



The
University
Of
Sheffield.

**Builders of Communism, ‘Defective’ Children, and
Social Orphans:
Soviet Children in Care after 1953**

By:

Mirjam Galley

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Sheffield
Faculty of Art and Humanities
Department of History

April 2019

Contents

List of figures.....	5
Abstract	6
Acknowledgements.....	7
Introduction.....	9
Soviet residential childcare in context	13
Politics, science, and power in residential care: theoretical implications.....	20
Source material and methodology.....	23
Chapter breakdown.....	25
1. Policing Deviance: The logic behind Soviet residential childcare.....	29
Families, poverty, and social problems: children’s ways into care.....	34
The reluctant rehabilitation of the family in the face of social breakdown.....	36
Disavowing social problems, blaming families.....	39
From poverty into residential care	43
Child Removal as a Mechanism of Policing Deviance.....	47
Societal organizations (obshchestvennost’) as co-parents?.....	48
The Commissions for the Affairs of Minors: between support and punishment.....	51
Notions of deviance, stereotype, and stigma in dealing with Soviet youth.....	58
Conclusion.....	63
2. Raising healthy, happy, and useful citizens: The theory of Soviet state childcare.....	67
Socialist tradition and Stalinist legacy: collectivism, discipline, and control in education before the 1958 Reform	68
The collective between inclusion and exclusion: children as a resource for the state	73
The rezhim: organization or over-regimentation?.....	77
Reforming Residential Childcare.....	82
An ambitious but rocky start: the 1958 Reform.....	83
The ambivalent role of labour in education.....	86
Improving residential childcare between ideology and pragmatism.....	93
The scientific groundwork of residential childcare.....	97
Classifying children in care: a rational framework?.....	98
Scientific or political project: the dual legacy of ‘Defectology’	103

Disability: the medicalization of the child in care	106
Challenging the Residential Childcare System.....	112
Conclusion.....	118
3. Managing residential childcare: Marginalizing the marginalized.....	122
Managing and marginalizing the system of residential childcare.....	124
Residential childcare staff: a high work load in poor working conditions	126
Variations in material conditions.....	137
Factors of change: the impact of inspections, personal dedication, and political pressures	150
The impact of inspections and the system’s potential to improve	152
The personal factor: agency, dedication, neglect, and abuse	158
‘Access to the outside world is closed’: Conscious isolation, bureaucratic inertia, or neglect?	167
Conclusion.....	178
4. Life in care as a way of life? Children’s experiences, ‘barracks’ life, and difficult transitions	181
An ‘institutional life’ with distinct social rules and structures.....	184
Adapting to life in care and coping mechanisms	184
Kazennaia zhizn’ – barracks life	191
Affection, Power, and Punishment.....	195
Social structures, the institution, and criminal culture.....	202
Leaving the institution: disculturation and stigma.....	209
Transition and trauma	210
Future lives in socialism?	214
‘Incubator kids’ – the stigma of residential care in society	221
A different way to grow up?.....	225
Conclusion.....	229
Conclusion	231
Bibliography.....	236
Primary Sources	236
Archives and Collections	236
Interview Transcripts	236
Newspapers.....	237
Published sources.....	237
Secondary Sources.....	241

List of figures

- 1.1 Children's home and boarding school population in the USSR, 1974 (p. 31)
- 1.2 Children in residential care in the USSR, 1990 (p. 32)
- 2.1 Rough overview of the network of residential childcare institutions in the USSR with regard to administrative responsibility (p. 71)
- 2.2 Exemplary daily rezhim for a children's home (p. 78)

Abstract

This thesis investigates Soviet residential childcare in its political, ideological, and social context, as well as the impact of life in institutions on children in care. It depicts the Soviet effort to raise children from the margins of society close to socialist values. This effort needs to be considered in the context of Nikita Khrushchev's relaunching of the Soviet socialist project after the death of Stalin. Residential childcare institutions were part of the leadership's policies against deviance from the socialist norm. In the Soviet context, deviant meant being unwilling or unable to perform useful work for the state. These policies thus targeted children whose parents could not or did not take care of them, as well as children with disabilities, but affected children from socially marginal and poor families disproportionately. The increasing involvement of the sciences in social policy led to a shift from a criminalization to a pathologization of deviance.

This thesis shows that the Soviet administration ran residential childcare institutions at a low priority. The authorities only intervened in individual cases in very specific circumstances, especially if the boundary between institution and outside world broke down. This conscious isolation of children in care brought about the formation of particular social structures in residential institutions. Children thus had to go through a process of adaptation to cope with life in care, and a similar process once they left the institutions. This was not only true for children from particularly 'bad' institutions, whose emotional scars from neglect or abuse made any kind of life difficult. It was also the case for children from homes and boarding schools which were working as the state had intended. More often than not, former children in care struggled to cope with life on their own, and with the realities of Soviet life.

Word count: 79,808

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to my supervisors, Miriam Dobson, for her invaluable advice, support, and patience with figuring out what I am trying to say, as well as Dina Gusejnova, Julia Moses, and Andrew Tompkins for their help, ideas, and corrections. Without them, I never would have gotten close to submitting. This research also would have been impossible without generous funding and encouragement by the Wolfson Foundation, as well as the supportive network provided by the White Rose College of the Arts and Humanities. I am also grateful to everyone in the archives of Moscow, Cheliabinsk, Ekaterinburg, and (especially) Riga for their openness and help with providing me with the material I needed, as well as for their patience with my Russian speaking skills.

I would like to thank my fellow PhD students at the Sheffield University History Department for their support and friendship, especially Hannah for being a wonderful co-Soviet-geek and for ping pong; and Sabine for always being game and hosting me over and over again; but also Liam and Joel for being amazing desk mates; Apurba, Imen, Liz, Steph, Gareth, Hanna, Harry, Aaron for being as lovely, fun, and helpful as you are. Thanks also go to my extended Sheffield gang from all over the world (you know who you are!) for sharing these wonderful, if sometimes strenuous, years with me; to SingSoc, for the music; and to this magical city for its hills, pubs, and folk music.

I would also like to send some thanks home to Germany, to all the people who supported me in my academic work, such as Malte Rolf, Robert Kindler, and Christian Teichmann, for helping me develop this project; and Bota Kassymbekova, Felix Schnell, and Katharina Schmitten for reading my work and for being amazing. Regards and thanks go to my Berlin friends and family for always supporting me and for providing distractions whenever necessary, especially Pita, Susi, Laetitia(s), Joe, Ganga, and my wonderful grandparents. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my parents, Susanne and Jens, for their unconditional love and support, and for never asking when I will finally submit. Thank you also, Charlie, for being my rock and the best cat anyone could ever wish for. I love you all.

Introduction

In 1984, the Soviet children's rights activist Al'bert Likhanov wrote a letter to the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Konstantin Chernenko, campaigning for a radical reform of the residential childcare system. Chernenko forwarded this letter to the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (*Sovmin*), Geidar Aliiev. In his note to Aliiev, he urges him to have the 'very important and painful issue of the children's homes' discussed in the *Sovmin* or Central Committee, adding in brackets: 'I think it is just a forgotten question'.¹ In the USSR, a happy childhood was not considered a family matter but rather a political issue in which the state was heavily invested. It thus seems surprising that a large group of children (those in residential childcare institutions) could simply be 'forgotten' by the Soviet leadership – and all the more so given the principles and rhetoric which originally shaped the formation of the residential childcare institutions, and especially the celebratory tone which accompanied Nikita Khrushchev's reforms to the childcare network in the 1950s.

The 1958 education reform set up a network of boarding schools to complement (and partly replace) the existing children's homes and reform colonies for underage delinquents, and to restructure the Soviet school system, which had been strained by war and lack of political attention under Stalin. The changes caused by this reform as well as the ongoing specialization of institutions for children with disabilities created an increasingly complex and fragmented network of residential childcare institutions. Traditionally, the children's home network had been subdivided into baby homes (*doma rebenka*), pre-school homes (*doshkol'nye detdoma*) and children's homes for school children (*shkol'nye detdoma*), and children passed from one to the other at the ages of four and seven.² Boys and girls were mixed in these institutions – albeit in separate dorms –, and although there are no general statistics, numbers from individual institutions suggest that there tended to be a slight majority of boys in residential childcare.³

¹ GARF, f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 1-14 (1983-85).

² Elena Khlinovskaya Rockhill, *Lost to the State: Family Discontinuity, Social Orphanhood and Residential Care in the Russian Far East* (New York, 2010), pp. 74-78.

³ GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 25-54 (1959); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, del. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-26 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 20-23, 24-30, 32 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 19-25 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 21-30 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, del. 2123, ll. 1-18 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971).

The *shkol'nye detdoma* were supposed to be replaced by general boarding schools after the reform, but this process was never completed.⁴ The difference between children's homes and boarding schools was mainly the type of schooling and financing: in contrast to boarding schools, children's homes did not have their own school on the premises and thus the children went to one of the local schools, together with 'family children'. And while children's homes offered full tuition for their 'inmates', boarding schools generally claimed tuition from the children's parents (if applicable). For that reason, children's homes were supposed to be only for children who did not have parents to care for them.⁵ Penal and rehabilitation institutions were a second category of residential childcare institutions. Children got sent or convicted to boarding schools for 'difficult children' and educational or labour colonies (DVK or DTK) for a few months or years only. Colonies were the only institutions that separated its underage inmates by gender, the overwhelming majority of which being for boys.⁶

Parallel to these institutions, there was a network of institutions for children with both physical and intellectual disabilities and illnesses, which became increasingly specialized throughout the decades.⁷ For instance, there were residential institutions for deaf children, for those with hearing impairments, for blind children, children with vision impairments, for the heavily speech impaired, for children with tuberculosis, nerve or mobility issues, epilepsy, polio, and cerebral palsy.⁸ In addition to those institutions, there were boarding schools and children's homes for children with intellectual disabilities, across which children were not classified according to the type of disability but according to its 'severity'. As this thesis will show, this mirrored the Soviet ideological focus on labour productivity. In accordance with this utilitarian logic, children with severe disabilities, that is whom the authorities did not expect to be able

⁴ Kelly, Catriona, *Children's World: Growing up in Russia 1890-1991* (New Haven, 2006), pp. 260-63; V.N. Zanozina, E.M. Kolosova (et al.), *Sirotstvo i bezprizornost' v Rossii: Istorii i sovremennost'* (St. Petersburg, 2008), pp. 136-37.

⁵ Zanozina and Kolosova (eds), *Sirotstvo i bezprizornost'*, pp. 140-41; GARF, f. R5446, op. 109, d. 1079, l. 5-6 (1974).

⁶ Kelly, *Children's World*, p. 272; GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 7-8 (1960-61).

⁷ Kelly, *Children's World*, pp. 258-60, 272; Zanozina and Kolosova (eds), *Sirotstvo i bezprizornost'*, p. 146.

⁸ GARF, f. A259, op. 46, d. 5706, ll. 26-30, 116-19 (1975-81). This thesis will address institutions for the deaf and blind (and deaf-blind) only in passing because, being less stigmatized and marginalized thanks to the fairly well-organized blind and deaf communities in the Soviet Union, their situation tended to differ in comparison to the large group of children without parental care and with intellectual and more severe disabilities, all of which carried heavy stigma in Soviet society. See Sarah Phillips, "There Are No Invalids in the USSR!" A Missing Soviet Chapter in the New Disability History', *Disability Studies Quarterly* 29.3 (2009), <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/936/1111> (accessed 26.02.2019); Claire Shaw, *Deaf in the USSR: Marginality, Community, and Soviet Identity, 1917-1991* (Ithaca, 2017); Susan Burch, 'Transcending Revolutions: The Tsars, the Soviets and Deaf Culture', *Journal of Social History* 34.2 (2000), pp. 393-401; Kirill Maslov, 'The Lives of the Blind in a Historical Whirlpool: Russian and Soviet Research Traditions Reconsidered', *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology* 48.5 (2010), pp. 36-97.

to perform ‘useful’ labour for them, would end up in care homes (together with elderly people) from their teenage years onwards.⁹

While this network of residential childcare institutions may appear to be very diverse and fragmented, the boundaries between the different types of children’s homes, boarding schools, and colonies were in fact quite fluid, as transfers could both be common and submitted to great contingency, as will be demonstrated. This gives reason for considering the institutions listed here together: the theory and practice of Soviet residential childcare diverged substantially, weakening the clear-cut definitions of which children should be in which institutions. This perspective allows to disclose that children who were most likely to end up in any of these institutions all came from a similar social background: the urban lower classes.

In the advent of Khrushchev’s 1958 education reform, the minister in charge explained that the reform was to ‘reinforce the role of the state in children’s education’,¹⁰ and the authorities claimed their goal to raise ‘the most active builders of communism’¹¹ in those institutions. As isolated and ‘easy to forget’ children in institutions may have been, the issue of residential childcare in fact played a crucial role in several fields of politics central to the Soviet leadership. In addition to the connection to education reform, such institutions were an important part of the Khrushchevian relaunch of Soviet governance, a way to police deviance, monitor people’s behaviour, and raise the next generations as loyal to the Soviet cause without resorting to Stalin-era terror. And yet, despite diverse and high aims, residential childcare was systematically underfunded and neglected by the authorities, and the upbringing offered in them provided insufficient preparation for an independent and productive life in Soviet society. These aspects have been addressed in scholarly literature, although often in isolation from each other. This thesis will offer a combined approach to Soviet residential childcare and explain how the high aims and relatively low official investment were not as paradoxical as they might look at first sight. It will also explore how staff and children tried to make do in the children’s homes, boarding schools, and colonies, and how that upbringing impacted their future lives.

Traditionally, the relatively long period ‘from Khrushchev to Gorbachev’ has been categorized into different leaderships, and each temporal segment analyzed separately according to phases

⁹ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 4244: Ob organizatsii domov invalidov, dlia prestarelykh i dlia umstvenno otstalykh detei v sistemakh Ministerstva sotsial’nogo obespecheniia RSFSR (1959) [about the organization of ‘invalids’ homes’ for the elderly and mentally retarded children in the system of the RSFSR ministry of social welfare].

¹⁰ N.D. Kaz’min (ed.), *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie po shkalam-internatam (19-23 aprelia 1957 g.): stenograficheski otchet* (Moscow, 1958), p. 13.

¹¹ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, l. 81 (1962); similarly Minister of Education Afansenko in 1957, see Kaz’min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, p. 12.

defined by political history.¹² However, in terms of the social history of how childhood in- and outside of residential care changed, it makes sense to consider the period between 1956 and 1985 as one. In recent years, several scholars have argued in favour of looking for continuity rather than radical ruptures. Alexei Yurchak, for instance, suggested examining the period from Stalin's death to the demise of the USSR as 'Late Socialism'.¹³ In *Shadow of War*, Stephen Lovell argued that looking at these times where 'nothing happens' (meaning no disruptive, catastrophic events like war or revolution) is more helpful to understand the Soviet Union, its collapse, and Russia today.¹⁴ Indeed, Soviet child welfare has been studied most in instances of crisis and catastrophe, such as the periods of revolution, civil war, famine, Stalinist terror, the Second World War or the collapse of the Union.¹⁵ But, following Lovell's argument, to assess the underlying political project that formed the Soviet child welfare system and its outcome, it is useful to look at a period of 'normalization'¹⁶, in between crises, namely the years from Stalin's death to Perestroika.

Research about this period of normalization, especially the Brezhnev period, has just begun to flourish in recent years. Most scholars in this strand have engaged with the stereotype of the Brezhnev era as a period of 'stagnation' (*zastoi*), initially a term used by the Gorbachev administration to denounce its predecessors. This is why work on this period tends to focus on dynamics and developments within the Soviet society of the late 1960s and 1970s, which are then contrasted with the accepted view of a much less dynamic political system run by an ageing and inert leadership.¹⁷ This study will instead work from the hypothesis that the Soviet system of children's homes and boarding schools retained some continuities from the period of Khrushchev's reforms to the collapse of the Soviet Union, whilst the rest of Soviet society changed more significantly over the same period. That is why this study begins with

¹² See for instance Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith (eds), *Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in the Soviet Union 1953-1964* (London/New York, 2011); Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (eds), *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (Basingstoke, 2002).

¹³ Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton, 2006), pp. 4, 31.

¹⁴ Stephen Lovell, *Shadow of War: Russia and the USSR, 1941 to the Present* (Chichester, 2010), pp. 13-17.

¹⁵ The post-war years were studied by Rachel Faircloth Green, Olga Kucherenko, and Mariia Zezina, the post-Soviet years by Svetlana Stephenson and Elena Khlinovskaya Rockhill. See Rachel Faircloth Green, *'There Will not be Orphans Among us': Soviet Orphanages, Foster Care, and Adoption, 1941-1956* (The University of Chicago: PhD Thesis, 2006); Olga Kucherenko, *Soviet Street Children and the Second World War: Welfare and Social Control under Stalin* (London, 2016); Mariia Zezina, 'Without a Family: Orphans of the Postwar Period', *Russian Studies in History* 48.4 (2010), pp. 59-73; Svetlana Stephenson, 'Street Children in Moscow: Using and Creating Social Capital', *The Sociological Review* 49.4 (2001), pp.530-47; Khlinovskaya Rockhill, *Lost to the State*.

¹⁶ This is Lovell's term, see Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 16.

¹⁷ See for example: Natalia Charnyshova, *Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era* (New York, 2013); Neringa Klumbyte and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova (eds), *Soviet Society in the Era of Late Socialism 1964-1984* (Lanham, 2014); Robert Hornsby, 'Soviet Society after Stalin', *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 41 (2014), pp. 325-34; Lovell, *Shadow of War*.

Khrushchev's reforms in the education system, especially his boarding school programme, as these shaped the residential childcare network into its 'post-Stalinist' form; and follows its development throughout the decades of 'Late Socialism' into the years of Perestroika and Glasnost'. It thus seeks to make a contribution to post-Stalinist Soviet social history, particularly to the research focusing on marginalized groups.

Soviet residential childcare in context

The period of the so-called 'Khrushchev Thaw' or de-Stalinization has been studied extensively by scholars over the past 20 years. His reforms were meant to change society, to break with Stalinism, and to facilitate the transition to Communism. How these changes were introduced by Khrushchev and adapted by his successors has mainly been studied from two perspectives. One tends to focus on the 'de-Stalinization' aspect, the improvement of living standards and social welfare. In this perspective, scholars have studied the revival of partly voluntary networks of social support ('public' or societal organizations such as Housing Committees, Comrades' Courts, Neighbourhood Brigades)¹⁸ as an attempt to transfer certain governance tasks to society. The first scholar to suggest such a change in the relationship between state and society, Vladimir Shlapentokh, claimed that the end of terror enabled people to retire 'into the private realm'. However, he interpreted this 'retreat' as a loss of state authority to which people reacted by losing interest in political life and went on to using state agencies only for their benefit. His views have been widely criticized as oversimplifying de-Stalinization.¹⁹

Since Shlapentokh's study, different scholars have studied the newly reinforced societal organizations extensively and adopted a more nuanced view of this development. Susan Reid, while also emphasizing the popular participation and negotiation with state representatives that de-Stalinization made possible, did not subscribe to Shlapentokh's 'privatization' of Soviet life. In her view, especially those agencies which literally entered people's homes had a way of intervening in people's private lives and of monitoring popular opinions. Victor Buchli has

¹⁸ See Victor Buchli, *An Archaeology of Socialism* (Oxford, 1999); Deborah Field, *Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev's Russia* (New York, 2007); Steven Harris, *Communism on tomorrow street: mass housing and everyday life after Stalin* (Washington, 2012); Lovell, *Shadow of War*; Susan Reid, 'Building Utopia in the Back Yard: Housing Administration, Participatory Government and the Cultivation of Socialist Community', in Karl Schlögel (ed.), *Mastering Russian Spaces: Raum und Raumbewältigung als Probleme der russischen Geschichte* (München, 2011), pp. 149-86; Mark Smith, *Property of Communists: The Urban Housing Program from Stalin to Khrushchev* (DeKalb, 2010); Elena Zhidova, 'Family, Divorce, and Comrades' Courts: Soviet Family and Public Organizations During the Thaw', in Carlböck, Gradska and Kravchenko (eds), *And They Lived Happily Ever After: Norms and Practices of Family and Parenthood in Russia and Central Europe* (Budapest, 2012), pp. 47-64.

¹⁹ Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia* (New York, 1989), pp. 153-56; Miriam Dobson, 'The Post-Stalin Era: De-Stalinization, Daily Life, and Dissent', *Kritika* 12.4 (2011), pp. 905-24.

pointed out a ‘reproblematization’ of people’s domestic lives, which according to him contradicts claims of ‘liberalization’ or freedom under Khrushchev. However, he did not present them in a ‘repressive’ light, but in the context of a quest for new meaning of socialism and a pursuit of principles that had been lost during Stalin’s rule.²⁰

Other scholars have approached Khrushchev’s reforms from a law and order angle, providing yet another perspective on societal organizations. Within that group, Oleg Kharkhordin emphasized mechanisms of surveillance (through those same channels of social support) more generally, claiming they led to a more encompassing (totalitarian, in a way) control than under Stalinist terror.²¹ In a more nuanced manner, Brian LaPierre and Miriam Dobson have stressed the public order dimensions of societal organizations, in particular how these networks were used to police deviance. Together with scholars such as Catriona Kelly and Victor Buchli, they convincingly showed the ways in which the Soviet state and the Party tried to shape people’s behaviour at home through surveillance, sanctions, advice literature, and housekeeping competitions. In contrast to Kharkhordin, however, they question the efficiency of these control mechanisms, and point out his failure to take into account people’s uneasiness and lack of compliance with such control mechanisms.²² This twofold view on Khrushchev’s reforms, a combination of a new social project involving popular involvement and a dimension of new forms of control, both through societal organizations, is crucial as a starting point for examining Soviet residential childcare, as the following will show.

Public order and social welfare were intertwined domains in the Soviet Union. As both Dobson and LaPierre have shown, the so-called *obshchestvennost’* played a role in identifying and ‘correcting’ deviant behaviour or removing deviant ‘elements’. Together with state and Party agencies, they were also responsible for identifying and possibly removing neglected or mistreated children. LaPierre showed in his book that these ‘societal’ strategies for monitoring behaviour were hard to control, so that they could entail anything from supporting neighbours

²⁰ Reid, ‘Building Utopia’, p. 158; Victor Buchli, ‘Khrushchev, Modernism, and the Fight against “Petit-Bourgeois” Consciousness in the Soviet Home’, *Journal of Design History* 10.2: Design, Stalin and the Thaw (1997), pp. 161-76, here p. 162. See also, especially for the discussion of the tension between the public and private realms in Soviet socialism, Lewis Siegelbaum (ed.), *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia* (New York, 2006); and, for the connection of family, housing, and societal organizations: Melanie Ilic, Susan Reid, and Lynne Attwood (eds), *Women in the Khrushchev Era* (Basingstoke, 2004).

²¹ Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices* (Berkeley, 1999), pp. 280-99.

²² Miriam Dobson, ‘The Post-Stalin Era’, p. 914; Brian LaPierre, *Hooligans in Khrushchev’s Russia: Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw* (Madison, 2012), pp. 144-50. See also: Buchli, ‘Petit-Bourgeois’ Consciousness in the Soviet Home’; Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 159; Catriona Kelly, *Refining Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from Catherine to Yeltsin* (Oxford, 2001), p. 324; Susan Reid, ‘Women in the Home’, in: Ilic, Reid and Attwood (eds): *Women in the Khrushchev Era*, p. 155.

in need to bullying people into certain behaviours.²³ The existing literature on the policing of deviance and post-Stalinist Soviet society more generally provides an excellent starting point for showing how agencies designed to impose public order and to police deviance were not only working with childcare agencies but were a significant part of the child welfare system. Such agencies ultimately transferred those groups of children into residential care which they considered to be in need of special care from the state to prevent them growing up to become deviant citizens.

Soviet residential care itself has also been the subject of research, most often in the context of studies of abandoned children in the Soviet Union. Such studies tend to focus on the aforementioned instances of crisis, when larger political, economic, and social disruptions swept hundreds of thousands of children out onto the streets. Apart from the administration of these institutions and the living conditions in them, the discussion has also revolved around the purposes of children's homes, boarding schools, and reform colonies. The most obvious purpose of the Soviet childcare system was, of course, the 'care' of children, in the sense of helping children in need. Those institutions were also supposed to raise productive workers and faithful socialist subjects for the Soviet state. Catriona Kelly, who produced the most extensive overview of the Soviet residential childcare system (and Soviet childhood in general) with her volume *Children's World*, argued that there was an ongoing tension between more indulgent and disciplinary views on childhood throughout the whole post-Stalinist USSR. According to her, the leadership failed to provide the material, emotional, and pedagogical conditions to bring up either useful citizens or 'happy children'.²⁴

In a separate strand of the literature, the purposes of Soviet residential upbringing have often been discussed in connection with the motives of the 1958 education reform. While most scholars agree with the idea that the system of residential childcare institutions was not purely based on ideological motives ('builders of communism'), they either disagree or remain largely silent on other possible purposes of that network, such as pragmatism, social welfare, or raising productive labour forces. Mariia Zezina emphasized purely pragmatic reasons for the reform: the children's homes had been in such a poor state that Khrushchev had had no choice but to build new institutions.²⁵ Many scholars have framed the boarding school project as a social welfare venture, differing only on the question of timing. Judith Harwin and Deborah Field, for instance, argued that Khrushchev had initially planned his reform to be an ideological

²³ LaPierre, *Hooligans*, pp. 152-54.

²⁴ Catriona Kelly, *Children's World: Growing up in Russia 1890-1991* (New Haven, 2006), p. 142.

²⁵ Zezina, 'Without a Family', p. 69.

education project, but that it quickly turned into a social welfare programme due to the boarding schools' unpopularity: parents who did not need state support to bring up their children preferred to raise their kids at home.²⁶ V.N. Zanozina and E.M. Kolosova considered the 1958 reform as a social welfare endeavour from the outset; they framed the boarding school programme as a measure against *beznadzornost'* (child neglect, literally 'without supervision'), and as a place for orphans, children of 'invalids', pensioners, and parents who could not take care of their children in general.²⁷

Maria Maiofis and Laurent Coumel have offered a different approach, recontextualising the 1958 reform and the resulting network of institutions in terms of the state's 'productive labour' shortages after Stalin's death. They explained how the boarding schools were supposed to train such labourers.²⁸ Maiofis speaks of an 'enservment' or 'subjugation' (*zakrepostshcheniia (ili – poraboshcheniia)*) of children through these facilities, as she conceptualized the boarding school system in terms of a social contract between leadership and parents: the state provided education and care for the children and expected their labour in return.²⁹ Other scholars have pointed out how the Soviet authorities neglected residential childcare, leaving the institutions as a means of getting unwanted children out of the public eye. Rachel Faircloth Green emphasized that the Soviet state reacted to the post-war wave of child abandonment in a similar way as it did in the 1920s: by paying enough attention to it to prevent a potentially destabilizing wave of juvenile delinquency, and relying on regional administrations to sort it out.³⁰ Svetlana Stephenson, in her study of street children in Moscow in the 1990s, argued that the problems in Soviet childcare were not solved in the years between Second World War and the collapse. Children were collected and put in institutions, parents were blamed, and underlying problems ignored.³¹

Olga Kucherenko, who studied Soviet street children during the Second World War, has offered an excellent illustration of the leadership's stance on these children at the time. She observed that while the Soviet authorities undertook measures to get children 'off the streets', they were also responsible for children ending up there in the first place, much more than they cared to admit – through their repressive campaigns against 'enemies', which at times included

²⁶ Judith Harwin, *Children of the Russian State 1917-95* (Aldershot, 1996), p. 29; Field, *Private Life*, p. 83.

²⁷ Zanozina and Kolosova (eds), *Sirotstvo i bezprizornost'*, p. 133.

²⁸ Mariia Maiofis, 'Pansiony trudovykh rezervov: formirovanie sistemy shkol-internatov v 1954-1964 godakh', *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie* 142.2 (2016), no pagination; Laurent Coumel, 'L'appareil du parti et la réforme scolaire de 1958: Un cas d'opposition à Hruscev', *Cahiers du monde russe* 47.1 (2006), pp. 173-94, here p. 173.

²⁹ Maiofis, 'Pansiony trudovykh rezervov'.

³⁰ Faircloth Green, 'There Will not be Orphans Among us', p. 15.

³¹ Stephenson, 'Street Children in Moscow', p. 530.

whole ethnic groups. However, as much as one should not overemphasize how much the state ‘cared’ about children in need, Kucherenko also cautioned against overemphasizing the leadership’s ‘sinister motives’ in targeting such children specifically with repression, violence, and forced labour.³² Such views would assume much more control and calculation than the Soviet authorities actually had at that time. Following Kucherenko, it is perhaps safe to conclude that children in care were simply not a priority for the Soviet state.

The classification and subsequent ‘distribution’ of children to different types of institutions by the Soviet state also requires engaging with research on disability in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe more generally. The first (Western) contribution to research on disability studies in the USSR was McCagg/Siegelbaum’s *The Disabled in the Soviet Union* (1989), an edited volume providing both snippets from the history of policy, research, and discourse on disability in the Soviet Union as well as the ‘present-day’ situation. It focused more on people’s everyday lives and how disability was treated as deviance (or even *dissidence*, in their terms) and vice versa.³³ The development of disability studies over the last two decades also rekindled an interest in disability in the Eastern Bloc. The volume *Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. History, Policy and Everyday Life* edited by Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova and Michael Rasell has set the standard and opened a wide spectrum of perspectives on disability. The editors drew up a theoretical framework for this ‘new’ field, describing the medicalization of disability under socialism (using Foucault’s *biopower* approach), leading to the institutionalization of ‘unproductive’ citizens and their subsequent isolation.³⁴ These insights are not only valuable with regard to studying the fate of Soviet children diagnosed with disabilities: the mechanisms of medicalization and marginalization provide useful insights to understanding the network of residential childcare more generally.

Historiography about Soviet residential childcare in late socialism tends to identify three main characteristics of these institutions: stagnation, underfunding, and diversity of experiences. Researchers from the US, UK, and Russia unanimously showed that the institutions did not fundamentally change from the post-war years until the collapse of the USSR; that generally the institutions failed to reach the standards set by the government; and that living conditions

³² Kucherenko, *Soviet Street Children*, pp. 6-7.

³³ William McCagg and Lewis Siegelbaum, *The Disabled in the Soviet Union. Past and Present, Theory and Practice* (Pittsburgh, 1989); especially: Ethel and Stephen Dunn, ‘Everyday Life of the Disabled in the USSR’, pp. 199-234; Paul Raymond, ‘Disability as Dissidence: The Action Group to Defend the Rights of the Disabled in the USSR’, pp. 235-52; Mark Field, ‘Dissidence as Disability: The Medicalization of Dissidence in Soviet Russia’, pp. 253-76.

³⁴ Michael Rasell and Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova (eds), *Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: History, Policy and Everyday Life* (London, 2014).

in individual institutions varied greatly depending on staff dedication, especially in view of bad working conditions.³⁵ In short, they have told a story of institutionalized neglect, which could only be lessened by sympathetic and dedicated people working at the grassroots level. In her study of orphans in the war- and immediate post-war years, Faircloth Green has shown how poorly trained and overwhelmed personnel tried to deal with traumatized children, causing high turnover and abuse. However, the actual behaviour of staff members varied from dedicated care to violence and neglect.³⁶ This thesis will use these insights as a starting point to examine in greater depth the Soviet leadership's mechanisms of managing and monitoring residential childcare, as well as the working conditions and attitudes of people working in that system. It will ask to which extent change took place in residential childcare, explain the leadership's political motives that led to the relative stasis in residential childcare, and shed light on how people dealt with this situation of 'institutionalized neglect'.

Scholarship has also established that many former children in care struggled with their lives in society after leaving their institution. Everyday life inside the institutions had kept them away from 'normal' life for too long and had not sufficiently prepared them for it. Harwin described the orphanage system as 'a world apart'.³⁷ In *Sirotsvo i besprizornost'*, the authors conceded that even legal changes designed to enable institution graduates to access higher education did not necessarily help because these children could hardly keep up with those educated in 'normal' schools and brought up in their families.³⁸ Elena Khlinovskaia Rockhill, whose research on child removal focused mostly on present-day Russia but also featured people's recollections of Soviet times, described how the isolation from society brought about by 'institutional life' had grave consequences for the children's lives: 'the consequences of isolation constitute one of the most pronounced problems of former residents: difficulties in understanding how the outside world functions, in social adjustment and a certain defencelessness and naïveté in dealing with social issues.'³⁹ This thesis will put these insights to the test, exploring the nature of 'institutional life' and asking whether its impact on the children's lives changed throughout Soviet history.

Catriona Kelly developed the idea of a 'specific personality type' that emerged from Soviet children's homes and boarding schools, although she has not explained what exactly this

³⁵ Kelly, *Children's World*, pp. 257-60, 284; Zanozina and Kolosova (eds), *Sirotsvo i besprizornost'*, pp. 132-33; Zezina: 'Without a Family', pp. 68-69, 71.

³⁶ Faircloth Green, 'There Will not be Orphans Among us', pp. 130-39.

³⁷ Harwin, *Children of the Russian State*, p. 49; see also Kelly, *Children's World*, pp. 270-71, 278.

³⁸ Zanozina and Kolosova (eds), *Sirotsvo i besprizornost'*, p. 132.

³⁹ Khlinovskaia Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, p. 190.

personality type entails. She also argued that while residential care was inherently static, growing up ‘outside’ changed considerably in the decades after Stalin’s death, and that children in care would thus be increasingly alienated from society, as the changes happening in society did not reach residential institutions.⁴⁰ Historiography on the post-Stalinist Soviet Union allows us to assess this claim and to evaluate these social changes, the developments shaping generations of Soviet youth growing up in the 1960s until the 1980s, and whether these could have influenced young people growing up in state institutions in the same way. Specifically, the research by Donald Raleigh and Alexei Yurchak illuminate the long-term changes in people’s everyday lives and horizons; and works by Juliane Fürst, Elena Khlinovskaia Rockhill, Olga Ledeneva, and Alexandra Oberländer provide valuable insights into conventions and unwritten rules structuring the Soviet everyday after Stalin’s death, that is the skill set that Soviet citizens needed in order to navigate in society.⁴¹ They suggest that socialist life – and childhood in socialism – did indeed change over the decades, and that the pace of social development within residential care was much slower.

Based on these strands of literature, this thesis exceeds past approaches by combining a long-term study of the Soviet residential childcare – its management as well as the experiences of people living and working in its institutions – with scholarly discussions about governance, science, and society. This will provide new insights into the purposes and motives behind residential childcare, as well as practical applications by people in charge. As isolated as Soviet children’s homes, boarding schools, and reform colonies might have been, it is important to study them in their social and political contexts, as well as children in care’s connection to society and its impact on their later lives. This thesis will go beyond the mere statement that residential childcare in the Soviet Union failed to raise the ‘builders of communism’ but will take a closer look at the uses and applications officials and staff found for these institutions, as well as what that meant for the children in question. The analysis of the theoretical underpinning of residential care, of the mechanisms linking care to society, and of the life within the homes will thus reveal the multi-functional dimension of the institutional network. Rather than ‘just’ clearing the streets from unsupervised children, the care system set out to manage deviance and criminality, marginalize the poor, and medicalize children with

⁴⁰ Kelly, *Children’s World*, pp. 270-71.

⁴¹ Juliane Fürst, *Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism* (Oxford, 2010); Khlinovskaya Rockhill, *Lost to the State*; Alena Ledeneva, *Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange* (Cambridge, 1998); Alexandra Oberländer, ‘Cushy Work, Backbreaking Leisure: Late Soviet Work Ethics Reconsidered’, *Kritika* 18.3 (2017), pp. 569-90; Donald Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia’s Cold War Generation* (Oxford, 2012); Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever*.

disabilities. This multi-functional dimension explains the strain that eventually overloaded the system, as its complexity made it virtually impossible to fulfil all of its functions.

Politics, science, and power in residential care: theoretical implications

At the heart of the connection between public order and social welfare policies lay a drive to ‘engineer’ society, to form people according to a certain norm. Deviance, or the fear of it, was thus a reason for the Soviet authorities to intervene in people’s lives. This term describes the existence of practices and ways of life which differ from a perceived norm and are therefore viewed negatively. Khlinovskaya Rockhill’s research on ‘social orphans’ in Russia touched upon the question of deviance in the Soviet and post-Soviet times. Following Durkheim, she saw deviance as a means for hegemonic power to build a community by defining a ‘good’ norm and excluding everything deviating from it.⁴² In the case of the Soviet Union, deviance was evaluated against the ‘norm’, or rather ideal, of the Soviet person. This norm was defined based on ideology (beliefs), behaviour, and also health; so that in the Soviet context, deviance could include delinquency, disability, illness, as well as diverging behaviours and belief systems. In this spirit, for instance, anti-‘hooliganism’ campaigns were closely linked to parenting and upbringing, as unsupervised and neglected (*bez nadzornye*) minors were considered to be a large percentage of present as well as future hooligans.⁴³

Explaining the link between social engineering and residential institutions, Michel Foucault named such institutions ‘the greatest support, in modern society, of the normalizing power’. According to him, this idea of engineering people began and evolved in places like prisons and reformatory schools, where staff worked as ‘technicians of behavior’. ‘Their task was to produce bodies that are both docile and capable’, he concluded.⁴⁴ To clarify the role of residential institutions in such a venture, Foucault’s conceptions of *biopower* are helpful. *Biopower* can be described as the regulation and classification of people as bodies with regard to their productivity, their work for the modernizing state.⁴⁵ According to Khlinovskaya Rockhill, the Soviet (and later Russian) child welfare system was characterized by *biopower* through ‘categorization, compartmentalization, and normalizing judgement’.⁴⁶ With the help of these

⁴² Khlinovskaya Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, p. 143.

⁴³ LaPierre, *Hooligans*, pp. 164–65.

⁴⁴ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London, 1977), pp. 294–306.

⁴⁵ Michael Rasell and Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova, ‘Conceptualizing disability in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union’, in: Iarskaia-Smirnova, Rasell (eds), *Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. History, Policy and Everyday Life* (London, 2014), pp. 1–17, here pp. 5–6.

⁴⁶ Khlinovskaya Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, p. 27.

institutions, the Soviet state classified and moved children around according to its own interest without taking the children's needs or wishes into account.⁴⁷ *Biopower* means that through disciplining, power is taken from the body by making it obedient, and that power is given to the body by making it economically useful, more often than not by putting it to work. Thus, individuals become instruments; they become submissive subjects and productive workers at the same time. This means that institutions such as prisons, mental hospitals, but also boarding schools and orphanages helped modern states both to define and try to enforce certain norms.⁴⁸

Politics involving social engineering and *biopower* tended to be legitimized by a 'scientific' and 'rational' groundwork, especially in Soviet state socialism, which already had the pretence of being both of these things in general. To study the role of science as theoretical groundwork and legitimization for a 'rational' Soviet childcare, it is helpful to consult Lutz Raphael's concept of the 'scientization of social affairs'. Raphael developed this concept in an attempt to explain the increasing importance of scientific 'experts' in modern governance.⁴⁹ Raphael described this development for Western Europe from the 19th into the 20th century, designating the involvement of the 'human sciences' (medicine, psychology, sociology, pedagogy) in policy and administration, as well as care. According to him, it began with statistics and the development of experimentation in medicine and psychology; and resulted in the formation of the welfare state. As phase two he described an upsurge in psychology and pedagogy, leading to a professionalization of carers and the classification of people they took care of.

These processes could lead to an authoritarian understanding of social welfare, when classifying and selecting people was used to police socially marginalized people, using discourses of social deviance and stigmatization. In such cases, scientific exactitude fell victim to some political mission of 'ordering' society or attempts by the scientists to legitimize their work. In Raphael's schematic representation, a phase of 'democratization' followed, meaning that the state and its experts were not merely interested in 'marginals' anymore, but in the whole of society. This connects to Foucault's processes of *biopower*, in which disciplining mechanisms would be exported from institutions into the whole of society. The final phase in Raphael's *scientization* was a certain disenchantment with scientific data, as people realized that

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 28.

⁴⁸ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 138, 304.

⁴⁹ Lutz Raphael, 'Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22 (1996), pp. 165-93.

prognoses drawn from such data did not necessarily match reality.⁵⁰ His theory has not been considered in research on Soviet residential childcare.

Whereas research on Soviet residential childcare institutions so far has considered them in the historical context of their time, it has rarely looked at these homes and schools *as* residential institutions. This thesis will consider Soviet children's homes and boarding schools in the context of theoretical research on such institutions, in particular Erving Goffman's *Asylums* and later adaptations of his ideas. According to Goffman, a wide range of institutions (like prisons, concentration camps, clinics, orphanages, and boarding schools) are structurally similar enough to put them into one category of 'total institutions'. These institutions are 'total' because of their limited contact with the outside world, and because life in them compresses all its spheres into one place: sleep, work, and leisure. Other necessary conditions are a relative restriction of movement, and a 'bureaucratic organization' of life in there, imposed from above, and following a 'rational' plan to fulfil the institution's purpose.⁵¹

This concept will be useful in exploring the Soviet residential childcare institutions as a system; developments of Goffman's theory by Christie Davies will help to also work out differences between different types of institutions (with regard to life in them). Davies both criticized and expanded Goffman's concept of the *total institution*. In his article 'Goffman's Concept of the Total Institution: Criticisms and Revisions' he called for a 'genuinely comparative model' for total institutions, arguing that different types of institutions were more different than Goffman suggested.⁵² He proposed a model of comparison using three main variables: the openness/closedness of an institution, its official purpose, and the 'dominant modes of eliciting compliance employed by the staff as perceived by the inmates'. He suggested ranking institutions on a graph using the categories open/intermediate/closed on the one hand, and task (mostly military or economic / containment / reform [make people behave according to society's norms]) on the other hand.⁵³

The thesis will have to address the question whether Goffman's concept of the 'total institution' is applicable to the case of Soviet residential childcare, or whether it is limited to 'free Western society', as Christie Davis has suggested. He argued that it only made sense in

⁵⁰ Raphael, 'Die Verwissenschaftlichung', pp. 176-79.

⁵¹ Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (London, 1991, first ed. 1961), pp. 16-17.

⁵² Christie Davies, 'Goffman's Concept of the Total Institution: Criticisms and Revisions,' *Human Studies* 12 (1989), pp. 77-95, here pp. 83-84.

⁵³ Davies, 'Goffman's Concept', p. 89.

societies in which boundaries between the areas of sleep, play, and work actually existed. According to him, it is necessary to include people's (prior) lives outside the institution into the equation, as such a total institution could even be liberating for someone who had been under great pressure in 'freedom', by their family for instance.⁵⁴ In the case of the Soviet Union, then, it is important to establish whether the difference between living in a total institution and wider Soviet society was indeed considerable enough. Some aspects of Soviet society indeed point to a more 'institutional' character of everyday life, such as *kombinat*-style organizations, in which a factory provided for housing and leisure, or societal (*obshchestvennye*) organizations which followed people from the workplace into their home and the other way around (as suggested by Kharkhordin).⁵⁵ An in-depth analysis of residential care, however, will illuminate the differences between life in care and in society, and show that Goffman's concepts are valuable to identifying social structures and mechanisms in care.

These theoretical approaches will enhance a deeper understanding of the Soviet residential childcare system and how it fit into state policies as well as social processes. With regard to the mechanisms around the institutions and their political context, the concept of *biopower* allows us to frame the Soviet authorities' approach to the children in their care. In combination with the ideas of *scientization*, it illustrates the role of science in this endeavour. Thus, this thesis can offer an explanation for the way in which this system of institutions developed, most notably the increasing focus on institutions for children with disabilities. With regard to the institutions themselves, Goffman's work on total institutions will allow us to illustrate social structures and processes inside institutions as well as their contact to the outside world. This will help understanding the life of children in care and its impact on their later lives, and to open up the analysis to comparison with total institutions in other contexts.

Source material and methodology

The following analysis is mainly based on material from Russian and Latvian archives, as well as interviews with former institution inmates and staff. The archival materials used were mostly produced by the Soviet (USSR), Russian (RSFSR), or Latvian (LSSR) government (i.e. Council of Ministers, *Sovmin*), ministerial (mostly of education), or regional administration; some also by the procuracy or Party organizations.⁵⁶ They include legal texts, or discussions thereof;

⁵⁴ Davies, 'Goffman's Concept', p. 79. To be fair, Goffman makes a similar point in his conclusion, see *Asylums*, pp. 110-11.

⁵⁵ Kharkhordin, *The Collective*, pp. 297-300.

⁵⁶ The Procuracy (*prokuratura*) was a Soviet state agency charged with supervising the adherence to Soviet law in all government bodies.

letters between different administrative agencies, levels, institution staff, or members of the public; and numerous reports of inspections of individual childcare institutions. This analysis features diverse Soviet residential childcare institutions, with regional focus on Latvia and the Russian Urals (namely Sverdlovsk and Cheliabinsk regions), as a smaller regional framework follows from the broad timeframe. The choice of Latvia as case study is also connected to practical reasons, because archive material about such institutions is particularly accessible and extensive there. In addition, examining the Latvian SSR and the RSFSR adds an interesting dimension because the Baltic states were a late ‘addition’ (annexation) to the USSR, and thus Latvian residential childcare had not been ‘Soviet’ before the Second World War.

Oral history material provides another backbone of the research. Such material gives a voice to former children in residential care, whose perspective is missing from official documentation, but also to gain an insight into how children’s home and boarding school inmates and staff coped on an everyday basis. As the scope of the project did not allow conducting interviews on top of the archival research, Catriona Kelly has made available the transcripts of interviews conducted for her own project about everyday life and childhood in Russia. The life history interviews cited here and coded ‘Oxf/Lev’ were conducted for a project sponsored by the Leverhulme Trust under grant no. F/08736/A ‘Childhood in Russia, 1890-1991: A Social and Cultural History’ (2003-2006). My thanks go to the interviewees, and to the project leader Catriona Kelly, for making this material available to me.⁵⁷

Oral history sources are personal life stories in which the interviewees try to make sense of what happened to them: they are a subjective interpretation of someone’s history. Oral history has been under scrutiny from the outset, because sources based on oral accounts were believed to be less reliable due to their subjectivity, the ‘distance’ to narrated events, and the danger of manipulation by the interviewee. These points are valid, although it seems that they are not specific to oral history but raise issues pertinent to all source material. The question, however, is less whether historians should use oral source material at all, but rather what kind of information they can provide. According to Trevor Lummis, assessing oral history entails looking at two aspects: considering how reliable the information given is, and understanding

⁵⁷ The interviews are © The University of Oxford. The coding system consists of a project identifier, place code (St Petersburg (SPb.), Moscow (M.), Perm’ (P), and Taganrog (T), and villages in Leningrad (2004) and Novgorod (2005) provinces (V)), a date code, a cassette number (PF), and a transcript page (e.g. ‘Oxf/Lev SPb-03 PF8A, p. 38’). The interviewees were Aleksandra Piir (St Petersburg), Yuliya Rybina and Ekaterina Shumilova (Moscow), Svetlana Sirotnina (Perm’), Yury Ryzhov and Lyubov’ Terekhova (Taganrog), Oksana Filicheva, Veronika Makarova, and Ekaterina Mel’nikova (village interviews), and the project co-ordinators, Professor Al’bert Baiburin and Professor Vitaly Bezrogov. For further information about the project, see www.mod-langs.ox.ac.uk/russian/childhood_and www.mod-langs.ox.ac.uk/russian/lifehistory.

how typical it is for a certain group or society.⁵⁸ Furthermore, when analysing accounts from the perspective of oral history, it is not only relevant whether a statement is true or false, but also *why* a person believes something to be true (what Alessandro Portelli has called ‘psychological truth’).⁵⁹

Working with oral history sources rests on valuing their intrinsic subjectivity instead of condemning it. According to Portelli, they do not only provide information about what people did, ‘but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did’.⁶⁰ This is linked directly to the question of what memory actually is in this context. Portelli defined memory as the ‘active process of creation of meanings’; and Alistair Thomson spoke of ‘composing’ memory.⁶¹ The interviewees, trying to make sense of what happened to them, build a specific narrative according to story-telling traditions known to them, which can take the form of a success story, a story of constant struggle, or even a tale of failure and decline. Within these, a single person’s memories add to the tradition of public memory, to their former and present selves, between which interviewees have to position themselves. In this process, people are likely to blur the boundaries between personal truth and ‘shared imagination’, such as knowledge acquired through media (newspapers, books, TV), or gained by talking to other people.⁶² In the interviews used here, interviewees also consulted photographs and sometimes documents during the interview; some asked people around them for details and information.

Chapter breakdown

This thesis aims, on the one hand, to trace a development in Soviet child welfare policies: what was the network of residential childcare designed to achieve, how did officials adapt this project to their interests and needs, and what happened in individual institutions? On the other hand, the thesis will focus on the children in question: how did the Soviet ‘institutional’ upbringing shape their lives and impact their future? To answer these questions, the analysis will include the social context of residential childcare, that is who was put in institutions and why. It will reflect on the purposes and theory of Soviet residential childcare, its management

⁵⁸ Trevor Lummis, ‘Structure and Validity in Oral Evidence’ (1983), in: Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds), *The Oral History Reader* (London, 2003, first ed. 1998), pp. 273-83, here p. 273-74.

⁵⁹ Alessandro Portelli, ‘What Makes Oral History Different’ (1991), in: Perks and Thomas (eds), *The Oral History Reader*, pp. 63-74, here p. 66-67.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 69; Alistair Thomson, ‘Anzac Memories: Putting Popular Memory Theory into Practice in Australia’, in: Perks and Thomas (eds), *The Oral History Reader*, pp. 300-10, here p. 300.

⁶² Thomson, ‘Anzac Memories’, p. 306; Portelli, ‘What Makes Oral History’, p. 66-67.

on a lower level, the living and working conditions as well as the upbringing offered there. Finally, it will examine the social structures and mechanisms in institutions and the children's post-institution lives.

The thesis will show that the Soviet state – as it had developed from the death of Stalin to the downfall of the Soviet Union – attempted to raise youths close to official ideological values and socialism but ended up raising individuals who were badly prepared for everyday life 'outside'. If children growing up in residential care integrated well into work and life in Soviet society, it seems like they did so in spite of, rather than thanks to, their institutional upbringing. Studying these institutions from the perspective of ideological or welfare purposes exclusively, one would most probably have to conclude that the state project to save the children and turn them into socialist citizens had failed. This, however, reduces a complex picture and reproduces a classic narrative in historiography about the Soviet Union, that is of high expectations cut short by reality, a trope prone to oversimplification. Instead, this thesis will look more closely, and raise new questions: did the Soviet authorities simply fail to realize their initial claims, or did they rather come up with a particular pragmatic application? And if they indeed did fail, it is important to examine what they did instead, what exactly they made of the situation and why, rather than taking the unproductive approach of simply claiming that they failed (as the narrative goes).

The first chapter will explore the social and historical roots of the residential childcare network to answer the questions of which children were put in institutions and why. For this purpose, it will place the Soviet residential childcare system in the context of Khrushchev's reforms and social order policies, especially the newly established mechanisms to monitor and control society without the recourse to direct repression and terror. The analysis will show that institutions such as children's homes, boarding schools, or reform colonies were part of the leadership's policies against deviance from the Soviet norm, and of their attempt to form well-adjusted citizens of the Soviet project. These efforts targeting children whose parents neglected, abused, or could not take care of them, and as well as children with disabilities; they thus ended up disproportionately affecting children from socially marginalized and poor families. In this way, social problems such as poverty, mostly omitted from public discourse, were not so much solved as made invisible by putting children from such families in residential care.

The second chapter will examine the political context of Soviet residential childcare to explore the concrete purposes and uses of these institutions. It will provide a new approach to the

development of the Soviet system of residential childcare institutions, bringing the theory and experts of childcare into the picture, who were supposed to realize the process of ‘normalization’ of ‘deviant’ children. It focuses on the relationship between politics, science, ideological and pedagogical concepts, as well as the agents involved, using the concepts of *biopower* and *scientization* of social matters. Soviet residential childcare appears thus as an attempt to develop a rational and scientific way to mould children into productive workers, classifying them according to their expected future productivity and training them according to the state’s needs. This becomes especially clear looking at children diagnosed with disabilities. This approach will help to assess the involvement of science in residential childcare, and show that Soviet sciences, especially those involved in the Institute of ‘Defectology’, were fighting against, as well as contributing to, the marginalization of institutionalized children by medicalizing them.

The third chapter zooms further into the management of Soviet residential childcare, looking at living and working conditions in institutions, the role and behaviour of staff, as well as mechanisms of change within the system, how problems were solved, conditions improved, and mistakes corrected. Administrative correspondence and inspection reports will give insight into the problems in residential childcare, how staff members and bureaucrats talked about them and dealt with them (if at all). This analysis will show that the Soviet administration ran residential childcare institutions at a low priority, just about keeping the institutions working and only intervening if ‘necessary’. It will examine the conditions in which change was possible in Soviet residential childcare, ranging from individual staff members’ dedication to unexpected interventions from above (often out of ulterior political motives), which led to a wide range of possible living standards in individual institutions. To explain this type of (mis)management, this chapter will look at Soviet residential childcare through the lens of Goffman’s concept of a tension or friction between the in- and outside of total institutions.

The fourth (and final) chapter focuses on the children’s experiences in residential care with regard to their personal perspectives on it, social structures in residential care, and how it affected their subsequent lives. This analysis features official documents describing how children coped with life in care, as well as interviews with former children in care about their ‘institutional’ life and their struggle to find their place in society. It will examine social structures which formed in such institutions and compare them to both life in other types of institutions (such as the army or prison) and life in ‘late socialism’ more generally. This chapter will show that children had to go through a process of adaptation to cope with life in care,

with which many struggled, and then they had to go through a similar process once they left the institutions, connected with similar difficulties. The state often seems to have been of little help in either of these processes. Finally, wherever on the spectrum of 'good' or 'bad' institutions a child in care grew up, its upbringing was unlikely to prepare them for life in Soviet society.

1.

Policing Deviance: The logic behind Soviet residential childcare

In April 1963, a Latvian factory committee contacted the Supreme Soviet about one of their co-workers. They explained that the mother of five children (aged 3-11 years old) had been abandoned by her husband, and consequently lived in difficult material conditions. According to the committee, ‘the societal organizations and the administration provide material help but cannot fully support the children’. These societal bodies had asked for the children to be put into a home six months earlier, but nothing had happened. The committee thus appealed to a higher level to resolve the situation.¹ Following this appeal, the Latvian Ministry of Education took over and informed the Latvian Council of Ministers that the children should be sent to different institutions according to their respective ages. The document concluded that ‘the citizen [name of the mother] has been notified of this’.² Various authorities thus decided the fate of a woman’s children completely over her head, although they neither blamed her for anything nor mentioned her doing anything wrong.

This case raises several questions: why did the factory committee intervene in their co-worker’s private life, and why did societal organizations feel responsible for her situation? Why did they not consult the mother, and instead sought the state’s support to take her children into residential care instead? And finally, why did it take so long for something to happen? This chapter will provide answers to these questions by examining the role of residential childcare in the Soviet Union, starting from the 1950s’ education reform which set up the network of boarding schools charged with reinforcing the role of the state in education. It will argue that the Soviet children’s homes, boarding schools, and reform colonies were in many ways meant as a response to social issues such as poverty, alcoholism, neglect, unemployment, and domestic violence. These efforts can be understood as part of a more comprehensive attempt by the Soviet leadership to fight deviance in the quest for the new socialist person. This chapter will show that the residential childcare system was a crucial part of Soviet social engineering,

¹ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 1982, ll. 19 (1963).

² LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 1982, ll. 21 (1963).


by signalling to families which forms of behaviour were deviant and by putting significant pressure on parents, threatening them with the loss of their children.

The residential childcare population reflected these policies: the majority of children in care were not orphans, but children who came into care because of social issues, or because they were diagnosed with disabilities. This chapter will focus on the former case, whilst the next chapter will examine the latter. Coherent numbers on children in care, like many statistics on (especially the margins of) Soviet society, are difficult to come by. During the research for this thesis, data on the residential childcare population from the years of 1974 and 1990 has surfaced (see figs 1-3). The 1974 data shows that children's homes (fig. 1) and boarding schools (fig. 2) existed side by side, as parallel structures, although the 1958 reform had declared the intention to replace the former by the latter. The data from 1990 (fig. 3) comprises both types of institutions. It seems that all three statistics exclude colonies for underage delinquents. As unreliable as these numbers may be in detail, they show quite clearly that the number of children in care did not change dramatically (being just below and just above one percent of the underage Soviet population, respectively).³ The percentage of orphans, that is children with no living parents, also remained constant at about ten percent, whilst the overwhelming majority of children in care found themselves there in consequence of one or several social issues with which their families were struggling, residential care often being the only 'state support' they could expect.


³ See GARF, f. R5446, op. 109, d. 1079, ll. 3-6 (1974); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 1-5, 6-8, 27 (1990); Michael Ryan (ed.), *Contemporary Soviet Society: Statistical Handbook* (Aldershot, 1990); Sovmin SSSR (ed.), *Naselenie SSSR (chislennost', sostav i dvizhenie naseleniia) 1973: Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow, 1975); Sovmin SSSR (ed.), *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda: Tom II: Pol, vozrast i sostoianie v brake naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1972).

Figure 1.1 Children's home and boarding school population in the USSR, 1974

Children's home population




Boarding school population



GARF, f. R5446, op. 109, d. 1079, ll. 3-6 (1974).

Figure 1.2 Children in residential care in the USSR, 1990



GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 1-5, 6-8, 27 (1990).

But how were children from all these categories institutionalized? For this, let us return to the mid-1950s and the Soviet reform of residential care, as it elaborated a new set of ideas and practices about how society should deal with a range of social problems. After Stalin's death, when the USSR found itself in a state of crisis, the Soviet leadership committed to monitoring and transforming society in a new way. After rising to power, Nikita Khrushchev strove to lift the Union out of political, economic, and social destitution. By condemning Stalin's crimes in his so-called Secret Speech, Khrushchev marked a 'relaunch' of the socialist project.⁴ The speech reflected his belief that Stalin's reign of terror had led the quest towards communism astray, and it was arguably the only way for him to stay in power. The new leader had to find ways to govern Soviet society without omnipresent state terror. He had to find new sources of legitimization because calling into question the previous political system did not only bring opportunities for change, but also the danger of destabilization. In what Khrushchev called a 'return' to Leninist values, he promised to lead the Union to communism within 20 years.⁵

This 'relaunch' had several repercussions on Soviet society. Firstly, after long years of deprivation and a leadership dismissing people's needs for a supposed greater good, Khrushchev introduced several measures aimed at improving living standards.⁶ Secondly, to

⁴ A special issue from the Slavonic and East European Review discussed 1945-1964 as an era of relaunch of the Soviet project, see Juliane Fürst, Polly Jones, and Susan Morrissey, 'Introduction', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 86.2: *The Relaunch of the Soviet Project 1945-67* (2008), pp. 201-07.

⁵ Buchli, *Archaeology of Socialism*, p. 138.

⁶ Many scholars pointed out the connection between attempts to improve living conditions and to preserve power in Khrushchev's political agenda, see for instance Smith, *Property of Communists*, p. 17; Harris, *Communism on Tomorrow Street*.

enhance the transition towards communism, certain governing responsibilities were transferred from state to societal organizations, the so-called *obshchestvennost'*. Khrushchev's rekindling of *obshchestvennost'* was an attempt to facilitate the so-called 'withering away of the state', and thus the transition from socialism to communism. This shift also meant an enhancement of the Communist Party's influence, which had been sharply reduced during Stalinism, as the Party was to coordinate all the *obshchestvennyye* organizations and their work.⁷

These years of reform, change, and renewed societal participation, however, were not only shaped by optimism and liberation, but also by disorientation and anxiety, as Miriam Dobson has shown in her study of former GULag prisoners' return to society. This explains the crackdown on groups of people who were believed to threaten public order or to be a bad influence on young people, like former prisoners and 'hooligans', and also helps to explain Khrushchev's urge to increase state influence in childcare.⁸ In his study on 'hooliganism' in the Khrushchev years, Brian LaPierre made a related argument, that the Khrushchev era was a time of 'repressive social discipline'.⁹ Several scholars have called the tension around surveillance and liberalization a paradox, although there is also some logic to it.¹⁰ As Deborah Field puts it, the Khrushchev leadership acknowledged some sort of private realm, but at the same time demanded control over it.¹¹ The groundwork for these developments was laid in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but lived on under Khrushchev's successors.

This chapter will explore social problems that afflicted the USSR (and intensified towards the final years of the Union). It will show how these were treated in official and public discourse within very strict limits, and how a network of state and societal agencies set up to monitor and control society in general (and families in particular), was charged with preventing and policing behaviour deemed as deviant. Having identified social issues and deviance as main paths into residential care, the chapter will demonstrate how these were in fact not separate problems to the authorities but merged into one, culminating in a network of residential institutions. The subsequent sections will explore the reasons as well as mechanisms that brought children into residential care across the Union, and thus provide the basis for studying the institutions themselves.

⁷ Dobson, 'The Post-Stalin Era', p. 912; Reid, 'Building Utopia', p. 151.

⁸ Miriam Dobson, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin* (Ithaca/London, 2009), p. 15.

⁹ LaPierre, *Hooligans*, pp. 147-49.

¹⁰ See for instance: Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 155.

¹¹ Field, *Private Life*, p. 18.

Families, poverty, and social problems: children's ways into care

Standards of living in the Soviet Union were on the rise after Stalin's death. In July 1957, Khrushchev introduced a reform to solve the serious housing shortage by building standardized residential areas all over the Union.¹² Although this housing reform did not meet its (very ambitious) targets, these simple but functional buildings provided housing for many families: between 1957 and 1965 nearly 100 million people moved into individual apartments; 130 million by 1970.¹³ Despite several problems regarding the quality of the buildings or delays in infrastructure development, they still meant an improvement compared to how families had lived in Stalinist times, especially after the Second World War: most people had lived in so-called communal flats, one family per room, without central heating and sometimes without running water.¹⁴ Those who were worse off had to stay in cellars, tumble-down barracks, or worse. Khrushchev also began to invest in light manufacturing (as opposed to the heavy industry) to provide people with consumer goods like refrigerators and washing machines.¹⁵ Living standards in the countryside also improved throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years, as for the first time, peasants could expect pay and a pension for their work on the state farms. Other changes included a reduction of work hours, combined with the attempt to offer 'cultured' leisure for workers.¹⁶ These developments continued until the 1980s, although growing social stratification and economic crisis created new problems in the 1970s.

Due to these measures, family life became easier in some respects. In others, however, it was still very strained, which was linked to other aspects of Khrushchev's effort to relaunch the socialist project. As socialist people, both parents were supposed to work. They should have children and bring them up to become the 'builders of communism', meaning they had to help them succeed at school, teach them hygiene, good taste, manners and provide 'cultured' leisure, take them to the theatre, museum, and to political events. This kind of upbringing required a certain amount of education, time, space, and means, which many families could not muster.

¹² Smith, *Property of Communists*, pp. 59-60. See also Steven Harris calling housing 'one of the chief failures of Stalinism', in: "'I know all the Secrets of my Neighbors': The Quest for Privacy in the Era of the Separate Apartment", Siegelbaum (ed.), *Borders of Socialism*, pp. 171-89, here p. 172.

¹³ Dietmar Neutatz, *Träume und Alpträume: eine Geschichte Russlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (München, 2013), p. 390; Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 151.

¹⁴ Timothy Colton, *Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis* (Cambridge MA, 1995), pp. 335-56. Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 152; Lynne Attwood, 'Housing and the Home in the Khrushchev Era', in Ilic, Reid and Attwood (eds): *Women in the Khrushchev Era*, pp. 177-202, here p. 180. Just before the Second World War, for instance, the average number of inhabitants per room in Soviet cities had risen to 3.91. See Smith, *Property of Communists*, p. 8.

¹⁵ Neutatz, *Träume und Alpträume*, pp. 390, 398.

¹⁶ This entailed politically, ideologically, and culturally 'sound' leisure, mostly in contrast to drinking, fighting, etc. Neutatz, *Träume und Alpträume*, pp. 384, 415; Reid, 'Women in the Home', pp. 170-71.

It was particularly difficult for single parents.¹⁷ Especially mothers found themselves under significant pressure because most, if not all the housework and childrearing was left to them, and there never were enough places in state childcare.¹⁸ As late as 1987, a mother wrote to the Lenin Children Fund that in her district, there were only 840 kindergarten places for 4000 children in need of one.¹⁹

While life became easier for the post-war generations in general – not having experienced terror, war and hardship like their parents and grandparents – people did not necessarily perceive it that way: on the one hand, expectations rose with the living conditions; on the other hand higher living standards did not happen for everyone to the same extent.²⁰ The overall improvement of living conditions went hand in hand with an increasing social stratification in Soviet society and (later on) a deepening economic crisis, both of which accentuated underlying social problems.²¹ The Soviet economy became less and less productive throughout the 1970s, and the leadership's commitment to keeping prices low and social welfare strong put a fatal strain on the state budget.²² As more and more people continued to move from the countryside to urban areas, living conditions in the cities remained problematic because the state could not keep up with this migration in terms of housing and infrastructure.²³ This led to further shortages, growing dissatisfaction, and the creation of a booming shadow economy, especially from the second half of the 1970s.²⁴

The 'withering away of the family', or the fight against the family as an outdated 'bourgeois' concept, as it had been preached in the early Soviet days, was definitely over at that time. To the contrary, the family became an important unit of Soviet life.²⁵ However, this 'rehabilitation'

¹⁷ Field, *Private Life*, pp. 86-88, 92.

¹⁸ Hence the importance of washing machines, proper kitchen equipment etc., which until the end of the Soviet Union, were not available to everyone, Neutatz, *Träume und Alpträume*, p. 476; Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 162; Zhidova, 'Family, Divorce, and Comrades' Courts', p. 55. The lack of childcare places was a problem throughout the whole period, see Attwood, 'Housing in the Khrushchev Era', p. 184; Field, *Private Life*, p. 87. This issue is also mentioned in T.A. Vlasova, 'K novym dostizheniiam sovetskoi defektologii', *Defektologiya* 3 (1971), pp. 3-12, here p. 10. This article alludes to a decree from the 24th Party Congress (1971) which planned the formation of two million preschool childcare places within the next five-year-plan.

¹⁹ GARF, f. P5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21, here l. 17 (1987).

²⁰ The gap between economic production and the popular demand for foodstuffs and consumer goods widened as rising living standards created new expectations that the Soviet command economy could not meet. See Hornsby, 'Soviet Society after Stalin', p. 328. Catriona Kelly, 'The Retreat from Dogmatism: Populism under Khrushchev and Brezhnev', in Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd (eds), *Russian Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 249-73, here p. 255.

²¹ Neutatz, *Träume und Alpträume*, p. 477.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 416-17.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 438, 452. Deborah Field pointed out that in 1964, at least 2.3 million people still lived in inadequate housing, see *Private Life*, p. 28.

²⁴ Neutatz, *Träume und Alpträume*, pp. 472-73; Ledeneva, *Russia's Economy of Favours*.

²⁵ Meaning that fewer people had to share their housing with strangers. See Field, *Private Life*, p. 83.

of the family was not unconditional: the Soviet leadership only supported families as long as they met the state's expectations, as the following will show. Even the established cooperation of state, society, and family in childcare could not solve all problems, as state support was deficient and parents struggled with the combined responsibilities of work, childcare, societal duties in a climate of increasing shortages and other issues. As this section will show, the official decision not to address wide-spread social issues and to blame child neglect and delinquency on individual parents eventually led to social breakdown in parts of society and strained the state's welfare structures even further. These developments contributed to the somewhat surprising revival of residential care under Khrushchev.

The reluctant rehabilitation of the family in the face of social breakdown

Throughout Soviet history, the official attitude toward the family as an institution changed several times. In the revolutionary beginnings and until the mid-1930s, more radical socialist thinkers conceptualized the family as a 'bourgeois' institution that they aimed to overcome. Instead, the state (and eventually communist society) were to take care of children. Stalin's family code of 1936 sought to re-establish family stability, and at the same time parents' responsibility for their children's fate. This was based on the leadership's declaration at the 17th Party convention in 1934 that socialism had in fact been built, which permitted the use of traditional institutions (such as the family) to support the new order and to gain broader support among the population.²⁶ These changes included a conservative backlash outlawing abortion and making divorce more difficult. The codes of 1944 and 1969 swung back slightly to reinforce the state's role in family and child welfare, making state and family partners in raising children.²⁷ In their respective leaderships, Khrushchev and Brezhnev tried to stabilize the Soviet economy and society by raising living standards and providing sufficient welfare.

As David Hoffmann has argued for the mid-1930s, the 'reinforcement' of the family should not be seen as a 'return' to the traditional family, but rather as the Soviet leadership's attempt to use the family for its own purposes, such as raising the birth rate and instilling socialist values into the next generations. The disintegration of families was no longer taken as a sign of socialist progress, but instead regarded as a source of juvenile delinquency.²⁸ However, the authorities' 'trust' in parents and families to handle their children's upbringing was still limited. Officials blamed families for juvenile delinquency, branding parents of offending teenagers as

²⁶ See David Hoffmann, 'Was There a "Great Retreat" from Soviet Socialism? Stalinist Culture Reconsidered', *Kritika* 5.4 (2004), pp. 651-74, here pp. 653, 657.

²⁷ Khlinovskaya Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, pp. 51-55; Kelly, *Children's World*, pp. 103-04.

²⁸ Hoffmann, 'Was There a "Great Retreat"', p. 656.

‘unsocialist’. As Russian minister of education Afanasenko pointed out in 1957, parents ‘often approach the education of their children unsystematically, make mistakes, sometimes resort to anti-pedagogical means and thus lose influence on their children. Because of this, many children spend a lot of time left to themselves, they are on the streets, often under bad influences, and occasionally even on the path to hooliganism and crime.’²⁹ This connection between juvenile delinquency and blaming individual families will be addressed further throughout this chapter.

The main reason for Brezhnev’s support of families was the demographic crisis, namely a cumulative decrease in the fertility rate. This decrease, in turn, can be explained by modernization and urbanization, as well as difficult living conditions and a lack of resources for families, especially when the overall economic situation began to deteriorate in the 1970s after the post-war growth. Children tended to be dependent on their parents longer than the pre-war generations: the average ages of financial independence, marriage, and having children went up considerably during these decades. Although people tended to be more tolerant of premarital sex (and sex in general), developments that took place in the West, a ‘sexual revolution’, family planning, and contraception, did not really happen in the USSR.³⁰ To the contrary even: during the 1970s the Soviet leadership encouraged women to have more children, as the fertility rate continued to decrease. In what Lovell called a ‘demographic panic’, the Soviet administration made maternity leave easier and suggested that more mothers should stay home, which contradicted the socialist work ethic.³¹

By the mid-1980s, the Soviet political, economic, and social crises deepened further. Mikhail Gorbachev introduced several reforms under the key words of *Perestroika* and *Glasnost*’ to counteract the crisis and ‘save’ the Soviet project. However, his lifting of media censorship had a (potentially destabilizing) side-effect: it made apparent to the whole population just how much Soviet families faced social breakdown. Reports about social problems and misery filled Soviet newspapers, and left many readers shocked about the extent of destitution around them. Poverty, substance abuse, domestic violence, crime, and child neglect suddenly came to public awareness. Many of these problems had existed throughout Soviet history, but some had worsened since the 1960s. In fact, the USSR was the only industrialized country in which people’s health deteriorated throughout the 1970s, and life expectancy decreased due to bad

²⁹ Kaz’min, *Vsesoizuznoe soveshchanie*, p. 12.

³⁰ Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 129; Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*, pp. 143-44.

