

Communicating European Identity

Media Coverage and Citizen Discourses on Turkey's Accession to the EU in Austria and the UK

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Abstract

Increasingly accelerating cultural, economic, political, and social transformations have put the question of identity firmly on public, political and research agendas. Identity has become the new master concept to give answers to the meaning of the disintegration of old structures and the creation of new ones. The fostering of a European identity has been of great interest to EU policy makers as a way to support and legitimatise the EU integration process. Drawing on constructivist identity theories which consider a significant Other as a general constituting feature in all identity construction processes, it is argued that Turkey's accession creates a unique context for analysing European identities as it poses a significant Other against which such identities are formed. The development of the Republic of Turkey from the remainders of the Ottoman Empire links the country to the image of the Eastern Other which played a crucial role in the construction of European unity in the past.

Grounded in empirical data from a cross-national comparison of Austrian and British newspapers and focus groups, this PhD project explores three distinct research questions. The first question investigates as to whether Turkey functions as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined today. The second question analyses how and to what degree citizens use mediated information and personal experiences in European identity constructions. The third question examines the boundaries (i.e. differences) and modes of identification (i.e. similarities) evoked by Turkey's accession to the EU in media and citizen discourses and what they reveal about the status and definition of European identity.

As previous research has largely focused on defining European identities through levels of identification in form of shared feelings of belonging to EU institutions, EU symbols or trust in fellow EU citizens, this research further highlights the importance of boundaries and differences in identity constructions. Drawing on the concepts of identification and difference, this research project proposes a more comprehensive approach to explore European identities by taking both elements of identification and othering into account. By combining media and citizens' perspectives into a comparative research design, this research forms a unique contribution to existing research.

Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Abstract	iv
Contents	v
Tables	viii
Abbreviations	ix
Introduction	1
Context and Topical Relevance	1
Research Approach	4
Structure of Thesis	6
Chapter 1 The Role of the Other for Collective Identity Constructions	9
1.1. Concepts of Identity: Definitions and Critique	9
1.2. Operationalising Identity: Similarities and Differences.....	16
1.3. Linking Individual and Collective Levels of Identity	18
1.4. The Case of National and European Identity	20
1.5. Summary	24
Chapter 2 Historical and Political Context of EU-Turkey Relations	25
2.1. Europe and the Eastern Other in European Identity Formations	26
2.2. Turkey's Orientation Towards the West	32
2.3. Chronology of EU-Turkey Relations	37
2.4. Issues and Policy Debates	42
2.5. Summary	45
Chapter 3 Mediated Differences and Similarities and the Construction of European Identities	47
3.1. From Mediated Realities to Mediated Identities	47
3.2. Mediated Perceptions and Collective Identities	53
3.3. The Construction of European Identities in National Media	56
3.4. Summary	58
Chapter 4 Research Design for Analysing European Identities	59
4.1. Research Questions and Hypotheses.....	61
4.2. Selection of Countries	62
4.2.1. Great Britain and the EU	67
4.2.2. Austria and the EU	71

4.3. The Use of Content Analysis to analyse European Identity Constructions in National Newspapers	74
4.3.1. Research and Gaps	76
4.3.2. Selection of Newspapers and Time Periods.....	79
4.3.3. Article Selection Criteria.....	80
4.3.4. Sampling Strategy and Units of Analysis	82
4.4. The Use of Focus Groups to Analyse European Identity Constructions Among Citizens	86
4.4.1. Research and Gaps	87
4.4.2. Focus Group Composition and Questions	92
4.4.3. Ethical Considerations for the Use of Focus Groups.....	96
4.5. Coding Procedure Using PASW Statistics 18 and NVivo 8.....	98
Chapter 5 Turkey’s Role in European Identity Formation Processes.....	100
5.1. References to European Identity in Austrian and British Media Coverage	101
5.2. References to European Identity in Austrian and British Focus Group Discussions	113
5.3. Comparison of European Identity References in Austrian and British Media and Citizen Discourses.....	118
5.4. Summary	121
Chapter 6 The Use of Media References and Personal Experiences for European Identity Formations in Focus Groups	122
6.1. Media References and Personal Experiences in GB.....	122
6.2. Media References and Personal Experiences in Austria.....	131
6.3. Comparison of Media References and Personal Experiences in Austria and GB.....	144
6.4. Media Stories and Long-Term Memory	147
6.5. Summary	149
Chapter 7 Topics Related to Turkey’s Accession to the EU in Media and Focus Group Discussions.....	150
7.1. Topics in Austrian and British Media Coverage.....	151
7.2. Topics in Austrian and British Focus Group Discussions	174
7.3. Comparison of Topics in Austrian and British Media and Focus Group Discussions	190
7.4. Summary	194
Chapter 8 Arguments in Support and Against Turkey’s Accession to the EU	195
8.1. Arguments in Austrian and British Media Coverage.....	195

8.2. Arguments in Austrian and British Focus Group Discussions	215
8.3. Comparison of Arguments in Austrian and British Media and Focus Group Discussions	228
8.4. Summary	232
Chapter 9 Key Findings and Conclusions.....	233
9.1. Turkey's Significance for European Identity Constructions.....	233
9.2. European Identities as Mediated Identities	235
9.3. Mapping European Identities	237
Appendix	240
1.1. Codebook	240
1.1.1. Variables on Article Level	240
1.1.2. Variables on Topic Level	243
1.2. Focus Group Questionnaire	255
1.3. Statement of Consent Form.....	256
Bibliography	258

Tables

Table 1: Support for Further EU Enlargement	63
Table 2: Support for Turkey's Accession to the EU in Austria and the UK.....	64
Table 3: Support for Turkey's Accession to the EU Among the EU Public.....	66
Table 4: Overview of Newspapers and Editorial Positioning	79
Table 5: Search Terms for Online Databases.....	80
Table 6: Population and Sample Overview of Newspapers	84
Table 7: Focus Groups Demographics	93
Table 8: Focus Groups Overview	94
Table 9: Data View Window in PASW Statistics 18.....	99
Table 10: Topic Salience and Evaluations in Newspapers Across Countries.....	152
Table 11: Topic Salience and Evaluations Across Newspapers.....	169
Table 12: Topic Salience and Evaluations in Newspapers Over Time.....	172
Table 13: Topics Related to Turkey's Accession to the EU in Austrian and British Focus Groups	175
Table 14: Topic Salience in Austrian and British Newspaper Articles and Focus Group Discussions.....	192
Table 15: Salience of Arguments in Support and Against Turkey's Accession to the EU in Austrian and British Newspapers Across Countries.....	199
Table 16: Salience of Arguments in Support and Against Turkey's Accession to the EU in Austrian and British Newspapers Over Time....	213
Table 17: Eurobarometer Results of Public Attitudes Towards Turkey's Accession to the EU	217
Table 18: Supporting and Opposing Arguments for Turkey's Accession to the EU in Austrian and British Focus Groups	220
Table 19: Supporting and Opposing Arguments in Austrian and British Media and Citizen Discussions.....	229

Abbreviations

AKP = Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Party of Justice and Development

AT = Austria

BZÖ = Bündnis Zukunft Österreich/Alliance for the Future of Austria

CAP = Common Agricultural Policy

CDU/CSU = Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern; Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union of Bavaria

CEEC = Central and Eastern European Countries

EB = Eurobarometer

EC = European Community

EEC = European Economic Community

EMS = European Monetary System

ERM = Exchange Rate Mechanism

EU = European Union

ECtHR = European Convention on Human Rights

FPÖ = Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/Freedom Party of Austria

GA = Die Grüne Alternative/Green Alternative Party

GB = Great Britain

GDP = Gross Domestic Product

MEP = Member of the European Parliament

NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OIC = Organization of the Islamic Conference

ÖVP = Die Österreichische Volkspartei/The Austrian People's Party

Ö1 = Radio Österreich 1/Austrian public broadcasting radio station

PASW = Predictive Analytics Software

PKK = Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan/Kurdistan Workers' Party

PPD = Percent Point Difference

TRNC = Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UK = United Kingdom

UN = United Nations

USA/US = United States of America

VÖI = Vereinigung Österreichischer Industrieller/Federation of Austrian Industrialists

Introduction

Context and Topical Relevance

Increasingly accelerating cultural, economic, political, and social transformations such as the collapse of communism, migration and globalisation as well as the growing influence of supranational institutions like the EU have put the question of identity firmly on public, political, and research agendas. Searches for answers of the meaning of the disintegration of old structures and the creation of new ones have mainly driven the increasing use and popularity of the concept of identity in academic discussions. It has taken on the dimensions of a new master concept replacing race, national character, and social consciousness (Malesevic and Haugaard, 2002). In a world where so many aspects of life are temporary and flexible, identity provides a way of making sense of these changes and locating our place within it.

Change appears to be one of the main facilitators to prompt the emergence of identity questions. The surfacing of questions of European identity falls into a period of institutional transition from an economic to a political union. The introduction of the Eurobarometer surveys in 1973 to capture European public opinion and the first elections of the European Parliament in 1979 illustrate a growing emphasis on the EU citizen. These developments form the preparatory ground for the ad hoc committee on A People's Europe, chaired by the Italian MEP Pietro Adonnino in June 1984, to adopt measures to strengthen the community's identity through the introduction of symbols and the promotion of information, culture, and citizen rights (Commission of the European Communities, 1988). This initiative marks the first time that European identity was explicitly addressed and mentioned in official EU documentation.

The emergence of a European identity has been of great interest to EU policy makers as a way to support the EU integration process. This is mirrored in political theory which considers the emergence of a political identity as a significant contributing factor to the legitimisation of a political community (Bruter, 2005). EU

institutions have largely addressed the fostering of European identity as a matter of public communication. This approach has seen the creation of a Directorate General for Communication within the European Commission and the implementation of a branding strategy. This branding has mainly been realised through measures of symbolic production that include the EU flag, EU anthem, the Europe Day on 9 May, or the “United in diversity” motto (Aiello, 2007).

Questions of European identity have re-emerged and intensified over Turkey’s prospect EU membership. Turkish ambitions to join the EU are mainly fuelled by the country’s understanding that EU membership is the final proof of being accepted as a Western country (Rubin, 2003). The first formalised cooperation between the EU and Turkey dates back to 1963 with the establishment of the Ankara Agreement¹. EU-Turkey relations culminated in the formal opening of accession negotiations on 3 October 2005. Since then, progress has been slow and severely interrupted by a stop of negotiations over Turkey’s failure to implement and apply the Ankara Protocol to Cyprus. By March 2007 accession negotiations were reopened and continued with the opening of further chapters.

Turkey appears to be the least European candidate country with its Muslim culture, geographic location, and history as one of Europe’s most significant opponents. Arguments against Turkey’s EU accession seem to outnumber the benefits by far. Taking into account widespread negative European public opinion the list of concerns continues to be long and complex. It includes human rights violations, the country’s size, and potential influence on EU institutions, Turkey’s reluctance to recognise the Republic of Cyprus, encumbered relations with Greece, and deep-rooted cultural prejudices. Positive aspects such as economic benefits or the facilitation of democratic reform processes in Turkey are too slow and far in the future to be appreciated. On the Turkish side, short-term disadvantages of Turkey’s accession are much more apparent and have united European accession critics from both the secularist and traditionalist side (Shakman Hurd, 2006).

What looks like a firm ground for denying Turkey EU membership is not as solid as it appears. It covers merely a fraction of the complex relationship between Turkey and the EU and misses the manifold connections between the two. Popular

¹ i.e. Agreement Creating an Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community.

arguments that suggest that the success of EU accession lies with Turkey's efforts alone overlook Europe's struggle to deal with questions of identity which play an increasingly important role in the current enlargement process (Tziampiris, 2009, Yükleven, 2009). Turkey's accession poses, in many ways, a challenge to the EU due to its perceived otherness as a big, poor Muslim country. The country's special status as an "unusual" or "awkward" candidate derives from the way its accession simultaneously challenges the EU's existing institutional, material, and identitarian status quo (Arvanitopoulos, 2009, Arıkan, 2006).

Turkey's accession to the EU provides great potential to initiate another period of change for the EU where questions of European identity are likely to emerge. These changes are brought upon by the ways Turkey challenges the EU's institutional, material, and cultural status quo. In this sense the country has been described as a litmus test for the EU to see whether enlargement decisions are entirely based on universal principles of human rights and democracy (Avci, 2006). It will most certainly be a litmus test for the application of the Copenhagen criteria and their range of interpretation. Further and more importantly, it will test the EU's ability to address the discrepancy between notions of Europe with its cultural legacy and the political realities of the EU. It forces the EU to rethink and adapt its current identitarian positioning to a prospective future with a Muslim member state. This makes Turkey's EU membership bid an interesting subject of analysis to explore formations of European identities.

These identities are increasingly shaped by mass-mediated information as most of the things people know goes beyond information drawn from or shared in interpersonal communication. This is particularly true for knowledge about anything outside the immediate scope of experience like understanding a supranational organisation such as the EU or a foreign place like Turkey. While some may have gained first-hand experience of the country through a holiday trip, for the majority of people Turkey remains the construct of a mediated reality. As for the EU, even a trip to Brussels might add little to the understanding of the complex processes of EU institutions. Instead, the media is at times the only source of information which people draw on to imagine and understand reality.

Due to their capacity to enlarge the scope of people's reality, the media have been conceptualised by medium theorists as extensions of our human senses that

allow people to expand their knowledge beyond immediate physical experiences (McLuhan, 1964, Meyrowitz, 1985). By extending the senses, the media are seen to have the potential to do more than simply expand, but to fundamentally transform people's perceptions of the world (Waite, 2003). The media constantly expose people to new environments. By doing so they enable them to be part of events that would otherwise be out of reach or would simply go unnoticed. They make people aware and connect them with other people, cultures, politics and institutions forming an important basis for making sense of this world and locating their place within it.

Just as much as media connect people with realities beyond the scope of their immediate physical experiences, they are also drawing boundaries that disconnect, exclude, and isolate at the same time. They can do so by ways of disconnecting or distancing people by drawing socio-cultural boundaries in mediated forms of communication. It is not a particularly obvious form of disconnection as it is channelled through a feeling of being connected to others by a medium. Connectedness created through mediated realities does not directly translate into a communal sense. It merely creates a platform for the construction of identities through modes of difference and identification in relation to others.

Research Approach

Drawing on constructivist identity theories this research is largely based on the identity concept of the sociological subject (Hall, 1996) which considers a significant Other as a general and central constituting feature in all identity construction processes. It is argued that Turkey's accession creates a unique context for analysing European identities as it poses a significant Other against which identities are formed. The development of the Republic of Turkey from the remainders of the Ottoman Empire links the country to the image of the Eastern Other. In this sense, Turkey can be seen as the successor of the Ottoman Empire in its role as Europe's opposing Eastern Other. Strong public opposition in the EU (European Commission, 2006a) and references to Turkey as an "unusual" and "awkward" EU candidate reflect this.

Grounded in empirical data from a cross-national comparison of Austrian and British newspapers and focus groups, this PhD project explores three distinct research questions. The first question investigates as to whether Turkey functions as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined today. The second question analyses how and to what degree citizens use mediated information and personal experiences in European identity constructions. The third question examines the boundaries (i.e. differences) and modes of identification (i.e. similarities) evoked by Turkey's accession to the EU in media and citizen discourses and what they reveal about the status and definition of European identity.

Previous research has largely focused on defining European identities through levels of identification in form of shared feelings of belonging to EU institutions, EU symbols or trust in fellow EU citizens to define the content and nature of European identity (Bruter, 2005, Scheuer and Schmitt, 2009a). Similarly, degrees of European news coverage in national media outlets have been interpreted as indicators of an Europeanisation of national media systems (Semetko et al., 2000, de Vreese, 2003) pointing towards the emergence of a European identity. Further, a growing body of literature has explored media coverage of Turkey's accession to the EU in member states as well as Turkey. These studies have focused largely on key EU events like EU summits, major milestones in EU-Turkey relations such as the nomination of Turkey as an official EU candidate country in December 1999, or the official start of accession negotiations in October 2005. To complement these short-time studies this PhD project provides a longitudinal study of news coverage over a period of time that covers the developments in EU-Turkey relations since the announcement of the start of accession talk in October 2004 to commence the following year in October 2005 until August 2009.

While large-scale opinion polls have measured general levels of support or opposition towards Turkey's accession to the EU (European Commission, 2006a) citizen views as to why and how they feel supportive or opposed remain largely unexplored. Recent studies have addressed these shortcomings (Bruter, 2008, de Vreese et al., 2008) by highlighting issues of measurement and the need to better understand "soft factors" such as feelings of belonging as predictors for opinion outcomes. This PhD project seeks to explore European identity formation processes among citizens by particularly looking at how media messages are used to form such an identity.

This PhD project draws on the concepts of identification (Hall, 1996) and *différance* (Derrida, 2000) to expand and complement these EU identification and Europeanisation studies by proposing a more comprehensive approach to explore European identities by taking both elements of identification and othering into account. Drawing on structuralist identity theories this study argues that an opposing Other embodies a main and general constituting feature in all identity formation processes. This opposing Other functions as a focus point against which identities are discursively constructed. According to this model people largely form their identities by referring to what they are not as a mean to say who they are.

The empirical analysis is based on data from a cross-national comparison of national Austrian and British newspaper coverage from October 2004 to August 2009 and focus groups conducted in July and August 2009. The selection of countries follows the rationale to compare opposing positions to capture the full scale of contrast. While Austria and GB share similar levels of scepticism towards EU integration, they have distinctly opposing stances towards Turkey's accession to the EU. Other than GB which is taking a neutral to positive stance Austria features strong opposition.

The idea to compare newspaper coverage and focus group discussions is inspired by the motivation to analyse the formation of European identities both from an elite and citizen perspective. Media tend to represent elite views and pronounce conflicts for reasons of increased news values which can distort and misrepresent the views held among citizens. Consequently a polarisation of the issue is a common outcome of most media studies. Providing a comprehensive analysis from both perspectives this PhD project complements elite media discourses with the analysis of citizens' point of views to form a unique contribution to existing research.

Structure of Thesis

This thesis is divided into three theoretical chapters, a methodological chapter, four analytical chapters, and a concluding chapter presenting key findings. **Chapter 1** establishes the theoretical framework on which the research design is based. It is argued that Hall's (1996) sociological subject provides the most suitable theoretical

foundation for a working definition of identities. The concept's focus on a significant Other as a constituting feature of identity constructions suggests that Turkey provides a relevant and researchable context for an analysis of European identity constructions. The chapter introduces the concepts of identification (Hall, 1996) and *différance* (Derrida, 2000) as a way to map the inner and outer lines of demarcations of European identities. It is suggested that individual and collective identities are linked and that European identities have to be understood in specific national contexts. **Chapter 2** provides the contextual framework of EU-Turkey relations. This includes a historical review outlining the importance of the Eastern Other for European unity in the past, the modernisation of Turkey since the founding of the republic in 1923, and a chronology of EU-Turkey relations and major issues since the 1950s. The chapter argues for the conceptualisation of Europe as a multiplicity of context-bound interpretations instead of a single homogeneous model. **Chapter 3** argues that the media are a major source of people's experiences and therefore play an important role in the construction of identities. It emphasises the interplay between the media as one of the main providers of the symbolic codes to distinguish between self and other on the one side, and the individual to actively form identities by selecting mediated information and relating it to personal experiences on the other. Further, the chapter draws on the theory of impersonal influence (Mutz, 1998) as a way to explain how people's perception of what others think affects their sense of identity the most. The chapter argues that identities are largely constructed in the context of national media outlets which make the emergence of a unified European identity an unlikely prospect.

Chapter 4 outlines the overall research design for analysing European identities. It includes the proposed research questions and hypotheses, a rationale for the selection of countries, and their relation to the EU. Further, the chapter covers the use of content analysis to analyse European identity constructions in newspaper coverage and focus group discussions. The rationale for the order of the empirical chapters is twofold. First, the empirical analysis tests whether Turkey bears a specific relevance for European identity formations. Second, the empirical chapters then gradually build up an argument for Turkey's significance in European identity formations. Special emphasis is put on the specifics of citizens' identity formations to allow an informed comparison of media and citizen discourses in the final chapters. In particular, **Chapter 5** explores Turkey's role for European identity

formations by analysing explicit references to European identity or a European future in media and citizen discourses. It highlights that the construction of European identities is subject to country and discourse specific characteristics. **Chapter 6** concentrates on the use of media references and personal experiences in European identity constructions among citizens. It evaluates the degree of media dependency and considers people's attitudes towards their media use. **Chapter 7 and Chapter 8** are linked by the same research question and focus on the identification of the inner and outer demarcation lines of European identities. This is done in a two-step approach. The first step analyses the contextual setting of discussions around Turkey's accession to the EU. It investigates the topic salience and corresponding evaluations in media and focus group discussions. The second step examines supporting and opposing arguments of Turkey's accession to the EU. Negative topic evaluations and arguments opposing Turkish EU membership are considered as differences representing outer demarcation lines. Positive topics and supporting arguments are seen as similarities indicating inner demarcation lines of European identities. **Chapter 9** is structured around the three main research questions. It concludes the thesis by testing the hypotheses and discussing the key findings.

Chapter 1

The Role of the Other for Collective Identity Constructions

The ambiguity of the notion of identity has led to critique that deem it as unsuitable for empirical research. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that “[w]hatever its suggestiveness, whatever its indispensability in certain practical contexts, ‘identity’ is too ambiguous, too torn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ meanings, essentialist connotations, and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social analysis” (p. 2). This chapter aims to challenge this critique by establishing a theoretical foundation that serves as a basis to prove that Turkey’s accession to the EU provides a researchable context to explore the constructions of European identity.

This chapter proceeds by first locating major concepts of identity in the literature before arguing for a working definition. As a next step the chapter discusses the employability of the concept for empirical research by identifying the concepts of identification (Hall, 1996) and *différance* (Derrida, 2000) as the defining parts in identity construction processes. Then, the chapter will examine the concepts of individual and collective identities and reflects on the defining elements of national and European identity.

1.1. Concepts of Identity: Definitions and Critique

In an attempt to argue for a working definition of identity that can be used for empirical research, this section draws on Hall’s (1996) classification that distinguishes between three major concepts of identity. These include 1) the Enlightenment subject, 2) the sociological subject, and 3) the post-modern subject (pp. 597-598). The Enlightenment subject revolves around the idea that identity is a given attribute that an individual maintains throughout life. This understanding of identity is characterised by stability and coherence. The concept of the sociological subject is based on mutual influences between subject and environment. It reflects the understanding that a person’s identity is not a given and independent entity, but a

relational construct. The identity of the sociological subject is formed through an individual's relation to significant Others. It is through this contrasting process or othering that an individual's identity crystallises. The defining attribute of this concept is its relational focus on a constituting Other. The post-modern subject is based on the idea that identity is something in constant flux. It is neither fixed, nor essential, or coherent. Instead, identity is understood to be a dynamic phenomenon that never materialises into something permanent. The focus of this section is to build up an argument that the sociological subject provides a better theoretical basis for a working definition of identity than the other two concepts.

The emergence of the notion of identity falls into the epoch of Enlightenment in the early 18th century marking the beginning of modernity. It is a period of great changes transforming societal structures and seeing the formation of nation states. The supersession of feudalism by a growing middle class marks a shift from old to new social structures where the bourgeois self takes centre stage. Inspired by the humanism of the Renaissance, this era is influenced by a strong belief in the rationalism of the individual and a person's self-determination. It is in this context that an individual is largely understood as a rational and independent subject with a unified, coherent and stable identity (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006).

The strong point of the Enlightenment subject is the methodological accuracy that this concept of identity offers. Its focus on stability and coherence means that it can be measured on the basis of a fixed set of identity manifestations and attributes that are assumed to emerge from the individual. This essentialist definition would mean that all EU citizens share an equal understanding of European identity and that these views remain the same over time. In the light of the cultural and national diversity of the EU and its dynamic nature of enlargement and institutional reform processes this seems implausible. The weak point of the Enlightenment subject is that it does not take into account environmental influences such as different contexts and changes over time. An individual does not exist in isolation. Assuming that a person's identity is fixed and unchanging ignores the changes that a person undergoes in the course of a lifetime, relations to others, and the consumption of information through modern mass media. A concept that disregards the complex and dynamic realities of today's world is ill equipped to explain the emergence, transformation, or decline of identities.

The post-modern subject, which is based on a fluid notion of identity, rejects any essentialist claims that refer to identity as a static continuum. Its strength is that it embraces the dynamics of identity constructions that emerge from the ever changing processes of social transformation. According to this concept identity is subject to constant change and characterised by complexity and inconsistency. Kershen (1998) compares this fluctuation of the post-modern subject to consumer behaviour where “many of us could, and some do, go shopping for the ‘most suitable’ identity as we go shopping for our seasonal wardrobes” (p. 2). This would mean that European identity is constantly changing and never materialises into something traceable. This conceptual dynamic brings a considerable methodological disadvantage. The elusive nature of the post-modern subject makes it unsuitable for empirical research. Malesevic (2002) argues that “if the concept of ‘identity’ is used theoretically to mean anything and everything (as in some works from poststructuralism and cultural studies) then it empirically means nothing” (p. 202). If it is assumed that people change their identities with such frequency then any attempt to capture these modifications empirically becomes obsolete. The assumption that anything and everything is constantly changing is not convincing. The concept of the post-modern subject appears to disregard the factor of pace. The slow processes of institutional, economic or social transformations make it improbable that people change their identities with the tact of a metronome. The relative pace of environmental change and people’s longing for stability makes it more likely that identity constructions hold some elements of continuity as well as change.

The concept of the sociological subject sees identity neither as something coherent and stable over time nor as something in constant flux. Its focus on relations to significant Others provides an important starting point for empirical analysis. If identities are constructed through relational processes of othering then an analysis of the similarities and differences that form these identitarian demarcation lines offers a way to capture identity constructions. This theoretical concept supports the empirical analysis of European identity constructions through a study of similarities and differences evoked in discussions about Turkey’s accession to the EU. Turkey, as the successor of the Ottoman Empire, functions as Europe’s opposing Eastern Other against which European identities are formed.

The concept of the sociological subject is part of the theory of social constructivism. This theoretical approach defines identity as a constructed, situational, multiple, and relational process embedded in social practices (De Fina et al., 2006). Complex processes call for equally complex and flexible concepts. Looking at the defining attributes of this concept individually will help to get a clearer picture of the ways of employing it for empirical research.

One of the major common attributes of literature in this field is the relationality of the subject to other subjects and the environment. This characteristic offers an important link for the empirical examination of identities. This feature emphasises that identities are produced as part of an exchange or discourse which requires at least two subjects to be established. The very basis for this aspect of identity is some form of mutual acknowledgement.

Taylor (1989) points out that it is not possible to have an identity on one's own, but that identity can only be realised in relation to other conversation partners. He describes these relations in his concept of "webs of interlocation" (p. 36). For him identity only exists within discursive practices that emerge from the dialogical exchange of individuals. According to this, an individual can only become aware of its identity through relations and references to others. Benwell and Stockoe (2006) make a similar point when defining identity "in terms of *who people are to each other*, and how different kinds of identities are produced in spoken interaction and written texts" (p. 6, emphasis in original). For them identity is a discursive process based on language and interaction. These definitions suggest that identities are manifested in discursive practices. This supports a research design to explore the construction of identities in discussions among citizens or mediated forms of communication.

In further support of this argument is the approach by Berger and Luckmann (1966) who define identity as "a phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic between individual and society" (p. 194). They argue that an individual's identity is shaped and influenced by social relations. According to this understanding an individual is a platform onto which identities are projected by external social processes. The subject itself takes little part in the active creation of identities, but is subordinate to the social structures of its environment. The shortcoming of this definition lies in its dialectic imbalance between individual and society. The

individual is seen to only react to the structures it is confronted with. This approach disregards the potential of the subject to actively take part in the construction of identities.

The relational nature of identity is also highlighted by Graham and Hart (1999) who note that “it is a situated and relational socially constructed narrative, capable of being read in conflicting ways at any one time, and of being transformed through time” (p. 264). According to this definition identities are not only relational, but also context bound. This is also highlighted by Sarun (1996) who argues that identity is not abstract, but always located in a given space and time and that the study of the concept needs to take this into account. Following this line of argument Neumann (2001) points out that identities are bound to specific contexts. This means that both contextual macro-structures like political frameworks as well as contextual micro-structures related to situational specifics contribute to the construction of identities. This would mean that perceptions of European identities can differ from one national context to another and from one point in time to another. These theoretical considerations would make the existence of a single European identity shared simultaneously across nation states very unlikely.

In addition to the contextual specifics that influence the construction of identities, Gramsci (1988) highlights the importance of a historical factor in the formation of identity when he argues that “each individual is the synthesis not only of existing relations but of the history of these relations. He is a précis of the past” (p. 326). According to this view identities are not just context-bound, but carry certain elements from the past with them. While acknowledging that identities are constructed as part of specific contexts this approach emphasises that this is not the only constituting feature. It suggests that European identities are historically rooted constructs that carry memory-like conceptions with them that continue over time and project their influence onto context-bound identity constructions in the present. Guibernau (2007) also singles out continuity over time as an important constituting feature. This is how he comes to conclude that “all identities emerge within a system of social relations and representation” (p. 10). The first signifies the context-bound identity constructions of the present, the latter the historical baggage that is linked to them. This could explain why European identities continue to carry Christian connotations with them, while the context of today is largely characterised by increasingly secular European societies.

As part of the relational dimension of identity constructions Castells (2004) points out that identities can be created by significant institutions. He emphasises that these institutional identities only become reality when they are internalised by an individual who then uses these identities to construct meanings around it. This suggests that efforts by the EU to create and strengthen European identities can only have success if these attempts are backed by the European public.

Fragmentation is another defining attribute characterising notions of constructivist identities that breaks with the assumed unity of identity as a single homogeneous construct. Hall (1996) illustrates this point by arguing that “identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured” (p. 4). Similarly, Cohen (1994) notes that “in the modern ... world, identity is fragmented, a process that starts with the fragmentation and humbling of the human ego itself” (p. 204). Calhoun (1994) highlights that the constitution of identities is far from being a harmonious process, but more like a struggle to accommodate “multiple, incomplete and/or fragmented identities (and sometimes resistances)” (p. 24). Woodward (1997) offers a valid explanation as to why fragmentation is such a defining attribute for constructivist identities. She argues that the plurality of sources of identity and their sometimes conflicting nature results in equally fragmented identities. In this sense fragmentation needs to be acknowledged as an important element of describing the reality of individuals and collectivities. This suggests European identities are the result of different identity sources including mediated information or personal experiences.

Plurality is another attribute characteristically of social constructivist identity conceptions. Similar to fragmentation it can also be seen as a consequence of numerous identity sources that individuals are surrounded with. It highlights that identity is to be understood not as a singular entity, but that multiple identities can co-exist alongside each other (Lemke, 2008, Hall, 1996: 4, Bruter, 2005). It implies that an individual can hold different identities and not just one master identity. It means that a person’s national identity does not become europeanised, but can form a separate entity. This theoretical notion suggests that identities do not replace one another, but can materialise into multiple entities as part of one individual.

Defining identity as a process embedded in discourse leads to narrativity as another attribute that is characteristic for social constructivist definitions of identity.

Bauman (2004) defines identity as a form of fiction. He argues that identity is not something that a person is born with, but an invented form of fiction to close the gap between the realities of someone's circumstances and what the person aspires to be. This would mean that European identity constructions carry a significant share of future projections with them to elevate the realities of the present. The prospective nature of identities has the potential to change reality. For the analysis of identities this means that they are to be understood as aspirations rather than mirrors of reality. In this sense identities appear to carry strong references to the future.

The narrative dimension of identity is a crucial aspect that contributes to the understanding and definition of the concept. Individuals are surrounded by various public narratives that form the social world they live in (Julios, 2008, Tilly, 1996). Somers (1994) defines narrative identities as constituted in "culturally constructed stories composed of (breakable) rules, (variable) practices, binding (and unbinding) institutions, and the multiple plots of family, nation, or economic life" (p. 625). She highlights that identity narratives do not originate from a person, but are constructed and mediated by the institutions and practices of the social world. It suggests that European identities are largely driven by EU institutions and the communicative practices that mediate them to the citizen.

The main arguments for using the sociological subject as a theoretical foundation for an analysis of European identity constructions lie in the advantages provided by the main attributes of the concept. According to these identity is to be understood as a 1) constructed, 2) situational, 3) multiple, 4) fragmented, and 5) relational process. The first attribute pays particular attention to the institutional and social influences on identity constructions. The second attribute highlights that identities carry traces of the past as well as projections of the future. The aspect of multiple identities accommodates the emergence of different identities that can be attributed to one individual. The fragmented notion of identities offers a way to understand them not as finished products, but as patchwork-like constructions. The relational nature of the sociological subject takes into account various forms of social relations ranging from personal to mediated ones. All these elements are reflected in Rutherford's (Rutherford, 1990) definition of identity which he describes as follows: "Identity then is never a static location, it contains traces of its past and what it is to become. It is contingent, a provisional full stop in the play of differences and the narrative of our own lives" (p. 24). From this the following

working definition of European identities is derived: European identities are socially constructed and context-bound narratives that emerge as identification and demarcation lines in relation to significant Others.

Overall, this section argues for the selection of Hall's (1996) sociological subject as the preferred theoretical foundation for a working definition of identity as it is based on a significant Other as the main constituting feature of identity constructions. This theoretical concept suggests that the study of Turkey's accession to the EU represents a significant context for European identity constructions.

1.2. Operationalising Identity: Similarities and Differences

After having argued for the sociological subject as the most promising theoretical foundation, this section seeks to build up an argument for the employment of identification and difference as a way to concretise and operationalise identity in empirical research. These two concepts describe some form of mutual acknowledgement and belonging on the one side and the construction of boundaries and distancing on the other. These two elements both form essential parts of the identity formation process. Melucci (1996) describes this duality as inherent to the concept of identity by arguing that "the paradox of identity always consists of the fact that difference, in order to be affirmed and lived as such, presupposes a certain equality and a degree of reciprocity" (p. 74). This exemplifies that identity consists of both a sense of belonging and difference. This paradox is also being addressed by Calhoun (1994) who notes that, while emphasising difference, identity always refers to 'common frames of significance'" (p. 25). This suggests that identity constructions around significant Others require also some form of similarity or shared denominators. According to this understanding, countries like the UK or Austria distinguish themselves through cultural difference, but share a common recognition to accept each other as nation states.

Treating this duality as a vital part of the identity formation process leads to the conceptual distinction between identification (Hall, 1996) and *différance* (Derrida, 2000). The concept of identification, which has originally been introduced by Sigmund Freud as part of psychoanalysis, is employed in this context according

to the definition by Hall. Unlike difference, identification is “constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation” (Hall, 1996: 6). Identification is not something that just stands by itself, but which requires a contrast and boundary, a definition of what it is not to mark what is outside in order to define what is inside. This is highlighted by Hall’s argument when he notes that the process of identification entails “the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries, the production of ‘frontier-effects’” (Ibid.: 3). This point illustrates that identification requires boundaries. Calhoun (1994) notes in this context that identification, or what he calls kinship, does no longer offer a framework for identity: “Kinship still matters to us as individuals: we invest it with great emotional weight, but kinship no longer offers us an overall template of social and personal identities” (p. 11). This suggests the need for a more inclusive approach that acknowledges the importance of difference for the construction of identities.

The creation of any meaning through difference is based on the notion of *différance* by Derrida (2000). It suggests that identities come only into existence through relations of difference (Redman, 2000). Acknowledging that Saussure (1959) was the first to highlight the role of difference in language for the creation of positive terms, Derrida uses this approach to generalise that there is no meaning at all without difference. He refers to this universal principle as *différance* and describes it as a conceptual process and all-encompassing system. Derrida argues that the practice to represent meaning through the sign is an indirect form of presence and therefore never the real thing. As a consequence the sign is described both as secondary and provisional. By secondary he refers to the fact that the sign stems from an original presence. Provisional indicates that the sign is a temporary mean to substitute the missing presence. Having outlined the surrogate processes in the construction of meaning through the sign, Derrida argues that the principle of *différance* is of original origin. By that he means that the principle constitutes the origin of differences and the universal basis of direct meaning.

Drawing on Saussure’s argument that language only consists of differences, Derrida concludes that meaning does not stand by itself, but only comes into existence with reference to something other than itself. In other words, it is within the system of *différance* that a subject becomes a subject in contrast to constituting

differences that can take on the form of an opposing Other. The relevance of differences to create meaning is also reflected in the formation of identity. Cohen's (1994: 1) hypothesis "You know who you are, only by knowing who you are not" illustrates the application of Derrida's universal principle of *différance* to identity formation processes by highlighting that identities are largely constructed by notions of difference. Similarly, Shore (1993) notes that people establish their identity to a large part by defining what they are not.

Overall, this section has introduced the concepts of identification and *différance* and their importance for the construction of identities. These concepts form an important basis for the employment of measurable indicators in form of variables signifying similarities and differences for empirical analysis.

1.3. Linking Individual and Collective Levels of Identity

Identity applies to individuals as well as groups, but is there a distinction to be made between individual and collective level that is conceptually meaningful? In order to answer this question an analysis of similarities and differences between individual and collective levels of identities will follow.

Other than individual identity, collective identity applies to a group of people that recognises itself as a community. Schlesinger (1993) summarises four main characteristics that exemplify collective identities which include 1) the creation and sustenance of a self-identifying community through cultural symbols, 2) dual processes of inclusion and exclusion to distinguish the collective consciousness from others, 3) selective memory and amnesia to create specific versions of history to support the collective identity over time, and 4) locality that situates collective identity in a national territory. He argues that it is vital to consider the origins, evolution and contextual setting of a social group when looking at constructions of collective identities. What can be drawn from this definition is that both individual and collective identities are relational. This suggests that individual identities are always embedded in greater collective social structures. Referring back to the social constructivist definition of identity, individual identity does not emerge from the individual, but is constituted in discursive work (De Fina et al., 2006). Hall (2004)

comes to a similar conclusion when he argues that “an individual’s self-consciousness never exists in isolation ... it always exists in relationship to an ‘other’ or ‘others’ who serve to validate its existence” (p. 51). This is a starting point to critically review the distinction between individual and collective levels of identity and explore the connectedness of both levels.

Continuing with another definition of collective identity Melucci (1996) defines it as “an interactive and shared definition produced by a number of individuals (or groups at a more complex level) concerning the *orientations* of their action and the *field* of opportunities and constraints in which such action is to take place” (p. 70, emphasis in original). These “action systems” are created and sustained through interpersonal and mediated communication channels. Melucci argues that a distinction between individual and collective level does not affect the concept of identity since “what changes is the system of relations to which the actor refers and with respect to which his recognition comes” (Melucci, 1982, cited in Schlesinger, 1991: 154). This highlights that an understanding of identity as a process is more important conceptually than a distinction between different levels.

A similar point is being made by Calhoun (1994) and Mennell (1994) who argue that it is more helpful to understand identity as a project or process than to focus on the distinction between macro- and micro levels. Calhoun (1994) points out that the politics of individual and collective identities are inseparably linked and that a distinction between them is not possible. He argues that “identities are often personal and political projects in which we participate, empowered to greater or lesser extents by resources of experience and ability, culture and social organization” (Ibid.: 27). This highlights that aspects of both private and public domains become mixed in any constructions of identities. Mennell (1994) supports Calhoun’s argument by drawing the conclusion that a distinction between individual and collective identity is more abstract than real. He argues that this differentiation is the product of structural thinking and describes it as “an artefact of our customary modes of concept formation” (Ibid.: 193). Drawing on the work of Norbert Elias (1997) who suggests to treat individual and society as parts of “process sociology” instead of separate entities, Mennell suggests to also understand identity as a process. This connects well with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) definition of identity which they describe as a phenomenon stemming from the dialectic between

individual and society (p. 195). Here, a distinction also becomes obsolete as identity is something constructed as a relational process by and between both elements.

Overall, the literature discussed above suggests that a distinction between individual and collective identities, though common, is not essential for the understanding of the notion of identity. The links between both levels are too closely tied together to justify a conceptual distinction. This suggests that European identities hold elements of individual identities and vice versa.

1.4. The Case of National and European Identity

Having built up a supporting argument to define identity as a process that disposes of the need to distinguish between individual and collective levels the next question to address is how to distinguish between different collective identities? This is an important theoretical question to be discussed to offer guidance for the empirical analysis of this project which aims to identify formations of European identity.

While national identity represents a specific form of collective identity (Schlesinger, 1991), European identity, as a supranational identity, appears hard to be accommodated alongside national collective identity conceptions. Are there different features and construction mechanisms that help to distinguish between the two? Smith (1991) defines national identity and nation as “complex constructs composed of a number of interrelated components – ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political. They signify bonds of solidarity among members of communities united by shared memories, myths and traditions” (p. 15). This definition highlights the main elements of national identity that include political and cultural components to form a sense of belonging and unity. In the same way European identity is seen to be based on a common history, values and people that can be fostered by unifying symbols such as the EU flag or the Euro – a view largely shared among policy makers. Smith (1991) argues that “the heritage of Roman law, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism and individualism, Enlightenment rationalism and science, artistic classicism and romanticism, and, above all, traditions of civil rights and democracy” have created “an overlapping family of

cultures” (p. 174). What remains open, however, is what elements are specific to national and to European identity.

It appears to be far easier to find similarities between constructions of national and European identities than it is to identify characterising differences. Anderson (1983) notes that national identity is a cultural artefact, but this is also true for European identity. Brubaker (1996) describes a nation as a unit of identity, loyalty and feeling among citizens of belonging together, but this could also be argued in a European context. Gellner (2006) conceptualises nationalism as a political principle that is based on the assumption that state and nation should overlap. This principle could also be applied to the case of the EU which is based on the assumption that only European states can become members of the EU². Lunn (1996) suggests that national identity is constructed by specific uses of the past. The same could be said about constructions of European identity which employ references to its Roman-Graeco cultural heritage. Another feature that both national and European identity conceptions share are unifying narratives of origin and destiny as pointed out by Delanty (2005).

Guibernau (1996) argues that national identity is a collective sentiment based on a particular set of distinct attributes shared by people belonging to a particular nation. She outlines five dimensions that constitute national identity which include psychological, cultural, territorial, historical, and political aspects. These dimensions largely overlap with the ones mentioned by Smith (1991), but they do not offer any specifics that could be attributed to national identity. By admitting that national identity is characterised by a fluid and dynamic nature (Guibernau, 1996) the argument of any essence becomes obsolete. This is the conclusion that Cohen (1994) arrives at. He addresses the impossibility of an essential national character by arguing that this would require “a single genetic blueprint radically different to that of other nations, or a set of traumatic historical experiences that affected the whole nation uniformly” (p. 197). Further, processes like the Europeanisation of national identities (Spohn, 2005) complicate any attempt to distinguish between different notions of national and European identities.

² See Treaty of Rome, Article 237. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2011. *Treaty of Rome* [online]. [Accessed 2 March 2011]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.

Turning to definitions of European identities Schimmelfennig (2001) argues that the EU is based on a thin post-nationalist identity defined by liberal values, including human and political rights, individual freedoms and civil liberties, and norms of domestic and international conduct. What he describes as a postnationalist liberal identity does not clarify any defining elements and suggests instead a rather universal character of European identities. The emerging question “What is so European about European identity” has been addressed in a similar way by Burgess (2002) who asks what is particularly European about the EU. Drawing a distinction between the EU and Europe he argues that there is something unique about the concept of Europe, but avoids naming the defining elements that would help to support a differentiation.

Other scholars addressing definitions of European identity have argued against the conceptualisation of it as a homogeneous unity based on the nation state model. Sjursen (2006) suggests to locate European identity in the concept of constitutional patriotism as a state of “in between-ness” (p. 213). Calhoun (2001) argues to see it “as an institutional arena within which diversity and multiple connections among people and organizations can flourish partly because they never add up to a single, integrated whole” (p. 38). This is a view also shared by Schlesinger (2001) who concludes that “despite the rhetorical claims, the EU does not have a transcendent common culture and identity analogous to the national cultures and national identities of its component states” (p. 99). Spohn (2005) supports this argument when he notes that there is no single EU identity shared equally among all member states. This suggests that, although there is no unified and coherent identity that applies to all EU member states in the same way, it does not mean that a European identity does not exist at all. This connects with the previously mentioned attribute of contextuality and the embeddedness of identities in time and space. It means that European identities are something that people experience in a different way depending on the context. It also means that different people in different member states and groups within it experience European identities differently.

The discussion above has identified two main challenges for a theoretical distinction between collective identities and their operationalisation in empirical research. These include the problem to define national and European identity in terms of identifiable attributes on one side and the consequential problem of

distinguishing between the two on the other. If neither national nor European identity can be defined it is difficult to distinguish between the two.

There is, however, one attribute of identity constructions that offers a partial solution. Eder (2005) points out that encoding a boundary is what gives a collective its particular identity. This suggests that analysing the constituting elements and ways boundaries are drawn define collective identities. Taking up this argument leads to what can be identified as another common denominator in both national and European identity formations: the role of a significant Other as a crucial defining element. It emerges as a main and general feature in all identity formation processes and is derived from the notion of *différance* (Derrida, 2000). Hall (1996) highlights the importance of a significant Other by arguing “that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not ... that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term – and thus its ‘identity’ – can be constructed” (pp. 4-5).

Applied to the context of this study this would mean that Turkey, as the embodiment of the Eastern Other, evokes different boundaries in Austria than it will in GB. In Austria it is more likely that Turkey causes the drawing of strong cultural boundaries due to its historical encounter to defend Vienna against the Ottoman Empire. In GB Turkey and its history as a former ally is much more likely to provoke boundaries around more universal liberal values. In both cases a merging of elements of national and European identity is inevitable. This is due to the increasing transformation of national identities through processes of Europeanisation (Spohn, 2005) and the connectedness of national and European identities (Finger, 1990).

This suggests that an analysis of boundaries and similarities evoked by Turkey in a national context will always represent a mixture of both national and European perceptions of identity. Taking this into account empirical results need to be seen as interpretations of European identities through an Austrian or British perspective.

1.5. Summary

The first section of this chapter has argued for Hall's (1996) sociological subject as the preferred theoretical foundation for a working definition of identity. The concept's focus on a significant Other as a constituting feature of identity constructions suggest that the study of Turkey provides a relevant and researchable context for an analysis of European identity constructions. The second section introduced the concepts of identification (Hall, 1996) and *différance* (Derrida, 2000) and their importance for the construction of identities. These concepts form the basis for the selection of empirical indicators to analyse the construction of European identities. The third section concluded that a distinction between individual and collective identities is not essential for the understanding of the notion of identity. Both levels are too interconnected to be treated separately. These theoretical considerations suggest that European identities hold elements of individual identities and vice versa. The literature discussed in the last section offered no meaningful distinction between collective identities such as European or national identities. Instead, it suggests that collective identities are closely linked. This implies that European identities need to be understood in the context of an Austrian and British perspective. These theoretical considerations inform the definition of empirical indicators to analyse constructions of European identity.

Chapter 2

Historical and Political Context of EU-Turkey Relations

The opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 has further accelerated the need to address crucial questions concerning the EU's identity and future. Turkey is unlike any other candidate country before, in a sense, that it is an openly religious country that seeks membership in a secular EU. It is also a Muslim country aiming to join a Union with member states of predominantly Christian heritage. With this, Turkey is in a position of not only facing the fulfilment of formal accession requirements, as outlined in the Copenhagen criteria³, but is also likely to be affected by the increasing importance of identitarian factors that question its Europeaness.

The following chapter explores the historical and political developments that constitute the current framework of EU-Turkey relations. The first section addresses the manifold ties that Europe shares with its Eastern neighbour and the role of the Eastern Other in the formation of European unity. The second part concentrates on the modernisation of Turkey since the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. The chapter concludes with a chronology of EU-Turkey relations and a brief overview of the major issues in public debates.

³ The so called "Copenhagen criteria" were introduced as a set of membership requirements at a meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993 in preparation of the future accession of countries from Central and Eastern Europe. They require EU candidate countries to adopt measures to ensure democratic standards, to have a functioning market economy, and to fulfil the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2011. *Enlargement* [online]. [Accessed 31 January 2011]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/criteria/index_en.htm.

2.1. Europe and the Eastern Other in European Identity Formations

The joint history of Turks and Europe goes well beyond the last 52 years of EU-Turkey relations when Turkey first applied to become an associate member of the EEC in 1959. These ties expand to connections between the Ottoman Empire and European nations and can even be traced back to Greek mythology. What is now known as Turkey has been more than Europe's opponent and military enemy as commonly described. At other times it has also been a trading partner with strong cultural influences and a military ally to European nations. These changing allegiances and links are symptomatic for European history. Emphasising Europe's cultural and political diversity this section argues for an understanding of Europe not as a unified model, but as a multiplicity of different interpretations.

Mango (2005) points out the various political, cultural and economic ties between the Ottoman Empire and parts of Europe since the 14th century. The scope of these exchanges includes military cooperation between Ottoman forces and the Byzantine Empire, alliances with France against the Habsburgs, with England against Spain or with Britain, France, and Sardinia against Russia. Other examples include economic trade partnerships between the Ottoman Empire and countries such as Britain, adaptations of fashions⁴ or the implementation of local administration following the French example in the 19th century. The above highlights that the Ottoman Empire meant different things to different European states. For some it was an economic partner or military ally. For others it embodied a political opponent. In the case of Austria-Hungary it was both. While besieging Vienna in 1529 and the Battle of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire fought together with its allies Germany and Austria-Hungary in the First World War. While the first is widely known the latter tends to be ignored in public discourses.

This stands in contrast to dominant interpretations that picture the Ottoman Empire as an enemy of the entire European civilisation and calls for a more differentiated view. Not only has the Ottoman Empire changed allegiances over the course of history, but so did former trade partners and military allies like Great Britain and France. Although never ratified, the planned division of the Ottoman

⁴ Examples include the popularity of turquerie interior designs in Europe or the adaptation of baroque architectural styles in the constructions of mosques.

Empire between the Allies France, Italy and Great Britain after the First World War, as outlined in the Treaty of Sèvres⁵, has been repeatedly described as a traumatic experience for Turks with the effect of strong reservations against Western countries and a weakening of Turkey's self-confidence (Dokos, 2009).

These rather ambivalent connections form an important basis for the understanding of the complex relationship between Turkey and the EU. While the EU continues to highlight its achievements as a unifying peace project, overcoming the war ridden past of most of its members, it does not seem to be as benevolent when it comes to historical conflicts with the Ottoman Empire. Rather, Turkey continues to carry notions of its past as Europe's Eastern Other. These continue to form a part of identitarian discourses as argued by Neumann (1999) who notes "The East' is indeed Europe's other, and it is continuously being recycled in order to represent European identities. ... The question is not whether the East will be used in the forging of new European identities but how this is being done" (p. 207).

The concept of the Eastern frontier serves as an important reference point in the context of European identity formation since it has played a major role in forming European unity in the past (Delanty, 1995). While European identity is and has been forged by a range of Others such as the USA or Russia, it is "the Turk" that remains the dominant Other in the history of the European state system (Neumann, 1999: 39-40). The developments that led to the East-West divide prompting "the Turk" to become Europe's main Other are complex and reveal Europe's manifold ties with the East. Describing the complex power relations and somewhat ambivalent ties between Europe and its Islamic Other Said (2003) notes that "the Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilisations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (pp. 1-2). This marks two important aspects of European identity that illustrate its ambivalent nature: the interconnectedness of

⁵ The Treaty of Sèvres refers to the peace treaty signed by the Ottoman Empire and the Allies after the end of World War One. The treaty divided Anatolian lands among European countries and Turkey's neighbours (Göksel, 2009).

Europe and the East through joint historical origins and the transformation of the East into an image of the Other.

The origins of the word Europe, which later evolved into a concept and structuring force of reality, lie in classical mythology. In this founding myth Europa is described as the daughter of Telephassa and Agenor, the Phoenician queen and king of the Levantine city of Tyre, located on the coast in present day Lebanon. The story tells that Zeus, King of the Gods, falls in love with Europa and approaches her in form of a bull. Europa, feeling attracted by the bull, climbs on its back from where she is brought across the sea westwards to Crete. There, she becomes the mother of several of Zeus' sons and later marries the king of Crete (Hay, 1957). Noticing that the setting of the myth is located in an area that is now considered to be part of the East, Delanty (1995) points out that Europa can be considered as an "eastern import" (p. 17). This is only one of several examples that demonstrate the connection of Europe's origins with the East. Further cases of Europe's Eastern roots include the Arabic presence in Spain and Sicily with Cordoba and Toledo being important locations from where Islamic culture spread to Europe (Ibid.). These examples illustrate the shifting of borders throughout history and cast an interesting light on today's discussions about Turkey's contested belonging to the EU.

