POWER AND PARTICIPATION IN KAMPONG BHARU: RECONSTRUCTING GOVERNANCE THROUGH THE CREATION OF AN URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

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People say, doing PhD is exhausting and full of emotional struggles. It takes a lot of courage to confront the insecurities and doubts in oneself and the wisdom to overcome them. Indeed, PhD is all about blood, sweat and lots of tears but at the end of it one will find the sweetness of the emotional journey. However, it would not be successful without the unconditional support of those people around us.

From the deepest of my heart, thank you everyone. Alhamdulillah.

ABSTRACT

This research contributes to our existing understanding of how agencies of government create spaces for greater public participation in urban regeneration, and what effect these new spaces can have on urban governance. Through an examination of one such government agency – an Urban Development Corporation in Kuala Lumpur – I show that while these participatory spaces could be an approach to embrace social justice through empowering the community, in reality they were loaded with conflicts and power struggles which eventually led to the practice of influence and manipulation in the decision-making process. I argue that the invitation for community participation was merely rhetorical and instead it was employed as a mechanism to shape the conduct of others towards targeted ends.

Urbanisation and urban development have not only increased the competitiveness of countries, but also created challenges to existing modes of government and governance. It is increasingly common for different models of urban development planning to be adopted across and within cities in response to these tensions and contested practices which often linked to simultaneous state restructuring. Kuala Lumpur, the capital city of Malaysia, is no exception in facing the challenges and contestations of urban planning practice. In order to achieve the national aspiration of making Kuala Lumpur globally competitive, the government is emphasising strategies to provide a conducive environment for the city to grow through coordinated urban development plan. One of the transformation strategies for Kuala Lumpur is the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, a traditional Malay-dominated village situated strategically in the golden economic triangle in the heart of Kuala Lumpur. Despite many unsuccessful events, the government has continued to work on developing Kampong Bharu; with the result that the Federal Government initiated a redevelopment strategy through the establishment of the Kampong Bharu Development Corporation (KBDC) under the Parliament Act in 2011. While the government is determined to make the development plan for Kampong Bharu a success, the community of Kampong Bharu, and particularly its landowners, has been very much divided on the implementation of the redevelopment plan.

The set-up of KBDC seemed to promote the practice of inclusive urban governance as it provided spaces for community participation through a series of public engagements and consultations, as well as via the practice of representation through the appointment of community representatives as members of the corporation. The involvement of many stakeholders, however, has fostered conflicts and power struggles amongst the actors involved in the planning process and the spaces created were less meaningful and unable to empower the community to participate effectively in decision-making process. At the same time, representation was highly limited and actually provided new ways for the government to manipulate the community through the practice of governmentality in the interests of promoting certain targeted aims of the government.

This research reveals how the establishment of a UDC reconstructs governance in urban development planning. The arguments raised in this research revolve around four main concepts: power, participation, governance and governmentality. The change in governance structure through the establishment of a UDC laden with conflicts and power struggles has eventually turned the spaces for participation into ones of manipulation and control. This research also offers comparative insights relevant to the governing practices of UDCs in other countries.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ECER	East Coast Economic Region
EPPs	Entry Point Projects
EPU	Economic Planning Unit
ETP	Economic Transformation Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
Greater KL/KV	Greater Kuala Lumpur/Klang Valley
IRDA	Iskandar Regional Development Authority
JPBD	Federal Department of Town and Country Planning Peninsular Malaysia
JPS	Drainage and Irrigation Department
KBDC	Kampong Bharu Development Corporation
KLCC	Kuala Lumpur City Centre
KLCH	Kuala Lumpur City Hall
KLCP	Kuala Lumpur City Plan
KLSP	Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan
LDDC	London Docklands Development Corporation
MAS	Malay Agricultural Settlement
NCER	Northern Corridor Economic Region
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
NDP	National Development Policy
NEAC	National Economic Advisory Council
NEM	New Economic Model
NEP	National Economic Policy
NKEAs	National Key Economic Areas
PAKAM	Children of Kampong Bharu Association
PEMANDU	Performance Management and Delivery Unit
PPKB	Kampong Bharu Development Association
PKB	Perbadanan Pembangunan Kampong Bharu
RDAs	Regional Development Authorities
RWA	Redfern-Waterloo Authority
SCORE	Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy
SDDC	South Sydney Development Corporation
SDC	Sabah Development Corridor
SNTDC	Songjiang New Town Development Corporation
TDR	Transfer Development Rights
UDC	Urban Development Corporation
UDIC	Urban Development and Investment Company
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of study

Cities are the nucleus of socio-economic development and are an engine of growth (Jacobs 1969; Duranton 2000, 2015). However, as cities grow, there are also challenges. The process of urban development creates potential conflicts, particularly in the use of land. The scarcity of land in prime areas creates high demand and the value of the land increases. This requires good management in order to maximise profit. This situation is inherently complex and requires government to have a strategic urban development plan; and this can be achieved through strong urban governance.

The challenges of managing urban growth are very much linked to the rapid process of urbanisation. The United Nations (2014) reported that there is a significant increase in the number of people living in urban areas globally; from 30 per cent in 1950 to 54 per cent in 2014. This percentage is expected to increase to 66 per cent by 2050 (United Nations 2014). Rapid urbanisation reflects on economic growth and the development patterns of countries; especially those which would benefit from higher per capita income and productivity (Overman and Venables 2005). At this stage it is important to understand that the growth of urbanisation reflects the determination of governments to create not only a strong economy for their country but also a competitive state. More often than not, governments have relied on major cities to power such growth as these cities have become regional hubs for economic development (United Nations 2016).

This rapid urban growth requires dynamic urban policies to formulate and implement measures to better manage development plans and optimise resources. The challenges of urbanisation have therefore produced new modes of urban governance, globally. Some countries opt for certain interventions through national-level urban policies to shape the direction for regional, metropolitan or local-level policies and strategies with regards to urban growth management (Geyer 2009). Other approaches involve more local or city-level institutional approaches to urban governance to address complex and interrelated economic, social and political challenges.

In Western Europe and the United States, cities have increasingly adopted corporatist modes of governance (Harding 1997). In the United Kingdom, the central government created Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organizations (often shortened to 'quangos') to allow business sector participation in the governing process. This includes the introduction of urban development corporations (UDCs) to perform certain functions which were previously conducted by the local authorities (DiGaetano and Strom 2003). Similarly, France has also practiced devolution of power at national, regional, and local government, where collaborations and alliances with business leaders were formed to formulate and carry out urban economic development policies and strategies (DiGaetano and Strom 2003).

Based partly on experiences such as these, countries in other regions of the world have started to experiment with similar forms of urban governance, including in parts of South East Asia. While the urbanisation rate has been on an upward trend globally, the United Nations in the *World Urbanization Prospects 2014 Revision* reported that the urbanisation rate in South East Asia has been

decreasing from the year 2000 and Malaysia is no exception. As shown in Table 1.1, the decline of urbanisation rate in Malaysia is significant compared to neighbouring countries. Despite the slowing down of the urbanisation rate in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur has experienced a steady increase of urban population (Table 1.2). The urban population expansion is mainly contributed by the increasing opportunites offered in the city centre. The substantial increase in people living in Kuala Lumpur has posed a major challenge to the practice of urban governance in managing the city's growth, particularly with regard to maximising the use of land in the prime area.

Against this context of continuing urban growth in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia has also opted for new urban governance approaches through decentralisation policies and an increased role for non-state actors. One of the approaches is to ensure strong institutional mechanisms and coordination structures of the government at the national, state and local level, together in partnership with private sector and organisations. The initiative includes the establishment of UDCs as a new governance form to oversee the implementation of an urban development planning. Kampong Bharu Development Corporation (KBDC) was the first UDC introduced in Malaysia as a new governance mechanism in urban planning despite a number of urban development authorities have been established as early as in 1971 by the government, mainly to redevelop and repurpose dilapidated buildings in urban areas. However, the fact that UDCs have been introduced in Kuala Lumpur to reform the city's governance does not mean that they take the same form as in other countries, and the Malaysian experience of urban governance through UDCs remains understudied. It is here that this thesis contributes to the broader literature, by offering a detailed study of UDC-

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led urban governance in Kuala Lumpur and what we can learn from this about urban governance reforms more broadly.

Table 1.1: Urbanisation Rate in South East Asia from 1970 until 2050

United Nations

Population Division

Department of Economic and Social Affairs

World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision

Average Annual Rate of Change of the Percentage Urban by Major Area, Region and Country, 1950-2050 |

POP/DB/WUP/Rev.2014/1/F09

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...ations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014). World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014.

Index	Major area, region, country or area	Note	Country Code	1970-1975	1980-1985	1990-1995	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025	2025-2030	2030-2035	2035-2040	2040-2045	2045-2050
104	South-Eastern Asia		920	1.55	2.14	1.85	1.60	1.52	1.36	1.19	1.05	0.92	0.81	0.73	0.69	0.66
105	Brunei Darussalam		96	0.10	0.77	0.84	0.65	0.54	0.44	0.36	0.29	0.23	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.19
106	Cambodia		116	-25.44	6.84	2.15	0.62	0.65	0.90	1.17	1.42	1.64	1.79	1.78	1.71	1.64
107	Indonesia		360	2.47	3.32	3.30	1.79	1.66	1.47	1.25	1.05	0.87	0.70	0.58	0.55	0.52
108	Lao People's Democratic Republic		418	2.82	2.18	2.37	4.40	3.80	3.07	2.40	1.82	1.29	0.97	0.92	0.87	0.82
109	Malaysia	8	458	2.36	1.75	2.24	1.44	1.26	1.04	0.80	0.60	0.44	0.31	0.22	0.21	0.20
110	Myanmar		104	0.93	0.09	0.76	1.40	1.64	1.65	1.58	1.51	1.44	1.36	1.29	1.21	1.14
111	Philippines		608	1.51	2.77	-0.12	-0.57	-0.59	-0.39	-0.05	0.29	0.62	0.92	1.04	0.99	0.93
112	Singapore		702	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
113	Thailand		764	2.57	0.95	0.57	3.57	3.22	2.67	2.06	1.55	1.13	0.77	0.56	0.53	0.50
114	Timor-Leste		626	2.49	2.38	1.56	1.62	2.29	2.10	1.78	1.49	1.22	0.97	0.79	0.75	0.73
115	Viet Nam		704	0.52	0.32	1.82	2.25	2.16	2.00	1.82	1.64	1.45	1.25	1.13	1.08	1.02

Source: *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision*, United Nations

Table 1.2: Annual Population of Urban Agglomeration in South East Asia from 1970 until 2050

	Annual Population of Urban Agglomerations with 300,000 Inhabitants or More in 2014 (thousands)											
2	Location	ISO 3166-1 numeric code	Note	1970	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030
3	World	900										
4	Asia	935										
5	South-Eastern Asia	920										
6	Cambodia	116										
7	Phnum Pénh (Phnom Penh)	20357	24	900	615	1 149	1 317	1 510	1 731	1 979	2 262	2 584
8	Indonesia	360										
19	Jakarta	21454	319	3 915	8 175	8 390	8 988	9 630	10 323	11 298	12 589	13 812
37	Lao People's Democratic Republ	418										
38	Vientiane	21772		157	283	442	580	761	997	1 271	1 540	1 782
39	Malaysia	458										
44	Kuala Lumpur	206411	329	451	2 098	4 176	4 927	5 810	6 837	7 844	8 703	9 423
50	Myanmar	104										
56	Yangon	20339		1 946	2 907	3 553	3 928	4 342	4 802	5 358	5 971	6 578
57	Philippines	608										
74	Manila	22109	349	3 534	7 973	9 962	10 884	11 891	12 946	13 942	15 200	16 756
76	Singapore	702										
77	Singapore	22447		2 074	3 016	3 918	4 496	5 079	5 619	6 057	6 334	6 578
78	Thailand	764										
81	Krung Thep (Bangkok)	22617		3 110	5 888	6 360	7 228	8 213	9 270	10 137	10 953	11 528
88	Viet Nam	704										
92	Hà Noi	22457	368	617	1 139	1 660	2 160	2 811	3 629	4 389	4 989	5 498

Source: *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision*, United Nations

As cities become centres of growth, one of the strategies identified in the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015) was to focus on the development of major cities. As Economic Planning Unit (EPU 2010) reported, with an average of 75 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) generated in cities, competition is no longer only between nations but increasingly amongst cities. This is because major cities have three times the productivity of rural areas, generating much denser economic activity than other areas (EPU 2010). Having to compete with other emerging cities in the region, Kuala Lumpur was set for an extensive improvement in its liveability through better infrastructure and efforts to improve the quality of life in the city. This strategy was supported by the implementation of the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) in which the idea of a Greater Kuala Lumpur as one of the National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs) was introduced in 2010. As the Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU), the responsible agency in facilitating ETP has stated, the main aim of establishing a Greater Kuala Lumpur was to attract talent and multinational corporations in order to stimulate higher gross national income (GNI) through high level job creation (PEMANDU 2010). Having these strategies in place, all efforts were focused on preparing Kuala Lumpur to compete globally. This required a strong commitment from the government to provide effective governance and policies to support the transformation agenda. Kuala Lumpur's position as the capital city of a developing country requires great scrutiny and focus by the government, particularly the Federal government, to formulate the necessary planning policies and approaches to align with national aspirations.

One of the government's moves in pushing forward economic growth in Kuala Lumpur was the proposal to redevelop an area called Kampong Bharu,

which is strategically situated in the centre of the city. The rapid growth occurring in Kuala Lumpur has put pressure on the government to better manage the use of land in the city. Kampong Bharu maintains an image of being a low-rise dilapidated historical village, in contrast to the modern high-rise business districts of the surrounding area. Despite many attempts by the government to reinvigorate the area, Kampong Bharu managed to avoid large scale redevelopment over the past four decades; until recently when the Federal government decided to embark on a major redevelopment plan for Kampong Bharu (for background on the Kampong Bharu redevelopment, see Bavani 2016; Gartland 2015; Lim 2015; Ujang 2016; Alhabshi 2010a). The persistence of the government in seeking to redevelop Kampong Bharu is very much driven by economic factors to generate the real estate potential of the land and to encourage greater economic development in the area. The scarcity of land and high land values in the city have been a substantial motivator for a major development transformation. Details on the background of Kampong Bharu and the Kampong Bharu redevelopment are further discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter Three of this thesis.

In order to understand how planning in Kuala Lumpur takes place, it is necessary to outline briefly how the government works in Malaysia. The ultimate authority in the country is the Federal government, which it is headed by the prime minister. Malaysia is a federal state which consists of 13 states and three federal territories, comprised of Kuala Lumpur (the capital city), Putrajaya (the federal government administrative centre), and Labuan (an offshore international financial centre). While the Federal government holds principal authority in the country as a whole, governance of the 13 states is shared between the Federal

and State governments, each having specific responsibilities. In terms of legal jurisdiction as specified in the Federal Constitution, each state has power over matters such as land, local government and Islamic law. However, in the event of any inconsistency between state and federal laws, federal law prevails over state law (Malaysian Government 1963). The administration of the government is supported by local authorities which, in the case of the 13 states, are under the purview of the State governments. This is different for Federal Territories, which are under the direct administrative control of the Federal government.

National strategic spatial planning in peninsular Malaysia (not including Kuala Lumpur) is under the jurisdiction of the Federal government, as stipulated in the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172). This was incorporated into each state's Structure Plan to provide policies on the development and use of land. Local Plans were drafted to accommodate the detailed planning of the area (Omar and Ling 2009). Kuala Lumpur, however, has a specific planning Act, the Federal Territory (Planning) Act 1982 (Act 267), which controls and regulates planning in the city. This Act gives ultimate power to the Minister of Federal Territories for general policy concerning the planning of development of all land within the Federal Territories and the Minister may give directions as long as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, which the Commissioner puts into effect (Omar and Ling 2009).

The first Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan (KLSP) prepared by the local authority, Kuala Lumpur City Hall (KLCH) was in put in place in 1984, and later replaced by KLSP 2020 (KLCH 2004). KLSP 2020 explicitly highlighted the need to prepare Kuala Lumpur to play a competitive role on the global stage. KLSP 2020 was complemented by the Kuala Lumpur City Plan 2020 Draft (Draft KLCP

2020), which gave details of land use zoning and planning guidelines for the purpose of development control. The Draft KLCP 2020 is comprised of four volumes; the fourth is specially devoted to the development of Kampong Bharu (KLCH 2008), the area which is the central focus of this study. The redevelopment of Kampong Bharu was also highlighted in the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015), and one of the strategies within this plan is to unlock the land value of Kampong Bharu through urban development (EPU 2010). Having a dedicated section in national documents shows the importance of the area to the overall development planning for Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia as a whole.

With great emphasis given to Kuala Lumpur as the central focus of national development, a number of supporting policies were initiated to provide a conducive environment in which the city could grow. These included undertaking government reform and developing efficient urban governance in order to provide better services for the city (Jusoh, Abdul Malek and Abdul Rashid 2009). The focus on reinvigorating Kuala Lumpur (and three other major cities in Malaysia) was further stressed in the Eleventh Malaysia Plan (2016-2020), in which the government planned for the structural transformation of urban centres in order to harness the development gains already made in the area. The plan is to foster the cities' competitiveness by increasing economic density in order to maximise the productivity of the area. In order to enable that, the role of local authorities will be enhanced, and they will be empowered to drive the local economy and social development (EPU 2015).

One of the transformation strategies for Kuala Lumpur is to redevelop an area situated right in the heart of the city, which has high potential to garner more profit from the prime urban land therein. The proposal to redevelop Kampong

Bharu is seen as one of the government's most challenging urban regeneration projects (Thean 2011). This is partly due to the fact that there have been so many unsuccessful attempts by the government to transform the area. Even with all the efforts put into redeveloping the area, such planning has been unsuccessful due to factors relating to land issues. Although the redevelopment plan for Kampong Bharu has started in 1975, the focus of this study is towards planning efforts on the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu from the 1980s until 2015, which is when the last fieldwork was carried out.

One of the challenges the government has faced in executing development plans in the area is with regard to the status and ownership of a specific area of land in Kampong Bharu, which is known as the Malay Agricultural Settlement (MAS) area. This particular area (which forms the major part of the redevelopment plan as a whole) is managed by a management board called MAS Board has historic issues to it. The plan to redevelop Kampong Bharu has received divided reactions from the people of Kampong Bharu. While some landowners were supportive of the idea, the plan also faced strong reactions from the local community including rejections and criticisms. The community of Kampong Bharu criticised the authorities, for example, for not involving the various landowners in the redevelopment plans from an early stage, and for the way the authorities have taken matters in hand (Bavani and Yip 2008).

After the many unsuccessful efforts by KLCH to manage development issues in Kampong Bharu, the Federal government decided to take a different approach in handling the redevelopment plan for the area. The development corporation, named Perbadanan Pembangunan Kampong Bharu (PKB) or the Kampong Bharu Development Corporation (KBDC) was established under the

Parliament Act in 2011 and given primary responsibility to coordinate and facilitate the development in Kampong Bharu, as well as promote private sector investments in the area (Fujita 2010). The establishment of the corporation was expected to resolve all development issues pertaining to Kampong Bharu and enable the implementation of the redevelopment plan. Details of the development issues are covered in Chapter Three.

Apart from having to deal with long-standing development issues, the government also has to cope with demands from the local community for more participation and representation in the planning process. The community has insisted on their views on the development being heard and addressed by the government. The establishment of KBDC was a way of trying to manage all the issues that have beleaguered the attempts to redevelop Kampong Bharu while also getting the community of Kampong Bharu to be part of the planning process. The establishment of KBDC, however, did not abate all of these concerns. Criticisms continued to be received, not only from the landowners and community of Kampong Bharu, but also from other parties including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), political leaders, and the public at large.

Although the landowners and the beneficiaries (those who are due to inherit the land in Kampong Bharu), in general were not against any development taking place in Kampong Bharu, they were however displeased with the government for not consulting them sufficiently, and for the government's inability to address their concerns about the value of the land and compensation (Bavani and Yip 2008; Gartland 2015; Mayberry 2017; Ujang 2016). They also argued that the government had not attended to the needs of the people of Kampong Bharu in

terms of the development needed in the area (Gartland 2014; Soliano 2014). At the same time, there was also issue on certain group in the community who were excluded from the planning process. These minorities were hoping to have more communication between themselves and the government so that all parts of the Kampong Bharu community had a sense of belonging to the place. As much as they want the development to happen, they felt that the identity of Kampong Bharu as an urban village, with its historic richness and cultural background, must be retained. Having a personal attachment to the place, the tenants and those who had lived in Kampong Bharu for years felt that the Kampong Bharu redevelopment should not be profit-oriented (Yip 2014; Gartland 2014, 2015).

1.2. Research problem

Based on the discussion above, there is a call for a different approach in undertaking redevelopment plans for Kampong Bharu. When the Federal government of Malaysia decided to set up an urban development corporation (UDC) to take the lead in coordinating and managing the development planning for this long-standing redevelopment, there were numerous reactions from various groups of people in the country. Due to the pressure of urban growth and the need to align growth in Kampong Bharu with national aspirations, the government felt compelled to opt for a different form of urban governance in pursuing the redevelopment initiative. As a result, the government encountered many challenges in governing the area, especially from the community of Kampong Bharu. The decision to establish an UDC signified a significant change in the government's practice of development planning in Malaysia. Traditionally, responsibility for development planning for an area was held by local authorities.

The delegation of power from government to a non-governmental body was a governance initiative designed to involve many stakeholders, including the community of Kampong Bharu. The initiative claimed to offer power-sharing and inclusion in decision-making processes, thereby promoting participation through constructive engagement with civil society and encouraging political, business, and civic leaders to deliberate on the social and economic priorities which are sustainable and beneficial to society.

Changes of power relationships in Malaysian governmental practice can be seen as early as the 1970s, when the Federal government introduced Regional Development Authorities to control regional development planning, correct imbalances between the regions, and bring closer integration amongst the states (Aslam and Hassan 2003). Regional development planning was strengthened in the Ninth and Tenth Malaysia Plans, with the introduction of five regional development corridors: the Iskandar Regional Development Authority (IRDA), Northern Corridor Economic Region (NCER), East Coast Economic Region (ECER), Sabah Development Corridor (SDC) and Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE). Their purpose was to reduce regional imbalances in order to achieve balanced socio-economic development across regions and states in a coordinated and integrated manner (EPU 2008). While the establishment of these authorities was aimed at promoting greater participation of the private sector in development planning, the government still maintained control over the decision making process as these authorities had to report to the government periodically on their progress (Government of Malaysia 2008).

This situation has slightly changed with the setting up of urban development corporations (UDCs), because they maximise the role of the private sector and

reduce public sector involvement in the process. Although the policy direction of development planning is guided by the government, allowing the private sector to lead the planning process suggests that planning decisions will in future be heavily influenced by market forces. Imrie and Thomas (1993) argued that UDCs have become an important economic and political tool to unlock the development potential of strategic prime urban areas. Drawing from the British urban policy experience, UDCs were used as a special-purpose vehicle to look into the regeneration of the inner cities, doing away with the traditional urban planning practice of local government and replacing it with the involvement of the private sector in urban development planning. This included removing all the red-tape of local authority bureaucracy while promoting collaboration with other agencies, in both the public and private sectors, to facilitate the development process in the area (Brownill et al. 1996; Brownill 1990). Brownill (1990, p. 5) has also argued that the exercise of UDCs has 'restructure[d]' the normal planning system, whereby the aims of having collective goals focused on social objectives and increasing the democratic involvements of the people are no longer the primary focus of planning. Instead, planning under UDCs revolves around the need to accommodate certain socioeconomic situations and political objectives (Brownill 1990; Imrie and Thomas 1993; Thomas and Imrie 1997). This suggests that UDCs were set-up to focus on certain urban developments with specific objectives and that, in delivering their tasks, they could go against the normal planning system and disrupt existing governance arrangements to deliver the developments.

The creation of UDCs also represents a new form of urban governance whereby they are seen as the enabler of a new orientation of urban policy which

is highly influenced by central government (Imrie and Thomas 1993). This has brought changes to local governance as UDCs restructure and circumvent the power and influence of local authorities. In the event of conflicts between local and national interests, urban policies will be directed towards meeting the priorities of the central government (Brownill 1990). In the example of the redevelopment of London Docklands, Brownill (1990) argued that the setting up of the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) ended the practice of local democracy where representation was removed and consultation for the locals to participate in the planning process was limited and deemed by them to be insufficient. Conflict surfaced as central government imposed market forces onto the local area, denying the ability of the interests of the community from being upheld. Consultations only involved selected people who were chosen by the corporation and it was merely a process of informing the public on the decisions made, rather than involving the community in the process of decision making. In many instances, the LDDC provided evidence of how national interests overrode the rights of councils and local people while benefitting only certain groups of people in society. Such criticisms suggest that LDDC has failed to uphold local democracy as the interests of central government remained the ultimate priority in planning strategies.

In any development planning process, it is only natural for a society to demand inclusion as its members want to articulate their ideas, opinions and hopes, particularly when it involves the development of their own area. Public involvement in the preparation of any planning documents is compulsory in Malaysia, as stipulated in Act 172, or in Act 267 in the case of Kuala Lumpur: plans and documents have to be displayed to prompt feedback from the public

during public exhibitions and hearings at which they can present their comments, suggestions and objections (Abdullah et al. 2015; Omar and Ling 2009). Public participation in any planning decision promotes communication not only between the public and government, but also among all related actors in the planning process in order to integrate people's opinions into communal decisions for the benefit of the people.

The establishment of KBDC was claimed to allow for the involvement of the community in the planning process of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment, to create spaces for the community to participate and allocate representation at the planning stage. This, however, differs from the practice of UDCs in other countries such as in the UK for example, where UDCs were quite often sought to exclude the community in planning decisions processes. As mentioned earlier, the UDC model used in the redevelopment of London Docklands allowed limited local participation in the planning process as there was insufficient consultation and community representation within LDDC (Brownill 1990). The relationship between the local organisations and residents and LDDC was distant and community organisations had limited influence and were frequently excluded from the decision-making process (Brownill 1993).

In the case of KBDC, consultations with the community were conducted to get their feedback on the development planning (Gartland 2015; Lim 2013; Lim 2015). Representation of the community has progressed to a certain extent, as some of the board members of KBDC were appointed from the landowners of Kampong Bharu or their heirs. This is in accordance with Act 733 Kampong Bharu Development Corporation Act 2011 (Act 733), which laid out the membership of the corporation and also specified that the members of the Advisory Council

should incorporate Kampong Bharu landowners or their heirs. The membership of KBDC also had to include a combination of representatives from federal, state, and local government, including village heads, association leaders, and community representatives, who were appointed to sit as KBDC Board and the Advisory Council members (Bernama 2010). Some of these people were involved from the very start of the drafting stage of Act 733. The emphasis on having representatives from among the landowners and heirs of the land was to suggest that the government was promoting the inclusion of the wider society in the planning process and that the interests of the people would be protected through the role played by these representatives. However, this perception would only have been true if participation and representation were practised in reality. By 2015, when this research was conducted, the community had raised disappointment in the lack of community participation and representation was considered less meaningful.

While the government's decision to form the corporation can be seen as an act that embraced social justice by providing a platform for the landowners and heirs to participate in the planning process, it can also be seen as a way for the government to use the corporation as a tool, and to shape the conduct and behaviour of society. The extent to which people's opinions and views being heard was uncertain as it was doubtful that further actions were taken to address the issues they raised. The appointment of village leaders and community representatives to sit as board members may have been an advantage to the corporation in disseminating the aims and objectives of the corporation, influencing people towards a targeted goal. The mismatch between what the community wanted for their locality and the objectives of the corporation often led

to disputes between the two. This has then led to conflicts and power struggles among them as they continued to pursue their goals and seek to influence the decisions towards their specific aims.

The establishment of KBDC has also raised questions about the power and authority of KLCH. As KBDC has been entrusted with leading and facilitating development in Kampong Bharu, it is necessary to understand the role of KLCH in the whole planning process. Although KBDC was entrusted with providing the development Master Plan, the power to assess any planning applications still lies with KLCH as the lawful local government for the area: all planning applications had to be submitted to KLCH for approval. Despite this, KLCH had to confer with KBDC in assessing these applications in order to ensure that they were aligned with the Master Plan. While this might have provided the basis for a good collaboration between the two entities in ensuring the best results for the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, it also raised questions about which agency would have the higher power and authority. It is important to note that both organisations were established under the Parliamentary Act, so each organisation has legal jurisdiction and both have certain powers and the authority to make planning decisions. The two organisations maintain an interdependent relationship and decisions should be made on the basis of a consensus between them, but contentious situations could arise if the two organisations did not come to an agreement on certain decisions. This extended the power struggles between the authorities involved in the development of Kampong Bharu.

In brief, the establishment of KBDC to take the front line in ensuring urban redevelopment of Kampong Bharu in an orderly and effective manner has raised a number of debates, particularly in terms of the governing of the area. The power

struggles among the actors involved and the outcries from the community demanding for more participation in the planning process have resulted the governance of KBDC being always in contestation. These issues that have been impeding the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu highlight the broader relevance of this study for understanding how the creation of an UDC can reconstruct urban governance and generate new forms of governmentality.

1.3. Research aims and questions

The aims of this study are to explore how the spaces for participation were created in urban development processes through the establishment of KBDC and the purpose behind the creation of these spaces. In exploring these spaces, it is also important to understand who would be allowed in that space, how people participated in the process and what could be the implication of such decisions. It provides an understanding of how power and influence were used to give effect to the decision-making process. In understanding these, this study has also investigated the conflicts and struggles that emerged from the exercise of power and the implications it has on the practice of governance. This helps to explore the dynamic of state-society power relationships with regard to the redevelopment plan for the specific area of Kampong Bharu.

With regard to the long-standing plans to redevelop Kampong Bharu, the community has demanded greater inclusion in the planning process. In response to the demands, the establishment of KBDC has provided spaces for the community to participate in the planning process. The establishment of the corporation could facilitate these spaces for participation in the planning process, but the involvement of the community was subject to certain conditions and

motivations set by the government. This suggests the spaces created for community participation were mechanisms for the government to control and construct the behaviour of the people. It is a process through which power is exercised in order to achieve the targeted goals.

This study addresses the following research questions:

1. Why was KBDC created and how did its establishment reconstruct governance in Kampong Bharu?

    i.   What was the rationale for establishing KBDC?

    ii. How did the establishment of KBDC affect the practice of governance in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu?

2. What kind of spaces for community participation were created with the establishment of KBDC and how representative were they of the Kampong Bharu community?

    i.   How were the spaces for participation created and how significant were they?

    ii. How was the representation of the people constructed and what was its significance in the decision-making process?

3. What power struggles did the establishment of KBDC raise and what do these tell us about urban development corporations (UDCs) as a distinct form of governmentality?

    i.   Who were the actors involved and what were their powers?

    ii. What was the conflict and why were there struggles?

4.   What broader lessons can we learn from the experience of Kampong Bharu about the practice of governance and public participation in the process of urban redevelopment?

This study constructs an analytical framework based on four theoretical concepts that are of particular relevance to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, which are: power, participation, governance and governmentality. After addressing the research questions, this thesis draws conclusions about the wider implications of this study. It looks at how the establishment of an UDC reflects on the reconstruction of urban governance more broadly in the process of urban development planning. The interactions between the actors involved in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment and its governance encompass the complex relationship of state and society. These sources of power from the actors involved, interweave to influence and give meaning to the decision-making process. Through the case study of the Kampong Bharu Development Corporation, this thesis illustrates how the use of an UDC to engineer redevelopment has created new problems for governance and communities' involvement in the planning process. This helps to uncover the dynamics of state and society power relations as well as local urban governance structure in shaping the planning decisions for the Kampong Bharu redevelopment.

1.4 Scope of study

This study uses the establishment of KBDC as the basis of the study, to explore the creation of spaces for participation and also to understand the power relations between the actors involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, Kuala Lumpur. The deliberation on state power covers the discussions on the role of the Federal government and Kuala Lumpur City Hall, the local government in the area, as the authorities involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. The influence of the Selangor State government is also explored to develop a comprehensive understanding of the use of state power. With regard to the power of society, the analysis covers the community of Kampong Bharu in general, including the landowners or their beneficiaries, as well as the tenants and small traders living in Kampong Bharu. The discussion on society also addresses the role of the three main community associations or NGOs in Kampong Bharu which are the MAS Board, Children of Kampong Bharu Association (PAKAM) and (Kampong Bharu Development Association) PPKB; politicians; business people; community leaders and the representatives of the Kampong Bharu people who are sitting as members of the KBDC Board.

This thesis focuses on KBDC as a single case study in understanding the change of governance in urban development of Kuala Lumpur. It provides a broad discussion on the urban governance structure that KBDC brought to development planning of Kampong Bharu. It also discusses on the impact of having multiple actors involved in the planning process and how this reconstructs the urban planning system from being a form of *government* to a form of *governance*. Simultaneously, this thesis also explores practices of governmentality that shape the decision-making process, whereby state power is obscured and operates

indirectly through the new role of the UDC and the appearance of participation that accompanies it.

Through the experience of KBDC, this thesis offers a broader understanding on how the practice of UDC in Kuala Lumpur contributes to the different modalities of urban development and how the forms of public participation in these processes are used or rather manipulated. As this study also explores the practices of UDCs in a few countries, such as in the United Kingdom, Australia and China, it unfolds the discussions on the practice of UDC in Kuala Lumpur to the bigger debates of the UDCs practices and urban governance in other countries. This will construct a robust discussion on urban development planning in a bigger perspective through the experiences of different countries, which will be of interest to a broad range of scholars and practitioners.

The time frame of this study begins with the planning efforts towards the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu dating from the 1980s until 2015. This covers the initiatives to redevelop Kampong Bharu that began in the 1980s, when the prime minister of the day showed a personal interest in the redevelopment of the area. Although the idea to redevelop Kampong Bharu was shelved for a couple of years because of various issues which arose in Kampong Bharu, it recommenced in 2010 and was spurred on by the establishment of KBDC in 2011. Some of Kampong Bharu's earlier history is also described to provide context to this study. As the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu is still an ongoing project, this study has had to limit its period of study, and only looks at the development phases of Kampong Bharu until 2015.

1.5 Importance of study

As mentioned earlier, this study explores how the establishment of KBDC has reconstructed governance in Kampong Bharu. To explain this, it draws on the four concepts of: power, participation, governance and governmentality to show how an UDC can transform practices of urban development planning. As this study explores the provision for community participation in urban development planning, it unravels the reasons why the spaces for participation were created in the first place, how they were created and who benefits from them. The community of Kampong Bharu was given the opportunity to be involved in the planning process through a series of consultations and engagements with the government. In addition, the foundation of KBDC has allowed for community representation as a number of people from the community were selected to sit in the corporation representing the community. This thesis examines the extent to which these spaces allowed meaningful participation and representation of the community in the planning process and a significant role in decision-making, with important implications for similar cases elsewhere.

Although there are forms of community representation within the corporation, the study interrogates who exactly is represented and whether this reflects the broader community in Kampong Bharu. As later chapters reveal, the forms of representation were highly limited and actually provided new ways for the government to manipulate the community in the interests of promoting a certain targeted aim of the government. While these representatives were assumed to be the voice of the Kampong Bharu community, and to be capable of defending the interests and rights of the people, their role could be utilised by the government in manipulating the conduct and behaviour of the community at

large. Using the concept of governmentality (a concept introduced by the philosopher, Michel Foucault 2002, 2007; and was further explored by Mitchell Dean 1994, 1999; Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller 1992; Thomas Lemke 2002, 2007 inter alia), as a lens to analyse the role of KBDC, this study uncovers the mechanisms used by the government in achieving its targeted end.

The establishment of KBDC signalled a substantial change in the government's approach in promoting local governance. Apart from taking over the role of a local authority in facilitating development planning for the area, the establishment of KBDC also weakened the power of the MAS Board, an organisation which had been the main authority for the people of Kampong Bharu during the preceding 115 years. These changes inevitably resulted in power struggles within the organisations in order to maintain the supremacy of their authority. At the same time, there were also evidence to show the exercise of influence over decisions by multiple actors involved in the process which further contributes to the conflicts and power struggles to the existing state of affairs. After many failed attempts by the government to redevelop the area, there was scepticism among the people as they became more wary and critical of the decisions made by the government. This also led to struggles as the government tried to win over the hearts and minds of the people of Kampong Bharu. This study aims to unpack these conflicts between the government and society and amongst the authorities within government and investigate the connotation it brings to local governance.

Another contribution of this study is to consider the experience of Kuala Lumpur in relation to UDCs beyond this case. Comparing with the experiences of other countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia and China, this study

seeks to understand the broader lessons that the establishment of UDCs brings to the practice of urban governance. This would include understanding the varying governance structure of UDCs, issues and conflicts associated with them, as well as providing critical reviews on the governing practice of UDCs. By making reference to the comparative experience of the establishment of UDCs in these other countries, this study will be able to assess the governance practice of KBDC and make some generalisations relevant to the practice of urban redevelopment planning.

Although previous studies have been made of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment (Alhabshi 2010a, 2010b; Mohamed 1999; Ujang and Abdul Aziz 2015; Ujang 2016), none of these research studies have been done from the perspective of governmentality. This study aims to provide an in-depth study of the ways in which the KBDC reconstructed urban governance, and how new forms of governmentality were used to influence the decision-making process. In exploring the changing state-society relations in Kampong Bharu that resulted from the introduction of KBDC, this thesis also sheds light on some of the consequences of attempts to reconfigure governance in cities such as Kuala Lumpur to make them more globally competitive.

1.6   The structure of the thesis

Following this chapter, Chapter Two provides a presentation of the theoretical framework and a literature review. It begins with a review of some of the most relevant literature on power as an overarching concept used in this study. It then deliberates on the notion of public participation, providing a

perspective of participation in planning process and some critical reviews on participation practice. This chapter then reviews differences between the concepts of government and governance, before focusing on the theory of governmentality. Finally, this chapter provides an overview of the implementation of an UDC as a new form of urban governance which can be thought of as bringing new forms of governmentality into the development planning process. Using the experiences of UDCs established in the United Kingdom, Australia, China and Singapore, it explores their governance structures and how these have been criticised.

Chapter Three brings in the context of this research to set the background to this study. It briefly introduces the current social, economic and political situation in Malaysia, linking it to the country's history and providing an overview of the government administration system. It examines the direction of national policy on urban planning, relating this to the aspiration of making Kuala Lumpur more competitive in a global setting. Discussion then moves to the case study of Kampong Bharu, Kuala Lumpur to highlight on the proposal to redevelop the area. Chapter Three also explores the change in government approach through the decision to introduce an UDC to manage development planning for Kampong Bharu.

Chapter Four presents the methodological justifications upon which this study is based, as well as describing its research design and methods. It explains the selection of the case study's methodology, a qualitative mixed-methods strategy including semi-structured interviews, document analysis and photographs, as well as direct observation for the collection of data.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven are analysis chapters. Chapter Five discusses the change in the government's approach to redevelopment planning for Kampong Bharu. It analyses the practice of the delegation of power from the Federal government through the establishment of KBDC to manage urban development planning. The chapter critically analyses the rationale for establishing KBDC as the lead in the development planning, and the ways in which it gives expression to the practice of governance in Kampong Bharu

Chapter Six discusses the creation of spaces for participation constructed through the establishment of KBDC to enable community involvement in development planning. This chapter discusses whether or not the setting-up of the development corporation has provided opportunity for the community to participate and be represented in the planning process. It also analyses the significance of representation to the community of Kampong Bharu. This will provide a fundamental understanding on how these local governance constructs give effects to the decision-making process.

Chapter Seven highlights the issues of conflict and power struggles amongst the actors involved in the redevelopment plans following the establishment of KBDC. The redevelopment of Kampong Bharu not only involves the authorities within the formal organisation system, but also those who have an indirect influence on the authorities. These actors may not have official authority to make planning decisions, but they may have the power to influence decision-making. Subsequent to that, this chapter also carefully analyses the practices of governmentality that influenced the decision-making process. In the final part of the chapter, it discusses on the practice of UDCs beyond the process of urban

redevelopment in Kuala Lumpur and how the experience of KBDC relates to the practice of governance and public participation in particular.

Chapter Eight presents the conclusion of this thesis, outlining its findings. The research questions are reviewed and addressed, and linked back to the theoretical framework used in this study. Before concluding, this chapter provides an overall reflection of this research, with some insights on its theoretical, methodological and research processes.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1   Introduction

This thesis explores the changes in urban governance that occurred through the government's decision to establish an urban development corporation (UDC) to facilitate the redevelopment of a particular urban area. Through doing so, a system was established whereby additional spaces for stakeholders' participation in the planning process were created, which has fundamentally reshaped the relationship between the government and other stakeholders. Not only did this represent a change of government practice in urban development planning, it also provided an insight into how the people were governed in the process. The establishment of Kampong Bharu Development Corporation (KBDC) was intended to facilitate the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu and changed the relationship between government and the community in the area. During this process, conflicts and power struggles among the actors involved arose as individual actors continued to seek to influence the decision-making process. In understanding the nature of the changes that were brought by the establishment of KBDC and the effects that it had upon the planning process, there is a need to ground this work in an academic discussion of theoretical concepts on power, participation, governance and governmentality. This helps to connect this study to a broader perspective of urban redevelopment process where the concepts of power, participation, governance and governmentality can be embedded.

Changes in the way state-society relations are configured in many parts of the world in recent decades are often conceptualised through the idea of governance. Rhodes (1996) defines governance as the self-organising of inter-

organisational networks which complement hierarchies of governing in managing resources and ensure control and coordination are applied in the process of governing. The practice of governance is said to be associated with the hollowing out of state, and is characterised by a smaller role for the public sector and a shift towards alternative delivery systems in which public and private sectors are involved in collective action (Peters 1994; Rhodes 1997, 1996; Stoker 1998). However, the transfer of power from state to non-state actors does not literally remove the power of the state in decision-making. Rather, it allows the state to govern society in new ways. This is because the conduct of the non-state actors can be shaped, guided and directed through practices that are sometimes termed 'governmentality', a concept that draws on the work of Foucault to analyse certain modern forms of government power and governmental practices (Sending and Neumann 2006).

As the practice of governance redefines the role of state in decision-making, it also involves processes of dialogue, public participation, representation and the inclusion of those being governed (Lemke 2007). This is because in recent years, across much of the world the role of the state has shifted from practicing hierarchical governing where the government impose direct forms of control, to that of governance where collaboration among wide range of actors becomes central to decision-making process (Kooiman 1999, 2000). Hence, the participatory process can be constructed and facilitated to maximise the opportunity of all participants involved be heard and be able to contribute to the process (Martin 2011).

Since this research focusses on a specific form of urban governance, its effect on power dynamics and the relationship it has between state and society,

this thesis has engaged primarily with existent literature on state and society; and the concepts of power, participation, governance and governmentality. This chapter is organised into four main sections. The first section provides a brief discussion of power in order to conceptualise the relationship between state and society and analyse the dynamics this relationship in decision-making. This is followed by discussion on participation in planning process and some of the key debates on the role of participation. In analysing participation, Arnstein's model of citizen participation will be explored to assess the wide range of public engagements. This chapter will also delve into some critical literature on participation to provide a holistic perspective of participation practice. This will be followed by a section on the transformation of modern states where it discusses the shift in governing practice from government to governance before deliberating on the central concept used in this thesis which is governmentality. Finally, the last section turns to the discussion on UDCs as a new form of governance with some reflections made in relation to the practice of UDCs in some other countries such as in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and also various part of Asia.

2.2 The Underlying Concept of Power

Although there are many scholars who have discussed power at length, this discussion takes the influential work of Max Weber as its starting point. Weber (2011) presented his view on social stratification in three dimensions; economic class, social status, and political power, where social honour is distributed within the community through social order. Here, Weber laid the foundation for understanding pluralistic forms of social conflict in modern society. He explained that when these dimensions are inconsistent, there is a possibility that individuals

will use the higher rank of one dimension to improve their rank over others (Johnson 2008). In discussing the relationship between authority, power and legitimacy, Weber argued that authority is power that may be considered legitimate. However, Weber argued that authority systems may be contrasted with power structures where power is imposed despite people's disapproval and that this is not necessarily legitimate (Uphoff 1989). With authority being backed by power, those holding power will try to promote acceptance of their domination, and therefore turn power into authority by making it legitimate (Coser 1977; Johnson 2008). Weber's theory of power is particularly concerned with the idea of bureaucracy, and the bureaucratic coordination of activities in modern hierarchical organisations governed by jurisdiction and demarcated role of duty. Within bureaucratic systems, power is organised centrally, cascading down to the lower hierarchy of the organisation and eventually shaping the coordination of people's actions (Coser 1977).

Building upon the ideas furthered by Weber, Robert Dahl discussed power as a relation between individuals. His idea of power is defined as follows: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl 1957, pp. 202-203). It follows, that those who have power will have influence or control, and he uses these interchangeably in making his argument. His definition of power has become the central focus of understanding the subject and has been widely explored by scholars after him, such as Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and (Lukes 1974). Dahl also looked at power within the boundary of communities, where he explored the role of ruling elites in his theory of community power. In his study of New Haven, Dahl (1974) concluded that influence and control are utilised in different manners dependent upon the

issues at hand. He believed that there are many structures of direct and indirect influence where politicians and citizens use some power and influence regarding certain issues while they use less on others (Holland 1963). This notion is supported by Clegg's (2014) view on power as relational where it could be in an extreme form of either direct violence or coercion. However, in the situation where the interests of one party may not be able to affect the interest of others or the cost of control over the others became unprofitable, the actors might resort to negotiation in resolving conflicts. Mutual consensus might be exerted although the actors might exercise control over others to obtain the benefits of their own interests (Dahl 1979). As this study looks into the relationship between actors involved in the process of decision-making, it is important to explore the decision-making process itself and how power dynamics influence the outcomes of the decision-making process.

Dahl's pluralistic notion of an open and democratic process leading to a decision was contested by Bachrach and Baratz (1962). Rejecting the elitist approach to power, Bachrach and Baratz argued that the pluralist approach also has its own defects. They rejected the idea that conflict is neutral when power is exercised and strongly believe that the forms of conflicts that arise during the process are also manifestations of power. In response to Dahl's theory, they developed the two faces of power model where they discussed the connection between how decisions are made and the dynamics of 'non-decision making' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). While the first face of power is, according to them, embodied and reflected in concrete decision-making, the second face is about the mobilisation of bias where power is reinforced to limit or prevent any actions that might raise conflicts which is detrimental to the people with power. As Clegg

(1989, p.11) points out, "power might be manifested not only in doing things, but also in ensuring that things do not get done".

In their deliberations on non-decision making, Bachrach and Baratz also resonate the 'rule of anticipated reaction', which was coined by Friedrich (1937), where a person accedes to the decision of another person mainly to avoid confrontation. They claim that decisions would sometimes be altered by decision makers as they anticipate that severe deprivation would occur if necessary actions are not taken (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). Another aspect of non-decision making is latent power, where distinguished attributes such as wealth, social status or the prominent background of a person can contribute to the exercise of power over others (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970).

Bachrach and Baratz (1970) disputed the notion that power is a possession, as suggested by Hobbes, for three reasons. First, there is a need to differentiate between power over people and power over matter; secondly, a person's power could be measured based on the desires he achieved, as power is not stand-alone and only applicable in relation to others. Thirdly, power cannot be possessed; instead, the success of power is dependent upon the choice of values made by the person over whom the power is being exercised. The key point that they wanted to assert is that power is relational and not possessive or substantive. Although the exercise of power may not be visible, it is still persistently present in many forms, whether it is consciously articulated or not to those in the system and those being excluded. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argued that, apart from the power relationship between A and B, which derived from conflict over a course of action and resulted in B's compliance, power could

also be present in situations where there is no overt conflict, for example in the form of authority, influence, force and manipulation.

The discussion of the 'two faces of power' was taken further by Lukes (1974), as he introduced the three-dimensional model. The new dimension of power as promoted by Lukes was about the relations that exist between the political preferences of those exercising power and the real interests of those being excluded. In one of his rebuttals to the two faces of power, Lukes (1974, p.23) argued that power was not just about how conflicts were resolved through decision-making or non-decision making, but could also be exerted through "influencing, shaping or determining" certain desires. In Bachrach and Baratz's conception, if decisions were not refuted, it could be assumed that the parties involved had arrived at a consensus. However, Lukes argued that it was unacceptable to conclude the non-existence of grievances would mean that there was consensus. Instead, he suggested that there was a possibility of decisions being influenced in more indirect ways through a 'third face' of power, which involves covertly shaping people's perceptions and interests.

Lukes stressed that power is a contested concept that involves constant disputes over how the users of power make use of the power that they possess. Although Lukes had agreed that non-decisions can be considered as decisions even though such actions are beyond the awareness of those being excluded, he criticised the uncertainty that exists relating to how the interests of those excluded were upheld. Hence, in order to have a holistic framework on power, he proposed the three faces of power which incorporate power as decision-making (the first face of power), power as decision-making and agenda-setting (the second face of power) and power as decision-making, agenda-setting and preference-shaping

(the third face of power). These three faces of power were succinctly encapsulated by Hay (2002) as pictured in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: The faces of power controversy: Political power in three dimensions

	One-dimensional view	Two-dimensional view	Three-dimensional view
Proponents	Dahl, Polsby, classic pluralists	Bachrach and Baratz, neo-elitists	Lukes, Marxists, neo-Marxists and radical elitists/pluralists
Conception of power	Power as decision making	Power as decision making and agenda setting	Power as decision making, agenda setting and preference shaping
Focus of analysis	The formal political arena	The formal political arena and the informal process surrounding it (the corridors of power)	Civil society more generally, especially the public sphere (in which preferences are shaped)
Methodological approach	'Counting' of votes and decisions in decision making arena	Ethnography of the corridors of power to elucidate the informal processes through which the agenda is set	Ideology critique – to demonstrate how actors come to misperceive their own material interests
Nature of power	Visible, transparent and easily measured	Both invisible and visible (visible only to agenda setters), but can be rendered visible through gaining inside information	Largely invisible – power distorts perceptions and shapes preferences; it must be demystified

Source: Hay (2002, p.180)

The third dimension of power focusses on latent conflict, which sits in between "the interest of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude" (Lukes 1974, p. 24-25) and the interest of those being excluded. It may not be apparent or expressed openly. In advocating the third dimension of power, Lukes strongly related power to the idea of domination. Domination, as a subset of power, is defined as "the capacity to secure compliance to domination through the shaping of beliefs and desires, by imposing internal constraints under historically changing circumstances" (Lukes 2005, p.144).

Another highly influential theory of power comes from the work of Foucault. Power, in Foucault's definition, is basically a relation between individuals or

groups of individuals that is exercised among them, or "a set of actions upon other actions" (Foucault 1982, p.789). Foucault argues that power is not wielded by individuals nor classes or institutions; rather, the actions of actors contribute to the operation of power (Gaventa 2003). Foucault was especially interested in the idea of disciplinary power, where methods of surveillance and assessment in institutions can be effective tools by which to develop order and maintain the stability of a social system (Foucault 1977). In describing disciplinary power, (Foucault 1977, p.176-177) uses the example of prisoners under surveillance, explaining how surveillance creates a "network of relations" from top to bottom and vice versa which holds the whole system together through the power of each individual in the network. Discipline in Foucault's view is more about creating obedience than the direct control of a certain group of people.

However, Foucault (1981, p.95) claims that "where there is power, there is resistance", and "consequently this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power". Foucault insists that resistance, sometimes also termed counter-conduct, exists merely to demonstrate and reaffirm the successful exercise of power (Gaventa 1980; Minson 1980; Wickham 1986). However, Foucault's suggestion that resistance, like power, can be everywhere and seemingly can be integrated to form a larger strategy, has been criticised by Wickham (1986, p.483) as it portrays "resistance as totally determined by a unified power". Referring to Minson's (1980) argument that resistance should not be treated in the same way as power, Wickham (1986) contends that resistance is not fixed in certain unified form or location. Instead, he argues that resistance is derived from power analysis, which is continuously reproduced in definite forms and conditions.

Discussion of resistance can also be seen in John Gaventa's work on quiescence, a situation of mute compliance in order to avoid conflicts (1980). The conception of resistance has also been extensively deliberated by James Scott. Scott (1985, p.29) suggests that the overt rebellion of the peasants could not be obviously identified, but resistance towards constant struggles faced by the peasants are displayed in the form of "foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage and so forth". This implies that resistance can be subtle and hidden, as suggested by Gaventa's (1980) conception of silent protest. Covert rebellion does not require advanced planning or coordination as it is expressed implicitly without conscious intent (Scott 1985). Scott's idea of resistance shown in hidden protest is also discussed in his work 'Domination and the Arts of Resistance' where he describes how the oppressed group express their resistance by disguising themselves, and practise anonymity in order to secure their safety (Scott 1990).