³¹ Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 129.

medical care, malnutrition, a lack of exercise, and alcoholism.³² Child neglect and abuse had been serious problems well before the big media scandals. Looking back at her many decades of work in the area, a child welfare worker emphasized in an interview that in the 1960s and 1970s, many parents did not take proper care of their children: ‘people abandoned their children, they drank, went out a lot [*gulialil*], did not bring up their kids, or just left’. In those times, she recalled, around 1000 parents lost custody of their children every year in the city of Leningrad alone.³³

Official reports from the late 1980s confirmed this negative view on the general state of society, and especially families. The Soviet procuracy described an increase in alcoholism and mental illness, leading to more child abandonment (mentioning 100,000 children in need of parental care for those reasons). They also evoked worrying trends of family disintegration, with 3.5 times more divorces in 1988 than back in the 1960s, an increase in underage parenthood as well as illegal abortions; and with 8,000 children being abandoned to baby homes every year.³⁴ Letters to the Lenin Children’s Fund also described difficult times for families in need of state support, like single mothers, families with many children, guardians, and parents with disabled children. Because of the cramped living conditions, especially families with more than two children could often not afford to provide for their children. In an extreme case, a family with four children were living on 9m²; another large family of 11 people lived on 280 roubles per month, 60 of which they spent on rent, the rest on food – for anything else they had to rely on other people’s kindness.³⁵

The increasing ‘rehabilitation’ of the family was also mirrored in the increasing promotion of adoption and foster care, which had been virtually non-existent in early Soviet times. This began during the Second World War, when many children lost their parents, and others were ready to take them in (as war orphans carried no stigma, unlike other children without parental care, as will be shown).³⁶ Foster care and adoption were upheld during the following decades, although they carried heavy stigma for both the child and the parents, in the case of adoption.³⁷ Officially, adoption was claimed to be preferable to residential care (in the case of orphans at least). In the 1980s, most (especially very young) orphans were adopted or in foster care (as

³² Neutatz, *Träume und Alpträume*, pp. 476-77.

³³ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53A, pp. 10-11.

³⁴ GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 52-117 (1988-90).

³⁵ GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

³⁶ See for instance Faircloth Green, ‘There Will not be Orphans Among us’, pp. 15-16; Kucherenko, *Soviet Street Children*, p. 55.

³⁷ Faircloth Green, ‘There Will not be Orphans Among us’, p. 7.

many as 80 percent).³⁸ However, that stance was not followed or encouraged everywhere.³⁹ Among letters to the administration, many people complained as late as 1988 that the local Party organizations did not support family care to the detriment of state care, that they would even impede popular initiatives to adopt children.⁴⁰ Although the Soviet leadership increasingly stressed the importance of the family, raising children was still seen as a societal task. This explains why the Soviet leadership never gave up on residential childcare: in case of a perceived ‘failure’ of the family, the state felt entitled to step in and take children away.

Disavowing social problems, blaming families

The opening case study at the start of this chapter suggests that residential childcare was seen as a response, or even solution, to social destitution. This section will show how the Soviet leadership refused to acknowledge the existence of widespread social issues, and instead blamed such problems on individual families – and resorted to child removal as a solution. Until the revelations of Glasnost, the existence of social problems had been denied in official discourse because such phenomena were thought to be associated with the harmful influence of capitalism.⁴¹ Theoretically, they could not exist in a socialist society that was supposedly classless and equal. No comprehensive data on social issues was published in Soviet times.⁴² In this Soviet discursive regime, things like poverty could only be addressed in very specific terms. As Elena Zubkova has shown, words for ‘poverty’ (like *nishchenstvo*) had disappeared from official discourse (about the Soviet Union) by the 1930s; and were often replaced by *poproshainichestvo* (beggary).⁴³ It is notable that a word denoting a general issue (for which the state would be responsible) was avoided for the sake of a word describing something individual people did (for which they could be blamed). The authorities used similar mechanisms after Stalin’s death, as the following analysis will show.

³⁸ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 21-31, here l. 21 (1990-91).

³⁹ GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 52-117 (1988-90).

⁴⁰ GARF, f. R5446, op. 149, d. 244, ll. 14-23, here l. 14 (1988). Letters to the so-called Lenin Children’s Fund, a state-run charitable organization established in 1987, confirm this impression – people wondered why they could not get a child to adopt, although residential institutions were full of ‘children without parental care’. One couple had been contacting children’s homes and local administrations since 1980, only hearing that ‘there are no healthy children.’ GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21, here l. 15 (1987). About the health of children in Soviet residential care, see also chapter three.

⁴¹ See Anthony Jones, Walter Connor and David Powell, ‘Introduction’, in Jones, Connor and Powell (eds), *Soviet Social Problems* (Boulder, 1991), pp. 1-8, here p. 1; Zezina, ‘Without a Family’, p. 71; Elena Zubkova, ‘Les exclus: Le phénomène de la mendicité dans l’ Union soviétique d’ après-guerre’, *Annales HSS* 2 (2013), pp. 357-88, here pp. 356, 363.

⁴² Paul Hollander, ‘Politics and Social Problems’, in Jones, Connor and Powell (eds), *Soviet Social Problems*, pp. 9-23, here p. 9.

⁴³ Zubkova, ‘Les exclus’, pp. 357-59.

To a certain extent, Khrushchev's claim to reach communism within 20 years made addressing social problems even more difficult, as public order agencies struggled to explain the rising crime rate in the alleged advent of communism.⁴⁴ For instance, a *militsiia* representative from Riga claimed in 1964 that 'it is embarrassing to admit that in the time of successful construction of communism, juvenile crime in this city has been on the rise'.⁴⁵ Official documents reveal two ways in which such problems could be addressed. The first possibility was to link social issues with capitalism by using the category of 'remnants of the past' (*perezhitki proshlogo*). This term could be used to describe any type of phenomenon that for ideological reasons was incompatible with socialism, as well as to explain any kind of so-called 'anti-social behaviour'.⁴⁶ However, this was a difficult line of argument because in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, most people had grown up in socialism and had no connection to the pre-revolutionary past. It also contradicted the Marxist doctrine according to which 'being determines consciousness': if people grew up in a truly socialist setting, they would become socialist people.⁴⁷

The discursive scope for social issues was difficult even in an academic context, although it seems that academics worked on pushing back these constraints slowly and consistently, or to find ways around them. Sergei Alymov has convincingly illustrated how difficult it was to study social problems in an academic setting in the 1950s. The philosopher S.M. Kovalev studied 'remnants of the past' in his 1957 PhD thesis, and came to the conclusion that the reason for ongoing social issues was that people's needs were met unequally in Soviet society. This, however, was a very risky assessment to make, as social justice and equality had been at the core of Soviet revolutionary propaganda. In consequence, Kovalev's dissertation panel made him change his 'anti-Marxist' view.⁴⁸ In another example, a law scholar reported that she could not research juvenile delinquency in the late 1950s because her superiors argued that 'with the advent of communism imminent, why study crime?'⁴⁹

However, at least in later years, scholars from sociology, criminology, pedagogy, and other disciplines managed to address social issues in an academic public forum (such as scientific journals) and with careful recourse to socialist concepts. According to Peter Juviler and Brian

⁴⁴ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 637, ll. 18-19 (1960).

⁴⁵ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, l. 94 (1964).

⁴⁶ Sergei Alymov, 'Poniatie "perezhitok" i sovetskie sotsial'nye nauki v 1950-1960-e gg.', *Antropologicheskii forum* 16 (2012), pp. 261-87, here p. 262.

⁴⁷ This doctrine is also the reason for the Soviet leadership's wish to control how people lived, as this would also indirectly control their behaviour, according to such thinking. See David Crowley and Susan Reid, 'Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc', in *ibid.* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 1-22, here p. 11.

⁴⁸ Alymov, 'Poniatie "perezhitok"', p. 266. The published version of Kovalev's article claimed instead that people have very different needs – an important semantic shift.

⁴⁹ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, l. 98 (1964).

Forschner, Soviet criminologists still claimed crime to be ‘remnants [...] alien to the socialist system’ in a general way, but when moving on to properly explaining it, they did not only mention factors like bad family influence, delinquent peer groups, or ‘bourgeois propaganda’, but also unemployment, the unorganized migration into badly planned living quarters (linked to the housing reform), the cultural impoverishment of low income families, unequal living standards and bad living conditions, as well as social stratification. Basically, if they did it discreetly, Soviet sociologists could paint a picture of an under-privileged social group of less educated people whose children were less likely to reach a certain level of education and more likely to commit crimes.⁵⁰ In 1971, a Soviet pedagogue even used the term ‘social problem’ (*sotsial'naiia problema*) in the journal *Defektologiiia* to address the severe lack of preschool childcare.⁵¹ Throughout the decades, academics found a way to address social issues in their discussions, although these could not reach the broader public.⁵²

The second way in which Soviet administrators and journalists addressed social issues was by denying they were widespread problems at all, and by blaming individual people or families for them. Mark Field described this as a ‘personalization of causality’.⁵³ One example for this was the term *mnogodetni i maloobespechennyi*, designating families with more children than they could (financially) afford to feed and house. *Mnogodetni* literally means ‘with many children’, which in the Soviet context meant three or more. The second part of the term can be translated by ‘of little means’, which amounts to ‘poor’ – however, in official documents it is only used together with the other, thus relativizing the ‘poverty’ aspect.⁵⁴ Otherwise, officials used awkward formulations like ‘families in which bad conditions for raising children prevail’ to describe poverty, adding a judgemental element.⁵⁵ The most common term to label ‘bad’ families was *neblagopoluchnyi*, which in the context of families meant ‘dysfunctional’, denoting in practice phenomena like poverty, alcoholism, neglect, or domestic violence.⁵⁶ The label *neblagopoluchnyi* had strong moral connotations, and it was very difficult for families to get rid

⁵⁰ Peter Juviler and Brian Forschner, ‘Juvenile Delinquency in the Soviet Union’, *The Prison Journal* 58 (1978), pp. 18-30, here pp. 20-21.

⁵¹ T.A. Vlasova, ‘K novym dostizheniiam sovetskoi defektologii’, *Defektologiiia* 3 (1971), pp. 3-12, here p. 10.

⁵² This will be discussed further in chapter two.

⁵³ Mark Field, ‘Soviet Health Problems and Convergence Hypothesis’, in Jones, Connor and Powell (eds), *Soviet Social Problems*, pp. 78-93, here p. 78.

⁵⁴ Examples of this phrasing in: GARF, f. A2306, op. 76, d. 1471, l. 99 (1967); GARF, f. R5446, op. 109, d. 1079, ll. 4, 5, 14 (1974); GARF, f. R5446, op. 144, d. 1188, l. 7 (1982); GARF f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, l. 18 (1983).

⁵⁵ GARF, f. R5446, op. 109, d. 1079, l. 3 (1974).

⁵⁶ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-2 (1962); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 69, d. 181, ll. 2, 22, 43-44, 60 (1966); GARF, f. R9527, op.1, d. 2124, l. 43 (1968). Officials either use the adjective *neblagopoluchnyi*, or even more complicated formulations like *neblagopoluchno v sem'e* or *semei v kotorykh neblagopoluchno s vospitaniem detei*, which makes poverty sound like a disease.

of it, as Khlinovskaya Rockhill has shown, carrying meanings of blame as well as the authorities' entitlement to intervene.⁵⁷

Officials thus used many terms denoting social issues as labels to blame the individuals in question, adding meanings of moral inadequacy, or even malicious intent. As a teacher and educator explained in an interview, the most common connotations with *neblagopoluchnyi* were alcoholism, or a certain moral depravity, as she put it, 'a family that seems fine from the outside, but is not at all on the inside'.⁵⁸ Other common labels for 'bad parents', such as 'previous offender', 'drunkard/alcoholic', or 'mentally ill', also tended to turn more general social problems into individual shortcomings, or to pathologize them.⁵⁹ These mechanisms of blame provided an opportunity for officials to deflect responsibility from the state or political system, while allowing them to articulate their frustration about social issues.⁶⁰ Similarly, official documents described unemployment (which in English is a passive term) in the most 'active' way possible. Official reports tended to speak of minors 'who do not work or study', as if it was their personal choice.⁶¹ In fact, it was often not possible (meaning affordable) for children from very poor families to continue school after the age of 14, while factories were reluctant to hire teenagers.⁶²

Another symptom of this denial of social problems was the absence of 'social workers' as a profession. A report about a British social worker visiting the Soviet Union in 1984 suggests that such an occupation was virtually unknown. Whoever wrote the report left a blank where the visitor's profession would be and filled in 'social worker' in Latin letters by hand, followed by a definition of what a social worker does, in 'Soviet' terms: 'specialists able to work with problem families, which entails incomplete families, single mothers, parents who will not or cannot bring up their children adequately, families with alcoholics, families with constant conflicts, etc.'⁶³ At the same time, public order and child welfare representatives frequently

⁵⁷ Khlinovskaya Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, p. 80.

⁵⁸ Oxf/Lev M-04 PF29A, pp. 11-12.

⁵⁹ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 5042, ll. 52-54 (1956); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 69, d. 181, ll. 175-79 (1966).

⁶⁰ Field, 'Soviet Health Problems', p. 78.

⁶¹ TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 71, d. 139, l. 11 (1967).

⁶² This was due to their lack of training on the one hand, and the legislation protecting underage workers on the other hand, as they were supposed to get the same wage but work fewer hours. LVA, f. 270, op. 3, lie. 637, ll. 18-19 (1960): 'They cannot find work by themselves, because they are underage, and people won't take them on, they won't even talk to them.' This was a particularly pertinent problem throughout the 1960s, see also LVA f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, ll. 121-22, 162-63r (1964).

⁶³ GARF, f. R9563, op. 1, d. 4790, l. 13 (1984).

mentioned that they needed someone conducting such work. In the Soviet case, however, this gap could only be filled by a volunteer.⁶⁴

The Soviet authorities were thus well aware of existing social issues but neither addressed them publicly nor solved them. A study on alcoholism in Cheliabinsk oblast' provides an interesting example of such mechanisms. At the end of the 1960s, the local Communist Party branch started an investigation into 'causes unfavourably affecting the upbringing of children' conducted among 310 people 'registered' as alcoholics with either their workplaces or the local *militsiia* in order to 'explore' the connection between alcoholism and child neglect.⁶⁵ Most of the respondents were male, between 26 and 40 years old, and workers, their most common family situation being a couple with two children. According to this data, 30 percent of the respondents did not take proper care of their children (in a material sense), while 70 percent admitted to not or hardly spending any time with them. In the document, these 'drinkers' were not only blamed for being a bad example for their children, but also for plunging their families into poverty, as they spent their wages on drinking (at least 72 percent of them). The author traced a direct connection between alcoholism, poverty, and juvenile delinquency. However, although he criticized the way the administrations dealt with such families, he still did not address social issues as something fundamentally *caused* by the Soviet authorities, but only as a *consequence* of alcoholism, something individual people but not the state could be held responsible for.

From poverty into residential care

As the last sections have shown, the Soviet authorities blamed issues like poverty, alcoholism, or child neglect on individual families, rejecting the idea that these might be caused by underlying structural problems to which the administration should develop solutions. A child-rearing dictionary for parents from 1967 illustrates this clearly: the entry for *beznadzornost'* (child neglect, literally 'without supervision') explained that while in capitalist countries, it was a consequence of poor living standards for workers, in the Soviet Union all 'social reasons for child neglect have been eradicated'.⁶⁶ Still, something had to be done about it. The Soviet go-to solution for such issues was to put people in institutions. In the case of neglected or potentially neglected children, this meant residential childcare. Both the state as well as many people trusted residential childcare as the best way to provide a decent upbringing to their

⁶⁴ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, l. 96 (1964).

⁶⁵ GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 151-73 (1967).

⁶⁶ *Semeinoe Vospitanie: Slovar' dlia roditelei* (Moscow, 1967), p. 25.

children. Families thus either sent their children to institutions, or the authorities took them away. The following section will examine how children in care ended up in residential institutions, providing valuable insights into the population of residential childcare institutions as well as into the Soviet administration's stance towards socially marginal people.

Until the mid-1960s, when the Soviet leadership introduced a legal way to renounce custody of one's child (*otkaz ot rebenka*), parents who did not want their children abandoned them at the hospital, or in front of children's homes. In her interview, a nurse working in a baby home (*dom rebenka*) from 1945 to 1998 remembered those days as particularly difficult. Among the abandoned children, many had disabilities, or had been neglected by their parents in such a way that their state of development was difficult to establish. Child abandonment before the *otkaz* also caused legal complications: the child could neither be properly admitted to the institution nor adopted or fostered until its identity was established and proper documentation drawn up.⁶⁷ Any child without complete documents could get stuck in between legal statuses and institutions in this manner.⁶⁸

However, residential care did not necessarily require severing the ties between a family and their children. Parents could send children to boarding schools without renouncing their custody if they needed support with childcare. One reason to send one's children to a boarding school was infrastructure: in many rural areas, the nearest school would be too far away, and thus unreachable on an everyday basis, especially with the roads often being unusable for many months a year. A former boarding school inmate remembered in his interview schools near their village only offered three years of schooling, so he was sent to a boarding school about ten miles away. This is surely the least traumatic point of entry into the network of residential childcare institutions, as well as the most likely to leave the child unscathed. This boy, for instance, had good and regular contact with his (intact, caring, and non-violent) family, which is a lot more than many 'urban' boarding schoolers could muster.⁶⁹

In such cases of sending children to residential institutions voluntarily, the contact between parents and children was encouraged. Many such children went home on weekends or for holidays.⁷⁰ The case of a parents' committee from Sverdlovsk boarding school no.9 illustrates that boarding schools played an important role in supporting parents, and that many of them wanted to maintain close contact with their children. In 1967, the committee wrote a letter

⁶⁷ See Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF57A, pp. 9-10, PF57B, p. 18.

⁶⁸ GASO, f. R233, op. 5, d. 1475, l. 131 (1966).

⁶⁹ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF26A, pp. 1, 2, 4.

⁷⁰ Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, pp. 38-39.

titled ‘Where will our children be?!’ to a newspaper, which was then discussed in the Russian (RSFSR) Ministry of Education. They explained that the city’s Party administration had decided to close ‘their’ boarding school and transfer the 409 children to others. However, 90 percent of these children’s families were single mothers or families struggling financially and lived within the district (*mikroraion*). Boarding school no.9 was the only such place in the neighbourhood. Parents were now faced with the options to either send their children to a faraway boarding school and only see them sporadically, or to send them to a local school, which left them unsupervised the whole afternoon – and they were not happy with that choice.⁷¹

As these cases show, boarding school children could have diverse backgrounds, and not all of them could be blamed for their social or financial situation, as people working in such institutions were aware. For many parents, raising their children was primarily an issue of time, especially for single parents: people had to work long hours, or had long commutes, and could not be home in the afternoon, or even in the evening to take care of their children.⁷² In an interview, a boarding school teacher pointed out that ‘their’ children could also be from ‘good families’, hinting at the common stereotype about boarding school children: ‘and it was not because she was a bad mother, or, excuse the term, some kind of a promiscuous woman. And there were such mothers. But usually they were normal families that just didn’t have the material means, and so-to-say, the boarding school helped out’.⁷³ Many of those parents resorting to boarding schools for their children belonged to the category of *mnogodetnye i maloobespechennye* (with many children and little means).

However, dividing families in ‘good’ or ‘bad’ was difficult, and unlikely to represent people’s realities adequately. A former boarding school girl’s background story can help to illustrate this point. She explained in an interview that her mother sent her to a boarding school because she was the oldest of her children, and because she did not have the means or time to take care of them all. ‘She was afraid to leave me neglected [*besprizornoi*]’, she explained. To emphasize her mother’s concern for her, she described that her way to school was very long and dangerous, and drunken men had followed her.⁷⁴ Later in the interview, however, it becomes clear that his was not the whole story. Her family evidently belonged to the category of ‘*neblagopoluchnyi*’, a ‘problem’ family. They lived in a hut in the countryside which they shared with another family;

⁷¹ GARF, f. A2306, op. 76, d. 1471, ll. 112-13 (1967).

⁷² Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, pp. 6-7.

⁷³ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53A, p. 3, quote p. 7.

⁷⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69, pp. 1-2.

it was too cold, and they did not always have enough to eat. Her father was an alcoholic and prone to domestic violence. Both parents were away working all day. There is a bitterness to her narrative: when she was 14, she found out that her father was actually her stepfather, shaking her belief in her parents' concern for her.⁷⁵ This example illustrates that while the categories of *mnogodetniyi i maloobespechennyi*, as well as *neblagopoluchnyi*, were used to describe the residential childcare population, they were not useful to actually describe or understand real families – showing that these terms served a different purpose.

If the authorities deemed a family to be *neblagopoluchnaia*, they might take measures to remove children from that family, which was a protective measure as much as a punitive one. In an interview, one girl remembered being sent to a children's home after her mother had gone away to look for work and left her with her sister, who fell ill and was hospitalized. According to the girl, her mother was unable to get her back because she could not secure a permanent place of residence, and subsequently lost custody.⁷⁶ When a child was taken away by court order, a parent had six months to improve their living conditions – easier said than done. If not, they would lose custody of the child.⁷⁷ Another interviewee, who was even younger when she came to the children's home, refused to talk about that topic altogether. She claimed not to know anything about her relatives and insisted that she did not want to talk about it: 'I ended up there and that's it.'⁷⁸ According to a *militsiia* inspector, the most problematic families were alcoholics, as they were prone to losing their job, then their housing, and their children.⁷⁹

This section has shed some light on the connection between social problems and residential childcare by flagging up different ways into residential institutions. The state both encouraged and enforced children's homes, boarding schools, and reform colonies as a solution (sometimes *the* solution) to various situations, such as poverty, unemployment, parental neglect, family tragedy (illness or death of a parent), and alcoholism. As Khlinovskaya Rockhill has pointed out, Soviet authorities conceptualized people from all these groups as deviant from the Soviet norm. This mechanism contributed to social problems being treated as individual (moral) inadequacy.⁸⁰ This 'othering' of people who did not conform to the Soviet norm led to their marginalization, and consequently to a criminalization of poverty. The Soviet state's approach to social issues by child removal was made possible both by conceptualizing families

⁷⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69, pp. 4, 6, 8, 13.

⁷⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47A, pp. 1, 2, 4.

⁷⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF58B, p. 41.

⁷⁸ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-06 PF79A, pp. 11-12.

⁸⁰ Khlinovskaya Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, p. 37.

as ‘deviant’ and by the post-Stalinist policies of monitoring society, as the following section will show.

Child Removal as a Mechanism of Policing Deviance

In an interview, a former teacher in a boarding school for delinquent children characterized ‘their’ clientele as mostly hooligans, who would ‘protest’ everything, refuse to go to school, fight, and disrupt public order – ‘systematically’. He was quite clear about how for these young people, re-education was often seen as pointless. If the system had worked properly, a minor ending up at such a school for juvenile offenders would have ‘refused’ plenty of re-education attempts by schools and the societal organizations (*obshchestvennost’*), ‘meaning, time and again, it even wasn’t just a question of re-education, right?, but just of isolation, so that they don’t pollute [!] the city.’⁸¹ According to him, about 70 percent of their inmates came from ‘*neblagopoluchnye*’ families, and were used to parental neglect, sometimes induced by alcoholism or delinquency.⁸² This teacher’s assessment of juvenile delinquency suggests that the notions of *neblagopoluchnye* families, of poverty and social marginality were closely connected to those of deviance.

In the decades after Stalin’s death, a new focus on families shaped social policies in the Soviet Union, as has been shown. Changes in everyday life encouraged something of a new family life in more ‘private’ spaces, as millions of people moved into individual apartments after Khrushchev’s housing reform.⁸³ In this context, and in combination with issues such as delinquency and legitimizing their power, the Soviet leadership perceived an enhanced need for control. Khrushchev and his successors pledged to fight crime and maintain public order on the one hand, but also to monitor the population to make sure that everyone adhered to the ‘right’ values and norms of behaviour on the other hand – without terrorizing the whole population, as Stalin had done. These efforts entailed the formation of a wide network of societal and state organizations which both defined and implemented Soviet images of appropriate or deviant behaviour.

Behaviour was thus another criterion for a child to be sent to residential institutions: not only parents who did not conform to norms of behaviour could cause child removal, but the same was true for children breaking the law. Teenagers who committed crimes, minor offences, or who disrupted the public order were brought to educational and/or labour colonies (DVK,

⁸¹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF62A, p. 5.

⁸² Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF62A, p. 6.

⁸³ Neutatz, *Träume und Alpträume*, pp. 444-45, 453.

DTK), or to boarding schools for delinquent children. The following section will explore this connection between social welfare and public order and explain how deviance became the link for the Soviet authorities to form the network of residential childcare institutions. It will first study the role which *obshchestvennye* organizations played in families' lives as well as in raising children; then show how the Commissions for the Affairs of Minors fared in identifying and dealing with children in need of either help or punishment; and finally explore the role which notions of deviance played in youth policy, society, and the roads into residential childcare.

Societal organizations (obshchestvennost') as co-parents?

Khrushchev based his rule on a combination of state and social control, although both were limited. In his ground-breaking study Oleg Kharkhordin argued that, with the reinforcement of existing societal bodies and the formation of new ones, Khrushchev had developed a system of control resembling 'communal enslavement', quoting the Soviet leader as he contemplated the opportunities of such a system: 'We have 10 million Party members, 20 million Komsomol members, 66 million members of trade unions. If we could put all these forces into action, if we could use them in the interests of control, then not even a mosquito could pass unnoticed.'⁸⁴

Kharkhordin's ideas have commonly been criticized as too extreme, although it seems that the biggest problem of his study was that he considered Khrushchev's ideas to have been realized into a perfectly working system. The extent of surveillance implied by Khrushchev would require the network of state and societal institutions to work together seamlessly, and officials as well as volunteers would have to work with disregard to their individual interests – which, indeed, was not the case.⁸⁵

This network charged with monitoring society and sanctioning people's behaviour consisted of state or Party, semi-official, and societal (or 'voluntary') organizations. The official agencies charged with such work were mainly the *militsiia* (police), the procurators, and regional Party organizations. The most prominent examples of semi-official agencies (with regard to youth) were the Commissions on the Affairs of Minors, which existed at various levels of state and Party administration, but were constituted of childcare, health care, and police professionals who worked in these commissions 'voluntarily', that is in addition to their paid jobs.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ See Kharkhordin, *The Collective*, p. 299.

⁸⁵ Dobson, 'The Post-Stalin Era', p. 914.

⁸⁶ Until 1962, also the *komissii po ustroistvu detei ostavshichsia bez popecheniia roditelei*, which was responsible of placing children in institutions. The commissions for minors' affairs became charged with sending minors to institutions (including colonies) with the *Postanovlenie o komissiiakh po delam nesovershennoletnykh* was published by the Supreme Soviet on 31 January 1962, LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 1982, l. 81. See also Kelly, *Children's World*, p. 272.

Completely ‘voluntary’ agencies were house committees (*domkomy*), women’s committees, Comrades’ Courts, or Neighbourhood Patrols (*druzhbiny*), which could be organized at the level of apartment buildings, of the work place, trade unions, Party organizations, or the Komsomol.⁸⁷ Most of these had existed since the 1920s, inactive throughout Stalinism, reactivated again for the first time during the Second World War, and then framed by a renewed policy by Khrushchev.⁸⁸ Although the *obshchestvennost’* was closely controlled by Party organizations, the reliance on voluntary work had the potential to add an unpleasantly arbitrary element to this network’s work.⁸⁹

Although the Soviet leadership had reemphasized the importance of the family, bringing up children was still officially considered to be a societal task. This is why many of the above-mentioned institutions were supposed to take part in childrearing, for instance charged with identifying cases of child neglect, so-called ‘problem families’, as well as cases of juvenile delinquency, and subsequently to become involved in either a supportive, sanctioning, or punitive way. House Committees in combination with the housing administrations (*zhilkontory*) could monitor families at home, where they relied on neighbours’ reports, but also conducted apartment inspections. Komsomol and Neighbourhood Patrols were charged with picking up delinquent or unsupervised children on the streets. These children were then brought to a ‘children’s room’ (*detskaia komnata*) run by the *militsiia*, where the police kept a watch list of children who had already caused problems. Children could be held there for up to eight hours.⁹⁰ From there they could be sent home, back to their institution, or moved on to a so-called collection and distribution point (*priemnik-raspreditel’*), where children could stay for no more than 30 days until they could be moved to another institution.⁹¹ Children in these *priemniki* were therefore either waiting to be taken to a colony, or for placement in a boarding facility.⁹²

Families were not only monitored at home and on the street, but also through the parents’ workplace and the children’s schools. Employers had the responsibility (and power) to assign flats and childcare places. Trade union representatives (in factories, for instance) were

⁸⁷ Field, *Private Life*, p. 19. These *druzhbiny* had 2.5 million members by 1960, see Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 158. About the legitimization of popular violence, see LaPierre, *Hooligans*, pp. 141-42. The ‘voluntary’ dimension of such activities has to be considered with care, as the Party could put considerable pressure on people to take part in such work, see Buchli, *Archaeology of Socialism*, p. 166; Zhidova, ‘Family, Divorce, and Comrades’ Courts’, p. 50.

⁸⁸ Field, *Private Life*, p. 30; LaPierre, *Hooligans*, p. 133; Olga Kucherenko, *Soviet Street Children*, pp. 61-62.

⁸⁹ Field, *Private Life*, p. 19.

⁹⁰ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 5042, ll. 20-21 (1956).

⁹¹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF62B, p. 16.

⁹² GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 119-25 (1962).

supposed to keep an eye on everyone at work to identify potentially problematic parents, as well as offer lectures and coaching on 'proper' parenting.⁹³ Whenever a case of drunkenness, child neglect, or domestic violence came to the attention of a body of the *obshchestvennost'*, it was supposed to contact the local Commission on the Affairs of Minors. School teachers also had to conduct home visits as well as to look out for signs of abuse and violence, such as bruises. The school nurse would then write a medical report and the case would go to the local commission.⁹⁴ It was the purpose of these commissions to coordinate all these efforts and form the core of the child monitoring network. The commission was supposed to meet regularly and could transfer children's (or parents') cases to courts (and recommend for a child to be taken away from its parents), to so-called Comrades' Courts, or to *obshchestvennost'* bodies at home or the workplace.

Whereas issues of custody had to be dealt with by courts, many smaller problems were supposed to be kept out of the judiciary system, and children should be kept in their families as long as possible.⁹⁵ This approach worked along the lines of the differentiation between criminal and anti-social behaviour. Organizations of the *obshchestvennost'* were thus charged with censuring anti-social behaviour, as well as with the prevention of all deviant behaviour, including crime.⁹⁶ In this spirit, the Soviet Supreme Court instructed public order agencies time and again to convict children to reform colonies only as a last resort, and to try the societal channels of re-education first.⁹⁷ The same was true for removing children from their parents' custody. If the child's life was not considered to be in danger, agencies like Commissions for Minors' Affairs or Comrades' Courts were supposed to take 'educational' measures before removing a child from its family. As a next level, a child could be transferred to residential care without the parents losing custody. Removing parental custody was only to be applied in extreme cases, or when none of the other measures helped.⁹⁸

Short of child removal, the *obshchestvennost'* and courts had diverse educational measures to which they could resort. The minors' commissions and Comrades' Courts had some sanctioning powers; they could give official warnings, fine people, place people under tutelage of a Party or Komsomol member or a work collective, make a case known to the public or

⁹³ Zhidova, 'Family, Divorce, and Comrades' Courts', p. 52.

⁹⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45B, p. 24. In an interview, a former boarding school teacher recalled visiting a student's home when her suspicions had been aroused after the child's parents had forgotten to pick up them up for the weekend, as an example: Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF50A, pp. 27-28.

⁹⁵ Juviler and Forschner, 'Juvenile Delinquency', p. 23.

⁹⁶ Field, *Private Life*, p. 30.

⁹⁷ One such example from 1977 cited in Juviler and Forschner, 'Juvenile Delinquency', pp. 24-25.

⁹⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53A, p. 11.

workplace, and in the case of the Commissions for Minor's Affairs, send children to boarding schools or reform colonies.⁹⁹ House Committees or trade unions only had minor sanctioning powers and thus mostly worked with techniques of personal tutoring and public shaming, especially the second of which could be quite effective.¹⁰⁰ Only by exerting pressure, these *domkomy* could have quite a lot of power over people's lives, although, as Buchli points out, this power was 'highly paternal and arbitrary'.¹⁰¹ Charged with many things, including identifying neglectful or abusive parents and supporting those in need, this network alternated between social welfare and public order tasks, as the following section will illustrate.

Susan Reid warns against a one-sided Cold War reading of these agencies and urges us to also acknowledge their potential to help people in need: the commissions at home or at the workplace, as well as street patrols could help identify cases of neglect and abuse which otherwise might not have been detected. Mark Smith has made a similar point, and, using the example of the housing reform, showed that the mobilization (and control) of residents became part of that endeavour only after its implementation, in this case from about 1958.¹⁰² However, this network of societal, state, and intermediate organizations held many opportunities for the state to intrude into people's lives. In this regard, the reinforcement of *obsbchestvennost'* did not mean a withering away of the state, but a consolidation of it, as these agents usually had close ties to the Party and collaborated with state institutions. The Brezhnev years provided final proof that the *obsbchestvennost'* reform had potential for state consolidation, whether it was initially meant as such or not. His administration retained these organizations as a part of his public order policies, but they clearly became a tool to support state power, not as a means to eventually replace it.¹⁰³

The Commissions for the Affairs of Minors: between support and punishment

The *obsbchestvennyye* organizations were thus heavily involved in child welfare. The agencies of the *obsbchestvennost'* were supposed to be monitored by the Communist Party, and numerous activists (at least those in charge) were Party members themselves, often retired Party activists.¹⁰⁴ However, a lack of state investment as well as the volatility of the *obsbchestvennost'* impeded that work. LaPierre has shown in his book that these 'societal' initiatives were hard

⁹⁹ Field, *Private Life*, p. 30.

¹⁰⁰ Reid, 'Building Utopia', p. 170.

¹⁰¹ Buchli, *Archaeology of Socialism*, p. 167.

¹⁰² Reid, 'Building Utopia', p. 158; Smith, *Property of Communists*, pp. 18, 77.

¹⁰³ See also LaPierre, *Hooligans*, pp. 199-201.

¹⁰⁴ Reid, 'Building Utopia', p. 155.

to control, so that they could entail anything from supporting neighbours in need to bullying people into certain behaviours.¹⁰⁵ This problem was enhanced by the fact that the ‘volunteer’ workers of these social organisations did not have any training for fulfilling their tasks.¹⁰⁶ Reid suggested that a smooth running of a Kharkhordinesque surveillance machine was overshadowed by incompetence, corruption, and inefficiency, as people might join such organizations for different reasons.¹⁰⁷

The organizations of the *obsbchestvennost’* were often formed rather hastily by local Party cells to fulfil the leadership’s decrees, but frequently did not really work or collapsed again.¹⁰⁸ Establishing such a network took time. A long correspondence between the central and regional procuracy, as well as regional Commissions for the Affairs of Minors shows how difficult this could be. The exchange followed a decree in 1956 to install Commissions for the Placement of Children without Parental Care (basically commissions alleviating the procuracy’s work to send delinquent children to colonies). In different regions of the USSR, nothing much happened for months after the decree, partly due to inefficiency, lack of interest, and lack of resources. In the case of Saratov, no one seemed to quite understand what they were supposed to do, leading the local procuracy to send an explanatory letter to the local minors’ commission ending with a somewhat exasperated ‘Is that understood now?’ (*Tak li nami eto poniatno?*).¹⁰⁹

The Commissions for the Affairs of Minors were revived under Khrushchev to lay at the centre of the network of state, Party, semi-official, and societal organizations charged with monitoring families, and potentially take action. In this function, they had far-reaching responsibilities, from detecting children in need, placing them, to monitoring people leaving institutions and finding them jobs or places in schools, and supervising the work of all childcare institutions. The first part of their duties was thus to supervise families and coordinate efforts, as a 1962 report from the Minors’ Commission in Leningrad’s Kirov district illustrates. The commission compiled lists of ‘*neblagopoluchnye*’ families, of children prone (*sklonnye*) to commit crimes, who did not want to work or study, of teenagers who had been released from colonies. According to this inspection, they worked personally with teenagers and parents, had *shefy* (which might translate as tutor) for almost everyone on their lists, and met relatively often

¹⁰⁵ LaPierre, *Hooligans*, pp. 152-54.

¹⁰⁶ Harwin, *Children of the Russian State*, p. 45.

¹⁰⁷ Reid, ‘Building Utopia’, pp. 160-61, 167, 182. See also Juviler and Forschner, ‘Juvenile Delinquency’, p. 25.

¹⁰⁸ LaPierre, *Hooligans*, pp. 145-46.

¹⁰⁹ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 5042, l. 4 (1956).

(every 2-4 weeks). This commission seems to have done a particularly good job in joining the local *obsbchestvennost'* forces, which in their case amounted to an '*aktiv*' of about 540 people.

A reasonably well-working commission required considerable effort in cooperation and coordination, as the example of the Lenin district in Sverdlovsk shows. It was chaired by the head of the district (*raion*) Party committee (*raispolkom*), and co-chaired by another Party official; secretary was the *militsiia* children's room inspector. Among the remaining members were factory bosses, Party officials, a Komsomol activist, and the director of the local Pioneer house. In 1963, they held monthly sessions in which they heard 70 minors in total, either for committed offences or for refusing to study or work. 16 of those were sentenced for violent behaviour, 19 for theft, 14 for refusing to go to school, five for amoral behaviour. At all sessions, either their parents and a representative from their workplace, or a teacher and school director were present with the accused minor. The commission sent nine teenagers to a colony; and four to a 'special' children's home. It discussed nine cases involving parents who were alcoholics and neglected their children, five of whom lost custody. It also got a job or training placement for 206 minors, and monitored 17 returnees from colonies, providing them with placements as well.¹¹⁰ It seems, however, that the well-working commissions tended to have one thing in common: they were chaired by a so-called '*osvobodzhdennyi rabotnik*', somebody who was exempt from their usual job to work for the commission full-time. Commissions who did not have that, concludes the report, 'work considerably worse', showing that volunteers only could not manage the commissions' workload.¹¹¹

Official reports from any year were filled with complaints about the *obsbchestvennost'*'s insufficient efforts in fighting child neglect (*beznadzornost'*), although the limits of their power were as much to blame as lack of coordination or commitment. Most general reproaches concerned the lack of individual work with difficult teenagers and families.¹¹² But even if the agencies of the *obsbchestvennost'* worked smoothly, it did not mean that their measures were successful – many parents chose to ignore them, demonstrating the limits of what the network could achieve.¹¹³ In terms of spotting cases of neglect and abuse, the monitoring network had a potential to work well. The difficult part was finding a solution. In an interview, a

¹¹⁰ GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 152, ll. 23-24, 27-28.

¹¹¹ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13. (1962). Two years later, the highest-level Latvian commission was reprimanded for their insufficient work, and the report concluded that it needed an *osvobodzhdennyi rabotnik*. See LVA f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, ll. 184-97 (1964). For detailed reports about such Commissions' work in the Cheliabinsk oblast in 1967, see GU OGACHO, F. P288, op. 163, d. 176, ll. 109-14 and d. 177, ll. 132-50 (1967).

¹¹² For instance, GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 153, l. 1 (1962); GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1467, ll. 28-45 (1963-65).

¹¹³ As Deborah Field points out, see *Private Life*, p. 83.

paediatrician expressed her frustration with that situation. As doctors, they could do ‘practically nothing’ about abuse, except sending the case on to the *militsiia* to go and check on the family. Even the *militsiia*, however, often proved to have little influence on parents. In her opinion, alcoholics could not be helped, and you could only resort to helping the children by getting them out of their home.¹¹⁴

The case of a mother living with three small children illustrates the limits of the commissions’ sanctioning power, as reported by Leningrad Minors’ Commissions in 1962. According to the report, the mother was an alcoholic and worked as a prostitute. The commission tried to have her children taken away via court order, which failed. However, neither fines nor workplace shaming made any sense, as she did not have a job or any money.¹¹⁵ The frustration about such cases ran deep, so that among childcare workers the calls for stronger action in holding parents responsible became louder. In a case in 1960s Latvia (LSSR), for instance, a boy was sent to an educational colony, although he was below the admission age. His mother did not want him around anymore because the boy’s father had left long ago, and she had remarried. For that reason, the boy had been roaming around because he was unhappy and did not feel welcome at home. At school, however, he did reasonably well, which is why the procuracy suggested that the boy should rather get help and be sent to a boarding school, while the mother and father should be held responsible for their terrible parenting.¹¹⁶ An official from the Latvian MOOP¹¹⁷ went as far as to say that the whole system revolved around itself, not achieving anything.¹¹⁸

The Commissions for Minors’ Affairs also struggled with their resources and workload, which often made work according to their guidelines impossible.¹¹⁹ One such case of overstrain happened in Latvia in 1960. The director of the Daugavpils colony complained in June that he had asked for a boy’s release in December, and had reminded them again in April, and still nothing had happened, although the child should have been home with his parents for half a year. The Latvian procuracy accused another commission of stalling for five months in such a release request and then making an uninformed decision.¹²⁰ Not only the so-called voluntary

¹¹⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF73A, p. 6.

¹¹⁵ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 28-36 (1962).

¹¹⁶ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 1982, ll. 53-54 (1963).

¹¹⁷ *Ministerstvo okbrany obschestvennogo poriadka* – Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order, as the Soviet ministries for internal affairs were called from 1962 to 1968 – evidence of a public order priority in the 1960s.

¹¹⁸ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, l. 103 (1964).

¹¹⁹ In the Kaluga region, for instance, the commissions did not have the resources to hold proper sessions, which led them to make their decisions ‘based on the documents’, without talking to any of the parties involved (including the child), according to a report from 1956. See GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 5042, ll. 14-16 (1956).

¹²⁰ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 637, ll. 67, 76 (1960).

organizations were faced with staff problems, however. A former boarding school teacher recalled her stressful work as an ‘inspector’ for the Leningrad city education administration (GorONO) in an interview. Theoretically, her task would have been to coordinate the district inspectors’ work in custody cases, adoptions, child removals, and conflicts between agencies. However, only half of the districts actually had inspectors (11 out of 21) in the second half of the 1960s, so she ended up with all of that work, too.¹²¹ She also criticized that the network worked too slowly: custody cases had a way of getting stuck at some level or other, and children were waiting to move on.¹²²

Official documents hold much evidence of failure in the monitoring system, although the one-sided nature of the material can obscure the reasons for these failures. Some suggest that the sheer number of institutions involved in that network was part of the problem, leading to inefficiency, pettiness, and fighting over responsibility. Correspondence with the newspaper *Literaturnaia Gazeta* bears witness of such official infighting. In 1956, a parents’ committee had contacted them to complain about a 14-year-old boy causing trouble in their children’s school. The description of the boy fit the stereotype of a hooligan from a problem family – his parents were previous offenders, alcoholic (the father), and mentally ill (the mother). The boy had been skipping school, swearing, drinking, and stealing. The parents’ committee had contacted the paper in late 1955, which in turn had contacted the *militsiia* about that case. The *militsiia* took only a couple of weeks to convict the accused to a colony, but over ten months later, the teenager was still free, hooliganizing, drinking, stealing. The journalist suspected institutional pettiness to be the reason behind the delay: as the *militsiia* had contacted the local Party committee instead of the procuracy, prompting the latter to stop the whole process claiming a lack of evidence.¹²³

These examples show that there was a drive towards punishment in the agencies responsible, countered by calls for moderation (often by the procuracy). Documents produced about the work of the minors’ commissions show frequent conflicts with the procuracy about which teenagers to send to educational and labour colonies. Typically, the procurators protested against – in their view – unnecessary incarcerations, which sent the case to the highest minors’ commission in the region. This could happen on very clear legal grounds, as time and again cases surfaced in which children younger than 11 (which was the minimum age for these

¹²¹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53A, pp. 9-10.

¹²² Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF54B, pp. 43-45.

¹²³ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 5042, ll. 52-54 (1956). In this case, it is difficult to judge the situation because not all parties were heard. The procuracy might have had a point stopping the conviction, in case the parents were on some witch hunt against a boy they did not approve of.

correctional facilities) were sent to a colony or special school.¹²⁴ In one of the more absurd cases, a regional procurator stopped a commission from sending a two-year-old to an educational colony. Such cases are strong evidence that the commission had not held their sessions with the concerned minor present, as instructed.¹²⁵

Such internal issues within the child welfare and public order networks could have serious consequences on a child's life, such as unnecessary incarceration or leaving them in limbo between institutions. The procuracy usually felt the need to remind the commission of the Supreme Court's ruling that a socially dangerous crime needs to have been committed or that all of the other possible means of education must have failed to send a minor to a correctional facility.¹²⁶ In one example, a 15-year-old boy from Ekaterinburg was sent from a children's home to a colony (DVK), although his 'crimes' merely consisted in being rude and attempting to run away with other children. According to the procurator, this was not enough to incarcerate the boy, but the local Party Council (*ispolkom*) backed the commission's decision and sent the boy away.¹²⁷ In Latvia, the procuracy protested convictions to institutions or failure to release children from institutions in almost 200 cases just in the year 1960 – and for most of them, the senior minors' commission complied.¹²⁸

This overemphasis on punishment is symptomatic of a serious overstrain of the Commissions on Minors' Affairs and the rest of the *obsbchestvennyi* network in dealing with families, or in some cases a lack of personal investment: sending a child on to a colony was the quickest and easiest way to close a case and remove a 'problematic' child from their responsibility, even if only for a certain time. Such moves could be guided by a lack of interest as much as by the realization that the community could probably not do much to help. Many commissions thus literally just did the absolute minimum, only discussing the cases given to them by the *militsiia* about placing children in institutions, and that often sloppily.¹²⁹ Official records were full of cases of children in need of help, not punishment. In 1961, a Leningrad commission sent a girl to an educational colony for stealing sweets. In their decision, however, they did not take into account that the child lived in appalling conditions at home, sharing a room with two other families, that her mother was a heavy drinker and beat her. Upon meeting members of the

¹²⁴ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13. (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 25, d. 204, l. 7 (1962); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 637, l. 27 (1960); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 1982, ll. 53-54 (1963).

¹²⁵ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 5042, ll. 92-95. (1956); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13 (1962).

¹²⁶ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 25, d. 204, ll. 1-10 (1962); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 1982, ll. 14-17, 46-48 (1963).

¹²⁷ GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 27, l. 28 (1957).

¹²⁸ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 637, 638 (1960).

¹²⁹ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13. (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 25, d. 204, ll. 1-10 (1962).

commission, the mother showed no interest in the fate of her child, telling them to ‘take her where you like’. In this case, the child should have been sent to a children’s home or boarding school, and the mother deprived of custody. But, as the report stated, ‘many commissions consider sending children to colonies not as an extraordinary, but standard measure’.¹³⁰

Even though this far-reaching and complicated network of institutions, agencies, and organizations had the potential to provide a safety net for struggling families, there were many opportunities to fail children. This phenomenon, however, was not limited to the Commissions for the Affairs of Minors. Institutional ‘laziness’ was also evident in the schools’ tendency to suspend children because they were difficult to handle. Party organizations warned schools from doing so without cooperating with the minors’ commissions to organize some new placement for them. This was especially true for boarding schools, as those children often had no place to go.¹³¹ A report from Sverdlovsk shows that there were 361,500 teenagers between the ages of 14 and 17 in the oblast’ in 1966, of whom about three percent did not go to school or have a job. This group, however, was known to produce 70 percent of juvenile delinquents according to their data. Nevertheless, schools had suspended 16,477 children for bad behaviour in the previous school year.¹³²

The same was true for workplaces: employers were not supposed to fire underage workers without agreement from the local minors’ commission. Underage workers had a difficult time at workplaces anyway. Many employers ignored the legislation set up to protect minors and even tended to exploit them for unqualified hard labour.¹³³ Workplaces not only tended to neglect their underage workers’ welfare but often neglected to look after them altogether, as was pointed out in a 1964 meeting of public order representatives in Latvia. Criticizing crime prevention at Latvian workplaces, a procuracy representative named two typical cases of underage workers planning violent crimes and even forging the weapons used in these crimes at the workplace – the first being a premeditated murder, the second a series of violent assaults resulting in serious injuries of nine people.¹³⁴

¹³⁰ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13. (1962); more examples in the same file, ll. 126-33; and in GARF, f. A385, op. 25, d. 204, ll. 1-10 (1962).

¹³¹ GASO, f. R233, op. 5, d. 1475, ll. 156-57 (mid-1960s); TsDOOSO, f. 161, op. 32, d. 50, ll. 18-21 (1960).

¹³² TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 71, d. 139, l. 2-15, here l. 11. It seems like this problem improved throughout the years, although it did not disappear. For instance, a report by the Soviet procuracy mentions 20,000 children expelled from polytechnic college, and 23,000 from middle school all over the Union in the course of 1987/88. See GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 52-117, here l. 70 (1988-1990).

¹³³ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, ll. 46-49 (1963-64). See also Kucherenko, *Soviet Street Children*, pp. 97, 119, for similar wartime tendencies.

¹³⁴ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, ll. 89 (1964).

The wide range of the minors' commissions' responsibilities boils down to two main purposes: social welfare (protecting children from neglect and abuse) and public order (punishing and stopping delinquent children). The commissions often failed in fulfilling these tasks, and the boundaries between them were often blurred. Officials saw their social welfare work as prevention of juvenile delinquency, and thus inextricably linked to their public order efforts. Because of this connection, social welfare seemed less of a purpose in itself, and more of a crime prevention strategy. This mindset, however, contained the risk of treating children in need of social support like potential delinquents. Indeed, it seems that many children and teenagers struggling with their lives were sent to colonies instead of offering them practical and emotional support. The concept of deviance thus connected social welfare and public order policies and contributed to the further social marginalization of the (especially urban) poor by channelling children into residential care, as the following will illustrate.

Notions of deviance, stereotype, and stigma in dealing with Soviet youth

Public order and social welfare were thus intertwined areas of policy. Popular and official fears of deviance as well as stereotypes merged in this field, which was mirrored in official language and people's approaches to difference and change in campaigns against delinquency, hooliganism, or 'parasites'. Societal organizations were not meant to see a child as 'deviant'; it was the parents from whose influence it had to be 'saved' that were deviant. In the long run, however, the term *beznadzornyi* (neglected) gained different new meanings, almost losing the 'victim' connotation as it became linked to deviance and crime. In reports about delinquent youths, officials using the word *beznadzornyi* meant that the child in question was roaming the streets, which implied that they were probably breaking the law as well. This shift in meaning was not due to a lack of words, as there was an official term for vagabonding (*brodiazhnichestvo*), an offence which numerous children found in the streets were charged with.¹³⁵ To give an example, a boy who had been suspended from school was reported have adopted a '*beznadzornyi* way of life', a phrase that would make no sense if *beznadzornyi* merely meant 'unsupervised' or 'neglected'.¹³⁶

In the end, child neglect was invariably perceived as a public order issue rather than a social problem. In official documents, terms like child neglect (*beznadzornost'*), juvenile delinquency (usually *prestupnost'* or *khuliganstvo*), and occasionally child homelessness (*besprizornost'*, although this was rather a phenomenon of the early Soviet Union or the late 1980s/1990s)

¹³⁵ GARF, f. A385, op. 25, d. 204 (1962).

¹³⁶ GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1475, ll. 156-57.

were often used together, sometimes even interchangeably.¹³⁷ One such occasion was a report about the inspection of *militiia* children's rooms and reception centres in the Krasnodar region, in which the local Party organization basically equated child neglect and delinquency. The report even established a causal link leading from 'incomplete' families, meaning with one parent absent, via child neglect to juvenile crime. This claim was based on a rather bold oversimplification of statistical data which suggested that 56 percent of minors sent to juvenile reform colonies only had one parent.¹³⁸ However, state and Party agencies omitted many circumstances in such cases, such as the fact that the Soviet Union lacked sufficient childcare facilities to support single parents. In this manner, the network to monitor families, through their work in helping children in need and preventing crime, imposed and defined standards of behaviour and what was to be considered as deviant.

This overlap of social welfare and public order in the approach to youth was connected to the post-Stalinist fear of deviance. It had first gained momentum in the context of the mass amnesty of GULag prisoners after Stalin's death in 1953. Only those prisoners who were officially rehabilitated and not just released could move freely and had a realistic chance of finding a place to live and work. Many former prisoners had no choice but to roam around, do low-paid jobs, or rely on crime – which was also due to the stigma that these people suffered from. Prisoners were thought responsible for the rising crime rate, allegedly having a bad influence on young people.¹³⁹ In the end, as Miriam Dobson has shown, this stance turned out to be a 'self-fulfilling prophecy'.¹⁴⁰ Alienated from society by the horrors they encountered in the camps, they had adopted the GULag or criminal culture (whether they had been criminal or political inmates), which had the potential to feed back into everyday culture in the form of tattoos, pamphlets, songs, and slang.¹⁴¹

Fears of deviance were rekindled time and again by actual or perceived waves of juvenile crime. These fears were predominantly built around the image of unsupervised youths hanging out in the streets, in staircases, and in the *dvory* (courtyards), where they were thought to be drinking, smoking, and gambling, all of which were seen as gateways into delinquency and crime.¹⁴² People's memories of their '*dvor* days' under Brezhnev, as told to Donald Raleigh,

¹³⁷ See for instance GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 27, ll. 65-70 (1957); GARF f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 23-26 (1962); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 69, d. 181, ll. 118-22, 175-79 (1966); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 6-8 (1990-91).

¹³⁸ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 23-26 (1962).

¹³⁹ Dobson, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer*, pp. 109-10.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 112-14, 125. This connection will be explored further in chapter four.

¹⁴² Reid, 'Building Utopia', p. 171-72. In an interview, a former inspector of the *militiia* children's room names exactly this correlation: Oxf/Lev SPb-06 PF79A, p. 6.

suggest that these fears were not completely unsubstantiated. Children did spend their time in the *dvory* after school. People remembered these after-school hours as a time of freedom, which included drinking, smoking tobacco and pot from a very young age. Several people also mentioned the ‘rules of the street’ playing an important role, hinting at the presence or influence of gangs.¹⁴³ Miriam Dobson, alluding to Raleigh’s book, described a ‘deep criminalisation’ of schools.¹⁴⁴ In an interview, a *militsiia* children’s room worker also decried the bad influence of the *dvor*, where gangs would rule and introduce minors to crime (as minors would get shorter convictions if caught).¹⁴⁵

The fear of deviance, however, was not only linked to crime and delinquency. It also entailed people who, for some reason or other, did not or could not conform to Soviet norms of ‘social usefulness’. New anti-parasite laws in 1961 made the agencies of *obshchestvennost’*, as well as the police, responsible for deal with such ‘parasites’. These laws, however, were open to interpretation by the lower levels of administration. This margin of agency led to a frequent over-use of that law, as the procuracy mainly had in mind fighting the second economy, whereas the local administrations tended to focus on prostitutes, beggars, drunks, and ‘hooligans’. Even invalids and pensioners were sometimes convicted under this law.¹⁴⁶ Such cases reflect a widespread intolerance of anyone not working (for whatever reasons) and suggest that such agencies were in fact policing difference rather than deviance (adding a normative judgement to anyone living their life differently than the norm).

The extent to which the Soviet administration’s policing of deviance was shaped by the personal stereotypes and fears of its officials was well reflected in the sexism apparent in Soviet juvenile law enforcement. Official documents show that Soviet notions of delinquency and deviance were deeply gendered. Female deviance was considered worse (although rarer) than male deviance.¹⁴⁷ The type of ‘offences’ girls and boys were mostly tried for also differed greatly. Although not only boys committed crimes, it seems that girls were mostly sent to colonies or ‘special’ schools for promiscuity (‘amoral behaviour’), or prostitution, if they could prove that money had changed hands. Boys, on the other hand, would be sent away most frequently for hooliganism, theft, or assault. The 1962 inspections from two *priemniki*, one for

¹⁴³ See Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*, pp. 125-26, 138-39; Kelly, *Children’s World*, p. 435.

¹⁴⁴ Dobson, *Khrushchev’s Cold Summer*, p. 123.

¹⁴⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-06 PF79B, pp. 16, 18-19.

¹⁴⁶ Sheila Fitzpatrick, ‘Social Parasites: How Tramps, Idle Youth, and Busy Entrepreneurs Impeded the Soviet March to Communism’, *Cahiers du monde russe* 47.1/2 (2006), pp. 377-408, here pp. 382, 392, 397, 404-05.

¹⁴⁷ Several youth workers pointed out that, whereas there would be fewer delinquent girls, those who were delinquent were much more difficult to reform. See for instance Oxf/Lev SPb-06 PF79B, pp. 20-22.

girls and one for boys, provide a good opportunity to compare those gendered notions of deviance. The boys' *priemnik* in Leningrad mostly held male teenagers waiting to be sent to a colony. They were accused of offences such as (in order of decreasing frequency) theft, hooliganism, drunkenness, and refusing to study or work. The report also listed the worst cases that they had in their *priemnik*, boys stealing state property on several accounts, breaking into apartments, organizing gangs, escaping from a colony, and rape.¹⁴⁸

In contrast, the common characteristic of the 11 girls waiting in the Pushkinsk *priemnik* for their place in a colony was their sex life, which the report described vividly. The girls either roamed around at night or had left home to stay with a man. The men in question were named as shady people, foreigners (in one case Swedish tourists), soldiers, badly behaving people, 'unknown' men, people from the Jazz scene – covering every possible stereotype for a bad match for 'good girls'. Most of the girls were either reportedly skipping school, misbehaving, drinking or smoking. Five of them lived at a boarding school, two were students, four had dropped out of school or were between jobs. Their families (often single parents) were mostly described as alcoholics, as leading 'an amoral lifestyle', as mentally ill. The report mentioned separately if the girls also had a bad influence on their environment, either quite literally by catching (and potentially spreading) venereal diseases – two of them had been hospitalized for gonorrhoea – and more metaphorically by 'having amoral conversations in her boarding school's dorm', thus corrupting the other girls at her school. Another common feature of those reports was the failure by other agencies to influence or re-educate them, be it schools, factory 'collectives', Komsomol people, *zhibkontory*, the *militsiia*, house committees. Only one of the girls committed an actual crime (together with other 'deviant' acts), a rather grim case of cruelty against animals.¹⁴⁹

These gendered notions of deviance could lead to punishing girls for crimes committed by men. Such was the 1963 conviction of a 14-year-old girl to a colony for leading an 'amoral life style', running away from school, and petty theft. The Latvian procuracy chose to protest this conviction, as the story behind it was rather tragic, and the girl was not usually known for bad behaviour. A 20-year-old man had started a relationship with this girl, which was illegal, and was abusing her emotionally. When her headmaster found out that the girl was sexually active, he persuaded her mother to send her to a boarding school. The man continued pursuing the girl and threatened to break up with her if she did not come to see him. Scared, she ran away

¹⁴⁸ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 126-33 (1962).

¹⁴⁹ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 119-25 (1962).

from school, stole some clothes to wear and went to meet him. She was picked up by the *militiia* and brought back to school, where the headmaster chose to put her in ‘quarantine’ for three weeks and then have her sent to a colony, bullying her mother into agreeing to this. At the time of the procurator’s protest, the girl was stuck at a *priemnik*, awaiting her transfer. The procurator demanded for her to be sent back, and for the security forces to instead charge the man who had abused her, as seemingly this had not occurred to anyone up to that point.¹⁵⁰

The tendency to blame girls for having sex even influenced the outcome of rape trials. In the 1960s in Latvia, a rapist was charged but not arrested because the victim had been a ‘promiscuous’ girl – a gross trivialization of rape.¹⁵¹ In a discussion about juvenile crime, a law scholar considered rape a serious problem amongst minors, and inexplicably linked it to single mothers, implying that it was the father’s job in a family to tell his sons not to rape anyone. To explain the status of rape among such youngsters, the scholar evoked the strange case of three boys being tried for group rape of a 26-year-old woman. Towards the end of the trial, one of the accused admitted that he actually did not take part in the crime but asked the court ‘not to tell anyone because that would embarrass him in front of his friends’.¹⁵² These examples bear witness to an underlying culture of criminalizing female sexuality, and of victim blaming in the case of rape. This culture, connected to a certain image of masculinity, was so widespread and unquestioned that not to rape a girl could be cause for embarrassment.

As these stereotypical images of hooliganizing boys and promiscuous girls suggest, worries around deviant youth had reached the extent of a moral panic (in the context of fast urbanization, social destabilisation and anxiety, the opening towards the West), serving as justification for the state’s social order policies.¹⁵³ These worries were personified by the *stiliagi* and the hooligans.¹⁵⁴ The ‘hooligan’ was the concept most widely invoked in Soviet society to label deviant behaviour. On the one hand, people would encounter hooliganism frequently when being harassed or disturbed on the street or at home; on the other hand, they could easily become a hooligan themselves, as law enforcers were free to interpret a ‘threat’ to social order as they saw fit – much like with the parasite laws.¹⁵⁵ Hooliganism was a fluid concept redefined at different places and times. It was a ‘barometer of how the system felt about its youth’, as

¹⁵⁰ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 1982, ll. 7-8. (1963)

¹⁵¹ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, l. 100 (1964).

¹⁵² LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, ll. 100-01 (1964).

¹⁵³ As argued by LaPierre, *Hooligans*, p. 22-23.

¹⁵⁴ The *stiliagi* were a Soviet youth subculture symbolizing [for the authorities] sex, drugs, rock music, materialism, as well as a very un-socialist ‘leisure ethic’ (*bezdelnichestvo*). Field, *Private Life*, p. 22.

¹⁵⁵ LaPierre, *Hooligans*, pp. 6-8.

Juliane Fürst has pointed out.¹⁵⁶ Hooliganism was a ‘crime’ mainly committed by working class men, supposedly the least marginal group in the proletarian state. A report from 1966 suggests that this was the case: it claims that 75 percent of registered ‘hooligans’ were workers.¹⁵⁷ Most underage ‘hooligans’ were also part of an organized institution, either at a school or workplace: they, too, came from the centre of society.¹⁵⁸

By labelling people as ‘hooligans’, the Soviet leadership could conceal social problems by re-categorizing people struggling to integrate into a standard socialist life course as ‘hooligans’, in other words as outsiders. By the 1960s, people could be punished for relatively everyday things, like ‘pestering’ people, picking flowers, being loud or drunk in public, becoming deviant for things they had always done – which is why LaPierre has argued that the Soviet state did not only police, but also create deviance.¹⁵⁹ LaPierre’s concept of ‘creating deviance’, however, is not only applicable to ‘hooliganism’, but also to Soviet residential childcare. This network of institutions played an important part in the Soviet authorities’ policies around social problems as well as public order. The uniting concept behind these policies was deviance, thus the institutions were designed to stop children from becoming deviant and become ‘good’ Soviet citizens instead. These policies were fuelled and supported by stereotypes against poverty, a tendency to universally blame parents’ moral integrity in case of a child in need, and the belief that state care would offer children a better fate.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the road into Soviet residential childcare began at the margins of Soviet society for most future children in care, be it out of poverty, other social issues, or because they or their parents’ behaviour were considered to be deviant. The residential childcare system thus fulfilled several functions for the state on top of reviving ideas of a collective or state upbringing in the quest to bring about communism. This chapter examined one of those functions, namely dealing with social deviance and poverty, that is keeping it out of sight. The following chapter will explore how scientific models shaped another function of residential childcare: ‘treating’ children with disabilities, thus dealing with medicalized rather than social difference.

¹⁵⁶ Fürst, *Stalin’s Last Generation*, pp. 181-82.

¹⁵⁷ TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 69, d. 181, ll. 1-21, here l. 2 (1966).

¹⁵⁸ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, l. 86 (1964).

¹⁵⁹ LaPierre, *Hooligans*, pp. 106-10.

Whereas these were two separate motives for the authorities, the boundary between them tended to blur: the graphs have shown that the classifications used in official documents were quite artificial and not an adequate representation of the residential childcare population. Firstly, these numbers only reflected the reason why children were put in an institution, marking a situation which could change any time. Secondly, these categories often overlapped. Documentary material relating to fig. 3 suggests that about 44 percent of boarding schoolers and 72 percent of children's home inmates were considered to have some sort of developmental delay; this meant they qualified them for the 'children with disabilities' group as well as other categories represented in the graph.¹⁶⁰ Notions of deviance and social issues such as poverty, family breakdown, or alcoholism blended into one, turning poverty, alongside 'non-conformist' behaviour and illness, into deviance, meaning behaviour deemed to endanger the socialist project and productive labour.

In a similar vein, Elena Khlinovskaya Rockhill has spoken of a 'Soviet trend to treat social problems as individual pathology' like a personal moral failure as a development reaching through late Soviet and into post-Soviet times.¹⁶¹ Residential childcare thus became a haven for children from such 'deviant' families, which in turn bred prejudice towards children in care. Interviews convey a similar impression of the average boarding school child, already from as early as the late 1950s, hinting as well at the social stigma linked to the *neblagopoluchnyi*: 'Yes, mainly, yes dysfunctional [families]. Mainly incomplete families, mostly, yes. Yes, yes, I remember it well, everyone had problems like that. There weren't any normal children, to my recollection.'¹⁶² Later on, the same person specified that children in her class either did not have a father around, came from a 'family with many children', or were somewhat difficult (*nepravliaemyi*).¹⁶³ Other former inmates and members of staff confirmed that impression.¹⁶⁴ From reading interviews with people involved in childcare, it seems that such *neblagopoluchnye* families were common enough to become some sort of cliché. A teacher having worked in boarding schools of different types since 1957 mentioned 'these socially unwell, these families, where there's no father or where the parents drink'.¹⁶⁵ While clearly *neblagopoluchno* did not seem to be a very precise term, the condescending note was quite clear. These issues around the

¹⁶⁰ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 33-54 (1990).

¹⁶¹ Khlinovskaya Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, p. 37.

¹⁶² Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69, p. 9.

¹⁶³ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69, p. 13.

¹⁶⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-05, PF67A, p. 4; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49A, p. 2; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, p. 5.

¹⁶⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF65A, pp. 1-2.

categorization of children and their stigmatization will be explored further in chapters two and four.

Although removing children from their families and putting them in institutions was a common approach to any social or family-related issues in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, it did not remain completely uncontested. In a discussion among public order officials in Latvia in 1964, criticism of excessive child removal surfaced. The officials reasserted the fact that parents were to blame for their children's crimes and that they had to be made responsible, regretting that all they could do is renounce parents' custody, although people should carry the moral responsibility for their children. The Latvian deputy minister for maintaining public order pointed out that 'rather than take a child from its mother, we have to conduct appropriate work with the mother. Taking children away is not a way out of the problem.'¹⁶⁶ This was a bold view in the Soviet 1960s. More commonly, official documents show evidence of parents being bullied into giving their children away, as this chapter has shown.

The criminalization of poverty, as well as the connection between poverty and residential institutions, was not a post-Stalinist invention. In her research on poverty and begging in the Soviet Union, Elena Zubkova has analysed the Stalinist mechanisms of fighting difference by classifying 'deviant' people or behaviour as 'socially alien' or 'socially dangerous'. At first, only people of the second category were repressed, but the border between the two collapsed during the Stalinist terror, turning poverty de facto into opposition. In 1951, when impoverished war veterans on the street made the plight of the urban poor visible to everyone, and, because of their honourable wartime effort, politically dangerous, Stalin started a new repressive campaign, during which 'beggars' who could work were put into labour camps, and those who could not into care homes.¹⁶⁷ Although repression was dialled down under Khrushchev's rule, the approach to beggars did not change: the authorities framed begging as 'parasitism', as a life choice without social or economic reasons, and rejected it in the context of their 'social usefulness' discourse.¹⁶⁸

The Soviet agencies designed to impose public order and to police deviance were not only working with childcare agencies but were a significant part of the child welfare system. Such agencies ultimately sent groups of children deemed to need special attention from the state to

¹⁶⁶ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, l. 103 (1964).

¹⁶⁷ Zubkova, 'Les exclus', pp. 364-68. The word 'care' for these homes was somewhat misleading, however, as provision and living conditions in them were very poor. Zubkova framed them as 'veritable ghettos for the poor', see *ibid.*, p. 372.

¹⁶⁸ Zubkova, 'Les exclus', pp. 381-82.

residential childcare institutions, so that they would not grow up to become deviant citizens. This category of deviance included delinquent children and children with disabilities, and also children who were feared to be future hooligans (or worse) due to their 'deviant' parents. The processes of marginalizing people by reclassifying them as criminals, which LaPierre has called the 'production' of deviance, is relevant to analyzing the institutionalization of children, where a similar classification takes place. In a larger context, public order and social welfare policies, as well as the system of residential childcare institutions were parts of a social engineering project. The specific purposes of such institutions, however, were more complex than that, and will be explored in the following chapter, which will study the post-Stalinist residential childcare network in its historical, political, and ideological context.

2.

Raising healthy, happy, and useful citizens: The theory of Soviet state childcare

In 1951 E.P. Andreieva, educator in a Leningrad children's home, explained in an article about children's home education how she taught the kids in her group good behaviour and created a 'child collective'. She chose to exemplify this point by describing how the children dealt with peers with disabilities, bringing up the case of Tonia:

Tonia has a bad limp (osseous tuberculosis). The girl is irritable, moody, and aggressive. The children try hard to moderate and correct these unpleasant character traits. They never forget Tonia. Tonia gets the prettiest dresses and shoes. Tonia cannot walk very well, so her comrades help her on the way to school or to the bathroom [...]. How much crudeness the girls and boys have to take from her! But they always forgive her because they know that the reason for their irritability lies in her physical defect, her illness.¹

The educator claimed to be forming a 'collective' and to teach the children 'comradely' behaviour. Yet she singled out Tonia for her so-called 'defect' and stigmatized her under the cover of being helpful and understanding. The girl was used as a tool to teach everyone else about collectivism, and how to behave towards 'sick' people. Tonia was neither seen as part of the collective, nor as an individual of her own – in the educator's writing, she appears as a 'diagnosis', and all of her behaviour was framed in connection to 'her physical defect'. The educator considered her limp a sufficient reason for being 'unpleasant', and she did not otherwise attempt to explain her behaviour. This pedagogic tale raises many questions about the conceptualization of children and childhood in Soviet residential childcare institutions: why was Tonia treated differently from the others, and why did her so-called 'defect' serve as a logical explanation for 'bad' behaviour? Why was the girl excluded from the 'collective'; and what was the educator trying to achieve with this approach?

These questions are connected to the much broader topic of the goals and purposes of residential childcare institutions, as well as how Soviet experts of education planned to achieve

¹ See E.P. Andrejewa, 'Arbeitserfahrungen bei der sittlichen Erziehung im Kinderheim', in *Erfahrungen aus sowjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954, orig. in Russian 1951), pp. 90-104, here pp. 96-97.

these, that is the theory of Soviet state childcare. Whereas the previous chapter looked at the reasons for institutionalizing children, pointing at questions of social order in a de-Stalinized USSR, this chapter will deal with the question of what the upbringing in these institutions was supposed to achieve, which shifts the focus from the state of Soviet society to the minds behind the system of residential childcare. The purposes of these institutions need to be considered in the context of Khrushchev's 1958 education reform, which prescribed setting up a system of boarding schools to educate the future builders of communism, or in the slightly more hyperbolic phrasing by the Russian Minister of Education Afanasenko: 'from day one of their being in the boarding school, the children must be taught to understand that they have to be the builders of a communist society among millions of other builders [...] and that, still at school, they have to do their bit in the labour of workers and peasants'².

This chapter will thus look at the design of the network of residential childcare institutions, and the way in which children were conceptualized. As chaotic as the residential childcare network appeared at first glance, with its numerous institutions controlled by different ministries, it was designed to maximize its inmates' productivity once they joined the working population, as this chapter will argue. This happened at the levels of external as well as internal organization. To clarify how the implemented network aimed at enhancing future productivity, the chapter will first show how children were classified according to different types of institutions and how this classification took place along categories of *biopower*. With the help of Raphael's theory of the scientization of social matters, it will investigate the role of science in this education project, looking at how children were conceptualized and the impact of this 'scientific' influence on childcare. These points will be framed by a chronological history of the Soviet system of residential childcare institutions after Stalin's death, pointing out continuities and changes throughout the decades. By analyzing the connection between social destitution and misdiagnoses, the chapter will argue that reformers and scientists played a problematic role in marginalizing and medicalizing Soviet children in care.