The East-West divide first started out as a division of geographic continents, then turned into a cultural opposition and only later became a political divide. The term Europe was originally applied to the mainland of Greece⁶ from where it expanded to continental Greece as well as areas West and North as part of the Greek colonisation of the Mediterranean. Continental differences were made between East and West, Persian and Greek, Asia and Europe. By the fifth century, these differences formed a non-political geographic East-West divide where Asia became antithetical to Greek culture, creating a dualism of Greeks versus non-Greek speaking barbarians (Gollwitzer, 1951). Romans adopted the Greek East-West polarity, but it did not bear any particular meaning to them (Hay, 1957). From there it was still a long way for the notion of Europe to become a structuring force of reality. During antiquity Europe was a term rarely used and it was not until the fourth century BC that Isocrates invented the connection of Europe with Greece and

⁶ As opposed to the Aegean islands.

Asia with Persia (Ibid.). In the second century AD, Ptolemy advanced this connection between what he called Sarmatia Europea and Sarmatia Asiatica and added the river Don as the separating border (Halecki, 1950). This definition became a dominant distinction and is still one of the geographical definitions in use for describing Europe today (Delanty, 1995).

According to Hay (1957) Europe and Asia, apart from their cultural opposition, did not have much political meaning in the Greek understanding and points out that the construction of Europe with “emotional content” did not take place until the seventh century (p. 14). Similarly, Delanty (1995) argues that Greeks did not consider themselves Europeans, but mainly as a cultural civilisation in opposition to anything else which they referred to as barbarism. He highlights the political dualism and ethnocentrism as a significant output that emerged from the distinction between Europe versus Asia. The formation of the East-West divide was mainly caused by the division of the supra-continental Roman Empire into two parts in 395 that created the Eastern and Western Empires which reflect the later civilisations of Europe and the Orient. The tendency to use the term Orient for the Byzantine East made it possible to describe Europe as the Occident. This division also introduced a religious distinction between the Oriental Byzantine East and the Occidental European West: while the Byzantine Empire followed the imperial tradition, Europe embraced Latin Christianity (Ibid.).

The beginning attachment of a territorial notion to Christianity which later resulted in the overlapping of Christianity with Europe is to be found in the success of Moslem intervention in the ninth and tenth centuries (Hay, 1957). These conquests counted Iraq, Syria, Palestine, North Africa and the fall of Alexandria in 642. They continued to include Anatolia, Persia, Mesopotamia and also reached parts of India, Indonesia and China. These conquests contributed to the image of Islam “to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of hated barbarians” and remained a “lasting trauma” (Said, 2003: 59). The Muslim conquest of Spain, after the fall of the Visigoths in 711, made the Pyrenees the border of European Christianity in the West. The Battle of Tours, between Frankish and Burgundian forces against armies of the Umayyad Caliphate, is seen as the starting point for the emergence of an identity in the West and of Europe as a “proto-cultural idea” (Delanty, 1995: 24). It was one of the first settings where the army of the Frankish leader Charles Martel was referred to as being European (Hay, 1957). What tends to

be getting overlooked or at times persistently ignored is that the so called “father of Europe” also formed alliances with Muslims if needed, despite his Christian military missions (McKitterick, 2008). This illustrates that the formation of Europe is much less clear cut, but a long-term and context-bound process with varying constellations of political, economic, and military coalitions between European and Eastern nations.

Three major factors contributed to the geographical attribution of Christianity to Europe. They include the gradual disappearance of differences in the light of the Moslem conquests, the discriminatory treatment of Christian minorities under Islam policy, and the hostility of Arabs against their enemies (Hay, 1957). These experiences between Islam and Christianity were significant in the formation of a sense of unity in the West. The Franks, having been converted to Christendom, became the “backbone of Christendom” with the Orient as the joint focus of opposition (Delanty, 1995). The rise of Islam polarised the divisions between the East and the West which in Delanty’s (1995) view “took on the character of a moral-religious divide with the Occident signifying civilisation and goodness and the Orient barbarity and evil” (Delanty, 1995). He argues that Christianity, which started as a universal religion without specific European geographical ties, became europeanised in the process of the Muslim advance and turned into the territorial religion of Europe. Davies (1996) notes that the concept of Christendom was gradually replaced by the notion of Europe through a complex intellectual process that started in the fourteenth century. By taking the place of Christendom as a unifying factor, Europe inherited a Christian legacy with ramifications for the understanding of European identity today.

These developments have contributed to the dominant perception that Europe equals Christianity. Religious figures such as pope Pius II are seen as influential facilitators of the interchangeable use of Europe and Christendom (Hay, 1957). This notion forms the basis of advocates of a Christian Europe who lobbied to have a Christian reference included in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe⁷ which was published in December 2004. The preceding Convention on the Future of

⁷ The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was rejected by two national referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005. The newly adopted Lisbon Treaty is a slimmer follow-up version of the original constitution.

the European Union⁸, chaired by former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, experienced intense debates about whether or not to include a reference to Europe's Christian religious roots (Kerry, 2007). Catholic churches particularly excelled in their support for such a reference (Aydin, 2009). Although the idea was dropped and no Christian reference included in the final European Constitutional text, it does not mean that the matter was concluded. Rather, this issue is likely to continue to be channelled through public debates.

The above illustrates that differing understandings of Europe lie at the very heart of such debates. Challenging attempts to monopolise interpretations of the meaning of Europe Jenkins (2008) points out that there is always a range of different Europes which makes it impossible to speak of a "clear-cut, consensual unified model of Europe" (p. 153). He argues that this state of vagueness is not a crisis, but a normal situation that can be seen as a common characteristic of the European project. Seeing the crisis of belonging as something symptomatic for the concept of identity (Bauman, 2004) devitalises views that this is something uniquely attributed to the EU.

Europe's multi-ethnic history and political and cultural diversity suggest conceptualising it not as a homogeneous model, but as a subject of different context-bound interpretations. Delanty (1995) highlights the dynamic nature of the idea of Europe when he argues "Europe can be viewed as a discursive strategy which is articulated by shifting signifiers in relational contexts" (p. 8). The analysis of different interpretations of what Europe stands for is crucial for the understanding of the disputes over the EU accession of Turkey. The manifestations of these interpretations in media and citizen discussions over Turkey's EU membership reveal the identification and demarcation lines of European identities. They are powerful underlying notions that conflict with the political realities of the EU. Burgess (2002) identifies this conflict as the tension between perceptions of Europe as "purveyor of a certain kind of cultural, spiritual or religious identity" and the bureaucratic shortcomings of European construction (p. 467). It is against this background that the emergence of identitarian discussions can be seen. They fill in

⁸ The Convention on the Future of the European Union included member states as well as EU candidate countries and representatives of civil society organisations.

the space created by the discrepancy between different notions of Europe and the formal Copenhagen criteria.

Overall, this section argues for a definition of Europe based on the notion of a plurality of different relational and context-bound interpretations, rejecting a singular and homogeneous model. The argument is based on Europe's historical transformations and political and cultural diversity that speak against claims of defining Europe as a Christian ethno-cultural unity with a cohesive European identity.

2.2. Turkey's Orientation Towards the West

Turkey's orientation towards the West and course of modernisation was a gradual process that started well before the founding of the republic. One of the first facilitators was the internationalisation of economic trade. The introduction of market liberalisations under Sultan Mahmud in the first half of the 19th century contributed to the emergence of a capitalist bourgeoisie. As a consequence the agrarian middle class prospered, since they could sell their products at higher prices than the national prices, while the crafts suffered under the pressure from cheaper manufactured European goods. After the First World War a minority of Muslims benefited from direct trade with Germany and Austria and established themselves as a new bourgeois class. This class marks the origins of the nationalist movement that was launched to stop the Treaty of Sèvres from being implemented (Ahmad, 2003).

It was General Mustafa Kemal Pasja⁹ who successfully persuaded the Allies France, Italy and Great Britain to dispose of the Treaty of Sèvres and to evacuate Istanbul. These developments culminated in the recognition of an independent Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923 and the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923. The Kemalists radically broke with the traditional and patriarchal views of the Unionists and the hierarchies of the old order. With the help of a French-derived administrative infrastructure and well

⁹ As part of the country's following modernisation and reform process Mustafa Kemal Pasja introduced compulsory surnames and later in 1934 chose the name Atatürk (i.e. "Father Turk") for himself (Mango, 2005, Ahmad, 2003).

trained administrators inherited from the late Ottoman Empire, the first president Mustafa Kemal pursued a strict process of Western-oriented modernisation and equality. His legacy laid the basis for most of Turkey's emerging political, economic and social contrasts.

Although reform measures included the creation of democratic institutions, secularism and women's rights Mango (2005) argues that Atatürk's rational approach did not equal a functioning democracy. He notes that a lack of checks and balances in the Jacobin-inspired first constitution lead to a concentration of power in the Assembly¹⁰. Similarly, Parker (2009) describes Turkey's democracy for most of the period following the Second World War as "distinctly *illiberal*" (p. 1090, emphasis in original). He argues that political freedoms and human rights suffered under the strict pursue and preservation of the nationalistic and secular legacy.

The critique above highlights two fundamental differences in Turkey's way to Westernisation and modernisation. First, it adopted a different form of secularism. Rather than separating religion from politics the Kemalists introduced "laicism" as a way to put Islam under state control (Ahmad, 2003: 84). And secondly, its democratic system resembled more what Schumpeter (1954: 269) calls a "thin" democracy rather than a liberal democracy following Dahl's (1982: 11) definition of "thicker" democracy which includes a free public sphere and active participation. As a consequence, the country's Kemalist understanding of democracy, with its centralist state organisation and functional separation of powers, has done little to support the emergence of a civil society (Weber, 2006).

The founding of the Republic of Turkey marked a radical break with Ottoman traditions. The first period of the young republic, stretching from 1923 to the 1930s, was characterised by a strict de-Islamisation that permeated all levels of public life. Islam, as the societal glue of a multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, was replaced by a faith in the nation, the creation of a national culture and the drive for Westernisation and modernisation (Kotsovilis, 2006). The political transformation that followed

¹⁰ This changed when a more liberal second constitution was implemented after a military coup on 27 May 1960. The constitution introduced a second chamber, a constitutional court, autonomous institutions, economic planning, guaranteed political and social rights, and proportional representation. Another constitution, which followed a military coup in 1980, sought to depoliticise both administration and society (Mango, 2005: 20, 22).

included measures such as abolishing the caliphate (1924), introducing Western clothing, changing calendar and week to Western standards (1925), abolishing the constitutional article describing Islam as the religion of the state (1928), the adoption of surnames (1934), or the introduction of the Roman alphabet. Examples of reforms introduced during the Kemalist era include a) institutional changes (e.g. the dissolution of religious associations in 1925), b) functional changes (e.g. the introduction of secular schools), and c) legal changes (e.g. abolishing Sharia courts, introducing the Swiss civil code in 1926) (Kotsovilis, 2006, Ahmad, 2003).

These changes, however, did not reach the people in the provinces who still associated strongly with the traditions and symbols of the Ottoman past. In order to reach people and to gain their support for the modernisation project, the Kemalists created a state ideology which was later to be known as Kemalism/Atatürkism. It was launched at a party congress in May 1931 and outlined six fundamental principles which were incorporated in the constitution in 1937. They included Republicanism, Nationalism/Patriotism, Populism, Statism, Laicism/Secularism, and Revolutionism/Reformism. The interpretation of these principles remained fluid and changed according to the needs of the growing bourgeoisie (Ahmad, 2003).

These measures contributed to the manifestation of a national identity and political culture based on etatism. This means that sovereignty lays with the state not its citizens. Despite other initial intentions, the elitist nature of Turkish secularist etatism led to the exclusion of large parts of society who preserved folk-Islamic elements. The centralised economy added to this emerging chasm to form an urban-secular versus rural-religious divide (Kotsovilis, 2006). These developments contributed to the emergence of a widening gap between rural and urban areas in Turkey.

The post-Kemal era brought political liberalisation and an opening-up of the strict secularist project which set the way for a greater role of the religious component of Turkish identity in public life. The introduction of a multi-party system in 1950 under İsmet İnönü had a liberalisation effect on society which led to a revival of religion. The renaissance of religion after World War II was accompanied by measures such as the reintroduction of religious education in 1948, allowing prayers in Arabic and support for Islamic publications. The religious rehabilitation, however, only accelerated the process of a deepening identitarian

fragmentation between the urban, secularist white population and the peasant black Anatolian population (Kotsovilis 2006).

The economic growth which Turkey experienced since the early 1950s improved conditions nation-wide temporarily, but was not enough to balance out the growing disparities. After 1955 an economic downturn set in and a rising inflation weakened the living standards of wage earners such as the military. Market liberalisation, the rapid industrialisation of urban areas and the systematic discrimination of rural development and its population further deepened the gap between the two fragmented Turkish identities and lead to the alienation of large parts of the population from the national secularist project. Structural incapacities to absorb large groups of internal migrants lead to the flourishing of religious safety networks on the peripheries of urban centres and Islamic schooling as an alternative to limited numbers of secular schools. These failures of the Turkish economic development strategy created a nation within the nation. On the one side there was a state dependent urban middle class and on the other a disadvantaged rural population, prone to seek social justice in religious networks and alternate political ideologies such as communism and political Islam (Ibid.).

Gradually the military took on the self-proclaimed role of the safeguard of the state and Kemalism, only to interfere with the democratic process four times (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997). Turkish NATO membership in 1952 is seen as an important factor in politicising the military class which suffered from the loss of prestige and living standards as part of ongoing inflation. The exposure of military officers to an international environment had its effect on their world views which translated into political reform ambitions in their own country (Ahmad, 2003). These developments gave the military class a new found self-esteem and contributed towards future military interferences in the democratic process.

These military interferences delayed Turkey's overall democratic transition and consolidation. Military influence on politics was institutionalised through the creation of the National Security Council (consisting of the Chief of Armed Forces, the Joint Chief of Staff, and other top government officials) to form the de facto executive body of the Turkish state. Processes of political liberalisation in the 1970s which included first expressions of political Islam were met by military intervention and the reinforcement of the secularist elements of Kemalism (Kotsovilis, 2006).

This history of regular military coups has cast serious doubts on the stability of the political system in Turkey.

Repeated undemocratic military coups could not completely suppress the entrance of religion in political life which continued to flourish after processes of political liberalisation in the 1970s. The 1980s saw the political Islamic movement benefit from increasing electoral support. The attraction and success of these parties lay mainly in their focus on social justice which a majority of the Turkish population was excluded from. The success of Necmettin Erbakan's explicitly Islamic Welfare Party in 1996, which took on the function of a diminishing welfare state, challenged the secularist establishment of the Turkish state and its identity (Kotsovilis, 2006).

New parties with Islamic associations appeared on the political scene marking the dwindling electoral support and ongoing disintegration of centrist politics (Çarkoğlu, 2004). Among them the AKP, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The political success of the AKP and its immunity to military intervention and bureaucratic suspicion is mainly based on three factors. Firstly, the electoral success of the AKP is largely based on improving the financial situation of large parts of the population (Ibid.). Secondly, the popularity of Erdoğan as a new leader figure can partly be explained by his non-establishment background (Ahmad, 2003). Thirdly, the AKP's approach to promote religion as a private matter and common cultural background rather than an issue of political governance (Kotsovilis, 2006). The latter had only limited success in convincing the European community and dispel concerns over the upkeep of secularism.

Nonetheless, the AKP has brought fundamental changes to Turkey's political scene since its electoral success in 2002. They include 1) the symbolic and economic inclusion of 'Black' Turks into society, 2) the AKP's pro-European judicial and political reforms, and 3) the prospect of political inclusion for Kurds and other ethno-religious minorities. AKP reforms have resulted in limited military influence on national politics, bolstered the education budget to become bigger than that of the military, abolished the death penalty, supported the decriminalisation of freedom of expression and expanded civil rights, particularly women's rights. Further, the AKP succeeded to expand its political support to include rural and suburban conservative groups and seeks to open up the political space to all minority groups (Kotsovilis, 2006). The implementation of these reforms still leaves room for improvement.

These developments have left the EU torn between support for the pro-European reform process of the AKP and the suspicion shown towards the party's roots in political Islam. Turkey's membership in the OIC has added to concerns that the country might feel attached to an Islamist discourse (Silvestri, 2007). The country's somewhat ambiguous relationship between religion and secularism forms a vital part in the controversy over Turkey's political stability and its efforts to position and present itself as a future EU member state.

2.3. Chronology of EU-Turkey Relations

Almost every enlargement of the EU has caused suspicion among its member states. The most recent accessions in 2004 and 2007, which saw twelve countries from Central and Eastern Europe become new members of the EU, was dominated by discussions labelling the process as too fast, too soon or too costly. This so called "big bang enlargement" (Ahrens et al., 2007) prompted intense debate about the EU's readiness to take on so many new members in such a short time. Earlier and smaller enlargements of individual countries also raised concerns among EU member states. The accession of the UK to the EU is an example of a country whose membership was contested because of its lack of European cultural affinity and was vetoed twice by France in 1963 and 1967 before it became a member of the EU in 1973. Up until today it continues to call itself and be called by others "a stranger in Europe" (Wall, 2008).

While it was a unilateral veto by the French government under President Charles De Gaulle that prevented a swift accession of the U.K. it has increasingly become a matter of public opinion to judge EU enlargement candidates. Among the most common reactions has been limited to low enthusiasm among the European public to welcome new member states to the Union. In Turkey's case, the country's EU application has seen exceptionally low levels of support (Arvanitopoulos and Tzifakis, 2009). While policy rhetorics, explicitly highlighting the European historical and cultural heritage of countries from central and Eastern Europe, have played in favour of their membership process, Turkey is being left outside this proclaimed European family (Arikan, 2006). Further, the EU's announcement to

consider the outcome of an EU enlargement process as open-ended for the first time (European Commission, 2005a), has added to the complexity of EU-Turkey relations.

The EU's proposal to turn Turkey's status into a privileged partnership in the event of failed accession negotiations has caused widespread critique and frustration on the Turkish side. Looking at the Agreement Creating an Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community (European Economic Community, 1977) which formed the beginning of the long-standing EU-Turkey relationship since its signing on 12 September 1963 explains the gravity of disappointment in Turkey. The so called Ankara Agreement was an important legal basis intended to realise Turkey's full membership in phases by planning the free movement of goods, people, services, and capital between the EEC and Turkey. This illustrates that Turkey's eligibility for full membership has been confirmed ever since it first applied for EEC membership in 1959 (Akçapar, 2006). It is against this background of longstanding relations, which foresaw Turkey's full membership as the final outcome, that Turkish reactions can be understood.

This uncertainty has been overshadowing recent EU-Turkey relations with serious ramifications for the future progress of the Turkish reform process. In this context Göksel (2009) highlights the need for predictability in EU-Turkey relations emphasizing its importance for the strengthening of the diverse pro-reform coalition in Turkey. She notes that before Turkey was admitted to become an official EU candidate, reforms requested by advocacy groups and intellectuals were ignored. With the EU's hesitation and proposed u-turn the continuation of the Turkish reform progress is in question. While dealing with a prolonged accession process is a tolerable though disappointing perspective for Turkey, the uncertainty about the final outcome has the potential to damage Turkey and its relations with the EU beyond repair.

Opinions that see forces at work that plot against Turkey have gained new momentum and are posing a threat to the stability of the delicate pro-reform coalition. Referring to the media's role in fostering such tendencies, Göksel (2009) points out that negative news coverage against Turkey's EU accession has played on Turkish pride and insecurities and revived historical fears such as the Treaty of Sèvres. What has also been labelled the Sèvres syndrome describes Turkish

concerns that the country could be torn apart by continuing processes of Westernisation (Yilmaz, 2009a). Cultural sensitivities and historical fears continue to play an important role on both sides in Turkish accession negotiations whose relevance has so far been underestimated (MacLennan, 2009).

The delicate Turkish-European relationship has also been described as one of “passion and pain” (Kushner, 1994: 683). This characterisation refers to the mutual attraction and bitter rivalries between the two sides over the course of centuries which has left the Turks particularly vulnerable as it was them who sought to transform and westernise according to the European model. Turkish ambitions to strive for EU membership as the final proof to be accepted as a Western country (Rubin, 2003) continue to be backed by high levels of public support. At the peak of support in 2003 almost three quarters of Turkish people (74 per cent) said they would vote “yes” in a referendum on Turkey’s EU membership. These numbers, which include a ten per cent increase from the previous year, are argued to be the result of the Erdoğan government’s decision to fully support Turkey’s EU membership (Yilmaz, 2005). Since then, however, first signs of EU fatigue have started to emerge. They are manifested in a rise of Euro-sceptic arguments that include fears of a rise of ethnic separatism, the loss of national unity and territorial integrity (Yilmaz, 2009a). The rise of Euro-scepticism in Turkey already reflects the negative effects of a prolonged accession process which are likely to grow further if the EU continues to pursue to revise the final outcome of the accession negotiations. Without a clear goal the EU risks losing ground as a strong facilitator of change in Turkey.

While an economic partnership was a sufficient level of cooperation at the early stages of EU-Turkey relations the gradual transformation of the EU from an economic community to a political union set the framework for demands of Turkey’s political integration in the EU. As part of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 two important bodies were created to institutionalise the relationship of Turkey with the EU. These bodies include the Joint Parliamentary Committee, with representatives of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the European Parliament, and the Association Council, a meeting of EU, member states, and Turkish authorities.

Turkey's history of military coups not only delayed the country's democratic development, but deteriorated its relationship with the EU. Each coup marked a serious setback in progressing Turkey's convergence towards the EU and caused several periods of frozen negotiations. The low points of EU-Turkey relations include a military coup in 1960, two further ones in 1971 and 1980, and Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and illegal occupation of the Northern part. It was not until the Turkish national multiparty elections in 1983 before the EC took up normal relations with Turkey again (Alexander et al., 2008).

In the aftermath of re-established relations, Turkey applied for full membership on 14 April 1987. The European Commission concluded that accession negotiations would not be taken up at this moment in time for reasons related to the internal and external changes in the community in the light of the fall of the Berlin Wall and Turkey's unsteady political and economic situation. Plans to intensify relations with Turkey became more concrete on 5 February 1990 when the Council of the European Union asked the European Commission to propose detailed measures to strengthen relations to Turkey.

In December 1997 Turkey was declared eligible to become a member of the European Union at the EU summit in Luxembourg, after its application for full membership had been previously declined by the European Council. Two years later at the EU summit in Helsinki, in December 1999, Turkey was recognised as an EU candidate country. This decision comprised a strategy for Turkey to support reform processes through financial assistance and other forms of cooperation. In March 2001 the Council of Ministers adopted the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey (The Council of the European Union, 2001) for the purpose of further assistance of Turkish authorities in meeting EU accession criteria such as the implementation of EU law. This coincided with the presentation of a National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis by the Turkish Government. This was followed by the adoption of national reforms through the Turkish parliament in September 2001 in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria and further political and human rights reforms in August 2002. In its progress report from 8 October 2002 the European Commission states that "The adoption of these reforms is an important signal of the determination of the majority of Turkey's political leaders to move towards further alignment with the values and standards of the European Union. The August reforms were adopted under difficult political and economic circumstances

and are particularly significant as they impinge upon traditionally sensitive issues” (Commission of the European Communities, 2002: 137). However, apart from the positive approval of reforms, the European Commission also expressed concerns, stating that “[n]onetheless Turkey does not fully meet the political criteria. First, the reforms contain a number of significant limitations ... on the full enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms. Important restrictions remain, notably, to freedom of expression, including in particular the written press and broadcasting, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion and the right to legal redress” (Ibid.: 139). On the basis of this progress report, the European Council agreed at the EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, to open accession negotiations with Turkey under the condition that the Copenhagen political criteria are met after an evaluation of the progress and a final decision of the European Council within two years time. Following the EU summit, the Council of Ministers decided on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives, and conditions of the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey in May 2003 (The Council of the European Union, 2003).

The EU summit on 17 December 2004 in Brussels marked the date of an agreement of the European Council to define the conditions for a definite and concrete start of EU accession negotiations with Turkey which were planned to begin on 3 October 2005. The Turkish government appointed State Minister Ali Babacan to become chief negotiator with the EU in May 2005. The formal opening of accession negotiations with Turkey started as planned on 3 October 2005 after the adoption of a Negotiating Framework by the European Council (General Secretariat, 2005). In November 2006 the European Commission adopted the Communication to the Council on accession negotiations with Turkey (The Council of the European Union, 2006).

Negotiations came to a halt on 11 December 2006 when EU Foreign Ministers met in Brussels to discuss Turkey’s failure to implement and apply the Ankara Protocol to Cyprus. The Council decided that until Turkey fully implements the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreements, eight chapters of negotiations relevant to the Ankara Protocol would not be opened and no further chapters closed. By March 2007 accession negotiations were reopened and continued in June 2007 with the opening of negotiations on the chapters Financial Control and Statistics (Joseph, 2006, Erdemli, 2003).

Since then Turkey's EU accession process has been slow but steady. By the end of 2007 negotiations on two further chapters¹¹ were opened. Shortly after, a revised Accession Partnership for Turkey was adopted by the Council of the European Union in February 2008. The latest developments include the opening of negotiations on three more chapters¹² in 2008 and 2010¹³.

The reasons for the uneven progress in relations are manifold and complex and cannot simply be attributed to one or the other side. While Turkey's bears the main responsibility for its history of repeated military coups and democratic instability as an obstacle towards negotiations, there is evidence that the EU has contributed to the slow pace of progress. Arikan (2006) argues that Turkey has possibly been treated differently ever since the Ankara Agreement in 1963. The nature of this different treatment was manifested in the largely absent "financial and moral support given to the CEECs to help them prepare for membership" (Lundgren, 2006: 138). This discrepancy changed after 1997 when the EU started to make explicit references to Turkey's membership ambitions at Council meetings and in formal reports.

2.4. Issues and Policy Debates

The following section attempts to shed some light on the complexities of the main issues related to Turkey's EU accession. One of the key issues concerns Turkey's political stability and democratic consolidation. After three military coup d'état in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and another military intervention in 1997, which put an end to the coalition government of prime minister Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party, Turkey's state structures suffer from a persistent democratic deficit (Keredis, 2009). Turkey's military forces have been described as being in the

¹¹ i.e. Trans-European Networks and Consumer and health protection.

¹² i.e. Intellectual property and Company law in June 2008; Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy in June 2010.

¹³ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2011. EU-Turkey Relations [online]. [Accessed 19 September 2011]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm.

paradoxical position of safeguarding democracy through nationalist forces, while impeding Turkey's democratisation (Ifantis, 2009, Kotsovilis, 2006).

Apart from military interventions that have delayed Turkey's democratic development it is the legacy of authoritarian Kemalism which causes problems to fulfil the standards of a liberal democracy. The main point of critique in this context is a weak civil society in Turkey (Weber, 2006). Survey data illustrates that, while the Turkish population shares close networks with family and friends, it only shows loose relations with the larger society (Alber, 2007). Turkey's reform efforts to comply with the EU Copenhagen criteria have helped to improve relations between state and civil society in Turkey.

Another problem of convergence lies with Turkey's outdated understanding of the European model. It is argued that, while Europe reinvented itself over the course of the last 60 years, Kemalism aspires to a Europe that does not exist anymore. Consequently, it is suggested that Kemalism has to reinvent itself in order for Turkey to remain European (Ifantis, 2009).

The tensions between the re-emergence of religion in the public and political sphere in the 1970s and secularist principles caused political Islam to become a hotly debated issue in EU-Turkey relations. While there is agreement on the need to include Turkey's religious identity in the political sphere (Kotsovilis, 2006) the ways how to achieve this remain contested. So far, the leading AKP party has proven victorious over attempts to abandon it on grounds of associations to political Islam, but it remains in a vulnerable position that casts doubts on the political stability of the country.

Political populism is seen as another hurdle towards EU accession. Turkey's political populism in the 1960s and 1970s has undermined Turkey's prospects for convergence with the EU. The emergence of neoliberal populism since the 1980s has caused Turkey to curtail the Copenhagen criteria with negative effects for the overall EU accession process (Eder, 2004).

Turkey's record of violations against human rights is a serious matter that has the potential to postpone progress significantly. Despite the lack of an official document to ensure the inclusion of human rights in EU legislation explicitly, the European Convention on Human Rights became an important instrument to safeguard human rights in the EU system (Alexander, 2008).

The disregard of rights of ethnic minorities such as the Kurds has also caused problems. With approximately 12 to 15 million living in Turkey (18 to 23 per cent of the population) the Kurds form a significant part of the Turkish population. Their demands for statehood or cultural autonomy and the refusals of the Turkish and neighbouring states such as Iran, Iraq and Syria to grant these requests have resulted in a series of Kurdish revolts, known as the Kurdish problem. Turkey's official strict policy lead to extremism and the creation of the PKK (Gunter, 2006).

The rights of women in Turkey are seen as a weak point that is echoed in European public opinion. While Turks are proud to look back on the early introduction of women-friendly legal reforms such as the Civil Code of 1926 which abolished polygamy and introduced the right for women to divorce and get custody of their children, it is still a long way to transform a predominantly patriarchal society with prevailing discrimination and low levels of women's participation in political life (Pope, 2005). Widespread domestic violence and cases of honour killings add to this critique. Turkey's respect for civic rights has also caused concerns after prominent trials against journalists and authors on the basis of violations of article 301 of the new penal code for insulting government, military and "Turkishness" (Weber, 2006).

The Cyprus problem poses another unresolved problem for Turkey's accession to the EU. The war in 1974 led to the creation of an ethnically homogeneous Turkish Cypriot part in the north of the island which was proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. Only recognised by Turkey the northern part remained isolated, while the internationally recognised southern Republic of Cyprus eventually joined the EU in 2004 after failed negotiations for a reunification under UN supervision. With Turkey refusing to accept the Republic of Cyprus as the legitimate government of the island, it is left in frustration over the lack of interest from the Greek Cypriot government to revisit the Annan plan (Bahcheli, 2006).

The costs of Turkey's accession to the EU are seen as a major challenge or even threat to the EU's resources. This, however, has been put into perspective by economic analyses that suggest that the cost of Turkey's accession to the EU is smaller than generally assumed and mainly of a budgetary nature. It is argued that migration costs are likely to be very small and will mainly affect low income earners. The argument is based on three main considerations. The first one points

out that EU imports from Turkey only account for 3 per cent. The second notes that Turkish agricultural exports are already tax free and unrestricted. And the third highlights that the institutional quality of the EU will not suffer under a Turkish enlargement (Ugur, 2006).

Turkish-Greek relations are seen to have transformed from a problematic to a positive aspect in Turkey's progress towards accession. Greece, since it became an EU member in 1981, has changed from a strict opponent to a supporter of Turkish EU membership. The reasons for this change are best to be found in the argument that a European Turkey will make a better neighbour and will provide a better chance to find a solution in Cyprus and the Aegean for a lasting regional peace (Kazamias, 2006).

The Armenian issue is a relatively new issue adding to the complexity of Turkey's accession to the EU. Ever since the passing of a bill in the lower house of parliament in France that would make it a crime to deny the Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey as genocide in 2006 the issue has received increased public attention and caused critique on the Turkish side.

The US involvement in Turkey's EU accession process can be traced to three main reasons of support. They include the civilisational dimension, the symbolic dimension, and geostrategic dimension of Turkey's EU membership (Taspinar, 2006).

2.5. Summary

This chapter has illustrated the contextual parameters for a better understanding of EU-Turkey relations and addressed the significance of the Eastern Other for European unity in the past. The first section has rejected a singular and homogeneous model of Europe based on evidence showing Europe's historical transformation and political and cultural diversity. As a consequence Europe is understood as a multiplicity of context-bound interpretations. The second part has mapped Turkey's modernisation and addressed the prevailing ambiguity over the AKP-lead EU reform process and the party's roots in political Islam. The last two

sections have focussed on the uneven progress of EU-Turkey relations over the past 60 years and major policy issues.

Chapter 3

Mediated Differences and Similarities and the Construction of European Identities

Mediated realities form an essential part of our daily lives. They have become increasingly integrated and interwoven with all aspects of people's public and private lives. People's encounters with media range from the provision of information to the management of social networks which form an ever growing and changing basis for people's experiences. This means that media are responsible for producing large parts of the contexts in which people find themselves in and relate to. With the media becoming more and more part of people's social world, makes them a significant contributor to identity formation processes. On the one hand, the media make us more aware of the manifold connections to others and ourselves. On the other hand, they show us how we are disconnected and different from others. The media allow us to compare ourselves to different people beyond our immediate surroundings.

This chapter explores the ways how the formation of identities is connected to mediated communication. The first section focuses on the concept of mediation to discuss the media's influence on identity formation processes. The second section addresses the role of mediated perceptions of others on collective identity formation processes. The third section highlights how constructions of European identities are largely taking place in national media environments.

3.1. From Mediated Realities to Mediated Identities

People are surrounded by an increasingly mass-mediated environment that feeds into their experiences and embeds their ways of thinking. This makes the concept of mediation an important starting point to explain the transformative power of the media and their relevance for identity formations. Given the continued integration of mediated communication in people's lives and the increasing number of time they spend on it has led scholars to speak of the media as a process that is

changing societal institutions, people's perceptions of the world, and the ways people manage their lives (Livingstone, 2009, Waite, 2003, Bennett and Entman, 2001). Mediation takes into account the past and ongoing transformation of institutions and society caused by the changes and developments of communication media. It is an approach to understand communication in a broader context that goes beyond the media and a way to see how citizens actively draw on the media in their constructions of identity. It is therefore a useful theoretical approach to understand identity constructions in media and citizen discourses.

One of the key characteristics of the concept of mediation is to understand communication not only in the context of media, but in a broader sense that also includes social contexts where media is consumed and given meaning by public and private protagonists. In his conception of *mediations* Martín-Barbero (1993) maps this expanded notion by arguing that communicative processes creating mass culture can only be understood when media and practices of communication like social movements are taken into account. He describes how the conception of communication has changed to be seen as a process of mediations and a question of culture rather than one of media alone. From this follows, that mediation aims to understand communication as a process where meaning and hence identities are negotiated in the context of a plurality of cultural frameworks. It includes the circulation of meanings about culture and the nation in both media and non-media related contexts (Madianou, 2005).

Meaning is not simply something that is communicated from the media to citizens, but only comes into existence in the mutual interplay of citizens and institutions. Silverstone (1999) makes the processual and interactive nature of mediation clear when he notes “[m]ediation involves the movement of meaning from one text to another, from one discourse to another, from one event to another. It involves the constant transformations of meanings, both large scale and small, significant and insignificant, as media texts and texts about media circulate in writing, in speech and audiovisual forms, and as we, individually and collectively, directly and indirectly, contribute to their production” (p. 13). This illustrates that the creation of meaning does not lie with the media alone, but that every citizen becomes a mediator in the production, transformation and circulation of meaning.

Silverstone (1999) goes as far as to argue that the choice is not ours to make when he notes “[w]e cannot escape the media. They are involved in every aspect of our everyday lives” (p. ix). People can of course choose not to read the news, to go off-line or switch off the TV programme. While this might temporarily stop exposure to mediated communication on an individual level, it does not stop the structural transformation on a larger scale. The degree of embeddedness of the media into the functioning of our society means that their influence continues to carry on even without direct or frequent use by individuals. What Silverstone means by this totality of the media is the scope and degree of their integration into societal and personal routines. He points out that the media are crucial to processes of how people make sense of the world. They do so by contributing to the ways how meaning is produced and shared. This gives the media great control over what is communicated, by what means and how far it is communicated.

This has led some scholars to speak of the “mediation of everything” (Livingstone, 2009: 1). This argument is based on a growing understanding to see media as a fluid process where everything is mediated rather than as a separate institution sitting alongside other societal institutions. Livingstone argues that the mediation of everything has transformed all influential institutions in society. She notes that this process has seen institutions like governments, education, the church or the family being subordinated to the monopoly of the media over the production, provision and dissemination of information. Traditional institutions continue to form vital elements of a functioning society and in most cases they are important sources of information. What changes in the process of mediation, is the control over what information is communicated via the media, how this information is presented and how citizens use mediated communication to make sense of their environment. In cases like European institutions the media are often the only way to introduce them to people’s reality. In that sense the media are more than providers of content and disseminators of information, they are creators of reality.

The mediation of everything has changed the sphere of action of institutions. Livingstone (2009) highlights the scope of the influence when she describes how the media have filled the space between institutions and citizens. By getting in between all participants in society the media have occupied the connecting points between institutions and their citizens. This enables them to significantly shape people’s relations with society. Beyond that, the media also shape people’s relations with

each other. Livingstone argues that it is due to this double-mediation of interpersonal and societal communication that the media mediate more than ever before. Further, she notes that the combination of social and technological changes has deconstructed the dualism of mass mediated and interpersonal communication to form new hybrid forms of mediated communication. This theoretical approach is quite different to the Habermasian conception of the media as “Organe der Öffentlichkeit” (1984: 14) or Luhmann’s (2000) theoretical definition which sees the media as an institution in a functionally divided society.

With the development of modern societies people’s sense of identity has changed to become “more reflexive and open-ended” (Thompson, 1995: 207). Thompson argues that with the institutional transformation and mediation of culture, individuals increasingly draw on mediated symbolic material in order to construct an identity for themselves. As a consequence, individuals don’t depend on a shared physical locale anymore. Instead, they can choose from a wide range of mediated symbolic material that connects them through a new mediated shared locale. The result is a new kind of mediated intimacy, as opposed to intimacy created in face-to-face interactions.

Thompson (Ibid.) argues that the main changes in the construction of identities through the mediation of culture stem from a new kind of intimacy facilitated through mediated interaction and the expansion of people’s experiences through mediated phenomena. He points out that, while people’s experiences have been disconnected by institutional and experiential segregation, which means that certain social phenomena such as illness and death are separated from everyday social contexts through specialised institutions, they have been re-connected through “mediated quasi-interaction” (p. 208). The major difference of this re-connecting with a larger scope of experiences is that it has become disconnected from active encountering. The result is a mix of mediated and face-to-face experiences that constitutes people’s realities. With this the media facilitate an entirely new way of experience. It is real not in a physical-local sense, but in a new physical-mediated sense.

Thompson’s approach conceptualises identity as a “symbolic project” that is actively constructed by the individual (Ibid., p. 210). Thompson argues that “We are all the unofficial biographers of ourselves” (Ibid., p. 210) who use symbolic material

that is available and actively construct our own “narrative of self-identity” (Ibid.). He points out that these narratives are subject to change over time since people draw on new symbolic material and new experiences in the course of a life-time. With the change of these narratives identities are gradually redefined.

This illustrates how the development of the media had a major influence on identity formation processes. As Thompson points out, before the development of the media people solely relied on symbolic material drawn from local face-to-face interaction. This local knowledge of people is increasingly expanded and substituted by mediated non-local knowledge. People’s horizons are generally broadened by this expansion but only on media terms. This means that the media largely determine the way and direction of people’s potential to expand their knowledge. Consequently, people’s identities are increasingly shaped by the media.

The potential of the media to influence people’s relations to institutions and each other has been expanded to arguments supporting the potential of the media to transform people’s perception and ways of thinking. In her concept of the communication matrix Waite (2003) makes this extra step when she argues that media alter our perceptions of the world and consequently our awareness of the self and our relationships to others. Her argument is based on four main premises that presume that human knowledge is grounded in perception as a starting point. From that she argues that perception is linked to people’s understanding of the social world, that communication technologies alter the human senses, and that an altered human sensorium affects people’s understanding of the social world. Waite concludes that although the media cannot physically change the settings of the human senses, they can change the ways people experience the world. By enlarging the scope of the human senses the media alter the human sensory system as a whole, which she calls the communication matrix.

At the core of Waite’s argument is that media alter our perceptions of the world and consequently our awareness of the self and our relationships to others. For her the media determine the scope, density, and frequency of the connection between an individual and the social world. Expanding the scope of people’s experiences via mediated communication means learning more about themselves.

“Individualism cannot exist in a vacuum. (...). The more a person understands her relationship to a community, the more she can understand where she has come from, how she is different, and what is unique about her existence. To the extent that our communication technologies are altering our sense of connection to the social world, our understanding of individuality will necessarily be altered as well.”

(Waite, 2003: 137)

This highlights the relevance of the media for the construction of identities in modern societies.

According to this understanding, the media’s potential to broaden and intensify people’s connections to society can deepen a sense of identity instead of diffusing it in the changing diversity of external contexts as outlined in post-modernist approaches. With the media people can refer to a broader platform of comparisons they can relate to and through which they can locate themselves as individuals in relation to society. In other words, the more people know about the world, the more they know about themselves. This argument is different to post-modern conceptualisations of identity which see it as something constantly changing and fluid that changes according to a changing external environment. Instead, it is suggested that identity only comes into existence in communicative practices of people. It is them who give any form of communication meaning by practicing and contextualising it. One must have a rooted starting point from where to understand the relations that constitute identity. This starting point lies within the individual, but can only develop into a sense of self-awareness and identity if relations outside the self are formed.

The expansion of people’s experiences through the media has led to an intensification of identity negotiation processes. Before the development of mass communication people were surrounded by more stable structures of information flows that relied more on interpersonal communication. Nowadays people are immersed by communication that offers a variety of different identity narratives. This requires them to actively deal with the information and mediated experiences they are confronted with. People have to navigate, select, and make sense of a changing communication environment more than ever before. That way the question of identity which used to be a given becomes a subject that requires negotiating on a more frequent basis.

3.2. Mediated Perceptions and Collective Identities

People's perception of themselves and of others through mediated forms of communication forms a crucial link to their identities. It is, however, not the only one. Personal communication with other people continues to play an important role for people's sense making. No matter how much information an individual is exposed to, the process of making sense of it all and relating it to oneself takes place on an individual level. It is responsive processes of direct mutual interaction and communication with each other where people are able to get reactions and feedback on their opinions and views. These are important contexts where self-reflexion and identity formation and re-formation are taking place. It is therefore not a question of either a greater role of personal or impersonal communication that influences people's perception, but a prolific process including both aspects. The growing dependence of individuals and institutions on the media gives reason to consider the wider implications of mediation and expanding mediated experiences for the imagination of the public and collective identities.

In her theory on impersonal influence Mutz (1998) argues that the way we perceive what others think affects our behaviour the most. Referring to Katz and Lazarsfeld's (1955) concept of personal influence she extends their assumption that explanations for political attitudes are to be found in immediate social environments by arguing that people's political behaviour is largely influenced by their perceptions of the attitudes or experiences of mass collectives:

“To extend Cohen's (1963) well-worn maxim, one might say that mass media may not be particularly influential in telling people what to think, or perhaps even what to think about, but media are tremendously influential in telling people what *others* are thinking about and experiencing. These perceptions, in turn, have important consequences for the political behaviour of mass publics and political elites as well.”

(Mutz, 1998: 5, emphasis in original)

This is a pointed specification of the processes that affect people's behaviour. Mutz (Ibid.) highlights that it is the media who give rise to the influence of others outside people's personal realm. What can be drawn from this argument for identity studies is that it is not simply the vast quantity of information, but the perception of collective identities that affects people's own sense of identity. It is the way people relate to other people's opinions and experiences in a process of fitting in these public identity narratives that form the basis for identity negotiations.

This can help to explain as to why people in Austria or GB continue to have strong reservations against European integration without drawing on negative experiences they have made themselves. In most cases critique on the EU is not driven by personal negative experiences but by the perception of opinions and experiences of what Mutz calls "impersonal others" (1998: 8). The same is true for opinions about Turkey's accession to the EU. Public support or resistance to the prospect of Turkey becoming a member of the EU is only scarcely based on personal experiences. Instead it is mediated perceptions of other people's opinion that people rely on when making up their minds about the larger social world. If the media coverage of Turkey's accession to the EU is predominantly negative, it is more likely that this is reflected in people's judgements.

By extending people's scope of experiences beyond those drawn from personal interaction the media are more likely to provide people with access to political information and judgements. It is here that media are most influential on people's opinions and attitudes that concern matters of a wider and more abstract socio-political scope. Mutz (Ibid.) argues that the media therefore contribute to an increasing segmentation of personal and social level judgements. She notes that, while people continue to rely on personal experiences in their immediate social environment to form judgements about personal risks, it is collective-level judgements that are most relevant for their political preferences. Since identities only take shape in people's relation to others it is these collective-level judgements that are most relevant for collective identity formations like European identities. In a way that mediated communication has the strongest influence on people's perceptions of the wider social world, they also have a greater impact on collective identities.

In contrast to the powerful role of the media assumed in mass society theory, impersonal influence offers a more differentiated approach to the impact of the media on people's opinions and identity formations. Distinguishing between personal-level and social-level judgements which are differently influenced by personal and impersonal experiences supports the argument that mediated communication plays a greater role in the construction of collective identities. Following this line of thought, European identities are likely to be more dependent on mediated communication.

Identity formations are complex processes in which mediated communication is an important contributing factor. The crucial part of making sense of information and incorporating it in people's identities continues to take place on an individual level. In this sense Madianou (2005) argues that the media-identity relationship is not a causal one, but requires a more differentiated view. She points out that media do not directly shape identities, but that they contribute to the creation of symbolic communicative spaces that can include and exclude people from public life.

In her analysis of television news reports Madianou (2005) finds that these mainly project a homogeneous identity through references to a binary scheme of us-them relations. This supports the argument that references to an opposing Other represent a common pattern in mediated identity constructions. At the same time she highlights that news programmes are not automatically a common point of reference for all people. Watching the same news programme or reading the same newspaper article does not result in a common view or shared opinion on an issue. Instead people use information and actively combine it with their own experiences to draw individual conclusions. This enables them to challenge and question media interpretations of events. Madianou's findings confirm that people's experiences of reality don't always match those expressed in news formats. This means that the constructed reality of the media and people's reality are two different things. They are, however, intrinsically linked with each other and are based on mutual interplay. Madianou highlights that the media contribute to the drawing of boundaries for ethnic categories and consequently inclusion and exclusion from public life.

It is the capacity of drawing boundaries where the media are most powerful in their influence on people's identities. They are a boundary setting force that determines on which side a subject belongs. Boundaries form a general constituting

feature of collective identity formations. The way the media define these boundaries affects how people construct their own identities since they are an important contributor to people's experiences and perceptions. People are surrounded by a plurality of mediated narratives. These narratives "create identity at all levels of human social life" by drawing "symbolic boundaries" (Loseke, 2007: 611). Similarly, Schlesinger (2008) notes that the media help sustaining a political community by "providing it with its deep codes to distinguishing between self and other" (p. 78). These codes or boundaries are constituted in culturally embedded communicative processes. They can take on the forms of concepts and categories to make distinctions and judgements (Silverstone, 1999).

Sometimes they do so by explicitly voicing arguments that put Turkey in or outside of Europe. In other cases it is the more subtle notions of symbolic boundaries that locate Turkey on one or the other side of Europe. Exclusion involves the domination of one and the marginalising of another individual, group or nation from the mainstream. The process of marginalisation includes the branding of the other as different. Derman and Ross (2003) point out that this differentiation is not neutral, but carries a valued connotation that locates the other in a hierarchically inferior context. Difference materialises in various distancing processes. In the context of Turkey's bid to join the EU they can take on the form of arguments against Turkey's EU accession, critique on the handling of issues like human rights, negative comparisons to EU standards, demands for change to comply with EU guidelines or stereotyping of the subject as the sick man of Europe. These mediated distancing processes form an important contributing factor in the formation of collective identities.

3.3. The Construction of European Identities in National Media

The media's power to create collective identities largely depends on the drawing of boundaries that distinguishes them from others. The way the media inform people's perceptions makes mediated difference an important factor in the definition of and process of boundary setting. The nature of these boundaries determines the entity they are enclosing.

The evolution of mass media played an important role in the development and construction of collective identities. In the case of national identity it was the development of the print media that gave significant rise to the spread of nationalism as described by Anderson (1983). He notes that the transformative power of print capitalism gave rise to a national consciousness. Anderson explains that the vast dissemination capacity of reproduced print-languages were the starting point for a nation-building process on a scale unknown before. He argues that print media “created unified fields of exchange and communication” (p. 44) which made it possible for people to understand each other. This is a crucial enlargement of the scope of mutual understanding since the diversity of the orally spoken word would not have allowed such a level of understanding. More importantly, the dissemination of the written word made it possible for people to become aware of each other and the dimension of their shared language field. Anderson points out that “[t]hese fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community” (Ibid.: 44). He concludes that the combination of capitalism and print technology and their homogenising effect on the diversity of language gave the critical impulse for the formation of a new form of imagined community as the basis for the modern nation.

Silverstone (2005) highlights the active role of the media in the formation of communities when he describes their function as “doing community” (p. 198). He explains that “media and media practices enable the creation of community as a symbolic space, mostly but not exclusively for the construction of nationhood” (Ibid.: 198). The increasing connectedness of nation states into global structures means that they no longer have the sole capacity or power to influence nation building. Processes like European integration have introduced new institutions, rights and interdependencies that require joint compromises and cut-backs in terms of national sovereignty.

Through the media people become increasingly aware of their European neighbours and beyond. Media contribute to making a European reality more imaginative and therefore more real. Since the scope of the EU exceeds most people’s personal experiences it is mainly the media which brings this European imagined community to life. The formation of European identities is different in a sense that it is not channelled through European media, but is largely communicated

by national media outlets of often global corporations. This means that the national category remains to form a distinct framework of reference. Consequently, European identities remain to be constructed through the means of national media systems. It is therefore the national media where European collective identities are constructed and influenced by its individual particularities.

From this it follows that it is unlikely to find a unified European identity due to the uniquely national media outputs in each country. Another argument that speaks for the development of different forms of European identities is that cultural settings inherent in the context of each state are different. The formation of European identities can only be understood in a national context. Although it is possible for states to develop similar degrees of European integration the content of European identities is likely to vary from country to country, region to region and even person to person.

3.4. Summary

This chapter has argued that the media, as a major source of people's experiences and a producer of meaning generally, makes them an important factor in the construction of identities. In this sense the media can be understood as creators of reality. This is taken into account in the concept of mediation which also emphasises the active part of people in the creation of identities by selecting mediated information and relating it to personal experiences. These dual processes have led to new forms of mediated experiences not in a physical-local, but physical-mediated sense. It is argued that the media's potential to broaden and intensify people's connections with the social world can deepen a sense of identity. Specifically, it is the perception of collective identities through mediated forms of communication that affects people's identities. Media are seen to provide the symbolic codes to distinguish between self and others that make them crucial to identity formation processes. Since European identities are largely constructed in a diversity of national media contexts it is unlikely to see the emergence of a unified European identity. Instead, these theoretical considerations suggest the emergence of a plurality of context-bound European identity formations.

Chapter 4

Research Design for Analysing European Identities

After laying the theoretical foundations, the following chapter describes the research rationale and methodology according to which the empirical data is analysed. The main theoretical argument is that identities are constructed through processes of identification and differentiation in relation to a significant Other. Identification describes the recognition, kinship, or belonging of an individual to another group, community, or values. Differentiation refers to the construction of identity through negative definition which means that people define who they are in opposition to something or someone else. Analysing empirical manifestations of similarities and difference is a way of exploring constructions of identities. These have been translated into empirical indicators that include topics and their evaluations as well as supporting and opposing arguments of Turkey's accession to the EU. While negative topics and opposing arguments signify differences, positive evaluated topics and supporting arguments represent similarities to form the inner and outer demarcation lines of European identities.

The research design is inspired by the concept of triangulation which in the most popular sense plays on the complementary strengths generated by employing different research methods on the same study object. This can take on the form of combining several quantitative or qualitative methods, or a combination of a quantitative with a qualitative method (Flick, 2006). That way, shortcomings of one research method can be balanced out with another one and vice versa. Methodological triangulation allows to minimise methodological biases stemming from a single method. Apart from methodological triangulation, the concept distinguishes between three further types of triangulation that include 1) investigator triangulation, 2) theory triangulation, and 3) data triangulation (Denzin, 2009). The latter best describes the approach used in this study. It refers to the triangulation of different data sources to complement the limitations of the small-scale qualitative nature of focus groups with a large-scale newspaper analysis and vice versa. In the context of this study the same codebook has been applied to two different data sets in form of newspaper articles and focus group discussions. This ensures an ideal level of comparison and the compatibility of results.

