from its original settlement projects to the areas of conservation, community health and nutrition education where there were not sufficient services from the UNIP government in the 1980s, supplementing the declined Zambian state in economic stagnation in the 1980s.

5.3.1.3 HUZA's Relations with the State and Target Groups

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[18]A public or collective good is a good, the significant benefit of which cannot be denied to those who do not help bear the costs.

HUZA has recognised its advantage and its relation with the government as follows:

> "HUZA now concentrate on community-based activities, maximizing local resources, since NGOs *are better placed to promote these vital grass-root activities than government.* HUZA also recognizes that it must act in ways that match, enhance and complement local government services and programmes" (HUZA, 1988: 24, emphasis added).

One of the cases of comparative advantage in an NSDAOs's role which HUZA has experienced was that of the incinerator. In 1984, Lusaka Urban District Council built the Chawama Urban Health Clinic with government funds. However the incinerator for the maternity wing was not in the plans and the clinic could not be used until one was provided. Even so, local councillors were told that an incinerator could not be built until the next financial year because the expenditure for it was not included in the government budget. In this situation, it was HUZA that was able to mediate, negotiate permission for the community to build one by themselves and mobilise resources for this purpose (HUZA, 1988: 24). This is a case which illustrates not only the comparative advantage of NSDAOs but also the role of NSDAOs in a "policy vacuum" at the micro-level. However this does not mean that HUZA has been a competitor of the government. Rather it has been a mediator between people and the government as well as a promoter of community organisations, and as shown in the quotation above it has been an actor to complement the government, whose capacity to respond people's demands has been limited.

Generally speaking, in its relationship with the state, HUZA has taken a deliberate strategy. Especially during the UNIP control, HUZA's

approach was to establish relationships not only with target groups like squatters, trainees, informal entrepreneurs but also with local councillors and local UNIP leaders, and local authority officers in the areas where HUZA was actually working. It is because building up and maintaining these relationships is to secure HUZA's working space by preventing party leaders or officials seeing HUZA's activities as representing a desire to preempt their responsibilities and by defusing the resentment felt by officers when presented with evidence of problems with service operation and maintenance (Rakodi, 1990: 16). Therefore HUZA's survival strategy is to let the state know their purposes and activities, and to support and collaborate with it. In political terms, HUZA has continued to let both the government and the party its political neutrality. This is the only practicable strategy for small NSDAOs like HUZA to achieve more effective results from their programmes given that an NSDAOs' network has not yet established. From the state's point of view, this is more or less to allow the state to control HUZA, by "monitoring" HUZA's activities.

In internal organisational terms, by taking deliberate and limited process of bureaucratisation, HUZA has gradually consolidated its organisational strength. HUZA's participative and self-critical management style, and emphasis on accountability within the organisation and to donors (Rakodi, 1990: 16) have contributed to HUZA s relatively successful performance. Therefore, HUZA has been the only NSDAO in Zambia which has not experienced any difficulties in obtaining funds. In this process of consolidating its position, HUZA has also started to exercise an influence, "by being consulted on policy and the initiation of community programmes outside Lusaka" (Rakodi, 1990). HUZA was an advisor on natural resource conservation during the preparation of the National Conservation Strategy and also represented on the NCDP subcommittee on women and development. Therefore, even in the one-

party politics, there is room, although it is not unlimited, for NSDAOs to participate in the policy-making process, with their background and field experience, which makes NSDAOs' role more meaningful in *policy advocacy*. This is quite contrasting an experience in comparison with NSDAOs in Botswana.

However, there are still problems which NSDAOs cannot easily overcome, which is applicable to the case of HUZA. One of them is that HUZA's impact in local communities is inevitably limited because of its "smallness," although its performances themselves have been successful. Also, in a declining economy, it is often difficult for entrepreneurs trained in HUZA's programmes to find both appropriate markets for their products and the materials necessary for their manufacture. These are problems in the economic environment which HUZA can neither manage nor influence effectively (see Smith et al., 1980)[19].

5.3.2 Thusano Lefatsheng (TL)

Thusano Lefatsheng (TL), which was formed in 1984 as a non-profit trust, is one of the "typical NGOs in Botswana," in the sense that it was established by a founding mother with an excellent idea but has not been well maintained (interview with the General Manager of TL, 12/4/92). Actually, while the first years of its existence have seen the organisation earning acclaim for its success in providing alternative sources for income

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[19] Smith et al.(1980: 8-9) classified three levels of environment where the organisation is working as follows:
(a) The "controlled" environment: this consists of the baseline activities that produce the results intended.
(b) The "influenced" environment: this is the entities external to the organisation whose activities can influence organisational and management performance. The basis of the relationship is a source of mutual influence between the focal organisation and the external entity.
(c) The "appreciated" environment: this includes institutions that produce activities affecting organisational performance, but that can neither be controlled nor influenced by its management.

to rural people, mainly through sales of the grapple plant[20], this period was also characterised by confusion and organisational disarray (Thusano Lefatsheng, 1990). TL can be also categorised as a "second generation" NSDAO, which is involved in developmental activities for people's self-reliance (Korten, 1987). This section is written based on materials obtained from the organisation itself.

5.3.2.1 The Origin and History of TL

The establishment of TL was largely as a result of the enthusiasm and vision of an expatriate, Françoise Horenburg and a small group of people. It was this lady who directed and designed structures in the initial stage. TL's main stated purposes are:

To provide "new" agricultural training (for semi-arid land) and income earning opportunities for subsistence farmers and the rural poor;

To provide job opportunities for rural women;

To contribute towards the economic, cultural and health developments of rural areas and to promote and support development of new small rural industries;

To research and develop the production and processing of wild and cultivated medicinal and aromatic plants, industrial plants, fruit trees, and other food producing plants.

In the initial stages, which was a preparatory phase, TL's main activities are briefing village organisations and kgotla in Kumakwane, Mmakgodi and Thamaga, so that the people in these villages were aware of the purpose of the organisation, and started to work at Kumakwane where a viable horticultural project existed. The Village Development Committee (VDC) agreed that the VDC plot be used for TL's first pilot project,

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[20]This is a kind of medical plant which grows in veld areas of the Kalahari (see fn. 20 in chapter2).

experimenting with the cultivation of exotic medical plants and herbs and the propagation of wild medical plants. At this time, Ian Martin, a horticulturist, joined TL. This project was financed by a loan from the Botswana Development Corporation. In October 1984, a second pilot project, which involved experimentation with a variety of indigenous and exotic fruit and nut trees as well as other crops, was started with fund from HIVOS.

In the second phase, when TL started to be more actively involved in various areas of concern, TL's relationship with donors were tightened. In March 1985, TL made a proposal to Appropriate Technology International to request support in a grapple processing project. Also in the same year, USAID and TL reached an agreement which saw TL linking with Ben-Gurion University in Israel on research into fruit and nut crop for arid lands. In December, a project document, in which five main areas of activity were outlined, was submitted to HIVOS, requiring support for TL's core budget as well as costs of all research and extension programmes. Five areas are (1) assistance for small farmers within 15km of TL's project site, (2) researching at the TL's project site the viability of alternative farming systems of producing crops which may create a significant source of new income while requiring little outlay of capital and little management, (3) growing crops at the project site which could provide TL with real revenue to finance its ongoing activities, (4) the organisation of harvesting of wild plants and buying these Veld Products from harvesters, and (5) ensuring the processing and marketing of these Veld products. In response to this request, HIVOS agreed to support TL and has continued to be the major donor since then.

With the financial support from HIVOS, TL started to establish a centre for activities, which was named "Thusego" by the chief of

Mmankgodi. The VDC plot at Kumakwane was at this stage handed over to the VDC with the balance of pilot project funds.

In 1986, other relationships with donors were established. But problems started to emerge. The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) agreed to fund a large project designed to ensure the development of phytochemical and pharmaceutical capacity in Botswana, and the introduction of TL products to the international pharmacopoeia. In this work, there was a collaboration between the University of Botswana and TL in training of a selected candidate. However, because this individual joined the private sector at the completion of training, the project was suspended. Loss of trained manpower continued in the following years, since people trained in Israel and Germany for the purpose of improving capacity of TL with collaboration with overseas universities eventually joined the government.

Also toward the end of this year, after investigating the situation of TL, the Board of TL, which is the body of direction, came to the conclusion that Mrs. Horenburg, the founder of TL, was misplaced as General Manager of the organisation, and that TL would benefit more if she could work in her area of pharmaceutical skill while the post of GM was filled by someone with training and experience in management. However she did not accept this proposal and resigned from TL itself in April 1987. This means that TL lost her wide knowledge of plants and their medical use which has been an essential component of the work of TL and TL's development was severely hampered by this event. Also as a result, limited contacts were made with a number of organisations. Moreover, TL was left without a GM for more than two years. Another blow to TL at this time was the resignation of Ian Martin, the horticulturist. In spite of all the difficulties which TL faced, staff under the Acting GM attempted to

adhere to the original plans. However there was a growing sense of frustration at the inability to direct the organisation and answer the pressing problems confronting TL.

After the new General Manager, Francis Johnstone, who is Scottish with a long experience in development management, was appointed, TL's activities became organised again. But it is still considered to be in the stage of *formation* and *development* (Garilao, 1987)[21].

5.3.2.2 Structure and Management Procedures: Assumptions and Realities

Thusano Lefatsheng is not a membership organisation composed of those interested in the activities of the organisation. It is directed by a Board of Trustees who meet four times a year[22]. The Board of Trustees[23] selected an Executive Committee, which is composed of a Chairperson, Secretary and three additional members, from among its members. The General Manager of TL is not a trustee, but attends all meetings of the Board and Executive committee. The General Manager is in charge of the daily management of TL.

As stated above, TL's founder became General Manager of the organisation, and she set course of most of the programmes with limited opportunities for consultation by staff. Therefore it can be said that there were no set procedures of mechanisms for decision-making. In this situation, there was little chance for reflection or critical appraisal of developments. TL at this stage was characterised by a small group taking many organisational initiatives, pursuing a development vision not

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[21]In the interview with the GM, he told me that he was shortly leaving for Lesotho and that Motswana would be a new GM.

[22]In 1996, members of the Boards meet monthly.

[23]The Board was originally selected by TL's founders, and since then has been "self-appointed," i.e., the Board decides if it needs a new member and then approach that person (TL, 1991: 21). However, the Board's involvement in TL's activities has been quite limited.

shared by many of the people who carried out the work, and by poor communication and inadequate management procedures. The moves to change this situation was partially made during the period when the post of GM was vacant, and more comprehensively made after the new GM took one the post.

Furthermore, the attitude of the Board, which was described "self-sustained oligarchy" (interview with the GM, 12/4/92) was a problem in managing the organisation. The Board of TL has taken a laissez-faire attitude to daily management over the years. In spite of a few key individuals' effort to mobilise their colleagues' participation in the organisation's affairs, the records of Board meetings showed a high rate of absenteeism, indecision on important questions, and a failure to look beyond superficialities. By April 1989 staff found the continuing inertia of TL and the staffing problems so intolerable that they submitted a memorandum to the Board to ask it to work hard to improve the quality of their participation in TL's affairs. But by the end of 1989, when the self-evaluation started, there had not been any change. Therefore, in organisational terms, TL was not well functioned in the 1980s.

In terms of finance, because of the overburden to the accountant, several necessary books of record were not maintained. In addition, the allocation of budgets, basically determined by the availability of donor funding, to activities were done by the accountant alone without any involvement of project staff.

In this way, the management of TL contained a lot of problems; lack of communication between staff; lack of proper direction and communication from the Board; lack of organisational procedure and structure and so on. Also loss of trained manpower owing to competition with the private sector, was a serious problem for TL, which caused suspension of one project.

5.3.2.3 TL's impact on target groups and other problems in TL's activities in the long term

One of the most important works of TL has been the harvesting, grinding and selling of grapple plants (Harpagophytium procumbens) based on the idea about alternative approaches to agriculture in Botswana. Until nowadays, the market, which has been mainly limited within Botswana, has been receptive to this product, and thus there has been success in promoting its utilisation. Therefore the effect of TL's veld product programme has created a reliable cash income for people, especially in the most remote areas where opportunities for employment is quite limited. Helpful aspects of TL have been recognised by the target groups, especially harvesters in remote areas, as follows:

> "TL helps poor people to earn a living by buying this plant (Grapple)
> from us" (TL, 1991: 8)

Similarly farmers in Kweneng assisted by TL have registered their appreciation of TL's activities as follows:

> "TL's agricultural approach is progressive compared with the
> traditional system of monoculture. TL encourages intercropping
> methods and has introduced indigenous plants as cash crops, bringing
> additional income. It brings new agricultural ideas and methods to
> us"(TL, 1991: 8).

> "Membership of the experimental projects committee is
> worthwhile since you can learn a lot in discussions.
> Mmankgidi, Thamaga and Kumakwane lands areas are
> represented on this committee and this helps communication.
> TL consults us in planning activities"(TL, 1991: 8).

"Helps to provide skill in preservation and propagation of
indigenous plants. Crops like Morama beans will bring money
and are also a source of protein"(TL, 1991: 8).

However, on the other hand, TL's programme, especially the
commercial part, has had some negative impact on people, which lead to
people's suspicion of TL, and also has created the "unexpected"
phenomenon of the emergence of "middlemen," who buy the plant from
the harvesters and then sell it to TL. Some of the complaints from
Takatokwane and Basarwa harvesters, for example, are:

"Rich people in the villages benefit more from the grapple plant
business than the poor people. They simply hire poor people to do
the harvesting then they sell the Grapple to TL at higher prices.
This exploitation is possible because the poor people need
immediate cash for food, tobacco etc" (TL, 1991: 7).

"We suspect TL is making huge profits from us, because they can buy
at P4 and sell at much more. This problem of cheating happens
throughout the Kagalagadi"(TL, 1991: 7).

"Prices, weight and grade of Grapple are not discussed or negotiated
with harvesters"(TL, 1991: 7).

"Some TL staff do not allow harvesters to see the weight of their
product on the scale"(TL, 1991: 7).

"We Basarwa are afraid to ask TL questions about anything. We are
not sure whether we are cheated or not because we can't count our
money after receiving it"(TL, 1991: 7).

These quotations, both positive and negative messages from target
groups, contain important implications. Among them, the emergence of
"middlemen" is directly associated with one of the TL's activities, which is

marketing of the grapple. In other words, NSDAOs' activities can offer opportunities of social class differentiation in rural areas. There is a background condition of this process that some individuals have a regular source of income while the majority do not. In TL's self-evaluation, two possibilities were considered; firstly the emergence of "middlemen" was interpreted as the result that someone buys harvested grapple from others who cannot wait until the TL truck arrives, but needs ready cash for food; secondly, this means that there is an operation where someone employs a number of people to get extraction certificates[24], harvest the tuber and then sell it at less than the market rate. This is one of the issues in which NSDAOs involved in developmental works have been cautioned, because "undifferentiating strategies in an environment which is in fact differentiated might in the end benefit only the strongest group or class" (de Graaf, 1990: 290).

However, at the same time, it is true that there were rural associations emerging as a consequence of TL's work, which means that TL's activities have promoted and facilitated communication among rural people to organise themselves. This tendency also means that TL's activities have contributed to "empowerment" of rural people, which was partly observed in chapter 3.

Taking both phenomena stated above into consideration, TL's developmental activities have had *ambivalent* impacts on its target groups. It is because TL has been involved not only in development activities but also in commercial ones mainly to sell grapple in the market in Botswana. The commercial side of TL's work has often been at odds with its development trust, and therefore the commercial side has

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[24] In fact, fire rangers are reported to have issued 881 extraction certificates in one village alone. As a result, the resource has been reported to be becoming scarce.

negatively impacted on the development side, by causing people's scepticism towards the activities of TL.