Succintly, resistance and power are interrelated and continuously being developed. Hollander and Einwohner (2004) describe the relation between the two as "a cyclical relationship, domination leads to resistance, which leads to the further exercise of power, provoking further resistance, and so on." (p.548). There is a dynamic relationship between power and resistance where the two subjects react and simultaneously affects one another. In theory, one of the ways of enhancing the power of ordinary people, whose sources of power are limited, is through the practice of participation. However, while there is a common understanding that public participation increases the power of ordinary people to influence government actions, there have been major debates on whether it really does empower people in decision-making. Thus, some deliberations around the

theory of participation and the practice in planning will be explored in the following section.

2.3 Public Participation in Planning

Participation has been widely used in the discourse of development. The concept has been related to rights of citizenship and empowerment which promotes democratic governance. Public participation in planning has always been debated and it has both optimistic and pessimistic connotations. In fact, the concept is very complex and open to extensive debate. According to Smith (1983), public participation encompasses a group of procedures designed to consult, involve and inform the public to allow those affected by a decision to have an input into that decision. Similarly, Rowe and Frewer (2004) define public participation as "the practice of consulting and involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-forming activities of organizations or institutions responsible for policy development" (p.512).

Dahl (1970, p.64) once observed that "everyone who is affected by the decision of a government should have a right to participate in that government". In general, this conveys the importance of public participation in the decision-making process of the authorities. It is particularly applicable to those who are potentially affected by the decisions, that they have the right to be consulted in order to arrive to more acceptable decisions of the organisations or government entities. As Fung (2004, p.2) clearly states, "public participation at its best operates in synergy with representation and administration to yield more desirable practices and outcomes of collective decision-making and action". While participation connotes the concept of community empowerment in local

areas (France 1998; Irvin and Stansbury 2004), the main aim of public participation is about improving the conditions of the community, as well as maintaining the existing power relations in society. The involvement of the community should be centred to promote communications, not only between the community and government, but also with all relevant actors in the process of decision-making in order to integrate people's opinion into communal decisions for the benefit of the people.

In the following section, the discussion will explore some of the foundational literature on participation, engaging with Arnstein's model and associating it with the planning process, as well as deliberating on critiques of the practice of participation.

2.3.1   Arnstein's Citizen Participation Model

In discussing public participation, Arnstein was one of the most influential early authors on participation in planning. The notion of citizen participation, also termed 'citizen power' by Arnstein (1969), is where power is redistributed to enable marginalised people to have a more of a say in decision-making process and gain a better share of benefits in society. As Arnstein phrased it, "there is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcomes of the process" (Arnstein 1969, p. 216). Her argument remains pivotal to the debates on the extent of effort taken to allow a more meaningful citizen participation in decision-making process.

The ladder of citizen participation model developed by Arnstein, which has eight rungs or levels of participation to describe the extent of citizens'

power in decision-making, is used extensively throughout the literature of community participation and empowerment. Each step corresponds to changes in degrees of citizen participation in decision-making process, which range from non-involvement to citizen power. The level of participation is categorised in three sub-categories, namely Nonparticipation, Degrees of Tokenism and Degrees of Citizen Power as illustrated in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation

Source: Arnstein (1969, p.217)

The bottom rungs of the ladder are Manipulation and Therapy, where people are non-participative and disabled from participating in planning process or conducting programs. Instead, at these two levels, powerholders are enabled to "educate" or "cure" the participants (Arnstein 1969, p.217) to be in line with the broader society. Meanwhile, rungs 3 ('Informing') and 4 ('Consultation') progress to levels of tokenism that become a starting point

towards people participation. These two rungs can be an important step to legitimate participation as citizens would have the opportunity to hear and be heard. Nevertheless, at these levels, citizens have limited power in ensuring their views are put into effect by the powerholders, which will only result in status quo of decisions or as Arnstein describe as "just a window-dressing ritual" (Arnstein 1969, p.219). Rung 5 ('Placation') on the other hand is a higher level of tokenism where citizens actually begin to have some influence, for example through the representation of a number of community members to hold seats on a board. Although this provides the community with more access to power holders, their voices could be easily ignored as the powerholders have the upper hand and retain the rights to decide.

The final three rungs of the ladder show the degrees of citizen power where people have more control of the process being held. Rung 6 ('Partnership') involves the government partnering with "an organized power-base in the community" (Arnstein 1969,p.221) that enables some level of control and power is shared and negotiated between citizens and power holders. In the seventh rung ('Delegated Power'), the citizen holds a more significant position in decision-making which provides the citizens the sense of ownership and accountability over a particular plan or program. At this level, public authorities will have to negotiate with the citizens to resolve any differences rather than responding to pressures from the community. Finally, in rung 8 ('Citizen Control'), the citizens have higher degree of control or power over the policy, planning and managerial aspects. This requires higher level of engagement among the citizens through many efforts and time needed to be spent in such activities.

Drawing on this framework, Arnstein argues "participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless" (Arnstein 1969, p.216). She believes that the conception of public participation has always been an "understated euphemism and exacerbated rhetoric" (Arnstein 1969, p.216) as not everybody can be represented in the participation and the concept of absolute citizen power is impossible to achieve. Although greater participation could facilitate improved governance, Arnstein's model depicts participation as a power struggle between citizens as they move up the ladder to claim more control or power in the decision-making process. The model identifies power relationships between the haves and the have-nots, between power and the powerlessness, the oppressed and the oppressor, the marginalised and the un-marginalised as those having the upper hands continue to "induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society" (Arnstein 1969, p.216).

Arnstein's model has generated some critical evaluations and debates on her notion of participation. For example, Collin and Ison (2006) indicate that the model, which focuses on power, is insufficient for making sense of participation at a conceptual or practice level. They argue that the assumption of the hierarchical nature of participation levels towards achieving citizen control does not necessarily align to the reasons for citizens to be engaging in decision-making processes. The linear conceptualisation of participation does not define the nature of issues being discussed that shapes the nature of participation. This echoed Hayward, Simpson and Wood's (2004) argument that not achieving full citizen control does not indicate failure of participatory process as the participants could be satisfied with whatever level they reached.

They challenged the assumption that the more participants involved in the process, the greater social inclusion and empowerment of the citizen. While Arnstein suggests that the roles and responsibilities change as the changing level of power increases, Collin and Ison (2006) argue that these roles and responsibilities of the participants involved are not necessarily defined by the power they have. Instead, it is the interests of the participants that construct the roles and responsibilities of the individuals involved.

Collin and Ison's critiques on the Arnstein's model are also drawn from Tritter and McCallum's (2006) argument that "Arnstein's ladder of participation is an over-simplification as it conflates means and ends, implying that user empowerment should be the sole aim" (p.162). Tritter and McCallum (2006), who show interest in user involvement, point out that Arnstein's model is only focusing on citizen control as an outcome and has neglected the processes of user involvement, as well as being to suggest methods for sustaining such involvement in the long run. They also argue that the model gives little attention to "the distinct, but overlapping, theoretical justification or types of user involvement" (Tritter and McCallum, 2006, p.163). Instead, they suggest to have a multiple-ladder model, incorporating different ladders for different types of user involvement to address the different needs of the users.

Agreeing to these debates, Carpentier (2016) states that Arnstein's model has discounted the problems of complexities, multi-layeredness and intensities in participatory processes. The process of participation does not appear in simple dichotomy positions and a straight linear connexion as described by Arnstein's participation typology. Instead, it deals with complexities and multi-layeredness of participatory process. He argues that

the model suggests participation as a stable process without acknowledging the struggles that arise due to the intensities of the processes, the particular fields of interests and the society that are involved in it. Having different actors with diverse interests and needs could lead to conflicts among the participants. Carpentier (2016) continue to argue that it is crucial to look into the different aspects of power and the multi-dimensions of participatory processes. This requires an analytical model involving the participatory process and various societal fields including social relationships, politics, economics, cultures and communications, the actors, decision-making moments and power relations involved. These analyses of various concepts involved in participatory processes help to unravel the complexity and the multiplicity that participation entails, rejecting the linear simplicity forms of participation as suggested by Arnstein.

2.3.2   The Evolution of Debates on Participation

Since Arnstein's influential work, there has been an explosion of literature on participation in the planning process. Although there were not many literatures that provide "systematic examinations of the link between planning epistemology and public participation, (Lane 2005, p.284), a number of planning literatures have deliberated upon numerous strands of public participation. In recent decades, much emphasis were focused on participatory planning, deliberative planning and collaborative planning (inter alia, Forester 2012, 1999, 1989; Healey 2006, 1998, 1996, 1992; Innes 1996, 1995; Innes and Booher 2010). In general, these theories have built upon Arnstein's work

which emphasises the importance of having citizen participation in decision-making process.

Forester (1999) for instance, upholds the idea of participatory planning which emphasise on the involvement of citizen in planning as he stated "…public participation can produce not just noise but well-crafted practical strategies that address real needs" (p.4). He argues that planners must learn to listen to others and to hear people's views, and take them into account before making decisions to be able to come up with a fair solution. Participatory planning also involves the objective to increase public confidence in the government. An effective way to improve participation would be to build on the efficiency gains in administration and service provision and that is hoped could be achieved through the re-engineering of public sector.

Building up on Forrester's argument, Fung and Wright (2003) have introduced the concept of empowered participatory governance, which, according to them, enables participatory practices to transform political decisions. This relates to Arnstein's (1969) notion of delegated power where power is distributed or devolved to those taking part in the participatory process. Through four experiments conducted in the Neighbourhood Governance Council in Chicago, Habitat Conservation Planning under the US Endangered Species Act, Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and the Panchayat Reforms in West Bengal and Kerala, India, they have proven that ordinary people could effectively participate in and influence policies which directly affect their lives. The key principle here is that ordinary people were empowered and given the capacity to make sensible decisions through reasoned deliberations (Fung and Wright 2003). The participatory governance

however entails a reorganisation of the government as it involves devolution of political power to the individuals or organisations involved. This however, requires a strong, functioning state that could embrace and develop the role of citizens in shaping state policy as well as promote the process of mobilizing citizens to work collectively (Fung & Wright 2003). Gaventa (2004) also acknowledges the challenges of participatory governance as it requires multiple strategies of institutional change, capacity building and behavioural change to make it work.

Similarly, Ansell and Gash (2007) stress the importance of having multiple actors, including those who are not involved in government or public agencies, to participate and practise active engagement in the process of decision-making. Since it focusses on collaborative effort, having a consensus on the best decisions is key in collaborative governance. Healey (1997) also discusses a new form of collaborative governance that emphasises collaboration with the inclusion of elements of society from all backgrounds while performing high degree of transparency, respect and responsiveness. She acknowledges the importance of social construction involving social networks focused on shared meaning and action to be embedded in the thinking system to allow for a more democratic and pluralistic mode of governance. Linking to Healey's work, Innes and Booher (2010) have provided a framework on how collaborative work can be established in a complex system and provide guidelines to make the process more effective and rational in resolving conflicts. They argue that for the deliberation to be effective, "all participants must also be fully informed and able to express their views and be listen[ed] to, whether they are powerful or not" (Innes and Booher 2010, p.6).

Further, they believe that bringing people together to deliberate effectively will not only produce significant outcomes but could also bring innovations to improve the governmental system through the multi-dimensional approach of communication and actions of those involved in the process.

2.3.3　Critical Literature on Participation

In theory, participation is believed to be the platform for locals to be involved in decision-making process. As the literature discussed above indicates, many authors believe participation to be the solution to limit the power of the outsiders or the experts to set the agenda and to have the upper hand in making decisions. However, empowering the community through power sharing and the incorporation of various perspectives of the locals could also lead to the unjust exercise of power and domination. While participation gives voices to the community to express their views and opinions, some individuals or parties could implement participatory practices to serve their own agendas. The participatory practices in development planning has been challenged in recent studies. Among others are Bedford, Clark and Harrison (2002); Campbell and Marshall (2000); Harris (2002) have questioned on whether participation really promotes public interest or merely benefits the interest of the dominant parties in the community. They also argue this dominance of certain interests and accentuating demands are only reproduction of existing power structures to go against the collective good.

Cooke and Kothari (2001) take this argument even further, arguing that participation of marginalised communities through the involvement of these groups in decision making can be an adverse act of the initial aim of

participation. Contrary to the noble objective of including communities in decision-making, participation could also conceal and reinforce oppression in their various manifestations. Although Cooke and Kothari's work mostly looks from the perspective of rural development programmes through the practice of participatory rural appraisal (PRA), their work on participation are still relevant to the discussion on urban planning. Their work has been further deliberated in many debates on participatory development by other authors such as Cleaver 2001; Baiocchi 2001; and Parfitt 2004.

In discussing participation as a tyranny, Cooke and Kothari argue there is often a pervasive naivety with regard to the complexities of power and power relations in participation as they suggest there is "a misunderstanding of power underpins much of the participatory discourse" (Cooke and Kothari 2001, p.14). Hence, they suggest that participation has become tyrannical in its practice as they defined tyranny as "the illegitimate and/or unjust exercise of power" (Cooke and Kothari 2001, p.4).

Three forms of tyrannies that can take in participation practices are namely, first, "the tyranny of decision making and control" where the existing legitimate decision-making methods are overridden. Second, "the tyranny of the group", where the group dynamic leads to participatory decisions that reinforce the interests of the powerful. Finally, "the tyranny of method", where participatory method can be at the expense of other potentially also productive methods (Cooke and Kothari 2001, p.7-8). Other contributors in the book Participation: The New Tyranny (Cooke and Kothari 2001) have also provided critiques in the discourse of participation where they analysed and deliberated on the subject from different perspectives.

The chapter written by Mosse (2001) for example, argued how local knowledge is often structured by the social relationship in determining planning decisions. He suggests that local knowledge reflects local power where it is "strongly shaped by local relations of power, authority and gender" (Mosse 2001, p.19). He also argues that local knowledge is manipulated by external actors who shape and direct the agendas to influence the people in constructing their "needs", "preferences or programme decisions" (Mosse 2001, p.20). Not only do the external actors have a role to play in shaping the agenda, local knowledge is also constructed by the local dominant groups and the project interests. He contends that participatory approaches are used to enable external interests be presented as local needs and dominant interests as community concerns where local knowledge is being used to legitimise these participatory approaches. In this sense, local knowledge is considered as part of power exercise in "constraining as well as enabling self-determined change" (Mosse 2001, p.22) which is articulated and structured by the participatory practice. This suggests that participation in development planning can be manipulated by both development agencies and local people to cater for their own interests.

Building on the critiques on participatory practice, Kothari (2001) argues that participatory methodologies create a 'dichotomy of power', separating the powerful from the powerless. The marginalised or powerless group is set at micro-level, while elites control the social power at the macro- and central levels. Kothari builds on Foucault, who argues that power must be analysed as something revolving in "a form of a chain" and "exercised through a net-like organization" (Foucault 1980, p.98). Kothari, however, stresses that power is

found everywhere "through the creation of social norms or customs that are practised throughout society" (Kothari 2001, p.141). Countering the common belief that the powerless will generally be excluded in the decision-making process, Kothari suggests that actually they are often included but in ways that will lead to the reassertion of power and social control of certain individuals and groups in the community. She therefore sees the inclusion of people in the decision-making process as an exercise of power and control over the individuals (Kothari 2001).

In response to Cooke and Kothari's arguments on the tyranny in participation, Williams (2004) takes a different stance, arguing that the depoliticisation of the participatory development critique is misguided and suggests that participation can actually provide the opportunity of opening up new spaces for political action. He asserts that the widespread failure of participatory practice is due to three factors: the emphasis of personal reform over political struggle, local power differences being hidden within the voice of the community and the inclusion of the marginalised group within capitalist modernisation projects in the name of freedom. Responding to Kothari's (2001) arguments, Williams (2004) suggests that participatory practice could be developed as 'a new political imaginary of empowerment' (Williams 2004, p.570). The spaces for empowerment could re-politicise participation and enable the community to make explicit demands in influencing decisions through political capacity building of the locals. He nevertheless, insists that empowerment should not be treated as the change in hierarchical power relations but rather, as a process built from within the political struggles of the whole process (Williams 2004).

Similarly, Hickey and Mohan (2004) in Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation have provided an extended debate on participatory practice and provide a conceptual framework for transformative participatory development. They agree that the existing participatory practices are mostly modest and rhetoric which tend to be unsupportive to participatory approaches and further cause social exclusion. Hence, they argue that in order for participatory approaches to be transformative, it requires three elements: participation must be ideologically explicit and coherent to development; participation must go beyond the individuals and locals; and it requires an institutional and structural transformation which involves multi-scaled strategies in the participatory proceses.

The intense debates on participatory approaches have helped uncover the fundamental issues, mostly associated with power relations that hinder participatory processes from being successful. Based on the arguments presented in this section, it is vital for participatory process to advance beyond the existing practice. Transformative participatory processes as suggested by Hickey and Mohan (2004) have provided a window for institutional and structural modification of the traditional participatory practice, which allows "a broader project of social justice and emancipation" (p.69) to take place. Hence, participation practice needs to be considered in relation to the broader governance context that enhance people's capability and the inclusion of all actors in decision-making process. At the same time, efforts should also be focused to understand the distribution of power among stakeholders through an effective governing approach in a shared-power. The discussion on the

change in governing practice from government to governance and later the practice of governmentality will be deliberated in the following section.

2.4   Government, governance and governmentality

Having addressed the concept of power and some of the key debates on participation, discussion will now turn to some of the other key concepts that can illuminate the relationships between state and society: specifically, government, governance and governmentality. This section does this by exploring the ideas of state and government, and how they differ from one another. It then turns to the discussion on the transformation of modern states as processes of *government* shift towards forms of *governance* through the involvement of a widening range of non-state actors society in decision-making processes. Finally, some arguments on the concept of governmentality, which is a central concept used in the thesis to analyse the practice of urban development planning in Kuala Lumpur, will be explored.

2.4.1   Distinguishing government from the state

Before proceeding, it may be helpful to explain briefly the difference between the concepts of state and government. The most influential definition of the state derives from the ideas of Weber, who suggests that the state is a "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Gerth and Mills 1972, p.78). In contrast, Migdal (2001, pp.15-16) provides a new definition of the state as "a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory,

and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts". Fundamentally, the state can be considered to be a legitimate authority that enforces its power, sometimes through violence, onto the people within the boundary of a given territory.

Government, on the other hand, basically refers to the people who have the authority and legitimate power to maintain the stability and running of a system. The practice of government is depicted as 'way of doing things' in order to shape, guide, correct and modify individuals' behaviour (Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991, p.19). Although the state and government are sometimes seen as synonymous, there is a distinct difference between the two. Flint and Taylor (2007, p.137) encapsulate the difference between the two concepts as:

> Government can be interpreted as the major agent of the state and exists to carry out the day-today business of the state. Governments are short-term mechanisms for administering the long-term purposes of the state. Hence every state is served by a continuous succession of governments. But governments only represent the state; they cannot replace it. A government is not a sovereign body: opposition to the government is a vital activity at the very heart of liberal democracy; opposition to the state is treason.

Another way of expressing the difference between the two is the idea that "It is the government which speaks on the state's behalf… It is these (government) institutions in which state power lies and it is through them that this power is wielded in its different manifestations by the people who occupy the leading positions in each of these institutions" (Miliband 1969, p.49). It can be concluded that states cannot take direct action in exercising their rights

without a government, as it acts as the agent of the state to speak and act on behalf of the state.

Nevertheless, the role of government as the agent of the state has slowly evolved over the years. The new interpretation of government has redefined the concept of government. The once "bureaucratic state and direct government" is experiencing a shift in administrative practice (Hill and Lynn 2005, p.174). Under the democratic ideology, government is no longer seen as having the consent of the governed but must have participation from all classes and interests in the society. Government is expected to be responsive to public opinions and unravel itself from any vested interest for it to become "an instrument of civilization and humanity" (Wilson 1984, p.194). In response to that, government functions have now reduced, particularly in terms of their decision-making power and accountability, with other non-government agencies and organisations playing an increased role in the exercise of power (Morison 2000). The modern practice of governing has started to look at the network of associations and collaboration between interdependent actors in service provision through the practice of governance.

2.4.2   From government to governance – The inclusion of society in the decision-making process

Governance can be understood as the functions of governing through the collaborative efforts of multiple agents from within and outside the government in order to allocate resources among the community (Healey 2006; Warren 2008). This definition has been taken further by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1997, p.2), which defines governance as "the exercise of

economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences". A similar definition was clearly stated by Stoker (2004, p.3), as he refers to governance as "the rules and forms that guide collective decision-making […] governance is not about one individual making a decision but rather about groups of individuals or organisations or systems of organisations making decisions". As states moves towards the practice of governance it requires the involvement of a wider range of stakeholders in decision-making process.

In general, collective decision-making in governance involves both public and private actors and not merely the power of the state alone. In analysing British public administration reform in the 1980s and 1990s, Rhodes (1997, p.57) explains that the reforms of the government practice were to eliminate the fragmented system delivery of the public service to more "functional imperatives for inter-organizational coordination". He elaborates on the functions of the State as it moves towards a collaborative network between governmental and societal actors (Rhodes 1997). This illustrates that governance will not replace formal government functions but instead will enable people to coordinate ideas in a more innovative and pragmatic manner, producing better decision-making (Innes and Booher 2010). The practice of governance relates to the idea of renewing and invigorating democracy from a traditional institution of government to the wider involvement of networks of many actors in the political, economic and social sphere. It embraces a broader and more inclusive concept of decision-making which involves the coordination

and collaboration of many stakeholders and actors in the process. Similarly, Kim et al. (2005, p.647) describe the new paradigm of governance as being based on "participatory policy making and a vast network comprising diverse actors" and "government is only one of many actors involved in governance". This interaction between multiple actors in governance can be established in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3: Integrated governance

Source: Samaratunge, Coghill and Herath, 2008

The integrated governance as shown in Figure 2.3 illustrates how the state, civil society and market forces intersect, overlap and intermingle, allowing the actors to influence each other in decision-making with the power they have. Apart from having strong relationships with all stakeholders, the roles they play must be backed by a certain degree of power to make any decisions valid. Hope (2008, p.730) emphasises that governance is "about power, relationships and accountability" and it is crucial to decide who has

influence or will make decisions and how all stakeholders express their say, and, more importantly, "how decision-makers are held accountable". Thus, it is important to establish a good balance between the respective parties, having a good systemic co-ordinated partnership as it involves "games about rules" rather than "games under rules" (Stoker 1998, p.22).

The shift from government to governance refers to the "new process of governing; or changed conditions of ordered rule; or new methods by which society is governed" (Rhodes 1996, p.652-653). Most literature on governance suggests that shifts in governance signify that authority is institutionalised or could be institutionalised in many spheres (Levi-Faur 2012). There are at least four domains of governance: the structure, the process, the mechanism and the strategy (Risse 2012). While the structure of governance indicates the dominance of formal and informal institutions, process looks into the dynamics and functions involved in policy-making (Levi-Faur, 2012). The mechanism refers to the institutional procedures of decision-making, and strategy denotes the actor's effort in governing and manipulates the institutions and mechanism towards the preferred choices of decision-making (Levi-Faur, 2012).

One of the main governance reforms associated with the shift from government to governance has been decentralisation, which aims to devolve power from central governments and bring governmental agencies closer to society. In order to make government more responsive and efficient, many countries have opted to reduce the role of central government, moving functions and responsibilities to the subnational level. The main aim of decentralisation is to "reconstitute government" (Faguet 2014, p.2) from a top-down government management to a more holistic system which incorporates

other societal institutions, including the private sector and civil society into governmental decision-making processes (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007).

In a broader context, decentralisation is a way of shifting the system from government to governance, through elevating the capacity of local government and the involvement of the private sector and civil society in order to respond better to the public's needs (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). It is sometimes seen as a way of "reducing the role of state in general, by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances" (Bardhan 2002, p.185). Faguet (2014) reasons that decentralisation helps to improve the accountability and responsiveness of government through the enhancement of the structure of the governmental system. He argues that, through decentralisation, power abuses can be tackled as some functions of the central government are disseminated; political stability could be improved with the inclusion of the minorities; political competition can be promoted; and service provision can improve. Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) have further emphasised the importance of having strong and committed leaders, both at central and local government level, for decentralisation to work. They stress that, while government officials must be willing to share power, authority and financial resources, political leaders must also be able to include those outside the direct control of central government or dominant political parties in the planning process (Ascher and Rondinelli 1999; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007).

The discussion of decentralisation leads to consideration of the concept of local governance, which can be understood as "the formulation and execution of collective action at the local level" (Shah 2006, p.1). This involves collective actions by formal institutions of local government, as well as the

informal networks of communities, organisations and associations locally. Blair (2000) has discussed in detail several aspects that contribute to democratic local governance which include service delivery performance, resource allocation and mobilisation, and the degree of power devolved. However, for Blair, participation and accountability are essential themes in determining the success of implementation. He maintains that the inclusion of citizens in local government decisions and the ability to hold local government responsible for the decisions they make are "what constitute the heart of the 'democratic' component of democratic local governance" (Blair 2000, p.22).

In summary, the practice of governance refers to collective effort and shared responsibility among the actors involved in the processes of decision-making. As the government takes a step back to give way to negotiated relationships with other actors, it could in theory bring in better outcomes, which is one of the reasons that moves from government towards governance have become so widespread. In order to enable a deeper analysis of practices of governance, we need to explore ideas about how modern forms of governing can be used to subtly manipulate and control populations, often in indirect ways. It is for this purpose that the concept of 'governmentality' can be a useful tool to analyse this art of governing populations.

2.4.3 Governmentality

While governance is a process of decision-making involving both state and non-state actors, governmentality is an analytical concept that emphasises the governing of people's conduct, enabling us to understand the power relations at work behind networks of governance and practices of

participation. Governmentality is a concept orginally formulated by 20th century French philosopher Michel Foucault that conceptualises the power relations and practices between "technologies of the self and technologies of domination, the constitution of the subject and the formation of the state" (Lemke 2002, p.50). The succinct definition of governmentality by Foucault was captured by Burchell et al. (1991, p.102-103) as:

1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.
2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs.
3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes 'governmentalized'.

The definition above provides an understanding of Foucault's idea on the art of government – an art of the government of others and being governed (Foucault 2007). It is a process of governing through various techniques to control, normalise and shape people's conduct (Mitchell 2002; Li 2007; Fimyar 2008). Therefore, governmentality identifies "the relation between the government of the state (politics) and government of the self (morality), the construction of the subject (genealogy of the subject) with the formation of the state (genealogy of the state)" (Fimyar 2008, p.5; Lemke 2002).

Foucault's work analyses power beyond the normal hierarchical, top-down power of the state to include forms of social control through disciplinary institutions as well as different form of knowledge. It relates to the connection between power as the regulation of others and a relationship with oneself; one governs one's own conduct while government guides the conduct of others. Government is seen as acting on both self-government and governing the conduct of people, which in this sense, is the active citizen. This self-government is not natural but is shaped through 'technologies of the self' (Simons and Masschelein 2006, p.419). According to Dean (1999), government attempts (to a certain degree) to shape people's behaviour through regulations and particular sets of norms:

> Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes. (Dean 1999, p. 11).

The argument of power is not only how we exercise authority over others or how we govern abstract entities (states and population), but also how we govern ourselves (Dean 1999). This idea links back to the notion of 'conduct of conduct' as proposed by Michel Foucault in his writings on governmentality in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Foucault suggests that power in modern society is no longer exercised through coercion or force but rather through shaping the conduct of others through influencing their desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs (Dean 1999).

Foucault's idea of governmentality relates to the connection between power as the regulation of others and a relationship with oneself; one governs one's own conduct while government guides the conduct of others. Government is seen as acting on both self-government and governing the conduct of people. Foucault (2002) also elaborates on the use of 'technologies' as a mechanism by the government to exercise its power upon the society being governed. He has expanded the understanding of power beyond the normal top-down hierarchical power of the state. Through knowledge and the specific technologies used, power can be internalised within the society to guide and control the behaviour of the people efficiently (Burchell et al. 1991). In other words, the government takes advantage of using knowledge where authorities can regulate individuals' values and actions and make society govern itself. It was further explained that governing people is not about governors applying force onto the people, but rather techniques that will "assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself" (Foucault 1993, p.204). Similarly, (Dean 1999, p.212) concurs that it is the technique of the government to "constitute logistical and infrastructure powers, and subsume the moral and political shaping of conduct by performance criteria".

In understanding the concept of the 'conduct of conduct', Foucault has elevated the interpretation of state power to another level. State power is no longer perceived as direct government enforcement of constraints on society but rather as an act of controlling through diverse, indirect and invisible ways. Governmental power works to govern through alliances with various authorities in order to shape economic activity, social life and individual

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conduct (Rose and Miller 1992). Instead of using force and forbidding individuals' activities, governmental power operates on individuals through shaping their values and conduct. Dean (1994) characterised governmentality into three aspects: political subjectification, governmental self-formation and ethical self-formation. He refers to governmental self-formation as a method used by the authorities, agencies, organisations and groups to shape and to incite self-formation of the habits, capacities and desires of particular groups of individuals towards a certain end. Meanwhile, ethical self-formation consists of the "practices, techniques and discourses of the government of the self by the self, by means of which individuals seek to know, decipher and act on themselves" (Dean 1994, p.156). These characteristics have been further developed into the concept of advanced liberalism, which provides a perspective on how the subjects of government continue to be governed at the same time as being told to govern themselves (Rose 1999).

Governmentality is a concept which is very close to the notion of governance. While governance provides the opportunity for society to gain power in influencing public services and addressing local issues through participation spaces, governmentality extends the idea of governing at a distance through the technologies of government that shape the behaviour and conduct of the people (Rolfe 2017). The debate continues where it suggests that through governmentality, it shapes individuals to control their own behaviour and others around them without having direct state intervention (Rose & Miller 2010). As an example, Rose (1996, 1999) proposes the concept of 'government through community' which builds on the Foucauldian idea of governmentality. He argues that while governmentality "refers to all

endeavours to shape, guide, direct the conduct of others ... And it also embraces the ways in which one might be urged and educated to bridle one's own passions, to control one's own instincts, to govern oneself" (Rose 1999, p.3). Through this concept, certain techniques of government such as community participation become the practice of governmentality.

Government through community prompts new modes of self-regulation and sense of community empowerment through collective community allegiances (Rose 1999). This has shifted the task of government to provide or be responsible for the society's needs as the responsibility has now turned to individuals or social formation within the state to make autonomous choice on social goods (Lister 2015). Communities are made to believe that the responsibilities are now shifted to them (Imrie and Raco 2003). Rolfe (2017) sees the onstensible withdrawal of government as an act to control the behaviour and indirectly responsibilise the people. Such transformation in governance reflects on Hunt and Wickham's (1994, p.26) argument which "the emergence of new and distinctive mentalities of government or governmental rationality, which involve a calculating pre-occupation with activities directed at shaping, channelling, and guiding the conduct of others'.

In another example, Swyngedouw (2005) offers another perspective of governance-governmentality relationship. Through his work 'governance-beyond-the-state', he suggests that the new arrangement of state functions through governance is fundamentally Janus-faced, where the new form of networked governance is very much shaped by the "wider political-economic transformation" (Swyngedouw 2005, p.2002). Networked organisations are directly or indirectly controlled by the choreographed multi-layered and non-

transparent governance where the state takes the centre stage of the process.

He concludes this as a form of governmentality as:

> Governance-beyond-the-state is embedded within autocratic modes of governing that mobilise technologies of performance and of agency as a means of disciplining forms of operation within an overall programme of responsibilisation, individuation, calculation and pluralist fragmentation (Swyngedouw 2005, p.2003).

According Swyngedouw (2005, p.1998), the new form of governance-beyond-the-state encompasses three basic re-organisations of the state that re-define the contours of governmentality. First, the externalisation of state functions through privatisation and deregulation, where non-state, civil society and market-based organisations become more involved in governing and organising a series of social, economic and cultural activities. Second, the up-scaling of governance whereby the state delegates regulatory and other tasks to higher levels of governance and thirdly, the down-scaling of governance to 'local' practices and arrangements that create greater local differentiation combined with a desire to incorporate new social actors in the arena of governing.

Similarly, Whitehead (2003, p.7) draws the attention to the concept of 'meta-governance' which relates to the work of Jessop (1997, 2001) on the high influence of state, through political practices, techniques and actions, over and within the governance system. The influence of state power in the governance structure and how the system works is what Scharpf (1994, p.41) terms as persistent 'shadow of hierarchical authority' towards realising economic and political goals and strategies. Thus, the guided or rather

controlled mode of governance will only frustrate the intended objectives and the autonomy of self-organisation network.

In summary, governmentality is an art of government where it sees less evident of state intervention but rather new and subtle forms of intervention to shape people's behaviour as Rose (1996) highlights "new ways are taking shape for understanding, classifying and acting upon the subjects of government, entailing new relations between the ways in which people are governed by others and the ways in which they are advised to govern themselves" (p.340). The function of government is to govern without directly governing society, but to ensure the conduct of individuals or community is consistent with government objectives (Dean 1999; Raco and Imrie 2000). One salient form of governance that has been widely discussed in recent decades is the introduction of UDCs in urban development practice. However, the governance of UDCs could also create a form of governmentality practice within the governing system which propagates continuous state power. These discussions will be deliberated in the following section.

2.5 Urban development corporations: Emergence of new form of governance

In the context of globalisation and urbanisation, cities are pushed to restructure systems of urban governance. One current practice in urban planning has been the introduction of UDCs, which were introduced in the UK in the early 1980s (Imrie and Thomas 1999) and have now been adopted in a number of developing countries. In an effort to be more globally competitive, governments have had to be creative in attracting economic development to particular urban

regions through the practice of partnership with the private sector, and this has been a central motivation behind the creation of UDCs (Harvey 1987). The creation of UDCs, to certain extent, can be seen as a new form of local governance as it shifts the roles and responsibilities of local authorites to a local corporate partnership with the involvement of multiple stakeholders including business entreprises and local community in the planning process. Stoker (1991) characterises this as a restructuring of governing system to reduce the power and influence of local authorities by transferring the executive and policy functions to single-purpose agencies and/or the private sector. However, there are significant variations in the practices of UDCs around the world as they have developed differently in different countries. In order to examine how UDCs as a form of governance have evolved in theory and practice, this section explores how they worked in the UK and Australia, before then turning to similar urban governance processes in various parts of Asia.

2.5.1   Urban development corporations in the United Kingdom

In the UK, UDCs were created under the New Town and Urban Development Corporations Act 1985 to make provisions to the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (DCLG 2014), with the objective of securing the regeneration of a particular urban area:

> By bringing land and buildings into effective use, encouraging the development of existing and new industry and commerce, creating an attractive environment and ensuring that housing and social facilities are available to encourage people to live and work in the area. (Local Government Planning and Land Act, 1980, section 136(2)).

The introduction of UDCs was intended to create a suitable environment for attracting private investment in the redevelopment or revitalisation of urban areas. It was said that UDCs are "going to produce more change more rapidly in those areas than any conceivable form of organisation could have done" (Heseltine 1982-1983, p.xxi). Although UDCs are not considered part of government, the fact is that institutions are centrally-directed and became a central mechanism of British urban policy (Thomas and Imrie 1997).

In order for UDCs to work, they are granted certain powers in the area of development planning (Lawless 1988). Even though the power to decide on any development planning in a certain area is shared between UDCs and local government, UDCs are given the authority to guide development and manage development control (Lawless 1988; Oatley 1989). UDCs are also granted the planning power to submit land-use proposals and, if the proposals are approved by the Secretary of State, a special development order and planning permission will be issued (Oatley 1989). This suggests that UDCs are empowered with wide-ranging powers which involve "effectively taking over the role of the local authority in the designated area" (Oatley 1989, p.7). Apart from planning powers, UDCs are also given unconditional support from central government, particularly with regard to resources, including financial aid, which makes it easier for UDCs to perform the functions of local authorities (Lawless 1988; Oatley 1989). This claim is supported by the statement from Heseltine, Secretary of State for the Environment, 1982-1983 (para 60, p.xxii):

> The political leadership and the industrial leadership and the resources of government pooled into one dynamic and decision-taking unit funded on specific areas of dereliction would serve to transform the inner cities.

The introduction of UDCs has contributed to changing practices of local governance. Lawless (1988) has argued that the establishment of UDCs could be an approach to weaken any vested interests in the local area. The representation of the local community on the boards of UDCs and the incorporation of the local community into UDCs' activities represents an effort to implement democratic local governance in particular areas. Brooke (1989) however, asserts that the role of UDCs fundamentally as an enabler requires them to work closely with key local institutions. This idea was supported by Thomas and Imrie (1997), who conclude that UDCs are compelled to create local linkages with all local agencies. Nevertheless, despite the emphasis on the creation of local governance, Brownill et al. (1996) point out the existence of marginalisation, arguing that there is evidence to show that minority representatives have been excluded in policy-making. Based on their work studying black and ethnic minority populations in six UDCs in UK, it was revealed that the representatives of the minorities who were chosen to be on these boards may not necessarily represent the interests of the community as a whole, and might not even be able to influence decision-making. They thus concluded that, despite the fact that the implementation of UDCs was said to promote local governance, evidence suggested that minority representatives were included and excluded selectively based on certain policy priorities, which further led to minorities being marginalised and not having equal opportunities in the decision-making process.

Despite the common assertion by governments that the establishment of UDCs has helped communities, there have been critiques arguing against this

(Lawless 1988; Middleton 1991; Rowley 1994). There have been questions about the impact of UDCs on local democracy and the effectiveness of institutions, as well as about the possibility of sectoral biases (Lawless 1988). While UDCs have become increasingly common in the recent practices of urban regeneration, there have been demands for evaluation and assessment of their practices (Brownill and O'Hara 2015; Imrie and Thomas 1999; Oatley 1989; Shaw 1995). It is interesting to delve into one of the comments made regarding the establishment of London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), which was said to possess a "draconian power" because the strategy of the corporation was not in line with 1976 Docklands Strategic Plan (Lawless 1988, p.282). Brownill (1990) argued that the setting up of the LDDC ended the practice of local democracy where representation was removed and consultation for the locals to participate in the planning process was limited and deemed by them to be insufficient. Central government was more focused on imposing market forces onto the local area, benefitting the private sector and failed to uphold the interests of the community.

Brownill (1990) further added that LDDC's development projects were said to have failed to address social needs; instead, most projects only brought profits and gains to particular groups, such as landowners and property developers. LDDC was also criticised for taking favours in giving out grants to the community: only those community groups which were supportive of the redevelopment plan and adhered to the terms laid down by the corporation were given funding to undertake community projects (Brownill 1990). Such criticisms suggest that LDDC was biased in its role; this would adversely affect the minorities who would be marginalised from gaining a benefit from the

overall development. As central government continued to place control in, and emphasised the interests of, private capital and market-led planning, local government was left to implement the policies laid down by central government. This resulted in contestations and conflicts between the local authority and the community, as the implementation of development planning did not reflect local needs (Brownill 1990).

Apart from the critiques above, Florio and Brownill (2000) assert that LDDC was "being unaccountable, for promoting undemocratic practices, failing to deliver benefits to the poor and increasing social polarization" (p.53). At the same time, it was criticised for using too much public funds in funding the redevelopment projects and was unable to attract investment to the area. They also argue that LDDC's approach to community involvement was very much controlled by central government and in few instances, it has encroached onto the local authority's role and function and "started to behave as leading partner" (Florio and Brownill 2000, p.60). Nevertheless, it was agreed that the planning system of UDCs did not significantly overlap with the local authorities and urban regenerations have remained in the public realm (Florio and Brownill 2000). Similarly, Brownill and O'Hara (2015) argue that UDCs were given extensive powers of land assembly and disposal, took over planning control powers from local authorities, and were accountable to a Board instead of the local electorate. It was revealed that the set-up of UDCs has surrendered local power to the central government and private sector (Brownill and O'Hara 2015).

In another example from the Thames Gateway, Brownill and Carpenter (2009) reveal the tensions and contradictions that arose from the governance

system of the Gateway. Similar to LDDC, the Thames Gateway UDC's programme also invites criticism and critical reviews of the governance mechanisms of the institution. Illustrating the networked governance of the development initiative as 'Janus-faced' (Swyngedouw 2005), they emphasise the catastrophe of the institutional structure of governance of the Gateway, which faces excessive central government control, choreographed governance and the underlying tensions arising from the governing practice (Brownill and Carpenter 2009). The networked form of governance is more of 'under the shadow of the hierarchy' (Scharpf 1994; Whitehead 2003) which suggests governmentality or meta-governance are being practiced through vertical influence of central government in meeting the centralised strategies and targets. Although the government is in favour of bottom-up, networked governance approach, in reality, it has been a failure in the system in bringing together the respective stakeholders in an open, accountable and effective environment. Other inherent tensions including the inclusion and exclusion of particular interests, have undermined participatory governance while the attempts to reconcile these tensions and contradictory objectives have further expose the governance failure of the existing set-up. Hence, the objective of creating sustainable communities, seeking to integrate economic growth, social inclusion and environmental sustainability was open to further contestation.

The notion of local governance and community empowerment being promoted in UDCs could be linked to the notion of advanced liberalism mooted by Dean (1999) and Rose (1999). As mentioned in section 3.5.3, advanced liberalism is derived from Foucault's idea of self-governing, which suggests

that it is the art of governing society through promoting societies' conduct to be in line with government objectives (Dean 1999). Raco and Imrie (2000) cite the example of the Single Regeneration Budget, an urban policy initiative in England since the mid 1990s that emphasised inclusive participation in development planning and power-sharing between central government, local government and community-based organisations. They describe how the initiative succeeded in embracing "participatory democracy and empowerment, seeking to stress the autonomy and self-determining powers of the individual" (Raco and Imrie 2000, p.2194).

Nevertheless, the practice of UDCs also portray the exercise of governmentality being applied where certain norms, assumptions and the thinking of the state were instilled into the communities involved in the initiative (Raco and Imrie 2000). Although the practice of empowerment and the extended role of communities are traced in the practice of UDCs, where the role of community representatives can be extended in local governance, it is expected to meet certain goals set by the central government. Based on the example of LDDC and Thames Gateway, UDC practices frequently revolve around economic competitiveness as the driver of policy agenda while governance is one of the mechanisms to support this agenda. The strategy of having networked governance can also be seen as a way for the government to legitimate and justify their actions through a collective decision-making process.

2.5.2 Urban development corporations in Australia

In Australia, UDCs are associated with the idea of 'growth centres'. This started in New South Wales with the provision of legislation under Growth Centres (Development Corporations) Act 1974 No 49 to enable a development corporation to be responsible for "promoting, co-ordinating, managing and securing the orderly and economic development of the growth centres in respect of which it was constituted" (New South Wales 1974, p.6). The development corporations collaborated across government, community and private sectors to unlock the economic potential of identified areas. The creation of UDCs in Sydney since the 1980s shows a further change in governance structures particularly in urban planning (Searle 2006). Sydney's first UDC was the Darling Harbour Authority, modelled on the London Docklands Development Corporation in the UK, was established to attract investment in advanced economy sectors to Sydney particularly in international tourism sector (Searle 2002).

While the establishment of UDCs in the UK has led to more holistic, 'joined-up' governance interventions (Beer, Clower, Houghtow and Maude 2005, p. 50) which was very much influenced by the central government, UDCs in Australia, particularly in Sydney were more of the influence of the State government (Searle 2006). This is because the UK has a unitary system of government where power is held centrally (Directgov 2012) while Australia practices federal system where powers are divided between a central government and individual states (Australian Government 2015). At the same time, there are also territories for areas within Australia's borders that do not fall under one of the six states which being directly administered by the

Australian government (Australian Government 2015). This makes the Australian case more relevant to this study as Malaysia practices federal system of government, with the power to govern is shared between the national and State governments.

The creation of South Sydney Development Corporation (SDDC) in 1996 by the State government, to coordinate development around Green Square area, has allowed more control by the State government as the corporation has to operate through a partnership with local and State government under a joint memorandum of understanding (Searle 2005). However, for the development in Green Square, the power to set basic planning and development controls remained at the local council (Searle 2005), while the corporation's power was limited and required to work in partnership with local and State government (Searle 2006). The State intervention has heightened in Sydney urban governance in mid 1990s as key State agencies were required to play active partnership with business entities. Hence, development corporations in Sydney were established to allow the government to have the necessary powers to coordinate development planning at the State, local government and community level. Nevertheless, the corporation faces criticism as it lacks community participation in determining the development plans for the area, where there was some community participation the state overrode this to achieve its ultimate development goals (Searle 2006; Searle and Bounds 1999).

Another example of development corporation fiasco is the decision by the New South Wales government to establish Redfern-Waterloo Authority (RWA) in 2004 to address social issues of the inner south city area through the

redevelopment of the said area. The establishment RWA has been perceived as an agency which involves "a significant state centralisation of authority and power" which reflects "a State government that seeks to control the political agenda and defuse periodic crises via high visibility projects" (Searle 2006, p.9). RWA has been criticised for not having enough local participation in the authority's decisions where it has failed in securing the identity and heritage of the area as well as proposing racial discrimination, particularly to Sydney's Aboriginal community, without a legitimate planning rationale. The development planning proposed by RWA was unable to receive strong support from the local community (Nixon 2006). These issues have also been deliberated in an inquiry report by the Standing Committee on Social Issues of New South Wales Parliament where the Committee insisted that RWA needs to have greater transparency especially with the local community and recommends "a genuine partnership between all levels of government, the non-government sector and the local community" in addressing the issues beleaguering the areas (New South Wales 2004). In general, the UDCs practice in Australia is quite similar to the one in the UK, particularly in terms of urban governance proceedings. Although it seems that the government is in support of local governance, in reality, the commitment community empowerment and participatory practice is just rhetoric. Local interests were eventually overridden by the state's ultimate goals to oversee a redevelopment of an area with high economic potential become manifested.

2.5.3 Change of urban planning governance in Asia

In many parts of the world, new forms of urban governance have emerged to address the challenges of managing urban development while unlocking the potential of urban spaces. Although they are not called UDCs in particular, they represent some of the same shifts of governing practice to a semi-autonomous, decentralised urban authority. In China, the role of government in urban planning has changed in line with the economic reforms in 1978. According to Asian Development Bank Report on Urban Innovations and Best Practices, it was revealed that the central government of China has started to decentralise its responsibilities to local governments in many areas including development planning. This allow local governments to have more authority and autonomy in decision-making process as well as in managing finances and investments. The central government formally ended financial assistance to local governments in 1988 which then led local governments to explore in other sources of funding for urban projects (ADB 2010). Among the initiatives taken was to introduce urban development and investment companies (UDIC) to become the driver for local governments in building infrastructure in China. UDIC is a corporate government structure which could borrow money and use funds on infrastructure projects on behalf of the local government (World Bank 2010). The creation of UDICs is said to be a "national strategy to marketize the infrastructure development function of the local governments into specialized corporate entities or municipal corporations" (World Bank 2010, p.6).

Similar to the establishment of UDCs in the UK and Australia, UDICs are also politically bonded with the government which in the case for China, the

local government. Li and Chiu (2018) asserted that UDICs were established not only to implement large-scale urban redevelopment projects but also serve as allies of the local government in promoting market-oriented land-use planning. UDICs are known as profit-making entreprises including development corporations and special-purpose development corporations which are highly affiliated to government which restructure the governance and state-market relationship. The establishment of UDICs is a policy tool to implement state spatial strategy through customised policies and resources in identified urban areas as it responses to market competition (Li and Chiu 2018).

In an example of the establishment of Songjiang New Town Development Corporation (SNTDC) in Shanghai, Songjiang District Government holds dominant control over SNTDC personnel appointments including their political and economic interests. The employees of SNTDC could also be wearing two hats where they could act on the capacity of the development corporation and also the government at local level. The strong connections between the corporation and local government have given an advantage to the corporation in project development. Despite the ease of doing business, this strong connection between the corporation and government would also lead to the monopoly of government contracts and also other manipulation of statutory planning mechanisms which could benefit the corporation in profit-making (Li and Chiu 2018).

At a glance, the establishment of UDICs in China resembles the introduction of UDCs in the UK. However, Li and Chiu (2018) argued that the two entities are fundamentally different from one another. While the British

UDCs act as agents to facilitate market-led redevelopment programme through private investment, China utilises UDICs to act as financier to local governments through the practice of borrowing funds from the market to finance urban development. They suggested that China's UDICs are more of resemblance to Singapore's Urban Redevelopment where urban planning practise state control over land through corporate power for social and economic development purposes in the country (Li and Chiu 2018).

Singapore's urban planning revolves around the practice of state capitalism where the government takes the central role in property markets and exercise hegemonic control over urban spaces (Shatkin 2014). State capitalism promotes "a system in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain" and this is carried out through state ownership of key corporations (Bremmer 2010, p.5). With the intense competition for investment and economic opportunity, some states see markets as "a tool that serves national interests, or at least those of ruling elites, rather than an engine of opportunity for the individual" (Bremmer 2010, p.52). Although Singapore's model of urban planning is commended for effective urban redevelopment planning, there were also critiques relating to the persistent political control of a one-party state and the incapacity of the state to build a coherent social contract as well as in providing a comprehensive urban master planning (Shatkin 2014). The overly controlled government is referred as practicing flawed democracy where the state power introduce and execute draconian policies in urban planning (Marshall 2016). The strong degree of control over urban spaces is a tool in achieving state objectives (Shatkin 2014).

One of the critical elements in Singapore's model is the state's dominance in land and economy. The dominance in land market allows Singaporean government to use its role as a tool to exert control in economic development and capitalising real-estate markets to generate revenue (Shatkin 2014). As for China, it has been established that all urban land belongs to the state, where any corporate entities or individuals are not allowed to own land despite having property on the land. Nevertheless, with the exercise of economic reform, land in China has gradually marketized through land leasing (Hsu, Li, Tang and Wu 2017). The emerging land market in China has led to major restructuring of urban land uses to allow higher investment for urban development (Zhu 2004). The land policy exercised in Singapore and China is different from the one practise in Malaysia, where land matters are under the purview of state governments with its own legislative and executive power. However, the federal government has the power to intervene in land matters through the legislation of the National Land Code (Awang 2003). Thus, in discussing the practice of UDCs, land tenure needs to be given due attention to comprehend the role its playing in driving development planning of designated area.

Meanwhile, decentralisation of central government authority for development planning in Malaysia started with the introduction of regional development planning as far as in 1966, where it sought to cultivate balanced regional development. The regional development programmes were administered by Regional Development Authorities (RDAs). RDAs focussed on four regional development strategies: new land development, in situ rural development, industrial dispersal and the creation of new growth centres

(Alden and Awang 1985). During the mid-term review of the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010), the Federal Government announced another regional development planning initiative, focussing more on growth centres and corridors which crossed inter-state boundaries. Five regional corridor authorities were introduced to spearhead corridor development in a more coordinated manner (EPU 2008). However, apart from striving for balanced regional development, the Malaysian government has realised the potential of specific major cities which could be leveraged for economic growth. Hence, a strategic policy was formulated for major cities in Malaysia to be developed in the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015) (EPU 2010). One of the strategies to execute the plan was to establish UDCs to focus on the development planning for specific areas within designated cities.

In general, the establishment of UDCs provides an avenue for urban governance reform in many parts of the world in recent years. Although in some countries, the practice may be able to facilitate urban regeneration through partnerships between government and private sectors, UDCs also face fierce criticism particularly with regard to addressing local community issues. With the power bestowed upon them, they enable decentralisation of government to a private entity to promote local governance through an integrated collaboration and coordination between local authorities, private entreprises and civil society. However, the experiences of UDCs in the UK, Australia and China discussed in this chapter suggest that this approach to networked governance to promote community inclusion in development planning is debatable as the pre-dominance of particular interests continue to exist.

Although the establishment of UDCs promotes the practice of governance through the involvement government and non-government actors in the planning process, the opportunity for the public to participate in planning processes through community engagements and representation seems limited. There is evidence to show the existence of marginalisation of the minority groups whilst community empowerment has been inadequate. Most decision-making is heavily weighted towards government and businesses. This suggests that the whole governance arrangement is just a rhetoric and being choreographed to legitimise decision-making. At the same time, state continues to assert its influence through the process of governmentality, where certain norms and thinking are instilled into the communities through the representatives sitting in the UDC boards. It is a process of governing the mind of the community through shaping the conduct and beliefs of the people, which can be seen as a technique of manipulation in a subtle way. Although the setting up of UDCs seems to empower the non-government actors in development planning, in reality the interests of the community were overridden by the state goals which were orientated to market forces. Hence, the practice of UDCs should be analysed from the perspective of governmentality and not merely the shift of government practice to governance.