The reason to compare newspaper coverage and focus group discussions derives from the motivation to analyse the formation of European identities both from an elite as well as from a citizen perspective. Media tend to represent elite views and pronounce conflicts for reasons of increased news values which can distort and misrepresent the views held among citizens. Consequently a polarisation of the issue is a common outcome of most media studies. Providing a comprehensive analysis from both perspectives this study complements elite media discourses with the analysis of citizens' points of view.

The study design is not an experimental design to analyse media effects on citizens' opinions, but an analysis of how European identities are constituted in newspaper coverage and focus group discussions. The decision to conduct the focus group discussions at the end of the selected time period of the newspaper coverage is based on the rationale to use the articles as a preparatory measure to inform the design of the questionnaire for the focus group discussions.

The choice to analyse print media in particular is based on the rationale that it is among the main information sources that people use when forming opinions about EU enlargement issues such as Turkey's accession to the EU. On EU average 43 per cent of people confirm that they use newspapers as their preferred source of information. This is significantly more than radio (29 per cent) or Internet (18 per cent) and only eclipsed by television (71 per cent). In Austria newspapers (61 per cent) are on the same level as television (62 per cent) forming the main sources of information. In the UK newspapers (42 per cent) rank second behind television (63 per cent) following the EU average (European Commission, 2006a). Methodologically the analysis of print media and their availability through online data bases allows access to a complete population according to selected search parameters. This enhances the availability of research data and its suitability for large scale content analysis.

The contents of this chapter cover an overview of research questions and hypothesis, the rationale for the selection of countries, an explanation of the use of content analysis and focus groups for the analysis of European identity constructions, and a brief description of the coding procedures.

4.1. Research Questions and Hypotheses

Question 1: Does Turkey function as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined today?

Hypothesis: Yes, Turkey functions as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined today.

Rationale: The development of the Republic of Turkey from the remainders of the Ottoman Empire links the country to the image of the Eastern Other. Turkey, as the embodiment of a continuation of the Eastern Other in Western perceptions, functions as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined today.

Verification: Analysis of references to European identity in newspaper coverage and focus group discussions as outlined in chapter 5.

Question 2: How and to what extent do citizens use mediated information and personal experiences in European identity constructions?

Hypothesis: Mediated information plays a larger role than personal experiences in the construction of European identities among citizens.

Rationale: Turkey's accession to the EU is an event that is largely outside the scope of people's personal experiences. Their dependency on mediated information is therefore greater than on personal experiences.

Verification: Analysis of media references and personal experiences as outlined in chapter 6.

Question 3: What boundaries (i.e. differences) and modes of identification (i.e. similarities) are evoked by Turkey's accession to the EU in media and citizen discourses and what do they reveal about the status and definition of a European identity?

Hypothesis 1: Islam is expected to be the main difference.

Hypothesis 2: Similarities are most likely to be found in the area of economic relations.

Rationale: Islam forms a major differentiating feature that sets Turkey apart from current EU member states and other candidate countries. Economic relations are most likely to be the base for a common ground due to Turkey's long-standing economic relations with the EU that date back to the 1960s.

Verification: Analysis of topics, topic evaluations, supporting and opposing arguments as outlined in chapters 7 and 8.

4.2. Selection of Countries

Austria and GB hold similarities as well as distinct differences between them which makes them a good selection for a comparative research design (Jupp, 2006). The country pairing guarantees that the chosen cases for this study hold a common ground that is relevant to the analysis as well as enough difference that produces a diverse research outcome. A common denominator of both countries is that they share similar critical public attitudes towards further European enlargement. Similar levels of scepticism ensure that the research findings are comparable and not distorted by greatly differing stances towards EU enlargement.

Table 1 provides an overview of support for further enlargement in Austria and the UK. Results show that the enthusiasm to include other countries in future years among the Austrian public is consistently low throughout the period of analysis from autumn 2004 to autumn 2009 with little variation. Support for further enlargement peaks in spring 2005 and autumn 2006 (31 per cent). The first increase of support can be seen in the context of the signing of the Accession Treaty with Bulgaria and Romania in April 2005¹⁴. Both countries hold historic as well as economic ties with Austria, which could explain the slight increase in general support for EU enlargement. Starting from a below EU-average level, support for further EU enlargement in the UK follows a consistent downward trend over time. After a 50

¹⁴ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2010. *Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union* [online]. [Accessed 15 November 2010]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/treaty_of_accession-bulgaria-romania_en.pdf.

per cent peak in autumn 2004, public support continues to decrease over time. The low levels of support in Austria and the downward trend in the UK need to be understood in the context of opposition to immigration. When asked about considerations about future enlargements both Austrian and British publics showed above EU average relevance of the issues immigration and cultural/religious issues (European Commission, 2009). These results point towards possible similarities among focus groups in Austria and the UK.

Table 1: Support for Further EU Enlargement

<i>EB</i>	<i>Date^a</i>	<i>AT</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>EU \bar{X}</i>	<i>EU \square</i>
62	05/2004	28	50	53	25
63	09/2005	31	48	50	25
64	06/2006	29	43	49	25
65	01/2007	27	44	45	25
66	09/2007	31	36	46	25
67	11/2007	28	41	49	27
68	05/2008	24	36	46	27
69	11/2008	27	36	47	27
70	06/2010	25	40	44	27
71	09/2009	25	32	43	27
72	11/2010	28	35	46	27
73	11/2010	21	33	40	27
74	02/2011	67*	59*	45*	27

Notes: Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for it or against it. Option: Further enlargement of the European Union to include other countries in future years. Cell entries: % For. * Cell entries: % Against. ^a Date of publication. \square Number of EU member states. *Sources:* Compiled by the author from Eurobarometer 62 (European Commission, 2004: 53), Eurobarometer 63 (European Commission, 2005b: 155), Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, 2006b: 134), Eurobarometer 65 (European Commission, 2007a: 159), Eurobarometer 66 (European Commission, 2007b: 220), Eurobarometer 67 (European Commission, 2007c: 188), Eurobarometer 68 (European Commission, 2008a: 125), Eurobarometer 69 (European Commission, 2008b: 26), Eurobarometer 70 (European Commission, 2010a: 229), Eurobarometer 71 (European Commission, 2009: 160), Eurobarometer 72 (European Commission, 2010b: 233), Eurobarometer 73 (European Commission, 2010c: 222), Eurobarometer 74 (European Commission, 2011: 59-60).

A point where the countries differ strongly is their public opinion towards Turkey's accession to the EU. The first time the Turkish question was introduced to the Eurobarometer survey was January 1996. The following year Turkey was

declared eligible to become a member of the European Union at the EU summit in Luxembourg in December 1997. Two years later, at the EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999, Turkey was formally recognised as an EU candidate country.

Although Table 2 does not provide a consistent record of data, the following trends in terms of public attitudes towards Turkish accession become apparent. Starting from a below EU average level, Austrian public opinion shows a distinct further drop in support for Turkey's EU accession after 2001. This decrease falls into the period when the opening of EU accession negotiations with Turkey were confirmed to start on 3 October 2005. The results support the argument that public support in Austria further dropped with the evolvement of concrete prospects of Turkey becoming a member of the EU. Developments in the UK show a relatively stable trend of support for Turkey's accession to the EU within a range of eleven per cent points difference over 15 years. EU average scores show an overall downward trend in levels of support until the beginning of 2001 within an EU of 15 member states. Similarly, results for an EU of 25 members show a negative trend with decreasing support from 2005 to 2006. Levels of support for Turkey's EU accession remain low within an EU of 27 members in 2008 and 2011.

Table 2: Support for Turkey's Accession to the EU in Austria and the UK

<i>EB</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>AT</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>EU \bar{X}</i>	<i>EU ^a</i>
*	01/1996	23	41	36	15
*	04/1997	26	40	32	15
*	04/1999	14	36	29	15
*	11/1999	21	37	30	15
*	06/2000	19	30	30	15
*	01/2001	21	32	30	15
*	11/2001	31	41	34	15
*	06/2005	10	45	35	25
*	10/2005	11	38	31	25
*	09/2006	5	30	28	25
*	04/2008	7	35	31	27
74	02/2011	----	----	30	27

Notes: Question: For each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future? Cell entries: % In favour of Turkey. ^a Number of EU member states. *Sources:* * Compiled by the author from EUROBAROMETER. 2011. *Eurobarometer interactive search system* [online]. [Accessed 28 June 2011]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en; Eurobarometer 74 (European Commission, 2011: 62).

These country specific results have to be seen in a greater EU context. Table 3 provides an overview of public support for Turkey's EU accession among EU member states in 2008. The data confirms that Austria shows the least support among the 27 EU member states, while the UK is situated alongside the majority of moderate opposers with more people opposing Turkish membership than supporting it. In addition to Austria, other countries like Cyprus, Germany, and France show levels of support lower than 20 per cent. The number of countries where public support is greater than opposition is limited. From 27 EU member states seven show a higher percentage of the public to be in favour of Turkey joining the EU. This apparent support has to be put into perspective. Four out of the seven countries in favour have an almost equally divided public. These include Sweden, Slovenia, Poland and Bulgaria. The remaining three countries Spain, Romania, and Hungary have more than 15 per cent of people who chose to neither support nor oppose Turkey's membership. These results confirm EU-wide low levels of support for Turkish accession. They help to position Austria and GB in this context.

Table 3: Support for Turkey's Accession to the EU Among the EU Public

<i>Country</i>	<i>% In favour</i>	<i>% Not in favour</i>	<i>% Don't know</i>
Austria	7	85	8
UK	35	49	16
Netherlands	40	55	5
Sweden	46	45	9
Spain	46	32	22
Slovenia	49	46	5
Slovakia	27	61	12
Romania	61	15	24
Cyprus	11	85	4
Portugal	37	41	22
Poland	43	41	16
Malta	31	43	26
Luxembourg	18	75	7
Lithuania	36	45	19
Latvia	34	50	16
Italy	25	58	17
Ireland	29	42	29
Hungary	45	40	15
Greece	22	78	0
Germany	16	77	7
France	19	71	10
Finland	31	64	5
Estonia	34	53	13
Denmark	32	62	6
Czech Republic	34	55	11
Bulgaria	42	38	20
Belgium	36	63	1
EU	31	55	14

Notes: Question: For each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future? Option: Turkey. *Sources:* Compiled by the author from EUROBAROMETER. 2011. *Eurobarometer interactive search system* [online]. [Accessed 28 June 2011]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en; Publication date 04/2008.

Austria and GB were specifically chosen for their polarised public and government views on the issue of Turkey's accession to the EU in order to add additional contrast to the comparative level of the study. The great polarisation offers a way to capture the full scale of opposing opinions. These differences are the main focus of analysis and the goal is to explain the reasons for such variations. A good starting point to explain such cross-national differences is to look at the individual relationships of the countries under investigation to the EU. This provides the needed background to understand differing national perceptions of EU identity in Austria and GB.

4.2.1. Great Britain and the EU

Resembling certain parallels around discussions about Turkey's EU accession process (Arikan, 2006) the UK's relationship with the EU has been repeatedly described as "awkward" (George, 1990, Wilks, 1996). This theme runs like a red line through the UK's relationship with the EU stretching from pre- to post accession and continues to be a defining feature which has led to the characterisation of the country as a "stranger in Europe" (Wall, 2008). This is down to a combination of various historical, political and economic reasons that require individual explanation.

Overall, the European question is a divisive force in British politics, particularly regarding party cohesion and electoral success, and is therefore treated with great caution. Marr (2001) pointedly notes that "'Europe', meaning Britain, has broken prime ministers, splintered parties, destroyed reputations, and mightily bored a large part of the population" (pp. 12-13). He explains that suspicion of the EU in the 1950s was mainly directed at "German domination and French protectionism" and that Britain's relationship to the EU prior accession oscillated between fears of being excluded from a powerful economic union and concerns over the loss of national sovereignty during the British Tory era (Ibid.: 6). According to Marr, the essence of a British version of Europe is that of a formal confederation giving limited powers to the European Commission and more weight to national political representatives (Ibid.: 11). This interpretation of the EU competes with other versions that are aimed at the strengthening of EU institutions and a deepening of EU integration.

The UK's specific circumstances under which EU membership took place contribute to the understanding of the country's special relationship to the EU. Under the conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan the UK first applied for EU membership in 1961. The following negotiation process failed when the French president Charles De Gaulle vetoed British membership of the European Economic Community in January 1963. Although the unilateral French veto caused the end of the UK's first attempt to join the EU, Greenwood (1996) argues that it was also the UK's continuing special relationship with the USA which stood in the way of

successful negotiations. He points out that it was mainly due to Prime Minister Edward Heath's lack of enthusiasm for a special bond between the UK and the USA that the third bid to join the European Community was finally successful in 1972. The UK's long-standing ties to the USA are seen as one of the major contributors to the complicated relationship with the EU. Elliot (2001) points out that both countries are connected through colonial history, language, culture, mutual immigration, and economic ties on a broad scale. He explains that as a consequence of this special relationship "the US has become, to an extent, familiar; Europe, by contrast, is 'foreign'" (Ibid.: 224).

Similarly to the Atlantic relations, the UK's bonds to the Commonwealth states have influenced British aspirations and negotiations of membership. Through its colonial history and cultural ties the Commonwealth was more than an economic factor, but also an "emotional issue" for the UK (Greenwood, 1996: 11). In the light of losing the benefits of the Commonwealth as a supplier of inexpensive agricultural products, through the development of a Common Agricultural Policy and tariffs on products outside the EEC, the UK was hesitant to commit to a customs union. Intense economic trade relations also contributed to a cautious treatment of a possible European commitment. During the 1950s British exports to the Commonwealth countries still made up 50 per cent of the overall exports. It was only when economic trade shifted from the Commonwealth states to European states that the UK's reservation to membership started to fade and was presented instead as an economic necessity (Crowson, 2011).

French opposition to British membership persisted when the British Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, applied for membership of the European Community a second time in May 1967. It was de Gaulle's veto yet again which prohibited British membership in November 1967. It was Britain's policy objective of multilateral free trade in an open world economy under US leadership which was under threat if the country would not be part of the development of the European Communities that served both as motivation to join as well as reason for de Gaulle to reject its entry a second time around. The French president continued to insist that Britain was not ready for EC membership and it would take de Gaulle's resignation from office in April 1969 for Britain's bid to be successful (George, 1990).

The UK's entry to the EC in January 1973 was accompanied by mixed signals towards European commitment. The initiative to renegotiate the terms of entry in March 1974 caused irritation and frustration among European leaders. The main issues of the renegotiation process, which was completed in March 1975 at the European Council meeting in Dublin, concerned the common agricultural policy and Britain's financial contributions to the EEC budget. These renegotiated terms were accepted by a majority in a national referendum on 5 June 1975, confirming Britain to remain a member of the EEC (Crowson, 2011). Although the referendum brought a sense of closure to the European question public opposition continued to persist.

This negative British public opinion towards EU membership can partly be explained by the perception that it symbolised weakness and dependency of a former imperial power. In contrast to that, for other nation states EU membership demonstrated economic and political success (Clegg, 2001). Public alienation from the European project was further deepened by the following two aspects. First, British people mainly felt threatened by and powerless towards the EU through a lack of democratic influence over changes in the EU and over questions where it will lead to. Secondly, a shift of focus away from national towards supranational institutions has added to the public's critical stance. The political framing of the EU as a process with a life of its own and a lack of emotional commitment to the project by "sentiment or tradition" have further alienated the British public from the EU (Patten, 2001: 31-33). Similarly, Curtice (2001) summarises the British public's view as being characterised by a lack of enthusiasm and identity, ignorance, little trust in EU institutions and unwillingness to support further European integration (p. 15). Further, public opposition to EU membership is mutually influenced and enforced by predominantly negative British news coverage that cuts across media types and editorial lines¹⁵.

British scepticism and distance to European integration continued when German chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing proposed the establishment of the EMS in July 1978. Shortly after the proposal the Labour government, lead by Prime Minister James Callaghan, announced not to

¹⁵ BBC GOVERNORS. 2010. *BBC News Coverage of the European Union: Independent Panel Report* [online]. [Accessed 12 May 2010]. Available from: <http://www.bbcgovernorsarchive.co.uk/docs/reviews/independentpanelreport.pdf>.

fully take part in the EMS in October 1978. With Margaret Thatcher becoming prime minister in May 1979 she focused her stance towards membership in the EEC on the country's financial contributions to the budget of the union which culminated in an agreement over a two-thirds rebate of British contributions at the European Council meeting at Fontainebleau in June 1984 (Crowson, 2011). During Thatcher's premiership EU relations were characterised by her "fervent resistance to further integration" (Greenwood, 1996: 13). The prospects of a monetary union, prepared by the Delors Committee in June 1988 planning to create a European Central Bank and the creation of a European currency, lead to Thatcher's speech to the College of Europe in Bruges on 20 September 1988. Here she made her understanding of national sovereignty and European identity clear.

"Willing and active co-operation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community. ... Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality."

(Thatcher, 1993, cited in Greenwood, 1996: 744-745)

Prevailing British scepticism did not stop the widening and deepening of economic and political European integration and in October 1990 Britain joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism. It was under Prime Minister John Major that a financial crisis forced Britain out of the ERM again in September 1992. Despite this Major insisted on ratifying the Treaty on European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, which took place in July 1993 and officially transformed the EC into the European Union (Greenwood, 1996, Crowson, 2011).

The election of New Labour brought a new commitment to European politics that was more cooperative and long-lived than the one pursued by previous governments. Under the New Labour government patterns of governance were increasingly europeanised. What stubbornly persisted was the unchanged negative public opinion towards European integration revealing the continuing dominance of national interest and power as pointed out by Crowson (2011).

The events and developments described above shed some light on the special relationship of the UK to the EU and help understand how and why the country has

come to largely position itself in opposition to the EU. It is the UK's understanding of being a connecting link between the USA, Commonwealth and the EU that continues to influence its vision of a confederal Europe. The UK might be considered a stranger in Europe, but one with a long-standing membership nonetheless. Without it the EU would not be the same as it is today. This unique contribution to the EU makes the UK an equal to all other member states, regardless of whether it comes from the fringes or the centre.

4.2.2. Austria and the EU

In comparison to the UK, Austria's EU membership history may not be as extensive, but just as eventful. The main reasons that prevented the country to join at an earlier stage were its neutral status and fears over losing existing high levels of social democratic standards such as full employment and a well established welfare state (Bieler, 2000). While the UK's EU membership was largely framed as a step taken out of economic necessity, Austria's membership in January 1995 was due to a combination of global economic, social and political structural change that prepared the country for supranational governance (Bieler, 2000, Bieler, 2002). Since then Austria's EU membership has been characterised by the EU-wide sanctions against the coalition of the right-wing FPÖ and the conservative ÖVP in 2000, persistent Euroscepticism, and staunch opposition against Turkey's prospects of joining the EU. The following section outlines the context of Austria's accession to the EU and membership years to contribute to the understanding of EU-Austria relations.

Austria experienced severe economic difficulties during the 1980s when growth rates slowed down, inflation increased, budgetary deficit and unemployment rose. This situation prompted a change in economic policies from Keynesianism to a neo-liberal approach introducing deregulation and privatisation. By 1994, after drastic political action that saw public sector privatisations from 1987-1990 and two tax reforms in 1989 and 1994, Austria completed its liberalisation of financial markets (Bieler, 2000). These economic developments form one part of a set of factors that paved the way towards EU membership. Bieler (Ibid.) highlights, however, that Austria's application for EU membership was not the consequence of

economic necessity, since the country could have joined the Internal Market without full membership, but the result of contesting internationally and domestically oriented social forces that drove the process towards accession.

It was the Internal Market initiative by the EU in 1985 that had a seminal influence on public discussion in Austria about EU membership. The Single European Act signed in Luxembourg in February 1986 mapped out a new Europe with an economic framework that would allow the free exchange of goods, services, capital and labour. This prompted Austria to take a stance and act on potential EU membership. It was the Federation of Austrian Industrialists VÖI that first went public by initiating an expert investigation into and confirmation of the compatibility of Austria's constitutional obligation to geopolitical neutrality with EU membership (Hummer and Schweitzer, 1987). Austria's neutrality formed a sensitive matter as it only gained state sovereignty by guaranteeing geopolitical neutrality. It has been established as one of the most defining features of its national identity in opposition to its German speaking neighbour Germany (Fitzmaurice, 1995).

A further series of publications (Breuss and Stankovsky, 1988, Öhlinger, 1988) lead to a significant widening of the scope of public discussion on EU membership prospects in national media outlets. Bieler (2000) points out that these public discussions were an important preparatory step towards EU membership, changing existing "frameworks of thought" (p. 55).

Austria's potential EU membership was subject to intense and strongly opposing discussions. This split of opinions ran through industrial and labour representatives in private and public sectors as well as political parties. Those groups opposing EU membership were mainly related to protected national sectors such as food, transport and agriculture that would face disadvantages by EU membership. Among political parties it was the Green Alternative Party which strongly opposed EU membership for environmental reasons. However, these concerns had to subside to being overruled by the parliamentary decision to apply for EU membership in June 1989. The main reasons for the failure of anti-EU groups are to be found in a lack of a common agenda as well as ministerial and parliamentary support and the strength of pro-EU national institutions linked to the global economy (Bieler, 2000).

Austrian accession negotiations, which officially started on 1 February 1993, were dominated by demands of maintaining military neutrality as a prerequisite for a successful referendum and the continuation of the transit agreement established in 1991. While the issue of Austria's status of neutrality was swiftly agreed on 21 December 1993, and transition periods were found as solutions for the issues of transit and secondary residences, it was the agricultural sector that almost caused the negotiations to collapse. By the time EU accession negotiations were successfully completed in spring 1994, public opinion polls showed that supporters and opponents of EU membership were neck to neck and the imminent referendum could turn out either way (Bieler, 2000).

Austria's accession to the EU posed a fundamental revision of the constitution and therefore required an obligatory national referendum. The referendum on 12 June 1994 confirmed a majority of 66.6 per cent in favour of joining the EU. This outcome was supported by a vast pro-EU media campaign highlighting the economic benefits of EU membership for private households as well as national security (Bieler, 2000, Jahn and Storsved, 1995). Previous to its second national referendum¹⁶ Austria's public debate was dominated by a strong pro-European media campaign supported by the organisation of Social Partnership, consisting of trade unions and employers (Fitzmaurice, 1994).

Five years into EU membership the national elections on 3 October 1999 caused a massive rift between Austria and the rest of the EU when coalition negotiations concluded with the formation of a shared government between the extreme right-wing FPÖ and the conservative ÖVP. In February 2000, as a reaction to this coalition under federal chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, EU member states led by Belgium and France collectively imposed bilateral sanctions on Austria. The motivation for this action can be explained by both domestic politics and EU identity politics that featured a growing importance of normative concerns over human rights and democratic principles as part of a common EU identity. It is argued that the sanctions were equally motivated by domestic politics as well as to defend European values and the EU's standing. It was not until a "wise men" report from 12 September 2000 confirmed Austria's fulfilment of human rights and

¹⁶ Austria held its first national referendum on nuclear power in 1978 (Fitzmaurice, 1994: 227).

unconditionally lifted the sanctions. This experience put Austria in a temporary, but extreme outsider position that led to growing anti-EU sentiments (Merlingen et al., 2001). Amid these events it does not come as a surprise that Austrian levels of support in key EU areas were among the lowest of all member states in 2001, the year after the sanctions (European Commission, 2001).

Overall, Austria's relationship to the EU is largely characterised by paradox. While Austria continued to follow good practice in terms of implementing EU law after the end of EU sanctions, public support for EU matters declined even further. This has led to the paradox of a strong EU implementation record paired with low levels of approval from the Austrian public (Falkner, 2001). Similarly, despite economic benefits from EU membership (Breuss, 2005), Austria continues to hold one of the most Eurosceptic electorates.

4.3. The Use of Content Analysis to analyse European Identity Constructions in National Newspapers

Textual analysis to explore identity constructions is based on the understanding that a text does more than mirror the realities of the existing world. It functions as a medium to construct and recreate realities. Analysing a text is the process of exploring the representations created by the written word that evoke different associations in those who read it. A text is therefore more than descriptive, it is "sequenced discourse, a network of narratives that can be read variously" (Krippendorff, 2004: 63). It is the representations constructed by such texts that are the starting point for an analysis of manifestations of European identity in newspaper articles.

Content analysis offers a unique way to analyse large amounts of data and is therefore particularly suitable for a longitudinal, cross-country research design of different national newspapers. Rather than going into depth the method allows the detection of large-scale trends and patterns to provide "a big picture" of the data (Deacon et al., 2007: 119). It provides a way to systematically code and analyse larger and different data sets according to the same standards and rules which allows for a direct comparison of results. The method's rationale is to "identify clear and

coherent categories that highlight salient aspects of the message conveyed and to use objective and reliable methods of calculating their relative significance in the overall message” (Scott, 2006: 40). The ability of content analysis to analyse large amounts of data over time is an important feature to capture the patterns of a fluctuating and reflexive concept like the emergence of a European identity.

The method is characterised by three defining features that include the systematic, objective and quantitative analysis of message characteristics following the rules of the scientific method¹⁷ to test relationships among variables (Neuendorf, 2002). Its nature is mainly descriptive in a sense that it captures message characteristics of manifest content. This does not mean that all quantitative content analysis has to be univariate by describing one variable at a time. The great strength of the method lies in its bivariate or two-variable analysis that can expose complex relationships that no other method is able to reveal. For example, it allows comparing the message features of a large data set across time, newspaper and country.

Content analysis is an unobtrusive technique that can avoid biases of participants or researchers (Krippendorff, 2004). This attribute makes the method a suitable choice for an investigation to explore constructions of European identity without influencing the subject of analysis. Another advantage of content analysis is that it can handle unstructured content as data (Ibid.). This is particularly important as it preserves the mannerism of an original text that would be largely ignored by structured research methods like surveys. This preservation of an original source is particularly important when seeking to analyse manifestations of identity constructions. It also allows applying the method to diverse data sets like newspaper articles and focus group transcripts. Further, content analysis is context sensitive which means that it acknowledges where data comes from and what it might mean to those who consume it (Ibid.). This allows drawing inferences from identity constructions in elite newspapers to the appearance of similar constructions among citizens who are likely users of such information sources.

¹⁷ The standards of the scientific method include criteria of objectivity-intersubjectivity, an a priori design, reliability, validity, generalisability, replicability and hypothesis testing (Neuendorf, 2002: 10-13).

Descriptive quantitative content analysis can be seen as a “reality check” (Riffe et al., 2005:14) where the representation of individuals, groups, countries or institutions in newspapers is measured against data from real life focus group discussions. That way it is possible to put media portrayals into perspective and use them as an indicator for media distortion. This reality check is an integral part of the research design where European identity constructions in elite newspaper coverage are measured against perceptions of citizens.

The method also allows an analysis of trends and patterns over the course of time and across different data sets which is important for capturing changes in European identity constructions and to make inferences about these changes to developments in the EU accession process.

4.3.1. Research and Gaps

There has been a growing body of literature addressing the portrayal of the complex EU-Turkey relationship in national media coverage. These studies have given important insights into the mapping of issues and arguments around the topic and the intensity and scope of national and transnational discussions.

In his study Wimmel (2005) examines transnational discourses between EU member states on Turkey’s EU accession as an indicator for the emergence of a European public sphere. He finds that public debates continuously increased and became more and more transnational in the time from the EU Helsinki summit in December 1999 up to December 2004 when the European Council decided to start EU accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. It remains up for discussion whether the combination of the temporary nature of transnational discourses and their dependence on convenient factors constitute conditions for recurring transnational discourses and a more stable European public sphere.

Similarly, Koenig, Mihelj et al. (2006) explore the emergence of a European public sphere in media coverage on Turkey’s accession to the EU. Their results of European, Turkish and U.S. American newspapers show that news coverage varies greatly among countries in terms of intensity and the manifestation of frames that structure debates as either a clash of civilisations between Islamic Turkey and

Christian Europe or as a unifying liberal-multiculturalist project. Their analysis of the immediate time period leading up to the European Council decision in December 2004 to open membership negotiations with Turkey the following year does not share the positive outlook of Wimmer regarding the emergence of a European public sphere. Negrine, Kejanlioglu et al. (2008) whose analysis covers a similar period from September to December 2004 also find significant differences in the news coverage among European countries and Turkey. Other than Koenig et al. they note, however, that this must not necessarily be antithetical to the construction of a European public sphere or European identity.

These studies on an Europeanised public sphere suggest that European identity is likely to be different depending on the national context. They also support considerations that further European integration in combination with national cultural diversity is possible. In other words, the success of European integration should be unlinked from the expectation that this can only be realised, measured, and imagined in form of a single European identity. Instead, it is possible to deepen the Europeanisation process whilst the imagination of European identities remains different.

Another study of quality press commentaries by Wimmel (2009) confirms the robustness of national differences in the news coverage of EU member states, particularly between continental states and the U.K. He suggests that these similarities and divergences reflect different normative views of Europe's finality. He notes that Turkey's accession to the EU has been instrumentalised for supporting or repressing different conceptions of the future of the EU. It is therefore likely to find clusters of similar news coverage and attitudes towards Turkey in countries that share a vision of the EU as a federal state or a confederation of sovereign nation states. This is an interesting approach that interprets differing news coverage on Turkey's EU accession as an expression of different visions of Europe. This is an important connecting point to European identities since these visions feed into it. These results suggest that depending on the normative views of people and media on how Europe should look like, their constructions of a European identity will differ accordingly.

Walter and Albert (2009) make a similar argument regarding the underlying notions of Europe that play a role in discussions around Turkey's accession to the

EU. They confirm that Turkey is discussed differently in different national contexts. They highlight that Turkey is an important focus point around which different discursive constructions of Europe are crystallised. These visions fall into two dualist categories that either include or exclude Turkey from a future Europe. In their longitudinal study of German and British newspapers and magazines during the periods 1960-1963 and 1999-2004 they find that Turkey is neither seen as a consistent European Other or a European Self. They conclude that Turkey is rather seen as something between these polarised points which they describe as “the thing on the (European) doorstep” (Ibid.: 223). It is this status of being in between which stimulates different constructions of Europe.

The findings of these studies show that Europe continues to be an intensely contested concept and that opinions vary depending on the national context and different interpretations of what Europe stands for and what it ought to be. They suggest that Turkey’s accession to the EU is different as compared to other EU candidate countries such as Croatia or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, because it puts the question of Europe’s future on the agenda. While the accession of any of the other countries would merely signify enlargements of states to be integrated into the EU, Turkey’s case is different as it bears considerable potential to transform the EU rather than being integrated into existing structures.

These studies and their important contributions offer room for further analysis. While their results confirm Turkey as an important reference point for the construction of European identities and the importance of national contexts for different version of Europe the content and processes of European identity constructions remain open. The focus of these studies on national comparisons has overlooked the potential influence of other significant contexts for the construction of European identities. It is argued that differences in the perception of European identities are likely to also emerge across media and citizens.

An analysis of similarities and differences in chapters 7 and 8 is a contribution towards defining the identification and demarcation lines of European identities. By introducing the comparative dimension of media and citizen discussions this analysis adds to the understanding of further variations of European identities.

4.3.2. Selection of Newspapers and Time Periods

The selection of three newspapers per country is representative of the mainstream political opinion in Austria and the UK with the newspapers functioning as opinion leaders in their national media systems. The selection is based on the assumption that other media are likely to follow a similar news agenda to the ones chosen. The newspapers comprise different types (i.e. quality and tabloid press) and a range of different editorial policies to represent the spectrum of political views ranging from the left to the right. This selection is based on the assumption that differences in the news coverage occur between different types of newspapers and different editorial policies. Table 4 gives an overview of all newspapers and their editorial positioning.

Table 4: Overview of Newspapers and Editorial Positioning

	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Great Britain</i>
Quality press	Der Standard left-of-centre	The Guardian (London) left-of-centre
	Die Presse centre-right	The Times (London) centre-right
Tabloids	Neue Kronen Zeitung right-wing	Daily Mail right-wing

The time period from October 2004 to August 2009 captures important milestones of EU-Turkey relations. The goal is to go beyond the limitations of short time periods around selected key events to capture the seamless development of discussions over time. A retrospective research design is also a favoured method to capture the dynamics of identity constructions by providing a way to measure change (De Vaus, 2006). Further, a longitudinal study allows for predictive statements (Bynner, 2006) in terms of trends where the development of a European identity might be heading towards.

The selected time period commences with the publication of the European Commission's progress report on 6th October 2004 which cleared the way for the decision of the European Council in December 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey the following year. This decision is based on the assumption that after the official announcement of accession negotiations with Turkey, the issue has

received increasing media attention. Another reason for selecting this particular time period is that other studies have largely focused on the years from 1999 to 2005. This study would extend this period to capture the latest developments in EU-Turkey accession negotiations.

The time period includes Turkish-national events with a European dimension as well as EU key events in relation to Turkey. Major Turkish-national events include the Turkish national elections in 2007. Key EU events include the announcement of the start of accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 at the European Council meeting in Brussels in December 2004. Further, the period covers the official opening of accession negotiations in October 2005, the suspension of further negotiations due to Turkey's failure to apply the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement to Cyprus, and the re-opening of negotiations in March 2007. With this time frame this PhD project extends previous studies in scope and timeliness (Wimmel, 2005, Wimmel, 2009, Aissaoui, 2007, Koenig et al., 2006, Negrine et al., 2008, Walter and Albert, 2009, Yilmaz, 2009b, Christensen, 2005).

4.3.3. Article Selection Criteria

The article selection criteria for news coverage on Turkey and the EU are based on the following search terms illustrated in Table 5.

Table 5: Search Terms for Online Databases

	<i>Austrian newspapers</i>	<i>British newspapers</i>
Database	WISO Presse	LexisNexis United Kingdom
Search terms	(EU OR Europ*) AND Türk*	EU OR Europ! AND Turk!

Sources: LEXISNEXIS® UNITED KINGDOM. 2009. *News* [online]. [Accessed 25 March 2009]. Available from: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis>; WISO DIE DATENBANK FÜR HOCHSCHULEN. 2010. *Presse* [online]. [Accessed 03 September 2010]. Available from: <http://www.wiso-net.de>.

The following article selection criteria capture news coverage with references to Turkey's bid to join the EU and further contexts linking Turkey to an EU or

European dimension. By expanding the selection criteria to a European dimension it is ensured that contexts outside the EU institutional framework, such as cultural matters, are also included in the analysis. The rules for the article selection criteria are as follows:

Turkey and European dimension: Articles are included that contain references to Turkey's bid to join the EU and articles about Turkey with references to an EU or European dimension. The EU dimension describes news coverage linking Turkey to the EU institutional framework. This includes the mentioning of people, bodies, treaties, legislation, etc. related to the following institutions: European Council, European Parliament, European Commission, European Court of Justice. The European dimension is more open and describes news coverage linking Turkey to European issues such as European culture, values or history. The European dimension also includes news coverage on the European Court of Human Rights although it is not an EU institution, but belongs to the Council of Europe. Articles on EU topics with only minor references to Turkey are excluded since they are not relevant for the analysis and would not allow coding variables on topic level.

150-word rule: The title or first 150 words of the text body of an article must mention Turkey's bid to join the EU or Turkey in connection with a link to an EU or European dimension. Exceptions to the 150-word rules are articles that cover Turkey as the main topic and have a European dimension in the text body. That way it is ensured that all articles on Turkey are included where references to an EU or European dimension appear later in the body of the text.

Monday to Saturday newspaper editions: Sunday editions are excluded from the newspaper selection. The reason for this decision is that newspapers in Austria and GB have different weekend editions of either one weekend edition covering Saturday and Sunday or individual issues. To include Sunday would cause the problem of different total numbers of newspapers per week (e.g. six for *Der Standard* and *Die Presse* and seven for *Neue Kronen Zeitung* and *The Times*). This would cause problems with comparisons and could distort results. Another reason for excluding the Sunday editions is that Sunday editions of the British samples are not part of the weekday newspaper, but are considered independent editions with

different editorial teams¹⁸. The Saturday editions will be included because they are likely to include an expanded culture section with relevant articles that fulfil the selection criteria.

Newspaper sections: The article selection includes the main newspaper sections politics, art, culture and business. This selection expands the focus of most studies that are limited to the politics section only. The reason for this expansion is that articles about Turkey's accession to the EU and related issues such as EU enlargement, economic performance, human rights issues or Muslim culture are likely to be discussed in other newspaper sections than the politics section alone. Newspaper supplements are excluded from the analysis since they are not comparable across countries, newspaper types or weekend editions. Interviews or book reviews are also excluded since their format differs cross-nationally and they do not qualify as full editorial pieces. Further, letters to the editor are excluded from the analysis since the focus is on news articles. Obituaries are also excluded from the analysis.

Full articles: Search results that consist of references to articles on other pages are excluded. These announcements are not included in the sample as coding of duplicated material is to be avoided. Only full articles are analysed.

The advantage of this strategy is that all topic-related articles can be identified that have EU-Turkey relations as a major topic. This ensures that all articles are included that have Turkey as the main topic, but where the link to an EU or European dimension is only established later in the text. The disadvantage of this article selection strategy is that it is very time consuming.

4.3.4. Sampling Strategy and Units of Analysis

The selection criteria for all three British newspapers produced a total of N = 490 articles in the chosen time period from October 2004 to August 2009. This

¹⁸ e.g. *The Guardian* and *The Observer*; *The Times* and *The Sunday Times*.

number represents the entire population¹⁹ of articles being considered for this longitudinal analysis. From this the *Daily Mail* emerged as an outlier by producing a considerably smaller population of only 75 articles. The population of Austrian newspaper articles was approximately four times bigger (N = 2122) than the British one. Similar to the British example, the tabloid newspaper *Neue Kronen Zeitung* produced a much smaller population of articles (N = 351).

The aim of the sampling strategy is to achieve the following two principles. First, the number of articles must be manageable to be coded from one researcher in a reasonable time. Second, the sample must be large enough to allow multivariate analysis with enough case numbers to produce meaningful results. To fulfil the first principle, it was necessary to draw a sample²⁰ from the overall population of Austrian newspaper articles to reduce the number of articles to a manageable size. The population of the British sample was used as a baseline to ensure comparable data sets for the quality newspapers. Since the *Daily Mail* produced a sample too small for multivariate analysis, it was decided to reduce the number of articles of the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* only as much as to maintain a meaningful number of cases.

In order to be able to make valid inferences about the population of the Austrian data set a probability sample was selected to ensure representativeness. This means that articles were randomly chosen from the entire population of relevant articles in the selected time period. Each article had an equal chance of being included in the sample. Based on the laws of probability articles with characteristics that occur more frequently in the population will also feature more frequently in the sample, while infrequent characteristics in the population will occur less frequently (Neuendorf, 2002, Krippendorff, 2004).

In order to ensure a level of generalisation of results, a purposive sample of national newspapers was combined with the complete population of British articles and a random sample of Austrian newspaper articles. While a convenience sample of newspaper articles would only allow inferring to the cases selected, a random

¹⁹ “In sampling, the term ‘population’ has a very specific meaning and refers to the group of people or other unit of analysis which is the focus of the study” (Davidson, 2006: 271).

²⁰ “A sample is a subset of units from the entire population being studied. The usual goal of such samples is to represent the population” (Riffe et al., 2005: 95).

sample across time infers to all 2122 newspaper articles during the selected time period. Systematic random sampling was ruled out as a strategy due to the risk of a potential bias created by a chosen interval.

The central limits theorem allows a researcher to estimate the amount of error in a probability sample at a specific level of probability. It refers to the chance that a particular sample mean from a random sample is close to the true population mean in the distribution of infinite random samples. It is possible to calculate this probability because the mean of an infinite number of samples will equal the population mean. The sampling error for the sample of this study in combination with a sample mean, allows estimating the population mean within a given range and with a certain level of confidence that the range includes the population value. The accuracy of a sample is indicated by sampling error which is represented by standard error (Riffe et al. 2005).

Table 6 gives an overview of the total population of articles in the period from September 2004 to August 2009 that fulfils the article selection criteria. It includes an additional column with the sample of Austrian newspaper articles.

Table 6: Population and Sample Overview of Newspapers

	<i>Population AT</i>	<i>Sample AT</i>	<i>Population GB</i>
Quality press centre-right	Die Presse (n=972)	Die Presse (n=212) 22% of population	The Times (London) (n=203)
Quality press left-of-centre	Der Standard (n=799)	Der Standard (n=212) 27% of population	The Guardian (London) (n=212)
Tabloid press right-wing	Neue Kronen Zeitung (n=351)	Neue Kronen Zeitung (n=179) 51% of population	Daily Mail (n=75)
Total	N = 2122	N = 603	N = 490

Table 6 illustrates the different article populations across countries and newspapers. In order to generate two data sets of similar size for analysis it was necessary to draw a random sample of articles from the Austrian data set. Based on the highest number of articles in the British quality press (212 articles in *The Guardian*) the number of articles in the categorically equivalent newspapers *Die*

Presse (minus 22 per cent) and *Der Standard* (minus 27 per cent) was reduced to a similar size. The number of articles in the tabloid *Neue Kronen Zeitung* was reduced by half (i.e. 51 per cent of population) to achieve a manageable sample size for coding. The rationale for doing so was that reducing the sample to 75 articles to match the *Daily Mail* would not have produced any meaningful results.

In a first step the sampling frame for each Austrian newspaper was established. This included the counting and numbering of all articles per newspaper to provide a full list of units for a simple random sample. In a second step a list of random numbers was generated using Word Excel to allow the selection of articles from the overall population. The identification of selected articles was done by combining the list of random numbers with another list containing the total numbers and the range of articles per month and newspaper. Using *Die Presse* as an example, 212 articles were randomly selected from the overall population of 972 articles. Choosing a random starting point commencing in August 2009 the articles were then selected back in time to October 2004.

This content analysis research design consists of two levels of units of analysis. These two levels include a) articles and b) topics with the latter being the main unit of analysis. The rationale for this choice of units of analysis is that news stories tend to deal with several different issues in one article. The decision to use a two-level approach for the unit of analysis aims at capturing the plurality of topics that are common in journalistic practices.

Articles: An article is defined by what the electronic database displays as a single coherent unit of text consisting of title, sub-title, lead and body of text. Pictures, graphics and other illustrations are not included in the analysis.

Topics: Each topic is defined as a unit consisting of textual information that refers to a single issue. A topic must not necessarily be compressed into a single paragraph, but can stretch through the whole body of text, including title, sub-title and lead.

4.4. The Use of Focus Groups to Analyse European Identity Constructions Among Citizens

The decision to use focus groups as a research method is based on the rationale to complement large-scale quantitative results of content analysis with an in-depth analysis of qualitative data. Through triangulation of research methods hypotheses can be tested more robustly and the methods strengths and weaknesses are mutually evened out (Neuendorf, 2002). Further, focus groups are chosen as the best method to analyse the discursive construction of identities since they provide a platform for participants to express and negotiate opinions (Myers and Macnaghten, 2001). Further, focus groups are described to be representative of community views, revealing people's attitudes and perceptions to an extent that is impossible to achieve via quantitative surveys (Waterton and Wynne, 2001).

Focus groups are presented as the preferred method for creating an ideal environment to research sensitive topics (Bloor et al., 2002). Turkey's EU membership bid is likely to provoke strong opinions and concerns around religion, values, migration or the future of the EU among participants. It is therefore crucial to choose a method that provides a secure and relaxed atmosphere for discussion where opinions can be expressed freely. Selecting participants according to a snowball principle where a participant suggests other potential participants from circles of friends and colleagues enhances levels of familiarity where opinions can be expressed without feeling inhibited. An intimate and confidential discussion environment limits the extent of participants giving socially desired responses which can misrepresent people's true opinions and consequently affect research outputs.

Focus groups provide qualitative data about what people think as well as the motive and logic behind these personal views and opinions (Denscombe, 2007). The method is predestined to uncover "the normative understandings that groups draw upon to reach their collective judgements" (Bloor et al., 2002). Exploring the meanings and reasoning behind people's opinions is an important aspect of analysis to understand as to why and how people come to certain conclusions. Other than answering formatted responses, as is the case in survey questionnaires or opinion polls, focus groups offer flexible surroundings for detailed and individual feedback. It is this freedom of expression that marks a particular strength of focus groups

research (Morrison, 1998) which is essential for analysing the construction of identities.

Group interaction and discussion in focus groups provide a reflexive environment where participants are encouraged to respond to each other's contributions and where opinions can be exchanged. Assuming that identities are constructed discursively this interactive research design is vital for the desired research output. Group dynamics generate a variety of different responses ranging from asking mutual questions, comments on shared experiences and opinions or anecdotes which reflects people's cognitive frames, concepts and priorities (Barbour and Kitzinger, 2001). This range of responses generated by focus groups discussions is close to people's natural way of expressing themselves which benefits the authenticity of research outcome. In addition, group settings encourage people to clarify their viewpoints towards other participants and the moderator (Morgan and Krueger, 1993). This further adds towards better analysis of motives and justifications.

Group interaction can benefit the quality of discussion in terms of issue scope and complexity. Further, the mutual exchange of opinions and knowledge increases the chances of participants to benefit from such discussion as opposed to when interviewed individually. Group dynamics culminating in general consensus or differing opinions on the topic of discussion allow hypotheses testing regarding potential discrepancies between elite news coverage and citizens' views (Denscombe 2007).

4.4.1. Research and Gaps

Most existing studies analysing European identity deal with various forms and degrees of identification that citizens share with or attribute to the EU. These include shared feelings of belonging to EU institutions, EU symbols or levels of trust among fellow EU citizens to define the content and nature of European identity. While these studies have given important insights into the nature and quality of people's attachment and relationship to the EU, they have left the exploration of demarcation lines that form an important part of identity formation processes underexplored.

The Eurobarometer surveys signify one of the largest and continuous sources for public opinion on attitudes towards European integration. Its official records date back to 1973 and have since been monitoring the development of public attitudes in EU member states. Question designs regarding the emergence of a European identity are largely based on levels of support for European integration. They also include categorisations and rankings of national and European identity to measure people's attachment to the EU. These large-scale opinion polls provide great insights into trends and developments over time, but have a limited potential to explore the constituting elements of European identity.

Using the same set of questions over time runs the risk to miss the dynamics of new formations of European identities and hybrid combinations with multiple national or regional identities. In his critique on measurement models of European identity Bruter (2008) discusses the problems and challenges that accompany empirical studies designed to measure European identity. He argues that the seeming paradoxes found in connection with analyses of European public opinion and electoral behaviour are not so much a matter of contradiction, but the result of an emerging European identity that has not been taken into account so far. He argues that the inability of making sense of these findings is down to problems of measurement. He particularly targets the Moreno question²¹ (Moreno, 2006) which has been commonly employed by Eurobarometer surveys since 1992 and other opinion polls. This highlights the complexities and difficulties surrounding analyses of empirically evaluating European identity. Bruter concludes with an appeal for better refined research instruments that properly capture European identity.

One such attempt to conceptualise and analyse European identity in a more refined way is a study by Scheuer and Schmitt (2009b) which explores to what degree the EU has developed into a political community. Their longitudinal analysis of Eurobarometer surveys over 25 years and the 2004 European Election Study measures European identity through the empirical indicators of perceived citizenship and pride to be European citizens. The development of a sense of community or well-being over time is captured through levels of trust among European citizens and

²¹ The exact wording of the Moreno question is as follows: "In the near future, do you see yourself as – Nationality only, Nationality and European, European and Nationality, or European only?"

the acceptance of new member states. They find that a European collective identity develops over time, but distinguish between higher levels among core member states and newcomers to the Community. Similarly, they find a divide in terms of levels of trust between Eastern and Western member states. Scheuer and Schmitt's empirical investigation is based on the concepts of identification and we-feeling among EU member states. Their results show that Turkey ranks on the bottom scale of trust and that it is generally perceived as "clearly different from what is considered European" (Ibid.: 564). While the study maps the strength of ties that keep the European community together, it remains open what the subject of this sense of community is. Equally, the nature of difference that people feel towards Turkey remains categorical and keeps the content of such differentiation open.

In his study on the emergence of a mass European identity among EU citizens Bruter (2005) explores influencing factors that contribute towards the development of collective identities. He argues that political identities are shaped by messages from institutions to citizens. By communicating these messages the media influence levels of European identity among citizens. Drawing on Iyengar's, Peter's and Kinder's (1982) experimental research, which tests the impact of television programmes on people's political attitudes, Bruter exposes citizens to positive and negative news coverage on Europe and European integration and EU symbols to find that they influence people's levels of attachment to the EU in three distinct ways.

First, he discovers that while good news have a positive effect on people's association to the EU, bad news have the opposite effect, diminishing people's attachment to the EU. He concludes that citizens distinguish between a civic and a cultural component of European identity. According to this conception a civic identity refers to the identification of citizens with a political structure and the political rules of a community. Cultural identity, which is based on the idea of the nation, describes the sense of belonging a person feels towards a political group defined by ethnicity, culture, social similarities, values or religion.

Secondly, he finds that news coverage largely affects the civic component of a political identity. And thirdly, he concludes that symbols have a stronger effect on the cultural aspect of a political identity. This study establishes an important link between the textual and visual components of news messages and their influence on

people's perception of the EU. What remains open is what lies between the polarised categories of good and bad news. By distinguishing between news coverage in favour or against EU integration other forms of distancing and closeness and their specific content remain largely unexplored.

In her study on young Flemish people Huyst (2008) uses a metaphor analysis for exploring perceptions of the EU and degrees of belonging. She finds that a majority of pupils feel some kind of belonging to the EU, but that levels are predominantly low. In her analysis of attributing animals to describe the EU, the majority of young people associate it with gregarious animals such as ants or wolves which points to a widespread perception of the EU as a communal entity. She concludes that European identity is highly dependent on situational contexts that determine how willing and to what extent people refer to themselves as European. Huyst also confirms that national identities sit alongside European identity and are not mutually exclusive. Her predominantly qualitative study offers important insights into the identity attributes used to describe the EU and the contextual determinants of expressing a European identity.

Another qualitative study that explores the meaning of Europe for citizens is an analysis of focus group discussions by Bruter (2004) that explores what people mean when they feel European. Results show that participants articulate a predominantly civic view of European identity in form of attributes like borderlessness, the circulation of citizens, policy making or prosperity. Another more cultural connotated way of describing European identity features attributes like peace, harmony, fading of historical divisions and co-operation between similar people and cultures. This study makes an important contribution towards the analysis of European identity on individual level counter-balancing studies featuring a top-down approach.

Eilders and Lichtenstein (2010) define European identity as a public collective that materialises within the framework of national media systems. Their theoretical considerations are based on a conception of identity that defines it as a citizen's feeling of belonging to the EU as a specific community characterised by economic, political, cultural and geographic features. It signifies a new conceptual approach that combines the research traditions on a European public sphere with that on European identity to form a new conception that is defined by a discursive,

relational and context-bound construction of European identity in inter-linked personal and mediated communications processes. They suggest that future empirical studies on European identity should include an analysis of both inclusive and exclusive elements. Highlighting the dominance of national media outputs as the main arena for identity constructions and the diversity of established national identities the authors argue that European identity is expected to be different in each member state. They point out that a European identity is likely to materialise in form of a variety of collective identities with different national connotations.

Taking up Eilders and Lichtenstein's argument to include both similarities and differences into the analysis of European identity a further study of European identity would benefit from a research design that treats exclusion and manifestations of distance as an equally important constituting feature of the identity formation process. Such an analysis would allow a more comprehensive conceptualisation of European identity. Previous studies have provided fundamental and much needed answers to questions like what a European identity means to its citizens, how it has developed over time and in what contexts people refer to it. Further, these studies have addressed the influencing factors of such a collective identity and identified the media and European institutions as important initiators and facilitators of a European identity. Research has significantly expanded the notion of European identity to also include levels of trust and we-feelings. The range of findings includes both qualitative studies as well as large-scale analysis of national and European opinion polls. Studies have provided important insights into the meaning of Europe for citizens and what attributes they assign to such a unique community. Moreover, they have shown in what contexts citizens express a European identity and that this is not contradictory to other identities on national, local or individual level.

Apart from the important contributions these studies point out areas of further research. Their weakness includes a bias towards theoretical conceptions of identity as a process of identification which neglects the relevance of significant Others for identity formations. The focus on citizens says little about people's identity constructions in the context of social and mediated environments and potential differences to constructions of European identity in the media.

This research project attempts to address these shortcomings in the following ways. What requires further analysis is first, how such identity formation processes take place and how citizens employ media references when making sense of complex events outside their immediate scope of experience? This is addressed in an analysis of the uses of media references and personal experiences among citizens in chapter 6. Secondly, the persistent negligence of difference as a crucial element of identity formation calls for a more inclusive research that combines identifying as well as differentiating processes to form a more comprehensive approach that is able to describe the content of an identity as well as its scope and limits. This is addressed in the theoretical foundations of chapter 1. Finally, a study design would benefit from a comparison of media and citizen discourses to explore identity constructions in different contextual settings. This is addressed in the empirical chapters 7 and 8.