In addition, there was a case that TL's internal dis-organisation, especially the resignation of the General Manager as stated above, caused the collapse of economic activities of a cooperative contracted with TL, Baratani Co-operative in Otse. Under the terms of the agreement, TL supplied a range of seeds of aromatic and medical plant to this cooperative. In this project, the central role was played by the former GM herself, because it was heavily dependent on her knowledge of various plants. There were periodic verbal reports made to the GM, and a written record was kept showing dates of planting, progress of the crops, watering times, and other general observations while she occupied the post. Therefore, when the GM left, there was no single staff member who had any idea of the potential uses of the plants they had grown, which led to the situation that TL could not buy plants. As a result, almost all crops had to be left to rot and the cooperative's agricultural section collapsed because the money coming from its activities was not enough to cover the water costs of the whole agricultural section. This illustrates the fact that weak organisational structure of NSDAOs and dependence on "expatriate" can damage self-reliant efforts of cooperatives or other community and development groups in long terms.

5.3.2.4 TL's Relation with the State

As stated in the previous section, TL is one of the NSDAOs which has been "favoured" by the Botswana government. This is supposed to be not because TL's performance has gained legitimacy in targeting areas and consolidated its position, but (1) because TL's areas of activities do not overlap those of the government and (2) because of its innovative way of

involvement in rural development. Therefore, the state's evaluation is derived not from NSDAO's performance, but from its development strategy and methodology. In fact, among the circle of the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, TL's activities, especially Thusego's research and extension activities have been highly appreciated, even though in the self-evaluation, both of activities was evaluated to have been inadequate and often unlinked to TL's development trust. It seems that it is only after the process of self-evaluation and the arrival of the new General Manager that TL's activities have again been gaining ground.

The fact that a half of African Hunger Prize awarded to President Masire, 50,000 pula was personally gifted to TL also seemed to reflect the government attitude toward the activities of TL. Moreover this government attitude can be illustrated from the fact that participation of the GM of TL in a government trip organised by the Ministry of Local Government, Lands, and Housing to Europe to consult the Remote Area Dwellers Programme (RADP) as the only participant from the "NGO community" in Botswana.

5.3.3 The Case of the NGO Consortium in Botswana

The NGO Consortium was composed of five member NSDAOs, namely the Permaculture, the Forestry Association of Botswana (FAB), the Rural Industries and Innovation Centre (RIIC), the Cooperation of Research, Development and Education (CORDE), and Thusano Lefatsheng (TL). This consortium was formed around August 1989 for the purpose of supporting the development of three target farms in Gantsi in collaboration with the district council. However, the consortium faced numerous problems, and, as we see below at length, there was a stigma, in the sense that the "consortium" was no longer a viable implementation

strategy either for Gantsi or for anywhere else at least in the short term, in Gantsi District and in certain Government circles against a cooperation scheme among NSDAOs. "Then intensity of the political problems affecting the work of the consortium reached a peak about end of 1990 and early 1991, culminating in the expulsion of the consortium from working in the three farms by the Gantsi District Council" (Mbere and Symacon, 1991). The consortium became no longer viable and it was eventually disbanded. This section is based mainly on the evaluation report of the NGO Consortium and information obtained in several interviews with government officials and officers of NSDAOs involved in the consortium.

5.3.3.1 The Issue of the Remote Area Dwellers (RADs)

The Remote Area Dwellers (RADs), which are often equated with "Basarwa" in current Setswana usage, "San" in anthropological terms for the people known as "Bushman." According to Wilmsen, the image of "Bushmen," that they are peoples living an elementary form of economic life" and that they were chasing wild animals, picking wild berries, and digging for roots whilst we were developing invincible armies," which has been created by indigenous African, European administrative, and academic anthropological interests, has had serious consequences today (Wilmsen, 1990: 21-22). This is because government policies, for example access to land, which also affect these peoples, have been formulated on the image of "Bushman". With regard to the rights of San-speaking peoples who are living on land then being considered for TGLP ranch development,

> "the Attorney General's Chambers ... stated the opinion that
> 'Masarwa have always been true nomads ... the true nomad Masarwa
> can have no rights of any kind except rights to hunting'. Hitchcock

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records that the views of anthropologists who maintain that 'Bushmen had no territories' have been cited in ministerial debates to support that opinion and thus to serve as justification for moving San-speaking peoples from lands they have occupied for generations" (Wilmsen, 1990: 22).

In fact, the Basarwa argue that, historically, they preceded the settlement of black people (Batswana)[25] and white people in the Gantsi District. And the Basarwa recognised that the land which they had come to know as "theirs," was taken away from them (Mogwe, 1992: 6). In her recent report on the human rights situation of Basarwa, Mogwe argued as follows:

"What emerged very clearly from the experiences of the Basarwa with regard to the land issue is their alienation. They are alienated from their lifestyle which was based on a close relationship with the land, its wild life and products. With the creation of settled communities, the Basarwa are being fitted into a hitherto alien mode of existence. The *limited access to land* directly affects the Basarwa's access to wildlife and to veld products" (Mogwe, 1992: 7, original emphasis).

The Basarwa have been discriminated against in the government policy. As Wilmsen interpreted this situation quite well,

"... the imposed pan-national Setswana term, Basarwa, is today at base a racial classification stereotyped in images of supposed child-like appearance, homogeneous prehistoric culture, simple social institutions, and peculiar language although this is masked by the rhetoric of ethnicity within the class structure of Botswana... However it should now be abundantly clear that San-speaking peoples ... have never been remote from economic, social processes

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[25]Basarwa describe other Batswana as batho-ba-bantsho ("black people"). They describe themselves as "red people" (Mogwe, 1992: 3n).

operating in the larger political entities of southern Africa but have functioned intimately within these processes. It is in this light that these people should be seen today" (1990: 32).

In recent arguments, as we can see above, there is a strong tendency to change the "image" of Basarwa that regards them as living in elementary forms, which seems to be still held in the government circle[26], or the RADs. It is in this situation of these peoples that the issue in which the NGO consortium was involved has to be considered.

5.3.3.2 Areas of Involvement and the Formation of the Consortium

It was in August 1989 when three large farms, namely those of Hanahai (173 NK), Grootelaagte (154 NK), and Chobokwane (164 NK), was allocated for development for the Remote Area Dwellers (RADs) in the Gantsi District that the issue around the utilisation of three farm appeared and there appeared a signal of the beginnings of the formation of the consortium. No sooner had the District Council taken responsibility for these farms than it realised that it did not have the capacity to develop them on its own. "Development" of the farms includes a process of developing water resources and infrastructure on the farm, identifying appropriate and sustainable projects, determining the organisation and management of the activities on the farms and so on. At this stage, the council, when faced with this task, felt the necessity to enlist the services available from some development agencies, both international and local,

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[26]At one conference held during the research period, titled "Sustainable Rural Development" organised by the Botswana Society, there were representatives from Basarwa for the first time. One of the officials from the Ministry of Agriculture told me that she could not understand why these people were there (personal communication, 13/4/92).

which could offer some relevant expertise and experience in the proposed areas of activities.

It was through the programme coordinator for the Communal First Development Areas Programme (CFDA)[27] that Permaculture Trust was invited to visit the project area and introduce some of its programmes in the CFDA. Also CORDE was invited to offer their service through organising a community participation workshop in the project area. What became crucial to the activities of the consortium and its relationship with the state later was that this was not an official invitation from the council at all but an invitation from a council staff member who believed that involving Permaculture and CORDE in the implementation of the CFDA programme would enrich the programme content. In addition, it became gradually clear that there was confusion between the district council and the Ministry of Local Government and Lands on the intended use of the farms. In fact, land policy issues were behind the controversy around the consortium.

Apart from these new programmes, and even prior to the formation of the consortium, NSDAOs which became members of the consortium had more or less been involved in and/or connected with the Gantsi District individually, like Thusano Lefasheng, as stated in the previous section.

Also in August 1989 NSDAOs were invited by the RAD business adviser to explore the possibilities of giving assistance to the District

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[27]"The Communal First Development Areas (CFDAs) were designed to shift priorities to the unrezoned communal lands, both agricultural and grazing, that would have to support the bulk of Botswana's rural population. The strategy behind the CFDA was avowedly that of integrated rural development" (Picard, 1987: 258).
  In addition several specific actions were embarked on for the CFDA's experiment:
1. linking of livestock and arable agriculture;
2. strengthening the connection between agricultural activities and rural industrial activities;
3. improving planning and administrative capacity at the local level; and
4. continuing the infrastructure improvements, especially where related to productive activities (Picard, 1987: 259).

Council in the development of the three farms. After this trip, what emerged were (1) that there was a clear understanding on the part of the NSDAOs involved that their involvement in Gantsi would go beyond just the three farms and target all eleven RAD settlements although the initial focus would be on the three farms, (2) that the NSDAOs involved had a clear intention to initiate and support the formation of a development organisation to be responsible for the development of the farms as a core activity as well as developing all other settlements, (3) that there was an "NGO-team," referred to several times in the report of the 1989 visit, which was looking at the possibility of working together in the Gantsi District, and (4) that it was the RAD department of the Council that was identified as the entry point for all NSDAOs and the focal point for the programme.

The follow up meeting to the 1989 visit was held on 29th January 1990 at the RIIC offices in Kanye. It was in this meeting that the intention of the NSDAOs to work not individually but *as a consortium* and to draw up a single set of terms of reference for the joint programme, was clearly expressed. This was the formation of the consortium. Also the consortium recognised that the three farms were not the *raison d'etre* for which the consortium was formed and that these farms were only a catalyst in the process of the appreciation by NSDAOs of the needs to work with the council, although the council's intention was to restrict these NSDAOs to a narrow area of rural development.

Already at this stage, there were potential factors for conflicts between the council and the consortium. These were (1) that the consortium had a broader perspective of participating in the district, whereas the council preferred that the NSDAOs' activities be narrowly restricted to the three farms, and (2) that the NSDAOs involved intended to work as a consortium rather than individuals, which was at odds with

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the intention of the council, which eventually caused a explicit conflict between the council and the consortium, as we see below.

5.3.3.3 The Formation and Dissolution of the Consortium in Its Relationship with the Council and the Central Government: Before and After the Gantsi Controversy

Concerning the documentation on the formation of the consortium, there are three separate documents which state the objectives of the consortium differently, which illustrates how the activities of the consortium had been influenced by the council and the central government.

In the first document entitled "Gantsi NGO Consortium Working Agreement" (undated), the objectives of the consortium were stated as follows:

A. To enable the three farms (173 NK, 164 NK and 154 NK) allocated to RADs to be viable, self-sustaining enterprises, so that they benefit the community in whose name they have been allocated,

B. To work in the settlements adjacent to the three farms, to ensure sustainability of the development of the three farms,

C. To support and strengthen the particular programmes of the individual NGOs, either current or proposed, in the district,

D. To facilitate cooperation with local and central Government departmental programmes in the district.

As stated above, these objectives, which were beyond the council's immediate requirements for the development of three farms were not welcomed by the council. Moreover a draft organisation structure of the consortium which was presented to the council created the first conflict with the council. As a result, the NSDAOs involved had to take these into

consideration, and they started to focus more on the three farms. This was confirmed in the second document, the "Proposed Terms of Reference for the Work of the Gantsi NGO Consortium on the Three farms Allocated to Remote Area Dwellers" (undated). In this document, the only two objectives are stated:

A. To enable the 3 farms to be viable, self-sustaining enterprises, in order to benefit the community in whose name they have been allocated.

B. To work in the settlements adjacent to the 3 farms, to ensure the sustainability of the development of the 3 farms.

These were completely in line with the council's requirements by restricting consortium's areas of activities into the three farms.

Apart from influence from outside, it was also true that the consortium itself lacked the organisational capacity in implementing its plans. Firstly, since the NSDAOs involved apart from the Permaculture do not have the domestic base in Gantsi, the consortium could not take "active action." Among members, it was agreed to engage a coordinator to be placed in Gantsi in January 1990, but it was only in November 1990 that he was in place. Secondly, even though the consortium recognised the difficulties of working together, its own agreement was never signed, which meant the consortium's unpreparedness for coordination and involvement in the communities. In addition, it was also true that dependence on donor/government funding eroded the consortium's independence.

It was toward the end of 1990 when the consortium and the council finally reached agreement on the activities to be implemented and when the consortium opened and staffed an office in Gantsi to facilitate its work, to liase with local and central government, and to work directly with the RADs that the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing

(MLGLH) sent a sudden instruction to reallocate the ranches to the next people on the priority list to the council, which was the beginning of the controversy.

This controversy contained some political aspects, which was only covered in a private weekly newspaper, *Mmegi*. It reported that:

> "Mmegi learns from reliable sources that three farms which were set aside for resettlement by Remote Area Dwellers (RADs) in the Ghanzi District will be taken back from them [by MLGLH] and sold to a syndicate which includes a senior cabinet minister" (*Mmegi*, 8-14 February, 1991).

In fact, one of the farms, NK 173 was allocated to Mochia Syndicate, in which former Gantsi District Commissioner Andersson Chibua and one Mogapi, a farm manager in Gantsi were members (*Mmegi*, 26 April- 2 May 1991). What became the main issues at this stage included that NSDAOs involved had not been invited by the council at all and that there had never been an agreement between the central government and members of the consortium. Swartz, MP for the Gantsi constituency claimed that:

> "he did not know about the involvement of ngos in the project. He wondered: 'who invited the ngos to the project in the first place? How will the farm be run and for...?" (*Mmegi*, 15-21 March 1991).

Also the Permanent Secretary, of the MLGLH, Pelonomi Venson told that:

> "there has never been agreement between government and ngos involving the gantsi farms. She further explained that the concerned council never passed any resolution entrusting the farms to ngos " (*Mmegi*, 15-21 March 1991).

When the full Gantsi Council meeting was held in early April 1991, the assistant Minister of the MLGLH, Michael Tshiinare blamed the council "for having failed to check the word of the central and local government officials who involved the ngos *without the knowledge of the council*" (*Mmegi*, 5-11 April 1991). He also accused members of the consortium of:

> "adopting *politically-motivated ideas*... This government is not going to abdicate its responsibility just because of these ngos and even those who want to advise us politically should follow the right procedure" (*Mmegi*, 5-11 April 1991, emphasis added)

In response to these attitudes of the central government, the consortium released a press statement, where it stated as follows:

> "The suggestion by central government officials that our advice and services cannot be given, or received, without a formal Council resolution does not make sense... It was made clear that the role of the consortium would be to provide advice and services to the Council on technical matters. The responsibility for developing the farms would be the Council's" (*Mmegi*, 19-25 1991).

After this conflict following the withdrawal of the farms by the MLGLH, the council turned around and alleged that the NGO consortium was involved in the district without invitation from the council, and asked the consortium to cease its involvement[28]. Even at this stage, the consortium still kept its intention of involvement, but its objectives which appeared in the third document, the "Gantsi NGO consortium working Agreement" did not mention the three controversial farms at all, but only the need for a broader development trust as follows:

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[28]As stated above, this is partly true, because invitation was not from the council itself, but from a council staff member.

A. To advance the social, cultural and economic development of the Remote Area Dwellers of the District.

B. To work in the settlements to ensure the sustainability of whatever developments are undertaken.

C. To support and strengthen the particular programmes of the individual NGOs, either current or proposed, in the District.

D. To coordinate in planning, and cooperate in executing, their several programmes in the District, to ensure a non-competitive and mutually-supportive approach to development and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort or resources.