Socialist tradition and Stalinist legacy: collectivism, discipline, and control in education before the 1958 Reform

Boarding schools existed in the Soviet Union before the 1958 reform, but only in specific contexts: either as elite institutions, schools for nomad children, for children with certain disabilities, or – and this was most common – facilities in remote areas called *shkola s internatom*

² Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, p. 17.

or *shkolnyi internat*, whose purpose was to allow children from rural areas to receive more than elementary schooling.³ The 1958 reform should be understood in the context of the terrible state of education and childcare after the Second World War and after Stalin's death, which added to the social problems of poverty, child neglect, and delinquency.⁴ Even before the war, many children throughout the Union had not had access to school education.⁵ Attempts to build boarding facilities for children in remote areas as well as for blind and deaf children were thus rekindled after the war, but until 1955 there were no attempts to make this a general policy.⁶

In Soviet education, there was a general trend towards extending school education: in 1949, compulsory schooling was prolonged to seven years, and to eight years from 1959. These measures, however, had the potential to expose the problematic state of the school system. The 1949 extension, for instance, impressively showed that neither the children and teachers, nor education administrations were ready for it, especially in the countryside. This resulted in high drop-out rates. Still in 1956, only 73.2 percent of urban and 45 percent of rural children finished seven years of schooling. When it comes to rural settings, it is likely that high drop-out rates were linked to the lack of boarding facilities, which was one of the factors making a reform in this area necessary.⁷ These high failing rates along with the general state of Soviet school education became one of the core topics in the discussions about the boarding school system.⁸ The bad conditions in schools and decreasing access to education can be linked both to the war and the education policies in late Stalinism, when most of the available funding went to elite institutions.⁹

Not only general schools were in a problematic state at that time, also the residential childcare network found itself in destitute conditions. During the war, children's homes had often been set up in a rush without the necessary funding, so that living conditions in them tended to be precarious. In addition to problems of overcrowding in homes and *priemniki*, living standards were very low and provision problematic in the war and immediate post-war years, as

³ Maiofis, 'Pansiony trudovykh rezervov'; K.S. Tikhomirov, *Shkol'nye internaty* (Moscow, 1953).

⁴ About the state of the Soviet school, the strain put on school teachers, and children dropping out of school to take to the streets, see Kucherenko, *Soviet Street Children*, pp. 17-19.

⁵ About Soviet education before Stalin's death, see Larry Holmes, *The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse: Reforming Education in Soviet Russia, 1917-1931* (Bloomington, 1991); Thomas Ewing, *Separate Schools: Gender, Policy, and Practice in Postwar Soviet Education* (DeKalb, 2010).

⁶ Maiofis, 'Pansiony trudovykh rezervov'.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ See Afanasenko's speech in Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, p. 18.

⁹ Andy Byford and Polly Jones, 'Policies and Practices of Transition in Soviet Education from the Revolution to the End of Socialism', *History of Education* 35.4-5 (2006), pp. 419-26, p. 422.

abandoned children in institutions were last in line to be provided with food, clothes, and other things.¹⁰ Reports also mentioned occurrences of neglect, abuse and rape by staff.¹¹ In the 1950s, the children's home population was in steep decline, as the World War orphans grew up.¹² Reports from the Russian Ministry of Education bear witness to the closing and reorganizing of children's homes because they were not needed anymore, too isolated, or in unacceptable conditions. In 1955, for instance, the ministry planned to close 275 children's homes in the RSFSR, or to turn them into institutions for children with special needs.¹³ The education offered in Soviet children's homes was also not up to standard. Although from 1955, the best pupils of a children's home could go on to school after seven years (before that, they had been sent to work right away), children in care often failed to keep up with the 'family kids' at school, meaning few were able to make use of that opportunity.¹⁴

The Soviet residential childcare system maintained certain characteristics throughout Soviet history. From the 1920s, institutions were run by different ministries, depending on the category of children that they were supposed to take care of. Ill children as well as children under the age of three would be sent to institutions by the Ministry of Health; children with more 'serious' disabilities came to homes run by the Ministry of Social Welfare; children convicted for crimes or 'delinquent' behaviour were sent to colonies run by the Ministry of the Interior, while all the other children in care (children with and without parental care, children with learning difficulties, children with physical impairments) ended up in the diverse institutions of the Ministry of Education.¹⁵ Certain ideas, such as raising 'useful' or 'productive' citizens, had been central to these institutions before Khrushchev came to power, as the following children's home director's assessment of the goal of his work shows: 'the children's home will always in all of its work aim to raise healthy, positive [*zhibizneradost'nye*], and useful citizens of our socialist homeland.'¹⁶

¹⁰ Zezina, 'Without a Family', p. 64.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹² Harwin, *Children of the Russian State*, p. 30.


¹³ GARF, f. A2306, op. 72, d. 3539; d. 3542, l. 107 (1954).

¹⁴ Zanozina and Kolosova (eds), *Sirotsvo i besprizornost'*, p. 132.

¹⁵ Kelly, *Children's World*, pp. 258-59.

¹⁶ GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115, l. 32 (1953/54).

Figure 2.1 Rough overview of the network of residential childcare institutions in the USSR with regard to administrative responsibility.



Measures towards the 1958 reform began several years before its implementation. One of Khrushchev's education concepts, 'polytechnical education' and the 'preparation of pupils for practical activity' went back to directives from the XIX Party Congress in 1952, and had been advocated in the Central Committee by Alexandr Shelepin (Komsomol) and Genrikh Zelenko (Labour Reserves) to get more young people into productive labour.¹⁷ This shift was motivated by the realization that labour training curricula were ignoring technological progress, and that simple sewing and carpentry workshops would not prepare children for labour in an industrialized society.¹⁸ Work education was re-introduced in schools in 1954 under the slogan 'linking school with life', which later became the catch phrase of Khrushchev's education reform.¹⁹ At the same time, the administration reintroduced coeducation after several years of experimentation with separate schooling.²⁰ Recently, research about the Khrushchev era has pointed out such Stalin-era 'prequels' to Khrushchevian policies in several other examples, such as the partial dismantling of the GULag and the housing reform.²¹

¹⁷ I.A. Kairov, 'O perekhode k sovместnomu obucheniiu v shkole', *Pravda*, 20 July 1954, p. 2. (Kairov was the Russian Minister for Education at that time). See also Coumel, 'L'appareil du parti', p. 176.

¹⁸ M.I. Demidow, 'Erfahrungen mit den neuen Lehrplänen für Arbeitsausbildung und -erziehung', in *Erfahrungen aus sowjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 170-83, p. 170.

¹⁹ Larry Holmes, 'Magic into Hocus Pocus: The Decline of Labor Education in Soviet Russia's Schools, 1931-1937', *The Russian Review* 51.4 (1992), pp. 545-65; Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 117; this term is also part of the boarding school campaign, see Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, p. 3.

²⁰ Ewing, *Separate Schools*, p. 4.

²¹ Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Ruling Circle, 1945-1953* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 124-32; Smith, *Property of Communists*, pp. 10-12.

The involvement of the social sciences in education and childcare also began long before Khrushchev's education reform, although the so-called *scientization* of social matters in the Soviet Union has often been described as having occurred after the Second World War, accelerating after Khrushchev's ousting. A typical example of such a 'new' involvement would be the rationalization and expert regimes around the housing reform of 1958, as Mark Smith has shown.²² The classification of children according to 'scientific' criteria, however, can be traced back to the 1920s, when the discipline of Paedology (*Pediatriia*) embraced all aspects of childhood, combining medicine, psychology, sociology, and sometimes pedagogy. Soviet paedologists gathered and linked data about the children, their families, their habits and lives – not only to understand child development better, but also to classify children according to health and behaviour.²³ In the late 1920s and early 1930s, paedology was hailed as the scientific basis for educating the new Soviet person, and pedagogy served as 'applied paedology', built on the belief that it was possible to 'restructure the entire activity of a child by ... changing his surroundings'.²⁴ The disciplines researching 'deviant childhood', such as 'psychoneurology' and 'defectology', also existed from the beginning of the Soviet Union.²⁵

Paedologists had developed the basic concepts of socialist education in the 1920s and 1930s, which remained relevant until the Union's collapse. When Soviet authorities discussed ideas of a boarding school reform throughout the 1950s, the need for a sound theoretical basis for such schools arose. During these years, the Ministry of Education published numerous text collections in which children's home staff reported their experiences of residential education and offered their expertise to support the setup of the new school type.²⁶ These publications were shaped by ideology, thus they are useful for illustrating how education workers understood the rather abstract socialist concepts, and how they developed socialist education on a rather experimental basis. The education professionals adopted the basic concepts of

²² Smith, *Property of Communists*.

²³ Jean Ispa, *Child Care in Russia: In Transition* (Westport/London, 1994), p. 10.

²⁴ Igal Halfin, *Terror in my Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial* (Cambridge, MA 2003), p. 233, 236.

²⁵ Nancy Rollins, *Child Psychiatry in the Soviet Union: Preliminary Observations* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 10-11.

'Defectology' was the scientific discipline dealing with research on disabilities, as well as therapy and teaching people with disabilities in the Soviet Union. It was a blend of medicine, psychology, sometimes engineering, and pedagogy; but institutionally it belonged to the Institute of Pedagogy. In the early Soviet years, 'defectology' was mostly based on Lev Vygotsky's research, until both his research and 'his' journal *Voprosy defektologii* were silenced by Stalin. 'Defectology' and other disciplines that had contributed to a 'science-based' childcare were curtailed and completely subjected to ideological doctrine, such as psychology (psychoanalysis was banned), paedology (which was labelled 'pessimistic and defeatist', as well as a 'pseudoscience'), and genetics. Rollins, *Child Psychiatry*, pp. 13-14; Halfin, *Terror in My Soul*, p. 237-39.

²⁶ L.M. Ziubina, *Vospitatel'naiia rabota v detskikh domov* (Moscow, 1961), p. 3: 'Children's homes have accumulated a lot of experience. Generalizing this experience is now especially necessary in connection with the gradual transformation of orphanages into boarding schools.'

socialist education, such as the collective, the *rezhim*, and discipline, which will be studied individually in the following section. Education in residential childcare institutions in the USSR was, and continued to be, based on these concepts.

The collective between inclusion and exclusion: children as a resource for the state

The ‘collective’ was one of the most basic and commonplace concepts in (not only) Soviet socialism. It was one of the concepts figuring in every other publication or speech (much like the obligatory Lenin quote).²⁷ In his classic study *The Collective and the Individual in Russia*, Oleg Kharkhordin introduced the concept by saying that ‘the word was so widespread as to become uninteresting for theoretical analysis’. On another level, however, as it denoted a particular form of social organization or group, it was culturally specific to the Soviet Union. The term *kollektiv* went through a shift in meaning throughout the Soviet period: while in the early Soviet Union it designated specific political bodies, it became more general and less political after the Second World War.²⁸ It remained, however, a way of organizing and controlling people, or as famous pedagogue Anton Makarenko would phrase it, a ‘technology of no mercy’.²⁹ Generally, a collective meant at the same time that people were equal and that individuals were not important, it was about living and working together, trying to achieve the same goal.³⁰ It was linked to the Marxist belief that human beings could develop their full potential and be free only in the collective.³¹

In educational theory, albeit slightly overused, the term ‘collective’ was more than an ideological buzzword to vaguely sum up ‘socialist life’, but a concept which developed dynamically around tensions with regard to the individual as well as authority. In theoretical texts, the ‘collective’ was often likened to a living organism: in an article about educating the collective and individual in boarding schools for children with disability, the pedagogue S.I. Stankina defined the collective as ‘a living social organism which, because it is an organism, has organs, so there is authority and the relationship and interdependence between parts – and

²⁷ Such as in Nikita Khrushchev’s speech to the Soviet Writers’ Union: ‘There is no bigger blessing for a human being, than to live in a collective, to work with the collective and be aware of working for the good of your society (*obshchestvo*), your motherland.’ In: *Pravda* 24.05.1959, p. 1.

²⁸ Kharkhordin, *The Collective*, p. 75. In a ‘Dictionary of Family Education’ from 1967, for instance, the family, the kindergarten, and schools are called collectives; and the ‘family collective’ is defined as ‘a friendly, close-knit family, bound together by common goals, interests, and unified views’. See *Semeinoe vospitanie*, pp. 114-15.

²⁹ Kharkhordin, *The Collective*, p. 76. Makarenko’s work with abandoned and delinquent minors had made him one of the major reference points for Soviet education. He was referenced in most academic works about residential childcare.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 104.

³¹ ‘Vvdenie’, in A.G. Umanskii, A.N. Lavrik, and K.Z. Asaturova, *Organizatsiia kollektiva vospitannikov v detskom dome* (Moscow, 1958), pp. 3-9, here p. 3.

without these, there is no collective'.³² Indeed, at least in the Soviet context, the collective was not a libertarian but rather an authoritarian concept, although it was not merely a simple relationship of domination and subjugation by force. At least in theory, people should subjugate themselves to the collective voluntarily.

The 'collective' thus presupposed complete homogeneity of its individual members, which could have inclusive as well as exclusive effects. The pedagogue N.V. Sharonova illustrated the voluntary subordination to the children in her care by comparing them to soldiers and peasants, as both were submitted their individual interest to a bigger whole. This is striking, just as her somewhat circular argument to point out the perks of collectivism: 'thus we showed the children with the help of concrete examples that the subordination to the will of the collective is the fulfilment of one's own will because everyone is a part of that collective.'³³ In line with the 'organism' metaphor, people who did not or could not integrate into the collective became 'germs' or 'viruses' in such pedagogic texts. Sharonova, for instance, described how new children arrived at the children's home from diverse places, full of bad habits and uncivilized ways: 'We feared hooliganism, rudeness, and theft as you'd fear diphtheria or typhus. The organism of our home was not healthy, hardened, and strong enough. We had a big task before us, to make the home immune to the dangerous and corroding influence of troublemakers.'³⁴

Throughout the years, Soviet pedagogues had developed practical applications of these theoretical rules. Their descriptions of how to build a collective in a home or school show that they perceived the 'collective' as a pattern of organization as well as a means of enforcing certain behaviours, putting the children under considerable pressure in the process. Pedagogic texts often broke down forming a collective into four steps. The first step was to teach children *samoobluzhivanie* (or self-care, which included personal hygiene and taking care of one's clothes), as well as *byt* (mainly, keeping the house clean and tidy). The following stages were forming school (or learning) collectives, Pioneer and Komsomol work, and teaching children independence.³⁵ Forming such a collective 'properly', as educators agreed, could take several

³² S.I. Stankina, 'K voprosu o vospitanii kollektiva i lichnosti vo vspomogatel'noi shkole-internate,' *Spetsial'naiia shkola* 115.3 (1965), pp. 37-42, p. 37.

³³ N.W. Scharonowa, 'Die Erziehung des Kinderkollektivs', in *Erfahrungen aus sowjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 119-44, here p. 127. See also about 'voluntary subordination': Maiofis, 'Pansiony trudovykh rezervov'.

³⁴ Scharonowa, 'Erziehung des Kinderkollektivs', p. 121.

³⁵ V.M. Galuzinskii, 'My stali edinoi i druzhnoi sem'er', in E.I. Afanasenko, I.A. Kairova (eds), *Piat' let shkol-internator*, (Moscow, 1961), pp. 208-21, p. 210.

years.³⁶ Once a child collective was in place and functioning, it was much easier to integrate new people, although in a way the collective had to be ‘created anew’ every time a child joined or left it.³⁷ School provides a good example of how a collective was supposed to work. To make everyone pass their exams, every individual child’s learning progress became a matter of honour: ‘in meetings and discussions, we persuaded the children that every bad grade, every breach of discipline would undermine the authority and honour of the children’s home.’³⁸ This created enormous pressure and could turn the children against each other.

Educators discussed ‘healthy’ relationships between the children in a manner typical of descriptions of professional behaviour at a workplace, which included being friendly, supportive, and respectful, while still being openly critical of each other. All social relationships and inner workings of a collective were subsumed under the (arguably fuzzy) term ‘comradeliness’, seemingly designating a degree of cooperation. Such ‘comradeliness’ was seen as the precondition for forming a collective.³⁹ As N.D. Levitov pointed out, in a collective one had to be everyone’s comrade but not everyone’s friend.⁴⁰ According to him, it was the task of educators to observe and monitor the friendships between children.⁴¹ Friendship, however, was not a private matter or about personal feelings: ‘the children have to be aware that [comradeship and friendship] are not about personal feelings that are nobody’s business but their own, but that they are responsible for them before society.’ This meant that if a friend did something wrong and a one-to-one conversation would not help, then the person would have to inform the collective.⁴²

In such a child collective, behaviour would be enforced by something like controlled peer pressure. Unsatisfactory behaviour (sloppiness, tardiness, bad grades) could lead to a meeting of the whole institution, and the child’s behaviour was discussed ‘in public’: ‘whenever one of the children had not worked diligently, the case was seriously discussed by the comrades of the circle. This usually had a strong impact on the person in question. The circles openly

³⁶ S.P. Val’eva, P.I. Shpital’nik (eds), *Detskii gorodok v Nizhnem Tagile* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 15-16.

³⁷ Umanskii, Lavrik, and Asaturova, *Organizatsiia kollektiva*, p. 19; Val’eva and Shpital’nik, *Detskii gorodok*, pp. 4-5. In this process, the educators differed from Makarenko’s approach, who started from the other end, first (physically, if necessary) enforcing certain behaviour, forming a gang-like group, and then to have the group civilize its members. He considered that children arriving at his ‘colony’ not to be ‘civilised’ enough for a softer approach, see Kharkhordin, *The Collective*, pp. 101-03.

³⁸ T.S. Lasarewa, ‘Das pädagogische Kollektiv des Kinderheims im Kampf um gute Lernergebnisse der Schüler’, in *Erfahrungen aus sowjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 13-24, here pp. 13, 17.

³⁹ Andrejewa, ‘Arbeitserfahrungen’, pp. 91, 96. See similar conceptions in Kharkhordin, *The Collective*, pp. 107-09.

⁴⁰ N.D. Lewitow, ‘Kameradschaft und Freundschaft bei Kindern im Schulalter’, in *Erziehungsarbeit im sowjetischen Kinderheim* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 9-22, here pp. 10-11.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 16-18.

criticized each other's work.⁴³ The collective formed what was called a 'public opinion' (*obsbchestvennoe mnenie*), which in a negative case came down to public shaming but could also result in public praise.⁴⁴ Soviet pedagogues considered this to be one of the most effective forms of disciplining people and homogenizing behaviour in a group. As S.P. Val'eva and P.I. Shpital'nik put it, 'public opinion – that's the ideological cement keeping the children's collective together.'⁴⁵

The collective was an ambivalent idea. On the one hand, it could create mutual support. Sharonova, for instance, mentioned the example of a boy who had been caught stealing. The other kids wanted to kick him out for 'bringing shame upon the home'. The educator, however, pointed out that this would have meant a conviction to a colony, which motivated them to give him another chance.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the collective was an authoritarian concept, as the children could not choose how they wanted to lead their collective lives. Pedagogic texts often described cases in which children would help and support each other, but not in the way the educators wanted.⁴⁷ In one example, a girl approached A.D. Solev'eva. She was upset because a boy had refused to help another in an algebra test. Following the logic of collectivism, she argued that none of the collective should stay behind. The educator, however, pointed out that if the boy had not prepared for the test, he would be undeserving of help.⁴⁸ In the end, these children were thought of as a resource for the state. Sharonova makes this claim explicit in the example of a boy who had fallen ill after going swimming without permission: 'his offence had been to disrupt the discipline and to act irresponsibly against his health, which both him and his motherland need.'⁴⁹ Consistent with the concept of *biopower*, the 'collective' served as a mechanism of control, and of harnessing the children's labour for the Soviet project.

⁴³ S.P. Mosgowaja, 'Drei Jahre Arbeit in der Gruppe', in *Erfahrungen aus sonjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 157-69, here pp. 165-66.

⁴⁴ 'We have to be ashamed because of you', see Mosgowaja, 'Drei Jahre Arbeit', pp. 165-66. This ritualistic form of publicly judging people's behaviour was not limited to childcare institutions, but practiced in all Soviet collectives, for instance at workplaces. See for instance LaPierre, *Hooligans*, pp. 150-51, 165-66; Kharkhordin, *The Collective*, pp. 114-15.

⁴⁵ Val'eva and Shpital'nik, *Detskij gorodok*, pp. 15-16.

⁴⁶ Scharonowa, 'Erziehung des Kinderkollektivs', p. 135.

⁴⁷ Andrejewa, 'Arbeitsverfahren', p. 100.

⁴⁸ A.D. Solowjowa, 'Die Entwicklung des Kinderkollektivs', in *Heimerzieher berichten: Beiträge sonjetischer Erzieher* (Berlin, 1955), pp. 3-17, here pp. 12-13. This story might have looked quite different from the children's perspective, as they often felt they had to stick together against the staff: see chapter four.

⁴⁹ Scharonowa, 'Erziehung des Kinderkollektivs', pp. 139-40.

The rezhim: organization or over-regimentation?

In Soviet children's homes and boarding schools, time was planned rigidly and 'rationally', between school, work, exercise, other organized activities, meals, and sleep. Educational theorists believed that such rational planning would bring forth a child's natural dispositions, so that they could steer children towards the 'right career path' according to their talents.⁵⁰ This way of organizing the children's time changed surprisingly little from the 1950s to the 1980s, as comparing different manuals and texts from different decades shows.⁵¹ Such a *rezhim* allowed members of staff nearly complete control over the children's everyday lives. They believed it to do much more than that, however. The *rezhim* was supposed to teach children discipline and order, purposefulness, accuracy, and determination, and to boost their physical and psychological development. The *rezhim*, as most underlying concepts of Soviet childcare, was backed by scientific research. In a 1954 manual on the topic, the authors linked the theory behind the *rezhim* to neurological research by I.P. Pavlov, and they gave scientific explanations for every aspect of the *rezhim*, which was supposed to optimize the children's health and development.⁵²

Such a *rezhim* divided up the day into units and put the children under constant pressure. Apart from longer sections like sleep and school lessons, the day was broken down into small blocks of 20, 30, 45 minutes; sometimes an hour or 90 minutes.⁵³ A 1976 manual for children's home educators described such a daily *rezhim*, pointing out wherever possible how rational, efficient, and good for the children's health it was. It did not, however, reflect on how intense this type of organization could be. Take, for example, a typical morning routine in such an institution: 'the inmates' day began with waking, gymnastics, freshening up, cleaning up. In 30-40 minutes they would have to successfully fulfil all of this well, quickly, and with benefit for their health; because on this depends the cheerfulness, activity, and efficiency of the inmates for the whole day.'⁵⁴ Meal times were planned to be speedy: 20 minutes for breakfast, 30 minutes for lunch, 10-15 minutes for a snack, 20 minutes for dinner; because 'the time is completely sufficient for

⁵⁰ Maiofis, 'Pensioni trudovykh rezervov'.

⁵¹ In the following, theoretical texts on the regime from 1954, 1976, and 1987 will be consulted: G.P. Sal'nikova, *Rezhim dnia vospitannikov shkol'nogo detskogo doma* (Moscow, 1954); Iu.V. Gerbeev and A.A. Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty v detskom dome: Posobie dlia vospitatelia* (Moscow, 1976); T.L. Bogina and N.T. Terekhova, *Rezhim Dnia v Detskom sadu* (Moscow, 1987), p. 4, quoted by Ispa, *Child Care*, p. 71.

⁵² Sal'nikova, *Rezhim dnia*, p. 3; Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchaniie*, p. 23; N.S. Iakovlev, *Zapiski direktora shkoly* (Moscow, 1987), pp. 9-10.

⁵³ Sal'nikova, *Rezhim dnia*, pp. 5-6, 33.

⁵⁴ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, p. 148.

normal food intake'. As the manual pointed out, taking more time would 'unacceptable' because it would affect other time units (*rezhimnykh momentov*).⁵⁵

Figure 2.2 Exemplary daily *rezhim* for a children's home

	7-8 years / grade I	8-11 years / grades II-IV	11-13 years / grades V-VI	14 years &more / grade VII & higher
Waking and getting up	7	7	7	7
Gymnastics, washing, tidying beds and dorms	7.00-7.40	7.00-7.40	7.00-7.40	7.00-7.40
Breakfast	7.40-8.00	7.40-8.00	7.40-8.00	7.40-8.00
School, including trips	8.00-12.50	8.00-12.50	8.00-13.45	8.00-14.40
Lunch	12.50-13.20	12.50-13.20	13.45-14.15	14.40-15.10
Nap	13.20-14.50	—	—	—
Play outside	14.50-16.20	13.20-14.50	14.15-15.45	15.10-16.10
Afternoon snack	16.20-16.35	16.20-16.35	16.45-17.00	At school
Homework	16.35-17.35	14.50-16.20	15.45-16.45 17.00-18.30	16.10-19.10
Labour lesson	17.35-18.20	16.35-17.45	18.30-20.00	19.10-20.40
Extracurricular lessons	18.20-19.10	17.45-19.10	—	—
Dinner	19.10-19.30	19.10-19.30	20.00-20.20	20.40-21.00
Time outside	19.30-20.00	19.30-20.00	20.20-21.00	21.00-21.40
Preparing for bed, sleep	20.00-7.00	20.00-7.00	21.00-7.00	21.40-7.00

Based on: G.P. Sal'nikova, *Rezhim dnia vospitannikov sbkol'nogo detskogo doma* (Moscow, 1954), p. 5.

Texts about the *rezhim* convey the pressure exerted by the strict timings, as well as the almost religious belief in its necessity: 'the daily *rezhim* is the law for all pupils. There absolutely cannot be any exceptions for anyone among them.'⁵⁶ They explained that nothing should be delayed, and that breaching it would have disastrous consequences on the collective because children would lose the sense of responsibility, fall out of the rhythm and lose respect for elders.⁵⁷ In her study of Soviet childcare in the late and post-Soviet years, Jean Ispa quoted a pedagogic book from 1987, saying that besides making children healthy, a *rezhim*

⁵⁵ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, pp. 149-50.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 147-48.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 146-47; Val'eva and Shpital'nik, *Detskii gorodok*, p. 18.

develops the ability to adapt to new situations and permits stability in the face of negative influences. As a rule [!], children who have gotten used to an established schedule appropriate to their ages are well-disciplined, sociable, active; have even dispositions and good work habits; and rarely suffer from lack of appetite.⁵⁸

Whereas a strict schedule developing flexibility simply sounds counterintuitive, this whole approach conveys the impression that a rationally planned week can solve all problems.

In such a rigid schedule, free time and relaxation were contested notions. In the context of health and wellbeing, manuals emphasized the importance of being outside in the fresh air as often as possible. As part of the *rezhim*, two to three hours per day (depending on age) were prescribed, although the 1976 manual included walking to and from school in that time.⁵⁹ Pedagogues always pointed out how important extracurricular (*vnesbkolnaia*) time was for the children's development. However, unorganized free time for the children to dispose of was only a small part of it. Extracurricular time was mostly taken up by so-called circles (*kruzhki*), which were organized by the school, the institution, or the Pioneer organization. Possible topics of such lessons were school subjects, technology, literature, sports, theatre, music, crafts, and many more. Excursions to the cinema or museum, outdoor exercise or play were also possible.⁶⁰ However, political education, Pioneer activities, socially useful or productive labour (like helping out on a farm, picking up rubbish in the nearest town, or building a playground) also counted as 'leisure'. The time for these activities was strictly limited, so it needed to be used 'rationally', as Gerbeev and Vinogradova explained.⁶¹

Even (or especially) days without school, such as Sundays or the summer break, were rigidly planned and would contain labour units. Every minute of the children's time had to be useful: 'the time that becomes free on such days in large quantities for the children's recreation needs to be used skilfully, with a high coefficient of usefulness. Every minute must be used to support health, for the mental and physical development of the children.'⁶² In what Gerbeev and Vinogradova called 'effective leisure', the children should have as many activities outside as possible, to support their immune system.⁶³ There was the opportunity to have excursions into nature, to factories or farms, or trips to other parts of the country or holiday camps (which

⁵⁸ Bogina and Terekhova, *Rezhim Dnia*, p. 4, quoted by Ispa, *Child Care*, p. 71.

⁵⁹ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, pp. 151-52.

⁶⁰ Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, pp. 5, 20, 37-38; B.P. Jessipow, M.W. Fingenowa, and N.J. Chochlowa, 'Die Erziehung zur Diszipliniertheit im Kinderheim', in *Erziehungsarbeit im sowjetischen Kinderheim* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 39-48, here p. 46.

⁶¹ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, pp. 152, 154-56.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 154-55.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

also had a *režim*, of course). ‘Actual’ or personal free time for the children to do what they liked was an ambiguous category. Whereas Sal’nikova used ‘free activity’ (*svobodnoe zaniatie*) synonymously to extracurricular time, including personal time but also *krushki*, socially useful labour, or Pioneer activities (all of which 1-2.5 hours a day), Gerbeev and Vinogradova understood ‘free time’ (*svobodnoe vremia*) as a more personal activity.⁶⁴ They argued that

[a] pupil of an orphanage cannot do without free time. He, like every man, wants sometimes to be alone, to think, to read, to share his secret thoughts with a friend, to do what he likes. Such free time, at least twice a week, should be provided to the pupils.⁶⁵

It is likely that the years of experience with such institutions between the publication of Sal’nikova’s book in 1954 and the Gerbeev/Vinogradova one in 1976 led to the realization that both rules of the collective and the *režim* should be relaxed a little.

Doubts about over-regimentation by the *režim* were part of the debates around the boarding school reform in the late 1950s, although those did not seem to lead to significant changes. In the 1957 discussion of the boarding school reform, Minister of Education Afanasenko warned of ‘overdoing’ regimentation, noting that the *režim* had a potential of straining children physically and psychologically. In his speech, he pointed out that ‘the inmates of many boarding schools complain about a lack of free time, about a great over-regimentation (*zaorganizovannost’*) of their whole life.’ He criticized the fact that some children had to live in boarding schools on 12-14-hour schedules whilst leaving the building only up to two hours a day.⁶⁶ These doubts, however, are difficult to contextualize because pedagogues both promoted extreme organization and complained about too extreme organization. It is also difficult to say how flexible educators were in adapting the *režim*, although it seems that they were under considerable pressure not to ‘break’ it. When discussing watching documentary films to complement the children’s political education, Gerbeev and Vinogradov pointed out that this was doable but difficult because the *režim* ‘regulates the inmates’ lives to the minute’.⁶⁷ In another article, the pedagogue M.M. Iashchenko had the impulse to defend his practice of talking to the children about their day just before bedtime. He argued that this would not mean a breach of the *režim* because ‘you cannot regulate everything in life’.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Sal’nikova, *Režim dnia*, p. 25. The same is true for the 1957 boarding school discussions, see Kaz’min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, pp. 37-38.

⁶⁵ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel’noi raboty*, p. 155.

⁶⁶ Kaz’min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, p. 23.

⁶⁷ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel’noi raboty*, p. 130.

⁶⁸ M.M. Iashchenko, ‘Starshklassniki v kollektive shkol-internatov’, in E.I. Afanasenko and I.A. Kairova (eds), *Piat’ let sbkol-internatov* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 143-60, here p. 152.

Many of the elements which Soviet educational theorists framed within their concept of ‘socialist’ education were also described by Foucault as typical of *biopower* in the context of residential care. Foucault subsumed these approaches under the organization of space and time, as well as discipline, all of which served the larger aim to control the institution’s inmates. In such institutions, space is limited as well as divided, assigning space to every inmate to impede any uncontrolled group formation, movement, or communication.⁶⁹ In addition, the inmates’ time is organized: the inmates’ days are divided into certain rhythms, patterns, and repetitions, which does not only have the purpose of disciplining but also of an ideal and rational use of time.⁷⁰ By the means of such an organization of space and time, individuals can be observed, which is a central means of power and control in an institution. These aspects existed within the education system of state socialism, as has been shown. Practices of thorough observation and documentation as means of control were also part of the manuals, which urged educators to maintain a log or file about every child in their care.⁷¹

Both in Foucault’s institutions of *biopower* and the case of Soviet residential childcare institutions, this rigid organization was more than a way to achieve maximum efficiency with as little staff and money as possible. They wanted to discipline people and turn them into loyal subjects according to a certain norm (as has been suggested in chapter one). For the Soviet case, this can be illustrated further with socialist ideas about ‘discipline’. In Soviet articles and books about education in residential childcare institutions, the topic of discipline was prominent. *Discipline* entailed much more than ‘not causing any trouble’. In a very Marxist way – under the presumption that ‘social existence determines consciousness’ – *discipline* began with appearances, with the cleanliness and tidiness of the building and people in it, and with respectful and quiet behaviour. Theorists believed that a pleasant environment would remove the basis for children’s acquired bad behaviour. This belief in the disciplining power of an ordered environment explains why people inspecting children’s homes or boarding schools were not only checking on sanitary conditions but also on ‘cosiness’, oddly insisting on the importance of flower pots, curtains, and framed pictures.⁷² In such conditions, pedagogues

⁶⁹ Michel Foucault, *Überwachen und Strafen: Die Geburt des Gefängnisses* (Frankfurt, 1977), pp. 181-90.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 192-97.

⁷¹ Iashchenko, ‘Starsheklassniki’, pp. 158-59.

⁷² See for instance the insistence on cosy, clean, and beautiful rooms, A.E. Stachurcky, ‘Die Mitarbeit der Zöglinge bei der Ausgestaltung des Heimgrundstückes’, in *Erziehungsarbeit im sowjetischen Kinderheim* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 64-73, here p. 64.

believed, it was easier to teach children tidiness and cultured behaviour during meals, politeness and good manners, in other words ‘disciplined behaviour’.⁷³

However, there was still more to discipline in terms of Soviet educational theory: it had to become an ‘organic part of the personality’. They strived for some sort of enhanced discipline, which they called *distsiplinirovannost’*. This entailed cleanliness, tidiness, punctuality, doing work diligently and on time, respecting people and their property.⁷⁴ Not surprisingly, according to Soviet educational theory, a well-organized collective was the precondition for *distsiplinirovannost’*.⁷⁵ Although the Soviet education system found itself in a state of crisis after the Second World War and Stalin’s death, policy makers and pedagogues could rely on the complex ideological, theoretical, and institutional foundation to instigate reforms. This foundation, in all its complexity, bore tendencies of extreme rigidity and a desire to control and shape people after socialist ideals. In accordance with Foucault’s ideas about *biopower*, it seems as if the basic concepts of Soviet educational theory applied in residential institutions could indeed provide ideal conditions for such a ‘forming’ of productive Soviet subjects. The following section will examine how education reformers and Soviet scientists attempted to put such a system into practice. It will show that designing residential childcare around ideas of making children into productive labourers made children in care susceptible to additional marginalization.

Reforming Residential Childcare

Khrushchev had inherited many issues in- and outside of the education system from his predecessor. In the context of his de-Stalinization policies, the Soviet system of residential childcare was changed in many ways, not only by the actual education reform. Khrushchev’s dismantling of the Stalinist system of terror can be considered as one step in this direction. The obsession with juvenile crime remained but the punitive system was dramatically reduced, as the leadership’s focus shifted back from incarceration to re-education.⁷⁶ Reminiscent of the wave of GULag amnesties just after Stalin’s death, a decree from 14 August 1959 ordered a review of inmates’ cases in colonies where underage delinquents were being held for minor offences. As a result of the decree, about 70 percent of inmates were released from the juvenile colonies (DTK, DVK), leaving the administration with the difficult task of both reducing the

⁷³ N.W. Scharonowa, ‘Die Erziehung der Kinder zu kultiviertem Verhalten’, *Erfahrungen aus sowjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 105-18, here pp. 106-107, 109.

⁷⁴ Jessipow, Fingenowa, and Chochlowa, ‘Die Erziehung zur Diszipliniertheit’, pp. 39-40.

⁷⁵ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel’noi raboty*, p. 6.

⁷⁶ Kelly, *Children’s World*, p. 272.

system of colonies and finding work for all the young people that they had let go.⁷⁷ The following sections will show how the 1958 education reform set out to build a new network of educational institutions which were meant to solve a range of problems at once. This ‘overdrive’ led to the most pragmatic motives behind residential childcare taking the lead, as a case study on labour education will illustrate.

An ambitious but rocky start: the 1958 Reform

Khrushchev’s 1958 education reform marked an important break in the history of Soviet residential childcare. Despite its chaotic start, it shaped the system until the breakdown of the Soviet Union, even to this day. The reform was triggered by the decree of 24 December 1958 ‘On the linking of school to life and the future development of the educational system in the USSR’. One of the issues at its centre was labour, as Laurent Coumel pointed out: ‘life’ actually meant ‘production’ in this phrase.⁷⁸ Khrushchev first publicly mentioned the idea of forming a system of boarding schools at the XX Party Congress in 1956. The first announcements of the boarding school system in 1956 were followed by hectic and often chaotic activity because the first facilities were supposed to open in September that same year. However, central and regional officials were not sure what these institutions were supposed to be or to achieve, as Khrushchev had not been particularly clear in his speech.

For several years, different ideas about the purpose of these boarding schools, and the kinds of children who should be targeted, circulated, illustrating once more the ambivalent Soviet stance towards the family. The boarding school system was to be comprehensive but voluntary, open to all, and free for the poorest families.⁷⁹ Afanasenko (Russian Minister of Education) stressed that ‘no matter the conditions in the boarding schools, children shall only be taken in according to their parents’ wishes’.⁸⁰ At their first session, Soviet education officials discussed the possible uses for such schools, until Khrushchev himself clarified that these facilities were indeed not intended for the Soviet elite, and that they should replace the children’s homes (due to their bad reputation). Kairov, charged with putting the reform into practice, specified the targeted group of inmates further: ‘[the boarding school] is a well-designed educational facility for Soviet children, for orphans, ‘half-orphans’ (*polusirot*), for children from mothers with many

⁷⁷ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 7-8 (1960-61). The Soviet leadership met the same problems following the GULag amnesties, see Dobson, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer*, pp. 110-11.

⁷⁸ Coumel, ‘L’appareil du parti’, pp. 173, 176.

⁷⁹ Harwin, *Children of the Russian State*, pp. 22, 28.

⁸⁰ Kaz’min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, pp. 12-13.

children, for disabled children, for children wherever the conditions for bringing them up are insufficient'.⁸¹

These statements suggest that Soviet authorities had envisioned that the boarding schools would support families in need. However, it seems that another motive was to strengthen the state's part in bringing up Soviet children. During a Central Committee session on the reform in April 1957, Afanasenko concluded his deliberations about the new boarding schools saying that 'one thing is perfectly clear: setting up boarding school is not only a means of meeting today's pressing needs of families without sufficient conditions to bring up their children. It is the beginning of a new system of education [...], reinforcing the role of the state in children's education.'⁸² This stance, however, was only deemed acceptable to a certain extent, as the reaction to Stanislav Strumilin's ideas shows. In 1960, the economist wrote in *Novyi Mir*: 'every Soviet citizen will go straight from the maternity home to a nursery school, from there to a twenty-four-hour kindergarten or children's home, then to a boarding school, which he will leave holding a free pass for an independent life.'⁸³ According to Deborah Field, Strumilin was criticized for that article for going too far by promoting the 'withering away of the family'.⁸⁴

Despite this potpourri of political motives (ideological project, social welfare, fighting poverty, raising workers for state purposes, expanding state control), it seems that the idea of tackling social problems with these schools had been part of the boarding schools reform pretty much from the outset. Throughout the discussions about the setup of the residential childcare system, many different problems appeared, like children dropping out of school, repeating or failing a year; the criminalization of schools and the streets; the low level of material security and hygiene (poverty and neglect) in many Soviet families (preventing many children from doing their homework or even going to school); the labour shortage and low prestige of productive labour jobs.⁸⁵ Thus the setup of the 'new' educational system began with a paradox – children would be prepared better for life in society by taking them out of society.

The implementation of this project met several practical problems, mainly of financial and organizational nature. In 1957, Afanasenko complained that the building of boarding school network was going slowly, due to the 'inattention' of education departments and Party

⁸¹ Maiofis, 'Pansiony trudovykh rezervov'.

⁸² Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, p. 13.

⁸³ *Novyi Mir*, no. 7 (1960), p. 208, quoted in Zezina, 'Without a Family', p. 70.

⁸⁴ Field, *Private Life*, p. 83.

⁸⁵ Maiofis, 'Pansiony trudovykh rezervov'.

organizations in charge.⁸⁶ Time and again, building targets were not met, although the numbers given about how many boarding school places were actually created vary.⁸⁷ Many reports from the RSFSR regions show lengthy delays in the building programme's seven-year-plan, with the plan only half-completed after more than five years, although, to be fair, several regional agencies had only been allocated about half of the funds as well. Another point of criticism was the low quality of the outcome, as some of the schools had terrible living and sanitary conditions.⁸⁸ It is fair to assume that many regional administrations either did not have the means or the motivation of committing themselves to the boarding school building programme and resorted to fulfilling the plan merely on paper.

In 1961, the Ministry of Education held a major review of the experiences with the implementation of the reform, which showed that in the midst of material problems, the children's education was often neglected. An edited volume published for the occasion named many successes like the first graduates having successfully entered work life. However, the articles also addressed the issues met in implementing the boarding school reform: 'we barely had time to get acquainted with the kids, organize their everyday lives (*byt*), study and leisure; the collectives in class were only just being formed, and there were many organizational difficulties, and, honestly, we could not even think about the issue of educating individual children.' The educator admitted to not having achieved much in their first year of existence, and went on to explain that their second year became even more difficult by the pressures put on them by the 1958 reform to 'link school to life'.⁸⁹ Other basic issues with the implementation of the reform had not changed, as staff did not have enough training, the building was lagging behind; and the reorganization of children's homes into boarding schools was not well-planned.⁹⁰

The most disastrous consequence of the delays in the building plan was severe overcrowding in the existing institutions, which often made normal living and learning impossible; and the opening of boarding schools that were not actually finished. Some boarding schools would house two or three times as many students as allowed per norm, meaning that children had to

⁸⁶ Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, pp. 8-9.

⁸⁷ Bogdanov mentions 180,000 boarding school inmates in 1958 and 1 million in 1960, whereas Harwin mentions 600,000 children in 1960. See Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotsvo i besprizornost'*, p. 141; Harwin, *Children of the Russian State*, p. 28; Kelly, *Children's World*, p. 263.

⁸⁸ See GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81, 92-96 (1961-62); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70; GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 39-47, 81-100 (1962).

⁸⁹ Iashchenko, 'Starshklassniki', p. 144.

⁹⁰ GASO, f. R233, op.5, d. 1471, ll. 35-47, ll. 36-37 (1961).

share beds, and that meals and lessons had to be conducted in two, three, or even four shifts.⁹¹ This situation was not new to Soviet schools but it was exactly one of those problems that the education reform was supposed to solve.⁹² Even the living quarters or school buildings that were finished often did not meet the high standards of ‘polytechnical education’, lacking *kabinety*, meaning specifically equipped rooms for individual subjects with high technological standards, especially in physics, chemistry, biology, and maths; as well as workshops for wood and metal work, sewing, and other things.⁹³ This was problematic because the policy of boarding schools as polytechnic schools was confirmed at the XXII Party Congress in 1961.⁹⁴ The boarding school reform was thus off to a difficult start, which led officials to meet high ideological goals with more pragmatic considerations.

The ambivalent role of labour in education

‘Labour’ was one of the pillars of socialist ideology and came to constitute an important part of education in residential childcare institutions. As it was typical for several of Khrushchev’s ‘relaunch’ policies, labour education had already been introduced after the revolution, but abolished again in the 1930s by the Stalinist leadership.⁹⁵ Soviet labour education meant more than preparing the children for their future jobs. It was also used as a tool, for instance to build a collective; and it was considered a value in itself. Finally, putting children to work in the institution also fulfilled pragmatic needs. Thus, an analysis of Soviet labour education reveals a complicated relationship of ideological and education goals, as well as pragmatic considerations. While the Khrushchev administration had learned some lessons from the first attempts in labour education a few decades earlier, they still underestimated the considerable investments necessary (workshops, equipment, training) as well as people’s lack of enthusiasm.

The specific context of reviving labour education through boarding schools and other institutions by the Khrushchev administration sheds light on the question of children as a labour resource. In the Khrushchev years, the Soviet leadership struggled with a shortage in manual labour, which both Laurent Coumel and Mariia Maiofis have linked to the Stalinist system of ‘labour reserves’ (*trudovykh rezervov*). The ‘labour reserves’ had been created in 1940 to (non-voluntarily) recruit young people finishing school before legal maturity, training them

⁹¹ Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, p. 14-15. GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 81-100 (1962). See in more detail in chapter three.

⁹² Larry Holmes, for instance, showed that in the late 1930s, 79.8 percent of urban schools were operating in two or more shifts. See ‘Magic into Hocus Pocus’, here p. 558.

⁹³ Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, pp. 7-8, 19.

⁹⁴ GARF, f. A259, op. 4, d. 9624, ll. 81-100, l. 85 (1962).

⁹⁵ Holmes, ‘Magic into Hocus Pocus’, pp. 547-48.

in a field and forcing them to work for the state in a workshop or factory (often heavy industry) for several years. This coincided with raising tuition for the upper grades of school as well as higher education, which meant that mainly poorer and rural populations were targeted for the labour reserves. This created a socially unequal system with often terrible work conditions and ended up alienating young people considerably from productive labour. According to Maiofis, the boarding school reform was supposed to be a way of repairing the damage done and meeting the resulting shortage of productive labour.⁹⁶ The boarding schools offered a less coercive version of the system installed under Stalin, although it followed similar motives of ‘harvesting’ children’s work force for the state’s use (and similarly reproduced the working class and hindered social mobility).⁹⁷

Productivity and ‘usefulness’ were a crucial part of Soviet ideology and were not limited to the realm of childcare. Policies regarding groups who did not fulfil the standards of ‘productivism’, which included stigmatized groups like ‘gypsies’ and so-called ‘parasites’ (people working in the ‘second economy’ [black marketeering], beggars, vagrants) but also pensioners and people with disabilities – anyone who for any reason could not or would not partake in productive labour for the Soviet state –, illustrate the ubiquity of the concept in Soviet discourse.⁹⁸ Such laws were based on the often-quoted idea of ‘he who does not work, shall not eat’⁹⁹ from the 1918 constitution, in which work takes the sense of ‘socially useful work’, meaning work for the state.¹⁰⁰ According to Sheila Fitzpatrick, everyone who did not do such work ended up being treated as a second-class citizen – not only by the Soviet leadership. Fitzpatrick found evidence of intolerance among officials and the general population, as even pensioners, housewives, the mentally ill, and people with disabilities were at risk of being convicted under this law, although they should not have been targeted by it.¹⁰¹

Soviet pedagogues believed that labour had an important educational value. According to A.D. Solov’eva, the children should be ‘united in labour’, in the institution’s garden, or a factory or collective farm (*kolkhoz*), so that they would develop work ethics.¹⁰² Common chores, work in

⁹⁶ Coumel, ‘L’ appareil du parti’, p. 175; Maiofis, ‘Pansiony trudovykh rezervov’.

⁹⁷ Maiofis, ‘Pansiony trudovykh rezervov’.

⁹⁸ See LaPierre, *Hooligans*, p. 5.

⁹⁹ See for instance Beate Fieseler, ‘Soviet-Style Warfare: The Disabled Soldiers of the ‘Great Patriotic War’, in Michael Rasell and Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova (eds), *Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: History, Policy and Everyday Life* (London/NY, 2014), pp. 18-41, here p. 19; Iarskaia-Smirnova and Pavel Romanov, ‘Heroes and Spongers: The Iconography of Disability in Soviet Posters and Film’, in Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 67-96, here p. 70.

¹⁰⁰ Fitzpatrick, ‘Social Parasites’, p. 392.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 392, 404-05; Zhidova, ‘Family, Divorce, and Comrades’ Courts’, p. 59.

¹⁰² Solowiowa, ‘Die Entwicklung des Kinderkollektivs’, pp. 4-5.

agriculture or in workshops together was also believed to contribute to the development of a ‘child collective’.¹⁰³ In many stories of ‘turning bad kids around’ in pedagogic texts, putting them to work was the key moment. In one such story, a boy had been undisciplined at school, but after he had discovered his interest in woodwork and spent hours in the workshop, he was rewarded for his work with an important function in the children’s administration.¹⁰⁴ It is difficult to say whether it was really labour doing the trick, or whether the children felt more accepted and respected after they had been trusted with a responsibility.

The ideological dimension of labour played out in a similar way as in the case of the *rezhim*, in a kind of fuzzy notion that labour makes everything work. It became a value in itself that children had to learn to ‘love and respect’, the ‘foundation of human lives’.¹⁰⁵ Thus labour education became moral education, as pedagogues claimed (with Marx) that ‘only in labour, man can realize all spiritual and physical forces (*sily*) of his personality’.¹⁰⁶ Alluding again to Marx, Afanasenko explained in 1957 that labour should become an everyday need to boarding school children, along with sleep, food, or entertainment.¹⁰⁷ This notion could escalate quite quickly to worrying levels of rigidity, as N.G. Morozova’s article about labour education and professional guidance in special schools proves:

It is our task to make labour their foremost necessity in life. You have to form the consciousness and educate the feelings of special school children in a way that they cannot and do not want to live working dishonestly or not working at all. [...] It is not enough to only teach them the will to work, but also the will to work well, valiantly, honestly, not out of fear but out of conscience. But that is not enough. You have to educate children so that they want to work as well as they can, not only for themselves, for their own benefit, but for the common good, the benefit of the nation [*naroda*], of society [*obshchestva*].¹⁰⁸

Especially for children with disabilities in ‘auxiliary’ (*vspomogatel’nye*) schools, however, labour education and training in such an atmosphere might be quite daunting, as this could take up 30 percent of their time at school.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰³ Umanskii, Lavrik, and Asaturova, *Organizatsiia kollektiva*, p. 19; Scharonowa, ‘Erziehung des Kinderkollektivs’, pp. 125-26.

¹⁰⁴ Jessipow, Fingenowa, and Chochlowa, ‘Die Erziehung zur Diszipliniertheit’, pp. 45-46.

¹⁰⁵ Ia.Ia. Madarai and M.Ia. Kliavin, ‘Vospitanie kommunisticheskogo otnosheniia k trudu i obshchestvennoi sobstvennosti u uchashchikhsia’, *Spetsial’naia shkola* 105.1 (1963), pp. 29-32, here p. 29.

¹⁰⁶ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel’noi raboty*, p. 102.

¹⁰⁷ Maiofis, ‘Pansiony trudovykh rezervov’.

¹⁰⁸ N.G. Morozova, ‘Psikhologicheskaia podgotovka k trudu uchashchikhsia spetsial’nykh shkol’, *Spetsial’naia shkola* 107.3 (1963), pp. 3-11, here p. 3.

¹⁰⁹ G.M. Dul’nev, ‘K itogam vserossiiskogo soveshchaniia-seminara rabotnikov vspomogatel’nykh shkol’, *Spetsial’naia shkola* 105.1 (1963), pp. 8-16. Dul’nev is referring to new educational plans for these schools.

Theoretically, work education was supposed to prepare children in residential care for a post-institutional life, although children often could not apply their training in their later work lives. Some institutions did have an impressive range of workshops and training opportunities to choose from, as well as work placements, vocational guidance or housekeeping lessons (*domovodstvo*).¹¹⁰ More commonly, however, institutions would offer wood and metal work for boys (sometimes only one of these), and sewing for girls, giving the latter no choice whatsoever.¹¹¹ In such cases, school workshops were thus unlikely to prepare children for work in local labour markets.¹¹² An inspection report from Liepāja auxiliary boarding school, from instance, showed that only a few children went on working in the profession they had been trained in – in the inspector’s words: the school did not ‘meet the economic requirements of the city’.¹¹³ The situation was different in the countryside, where children were put to work in agriculture, either on their own farmsteads, or (more commonly) on nearby collective and state farms.¹¹⁴ Training in agriculture could also have a technological dimension, as children were trained to maintain and fix agricultural equipment and machinery.¹¹⁵ This agricultural branch of work education was the most common (and often the only) attempt to match work education to the local labour market.

¹¹⁰ Such as wood working (often furniture), sewing, shoemaking, weaving, bookmaking, cooking, moulding, joining, fitting, cinema mechanic, building, mechanics, forestry, driving, typing, photo/film, painting/plastering, urban greenery/gardening, farming, nursing, see LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 26-43 (1958); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 63-68, both sides (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27 (1962); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 146-147 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54 (1973); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 647, ll. 2-4 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 39-47, 82-94 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 118-126 (1980); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll.1-4, 5-6 (1984).

¹¹¹ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-131 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 60-64, 73-84, 85-101 (1961); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 14-22, 26-31, 86-94 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 47-55 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15, 19-25 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19, 105-110 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1310, ll. 46-57, 60-68 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); GU OGACHO, f. P-288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 28-33 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 51-58, 70-81 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, ll. 85-96 (1979); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41, 103-08 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 45-48 (1984). Same impression from interviews: Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67B, p. 18.

¹¹² As pointed out occasionally in inspection reports: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 95-101 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 103-08, 110-14 (1981). The pedagogue G.M. Dul’nev criticized the low economic efficiency of such training in an article because in his opinion labour training should be tailored to the local labour market; see Dul’nev, ‘K itogam’, p. 15.

¹¹³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 95-101 (1980). However, the prevalence of ‘traditional’ trades in these institutions has other possible explanations: change was slow and expensive, and workshops using complicated technology or requiring expensive material would have required considerable financial investments.

¹¹⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 173-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 60-64, 85-101 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61 (1962); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 14-22 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15, 19-25 (1965); GU OGACHO, f. P-288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1310, ll. 46-57 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1445, ll. 6-36 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 51-58, 70-81 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 103-08 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 15-19 (1983); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 33-38, 45-48 (1984).

¹¹⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 76-82 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973).

Despite its publicly claimed importance, however, work education did not get the state investment it needed. The official decrees about work education were difficult to realize because they required considerable investment in staff training, well-equipped workshops, tools, machines, and material. Some institutions improved their work training by cooperating with factories or other workplaces and sent children on placements.¹¹⁶ It was less common that the school workshops were considered to be well-equipped, working well, let alone profitably.¹¹⁷ Rather, in many institutions, inspectors considered work education to be insufficient or of bad quality,¹¹⁸ the workshops or farmsteads to be either non-existent, in a bad state or not productive enough, or even unsafe.¹¹⁹ In Cheliabinsk colony, for instance, the inspectors found some ‘pre-revolutionary’ tools, meaning around 70 years old.¹²⁰ Such examples shed some doubts on just how much, or rather little, of a priority residential childcare had in Soviet politics, as will be discussed in chapter three.

Instead of catering to the children’s needs, it seems that workshops were tailored to the needs of the institutions rather than the children’s professional future. Many institutions used their workshops to produce furniture or toys for themselves; and to repair clothes, shoes, and linen.¹²¹ On the one hand, such work assignments were consistent with Soviet labour ideology and work education for children; on the other hand, making children work for their basic food provision sounds suspiciously like child labour. Yet the Soviet state had outlawed child labour already in 1922 in order to fight the exploitation of children, so that (with slight changes over

¹¹⁶ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-23 (1960); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61, 63-68, both sides (1962); GU OGACHO, f. P-288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1970).

¹¹⁷ GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 47-55 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54 (1973).

¹¹⁸ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 32-35 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 2-19 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); GU OGACHO, f. P-288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P-288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 28-33, 34-38 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 4-13 (1978).

¹¹⁹ Unproductive workshops: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 76-82 (1958); GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 158-179 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 9-19, 182-87 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 14-16 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 9-16, 28-37 (1962); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 7-9 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 62-68 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-127 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 1-6 (1969); GU OGACHO, f. P-288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 28-33, 34-38 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 8-20 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 106-114 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41, 103-08 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 1-13 (1983); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 1-5, 6-8, 27 (1990). Unsafe workshops: GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 1-6 (1969); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 28-33 (1972).

¹²⁰ GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 28-33, 34-38 (1972).

¹²¹ See for instance Sverdlovsk children’s home no.5, producing toys for their own use and other children’s homes: GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-23 (1960).

time), minors between 14 and 16 could only work under strict stipulations, and under 14-year-olds not at all.¹²² This sort of labour in the context of ‘work education’, regulated by schools and other institutions, was the exception to this rule, forming some sort of legal grey area – termed by Svetlana Stephenson as both de facto ‘child labour’ and ‘forced labour’.¹²³

Work hours for minors were thus strictly regulated. Some institutions, however, broke labour legislation. In the early 1960s, for instance, several colonies were criticized for exceeding the legal work hour limit for their inmates.¹²⁴ In colonies, minors would usually have to split their time relatively evenly between school and work, at least theoretically, whilst a Cheliabinsk colony had their inmates working in two six-hour shifts,¹²⁵ a Leningrad colony had four hours scheduled for their inmates, although organization was so scattered that they mostly only ended up working 2-2.5 hours.¹²⁶ In children’s homes, where children were usually younger than in colonies (and not convicted to labour), work hours would be much lower.¹²⁷ A former boarding school student explained in her interview that institutions easily found ways around regulations: agricultural labour in the summer months, for instance, was simply not counted as work.¹²⁸ A report from Rauda auxiliary boarding school confirms the existence of such undocumented (and thus illegal) hiring of minors for diverse jobs (without the required medical examinations or work book).¹²⁹

Just as work education, lessons designed to prepare children in care for an independent life in society were highly ambivalent: potentially useful, yet open to exploitation. In these lessons, children learned how to go shopping, and to get to know places in the nearest city such as the post office, pharmacy, schools, societal organisations, the library. They should learn how to use public transport and get acquainted with nature. Finally, they needed housekeeping lessons, showing them how to prepare food or do laundry; practical things like handling money, writing letters, or filling in forms; and taking care of their clothes and shoes, keeping their homes clean, ‘cosy and pleasant’. Pedagogues set high standards for such lessons: it was not enough to cook tasty food, but it should be done ‘rationally, carefully, economically’; and clothes should not

¹²² Svetlana Stephenson, ‘Child Labour in the Russian Federation,’ (2002) in <http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/child/15>, accessed 09.04.2018, pp. 1-19, p. 1.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹²⁴ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 48-54, 189-205 (1960-61).

¹²⁵ GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 28-33, 34-38 (1972).

¹²⁶ GARF, f. A385, op. 46, del. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962).

¹²⁷ Such as 1-2 hours per day from the age of 12 in a Sverdlovsk home, or even only 4 hours a week in a Jelgava home: GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 16-19 (1964).

¹²⁸ Legally, they should not have exceeded four to six hours per day, whereas they worked in the fields from 8am to 2.30pm without any breaks Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48A, p. 34.

¹²⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 118-26 (1980).

just be mended but renewed in a fashionable and beautiful way.¹³⁰ In some institutions, housekeeping (*domovodstvo*) was offered as an option for girls only, occasionally including lessons with such obscure titles as ‘how to dress beautifully’.¹³¹ Inspection reports, however, suggested that this type of preparation was often neglected in children’s homes and boarding schools across the Union.¹³²

Despite its obvious merits, teaching children how to do housework could look dangerously similar to institutions having the children in their care do housework when they should be studying or relaxing.¹³³ While being taught diligence, ‘self-care’, responsibility and ‘socially useful labour’, the children and teenagers were in fact taking an active part in maintaining, and sometimes even building their institution. They were supposed to help with cleaning, work in the kitchen (food preparation, setting the table, doing the dishes), repairing equipment, taking care of the garden, building furniture, sewing or mending clothes.¹³⁴ And although this had some legitimate pedagogical points and aims, there was a certain grey area between putting children to work for educational reasons and exploiting them, thereby using ideology to explain away staff shortages or material need.¹³⁵ The case of Cheliabinsk colony shows how far such an engagement of students could go. At the time of the 1972 inspection, inmates were building a new living building, and working on the water works. They had previously fixed the heating

¹³⁰ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, p. 105; GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 143-200 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 47-55 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1445, ll. 6-36 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 82-94 (1977). See also Val'eva and Shpital'nik (eds), *Detskii gorodok*, p. 8; D.L. Chekerlan, ‘V internate dalekogo zapoliar'ia’, in: Ziubina, *Vospitatel'naiia rabota*, pp. 25-31, here pp. 27-28.

¹³¹ GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 23-30 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 82-94 (1977). For the example see: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101 (1961). It is hard to say why work education was split by gender so consistently in the Soviet Union (except for agricultural labour). The extent of how normal such a gender split was seems at least surprising in the light of the proclaimed equality of the sexes in the Soviet Union, campaigning to ‘free’ women from their domestic duties in the 1920s and 1950s.

¹³² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 71-76 (1964); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27 (1967); GU OGACHO, f. P-288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968);

¹³³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 9-16 (1961-62); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 33-44 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973).

¹³⁴ Iashchenko, ‘Starsheklassniki’, p. 148; Demidow, ‘Erfahrungen mit den neuen Lehrplänen’, pp. 170-71, 174-75; Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchaniie*, pp. 20-21, 33-34; Stachurcky, ‘Mitarbeit der Zöglinge’, p. 64. See also: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 26-43 (1958); GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-23 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 9-16 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 17-19 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15, 19-25 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P-288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 28-33, 34-38 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 647, ll. 2-4 (1973).

¹³⁵ In the case of Malta auxiliary boarding school, for instance, the children were reported to have helped with vegetable cultivation in exchange for food in 1960, and to have received potatoes in exchange for providing cultural entertainment in the farm in 1970. See LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973).

in the school, dining hall, club rooms and *bania*, and were now working on the heating in the workshops; as well as on improving the electric wiring.¹³⁶ These insights confirm that in many places, work education was to benefit the institution rather than the children living in it.

Pragmatism also permeated the so-called *proforientatsiia* part of labour orientation, the choice of a profession. Theoretically, the children's labour was supposed to be connected to their everyday life and interests; and to take into account their age, physical health, and development.¹³⁷ According to several reports, such guidance could include seminars, meetings with workers (including former graduates), and excursions to workplaces.¹³⁸ In boarding schools, work training, political education, and Pioneer work were also counted as part of vocational guidance (*proforientatsiia*), as a report from Aduliena auxiliary boarding school suggests.¹³⁹ However, other documents and testimonies show that part of vocational guidance was to manage the children's expectations.¹⁴⁰ A report from Dzelzava auxiliary boarding school, for instance, criticized the eighth-graders' 'unrealistic idea of post-graduation work'.¹⁴¹ In her interview, a former student mentioned her 'secret dream' (*mechta golubaia*) of becoming a geologist.¹⁴² However, her vocational counsellor merely urged her to keep going to school but offered her no options about how to go on without any support from her family. Finally, she ended up going to work at the local factory after graduating.¹⁴³ This points again to the boarding school inmates being destined for productive labour, as is perfectly summed up by an example from the five-year-report about the boarding school reform from 1961: 'Liza Mamonova, who had dreamt of the romantic profession of an animal trainer, is a seamstress now, and member of the communist labour brigades.'¹⁴⁴

Improving residential childcare between ideology and pragmatism

As the example of the role of labour in education has shown, ideas and discourses about residential childcare throughout the reform period were permeated by ideology, but in the

¹³⁶ GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, de 247, ll. 28-33 (1972).

¹³⁷ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, p. 104.

¹³⁸ GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 75-89 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54 (1973).

¹³⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 2-19 (1965). Many institutions, however, do not seem to have invested enough efforts in such work, see GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 1-6, 8-30 (1969-70); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 103-08 (1981); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9969, ll. 58-61 (1990); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 70-76 (1990).

¹⁴⁰ This was true especially for children with disabilities, as will be further illustrated later in this chapter.

¹⁴¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 15-19 (1981).

¹⁴² Literally 'blue dream', with the connotation of something 'ideal' or even unrealistic.

¹⁴³ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69, p. 12.

¹⁴⁴ Iashchenko, 'Starsheklassniki', p. 143.

realization of those ideas, officials often let pragmatic considerations dominate. This type of tension prevailed: while the general project was upheld, the Soviet leadership began limiting its scope merely a few years after the education reform. The XXII Party Congress in 1961 confirmed the preference for societal over family upbringing to raise the ‘most active builders of communism’. This time, however, boarding schools were named in combination with the so-called *shkol s prodlenным dnem* (schools in which children stayed from the morning until the late afternoon, going home to their parents for the night).¹⁴⁵ This (new) type of institution became more popular after Soviet officials had realized that a comprehensive boarding school network was simply too expensive (costing the state four or five times as much). They also claimed that these schools were more popular among the general public.¹⁴⁶ 1962 already saw a reduction of the boarding school building plan in the RSFSR in favour of building more *shkol s prodlenным dnem*, as well as some additional regulations to make boarding schools cheaper.¹⁴⁷ Given Khrushchev’s 1961 claim to reach communism within 20 years with the help of his boarding schools, such an early dampener on building them is remarkable.

After Khrushchev’s ouster, the official policies around the residential network changed again, at least in some regards. The rhetoric around the residential childcare system was toned down, and the high goals of bringing up ‘builders of communism’ were hardly mentioned anymore. In 1966, the Soviet leadership decided not to build any new general boarding schools. This seems to coincide with the popular mood: in Sverdlovsk oblast’ for instance, boarding school contingents decreased in 1964-1978 because day-long schools became more and more popular, and because people could not afford the boarding school tuition.¹⁴⁸ Yet the existing institutions were kept, children’s homes were still converted into boarding schools, and the part of the network designed for children with disabilities was continuously expanded.¹⁴⁹ Khrushchev’s successors also abandoned the ‘polytechnization’ of education because it was unpopular, especially in circles of higher education.¹⁵⁰ In this period, the extension of schooling reached residential childcare. Towards the mid-to-late 1960s, more and more boarding schools offered ten years of schooling.¹⁵¹ Although Brezhnev put a much stronger emphasis on the family and its importance than his predecessor, his administration still opted for expanding state childcare

¹⁴⁵ GARF, f. A259, op. 4, d. 9624, ll. 81-100, l. 84 (1962).

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Such as bigger classes (meaning fewer teachers), bigger schools, a tensor regulation on tuition, standardized production of furniture and clothes. GARF, f. A259, op. 4, d. 9624, ll. 39-47, 101-10 (1962).

¹⁴⁸ GASO, f. R233, op. 5, d. 1471, l. 28 (1968).

¹⁴⁹ Maiofis, ‘Pansiony trudovykh rezervov’.

¹⁵⁰ Just as it had been in the 1930s when the Soviet leadership abolished it the first time round. See Holmes, ‘Magic into Hocus Pocus’; Kelly, *Children’s World*, pp.146-47; Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*, pp. 69-70.

¹⁵¹ GARF, f. A2306, op. 76, d. 1471, ll. 21-22 (1967).

rather than offering parents the opportunity of spending more time with their children through paid leave and the like.¹⁵²

Within the residential network, it seems like little changed: living conditions were still problematic ten years after the education reform. After a major round of inspections in 1968, the Russian Council of Ministers (*Sovmin*) reprimanded the Ministries of Education, Health, and Trade, as well as the *Sovmins* of ASSRs and local Party organizations of neglecting their work in residential childcare, especially regarding living conditions, provision, and economic efficiency. Local Party organizations and the head of the ‘Administration of boarding schools and children’s homes’ were formally reprimanded (*vygovor, strogiĭ vygovor*) and threatened with ousting from their position should the situation not improve.¹⁵³ In the mid-1970s, the Soviet authorities initiated a new round of trying to change and improve the residential childcare system, pointing at ongoing problems in the institutions. Thus, in January 1976, the Ministry of Health adopted a new guideline on Baby Homes because ‘the number of disabilities among the youngest [was] increasing’.¹⁵⁴ These institutions housed abandoned children and children with disabilities between 0-3 years. This reflects terrible care in these institutions, as well as increasing issues of poverty and neglect in Soviet families or a state crackdown on these families. Another explanation could be the improvement of general medical care, as children with health issues who would not have survived earlier might in that time.¹⁵⁵

Overall, there was a general trend towards ‘differentiation’ (meaning fragmentation) of residential childcare institutions.¹⁵⁶ According to Soviet officials, the underlying belief at the basis of this fragmentation was that children would learn better in homogenous collectives.¹⁵⁷ For instance, while children without parental care and others had been together in general boarding schools, the Council of Ministers developed a prototype for a new type of boarding school ‘for orphans and children without parental care’ in the mid-1970s. At that point there were 735,000 boarding schoolers, of which 83,000 children were without parental care, of which 59,000 were orphans. This meant a reshuffling and re-separation of boarding school

¹⁵² Harwin, *Children of the Russian State*, p. 40.

¹⁵³ GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 103-04r (1968).

¹⁵⁴ Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotstvo i besprizornost’*, p. 141.

¹⁵⁵ Dunn, ‘Everyday Life of the Disabled in the USSR’, pp. 200-01.

¹⁵⁶ GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 134-39 (1967).

¹⁵⁷ GARF, f. R5446, op. 111, d. 1196, l. 1 (1975-77).

inmates. Officials argued that separately, these ‘orphans’ could be better prepared for work and life; and that this would help prevent crime and *beznadzornost*.¹⁵⁸

This reshuffling was problematic in many ways and revealed several harmful preconceptions about children in care by Soviet officials. It bears witness to the widespread stereotype that children without parental care were ‘naturally’ more prone to commit crimes and thus needed special attention. By adding preschool sections to these schools, the authorities also enhanced the isolation of such children from society. It seems that this reorganization primarily served financial purposes rather than the improvement of children’s education: wherever the ‘orphans’ and others were mixed, the schools needed to provide for staff and food during weekends and holidays as well, whereas these would not be necessary in schools without ‘orphans’. Finally, the setup of the new ‘orphan boarding school’ exposed the state’s low expectations for children without parental care: this type of boarding school provided merely eight years of schooling. This supports Maiofis’ and Coumel’s view that these children continued to be viewed as sources of unskilled labour: there was little ambition to try and raise the education levels of children without parental care. In addition, former staff members contended in their interviews that the school education in the ‘orphan boarding schools’ tended to be worse than in the general ones, making it very difficult for these children to reach higher education.¹⁵⁹ This should be understood in a general context of ‘fundamental inequalities in access to education’ in the USSR.¹⁶⁰

By focusing on the 1958 education reform, including later adjustments, and its connection to labour in the context of Soviet residential childcare, this section has illustrated how ideology and political pragmatism interacted dynamically in the formation of the residential childcare network. While experiencing numerous setbacks caused by too ambitious targets or chaotic planning, the Soviet leadership went through a phase of trial and error, and attempted to realize at least their most pragmatic goals, such as raising young workers according to the state’s needs. The following section will explore the role of science in this endeavour and show that Soviet scientists, while attempting to create a rational and efficient system designed to raise productive future workers, in fact contributed to the marginalization of children in care.

¹⁵⁸ GARF, f. R5446, op. 111, d. 1196, ll. 14-15, 16-27 (1976). This reorganization was still going on in the late 1980s, as documents from Sverdlovsk oblast’ show: TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 1-9, here l. 2 (1987).

¹⁵⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47B, p. 17; PF48A, pp. 30-31.

¹⁶⁰ Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 121.

The scientific groundwork of residential childcare

In developing the residential childcare network in the 1950s and 1960s, political and scientific reformers cooperated closely. After Stalin's death, scientific disciplines like psychology and 'defectology' could resume their work; training and jobs in psychiatry were on the rise.¹⁶¹ This had an enormous impact on the relationship between politics and science in the realm of childcare, rekindling the *scientization* of social matters (in the terms of Raphael). In 1958, the leading Soviet child psychiatrist Grunia Sukhaeva stressed the need for prevention in child psychiatry, promoting a closer cooperation between education and therapy, psychiatry, and neurology; and called for an expansion of the network of psycho-neurological institutions.¹⁶² According to William McCagg, the Institute of 'Defectology' had existed under Stalinism, albeit underfunded and suppressed, and became some sort of hub for promising scientists, which explains the fast recovery of the discipline when Vygotsky's work was rehabilitated in 1958.¹⁶³ This 'quick recovery' can be understood in the context of the 1958 education reform and the development of the special school network. The 'defectologists' were able to use this opportunity to legitimize their work; and their journal was rehabilitated under the name of *Spetsial'naiia shkola* (later *Defektologiya*).