4.4.2. Focus Group Composition and Questions

Focus groups are small sized interview groups of six to eight individuals that discuss a specific topic among each other. The discussion is usually tape-recorded and lead by a neutral moderator (Morgan, 1993). The focus group sample for this study comprises four focus groups per country (eight groups in total) with three to eight participants per group. Although online focus groups promise the option of fast, low cost, convenient and larger scale research, face-to-face focus groups are preferred. The rationale for this decision is to avoid weaknesses such as population biases of online users, the lack of non-verbal cues and information, and potential problems such as failure to establish rapport and interaction between participants (Bloor et al., 2002). Online focus groups are also more prone to develop discussions that deviate from the originally intended focus. In such cases the moderator has only limited abilities to intervene (Greenbaum, 1998).

Participants are selected by nationality, age, gender and profession to ensure a demographically balanced sample from rural and urban areas. The focus groups do not provide statistical representativeness. The selection criteria are aimed to include a variety of Austrian and British citizens over the age of 18 years to retrieve a range of views from different groups of the population. The total number of focus groups

and group size aims to accommodate relevant demographic factors in the group composition for a diversity of viewpoints and to ensure an intimate discussion environment without time pressure or competition for expressing opinions.

Table 7 reveals a broad comparability between the two national focus group sets in terms of gender and age, although the British sample has a slightly younger population. Levels of higher education are somewhat more pronounced in the British sample. With regards to occupations there appears to be an overrepresentation of supervisory and technical occupations and a lack of routine occupations in the British sample. These demographic distributions have to be taken into account when making inferences about demographic factors and attitudes.

Table 7: Focus Groups Demographics

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Austria</i>		<i>Great Britain</i>	
Gender				
Female	46	(11)	50	(11)
Male	54	(13)	50	(11)
<i>Total</i>	100	(24)	100	(22)
Age				
18 to 24	4	(1)	9	(2)
25 to 34	29	(7)	36	(8)
35 to 44	17	(4)	32	(7)
45 to 59	33	(8)	18	(4)
60+	17	(4)	5	(1)
<i>Total</i>	100	(24)	100	(22)
Education				
Professional training/University degree/diploma	58	(14)	84	(16)
A/O level secondary	17	(4)	16	(3)
Primary/None	25	(6)	---	
<i>Total</i>	100	(24)	100	(19)
Occupation				
Employers and managerial occupations	8	(2)	6	(1)
Professional occupations	54	(13)	55	(12)
Supervisory and technical occupations	4	(1)	27	(6)
Routine occupations	13	(3)	---	
Housewife/Pensioner/Student	21	(5)	14	(3)
<i>Total</i>	100	(24)	100	(22)

Notes: Figures may not add exactly due to rounding. Cell entries: %; N in brackets.

Recruitment follows by initially identifying suitable focus group participants through personal contacts and continues through a snowballing principle. This principle is recognised as a standard technique of recruitment (Bloor et al., 2002). People from this pool who fulfil the desired demographic criteria are then selected as participants. The benefit of this strategy is that it ensures levels of internal homogeneity.

Groups are organised to be homogeneous within themselves, but differing in terms of the specified demographic criteria. The compatibility of participants and internal group homogeneity represents an important factor for the success of focus group research (Morrison, 1998, Morgan, 1998). The aim is to provide a balance between sufficient diversity to encourage discussion and a degree of homogeneity to avoid group conflict and the repression of views (Bloor et al., 2002). This is achieved by grouping participants of similar age, professional levels and gender together.

The group size is chosen to be small to create an intimate discussion environment as the topic of Turkey's EU accession process holds a potential to reveal strong personal opinions of participants, particularly in Austria where public opinion shows strong opposition (European Commission, 2006a). Further, small group sizes ensure that participants have enough time to express their views and engage in discussions with each other. Table 8 gives an overview of the conducted focus groups.

Table 8: Focus Groups Overview

<i>Austrian Focus Groups</i>			<i>British Focus Groups</i>		
<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Participants</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Participants</i>
15.07.2009	Matrei ^a	6	18.08.2009	Leeds [□]	8
16.07.2009	Matrei	6	19.08.2009	Leeds	5
17.07.2009	Innsbruck [□]	7	26.08.2009	Leeds	6
23.07.2009	Matrei	5	30.08.2009	Hull ^a	3
Total		24			22

Notes: Cell entries for participants: N. ^a Rural area. [□] Urban area.

Focus group participants are asked to fill in a short anonymised questionnaire²² before the beginning of the discussion to record basic demographic characteristics, media usage, personal experiences with Turkey, attitudes towards EU enlargement and people's political orientation. This information is gathered to check on the potential influence of these independent variables on opinions and attitudes. All participants are asked to discuss the following questions²³ among each other:

What comes first to your mind when you think of Turkey? How would you evaluate this?

Do you recall a media story on Turkey and Europe? What were your reactions?

If you would have to describe Turkey/the EU/Austria/Great Britain with an object, what would that be? Could you describe what the object stands for?

What similarities/differences do you see between Turkey and the EU? How big are they?

Would you say that Turkish EU membership poses a threat? In what sense? Could you describe this? Could you give examples? Who is affected by this threat?

From your point of view, how should Turkey interact in relation to EU culture, practices and standards?

From your point of view, how should the EU interact in relation to Turkey's culture, practices and standards?

What arguments speak for Turkey's accession to the EU?

What arguments speak against Turkey's accession to the EU?

From your point of view, what time frame would be appropriate for Turkey's accession to the EU?

From your point of view, what would be the right handling of Turkey in the context of a European future?

²² For the full questionnaire please see Appendix 1.2.

²³ Please note that this questionnaire is a full version. Not all questions are used for analysis.

Audio recordings of focus group discussions are transcribed to allow textual analysis. These transcripts form the basis for the coding procedure.

4.4.3. Ethical Considerations for the Use of Focus Groups

The University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee has granted approval for conducting research with human participants based on the following considerations.

Inducement to participate in research: All participants were recruited on the basis of voluntary participation. They were not forced to take part nor offered any financial incentives.

The conduct of research: The conduction of the focus groups was carried out by the principal investigator whose previous experience as a research assistant on other research projects has provided adequate training for conducting focus group research and handling audio-equipment. Any future publications will be carried out with integrity and be based on the principles of honesty and openness.

Risks and benefits: The benefits of the focus group research were that they provided original qualitative data of citizens' identity formation processes which have not been addressed before. The risks include that the conduction of the focus groups have and future publications will affect the personal and institutional reputation of the principal investigator and the University of Leeds. Both are therefore carried out and treated with the greatest care and to the highest standards of research.

Treatment of subject-participants: The wellbeing of all focus group participants was ensured by providing a familiar and safe location and discussion environment in people's work place and homes. Further, to ensure appropriate levels of hospitality and comfort, participants were offered snacks and refreshments during the course of the group discussion. Tested and certified digital audio-recording equipment was provided by the Institute of Communications Studies at the University of Leeds. The psychological well-being and dignity of focus group participants was ensured by voluntary participation, confidentiality of data, anonymity and the freedom to withdraw from the study at any time before, during and after and the freedom to withhold sensitive information or opinions.

Obtaining informed consent: Informed consent was obtained from all focus group participants by mutually signing a consent form with each participant. This included explaining content and purpose of the study and the terms of use of the data retrieved from the discussion. Extra care was taken to ensure that the information was understood by answering any open questions. Recruitment of two weeks in advance provided sufficient time for participants to reflect on the information. It was pointed out to participants that participation is voluntary, anonymous and that participation can be withdrawn at any time before or after the discussion. There was no use of coercion, disproportionate payment or the expectation of any other inappropriate reward be used to influence consent.

Data protection: Data protection was ensured by informing participants that all contributions made during the discussion were to remain confidential among participants. Further, any data retrieved from the discussion (audio recordings, transcripts, questionnaires) was anonymised by indexing the questionnaires and transcripts with reference numbers. All manual and digital data is exclusively stored on University premises and servers.

Confidentiality: If, in the unlikely event of uncovering information relating to criminal activity; intent to engage in criminal activity; or information about sensitive topics such as public health issues or potential physical or psychological harm to children or vulnerable adults, the principle investigator decides on a case by case basis whether to breach confidentiality.

Ownership of research: The research is owned by the University of Leeds.

Allocation of responsibilities: Agnes Inge Schneeberger is the principal investigator and main bearer of responsibility to carry out the research.

Monitoring of research: The following procedure for resolving any complaints from participants is in place: All participants were informed prior to taking part in the study that they can contact the principal investigator at any given time. They were provided with the contact details of the principal investigator (University business card of principal investigator). In case of a complaint from a participant appropriate action will be taken. If, for example any information given during the course of the discussion is deemed too sensitive it will not be used for analysis or publication.

4.5. Coding Procedure Using PASW Statistics 18 and NVivo 8


The process of coding is described as a way of transforming “raw data into categories and classifications, which then become the subject of quantitative data analysis. Coding involves the act of measurement, for in classifying answers to a question, one is trying to measure the underlying social variables” (Bulmer, 2006: 30). For a consistent comparison of data sets the same key variables on topic level²⁴ are applied to newspaper articles and focus group transcripts.

PASW Statistics 18 is one of the leading software packages for investigating quantitative data sets. The user interface has two main windows called variable view and data view. The variable view window serves to provide a description of the data. It defines all variables and their features and consists of a table where each row represents a new variable and each column a feature of that variable. The data view window consists of a table where each row represents a new case. Since the main unit of analysis is based on different topics, each row represents a topic. Individual columns signify different variables. It is important that all variables are applied to each case so that every cell of the data holds a valid data value. Table 9 illustrates a coding example in the PASW Statistics 18 data view window. The start of a new article is indicated through a filter variable.

²⁴ These include the variables TOPICS, TOPICEVAL, ARGUMENTOPPOSE, and ARGUMENTSUPPORT; For full details please see Appendix 1.1.

Table 9: Data View Window in PASW Statistics 18

<i>Article level</i>								<i>Topic level</i>			
Filter	Article ID	Paper	Year	Month	Day	Genre	...	Topic ID	Var	Var	Var
1	83	1	1	2	11	4	...	1
0	83	1	1	2	11	4	...	2
1	55	2	2	10	24	1	...	1
0	55	2	2	10	24	1	...	2
0	55	2	2	10	24	1	...	3
0	55	2	2	10	24	1	...	4
0	55	2	2	10	24	1	...	5



Focus group data can also be subjected to content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004). In order to be able to compare the results of the newspaper analysis with those of the focus groups it is necessary to apply the same key variables of the codebook to the transcripts. For that purpose audio recordings of focus group discussions are transcribed into text and then analysed according to the content analytic research outline. The transcripts are entered as sources into NVivo 8 and coded with the help of nodes. These nodes, which resemble variables in PASW Statistics 18, are linked to relevant text passages in the sources. Accessing a node offers a list of all relevant text parts at one glance.

Chapter 5

Turkey's Role in European Identity Formation Processes

The following empirical chapters follow the order of research questions as outlined in chapter 4 to first test and then gradually build up an argument for Turkey's significance in European identity formations. The order of chapters also guarantees that the specifics of citizens' identity formations are considered to enable an informed comparison of media and citizen discourses in the final empirical chapters. For these purposes chapter 5 tests the assumption whether Turkey functions as a relevant focus point by employing a small-scale key word search of references to European identity and European future in both data sets. This is done to establish a ground backed by empirical evidence to pave the way for further analysis. In order to better understand identity formation processes among citizens chapter 6 looks at how people employ mediated information and personal experiences. This is crucial for the understanding as to why certain issues matter more to citizens than elites and what role the media play in it. This can be seen as a preparatory step to allow an informed understanding of citizen contributions in a comparison of citizen and media discussions in chapters 7 and 8.

In particular, chapter 5 addresses the question of whether Turkey functions as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined today. The reason for doing so is to test, pinpoint, and evaluate the specific role that Turkey holds for European identity formations, as small or as big it may be. The outcome could well be that Turkey does not represent a specific focus point against which European identities are defined. If that were the case, results would hold no or little indication that Turkey's accession to the EU prompts discussions around questions of identity. If Turkey does represent a relevant focus point against which European identity is defined, results would support this through explicit references. Results serve as a basis to test the validity of the question and to establish a supporting argument for analysing European identities based on the theoretical notion of the sociological subject (Hall, 1996) as outlined in chapter 1.

The scope, specific contexts, and evaluations of references to European identity are explored in this chapter. The findings are presented according to the following structure, starting with a comparative analysis of media coverage in

Austria and GB, followed by a comparison of focus groups in Austria and GB, and finally an examination of media and citizen discourses in both countries.

5.1. References to European Identity in Austrian and British Media Coverage

In a first step to address the above question all newspaper articles are scanned for references to European identity or a European future²⁵. The decision to also include references to a European future is based on the rationale that the terms European identity and European future are occasionally used interchangeably in newspaper texts. For this purpose a key word search is conducted²⁶ to identify relevant parts of a text. The reason to start the analysis with a key word search for direct references to European identity or a European future is to check whether the key words manifest themselves through explicit mentioning in newspaper texts or not.

Results show that direct references to European identity or a European future in newspaper coverage are rare. This is not surprising as identity is an abstract and complex concept that does not translate easily into news values. The lack of direct references does not falsify the research question of whether Turkey functions as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined. Instead, the

²⁵ British newspaper coverage: a total of 23 articles contained references (12 articles referring to European identity; 11 referring to a European future) of which 9 articles appeared in *The Times* (five articles referring to European identity; Four articles referring to a European future), 11 articles in *The Guardian* (six articles referring to European identity; Five referring to a European future) and three articles appearing in the *Daily Mail* (one article referring to European identity; Two articles referring to a European future). Austrian newspaper coverage: a total of 16 articles with references (nine articles referring to European identity; Seven articles referring to a European future) of which four articles appeared in *Die Presse* (two articles each referring to European identity and a European future), five articles in *Der Standard* (four articles referring to European identity; One article referring to a European future) and seven articles appearing in *Neue Kronen Zeitung* (three articles referring to European identity; Four articles referring to a European future).

²⁶ For this purpose the following key words were employed in English and German language: “ident*” and “futur*”/ “zuk*”.

findings point towards the methodological shortcomings of simple key word searches when attempting to capture complex concepts. In this sense, the low count of articles entailing the key words supports the approach of this study to analyse European identity constructions through a set of theoretically derived variables to capture multifaceted manifestations of European identity.

It is interesting to note that the majority of articles with direct references to either European identity or a European future were published between the years 2004 to 2006²⁷. This goes in line with the stalled negotiation process over Cyprus in December 2006 and a gradual decline of newspaper coverage after peak events such as the start of membership negotiations in October 2005. The data suggests that the urgency around the issues of European identity and a European future fades with the lack of progress in Turkey's EU accession process. This supports considerations that concrete prospects of Turkey's accession forge more intense debates around European identity, while a slowed-down accession process results in reduced or absent discussions. This finding establishes a link between Turkey's accession to the EU and discussions of identity. It confirms a negative correlation between the number of references to identity discussions and the progress of negotiations. This evidence confirms Turkey as an important focus point in the construction of European identity. Turkey's EU accession process has put identity questions permanently on the European policy agenda – with or without its explicit mentioning as the following article citation points out.

The Turkish question rarely figures in the foreground of European debate today, yet its spectre hovers over discussions of “European identity”, “immigration” and the “Muslim question”.²⁸

When looking at the thematic spectrum, the data demonstrates a distinct difference between newspaper coverage in Great Britain and in Austria. While

²⁷ 29 articles were published between 2004 and 2006; 10 articles were published between 2007 and 2009.

²⁸ *The Guardian*, 7.08.2009, Turkey is part of Europe. Fear keeps it out of the EU: Sarkozy's argument won't wash. This great nation, a crucial link with the Muslim world, would be a major asset for the union, Tariq Ramadan, p.33.

Austrian newspapers have a more diffused thematic range of articles when addressing European identity or a European future, British newspapers demonstrate a clear focus on the issue of an EU identity crisis. This crisis is described as a battle of different visions of Europe among member states and the EU's failure to adapt to change. In this context the EU is portrayed as a "fractious organisation, uncertain of its identity and anxious about the future."²⁹

An EU identity crisis as a central theme can both be found in *The Times* and *The Guardian*, while the *Daily Mail* shows no specific thematic focus. Responsibility for a solution is clearly attributed to the EU and its member states and is not seen as a problem as part of Turkey's accession to the EU. In one case it is even presented as a solution to the EU's identity crisis.

To the last, this latest round of talks about talks, which last night produced an agreement to launch a formal Turkish accession process, was dominated by political brinkmanship fuelled by fundamentally different visions of Europe. Emboldened by polls showing that up to 80 per cent of Austrians oppose Turkish accession, and by private backing from other EU member states, Austria appeared determined to offer Ankara something less than full EU membership as the goal of the accession process. Turkey has long since made clear that it will discuss only full membership. As a result, the Union faced an identity crisis more acute, perhaps, than ever in its history, and certainly since Charles de Gaulle said "non" to Britain 42 years ago. That identity crisis still exists, but Turkish accession talks offer a way out.³⁰

With reference to Britain's own long-winded way into the EU an allegiance with the Turkish side is clearly accentuated. Further parallels to the Turkish example are drawn which create and reinforce a sense of understanding and loyalty to the candidate country. In one article the author notes that "[t]he sense of former imperial glory is as pronounced in Turkey as it is Britain; neither country relishes being told what to do by its former European rivals."³¹ It is notions like these that create the

²⁹ *The Times*, 30.09.2005, Brutality, poverty and religion stand between Turkey and EU, Ben MacIntyre, p.40.

³⁰ *The Times*, 4.10.2005, Let talks begin, editorial, p.17.

³¹ *The Times*, 30.09.2005, Brutality, poverty and religion stand between Turkey and EU, Ben MacIntyre, p.40.

image of a special bond between the two countries, suggesting that Britain made it into the EU from an outsider position and against opposition from EU member states and that Turkey could do the same. This allegiance highlights a divide between GB and other EU member states which is a recurrent theme in British news coverage.

British newspapers portray Turkey to have resolved its own identity issues, while it is the EU which continues to struggle. The following serves as an example to show that responsibility for the success of Turkey's accession is attributed to the EU.

The application to the EU is characterised by two ironies, neither of which is lost on Turks. Firstly, although Turkey pioneered secularism in the Muslim world, discussion in the EU of Turkey's application to join has focused on its 97% Muslim population. Secondly, although Turkey has finally resolved its decades-old identity crisis as to whether it is European or Asian - the majorities in favour of EU accession are substantial - Europe has now plunged into an identity crisis. Much of the opposition to Turkish EU membership pivots on these ironies and the questions they prompt: is Europe a geographical or a cultural entity, and how do you define the boundaries of either?³²

The quote above confirms that Turkey does indeed prompt discussions around Europe's identity and borders. Further, it illustrates another important point in the discussions around Turkey's accession to the EU which is that of religion, or Islam specifically. It is pointed out that secularism as a prerequisite for a democratic state and a condition for EU entry is the decisive element and not Turkey's leading religion of Islam. Here, different interpretations of Europe start to become apparent.

The Guardian features another dominant theme that highlights a divide within the EU over different visions of Europe. Articles covering ideas for a French-lead group to forge the future of Europe are portrayed as a negative initiative trying to stall or obstruct Turkey's EU entry.

The French president, Jacques Chirac, opened a new battle with Britain yesterday when he called for a special EU conference to decide whether to

³² *The Guardian*, 22.05.2006, Comment & Debate, Madeleine Bunting, p.31.

go ahead with further enlargement, a move designed in the long term to slow or even block the planned accession of Turkey.³³

The example above illustrates the positioning of Great Britain in opposition to other EU member states. This divide constitutes a prominent feature in British news coverage that portrays the EU as an incoherent and flustered organisation united in disunity. Highlighting this disunity weakens calls for a unifying identity and strengthens Britain's own favoured position for an economically driven, democracy expanding multi-cultural EU that embraces a predominantly Muslim country like Turkey.

The theme of disunity and incoherence within the EU is further supported by examples which show that questions of identity over Turkey's accession to the EU are not commonly shared within the EU, but are confined to certain EU member states. One article exemplifies these differences in national discussions between EU member states by highlighting "[w]orries about race, religion, identity and jobs are most evident in France, Germany and Austria, where public opposition is strongest."³⁴ The mixing of identity politics with enlargement is criticised for being an economically risky manoeuvre in the British press.

Will self-interest - put crudely, young Turks might pay for ageing Europe's pensions - be trumped by the unpredictable politics of identity as an insecure Europe, aware of its shrinking demographic and economic weight in the world, pulls up the drawbridge and opts to define itself more narrowly around its historical Christian identity?³⁵

It is pointed out that British support for Turkey's accession represents a minority position within the EU. This divide is illustrated by an article that notes

³³ *The Guardian*, 17.06.2005, European summit: Chirac opens new front on accession, Patrick Wintour, p.4.

³⁴ *The Guardian*, 14.12.2004, World briefing: Turkish captain foils EU's would-be defenders, Simon Tisdall, p.11.

³⁵ *The Guardian*, 26.09.2005, Regime change, European-style, is a measure of our civilisation: European self-interest must not be trumped by the politics of identity on the road to Turkey's accession to the EU, Madeleine Bunting, p.23.

“Britain’s enthusiasm is echoed in only a few countries such as Poland and Spain, while across the rest of the continent the “clash of civilisations” argument is flourishing.”³⁶ Ultimately, these national differences add up to competing notions of Europe.

The values expressed in the British newspaper coverage reveal a project-oriented understanding of the European Union that combines economic interests with democratic values.

But suddenly the vision thing looks tatty. For what is our distinctive dream of a European future? It isn’t old French, German or Belgian, plunging ever deeper in search of total integration. It is broader, wider, naturally dynamic. It seeks to create fresh markets and spread prosperity, to compete on global terms. It is naturally hot on peace and democracy.³⁷

The previous two examples lend support to a distinction between an “old” and “new” vision of Europe. While approaches to a deepening of European integration are labelled as old and outdated, the British understanding of Europe’s future is described in forward-looking and active terms that symbolise a more modern and global approach. Characterising an opposing view as old is a powerful way to weaken and devalue it as an argument.

A discussion for the need of a culturally unifying European identity is evidently absent in British news coverage. Instead, a pragmatic project-oriented view based on an expanding EU spreading its democratic values and economic influence is favoured. Discussions of identity are repeatedly dismissed as risky, inward-looking and outdated.

Nilufer Gole, a Turkish academic working in France, warns of the grave dangers of a narcissistic European Union obsessed by these questions of identity rather than motivated by the sense of project (initially, Franco-

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ *The Guardian*, 29.08.2005, We owe them a debt of honour: The Ukrainians and Turks can’t be left out of the new Europe, Peter Preston, p.15.

German peace) that gave birth to the EU and has sustained it. It's the project - of peace, of economic growth, of democracy and human rights - that appeals to Turkey, not indeterminate questions of identity.³⁸

The distinction between an old and new vision of Europe adequately accommodates the polarised views of a focused and project based EU favoured by GB in opposition to vague and scattered identity discussions among other EU member states. British news coverage conventionalises identity discussions as abstract and quixotic and therefore unfit for a policy basis. In line with this position one British article advises “[i]nstead of being obsessed by the question of culture and religion, European leaders would be better advised to develop a forward-looking strategic vision.”³⁹

The typification of an old and new vision of Europe is further supported by a distinction being made between a historical and a contemporary definition of Europe. While a historical interpretation of Europe is characterised by a Judeo-Christian outlook, a contemporary understanding of Europe opens up to Muslim culture. British newspaper examples tend to favour a more open contemporary definition of European identity that includes Muslim culture over a historical Judeo-Christian interpretation. The following example illustrates the British opposition to a historical European definition.

Political parties that call for an increasingly narrow view of Europe are gaining ground. These parties promote a strictly Judeo-Christian perspective of European history, mistrust of Islam, repressive hardline immigration policies and reject a Turkey they claim is overpopulated and excessively Muslim.⁴⁰

³⁸ *The Guardian*, 22.05.2006, With Turkey in the club, Europe can forge a fresh engagement with Islam: The EU should stop fretting over questions of identity and grasp the chance to bury ‘clash of civilisations’ sloganeering, Madeleine Bunting, p.31.

³⁹ *The Guardian* 7.08.2009, Turkey is part of Europe. Fear keeps it out of the EU: Sarkozy’s argument won’t wash. This great nation, a crucial link with the Muslim world, would be a major asset for the union, Tariq Ramadan, p.33.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

British newspapers support a pragmatic-strategic vision of Europe that stands in opposition to a cultural-religious definition of Europe in the Austrian press. The latter is portrayed as a culturally dividing and outdated view. The British vision of Europe is against a culturally determined definition and calls for an adjustment to migration trends that have changed the demographic constellation of Europe over the past decades.

It is time for the countries of Europe to overcome their fear of Islam; time for them to stop turning Turkish EU membership into a cultural battleground. The only criteria to membership should be those of Copenhagen ... Millions of women and men are already European and Muslim; Turkish EU membership would be nothing new, and present no dangers. Islam is, de facto, a European religion; culturally, politically and economically, Turkey forms an integral part of its future.⁴¹

The emphasis on time further supports the distinction between an old and new vision of Europe. These visions are portrayed and supported distinctly different and in opposition to each other in the national press. By introducing the element of time British news coverage adds a hierarchical dimension to the discussion over contesting visions of Europe. Framing its own vision of Europe as a modern forward-looking example, it stigmatises and ultimately devalues other interpretations as old-fashioned and outdated. By introducing a time dimension to the definition of European identity, British news coverage projects the image of holding a leading idea.

Despite these overarching general similarities in the British newspapers specific differences can also be noted. While *The Times* tends to focus on the lack of unity in the EU, *The Guardian* uses Turkey's accession to the EU as a means to pursue its multicultural agenda.

Moreover, the negotiations with Turkey on its entry to the EU, strongly favoured by Britain ... will face new objections and obstacles. Opposition to

⁴¹ Ibid.

Turkish entry featured in France and has been a big factor in the Netherlands.⁴²

Finally - the coup de grace - it would strengthen the claim of Europe's 15 million-strong Muslim minority to a home in Europe. ... But this is the nub of the problem - vast swaths of Europe don't buy it. Either they don't believe a peaceful accommodation with Muslims is possible or they fear it requires such a dilution of European identity that they don't want it.⁴³

The examples above highlight the disunity of EU member states on the Turkish question as featured in *The Times* and *The Guardian*'s emphasis on peaceful cross-cultural relations.

Similar to the British quality newspapers *The Times* and *The Guardian*, the Austrian tabloid newspaper *Neue Kronen Zeitung*⁴⁴ shows a dominant theme in articles with direct references to European identity or a European future. In contrast to the British news coverage, which speaks of an EU identity crisis, the Austrian tabloid newspaper portrays Turkey's EU accession as a threat to European identity. While in the British case the EU was held responsible for its home-made identity crisis, Austrian tabloid news coverage sees the cause for Europe's identity questions in an outside threat.

While Austrian quality newspapers have a dispersed thematic scope, the tabloid newspaper *Neue Kronen Zeitung* emphasises the threat posed by Turkish accession to European identity and the need for its definition. In one article the author anticipates a negative answer through a rhetorical question by asking "Will the EU be able to bear such a big, Islamic, and predominantly Asian country? How

⁴² *The Times*, 31.05.2005, Britain will have to sort out the mess, Peter Riddell, p.2.

⁴³ *The Guardian*, 26.09.2005, Comment & Debate: Regime change, European-style, is a measure of our civilisation: European self-interest must not be trumped by the politics of identity on the road to Turkey's accession to the EU, Madeleine Bunting, p.23.

⁴⁴ According to results of Media-Analyse from 2010 the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* has a range of influence of 40 per cent. These numbers illustrate the newspaper's market dominance and make it a significant factor in public discourses. DIE PRESSE. 2010. *Media-Analyse: "Krone" unter 40 Prozent Reichweite* [online]. [Accessed 17 January 2011]. Available from: http://diepresse.com/home/kultur/medien/600049/MediaAnalyse_Krone-unter-40-Prozent-Reichweite.

European will its identity remain in a Europe exceeding European frontiers and united in such disunity?”⁴⁵ This quote⁴⁶ draws the picture of a geographically defined and culturally united EU that is fundamentally different from the British vision. While in the British case the EU is presented as being disunited within itself the Austrian tabloid newspaper makes Turkey responsible for bringing disunity to the EU. These lines of arguments are based on two different visions of Europe. The first sees Europe as a loose cooperation to expand values and influence through enlargement and economic drive. The latter sees the EU as a homogeneous cultural unit under threat of being diluted by globalising forces of which Turkey’s accession is seen to be part of.

A vicious cycle commences: politicians are unable to offer solutions; citizens lose confidence in their political representatives; people feel they are losing control and are subject to heteronomy. That is the ground for developing a diffuse fear against everything that comes from outside. A world without borders is perceived as an existential threat. European citizens sense that the future will be worse than the present. ... All this is toxic for the EU: ... [globalisation] is responsible for unlimited turbo-capitalism, fanatic accession rounds deep into the Turkish Orient and for a Europe of bureaucratic simple-mindedness.⁴⁷

While an economically and project-oriented EU is favoured among British newspapers, the Austrian tabloid *Neue Kronen Zeitung* prefers a culturally defined Union. This point is reflected in an article which argues that “[p]eople need more than a sound economical development. They require a jointly lived culture within agreed frontiers in order to develop awareness of a European identity.”⁴⁸ This highlights a fundamental difference in the understanding of “us” and “them” in an identity forming context. In Austria “us” refers to the EU as a unit standing against “them”, an outsider Turkey. In contrast to that, the British polarity of “us versus

⁴⁵ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 15.12.2004, Über Kreuz, Ernst Trost, p. n. s.

⁴⁶ Please note that direct quotes from Austrian newspapers are translations by the author.

⁴⁷ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 04.06.2005, Wagenburg gegen die Globalisierung, p.4.

⁴⁸ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 04.07.2005, Rückhalt für die Menschen, p.24.

them” describes a more nationalistic interpretation of GB versus the EU that confirms Britain’s perceived outsider position in the EU. This British outsider position is also reflected in the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* where GB is singled out as not being part of a European “us”. This goes as far as denying GB a European spirit and to depict it as a European outcast. The British vision of Europe is portrayed as an antithesis to a truly European view. It is even suggested that GB is not actually European as it represents a transatlantic view and liaises with the USA.

It is Britain that serves as an example where two visions of a future EU part. Great Britain sees the EU merely as an expanded free trade area. Others want to merge a future EU into a more integrated and deepened union. Great Britain and the USA want to stop this. That makes it obvious: With a “giant” like Turkey as an EU member the EU as a “deepened” union of states would be dead.⁴⁹

In the Austrian tabloid newspaper coverage Turkey’s accession is perceived as an outsider intrusion to destabilise an assumed pre-existing culturally coherent EU. Instead of spreading its influence through further accession the need to define Europe’s borders takes centre stage. Europe’s citizens are used as an argument to highlight opposition to Turkey’s EU accession.

The EU must not get out of control. Europe has to answer its citizens two questions in order to regain their trust: one is the question over Europe’s borders and the other over Europe’s identity.⁵⁰

The example above illustrate the link between questions of identity and borders, confirming theoretical considerations arguing for boundaries as a general constituting feature of identity formation processes (Hall, 1996, Schlesinger, 1991, Eder et al., 2002). Further, the media take on the position of speaking on behalf of

⁴⁹ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 18.12.2004, US-Regierung will die Türkei als “Trojanisches Pferd” in der EU, p.6.

⁵⁰ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 28.01.2006, Erweitert sich die EU zu Tode? Kurt Seinitz, p.6.

European citizens and to voice their disagreement. This gives the impression of the media being an advocate of the people and to have a shared agenda. As to whether this holds true is addressed in chapters 7 and 8.

Overall, results confirm Turkey as an important focus point in the construction of European identity. The degree to which it functions as a focal point against which a European identity is defined in opposition to the EU varies between national newspaper coverage. In the British case Turkey is portrayed as an ally to support a vision of a European future in opposition to a predominantly continental European view. It is not Turkey, but a majority group of countries that is used as a point of reference against which a European identity is defined. This is supported by examples that draw parallels between the UK's and Turkey's accession process which portray them as outsiders to a European vision that is supported by a majority of EU member states. Following this theme, the British press attributes responsibility for the EU's identity crisis to the EU and not Turkey. In stark contrast to that the Austrian tabloid newspaper *Neue Kronen Zeitung* sees Turkey as an outsider threat to European identity. Generalisations from the Austrian results have to be treated with caution since the quality newspapers do not show a coherent theme in articles referring to European identity or future. The portrayal of Turkey's accession to the EU as an outsider threat to the EU's internal unity appears to be a specific tabloid phenomenon. These opposing views illustrate how Turkey is used to put forward competing visions of Europe in the form of an old culturally defined versus a new project oriented understanding.

What the newspaper coverage in both countries agrees on is that Turkey is considered to be different enough to alter the current status quo of European identity. It is not individual differences like cultural variations as such, but the combination of different factors coming together that frame Turkey as a unique case. These include Turkey's demographic size, its economic semi-development and Islamic religion. It is the coming-together of these major elements that distinguish Turkey from other new EU member states and candidate countries.

These findings demonstrate that the Turkish question is used in different ways to put forward competing visions of Europe. These visions manifest themselves through a variety of issues. The questions of how and in what contexts Turkey is used to put forward contesting visions of Europe are key elements in analysing

European identity. Results indicate that the question to which degree Turkey functions as a focus point against which a European identity is defined offers a good starting point of analysis, but should be rephrased to include a broader perspective to do justice to the different processes of identity formations. To appropriately highlight the roles of both similarities and differences in identity formation processes the question should read instead “Does Turkey’s accession to the EU function as a platform for European identity constructions?” The latter represents a more fitting way to stress the complex and dynamic interplay of similarities and differences that allow the analysis of constructions of European identity.

5.2. References to European Identity in Austrian and British Focus Group Discussions

Questions of identity appear to bear a particular relevance among citizens. This is supported by focus group discussions addressing the purpose and role of identity with one participant describing identity as a fundamental requirement and basis noting that it is “important to all mankind. It symbolises someone’s roots” RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT⁵¹. Focus group results show that participants in every group in both countries discuss EU identity at some point in the discussion without previously having been introduced to the concept or asked directly to do so by the moderator. This is a strong starting point to verify the research question and confirms theoretical considerations to support an analysis of identity based on the sociological subject (Hall, 1996). It confirms that Turkey’s accession to the EU serves as an important platform for constructions of European identity among citizens. Another joint feature is that all focus groups address European identity by referring to the EU’s finality. Focus groups in both countries discuss the issue of the EU’s final

⁵¹ For reasons of confidentiality contributions from focus group participants to the discussions are anonymised according to the following scheme. The speaker reference reveals the group number, individual speaker number, gender and country of origin as illustrated in the following example: RESP [7] 39, MALE, AT. This allows the identification of specific features among groups, individual speakers, or along gender or country divides. Quotes by the discussion moderator are marked by the abbreviation MOD. Please note that direct quotes from Austrian focus groups are translations by the author.

shape in terms of member states or future direction as a way to define its identity. This supports theoretical considerations that, apart from similarities, identity also requires boundaries in form of differences in order to be defined (Hall, 1996, Schlesinger 1991, Eder et al., 2002).

The thematic focus of these discussions, however, differs along a national divide. Overall, British focus group participants express a more forward-looking future oriented vision of European identity. In contrast to that Austrian discussions circle around the question of what the EU actually is and not so much on what it will become. The latter question reveals a concern for the EU's status quo that is not as present in British discussions. Austrian citizens express a more reflective and inward-looking approach when addressing European identity. An interesting commonality is that in both instances the issue of boundaries plays a prominent role when defining European identity. As to what these boundaries are differs across countries. This national divide manifests itself in opposing positions over Turkey. While British participants do not see Turkey as the final frontier of the EU, Austrian discussants do.

RESP [2] 11, MALE, GB: The other thing for some people is, where does it [Europe] stop? ... Having said that, because things have gone so far to now and because there are also cultural benefits and strategic benefits it would be wrong to block it [Turkey]. But if you don't then where does it stop? Europe just becomes this sprawling behemoth where you got so many different nationalities and cultures. ... If it [Turkey's accession] does go ahead then some lines have to be drawn. Where does Europe stop? It does extend so far East it almost includes India.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: First of all, Europe implies European. And that in itself is a kind of demarcation line to me.

The examples above illustrate the point made previously that identity requires some kind of boundaries in order to be defined. The British example shows that without external borders Europe is perceived as an ever expanding faceless entity. In the Austrian case the definition of Europeaness implies a certain delineation. These examples establish a twofold link. The first one is between Turkey's accession and questions of EU identity. Evidence suggests that Turkey embodies a significant

focus point for European identity constructions. The second one is between identity and boundaries. Results lend further support to theoretical considerations that identity constructions are intrinsically linked to references of boundaries. In the examples above these references appear in form of questions around Europe's finality or calls for boundaries as an identity establishing necessity. These findings support the argument that boundaries form a constituting feature for defining identity in general and European identity in particular.

When further looking at the thematic focus of citizen discussions in regards to European identity another national divide emerges. While British focus group participants express fears over a sense of loss of national identity through membership in the EU, Austrian citizens experience a strengthening of national and regional identities by being part of the EU.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: ... Two aspects are important [in terms of EU membership] – on the one hand, the widening of your horizon and on the other hand, the strengthening of identity. You can break this down to your home town or even house. It goes both ways.

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: It [the EU] must not become a pabulum. It also needs to be ensured that national identity remains relevant, at least a little.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: I agree. Something that allows you to feel Austrian and European at the same time.

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: Exactly, and something that also allows you to be Tyrolean, while being Austrian. That is the next level, isn't it? These are all different levels, aren't they?

MOD: How could these look like?

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: I think, that this has already been recognised [by the EU].

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: Yes that the regional matters.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: Exactly, that the regions need to be cultivated.

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: So that it [the EU] does not become a pabulum.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: One example is the regional identity shared by Tyrol and Southern Tyrol. The latter is not part of Austria but belongs to Italy.

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: In the past it [the region] belonged together. It used to be a unit. It is in the process of growing together again [through EU membership].

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: I have to say that, since then [EU accession], I see Southern Tyrol differently than before.

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: In the past it [Southern Tyrol] was Italy and now it is a bit like Tyrol.

RESP [5] 24, MALE, AT: I agree, the borders become blurred. They are not as dominant as they used to be. You cross them and you do not notice anymore. In the past when you drove there you were stopped by a bar. And

that was the end of it. Now, driving into a different EU country is a completely different experience.

The discussion above illustrates and verifies a string of aspects about the formation and understanding of European identity and how it sits alongside other identities that people hold. In the Austrian case it confirms a strengthening effect of EU membership on identities on various levels stretching from European, to national to local. Further, the example shows the relevance of an identity model that allows the co-existence of multiple identities. This is true for the parallel coexistence of local, national, and European identities. These examples point towards a preference for a multiple identities model among Austrian citizens that accommodates a range of identities without the normative pressure of one overshadowing another.

Further, the example above refers to EU regional policy programmes as evidence and a good example to strengthen regional identities across national borders. The cases of Tyrol and Southern Tyrol are mentioned as a case in point where EU membership had a positive effect on regional identities by reuniting separated regions through permeable borders. Borderlessness within the EU is appreciated as an identity enforcing factor. This confirms that connecting similarities within an entity are just as important for the formation of identity as are differences enclosing this entity.

The Austrian example stands in stark contrast to the British experience where fears over a loss of identity through EU membership prevail. One participant expresses her unease over British EU membership when she notes “I also think what is sad is that all the countries have lost their own identity” RESP [1] 01, FEMALE, GB. Other than the multiple identities model in Austria, this reveals a perception of the EU as a homogenising force overshadowing national identities among British citizens.

RESP [1] 05, FEMALE, GB: ... I went to Ireland last year for a holiday and it was the first time I have been there with the Euro. ... It is really sad – you go there now and it feels quite clinical. The roads are really ugly and they have got made-up bridges and buildings.

The example above shows that even ostensibly positive aspects like regional investments and improvements of infrastructure through EU funding can be regarded as intrusive to national identity. This means that positive associations with the EU cannot simply be established through investments. Instead the formation of European identity is based on a complex interplay of processes of differentiation and identification.

Another interesting finding is that British focus group participants tend to draw a distinction between GB and the rest of the EU. Since this is similar to the findings in the news coverage it can be interpreted as an important feature of British identity. Further, this distinction of being different from the rest of EU member states is a central aspect that has to be factored in the understanding of European identity among British citizens. Rather than being a strengthening factor, as in the Austrian case, EU membership is seen as an intrusion into national identity and culture.

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: I am fed up of them telling me what to do. I don't want their laws in my country. EU laws might work across there [in Europe], because you have different cultures. I also think that in Europe you have got more of a similar culture. Simply because you are all in that area and are all next door to each other. You all have individual ways, obviously, but I think because us being an island we are kind of cut off from that - purely geography-wise. I just think the EU is taking us over and they are telling us "You can't do this, you can't do that" - well, I can because I am British and it is my country and that is what we are used to do, so stop telling me I can't. And I think everybody who joins in the end loses - every country loses some identity by becoming this massive, big EU country.

The example above highlights a bipolar definition of us, as in GB, versus them, as in the EU and continental EU member states, that appears to be symptomatic in the self-image of British identity and GB-EU relations. EU laws are seen to work better in the rest of Europe than in GB. This is based on the perception that continental EU member states share more cultural similarities by means of geographic proximity. It is indicative of British identity that great emphasis is put on GB to be in an outsider position within the EU. This confirms characterisations of GB as a stranger in Europe (Wall, 2008). It also highlights the role of geographic distance or proximity as an influencing factor on perceptions of identity.

Overall, Austrian focus group participants highlight a positive strengthening effect of EU membership on identities by rejuvenating regional identities through policy measures. Further, Austrians argue that through the variety of nationalities within the EU they are more aware and proud of their own uniqueness.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: When I drive to France or Brussels it is nice to be Austrian or Tyrolean among many different nations. ... Somehow, one feels very comfortable among them despite being Austrian or Tyrolean. ... The difference is what appeals to me.

This strengthening effect on national identities is not shared among British focus group discussants who voice concerns over a general loss of identity for any country that joins the EU, particularly their own national identity. While Austrians see themselves as unique among different nations, British people feel alien and distanced from other EU member states. The examples above illustrate that difference can be interpreted in many ways. In the first example difference is perceived as a source of an enriching sense of uniqueness among a variety of nations. In the latter case difference is seen as a separating and isolating factor.

5.3. Comparison of European Identity References in Austrian and British Media and Citizen Discourses

A comparison of key findings between media and citizen discussions reveals a mix of similarities and differences between the two discourses. First, results confirm that Turkey plays an important focus point in the construction of European identity in elite media as well as in citizen discussions across national boundaries. Secondly, a British outsider position within the EU is confirmed by media and citizen discussions in GB as well as in Austria. This suggests that Britain's distanced relationship to the EU is not just a matter of a specific national perception, but also one held more widely among other member states. Thirdly, a national divide over differing visions of Europe is found in both media and citizen discussions. The issue of Turkey's accession to the EU is used to put forward these competing visions of

Europe. Results confirm consistent similarities in elite media and citizen discussions along a national divide. Where media and citizen discussions differ is the way they address the issue of identity. Citizens tend to rely more on references to boundaries when constructing their identities. These feature less frequently in the press.

A comparison of media and citizen discussions reveals a strong link between the issue of Turkey and European identity. In the case of citizen discussions about Turkey's accession to the EU the issue of European identity is brought up without a direct input by the moderator. In a sample of newspaper articles, containing direct references to EU identity or a European future, results reveal a negative correlation between the number of references and progress of EU-Turkey accession negotiations. The amount of news coverage decreases with a lack of progress in negotiations, suggesting that the urgency of the issue of EU identity fades with Turkey's diminishing prospects of becoming an EU member state in the near future. These results further support Turkey as an important focus point in the construction of European identity.

A British outsider position is to be found in both media and citizen discussions across countries revealing different meanings of the dichotomy "us versus them" as a reference point for identity constructions. In the British case the polarity is based on the EU versus GB. Here, "us" stands for a nation-specific definition referring to GB. "Them" is attributed to the EU as the main reference point in opposition to a British identity. EU membership is perceived as an intrusion to national British culture and identity. In the Austrian case, EU membership is seen as a way to realise and celebrate the country's uniqueness among other member states. "Us" refers to the EU as a unit in opposition to Turkey.

References to borders in citizen discussions support theoretical considerations that boundaries form a general constituting feature of identity formations. Focus group discussions repeatedly focus on the EU's finality as a way of discussing EU identity issues. Exactly where this finality lies is subject to differing national interpretations. While British focus group participants see Turkey's accession to the EU as a significant change to the scope of the EU and an important position of points for future enlargements, Austrian discussants perceive Turkey's EU membership as an end to the EU as it is. In contrast to Austrian participants, which see Turkey as the final European frontier, British discussants perceive it as a prelude

for further enlargement rounds. These results point towards a difference between identity constructions in elite media discourses and citizen discourses. Boundaries and direct comparisons appear to play a larger role in citizen discussions, marking them as an important characteristic of identity constructions among citizens.

In the case of elite media discussions direct references to EU boundaries feature less prominent. Instead, Turkey is used as a way to put forward competing visions of Europe as a more subtle form of demarcation, suggesting what Europe should be and how far it should go. In the British case, newspaper coverage is dominated by the theme of an EU identity crisis and the EU's inability to adequately adopt to change. Here, responsibility for the failure or success of accession negotiations is attributed to the EU. This shift of responsibilities to the EU demonstrates a picture of the EU where it is not Turkey's problem to fit in, but instead the EU's task to adapt to changed conditions brought upon by Turkey's accession. These results stand in stark contrast to the main theme in Austrian newspaper coverage. Here, the issue of Turkey's accession as a threat to European identity and unity was a dominant and consistent feature in the Austrian tabloid newspaper *Neue Kronen Zeitung*.

Focus group discussions show a similar national divide, but with different concerns, revealing their relationship and vision of Europe. While British citizens fear a loss of national identity through EU membership, Austrians see it as a revival of regional and strengthening of national identities. These views reveal differing visions of Europe. They also demonstrate different identity models among citizens. While Austrian citizens seem to accommodate their identities in a multiple identities model where different identities co-exist without an intrinsic order, British citizens think in terms of a hierarchical identity model where national British identity is overshadowed by an intrusive European identity. These results confirm perceptions of a distinct outsider position of GB in the EU.

Overall, the issue of Turkey reveals different visions of Europe found in both media and citizen discussions along a national divide. While Austrian media and citizen discourses focus on a European status quo, GB favours a more future oriented version of Europe. The British view exposes a project-oriented vision, combining economic interests with democratic values putting forward its own

version as a new and modern vision of Europe. In contrast to that, the Austrian version focuses more on identity politics, culture and religion.

5.4. Summary

This step of analysis has shown that Turkey bears a significant relevance for European identity formations across countries and discourses. The construction of these identities is subject to country and discourse specific characteristics. Across discourses results suggest that citizens tend to refer more to boundaries and comparisons as a means to construct their identities. Results suggest that Turkey evokes different associations and meanings in Austria and GB. Consequently, Turkey plays a different role for EU identity formations in an Austrian or British context. In the British case Turkey's accession is important for putting forward a specific vision of Europe, reaffirming the boundaries of British national identity in opposition to the EU. The Austrian example has shown that Turkey serves as an important focus point in a leading tabloid newspaper for defining EU identity in form of a dichotomy where "us" includes a majority of EU member states that stand in opposition to Turkey. These results reveal distinct national differences in the understanding, dynamics and levels of identity formations. Results show that Austrians tend to think in form of a multiple identities model where Austrian national identity is situated alongside local and European identities. British citizens tend to think in terms of a hierarchical identity model where a British national identity is subordinated to a European identity. These results reveal different identity models demonstrating the importance of national specifics to explain different perceptions of European identity.

Deemphasising the notion of Turkey as an opposing Other against which European identities are generally defined the research question should be rephrased to read "Does Turkey's accession to the EU function as a platform for European identity constructions?" instead of "Does Turkey function as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined today?" The first is a more precise way to highlight Turkey's specific role for EU identity formation processes in different national and discursive contexts.

Chapter 6

The Use of Media References and Personal Experiences for European Identity Formations in Focus Groups

After having highlighted the relevance of Turkey's accession to the EU as a platform for European identity constructions, the following chapter looks at identity formations among citizens. The aim is to reveal the ways how citizens use mediated information and personal experiences in European identity constructions? Results will give important insights into people's identity formation processes to help understand why certain issues matter more to citizens and what role the media play in it. These findings form a significant basis for a comparison of citizen and media discussions in chapters 7 and 8.

The chapter first starts with an analysis of media references and personal experiences in GB, before examining the same among Austrian focus groups. In a third step a cross-national comparison of media references and personal experiences is conducted before reviewing key findings in a summary section.

6.1. Media References and Personal Experiences in GB

One prominent media story⁵² mentioned by British focus group discussants is that of the killing of two English Leeds United fans in clashes before the UEFA Cup semi-final between the Turkish football club Galatasaray and the British club Leeds United in the year 2000. It is remarkable that this media story dates back almost a decade from when the focus group interviews were conducted⁵³, yet people

⁵² The salience of topics in media stories brought up by focus group participants is measured by the frequency of a topic mentioned by individual speakers. For example, if a person introduces a topic to the discussion round the topic is counted as one salience point. If people reply to the mentioned topic their contribution is noted down as an additional salience point for that topic. The more people mention a topic, the more salience points are awarded to that particular topic.

⁵³ The British focus group interviews were conducted in the period from 18-30 August 2009.

name this incident as one of the main mediated associations in connection with Turkey. These findings point towards potential longitudinal effects of media coverage to shape people's perceptions.

The football incident has to be put into perspective by the specific location from where participants were mainly recruited. Since the majority of discussants have private or professional ties with the area of Leeds the salience of the story can partly be explained by this local proximity. Further, the demographic factor age contributes to explaining the occurrence of stories that date back for a longer period of time since most British focus group discussants are older than 25. Although the story as such addresses a tragic event, participants are predominantly neutral towards it with the incident being described as an unfortunate accident.

RESP [2] 10, MALE, GB: I remember ..., a few years ago, the stabbing of Leeds United fans in Turkey. ...

RESP [2] 12, MALE, GB: It was 2001 I think.

RESP [2] 10, MALE, GB: Yes and there was some trouble ... before the game. Two Leeds fans were stabbed. ... There was certainly some animosity towards Turkish people.

RESP [2] 11, MALE, GB: Yes, I remember my barber went to Turkey and he was wearing a Leeds United top and I remember at the time asking him whether he got any animosity? And he said that he generally didn't. And in fact, a lot of people never mention the Leeds thing. The individual, the men on the street will say "Oh yes, I read about that. How terrible."

Although the story features prominent among British focus group discussants, it is not used as an argument against Turkey's accession to the EU.

A number of other media references among British focus group participants are related to human rights, particularly women's rights. It is significant that evaluations are largely critical and appear as a major concern almost exclusively among female participants. The examples below broach the issues of personal and economic dependency of Turkish women on their partners, oppression, patriarchal structures and religious clothing.

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: It is that criteria – human rights. Again, this is from the media, so I don't know how true it is, but I am sure I have read

somewhere that until recently ... wives could only work for husband's allowance. I don't know whether that is true, but that is something I have read. And even if they have changed it now – that is a human rights thing.

MOD: Can you think of any media story involving Turkey and Europe?

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: Yes, when young girls have gone when they were 15 and they fell in love with a Turkish guy, sometimes you don't get them out, do you?

RESP [1] 08, FEMALE, GB: I have never been to Turkey. ... My parents may have been and I probably heard my dad rant about women having to take less steps behind the men and that the men is always leading the way.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: ... Like this photograph in the paper today of a Muslim [woman] pushing a pram and all you can see is her eyes. I don't want to see that walking down my street.

The last example is of particular relevance as it refers to women's fear of an Islamisation of society that could potentially curtail their human rights as women. It also illustrates that women tend to be more concerned about a watering down of their rights than men are.

Another set of news stories, related to human rights, addresses the issue of Kurdish minority rights in Turkey. British focus groups participants tend to point out the issue as problematic or unsolved, but do not take sides or voice particular judgements against Turkey. This lack of evaluation could be down to being relatively unfamiliar with the topic. The second example below illustrates this in a case of misinformation, highlighting that British focus groups are more likely to have been informed about Kurdish minorities in the context of the Iraq war.