E. To facilitate cooperation with local and central government departmental programmes in the district.

During the period of the controversy in 1991, one of the members of the consortium, Permaculture attended only one of the five meetings of the consortium, while 90 per cent of the meetings were attended by all members in 1990. This illustrates the lack of internal cohesiveness of the consortium deriving from the fact that the working agreement of the consortium had not been signed. Therefore it is obvious that the working environment for the consortium as well as its internal cooperation had been dramatically worsened after the controversy.

One of the questions which emerged from the controversy is why the MLGLH issued the instruction to reallocate the ranches just when everything seemed to be prepared for implementation. There was relatively good communication between the consortium and the Gantsi District Council/ Administrative officers including the District Commissioner and Council Secretary, on the intended use of the farms. It was only the headquarters of the MLGLH that seemed not to have been adequately informed. In fact, one of the senior officers of the Ministry told me that the consortium had worked *without their knowledge* and interfered in the government area of activities, i.e., land policy issues (personal interview, 5/5/92). This is a concerted response in harmony

with the accusation of the Minister as quoted above. This made the government wary and suspicious of the activities of NSDAOs, especially in consortium format. What made the government more suspicious was, according to an informal communication with the Permanent Secretary of the MLGLH, the fact that most of the people involved in the farms were just *coincidentally* white not Batswana (interview with the GM of the Thusano Lefatsheng, 12/5/92). In fact, top management posts of the involved NSDAOs have been occupied by whites, and staff of international agencies involved, like HIVOS, were also white. Taking these factors into consideration, the government action seemed to be taken so as to narrow the working space of the consortium. Actually, after this controversy, there has developed a stigma against the term of "consortium" in the Gantsi District and in official circles in Gaborone.

Apart from Permaculture whose involvement in the consortium rapidly diminished after the controversy and which visibly distanced itself from the consortium, it was RIIC which withdrew from the consortium first as a result of the decision of its board of directors. This was because RIIC has been a quasi-NSDAO which depends heavily on the state for its funding and the board of directors is represented by the government, and thus it was obliged to compromise with the state. Consequently, even though the members of the consortium have been still involved in some projects individually, the consortium was dissolved.

5.3.3.4 A Failure of Cooperation among NSDAOs: Some Political Implications

Concerning this case, what was pointed out both by officers of NSDAOs involved and evaluators was that it was the Remote Area Dwellers that were the eventual losers. In the communities, in default of

almost any active action, the consortium was never recognised as legitimate. After the ending of the involvement of the consortium, there has been little development of the farms.

In addition, there was a problem of lack of autonomy of the NSDAOs. In particular one of the members, namely the RIIC, which is a quasi-NSDAO, has been heavily dependent on the government for funding, and can therefore be easily controlled by the state through the channel of the board of directors. Also the consortium itself had been dependent on the state in this project, its autonomy was not easily secured, although individual activities of member NSDAOs were not necessarily so.

In terms of political nature of the conflict, what became clear through the controversy on the three farms in Gantsi was that the main problem of the NGO consortium was not its objectives stated in its documents like community development among the RADs, but the form of "consortium," or the format of working together, in Gantsi. "The objectives remain valid but the strategy [of implementation] may not be" (Mbere and Symacon, 1991: 16). There are mainly two reasons for this. First, the organisational capacity of the consortium was not adequate to implement its programmes. According to the evaluation report, owing to the council's rejection of the idea of management committee with democratic representation of the beneficiaries of the communities, the NSDAOs involved in the consortium were forced to abandon the idea by the council (Mbere and Symacon, 1991: 19). Therefore, the consortium was only an inappropriate system, lacking democratic structure, to tackle problems in the communities. In fact, apart from the individual activities of the NSDAOs involved, there were no activities in the communities by the consortium as such. This was because members of the consortium failed to prepare a plan of action for implementation or to sign a working

agreement of the consortium, which led to organisational weakness. This "unpreparedness" on the side of the consortium clearly caused the consortium's vulnerability to the central government response as well as the loss of confidence in the consortium by targeting communities.

Second, NSDAOs, working together in the format of consortium, were viewed as politically motivated and regarded by the government with suspicion. In this case, since the area of the consortium's involvement was development projects promoted and sponsored by the government, these NSDAOs were left little space to develop their own agenda to cope with several identified issue areas in Gantsi. Also, the consortium was vulnerable in the sense that it had not been gaining ground in the communities and it depended on the government and international agencies for funding. As a result, as stated above, the format of consortium was gradually recognised as a *stigma* and it became impossible to work together in the region as the NGO consortium.

This case showed us that especially in the area of the government's concern, it is quite difficult for NSDAOs to be involved in that area in a *competitive* way with the government (in this case, in the format of consortium, which was stigmatised and was used as a scapegoat for the failure of the government programmes in Gantsi). As far as each NSDAO are committed in a variety of issue areas in *complementary* way as in the case of TL, as stated earlier, the possibility of political controversy is low. In addition, NSDAOs themselves face the problem of legitimacy and difficulties of working in targeting areas of activities, when they are not genuinely represented by beneficiaries. However, in practical terms, this failure may be a lesson for Botswana NSDAOs' community to formulate future strategies of action.

5.4 The Cases of NSDAOs in the Issue Area of Population and Family Planning

In this part of the chapter, NSDAOs involved in population and family planning issues in both countries will be comparatively analysed in terms of their organisational development and their roles in policy-making and policy-implementing processes.

5.4.1 Population Issue in Africa: From Pro-Natalism to Anti-Natalism

Generally speaking, in sub-Saharan Africa, there has been a tendency of pro-natalism, rooted in traditional African culture. According to Banda (1993: 92), there are five reasons why children were highly valued in African tradition:

(1) source of labour;

(2) source of wealth and old age security;

(3) ensuring the growth and perpetuity of the lineage;

(4) importance of procreation (rooted in African traditional religions);

(5) strengthening family relationship, reducing the burden of child rearing on biological parents, and thereby encouraging high fertility as a result of child fosterage.

Therefore, among Africans, it was strongly felt that a large number of children is a great contribution to the general vitality, security harmony and prosperity of the whole ethnic and neighbourhood community (Banda, 1993: 93). These reasons are also considered to explain early marriage and polygamy in Africa.

In addition, pro-natalism was "intensified" through high infant and child mortality, "modern" religions like the Roman Catholics which resists modern family planning, and colonial governments which had a pronatalist attitudes towards Africans who were a source of cheap labour

forces (Banda, 1993: 108-111). Even in the early period of independence in the 1960s, population policies received little attention from newly independent African leaders. In fact, there were the apparent reluctance to adopt anti-natalist population policies in African countries.

However, as a result of improved availability of better demographic data, stagnation of socio-economic development, high levels of infant mortality rate, high population growth rate during the 1970s and 1980s, and more recently high rate of HIV infection, it has become necessary for governments in Africa to change its position from pro-natalist to anti-natalist to sustain the level of life standard in each country and to pay attention to the issues of population and family planning.

However "population policy" itself is normally composed of the several policies which are designed to influence population variables in a specific way. These include migration policies, mortality policies and fertility policies (see e.g. Msimuko and Khasiani, 1981).

In fact, many developing countries have not recognised the necessity to reduce their population growth rate and have not yet adopted birth control policies. Backgrounds of this are socio-economical, cultural, religious and political (Jones, 1990: 242-258), which were briefly refered to above. Therefore, the government, which has adopted some policies, often make a distinction between "birth control" and "family planning," supporting the latter. "Birth control" refers to a fertility-reducing population policy, while family planning is part of a family welfare policy whose policy whose purpose is to eliminate abortion and too close spacing of births to maintain health conditions of mothers and children[29]. This is actually the case in Zambia and Botswana.

The Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ), as we consider below, has taken the stance that family planning is one of the

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[29]On this controversial issue, see e.g., Lappé & Schurman, 1988.

components of fertility control, but it is not the same as contraception, birth control or fertility regulation. According to a broader definition offered by the WHO, which the PPAZ quoted in its paper:

> "Family Planning is a way of thinking and living that is adopted voluntarily, upon the basis of knowledge, attitudes and responsible decision, by individuals and couples, in order to promote the health and welfare of the family group and thus contribute to the social development of a country" (WHO, 1971: 5).

In practice, family planning is the idea and ways which offer families to make it possible to determine the number of children and intervals between births, by using a variety of measures, both traditional and modern. In Africa, where these measure had not been well known, it has been one of the important task to disseminate the information of family planning and the usage of a variety of measures of contraception.

5.4.2 Zambia

5.4.2.1 Zambia's Population Situation, 1963-1990

According to the past national censuses, the population was 3.5 million in 1963, and increased to 4.1 million in 1969 and 5.7 million in 1980 (FNDP: 52). The population had further increased to 6.7 million in 1984 and 7.5 million. The most recent census shows that the population in 1990 is 7.8 million (CSO, 1990: 2). The rate of growth of the population had been high and increasing by rapid during the period. Between 1963 and 1969, the rate of growth was 2.6 per cent per annum; this increased by 3.1 per cent per annum between 1969 and 1980 and 3.6 per cent per annum between 1980 and 1985. Between 1985 and 1989, the rate reached 3.8 per

cent, but there was only a 0.2 per cent increase between 1989 and 1990 (*Monthly Digest of Statistics*, April-June 1991: 1).

In Zambia, the level of fertility has remained persistently high for the past four decades and is likely to remain so for some time in the future (FNDP: 53). The crude birth rate[30] was about 49 in 1988. The total fertility rate[31] has remained at about 7.2 children. This is higher than the African average, 6.2, and is among the highest in the world. This is cons.dered by the policy-makers to be one of the most important factor determining the country's demographic and health situation (FNDP: 53). Table 5-5 shows provincial differentials in levels of recent fertility resulted from the 1980 census of population.

Table 5-5 Provincial Variations in Fertility in
Zambia, 1980 (estimated total fertility rate)

Province	Total Fertility Rate
Central	7.5
Eastern	6.9
Luapula	8.0
Lusaka	7.5
Northern	7.7
Southern	7.1
Western	5.7
Copperbelt	7.9
Total	7.2

Source: FNDP: 53

Several factors pointed out in the FNDP include cultural and institutional factors such as low average age at first marriage (which at present stands at 16 years for females); low educational levels particularly among females; desire for large families; high levels of infant and children mortality; the economic rationality of large family size since many children provide some economic benefits such as insurance in old age and in times of need; and low socio-economic status of women and so on (FNDP: 53).

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[30]The Crude Birth Rate is the number of births per 1,000 persons in the population per year.
[31]The Total Fertility Rate is the number of children a woman is likely to bear in her life time under the prevailing fertility regime.

In the case of mortality, the levels of mortality have declined. The crude death rate[32] declined from 19.7 in 1969 to 16.7 in 1980 and was estimated at 14.0 in 1988. This decline has led to a substantial increase in the expectation of life at birth among Zambians. In 1988 it is estimated that life expectancy is 55 and 52 for females and males respectively, as compared with 47.8 and 44.6 in 1969.

The persistently high level of fertility has led to the extreme youthfulness of the Zambian population. In the 1980-88 period, almost half of the population was under fifteen years and nearly 20 per cent under five years. Those in economically active age groups (15-64) comprised 47.6 per cent while those over 65 years made up only 2.4 per cent.

As a result of migration, Zambia has become one of the most urbanised countries in Africa in terms of spatial distribution of population. In 1963 20.5 per cent of the population lived in urban centres of more than 5,000 persons; this proportion increased to 39.9 per cent in 1980 in contrast to the African average of 28.8 per cent and an estimated 45 per cent in 1985. Table 5-6 shows the change of population distribution over the period of 1963-90.

Table 5-6 Percentage Distribution of population by Province, 1963, 1969, 1980 and 1990 (Zambia)

Province		Percentage Distribution		
Year	1963	1969	1980	1990
Central	14.4	17.5	9.1	9.3
Copperbelt	15.6	20.1	22.1	20.0
Eastern	13.8	12.6	11.5	12.5
Luapula	10.2	8.3	7.4	6.7
Lusaka	-	-	12.2	15.5
Northern	16.1	13.5	13.5	11.1
North-Western	6.0	5.7	5.7	4.9
Southern	13.4	12.2	12.2	12.1
Western	10.5	10.1	10.1	7.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: CSO, 1990: 2.

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[32]The Crude Death Rate is the number of deaths per 1,000 persons in the population per year.

5.4.2.2 Attitude of the UNIP Government towards the Population Issue: Changes between the 1970s and the late 1980s

Due to Kenneth Kaunda's philosophy of Humanism which had both traditional and Christian backgrounds and that emphasised the importance of Zambian nationals, or, in other words, the high growth of population in Zambia's socio-economic development, by the end of the 1980s, when the population policy which has anti-natal stance, the then President was reluctant to adopt family planning programmes. In fact, by the early 1980s, Zambia did not have fertility reduction policy and at best it was described as "laissez-faire" (Msimuko & Khasiani, 1981: 44).

However, the government gradually started appreciating the effect of rapid population growth after the Bucharest World Population Conference in 1974[33]. It was after a National Urban Household Size and Income Survey in 1974-75, which revealed increasing household size (average household size was over 5) and deteriorating monthly income, that UNIP government officially allowed the PPAZ to provide modern family planning services, but only to those who voluntarily asked for the PPAZ (Banda, 1993: 197)[34].

In the following year, the Ministry of Health organised a Maternal and Child Health Care and Family Planning seminar which called on the government to establish a national population policy. Also in this year, the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, in collaboration with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), organised another seminar focusing on the relationship between high population growth and economic development. Therefore, at this stage, the UNIP government

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[33]In fact, as early as in 1970, the Vice-President Kapwepwe stressed the need for family planning during the May Day Rally, reasoning that the high population growth rate led to massive unemployment in the future (Msimuko & Khasiani, 1981: 44).

[34]At this time, there were criticisms from the CCZ, the Catholics, the House of Chiefs, and even UNIP's Women;s League (Banda, 1993: 197-8).

started to recognise the importance of the population issue in economic development. In 1977, for example, the Ministry of Finance warned that the continuing high rate of population growth would led to the decline of the welfare of Zambian people (Msimuko & Khasiani, 1981: 44).

In the late 1970s, to cope with the population issue, the Family Welfare Education Unit was established in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, but it focused on industrial workers. In addition, at this time, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) supported the Ministry of Health in implementing the Health Family Planning Programme. However, these programmes were not so effective[35].

It was after the Mexico World Population Conference in 1984 that the population issue was more widely paid attention to and the necessity to adopt a population policy was more strongly felt among the government circle (Banda, 1993: 203). The delegation from Zambia under the leadership of the chairperson of UNIP's Women's League, Chibesa Kankasa, attended the conference. At this time, the initiative to establish counselling units in all districts to introduce sex education came from the Women's League and this idea was also supported by the Chairman of the Social and Cultural Committee of the Central Committee of UNIP. It was around the mid-1980 that the cabinet ministers, including, the then Prime

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[35]According to Banda (1993: 200-201), there are three reasons to explain the poor performance of the former programme:
(1) concentration of the activities in urban areas;
(2) "Education of Factory workers" was not popularly incorporated in target labour unions education programme;
(3) labour and family welfare committees, which was intended to educate and motivate workers into accepting family planning service, were not well set up in labour unions;
(4) the objective of integrating Population Education into the course of the President Citizen college (PCC) was not fulfilled.
The latter programme's problems were:
(1) traditional birth attendants were not included in the training programme;
(2)people in the remote rural areas had no access to modern family planning services.

Minister continued to appeal through the media the necessity to regulate fertility.