As Lutz Raphael emphasized, political leadership and science are often entangled in the areas of education and social welfare. Foucault has described this specific relationship between policy and scientific expertise in his texts and lectures about *biopower*. He invoked a shift towards therapy and medicalization in dealing with people, an 'appetite for medicine'. According to him, teachers, social workers, and doctors became judges of people: 'it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements.'¹⁶⁴ These normative judgements were legitimized by or based on findings by scientific experts. In the Soviet case, as was common in modern 'scientized' social policies, reforms in the realm of education were backed by scientists. Thus, the journal *Shkola-internat* was founded after the 1958 reform to create a forum to fill the boarding school project with scientific meaning.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ Rollins, *Child Psychiatry*, p. 23.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

¹⁶³ William McCagg, 'The Origins of Defectology', in McCagg and Siegelbaum, *The Disabled in the Soviet Union*, pp. 39-61, here pp. 53-54.

¹⁶⁴ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 304-05.

¹⁶⁵ The recurring metaphor of these schools as a 'laboratory' increases this impression, see Maiofis, 'Pansiony trudovykh rezervov'.

Thus, research in the realm of education was partly based on a specific political mandate to implement the boarding school reform, as can be shown for ‘defectology’ throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. Most editorials throughout the journal issues of *Defektologija* addressed the keywords of educational policy, such as the ‘linking of school with life’, the combination of training and productive labour, or polytechnical education.¹⁶⁶ Some of the editorials and other articles referred to the XXII Party Congress, and thus put their work in the context of the formation of a communist society, as proclaimed by Khrushchev in 1961.¹⁶⁷ More generally, science could not exist independently from the Party state: an academic career involved connections in the Party, and their workplaces were either run by the state or the Party (universities, schools, medical-pedagogical commissions). This section will first explore the system of classifying children in care across the different types of institutions, then study the role of ‘defectology’ in this endeavour, to finally analyse the Soviet notion of disability as it developed in this context. Thus, it will argue that the role of Soviet scientists was ambivalent: in their attempt to create a rational system to assess and help children in care through classification, they in fact contributed to their medicalization and marginalization. This mirrored the Soviet authorities’ gradual shift from penal reform institutions to medical correction institutions, in close connection with a changing concept of deviance.

Classifying children in care: a rational framework?

As the previous sections have shown, the setup of the residential childcare network was based on classifying children into different groups, to transfer them to different types of institutions. These classifications, legitimized by the sciences involved in childcare, were both meant as rational bases for educating children and for ‘managing’ their upbringing. In general, children were classified according to the criteria of age, behaviour, and health to be distributed across different schools or children’s homes.¹⁶⁸ Baby homes would house children until the age of three, whereas the age limit between preschool and school children’s homes was seven. These limits, however, could be breached in several ways. In 1978, the Ministry of Education fostered the idea of mixed children’s homes (all ages from age three), so that siblings could stay together.¹⁶⁹ Children whose health issues or learning difficulties delayed their school education could not necessarily comply with such age limits. The classification of children according to

¹⁶⁶ A.I. D’iachkov, ‘Itogi soveshchaniĭ-seminarov po perestroĭke sistemy spetsial’nykh uchrezhdenii’, *Spetsial’naia shkola* 105.1 (1963), pp. 3-4; Dul’nev, ‘K itogam’.

¹⁶⁷ A.I. D’iachkov, ‘Ponjat’ uroven’ idejno-vospitatel’noj raboty v spetsial’nykh shkolakh’, *Spetsial’naia shkola* 113.1 (1965), pp. 3-6; Morozova, ‘Psikhologicheskaia podgotovka’, pp. 3-11.

¹⁶⁸ GARF, f. R9563, op.1, d. 1439, ll. 1-10 (1971).

¹⁶⁹ Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotsvo i besprizornost’*, p. 141.

criteria of behaviour was mostly linked to separate delinquent children from the ‘disciplined’ ones. Institutions and regulations in this area tended to be shaped by discussions of punishment or re-education, of institutionalization or societal ‘tutelage’ (*shestvo*), of mixing or separating violent and petty offenders.

The criterion of health structured the system of residential childcare to an increasing degree. The development of a wide network of institutions for children with disabilities began after the Second World War. This network continued to be expanded and split into more and more specialized institutions until the end of the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁰ In the RSFSR in 1978, for instance, there were 1226 boarding schools for children with learning difficulties, 93 for deaf children, 54 for hard of hearing, 27 for blind children, 44 with bad sight, 52 for heavily speech impaired, 33 for children with polio and cerebral palsy.¹⁷¹ The official idea behind this classification was to create the best ‘conditions for education’ for every child. At the centre of this endeavour lay not only the screening of children at birth and in clinics, but also finding children who failed at school, and to find out why they were failing. This was the job of so-called medico-pedagogical commissions constituted of doctors, pedagogues, and ‘defectology’ specialists. Every year they tested those children who either did not go to school or had failed the school year and diagnosed those children that they considered to have a disability to finally transfer them to a school corresponding to their diagnosis.¹⁷²

These commissions had to get a complete impression of the child’s abilities in a short period of time, which caused problems. A former educator recalled the transfers from baby homes to children’s homes at the age of four, before which they also had to face a commission to determine the type of institution they would move on to: ‘they were awful, it was all dreadful. These transfers were horrible. I always, as soon as the time to transfer children came about, it was very hard, very hard.’¹⁷³ It was her job to prepare children for the ‘next’ institution, and especially for the transfer. According to her, the commissions neither took into account her impressions of the child nor adapted their tests to children’s individual characters and needs. Children tended to be intimidated and scared in front of a group of strangers, and often did not perform as well as they could. She basically accused these commissions of misdiagnosing

¹⁷⁰ Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotstvo i besprizornost*, p. 145.

¹⁷¹ GARF, f. A259, op. 46, d. 5706, ll. 26-30, 116-19 (1975-81).

¹⁷² GARF, f. R9563, op. 1, d. 797 (1969). For notes on such sessions see for instance: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 762, ll. 1-72 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 868a (1962); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 77-85, 130-40 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 970 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1130, ll. 11-22, 121-29 (1965); GARF, f. A482, op. 54, d. 3578 (1969-70); GARF, f. A482, op. 56, d. 1422, ll. 70-75 (1982); GASO, f. R233, op. 7, d. 1014 (1984).

¹⁷³ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF58B, p. 41.

children, as such accusations increasingly came to light: ‘now I more often see on television, how children perform – for what they are shoved into these homes! They attest them all sorts of disabilities – they are healthy children, and yet count as disabled!’¹⁷⁴

These diagnoses shaped the education level a child could expect to achieve. For instance, children with learning difficulties were further sub-classified into three degrees of ‘disability’, called ‘*debil*’, ‘*imbetsil*’, and ‘*idiot*’.¹⁷⁵ Most children with a preliminary diagnosis (about 75-85 percent) would be put into the first category. They were transferred to one of the special needs schools run by the Ministry of Education (*vspomogatel’nye shkoly*). In these facilities, children would receive eight to nine years of schooling according to a special curriculum, combining general elementary education and ‘professional labour preparation’ (*professional’no-trudovaia podgotovka*) in a certain trade (*spetsial’nost’*). Children who were not successful at such schools, or who were diagnosed with more ‘serious’ forms of intellectual disabilities risked of ending up in specialized institutions by the Ministry of Health or in institutions belonging to the Ministry of Social Welfare (SOBES). In these institutions, educators worked with children ‘to be able to master skills of self-care (*samoobsluzhivanie*) as well as of the simplest types of manual labour’.¹⁷⁶ Also, reading, writing and basic counting would be taught.¹⁷⁷ This type of classification predetermined the kind of education a child would receive, and ultimately, the type of work they would perform later on.

The ‘defectologists’ classifications were based on estimates of the children’s future productivity, and thus tailored to the state’s needs. Another way of classifying children with intellectual disabilities (*oligofreny*), which became popular among scholars in the 1960s, illustrates this. ‘Defectologists’ in favour of this classification claimed that it allowed to establish a direct link between the ‘clinical structure of the defect’ and the ability to engage in labour in later life. This classification, developed by ‘defectologist’ M.S. Pevzner, split the group of *oligofreny* into those with slight disabilities only, which are characterized as disciplined and reliable (*ispolnitel’nyi*); the ‘delayed’ (*tormoznye*) ones are described as ‘apathetic’, slow, but well-behaved; the ‘nervous’ (*vozbudymye*) ones are depicted as irritable, unhinged, and easily distracted; and those who are cognitively and emotionally ‘underdeveloped’, who are said to

¹⁷⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF58B, p. 41.

¹⁷⁵ A classification initially developed by G.E. Suchaeva, see M.S. Pevzner, ‘Osnovnye napravleniia v izuchenii oligofrenii’, *Defektologïa* 2 (1970), pp. 40-44.

¹⁷⁶ GARF, f. R9563, op. 1, d. 797, ll. 1-4 (1969).

¹⁷⁷ Iu.K. Zubrilin, ‘Sovmestnaia rabota pedagogov i vrachei v uchrezhdeniakh dlia gluboko umstvenno otstalykh detei’, *Defektologïa* 2 (1971), pp. 30-34; V. Iavkin, ‘O rabote v Vsesoiuznogo S“esda nevropatologov i psikhiatrov’, *Defektologïa* 2 (1970), pp. 92-96.

display ‘psychopathic’, sometimes criminal behaviour. In this classification, children were ultimately assessed by behaviour patterns, linked to their most likely degree of social adaptation.¹⁷⁸ These categories make blatantly clear that one of the main goal of Pevzner’s classification was to ascertain how ‘manageable’ children were: group three, for instance, were assigned ‘limited work efficiency’ (*rabotosposobnost’*).

This link between the classification of institutionalized children with disabilities and productive labour activity also becomes apparent in official documents. Productive labour was presented as a ‘means of self-assertion’ for the ‘mentally retarded youngsters’ (*umstvenno otstalykh podrostkov*), and ‘a means of correcting the development of their personality’.¹⁷⁹ The example of children with disabilities reveals the dangers of such a productivity-based approach to child education. This becomes excruciatingly clear in a *Sovmin* document from the mid-1980s, in which an official mentioned the need to extend ‘boarding facilities within the system of Social Welfare for disabled children without prospects’ (*neperspektivnykh detei-invalidov*).¹⁸⁰ After all, such a *biopolitical* discourse of usefulness tends to leave a group of people deemed ‘useless’, with dangerous implications.

The practical dimension of these classifications of children, that is transfers of children between different types of institutions, created further problems. Theoretically, the boundaries between institutions were quite fluid, as children could be moved around for diverse reasons to improve their placement. The example of a boarding school in Cheliabinsk oblast’ gives an impression of just how much children were moved around. That school had opened in autumn 1960, with 56 children starting first grade. In 1968, an inspection report claimed that 13 of these were still at that school, studying in grade eight, which means that 43 had left in the meantime (36 of whom went to a boarding school for children without parental care).¹⁸¹ A ‘perfect placement’ for all children, in any case, was impossible. A classification of people, as fragmented as it may be, could never cater for everyone (even theoretically), and many children fell through the cracks of the network. A 15-year-old boy from Ukraine, for instance, was sent to a colony for stealing from his children’s home, for ‘systematically disrupting the order’ of the institution and rude behaviour towards his peers. The colony, however, sent him back

¹⁷⁸ A.G. Asafova, ‘Katamnezy detei, okonchivshikh 30-iu vspomogatel’nuu shkolu Moskvy v 1955-1960 uchebnykh godakh,’ in *Spetsial’naia shkola* 108.4 (1963), pp. 70-75.

¹⁷⁹ TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, l. 2 (1984).

¹⁸⁰ GARF, f. 5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 27-32 (1983-85).

¹⁸¹ GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967-70).

because the boy was classified as disabled. The procuracy argued that the colony could not ‘re-educate’ the boy in their workshops because the boy did not have any hands.¹⁸²

Such a ‘perfect placement’ was further hindered by a constant lack of places in diverse institutions, causing children to get stuck, and eventually be sent to wherever there was space. A 1959 report from the Moscow oblast’ education department for instance, claimed that 164 children in children’s homes were awaiting transfer (some had been for months), and that 230 had not been transferred from a baby home to a children’s home.¹⁸³ Especially for baby homes such a lag was problematic, not only because the child would block a place for someone else, but also because the institution (furniture, clothes, food) was only designed for children of a certain age.¹⁸⁴ The Riga boarding school for ‘difficult’ children provides another example for ‘getting stuck’. After an inspection in May 1969, the Latvian procuracy wrote a letter to the republic’s Ministry of Education, complaining that the institution broke legal requirements: children were only allowed in there until the age of 15, and never longer than for three years. The inspection, however, had uncovered that there were 80 16- and 17-year-olds living at the school, as well as 68 children who had been there for longer than three years.¹⁸⁵

The abuse of transfers also got in the way of a child’s suitable placement. Children’s home and boarding school directors often tried to send ‘difficult’ children to colonies to make their lives easier.¹⁸⁶ In 1961, for instance, the department administrating colonies for delinquent children contacted the Latvian procuracy about a boy who had been sent to a colony. The department argued that the boy’s case was full of inconsistencies. The headmaster seemed to have overemphasized or simply made up some of the boy’s offences.¹⁸⁷ The procurator suspected the school of plotting against this boy to get rid of him and pleaded for his immediate release. Agencies working in the field of crime prevention saw this as a wide-spread issue, arguing that

¹⁸² GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 5042, ll. 62-63 (1956).

¹⁸³ GARF, f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257, ll. 2-3 (1959). Such reports came in from all over the Union, with regard to children’s homes, institutions for children with disabilities as well as colonies for delinquent children, see GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 4244, ll. 2-13, 18, 33-35 (1959); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 10-22, here l. 21 (1960).

¹⁸⁴ GARF f. A482, op. 54, d. 3578, l. 2 (1969).

¹⁸⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426 (1969-70). These two groups might overlap.

¹⁸⁶ Often, either the procuracy or the colony administration might send the child back, arguing that professional pedagogues should be able to deal with them. See Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotsvo i besprizornost’*, p. 146. The exception to this rule were children who had run away from their institution, who were usually transferred to facilities for delinquent children because they were deemed *sklonnykh k brodiazbnichestvu* (prone to vagrancy), see chapter four.

¹⁸⁷ The report dated back some of the alleged offences to the same day and others to times when the school had actually been closed. LVA, f. 700, op. 5, d. 758, ll. 157-58. Other cases in which the institutions were blamed for not really trying to educate a child, or to getting rid of them: LVA f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 1982, ll. 13-14, 16-17, 98-99 (1963).

school teachers ‘instead of conducting deep, serious educational work with some, mostly “difficult” pupils, try to send them to evening schools or reform colonies’.¹⁸⁸ The classification of children, whilst designed to rationally achieve the children’s perfect placement, was hard on the children, open to abuse, and the network of institutions often did not have the capacities to match the categorizations.

Scientific or political project: the dual legacy of ‘Defectology’

‘Defectology’ was the scientific discipline in charge of framing and legitimizing the classification of children along the criterion of health in order to maximize their future productivity. It will serve here as a case study to shed light on the role of scientific discourse in Soviet residential childcare and the relationship of science and politics. In the post-Stalinist period, the cult of ‘enthusiasm’ as an equivalent of ability and ‘the overtly plebeian [were] on the retreat’, as Stephen Lovell has pointed out, to make way for social stratification and a ‘cult of professionalization’ in a modern, mechanized economy.¹⁸⁹ Such a proclaimed need for experts and specialists, as well as a shift in the self-fashioning of workers in education, also took place within the residential childcare network. The discipline of ‘defectology’ itself was gaining importance at the time: their continuous efforts at self-promotion started to pay off when in 1970 the Russian ‘defectology’ branch was reopened as the Soviet Institute for Defectology, with the aim of improving the education of children with disabilities, helping parents and teachers, and developing more differentiated diagnostics.¹⁹⁰ While ‘defectologists’ had quite deep insights into residential childcare and attempted to solve its intrinsic problems, their efforts hit both political and scientific boundaries: these were linked to the medicalized view of disability, and constraints of the Soviet primate of productivity.

To uphold the authorities’ high scientific standards, the medical-pedagogical commissions were charged with assessing children with learning difficulties and sending them to ‘special’ institutions for children with disabilities. These commissions were legitimized by the scientific expertise of their members: psycho-neurologist/psychiatrist, ENT specialist, eye doctor, orthopaedist, speech therapist, ‘defectologist’, and people from ministries of health and education.¹⁹¹ In a 1963 report about the latest ‘All-Russian congress of workers in special [*vspomogatel’nykh*] schools’, G.M. Dul’nev stressed the ‘formal and moral’ responsibility of these

¹⁸⁸ LVA f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, ll. 78-85 (1964). In her interview, a boarding school teacher mentioned directors of general schools trying to transfer difficult children to boarding schools, see Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF50B, p. 44.

¹⁸⁹ Lovell, *Shadow of War*, p. 121.

¹⁹⁰ GARF, f. 10049, op. 1a, d. 1322, ll. 1-17, here 1-2 (1970); McCagg, ‘The Origins of Defectology’, pp. 50-51.

¹⁹¹ V.F. Machikhina, ‘Pravil’nyi otbor i komplektovanie: vazhnoe sveno v rabote spetsial’nykh shkol’, *Defektologiya* 1 (1970), pp. 3-7.

commissions. He emphasized the importance of having highly qualified specialists on them as well as of circulating research-based material among them to lessen the risk of misdiagnosis. Diagnosing was another one of the recurring issues discussed in these journals – as according to Dul'nev, only children with 'heavy organic infractions to the brain' should be in a school for children with learning difficulties, in contrast to temporary delays of development, or simple speech defects. He also urged for stricter measures to be taken against commission members who misdiagnosed children, implying that this was an issue for which people were not really held responsible.¹⁹²

Both administrative and scientific texts continuously stressed the importance of scientific rigour, especially in the classification of children, even if the bureaucrats' actual understanding of it was limited, and the 'defectologists' impact not straightforward. Officials pointed out that the 'success of the pedagogic collective in the preparation of pupils for life and labour in work collectives considerably depends on the level of scientific, methodological, and organizational provision [*obespechenie*].'¹⁹³ In practice, however, although the 'scientific' classifications for children with disabilities were used in administrative texts, they were often misspelt (especially '*imbetsil*') along with other medical terms, which puts in question the real enthusiasm for 'professionalism' and 'expertise'.¹⁹⁴ Lutz Raphael has convincingly illustrated the problematic relationship between political power and science in the context of an authoritarian system. Indeed, Soviet 'defectologists' depended on the authorities for their professional survival, which was bound to interfere with their work. However, researchers still tried to practice relatively 'independent' research and not to act as mere tools for political agents.

An analysis of 'defectology' journals can serve to illustrate that researchers were not ready to give up their independent work. Although the authors – and especially the editors of such publications – had to react to and support official discourse, they found ways to put forth alternative points of view. In discussions about reasons for disability, for instance, the 'defectologist' A.I. D'iachkov ultimately diverged from officially stated views on disability. Among researchers, there was a general consensus about the fact that there were both biological and social reasons for developmental 'defects' and 'delays'. In a Soviet belief system, however, the question of 'social' reasons posed a problem.¹⁹⁵ In *Spetsial'naiia Shkola*, D'iachkov

¹⁹² Dul'nev, 'K itogam', pp. 8-16.

¹⁹³ TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, l. 3 (1984).

¹⁹⁴ Examples: GARF, f. R5446, op. 95, d. 240, l. 6 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 762, l. 72 (1961); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 11-18, 33-44 (1968).

¹⁹⁵ See for example M.S. Pevzner, 'Meditsinskoe obsluzhivanie spetsial'nykh shkol', *Defektologija* 6 (1970), pp. 3-10. This is comparable to the Soviet handling of social problems, see chapter one.

first agreed with the official line, and claimed that ‘nowadays, the social basis of this [child disability] has been eradicated’. However, the placement of this statement on the first couple of pages of a journal issue raises the suspicion that the researcher was paying lip service to the political leadership and their ideological standpoint.¹⁹⁶ This claim can be supported by two aspects: firstly, he copied the exact same sentence into another editorial for a journal issue a year later.¹⁹⁷ Secondly, D’iachkov contradicted that notion directly after raising it.

Right after negating a ‘social basis’ for developmental problems, D’iachkov chose to address two issues that indirectly contradicted that claim. He claimed it was important to develop a system of preschool education for children with disabilities, because without it such a child would start school with significant developmental delays, adding ‘i.e. he will be pedagogically neglected’. He went on to explain how these children would be deprived of the ‘joys that childhood usually brings’, which was a strong statement in a political system that claimed the happiness of all its children. After introducing the themes of neglect and unhappiness into his text (which allegedly claimed the absence of social reasons for ‘disability’), he casually mentioned another issue concerning the social situation of children with disabilities: ‘anomalies [*anomal’nost’*] in the physical and mental development often lead to a disruption of the anomalous child’s [*anomal’nogo rebenka*] connection with its social environment, creating some isolation.’ While not making explicit claims, the researcher still chose to name the issues he wanted to address, in this case neglect and social isolation.¹⁹⁸

The articles published in the ‘defectology’ journals show that the scholars were generally aware of the problems in the network of special institutions, and that they were ready to address them in this forum as well as look for means to improve the situation. In 1963, G.M. Dul’nev mentioned that housekeeping (*domodovodstvo*) lessons were added to the special school curriculum because ‘experience has shown that these lessons are important for the formation of housework and self-care [*samoobsluzhivanie*] skills in pupils, without which they would be helpless in life’, addressing again the issue of social isolation and bad preparation for life.¹⁹⁹ A similar approach emphasized the importance of teaching children with intellectual disabilities self-assessment skills (*samoosenka*), an approach which could be subsumed under ‘managing expectations’. N.L. Kolominskii suggested confronting children with learning difficulties with tasks of different levels, to make them choose one, and explain their choice – thus they would

¹⁹⁶ A.I. D’iachkov, ‘O nekotorykh zadachakh spetsial’nykh shkol’, *Spetsial’naia shkola* 114.2 (1965), pp. 3-6.

¹⁹⁷ A.I. D’iachkov, ‘Nasushchnye problem spetsial’nykh shkol’, *Spetsial’naia shkola* 117.1 (1966), pp. 3-6.

¹⁹⁸ D’iachkov, ‘O nekotorykh zadachakh’.

¹⁹⁹ Dul’nev, ‘K itogam’.

learn to assess their abilities better. The background of this approach was to prepare mentally disabled children for their future work life:

Many boys dream of professions which the school workshops do not prepare them for. They believe that they will be journalists, drivers, radio engineers. One of them expressed the desire to become an investigator. [...] It was important to us to make sure that the mentally retarded [*umstvenno otstalye*] children understand that wanting to be something, dreaming ('what do I want to do?') is one thing, but that the realization of this dream ('what will I work as?') is a completely different matter. [...] The kids' confidence in their ability to become drivers, doctors, pilots should concern and alarm us.²⁰⁰

This sounds very harsh, but mirrors the extent of the children's social isolation.

Some 'defectologists' adopted a more empathetic stance towards children and addressed problems of destitution and difficult family conditions. In 1965, I.G. Tokar', a Moscow 'auxiliary' (*vspomogatel'noi*) boarding school director, reflected on 'educative influences' in such institutions. He blamed parents for not cooperating with the school staff in their children's upbringing, as some would send their children to these schools for material reasons (because they would be clothed and fed there), which points to poverty, and some would take a 'rude' and 'antipedagogical' attitude towards their children, which points to domestic violence.²⁰¹ This article was practically informed and a (rare) example of a more understanding approach to children with disabilities in these journals, as he described these children as sentient people: 'we are convinced that our children do not always understand everything but that they feel a lot (although many of them are not able to express these feelings in words)'.²⁰² He stressed the importance of strengthening children's confidence in their abilities (however 'limited' they may be), and of relying on encouragement instead of punishment. That such a display of empathy was the exception rather than the rule was connected with the Soviet concept of disability, as the following will show.

Disability: the medicalization of the child in care

While subordinating their work to high 'scientific' standards, the 'defectologists' work was ambivalent in its outcome. On the one hand, they were aware of problems with diagnostics and classification within the residential childcare system; on the other hand, their basic notion

²⁰⁰ N.L. Kolominskii, 'Samootsenka uchashchikhsia vspomogatel'noi shkoly i uroven' ikh pritiiazanii v protsesse professional'no-trudovoi podgotovki', *Defektologiya* 2 (1970), pp. 70-74.

²⁰¹ I.G. Tokar', 'Vospitatel'nye vozdeistviia v usloviakh vspomogatel'noi shkoly-internata', *Spetsial'naiia shkola* 116.4 (1965), pp. 92-94, here p. 92.

²⁰² Tokar', 'Vospitatel'nye vozdeistviia'.

of disability was highly problematic, which in turn worsened the problems they were trying to ‘fix’. In a study about the representation of people with disabilities in Soviet culture, Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova and Pavel Romanov have shown that medicalist perspectives on disability subjected people to research and therapy, disowning them of their bodies and turning them into objects of ‘correction’. This trend intensified after Khrushchev’s ousting, and during the 1970s there was an emphasis on science and technology, including ‘governmental control and isolating forms of care’ (institutionalization), which turned people with disabilities into ‘clients’ and ‘patients’.²⁰³ Disability thus provides a useful case study about the role of science in Soviet residential childcare. It illustrates the medicalized view of children in care, as well as patterns of stigmatization and of dealing with ‘deviance’ and difference, as state socialism classified people along the line of work ability. Whoever could not work was seen as deviant, implying the need of state regulation, which in this case used science to legitimize and frame this regulation.²⁰⁴

The ‘defectologists’ narrow concept of ‘disability’ permeated their professional convictions. According to the ‘defectologists’ themselves, their main task was to reduce the number of children in need of such support, as part of a campaign for the general health of the population and a ‘regulated [*zakonomernoe*] decrease of defective childhood[.]’.²⁰⁵ However, ‘defectology’ was also supposed to ensure the interaction of theory and practice in the education of children with disabilities, providing the ‘scientific basis for the differentiation of the network of special schools’.²⁰⁶ To make such an education possible, according to D’iachkov, the ‘structure of the defect’ had to be studied in order to develop a typology of defects; this in turn would enable them to work out ways to ‘overcome, correct, and compensate’ the ‘defect’.²⁰⁷ The ‘differentiated diagnosis’ of children would encompass both exogenic and endogenic factors, the structure of the defect and its reasons, the time of the injury, the development of the disease, conditions of upbringing.²⁰⁸

Looking closely at the language that the ‘defectologists’ used to label children with disabilities, it becomes clear that they were working with a medical, or deficit model of a person. This

²⁰³ Iarskaia-Smirnova and Romanov, ‘Heroes and Spongers’, pp. 81, 87.

²⁰⁴ Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, ‘Conceptualizing disability’, in *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 2, 5.

²⁰⁵ D’iachkov, ‘O nekotorykh zadachakh’.

²⁰⁶ T.A. Vlasova, ‘K novym dostizheniiam sovetskoi defektologii’, *Defektologiya* 3 (1971), pp. 3-12. According to numbers by the Defectology Institute from 1978, 60 percent of their 128 research staff has had practical experience in schools, see GARF, f. 10049, op. 1a, d. 3636, l. 6(1978).

²⁰⁷ A.I. D’iachkov, ‘O vzaimodeistvii teorii i praktiki vospitaniia i obuchenii anomal’nykh detei’, *Spetsial’naiia shkola* 106.2 (1963), pp. 3-4.

²⁰⁸ GARF, f. 10049, op. 1a, d. 2473, l. 1 (1975).

began with but was not limited to the name of their own discipline, and points to a normative approach to human beings. Common labels for children with disabilities more generally or learning difficulties more specifically included ‘anomalous’ (*anomal’nyi*) child, ‘mentally retarded’ (*umstvenno otstalyi*), ‘defective’ (*defektivnyi*), ‘feeble-minded’ (*slaboumnyi*, or in medical terms *oligofreniia*), or ‘substandard’ (*nepolnotsennyi*).²⁰⁹ In addition to using these labels, ‘defectologists’ framed the children’s whole life in medical terms: their history (including family history) was termed *anamnesis* (medical history), whereas the way the children coped after graduation from a special school was referred to as *catamnesis*, a term used to describe the follow-up history of a patient after the release from hospital or after the end of treatment. These studies were supposed to ‘study the effectivity of the correctional-educational work, the social adaptation and rehabilitation of anomalous children’.²¹⁰ They examined the special school graduates’ work life, family situation, and potential behaviour, discipline, or drug problems; or whether they had to go back to an institution.²¹¹

This type of language also found its way into official discourse. A document by the Soviet Ministry of Education about Latvian schools for children with learning difficulties, for instance, emphasized the importance to investigate the reasons for failure in school. More specifically, it argued that it was necessary to find those who failed due to ‘various deviations of psychophysical development’, and to provide ‘these children with ideal conditions for their education as well as the correction and compensation of their defects’.²¹² This language was present in official documents throughout the Union, which tended to label children with learning difficulties as ill.²¹³ In a discussion about mixed or segregated summer camps, for instance, the authors mentioned the ‘recovery of mentally retarded children’ (*ozdorovleniui umstvenno-otstalykh detei*), only to contrast these with ‘collectives of healthy children’ (*kollektivakh zdorovykh detei*). They argued that children with intellectual disabilities would only fit into one of those ‘healthy’ collectives with difficulty.²¹⁴ Even in the late 1980s, children with learning

²⁰⁹ GARF, f. 10049, op. 2, d. 466, l. 2 (1960); Pevzner, ‘Meditsinskoe obsluzhivanie’, p. 3; Tokar’, ‘Vospitatel’nye vozdeistviia’, p. 92.

²¹⁰ V.F. Shalimov, ‘Katamnestichekoe izuchenie oligofrenov’, *Defektologii* 4 (1970), pp. 26-32.

²¹¹ Asafova, ‘Katamnezy detei’; Kolominskii, ‘Samootsenka uchashchikhsia’; Shalimov, ‘Katamnestichekoe izuchenie oligofrenov’; M.I. Iakovenko, ‘Trudoustroistvo vypusnikov vspomogatel’noi shkoly [iz materialov iubileinykh vsesoiuznykh “pedagogicheskikh chtenii” 1970g.]’, *Defektologii* 1 (1971), pp. 37-39.

²¹² GARF, f. R9563, op. 1, d. 1439, l. 1 (1971).

²¹³ GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 647, l. 2 (1973). A document about the objectives of a 1978 (RSFSR) reform, for instance, called for improving their material conditions and creating conditions for ‘the correct organization of correctional-educational work and treatment (*lecheniia*) of the children’, see GARF, f. A259, op. 46, d. 5706, ll. 101-04 (1978).

²¹⁴ GARF, f. R5451, op. 28, d. 3015, l. 59-61, here l. 61 (1980).

difficulties were still referred to as ‘ill’ (*bol’nye*) in a publication by the Ministry of Social Welfare.²¹⁵

This type of discourse was typical at the time and continued to be, especially in Eastern Europe.²¹⁶ A medical model of disability, however, ‘is far from socially benign, since for disabled people, it is based on the disabling extrapolation that bio-physical “maladaptation” – to use the ubiquitous evolutionary terminology – leads to social maladaptation’. According to Bill Hughes, one of the central theoreticians of disability studies, such a ‘medical management of disability’ is potentially unhelpful and demeaning, as the ‘identities of disabled people were reduced to medical categories’. In such a model, people are expected to adapt to society, whereas a social model of disability would expect society to respond to people’s needs.²¹⁷ In the Soviet Union, the pressure of uniformity as well as work ability and productivity added to this ‘natural’ connection between medical and social maladaptation.²¹⁸ The ability to work was seen as a central component of Soviet citizenship; being unproductive thus risked depriving people of their civil rights.²¹⁹

In the context of this approach to disability, the medical assessment of the ability to work was thus at the centre of all dealings with disabled people.²²⁰ The classification of people with disabilities according to Sukhaeva’s or Pevzner’s systems illustrates the way in which modern societies classify people to overcome alterity. This is a means to get rid of difference through the creation of binaries such as healthy/ill or adapted/deviant, which in turn leads to the exclusion of people. In a categorization according to health and behaviour, people not conforming to the norm are ‘invalidated’, illustrated by the Russian term *invalid* for people with disabilities.²²¹ According to Hughes, modernist discourse suggests that everyone should improve their bodies – in Bauman’s terms: an ‘impaired body signifies moral failure’.²²² The entitlement to decide who is normal and who is deviant gave the medical profession

²¹⁵ See for instance Ministry of Social Welfare (ed.), *Sotsial’no-trudovaiia adaptatsiia umstvenno otstalykh detei v domakh-internatakh: Metodicheskie rekomendatsii dlia rabotnikov orgnov i uchrezhdenii sotsial’nogo obespecheniia* (Moscow, 1986), p. 27.

²¹⁶ Rasell/Iarskaia-Smirnova, ‘Conceptualizing Disability’, p. 3.

²¹⁷ Bill Hughes, ‘Medicine and the Aesthetic Invalidation of Disabled People’, *Disability and Society* 15.4 (2000), pp. 555-568, here pp. 555-56.

²¹⁸ D’iachkov, for example, pointed out a connection between disability and social isolation, which in turn would lead to ‘individualism’, ‘withdrawal’, and, strangely, religiosity. D’iachkov, ‘O nekotorykh zadachakh’.

²¹⁹ Agita Lūse and Daiga Kamerāde, ‘Between Disabling Disorders and Mundane Nervousness: Representations of Psychiatric Patients and their Distress in Soviet and Post-Soviet Latvia’, in Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 97-120, here p. 100. Also see Phillips, “‘There Are No Invalids in the USSR!’”.

²²⁰ Teodor Mladenov, ‘Breaking the Silence: Disability and Sexuality in Contemporary Bulgaria’, in Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 139-64, here pp. 141-42.

²²¹ Hughes, ‘Medicine’, pp. 557-58.

²²² *Ibid.*, pp. 559-61.

considerable power, as Raphael's analysis has shown.²²³ Ideas about a social model of disability were not discussed in the Soviet Union until the 1990s, and the fields of intellectual disabilities, mental illness, and learning difficulties remain neglected in Eastern Europe until today.²²⁴

The classification of children into schools for children with learning difficulties could have problematic consequences, as a study of graduates from special schools and their performance in work training shows. A.V. Politova conducted individual development studies with 24 teenagers, splitting them into a slow, a medium, and a fast group. Only one of the children failed to improve its work pace at all. This child's diagnosis read 'hydrocephalus', and a combination of 'mental insufficiency' and 'lethargy'. She described the cases of two other children who developed throughout the training cycle, meaning either that this special school had done a very good job or that the institutions before had done a very bad one. In Politova's presentation these girls' 'defects' did not really become apparent. The *anamnesis* report of one of them merely stated that her mother had been an alcoholic and had abandoned her, as well as that the girl had been ill frequently (smallpox, scarlet fever, whooping cough, acute appendicitis). It seems that the essence of her 'disability' was neglect, and missing school due to illness. This analysis conveys the impression that the overwhelming majority of children in this special school did not have any 'disability', and merely suffered from neglect by their families or other residential care institutions.²²⁵

People who worked with such children in special schools were likely to be aware of such misdiagnoses. In an oral history interview, one boarding school teacher cautioned against calling children disabled too easily and sending them away too quickly: they might just need some additional attention to catch up. According to her, most children with learning difficulties coming from '*neblagopoluchnye*', poor or dysfunctional, family backgrounds did not have anything 'medically wrong with them' – their problems were caused by neglect.²²⁶ With intensive individual work with both the child and its parents they might catch up with the others.²²⁷ Another teacher made similar observations, and stressed the importance of differentiating between an intellectual disability or retardation (*umstvenno otstalnost'*) and a 'delay

²²³ Raphael, 'Die Verwissenschaftlichung', pp. 168, 175-76.

²²⁴ Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, 'Conceptualizing Disability', pp. 9-10.

²²⁵ If that was not the case, it would be interesting to know why Politova chose her case studies like that: It is likely that she was trying to make a point about the bad state of the system of care and diagnostics. A.V. Politova, 'Individual'nye razlichii v tempe raboty vypusknits vspomogatel'noi shkoly v protsesse proizvodstvennogo obucheniia, *Defektologii* 5 (1970), pp. 62-65.

²²⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, p. 17; PF45B, pp. 18-19. Another teacher made a similar point: 'Not all of them were such mentally retarded, I mean sick children, there were as many suffering from social-pedagogical neglect', see Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53B, p. 21.

²²⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45B, p. 19.

of psychological development' (*zaderezhka psikhologicheskogo razvitiia*). In Soviet times, she explained, these groups of children were taught together.²²⁸ Whereas the question of whether separation or integration are better for children with special needs cannot be answered here, the tendency of 'over-diagnosing' children is apparent.

This tendency puts the constant lack of places in institutions for children with disabilities into context. In the earlier days of the boarding school network, such a shortage was not surprising. However, its consequences could be severe, as a 1961 letter by a group of mothers of children with disabilities to Khrushchev suggests. They complained about the lack of schools for children with disabilities and explained that their children would probably end up with three to four years of schooling instead of eight because they would need to repeat several grades. Then they would be transferred to the feared SOBES institutions or return home without work or a pension, which in turn would mean a social downward spiral for the family, as one parent would have to stop working. They accused the state of treating these children like 'the motherland's stepchildren' and of 'depriving these children of life'.²²⁹ As a reaction to that letter, the authorities checked on the state of education and care in the city of Moscow and found out that in Moscow alone 1,300 children did not have a school place (900 of whom were in school age). They concluded that new schools were needed but that this could only happen to the detriment of building general schools (which were also needed) due to budgetary restrictions.²³⁰

The same was true for the whole of the Soviet Union, as the planning agency Gosplan confirmed: there were not enough institutions for children with disabilities, so that they could only cater for the financially and socially most endangered families, which were the most likely to have their children institutionalized regardless of health issues.²³¹ In that year, 51,217 children with disabilities were waiting for a place in an Education Ministry institution (41,374 of which with learning difficulties), while the Ministry of Social Welfare had a waiting list of 7,000.²³² Although the situation of institutions for children with disabilities improved, there

²²⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF54A, pp. 33-34.

²²⁹ GARF, f. R5446, op. 95, d. 240, ll. 2-5 (1961).

²³⁰ GARF, f. R5446, op. 95, d. 240, l. 6 (1961).

²³¹ GARF, f. R5446, op. 95, d. 240, l. 7-10 (1961).

²³² These numbers apply to the whole of the Soviet Union. GARF, f. R5446, op. 95, d. 240, l. 16-18 (1961). The Russian Ministry of Education noted that to take care of all the children with physical and mental disabilities in the republic, they would have to build up to 240 schools for 48,000 children during the upcoming five-year-plan (1961-65), as 30,000 children in the RSFSR had not gone to school that year (24,495 with learning difficulties or intellectual disabilities). See: GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 7781 (1961).

was always a lack of school places for these children until the end of the Soviet Union.²³³ From the mid-to-late 1970s, the Russian Council of Ministers was working on the further expansion on the boarding school network for children with special needs.²³⁴ There were not enough institutions for children diagnosed with disabilities and overcrowding was widespread until the end of the Soviet Union.²³⁵ In 1984, for instance, Sverdlovsk oblast' had 34 boarding schools for children with learning difficulties with 3916 places but 6489 children living in them.²³⁶

As this analysis has shown, schools for children with learning difficulties had the potential of turning neglected children into disabled children by classifying them as such within the framework of a medicalized model of disability. Thus, these classifications might well have contributed to a 'creation of disability' by the Soviet administration, legitimized to a degree by scientific experts.²³⁷ This type of classification was highly problematic in the larger context of the residential childcare network. The failure rate of pupils each school year was one criterion in a boarding school or children's home inspection. This might have added significant pressure for school directors to have 'unsuccessful' children diagnosed as disabled and transferred to other institutions to improve their statistics.²³⁸ In accordance with their problematic concept of 'disability', Soviet 'defectologists' contributed to the social isolation of children with disabilities and the 'creation of disability'.

Challenging the Residential Childcare System

Even before Glasnost' brought many of the problems in residential childcare to light, they dominated discussions among childcare professionals increasingly from the second half of the 1970s. This section will outline the main challenges brought to residential childcare and argue that a paradigmatic shift took place during from the 1970s, reaching further into the administration, and allowing a more critical stance. However, the actual impact on the institutions remained minor. The manual for children's home educators published in 1976 by Gerbeev and Vinogradova seems to have been one of the first texts to offer a more critical analysis of Soviet residential childcare. It touched upon the topic of social and emotional

²³³ See for instance TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 71, d. 139, l. 13 (1977); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll. 1-4 (1984); GARF, f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 27-32 (1983-85).

²³⁴ With a project to improve the 'education, work training, and placement of people with defects of the mental and physical development', see GARF, f. A259, op. 46, d. 5706, ll. 116-19 (1975).

²³⁵ There were significant regional differences with regard to the expansion of that network. By the 1970s, the development of the special school network had hardly begun in regions like Central Asia, and some republics did not even have the commissions that would send children to such schools yet. Machikhina, 'Pravil'nyi otbor'.

²³⁶ TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll. 1-4 (1984).

²³⁷ In a somewhat similar manner as the creation of deviance, see chapter one.

²³⁸ GASO, f. R233, op. 5, d. 1475, ll. 81-85 (1962-65).

deprivation in children's homes. One of their main suggestions in tackling the problem was to organize the 'child collective' into mixed-age groups.²³⁹ This concept had been developed by Makarenko but was not widely practised for pragmatic reasons: it was much easier to leave the children in the groups in which they studied at school. As a result, however, the institutionalized children would spend all their time with the same group of maybe 10-15 people.²⁴⁰ The idea behind the mixed-age groups was to widen the children's social circle and to install a system of *shefstvo* (tutelage). Older and younger children were supposed to do homework and chores together and develop a relationship much like among siblings. This was to create an atmosphere of responsibility, 'care and affection' (*zabotoi i laskoi*).²⁴¹

The pedagogues also addressed the issue of over-regimentation in such institutions. It criticized the double presence of Pioneer squads in the children's lives, both at the children's home and their school. This posed many problems: firstly, the children's lives became too rigid because the Pioneers were a military-style organization with a command chain, drills, and uniforms. 'In a children's home there need to be different, warmer forms of working with these kids which are closer to family ways', they argued.²⁴² Secondly, having an institutional Pioneer squad led to an unpleasant degree of 'over-organization' within the home. This strained the children involved and often forced them to do their homework at night – a breach of the *rezhim* and health hazard.²⁴³ Thirdly, a children's home-based Pioneer squad confined the children's lives to the institution too much.²⁴⁴ A survey showed that in children's homes with their own Pioneer squads, only two percent of children had friends outside their group. The idea was that if children in care spent more time at school, they would have more contact with people from 'outside', and get to know their 'everyday, their lives' (*ikb byt, zhižn'*) – pointing at the children's social isolation.²⁴⁵

Later on, Gerbeev and Vinogradova returned to the idea of the mixed-age groups as a family when addressing what might be called emotional deprivation or institutional dreariness. At first, they described a relationship of patronage between older and younger children, likening it to one in a 'family collective' – which at that point was used as a sociological category.²⁴⁶ Further on, however, 'family' became a place of emotional warmth. The authors argued that

²³⁹ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, pp. 3, 6-7.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 7-9.

²⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 10-16.

²⁴² Ibid., p. 31.

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 34.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 31-32.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 32, 36.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 108.

the ‘disciplinary tone’ in a hierarchical educator/child relationship was not enough, that it needed another, more familial atmosphere:

A children’s home – as good as it may be – is no cosy family home, where besides the parents there are older and younger sisters and brothers, who give or await guardianship. A thirst for affection and attention from elders is always unsatisfied for children’s home inmates, even more so if they are in same-age groups. From waking up in the morning, they feel the barracks atmosphere [*kazennuiu atmosferu*] right away. The illusion of their own family home, which might have appeared in their dreams or by a strong desire for it, is destroyed within their first seconds of waking. Thus begins the day, this sets the tone.²⁴⁷

Instead, the children should wake up with a friendly word, touch, or smile, and begin the day with a ‘positive emotional charge’ (*dobraia emotsional’naia zariadka*), feeling supported and cared for.²⁴⁸ This was a clear break with the initial promotion of institutional life in the context of the boarding school reform. Here, some of the essential features of residential care were put into question.

This trend intensified considerably in the 1980s, and although it was still far from representing a mainstream opinion, the debates started reaching higher levels of power. In 1983, activist and author Al’bert Likhanov wrote a long letter to General Secretary Chernenko to draw his attention to the problematic conditions in the Union’s children’s homes and called for ‘radical’ changes.²⁴⁹ Likhanov suggested developing a new children’s home concept with smaller groups to create a ‘familial’ atmosphere by increasing staff numbers, by paying them better, and by improving provision.²⁵⁰ However, Likhanov’s suggestions were not met with general enthusiasm: the Minister of Education Prokofev replied that there already was a comprehensive system to help children and ‘there is no reason whatsoever to change it’. According to him, it would be better to find other ways to help children or to support existing institutions.²⁵¹ This probably delayed broader changes within the system until Perestroika.

Likhanov’s letter did have some immediate impact, however. It seems to have raised awareness of the fact that residential childcare staff was grossly underpaid. In the realm of the general boarding schools, the Council of Ministers drafted new laws every few years, reworking class sizes, calculations of food or clothes norms, and tuition costs for families. No bigger changes

²⁴⁷ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel’noi raboty*, pp. 148-49.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-49, 151.

²⁴⁹ GARF, f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, l. 1 (1983).

²⁵⁰ GARF, f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 1-14, here 4-7 (1983-85).

²⁵¹ GARF, f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 15-20 (1983-85).

were made. A draft law from 1982 had already exposed issues with support by state and societal bodies (resulting in bad provision and lacking medical care), the isolation of institutionalized children (inadequacy of funds to allow children to go to the cinema or theatre).²⁵² As the Ministry of Justice pointed out, however, this law hardly differed from the ones before; and measures causing additional costs tended to be blocked by the Ministry of Finance.²⁵³ In a new law drafted from 1983-1985, that is after Likhanov's letter, two new topics appeared in the drafts: increasing institutionalized children's education levels (by having more ten-year boarding schools and allowing them access to higher education), and increasing wages of teaching staff in these institutions by 25 percent, and medical staff wages by 15 percent. Once again, the Ministry of Finance delayed these measures due to budgetary constraints.²⁵⁴

Among the radical changes put in motion by Gorbachev after he became Soviet leader in 1985, two touched the residential childcare system: the re-legalizing of private (or at least non-state) charity, and the considerable press (and public) attention to these institutions.²⁵⁵ The 'rebirth of charity' made possible the foundation of the 'Lenin Children's Fund' in 1987, which unsurprisingly was to be chaired by Al'bert Likhanov.²⁵⁶ They raised funds for improving the legal and material conditions of children in the Soviet Union, including children in care. The Children's Fund conducted experiments with new types of residential institutions, tried to improve the inmates' legal situation and living conditions, sought to assure privileges for their lives after the institution (such as stipends and jumping housing queues), and to address problems of integration into society.²⁵⁷ The work of the Fund, however, became heavily contested after just a couple of months. People accused it of being bureaucratic and megalomaniac, and of not spending its money sensibly, for instance 'wasting it on foreign guests', as one journalist pointed out.²⁵⁸

In 1987, the Soviet leadership reacted to official reports as well as to a public outcry after the scathing media reports on the conditions in children's homes by passing the 1987 decree no.872 'On measures to radically improve the care, education and material welfare of orphans

²⁵² GARF, f. R5446, op. 144, d.1188, ll. 5-30 (1982).

²⁵³ GARF, f. R5446, op. 144, d. 1188, l. 31(1982-84).

²⁵⁴ GARF, f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 33-51, here ll. 37, 41, and ll. 58-59 (1983-85).

²⁵⁵ Harwin, *Children of the Russian State*, pp. 74-75; Anne White, 'Charity, Self-Help and Politics in Russia 1985-1991', *Europe-Asia Studies* 45.5 (1993), pp. 787-810.

²⁵⁶ Harwin, *Children of the Russian State*, p. 74.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

²⁵⁸ Elizabeth Waters, "'Cuckoo Mothers'" and 'Apparatchiks': Glasnost and Children's Homes', in *Perestroika and Soviet Women* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 123-41, here pp. 130, 132-33; GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 61-64 (1990).

and children left without parental care'.²⁵⁹ The legislators came to the disastrous conclusion that 'all these deficiencies have resulted in disgraceful anti-pedagogical practices, undermining of children's feelings of self-worth, abuses, embezzlement, the grossest violations of financial and labour management and sanitary conditions'.²⁶⁰ The 1987 law, however, still 'only' offered improvements to the existing system, vouching to hire more staff and have smaller groups of children for a better child-to-staff ratio; to offer special training for residential childcare staff; and to allocate funds to support institution graduates, not touching the general setup of the system.²⁶¹ The biggest change thus seemed to be a discursive one: Likhanov publicly refuted the whole idea of the superiority of state care over family upbringing altogether, saying that 'the deepest public [*obshchestvennym*] misconception is the theory that children should above all be raised by the state'.²⁶²

With a new-found openness to reforms, Likhanov managed to have 'his' so-called family-type children's homes ratified in 1988, and he campaigned for international collaboration.²⁶³ The new 'family-type' institutions were supposed to offer smaller groups of children the constant care of assigned 'parents' – a concession to the family as the most suitable 'place' to raise children. Whereas their overall objectives were the same, these institutions were designed to provide what others lacked: 'the main idea is to combine the humane principle of the socialist education system with the cosiness and warmth of a family, with parental care and the advantages of a 'home collective' [*domashnego kollektiva*].'²⁶⁴ Inspired by the SOS Children's Villages from Austria, the Council of Ministers projected to build around 30 *detskie gorodki* from 1988-91.²⁶⁵ This was not the only instance of international cooperation in the realm of childcare: in an attempt to improve the implementation of children's rights, Likhanov campaigned for the Soviet Union to sign the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.²⁶⁶

By the late 1980s, the leadership's attitude towards the residential childcare system had taken a distinctive turn: the system was not merely criticized as ill-executed, but as a system itself.²⁶⁷ A Central Committee protocol circulated across the Union promoting the work of the Children's Fund hinted at the terrible conditions in residential childcare institutions,

²⁵⁹ Waters, "Cuckoo mothers", p. 123.

²⁶⁰ Postanovlenie no.872, quoted in Harwin, *Children of the Russian State*, pp. 68. On that decree see also Waters, "Cuckoo mothers", p. 125.

²⁶¹ Harwin, *Children of the Russian State*, pp. 70-71.

²⁶² Al'bert Likhanov, 'Obernut'sia k detstvu: Net zaboty vazhnee', *Pravda*, 13 August 1987, pp. 3, 6.

²⁶³ Kelly, *Children's World*, p. 594.

²⁶⁴ GARF, f. R5446, op. 149, d. 244, ll. 28-50, here l. 43 (1988).

²⁶⁵ GARF, f. R5446, op. 149, d. 244, ll. 1, 12, 53 (1988).

²⁶⁶ GARF, f. R5446, op. 149, d. 1316, ll. 46-80 (1988).

²⁶⁷ Kelly, *Children's World*, p. 283.

concluding that ‘we cannot and must not have abandoned and neglected children, neither in children’s homes, boarding schools, special schools, in facilities for disabled children, on the streets, or in families’.²⁶⁸ The fact that all these ‘places’ are lumped together in the report shows that the authorities had changed their pattern of idealizing the institutions whilst demonizing the streets, and sometimes the family. The financial strain of residential childcare was also accentuated: a report from 1990 claimed that norms for clothes, food, shoes had increased and that costs for every child in care had risen by 60 percent.²⁶⁹ Data and press coverage from the late 1980s give the impression of a broken system in chaotic conditions. According to data from 1987, 1.1 million children lived and were educated in boarding facilities; 1.85 million children had mental health issues; and 900,000 were detained each year for ‘vagrancy’ or crimes.²⁷⁰

The Perestroika press discussed issues such as problems of provision and bureaucracy within the system of institutions; and the magazine *Ogonek* reported the lack of access for people with disabilities, problems in reform colonies, and addressed the issue of institutional care being neglected by the Soviet leadership on every level.²⁷¹ Newspapers ran investigative reports, such as Tat’iana Panina’s reports in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* in 1990 about misdiagnosed children (labelling neglected children as disabled). The journalist criticized the practice by the medico-pedagogical commissions and expressed her doubts about deciding a child’s fate in 15-30 minutes, as these decisions were often hard to reverse. Once a child had been at a special needs school for a while, it would be incredibly hard to catch up on the curriculum after a retransfer to a general school.²⁷² Panina established a link between *oligofreniia* diagnoses of ‘orphans’ and child neglect (first by families, then by state institutions) – children ‘lagging behind in their development not because of organic lesions of the nervous system, but because of their incomplete upbringing and their residence in children’s home facilities’.²⁷³ Although the residential childcare system seemed to be in decline throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the general political and economic crisis around the collapse of the USSR paradoxically stopped that development.

²⁶⁸ TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 25-32, here l. 28 (1987).

²⁶⁹ GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 33-51 (1990).

²⁷⁰ See Myl’nikova, ‘Sochastie v sud’be’, in *Detskii dom: Uroki proshlogo* (Moscow, 1990), p. 154, as quoted in Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotsvo i besprizornost’*, p. 149.

²⁷¹ See for example *Izvestiia*, 23.06.1988, p. 1; *Ogonek*, no.6, February 1988, pp. 12-15; *Ogonek*, no.9, February 1988, pp. 12-15; *Ogonek*, no.16, April 1988, pp. 25-26; *Ogonek*, no.3, January 1988, pp. 18-21, 26; *Ogonek*, no.18, April, pp. 10-12.

²⁷² ‘Prinuzhdenie k sirotsvo’, by Tat’iana Panina, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 21.4.1990.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*.

Russian scholars in particular have pointed out the Soviet/post-Soviet continuity in the complex of residential childcare institutions.²⁷⁴

Conclusion

Coming back to Khrushchev's 1958 reform, this chapter began with the question of the purposes of the residential childcare system in the Soviet Union. The high ideological aim of raising the 'builders of communism' was much more than sheer marketing or an empty slogan publicized to conceal other motives. In fact, Maiofis' and Coumel's argument that the boarding schools were created to produce labourers for production does not contradict that aim – it was a specific and pragmatic application of it. The 'builders of communism' were urgently needed productive workers, a strain of work that had become unattractive to young people after years of de facto forced labour in Stalin's 'labour reserves'. In the Soviet endeavour to create 'healthy, happy, and useful' citizens in residential childcare institutions, health and happiness were reduced to preconditions for usefulness or productivity. The basic concepts of Soviet (residential) education were instrumental in creating well-adapted, efficient, and productive labourers: children were taught to take care of themselves, trained in tidiness and punctuality, habituated to rigid hours, given the 'right' beliefs and mind set; coached on how to spend their free time in a 'cultured' way. Soviet educational theory taught the relative unimportance of the individual with regard to the collective, requiring a voluntary subordination of the former to the latter.

The following decades brought long discussions of what these institutions were for exactly, of how many there should be, and what the education in them should look like. The network of institutions, the general educational framework, as well as the number and social composition of inmates does not seem to have changed dramatically, but the perspective on them shifted gradually. At the time of the 1958 reform, the system of residential childcare institutions set out to be comprehensive and universal, but by the end of the Soviet Union, these institutions were places of neglected, 'sick', and delinquent children, and inmate numbers targeted as something to be reduced. Basically, officials in the 1950s and 1980s were looking at similar numbers, the former finding them too low, the latter too high.

The increasing involvement of the sciences, especially medicine, psychology, and pedagogy in the realm of social policy, that is the 'scientization of social affairs', led to a shift from a

²⁷⁴ Stephenson, 'Street Children in Moscow', p. 530; Maiofis, 'Pansiony trudovykh rezervov'; Zezina, 'Without a Family', p. 72.

criminalization to a pathologization of deviance in the decades after Stalin's death.²⁷⁵ It can be seen in context with the reduction of the network of penal institutions on the one hand and the ongoing expansion of the network of institutions for children with disabilities, physical or mental illnesses. Science thus played an ambiguous role in the endeavour to educate 'the builders of communism'. On the one hand, it served as a legitimization for the education, care, and therapy practiced in these institutions, and scientists strived to improve diagnostics and research to make the classification and education of children flawless. On the other hand, scientists contributed to the problem by medicalizing the children within the system, turning anyone who could not or would not work or adapt into a medical case, a patient. In a way, this reflects the Soviet regime's approach to poverty (as shown in chapter one): because the authorities did not acknowledge the existence of underlying social issues, people who did not take part in 'productive labour' for the state for whatever reason were considered deviant, disabled, in need of 'correction'.

In the course of people's classification, their medical assessment thus focused on their ability to work. In this way, scientists inadvertently contributed to a problematic development. With time, the categories of deviance from the state-sanctioned norm became blurred, such as crime, poverty, social marginality, opposition, disability, (mental) illness. These diverse groups of marginalized people had in common that they did not or could not work the way in which the state wanted them to. This mixing of categories seems paradoxical because of the system's drive for classification and fragmentation, but cases where neglect has been mistaken for disability were too common to be exceptions. Such a 'blurring' of categories was common in diverse forms of discourse, be it Khrushchev linking crime to mental illness in a 1959 speech, or the mother of a disabled girl calling her daughter 'mentally ill' in a letter to the Children's Fund.²⁷⁶

With regard to their aims, structure, educational framework, and involvement of the sciences, the Soviet residential childcare institutions seem like a perfect example of the 'carceral' as outlined by Foucault, in which institutions are places of normalizing power and *biopower*.²⁷⁷ This, however, is only true on a theoretical level. Within the ideological framework of Soviet residential childcare, there was room, and probably the need, for pragmatism, for instance by making children work to maintain their own institution (as has been shown). As these children

²⁷⁵ The incarceration of political adversaries in psychiatric clinics is probably the most well-known example of such a pathologization. See Robert van Voren, *Cold War in Psychiatry: Human Factors, Secret Actors* (Amsterdam/New York, 2010).

²⁷⁶ See *Pravda* 24 May 1959, p. 2; GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

²⁷⁷ See also Khlinovskaya Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, pp. 27-28.

were regarded as a resource for the state, they could also be trained to fill gaps in the labour market. As children without parental care and children in ‘special schools’ tended to receive less education and more labour training than others, Maiofis’ and Coumel’s hypothesis about the labour reserves can be extended from the specific context of Khrushchev’s boarding school reform to later decades and other institutions within the residential childcare network as well.

Productivity, collectivism, and patriotism were values which the Soviet leadership wanted to install in all of their subjects. On the one hand, one might argue, the institution inmates were the perfect guinea pigs for the Soviet state, as full access on the children gave them the opportunity to form them; on the other hand, these children were most likely not the easiest subjects due to their social or family backgrounds. The aim of raising productive workers was supposed to be achieved by classifying them along the lines of productivity and ‘manageability’, as Soviet educators believed in homogenous collectives. In a system as rigid as the one theorized in the educational manuals, using the collective and the *rezhim* as framework, homogeneous groups seem to make sense: under such a strict time management and with limited staff, educators would hardly have the time to deal with ‘difference’ or heterogeneity. As exaggerated as Kharkhordin’s view of a ‘faultless and ubiquitous’ ‘disciplinary grid’ in post-Stalinist socialism sounds, with an ‘inescapable participation in the mutual enforcement of unfreedom and humiliation in public’ – if such a place ever existed, at least in theory, it would be a residential childcare institution.²⁷⁸

This drive for efficiency above all, however, is what Gerbeev and Vinogradova criticized when they suggested mixed age group collectives. It has been shown that experts both on the medical and on the education side of childcare were aware of issues like neglect and isolation within the system of residential institutions, linked to the realization that the systems of classification and education had to be more flexible. This chapter has shown instances when the theory of residential childcare clashed with reality. Where overcrowding forced institutions to conduct meal times or lessons in three shifts, keeping to a *rezhim* or organizing a child collective were difficult to achieve. A constant lack of funds, means, and staff clashed with the high aims of shaping whole generations according to socialist ideology, of making them into productive workers, of solving social problems and ‘correcting’ people not complying with the norm.

²⁷⁸ Kharkhordin, *The Collective*, p. 303.

However, this system continued to exist, to house and bring up hundreds of thousands of children every year.

3.

Managing residential childcare: Marginalizing the marginalized

In 1960, A. Kotovshchikova addressed the issue of social isolation in residential childcare, specifically in baby and preschool homes, in *Literaturnaia Gazeta*. In her article titled 'Neobychnye deti' (unusual children), the journalist described the preschool children growing up in such homes: they were years behind other children their age in terms of understanding the world around them. When she visited such homes, children were amazed at the sight of her because she was wearing everyday clothes (they had only ever seen grown-ups in white lab coats), and at the sight of male workers coming to repair things (only women worked at the home). The children were even shocked by the sight of their own faces: when looking at a group photo together, a little girl could point out everyone but herself, as they were no mirrors in the home (which was quite a good metaphor for the lack of individual care in the home). According to Kotovshchikova, the home was clean and bright, and the children were healthy and well-fed. However, there was something missing in the children's lives. In their attempt to keep flies and germs away from them, she concluded, these homes also isolated them from the outside world.

She urged the scientific community ('physiologists, psychologists, doctors, teachers') to discuss this issue, backing up her claims with educational theory. She argued that paediatricians recommended that parents should talk to their children from birth, and that childcare staff could not provide that kind of attention for at least 15 children at once. In her opinion, the only way to improve that care would be to organize other ways for the children to have more human interaction, firstly by merging baby and preschool homes, having babies, toddlers, and children up to the age of seven live together, and secondly by tearing down the boundaries between the institution and the outside world. 'Certainly there will be women, who in the context of *obshchestvennost'*, would happily go regularly to children in the care of preschool homes, play with them, go on walks', she argued.¹ This article gives further insight into the extent of social isolation in residential childcare, but also shows that the journalist was relying

¹ A. Kotovshchikova, 'Neobychnye deti', *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 29.10.1960, p. 6.

on science as both explanation and solution to the problem, and that to her, a ‘professionalized’ childcare and the involvement of the *obsbchestvennost’* (meaning untrained people) were not contradictory.

Looking back at the concepts of socialist education discussed in the last chapter, which were linked to ideals of collectivism, rationality/science, and labour, the homes discussed in this article confirm the impression of residential childcare institutions as laboratories or greenhouses – but not in a helpful way. This case study raises the questions of whether the system of residential childcare was ultimately capable of fulfilling its purpose – that is, raising productive workers for the state – under these circumstances. This chapter will begin to provide an answer to these questions, looking at the organization of life in Soviet residential childcare institutions through their descriptions in administrative documents and correspondence, as well as through published materials, and through the memories of people who lived and worked in them.

Indeed, the social isolation of children in care had been noted by the very scientists to whom Kotovshchikova appealed for help, as chapter two has shown. Following Goffman’s ideas, limited contact between institutions and the outside world as well as a restriction on the ‘inmates’ movement are central characteristics of total institutions.² The previous chapters as well as this case study have already established some motives behind such isolation: a containment strategy for social issues that should not become publicly apparent, control over a group of the population to educate them according to official norms, and, in the case of these smaller children, keeping illnesses and infections to a minimum. However, this isolation also had negative consequences for people in total institutions, especially for children, which raises the question whether the isolation of Soviet children in care to such a degree was a deliberate policy, or rather an accidental by-product of policies subordinated to other priorities.

This chapter will argue that Soviet authorities kept their residential childcare system marginalized and at a low priority. By analyzing how the residential childcare system was run on a day to day basis, it will first uncover a great variety regarding living conditions, educational work, and working conditions between individual institutions. Following this, the chapter will examine the reasons for such ‘diversity’ across the Union by studying the way in which local, regional, and central administrations handled problems in childcare institutions. It will show that improvements or interventions in individual boarding schools, children’s homes, or

² Goffman, *Asylums*, pp. 16-17.

reform colonies were usually linked either to an individual person's dedication or ad hoc efforts by the authorities motivated by other (external) political motives. In this way, the chapter will transcend the established narrative of high political aims cut short by reality and incompetence and instead illustrate how officials made use of the resources at hand and reinterpreted regulations for their own aims. This is consistent with Geoffrey Hosking's analysis of Soviet institutions, which according to him 'never function quite as intended by the government that set them up' and 'take on a life of their own, determined by the need of the human beings who actually man them'.³

Managing and marginalizing the system of residential childcare

To assure that laws and regulations were applied and conditions satisfactory, the Soviet authorities had residential childcare institutions inspected on a regular basis. Such a system of regular inspections was introduced in 1954.⁴ Government and Party agencies also conducted inspections in preparation for the next school year;⁵ in the wake of scandals;⁶ in connection with new decrees;⁷ or building programmes;⁸ or if the closing or moving an institution was planned.⁹ The inspectors' reports, as well as documents reacting to them are valuable sources to learn about the day-to-day management of residential care. During research for this thesis, the inspections of about 215 institutions were viewed, as well as 53 reports grouping different institutions and discussing them together, ranging from a couple of institutions to all of them.¹⁰ Many of these documents – 219 out of 350 – are from the 1960s, partly because the decade after the boarding school reform saw particularly extensive inspections to monitor the

³ Geoffrey Hosking, *The Awakening of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 21.

⁴ Kelly, *Children's World*, p. 260.

⁵ See for example LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 14 (1964); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); GARF f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71 (1968).

⁶ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, del. 6578, ll. 40-45 (1960); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 1-3, 63-68 (both sides) (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 20-23, 24-30. (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32, 67-68 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 78-83 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 1-6 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 118-126 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 56-69 (1981); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 918, ll. 14-20 (1983-1990); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 918 (1984).

⁷ See for example GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 27, ll. 104-05 (1957); GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 2-6, 10-15 (1959-60); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 104-12; LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 43-46 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 17-19 (1964); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2124 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1448, ll. 108-11 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426 (1969-70); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 647, ll. 2-4 (1973).

⁸ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 401, ll. 10-12 (1956); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 9-19, 182-87 (1960); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623 (1961); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll. 1-4, 5-6 (1984); GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 33-51 (1990).

⁹ GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, l. 50 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 209, ll. 152-55 (1972).

¹⁰ Including 50 reports about children's homes, 70 about boarding schools, 46 about boarding schools for children with learning difficulties, 22 about colonies or boarding school for delinquent youths, and 33 'sanatorium' homes or schools, and 7 baby homes.

implementation of the reform and, after Khrushchev's ouster, attempts to adapt the system (as discussed in chapter two).¹¹

These inspections looked at the material living conditions in the institutions and the education provided in them, as well as the behaviour of staff and children. There were clear guidelines for the material living conditions in residential childcare institutions, from more general requirements like cleanliness and 'cosiness', to measurable figures like a minimum temperature (16°), space (4m² per person), and light (one 200 watt bulb for 10 m²).¹² This all seems in accordance with the ideal of a 'scientific' basis of raising children in a controlled environment, as if it were a greenhouse in which the 'builders of communism' were to be grown. Other criteria included a decent amount of furniture and clothes for children of all (relevant) ages, ventilation, facilities and appliances for personal hygiene and many others.¹³ Such an inspection could be a relatively short visit to check on cleanliness and the state of the building and equipment; or it could take weeks and involve several inspectors from ministries, Party organizations, or education professionals. They came to the institution not only to look at the general state of it but also to inspect lessons and extracurricular activities, including doing algebra tests and dictations with the children. They reviewed the documentation, curricula, and work plans, checked whether the *režhim* was being observed, and interviewed the director and deputies, teachers, educators, and Pioneer leaders.¹⁴

This section will show that the Soviet authorities, whilst upholding high aims for their system of residential childcare as well as socialist education in general (as shown in chapter two), in fact managed that system on a low priority, investing just enough resources and effort for it not to collapse. Whilst never solving the problems that seemed to be intrinsic to the system of residential childcare, there were still certain developments and changes over time. More striking, however, were the variations between individual institutions. To provide an overview of this management, this section will first look at staff working in residential childcare, at their working conditions and work load. Then it will examine the material conditions and

¹¹ Just over 60 percent of these inspection reports are from Latvia, the rest mostly from Russia and the ASSR, with a focus on the Urals (Sverdlovsk and Cheliabinsk regions), with over a quarter of those.

¹² Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, pp. 153, 157-59. See also Sal'nikova, *Režhim dnia*, pp. 35-37. In Gerbeev/Vinogradova's manual, cosiness was defined like this: 'The group room, if it is large, bright, clean, warm, dry; if it is provided with enough comfortable and beautiful furniture, attracts pupils. In this room you want to stay longer, it is easy to think in there, to work. It is cozy.' See Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, p. 152.

¹³ Sal'nikova, *Režhim dnia*, pp. 38-39, 43-45.

¹⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 119-27 (1964); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 53-63 (1984).

educational work in Soviet residential childcare institutions, and how they were monitored by the authorities.

Residential childcare staff: a high work load in poor working conditions

Inspectors thus did not only evaluate the institutions themselves but also the people working in them. As this section will show, the Soviet state had placed very high demands and pressure on their residential childcare staff, whilst offering them only bad working conditions and few incentives. In official discourse, raising children was often likened to ‘engineering’, and thus teachers and educators to ‘engineers of the souls of the growing generation’.¹⁵ Thus, the importance of professional training for teachers and educators was stressed time and again in political discourse, as well as administrative documents and inspection reports.¹⁶ The Ministry of Education required that every staff member stay up to date with educational theory.¹⁷ Teaching staff were even encouraged to get additional degrees to specialize their qualification.¹⁸ However, many institutions employed badly trained and inexperienced people, or relied on low-pay alternatives.¹⁹ For instance, a report following a devastating evaluation of Krasnoïarsk *krai* children’s homes stated that 44 out of 182 educators did not have any training at all.²⁰ Institutions for children with disabilities had additional, very specific requirements, as teaching staff were supposed to have special (‘defectological’) training. Many institutions, however, did

¹⁵ Nikita Khrushchev cited in: Maiofis, ‘Pansiony trudovykh rezervov’. Khrushchev was quite fond of such phrases, and also called the Soviet writers ‘engineers of the soul’ in a 1959 speech in front of the Soviet Writer’s Union, see *Pravda*, 24.05.1959, pp. 1-3.

¹⁶ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 94-99 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 14-19 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1355, ll. 16-33 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 1-9, 20-29 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 5-20 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 1-11 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49, 51-66 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 95-101 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 1-13 (1983).

¹⁷ By going to conferences, visit other institutions, or by reading scholarly literature. Whether children’s homes and boarding schools, namely the director, provided training opportunities for their staff as well as the newest educational literature was regularly checked in inspections. See for instance Umanskii, Lavrik, and Asaturova, *Organizatsiia kollektiva*, pp. 14, 17.

¹⁸ At the time of the 1960 inspection of Medumi auxiliary boarding school, for instance, nine out of 26 pedagogic staff members were studying on the side. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960).

¹⁹ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 27, ll. 104-05 (1957); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 9-19, 44-46, 182-87 (1960); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 10-16 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 243-49 (1962); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, pp. 53-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 32-5 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 4-11, 22-27, 28-32, 47-55 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 62-68, 78-83 (1965); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27, 140-45 (1967); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 48-61 (1970); GU GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17, 106-114 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 103-08 (1981); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 7956, ll. 43-47 (1983); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 45-48 (1984).

²⁰ GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 140-145 (1967).

not have enough (or even not any) staff with special training, which is surprising in the context of a ‘professionalization’ of childcare.²¹

Teaching staff were held to high standards on a more personal level as well, although inspections show that many staff members did not live up to them (with disastrous consequences for the children in their care). Inspectors singled out some staff members for their effort and dedication, and reprimanded others for their terrible overall performance, for giving a bad example to children, or for lacking the necessary feeling of responsibility (*chuvstva otvetstvennosti*).²² A report from a more general 1960 inspection of children’s homes in Sverdlovsk, for instance, pointed out that some educators were rude and heartless with the children, pushing them and shouting at them.²³ In some instances, staff members were caught stealing from the institution.²⁴ Such personal assessments were quite important, as even one educator doing a bad job could have a serious impact on a child’s life. The Russian and Latvian groups in Jūrmala sanatorium children’s home, for instance, were described so differently that it is difficult to believe they lived in the same institution. According to their teachers, the Latvian children were tidy, well-dressed, well-behaved, and successful at school; whilst the Russian children from the same home did not always wear their uniforms, sometimes not even clean clothes, and they were said to be badly prepared, ‘neglected, difficult’.²⁵

The teachers’ educational work (in the class room) was also supposed to meet high standards. To assess such work, many inspectors started by collecting data on how many children passed the recent quarter, semester, or school year.²⁶ For more extensive inspections, inspectors also

²¹ GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 14-22, 26-31, 32-34, 36-42, 43-46, 86-94 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 42-50, 62-68, 78-83 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 27-34 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 48-61 (1970); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 51-58, 70-81 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 95-101, 106-114 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 15-19 (1983); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 45-48, 53-63 (1984).