2.6 Summary

The main contribution of this chapter is to outline some of the key concepts needed to address the research questions posed in this research. With this in mind, this chapter first reviewed the underlying concept of power, revealing the different perspectives of scholars on the structure of power which is fundamental to the discussion in the later substantive chapters. It then explored some of the

foundational literature on public participation to understand the role of society in the planning process as well as reviewing some critical debates on participation in practice. To place participation in its contemporary institutional setting, the later part of this chapter is focussed on the key concepts of government, governance and governmentality.

As this research looks into a change in the Malaysian government's approach in undertaking urban development planning, this chapter has also reviewed concepts of government and governance with careful consideration of the difference between the two concepts. It has also discussed the concept of governmentality as a 'technology' through which government can influence the decision-making process. This provides a further perspective on the approaches that governments can take towards governing societies without having to impose coercion or force, focussing instead on shaping the conduct, beliefs and thinking of the people – including through forms of participation. Finally, this chapter has provided some discussions on the practice of UDCs as a major form of urban governance reform, which embody forms of governmentality. Providing a few examples of UDC experiences in the UK, Australia and parts of Asia, discussions revolved around the impact that UDCs brought to local governance as well as some critical reviews of their practices.

In order to help understand the concepts discussed in this chapter and their inter-relationships, the diagram as shown in Figure 2.4 provides a visual presentation of the conceptual framework for this study.

Figure 2.4: Conceptual Framework

Source: Author

As shown in the diagram in Figure 2.4, this study on urban redevelopment planning of Kampong Bharu looks into how decentralisation of state power through the establishment of UDCs have shift the governing practice from government to governance. Governance involves a direct link to society in the governing system through public participation. At the same time, UDCs could also involve the practice of governmentality, which will have a direct impact on public participation. The practice of UDCs and public participation involves the use of power which closely related to the exercise of authority, influence, force and also manipulation (to name a few) in the process of decision-making. This framework is the basis for discussion in the analytical Chapters Five, Six and Seven. These

theories and concepts help to validate certain claims and arguments made in the

analysis and to provide a thorough evaluation of the issues being raised.

CHAPTER THREE: POSITIONING MALAYSIA IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: KUALA LUMPUR AS ONE OF THE EMERGING CITIES OF THE SOUTH

3.1 Introduction

As cities around the world compete for investment, talent and high-skilled workers to the benefit of their economy, increased emphasis has been placed on the idea of distinguishing themselves from others with their own uniqueness while providing the basic infrastructure and incentives to serve the demands of their inhabitants. It is important to ensure that cities can generate economic development, stimulate growth, increase productivity, create jobs and increase incomes, all of which contribute to making a better living. In order to achieve these targets, strong policy direction is required from the government to steer the way towards the goal. This includes the need for extra attention to policy making, strategic development planning and financial support from central government in order for cities to be able to compete globally.

The main purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the context of this research. It highlights the background of Malaysia from a broader perspective to understand the country's current social, economic and political situation, leading to its aspiration to become a high-income nation by the year 2020. As the current situation in Malaysia is heavily influenced by its historical background, this chapter provides a brief outline of the historical development of Malaysian government administration. Government administration in Malaysia has distinctive characteristics. For instance, the formation of Federal Territories for three areas in Malaysia gives direct authority to the Federal government to oversee the running of local authorities, eliminating the power of State

governments in these three areas. Some issues like land matters and local government administration are supposedly under the purview of State governments, but the situation is different for Federal Territories as the function of State governments is not applicable in these areas. The focus of this research is on the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur with specific emphasis on Kampong Bharu, an area centrally located in Kuala Lumpur. Kampong Bharu is known as a historical village, distinguished by its traditional Malay culture which has become a unique landmark and a tourist attraction in Kuala Lumpur. Due to rapid development in surrounding areas, the rustic look of Kampong Bharu is perceived by the government to damage the image of Kuala Lumpur and therefore impedes the city's development. Hence, Kampong Bharu was pushed to undergo redevelopment planning in order to reinvigorate the area and to keep up with the strategy to make Kuala Lumpur a competitive city in the region.

This chapter is broken into sections. The first section highlights the political history and government administration system in Malaysia. This includes a preamble about certain decisions made regarding development planning in Kuala Lumpur. This section also highlights the change in the administration of Kuala Lumpur from being under the purview of a State government to that of the Federal government after the city was established as a Federal Territory in 1974. It discusses the politics and division of power between federal, state and local government. The second section explores the vision and strategy of making Malaysia a high-income country by the year 2020. In order to do so, a brief background to national economic policies is provided, elaborating on current strategies, including development planning in Malaysia. This chapter focusses on Kuala Lumpur in its later section, primarily on its position as Malaysia's capital

city and the aspiration to make it competitive on a global level. Finally, this chapter introduces the case study of Kampong Bharu, with a discussion of its background, history and demographic features, as well as its economic and social development. This provides a basis for understanding the government's vision of the desired development in the area. The chapter also discusses existing development issues in Kampong Bharu. A brief review of the practice of governance in Kampong Bharu is included as the chapter describes the establishment of Kampong Bharu Development Corporation (KBDC) as the main agency for Kampong Bharu's redevelopment.

3.2   Colonialism and its impact on the current government administration system

Malaysia had a long history before it became an independent country in its own right. British colonialism and, following their invasion in 1941, the Japanese, played a significant role in shaping Malaysia today, particularly in its administration. Adopting the legacy of British colonial rule, its government is modelled on the Westminster parliamentary system. Malaysia also has the three tiers of government: federal, state and local. In many states in Malaysia, the management and administration of local government operates under the dominion of a state government. This is not the case for the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and two other territories: Labuan and Putrajaya, where the role of State government has been eliminated and the Federal government has direct control over the local authorities.

3.2.1 From colonialism to the current government system

Malaysia's long history of colonialism began with the intrusion of the Portuguese in 1511. The Dutch followed in 1641, and Malaya (its name then) was colonised by the British in 1824, before the occupation of the Japanese between 1941 and 1945 (Harding 2012). The British had a significant impact on the social, economic and political transformation of the country. Under British administration, immigrants from China and India were brought in to cater for the labour needs of the plantations and tin mines (Alhabshi 2012; Hirschman 1986; Yusof et al. 2000). The influx of immigrants over the years has had a significant impact on the region. Along with the introduction of a divide-and-rule approach by the British colonists, Malaysia's society has become more segregated and compartmentalised because of the separation of ethnic groups; as Aljunied (2011, p.17) explains, this was because "colonialism brought inequalities in terms of wealth, ethnic background and class".

The social gap between the ethnic groups was heightened during the Japanese occupation, especially between the Malays and Chinese, as the two communities reacted differently to Japanese control. While the Malays were fairly treated and allowed to continue holding high positions in government, the Chinese were unable to accept Japanese policy (Yang 1998). Japanese repressive treatment against Chinese while maintaining good relationship with the Malays have further developed racial conflict between the two ethnics (Cheah 1981).

Socio-economic activities were not evenly distributed among the ethnicities. The Malays, also known as indigenous people or 'Bumiputera',

lived predominantly in rural areas, while the Chinese took on the opportunities available in the urban areas and the Indians gathered in the plantations. This was the outcome of colonial capitalism, in which an "ethnic division of labour" generated ethnic stereotypes: the Malay farmer, the Chinese trader and the Indian estate labourer (Khoo 2005). The socio-economic imbalances and inequality between the ethnicities have resulted in tensions which climaxed in a riot between the Malays and Chinese in Kuala Lumpur in May 1969. As a result, the State sought to reconcile the communities through national policies which included the introduction of a National Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, intended to eradicate poverty regardless of race, and to restructure society in order to correct economic imbalances (Khoo 2005; EPU 2004). The implementation of the NEP has raised the capacity of the Bumiputera to hold better positions in the economy and in public sector administration (Khoo 2005).

Malaysia's federal system was introduced by the British administration and has been maintained since the country gained independence in 1957. The federal constitution provides a framework for a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy, where the supreme head of the federation is the king, Yang di-Pertuan Agong, a position which is rotated every five years between the rulers of the Malaysian federation. The constitution observes the separation of powers of the executive, legislative and judiciary systems (Siddiquee 2005). The form of Malaysia's governance is based on that of a constitutional monarchy, having a Westminster parliamentary executive and a prime-ministerial system of government with the involvement of cabinet members (Harding 2012). Although Yang di-Pertuan Agong is the head of the

state, his role is largely ceremonial, as any decisions must be taken on the advice of the prime minister (United Nations 2005; Harding 2012). Executive authority lies with the prime minister and his cabinet, who hold the power to execute government policies and programmes with the assistance of civil servants (Siddiquee 2005).

The structure is similar in all 13 states in Malaysia, where each state has its own constitution. The government administration is headed by Menteri Besar (for the Malay states to replace the British resident system) and Ketua Menteri (for those states without hereditary rulers). Together with the state assembly members, they advise the sultans (the rulers) or Yang di-Pertua Negeri (governors) on the states' administration (Siddiquee 2005). Although the role of the state rulers seems limited and confined to Westminster-style conventions stipulated in state constitutions, the Conference of Rulers under the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 serves a significant function as "the guardian of Malay rights and also protectors of the legitimate interests of the non-Malays" (Harding 2012, p.130). The significance of these rulers is deeply rooted in the country's culture, especially for the Malays.

Although the role of Malay ethnicity is important for this thesis, this does not mean that ethnicity is the primary focus of the study. Malay ethnicity has been discussed extensively in the existing literature on politics and development planning in Kampong Bharu (see Mohamed 1999; Mohamed and Mohd. Zen 2000; Md. Yassin 2009; Alhabshi 2010a; Ujang and Abdul Aziz 2015; to name a few). The present study takes into account the significance of ethnicity for development planning and implementation in Kampong Bharu, but

its primary focus is on how the effort to redevelop the area has generated new forms of governance and reconfigured state-society relations.

3.2.2 Federal, state and local government – The division of power between them

While the governance of Malaysia's 13 states is divided between the Federal and State Governments, the three Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan are directly controlled by the Federal Government. The separation of responsibilities between the Federal and State Governments in exercising legislative power is specified in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of Malaysia. This division of constitutional power is shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: The constitutional division of power between federal and state government

Federal List	State List	Concurrent List
External Affairs	Muslim Religious Law	Social Welfare
Defense and Security	Land Ownership and Use	Public Health
Trade, Commerce and Industry	Agriculture and Forestry	Town and Country Planning
Shipping, Communication and Transport	State Works and Water Supply, when not federalized	Drainage and Irrigation
Water Supply, Rivers and Canals	Loans for State Development and Public Debt	Rehabilitation of Mining Land and Soil Erosion
Finance and Taxation	Malay Reservation and Custom	National Parks and Wildlife
Education and Health	*Local Government*	
Labor and Social Security		
Public Works and Utilities		

Source: Harding 1996 In Phang 2008 (p.127)

In terms of the division of authority, most of the important and larger issues that might affect the country are tackled at the federal level while state governments undertake matters pertaining to Islamic law and its customs, land, agriculture, forests, natural resources and local governments (Harding 2012). Malaysia has a highly-centralised form of federalism in which federal laws overrule any state legislation if there is any contradiction between them. This is clearly specified in Article 75 of the Federal Constitution: "If any state law is inconsistent with a federal law, the federal law shall prevail and the state law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void" (Government of Malaysia 1963, p.59). The Federal Government therefore retains important powers to constrain states' autonomy (Morrison 1994). State governments are very much dependent on the financial assistance from the federal, which means that the Federal Government can readily intervene in the affairs of the state governments (Phang 1997, 2008; Norris 1980). As Harding (2012) has pointed out, the notion of a strong, centralised federal government with the ultimate power to control financial matters was embedded by the Reid Commission, an independent commission which was responsible for the preparation of the Federation of Malaya's constitution. The states have to juggle the expenditure they are committed to with the limited resources they have.

Local government is the lowest level of government in Malaysia, and operates under the purview of state governments. Executive power rests with the appointed mayor, supported by a system of committees. The councillors in the committees are appointed (not elected) by the state government for three years from amongst those prominent people in the locality who reflect the interests of the political party at state level (Phang 2008; Harding 2012). As

mentioned earlier, the Federal Government has direct power over local government in the three Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan. The mayors of these areas are appointed by the Federal Government for a period of five years (Harding 2012) and the management of these local authorities is supervised by the Ministry of Federal Territories.

Government administration in Malaysia has a traditional, top-down approach in which both state and local government operate while politically, financially and economically dependent on the Federal Government. This has resulted in some deficiencies in local government's service delivery to the public and limited local government authorities' accountability to their constituents, as they are expected to perform the services directed by the Federal Government (Phang 2008). Harding (2012) therefore argues that there is a lack of accountability and transparency in the administration of local governments in Malaysia. However, Othman and Taylor (2008) maintain that accountability exists across a wider part of the public sector, and claim that managerial and public accountability has been emphasised in order to provide clear operating goals in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness. According to them, some local government authorities promote accountability through formal and informal reporting to the higher levels of government. This is consistent with Sinclair's (1995) argument that councillors, state and federal government ministers have a direct effect on the behaviour of local government. Overall, the literature suggests that local government has stronger upward accountability to the Federal Government than downward accountability to local communities. This is most probably because councillors

in local government in Malaysia are appointed by the higher tier of government and not elected by the community.

3.2.3 The formation of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur: The change from State to Federal government administration

The formation of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur took place on 1 February 1974 with Kuala Lumpur City Hall (KLCH) acting as the local authority for the area. Prior to its naming as a Federal Territory, Kuala Lumpur was under the jurisdiction of Selangor State, which has its own constitution and government structure. As mentioned above, the form of a Federal Territory eliminates the role of a State government, giving power instead to the Federal Government, which have direct control over KLCH through the Ministry of Federal Territories.

When the Federation of Malaya was established in 1948, Kuala Lumpur was the state capital of Selangor, and also became the capital of the Federation of Malaya. The move to change its status as the Selangor State capital began in 1956 in order to allow the Federal Government to have full authority over Kuala Lumpur. While Selangor State was considering where its new capital should be, the Federal Government began to take over the administration of Kuala Lumpur. In order to legitimise the transfer of Kuala Lumpur's administration, the Federal Capital Act of 1960 was passed in Parliament. Although the cession of Kuala Lumpur was designed to give power over it to the Federal Government, there were some unresolved issues. One concerned land matters, which remained within the purview of the Selangor State Government. Other issues raised included political imbalances,

unresolved compensation issues, finalising the delineation issues between Selangor and Kuala Lumpur and resolving legal issues between the two legislative bodies (Azmi et al. 2014).

As far as political imbalances were concerned, the general election of 1969 had a massive impact on the local political arena when the Alliance political party (now known as Barisan Nasional) lost ten per cent of the popular vote, resulting in the loss of almost half of its parliamentary and Selangor State seats. The shocking results of the election led to an incident on 13 May 1969, when racial riots occurred due to a provocative procession on the 12 May 1969 by the opposition party (mostly of Chinese ethnicity) to celebrate their victory in the election. Aggravated by the action, the pro-government procession of Malays was intended to demonstrate a protest to the Chinese on the next day (13 May 1969). This led to tensions between the two ethnicities and ended up with unprecedented rioting in Kuala Lumpur, causing loss of life and damage to properties (Harding 2012). As a result, the declaration of a state of national emergency was announced and followed by the suspension of Parliament by the Malaysian government.

This incident had a major impact on the political landscape of Kuala Lumpur itself, as the government decided to delineate the electoral constituencies, separating Kuala Lumpur from Selangor. The separation was an attempt to prevent the loss of votes to the opposition political party, especially the non-Malay party, and to weaken the power of the opposition in the Selangor State legislature (Awang Besar and Ali 2014). The political turmoil of 1969 was the key to expediting the transfer process and finally, on 1 February 1974, Kuala Lumpur was handed over to the Federal Government

by the State of Selangor through the signing of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur agreement (Azmi et al. 2014).

3.3   Driving Malaysia towards being a high-income country by the year 2020: Strategic planning and policies

After the 13 May 1969 incident, the Federal government implemented various strategies to restructure ethnic imbalances and to curb the ethnic division of labour that originated in the colonial period (Khoo 2005). The launch of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 was the beginning of policy change and socio-economic restructuring in order to achieve economic growth objectives. It was followed by Vision 2020, introduced in 1991 as the basis of development planning for Malaysia until the year 2020. Malaysia embarked on its National Development Policy (NDP) at the same time, laying out its strategy for achieving the targets set for Vision 2020. While retaining the main elements of NEP, NDP promoted balanced development through new policy initiatives, including an anti-poverty strategy, employment creation, promoting the participation of Bumiputera (the indigenous group) in a modern economy, stimulating the involvement of the private sector and focussing on human resource development. It was followed by the implementation of the National Vision Policy in 2001 to promote sustainable growth and strengthen economic resilience, as well as create a united and equitable society (EPU 2004). The evolution of economic policies in Malaysia is summarised in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Major economic policies in Malaysia, 1957 - 2010

MAJOR ECONOMIC POLICIES

National Vision Policy (NVP) — Building a Resilient and Competitive Nation, 2001-10

National Development Policy (NDP) — Balanced Development, 1991-2000

Vision 2020 — Total Development, 1991-2020

New Economic Policy (NEP) — Growth with Equity, 1971-90

Post-independence 1957-70
- *Laissez-faire* / export-oriented
- Economic and rural development

Source: Economic Planning Unit, Development Planning in Malaysia, 2004

In gearing up to become a high-income nation with reduced inequality by 2020, the Federal government introduced the New Economic Model (NEM) in 2010. Its main focus was the aim to become an advanced nation with inclusive and sustainable economy. The framework of the NEM included the implementation of the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) introduced in 2010 and the Tenth Malaysia Plan, which set out economic plans for the period of 2011-2015. According to the National Economic Advisory Council (NEAC), the NEM was aimed to achieve a balance through the development of a high-income economy, maintaining the inclusiveness of the *rakyat* (people) and having a sustainable approach for the benefit of people's quality of life (NEAC 2009), as shown in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Goals for New Economic Model

Source: National Economic Advisory Council (NEAC 2009)

ETP is not so much a plan as a strategy, with a strong focus on the private sector to drive the economy with the support of the public sector for relevant policy measures. Along with the Tenth Malaysia Plan, the ETP is set to attain the targets for Vision 2020 through the implementation of 12 National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs) (Figure 3.3), which were identified as the sectors that could make contributions to the economy and raise Malaysia's competitiveness (PEMANDU 2010). One of the NKEAs identified was Greater Kuala Lumpur/Klang Valley (Greater KL/KV) as a driver for economic growth. The rationale for choosing Kuala Lumpur/Klang Valley was based on understanding the role and potential of primary cities which could compete regionally and globally. Four important dynamics were identified as enablers for Greater KL/KV: first, the urbanisation rate of the area, whose concentrated population would result in economic

specialisation while increasing productivity and economic output; secondly, taking advantage of the status of a primary city, where Greater KL/KV is forecast to be able to contribute better than any other urban centres in Malaysia; thirdly, to maximise urban productivity in order to promote the efficiency and liveability of the area; and finally, in order to attract talent in the form of highly skilled workers and investors, Greater KL/KV is expected to improve on the liveability and the vibrancy of the area (PEMANDU 2010).

Figure 3.3: The 12 National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs) of the Economic Transformation Programme

Source: PEMANDU, Economic Transformation Programme, 2010

The ETP specifies that all NKEAs projects will be prioritised and receive government support including funding, top talent and prime ministerial attention. This would include policy reforms such as the removal of barriers to competition

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and market liberalisation in order to facilitate NKEAs. These initiatives were aligned with the Tenth Malaysia Plan to indicate the government's strong commitment to enhancing access and success for the programmes (PEMANDU 2010). The Federal Government of Malaysia has set a clear direction on the socio-economic policy of the country by maximising the economic growth of the NKEAs. Having Greater KL/KV as one of the NKEAs to support economic growth was linked to one of the strategies of the Tenth Malaysia Plan which is to rely on primary cities to be a source of economic growth. Developing that strategy, the government formulated the necessary action for Kuala Lumpur's development planning.

3.4   City competitiveness in urban development planning: Positioning Kuala Lumpur as a world-class city

The Malaysian government's strategy reflects the idea that "globalization takes place in cities and cities embody and reflect globalization" (Short and Kim 1999, p.9). Jusoh et al. (2009) argue that the major effect of globalisation would be competition between cities and regions in the global arena, and in order to attract investors and markets, cities have to facilitate this with sound infrastructure, good facilities and attractive incentives. 'Global cities' like London, New York, Paris and Tokyo have something in common: competitive advantages that enable them to thrive in a highly competitive global economy (Sassen 2013). In order to retain their competitiveness, these cities implemented bold urban transformation plans to make way for new economic activities to maximise the efficiency of land use (JLL 2015), even though these can have negative impacts on equality and the affordability of land and housing for lower-income groups. It

has been accepted that cities are the key to economic growth; for example, Duranton (2000, pp.291-292) notes that "the city is not only the place where growth occurs…but is also the engine of growth itself". It is now well-established that economic growth is very much linked to urbanisation. The concentration of population in urban areas is generally associated with higher productivity, job creation and higher per capita incomes (Overman and Venables 2005; Spence et al. 2008; Walton 2012).

As Malaysia becomes increasingly urbanised, the focus of development growth is centred in major cities. A focus on primary cities was presented in the Tenth Malaysia Plan and in the ETP; as the capital city, Kuala Lumpur is accorded special status in the government's strategy. According to the World Bank (2011), Kuala Lumpur specifically brings in 1.6-1.8 times as much gross domestic product (GDP) as compared to secondary cities such as Johor Bharu in the south and Penang in the north. The strategy of making Kuala Lumpur excel on a global stage is supported by the introduction of NKEA Greater KL/KV in the ETP. Greater KL/KV has set a strong target – to become a top 20 ranking in economic growth as well as top 20 globally for the most liveable cities by 2020.

Development planning in Malaysia is a shared responsibility between the Federal and State government (Table 3.1). At a federal level, the Federal Department of Town and Country Planning Peninsular Malaysia (JPBD), an agency under the Ministry of Urban Wellbeing, Housing and Local Government, has the authority to formulate and administer all national policies pertaining to town and country planning in Peninsular Malaysia, as stipulated in the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172). Although the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur observes the Federal Territory (Planning) Act 1982 (Act 267), which is a

specific Act on planning for Federal Territories, it still has to be aligned to national planning set by JPBD.

Figure 3.4: National Development Planning Framework

Source: National Physical Plan-2 (JPBD 2010)

Figure 3.4 shows the framework of development planning in Malaysia, depicting the relationships between relevant agencies at all levels: federal agencies, state governments and local authorities. Development planning goes through a comprehensive process involving the relevant parties to formulate a strategic plan in accordance with the national agenda. As in Kuala Lumpur, the local plan or any special area plan must adopt the spatial policies and measures on land use and physical development provided in the National Physical Plan (JPBD 2010).

As shown in Figure 3.5, Kuala Lumpur could make a contribution to GDP which is eight times higher than the other cities in Malaysia (EPU 2010). In order to increase its competitiveness in attracting more talent and highly skilled workers, the government strategy suggests that Kuala Lumpur needs to focus on creating agglomeration economies: in other words, densely populated areas in which the concentration of economic activities leads to higher productivity and economic growth. Alongside significant Entry Point Projects (EPPs) such as attracting world dynamic firms and attracting internal and external talent; basic infrastructure especially transportation and connectivity were given high priority for improvement to provide support and facilitate foreign investment (Yong 2010; PEMANDU 2010).

Figure 3.5: Comparison between Kuala Lumpur and other cities in Malaysia

Kuala Lumpur contributes 8 times the GDP of any other geographic cluster in Malaysia

Geographic clusters	2010 Urban GDP contribution US$ million
Kuala Lumpur[1]	74,778
Johor	9,372
Pulau Pinang	8,871
Kuching	7,170
Ipoh	5,726
Seremban	5,373
Kuantan	3,290
Kota Kinabalu	2,908
Sandakan	2,443
Alor Setar	2,384
Kuala Terengganu	2,038
Kota Bahru	869
Perlis	447

1 Population for KL includes FT Kuala Lumpur, Klang, Petaling Jaya, Subang Jaya, Ampang Jaya, Shah Alam, Cheras and Kajang
SOURCE: World Gazeteer, Department of Statistics Malaysia

Source: World Gazetteer, Department of Statistics Malaysia, In EPU, Tenth Malaysia Plan, 2010

The aspiration to make Kuala Lumpur stand out globally started with the Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 1984. However, the plan was overambitious and ineffective management of development controls has led to failures in delivering it. The 1984 plan stressed balanced growth but this did not materialise, as urban growth in city centres was uneven (Sirat 2001). Reflecting upon external factors like global demand and rapid changes in the city's surroundings, which were not anticipated in the 1984 plan, KLCH embarked on preparing a new structure plan in early 2000. The Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 2020 was completed in 2004 and provided guidelines on the development of Kuala Lumpur for the next 20 years, including development around Kuala Lumpur. The 2004 plan aims to respond to both national and global perspectives, and to ensure that Kuala Lumpur emerges as a world-class city, providing a better infrastructure, good environment to live in, and efficient city management while providing good facilities for the people. The document was approved by the Federal Territories Minister on the 12 August 2004 and gazetted for adoption on 4 November 2004 (KLCH 2004). Since its launching, the Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 2020 has become the guideline for spatial and physical development planning in Kuala Lumpur.

Political support has also impacted on the transformation of Kuala Lumpur itself. While Dr Mahathir Mohamad was the prime minister, he took a personal interest in the development plans for Kuala Lumpur and incorporated the management of Federal Territory Kuala Lumpur into the Prime Minister's Department (Phang et al. 1996). At this point, it was said that there was little governance structure to administer development planning and that power was very much centralised in certain Federal Government ministries and agencies. The only coordinating agency then was the Klang Valley Planning Secretariat,

and it remained ineffective as the Federal Government continued to exercise its centralised power in the development planning of Kuala Lumpur. Bunnell et al. (2002) claimed that the governance of Kuala Lumpur was under the strong influence of the Prime Minister's Department through the Economic Planning Unit, an agency under its direction.

3.5   The significance of Kampong Bharu, Kuala Lumpur

As mentioned earlier, the strategy of making Kuala Lumpur excel on a global stage is supported by the introduction of NKEA Greater KL/KV in the ETP. As the country moves forward in trying to maximise Kuala Lumpur's competitiveness, it will require a concerted effort to make the vision a success. In order for the city to maintain its competitiveness, policy recommendations centre on developing the ability to attract investors and talent by providing a vibrant liveability, being a sustainable place to live and work, and by strengthening the local economy in the area (World Bank 2011). In order to achieve Greater KL/KV's strong target in attaining high economic growth and becoming a competitive city, all efforts are geared towards supporting the development of Kuala Lumpur City. This includes necessary strategies to redevelop Kampong Bharu, which sits strategically in the heart of Kuala Lumpur. Figure 3.6 shows the location of Kampong Bharu, sitting at the centre of Kuala Lumpur conurbation of Greater KL/KV. This reveals the existing potential and opportunities that Kampong Bharu has to offer to the development of Kuala Lumpur.

Figure 3.6: Kampong Bharu in the Greater Kuala Lumpur Conurbation

Source: Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu, 2014

Although Kuala Lumpur in general is very dense and has been subject to various forms of modern and vertical development, there are parts of the city that remain relatively low density and low-rise, with relatively little large-scale investment. These areas are seen by the government as spaces of underdevelopment which needed 'a facelift' in order for them to match their surroundings and to maximise the economic value of the prime land. Kampong Bharu is one such area. It is a living heritage and tourist destination, infused with Malay ethnic culture and identity. It was built more than 115 years ago, covering 307.34 acres and has a population of 17,000 according to the 2010 Census (KBDC 2014b). Figure 3.7 shows the location of Kampong Bharu in Kuala Lumpur development plan. Being surrounded by massive development which dominates the skyline of Kuala Lumpur, Kampong Bharu is submerged within the modern

city centre of Kuala Lumpur (KLCC), in the shadow of the Petronas Twin Towers and Kuala Lumpur Tower, which are adjacent to Kampong Bharu.

Figure 3.7: Kuala Lumpur Precinct Plan

Source: Draft Kuala Lumpur City Plan 2020, 2008

3.5.1   The background of Kampong Bharu

Kampong Bharu was established during the colonial era. When Kuala Lumpur prospered from mining activities in the 19th century, the British brought in immigrants from China and India to provide labour. The volume of

immigration left Malays as only 12 per cent of Kuala Lumpur's population. The Malays were later moved to the outskirts, as Mohamed and Mohd Zen (2000) argues that it was the intention of the British colonial administration to exclude Malays from urban development to enable the Malays to continue with agricultural activity at the urban periphery. Most of the Malays living in the centre of Kuala Lumpur were moved to an area set up by the British government, which had asked the Ruler of Selangor for a designated area in Kuala Lumpur. This allowed the Malay community to live and practise Malay customs (Mohamed and Mohd. Zen 2000).

In 1897, Kampong Bharu was given to the Malays by the Ruler of Selangor. The area was known as the Malay Agricultural Settlement (MAS) and a board of management was appointed to administer the running of the area (Alhabshi 2010a). There is a special provision by which the land may not, either through sale or lease, be transferred to non-Malays (advertised in the Gazette by Selangor State Government, number 20, January 12, 1900 under Section 6, Land Enactment 1897). The aim was to protect the landownership of the Malay area from being transferred or occupied by non-Malays (Abdul Razak 1992; Mahmood 1996). The definition of Malays in the 1897 Selangor Land Enactment refers to those from the Malayan Archipelago with Islam as their official religion, who speak in Malay, and maintain Malay culture. The individuals must also be declared as Malays by the MAS Board (Ujang and Abdul Aziz 2015; Md. Yassin 2009).

The initial boundary of Kampong Bharu was confined only to the MAS area, which within it consists of seven villages. The villages are, namely, Kampung Periok, Kampung Masjid, Kampung Atas A, Kampung Atas B,

Kampung Hujung Pasir, Kampung Paya and Kampung Pindah, as shown in Figure 3.8. The area of Kampong Bharu however, was expanded to encompass some of other areas (the non-MAS land) when Kuala Lumpur became a Federal Territory.

Figure 3.8: Map of the Seven Villages in Kampong Bharu under MAS administration

Source: Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu, 2014

As one of the earliest Malay residential areas in Kuala Lumpur, Kampong Bharu remained a reserved residential area for the Malay ethnic group. In the early days, most of the villagers' daily activity was determined by a system created by the MAS Board, which was then led by a British resident. The lifestyle was quite regimented, and the villagers had to follow a specified schedule outlined by the board (Mustaffa 2009b). Due to these fixed activities, most of the village folks became very close-knit, and these relationships

remained strong in later generations. This has supported a strong Malay ethnic foundation in the area until today. Over time, the MAS area, which started from an agricultural base, has gradually transformed into a residential area, as the place was no longer suitable for plantation (Yip 2014).

As mentioned above, the establishment of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur in 1974 changed the landscape of Kampong Bharu. The initial area of Kampong Bharu, consisting of the seven villages on MAS land over 101.02 hectares, has expanded to 162.95 hectares. This area outside the formal boundaries of Kampong Bharu is known as the non-MAS area (Alhabshi 2010a) as shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Kampong Bharu land area

Non-MAS Area	**MAS Area**
Chow Kit	Kampong Periok
Dang Wangi	Kampong Masjid
Sultan Ismail	Kampong Atas A
Kampung Sungai Baru	Kampong Atas B
Flat PKNS	Kampong Hujung Pasir
	Kampong Paya
	Kampong Pindah
Total land area: 61.93 hectare (153.04 acre)	**Total land area: 91.41 hectare (225.89 acre)**

Source: Kuala Lumpur City Hall, 2008 (KLCH 2008)

Land administration in Kampong Bharu is unique. While KLCH has the outright authority as a local government to administer the running of Kampong Bharu, its powers are rather limited within the MAS area. This is because the 1897 Selangor Land Enactment which gave the MAS Board the authority to

administer the MAS area is still a valid legislation and has never been revoked. When the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur was formed in 1974, the Federal Government overlooked the binding law of 1897 Selangor Land Enactment on the MAS area. The MAS Board has argued that, since the enactment is still in force, the Board still remains the custodian of the MAS area. There were attempts made by KLCH to revoke the power of the MAS Board but these have been unsuccessful and created tensions between the two parties (Alhabshi 2010b). Most of the villagers residing in MAS area remain very much attached to the MAS Board, which has been administering the area for the last four generations. The Board's tenure of more than 115 years has built up trust between the community and the organisation. MAS Board has always been regarded the 'local government' by the community of Kampong Bharu (Yip 2014).

Having two different administrative powers means that there are duplications of authority in relation to the administration of Kampong Bharu (Alhabshi 2010a). KLCH has limited power over the MAS area, but because it is directly under the Ministry of Federal Territories and headed by a minister, KLCH gains extra credence. The Mayor of Kuala Lumpur holds executive power and is also the Chairman of the MAS Administrative Board (Alhabshi 2010a). The reason for the same person holding the two positions is because the post was delegated to the Mayor of Kuala Lumpur from the Chief Minister of the Selangor State Government when Kuala Lumpur became a Federal Territory (Md. Yassin 2009). The appointment continues a practice taken over from the Resident post during the British occupation (Alhabshi 2010a). Theoretically, the Mayor should hold considerable power over the MAS Board

and the running of the Kampong Bharu administration since he is also the Chairman of the MAS Board. This, however, did not materialise and the Mayor has not able to exercise his power over the people of Kampong Bharu, including the members of the MAS Board. This is an example of the power struggle between the MAS Board and KLCH, where the two organisations continue to uphold their own agenda although they are headed by the same person.

3.5.2 The socio-economic background of Kampong Bharu

According to the 2010 Malaysian Census, the population of Kampong Bharu is 18,372, with more than 1,500 small-traders (KLCH 2013). Each village holds a distinct character which relates to the ancestral roots of the villagers, who encompass various Malay ethnicities with their own identities, traditions and beliefs, brought in by their forefathers. For instance, Kampong Atas A is mostly dominated by the Mandailing community, which migrated from Sumatra, Indonesia, while Kampong Atas B is populated by people who originally came from Minangkabau, also on Sumatra. Kampong Paya has a community of Javanese descendants, while people in Kampong Pindah, Kampong Hujung Pasir and Kampong Periok have Malaccan ancestry. Although in the past these communities have refrained from mixing with people of other ethnicities from other villages, this tradition has diminished among the younger generations (Yip 2014). The villagers still observe some of the traditional customs of their ethnic groups today, but most of the people in Kampong Bharu blend in naturally within the new environment of modern life in the area. This may be due to the massive development that is happening

around them, or the influx of immigrants from other countries like Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan, which brings different customs and ways of living to the area.

As shown in Figure 3.9, there is a huge contrast between development in Kampong Bharu and the surrounding parts of Kuala Lumpur: the skyscrapers dwarf the rustic structures of Kampong Bharu.

Figure 3.9: Photos of traditional houses in Kampong Bharu

Source: Author (January, 2015)

Kampong Bharu has been described as the last bastion against high-rise development (Gartland 2014), as the villagers have resisted efforts to redevelop the area along the same lines as the surrounding areas. The villagers believe in maintaining the heritage value of the existing buildings but with necessary enhancement to the infrastructure and facilities of the area.

While the landowners wanted to beautify their properties, they were frequently unable to do so because of their own lack of funding. This led to some properties becoming dilapidated, like the example shown in Figure 3.10. In addition, most landowners decided to move away from the village to new property and left their houses in Kampong Bharu to be rented out to immigrants (Alhabshi 2010a; Mohamed and Mohd Zen 2000). Renting out houses in this area was very common as there was a huge demand from the low-earning immigrants who made a living in the area. As Ujang (2016) claimed, rents in the area were relatively cheaper than any other parts of Kuala Lumpur, probably because of the poor condition of the houses. Unfortunately, the influx of people in the area has contributed to greater dilapidation as it has become overcrowded. With houses also being extended illegally, the area has some of the characteristics of an informally-evolving slum rather than a heritage site that is being preserved (Alhabshi 2010a).

Figure 3.10: Example of a few derelict properties in Kampong Bharu

Source: Author (February, 2015)

With regard to economic activities, Kampong Bharu has always been known for its eateries and night markets. Small-traders in Kampong Bharu are hawkers and stall-owners who make a living by providing for the daily needs of the people, mostly food and groceries, and providing local services like car workshops and budget hotels. Some of the economic activities have become an iconic feature of Kampong Bharu's tourist attractions. The operators of the small businesses in the area might be either landowners or tenants. Figure 3.11 shows a number of small businesses in Kampong Bharu.

Figure 3.11: Some of the economic activities in Kampong Bharu

Source: Author (February, 2015)

Apart from the small businesses people run daily, there is also a more profitable economic activity which has become the main source of income for most landowners in Kampong Bharu. Due to its proximity to the city centre, there is a high demand for houses and room rentals in Kampong Bharu. Most landowners have taken the opportunity to rent out their property in order to provide them with a lucrative passive income. Some of the landowners rely solely on rentals to make a living as they can earn approximately RM10,000 (approximately GBP1,800 in 2016) per month from such activities. Some have gone to the extent of extending their houses to accommodate additional studio residences on their plots of land in order to make even more money. Figure 3.12 shows an example of a single plot of land that has been transformed into multiple dwellings. Although each residence has individual amenities and facilities including a toilet and kitchen, like standard houses, the dwellings are rather small and in many instances cramped, with no apparent limit on the number of people living in a plot.

Figure 3.12: Multiple residences on a single plot

Source: Author (February, 2015)

Despite the large number of migrant renters, Kampong Bharu still retains its traditional Malay culture and close-knit community. This community is comprised not only of landowners, but also the tenants and business traders in the area. Even those migrants who have lived in Kampong Bharu for a long time have built strong bonds with community. They have retained the spirit of village community in the social environment; according to Ujang and Abdul Aziz (2015, p.200), this reflects on the "unity of the Malays as social and political entities". As well as the informal social relations through which the community continues its daily interaction amongst its members, the people of Kampong Bharu are also closely connected through formal social group activities.

Other than the MAS Board, which has gained the trust of the people and is regarded as the custodian of the MAS land in Kampong Bharu, there are social groups that bind the community in collective social activities. The two main social groups in Kampong Bharu are the Children of Kampong Bharu Association (PAKAM) and Kampong Bharu Development Association (PPKB). These groups have formed out of shared interests, to protect the rights of Kampong Bharu people. PAKAM is an association of Malays in Kampong

Bharu aged 18 and above which aims to foster better relationships amongst its members, promote education, culture, welfare and business, and facilitate cooperation with the relevant welfare institutions at a federal or state level. PPKB membership is for those aged 18 and above who own a property or have any interest in property in Kampong Bharu, or for those who own established businesses more than ten years old (Mustaffa 2009b).

Although these two associations claim to play a role in advocating the rights of the people of Kampong Bharu, their representation is only to their members, who are primarily landowners and beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu. This includes absent landowners who have moved out of Kampong Bharu provided that they still own land in its precincts. In 1994, the two associations presented a memorandum to the government regarding the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. They played a role in a series of discussions between the government, landowners and beneficiaries on the way forward for Kampong Bharu, ensuring that the interests of the people they represented were upheld in the planning process (Bernama 2009). As the focus of these associations was towards landowners and beneficiaries, there were groups of people who were not represented. Tenants, small traders who are not members of the associations, and immigrants were therefore marginalised from the planning process.

3.6   The proposal for Kampong Bharu redevelopment

The idea of redeveloping Kampong Bharu has long been the focus of the federal government, which has recognised the economic potential of the area because of its prime location. Government attempts to develop the area seem to

have begun in 1975, when KLCH initiated efforts to promote development plans in the area (KBDC 2014b). The idea was unsuccessful at that time because of legal and jurisdictional issues relating to the status of the land in Kampong Bharu (Alhabshi 2010b). The effort to redevelop Kampong Bharu resumed in 1984 when KLCH prepared a paper on the Kampong Bharu Development Plan to be presented to the prime minister (KBDC 2014b). Even during the premiership of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the former Prime Minister, who had shown great support to the redevelopment plan through various initiatives, these efforts remained unsuccessful.

The government had, through KLCH, prepared the planning necessary for the area. In the Draft Kuala Lumpur City Plan 2020 (Draft KLCP 2020), which was launched in August 2008, Kampong Bharu area was identified as a new growth centre, to be developed in order to keep up with the rapid development of other surrounding areas. The Kampong Bharu development was highly emphasized as there was a specific volume on Kampong Bharu dedicated in the Draft KLCP 2020 (KLCH 2004). In 2008, the Kampong Bharu Renewal Plan was proposed but the plan was strongly criticised for not aligning the plan to the National Physical Plan prepared by JPBD. Alhabshi (2010a) analysed it in detail on the renewal agenda proposed by KLCH in 2008 and it was revealed that the Kampong Bharu Renewal Plan did not materialise due to political, historical and institutional reasons. Mustaffa (2009b) has identified multiple factors, primarily related to the land issues, which prevented the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu from taking place, even though the effort was strongly backed by the political elite. The plan to redevelop Kampong Bharu was deferred until the Federal Government decided to establish a UDC in 2011 to take the lead in the project.

Since KBDC was officially established in April 2012, the corporation has taken robust initiatives in negotiating and mediating the development plans between the landowners and the investors. As later chapters reveal, however, this approach has been highly problematic from the perspective of many members of the community.

Volume 4 of the Draft KLCP 2020 identified Kampong Bharu as an area with the potential to provide an attractive urban living environment through the promotion of good urban design while maintaining the cultural vitality of the area. In order to do that, the government decided that a comprehensive and integrated Master Plan was needed to provide implementation strategies for the development plan. Following that, KBDC was tasked to devise a Master Plan and facilitate the implementation of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment. Apart from the seven villages of MAS land, Draft KLCP 2020 has indicated five other areas which will be included in a redevelopment programme: Chow Kit, Dang Wangi, Sultan Ismail, Kampong Sungai Bharu and the Selangor State Development Corporation Flats (KLCH 2013). However, these areas have been refined further under the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu, where they have named Raja Bot, the Selangor State Development Corporation Flats, Pasar Minggu and Sungai Bahru Flats to be incorporated in the redevelopment programme. These areas were just refined names of the areas around Kampong Bharu without any change to the boundaries proposed in Draft KLCP 2020. The coverage of the redevelopment proposed in the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu is as shown in Figure 3.13.

Figure 3.13: Kampong Bharu Redevelopment area coverage

Source: Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu, 2014

KBDC was entrusted with preparing the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu, which was approved by the Cabinet in October 2014. The plan is intended to transform Kampong Bharu if the government implemented, and will indeed have a tremendous impact on its society. As shown in Figure 3.13, Kampong Bharu's proposed redevelopment covers quite a big area, a total of 301.38 acres. As the non-MAS areas are not subject to the restricted interest on the land, it was anticipated that the five non-MAS areas would generate less resistance from the community regarding redevelopment, so the government decided to begin with these areas. Some development projects have started in the non-MAS area, such as in Raja Bot, where the project to modernise the historical market in the area has been seen as a catalyst for the

redevelopment of Kampong Bharu as a whole (Puspadevi 2013). This was followed by redevelopment in the Pasar Minggu area, accommodating modern and futuristic mixed-use buildings that will obviously change the whole landscape of the area (Bavani 2016).

While development has begun on the non-MAS land, the situation is different for the MAS land, where the redevelopment proposal has received divided reactions from the community. Existing research indicates that although the landowners and beneficiaries of Kampong Bharu land in general do not reject the idea of redeveloping Kampong Bharu, they were very much concerned about the method of implementation and how the redevelopment would affect their lives. This does not exclude other community elements in Kampong Bharu, such as the tenants and small traders who live in the area from being anxious about how the redevelopment would change their lives (Mustaffa 2009a; Mohammad Nor 2009; Astro Awani 2015). The research presented in this thesis shows, however, a more complex and divided community response.

With the redevelopment taking place, the community of Kampong Bharu, including the landowners, small traders and tenants who live in the area are bound to be affected. Their social life will experience significant change and their sources of income will also be at stake, especially for those who make their living in Kampong Bharu. They fear that the new development would require residents to be relocated. Whether these villagers would be able to start a new life in the new place, leaving behind their childhood memories and inheritances and without any trouble adapting is very much disputable (Amly 2015; Mohammad Nor 2009; Mayberry 2017). Even the absent landowners who have moved away from Kampong Bharu but still hold property there have spoken of the strong emotional

and spiritual attachment they have towards the place (Gartland 2014; Mayberry 2017). The redevelopment of Kampong Bharu has always been considered a sensitive issue for its people. As much as they want the development to happen, they also want to retain the uniqueness and the traditional Malay culture embedded in the area. For some people, Kampong Bharu should be retained in its current state as the place is the embodiment of who they are, giving expression on the identity of the area and not just merely a place to live (Mayberry 2017; Ujang and Abdul Aziz 2015).

As reported in the media, the community of Kampong Bharu, regardless whether they are landowners, tenants or traders, has demanded greater participation and representation in the planning process of the redevelopment plan. They have argued that there was not enough communication between the community of Kampong Bharu and the authorities regarding the development proposal (Amly 2015; Bavani and Yip 2008; Yip 2014). Although the government has insisted that the necessary engagements and consultations have been conducted to explain the redevelopment plan to the people of Kampong Bharu and maintain that they received positive feedback on the proposal, the majority of the landowners and beneficiaries rebut these claims and assert that the proposal was far from gaining the people's approval (Ujang 2016). The community has insisted that the needs of the people who will be affected should be addressed and that the government should not focus on profit alone (Yip 2014). The demand for greater involvement of the community in the development planning can be seen as a transformation from an inactive community to a dynamic and ardent society which has become more critical in assessing the government's decisions and actions. The views and reactions of the Kampong

Bharu community with regard to the redevelopment plan is considered in Chapter Five of this thesis and, in Chapter Six, an in-depth discussion on community participation and representation is presented.

3.7 The redevelopment of Kampong Bharu: A change in the government approach

The establishment of KBDC after Act 733 was passed by Parliament in 2011 marks a significant change in the government's approach to urban planning. The responsibility for development planning, once the preserve of local government, has been transferred to a corporation. This changed the planning system from one that was clearly led by *government* to one characterised by *governance,* in the sense that participation by non-government actors was made central to the planning process. The establishment of KBDC has provided the opportunity for more actors to be involved in the planning process, including the community of Kampong Bharu, either through the engagements and consultations that were conducted between the corporation and the community, or through those people's representatives who were appointed to be part of the corporation.

KBDC has also provided spaces for community representation through the structure of KBDC, as stated in Act 733 Kampong Bharu Development Corporation, where it involved two entities: the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. These bodies were supposed to ensure broad stakeholder representation. While the KBDC Board consists largely of representatives from federal, state and local government agencies, there was also a number of people appointed to the Board representing the landowners and beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu. Additionally, the Advisory Council, consisting of all seven

village heads of the MAS area as well as a number of community leaders and representatives in Kampong Bharu, advises the KBDC Board on matters relating to the interest of Malays in Kampong Bharu and any other matters regarding the development of Kampong Bharu (Government of Malaysia 2011).

The opportunity for community engagement and representation provided by KBDC somehow corresponds to the general idea of collaborative approach involving a variety of stakeholders entailed in the establishment of UDCs, in contrast to the more heavily top-down approach practised by the earlier planning systems. In fact, KBDC was set up with participation being much more central to the overall rationale of the UDC than was the case in the UK, where UDCs are widely seen as a mechanism by central government to secure the implementation of central government policies (Thomas and Imrie 1997) and to marginalise elected local authorities (Lawless 1988). Brownill (1990) argues that there was a lack of representation and community consultation in the planning process in London's LDDC, while for KBDC, there was a significant attention to creating explicit opportunities for the local community to be involved in the decision-making process. Despite this, in reality, the outcomes of the two UDCs in terms of participation may not be so different, since even in the KBDC case community participation and representation were rarely meaningful. This argument will be further deliberated in Chapter Six of this thesis.

The main function of KBDC is to implement policies, directives and strategies on Kampong Bharu's development in accordance with Kuala Lumpur's structural and local plans (KBDC 2014c). Although the establishment of KBDC does not replace the role of KLCH as the lawful local authority of the area, the corporation has officially taken over the function of facilitating and administering

the development of Kampong Bharu. Despite having a representative of KLCH on the KBDC Board, the power to make planning decisions no longer lies with the local authority, but rather through the collective deliberation of the members of KBDC, who now set the planning agenda of Kampong Bharu. Nevertheless, KLCH still retains its role in assessing planning permission and granting planning approvals, but the decisions made are tied to development planning prepared by KBDC.

Apart from the changes it brought to the role of KLCH, the establishment of KBDC has ultimately reduced the function of the MAS Board, which has always been regarded as the key local authority by the community of Kampong Bharu, especially since it retained powers over land. Ever since it was first established, its main function was to supervise all of the administrative affairs of the villages in Kampong Bharu. Among the Board's powers was the mandate to frame by-laws for the effectual control and management of the settlement as long as they are not inconsistent with the Malay Agricultural Settlement (Kuala Lumpur) Rules, 1950. In general, the Board may authorise any approved Malay applicant to occupy an allotment within the MAS area and the record of occupiers was maintained through a register. The register is an endorsed list of the approved applicants, deletions or any substitution of occupants with all the necessary information regarding the area that were allocated to them (Alhabshi 2010a).

The MAS Board has also the prerogative to order any registered occupants to vacate the area after three months' notice if the Board disapproves of their conduct or their mode of living, judging it to be objectionable and detrimental to the well-being of the settlements (Alhabshi 2010a). This indicates the authoritative power vested in the MAS Board in determining who shall be

accepted in the settlement. The MAS Board operates on a voluntary basis. Consequently, although the Board members work hard to provide services to the people of Kampong Bharu through the power given to them, they are financially constrained, operating on a small annual grant from KLCH and small token fees for the services rendered to the community.

The establishment of KBDC has created a dilemma for the local administration of Kampong Bharu. In many situations, the MAS Board has been increasingly side-lined from being involved in the development planning of Kampong Bharu (Gartland 2015). Despite its diminishing role, however, the organisation is still considered powerful by local people due to the long tenure it has had as the administrator and custodian of the MAS area in Kampong Bharu. This dilemma is reflected in the conflicts and power struggles emerging between KBDC and MAS Board which will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

3.8 Summary

This chapter has aimed to situate Kampong Bharu's redevelopment in its national and historical context. It began by providing an overview of Malaysia's historical journey of government administration from colonialism until the current government system as a preamble to understand the social, economic and political situation in Malaysia. The discussion then moved to the role of Kuala Lumpur and the government's aspiration to make it a competitive city in a global arena, highlighting the link between government policies at the national level and urban planning strategies. Understanding the importance of having thorough development planning for Kuala Lumpur, the chapter moved on to the discussion of Kampong Bharu, which has been identified in government strategies as an

area in need of major redevelopment, and which forms the central focus of this research.

Being strategically located in the prime location of Kuala Lumpur, Kampong Bharu's current situation is seen by government as a drawback to Kuala Lumpur's overall development. Government strategies indicate a determination to revitalise Kampong Bharu in order for it to more closely resemble the high-rise business districts in surrounding areas. The latter part of this chapter has deliberated on the establishment of KBDC as the authority in charge on the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, which is framed as a fundamental change in the government's approach and a shift from the realm of government to one of multi-stakeholder 'governance'. Although the establishment of KBDC was the government's way of resolving some of the issues that had earlier prevented it from redeveloping the area, it has actually generated new dilemmas in the development planning process, including new power struggles between actors involved in the process.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

4.1   Introduction

This chapter provides methodological justifications for the research, and discusses the approaches taken in framing the research design and methods. In so doing, it focuses on the qualitative research method, using the single case study approach that was taken in this study. In addition to providing the reasons for choosing a specific geographical area as the case for this study, this chapter also details out the techniques used for data collection. These included a document review, focus group sessions, semi-structured interviews, visual images and direct observation. The chapter ends with a discussion of the strategy that was used to analyse the data.