However, even at this stage, the government's involvements in the practical family planning issue area was never comprehensive and rather sporadic. Main government' programmes included Training of Family Health Trainers and Zambia Enrolled Nurses were trained under the Health Family Planning, the establishment of the Zambia Population Communication Unit (ZAMPOPCOMU) within the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting with assistance from UNEP and UNESCO to provide communication support to all population and family planning programmes (Banda, 1993: 214), and the establishment of the Inschool Population Education Unit at the Ministry of General Education, Youth and Sports under the support of UNFPA to help Zambian youths learn how to identify, analyse and resolve family, community and national demographic and development problems (Banda, 1993: 215). In fact, these programmes were quite strongly influenced by external actors[36].

Against these backgrounds, the first attempt to integrate population factor in the development planning was made within the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) a year before the Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP), which was preceded the Interim National Development Plan (July 1987-December 1988) published in 1986. Eventually, a chapter on population, health and family planning was included in the document.

In 1989, the official population policy was announced for the first time by President Kaunda. In the FNDP, a chapter on "Population and Development" was included.

In the FNDP, the policy-makers admitted that:

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[36]There were criticisms from members of the House of Chief (Banda, 1993: 215). UNFPA was also active to support the government to formulate its population policy for the first time.

"No systematic attempt was made to integrate population factors in Zambia's previous development plans" (FNDP: 52).

However,

"More recently, however, it has been acknowledged that the youthfulness and high rate of growth of the nation's population are definite constraints on attempts at improving the quality of life and standard of living of the people. This is reflected in the increasing inability of Government at all levels to maintain and improve existing levels of services. It is for these reasons that the Party and its Government has decided to start, with the Fourth National Development Plan, systematically integrate population factors into its development plans. It is expected that this will lay the foundation for sustained progress and self-reliant development of the nation" (FNDP: 52).

Objectives of the population were quite ambitious as follows:

(a) to initiate, improve and sustain measures aimed at slowing down the high population growth rate;

(b) to improve the health of the mother and child;

(c) to integrate population factors into the development planning and plan implementation process;

(d) to strengthen and co-ordinate institutions that are involved in population activities;

(e) to establish a National Population Council of Zambia;

(f) to strengthen and sustain the nation's population data base;

(g) to extend the coverage of family planning service to all adults;

(h) to work towards the reduction of the total fertility rate from 7.2 to 4; and

(g) to reduce the infant mortality rate from the present 97 per 1,000 live births to 75 per 1,000 live births per year during the Plan period (FNDP: 58).

In order to achieve the above objectives, the following strategies were adopted:

(a) promoting awareness among all the people in Zambia of population dynamics and the effects of rapid population growth on development through various information, education and communication programmes;

(b) providing the necessary information and education on the advantages of small family size to both the individual family and the nation as a whole in achieving self-reliance;

(c) educating young people on family life matters, including fertility regulation and family planning before they enter the ages of marriage and child bearing;

(d) upgrading existing family planning activities to a comprehensive programme which will aim at increasing the levels of awareness, acceptance, and practice of, as well as promoting more favourable attitudes towards, family planning. In addition, more efforts will be made to make family planning methods culturally acceptable and more easily accessible and affordable for persons who voluntarily want to use them;

(e) establishing the use of commercial out-reach and community based distribution channels for family planning in rural areas which are not covered by the current health care programme;

(f) expanding and intensifying the primary health care (PHC) and maternal and child health care (MCH) programmes; and

(g) vigorously pursuing training retraining and retention of various categories of manpower in the various fields of demographic planning, management, health and family planning, statistics, education, etc. (FNDP: 59)

To implement the population policy as formulated above, the following administrative bodies were established:

(1) Population Council;

(2) Technical Committee;

(3) Special Task Forces;

The Population Council is the highest advisory body to the government and is responsible for offering advice an interpreting policy concerning population and related development issues (FNDP: 59). The Technical Committee was also established to reinforce the technical skills necessary to carry out the Population Council's work. The Special Task Forces were also formed to prepare detailed and technical reports, review specific

population programme areas like training, service delivery, research and evaluation and so on (Banda, 1993: 225).

Therefore, the UNIP government had gradually changed its thinking on the issue of population from pro-natalism to anti-natalism since the 1970s, and it was only in 1989 that it adopted the population policy. However, these government policies require basic changes in people's behavior, so that it remains to be seen how the policy will be effectively implemented to achieve its objectives.

5.4.2.3 PPAZ: History, Objectives, Activities And Structure

It was only as late as 1986 that the Zambian government included a chapter on population, health and family planning in its documents like the Economic Review and Annual Plan. In addition, it was in 1989 that the UNIP government adopted the population policy. It was in this context that the PPAZ has complemented the lack of governmental efforts in the area of anti-natal population policy and family planning.

It was in August 1972, when a group of 44 men and women had a conference organised by the Department of Social Work of the University of Zambia at the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation, that the first family planning association was formed in Zambia. At inception, the name of the association was the Family Planning and Welfare Association of Zambia. In the same year, the government approved the registration of the Association under the Societies Act. The National Headquarters was in Ndola until 1977 when it was moved to Lusaka. During the first year of formation, its membership, which is on a voluntary basis, has grown from 40 to 1,500, and it established six branches at Ndola, Kitwe, Mufulira, Lusaka, Chingola and Chipata. In 1979, it changed its name to the Planned

Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ). Currently, the number of branches is 34 and its membership is more than 20,000.

According to the draft brochure of the PPAZ, it has six aims and objectives:

1. To disseminate information on family planning and population issues to the general public;

2. To provide family planning services and promote the physical and mental health of mothers through proper spacing of birth;

3. To help improve the welfare of women by finding small scale income generating projects undertaken by women;

4. To collaborate with other agencies on projects and child spacing and population;

5. To give advice and guidance to problems related to fertility and sub-fertility;

6. To stimulate and/or participate in proper research in family planing and related fields.

In order to fulfill the above aims, the PPAZ has identified the following area of activities:

1. To extend and expand family planning campaigns among the general public in order to increase knowledge and practice of family planning;

2. To support the Party and its Government and other Community Service Providers in their family planning efforts and to establish models of service capable of replication;

3. To promote family planning by stimulating and supporting the effort of rural communities to undertake self-help activities;

4. To develop the management capability of Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia volunteers and staff;

5. To gather information and data aimed at assisting the Association in programme planning;

6. To create awareness of the needs of young people and to promote family life education;

7. To expand the programme of PPAZ through Resource Development Activities (PPAZ, 1989: 13-14).

In practice, the PPAZ has been involved in following areas:

1. Delivery of contraceptions;

2. Projects for the youth and women;

3. Training of personnel;

4. AIDS prevention.

Firstly the PPAZ's involvement is the distribution of contraceptives to family planning delivery points like hospitals and clinics. Among the family planning methods promoted by the PPAZ are condoms, hormonal methods like the pill, injectables or implants, intra-uterine devices (IUDs), scientific natural family planning methods, voluntary surgical sterilisation and tubal ligatio. For the purpose of providing more comprehensive service of family planning, the PPAZ established a Family Planning Centre in Lusaka in 1988 which provides high quality reproductive health services and a complete range of contraceptive methods.

Second, the PPAZ has also been involved in family life education programmes for the youth by establishing the training schemes in Livingstone and Solwezi which also offer income generating opportunities. The PPAZ has eight income-generating projects for women ranging from chicken rearing, knitting, sewing, gardening by supporting local voluntary groups as other NSDAOs.

Third, the PPAZ initiated extensive programmes intended to develop professional skills in family planning and to train medical personnel. Fourth, more recently it has also been involved in the activity of AIDs prevention. The current structure of the PPAZ is shown in figure 5-1 and figure 5-2.

National Level

| Patron | General Conference | Trustees |

National Executive Council

| Administrative Finance Committee (Personnel) | Programme Review Committee (Project Implementation) | Resource Mobilisation Public Relation (Fund Raising) |

Regional Level

Regional Conference

Branch Annual General Meeting

Branch Executive

Sub-Committees

Figure 5-1 Policy-Making Structure of the PPAZ

Source: Information from the Project Coordinator of the PPAZ, Lusaka.

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Figure 5-2 Administrative Stucture (National Level)

Source: Information from the Project Coordinator of the PPAZ, Lusaka.

Basically the PPAZ is a voluntary organisation which had estimated 20,000 volunteers throughout the country. There is the Annual General Conference (AGC) which is the supreme policy making body of the Association and to which each branch sends a representative. At the AGC, eight out of ten members of the National Executive Council are elected every three years (two of them are coopted). The Council is under the AGC and is responsible for the management of the Association's affairs. Also it

formulates and takes policy decisions on behalf of the AGC. Under the Council, currently there are three committees, as is shown in figure 5-1.

In the administrative structure shown in figure 5-2 which has been evolved over the two decades of its existence, there are 75 (full-time) employees. Those who have a wide variety of professional and technical background, and experience are included. The staff are led by an Executive Director supported by Assistant Directors of the two department: Programmes and Finance. Below the positions of Assistant Directors are Programme Officers. In order to maximise its effectiveness in the delivery of family planning service, two Regional Offices headed by Regional Coordinators, who are situated in the Copperbelt and Eastern Provinces, were created in 1989. At branch level, field officers coordinate the activities of the Association.

Financially, the PPAZ has been heavily dependent on its international body to which the PPAZ is affiliated, the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). It received almost 90 per cent of the annual total budget from the IPPF (Interview with an officer of the PPAZ, 5/2/92). Other donors include CIDA (Family Planning Awareness Campaign), NORAD (Rural Areas' Planning Services Project), WHO. There is also some financial assistance from the government in the form of the rebate of duty on imports, and provision of accommodation at branches. In 1987, there was 130,809 kwacha in the form of the rebate from the Ministry of Finance and 30,600 kwacha in the form of provision of accommodation at branches from the Ministry of Health (PPAZ, 1989: 91).

5.4.2.4 Operating Difficulties of PPAZ

As other NSDAOs, the PPAZ has problems of lack of skilled manpower and lack of fund to expand its activities. Moreover, since the

PPAZ has no service delivery points of its own, it has to distribute contraceptives through other organisations' facilities, like Government hospitals under the Ministry of Health, Mission and Mine hospitals and clinics as well as the Zambia Flying Doctor Service and District Councils. When the PPAZ was formed, its activities were concentrated around the Copperbelt and in urban areas. It was by the end of 1970s that the PPAZ had expanded its services to the rural areas and almost all provincial centre were manned by field officers who act as coordinators with other agencies. Although the PPAZ itself has developed and is currently one of the most developed NSDAOs in Zambia in terms of organisation, which has country-wide network, it still experiences such a bottleneck of its activities.

In addition, the PPAZ has experienced another kind of problems. At the beginning stage, the association was occasionally misconstrued to be an organisation that was merely interested in limiting the population growth of the country so as to perpetuate colonialism: the domination of the colonialist over the country through the maintenance of a small population (PPAZ, 1986: 1). This kind of misunderstanding, which was derived from people's cultural pro-natal attitudes, actually lasted for a long period. From the experience of the PPAZ, the problem they faced include (1) scepticism and suspicion by the politicians of the activities of the PPAZ, (2) interference of local politicians into the PPAZ's field activities, which takes the forms of both physical and non-physical like intended misinformation of the idea of "family planning," (3) people's conservative pro-natal attitude towards the "new" idea and the usage of modern methods. According to the explanation of a PPAZ's officer, it was their approach to access to the people first which caused the first problem. As a nature of the NSDAOs which serve others, or in other wards, target groups, this approach supposed to be usual. However this example shows

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us that there are difficulties which restrict NSDAOs' scope of activities beyond the knowledge of political elites. These were main difficulties to the operation of the PPAZ and the implementation of the programmes.

5.4.2.5 Interaction between the UNIP Government and the PPAZ

As so far stated, although the PPAZ was officially allowed by UNIP to provide modern family planning service as early as 1975, the operating environments were not good enough for the PPAZ, because of oppositions from UNIP members themselves.

In order to solve the problem, one of the tactics which was adopted by the PPAZ in the early 1980s was to accept the patron at the national level who was a member of the UNIP Central Committee and director of the UNIP Women's League, Mrs. C. Kankasa. Also at branch levels, most of the branches had political local leaders as patrons. There was a background of 1984 Mexico Population Conference as mentioned above, which stimulated Kankasa's involvement in the population issue.

These facts have several dimensions in terms of the idea of civil society. From the point of view of the PPAZ, on the one hand, this tactic was indispensable for the association's smooth operation and implementation of its programmes. Also it was tactics for survival of the PPAZ in the one-party political regime. In fact, it was after the establishment of the post of patron and the PPAZ's minute explanation of "family planning" to Mrs. Kankasa that the PPAZ's operation became more smooth (interview with a officer of the PPAZ, 5/2/92).

On the other hand, from the standpoint of UNIP, it had not only a symbolic and mobilisational importance but also a means of party-control of the association, although the PPAZ was never completely coopted into the party structure. Furthermore, interestingly enough, according to

Banda's observation, on the side of UNIP, there was no intention to affiliate the PPAZ to the then ruling party in the 1970s and early, because the PPAZ is wholly funded by international organisations whose motives are not clear (Banda, 1993: 209). Also in terms of "ideological" stance, UNIP did not forced the PPAZ to change its anti-natalism and UNIP had gradually changed its stance from pro-natalism to anti-natalism.

Therefore the PPAZ chose the option to abandon a part of "autonomy" in order to continue its activities in exchange for more favourable working conditions by getting support from a member of the most highest policy-making body, the UNIP Central Committee, in the Second Republic. However, it succeeded in keeping its major parts of autonomy in terms of resources, organisation and ideology.

It was in 1984 that the PPAZ increased and intensified its activities, including family planning publicity campaigns, family planning motivation campaigns for industrial workers. In this improving working conditions of the PPAZ, the PPAZ held two seminars in 1985. One was for traditional rulers for the purpose of letting them know the idea of "family planning." The other was for Members of the Parliament. As a result, these seminars called on the government to assist the PPAZ in its work and recommended the establishment of a Population Council which would co-ordinate all population related activities in the country. Another improvement after these seminars was the increase of the number of branches, which is currently 34, because traditional rulers and other leadership have openly supported the idea of family planning and have urged the PPAZ to go to their villagers and communities and educate the people on this matter (interview with a officer of the PPAZ, 5/2/92).

5.4.2.6 Involvement of the PPAZ in the Process of Population Policy Making and Implementation

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In 1989 that the official population policy was announced by President Kaunda, as stated above.

What can be pointed out additionally in the Population and Development Policy in the FNDP is that the PPAZ and the Family Life Movement of Zambia (FLMZ) are included alongside the governmental agencies as components of the basic institutional framework within which various programmes and objects designed to achieve the nation's population policy can be implemented (FNDP: 59). This can be interpreted that both NSDAOs had been institutionalised as indispensable actors in the issue area of population and that this institutionalised actors have been recognised as such by the policy-makers. In fact, both NSDAOs have been involved in the process of making this population policy, to which we turn next.

In September 1987, one of the most important consultative conferences, "Promoting Family Health: Towards Closer Collaboration between Government and NGOs in Zambia" was held in Livingstone. It was organised by the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and the PPAZ with financial assistance from the World Bank. This was the first consultation to be organised for a specific sector in Zambia. And there were 17 participants from ministries and non-governmental sectors as follows:

Ministry of Health;
Ministry of Labour and Social Service;
Ministry of Education and Culture;
Family Life Movement of Zambia;
Makeni Ecumenical Centre;
United Independence Party (UNIP) Women's League;
United nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA);
Young Women Christian Association (YWCA);

National food and Nutrition Commission.