RESP [1] 08, FEMALE, GB: I know there is a lot of discrepancy about the land, isn't there? Between Kurdish people and Turkish residents as well. I don't know the ins and outs, but I know that it is quite a problem because they need to settle that before they are going into the EU. That is sort of a liability for members of the EU. They got bad times in the country.

RESP [2] 11, MALE, GB: ... Does Turkey border with Kurdistan?

RESP [2] 13, MALE, GB: I think it is Iraq.

RESP [2] 11, MALE, GB: Or at least the North of Iraq where those Kurds live. I think I remember some media coverage about the Turkish reaction to the Kurds. ... They weren't happy about it.

Further media references among British focus group participants include a string of issues such as human rights in general, religion, migration issues, and Turkey's EU accession process. While human rights and religion are predominantly connected to negative evaluations, migration issues present a more ambivalent picture with some positive and negative evaluations. The issue of Turkey's accession process to the EU does not hold any particular evaluations and is discussed in a neutral context.

One story in connection with human rights and Islam, about a female British teacher who is arrested over naming a stuffed animal Muhammad, causes particular irritation among discussants. It is interesting that the story is assumed to have taken place in Turkey when it was Sudan instead. It appears that Islam is the main factor leading people to believe that the incident took place in Turkey. This reveals that Islam is one of the major identifying features that people attribute to Turkey. Further, it suggests that issues of violations of human rights in connection with Islam are potentially attributed to any Muslim country.

The story refers to a British teacher who was arrested in Sudan in 2007 on charges of insulting Islam's prophet by naming a teddy bear in class Muhammad.

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: [Do] you remember that teacher? Was that in Turkey? With the teddy bear named Abdul and she worked abroad. ...

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: Yes, I remember something.

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: They were going to execute her.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: That's right.

RESP [4] 20, FEMALE, GB: For having a teddy called Abdul? ...

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: This is going back a couple of years ago, but I don't know if it was Turkey or not. But she was a teacher for British children. She has gone across and she has been there for years, helping impoverished children. And all the kids loved her to bits and then, apparently, they found out that she had named this teddy ... Muhammad. ... The parents found out and she got arrested and thrown in prison. And they were going to stone her to death.

RESP [4] 20, FEMALE, GB: You are joking.

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: And then the British government had to get involved and saved her.

RESP [4] 20, FEMALE, GB: Good.

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: ... [T]here was a child in the class called Muhammad, so she just said "Oh, what do you want to call the teddy bear?" And he said "Muhammad". So she called him Muhammad and world war three could have broken out. Now, that was ridiculous. And she has gone to help and volunteered their services and helped their children.

It is noticeable that the story happened two years before the interviews were conducted, yet people clearly remember it after this period of time and continue to have strong feelings about it. This points towards potentially lasting effects of media stories on people's memories and opinions. The story holds a strong link to a British national context since the teacher affected is from GB. This contributes to explaining the salience of the issue in a British context.

Other media stories that are mentioned by British focus group discussants include a balloon accident where a general lack of security standards in Turkey is highlighted. The story is taken as an example to illustrate Turkey's shortcomings in terms of security standards.

RESP [2] 12, MALE, GB: I have just remembered a news story. It has been a ballooning incident. Apparently there has been an area in Turkey which has been very popular for hot air ballooning. And it is unregulated. Like the regulations about who can go up and how many balloons and people at once. There has been an incident where people died. And that was the news story, but also that the regulations may be not up to standard for the EU as an example. Maybe they don't have the safety and kind of laws that are passed in the EU making sure that according to the health and safety laws everyone is safe.

Further media references address the military involvement in the democratic process in Turkey, the denial of the Armenian genocide by Turkish officials, internal terrorism, a lack of economic development, a Turkish earthquake, and charged relations with Cyprus, all of which are discussed and evaluated in a negative context. The only positive media story mentioned is linked to Turkey as a popular holiday destination.

Overall, media references mentioned by British focus groups are characterised by an array of different thematic foci. Despite this lack of a coherent thematic focal point, these media stories reveal a tendency towards concern over issues of human rights with a special emphasis on women's and minority rights among British focus group participants. This means that this issue points towards an important demarcation line for European identity constructions. Further, results show that negative headlines tend to dominate people's memories and opinions, suggesting

that negative news have a greater potential to be remembered and therefore to develop an opinion influencing potential.

When looking at references to media, results reveal major points of media critique that British focus group participants share among each other. This critique forms an important part in analysing people's relationship to mediated information. People find themselves in a situation where they are dependent on the media, particularly in events that go beyond the limits of personal experiences. Turkey's accession to the EU is such a case where very few people can compare media coverage to their own personal experiences. British people tend to have very little experience with Turkish migrant communities. Most of their personal experiences stems from holidays. This makes them highly dependent on media stories to influence their opinions.

The most commonly voiced critique towards media coverage addresses discrepancies between media representations and people's personal experiences.

RESP [3] 14, MALE, GB: ... I am sure Turkey being a huge country, there is probably lots of different habits in life just like there are in the UK. But I think what gets often overlooked is, they are just people. Just like the rest of us who are trying to get by. We often see, as portrayed in the media, people of different religion ... different skin colours ... different cultures. It is as if they are some kind of alien. And yet, they still have to put food on the table. Live life.

RESP [1] 03, FEMALE, GB: Holidays and lots of narrow streets. I think of old quarters and ancient cities.

MOD: Can you describe that a bit more?

RESP [1] 03, FEMALE, GB: These narrow streets where ... you get the shade because they are close together. In a very hot place. That is sort of the idea. That is more TV-film Turkey, probably, than real Turkey. That is what comes to mind.

The first example refers to misrepresentations of the media that portray Turkish and other cultures in an alienating way. Despite the media's emphasis on differentiating aspects, the focus group participant questions the validity of such representations. Instead he points out joint commonalities such as the economic necessities to manage life on a daily basis. This shows that people actively compare media information and the values that come with it against their personal opinions

and values. As part of this process they distance themselves from the content of media coverage that allows them to integrate it into their own understanding of reality.

The second example illustrates how people rely on mediated information to imagine people and places that are beyond their personal experiences. Here, the focus group discussant gives insight into her perception of how she imagines Turkey despite having been there herself. Aware of this dependency she distances herself from such images by saying that these are not very likely to represent realities in Turkey. This shows that although people rely on mediated information about events beyond their knowledge they treat this information with a degree of caution. It looks like media coverage undergoes a process of evaluation when adapted by people.

Suspicion of media coverage can go as far as avoiding it entirely. As the following example shows one British focus group participant's reaction to media misrepresentation and misinformation is to shun it completely. A female focus group participant voices her critique about the media when she describes her reaction "... I just turn the telly off. It is a bit bad really, but I just don't want to know. Because they are getting a lot of it wrong anyway" (RESP [1] 06, FEMALE, GB). This illustrates that people actively choose to avoid exposure to information that runs counter their beliefs or standards of objectivity.

The second most common media critique among British focus groups is that of insufficient media coverage. The example mirrors the limited degree of British news coverage on the topic of Turkey's accession to the EU.

MOD: [D]o you recall a media story on Turkey and Europe or the European Union?

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: I think there has been [a story] ... in the early 90s when it first started ... the appeal or applications. That is probably when it first applied into Europe. That is just one I remember.

RESP [3] 16, MALE, GB: I just hear in the news every now and then that they want to join and discussions are going on. That is what I seem to hear. I don't see much about it on the TV or anything.

RESP [3] 18, MALE, GB: I heard about Romania and Poland, but I haven't heard about Turkey.

The example above illustrates the dependency of people on mediated information, particularly in cases where the information lies outside their personal experiences. These findings have to be seen in the context of diminished news coverage about Turkey's EU membership negotiations at the time when the focus groups were conducted.

The third most frequently mentioned media critique is on the general limitations of media coverage in terms of scope. One discussant explains how he relies on mediated information to shape his opinions when he says "... I can only have this opinion from what I get from the media ..." (RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB). This example illustrates a media agenda-setting effect in the case of events beyond people's personal experiences. On the same level stands critique on a predominantly negative media bias and the distorting effects it has on the representation of issues. As one discussant expresses, negative media bias can go as far as putting people off news coverage altogether "... There is so much bad press everywhere. You sort of don't want to take it in. You just want to ignore it" (RESP [1] 02, FEMALE, GB).

There is one example where two types of mediated experiences are contrasted against each other. In the first instance the discussant refers to the promotional image of Turkey as it is used in brochures about destined holiday resorts. The second refers to a more journalistic coverage.

RESP [1] 07, FEMALE, GB: [T]he holiday resorts ... are quite modern because of all the people from all over the world who go there. When you see something that is on the news ... they are not very modern places that they show. With all the killing each other and bombing and all this stuff. It is not very nice.

In this case different types of mediated information are used to expand the scope of personal experiences.

An analysis of people's personal experiences reveals that four out of 23 British people⁵⁴ have been to Turkey as part of a holiday experience. Results show that people recount seven individual holiday episodes and two encounters with Turkish

⁵⁴ Please note that one participant chose not to answer the questionnaire question "Have you ever been to Turkey?"

and other Muslim migrants as part of their direct personal experiences⁵⁵. Further, they mention four indirect experiences⁵⁶ with Turkish people or culture. In comparison to people's mediated experiences, personal encounters are considerably less frequent⁵⁷. This reflects on the lack of significant Turkish migrant groups in GB and people's tendency to know Turkey first and foremost as a holiday destination.

British focus group's direct experiences are largely characterised by their anecdotal nature and tendency to focus on encounters that strike people as different to their normal experience.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: We were invited to a wedding that was going on, quite strangely. We were just passing and it was like a big area. And there were all the bridal women, no men about, just the women, and this poor bride.

RESP [1] 04, FEMALE, GB: Recently, I helped a friend ... to ensconce this guy from Turkey – a new research student – in a flat in Leeds and he turned up with his wife and son, expecting the flat to be kitted out with kitchen, table, cutlery, bedding, everything. That is my latest experience with Turkey. They weren't very happy about that. So, I don't know whether in Turkey ... you rent a flat or something and everything is sort of there for you, ready to move in.

The first example illustrates how the focus group participant's attention is drawn to the surprise invitation of her as a stranger to a Turkish wedding and the lack of male guests among the party. It is this element of comparison, also notable in the second example, which appears to be a key feature in people's identity constructions and sense making processes. Taken as a whole, personal experiences make for a very limited contribution towards people's experiences with Turkish people and culture.

⁵⁵ Direct experiences refer to people's immediate encounters with Turkish people and culture.

⁵⁶ Indirect experiences refer to real life stories about experiences with Turkish people and culture told by third persons.

⁵⁷ References to mediated experiences outnumber those of personal experiences by 29 to 13.

Overall, British focus groups have significantly more mediated experiences than personal encounters with Turkish people or culture. This points towards a relatively high degree of media dependency. At the same time, people show surprising levels of awareness of the limitations of news coverage. It is interesting to see that people express such a reflective point of view on the limitations in place that determine their opinions and identities. Looking at all points of media critique a main and general common denominator takes shape. Results reveal that media dependency is a major concern among British focus group discussants. It is symptomatic of an ambivalent situation that people find themselves in. While they are very much aware of their dependence on media coverage they maintain a certain degree of distance towards the reliability of media content. One discussant describes his unease about the trustworthiness of mediated information when he notes “[a]gain, this is from the media, so I don’t know how true it is” (RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB). Evidence suggests that media coverage forms a relevant part in the formation of European identities among people, but is used with caution. These conclusions have to be understood in the context of heightened levels of reflexion facilitated by the focus group settings. Under more natural circumstances people are more inclined to draw on spontaneous associations of opinions and pieces of information.

6.2. Media References and Personal Experiences in Austria

A set of media references featuring among Austrian focus group participants is related to issues about women’s rights. The evaluations of these stories are predominantly negative throughout. The stories feature a range of different issues including honour killings within Turkish migrant families, the symbolism of religious clothing like wearing a veil, a case of child abduction by a Turkish husband, women’s dependency on men, or patriarchal structures. The frequency of these news stories can be linked to two factors. First, it is very likely that focus group discussions reflect to some degree stories that feature prevalently in the news coverage. One has to bear in mind though, that it is negative stories that stay in people’s memories for longer and are therefore remembered and told more often

than stories with positive connotations. This means that even with balanced news coverage of equally negative and positive news stories, it will be the negative stories that are more likely to be remembered. The second factor that contributes towards an increased occurrence of media stories covering women's rights is Austria's Turkish migrant communities. This proximity makes it more likely that problems feature more often in Austrian media than in British ones where there is no significant Turkish immigration group. Evidence shows that women's rights strike a particular chord with Austrian focus group discussants revealing an understanding of EU identity strongly linked with freedom and security for women at its core.

In one case focus group discussants describe a media story where a female Turkish student chose to study in Austria so that she would be able to wear a veil at University, which is not allowed in Turkey under secularist rules. This causes a discussion contrasting religious freedom and tolerance in Austria and Turkey.

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: ... I saw a discussion on television which featured the case of a female Turkish student who chose to study in Austria because she was not allowed to study in Turkey wearing a veil. ... There [at the television discussion round] were several Turkish citizens who said they would have better chances here than in their own country.

MOD: What kind of impression does this give?

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: Somehow ... that left a negative impression.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: That is also my impression. In my view, Turkey is lacking a certain tolerance.

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: I agree.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: ... Somehow, they are expecting this kind of tolerance towards Turkish people. ... But there is a great mismatch.

The example above features a direct comparison between mediated information and personal experiences as a way to evaluate an issue. This appears to be a common characteristic among Austrian focus group participants to form their opinions. It demonstrates that people tend to judge Turkey according to their own standards and freedoms they enjoy. Rather than looking at arguments, people largely draw comparisons when building their opinions about Turkey. Despite widely-used media critique, mediated information forms an integral part of this evaluation process.

The empirical evidence supports theoretical considerations that state how identities are formed through an interplay of similarities and differences. Here, people use commonalities they share with their immediate environment as a starting point for evaluations. It is through the process of drawing direct comparisons between their own standards and practices and those in Turkey that they are able to evaluate Turkey. It is the interplay between how people perceive their environment and the image they have of Turkey that determines their understanding of a European identity.

Religion is seen as a major cause for infringements of women's as well as human rights. One focus group participant describes his view on the contradictoriness of Islam with human rights drawing on mediated information: "It is mentioned in the media that ... Turkish people are brought up in a strict religious way and live according to the Koran. I suppose that some of the rules [of the Koran] are not agreeable with EU human rights" (RESP [7] 40, MALE, AT). Similarly, in the case of honour killings, Islam is seen as a major cause for violence against women inflicted by a family member, partner or ex-partner. The example below features a case of honour killing where a woman chose a partner outside her cultural reach. This stirs up considerable offence among Austrian focus group discussants.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: Religion plays a big role.

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: ... They kill their own sister, just because she has a German boyfriend. ...

RESP [6] 31, MALE, AT: That happens quite often. That has happened on various occasions, based on what you read. ...

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: That has shocked me, quite honestly.

RESP [6] 29, FEMALE, AT: They are quite radical.

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: It was mainly the parents who initiated this. ...

RESP [6] 31, MALE, AT: Yes, they instigate it and some brothers will finish the job.

The example illustrates an agenda-setting potential of the media. Media coverage emphasising the issue highlights honour killings as a growing problem in Turkish society and among Turkish migrant families. The stories cause strong reactions among focus group participants which reflects on the importance of the issue. The example above touches upon various issues offering an explanation for the strong opinions. First, the issue of intercultural relations in connection with

religious traditions and believes and secondly, the use of violence against a family member play an important role. It is noticeable that the notion of tolerance features repeatedly as an important value among Austrian focus group participants.

In another story the case of an Austrian woman whose child was abducted by the Turkish father after their divorce is described. Focus group participants criticise the lack of legal opportunities in Turkey to prevent or appeal such practices. Similar to the honour killing case people draw the conclusion that this is common practice in Turkey with one discussant noting “This story appears to be symptomatic for the situation there [in Turkey]” (RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT). This highlights the degree of media dependency of citizens particularly in the case of events beyond people’s experiences.

Referring to a media report, female focus group discussants imagine the realities of a woman living in Turkey as one being dominated by restrictive patriarchal structures, binding them to the domestic sphere.

RESP [8] 46, FEMALE, AT: All they [women] do is work and have kids – that is what they do for the rest of their lives. There was a report about it. They are not allowed to go anywhere. They stay at home and have to take care of the housekeeping. They cannot escape.

RESP [8] 45, FEMALE, AT: This is not something one would want to adapt to as a woman who grew up here [Austria] and who enjoyed equal rights. I do not hold any kind of understanding for that sort of thing.

RESP [8] 46, FEMALE, AT: I can’t believe that such living conditions continue to exist nowadays.

The example above introduces a certain development discourse where Turkey is seen as a backward and underdeveloped country. As featured in previous examples people draw comparisons as a common way to evaluate issues. Comparisons appear to be a highly relevant technique for Austrian focus groups to form opinions and evaluating a situation or issue.

A number of other media references are related to migration issues with examples of Turkish migrants living in Austria. Evaluations are mixed and do not show a particular tendency towards one or the other, ranging from positive to negative. The frequency of this topic appearing in discussions among Austrian discussants can be linked to personal experiences that some of the people have with

Turkish migrants. Further, it is likely that discussions reflect the emphasis placed on migration stories as they are featured in news coverage. The stories mentioned in this context address the problems faced by intercultural relationships and challenges of migrant Turks who are struggling to unite the realities of different cultures.

In the first case discussants refer to a media story where the situation of a Turkish-Austrian couple is described who face suspicion and opposition by the Turkish parents of the woman. In the following discussion among focus group participants the end of the story is portrayed as a conciliatory one where the Austrian boyfriend is finally welcomed into the Turkish family. The other example describes the challenges faced by Austrians with a Turkish cultural background who are torn between Turkish tradition and their pursuit for more independence. One discussant describes how young generations with Turkish backgrounds strive to “live their own lives, but do not have the chance to do so. Reality catches up with them” (RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT). Other than the stories related to women’s rights, which causes strongly opposing views, people tend to show greater sympathy and understanding towards the problems faced by young people with Turkish backgrounds living in Austria.

Another significant media story is the Marco case which is discussed in terms of legal security and human rights standards in Turkey. The case describes the story of a German teenager who was put into investigative custody in a Turkish jail for eight months on charges of assaulting a 13 year old British girl on a holiday trip to Turkey. Evaluations are exclusively negative with people particularly criticising the lack of an adequate legal representation and issues of human rights over detaining a minor for such a long period of time. One discussant notes that “It gave the impression that he was rather helpless. That he was not adequately legally represented” (RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT).

Another set of news stories refers to Islam and holds predominantly negative connotations. In one case a participant describes a media story contrasting Islam in opposition to Christian ideology and how this contributes towards a suggested religious divide between Turkey and the EU.

RESP [7] 38, MALE, AT: You constantly hear in the media, whenever Turkey is mentioned in connection with the EU, that the Christian Occident

or Christian ... religion is contrasted with Islam. That is why I associate it with Turkey too.

This example illustrates the potential of media stories to link Turkey with a particular set of associations. The case featured above suggests an inherent confrontation and mutual exclusion of the two religions. Although the participant expresses a certain distance to these media claims, he accepts them as genuinely valid since they appear consistently in the news coverage. This illustrates that media coverage, although treated cautiously, regains credibility if certain claims appear consistently over time.

Another media story mentioned by Austrian focus group discussants frames Islam as a threat. This example illustrates the potential of the media to frame an issue in a specific way, particularly when no other sources of information could counterbalance such claims.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: You constantly hear in the news that ... representatives of Islam have the ambition to bring their faith to Central Europe ... and to become the world religion. That is what you hear in the media. It is this ambition in combination with the cultural dimension that makes for most of people's anxieties. ... I think religions should rather highlight what they share and have in common and that there is no need to be in competition with each other. But you hear very little about that.

It is interesting to see how the discussant justifies his position as being one derived from mediated information. That way he indirectly distances himself from the claims and puts responsibility for validity on the source of the information. The example also shows how mediated information is used to form the basis for personal views and opinions.

Further media references are related to minority rights in Turkey with predominantly negative evaluations. These stories mainly feature references to the treatment of religious minorities in general and the Kurdish minority in particular. One participant highlights shortcomings in the handling of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. He explains "What is important to note ... is Turkey's deficit regarding the treatment of minorities. For example how they treat Kurds. ... I am only repeating

what I hear in the media” (RESP [5] 25, MALE, AT). This example highlights the media dependency of discussants. At the same time it illustrates how people tend to distance themselves from mediated information, putting responsibility for the truthfulness of the information on the media.

Another story addresses the problems faced by religious minorities in an Islamic society. As featured before, people draw comparisons between the treatment of religious groups in Austria and in Turkey. The hypothetical question of whether Turkey would offer similar or the same religious freedoms to Austrian migrants in Turkey features significantly in discussions among Austrian focus group participants. It is not so much the question whether Turkey is exactly like Austria, but whether legal rights and freedoms are comparable to what people are used to in their own country that matters.

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: What you hear in the news ... is that Catholics have fewer chances [in Turkey] than Muslims have here [Austria]. That is based on what I read.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: That is a popular comparison often drawn: would we have the same opportunities if we wanted to build a church [in Turkey]? But you cannot compare this.

RESP [6] 31, MALE, AT: You would probably have bigger problems there [in Turkey] as opposed to the ones you are facing when you build one [a mosque] here [in Austria].

The example further highlights people’s distanced relationship to the media. This is yet another case where responsibility for the credibility of the information is attributed to the media.

Media stories about Turkey’s EU accession process hold mixed evaluations with a slight tendency towards a negative emphasis.

RESP [5] 25, MALE, AT: I think that Turkey does not have the endurance to wait until Europe is ready for it to join. ...

MOD: Where do you get this impression from?

RESP [5] 25, MALE, AT: That is what you hear in the media. They say that Turkish people think that they are just given the run-around. Which is true to some extent. In the case of all other countries there is a specific time frame but for Turkey it is missing. ... They will not be able to exercise that kind of patience.

The example above shows how people construct their opinions using mediated information. That effect is particularly powerful when alternative sources or personal experiences are missing. Media can be influential in framing certain issues. In this case, Turkish frustration over the lack of progress and signs of EU fatigue are seen as a lack of virtue to join the EU. One participant notes “[t]here was a report recently, saying that they do not want to join the EU (RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT). This illustrates that the willingness to join the EU is a relevant aspect from a citizen’s perspective to support Turkey’s accession to the EU.

Other news stories that do not fall in one of the thematic categories mentioned above include campaign slogans against Turkish migration used by right-wing parties during the Austrian national elections in September 2008, critique on the denial of the Armenian genocide, the pending solution to the Cyprus conflict, legal security issues, human rights, sports events, the case of a wedding mass murder and the story of a tourist kidnapping case at mount Ararat. A story about the banning of the Turkish siege and battle of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 from school history text books for reasons of not straining intercultural relations causes particular irritation among Austrian focus group participants.

RESP [8] 45, FEMALE, AT: There was a newspaper report, covering a story about how it is not allowed to teach the Turkish siege of Vienna in history classes anymore, because this might lead to conflicts.

RESP [8] 43, FEMALE, AT: Really?

RESP [8] 45, FEMALE, AT: I found that quite drastic. You cannot negate a historic fact and act as if nothing has happened. ...

RESP [8] 42, FEMALE, AT: That is almost criminal.

This example illustrates some of the prevailing sensibilities stemming from historical conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy.

Overall, the thematic focus of the media stories mentioned by Austrian focus group discussant reveals a particular concern with human rights in general and women’s and minority rights in particular. Further, media stories relating to migration issues feature prominently in discussions. This can be linked to increased media coverage about Turkish migrants in Austria and people’s personal experiences.

Media critique features extensively among Austrian focus group discussants who tend to be particularly critical towards news coverage. They show a general awareness and reflectivity of the limitations of mediated information. People with personal experiences tend to use this alternative information as a tool to compare and evaluate mediated information.

Austrian media critique focuses on three major points that include negative media bias, media dependency and agenda-setting. By far, the most prominent media critique is targeted at negative media bias. People express a highly critical view of negative news media and the distorting effects this may have on their opinions of Turkey. The examples above also support arguments that state that negative news tend to be remembered more easily and for longer than positive news. In the case of predominantly negative news coverage about Turkey this has a multiplying effect, creating a persistently and long lasting negative image of the country.

RESP [5] 24, MALE, AT: You always hear of the negative examples.

RESP [5] 26, FEMALE, AT: You hear a lot of negative stories.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: The information we receive is distinctly one-sided.

RESP [7] 37, MALE, AT: The impressions you get from Turkey or the main news you get about Turkey are negative stories like the one about the Marco case.

RESP [7] 38, MALE, AT: The majority [of Turkish migrants] work hard ... There are exceptions to that of course and those are the stories you find in the news.

MOD: Can you think of any other media stories?

RESP [8] 45, FEMALE, AT: You usually think of these kinds of [negative] stories. They are the ones you remember the easiest.

RESP [8] 43, FEMALE, AT: Yes, it is the negative stories that you remember. It is always like that.

RESP [8] 45, FEMALE, AT: These stories are simply more lurid.

This negative media bias suggests that the identity clues provided by mediated information are largely based on differences. The extent to which people rely on

mediated information means that they are exposed to a biased choice of identity parameter. This would mean that it is not by choice, but by the provision of biased mediated information that people tend to use differences to form European identities. This opens up a new perspective on how media contribute towards identity formations. A negative media bias means that people are largely denied the choice to construct their identities through processes of identification. Instead, a negative media bias steers them into using differences as their main points of reference to construct their European identities.

One focus group participant voices her frustration about the negative media bias in Austria, linking this to the negative attitude of the general public. The example also highlights the importance of personal experiences to put mediated information into perspective.

RESP [8] 43, FEMALE, AT: I believe that people here [in Austria] generally have a negative attitude [towards Turkish migrants], because they constantly hear negative news about them. ... You never hear about the reasons why people leave their country. That causes you to become extremely biased. ... Once you know the other side you realise that they are not all the same.

Similarly, another focus group discussant describes how personal experience has changed her views that she developed based on mediated information. The example also highlights that similar problems are put under greater scrutiny when placed in another cultural context.

RESP [8] 44, FEMALE, AT: You always hear the worst. The fact that we have similar problems is being overlooked. ... You always read the worst of stories [about Turkish migrants]. But if you know people personally – and I know Turkish people - then you realise how nice they are.

The examples above demonstrate the importance and potential of personal experiences to counterbalance negative news bias. Knowing that this is limited suggests a heightened influence of the media where such checks and balances through alternative information are missing.

The second most common media critique among Austrian focus group discussants is awareness for media dependency. The following examples illustrate two points. First, that people rely heavily on mediated information in aspects that are beyond their scope of personal experiences. Secondly, they show a surprising awareness of their own media dependency and a critical stance towards mediated information. People's relation to mediated information exposes it as a necessary mean, but one that is treated with caution.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: ... You get the impression that there [in Turkey] are a lot of religious fanatics, which I generally find threatening. It looks like tolerance is not very pronounced. To what degree this is actually true I cannot say.

RESP [6] 34, FEMALE, AT: We have very little personal experience with it [Turkey]. Most information is from the media. In effect, we are influenced by the media.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: As you can see, our knowledge is mainly derived from the media.

RESP [6] 29, FEMALE, AT: Other than that we do not have any other experience. ...

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: The information we get is largely one-sided.

The examples above illustrate that without personal experiences people are left vulnerable to and dependent on mediated information. They also reveal issues of trust as to which information source can be trusted to get an adequate picture of an issue. It is interesting to see that people draw a distinction between media representations and what they perceive as reality. This shows that people are well aware of the limitations of the media. This suggests that they use mediated information as a way to construct reality, but not adopt it as a reality in itself. One focus group participant illustrates this distinction between mediated information and reality when she addresses women's rights in Turkey.

RESP [8] 45, FEMALE, AT: What is the situation on emancipation [in Turkey] nowadays? How does it look like in reality? Are women really the way they are portrayed [in the media]? Or is this just another prejudice? That is what you hear in the media.

This sheds an interesting light on the way media are used for constructing identities. Evidence suggests that people use mediated information in an interactive way to compare it to direct or indirect personal experiences. What follows is an evaluation process where information sources are measured against each other and actively used and integrated into European identity formations.

The third most common media critique among Austrian focus group participants revolves around agenda-setting. It generally refers to the media's potential to determine how and what people learn about an issue and how much importance is attributed to a topic (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). In this context, it refers to the power of the media to introduce certain issues, mark them as relevant and make them a leading association that first comes to mind when thinking of a specific topic.

RESP [7] 38, MALE, AT: The first association that comes to mind in connection with the EU is community. That is the association most widely used in the media. That is the first thing that I associate the EU with.

The agenda-setting potential of the media is criticised by people for disseminating misleading views about Turkey. What bothers people in particular is that they are unable to distinguish between single cases and representative information. One participant expresses her frustration over the lack of telling one from the other when she argues that “[w]hat you hear in the media quite often are cases of honour killings. ... Does that reflect the real situation or are these just isolated cases?” RESP [8] 45, FEMALE, AT. One example illustrates the power of media agenda-setting where mediated information outweighs personal experiences. Here, one discussant describes his reluctance to rent a car in Turkey based on mediated information, despite never having had a negative personal experience that would justify this conclusion.

RESP [5] 25, MALE, AT: Unless it is absolutely necessary, I would not rent a car [in Turkey]. I am saying this because that is what you hear [in the media], despite me never having had a negative experience.

In comparison to extensive media references, personal experiences feature much less frequently among Austrian focus groups⁵⁸. Nine out of 22 focus group participants has been to Turkey before. Overall, people's personal experiences with Turkish people and culture stem almost equally from holiday experiences and encounters with Turkish migrants, with a slight emphasis towards the latter. Indirect experiences are eclipsed by direct experiences by a third⁵⁹. Despite Austria's significant Turkish community, people's general personal experiences are rather limited. A rural-urban divide among the selected focus group discussants makes them less likely to have had personal encounters as the majority of them are from predominantly rural areas.

Where Austrian focus groups draw on direct personal experiences they tend to focus on encounters with Turkish migrants rather than their holiday experience. Integration issues feature particularly strong as the following examples illustrate.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: I only have very few points of contact with Turkish people. I know one personally. He works in an IT shop. The guy is reserved, but very accomplished. I saw him earlier today and noticed how busy he was. He has a good work mentality, I like that.

RESP [7] 38, MALE, AT: Most of the Turks living here are hard-working. I know how diligent they clean at my workplace and how friendly they are. ... The majority works very assiduously and is willing to integrate. ...

RESP [7] 35, FEMALE, AT: There are always two sides. There are Austrians that do not talk proper German to Turkish people. How are they supposed to learn the language then?

RESP [7] 38, MALE, AT: Exactly. ... I witnessed a situation between a janitor and his Turkish cleaning personnel and he talked to them like you would talk to a small child.

It is interesting to notice that a similar work mentality emerges as a point of connection and reason for respect and that responsibility for integration is partly shifted to the Austrian side. The comparison to one's own standards, in this case people's attitude towards work, appears to be a relevant feature to assess Turkish

⁵⁸ A total of 76 references to media stories compares to 28 cases of personal experiences among Austrian focus groups.

⁵⁹ 17 direct experiences compare to 11 indirect experiences.

people and their culture. On the whole, people's personal experiences are relatively limited.

Overall, Austrian focus groups rely significantly more on mediated information than on personal experiences. Media critique is expressed frequently and concentrates on three main points: 1) negative media bias, 2) media dependency and 3) media agenda-setting. Austrian discussants issue extensive critique on the prevalent negative media bias in news relating to Turkey's accession to the EU. The critique goes as far as doubting the truthfulness of such coverage altogether. Together with the widespread criticism of media dependency and media agenda-setting, a distinct and general awareness of the limits of media coverage can be attested among Austrian focus groups. Results demonstrate that personal experiences play a minor role but are used, where possible, to act as a system of checks and balances to evaluate mediated information.

6.3. Comparison of Media References and Personal Experiences in Austria and GB

A comparison of media references among focus groups in Austria and GB reveals a number of differences and some surprising commonalities. Austrian focus group participants tend to mention a greater number and variety of media stories combined with increased depths of knowledge and detail. This can be linked to a greater salience of the topic in Austrian national news coverage and tendencies of being more receptive to these issues through a proximity to migrant communities.

Looking at the topical focus of media stories mentioned by focus group participants in both countries shows a distinct concern with issues of human rights, particularly women's and minority rights. Taking aside the story about the death of Leeds United fans in Turkey as a case of heightened salience due to the local proximity of focus group recruits, discussants in both countries demonstrate significant levels of agreement over the topical focus of media stories they recall. Women's rights, minority rights and human rights in general appear frequently in a number of news stories in both countries. Another significant commonality is the relevance of migration issues which receives increased levels of attention in both

countries. Taking these significant commonalities into account, results reveal that people tend to recall stories they can relate to on a personal level. This sheds an interesting light on identity formation processes exposing the relevance of personal affectedness as a way to select mediated information.

These media stories reflect a certain media agenda-setting effect where the media are responsible for introducing certain topics and marking them as particularly relevant to the audience. This means that focus groups are more likely to mention stories that receive a prominent coverage in the news. This, however, is only one factor in explaining why people recall these specific news stories. Another important factor is that stories around human rights and migration issues appear to meet a particular resonance among focus group discussants. The examples as derived from the data show that breaches of human rights and migration issues tend to be connected to contexts and situations that people relate to and feel personally affected by. These are areas that most people can sympathise with and are close to their personal lives rather than topics like Turkish relations to Cyprus or economic developments in Turkey that take place on an elite level. These findings confirm personal affectedness as an important factor in the perception and selection of media content and for the understanding of European identity.

The agreement over migration issues is even more surprising when taking into account that British focus group participants have a limited scope of personal experiences with Turkish migrant communities. Other than Austrian discussants, they largely rely on their holiday experience. Yet, they mention personal encounters with and media stories about Muslim communities in their country as an important topical reference point. This suggests that religion plays a crucial role, connecting migration experiences of focus group participants with Muslim communities across countries. It can be seen as a generalising step where Turkey is no longer seen as a specific national example, but where its perceived identity as a Muslim country comes to the fore. Results suggest that Islam features as a relevant reference point for identity constructions.

Considering that the majority of topics mentioned in both countries contain negative evaluations points towards a heightened significance of differences as a main feature of identity constructions. Given that almost all mentioned media stories entail negative evaluations supports considerations that mediated difference plays a

major role in people's identity formation processes. The finding that people almost exclusively recall and mention negative news stories around Turkey's accession to the EU is the likely result of three factors. First, a general tendency of the media to report negative stories is expected to affect people's perception. Second, a psychological predisposition of people to remember negative stories better than positive ones multiplies the negative media bias even further. Third, an affinity to stories with links to people's lives makes them particularly sensible to threats that would challenge the status quo they are used to. This makes it more likely for people to pick up on stories that run counter to what they know and are used to. Overall, it is a complex interplay of negative media bias and personal perception that makes people more receptive to differences rather than connecting commonalities.

A comparison of media critiques in Austria and GB reveals that negative media bias features as a major point of critique in both countries. While British focus group discussants name it as the third most relevant media critique, Austrian participants rank it as the most important criticism. These surprising national parallels point towards a general awareness of the limitations of media coverage among citizens in Austria and GB. Where people in Austria and GB also agree in their media critique is over a media agenda-setting effect. This media critique ranks third in both countries and addresses the media's potential to highlight certain issues as particularly relevant to the audience.

A cross-national comparison of people's personal and mediated experiences shows a majority of commonalities and some minor national specific differences. Focus groups in both countries tend to rely significantly more on mediated than personal experiences which illustrate a relatively high degree of media dependency. Further, Austrian and British discussants show a surprising joint awareness of the limitations of media coverage. Small national differences prevail where results show that Austrian focus groups tend to rely more on personal experiences with Turkish migrants, while British participants refer more to their Turkish holiday experience. Despite these slightly differing national emphases, comparisons emerge as a common feature to evaluate Turkish people and culture.

Overall, personal experiences play a relatively minor role with mediated information taking up the larger share of people's knowledge about Turkish people and culture. Despite this high media dependency, people show a surprising

awareness of the limitations of media coverage. Further, results show that comparisons feature frequently among focus groups in both countries, marking them as important for evaluation processes. Reference points for such comparisons are almost exclusively drawn from standards that form part of people's value systems. Such comparisons are largely absent in media coverage. Instead, newspapers tend to rely on arguments as a way of evaluating and drawing distinctions between Turkey and Europe.

6.4. Media Stories and Long-Term Memory

A significant media story can stick in people's memory and potentially influence their views on an issue. This is linked to the effects of strong emotions on cognitive processes. Empirical evidence indicates that people remember negative stories better and for longer than positive ones. This is supported by research confirming that negative news sensitise people to pay more attention to the media content they are presented with and increase people's emotional responsiveness so that negative news are perceived even more negatively (Lang et al., 1996). This points towards a potential longitudinal media effect on people's perceptions and opinions of an issue. This is illustrated by the next example where a British focus group participant voices her opposition to visiting Turkey despite being unable to recall the specifics of an old media story that she relies on to justify her position.

RESP [1] 05, FEMALE, GB: Weren't there some issues around human rights or something? Wasn't there a destination that Amnesty banned or something a couple of years ago? It was a number of years ago. The press saying – don't go to Turkey because they have human rights issues. ...

MOD: RESP [1] 05, FEMALE, GB., you mentioned a media story.

RESP [1] 05, FEMALE, GB: Yes, I can't even remember what it was. It was twenty years ago ... I just remember, thinking I don't want to go to Turkey now because ... out of principle. Which is a shame, because it sounds like a really nice place. I could go to Istanbul or something. It was a big thing at the time, but I can't remember what it was about, I can't remember what came of it, I can't remember if it is still a place where you shouldn't go.

This poses an interesting case where people seem to remember old media stories which still dominate their memory and opinion about Turkey. These media memories appear to be even stronger when no new information is counterbalancing the old memory, resulting in a set opinion that continues to last over time. The following example illustrates a similar point. Here, a participant recalls a media story almost one and a half decades ago that prompted him to leave church. The critical view he held back then continues to last and affect his opinion to the day.

RESP [7] 36, MALE, AT: The Kurdish problem will never solve itself. ... The Iraqis chased the Kurds from one side and the Turks from the other. And the only thing the pope was calling for was to pray and donate money. ... He did not take sides with the Kurds. He simply called for donations. ... For me that was the trigger ... for leaving the [Roman Catholic] church altogether. The reason was the Kurdish problem. You could see how they perished ... frozen to death in the winter.

The example above illustrates the power of media stories to not only influence opinions over a long time, but to also prompt someone to act. It is interesting to see how an individual's memory is mixed with media information to form something new, a mediated memory. The next example similarly illustrates the scope of people's long term memory and ability to recall media stories that date back years, or even decades.

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: I think it has been ... the early 1990s ... when it [Turkey] started the appeal for applications. That is probably when it first applied for European membership.

These examples are surprising evidence for the longitudinal scope of news stories that people tend to recall. This indicates potential long-term media effects establishing lasting opinion frames that people rely on. It is not so much the continuous flow of new information that alters people's perception, but significant events accompanied by emotional responses that prompts people to remember particular stories. In the case of Turkey's accession to the EU this means that a

negative media bias is multiplied by people's cognitive disposition to remember negative news better and for longer.

6.5. Summary

Focus group discussions reveal a significantly higher number of references to media content than to personal experiences. This imbalance shows that the formation of European identities among participants is largely dependent on mediated information that tends to provide negative points of reference in regards to Turkey's accession to the EU. People show a distinct awareness of the fact that they rely on mediated information regarding events that are beyond their personal experiences. Despite this apparent media dependency, discussants demonstrate a surprisingly critical and cautious treatment of media information, though this is less pronounced among British people. They particularly express their disapproval of the predominantly negative media bias and distance themselves from it. Results reveal that people tend to distance themselves from media information by attributing responsibility for validity and objectivity to the media source.

News stories in connection with Turkey mentioned by focus group discussants in Austria and GB are predominantly critical. This reflects on the negative bias of news coverage and people's tendency to remember negative stories better and for longer. For identity formations this means that it is negative stories about differences that dominate people's memories and are a major factor for constructions of European identities. This gives differences a new dimensional scope. It shows that in Turkey's case differences play a larger role than similarities.

Chapter 7

Topics Related to Turkey's Accession to the EU in Media and Focus Group Discussions

After having confirmed the relevance of Turkey's accession to the EU as a platform for European identity formations and an examination of people's use of mediated and personal experiences, the analysis now moves from a qualitative to a quantitative approach to identify more general patterns. The chapter focuses on the specific contexts of newspaper articles and focus group discussions by asking "What boundaries (i.e. differences) and modes of identification (i.e. similarities) are evoked by Turkey's accession to the EU in media and citizen discourses and what do they reveal about the status and definition of a European identity in Austria and Great Britain?"

In order to answer this question, a set of variables is used to map the thematic scope and evaluations of Turkey's EU accession in focus group and media discussions. This allows for an analysis of the specific contexts and associations that are evoked by Turkey's EU accession. The emerging thematic clusters are then analysed according to their modes of identification and difference to reveal interpretations of European identity. Analysing the evaluation variable gives important clues about positive and negative associations. For this purpose all newspaper articles and focus group discussions are coded systematically. The data is then entered into quantitative⁶⁰ and qualitative⁶¹ software packages to allow further analysis.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the analysis focuses on a comparison of topics in Austrian and British newspaper coverage. In a following step, focus group discussions are analysed and compared across countries. In a final step, an assessment of media and focus groups in both countries is conducted to allow an analysis of different emphases or commonalities between media and citizen agenda.

⁶⁰ i.e. PASW Statistics 18.

⁶¹ i.e. NVivo 8.

7.1. Topics in Austrian and British Media Coverage

As a semantic⁶² unit of analysis the variable topic is coded according to the following rules that identify an issue in a newspaper text. According to these rules, a topic is signified as a leading theme in a text. Such major themes typically appear in the heading or first paragraph of an article. Frequently, newspaper articles contain more than one topic. The coding of multiple topics is possible where other content variables such as supporting or opposing arguments can be attributed to another leading theme mentioned in the article. Minor references do not qualify as a topic. Each new topic holds the same article level variables, but individual content variables.

Table 10 shows that the negotiation process with Turkey is the main topic in both Austrian and British media coverage on Turkey's accession to the EU. This topic focuses on the proceedings, status, delays, or progress of negotiations. The salience of this thematic focus demonstrates that the majority of media reports are dominated by elite discussions about the general developments of Turkey's EU accession process. This goes in line with news values that tend to focus on significant events such as EU summits that mark specific milestones in the process or statements by political elites on the negotiations. Evaluations⁶³ of the negotiation process show a positive bias in the British news coverage which is more favourable than the Austrian print media. These findings reflect the positive stance of British government officials towards Turkey's accession to the EU and reaffirm more critical positions held among political elites in Austria.

⁶² i.e. content-led.

⁶³ For a detailed explanation how evaluations are coded see codebook in Appendix 1.1.2.

Table 10: Topic Salience and Evaluations in Newspapers Across Countries

<i>Topic/Country</i>	<i>AT + GB</i>		<i>AT</i>		<i>GB</i>	
	Salienc ^a	Evaluat [□]	Salienc	Evaluat	Salienc	Evaluat
Negotiation process	34 (445)	+0.03 (259)	40 (299)	-.15 (156)	27 (146)	+.30 (103)
Human rights	17 (222)	-.81 (179)	15 (116)	-.80 (85)	20 (106)	-.82 (94)
Turkish-Cypriot relations	12 (151)	-.89 (62)	12 (92)	-.94 (35)	11 (59)	-.81 (27)
Democracy	9 (118)	-.29 (91)	6 (44)	-.54 (28)	14 (74)	-.17 (63)
EU enlargement	9 (111)	-.32 (41)	11 (83)	-.46 (26)	5 (28)	-.07 (15)
Economy	5 (59)	+.36 (44)	5 (35)	+.36 (28)	4 (24)	+.38 (16)

Notes: Questions: What topic is discussed in connection with Turkey and a European dimension? What is the evaluation of that topic? Rounded per cent. Topics are ranked according to salience starting with the most salient topic on top of the table and continuing with the next prominent topic. Results feature the six main topics in media discussions across countries. ^a Cell entries for salience: % of frequency; N in brackets; Difference up to 100%: other topics. [□] Cell entries for evaluation: \bar{X} of evaluation values; N in brackets; Scale for evaluation values includes +2 (very positive), +1 (fairly positive), 0 (ambivalent), -1 (fairly negative), -2 (very negative).

It is noticeable in both countries that media discussions on the negotiations tend to be dominated by statements from political elites from EU member states. To only a limited extent does the news coverage feature Turkish views⁶⁴. Portraying negotiations as discussions with little input by the prospect member implies a hierarchical connotation where EU members appear as rigorous investigators and Turkey as a passive interrogated subject that is largely being talked about instead of being equally heard. The pointed absence of the Turkish side gives the impression of Turkey being in a position where it is subject to increased scrutiny.

In the small number of articles where the Turkish view is mentioned, emotional reactions take centre stage, highlighting the asymmetry of negotiations.

⁶⁴ From a total of 445 articles that feature the negotiation process as the main topic 16 per cent (N=72) hold statements from Turkish political authorities; *The Times* 21% (N=56), *The Guardian* 27% (N=62), *Daily Mail* 21% (N=28), *Die Presse* 20% (N=92), *Der Standard* 18% (N=113), *Neue Kronenzeitung* 7% (N=94).

“They (Europeans) have been teasing us for 40 years. And now they’re delaying our membership again. It really bothers us,” said a local jeweller, Ismail Akbay. “We don’t have to accept whatever the EU asks from us. That’s just too many sacrifices. We should try and find a mid-point.” ... “We Turks want to be part of Europe, but with our honour and values intact,” said Irfan Solmaz, a factory worker. “The Europeans are humiliating us with so many conditions.”⁶⁵

In Turkey, honour means a lot. The Turkish electorate values someone, who insists on respect towards their country. That is what Recep Tayyip Erdoğan demands ever more forcefully than before in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. These demands are particularly addressed at the EU, by which Turkey feels hard done-by. “Make up your minds” he demanded on Tuesday.⁶⁶

The two examples above illustrate Turkey’s frustration over the unequal basis of negotiations and arrogating demands. They exemplify the country’s quest for respect and to be treated as an equal. These references to Turkey’s point of view can be read as a way to evoke sympathy and understanding, but they cannot disguise the hierarchies that emerge from the unequal relationship between candidate country and EU.

Ministers also failed to agree the parameters of the entry talks, with Austria and other countries pushing for an alternative, special “economic partnership” with Turkey, similar to Iceland’s, rather than full membership. There is increasing dismay in Ankara, with one official saying that leaders were becoming “disillusioned” and “frustrated”. Another gave warning that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Prime Minister, “may well explode” if provoked further.⁶⁷

The way emotions on the Turkish side are portrayed in media coverage suggests vulnerability and inferiority. Highlighting Turkey’s emotionally charged political reaction elevates the EU in a position of control where one side is asking

⁶⁵ *The Guardian*, 18.12.2004, We Turks want to be a part of Europe, but with our honour and values intact, Helena Smith, p.16.

⁶⁶ *Die Presse*, 28.03.2007, Türkei an EU: “Entscheidet Euch”, APO Europa, p.6.

⁶⁷ *The Times*, 3.09.2005, Turkey’s fury at stalled EU bid is a test for Britain, Anthony Browne, p.40.

for accession and the other is setting the conditions. These power dynamics form a significant demarcation line in discussions about the negotiation process.

Prime Minister Erdoğan openly expressed his bitter disappointment over the scope of rejection towards Turkish EU membership: “Austria shocked me the most.”⁶⁸

By playing on Turkey’s pride and honour newspaper coverage contributes towards making Turkey appear vulnerable to rejection and critique. Introducing the existence or lack of mutual sympathies in the negotiation process exposes Turkey as a weak partner in a negotiation process that is clearly dominated by the EU.

A “privileged partnership” already exists and all relevant Turkish politicians, including Prime Minister Erdoğan, have declared that such a solution would be regarded as an affront to Turkey and not be accepted.⁶⁹

Overall, these examples illustrate a significant power asymmetry in the negotiation process. Turkey’s frustrated reactions emphasise this gap even further. This brings the discussion to a sensible level where Turkey is being put in an inferior position of weakness and vulnerability. The picture of Turkey as an emotionally charged country stands in clear contrast to EU member states that are in control and in charge of setting the conditions for the country to join.

What stands out in Austrian news coverage about the negotiation process is the embeddedness of the topic in national politics. In contrast, the EU negotiations are predominantly treated as a matter of foreign relations in the British news. While the majority of articles in both countries are published under the news section international or world news, Austria holds 16 per cent of articles as part of the news section national news which compares to only seven per cent in the British news

⁶⁸ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 6.10.2004, Erdoğan: “Österreich hat mich schockiert!”, Kurt Seinitz, p.2.

⁶⁹ *Der Standard*, 4.12.2004, Schüssels Türkei-Mission, Hans Rauscher, p.39.

coverage⁷⁰. These results demonstrate the relevance of the topic to national party politics and its instrumentalisation and polarisation potential as part of election campaigns.

The SPÖ is against Turkey's accession to the EU and demands to bind Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel to a parliamentary mandate that will force him to only open negotiations about a status as part of the European Economic Community. While the FPÖ does not see the necessary criteria for the accession of Turkey fulfilled, the ÖVP accuses the SPÖ of a zigzag course ... The public debate about Turkey started to gain momentum since Thursday.⁷¹

Today, Tuesday, the steering committee of the FPÖ is meeting in Vienna. Frictions are guaranteed: a detailed and controversial discussion is expected. Feelings about Turkey's accession to the EU are still running high. While Jörg Haider, the governor of Carinthia, is in support of membership, the rest of the party is in dispute over the official party line on Turkey's EU accession.⁷²

While *Der Standard* portrays the topic of the negotiation process as a general cause of internal differences within and between national parties, *Die Presse* focuses particularly on the topic as a source of conflict among members of the right-wing FPÖ. In contrast to that, the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* tends to also highlight the discrepancies between elite positions and public opinion more than other newspapers.

In the case of Turkey's accession to the EU, never before has the official course of EU politics diverged so much from public opinion. Despite massive reservations that run through various political parties, the EU Commission decided to recommend the start of accession negotiations with

⁷⁰ British news coverage has 64% (n=76) of articles on the topic negotiation process published as part of the international or world news section compared to 55% (n=163) in the Austrian print media. 16% (n=47) of Austrian articles appearing in the national news section compares to only 7% (n=7) in the British news coverage.

⁷¹ *Der Standard*, 8.10.2004, Streit um Türkei wird heftiger, IPO Innenpolitik, p.9.

⁷² *Die Presse*, 19.10. 2004, Türkei-Beitritt: FP-Generalsekretär droht FP-Vize Strache, IPO Inland, p.5.

Turkey. ... Open-ended negotiations are not part of the agenda. Brussels already decided over Turkey's accession.⁷³

These results fit in with the self-proclaimed image of the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* as a people's newspaper. Overall, results show a visible link of the EU negotiation process to national party politics. This has to be understood in the context of the political landscape in Austria that is based on a multiparty system. Against the background of an ethnic minority in Austria, Turkey's accession holds a great potential for polarisation during election times. The degree of nationalisation illustrates the embeddedness of the topic in national discussions and highlights its potential for contestation in public discussions. In contrast to that, British news coverage treats the topic largely as a matter of foreign relations.

The second most relevant topic in both British and Austrian newspaper coverage is human rights. Results demonstrate a great number of similarities. While the topic holds a slightly higher presence in the British news coverage, both countries unanimously share similarly critical evaluations. This topic category consists of the sub-categories general human rights violations, women's rights, minority rights, and civic rights⁷⁴. Within the human rights category civic rights feature most prominently, followed by minority and general human rights violations. Women's rights feature notably less prominent. In a cross-country comparison, civic rights are more pronounced in British news coverage, while Austrian news coverage lays greater emphasis on minority rights.

In the British news coverage, where civic rights feature most prominently as part of the human rights category, the trial against the Turkish writer Ferit Orhan Pamuk⁷⁵ raises particular attention. The novelist is put on trial in September 2005 on charges of insulting Turkishness by publicly claiming that "30,000 Kurds and

⁷³ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 5.10.2004, EU-Beitritts-Verhandlungen mit der Türkei von Kommission empfohlen trotz weitgehend ablehnender Stimmung in der Bevölkerung, Christian Hauenstein, p.2.

⁷⁴ e.g. freedom of speech.

⁷⁵ Nobel Prize Laureate for Literature of 2006.