4.2   Approach to Study

4.2.1   Research Aim

This study explores the dynamic of state-society power relationships with regard to the redevelopment plan for the specific area of Kampong Bharu, an area situated in the centre of Kuala Lumpur, the capital city of Malaysia. For this study, the exercise of power by the state was viewed from the perspective of how the relevant authorities used their power in executing their planning decisions. This includes the use of law and regulations, power and authority, bureaucracy, and other organisational tools. In contrast, 'society' was examined from the perspective of peoples' representation and especially how the people's representatives used their role to benefit the community they

represent. This study also investigates the role of other actors in society who were indirectly involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. This includes politicians, land developers, business people and those who have vested interests in the development of the area.

The management of the city of Kuala Lumpur was put under the direct purview of the Federal Government when Kuala Lumpur became a Federal Territory in 1974. With the power held by the Federal Government to provide direction for national policies, the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu attracted more attention when the Federal Government decided to establish KBDC, an urban development corporation, through an Act of Parliament in 2011, to spearhead and facilitate the redevelopment plans for Kampong Bharu. The establishment of the Kampong Bharu Development Corporation (KBDC) denoted a change in the government's approach to managing and executing development plans in the area. The decision to set up an urban development corporation signified a potential shift of power from the Federal Government to a non-governmental entity; authority to make planning decisions was passed to a corporation. Having a corporation taking the lead in the redevelopment plans, it might be expected that planning decisions would show more support for market forces (Brownill and O'Hara 2015; Brownill 1990; Thomas and Imrie 1997).

The establishment of KBDC also fostered the practice of governance whereby the role of governmental bodies in the decision-making process changed. The creation of KBDC permitted different spaces for community participation in the development process. Through the representation of people who were selected from among the communities of Kampong Bharu to

sit as members on the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council, the establishment of KBDC seemed to provide a platform for the Kampong Bharu communities to be more empowered in deciding the nature of development needed in their local area. In this study, the domain of society was explored within the representation of the three main NGOs in Kampong Bharu, which are Malay Agricultural Settlement (MAS) Board, Children of Kampong Bharu Association (PAKAM) and Kampong Bharu Development Association (PPKB). These three NGOs are central and significant in the life of Kampong Bharu people as they had existed for many years. MAS Board in particular, has played an essential role as the custodian of Kampong Bharu administration for more than 115 years and the historical aspect has meant the organisation is widely respected. This study also recognises the influences of other social networks that have played significant roles in the decision-making process, including land developers, business people, politicians and small traders.

Although the establishment of KBDC seemed to create the spaces of opportunity for more stakeholders to participate in the planning process and has reconstructed the practice of local governance in the development planning of Kampong Bharu, it has also involved conflicts and power struggles. This is because each of the actors sought to use their power to influence the decision-making process to achieve their own targeted goals. These conflicts and power struggles between the actors led to questions being raised as to the legitimacy of the decisions made in the process, as a number of decisions were challenged and not implemented. Apart from the conflicts and struggles that beheld among the actors, the Kampong Bharu community continued to argue as to the lack of participation of the community in the planning process.

Despite having the peoples' representatives as members in KBDC, the community argued that the development plan did not address the needs of the people and that local people were not sufficiently involved in the planning process.

Hence, in order to understand what really happened on the ground, this study investigates how the spaces for participation were created and the purpose behind the creation of these spaces. It is also important to understand who was allowed in that space, how people participated in the process and what the implications of such decisions were. The findings of this study have enabled an understanding of how power and influence were used in order to give effect to the decision-making process. This study has helped to uncover how the state and society used their power to shape the planning decisions for the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu.

4.2.2   Research Questions

This study answers four primary research questions:

1.   *Why was KBDC created and how did its establishment reconstruct governance in Kampong Bharu?*

As this research used KBDC as the focus of analysis, it was necessary to understand the rationale for KBDC's establishment before the study analysed the relationship between the actors involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. This research question was a key starting point in understanding what drove the government to decide on having a specific entity

to lead a development on private land, when hitherto such a role would have been the preserve of a local authority. It was also necessary to examine the powers held by the corporation in making decisions and whether these were legitimate. In addition, as the process of having an urban development corporation to lead development planning is relatively new in Malaysia, this study explores the effects of the establishment of KBDC on existing authorities. In addressing this fundamental question, these sub-questions were prepared to give further emphasis to the research question:

  i.   *What was the rationale for establishing KBDC?*

  ii. *How did the establishment of KBDC affect the practice of governance in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu?*

2. *What kind of spaces for community participation were created with the establishment of KBDC and how representative were they of the Kampong Bharu community?*

When KBDC was established, it was acknowledged that there was a shift in approach whereby the government was making way for more stakeholders to be involved in the planning of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment. This practice of governance was embodied through the selection of various groups from amongst the local community to sit as members on the KBDC Board and the KBDC Advisory Council. These members were regarded as peoples' representatives, who could deliver the voice of the groups they were representing. However, the question remained as to how representative such people were to sit on the committee and to what extent these representatives

were truly able to uphold the interests of the people they represented (Bavani and Yip 2008; Gartland 2015). In addition, there were also people who were not directly involved in the process of planning who were nevertheless influential enough to have a direct impact upon the decision-making process. As a result, it was considered necessary for this research to explore the power these people had and how they used their power to influence the decision-making process. It was assumed that the interactions between state and society were not limited solely to those actors who were directly involved, but also included the actions of non-actors who influenced the decision-making process covertly. In order to explore such issues, the sub-questions below are answered within this study:

i.   *How were the spaces for participation created and how significant were they?*

ii.   *How was the representation of the people constructed and what was its significance in the decision-making process?*

3. *What power struggles did the establishment of KBDC raise and what do these tell us about urban development corporations (UDCs) as a distinct form of governmentality?*

i.   *Who were the actors involved and what were their powers?*

ii.   *What was the conflict and why were there struggles?*

As discussed in Chapter Two, although the establishment of Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) promote local governance, it nevertheless has led to a discussion on the contestation and conflicts that emerged from

within and beyond the establishment of the corporation. The conflicts emerged either in the form of power struggles amongst the authorities involved in the development planning or between the authority and the community in the planning process. The conflicts and power struggles arose mainly due to the exercise of power by each of the actors. This research addresses these issues by investigating the conflicts and power struggles that occurred amongst the actors involved in Kampong Bharu's redevelopment as they exercised their power and authority, either overtly or covertly, to shape the direction of decisions towards their targeted ends. There were also actors who were indirectly involved in the planning system, including politicians, developers, business people and people with vested interests.

Although these actors did not have direct access to the decision-making process, they indirectly shaped the decision-making process through the power and influence that they each possess. This is very much linked to the concept of governmentality where the conduct and decisions of the people were governed without having to go through coercion or force in accepting them. Hence, this research question explores how the establishment of KBDC is very much linked to the practice of governmentality in achieving the ultimate goals of those with vested interests in the redevelopment area.

4. *What broader lessons can we learn from the experience of Kampong Bharu about the practice of governance and public participation in the process of urban redevelopment?*

In understanding what broader lessons the establishment of UDCs brought to the process of urban redevelopment, deliberations were made on three areas of discussion – development planning practice, governance and public participation facilitated by KBDC in Kampong Bharu. Examples of practices from other countries such as in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and China were discussed, in relation to the one practiced in Kampong Bharu, to provide a broader perspective on the impact of UDCs on urban redevelopment planning.

4.2.3   A Single Case Study Approach

This study involves the use of a single-case study, focusing on the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. The choice of a single-case study was because the case itself was unique in terms of the nature of urban development practices in Malaysia in the early part of the twenty-first century. Located in the centre of the capital city, it was believed by the Federal Government that Kampong Bharu had high potential for development and could enhance Kuala Lumpur's competitiveness in a global market. The situation in Kampong Bharu during the study period of 2015-2016 was one in which there were many derelict buildings and under-utilised land with scattered development. This was considered by the media and academic scholars as a 'blot on the landscape' for the vibrant and rapid development of the 'golden triangle area' surrounding Kampong Bharu (Alhabshi 2012; Bavani 2016; Gartland 2014; Mayberry 2017; Ujang 2016; Yip 2014). The continued failure to bring about the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu by successive governments led to a change in approach, reflected in the establishment of

KDBC. Figure 4.1 provides an idea as to the importance of Kampong Bharu's location in the heart of Kuala Lumpur and it is indicated in red in the diagram. In order to offer a clearer picture of the strategic location of Kampong Bharu, Figure 4.2 presents an aerial view of Kampong Bharu, surrounded by the iconic buildings of Kuala Lumpur, such as the Kuala Lumpur Tower and the Petronas Twin Tower, with good connectivity to other important areas within the boundaries of Greater Kuala Lumpur.

Figure 4.1: The Location of Kampong Bharu in the Kuala Lumpur Area

Source: Physical Planning Department, Kuala Lumpur City Hall, 2013, In the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu, 2014a

Figure 4.2: Contrasting View of Kampong Bharu area to the Surrounding Area

Source: Internet search. Retrieved from
https://www.shutterstock.com/video/search/kuala-lumpur-aerial

Portrayed by the media and academic scholars as a dilapidated urban area but which also had a high economic potential to be developed (Alhabshi 2010a; Bavani 2016; Gartland 2014; Mayberry 2017; Ujang 2016; Yip 2014) Kampong Bharu had faced many unsuccessful redevelopment initiatives. This was mainly due to multiple issues relating to political, historical and institutional factors, as mentioned in Chapter Two. The cumulative effect of these factors was that no full renewal plans took place in the area (Alhabshi 2010a). The efforts of the government to redevelop Kampong Bharu began in 1975 when a special team of government officials from Kuala Lumpur City Hall (KLCH) was directed to present to the government proposals to redevelop Kampong Bharu. Such attempts were heightened in the 1980s; the proposal for Kampong Bharu's redevelopment was started in 1984 and the Kampong Bharu Development Plan was prepared in 1985. The initiative to redevelop Kampong Bharu also received the special attention of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the then

Prime Minister of Malaysia and eventually gave rise to the draft Kampong Bharu Local Plan, which was accepted by the government in 1993 (KBDC, 2014b). Despite many efforts, however, the Local Plan remained only a plan.

One factor that hampered government attempts to progress with the development plans for the area was the status of the land in Kampong Bharu. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the standing law on the status of MAS land has prevented any non-Malay ethnic group from purchasing, leasing or even occupying the majority of the land that was involved in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment plan headed by KBDC. This legal restriction on the land has caused many obstacles for development as it was very much linked to the racial sensitivity of the landowners and the beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu. Adding to the complicated status of the land in Kampong Bharu is the unresolved issue of multiple land ownership, which involves the issue of land inheritance amongst the beneficiaries of the land. While the landowners have their names written on the land titles, the beneficiaries of the land refer to those who still have their entitlement on the land unresolved. In addition, the previous plan to redevelop Kampong Bharu did not come to fruition because of disputes regarding the value of the land, as well as due to the aforementioned issue pertaining to the multiple ownership of land titles. Despite acknowledging these issues (and KBDC putting in place a number of necessary measures to resolve them), the authority still faces challenges in executing the Kampong Bharu Development Master Plan. These varied and interlocking factors make the Kampong Bharu redevelopment a relevant case study for investigating issues relating to state-society conflicts in urban areas.

In general, the people of Kampong Bharu have not resisted any attempt redevelopment of their area (see Alhabshi 2012; Gartland 2015; Soliano 2014; Ujang 2016). They were, however, displeased with what they felt was insufficient consultation being carried out by the government, (both Federal Government and KLCH) and the failure of the government to address their concerns relating to land value and the issue of appropriate compensation. The people of Kampong Bharu argued that the Federal Government and KLCH were not attending to their needs in terms of the development needed in the area. The effort to redevelop Kampong Bharu remained unsuccessful until the Federal Government decided to establish KBDC with the passing of the Parliamentary Act in 2011. After the establishment of KBDC, the desire to redevelop Kampong Bharu seemed to be making progress, although development was only being carried out on non-MAS land.

Another unique factor which contributed to the decision to settle upon this case study area was the position of Kuala Lumpur as a Federal Territory. Being within a Federal Territory, KLCH, the local authority of the area, was put under direct control of the Federal Government. This is not the case for any other areas aside from Federal Territories, as normally local authorities fall under the jurisdiction of a state government. Being under the control of the Federal Government and supported by the strategic location in which Kampong Bharu is situated, the proposal to redevelop Kampong Bharu received special attention from Federal Government agencies. The decision to establish KBDC to spearhead the development in Kampong Bharu was a significant decision by the Federal Government, as it was the first time that such a vehicle was established in Malaysia specifically to address urban redevelopment.

Moreover, it illustrated that the government was prepared to take a step back in urban planning by entrusting a development corporation with the responsibility of an important area. This signifies a change of power relation from government to a non-governmental body and has made this case an interesting subject on which to base a study.

With the establishment of KBDC, there was evidently a shift in the government's approach to dealing with the development of Kampong Bharu. With the inclusion of many stakeholders, it has shifted the planning exercise from a government-led approach to one of local governance. Although the establishment of a single dedicated entity to focus solely on the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu seemed to provide an opportunity for community empowerment, it has raised a series of conflicts and the questions with regard to issues of power legitimacy. At the same time, this study also looked at how the actors involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu corresponded and influenced the decision-making process. The interactions between the government and the people has uncovered the way certain behaviours were conducted and how this influenced certain aspects of the decision-making process. While the establishment of KBDC seemed to allow more community participation in the planning process, it was also seen as an avenue by which the government could control and manipulate the people to act and behave in a particular way. This study advances the hypothesis that KBDC was regarded as a governmental apparatus to shape and influence the conduct of society in order to achieve specific ends that had been set by the government.

All of the factors mentioned above illustrate the uniqueness of the case study, and this in turn limited any usefulness that might have been derived

from a comparative study. The decision to do a case study was also very much linked to the research questions which the study addresses. As the questions are mostly of a 'how' and 'why' nature, a case study was considered the best approach by which to gather and analyse information to address the issues being discussed (Yin 2003).

4.3   Research Design

Ragin (1994, p.191) defines research design as:

> A plan for collecting and analysing evidence that will make it possible for the investigator to answer whatever questions he or she has posed. The design of an investigation touches almost all aspects of the research, from the minute details of data collection to the selection of the techniques of data analysis.

This study has adopted a qualitative research method to provide an in-depth explanation and understanding of complex state-society power relations. This in-depth exploratory and descriptive analysis of the case study explores how state and society asserted their power and the influence that they each had to achieve their desired outcomes.

4.3.1   Data collection methods

As this study is interested in looking at interpretations, meanings and understandings of the underlying concepts of state-society power relations, it has heavily relied on primary data and used a number of different sources of data collection. The use of a number of different sources of information is important for a case study approach, as Yin (2003) suggests. The process of data collection started with a review of documents related to Kampong Bharu's

redevelopment. The document review was essential in order to develop an understanding of the overall subject matter being explored. After an elementary understanding of the subject being studied had been achieved, the process of data gathering proceeded with the fieldwork activity to gain an in-depth understanding and to address the issues being raised in this study.

The fieldwork activities involved a series of focus group sessions within the community of Kampong Bharu, specifically focussing on the landowners and the beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu, as well as the tenants and small traders who live or make a living there. It also included semi-structured interviews with key people involved in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment planning, including policy makers, politicians, a number of KBDC members, and the people's representatives. These sources of data collection were treated as a primary source of information, which contributed substantial preliminary evidence to address the questions posed in this study. To support the primary data, observation and visual images of photographs were also studied to provide a better perspective on what was on the ground. Images of Kampong Bharu which were captured during the fieldwork, for instance, included photos of traditional old houses, providing an insight into the village lifestyle that represents the heritage element of the Malay culture, and the small businesses operating in the area. These provided additional viewpoints to the researcher. In addition, images of graffiti in Kampong Bharu illustrated the future image of Kampong Bharu as drawn on one of the walls in the area. Finally, banners condemning KBDC's management and handling of certain issues in Kampong Bharu provided a different perspective to those which the researcher had previously gathered for data analysis purposes.

The first phase of fieldwork was conducted between 4th January and 15th February 2015, while the second phase was from 23rd August until 10th October 2015. The first phase covered five focus group sessions, and incorporated some fundamental research to gather secondary documentary information on Kampong Bharu. The second phase focused on interview sessions with significant individuals who had been identified earlier as being able to provide a detailed understanding of the subject and research questions. During these two phases of data collection, the researcher took the opportunity to walk around the case study area to make observations and took some photographs to support the arguments advanced in this thesis.

i. Document Review

Yin (2003) highlights that a document review or document analysis is very relevant for studies that adopt a case study approach, as the source of information could support and expand evidence obtained from other sources. For this study, a review of documents served the purpose of providing background on the policy context of the government. It also enabled the author to gain a comprehensive understanding of the processes involved. The analysis of the content of the development plans for Kuala Lumpur as a capital city and the importance of Kampong Bharu in helping Kuala Lumpur gain its strategic goal of becoming a world-class city in 2020 gave the author an early understanding of the significance of the case study. The document review undertaken for this study was not only limited to the existing documents that were used for reference but also included a range of archival records related to the study. One of the archival records examined was the Declaration of the

Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and Kuala Lumpur Agreement in 1974, which was retrieved from the National Archives of Malaysia. Other documents that were reviewed included:

- Act 733 Kampong Bharu Development Corporation Act 2011
- Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu
- Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan
- Kuala Lumpur City Plan
- Mid-term Review of Ninth Malaysia Plan, Tenth Malaysia Plan and Eleventh Malaysia Plan
- Economic Transformation Programme
- New Economic Model
- History of Kampong Bharu
- History of Malay Agriculture Settlement Kampong Bharu
- Parliament Hansard
- National Land Code

ii.   Focus group discussions and group interviews

The first phase of the data collection period focused on conducting five focus group sessions. These involved the community of Kampong Bharu and the selection of each group was divided into four categories: the landowners or beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu; the small traders or business people; tenants renting properties in Kampong Bharu; and people who live in the area outside the MAS land. The main objective of the focus group discussions was to gather information on their views and opinions, as well as

to begin to understand participants' reactions and involvement in the preparation of Kampong Bharu's development planning. As Morgan and Krueger (2013, p.6) have highlighted, the goal of focus group discussions is "to collect concentrated discussions on topics of interest to the researcher". Accordingly, it was important to ensure the selection of the focus group participants corresponded to the topic being researched. The objective of focus group sessions was to draw upon the experiences and opinions of the participants about Kampong Bharu's redevelopment. It was necessary to gather opinions from the community and those who were directly affected by the decisions made on the redevelopment proposal. Since it was not possible for the researcher to interview each and every household and the business people in the area, focus group discussions were considered the best option to get the information needed. The justification for settling upon five focus groups (and their division into specific categories) is shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: The category of focus group members

Focus Group	Category of members	Justification
1	Landowners or beneficiaries of the land in: - Kampong Periok - Kampong Masjid - Kampong Atas A - Kampong Atas B	The owners or beneficiaries of the land within the seven villages in MAS land were divided into two groups to ease the facilitation of the focus group sessions. These groups were considered the most important groups as they were directly affected by the Kampong Bharu redevelopment plans.
2	Landowners or beneficiaries of the land in: - Kampung Hujung Pasir - Kampung Paya - Kampung Pindah	
3	Business people and small traders in Kampong Bharu	These groups were approached so that the author might gather their views and concerns on the redevelopment plans for Kampong Bharu. Since the focus of KBDC was on the rightful landowners and the beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu, it was necessary to get the views of the small traders and the tenants who seemed to have been disregarded in the development planning although they were also highly affected by any decisions made.
4	Tenants in Kampong Bharu	
5	Owners of property outside MAS land: Raja Bot, Pasar Minggu, Kg Sungai Baru and PKNS Flats	This group category was focussed on the people living outside the MAS land area but were also involved in Kampong Bharu redevelopment. These are the non-MAS land area as per KBDC's Master Plan for Kampong Bharu redevelopment. It was essential to gather information from this group to understand how they perceived the redevelopment plan and their level of involvement in the planning process.

Source: Author

The process of identifying the participants for the focus groups started with correspondence through email and telephone calls with the seven village heads of MAS land in Kampong Bharu. The village heads were considered important in this research as they were the key to connect the researcher to the community of Kampong Bharu. In addition, and as a consequence of their being members of the KBDC Advisory Council and the committee of the MAS Board, these village heads were expected to provide the in-depth information needed on the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu with special regard to their involvement in the planning process. The contact details for the village heads were easily obtained from the Honorary Secretary of the MAS Board as the village heads were also committee members of the MAS Board. All correspondence with the village heads started a month prior to the start of the researcher undertaking the first fieldwork in Malaysia. However, despite a number of emails and follow-ups through telephone calls, the number of participants nominated to participate in the study was insufficient to set up a focus group as most of the village heads did not respond to the emails. As most of the village heads were quite elderly, communication through emails may not have been suitable. However, due to geographical and monetary factors, the use of emails was considered the most appropriate option by the researcher. Thereafter, feedback from the village heads remained minimal, despite follow-up telephone calls; it was deduced that the individuals were simply not interested in providing the researcher with assistance.

When the researcher was unable to get enough participants for the focus groups, the Honorary Secretary of the MAS Board was approached again to seek his assistance in obtaining a list of contact details for the landowners and

beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu. The list of landowners and beneficiaries of the land within MAS land was easily retrievable as the MAS office keeps a register of the landowners and other information pertaining to the land. However, this list was limited to those owners within MAS land. With regard to the other categories of focus group participants, the tenants, small traders and those property owners of non-MAS land, the researcher opted for a snowball approach. As Vogt (1999, p.368) describes, a snowball approach is one of a number of appropriate "techniques for finding research subjects. One subject gives the researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on." This strategy was able to connect the researcher to other potential participants who were difficult to access before and who have distinct and special knowledge that is essential to the research. Through this strategy, the researcher was able to initiate contact with the potential participants and build up trust quickly with them, through the referral of a mutual contact. The contacts from the list given by the MAS office were invited to introduce their friends and networks to participate in the research. Each of the potential participants was contacted by telephone to get their agreement to be part of the study. The objectives of the study and the approach of focus group which was used in collecting the information needed was explained to them, along with issues of informed consent.

The exercise of getting the participants to participate in the focus group sessions was quite challenging as most of the people approached were sceptical as to the author's reasons for getting them involved in the study. They were either suspicious of the researcher as they initially thought the researcher was a government representative who was trying to influence the people into

agreeing to the redevelopment proposals for Kampong Bharu, or they were simply not interested in participating in the exercise at all. It took a number of phone calls to the respective participants to reassure them that the focus group sessions were for an academic purpose. The hesitant participation of the people was demonstrated further in the actual turn out recorded for the focus group sessions. Out of the ten participants expected for every session, only seven participants were able to join each of the Focus Groups 1 and 2, while only five persons attended Focus Group 3. Sessions 4 and 5 had only three participants in each group. Due to the minimal number of participations for Groups 4 and 5, the sessions had to be modified into a group interview, instead of full focus group sessions. As a consequence, the discussions of the two groups were not as intense as the other three groups which had more participants. The groups with fewer participants were nevertheless still able to address the objective of the focus group; their opinions and views were still collected.

All of the focus group sessions were conducted in a meeting room next to the MAS office. One reason for conducting the focus group sessions in the building was because of the convenience it brought to the participants who mostly lived around the area, and they were familiar with the office. Since the focus group sessions were designed to gather the opinions of the community of Kampong Bharu, it was necessary to make the participants feel comfortable with their surroundings. Creating a relaxed environment in which participants will talk freely is, as Sobreperez (2008) notes, can help to reduce suspicion among the respondents and build trust. This is an important consideration in undertaking focus group work, so that a full and frank discussion can be held

and greater insight achieved. As mentioned earlier, there was a number of participants who were sceptical as to the purpose of the focus group; hence it was important not to raise their suspicions further by holding the sessions at other government offices, like KBDC or KLCH. Other possible venues like community halls needed prior arrangements for bookings and most of the halls were quite a distance from the villages.

At the start of the focus group sessions, the participants were briefed on the objective of the focus groups and further explanation was given as to expected outcome of the sessions. Before the start of the focus group sessions, they were given time to read the participant information pack which included the background of the research. The participants were also required to sign a consent form to indicate their approval to participate in the study. As Corti, Day and Backhouse (2000) note, in all research, it is critical to obtain informed consent from the participants. Respondents need to be well informed about the study, the potential risks they might encounter and their rights to refuse to participate in the research. They also need to be assured how aspects of confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained. Examples of these documents are shown in the appendices (Appendix A).

All of the groups were given the same set of questions to deliberate upon. The questions were:

1. To what extent do you understand on Kampong Bharu Redevelopment Program?

2. How were you involved in the planning process of the redevelopment plan?

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3. In your opinion, were there any changes on community participation in the planning process of Kampong Bharu redevelopment before and after the establishment of KBDC in 2011?

4. In your opinion, does the establishment of KBDC provide the opportunity for the people to be more involved in the decision making process especially in deciding on the development needed for the people in the area?

The researcher had also prepared a set of questions to probe the participants in situations where they were unable to start the discussion or digressed from the main question that they were required to discuss. Krueger (1994) has written about the importance of a focus group protocol, whereby cued probes can help to promote discussions during the focus group sessions. While the introduction questions were focussed to get the participants comfortable talking about the subject, the transition questions were intended to take the group into the discussion more deeply to elicit additional information from the participants, in the manner recommended by Krueger (1994). Supplementary questions are often required to reinforce the direction of the sessions in order to ensure the appropriateness of the information gathered for the research (Sobreperez 2008). In this study, some supplementary questions were added to add clarification.

All of the sessions were moderated by the researcher with the assistance of an associate, who undertook the logistic part of the focus group sessions and helped with note taking. In order to maintain the confidentiality of the data retrieved from the focus group sessions, the research assistant was required

to sign a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement as shown in Appendix B. At the end of every session, the researcher made a summary of the points discussed and verified it with the group to ensure no important points were missed or misunderstood. A digital voice recorder was used throughout the sessions to assist in recording the discussions. These audio recordings were later transcribed to facilitate the process of analysing the data.

iii.   Semi-structured Interviews

Apart from the focus group sessions, semi-structured interviews were considered an important primary source of information for this study to gather an in-depth understanding of the case. Mason (2002) suggests that semi-structured interviews are useful if the data collection process seeks to determine people's knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, and experiences of the matter being studied. This study realised the importance of people's knowledge, views and understanding of the redevelopment plan for Kampong Bharu to enable a better understanding of what was happening on the ground.

All of the interviewees were carefully selected in order to obtain extensive information on the matter being studied as they had the greatest access to the relevant information. Most of the interviewees were elite-level individuals in the individual organisations that they represented. Although it was quite difficult to access these people in the beginning, the network the researcher had established during work service as a government official prior to the study helped to facilitate the process of contacting the individuals. A number of key

persons in this study was also introduced through the process of snowballing, whereby one of the interviewees successfully approached gave the interviewer access to their personal contacts so that other significant individuals could be short-listed and interviewed. These individuals were contacted through telephone calls and the intentions of the researcher were made clear. The individuals were asked for interviews. Other interviewees were contacted through the protocol of sending out emails or by contacting their personal assistants to set an appointment. In total 30 interview sessions were conducted with 26 interviewees. A few interviewees were approached more than once in order to get additional information, and most of the interview sessions were conducted in the interviewees' respective offices or homes. The interviewees who were approached included politicians, involving the past and present Member of Parliament of the Titiwangsa constituency where Kampong Bharu is situated, and the Youth Chief of the opposition political party of the Titiwangsa constituency. Interviews were also held with senior government officials from various departments within the Federal Government, State Government, and local authority, including the Secretary-General of Federal Territories Ministry, and the former Mayor of Kuala Lumpur. The interview sessions also involved the senior managers of KBDC. During the data collection period, the researcher managed to gather the views and insights of the past and present Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of KBDC. Other interviewees who were involved in providing information on the Kampong Bharu redevelopment included the Chairmen of the community associations, PAKAM and PPKB; the Vice President and the Honourable Secretary of the MAS Board; and a number of Kampong Bharu village heads

and community leaders. In order to have an opinion on the Kampong Bharu redevelopment from an academic perspective, senior academics from the International Institute of Public Policy and Management of the University of Malaya who had previously carried out a number of research projects on Kampong Bharu were also consulted during the data collection period. Due to the high profile that most of these interviewees held and to retain their anonymity, they were categorised as government officials, KBDC members, members of NGOs and politicians in the data analysis stages of this study.

As the interview format was a purposive interview, the development of the interview questions varied from one person to another; the questions posed to each individual were suited to the organisation they represented or to the role they played with regard to the Kampong Bharu redevelopment. The interview questions were shaped to a certain extent by the findings retrieved from the focus group sessions and refined to achieve the aim and objectives of this research (as detailed in the research questions). While the interviews were conducted in order to gather more detailed information on the Kampong Bharu redevelopment from a variety of different perspectives, some of the questions posed to the interviewees were also intended to reaffirm and counter-balance certain findings obtained from other data collection methods, particularly from the document review and focus group sessions.

All of the questions were open-ended and prepared in a protocol to determine the direction of the interview sessions. This approach also made allowance for additional questions to be developed based on the information gathered during the individual interview sessions; this permitted the interviewees to provide additional information on the subject being discussed

and also helped to ensure the clarity of the information gathered. There were times when the interviewees opened up the discussion to include matters that seemed to diverge from the main topic being discussed. However, they were allowed to share their views on such matters to a certain extent before the researcher brought them back to the context of the discussion. The reason for allowing the interviewees to share such thoughts was because it enabled the researcher to understand the thinking process and views of the interviewees in depth. More often than not, new findings were gathered through this process and the out-of-scope information provided new knowledge on the subject which was nevertheless relevant to the study. In order to facilitate the interview process and to ensure all the information gathered was secured, a digital voice recording was used and supported with note-taking during the sessions. Reflection notes were also prepared for some of the interview sessions in order to capture the important facts discussed in the interview which could not be written down during the process. An example of the reflection notes taken is shown in Appendix D. All of the interviews were later transcribed and highlighted according to the themes which arose throughout the interviews.

iv. Observation

Jersild and Meigs (1939) argue that direct observation is the oldest but most commonly used methodological approach in scientific research. It is often used in anthropology studies to gain a better understanding of the community being researched or where the research focuses on human interactions within a specific socio-cultural context (Smiley 2015). As this study explores the relationship between state and society, the use of the direct observation

method was an additional source of data that was particularly useful in understanding the interactions between the community of Kampong Bharu and the authority involved in its redevelopment. The direct observation used in this study also included examining the behaviour and lifestyle of the Kampong Bharu community in their own socio-cultural environment. This was done to complement the overall understanding and interpretation of the case being studied. Apart from the way of life of the community living in Kampong Bharu, interactions and connections between the community and the MAS office were observed. During the fieldwork, this study also undertook reflections on the relationship between the MAS office and KBDC through observing the interactions and engagements they had. Through these observations, evidence was uncovered of some unexpected examples of social behaviour. In addition, events and interpretations emerged which were not captured in other data collection tools used in this study, such as the interviews and the document review.

One significant observation made during the fieldwork was the constant level of support that the Kampong Bharu community has for the MAS Board's administration. The trust and dependency that the community has for the MAS office was evident even though KBDC has been referred to as the single authority to manage Kampong Bharu's redevelopment. As an example, during the fieldwork, the researcher had the opportunity to see a number of landowners visit the MAS office to seek advice on how to resolve their land matters, especially on the multiple ownership of the land. Some had also consulted the MAS office with regard to getting planning permission for the renovation of their individual properties. Other than that, the MAS Board office

was often consulted in relation to organising community activities held in Kampong Bharu. All these are examples of the observations which have contributed to a greater understanding of the community beyond that which was captured in the documents and through the other research methods utilised in this research.

As Mason (2002) notes, some of the social explanation and arguments should not be interpreted at face value where they only involve broad analysis or direct comparisons of data retrieved through a structured data collection method. For instance, the data collected through the interview and focus group approaches would normally involve a manufactured and constructed setting, which can result in an artificial interpretation of the data gathered.

Therefore, this study used the direct observation method to complement the evidence gathered through other data collection tools. Such data was recorded during the two fieldwork sessions in the case study area. Observation was done by undertaking frequent walkabouts around the case study area, repeated visits to the MAS office, and in between interview sessions with KBDC and the MAS Board. The direct observation was supported with note-taking and photographs, which helped the author in making more critical and detailed reflections and interpretations on the case study.

v.   Visual Images

This method included pictures taken from newspapers, reports, websites, and blogs, as well as those that were retrieved from the archival records of various authorities, organisations, and individuals. Photographs around Kampong Bharu were also taken during the fieldwork trips to complement the

observation approach. Rose (2014 p.25) describes visual research methods "as part of the process of generating evidence in order to explore research questions." Sweetman (2009 p.500) on the other hand describes photography as a tool "to uncover, reveal and convey deeper aspects of habitus". Having visual images in qualitative research could help to uncover implicit knowledge on the subject being studied like for instance, some of the photographs taken showed the hidden expression of the community in Kampong Bharu as to their opinions towards the Kampong Bharu redevelopment, as shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: Graffiti in Kampong Bharu

Source: Author (January, 2015)

In the above picture, the graffiti drawn on one of the walls in Kampong Bharu shows a significant expression of the person drawing it on the development taking place in Kampong Bharu. The picture was considered very

appealing as it displayed graffiti of the future image of Kampong Bharu, drawn on the wall surrounding a traditional Malay house with tall, modern buildings in the background. This photo is, therefore, an example of how visual images can provide their own interpretation of people's perceptions of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment. Such views are in addition to those that were gathered through the study's other data collection methods.

In order to encapsulate the data retrieved from the fieldwork sessions, a brief report was prepared at the end of every fieldwork trip. The reports sought to provide a brief explanation of the early findings and observations of the two phases of fieldwork conducted between 4th January and 15th February 2015 and between 23rd August and 10th October 2015. These were prepared before the researcher proceeded to the next step of transcribing the data. An example of the fieldwork report is shown in Appendix E. These reports were internally cross-checked with the transcribed data during the analysis process to ensure that the important information reflected in the reports was highlighted and analysed.

4.3.2 Data Analysis

Lichtman (2012) defines data analysis as a process to make certain interpretation to the data collected. The purpose of data analysis is to draw a connection between the information gathered with the objectives of a study and the research questions asked. During the data collection period, all information was managed in physical form and electronic formats. All of the audio recordings obtained from the focus group sessions and interviews were uploaded to a computer and stored electronically to ease the process of

transcription. Similarly, all visual images and photographs were stored electronically for easy retrieval.

All of the interview sessions and focus group discussions were transcribed using NVivo software. Most of the sessions were conducted in the Malay language but there were also sessions within which a mix of Malay and English was used. However, in order to maintain the originality of the meaning and interpretation of the data, the transcribing process retained the original language used in the interview and focus group sessions. This was to ensure certain jargon, expressions, and phrases used in the data collection process were captured to add to the richness of the inherent meanings and ideas of the data. The transcribing process was more of a verbatim text which reproduced almost every single word expressed by the participants. In some of the transcription, it also reflected the individual participant's body language and expressions in order to highlight the views and feelings expressed. Although the transcription process retained the original language used, certain Malay phrases were translated into English when the phrases needed to be quoted in the thesis itself. At the end of the transcription process, each text was kept in a hard copy to ease the process of cross-checking and referencing whenever needed. The transcription of the focus group sessions, interviews, reflections on the interviews and visual material were indexed according to the category of data source for facilitating storage and the easy retrieval of each piece of information.

As the fieldwork went through two phases of data collection with a gap of six months in between the two sessions, the data from the individual focus group sessions were analysed separately from the interview process.

Immediately after the data from the focus group sessions were transcribed and analysed, preparations started to be made for the second period of fieldwork. The findings derived from the focus group sessions was used to help refine the aim and focus of the study whereby the objectives and research questions were restructured to strengthen the direction of the overall research.

Mason (2002) has suggested that data can be analysed either literally, interpretively, or reflexively. Since this study is context-dependent and involved in the complexity of the findings, it required an in-depth approach to data analysis. Hence, data analysis for this study engaged the literal and interpretive approaches, where key elements that surfaced from the analysis process were interpreted in a certain manner to provide meaning and understanding to the findings. In such situations, the researcher plays a significant role in interpretation as it involves "reading through or beyond the data" (Mason 2002, p.149).

During the analysis process, themes were identified based on the issues that repeatedly emerged in the focus group and interview sessions. The emerging issues from the data were gathered through a process of brainstorming and mind mapping. From there, links and connections started to be made between the issues which were later clustered around the main topics of the findings. These main topics and issues were further developed as the organising themes and sub-themes in order to make the findings more visible and easier to analyse. This thinking process is exhibited in Appendix F.

A number of issues stood out from the data; however, it was decided that this study should only look at four key issues, which later became the themes for discussion. These themes revolved around addressing the research

questions posed in this study. The themes that were emphasised were on governance; community participation and representation; power and authority; and finally, power struggles and the legitimacy of power amongst the actors involved in Kampong Bharu redevelopment. These themes are deliberated in the analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

4.3.3   Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability are two elements which contribute to qualitative research during the process of designing a study, analysing results and judging the quality of the study (Patton 2002). While validity in research emphasises the accuracy and truthfulness of scientific findings (Lecompte and Goetz 1982), reliability considers the importance of "consistency, stability and repeatability of the informant's accounts as well as the investigators' ability to collect and record information accurately" (Selltiz et al. 1976, p.182).

As the data analysis of this study relied on the interpretation and assessment of the researcher, it was important for this study to validate the data through various sources of information. Just as Yin (2009) suggests, the integration of multiple sources through a chain of evidence was necessary to ensure the quality measures were observed in order to increase validity and reliability. Hence, a process of triangulation was conducted during data analysis, where multiple methods of data collection were used to verify and validate the findings of the data collected. As Patton (2002, p.247) states, "triangulation strengthens a study by combining methods. This can mean using several kinds of methods or data, including using both quantitative and qualitative approaches".

During the first fieldwork when the focus group discussions were conducted, certain assumptions were developed pertaining to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. It specifically examined the viewpoint of the community, however, without much attention given to the perspective of the government or other stakeholders. It was only after the second fieldwork that a more comprehensive and broader outlook was adopted. This proved the importance of having multiple methods in data collection in order to minimise biasness in the study, a principle which Johnson et al. (2007) espouses. All data collected must be thoroughly analysed and validated through the evaluation of multiple sources of evidence.

4.4 Study Limitations

Although the study accomplishes its aim, there were some unavoidable limitations. As this is a qualitative research study, the data gathered were mostly self-reported data which could not be independently verified. It is inevitable to have some bias or some structured questions posed to the interviewees during the data collection period in order to align the information gathered to the overall aim of the study. There could also be some bias during the collection of data due to the positionality aspect of the researcher. The researcher's background in the Federal Government of Malaysia has had a certain impact on the direction and interpretation of the research. This research was classified by the KBDC officials as a highly sensitive subject and was deemed to have an impact on national security mainly because it involves a discussion of national policies and because the redevelopment planning is still an ongoing process. Therefore, there is a need for this research to keep a balance in providing interpretation and meanings to

the findings of the research. Apart from that, the prior informal information on Kampong Bharu redevelopment gathered from the researcher's working experience and personal network had some influence on the presumption and direction of the research and also during the process of analysing the data. Nevertheless, the researcher has tried as much as possible to take a neutral position during the analysis process, by strictly focussing on the data collected during the research period. In any situation which required confirmation of the findings, the process of triangulating data was carried out.

Another aspect that need to be raised is the language used during data collection. In most cases, the interviews and focus group sessions were conducted in the Malay language as the participants were more comfortable speaking in their native language. The process of transcribing the data collected was retained in the same language to avoid losing any important information during the process. However, for the purpose of writing, some selected quotes were translated into English to facilitate understanding for the reader. In the process of translation, there is a possibility some of the nuances of the translated quote might be lost. Nevertheless, the translated quotations have been as close as possible to the original text.

4.5   Summary

This chapter has presented the approach to the research and the research design utilised in this study. It has deliberated on the research design conducted in this study to explain how the research was carried out. It has also provided a justification of the decision of using a single case study. Various data collection methods were discussed to provide extensive and detailed evidence to support

the arguments raised during the data analysis process. These various methods helped to address the research questions prepared for this research. In order to ensure the validity and reliability of the research, a process of triangulation was carried out where these multiple methods were analysed together to ensure the coherence and logic of the evidence. A full analysis of the findings is discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, with specific themes identified from the data collection process.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE EFFECT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KAMPONG BHARU REDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ON THE PRACTICE OF GOVERNANCE IN KAMPONG BHARU

5.1   Introduction

Chapter Three of this thesis elaborated on the vision of making Kuala Lumpur, the capital city of Malaysia, a competitive urban area, and the government's attempts to develop it into a world-class city. In order to be able to compete globally, the government believes that cities should be supported by a pertinent urban policy and development planning for the area. This would include the implementation of bold urban transformation plans for the city and it could only be achieved through a strategic approach in executing the plans. One of the strategies identified in the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015) to make Kuala Lumpur a competitive city is through reinvigorating Kampong Bharu, a highly strategic area situated in the heart of Kuala Lumpur. Realising that the customary model of urban planning practice being led by local government may not be adequate to facilitate that which was desired for the area, the Federal Government came forward with the idea of creating an urban development corporation (UDC) to lead the redevelopment plan. Apart from facilitating the redevelopment plan for the area, the establishment of Kampong Bharu Development Corporation (KBDC) also represents a shift in existing government practice with regard to urban planning, as it introduces the concept of governance to the process by opening up spaces for wider stakeholder participation. Nevertheless, it is important to examine the significance of KBDC's establishment to the practice of governance in enabling the redevelopment plan for Kampong Bharu.

This chapter addresses the first research question of this study pertaining to the rationale for KBDC's establishment in taking the lead role in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. It also highlights how the establishment of an UDC was able to reconstruct local governance in determining the development planning for the area. The chapter revolves around this change in planning practice, as it shifted from a government-led planning process to one of governance, and provides evidence as to how this change contributed to the development planning of Kampong Bharu.

5.2 The establishment of Kampong Bharu Development Corporation – An initiative of the Federal Government

As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Federal Government of Malaysia has embarked on one of the strategies identified in the Tenth Malaysia Plan, which was to focus on the development of major cities in Malaysia. As the Economic Planning Unit (EPU 2010) noted, Kuala Lumpur and several other cities were given a high national priority so that they were better placed with regard to their competitiveness in a global market. One of the strategies identified for Kuala Lumpur was the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, as the government believed that the area could spur the economy forward through maximising the area's land use. The proposal to redevelop Kampong Bharu started in 1975, with development plans prompted by Kuala Lumpur City Hall (KBDC 2014b). Despite many attempts by the government to redevelop the area, it has not been successful due to multiple factors, mainly because of land issues. These issues are discussed later in this chapter. Nevertheless, the Federal Government has

insisted on redeveloping Kampong Bharu and this has led to the establishment of KBDC.

The establishment of KBDC is unique in the sense that it is the first UDC formed in Malaysia, and was initiated by the Federal Government to work on the redevelopment plans of a highly sensitive area in the centre of the capital city. As articulated in Chapter Three, KBDC was officially established in April 2012 under the Parliament Act 733, which was passed in December 2011. The main function of KBDC is to implement policies, directives and strategies for Kampong Bharu's development and it has been entrusted to be the coordinator, facilitator and prime mover on the redevelopment. The Corporation is expected to promote and facilitate investment in the development of Kampong Bharu through collaboration across government, community and private sectors. Table 5.1 briefly describes the background of KBDC to provide some insight on the objective of setting up the Corporation.

Table 5.1: Brief description on the background of Kampong Bharu Development Corporation

Vision	To generate the potential of the property through enhancing property value and transforming the economy towards greater well-being which is balanced with the preservation of historical value, cultural characteristics and the Malay heritage of Kampong Bharu.
Objectives	i. To become the prime mover and facilitator in implementing efficient and effective policies, directives and strategies within the area of Kampong Bharu Redevelopment; ii. To provide various service initiatives for development and viable advisory services in the redevelopment or improvement of Kampong Bharu Redevelopment area; iii. To spur, stimulate and promote activities for economic, commercial and industrial growth through strategic alliances and partnerships that benefit the landowners and inheritors of Kampong Bharu land; iv. To ensure professional management in development and financial administration, and

	v. To ensure that all the features of development are based on the preservation of Malay culture and heritage as well as Islamic virtues.
Functions of the Corporation	Among others are: i. To implement policies, directions and strategies in relation to the development within the Kampong Bharu development area in accordance with the structure plan and local plan; ii. To act as principal coordinating body in relation to the development, redevelopment or improvement of the Kampong Bharu development area; iii. To promote, stimulate, encourage and facilitate economic, commercial and industrial growth activities as well as the development of infrastructure, amenities and facilities in the Kampong Bharu development area; iv. To disseminate information on potential investment and marketing to investors within Kampong Bharu development area; v. To promote private sector investment in the development; and vi. To manage and promote the sale of properties in the Kampong Bharu development area.
Powers of Corporation	The Corporation has the power to do all things necessary or expedient for or in connection with the performance of its functions and it also includes: i. To require any relevant Government departments and agencies to submit such information as may be required by the Corporation; ii. To impose fees or charges for services rendered by the Corporation; and iii. To establish or expand, or to promote the establishment or expansion of companies or other bodies to carry on any of its activities.
Direction by Minister	The Corporation shall be responsible to the Minister, and the Minister may, from time to time, give directions not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Corporation shall give effect to all such directions.
Finance	A fund known as 'Kampong Bharu Development Corporation Fund' was established which is controlled, maintained and operated by the Corporation. The fund includes financial sources, among others, from: i. Such sums as may be provided from time to time by Parliament; ii. Such sums as may be provided by the Federal Government for the development of any Kampong Bharu development area; iii. All monies derived from the sale, disposal, lease or hire of any property, mortgages, charges or deventures vested in or acquired by the Corporation; and iv. Sums borrowed by the Corporation.

Source: Adapted from Act 733 Kampong Bharu Development Corporation Act 2011 and KBDC website

Meanwhile, it was said that the establishment of KBDC by the Federal Government was to respond to the demand of the community. One of the government officials interviewed during the data collection period claims that the community wanted to have a different entity to lead the redevelopment in Kampong Bharu. He commented:

So during our time, we had 17 series of discussions, and I was one of the team members involved directly with [the community of Kampong Bharu]. We tried to acquire what they really want. First, they wanted the land price of their property to be given at a high price. Second, they wanted to be sure that the development is guaranteed by the government. They do not want the development to be handed to the private sector. Third, they had a bad experience with the previous redevelopment approach whereby their land was taken and the private sectors were encouraged to redevelop the area. In the end, the land was not developed and the land titles were traded off to the bank.

During our discussions, we also had meetings with the Prime Minister [it was] suggested for a Parliamentary Act to be formed. So, we went to the Parliament. Before that, we have proposed for the new agency; [to take the lead on the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu] to be formed as a wing under Kuala Lumpur City Hall. However, it cannot be done because Kuala Lumpur City Hall is not a business entity. This is because Kuala Lumpur City Hall still acts and functions as a local authority. So, after the discussion with the legal advisor from the City Hall and Attorney General Chambers, the proposal to create a body under the City Hall seemed impossible. Nevertheless, due to the request of the community in Kampong Bharu, as they wanted to have [a] government guarantee, we went for the Bill in Parliament and subsequently, Kampong Bharu Development Corporation was formed. (Government Official 1, 10 September 2015).

Based on the feedback received from a number of government officials, the government felt the need to have a single entity looking after the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. They emphasised that the idea was drawn from the

community of Kampong Bharu itself and, from within that, particularly the landowners and the beneficiaries of the land, who wanted to have a dedicated body to lead the development in. This was supported by another government official, who reported:

> *When we had the negotiations between the landowners and the Ministry of Federal Territories, Kuala Lumpur City Hall, the people who were drafting the plan and the local people, we envisaged there is a need for a single body to focus on the development of Kampong Bharu. (Government Official 2, 2 October 2015).*

Subsequently, the Act 2011 [Act 733] Kampong Bharu Development Corporation was passed in Parliament in December 2011. Not only was it set up to facilitate the redevelopment of the Kampong Bharu area, the formation of KBDC has fostered more involvement from other stakeholders particularly the landowners and the beneficiaries to the land in the redevelopment planning. Along with a series of consultations and engagements, the establishment of KBDC has also provided spaces for community representation within the structure of the corporation. As stated in Act 733 Kampong Bharu Development Corporation, the establishment of the corporation entailed two entities: the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. Apart from representatives from federal, state and local government agencies, there was a number of people from among the community of Kampong Bharu who were appointed to the corporation to represent the interests of the landowners and beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu. These representatives sitting in the corporation were basically the community leaders in Kampong Bharu. As the landowners or beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu, these representatives were expected to safeguard

the interests of the landowners and the community of Kampong Bharu. Figure 5.1 shows the broad stakeholder representation within KBDC.

Figure 5.1: The structure of Kampong Bharu Development Corporation

Source: Adapted from Act 733 Kampong Bharu Development Corporation Act 2011 and list of KBDC members and Advisory Council members 2016-2017 on KBDC website (KBDC 2016).

It is clear that the establishment of KBDC is a step by the government to introduce governance practice with the inclusion of many stakeholders in the decision-making process. The intention is that the views and advice of the Advisory Council will be channelled to the KBDC Board through the Chairman of the Advisory Council, who is also the Deputy Chairman of the KBDC Board. The Chairman of the Advisory Council acts as a bridge between the Advisory Council and the Board. The structure of KBDC illustrates that the government has incorporated multiple stakeholders to be part of the decision-making process and

suggests that the government was aware of the importance of having community involvement in the planning process. However, as stated in Act 733, the central focus of the government through the structure of KBDC is only towards the landowners and heirs. This indirectly implies that the government is neglecting other groups from within the area's community, such as the tenants, small traders and other minorities who make their living in Kampong Bharu. The non-landowners appeared to be unrepresented in the planning process, despite the fact that they will also be highly affected by any planning decisions made with regard to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu.

In any redevelopment initiative, it is important for the government to secure the buy-in of the community; this could only be achieved through the participation of the community in the planning process. This relates to Fung's (2004) argument as to the importance of having participation through the synergy of representation in order to maximise an optimal outcome of collective agreement in decision-making. Conversely, Rose (1996, 1999) argues that the involvement of community in the planning process is very much linked to the practice of governmentality. Through his idea on government through community, communities are instrumentalised by governments as a tool to shape, guide and direct the conduct of others (Rose, 1999, p.3). It is a salient political power to assert control and manipulation in shaping the conduct of communities without having to use direct force or coercion, which known as a technique of governmentality.

5.3   Addressing the development issues in Kampong Bharu

Based on the data gathered during the fieldwork, development issues have delayed the implementation of the Kampong Bharu redevelopment plan, and revolve around land issues in the MAS area, which forms the largest area involved in the redevelopment planning. These issues can be narrowed down to three main challenges: first, multiple ownership of the MAS land prevents development from being carried out smoothly. Secondly, landowners ask high prices for the land in the MAS area, which deters any land acquisition from taking place and this will eventually affect the development cost as a whole. One of the government officials interviewed during the fieldwork mentioned:

> *That is why during the Tun Mahathir era, he was very frustrated because they [the Government] had announced the proposal to develop Kampong Bharu. In the end, he had to withdraw and abandon that because the people of Kampong Bharu wanted a land price at a rate which is not permissible for development. (Government Official 1, 10 September 2015)*

Thirdly, there is a restriction on MAS land, as discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, which does not allow the land to be sold, leased or even occupied by non-Malays. This restriction is specified in the 1897 Selangor Land Enactment, which to this day has never been revoked. This restriction has eventually diminished the value of the land, as it impedes investors from coming in as they would have difficulty selling their properties in the future if the restriction was still effective. These three main issues have become the key challenges to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu ever since the idea was proposed in the early 1980s.

In addition, KBDC is also facing problems relating to the small acreage of individual plots, as this does not permit a viable development to take place. According to feedback received during the fieldwork, a feasible development requires at least 30,000 square feet (sq. ft.) of land. In the case of Kampong Bharu, most of the land parcels owned by individual owners are relatively small and range from 4,000 sq. ft. to 8,000 sq. ft. Hence, for just one comprehensive development to take place, it requires at least four lots of land to be amalgamated before it can be developed. These issues were also highlighted in the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu as among the key challenges in redeveloping the area (KBDC 2014a). The term 'ready to be developed' would imply that the issue on ownership and acquisition has been resolved, which of course would be the most challenging aspect for most of the land in the MAS area.