The objectives of this consultation were:

(1) To deliberate with Government and NGOs officials on the importance of population and family health programmes in national development;
(2) To identify the means to foster stronger and more effective collaboration between the Government and NGOs in formulating, designing and implementing family health programmes;
(3) To work out strategies and plans for better collaboration and future action in promoting family health activities.

This offered the first opportunity for Zambian NSDAOs to consult the population issue with the government officials (1) to identify areas of collaboration between the government and NSDAOs and (2) to set up an agenda to formulate the national population policy which was announced in May 1989, when the National Population Policy Conference was held. In fact, it was this workshop that the necessity "to create opportunities for NGOs to take part in policy formulation process in the government as well as participate in development programmes" (*Report of the Livingstone Workshop*: 31) was found. In addition, in this workshop, collaborations in the area of utilisation and sharing the manpower and other facilities, in the area of training personnel as well as disseminating and sharing of information were considered.

Although collaboration was the main topic, the issue of conflicts between the government and NGOs was also discussed so as to avoid them. As ways of mininising conflict, the workshop noted the necessity of holding regular meeting with government, of drawing up guidelines on lines of communication and relationships between NGOs and government and so on.

Shortly after this workshop, in fact, the PPAZ was involved in the policy-making process. When the FNDP was prepared, the PPAZ was invited to sit on the committee preparing for it. In this process, the PPAZ was requested to submit an input on "Population and Family Planning" for inclusion in the FNDP and the proposed Population Policy (PPAZ, Three Year Plan, 1989-91: 8). We can easily understand this involvement, when we consider the fact that the PPAZ was recognised as one of the components in the areas as mentioned in the FNDP. In fact, a part of the policy was drafted by the PPAZ (interview with an officer of the PPAZ, 5/2/92) and the PPAZ recognised its role as "a pressure group" in the policy formulation process (PPAZ, Three Year Plan, 1989-91: 8). When we read the objectives and strategies of the population policy carefully, taking into account the PPAZ's objectives and activities, we can identify the PPAZ's influence. For example, the Population policy's strategies (a) and (b), which are "promoting awareness of population and family planning" have almost the same contention of the PPAZ's strategy (1) and objective (1). And the strategy (c) of the education of the youth has been a part of the activities of the PPAZ as stated above.

Moreover, in the area of population, the Inter-agency Technical Committee on Population (ITCP) was established in June 1989 in the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) with a membership drawn both from governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in population activities. Its main purpose is to foster the effective implementation of Zambia's population policy soon after its adoption. The ITCP have organised a few workshops in which members from ministries and non-governmental agencies took part to prepare all agencies involved in population work for effective population policy awareness campaigns.

5.4.2.7 Impacts of the PPAZ: A Question of Institutionalisation in Zambian Society

When I interviewed officers of the PPAZ, asking "do you think that the PPAZ has been gainning ground or not?" In response to this question, one officer answered "yes." This was because the PPAZ has been a main supplier of contraceptives and the PPAZ has been more and more invited to workshops and conferences. This shows one of the dimensions of the process of institutionalisation from a "subjective point of view," which is shared by the staff of the organisation. However, apparently, this is not enough to explain the PPAZ's institutionalisation in Zambian society.

Another important dimension is how the organisation has been recognised by Zambian people. In other words, it is the process of institutionalisation from an "objective point of view." In order to consider this dimension, evaluation reports will be useful although the fact was found there have been few reports of non- governmental agencies because of shortage of funds and skilled manpower. In the case of the PPAZ, it has not conducted such kind of research.

Although there is limited data which shows the level of institutionalisation of the PPAZ in Zambian society, we can find an example of the people's knowledge of family planning organisation (ZARD et al., 1988: 75-76).

According table 5-7, 21.7 per cent of the sample of this research could name the PPAZ. This is the highest percentage among all family planning-related organisations. The people who know about family planning organisations are mostly in urban areas. This means that family planning organisations including the PPAZ are still urban-oriented because the PPAZ, for example, had difficulties like lack of facilities and manpower, in

operating in rural areas as was stated in earlier sections and therefore the penetration into rural area has been still quite new.

Table 5-7 Percentage of Knowledge of family planning activities of different organisations in Zambia

Urban or Rural	Family Life	PPAZ	Missionaries	WHO	Ministry of Health	Number
Urban	10.7	39.3	1.4	6.6	3.8	290
Rural	2.1	10.7	0.4	0	0	467
Urban & Rural	5.4	21.7	0.8	0.3	1.5	757

Source: ZARD et al., 1988: 75.

In contrast with knowledge of the PPAZ as a organisation of family planning, only 1.5 per cent of respondents could identify the Ministry of Health as being an organisation particularly concerned with family planning activities. There seems to be a contradiction because the government hospitals and clinics are considered to be points to provide family planning methods more than half the sample of this study (ZARD et al., 1988: 70). "This may well be an accurate assessment of an organisation which makes family planning methods available to those that ask for them, but otherwise does little to promote family planning" (ZARD et al., 1988: 75, emphasis added).

What can be observed from these examples is at least that the PPAZ has been recognised among people as the most important organisation promoting family planning in Zambia, although pro-natalist attitudes, reasons of which were raised in earlier part, are still dominant among Zambians, which has been shown in several studies (e.g., Banda, 1993; ZARD et al., 1988).

This shows us strengths of NSDAOs. They have an opportunity to spearhead the issue areas which are neglected by the, especially weak, state with limited resources, because they have flexibility in formulating and implementing their own policy. It is, thus, possible for them to be

gradually institutionalised in a society as far as there are not oppressive controls and incorporating tactics from the state.

In this situation, collaboration with the state in formulating and implementing the state policy, which is a "democratic" (in the sense of expanded opportunity of political participation) way, as is described in earlier sections, is important for effective functioning of an NSDAOs. However, it is also true that this collaboration is viewed and is criticised as "being reduced to being just another arm of the state" in the Second Republic (*Weekly Post*, 7-13 February, 1992). As I argued in the previous sections, the PPAZ is a case of an NSDAO which had taken a strategy to allow itself to be partly controlled by UNIP, so as to survive in the Second Republic.

Anyway, it remains to be seen how this collaboration between the state and the PPAZ will generate effective performance in the new multi-party system under a deteriorated economy.

5.4.3 Botswana

5.4.3.1 Botswana's Population Situation from the 1971 and 1981 Censuses

In comparison with the 1971 figure of a de jure[37] population of 650,000 (574,000 de facto[38]), the 1981 census yielded a de jure population of 967,000 (941,000 de facto). Over this period, the rate of population growth rose from 3.1 per cent per annum to 3.3 per cent per annum in 1981. But more recent data seems to suggest that the population growth has recently begun to decline (see NDP7 Chapter 2).

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[37]De jure population includes Botswana citizens temporarily abroad and excludes non-citizens visiting Botswana temporarily.

[38]De facto population is the number of people, of whatever nationality, actually in Botswana at the time of the census.

In terms of fertility rates which are only derived from the 1971 and 1981 census, which are shown in table 5-8, the current fertility rates in Botswana are not only high, but they have risen during the intercensus decade in spite of some substantial gains in health, education, urbanisation and overall economic status of the people (ROB, 1987c: 9). Also the crude birth rate has been increasing from 44.5 in 1971 to 47.2 in 1981.

Table 5-8 Total Fertility Rates in 1971 and 1981 by Urban-Rural Residence in Botswana

1971	1981	
	Urban	Rural
6.5	6.019	7.295

Source: CSO, 1987: 10

As in Zambia, the crude death rate has been declining from 13.7 in 1971 to 13.0 in 1981 (NDP6: 9) owing to the improvement of health facilities. This decline leads to the change of life expectancy of 52.5 and 58.6 in 1971 to 52.7 and 59.3 in 1981 for males and females respectively.

In terms of population age distribution, Botswana has also quite a youthful population structure. Those under 15 years made up 47.0 per cent of the population in 1981 and 19.7 per cent were under five. Economically active people (15-64) accounted for 48.8 per cent, while those over 64 4.6 per cent.

The urbanisation has been also one of demographic features in Botswana. Table 5-9 shows clearly this tendency.

Table 5-9 Growth of Urban* Settlements, 1971-1991 (Thousand) (Botswana)

	Actual 1971	Actual 1981	Estimated 1991
Gaborone	17.7	56.7	136.4
Francistown	18.6	31.1	58.2
Lobatse	11.9	19.0	28.4
Selebi-Phikwe	4.9	29.5	54.6
Orapa	1.2	5.2	9.8
Jweneng		5.6	16.4
Palapye		9.6	19.0
Tlokweng		6.7	13.3
Mogoditishane			6.1
Serowe			30.1
Mahalapye			28.8
Maun			19.8
Letlhakane			9.0
Kasane			3.1
Ghanzi			6.1
Sowa			2.2
Total Urban	54.4	166.3	441.3
Total population	596.9	941.0	1,334.4
Urban as proportion of total	9.5%	17.7%	33.1%

Source: NDP7: 12.

* "Urban" is defined, for census purposes, as "any settlement of 5,000 or more persons with at least 75 per cent of the labour force in non-agricultural employment".

5.4.3.2 BOFWA: Objectives, Operation and Structure

The Botswana Family Welfare Association (BOFWA) was established in 1988 by a group of NGOs in Botswana, which was the Botswana NGO health coordinating committee, in coordination with the government. Its establishment was also assisted by the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF).

In January 1985, there was a workshop organised by the government and the World Bank in Gaborone to discuss the means of collaboration between the government and the non-governmental organisation. There were many participants also from countries in southern and eastern Africa. This was because it was recognised that the task of reaching the entire population in the area of family planning could not be accomplished alone (BOFWA, 1988: 2). This was followed by another workshop in Harare where an action plan for collaboration was

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formulated and an NGO coordinating committee including YWCA, was formed. The Botswana NGO health coordinating committee eventually agreed the idea to establish the BOFWA with assistance of the IPPF field office in Mbabane, Swaziland. Therefore, the initiative and the idea to establish a NSDAO and collaboration between the government and the NSDAO in the issue area of family planning originally came not form non-governmental sector but the government, although the establishment of the BOFWA itself was coordinated among NGOs.

In 1988, the BOFWA was registered in June and launched in September. At the time of the launching, there was a seminar with 45 participants representing schools, churches, private practitioners, chiefs, members of Parliament, and the following NGOs:

Botswana Christian Council (BCC)
Botswana Girl Guide Association
Botswana Boy Scouts
Botswana Red Cross Society
Botswana Council of Women (BCW)
Botswana Young Women Christian Association (YWCA)
Business and Professional Women's Clubs of Botswana
Botswana Nurses Association
Emang Basadi

The stated objectives of the BOFWA are:

(1) To collect information and advise education in family planning and responsible parenthood in the interest of family welfare and community well being;
(2) To increase understanding by the people of Botswana of the demographic problems of their own country and the world;
(3) To advocate and promote the provision of information and education particularly human physiology, sexual development and human production;
(4) To advise on premarital counseling;
(5) To assist in the formation, organisation and operation of family planning and other related health and development services;

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(6) To promote and support family planning through appropriate organisations;

(7) To promote training of appropriate professional workers in the implementation of its policies and principles (Background Information on BOFWA: 2).

The BOFWA's organisational structure is shown in figure 5-3.

Figure 5-3 Organisational Structure of the BOFWA

Source: Compiled from the information of the Executive
Staff Office, Gaborone and NORAD, 1989: 6.

In organisational term, BOFWA is a membership associations composed of persons and institutions. The National Council, which oversees the fulfillment of objects of the BOFWA and is held once a year,

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is the supreme authority and policy making organ of the BOFWA. Members of the National Executive Committee (NEC) are elected by the National Council and it is the management and running body of the BOFWA. Two standing committees, namely the National Finance and Administrative Committee and the National Programme Committee, are appointed by the NEC. In administration, the Executive Staff Office is the permanent organ which undertake duties assigned to it by the NEC with an Executive Director as its chief.

The BOFWA is financially dependent for about 60 to 70 per cent of its annual budget on its international mother body, the IPPF. And 20 per cent of it is from the government.

However, the BOFWA with its short history is still in the rudimentary stage of its operations and depends on expatriates in its management as has often happened in NSDAOs in Botswana. Since its establishment, the BOFWA formed a few branches and recruitment of staff is underway. One of the means to attain its objectives is the establishment of a youth counseling centre for family life education in Gaborone. This centre's activities are as follows:

(1) A small library with booklets to provide information on family Life Education and family planning;
(2) Indoor game to provide entertainment and occupational therapy for the youth;
(3) Counseling service provide the youth with an opportunity to discuss problems related to their emotional, sexual and psychological development;
(4) Short training courses will be organised for the youth (Background Information on BOFWA: 3-4)

Generally speaking, it remains to be seen what kind of role the BOFWA will play in this issue area in its relations with the government.

5.4.3.3 The State-initiated Anti-Natal "Population Policy": The Evolution of Maternal and Child Health/Family Planning (MCH/FP) and of Institutional Framework

In the issue areas of population and family planning, basic designs of programmes have been drawn by the government.

The Botswana government have been motivated to play a very active role in population programmes since as early as the early 1970s. It was because of (1) people's concentration in the more fertile eastern strip of the country which comprises less than 5 percent of Botswana's cultivative land, and the problem of droughts affecting its agricultural yields, and (2) inefficient employment. In addition, between 1960 to 1975, natural increase increased from 3.3 to 3.5 percent per annum. Therefore, the government was motivated to support family planning programme shortly after political independence. Against this background, the Maternal and Child Health/ Family Planning (MCH/FP) Programme was developed.

Maternal and child health/family planning services in Botswana originated as early as in 1967, when several women in Francistown asked the government surgeon for contraceptives. At this stage, contraceptives were provided by the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) which subsequently began a pilot project in 1969 to introduce family planning in Serowe. It was at this time that six middle-aged women with children were trained as volunteer family welfare educators, who are normally selected in the Village Development Committee, by an IPPF visiting team. In addition to human reproduction and family planning, the training at this time included other subjects such as immunisations, breadfeeding, nutrition, child maternal care, environmental sanitation, prevention of some major diseases and communication skills. Thus, from

the beginning, "family planning in Botswana has been integrated into the general context of maternal and child health and has never been a separate programme" (*Botswana Family Health Survey II (BFHS-II): 3*).

In the *National Development Plan 1970-75* issued in 1970, the policy-makers showed their concerns on a "population explosion to outstrip the economic expansion" at that time, and their recognition that improved child care can be achieved through *family planning*" (p.113, emphasis added). In fact, the government had sponsored a training programme run by the IPPF mentioned above "to cater for those who want to plan the size of their family" (NDP 1970-75). It is also stated in this plan that the government "wishes to see established, where possible by Local Authorities, a network of maternal and child welfare clinics at which family planning advice would be available" during the plan period (NDP 1970-75: 113-4). In addition, the government set a target for population growth not exceeded 2.5 percent per annum by 1985 in this Development Plan. Therefore, it is possible to interpret that this suggested de facto adoption of anti-natal population policy, although there is no clear population policy in Botswana.

The Botswana government started to take action to establish an institutional framework quite quickly to achieve the objective of the plan. It was in 1973 that the Maternal and Child Health/Family Planning (MCH/FP) Unit was formed in the Ministry of Health and a national programme was established. The policy of the government was that these services are available to every family. The basic stance was stated by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health in 1976 as follows:

> "It is a basic right of every family to determine for itself how many
> children to have and when to have them. If couples are to exercise
> the choice of determining the number and spacing of their children,
> then health facilities must provide them with the service, supplies

and information on how to plan their families" (Ministry of Health, 1976: i).

One of the important decisions, which was made as a key component of the MCH/FP programme, was to train 60 family welfare educators (FWEs) every year (*BFHSII*, 1988: 4). More than 600 FWEs have been trained by the MCP/FP Unit since 1973. They have played educational and motivational roles in communities.