²² Examples of dedicated educators and teachers: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 20-27 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97, 105-17 (1971). Examples of criticism for poor work: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 47-49 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 43-46 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980). Unworthy behaviour by staff members included rudeness, roughness, and shouting at the children, see LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 472, ll. 1-7 (1957); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 43-46 (1963); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27 (1967).

²³ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960). More serious digressions by staff members, such as violence against children, will be discussed further in chapter four.

²⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 148-54 (1961).

²⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 29-31 (1964). However, it is also possible that this report mirrors the inspector’s resentment towards Russian people.

²⁶ These percentages tend to range in the 90s, but often enough move down to the 80s and 70s, sometimes as far as to the 50s, which is a disastrous result for a school. To name only a few examples, the so called ‘success rate’ was 92.1 percent in Moscow oblast children’s homes, worst home 70.2 percent: GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); most groups between 53.7 and 65.7 percent, 100 in one group in Liepāja auxiliary boarding school: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 104-12 (1960); 96.4 percent at Aglona boarding school, 95 at Cesvaine, 93.2 at Riga boarding school no.2 – Latvian boarding schools in general 89.7 percent: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 9-

sat in a number of lessons and described the teachers' approaches and methodology in some degree of detail. Most reviews of teaching staff of an institution were mixed, which should be normal for schools.²⁷ A few institutions received positive feedback throughout for their teaching.²⁸ Most reports, however, pointed out issues in the teaching staff's work, mostly complaining about unprepared teachers giving boring lessons, making no effort, or giving 'formulaic', old-fashioned lessons without any interesting material for the students.²⁹ More detailed reports address a lack of effort in language teaching, meaning either not teaching any foreign languages, not speaking with the children enough, or not making sure that they spoke

19, 182-87 (1960); 87 percent in Slantsevskaja colony, Leningrad oblast: GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83 (1962); an average of 93.3 percent in RSFSR boarding schools: GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 81-100, 70-79 (1962); 93 percent in Malta boarding school: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 17-19 (1964); 88 and 89 percent in recent years in Jelgava children's home: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 16-19 (1964); ranging between 81 and 94 percent in Aduliena auxiliary boarding school: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 2-19 (1965); from 91.3 to 94.6 percent in a Cheliabinsk boarding school (groups ranging from 69.9 to 100 percent): GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); 80-88 percent in five Sverdlovsk oblast children's homes: GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1471 (1968); 88 percent in the first semester at Cheliabinsk oblast children's homes: GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); 97.6 percent in Malta boarding school: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 75-89 (1971); ranging between 90 and 96 percent at Raiskumi boarding school (worst group 60 percent): LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 82-94 (1977).

²⁷ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 472, ll. 1-7 (1957); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 59-75 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31, 132-60 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 1-5, 6-8, 54-66, 67-79, 88-91 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101, 103-142 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 148-54 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 1-9, 47-60, 66-70 (1963-64); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11, 17-19, 23-30 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 10-15 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 56-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1086, ll. 3-9 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 21-30 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1309, ll. 13-43 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1310, ll. 17-28, 60-68 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1234, ll. 17-42 (1967); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38, 48-61 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 75-89, 90-97, 105-17 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 8-20 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 82-94 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 95-101, 106-14 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 103-08 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 1-13, 15-19 (1983); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 10-14, 33-38, 53-63 (1984).

²⁸ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 1-5, 6-8 (1960); GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 158-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 60-64 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 47-55 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 4-9 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 19-25 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); GARF f. R9527, op.1, d. 2124, ll. 174-189 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 75-89, 90-97, 105-17 (1971).

²⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 44-46, 52-56 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 140-43, 199-201, 243-49 (1961-62); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, pp. 53-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11, 45-61, 119-27 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 20-24 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 71-76 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1086, ll. 3-9 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 62-68, 94-99 (1965-66); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 157-59 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1355, ll. 88-102 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 40-44 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 4-13 (1978); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 33-38 (1984); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 918 (1986). Or they simply decried their bad teaching in general: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 1-3, 50-51 (1958-59); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 173-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 148-54, 243-49 (1961-62); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 104-116 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 119-27 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19, 105-10 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1234, ll. 1-4 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 1-6 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 40-44 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 51-58 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980).

properly.³⁰ Another common reproach to teachers was a lack of individual care, namely that they would tend to work with the strong and active pupils only, and neglect working with the weaker or failing ones.³¹

The work profile of educators (*vospitateli*), who took care of the children before and after school, as well as on weekends, was even more varied. Educators did homework with the children, organized activities outside of school (possibly in cooperation with *shefi*), and had to form a child collective on the one hand, and to work individually with the children on the other.³² On a more ideological level, children were supposed to do useful work, help sustain their school, and take part in the ‘self-administration’ (*samoupravlenie*) of their institution.³³ This completed more theoretical education, in so-called patriotic, aesthetic, international, and political lessons – teaching them ‘a worldview based on dialectic Marxism.’³⁴ The inspectors’ assessments were based on Soviet education theory, as has been outlined in chapter two.

These manifold tasks represented merely the basic expectations of their work. Inspectors singled out those pedagogues who exceeded even those high expectations, as they tackled the specific challenges of residential childcare, or because they made an effort to work with struggling children. In a general report about Moscow oblast children’s homes, the inspector explained how ‘good’ educators made an effort to work on the children’s speech with games improving articulation, talking and reading to them a lot, learning poems and telling stories with pictures together. They also made sure that the children got to know their surroundings,

³⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 1-3, 44-46, 50-51, 52-56 (1958-59); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 28-37 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41, 103-08 (1981). In an extension to this idea, inspectors often had the impression that teachers did not invest enough into developing the children’s reading and writing skills. See LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 1-3 (1959); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41, 103-08 (1980).

³¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 1-3, 52-56 (1958-59); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 28-37 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 104-16 (1963); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, pp. 53-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 17-19 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 16-19 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 94-99 (1966); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 157-59 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 40-44 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 106-114 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41, 103-08, 117-22 (1981).

³² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 19-25 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 20-27 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40, 90-97 (1971).

³³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 9-19, 44-46, 182-87 (1960); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 63-68, both sides (1962); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97 (1971).

³⁴ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 59-75 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-131 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 60-64 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 19-25 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 5-20 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970). The ideal in extracurricular education for older children is summed up in this assessment from Medumi auxiliary boarding school, which prioritises the inherent value of work: ‘the children are taught a socialist attitude towards work, skill and accuracy in fulfilling tasks, savvy and resourcefulness, ability to perform any feasible work, ability to take care of themselves and their younger peers.’ See LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101 (1960-61).

and organized pen pals for them in different parts of the USSR and other socialist countries. Thus, they actively approached the issues of social isolation and lack of social interaction.³⁵ Helpful individual work with ‘weaker’ or undisciplined children could entail work placements outside the institution, getting individual *shefy* (tutors) from outside to support children in their development (mostly factory workers or Komsomol members), or setting up individual teaching plans in cooperation with the child’s school teachers.³⁶

Such a rich range of pastimes, as organized by the more dedicated pedagogues, were important to ensure the children’s development and wellbeing. Organized leisure was supposed to teach additional skills, but it was often one of the few chances for the children to relax, wind down, and experience something out of the ordinary (and just as importantly, outside of the institution). State agencies usually preferred a highly organized time after school, believing it to be the best way in terms of a collective upbringing, and of course the best way to control and supervise a large group of people.³⁷ According to inspection reports, well-organized leisure included regular trips to the cinema, museums, concerts or the theatre;³⁸ excursions to nature, cities, cultural events, Pioneer palaces, and workplaces;³⁹ organizing film screenings, lectures, and music performances;⁴⁰ a library with books and newspapers;⁴¹ visits by ‘heroes’ and

³⁵ Such as in Sverdlovsk children’s home no.10: GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); and Jūrmala sanatorium children’s home: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 20-27 (1967).

³⁶ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-23 (1960).

³⁷ When inspectors criticized that either nothing was planned for the children’s free time, or that the planning was not good enough, there is no straightforward way to interpret it. On the one hand, it could mean that the children had time to fill by themselves, which is an important skill to learn. On the other hand, it could mean that the children were bored, did not have anything to do, or did not get out of the house enough. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 44-46, 173-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 144-47, 243-49 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 5-7, 10-16 (1961-62); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 3-5, 9-15 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3, 16-19 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1355, ll. 16-33, 88-102 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 28-33, 34-38 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41, 103-07, 117-22 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 15-19 (1983).

³⁸ GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 47-55 (1964); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 11-18 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 105-17 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 10-14, 33-38 (1984).

³⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 129-142 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 143-200 (1961); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 11-18 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 10-14, 33-38 (1984). Medumi auxiliary boarding school, for instance, organized excursions to a dairy, a poultry farm, a pig farm, some workshops, to the city, to a lake, and into the forest in the early 1960s. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101 (1961).

⁴⁰ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 158-179 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 143-200 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 32-35 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 58-68 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 10-14, 33-38 (1984).

⁴¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 103-42 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 31-8, 41-44 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 32-35 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 2-19 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 5-20 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 58-68, 69-74, 75-89, 90-97 (1971).

veterans;⁴² and camp in summer.⁴³ Another big part of organized leisure in Soviet schooling in general, but residential childcare more particularly, were the so-called *kruzhki*.⁴⁴ The scope of these *kruzhki* was very wide, including school subjects; engineering-themed ones like plane modelling, ship building, or cinema technology; nature-themed ones, tourism, local studies; first aid; photography; housekeeping; arts and crafts; singing, dancing; writing; instrumental music; drama; puppet theatre; animal care, gardening, bee keeping; tractor driving; shoe making, book binding, wood work, sewing; as well as sports such as athletics, gymnastics, skiing, volley ball, table tennis, hockey, chess, or martial arts.⁴⁵

In interviews with former Soviet educators, the wide range of different duties appears even more straining. In general, they worked in shifts: someone had to be there in the morning to make sure that the children got up, washed, tidied up, had breakfast, wore the right clothes and went to school with everything they needed. After school, the actual ‘education’ took place (which involved planning and preparation) – educators went out with the kids, did homework with them, and taught them other skills. During the night, someone had to watch over them. Often enough, one educator would be responsible for one class, which in Soviet times could amount to over 30, or even up to 40 or 50 children. If there were ‘orphans’ at the boarding school, someone had to stay for the weekend and to accompany children to work or leisure camps during the holidays.⁴⁶ Their work did not end there, however. The educators also had

⁴² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 47-55 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 105-17 (1971).

⁴³ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 11-18 (1968); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497 (1987).

⁴⁴ ‘Circles’, meaning specified lessons or activities organized in small groups. According to samples from inspection reports, it seems that a decent institution tended to have between 8 and 18 such *kruzhki*, and that less would be seen as unsatisfactory. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 472, ll. 1-7 (1957); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 59-75 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 87-103, 113-31 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 44-46 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 103-42 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 47-60, 66-70 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 45-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 21-30 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 27-34 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 105-17 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 15-19 (1983).

⁴⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 59-75 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 44-46 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31, 132-60 (1960); GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 158-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 103-42, 143-200 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27, 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 37-40 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 31-38, 41-44 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 24-34, 47-60, 66-70, 81-102 (1963-64); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, pp. 53-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 23-30, 119-27 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 20-24, 29-31 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 4-11, 47-55 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 2-19, 42-50, 78-83 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 1-3, 11-15 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1309, ll. 13-43 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1234, ll. 5-16 (1967); GU OGACHO, f. R288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1310, ll. 46-57 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 20-27 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1355, ll. 16-33 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 20-29 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1445, ll. 6-36 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 69-74, 75-89, 105-17 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 70-81 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 45-48, 53-63 (1984); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll. 1-4, 5-6 (1984); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497 (1987).

⁴⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49A, pp. 6-8, 25. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF46A, p. 48. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF54A, p. 25. In a closed boarding school for delinquent children, the groups would be slightly smaller, about 20-25 people. In all the institutions, groups seem to be smaller nowadays. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF62B, p. 17.

to help in managing the provision of the institution, keeping track of all the inventory (furniture, linen, sheets, and also clothes), to ensure that nothing went missing and that new things could be ordered in time.⁴⁷ They also had to check the state of kitchen and canteen, and make sure that no one stole food.⁴⁸

In addition to that, what could be considered as ‘social work’ added to their workload. Educators and teachers had to work with parents, visit their home to check whether living conditions were sufficient for a child, and also get them to pay school fees. They also had to organize pedagogical lectures and workshops for parents, and, in case people neglected their parental duties, they had to contact the authorities or the parents’ workplace to apply some pressure.⁴⁹ Official documents confirm that staff in such institutions were not only responsible for ‘fixing’ the children but were also required to fix their families. An inspection of Riga’s boarding school no.1 shows that staff were expected to work with parents who were not involved enough with their children’s upbringing or who led an ‘amoral lifestyle’. An institution was supposed to ‘create a public opinion’ about them, meaning to make their behaviour known at their places of work, of residence, or involve ‘Comrades’ Courts’. The report criticized that ‘it is extremely rare for a school to initiate a case involving the treatment of parental rights that negatively affect children who are not worthy of being called parents’.⁵⁰

Finally, educators were also expected to take on several so-called ‘societal’ (*obshchestvennye*) tasks, most of them in connection to the Communist Party. They were supposed to sit in several committees, do work for the trade union, work with ‘bad’ teachers, all of which entailed considerable paperwork. When talking about these additional duties, a teacher used synonyms of the word ‘burden’ three times in two short sentences in her interview: ‘I was really burdened [*zagružbena*] with all these societal strains [*nagružkami*] at the boarding school. Well, chairman of the local committee, classes, and then educational work after school and then the societal load [*nagružka*].’⁵¹ Official documents confirmed this dimension of the workload as well.⁵² In

⁴⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49B, p. 16; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45B, p. 21.

⁴⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53A, p. 9.

⁴⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF50A, pp. 28-30; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53B, p. 18; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF54B, p. 37. When asked whether it had been difficult to influence ‘difficult’ parents, a former teacher answered: ‘Yes, of course! Well how, well how do you influence them? Who drinks, drinks.’ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF73A, p. 6.

⁵⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97 (1971).

⁵¹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53A, p. 9. Although she also might be trying to justify her decision to stop working with the children on an everyday basis, pointing out that she did not leave because of them, but for all the annoying paperwork.

⁵² In a document about building boarding facilities next to rural schools in 1969, the Soviet Ministry of Education described the basic tasks of an educator in this way: ‘The educator ensures the performance of the student’s day schedule, rules of conduct established in the boarding school; monitors the performance of pupils’ homework assignments and provides them with necessary assistance; directs extra-curricular reading of students and organizes their cultural leisure; takes care of the health and life of students, maintains a permanent

their reports, inspectors complained about institutions which were not involved enough in their region's societal (*obsbchestvennyi*) work, or not invested enough in teaching the children ideology and values.⁵³ In 1987, a Politburo protocol explained what residential childcare educators should achieve:

It is necessary that they [children in care] are surrounded by the love and care of the people, have all the conditions for mental and physical development, to grow up to be full-fledged and happy citizens. Each child needs help to survive the misfortune that has befallen them, parent-like [*po-roditel'skiz*] support, to be firmly put on their feet, to enter a self-sustained life as an educated, ideologically sound, hardworking, active citizen.⁵⁴

All of these things could not possibly be achieved by working to contract, as documents point out every now and then – educators were expected to regularly exceed their work hours.⁵⁵

If residential childcare staff did work to contract, conditions for the children would be terrible, as inspection reports suggest. A report from Igate children's home, for instance, conveyed an atmosphere of neglect: the children looked like they did not wash, their clothes seemed crumpled and dirty, the girls' stockings were untidy, their aprons not ironed, the boys' shirt cuffs looked messy. The children did not have any slippers and were walking around in their boots, their linen was dirty, and they slept in their underwear as they did not have nightshirts. Their towels looked dirty too, and the kids carried dirt everywhere because the floors were not clean. They also did not use their soap and tooth brushes regularly. According to the inspector, the children had not learned to behave or to take care of themselves.⁵⁶ 'At the sight of strangers', she reported, 'they scream, laugh, and point'. This seems as much a sign of lacking education as of social deprivation. The general organization (and *rezhim*) of the home were also unsatisfactory. The inspector concluded:

The rooms of the boarding school are gloomy, inhospitable. There are no flowers. Blank wallpaper and an empty notice board. On a board entitled 'sample and memorize', only a map of the bedroom distribution is displayed. In the break room there are no toys or other things for children. It appears

contact with the parents of schoolchildren or their substitute, maintains a diary of educational work.' See LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1448, ll. 25-32 (1969).

⁵³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 173-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 45-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 53-63 (1984); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 918 (1986).

⁵⁴ TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 25-32 (1987).

⁵⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 9-16 (1961-62).

⁵⁶ However, as seen in chapter two, learning these skills was supposed to be the first step in the formation of a child collective.

that the children's home's life and work are led by careless, indifferent, and irresponsible people. And that the Igate children's home is a children's shelter without heart and soul.⁵⁷

However, while the inspector's indignation is understandable, residential childcare staff also had good reasons for working to contract: neither their pay nor their work conditions even remotely reflected the dedication that was expected from them.

This helps to explain why the Soviet leadership struggled to find people to work in residential childcare. Staff shortages were a widespread problem in all types of institutions, forcing staff members to take on additional hours.⁵⁸ According to a report from Sverdlovsk, four general boarding schools in the area were operating with only 40 percent of posts filled.⁵⁹ Such shortages were particularly harrowing among medical staff.⁶⁰ In 1961, only 89.4 percent of doctor's posts in Soviet boarding schools were filled.⁶¹ When crisis and hardship hit the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the conditions worsened – in 1989, only 68.6 percent of doctors' posts were filled in Soviet children's homes, and only 79.4 percent of nurses'.⁶² Many institutions also suffered from high turnover, which created a bad work atmosphere and was harmful for the children, who struggled with ever-changing attachment figures.⁶³ These findings suggest that residential childcare institutions were not very fulfilling or rewarding workplaces.

⁵⁷ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 4-9 (1964).

⁵⁸ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 81-100, 70-79 (1962); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, pp. 53-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11, 45-61, 119-27 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 10-15 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 48-61 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 69-74 (1971); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 8-20 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 70-81 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 103-08 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1950, ll. 1-2, 8-12 (1982); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 7956, ll. 43-47 (1983); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293 (1984).

⁵⁹ TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293 (1984).

⁶⁰ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-25 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 60-64 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 66-71 (1962); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 12-13, 43-46 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 20-22 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19 (1966); GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1507, ll. 94-102 (1967); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 140-45, 167-71 (1967); GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1471 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 10, 11-18 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1448, ll. 98-102 (1969); GARF, f. A482, op. 54, d. 3578, ll. 1-2, 78-80 (1970); GARF, f. A482, op. 56, d. 4211, ll. 25-30 (1982); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll. 1-4, 5-6 (1984); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 918 (1986); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497 (1987); GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 33-51 (1990); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9969, ll. 46-51, 115-20 (1990).

⁶¹ And even fewer (77 percent) in 1959. See GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 70-79, 81-100 (1962).

⁶² In boarding schools, the situation looked slightly better with 75.4/90.7 percent; and 69.9/86.7 percent in children's homes for mentally disabled children. GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 1-5, 6-8, 27 (1990).

⁶³ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 241-42 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 81-100, 70-79 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 20-23, 24-30, 32 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1086, ll. 3-9 (1965); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 157-159 (1967); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); GARF, f.

In such a situation of constant personnel shortages, the range of responsibilities subjected educators to considerable strain, as former staff members have pointed out.⁶⁴ One teacher said that working at a boarding school was much tougher than at a regular school, not only physically, but also because one would be much closer to the children emotionally.⁶⁵ Another teacher also pointed to the psychological challenge of her job: ‘our work was very tough, very tough. Such load just burdens the psyche, of course.’⁶⁶ For some, this emotional strain was too much: one school teacher explained in her interview that she stopped working in a boarding school because of the hopelessness of her work. The children suffered and no one around seemed to care.⁶⁷ Working overtime added to the strain, as some pedagogues worked both as teachers and educators at the same institution, due to staff shortages and because people were prepared to work additional hours for more money.⁶⁸ In her interview, an educator explained that they would usually work 30 hours a week, but that because of these shortages and the low salary, many worked 45 hours instead.⁶⁹

The issue of pay added to the strain of a high work load. Although staff in residential childcare institutions tended to have more work than teaching or medical staff in non-residential institutions, they actually made less money than their colleagues and had fewer days off (36 instead of 48 days of paid leave per year).⁷⁰ Taking into account that teachers and doctors were badly paid in the Soviet Union in general, these even lower wages for children’s home and boarding school staff explain both personnel shortages and high turnover. An inspection report of Leningrad colony even mentioned explicitly that staff members were leaving because of bad pay.⁷¹ Getting additional training could be one way to get paid more, as teachers and educators with ‘defectological’ training at auxiliary institutions would earn up to 25 percent

R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 20-29 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972).

⁶⁴ One teacher explicitly mentioned four times how difficult work was: Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49B, p. 16, 20; PF50A, p. 33; PF51A, p. 49. Another former teacher talked about personnel shortages, saying that she was so busy cleaning all the time that she could not spend as much time with the children as she wanted to, Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF57B, p. 16. See also Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF60A, p. 3.

⁶⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF54A, p. 24.

⁶⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF65B, p. 19.

⁶⁷ She described parents who did not care about their children and even sold their school uniforms, as well as teachers and management who beat the children and stole resources meant for them. She explained that she had to leave that job because it took a toll on her health (she lost 12kg in that year). See Oxf/Lev SPb-02 PF19A, pp. 7-8, 9-10, PF19B, pp. 49-50.

⁶⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53A, pp. 3-4; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47A, p. 12.

⁶⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49B, pp. 15-16, 20.

⁷⁰ GARF; f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1188, ll. 27-32 (1982-84). See also Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotsvo i besprizornost'*, p. 138: teaching staff in boarding schools got the same wages as children’s home educators, and thus less than a teacher in a general school.

⁷¹ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 75-83 (1962). Riga boarding school no.1 reported in 1983 that 11 educators had left in the last year because work hours and pay were not attractive enough, see GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 7956, ll. 43-47 (1983).

more.⁷² Such low wages reflected badly on the state's appreciation of residential childcare staff. In 1984, Al'bert Likhonov branded this a mistake and called for raising teaching and medical staff's pay as well as giving them more appreciation through medals and honours.⁷³ This led the Council of Ministers to at least consider raising teaching staff's pay by 25 percent, medical staff's by 15 percent, although the Ministry of Finance blocked, or at least delayed, this motion.⁷⁴

Interviews confirm that working in residential care had quite low prestige. Staff members did not only live on low wages, but were also quite conscious of the low status of their work.⁷⁵ The interviewees linked staff shortages to the fact that 'boarding school educator' was a badly paid job that everyone admired in theory, but no one wanted to do: 'people did not wish to become educators. They didn't.'⁷⁶ The gender ratio was also connected with the reputation and the low wages – hardly any men would go to work at a boarding school.⁷⁷ One educator tried to get a job as an inspector within the administration, also but not only because her husband put her under pressure: 'well, you, it is just ... it is – he says – even embarrassing for me to tell people where you are working. [laughs]⁷⁸ It seems that members of staff felt that they needed to explain why they were doing this job.

This section has explored the dichotomy of work load and work conditions of residential childcare staff. It has shown that while the state expected much of teachers and educators in such institutions and monitored their work, it did not offer them decent working conditions or sufficient pay for their effort, as childcare workers themselves were aware, and the authorities eventually recognized (but did not change). The fact that educational staff in residential childcare received lower wages than their colleagues in general schools points to the authorities tendency to keep residential childcare at a low priority, making no effort to make

⁷² GARF, f. R9563, op. 1, d. 797 (1969). A report about Jelgava children's home no.1 illustrates this development: in the years leading up to the inspection, two educators had transferred to a specialized institution after having had special training; and three educators were studying part-time to eventually do the same thing. See LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 14-19 (1968).

⁷³ GARF, f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 1-14 (1983-85).

⁷⁴ GARF, f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 33-51, 58-59 (1983-85).

⁷⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF58A, p. 34. See also Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF65A, p. 12. But still, several of the interviewees spent some of their (meagre) pay on things for the school, like for instance paint for the walls (when the administration would not do the necessary refurbishments for years), treats for the children, or a ticket for public transport in case parents forgot to pay for it. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF54A, p. 32; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF58A, p. 34.

⁷⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, p. 4.

⁷⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF52A, p. 9.

⁷⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF52B, p. 15. Another teacher remembered how people tried to convince her to work someplace else because of the low wages and the hard work – she replied that she loved these children and could not do without them, that the work made her forget everything around her, see Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF58B, p. 44.

work in such institutions attractive to pedagogues. The following section will investigate the material conditions for living and learning in Soviet residential childcare, how they evolved over the years, how the state provided for such institutions and monitored the conditions in there.

Variations in material conditions

Inspection reports from different places, times, and types of institution provide many insights, the most striking of which is the considerable variation of living and learning conditions in residential childcare. This variation seemed to depend only marginally on factors like time, place, and type. In accordance with education theory and ideology (as outlined in chapter two), residential childcare institutions were evaluated according to criteria of cleanliness, hygiene, safety, equipment, provision, nutrition, and healthcare. The following section will analyse the explanations for such varied living and learning conditions and show that some general political developments influenced living conditions in residential care, such as the 1958 boarding school reform or late Soviet economic crisis. The general variation of such conditions should rather be considered as an instability of residential care caused by its institutionalized neglect by the Soviet administration.

The criterion of ‘good material conditions’ at a residential childcare institution entailed a number of factors on top of labels such as ‘warm’ and ‘cosy’, or clean and tidy.⁷⁹ The criterion of cleanliness not only concerned the state of the rooms; it also entailed regular inspections of the premises, changing sheets and linen regularly (every seven to ten days), the children washing every day, going to the *bania* on a regular basis, washing their hands before every meal, wearing clean and tidy clothes, and keeping their dorms and class rooms in order. To ensure

⁷⁹ About warm and ‘cosy’ conditions: GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 65-72 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 119-27 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 1-3, 16-18, 19-25, 27-30 (1965); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 11-18 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17, 106-14, 126-37 (1980). About cleanliness and tidiness: GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 44-46, 50-51 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 59-75, 76-82 (1958-59); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 54-66, 88-91 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 63-68, both sides (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 37-40 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 31-8, 41-44, 119-27 (1963-64); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 16-19, 29-31, 32-35, (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 1-3, 4-11, 56-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 1-3, 10-15, 19-25, 27-30 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1086, ll. 3-9 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 2-19, 78-83 (1965); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13, 14-19 (1967-68); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1507 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 10, 11-18, 33-44 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 1-11, 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 58-68, 105-17 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49, 51-66 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54, 80-108 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 70-81 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980).

such conditions, an institution was supposed to have sanitary facilities, such as washrooms and toilets with running hot and cold water, and central heating.⁸⁰ Medical facilities, meaning a properly equipped infirmary with beds to isolate children with infectious diseases were also among the basic requirements.⁸¹

In addition to decent living conditions, residential childcare institutions were supposed to provide good conditions for the children's education, including curricular school education, work education, extracurricular lessons, and organized leisure, such as a gym, sports pitches, rooms to read, play, listen to music, a library, and a Pioneer room.⁸² These standards entailed state-of-the-art teaching facilities, including classrooms, so-called *kabinety* and workshops, as well as grounds suitable to grow vegetables or even keep livestock.⁸³ However, facilities providing education and entertainment could be difficult to come by. In several institutions, there were no properly equipped classrooms or labs, which in extreme cases could mean that lessons had to take place in the dining hall or corridors.⁸⁴ Many institutions struggled with a shortage of spaces for leisure, such as libraries, rooms for reading, playing, or relaxing, gyms, Pioneer rooms.⁸⁵ These, however, were of great importance for children living in such institutions: without these spaces, children in institutions would have nothing to do in their free time because they could not move freely outside their home, school, or colony.

⁸⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 33-44 (1968); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293 (1984).

⁸¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 1-3, 27-30 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 11-18 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971);

⁸² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 116-26 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 1-5, 6-8 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 1-3, 11-15, 16-18 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1507, ll. 94-102 (1967); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 146-147 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 20-27 (1967); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 1-9, 11-18 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 7956, ll. 43-47 (1983).

⁸³ About workshops, see: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 19-25 (1965); GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1507, ll. 94-102 (1967); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 146-47 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1355, ll. 13-33, 44-47 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 11-18 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49 (1973); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 7956, ll. 43-47 (1983); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll. 1-4, 5-6 (1984). About grounds suitable for agriculture: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 60-64 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49 (1973).

⁸⁴ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 141-47 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 69-74 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 1-13 (1983); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 53-63 (1984).

⁸⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 116-26 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 593, ll. 7-8 (1959); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 199-201 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 31-8, 41-44 (1963); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 7-9, 26-31, 36-42, 86-94 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 2-19, 62-68 (1965); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27, 167-71 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 93-97 (1981); GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 33-51 (1990).

Many institutions, however, did not meet one, several, or indeed *any* of the criteria for decent living and learning conditions. On the most basic level, buildings had to be suitable to house people in the first place. However, inspection reports mentioned buildings that were in dire need of repair work, that were unfinished, old, decrepit, or unsafe.⁸⁶ Basic living conditions were not self-evident either, as many facilities were listed as too dark, as not having (working) electricity coverage, as too wet (usually meaning mouldy),⁸⁷ as too cold or not having a (working) heating system,⁸⁸ badly ventilated, or simply as too small.⁸⁹ To give an example, a 1967 report described the children's home in Igate (Latvia) as follows: 'the outer wall plaster of the building, the water drain and roof are damaged, as a result water flows through the

⁸⁶ GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 27, ll. 104-05 (1957); GARF, f. A269, op. 42, d. 7781, ll. 32-34 (1959); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 188-91 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808, ll. 10-16 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 66-71, 144-47, 199-201 (1961-62); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 81-100, 70-79 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, l. 20-23, 24-30, 32, 50 (1963); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 7-9, 43-46 (1964); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, pp. 53-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 103-7 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 1-3, 14 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19 (1966); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71, 123-27, 140-45, 152-53, 157-59 (1967-68); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1448, ll. 108-11 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 209, ll. 152-55 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 4-13, 82-94 (1977-78); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17, 95-101 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1950, ll. 1-2, 8-12 (1982); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 10-14 (1984); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll. 1-4, 5-6 (1984); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 42-45 (1987); GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 33-51 (1990).

⁸⁷ Too dark: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 116-26 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 140-43, 199-201 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 4-9 (1964); GARF, f. A482, op. 54, d. 3578, ll. 78-80 (1970); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972). No working electricity: GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 86-94 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10, 27-30 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 93-97 (1981). Too wet or mouldy: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10 (1965); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 93-97 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1950, ll. 1-2, 8-12 (1982).

⁸⁸ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 52-56 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 67-79 (1960): in this case only 13-14 degrees inside; LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 148-54 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 9-15, 50 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 21-30 (1966); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27, 140-45, 146-47, 157-59 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); The water froze inside the buildings here: GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); GARF f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); temperature goes down to four degrees in the dorms: GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 209, ll. 152-55 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 4-13 (1978); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, ll. 10-18 (1978); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 93-97 (1981); only eight degrees inside: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1950, ll. 1-2, 8-12, 13-16 (1982); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 918 (1985); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9969, ll. 20-22 (1990).

⁸⁹ Bad ventilation: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 54-66, 88-91 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972). Not enough space: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, l. 14 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 16-18 (1965); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 126-137 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 1-13 (1983); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 10-14 (1984).

ceiling when it rains', conjuring images of wet walls, sunken floors and unsafe furnaces, leaving the dorms cold.⁹⁰

On top of the basic safety of the building, the boarding schools, children's homes, and colonies needed certain facilities to offer a decent living standard. Throughout the decades, however, institutions struggled with providing washrooms, toilets, and clean water.⁹¹ As one inspector pointed out after visiting Sigulda boarding school in 1961: 'there is often no water in the boarding school, which makes the process of washing the children more difficult.'⁹² Even more than the presence or absence of these elements in an institution, the sanitary conditions often presented an issue, such as filthy water because of a broken sewage system, or because of the absence of proper water supply, forcing the administration to take water from rivers or uncovered wells. Sometimes it was the administration itself which caused the poor sanitation by not taking care of cleaning, leaving floors, laundry, beds and grounds dirty, leaving food and rubbish lying around, which attracted vermin such as rats or cockroaches.⁹³ A report about

⁹⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13 (1967).

⁹¹ GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 60-64 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808, ll. 10-16 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 14-16, 199-201 (1961-62); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 104-16 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, l. 50 (1963); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 86-94 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, l. 14 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 27-30 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 2-19 (1965-66); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27, 140-45 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21, 22-38 (1967-68); GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1471 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); GARF f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 1-9, 11-18 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 62-75 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 209, ll. 152-55 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 14-17, 51-58, 82-94 (1977-78); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, ll. 10-18 (1978); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1950, ll. 1-2, 8-12, 13-16 (1982); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 10-14 (1984); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 42-45 (1987); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, del. 9969, ll. 20-22 (1990); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, del. 9970, ll. 33-54 (1990).

⁹² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 148-54 (1961).

⁹³ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 27, ll. 80-82, 104-05 (1957); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 16-25 (1958); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808, ll. 10-16 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 78-81, 140-43, 148-54, 199-201, 243-49 (1961-62); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 28-37, 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 3-5, 9-15, 20-23, 24-30, 32 (1963); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 86-94 (1964); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, pp. 53-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 17-19, 103-07 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32, 71-76 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3, 20-24 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10, 11-15 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19, 42-50, 62-68 (1965-66); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1234, ll. 5-16 (1967); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71, 146-147 (1967-68); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 27-34 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 62-75 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 51-58 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 93-97, 103-08 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1950, ll. 1-2, 8-12, 13-16 (1982); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 1-13 (1983). Unsanitary work in the kitchen, involving filthy workspaces, failure to use disinfectants, unsafe storage of food, the use of dirty water for dishwashing or food preparation, were usually named separately, see GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-170 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 144-47, 243-49 (1961-62); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 104-116 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 20-23, 24-30, 32 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 119-27 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 62-68 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 16-18, 27-30 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972).

a colony in Leningrad from 1962 provides a glimpse of what such an institution might look like:

In the classrooms, where the children have to prepare their homework under supervision of an educator, it is incredibly dirty, cigarette butts on the floor, books and papers scattered under the desks; in the desks are food leftovers, sometimes even on tin plates; all desks are crooked and ink-stained, pierced or punched.⁹⁴

However, such descriptions reduced people's living conditions to a list of technicalities, which may not adequately represent how children actually fared there, as the example of 'cosiness' will illustrate.⁹⁵ On the one hand, this focus on 'comfort' might seem surprising because Khrushchev criticized the amount of excess in Stalinist architecture and advertised more modernist housing, simple and functional in décor. On the other hand, however, the Khrushchev era was shaped by an increasing regulation of the domestic sphere in the context of the housing reform, and thus a reinterpretation of cosiness, which would explain detailed regulations in residential childcare.⁹⁶ In their 'ticking boxes' style, inspection reports usually related an 'uncomfortable' home to a lack of curtains, flowers or plants in the rooms, or pictures on the wall, such as was detailed in a report from a Jelgava children's home from 1962. The inspector's impression of a lack of 'cosiness' was reinforced by messiness, or in her words 'unnecessary things' on the bookshelves, as well as floors that 'could be cleaner'.⁹⁷ It seems that 'cosiness', as well as being a subjectively felt or perceived quality, was formalized and somehow rationalized – made countable with the help of flowerpots, curtains and framed pictures.

The material living conditions in a residential childcare institution were endangered most by overcrowding, which at the same time is probably the clearest sign that these institutions were managed at minimal effort. Initially, overcrowding issue seemed to be linked to the hasty and

⁹⁴ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13 (1962).

⁹⁵ In addition to being unsanitary, conditions such as those described above were considered as 'uncomfortable', or not cosy enough, a reproach featuring frequently in inspection reports. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 44-46 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 144-47, 243-49 (1961-62); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 1-3, 14, 22-27, 28-32 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 4-9 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1355, ll. 16-33 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 69-74 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 4-13, 14-17 (1978); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, ll. 10-18 (1978); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 95-101 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 103-08 (1981); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 7956, ll. 43-47 (1983); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 10-14, 33-38, 53-63 (1984).

⁹⁶ Susan Reid, 'Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union of Khrushchev,' *Slavic Review* 61.2 (2002), pp. 211-52, here pp. 218, 244-45; Field, *Private Life*, p. 29; Buchli, 'Khrushchev', pp. 162-64, 171; Iurii Gerchuk, 'The Aesthetics of Everyday Life in the Khrushchev Thaw in the USSR (1954-64)', in Susan Reid and David Crowley (eds), *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe* (New York/Oxford, 2000), pp. 81-98, here p. 90.

⁹⁷ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15 (1965).

sometimes half-hearted attempts to put Khrushchev's boarding school reform into practice.⁹⁸ In extreme conditions, institutions had to cope with twice as many children as there were places.⁹⁹ Overcrowding had severe consequences for living and learning in these institutions, the most obvious one being disorder and dirt because there was no space to clean or store things. Classrooms were crammed with desks, and dorms packed with beds, with no space for wardrobes or nightstands.¹⁰⁰ Children often had to share beds or sleep in the corridors.¹⁰¹ Overcrowding interfered with the *rezhim*, as meals and lessons had to be conducted in two, or even three or four shifts.¹⁰² A 1961 report from Rēzekne sanatorium boarding school illustrates well the gravity of the organizational problems that such conditions caused: because meals had to be conducted in shifts, the older children ended up not getting any food between 7.40am and 2.30pm.¹⁰³

Overcrowding could occur for various reasons, most generally (and especially in the case of specialized institutions), because the demand for such institutions was bigger than the number of places on offer, due to bad planning or lack of investment, as shown in the previous chapter. During the reform period, slow building (and the closure of children's homes when the

⁹⁸ The head school inspector of the Latvian Ministry of Education, for instance, pointed out in 1961 that most children's homes in the republic were overcrowded. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 135-37 (1961).

⁹⁹ Medumi auxiliary boarding school, 124 children for 60 places, 1959: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 593, ll. 7-8; Sverdlovsk oblast', 8 children's homes, 1229 children for 659 places, 1959: GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22; GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); Cheliabinsk colony, 670 children for 525 places, 1972: GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 28-33, 34-38; Miass colony, 708 children for 650 places, 1972: GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42.

¹⁰⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 16-25 (1957); only 2.3m² per person in the dorms instead of 4: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 593, ll. 7-8 (1959); only 1.9m² per person in the dorms: GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); only 2.5m² per person in the dorms: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 1-5, 6-8 (1960); in six of Latvia's boarding schools only 1.8-2.7m² per person in the dorms: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 9-19, 182-87 (1960); only 2.5m² p/p in the dorms: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101 (1961); only 2m² p/p in the dorms: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 143-200 (1961); only 1.5m² p/p in the dorms: GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); only 1.7m² p/p: GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83 (1962); only 2.2m² p/p: GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 7-9 (1964); only 2.2m² p/p: GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 26-31 (1964); less than 2m² p/p: GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 86-94 (1964); only 2.3m² p/p: GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 141-47 (1964); only 1m² p/p: GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 140-45 (1967); only 3m² p/p: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 14-19 (1968); only 2.5m² p/p: GARF f. R9527, op.1, d. 2124, ll. 1-22 (1968); only 1.8-2m² p/p: GARF, f. A482, op. 54, d. 3578, ll. 1-2 (1970); only 1.7m² p/p: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); only 2.5m² p/p: GARF, f. A482, op. 54, d. 3578, ll. 121-24 (1970). In the interviews, former boarding school students also remembered their schools as crowded: Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, p. 5. One of them recalled that there were no 'play rooms' in their institution; that they would play in the corridors; see Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47B, p. 21. Also, there would have been more children in each bedroom than nowadays; see: Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48B, pp. 45-46.

¹⁰¹ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 63-68, both sides (1962); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 36-42, 141-47 (1964); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71, 140-45, 160-64 (1967-68); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 118-26 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 93-97 (1981).

¹⁰² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 16-25 (1957); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 7781, ll. 51-53 (1960); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 36-42 (1964); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 140-45 (1967); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 1-9 (1968);

¹⁰³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 140-43 (1961).

boarding schools to replace them were not yet ready) was a common cause of such problems.¹⁰⁴ In some cases, the institution was in such a bad state that parts of it were unusable or unsafe, creating temporary overcrowding.¹⁰⁵ The issue of overcrowding was never really resolved, although it seems to have shifted ever so slightly. Until at least the mid-1960s, overcrowding was an omnipresent problem in Soviet residential childcare, in general as well as specialized boarding schools, colonies, and children's homes. Later on, overcrowding was less a problem of general boarding schools, and more typical of institutions for disabled or delinquent children and children's homes.¹⁰⁶

Alongside overcrowding, widespread provision problems with furniture, kitchenware, clothes, books, food and other things all point to institutionalized neglect of residential childcare by the Soviet leadership. As a general impression from working with inspection reports, it seems that almost every institution had some sort of provision issue, or at least did not live up to the inspectors' expectations.¹⁰⁷ Some of these problems were of a more general nature. Over the last decade of the Soviet Union's existence, provision shortages tended to increase as the general economic situation deteriorated.¹⁰⁸ More isolated institutions often struggled to provide for the children, some of them because the roads leading to them would be unusable because of harsh weather conditions for large parts of the year. One inspection report, for

¹⁰⁴ See for instance LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 188-91 (1960); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 140-45 (1967).

¹⁰⁵ One building destroyed in a fire, Jelgava children's home: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 16-19 (1964); One dorm is unsafe, Bauska children's home: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3 (1964);

¹⁰⁶ See for instance: Riga, boarding school for deaf-mute children, 125 children for 90 places, 1957: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 16-25; Moscow oblast', 83 children's homes, 7090 children for 6850 places, 1959: GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257; two colonies in Kharabovsk krai, 578 children for 400 places, 339 for 329 (1962): GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 4-6; Atlianskaia colony in Miass, 1000 children for 800 places (1962): GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 63-68, both sides; Chuvashskaia ASSR, 8 school for children with disabilities, 1130 children for 950 places: GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 7-9 (1964); Rostov oblast, school for children with disabilities, 106 children for 70 places, 1964: GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 36-42; Sverdlovsk oblast', two schools for children with disabilities, 427 instead of 350, 276 instead of 210 (1964): GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 86-94; Altaisk school for blind children, 120 children for 80 places (1964): GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 141-47; Tiskadi children's home, 317 children for 210 places (1964): LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 103-7; in 2098 children's homes of RSFSR, 205,700 places for 244,000 children (1967): GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 167-71; ASSR Dagestan, all the children's homes overcrowded, in one boarding school 270 children for 150 places 1967: GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 140-45; Iecava boarding school, 280 children for 210 places, 1967: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1309, ll. 13-43; Cheliabinsk boarding school no. 7, 400 children for 300 places, 1968: GARF f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71; Sverdlovsk oblast, 34 boarding schools for children with learning difficulties, there 3916 places but 6489 children in need of one (children waiting), 1984: TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll.1-4, 5-6; in the Soviet Union 2394 boarding schools for children with learning difficulties, 394,500 children but 380,178 places, 1990: GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 33-54.

¹⁰⁷ It is also possible that inspectors felt pressured to add some sort of criticism to their reports to legitimize their work.

¹⁰⁸ About widespread issues with provision of food and medical equipment in the 1980s, see for instance GASO, f. 5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 27-32 (1983-85); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 42-45 (1987); GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 33-51 (1990); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 18-20 (1990-91).

instance, claimed that some children's homes in Perm' oblast' were difficult to reach in 'spring, autumn, and winter'.¹⁰⁹

The legal situation regarding the provision of residential childcare institutions posed an additional challenge to the more isolated ones specifically. The administration of an institution could not buy supplies from wherever it was convenient, but they were assigned to certain provision bases. Documents suggest that these could be hundreds of kilometres away, as in the case of two children's homes from Bashkiria (now Bashkortostan), whose provision base was in the Republic's capital Ufa, about 400km away.¹¹⁰ This issue was picked up by the late Soviet press during Glasnost'. An *Izvestiia* article from 1988 reported that a year earlier the corresponding law had been changed to allow such institutions to get supplies from anywhere if need be – but this change had been reversed again, much to the journalist's disapproval.¹¹¹ Former residential childcare workers brought up another issue with provision regulations in their interviews: according to them, the frequency of the replacement of children's clothes was far too low. A boarding school teacher and educator brought up the example of winter coats: 'they gave one winter coat every four years. Can you imagine, the way a child grows?'¹¹² It is not easy to figure out how widespread these provision problems were, as inspectors attributed many instances of insufficient provision to carelessness or bad budgeting.¹¹³

Just as in the case of basic material and sanitary conditions, the quality of provision varied significantly among different institutions. Several inspection reports convey an impression of decent material conditions and good food provision,¹¹⁴ or a decent offer of leisure activities by

¹⁰⁹ GARF, f. A269, op. 42, d. 7781, ll. 32-34 (1959).

¹¹⁰ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 1-9, 11-18 (1968).

¹¹¹ 'Dobrota po limitu', *Izvestiia*, 23.06.1988, p. 1.

¹¹² Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49B, pp. 17, 29, 32.

¹¹³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 148-54, 243-49 (1961-62); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 16-18 (1965); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 160-64 (1967).

¹¹⁴ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 158-179 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 140-43 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 161-64 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 1-9 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 31-8, 41-44, 45-61, 103-07 (1963-64); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 1-3 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 16-19, 29-31 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15, 19-25 (1965); GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1507, ll. 94-102 (1967); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 14-19 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 1-9, 20-29 (1968); GARF f. R9527, op.1, d. 2124, ll. 174-189 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 1-11 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 75-89, 105-17 (1971); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 8-20, 51-66 (1972-73); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1950, ll. 13-16 (1982); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 1-13 (1983). Often enough, a good food provision seemed to be linked to institutions growing their own fruit or vegetables, or keeping livestock, see LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 60-64 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 1-9, 11-18, 20-29 (1968); 75 percent in Sverdlovsk oblast grow their own vegetables: TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497 (1987); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9969, ll. 46-51 (1990). This impression is confirmed in interviews, Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 1.

providing for a well-stocked library, sports equipment, television sets, radios, and film projectors.¹¹⁵ However, it seems that the number of institutions facing problems with provision was much higher. Many institutions were listed as not having enough furniture, either in general, not corresponding to all relevant age groups, or as having furniture that needed replacing.¹¹⁶ This could lead to children being too tall for their beds, or children having to sit on tables because their boarding school did not have enough chairs.¹¹⁷ There seems to be a clear trend from a shortage in furniture in the 1960s towards complaints about old, worn, or broken furniture in the 1980s. This suggests that many institutions never replaced their first batch of furniture, or that investments to this aim were insufficient.

Such provision issues hit every area of the children's lives. For instance, inspectors listed as a lack of (working) refrigerators, washing machines or cars; a lack of appliances for the children's personal hygiene like toothbrushes, towels, or soap; a lack of bed linen, medication, or medical equipment.¹¹⁸ Institutions all over the Union also suffered from shortages of sports equipment, books, toys and games, classroom equipment (such as for physics, chemistry, and biology labs,

¹¹⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 472, ll. 1-7 (1957); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808 (1962); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1355, ll. 16-33 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 1-9, 11-18, 20-29 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 8-20 (1972); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 647, ll. 2-4 (1973);

¹¹⁶ GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-25 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 1-5, 6-8, 9-19, 54-66, 88-91, 182-87, 188-91 (1960); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 14-16, 243-49 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 5-7, 20-27 (1962); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 32-34 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 4-9 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 14 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10, 11-15 (1965); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71, 123-27, 140-45, 148-51, 157-59, 160-64 (1967-68); GASO, f. R233, op. 5, d. 1471 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21 (1968); GASO, f. R233, op. 5, d. 1507 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); GARF f. R9527, op.1, d. 2124, ll. 1-22 (1968); GARF, f. A482, op. 54, d. 3578, ll. 1-2 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, ll. 10-18 (1978); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 95-101, 106-114 (1979); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 93-97 (1981); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 7956, ll. 43-47 (1983); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll.1-4, 5-6 (1984); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 918 (1986); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 42-45 (1987).

¹¹⁷ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-170 (1961).

¹¹⁸ About shortages of refrigerators, washing machines, or cars: GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 78-81 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27, 38-40 (1962); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 81-100, 70-79 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 104-116 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 103-7 (1964); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 30-32, 47-49 (1968). About shortages of personal hygiene appliances: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 1-5, 6-8 (1960); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 14-16, 78-81, 140-43, 144-47, 243-49 (1961-62); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 5-7, 28-37 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 32-5 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 1-3, 27-30 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 42-50 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 69-74 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, ll. 10-18 (1978); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 93-97 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1950, ll. 1-2, 8-12 (1982); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 1-5, 6-8, 27 (1990). About shortages of bed linen: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 1-5, 6-8 (1960); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 157-159 (1967). About shortages of medical equipment or medication: GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 70-79, 81-100 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 27-30 (1965); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 140-45, 146-47 (1967); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 918 (1986).

as well as maps, posters, school books), and workshop equipment.¹¹⁹ Shortages in clothes, including more specific items such as shoes, sports kits, school and Pioneer uniforms, work clothes, winter clothes, or general complaints about the bad quality of clothing were widespread.¹²⁰ Shortages in the kitchens and dining halls were common as well, with regard to kitchenware, crockery or cutlery.¹²¹ Several reports described children eating all their food with spoons, or drinking from plates. An report from Komsomol'sk boarding school no.4, for instance, listed a total of 220 cups, 130 plates, 180 spoons, and 100 forks for 360 children.¹²² The same was true for food provision: in a number of institutions, children had to cope with one or several of the food groups missing from their diet, most commonly fresh fruit and vegetables, dairy, fish, eggs, or meat.¹²³ In other cases, the food in institutions was not healthy

¹¹⁹ GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 27, ll. 104-05 (1957); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 44-46 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 9-19, 182-87 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 140-43, 148-54, 243-49 (1961-62); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61 (1962); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 70-79, 81-100 (1962); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 26-31, 86-94 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 4-9 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11, 119-27 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1086, ll. 3-9 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1234, ll. 1-4, 5-16 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13 (1967); GARF f. R9527, op.1, d. 2124, ll. 165-73 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 1-11 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 69-74 (1971); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 4-13 (1978); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, ll. 85-96 (1979); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 93-97, 103-08, 117-22 (1981); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293 (1987). TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 42-45 (1987).

¹²⁰ GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 47-49, 52-56 (1958); GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 9-19, 80-86, 173-79, 182-87 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808, ll. 10-16 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 148-54, 199-201, 243-49 (1961-62); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 70-79, 81-100 (1962); GARF, f. A420, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 7-9 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 4-9, 32-35 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 71-76 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10, 16-18 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7, 21-30 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1234, ll. 1-4 (1966); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71, 140-45, 146-47, 152-53 (1967-68); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll.1-4, 5-6 (1984); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 918 (1986); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 42-45 (1987).

¹²¹ GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 27, ll. 104-05 (1957); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808, ll. 10-16 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 243-49 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 20-22 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 42-50 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 42-45 (1987).

¹²² GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961).

¹²³ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 9-19, 54-66, 88-91, 173-79, 182-87 (1960); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 14-16, 78-81, 144-47, 148-54, 199-201 (1961-62); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 37-40 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 16-18 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19 (1966); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27, 160-64 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 14-19 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 1-9, 11-18 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1355, ll. 88-102 (1968); GARF f. R9527, op.1, d. 2124, ll. 1-22, 174-89 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1950, ll. 1-2, 8-12 (1982); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll. 1-4, 5-6 (1984); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 33-54 (1990).

or nutritious enough, or too monotonous (some schools served *kasha* [porridge] for most meals, or nothing but bread with jam for dinner).¹²⁴

Official documents suggest that the Soviet authorities' low-priority stance towards residential childcare could even endanger the children's health. To ensure decent healthcare for children in residential childcare, institutions were supposed to have at least a nurse on staff and a doctor on duty (if not on staff as well). Medical staff had to conduct regular medical checks, make sure everyone got their vaccinations (such as polio, diphtheria, smallpox, tetanus, measles, tuberculosis) and bring in specialists to check on children's eyes and teeth. Children with disabilities or chronic conditions were to receive special care and therapy. Medical staff were also charged with supporting the children's health by making sure they would move, sleep, and be outside enough. They also had to impose standards of sanitation, to ensure the institution and its inhabitants were clean, which included testing the food and checking on its storage and preparation, making sure that children washed and brushed their teeth, as well as keeping thorough documentation of everyone's health.¹²⁵ Thus medical staff (with the support of local health authorities) were responsible for keeping up the 'scientific' standards that the Soviet authorities considered necessary for residential childcare. This also entailed procedures like calculating and counting calories, vitamins, and other nutrients contained in the food served to children in care.¹²⁶

The children's health was thoroughly documented, which provides information on how much life in care could have a negative impact on children's health. Inspection reports listed

¹²⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 1-3 (1959); GARF, f. A269, op. 42, d. 7781, ll. 32-34 (1959); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 173-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 78-81, 199-201 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 24-34, 104-16 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11, 20-22, 103-7, 119-27 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 2-19 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10, 16-18 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 21-30 (1966); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71, 146-47 (1967-68); GASO, f. R233, op. 5, d. 1471 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 42-45 (1987); GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 33-51 (1990); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 33-54 (1990).

¹²⁵ Any of these tasks mentioned: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 76-82 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 87-103, 113-131 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 78-81 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 161-64 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 16-19, 29-31 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 1-3, 19-25 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 1-13, 14-19, 20-27 (1967-68); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21, 22-38 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 30-32, 47-49 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 1-11, 27-38 (1970); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 126-37 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41 (1981).

¹²⁶ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 78-81, 148-54 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 161-64 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 104-16 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 20-22 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 1-3 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 1-11 (1970).

occurrences of ‘normal’ illnesses such as tonsillitis, chicken pox, scarlet fever, or appendicitis;¹²⁷ but also outbreaks of more dangerous and infectious diseases such as influenza, measles, pertussis, or diphtheria.¹²⁸ These reports on health also named outbreaks of illnesses which are characteristically linked to bad sanitary conditions, and parasites, and often linked to bad care, such as dysentery, scabies, lice, fleas, or diverse other skin conditions.¹²⁹ Additionally, official reports frequently problematized the general state of health of children in residential care, especially in the late Soviet Union, including both physical health and developmental delays (which was consistent with the ‘medical model of disability’, as discussed in chapter two).

Data from the late 1980s in particular have shown that children in care had disproportionately many health issues and disabilities. In 1988, medical exams conducted for a larger investigation by the Control Committee on the state of residential childcare claimed that 20.42 percent of the children’s home population and 42.2 percent of children in boarding schools had intellectual disabilities. This tendency was even more developed in institutions for ‘orphans’ or children without parental care: about 44 percent of boarding schoolers and 72 percent in children’s homes had some sort of developmental delay. A report by the Ministry of Health came to even broader conclusions, stating that ‘the results of sample investigations of children in boarding facilities show that with regard to physical development they lag behind their peers who grow up in families’.¹³⁰ Exemplary checks from two years later in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Latvia, confirmed this impression, establishing that every second

¹²⁷ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 16-25, 59-75 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 140-43 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808, ll. 10-16 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 1-9 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 1-3 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 11-18, 30-32, 47-49 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 82-94 (1977).

¹²⁸ Such as 142 cases of influenza in a Riga boarding school, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 16-25 (1958); 224 cases in the Cēsis sanatorium children’s home, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 59-75 (1958); 132 cases in a Riga boarding school for deaf-mute children, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 25-54 (1960); 26 cases of measles in a Sverdlovsk children’s home, GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); 24 in the Cēsis sanatorium children’s home, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 59-75 (1958); two cases of pertussis in the Cēsis sanatorium children’s home, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 59-75 (1958); three cases of diphtheria in the Medumi auxiliary boarding school, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-131 (1960).

¹²⁹ Dysentery: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808, ll. 10-16 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 20-22, 103-07 (1964); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972). Scabies, lice, fleas, and other skin conditions: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 140-43 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 808, ll. 10-16 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-170 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 43-46 (1963); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, pp. 53-61 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 20-22, 103-07 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19 (1966); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, del. 7538, ll. 140-45, 148-51 (1967); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 140-45 (1967); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 11-18 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968).

¹³⁰ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 1-5, 6-8, 27, 33-54 (1990).

or third child in care had some sort of chronic condition.¹³¹ The situation seemed to be worst in baby homes: in Perm, children in such homes reportedly lagged behind in physiological and mental development despite decent medical care, adding that ‘these children have reduced cognitive activity, weak emotional manifestations, and lack attachment to adults’.¹³²

The first large-scale investigation after the boarding school reform came to the same conclusion as these Perestroika data: children in such institutions lagged behind in physical development in comparison to their peers in general schools.¹³³ They linked this ‘lag’ to provision problems, and to the poor care that most children had received in their families before entering the institutions.¹³⁴ Reports from the 1980s and 1990s made the same connection between the children’s state and their past. A report by the Council of Ministers emphasized that children coming to homes and boarding schools for children without parental care were ‘as a rule socially and pedagogically neglected, had large gaps in their knowledge, and negative behaviour and habits’, and that most of them suffered from chronic illnesses and ‘injuries of the psyche and the nervous system’.¹³⁵ Whilst acknowledging some shortcomings in residential childcare, this report seems to place the blame for the children’s poor health mostly on the parents. In the early 1990s, the authorities showed more readiness to take responsibility.¹³⁶ This change of perspective throughout the 1980s is consistent with changes in politics in connection to Perestroika, as has been shown in chapter two.¹³⁷

Inspection reports from residential childcare institutions thus provide several insights into the material living conditions of such institutions. They are difficult to interpret, even misleading, as observations from the institution were merely listed, not qualified or connected. The reader always has to connect the dots and establish a more complete image of the children’s living

¹³¹ GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843, ll. 33-51 (1990). Documents from individual regions of the Union paint an even gloomier picture: in Stavropol krai, even 85 percent of institutionalized children had a chronic condition, see GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9969, ll. 58-61 (1990).

¹³² GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9969, ll. 115-20 (1990).

¹³³ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9623, ll. 167-70 (1961-62).

¹³⁴ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 70-79 (1962).

¹³⁵ GARF, f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 27-32 (1983-85).

¹³⁶ A report from Perm concluded that children in residential care had a ‘high prevalence of disturbances in the psycho-neurological sphere,’ and were more prone to have other diseases (respiratory, skin, eyesight etc.), see GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9969, ll. 115-20 (1990).

¹³⁷ Health reports from individual institutions across the decades give a similar impression. Aglona boarding school is one of the more extreme examples: among the 334 children living there in 1962, 45 had eye problems, 14 bad hearing, 39 ‘chronic tonsillitis’, three rheumatism, and a staggering 146 children were reported to have back problems. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 14-16 (1962). See other worrying health reports, especially with regard to back problems: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 1-9 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 103-7 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 21-30 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); GARF f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 69-71 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54, 80-108 (1973)

conditions. The reports show that problems with material conditions and provision existed throughout the whole post-Stalinist Soviet period, and were never resolved, which confirms the impression of stasis within Soviet residential childcare. However, the reports also show a minor chronological development, and that different issues with the living, learning, and working conditions in Soviet residential childcare were prevalent at different times, depending on external factors such as the failure to implement the 1958 reform or the economic crisis of the 1980s. Strong variations between individual institutions add another layer of complexity to the material situation of Soviet childcare. This section has shown that Soviet residential childcare was underfunded and neglected by the agencies responsible for this network, managing the institution on a minimal-effort basis. This created an instability which allowed conditions in individual institutions to deteriorate quickly.

Factors of change: the impact of inspections, personal dedication, and political pressures

In 1969-70 the Riga special school for minors who were ‘unresponsive to education’ (*trudnovospituemykh*) kept the Latvian authorities busy. Following an inspection in May 1969, the Latvian procuracy confronted the Ministry of Education with their results, charging the boarding school with ‘gross violations of the rule of law’.¹³⁸ The report also listed instances of escapes and violence among the inmates, and a misuse of solitary confinement. At the centre of the procurator’s report were ‘incidents of inmates [*vospitanniki*] being beaten’. In September and November, a warden had beaten a child with a rubber hose; in April, a physics teacher had hit a kid on the head repeatedly – the same teacher had been reported beating children in autumn 1967 and spring 1968. In May 1969, an educator hit a child in the face and broke his nose – the same educator had beaten a pupil in December 1968 and broken his skull with a pair of scissors. None of these (extremely violent) instances had been discussed in the pedagogic council afterwards, and the school administration had not intervened. In July 1969, the Latvian Ministry of Education replied to the procuracy, pledging to solve these problems, to reprimand the violent teacher, and to punish the violent educator (without specifying how).¹³⁹

¹³⁸ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 1-6 (1969). In addition, the inspection showed that among 228 children, 80 were older than 15 and 68 had been there longer than three years, thus breaking the regulations for such institutions. According to the inspector, the school’s administration did not control the teacher’s work and the implementation of the *rezhim*. There were issues with the sanitary situation, lacking workshops, and poor educational work.

¹³⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, l. 7 (1969).

In February 1970, 29 people visited the school for almost two weeks for another inspection to check on the state of the school – due to the previous year’s problems and because the Ministry had decided to increase the school population from 220 to 300 (!). According to the report, however, there were still seven teenagers at the institution who should have been released years earlier. The school also suffered from severe overcrowding, with up to eight teenagers sharing 12-14m² dorms; and the premises were not well maintained or well aired. The kitchen even had no ventilation at all, and as a result, its walls and ceiling were black from moisture and mould.¹⁴⁰ The inspectors also criticized the *rezhim* at the school: excessively long learning hours prevented the children from going outside, and there was not enough time for organized leisure. Apart from this, however, the administration’s ‘leadership’ of the school was reviewed positively. The inspectors considered the teachers’ work to be good, although the report mentions that teachers were ‘not always as moderate and patient’ as they should be. The inmates seem to have made a good impression on the committee, although many of them had still tried to run away from the school: in 1967/68 alone, 18 teenagers escaped, 20 in 1968/69, and eight the following year.

These documents raise many questions about the management of Soviet residential childcare institutions. First, why were such cases of violence against children not reported or noticed by the authorities earlier? It is notable that in the 1969 report, violent incidents were termed ‘antipedagogical means’, and treated more like a bureaucratic problem than cases of abuse. These cases were also basically discovered by accident, and the authorities might easily have missed them. Secondly, why were the problems at the boarding school not fixed? Despite the pressure from the Latvian procuracy, neither the Ministry of Education nor the institution management seem to have done much to improve the situation. Thirdly, why did children continue to run away from the school in 1970, although leadership, staff, and children generally made a good impression on the inspectors? The 1970 report failed to make the connection between the cramped and messy conditions, the lack of exercise and air, and the constant threat of violent members of staff, which explain the children’s attempts to escape.

According to the agencies in charge of residential childcare, inspections of children’s homes, boarding schools, and colonies had the long-term goal of ensuring that the facilities were in a decent state, that they offered good care and education to their inmates, and that public money

¹⁴⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1969).

was spent reasonably.¹⁴¹ Is it, however, possible to establish whether such improvements actually took place, in general as well as in individual institutions? Existing research about the war and immediate post-war years suggests that living conditions had improved between the mid- to late 1940s and the 1960s, which probably corresponded to a more general recovery after the Second World War.¹⁴² Regarding the developments after the 1958 reforms, Zezina and Kelly give ambivalent accounts about developments in institutions: while conditions improved in general as the network was expanded and professionalized, the situation in individual institutions did not change much.¹⁴³

Kelly suggested that institutions were managed on the edge of what was acceptable throughout the decades: ‘where standards were high, they were often high despite the official mechanisms of control, rather than because of these.’¹⁴⁴ This section will review this statement and show that these official means of control could indeed lead to an improvement of living conditions in individual cases if the agencies in charge chose to. It will explore the reasons for these variations and examine the connections of residential childcare institutions to the outside world. Starting from the hypothesis that the isolation of residential childcare (as suggested by Kotovshchikova’s article) was a decisive factor in how it was managed, it will show that conditions in individual institutions could not only change through personal investment of childcare workers, but that such change was often motivated by Soviet government and Party bodies to prevent the boundary between residential care and society to break down.

The impact of inspections and the system’s potential to improve

General reports about residential childcare suggest that living conditions in such institutions remained problematic throughout the decades. A report quoted by Zezina about children’s homes in the RSFSR from just after the 1958 reform gives a glimpse into the terrible starting point for the reforms: only 15 percent of the homes had central heating or a sewage system, 20 percent had running water, and 16,000 buildings were ‘dangerously unsafe’.¹⁴⁵ In 1961, a report about the RSFSR stated that ‘in the majority of boarding schools there have not been

¹⁴¹ Following their purpose, these inspection reports asked for improvement, some even explicitly demanded certain alterations or changes within concrete deadlines, see for instance: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, pp. 25-26 (1969).

¹⁴² Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotstvo i besprizornost*, p. 131; Kelly, *Children’s World*, pp. 264-65. Zezina listed the ‘economic aftermath of the war’, ‘disintegration of established norms and procedures’, and ‘malfeasance’ as main reasons for the especially grave situation in residential childcare in this period, adding that the inspections could mostly help with the latter, sorting out local problems and investigating against abusive staff, see Zezina, ‘Without a Family’, pp. 66-67.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 69, 71; Kelly, *Children’s World*, pp. 259-60.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 263-64.

¹⁴⁵ Zezina, ‘Without a Family’, pp. 69-70.

the necessary conditions for housing and educating pupils until now'. Six years later, more than half of RSFSR children's homes were listed as mouldy and broken, over 17 percent without *bania* or laundry facilities, 12 percent without workshops, and 40 percent without running water or heating.¹⁴⁶ In the early 1980s, the Cheliabinsk and Gor'ki regions both confirmed that not much had changed since 1968; and Chita (then Chitinsk) region contended that 'the majority of children's homes and boarding schools are located in 'adapted' buildings [meaning not built for purpose]; as a rule, they are uncomfortable, and poorly equipped for living in them, for bringing up and caring for children'.¹⁴⁷ After new demands to improve the residential childcare network had been raised in the 1987 decree no.431, the Control Commission reported in 1990 that not enough had happened since.¹⁴⁸

A more nuanced look at individual institutions, namely three Latvian boarding schools between the reforms of the 1950s and the 1980s, allows us to discern specific contexts in which living conditions could change for better or worse. The first example studied here is Cesvaine boarding school, with the help of its inspection reports from 1958, 1960, and 1967. According to these documents, the school was off to a good start: the inspector conveyed the impression that people cared for the school, even though not everything worked well. Teachers, educators, and medical staff got mixed reviews, and material conditions seemed fine, although not ideal. In 1960, the boarding school was still reviewed relatively positively, with references to only small things needing improvement.¹⁴⁹ The 1967 inspection report, however, gave a very different impression of the place. It painted a picture of carelessness, with clocks set to the different times, filthy bathrooms, undisciplined children, and bad lessons in school (although leisure activities got positive and teaching staff again mixed reviews).¹⁵⁰ In this case, it is hard to tell what led to the deterioration of living conditions, or whether it was actually the inspectors' personal perspectives making the reports sound so different.

¹⁴⁶ GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27 (1967). Only a year later, the Soviet Ministries of Education and Health reported that most boarding schools needed better learning conditions, new or refurbished buildings with more light, colours, and proper windows, see LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1448, ll. 1-2 (1968).

¹⁴⁷ Too many buildings were still in bad conditions, lacking sports and activity facilities and not assuring sanitary conditions; and food provision did not meet official standards. GARF, f. A482, op. 56, d. 4211, ll. 25-30, 31-34 (1982); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 7956, l. 101 (1983). A report about the RSFSR in general admitted that 'some' buildings were in a bad state, without sewage system, water pipes, hot water, proper beds, not enough opportunities for leisure and relaxation, or work training. They concluded that in such places there could not be any 'societal upbringing', which lead to *beznadzornost'* (child neglect) and crime. GASO, f. 5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 27-32 (1983-85).

¹⁴⁸ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 65-69 (1990).

¹⁴⁹ Such as cosmetic repairs on the building, the gym in general, the provision of fresh vegetables and furniture, etc.

¹⁵⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 44-46 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 54-66, 88-91 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1309, ll. 1-10 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1234, ll. 5-16 (1967).

The second example, Malta auxiliary boarding school (as inspected in 1964, 1970, 1973, and 1980) confirms general trends in the history of residential childcare. The first report presented an institution not up to the task, with overcrowding, crammed dorms, unsafe buildings, dirt, destruction, and a complete lack of washrooms and running water. The material conditions must have improved dramatically by 1970, when the institution got almost enthusiastic feedback regarding the material conditions matched by dedicated management and staff, as well as methodologically sound and invested work with the children. The 1973 inspection mostly confirms this impression. However, the 1980 report indicates a new turn in the school's development, criticizing the lack of specialized training among staff, as well as a certain deterioration of material conditions, especially the 'unsanitary' workshops, and 'ugly and neglected' furniture.¹⁵¹ This sort of parabolic development reflects a general trend of a problematic start in the late 1950s caused by too chaotic an approach to reforms which were too ambitious; followed by an improvement in the 1970s; only to be crushed by a renewed deterioration, enhanced by a systematic lack of investment, that would plunge residential childcare into crisis as soon as other problems surfaced with more general economic crisis in the 1980s.

The third example, Tiskādi boarding school, according to its inspections in 1958, 1964, 1971, and 1973 shows how fragile the state of such institutions was. The 1958 inspection report described a carelessly run place. The inspector accused the teachers of being too rough with the children, and of not knowing the official rules, laws and guidelines. They called out the institution's management for neglecting the *rezhim*, for allowing the rooms to get too cold and the children to be sloppy and filthy. According to the report, the school was being rebuilt at the time of the 1964 inspection, which led to horrific overcrowding (317 children for 210 places). At that time, the bathrooms did not work properly, the rooms and the water were not clean enough, and there was no refrigerator. These factors contributed to outbreaks of dysentery and skin diseases. In the 1971 and 1973 inspection reports, however, the boarding school sounded quite different. The inspector was satisfied with the 'good teaching collective' and very enthusiastic about the school's director and deputy director's work. Material conditions as well as school, general, and Pioneer education and extracurricular activities and the children's behaviour seemed satisfactory.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 14 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 106-14 (1980).

¹⁵² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 52-56 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 103-07 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 105-17 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 80-108 (1973).

Among these examples, only Tiskādi boarding school conveys the impression that an official inspection had any immediate impact on the living and learning conditions in the institution. This raises the question of the overall purpose of these inspections – were they meant to bring about an improvement at all, to match the leadership’s pronounced high aims, or did the agencies in charge mostly aim to keep the network (barely) working on a low priority? Inspections usually followed a similar list of criteria, of boxes to be ticked, which was clearly reflected in the writing style of these reports. Because of this writing style, reports of very different institutions could sound almost the same; positive and negative points were listed next to each other, making it difficult to get an overall sense of the institution. The same report could sound both positive and negative, and a report of actually scandalous conditions can still read like a rather dry list.¹⁵³ This suggests that such inspections (and especially the resulting reports) were mostly a bureaucratic exercise without the expectation of achieving anything much except keeping the status quo.