1,000,000 Armenians were killed in Turkey”⁷⁶, a reference to the killings under the Ottoman Empire between 1915 to 1917 and the deaths since the beginning of the 1984 conflict between Turkey and Kurdish separatists. The charges are based on article 301/1 of the Turkish penal code. All charges are eventually being dropped against Pamuk in January 2006. In the British news coverage the trial is generally seen as a case illustrating the disregard for freedom of expression in Turkey.

You would think that the Turkish authorities might have avoided so blatant an assault on their most celebrated writer’s fundamental freedoms at the very moment that their application for full membership of the European Union - an extremely unpopular application in many EU countries - was being considered at the EU summit. However, in spite of being a state that has ratified both the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, both of which see freedom of expression as central, Turkey continues to have and to enforce a penal code that is clearly contrary to these very same principles, and, in spite of widespread global protests, has set the date for Pamuk’s trial.⁷⁷

The example above illustrates the strong reactions in the British press on breaches of freedom of speech. It is interesting to note that the trial is not seen as proof of Turkey being unsuitable for EU membership. Instead, the implementation of the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights is being criticised, suggesting that there is room and potential for future improvement. What stand out in the British news coverage are references to Turkey as an undisciplined and semi-developed country. Detailed descriptions of chaotic scenes during the hearing of the Pamuk trial further support the notion of a developmental discourse present in British newspapers.

Even the scenes at the courtroom yesterday were an embarrassment for a government desperate to prove that it is ready for EU membership. An EU

⁷⁶ *The Times*, 30.09.2005, Brutality, poverty and religion stand between Turkey and the EU, Ben Macintyre, p.40; The statement was originally published in the Swiss newspaper *Tages Anzeiger* on 6 February 2005.

⁷⁷ *The Times*, 14.10.2005, How can a country that victimises its greatest living writer also join the EU?, Salman Rushdie, p.25.

delegation found itself jostling with irate nationalists in a chaotic courtroom that appeared to outsiders to be anything but European. “I was elbowed in the face by one of the right-wing (prosecution) lawyers,” Denis Macshane, Britain’s former Minister for Europe, said. He was there to support Mr Pamuk. The lawyers wanted the Europeans out of the packed courtroom, he said. The hearing “was one of the weirdest things I’ve seen in my life.”⁷⁸

The example presents Turkey as a country lacking a composed European etiquette. It is interesting to note that an explicit distinction between Turks and Europeans is being drawn that forms a clear demarcation line. Descriptions of the disorganised court room draw a picture of embarrassed and appalled European spectators on the one side and incompetent Turkish officials on the other. Describing Turkish laws as brutal, as in the example below, is another manifestation of a developmental discourse where Turkey is linked to uncultured practices that stand in contrast to civilised European law.

In reading reports of the trial of the Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk, you are struck by two things. The first, of course, is the anachronistic brutality of the country’s laws. Mr Pamuk, like scores of other writers and journalists, is being prosecuted for “denigrating Turkishness”, which means that he dared to mention the Armenian genocide in the First World War and the killing of the Kurds in the past decade. The second is its staggering, blithering stupidity. If there is one course of action that could be calculated to turn these massacres into live issues, it is the trial of the country’s foremost novelist for mentioning them. As it prepares for accession, the Turkish government will discover that the other members of the EU have found a more effective means of suppression. Without legal coercion, without the use of baying mobs to drive writers from their homes, we have developed an almost infinite capacity to forget our own atrocities.⁷⁹

Despite references to a developmental discourse that sets Turkey apart from European standards, the example holds evidence of parallels between Turkey and

⁷⁸ *The Times*, 17.12.2005, Courtroom in chaos as Turkey delays ‘insulting’ author’s trial, Suna Erdem, p.39.

⁷⁹ *The Guardian*, 27.12.2005, Comment & Debate: The Turks haven’t learned the British way of denying past atrocities: It is not illegal to discuss the millions who were killed under our empire. So why do so few people know about them? George Monbiot, p.28.

the UK as a former imperialist power. Although marked as a clearly self-critical comment on the country's colonial failures, the author plays on the UK's imperial past to judge Turkey on its handling of crimes under the Ottoman Empire. Giving advice on how Turkey should have behaved instead suggests a common ground and a degree of sympathy for each other that are based on the two countries' past as imperialist powers.

Overall, the British news coverage of the trial has revealed evidence of a hierarchical notion in form of a developmental discourse that is manifested in descriptions of Turkey as a country dominated by emotional reactions that stand in contrast to intellectual-political European reasoning. At the same time, British news coverage establishes a bilateral bond with Turkey that is based on the countries' imperialist past.

Austrian newspaper coverage specifically highlights the importance of minority rights in its human rights category. Besides highlighting infringements on the rights of the Kurdish minority, Austrian news coverage particularly emphasises the violations of religious minorities in Turkey. Violations against Christian minorities cause particular attention. The following example describes a critique by a Vatican spokesperson on the insufficient implementation of rights for religious minorities in Turkey.

The Vatican has severely criticised Turkey: in the Islamic dominated state, Christians are inhibited to worship, argues Edmond Farhat, ambassador of the Vatican.⁸⁰

It is interesting to note that Turkey is referred to as an Islamic state which suggests that the reason for infringements on the rights of religious minorities could lie with Islam. Another example makes this link more explicit by portraying Islam as an intolerant religion. Here, the religious minority of Alevites is taken as an example to illustrate the inability of Islam, as practiced in Turkey, to tolerate other religions alongside it.

⁸⁰ *Die Presse*, 25.06.2005, Vatikan geißelt die Türkei, APO Ausland, p.8.

The problem lies with Islam itself. In this internal conflict breakouts of religious violence are commonplace. At its heart are the Alevites, that form a specifically Turkish persuasion of Islam. This socially discriminated religious minority, which is not recognised by the government agency for religion, represents one third of the population.⁸¹

Islam is depicted as a fanatical religion with a potential for violence. The example above makes explicit reference to how a particular reading of Islam is enforced in Turkey. The following example enforces this link by a story containing graphic descriptions of the murder of three members of a publishing house that distributed Christian writings. The example draws a clear distinction between Turkish and European standards of religious freedom.

In a recent attack on the Christian minority in Turkey three people died on Wednesday. ... The attackers handcuffed the victims before cutting their throats. A spokesperson of the publishing house confirms that the publisher received threats for the distribution of bibles and other Christian tracts. ... Turkey is a far cry away from the religious freedom that characterises Europe.⁸²

Overall, human rights are regarded of high importance in Austrian and British news coverage which marks them as a significant demarcation line to Turkey. In cross-national comparison, minor differences appear in the emphasis of specific human rights. While British news coverage pays special attention to freedom of speech, Austrian newspaper coverage is more concerned with minority rights. These results illustrate that Austrian media discourses are particularly affected by breaches of human rights against religious minorities that reflect the country's pronounced Christian identity which is based on a majority population of Roman Catholics and religion being a major part of public life. In contrast to that, British news coverage reveals a stronger preference for legal standards revealing a more secularist point of view where religion is largely treated as a private matter.

⁸¹ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 11.12.2006, Wo ist der wahre Islam? APA-DeFacto, pp.4-5.

⁸² *Der Standard*, 19.04.2007, Türkei: Extremisten morden in christlichem Verlagshaus, APO Außenpolitik, p.4.

The third major topic in media discussions in Austria and GB are Turkish-Cypriot relations with an almost identical share of twelve per cent in Austria and eleven per cent in GB. Similarly, evaluations are equally negative with a slightly more critical pronouncement in Austrian newspaper coverage. This topic category mainly addresses a dispute between Turkey and the EU after Turkey's declaration in September 2005 to extend its EU customs union to all members of the EU, including the Republic of Cyprus and nine other countries that joined the EU in 2004. Despite signing the agreement Turkey insists that it does not recognise the Cypriot government in the south and consequently refuses to let Cypriot boats and planes use Turkish ports and airports. Turkey recognises the north of the island, where it has 35,000 troops stationed, but not the Republic of Cyprus in the southern half.

The generally critical stance of newspaper discussions is illustrated by the following examples. Responsibility for the problem is mainly attributed to Turkey with one article claiming "What is left is the question over Cyprus, where Turkey upholds occupying forces, which has been repeatedly criticised by UN resolutions that fill entire volumes."⁸³ The Austrian newspaper *Die Presse* particularly highlights the position of the Cypriot side. This goes in line with previous findings that suggest that European officials are given more space to express their views than is the case for the Turkish side.

"If Turkey carries on like this, it will have consequences for its EU accession negotiations. We will not play along by acting as if nothing has happened." On his visit to Vienna Cypriot foreign minister Georgios Lillikas made clear: Ankara has "to stick with its commitments" to the EU and open its ports and airports to Cypriots by the end of the year. Otherwise, Nicosia will make good on its threat to block all chapters of negotiations. So far, Ankara refuses to expand its customs union to the EU member Cyprus. The Turkish government demands from the EU to first end the isolation of the Turkish part of the island.⁸⁴

⁸³ *Der Standard*, 6.11.2007, Washington sollte Ankara unter Druck setzen, nicht umgekehrt, Christopher Hitchens, p.35.

⁸⁴ *Die Presse*, 19.10.2006, "So eine Türkei wollen wir nicht als Partner" Zyperns Außenminister droht Ankara mit Blockade, APO Europa, p.4.

Where Turkish views are considered, this is done in an indirect form with no direct quotes or detailed information, but simple demands that give the impression of a difficult negotiating partner. What is noticeable in the previous and following example is that when a Turkish position is illustrated, it is not a specific official such as the prime minister or other government figure that is named as a source. Instead, the Turkish government is indirectly being referred to as “Ankara.” This furthers the impression of Turkey being a passive negotiation partner without an identifiable voice of its own.

Turkey has been given a blunt warning by Brussels that it is jeopardising its 40-year dream of joining the European Union by failing to negotiate in good faith. ... The warnings were prompted by Turkey’s refusal to abide by a commitment last year to open its ports and airports to planes and shipping from Greek Cyprus. Cyprus gave its go-ahead to EU membership talks only after Turkey signed the “Ankara protocol”, which allows all 25 EU countries - including the divided Mediterranean island - to trade with Turkey. Ankara is now arguing that the EU should also end its trade embargo with the Turkish north of the island.⁸⁵

The disagreement peaks when EU membership negotiations are eventually suspended. On 28th November 2006 the European Commission issues a recommendation to put negotiations with Turkey on ice due to its refusal to open trade with the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey has been previously given a year to resolve the issue. Turkey’s position is that it would only open its ports to all EU member states if the EU ends the economic isolation of Northern Cyprus. This demand is blocked by the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. As a consequence the EU decides at an EU summit on 15 December to partly freeze accession talks as a punishment for Turkey’s failure to open trade with Cyprus.

Turkey reacted furiously yesterday to the proposed suspension of a large section of its talks on joining the EU as a punishment for its refusal to open trade with Cyprus. Eight of 34 areas of negotiation will be frozen under the

⁸⁵ *The Guardian*, 6.04.2006, Turkey warned hardline tactics may derail EU talks, Nicholas Watt, Brussels and David Gow, Istanbul, p.17.

European Commission's plan until Ankara fulfils an agreement signed last year to open its ports to Cyprus, an EU member that it does not recognise.⁸⁶

Descriptions of Turkey's emotional reaction to the stop of negotiations over Cyprus resemble notions of a developmental discourse as found in discussions on human rights. Such portrayals of Turkey strengthen its image as an unpredictable and hot-tempered negotiation partner in media discourses. Overall, Turkish-Cypriot relations are a topic with similar salience and comparable negative evaluations in Austrian and British newspapers. This marks them as another significant demarcation line in the context of European identity.

Topics four to six include 4) democracy, 5) EU enlargement and 6) economy which refer to the independence of Turkey's democratic institutions and execution of democratic values, discussions of further EU enlargement in the light of Turkey's accession, and Turkey's economic performance. Turkey's democratic standing is more than twice as pronounced in GB as it is in Austria, but is seen less critically than in Austrian newspaper coverage. This topic category consists of a set of issues that include Turkey's general execution of democratic values, the country's safeguarding of secularism, the independence of key democratic institutions such as the judiciary, political Islam and military interventions. Within the topical category democracy, secularist principles receive particular attention in the British press, while Austrian newspapers show no specific preference.

After Sunday's election Turkey is still as starkly divided as it has ever been about what kind of country it wants to be. Does it still want to stick fiercely to the secular vision of its founder, Kemal Ataturk, keeping religion out of the public square? Or should it express its Muslim heritage and identity, or even become an Islamic republic? Does it want to continue to move closer to Europe, or seek a new Asian destiny? Turkish voters did not give a clear, overwhelming answer to any of these questions.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ *The Times*, 30.11.2006, EU pulls the rug on Turkish talks over refusal to lift Cyprus blockade, David Charter, Suna Erdem Istanbul, p.39.

⁸⁷ *The Times*, 24.07.2007, A very Turkish coup? It may already be under way, Amir Taheri, p.15.

The example above implies that secularism is regarded as a European value when it is described as a way of moving closer to Europe. In contrast to that, an Islamic republic is seen as an act of positioning itself as a non-European Asian country. The British view is that Islamic values and secular democracy are compatible under the premise that secular principles are safeguarded: “EU entry is contingent on Turkey showing that Islam can sit with secular democracy, a challenge that Turkish modernisers are determined to meet.”⁸⁸

Discussions about further EU enlargement in the light of Turkey’s accession are more pronounced and more negative in the Austrian press than in British newspapers. This topic category consists of the issues future EU enlargement and referenda on EU enlargement. These issues address the EU’s general enlargement strategy and demands for the possible introduction of referenda for future EU enlargements. Results show that discussions about the EU’s integration capacity, as part of the EU’s new enlargement strategy introduced in November 2006, is particularly relevant.

The EU Commission reacts to the growing scepticism towards another enlargement of the union. In an entire package of reports on the readiness for accession and on the absorption capacity of the union, Brussels will put on the breaks.⁸⁹

The EU Commission has presented its enlargement strategy for the following years. The “integration capacity” of the union will play an important role in the future.⁹⁰

The examples above illustrate an EU proposal for the introduction of the EU’s integration capacity as a criterion for future enlargements. The heightened salience in Austrian newspaper coverage reflects on the importance of the issue, revealing a preference for a deepening of EU integration.

⁸⁸ *The Times*, 11.12.2006, Straight Road to Europe, Editorial, p.16.

⁸⁹ *Die Presse*, 8.11.2006, EU will Erweiterung stoppen, p.1.

⁹⁰ *Der Standard*, 9.11.2006, EU bremst weitere Beitritte, APO Außenpolitik, p.5.

The sixth most salient topic category is economy and refers to Turkey's economic performance, infrastructure, economic relations and resources. It is the only topic that receives distinctly positive evaluations in both the Austrian and British press. This reflects on Turkey's impressive GDP growth rates of up to eight per cent⁹¹. Further, it demonstrates that Turkey is seen as an attractive trading partner and that joint economic interests are a strong point of reference for identification.

In the example below, *The Times* stresses Turkey's market potential and describes it as an attractive place for future investment. Emphasised attributes such as low corporation tax and privatisations are directly in line with the British economy and how GB imagines the future EU to be. In addition to complimenting Turkey's economic development, *The Guardian* pursues its editorial multicultural agenda by highlighting good economic relations as a facilitator for better cross-cultural relations. While praising its economic growth the *Daily Mail* draws particular attention to Turkey's long-standing European and transatlantic links.

Already one of the world's biggest markets, with a population of 72 million, Turkey is on course to break into the top ten global economies in the next 20 years. With corporation tax falling from 30 per cent to 20 per cent, EU membership beckoning and a continuing privatisation programme, foreign direct investment has ballooned to \$21 billion (£ 10.3 billion) from \$1 billion a year in the early 1990s.⁹²

Turkey is offering Europe a cornucopia of dazzling possibilities as the pipelines are laid and the economy booms. Not surprising then that the Turkish and western European political and economic elites feasting at last week's Forum Istanbul - the Turkish equivalent of the Davos World Economic Forum - are chorusing heartily from the same hymn sheet. It was a lovefest as participants got giddy on the dream of a utopian future in which Muslims and secularists happily co-exist, ancient enmities between Christian

⁹¹ INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. 2011. International Monetary Fund [online]. [Accessed 18 February 2011]. Available from: <http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>.

⁹² *The Times*, 11.10.2007, With sparkling growth, Ankara strives to find its own place in the sun, Steve Hawkes, p.58.

and Muslim are reconciled, and Turkey pioneers a way forward beyond “clash of civilisations” simplicities.⁹³

Turkey was a founding member of the United Nations and has been a member of Nato since 1952. It joined the EEC in 1963 and entered into a customs union with the European Union in 1995, meaning that goods can travel between Europe and Turkey tax-free. It wants to become a full member of the EU, and Britain is backing it. In 2004, Turkey’s GDP was 9 per cent, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing economies (though this figure fell to 5 per cent in 2005- 6). And tourism is big business.⁹⁴

Overall, British newspapers tend to point out positive overall economic developments in Turkey with special emphasis on growth rates which overlaps largely with the Austrian press. While *Die Presse* and *Neue Kronen Zeitung* congratulate Turkey’s economic growth, *Der Standard* points out a somewhat awkward ambivalence that is symptomatic for the Austrian position. This conflict is caused by the country’s economic interest in Turkey and wide-spread political and public opposition to Turkish EU membership.

Sunday’s Turkish parliamentary elections turned out to be very much to the liking of worldwide financial markets. It is generally expected that after his election victory Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will continue his course of reforms and EU convergence. Over the past few years, Turkey has enjoyed a positive economic development under Erdoğan. “The Turks voted with their wallets”, says Manfred Zourek from Erste-Sparinvest. ... Zourek evaluates future developments at the Istanbul stock exchange as positive. This year, the Turkish stock market is one of the best performing one worldwide and broke record after record even days before the elections.⁹⁵

⁹³ *The Guardian*, 22.05.2006, Comment & Debate: With Turkey in the club, Europe can forge a fresh engagement with Islam: The EU should stop fretting over questions of identity and grasp the chance to bury ‘clash of civilisations’ sloganeering, Madeleine Bunting, p.31.

⁹⁴ *Daily Mail*, 12.10.2007, Turkey vs. Morocco; Two emerging markets with big plans for the future. But should you opt for a North African bolthole or a Middle Eastern seaside retreat? Paul Torrisi, p.87.

⁹⁵ *Die Presse*, 24.07.2007, Börsianer jubeln über Erdoğan-Wahlsieg. Aktienkurse und Lira deutlich höher, APA-DeFacto, p.21.

The perspective to join the EU has quickened the Turkish economy to reach the highest growth rates in Europe. Over the last 50 years Turkey has never been more successful and better functioning.⁹⁶

The economy is the main focus of this trip lead by the president. If it wasn't one would quickly skate on thin ice. Government plans to hold a national referendum on Turkey's accession to the EU and the strong opposition of the Austrian public against it (only five per cent are in support according to opinion polls) is seen in Ankara as a disappointment and affront. Under these circumstances, everyone is happy to hold on to the good joint trade relations. The delegation shares a more differentiated perspective. "If only business people show up who want to go about their business, while Austria is against Turkey's EU accession –that makes a bad impression", says Christian Reder, head of the Centre for Art and Knowledge Transfer. "We represent to some extent a certain appreciation."⁹⁷

Overall, results confirm economic links as a strong point of reference for identification between EU members Austria and GB and Turkey.

When comparing newspapers, the question is whether results give support towards a populist divide among broadsheets and tabloids and an ideological divide among conservative and liberal editorial lines of newspapers. This assumption is based on the rationale that the polarity of the topic makes it particularly attractive for the editorial lines of tabloids which tend to favour populist topics. As can be seen in Table 11, with the exception of *Der Standard*, which evaluates Turkey's EU negotiation process as ambivalent with a slight bias towards positive evaluations, the two other Austrian newspapers hold predominantly negative evaluations with the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* being the most critical newspaper. This pronounced negative bias of the Austrian tabloid newspaper can also be found in the British *Daily Mail*, which holds a majority of negative evaluations. In stark contrast to the tabloid press in Austria and GB the broadsheets in both countries hold predominantly positive views on the accession process. This points towards a populist divide among broadsheets and the popular press.

⁹⁶ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 11.12.2006, Wo ist der wahre Islam? Die Türkei wird niemals ein "Gottesstaat" werden, aber Glaubensfragen sind ein Konfliktherd, APA-DeFacto, pp.4-5.

⁹⁷ *Der Standard*, 23.05.2008, Geschäfte machen im Windschatten des Präsidenten. 170 Teilnehmer begleiteten Fischer auf Türkeiimission, Johanna Ruzicka, p.19.

Human rights feature noticeably less prominent in the tabloid press in both countries (nine and ten per cent). In a comparison of newspapers, human rights feature particularly prominent in *The Guardian* (25 per cent). When looking at Turkish Cypriot relations results show that the topic features less prominent among the yellow press and equally prominent among broadsheets. This further supports the argument of a divide between quality newspapers and the yellow press.

Though on a much lower percentage level, conservative newspapers *Die Presse* and *Neue Kronen Zeitung* feature democracy on similar significance levels. This preference for the topic in conservative newspapers is only reflected in the British *The Times* but with distinctly opposing evaluations. Opposition to further EU enlargement features most prominent in the Austrian conservative *Neue Kronen Zeitung* and the British conservative newspaper *The Times*. This lends some support towards joint ideological editorial lines across newspaper types.

Economic issues feature more strongly in the *Daily Mail* but are predominantly critical, which sets the topic apart from the lower salience and the positive evaluations it receives in the rest of the newspapers in Austria and GB. Overall, the topics provide some but no coherent evidence for a populist divide among newspaper types. An ideological divide on economic issues among editorial lines of newspapers cannot be verified.

Table 11: Topic Salience and Evaluations Across Newspapers

<i>Topic/Newspaper</i>	<i>AT</i>				<i>GB</i>							
	<i>Presse</i>		<i>Standard</i>		<i>Krone</i>		<i>Times</i>		<i>Guardian</i>		<i>Daily Mail</i>	
	Salienc ^a	Evaluation \square	Salienc	Evaluation	Salienc	Evaluation	Salienc	Evaluation	Salienc	Evaluation	Salienc	Evaluation
Negotiation process	33(92)	-.13(45)	42(113)	+.02(53)	46(94)	-.33(58)	25(56)	+.63(32)	26(62)	+.30(47)	36(28)	-.21(24)
Human rights	19(54)	-.93(41)	16(42)	-.59(29)	10(20)	-.87(15)	18(40)	-.75(36)	25(59)	-.83(53)	9(7)	-1.20(5)
Turkish-Cypriot relations	14(38)	-.94(16)	13(36)	-.57(7)	9(18)	-	13(29)	-.20(5)	12(29)	-1.0(21)	1(1)	0.0(1)
Democracy	7(18)	-.62(13)	3(9)	-.60(5)	8(17)	-.40(10)	17(38)	+.07(30)	14(34)	-.39(31)	3(2)	-.50(2)
EU enlargement	9(25)	-.40(10)	11(29)	-.40(10)	14(29)	-.67(6)	7(15)	-.38(8)	4(10)	+.29(7)	4(3)	--
Economy	7(20)	+.31(16)	3(9)	+.29(7)	3(6)	+.60(5)	3(7)	+1.00(3)	3(6)	+1.33(3)	14(11)	-.10(10)

Notes: Questions: What topic is discussed in connection with Turkey and a European dimension? What is the evaluation of that topic? Rounded per cent. Topics are ranked according to salience starting with the most salient topic on top of the table and continuing with the next prominent topic. Results feature the six main topics in media discussions across countries. ^a Cell entries for salience: % of frequency; N in brackets; Difference up to 100%: other topics. \square Cell entries for evaluation: \bar{X} of evaluation values; N in brackets; Scale for evaluation values includes +2 (very positive), +1 (fairly positive), 0 (ambivalent), -1 (fairly negative), -2 (very negative).

When comparing the salience of newspaper topics over time, the question is whether there are specific topical or evaluational trends detectable over time. To explore change and stability Table 12 breaks down the development of salience and evaluation for each year between 2004 and 2009.

The negotiation process as a more general topical category featuring the proceedings and developments of Turkey's accession peaks in the preparatory phase to the opening of and the first year after the start of negotiations in the period from 2004 to 2005. Overall, the topic shows a continuous decline from 2005 to 2008, finishing with another peak in 2009. This trend is mirrored equally in Austria and GB. This could point towards a shift of more specific topics after the start of negotiations. Overall, evaluations reveal a positive trend in the second half of the examination period from 2007 to 2009 implying a potential positive outlook. After a similarly positive start in 2004, cross-national differences are most noticeable in 2005 and 2009 with consistently and predominantly positive evaluations over time across all British newspapers and a more pessimistic view among the Austrian press that is only briefly interrupted by positive evaluations reaching British levels in 2008.

The salience of human rights consistently increases over time with a peak in 2007, but is interrupted by a significant decline of the issue from 2008 to 2009. After a lower level start, criticism peaks together with the topic's salience in 2007 and remains significantly high. This trend is mirrored in both countries. These results point towards human rights violations as a persistent problem with increased levels of criticism.

The salience of Turkish-Cypriot relations continuously rises and peaks in 2006, then abruptly falls when negotiations are stalled over Turkey's refusal to open its ports to Cypriot air and sea traffic. This trend is reflected in both countries. The salience of the topic democracy peaks in 2007 and 2008 after having played almost no role in the first half of the period of examination. This trend is equally supported in Austria and British news. This peak can largely be explained by an increased number of newspaper reports covering the Turkish general and presidential elections in 2007. The salience of further EU enlargement declines steadily until 2007 with a brief high in 2008 before losing importance again in 2009. This trend is largely reflected in Austrian newspaper coverage, while British print media draw most

attention to it in 2005. Economic issues significantly gain importance in 2009 with Austria paying particular attention to it in 2008 and 2009. Similarly, British news feature economic issues as a relevant topic in 2009 after having focused on them before in 2004⁹⁸.

⁹⁸ An assessment of evaluations over time cannot be verified for these topics due to the inconsistent and at times insufficient numbers of articles holding evaluations.

enlargement												
AT + GB	15(26)	-.80(10)	9(35)	-.07(15)	8(26)	-.27(11)	3(5)	0.0(4)	12(16)	-1.0(1)	4(3)	--
AT	18(23)	-.78(9)	9(20)	-.20(5)	11(21)	-.33(9)	3(3)	0.0(2)	18(13)	-1.0(1)	2(1)	--
GB	6(3)	-1.0(1)	9(15)	0.0(10)	4(5)	0.0(2)	2(2)	0.0(2)	5(3)	--	7(2)	--
Economy												
AT + GB	6(11)	0.0(9)	2(9)	+.63(8)	4(14)	0.0(10)	4(8)	+.75(8)	6(8)	+.43(7)	13(9)	+1.0(2)
AT	4(5)	+.20(5)	3(7)	+.50(6)	4(7)	-.17(6)	3(3)	+1.0(3)	10(7)	+33(6)	14(6)	+1.0(2)
GB	11(3)	-.25(4)	1(2)	+1.0(2)	5(7)	+.25(4)	5(5)	+.60(5)	2(1)	+1.0(1)	11(3)	--

Notes: Questions: What topic is discussed in connection with Turkey and a European dimension? What is the evaluation of that topic? Rounded per cent. Topics are ranked according to salience starting with the most salient topic on top of the table and continuing with the next prominent topic. Results feature the six main topics in media discussions across countries. ^a Cell entries for salience: % of frequency; N in brackets; Difference up to 100%: other topics. □ Cell entries for evaluations: \bar{X} of evaluation values; N in brackets; Scale for evaluation values includes +2 (very positive), +1 (fairly positive), 0 (ambivalent), -1 (fairly negative), -2 (very negative).

Overall, a trend towards more specific topics since the start of accession negotiations and a return to more general proceedings can be noted over time. The former can be explained by specific issues that evolve as significant after the beginning of negotiations as part of EU assessments of Turkey's progress. In this context, human rights appear as a continuous and persistent point of relevance and critique. A revival of the general topic of EU negotiation processes can be seen in the context of generally slowed down negotiations as part of critical EU reports on Turkish reforms.

Further, this section has revealed some interesting differences and similarities. As part of the most salient topic, which addresses the general proceedings and progress of negotiations with Turkey, the asymmetric nature of negotiations comes to the fore in newspapers across countries. On the one side stands an emotionally charged Turkey seeking for entry and on the other side stands the EU setting the conditions and deciding over the candidate's appeal. Other significant cross-national parallels include the importance and evaluations attributed to human rights, Turkish-Cypriot relations, and Turkey's economic success. Major differences can be noted in the areas of how Turkey's accession is treated as a popular subject in Austrian national party politics as opposed to its classification of being part of foreign relations in GB. In terms of democratic standards, British media particularly emphasise the importance of secularist principles. When it comes to further EU enlargement, the Austrian press is more concerned with the EU's integration capacity. These findings support the existence of a number of collective values as part of EU identity that are shared across national borders. They also reveal nation specific versions of Europe and confirm that Turkey evokes different associations in different national settings. While a British view of EU identity highlights the more open and outward looking principle of secularism, Austrian media tend to favour a more inward looking principle gravitating around the EU's integration capacity.

7.2. Topics in Austrian and British Focus Group Discussions

In focus groups a topic is coded as such if more than one focus group participant engages in a discussion of the same topic. Individual contributions that

do not prompt a reaction from another discussant are disregarded. This rule is relevant in order to be able to distinguish between the topic variable and other variables. It is possible to double-code focus group contributions if they fulfil other variable criteria. A double-coding is justified where a reference to a topic also signifies a supporting argument. In that case, each variable is coded based on the same discussion contribution. The topic salience is measured by speaker contributions. A topic is awarded a salience point when first introduced by a speaker. Immediate follow-ups by the same speaker are not coded as they count as part of the original contribution. References to the same topic by other speakers count as additional salience points.

Table 13 gives an overview of topics related to Turkey’s accession to the EU in Austrian and British focus groups.

Table 13: Topics Related to Turkey’s Accession to the EU in Austrian and British Focus Groups

<i>AT</i>			<i>GB</i>		
Topics	Evaluation ^a	Count□	Topics	Evaluation	Count
Human rights	negative	44	Human rights	negative	48
Integration	negative	37	Islam	negative	32
Islam	negative	32	Integration	negative	22
Democracy	negative	26	Holiday	positive	17
Economy	positive	15	Culture	ambivalent	14
Holiday	positive	10	Turkish-Cypriot relations	negative	10

Notes: Questions: What comes first to your mind when you think of Turkey? How would you evaluate this? Topics are ranked according to salience starting with the most salient topic on top of the table and continuing with the next prominent topic. Results feature the six main topics in focus group discussions across countries. ^a Cell entries for evaluation: $-\bar{X}$ of evaluation values = negative; $+\bar{X}$ of evaluation values = positive; If \bar{X} of evaluation values is 0 = ambivalent; Scale for evaluation values includes +2 (very positive), +1 (fairly positive), 0 (ambivalent), -1 (fairly negative), -2 (very negative). □ Cell entries for count: salience points.

In compliance with Austrian discussants, who rank human rights as the most relevant issue, British focus groups also name it as the most significant topic in relation to Turkey’s accession to the EU. This topic category consists of more

generally defined human rights issues, women's rights, minority rights, and civic rights. The issue of women's rights further divides into national specific sub-topics. While British discussions specifically focus on religious clothing, arranged marriages and discrimination, Austrian discussions show a slightly broader range of sub-topics. Apart from the topics mentioned previously, they also include issues of honour killings, macho culture, and domestic violence against women. Minority rights largely concern the Kurdish minority in Turkey but also include cases of Catholic minority groups. The evaluations of this category in both countries are distinctly negative. Women's rights are by far the most relevant issue within the human rights category among Austrian and British focus group participants. Results show a pronounced gender divide with more women being concerned about women's rights violations. This divide can be explained through increased levels of personal affectedness and immediate social proximity that women associate with the topic. This evidence suggests that European identity as it is perceived in Austria and the UK gravitates strongly towards specific core values based on human rights in general and women's rights in particular.

Results reveal a strong link between violations of women's rights and Islam that people in both countries presume. Austrian and British citizens tend to see Islam as a religion and culture that is likely to be in breach of human rights, particularly for women. One discussant notes that "... if a woman lives according to Islam, her human rights as a woman are not guaranteed" RESP [7] 37, MALE, AT. What stands out is that discussants in both countries demonstrate high levels of personal affectedness which they project onto the issue. It is the emphasis on differences between us and them as part of identity construction processes that helps to explain what makes female participants in GB concerned and particularly interested in the topic. Austrian participants appear to have a different focus. They particularly voice their disagreement about infringements of women's rights in cases involving immigrants or Austrian citizens with an ethnic Turkish background, as an example of national proximity. Austrians tend to feel particularly strong towards cases of honour killings among families living in Austria as the following example illustrates.

RESP [6] 29, FEMALE, AT: If a brother kills his own sister, just because she was unfaithful – how low can you sink? ...

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: That has shocked me too.

RESP [6] 29, FEMALE, AT: They are quite radical.

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: The parents were the driving force behind it, weren't they? ...

RESP [6] 31, MALE, AT: They [the parents] ordered it and the brothers go and liquidise her.

The salience of honour killings in Austrian focus groups can be explained by the greater likelihood of occurrence of these crimes among the Austrian-Turkish community and their reporting in the national press. Both cross-national results confirm the importance of personal affectedness and social proximity for issue salience.

The next example shows how, from a British female view, Muslim culture is perceived to be different and to also bear a threat to existing human rights standards in the EU. What features prominently in British discussions about women's rights is that Turkey's EU accession may compromise standards of human rights with negative consequences for women living in the EU.

RESP [1] 02, FEMALE, GB: ... most of the people there [in Turkey] are Muslim. And so their way of doing things and thinking is completely different. ...

RESP [1] 01, FEMALE, GB: I think it is quite traditional. ... Is it Muslims with the Sharia law? ... I think they want to bring that into the country, aren't they?

RESP [1] 03, FEMALE, GB: They have already.

RESP [1] 01, FEMALE, GB: And enforce it here. So with more Muslims it could be enforced. And we could all end up wearing the burqua in ten years time.

The example above illustrates the fear that Turkish EU membership might introduce cultural practices that curtail the freedom of women in the EU. One British female focus group participant describes her picture of Turkey as a place where "men make all the rules and women can't do anything" RESP [1] 07, FEMALE, GB. EU membership is seen as a risk of introducing and making these practices

acceptable. The level of personal affectedness leads British participants to strong opinions of what they perceive as a threat to their personal life.

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: That [wearing a burqa] is what has surprised me. I have recently found out – I thought, they had to do that, but apparently they don't. A lot of the women don't here, but they choose to.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: Well, if that is what they choose to do, go on and do it but not in my street.

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: They were probably born here. ...

RESP [4] 20, FEMALE, GB: I don't think the people born here would be like that.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: Would you agree with that? With them wearing burquas up to their eyes? Do you agree with them? No.

RESP [4] 20, FEMALE, GB: Burquas? No, I wouldn't do it. No way. Not for anybody.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: Well, should we have them walking down our street like that?

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: You see, that is where my problem lies if Turkey joins.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: Exactly.

The dialogue above addresses two main issues. First, it emphasises the fear of an Islamisation effect of British and European culture through Turkish EU accession that disadvantages the status of women's rights in European countries. Second, it raises the question of where to draw the line between tolerance towards cultural practices and human rights standards. Results confirm that British citizens generally rank human rights over cultural practices. However, the example above reveals a certain ambivalence in people's reasoning when applying human rights standards to different cultures. While they strongly object to violations of women's rights where they could be personally affected, they tend to tolerate these infringements when situated in another cultural setting. This ambivalence can also be noted among Austrian focus groups. The examples below illustrate people's ambivalence and unease to distinguish between cultural practices and breaches of human rights.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: The only thing I was put off about in Turkey was – we were using an apartment here and there was an apartment that was local. And every time that woman came out and on that balcony she had to cover her hair up.

RESP [4] 20, FEMALE, GB: She was probably Muslim.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: I don't like that. I think it is suppressing the women.

RESP [4] 20, FEMALE, GB: Well, it is their religion, isn't it?

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: That's how it is there.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: Well yes - I know - but it put me off. ...

MOD: Could you describe what you mean by saying "It puts you off"?

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: Apparently, her husband ... was a rail worker and she had three children and the eldest lad told her what to do. He was the boss, while his dad was away and it quite put me off. I mean, don't get me wrong, I had a lovely holiday there and the people were really nice to me, but watching that - it sort of put me off.

RESP [4] 20, FEMALE, GB: I think you might see touristy things but it is like any Muslim country.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: Well yes I suppose. But am just saying I didn't like what I saw. And this lad, he was really demanding what his mother did.

While respondent 22 clearly expresses her disagreement over the treatment of a Turkish woman by her eldest son, participant 21 uses Islam as an explanation to justify such behaviour. The example highlights people's ambiguities when applying their positions to other cultural settings. A similar trend can be noted among Austrian focus groups.

RESP [5] 28, FEMALE, AT: I think that [Turkish] women do not feel oppressed. ... For them it is normal.

RESP [5] 24, MALE, AT: They grow up with it. They do not know otherwise, supposedly.

RESP [5] 28, FEMALE, AT: ... They probably do not think that it could be different. That is how they grow up.

Austrian discussants salve their conscience over traditional female roles in Turkey with the explanation that the cultural upbringing in Turkey makes women immune to realise that they are suffering from potential discrimination. These examples highlight that women's roles hold different meanings depending on their cultural context. They also illustrate a general lack of knowledge about Turkey's history and political development among focus group participants.

People appear to have problems making normative judgements in different cultural settings. What resonates with explanations for such behaviour is a fear of appearing intolerant towards Islamic culture on the one side and worries of being

ignorant towards human rights violations on the other. Practices that are regarded to belong to Islamic culture tend to be shielded from criticism.

Such dilemmas of normative judgement can also be noted for practices in cultural settings that are familiar to focus group participants. Discussant 14 points out the double standards applied to violations of women's rights committed as part of Christian cultural practices. He notes how people turn a blind eye on violations committed in a familiar Christian cultural sphere, while scrutinising such breaches more strictly in Islamic culture. This highlights that culture can function as magnifying or rose-coloured glasses depending on whether someone's own or an alien culture is evaluated. This points towards a potential effect of culture to blur people's judgement and to make violations of women's rights acceptable under the disguise of cultural practices.

RESP [3] 14, MALE, GB: But we have our own culture internally. ... [I]t isn't legally enforceable but we already allow husbands in certain cultures to dictate their wives what to do. We don't blink our lid. Unless or course, if somebody is seen as not our culture. If you find a religious Christian family where the father dominates – that is fine because it is Christian and safe. Do that in a Muslim house and all of a sudden it is a bit – it is pushing the boat a bit. ... [I]f it looks like we would have done it in the past it is OK, but if it is a slightly different culture it is unacceptable.

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: I wouldn't dream of enforcing on anyone that I was married to on what to do. Not in a million years.

RESP [3] 15, MALE, GB: It is not your culture.

RESP [3] 14, MALE, GB: I know lots of young Christians ...[where] the husband is the boss and runs the household and works out the finances and they live in a very traditional Christian way. Which we would now find, as a predominantly lapsed Christian nation, a little bit odd. A little bit backward. But we allow it. We don't complain about it. You know, a Muslim woman comes out with a headscarf and all of a sudden it is like "Oh, someone is impinging your rights." And sometimes it might be and sometimes she might be choosing to do that.

The example above highlights how women's rights and cultural practices are intertwined. While people in Austria and GB perceive women's rights to be part of their culture they see Islamic culture in Turkey as not necessarily including these rights.

The following example illustrates a link made between Christian culture and human rights, suggesting that they have different meanings in different cultural settings.

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: Presumably they all have to meet the Copenhagen criteria. And that has got some things on human rights and things which might not be a problem for everyone else because they were hugely a Christian nation. Whereas it might have a completely opposite meaning in an Islamic nation.

Rather than clearly distinguishing between culture and human rights, people perceive the latter as part of a specific culture. This imminent connection helps to explain how people come to tolerate violations of human rights when committed in different as well as familiar cultural settings. The link made by focus group discussants between culture and human rights explains the ambivalence of people's tendency to tolerate human rights violations in Christian culture, while criticising it in Islamic culture. Human rights violations happening within familiar cultural boundaries make them more acceptable to people of that culture. The opposite is the case when such breaches are committed in an outsider culture.

Linking women's rights with culture poses another dilemma. If it is assumed that human rights are part of a European culture they can only be adopted through an almost impossible change of culture. Given that Turkey is considered to lack such European culture poses an area of permanent difference that cannot be changed through political or legal reform processes. This link puts Turkey in an isolated position as it suggests that it would have to change its culture in order to belong to Europe.

Overall, an analysis of the topic category human rights reveals that focus group participants in Austria and GB consider it as a core value of their European identity. As part of the category, women's rights appear as the most relevant issue showing a pronounced gender divide. Further, results show that violations of women's rights are strongly linked with Islam and that human rights are generally seen as part of Western culture as opposed to a legal-democratic criterion that can be fulfilled independent to its cultural setting.

The second most prominent topic among Austrian focus group participants are issues around integration. The high salience of this topic in Austria can be explained by people's personal experiences with the Turkish community and increased exposure to national news coverage on related issues, which is likely to raise general levels of knowledge and awareness of such issues. In the British case, where integration is ranked in third place, the salience of integration issues is to a lesser degree, because of people's personal or mediated experiences with Turkish communities. Instead, British people refer extensively to their familiarity with Muslim communities in their country. Linking Turkey with integration issues of Muslim communities in GB points towards the importance of religion in the perception of Turkey among British citizens. It highlights that Turkey is primarily perceived as a Muslim country.

The topic category integration consists of people's general experiences with people of ethnic Turkish background or Muslim migrant communities and specific issues such as work migration or social welfare. Concerns over work migration and social welfare feature particularly strong among British focus groups with predominantly negative connotations. Austrians speak more generally of integration problems with Turkish migrant communities. These results reveal different expectations and concerns along a national divide. While British focus group participants are more concerned about social competition through migration, Austrian discussants lay greater emphasis on integration of people with Turkish ethnic backgrounds into local communities.

Other than in the British case, language appears to form an essential part of people's understanding and expectations of integration in Austria. It is used as an indicator to evaluate levels of integration and to judge people's willingness to do so. The issue of language plays almost no role in discussions among British participants. It is only mentioned once in the context of a case involving the payment of translators for migrant children at school. Here, the major concern is not the integration aspect, but the appropriate use of resources. The following example illustrates how language barriers are perceived as a considerable problem by Austrian participants in daily life.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: Where I am personally touched, although not directly affected, is by accounts from colleagues at school. ... For them it [language] is principally a big problem because there are a lot of guest worker⁹⁹ families. At some schools, more than half of the students are foreigners, with most of them being Turks. Language causes them quite a few problems, presumably on both sides [teachers and students].

It is somewhat surprising to see the term guest worker or foreigner being used, particularly since it can be assumed that the people referred to are Austrian citizens. The example highlights the importance of language as an indicator for successful integration. It suggests that not citizenship but language competence qualifies a person as “one of us.” Austrian’s tend to interpret a lack of German as a deliberate form of resistance to further social integration.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: It all starts with language.

RESP [6] 31, MALE, AT: They [Turkish migrants] do not want to learn German.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: Sometimes they pretend not to speak German when it suits them.

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: That is the reason why there are problems at school later on.

RESP [6] 31, MALE, AT: I agree.

RESP [6] 30, FEMALE, AT: At home, they make no attempt to speak German with their children.

RESP [6] 32, MALE, AT: They deliberately do so.

The example underlines the role attributed to parents and their responsibility towards their children to establish and deepen language competence. This points towards a general expectation held among Austrians that achieving language competence is seen as a private effort rather than an institutional duty. In another example, an Austrian discussant voices her frustration over a lack of knowledge of German, which reveals a sense of personal affront.

⁹⁹ This is a term that dates back to the 1970s when Germany recruited labour force from countries such as Turkey or Italy to cope with increasing demand.

RESP [7] 35, FEMALE, AT: I notice my own reaction when someone comes to my medical practice who cannot speak German – it bothers me. It annoys me to see someone who has lived here for 20 years and who does not integrate. I am thinking - how is that possible? If I would migrate to another country I would want to be able to speak the language. I would want to do this for myself to be able to communicate. This attitude bothers me.

Evidence suggests that Austrians tend to react sensitive towards forms of cultural seclusion which is looked upon with suspicion. They point out the formation of sub-cultures as particularly problematic to integration.

RESP [7] 37, MALE, AT: The result is sub-cultures. ... People only talk to each other, they visit each other, they marry each other, and they have relationships with each other. Basically, they have no contact to the outside. Their friends are Turks, their husbands and wives are Turks, and their children are brought up in a way so that they remain fixed in this culture group. Somehow, it is like a vicious circle. There are two main reasons as to why that is the case. On the one side, people want to protect their culture. On the other, they feel that their culture is not accepted by us. That, however, is understandable because it is so different, so Islamic.

RESP [5] 24, MALE, AT: Individuals integrate easier than groups.

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: They [Turkish people] form groups. They do not want to integrate.

RESP [5] 24, MALE, AT: That is the problem. They isolate themselves.

Although the first example above shows a certain awareness and understanding towards the problematic of cultural isolation, it affirms a sense of entitlement among Austrians that is based on the expectation that Turkish culture should adopt to the existing majority culture.

Apart from language, Austrian focus group discussants show particular concern for disrespect of female authority in Islamic culture. Two incidents that caused strong responses concern the mentioning of two cases where female teachers' authority is challenged by Turkish pupils.

RESP [5] 26, FEMALE, AT: Children at school do not obey female teachers as much as they do male teachers. We experienced that very drastically.

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: That is because of their upbringing, right?

RESP [5] 26, FEMALE, AT: The authority of the father. ...

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: They do not obey.

RESP [5] 26, FEMALE, AT: ... Only the head of school ... [or] a male colleague is accepted as an authority.

RESP [5] 25, MALE, AT: It is not just Turkish students but any male Muslim student who does not respect women. She is simply not regarded as a person in a position of authority.

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: She does not hold the same significance like a man does.

RESP [5] 26, FEMALE, AT: My mother also did not have the same significance as my father in the family.

RESP [6] 34, FEMALE, AT: I remember the case of a teacher in Vienna who suffered a burn-out. ... Out of 20 students only three were local, the rest were Turks. They disrupted her classes and she warned them to stop. The parents, however, did not come to her to complain. They went straight to the head of school which caused her major problems. She could not understand this.

The examples above represent a complex combination of various issues that revolve around integration, disrespect for female authority and macho culture. The first case illustrates the link people make between Islam and a lack of respect shown towards women in the workplace. This goes in line with the connection made between Islam and violations of women's rights earlier in this section. It reinforces the association that people hold about Islam, which is seen to be at odds with basic human rights. The second example shows how female authority is disrespected by both students and parents, suggesting that such practices stretching across different generations are common in Islamic culture.

Respondent 26, however, exposes a certain ambivalence and inconsistency in the line of argument about how disrespect for female authority is exclusively attributed to Islamic culture. She points out that Christian culture is also prone to disregard female authority. Unmasking these ambivalences in regards of the universal application of women's rights goes in line with findings in the section on human and women's rights. They highlight people's tendency to scrutinise violations of women's rights in an Islamic cultural setting more vigorously, while overlooking similar breaches in their own culture.

In contrast to Austrians, British focus group discussants put greater emphasis on work migration and social welfare in the context of integration. The following examples illustrate people's concerns over migration and access to social welfare

services. It should be noted that these examples have to be interpreted against the background of certain demographic biases. Concerns over the allocation of social welfare services tend to be more common among focus group discussants with lower income levels.

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: We give in to everybody. We let everybody come here.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: We opened our borders and we just bring everybody in ...

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: It has gone mad.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: Because there is a lot here that we don't know where they have come from, who they are, where they are.

RESP [4] 21, FEMALE, GB: It is supposed to be getting better, but they all come for "easy street" and they get it. Which you can't blame them. It is our policy I suppose.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: Yes, we get social security ... we give it to anybody.

RESP [4] 22, FEMALE, GB: You can understand people who have been annoyed. Especially when there is a couple who maybe has got two children and they can't get a house on the housing list. And next door ... is somebody who is an immigrant that has come over. And who has been given a home straight away. You can understand the bitterness in Britain.

It is interesting to note that responsibilities are put on national institutions and policies rather than on individuals. This forms a major difference to the Austrian integration cases where critique is explicitly addressed at individuals. The same is true for the following example where responsibility for increased job competition is not placed on the Turkish migrant, but rather on the employer who opts for cheaper labour force.

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: There is a risk ... that lots of Turkish people will immigrate ...

RESP [3] 16, MALE, GB: People say that they are all going to come and take our jobs. What jobs are they taking? They are not taking the top paying jobs. They always take the jobs that nobody else wants anyway. The only people that are complaining are the ones that wouldn't do those jobs. They are not coming over here taking our jobs.

RESP [3] 18, MALE, GB: They are. You are just not aware of it.

RESP [3] 16, MALE, GB: No, I mean our jobs. You don't hear of them coming over and taking over IT companies, do you? It is always manual labour.

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: But what about people who don't have degrees? They need jobs in factories and if they are going to pay half the wage for a young Turkish lad to come and do it, then they are not going to pay a young British lad.

Overall, results suggest different perceptions of integration in Austria and GB. This is relevant for the understanding of European identity in different national contexts since it pinpoints the terms of "becoming one of us." Austrian people are much more concerned with cultural adaptation than British people are. Accordingly, they emphasise the importance of language for integration. Acquiring sufficient language skills functions both as a measurement for successful integration and an indicator for a willingness to integrate. Critique is mainly addressed towards individuals. They are held responsible for the success or failure of integration on a personal level. In contrast to that, British people largely point their critique at institutional and political shortcomings. They are more concerned with the fair allocation of resources between nationals and immigrant groups. For them, it is an institutional duty to put mechanisms in place that enable fair access to resources.

The second most prominent topic among British focus group discussants is Islam. This is similar to the Austrian ranking where the topic comes in third place. Evaluations are equally negative. Those contributions by British focus group participants that hold evaluations the majority are negative. In comparison to that, Austrians are more likely to be slightly more critical of Islam. Results show that Islam is a topic that is well linked to other issues. This has been the case with human rights and women's rights in particular as well as with issues of integration. In these contexts, Islam is largely seen as an obstacle to further integration and major cause for violations of women's rights. The trans-topical nature of Islam that permeates various issues illustrates the general relevance of the topic among both Austrian and British citizens in their perceptions of Turkey.

While British citizens are particularly apprehensive of links between Islam and politics, Austrian people tend to be more concerned over Islam as a religion with dominant tendencies close to radicalism. The following example illustrates how

Austrian focus group participants see Islam to hold a distinct presence in Turkish public life.

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: Religion dominates everything.

RESP [5] 24, MALE, AT: Yes, it [Islam] has way too much influence there [Turkey].

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: It is too dominant. ... The entire routine of the day is dominated by religion.

Islam is perceived to have too great of an influence over people's daily routines, suggesting that this influence should be restricted. Similarly to this Austrian view, a British discussant notes that "[r]eligion should be inly. And they [Turkish people] should be told" RESP [3] 16, MALE, GB. This illustrates that the perception of Turkey as a country where religion is openly lived is at odds with a European understanding where religion tends to be treated as an apolitical private matter. What worries Austrian participants in particular are radical tendencies that they attribute to Islam.

RESP [5] 25, MALE, AT: Turkey is always difficult. There are radical Islamic tendencies.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: There [in Turkey] are a lot of religious fanatics. I found that generally threatening. Tolerance is not very pronounced.

RESP [5] 26, FEMALE, AT: It is the only fanatic religion in the EU so far ... Other religions are not as fanatic.

Other than Austrians, British people are more specific regarding their concerns over Islam, singling out links between Islam and politics as particularly problematic. For them political Islam is an issue that deserves special attention.

RESP [3] 18, MALE, GB: I don't think Gordon Brown would use his religious opinions to change policy. Whereas in countries like Turkey, where religion is considered to be a high priority, it is more likely that they are going to use that as an influence.

RESP [3] 18, MALE, GB: It is not in the sense of the EU. Because in the EU a secular state means a secular state. The new leader in Turkey is a religious leader. That is why the EU is worried, because of him taking over. They are concerned that he is going to use religion as a cause to say ... "God would believe us to do it this way, so that is the way we should go, that is what we are going to do."

Overall, Islam appears as a topic that tends to be critically viewed in Austria and GB. Further, results suggest that it is a subject well linked to other issues like human rights violations and integration problems that mark it as an obstacle. The views held on the role of Islam in Turkey reveal different national anxieties. While British people are more concerned over the potential role of Islam in politics, Austrians are more concerned over the role of Islam in daily life. In the British case, the emphasis is on the political domain. In contrast to that, Austrians stress the potential influence of Islam in altering the cultural parameters of everyday life.