In 1979, the Family Health Division was formed with the result that the MCH/FP Unit joined with the Nutrition Unit and the Health Education Unit. The main objectives of the Family Health Division are (1) to reduce sickness and death among mothers, children and infants, (2) to promote reproductive health, and (3) to promote the physical and psychological health and development of children and adolescents. To attain these objectives, health workers provided services and supervised deliveries in family planning and so on.

In this institutional development process, the number of service points has been increased from 50 to more than 441 permanent facilities in 1989 as is shown in figure 5-4, which have made each family more possible to assess MCH/FP services.

As in the case of Zambia, influences of international conferences on population issues also stimulated the government to develop clearer population policies and implementation strategies. These conferences included the Second African Conference on Population and Development in Tanzania in January 1984 and International Conference on population in Mexico in August 1984. Following these international conferences, a series of workshops and conferences on population and development were held to further conscientise policy makers on this issue in the country (*BFHS-II*, 1988: 6). In October 1985, a seminar was held to disseminate the result of the Botswana Health Survey in 1984. In

September 1986, there a conference for Parliamentarians and Chiefs. Also in June 1987, another conference on the same subject was held (*BFHS-II*, 1988: 6). Therefore, following development in the issue area seems to have its origin around in 1984, where the necessity for clear pollution policy was gradually shared among the policy-makers.

Referral
Hospitals-3

District
Hospitals-12

Health
Centre-13

Clinics-163
(58 with
maternity)

Health Posts
(137 with
nurses)

Figure 5-4 Health Care Pyramid
Source: Medical Statistics Unit quated in BFHS-2, 1988:5.

Until 1984 family planning service were offered at only specified times during the week. Late in 1984, the MCH/FP Unit tested the integration of these services on a daily basis at several clinics in order to increase the accessibility of services. From the initial pilot projects in two clinics in the Southeast District, integrated services have been extended to all parts of the country. As a result, in 1988 over 77 per cent of clinics offer

integrated services. This approach have made it possible that the entire family can obtain MCH/FP service on one day (*BFHS-II*, 1988: 4).

Another development since 1984 is an intensification of training in MCH/FP, both within and outside the country for the purpose of improving the quality of services. Health workers have used various opportunities in many areas related to MCH/FP.

Owing to these institutional developments of family planning on the initiative of the state, it has become possible to reach the people in need of MCH/FP services more easily.

Furthermore, in October 1987, in order to improve the quality and safety of family planning services in Botswana, the Family Health Division developed the *Family Planning Policy Guidelines and Service Standards*, which took effect in May 1988. Also in 1987, the Ministry of Health engaged a consultant to develop a three-year programme of information, education, communication (IEC), which is an important component of any MCH/FP programme, to further promote MCH/FP activities.

In January 1989, the government created an Interministerial Programme Steering Committee on Population and Development to develop and implement a national population policy. The background of this establishment was a series of conferences and workshop stated above to stress the need for the government to develop clear population policies and implementation strategies (*BFHS-II*: 6).

In was in this context of the evolution of state-initiated "population policy" that the BOFWA was launched to collaborate with the government in policy implementation.

In terms of performance of the state-initiated anti-natal policies, it can be concluded that they have been relatively successfully done. Between 1985 and 1988, for example, the percentage of women knowing at

least one modern method of contraception increased from 75 percent to 95 percent (*BFHS-II*: 34-36). In addition, a target set by the government in 1985 to increase the proportion of married women accepting family planning from 20 percent to 30 percent in 1990 was achieved, and the proportion was 32 percent in 1990. In this regard, Botswana is only surpassed by Mauritius (46 percent) and Zimbabwe (36 percent) among Sub-Saharan countries (Banda, 1993: 166).

5.4.3.4 The Government' View on the Role of the BOFWA: A "Tool" of the State?

At the launching seminar of the BOFWA, top-ranking government officials were invited to make opening and key note addresses. The one was P. Venson, the then Deputy Permanent Secretary , Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs and the other E.T. Maganu, the Director of Health Services? Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health. Also, Mrs. Masire attended the seminar.

In the keynote address made by Maganu, entitled "the Role of Voluntary Organisation in a National Family Welfare programme" (BOFWA, 1990: 35-39), gives us an image of the BOFWA recognised by the government. One of the points we can find in the text is the role of voluntary organisations as innovators derived from their flexible organisational structure. In this regard, the BOFWA was expected to play a role in counselling procedures, which is one of the areas of activities. Also, initiatives of NGOs were expected to impact positively on the improvement of the quality of life in the areas where current government services had limited impact (BOFWA, 1990: 38). Therefore, we can observe that the government expected complementary role of NGOs. However, what we have to realise is the following phrase:

> "Your success or failure in the initial phases will determine how much support you get from Ministries dealing with social services..." (BOFWA, 1990: 39).

This phrase connotes that the activities of the BOFWA in the future will depend not only on the performance of the BOFWA itself, but also on the government. This means that quite limited autonomy was allowed for the BOFWA in its relation with the state at the initial stage of establishment.

Since the establishment of the BOFWA, there was an impression that there had been "excellent" relationship between the government and the BOFWA in 1992 (Interview with an officer of the BOFWA, 26/3/92).

It was in the NDP7 that the government started to refer to and emphasised the importance of "non-governmental organisations" in the process of *policy implementation*. In the area of the population, the government stated as follows:

> "The implementation of population policy cuts across the programmes of many ministries, non-governmental organisations, and the private sector" (NDP7: 91).

and

> "Non-governmental organisations are active in related research and the provision of private health and education services. They can assist in *disseminating information, distributing supplies,* and *monitoring progress*" (NDP7: 91, emphasis added).

Furthermore,

> "To deal with the problem areas identified, NGOs, such as the Botswana Family Welfare Association, the Botswana Christian Council and women' organisations, will be encouraged to *disseminate*

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information about family planning, population and teenage pregnancy" (NDP7: 378, emphasis added).

It is clear from these phrases that the government expects the role of NSDAOs only in the *limited areas* of activities where the government has not been involved enough like information dissemination and counseling. This stance corresponds to that shown in the launching seminar of the BOFWA in 1988, as stated above.

In addition, in response to my question if there would be any possibility for NSDAOs like the BOFWA to be allowed to participate in the policy making process in the case of formulating more clearer official population policy in Botswana, one of the senior officials of the Family Health Unit of the Ministry of Health answered that there would be few opportunities for the BOFWA to participate in the process (Interview, 24/4/92). Also the official said that there was no prospect for the government to withdraw from the areas in which it had been working and to leave them to NSDAOs.

It can be observed (1) that, in the issue areas of population and family planning, there is a relatively clear boundary between the space of the government and that of the BOFWA, which is almost regulated and limited by the state and (2) that it is difficult and almost impossible for the BOFWA to change and expand the working sphere and to infiltrate into the area which has been already occupied by the state. Therefore, the "good" relations kept between the state and the BOFWA from the BOFWA's point of view can be considered to be partly due to the clearer boundary of each working space determined almost by the state. In other words, there is a limited chance of conflicts between the state, as far as the working sphere is kept. However, this rigidly determined boundary also means that the BOFWA is regarded as only an instrument or a tool to

implement a part of government policy, and that there is a limited opportunity for the BOFWA to advocate policy matters in the issue area. The BOFWA is, thus, considered to be only "embedded" in a state's policy design.

5.5 Comparison of NSDAOs' Experiences in Zambia and Botswana

As we have seen in this chapter, there are similarities as well as differences in the experiences of NSDAOs in Zambia and Botswana in various aspects. From a comparative point of view, we can draw some theoretical implications from the experiences of both countries.

NSDAOs are, in their nature, "intermediary" (Carroll, 1992) between the state and the grassroots (target groups). As considered in chapter 1, their development depends both on the capacity and tactics of the state and the socio-economic and political conditions of target groups. In addition, in terms of their roles in democratisation, they are potentially important in two ways, because (1) they can become important actors in civil society by themselves and (2) they are influential *within* civil society, in their relation to target groups; first, they have possibilities to influence national policies, when they have space for policy advocacy; second, they can contribute to "rural or grassroots democratisation," by empowering their target groups. However, they also take risks in two ways; first, if they compete with the state, they have difficulties in securing working "spaces," and even run a danger of being oppressed by the state, because they may be recognised challengers to erode the ideological base of the state; second, if they are not represented by their target groups to some extent, their involvement rather negatively affected the rural communities at which they are targeting, which will cause problems of legitimacy among their target groups. This latter point challenges the

conventional assumption that NGOs in civil society are synonymous with democratic forces (see, Ndegwa, 1993, 1996 on this issue in the case of Kenya). Therefore, NSDAOs' development and roles in democratisation are necessary to be evaluated from these points of view.

5.5.1 Differences of Organisational Development

As argued in chapter 1, one of the dimensions of development of civil society is that of organisation. It is now possible to conclude that NSDAOs in both countries belong to what Korten called a "second generation" (1987, 1990), considering that their main aim has gradually been shifted from relief and welfare to self-reliant local (community) development, by mobilising people. This tendency seems to be more salient in Zambia, where NSDAOs like HUZA explicitly stress the importance of empowerment of people. Generally speaking, Zambian NSDAOs depend less on expatriates in their management and activities, which means their relative organisational strength, than those in Botswana. In my view, therefore, one of the differences between NSDAOs in Zambia and those in Botswana is that Zambian NSDAOs have been not only organisationally more "developed" in the sense that they have established relatively well-working programmes, projects, and manpower than those in Botswana (see, Garilao, 1987:115)[39].

As we have seen in the case studies, there are quite contrasting experiences between HUZA and TL, and between the PPAZ and the

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[39]Garilao (1987: 115) categorised a pattern of organisational development into three stages. The first stage is the formation and development stage wherein groups of individuals identify common needs and problems and organise themselves to respond collectively to these problems. The second is the consolidation stage. In this stage, 'eadership is established and an expertise is developed. The third stage, onto which some can move, is the institutionalisation stage. In this stage, not only can an organisation carry out its programmes and projects well, but these have a certain strategic impact in its geographic locality. The programme can become the model for other organisations and the government.

BOFWA. What can be observed from these cases is that HUZA has taken quite deliberate tactics to develop its bureaucratic organisation and has gradually expanded and consolidated its areas of activity, while TL had failed to establish its organisational structure to support its own activities and once faced a crisis of continuation of its own activity. HUZA has developed expertise and offered a range of services relevant to mainly urban communities and has even moved into policy advocacy by advising on natural resource conservation and making representation on the NCDP on women and development. On the other hand, TL has not yet established its final organisational structure[40] and it has had problems with its targeting groups as stated above, although it has been regarded as one of the more important NSDAOs by the government because of its innovative way of contributing to rural development and is "favoured" in government circles because it is less competitive with the state. The experiences of TL illustrates that Botswana NSDAOs' "organisational weakness" derives partly from their dependence on "expatriates" with special skills and knowledge, in other words on the shortage of local qualified manpower. In fact, localisation of NSDAOs has been more advanced in Zambia.

This contrast is also the case in the experiences of the PPAZ and the BOFWA, both of which have been involved in the same issue area of family planning. The PPAZ has established relatively good organisation, and has gradually consolidated its activities, while the BOFWA is still at a rudimentary stage in terms of organisation and has limited areas of activities.

Therefore, in terms of NSDAOs, civil society in Zambia was more developed in that in Botswana.

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[40]TL was considering whether to transform its organisational structure into a membership one during my research period.

5.5.2 Reasons for Different Levels of Development of NSDAOs: Interaction with the State and Working "Spaces"

5.5.2.1 NSDAOs in Zambia: Survival and Participation in Policy Process

In Zambia, as the case of the ZCSD illustrated, there were attempts by the UNIP government to control NSDAOs' activities within the policy framework of the one-party era. In this political context, NSDAOs in Zambia were obliged to work quite deliberately to collaborate with the state because it was the only survival strategy in order not to be regarded as "political oppositions." From the point of view of the state, thus, NSDAOs' activities had been, at least, *monitored*. And as far as NSDAOs worked within the policy framework of the state, NSDAOs' activities, which were not legally prohibited because freedom for the formation of non-political associations was one of the constitutional rights, were allowed to complement those of the state, even during the one-party period. This means that NSDAOs as actors in civil society can be developed in the seemingly limited sphere of the one-party political regime as far as they were not in acute confrontation with the state in policy and ideological terms.

In addition, as the case of the PPAZ shows, even in the sphere not occupied by the state as a provider, the state intervenes to control NSDAOs when they have different ideological inclination (e.g., anti-natalism in the case of the PPAZ). Especially in the case of NSDAOs, which serves others and are organised for specific purposes, their *raisons d'etre* are not to be institutionalised in a society like churches in a historical process but to provide services which are not actually provided by the state, by carefully developing its own programmes and projects. Therefore, in this case, the

tactics taken by the state are limited to co-optation or less interventionist ones. In the case of the PPAZ, it could gradually expand their working sphere, especially in the period of structural development, where they can be just functionally institutionalised as providers of family planning services in exchange for some control from the state. What is interesting is that the PPAZ basically kept its relative organisational, financial[41] and ideological autonomy from UNIP, although there were harassments from individual politicians with a pro-natal stance. Furthermore, the PPAZ has not only gradually succeeded in transforming the state ideology on the population issue from pro-natalism to anti-natalism, but also influenced the establishment of anti-natal population policy. This is considered to be an important development in terms of political participation, which is supposed to be one of the two dimensions of democratisation, as stated in chapter 1, although the impact of this level of participation is not enough to promote national political reform and democratisation.

In terms of networks of NSDAOs, the formation and consolidation of collaboration among NSDAOs has not yet materialised in Zambia. The Zambia Council for Social Development was once formed as a coordinating national body of NSDAOs. However, it has never been a "genuine voice" of NSDAOs in Zambia.[42] In this sense, NSDAOs in Zambia have not yet become a major actor in the process of democratic consolidation. In the Third Republic, however, NSDAOs, which have been delinked from the dominant UNIP political structure, are supposed to play more roles based on their expertise and knowledge accumulated so far.[43]

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[41]In practice, it was difficult for the PPAZ to expect financial assistance from the government whose revenues became dwindled.
[42]The ZCSD was being reorganised to become the "genuine voice" of NSDAOs in Zambia in the Third Republic (interview with the General Secretary of the ZCSD, 21/12/1991).
[43]NSDAOs in collaboration with IAOs and Churches are actively involved in to avert some political-related problems (See, e.g. *Post*, 23 May 1996). The case of the PPAZ is also reported (*Post*, 4 June 1996).

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5.5.2.2 Relatively "Strong" State: Limits of NSDAOs in Botswana

As experiences of NSDAOs in Botswana illustrated, some NSDAOs can be collaborative with the state, while others are conflictive. On the one hand, one of the cases which has gained a favourable response from the state is, as considered as a case study in the previous section, the Thusano Lefasheng. This is mainly because the areas of activities of TL do not overlap those of the state. In other words, TL is *not* regarded as competitor by the state. Therefore, some collaboration developed as special financial support from the President himself. On the other hand, there are conflicting cases. CORDE's conflicts with CODEC derive from its activities' duplication with those of CODEC and its difference in approach at the ideological level from that of CODEC, as it emphasises on the original idea of the Brigades to create self-managed production cooperatives, such as Boiteko the adult women's cooperatives. Therefore, CORDE is certainly recognised as being competitive with the state, which eventually led to its working difficulties.