However, these inspections still had the potential to be a catalyst for change. This becomes particularly clear in cases of inspection reports by either non-professionals, or by childcare professionals in a non-professional setting.¹⁵⁴ The example of Riga’s children’s home no.6 will show how change could be realized in Soviet residential childcare. On 16 December 1960, an unusual report reached the Latvian Ministry of Education. A group of pensioners had volunteered to visit the institution through their organization, the ‘council of pensioners’ (*sovet pensionerov*), for a whole month. This report is particularly interesting because the volunteers did not follow any ministry checklists. When they arrived, construction work was disrupting the institution’s everyday life. The home was in a ‘terrible unsanitary state’. Children carried dirt from the construction site everywhere, even into their beds. According to the pensioners, the ensuing chaos led to a ‘weakening of discipline’. Some children boycotted trips to the *bania*, and ‘systematically stay[ed] dirty’. The sewage system was out of order, and there was filthy water on the toilet and washroom floors. The grounds around the home were dirty as well, as the children went there in absence of any working toilets and carried all sorts of dirt back into

¹⁵³ There are some exceptions to this rule. One inspector, for instance, made a point of sharing her personal impressions in the report, usually introduced with the word *čūkstuvētsia*, as in this example from Jelgava children’s home, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 11-15 (1965). Sometimes, inspectors got quite upset by what they encountered, as in an inspection of Igate children’s home quoted earlier in this chapter. The inspector was so appalled by the carelessness of the staff there that she branded them ‘careless, indifferent and irresponsible,’ and characterized the place as a children’s home ‘without heart and soul.’ See LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 4-9 (1964).

¹⁵⁴ Such as this report by a local group of pensioners about the Riga children’s home no.6: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 9-16 (1961-62); or letters to the Lenin Children’s Fund, written by parents or childcare institution staff: GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

the home. As could be expected, vermin followed, and dysentery and scabies befell the children by December.¹⁵⁵

The pensioners reported a complete breakdown of routine and order in that children's home. In one very graphic passage, they described an otherwise empty room with a broken piano, surrounded by excrement and plates of food. When they arrived, the children were 'badly dressed' and showed no respect towards grownups. The educators had lost control over the dorms, as in some cases boys and girls locked themselves into the dorms together at night. The dining hall was equally disorganized: the children came and went whenever they pleased, there was no proper cutlery and children drank out of plates.¹⁵⁶ The children's home staff were described as helpless and unable to impose any *rezhim*. The inspection showed that usually only 60-70 percent of children were in class. The rest were doing chores in the home or were roaming around. The children behaved badly, stole things, and roamed around the city, 'surfing' cars and buses. The pensioners attributed this behaviour to unqualified staff, to the absence of socialist organizations like Pioneers, and the presence of grownup former inmates who never left and disrupted *rezhim* and discipline.¹⁵⁷

The pensioners achieved some improvements in the home, after state and Party had failed to do so for years, as documents show. The volunteers had 14 of the children sent to colonies and other children's homes to 'save the collective'.¹⁵⁸ In a follow-up meeting in January 1962, the children's home was assigned *shefstvo* by several factories to get the home up to standard, other firms to provide equipment for *kruzhki*, as well as the local Party organization to make sure they got household equipment to free the children from doing chores during school hours.¹⁵⁹ Given the situation, it seems surprising that the director was not criticized in the volunteers' report. However, the files show that he had tried to improve the situation at 'his' institution for quite some time, often with the support of the main school inspector Tammer. Specifically the issue of the 'grownup' children's home inmates had already been addressed seven times since November 1959 – both before and after the pensioners' inspection.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 9-16 (1961-62).

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ This sort of language bears witness of the prevalence of theories of socialist education in everyday bureaucratic discourse.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 17-19 (1962).

¹⁶⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 9, 82-83, 94, 96-98, 99-100, 106-08, (1959-61).

In mid-November 1960, there were six such people still living in the home, three of them working in nearby factories and other workplaces.¹⁶¹ From May to October of that year, the problem was repeatedly referred from agency to agency.¹⁶² The young adults created several problems for the institution (in addition to blocking places for other children): they drank alcohol in the children's home, and one of the girls had taken children to work with her.¹⁶³ According to the Party organization, they provided the worst possible role model to the children: 'the inmates [*vospitanniki*] who do not work or study turn into spongers, lead a parasitic way of life and thus are a bad influence on other unplaced [*neustroichinykh*, as in unemployed] inmates.'¹⁶⁴ The director of the children's home tried to tackle the situation in various ways, and petitioned for support with the provision of teaching materials, furniture, clothes and other things.¹⁶⁵ In August 1961, he tried to convince the Ministry of Education to have six children transferred. Most of them were in sixth form, disobedient, rude, lazy, some of them roaming around, stealing, smoking – generally considered a bad influence. He argued that the 'child collective' was still in a state of formation (using the language of socialist education theory), and thus and 'it must be protected from the disintegrating action of extremely debauched, hooliganous and parasitic elements'.¹⁶⁶

In October 1962, the institution was inspected again to check up on the children's home's development since the scandalous inspection in December 1960. The report acknowledged the director's hard work. In general, the report portrayed the institution as an average one, which indeed was an enormous progress in comparison.¹⁶⁷ It is, however, difficult to compare the two reports in this way because this second one was written by an official inspector. The documents suggest that it took at least three years to achieve some improvement in this case, as well as the dedicated commitment of the home's director and the school inspector, as well as several volunteers raising awareness on a local level. At the root of such a disastrous situation was most likely a combination of underfunding, a shortage of housing, as well as high unemployment rates among young people. This case study shows that the general inspections, intended as a control mechanism in residential childcare institutions, tended only to have an

¹⁶¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 99-100 (1960).

¹⁶² The city Party organization instructed the Ministry of Education to move these youngsters to state farms in May. In July, they contacted the ministry again to request housing for three of them. In October, the Ministry of Education appealed to the Ministry of Economy and the Latvian Council of Ministers about it, see LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 82-83, 96 (1961).

¹⁶³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 81, 82-83 (1961).

¹⁶⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, l. 9 (1961).

¹⁶⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, l. 79 (1961).

¹⁶⁶ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 133-34 (1961).

¹⁶⁷ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27 (1962).

impact if individual people working in the administration made a pronounced and consistent effort to achieve such change, whilst the numerous agencies in charge seem to have been detrimental, or ineffective at best. The following sections will examine the role of institution staff, as well as Party and state administration in accomplishing change.

The personal factor: agency, dedication, neglect, and abuse

According to an educator, social worker, and school inspector, directors of residential childcare institutions had the most impact on the state of a children's home or boarding school. Even good teachers could not work well in a messy institution, as internal discipline could not exist without external order and cleanliness, she claimed.¹⁶⁸ Inspection reports emphasized both the considerable responsibility of institution directors and acknowledged the challenges that their job entailed. Depending on the size of the institution, management typically consisted of a director and one or two deputies (often a male director and female deputies) charged with micromanaging everything that happened at a children's home or boarding school.¹⁶⁹ Apart from generally keeping the institution up and running, management were responsible for keeping thorough documentation about everything and everyone, including the place's finances.¹⁷⁰ Inspection reports further suggested that a central task of management was to plan the daily schedule, activities, and education of children, as well as to check on the staff's work (for instance by visiting lessons regularly).¹⁷¹ This section will explore the agency of directors as well as teaching staff in residential care institutions and show these workers had the opportunity as well as the power to improve or endanger children's lives. This power was connected to the relative isolation of such institutions, as neglect or abuse could remain undetected for a long time.

In many institutions, management did not seem to do as much as they could have done. For instance, many directors failed to evaluate teachers' work and to make sure teaching plans were fulfilled; they made too general, 'formulaic' plans, did not work with the parents, put in place

¹⁶⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF55A, p. 59.

¹⁶⁹ As for instance in this institution: GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1970).

¹⁷⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 19-25 (1965).

¹⁷¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 467, ll. 59-75 (1958); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 44-46 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 143-200 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 4-11 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 16-19 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 23-30 (1964); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 20-27 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1355, ll. 16-33 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 1-11, 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97 (1971); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 8-20, 40-49, 51-66 (1972-73); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54, 80-108 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 70-81 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 53-63 (1984).

a functioning 'pedagogic council' to coordinate educational work; or make enough of an effort to provide proper provision for the institution.¹⁷² On other occasions, inspectors conceded that management were doing a good job with what they had, hinting at dire conditions which meant that they could not do much at the time.¹⁷³ In some institutions, directors did not do their paperwork properly, which could result in suspicions of embezzlement.¹⁷⁴ Some inspectors got a general impression of disorganisation from their visit to the children's home or boarding school.¹⁷⁵ In Reutovsk children's home, for instance, only three out of six educators were working – one post was vacant, two were on holiday at the time – a testimony of sloppy organization or a lack of interest.¹⁷⁶ A high turnover among directors was also a sign of disorganization, and reflected badly on living conditions and education in the institution.¹⁷⁷

The importance of a well-working management became apparent as soon as there was a lack of it, as in Riga's boarding school no.1 in the late 1970s. That school had been something of a model school in the republic, as earlier inspections from 1962 and 1971 suggest. In these years, the school had been described as positive throughout, even more so because they dealt with an especially difficult group of children. In 1979, however, the school described in the inspector's report sounds like a different place entirely. At the day of the inspection, 62 of the children registered at the school were absent (40 to 50 of them were said to stray). The documentation was incorrect, and rooms were cold (10-15 degrees), and not cosy or properly furnished. The report suggested that the director's prolonged illness had triggered the steep decline in order and living conditions. He had been unable to work the whole of the first

¹⁷² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 1-3 (1959); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 173-79 (1960); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 81-100, 70-79 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 104-16 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 37-40 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 119-27 (1964); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 160-64 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1356, ll. 2-12 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 27-34 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 69-74, 90-97 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 8-20 (1972); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 117-22 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 33-38 (1984).

¹⁷³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 14-19 (1968).

¹⁷⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 1-5, 6-8, 173-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 148-54 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19 (1966); GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 160-164 (1967); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 30-32, 47-49 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 58-68 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 51-58 (1977); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, ll. 10-18 (1979); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 1-13 (1983); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 7956, ll. 43-47 (1983); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 10-14, 53-63 (1984); GASO, f. 1427, op. 2, d. 918 (1986).

¹⁷⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 14-16 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3 (1964); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2124, ll. 165-73 (1968); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 28-33, 34-38 (1972).

¹⁷⁶ GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 157-59 (1967).

¹⁷⁷ GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 140-45 (1967). The above-mentioned Reutovsk children's home, for instance, had had three directors in three years, almost a guarantee for chaotic conditions, see GARF, f. A259, op. 45, del. 7538, ll. 157-59 (1967). Similarly, a boarding school in Kalinisk oblast had three directors in five years; and a colony in Leningrad oblast even five directors in five years: GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9622, ll. 63-81 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962).

semester of the 1979/80 school year. Other staff members tried to fill in, but were not very effective, as indeed they each had their own jobs to do under the circumstances of staff shortages.¹⁷⁸

The power of a residential childcare institution director becomes clearest in situations of abuse of power, such as cases of embezzlement, in which members of management used the institution's resources for their own gain. In 1980, for instance, the authorities led an investigation against the director of Rauda auxiliary boarding school, accusing him of embezzlement and indifference towards staff misbehaviour. He had already been reprimanded for 'illegally spending public funds, expressed in unauthorized changes to the construction project' in 1973. The reprimand did not seem to impress him much, as he was discovered cheating with staff payments, having relatives and friends fill in for people on leave and overpaying them. Whenever a member of staff left, the director would delay reporting it to the Ministry to take that person's wages for himself.¹⁷⁹ Generally, such cases did not become public because it was the director's job to report them in the first place – and the institution's isolation protected them from government interference. Letters to the Lenin Children's Fund from 1987 by staff members provide a broader picture. A staff member from Tashkent auxiliary school no.105 reported neglect and violence by staff; drug abuse, crime, and rape among children; dangerous conditions (cold, no food, no medication); and the death of a child at the institution's summer camp, which the school's administration had covered up.¹⁸⁰

A scandal which took place at Stikli auxiliary boarding school in 1964 illustrates just how bad the situation at an institution could get before the authorities would intervene. In spring, the inspector of the Ventspils *militsiia* children's room sent a letter to the Latvian Ministry of Education and to *Padomju jaunatne*, the newspaper of the Latvian Communist Youth League. They reported a mixture of neglect, corruption, violence, embezzlement, and abuse to be going on at Stikli. A pupil of that school had been picked up by the *militsiia* in March. According to his mother, he 'unexpectedly came home sick', with severe influenza. Apparently, his class teacher had sent the boy home for breaking some boots: 'he was banished from school with a

¹⁷⁸ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, ll. 10-18 (1979); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980).

¹⁷⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 118-26 (1980).

¹⁸⁰ In another case, a staff member from a boarding school for delinquent girls in Iaroslavl' oblast blamed the director for the scandalous conditions there. The educator legitimized their decision to address the children's fund: 'my heart aches for these children, abandoned, and needed by no one.' Another educator addressing the fund had a similar view, explaining that 'we cannot be silent – children are suffering.' See GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

blow to the neck, you could still see a scratch.¹⁸¹ Following this incident, the *militsiia* inspector investigated further. Different parents reported that their children had complained about not getting decent food at the boarding school (such as ‘magotty’ fish); and asked for their parents to send them bread. They also said that the director and staff beat children. The boy corroborated these testimonies, adding that his class teachers gave a classmate a bloody nose as a punishment for smoking.¹⁸² The director not only perpetrated and tolerated acts of abuse against his students, but also embezzled money allocated for the education and care of the children.

The position of the boarding school staff, however, was delicate. Three teachers had actually approached parents to appeal to a higher level of administration about it because they were afraid to do it themselves. Their fears were not unfounded: a teacher had recently been fired for showing too much interest in the boarding school’s finances. Through the involvement of the *militsiia* inspector, the director was removed from his post.¹⁸³ Once such misgivings reached the attention of the agencies responsible, they often took action quite quickly. Such impressions of powerlessness among staff members against ‘bad’ management seem to have occurred time and again. At 1962, for instance, members of a colony’s teaching staff contacted the regional youth commission anonymously about their management’s ‘rough and inhumane’ treatment of children, and ‘sadist ways’ of running the place. Everyone who had criticized the *nachalnik* before had been demoted, punished, or fired.¹⁸⁴

Members of staff such as teachers and educators, however, were not generally powerless. Their dedication was crucial to the children’s wellbeing. Given the high expectations, hard work, and low incentives that jobs in residential childcare offered, one might wonder why people worked in such institutions at all. Interviews suggest that people chose careers in residential care because of their sense of mission. Many (former) staff members pointed out that they had always wanted to work with children, and that for them, working at a boarding school was more than just going there, doing your time, taking the money, and going home.¹⁸⁵ One teacher considered boarding schools to be important means of social support for families with

¹⁸¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 67-68 (1964).

¹⁸² The *militsiia* inspector found evidence of a similar occurrence several years earlier, showing that the conditions in that school had not been a recent development: in 1960, the director had expelled a boy for two weeks without consulting the ‘pedagogic council’ of the school. The boy had committed some minor offences, for which he was hit in the face and sent home (which was 50km away).

¹⁸³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 71-76 (1964).

¹⁸⁴ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 66-67 (1962).

¹⁸⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49B, p. 16. Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF72A, p. 1. One teacher explained that she had always wanted a job in which she would help other people, Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53A, p. 5.

financial issues or social problems, for single mothers or poor parents. She saw herself as part of this endeavour and criticized the tendency of schools and parents to abuse this system of support by sending them children with whom they did not want to cope. She made a point of acting in the interest of the children, as their advocate, for instance campaigning for a child to be taken off the *militiia*'s list of offenders, or for parents to get custody back if she considered this to be best for the child.¹⁸⁶

Staff interviews confirm the impression gained from other sources, that the quality of the inmates' institutional life depended greatly on the dedication of individual staff members. When, for instance, a teacher at school for children with intellectual disabilities took on a class of especially difficult children (a *banditskii klass*), she struggled to gain their trust for several months. They told her that 11 people had given up on them before her. According to them, other educators had never organized anything interesting, never dared to take them out for excursions. As the curricula gave only very broad directions, much was left for the individual educators to decide – and if they wanted to keep their efforts minimal, the children's life could be dull and dreary. The teacher talked about this episode as a personal success story: she was the only one who could win these children over.¹⁸⁷

The personal dedication of individual staff members was thus a crucial factor in the quality of life of children's home or boarding school inmates, as it shaped the relationship between the children and their surroundings. In her interview, a former boarding school child talked about one of her own educators to illustrate the difference between a good and a bad one: 'she somehow tried to, well, to direct our attention to some things. Not just to live like: eat, sleep, study, but that, well, we would sort of see beautiful things somehow. That in some human relationships we saw something extraordinary. That's what she tried to do.'¹⁸⁸ However, she stressed that warm personal relationships between inmates and staff were hardly possible; as all children, for instance, were addressed by their last name.¹⁸⁹ In contrast, another former boarding schooler described an educator whom they did not like, who basically only showed

¹⁸⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF50B, pp. 44-45.

¹⁸⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53B, p. 15. Another teacher tells a similar story about a group of 'deviant' children that she took outside to some political event. She lost the whole group in the crowd and could not find them again – finally the children all went back to the school by themselves; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF65B, p. 15.

¹⁸⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69A, p. 7. This notion of 'seeing beautiful things in human relations' can be found in official documents as well and seems to have been part of Soviet education discourse – showing how deeply people who went through this system could be shaped by its discourse. See for instance: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 33-41 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 53-63 (1984).

¹⁸⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69B, p. 24.

up to check children's homework and left again without bonding with them.¹⁹⁰ Such cases could be traumatic for a child because the educator might be the only adult person they had to relate to outside of class.¹⁹¹

This relationship between residential childcare staff and the children, however, was not easy or straightforward to assess. Following Goffman's analysis, there was a 'basic split' between inmates and staff of an institution, with a pronounced social distance and restricted social mobility. This social distance was encouraged in 'total institutions', as too much sympathy, or even affection with the inmates would put the efficient running of the institution in jeopardy. Standards of humanity and institutional efficiency would frequently clash.¹⁹² This issue was particularly pronounced in residential childcare, especially institutions with small children because children are likely to both attract and need affection and attention from staff members. In the case of baby homes, such a lack of individual attention to children, especially but not only during their first 12 months, can lead to serious developmental problems, as neurological research in Romanian children's homes has shown.¹⁹³ However, staff shortages and the requirements of efficiency pushed staff members to treat children with a certain distance, thus endangering their emotional wellbeing.¹⁹⁴

Helpful members of staff, whatever function they had in the institution, could be of vital importance as advocates for these children, who often had no one to speak up for them. In their interviews, former boarding school children described teachers on whom they could rely for support against their parents, for comfort and shelter, and for help in finding work or housing.¹⁹⁵ As these interviews convey an image of dedicated childcare workers, it seems imperative to ask the extent to which those were representative among people working in this field. Many of the interviewees mentioned colleagues who were less committed to their work; just as no one talked about anyone more committed than they were. It is also safe to claim that people who agreed to talk about their work in an interview for several hours probably

¹⁹⁰ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67B, p. 14. A former boarding school student described a similar work ethic of his educator without criticizing it; Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14B, p. 14.

¹⁹¹ The gender ratio amongst staff might also be difficult in this respect because orphans might rarely meet adult men. A former teacher hinted at this. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47B, p. 27.

¹⁹² Goffman, *Asylums*, pp. 18-19, 76-80.

¹⁹³ Charles Nelson, Nathan Fox and Charles Zeanah (eds), *Romania's Abandoned Children: Deprivation, Brain Development, and the Struggle for Recovery* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 1-4, 129-31, 159-60.

¹⁹⁴ See for instance Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, p. 6, and chapter four.

¹⁹⁵ One girl, for instance, was only able to finish school because her educator could convince her mother not to send her to work in a factory after seventh grade, see Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69A, p. 5. Another girl had one teacher and an administrator of the school who let her stay at their places in times of distress and to try to get her a room after she had finished school. However, she emphasized that this help did not come from the school, but that these women helped her out of kindness. Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, pp. 20-21.

considered their work to be meaningful and important and considered themselves to be good at their job. Basically, the 13 interviewees studied are representative of that system with regard to their jobs because they came from many different branches of that system, but they are less representative with regard to how they did their job, seeming to be especially dedicated. To get a better impression of the whole spectrum of staff dedication (or the lack thereof), it is useful to explore the other extreme, that is cases of mismanagement, neglect and abuse by residential childcare staff.

In residential childcare institutions, where children had often experienced neglect even before their time in care, insufficient supervision could result in grave injuries or death. Poor work safety and work accidents were commonly reported, especially in colonies.¹⁹⁶ According to a report about accidents in RSFSR residential care, several children from Russian children's homes or boarding schools had died that school year (1961/62) from assault or accidents: one was run over by a tractor, one fell out of a tree, one froze to death in the woods, one fell to their death in unknown circumstances, one was buried in a gravel pit. That same year, six children drowned, two tried to kill themselves, and 321 suffered from food poisoning, killing one of them.¹⁹⁷ All of these cases can most likely be explained by careless supervision by staff members, although the file did not contain material on investigations.

A similar report from five years later (school year 1966/67) offers more detail about the circumstances of the incidents. Carelessness was a common reproach in such reports, but the consequences for the staff members in question depended on whether it was ruled accidental or criminal. In Astrakhan, for instance, two first graders played with a Hexachloran pen (a medical device that should have been locked away) and ingested some of it. One of them died in hospital. The procuracy dropped the case and treated the death as accidental. A case in Kamchatka oblast was ruled differently. On 8 May 1966, two educators failed to count the children at the shift handover. A few hours later, they realized that some children had run away. Most had gone to see their parents, but the educators did not check whether the runaways actually arrived there. On the 11th, they realized that one girl had never reached her parents. The *militiia* eventually found her, two days later, in critical condition. She died the

¹⁹⁶ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 18-27, 31, 48-54, 129-42, 143-56, 158-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 20-22 (1964); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 28-33, 34-38 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 82-94 (1977). For instance, Cheliabinsk colony counted nine work accidents in 1972, amounting to 185 days of inability to work in total, see GU OGACHO, f. R288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 28-33 (1972).

¹⁹⁷ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 48-50 (1962).

next day. This story revealed a stunning degree of negligent behaviour among the institution's administration and subsequently lost all people in charge their jobs.¹⁹⁸

Some cases could only partly be treated as accidents, as the staff members deliberately used children for labour in potentially dangerous conditions and off school premises, thus putting their own personal interests before the children's safety. These incidents usually left a much larger trace in the documents. One such case, named a 'tragic accident' or 'tragic death', occurred at Lielvircava auxiliary boarding school in 1965. A teacher of that school took a group of 5th and 6th graders to do some work at an old barn and to break down a wall. The teacher did not ensure safe working conditions, but instead 'amateurishly and ill-advisedly allowed the children to beat the fundament of the wall with a hammer and break it, and thus the approx. 2.8-meter-high earthen wall collapsed'. The wall buried one of the children, resulting in her death. The teacher was fired, and the administration reprimanded.¹⁹⁹

Disinterest, neglect, and abuse were often related, as a report from Katvari auxiliary boarding school illustrates. In 1964, an outraged inspector described the behaviour of the teaching staff:

At the special boarding school there is no unified collective. The work morale of some teachers does not correspond to the requirements of a Soviet teacher. There are cases when drinking binges are organized at the school, in which teachers take part during their work hours. Students are often involved in teachers' intrigues and disagreements and sometimes they even witness scenes (like during the binges, when there were swearing and brawls).

The school's director did not intervene, but the state did: three educators and two teachers were either fired or reprimanded for consuming alcohol during work hours, breaking work discipline or neglecting their duties.²⁰⁰

Reports about violence and abuse were all too common in residential childcare. Documents further point to a sloppy enforcement of legislation protecting minors from abuse, which might explain why such cases were still prevalent in the 1980s. From 1987, parents and staff members used the new opportunity to write letters to the Lenin Children's Fund to complain about such cases. These letters imply that physical abuse of children in residential childcare

¹⁹⁸ GARF, f. A2306, op. 76, d. 1475 (1966-67).

¹⁹⁹ Strangely the author of the report still emphasized the good educational work of the school's teaching collective, maybe to place sole blame on the teacher. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 78-83 (1965). In a similar case in Liepāja a Pioneer leader took two boys to his private garden plot during a work placement at the collective farm. Without proper supervision there, the boys found some explosives and nearly blew themselves up – both were taken to hospital in critical condition. See LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 56-69 (1981).

²⁰⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32 (1964).

institutions was much more common than official reports suggested, and that most instances were not reported. It seems that staff members saw the Fund as a last resort to make atrocities known: an educator from Baku's preschool home no.12 reported the beating of children; another from Moscow children's home no.11 told how educators reportedly beat children on the head with ropes and canes, locked them in drying cabinets overnight, or withdrew food. Staff members from boarding school no.6 in Maisk (Kabardino-Balkaria) even compared their institution to a concentration camp – children were beaten there, sent to a holding cell for no reason, and staff members stole food to give it to 'local delinquents', which points to the existence of gang- or mafia-like structures.²⁰¹

As ever, cases of abuse and terrible care in residential institutions proved to be worst and the most commonly reported in facilities for delinquent children, namely colonies. General reports about colonies in 1960 listed various transgressions by colony staff, such as beating inmates, getting drunk at work, sexual relationships between wardens and inmates, and staff blackmailing inmates with photos they had taken. Most of these staff members were fired for their behaviour.²⁰² Individual case studies shed more light on staff members abusing their position of power, mistreating inmates, or generally misbehaving – ranging from disinterest to violence. Such reports involved staff or management beating inmates for disrupting discipline, often with small misdemeanours like drinking or swearing, as in the cases of colonies in Kemerovskaia, Khmel'nits, Tomsk, Saratov and Krasnodar regions.²⁰³ An inspector visiting Leningrad colony even witnessed three such beatings. One of the victims had to go to hospital, as the member of staff hitting him had injured his eye.²⁰⁴

An inspection of the Cēsis colony revealed several charges of mismanagement: the management of the institution was charged with embezzlement and corruption, with several thousands of roubles unaccounted for, shady awarding procedures, and obscure orders. The inspector claimed that they also failed to do anything to stop violence among inmates and binge-drinking among staff. When two former inmates visited the colony for propaganda reasons, one of the educators got them so drunk that they got arrested for 'hooliganism' right after returning to Riga. The colony's management failed to punish the educator in question, and even rewarded the individual for a 'conscientious attitude to work'.²⁰⁵ Over a decade later,

²⁰¹ GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

²⁰² GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 143-56 (1960).

²⁰³ The culprits were reprimanded or fired. GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 48-54 (1960); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 36-39 (1962).

²⁰⁴ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-38 (1962).

²⁰⁵ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 40-45, 73-75 (1960).

two colonies in Cheliabinsk oblast were found guilty of a similarly indifferent attitude to their inmates' care. Work education was heavily criticized, and crimes among inmates were still common. The report particularly singled out the bad work discipline among non-teaching staff, complaining about people coming to work drunk, getting drunk at work, coming in late, leaving and staying away without permission etc. Within only half a year, the colony's boss had reprimanded no less than 42 staff members for similar misdemeanours.²⁰⁶

The degree of dedication from an institution's staff and directors was crucial to the children's wellbeing, which speaks to their importance as well as to their power. Evidence has shown that staff and especially directors could often rule their institutions uncontested. And while inspections had the potential to expose any instances of mismanagement or abuse, many remained undetected for a long time, and it is fair to presume that many were never detected at all. Individual childcare workers thus had a lot of agency in making life better (or much worse) for the children in their care. However, through institutional neglect and poor work conditions, the Soviet authorities increased the risk of such neglect by childcare personnel towards the children in their care.

'Access to the outside world is closed': Conscious isolation, bureaucratic inertia, or neglect?

The above quote comes from Kotovshchikova's article about the isolation of children in baby and preschool homes.²⁰⁷ Indeed, cases of abuse and neglect were often detected late, if at all, which raises questions about the involvement of the agencies in charge of Soviet residential childcare. To get a better sense of how these worked, this section will examine how the Party organizations, ministries and departments of education, as well as other agencies dealt with problems in institutions. As we have seen, the higher levels of administration got involved in cases of misbehaviour by members of staff or the institutions administration (if they found out about it). If news got out about a suspicious number of children running away from an institution, violence by staff members against children, alcohol abuse by staff members, instances of corruption, embezzlement, or neglect, staff members and directors risked receiving official warnings, and ultimately being fired.²⁰⁸ This section will look more closely at instances and motives for official intervention in residential childcare institutions. With the

²⁰⁶ GU OGACHO, f. R288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6 (1972).

²⁰⁷ Kotovshchikova, 'Neobychnye deti'.

²⁰⁸ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 1-3 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 20-23, 24-30, 43-46 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32, 67-68 (1964); GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1475 (1962-69); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 118-26 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 15-20 (1982); GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

help of Goffman's concept of total institutions, an analysis of the boundaries between such institutions and society will show that the isolation of children in care was in many ways a conscious policy, intended not only as a means to keep them out of sight, but also to control them more efficiently.

This impression of an overly complicated bureaucratic structure in the best case, and disinterested, uncooperative agencies in the worst case permeates a great part of official correspondence about the residential childcare network. Whenever one of the bodies in charge made unpopular decisions, local agencies or even the institutions themselves appealed to people higher up the administrative chain to try and reverse it. Such a case occurred in Daugavpils raion, when the local Party organization planned to move Medumi auxiliary boarding school to new premises, a former general school. The boarding school administration protested, arguing that the new premises were too isolated, and that the roads leading to it would be inaccessible from autumn until spring, making food provision problematic and making it impossible for children to see their families on weekends or holidays. In addition, the new premises were not ready for boarding, as several facilities like staff housing, administration buildings, a *bania*, laundry facilities were missing; the kitchen and dining hall were too small; and there was neither electricity (except from a small generator) nor running water. Finally, several of the school's teachers had already refused to move there. It seems as if the local Party organization either had not checked the new premises or were led by priorities they deemed more important than the well-being of children with learning difficulties.²⁰⁹

Many of the problems seemed to arise out of a lack of communication between Party organizations and the ministries (and their local representations), as correspondence between such bodies shows. A 1968 letter from the RSFSR Ministry of Education to the Cheliabinsk Party organization bears witness to the arbitrary nature of decision-making resulting from the complex administrative structures. According to the ministry, the Cheliabinsk *obkom* (oblast committee) had transferred the housing facilities for 300 children as well as an isolation facility belonging to Cheliabinsk boarding school no.7 from the education department to the department for the defence of public order. According to the ministry, this happened without their consultation, and left the boarding school in terrible conditions, exacerbating the bad state it had been in already: due to the increased lack of space, several children now had to sleep in corridors; there were no rooms for leisure anymore, and no gender partition. It also

²⁰⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1013, ll. 33-34 (1963).

was far too cold in these facilities, with water freezing in the pipes during winter, forcing the children to sleep in their outside clothes, and sometimes to share beds.²¹⁰

Wherever different agencies fought over responsibility or looked for fast, easy, and cheap solutions, they put the children's well-being at risk. In one such example, the chief doctor of Riga's *sanepidstantsiia* (SES), an agency responsible for checking on sanitary conditions in institutions and preventing the spread of diseases, took up a fight with several agencies. According to a letter from 23 May 1963 to the city's education department and Party organization, he had 'repeatedly' urged them for two months to have auxiliary boarding school no.4 closed by the end of the school year (June). Instead, they had issued an order to have the school renovated, although the premises were not suitable for such a facility: the classrooms, corridors, sanitary facilities were too dark and narrow, and their sewage system consisted of a dry cesspool; and neither of these things could be improved due to the local conditions. The doctor felt he was not taken seriously by the agencies, closing his letter with even more anger: 'proceeding from the above it is c l e a r [emphasis in the original] that an overhaul of the facility will not substantially improve the sanitary state of the school.'²¹¹

On 5 June 1963, the Riga education department contacted the Latvian Ministry of Education, asking that school indeed be taken out of its present facility and to transferred to another school in the republic, outside the city. Thus, it shifted the responsibility to the republic level.²¹² The ministry refused, arguing that moving the school to the countryside was 'ill-advised' and 'unrealistic'.²¹³ It is difficult to deduce what happened to the school, although an inspection of 'auxiliary boarding school no.4' from 1964 mentions that conditions had greatly improved, suggesting that the institution might have moved to different premises by that time.²¹⁴ However, other documents suggest that the agencies did not put much effort into solving the problems at hand. 'Eleven orphans' from the boarding school had been transferred to another school in the city. Only a month later, in July 1963, the director of that boarding school (no.3) addressed the city's education authorities. He explained that they had been sent many children without parental care lately. Among these, 17 were Russian-speaking, and 14 Latvian-speaking, leaving the director with two incomplete groups needing different kinds of lessons and

²¹⁰ GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968).

²¹¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1013, l. 19 (1963).

²¹² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1013, l. 20 (1963).

²¹³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1013, l. 21 (1963).

²¹⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 47-55 (1964).

teachers. In addition, the boarding school was in fact not equipped to keep ‘orphans’ because they did not have enough staff to work on weekends and over the holidays.²¹⁵

Trying to solve a problem quickly and with minimum investment at one school, the city’s education department created problems at another school, pushing the local SES to intervene again. Apparently, the education department had increased the student quota for boarding school no.3 from 200 (which the school had been intended to house) to 276 (most likely the number of students living there), thus polishing the numbers without addressing the problem (overcrowding). Dorms and classrooms were packed, leaving no room between the desks, no rooms to relax, even forcing gymnastics classes into the corridors. The material conditions had already been unsatisfactory: the heating system was outdated, there was no proper water provision and not enough room to wash. The SES doctor ordered the education department to lower the population back to 200 and to help the school to improve its living conditions. After three more (quite unfriendly) letters between the doctor and the Ministry of Education, Latvia’s main school inspector reassured the SES in late December 1963 (!) that they would either transfer the children or provide more living space.²¹⁶ While it is not easy to tell what happened to that institution in the end, it is clear that its children had lived in appalling conditions in one or the other boarding school for at least a year, due to bureaucratic inertia and chronic underfunding.²¹⁷

These findings suggest that the agencies responsible for keeping the network of residential childcare institutions up and running were not particularly eager to do so, showing a strong reluctance to jump into action and a tendency to shift responsibility to another agency. Cases that motivated higher-level agencies, like ministries, Party organizations, the procuracy, or departments on a city or oblast’ level to take action can be grouped in four categories: casualties and cases of extreme violence, institutions wasting official funds, cases of sexual relationships and pregnancies, and anything linked to the prevention of juvenile delinquency or the presence of unsupervised minors on the streets. With regard to the first category, the procuracy would investigate cases of death, as has been shown. The same holds true for cases of extreme violence or neglect by staff members, such as in cases of beatings or epidemics.²¹⁸ The second category includes cases of embezzlement involving the administration of individual homes and schools, institutions not filling up to maximum capacity, or residential childcare staff stealing

²¹⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1013, ll. 36-38 (1963).

²¹⁶ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1013, ll. 53-60 (1963).

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Such cases will be investigated further in chapter four.

or selling things like food and medication.²¹⁹ The agencies in charge of residential childcare also tended to intervene swiftly in cases of rape, sexual relationships with minors, and teenage pregnancies (the third category).²²⁰

The fourth complex of reasons for the authorities to intervene concerned cases relating to unsupervised children in the streets. It often boiled down to situations in which the boundary between the institution and the 'outside' broke down. To illustrate this, it makes sense to compare two cases, one in which the authorities intervened, and one in which they did not. For the first case, the Riga special school for difficult teenagers (from the case study opening this chapter) will serve as an example, as a typical failing institution: material conditions were dire, staff members behaved negligently and violently towards the inmates, the school administration showed no interest in changing these conditions, and external control mechanisms took many months even to realize there was a problem. The planned increase of the inmate population that caused the 1970 inspection was mentioned in the report but not connected to the bigger picture. Here it seems that, largely unconnected to the scandal from the year before, the education administration checked on the boarding school in case they could cram even more underage offenders in there, because the minors' commissions had been struggling to place all of the teenagers deemed 'difficult' or delinquent in institutions.

Immediately following this inspection, the Latvian procuracy sent another letter to the Ministry of Education to push them for a timely release of inmates who had passed their sentence, were too old, or had proved themselves reformed. This lingering in a closed institution for no reason was indeed disastrous for every child in question, although the procurator seems to have been motivated above all by the lack of places and long waiting lists at the minors' commissions rather than the children's wellbeing.²²¹ The example of the Riga boarding school for delinquent children shows two instances in which higher layers of administration would intervene in the management of individual institutions: in cases of particularly harrowing breaches of the law (if indeed they found out about them in the first place), or out of ulterior motives, such as the situation in institutions endangering wider political motives or risking outrage among the population. In this case, the second intervention occurred because it produced a problem

²¹⁹ Cases of embezzlement: GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 40-45, 73-75 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 43-46 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 67-68 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 118-26 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 15-20 (1982). Institutions leaving spaces open: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1892, pp. 25-26 (1969). Institutions stealing and/or selling food or medication: GARF f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9969, ll. 42-45 (1990).

²²⁰ GASO, f. P233, op. 5, d. 1475, l. 114 (1966); GARF, f. A2306, op. 76, d. 1475, ll. 21-22 (1967).

²²¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 31-34 (1969).

visible outside the institution: deviant youth roaming the streets because there were not enough places in institutions. The (more or less) regular inspections thus seem to be a means of containment and minimal intervention rather than of increasing quality of care.

In contrast, the authorities did not intervene in Bauska children's home in 1964, although the inspectors visiting the place were so appalled by what they saw that they appealed to the local Party organization, and then later the Deputy Minister of Education. In the home, parts of the building had collapsed, so that the children did not have enough space, it was filthy and cold, a foul smell hung in the dorms, children behaved badly and violently, and hardly anything was organized in terms of education or pastimes. The inspectors urged the city's education department to replace the director and staff of that children's home with more competent people, and to make this institution a priority until conditions were better. Since then, however, no 'radical measures' to improve the situation had been taken.²²² Although the situation in Bauska was bad enough to attract the authorities' attention, they do not seem to have intervened, arguably because they had no immediate interest in doing so: no funds were being wasted, no children were roaming the streets.

The difference between the Riga and Bauska cases was not merely that the agencies in charge had an immediate motive to intervene in the case of the former (because they needed more space for underage offenders). Children running away into town also endangered the boundary between the institution and the outside world, which bears witness to a conflicted relationship of openness and closed-ness in residential childcare. Soviet children's homes and boarding schools had a most ambivalent, if not paradoxical relationship with the outside world. This is common in such residential institutions, as Goffman has pointed out: total institutions are characterized by their limited contact to the outside world. This does not mean a complete absence of contact, just that communication between institution inmates and the outside world are under strict control. The intensity of control and contact depends on the type of institution, which is the reason for Davies' suggestion of using different degrees of 'openness' to compare institutions.²²³

As pointed out in chapter two, the residential childcare system as it was (re)created in 1958 was inherently paradoxical: children who were in a 'bad' place in society were taken out of society to be better prepared for a life in society. A report about a children's village in Nizhnyi Tagil, for instance, stated that educational facilities should not exist isolated from society, 'with

²²² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3 (1964).

²²³ Davies, 'Goffman's Concept', pp. 88-90.

closed doors’, because bringing up children was a ‘national task’ (*narodnoe delo*).²²⁴ This tension between openness and isolation permeates works about residential childcare institutions. When discussing the role of the new boarding schools, Afanasenko emphasized that they were not ‘closed’ institutions but closely connected to life and that they would not try to antagonize (*protivopostavliatsia*) the family. In the case of boarding schools, officials stressed the importance of keeping in touch with the parents, with open days for presentations, lectures, and meetings for parents; parents’ committees; and of children going home on weekends and public holidays.²²⁵ All the institutions were supposed to have some sort of relationship to the outside world, be it through labour assignments in factories or farms, excursions, or visits to the institution.²²⁶

The following analysis will show the extent to which Soviet residential childcare institutions were open and/or closed. Children’s homes, boarding schools, even colonies, were supposed to establish connections with society. For instance, the administrations of residential childcare institutions had to call on support from external organizations for *shefstvo*, like factories and enterprises, farms, local Party organizations, theatres, universities, etc.; or individuals, such as pensioners, workers, labour brigades, or Komsomol members to support their efforts, basically to help out wherever the state failed.²²⁷ The functioning of an institution could sometimes depend entirely on the involvement of such patrons, as Catriona Kelly has pointed out.²²⁸ A document about RSFSR boarding schools confirms this impression, saying that the provision of schools, especially with food, could only be completely satisfactory with *shefstvo*. This both puts the state administration of these institutions in a very poor light and reveals the strange

²²⁴ Val’eva and Shpital’nik, *Detskii gorodok*, p. 10.

²²⁵ These things, however, tended to work only in the cities, as parents lived a lot farther away from boarding schools in the countryside. Kaz’min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchaniie*, pp. 23-24, 38-39.

²²⁶ Kaz’min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchaniie*, p. 7. A.S. Kalmanok advised to conduct 2-3 factory visits a year, see: A.S. Kalmanok ‘Besichtigungen von Betrieben’, in *Heimkehrer berichten*, pp. 55-64, p. 56; Scharonowa, ‘Erziehung des Kinderkollektivs’, pp. 130-31.

²²⁷ To the limited extent that this type of involvement was voluntary at all in the Soviet Union, as discussed in chapter one. Thus, Tomsk colony had a sewing factory, a theatre, and the local university as *shefy*, GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61 (1962); the Daugavpils colony was reported as having good *shefstvo*, LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, pp. 53-61 (1964); the Krāslava children’s home was supported by pensioners, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 19-25 (1965); the Jelgava children’s home no.1 seems to have had several *shefy*, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 14-19 (1968); similarly, Tukums children’s home had two factories helping with the metal workshop and work education, and additional support by political institutions, newspapers, other companies, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); the Riga boarding school for delinquent children had help from diverse societal (*obshestvennyie*) organizations and trade unions, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); Riga boarding school no.1 was supported by a factory, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97 (1971); and Malta boarding school had the local forestry union, factories and vocational schools as *shefy*, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54 (1973).

²²⁸ Kelly, *Children’s World*, p. 263.

cohabitation of professionalization (by implementing scientific standards, for instance) and reliance on *obschchestvennost'* (without guarantee that the people involved were qualified).²²⁹

Such *shefstvo* could happen on a material or on a social level. Material support could entail help with building and repair work, as well as donations of money, furniture, machines, clothes, shoes, crockery, food, linen, books, and musical instruments.²³⁰ A Cheliabinsk boarding school had particularly helpful *shefstvo*: a building company had helped to improve the school's material basis, to build basketball and volleyball pitches. They also donated two turntables and 40 pairs of skis; sent people to help repair things, and funded events, as well as summer holiday retreats.²³¹ For the *shefstvo* by collective or state farms, which usually entailed food donations to meet ongoing provision problems, reports and interviews often mentioned that the children worked on the farms and got food for their institution in return.²³² *Shefy* also provided social support, for instance with social visits, meetings with labour brigades and war veterans, or organizing cultural events, festivities, or birthday parties.²³³ In other cases, they were more closely linked to extracurricular activity or everyday leisure, such as *kruzhki*, exchanges, and excursions.²³⁴ Factory workers or Komsomol members from outside the institution would also act as personal patrons for children who struggled with school, institutional life, or 'discipline'.²³⁵

It seems, however, that good *shefstvo* was difficult to come by, or that institution directors did not do enough to engage workplaces around them for support. Inspectors often blamed the institution's administration for hardly establishing any contact with surrounding people or schools whatsoever.²³⁶ Reports suggested, however, that more commonly institutions officially

²²⁹ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 9624, ll. 81-100, 70-79 (1962). See also Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45B, pp. 33-34.

²³⁰ As reported from the Moscow oblast children's homes: GARF f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959); and in parts from the Sverdlovsk city children's homes: GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); with regard to the building support for the Soviet colonies: GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 189-205 (1961); other examples for help with building and fixing things in individual institutions: GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 1-9 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1489, ll. 27-38 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 3-4, 6-10, 14-17 (1980); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 33-38 (1984).

²³¹ GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967).

²³² See for instance LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 75-89 (1971); Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, p. 8.

²³³ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 129-42, 143-56, 158-79 (1960); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2123, ll. 20-29 (1968).

²³⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 37-40 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 16-19 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971).

²³⁵ GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 23-27 (1972). Such personal *shefstvo* could be very helpful for the children in question, but it was complicated by the isolated location of many institutions.

²³⁶ Such as in the case of Viļaka boarding school: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 243-49 (1962). Similar reproaches can be found in reports on Sverdlovsk children's home no. 10, GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 27, ll. 104-05 (1957); Zilupe children's home, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 28-37 (1962); and Jelgava children's home, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 5-7 (1962).

had *shefy* but that these did not do anything to support their client.²³⁷ The directors of childcare institutions did not have much leverage to force *shefy* into action, especially if the local Party administration showed as little enthusiasm as the *shefstvo* organizations. In 1968, for instance, the director of Kurmene children's home claimed to have asked twice for the local Party organization's support to get some patrons to help but had received no reaction.²³⁸ That same year, a report about residential childcare in Cheliabinsk oblast claimed that neither enterprises, factories, farms, party organisations, trade unions, or the Komsomol were doing enough to support such facilities.²³⁹

Political youth organisations like the Pioneers or the Komsomol provided another link between residential childcare institutions and the 'outside world'. It was their responsibility to organize political education in cooperation with school teachers. According to the Gerbeev/Vinogradova manual, political education in residential childcare tended to be limited to what was called *politinformatsiia*, basically explaining the news, political developments, and some history to the children.²⁴⁰ Teaching staff tended to neglect to instil important values in the children, such as patriotism, love of nature, respect of people, collectivism, humanism, and diligence. The authors explained that political education should entail lectures, discussions, conversations, films, magazines, books and guest speakers conveying these values, in addition to regular *politinformatsiia*; and preparing the children for membership in the youth organizations.²⁴¹ Unsurprisingly, many institutions struggled to organize political education or Pioneer work that was good enough to satisfy the inspectors, or they simply did not make much of an effort in the first place. Many reports feature complaints about either no Pioneer work, or about it being formulaic, happening only on paper.²⁴² In Sigulda boarding school, for

²³⁷ See for example Cesis colony, GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 73-75 (1960); Dobeles children's home, LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10 (1965); institutions in Tula oblast, GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 160-64 (1967); Arkhangel'sk oblast, GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 2124, ll. 1-22 (1968); and Cheliabinsk and Miass colonies, GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6 (1972).

²³⁸ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 1-21 (1968).

²³⁹ GU OGACHO, f. P-288, op. 164, del. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968).

²⁴⁰ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, pp. 123-24.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 125-28, 136-38.

²⁴² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 472, ll. 1-7 (1957); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 575, ll. 113-31 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 173-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 148-54, 243-49 (1961-62); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 5-7, 10-16, 20-27, 28-37 (1961-62); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 3-5, 9-15 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 104-16 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27, 28-32 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3, 10-15 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 11-19, 78-83 (1965-66); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 164, d. 169, ll. 95-99 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 1-6 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1870, ll. 4-13, 51-58 (1977-78); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 7956, ll. 43-47 (1983). According to a report about Riga's children's home no.6, their Pioneer work consisted mainly of 'many general phrases and few concrete matters', see LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 20-27 (1962).

instance, 50 percent of Pioneers had failed the school year, which contradicted one of the basic ideas behind the organization – being an incentive to do well at school.²⁴³

On a practical basis, the Pioneer and Komsomol organizations were supposed to help the institutions to organize so-called *shtaby* and *druzhiny*, task forces working to organize a ‘Lenin museum’, improve the library, the school education, discipline, or the sanitary conditions in the institution and grounds, to popularize the concepts ‘revolutionary tradition’, internationalism, the socialist economy, and socialist tourism, to work with the local cells of the Octobrists, Pioneers, Komsomol, or the ‘young friends of the *militsiia*’.²⁴⁴ Boarding school and children’s homes organized festivities on socialist holidays and jubilees, as well as various events and competitions to make Lenin, heroes of the revolution and labour, the Soviet space program, and other things, popular.²⁴⁵ Patriotism was thus one of the more important goals of political education, often linked with visits by war veterans, military drills and games.²⁴⁶ Youth organisations were also charged with helping to organize the children’s leisure activities and with developing contacts with students from other (socialist) countries and republics in the context of ‘international friendship’.²⁴⁷ These organizations could have an considerable amount of power over the children because good grades and behaviour were preconditions for joining a youth organization.²⁴⁸ A report from Miass colony inadvertently addressed the problems that this could cause by explaining that there was ‘almost no abuse of power [by these bodies] anymore.’²⁴⁹

²⁴³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 173-79 (1960).

²⁴⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 37-40 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1000, ll. 47-60, 66-70, 81-102 (1963-64); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 23-30 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1086, ll. 3-9 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 20-27 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1355, ll. 16-33 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 5-20 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 75-89, 90-97 (1971); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1971, ll. 15-19 (1983).

²⁴⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11, 23-30 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1086, ll. 3-9 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 19-25 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1234, ll. 17-42 (1967); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 163, d. 177, ll. 191-204 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1310, ll. 46-57 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 20-27 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 5-20 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49, 51-66 (1973).

²⁴⁶ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1234, ll. 17-42 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1310, ll. 46-57 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49, 51-66 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54 (1973). A former child in care also mentioned military events and drills at her boarding school for Red Army day, Oxf/Lev PF50A, p.26.

²⁴⁷ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 20-27 (1967); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 5-20 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1613, ll. 40-49, 51-66 (1973); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1665, ll. 34-54 (1973). Tukums children’s home, for instance, organized exchanges with other SSR such as Belarus or Ukraine, and other socialist countries like Poland, Bulgaria, or the GDR, see LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968).

²⁴⁸ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 16-19 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF55B, pp. 61-62.

²⁴⁹ GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972).

However, social isolation seems to have remained widespread. As chapter two has shown, theorists warned about the dangers of social deprivation and institutional dreariness. According to Gerbeev/Vinogradova, for instance, educators and children should create family-like relationships, thus get ‘closer to life’ because ‘a children’s home, however good it is, is not a cosy family home’.²⁵⁰ Documents about institutions contain much evidence of social isolation, often related to complaints about ‘bad behaviour’. Although the inspectors complained about the children ‘misbehaving’ (on purpose), the scenes they depicted suggest that the children did not know how to behave, especially in cases of children screaming, laughing, pointing, and running around at the sight of people. It is likely that they were simply overwhelmed.²⁵¹ In 1962, a history teacher from Malta boarding school revealed the degree of social isolation while he was trying to defend himself against the charge of neglecting ‘atheist propaganda’ in his teaching. He explained that there was no need to conduct such work with the children, because they were ‘isolated from the influence of the adult population’.²⁵²

However, the documents also show that whilst the authorities recognized the harmful ‘side-effects’ of social isolation, the isolation itself was not accidental. The authorities reacted strongly and anxiously to children running away from institutions, claiming that such ‘runaways’ would commit crimes on the street. Public order agencies even turned the unsupervised presence of children on the street itself into an offence under the term ‘vagrancy’ (*brodiazhnichestvo*, see also chapter one). A report from 1990 suggested that the *militsiia* held 14,100 children in care for vagrancy every year.²⁵³ Inspection reports confirm this impression: they named ‘running away’ and vagrancy among the main ‘offences’ committed by children in institutions, together with petty theft, assault, and brawls.²⁵⁴ In addition, children were often sent to colonies just for running away from their boarding school or children’s home, showing that the Soviet state went to great lengths to prevent minors from leaving their institution unsupervised.

Rachel Faircloth Green and Mariia Zezina have pointed out in their work about children’s homes in the war and immediate post-war years that the authorities did not prioritize these institutions much, investing just enough to keep juvenile delinquency under control. The same seems to be true for residential childcare after Stalin, as this chapter has shown. One can go

²⁵⁰ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel’noi raboty*, pp. 108, 148-49, 151.

²⁵¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 4-9 (1964).

²⁵² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 134-39 (1962).

²⁵³ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 6-8 (1990-91).

²⁵⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 173-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 10-16 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, l. 50 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 42-50 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 69-74 (1971).

even further than that, however. It seems that the Soviet state purposefully isolated children in residential childcare, which to a great extent had been marginal already. Boarding schools set up to meet the lack of infrastructure in the countryside were an exception to this. This policy of isolation was even more pronounced for delinquent children and children with disabilities, as the example of a reform colony shows: in the late 1950s a regional Party organization sought to convince the Russian Ministry of the Interior to close one of their colonies, arguing not only in favour of isolating those delinquent children in this colony, but instead of isolating the whole colony. Allegedly it was too close to an important railway, where tourists and travellers (some of whom were foreign) might see them.²⁵⁵ In 1961, an internal document from the Soviet Council of Ministers stated that children with a ‘significant intellectual disability’ should be institutionalized, because their staying in the family ‘makes the upbringing of healthy children more difficult’.²⁵⁶

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the residential childcare system was systematically underfunded and neglected on an administrative level, contravening the high aims proclaimed by the Soviet leadership. There were some long-term changes with regard to the living conditions in care, such as a parabolic development from a period of hardship in the implementation of the 1958 reforms, via a period of consolidation in the 1970s, to the oncoming crisis of the 1980s/1990s; and a shift from more general childcare towards ‘special’ childcare for children with disabilities. However, most problems within the network were never resolved. In contrast to rather subtle long-term changes across the whole network, the evidence suggests that the variation between individual institutions was considerable. This chapter has shown that these were connected to a low-priority investment and a policy of containment by the Soviet authorities. To achieve change for an institution, anyone within the system, be it an inspector or a staff member from a children’s home, colony, or boarding school, had to invest considerable time, energy, and dedication. As has been shown, the authorities had the power to intervene and achieve change in individual institutions but did so mostly for financial reasons or to keep the institutions from ‘leaking’ into society. One can thus go further than Kelly’s observation of ‘wasteful parallelism and rigidity’ in the authorities’ management of the residential childcare network: it was possible

²⁵⁵ GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 2718, l. 3 (1959). Evidently the motive behind wanting to close that institution might have been a different one but the fact that people thought that this was a valid point hints to their opinion on these children.

²⁵⁶ GARF, f. R5446, op. 95, d. 240, l. 17 (1961).

for them to improve the situation in homes and schools, but they did not consider it a priority.²⁵⁷

Goffman's concept of the 'total institution' with regard to the open or closed character of such institutions helps to evaluate the almost paradoxical nature of Soviet residential childcare, and one of its main dilemmas. Goffman explained that 'total institutions' use the tension between the inside and outside world as a means of power or control over the 'inmates'. Such a barrier between the institution and the outside world allowed the institution to dismantle the inmates' identities and establish new social rules.²⁵⁸ This caused a dilemma within Soviet residential childcare: on the one hand such a barrier or at least tension with the outside world was necessary to uphold control over the children. In addition, the isolated position of children's homes and boarding schools had the 'advantage' for the authorities of keeping social problems and poverty out of public perception with minimal (additional) investments. On the other hand, they also needed a close connection to the outside world for providing a decent upbringing, and even the basic maintenance of institutions.

By the late 1980s, however, the Soviet leadership seemed to catch on to some of these issues. High-level documents conveyed the notion that the agencies responsible for residential childcare did not work hard enough. In July 1987, the Politburo held a meeting about 'serious shortcomings in the work with orphans', in which they blamed political agencies on all levels for being oblivious to the importance of the issue.²⁵⁹ They called for the work with orphans to be prioritised in the future, 'to prevent a formal, bureaucratic attitude towards their destinies, to give these facts a principled party assessment'.²⁶⁰ In 1990 the Control Commission came to a similar conclusion, arguing that the diverse agencies in charge did not really try to improve the situation, that they were not invested in the children's future, and charging them with 'indifference, a lack of discipline (*nedistsiplinirovannost'*), and formalism'.²⁶¹ This apparent inefficiency is also connected to the relationship between central and regional agencies in the Soviet Union: officials at the lower levels improvised and adapted the orders from above to their own situation and agenda, trying to keep the higher levels of administration in the dark about their dealings as much as possible.²⁶²

²⁵⁷ Kelly, *Children's World*, p. 258.

²⁵⁸ Goffman, *Asylums*, pp. 23-24.

²⁵⁹ This was quite a hypocritical statement, considering Konstantin Chernenko's surprise about Likhanov addressing the issue only a few years earlier, as has been shown in the introduction.

²⁶⁰ TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497, ll. 25-32, here l. 29 (1987).

²⁶¹ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 65-69 (1990).

²⁶² See Hosking, *The Awakening*, pp. 22-28.

Former residential childcare workers agreed with such reproaches. A boarding school teacher explained that it had only been thanks to the determined and dedicated staff in her school that the administration and provision somehow added up: ‘you know, I think, in my perspective, the RONO’s [the local education administration] attitude to boarding schools had always been like this, this was the list, the list of schools: schools, schools, schools, schools, schools, and all the way at the bottom – boarding school no.7.’²⁶³ A teacher from the same school recalled the RONO trying to close their boarding school, arguing it was merely an excuse for alcoholics to stop caring and dump their kids on the state’s threshold. She emphasized that the education department had ‘always’ thought so and had given them a hard time for that reason.²⁶⁴

²⁶³ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF50A, p. 33. These points are backed by a teacher who worked at the same school: Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, pp. 10, 14-16.

²⁶⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45B, p. 26.

4.

Life in care as a way of life? Children's experiences, 'barracks' life, and difficult transitions

In 1974, the story of Vitia, a boy who had run away from Zagorsk children's home, filled a full page of *Literaturnaia Gazeta*.¹ Vitia had been picked up outside in the cold, hardly breathing. After reanimating him and treating him for a viral inflammation of the nervous system, the doctors heard his story and decided to get the press involved. Vitia explained that a few days before his escape, he had been pulled out of bed and led into one of the school workshops to meet some of the older boys. They beat him until they felt he had had enough, and said, 'we punished you for a bad grade and for smoking. If you don't improve, you'll get more.' Two days later, Vitia got another bad grade, prompting the older boy to take his belt and beat him again, right in front of his younger brother. Vitia ran, without having anywhere to go. The doctors were outraged by the story, but no one at the home seemed to be interested in the boy's fate (this was already about a week after his escape). Only when the doctors mentioned the newspaper, two of the older boys visited the hospital to apologize for the 'trouble' they had caused him, asking (threatening) him 'not to wash his dirty linen in public'.

To find out more about how education in this children's home worked, the journalist went to talk to other boys at Zagorsk, as well as to members of staff. What had happened did not seem unusual to any of them. The educator responsible for Vitia did not show any sign of sympathy. When the journalist, Arkadii Stavitskii, confronted her with what the boy told his doctors, she replied: 'that's a great story, but it is hard to believe that someone can get so ill from just a couple of strikes with the belt... he was a cheater, you know, [...] but we exposed him, of course.' A conversation with other boys in Vitia's group revealed that the institution's staff had implemented a system of collective punishment and left the oldest boy in charge of discipline. Whenever one of them misbehaved or scored bad grades, everyone could be punished – thus creating a gateway to peer pressure, bullying, violence, and abuse. In that conversation, another

¹ Arkadii Stavitskii, 'Pobeg', *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 7/1974, p. 12.

member of staff argued that it was ‘nonsense’ to beat people, to which a boy replied: ‘it’s not nonsense, because of him we could all be deprived of cinema’ – another adding ‘Exactly! Or hockey!’ Was this a real-life application of what education manuals had called the ‘child collective’? Or was this a perversion of it? The journalist seemed to think the latter, calling these structures *samosud* and lawlessness (*bezzakonnost’*).²

In addition to these structures of *samosud* and violence, Stavitskii addressed the place of children’s homes in Soviet society. He expressed his outrage at the state of the ‘present-day’ (*sovremennyi*) children’s home and contrasted it with the ‘proud’ tradition of Soviet residential childcare (referring to the orphans of the Civil War and the ‘blockade’ orphans of the Second World War).³ As shown in chapter one, children’s homes after the 1950s were hardly populated by orphans (only around ten percent). Indeed, among the 90 children in the Zagorsk home, a mere nine did not have living parents. According to Stavitskii, ‘Vladimir lives “as an orphan” with a living mother who does not care at all about her son’s fate’. Linking back to the ‘noble history of the Soviet children’s home’, he concluded that ‘back then there was a clear tragedy, and now we have to deal time and again with a filthy farce, played out by well-fed but inhumane mums and dads’. This confirms the impression of the state’s politics of marginalization of residential childcare, as the journalist presented the social composition of children in care – as it had been for at least a decade – as an outrageous new fact.

The leadership’s reaction to the story points in the same direction. Thanks to the newspaper article, the higher levels of the Soviet administration felt compelled to discuss the case. The Soviet Council of Ministers drafted a new law regulating the distribution of children to children’s homes and boarding schools respectively. Although boarding schools had been meant to eventually replace children’s homes, the two went on to exist as parallel structures. However, while boarding schools housed all kinds of children (with or without parents), children’s homes were supposed to be for children without parental care only. The draft law suggests that the authorities had not been fully aware of just how many children with living parents were staying in children’s homes.⁴ However, this law did not comment on the issues raised by the journalist, that is neglectful parents and violence in children’s homes. Instead, the

² *Samosud*, literally ‘self-law’, denoting people taking the law into their own hands, often meaning lynching or vigilante justice.

³ Although research has shown that this ‘proud’ history has mostly been informed by propaganda, both in the case of the 1920s/1930s and the Second World War, see Mirjam Galley, “‘Wir schlagen wie eine Faust’: Straßenkinder, Gangs und Staatsgewalt in Stalins Sowjetunion”, *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 64.1 (2016), pp. 26-53; Kucherenko, *Soviet Street Children*, pp. 1-3.

⁴ GARF, f. R5446, op. 109, d. 1079, ll. 3-6 (1974). The link between the article and the piece of legislation is clear because a newspaper clipping and the draft law were filed together in delo 1079.

law was supposed to fix a problem of a mainly financial nature: as it stood, children in children's homes lived on a full state stipend, whereas parents had to pay tuition for sending their children to boarding schools.⁵ It was thus against the state's interest to have children with parents live in a children's home.

The omission of child abuse was not accidental, as an initiative by the Latvian Ministry of Education shows. After 'Pobeg' was published, an official from the ministry suggested to the Latvian Council of Ministers to have the article discussed among staff in schools and residential childcare institutions. These discussions should entail the question of how to maintain order and punish children 'properly', in contrast to Vitia's institution. The official also proposed inspecting every childcare institution in Latvia to demonstrate that such behaviour would not be tolerated. Before this letter could be sent out, it was heavily edited: everything related to publicizing or discussing the issue further was crossed out.⁶ This shows that although the Soviet leadership may have been worried about the contents of the article, they chose not to act on it and to suppress any further discussion. This confirms the claim made in chapter three, that the leadership attempted to keep residential childcare closed to society, and only intervened for their own interests, in this case financial ones.

However, this case study also raises new questions: was such 'lawlessness' and tolerance of violence normal in residential childcare? How did such institutions prepare the children in them for a life after the institution? How did such an upbringing impact a child's life? And, if it was not generally known what was going on in boarding schools and children's homes, how were children in care integrated into society? This chapter will move away from the managerial side of residential care and shed light on how the children living in them experienced 'institutional life', studying their coping mechanisms and social structures developing in institutions, with the help of archival documents and interview transcripts. It will also examine the impact of residential childcare on children's lives by studying people's adaptation processes and later lives, as well as comparing the 'institutional' upbringing and Soviet childhood 'outside' care. On that basis, the chapter will argue that the institutional upbringing was indeed different from the a 'general' Soviet one, and hardly prepared its graduates for a 'normal' life in society.

⁵ Although there were circumstances in which parents could be freed from paying tuition.

⁶ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1730, ll. 12-13 (1974).

An ‘institutional life’ with distinct social rules and structures

The previous chapter showed that despite their initial high aims, the Soviet authorities systematically neglected the residential childcare network, subjecting residential childcare workers to constant strain and the children’s living conditions to great contingency. Having focused primarily on the material living conditions in residential care so far, this section will turn to the social and emotional sides of life. According to Goffman, people needed to adjust to their ‘institution’ life, with new rules and to their behaviour being under constant scrutiny. In his interview, a former boarding school student described the traumatic arrival at his boarding school: his parents had to leave right away, a quite abrupt (and tearful) rupture with his home life.⁷ Similarly, a report from Jūrmala sanatorium children’s home referred to a long process of adaption; throughout the year, children would learn what was expected of them and how to behave.⁸ This section will explore how children coped with their life in care and how they experienced it, and analyze social structures in these institutions. It will show that life in care was often difficult to adapt to; and that the social structures developing in residential care were closer to other ‘total institutions’, such as the army or prison, than those organizing families and society more generally.

Adapting to life in care and coping mechanisms

Upon entering a residential childcare institution, a child had several options of how to react to the new surroundings and rules. Official documents are a way to approach such reactions, especially inspection reports, because they feature descriptions and assessments of children’s behaviour. Although one can rarely be sure about the motives for these behaviours, the assessments are still helpful to consider the scope of children’s strategies to cope with ‘institutional life’. According to Goffman, ‘inmates’ tended to adopt certain patterns of behaviour to adapt to the new life, which he conceptualized as ‘situational withdrawal’, the ‘intransigent line’ (refusing to cooperate), ‘colonization’ (accepting the institution’s rules, making the place their own and trying to get the most out of it), ‘conversion’ (the inmate playing the staff’s game, trying to be the perfect inmate).⁹ The following analysis will use the idea of coping mechanisms (while not necessarily using the same categories) to examine the children’s agency, to which extent they consciously chose a strategy of adaption, and which types of behaviour they tended to resort to.

⁷ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 6.

⁸ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1311, ll. 20-27 (1967).

⁹ Goffman, *Asylums*, pp. 61-64.

One of these adaptation mechanisms was compliance, be it out of agreement, or in the sense of ‘colonization’ or ‘conversion’ in Goffman’s terms. Compliance was represented in official documents as positive behaviour. Inspection reports were usually quite clear about which behaviour was considered ‘good’ in a residential childcare institution, unsurprisingly expressed by the term ‘discipline’. As shown in chapter two, this notion entailed more than ‘not breaking any rules’: children were expected to be active in class, and polite to everyone; they also should be active and committed in extracurricular activities as well as *socially useful work*, take care of themselves (*samoobslužhivanie*), work tidily, and help each other.¹⁰ All this is expressed in a report of Riga’s boarding school no.1, for example, describing a ‘good’ group of 7th and 8th graders: ‘the children in these groups live amicably, with well-organized comradely mutual support, the class *aktiv* is demanding, principled, and shows initiative. In class, discipline is good, the children are neat, polite, everyone studies to the best of their ability.’¹¹

Many children, however, failed to adapt to life in the institutions. Official documents reflect several reactions to life in an institution, often signs of unhappiness or psychological distress. Escapism was one of these, most obviously when children tried to run away from their institution. Some documents explicitly linked escapes to bad living conditions and staff abuse, in others there was a suspicious coexistence of these things.¹² In 1961, for instance, the Riga ‘reception centre’ (*detpriemnik*) reported to the Ministry of Education that 35 children had been caught on the run from residential childcare within only three weeks, and that they had come from up to 200km away.¹³ In the months before that, 22 children had been held at the *detpriemnik* for leading a ‘*beznadzornyi* way of life after leaving their children’s home or boarding school without permission’.¹⁴ In her study about Second World War ‘orphans’, Kucherenko has referred to escaping from institutions as the ‘most widespread form of protest’.¹⁵

¹⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 519, ll. 1-3 (1959); GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 10-15 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 9-19, 182-87 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 649, ll. 85-101 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1001, ll. 1-11 (1964); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 78-83 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97 (1971); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 33-38 (1984).

¹¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 90-97 (1971).

¹² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 131, 210 (1961); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 11-12 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 1-3 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); GARF, f. R9527, op.1, d. 2124, ll. 165-73 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1357, ll. 22-38 (1968); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 69-74 (1971); GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 1-5 (1990). A report from the early 1990s explained that many children ran away from institutions because of bad educational work ‘as well as numerous violations of the rights and interests of the children’, see GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 6-8 (1990-91).

¹³ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 66-68 (1961). Children picked up on the street, or children otherwise awaiting transfer to an institution, were brought to such *priemniki*, ‘reception and distribution centres’. They were not supposed to stay there longer than six weeks.

¹⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 69-71 (1961).

¹⁵ Kucherenko, *Soviet Street Children*, p. 144.

Unsurprisingly, the situation was most pronounced in institutions for delinquent children and running away from an institution could be problematic for the authorities as well as the children in question. Such escapes often point to poor living conditions: the worse the conditions were and the more violence occurred, the more inmates tried to escape.¹⁶ From 14 inspected colonies in the RSFSR in 1960, 43 children had run away between January and October, 16 of which from the same one, with five still being on the run.¹⁷ Leningrad colonies, where conditions were particularly grim, must have broken several records with 450 flight attempts in 1961.¹⁸ Children running away was not only problematic as a potential public order hazard, but also for the children themselves. The streets could be dangerous, and so could running back to their parents, as many among them had lost custody, often because of alcoholism or domestic violence. The authorities reminded institutions time and again not to send children back to their parents in such cases.¹⁹

Inspection reports also bear witness of other manifestations of psychological distress, such as bed wetting or apathy. The former was either mentioned along with health issues or as a complaint about educators who did not change the sheets often enough.²⁰ The latter was sometimes listed alongside complaints about a lack of leisure opportunities and showed that some children turned quite apathetic to everything going on around them. A report from Kurmāle children's home, for instance, mentioned that 'there are still many pupils that aren't interested in anything, who wander aimlessly around, don't find anything to do'.²¹ There seems to have been a similar issue in Volgograd oblast, as a report claimed that 'the children often do not do anything'.²²

In the most extreme cases of psychological strain, children took their own lives. Two such cases were documented in Kursk oblast in 1967. In July, a pupil of Shuklinsk boarding school

¹⁶ In Riga boarding school, 14 children had run away within a few months in late 1968, one of which was still on the run in 1969, and even more had escaped in the years before: LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 1-6, 8-30 (1969-70). Kharkov colony listed five attempted escapes in 1960: GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 10-15 (1960). A Georgian colony reported as many as 17 that same year, with three still being on the run: GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 115-28 (1960).

¹⁷ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 143-56 (1960). This trend went on in a similar way in colonies all over the Union: GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 158-79, 189-205 (1960-61); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61, 63-68, both sides (1962); LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 2283, pp. 53-61 (1964).

¹⁸ GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962).

¹⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 8-9, 129-30, 152 (1961).

²⁰ GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 142, ll. 5-7, 10-22 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 140-43, 144-47 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 5-7 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1544, ll. 28-40 (1971).

²¹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 21-30 (1966).

²² GARF f. R9527, op.1, d. 2124, ll. 165-73 (1968).

killed herself during the summer holidays. The report described her as a good student who loved sports, work, reading, art, and singing, as someone who got along with people. It concluded that ‘there were no abnormalities of the psyche. There have never been any complaints about boarding school life’. This suggests that the only purpose of this report was to clear the school of any responsibility for the girl’s death because she committed suicide off the school premises.²³ In contrast, the case of a boy taking his life in Kastorensk boarding school in November had a judicial aftermath for the institution. The boy’s personal file claimed that ‘he was a rough and insolent student, he could insult the teachers, smoked, offended younger ones, systematically flunked lessons and homework hours, often went home without permission, did not recognize any discipline’. When his behaviour was about to get marked down again, he was supposed to explain himself in front of the *pedsovet*. But instead of speaking, he ran out of the hall: ‘some minutes later he came back [...] and in the presence of everyone stabbed himself in the chest with a pocket knife.’ The boy died in hospital. The regional Party organization accused the staff of not having taken ‘individual’ care in bringing up such a difficult child.²⁴ The report blamed the educator who graded his behaviour down without waiting for the *pedsovet* session, claiming that this ‘in fact [!] was the reason for his suicide’. As soon as some bureaucratically satisfying explanation was found, the usual mechanisms came to work: the director and head educator were fired and got reprimanded for their lack of care.²⁵

Some children in care who could not or did not want to comply with the institution’s rules adopted the ‘intransigent line’, in Goffman’s terms, meaning they resisted. However, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a conscious refusal to comply from unintentional non-compliance caused by neglect (as shown in chapter three).²⁶ What is called poor or lacking ‘eating culture’ is a sign of either neglect or insufficient material conditions: in one boarding school, for instance, children ate all their meals with a spoon from chipped dishes; in another school, children did not know how to ‘deal with bread’.²⁷ Other types of (mis)behaviour clearly entail a conscious breaking of rules and opposing the system of the institution, such as skipping lessons, or leaving the institution temporarily to roam around town unsupervised, stealing

²³ GARF, f. A2306, op. 76, d. 1475, l. 27 (1967).

²⁴ This was standard educational jargon for being personally invested in a child’s development and was used as an explanation whenever something went wrong.