KBDC has been entrusted to resolve all the development issues in Kampong Bharu in order for redevelopment to take place. KBDC has also received help from other government agencies in resolving development issues. Action was prompt as other government agencies have always given a high priority to KBDC's requests for assistance. For instance, Kuala Lumpur City Hall (KLCH) has given special treatment to the Kampong Bharu redevelopment so that KBDC was able to do away with all the planning regulations normally enforced on any planning application, facilitating the approval of planning permission through a faster and simpler process. As admitted by one of the interviewees:

> *The Government's commitment is there. We have given them a plot ratio of 1:10 for residential. Secondly, on the establishment of KBDC. Thirdly, in terms of allocation. Fourth, we will straightaway approve the Master Plan and KLCH has made the*

> *promise that we will approve anything pertaining to Kampong Bharu redevelopment. The commitment is there. (Government Official 1, 10 September 2015).*

The above evidence shows that special privileges were given to KBDC to run the redevelopment plan for Kampong Bharu. Although the intention of the government was to ease and expedite the process for any development projects in Kampong Bharu, the special attention given to KBDC has somehow disrupted normal planning practices. KBDC has worked beyond the normal practices of urban planning by removing some of the traditional bureaucracy that surrounds it. This reflects Brownill's (1990) argument as to how such bureaucracy can be circumvented, or cut, by UDCs . Apart from that, the unconditional support from the government gave KBDC a better position compared to the local authority in delivering the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. This is similar to UDCs in the UK where the empowerment and unconditional support given to the corporations have helped UDCs to perform the role of local authorities (Lawless 1988; Oatley 1989).

With regard to the issue of multiple ownership of MAS land, KBDC has taken steps to resolve the matter through collaboration with the Land Office to track down the heirs in order to expedite the process of getting their consent and approval for the development to take place. As stated in the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu (KBDC 2014a, p.1-19):

> This uncertainty in land ownership requires immediate solutions to ensure that redevelopment can be undertaken as planned. In this respect, KBDC together with the Land and Mines Department will need to reseolve the issue as fast and possible to enable ease of development implementation.

Without the consent of all heirs, any decisions made on the land could be contested and this could lead to disputes in the future. This matter is very intricate as it involves four generations of families; some of these families may have lost contact for years but may nevertheless strongly disapprove of the proposal to redevelop the land. KBDC has also initiated a special task force to carry out the task of finding the heirs based on the list given to it by the Land Office to ensure that the issue of multiple ownership can be resolved promptly. There has been a problem, however, because the list of the landowners and heirs on the Land Office's record slightly differs from the list that is in the possession of the MAS Board. The MAS Board has claimed that, as the custodian of the land in the MAS area, they have maintained the register of the land's occupants since the early years of MAS existence and their record would be the most detailed.

While the MAS Board defended the accuracy of the landownership list, the Land Office has asserted that its list is the most current, as they are the agency responsible for final land transfers. According to the Land Office, the MAS Board is only managing the historical data of land occupancy before the land was given individual titles. Once the land was given individual titles, the MAS Board was no longer responsible in for administering the land as the land rightfully belonged to the individual owners as approved by the Land Office. Nevertheless, the final details of the land transfer and information will also have been communicated to the MAS Board for record purposes. Realising that the issue of landownership would hamper the redevelopment from taking place, KBDC was committed to track down all of the heirs to the land in the MAS area. They claimed to have the interests of all landowners and their heirs protected, as they declared:

> *Our [KBDC] capacities are limited to three aspects only. One as*
> *the facilitator. Secondly as the coordinator and thirdly, we also*

make sure that in the development, the owners or the beneficiaries are not marginalised. That is why we trace all the heirs, so that their inheritance rights on the land will be protected. (KBDC member 5, 8 September 2015).

As for the issue of the high land prices demanded by the landowners for acquisition, KBDC has admitted that it is an intricate matter. The landowners claimed that KBDC was unable to propose a fixed value on MAS land and that, in many instances, the land was undervalued by the government. One of the focus group participants mentioned that the land in Kampong Bharu was priced between Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) MYR200 and MYR375 per sq. ft. (MYR100 = GBP19.01 as of 19 July 2016), which is very much underrated compared to the valuations given for land in surrounding areas. Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC) for instance, which is located close to Kampong Bharu, was valued at MYR1,000 per sq. ft. The subject of valuation rates for land in Kampong Bharu has been at the centre of discussions between landowners and government for some time and it is an issue that has yet to be resolved. KBDC was unable to disclose the value of the land in Kampong Bharu, although a proper valuation study with a trusted surveyor on the land has been carried out by KBDC. The argument was:

As a corporation, we cannot tie ourselves into the land value because if we do a valuation, road frontage and everything else will have a different value. So how can you claim that every [plot of] land will have the same value? Definitely not. So, for that reason, if the landowners want to know the value of their land, they will have to engage with their own surveyor to get an actual valuation. At the same time, we [KBDC] have engaged a consultant to conduct a post-preliminary study on the land valuation in Kampong Bharu. We have got the report. However, the value could not be disclosed to the people of Kampong Bharu for it will create a lot of unnecessary situations. (KBDC member 6, 9 January 2015).

As a result, the land value issue remains unresolved and this has resulted in there being further suspicion from the landowners towards KBDC on its intentions with relation to protecting the interest of the landowners and beneficiaries in Kampong Bharu. Apart from that, the restriction on the land which does not permit non-Malays to buy, lease or occupy MAS land, has also contributed to the weakening value of the land in the area. Hence, KBDC could only act as an intermediary for landowners to negotiate a sensible price for their land with any potential developers and ensure that any proposed development was aligned to the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu (Master Plan).

In order to address the issue of the restrictions on MAS land, KBDC proposed to implement the concept of transfer development rights (TDR) where the rights of the landowners will be transferred to a special-purpose vehicle, which will be led by government-linked companies, to manage the development of the land in Kampong Bharu. TDR, as explained by one of the KBDC members during the fieldwork, would avoid any selling of properties or land in Kampong Bharu and, therefore, would address the concern that the land might be taken over by non-Malays. The landowners in return will be given an upfront payment and later will gain their profit through the sale of their shares of the development carried out on their land.

Inevitably, the idea of transferring the land rights to another party has generated strong apprehension from the landowners. This is partly because of previous experiences in which the landowners were deceived by trusting an individual land developer who claimed to have been given the authority by the government to develop the land in Kampong Bharu; this resulted in them losing

land ownership and has contributed to the growth of scepticism and a desire to exercise caution among the landowners. The participants of the focus group session explained that, in the past, some landowners had been deceived through a scheme whereby they gave their powers of attorney and titles to their land to a developer. The intention was that the developer would ensure that the property was mortgaged to the bank; in return, the landowners would have available a huge overdraft to be used for development purposes. Unfortunately, no development took place and the landowners lost their land titles to the bank, while the developer who promised to develop the land fled with the overdraft money. This bad experience has made other landowners warier as to the implementation of TDR as they fear they would lose their rights over their own land.

Not only is TDR a new concept in development planning in Malaysia, it is also a system that is incomprehensible or has not been explained satisfactorily to most of the Kampong Bharu community. This has caused more anxiety amongst the landowners and beneficiaries. The community of Kampong Bharu has claimed that they have little access to information on TDR and even less knowledge as to the overall development plan for Kampong Bharu. The community of Kampong Bharu claimed that whilst detailed information on the redevelopment plan was made available in the Master Plan, they would have to either purchase the Master Plan or browse online for information on KBDC's website. This is a problem because, for a middle-income earner, the price of purchasing the Master Plan is quite a significant amount. They have also argued that it was not feasible for them to access the information required online as most of the members of the Kampong Bharu community are quite elderly and have limited computer literacy. The community of Kampong Bharu has also criticised

the technical jargon used in the Master Plan which makes it difficult for an ordinary person to understand. The lack of information provided in a format and at a level of comprehension appropriate to that of the needs of the community has made it difficult for the community, especially the landowners, to make informed decisions as to what to do with their land.

The TDR concept was critically scrutinised not only by the landowners, but also the members of KBDC Board. The latter were also sceptical as to the implementation of the concept. It was said that not many people, even among the members of KBDC, could fully understand how this concept would work. As declared by one KBDC member:

> *I may say that I have one vote in terms I can say what I want to say [in the Board]. But in actual fact, do they want to listen or not, it is another story. I have raised the issue on TDR and I asked what if TDR fails, what is your alternative? They, however insisted on TDR. Perhaps TDR is a good concept. I have also raised in the meeting, if the development plan fails, can we still do it? (KBDC member 1, 7 September 2015).*

This shows that KBDC must not only to face challenges from the community of Kampong Bharu, but also with reservations held by members of the corporation with regard to the implementation of the proposed business model. Referring to TDR as "*a business model that was a difficult product to sell to the Kampong Bharu folks*" (KBDC member 4, 8 October 2015), KBDC was facing hard time convincing stakeholders on the appropriateness of their desired approach to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. This resulted in delays in the implementation of the Master Plan and, at the time of the conclusion of the research phase of this study (2015), KBDC was still unable to resolve the land issues.

5.4 Communities' views and reactions on the establishment of KBDC and the development plan

Act 733 which established KBDC received mixed feedback from the community of Kampong Bharu. During the focus group sessions involving the landowners, tenants and people of Kampong Bharu, they were not hesitant to express their perceptions of the establishment of KBDC. Most of the focus group participants were critical of the establishment of KBDC and divided on their views towards KBDC. While some of the participants were agreeable to Act 733 and the formation of the corporation, others were not. One of the participants of the focus group sessions had a strong adverse opinion on Act 733, as he claimed

> *What is important is that the Act which was enacted is a draconian type of Act. (Focus Group Participant 1, 14 January 2015)*

The above statement demonstrates how the people of Kampong Bharu felt forced to accept the Act and the establishment of KBDC before proper research or consultation had been carried out. The participants argued that the notion of establishing KBDC was:

> *Being pushed down our throat and the people of Kampong Bharu were pressured to accept it by bringing the Bill to the Parliament.* (Focus Group Participant 2, 14 January 2015).

Although the government had claimed that the establishment of KBDC was a response to the request of the Kampong Bharu community to have a single entity looking into the development needed in the area, the community was sceptical about the ability and genuineness of KBDC in leading the development

needed for the area. According to the participants, the establishment of KBDC has undermined the role of the MAS Board, who the community of Kampong Bharu has always regarded as the main authority in Kampong Bharu for more than 115 years. They said:

> *KBDC should be in MAS. We [MAS Board]) advise them on what we want. KBDC should not make the villagers as their advisors. It doesn't work that way. Although KBDC has the Parliament Act, we [MAS Board] have 115 years [of] Enactment which is read together with the Selangor State law. But you (KBDC) want to seize all. You want to side-line MAS and the organisation removed. This should not be happening since the people of Kampong Bharu still depend on MAS.*
>
> *You see, KBDC started in 2011 while MAS was established 115 years ago. MAS has its own surveyor, building consultant and banker. They can also appoint their own real estate agent. So what more do you need? KBDC does not have the same track record. Why they are there is just political. (Focus Group Participant 2, 14 January 2015).*

The evidence above shows that, despite the claim made by the government as to the local community wanting a new authority to oversee the redevelopment plan on their area, the local community still has high regard for the MAS Board. The long historical relationship between the community of Kampong Bharu and the MAS Board has contributed to the feeling of trust, respect and devotion towards the MAS institution. Hence, when the government tried to abolish the function of the MAS Board in Kampong Bharu and replace its role with KBDC, the Kampong Bharu community was agitated.

The focus group participants also shared the resentment that the local community of Kampong Bharu has for KBDC, even though it was uncertain as to the real cause of such feelings. The strong adverse feelings the community has

towards KBDC could be due to either the unpopular decisions made by KBDC, particularly in managing Kampong Bharu, the personalities holding posts in the establishment of KBDC itself, or a consequence of the strong feelings and support the community has for the MAS institution. Some evidence that could relate to the above comments include:

> *I'm talking through my experience. Things don't work with KBDC they say. If we try to suggest or do things in certain ways, they will say that could not be done. This cannot be done and even that could not be done. So, meanwhile, what can we do? With MAS, they advise. (Focus Group Participant 1, 14 January 2015).*

> *MAS has a role to play. Every Wednesday of a fortnight, MAS will attend the meeting at the City Hall to present on Kampong Bharu. We don't need KBDC. We don't need. Because they [MAS Board] will show up their face every two weeks whether you like it or not, whether the Mayor is there or not. Whether the present Mayor will attend or not, they don't care. (Focus Group Participant 2, 14 January 2015).*

> *I'm quite sure you realised that some governments in the world are governed not by the government but by corporate bodies. So, we don't want KBDC to use the government in order to penetrate Kampong Bharu. We already have the Enactment which is 115 years old. That is our government. We don't want corporate bodies to run the government. We want the government to run us. (Focus Group Participant 2, 14 January 2015).*

The above comments from focus group participants show the strong sentiments that the community of Kampong Bharu has for the MAS institution. Even though KBDC was established under the Parliament Act, which gave them the outright power and authority to undertake development planning in Kampong Bharu, the community is still holding onto the power and authority of the MAS

Board as they believe in MAS's role as the custodian of Kampong Bharu. Apparently, the historical factor and the close relationship developed between MAS and the Kampong Bharu community have further foster the trust and loyalty towards the institution. This state of affairs has certainly affected KBDC and has led to other conflicts and power struggles between the MAS Board and KBDC. The issue of conflicts and power struggles between these two institutions is further discussed in Chapter Seven.

KBDC's genuineness in protecting the interests of the Kampong Bharu people was also questioned because of the fact that most of the people in the KBDC management office were not born and bred in Kampong Bharu. The community of Kampong Bharu has argued that because it is comprised of so many outsiders, KBDC could not embrace the spirit and culture of Kampong Bharu and would not have best interests of the people at the core of everything it did. One of the participants said:

> *To us, KBDC has no sense of belonging in Kampong Bharu so they don't care what will happen to the Kampong Bharu people. I have raised this before – how many Kampong Bharu people are there in KBDC? If you want to develop Kampong Bharu, there must be people from Kampong Bharu in it who understand the wishes of the people. If you don't have the people, you will never understand. You are more concerned with the execution of the development but you don't have your soul in it. You don't have the intent to help the people of Kampong Bharu. (Focus Group Participant 5, 18 January 2015).*

Evidently, KBDC is facing a big challenge in building up the confidence of the people of Kampong Bharu. Every decision made and all the actions taken by KBDC will be scrutinised and the people do not hold themselves back in expressing their opinions. In one of the ordeals encountered by KBDC, there was

an incident involving a sinkhole. The community living in Kampong Bharu bluntly criticised how the issue was handled. In that particular incident, the government had agreed to compensate the affected residents with a certain amount of compensation. KBDC however, was said to be holding on to the disbursement of the compensation. As the people became impatient for the disbursement, the community of Kampong Bharu resorted to street demonstrations demanding fast action. They hung banners to condemn KBDC's management of the issue and, at least until the date of the conclusion of the fieldwork period, the banners could still be seen in Kampong Bharu. Some of the images of the banners are shown in Figure 5.2, where the victims of the sinkhole incident demanded that MYR12 million should be distributed to the respective recipients as soon as possible. The first one says, "CEO KBDC, RM12 million compensation for 22 houses involve in sinkhole. It is not for KBDC" while another one says, "KBDC, a traitor to the people of Kampong Bharu; Drainage and Irrigation Department (JPS), pay the compensation to the dwellers involved; All are just empty promises". The last banner was written "KBDC: Liar. The sinkhole victims were deceived by KBDC. Resolve our claims. 24 months without any settlement and compensation".

Figure 5.2: Pictures showing the banners condemning KBDC on the unresolved issue of a sinkhole in Kampong Bharu

Source: Author (February, 2015)

Although the existence of KBDC in Kampong Bharu has been contested and highly criticised, the landowners and beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu in general have asserted that they are not against the redevelopment of the area. They have also expressed their anticipation as to the outcome of the redevelopment and what it will be like for Kampong Bharu. Nevertheless, the

landowners are very much concerned as to the implementation of the development and the direct impact that it will have upon them. Similarly, other community groups in Kampong Bharu, which include tenants and small traders, were also anxious as to the implementation of the redevelopment plan. In general, most of Kampong Bharu community – both landowners and non-landowners – want to retain the historical aspect of Malay culture in Kampong Bharu and argue that the area is the most appropriate place to preserve the Malay ethnic identity. This is because the area has long been known to be one of the Malay-dominated areas of Kuala Lumpur. Most of the community members enunciated that they were not in favour of the modern design of high skylines and a high-end development being implemented in Kampong Bharu. They argued that this would not only change the whole landscape of Kampong Bharu, but also hamper the Malays from living in the area, as high-end development would increase the cost of living and the price of properties in Kampong Bharu would be beyond the financial capability of the Malays who, in general, are middle-income earners.

One of the main factors that stimulated the suspicion of the Kampong Bharu community was the fear that Malay interests in Kampong Bharu would be diminished. Being the only Malay-dominated land in the heart of a capital city, the Malays tend to be protective of the land and would want to preserve the Malay interest for future generations. As one of the participants of the focus group stated:

> *If we look at the proposed development, they have suggested 30 per cent allocation in Kampong Bharu be given to foreigners. If we look at Setia Sky [a high-end residential project in Kampong Bharu] which has been developed, who will reside there? We are the Malays. Those who will be occupying the building will be the*

Chinese. Our identity will be gone. Titiwangsa will be finished. So, if you want to develop Kampong Bharu with the price that you want, which Malay can afford that? We are not against [development]. We are not saying the development is not good. It is true that every development for the Malays is good but the approach must be right. (Focus Group Participant 3, 14 January 2015).

Although there were many attempts by KBDC to assure the people of Kampong Bharu that the redevelopment plan had the best interest of the people and especially the Malays at its heart, the community is yet to be convinced. Without the trust, confidence and acceptance from the community, particularly the landowners and beneficiaries, KBDC will have a hard time in executing the redevelopment plan.

5.5   The rationale for the establishment of KBDC

Based on the discussion above, it is apparent that the establishment of KBDC was an initiative of the Federal government to reinvigorate Kampong Bharu after many unsuccessful attempts in the past. The redevelopment of Kampong Bharu is crucial to the overall growth of Kuala Lumpur as it strives to become one of the more competitive cities in the global arena. Realising that KLCH, as the local authority, has limited capacity in dealing with the development of Kampong Bharu on its own, the Federal Government stepped in to introduce an urban development corporation to planning practice in Kampong Bharu.

5.5.1   Infusing business-centric approach to achieve national agenda

One element of the strong government support given to KBDC was on funding. In order to have a comprehensive development for Kampong Bharu, it requires a major allocation of funds and KLCH would not be able to allocate a huge amount of expenditure to Kampong Bharu. This is because KLCH is also accountable in making provision for other areas under its jurisdiction. Hence, the establishment of KBDC under the Parliament Act has given special privileges to the corporation to procure funding from the Federal Government or any sum provided by the Parliament from time to time as shown in Table 5.1. The dependence on Federal government funding for Kampong Bharu development was validated by this statement:

> *We were considering [KBDC] to be put under KLCH. The reason being that it will be easier since Kampong Bharu is also under the jurisdiction of KLCH. But I feel that if it is under KLCH, we will have constraints and problems on the funding later on. KLCH itself would not have enough capacity to fund this proposed development of Kampong Bharu. So, in the end we have to form a corporation under the Act of Parliament so that there will be funds coming in from the Federal Government which is from the Treasury. (KBDC member 2, 17 September 2015).*

Evidently, the establishment of KBDC under the Parliament Act was to legalise the flow of allocation from the Federal government to enable a comprehensive development to be carried out. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that the Federal government agreed to step in to provide funding and policy support for the redevelopment programme, as the Federal government has a broader motivation in aligning the redevelopment plan to the national aims and objectives. The redevelopment of Kampong Bharu is not merely a development to resolve community issues or provide services to suit

local needs but has a bigger purpose: accomplishing the national agenda of making Kuala Lumpur more competitive globally. Based on the previous experiences of unsuccessful attempts to redevelop Kampong Bharu, the standard planning process will not work in dealing with the complex situation in Kampong Bharu. In order to achieve the national aspiration of making Kuala Lumpur as Malaysia's engine of growth, the government realised it requires a different approach altogether, and this could only be done through a bold innovative policy strategies. With this motivation, the Federal Government decided to establish a corporation, infusing it with commercial and corporate orientation in its management practice and leaving the decision-making process to market forces.

As mentioned by the former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, "When we are surrounded by development and skyscrapers, will (Kampong Bharu) be left behind if (it does) not make an effort to develop (itself)?" (Babulal 2017). The community of Kampong Bharu were urged not to be drawn back to the sentimental and historical aspect of Kampong Bharu in the past as the government has encouraged development to take place in the area (Babulal 2017). The importance of Kampong Bharu redevelopment for economic purposes was highlighted in the Tenth Malaysia Plan where it was named as a signature project under the Plan to unlock the land value of the area. This is mainly due to the proximity of Kampong Bharu to the surrounding prime real estates in Kuala Lumpur as pictured in Figure 5.3. The economic potential of Kampong Bharu land was reiterated during the launching of Kampong Bharu master plan in 2015 where the former Deputy Prime Minister announced that

Kampong Bharu redevelopment plan would generate real estate potential and encourage economic development in the area (Lim 2015).

Figure 5.3: The close proximity of Kampong Bharu to the surrounding prime real estate

Source: Ministry of Federal Territories and Urban Wellbeing In EPU,
Tenth Malaysia Plan, 2010

Based on the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu, KBDC has focused on redeveloping the area with catalytic economic activities "to generate and stimulate further economic activities thus contributing to growth of Kampong Bharu as an economic growth centre for Kuala Lumpur city and the Greater Kuala Lumpur region" (KBDC 2014a, p.2-5). This is supported by the statement made by the Chairman of KBDC in 2016 where he pronounced "Kampong Bharu is set to boom. Things are in motion already, ever since the government launched the Kampong Bharu Detailed Development Master Plan early last year" (Bavani 2016). With the upcoming

development plan to have mixed development involving 12 iconic buildings with high returns of collective gross development value, Kampong Bharu is set to be the economic hub in Kuala Lumpur (Bavani 2016).

The Federal government, however, has continued to play the role of providing an aerial perspective of the overall planning process, postulating certain policy direction and strategies to ensure the development planning is aligned to the national aims. Here it can be deduced that the government's decision in taking a step back, detaching itself from the development activities, is intended to unleash the economic potential of the development area through private sector involvement. This strategy of getting the private sector to be the primary drivers of economic growth has been one of the initiatives stipulated in the Tenth Malaysia Plan in order to increase the global competitiveness of the country and modernise public governance in Malaysia.

The establishment of KBDC can be linked to the discussion made in Chapter Two on the purpose of setting up an UDC. As Imrie and Thomas (1993) have argued, UDCs could be an ideal economic and political tool to unlock the development potential of prime urban areas. This is similar to Kampong Bharu, which is situated in the centre of Kuala Lumpur with a high potential to be developed. Due to unsuccessful efforts to redevelop Kampong Bharu in the past, the area's redevelopment needed to have a different strategy to make it work. As Brownill (1990) commented, UDCs seek to restructure normal planning practices, removing the bureaucracy of the local authority and fostering collaboration with other agencies, from both from the public and private sectors.

5.5.2 Building up trust and rapport with the community

As mentioned in section 5.2 of this chapter, KBDC was introduced after much deliberation was undertaken on the options that the government has in setting the planning strategy for Kampong Bharu. Apart from having a single entity to facilitate development in Kampong Bharu, the establishment of KBDC was also intended to fulfil the demands of Kampong Bharu community, who wanted to have an organisation with a government guarantee to steer the development in the area.

When the government claimed that the establishment of KBDC was in response to the demands of the community, it seemed like it was a strategy by the government to build a good rapport with the Kampong Bharu community. This suggested that the government was listening to the people in providing the necessary means for improvement and fulfilling the demands of the community for the best interests of the people. After all, the community of Kampong Bharu have waited a long time for an appropriate development to materialise and the act of getting the development planning to commence through KBDC shows the determination of the government in developing Kampong Bharu. It is a starting point for the government to build up trust among the community, particularly landowners, and to ease the buy-in process for the implementation of the development.

The establishment of KBDC has also provided a space for the landowners and beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu to participate in the development planning of the area. This suggests that there was a clear intention for the community to be empowered in the decision-making process for the development planning of Kampong Bharu. It was essential for the

government to build up trust and good rapport with the community especially when the community were beleaguered with bad experience they had in the past, which led to further scepticism on the intention of the government to redevelop Kampong Bharu. This connects to the concepts of participatory planning, deliberative planning and collaborative planning as propagated by planning scholars such as Forester, Healey as well as Inner and Booher. As Forester (1999) argued, participatory planning could increase public confidence in the government and the effective way to improve public participation is through the re-engineering of public sector.

5.6   The shift from government to governance – The reconstruction of local governance

As mentioned earlier, the decision to set up UDC to take a lead in the development planning of Kampong Bharu marked a significant shift in planning practice in Malaysia. The traditional, government-led planning controlled by a local authority has now been opened up for more parties to be involved in the planning process. The establishment of KBDC has facilitated more involvement from the private sector in steering the development planning of Kampong Bharu, guided by the local plan – Kuala Lumpur City Plan 2020 Draft (Draft KLCP 2020) – which was prepared earlier by KLCH. The structure of KBDC comprises representatives from federal, state and local government, together with other participants from the business sector, professionals and developers, and most importantly representatives of the local community in Kampong Bharu. The involvement of community representatives started in the early years of formulating KBDC, where there was a series of discussions conducted involving

many stakeholders, with the aim of getting their views on the preliminary work of preparing the Bill on KBDC before it was tabled in Parliament. There was also engagement with the majority of the Kampong Bharu community, focusing on the landowners and heirs, in order to gather feedback on the approach needed for the redevelopment they expect to be carried out in Kampong Bharu. This includes the involvement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and political parties' representatives to represent the wider Kampong Bharu community.

The opportunity to be involved in the planning process continued during the preparation of the Detailed Master Plan of Kampong Bharu Development through public engagements, consultations and meetings that were carried out by KBDC. More importantly, the voices of the landowners and beneficiaries were brought to the attention of the higher authority by the representatives of the people who were selected from among the community of Kampong Bharu to sit as members of the corporation. This suggests the practice of local governance is being applied, as the Kampong Bharu community was given the opportunity to give its views and opinions on the development needed for the area through these representatives.

Although often the public engagement and consultation sessions ended up in a heated discussion (as described by a number of key people interviewed during the data collection period), the sessions have provided a platform for the government to enlighten people on the proposed plan, as well as an avenue for people to respond to the redevelopment proposal. The feedback gathered from the sessions was used to further strategise in the implementation of the plan.

At the beginning of preparing for the establishment of KBDC, the government had engaged with a small group of selected people, which they named the 'wise men', comprised of prominent people from different

backgrounds, including politicians, developers, business people, academics and other professionals to deliberate on the way forward for Kampong Bharu development. The gathering of the group was recalled by one of the key interviewees:

> *The Minister then called me to form up a committee through the Secretary General of the Federal Territories Ministry – as he called it, "Let's gather the wise men of Kampong Bharu", the wording he used. We then gathered them and sat down with the Ministry to see how we can work it out. (KBDC member 2, 17 September 2015).*

Based on the evidence above, the selection of people was based on the reputations they had as prominent figures with experience and knowledge on Kampong Bharu. At this point, only a few people were involved and they became a think-tank for the government in brainstorming the best approach on how to deal with the redevelopment proposal, including the setting up of the entity to run the development planning. The naming of the so-called 'wise men of Kampong Bharu' suggests that the group was claimed by the government to have a high degree of wisdom on the running of Kampong Bharu and have strong feelings for the area as they were born and bred in Kampong Bharu.

This was later followed by the involvement of other members of the Kampong Bharu community in the early phase of preparation for the redevelopment plan. Various public meetings and workshops were organised by the government to gather early feedback on the direction of the development plan. At this point, at the organised meetings, the community of Kampong Bharu was represented by a number of associations and NGOs, which included the community associations and small trader associations to uphold the interests of

the organisations they represented. Eventually, from these meetings, emerged a major collaboration between the three core groups of NGOs in Kampong Bharu: Children of Kampong Bharu Association (PAKAM), Kampong Bharu Development Association (PPKB) and MAS Board. This collaboration was named as 'the sacred confederation' and was set to fight for their voices to be heard collectively to give more strength and support for any of the groups' propositions. The representatives of the three groups realised that fighting on their own, as they had done previously in making demands for redevelopment, would not advance them further in getting what they wanted:

> *So, at that time everybody had their own individual ideas. Everybody was fighting their own battle. Then I called them up saying why do we not discuss the issues pertaining to the formation of Kampong Bharu? Ok, what do you want to discuss? And they say, Oh, I want my people to be in the corporation Board. It doesn't matter how many. So we discussed and everybody started to reveal their interest. (NGO 1, 3 September 2015).*

Evidently from the above statement, the ultimate aim of these groups was to gain access to the corporation in order to have power in the decision-making process. This is a construct of local governance which is exhibited through the creation of collective action in order to achieve a common goal (Stoker 2004). Through such collaboration, they maintained support from each other and eventually the three groups were each given a place on the KBDC Board to represent their associations and the interests of their members. The representation of the community through the representatives of the three main associations in Kampong Bharu to sit as members of KBDC Board also proved the reconstruction of local governance in empowering the community to be part

of the development process. The alliance of the three main associations in Kampong Bharu certainly made a significant contribution to the decision-making process, as they were better able to strategise their demands, ensuring the results would be in the best interests of the people of Kampong Bharu.

The establishment of KBDC has clearly changed planning practice in Kampong Bharu despite receiving criticism from the community. The involvement of other individuals and organisations in the development planning of Kampong Bharu suggests that local governance was being practised, as the community of Kampong Bharu was given the opportunity to provide its views on the development needed in the area. The reconstruction of local governance that was happening in Kampong Bharu illustrates the process of a change in power relations from government to governance, facilitating the involvement of non-government bodies in the relationship, including the community of Kampong Bharu to respond to the development needed for the area. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the design of KBDC was different from many other UDCs in the sense that it had a particular emphasis on participation and public engagement, even if in practice KBDC does not operate very differently from other UDCs. The collaboration of multiple stakeholders in decision-making process relates to the concept of integrated governance where state, market and civil society are interconnected, interdependent and interact in a complex evolving system (Samaratunge et al. 2008). As Shah (2006) states, local governance as the formulation and execution of collective action at local level, involving a wider network of actors in the political, economic and social sphere, allows for a collective effort and shared responsibility to take place in the decision-making process.

5.7 Summary

This chapter has discussed the purpose of establishing KBDC to take the lead in the redevelopment planning of Kampong Bharu. It considered the rationale for the Federal Government's decision to set up an urban development corporation to take the reins of planning practice which previously was under the jurisdiction of a local authority. This chapter has also elaborated on the development issues in Kampong Bharu that have been beleaguering the authorities and delaying the whole process of developing the area. The establishment of KBDC was claimed to be a response to the demands of the Kampong Bharu community, which wanted a single entity with a government-backed guarantee to take control of the development in Kampong Bharu. However, as discussed in this chapter, there is evidence to show that adverse opinion predominated in the community on the setting up of the institution. Despite the community's mixed reactions, the Federal Government stayed firm on the decision to use a different approach in managing the development of Kampong Bharu. Based on the deliberation presented in this chapter, it is evident that the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu does not merely represent an intention to reinvigorate a local area in order for it to be abreast with the growth of the surrounding area. The redevelopment of Kampong Bharu serves a bigger purpose in the national agenda, where it has become one of the strategies of the Federal Government to propel Kuala Lumpur into the global market.

The establishment of KBDC also marks a transformation in government planning practice as it opened up more involvement by non-government bodies in the planning process. The practice of governance was apparent as the

community of Kampong Bharu was given the opportunity to voice their opinions during consultations and community engagement sessions. The foundation of KBDC has also allowed for peoples' representatives to have a vote in the decision-making process as they were appointed to sit as members of the corporation. This suggests that the establishment of KBDC has reconstructed local governance in Kampong Bharu because the local community was given the space to participate in the planning process.

Following the notion of the construction of local governance, next chapter explores the spaces created for community participation in Kampong Bharu and the representation of the community through the representatives who were selected to sit in KBDC. These representatives were either members of KBDC Board or the Advisory Council. The chapter deliberates whether spaces for participation were meaningful in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment planning process and the significance of the spaces that were provided for the community. Additionally, the next chapter examines how this representation affected the decision-making process.

CHAPTER SIX: SPACES FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION IN KAMPONG BHARU

6.1   Introduction

In the last chapter, the rationale of KBDC taking the lead in the redevelopment planning of Kampong Bharu was discussed. The establishment of KBDC also enabled a shift in the government's approach to development planning in Kampong Bharu, from one that was government-led to one of governance. With the inclusion of non-governmental parties in the planning process (and particularly the involvement of Kampong Bharu community), the set-up of KBDC constructed a space within local governance where the community was given the opportunity to determine the development needed for the area. In relation to the construct of local governance, this chapter deliberates on the spaces for public participation in Kampong Bharu and the view of popular representation that was created with the establishment of KBDC. The emphasis on these two notions is important in addressing the second research question of this study: *What kind of spaces for community participation were created with the establishment of KBDC and how representative were they of the Kampong Bharu community?*

The establishment of KBDC has contributed to the changing structure of the community in Kampong Bharu with regard to their involvement in the planning process for the area. As mentioned earlier, hitherto development planning of a local area has always been in the realm of local authorities and there were not many avenues for the people to be involved in development planning. It would be inappropriate to assert that there was no public engagement at all in the past, but public involvement in the planning process was merely a procedural process in

which there were public consultations or public hearings. These are obligatory steps before the passing of any development plans, as stipulated in the Town and Country Planning Act. This situation has slightly changed with the establishment of KBDC, whereby the community of Kampong Bharu became more involved in the planning process. More consultations with local community were carried out and community representations were initiated to present the view and interests of the people. Nonetheless, the level of community engagement and the representations of the people in Kampong Bharu was further contested as the community asserted that they have not participated enough in the planning process. The community of Kampong Bharu claimed that they were forced to accept the planning decisions without being given enough time to deliberate on the proposals and they have demanded more participation in the decision-making process. This claim is explored in this chapter to foster an understanding why the demand for more involvement has increased despite the spaces for them to participate in the planning process have been created.

This chapter also investigates further how these representatives play their role in pursuing the views and needs of the people. As highlighted in Chapter Five, the people's representation was permitted to be part of KBDC, as a number of selected people were appointed to become members of KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. They were appointed to represent the voices of the Kampong Bharu people and to uphold the interests of the people; the degree to which this occurred in a meaningful way is explored in this chapter, including who they represent in a real sense. The end of this chapter considers the significance of such representation in influencing the decision-making process.

The flow of this chapter is as follows: in the subsequent section, the creation of spaces for participation with the establishment of KBDC is explored. In so doing, it discusses the opportunities offered to the people of Kampong Bharu to be involved in the planning process. Following that, is discussion of the issue of people's representation. This section, therefore, explores who the representatives are, and how representation came about. It also analyses the community perception of these representatives in their role as presenters of the people's opinions and aspirations. The main objective of this analysis is to establish whether the representatives did represent the majority of the people and whether the people believe they were accurately represented. All of the arguments in this chapter are supported by evidence gathered from the fieldwork. The function of this analysis is to view the people's representation in the decision-making process to determine why spaces for participation were created in the first place. The chapter concludes by making a decision as to whether these spaces for participation and representation were truly created to benefit the people or merely to the advantage of the government.

6.2   Spaces for community participation

As mentioned in the introduction and the previous chapter, there has been a shift in planning practice with regard to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. The once purely local government area in planning practice has now shifted to an urban development corporation (UDC) to spearhead and control the development planning for Kampong Bharu. This change was realised through the Parliament Act in 2011. During the early preparation for the Bill, the government

(both federal and local) started to engage with the community through a series of

consultations and engagement sessions. It was revealed that:

> *When we prepared the draft of the Act on the establishment of the KBDC, it was a policy from the Ministry of Federal Territories. It was a policy that was decided at Ministry level. We decide on the plot ratio plan, withdraw on the land acquisition, include MAS as an advisor, resolve the issue of multiple ownership with the Land Office, help them [the landowners] to resolve any issues and also seek advice from the Selangor State Ruler. So everything was done at the Ministry of Federal Territories. Then we presented it at the Putra World Trade Centre. We called all of the Kampong Bharu people and we explained to them that we will table the Bill at the Parliament. Only after the corporation was formed, the Detailed Master Plan was prepared by KBDC. (Government Official 1, 10 September 2015).*

Evidently, the series of public engagements and consultations on the

redevelopment planning of Kampong Bharu were reported in the local

newspapers and in the Comprehensive Development Master Plan. Some of the

photos could also be viewed in the photo archives on KBDC's website as shown

in Figure 6.1.

**Figure 6.1: Photos showing series of public engagements on the
redevelopment planning of Kampong Bharu**

Source: Comprehensive Master Plan of Kampong Bharu (KBDC 2014a)

Source: Utusan Online (Suhaimi 2016) and The Star (Daniel 2014)

Source: KBDC's website (KBDC 2013)

The statement on the people's engagement during the preparatory work of establishing KBDC was supported by other testimony, as indicated below:

> *The Act was drafted after a few series of workshops organised by KLCH through the Ministry of Federal Territories. The first launching of the Act was in 2011 but there was a lot of objections. There was also a series of engagements with the local people where the officials at that time were bashed by the people of Kampong Bharu. (KBDC member 9, 4 September 2015).*

The draft of the redevelopment plan was then made public as the Mayor of Kuala Lumpur announced, "among the requirements is a display of the plans for a month and holding hearings with every single owner of the lands involved" (Choong 2014). This is an evidence of the government engaging with the local community for feedback and to comply to the legal requirements for the plan to be effective. Although the focus of the government with regard to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu was narrowed down only to concentrate on the landowners and heirs of the land, the wider community in Kampong Bharu was involved during the early stage of the development planning. It was reported that the engagement with the public was very extensive and recurrent, conducted using various methods (as shown in Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2: The engagement sessions with stakeholders

No of Attendance to the Outreach Programme				
No.	Date	Village	No of Participation (Landowners / Beneficiaries) Persons	Percentage of Attendance (Landowners/ Beneficiaries) %
1	30 June	Kg. Periok	696	16
2	24 August	Kg. Hujung Pasir	538	13
3	21 September	Kg. Masjid	1,178	27
4	12 October	Kg. Paya	387	9
5	23 November	Kg. Atas A, Kg. Atas B, Kg. Pindah	1,505	35
		Total	4,304	100

Source: KBDC, 2013

Flowchart:
- The Preparation of the Comprehensive Master Plan of Kampong Bharu (April 2013)
- Outreach Programme (June 2013 – Nov 2013)
  - Open Day (May 2014)
  - Briefing Session with the Stakeholders (Oct 2013 – Mac
  - Public Exhibition (May – June
  - Technical Working Group (June – July 2014)
- Finalising the Comprehensive Master Plan of Kampong Bharu (August 2014)

Source: Comprehensive Master Plan of Kampong Bharu (KBDC 2014a)

The consultations and engagement with the Kampong Bharu community were an act of governance that demonstrated the government was being democratic by allowing the community to share their views on the subject during the process. The concepts of public participation and community involvement in planning processes were discussed at length in Chapter Two. As Forester (1999) argued, public participation can produce well-crafted practical strategies in addressing real needs of the community. It also allows community empowerment, where it requires a reorganisation of the government to allow non-governmental individuals and organisations to participate and actively engaged in the decision-making process (Ansell and Gash 2007). The involvement of multiple actors in the community also enables ordinary people to be empowered to make sensible decisions through rational deliberations (Fung and Wright 2003).

In the case of Kampong Bharu redevelopment, the establishment of KBDC has provided spaces for community participation in the planning process through series of public engagements and consultations as discussed earlier. However, community involvement in redevelopment planning of Kampong Bharu was restricted to listening to briefings from the authorities. Even if they gave feedback, it could not be determined how the feedback was utilised. As shown in Figure 6.2, there were several levels of engagement with the community, with the main focus being given to the landowners and the beneficiaries. During the outreach programme, it was reported that five engagement sessions were carried out between June and November 2013, which involved the seven villages in the MAS area. The purpose of the engagement was to provide information on the various forms of financial initiatives and services offered to owners who agreed to develop their land. Based on the statistics reported in the Master Plan, the outreach

programme involved a total of 4,304 landowners in Kampong Bharu (KBDC 2014). KBDC has concluded that 88 per cent of those who attended the outreach programme have given their agreement to develop their land (Lim 2015). However, according to one of the KBDC members interviewed during the fieldwork, out of 4,304 whom attended the programme, only 2,388 were the registered landowners, a figure which was based on the Land Office record (KBDC Member 10, 8 September 2015). This suggests that out of those who attended the outreach programme and had given their agreement to develop their land, only 55.5 per cent were the rightful landowners (2,388 landowners out of 4,304 who attended the programme).

This statistic of 88 per cent landowners whom had given their consent to develop their land as claimed by KBDC was refuted strongly by a number of landowners who participated in the focus group sessions during the data collection period. They argued that the number of landowners quoted as giving their consent to redevelop their land was misleading and falsely reported. One of the focus group participants stated:

> *KBDC mentioned 88 per cent. Where did they get the figure saying 88 per cent of Kampong Bharu people have agreed? I went to the Sulaiman Club. I raised the question on how do they arrive at the figure saying 88 per cent have agreed. I went to Kampong Paya and asked the people whether there was any study being carried out? Did they do a survey from house to house? No, they didn't. The figure was the attendees of the briefing sessions that they carried out at the villages. I said this is not right. Attending the briefing does not mean they have agreed. (Focus Group Participant 5, 18 January 2015).*

It was also claimed that even the explanation given during the engagement sessions was inaccurate and not comprehensive. They argued that questions on the execution of the plan raised by the participants during the sessions were not answered. This resulted in dissatisfaction among the landowners and made KBDC appear devious in disseminating information to the local community. One of the focus group participants enunciated:

> They [KBDC] just want us to agree. We, the community, we don't want to agree. We want to know how, what are the terms. The compensation mechanism for the landowners must also be there. We do not object to development but it must be explained in detail on the development. We want to know how much they value for every square foot. This programme was done through the help of village heads. It was held in the Sulaiman Club. KBDC is very canny when they convened [the engagement session] in Sulaiman Club. I have questioned why didn't they do it at the village itself? If they organised it in the Sulaiman Club, how many of the old folks could attend the session? These old folks were unable to make it there. Those who attended were the youngsters who had no relation to the beneficiaries. For those who have not attended and had sent in their beneficiaries, they wouldn't know. (Focus Group Participant 5, 18 January 2015).

From comments such as those above, it can be deduced that the majority of the Kampong Bharu community was frustrated as to how the consultation and engagement sessions were conducted. They have asserted that they were not intensely involved in the planning process as the involvement of the community in the development planning of Kampong Bharu were merely public engagement to disseminate information rather than the community being involved in the decision-making process. This reflects Arnstein's (1969) third and fourth rungs of participation, which involve the process of informing and consulting the citizen but with limited power to ensure the views of the citizen are taken into account by the

powerholders. This, however, contradicts to Smith's (1983) as well as Rowe and Frewer's (2004) notion of public participation as they argue public participation should involve the process of consulting, involving and informing the public to allow those affected by a decision to be included in that decision. These comments suggest the need for a deeper exploration of whether the establishment of KBDC has provided the spaces for community to participate in the decision-making processes in any meaningful way.

6.3 Local community involvement in the redevelopment plan

The involvement of local community in planning practice is essential in addressing the real needs of the community. In the case of Kampong Bharu, the community claims that the Master Plan was presented to the community of Kampong Bharu only at a later stage of the planning process. The local community and especially the landowners and beneficiaries were aggravated when they only learnt about the proposed plan during the public exhibition stage. This was because it means that the plan had already been prepared without prior consultation with the rightful people of Kampong Bharu on the methods and approaches that would be used in the proposed development. The engagement with the public through the open day and public exhibition as shown in Figure 6.2 was more of a procedural step of getting the plan presented to the general public.

As mentioned previously, the Kampong Bharu community was never against the principle of development for Kampong Bharu. However, they were very much concerned as to how the development would be executed (see Scruggs 2018; Mayberry 2017; Gartland 2014, 2015). According to the focus group participants, many of the proposed projects in the Master Plan were

considered illogical and insensitive to the community. This resulted in the rejection of such aspects of the plan from among the community. One example of a project that was rejected was the idea of having a 13.48-acre recreation and water retention area in the centre of Kampong Bharu, as depicted in the blue coloured area in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3: Recreation area and green hubs in Kampong Bharu

Source: Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu, 2014

Based on the information provided in the Master Plan, the water retention area was designed to create an identity for Kampong Bharu, increase land value, provide a sustainable rehabilitation for the ecology system and create a green and vibrant public space (KBDC 2014a). Although the intention to build the water retention area was good and technically appropriate, the fact that it was only revealed to the community at a later stage caused uproar among the residents of Kampong Bharu. The disapproval was heightened among those landowners whose land was located within the project area and would be directly affected by

the proposed plan. They found that the idea of building a large body of water in Kampong Bharu ridiculous as land is scarce in such a small area. They asserted that there was no in-depth thinking in the planning and that there had not been enough discussion or engagement to seek the opinions of the landowners involved. As one of the focus group participants argued:

> *From an economic perspective, why must there be a pond or lake here? Why can't it be outside of Kampong Bharu? Kampong Bharu land is very valuable. This is a place of our forefathers. Every inch of the land has its own soul and has its own story. So the people of Kampong Bharu will start asking what is going to happen to our land if it is transformed into a pond. There will be issues. The City Hall people said that the pond will help to reduce the heat in Kampong Bharu. To me, it is illogical. No significance there. (Focus Group Participant 2, 14 January 2015).*

Based on the above statement, it can be concluded that there is a strong attachment between the community of Kampong Bharu for the historical aspects of the area. They feel that the images of their ancestors have a certain sentimental value to the community and any notions to break their memories would overwhelm them. Although there were attempts by KBDC to clarify the rationale of the proposed plan, the community simply refused to comprehend it and saw KBDC as acting totally against their will. The landowners also claimed that they were pushed to accept the idea without proper consultation. It was declared:

> *You [KBDC] can 'bring the horse to the river but you cannot force the horse to drink the water'. That is the conclusion. You can bring in [any proposed development] but you cannot force us to accept. We will accept the development as far as 'I'm thirsty, I will drink until I quench my thirst'. Not more than that. (Focus Group Participant 2, 14 January 2015).*

Evidently, the local community was infuriated with the development proposal that was being forced upon them. Most of the Kampong Bharu community still has a strong attachment to Malay culture and customs and find any notions of dismissing these as disrespectful and unacceptable. Most of the landowners want to retain the Kampong Bharu culture for the next generation. The proposed plan for Kampong Bharu, encompassing modern structures and contemporary living was incomprehensible to the local community. They were even more enraged with the idea of not being part of the decision-making process. Despite the proclaimed notion of promoting local governance, the community of Kampong Bharu was excluded from the rights to decide on the development needed in their area.

Apparently, based on the arguments above, the practice of community involvement in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu were not fully embraced. In order to arrive to fair planning decisions, the views of the parties involved in decision-making process need to be sought and take into account regardless what power they hold (Forester 1999; Innes & Booher 2010). Community involvement in planning decisions can empower the locals and enable sensible decisions to be made through reasoned deliberations (Fung and Wright 2003).

6.4 Representation of the people in KBDC

Representative participation in local governance may take many forms of community involvement, including consultation, direct involvement or power sharing, community action and community self-management (Chee and Phang 1992). As mentioned in Chapter Three and Five, the communities' representation in KBDC encompassed two arms: the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. Act

733 specified that, apart from the representatives from the government sector, the membership of the corporation (the KBDC Board) must consist of five persons nominated from amongst the landowners and the heirs and not more than three persons who have vast knowledge and experience of Kampong Bharu. The Act also specified that the Deputy Chairman of the Board must be amongst the owners or heirs of the land in Kampong Bharu. The Advisory Council, on the other hand, must include no more than fourteen representatives from the Kampong Bharu community. This clearly provides evidence that Act 733 made it compulsory for representatives of the landowners and heirs of the land in Kampong Bharu to be included in the structure of KBDC.

During the first two terms of KBDC establishment, which is between 2012 and 2015, out of the five persons which were supposed to be nominated from amongst the landowners and the heirs to be the member of the KBDC Board, three of them were the representatives of the three main NGOs in Kampong Bharu: the Children of Kampong Bharu Association (PAKAM), Kampong Bharu Development Association (PPKB) and MAS Board. These representatives were appointed to sit on the board by the virtue of their positions as the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of their respective organisations. The members of the Advisory Council on the other hand, comprised of the seven village heads and five community representatives in Kampong Bharu including those from the neighbourhood watch committee and mosque committee members. It is also important to note that the Chairman of the Advisory Council also sits as the Deputy Chairman of KBDC Board. It is assumed that the reason for having a representative from the Advisory Council to sit on the KBDC Board was to ensure that the two wings of the corporation came together. The Chairman of the

Advisory Council would transmit all of the views and decisions made at the Advisory Council to the KBDC Board and *vice versa*.

Most of the members of the corporation were appointed by the Minister of Federal Territories and it is plausible that the selection was based on their credentials and the position they held in their respective organisations. However, this meant that a spotlight was thrown on how they achieved the position they hold in their respective organisations. In the case of government officials, it is expected that their appointments to the positions they hold are based on their credentials and experiences. Hence, in their roles as members of the corporation, they were expected to represent the organisation they worked for. The concern now is whether the representatives of the three NGOs in Kampong Bharu (PAKAM, PPKB and MAS), the seven village heads, and the five additional community representatives appointed to the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council are considered by the community to be truly representative of the landowners and heirs of MAS land in Kampong Bharu. In exploring this matter, discussion should start with understanding the basis of the selection process of the respective individuals to be in the positions they hold in their organisation.

During the data collection period, questions on membership and the selection of the committee members of the NGOs were put to the representatives of the NGOs stated. As mentioned in Chapter Three, PAKAM was formed on the basis of looking after the welfare of Kampong Bharu people. Aside from safeguarding the social wellbeing of the people, PAKAM also provides monetary assistance for social activities held in Kampong Bharu. Over the years, the role of PAKAM has advanced beyond the traditional objective of attending to the social welfare of Kampong Bharu and it has started to look at more

comprehensive matters in Kampong Bharu, including development, religious matters, education and even the development of *waqf* land[1]. The PAKAM representative interviewed during the data collection period claimed that they were behind the formation of KBDC, which in this context was to ensure the development of Kampong Bharu would be carried out in a conscientious way.

Committee members of PAKAM elected at a general assembly held every two years. In terms of the membership of this association, it is by application and not limited to those living in Kampong Bharu. Membership is also open to those who have lived in Kampong Bharu, for a long time even if they do not own a land or property there, so long as they make contributions to the benefit of the Kampong Bharu people. Not everyone residing in Kampong Bharu at the moment is a member of PAKAM. To date, the membership is slightly over 1,000 members; the number of people in Kampong Bharu, as reported in the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu reached 18,372 people in 2010 (KBDC 2014a). Membership therefore comprises only a small percentage of Kampong Bharu residents. With such a small percentage of membership, there is a question as to whether PAKAM can adequately claim to represent the population of Kampong Bharu as a whole.

The PPKB is another major NGO in Kampong Bharu which supposed to look into the development of Kampong Bharu. According to the representative of PPKB who was approached during the data collection period, when the former prime minister of Malaysia announced in 1994 that there was a need to redevelop Kampong Bharu, both PAKAM and PPKB responded to the call for

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[1] *Waqf* is a concept in Islamic culture that refers to holding certain property and preserving it for the confined benefit of charitable activities and religious purposes.

redevelopment. Both NGOs were apparently against the proposed development for Kampong Bharu as put forward by the government. They felt as the rightful owner of the land in Kampong Bharu, the NGOs especially PPKB have the rights to take the lead in developing Kampong Bharu according to their terms. This has brought to the decision of PPKB in 1994 to propose its own development plans without comprehensive analysis being undertaken on the sustainability and viability of the projects proposed in the plan. At this point, PPKB committee had rejected any form of interference from the government, especially from KLCH, in determining the development needed for Kampong Bharu. Although the PPKB committee was looking forward to development happening in Kampong Bharu, they felt that the local Kampong Bharu people should be empowered to determine the nature of the development they wanted. However, due to a lack of capacity to run the redevelopment plan, their development plans were discarded and PPKB remained as an association without much activity. When PPKB had their general meeting in 2013, the chairmanship was handed over to another person who had a different approach in steering the association forward. Highly involved with the younger generation of Kampong Bharu, the new chairman has the advantage of being able to approach and influence the youth into being forward looking with regard to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. However, it was admitted that the membership of PPKB is still very limited. With only 400 members, of whom the vast majority is elderly and live outside Kampong Bharu, it would be a challenge to have a paradigm shift in their perceptions of the development needed for Kampong Bharu.