The case of the NGO consortium showed that NSDAOs working in a "consortium format," which can be interpreted "apparently (not substantially) more politically powerful," tend to be regarded with greater suspicion by the state. This is because the formation of a consortium in order to access the "grassroots," especially *without* the knowledge of the central government, can be considered as politically motivated to mobilise people and as a threat to the hegemonic dominance of the state. This caused the interference of the state in activities of NSDAOs in Gantsi *as a consortium*. Although the simple fact was that NGO consortium was dissolved by its membership, the consortium was "symbolically" disbanded as a scapegoat in Gantsi as a result of the state interference. In

addition, a member of the consortium, namely the RIIC, was quasi-AO heavily dependent in financial terms (financial dependency), which eventually weakened the collaboration.

Therefore the NSDAOs' activities in Botswana have been regulated by the relatively strong state as "intruder," as Chazan stated (1988: 333). Therefore, the Botswana state, with a strong material and ideological base, seems to have deliberately "divided and controlled" NSDAOs. It is, thus, quite ironical that NSDAOs, which have attempted to establish programmes "alternative" to those of the state, faced problems of their "narrowed working spaces" in Botswana where constitutional freedom of action is supposed to be more guaranteed.

In addition, NSDAOs' efforts to empower people are also discouraged by socio-economic factors such as the shortage of market for people's products. Even so, at the level of the community, activities of NSDAOs have unexpectedly as well as expectedly impacted on the rural community as happened in the case of TL. On the one hand, they have contribute to the growth of rural civil society by helping rural people to form groups. However, on the other hand, as stated above in detail, TL's involvement in projects in rural communities also stimulated the social differentiation. This experience shows us an ambivalent characteristics of roles of NSDAOs in rural democratisation.

In summary, at the national level, the degree of political participation of NSDAOs in Botswana was still low. This means that the nature of the political regime in Botswana was rather exclusive. At the level of local communities, however, NSDAOs, especially these belonging to the "second generation" being involved in community development, had some potential to promote rural democratisation, although they will fail to do so if they do not sufficiently pay attention to changing social structures of the targeted communities.

5.5.2.3 Working "Space" Matters?

From the experiences of NSDAOs in both countries, it became clear that it is in the area of a "policy vacuum," where the state has been operating or is "newly" expected but has failed to offer sufficient services and benefits to the people, that NSDAOs, such as the PPAZ, have emerged and have been working. This shows us that NSDAOs are actually important actors in "alternative development," as argued in the first chapter. Therefore, in Zambia, where the state has became "weaker" as a distributor of services due to eroded material bases, the working "space" for NSDAOs has become larger (and expanded under structural adjustment) than in Botswana, where the state has been relatively "strong" with a sufficient material base to offer services. Also, the Botswana state's relatively strong ideologically hegemonic stance has narrowed "constitutionally free space" of NSDAOs' activities[44]. As a result, NSDAOs have been more developed and more active in Zambia.

In addition, as stated above, the NSDAOs in Zambia have to develop their organisations and programmes quite deliberately so as to tackle important problems in a deteriorating economy, under the "apparently" rigid authoritarian regime, which ironically resulted in relatively well-working organisations. This development was possible because the political regime in Zambia under UNIP control did not necessarily totally oppress civil society. Botswana's constitutional multi-partyism provides at first sight a more favourable condition for NSDAOs to develop freely. However, as we have seen, this has never been the case. It was only before the state secured financial resources from diamonds that

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[44]We can find Good (1996a), characterising Botswana "authoritarian liberalism," concerning a relatively recent argument related to this point.

the so called NGO sector played relatively an important role in development (see Grant, 1980) in comparison with the state. The more the state's role in development became important, the less opportunities for NSDAOs to play in development. Therefore, as stated in Chapter 1, NSDAOs are not necessarily more developed in "multi-party democracy," which disproved the intuitive assumption that a constitutional democracy provides more favorable conditions for the development of civil society.

In theoretical terms, these experiences support the argument, which is closely related to the second hypothesis that civil society develops in the working space which was created by the failure of the state, caused by both material and ideological decline, as a provider of necessary services. In other words, it is difficult for civil society to develop in the sphere which is completely occupied by the relatively strong state with sufficient material bases as a provider of services. In this case, we can take it that civil society is diminished. These insights obviously prove the second hypothesis. As the case of the BOFWA shows that its working area is relatively rigidly determined because it operates in an area which the state, with a relatively sufficient material base, has already occupied.

5.5.3 Political Regimes and Development of NSDAOs

Finally, it is necessary to just briefly mention that it is clearly shown from the experiences of HUZA, the PPAZ and the BOFWA that how active NSDAOs are and how much opportunity they have to partake in policy making and implementation process do not directly depend on the expected characteristics of the "constitutional" political regime in the sense that it is democratic (multi-party) or authoritarian (one or no party system, and military regime). These are more directly related to characteristics of

the state in terms of both the material and ideological bases, as the present study suggested in the first chapter.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT AND STAGNATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

In this study, the political logic of development of civil society has been analysed by using case studies of two countries in southern Africa, namely, Zambia and Botswana. In this chapter, two tasks remain to be carried out. First, it is necessary to summarise the findings in this study by testing the hypotheses stated in chapter 1. Second, some implications derived from this study will be read into the broader theoretical context raised in the first chapter on African politics: in particular arguments concerning democratisation and the nature of political regimes.

6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Before summarising the findings, it is useful to quote the hypotheses developed in the first chapter as follows:

1. There are more limited opportunities of the development of civil society in a country where a regime is established in favour of the state in terms of power distribution, or in other words, the state dominates material and ideological bases in the territory. Therefore, there are more opportunities for civil society to develop in the country where monopolistic tendencies of the state are relaxed.

2. There are more opportunities of the growth of civil society in a country where material and ideological bases of the state are eroded and socio-economic conditions are declined, or in other words, the state is losing its legitimacy and resources. Therefore, in this situation, IAOs and churches will become candidates to challenge the state to reform it, and DAOs agents of "alternative development."

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3. There are more opportunities of the emergence of vibrant civil society in a country where material conditions have been prepared for civil society as a result of industrialisation and commercialisation, ideological conditions have been offered by education, and organisational bases have been acquired both through historical experiences like a struggle for independence and by strong leadership in a society at large.

4. The state with ample resources tends to use the "preemptive" tactic to control, especially, rural areas, which are major political bases of ruling elite, for the purpose of depoliticising people in a clientelist manner.

5. As far as the state is strong in terms of power distribution, the state tends to take more repressive tactics toward AOs especially with different ideological inclinations from the state, for the purpose of securing hegemony by restricting activities of the AOs.

Apart from the rural sectors where the development of rural civil society has been deliberately blocked by the state in both countries, as detailed in chapter 3, it is possible to conclude that civil society is more developed in Zambia than in Botswana.

As a phenomenon, this was most explicitly expressed in the "transition" period from the Second to the Third Republic in Zambia, when the trade unions became the core of the anti-UNIP movement and the formation of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), which eventually took power, after the election in October 1991. The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) is, as well-known, one of the most organised labour movements in Africa. In addition, as detailed in chapter 4, Christian churches were quite actively involved in the democratic "transition phase," so as to avert constitutional stalemates and to conduct a successful election. Furthermore, NSDAOs, working in the selected issue areas, are more developed in Zambia in terms of organisation and a variety of areas of activities, as detailed in the previous chapter.

In contrast with Zambia, in the current "democratisation," Botswana has not experienced any explicit "transitions" because it has kept

"multi-party democracy" since independence. As we have seen so far, however, the areas of activities of a variety of AOs have been "narrowed" by the state.

It is possible just from these findings in the two countries to disprove a conventional assumption that a constitutional "democracy" provides more favourable conditions for the development of civil society.

6.1.1 Zambia: The Erosion of Material Bases, the Failure of Ideological Dominance, and the Development of Civil Society

Zambia, whose economy has been in a bad condition since the early 1970s, due to the decline of the copper price in the world market, and structural adjustment imposed by the IMF-World Bank in the 1980s (which is considered to be a symbolical and indirect expression of the defeat of UNIP's development strategy), is a case which corresponds to the second hypothesis that there are more opportunities for the growth of civil society in a country where the *material* and *ideological* bases of the state are eroded and socio-economic conditions have declined.

In addition, it was against the political and economic backgrounds that NSDAOs such as HUZA and the PPAZ have been gradually and deliberately establishing thei, organisations and legitimacy in each working area of concern, as argued in chapter 5. They have, thus, relatively successfully become agents of "alternative development" (hypothesis 2).

It was also in the political and economic crisis that IAOs represented by the ZCTU challenged the UNIP government so as to reintroduce multi-party politics. Therefore, these crises also meant that Zambia was a case where the state failed to impose hegemony over the ruling territory, which eventually caused the social unrest in the 1980s and the formation

of oppositions. In addition, as detailed in chapter 4, Christian churches were involved not only in the reintroduction of multi-partyism, but also in mediating the constitutional stalemates between parties and in monitoring election to achieve a peaceful transition.

Both the trade unions and the Christian churches in Zambia, which were deeply involved in politics not only in the transition period but also in the one-party era, have been historically institutionalised and have had organisational strength. The trade unions have their origin in the late 1940s, owing to the development of the copper mines started as early as in the 1930s. In the liberation struggle, they played important roles. In addition, in the one-party era, ZCTU was *de facto* the opposition group. In comparison with the case of Botswana, where industrialisation was mainly the post-independence phenomenon, therefore, there were more favourable material conditions for IAOs, especially trade unions, in Zambia to establish organisational strength, which corresponds to hypothesis 3. Christian churches also have been historically important not only in terms of education, which was important in terms of the formation of early political elites, and health, but also a "voice" to check the state behaviour. It is because they have their "visions" on national affairs (ideological autonomy), as observed in the case of the introduction of scientific socialism in the early 1980s, and their continuous involvement in their area of concerns in the form of "pastoral letters" in the 1980s. In addition, their relative financial autonomy strengthens their position vis-a-vis the state.

The UNIP government could only secure ample material bases by the early 1970s, when the government could get sufficient revenue at its disposal from the export of copper. Therefore, it was only by the early 1970s that it could manage to use a form of communal cooperatives as a means of preempting rural areas to achieve "micro-socialism" based on

Humanism, and subsidies as a tool to integrate people in rural areas in a clientelist manner, which proves hypothesis 4. However, as a result of dwindling revenue, UNIP failed to continue the same tactic in rural areas after the 1970s, and, thus, partially failed to implant the "ideological" dominance (hegemony) of the state even in rural areas, although attempts to preemptive rural areas have eventually suffocated local initiatives of "development from below," which was shown by the fact that the cooperative movement in Zambia still had very weak grassroots.

UNIP also failed to keep its ideological dominance in its relation with the Christian churches, as a result of the defeat in the debate concerning the introduction of scientific socialism in the early 1980s. This is also the case in the issue areas of population and family planning, where the UNIP government gradually shifted its stance from pro-natalism in harmony with Zambian Humanism to anti-natalism, which had been promoted by the PPAZ in Zambia. These cases show relative weakness of the Zambian state in terms of ideology (see, hypothesis 5).

Against the shift of the UNIP government's stance towards the population issue, the PPAZ successfully influenced the establishment of national population policy by participating in the policy-making process, which is one of the positive signs of democratisation in the dimension of participation. This change was more explicitly observed in the period of structural adjustment in the 1980s, when monolistic tendencies of the UNIP government was relaxed and its "socialistic" development path was clearly defeated (hypothesis 1).

In summary, in Zambia the state did not necessarily dominate either *material* or *ideological* bases (hypothesis 1) and failed to secure hegemony, which had been gradually eroded. This means that there were relatively favourable conditions or "political spaces" for AOs to act autonomously. Relatively developed civil society under these conditions

emerged *as opposition* drastically as a counterweight against UNIP in the transition period, when the "monopolistic tendencies of the state" were relaxed (hypothesis 1). The ZCTU became the core organisation to form the MMD, and Christian churches, the Law Association of Zambia, and the NGO Coordinating Committee which delinked from the Women League of the UNIP were involved in election monitoring during this period. In addition, NSDAOs like HUZA and the PPAZ had the opportunity to be involved in policy-making process in specific issue areas.

However, it is also necessary to mention that there were also "attempts" of relatively rigid controls from the state during the one-party era, as shown in the case of the ZCSD and the PPAZ, designed to prevent these NSDAOs going beyond the policy-framework of the state. Generally speaking, however, considering the analyses so far in the study, despite its continuous attempts to control civil society, the power of the state was gradually weakened since the early 1970s, which allowed the development of a relatively autonomous civil society in Zambia.

6.1.2 Botswana: The Secured Material Bases, the Success of Ideological Dominance, and the Relative Stagnation of Civil Society

Botswana is a case that is depicted in hypothesis 1, which is that "a regime is established in favour of the state in terms of power distribution," and "the state dominates material and ideological bases." As depicted in chapter 2, Botswana achieved "a second independence" around 1972-3, when it ceased to rely on support from the United Kingdom to finance recurrent spending (Harvey and Lewis, Jr., 1990: 53), and saw continuous improvements in its financial situation.[1] This sound financial condition

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[1] The cash reserves held by the Government in 1985 actually exceeded total recurrent spending in that year (NDP7: 69), as a result of conservative public spending policy pursued by the BDP.

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has guaranteed the material bases of the state independent of tax revenues, owing to which the state can pursue "distributionist policies," targeting especially rural areas where the dominant BDP's support is based.

In fact, these policies have been a "preemptive" tactic to control these areas. This tactic can be interpreted as a device to departicipate and depoliticise people in rural areas by controling them in a clientelist manner (hypothesis 4). The BDP is also engaged in patron-client relationships with large cattle owners, some of whom are BDP MPs. Therefore, people in rural areas, who are politically emasculated in an clientelist manner and who are organised from "above," are in the situation where it is difficult for them to organise themselves autonomously, which has prevented "rural democratisation" in Botswana.

In terms of ideology, the Botswana state has chosen a capitalist-oriented development path. An examined in chapter 3, the Serowe Brigade with its socialist inclination faced intervention by the government which favoured the commercially-oriented Kweneng Rural Development Association (KRDA) model. Eventually the Brigade movement itself was coopted into the lower level of the state hierarchy in education. Therefore, it is possible to consider that there was imperatives for the Botswana state to "implant" obedience to secure both its hegemony and security by coopting the Brigade, which was recognised as a challenger in a changing and strained regional (southern African) political situation in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. This case corresponds to hypothesis 5 that the state tends to take more repressive tactics toward AOs especially with different ideological inclinations from the state, so as to keep its state hegemony. This tendency of hegemonic dominance was also exemplified in the case of "independent churches," as stated in chapter 4.

Against the sound financial resources, the Botswana state has been involved in relatively wider issue areas than other sub-Saharan African states which have "failed," and has provided public services, including clinics and primary schools, which were improved throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and food, in the case of drought. This wide-range of activity actually "narrowed" the potential working space where NSDAOs and even Christian churches are usually actively working in other countries, as observed in the case of the population issue in comparison with Zambia in chapter 5. In this situation, it is not so easy for NSDAOs to be established and to act as agents of "alternative development," which also stunts the development of civil society. This finding is consistent with the second hypothesis that it is in the country where material and ideological bases are eroded and socio-economic conditions have deteriorated that NSDAOs can emerge as agents of "alternative development."

Generally speaking, the monopolistic tendency of the state has been relatively rigidly sustained against the background of the ample material bases and a relatively rigid development strategy in Botswana. As a result, opportunities for the development of civil society have been politically restricted. In addition, organisational bases of AOs have been still underdeveloped because of, for instance, the shortage of qualified personnel, as stated in chapter 5, and strong leaderships, as we can observe in the case of Zambia.

6.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

6.2.1 Rethinking Political Regimes

From the findings summarised above, we can develop a view of political regimes in sub-Saharan Africa quite different from the simplistic conventional view of political regimes.