Looking at topics four to six reveals some cross-national differences and similarities. While British discussions focus on 4) Turkey as a holiday resort, 5) Islamic culture and 6) Turkish-Cypriot relations, Austrian discussions are preoccupied with 4) Turkey's democratic institutions, 5) Turkey's economic development potential, and 6) Turkey as a holiday destination. While Turkey's economic performance and qualities as a holiday destination are distinctly positive, Turkey's Islamic culture prompts ambivalent reactions. The quality of Turkey's democratic institutions is seen as a reason for concern. Similarly, Turkish-Cypriot relations hold more negative evaluations. Apart from the overwhelming topical overlaps in the top three, the topic range in the lower ranks point toward national-specific preferences. While Austrian focus group participants are more concerned with democratic and economic standards, British people lean towards matters of culture.

In Austria, Turkey's democratic institutions are particularly criticised for their failings in the area of legal security. In regards to Turkey's economic development potential, Austrian discussants lay particular focus on Turkey as a vast and promising upcoming market. Turkey as a popular holiday destination is especially praised for its hospitality. Similarly, British people praise Turkey's qualities as a holiday destination with good value for money. Further, Turkey's history as an

imperialist power and its diverse food culture are pointed out. The division of Cyprus also features relatively prominently among British discussants.

Overall, results of the thematic scope of discussions reveal evidence of significant similarities as well as individual national differences. It is surprising to see that focus group participants in both countries unanimously and independently agree on three major topics. Austrian and British citizens regard 1) human rights in general and women's rights in particular, 2) integration issues and 3) Islam as the three most important topics in connection with Turkey's accession to the EU. These results provide strong evidence for a common ground of European values that form part of European identity perceptions across different countries. What emerges as a cross-cutting issue from the discussions is Islam. It appears to be intrinsically linked to the majority of topics, highlighting its domineering relevance in the perceptions of Turkey among Austrian and British citizens.

Cross-national differences are most pronounced in the areas of culture, democracy and economy. While British focus group participants emphasise the importance of culture and Turkish-Cypriot relations, Austrian discussants attribute greater relevance to Turkey's democracy and economic development. Taking the six most prominent topics into account Austrian discussants tend to be slightly more critical in their evaluations towards Turkey than British participants are. Overall, these findings point towards significant demarcation lines of European identity shared by Austrian and British citizens that revolve around standards of human rights, integration and Islam.

7.3. Comparison of Topics in Austrian and British Media and Focus Group Discussions

Results reveal distinct differences in the topical focus of media and citizen discourses. At the same time, they also highlight some significant similarities. Human rights are the only topical category that holds similar levels of significance and consistently negative evaluations across both media and citizen discussions. The topic ranks unanimously first among Austrian and British focus groups and on identical second position in media discussions in Austria and GB. This illustrates the

topic's significance for both elites and citizens and signifies an important line of demarcation for European identity. There are, however, minor differences in the dominance of issues within the human rights category that consist of several issues such as women's rights, minority or civic rights. Media discussions pay special attention to freedom of speech, as is the case in GB, and minority rights which are particularly salient in Austria. In contrast to that, focus groups in both countries see women's rights as the most relevant issue within the human rights category. This is further characterised by a distinct gender divide where more women than men worry about violations of women's rights. This evidence could point towards gendered versions of European identity. This would mean that it is not simply down to nationality how European identity is perceived or whether you are a citizen or part of the political elite. It means that European identity would also be determined by female or male views that attribute different meanings to it.

Moreover, focus groups results have shown that violations of women's rights are strongly linked to Islam which is seen as the major cause of the problem. Similar to that, newspaper coverage in Austria draws a connection between human rights abuses and Islam. This marks a significant similarity between citizens' views and Austrian media discussions in the human rights category. Islam as an obstacle to human rights matters greatly to citizens, a view also shared by the Austrian press. These findings reveal analogous views about the nature of Islam and human rights and possible causal relationships between them. Focus group results have shown that people tend to see human rights as part of a specific Western culture that an Islamic culture lacks. Austrian media coverage leans towards portraying Islam as an intolerant religion with fanatic tendencies infringing human rights, particularly those of religious minorities. This points towards a general relevance of Islam that manifests itself in form of an overarching theme that links different topics. This applies particularly to focus group discussions where Islam ranks as a topic in the top three list in both countries.

Table 14 gives an overview of the top six topics¹⁰⁰ in media and focus group discussion across countries.

¹⁰⁰ Focus group topics qualify for the top six table when they are mentioned on at least ten occasions in the overall national discussions.

Table 14: Topic Salience in Austrian and British Newspaper Articles and Focus Group Discussions

<i>Focus group discussions</i>				<i>Media discussions</i>			
Focus groups GB		Focus groups AT		Print media AT		Print media GB	
Topic	Evaluation ^a	Topic	Evaluation	Topic	Evaluation	Topic	Evaluation
Human rights	negative	Human rights	negative	Negotiation process	negative	Negotiation process	negative
Islam	negative	Integration	negative	Human rights	negative	Human rights	negative
Integration	negative	Islam	negative	Turkish-Cypriot relations	negative	Turkish-Cypriot relations	negative
Holiday	positive	Democracy	negative	Democracy	negative	Democracy	negative
Culture	ambivalent	Economy	positive	EU enlargement	negative	EU enlargement	negative
Turkish-Cypriot relations	negative	Holiday	positive	Economy	positive	Economy	positive

Notes: Questions: Newspapers: What topic is discussed in connection with Turkey and a European dimension? What is the evaluation of that topic? Focus groups: What comes first to your mind when you think of Turkey? How would you evaluate this? Topics are ranked according to salience starting with the most salient topic on top of the table and continuing with the next prominent topic. Results feature the six main topics in focus group discussions across countries. ^a Cell entries for evaluations: $-\bar{X}$ of evaluation values = negative; $+\bar{X}$ of evaluation values = positive; If \bar{X} of evaluation values is 0 = ambivalent; Scale for evaluation values includes +2 (very positive), +1 (fairly positive), 0 (ambivalent), -1 (fairly negative), -2 (very negative).

Another similarity between citizen and media discussions is Turkish-Cypriot relations. The topic ranks sixth among British focus groups and is in joint third place in the Austrian and British press. Slight differences appear in the evaluations of the subject, with an ambivalent stance among British focus groups and predominantly negative views in elite media coverage. These results can be understood against the background of Cyprus being a former British protectorate, which makes it more likely to be given extra attention in British media coverage and for British people to be familiar with the topic. Its high ranking presence in the press signifies it as an elite political topic as it involves national and EU leaders as the main actors.

Economy is another topic that is addressed in both citizen and media discussions. It is ranked fifth in Austrian focus groups and joint sixths in media coverage in Austria and GB with positive evaluations throughout. The presence of the topic in media discussions confirms the topic as a predominantly elite subject. Economic standards also strike a particular chord with Austrian focus group participants. Democracy is also part of the topical parallels between media and citizen discussions that mark it as a subject that appeals both to elites and non-elites. The topic is ranked in fourth place in Austrian focus groups as well as Austrian and British media coverage and receives negative evaluations throughout.

Overall, there are more topical overlaps between Austrian citizens and elite media discussions. This largely depends on the contextual setting of the topic and how it is connected to people's lives. Results suggest that human rights, peaceful relations to EU members in form of Turkish-Cypriot affairs and democratic standards are relevant parts in the perceptions of EU identity shared among elites and citizens. Further evidence gives some support to economic success being a relevant part of both elite and citizen perceptions of EU identity and a strong point of identification with Turkey. This points towards human rights, peaceful relations, democratic standards and economic development to form a significant basis in the understanding of EU identity shared among elites and citizens alike.

Apart from these similarities it is major differences that play an important role in media and citizen discussions. Citizens lay greater emphasis on issues related to integration and religion that are close to their personal experiences or where they feel likely to be personally affected by. In contrast to that, media discussions tend to

be more drawn towards topics involving elite actors. These news values are mirrored in the salience of elite EU negotiation processes and Turkish-Cypriot relations.

7.4. Summary

Results of this chapter have shown that media and citizen discussions share some common ground, but are largely characterised by significant differences. These divergences between media and citizen discussions in the top three topic categories suggest major differences in the emphasis of what matters to people and elites. These findings suggest that apart from a small number of joint values revolving around human rights, peace, democracy and economic development, distinctly different versions of EU identity are shared among citizens and elites. This lends further support to an emerging concept of a pluralist EU identity that is largely dependent on factors like national contexts, gender, and citizen or elite specific perspectives.

Chapter 8

Arguments in Support and Against Turkey's Accession to the EU

The purpose of this chapter is to identify significant demarcation lines and commonalities that emerge from an analysis of arguments for and against Turkey's accession to the EU.¹⁰¹ This approach is based on the theoretical concepts of identification (Hall, 1996) and *différance* (Derrida, 2000) from which similarities in form of supporting arguments and differences in form of opposing arguments are derived. Results will shed light on similarities and distinct differences between the rationales of media and citizen discussions in regards to European identity formations. Similar to the previous chapter 7, this one refers to the question "What boundaries (i.e. differences) and modes of identification (i.e. similarities) are evoked by Turkey's accession to the EU in media and citizen discourses and what do they reveal about the status and definition of a European identity in Austria and Great Britain?"

The analysis is structured to first cover arguments in elite media coverage and will then compare them cross-nationally in focus group discussions. In a third step, both media and citizen arguments are compared before drawing some conclusions in the summary part of this chapter.

8.1. Arguments in Austrian and British Media Coverage

Supporting and opposing arguments to Turkey's accession to the EU are semantic variables that are coded in a systematic way into a quantitative software package. An argument refers to an explicit rationale as to why Turkey should or should not be admitted to the EU. Arguments in newspaper articles are coded regardless of whether they are issued by a national or foreign source. The general prominence and exposure of an argument in the press is the focus of analysis rather than specific national views.

¹⁰¹ This section includes the variables ARGUMENTSUPPORT and ARGUMENTOPPOSE; For more details see codebook in Appendix 1.1.

Results reveal that the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West is by far the main supporting argument in the overall newspaper coverage. This argument refers to Huntington's prediction that in the Post-Cold War era future global conflict will be running along cultural lines to result in a clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1995). As part of this view of the world, he defines eight major civilisations that include further sub-civilisations. According to this distinction, Western civilisation is divided into a European and North American category, while Islam holds Arab, Turkic and Malay sections (p. 180). The argument category includes references to the general importance of integrating a Muslim country into the West, the signalling effect that Turkey's EU accession would have to the Muslim world, or Turkey's role as a bridge between Islam and the West.

The argument shows a pronounced national divide with high levels of salience among British newspapers and only half the salience of it in the Austrian press. It is not surprising to see this argument being less popular in Austrian newspaper discussions, as it does not fit the country's vision of Europe that leans towards a more culturally homogeneous entity. The popularity of this argument in the British press reflects on a British vision of Europe that focuses on making the EU a strong international actor with a Muslim secular nation among its members. In the British view, Turkey's EU membership is a question of vital necessity to prevent future conflicts as the following examples illustrate.

For Mr Straw, the issue was simple: the EU had agreed in December to start entry talks with Turkey yesterday, and it was essential to prevent a clash of civilisations that the EU kept its word and embraced its large Muslim neighbour.¹⁰²

The EU has gone so far towards accepting Turkey that a halt would be both a betrayal of the country's democrats as well as a terrible signal to the region and the entire Muslim world. It would be widely interpreted as a slap to Islam and a new strike in the "clash of civilisations".¹⁰³

¹⁰² *The Times*, 4.10.2005, A two-day test of nerves for the EU, Anthony Browne in Luxembourg, p.32.

¹⁰³ *The Guardian*, 22.10.2004, Comment & Analysis: After years of 'yes if': While Europe has wavered, pressure from within has liberalised Turkey, Jonathan Steele, p.27.

Today's intensive diplomatic activity is aimed at focusing on the fact that welcoming Turkey into the EU would send an important signal to moderate Islamic opinion.¹⁰⁴

The signalling effect refers to the significance Turkey's EU accession has in order to demonstrate that the EU assesses the country's application according to the conditions set out in the Copenhagen criteria. This argument puts great emphasis on the issue of Islam as a litmus test for the EU to prove that it is more than a Christian club. It is interesting to note that British newspaper coverage intrinsically links the argument to the EU's credibility. By turning Turkey's accession into a question of reputation, integrity, and authority British news put great pressure on the EU, suggesting that unsuccessful negotiations would equal a failure of the EU.

To deny Turkey the chance of EU membership would be a betrayal of its reformers. To grant it would prove to a sceptical Muslim world that when Europe talks about embracing diversity, it means exactly what it says.¹⁰⁵

The example above further illustrates how British news tend to emphasise that responsibility for Turkey's EU accession is largely attributed to the EU which coincides with previous findings. The next citation shows that Turkey is predominantly seen as a bridge between Europe and the Arab world. This notion reveals a British understanding of European identity that aims at a strategic enlargement to link Europe and the Arab world.

All three major parties in Britain support Turkish entry, viewing it as a key link between the West and the Islamic world. In his interview, Mr Blair said Britain backs entry for two reasons: "First, Europe will benefit from opening up, not from being introverted. The second reason is that Turkey is a country that can become a bridge between Europe and the Arab world." But Austria harbours centuries-old animosities towards the Turks. One senior EU

¹⁰⁴ *Daily Mail*, 14.12.2004, Blair champions Turkey to join European Union, David Hughes, p.2.

¹⁰⁵ *The Times*, 4.10.2005, Let talks begin, p.17.

ambassador said the chances of negotiations starting on time were only 50-50.¹⁰⁶

Further, the example pointedly illustrates the opposing positions that GB and Austria hold. By stating that Austria continues to cling on to historical hostilities towards Turkey, British news coverage suggests that Austria's judgement is clouded by outdated views that favour an inward looking EU. This goes in line with findings in chapter 6 that illustrate a distinction between an old and new version of Europe attributed to Austria and GB respectively. While a historical interpretation of Europe is characterised by an inward looking Judeo-Christian view, a cosmopolitan understanding of Europe opens up to Muslim culture.

Overall, this argument category has been characterised by a distinct national divide with a 24 per cent point difference. The British press score the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West significantly higher levels of relevance than the Austrian press. The reasons for this national split can largely be found in the different notions of Europe that Austria and GB hold. While Austria tends to favour a cultural-religious definition of Europe, GB supports a pragmatic-strategic vision.

Table 15 provides an overview of all arguments for and against Turkey's accession to the EU in Austria and GB.

¹⁰⁶ *Daily Mail*, 1.10.2005, Turkey belongs in the EU says Blair, Tim Shipman, p.36.

Table 15: Salience of Arguments in Support and Against Turkey's Accession to the EU in Austrian and British Newspapers Across Countries

<i>Arguments/Country</i>	<i>AT + GB</i>	<i>AT</i>	<i>GB</i>
In Support			
Avert clash between Islam and the West	40 (90)	25 (22)	49 (68)
Economic benefits	16 (37)	22 (19)	13 (18)
Reform process through EU monitoring	10 (23)	17 (15)	6 (8)
Turkey meets conditions to start negotiations	10 (23)	13 (11)	9 (12)
Against			
EU integration capacity	27 (77)	35 (50)	20 (27)
Refusal to recognise Cyprus/open ports	11 (32)	8 (12)	15 (20)
Lack of EU public support	9 (26)	10 (14)	9 (12)
Cultural differences	9 (25)	8 (11)	10 (14)

Notes: Questions: What argument is in support of Turkey's accession to the EU? What argument speaks against Turkey's accession to the EU? Rounded per cent. Arguments are ranked according to salience starting with the most salient topic on top of the table and continuing with the next prominent topic. Results feature the four main arguments in newspaper discussions across countries. Cell entries: % of frequency; N in brackets; Difference up to 100%: other arguments.

The second most popular argument in support of Turkey's accession to the EU is economic benefits. This topic includes references to Turkey's overall positive economic development as well as benefits for the EU's labour or energy market. Results show a pronounced national divide with the Austrian press putting greater emphasis on economic benefits than British newspapers. While Austrian newspapers pay particular attention to stories about the construction of the gas pipeline Nabucco, British news tend to focus more on the stimulation of EU labour markets through Turkish work migration.

Other than GB, Austria is largely dependent on natural resources from Russia which has proven to be an unreliable trade partner in the past¹⁰⁷. A combination of the country's search for alternative energy suppliers and economic involvement in

¹⁰⁷ In 2009 the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom stopped its gas supplies to Europe on the basis that pipelines through the Ukraine had been compromised and gas being diverted illegally.

the Nabucco Pipeline Project¹⁰⁸ help to explain the salience of this argument in the Austrian press.

“We need Turkish membership for reliable energy supply in the EU”, demands socialist MEP Hannes Swoboda. He urges the EU Commission to start negotiations with Turkey on the energy chapter immediately.¹⁰⁹

“The EU cannot cover its energy demands for oil and gas from the North Sea. The EU needs oil and gas from Iran, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. Turkey will become the central country of transit for these energies. I believe that the energy transit will become one of the most important trump cards Turkey has in the negotiations with the EU.” The former ambassador Yaman Baskut, who acted as chair at the international energy congress in Istanbul in March, is not the only one who is convinced that questions of energy supply will define the future role of Turkey in the years to come. ... Brussels has also realised that Turkey will play a key role.¹¹⁰

In contrast to Austria’s emphasis on Turkey to secure future energy supplies, British news coverage tends to focus more on economic impulses stemming from an expected demographic boost to the EU’s working population if Turkey joins. This goes in line with a more pragmatic-economic approach towards European identity.

The “demographic time bomb” facing Europe as its population of working age shrinks over coming decades, sapping economic growth, may be partly defused if Turkey were allowed to join the European Union, according to a paper for the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. ... The number of Turks aged 20 to 64 is set to climb by 14 million, the study says.

¹⁰⁸ The Nabucco Pipeline Project is a collaboration between Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Romania, and Turkey to build a gas pipeline from the Caspian region, the Middle East and Egypt to Europe.

¹⁰⁹ *Die Presse*, 12.02.2009, “Brauchen türkischen Beitritt wegen Energie” EU-Abgeordnete drängen die Kommission, die Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Ankara zügig fortzusetzen, Regina Pröll, APO Europa, p.4.

¹¹⁰ *Der Standard*, 23.03.2007, “Trumpfkarte der Türkei” Das Energietransitland wird für die EU geostrategisch wichtiger, Jürgen Gottschlich, APO Außenpolitik, p.5.

Turkish entry to the EU could therefore give a valuable boost to Europe's working population.¹¹¹

A recent report by an independent commission, chaired by the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, suggested that, at most, 2.7 million more, or 0.5%, of the EU's population, would work or settle in other EU countries in the long term. ... The independent commission estimates that by about 2020 Turkey's population may have overtaken that of Germany's, making it the largest state in the EU with about 85 million people. The commission claimed that Turkish migration could help revitalise other EU economies.¹¹²

An absence of the argument in the tabloid newspapers points towards a potential populist divide between newspaper types. Neither the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* nor the *Daily Mail* shares the broadsheets enthusiasm for economic benefits from Turkey's EU membership. Instead, they regard a potential influx of Turkish migrant workers as a serious threat to national labour markets.

Overall, this argument category shows a clear national divide with Austria putting greater emphasis on economic benefits from Turkey's accession to the EU. The emphasis of the argument is subject to national specifics. While Austrian newspapers highlight the relevance of Turkey's membership for EU energy supplies, the British press focuses on a demographic boost to the EU's working population. These results provide further evidence for differing visions of Europe among Austria and GB. While Austria generally holds a distinctly sceptic position towards Turkey's EU accession, the country supports Turkish membership on the grounds of it being a necessary step to ensure future energy supplies and resource independence from Russia. The British focus on revitalising effects to labour markets demonstrates a more general interest in economic growth within the EU. This positive economic outlook is not shared among tabloid newspapers, pointing towards a potential ideological divide.

The third most common argument in support of Turkey's accession to the EU addresses Turkey's reform progress through EU monitoring as part of the country's accession negotiations. This argument refers to various reforms in the areas of

¹¹¹ *The Times*, 27.10.2005, Young Turks 'can remedy EU demographic time bomb', Gary Duncan, p.64.

¹¹² *The Guardian*, 6.10.2004, UK resists EU curb on Turkey, David Gow, p.15.

human rights, rule of law, and general democratic standards that are the result of Turkey's prospects of joining the EU. The reform argument receives a considerably higher salience in the Austrian press than in British newspapers.

If one cares about forcibly married women, imprisoned authors, and Kurdish minorities, then the pressure from accession negotiations is a suitable measure to bring change underway – no matter how long it will take.¹¹³

On principle Ulrike Lunacek [Green Party] supports Turkey's accession. She argues that this option is a major drive for the forces of reform in the country.¹¹⁴

A strong argument for supporters of Turkey's EU accession is the Europeanisation of the country: Turkey should be brought closer to Europe, and the processes of development of the constitutional state, human rights and civil liberties should be strengthened through the negotiations.¹¹⁵

It appears that Turkey's reform efforts find a particular resonance among Austrian quality newspapers, while the tabloid press is less enthusiastic about Turkey's progress. The reason for the Austrian preference for this argument could be that it is highly dependent on an evaluation process by the EU and can turn into an opposing argument if not met satisfactorily. In that respect, it is a conditionally supportive argument. This precaution fits in with Austria's overall more critical stance towards Turkey's EU accession.

The fourth most salient argument in the overall newspaper coverage reasons that Turkey meets the conditions for the start of EU accession talks. This argument refers to the rightfulness to start accession negotiations on the basis that Turkey has met the required political criteria. The argument receives similar levels of salience with a slightly higher percentage in the Austrian press, but receives noticeably little resonance among the *Daily Mail* and *Die Presse*. In cross-national comparison the

¹¹³ *Der Standard*, 6.09.2006, Mühsamer Lernprozess, Michael Moravec, p.36.

¹¹⁴ *Die Presse*, 11.05.2009, Die grüne EU-Spitzenkandidatin Ulrike Lunacek unterstützt Linie der Kommission, IPO Inland, p.2.

¹¹⁵ *Die Presse*, 27.10.2006, Die Europäisierung der Türkei, Commentary, Erich Reiter, p.37.

argument is characterised by a different emphasis on the outcome of negotiations. While the Austrian press tends to favour an open-ended approach stressing the possibility of a privileged partnership, British newspapers accentuate the prospect of full membership for Turkey.

In the first examples, the British press draws particular attention to the fact that, so far, every EU accession negotiation has resulted in full membership and that this will be no different in the Turkish case. In the second example, full membership is also assumed to be the expected outcome of negotiations. It is interesting to notice the choice of words that describe the political criteria as the preconditions for the start of negotiations as “a set of hurdles”. This suggests that it is the EU which holds main responsibility for obstacles to accession negotiations. This finding coincides with previous results in chapter 6 that confirm tendencies of British newspaper coverage to attribute the success of negotiations to be largely dependent on the EU.

President Kennedy was still alive, the cold war was at its height and Harold Macmillan was in Downing Street when Turkey was first told that it could hope one day to be accepted as part of Europe. Forty-one years later, there was quiet satisfaction though no jubilation in Ankara at yesterday’s cautious finding in Brussels that this country of 71 million has finally met the political criteria for joining the club. It will still be 10 or more years before Turkey can become a member. But no country which has started the process of EU accession has yet failed to be accepted.¹¹⁶

A European Commission report, to be published on Wednesday, will state that the Turks have successfully crossed the first set of hurdles to membership.¹¹⁷

In contrast to that, the Austrian newspaper coverage tends to focus on the contestation of Turkey’s full membership. It emphasises the general need for an alternative to full membership by favouring the option of a privileged partnership. This finding supports results in the previous paragraph, which illustrate that supporting arguments in an Austrian context have a propensity to be subject to a

¹¹⁶ *The Guardian*, 7.10, 2004, Comment & Analysis: EU membership: Turkey meets the tests, p.27.

¹¹⁷ *The Times*, 4.10.2004, Turkey gets green light to begin EU membership talks, Roger Boyes, p.28.

certain conditionality. It fits the generally more critical stance of Austria towards Turkey's accession to the EU.

EU-Turkey politics have been the cause of further alarm on the weekend: Enlargement Commissioner Rehn said that the EU Commission sees the conditions for the start of negotiations as fulfilled. The German CDU/CSU opposition is prepared to prevent Turkish full membership if it gains power in the next elections.¹¹⁸

Olli Rehn has caused massive irritations with his claim that Turkey has already fulfilled all conditions for membership. ... "There must be an alternative to full membership" argued Foreign Minister Plassnik in Ö1. She disagrees with an "all or nothing strategy" and insists that there must be a third way. One such option would be a privileged partnership like it is favoured by Vice Chancellor Hubert Gorbach.¹¹⁹

Overall, this section on supporting arguments has shown some distinct cross-national differences. While British news coverage clearly sees a prevention of clashes between Islam and the West as the most important argument to support Turkey's EU accession, Austria puts greater emphasis on Turkey's relevance for future EU energy supplies as a reason to support Turkish membership. Further, Austrian support tends to have strings attached to its backing of Turkey. Two out of the four main supporting arguments are based on conditions and increased scrutiny. These findings reveal that GB is inclined to see the EU as a culturally diverse multinational power stretching to the Middle East. In contrast to that, Austrian newspapers are more likely to favour a culturally homogeneous EU. Support for Turkey is restricted to absolute economic necessities such as the securing of future access to energy resources.

Arguments against Turkey's accession to the EU focus on 1) the EU's integration capacity, 2) Turkey's opposition to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and to open its ports, 3) a lack of support for Turkey's accession by the EU public, and

¹¹⁸ *Der Standard*, 29.08.2005, EU-weite Debatte über Türkei-Politik, APO Außenpolitik, p.4.

¹¹⁹ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 30.08.2005, Irritationen um EU-Beitritt der Türkei: EU-Erweiterungskommissar Rehn stößt in Wien auf keine Gegenliebe, Dieter Kindermann, p.2.

4) Turkey's Muslim population. Results reveal that the EU's integration capacity is by far the most common argument in opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU. Both countries generally hold high levels of salience of this argument in their newspaper coverage, but distinct cross-national differences prevail. The Austrian press tops the British one with a fifteen per cent point difference, which means that the argument makes for a third of all opposing arguments.

First described as the EU's absorption capacity at the EU summit in June 2006 and later renamed EU integration capacity, the term refers to the EU's decision to also consider the pace of accession as well as the capacity of the EU to accept new members as a prerequisite when assessing applications of prospect member states. It aims "to reinforce and deepen European integration by ensuring the EU's capacity to function", to fulfil the conditions set out in the Copenhagen criteria, and to ensure public support (Commission on enlargement, 2006: 15-16).

Specifically, this popular argument refers to a range of aspects such as the general limits of the EU's integration capacity, demands that the EU needs more time to digest the latest enlargement rounds, or concerns over high costs to integrate Turkey into the EU. The argument is particularly relevant among Austrian newspapers highlighting Austria's leading role in introducing the question of the EU's integration capacity to future enlargement.

Schüssel is making himself and by extension Austria the spearhead of those forces within the EU that have serious and justified concerns over the suitability of Turkey to join the EU and over the EU's absorption capacity.¹²⁰

Being the major driving force behind introducing the EU's integration capacity to future enlargement rounds helps to explain the prominent featuring of this argument in the Austrian national press. Great emphasis is laid on the conditionality of negotiations with Turkey and an open outcome.

¹²⁰ *Der Standard*, 6.09.2005, Schüssel lehnt sich aus dem Fenster, Hans Rauscher, p.27.

For Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel the EU absorption capacity is one of the most important points in the discussions over the start of negotiations with Turkey. He emphasises that he will continue to campaign for open-ended negotiations at the upcoming EU summit.¹²¹

Rather than pointing out that this would be a unique case in the history of EU accession, Austrian newspapers portray open-ended negotiations or alternatives to full membership as a necessary step in order not to go beyond the scope of the EU. This picture of an overburdened EU is further reinforced through stressing the financial costs of Turkey's accession and Austria's expected share as a net contributor to the EU budget.

You don't need to be a Nobel Prize winner to realise the permanent consequences Turkey's EU membership would have: it would be a financial burden on an already overstrained EU. Net contributors to the EU budget like Austria will have to pay many more billions to Brussels to eradicate the most severe poverty in Turkey. Is that what the EU was founded for?¹²²

Other than the Austrian press which identifies heavily with the EU integration capacity, the British press takes on a distinctly distanced approach. Although the argument features relatively prominent, British newspapers tend to mention it exclusively as part of other political actor's claims but their own¹²³. This means that responsibility for opposition to Turkey's bid is shifted towards the EU and not GB. The examples below demonstrate that the argument is attributed to a range of other national and EU sources with a particular emphasis on the Austrian position.

Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, said that the EU's ability to absorb new countries was "stretched to the limits" but that it had

¹²¹ *Die Presse*, 16.12.2004, Verhandlungen: Stopptaste gilt auch für die Union, p.4.

¹²² *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 8.10.2004, Türkei: Kuckucksei im Nest der EU, APA-DeFacto, p.5.

¹²³ Please note that an argument is coded regardless of whether it is issued by a national or foreign source. The general prominence and exposure of an argument in the press is the focus of analysis rather than specific national views.

already promised the Balkan nations that they were destined for EU membership.¹²⁴

In a blow to Tony Blair's wish to see Turkey join the community quickly, he [EU President Manuel Barroso] declared that Europe also needed a rest before any further expansion of the 25-country club.¹²⁵

Austria and Cyprus led the way in opposing Turkey at yesterday's talks. Ursula Plassnik, Austria's foreign minister, said: "We have always thought it would be smart to explicitly spell out an alternative (to full EU membership). We stress the issue of (the EU's) absorption capacity accordingly."¹²⁶

Overall, this leading argument in opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU has revealed distinct national differences. While Austria takes on a principal role in raising awareness and support for the issue, GB distances itself from it by portraying the argument as a problem almost exclusively shared among EU officials and other EU leaders.

The second most prominent argument in opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU is the country's refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and open its ports for trade with the EU member state. Results show that this argument has a higher relevance in the British press than in Austrian newspapers featuring particularly strong in the quality press. Similar to the EU's integration capacity, this opposing argument is largely attributed to non-British political actors, singling out France as the main opposer.

M de Villepin said that formal negotiations were inconceivable if Turkey maintained its refusal to endorse the Greek Cypriot Government.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ *The Times*, 10.11.2005, 'Two years to sort out your human rights', Anthony Browne in Brussels, p.42.

¹²⁵ *Daily Mail*, 3.02.2005, Be more like the British, Brussels boss tells Europe, Paul Eastham, p.31.

¹²⁶ *The Guardian*, 19.07.2005, Europeans reject Turkey, poll shows, Nicholas Watt, p.14.

¹²⁷ *The Times*, 3.08.2005, New obstacle blocks Turkish road to EU, Adam Sage, p.33.

France yesterday threatened to derail the official start of talks this autumn with Turkey on its entry to the EU by insisting that it recognises Cyprus in advance. Dominique de Villepin, the French prime minister, said: "It does not seem conceivable to me that a negotiation process of any kind can start with a country that does not recognise every member state of the European Union, in other words all 25 of them." But Britain, which holds the EU presidency, and the European commission made it plain that Turkish recognition of Cyprus was not a precondition for talks to begin.¹²⁸

While the first example illustrates a case of outsourcing an opposing argument by attributing it to another political actor, the second example shows a clear rift between the British and the other view. The combination of a shared British and EU view is somewhat surprising with the effect of diminishing the scope of the argument to a bilateral matter between France and Turkey. By portraying the argument as part of a bilateral dispute rather than being representative of a majority EU view the argument loses part of its weight. Overall, this opposing argument, which features more prominently in the British press, appears to be mainly supported by French opposition and is not backed up by a similar British view.

The third most popular argument against Turkish EU membership addresses the lack of public support within the EU. This argument generally refers to public opinion polls illustrating opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU. Austrian and British newspapers share similar levels of salience regarding the argument, but differ in terms of national opposition. While the British press mostly refers to non-British political actors when featuring this opposing argument, Austrian newspapers demonstrate a more explicit identification with the argument on a national level. This can be explained by a unanimously critical position shared among the public and political elite in Austria and a coherently positive stance of the British government.

When the argument features in the British press, it is largely attributed to other European national actors like Germany and France, where opposition to Turkish EU membership is strong.

¹²⁸ *The Guardian*, 3.08.2005, France may bar Turkey's EU bid, David Gow, p.15.

Frau Merkel has said that she will try to block Turkey's membership in favour of a "privileged partnership". She said: "This alienation between Europe and its public must be overcome and we need an honest debate about Turkish membership."¹²⁹

On other EU issues, 93 per cent of French voters are in favour of a more integrated EU environment policy. And some 78 per cent approve the establishment of a European defence structure. When asked about how they felt about Turkey's eventual EU membership, only 30 per cent thought it was a good idea.¹³⁰

This coincides with similar findings in the section on the opposing argument of Turkey's refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. It is interesting to note that British newspapers tend to disregard public attitudes towards Turkey's accession in their country. Expressions of sympathy with public opposition in other EU member states as illustrated in the following example are relatively rare.

For one thing, to admit Turkey is to repeat the very behaviour that has created the union's crisis of legitimacy [constitutional no-votes]. Once again, the governments and elites have pressed ahead with a step that their peoples loudly oppose. Europe-wide polling shows a clear majority against Turkish membership, with unambiguous opposition in Germany, France and the Netherlands, rising to 80% in Austria. One can shake one's head at the xenophobia or even Islamophobia that might lurk behind those numbers, but it won't do any good. If this year's referendum defeats said anything, it was that Europeans were fed up with their views being pushed aside by a political class that, time after time, insists it knows best. To press ahead blithely with Turkish admission, waving aside the concerns of these majorities, would be to have learned nothing.¹³¹

In contrast to that, Austrian newspapers greatly feature public opposition against Turkish EU membership as part of their national consent. The identification of the press with public opposition is much greater than in the British case.

¹²⁹ *The Times*, 1.06.2005, Dreams of a bigger EU dashed by voters' fears for lost jobs, Anthony Browne, p.8.

¹³⁰ *Daily Mail*, 27.06.2008, Vote again on Lisbon, say French, p.31.

¹³¹ *The Guardian*, 5.10.2005, Comment & Debate: European elites can't ignore the views of their peoples: Opening the door to Turkey was right, but EU expansion is bound to fail if the dreamers ignore the majority, Jonathan Freedland, p.27.

[Jörg] Haider criticises the ÖVP: “Schüssel and Plassnik plan to fool the citizens over the Turkey question”, in the background preparations for EU accession continue. He describes the position of the ÖVP as a trick. ... Haider is determined not to accept this and angrily comments: “Schüssel and Plassnik have a clear mission from the BZÖ and the Austrian people to prevent Turkey’s accession to the EU.”¹³²

The Austrian government demands that public opinion should be taken into account for future enlargement. ... It would be more honest to say that no local government can afford to support Turkey’s accession at this point in time.¹³³

The Austrian tabloid newspaper *Neue Kronen Zeitung* shows particular support for public opposition against Turkey’s EU accession. This supports its editorial line of being a people’s newspaper. Here, the EU is made responsible for acting counter to popular opinion.

Despite massive European-wide opposition against Turkey’s accession to the EU, the EU Commission pressed ahead with a spectacularly divergent statement: it considers the criteria for accession talks as fulfilled and single-handedly gives the green light.¹³⁴

Overall, a closer analysis of this opposing argument reveals that despite similar levels of salience newspaper coverage in Austria and GB differs greatly in terms of national opposition. While British newspapers feature this argument largely as part of national resistance in Austria, France, or Germany, the Austrian press tends to identify greatly with public opposition manifested in references to national actors. In the British case, the argument appears to be functioning as a point of contrast against other views to strengthen its own position. These results reflect on the general

¹³² *Der Standard*, 31.08.2005, Haider sieht Türkei-“Finten” der VP, IPO Innenpolitik, Eva Linsinger, p.8.

¹³³ *Die Presse*, 16.06.2006, Zwei Seelen für die EU-Erweiterung, Wolfgang Böhm, p.35.

¹³⁴ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 29.08.2005, Trotz Europaweiten Widerstands gibt EU der Türkei grünes Licht!, APA-DeFacto, Peter Gnam, p.3.

government positions, which tend to be more favourable towards Turkish EU accession in GB than they are in Austria.

The fourth most popular argument against Turkey's accession to the EU refers to cultural differences. This argument deals with Turkey's Muslim population in general and fears over an Islamisation of the EU in particular. Results show similar levels of salience with a slightly higher emphasis in the British press. Other than the Austrian press, British newspapers use the argument as a contrast to highlight differences to its own position as illustrated in the following example.

As Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, he [the pope] argued against the entry of Turkey into the European Union, saying it was part of a different culture. In February he demoted Walsall-born Archbishop Michael Fitzgerald, then Britain's highest representative at the Vatican, for being too warm towards Islam.¹³⁵

Further, references to this opposing argument in the British press tend to focus on political actors from other countries. The argument is not backed up by a British national consent, but outsourced to other political figures within the EU.

The group [a ten member European "reflection group" proposed by French president Sarkozy] will be led by Felipe Gonzalez, a former prime minister of Spain, who is known to have spoken out against Turkish membership of the EU. He told an audience in Barcelona in 2004 that there were limits to the enlargement of Europe and it should "stop at the borders of Turkey" because of social and cultural differences.¹³⁶

Some commissioners oppose Turkish entry because they fear the largely Muslim and poor country will lead an "Islamicisation" of the EU.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ *Daily Mail*, 16.09.2006, Muslims outraged after the Pope talks of 'evil' Mohammed, Steve Doughty, p.12.

¹³⁶ *The Times*, 15.12.2007, Brown and Sarkozy set out different dreams for Europe, David Charter, Rory Watson, p.53.

¹³⁷ *The Guardian*, 6.10.2004, UK resists EU curb on Turkey, David Gow, p.15.

In contrast to the British press, Austrian newspapers have a tendency to identify with the argument on a national level or sympathise with positions similar to theirs. The examples below illustrate that the argument is referred to in a more general way without specifics of what these cultural differences entail.

84 per cent of Austrians argue that the cultural differences between the EU and Turkey are too great [for the country to join].¹³⁸

The most common argument against Turkey's accession to the EU among the Tyrolean public is "the different mentality and culture of Turks"....¹³⁹

Before Merkel left, the Bavarian CSU and the governor of North Rhine-Westphalia, Jürgen Rüttgers, briefed her that Turkey does not belong in the EU.¹⁴⁰

A cross-national comparison of this argument reveals that the British press tends to use it as an argument in disguise to emphasise its own position as being different. Cultural differences as an opposing argument to Turkey's accession to the EU are not backed by a British national consent. Instead, the argument predominantly reflects opinions of political actors from other EU member states.

Overall, arguments against Turkey's accession to the EU appear to be ostensibly balanced in the Austrian and British press. However, on closer examination the majority of arguments in the British press are opposing arguments in disguise where negative views are largely attributed to non-British political actors. This outsourcing of critique to actors outside the British national context suggests that GB does not share these negative points. In other cases, the argument is used to further emphasise the contrast between a positive British stance and opposing other views. This means that negative arguments are more pronounced in

¹³⁸ *Die Presse*, 19.12.2006, Österreicher sagen: Lieber die Albaner in der EU als die Türken, p.36.

¹³⁹ *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 20.11.2004, Drei Viertel gegen Türkei, APA-DeFacto, p.12.

¹⁴⁰ *Der Standard*, 6.10.2006, Merkel mahndend in der Türkei: Die deutsche Kanzlerin verlangt von Ankara die Anerkennung Zyperns, APO Außenpolitik, Jürgen Gottschlich, p.4.

the Austrian press. These findings confirm Austria's more critical position towards Turkey's accession to the EU.

When looking at the development of arguments over time, results illustrated in Table 16 reveal a number of trends. A majority of categories in the second half of the time period under investigation show case numbers lower than ten and are therefore treated with caution¹⁴¹. Taking into account these limitations to the generalisation of results, the analysis predominantly focuses on detectable trends in the first part of the time phase.

Table 16: Salience of Arguments in Support and Against Turkey's Accession to the EU in Austrian and British Newspapers Over Time

<i>Topic/Year</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>
In Support						
Avert clash between Islam and the West	28 (15)	51 (37)	50 (26)	19 (4)	36 (4)	25 (4)
Economic benefits	19 (10)	12 (9)	12 (6)	24 (5)	18 (2)	31 (5)
Reform process through EU monitoring	13 (7)	8 (6)	8 (4)	19 (4)	---	13 (2)
Turkey meets conditions to start negotiations	15 (8)	12 (9)	6 (3)	10 (2)	9 (1)	---
Against						
EU integration capacity	27 (14)	32 (34)	22 (17)	20 (6)	38 (3)	33 (3)
Refusal to recognise Cyprus/open ports	2 (1)	8 (8)	26 (20)	3 (1)	25 (2)	---
Lack of EU public support	8 (4)	13 (14)	8 (6)	3 (1)	13 (1)	---
Cultural differences	8 (4)	7 (7)	11 (8)	13 (4)	---	22 (2)

Notes: Questions: What argument is in support of Turkey's accession to the EU? What argument speaks against Turkey's accession to the EU? Rounded per cent. Arguments are ranked according to salience starting with the most salient topic on top of the table and continuing with the next prominent topic. Results feature the four main arguments in newspaper discussions across countries. Cell entries: % of frequency; N in brackets; Difference up to 100%: other arguments.

When looking at the most prominent argument in support of Turkey's accession to the EU, results show that the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West is most pronounced in the years 2005 and 2006, which marks the early stages of EU accession talks and can be mainly attributed to British newspaper

¹⁴¹ Please note that the low case numbers in some of the argument categories makes a further breaking down into country specific results obsolete.

coverage. After that, case numbers drop below threshold levels of significance, which overlap with a general decline of newspaper coverage in the second half of the time period. The second ranking argument supporting Turkish EU membership shows more continuous salience levels. Previous results have illustrated that economic benefits are of particular importance to Austrian newspapers and largely concern the country's interest in Turkey as an energy provider. The relative stability of salience in the Austrian press over time can partly be explained by the country's persistent interests in energy safety that is unaffected by Turkish influence or performance as part of accession negotiations. The third most important argument in favour to Turkey's accession shows decreasing levels over time. This can be explained by a fading enthusiasm for reform progress under EU guidance that is particularly pronounced in the Austrian press. Similarly, the fourth argument supporting Turkey's EU accession shows a decrease in salience levels over time. This trend can be explained by the contextual setting of the argument, which focuses on the opening of EU accession negotiations. Overall, the salience levels of arguments in support of Turkey's accession to the EU show a slight downwards trend over time.

When looking at the salience of arguments against Turkish EU membership, results show that a majority is characterised by significant peaks. These include the three most prominent arguments opposing Turkey joining the EU. The major argument referring to the limits of the EU's integration capacity shows a strong presence from 2004 to 2006 with a decrease after 2007. This can be seen in the context of successful efforts by Austria to put the matter on the EU agenda by 2006. Similarly, the lack of public support for Turkey's accession peaks in 2005, followed by a peak of Turkey's refusal to recognise Cyprus and an emphasis on cultural differences in 2006. When looking at the development of arguments against Turkey's EU accession over time, results reveal a succession of significant peaks. These high points mark the prominence of particular arguments in media discussions which makes them more likely to be remembered.

Overall, an analysis of arguments over time shows that the salience of negative arguments is characterised by significant peaks, while positive arguments show a slight downwards trend. These results suggest that negative arguments are more likely to be remembered due to their successive peaks in newspaper coverage. Taking into account that the Austrian press puts greater emphasis on negative

arguments, it is more likely that these will get a greater attention among the Austrian public.

Overall, this section has shown some distinct national differences in regards to the salience of arguments opposing and supporting Turkey's accession to the EU, their presence over time and what they reveal about European identity from a national point of view. The British focus on the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West reveals an understanding of the EU that sees it as a culturally diverse multinational power stretching to the Middle East. In contrast to that, the Austrian emphasis on future energy security illustrates a strict orientation on economic necessities and conditional support for Turkey's case demonstrating an understanding of the EU as a culturally homogenous entity. Arguments against Turkey's accession turn out to be ostensibly balanced with great differences in national support of these arguments. Most arguments in British newspapers are used to prove a contrasting point, while others are almost exclusively attributed to non-British actors. This means that most negative arguments in the British press are not supported by national consent. An analysis over time reveals that negative arguments tend to have significant peaks, while positive arguments tend to decline over time. These findings support previous results confirming more critical views among Austrian newspapers.

8.2. Arguments in Austrian and British Focus Group Discussions

The following section explores the arguments employed by Austrian and British focus groups in support of or opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU. In an attempt to put these qualitative results into perspective an analysis of large-scale Eurobarometer opinion polls is included to test the robustness of focus group findings.

Apart from being a country with one of the most Eurosceptic electorates, Austria has one of the highest levels of public opposition in regards to Turkey's accession to the EU, which coincides with similarly critical views on government level. The first characteristic is equally shared by GB who is one of the least enthusiastic countries when it comes to support for further EU integration. The

country is well known for its government support for Turkey's accession to the EU and the public is assumed to hold similar views. The following Eurobarometer results will shed some light on whether these assumptions regarding public attitudes hold true.

Table 17 gives an overview of public opinion on the question of Turkey's accession to the EU in Austria and the GB. The table sections address Turkey's affiliation to Europe, supporting as well as opposing arguments regarding Turkey's prospects of joining the EU, demands placed on the country, and general support for Turkey's EU accession. Country specific results are contrasted against an EU average. General public support for Turkey's accession is considerably low among the Austrian public with just 16 per cent. Despite the British results being much higher, they remain below EU average and reveal that only a minority of the overall British public (42 per cent) is in favour of Turkey joining the EU.

Looking at Turkey's perceived affiliation to Europe, results show that the Austrian and British public lay greater emphasis on Turkey's belonging to Europe by geography rather than history. This is in line with a majority view held among the EU public. It highlights that geographic ties tend to play a greater role in the perception of people's sense of belonging than historical connections.

Table 17: Eurobarometer Results of Public Attitudes Towards Turkey's Accession to the EU

	<i>EB</i>	<i>Date^a</i>	<i>AT</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>EU \bar{X}</i>	<i>EU</i> □
Support for Turkey's EU accession	69	11/2008	16	42	45	27
Turkey's affiliation to Europe						
Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography	63	09/2005	47	53	55	25
	64	06/2006	78	40	55	25
	66	09/2007	42	49	56	25
Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history	63	09/2005	36	43	42	25
	64	06/2006	39	37	40	25
	66	09/2007	33	36	40	25
Supporting arguments						
Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region	63	09/2005	20	40	38	25
	64	06/2006	19	38	35	25
	66	09/2007	18	31	33	25
Turkey's accession would favour the rejuvenation of an ageing European population	63	09/2005	21	32	29	25
	64	06/2006	25	25	29	25
	66	09/2007	24	24	29	25
Turkey's accession to the EU would favour the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values	63	09/2005	24	45	41	25
	64	06/2006	22	37	38	25
Opposing arguments						
Turkey's joining could risk favouring immigration to more developed countries in the EU	63	09/2005	78	52	63	25
	64	06/2006	76	52	63	25
	66	09/2007	81	58	66	25
The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow for this accession	63	09/2005	73	41	54	25
	64	06/2006	51	53	54	25
	66	09/2007	84	47	61	25

Notes: Question for Eurobarometer 69: Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set out by the European Union, would you be strongly in favour, fairly in favour, fairly opposed or strongly opposed to the accession of Turkey to the European Union? Answers: % sum Strongly in favour and Fairly in favour. Question for Eurobarometer 63, 64, 66: For each of the following please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree, don't know. Answers: % sum totally agree and tend to agree. ^a Date of publication. □ Number of EU member states. *Sources:* Compiled by the author from Eurobarometer 63 (European Commission 2005: 162), Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission 2006: 139), Eurobarometer 66 (European Commission 2007: 226), Eurobarometer 69 (European Commission 2008: 30).

The table section on supporting arguments illustrates that benefits from Turkish EU accession for security in the region scores particularly low among Austrian citizens. Results ranging from 18 to 20 per cent show priority levels well

below the EU average of 38 per cent. The British public shows higher levels of support with results being in line with the EU average. Similar to the EU average, British support shows a downwards trend with a decrease over time from 2005 to 2007 by almost ten per cent down to 31 per cent. Positive effects of Turkish accession on EU demographics hold low levels of agreement among the Austrian public with percentages ranging from 21 to 24 per cent. British results see above EU average levels of support decrease over time from 32 to 24 per cent. The argument of improved mutual understanding of European and Muslim values shows pronounced low levels of agreement in Austria. The British public shows above EU average support, which fades over time from 45 to 37 per cent.

Overall, this section on supporting arguments for Turkey's accession to the EU demonstrates consistently low levels of agreement among the Austrian public that is well below EU average. In contrast to that, the British public shows greater agreement with these arguments in favour of Turkey's accession to the EU. Despite higher levels of support as compared to Austrian public opinion, British support is not backed by a majority view with percentage levels of a maximum of 45 per cent and tendencies of decline over time. This means that the British public backs supporting arguments in favour of Turkey's accession to the EU with relative interest but not with outstanding enthusiasm.

Results in the section on arguments against Turkey's EU accession show that Austrian opposition is significantly above EU average, while the British public shows support for negative arguments that is below EU average. Opposition to Turkish work migration is significantly strong among the Austrian public and growing with a per cent point difference of 15 to the EU average. In contrast to that, British public opinion underscores the EU average well by more than 10 per cent point difference. The question on cultural differences shows similar levels of polarisation. While a majority of up to 84 per cent of Austrian people think that cultural differences are too significant to allow for Turkish accession, only 53 per cent of the British public shares this concern. Overall, this section demonstrates that levels of opposition to Turkey's EU accession are significantly higher among the Austrian public with slight tendencies of further growth over time. British opposition to Turkish EU membership is considerably lower than the EU average. Overall, Eurobarometer results confirm noticeable national characteristics such as a distinctly critical Austrian public opinion. The analysis also gives new insights into

levels of British public support, which is more reserved than government positions in newspaper coverage suggest.

The following section explores arguments for and against Turkey's accession to the EU among Austrian and British focus groups. In the final remarks, these qualitative findings are contrasted against sections of the large-scale Eurobarometer opinion poll results to evaluate the robustness of some of the data. The argument salience in focus groups is measured by speaker contributions represented by salience points. An argument is coded once when introduced by a speaker. Agreement with the argument by other participants are coded as additional salience points. Immediate follow-ups by the same speaker are not coded as they count as part of the original contribution. If, however, a speaker raises the same issue again later in the discussion the argument is coded as a new entry as this repetition represents an important emphasis to be measured in additional salience points.

Table 18 reveals a vast number of significant cross-national parallels among supporting and opposing arguments. Three out of the top four arguments in support of Turkey's accession to the EU are identical among Austrian and British focus group participants. These include 1) economic benefits, 2) the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West, and 3) Turkey's ongoing reform process under EU monitoring. Minor national-specific differences prevail regarding hopes for better integration of Turkish migrant communities in Austria and a preference for better mutual understanding of cultures among British participants.

Table 18: Supporting and Opposing Arguments for Turkey’s Accession to the EU in Austrian and British Focus Groups

<i>Supporting Arguments</i>			
<i>AT</i>		<i>GB</i>	
<i>Argument</i>	<i>Count</i> ^a	<i>Argument</i>	<i>Count</i>
Economic benefits	12	Avert clash between Islam and the West	19
Avert clash between Islam and West	11	Economic benefits	9
Better integration of Turkish migrant community	5	Reform process through EU monitoring	5
Reform process through EU monitoring	4	Better mutual understanding of cultures	4
<i>Opposing Arguments</i>			
<i>AT</i>		<i>GB</i>	
Cultural differences	22	Cultural differences	17
EU integration capacity	14	Work migration	10
Geographic location	9	Negative effects on EU decision making/functionality	8
Negative effects on EU decision making	6	Geographic location	8

Notes: Question: What arguments speak for Turkey’s accession to the EU? What arguments speak against Turkey’s accession to the EU? Arguments are ranked according to salience starting with the most salient argument on top of the table and continuing with the next prominent argument. Results feature the four main arguments in focus group discussions across countries. ^a Cell entries for count: salience points.

Overlaps in the top two supporting arguments reveal strong connection points regarding economic benefits that feature as the most important argument in support of Turkey’s EU accession among Austrian participants, while the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West ranks highest among British focus groups. The following examples illustrate Austrian enthusiasm for economic benefits in the event of Turkey joining the EU. People tend to generally see it as an opportunity to greatly extend the EU’s economic area to increase internal trade.