Similar to the case of PAKAM, with its small membership, it is debatable as to whether or not PPKB can truly represent the needs and interests of the larger

community of Kampong Bharu. Though PKKB has a representative sit on the KBDC Board, many in the community are not convinced that he will be able to be the voice of that community. The PPKB representative confessed that, more often than not, he tends to agree all the decisions made by the Board. This somehow contradicts the spirit of having a so-called representative of the Kampong Bharu community sit on the Board. Ironically, for both PAKAM and PPKB, the representatives were far from being representative of Kampong Bharu community, as they do not represent the overall community in Kampong Bharu. This connects to the argument suggested by Bedford et al. (2002) and Harris (2002) that public participation has failed to promote public interest but instead, only benefitting the interest of dominant parties in the community.

The village heads who were selected to be in the Advisory Council of the KBDC are also members of MAS Board and thus they were expected to bridge the gap between the Kampong Bharu community and the authorities, particularly KBDC. This is because, as the people's representatives, they were expected to be a focal point for information and to present the views and concerns of the people to the higher authority. At the same time, they were expected to advocate the objectives that MAS has been championing on behalf of the Kampong Bharu community. In terms of the selection of the village heads, responsibility for this lies with the MAS Board, but such appointments must have the consent of the village folk. The process of selection starts with a nomination of a few candidates by the villagers; they are then assessed and interviewed before being appointed. In the event of there being no nominations, the MAS Board appoints a candidate whom they deem fit to take up the role. These candidates are given a six-month probation period to prove their competence in performing their duties. At any

point, if there are any complaints received from the people, these heads may be replaced if necessary, after a thorough investigation has been carried out. This process of selecting a leader, if it is done in a transparent and legitimate manner, ensures that the Kampong Bharu community gives their consent to the person representing them as they, to a certain degree, have agreed to the appointment of these leaders. Unfortunately, their representation of the community of Kampong Bharu was contested. A government official commented:

> *There we have the Advisory Council. How were they appointed? Currently, they are appointed by tradition. What is MAS's role when they meet the people? They were supposed to represent the seven villages. They cannot depend on KBDC. If KBDC asks to meet the people, they will say that KBDC is crossing the boundaries of MAS. MAS needs to play its role as they are the representatives in the Advisory Council. (Government Official 1, 10 September 2015).*

Apart from the village heads, there were also community leaders or neighbourhood representatives appointed to sit on the Advisory Board. They had their own procedures for selecting their candidates and most of the time, the process of getting the leader started when the position was left vacant. It would first require a nomination from the community and later the process would go through a voting system before a nominee was appointed as the committee member. However, based on the findings, some of the community leaders have held their positions for a long time and, as long as the position was filled, there was no requirement to have a new process of appointment. When these leaders were selected to become the people's representatives in the Advisory Council, indirectly it suggests that they were given consent to act and make decisions on behalf of the community. These leaders, on the other hand, would have needed

to understand that they were representing the people, and that, accordingly, all decisions made must reflect the views and needs of the people they represent. Should these representatives allow decisions be made to serve certain interests of dominant parties, it would only suggests that this kind of participation is merely a reproduction of existing power structures to override the collective goods of the people and not empowering the people (Bedford et al. 2002).

6.5   The degree of representativeness of the people

As stated in the Act, the role of the Advisory Council is to advise the corporation in carrying out its functions and on matters pertaining to the interest of the Malays in Kampong Bharu. However, the role is limited to providing advice, which may or may not be adopted by KBDC. Nevertheless, these representatives are expected to be prepared to voice the concerns of community members unequivocally. However, in much of the feedback received during the fieldwork, it was reported that these village leaders were not equipped with the credentials and the right attitude to represent their organisation and the people at large. Many of the Council members were perceived as unwilling to speak up, let alone provide their opinion during Council meetings. Those who failed to attend meetings could not have fulfilled their duties in representing the people. These leaders were also criticised for not having the leadership skills needed to lead the community in their area. The view of many in the Kampong Bharu community that there was a lack of competence among the members of the Advisory Council for such a complex role has resulted in a perception that there were many failures in shaping the decisions of the Board. During one of the interviews with a member of the Advisory Council, he acknowledged his role as 'the eye and ears of MAS Board', but

admitted being ill-informed and unfamiliar with certain decisions made by the corporation. The corporation was said to have failed to provide the members of the Advisory Council with terms of reference on their role but this claim was rebutted by KBDC. KBDC emphasised instead that it is a lack of personality and competency among the individuals sitting in the Council that has contributed to the ineffectiveness of the role. In many cases, some members of the Advisory Council were not able to grasp the matter being discussed, and this resulted in their inability to voice their views.

> *Some of them are not effective in the Board. Sorry to say but these people are not well educated as compared to the owner of the land. So, how? Some owners are more educated and more exposed than the Village Heads. How are these Village Heads able talk to them then? (KBDC member 2, 17 September 2015)*

> *When you are appointed as an advisor, what is your role? Is it simply to become takers or are you a decision maker for a big policy? That is why there is no impact when they become the advisors. They became clowns. People challenge them, their capabilities, abilities to communicate, ability to understand. (NGO 1, 3 September 2015)*

These are some of the statements that were put forward to describe the Advisory Council members in general. Without the right credentials and skills, it has been suggested by the KBDC members and the NGOs representatives interviewed that the community leaders were unable to deliver their responsibility as the representatives of the Kampong Bharu community. Being part of the Advisory Council, the leaders should have taken advantage of being able to influence the decision-making process. The village heads who were also on the committee of MAS Board were expected to be the voice of MAS Board in

advocating for the rights and interests of the community at large. However, interviewees described the Advisory Council as not being an effective platform for being a positive influence for MAS in the decision-making process. As mentioned earlier, because the role of the Advisory Council is limited to providing advice to KBDC, there was no guarantee that such advice would be adopted by the corporation. Without an assurance that the advices would be heeded by the corporation, the issue of representation becomes dubious. Indeed, it was even claimed that the Advisory Council was only referred to once decisions had been made at the KBDC Board level. As one of the members of the Advisory Council declared:

> *They [KBDC] will only refer to the Advisory Council once they have come up to a decision. In the Advisory Council we can't make decisions. We can only give an opinion and if the opinion is overruled, we have to accept it. This is because the decision makers are the people in the Board. We [the Advisory Council] can only advise. (KBDC member 7, 11 September 2015).*

Meanwhile, the process of getting the Advisory Council's advice after decisions have been made at the KBDC Board level has been criticised. Even if the Advisory Council provides its views and opinions, the final decisions still lie with the Board as the latter has the prerogative whether or not to adopt the Council's advice. This suggests that the process of getting the advice from the Advisory Council is no more than a procedural step in completing the decision-making process. It appears, therefore, that the corporation is engaging with the people's representatives only to show that the decision-making process has taken into consideration the opinions of the Council, rendering the process little more than a façade. The collective decisions are instead made among those in

the corporation; the representative contribution to the decision-making process is just rhetoric.

Drawing from the discussion above, it raises concerns on whether the appointed representatives could provide the expected representation of the community, especially in advocating the views and interests of the local community. This relates to Arnstein's (1969) argument when she equated citizen participation with citizen power: if participation is unable to promote power balance between the haves and have-nots, then it is not genuine participation. This also means that the representation and spaces for community participation were, as termed by Arnstein (1969, p.219) as, "just a window-dressing ritual" where the community had limited power to influence the powerholders in decision-making processes. Community voices were ignored even though the representatives sit as members in the board. This indicates that the community participation was merely a degree of tokenism and has yet to achieve the level of citizen power in the ladder of citizen participation.

6.6 The marginalised groups

Act 733 stipulates that the focus of KBDC for the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu should be on the Kampong Bharu community, as they are the owners of, and heirs to, the land in Kampong Bharu (Government of Malaysia 2011). At the same time, as mentioned in Chapter Three with regard to the special provisions on MAS land, it has acknowledged that the land can only be inhabited by Malays and may not be leased or transferred to non-Malays, with the result that the focus is only on the Malay ethnic group within the MAS land. However, as the report on the population distribution in the Master Plan shows, there are

other ethnic groups who could be affected by the implementation of the redevelopment plan. Table 6.1 indicates in detail the population distribution in Kampong Bharu based on ethnicity. Although this thesis does not intend to explore the issue of ethnicity in Kampong Bharu in great detail, it is important to highlight that there are other ethnic groups residing in Kampong Bharu upon whom any planning decisions made for the area will have an impact. Their rights and well-being, however, have never been discussed at any forums in relation to the redevelopment of the area. Based on Table 6.1, although the non-Malay ethnic group has only 8.11 per cent cumulatively of the Malaysian population in Kampong Bharu (a relatively small percentage of the total), it does not take away the rights of these people to be represented or that their interests should be protected.

Table 6.1: Population distribution in Kampong Bharu based on ethnicity, 2010

Ethnicity	No. of Population (Person)	Percentage (%)
Malay	13,368	72.76
Chinese	710	3.86
Indian	212	1.15
Other Bumiputera (Indigenous People)	169	0.92
Others	400	2.18
Non-Malaysian citizens	**3,513**	**19.12**
Total number of Malaysian citizens	**14,859**	**80.88**

Source: Population and Housing Census, Malaysia, 2010, in the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu (KBDC 2014a)

Thus, the non-Malaysian citizens group constitutes 19.12 per cent of the population in Kampong Bharu, as depicted in Table 6.1. Presumably these are permanent residents or perhaps even illegal immigrants who make a living in Kampong Bharu but have always been regarded as detrimental or contrary to the overall development of Kampong Bharu, as highlighted by Alhabshi (2012). Nevertheless, in what has been promoted as a democratic process, it is not justifiable for this group to be marginalised from the development planning for Kampong Bharu. There should be some mechanism employed by the government to ensure the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu is inclusive of all parties.

Additionally, consideration must be made of the tenants (or even squatters) and small traders and business owners in Kampong Bharu who do not fall into any of the aforementioned categories, such as the Malays, landowners or heirs of the land in Kampong Bharu, as listed in Act 733. In the focus group session involving the small traders and businesses, it was revealed that this group has some reservations on the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, as they fear their businesses will be greatly affected by its development. According to them, the rental values of their premises would be increased concomitantly with the modern development that will take place. For instance, with such high rentals, they would have to increase the price of their goods or services in order to balance their business margin, which would then be imposed on their customers. This is likely to most greatly affect small businesses as they would lose their customers and simultaneously could no longer bear the increased cost of overheads. They have also raised concerns about where their premises would be temporarily located and how their businesses will be affected during the period while the development

is taking place. The small traders and business owners also added that they have never been consulted by KBDC or the government, despite the clear impact that the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu will have on them. All of these issues were among those raised during the focus group session with the small traders and businesses in Kampong Bharu; in turn, these need to be addressed tactfully by KBDC.

Similarly, in Kampong Bharu, there are tenants who may have been resident for generations and consider themselves to be part of the local community. According to the focus group participants, the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu would change the demography and socio-economic profile of the people living there, which will indirectly force the current tenants to move out of the area. For example, these people cannot afford to occupy residences in luxury, high-rise developments such as Setia Sky, a project in Kampong Bharu that was completed in 2011. The tenants interviewed have asserted that no efforts were made by the authorities or even the village heads to engage with them to discuss the redevelopment plans and how the tenants would be affected, although at the same time they knew there were consultations and engagement being carried out with the landowners. Among the feedback received from the focus group participants were comments such as:

> *I have repeatedly urged for us to sit down to discuss among us the Master Plan. To have a discussion at our level and to discuss it openly. However, we don't get that. (Focus Group Participant 7, 25 January 2015).*

> *I feel that, according to them [the government and KBDC] the tenants don't have any rights to Kampong Bharu. That is what I feel. (Focus Group Participant 8, 25 January 2015).*
> *When we were not included directly, the development has no meaning to us. We were supposed to be involved. We have*

anxiety on when the development will be carried out. If we have to move out, where will we go? So this is not so good for us. (Focus Group Participant 9, 4 February 2015).

Based on this feedback received from the focus group sessions involving the small traders, business owners and tenants in Kampong Bharu, these groups feel marginalised from the planning process. They were not engaged by the authorities and most of the information they received was merely hearsay and speculation. When the issue was raised to KBDC, the answer given was:

That is pretty simple actually. They don't even own land. They don't own a property here. But they are renting. Let's say I am renting from you and then I sub-rent it to the Indonesians and Bangladeshis. I make more money but actually I don't have the rights. But you have the rights since it is your property. [..] The smaller folks who have their small business here, of course they will be part of the redevelopment. To say that we only care about the landowners and the heirs – Yes, of course. Without them and a clear title, how can you develop? (KBDC member 4, 8 October 2015).

Evidently, the tenants, small traders and businesses were not given the same treatment as the landowners or heirs although the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu would have a direct impact on them as well. This raises the arguments on the tyranny in participation as proposed by Cooke and Kothari (2001) where the tyranny of certain dominant group reinforces the interests of the powerful and override the voices of the marginalised people. It is a reassertion of power and social control of certain groups in the community over the powerless as suggested by Kothari (2001).

This relates to the case of black and ethnic minority populations who were marginalised by the establishment of UDCs in UK, as highlighted in Chapter Two.

The study by Brownill et.al (1996) revealed that the interest of the minorities may not necessarily be represented by the representatives chosen to sit in the UDC boards, hence were not able to influence decision-making. In the case of Kampong Bharu, there is no evidence to show that the minorities are represented in KBDC board. Being part of Kampong Bharu, these marginalised group deserve to be heard and their views to be acknowledged. They also should be given rights to be represented in the planning process. Although the government – through KBDC – can justify their reasons for not considering these groups, there should be some appropriate mechanism that could be exercised on the behalf of this marginalised group. Without this, the redevelopment plan of Kampong Bharu cannot be construed as all-inclusive.

6.7 Becoming a persuasive community

As mentioned in Chapter Five, the establishment of KBDC has brought about the collaboration of the three main NGOs in Kampong Bharu: PAKAM, PPKB and MAS, as the so-called 'sacred confederation' to act in one voice in deliberating the redevelopment plan for Kampong Bharu. The three NGOs have realised that they need to come together in order to make their view more prominent and that this could only be done through close collaboration and providing strong support for each other. One example of this sacred confederation being persuasive within the decision-making process was during an early proposal by the government to abolish the MAS Board. The proposal to abolish the MAS Board was inserted as one of the clauses in the Kampong Bharu Development Corporation Bill and was tabled in the Parliament in 2010. In addition to community uproar concerning the idea to abolish the MAS Board, the

three NGOs came together to strategise so that they could take a firm stand for the power of the MAS Board to be reinstated. When the matter was brought up during a meeting with the Minister of Federal Territories, the three NGOs provided strong support for each other in order to influence the decision. As one representative noted, they felt considerable support from the Kampong Bharu community:

> *I received very strong support from these people. When we were in the midst of drafting the Bill, we worked together. When I give comments, they will support. When one of the reps gives his comments, I will give my support. This is referring to the discussion on drafting the law for Kampong Bharu redevelopment. We definitely supported each other because our objective is the same, for the interest of Kampong Bharu. And when there was a certain time when the authority intends to abolish MAS, we defended it so that MAS could survive. If we stay united, nobody could do anything. We complement each other. (NGO 2, 8 September 2015).*

The collaboration of the three NGOs certainly played a significant role in steering the direction of the Bill. At this early stage of the process, they gained the trust of the decision-makers in contributing their views and opinions in the decision-making process. This act is coherent to the notion of agenda shaping in Bachrach and Baratz's (1970) conception of power where power could be exerted through influencing, shaping and determining targeted desires. With the strength of this collaboration, eventually the three NGOs were given seats in KBDC as Board members. This demonstrates the persuasiveness of the three main NGOs in Kampong Bharu in maintaining their objective to protect the interests of Kampong Bharu community.

As members of KBDC Board, the three representatives of the NGOs had maintained their influence in the decision-making process, providing their views and opinions on the development planning needed for Kampong Bharu. However, the once-sacred alliance between the three NGOs which was formed around 2010 when the government initiated the establishment of KBDC, has gradually started to weaken. The three NGOs started to develop disagreements among themselves as KBDC began to work on the redevelopment plan. One of the NGOs representative has stated that PAKAM and PPKB supported the development plan proposed by the corporation. The MAS Board, on the other hand, continued to be reserved on certain aspects of the development plan. MAS was said to disagree on the proposed plan laid out in the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu and continued defending the notion of retaining the culture and identity of Kampong Bharu. The disagreement in principle between the representatives of MAS and other KBDC Board members finally resulted in the withdrawal of the MAS representative from the Board. The representative decided to resign from the KBDC Board as a sign of protest for the decisions made that do not seem to protect the interests of the Kampong Bharu community. The act of resigning from the Board depicts a strong assertion by the representative that they do not agree with the decisions made by the Board.

The persuasiveness of the community has also resulted in a review of the Master Plan. As the plan was highly disputed by the people of Kampong Bharu, especially on the concept of transfer development rights (TDR), the government has instructed KBDC to revise the Master Plan. The corporation was asked to refocus on the priority of the projects and to look into another business model that

could meet less resistance from the people, especially the landowners. The government has realised that the TDR business model is unfavourable to the landowners and it will take a lot of effort for the corporation to have sufficient engagement with the landowners to explain the concept and convince them to agree. Hence the corporation was left to review the Master Plan and devise a better approach to development that is more viable for both the government and the community. This suggests the community's persuasive power could have influenced the decision-making process.

Despite the community being persuasive in certain aspects as discussed above, they were unable to ensure meaningful participation in the decision-making process to take place with regard to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. The creation of spaces for participation through the establishment of KBDC were limited as the local community asserted that they have not participated enough. More often than not, the public engagement and consultation sessions ended up with ony the process of informing or disseminating information rather than the community being empowered to make demands and eventually make significant contribution to the decision-making.

While there is evidence to show that the minorities were not represented, the representatives appointed to sit in the board in general seemed to be incapable of safeguarding the interests of the community they were representing. This suggests that although these representatives, particularly the three main NGOs in Kampong Bharu, were once very vocal in making their demands and in exerting their power to ensure that certain decisions were made, they were unable to remain persuasive in advocating the interests of the wider community. Similarly, the Advisory Council, which encompasses of the village heads, had a

limited role in influencing the decisions made by KBDC board. Instead, these representatives were utilised as a medium to execute the decisions made by KBDC. The ineffective participatory process is partly due to the power struggles among the different groups in Kampong Bharu as they try exercise their power to influence the decision-making. The discussion on power struggles among the actors involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu and how it later links to the practice of governmentality in shaping the community beliefs and conducts, will be analyse in the next chapter.

6.8 Summary

This chapter has discussed the creation of spaces for community participation in the development planning created by KBDC. It has deliberated on how the government has encouraged the participation of the community in the planning process through a series of consultations and engagement with the landowners and heirs of the property in Kampong Bharu. Although the government has provided evidence of engaging with the people of Kampong Bharu, it has been refuted by the landowners, who have strongly argued that KBDC has not been entirely transparent with their actions. The community has claimed that the redevelopment plan was forced upon them and much of the information given was misleading and that KBDC did not attend to basic queries from the people, especially the landowners. The community has asserted that participation involving the community of Kampong Bharu was less meaningful in the decision-making process and they were infuriated that they were not able to decide on the appropriate form of development needed in their local area.

This chapter has also made an argument on the aspect of representation in KBDC. Deliberations were made on the process of selecting the representatives and the role these representatives should be playing in representing the people of Kampong Bharu. It has also discussed at length the role of the Advisory Council to advise the corporation in carrying its functions and on matters pertaining to the interest of the Malays in Kampong Bharu. Although it appeared that the people's representatives were given the power to advise the KBDC Board, the ultimate decision on development lies with the Board, as they may decide whether or not to adopt the views and suggestions proposed by the Advisory Council. In many instances, the Advisory Council was only able to advise the Board after the decisions were made. This suggests that the process of involving the people's representatives in the Advisory Council was merely procedural to reflect a collective effort in the decision-making process for political reasons.

The chapter also explored the position of marginalised groups in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. The process enacted has eliminated the rights to be heard and considered of non-landowners, including tenants, small traders, small businesses, non-Malays, and non-citizens in Kampong Bharu. These marginalised groups were left without any consultation or representation. Here, the discussion was also coined to the notion of tyranny in participation where participation has led to overriding and assertion of power of the dominant party unto the marginalised group who has less power in decision-making. This discussion argued that there is a need for a proper mechanism to be adopted to reflect the views of these marginalised people, as they will also be affected by the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu.

The final discussion of this chapter analysed the issue of persuasive community, having elaborated on how the collaboration of the three main NGOs in Kampong Bharu managed to make their views more prominent in influencing the early stages of the decision-making process. It has also touched on how community can be persuasive in influencing certain planning decisions. The decision that the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu must be revised was a clear example of how the community has exercised their persuasive power to influence the decision-making process. However, this persuasiveness could not be sustained as the representatives were not able to provide meaningful community participation in advocating the interests of the community at large.

This thesis discussed the rationale of the foundation of KBDC and how it reconstructs local governance in Kampong Bharu in the previous chapter. Further, within this chapter, it has deliberated on how the establishment of KBDC has created spaces for community participation and representation in the planning process of Kampong Bharu. Accordingly, developing on this theme, the next chapter expands upon the power struggles encircling the actors involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu and the implications that these had for the decision-making process. It also looks at the practice of governmentality through the establishment of KBDC to understand how the corporation uses its power to govern and shape the conduct of the community. Finally, the next chapter also deliberates on the findings of this study to link Kampong Bharu redevelopment in a broader sense which is beyond the practice of urban redevelopment in Kuala Lumpur.

CHAPTER SEVEN: POWER STRUGGLES AND THE PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENTALITY THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

7.1 Introduction

Chapter Six provided a discussion as to how the establishment of Kampong Bharu Development Corporation (KBDC) allowed the creation of spaces for community participation and representation in the planning process. As the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu is an ongoing process, it should be noted that this research pertains to the period up until December 2015. The spaces that were created in the study period, however, allow window for community empowerment through a series of public engagement and consultation to help to decide the development needed in their area. Together with the community representatives who were appointed to sit on the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council, such innovations cumulatively suggest that the development planning of Kampong Bharu was done collectively, reflecting the practice of local governance in an area of Kuala Lumpur.

Nevertheless, the involvement of multiple parties in the development planning process not only represents the implementation of governance in planning practice, where all planning decisions were arrived at collectively. There are also consequences to the process that was used; it brought some level of conflict and struggle among the actors involved, as they sought to exercise their power and authority to influence the decision-making process. In addition, there were actors who used their power covertly to shape the planning decisions. Such covert actions led to more conflicts and struggles in the planning process and also impacted upon the decision-making.

The focus of this chapter is to examine the conflicts and power struggles that existed among the actors involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. It includes actors from within the formal planning system which have had a direct influence on the development planning of Kampong Bharu, as well as those actors from outside the formal system who nevertheless had significant influence on decision-making. The actors from within the formal system include the government: both the Federal Government and the local authority, and also the people within KBDC, including the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. The actors outside the formal system include the politicians, developers, business people and people with vested interests in the redevelopment plan. This set of actors from outside the formal planning system was perceived to have uses their hidden hands to shape the direction of the decision-making process to a certain extent.

This chapter also looks at the covert influence of the monarchical system of Selangor State in prompting certain decisions in the planning process. Although the monarchy did not directly intervene in the planning process, it played a significant role in guiding the decision-makers. Subsequent to the discussion on conflicts and power struggles that arose amongst the actors, this chapter considers how the establishment of KBDC has enabled the corporation to exercise governmentality in shaping the community in decision-making process. These discussions address the third research question of this study, which is: *What power struggles did the establishment of KBDC raise and what do these tell us about urban development corporations (UDCs) as a distinct form of governmentality?* In relation to understand the contribution of this study in a broader context and beyond the practice of urban redevelopment in Kuala

Lumpur, this chapter also attempts to address the final research question, which is: *What broader lessons can we learn from the experience of Kampong Bharu about the practice of governance and public participation in the process of urban redevelopment?*

7.2 The actors involved in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment plan

When KBDC was established, the corporation was in charged with steering and facilitating the development of Kampong Bharu. As elaborated in Chapters Three and Five of this thesis, the corporation consisted of two wings: the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. Within the structure, it consists of several main actors involving representatives from government agencies, corporate personalities, people's representatives from the three main NGOs in Kampong Bharu – the Children of Kampong Bharu Association (PAKAM), Kampong Bharu Development Association (PPKB) and the Malay Agricultural Settlement (MAS) Board as well as all of the village heads in the MAS area and other community leaders in Kampong Bharu. However, apart from the corporation, which was given outright authority to lead the development planning for Kampong Bharu, there were other actors involved directly and indirectly in influencing the development planning process. The influence of these other actors could be performed either in an overt or covert manner depending on the power that the individual actors held.

In order to understand the situation better, it is important to deliberate on how the mechanisms of the organisations or individuals involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu work to evaluate the power and influences of each actor. The influence on Kampong Bharu redevelopment does not only exists

within a formal system or organisational structure but also arises from forces that are outside the system. Weber (1978, p.926) views power as the "chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action", and every actor involved in a power struggle has their own mechanism to push their aims forward. This mechanism can be exercised either directly or indirectly from within or outside the system and aims to enable prompt decisions to be made to the advantage of the actors. In order to assist in understanding the power system related to the Kampong Bharu redevelopment, Figure 7.1 provides an overview of the mechanism of the existing influences on the decision-making process.

Figure 7.1: The relationship between actors involved in Kampong Bharu redevelopment

Source: Author

As shown in Figure 7.1, on the left is the formal structure of those involved directly with the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. Although KBDC was set up

as a corporation, the organisation is located administratively under the Ministry of Federal Territories because the latter requires the corporation to report periodically on its progress. It is also responsible to the Minister as stipulated in Act 733 (Government of Malaysia 2011), which in this case is the Minister of Federal Territories. Either way, the corporation is accountable to the Federal Government directly. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu has become one of national interest and importance as it is aligned to the national aim of making Kuala Lumpur a competitive city globally. Hence, the redevelopment plan has benefitted from the attention of the prime minister and the Federal Government. Indeed, the progress of the Kampong Bharu redevelopment has been presented to the prime minister from time to time. This suggests that the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu receives consistent attention from the political masters of the country. As indicated in Act 733, the corporation is required to adhere to the directions given by the Minister, even if they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act (Government of Malaysia 2011).

KBDC was formed to focus solely on the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. Although KBDC was given the authority to lead the Kampong Bharu redevelopment, the corporation has no power to act as a unit of local government. The power and authority of local government remains under the purview of Kuala Lumpur City Hall (KLCH). While the Ministry of Federal Territories provides policy direction for the development of Kuala Lumpur as a whole, KLCH deliberates on policy direction and translates it into local strategic plan for Kuala Lumpur. KBDC was expected to interpret these strategic plans and use them as the basis for the Kampong Bharu redevelopment. The Comprehensive Development Master Plan

for Kampong Bharu, the document that has set the foundation for Kampong Bharu's redevelopment, has been prepared by KBDC in accordance with the Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 2020 and the Draft Kuala Lumpur City Plan 2020 (KBDC 2014a).

As shown in Figure 7.1, KBDC has two wings within its organisation to assist with the running of the corporation. While the KBDC Board looks into the implementation of Kampong Bharu redevelopment through coordinating and facilitating the development planning and strategies, the Advisory Council advises the corporation on matters pertaining to the interest of the Malays in Kampong Bharu and other matters which are referred to it by the corporation (Government of Malaysia 2011). These are the entities in the formal system which were given the power and authority to be directly involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu.

Operating alongside this formal system is, as depicted on the right hand side of Figure 7.1, indirect influence. This shows, for instance, the involvement of politicians, developers and business people, as well as other people with vested interests to advocate for their personal aims with regard to the decision-making process. These groups attained such influence implicitly through their personal connections with key figures in KBDC. This reflects Weber's idea on the pluralistic forms of social conflict in modern society where individuals will try to use the higher rank of one dimension to increase their rank over others (Johnson 2008).

Apart from the involvement of the politicians, developers and business people, indirect influence also comes from the monarchy system which is the Ruler of Selangor State. Although the monarchy system in Malaysia is predominantly ceremonial, the influence of the Ruler of Selangor State has a

significant impact on the decisions of the government. Then, there is also the influence of MAS Board, which has the direct link to the KBDC Advisory Council. As the representatives of the Advisory Council encompasses of the seven village heads, who are also the committee of the MAS Board, the representatives are perceived to have significant influence to the decisions made at the Council. Nevertheless, in reality, these representatives were unable to represent the community effectively. Detailed analysis on the indirect influences of the formal structure of Kampong Bharu redevelopment will be deliberated later in this chapter, when we discuss on the influence of the hidden hands.

7.3 The conflicts and struggles within and outside KBDC

Weber (1964) proposed that power can be imposed on an actor in a social relationship; accordingly, power can shape the people over whom the power is exercised. This may come in the form of direct or indirect influence, as suggested by Dahl (1974), to construct the behaviour of others. As stipulated in Act 733, the representatives were appointed by the Minister via a recommendation from the Ministry and it is safe to say that the selection of most of these representatives was based on their credentials and their positions within their respective organisations.

Nevertheless, there has been speculation in Kampong Bharu that the appointment of some members by the Minister was based on political reasons and personal discretion (NGO 1, 3 September 2015). For instance, the appointment of the first Chairman of KBDC was said to be a political decision and was based on the personal relationship that he had among their circle of connections. One of the KBDC members interviewed for this study recalled how

he persuaded the candidate to be in the corporation by saying, *"Hey... I want to use you and bring you onto the Board"* (*KBDC Member 2, 17 September 2015).* Not long after this, the candidate was appointed by the Minister to become the Chairman*.* This relates to Dahl's notion on power relations and power of the ruling elites in his theory of community power (Dahl 1957, 1974). As Dahl argues, those who have power will have influence and control which are used in different manners, depending on the issues encountered. Evidently the appointment of some members in KBDC board were based on the influence and control exerted by the power of the elites who want certain decisions be made.

This appointment of the candidate as the Chairman of KBDC received varied responses from the public, especially from those who had been involved in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment since the early days. One of the NGOs representative whom was interviewed has argued that the appointee was not involved from the very beginning of the process of establishing KBDC and therefore, would not understand the spirit of the proposed redevelopment plan. Nevertheless, being born and bred in Kampong Bharu and owning land in the area, as well as being an established business person, provided him with substantial social and political connections. In addition, for two terms he has served as the Parliamentary Member for the Titiwangsa constituency, which is the constituency to which Kampong Bharu belongs, was believed to be the determining factor in his appointment as the Chairman of KBDC. Notwithstanding these facts, the appointment was highly criticised by one of the interviewees during the fieldwork:

> *What is their enthusiasm for Kampong Bharu? They were appointed based on political connections. They have no excellence. Everything is about politics. Therefore, nobody cares about Kampong Bharu. They will only care if they can benefit or*

> *have a certain interest in it. Sorry to say that the Kampong Bharu development doesn't have the right leader to articulate and provide the direction for the development in Kampong Bharu. They were there because of political connections. They were there because of family connections. Too political. (NGO 2, 8 September 2015).*

Similarly, the appointment of the second and current Chairman also received criticism from the general public. Despite having a reputable image from his prior profession as a lawyer, the public was concerned that he is not local to Kampong Bharu and for that reason he would not be familiar with the special and unique issues in this distinct cultural enclave. As discussed in Chapter Five, the people of Kampong Bharu are highly sensitive as to the appointments of those in KBDC and have consistently criticised any appointment that does not directly involve someone who was born and bred in Kampong Bharu. Since the appointment of the current Chairman was said to be due to his position in the national political party in Titiwangsa and his close relationship with the division head who is also the Member of Parliament for the Titiwangsa constituency as mentioned by one of the interviewees, it could suggest that the appointment was based on political reason. Though he has denied this allegation, his good relationship with the division head would surely be beneficial to his performance of his duties in the corporation.

Conflicts and power struggles also persist within the formal structure of the authority itself. When KBDC was established, it was given the responsibility to prepare the development Master Plan and to facilitate the implementation of the plan. This meant that there would be a shift of responsibility and delegation of authority to develop a local area from a local authority, in this case KLCH, to the

management of a corporation. However, despite the authority given to KBDC, the corporation has no authority to authorise any planning permissions for Kampong Bharu. The authority which assesses and approves planning permissions remains KLCH. However, KLCH would need to consult and obtain validation from KBDC on any planning proposal before they could approve it. The situation between the two authorities is peculiar, as they both appear to have the power to make decisions but may not have the authority to exercise that power. When the question was raised as to which agency has more power, this was the answer given:

> *Power will be in Kuala Lumpur City Hall. We don't have power. We are only a caretaker. We advise. We don't have power. (KBDC Member 5, 8 September 2015).*

This point has also been substantiated by a Ministry spokesman whom was interviewed and it was emphasised that KBDC will be responsible for preparing the Master Plan and that the plan will be the primary reference for any planning development in Kampong Bharu. KLCH on the other hand, will analyse the technical aspects that relate to its planning principles, in keeping with its function as a local authority (Government Official 7, 1 October 2015). Nonetheless, one point made by a KLCH representative who emphasised the need for KBDC's agreement in approving any planning permissions (Government Official 2, 2 October 2015), suggests that the power of City Hall to approve the development in Kampong Bharu is subject to the power of KBDC. The power that both organisations hold overlap with one another and any decisions made require consent from both parties. Although, from one perspective, this situation suggests that both organisations are practising collective agreement in governing

Kampong Bharu, from another angle it suggests that there remains a power struggle between the two entities in the decision-making process.

This relates to Dahl's comments regarding power comparability of different entities in determining who has more power. According to Dahl (1957), those who have power will have control. However, when there is more than one power, it is crucial to understand who will have the most power to influence decision-making. In the case of KBDC and KLCH, both organisations have equal status and the same means of influencing decisions. It may also appear – at least at this time – that both organisations are on agreeable terms in determining the development needed for Kampong Bharu. However, the legitimacy of the decisions could be contested were there to be any divergences in judgements, as both organisations would assert their authority and power over the other. Although the powerful will be able to influence the policies and direction of behaviours (Sherrard and Steade 1966), the ranking of power between the KBDC and Kuala Lumpur City Hall in terms of which organisation holds the higher authority, is yet to be established. The uncertainty as to which agency holds the ultimate power would impact on the accountability and responsibility for any decisions taken.

As briefly discussed in Chapter Five, there is concern that the MAS Board has been side-lined by the government after the establishment of KBDC. The MAS Board has been acknowledged as the custodian of MAS land in Kampong Bharu for the last 115 years and has gained the local community's trust in administering Kampong Bharu. During the early stage of preparing the Kampong Bharu Development Corporation Bill for presentation in Parliament in 2010, concern was raised by the MAS Board that there was a clause appended to the Bill which proposed to dissolve the function of the MAS Board. The proposal

caused aggravation among the members of the MAS Board. This also resulted in disapproval from among the Kampong Bharu community as they showed their support for the MAS. The argument as to the need to uphold the MAS Board was with regard to the need to safeguard the interests of the Malay ethnic. The Bill was eventually tabled in the Parliament but during the period before it was scheduled for the second reading, the Minister of Federal Territory (then) had few engagement sessions with the community of Kampong Bharu. In the course of these sessions, it was proposed that the Bill required some amendments and primary attention was given to the proposal to reinstate the role of the MAS Board. A few of the NGOs in Kampong Bharu who were gathered to provide feedback to the Bill deliberated on the issue. They stated:

> *We are more concerned about paragraph 7 [of the Bill] which is to propose an amendment in order to provide reasons why MAS should not be repealed. This is because the existence of MAS does not conflict with the running of the corporation in the course of developing Kampong Bharu. Yet, MAS could help in strengthening the role of the corporation. (NGO 1, 3 September 2015).*

Eventually, with strong objections received from the community to the idea of abolishing the MAS Board, coupled with the influence of the Ruler of Selangor State (which is discussed later in this chapter), the government made the necessary amendments to the Bill. The earlier paragraph on the abolition of the MAS Board was taken out, but nevertheless the MAS Board's role was still kept silent. Despite the attempt by the government to abolish MAS Board, MAS Board continued managing Kampong Bharu. They were even involved in the KBDC *pro tem* committee, to work on public consultations with the local community. However, not long after, the MAS Board was instructed by KLCH to limit its role

to performing social obligations only and was restrained from assessing any planning applications or permissions. It is important to note that, prior to this period, the MAS Board had maintained the authority to authorise planning permissions for buildings fewer than five storeys in height within the MAS area, as part of its role as the administrator of Kampong Bharu. The authority to approve and advocate the conditions of development plans and housing extensions is within the MAS Board's jurisdiction, as stipulated in Government Gazette No. 530 (Amendment) dated 20 September 1901 (Government Official 3, 17 September 2015). When MAS was refrained from performing its previous role in evaluating planning permissions, KLCH was challenged by the MAS Board to provide evidence of a legitimate clause in legal documents to justify the decision.

During the data collection period, it became apparent that the relationship between the MAS Board and KBDC was always in contestation, as KBDC tried to suppress the power of the MAS Board while the MAS Board continued to prove that it was still relevant to the daily lives of those who live in Kampong Bharu. There has been a series of instances which demonstrate that KBDC was trying to take over the role of the MAS Board in Kampong Bharu, even on trivial matters such as organising food stalls during the month of Ramadhan. In the case of the sinkholes in Kampong Bharu discussed in Chapter Five, KBDC was highly criticised for not being able to handle the matter well and that this resulted in a delay of the compensation being disbursed. This led to further conflict between the MAS Board and KBDC, as the former was clearly defending the community of Kampong Bharu and seeking to hasten the compensation disbursement. Despite some attempts by KBDC to undermine the role of the MAS Board in

Kampong Bharu, the MAS Board remained adamant as to the importance of maintaining its existence. As a member of the Board said:

> *We [the MAS Board] told them, you can say whatever you want, you can do whatever want you want but we will continue with our work. You must understand that KBDC acts as a facilitator. MAS is totally different. Even though they have the Master Plan, they cannot execute it. They [KBDC] don't have the manpower. They just plan the development. They cannot sue you. Whereby on our part, we have a bigger role. They cannot issue any instruction for road closures. They have to ask City Hall to close the road. Whereby for us, if we want to close the road, we just close. We just put up a notice to the villagers, explaining why the road must be closed and nobody will complain. (NGO 1, 3 September 2015).*

Based on the above statement, it is evident that conflict exists between KBDC and the MAS Board. While KBDC strives to show its authoritative power in Kampong Bharu, the MAS Board unwaveringly maintains its prominence. When the notion of having collaboration between KBDC and the MAS Board was suggested, the response from the two organisations differed. While the MAS Board seemed to look forward to collaborating, KBDC had a different opinion and asserted that, according to the Attorney General's Chambers, the MAS Board was obsolete and no longer held any administration role in Kampong Bharu. Hence, there was no point for KBDC to have any collaboration with the MAS Board (KBDC Member 3, 9 September 2015). They also stressed that MAS's role had already been incorporated into KBDC with the presence of MAS Board representatives on the KBDC Board and Advisory Council (Government Official 1, 10 September 2015).

The conflicting views on the role of the MAS Board between the two organisations has led to more conflicts and power struggles between them.

Bachrach and Baratz (1962) strongly believe that conflicts which arise during the exercise of power are also manifestations of power. Therefore, the conflicts that occur between KBDC and MAS Board are the expressions of the two entities exerting their power upon each other. Nevertheless, with the new management team at KBDC, which was re-appointed for the new term 2016 - 2017, things have slightly changed. KBDC has seemingly taken a more open approach and is now looking forward to collaborating with the MAS Board. KBDC's readiness to collaborate with the MAS Board raises the question as to whether they have now begun to recognise the role and power of MAS or whether they merely wish to avoid confrontations with MAS.

7.3.1   Multiple roles in the decision-making process

Apart from being a member of the KBDC Board or the Advisory Council, the appointed members also hold positions in their respective organisations. The members of the KBDC Board come from various backgrounds, including the government sector, politics, business and the corporate world, land developers and NGOs. This means that when they deliberate on certain matters, they not only have to consider the impact of their decisions on the corporation, but also the organisation that they are representing. It is intriguing to explore whether their opinions – as voiced whilst sitting on the KBDC Board and participating in decision-making process – reflects the perspective of their organisation, the corporation, or their own personal view. According to one of the interviewees from the fieldwork, more often than not, KBDC members make it clear who they are representing, although they admitted that there was

a difficulty in working out the weight of impact that such positioning had on the overall decisions made.

In one of the interviews with a representative of a central government agency, the interviewee confessed that, in many of his decisions, he puts his personal principles first. He said all members were given the opportunity to express their own opinion in Board meetings before arriving at a decision. Generally, their role on the Board is to provide policy direction and development strategies for Kampong Bharu. However, despite his assertion that he does not play a specific role on the Board and that most of his opinions are based on his own principles, his professional working background would be embodied in his thinking process. This can be seen during the interview session, when voiced an opinion which was based on national interests and the organisation that he represents. With regard to the power to make decisions, he declared that the ultimate decision lies with a higher authority of his organisation. Nonetheless, the official admitted that, during the process of convincing the management of his organisation as to the opinions he had voiced, he had worn the hat of a Board member in order to influence the decision. In difficult times when he needed to convince his organisation's management of an issue, he would just say:

> *I am one of the Board Directors and I know what is required. Please, you have to give this. (Government Official 6, 30 September 2015).*

This suggests that people juggle the powers they have. In the example above, it can be seen that, even though the government official did not have the ultimate power to make the final decision, he used his position to influence

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those with the power to make decisions, an influence that was enforced upon others explicitly. In another instance, the element of influence also existed when a politician who was also the Chairman of a development authority tried to find a balance between the two roles he played in resolving an issue relating to land requisition of a plot in Kampong Bharu. Realising his political position as the Member of the Parliament for the Titiwangsa constituency relied on the votes of the Kampong Bharu community, his priority was to focus on pleasing the local community. With regard to the land requisition of a plot in Kampong Bharu which is outside MAS land, the development agency had to spend a substantial amount of money in order to compensate the people involved in the relocation. Although it was said that the compensation amount was too much, he was able to proceed with the amount suggested mainly because of the position he held as the Chairman of the development authority. Simultaneously, as a politician, he was also able to persuade the residents in the area to agree to the relocation on the grounds of their receiving a certain amount of compensation. As a politician, he received strong support from the community and the local leaders in the area; as a result, convincing the people involved of the merits of the relocation became easier. With his political position, he was also able to build a robust relationship with government agencies. This helped to resolve the land issue with ease. According to him, in order for the development in Kampong Bharu to work, these three focal actors need to collaborate: the land developers, KBDC, and local leaders or community representatives.

At times, the judgements of the decision-makers are very much shaped by their own personal interests. There is a possibility of having a conflict of

interest as people have their own objectives and responsibility to deliver and there is always a risk that those who hold more than one role at a time may make judgements that are not well-balanced. As the examples given above, they suggest that decision-makers are inclined to achieve their personal interest above all other interests, including the organisation they represent. The selection of the members sitting on the Board also demonstrated how conflicts and power struggles could happen. These individuals were not only appointed to be on the KBDC Board because of their credentials, but also to serve a purpose that could be favourable to the corporation. In one of the interviews held during the fieldwork, the interviewee was asked his opinion on whether he thought that it was a strategic move for KBDC to include representatives from the Federal Government to sit on the Board. He replied:

> *As far as KBDC is concerned, it is strategic. However, the issue is you will have a conflict of interest. As a guardian of the government, you have to look at the potential of KBDC. You will see the conflict. Not only in KBDC, anybody from the Ministry who becomes a Director, will have conflicts. To me, if you can't make changes on the Board, don't become a member. If you can't make any transformation, don't go to the Board. There are people who are on the Board but don't speak up. I don't think it is fair. You have accepted the appointment; you do what you should. To me, the Board of Directors does have conflict of interest because the direction of the government is not the same as KBDC. You might see a clash. It is happening actually. (Government Official 6, 30 September 2015).*

According to the response given, conflicts of interest exist for those who hold more than one role on the Board. This is because people use their power and authority to persuade others to support the decisions that are beneficial to them. In general, people with multiple roles will sometimes get caught in a

position whereby they are required to decide which organisation are they representing or which role should they play in deciding a given issue. As people try to manoeuvre their way in influencing the decision-making process, the actors sometimes need to keep changing their roles during the process in order to achieve their targeted goals. This is an example of an adverse advantage of participation where participation has allowed the dominance of certain parties in the community to serve their own agendas above the collective goods of the community (Bedford et al. 2002; Harris 2002). While participatory practice can promote community empowerment and power sharing, it could also be abused by the upper hands in influencing the decisions of others. As Cooke and Kothari (2001) suggest the tyranny in participation where the group dynamic leads to participatory decisions that reinforce the interests of the powerful through overriding and controlling the decision-making process.

7.3.2   The influence of hidden hands

As mentioned earlier, influence could be direct or indirect, and either explicitly or implicitly exercised. In analysing the exercise of power that exists in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, this section will draw on the earlier conceptual discussion of power and governmentality in Chapter Two of this thesis. In understanding the relationship between indirect influence exercised by various actors in Kampong Bharu and the overall decision-making mechanism, I make reference to the diagram shown in Figure 7.1.

An example of covert power is the indirect involvement of the monarch. Although the monarchy does not have an official role to play in the legislative

process and only exercises executive power through the advice of the Cabinet (Harding, 2012, p.117), any mandates coming from the Ruler are taken seriously by the Federal Government. Realising the respect that the people have for the sovereignty of the monarch, the MAS Board appreciated the potential influence available and how this could be used to the benefit of the MAS Board. Given that MAS land was bestowed upon the Malays by the Ruler of Selangor State in 1900, there remains a strong historical attachment between the MAS Board and the State of Selangor. This relates to Weber's discussion on the relationship between authority, power and legitimacy, where powerholders try to promote acceptance of their domination and turn power into authority by making it legitimate (Coser 1977; Johnson 2008). Here, it can be argued that MAS Board turns to the power of the Ruler of Selangor State to legitimise its existence and authority in Kampong Bharu.

During the interview session, the MAS Board representative has informed that they would seek the advice from the Ruler of Selangor State when there were any decisions that seemed unfavourable to the MAS Board. One example of this was when the government proposed to abolish MAS's role in Kampong Bharu when the KBDC was first established, which received major criticisms from the Kampong Bharu community (KBDC Member 3, 9 September 2015). Understanding the sensitivity of the Kampong Bharu community to the MAS Board issue, the government made an effort to have an audience with the Ruler of Selangor State to get his views on the redevelopment plans of Kampong Bharu and the role of the MAS Board. It was asserted:

At one time we went to see the Ruler of Selangor and he advised us to maintain the entity of MAS. By right, according to the Attorney General's Chambers, MAS will lose its function once the land has been alienated or given titles. If the land is not alienated, MAS would still function as a social entity to oversee, control and advise the land. However, the whole land of Kampong Bharu would have been alienated and have individual ownership. This would mean, MAS's function had ceased. No more. However, as advised by the Ruler of Selangor, for the sake of sensitivity and the community whereby the land was created and granted by the Ruler, we still maintain MAS's role but in the form of a social function. (Government Official 1, 10 September 2015).

Although the Ruler of Selangor has no direct involvement in the decision-making process regarding the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, the monarchy, as an institution, can certainly exert influence over the process. The earlier proposal to abolish the MAS Board was put off the agenda. This can be related to what Bachrach and Baratz (1970) termed as non-decision making power. The act of seeking advice from the Ruler of Selangor State can be described as an attempt to suppress certain issues and restrict decisions from being taken. While a decision is "a choice among alternative modes of action", a non-decision is "a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision maker" (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970, p.39 - 44).

In some ways, the MAS Board used the support of the monarchy and the State of Selangor to influence the decision to the benefit of the organisation. The result of the non-decision was that the early proposal to abolish the MAS Board was withdrawn. This reflects on Clegg's (1989, p.11) argument that "power might be manifested not only in doing things, but also in ensuring that things do not get done". The altered decisions which deviated from the initial

judgements are partly due to the anticipation that it could lead to severe deprivation if the decisions made will be confrontational (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). The willingness of the government to comply with the advice proffered by the Ruler of Selangor in the manner described in the quotation above can be seen as their showing respect to the royal institution and also as what Bachrach and Baratz (1962) reason to be the fear of being regarded as disloyal. In order to avoid any confrontational issues and to suppress any conflicts that may arise, the decision-makers have a tendency to heed the advice of the Rulers.

Another example relating to the hidden influence of the monarch was drawn from the experience of a politician who was interviewed during the fieldwork. He revealed that he has built up a strong personal connection with the Ruler of Selangor State to gain support for the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. In the early 1980s, when the idea to redevelop Kampong Bharu was proposed, many people (and especially the landowners and the Kampong Bharu community) were not convinced of the idea. Therefore, the politician sought the support of the Ruler of Selangor to show how serious the government was that the redevelopment plan should be a success. He asserted:

> *In 1984, people at that time did not really see the development needed in the area. People were saying that I'm crazy and whatnot. Then, I brought the Ruler of Selangor. I got close to His Highness. He also owns a land in Kampong Bharu and was brought up here. And I managed to convince him and he agreed to visit Kampong Bharu. When he came to visit, the spirit of the people to develop Kampong Bharu has risen. I needed the strength to develop Kampong Bharu. I needed the strength to convince the people and to convince the government. [The Ruler of Selangor] was so attached to Kampong Bharu because he*

lived here when he was young. He met a lot of his badminton friends when he came to visit. That sparks, you know. That sparks the spirit to develop Kampong Bharu. I am a politician and I know how to play the game. I need support. Convince the government, convince the City Hall and convince the people that we should develop Kampong Bharu. (Politician 1, 2 September 2015).

This example proves that, although the Ruler of Selangor State has no direct power over the executive or administrative power of Kampong Bharu, his presence and support for Kampong Bharu was enough to convince the people as the commitment of the government to develop the area. The power of the monarch as an institution plays a significant role in influencing the process of decision-making. This is because the monarchy is a governance system that is embedded in Malaysian culture as a symbol of religion and tradition and maintaining the presence of a Ruler has always been "an aspect of Malay governance traditions" (Harding, 2012, p.113). The influential role of the monarch could be linked to what Bachrach and Baratz (1970) describe as the latent power, where distinguished attributes such as wealth, social status or the prominent background of a person can contribute to the exercise of power over others.

Apart from seeking support from the Ruler of Selangor State, the MAS Board could be perceived to have a major influence on the corporation, as it has a number of representatives sitting in the corporation. This is because a position on the KBDC Board has been allocated to a representative of the MAS Board, and because the seven village heads who form the committee of the MAS Board sit as members of the Advisory Council. This suggests that the MAS Board has strong representation in the corporation to maintain the

former's objective to protect the rights and interests of the landowners and beneficiaries of the land in the MAS area. However, MAS's influence in the corporation depends very much on the effectiveness of its representatives. Hypothetically, with such a significant number of representatives sitting on the KBDC Board, MAS should have a strong voice in the corporation and be able to exercise substantial influence on the decision-making process.

Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 6, the representation of the community through the Advisory Council did not materialise as reps were not able to participate effectively through the platform. Ever since the dissolution of the alliance of the three main NGOs in Kampong Bharu, the community persuasiveness in making demands seemed to weaken. This is partly due to the issue of the personality and competency of the appointed reps in the Council themselves, who were unable to make significant contribution to the decision-making process. Instead, they were convinced to accept the decisions made by the corporation. The act of influencing the decisions of others could be linked to Lukes (1974) notion of the third face of power, where it involves the shaping of peoples' perceptions and interests indirectly towards a certain agenda-setting.

At the same time, the influence imposed onto the members of the Advisory Council in accepting the decisions of KBDC Board could also be considered as an act of governmentality as proposed by Foucault. Through governing and shaping the conduct of the representatives by the means of influencing their desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs (Dean 1999), KBDC can be seen as exercising governmentality. As mentioned in Chapter Six, the ultimate decision on development planning lies with the Board while the role of

the Advisory Council is only to advise the Board when required. This suggests that the Council members have less opportunity to make significant contribution to the decision-making process. Instead, the representatives were utilised as a medium to execute the decisions made by KBDC. This is because, the representatives were convinced that the decisions were made collectively and mutually consented at the Board level. This is a process of governing through various techniques to control, normalise and shape people's conduct (Mitchell 2002). It is also a technique to "assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself" (Foucault 1993, p.204).