²⁵ GARF, f. A2306, op. 76, d. 1475, l. 33 (1967).

²⁶ Children with ‘bad behaviour’ were often termed as ‘undisciplined’ or rude (*grubnyi*), or described as not knowing how to behave, descriptions which apply to both conscious resistance or neglect. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 241-42, 243-49 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 38-40 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 9-15, 50 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 103-08 (1981); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1992, ll. 10-14 (1984).

²⁷ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 768, ll. 241-42, 243-49 (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 27-34 (1969).

things or buying alcohol or cigarettes.²⁸ In one such case, some children from Bauska children's home were picked up by the police in 1964 because they had walked around town during school hours to 'stop passers-by, ask for money from them, referring to the fact that they allegedly have nothing to eat'.²⁹ In some institutions, the inmates openly defied the staff, as the case study about Riga children's home no.6 has shown in chapter three.³⁰

Open (and sometimes violent) resistance was most common in reform colonies. In Leningrad colony, for instance, teenagers often did just the opposite of what was expected of them. An inspection report complained that 'during the breaks the students don't leave the classroom. Many among them sit on the floor in their caps, or lie on the desks, smoking'. In class, they ignored the teacher or even behaved in an openly threatening way: 'many of them read books, or do other things: write letters, carve inscriptions into their desks, clean the knives they made in the workshops, sleep, etc.'³¹ They also deliberately destroyed textbooks and other school supplies, according to the report, and bullied teachers. Those students who wanted to follow the classes ended up being 'boycotted' (ignored), threatened, and beaten by the others, so that they began answering questions in class with 'I don't know', or even 'I don't know anything'. According to the inspectors, only very few teachers managed to control these children.³²

Inspectors were particularly alarmed by perceived anti-Soviet utterances. When a 6th form teacher dictated a text about Lenin, for instance, one student interrupted the dictation: 'we've written about Lenin a hundred times already – I'm fed up!' Another class drove their teacher to give up on their political education by interrupting a lecture with shouts of 'all of this is not true, they're lies. Every one of us would love to go abroad!' Whereas these anecdotes might not seem that subversive, the fact that they were written down shows that they had caused concern among inspectors and teachers.³³ Most reports of insubordination or teenagers refusing to do work or go to school are about colonies. On the one hand, such things probably happened in colonies more often than in other institutions; on the other hand, it is likely that

²⁸ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 9-16 (1961-62); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1143, ll. 7-10 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1424, ll. 27-34 (1969); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1930, ll. 103-08 (1981).

²⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3 (1964).

³⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 9-16 (1961-62).

³¹ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 88-102 (1962).

³² GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 88-102 (1962).

³³ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 88-102 (1962).

the students' behaviour was monitored (and documented) more closely in a colony than for example in a children's home.³⁴

In accordance with research about resistance in the Soviet Union, these acts of resistance were mostly not of a deliberately anti-Soviet nature, but they should still be considered 'political acts'. In her study of youth in Late Stalinism, Juliane Fürst coined *booliganism* as resistance because it entailed rejecting the Soviet norms of everyday life, whilst rarely bearing any criminal intent.³⁵ The Soviet conception of *booliganism* added to this, as has been shown in chapter one: by the restrictive rules of behaviour envisioned by the leadership, many things that were part of subcultural behaviour and working class culture became *booliganism*, such as drinking or fighting.³⁶ In this perspective, the relatively harmless acts described in the Leningrad colony report can be called resistance because they were directed against communist education and its values. The teenagers showed 'their refusal to submit to an authority that wanted to shape them into standard versions of well-behaved, cultured, and politically and ideologically enlightened Soviet adolescents'.³⁷ According to Sheila Fitzpatrick, such acts of resistance were political, especially because such acts of everyday resistance mostly originated from the urban lower classes, people with an ideological importance to the Soviet project.³⁸ The same could be argued for children in care.

As opposed to open acts of rebellion, 'mild rule breaking' can be interpreted not only as normal behaviour for a teenager, but also as attempts of taking control in an environment in which their whole life is generally out of their control – although arguably the boundary towards conscious resistance at this point is very fluid. The example of drinking and smoking allows to illustrate this point. Whenever reports described a 'bad' teenager or a delinquent, at least one of the two would figure in the list of misdemeanours. The director of Riga's children's home no.6, for instance, when he urged the ministry to transfer six of 'his' worst troublemakers, he described them as being disobedient, refusing to work, vandalizing, stealing, offending people, being rude and lazy, roaming around, hanging with 'bad' people, as well as smoking, which

³⁴ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 10-15, 129-42 (1960); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 11-12, 13-22 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 75-83 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61, 63-68, both sides (1962).

³⁵ Juliane Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation*, pp. 182-84.

³⁶ People thus 'often straddled the line between criminal behaviour and life-style options'. Juliane Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation*, p. 185.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

³⁸ Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'Popular Sedition in the Post-Stalin Soviet Union', in Vladimir Kozlov, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and Sergei Mironenko (eds), *Sedition: Everyday Resistance in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev* (New Haven, 2011), pp. 1-24, here pp. 9-13.

seems like a negligible offence next to the others.³⁹ Reports from Riga boarding school for delinquent children described teenagers sneaking to the shop to buy cigarettes and alcohol for their friends.⁴⁰ In interviews about their time in residential institutions, former children in care give a mixed picture about the prevalence of drinking or smoking. Some denied their occurrence altogether, others talked about it as normal things to do.⁴¹ In any case, it seems like children in care did not consider smoking and drinking as acts of resistance.

Goffman has called such behaviour ‘secondary adjustments’: they did not challenge staff members directly but broke the rules in order to obtain a feeling of control.⁴² One former boarding school student described an example of such behaviour in his interview: in his school, smoking or drinking led to an exclusion from meals (which incidentally Soviet pedagogic texts advised against).⁴³ Their reaction to this, however, was not to refrain from doing these things, but to buy alcohol, cigarettes, *and* food, and then to cook their own meals whenever they had been denied lunch or dinner.⁴⁴ The different coping mechanisms discussed in this section share a common precondition: some sort of adaptation was necessary. In *Asylums*, Goffman has named two exceptions to this rule: people did not need adapting if their ‘home world’ had been equally bleak, or if they had already lived in other institutions.⁴⁵ This suggests that there is such a thing as an ‘institution way of life’, that once a person has lived in one institution, they will most likely adapt quickly to others. The following section will explore how Soviet children in care experienced this ‘institutional life’ according to their own memories and impressions. It will argue that in fact life in care did correspond to the pedagogues’ visions in many ways, although the many of the children in question perceived it as oppressive, or at least straining.

³⁹ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 807, ll. 133-34 (1961).

⁴⁰ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 1-6 (1969). This seemed to be a relatively normal thing to do, as other reports mentioned similar things, as for example from Dobeļe children’s home, where some boys went to the train station and got drunk. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1235, ll. 1-7 (1966). See also other examples: GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 75-83 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61, 63-68, both sides (1962); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 42-50 (1965); GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

⁴¹ See Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 7: ‘What are you saying!! What?!! Smoking!!! Yes, I just... it didn’t even occur to me, honestly. And now, it’s, you know, without exception. Everyone – the young ones, and the older ones.’ Another former boarding schooler remembered that they were smoking from the age of 15 onwards, although, ‘paradoxically’, as she put it, they did not drink; whereas yet another pointed out repeatedly that kids did not smoke ‘back then’. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47B, p. 18; Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 7, 9. Others talk about smoking and drinking in school as something completely normal (and forbidden, of course) – although smoking seems to have been more common. See Oxf/Lev P-05 26B, p. 13-14; Oxf/Lev P-05 14A, p. 7.

⁴² Goffman, *Asylums*, p. 56.

⁴³ Tokar’, ‘Vospitatel’nye vozdeistvii’.

⁴⁴ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 7-9.

⁴⁵ Goffman, *Asylums*, pp. 65-66.

Kazennaia zhizn' – barracks life

After examining the behaviour of children in care as seen from an official or staff perspective, it is vital to examine the children's view on 'their' institutional lives. In interviews, former children in care described the material living conditions in their respective institutions as relatively bleak from an outside perspective, but cosy to them (for some, it was better than at home).⁴⁶ The *rezhim* was one of the most formative elements of 'institutional life'. Although it could look different in detail from one institution to another, it was similar in its rigidity.⁴⁷ All the respondents noted that there was hardly any time for leisure:

They let us out, yes, but we had to ask permission. And only up to a certain time – until 9pm. That means two hours. At 7pm our study time ended – you had to go to dinner. Then you eat and everything. And when do you want to go out? There is no time. Well you go out into the garden, spend some time with your boys. Well with your boys, meaning we all usually went out as a group. And at nine o'clock – that's it, you go to sleep, they close the door.⁴⁸

This strict *rezhim*, however, did not only mean that people had little time at their disposal; it also meant that they had to spend most of this time together, as a former boarding school student emphasized: 'we did everything in the group. Went here as a group, there as a group. Everything in the group, yes. [...] So all of us, somehow all of us together. All the time we had to look after each other. You cannot get away anywhere.'⁴⁹

Most of the interviewees described their lives together in the institution as collective (in accordance with official discourse) and friendly.⁵⁰ Usually, this 'collective' corresponded to classes or groups; the only 'outreach' took place in the context of the internal *shemy* organization.⁵¹ When asked whether weaker students were mocked in his school, a respondent appeared shocked by that question and reacted indignantly.⁵² Children had an interest in

⁴⁶ 'We thought that it was cosy, we liked it there', Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68B, p. 37. One former boarding school student described bleak conditions at her school but linked them to a feeling of pride because they would work in their free time and then buy things for the school (which conveys a poor impression of the school management): 'that is, we, the orphans, gave gifts to our school'. See Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47A, p. 10. At another boarding school, there was a lack of furniture, so that parents were trying to provide for some things. See Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 10.

⁴⁷ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 7.

⁴⁸ Only in the boarding school for children with developmental retardations the *rezhim* seems to have been less tightly knitted; although even the former special school student among the interviewees talked about how strict and orderly the schedule was, Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 6. A former general boarding school student pointed out that they had practically no free time, Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47B, p. 22.

⁴⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69A, p. 9.

⁵⁰ See for instance Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 8.

⁵¹ Meaning that all the first-grade kids would get a partner, a *shemy*, from the higher classes to look after them. See Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, p. 9; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47B, p. 21; Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14B, p. 13; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49A, p. 2.

⁵² Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14B, p. 17.

sticking together as a group; several of them evoked a sort of code of honour that they followed and cherished, according to which secrets had to be kept from adults at all cost.⁵³ This links back to notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ comradeship (from a staff perspective), as discussed in chapter two. According to former children in care, the very best students (*otlichniki*) were in danger of being marginalized, mostly if they were not ready to let other kids copy from them.⁵⁴ This importance of copying from others was probably linked to the fact that homework time was ‘collective’, so that often no one could leave until everyone had finished. People who would not let others copy the answers might deprive the whole group of scarce free time.⁵⁵ Goffman considered such ‘fraternization of inmates’ against the staff, whilst acting harshly and sometimes violently against inmates telling on others, a typical survival mechanism in total institutions.⁵⁶

These descriptions of their ‘collective’ lives together appear like a mixture of what official discourse dictated them (the collective spirit) and of a certain way of life influenced by the specific institutional context of the children’s home or boarding school. These collective structures did not only have an inclusive, but also an exclusive dimension. In her interview, one former boarding school student evoked a grim perspective on their collective life at school. She explained that relations between the children were not always peaceful:

There were, certainly, excesses. The boys beat us there. You know, how they beat us? Right in the stomach, they had such a blow. It takes your breath away immediately. We held our books there like this and went out, that is, watching out. Once, he – I held a book here, and he hit me in the stomach. Ye-es, I remember that very well. But my first blow was without the book. I remember that as well. That I completely blacked out for a minute. Well I don’t know, you know they, I don’t know why they beat us like that. Maybe they found it interesting how we convulsed with pain. I don’t know. That I don’t remember.⁵⁷

Other people in the sample of former children in care, however, idealized this living together and used the opportunity to complain about the ‘youth of today’. One was nostalgic about his childhood to a degree that he wanted to return to it: ‘I want to go back. That my childhood

⁵³ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69B, p. 21; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47B, p. 18.

⁵⁴ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF26B, p. 23. A former boarding school student mentioned that *otlichniki* were few and ‘v storone’ (on the side, isolated) at her school; another even recalled that those who would not let others copy would be beaten up. Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69B, p. 16; Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, p. 13; Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68A, S. 27.

⁵⁵ A former boarding school student hinted at this connection, Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68A, p. 31. Although another mentioned that sometimes individual children had to stay behind to finish their homework, Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49A, p. 11.

⁵⁶ Goffman, *Asylums*, pp. 57-59.

⁵⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69A, p. 3.

comes back.⁵⁸ In addition to the alleged egocentrism of ‘today’s’ youngsters, the interviewees agreed about the fact that if love, sex, or relationships among pupils existed at all, they would be handled much more discreetly than ‘nowadays’.⁵⁹ An interviewee who went to school in the 1960s used the words ‘friendly’ and ‘friendship’, to describe the relationship between boys and girls as innocent and free (in accordance with official ideology).⁶⁰ Those who went to school in the 1970s (or even early 1980s) said that ‘there was everything’, alluding to sex, but that relationships tended to be long-term and less public than ‘nowadays’.⁶¹

Former children in care evaluated the ‘ideologized’ and ‘disciplinary’ style of their upbringing differently. Looking back on their time in their boarding schools or children’s homes, two of the younger respondents (born 1971 and 1976) agreed that the disciplinary style of their education had made decent people out of them. One of them specified:

As far as I know, the guys I went to tenth grade with, they are all normal people. All married with children. And the graduates now – all out of control. They are about 24, 25. They were not involved in any crimes, but some are on the *militsiia’s* list. Licentiousness – it’s a harmful thing. But when there was control...⁶²

Most of the older interviewees also focused on positive memories and believed that their education and collective living conveyed good values.⁶³ One of them (who became a boarding school teacher), however, emphasized that the boarding school was not the best form of education, because it could not provide ‘domestic warmth’.⁶⁴ She decided not to do that to her daughter and instead to give her what she herself had never had: a home.⁶⁵

One of the interviewees, however, presented her boarding school years as overwhelmingly negative. She defined life in care as barracks life (*kazennaia zhizn’*), an oppressive form of living because of the forced collectivism, where normal life was made impossible by the *rezhim*. She compared the boarding school to a prison (*kak v tiuriage*), where she slept badly and felt

⁵⁸ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14B, p.13. Example of complaining about today’s youth: Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 10.

⁵⁹ One former boarding school student said there was love, although she did not fall in love at that time; Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69A, p. 15. According to another former child in care, relationships were ‘more hidden’ and shy in comparison to ‘nowadays’: Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 10.

⁶⁰ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, pp. 6-7. It should be mentioned that the term ‘love’ might be somewhat misleading in that context, as back then it seemed to be more common to say ‘be friends with’ than ‘be in love with’, as one of the interviewees pointed out: Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48A, p. 39.

⁶¹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47B, p. 29; Oxf/Lev P-05 PF27B, pp. 15-16.

⁶² Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 12; Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 8. One pointed out that she might have been worse off in a harmful family environment.

⁶³ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF27A, p. 25; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47A, p. 9f; Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68A, p. 25.

⁶⁴ The same phrasing is used by one former child in care: ‘But it was obvious that there was not much warmth’, see Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69B, p. 24; and by FEV Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 12.

⁶⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48B, p. 55.

terrorized by the fact that all the children had to look the same. She contrasted the ‘barracks life’ to the ‘homely atmosphere’ (*domashniaia obstanovka*) at her parents’.⁶⁶ At her parents’ place, however, it was cold, and she had to deal with hunger, as well as with her violent and perpetually drunk stepfather. Still, she preferred a ‘free’ life: ‘in freedom, of course, bread is tastier’. She recognized that living conditions in the school were better for physical health but ‘for the psyche I think it wasn’t’. The interviewer then asked her directly whether she felt unfree in boarding school, to which she replied: ‘I think that I did’ and moved on to describing the atmosphere there as she remembered it: ‘It affected us a lot somehow. Well like a certain worldview, yes. In spite of everything, there is a slightly stressful state of anxiety, obviously. All through my childhood.’⁶⁷

At this point, it makes sense to ask why the interviewees’ accounts differ with regard to life in care. Did their experiences differ? Or did they just choose to place different emphases in their narratives? When reading the six interviews with former children in care as a corpus, one gets the impression that there was indeed some sort of ‘common experience’ of post-Stalinist residential childcare in the sense that people had to face similar problems.⁶⁸ Their accounts differ most with regard to their way of coping with these problems. It seems that the boarding school or children’s home years were an absolutely central and crucial part of these people’s life stories for three reasons: because it shaped them much more than a ‘normal’ school would; because it was a difficult and alienating life there, and for most of them; because other influences that children usually have (family, environment, activities outside of school) were at least partly missing.

Among the experiences related in the interviews, however, one seems like the odd one out. His case confirms the claim that the social isolation of residential childcare was particularly hard for the children. This former boarding school student hardly mentioned any of the issues related by the others. His different social background and reasons for his being in care can explain this discrepancy. Unlike the others, he came from an intact family in the Russian countryside. In the more isolated rural areas, boarding schools could be the only way to get education past the elementary level. The boy spent his summers, and sometimes weekends with his family. This suggests that such an ‘institutional’ experience could be less traumatizing

⁶⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69A, pp. 2-3, 6-8, PF69B, p. 16.

⁶⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69A, pp. 6, 13.

⁶⁸ However, this impression may be reinforced by the way the interviews were conducted. The interviewers did not ask for a ‘complete’ life story in the beginning of the interview, as it is sometimes done, but led the former inmates through the interview by posing relatively precise questions. All the respondents were asked similar questions, which may intensify the impression of a certain ‘symmetry’ of experiences.

if the child still had a positive relationship to people and life on the outside.⁶⁹ It is likely that such boarding schools were also less psychologically straining if the children there tended to come from safe and loving family homes.

According to institution graduates, life in care was shaped strongly by collectivism, the *rezhim*, and strict discipline, just as Soviet pedagogues had envisioned it. However, it seems like the outcome for the children in question diverged from these visions, as many children did not feel comfortable in this environment. Even people who remembered their childhood fondly did not consider residential care as a desirable alternative to a family upbringing (as people stated they did not or would not want the same for their children). These elements of Soviet residential care, however, not only conformed to Soviet educational theory, but also intrinsic elements of residential institutions more generally. The following sections will thus examine the relationship between staff members and children in care, as well as between social structures in residential childcare and in ‘total institutions’ more generally, showing that a specific culture existed in these places, which was close to other institutions like the army, but also to criminal culture.

Affection, Power, and Punishment

The life experiences of children in care were crucially shaped by their relationships with staff members. Apart from providing the children with housing, food, and school education, they had to give them examples of social behaviour and human relationships, as well as the knowledge and skills to survive on their own, to integrate well into the Soviet workforce (as has been established in previous chapters). This section will analyse the wide spectrum of care offered by staff in residential institutions, which ranged from loving support to neglect and abuse. It will show that staff members had extraordinary power to help the children in their care to get a better start into life or to scar them considerably. In any case, these relationships were bound to be rigid and distanced compared to ‘unofficial’ relationships that most children in society grew up with.

In Goffman’s terms, there is a clear hierarchy of power between staff and inmates in *total institutions*. This difference in power is even more pronounced in residential childcare, where almost all inmates are underage, whereas staff member are grownups. In addition to this obvious relationship of power, Goffman showed how, by entering an institution, inmates are forcibly stripped of the conceptions they had of themselves, a process he called ‘mortification

⁶⁹ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF26A, pp. 1-5.

of the self.⁷⁰ This process is reinforced by admission procedures like haircuts, measuring, medical exams, searching, or giving up one's clothes and possessions. Staff members conduct other such humiliations aimed at obedience or will-breaking, some more indirect, such as regular drills, tests, and searches, having to ask for permission for everything; some more direct, such as name calling, teasing, or ignoring people.⁷¹ After such rites of passage, staff members continue to monitor the inmates' behaviour with the help of a system of privileges and punishments. Adult inmates will find such a treatment humiliating and infantilizing, whereas children are more likely to be treated similarly outside residential care.

However, staff/child relationships differ from family ones by being 'institutional', and often do not provide stable attachment figures. In addition, according to Goffman, punishments in residential institutions tend to be harsher than in families or general schools.⁷² These things hold true for Soviet residential care: children were graded for their behaviour and punished for breaking the institution's rules, although physical violence against children was not allowed in the Soviet Union. 'The supervision of the children by teachers and educators must be thoughtful, heartfelt, demanding, but not intrusive', explained Minister of Education Kaz'min in 1957.⁷³ However, it is difficult to tell how people understood 'violence'. Studies about residential childcare institutions in other socialist states, namely Hungary by Jenny Rasell and the GDR by Agnès Arp, have shown that physical violence was tolerated as long as it was not 'excessive'; and that former children in care often denied the existence of violence in their childhood because they did not perceive slaps given by an educator or teacher as violence. Rasell has framed violence as a 'fluctuating concept', temporarily and spatially, as for instance things that would be tolerated in a family could cost educators their jobs.⁷⁴ At the same time, however, sources confirm that violence against children in care was not uncommon, suggesting that either many pedagogues either felt they could freely break the rules, or they interpreted 'no violence' as 'no excessive violence'.

This ambivalent stance towards violence seems to have been intrinsic to education at the time rather than an anomaly because it permeated the works of Anton Makarenko, who was considered pioneer of residential childcare for difficult children. In his writings, he rejected

⁷⁰ Goffman, *Asylums*, pp. 23-24.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-31.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁷³ Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, pp. 16, 33.

⁷⁴ Jennifer Rasell, 'Rethinking Care and Violence: Dynamics in Children's Homes in State Socialist Hungary', *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 33.1 (2015), pp. 59-69, here pp. 62-63; Michael Hofmann and Agnès Arp, *Zur sozialen Lage ehemaliger DDR-Heimkinder in Thüringen: Forschungsbericht im Auftrag des Thüringer Ministeriums für Soziales, Familie und Gesundheit* (Jena, 2012), p. 52.

violence against children, although it is unclear what exactly he meant by that. His accounts of how he set up his colonies for street children in Stalinist Ukraine contain a considerable amount of violence. In fact, Makarenko only managed to gain the boys' respect after hitting one of them in the face so hard that he collapsed into a nearby oven, for not addressing him with due respect. Afterwards, the boys went to work with him without resisting. According to Makarenko, the boy came to him afterwards, and said, laughing, 'that was great! [...] how you landed one on me!' Although Makarenko portrayed this as a singular loss of control, he did not have a guilty conscience: 'I saw that the purity of my pedagogical hands is a minor matter in comparison with the task before me.' He decided to be 'a dictator' if need be, and shortly afterward yelled at another boy 'I will not only beat you up, I will mutilate you!' because he refused to clean up the dorm.⁷⁵ Throughout his entire 'epic of education' (as he named his book), he did not address that he 're-educated' this gang of hardened street children by effectively becoming their gang leader, and by tolerating a fair amount of 'residual' violence and criminal culture among them.

In residential childcare after Stalin's death, staff showed various stances towards abusive behaviour. A former boarding school educator, for instance, explained in her interview that boarding school educators should not fall victim to extremes but teach the children useful things without using force. They should not value their own good higher than the children's and should never opt for the easiest way out.⁷⁶ However, not everyone acted that way. Another former teacher talked in her interview about cases of violent and abusive staff (even sexual abuse and rape) that she encountered in her position as inspector. According to her, using force against pupils was wrong but common. Teachers verbally abusing children could be a major problem as well: she recalled the case of a girl refusing to go back to school because one of her teachers shouted at them constantly, calling them useless and stupid.⁷⁷ She also mentioned another teacher who would throw abuse at her class on a regular basis, calling them parasites, bastards, and fascists.⁷⁸

Interviews with former children in care suggest that the most typical form of punishment were a severe scolding or additional chores. While violence was not the norm, corporal punishments were quite common: two interviewees mentioned 'holding a pillow', for which the 'wrongdoers' had to stand or kneel, stretch their arms forward and hold a pillow in each of

⁷⁵ Anton Semenovich Makarenko, *Sochineniia, tom pervyi: Pedagogicheskaia poema* (Moscow, 1950), pp. 24-26.

⁷⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF46A, p. 45.

⁷⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF55A, pp. 55-57.

⁷⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF55A, p. 57.

them, which became increasingly painful with time.⁷⁹ According to one of them, this kind of punishment awaited them for wetting the bed or ‘behaving like a hooligan’.⁸⁰ The other interviewees did not consider their teachers and educators to be very strict, although such statements are difficult to assess because they have to be related to how much ‘strictness’ they had been used to. A former special school student even spoke favourably of discipline and the punishments they got at school, although he admitted that they scared him: ‘they did not punish me much. I was almost disciplined. I was scared.’⁸¹ Archival documents such as inspections do not mention corporal punishment, most likely because it was not considered worth mentioning, but they did make note of neglectful, abusive, or violent behaviour towards children. In the later years, official reports found drastic words for such transgressions (especially in comparison to earlier decades), such as ‘the inhumane treatment of children’, or ‘multiple violations of the rights and interests of children’.⁸²

The excessive use of solitary confinement (in the so-called ShIzo, *shtrafnyi izolator*), mostly confined to colonies, was another frequently reported issue in inspections.⁸³ Some colonies used this type of punishment too much (such as 316 times a year in an institution with only 150 children), for harmless offences (in one case a boy had skipped lessons and insulted a guard and was subsequently isolated for ten days), or overly frequently on the same person (five to ten times). In Leningrad colony, the isolation cell sometimes held eight to ten students at a time.⁸⁴ In several places, the isolation cells were in terrible conditions, too cold or too small and lacking furniture, so that children had to sleep on the floor. One boy got so cold that he had to be treated for frostbite in hospital for 12 days after leaving the isolation cell.⁸⁵ Those

⁷⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, p. 12; Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 10; Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 7.

⁸⁰ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 10.

⁸¹ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, pp.7-10. Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14B, p. 16. Note the likening of discipline to fear. The same was true for another former boarding school student, who linked the bad development of today’s boarding school kids to an allegedly harmful lack of punishment: ‘And now, now there is nothing at all. Now they are just so... well absolutely for misconduct ... talks, these ‘impressive’ conversations, talks. You’d like to reach them somehow. Of course, it does not always work. It does not always work, and for that reason the statistics show that indeed in this time of ours, you know, how many children from children’s homes, from boarding schools, they are in a very bad place, of course.’ See Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 7.

⁸² GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 1-5, 6-8, 27, 70-76 (1990). One report explained that the ‘difficult moral and psychological climate in many children’s homes and boarding schools generates crime among its students’, see GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 65-69 (1990). This was a clear change of tone from relativisations used to describe abuse in earlier reports, such as ‘physical manipulation’, ‘amoral behaviour’, or ‘antipedagogic measures’. See LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 20-23, 24-30 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 118-126 (1980); GASO f. R233, op. 5, d. 1475 (1962-69). Several cases of staff members neglecting and beating the children in their care have already in addressed in previous chapter.

⁸³ One interviewee, however, remembered this type of punishment from his boarding school years: he got getting 12 hours of detention (in a 4m² isolation cell) for swearing. Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 10.

⁸⁴ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 48-54, 189-205 (1960-61); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-38 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 36-39 (1962).

⁸⁵ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962).

children who ended up in the *Sblizho* too often reportedly suffered psychological trauma. In 1959, for instance, a boy was been sent there nine times within half a year; and killed himself shortly afterwards.⁸⁶ It is impossible to say how these events were linked but it is safe to say that the boy did not get help when he needed it.

A 1962 report from Tomsk colony no.2 related similar connections between solitary confinement and mental illness, although it is hard to tell whether hospitalization was meant as treatment or part of punishment. One girl had been sent to the *Sblizho* seven times within a year for offences including swearing, stealing, and ‘hooliganizing’. Shortly afterwards, she was taken to a psychiatric hospital to be treated for ‘psychopathic personality in the stage of decomposition’, suggesting that the overuse of solitary confinement caused considerable blows to her mental health. Another girl was isolated four times for ‘breaching the *rezhim*’, fighting, trying to escape, and for insulting the colony boss. They sent her to a psychiatric hospital as well.⁸⁷ It is possible that these girls did in fact become ill through inhumane treatment by excessive isolation. However, the colony also might have used the psychiatric hospital to either get rid of the girls, or as some sort of ‘next level punishment’, as the solitary confinement did not seem to do whatever they colony management wanted to achieve.⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch identified such practices in Russian residential childcare institutions shortly after the collapse of the Union.⁸⁹

In addition to excessive punishments, residential childcare staff have been accused of exploiting children in care: the mother of a girl living in a *dom veteranov* (‘veterans’ home’, or home for the elderly) in Nizhnevartovsk reported an outrageous case of abuse and exploitation in a letter to the Children’s Fund. According to that mother, staff members in that institution forced teenagers with disabilities to do the most difficult jobs at the home, such as physically straining work in the kitchen, taking care of the most poorly elderly people, and washing corpses in the morgue. If the teenagers refused to comply, they suffered humiliation, painful injections, and beatings.⁹⁰ The punishment by medication (such as psychotropic or sedative

⁸⁶ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 48-54 (1960).

⁸⁷ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61 (1962).

⁸⁸ A former teacher hinted at similar practices when she talked about a girl who had run away from ‘her’ boarding school for children with learning difficulties. When found, the girl expressed her fears about going back because she was worried about being sent to a ‘mental hospital’ as a punishment. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF54A, p. 29.

⁸⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Abandoned to the State: Cruelty and Neglect in Russian Orphanages* (New York, Washington, a.o., 1998), pp. 9, 26, 127. See also Caroline Cox (ed.), *Trajectories of Despair: Misdiagnosis and Mistreatment of Soviet Orphans* (Zürich, London and Washington, 2nd edition 1993), p. 4.

⁹⁰ The mother expressed her outrage and despair, asking ‘who gives such orders and permits to exploit underage mentally ill children? This is clearly a crime.’ This example shows that such cases of abuse in residential care were not widely known, which explains her shock. Her mixing up mental illness and disability is

drugs) is noteworthy, as it was not only a well-known means against political dissidents, but also mentioned time and again in residential childcare.⁹¹

Such things could happen because colleagues and management often failed to report abusive members of staff. For instance, an investigation into Rauda auxiliary boarding school about embezzlement suspicions also revealed abusive behaviour against children. When the investigators confronted the educator accused of such behaviour, he said that the school's director had also beaten children and forced them to smoke until they felt sick. In the end, both were reprimanded.⁹² In her interview, a former teacher recalled a similar case: children came to their boarding school from children's homes in a traumatized state and mentioned severe beatings in their former institution. However, she decided not to report the educator in question: 'we had already seen this educator, but we did not talk to her about that topic. Because she... well, it was not our business. She already had her own collective. Let them deal with her.'⁹³

The relationship between staff and inmates, however, was not limited to power and punishment. Staff members were dealing with children in need of support and affection as much as guidance and education. According to interview transcripts, many residential childcare staff who worked closely with children 'adopted' them on an emotional level. One former teacher described her relationship to the children as 'familial', they were 'our children'.⁹⁴ Another commented on her working with children from such challenging family backgrounds that she felt quite at home around them: 'it is not quite like working, I rather live with them. I am going home, I work at home.'⁹⁵ They both expressed pride of 'their' children, like parents, pointing out how beautiful and clever they were.⁹⁶ Several of the interviewees also showed photographs to the interviewer while talking about 'their' children, reinforcing the impression of fondness and closeness between them.⁹⁷

also notable, especially as a mother of a girl with learning difficulties. GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

⁹¹ van Voren, *Cold War in Psychiatry*.

⁹² LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1912, ll. 118-26 (1980).

⁹³ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF46A, p. 45.

⁹⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49A, p. 6. Another teacher also spoke of 'my children' on several occasions, see Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45B, p. 33.

⁹⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, p. 11.

⁹⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF50B, p. 38; PF51A, p. 51. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF46A, p. 36. Another teacher emphasized how beautiful, strong, and healthy 'their' children were. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF58 A, pp. 28-29.

⁹⁷ For instance: Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53A, p. 8, PF 54A, p. 32, PF54B, p. 36; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF66A, p. 29. One interviewer remarked that the educator she was speaking to could name every child on every photo they looked at, see Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF58B, p. 41.

However, there were limits to this ‘closeness’ between staff and children. Former staff members emphasized that as educators they could not let the children get too close, as this would result in chaos: ‘of course you couldn’t caress them. Because if you did, and there are 30, or even 35 people in a group, one will be jealous of the other [...], and right away there will be a mass brawl and everything.’⁹⁸ They showed that in this paradox relationship between educators and ‘their’ children, familial closeness and professional distance were closely linked.⁹⁹ For educators in baby homes, work was probably the most extreme in this regard, possibly because they mainly worked with very small children who need a mother figure more than anything else. In her interview, one such educator showed great sympathy with ‘her’ children; and explained how she would organize interesting activities to make them forget their suffering when their parents would not show up on visiting days.¹⁰⁰ She claimed to have shed many tears about these fates, for instance when parents who gave away their children did not want to say goodbye to them, claiming their child was already dead to them.¹⁰¹

For children in care, empathy and ‘warmth’ made a considerable difference in their lives, as interviews confirm. One former boarding school student recalled that two of her teachers took her in to stay in their apartments after an especially traumatic episode with foster parents (shortly after the death of her mother), and occasionally on weekends.¹⁰² In contrast, she had bitter memories of another educator who supervised their homework, but never talked to them, never hugged them: ‘we needed caresses, you understand? And there were no caresses, there was nothing. So. And then, you see, she looks at you like that’.¹⁰³ In her interview, a teacher emphasized that she made a point of not being too strict with the children. She told a story about a staff member who shouted at children for running across the floor she had just swept. She recalled saying to her: ‘Is this a school for children, or children for the school?’¹⁰⁴ However, despite the emotional accounts by members of staff, one should not forget the power relations between staff and inmates and how prone to abuse they were. Although the spectrum of affection and abuse was quite broad, these children overall grew up in a

⁹⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, p. 6.

⁹⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF54A, p. 24. In the end, however, the interviewees wanted to convey that it was the familiarity that prevailed: ‘and here, of course, the children are closer to you, the children get used to you. [...] You see, they are closer to you, they are like family. Like in a family you, like, bring up your children or you live in a family.’

¹⁰⁰ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF57B, p. 21. She explains that she would be perfectly ok with the children calling her ‘mommy’, but then they would leave for another home – so they could not be too close.

¹⁰¹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF58A, p. 35.

¹⁰² Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67B, p. 17.

¹⁰³ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67B, p. 14.

¹⁰⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, p. 10.

comparatively harsh environment with fewer close attachment figures than children living with their parents.

Social structures, the institution, and criminal culture

In reaction to the parameters of everyday life prescribed by both the institutional setting and by staff members, the children living in residential care formed quite unusual social structures. Life in care had the potential to turn into a curious amalgamation of an ideological concept imposed on the children (namely collectivism) and a survival strategy adopted by them (fraternization). Children thus made use of official structures and adapted them to their own use. Institution staff and administration, however, used different strategies to break up this ‘unity’ of inmates, partly applying other ideological concepts like self-administration, partly acting out of necessity because of staff shortages. In the process, they appointed group leaders among the older children who were supposed to help them control the others, giving them the power to punish and certain privileges. This relativized the usual social immobility in institutions, as well as the binary of staff and inmates.¹⁰⁵

These group leaders were often called *komandiry*, reflecting the military-style organization in Soviet education (especially in the Pioneers and Komsomol), and indeed their ‘commanding’ led to the formation of social structures and behaviours known from the Soviet army. *Komandiry* were supposed to assist staff members in maintaining order in the institution; and imposing the staff’s rules. Too often, however, the situation turned out like in Vitiia’s children’s home, as described in the case study that opened this chapter.¹⁰⁶ Time and again, *komandiry* abused their power and terrorized the children in their responsibility. In this way, the institutions encouraged the development of social structures similar to what has been called *dedovshchina*, meaning hazing practices in the Red Army. *Dedovshchina* consisted of older recruits holding absolute power over new conscripts throughout their first six months of service, which often led to bullying, terrorizing, and sometimes torturing them. Many conscripts persevered, knowing that whatever was done to them, they could do to the next cohort. Such practices were thus transferred from generation to generation.¹⁰⁷

Dedovshchina has been a defining feature of Soviet (and then Russian) military life at least since the mid-1950s and set apart military from civilian life in a similar way as *kazennaia zhizn’* or the

¹⁰⁵ Goffman, *Asylums*, pp. 85-86.

¹⁰⁶ Stavitskii, ‘Pobeg’.

¹⁰⁷ Alena Maklak, ‘Dedovshchina on trial: Some evidence concerning the last Soviet generation of “sons” and “grandfathers”’, *Nationalities Papers* 43.5 (2005), pp. 682-99, here pp. 684-85.

reign of *komandiry* did in residential childcare.¹⁰⁸ Alena Maklak has argued that this was seen as a part of initiation, as transition from civilian to military life, much more so than official acts such as giving up personal belongings, having one's head shaved, getting a uniform (as suggested by Goffman).¹⁰⁹ Many conscripts saw *dedovshchina* as a lesson in life skills (through the chores they had to do for their seniors), and a school of masculinity, teaching them resilience (to violence, among other things).¹¹⁰ Maklak has shown how Soviet university students interviewed about their military service in 1989 framed their time in the army as a story of personal resilience and success, explaining that *dedovshchina* made sense to them at the time whilst being critical about it on a more general level.¹¹¹ Several scholars have addressed the difference between civilian and military life. Bannikov, for instance, has shown that the transition was challenging both ways, into as well as out of military service. By the end of their service, conscripts had reached the 'other side' to *dedovshchina*: they had held unlimited power in their unit; people feared them; they met no resistance. They had to go back to a 'society' with different rules, in which they had to start as a 'nobody' again.¹¹²

Even if people did not use the word *dedovshchina* to address behaviour patterns in residential childcare, interviewees as well as official reports described practices showing suspicious similarities to both 'deputy' punishing and barrack-style hazing. Two interviewees recalled to have been punished by older children in their group (presumably acting on staff orders).¹¹³ A report from Bauska children's home mentioned that older children were beating up younger ones, but that the administration did not know much about it because the younger ones refused to talk about it.¹¹⁴ Although the existence of these cases of violence were known, the institution staff did nothing to prevent it from happening again. A year later, another inspection conveyed a similar impression: older inmates were stealing the younger children's food and would beat them in case they complained.¹¹⁵ This is evidence of a normalized, if not institutionalized culture of violence.

¹⁰⁸ Maklak, 'Dedovshchina on trial', pp. 684-85.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 685-87, 690.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 691-92.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 693-94. This sounds surprisingly similar to the way in which interviewees described their life in care, as has been shown.

¹¹² Konstantin Bannikov, 'Regimented Communities in a Civil Society', *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies* 1 (2004), Online since 29 September 2005, accessed on 22 June 2018. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/pipss/40>

¹¹³ A former child in care recalled to have been punished by older girls: Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 7; another one by an older kid or the night nurse: Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 10.

¹¹⁴ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, ll. 3-5 (1963).

¹¹⁵ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1089, ll. 1, 2-3 (1964).

In colonies, such ‘reigns of terror’ by *komandiry* seem to have been especially prevalent, as inmates were likely to be more prone to use violence and they were closer to criminal and gang culture, as will be discussed later on. In 1960, all 14 colonies in the RSFSR were inspected, and the report explicitly named violence by *komandiry* in four of them.¹¹⁶ The colony in Cēsis is a particularly striking example of such structures. In June 1960, the Latvian procuracy wrote to the Latvian Ministry of the Interior about crimes in that colony. Time and again, new inmates had been beaten brutally: in January alone five inmates had been taken to hospital, some only days after their arrival. Two of them had to stay in hospital for about six weeks with a broken jaw and a head injury. The colony administration transferred two of the perpetrators to prison in mid-February. However, the beatings went on: until 8 April, four more boys ended up in hospital with broken jaws. No one was punished. Around the same time, a boy beat another one to death in a fight – further evidence of a more general culture of violence in the institution. In fall 1960, the procuracy contacted the ministry again, as beatings were still happening.

However, the degree of (unpunished) violence is not the only evidence of an established and tolerated rule of *komandiry*: the distribution of work productivity was highly suspicious as well. Whereas the colony had a total of 90 percent work productivity, certain students fulfilled only 55 or even a mere 35 percent of their quotas. This points to a system of privileges in which the administration tolerated *komandiry* to be working less (or not at all) as long as they made the other inmates work.¹¹⁷ Reports about other colonies confirm that *komandiry* imposed order and increased productivity, or at least tried to. In a colony in Perm’ oblast, for instance, *komandiry* beat several inmates, allegedly because they did not study hard enough and did not fulfil their work quotas.¹¹⁸ Inspections of Belorechensk, Belozersk, Kineshemsk, and Birobizhansk colonies also revealed assaults and beatings by *komandiry* or more generally the *aktiv*, allegedly for skipping lessons, bad grades, smoking, or stealing.¹¹⁹

The documents clearly suggest that such behaviours were, if not encouraged, then at least tolerated by the administration, which put students suffering under their *komandir* in a difficult position. In 1959, an inmate from Ivanovskaia colony had behaved rudely towards his master

¹¹⁶ In a similar inspection of colonies all over the Union, *komandiry* beating up inmates were mentioned noticeably often, providing a shocking account on the level of violence in these institutions. GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 48-54 (1960). An inspection a couple of years later revealed similar cases, for instance from Saratov, Krasnodar krai (where *komandiry* forced other to work and break rules for them), Cheliabinsk, Miass, and other. Often, the victims of such beatings ended up in hospital, which means that they could definitely not go unnoticed. See GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 13-22, 36-39, 63-68 (1962).

¹¹⁷ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 40-45, 73-75 (1960-61).

¹¹⁸ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 48-54 (1960).

¹¹⁹ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 143-56 (1960-61). The *aktiv* designates a smaller group within a collective taking on leadership functions (and being the most active in working for the collective).

and was supposed to scrub the bathroom floor as a punishment. Because the boy showed no inclination to do so, the chief educator handed the boy over to the *komandir* of his division. They took the boy to the bathroom, kicked him and dragged him repeatedly across the bathroom floor. The administration knew what happened but did not react, probably not to disturb a ‘working system’.¹²⁰ From official documents, it appears that other inmates were aware of how desperate their situation was once they got into trouble with one of the *komandiry*. A report about Tomsk colony no.1 even mentioned a case in which a boy tried to kill his *komandir*. He forged a ‘Finnish knife’ to fight back against the commanders and injured two of them. In response, two *komandiry* (unsuccessfully) tried to kill the boy. When the boy was asked about the motive for the assault, he explained that they were ‘systematically’ beating up other inmates. None of them had dared to complain out of fear for retaliation (with good reason, as it turned out).¹²¹

While it is impossible to say to which extent these ‘reigns of terror’ were tolerated as an active policy by the institutions, it is safe to say the higher layers of administration knew about them. A report about Leningrad colony, for instance, complained about ‘problematic power relations’:

In one of the divisions of the colony there was for a long time a so-called *aktiv*, which consisted of the physically strongest inmates and was called by some educators to help implement discipline among the inmates. In reality, this *aktiv* has plundered and terrorized other inmates, to the point that inmates were stripped and beaten. This resulted in 10-15 inmates from that division running away from the colony.¹²²

The author of the report accused educators of using strong inmates to implement discipline, insinuating their intent to have them use violence. Reports from different years urged colony administrations to stop appointing the ‘worst’ inmates to such positions of responsibility.¹²³

The social structure among children in residential care could thus be shaped strongly by *komandiry* and their rule. This was both helpful for the administration (as it made controlling

¹²⁰ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 48-54 (1960).

¹²¹ In the end, the boy had ten years added to his sentence, but the report suspiciously did not mention what happened to the colony’s *komandiry*. GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 48-54 (1960).

¹²² GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962).

¹²³ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 48-54 (1960-61). The way that these complaints are phrased suggest that the authorities knew exactly what was going on: ‘commanders of sections and other activists are not selected from the best inmates but from unsatisfactorily checked [inmates] or from the physically healthiest [inmates] who are able to affect others by their physical force. Such activists, taking advantage of the trust of the colony administration, allow the beating of inmates and exercise despotic power.’ See GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 143-56 (1960-61); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962).

the children easier) and threatening as soon as *komandiry* decided to go their own way. The *komandir* system was not the same thing as *dedovshchina* (because *komandiry* were supposed to execute the staff's orders) but it enabled *dedovshchina*-like structures to develop. Such social structures created connections between different types of *total institutions*, such as residential childcare institutions, the army, or prisons. Scholars who studied *dedovshchina* have pointed out such connections as well: Oleynik, for instance, likened the army to a *total institution*. He analyzed the army as a community which produced 'replacement victims', to which all negative emotions and violence existing in that community were channelled, to achieve a stable community. He argued that hospitals and schools showed elements of this as well.¹²⁴

The *komandir* system did not only blend seamlessly into the traditions of *dedovshchina*, but also into the criminal subculture. Children in care committed offences in all types of institutions, not only in those for previous offenders.¹²⁵ The most common ones were running away and 'vagabonding' the streets, petty theft, and assault or brawls.¹²⁶ It is likely that far from all instances of such behaviour were reported because children in boarding schools and homes were less closely monitored than in colonies. A report from Ezersale auxiliary boarding school reveals that sometimes, staff members did not even know where people were, let alone what they were doing: 'there are cases when children leave the boarding school in the late evening without permit, and the educators do not always know where each kid is at night.'¹²⁷ More noticeable offences such as outbursts of violence also occurred, albeit less frequently. A report about baby homes in Perm' oblast, for instance, mentioned older children attacking younger ones, which is frightening considering that children there should be no older than four.¹²⁸

In colonies, levels of violence and delinquency were substantially higher, according to the reports. Commonly reported offences included attempted escapes, assault, fights/brawls, vandalism, theft (often stealing things from workshops that could be used as a weapon, like files, pipes, or hammers), or forging weapons like knives in the workshops.¹²⁹ In Leningrad

¹²⁴ Anton Oleynik, 'Dedovshchina as an Element of the "Small Society": Evidence From Russia and Other Countries', *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies* 1 (2004), Online since 29 September 2004, URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/pipss/136> (accessed on 22 June 2018).

¹²⁵ It is safe to assume that colony inmates committed more crimes than children in other residential childcare institutions.

¹²⁶ Most of which figured under the label of 'hooliganism' in a Soviet legal context. LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 655, ll. 173-79 (1960); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 915, ll. 10-16 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1003, l. 50 (1963); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 42-50 (1965); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1663, ll. 69-74 (1971).

¹²⁷ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1142, ll. 42-50 (1965).

¹²⁸ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9969, ll. 115-20 (1990).

¹²⁹ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 10-15, 129-142, 189-205 (1960); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962); GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61 (1962); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972); GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

colony, 168 knives were confiscated in 1961. 83 teenagers were charged with crimes that year, 70 of which for committing offences while on the run, 13 while in the colony.¹³⁰ A report from Cheliabinsk colony complained that incidents were not properly reported, and that inmates were not punished sufficiently for their crimes. It mentioned numerous accidents (suggesting that some reported ‘accidents’ might not have been accidental) and cases of assault in the workshops.¹³¹ In 1987, a letter to the Lenin Children’s Fund described what sounds like a gang war in a school for delinquent girls in Krasnoborsk: the girls had formed two camps and they took metal bars out of their beds to fight each other, in what the author of the report called a ‘pogrom’.¹³²

These cases give an impression of anarchy in colonies. However, as a case from Kharkov colony shows, things could get a lot worse as soon as the administration’s control of the situation collapsed. In April 1960, a group of boys in the Kharkov colony workshops were forced into a break from work due to a power cut: the machine they had been working with did not work and they were waiting for new supplies. Their supervisor did not stay around, which turned out to be a fatal mistake. Two of the boys got in a fight, as one got upset because the other was (allegedly) not listening to him and punched him in the face. This caused the other to lose it completely, pick up a metal bar and hit the first one on the head, who collapsed. Other boys stayed back because the perpetrator had a go at anyone trying to intervene. He continued to beat the boy – who was now lying on the floor – on the head and back. He died in hospital later, and his attacker got ten years added to his sentence.¹³³

Inspection reports show that there were similarities between behaviour codes in residential childcare and Soviet criminal culture (apart from actual crimes). Especially in colonies, inspectors complained about tattoos, swearing, and general hooliganism.¹³⁴ An inspector visiting Tomsk colony complained about teenagers using ‘foul language’ (*netsenzurniui bran*).¹³⁵ In residential childcare more generally, however, the connections were subtler and are best described with an affinity between different types of institutions, such as residential childcare,

¹³⁰ GARF, f. A385, op. 46, d. 203, ll. 1-13, 75-83, 88-102 (1962). In Arkhangelsk colony, 15 inmates were convicted for crimes committed in the institutions in 1959; four were convicted for robbing a shop in September. See GARF f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 48-54 (1960-61).

¹³¹ The latter included an inmate hitting another on the head with a pipe, and one stabbing another in the back. GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 28-33, 34-38 (1972).

¹³² GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

¹³³ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 10-15, 31-38 (1960).

¹³⁴ In a Krasnodar colony, for instance, over 60 percent of inmates reportedly had tattoos. GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962). Other examples: GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 11-12 (1962); GU OGACHO, f. P288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6, 9-13, 14-19, 23-27, 39-42 (1972).

¹³⁵ GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 205, ll. 47-61 (1962).

the army, or prison. Vadim Mikhailin, for instance, has studied the connection between the so-called *mat* ('obscene language') and the army, showing that every conscript who wanted to be respected eventually had to learn it.¹³⁶ There was thus another connection between the army and some of the other 'total institutions': people spoke the same language in the army, prisons, and at least parts of residential childcare. This also explains the Soviet authorities' ongoing fight against 'swearing' in children's homes, colonies, and boarding schools.¹³⁷

This anxiety about *mat* and other elements of criminal culture is connected to the 'GULag subculture' that was perceived to be spreading across Soviet society following the mass amnesties after Stalin's death, as Miriam Dobson has established. The visibility of prison/camp tattoos, subversive leaflets, verbal (often drunk) anti-Soviet outbursts, and slang were part of this 'threatening' subculture. Dobson showed that especially slang and songs from the camps gained a certain popularity among youths, causing considerable alarm among the authorities (and the general population).¹³⁸ Catriona Kelly has also described reform colonies at hotbeds of prison folklore, and many of their inmates moved on to grown-up prisons or camps.¹³⁹ Such structures were neither new to residential childcare after Stalin's death, nor did they necessarily have a direct connection to the prison system. Gangs of street children had brought criminal culture, including tattoos, violence, swearing, and *dedovshchina*-like gang hierarchies in from the streets in the 1920s-30s, throughout the war and early post-war years.¹⁴⁰ Through transfers between different types of institutions and children mixing in collection and distribution centres (*priemniki*) when they were picked up on the street or awaiting transfer, such elements of criminal, gang, and street culture could potentially circulate freely among children in the residential care system, as Kucherenko has shown for the post-war years.¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Vadim Mikhailin, 'Russian Army *Mat* as a Code System Controlling Behaviour in the Russian army', *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies* 1 (2004), Online since 29 September 2004, URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/pipss/93> (accessed on 22 June 2018).

¹³⁷ See for instance, GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 5042, ll. 52-54 (1956); GARF, f. A259, op. 42, d. 7777, ll. 72-79 (1961); LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 22-27 (1964).

¹³⁸ Dobson, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer*, pp. 14, 121-22, 125.

¹³⁹ Kelly, *Children's World*, p. 282.

¹⁴⁰ Other practices found in colonies, for instance, show striking similarities to behaviour found among orphans and street children in the 1930s (who were in close connection to the criminal subculture): a report from Cheliabinsk colony described a case of 'hooliganism', in which a boy set fire to a piece of paper stuck between another boy's toes. A memoir written by a former street children gang member describes the same thing as a popular game called 'the mill' in Stalinist times, named after the victim's windmill-like flapping of arms the moment he would wake up to find his feet on fire. GU OGACHO, f. R288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 1-6 (1972); Galley, "'Wir schlagen wie eine Faust'"; Nicholas Voinov, *Outlaw: The Autobiography of a Soviet Waif* (London, 1955), p. 33.

¹⁴¹ Kucherenko, *Soviet Street Children*, pp. 23, 33-34, 45-46, 125, 130-33.

This section has shown that the upbringing and life in residential childcare differed significantly from ‘family life’, as has been confirmed by all interviewees, with regard to ‘emotional warmth’ as well as having more freedom to dispose of one’s own time (and having time and space to oneself). However, interviews also confirmed that the extent of that difference and of how traumatic the transition into the institution was depended on the children’s lives before the institution, as has also been suggested by Goffman and Davies. Evidence suggests that adaptation to life in the institution was indeed necessary, but that the way children coped with this life could differ considerably. Institutional life (*казенная жизнь*) has also been shown to foster very particular social structures, which seemed closer to other heavily institutionalized settings such as the army or prison.

Khlinovskaia Rockhill confirmed these connections, or affinities between residential childcare, the army, and prison for the late and post-Soviet years. She interviewed people who grew up in children’s homes or boarding schools, who felt that the experiences of violence and overcoming fear made them tough, and ‘allowed them to stand up for themselves in prison’. In addition, their acquired knowledge of hierarchy, regimentation, control, and discipline proved excellent preparation for both prison and the army.¹⁴² Residential childcare thus not only failed to make up for the disadvantageous position that many children found themselves in, and to prepare them for a life in society, but it prepared them for something else: a life in certain (closed-off) pockets of society, or on its margins. The existence of *казенная жизнь* as something different than family life thus suggests that it was not only difficult to get used to, but also to get away from (as has also been reported for the army and the Gulag).¹⁴³ The following section will examine the resulting process of (re-)adaptation into society.

Leaving the institution: disculturation and stigma

Most Soviet children in care left their institution eventually and had to fare on their own and in society. If ‘institutional life’ followed rigid and specific rules, which were difficult to get used to, it follows that a similar process of (re-)integration or adaptation was necessary for children leaving residential care. Goffman has developed the concept of ‘disculturation’, meaning the process of losing the skills needed to live in society.¹⁴⁴ This section will study the moment of release with the help of personal testimonies; and examine the processes of adaption to life in society. According to Goffman, a prolonged stay in a total institution typically changes a

¹⁴² Khlinovskaia Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, p. 223.

¹⁴³ Dobson, *Khrushchev’s Cold Summer*; Anne Applebaum, *Gulag: A History* (London, 2004); Bannikov, ‘Regimented Communities’.

¹⁴⁴ Goffman, *Asylums*, p. 23.

person's social status, and in a negative case *stigmatization* by society can occur, adding pressure to adapt whilst making integration more difficult.¹⁴⁵ Using the concept of stigmatization, this section will also analyse how children in care were viewed, and, in extension, received in society. It will show that children in care had not been taught the skills necessary to cope with life in the Soviet Union, and that their status in society was precarious to say the least (due to a mixture of ignorance and stereotypes among the population). This required a considerable effort by former children in care to get a chance to adapt to life in society and start one of their own.

Transition and trauma

The 1976 Gerbeev/Vinogradova manual for children's home educators acknowledged that 'the first years of their independent life will be hard'; and pointed out that staff members had the responsibility to continue helping and supporting their graduates after they left the institution.¹⁴⁶ A 1964 report from an auxiliary boarding school in Spāre suggests that this was not a new idea. The inspector complained that there was almost no work with former graduates at the school: 'they are not interested in the conditions in which they live, what their achievements in production are, they don't organize meetings with former graduates, don't correspond with them, etc.'¹⁴⁷ To make the transition between the institution and 'outside' easier, Gerbeev/Vinogradova proposed a tightly knit *shefstvo* relationship with a workplace because in consequence many children could 'choose' to work there. This, however, seems like an extension of institutional life into society rather than successful adaptation, as the children's 'choice' seems to have a lot to do with not knowing what else to do.¹⁴⁸ In her interview, a former teacher also recalled how difficult it was for institution graduates without parental support because – in contrast to what the manual said – the state was not really responsible anymore, and the children ended up without any help or (enough) money, which forced them to find work straight away.¹⁴⁹

Official documents suggest that the Soviet authorities had been working and reworking legislation for decades to address these problems. A 1955 decree stipulated giving children's home graduates full support for professional training after seven years of schooling. In 1963,

¹⁴⁵ Goffman, *Asylums*, pp. 70-71.

¹⁴⁶ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, pp. 167-68. Examples for such support were (tellingly) listed as help with finding housing, with not falling in with the wrong crowd, and, in an emergency, to welcome them back. In a similar spirit, a former teacher mentioned talks to her 'girls' about not blindly trusting men to avoid exploitation, see: Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF54A, p. 28.

¹⁴⁷ LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1088, ll. 56-61 (1964). Note again the high expectations towards staff members.

¹⁴⁸ Gerbeev and Vinogradova, *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty*, pp. 165-67.

¹⁴⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF55A, p. 53.

this was extended to eight years of schooling and boarding school graduates without parental care.¹⁵⁰ In addition, graduates were allowed to stay at the institution for up to half a year if necessary; or return for a ‘holiday’ of two weeks.¹⁵¹ Both of these suggest that the transition from the institution into society was quite challenging.¹⁵² The 1980s brought about a number of additions to the legislation: children’s home inmates and other children without parental care were entitled to full state support until the end of their training, and to places at schools or vocational schools ‘out of competition’. This reveals another reason why the authorities might not have been interested in pushing these children’s education very far: they had to pay for it. The 1982 draft was another attempt by the state to support these children whilst using them for their purposes. It decreed that military training facilities should leave 15 percent of places open to ‘orphans’ (meaning children without parental care).¹⁵³

While the state failed to offer widespread support to their care graduates, individual schools or staff members attempted to help the children in their care. A former teacher recalled that they had to find a job and housing for every graduate, and some of them became personal guardians of children who struggled. She concluded, ‘they were not just thrown on the street, they weren’t’.¹⁵⁴ Another teacher backed this account, adding that children leaving the institution got a stipend, a furnished room, clothes, and kitchen appliances.¹⁵⁵ According to a 1987 Party report from Sverdlovsk oblast, for instance, vocational schools had taken in 876 orphans that year, supporting them with ‘individual educational work’, a dorm (*obshchezhitie*) room, *krushki* after school, a grant of 1.49 per day (1.69 during term break), and one set of clothes worth 200 rubles.¹⁵⁶ More general official reports from 1989, however, suggest that such support was sporadic and depended on individual dedication: responding to the 1987 decree to improve the education and provision of children without parental care, they urged different agencies to make sure graduates from such institutions were given proper housing independent of the official waiting lists.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁰ GARF, f. R5446, op. 97, d. 1272 (1963).

¹⁵¹ Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotstvo i besprizornost*, p. 143; GARF, f. R5446, op. 111, d. 1196, ll 5-30 (1982).

¹⁵² Several inspection reports actually mentioned children returning to their former institution for visits, holidays, even worked there, or kept in touch another way: N.N. Dudko, ‘Die Pionierarbeit im Kinderheim’, in: *Erfahrungen aus sowjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954, orig. in Russian 1951), pp. 145-56, here p. 156; GASO f. 1427, op. 2, d. 115 (1954); GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 40-45, 73-75 (1960).

¹⁵³ GARF, f. R5446, op. 111, d. 1196, ll 5-30 (1982). Documents from 1987-89 reaffirmed these measures, suggesting that the situation was still problematic. GARF, f. R5446, op. 162, d. 843 (1988-90); TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497 (1987).

¹⁵⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF49A, pp. 12-13.

¹⁵⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF46A, pp. 38-39.

¹⁵⁶ TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 113, d. 497 (1987).

¹⁵⁷ GARF, f. R5446, op. 163, d. 843 (1988-90).

Former children in care painted a grim picture of their time after leaving care. One of them accused her former school of not having helped her at all with her ‘transition’, neither with clothes nor money. Only her guardian gave her some clothes and linen. ‘No, that was it, they just released us and that was it’, she concluded.¹⁵⁸ Another former boarding school pupil recalled that she got a set of clothes, some winter clothes and some linen from her school, but no financial support.¹⁵⁹ Two former children in care (who went to the same boarding school in Leningrad) recalled little to no support after graduating. One concluded that ‘of course’ they had not been ready for life, that they had felt left alone.¹⁶⁰ According to her, the schools did not give them any money, any clothes or help with finding a room.¹⁶¹ Getting no help with finding a room was a serious problem in the context of the everlasting Soviet housing shortage, as they had to find out: ‘we lived in the boarding school after grade eight, because we had nowhere else to go.’¹⁶² She finally managed to get hold of a room, but only with the help of a member of staff from her school with whom she was close. A lack of clothes could also lead to difficult situations: every time she had to do laundry, she would miss her evening classes because she only had one set of clothes.¹⁶³

Some also conveyed the culture shock they experienced after living collectively and under close supervision, to suddenly find themselves alone.¹⁶⁴ One shared a room with another girl for some time because she could not sleep alone: ‘she [...] lived with me, because she got a room, and I got a room, but we could not live on our own. It was hard.’¹⁶⁵ Both former staff members and children in care considered the institutions’ preparation for life outside insufficient, which might have enhanced the feeling of alienation. A former teacher deemed children in care unfit (*neprisposoblennye*) for life because they could not even feed themselves, as they were used to being served in the canteen: ‘no one prepared them for an independent life.’¹⁶⁶ She told the interviewer how the children wanted her to read cooking recipes for porridge and soup instead

¹⁵⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68A, p. 21-22.

¹⁵⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48B, p. 45.

¹⁶⁰ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69B, p. 17. Former children in care have described that transition in a strikingly similar way: ‘we got out, and goodbye, that was it’, Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69B, p. 17; ‘they released us, and that was it, goodbye’, Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68A, p. 25.

¹⁶¹ A former child in care recalled that they left school only with the possessions they already had, and also finding a place to live turned out to be a challenge. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48A, p. 44.

¹⁶² Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67B, p. 20.

¹⁶³ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69B, p. 18.

¹⁶⁴ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 3.

¹⁶⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48B, p.45.

¹⁶⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF46A, p. 36. Another teacher made a similar point: she found it problematic that the boarding school children got everything for free without having to take any responsibility. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF50A, pp. 31-32. Current residential childcare staff members interviewed by Elena Khlinovskaya Rockhill make exactly the same point: *Lost to the State*, pp. 226-27.

of a bedtime story.¹⁶⁷ A former baby home nurse recalled that they tried to teach children how to do grocery shopping (and other things) through play, because many children coming out of institutions would not be able to cope.¹⁶⁸

The lack of ‘preparedness’ concerned several areas of life. One former boarding school student recalled that they were missing key skills, like preparing food, organizing their household or handling money.¹⁶⁹ In addition, they did not know anything about sex, family life, or raising children.¹⁷⁰ Another woman who grew up in care illustrated the general ignorance at her school regarding procreation: when one staff member had a baby, the children apparently did not understand how that was even possible for an unmarried woman. Their teachers also led them to believe that girls could become pregnant from kissing boys, so that she was afraid of kissing the boy she liked until she was about 15.¹⁷¹ Another respondent blamed her difficulties with raising her daughter on her boarding school upbringing, having caused not only gaps of knowledge, but also emotional ‘gaps’: ‘and I can say, I can say honestly, well you know how people say that maternal love begins with the first drop of milk. It was not like that in my case. I felt sorry for that little thing, it was so small, defenseless. Love – none. [...] Because we don’t know what love is. Mother and child. That is, we did not get enough of it, and so we could not pass it on to our children.’¹⁷²

Some interviewees pointed out that residential care did prepare them for life, but in a rather morbid way. A former special school student was very positive about the harsh discipline at his institution, as it provided a ‘hardening of the soul’: ‘strictness is strictness, but it hardens the soul, hardens people. Many among us who went to military service – I did not – they said that for them life in the army was easier, because they had learned at school how to cope with that. Discipline is discipline.’¹⁷³ Another former child in care described the *internat* as a school of life for her, inasmuch as she learned that they had to take care of themselves: ‘I don’t even know how to say this. [pause] Well I think that we went out prepared. We were more independent. We were independent, because you know, that already there is no one there for

¹⁶⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF46A, pp. 36, 38.

¹⁶⁸ ‘It is no secret, that when children leave children’s homes, many of them don’t know where to get their sweetened tea. It was like that! So. Then we prepared them.’ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF58A, p. 32.

¹⁶⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48B, p. 54.

¹⁷⁰ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69A, p. 15; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47B, p. 29; Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48B, p. 52. Another child in care confirmed that she had no idea how to prepare food for herself after leaving the boarding school: Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67B, pp. 22-23.

¹⁷¹ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, p. 7.

¹⁷² Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48B, p. 54.

¹⁷³ This links back to the idea of an ‘institutional upbringing’ which prepares people for any such institution. Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, p. 10.

you, you have to figure things out for yourself.’ What she calls independence, however, could just as well be described as a state of abandonment. At that point in the interview, the interviewer tried to emphasize this point further, asking whether – although she had found some adult people she was close to – the boarding school had not finally behaved coldly and distantly towards their graduates. She remained silent.¹⁷⁴

Future lives in socialism?

After a difficult period of transition, former children in care had to (re-)integrate into society and decide what to do with their lives. The authors of *Sirotsvo i besprizornost* claimed that even giving children in residential care a head start, as the Soviet leadership tried with its legislation, often did not help because they were too far behind already.¹⁷⁵ It is difficult to establish in more detail how former children in care fared after the period of transition into society because material following their lives long-term is very scarce. This section will attempt to evaluate the impact of residential care on children’s life course by tracing their trajectories after leaving institutions such as colonies, boarding schools for children with disabilities, and general boarding schools. It will show that although many former children in care managed to make a life for themselves, they usually went through a longer period of struggle, hard work, and – often enough – conflict with the law.

There is scattered data from individual institutions tracking where their graduates went after leaving. A 1959 report about children’s homes in Moscow oblast, for instance, suggests that among those leaving the institution that year, about 22 percent went back to their parents, 26 percent went straight to work, whilst the others went to diverse vocational schools, some to university, and a few to the army, or to work in residential childcare.¹⁷⁶ In 1967, the Ministry of Education drew data from almost 3000 children’s homes: 98 percent went on to school or a vocational school (*tekhnikum*). One of the reports criticized the fact that most graduates just ended up in the nearest vocational school (*proftekhnikum*), which posed problems because many of those did not have dorms; and only small part of children’s home graduates finished middle school. It concluded that ‘there are serious issues (*nedostatki*) with the determination (*opredelenie*) of children’s home graduates’ further life course.’¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68A, p. 25. These aspects were again different for the boy growing up in the countryside. He neither felt like an outcast nor to have had problems to ‘integrate’ after school, which is most probably due to his ongoing connections to his family. Oxf/Lev P-05 PF26A, p. 24.

¹⁷⁵ Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotsvo i besprizornost*, p. 132.

¹⁷⁶ GARF, f. A2306, op. 72, d. 7257 (1959).

¹⁷⁷ GARF, f. A259, op. 45, d. 7538, ll. 123-27, 167-71 (1967).

By 1989, not much seems to have changed. Reports from Krasnodar and Stavropol krai show that respectively 78 and 73 percent of graduates went on to a PTU (*proftekhuchilishche*), whilst 19 percent from Stavropol went straight to work.¹⁷⁸ A more general report about 170 institutions for children without parental care conceded that because of the education agencies' 'formulaic' work, 75-80 percent of the institutions graduates went to the nearest PTU, whilst an only 'insignificant' part went to school for longer than eight forms or even to university.¹⁷⁹ In the context of a 1989 campaign against juvenile delinquency, the authorities reported that many residential care graduates did not have anywhere to go: 'in connection with the fact that the question of guardianship is not being decided in advance, no place to live is found, and the graduates often either go back to their parents who have lost custody of them, or, not having a place to stay, lead an anti-social (*antiobshchestvennyi*) way of life, commit crimes.' Although the situation is implicitly blamed on people in charge, the author of the report used a passive voice (in contrast to the active voice describing offending institution graduates).¹⁸⁰

The situation was more difficult for underage offenders leaving colonies. Although there were mechanisms to make sure that inmates could be released even before the end of their initial sentence, documents from the Riga procuracy suggest that the youth committees were often reluctant when it came to releasing offenders back into society.¹⁸¹ Theoretically, a colony was supposed to release inmates when they were 're-educated'. Latvian procuracy files from 1959-1963 suggest that the local youth commissions repeatedly either ignored or rejected the colonies' requests to release teenagers.¹⁸² The colonies' requests for release usually featured a personalized story about the teenager's rehabilitation, including their problematic behaviour at the time of their conviction, which was contrasted with how the boy or girl was behaving now (learning well at school, working diligently, doing extracurricular activities, being a Komsomol member, and being friendly in the collective). The reasons for the local commission to refuse the child's release are usually unclear, although sometimes it seems either they did not care, or they left them in the institution because there was no place for the teenagers outside. In the case of a boy who had been in several colonies for five years, the local commission argued that

¹⁷⁸ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9969, ll. 46-51, 58-61 (1990).

¹⁷⁹ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 70-76 (1990-91).

¹⁸⁰ GARF, f. R9527, op. 1, d. 9970, ll. 6-8 (1990-91).

¹⁸¹ In 1961, for instance, about 86 percent of colony inmates were released early in 22 Soviet colonies: GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 189-205 (1961).

¹⁸² Preconditions for a release could be that the children had reached the maximum conviction time (three years) or the maximum age (18), that the parents were ready to take them back, or that the children had truly reformed during their stay. See for instance LVA f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 264, ll. 7-9, 12-14; lie. 637 (1959-60).

they had not released him despite his good behaviour because there was no job for him in his hometown.¹⁸³

Even with a short sentence, a conviction to a colony could prove disruptive, as the agencies in charge tended to move slowly. In the case of a 13-year-old girl, for instance, a whole month passed from the pedagogic councils' (*pedsoviet*) decision until the document was actually sent to the commission, and another month until they discussed her case.¹⁸⁴ One colony director accused the local commission of laziness, as they had failed to react to a boy's release request for half a year, a time in which he should have 'lived with his family, worked, and studied, like all children'.¹⁸⁵ This was all the more problematic because many of the teenagers in colonies ended up there for minor misdemeanors: petty theft, flunking school, running away from home or institution, hooliganizing, begging, vagrancy, studying and behaving badly at school, being 'immune' to education attempts from school and *obsbchestvennost'*. None of these children sound like hardened criminals but rather like troubled, neglected, from a challenging background.¹⁸⁶

When a colony inmate was finally released, the institution was supposed to take care of their future placement, and keep in touch, at the very least inform the youth commission so that they could step in.¹⁸⁷ Documents suggest that the colonies' efforts were sketchy at best: a report about Atlianskaia colony explained that while some former inmates had been employed by the local factory, with *shestvo* from senior workers, and that colony educators were still in touch with them, 'these are individual examples. In general, there is nothing known about the fate of most inmates released from the colony'.¹⁸⁸ As with residential institutions, much depended on the dedication of (mostly unpaid!) individual youth commission workers: some commissions placed hundreds of teenagers in jobs every year, whereas in other cases teenagers were not

¹⁸³ In two cases, the children even came back to the colony by themselves because they had nowhere else to go, in one case the parents had refused to take him in; in the other the boy had not found any place to work. LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 638, ll. 106-07, 112-14 (1960).

¹⁸⁴ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 264, ll. 3-5 (1959).

¹⁸⁵ LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 637, l. 76 (1960).

¹⁸⁶ A report written with a little more empathy provides a good example. The colony director seems to have found the girl's situation unfair; and blamed her mother. According to him, the girl 'had found herself educated by a single mother who had not been doing any socially useful labour, traveled around the city with her children and forced them to beg'. LVA, f. 270, ap. 3, lie. 637, ll. 13-14 (1960).

¹⁸⁷ GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 129-142 (1960).