RESP [8] 42, FEMALE, AT: If Turkey joins ... then the entire economy will change. From that point of view it will be a great strengthening of the EU economy.

RESP [5] 24, MALE, AT: It [Turkey] is without a doubt an enormous economic area.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: I do not just see the great financial help that would be required, but also the profits the EU would make [with Turkey's EU accession].

British focus group discussants are a bit more varied regarding the specifics of economic benefits from Turkey's accession to the EU. They tend to name various issues that include the general strengthening of the EU economy to be better equipped for competition on a global level, acknowledgement for the strength of the Turkish economy and hopes for increased internal trade as key aspects.

RESP [3] 18, MALE, GB: [W]e want them to join because we want Europe to be bigger and bigger so that we can compete against China, against America and Russia.

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: They [Turkey] got a good economy.

RESP [1] 08, FEMALE, GB: [I]f the EU can offer them [Turkey] money and support certain areas of the country, underdeveloped areas would become more developed ... It would be like opening up doors to sales.

Further significant cross-national common characteristics include views on the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West. This argument leads the British ranking of supporting arguments, while featuring second among Austrian focus groups. Results reveal a generally strong emphasis on geopolitical benefits from including a Muslim country in the EU. The following examples illustrate the British view.

RESP [2] 11, MALE, GB: I think it is a good thing. It probably decreases the security threat because it is a progressive Europe that is willing to integrate that kind of culture and accept it and therefore probably reduce security risks and doesn't put a barrier up between pale skin Christian group of countries and Middle Eastern countries. It opens the doors a little bit.

RESP [2] 10, MALE, GB: I think the potential acceptance of Turkey – part of it is a security measure to secure the EU from bordering Middle Eastern countries. And there are concerns about Iran.

RESP [2] 13, MALE, GB: Its strategic position is excellent. They have a border with Iraq and Iran and also with Russia.

RESP [3] 15, MALE, GB: It could be a benefit to the EU to have that strategic position.

While British participants draw special attention to the benefits that stem from Turkey's strategic location and security aspects, Austrian focus groups tend to highlight geopolitical benefits and a signalling effect to the Muslim world.

RESP [5] 25, MALE, AT: Strategically it [Turkey] is very important.

RESP [7] 38, MALE, AT: With Turkey ... we will have good relations to the Arab world.

RESP [7] 37, MALE, AT: I think that the current world political situation comes down to a clash of civilisations: Christianity against Islam, the West against Islam, or all against Islam. Turkey's accession to the EU is an immense chance to prove that an Islamic country can act in a Western oriented way. ... That would send a strong message: "Look Turkey can do it! They are an Islamic country and it works!"

RESP [7] 35, FEMALE, AT: It would send a strong message to the world if religion does not become an issue and one can maintain a good economic and political alliance with a country that has a different religion. One should be able to say that we all cooperate under human rights, no matter whether you are a Muslim, Buddhist or Christian.

Austrian and British focus group participants also show strong similarities in regards to the positive effects Turkey's EU accession process has on the country's political reform process. While British people tend to focus on Turkey's reform efforts, Austrian focus group discussants highlight the importance of the EU's soft power. These minor differences in focus point towards the countries different visions of Europe.

RESP [3] 14, MALE, GB: But surely it is easier to persuade someone to change their ways if they are your friends than if they are – well, enemy is too strong a word. It is easier to persuade people to do things when you are trading with them and their prosperity and happiness depends on meeting

you halfway. If you would say to Turkey “We don’t want you in the EU, because you will never manage to adapt”, then they will never need to adapt. Whereas if you provide the encouragement of that then there is always a chance of them meeting the criteria.

RESP [3] 15, MALE, GB: [T]hat [reform] has become more important to them because of their obligations to the EU. They are trying to align those things [to comply with the Copenhagen criteria].

RESP [8] 42, FEMALE, AT: I can definitely see that the EU is able to completely reform Turkey.

RESP [7] 38, MALE, AT: The EU should also be interested in Turkey’s EU accession to steer the country’s law towards a more humanistic society.

Where Austrian and British focus groups differ slightly is regarding a better integration of Turkish migrants into society in Austria and a generally better mutual understanding of cultures among British participants. These differences can be explained by national specific contexts. In the Austrian case, increased levels of media and personal experiences with Turkish migrant communities partly explain why a better integration of people with a Turkish background would be regarded as a major advantage if Turkey joins the EU. British participants’ experiences with Muslim communities in their country makes them more likely to see better cross-cultural relations as a positive outcome of Turkey’s EU accession.

RESP [5] 27, MALE, AT: I believe that the Turks who have been living here for decades would get a real chance to integrate. It is partially up to us that integration has not always been satisfying. It would be a great chance if they would become EU citizens.

RESP [5] 23, MALE, AT: They would see things differently.

RESP [5] 24, MALE, AT: The pre-conditions would be different if they were an EU member.

RESP [1] 03, FEMALE, GB: The idea of Turkey coming to join the EU is a bit like a bridge head to the more Muslim countries. And if that was successful and they actually joined us and we learned more about them and they learn more about us then that would help to go towards other countries.

At a closer look, these ostensible differences are less significant than they appear and reveal a strong common basis among both Austrian and British focus

group participants aiming at better and peaceful communal relations across different cultures.

Overall, the analysis of supporting arguments reveals strong cross-national similarities. These coherent results point towards citizen specific views. People's support for Turkey's EU accession focuses on 1) economic aspects, 2) the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West, 3) the EU's soft power to facilitate reforms in Turkey, and 4) better cross-cultural community relations. These results reveal strong identification points around joint economic success, Turkey's commitment to reforms, and peaceful cross-cultural relations on national and communal level among Austrian and British citizens.

Similar to arguments in favour of Turkey's accession to the EU, opposing arguments show strong cross-national parallels. Three out of the top four arguments against Turkey's accession to the EU are identical among Austrian and British focus groups with minor differences in ranking. Cultural differences are by far the most relevant argument opposing Turkey's accession to the EU in both Austria and GB.

RESP [2] 11, MALE, GB: The only argument against it that you could give is that it is so culturally different from Europe and its current core values.

RESP [4] 20, FEMALE, GB: I think bringing a Muslim country in is just going to be like a little time bomb.

RESP [8] 45, FEMALE, AT: I think that not everything will fit together. The cultural differences are currently too great. Maybe that will change in 15 years time.

RESP [8] 46, FEMALE, AT: There are too many blatant differences. The whole mentality – it just does not fit together.

Further cross-national overlaps in the top four opposing arguments concern Turkey's geographic location and negative effects from Turkish membership on EU decision making processes and its general functionality. Turkey's geographic location which ranks third in Austria and fourth in GB, casts doubts on the country's belonging to Europe and its prospects of joining the EU.

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: Do you think the country is in Europe? Should it be allowed to the European Union where it is? That is a stickler for me as well. I don't think it is in Europe.

RESP [1] 01, FEMALE, GB: It [Turkey] is not a European country.

RESP [7] 37, MALE, AT: In my opinion, Turkey is not a European country.

RESP [6] 33, MALE, AT: There is a border between Orient and Occident that should not necessarily be -

RESP [6] 34, FEMALE, AT: - opened.

Arguments on the negative effects of Turkish membership on EU decision making processes reveal a particular concern with a general loss of power of old member states to a large Muslim nation. The following examples illustrate people's unease with the prospect of changes to the status quo brought upon by a powerful and culturally different EU member state.

RESP [2] 10, MALE, GB: We don't want to give away our power.

RESP [2] 12, MALE, GB: Yes. Exactly.

RESP [2] 17, MALE, GB: Especially not to a new state.

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: Yes, but is that [Turkey's EU membership] wise? Having a brand new member state, huge numbers of delegates, opposite religion -

RESP [3] 16, MALE, GB: Probably not.

RESP [7] 39, MALE, AT: When Turkey joins then only one country will govern – Turkey!

RESP [7] 37, MALE, AT: I think that Europe will become ungovernable if Turkey joins.

National differences are most eminent in the areas of the EU's integration capacity, which ranks second among Austrian focus groups, and work migration, which is the second most prominent opposing argument among British focus groups. Results reveal that Austrian focus group participants tend to share a particular concern over the financial dimension of Turkey joining the EU. This focus on costs can partly be explained by Austria's role as a net contributor to the EU budget.

Further, concerns over the EU's integration capacity reflect on Austria's vision of Europe that favours a deepening of integration.

RESP [7] 41, MALE, AT: It [Turkey's accession] is a financial threat that could bring the EU to collapse. The financial commitment is too great.

RESP [5] 25, MALE, AT: I think economically it will be very difficult to fully integrate such a large and predominantly poor nation. ... I doubt that we can afford that.

In contrast to that, British focus group participants highlight problems stemming from an expected influx of Turkish people to work and live in GB once they become EU members. Results show that women tend to be more concerned about strains on social security, while men tend to worry about increased competition on the labour market. The gender divide can partly be explained by socio-economic differences that make women more likely to be dependent on social benefits. Increased concerns over job losses to cheaper labour among men can be seen in the context of previous experiences with Polish work migration to GB after EU enlargement in 2004.

RESP [3] 17, MALE, GB: I mean, there is a risk that lots of Turkish people will immigrate and fill in other countries.

RESP [3] 16, MALE, GB: People say that they are all going to come and take our jobs. ...

RESP [3] 18, MALE, GB: They are. You are just not aware of it.

RESP [1] 01, FEMALE, GB: They can come to England and get all the benefits.

Overall, the analysis of arguments against Turkey's accession to the EU shows strong cross-national similarities that support the existence of citizen specific concerns. Results show that a strong demarcation line runs along cultural differences, which is by far the most important argument against Turkish EU membership in Austria and GB. This cultural anxiety extends to other areas to also include concerns over the EU's future functionality and the loss of power to a large

and culturally different state. The combination of Turkey's size and cultural difference turns into a disadvantage. Other cross-national overlaps can be found in the area of Turkey's geographic location that casts doubts onto the country's eligibility to join the EU. The EU's name giving geographic outline steers people towards favouring geographic proximity to justify EU membership. National differences prevail regarding the EU's integration capacity among Austrian discussants and concerns over work migration among British participants. These can in part be explained by a specific vision of Europe that gravitates towards a deepening of integration in the Austrian case and past experiences with an influx of Polish workers in a British context.

Overall, this section on supporting and opposing arguments has shown consistent cross-national similarities between focus groups in Austria and GB. These coherent results suggest the existence of citizen specific areas of identification and difference in regards to European identity. Connecting points between citizens and Turkey have been identified to focus on joint economic success, Turkey's commitment to reforms, and peaceful cross-cultural relations on national and communal level. Strong joint demarcation lines manifest in form of concerns over cultural differences between the EU and Turkey, a geographic divide, and power shifts within the EU towards a large and culturally different state. These results reveal a certain ambivalence regarding cultural difference. On the one hand, people are strongly in favour of Turkey's accession to the EU on the grounds that it will improve mutual cultural understanding. On the other hand, cultural difference is perceived as a major hurdle to Turkey's EU membership. Focus groups appear to be torn between a desire for better cross-cultural relations and fears of security risks if Turkey becomes an EU member state.

A comparison of these quantitative results to Eurobarometer findings shows that a majority of focus group results can be verified as reflecting the larger Austrian and British population. Conflicting results in other sections call for a more cautious treatment of focus group findings. Similar to focus group results, Eurobarometer findings confirm little national differences in regards to attitudes towards Turkey's geographic location. Security benefits demonstrate a national divide, with the British public attributing it higher levels of relevance. This gap is also reflected in focus group results in regards to the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West. In the category better mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values

Eurobarometer results show a distinct national divide with low scores among the Austrian public and high levels of relevance among British people. This is in line with focus group results that show an explicit preference for a better mutual understanding of cultures among British focus groups.

Disparities between Eurobarometer and focus groups results are most apparent in the areas of work migration and cultural differences. While work migration scores higher among the Austrian public in the Eurobarometer survey, focus groups results show higher levels of salience among British participants. In the case of cultural differences, Eurobarometer data shows higher scores among the Austrian public, which is contrasted by similar scores as part of the focus group results. These discrepancies require a cautious treatment of focus group results in these areas.

8.3. Comparison of Arguments in Austrian and British Media and Focus Group Discussions

A comparison of supporting and opposing arguments in media and focus group discussions reveals a majority of significant similarities. The findings identify a number of arguments as leading points of discussion among both media and focus group participants. These arguments can be regarded as particularly relevant and more generally applicable to the overall discussions among media and citizens alike. Results show that these overlaps are greater among supporting arguments, while opposing arguments reveal a larger degree of incoherence. These differences show a similar number of citizen specific as well as media specific arguments against Turkish membership. Table 19 gives an overview of the top four supporting and opposing arguments on Turkey's EU membership across media and citizen discussions.

Table 19: Supporting and Opposing Arguments in Austrian and British Media and Citizen Discussions

<i>Supporting arguments</i>			
Focus group discussions		Media discussions	
<i>Focus groups GB</i>	<i>Focus groups AT</i>	<i>Print media GB</i>	<i>Print media AT</i>
Avert clash between Islam and the West	Economic benefits	Avert clash between Islam and the West	Avert clash between Islam and the West
Economic benefits	Avert clash between Islam and West	Economic benefits	Economic benefits
Reform process through EU monitoring	Better integration of Turkish migrant community	Reform process through EU monitoring	Reform process through EU monitoring
Better mutual understanding of cultures	Reform process through EU monitoring	Turkey meets conditions to start negotiations	Turkey meets conditions to start negotiations
<i>Opposing arguments</i>			
<i>Focus groups GB</i>	<i>Focus groups AT</i>	<i>Print media GB</i>	<i>Print media AT</i>
Cultural differences	Cultural differences	EU integration capacity	EU integration capacity
Work migration	EU integration capacity	Refusal to recognise	Refusal to recognise
Negative effects on EU decision	Geographic location	Cyprus/open ports	Cyprus/open ports
Geographic location	Negative effects on EU decision making	Lack of EU public support	Lack of EU public support
		Cultural differences	Cultural differences

Notes: Questions: Newspapers: What argument is in support of Turkey’s accession to the EU? What argument speaks against Turkey’s accession to the EU? Focus groups: What arguments speak for Turkey’s accession to the EU? What arguments speak against Turkey’s accession to the EU? Arguments are ranked according to salience starting with the most salient argument on top of the table and continuing with the next prominent argument. Results feature the four main arguments in focus group discussions across countries.

A comparison of supporting arguments across media and focus group discussions shows a large number of significant similarities. Three out of four arguments overlap with an identical ranking of the top two arguments among focus groups. These common characteristics that cut across media and focus group discussions include 1) the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West, 2) economic benefits, and 3) Turkey’s reform process through EU monitoring. This confirms important points of identification with Turkey in the areas of better relations between Islam and the West, shared economic success, and reform efforts

to comply with EU political and human rights standards. These results suggest that peaceful intercultural relations, economic development, and commitment to reforms in order to comply with EU standards are important features of European identity.

Apart from a majority of overlaps, some minor differences prevail. While focus groups emphasise better cross-cultural relations on community and national level as favourable for Turkey's potential EU accession, newspaper coverage highlights the importance of fulfilling the required standards to start accession negotiations. These arguments illustrate different priorities among media and citizens. The citizen argument shows that people care greatly about aspects where they are more likely to feel personally affected by. In contrast to that, media coverage tends to focus on an elite outlook such as high profile negotiations among political leaders.

Results for opposing arguments show a similar share of overlaps and discussion specific arguments between media and focus groups. These joint commonalities include concerns over 1) cultural differences¹⁴² and 2) the EU's integration capacity. This suggests that cultural discrepancies and integration aspects form major obstacles to Turkey's successful accession. These opposing arguments pose particularly difficult hurdles, as they are largely outside of Turkey's sphere of influence. They illustrate that cultural boundaries play an important part in European identity constructions. The importance of the EU's integration capacity indicates that the EU's functionality forms another crucial part of European identity.

Major differences between media and focus groups concern the areas of 1) negative effects on EU decision making processes, 2) Turkey's geographic location, and 3) fears over Turkish work migration¹⁴³ that are of particular importance to focus groups. Media tend to focus more on opposing arguments addressing 1) Turkey's refusal to recognise Cyprus, and 2) the lack of public support for Turkey's EU accession. Apart from Turkey's geographic location, focus group specific arguments reveal that arguments such as work migration and negative effects on EU

¹⁴² Please note that a comparison of focus groups with Eurobarometer results suggests that these findings are not representative of a wider national public but should be treated as focus group specific.

¹⁴³ Please note that this argument is particularly relevant among British focus group participants which is likely to be connected to experiences with Polish work migration.

decision making processes address aspects where people tend to feel personally affected by. It is these concerns about areas that touch upon people's personal lives that help to explain the emergence of focus group specific arguments. In contrast to that, media tend to adopt elite points of view which are manifested in political disputes over Cyprus and popular opinion. It is somewhat surprising to see that it is the media instead of focus groups that hold a lack of public support against Turkey's EU accession. Considering that this argument is a powerful political instrument to add validity to claims by political elites, it is less surprising to see this argument being employed by the media.

Overall, a comparison of media and focus group discussions reveals a majority of distinct similarities. These are greater among supporting arguments and less pronounced among opposing arguments. These overlaps make a strong case for more generally applicable arguments that are shared by media and citizens alike. These include 1) the avoidance of clashes between Islam and the West, 2) economic benefits, and 3) Turkey's reform efforts. These consistent similarities illustrate that peaceful cross-cultural relations, economic strength, and a commitment to reforms to meet EU standards form integral identifying parts of European identity.

Arguments against Turkey's accession to the EU tend to be less coherent and show a similar share between joint concerns and media and citizen specific individualities. Shared arguments against Turkey's EU accession include 1) anxieties over cultural differences, and 2) doubts over the scope of the EU's integration capacity. These collective anxieties represent significant obstacles to Turkey's EU ambitions, as they are largely outside of the country's area of influence. They demonstrate that, despite expected benefits for cross-cultural relations, cultural differences remain an important line of demarcation in the context of European identity. Despite British tendencies to favour a more open and forward-looking vision of Europe, the EU's functionality is an issue that is seen to require safeguarding and poses an important boundary to European identity.

Individual demarcation lines focus on 1) Turkey's refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus, and 2) a lack of public support for Turkey's EU accession that is emphasised in Austrian and British newspaper coverage. These arguments reflect on media tendencies to focus on elite political matters and arguments. In comparison to that, focus groups show a tendency to emphasise arguments that are likely to be

linked to their personal lives. These include negative effects on EU decision making procedures with a particular fear over a loss of power to a large culturally different state. The link to people's personal affectedness is established through concerns that this shift of power could limit the sphere of influence of national governments and consequently curtail the political feasibility of national interests on behalf of its citizens. Overall, these media and citizen specific demarcation lines show that peaceful relations to all EU member states, citizens' popular support, the functionality of the EU, and fears over increased competition in the labour market are important differentiating elements of European identity constructions.

8.4. Summary

Results of this chapter have shown that media and citizen discussions share an overwhelming majority of significant similarities in regards to arguments in support and against Turkey's accession to the EU. These findings point towards the existence of a number of generally dominating arguments in discussions around Turkey's membership prospects. These revolve around peaceful cross-cultural relations, economic development, and reform efforts that form important connecting points. Cultural differences as well as limits to the EU's integration capacity form important boundaries in European identity constructions. These results lend support to the emergence of a collective rationale as part of European identity formations.

Chapter 9

Key Findings and Conclusions

Following the results presented in the empirical chapters 5 to 8, this chapter focuses on drawing conclusions from three sets of key findings. The first set addresses the question of whether Turkey functions as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined today. The second set of key findings explores the use of mediated information and personal experiences in European identity formations among citizens. The third set concentrates on the similarities and differences evoked by Turkey's accession to the EU in media and citizens discussions and what they reveal about European identity constructions. Results confirm some of the hypotheses as outlined in chapter 4 and reveal further new findings.

9.1. Turkey's Significance for European Identity Constructions

The results presented in this research show that Turkey serves as a significant focus point for the construction of European identities across countries and discourses. This is confirmed by explicit references to European identity and Europe's future in newspaper articles and focus group discussions in Austria and GB. Drawing on literature illustrating the role of the Eastern Other for the historical formation of European unity (Hay, 1957, Said, 2003, Delanty, 1995) these findings suggest that the Eastern Other, represented by modern Turkey, continues to form a significant Other in European identity formations. Neumann (1999) offers an explanation for this identitarian continuity by arguing that constructions of European identities today are embedded in historical perceptions. He notes that “[p]resent-day representations of Turkey ... carry with them the memory of earlier representations. These memories are among the factors operative in today's Turkish-European discourse, and this discourse remains part of the discourse on European identities” (Ibid.: 62).

Differences across national and discursive contexts suggest the existence of a variety of interpretations of European identities which make the reference to “a common European identity” inadequate. The original research question should therefore be rephrased to read “Does Turkey’s accession to the EU function as a platform for European identity constructions?” instead of “Does Turkey function as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined today?” These results support theoretical considerations that treat identity as a socially constructed process. They verify theoretical claims that European identity is something “consisting of repertoires of evaluation, discursive practices, a plurality of identity projects” (Delanty, 2005: 128). This lends support to the conclusion that “there cannot be such a thing as a European identity in the singular but only a plurality of European identities that will clash and reconstruct one another” (Neumann, 2001: 160).

Further, results suggest that Turkey is not the only significant Other in European identity constructions. In addition to Turkey, media and citizens refer to further Others to distinguish between their own visions of Europe. Results show that other EU member states serve as additional focus points against which a British vision of European identity is constructed. In a similar way, GB is seen as an outsider in opposition to an Austrian vision of the EU. This lends support to the definition of Turkey as a significant EU external Other and the existence of EU internal Others in form of member states. Overall, results verify the hypothesis “Yes, Turkey functions as a focus point against which a common European identity is defined today”, but call for an expansion. The relevance of more significant Others in European identity formations needs to be acknowledged. Overall, these findings confirm the relevance of a significant Other for identity constructions. In the case of European identities, Turkey constitutes a significant EU external Other that coexists alongside relevant internal Others. These further Others could serve as interesting focus points for future research.

Results show that the construction of European identities varies across countries and discourses, which lends support to the existence of context-bound identity constructions as part of constructivist identity theories. The analysis shows that Turkey evokes different associations and meanings in Austria and GB. While in Austria the tabloid newspaper *Neue Kronen Zeitung* emphasises Turkey as an outside threat to internal EU unity, Turkey is used in the British press to put forward

a specific vision of Europe in opposition to the EU. These distinct national divides reaffirm the relevance of national contexts in European identity constructions. Further, evidence supports new insights into the relevance of discourse specific contexts for identity constructions. This is illustrated by results showing that citizens tend to refer to boundaries and comparisons as a means to construct European identities more frequently than newspapers do. These findings verify the significance of the comparative dimension of citizens and media discourses.

9.2. European Identities as Mediated Identities

Results show that citizens largely rely on mediated information when it comes to European identity constructions in discussions over Turkey's accession to the EU. This is verified by significantly higher numbers of references to media content than personal experiences. These findings support theoretical considerations which suggest a "growing media presence in identity constructions" since "culture is more and more dependent on communication media" (Fornäs, 1995: 210). Results confirm that European identity constructions are forms of mediated identities. The continuing relevance of national contexts that tend to dominate people's scope of personal experiences suggests that European identity constructions largely rely on mediated information. In reference to the research question "How and to what extent do citizens use mediated information and personal experiences in European identity constructions?" results confirm the hypothesis that mediated information plays a larger role than personal experiences in the construction of European identities.

Further, results give interesting insights into the construction of European identities and the role negative media bias and mediated memories play. Evidence hints that European identities are largely constructed around negative points of references. This is due to the combination of people's psychological disposition to remember negative stories better and for longer than positive ones and a preference of the media for negativity. This doubling of negative reference points emphasises the relevance of differences in European identity constructions among citizens. These findings support theoretical reflections that highlight the specific role of

differences in identity constructions. Hall (1996) highlights this by noting that identities “emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity – an ‘identity’ in its traditional meaning (that is, an all-inclusive sameness, seamless, without internal differentiation)” (p. 4).

In addition to that, results give new insights into how citizens use mediated information. They demonstrate a distinct awareness of their reliance on the media and the limitations attached to this dependency. Citizens display a surprisingly critical and cautious treatment of mediated information. Their media critique mainly addresses the negative bias of news coverage. Citizens display a distancing behaviour from mediated information by attributing responsibility for the validity and objectivity to the media source. This shows that when citizens use mediated opinions they tend to highlight their use through explicit references. In spite of people’s critical attitudes towards mediated information, the influencing power of the media on people’s perceptions has to be emphasised (Waite, 2003).

The catalogue of specific uses of mediated information includes 1) a general awareness of media dependency, 2) critique of negative media bias, and 3) distancing behaviour to media sources points towards the active part that individuals play in the construction of identities. These results feed into theoretical approaches that emphasise the interactive nature of identity constructions that takes place between the individual and mediated environments (Silverstone, 1999, Thompson, 1995, Madianou, 2005). Silverstone (1999) describes this merging of contributions by individual and media by noting “[t]he media have given us the words to speak, and ideas to utter, not as some disembodied force operating against us as we go about our daily business, but as part of a reality in which we participate, in which we share, and which we sustain on a daily basis through our daily talk, our daily interactions” (p. 6). Overall, results support the suitability of the concept of mediation to explain the growing influence of media on people’s perceptions and identities (Livingstone, 2009; Silverstone, 2005).

9.3. Mapping European Identities

A comparison of topics and arguments highlights two overarching identification and demarcation lines that media and citizens in both countries agree on. While human rights function as an important difference or outside frontier, economic benefits act as a significant similarity or “internal glue” in the construction of European identities. This suggests a pronounced civic version of European identity (Bruter 2005). In reference to the research question “What boundaries (i.e. differences) and modes of identification (i.e. similarities) are evoked by Turkey’s accession to the EU in media and citizen discourses and what do they reveal about the status and definition of a European identity?” results verify the hypothesis that similarities are most likely to be found in the area of economic relations. In the light of the current economic climate and the crisis of the Euro, it is likely that the relevance of this similarity becomes eroded and could lead to a shift towards more dominant differences.

Further, results falsify the hypothesis that Islam functions as the main point of difference as it does not emerge as a dominant topic or argument. It plays, however, a central role as it is connected to a number of topics and arguments in media and focus group discussions alike. This is illustrated by British media coverage that lays emphasis on secularism as a European principle or focus group concerns that link Islam to human rights violations and integration problems. The dominance of negative connotations attached to Islam marks it as an important point of difference in the construction of European identities. Evidence in this research, which has highlighted people’s ability to recall significant media events over long periods of time, offers further considerations for perceptions of Islam. The recent events connected to the revolutionary demonstrations of the Arab spring are likely to pose significant events to change perceptions of Islam in another direction. The largely positive connotations and sympathies towards protesters in Muslim countries like Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya are expected to counterbalance predominantly negative associations in the time after the events of 9/11 with its emphasis on Islamic terrorism. The conceptualisation of identity as socially constructed and context-bound narratives (Rutherford 1990) emphasises the links to past, present, and future. This means that European identity, as an ongoing process, is likely to undergo shifts in the constellation of its current identification and demarcation lines in the light of significant mediated events.

Results show major parallels between media and citizens in regards to supporting and opposing arguments of Turkey's accession to the EU. At the same time, they reveal significant differences between media and citizens in their choice of relevant topics. These findings point towards a shared rationale for Turkey's EU accession combined with distinctly different topical contexts. These results can be understood in the context of constructivist theory that support the emergence of a plurality of context-bound European identity constructions.

Looking at the choice of topics, results reveal major discrepancies between what matters to people and media in different national contexts. These differences point towards distinctly different constructions of European identities in further support of a pluralist conception. Apart from reaffirming the importance of national contexts, they also confirm the distinction between citizens and media as a relevant category of comparison when exploring European identity constructions. With the exception of human rights, media and citizens show different preferences for topical contexts. While media views focus on Turkish-Cypriot relations and economic aspects, citizens concentrate on integration issues and Islam. This highlights that media tend to represent elite views involving high-profile political actors, while citizens are more concerned with issues that are closer to their personal lives and where they could be directly affected by. These results suggest different identification and demarcation lines between elites and citizens.

In addition to the relevance of the comparative dimension of elite media and citizens' views, focus groups give support to also consider the gender dimension as a relevant category for European identity constructions. Results show pronounced differences between men and women in regards to topics and arguments. While women appear to be significantly more concerned about violations of women's rights and strains on social security and the welfare state, men worry more about the economic and financial impacts of Turkey's EU accession, and particularly increased competition on the labour market. These discrepancies emphasise the different realities that people live in. From that follows that identity constructions are also affected by these gendered realities. These findings further support theoretical considerations that conceptualise identity as a context-bound and plural model.

Results show significant overlaps between media and citizens regarding arguments in support and against Turkey's accession to the EU. These parallels are greater among supporting arguments marking important points of identification. They focus on 1) the prevention of clashes between Islam and the West, 2) economic benefits, and 3) Turkey's reform progress through EU monitoring. These commonalities of peace, economy and political reforms resemble what Bruter (2005) refers to as the civic and cultural components of European identities. According to this conception, a civic identity refers to the identification of citizens with a political structure and the political rules of a community. Cultural identity, which is based on the idea of the nation, describes the sense of belonging a person feels towards a political group defined by ethnicity, culture, social similarities, values or religion. Results show an emphasis towards a civic understanding where media and citizens identify with structural aspects such as economic success and the implementation of political reforms. The prevention of clashes between Islam and the West poses an interesting hybrid. It is largely based on a cultural understanding of European identity, but also holds aspects of a civic identity component. While better intercultural relations emphasise culture, they are accompanied by strategic considerations on political level to sustain and ensure long-term peace.

Overall, the results presented in this research provide strong evidence for the conceptualisation of European identity as a multiple identity that is manifested in a variety of context-bound interpretations. The particular role of contexts in identity formations has been confirmed by key findings in all analysis chapters. National contexts, media and citizen contexts as well as gender contexts have been identified as particularly relevant dimensions for the construction of European identities.

Appendix

1.1. Codebook

The aim of the codebook is to infer the understanding and definition of European identities from measures of differences and similarities in newspaper coverage and focus group discussions about Turkey's bid to join the EU. Please note that the following is a full version of the codebook. Not all variables are used for analysis in this PhD project.

1.1.1. Variables on Article Level

Variable AID	
Name	AID
Type	Numeric
Label	Article identification number
Value Labels	None
Missing values	None
Level of Measurement	Scale
Code	Three digits
<i>Purpose: This variable gives each article an individual number for identification purposes.</i>	
<i>Rule: Numbers start with 001 for each issue.</i>	

Variable FILTER	
Name	FILTER
Type	Numeric
Label	Filter for new or ongoing article
Value Labels	1 = Start of a new article 0 = Ongoing article
Missing values	None
Level of Measurement	Scale
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable indicates the beginning of a new article or the continuation of an article.</i>	

Variable PAPER	
Name	PAPER
Type	Numeric
Label	Name of newspaper
Value Labels	1 = The Times (London) 2 = The Guardian (London) 3 = Daily Mail 4 = Die Presse 5 = Der Standard 6 = Neue Kronen Zeitung
Missing values	None
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable identifies different newspapers.</i>	

Variable COUNTRY	
Name	COUNTRY
Type	Numeric
Label	Country of publication
Value Labels	0 = Great Britain 1 = Austria
Missing values	None
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable identifies the country of origin.</i>	

Variable YEAR	
Name	YEAR
Type	Numeric
Label	Year of newspaper issue
Value Labels	1 = 2004 2 = 2005 3 = 2006 4 = 2007 5 = 2008 6 = 2009
Missing values	None
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable refers to the year of publication. It is used for comparisons over time and exact referencing of time periods.</i>	

Variable MONTH

Name	MONTH
Type	Numeric
Label	Month of newspaper issue
Value Labels	1 = January 2 = February 3 = March 4 = April 5 = May 6 = June 7 = July 8 = August 9 = September 10 = October 11 = November 12 = December
Missing values	None
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	Two digits
<i>Purpose: This variable refers to the month of publication. It is used for comparisons over time and exact referencing of time periods.</i>	

Variable DAY	
Name	DAY
Type	Numeric
Label	Day of newspaper issue
Value Labels	None
Missing values	None
Level of Measurement	Scale
Code	Two digits
<i>Purpose: This variable refers to the day of publication. It is used for comparisons over time and exact referencing of time periods.</i>	

Variable GENRE	
Name	GENRE
Type	Numeric
Label	Journalistic genre of article
Value Labels	1 = News article 2 = Background article 3 = Opinion/commentary 4 = Editorial
Missing values	9 = Unknown
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable refers to different journalistic genres.</i>	
<i>Rules: News articles refer to day-to-day coverage of events, e.g. news reports; background articles refer to background reports or analyses of correspondents or experts; opinion or commentaries refer to contributions from columnists or guest</i>	

authors; editorials refer to leading articles written by senior editorial staff.

Variable SECTION	
Name	SECTION
Type	Numeric
Label	Section where article appears
Value Labels	1 = Mixed international/national news section (e.g. first page) 2 = International/World news section 3 = National news section 4 = Culture & Arts 5 = Commentary pages 6 = Business/Financial/Economy section 7 = Other
Missing values	8 = No differentiation between sections 9 = Section unknown
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable refers to the newspaper section where the article appears.</i>	
<i>Rules: The focus of the article selection process is the main section of a newspaper; letters to the editor or obituaries are excluded.</i>	

1.1.2. Variables on Topic Level

Variable TID	
Name	TID
Type	Numeric
Label	Topic identification number
Value Labels	None
Missing values	None
Level of Measurement	Scale
Code	Two digits
<i>Purpose: This variable gives each topic within an article an individual number for identification purposes.</i>	
<i>Rule: Numbers start with 01 for each topic.</i>	

Variable TOPICS	
Name	TOPICS
Type	Numeric
Label	What topic is discussed in connection with Turkey and a European dimension?
Value Labels	10 = Economy

	<p>11= Turkish work migration 12 = Turkish exports 13 = Inflation 14 = Growth rates 15 = Natural resources 16 = Infrastructure 17 = Economic relations 18 = Market liberalisation</p> <p>20 = Democracy 21 = Judiciary/rule of law 23 = Secularism 24 = Political Islam 25 = Civic society/social change 26 = Role of military/intervention</p> <p>30 = Human rights 31 = Minority rights 32 = Women's rights 33 = Civic rights 34 = Honour crimes/killings</p> <p>40 = European Union 41 = Size of EU 42 = EU constitutional no votes 43 = EU budget 44 = EU decision-making process 45 = EU public opinion 46 = EU integration</p> <p>50 = External relations 51 = Turkish-Cypriot relations 52 = Turkish-Armenian relations 53 = EU foreign policy</p> <p>60 = Culture 61 = Islam 62 = Religious clothing</p> <p>70 = Terrorism 71 = PKK conflict/terrorism 72 = Nationalist terrorism</p> <p>80 = EU enlargement 81 = Referenda on EU enlargement</p> <p>Other 90 = Turkey's size 91 = Demography 92 = Armenian massacres/genocide 93 = Corruption</p>
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	94 = Reform 95 = EU negotiation process
Missing values	99 = No topic
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	Two digits
<p><i>Purpose: This variable identifies a topic in relation to Turkey with a European dimension.</i></p> <p><i>Rules: The variable forms a key part in the analysis as it generates all cases. It is a semantic unit of analysis (content-led) as opposed to a programmed unit of analysis. A topic is signified as a leading theme in a text. Such major themes typically appear in the heading or first paragraph of an article. The coding of multiple topics is possible where other content variables can be attributed to another leading theme mentioned in the article. Minor references do not qualify as a topic. Each new topic holds the same article level variables but individual content variables.</i></p>	

Variable TOPICEVAL	
Name	TOPICEVAL
Type	Numeric
Label	What is the evaluation of that topic?
Value Labels	-2 = Very negative -1 = Fairly negative 0 = Ambivalent 1 = Fairly positive 2 = Very positive
Missing values	8 = Missing 9 = Neutral
Level of Measurement	Ordinal
Code	One digit
<p><i>Purpose: This variable refers to the overall evaluation of a topic.</i></p> <p><i>Rules: The overall evaluation of a topic is composed of the sum of supporting or opposing arguments and expressions of critique or praise that can be attributed to that particular topic. If there is a mix of positive and negative evaluations that balance each other out the overall evaluation of the topic is coded as ambivalent. -1/1 is used to describe normal language use. -2/2 is used to describe emphasised language use (e.g. adjectives or superlatives).</i></p>	

Variable REFTURKEY	
Name	REFTURKEY
Type	Numeric
Label	What self-reference, central theme, image, stereotype, or label is employed for describing Turkey?
Value Labels	10 = Political theme 11 = Secular country 12 = Muslim-secular country 13 = EU candidate country 14 = NATO member 15 = Democratic country

	16 = Reforming country 17 = European Council member 20 = Geo-strategic theme 21 = The East/Orient 22 = Western ally 23 = Big country 24 = New Europe 30 = Developmental theme 31 = Modern Turkey 32 = Ottoman foe 33 = Semi-developed country 34 = Poor country 40 = Cultural-religious theme 41 = Muslim country/nation 50 = Turkey
Missing values	99 = No reference
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	Two digits
<i>Purpose: This variable describes a specific reference to Turkey.</i>	
<i>Rule: The first reference to Turkey in the text will be coded (including the title).</i>	

Variable REFTURKEYEVAL	
Name	REFTURKEYEVAL
Type	Numeric
Label	What is the evaluation of this self-reference, central theme, image, stereotype, or label?
Value Labels	-2 = Very negative -1 = Fairly negative 0 = Ambivalent 1 = Fairly positive 2 = Very positive
Missing values	8 = Missing 9 = Neutral
Level of Measurement	Ordinal
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable refers to an evaluation of a reference to Turkey.</i>	
<i>Rules: -1/1 is used to describe normal language use. -2/2 is used to describe emphasised language use (e.g. adjectives or superlatives).</i>	

Variable MEMBERSHIPTYPE	
Name	MEMBERSHIPTYPE
Type	Numeric
Label	What is the mentioned/favoured type of

	EU membership for Turkey?
Value Labels	1 = Full EU membership 2 = Privileged partnership/associate membership 3 = “Club Med” a formal union of countries bordering the Mediterranean 4 = Both
Missing values	9 = Missing
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	One digit
<p><i>Purpose: The variable captures a reference to Turkey’s membership type. The variable aims to code how the process of accession is predominantly referred to in the text.</i></p> <p><i>Rules: If more than one reference to a membership type is mentioned in the text then the coding is “both”.</i></p>	

Variable REFEU	
Name	REFEU
Type	Numeric
Label	What self-reference, central theme, image, stereotype, or label is employed for describing the EU?
Value Labels	<p>10 = Geo-strategic theme 11 = Western Europe/the West 12 = Free world 13 = Europe 14 = Old Europe</p> <p>20 = Cultural-religious theme 21 = Christian union/club 22 = Cultural community</p> <p>30 = Political theme 31 = European Union/EU 32 = Secular Europe</p> <p>40 = Other group collective terms 41 = Club 42 = Value community 43 = Fortress Europe 44 = Bloc 45 = European family</p> <p>50 = European Union</p>
Missing values	99 = No reference
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	Two digits
<p><i>Purpose: This variable describes a specific reference to the EU.</i></p> <p><i>Rule: The first reference to the EU in the text will be coded (including the title).</i></p>	

Variable REFEUEVAL	
Name	REFEUEVAL
Type	Numeric
Label	What is the evaluation of this self-reference, central theme, image, stereotype, or label?
Value Labels	-2 = Very negative -1 = Fairly negative 0 = Ambivalent 1 = Fairly positive 2 = Very positive
Missing values	8 = Missing 9 = Neutral
Level of Measurement	Ordinal
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable refers to an evaluation of a reference to the EU.</i>	
<i>Rules: -1/1 is used to describe normal language use. -2/2 is used to describe emphasised language use (e.g. adjectives or superlatives).</i>	

Variable RESPONSIBILITY	
Name	RESPONSIBILITY
Type	Numeric
Label	Who is responsible for the outcome of the accession negotiations?
Value Labels	1 = Turkey 2 = EU 3 = Both 4 = EU public opinion
Missing values	9 = Missing
Level of Measurement	Ordinal
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable captures the attribution of responsibility for the outcome of the EU accession negotiations.</i>	
<i>Rules: Positions of individual EU member states are also included under "EU".</i>	

Variable ARGUMENTOPPOSE	
Name	ARGUMENTOPPOSE
Type	Numeric
Label	What argument speaks against Turkey's accession to the EU?
Value labels	10 = European integration capacity 11 = EU needs time to digest latest enlargement 12 = High costs to integrate Turkey 13 = European integration/absorption capacity

	<p>14 = EU would become too big 15 = Constitutional crisis</p> <p>20 = Human rights violations 21 = Honour killings 22 = Lack of minority rights 23 = Violation of civic rights 24 = Violations of freedom of expression</p> <p>30 = Turkey's low economic development 31 = Turkey's rural and agricultural East</p> <p>40 = PKK conflict/terrorism 41 = Separatist violence</p> <p>50 = Cultural differences 51 = Turkey's Muslim population</p> <p>60 = negative effects on EU decision making 61 = Turkey's influence on EU structures</p> <p>Other 70 = Turkish work migration 71 = Negative European public opinion 72 = Turkey's historical clashes with Europe 73 = Refusal to recognise Armenian massacres/genocide 74 = Refusal to recognise Cyprus/open ports 75 = Turkey hasn't met Copenhagen criteria/is not ready yet 76 = Violation of democratic principles 77 = Pace of reform process 78 = Social differences 79 = Turkey's geographic location 80 = Turkey's geopolitical location 81 = Lack of integration of Turkish diasporas 82 = Violation of secularist principle 83 = End of political union of the EU</p>
Missing values	99 = No argument opposing Turkey's accession to the EU
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	Two digits
<p><i>Purpose: This variable refers to an argument opposing Turkey's accession to the EU.</i></p> <p><i>Rules: The difference between an opposing argument and a point of critique is that an opposing argument refers to a specific rationale as to why Turkey should not be</i></p>	

admitted to the EU (e.g. unfulfilled conditions for EU membership etc.). Arguments are coded regardless of whether they are issued by a national or foreign source. The general prominence and exposure of an argument in the press is the focus of analysis rather than specific national views. Arguments issued by Turkish representatives are not coded as it is the aim to analyse claims by political actors from EU member states. Arguments are attached to topics as the main unit of analysis. If more than one argument appears in a text that can be attributed to a topic, the one that appears first in the article text is coded.

Variable ARGUMENTSUPPORT	
Name	ARGUMENTSUPPORT
Type	Numeric
Label	What argument is in support of Turkey's accession to the EU?
Value Labels	<p>10 = Avert clash between Islam and West 11 = Turkey's membership would bring peace with Greece 12 = Security, stability and peace in Eastern Europe/Middle East 13 = Prevent/stop Islamic radicalisation 14 = Geopolitical benefits from including a Muslim country in the EU 15 = Signalling effect to Muslim world 16 = Rejecting Turkey would cause reorientation to the East</p> <p>20 = Economic benefits 21 = Turkey's economic development 22 = Demographic boost to EU's working population 23 = Natural resources/Nabucco</p> <p>Other 30 = Turkey meets conditions for start of negotiations 31 = Islamic values and democracy are compatible 32 = Ongoing reform process through EU monitoring 33 = Turkey has been a long term ally 34 = Turkey should not be treated differently 35 = EU is not a religious/cultural community 36 = End of political union of EU (British view) 37 = With Turkey EU becomes global power</p>

	38 = Turkey adds diversity of ethnicity, tradition, and faith 39 = Avert damage to EU credibility/trust 40 = Political/democratic stability
Missing values	99 = No supporting argument
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	Two digits
<i>Purpose: This variable refers to an argument supporting Turkey's accession to the EU.</i>	
<i>Rules: see variable ARGUMENTOPPOSE.</i>	

Variable DEMAND	
Name	DEMAND
Type	Numeric
Label	What demand is placed on Turkey?
Value Labels	<p>10 = Improve human rights 11 = Respect for minority rights 12 = Respect for civic rights 13 = Greater religious tolerance 14 = Greater cultural tolerance 15 = Abandon patriarchal social structures</p> <p>20 = Improve democratic standards 21 = Demonstrate compatibility of secular democracy and Islamic values 22 = Better secular education 23 = Rule of law/judicial independence 24 = Reduce military power 25 = Defend democratic principle 26 = Defend secular principle</p> <p>30 = Accept new EU entry conditions 31 = Face EU referenda before Turkish EU entry 32 = Accept open-ended negotiations 33 = Accept "Club Med" membership 34 = Accept limitations on Turkish migration</p> <p>40 = Economic development 41 = Economic growth 42 = Market liberalisation</p> <p>50 = Recognising Cypriot government 51 = Recognising Greek Cyprus as legal government of the island 52 = Open trade with Cyprus</p>

	Other 60 = Cultural assimilation 61 = Continue reform process 62 = EU must keep prospect of full membership 63 = Recognise Armenian massacres/genocide 64 = Accept EU policies in international organisations 65 = Resolve PKK conflict 66 = Distance from radical Islam 67 = EU environmental standards
Missing values	99 = No demand
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	Two digits
<i>Purpose: This variable measures a demand placed on Turkey.</i> <i>Rules: Demands are expressed through expressions like “should”, “ought to”, “must do” or “has to”. These expressions are summarised under the term deontic modality. It implies that Turkey has an obligation, duty, or obligation to follow a demand.</i>	

Variable RESPONSE	
Name	RESPONSE
Type	Numeric
Label	What is the response of Turkey to the demand placed on it?
Value Labels	- 2 = Strong rejection - 1 = Some rejection 0 = Ambivalent 1 = Some acceptance 2 = Strong acceptance
Missing values	8 = Missing 9 = Neutral
Level of Measurement	Ordinal
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable refers to a specific response by Turkey to a demand placed in it.</i>	

Variable CRITIQUE	
Name	CRITIQUE
Type	Numeric
Label	What is the issue of critique towards Turkey?
Value Labels	10 = Human rights abuses 11 = Freedom of expression 12 = Torture 13 = Violations of women’s rights 14 = Lack of religious tolerance

	<p>20 = Lack of democratic standards 21 = Rule of law and enforcement 22 = Violation of secularist principle 23 = Military intervention/threat 24 = Violation of democratic principle</p> <p>30 = Lack of cultural affinity 31 = Lack of cultural affinity 32 = Different values</p> <p>40 = Economic development 41 = Low economic development</p> <p>Other 50 = Turkish nationalism 51 = Islamic radicalisation/populism 52 = No right to join the EU 53 = Turkey's resistance to recognise Armenian massacres/genocide 54 = Turkey's resistance to recognise Cyprus 55 = Pace of Turkish reforms 56 = Struggle to reconcile East-West identity 57 = Corruption 58 = Lack of animal rights 59 = Lack of integration of Turkish Diaspora 60 = Environmental standards/protection</p>
Missing values	99 = No issue of critique
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	Two digits
<p><i>Purpose: This variable refers to a point of critique addressed to Turkey.</i> <i>Rules: A point of critique is different to an opposing argument in a way that it passes negative judgement on Turkey but does not use this critique as a justification to exempt Turkey from joining the EU. Expressions of critique include statements addressed at Turkey. Critique issued by Turkish representatives is not coded as it is the aim to analyse claims by political actors from EU member states. Sources of critique can be editorial or quoted from different political speakers.</i></p>	

Variable CRITIQUE TYPE	
Name	CRITIQUE TYPE
Type	Numeric
Label	Is issue of critique inherent or acquired?
Value Labels	1 = Inherent 0 = Acquired
Missing values	8 = Missing 9 = Unknown

Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	One digit
<p><i>Purpose: This variable categorises a point of critique as inherent (unchangeable) or acquired (changeable).</i></p> <p><i>Rules: Inherent identity features indicate an exclusive perception of identities. Acquired or temporary identity features indicate more inclusive perceptions of identities (Rumelili 2004).</i></p>	

Variable AGREEMENT	
Name	AGREEMENT
Type	Numeric
Label	What is the issue of agreement/common ground/praise?
Value Labels	<p>10 = European orientation 11 = Long-lasting relations 12 = Shared values 13 = Orientation/exposure to the West 14 = Shared European heritage 15 = Historical reconciliation 16 = NATO membership 17 = Council of Europe membership</p> <p>20 = Democratic standards 21 = Secular democracy 22 = Civic engagement 23 = Political stability 24 = Democracy 25 = Compatibility of Islamic values and democracy</p> <p>30 = Respect for human rights 31 = Respect for minority rights</p> <p>Other 40 = Shared history of colonisation 41 = Historical multiculturalism 42 = Economic partnership/exchange/growth 43 = Fight against terrorism 44 = Commitment to reform process 45 = Same work ethic 46 = Muslim communities 47 = Dialogue between Europe and Muslim world</p>
Missing values	99 = No issue of agreement
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	Two digits
<p><i>Purpose: This variable refers to a point of agreement or praise addressed to Turkey. This variable is complementary to the variable CRITIQUE.</i></p>	

Rules: A point of agreement is different to a supporting argument in a way that it passes positive judgement on Turkey but does not use this praise as a justification to support Turkey in joining the EU. Praise issued by Turkish representatives is not coded as it is the aim to analyse claims by political actors from EU member states. Sources of praise can be editorial or quoted from different political speakers.

Variable AGREEMENTTYPE	
Name	AGREEMENTTYPE
Type	Numeric
Label	Is issue of agreement/common ground inherent or acquired?
Value Labels	1 = Inherent 2 = Acquired
Missing values	9 = Missing
Level of Measurement	Nominal
Code	One digit
<i>Purpose: This variable categorises a point of agreement or praise as inherent (unchangeable) or acquired (changeable).</i>	
<i>Rules: See variable CRITIQUETYPE.</i>	

1.2. Focus Group Questionnaire

Please fill in/tick all appropriate boxes

Reference number	
Age	
Occupation	
Education (highest level)	
Marital status	
What newspaper(s) do you read?	
How often to you read these newspaper(s)?	
What TV channel(s) do you watch?	
What programme(s) do you watch?	
How many hours per week do you watch TV?	
What radio station(s) do you listen to?	
How many hours per week do you listen to the radio?	
Have you ever been to Turkey?	Yes No
Before this discussion round, did you know about the EU accession negotiations with Turkey?	Yes No
From your point of view, how well is the EU prepared to accept Turkey as a	Very well prepared Well prepared

member?	Badly prepared Very badly prepared
From your point of view, how well is Turkey prepared to join the EU?	Very well prepared Well prepared Badly prepared Very badly prepared
Should Turkey become a member of the EU?	Yes No
Is the UK's EU membership ...	A good thing Neither good nor bad A bad thing
What party did you vote for in the last general elections?	

1.3. Statement of Consent Form

<p>STATEMENT OF CONSENT PhD Project Europe and Turkey Researcher: Agnes Schneeberger, Institute of Communications Studies , University of Leeds, U.K., a.i.schneeberger@leeds.ac.uk</p>
<p><i>Please complete this form, ticking the boxes where appropriate:</i></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> I understand the information provided for me about the research project.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> I have had the chance to consider the information, ask questions and have my questions answered satisfactorily.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> I agree that the information I give can be used in the writing of the research report and other future publications relating to the research.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> I agree to the use of anonymised quotes from me in the focus group to be used in any future publications relating to the research.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> I understand that the researcher will hold all information and data collected securely and in confidence. I understand that all efforts will be made to ensure that I cannot be identified as a participant in the study (except as might be required by law) and I give permission for the researcher to hold relevant personal data.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> I agree to the focus group being audio-recorded.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> I agree to take part in the above research project.</p> <p>Name of participant: Signed: Date:</p> <p>Name of researcher: Signed: Date:</p> <p><i>Questions or concerns about the study can be addressed to Agnes Schneeberger.</i></p>

Consent form information

You are entitled to ask questions before you agree to take part in the research.

Participants will be provided with food and refreshments during the course of the focus group discussion.

Participation is voluntary and participants are free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.

The information given by participants will be used in the writing of the PhD thesis and other future publications relating to the research.

Anonymised quotes from participants taking part in the focus groups will be used in the writing of the PhD thesis and future publications relating to the research.

The researcher will hold all information and data collected securely and in confidence.

All efforts will be made to ensure that participants cannot be identified in the study (except as might be required by law).

With the permission of the participant, the researcher will securely hold relevant personal data.

The focus group will be audio-recorded.

Questions or concerns about the study can be addressed to the principal researcher.

Please complete the consent form overleaf if you agree to take part in the Research Project.

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