In discussing the influence of hidden hands, this study has also delved into the relationship between the politicians, land developers and other people who have a vested interest in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment. Most of these actors have known each other for a long time and these personal relationships make it easier for them to indirectly influence the decision-making process. For example, and with reference to the committee established at the start of the set-up of KBDC, as mentioned in Chapter Five, a small group of selected people comprising prominent people and dubbed the "wise men of Kampong Bharu" was gathered to deliberate on the way forward for the Kampong Bharu development (KBDC Member 2, 17 September 2015). They were respectable people with high credentials and extensive knowledge of Kampong Bharu and a number of people from this group of wise men was appointed to sit on the KBDC Board. When it was asked whether the connections they established prior to the establishment of KBDC had contributed to the partnerships that exist in KBDC, the answer given was:

> *Yeah. [It is] not only because of the Board that I see them. I've seen them since I was small. I grew up with them. My relationship with them, other than Kampong Bharu, includes becoming [a member of] the committee of the mosque and prayer rooms, helping them during difficult times. I am used to it, I am village folk. (KBDC Member 2, 17 September 2015).*

This reply provides evidence that decisions can be influenced not only through the mechanisms of formal structures, but also through informal settings, based on personal relationships. In many instances, people are more approachable if they have previously built up a personal relationship with the other person. This means that exercising influence over decisions would be easier. This relates to Simpson et al. (2015, p.402) argument on power within relationship where they asserted it is "the ability one partner in relationship to achieve his or her desired goals by intentionally influencing the other partner to facilitate (or at least not block) what he or she wants to achieve". While some might consider this to be a strategic approach towards getting things done, it may also have created opportunities for bias to flourish, especially when the decisions made only benefit the interests of certain groups of people – 'the few', rather than 'the many'.

7.3.3   Conflicting law

Another conflict that surfaced from the establishment of KBDC was the conflicting law that governs KBDC and other authorities in Kampong Bharu. When Act 733 Kampong Bharu Development Corporation was passed in 2011, the Federal Government gave its full support to making the corporation operate smoothly in achieving its objectives. All government agencies, including those

at federal and local level, were geared to assist in the operation of the corporation. This included giving interpretations to the existing law and regulations.

The management of the land in Kampong Bharu, for instance, has been altered to fit the need of the government. In Malaysia, land matters have always been under the jurisdiction of a state government. However, in the case of Kuala Lumpur (since it is a Federal Territory), land matters are guided by Act 56 National Land Code 1965 (NLC). As mentioned in Chapter Three, the land involved in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment comprises two parts: MAS land and non-MAS land. While the non-MAS land falls under the jurisdiction of NLC, MAS land is tied to both NLC and Notification No. 21, in the Selangor Government Gazette of 12 January 1900 (under Section 6 of the 1897 Selangor Land Enactment) (Alhabshi 2010a).

The provision of this law includes any law relating to Malay reservations or Malay holdings. This is very much related to the status of the land in Kampong Bharu. During the early days of the MAS settlement, no individual titles were issued to the occupants, as stipulated in the Rules of Selangor Gazette 1900 Notification No. 21. This, however, was amended in 1950, through by-laws (MAS Rules 1951) and 1994 (Cap 138, Section 246(4), whereby land ownership titles were given to the occupiers (Alhabshi 2010a).

In the feedback gathered during the fieldwork, the Land Office official proclaimed that there had been two schools of thought with regard to the legitimacy of the land titles issuance. One school of thought strongly expressed the view that the issuance of titles to individual landowners was invalid because the necessary lawful procedures were not adhered to; the other

school of thought pronounced that the action was legal and permissible as the public announcement on land issuance was sufficient to inform the people and public at large as to the government's intention. According to the Land Office, the proper procedure for issuing titles to reserved land is that the titles pertaining to a plot of reserved land must be revoked and gazetted before being removed from government's land list. In the case of MAS land, the early status given to the land was for it to be reserved for public purposes, i.e. settlements. Accordingly, no titles were to be given to individuals. However, there was no evidence to show that the necessary actions had been taken to revoke the gazetted reserve. Nevertheless, the Land Office at that particular time had made it public that it intended to issue titles by putting up notices and making announcements. This action was regarded as sufficient to justify the approach taken by the Land Office. The government emphasised that the action of issuing titles without revocation of the reserved land was considered acceptable as it was in accordance to Section 64, NLC, and had been the practice ever since (Government Official 5, 14 September 2015).

However, the issuance of the land titles to MAS land would have an impact on the role of the MAS Board. This is because, once land titles in the MAS area were issued to individuals, the role of MAS Board to administer the land would be void as the administration of the land would, thereafter, fall under the Land Office. Therefore, any dealings on the titled land would be between the individual owner of the land and the Land Office only. This suggests that the MAS Board would no longer have a role in managing the land or keeping a record of the activities carried out on the land. Currently, it is reported that 98 per cent of the MAS land has been issued individual titles (Government

Official 5, 14 September 2015). Once all of the MAS land has been awarded individual titles, the position of the MAS Board was said to be redundant.

Hence, it can be assumed that the different school of thoughts on the revocation of gazetted reserves of MAS land was interpreted differently to the benefit of the government. As explained in Chapter Five of this thesis, the 1897 Selangor Land Enactment which gave authority to the MAS Board to administer land in the MAS area has never been revoked. When the proposal to revoke the MAS Board was presented in the Bill on the establishment of KBDC, the Federal Government was asked by the MAS Board to produce a strong justification and legal documentation for the proposal. The MAS Board powerfully argued that the Selangor Land Enactment was still in force, as there was no evidence to prove that the Selangor Land Enactment had been annulled. This defence was also validated through a Parliamentary debate dated 27 June 2006, when the question of the current status of the MAS Board was raised. The following answer was given:

> *With regard to the enquiry on the Malay Agricultural Settlement Rules 1951, Selangor State Gazette No. 50/1951 is still in force. The Attorney General's Chambers has informed that under Section 6 Constitution (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1973, Act A206, 'Any written law which is existing and in force in the Federal Territory shall continue to be in force therein until repealed, amended or replaced by laws passed by Parliament. The section also provides any power or function is vested in the Ruler of the State of Selangor or in any authority of the State, that power or function in relation to the Federal Territory shall be vested in and exercised or performed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister responsible for the Federal Territory or such other persons or authorities as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may by order direct.' With that, as long as the rules of Malay Agricultural Settlement 1951 are not repealed or replaced with a law passed by the Parliament, the rules are considered still in force at present. (Hansard, House of Representatives, 27 June, 2006).*

As specified in Hansard, it is evidently clear that the MAS Rules 1951 under the 1897 Selangor Land Enactment are still valid and that the MAS Board still holds a legitimate authority in the area. However, this seems to be in contrast to the argument provided by the Land Office when it proclaimed that the role of the MAS Board would cease after every parcel of land in the MAS area had been given a title. The conflicting justifications as to the status of the MAS Board have led to confusion and uncertainty as to the legitimacy of MAS authority. The power struggles that exist between the authorities in Kampong Bharu, which include KBDC, KLCH and the MAS Board, will have an impact on the legitimacy of the decisions made by these authorities.

In discussing the situation above, perhaps some reference should be made to Weber's argument about the relationship between power, authority and legitimacy. He argues that authority is a form of legitimate power and what differentiate authority from power is that power is imposed on people and may not necessarily legitimate (Uphoff 1989). In the case of KBDC and MAS Board, apparently both have the authority to administer Kampong Bharu. However, there is no evidence to prove that either authority is the ultimate power that supersedes the other. Both KBDC and the MAS Board are supported by a valid Act or Enactment. Coser (1977) asserts that the power holder will promote the acceptance of their domination, which then turn power into authority by making it legitimate.

Nevertheless, after all these years, there has been no substantial effort to resolve the power struggles between KBDC and the MAS Board. The ultimate resolution to end the struggle would be to propose the annulment of

the MAS Enactment through a Parliamentary Amendment Act, but at present it seems that the Federal Government has no plans to go pursue such a course of legislative action. This could be due to the protests from the Kampong Bharu community which the government encountered during the first attempt to strip MAS of power when the Bill on KBDC was tabled in Parliament. The criticisms received from the community and NGOs of Kampong Bharu have made the government realise the extent of the calamity they will encounter if they proceed with the idea to abolish the MAS Board.

The covert influence of the actors who are not in the formal governance structure of Kampong Bharu redevelopment has resulted in multiple conflicts and struggles as these actors continue to impose their power to influence the decision-making process. As Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argue, conflicts that arise during the process of exercising power are manifestations of power, it can be deduced conflicts are inevitable when power is being exerted. The issues of different agencies having multiple conflicting roles in decision-making process, and the influence of the hidden hands who are not directly involved in the process as well as the conflicting law illustrate the power struggles that exist in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. This shows the complexity of the process of decision-making and how power dynamics influence the outcomes of decision-making. In some of the instances deliberated above, there is evidence to show the practice of governmentality was exercised with regard to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, and this will be further detailed in the next section.

7.4 The practice of governmentality in KBDC

Based on the discussions earlier in this chapter and in the previous chapters, it is undeniable that the establishment of KBDC has provided space for public participation. The structure of KBDC has provided an avenue for the community of Kampong Bharu to voice out their views and needs through the representatives selected among the local people. However, the degree of representation of the community through the governance structure of KBDC did not seem to represent the community of Kampong Bharu at large. The arguments made in Chapter Six shows that inadequate consultations were made with the representatives in the Advisory Council and engagements were merely procedural to feature decisions were made collectively.

Instead, the corporation does use the Advisory Council as a platform to disseminate information and decisions made by the corporation to the Kampong Bharu community. As asserted by one of the KBDC members:

> *PAKAM and PPKB are included [in the decision-making process] and most importantly, we must not forget that MAS is inclusive of all the seven villages. And all the seven village heads are in our Advisory Council. There is no problem about it. It [Decision-making] has become official. Now, the Advisory Council which encompasses of the village leaders are also the representatives of the people. It is just like the Parliament and these representatives are the Parliamentary members for their respective areas. Hence, they are responsible to disseminate all information to their constituency. The same goes to the village heads. Since they are all in the meeting and they are actually involved in the process, they must be able to inform their people. (KBDC member 6, 9 January 2015).*

The corporation's approach of getting the Advisory Council members to accept the decisions and later disseminate necessary information to the

community can be considered as an act of governmentality. This finding reflects Foucault's (1982) idea of governing the conduct of others whereby governmental power operates on individuals by shaping their values and conduct without having to use force or coercion. This is because, according to many people in the community, the structure of the representative process was designed to convince the community that all decisions undertake full deliberation of every opinion and they are therefore made consensually by the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. The members of the Advisory Council then were expected to accept the decisions as the decisions were assumed as being justifiably agreed by all parties. One of the Council members asserted:

> *There are certain things that the KBDC Board referred to the Advisory Council to seek advice. If they don't refer to us, it might be something new which has been decided and later referred to the Advisory Council. The Advisory Council cannot make decisions. We can only provide opinion and even if our opinion is not acceded to, we have to accept it. This is because the decision makers are the ones at the KBDC Board. What I can conclude here is that, if they accept our opinion, great! But if they don't, we just have to accept whatever decisions made by the Board. So, we have to support this. We cannot be in conflict with each other and go on contradicting [each other]. (KBDC member 7, 11 September 2015).*

The above statement shows the limited role the Advisory Council member believed they held in the decision-making process. As advisors to the board, the members of the Advisory Council could have played a bigger role in influencing the decision-making process. More importantly, they were expected to raise the voice of the people they are representing. However, this is not materialised as the statement above seems to suggest that the Advisory Council were obliged to accept the decisions made by KBDC Board rather than be the advisor to the

Board. This would have avoided a situation such as that described by Dean (1999), whereby acts of governmentality shape the beliefs of the people, and they have limited influence over their own desires, aspirations and interests. The act of convincing the Advisory Council members into accepting the decisions and later insisting they deliver the decisions to the community can be interpreted as a strategy by the corporation to practise acts of governmentality over the community of Kampong Bharu. One of the Council members mentioned:

> *Normally, it [suggestion by the Board] will be clarified first. Everyone will be given the necessary explanation. Then, we will move towards consensus decision. Majority wins. That would mean, if the majority has agreed, then the suggestion will be endorsed... We have to accept whatever decisions made by the Board. Then later, we have to convey them to the community. (KBDC member 7, 11 September 2015).*

KBDC has not only exercised forms of governmentality in relation to the representatives who sit in the Advisory Council but also towards the community of Kampong Bharu in general. As discussed in Chapter Six, the consultation and engagement sessions with the community organised by KBDC were merely to disseminate information and community involvement in the planning process was restricted to listening and accepting the planning proposed by the corporation. The engagement sessions can be considered as a starting point of a participatory process although the community has limited power to decision-making. It is similar to Arnstein's (1969) lowest degree of citizen participation which is nonparticipation, where community are disabled from participating effectively whilst the powerholders "educate" (p.217) the participants to be in line with the broader society. This resulted in 88 per cent of those attended the engagement session have given their consent to develop their land (Lim 2015). Although this

percentage was later refuted by the local community, it suggests that KBDC were able to convince and influence the community of Kampong Bharu to agree to the redevelopment plan proposed.

This suggests an exercise of power over the people through an art of government to achieve a specific end through shaping and influencing the interests and beliefs of others without having to use force and coercion (Dean 1999). Getting the community of Kampong Bharu to agree and give consent to the redevelopment plans through the means of shaping their beliefs and without having to use force or coercion is an example of governmentality exercised by KBDC onto the community. This is shown by the report mentioned in Chapter Six, on the high percentage of participants who attended the outreach programme had given their agreement to develop their land. Although the statistic was refuted, it nevertheless has shown participants' interests into agreeing to the development plan. KBDC was able to get the local community to self-regulate their behaviour as well as convincing them into believing and accepting the proposal of Kampong Bharu redevelopment despite the earlier resistance from the local community on the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu as described in Chapter Three. This also relates to Foucault's (1982) idea on technologies of power where power is exercised upon others in order to interfere with them and govern the behaviour in other ways the people would have done. It is a form of covert power that works through people rather than through the use of force and violence.

This also reflects on the argument raised by Swyngedouw (2005, p.2002) on governance-beyond-the-state which suggests that the networked governance created through the establishment of KBDC is very much shaped by the "wider

political-economic transformation" to serve the interests of certain parties. The collaboration of the multiple actors in the governance structure is very much choreographed to portray the collective effort in decision-making process. Having high influence and control from the Federal government, the governance structure of KBDC is similar to what Scharpf (1994, p.41) terms as 'shadow of hierarchical authority'. Reflecting on the diagram on the actors involved in Kampong Bharu redevelopment as shown in Figure 7.1, it suggests that KBDC receives a direct control from the Federal Government through the Ministry of Federal Territories and also from the Minister himself, which reflects the hierarchical authority as suggested by Scharpf (1994). At the same time, KBDC also have to deal with the indirect influence from those outside the formal governance system. Although the involvement of many parties in the decision-making process or what Swyngedouw (2005) identified as governance-beyond-the-state may seem like practicing good governance, in reality, KBDC is shaped and subject to serve the interests of certain parties through informal, covert and non-transparent means.

7.5 Implications of the Kampong Bharu case for broader analysis of urban redevelopment

The establishment of KBDC is a significant move of Malaysian government to the approach in urban planning system through an Act passed by Parliament where it involves the participation of non-government actors in the planning process. It has transferred the responsibility of development planning for Kampong Bharu from a local government to a corporation which have changed the traditional planning practice in Malaysia. In order to address the fourth

research question that was posed in this study, which is *"What broader lessons can we learn from the experience of Kampong Bharu about the practice of governance and public participation in the process of urban redevelopment?"*, this study has looked into three main areas of discussion: development planning and financing, governance and public participation.

One significant contribution that can be derived from the establishment of KBDC for the practice of urban planning in Malaysia, or in Kuala Lumpur in particular, is that it has changed the traditional planning policy from being public centric to more of a market driven. With the setting up of KBDC, the planning system, which once was under the domain of KLCH, has now been transferred to the purview of a corporation. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Kampong Bharu redevelopment was very much driven by the high economic potential and opportunities that Kampong Bharu has to offer to support the development of Kuala Lumpur so as to become world-class competitive city. In order to achieve that, it has also made spatial adjustment to the land use in Kampong Bharu. The said area, which is basically one of the earliest Malay ethnic residential area (Mustaffa 2009b) will be transformed into the new economic enclave of Kuala Lumpur city to support the Greater Kuala Lumpur region (KBDC 2014a).

KBDC was set up to generate economic activities in Kampong Bharu, leveraging the private sectors as the key drivers. The Corporation was tasked with elevating property values in the area through promoting and facilitating investment and other economic activities. In order for KBDC to execute its functions, it was given certain powers to lead on the development planning in the area, which before was the responsibility of KLCH. Evidently, this has changed the traditional practice of urban planning where it has lessened the power of

KLCH, but not replacing the role as the local authority, in determining the development needed in the area. The power to process planning approvals still remain with KLCH, but the decisions are tied to the development planning prepared by KBDC. Any application for planning permissions were required to be assessed by KBDC before KLCH could issue the planning approvals. This has disrupted the normal planning practice as for the first time in Malaysia, urban development requires the endorsement of two different entities before any development planning were approved. More broadly, with the power given to the UDC, it has reduced the control powers of the local authorities, where more powers were surrendered to the private sector as argued by Brownill and O'Hara (2015).

Apart from planning power given, KBDC was also granted financial aid, which among others, will be provided by the Federal Government (Government of Malaysia 2011). As mentioned in section 5.5.1 of Chapter Five, it suggests that KLCH's limited financial resources has given KBDC a better position to run the development planning in Kampong Bharu. The statement given by one of KBDC member during the interview verifies this:

> *But I feel that if it is under KLCH, we will have constraints and problems on the funding later on. KLCH itself would not have enough capacity to fund this proposed development of Kampong Bharu. (KBDC member 2, 17 September 2015).*

The special provisions given to UDCs in redevelopment planning is a common practice in other countries. In the UK, UDCs are given wide-ranging powers and unconditional support from central government including on financial aspect. At the same time, UDCs in many countries were said to drive rapid

change in urban redevelopment through the partnership between the central or state government with local government to unleash the economic potential of the designated area and to attract investment in advanced economy sectors (Imrie & Thomas 1999; Searle 2002). In the case of Dockland, since the central government started tightening the means for the local council to raise avenue locally, the local authority had to turn to LDDC for financial aid in implementing certain programmes. The local authorities have realised that they could take advantage of this smart partnership with UDCs to their benefit (Florio and Brownill 2000). This however, has raised many critiques as it was revealed that UDCs spent too much public funds without being able to bring in private investment to fund for the redevelopment projects (Florio and Brownill 2000). The model is slightly different in China, where the urban development and investment corporations (UDICs) have been leveraged as profit-making entreprises that also provide financial assistance for local governments in China through borrowing money from banks to fund infrastructure projects on behalf of the local government (World Bank 2010). Thus, going back to the practice in Kampong Bharu, the establishment of KBDC could also be understood as a strategic collaboration between public–private partnership to fund for certain redevelopment projects to accomplish the national agenda, which could not be done by KLCH alone.

Apart from unlocking the economic potential of the designated area, the introduction of UDCs is expected to promote better local governance. The setting up of KBDC is supposedly allow decentralisation of government responsibility to a private entity through an integrated collaboration and coordination between government bodies, private entreprises and civil society. In the case of KBDC, it

is very much controlled by the Federal Government although the corporation was given significant powers given to manage development planning in Kampong Bharu. More interestingly, unlike other states in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur sits in as a Federal Territory. This would mean that, comparing to other states where the local authorities are accountable to the respective state government, KLCH as the local authority of Kuala Lumpur is under the direct control of the Federal Government. The Mayor of Kuala Lumpur is appointed by the Federal Government (Harding 2012) and the management of KLCH is supervised by the Ministry of Federal Territories. Even the Act 733 on the establishment of KBDC has clearly stated that the Corporation shall be responsible to the Minister and have to adhere to the directions of the Minister (Government of Malaysia 2011). This administration system of government in Malaysia has been explained in Chapter Three of this thesis.

Similarly, the UDCs in some other countries adopted the practice of governance where they involve collaborations of many stakeholders in the development planning other than the government. Based on the experience in the UK, Australia, China and Malaysia, governments continue to hold control over planning decisions. For instance, the UDCs in the UK are centrally-directed although they were empowered with certain powers to develop the stipulated areas (Thomas and Imrie 1997). Reflecting on the redevelopment of Thames Gateway, Brownill and Carpenter (2009, p. 258) assert that the project is practicing "choreography of governance", where it has only resulted in the failure in the governance of sustainable communities. Meanwhile, UDCs in Australia also encounter high interventions by the state governments (Searle 2006) while in China, the corporations are being used to the benefit of the local governments

(Li and Chiu 2018). This suggests that UDCs in general have strong involvement of government either at central, state or local level to the benefit of the government, and KBDC is no exception. With high interventions of government, it has deflected the objective to decentralise government administrative power and functions, despite ongoing rhetoric about local governance and participation.

The strong intervention of central government in the local governance of UDCs has eventually raised criticism among the local community in many international contexts. For example, the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) implemented all policies outlined by the central government, many of which are not aligned to the needs of the locals, which caused conflicts and outcries of the local community (Brownill 1990). Likewise in Australia, the UDCs also face criticism by the local community as the state government overrides planning decision to achieve its development goals (Searle 2006). Similarly, the local community of Kampong Bharu has also criticised the unpopular decisions made by KBDC as the corporation continued to pursue the Federal Government agenda.

In another perspective, KBDC also encounters covert influences from those outside the formal organisational structure. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, the involvement of other actors such as politicians, land developers, business people and even the monarch have exerted influence over the decision-making process with regard to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. The covert influences of the actors from the non-formal structure or what this study terms the 'influence of the hidden hands' have led to many power conflicts and struggles as these actors influence the decision-making process to serve their own interests. The situation is quite similar to the one in China, where the governance structure of Songjiang

New Town Development Corporation (SNTDC) consists of those who play multiple roles in decision-making process. They could have the same person as the head of administrative unit for both at the district government and also the development corporation (Li and Chiu 2018). As a result of the strong connection between the corporation and district government, most of the government contracts could be monopolised by the corporation while the statutory planning mechanisms could be easily manipulated to the benefit of the corporation. The connections have not only also given advantages to SNTDC in profit-making, but also enabled the government to have control and dominant position in the corporation (Li and Chiu 2018). What this study of KBDC offers, however, is some insight not only into the overlaps between roles of particular individuals but also into informal channels of influence used by actors who have no official role in the planning process at all.

Meanwhile, the establishment of KBDC shows some significant differences from other UDCs in terms of the role of public participation as part of the initiative to promote local governance. For instance, in the UK, Brownill et al. (1996) argue that UDCs may not necessarily represent the interests of the community as a whole as there is evidence to show an example of marginalisation where the representatives of the minorities were not given equal opportunity to participate effectively in decision-making process. Similarly, in Australia, UDCs were pushed to foster greater partnership with all stakeholders including the local community in addressing local issues (New South Wales 2004). However, Searle (2006) argues that the South Sydney Development Corporation (SSDC) has override local community participation in the development of Redfern-Waterloo area. In order to prevent potential disagreements between the community and the

development plan prepared, SSDC had utilised the power of the Redfern-Waterloo Authority (RWA) to limit the community participation in development decisions.

In Malaysia, the establishment of KBDC has provided the space for more community participation in the planning process through various community engagements and peoples' representation in the corporation. While the wider debates about UDC focus on decentralisation and the dynamic role of the private sector in taking the lead in urban redevelopment as well as the reorientation of urban policy towards new economic imperatives, KBDC is giving emphasis to fostering better practices of urban governance through creating spaces for community participation. Although the community involvement in the planning process has brought little change to power relations in Kampong Bharu, it provides a new form of local governance with new avenues for participation (even if these were not very effective or representative) which distinguishes the practice of UDCs in Malaysia from those in other parts of the world. Unfortunately, the fact that the outcomes seem to be similar to other UDCs in terms of power relations and poor community representation suggests that these institutional channels for participation did not make much difference.

Despite the emphasis on promoting local governance, the degree of community participation in Kampong Bharu redevelopment has been contested as KBDC was unable to provide a comprehensive platform for the community to participate in the development planning process of Kampong Bharu. As discussed in Chapter Six, there was evidence to show that public engagement and consultations were only limited to listening and disseminating information whereas community representation was highly limited, as the representatives

were not empowered to advocate the interests of the local community. There was also indication of minorities being marginalised from the decision-making process and being underrepresented. Based on the arguments given in Chapter Six, this thesis suggests that public participation has failed to promote public interest but instead, only benefitting the interest of dominant parties in the community. As Arnstein phrased it, "there is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcomes of the process" (Arnstein 1969, p. 216), community participation in Kampong Bharu was far from achieving the level of citizen power and making significant contribution in decision-making process.

In a nutshell, Kampong Bharu's redevelopment through KBDC was an attempt to reinvigorate an urban area through spatial reorganisation and economic restructuring. It constitutes an effort to change the traditional planning approach with the introduction of governance practices, as well as finding creative ways of maximing land value of a prime area and private profit-making. This new approach to urban development planning was very much prompted by the longstanding development issues that have been beleaguering Kampong Bharu. The introduction of KBDC was an attempt to find the new form of government intervention in finding the right formula for urban development towards achieving national agenda of making Kuala Lumpur globally competitive.

This study has shown that the creation of UDCs is a new form of governance to generate urban redevelopment activities, which can be used to try and overcome various organisational and developmental challenges that have impeded efforts to bring about redevelopment by other means. Although the primary aim of setting up a UDC in Kuala Lumpur seems noble in facilitating urban

redevelopment and fostering local governance, the practice in reality was full of conflicts and power struggles, which contributed to marginalising the interests of the local community. Local planning has been eroded by legislation to provide extensive power to the corporation and coupled with heavy influence by the Federal Government. This has changed the system of governance and left the local development planning very much led by market forces. The relationship among the actors involved appeared to be in constant contestation. Direct and indirect influence became typical to the new approach of governance, which has resulted in the exercise of governmentality to shape the beliefs and conducts of the community into believing and accepting the decisions made in order to serve the interest of certain dominant parties. As a result, local community needs and interests became the lowest priority for the UDCs. This study has therefore contributed to the wider literature on UDCs by showing how covert influence, power struggles and contested organisational mandates can combine with weak participatory processes to produce particularly disempowering outcomes for residents of a redevelopment area.

7.6 Summary

This chapter has provided an extensive discussion on the actors involved in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment and the connections between these actors. It has described the formal structure of the organisation which has the outright authority in the decision-making process, as well as the influences from outside the formal structure of authority. While some actors have the direct power and authority to make decisions, other actors were able to influence judgements in a covert manner. The process of decision-making is not as straightforward as one

might think. These influences have further led to conflicts and struggles within the system, as actors will manoeuvre their way in order to achieve a certain end.

The discussion on conflicts and power struggles within the formal structure of authority covered the conflict on the appointment of the Chairman of KBDC, who has clear political affiliations, before deliberating on the conflict of authority between KBDC and KLCH. In this chapter, the power struggle that exists between these two authorities in the decision-making process has been analysed comprehensively. As they would require each other's approval in assessing any planning permissions, it suggests that their power in decision-making is tied to each other. Subsequently, the power struggle between KBDC and the MAS Board was explored, as the latter claimed to have been sidelined after the establishment of KBDC. While KBDC seemingly tried to suppress the power of the MAS Board, the Board was adamant in maintaining its survival in Kampong Bharu. The relationship between the MAS Board and KBDC appeared to be in constant contestation and full of conflicts. Power struggles also prevail among those in the system who are performing more than one role in delivering their responsibilities. Thus, the chapter illustrated that, in the decision-making process for the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, actors with multiple roles tried to maintain a balance between their roles, although more often than not they ended up in a conflict of interest.

Apart from the authorities in the formal system, there were also influences of other actors outside the formal system, who play a significant role in pursuing certain decisions. This involves the influence of hidden hands, such as the covert influence of politicians, business people and people with vested interests. This chapter has also deliberated at length on the influence of the monarchy, which

has significantly affected the decision-making process. This chapter has also discussed the conflict that arose due to the conflict in existing law, which has defined the status of the MAS Board's role in Kampong Bharu.

In the latter part of the chapter, deliberations were made on the practice of governmentality in KBDC, drawing some arguments on how it put effects to the decision-making process. Finally, this chapter has also discussed the broader lessons that the creation of a UDC in Kuala Lumpur has contributed to knowledge on the processes of urban redevelopment and the role of UDCs within this. Discussion in this section revolved around three main aspects: development planning and financing, governance and public participation. Some reflections were also made about how the Malaysian experience relates to the practice of UDCs in the UK, Australia and China.

The discussion on the four research questions have been addressed respectively in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, drawing evidences to support the arguments presented in the discussion. In the next chapter, an overall view of all deliberations made in this research will be provided, drawing a conclusion to a wider perspective of urban governance practice.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

This PhD thesis explored the creation of spaces for greater public participation and how these spaces relate to urban development outcomes and broader urban governance processes. Using a case study of the redevelopment of a neighbourhood called Kampong Bahru, it has shown that these spaces for more participation have raised the voice of the community in the area of the envisaged development, but in ways that were largely non-representative, mostly limited to approving existing plans, and also generated conflict between the actors involved. The decision to establish an urban development corporation that would lead the redevelopment planning for Kampong Bharu was a manifestation of a change in approach from government being responsible to one which embraced the practice of governance. The change in governing involved a transfer of power and authority which evidently caused conflicts and power struggles. This occurred within the authorities and also affected the relationship between the government and multiple layers of society, as the actors who were involved in the process continue to influence the decision-making. From a wider perspective, this study has analysed how the establishment of an urban development corporation reconstructs a new form of governance in urban redevelopment, which is laden with conflicts and power struggles that eventually turned the spaces for participation into the practice of control and manipulation.

This study addresses the following research questions:

1. Why was KBDC created and how did its establishment reconstruct governance in Kampong Bharu?

    i. What was the rationale for establishing KBDC?

    ii. How did the establishment of KBDC affect the practice of governance in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu?

2. What kind of spaces for community participation were created with the establishment of KBDC and how representative were they of the Kampong Bharu community?

    i. How were the spaces for participation created and how significant were they?

    ii. How was the representation of the people constructed and what was its significance in the decision-making process?

3. What power struggles did the establishment of KBDC raise and what do these tell us about urban development corporations (UDCs) as a distinct form of governmentality?

    i. Who were the actors involved and what were their powers?

    ii. What was the conflict and why were there struggles?

4. What broader lessons can we learn from the experience of Kampong Bharu about the practice of governance and public participation in the process of urban redevelopment?

To answer these questions, the central focus of this study was on the establishment of KBDC, a UDC that was introduced to take lead in the redevelopment programme in Kampong Bharu. This enabled the study to scrutinise the real meaning of those spaces that were created for the public to be more involved in the planning process through the setting up of KBDC. It also allowed the study to address the implications of that undertaking. It examined in substantial detail the other possible actors related to the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, as well as the politicians, business people, community leaders and, of course, the landowners and residents of Kampong Bharu, who are considered the group most affected by the redevelopment planning of the area. Using a mixed-method qualitative approach to answer the research questions, this research conducted 30 in-depth qualitative interviews in total involving government officials, KBDC board members, politicians, business people and community representatives. It also undertook five focus group sessions, engaging with the landowners and heirs of the land in Kampong Bharu, its residents, and those business people who are the proprietors of small businesses in the area. The evidence thus accumulated is supported by other sources, such as document reviews of the Comprehensive Development Master Plan of Kampong Bharu, Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan, Kuala Lumpur City Plan, Malaysia Plans, relevant Acts and newspaper cuttings. In addition, observations and visual images via the medium of photography were taken during the fieldwork.

In this final chapter of the thesis, the conclusions from the analysis of the findings of the research are presented. It begins with a summary of the key empirical findings to address the questions that this research has answered. This

is followed by some reflections on the methodological and theoretical approaches adopted within the research. Since this research was not able to cover all aspects of the topic being discussed, this thesis also provides some recommendations for future research.

8.2 Key empirical findings

The key empirical findings were organised and presented within their respective discussion chapters and addressed the specific research questions. Chapter Five presented an analysis of the rationale of the establishment of KBDC as a body in charged with facilitating Kampong Bharu's redevelopment and the effects that this reconstruct the governance practice in the area. This answered the first research question of this study. Chapter Six focussed on the significance of spaces for participation that KBDC created, with some deliberation made on the issue of representation and how it gives meaning to the decision-making process. Discussion in this chapter answered the second research question. In Chapter Seven, thorough consideration was given to issue of conflicts and struggles that resulted from the establishment of KBDC and how these were connected to the practice of governmentality in the process of development planning of the designated area. Subsequent to that, deliberation was made on the broader lessons of the experience of KBDC and the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu have brought to the process of urban redevelopment. This chapter addressed research questions three and four of this study. Since these research questions have already been addressed in their respective analysis chapters, this particular section summarises the answers to the four research questions posed for this study.

8.2.1 Why was KBDC created and how did it reconstruct governance in Kampong Bharu?

The rationale for the establishment of KBDC

The decision to set up an urban development corporation to take the lead role in making planning decisions marked a transformation in government practice with regard to urban development planning. It is a process where the government exercises the delegation of power to a non-governmental body. Development planning of a local area has always been the responsibility of the local authority and planning is streamlined to the structure plan prepared by the local government. In the case of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment, there were many previous attempts by local government to reinvigorate the area but they were unsuccessful. This was primarily due to land issues. However, driven by the high potential Kampong Bharu has to offer, the government continued with the plan to redevelop the area in order for it to be as robust as surrounding areas. In order to support the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, the government was prepared to provide support through the provision of relevant national policies and strategies, including the setting up of an UDC to facilitate the redevelopment of the area.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Federal government's decision to establish KBDC is seen to have been due to two main factors:

i. The need to take a bold approach in urban development planning through infusing business-centric approach in order to achieve national agenda

The determination of the government to redevelop Kampong Bharu is very much connected to its motivation to make Malaysia a high-income country by the year 2020. This is also linked to the mission of enhancing Kuala Lumpur's competitiveness in a global market. As specified in the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015), one of the strategies to achieve the national aspiration of achieving higher economic growth is to focus on major cities. Hence, Kuala Lumpur, being the capital city of Malaysia, was given a high priority for the establishment of a comprehensive development strategy to ensure that it becomes the economic power house of the country. At the same time, Kampong Bharu's redevelopment was identified as one of the signature projects under the Tenth Malaysia Plan, taking advantage of the proximity it has to other developments in the surrounding area. Together with the 2010 launch of Greater Kuala Lumpur as one of the key growth engines or National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs) under the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP), there was a determination that a programme of holistic urban development planning should be implemented. All of these issues were discussed in Chapter Three. Evidently, this national aspiration of making Kuala Lumpur as Malaysia's engine of growth has very much motivated the decision of the Federal Government to establish KBDC under the Parliament Act. Nevertheless, in making it a reality, it required a

comprehensive restructuring of development planning for Kampong Bharu.

The restructuring of development planning requires a strong commitment by the government, particularly at the federal level, to ensure central priorities are met. Such extensive planning was deemed to be difficult for a local authority to deliver. The creation of a UDC was expected to enable more robust development to take place with the collaboration of the private sector to develop an appropriate business model. In the case of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment, it was believed that Kuala Lumpur City Hall (KLCH) as the local authority of the area had limited resources and would not be able to meet this nationally important challenge. Previous unsuccessful attempts headed by KLCH to reinvigorate Kampong Bharu suggest that a different approach was indeed needed. The decision to establish a development agency under a corporation was a deliberate action to infuse commercial and corporate elements in the management practices, so that they would securely underpin the redevelopment process. With the establishment of KBDC, it was said that the development planning for Kampong Bharu would be more focussed and more business-centric in getting private investment, as the corporation would be able to concentrate on Kampong Bharu alone, rather than also having to give attention to other responsibilities (as was the case for KLCH). One piece of evidence that shows the business orientation of KBDC is the introduction of transfer development rights (TDR) method, as discussed in Chapter Five. This

approach to transferring the rights of land which has restrictions on it to a special-purpose vehicle, without having to give up on the land titles and rights on the land, was considered a bold approach proposed by the corporation. Although the TDR concept received grave and widespread objections from the landowners and the beneficiaries, this concept was mooted an alternative to dealing with the longstanding and sensitive issue of land matters in Kampong Bharu.

The point that needs to be emphasised here is that there was a realisation on the part of the Federal Government that, in order to achieve the national aspiration of making Kuala Lumpur more competitive, it required the adoption of an innovative approach. This could not possibly be achieved if the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu were to have utilised the traditional planning approaches normally used in local planning by local authorities. This is in line with the arguments of Brownill (1990) and Imrie and Thomas (1993), whereby the practice of UDCs has changed the traditional practice of urban planning and enabled redevelopment plans to take place on prime land. With the collaboration of the private and public sectors and the involvement of local community, a new form of urban governance in urban planning in Malaysia was created. Apart from the limited capacity of a local authority to focus on the sweeping development needs of a specific area, the government has been seen leaving the role of developing the area to be taken up by private initiatives. The approach of having the private sector take a bigger role in economic development is part of the Federal Government's strategy to

modernise public governance in Malaysia, as stipulated in the Tenth Malaysia Plan. All these arguments were discussed in Chapter Five.

ii.   Building trust and a rapport with the community

As mentioned in Chapters Three and Five of this thesis, proposals to redevelop Kampong Bharu first emerged in 1975 and were moderately implemented in a piecemeal fashion in the 1980s. The whole development plan did not materialise due to many issues, mainly land matters, and unfortunately in some cases, the landowners were deceived by local individual land developers which resulted in the loss of their land titles. Hence, when the Federal Government announced the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, most of the villagers were sceptical. As discussed in Chapter Five, the landowners and beneficiaries of the land in general were basically not against any development taking place in Kampong Bharu and, as a matter of fact, they were looking forward to the next course of action from the government. The question has always been on how the development would be carried out and how the people of Kampong Bharu would be affected by it. Concurrently, the community of Kampong Bharu demanded greater participation and to be allowed to contribute to the planning process.

The government claimed that the establishment of KBDC was a response to this community demand, as it would have expected to safeguard the interests of the Kampong Bharu community, and particularly those of the landowners and beneficiaries. Realising the

high expectations the community of Kampong Bharu has for the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu, the government was persistent in ensuring that redevelopment could take place. The establishment of KBDC created spaces for the community of Kampong Bharu to participate in the planning process. This was done through a series of engagements with the landowners and beneficiaries, and representatives of the community were also selected to sit on the KBDC Board. The government presented KBDC as a platform for the community to voice their views and concerns with regard to the development plans. This gives a sense of community empowerment. Through engagement with the community, KBDC had the opportunity to build up its relationship with the locals and display the government's enthusiasm to reinvigorate Kampong Bharu.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, despite community scepticism and various barriers to development that KBDC had to overcome, a few development projects like Raja Bot market and redevelopment of Pasar Minggu area have taken place in recent years, but these have been limited to the non-MAS land in Kampong Bharu. Such property has fewer restrictions on development compared to the MAS land. For the MAS area, KBDC is continuing to try to find ways to resolve the ongoing land matters. The commencement of some initial development projects generated a level of optimism among members of the public towards KBDC and strengthen many people's confidence on the government's commitment to developing the area. Unfortunately, some of these developments also worry Kampong

Bharu residents, as they promise 'luxury living', which would be unaffordable for many tenants and even landowners. Nevertheless, such progress suggests that the government's decision to establish KBDC was apt and timely in taking the responsibility to take the lead in the redevelopment planning.

Chapter Five has also mentioned that, although the landowners and the beneficiaries of the land were not against the development, they were still dubious about the government's intentions with regard to developing Kampong Bahru and were waiting for the government to execute a plan appropriate to the area. The initial development projects which took place on non-MAS land gave an indication to the people that Kampong Bharu would be developed and that it was just a matter of time until the development reached all areas, including MAS land. With the establishment of KBDC, the government is working towards convincing the people of Kampong Bharu that the government is earnestly committed to developing the area for the benefit of the Malay people specifically, and the country as a whole. It is about building trust and maintaining a good relationship between the people and the government.

The effect of the establishment of KBDC on the practice of governance in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment

The establishment of KBDC under the Parliament Act represents an intense restructuring of government practice. It introduced the concept of local governance to urban development planning. The role of development

planning which once used to be in the domain of local authority has now been shifted to a non-government entity in deciding for the development needed in the area. Based on the findings, it is believed that due to the past experiences of so many unsuccessful attempts in developing Kampong Bharu, the government realised the importance of bringing other stakeholders into the planning process. The new construct of governance involves representatives from the three tiers of government – federal, state as well as local government and the non-government bodies including participants from the business sector, professionals and developers, and most importantly representatives of the local community in Kampong Bharu. With the opportunity to sit as a member in KBDC Board and Advisory Council, representatives could gain access to the corporation in order to have power in the decision-making process. The formation of a comprehensive structure in representing all stakeholders is expected to create a holistic synergy to accelerate development planning for Kampong Bharu.

The establishment of KBDC created spaces for the local community to participate in the planning process. Apart from having community representatives to sit on the KBDC Board and Advisory Council, the new structure has enabled more public engagements and consultations be carried out. Despite the criticisms received from the public on the establishment of KBDC and the redevelopment proposal for Kampong Bharu, the governance structure has enabled a platform to inform the community and receive feedback from the public on the redevelopment plans. The community was also provided with opportunities to give views

and opinions on the development needed for the area through these representatives sitting in KBDC Board and Advisory Council, who were appointed among the community. However, despite these opportunities to offer opinions, there were no evidence that shows these opinions were taken on board, as demonstrated in Chapter Six.

One significant contribution that KBDC made in the development planning of Kampong Bharu was its determination to solve development issues and particularly those pertaining to land inheritance through collaboration with other relevant government agencies. Although KBDC and KLCH defended the practice of giving priority and special privileges to Kampong Bharu's redevelopment were merely to expedite the process of planning approvals and to facilitate development, it also suggests that the government is relentlessly providing unconditional support to Kampong Bharu's redevelopment. This proves that, in order to get things done, KBDC's *modus operandi* could be disruptive to existing governance arrangements, as discussed in Chapter Five. In terms of financial aid, there is evidence to show there was a strong commitment given by the government to provide enough funding for the purpose of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment. With all the assistance and attention given by the government, KBDC was set to deliver its tasks with ease; as Lawless (1988) reflects, UDCs have been given unconditional support from central government to perform the functions of local authorities in other such projects.

In summary, the establishment of KBDC to reinvigorate the urban development of Kampong Bharu was a forceful attempt by the government

to streamline local development so that it is aligned with the national agenda. This leads to a new dimension of urban planning and the process of a change in power relations as it invites the practice of governance to replace traditional government-led planning. It reconstructs the relationship between the government and society, where both entities influence the decision-making process.

8.2.2 What kind of spaces for community participation were created with the establishment of KBDC and how representative were they of the Kampong Bharu community?

As the Kampong Bharu community demanded for more inclusion in the development process, the government assented to the demands by hosting greater engagement and more consultations with the respective parties. Additionally, it allowed wider representation through the appointment of community representatives on the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. However, these spaces of participation and representation did not necessarily provide the community with sound opportunities to decide on the development needed in their local area. Based on the findings of this study, the extent of community participation and representation resulted in disillusionment in this planning practice model. This was discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis.

Creation of spaces for community participation and their significance

In order to gain the confidence and trust of the people, KBDC was prepared to conform to the demands of the people in providing a platform for them to be involved in the planning stages of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment. There was evidence, as discussed within this thesis, to show that public engagement and consultations were carried out in order to reach out to the community of Kampong Bharu. However, these sessions merely disseminated information on the redevelopment plans, rather than sought the people's feedback on what was planned for their locality. Even when the public did give feedback, there was no indication that their concerns were addressed. The authorities were more concerned with the quantity of engagement sessions carried out, than the content being discussed. Apparently, there were no reports that related to actions being undertaken to address the issues raised by the community. The authorities chose to keep the information confidential rather than debate the matter openly, although they claimed to have taken necessary actions on the issues raised.

More often than not, the spaces for public participation were created at the very end of the planning stage, when the plan was already prepared and ready to be publicised. In addition, the plans were prepared with jargon and technical terms which would make it difficult for the community to comprehend and provide appropriate responses. This may have caused even more confusion and frustration among the community in Kampong Bharu especially the landowners and the beneficiaries, as they were

expected to accept the proposed plan without fully understanding it. This resulted in most of the consultation sessions becoming little more than sessions in which to listen to what KBDC wished to deliver and not what the community wanted to know. This connects to the argument made by Arnstein where the involvement of citizens in decision-making process was merely a tokenism or "just a window-dressing ritual" (Arnstein 1969, p.219).

Another key finding relates to the people who were invited to participate. In many of the engagement and consultation sessions, KBDC asserted that only the landowners and the heirs were their priority, leaving other parts of the community ignored, such as small traders, business owners and tenants of leased premises. These groups were marginalised from the entire planning process. Even those who were invited to participate in community engagement and consultations felt the sessions were not designed to access all of the landowners and heirs, as many were unable to attend for reasons, including personal reasons, distance, health issues and even that some of the beneficiaries were unable to be located. However, those who attended the sessions were presumed to be representative of all the beneficiaries and their responses were taken to represent the opinions of the whole community of Kampong Bharu.

Apart from consultations and engagement with the respective parties, the involvement of the community in the planning process was in the form of selected representatives being appointed as members of the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. With the process of consultations and having representatives selected from the community of Kampong Bharu, it provided a space for community participation and empowerment.

The representation of the people and its significance in decision-making

In order to have meaningful participation, Goh (1991) notes that there is a need to have truly representative participants, a factor which has often been neglected with regard to its importance in promoting effective public participation. In Kampong Bharu's redevelopment, community representation was embraced as part of the spaces for public participation. As mentioned within this thesis, KBDC was comprised of two parts: the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. In these two boards, a number of significant people was selected as representatives of the people of Kampong Bharu. Although their appointment as Board or Council members was by virtue of their positions in their respective organisations, they were considered to represent the voice of the Kampong Bharu community. This would suggest that they were expected to uphold the interests of the people or organisations that they represented. However, representation was restricted only to certain groups of people. In involving the community in the planning process, the focus of the government has always been towards the landowners and beneficiaries. This has resulted in the exclusion of non-landowners, such as tenants and small traders, who were not represented and did not have an equal opportunity to participate in the planning process.

Based on the findings presented in Chapter Six, some of the representatives were inclined to acquiesce to the decisions made by the KBDC Board, although they agreed that they were given the opportunity to raise their views. They would rather be seen as in agreement with the decisions made by the Board than create an uncomfortable environment by

challenging the decisions. In relation to the act of agreeing to the decisions made by KBDC Board, the experiences noted in this thesis can be associated with Lukes's (1974) concept of the third face of power. This shows how one can be covertly manipulated into agreeing to matters with which might ordinarily disagree. Just as Lukes (1974, p.23) argued that power was not just about how conflicts were resolved through decision-making or non-decision making, it is also the case that power can be exerted through "influencing, shaping or determining" certain desires.

The Advisory Council was more closely representative of the Kampong Bharu community because the members of the Council encompassed the village heads and community leaders. In much of the feedback received, the members claimed that they were obliged to accept the decisions made by the KBDC Board on the redevelopment plan. Even if the members of the Advisory Council provides its views and opinions, the final decisions still lie with the Board as the latter has the prerogative whether or not to adopt the Council's advice. This suggests that the process of getting the advice from the Advisory Council is no more than a procedural step in completing the decision-making process or what Arnstein (1969, p.219) termed as, "just a window-dressing ritual". This practice contradicted the main role of the Advisory Council, which is to advise the KBDC Board in decision-making. The members of the Advisory Council were expected to circulate all information and decisions made by the corporation to the community of Kampong Bharu. Although the members were not in agreement to certain decisions made by the corporation, they were

convinced that the decisions were made through consensus among the members of the Board after full and extensive deliberation.

As argued in Chapter Six, the competency of the representatives plays a significant role in ensuring they are able to represent their community. In many occurrences, these representatives, especially those members of the Advisory Council, were deemed by people in Kampong Bharu to be unable to deliver their role in representing the people as they were not equipped with the knowledge and proficiency required. This resulted in many of the representatives being inclined to adhere to the decisions made, although they did not concur with those decisions. It can be deduced that the key issue here is the lack of capacity of the representatives to understand the issues at hand and the role they are supposed to play. A lack of competency in articulating their views and making a firm statement on certain decisions can lead to representatives being mere adherents to the supreme power. As shown through all of the evidence discussed in Chapter Six, the validity of community representation is debatable as the representatives appeared to be unable to represent the community in a real sense.

To conclude, it is undeniable that the establishment of KBDC has created spaces for participation to take place through a series of consultations with the Kampong Bharu community. It also enabled representatives of the community of Kampong Bharu to sit as members of the corporation and be involved in the planning process. This would suggest that the practice of local governance was put in place where spaces for participation and representation were allowed in the process. However, this thesis argues that the community was

not actually empowered to decide on the development needed in their locality. The community was not given enough opportunity to voice its views and opinions on the redevelopment plan. Instead, the spaces for community involvement were used in favour of the corporation, so that the representatives and people agreed to the decisions made by the corporation. Although the creation of these spaces was deemed appropriate as a platform for communicating the redevelopment plans for Kampong Bharu, it was also employed as a mechanism to shape the conduct of others towards the targeted end, as the theory of governmentality advocates.

8.2.3 What power struggles did the establishment of KBDC raise and what do these tell us about UDCs as a distinct form of governmentality?

The establishment of KBDC promotes the practice of governance, which allows more parties to be involved in the planning process. Apart from the Kampong Bharu community, which strove for the development they believed was needed in their locality, there were other parties which exercised their power and authority in an attempt to accomplish their desired aims. There were also actors who sought to exercise their power by influencing the decision-making process. These direct or indirect influences, which were practised either overtly or covertly, created conflicts and struggles in shaping the outcome of the decisions made. Chapter Seven of this thesis deliberated on the conflicts and struggles that besieged the actors involved in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment and how these conflicts and power struggles have

impacted on the decision-making process. Based on the discussion of power struggles which exist within KBDC, this thesis has also explored on how the establishment of the corporation can be linked to the practice of governmentality in achieving its ultimate goal.

The actors in Kampong Bharu redevelopment and their powers

The establishment of KBDC has actuated the execution of local governance in the planning process of Kampong Bharu, where many parties were involved in the redevelopment programme for the area. Aside from the Federal Government and the local authority, which were directly involved; there were also business people, corporate entities, representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and community leaders involved in the process. As members of the corporation, they were involved directly in the planning process, representing their respective organisations in making planning decisions.

The structure of KBDC consists of two wings within its organisation to assist with the running of the corporation. While the KBDC Board looks into the implementation of Kampong Bharu redevelopment through coordinating and facilitating the development planning and strategies, the Advisory Council advises the corporation on matters pertaining to the interest of the Malays in Kampong Bharu and other matters which are referred to it by the corporation. These are the entities in the formal system which were given the power and authority to be directly involved in the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu.

In addition, the Kampong Bharu redevelopment also faced the influence of other actors who were not in the formal structure of authority to make decisions in the planning process. The actors outside the formal structure included politicians, land developers, people with personal and vested interests, and the Ruler of Selangor State to advocate for their personal aims with regard to the decision-making process.

The conflicts and power struggles

When KBDC was given the responsibility to take over the development planning of Kampong Bharu, it raised conflicts and struggles among the actors involved. Among the conflicts faced by the actors within the system was on the appointment of the representatives who sit in KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. It was claimed that some appointments were based on political reasons and personal discretion.

Conflicts and power struggles persist within and outside the formal structure of the authority itself. Within the system, KBDC and KLCH struggled to maintain their authority in approving planning permissions. Although the two agencies acknowledged the power each agency had, they both struggled to maintain their power supremacy in assessing planning permissions for Kampong Bharu. While KBDC was given the authority to evaluate any development plans in Kampong Bharu, the power to authorise planning permissions lies with KLCH. Accordingly, as the thesis discussed, KLCH will have to consult KBDC before deciding on any planning permissions. This reflects how both powers are tied to each other and this means that there are inherent power struggles between them.

There were also power struggles between KBDC and the MAS Board. Although there is a number of MAS representatives sitting as members of the corporation, the MAS Board has insisted on having a bigger role in the development planning of Kampong Bharu. Having strong support from the local community, which have always regarded the MAS Board as the local government in Kampong Bharu, the MAS Board has continued pursuing its role despite the clear directive given by KLCH to limit its function to issues of social responsibility. The establishment of KBDC as the facilitator for development in Kampong Bharu was not able to supersede the role of the MAS Board in the area. Evidently the long tenure of the MAS Board in the administration of Kampong Bharu over a period of 115 years has built up the trust and confidence that the local community has for them to continue to render support for the MAS Board.