¹⁸⁸ GU OGACHO, f. R288, op. 173, d. 247, ll. 23-27 (1972). The Latvian procuracy made the same point about Latvian colonies: GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 73-75 (1960-61); there are similar testimonies about Russian youth commissions: GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 1-10 (1962). The institutions' reluctance to commit to helping their former inmates was worrying to the authorities, as children would 'work or study nowhere for a considerable time, and in consequence they commit crimes again'. See LVA, f. 700, ap. 5, lie. 1426, ll. 8-30 (1970). This case concerns a special boarding school for delinquent children.

taken care of, and often ended up reoffending.¹⁸⁹ Thus the Soviet institutions for juvenile delinquents never really became tools of re-education (as initially intended). According to a teacher who drew up statistics on the boarding school he was working at, they managed to ‘save’ about 30 percent of the teenagers in the 1980s, and the rest ended up in prison despite their efforts.¹⁹⁰

It is not easy to establish how children graduating from the numerous special schools for children with disabilities or learning difficulties fared after leaving the institution. They left little trace in archival documents, and only one person among the interviewees went to such a school. He (born 1976) had quite a positive impression of his upbringing, saying that everyone he went to school with were leading ‘normal lives’ (that is, with a job and a family), saying that some even made it as far as lawyers, doctors, engineers, and factory workers (which sounds quite exceptional compared to other evidence). He went to a vocational school himself as a carpenter, but stopped when his parents fell ill, and he had to work.¹⁹¹ Slightly more comprehensive impressions can be found in ‘defectological’ publications dealing with children’s *catamnese*.¹⁹² ‘Defectologists’ tried to establish a link between what they called the ‘structure of the defect’ and how well the children adapted to life and labour as adults (using Pevzner’s classification, as discussed in chapter two).¹⁹³

Such studies showed that while most graduates from ‘special schools’ worked somewhere, few were able to fully profit from their boarding school education. For instance, A.G. Asafova analysed the cases of 151 ‘special school’ graduates in her 1963 study. Almost all of them worked, but 40-60 percent did not work in the trade they learned at school. Only very few had

¹⁸⁹ In Leningrad colony, for instance, 26 percent of the 166 released teenagers in 1961 committed new crimes within a year. GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 203, ll. 1-13 (1962). In 5 Ukrainian colonies, 6.6 percent of released teenagers returned to crime within a year: GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 129-42 (1960); 22.5 percent in 12 RSFSR colonies: GARF, f. R8131, op. 32, d. 6578, ll. 143-56 (1960); 20 percent in three Krasnodar krai colonies: GARF, f. A385, op. 26, d. 204, ll. 13-22 (1962); Among those leaving Russian colonies in 1956, 7.2 percent were not working or studying, 2.6 percent are back in another colony, and 10 percent are convicted for ‘proper’ crimes: GARF, f. A259, op. 42, del. 2423 (1958).

¹⁹⁰ However, it is not clear whether this was mostly due to insufficient education and care in the institution, or the lack of care and support after the underage offenders had left the institutions. He seems to suggest the latter, as he claimed that in post-Soviet Russia, released teenagers were personally supported by social workers, and they thus managed to reverse the numbers. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF62A, pp. 9-10.

¹⁹¹ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF14A, pp. 1, 8, 17.

¹⁹² Medical term used to describe the follow-up history of a patient after the release from hospital or after the end of treatment.

¹⁹³ Asafova, ‘Katamnezy detei’; Shalimov, ‘Katamnestichestkoe izuchenie oligofrenov’, p. 28; N.A. Terent’eva, ‘Trudovaia i obshchestvennaia deiatel’nost’ vypusnikov Gor’kovskoi shkoly-internata dlia glukhikh’, *Defektologii* 4 (1970), pp. 56-59; V.M. Vel’gus, ‘Proizvodstvennaia podgotovka I trudovoe ustroistvo glukhikh uchashchikhsia’, *Defektologii* 6 (1970), pp. 54-60.

a family and children at the time in which the study was conducted.¹⁹⁴ A similar study in 1970 by M.I. Iakovenko showed that only 165 among 220 had finished the full special school curriculum; one had to drop out, and 54 had reached the age limit of 18 before they could finish. Again, most graduates did some sort of work, but even fewer worked in the trade they had learned at school (compared to the other study).¹⁹⁵ A similar study by V.F. Shalimov from 1970 gives interesting insights into the family life of graduates from schools for children with disabilities: among the 82 cases he studied, 56 lived with a partner, 22 of which had ‘various deviations of the mental development: schizophrenia, traumatic encephalopathy, manic-depressive psychosis, chronic alcoholism etc.’, 10 were married to other people from ‘special schools’, and 19 were with people without any disability or mental illness. This data reflects the social marginalization of people with disabilities (and, incidentally, the mentally ill).¹⁹⁶

For more personal experiences, albeit only of graduates from ‘general’ boarding schools or children’s homes, the interviews with former children in care are useful. Their fates broadly correspond with what official and published sources have suggested. One interviewee (b. 1951) came from a poor family, her mother sent her (as the oldest child) to a boarding school for financial reasons. After eight years of school, she started working in factory jobs while studying on the side, doing different jobs throughout her life. At the time of the interview, she was a widow and mother of two. Apart from her best friend from school, she did not have any contact to people from school anymore.¹⁹⁷ For her, the boarding school years were a traumatic experience. She either found life in an institution much worse as her family home, or she used it as a projection to cope with the troubles of her childhood. In any way, these years represent a time of suffering that she had to get over, on a quest for a home and a family.

Another former boarding school student grew up without a father and lost her mother at the age of 11. She also did several jobs after graduating but was unemployed at the time of the interview. She was married, with two children.¹⁹⁸ In her life story, she focused on the struggle

¹⁹⁴ According to her, 12 of them did not work at all. Those who finished longer ago (three to five years) tended to work in the trade they were trained in at school, whilst those who graduated more recently (up to two years) often worked in different professions, such as building, amounting to 40-60 percent. Among these graduates, only 36 had a family of their own, and only 14 families had children. On the one hand, those are few, on the other hand some of them had graduated relatively recently. Asafova, ‘Katamnezy detei’, pp. 70-71.

¹⁹⁵ 21.5 percent. Iakovenko, ‘Trudoustroistvo vpusknikov’, pp. 37-39. Documents from the 1980s give a similar impression: in 1984, 609 children graduated from the 34 boarding schools for children with intellectual disabilities in Sverdlovsk oblast. 62.5 percent went straight to work, 2/3 of which started in the trade they were trained in; 33.7 percent got training at a local vocational school (PTU), and 3.8 percent were taken straight out of the work force. See TsDOOSO, f. 4, op. 107, d. 293, ll.1-4, 5-6 (1984).

¹⁹⁶ As explained by Shalimov, ‘Katamnestichestskoe izuchenie oligofrenov’, pp. 27-28.

¹⁹⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69, pp. 1, 11, 20-21.

¹⁹⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, p. 1.

rather than the suffering. Her story is that of an outcast (in many respects) who through very persistent fighting for her existence finally managed to get education, a job, a family – not with the help of the state but of helpful individuals. According to her, the school offered little support: ‘they just told us, confronted us with the facts [*postavili pered faktom*]. How would I find a place? [...] no place at all came up for me.’ For that reason, the school assigned her a staff member as a guardian and told her to go to the building organization for board and training, which she refused. In the end, her guardian managed to organize her a room with the building organization, but they let her work at a factory, while she finished grades 9 and 10 in evening school.¹⁹⁹

The few people she was still in touch with had all gone straight to work, and to evening school on the side. It seems that this was the most useful way for children without parental care to start a career, as they had no financial support or place to live. In contrast, one of her friends still had her parents (and thus a place to stay): she could start full-time vocational training right away.²⁰⁰ She also remembered two people who made it to university to study science in the end. Another one became a stewardess, one worked in the local building organisation, and two went into childcare (with the *militsiia* children’s room and at a kindergarten).²⁰¹ The only properly rural biography (male, with parents, b. 1962) contrasts quite strongly with the mostly female urban ones without parental care. As several of his classmates, he went to the city after school to become a lorry driver (many others became tractor drivers or went to the army); at the time of the interview he was divorced, with two children.²⁰²

The tendency for children in care, especially children without parental care, to end up working in childcare, often even residential care, was also reflected in the interviews: two among the six interviewees (b. 1967 and 1971) went from boarding school/children’s home education to work in the same type of institution; both of them grew up without parents.²⁰³ The institution basically has been their whole life. The former, who had always wanted to be a teacher, knew that she could never work at a normal school because the boarding school was all she had known.²⁰⁴ Another teacher from that same boarding school confirmed these impressions: ‘you see, this is the environment around which they [‘orphans’, children in care] would revolve.

¹⁹⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, pp. 20-21.

²⁰⁰ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67A, p. 21.

²⁰¹ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68A, p. 26.

²⁰² Oxf/Lev P-05 PF26A, p. 1; PF26B, pp. 24-25.

²⁰³ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF47A, p. 1; PF47B, p. 17; Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, pp. 1-3.

²⁰⁴ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48A, p. 43. One former child in care latter worked at the children’s home that she grew up in, but none of the children there knows that. Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 3.

They are afraid that they cannot cope anywhere. Very rarely you will find an orphanage child who ... or a full orphan who would go into another trade.²⁰⁵

Staff members gave a mixed impression of graduates' life courses after leaving the institution. One teacher exclusively listed success stories that she encountered in her working years (since 1970), including Olympic ice skaters, fashion models, and people who ended up going abroad.²⁰⁶ She did, however, clarify later on that 'many' children went to a vocational school first and then eventually moved on the higher education.²⁰⁷ Another childcare worker (since 1959!) gave a more levelled impression of how people coped with their lives after the institution:

Some ended up in prison. I know that some from the boarding school for mentally disabled, where their children are mentally disabled. I know that from my class three people ended up, they were in prison, they were in prison. Well. They are out now, generally became someone, working normally, having a family and everything.

She specified that these teenagers had not been delinquents, but that they had been send back at the age of 15 to their 'terrible' families, often alcoholics, who did not take care of them. According to her, it was difficult for them to have a family, with no first-hand experience of a 'good' one. Despite these hardships, most of both 'her' graduates had managed to build a 'normal' life for themselves in the end. In the case of special needs children, however, she admitted that the placement by the medico-pedagogical commissions could be quite arbitrary, so that their future 'depended on luck'.²⁰⁸ This unfortunate tendency to get mixed up with the prison system at least in the first years 'out' of residential care has been confirmed by Khlinovskaia Rockhill and her interviewees for the late and post-Soviet period. The ones who had been to prison saw it as a continuation of their children's home or boarding school life, and they considered themselves to be at a higher risk of alcoholism and crime.²⁰⁹ Khlinovskaia Rockhill has connected these tendencies to both material, psychological, and social challenges for former children in care: these children 'have had to deal with their ambiguous status and experience the numerous social implications of being *detdomovets* (children of the state).'²¹⁰

²⁰⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, pp. 7-8.

²⁰⁶ She explained that 'very many' of 'their' orphans had reached higher education, albeit not adding which time she referred to. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, p. 18; PF46A, pp. 36, 42.

²⁰⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF46A, pp. 39-40.

²⁰⁸ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF54A, pp. 27-28, PF54B, pp. 39-40.

²⁰⁹ Khlinovskaia Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, pp. 214-15. An assessment of different surveys has shown that 25-50 percent of former children in care have been to prison. Vazhdaeva, quoted in Khlinovskaia Rockhill, p. 249.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

'Incubator kids' – the stigma of residential care in society

In addition to problems of social adaptation and with getting education, work, and housing, former children in care had to face rejection in society, caused by stereotypes about residential care that permeated Soviet society. Following Goffman's conceptualization of that phenomenon, one can say that these children were stigmatized: in the process of categorizing people into 'ordinary'/'natural' or not, society identifies attributes that made people 'different', called stigmata. According to him, people 'stigmatize' others to confirm their own normalcy.²¹¹ Stigmatization thus means that 'by definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human. On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances.'²¹² In a stigmatized person, Goffman explains, any 'minor failing' that would be overlooked in a 'normal person' will be attributed to the defect causing the stigmatization in the first place.²¹³ In an institution where people share a type of 'stigma', some sort of community of 'fellow-sufferers' with a common understanding might form. Upon leaving the institution, many attempted to conceal their stigma, and to 'pass' as 'normal'.²¹⁴ The following sections will examine how Soviet children in care were treated in society and show how their stigmatization could influence their life experiences in society after leaving the institution.

Scholars writing about society's view of children in care have mentioned their marginalized and stigmatized position. In interviews, former children in care confirmed these impressions of difficult relationships between 'inside' and 'outside'. Children in care faced the problem that anyone could easily identify them because of their clothes, which made 'passing as normal' difficult, an issue addressed by many of them.²¹⁵ According to a former boarding school child, they were 'very poorly dressed', and they were embarrassed about it: 'well it was just embarrassing to go out anywhere, especially when you met a boy. So then you ask the girls [who lived with their parents] for something: Give me something to wear, give me something to wear.'²¹⁶ A boarding school teacher also noted that everyone looked the same, and people

²¹¹ Goffman distinguished three types of stigma: 'abominations of the body', 'blemishes of individual character' (which people often link to phenomena like alcoholism, addiction, mental illness, imprisonment, unemployment, homosexuality, etc.) and 'tribal' (nationality, religion, race). See Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (New Jersey, 1990, first edition 1963), pp. 12-14.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²¹³ For instance, any type of behaviour in a mentally ill person will be attributed to their illness. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51, 92-95.

²¹⁵ 'But all the same it was obvious that those were boarding school children, that those were children's home kids'. Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68A, p. 27.

²¹⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68A, p. 27. A former child in care described the clothes they were given as 'really pathetic'. Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF69A, p. 6.

could identify them easily, also because they only got two sets of uniforms for three years, concluding that conditions for ‘orphans’ were ‘very, very, very [scarce]. Just a lot.’²¹⁷

The fact that they were so easy to identify enhanced their stigmatization. In their interviews, former children in care complained that people treated them like ‘black sheep’, called them names (*detdomontsy, internatskie, inkubatorskie*), and blamed them for everything that went wrong around them.²¹⁸ One especially mentioned name calling several times during the interview: ‘how they called us, “orphanage kids”. Although I really did not like that word. [...] And the guys called us, also in the [summer] camp, yes: “There are the orphanage kids”. I was crying all the time, we got into fights with them because of that.’²¹⁹ A former teacher also mentioned the stereotype about ‘bad’ institution kids. She blamed the parents who sent their children to institutions because they did not want them, thus causing a vicious circle:

What opinion can there be if I, he, and she know that we only send the worst ones there? You see, even emanating from this. Then it will be considered after all, that if a family is incomplete, it is not good. And if the family is not good, neither is the child.²²⁰

Such impressions, however, could vary from person to person. For instance, one of the interviewees who grew up in a children’s home did not remember any issues between *detdom* and family children.²²¹ In contrast, a former boarding school student could trace such alienation into her time at university. She was still easily recognized as institution child by her clothing and having less money than everyone else; she remembered feeling like an ‘ugly duckling’.²²²

Interviews with people who grew up outside residential care (also conducted in the context of Kelly’s *Children’s World* project) reveal quite negative stereotypes about children in care. A woman asked about her childhood fears named ‘the orphanage’ and ‘the dark’, the first of which having been triggered by her parents’ behaviour. According to her recollections, her parents shouted at her a lot and threatened to send her to an orphanage if she did not obey: ‘it was scary, very scary. I was afraid of that.’ She was not only afraid because she would be

²¹⁷ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45B, p. 31.

²¹⁸ ‘Sometimes there were these, there were these people shouting: ‘Boarding schoolers! boarding schoolers! Incubator kids! Well and then there was this kind of mistrust, this ... yes you can probably call it mistrust and a readiness to blame everything on boarding school kids. Everything, everything bad that happened – it was the boarding school kids.’ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48, pp. 52-53. This was a common thing, according to Zanozina and Kolosova, *Sirotsvo i besprizornost*, p. 139.

²¹⁹ Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF67B, p. 24. Also: Oxf/Lev SPb-05 PF68B, p. 38.

²²⁰ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF50B, p. 44.

²²¹ Oxf/Lev P-05 PF9A, p. 1.

²²² Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48A, p. 44. Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF48B, p. 52: ‘You see, there we went out, to life, really like ugly ducklings.’

without her mother and father, and all alone, but also because of what she had heard about such children. She claims to never have had any contact with children in care, but people had told her that ‘they are ill-mannered, they are fighting, they are stealing, they are everything you can imagine’. She believed that as a child and did not want to engage with these children, as she admitted.²²³ Such stereotypes could even exist among former children in care. A war orphan who grew up in a children’s home conceded on the one hand that it was hard for them to go out in the world, that they had been shy, scared and ashamed, different from other people, and that they were stigmatized, thought to be thieves. On the other hand, she thought of ‘present-day’ children in care with pretty much the same stereotypes:

Now at the children’s home – they are all such fighters now. Children are now fierce and mischievous, and everything. We were a little bit different. We were inhibited, we were intimidated, we were heartbroken. Because, as a rule, every one of us came from good, functional [*blagopoluchnykb*] families, loving, happy ones.²²⁴

As has been suggested before, these phenomena were less of an issue in rural general boarding schools, as children did not go there because of their parents, but because of the poor local school infrastructure. In an interview, a teacher who worked in the Soviet countryside explained that their nearest orphanage was in the city, so there were no orphans in their boarding school (making a ‘social’ statement). According to her, there were no divisions between children from different types of schools: everyone looked the same anyway, so when a boy was at a boarding school, it was ‘just his place of residence’.²²⁵

Letters to the Children’s Fund show that among popular notions about children in care was a certain ‘inherited’ stigma. Although some people were more than ready to help these children, offering to work in a children’s home, sending money or founding charities, there was a general consensus that children got into care because their parents were delinquent, disabled or mentally ill – that something ‘was wrong with them’ as well.²²⁶ This notion created some worrying ideas about ‘saving’ children, reminiscent of eugenics. A few letter writers suggested that people who were ‘psychologically inferior’ should not be allowed to have children at all. One lady talked about her own cousins, two girls with learning difficulties, born from her aunt and her husband (who had an intellectual disability): she wondered why the state should be

²²³ P-05 PF23A, p. 6.

²²⁴ SPb-02 PF1A, p. 11.

²²⁵ P-05 PF8B, p. 17.

²²⁶ GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987); GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 2485 (1990-93).

'burdened with such children' when it could stop people from giving birth in the first place.²²⁷ Another man wanted the state to have alcoholics, drug addicts, and mentally ill people sterilized, to decrease the births of children with disabilities and the crime rate.²²⁸

These letters also confirm the notion discussed earlier in connection with the 'Pobeg' article: that people generally were not aware of conditions in the homes. In the first two months of their existence, the Lenin Children's Fund received 425 letters, several of which conveyed a sense of urgency. Staff members or parents wrote to the Fund to make dismal conditions in institutions known. Someone working at a children's home in the Mariiskaia ASSR described severe neglect of the children, concluding: 'one cannot keep silent – children are suffering.' Others also legitimized their letters in this way: an educator working in a school for delinquent girls in Krasnoborsk witnessed all sorts of misbehaviour, thefts, even violent gang wars there, as well as very poor material conditions and management. She explained that 'the heart aches for these children, who are abandoned (*broshennykh*) and needed by no one.'²²⁹ Feeling the need to make such issues known suggests knowledge of the general ignorance about them, and of official attempts to keep it that way.

Looking at children with disabilities provides further evidence of stigmatization and marginalization, as similar mechanisms were in place. Recent research about disability in the Soviet Union has flagged up the trend in state policy away from 'the economic participation of disabled people towards the provision of pensions and institutional care for them'. According to an activist, this led to a wide-spread view among the population that people with disabilities were passive recipients of social benefits.²³⁰ Many people travelling to the Soviet Union in the 1980s observed that 'disability' was pretty much invisible there.²³¹ In an interview, a university teacher confirmed this impression, saying that for a long time, she had not been aware of disabled children or any discourse about them: 'in general, I came across the problem of disabled people quite late'.²³² In a documentary from 1988, people with disabilities explained this was actively promoted in society, as they got turned down in job

²²⁷ GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

²²⁸ GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 2485 (1990-93). He also opted for the death penalty for people who killed a child and castration as well as lifelong incarceration for someone raping 10-12-year-old girls.

²²⁹ GARF, f. R5446, op. 148, d. 1449, ll. 6-21 (1987).

²³⁰ Iarskaia-Smirnova and Romanov, 'Heroes and Spongers', p. 79. According to the authors, this view was supported by the very selective portrayal of disability in Soviet media and films, until the development of independent arts made possible by Glastnost, see *ibid.*, pp. 82-85, 89-91.

²³¹ Landon Pearson, *Children of Glasnost: Growing Up Soviet* (Seattle, 1990), p. 186; Dunn, 'Everyday Life of the Disabled in the USSR', pp. 217-19, 227.

²³² P-05 PF4A, p. 29.

interviews or at the theatre box office because they might scare people.²³³ People with disabilities were thus stigmatized and marginalized by the Soviet system, whether they lived in residential care or not.²³⁴

Interviews with people working in the education sector show that such negative views about people with disability were widespread among the population. A teacher working with special needs children shared her indignation about people's attitudes towards 'her' pupils. When she visited a blockade monument with her group, the school director had greeted her initiative with the words 'have you gone mad? With mentally retarded children!'. When later on she gave some of them money to buy flowers, the lady working at the monument panicked: 'what?! What did you do! You gave them...?! They won't come back!' – all suggesting that children with disabilities could not be trusted.²³⁵ In her opinion, this prejudice, in combination with diagnosing neglected children as disabled, and with labelling struggling children as 'bad students', started many delinquent careers.²³⁶ The deeply entrenched stereotypes about children in care which permeated Soviet society added to feelings of rejection with which many children in care had to live and caused difficulties for them to start a life outside of care. These difficulties were enhanced by what has already been called a 'clash of cultures'.

A different way to grow up?

When Christie Davis reflected about the limitations of Goffman's concept of the *total institution*, he suggested that it only made sense in contexts in which the lives of people outside institutions is radically different from life in institutions, for instance where the domains of sleep, work, and play are separated. According to Davis, the *total institution* as an analytical category is thus only helpful in a modern Western context.²³⁷ It is necessary to consider carefully whether this

²³³ Iarskaia-Smirnova and Romanov, 'Heroes and Spongers', pp. 88-89.

²³⁴ See also Eszter Gabor, 'Living with a disability in Hungary: Reconstructing the narratives of disabled students', in Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 121-40, here pp. 121-22. According to Lūse/Kamerāde, the same was true for mental illness. In their research about psychiatry in Soviet Latvia, they showed that even seeing a 'psychoneurologist' would put people on an official list, stigmatizing them as ill, or as 'less than others': they were then banned from travelling abroad, from certain professions, in some cases even from driving a car: 'Moreover, being listed could also become known to colleagues, bosses, neighbours or other citizens, the majority of whom regarded mental illness as not only irreversible and untreatable, but also dangerous. At the level of Soviet ideology, people with disabilities of any kind were perceived as a threat to the state-cultivated image of happy and productive Soviet citizens. Therefore, they were likely to be kept out of public sight and treated in psycho-neurological hospitals.' Agita Lūse and Kamerāde, Daiga, 'Between Disabling Disorders and Mundane Nervousness: Representations of psychiatric patients and their distress in Soviet and Post-Soviet Latvia', in Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 97-120, here p. 102.

²³⁵ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53B, p. 16.

²³⁶ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF53B pp. 20-21.

²³⁷ Davies, 'Goffman's Concept of the Total Institution', p. 79.

concept is a productive tool to explain Soviet residential childcare institutions.²³⁸ Although scholars (especially Kharkhordin) have argued that such divisions between work, sleep, and play were marginal in the Soviet Union, this section will argue that they were not marginal compared to residential care, and that the rift between life in ‘inside’ and ‘out’ was widened by developments happening in society that never reached institutions in the same manner, which made the process of adaptation increasingly difficult for graduates. This will allow to get a better sense of the extent of the marginalization and alienation that children experienced in residential care.

The picture emerging from most recent works on Soviet social history contradicts the notion that life in Soviet society was like a total institution.²³⁹ The sections above have suggested that children growing up in residential care had a different childhood to children growing up in families. Catriona Kelly has argued that children in care’s problems of adaptation were connected to the social isolation of the institutions. According to her, many general social changes in the decades of Late Socialism never made it to residential care. She singled out the example of the extension of childhood in the post-war decades (as it happened in many other countries around that time), which never took place in children’s homes and boarding schools of the Union, or only to some degree. School education had been extended in residential care, but children were still released from children’s homes comparatively early.²⁴⁰ In this view, the residential upbringing was thus in a way ‘old-fashioned’. Residential care had fallen out of step with contemporary life, although not only in the way that Kelly has suggested.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the relationship between citizens and the Soviet leadership changed; many people perceived a certain disenchantment with the whole socialist framework. Donald Raleigh has addressed this in his oral history-based book *Soviet Baby Boomers*. Raleigh has painted the picture of a ‘cynical generation’, which challenged the ‘truths’ presented by the Soviet leadership, practised a pragmatic approach towards the system, and had more access to information and commodities (including ‘Western’ ones) than any generation before them.²⁴¹ One has to keep in mind, however, that this study mainly looked at the offspring of the Soviet

²³⁸ Just as Jan Plamper has cautioned against universally and carelessly applying Foucault’s ideas about *biopower* to Soviet examples without considering the historical context. Jan Plamper, ‘Foucault’s Gulag’, in *Kritika* 2/3 (2002), pp. 255-80.

²³⁹ See for instance, Fürst, *Stalin’s Last Generation*; Lovell, *Shadow of War*; Oberländer, ‘Cushy Work’; Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*; Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever*.

²⁴⁰ Kelly, *Children’s World*, p. 271. Khlinovskaia Rockhill also quoted A. Kharchev, a Soviet sociologist, who connected the ‘extension of childhood’ to changes in labour legislation as well as the prolonged school education. See *Lost to the State*, p. 298.

²⁴¹ Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*, pp. 163-66.

elite; people who were relatively well-off and well connected. Research on the Brezhnev era, so far, has hardly looked at people at the margins of society (in contrast to scholars of the Khrushchev era) but mostly at members of subcultures, dissidents, or underground artists.²⁴²

In his book *Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More*, Alexey Yurchak also described a long-term change in people's relationships with Soviet ideology and the state. He claimed that Soviet citizens did not expect the Soviet Union to collapse, but still most people (at least in the younger generations) did not seem surprised by it, were even prepared for it.²⁴³ According to him, a 'performative shift' took place within the last Soviet generations, meaning that the discursive elements in Soviet rituals (like parades, socialist holidays, Komsomol assemblies) were basically reduced to their performative dimension, whereas the constative dimension (the content) lost its meaning and was reinterpreted by individual citizens. Yurchak has labelled these actions (of accepting some norms, rejecting others, and adapting others again) not as resistance to the Soviet leadership, but as agency.²⁴⁴ This development started in the 1950s after Stalin's death and was the reason why parts of the 'last Soviet generation' could distance themselves enough from the official sphere that they lived *вне* the Soviet system (the Russian word for 'outside of', implying that it was not in opposition to, but neither completely detached from it).²⁴⁵

Other scholars have established that Soviet people developed informal practices and discourses which completed official ones. In her study of Soviet post-war youth, Juliane Fürst has argued that while personal relationships in the USSR were usually somehow linked to the official sphere (as Kharkhordin had suggested), this was only part of the picture: 'official norms and values were supplemented with a whole variety of contrasting practices and codes of behaviour, which existed on a non-written, non-coded, populist level.'²⁴⁶ In a similar spirit but with a clearer focus on everyday life, Alexandra Oberländer has studied 'Soviet work ethics' to question the popular stereotype that 'no one worked' in the late Soviet Union. She thus showed similar strategies to make do in the Soviet everyday, not opposing the Soviet system but using its structures creatively to one's advantage. It would thus be wrong to say that people did not work much; people were rather investing considerable time and energy into 'work' outside

²⁴² This is argued by Juliane Fürst in 'Where Did All the Normal People Go? Another Look at the Soviet 1970s,' *Kritika* 3/14 (2013), pp. 621-640, here 622-23.

²⁴³ Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever*, p. 2.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-30. Yurchak bases these observations on speech act theory as developed by John Austin.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-31.

²⁴⁶ Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation*, p. 289.

their paid employment. This could become a necessity in a society in which many things could not be bought in shops and with money.²⁴⁷

Instead of investing all their energy into their official job, people engaged in many other activities to keep their lives afloat. They committed to *obshchestvennaia* work to improve their chances to a nicer apartment or a car; they engaged in private business or petty trade (*blat*) to provide for themselves materially; they grew their own food; left work early to get home in time, take care of the home and family, buy groceries to make up for the poor infrastructure; or volunteered for services which the official administration failed to provide, such as taking care of their housing, or even medical care.²⁴⁸ In her study of the Soviet informal economy, Alena Ledeneva described *blat* as ‘nothing special at all – just a daily routine, habitual and therefore fairly automatic’ to those who grew up with it but as ‘a kind of art’ to those who did not (referring to ‘Westerners’).²⁴⁹ While based on the traditional rural concept of *krugovaia poruka* (collective guarantee or responsibility – equally supportive and controlling networks within a community), *blat* was based on ‘following the unwritten rules and a subtle understanding of what was possible and what was not’, which could be very complex for outsiders. In addition, like rural communities, such networks could be quite exclusive for people considered not to belong.²⁵⁰ There was thus a complex substructure to the official state- and Party-run system (the former being necessary to keep the latter afloat) – which provided a challenge for the ‘children of the state’.

This corresponds to Khlinovskaia Rockhill’s argument that ‘these children were raised to be better Soviet citizens than children who grew up at home, since many characteristics fostered by the Soviet moral code and transmitted through heavily ideologized educational settings were uncontested by the familial influence’. A children’s home director explained that children in care tended to be ‘too honest’ and unaware of implicit rules, unable to manoeuvre in the complex networks, often lost in society.²⁵¹ One could thus argue that an upbringing in residential care with its spectrum from loving care to neglect and abuse might offer different types of unsuitable preparation for a life in society. Coming from the worst kind of institution, children might leave deeply traumatized, struggling to form social relationships and to adjust to an unregulated life. Coming from the best kind of institution, children might leave prepared

²⁴⁷ Oberländer, ‘Cushy Work’, pp. 569-572. In addition, it happened frequently that there was not much to do ‘at work’ because of shortages.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 573-86.

²⁴⁹ Ledeneva, *Russia’s Economy of Favours*, p. 4.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 76-77.

²⁵¹ Khlinovskaia Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, p. 242.

for a ‘socialist’ society that did not exist, overwhelmed by a double clash of cultures: ‘institutional’ life vs. life in society, as well as a simplified ideological concept of socialist society vs. the much more complex and less ideological ‘every day socialism’. As one of Khlinovskaia Rockhill’s interviewees put it, their communist upbringing ‘put rose-tinted glasses on [their] eyes’.²⁵²

Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter, the newspaper article ‘Pobeg’ set the scene for post-Stalinist residential childcare – with so-called ‘social orphans’ filling the institutions, and an established system of administration (including punishment) by proxy resulting in abuse and violence. Both of these seemed perfectly normal to people in care and outrageous to the rest of society, as the journalist suggested. These impressions confirm and expand the idea developed in chapter three, that Soviet residential childcare provided a (probably systemically) deficient preparation for a fully independent life in society. Children in care had a difficult start in life, as institutions generally did not make up for the initial ‘disadvantages’ that they already had, sometimes quite to the contrary. In addition to these insights, this chapter has shown that children had to go through a process of adaptation to cope with life in care, and then they had to go through a similar process once they left the institutions. The state often seemed to be of little help in either of these processes.

The way in which children perceived life in care depended on their family situation, prior experiences, their personality, and parameters in their institution (material conditions, how they were treated by staff and peers). Some managed to adapt well, whilst others hated the ‘institutional life’ – looking back, most of them seemed to agree that their experiences made them tough. And, of course, those were the ‘survivors’ speaking. The chapter illustrated that life in care was very peculiar, and that the rigid, even oppressive atmosphere created by the *rezhim*, collectivism, and the material setting of residential care could not be levelled out by members of staff, although a number of them tried. In cases of staff members abusing children, children could end up traumatized, not used to any kind of normal interaction. One boarding school teacher, for instance, recalled a group of traumatized children coming to their boarding school from a *detdom*, telling her how they had been beaten there: ‘if you talked to them in a friendly, human way, they didn’t understand at all.’²⁵³

²⁵² Khlinovskaia Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, p. 228.

²⁵³ Oxf/Lev SPb-04 PF45A, p. 5.

As with life in residential care, the children's later life could go various ways: some managed to lead a 'normal' Soviet life, to get education and work, to start family; but a great number of them also ended up in prison or psychiatric hospitals.²⁵⁴ Many went straight to work, if they could find any. Additional career ambition required extra effort and struggle (usually doing manual labour and going to evening school for further qualification), which a number of them took upon themselves. To this added their marginalized and stigmatized position in society – if people had any thoughts about them at all, they would tend to see them as delinquents waiting to happen, as disabled or mentally ill. A sense of 'if they were in an institution, something *must* be wrong with them' was widespread. The blurring of categories such as 'disabled', 'mentally ill', or 'delinquent' (as discussed in chapter two) can thus not only be explained by a common criterion of being unable or unwilling to work according to the official rules, but also by a common stigmatization and marginalization of these groups: 'what' exactly they were was less important than confirming the fact that they were different, 'not normal'. The relatively fluid network of institutions inadvertently reinforced this trend.

²⁵⁴ As has been confirmed by Khlinovskaia Rockhill, both for the Soviet years and beyond, see *Lost to the State*, p. 241.

Conclusion

In 1957, the Russian Minister of Education Afansenko had advertised the boarding school reform as the formation of a ‘new system of education’ that would further reinforce the role of the state bringing up the Union’s children.¹ That General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko labelled the issue of residential childcare as ‘simply forgotten’ almost 30 years later seemed surprising at first.² After analyzing the context of residential childcare, how it was managed, and how children lived in it, this development looks less paradoxical. Soviet welfare and public order agencies targeted children whose parents could not take care of them, neglected or abused them, as well as children with disabilities. However, they ended up hitting disproportionately children from socially marginalized and poor families. Residential childcare took in children who did not or could not live according to socialist norms. Among people considered as ‘deviant’ by the Soviet authorities were mostly people suffering from diverse social issues and people diagnosed with disabilities. The Soviet leadership meant to uphold an image of a happy and healthy socialist society, and residential care not only served as a means to form ‘deviant’ children under their full control and transform them into ‘builders of communism’; such institutions also offered the additional advantage of keeping these children out of sight.

Social issues were largely omitted in Soviet public discourse, and wherever they manifested themselves, the authorities blamed individual people for poverty, alcoholism, or unemployment. Child removal thus served as threat and punishment for parents to adjust their behaviour. In close cooperation between public order and social welfare agencies, this way of dealing with social destitution led in fact to a criminalization of poverty. Just as the different institutions formed one residential childcare network, the boundaries between different notions of deviance, such as poverty, alcoholism, mental illness, delinquency, and disability, became blurred, as all were considered as dangers to the socialist project and the productivity of society. Thus, the children’s projected (un-)productivity was the factor connecting the different ways into care: children were put in boarding schools and children’s homes so that

¹ Kaz'min, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie*, p. 13.

² See the beginning of the introduction, and GARF, f. R5446, op. 145, d. 1258, ll. 1-14 (1983-85).

they would not grow up to become deviant citizens, to ensure they would be useful to the state.

The Soviet residential childcare system was thus designed to isolate its inmates and to maximize their productivity as future loyal socialist workers. Children were classified within this system according to their age, health, and behaviour, based on an assessment of their future ability to work. In cooperation with the scientific community, the Soviet authorities aimed to create a rational model of education and control. Whilst the input of experts in relevant fields can generally prove a valuable influence in politics and provide legitimization (and funding) to the disciplines in question to improve their work, the power balance might however shift the other way. In this case, rather than research informing new policies, the political leadership might shape research to an extent that threatens its independence, especially in an authoritarian regime like the Soviet one. Although Soviet ‘defectologists’ produced research at a high level, their power to influence the authorities or their investments was very limited. This thesis has shown that the increasing involvement of the sciences, especially ‘defectology’ (that is, medicine, psychology, and pedagogy) in the realm of social policy led to a shift from a criminalization to a pathologization of deviance in the decades after Stalin’s death. Thus, scientists fought against, as well as contributed to the marginalization and medicalization of Soviet children in care.

Soviet child welfare policies lead to a ‘double’ marginalization, of the children in residential care, and of residential care itself. As the analysis of the varying living conditions in homes and boarding schools has shown, the Soviet authorities managed residential childcare on a low priority. Central, regional, and local agencies kept these institutions underfunded, demanding great dedication from the local staff, and thus conducted a policy of containment. Case studies indicated that improving the conditions in individual institutions was possible but that the responsible agencies chose to intervene only in very specific situations: when they found that institutions wasted state funds, or when children left the institution unsupervised. In this case, the boundary between institution and outside world broke down, which risked revealing the issues that residential childcare was supposed to conceal.

Thus, residential care allowed the governing and Party agencies on a regional level to ‘manage’ social issues (if only keeping them out of sight), and to enable children in care to be as well-adapted and productive as possible with spending as little money as possible. On the one hand, the belief that controlling and marginalizing these children was paramount to achieving these aims must have been stronger than financial constraints, because putting children in care was

in fact much more expensive than leaving them in their families. On the other hand, the more isolated children were in residential care, the more the authorities could allow themselves to cut the funds allocated to them, hoping that the 'outside world' would not find out about it. This isolation, however, impeded the attempts to prepare the children in their care for productive labour.

The management of the Soviet residential childcare network was thus shaped by a paradox to which the people in charge responded with pragmatism. As Goffman has shown, the tension between inside and outside, the barrier between them was used to control the inmates of *total institutions*. However, isolating the children from society like this made it difficult, if not impossible, to prepare them for a life in society. In addition, the connection to society was necessary to provide for the children due to the underfunding of residential childcare. As a response to this and other dilemmas, state and Party officials often resorted to pragmatism, a balancing of ideological or political aims and what was possible given the lack of funding. For instance, children in care had to take part in maintaining, sometimes even building their institution, which was interpreted as life preparation and socialist self-administration. Children in care were also seen and used as a resource by the state to fix gaps in the labour market, under the slogan of raising 'builders of communism'.

This boundary between institution and society, with the subsequent isolation of the institution, led to the formation of an 'institutional culture', of particular social structures and conventions that were different from those 'outside'. As diverse as different types of institutions as well as conditions in individual institutions could be, archival documents and interview transcripts have shown that children in care had common experiences. Life in care was dominated by the rigid organization of space and time by the institutional setting, the *rezhim*, and collectivism. Even dedicated and caring staff members could not completely make up for the oppressive atmosphere created by these organization patterns. Together with the children's family situation, personality, and prior experiences, it depended on these staff members how the institution shaped a child's life: some children got used to life in care eventually, others could not and left the institution traumatized. However, former children in care agreed that this life had made them tough, tougher than children 'outside'.

Several scholars have established that there was something of a typical 'institutional child'. Shaped by common experiences and stigma, children in care felt connected to each other, different from the rest. They were bound by the paradoxical nature of life in care, being alone

and in the collective, controlled and neglected at the same time.³ In Khlinovskaia Rockhill's interviews, former children in care explained that they recognized other former children in care immediately, and instantly found a common language.⁴ Through this culture clash, the feeling of being different (mirrored by stigmatization in society), the 'institutional' upbringing prolonged the children's marginalization into their life after the institution. Often, people around them were not very helpful because many saw former children in care as either future delinquents, disabled, or mentally ill. The aforementioned blurring of categories of deviance was widespread in Soviet society: it seems like more generally, it hardly mattered in which way people were 'not normal'. The relatively fluid network of total institutions inadvertently reinforced this trend.

This created a certain affinity for other 'total institutions' among former children in care, as the analysis of social structures developing around punishment by proxy and their similarity to gang hierarchies, *dedovshchina*, and prison culture has shown. This was also true for 'inmates' of other total institutions. Bannikov established in his studies about the Soviet army that many former conscripts favoured social environments in which their army-learned behaviour was more acceptable (such as with the police force).⁵ In the case of former children in care, this meant that although a number of them managed to make a 'normal' life for themselves, many children moved on to the army, which was encouraged by the authorities. Others tried to stay in residential childcare by working there, and that others again struggled to integrate, or committed to a life of crime (more or less on purpose).

As the importance of Goffman's, Raphael's, and Foucault's ideas for this thesis suggest, such observations about children in care and residential institutions are not necessarily limited to the Soviet case. Children from marginalized social groups, from poor families, and children with disabilities were isolated in residential care, suffered neglect and abuse, were stigmatized and struggled in life in other countries and other contexts as well. The practice to lock people with disabilities into institutions, to tie them to their beds, and deprive them of their rights was also widespread well beyond the boundaries of the iron curtain. In Western Europe, however, large-scale activism to 'de-institutionalize' people with disabilities started earlier than in Eastern Europe, in the 1970s. These and other parallels with residential care at other times and places

³ See Khlinovskaia Rockhill, *Lost to the State*, p. 250.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

⁵ Bannikov, 'Regimented Communities'.

open a perspective for comparison, which cannot be thoroughly explored in the context of this thesis.

Some characteristics of Soviet residential childcare seem to be specific to its context, many of them being connected to the role of ideology in the USSR. The ubiquity of ideology, for instance, was a specifically socialist trait, and created many paradoxical situations: in residential care, children were prepared for an idealized version of the society in which they would live later on (more so than in other places). At the same time, these children in care belonged to marginalized social groups which officially hardly even existed due to the specifically Soviet stance on poverty and disability. In addition, the Soviet case, to an extent along with other socialist countries, was specific because there was an ideological foundation establishing state institutions as adequate, if not the best places to bring up a child, with its collectivism and 'rational' organization (even if this notion was increasingly contested). The Soviet way of governance also had a strong impact on residential childcare: starting overly ambitious projects in the centre of power and leaving it to regional and local authorities to sort out the specifics. Whilst similar things happened in other (especially authoritarian) states, these seem particular to the Soviet Union, if only because of its size.

Those former Soviet children in care who ventured out into society to make a living usually found out that they were not prepared for it. This was not only true for children from particularly 'bad' institutions, whose emotional scars from neglect, abuse, or violence made any kind of life difficult. It was also the case for children from homes and boarding schools that were working as the state had intended, with dedicated personnel. More often than not, former children in care struggled to cope with life on their own, and with the realities of Soviet life. This was due to the (in many ways) idealized upbringing in residential care: they had learned more about socialist society as it should have been, and less about how it actually worked. As has been shown, Soviet people had developed mechanisms and conventions to complete or even circumvent the often inflexible, rigid official structures to provide for themselves. Children in care grew up with no or limited knowledge of how to procure oneself with housing, food, and other things; they grew up isolated, often without family or other outside connections to help them out. They had much to catch up on, and little to show for it.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Archives and Collections

GARF (*Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, Russian State Archive): material from the Union-level Council of Ministers (f. R5446), the Russian Council of Ministers (f. A259), the Soviet Procuracy (f. R8131), the Soviet Control Committee (f. R9527), the Russian Control Committee (f. A420), the Russian Supreme Soviet (f. A385), the Soviet Ministry of Education (f. R9563), the Russian Ministry of Education (f. A2306), the Soviet Academy of Pedagogy (f. 10049), and the Central Soviet Council of Trade Unions (f. R5451).

GASO (*Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sverdlovskoi Oblasti*, Sverdlovsk Oblast' State Archive): material from: the city's (f. 1427) and the oblast's (f. 233) education department.

TsDOOSO (*Tsentralnaya Dokumentatsiia Obshchestvennykh Organizatsiakh Sverdlovskoi Oblasti*, former archive of the Sverdlovsk Communist Party): material from the oblast'- (f. 4) and city-level (f. 161) committees.

GU OGACHO (Cheliabinsk Oblast' State Archive): material from the Oblast'-level Party committee (f. P288).

LVA (*Latvijas Valsts Arhivs*, Latvian State Archive): material from the Latvian Ministry of Education (f. 700) and the Latvian Council of Ministers (f. 270).

Interview Transcripts

The life history interviews cited here and coded 'Oxf/Lev' were conducted for a project sponsored by the Leverhulme Trust under grant no. F/08736/A 'Childhood in Russia, 1890-1991: A Social and Cultural History' (2003-2006). The interviews are © The University of Oxford. The coding system consists of a project identifier, place code (St Petersburg (SPb.), Moscow (M.), Perm' (P), and Taganrog (T), and villages in Leningrad (2004) and Novgorod (2005) provinces (V)), a date code, a cassette number (PF), and a transcript page (e.g. 'Oxf/Lev SPb-03 PF8A, p. 38').

Oxf/Lev M-04: PF29A

Oxf/Lev P-05: PF9A-B, PF14A-B, 26A-27B.

Oxf/Lev SPb-02: PF19A-B.

Oxf/Lev SPb-04: PF45A-46A, PF47A-48B, PF49A-51A, PF52A-B, PF53A-55B, PF57A-59A, PF60A-61B, PF62A-63B, PF65A-66B.

Oxf/Lev SPb-05: PF67A-68B, PF69, PF72A-B, PF73A-B.

Oxf/Lev SPb-06 PF79A-B.

Newspapers

Pravda

Izvestiia

Literaturnaia Gazeta

Ogonek

Sovetskaia Rossiia

Published sources

Afanasenko, E.I. and Kairova, I.A. (eds), *Piat' let sbkol-internatov* (Moscow, 1961).

Andrejewa, E.P., 'Arbeitserfahrungen bei der sittlichen Erziehung im Kinderheim', in *Erfahrungen aus sowjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954, orig. in Russian 1951), pp. 90-104.

Asafowa, A.G., 'Katamnezy detei, okonchivshikh 30-iu vspomogatel'nuiu shkolu Moskvy v 1955-1960 uchebnykh godakh,' in *Spetsial'naiia shkola* 108.4 (1963), pp. 70-75.

Bogina, T.L. and Terekhova, N.T., *Rezhim Dnia v Detskom sadu* (Moscow, 1987).

Chekerlan, D.L., 'V internate dalekogo zapoliar'ia', in: Ziubina, *Vospitatel'naiia rabota*, pp. 25-31.

D'iachkov, A.I., 'Itogi soveshchaniï-seminarov po perestroïke sistemy spetsial'nykh uchrezhdeniiï', *Spetsial'naiia shkola* 105.1 (1963), pp. 3-4.

D'iachkov, A.I., 'Nasushchnye problem spetsial'nykh shkol', *Spetsial'naiia shkola* 117.1 (1966), pp. 3-6.

D'iachkov, A.I., 'O nekotorykh zadachakh spetsial'nykh shkol', *Spetsial'naiia shkola* 114.2 (1965), pp. 3-6.

D'iachkov, A.I., 'O vzaimodeïstviï teorii i praktiki vospitaniia i obucheniia anomal'nykh detei', *Spetsial'naiia shkola* 106.2 (1963), pp. 3-4.

D'iachkov, A.I., 'Ponjat' uroven' idejno-vospitatel'noj raboty v spetsial'nykh shkolakh,' *Spetsial'naiia shkola* 113.1 (1965), pp. 3-6.

Demidow, M.I., 'Erfahrungen mit den neuen Lehrplänen für Arbeitsausbildung und -erziehung', in *Erfahrungen aus sowjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 170-83.

Dudko, N.N., 'Die Pionierarbeit im Kinderheim', in: *Erfahrungen aus sowjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954, orig. in Russian 1951), pp. 145-56.

Dul'nev, G.M., 'K itogam vsrossiiskogo soveshchaniia-seminara rabotnikov vspomogatel'nykh shkol', *Spetsial'naiia shkola* 105.1 (1963), pp. 8-16.

- Galuzinskii, V.M., 'My stali edinoi i družnoi sem'ei', in E.I. Afanasenko, I.A. Kairova (eds), *Piat' let shkol-internatov*, (Moscow, 1961), pp. 208-21.
- Gerbeev, Iu.V. and Vinogradova, A.A., *Sistema vospitatel'noi raboty v detskom dome: Posobie dlia vospitatelia* (Moscow, 1976).
- Iakovenko, M.I., 'Trudoustroistvo vypusknikov vspomogatel'noi shkoly [iz materialov iubileinykh vsesoiuznykh "pedagogicheskikh chtenii" 1970g.]', *Defektologii* 1 (1971), pp. 37-39.
- Iakovlev, N.S., *Zapiski direktora shkoly* (Moscow, 1987).
- Iashchenko, M.M., 'Starsheklassniki v kollektive shkol-internatov', in Afanasenko and Kairova (eds), *Piat' let shkol-internatov*, pp. 143-60.
- Iavkin, V., 'O rabote V Vsesoiuznogo S"esda nevropatologov i psikhiatrov', *Defektologija* 2 (1970), pp. 92-96.
- Jessipow, B.P., Fingenowa, M.W., and Chochlowa, N.J., 'Die Erziehung zur Diszipliniertheit im Kinderheim', in *Erziehungsarbeit im sonjetischen Kinderheim* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 39-48.
- Kaz'min, N.D. (ed.), *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie po shkolam-internatam (19-23 aprilia 1957 g.): stenograficheski otchet* (Moscow, 1958).
- Kolominskii, N.L., 'Samootsenka uchashchikhsja vspomogatel'noj shkoly i uroven' ikh pritjazanii v protsesse professional'no-trudovoj podgotovki', *Defektologija* 2 (1970), pp. 70-74.
- Lasarewa, T.S., 'Das pädagogische Kollektiv des Kinderheims im Kampf um gute Lernergebnisse der Schüler', in *Erfahrungen aus sonjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 13-24.
- Lewitow, N.D., 'Kameradschaft und Freundschaft bei Kindern im Schulalter', in *Erziehungsarbeit im sonjetischen Kinderheim* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 9-22.
- Machikhina, V.F., 'Pravil'nyi otbor i komplektovanie: vazhnoe sveno v rabote spetsial'nykh shkol', *Defektologija* 1 (1970), pp. 3-7.
- Madarai, Ia.Ia. and Kliavin', M.Ia., 'Vospitanie kommunisticheskogo otnosheniia k trudu I obshchestvennoi sobstvennosti u uchashchikhsja', *Spetsial'naia shkola* 105.1 (1963), pp. 29-32.
- Makarenko, Anton Semenovich, *Sochineniia, tom pervyi: Pedagogicheskaiia poema* (Moscow, 1950).
- Ministry of Social Welfare (ed.), *Sotsial'no-trudovaia adaptatsiia umstvenno otstalykh detei v domakh-internatak: Metodicheskie rekomendatsii dlia rabotnikov orgnov i uchrezhdenii sotsial'nogo obespecheniia* (Moscow, 1986).
- Morozova, N.G., 'Psikhologicheskaja podgotovka k trudu uchashchikhsja spetsial'nykh shkol', *Spetsial'naia shkola* 107.3 (1963), pp. 3-11.
- Mosgowaja, S.P., 'Drei Jahre Arbeit in der Gruppe', in *Erfahrungen aus sonjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 157-69.
- Pevzner, M.S., 'Meditsinskoe obsluzhivanie spetsial'nykh shkol', *Defektologija* 6 (1970), pp. 3-10.

- Pevzner, M.S., 'Osnovnye napravleniia v izuchenii oligofrenii', *Defektologii* 2 (1970), pp. 40-44.
- Politova, A.V., 'Individual'nye razlichii v tempe raboty vypusknits vspomogatel'noi shkoly v protsesse proizvodstvennogo obucheniia, *Defektologii* 5 (1970), pp. 62-65.
- Sal'nikova, G.P., *Rezhim dnia vospitannikov sbkol'nogo detskogo doma* (Moscow, 1954).
- Scharonova, N.W., 'Die Erziehung der Kinder zu kultiviertem Verhalten', *Erfahrungen aus sonjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 105-18.
- Scharonova, N.W., 'Die Erziehung des Kinderkollektivs', in *Erfahrungen aus sonjetischen Kinderheimen* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 119-44.
- Semeinoe Vospitanie: Slovar' dlia roditelei* (Moscow, 1967).
- Shalimov, V.F., 'Katamnesticeskoe izuchenie oligofrenov', *Defektologii* 4 (1970), pp. 26-32.
- Solowjowa, A.D., 'Die Entwicklung des Kinderkollektivs', in *Heimerzieher berichten: Beiträge sonjetischer Erzieher* (Berlin, 1955), pp. 3-17.
- Sovmin SSSR (ed.), *Naselenie SSSR (chislennost', sostav i dvizhenie naseleniia) 1973: Statisticheski sbornik* (Moscow, 1975).
- Sovmin SSSR (ed.), *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda: Tom II: Pol, vozrast i sostoianie v brake naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1972).
- Stachurcky, A.E., 'Die Mitarbeit der Zöglinge bei der Ausgestaltung des Heimgrundstückes', in *Erziehungsarbeit im sonjetischen Kinderheim* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 64-73.
- Stankina, S.I., 'K voprosu o vospitanii kollektiva i lichnosti vo vspomogatel'noi shkole-internate', *Spetsial'naia sbkola* 115.3 (1965), pp. 37-42.
- Terent'eva, N.A., 'Trudovaia i obshchestvennaia deiatel'nost' vypusnikov Gor'kovskoi shkoly-internata dlia glukhikh', *Defektologii* 4 (1970), pp. 56-59.
- Tikhomirov, K.S., *Sbkol'nye internaty* (Moscow, 1953).
- Tokar', I.G., 'Vospitatel'nye vozdeistvija v uslovijakh vspomogatel'noj shkoly-internata', *Spetsial'naia sbkola* 116.4 (1965), pp. 92-94.
- Umanskii, A.G., Lavrik, A.N., and Asaturova, K.Z., *Organizatsiia kollektiva vospitannikov v detskom dome* (Moscow, 1958).
- Val'eva, S.P., Shpital'nik, P.I. (eds), *Detskii gorodok v Nizhnem Tagile* (Moscow, 1963).
- Vel'gus, V.M., 'Proizvodstvennaia podgotovka i trudovoe ustroistvo glukhikh uchashchikhsia', *Defektologii* 6 (1970), pp. 54-60.
- Vlasova, T.A., 'K novym dostizhenijam sovetskoj defektologii', *Defektologii* 3 (1971), pp. 3-12.
- Voinov, Nicholas, *Outlaw: The Autobiography of a Soviet Waif* (London, 1955).

Ziubina, L.M., *Vospitatel'naiia rabota v detskikh domov* (Moscow, 1961).

Zubrilin, Iu.K., 'Sovmestnaia rabota pedagogov i vrachei v uchrezhdeniakh dlia gluboko umstvenno otstalykh detei', *Defektologiiia* 2 (1971), pp. 30-34.

Secondary Sources

- Alymov, Sergei, 'Poniatie "perezhitok" i sovetskie sotsial'nye nauki v 1950-1960-e gg.', *Antropologicheskii forum* 16 (2012), pp. 261-87.
- Applebaum, Anne, *Gulag: A History* (London, 2004).
- Attwood, Lynne, 'Housing and the Home in the Khrushchev Era', in Ilic, Reid and Attwood (eds): *Women in the Khrushchev Era*, pp. 177-202.
- Bacon, Edwin and Sandle, Mark (eds), *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (Basingstoke, 2002).
- Bannikov, Konstantin, 'Regimented Communities in a Civil Society', *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies* 1 (2004), Online since 29 September 2005, URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/pipss/40> (accessed on 22 June 2018).
- Borland, Katherine, "'That's not what I said": Interpretive Conflict in Oral Narrative Research' (1991), in: Perks and Thomson (eds), *Oral History Reader*, pp. 320-332
- Buchli, Victor, *An Archaeology of Socialism* (Oxford, 1999).
- Buchli, Victor, 'Khrushchev, Modernism, and the Fight against "Petit-Bourgeois" Consciousness in the Soviet Home', *Journal of Design History* 10.2: Design, Stalin and the Thaw (1997), pp. 161-76.
- Burch, Susan, 'Transcending Revolutions: The Tsars, the Soviets and Deaf Culture', *Journal of Social History* 34.2 (2000), pp. 393-401.
- Byford, Andy and Jones, Polly, 'Policies and Practices of Transition in Soviet Education from the Revolution to the End of Socialism', *History of Education* 35.4-5 (2006), pp. 419-26.
- Charnyshova, Natalia, *Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era* (New York: Routledge, 2013).
- Colton, Timothy, *Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis* (Cambridge MA, 1995).
- Coumel, Laurent, 'L'appareil du parti et la réforme scolaire de 1958 : Un cas d'opposition à Hruscev', *Cahiers du monde russe* 47.1 (2006), pp. 173-94.
- Cox, Caroline (ed.), *Trajectories of Despair: Misdiagnosis and Mistreatment of Soviet Orphans* (Zürich, London and Washington, 2nd edition 1993)
- Creuziger, Clementine, *Childhood in Russia: Representation and Reality* (Lanham, 1996).
- Crowley, David and Reid, Susan, *Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc*, (Oxford, 2002).
- Crowley, David and Reid, Susan, 'Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc', in *ibid.* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 1-22.
- Davies, Christie, 'Goffman's Concept of the Total Institution: Criticisms and Revisions,' *Human Studies* 12 (1989), pp. 77-95.

- Dobson, Miriam, 'The Post-Stalin Era: De-Stalinization, Daily Life, and Dissent', *Kritika* 12.4 (2011), pp. 905-24.
- Dobson, Miriam, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin* (Ithaca/London, 2009).
- Dunn, Ethel and Stephen, 'Everyday Life of the Disabled in the USSR', in: McCagg and Siegelbaum (eds), *The Disabled in the Soviet Union*, pp. 199-234.
- Evans, Alfred, Henry, Laura, and McIntosh Sundstrom, Lisa (eds), *Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment* (Armonk/London, 2006).
- Ewing, Thomas, *Separate Schools: Gender, Policy, and Practice in Postwar Soviet Education* (DeKalb, 2010).
- Faircloth Green, Rachel, "There Will not be Orphans Among us": *Soviet Orphanages, Foster Care, and Adoption, 1941-1956* (The University of Chicago: PhD Thesis, 2006).
- Field, Deborah, *Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev's Russia* (New York, 2007).
- Field, Mark and Twigg, Judyth, *Russia's Torn Safety Nets: Health and Social Welfare During the Transition* (Basingstoke, 2000).
- Field, Mark, 'Soviet Health Problems and Convergence Hypothesis', in: Jones, Connor and Powell (eds), *Soviet Social Problems*, pp. 78-93.
- Field, Mark, 'Dissidence as Disability: The Medicalization of Dissidence in Soviet Russia', in: McCagg and Siegelbaum (eds), *The Disabled in the Soviet Union*, pp. 253-76.
- Fieseler, Beate, 'Soviet-Style Warfare: The Disabled Soldiers of the 'Great Patriotic War'', in Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova (eds), *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 18-41.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila, 'Popular Sedition in the Post-Stalin Soviet Union', in Vladimir Kozlov, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and Sergei Mironenko (eds.), *Sedition: Everyday Resistance in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev* (New Haven, 2011), pp. 1-24.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila, 'Social Parasites: How Tramps, Idle Youth, and Busy Entrepreneurs Impeded the Soviet March to Communism', *Cahiers du monde russe* 47.1/2 (2006), pp. 377-408.
- Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London, 1977).
- Foucault, Michel, *Überwachen und Strafen: Die Geburt des Gefängnisses* (Frankfurt, 1977).
- Fürst, Juliane, 'Where Did All the Normal People Go? Another Look at the Soviet 1970s,' *Kritika* 3/14 (2013), pp. 621-640.
- Fürst, Juliane, *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism* (Oxford, 2010).
- Fürst, Juliane, Jones, Polly and Morrissey, Susan, 'Introduction', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 86.2: *The Relaunch of the Soviet Project 1945-67* (2008), pp. 201-07.

- Gabor, Eszter, 'Living with a disability in Hungary: Reconstructing the narratives of disabled students', in Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 121-40.
- Galley, Mirjam, "'Wir schlagen wie eine Faust': Straßenkinder, Gangs und Staatsgewalt in Stalins Sowjetunion', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 64.1 (2016), pp. 26-53
- Gerchuk, Iurii, 'The Aesthetics of Everyday Life in the Khrushchev Thaw in the USSR (1954-64)', in Susan Reid and David Crowley (eds.), *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe* (New York/Oxford, 2000), pp. 81-98.
- Goffman, Erving, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (London, 1991, first ed. 1961).
- Goffman, Erving, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (New Jersey, 1990, first edition 1963).
- Gorlizki, Yoram and Khlevniuk, Oleg, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Ruling Circle, 1945-1953* (Oxford, 2004).
- Gorlizki, Yoram, 'Policing Post-Stalin Society: The militia and public order under Khrushchev', *Cahiers du monde russe* 44.2 (2003), pp. 465-80.
- Halfin, Igal, *Terror in my Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial* (Cambridge, MA 2003).
- Harris, Steven, *Communism on tomorrow street: mass housing and everyday life after Stalin* (Washington, 2012).
- Harris, Steven, "'I know all the Secrets of my Neighbors': The Quest for Privacy in the Era of the Separate Apartment', Lewis Siegelbaum (ed.), *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia* (New York, 2006), pp. 171-89.
- Harwin, Judith, *Children of the Russian State 1917-95* (Aldershot, 1996).
- Hoffmann, David, 'Was There a "Great Retreat" from Soviet Socialism? Stalinist Culture Reconsidered', *Kritika* 5.4 (2004), pp. 651-74.
- Hofmann, Michael and Arp, Agnès, *Zur sozialen Lage ehemaliger DDR-Heimkinder in Thüringen: Forschungsbericht im Auftrag des Thüringer Ministeriums für Soziales, Familie und Gesundheit* (Jena, 2012).
- Hollander, Paul, 'Politics and Social Problems', in Jones, Connor and Powell (eds.), *Soviet Social Problems*, pp. 9-23.
- Holmes, Larry, 'Magic into Hocus Pocus: The Decline of Labor Education in Soviet Russia's Schools, 1931-1937', *The Russian Review* 51.4 (1992), pp. 545-65.
- Holmes, Larry, *The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse: Reforming Education in Soviet Russia, 1917-1931* (Bloomington, 1991).
- Hornsby, Robert, 'Soviet Society after Stalin', *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 41 (2014), pp. 325-334.

- Hornsby, Robert, *Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev's Soviet Union 1953-64* (Cambridge, 2013).
- Hosking, Geoffrey, *The Awakening of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, 1990).
- Hughes, Bill, 'Medicine and the Aesthetic Invalidation of Disabled People', *Disability and Society* 15.4 (2000), pp. 555-568.
- Human Rights Watch, *Abandoned to the State: Cruelty and Neglect in Russian Orphanages* (New York, Washington, a.o., 1998).
- Huxtable, Simon, 'In Search of the Soviet Reader: The Kosygin Reforms, Sociology, and Changing Concepts of Soviet Society 1964-1970', *Cahiers du monde russe* 3-4/54 (2013), pp. 623-642.
- Iarskaia-Smirnova, Elena and Romanov, Pavel, 'Heroes and Spongers: The Iconography of Disability in Soviet Posters and Film', in Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 67-96.
- Ilic, Melanie, Reid, Susan and Attwood, Lynne (eds), *Women in the Khrushchev Era* (Basingstoke, 2004).
- Ilic, Melanie and Smith, Jeremy (eds), *Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in the Soviet Union 1953-1964* (London/New York, 2011).
- Ispa, Jean, *Child Care in Russia: In Transition* (Westport/London, 1994)
- Jones, Anthony, Connor, Walter and Powell, David (eds), *Soviet Social Problems* (Boulder, 1991).
- Jones, Anthony, Connor, Walter and Powell, David, 'Introduction', in Jones, Connor and Powell (eds), *Soviet Social Problems* (Boulder, 1991), pp. 1-8.
- Juviler, Peter and Forschner, Brian, 'Juvenile Delinquency in the Soviet Union?', *The Prison Journal* 58 (1978), pp. 18-30.
- Kelly, Catriona, *Children's World: Growing up in Russia 1890-1991* (New Haven, 2006).
- Kelly, Catriona, *Refining Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from Catherine to Yeltsin* (Oxford, 2001).
- Kelly, Catriona, and Shepherd, David (eds), *Russian Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (Oxford, 1998).
- Kelly, Catriona, 'The Retreat from Dogmatism: Populism under Khrushchev and Brezhnev', in Kelly and Shepherd (eds), *Russian Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 249-273.
- Kharkhordin, Oleg, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices* (Berkeley, 1999).
- Khlinovskaya Rockhill, Elena, *Lost to the State: Family Discontinuity, Social Orphanhood and Residential Care in the Russian Far East* (New York, 2010).
- Klumbyte, Neringa and Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz (eds), *Soviet Society in the Era of Late Socialism 1964-1984* (Lanham, 2014).

- Kotkin, Stephen, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000* (Oxford, 2008, updated edition).
- Kucherenko, Olga, *Soviet Street Children and the Second World War: Welfare and Social Control under Stalin* (London, 2016).
- LaPierre, Brian, *Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia: Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw* (Madison, 2012).
- Ledeneva, Alena, *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange* (Cambridge, 1998).
- Lovell, Stephen, *Shadow of War: Russia and the USSR, 1941 to the Present* (Chichester, 2010).
- Lummis, Trevor. 'Structure and Validity in Oral Evidence' (1983), in: Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds), *The Oral History Reader* (London, 2003 [first edition 1998]), pp. 273-83.
- Lūse, Agita and Kamerāde, Daiga, 'Between Disabling Disorders and Mundane Nervousness: Representations of Psychiatric Patients and their Distress in Soviet and Post-Soviet Latvia', in Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 97-120.
- Maiofis, Mariia, 'Pansiony trudovykh rezervov: formirovanie sistemy shkol-internatov v 1954-1964 godakh', *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie* 142.2 (6/2016), no pagination.
- Maklak, Alena, 'Dedovshchina on trial: Some evidence concerning the last Soviet generation of "sons" and "grandfathers"', *Nationalities Papers* 43.5 (2005), pp. 682-99.
- Maslov, Kirill, 'The Lives of the Blind in a Historical Whirlpool: Russian and Soviet Research Traditions Reconsidered', *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology* 48.5 (2010), pp. 36-97.
- McCagg, William and Siegelbaum, Lewis, *The Disabled in the Soviet Union. Past and Present, Theory and Practice* (Pittsburgh, 1989).
- McCagg, William, 'The Origins of Defectology', in McCagg and Siegelbaum, *The Disabled in the Soviet Union*, pp. 39-61.
- Mikhailin, Vadim, 'Russian Army Mat as a Code System Controlling Behaviour in the Russian army', *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies* 1 (2004), Online since 29 September 2004, URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/pipss/93> (accessed on 22 June 2018).
- Millar, James, and Wolchik, Sharon, *The Social Legacy of Communism* (Washington, 1994).
- Mladenov, Teodor, 'Breaking the Silence: Disability and Sexuality in Contemporary Bulgaria', in Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova, *Disability in Eastern Europe*, pp. 139-64.
- Nelson, Charles, Fox, Nathan and Zeanah, Charles (eds.), *Romania's Abandoned Children: Deprivation, Brain Development, and the Struggle for Recovery* (Cambridge, 2014).
- Neutatz, Dietmar, *Träume und Alpträume: eine Geschichte Russlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (München, 2013).

- Oberländer, Alexandra, 'Cushy Work, Backbreaking Leisure: Late Soviet Work Ethics Reconsidered', *Kritika* 18.3 (2017), pp. 569-90.
- Oleynik, Anton, 'Dedovshchina as an Element of the "Small Society": Evidence From Russia and Other Countries', *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies* 1 (2004), Online since 29 September 2004, URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/pipss/136> (accessed on 22 June 2018).
- Pearson, Landon, *Children of Glasnost: Growing Up Soviet* (Seattle, 1990).
- Perks, Robert and Thomson, Alistair (eds), *The Oral History Reader* (London/New York, 2003 [1998]).
- Phillips, Sarah, 'Citizenship and Human Mobility: Disability and the "Etatization" of Soviet and Post-Soviet Space', in Randolph and Avrutin (eds), *Russia in Motion*, pp. 253-71.
- Phillips, Sarah, *Disability and Mobile Citizenship in Postsocialist Ukraine* (Bloomington, 2011).
- Phillips, Sarah, "'There Are No Invalids in the USSR!'" A Missing Soviet Chapter in the New Disability History', *Disability Studies Quarterly* 29.3 (2009), <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/936/1111> (accessed 26.02.2019).
- Plamper, Jan, 'Foucault's Gulag', in *Kritika* 2/3 (2002), pp. 255-80.
- Portelli, Alessandro, 'What makes oral history different' (1991), in: Perks and Thomas (eds), *The Oral History Reader*, pp. 63-74.
- Raleigh, Donald, *Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation* (Oxford, 2012).
- Randolph, John and Avrutin, Eugene (eds), *Russia in Motion: Cultures of Human Mobility Since 1850* (Chicago, 2012).
- Raphael, Lutz, 'Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22 (1996), pp. 165-93.
- Rasell, Jennifer, 'Rethinking Care and Violence: Dynamics in Children's Homes in State Socialist Hungary', in *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 33.1 (2015), pp. 59-69.
- Rasell, Michael and Iarskaia-Smirnova, Elena (eds), *Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: History, Policy and Everyday Life* (London, 2014).
- Raymond, Paul, 'Disability as Dissidence: The Action Group to Defend the Rights of the Disabled in the USSR', in: McCagg and Siegelbaum (eds), *The Disabled in the Soviet Union*, pp. 235-52.
- Reid, Susan, 'Building Utopia in the Back Yard: Housing Administration, Participatory Government and the Cultivation of Socialist Community', in Karl Schlögel (ed.), *Mastering Russian Spaces: Raum und Raumbewältigung als Probleme der russischen Geschichte* (München, 2011), pp. 149-86.
- Reid, Susan, 'Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union of Khrushchev', *Slavic Review* 61.2 (2002), pp. 211-52.

- Rollins, Nancy, *Child Psychiatry in the Soviet Union: Preliminary Observations* (Cambridge, 1972).
- Ryan, Michael (ed.), *Contemporary Soviet Society: Statistical Handbook* (Aldershot, 1990).
- Siegelbaum, Lewis (ed.), *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia* (New York: 2006).
- Shaw, Claire, *Deaf in the USSR: Marginality, Community, and Soviet Identity, 1917-1991* (Ithaca, 2017).
- Shelley, Louise, *Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control* (London/New York, 1996).
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia* (New York, 1989).
- Smith, Mark, *Property of Communists: The Urban Housing Program from Stalin to Khrushchev* (DeKalb, 2010).
- Stephenson, Svetlana, 'Child Labour in the Russian Federation, Working Paper for the International Labour Office' (Geneva, 2012), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_decl_wp_7_en.pdf (accessed 14.03.2019).
- Stephenson, Svetlana, 'Street Children in Moscow: Using and Creating Social Capital', *The Sociological Review* 49.4 (2001), pp. 530-47.
- Thompson, Paul, 'The Voice of the Past. Oral History' (1988), in: Perks and Thomas (eds), *Oral History Reader*, pp. 21-28.
- Thomson, Alistair, 'Anzac Memories: Putting Popular Memory Theory into Practice in Australia', in: Perks and Thomas (eds), *The Oral History Reader*, pp. 300-10.
- van Voren, Robert, *Cold War in Psychiatry: Human Factors, Secret Actors* (Amsterdam and New York, 2010).
- Wallace, Samuel (ed.), *Total institutions* (New York: 2017 [1971]).
- Waters, Elizabeth, "'Cuckoo Mothers" and 'Apparatchiks': Glasnost and Children's Homes', in *Perestroika and Soviet Women* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 123-41.
- White, Anne, 'Charity, Self-Help and Politics in Russia 1985-1991', *Europe-Asia Studies* 45.5 (1993), pp. 787-810.
- Wolfe, Thomas C., *Governing Soviet Journalism: The Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin* (Bloomington, 2005).
- Yurchak, Alexei, *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton, 2006).
- Zanozina, V.N., Kolosova, E.M. (et al.), *Sirotstvo i besprizornost' v Rossii: Istorii i sovremennost'* (St. Petersburg, 2008).
- Zeina, Maria, 'Without a Family: Orphans of the Postwar Period', *Russian Studies in History* 48.4 (2010), pp. 59-73.

Zhidova, Elena, 'Family, Divorce, and Comrades' Courts: Soviet Family and Public Organizations During the Thaw', in Carlbäck, Gradska and Kravchenko (eds), *And They Lived Happily Ever After: Norms and Practices of Family and Parenthood in Russia and Central Europe* (Budapest, 2012), pp. 47-64.

Zubkova, Elena, 'Les exclus: Le phénomène de la mendicité dans l' Union soviétique d' après-guerre', *Annales HSS* 2 (2013), pp. 357-88.