As stated in chapter 1, in terms of the theory of political regimes, what matters to civil society is not the dimension of competition but that of participation. If democracy is to be considered as, so called, "procedural democracy," which guarantees only people's suffrage (the minimalist definition of democracy), it is obvious that Botswana is more democratic than Zambia under UNIP control, because the degree of competition has been higher in Botswana than that in Zambia by the early 1990s.

However, as stated in chapter 1, the concept of "participation" is not necessarily limited to "electoral participation." In this study, this concept has been treated in a broader perspectives, which includes participation in public decision-making as well as management of people's own affairs (empowerment). Therefore, if the concept of "participation" is broadened, the nature of a political regime can be differently characterised. Considering the limited autonomous political space in Botswana, "departicipated" people especially in rural areas, and no opportunities for AOs to participate in the policy-making process which is dominated by top bureaucrats and politicians, the degree of participation in Botswana is not as high as conventionally supposed[2]. As summarised above, this is derived from a "strong" state, dominating the material and ideological bases and manipulating social actors to be obedient to the state by using these resources as its disposal. Therefore, the state has appeared as a powerful actor in controlling society to maintain its hegemony. This relatively rigid domination has so far achieved political stability and economic success *at the macro-level.*

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[2]See Good, 1996b, for recent issues on participation in Botswana.

On the other side, Zambia under UNIP control was categorised as, for instance, "a competitive one-party system" (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994) and "a party-mobilising regime" (Chazan, et al., 1992), both of which focused on the nature of the single party in power: "competition" among party members, and mobilisation-oriented nature. These categorisations are useful to distinguish political regimes under one-party rule. However, as developed in chapter 1, if the argument of political regimes includes changing reciprocal patterns of power between state and civil society, we have to consider the nature of the political regime of Zambia from another point of view. In this study, Zambia under UNIP rule was not considered competitive, in the sense that there is no competition *among* parties, because political society was absorbed into the state, or in other words, no other parties than UNIP were allowed. However, the absorption of the political society does not mean that civil society was also restricted.

In fact, as observed already, quite a variety of AOs, like churches and trade unions were quite actively working in the one-party era. In addition, there were opportunities for NSDAOs to "participate" in national policy-making process at the end of the era, when reintroduction of political society, or the return to the multi-party politics, was in sight. Therefore, the content that "the imposition of auth: ritarian[3] [in the conventional categorisation] rule affects the development of civil society in important, sometimes contradictory, ways," pointed out by Oxhorn from his Latin American experiences (1995: 5), is also applicable in the African context. In addition, ironically enough in the case of Zambia, the UNIP catch phrase of "one-party *participatory* democracy" could be interpreted to be *half true*, because the level of "participation" became higher at least in the 1980s,

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[3]In this case, this concept of "authoritarian" means that the state absorbs political society, say, in a form of one-party system, but not completely oppress all societal actors.

under structural adjustment, than that of Botswana, although there was a fundamental contradiction between "one-party" and "democracy."[4]


Figure 6-1 Regime Variants: Zambia and Botswana in Comparison

Zambia and Botswana may be added into the figure 1-1 as shown in figure 6-1, which shows as follows:

Zambia under UNIP control was less competitive, but becoming more participatory towards the end of the one-party era, a political

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[4]In this case, democracy contains at least competition among political parties.

regime, which was closer to "inclusionary authoritarianism" than Botswana. The latter was a more competitive, but less participatory political regime, closer to "exclusionary democracy."[5] In the Third Republic, when the multi-party system was reintroduced, Zambia become closer to "inclusionary democracy,"[6] although the newly introduced political regime has not yet consolidated[7].

6.2.2 Civil Society in the Period of the Political Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Hopes and Problems to Achieve Equilibrium[8] of Power between the State and Civil Society

In the current tide of democratisation in Africa, civil society has been occasionally recognised to have emerged *as an opponent against* [9]the "failed" state. As observed in the case of Zambia, the period of political transition or re-ordering (of "crisis") offers an opportunity for actors not only to emerge at odds with the state but also to develop networks to cope with newly forming political realities. This movement occasionally crystalised into the reintroduction of "political society," namely, multi-party competition, in the democratic "transition phase." Therefore, it is partially true that civil society has functioned to establish new rules of the game between the state and actors in civil society in this phase. In this sense, AOs, including trade unions and Christian churches, have been

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[5]This characterisation of Botswana polity is consistent with Good's recent definition of "authoritarian liberalism," focusing on the institutional aspects of the Botswana state (Good, 1996a).

[6]See, Dryzek, 1996, for one of the most recent theoretical reflections on "political inclusion" as democratisation.

[7]The arrows with a dotted line in figure 6-1 suggest the unstable and changeable nature of "unconsolidated" political regimes in Africa in the era of "democratisation."

[8]The concept of equilibrium is not necessarily new in democratic theories. However, this concept has been usually used in the pluralism to refer to balanced relations among a variety of interests(see, Held, 1987, chapter 6). In this study, this concept means balanced and tense relations between the state and civil society.

[9]See fn. 7 in chapter 1 on recent arguments on the concept of civil society in terms of "opposition" to the state.

engaged in "norm-setting functions," which are among the most important roles which actors in civil society are supposed to play. In this phase, the norm is supposed to re-introduce multi-party politics so as to tackle political stalemates and economic deterioration under the UNIP rule. This imperative came from the position of *de facto* opposition in the second Republic. In the case of Christian churches, their role in the debate against the introduction of scientific socialism was also considered to be a part of this function to "check" the state. They continued to keep their concerns on a variety of political and socio-economic issues, as detailed in chapter 4. In addition, the role of the PPAZ in the UNIP's change from pro-natalism to anti-natalism was another example of the function of AOs.

Considering these examples of AOs' "norm-setting function" in Zambia, it seems that favourable conditions on the side of civil society for the consolidation of democracy have been in preparation. However, as argued in chapter 1, the development of civil society is a necessary but not sufficient condition for stable democracy. The state also should be *r*eformed to be more accountable and less corrupt, so as to achieve power equilibrium between the state and civil society. Also, the tendency of the state towards a monopolisation of power must be relaxed to some extent in favour of AOs. In other words, more participatory opportunities and channels must be gradually institutionalised. Furthermore, civil society must be "democratised." In other words, "civility"[10] is to be gained for democratic consolidation.

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[10]Concerning the issue of "civility" of society in Botswana, du Toit recently argued that Botswana society is *strong* because it has been free of looting, civil violence and social decay. He argued that this strength has been established by the presence of the institutional rules of tradition, which socially control Tswana custom and law (1995: 153-163). However, it was unfortunate that a civil unrest happened in February 1995 in Gaborone (see, Goods, 1996b), which marred his argument. Therefore, it is possible to argue that "civility" of Botswana society remains to be formed in the precess of democratisation, which supports the thesis of relatively underdeveloped civil society in Botswana.

It is in this context that embryonic efforts of self-help in rural areas and NSDAOs' impacts on their target groups should be considered. As analysed in chapter 3, there are a variety of efforts of the state in both countries to control rural areas by organising them in a clientelist manner by providing patronage and acquiring political support. Local branches of the dominant party are also commonly used as providing patronage and controlling rural areas as observed in the cases of UNIP in Zambia and the BDP in Botswana. As a result, organising efforts came not from "above" but from "below," which has sustained clientelism and has prevented "citizenship." As a result, the democratisation process has been more delayed in rural areas, resulting in "partial democratisation."[11] In this situation, several groups with relatively strong leaderships have come out to solve their problems, which will be potentially good signs for "rural democratisation" in the long run.

It is also necessary to point out that NSDAOs, which situated themselves in "intermediary positions," have not necessarily positively contributed to empowerment, but also impede rural democratisation when they are not well represented by target communities and when they are not aware of their impacts on "micro-level" social structure. This finding in chapter 5 challenges the simple assumption that NGOs in civil society are synonymous with democratic forces.

Therefore, the introduction of multi-party system instead of a one-party system in the name of democratisation may be a step forward to democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa in the sense of reintroduction of competition in a political regime, but, it does not

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[11] I owed this point to Professor Lionel Cliffe.

necessarily guarantee a stable democratic transition and consolidation[12] in Africa, which has already become a big problem in more recent days.

6.2.3 An Evaluation of the Applicability of the Concept Civil of Society in the Period of Democratisation

As used in this study, the concept of civil society, which does not necessarily contain the element of "opposition," offers us a useful analytical point of view to consider the phenomenon of democratisation in Africa at various levels, especially to consider and to analyse AOs and their relations to the state and their roles in democratisation. Especially in the era when so called NGOs, as alternative societal actors, have been paid attention to not only internally but also externally and internationally, the perspective from civil society is undoubtedly important.

I oppose the abuse of the concept as a slogan or just words without any clear content. My stance is, as clarified in the first chapter, that this concept must be given clearer content that is applicable for analysis, if this term is to be used in any analytical projects. Only by refraining from the abuse of the concept, can analysts produce more useful analytical results.

This study is one project in the pursuit of obtaining academically useful insights from the concept of civil society, as applied to the cases of Zambia and Botswana.

The attempt for civil society to be more democratised is still under way. This process as well as reform of the state will be inevitable for African countries to achieve their long journey to stable democratic political regimes.

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[12]Recent troubles in Zambia in the Third Republic seems to be mainly derived from the failure of the reform of the state, which is one of the essential components of democratic consolidation.

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APPENDIX
Oral Sources: List of Interviewees

ZAMBIA

<Political Parties>

MMD
MMD Secretariat, Mr. Mwela, 28 January 1992.
MMD Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Chitala, 3 February, 1992.
UNIP
Director of the Research Bureau, Dr. Ngwisha, 27 January, 1992.
Research Bureau, Officer of Women's Affairs, 27 January, 1992.

<Government>

National Commission for Development Planning. WID Department. Mrs. Mutale, 4 February, 1992.
Dept. of Marketing & Cooperative. Food Security Division. Mr. Mundia, 4 January 1992.
Ministry of Home Affairs, Registrar of Societies. Mr. Musonda, 22 January 1992.

<Churches>

Christian Council of Zambia.
Acting General Secretary, Mr. Nkonga, 9 December, 1991.
Women's Development Division, Nellah Sinoya, 4 December, 1991.
Refugee and Relief Division, Mr. Simposya, 16 December, 1991.
Evangerical Fellowship of Zambia.
General Secretary. Rev. Imakando, 21 January, 1992
E.S.D. Coordinator. Mr. Sialwiindi, 9 January, 1992.
Zambia Episcopal Conference.
Acting General Secretary and Secretary for Social Problems, Fr. Calmettes, 30 January, 1992.
Secretary for Development, Mr. Muzeta, 30 January, 1992.

<IAOs>
Law Association of Zambia. Executive Secretary, Mrs. Mulwila, Mr. Lwatula, 21 January 1992.
Pharmaceutical Society of Zambia. Director, Mr. Mmembe, 24 January, 1992.
Press Association of Zambia. Mr. Phiri, 21 January, 1992.
ZEMCC (Zambia Election Monitoring Coordinating Committee)
(ZEMCC is currently **FODEP**, Foundation for Democratic Process)
Chairman, Rev. Foston Sakala, 22 December, 1991.
Secretary, Rev. J. Imakando, 21 January, 1992.
Secretariat, Mr. M. H. Nkwilinba, 10 January, 1992.
ZCTU Lusaka Office. Mr. Mulenga, Mr. Chisala, 12 February, 1992.

<Press>

Weekly Post. Acting Editor, Mr. J. Mwiinga, 18 December, 1991.

<DAOs>
Human Settlement of Zambia. Director, Mr. Jere, Project Coordinator, Mr. Musowe, 21 January, 1992.
Family Life Movement of Zambia. Director, Fr. Cremins, Programme Officer Mr. Muchindu, Family Life education Secretary. Mrs. Mvula, 21, January, 1992.
NGO Coordinating Committee. Executive Secretary. Mrs. Makasa, 4 December, 1991.
Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia. Director of Programmes, Mrs. Manda, Programme Officer, Mrs. Zambezi, 5 February, 1992.
Self-Help Development. Programme Coordinator, Mr. Banda, 6 January, 1992.
Village Industry Service. Mr. R. Mushanga, 29 January, 1992.
YWCA. National Programme Coordinator. Mrs. Liswaniso, 20 January, 1992.
Zambia Association for Research and Development. Chairperson, 11 January, 1992.
Zambia Council for Social Development. Executive Secretary. Mr. Munsanje, 11 December, 1991.
Zambia Pre-school Association. Programme Officer, Mrs. Mumba, 22 December, 1992.
Zambia Red Cross Society. Administrative Officer, Mr. Situmbeko, 20 January, 1992.

Cooperatives
Zambia Cooperative Federation, Development Service Division, General Manager, Mr. Chabala, 24 December, 1991.

BOTSWANA

<Political Parties>

Botswana Democratic Party, Deputy Executive Secretary. Mr. Modipane, 28 April, 1992.

<Government>

Ministry of Health. Family Health Division, 26 March, 1992.
Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs.
Registrar of Societies, 14 March, 1992.
Undersecretary for Cultural Affairs, Women's Affairs & Youth Division, 11 May, 1992

Ministry of Education, BRIDEC. Deputy Principle, Mr. Nkile, 27 April, 1992.

Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing. Undersecretary for Rural Development, 5 May, 1992.

Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. Rural Development Unit, Ms. Anderson, 12 May, 1992

Ministry of Agriculture.

Several Officials responsible to Financial Assistance to farmers, 10 May, 1992

Several officials of Dept. of Cooperative Development, 20 May, 1992

<Churches>

Botswana Christian Council. General Secretary, Mr. Gape, Deputy G.S., Rev. Sommerfeldt, 18 March, 1992.

<IAOs>

Botswana Confederation of Commerce Industry & Manpower. Public Relations Officer, Ms. Sebonego, 4 May, 1992.

Botswana Federation of Trade Unions. Executive Secretary, Mr. Mazunga.

Emang Basadi. Chairperson. Mrs. Setswaero, 8 April, 1992.

<Press>

Mmegi. Editor, Mr. T. Mbuya 20 March, 1992.

<DAOs>

Botswana Family Welfare Association. Consultant, William Sampson, 24 March, 1992.

Botswana Red Cross Society. Public Relation Officer, 26 March, 1992.

Cooperation for Research, Development and Education. Research & Project Officer. Pennie Hamer, 19 March, 1992.

Child to Child Foundation. Coordinator, 12 April, 1992.

Forestry Association of Zambia. Officers, 25 March, 1992 ;Director, Mr. Van Oostveen, Education Officer, 5 May, 1992.

Fcrum on Sustainable Agriculture. Coordinating Secretary, Mr. Kashweeka, 9 April, 1992.

Foundation for Education with Production. Mr. T. van Rensberg, 6 May, 1992.

Kalahari Conservation Society. Chief Executive Officer, Mrs. Patterson, Conservation Officer, Mr. Pilane, 18 March, 1992.

Rural Industries Promotions. General Manager. Mr. Inger, 28 April, 1992.

Rural Industry Innovation Centre. Information Officer, Mr. Jacobs, 30 April, 1992.

Southern Rural Development Association. Executive Secretary 7 May, 1992.

Thusano Lefatsheng. General Manager, Francis Johnstone, 12 April, 1994.

Brigades

Kanye Brigade Development Trust. Coordinator, Mrs. Keoepile, 30 April, 1992.

Kweneng Rural Development Association. Deputy General Manager, Mr. Masunga, M.B.B. Manager, Mr. Lebure, 8 May, 1992.

Serowe Brigade Development Trust. General Manager, Mr. Sesinyi, 29 April, 1992.