These conflicts are not only with the actors in the system – government agencies and KBDC – but also with those outside the formal structure of the legitimate authority. These actors may enforce their power covertly to influence the decision-making process. One of the conflicts and power struggles encountered were multiple roles that actors have had to play during the decision-making process. There is a possibility that the actor would use his position to influence those with the power to make decisions, which become an influence that was enforced upon others explicitly. This raised the question as to how such actors balance their role with the power they have and ensure that they can protect their vested interests.

Apart from that, there are others from outside KBDC or the government agencies who played their role in influencing the decision-making process

indirectly. These actors (termed in this research as 'hidden hands') manipulated the system to influence the planning process to their advantage. The involvement of these actors suggests that the power to influence decision-making may not only come from the formal structure of those in the system, but can also take place in informal settings. They exercised their power covertly to shape decision-making and eventually influence decisions made by the authority.

One example of the influence of the hidden hand was the role of the monarch, as the Ruler of Selangor State used his influence to shape the decision-making process. The influence of the monarch in shaping the direction of the decision-making relates to Weber's (1964) notion of power where it can be imposed on other actors in a social relationship and can also be in the form of direct or indirect influence in order to construct the behaviour of others. Through the influence of the monarch, certain decisions were taken off the decision-making agenda. An example to this was the support given to MAS Board when there were any decisions to abolish MAS Board. This was referred to the Ruler of Selangor and the proposal to abolish MAS Board was withdrawn. The influence of the monarch can be linked the notion of non-decision making proposed by Bachrach and Baratz (1963, 1970). This non-decision making resulted from the suppression of a decision imposed on the decision-maker to prevent certain actions from being carried out.

Conflicts also emerged due to the contradictory law that governs KBDC and other authorities in Kampong Bharu. With regard to the management of land in Kampong Bharu, there were discrepancies on the

provision of land title issuance. This has resulted in different perspectives on the legitimacy of land titles as the discrepancies in law has allowed different interpretation to the law itself. The issuance of land titles have had an impact on the role of the MAS Board. The Federal Government argued that the MAS Board's role in Kampong Bharu would cease once all the land in the MAS area was given individual titles of ownership. With individual land titles, the management of the land falls under Act 56 National Land Code 1965 and would be between each individual owner and the Land Office. With only a small amount of land in the MAS area yet to be given individual titles, the MAS Board is challenged as to how to maintain its long-term relevancy in Kampong Bharu. Although the Federal Government argued that the establishment of KBDC had superseded the role of the MAS Board, the latter continued to argue that they still have the authority to administer MAS land. This is because MAS Rules 1951 under the 1897 Selangor Land Enactment has never been revoked, giving the MAS Board the authority to continue its role in Kampong Bharu.

These are some of the examples discussed within the thesis that demonstrated the conflicts and power struggles related to the establishment of KBDC and the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu. It is inevitable for conflicts to arise as every actor will inherently use their power overtly or covertly to influence the decision-making process (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962).

UDCs as a distinct form of governmentality

Chapter Seven also provided a discussion on how the establishment of UDCs could be a form of governmentality. While the establishment of KBDC has provided the avenue for the community and other stakeholders to take part in the planning process, the mechanism and degree of public participation was limited. Instead of the community be given the community to raise their views and needs on the development needed in the local area through the engagement and consultation sessions, KBDC had utilised these sessions to disseminate information on the development proposal. The participants were led to believe that the redevelopment plan was in their best interests and eventually were convinced and influenced into agreeing to the redevelopment plan proposed.

In the meantime, having representatives of the community sitting on the KBDC Board and Advisory Council did not seem to be to the advantage of the local community. In the example discussed in Chapter Seven, the representatives sitting on Advisory Council were only consulted by the KBDC Board when needed and there were no guarantee that their views be taken into consideration in the decision-making process. Instead, they were expected to accept the decisions made and circulate those decisions to the community. The consultations with the Advisory Council were merely procedural to portray that decision-making were done collectively although in reality, this was not materialised. These representatives were not empowered and their power to influence decision-making process were limited. Instead, they were used as a tool to convince the community they represent into accepting the redevelopment plans.

These practices demonstrate that governmentality being exercised by KBDC onto the community of Kampong Bharu. The corporation has taken advantage to manoeuvre their power and influence to reach their own targeted aims of land value maximisation through the process of influencing the behaviour and governing the conduct of others. The community and representatives were convinced to accept the decisions through the process of influencing and shaping the conduct of the people. This is as Foucault's (1982) notion on governmentality - a process of governing the conduct of others whereby governmental power operates on individuals by shaping their values and conduct without having to use force or coercion. The peoples' conducts were shaped and governed through knowledge and specific technologies used (which in this case, the representatives on the Advisory Council) to produce internal power to regulate the behavious of people effectively (Burchell et al. 1991).

8.2.4 What broader lessons can we learn from the experience of Kampong Bharu about the practice of governance and public participation in the process of urban redevelopment?

The establishment of KBDC has brought a significant change in Malaysia's urban planning. Not only it has changed the urban planning system from being government-led to governance, it also has transferred the responsibility of development planning for Kampong Bharu from a local government to a corporation. Discussion on the implications of the establishment of KBDC to the broader analysis of urban redevelopment was focussed on three areas, which

are development planning and financing, governance, and public participation. It also provided some reflections on the practice of UDCs in the UK, Australia and China to provide a comparative perspective.

The introduction of KBDC in leading the redevelopment planning of Kampong Bharu has changed the traditional planning policy from being public centric to more of a market driven. The motivation for the redevelopment of Kampong Bharu was driven by the economic potential that Kampong Bharu has to offer. The location of Kampong Bharu within the capital city Kuala Lumpur has changed the landscape of the neighbourhood, where it was envisioned to be a new economic enclave for Kuala Lumpur.

With certain powers given to KBDC to take lead on the development planning in Kampong Bharu, it has changed the the traditional practice of urban planning, which was under the domain of KLCH. Nevertheless, these powers given to KBDC did not remove the power of KLCH as the local authority in issuing planning approvals. This has disrupted the normal planning practice as any planning permission will have to get the endorsement from both KBDC and KLCH before any development planning were approved.

Apart from unlocking the economic potential of Kampong Bharu, the introduction of KBDC is expected to promote better local governance. This study argues that KBDC is very much controlled by the Federal Government with under the direct supervision from the Ministry of Federal Territories. This situation is similar to other countries such as UK, Australia and China as the UDCs in general have strong involvement of government either at central, state or local level to the benefit of the government. However, this PhD has also shown how 'hidden' channels of influence have enabled a range of actors to influence the governance

process in informal and covert ways, which led to a number of power struggles and undermined the capacity for the UDC to foster inclusive urban governance.

In terms of public participation, the setting up of KBDC has encourage public participation as part of the initiative to promote local governance. However, in reality, the degree of public participation in Kampong Bharu redevelopment is fairly limited and only benefitting the interest of dominant parties in the community. The role of community representatives were also restricted and they were not empowered to uphold the interests of the local community. This study also argues that the establishment of KBDC has only benefitting the interest of dominant parties in the community and not the community at large.

In general, the establishment of KBDC has evidently changed the landscape of urban redevelopment in Kuala Lumpur. Although it provided spaces for community to participate in the decision-making process, it was also plagued with conflicts and power struggles. At the same time, the multiple actors involved in the planning process has provide a direct and indirect influence to the decision-making process, which resulted in the practice of governmentality to ensure that the government's desired end of maximising the area's economic potential was realised. As a consequence, local community needs and interests became the lowest priority as the focus was reoriented to serve the interests of certain dominant parties.

8.3 Conclusion

New forms of governance are commonly introduced in the context of urban development. Such innovations reconstruct the existing relationship between state and society and are very much influenced by ideas of decentralisation and

broadening governance beyond the state. This has changed the conventional way of governing, as it brings in new powers for local areas to make decisions which closely reflect local preferences. One of the approaches taken in the new form of governance in urban development planning is the establishment of UDCs. In claiming to foster better practices of governance in Kampong Bharu, the setting up of KBDC focused on the creation of spaces for community participation and the collaboration of many stakeholders in the planning process. This has not been the central focus of many other UDCs around the world, which generally involve the reorientation of urban policy towards economic imperatives and increasing the role of the private sector in the planning process. This thesis however highlights how KBDC gave particular emphasis to community participation and representation in Kampong Bharu, but also demonstrates the limitations of this.

The redevelopment of Kampong Bharu is an illustration of a significant transformation in urban planning in Kuala Lumpur as the government delegated its authority by establishing the KBDC. This move was seen as a notable change in urban planning as it promotes the practice of local governance with the involvement of more parties in the planning process. With the participation of a comprehensive range of people representing the government, business sector and society, the establishment of KBDC was anticipated to encourage better collaboration between the government and local people in determining the development needed in Kampong Bharu. In reality however, the governance structure of KBDC is laden with power inequalities and undermined by institutional conflicts and power struggles. The opportunity for the community to participate in the planning process seems to be merely a rhetorical device to convey an impression of participation since it was not adopted in the true sense.

Local governance was very much controlled by the federal government, which only benefitted certain groups of people and left minorities marginalised.

Based on the findings of this research, it can be deduced that Kampong Bharu's redevelopment is very much controlled by the Federal Government despite the delegation of authority. It can be further asserted that the reason behind the centrally-controlled management of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment was to align the development planning of the area to the bigger national agenda; to enhance the competitiveness of the capital city, Kuala Lumpur, globally. In order to do that, the Federal Government needed to intensify all its strategies through national policies to support the development of Kuala Lumpur as a whole to be a powerhouse for Malaysia's economic growth. This included the change in institutional structure by which KBDC was empowered to take the lead in Kampong Bharu's redevelopment. However, the structure of KBDC can be argued to be explicitly accountable upwards to its political masters, rather than downwards, to the people of Kampong Bharu.

The establishment of KBDC also introduced the practice of community representation as a group from Kampong Bharu was appointed to sit as members of the corporation. These representatives were expected to present the majority view of the people in Kampong Bharu, articulating their opinions and concerns about the redevelopment of their area. Coupled with a series of engagement opportunities and consultations held by KBDC, this conveyed an impression that the people of Kampong Bharu were being included and empowered to make their statements on the direction of planning for Kampong Bharu's redevelopment. However, from the very beginning, the inclusion of Kampong Bharu people in the planning process was limited to certain select people who were considered to be

prominent people in Kampong Bharu. It appears that the government was discriminating in who it chose to consult and the so-called 'wise men of Kampong Bharu' were considered to be the core group to direct the development in Kampong Bharu. The majority of the community was only involved in the planning process during the engagement and consultation sessions, which were conducted at a later stage of the planning process. The consultations and engagement opportunities were merely to inform the public as to the decisions that had been made, rather than enabling them to be involved in the process of making those decisions. Subsequent to the establishment of KBDC, the focus of the corporation was towards the landowners and beneficiaries of the land in Kampong Bharu, which accounts for a majority of the community in Kampong Bharu. However, KBDC failed to address issues relating to other segments of the community in Kampong Bharu, including the tenants and those small traders who make a living in the area. These groups were marginalised and their right to be part of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment was ignored.

As Kampong Bharu's redevelopment appears to be highly shaped by the political processes carried out at the national agenda level, it follows that there were conflicts and power struggles among the actors involved in the process. Conflicts and power struggles continued to emerge as the actors exerted their power and authority in an attempt to influence the decision-making process in order to achieve their own goals. These conflicts were a manifestation of power as each actor manoeuvred to influence and shape the decisions of others. The contestation of power, as described by Bachrach and Baratz (1962), is associated with coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation, as the most prominent actors continuously exercise their influence overtly and covertly to direct the

decision-making process to their desires. The most apparent power struggle in the Kampong Bharu redevelopment process is that between KBDC and the MAS Board. As KBDC strove to gain the trust of the Kampong Bharu people in delivering development planning for the area, the corporation elected to undermine the power of the MAS Board. The inclusion of the village heads and community leaders, as part of the committee of the MAS Board, and as members of the KBDC Advisory Council, was a tactic to diminish the influence of the MAS Board in Kampong Bharu. The message to the community of Kampong Bharu and the public at large emphasised that KBDC had been given the rightful authority to steer Kampong Bharu's redevelopment and the role of MAS Board has been incorporated in KBDC through the representation of the committee in the KBDC Board and the Advisory Council. This also indirectly indicated that the role of the MAS Board in Kampong Bharu has ceased and become irrelevant to the community of Kampong Bharu. Nevertheless, as a consequence of having the support of the local community and through obtaining the support of the Ruler of Selangor State, MAS forced KBDC to re-evaluate the power of the MAS Board in the area. This suggests that the power relations between KBDC and MAS Board will always be in contestation as the two entities continue to seek to exert their authority and influence in Kampong Bharu.

With regard to the representation of Kampong Bharu's people through the appointment of representatives to KBDC, either as a member of its Board or the Advisory Council, this research has revealed that, more often than not, the decisions made were advantageous to the corporation or towards achieving the goals of the government, rather than the interests of the local people. Having people's representatives on the Advisory Council was not enough to enable the

local community to shape the decision-making process of the corporation towards benefiting the community of Kampong Bharu at large.

Instead, the corporation took advantage of the presence of the community representatives on the Advisory Council to shape their thinking and behaviour so that they believed the decisions made by the corporation were binding. Having these representatives on the Advisory Council can arguably be construed as a tool for the corporation to govern the conduct, behaviour and beliefs of the community of Kampong Bharu. This is because these representatives were the closest to the community, and used to convince the community to accept the decisions made by the corporation. Using the theoretical lens of governmentality, this research has looked into the tactics of governing used by the government through the authority of KBDC in influencing and governing the conduct of Kampong Bharu's community. The case of the Kampong Bharu redevelopment can be linked to the concept of governmentality proposed by Foucault (1982) whereby the use of 'technologies' can be used as a mechanism to exercise power over those being governed. This gives a perspective on how power can be internalised in a society to control the behaviour of the people to achieve specific ends set by the government.

This research has looked at the concept of governmentality where the establishment of KBDC is seen as a tool or 'technology' developed by the government to govern the conduct of the society in question. The spaces for participation for people to be involved in the planning process of Kampong Bharu's redevelopment is seen as what Foucault (1988) has termed a mechanism for the state to exercise its power through so-called empowerment and regulated modes of power through a specific form of rationality in order to

attain certain targets. This can also be seen in the practice of representation, where the representatives serve a role as a system of actor networks to shape and construct the behaviour of the society through a set of norms and rationality imposed on the people. Community, on the other hand, also plays a significant role in influencing the decision-making process through the representatives and by adopting strategies to become more persuasive in achieving the desired outcome. In short, it is the enforcement of a modern exercise of power, where the method of coercion is no longer relevant. Instead it is replaced by self-government, where the conduct of others is shaped and constructed to the way in which they are expected to behave.

8.4 Reflections

8.4.1 Methodological and research process

This research has embarked on a full qualitative approach, using the case of the Kampong Bharu redevelopment and dealing with a broad spectrum of data collection, including semi-structured interviews, focus group sessions, document review, visual observation and photographs. The use of a single case study was to focus on understanding the planning process in the area and the issues beleaguering planning practice. It is intended to offer a generalisation of urban development planning in Kuala Lumpur. The process of gathering the evidence in order to address the research questions was challenging as the data collected revealed the complexity of the case being studied, which sometimes presented conflicting assumptions and information.

The data collection for this research started with the focus group sessions, where it became apparent that the people's perception of the redevelopment plan for Kampong Bharu deviated substantially from the prior hypothesis of this research. With these new findings, it was helpful to reassess the aims and questions to be addressed, and later the focus for the interview sessions. The process of getting people to participate was difficult, as the people of Kampong Bharu were rather wary about the intent of this research. This was because they were concerned that their opinions would be used by the government to violate the interests of the people. At the same time, some participants expressed high expectations for this research to resolve the development issues that have been plaguing Kampong Bharu for a long time; they hoped that the opinions they presented during the focus group sessions would be taken up to the government for immediate action. Eventually the matter was reconciled with the help of the MAS Board, whereby the participants were convinced that this research is purely for academic purposes.

Another challenge that was encountered during the data collection period was engaging with the interview participants. Many of the interviews involved elite participants, including high-ranking government officials, politicians, land developers and successful business people, who were quite difficult to access. Fortunately, gaining access to one primary participant facilitated a snowball effect and thus the participant was able to introduce the researcher to the other participants. Most of the participants faced the constraints of confidentiality, as the issue being discussed was rather sensitive, politically, commercially, and personally. Accordingly, where

necessary they limited themselves to sharing information on 'a need to know basis' and were not able to discuss certain topics in depth. There were times when the participants were willing to be interviewed and be part of the research but requested that the information they provided be off the record and not quoted. This request must be respected and adhered to by the researcher, but the information enabled a fundamental understanding of their perspectives of the issue being researched. Time was another constraint, as some appointments had to be rescheduled to fit the participants' busy timetables. Additionally, some of the interview sessions had to be conducted more than once in order to gain a broader understanding of the data given.

Document reviews were also extensive, encompassing government policies, development plans, Hansard, the relevant Acts and Enactment and newspaper articles, some of which were dated decades ago. Some of these documents were gathered from internet searches where they were made available online, while others were retrieved from the library archive and the organisations' document compilations. In order to have a better view of the situation on the ground, visual observation and photography has helped to describe certain observations more effectively than in writing.

Above all, this research has unravelled a very complex situation of urban planning in the capital city, Kuala Lumpur. With the government aspiration of making Kuala Lumpur more competitive, this research has trickled down the strategies that were deployed in making that goal more attainable. Along the way, this research has uncovered the politics and conflicts around the planning process, which made the findings more thought-provoking in their analysis. This research has been a challenging experience in reaching a deep

understanding of the relationship between the state and society and how the power relationship between the two entities was continuously intertwined to exercise influence over the process of decision-making.

8.4.2   Theoretical reflection

As this research examined power, governance and governmentality through the creation of spaces for participation in urban development planning, it was essential to have a deeper understanding of theories of power and how such relations are interwoven in arriving at a certain decision-making process. The original contribution of this research is to bring these theoretical perspectives together through a study of a specific kind of governance reform – the creation of a UDC to facilitate urban redevelopment. Although prior research has been conducted regarding Kampong Bharu, none of those studies examined the issues from the perspective of governmentality. Therefore, this research has contributed to a wider understanding on the practice of governmentality to conceptualise the power relations between the state and society in the practice of urban development planning.

This research has presented a discussion on the modern approach being used by the state in exercising power over society to achieve targeted goals. It has therefore also contributed to a broader understanding of power which is not necessarily associated with coercion and forceful acts, but rather through influencing and shaping the conduct of the people. It contributes to these debates by exploring how governmentality can play out through organisations such as UDCs, which provide the impression of inclusive and participatory

governance while actually facilitating manipulation and channeling covert forms of power and influence.

This research has also highlighted how the UDC in Kampong Bharu evolved in practice as it shifted spaces for participation into ones of control and manipulation. The governance of UDCs is laden with conflicts and power struggles that also create forms of governmentality that propagate continuous state power. Based on some reflections made in relation to the practice of UDCs in some other countries such as in the UK, Australia and also various part of Asia, there are significant variations in the practices of UDCs as a form of governance around the world. KBDC emphasized the creation of spaces for community participation, yet community involvement in the planning process has brought small change to the power relations in Kampong Bharu. Thus, while its particular governance configuration distinguished the UDC in Malaysia from UDCs in other part of the world, the outcomes in terms of community representation and empowerment are ultimately rather similar.

8.5 Recommendations for future work

Urban development planning is an extensive field for research as it provides a multi-dimensional sphere for consideration. This research was set on a particular research framework where the findings served to answer the specific research questions with an explicit aim in order to address the research problem raised. Perhaps future research using a different research design could be done to extend knowledge about the practice of urban planning. One approach could be to perform a comparative study between developing countries or cities, or the

adoption of multiple case studies to provide an extensive insight on the practice of urban planning in other spheres.

Even the case of the Kampong Bharu redevelopment is a topic that can be further explored in depth. While this research focusses on the theory of power and the concept of governmentality to understand state-society power relations, other areas to be explored could include the conflicting legal issues that have beleaguered Kampong Bharu and which continue to remain unresolved.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Participants Information Pack

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Tajuk Kajian:

Penyertaan Masyarakat dalam Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu: Dari Perspektif Hubungan Kuasa Pemerintah – Masyarakat

1.   Keterangan Kajian:

Penyertaan masyarakat merupakan salah satu prinsip demokrasi kerana ia membolehkan orang ramai menyuarakan pendapat, idea dan harapan untuk perancangan dan pembangunan negara. Ia merupakan antara usaha kerajaan yang menggalakkan penyertaan sebagai cara untuk mengesahkan keputusan kerajaan dalam proses pembuatan dasar. Penyertaan masyarakat dilihat sebagai sebagai satu peluang untuk memberi kuasa kepada masyarakat untuk menentukan pembangunan yang sesuai di kawasan mereka. Di Malaysia, salah satu contoh yang menggambarkan penyertaan masyarakat dalam perancangan pembangunan dapat dilihat melalui Program Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu. Lanjutan daripada beberapa desakan rakyat yang inginkan lebih penglibatan di dalam proses perancangan pembangunan semula Kampong Bharu, ia telah membawa kepada penubuhan Perbadanan Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu (PKB) yang bertindak sebagai pemudahcara dan pengantara antara tuan tanah dan pihak pelabur untuk pelan pembangunan di Kampong Bharu. Secara umum, pembentukan PKB menunjukkan usaha kerajaan untuk melibatkan masyarakat dalam proses perancangan pembangunan Kampong Bharu. Namun, sejauh manakah masyarakat benar-benar terlibat di dalam perancangan pembangunan semula Kampong Bharu?

Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis dinamika kuasa antara Kerajaan dan masyarakat di Kuala Lumpur dengan mengkaji penyertaan masyarakat di dalam Program Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu. Manakala objektif kajian pula adalah:
  i.   Menganalisa sebarang perubahan di dalam penyertaan masyarakat berkaitan perancangan Kampong Bharu.
  ii. Mengkaji bagaimana penyertaan masyarakat mempengaruhi dan memberi impak kepada pembuatan keputusan bagi perancangan Program Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu.

1.   Mengapa Tuan/Puan Terlibat Di dalam Kajian Ini?

Sebagai orang yang mempunyai pengetahuan yang luas dan berpengalaman dalam bidang yang sedang dikaji ini, adalah penting bagi saya untuk melibatkan tuan/puan di dalam proses pengumpulan sebanyak mungkin maklumat yang berkaitan dengan Program Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu. Adalah diharapkan bahawa hasil kajian ini akan mencerahkan amalan penyertaan masyarakat dalam proses perancangan di Malaysia dan bagaimana penyertaan mempunyai setakat ini dapat mempengaruhi keputusan perancangan yang dibuat oleh pihak berkuasa. Maklum balas tuan/puan akan membolehkan pemahaman yang mendalam tentang apa yang tidak dinyatakan dalam mana-mana dokumen yang telah tersedia.

3.   Bagaimana Sesi Kumpulan Fokus ini akan dilaksanakan?

Tuan/Puan akan dibahagikan kepada 5 kumpulan besar di mana di dalam setiap kumpulan akan terdiri daripada 6 atau 7 orang peserta yang merupakan pemilik atau pewaris tanah atau penduduk di Kampong Bharu. Setiap sesi kumpulan fokus akan diperuntukkan masa selama 4 jam (maksimum). Cadangan pembahagian masa bagi setiap sesi kumpulan fokus adalah seperti berikut:

½ jam pertama	-	Sesi taaruf dan urusan pentadbiran
3 jam	-	Perbincangan mengenai persoalan yang dikemukakan
½ jam terakhir	-	Jamuan ringan

Sepanjang sesi kumpulan fokus ini dijalankan, rakaman audio akan dibuat bagi memastikan setiap maklumat yang dibincangkan dapat direkodkan dengan baik. Selain daripada penyelidik yang akan menjadi fasilitator perbincangan, dua orang pembantu penyelidik akan turut bersama bagi membantu mencatit nota perbincangan.

Topik perbincangan akan berkisar kepada pandangan dan pendapat tuan/puan mengenai pembangunan semula Kampong Bharu serta penyertaan masyarakat di dalam perancangan pembangunan semula Kampong Bharu. Suka diingatkan bahawa tiada jawapan salah atau betul bagi setiap soalan yang diajukan.

4.   Aspek Kerahsiaan

Kajian ini merupakan kajian akademik semata-mata dan aspek kerahsiaan akan diberi perhatian yang tinggi. Semua maklumat yang dikumpulkan daripada tuan/puan kan dirahsiakan sepenuhnya. Hasil kajian dicadang untuk diterbitkan pada tahun 2016 dalam bentuk laporan tesis dan juga akan turut disiarkan dalam penulisan jurnal. Sekiranya tuan/puan tidak mahu nama atau jawatan tuan/puan dimaklumkan atau disebut di dalam kajian ini, penggunaan ganti nama akan digunakan di sepanjang proses analisis dan penulisan tesis dilakukan.

5. Soalan-soalan yang akan dibincangkan

   i. Sejauh manakah yang tuan/puan mengetahui mengenai Program Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu?

  ii. Bagaimanakah penglibatan tuan/puan di dalam proses perancangan pembangunan semula Kampong Bharu?

 iii. Adakah terdapat perubahan di dalam penyertaan masyarakat di dalam perancangan pembangunan semula Kampong Bharu sebelum dan selepas penubuhan Perbadanan Pembangunan Kampong Bharu pada tahun 2011?

 iv. Adakah penubuhan Perbadanan Pembangunan Kampong Bharu memberi ruang kepada masyarakat untuk lebih terlibat di dalam pembuatan keputusan pihak berkuasa berhubung pembangunan yang diinginkan oleh masyarakat setempat?

MAKLUMAT UNTUK PESERTA KAJIAN

1. Tajuk Kajian:
    Penyertaan Masyarakat dalam Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu: Dari Perspektif Hubungan Kuasa Pemerintah – Masyarakat.

2. Tuan/puan adalah dijemput untuk mengambil bahagian dalam penyelidikan ini. Walau bagaimanapun, sebelum tuan/puan membuat keputusan untuk menyertainya, adalah penting bagi tuan/puan memahami serba sedikit mengenai tujuan serta kaedah yang digunakan di dalam kajian ini. Sila luangkan sedikit masa untuk membaca maklumat berikut dengan teliti dan sekiranya terdapat perkara yang kurang jelas, tuan/puan adalah dialu-alukan untuk mengemukakan pertanyaan.

3. Keterangan Kajian:
    Penyertaan masyarakat merupakan salah satu prinsip demokrasi kerana ia membolehkan orang ramai menyuarakan pendapat, idea dan harapan untuk perancangan dan pembangunan negara. Penyertaan masyarakat dalam perancangan pembangunan menjadi fokus kebanyakan negara di dunia sejak beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini. Selain daripada kerajaan menggalakkan penyertaan sebagai cara mengesahkan keputusan kerajaan dalam proses pembuatan dasar, penyertaan masyarakat dilihat sebagai sebagai satu peluang untuk memberi kuasa kepada masyarakat untuk menentukan pembangunan yang sesuai di kawasan mereka. Walau bagaimanapun, terdapat hujah-hujah yang menggambarkan bahawa penyertaan masyarakat sebenarnya adalah merupakan cara yang digunakan oleh pihak pemerintah untuk mempengaruhi pemikiran dan keputusan masyarakat.

    Di Malaysia, salah satu contoh yang menggambarkan penyertaan masyarakat dalam perancangan pembangunan dapat dilihat melalui Program Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu. Melalui beberapa penulisan artikel di akhbar, terdapat permintaan daripada orang ramai yang mendesak kerajaan supaya lebih banyak penyertaan masyarakat dibenarkan di dalam proses perancangan pembangunan semula Kampong Bharu. Lanjutan daripada itu, ia telah membawa kepada penubuhan Perbadanan Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu (PKB) yang bertindak sebagai pemudahcara dan pengantara antara tuan tanah dan pihak pelabur untuk pelan pembangunan di Kampong Bharu. Secara umum, pembentukan PKB menunjukkan usaha kerajaan untuk melibatkan masyarakat dalam proses perancangan pembangunan Kampong Bharu. Ini dapat dilihat melalui pelantikan beberapa ahli jawatankuasa penasihat perbadanan yang terdiri daripada kalangan pemilik atau pewaris tanah di Kampong Bharu. Namun, dalam perspektif lain, penubuhan PKB juga boleh ditafsirkan sebagai tindakan kerajaan menggunakan perbadanan itu untuk membentuk tingkah laku masyarakat demi mengekalkan kestabilan dalam sistem.

4. Secara ringkasnya, matlamat kajian ini adalah untuk menganalisis dinamika kuasa antara pemerintah (boleh ditafsirkan sebagai Negara dan Kerajaan) dan masyarakat di Kuala Lumpur dengan mengkaji penyertaan masyarakat di dalam Program Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu.Kajian ini mempunyai beberapa objektif iaitu:
   i. Menganalisa perubahan di dalam penyertaan masyarakat di dalam perancangan Kampong Bharu
   ii. Mengkaji bagaimana penyertaan masyarakat mempengaruhi dan memberi impak kepada pembuatan keputusan bagi perancangan Program Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu.

5. Untuk makluman tuan/puan, kajian PhD ini adalah ditaja sepenuhnya oleh Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia dan tempoh kajian ini bermula daripada September 2014 sehingga Disember 2016.

6. Sebagai orang yang mempunyai pengetahuan yang luas dan berpengalaman dalam bidang yang sedang dikaji ini, adalah penting bagi saya untuk melibatkan tuan/puan di dalam proses pengumpulan sebanyak mungkin maklumat yang berkaitan dengan Program Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu. Adalah diharapkan bahawa hasil kajian ini akan mencerahkan amalan partisipasi masyarakat dalam proses perancangan di Malaysia dan bagaimana penyertaan mempunyai setakat ini dapat mempengaruhi keputusan perancangan. Maklum balas tuan/puan akan membolehkan pemahaman yang mendalam tentang apa yang tidak dinyatakan dalam mana-mana dokumen yang telah tersedia.

7. Pandangan tuan/puan akan selanjutnya dianalisis dan diterjemahkan sebelum proses penulisan tesis dilaksanakan. Kaedah yang dicadangkan untuk pengumpulan data kajian ini meliputi analisis dokumen, sesi temu bual, kumpulan fokus, pemerhatian dan imej visual. Tuan/puan adalah bebas untuk memutuskan sama ada ingin mengambil bahagian atau tidak di dalam kajian ini. Jika tuan/puan bersetuju untuk mengambil bahagian, tuan/puan adalah diminta untuk menandatangani borang persetujuan yang dilampirkan bersama ini. Tuan/puan boleh menarik diri daripada menyertai kajian ini pada bila-bila masa tanpa memberikan sebarang alasan.

8. Laporan kajian ini turut disediakan untuk bacaan pelbagai pihak di mana tuan/puan mungkin ingin memberi perhatian kepada beberapa aspek kerahsiaan maklumat dan dokumen yang ingin dikongsi di dalam kajian ini. Walau bagaimanapun, saya ingin menegaskan bahawa kajian ini adalah merupakan kajian akademik semata-mata dan semua maklumat akan dilayan dengan kerahsiaan yang tinggi. Semua maklumat yang dikumpulkan daripada tuan/puan selama penyelidikan dijalankan akan dirahsiakan sepenuhnya. Hasil kajian dicadang untuk diterbitkan pada tahun 2016 dalam bentuk laporan tesis dan juga akan turut disiarkan dalam penulisan jurnal. Sekiranya tuan/puan tidak mahu nama atau jawatan tuan/puan dimaklumkan atau disebut di dalam kajian ini, penggunaan ganti nama akan digunakan di sepanjang proses analisis dan penulisan tesis dilakukan.

9. Rakaman audio akan digunakan di sepanjang sesi kumpulan fokus dan temu bual manakala rakaman visual akan turut digunakan untuk analisis dan ilustrasi dalam pembentangan persidangan dan mesyuarat Jabatan. Ia tidak akan digunakan untuk tujuan lain tanpa kebenaran bertulis daripada tuan/puan.

10. Usul kajian ini telah diluluskan oleh Jawatankuasa Etika Penyelidikan Universiti of Sheffield yang memantau tatacara dan etika pelaksanaan kajian yang dilakukan oleh semua penyelidik di University of Sheffield.

11. Sekiranya terdapat sebarang pertanyaan atau aduan mengenai prosiding yang dilakukan oleh penyelidik , tuan/puan boleh mengemukakan pertanyaan atau aduan tersebut kepada:

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Maklumat kajian ini adalah untuk perhatian dan simpanan tuan/puan. Turut disertakan bersama ini adalah borang persetujuan untuk tuan/puan tandatangani. Terima kasih di atas kesudian tuan/puan mengambil bahagian dalam kajian ini.

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Participant Consent Form
Borang Kebenaran Peserta

<u>*Title of Research Project*</u> / Tajuk Kajian:
Public Participation in Kampong Bharu Redevelopment Programme: From the Perspective of State-Society Power Relations.
Penyertaan Masyarakat dalam Pembangunan Semula Kampong Bharu: Dari Perspektif Hubungan Kuasa Pemerintah – Masyarakat.

<u>*Name of Researcher*</u>/Nama Penyelidik:
Noranida Zainal

<u>*Name of Research Supervisors*</u> /Nama Penyelia:
Prof. Gordon Dabinett dan Dr. Thomas Goodfellow
Department of Town and Regional Planning
University of Sheffield

Participant Identification Number for this project/ No. Identifikasi Peserta:
……………………

Please INITIAL the boxes below to indicate consent, as appropriate.

Sila turunkan TANDATANGAN RINGKAS di dalam kotak di bawah untuk menunjukkan persetujuan, di mana berkenaan.

1. *I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the project named above and that I have had the opportunity to ask questions about it.*
    Saya mengesahkan saya telah membaca dan memahami maklumat tentang projek yang dinyatakan di atas dan saya telah diberikan peluang untuk bertanyakan soalan tentangnya.

2. *I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my consent at any time without giving a reason. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.*
    Saya faham bahawa penglibatan saya adalah secara sukarela dan saya bebas untuk menarik persetujuan saya pada bila-bila masa tanpa memberikan sebab.Selain itu, sekiranya saya tidak berhasrat untuk memberi sebarang jawapan ke atas mana-mana soalan yang diajukan, saya bebas untuk menolak pertanyaan tersebut.

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3. *I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I give permission for members of the research team to have access to*   *my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be disclosed or being linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research.*

   Saya faham bahawa semua maklumbalas yang diberikan akan dilayan dengan kerahsiaan yang tinggi. Saya memberi kebenaran kepada mereka yang terlibat di dalam kajian untuk mendapat akses kepada maklumbalas yang telah dilabelkan secara rahsia. Saya faham bahawa nama saya tidak akan didedahkan atau dikaitkan dengan bahan kajian dan saya juga tidak akan dikenali atau dikenalpasti di dalam laporan yang dihasilkan daripada kajian ini.

4. *I give permission for the audio recordings to be used during data collection processes and the recordings collected for this study to be stored, securely and confidentially, for longer than the duration of the study.*

   Saya memberi kebenaran untuk penggunaan rakaman audio semasa proses pengumpulan data dan semua rakaman audio yang diperolehi untuk kajian ini disimpan, secara sulit dan terjamin, lebih lama daripada jangkamasa kajian ini dijalankan.

5. *I am willing to be contacted in future should the researcher requires further information.*

   Saya bersedia untuk dihubungi sekiranya penyelidik memerlukan sebarang maklumat tambahan.

6. *I agree to take part in the above research project.*

   Saya bersetuju untuk terlibat di dalam kajian yang disebutkan di atas.

_____   _____   _____

NAME OF PARTICIPANT/   DATE/TARIKH   SIGNATURE/TANDATANGAN
NAMA PESERTA
(or legal representative/atau wakil sah)

_____   _____   _____

PRIMARY RESEARCHER/   DATE/TARIKH   SIGNATURE/TANDATANGAN
PENYELIDIK UTAMA
(To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant/
Untuk ditandatangani diberikan tarikh di hadapan peserta*)*

A copy of this form, once signed by all parties and dated, will be given to the participant, together with a project information sheet. A copy of the signed and dated form will be kept in the main project file, in a secure location, by the research project team.

Sesalinan borang yang telah ditandatangani dan diberikan tarikh, perlu diserahkan kepada peserta bersama-sama lampiran maklumat untuk peserta. Borang yang telah ditandangani dan diberikan tarikh perlu dimasukkan di dalam fail projek dan diletak di lokasi yang selamat oleh pasukan penyelidik.

Appendix C: Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement

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CONFIDENTIALITY AND NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

I understand and acknowledge that:

1. I shall respect and maintain the confidentiality of all discussions, deliberations, participants information and any other information generated during focus group sessions pertaining to the study on Kampong Bharu Redevelopment Programme;

2. It is my legal and ethical responsibility to protect the privacy, confidentiality and security of all information and other confidential information relating to the participants involved in the focus group activities;

3. I agree to discuss all information gathered only with the main researcher and to not discuss such information with other individuals or within hearing of other people who do not have a need to know about the information.

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the foregoing information and that my signature below signifies my agreement to comply with the above terms.

Dated: _____   Signature: _____

Print Name: _____

In the presence of Main Researcher:

Dated: _____   Signature: _____

Print Name: _____

Reflection note: Meeting with the CEO of KBDC

Meeting was held on the 9th January 2015 at his office in Rumah ROHAS, Kg Bharu. Correspondence with him started on 8th December 2014 through email and the meeting was set when the interviewee replied the email on the 22nd December 2014. He gave a very warm welcome upon my arrival and he recognized me from previous working networking (when I was in EPU).

Throughout the session he was very facilitative, providing me with many insights and information pertaining to Kg Bharu Redevelopment Programme. However, at times he seems to be quite protective and defensive on the programme especially when I provoked him with scenarios and issues which were being raised in blogs and articles retrieved from internet. He also refused audio recording and insisted I must provide the letter of authorisation from EPU before I could record anything. I have obtained the approval from EPU on the 6th November 2014 however, on the day of the meeting I have yet to retrieve the original authorization letter from EPU. He, as a whole was willing to share information although there were times he seems to be derailed from the subject matter and started to share his story on how being involved with Kg Bharu Redevelopment Programme and the experience of establishing KBDC.

He corrected me on the term 'redevelopment' I used in my proposal. He said there is no 'redevelopment' but rather 'development' alone. (I need to re-confirm on this.)

The interviewee mentioned on the launching of Kg Bharu Masterplan by Deputy PM on the 15th January which will involve the GLCs. However, it is a closed session.

Things discussed during the meeting:

1. There were 2 rounds of public participation pertaining to Kg Bharu Redevelopment Programme.
    First Round:
    i.   Public engagement publicly – in Kelab Sultan Sulaiman and PWTC.
    ii.   Specific engagement with the landowners according to the land lot number which was retrieved from PTGWP (the agency responsible on all records of landownership in KL). It was then being cross-checked with National Registration Dept (Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara) to check the current status of the landowners – whether they are still alive or not. It was also checked with the town council (DBKL) and Election Commission of Malaysia (SPR) to confirm whether they were the original residents in Kg Bharu.
    iii. SMS (must check on this).

     i.   KBDC went to all villages under MAS Land to explain in the programme. It has been more crucial at this point as the people have become more critical of the programme.

    ii.   When preparing the Cabinet paper on the incentives for the landowners, it involved public participation as well but perhaps it was at a higher level of participation.

2. After the year 2011 – it was more of convincing the landowners and heirs. *perhaps would be useful to have a paragraph on convincing the public*

3. KB Redevelopment Prog was mooted a long time ago and it was a combination of a venture of the political masters and government agencies.

4. Public participation involves all tier of the public in Kampong Bharu. It also involved MAS, PAKAM and PPKB.

5. Reasons for the rejection from the public on the programme:
     i.   Absence of knowledge and understanding of the programme itself
    ii.   The presence of political pressure. Previously KB was under PAS (opposition political party) and they were quite vocal in criticizing the idea to redevelop KB.

6. The interviewee claimed that there was public engagement however it is less participation of the public.
- According to him, most sessions were more of the public listening to what the authorities plan to do. There is no significant contribution from the public at the moment.
- The reasons for that situation are because:
     i.   The public who attended the sessions were merely the heirs and not the main landowners
    ii.   The people do not live in KB anymore. They live somewhere else and may not know in depth of the current situation in KB.

7. KBDC also talked to all wise people (so called think tanks and successful entrepreneurs) who are also the landowners but no longer live in KB. They also consulted small traders association in KB, PAKAM and PPKB.

8. The Deputy Chairman of KBDC is also the President of PAKAM. However, the interviewee explained that the selection for the chair was not because of his position in PAKAM but rather because of his knowledge and personality.

9. The rational of the establishment of KBDC was because of the public pressure because they don't know who to trust and to consult on the redevelopment of KB. For the record, the people of KB has previously had bad experience being conned by local developer

who claimed that he was the representative of the government and political party in developing KB. It resulted in the landowners had lost their land as their land had been mortgaged to the banks.

10. The KB Redevelopment Master Plan was passed in October 2014.

REPORT ON 1ST FIELDWORK
4TH JANUARY – 15TH FEBRUARY 2015

1. **BACKGROUND**

    FOCUS GROUP SESSIONS:
    -   5 focus group sessions were carried out on the dates with the attendance of the participants as follow:
        i.   14th January – 7 participants attended. They were the owner/heirs of the land in 4 villages within Malay Agriculture Settlement (MAS) administration (Kg Periok, Kg Masjid, Kg Atas A and Kg Atas B).
        ii.   18th January – 7 participants attended. They were also the owner/heirs of the land in 3 villages within MAS administration (Kg Hujung Pasir, Kg. Paya and Kg. Pindah).
        iii. 21st January – 5 participants comprising of the small traders and those who own a business in Kg. Bharu area.
        iv.   25th January – 3 participants comprising of the tenants (house or shop lots) in Kg. Bharu area.
        v.   4th February – 3 participants who were the owner or heirs of the land/building in the area outside of MAS administration boundary (Raja Bot, Pasar Minggu, Kg Sungai Bharu and PKNS Flats).

    -   All sessions were basically conducted in Malay language with some occasional use of English language by the participants.
    -   The sessions were performed in a meeting room at MAS office. On average, all sessions were conducted for the period of 2 ½ hours.

    INTERVIEWS:
    -   The 1st fieldwork also involves interview sessions with the CEO of Kg Bharu Development Corporation (KBDC) and the Head of Corporate Communication Unit of KBDC. The intention for approaching the two figures was to get overall information on the setup of KBDC and more information on Kg Bharu Redevelopment Programme.
    -   Apart from the focus group participants, I also approached some of the village folks to get their views and their understanding of Kg Bharu Redevelopment Programme.

2. **FINDINGS**

    2.1. **Current Status on Kg Bharu Redevelopment Programme**
        i.   The Detailed Masterplan of Kg Bharu Redevelopment has been passed on October 2014.
        ii.   The authorities have yet to find a solution on how to redevelop the area which is under the MAS Administration Board's jurisdiction. They have yet to convince the landowners on the concept of Transfer of Development Rights that they suggest to be applied in Kg Bharu.

iii.   Meanwhile, KBDC has already started redeveloping 2 areas outside MAS land which are Pasar Minggu and Raja Bot. The projects have less issue to be carried out because the areas are under the administration of the town council.

2.2.   General issues raised during focus group sessions

i.   Issue of protecting the Malay rights and to preserve the Malay heritage.

ii.   Issue on the implementation of the programme. KBDC was said not able to answer the basic questions raised by the landowners regarding the land value and how the project will be implemented.

iii.   Issue on land status – Malay Reserve vs Condition and Restriction on interest of the land (need to check on the legal term and the implication).

iv.   Issue on the conflict between the establishment of Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur in 1974 and the MAS Enactment gazetted in 1899 under State of Selangor. The establishment of Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur did not revoke the power of MAS Board as the administrator of Kg Bharu.

v.   Issue on leadership and the credibility of the leaders. KBDC vs MAS. KBDC was established only in 2011 while MAS was formed 115 years ago. Some suggested that both organisations should collaborate.

vi.   Issue of different sources on the list of landowners and heirs in Kg Bharu. KBDC is using the list obtained from the Federal Territories Director of Lands and Mines Office while MAS Board has their own register record maintained ever since it was established. This has bearing on the people being consulted and engaged by the authorities.

vii.   Issue of the landowners/heirs who no longer live in Kg Bharu. Some of them have different perspective on the redevelopment programme. Those who are currently residing in Kg Bharu are not quite happy when the authorities consulted the people who no longer live in Kg Bharu as they do not represent the true people of Kg Bharu.

viii.   Misleading feedback portrayed by the media.

ix.   Most participants were not happy with the participation and engagement process.

2.3.   Views on Kg Bharu Redevelopment Programme

i.   In general, all participants agreed that they are not against the redevelopment plan. They support the programme and are looking forward to the development proposed in the area. However, they are quite sceptical on the implementation of the programme and are not happy with the way government is managing it.

ii.   Some were quite sceptical on the success of the project. This is due past history which demonstrates the failure of planning and the implementation of what have been planned.

iii.   The participants mentioned the issues of landownerhip should be resolved and make priority by the government before considering redeveloping the area.

iv. Most of the people in Kg Bharu were commenting that they have not seen the Masterplan of Kampong Bharu Redevelopment Programme despite the Masterplan can be easily accessed from KBDC's website.

v. In general, the participants admitted that most of the information they received on Kg Bharu Redevelopment Programme were gathered through the media and also from the daily conversation with the village folks.

vi. Some attended the public hearing set by KBDC during the early establishment of KBDC but most of them did not understand how the programme is going to be implemented. They argued that the information given was too advanced for them to understand. Most of them are still confused/puzzled what is intended and how their property going to be affected.

vii. The programme was said to only consider the economic aspect but failed to comprehend the need of the people and necessary action to protect the Malay rights.

2.4. Views on the establishment of KBDC

i. Some of the participants regarded the Act 733 – Kampong Bahru Development Corporation Act 2011 as a Draconian Law as the Act was being 'pushed down the throat' to be accepted by the public before proper research or consultation being carried out.

ii. The people of Kg Bharu questioned the need to form KBDC since they have always consulted MAS all these years.

iii. They are also quite sceptical with the leadership of those in the KBDC Board as they might have vested interest in the project.

iv. The function of Advisory Council in KBDC which consists of the representatives of Kg Bharu community is very much questionable. Currently, the representatives are among the village heads and community committee. It was said that there is no proper Term of Reference for their function in the council and they are there basically to disseminate information or decisions made by KBDC Board to the community rather than to advise the Board on the needs or concerns of the public.

2.5. Views on public participation

i. In general, the participants agreed that there is no real participation pertaining to the redevelopment programme. Some of them had attended the briefing sessions organised by KBDC and they are able to raise questions. However, most of them were not happy with the explanation given. Basically, the sessions were merely 'to inform the public' rather that to get necessary feedback from the public for the betterment of the Masterplan or the programme.

ii. One of the participants informed that he took own initiative to prepare a paper to suggest the necessary development needed in the area and presented to the Minister but no further action has been carried out.

iii. They claimed that they were not given the chance to participate in the planning process. Even during the consultation/briefing session, their concerns and questions were not being attended appropriately.

iv. The representation of the public through Advisory Council is regarded ineffective because the members were not able to put forward the voices of the people.

v. The participants argued that participation were only permitted to the selective few who are on the same page with the authorities or has interest in the redevelopment project.

vi. In general, the authorities only engage with the rightful landowners and heirs, disregarding the tenants (both the people renting the house and the traders in the area).

2.6. Feedback from KBDC

i. KBDC has been instructed by the higher authority to only deal with the rightful landowners and heirs.

ii. KBDC claimed that there is engagement with the public but still less participation. Most of them only attend the sessions conducted by KBDC only to listen to the briefing. They mentioned that there is no contribution from the public because of 2 reasons: First, they are not the original landowner and mostly are heirs. Second, they are not residing in Kg Bharu.

iii. There are several levels of engagement with the public for them to participate in the redevelopment programme.
   a. With the landowners/heirs
   b. Political components
   c. NGO's – Hawkers Association, PAKAM and PPKB (representing the public in general)
   d. The wise men in Kg Bharu which include academia, intellectuals, planners, professionals, developers etc.

iv. There were 2 rounds of public participation pertaining to Kg Bharu Redevelopment Programme.
   First round:
   a. Public engagement being done publicly – in Kelab Sultan Sulaiman and PWTC.
   b. Specific engagement with the landowners according to the land lot number which was retrieved from the Federal Territories Director of Lands and Mines Office which was later corroborated with other sources.
   c. SMS
   Second Round:
   a. KBDC went to all villages under MAS Land to explain in the programme. It has been more crucial at this point as the people have become more critical of the programme.
   b. When preparing the Cabinet paper on the incentives for the landowners, it involved public participation as well but perhaps it was at a higher level of participation.

v. They argued that the establishment of KBDC is the outcome from the demands made by the public who wanted a separate entity from the authorities to manage the redevelopment plan.

vi. KBDC suggests that the reasons for the rejection from the public on the programme are because:

    a. Absence of knowledge and understanding of the programme itself.

    b. The presence of political pressure. Previously Kg. Bharu was under PAS (opposition political party) and they were quite vocal in criticizing the idea to redevelop Kg. Bharu.

3. CONCLUSION AND STEPS FORWARD

3.1. Need to get clarification with certain agencies and get a better understanding on the land status and legal aspects. Agencies include Federal Territories Director of Lands and Mines Office and Attorney General Office.

3.2. Transcribe the data and start on the analysis. Plan to transcribe in the original form and not to translate from Malay language to English. Will only code in English and translation will be done when needed during analysis.

3.3. Will also do document review simultaneously.

3.4. Prepare the questions for interview sessions which will be conducted in the 2nd phase of fieldwork. Questions will be based on whatever information gained during the 1st fieldwork and all necessary information needed to validate the data gathered.

Appendix F: Brainstorming on issues gathered from data collection

Themes emerged from the brainstorming session

ORGANIZING THEMES	SUB THEMES	
Land issues	Land ownership	- How to resolve multiple ownership issue? - Who play the role in resolving this?
	Land status	- Freehold vs Restriction of interest. What is the impact on development, value and the regulations? - Conflicting info and understanding of the landowners on the land status and the impact.
	Compensation	- Methods of compensation. - Who decides on the compensation? - Landowner's reaction of the method proposed. How well-informed are they?
	Land value	- Comparison on land value with the surrounding areas - Who decides on the value? - Factors involved in deciding the land value

Ethnic Issue	Sensitivity on Malay rights	- Why Malay rights has become major issue in this matter? - The history and background of Kampong Bharu. - Does it really matter to the landowners?
	Laws to protect Malay rights	- Federal Constitution vs government ideology
	Ethnic tolerance	- Rights of other races - Other races acceptance on issue of Kampong Bharu
Influences	Political Influence	- Role of political masters - Role of the opposition political parties
	Political will of national government	- What are the government's political will with regards to the development? - How do government portray their commitments?
	Monarchy influence	- Is there any? - Is it significant? If yes, to what extent? - Is it out of courtesy of Federal government for taking away Kuala Lumpur from State of Selangor?
	The hidden hands	- Who are they and what are their roles? - How do they influence the decision making process
Power and Authority	Legitimacy of agencies/institutions	- Existing Act and law
	Hierarchical power of government agencies	- Who has the upper hand?
	Accountability and integrity	- Who are they accountable to? - In cases of their integrity
	Empowerment	- Is there any legal standing? - How is it being done? - Issue of reassigning roles and responsibilities
	Exertion of authority	- How do they show their authority? - Is there any conflict between the authorities? If there is, how do they resolve it?
	Duplication of functions	- How do they resolve any conflicts which arises from the different source of command?
	Diminishing power of MAS Board	- What is the current position? - What power and authority do they have before? - What power and authority do they have now?

Governance	Government machinery	- Who governs and what are their powers?
	Accountability	- What are their accountability and who are they accountable for?
	New approach of government in addressing issues	- The set-up of a corporation – why the decision? - Who made the decision? Factors influencing the decision. - The impact of the decision on other government agencies.
Law	Statutory and legality	- Existing law and bylaws. - The differences and the impact of law under different States (for this case, the impact when Kuala Lumpur was under State of Selangor before and currently under the Federal Territories).
	The practice of law	- The enforcement of existing law. Do they actually practice all regulations? - How often do they bend the rules? Why it is being allowed? What will be the impact? - The impact when the law is silent.
	Conflicting laws and bylaws	